

SB
831

PREM 19/345

The Situation in Rhodesia

RHODESIA

Part 15.

Part 1: May 1977

Part 15: February 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
19.2.80							
23.2.80							
27.2.80							
28.2.80							
29.2.80							
16.15 ends							

PREM 19/345

PART 16 begins:-

Tel Monrovia to Fco 48 1.3.80

PART 15 ends:-

Tel Maputo to Fco 139 29.2.80.

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(80) 7th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	21.2.80
CC(80) 8th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	28.2.80

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed Wayland

Date 22 July 2010

PREM Records Team

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

Rhodesia

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MW

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GPS 430

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 291500Z SALISBURY

FM MAPUTO 291115Z FEBRUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 139 OF 29 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE

LUANDA LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

MOZAMBIQUE/RHODESIA

1. MR SHORE HAD A USEFUL MEETING YESTERDAY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO. CHISSANO WAS WORRIED, BUT BY THE END EXPRESSED GUARDED OPTIMISM.

2. THE MAIN POINTS MADE BY CHISSANO WERE:

A. IN ANSWER TO A PROBE BY MR SHORE, HE IMPLIED THAT MOZAMBIQUE ACCEPTED THE ELECTIONS AS FREE AND FAIR. HE SAID THAT IT WAS HARDLY RELEVANT TO DOUBT THIS, NOW THAT ALL THE LEADERS HAD DECIDED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO GO TO THE POLLS. THERE WOULD BE PROTESTS AFTERWARDS; BUT THESE WOULD NOT BE OBJECTIVE

B. WE SHOULD DO MORE TO INTEGRATE THE ARMIES NOW, AND NOT LEAVE IT TO THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT. A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION WOULD ARISE IF WE DID NOT DO SO. INITIALLY ALL FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED. PF FORCES COULD NOT REMAIN CONFINED FOR LONG

C. MOZAMBIQUE WANTED A COALITION, EVEN IF ONE PARTY GOT AN OVERALL MAJORITY, TO AVERT CIVIL WAR. NKOMO COULD NOT REJECT A COALITION WITH MUGABE, EVEN THOUGH HE MIGHT ARGUE ABOUT HIS STATUS IN IT. WHITES COULD BE INCLUDED. HONWANA HAD SAID THAT MUGABE WAS DOING EVEN BETTER THAN EXPECTED IN THE VOTING; NKOMO WAS ALSO DOING WELL, THE BISHOP LESS SO

D. THEIR MAIN CONCERN WAS POSSIBLE S. AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN RHODESIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. HE WANTED HMG TO RESTRAIN THEM. BUT HE DOUBTED IF THE S. AFRICANS WOULD INVADE RHODESIA UNLESS A THREAT TO THEM EMERGED, EG AS A RESULT OF CIVIL WAR; BUT FOR THAT REASON, S. AFRICAN EXTREMISTS MIGHT SEE A CIVIL WAR IN THEIR INTERESTS NOW

E. MUGABE'S MEETING WITH LORD SOAMES HAD GONE VERY WELL. MUGABE WAS PLEASED THAT ELECTIONS HAD NOWHERE BEEN BANNED.

F. GEN. WALLS HAD IMPRESSED CHISSANO AS A REALIST. HE DID NOT ENLARGE ON HIS VISIT HERE, BUT THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN HELPFUL. HE PRAISED HIS APPRECIATION OF THE NEED BOTH FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION AND FOR SOME WHITE TROUBLE-MAKERS TO LEAVE. MUGABE'S MEETING WITH WALLS WAS A HOPEFUL DEVELOPEMENT; THEY SHOULD HAVE MET MORE OFTEN

G. HE FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE WALLS' ASSURANCE THAT THE RHODESIANS 'HAD DROPPED' THE MOZAMBIKAN RESISTANCE AND THAT FLIGHTS HAD BEEN MADE ACROSS THE BORDER SINCE THE CEASEFIRE ONLY TO SEE THAT ALL RHODESIAN FORCES HAD RETURNED. CHISSANO THOUGHT THE BISHOP OR S. AFRICA WERE STILL HELPING THE RESISTANCE. IT WAS A SERIOUS PROBLEM

H. HE TWICE SAID THAT BRITAIN SHOULD NOT WASH ITS HANDS OF ZIMBABWE. WE HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO SECURE PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENCE AND TO HELP THE NEW GOVERNMENT THEREAFTER, SPECIALLY WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTENCE TO FILL GAPS CAUSED BY DEPARTING SKILLED WHITES

I. HE EARNESTLY ASKED WHETHER MORE HELP AND COOPERATION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING FROM THE UK FOR MOZAMBIQUE 'NOW THAT THE WAR IS OVER'.

3. RECORD BY BAG TO FCO AND SALISBURY.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF SALISBURY WOULD SHOW THIS TO MR SHORE.

PAPADOPOULOS

RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

+28

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

PS/NO 10 ~~DOWNING~~ STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

MR ASPIN

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/UND

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HE/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MR FIFOOT

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SALISBURY 291612Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 886 OF 29 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA
PRETORIA CAPETOWN WASHINGTON LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA PRIORITY
OTTAWA WELLINGTON NAIROBI AND SUVA.

RHODESIA: SITREP 29 FEBRUARY.

1. THIS HAS BEEN ANOTHER FAIRLY QUIET DAY WITH ONLY ONE MAJOR INCIDENT. THIS WAS A CONTACT BETWEEN THE SECURITY FORCES AND 6 ZIPRA GUERRILLAS IN GOKWE (WHICH IS NOT FAR FROM NKAI) IN WHICH ALL 6 WERE KILLED. THEY WERE FAIRLY HEAVILY ARMED. THE FULL FIGURES FOR THE DAY WERE 4 CONTACTS, TWO SHOOTINGS, ONE MURDER, ONE CASE OF ARSON/ASSAULT, 4 STOCK THEFTS, 16 CAPTURES AND A NUMBER OF ARRESTS. THIS MORNING THERE WERE 24,427 IN THE ASSEMBLY PLACES AND AT ESSEXVALE TRAINING CAMP. 100 ZANLA GUERRILLAS ARE MISSING FROM DELTA AND 115 FROM ECHO.

2. THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION MET THIS AFTERNOON AND CONSIDERED THE MOVE OF 600 ZANLA TO A TRAINING CAMP (FULL DETAILS IN MY

2. THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION MET THIS AFTERNOON AND CONSIDERED THE MOVE OF 600 ZANLA TO A TRAINING CAMP. (FULL DETAILS IN MY TELNO 884) THE COMMISSION MET IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF NOTABLE HARMONY AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER THE PAST 10 DAYS ARE BEARING FRUIT.

3. ASSEMBLY POINT BRAVO IS CLOSING DOWN TOMORROW AND ITS ZANLA INMATES ARE BEING MOVED TO CHARLIE. THERE ARE NOW BETWEEN 20 AND 50 MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND OF THE RHODESIAN POLICE IN EACH ASSEMBLY POINT. GENERAL WALLS IS THINKING OF INCREASING THE PRESENCE TO ABOUT 70 IN EACH.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL

SOAMES

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

+27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 ~~DOWNING~~ STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
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DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURYU291220Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 884 OF 29 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA NAIROBI MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM
LUANDA LAGOS MONROVIA ADDIS ABABA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CAPE
TOWN CANBERRA AND E E C POSTS

RHODESIA: MILITARY MATTERS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE LATEST POSITION:-

A) ASSEMBLY AREAS

NKOMO AND MUGABE HAVE RECORDED BROADCASTS TO THE ASSEMBLY AREAS
ORDERING THEIR MEN TO REMAIN IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS AND TO OBEY
ORDERS. THESE BROADCASTS WILL START TONIGHT AND WILL BE REPEATED
OVER THE WEEKEND AND ON MONDAY. NKOMO WILL TOUR THE Z I P R A
ASSEMBLY AREAS ON 1 MARCH ACCOMPANIED BY GEN ACLAND, (COMMANDER
OF THE MONITORING FORCE) AND GEN MACLEAN (COMMANDER OF THE RHODESIAN
ARMY) DURING THE TOUR HE WILL REPEAT THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAS
GIVEN OVER THE RADIO. MUGABE HAD PROMISED ME THAT HE WOULD TOUR
THE Z A N L A ASSEMBLY AREAS WITH THE SAME PURPOSE ON 1 AND 2
MARCH, BUT THIS WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS HE RETURNS FROM MAPUTO
TODAY.

ASSEMBLY PLACE BRAVO IS BEING CLOSED. THIS WILL LEAVE 11 ASSEMBLY
AREAS, 7 Z A N L A, 3 Z I P R A AND ONE MIXED.

THE RUNDOWN OF THE MONITORING FORCE AT THE ASSEMBLY AREAS WILL
BEGIN ON 3 MARCH. ALL THE PERSONNEL FROM THE COMMONWEALTH CONTINGENTS
WILL LEAVE THE ASSEMBLY AREAS ON THAT DATE. BUT SIX MEMBERS OF THE
MONITORING FORCE, WHO WILL BE ALL BRITISH, WILL REMAIN IN EACH

WILL LEAVE THE ASSEMBLY AREAS ON THAT DATE. BUT SIX MEMBERS OF THE MONITORING FORCE, WHO WILL BE ALL BRITISH, WILL REMAIN IN EACH ASSEMBLY AREA TO CONDUCT LIAISON UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 8 MARCH. RHODESIAN POLICE/SECURITY FORCE PRESENCE IN EACH ASSEMBLY AREA IS NOW BEING INCREASED TO APPROXIMATELY 40 MEN. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES GENERAL ACLAND HAS DECIDED THAT, SUBJECT TO A FINAL DECISION NEARER THE TIME, IT WILL PROBABLY BE POSSIBLE FOR THE MONITORING FORCE LIAISON PERSONNEL TO REMAIN IN BOTH THE Z I P R A AND Z A N L A CAMPS THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD WHEN THE ELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED AND NOT TO BE TEMPORARILY WITHDRAWN FROM THE Z A N L A CAMPS AS WAS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED.

B) TRAINING

THE TRAINING EXERCISE WITH Z I P R A CONTINGENT AT ESSEXVALE IS GOING WELL, AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MONITORING FORCE, THE Z I P R A CONTINGENT AND THE RHODESIANS ARE GOOD. ARRANGEMENTS ARE GOING AHEAD TO TAKE A CONTINGENT OF 600 Z A N L A TO A TRAINING CAMP AT RATHGAR WHICH IS JUST OUTSIDE MTOKO, NORTH-EAST OF SALISBURY. THIS MOVE IS DUE TO TAKE PLACE ON 3 MARCH. ADDITIONAL MONITORING FORCE PERSONNEL WILL BE REQUIRED TO ASSIST WITH TRAINING AND THE COMMANDER OF THE MONITORING FORCE HAS ASKED FOR 40 VOLUNTEERS WHO WOULD STAY BEHIND AFTER INDEPENDENCE UNTIL THEY COULD BE REPLACED BY LONG-TERM BRITISH TRAINING TEAMS.

FCO PASS ALL

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FROM SALISBURY 281645Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 871 OF 28 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

Read in full
M

RHODESIA.

1. RENWICK SAW NKOMO AT HIS REQUEST TODAY. NKOMO'S MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO TALK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF FORMING A GOVERNMENT AFTER THE ELECTIONS. RENWICK ASKED HIM WHETHER, IF MUGABE WON MOST SEATS AND THEN SOUGHT AN ALLIANCE WITH HIM, NKOMO WOULD AGREE TO SERVE UNDER HIM, OR AS PRESIDENT. NKOMO SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT: MUGABE HAD BROKEN THE ALLIANCE WITH HIM, AND HAD PREVENTED HIM FROM CAMPAIGNING. NKOMO WAS CONFIDENT OF THE SUPPORT OF MOST OF THE TWENTY WHITE MPS (THOUGH HE KNEW THAT DAVID SMITH AND CRONJE, WHOM HE IS SEEING SHORTLY, STILL FAVOURED THE BISHOP). HE WOULD LIKE AN ALLIANCE WITH THE UANC. THE PROBLEM WAS MUZOREWA: HE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. COULD HE BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT THE PRESIDENCY? IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO INCLUDE SOME ZANU(PF) IN A FUTURE GOVERNMENT. IF NKOMO HEADED A GOVERNMENT, HE WOULD BE CONFIDENT OF SECURING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. THERE MIGHT BE A ROW IN THE OAU WITH NYERERE TRYING TO PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF MUGABE. IF SO, NKOMO WAS PREPARED TO FACE THIS.

2. RENWICK MADE IT CLEAR THAT MY OBJECTIVE AFTER THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE TO DISCOVER HOW A GOVERNMENT COULD BE FORMED WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT. IT WOULD BE NO USE REVERTING TO ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE ALIGNMENTS WHICH EXISTED AT LANCASTER HOUSE (MUZOREWA AND THE WHITES: OR NKOMO AND MUGABE). NKOMO TOOK THE POINT. HE CONSIDERED THAT THE ESSENTIAL CRITERION WAS THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE A WORKING MAJORITY IN THE ASSEMBLY. RENWICK SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT IT SHOULD ALSO HAVE A MAJORITY OF THE AFRICAN SEATS. THE GOVERNOR WOULD ENGAGE IN THOROUGH CONSULTATIONS BEFORE DECIDING HOW TO PROCEED.

3. IT WAS CLEAR THAT NKOMO SUSPECTS THAT HE IS LIKELY TO WIN FEWER SEATS THAN MUGABE (DUE IN PART, IN HIS VIEW, TO INTIMIDATION). HE IS CONCERNED TO REACH SOME UNDERSTANDING WITH THE UANC, BUT WOULD BE EVEN LESS DISPOSED TO TAKE SECOND PLACE TO MUZOREWA THAN TO MUGABE. ALTHOUGH HE SAYS HE WOULD REJECT AN OFFER FROM MUGABE SIMPLY TO FORM A GOVERNMENT WITH ZANU(PF), HE PROBABLY WOULD TRY TO OFFER ZANU (PF) SOME PLACE IN ANY GOVERNMENT HE TRIED TO FORM.

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4. IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO NKOMO THAT WHAT I DECIDED TO DO WOULD DEPEND ESSENTIALLY ON THE ELECTION RESULT: BUT THAT I WOULD WANT TO KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH HIM AND THAT HIS ROLE WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN HELPING TO UNIFY THE COUNTRY AND ATTRACTING INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE.

5. WE ENCOURAGED NKOMO TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO LAGOS. HE SAID THAT HE MIGHT SEND JOHN NKOMO. HE WILL VISIT THE ZIPRA ASSEMBLY PLACES WITH GENERAL MACLEAN ON 1 MARCH.

FCO PSE PASS

SOAMES

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/FUS
SIR D MAITLAND

SIR A ACLAND
LORD N G LENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CPO

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY

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OO F C O DESKBY 281930Z

OO SALISBURY

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 281930Z

FM LUSAKA 281725Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO. 236 OF 28 FEBRUARY 1980

REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

ROUTINE GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, CAPETOWN,
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, NAIROBI

YOUR TEL NO. 115 AND MY TEL NO. 233 (TO FCO ONLY).

1. CONVEYED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO A VISIBLY RELAXED
AND HAPPY PRESIDENT KAUNDA AT 1630 ZULU TODAY. I SUBSEQUENTLY
LEFT WITH HIM AN AIDE MEMOIRE BASED ON FIRST TUR, AND A COPY OF
GOVERNOR'S SPOKESMAN'S REMARKS ON 26 FEBRUARY (SALISBURY TEL
NO. 935 REFERS).

2. KAUNDA SAID HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S
PROMPT RESPONSE WHICH CALMED A REAL FEAR WHICH HE HAD HAD. THINGS
WERE GOING WELL AND HE HAD TOLD MR FRASER SO WHEN THE LATTER
TELEPHONED AN HOUR AFTER HIS TALK WITH MRS. THATCHER. HE HAD AT
THE SAME TIME TOLD MR FRASER OF HIS ONE WORRY BUT SAID MRS.
THATCHER HAD UNDERTAKEN TO RESPOND TO HIS ENQUIRY.

3. AS THE ATMOSPHERE WAS SO GOOD I DISCUSSED OUR PLANS (SALISBURY
TEL NO. 159 TO LUSAKA - NOT TO ALL) FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF
PERMANENT BORDER LIAISON TEAMS ON THE ZAMBIA/RHODESIA BORDER
AND GAVE HIM ANOTHER AIDE MEMOIRE, ADDING THAT I WOULD LIKE
MY MLO TO STAY UNTIL INDEPENDENCE IN VIEW OF THE EXCELLENT

3x

Rhodesia Desk

M'Day

-PS / N° 10 DS

RC

DESKBY

MT

AND GAVE HIM ANOTHER AIDE MEMOIRE, ADDING THAT I WOULD LIKE MY MLO TO STAY UNTIL INDEPENDENCE IN VIEW OF THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS ESTABLISHED WITH THE ZNDF. KAUNDA ACCEPTED OUR PLEN AND WELCOMED MLO'S CONTINUED PRESENCE.

4. IN GENERAL CONVERSATION KAUNDA REPEATED HIS SATISFACTION AT HOW THE ELECTION WAS PROCEEDING AND AGREED THAT THE HIGH TURN OUT AND GOOD HUMOUR BEINGS SHOWN BY VOTERS WERE "MOST ENCOURAGING SIGNS".

NEILSON.

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CCN PARA M 4 IN GENERAL CONVERSATION

AND GOOD HUMOUR BEINGS SHOWN BY VOTERS WERE ETC ...

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

RODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES] 28

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
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MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

IMMEDIATE

RESIDENT CLERK

GPS 460

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 281200Z SALISBURY

DESKBY 281200Z FCO

FM MAPUTO 281025Z FEBRUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 28 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA LAGOS

YOUR TELNO 136: RHODESIA

1. MUGABE ONLY ARRIVED AT 10.00 PM LOCAL YESTERDAY AND WAS NOT AVAILABLE TILL 09.45 TODAY. HE WAS NOT TO BE MOVED.

2. DOBLE EXPRESSED ON THE LINES OF TUR YOUR GRAVE CONCERN AND ASTONISHMENT AT MUGABE'S MOVEMENTS, AFTER HE HAD AGREED TO VISIT ALL THE ASSEMBLY POINTS (APS) ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY. HE ADDED THAT AT THIS MOST CRITICAL AND DELICATE TIME MUGABE'S PRESENCE IN RHODESIA SEEMED VITAL. ALL CONCERNED WITH THE APS, COMMONWEALTH, RHODESIAN AND ZANU (PF) PERSONNEL ALIKE, NEEDED REASSURANCE AND A GUARANTEE OF STABILITY. ONLY HE COULD PROVIDE THIS, BY PERSONALLY TELLING HIS MEN TO STAY CALM AND STAY PUT. THERE HAD BEEN INSTANCES WHERE RADIO INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY IGNORED BY ZANU (PF): THERE WAS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR HIM, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GIVING HIS ORDERS PERSONALLY.

SUBSTITUTE FOR HIM, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GIVING HIS ORDERS PERSONALLY.

3. MUGABE, IN RELAXED MOOD, SAID THAT YOU HAD NO NEED TO BE WORRIED ABOUT HIS MEN LEAVING THE APS. HE HAD GIVEN ORDERS BY RADIO, WHICH YOU HAD AWELCOMED, FOR THEM TO STAY. THESE WOULD BE OBEYED. IN ADDITION HIS VICE PRESIDENT AND MILITARY COMMANDER, NHONGO, WOULD TOGETHER REPEAT THIS ORDER IN PERSON AT EACH AP. WHEN DOBLE QUERED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MUZENDA'S ORDERS, MUGABE SAID THAT THE WHOLE BUSINESS OF THE APS HAD GONE SMOOTHLY, WITHOUT HIM HAVING VISITED THEM AT ANY STAGE; DOBLE COMMENTED THAT IF HIS MEN HAD NOT SEEN THEIR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AT ALL SINCE THE CEASEFIRE, IT SEEMED ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO VISIT THEM HIMSELF NOW, WHEN THEY MUST BE ON EDGE. HE INSISTED THAT HE HAD TO "WIND UP OUR AFFAIRS" HERE AND HAD TO HAVE IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENTS MACHEL AND NYERERE (LATTER ON 1 MARCH). ALSO GENERAL WALLS HAD HAD TALKS HERE, WHICH HE SEEMED TO CONSIDER AN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT; HE NEEDED TO HEAR FROM THE MOZAMBICANS EXACTLY WHAT HAD BEEN SAID. HE WOULD RETURN TO SALISBURY ON DETA ON SUNDAY 2 MARCH. HE ALSO REITERATED SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HE SAID HE HAD PUT TO YOU, TO ASSURE ZANU(PF) OF THEIR SECURITY (RHODESIAN DEMOBILISATION, RETURN TO BARRACKS, REMOVAL OF HEAVY WEAPONS FROM THE STREETS ETC). HE MENTIONED HIS MEETING WITH GENERAL WALLS, AS IF THEY HAD ESTABLISHED SALISFACTORY LIAISON. BUT HE IS NEVERTHELESS WORRIED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF A WHITE COUP.

4. DOBLE HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED TO FERRAO (SECRETARY GENERAL MFA), OUR VERY GREAT CONCERN AT MUGABE'S ABSENSE FROM THE COUNTRY. HE UNDERTOOK TO TELL THE PRESIDENT AT ONCE OF OUR REQUEST THAT HE SHOULD URGE MUGABE TO RETURN BY FRIDAY NIGHT. FERRAO WAS SURPRISED AND CRITICAL OF MUGABE FOR LEAVING RHODESIA AT THIS JUNCTURE. KHAN (MFA) LATER TOLD CHISSANO THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE MOZAMBICANS TO GET MUGABE TO RETURN ON FRIDAY. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT WHETHER THEY WILL HAVE ANY MORE SUCCESS THAN DOBLE IN GETTING MUGABE TO CHANGE HIS PLANS.

PAPADOPOULOS

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IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY:

ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
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SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

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SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

MR ASPIN

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

(Dues)

RESIDENT CLERK

SECRET

FM CG JOHANNESBURG 281805Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM 31 OF 28 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY AND CAPE TOWN

MT

FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR

RHODESIA/SOUTH AFRICA

1. PIK BOTHA HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME FROM CAPE TOWN (I AM SPENDING TONIGHT IN JOHANNESBURG) IN A GREAT STATE OF EXCITEMENT ON TWO POINTS
2. THE FIRST IS THAT HE HAS HEARD FROM MALAN, WHO GOT IT FROM WALLS, THAT ZANU SUPPORTERS ARE INTIMIDATING PEOPLE OUTSIDE POLLING BOOTHS BY DEMONSTRATING IN LARGE NUMBERS, SINGING AND SHOUTING. I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS SAYING THIS WAS WIDESPREAD OR COULD BE INDICATE WHERE IN PARTICULAR IT WAS HAPPENING. HE SAID THAT WALLS COULD SUPPLY THE DETAILS.
3. THE SECOND MATTER WAS, HE SAID, EVEN MORE SERIOUS. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT MUGABE WAS PLANNING IN MAPUTO AND DAR ES SALAAM. THEY DID NOT KNOW WHY HE WAS THERE AND COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT HE WAS ARRANGING FOR "INDIRECT RUSSIAN SUPPORT" FOR A COUP AFTER THE ELECTION. WITH THIS PROSPECT THE S.A.G. WERE CONSIDERING PULLING OUT THEIR EQUIPMENT AND MEN IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS. THEY COULD NOT

ADVANCE REBEL SUPPORT FOR A COUP AFTER THE ELECTION.
WITH THIS PROSPECT THE S.A.G. WERE CONSIDERING PULLING OUT THEIR
EQUIPMENT AND MEN IN THE NEXT 36 HOURS. THEY 'COULD NOT
AFFORD ANOTHER ANGOLA'. HE REALISED ONLY TOO WELL THAT IF THEY
DID THIS THEY WOULD PROVOKE THE WHITE EXODUS WE ALL WANTED TO
AVOID. IT WOULD HELP HIM TO ARGUE IN FAVOUR OF HANGING ON AND
DOING NOTHING PRECIPITATE IF I COULD TELL HIM QUICKLY THAT WE
WANTED THEM TO STAY ON AND AT THE SAME TIME GIVE THEM AN ASSURANCE
THAT IN THAT EVENT WE WOULD NOT MAKE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT WHO
HAD WON THE ELECTION OR WHO WOULD FORM THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT
GIVING THEM AMPLE ADVANCE NOTICE. THATWAY WE COULD CONSULT
TOGETHER QUICKLY ABOUT WHAT THEY SHOULD DO IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES
PREVAILING AT THE TIME. THEY CERTAINLY WANTED TO AVOID DOING
ANYTHING TO EMBARRASS US.

4. I TRIED TO CALM PIK DOWN. I SAID THAT, AS DUFF HAD TOLD HIM
THIS MORNING, IT SEEMED QUITE LIKELY TO US THAT MUGABE HAD BEEN
SUMMONED BY MACHEL TO BE TOLD THAT HE MUST MEND HIS FENCES WITH
NKOMO. HE AGREED BUT INDICATED THAT THERE WAS PROBABLY MORE TO
IT THAN THAT.

5. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO IN HIS CONVERSATION
WITH DUFF A FEW WEEKS AGO HAD MADE CLEAR HIS PREOCCUPATION OVER
THE SOUTH AFRICAN MEN AND EQUIPMENT AND HIS DETERMINATION TO
AVOID ANOTHER ANGOLA DEBACLE, IS WORKED UP AND IS ON PIK'S BACK.
I HOPE THEREFORE THAT I CAN BE INSTRUCTED TO TELL PIK TOMORROW
MORNING THAT WE WOULD LIKE THEM TO HANG ON AND THAT WE WILL KEEP
THEM CLOSELY INFORMED NEXT WEEK OF HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER
THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE GOING. WE CANNOT,
HOWEVER, GIVE THEM ANY UNDERTAKING, I ASSUME, TO TELL THEM IN
ADVANCE WHAT THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION ITSELF ARE.

6. I WILL BE BACK IN CAPE TOWN BY 0900Z TOMORROW.

TITCHENER

NNNW

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

+29

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MT

CONFIDENTIAL

FM GABORONE 271515Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 80 OF 27 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, LUSAKA, LUANDA, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO,
ADDIS ABABA, LAGOS, CAPE TOWN EMBASSY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

DAR ES SALAAM TEL 207: RHODESIA: FLS MEETING

1. LEGWAILA, THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, TELLS ME THAT THE
PLENARY SESSION OF PRESIDENTS LASTED ONLY HALF AN HOUR, AFTER WHICH
OFFICIALS INCLUDING LEGWAILA GOT DOWN TO DRAFTING THE COMMUNIQUE.
LEGWAILA SAYS THAT THE COMMUNIQUE COVERS ACCURATELY THE RANGE OF
DISCUSSION. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION ON RECOGNISING THE ELECTIONS
UNLESS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WIN AND THE PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT THEY
WOULD RECOGNISE ANY GOVERNMENT SO LONG AS THEY WERE SATISFIED THAT
THE ELECTIONS WERE FREE AND FAIR. PRESIDENT NYERERE WAS VERY
RESTRAINED AND DID NOT REPEAT HIS BITTER ATTACKS ON BRITAIN.
HE AVOIDED MATTERS WHICH WOULD EXPOSE DIFFERENCE AMONGST THE FLPs
AND THE OTHERS WENT ALONG WITH THIS. LEGWAILA THOUGHT THAT NYERERE
HAD GOT THE MESSAGE THAT AFRICA (AND THE COMMONWEALTH IN GENERAL)
WAS NOT SUPPORTING HIM IN THE MORE OUTRAGEOUS OF THE STATEMENTS
AND HAD CALLED THE MEETING TO RE-ASSERT THE UNITY OF THE FRONT LINE
ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS.

2. LEGWAILA SAID THAT THE DISCUSSION COVERED THE FAMILIAR CRITICISMS

2. LEGWAILA SAID THAT THE DISCUSSION COVERED THE FAMILIAR CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNOR'S ADMINISTRATION BUT IN A MUTED FASHION. THERE HAD BEEN PARTICULAR CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNOR'S STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY CALL UPON THE LARGEST PARTY TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. THE BATSWANA HAD TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS. LEGWAILA THOUGHT THE IF MUGABE GAINED THE GREATEST NUMBER OF SEATS THE FLPs WOULD BE SATISFIED IF HE WAS ASKED FIRST EVEN IF IN THE EVENT HE COULD NOT FORM A GOVERNMENT.

3. LEGWAILA COMMENTED THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS EXPERIENCE THE OFFICIALS DRAFTING THE COMMUNIQUE HAD STARTED WITH BLANK PAPER AND FOR THIS REASON THE BOTSWANA DELEGATION WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE A MORE MODERATE COMMUNIQUE. THEY MANAGED TO HAVE DELETED A NUMBER OF DETAILED CRITICISMS OF BRITAIN AND, BASING THEMSELVES ON OUR BRIEFING, REFUSED TO INCLUDE CRITICISM OF THE USE OF THE MPVS. LEGWAILA SAID AT THE END OF THE DRAFTING SESSION THE MOZAMBICANS HAD WANTED TO ADD "ALUTTA CONTINUA". AMID LAUGHTER THE BOTSWANA DELEGATION HAD INSISTED THEY WOULD ONLY ACCEPT "ALUTTA NON CONTINUA".

4. LEGWAILA COMMENTED THAT IN THE VIEW OF THE BATSWANA THE MEETING WAS A WASTE OF TIME.

TURNER.

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/LR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

+29

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/UND

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

MT

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 271524Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 849 OF 27 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA NAIROBI MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS
MONROVIA ADDIS ABABA CAPE TOWN CANBERRA WELLINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON E E C POSTS

FUTURE OF THE P F FORCES

1. WE HAVE NOW AGREED WITH MUGABE THAT A UNIT OF 600 Z A N L A WILL
BE TAKEN INTO TRAINING WITH RHODESIAN PARTICIPATION UNDER THE AUS-
PICES OF THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE. WE ARE AIMING FOR THE
MOVE TO TAKE PLACE ON 2 OR 3 MARCH. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT ROOM
AT THE CAMP AT ESSEXVALE IN WHICH THE Z I P R A FORCES ARE TRAINING
AND SO Z A N L A WILL GO TO ANOTHER CAMP. THIS WILL PROBABLY BE AT
ASSEMBLY POINT BRAVO, NORTH-EAST OF BINDURA, WHICH WILL BE
REDESIGNATED AS A TRAINING CAMP.

2. WE SHALL ANNOUNCE THIS MOVE IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS, IT
IS IMPORTANT THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOT THINK THAT WE ARE
DRAGGING OUR FEET ABOUT IMPLEMENTING THE OFFER TO Z A N L A. POSTS
TO WHICH THIS TELEGRAM IS REPEATED MAY THEREFORE INFORM THE
GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

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19367 - 2

Ag.
Anty

GRS 549

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DESKBY 271600Z (SALISBURY ONLY)

FM FCO 271300Z FEB 80

TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 115 OF 27 FEBRUARY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY AND
ROUTINE DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, CAPE TOWN, CANBERRA,
WELLINGTON AND NAIROBI

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT KAUNDA

1. PRESIDENT KAUNDA TELEPHONED THE PRIME MINISTER AT NOON
TODAY. COPY ADDRESSEES SHOULD REGARD THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT
OF THEIR BRIEF CONVERSATION AS FOR THEIR BACKGROUND INFORMATION
ONLY.

2. KAUNDA (WHO SAID HE HAD BEEN IN BED WITH A COLD) SAID
THAT VOTING SEEMED TO HAVE STARTED WELL, BUT THAT THERE WAS
JUST ONE POINT OF ANXIETY WHICH HE WISHED TO SHARE WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER. THIS WAS THE "ANNOUNCEMENT" THAT THE MONITORING
FORCE WOULD WITHDRAW FROM ASSEMBLY AREAS BY 29 FEBRUARY. HE
HOPED THAT THE MONITORING FORCE WOULD STAY UNTIL THE NEW
GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE PLAN
WAS FOR THE MONITORING FORCE TO DRAW BACK TOWARDS SALISBURY,
AND THAT SHE THOUGHT THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD
HAVE BEEN AGREED WITH THE COMMANDERS OF ALL THE FORCES CONCERNED,
AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. WAS IT NOT THE
CASE THAT NKOMO HAD AGREED TO THESE ARRANGEMENTS? KAUNDA
SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW. THE PRIME MINISTER THEREFORE
PROMISED TO ENQUIRE, AND LET KAUNDA KNOW WHAT THE EXACT
POSITION WAS.

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19367 - 2

3. KAUNDA SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING ELSE WHICH HE WISHED TO RAISE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. MRS THATCHER MENTIONED THAT NKOMO HAD SCRUPULOUSLY KEPT TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT DURING HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN. WE MUST NOW ALL AWAIT THE RESULTS OF THE POLLING.

4. YOU SHOULD TAKE EARLY ACTION WITH STATE HOUSE TO REASSURE KAUNDA OVER THE FUTURE OF THE MONITORING FORCE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES. WE ARE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO DEVELOP CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES THROUGH JOINT TRAINING, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POLICE AND RSF PRESENCE IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS, AS THESE CONTACTS DEVELOP AND CONFIDENCE BUILDS UP, THE MONITORING FORCE'S ROLE WILL CHANGE INCREASINGLY TO LIAISON AND TRAINING, AND THIS WILL ENABLE US TO REDUCE THEIR NUMBERS (YOU SHOULD SO FAR AS POSSIBLE AVOID REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL). YOU CAN ASSURE KAUNDA THERE WILL BE NO SUDDEN PULL-OUT ON 29 FEBRUARY, OR INDEED ANY OTHER DATE. WE ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF A PHASED REDUCTION BEGINNING ON 3 MARCH WHICH WILL ENABLE ELEMENTS OF THE FORCE TO REMAIN TO CONDUCT LIAISON AND TRAINING UNTIL INDEPENDENCE. OUR INTENTIONS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS AND THEIR MILITARY COMMANDERS. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO DESCRIBE THE MEASURES BEING TAKEN IN RELATION TO THE FUTURE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES. OVER 600 OF MR NKOMO'S FORCES ARE ALREADY ENGAGED IN JOINT TRAINING WITH THE RHODESIANS UNDER MONITORING FORCE AUSPICES AT ESSEXVALE: IT HAS NOW BEEN AGREED THAT 600 MEMBERS OF ZANLA WILL ALSO START SIMILAR TRAINING WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN STEPS TO DETERMINE WHICH MEMBERS OF THE PF FORCES WISH TO RETURN TO CIVILIAN LIFE AND ARE EXPLORING TRAINING AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEM. IN ALL THIS, OUR CONCERN IS TO BUILD UP THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PF FORCES THAT THERE IS NO THREAT TO THEM.

5. YOU MIGHT LEAVE STATE HOUSE WITH THE TEXT OF THE GOVERNOR'S SPOKESMAN'S REMARKS ON 26 FEBRUARY (SALISBURY TELNO 835 REFERS).

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

NNNN

F I L E S	PS/LPS
RHOD DEPT	PS/MR LUCE
DEF DEPT	PS/PUS
CAD	SIR D MAITLAND
PS	MR DAY

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

Rhodesia

	↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby FLASH
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ZCZC
GRS
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1	ZCZC
2	GRS
3	CONFIDENTIAL
4	
5	DESKBY 271600Z (Salisbury only)
6	FM FCO 271300Z
7	TO FLASH LUSAKA
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY AND
10	ROUTINE DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, CAPE TOWN, CANBERRA,
11	WELLINGTON AND NAIROBI
12	
13	CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT KAUNDA
14	1. President Kaunda telephoned the Prime Minister at noon
15	today. Copy addressees should regard the following account
16	of their brief conversation as for their background information
17	only.
18	2. Kaunda (who said he had been in bed with a cold) said
19	that voting seemed to have started well, but that there was
20	just one point of anxiety which he wished to share with the
21	Prime Minister. This was the "announcement" that the Monitoring
22	Force would withdraw from assembly areas by 29 February. He
23	hoped that the Monitoring Force would stay until the new
24	government was formed. The Prime Minister said that the plan
25	

For President - 29/2

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /was for
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) R M J LYNE		Files Rhodesia Dept PS PS/LPS PS/Mr Luce PS/PUS Mr Day Defence Dept CAD Copy: No 10
Telephone number 233-4641		
Authorised for despatch <i>CD Powell</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Page
2

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1 <<<<
2 was for the Monitoring Force to draw back towards Salisbury,
3 and that she thought that arrangements for the withdrawal would
4 have been agreed with the Commanders of all the forces concerned,
5 as one might expect in such circumstances. Was it not the
6 case that Nkomo had agreed to these arrangements? Kaunda
7 said that he did not know. The Prime Minister therefore
8 promised to enquire, and let Kaunda know what the exact
9 position was.

10 3 Kaunda said that there was nothing else which he wished
11 to raise with the Prime Minister. Mrs Thatcher mentioned that
12 Nkomo had scrupulously kept to the letter and spirit of the
13 Lancaster House Agreement during his election campaign. We
14 must now all await the results of the polling.

15 ~~4 You should now take action as rapidly as possible with~~
16 ~~State House to ensure that, in response to his telephone call~~
17 ~~to the Prime Minister, Kaunda is fully briefed on the~~
18 ~~arrangements for the withdrawal of the Monitoring Force.~~
19 ~~You yourself are already familiar with these arrangements,~~
20 ~~but the points you will wish to stress include:~~
21 4. You should take early action with State House to
22 reassure Kaunda over the future of the Monitoring Force on the
23 following lines. We are making a major effort to develop
24 confidence between the forces of the two sides through joint
25 training, and the establishment of a police and RSF presence
26 in the assembly areas, ~~between Rhodesian forces and the~~
27 ~~Patriotic Front.~~ As these contacts develop and confidence
28 builds up, the Monitoring Force's role will change increasingly
29 to liaison and training, and this will enable us to reduce
30 their numbers (you should so far as possible avoid reference
31 to withdrawal). You can assure Kaunda there will be no sudden
32 ~~withdrawal~~ ^{pull-out} on 29 February, or indeed any other date. We are
33 thinking in terms of a phased reduction beginning on 3 March
34 which will enable elements of the force to remain to conduct

NNNN ends
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Catchword

liaison

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

1 <<<<

2 liaison and training until independence. Our intentions have
3 been explained to the Patriotic Front leaders and their military
4 commanders. You should go on to describe the measures being
5 taken in relation to the future of the Patriotic Front forces.
6 Over 600 of Mr Nkomo's forces are already engaged in joint
7 training with the Rhodesians under Monitoring Force auspices at
8 Essexvale; it has now been agreed that 600 members of ZANLA
9 will also start similar training within the next few days. We
10 have also taken steps to determine which members of the PF forces
11 wish to return to civilian life and are exploring training and
12 job opportunities for them. In all this, our concern is to
13 build up the confidence of the PF forces that there is no threat
14 to them.

15 5. You might leave State House with the text of the Governor's
16 spokesman's remarks on 26 February (Salisbury telno 835 refers).

17

18 CARRINGTON

19 NNNN

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NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword

SUBJECT

Ky. Rhodesia
27/2

PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA AT 1200
ON WEDNESDAY 27 FEBRUARY 1980

Prime Minister: Kenneth, how are you? Hello Kenneth, how are you?
Its Margaret here.

President Kaunda: Hello Margaret, how are you?

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T39/80**

Prime Minister: I'm well, and you?

President Kaunda: I'm afraid I'm not very well, I'm in bed with
a cold.

Prime Minister: Oh I'm so sorry.

President Kaunda: That's all right. I think I'm recovering
Margaret, thank you.

Prime Minister: Good.

President Kaunda: Just one thing, Margaret, we seem to have started
off well across the river here.

Prime Minister: Good.

President Kaunda: I just thought I should share with you my one
anxiety I have and this is the announcement made that the Monitoring
Force, the people, would withdraw by the 29th.

Prime Minister: Go on Kenneth I'm sorry you are anxious that they
are going to . . .

President Kaunda: . . I thought I should share with you my anxiety
of the announcement that the Monitoring Force people would withdraw
from these assembly points by the 29th.

Prime Minister: To draw back into Salisbury or towards Salisbury
and you are anxious about that. Please go on, you are anxious about
that, Kenneth, are you?

President Kaunda: Yes I am anxious about that Margaret. I was wondering

/ whether

whether you could not wait until the 4th when the new Government is formed.

Prime Minister: Usually when we withdraw from a point its in agreement with the commanders of all the forces concerned. Has Joshua Nkomo not agreed to that?

President Kaunda: Sorry Margaret I didn't get that.

Prime Minister: Usually when we plan to withdraw from a Monitoring point its with the agreement of the forces concerned and with the agreement of the Patriotic Front. Has Joshua not agreed to that one?

President Kaunda: Oh. Well I didn't know that.

Prime Minister: That's the way its usually done in conjunction with them. But we'll inquire.

President Kaunda: So that when we have all agreed it means that we are willing to co-operate. Is that it?

Prime Minister: Usually yes. It's only done in agreement with them.

President Kaunda: I see.

Prime Minister: But let me communicate your worries Kenneth and we'll find out.

President Kaunda: the background to this.

Prime Minister: Yes. Other things are going well I believe. We are waiting anxiously here.

President Kaunda: What's that Margaret, the way that things are going now so far?

Prime Minister: They are going well.

President Kaunda: Yes I think so.

/ Prime Minister

Prime Minister: Well I'm very pleased. Because its a critical week for Rhodesia.

President Kaunda: Yes.

Prime Minister: Anything else Kenneth because it is good to talk to you.

President Kaunda: I didn't get that Margaret.

Prime Minister: Anything else because its good to talk to you?

President Kaunda: That's the main worrying point.

Prime Minister: That's the main worrying point.

President Kaunda: That's right thank you.

Prime Minister: I'll have inquiries made about it Kenneth. I think we will have agreed it with Joshua but I will certainly find out.

President Kaunda: Thank you.

Prime Minister: And I must say that from all reports here he has fought the election magnificently and kept to the letter and the spirit of every agreement and now we all await the result.

President Kaunda: Oh yes certainly.

Prime Minister: All right Kenneth well I do hope your cold will soon be better and I'll start to make inquiries about that particular point.

President Kaunda: Thank you, Margaret.

Prime Minister: All right?

President Kaunda: Goodbye now Margaret.

Prime Minister: Goodbye thank you very much for phoning, Goodbye.



N.S. med.

K. P. 27/2

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA

1. Major achievement to have got to the point of holding elections with all parties taking part. Grateful for Zambia's help.
2. Sincerely believe they will be as fair as possible under the circumstances.
3. Mr Mugabe told the press after seeing the Governor yesterday that he believed his party could take part on an equal footing with others and that he will accept any outcome.
4. Glad that meeting of Front Line Presidents did not try to prejudge the results.
5. After the elections, Governor will consult all the political leaders to see who has the best chance of forming a government. It will be up to them, not to us, to say what coalition they want.
6. Excellent progress towards integration of forces after elections.
7. Very pleased with Mr Nkomo's contribution to reconciliation.

DEFENSIVE

8. Really not the case that there are thousands of South African troops in Rhodesia. There are some South Africans in the Rhodesian forces.
9. [If Kaunda complains about deployment of Rhodesian forces during elections.] This is to ensure peaceful conditions. They won't be anywhere near the polling booths. Our people
/will

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will be at the polling booths to ensure no interference.

10. [If he complains that Rhodesians in Zambia can't vote.]

Those who have proper travel documents can return,
but not those without. Position explained to Mr Nkomo.

Rhodesia Department

27 February 1980

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

(100)
X-27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/LR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET ✓

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/UND
HD/PUSD (2)

(Dep't)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

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Read in full

FM SALISBURY 271328Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 842 OF 27 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA NAIROBI MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA
LAGOS MONROVIA CAPE TOWN ADDIS ABABA OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK E E C POSTS

MEETING WITH MUGABE

1. MUGABE CALLED ON ME AT MY REQUEST YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND WE HAD ABOUT AN HOUR'S TALK TOGETHER ALONE. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE.
2. WE SPOKE FIRST ABOUT THE PROPOSAL THAT 350 OF HIS SOLDIERS SHOULD MOVE INTO A CAMP TO TRAIN WITH RHODESIAN PARTICIPATION. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE IMPRESSION HAD BEEN GIVEN THAT HE HAD BEEN DRAGGING HIS FEET ON THIS ISSUE FOR IN HIS VIEW HE HADN'T. I REMINDED HIM - AND HE ACCEPTED THE POINT - THAT AT OUR LAST MEETING HE HAD SAID THAT HE WANTED TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE QUESTION OF HIS FORCES EXCHANGING THEIR PRESENT ARMS FOR RHODESIAN WEAPONS. HE HAD ONLY FINALLY LET US KNOW ON 25 FEBRUARY THAT HE AGREED TO THIS.
3. HE WAS KEEN THAT HIS MEN SHOULD BE TREATED AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE THE SAME AS THE Z I P R A FORCES: IF Z I P R A HAD MOVED 650 MEN INTO TRAINING WHY ONLY 350 OF Z A N L A? I SAID THAT THE DIFFERENCE STEMMED PARTLY FROM THE FACT THAT Z I P R A HAD A FORMED BATAILLION TO MOVE WHICH Z A N L A HAD NOT. HE COULD REST ASSURED THAT THERE WAS NO DESIRE ON OUR PART TO DISCRIMINATE AND THAT THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET ELEMENTS OF ALL THREE ARMIES TOGETHER: BUT

WAS NO DESIRE ON OUR PART TO DISCRIMINATE AND THAT THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET ELEMENTS OF ALL THREE ARMIES TOGETHER: BUT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT ROOM AT ESSEXVALE AND SO SOME OTHER CAMP WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND. I SUGGESTED THAT ASSEMBLY POINT BRAVO, WHICH WE WERE INTENDING TO CLOSE DOWN, COULD BE REDESIGNATED AS A TRAINING CAMP AND PROPOSED THAT HE SHOULD HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF MY STAFF TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS. (SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM).

4. I THEN SAID THAT I HOPED VERY MUCH THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY GO ROUND THE Z A N L A ASSEMBLY AREAS ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY WITH SENIOR OFFICERS FROM THE RHODESIAN FORCES AND THE MONITORING FORCE. THE OBJECT OF THE VISIT WOULD BE TO INSTIL CONFIDENCE IN THE MEN IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS AND FOR MUGABE PERSONALLY TO ORDER THEM TO STAY PUT AND TO OBEY ORDERS. HE HESITATED SOMEWHAT BUT FINALLY AGREED WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT NKOMO HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED TO TOUR THE Z I P R A ASSEMBLY POINTS.

5. I ASKED HIM HOW THINGS WERE GOING. HE SAID HE HAD A LOT OF DIFFICULTIES AND THAT LITERALLY THOUSANDS OF HIS MEN HAD BEEN PICKED UP LATELY BY THE POLICE. I SAID THAT THIS WAS A GROSS EXAGGERATION AND THAT INDEED I HAD SEEN THE NUMBER OF 5,000 MENTIONED IN HIS LETTER TO YOU: THIS WAS ONE OF A NUMBER OF INACCURACIES IN THAT LETTER. WE HAD A SHORT DISAGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. I THEN TOLD HIM THAT I WAS MOST DISPLEASED WITH THE INTIMIDATION BY HIS PEOPLE IN THE EAST AND CENTRE OF THE COUNTRY. THOUGH I AGREED THAT THINGS HAD BEEN DONE BY OTHER PEOPLE AS WELL, THE HARD FACT WAS THAT INTIMIDATION BY Z A N L A WAS OF A TOTALLY DIFFERENT ORDER. BUT NEVERTHELESS I THOUGHT IT WAS IN RHODESIA'S INTEREST TO ALLOW THE ELECTIONS TO GO ON WITHOUT ANY MOVE TO PROSCRIBE ANY AREAS, ALTHOUGH I COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT LIGHTLY FORGET WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THOSE AREAS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT I WAS NOT GOING TO TAKE ANY ACTION ON PROSCRIPTION. HE AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN INTIMIDATION BY HIS PEOPLE BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ORDER OF INTIMIDATION WAS MUZOREWA FIRST, HIMSELF SECOND AND NKOMO A CLOSE THIRD.

6. MUGABE THEN SAID THAT HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE ELECTIONS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE MOST NATURAL COALITION FOR HIM WOULD BE WITH NKOMO, BUT HIS PRESENT THINKING WAS THAT HE WOULD BE PERFECTLY READY TO INVITE MUZOREWA ALSO AND SOME OF HIS PEOPLE TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT WITH HIM. THERE WOULD BE A LOT OF CHANGES TO BRING ABOUT BUT HE REALISED THAT THIS SHOULD BE OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. HE KNEW THAT SOME PEOPLE REGARDED HIM AS AN OGRE BUT HE WASN'T. HE DID NOT WANT ANYONE TO FEEL THAT THEY HAD TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, BUT THERE WOULD NEED TO BE, AND BE SEEN TO BE, A GROWING DEGREE OF AFRICANISATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE. HE HAD MANY ANXIETIES ABOUT HOW HE WAS GOING TO GOVERN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE FOR HE REALISED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE MANY PEOPLE

GROWING DEGREE OF AFRICANISATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE
HE HAD MANY ANXIETIES ABOUT HOW HE WAS GOING TO GOVERN IN THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE FOR HE REALISED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE MANY PEOPLE
EXPERIENCE OR WITH ADMINISTRATIVE SKILLS AROUND HIM.

7. HE THEN CAME TO WHAT HE SAW AS THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTER AFTER
THE ELECTIONS, NAMELY THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE. INDEPENDENCE SHOULD
NOT BE GRANTED FOR MANY MONTHS AND THE BRITISH GOVERNOR AND HIS
STAFF SHOULD STAY, CHIEFLY IN ORDER TO GIVE CONFIDENCE TO THE PEOPLE.
I TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS NOT IN OUR MINDS AT ALL, NOR DID I SEE
WHAT ROLE THE GOVERNOR COULD PLAY ONCE THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN
CHOSEN AND WAS IN THE SADDLE. BUT I PROMISED TO PASS ON HIS VIEWS
TO H M G. HE ASKED ME HOW LONG I THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE BETWEEN THE
FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENCE. I SAID THAT IT SHOULD
BE COUNTED IN DAYS OR PERHAPS A WEEK, BUT NOT MUCH LONGER. HE SAID
HE HOPED IT WOULD BE AT LEAST MONTHS.

8. I TOLD HIM FINALLY THAT I WOULD BE WANTING TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH
HIM FROM NOW ON AND THAT I HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH HIM
WHENEVER WE WANTED BETWEEN NOW AND AFTER THE ELECTION RESULTS WERE
KNOWN. HE SAID WE CERTAINLY WOULD.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL
FROM SALISBURY 261830Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 833 OF 26 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON EEC POSTS CANBERRA OTTAWA DAR ES SALAAM
LAGOS MAPUTO LUSAKA WELLINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 605: RHODESIA: ACTION AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

1. WE SHALL OF COURSE REPORT AS REQUESTED IN PARAGRAPH OF T U R.
M I F T CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A BROADCAST THE GOVERNOR IS MAKING
THIS EVENING.

2. WE ARE TRYING TO ENCOURAGE OBSERVERS FROM OTHER EEC COUNTRIES
TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS ON THE ELECTION BEFORE THE RESULTS ARE
KNOWN. ON THE WHOLE, SUCH INDICATIONS AS WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN ABLE
TO OBTAIN SUGGEST THAT THE REPORTS OF, FOR INSTANCE, THE GERMANS
AND BELGIANS MAY POINT OUT THAT WHILE THERE HAS BEEN INTIMIDATION
BY ZANLA AND IRREGULARITIES ON THE PART OF THE RHODESIAN
ADMINISTRATION, THE ELECTION MAY IN "ROUGH AND READY" TERMS BE
REGARDED AS A REASONABLY FAIR REFLECTION OF THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE
OF RHODESIA. WE SUSPECT HOWEVER THAT SOME FAIRLY SLANTED CRITICISM
IS LIKELY TO BE FORTHCOMING FROM INTER ALIA THE AUSTRALIAN GROUP

REGARDED AS A REASONABLY FAIR REFLECTION OF
OF RHODESIA. WE SUSPECT HOWEVER THAT SOME FAIRLY SLANTED CRITICISM
IS LIKELY TO BE FORTHCOMING FROM INTER ALIA THE AUSTRALIAN GROUP
AND THE DUTCH AND DANES.

3. THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP HAS
BEEN HEAVILY SLANTED TOWARDS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN GENERAL AND
MUGABE IN PARTICULAR. IT IS HOPED THAT THEY WILL SEND AN INTERIM
REPORT TO RAMPHAL ON 1 MARCH. ALTHOUGH THIS WILL INEVITABLY CONTAIN
A GOOD MANY SLANTED COMMENTQ AND MAKE MUCH OF ALL SORTS OF MINOR
ISSUES, THERE APPEARS AT PRESENT TO BE SOME PROSPECT THAT THIS
TOO MAY CONCLUDE, WITH SOME RESERVATIONS, THAT THE ELECTION WAS
BROADLY SPEAKING ACCEPTABLE. WE CANNOT HOWEVER COUNT ON THIS.
AN ARGUMENT IS STILL GOING ON WITHIN THE GROUP.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL

SOAMES

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
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MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
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RESIDENT CLERK

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FM SALISBURY 261724Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 829 OF 26 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA
PRETORIA CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA
PRIORITY OTTAWA WELLINGTON NAIROBI SUVA

RHODESIA: SITREP 26 FEBRUARY

1. THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS. THERE WERE 3 CONTACTS, 2 SHOOTINGS, ONE MURDER AND ONE ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSION. FIVE LOCALS WERE KILLED AND SIX WOUNDED: 3 OF THE DEATHS AND 5 OF THE INJURIES WERE CAUSED IN CROSS-FIRE BETWEEN POLICE AND Z A N L A GUERILLAS. IN THE Z A N L A AREA IN THE EAST A SKY-SHOUT AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT AT, A YOUTH WAS ABDUCTED, TWO ARMS CACHES WERE LOCATED AND 10 CAPTURES WERE REPORTED. THERE WERE 21,497 IN THE ASSEMBLY PLACES THIS MORNING AFTER 617 Z I P R A HAD BEEN MOVED TO ESSEXVALE OVERNIGHT FOR TRAINING.
2. THE TRAINING FOR THE Z I P R A FORCES AT ESSEXVALE HAS STARTED AND SO FAR THE WHOLE OPERATION HAS BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL. Z A N L A ARE KEEN TO FOLLOW THE SAME COURSE AND ARE MERELY WAITING FOR A SUITABLE CAMP TO BE FOUND.
3. ON THE EVE OF THE POLL THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE DEPLOYED HEAVILY ARMED GROUPS, INCLUDING ARMoured CARS, TO SENSITIVE AREAS OF SALISBURY.

MT

Group/Class..... PREM 19.....

Piece..... 345.....

Commonwealth Secretariat papers:
CSA (80) 3rd Meeting, Minutes,
21 February 1980

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 22 July 2010.....

(Signed)..... D. Wayland.....

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

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FM SALISBURY 261047Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 823 OF 26 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK LUSAKA NAIROBI MAPUTO OTTAWA GABORONE
DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS MONROVIA WELLINGTON WASHINGTON CAPE TOWN
CANNBERRA E E C POSTS ADDIS ABABA

Read in full

RHODESIA: NKOMO'S VIEWS

1. I SAW NKOMO THIS MORNING AND EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT I DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE ACTION TO DISQUALIFY Z A N U (P F) IN ANY DISTRICT: OR TO DISENFRANCHISE ANY DISTRICT.
2. NKOMO ASKED HOW WE COULD SAY THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE FREE AND FAIR WHEN HE AND HIS PARTY AND OTHER PARTIES HAD BEEN COMPLETELY UNABLE TO CAMPAIGN IN LARGE PURTS OF MANICALAND, VICTORIA PROVINCE AND SOME PARTS OF THE MIDLANDS. Z A N L A WERE EVEN PREVENTING HIS PARTY CAMPAIGNING IN SOME T T L S IN MATABELELAND SOUTH. TWO

MORE OF HIS PARTY WORKERS HAD BEEN MURDERED BY Z A N L A YESTERDAY.

3. I TOLD NKOMO THAT I WAS EXTREMELY UNHAPPY ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH Z A N U (P F) HAD CONDUCTED THEMSELVES DURING THE CAMPAIGN. BUT I HAD CONCLUDED THAT IF I TOOK ACTION AGAINST THEM BEFORE THE ELECTIONS THIS WOULD GIVE MUGABE AN EXCUSE NOT TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME AND IT WOULD AFFECT INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESULT. I ADDED THAT IN ANY EVENT I WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE CALLING ON THE LEADER OF THE LARGEST SINGLE PARTY TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD BE FOR ME TO DISCERN WHO WAS BEST ABLE TO FORM THE COALITION LIKELY TO COMMAND A MAJORITY IN THE ASSEMBLY. WHAT WERE HIS INTENTIONS?

4. NKOMO INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEMS OF REVERTING TO AN ALLIANCE WITH MUGABE. HE REMAINS BITTER ABOUT MUGABE'S CONDUCT. HE SPOKE ANGRILY ABOUT NYERERE'S ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE HIS OWN SORT OF SOLUTION HERE AND ABOUT THE STATEMENT BY THE NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THAT AFRICA WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE RESULT IF MUGABE WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GOVERNMENT.

5. NKOMO SAID THAT IN ORDER TO TAKE THE WIND OUT OF THE SAILS OF NYERERE AND HIS ILK IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESENT CAREFULLY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE BRINGING TOGETHER OF THE ARMED FORCES. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO PLAN FOR THE MOMENT WHEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE OR NECESSARY TO TRY TO WIN OVER SOME ELEMENTS OF Z A N L A. WE AGREED THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING CLEAR TODAY THAT - AS IS THE CASE - THE SAME OFFER IS OPEN TO Z A N L A FORCES AND THAT WE ARE TAKING STEPS TO PUT IT INTO EFFECT.

6. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH A REASONABLY GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US. NKOMO IS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH WALLS AND THE WHITES. I BELIEVE THAT HE REALISES THAT AN ATTEMPT TO REVERT TO A SIMPLE PATRIOTIC FRONT ALLIANCE IN ITS OLD FORM WOULD PROVOKE VERY STRONG REACTIONSE HERE. THE EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON HIM TO DO SO WILL MOUNT QUICKLY AND HE IS VERY CONCERNED THAT MUGABE WILL GET MORE SEATS THAN HE DOES. THERE IS ALSO A MAJOR PROBLEM TO BE OVERCOME IN TERMS OF THE PERSONAL RIVALRY BETWEEN HIM AND MUZOREWA.

7. KOMO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD PLAN FOR HIM IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTIONS TO VISIT THE REMAINING Z I P R A ASSEMBLY PLACES TO GIVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS FORCES TO STAY PUT. HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SENIOR RHODESIAN OFFICER (PROBABLY GENERAL MCCLEAN) AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MONITORING FORCE. WALLS HAS AGREED THAT A SIMILAR OFFER SHOULD BE MADE TO MUGABE THIS AFTERNOON.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/IR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 261333Z

TO PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO. 225 OF 26 FEBRUARY 1980

REPEATED TO PRIORITY KINSHASA, SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, LUANDA,
GABORONE, MAPUTO, WASHINGTON
ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, ADDIS ABABA, LAGOS.

KINSHASA TEL NO. 40 (NOT TO ALL): ZAIRE/RHODESIA/ZAMBIA

Foreign Minister of Zaire.

1. ALONG WITH US, FRENCH, BELGIAN AND WEST GERMAN HEADS OF MISSION,
I SPENT AN HOUR THIS MORNING WITH NGUZA. HE WISHED TO DISCUSS
WITH US THREE SUBJECTS:

- A) RHODESIA; B) THE ZAMBIAN ACQUISITION OF SOVIET ARMS AND;
- C) THE ZAIRE/ZAMBIAN BORDER.

2. ON RHODESIA NGUZA WAS PLAINLY FURIOUS WITH NYERERE - AND EQUALLY
CONTENT WITH KAUNDA'S ATTITUDE WHICH PARALLELED ZAIRE'S. HE HAD
SPENT TWO HOURS WITH KAUNDA YESTERDAY AND HAD FOUND THAT
DESPITE "ANXIETIES" HE WAS HOLDING TO HIS POSITION THAT THE
PEOPLE OF RHODESIA SHOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THEIR FUTURE GOVERNMENT
FREELY. IN CONTRAST, NYERERE WAS HANDICAPPING THOSE AFRICAN
COUNTRIES THAT WISHED TO KEEP BRITAIN UP TO THE MARK IN PROVIDING
FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN THAT NYERERE WAS HIMSELF SHOWING AN
INTOLERABLE BIAS. KAUNDA HAD AGREED THAT NYERERE WAS UNHELPFUL
AND SAID THAT NO JUDGMENT COULD BE PASSED UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION
AT WHICH STAGE HE (KAUNDA) WOULD PLACE GREAT WEIGHT ON THE REPORT
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS. HE HAD FOUND KAUNDA INCLINED TO

AND SAID THAT NO JUDGMENT COULD BE PASSED UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION AT WHICH STAGE HE (KAUNDA) WOULD PLACE GREAT WEIGHT ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS. HE HAD FOUND KAUNDA INCLINED TO FAVOUR A COALITION OF ALL THE PARTIES IN A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. NYERERE ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS THREATENING TO SPLIT THE FRONT LINE STATES AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE BUT IN FACT ACCORDING TO NGUZA, THIS HARDLY MATTERED AS THE FRONT LINE STATES' INFLUENCE WOULD QUICKLY MELT AWAY ONCE THE ELECTIONS HAD BEEN HELD AND THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF RHODESIA EXPERIENCED AN INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION.

3. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WHICH ZAIRE HAD PLAYED BOTH AT ADDIS ABABA AND EARLIER AND THANKED THE MINISTER FOR THIS RE-AFFIRMATION OF THE ZAIREAN POSITION. I TOLD HIM THAT DESPITE THE MANY DIFFICULTIES IT NOW LOOKED, IN MY PERSONAL OPINION, AS THOUGH THE ELECTION WOULD TAKE PLACE THROUGHOUT RHODESIA WITHOUT ANY PARTY OR INDIVIDUAL BEING BANNED (NOT FEELING ABLE TO GO FURTHER THAN A PERSONAL RENDERING OF SALISBURY TEL NO. 804 IN VIEW OF ZAIRE'S NON-FRONT LINE STATE STATUS). I TOLD HIM ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENTS AT ESSEXVALE AND ADDED THAT WHEN WE STOOD WITHIN 24 HOURS OF THE ELECTIONS FOR WHICH EVERYONE HAD FOUGHT SO HARD, I WAS SURE THAT WE COULD COUNT ON ZAIRE'S CONTINUING SUPPORT WHICH COULD PROVE IMPORTANT IN VIEW OF HIS FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS WITH MACHEL.

4. TURNING TO THE SOVIET ARMS DEAL, NGUZA SAID THAT KAUNDA HAD GONE THROUGH HIS USUAL LITANY OF EXCUSES ABOUT WESTERN INACTION IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THESE PURCHASES. HE HAD INSISTED THAT THE ARMS HAD BEEN BOUGHT ON STRICTLY COMMERCIAL TERMS. THERE WAS NO ELEMENT OF GIFT AND HE WOULD EXPECT NO POLITICAL STRINGS. ZAMBIA WAS DETERMINED TO REMAIN NON-ALIGNED. THE US AMBASSADOR INTERVENED TO SAY THAT KAUNDA HAD WRITTEN IN SIMILAR TERMS TO PRESIDENT CARTER. HE SAID THAT WHILST IT WAS THE WISH OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION TO RETAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ZAMBIA, HE HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO POINT OUT TO KAUNDA THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT ALWAYS CONTROL PUBLIC OPINION OR CONGRESS AND THAT THE ZAMBIAN MOVE WOULD OCCASION DIFFICULTIES PARTICULARLY POST AFGHANISTAN. I ADDED THAT WE, FOR OUR PART, WERE QUITE CLEAR THAT WE HAD HONOURED THE TERMS OF THE KANO AGREEMENT AND ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNISED THAT THERE MIGHT BE AREAS IN WHICH PRESIDENT KAUNDA FELT LESS THAN HAPPY, WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAD PROVIDED AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE AND THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO TRUTH IN KAUNDA'S SAYING THAT WE HAD GIVEN THE RHODESIANS AN ACCOUNT OF ZAMBIA'S AIR DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS SO INVITING RHODESIAN ATTACKS ON ZAMBIA.

5. ON THE ZAMBIAN/ZAIRE BORDER QUESTION, NGUZA DECLARED HIMSELF

5. ON THE ZAMBIAN/ZAIRE BORDER QUESTION, NGUZA DECLARED HIMSELF
CONTENT WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE WHICH WOULD PERMIT CROSS-BORDER
INSPECTIONS TO ENSURE THAT NO BUILD UP OR MOVEMENT OF INSURGENTS
WAS TAKING PLACE.

6. NGUZA THROUGHOUT WAS FRIENDLY AND AT PAINS TO SHOW HIMSELF
AND MOBUTU DEDICATED TO COOPERATION WITH THE WEST.

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RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES] 25

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MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELN 0 204 OF 26 FEB
INFOR IMMEDIATE SALISBURY LUSAKA MAPUTO LUANDA LAGOS GABORONE
ADDIS ABABA
PRIORITY CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEWYORK

RHODESIA

1. THE MAIN NEWS STORY TODAY, 26 FEB, IS PRESIDENT NYERERE'S PRESS CONFERENCE HELD YESTERDAY. THE DAILY NEWS HEADLINE IS "RHODESIA POLLS WILL BE RIGGED". NYERERE IS QUOTED AS SAYING " I BELIEVE THAT BRITAIN WILL ACTUALLY RIG THE ELECTIONS. THE RESULTS THAT ARE GOING TO BE ANNOUNCED BY THE GOVERNOR ARE GOING TO BE RIGGED RESULTS". ACCUSING BRITIAN OF ABUSING THE TRUST OF THE COMMONWEALTH, NYERERE SPOKE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT "PROSTITUTING THE HONOUR OF THE COMMONWEALTH". HE WENT ON TO SAY " WE CANNOT ACCEPT A GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA

WHICH IS THE RESULT OF COLLUSION BETWEEN BRITISH RACIST, RHODESIAN RACISTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN RACISTS''. BRITAIN HAD ASKED TO BE TRUSTED TO SUPERVISE THE ELECTIONS AND THE COMMONWEALTH HAS DECIDED TO TRUST THE BRITISH AND INDEED TO PERSUADE THE LEADERS OF THE PF TO TRUST THEM: ''NOW I MUST SAY I BELIEVE THE WHOLE THING WAS A TRICK''. NYERERE ALSO REHEARSED AT LENGTH THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS, THE USE OF THE AUXILIARIES AND THE GOVERNORS BIAS AGAINST MR MUGABE.

2. BOTH THE DAILY NEWS AND UHURU ALSO CARRY EDITORIALS VIRTUALLY REPEATING WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TO SAY.

3. COPIES OF THE DAILY NEWS ARTICLE, WHICH IS AN ALMOST VERBATIM ACCOUNT OF NYERERE'S STATEMENT (BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL HIS REPLIES TO QUESTIONS) BY NEXT BAG TO FCO

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 160 OF 26 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, PRETORIA (FOR D A)

YOUR TEL NO 585 TO SALISBURY (NOT TO PRETORIA):

RHODESIA: REFUGEES

1. PIK BOTHA RAISED THIS QUESTION WITH ME YESTERDAY EVENING. HE SAID HE HOPED, INDEED HE ASSUMED, THAT WE WOULD BE READY TO SHARE THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE S A G IF THE WORST CAME TO THE WORST AND STREAMS OF REFUGEES, WHITE AND BLACK, Poured out of Rhodesia into South Africa in the aftermath of the election. AS I KNEW THEY HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION WITH US BEFORE.

2. I DID NOT GIVE HIM A DIRECT ANSWER. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS SOMETHING WE SHOULD DISCUSS WITH THEM AND THAT SIR A DUFF'S MEETING WITH HIM ON THURSDAY MORNING WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO. HE AGREED.

3. PIK WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY EXERCISED ABOUT BLACK REFUGEES AND HE REMINDED ME THAT ABOUT A MILLION HAD COME TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM ANGOLA IN 1975. HE SAID THAT HE HAD MENTIONED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THIS TO M. FRANCOIS-PONCET LAST WEEK IN PARIS. IF NECESSARY, SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AFTER THEM TEMPORARILY BUT IT COULD NOT ABSORB ANOTHER INFLUX OF THE SAME ORDER.

4. PIK ONCE AGAIN SAID THAT IF IT BECAME CLEAR THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEND IN TROOPS TO RESCUE FLEEING REFUGEES THE S A G WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD BACK. I SAID THAT EVEN IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH ACTION WOULD BE MISREPRESENTED AND ATTACKED ALL OVER THE WORLD. HE SAID THAT HE REALISED THIS, BUT WOULD EXPECT US TO SUPPORT THEM. AFTER ALL, THEY WOULD BE HELPING US OUT. SURELY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT AFFORD TO ALLOW ITS CITIZENS TO BE KILLED AND MAIMED? AGAIN I SAID THAT WE SHOULD TALK FURTHER ABOUT ALL THIS.

5. WE NOW HAVE THE OPENING FOR A FRANK DISCUSSION OF THIS WHOLE PROBLEM WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 260615Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 155 OF 26 FEBRUARY 1980

AND TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

YOUR TELNO 605 TO SALISBURY AND MY TELNO 152: RHODESIA: ACTION AFTER THE ELECTIONS

1. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT DURING DUDGEON'S CALL ON THE ACTING SECRETARY, DFA LAST NIGHT, PARSONS HINTED STRONGLY THAT IF, IN THE EVENT OF ZANU (PF) EMERGING AS THE LARGEST SINGLE PARTY IN THE ELECTIONS, MUGABE WERE EXCLUDED FROM GOVERNMENT, WE SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE AUSTRALIAN RECOGNITION OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT FOR GRANTED.

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 260645Z FEB 80
TO FLASH SALISBURY
TEL NO 24 OF 26 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

SALISBURY TEL NO 794

RHODESIA: THE ELECTION

PIK BOTHA ASKED ME TO CALL YESTERDAY EVENING. I AM REPORTING OTHER PARTS OF THE CONVERSATION SEPARATELY. THIS TELEGRAM DEALS WITH HIS URGENT ADVICE THAT YOU SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) USE YOUR POWERS TO PREVENT VOTING TAKING PLACE IN SPECIFIC LOCALITIES.

2. PIK'S REASONS FOR SAYING THIS WERE THREEFOLD:

FIRST IT WOULD NOT ACHIEVE VERY MUCH; SECONDLY IT MIGHT HARM THE PARTIES - IT WAS MEANT TO HELP - "THE WAYS OF AFRICAN POLITICS ARE STRANGE"; THIRDLY IT WOULD PROVOKE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM. I WAS SURPRISED BY THIS AND PROBED TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS REALLY ON HIS MIND, BUT HE WOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER. I TOLD HIM THAT YOU HAD BEEN GIVING CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THIS QUESTION AND THAT SPEAKING OFF THE CUFF I BELIEVED THE DECISION WOULD COME DOWN AGAINST USING YOUR POWERS. BUT IT WAS A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM AND YOU WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE LIKELY REACTIONS OF MUZOREWA AND WALLS. HE TOOK THIS POINT ALL RIGHT AND SAID THAT HE HOPED YOU WOULD ANNOUNCE IN ADVANCE OF THE VOTING THAT YOU WOULD ONLY DECIDE AFTER IT HAD ENDED WHETHER THE ELECTION HAD BEEN FREE AND FAIR. THERE WAS, HE THOUGHT, SOME ADVANTAGE IN LEAVING SOME DOUBT IN PEOPLE'S MINDS WHAT YOUR DECISION ON THIS WOULD BE. I SAID I WOULD PASS THIS ON.

3. THIS SHOULD GIVE DUFF THE OPENING TO ASK PIK BOTHA WHEN HE SEES HIM ON THURSDAY MORNING TO USE HIS INFLUENCE ON MUZOREWA AND WALLS TO ACT SENSIBLY.

LEAHY

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MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
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**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
21 PRINCE'S GATE
LONDON SW7 1QB

TEL. 01-589 9405
01-589 2264

357-3a-05-80 SERIAL No. **T88/80**

25th February, 1980

Rec'd by FCO telegram

Madam Prime Minister,

I have the honour, most respectfully, to transcribe hereunder, text of a telegraphic message from President William R. Tolbert, Jr, addressed to your goodself:-

Am

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON ON THE EVE OF ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE CMA I GREET YOU ONCE AGAIN IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF LIBERIA AND IN MY CAPACITY AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY STOP GRAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED BY AFRICA AS REFLECTED IN RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA CMA THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE OAU RECENTLY HELD IN ADDIS ABABA AS WELL AS PRONOUNCEMENTS BY MANY AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE FROM THEIR CAPITALS STOP THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THESE ACTIONS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS HAS BEEN TO ENSURE THE FULL AND IMPARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT BY YOUR GOVERNMENT CMA THE ADMINISTERING POWER STOP THAT IS WHY AFRICA HAS NOT HESITATED TO CALL ATTENTION TO MEASURES TAKEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNOR IN RHODESIA EVEN AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTIGENT FROM BEIT BRIDGE CMA THE IMPEDED REPATRIATION OF ZIMBABWEAN REFUGEES AND EXILES AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF RHODESIAN SECURITY AND AUXILIARY FORCES WHICH HAVE LED TO REPORTED INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE CMA HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION STOP IT IS OUR EARNEST HOPE CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA THAT DESPITE MANY DIFFICULTIES CMA YOUR GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAS SUCCEEDED IN TAKING THE NECESSARY ACTIONS

...../2..

The Rt. Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON S.W. 1.



EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
21 PRINCE'S GATE
LONDON SW7 1QB


TEL. 01-589 9405
01-589 2264

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THAT WILL BRING TO AN END ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BY ANY OF THE PARTIES THERETO AND THEREBY CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE IN ZIMBABWE CONDUCIVE TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS STOP IT WOULD BE OF GREAT CREDIT TO YOUR COUNTRY AND PARTICULARLY TO YOUR GOVERNMENT IF THE RHODESIAN QUESTION WHICH HAS PLAGUED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR SO LONG COULD BE PEACEFULLY RESOLVED AS ENVISAGED UNDER THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT STOP WE ARE OF COURSE COMMITTED TO RESPECT ONLY THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE FREELY AND FAIRLY EXPRESSED BY THEM STOP THUS OUR CONSUMING CONCERN CMA AS MANIFESTED IN OUR VARIOUS EXCHANGES WITH YOU CMA HAS BEEN THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DISRUPT THE COURSE SO PAINSTAKINGLY CHARTED IN LONDON BY WHICH INDEPENDENCE WITH MAJORITY RULE IS TO BE ATTAINED IN ZIMBABWE THROUGH THE ELECTION OF A GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD MERIT THE RESPECT AND RECOGNITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY STOP THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE WHO HAVE SUFFERED THROUGH MANY YEARS FOR THIS NOBLE OBJECTIVE DESERVE NOTHING LESS STOP FOR US IN AFRICA CMA IT WOULD BE A GOOD GESTURE ON THE PART OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THE TEAM FROM THE OAU SECRETARIAT CMA WHICH HAS BEEN INVITED TO WITNESS THE ELECTIONS CMA TO REMAIN IN RHODESIA A FEW DAYS THEREAFTER SO THAT THEY WOULD BE PRESENT IN THE TERRITORY WHEN THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS ARE ANNOUNCED SINCE THEY WILL BE ARRIVING IN RHODESIA BARELY TWO DAYS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS COMMENCE STOP WE DO NOT PERCEIVE THAT THIS SHOULD CAUSE ANY INCONVENIENCE TO THE GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA STOP AS WE LOOK FORWARD WITH GREAT OPTIMISM TO USHERING THE NEW NATION OF ZIMBABWE INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CMA LET ME TAKE THIS OCCASION TO ONCE AGAIN WISH FOR YOU ABOUNDANT SUCCESS IN ALL THAT YOU SHALL DO FOR THE PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY CMA FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE EQUITABLE AND JUST WORLD ORDER AND FOR THE PROMOTION OF FREEDOM AND HUMAN DIGNITY FOR OPPRESSED PEOPLE STOP PLEASE ACCEPT CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA THE RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM SINCERELY

W. R. TOLBERT JR
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA AND
CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU"

Please accept, Madam Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest esteem and consideration.


Francis A. Dennis
AMBASSADOR

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THE RT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER PRIME MINISTER OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND NORTHERN IRELAND 10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1

MADAM PRIME MINISTER COLON ON THE EVE OF ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE
GMA I GREET YOU ONCE AGAIN IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
PEOPLE OF LIBERIA AND IN MY CAPACITY

Rec'd by F. Co. Ulegan -
La. [Signature]

PAGE 2/50 WRDS

AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY STOP
GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED
BY AFRICA AS REFLECTED IN RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY
COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

PAGE 3/50 WRDS

OF MINISTERS OF THE OAU RECENTLY HELD IN ADDIS ABABA AS WELL AS
PRONOUNCEMENTS BY MANY AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE FROM THEIR CAPITALS
STOP THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THESE ACTIONS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS
HAS BEEN TO ENSURE THE FULL AND IMPATIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE

AGREEMENT BY YOUR GOVERNMENT GMA THE ADMINISTERING POWER STOP
THAT IS WHY AFRICA HAS NOT HESITATED TO CALL ATTENTION TO MEASURES
TAKEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA WHICH DO NOT CONFORM
TO PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT SUCH AS THE CONTINUED PRESENCE
OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AND MERCENARIES IN RHODESIA

PAGE 5/50 WRDS

EVEN AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTINGENT FROM
BEIT BRIDGE CHA THE IMPEDED REPATRIATION OF ZIMBABWEAN REFUGEES
AND EXILES AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF RHODESIAN SECURITY AND AUXILIARY
FORCES WHICH HAVE LED TO REPORTED INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE GMA
HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION STOP IT IS OUR EARNEST HOPE GMA MADAM

PAGE 6/50 WRDS

PRIME MINISTER GMA THAT DESPITE MMANY DIFFICULTIES GMA YOUR
GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAS SUCCEEDED IN TAKING THE NECESSARY ACTIONS
THAT WILL BRING TO AN END ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BY
ANY OF THE PARTIES THERETO AND THEREBY CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE IN
ZIMBABWE CONDUCIVE TO FREE AND FIAR ELECTIONS STOP IT

PAGE 7/50 WRDS

WOULD BE OF GREAT CREDIT TO YOUR COUNTRY AND PARTICULARLY TO
YOUR GOVERNMENT IF THE RHODESIAN QUESTION WHICH HAS PLAQUED
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR SO LOING COULD BE PEACEFULLY
RESOLVED AS ENVISAGED UNDER THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT STOP
WE ARE OF COURSE COMMITTED TO RESPECT ONLY THE CHOICE OF THE

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PAGE 8/50

PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE FREELY AND FAIRLY EXPRESSED BY THEM STOP
THUS OUR CONSUMING CONCERN CMA AS MANIFESTED IN OUR VARIOUS
EXCHANGES WITH YOU CMA HAS BEEN THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE ALLOWED
TO DISRUPT THE COURSE SO PAINSTAKINGLY CHARTED IN LONDON
BY WHICH INDEPENDENCE WITH MAJORITY RULE IS TO BE ATTAINED

PAGE 9/50

IN ZIMBABWE THROUGH THE ELECTION OF A GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD
MERIT THE RESPECT AND RECOGNITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
STOP THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE WHO HAVE SUFFERED THROUGH MANY
YEARS FOR THIS NOBLE OBJECTIVE DESERVE NOTHING LESS STOP FOR
US IN AFRICA CMA IT WOULD BE A GOOD GESTURE ON

PAGE 10/50

THE PART OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THE TEAM FROM THE OAU
SECRETARIAT CMA WHICH HAS BEEN INVITED TO WITNESS THE ELECTIONS
CMA TO REMAIN IN RHODESIA A FEW DAYS THEREAFTER SO THAT THEY
WOULD BE PRESENT IN THE TERRITORY WHEN THE RESULTS OF THE
ELECTIONS ARE ANNOUNCED SINCE THEY

PAGE 11/50

WILL BE ARRIVING IN RHODESIA BARELY TWO DAYS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS
COMMENCE STOP WE DO NOT PERCEIVE THAT THIS SHOULD CAUSE ANY
INCONVENIENCE TO THE GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA STOP
AS WE LOOK FORWARD WITH GREAT OPTIMISM TO USHERING THE NEW NATIONS
OF ZIMBABWE INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CMA LET

PAGE 12/50

WE TAKE THIS OCCASION TO ONCE AGAIN WISH FOR YOU ABUNDANT
SUCCESS IN ALL THAT YOU SHALL DO FOR THE PRESERVATION OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY CMA FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A MORE EQUITABLE AND JUST WORLD ORDER AND FOR THE PROMOTION
OF FREEDOM AND HUMAN DIGNITY FOR OPPRESSED

PAGE 13/34

PEOPLES STOP PLEASE ACCEPT CMA MADAM PRIME MINISTER CMA THE
RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM
SINCERELY

WR TOLBERT JR PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

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FM SALISBURY 251802Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 816 OF 25 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA

PRETORIA CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA

PRIORITY OTTAWA WELLINGTON NAIROBI SUVA

RHODESIA: SITREP 23, 24 AND 25 FEBRUARY

1. THE PATTERN OF A HIGH LEVEL OF CONTACTS AND SHOOTINGS CONTINUES, ALTHOUGH SUNDAY WAS QUIETER. DURING THE LAST 3 DAYS THERE WERE

24 CONTACTS, 13 SHOOTINGS, TWO MURDERS, ONE HOMESTEAD ATTACK, ONE ABDUCTION AND ONE EXPLOSION. THERE WERE THREE INCIDENTS INVOLVING JUNIOR HOME AFFAIRS OFFICIALS: ONE RAN AMOK WITH A RIFLE, KILLING 4 AND WOUNDING ONE OTHER BEFORE SHOOTING HIMSELF; ANOTHER HAS BEEN HELD ON 7 CHARGES OF ATTEMPTED MURDER AND ONE DISTRICT ASSISTANT WHO WAS REPRIMANDED FOR RETURNING LATE WENT BERSERK AND SHOT TWO OF HIS SUPERIORS. SEVERAL ARMS CACHES HAVE BEEN FOUND, INCLUDING ONE WITH SOME EXPLOSIVE. THERE WAS A REPORT OF INDISCRIMINATE FIRING BY DRUNKEN FARM MILITIA MEN. IN ONE OF THE MURDER INCIDENTS TWO ARMED Z A N L A GUERRILLAS ENTERED A BEER HALL WHERE A FILM WAS BEING SHOWN AND SHOT A MAN WHO RAN OFF. TWO MONITORING FORCE OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ASSAULTED BY WHITES IN UMTALI.

2. THERE WAS A BOMB EXPLOSION IN GWELO WHICH DESTROYED THE OFFICES OF THE MAMBO PRESS WHICH PUBLISHES MOTO, A ROMAN CATHOLIC NEWSPAPER. TWO UNIDENTIFIED BODIES WERE FOUND, ONE OF WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN WHITE. NKOMO HAS BLAMED THE SELOUS SCOUTS AND COMOPS HAVE NOT DENIED THIS. A FIRE FORCE WAS DEPLOYED NEAR ASSEMBLY POINT DELTA THIS MORNING TO PROTECT SECURITY FORCE ENGINEERS WHO WERE OPERATING CLOSE TO THE ASSEMBLY POINT IN CASE OF A STRIKE BY THE Z A N L A PERSONNEL.

3. THE NUMBERS REPORTED IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS ARE FLUCTUATING. THIS MORNING THE NUMBER WAS 22,113.

4. 650 Z I P R A GUERRILLAS ARE BEING MOVED OUT FROM ASSEMBLY POINT LIMA TO ESSEXVALE FOR TRAINING. THE NEW ZEALANDERS WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THEM THERE AND THE TRAINING WILL BE DONE BY A TEAM OF ^{COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE MEN AND A GROUP OF} 25 RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL. THE REST OF THE MEN IN THE ASSEMBLY POINT ARE BEING MOVED TO JULIET. UNFORTUNATELY, MOVEMENT TODAY HAS BEEN SEVERELY DISRUPTED BY BAD WEATHER. ASSEMBLY POINT KILO IS CLOSING TOMORROW AND THE MEN ARE MOVING TO JULIET. THERE IS NOW A SECURITY FORCE PRESENCE IN ASSEMBLY POINTS ECHO AND FOXTROT, AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE WEEKEND TOURING BY THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION. ALL IS GOING VERY WELL IN THESE TWO ASSEMBLY POINTS, ALTHOUGH NOW THERE ARE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE POLICE COMMISSIONER OVER POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN THIS PROGRAMME.

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MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

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FROM SALISBURY 251415Z FEB 80

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 809 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1980

AND TO F L A S H DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO LUSAKA GABORONE AND LUANDA

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LAGOS NAIROBI EEC POSTS
CANNBERRA WELLINGTON OTTAWA AND SUVA.

MY TELNO 804: RHODESIAN ELECTIONS.

1. H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FRONT LINE POSTS MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION TELL GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT I SHALL WISH TO MAKE USE OF THE POWER TO DISQUALIFY A PARTY IN ANY ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT; OR TO DECIDE THAT ELECTIONS CANNOT BE HELD IN ANY DISTRICT.
2. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT I HAVE TAKEN THIS DECISION DESPITE THE EXTENSIVE INTIMIDATION BY ZANLA, WHICH HAS RENDERED IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR NKOMO AND MUZOREWA TO CAMPAIGN IN CERTAIN AREAS.
3. THE DECISION HAS BEEN BASED ON THE CONSIDERATION THAT ANY ACTION OF THIS KIND IS LIABLE TO BE REGARDED AS ARBITRARY; AND I DO NOT WISH TO GIVE EXTERNAL CRITICS, AND PARTICULARLY THE FRONT LINE PRSIDENTS, ANY EXCUSE TO ARGUE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE NOT FREE AND FAIR.

4. THOUGH THIS DECISION WILL MAKE LIFE DIFFICULT IN THE NEXT DAYS, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN THE LONG-TERM AND WIDER INTEREST OF RHODESIA THAT IT BE TAKEN.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL POSTS

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FM SALISBURY 251030Z FEB 80

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 804 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1980

AND TO FLASH DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LAGOS NAIROBI EEC POSTS
CANBERRA WELLINGTON OTTAWA SUVA AND CAPE TOWN.

RHODESIA: POSSIBLE FRONT LINE MEETING

1. WE UNDERSTAND THAT, NYERERE HAS CALLED A FRONT LINE MEETING TO DISCUSS RHODESIA IN DAR ES SALAAM TOMORROW. THIS WILL PRESUMABLY BE ANOTHER OF HIS ATTEMPTS (FOLLOWING THE ACTION INSPIRED BY HIM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND AT THE OAU) TO INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENTS HERE IN THE DIRECTION OF MUGABE.

2. IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR HM REPRESENTATIVES, AS THEY THINK NECESSARY, TO SPEAK TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. WE ARE NOW TWO DAYS OFF THE ELECTIONS. THE VERY SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE ARISEN IN THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD HAVE, TO A LARGE EXTENT, BEEN OVERCOME. WE ARE REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT HOLDING THE ELECTIONS IN PEACEFUL CONDITIONS AND IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE AS FREE AND FAIR AS CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR:

B. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS PERIOD. THERE HAS BEEN SOME COMING TOGETHER OF THE PARTIES PREVIOUSLY ENGAGED IN THE CONFLICT. WE ARE MAKING A START WITH THE PROCESS OF BRINGING ZIPRA AND ZANLA INTO A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RHODESIAN FORCES, THEREBY WE HOPE CREATING A BASIS FOR COOPERATION AFTER THE ELECTIONS:

C. (FOR GABORONE, LUSAKA AND, AS NECESSARY, LUANDA ONLY)
NKOMO IN PARTICULAR HAS PLAYED A STATESMANLIKE ROLE. HE HAS IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONSTANTLY REITERATED THAT THE WAR IS OVER, THE NEED FOR RECONCILIATION AND TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE FUTURE. THIS HAS ALSO BEEN THE LINE OF RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY MUZOREWA (AND WALLS):

D. (AS NECESSARY)

WE HAVE EXPERIENCED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN THIS PERIOD IN A NUMBER OF AREAS, INCLUDING THE WITHHOLDING OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ZANLA PERSONNEL FROM THE ASSEMBLY PLACES: THE CONTINUANCE OF THE WAR IN A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE ZANLA-DOMINATED AREAS: AND SYSTEMATIC POLITICAL INTIMIDATION (TO TAKE BUT ONE RECENT INCIDENT, THIRTEEN PARTY WORKERS RECENTLY SENT BY NKOMO INTO THE MTOKO TTL, WHICH IS INFESTED BY ZANLA, HAVE SIMPLY DISAPPEARED). IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR NKOMO OR OTHER PARTIES TO CAMPAIGN IN CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY.

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E. NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION IN THE LAST TWO TO THREE WEEKS. THIS MEANS THAT WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO HOLD THE ELECTIONS IN REASONABLY FAIR AND SECURE CONDITIONS. OUR OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION IS THAT THE ELECTION RESULTS MUST FAITHFULLY REFLECT THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY.

F. THE CHOICE OF THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE IS OUT OF OUR HANDS (AND THOSE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS) AND IS UP TO THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY. THEY WILL EXPRESS THEIR CHOICE. WE MUST AWAIT THE RESULTS. WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES MUST COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY. IT IS EMPHATICALLY NOT THE BUSINESS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK TO INTERVENE.

3. IF YOU ARE ASKED ABOUT MY STATEMENT, IN REPLY TO A PRESS ENQUIRY YESTERDAY, THAT I WOULD NOT NECESSARILY CALL ON THE LARGEST PARTY TO FORM A GOVERNMENT, YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I SHALL SEE THE LEADERS OF ALL THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES THAT EMERGE FROM THE ELECTIONS, AND IT WILL BE UP TO THEM TO DECIDE HOW (IF A COALITION IS NECESSARY) THEY MEAN TO COALESCE IN ORDER TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. OUR OWN HOPE OF COURSE IS THAT THE MOST STABLE POSSIBLE COALITION WILL BE FORMED. THIS IS THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE THAT THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT REFLECTS AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY. IT IS ALSO THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE AGAINST THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR. BUT IT WILL NOT BE MY BUSINESS TO DICTATE TO THE POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE NEWLY ELECTED ASSEMBLY.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 25 FEBRUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO.

INFO PRIORITY GABORONE, LAGOS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAPE TOWN.

Read in full

(Mr Shore seems to have spoken well.)

MR PETER SHORE'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA

1. I TOOK MR SHORE TO CALL ON PRESIDENT KAUNDA THIS MORNING. IN A BRIEF OPENING PASSAGE KAUNDA REFERRED TO HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN WHICH HE HAD SET OUT HIS "ANXIETIES". THESE WERE ON FAMILIAR LINES (THE DEPLOYMENT OF AUXILIARIES, THE GOVERNOR'S SUBORDINATION TO GENERAL WALLS, AND THE FAILURE TO "CONFINE" THE SECURITY FORCES IN KEEPING WITH THE "SPIRIT" OF LANCASTER HOUSE) BUT HIS MAJOR PREOCCUPATION WAS WITH THE PRESENCE OF AND THREAT POSED BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA. HE EMPHASISED THAT MUCH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF AT THIS STAGE ALL WAS TO BE LOST BECAUSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS' ROLE.

2. MR SHORE REPLIED IN SPIRITED FASHION. WHILST HIS INITIAL VISIT TO SALISBURY HAD BEEN SHORT HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE THREE MAJOR PARTIES

(A) ALL THOUGHT THEY WOULD WIN AND

(B) ALL THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE BEING PARTICULARLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST.

IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM KAUNDA MR SHORE SAID THAT MUZOREWA CERTAINLY FELT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN THAT HE COMPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNOR HAD FAILED TO MAKE USE OF THE POWERS WHICH HE HAD TO CONTROL OTHERS WHO WERE MISBEHAVING. MR SHORE WENT ON TO DRAW ON A CONVERSATION IN WHICH CHINAMANO HAD INSTANCED TO HIM THE VICTORIA AREA, MOASHONALAND AND MANICALAND AS AREAS WHERE DUE TO ZANLA'S ACTIVITY (AND TO A LESSER DEGREE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AUXILIARIES) HIS PARTY HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY UNABLE TO CAMPAIGN. KAUNDA APPEARED TO PAY VERY CLOSE ATTENTION TO WHAT MR SHORE HAD TO SAY ABOUT INTIMIDATION AND TO BE GENUINELY IMPRESSED BY THE EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC CONVERSATIONS.

3. TURING TO THE QUESTION OF THE GOVERNOR'S DEPENDENCE ON GENERAL WALLS AND THE WHITE ESTABLISHMENT MR SHORE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A MATTER WHICH HE HAD INITIALLY FELT CONCERN ABOUT. BUT HIS VISIT TO SALISBURY HAD PERSUADED HIM THAT IN CRITICAL AREAS THE GOVERNOR HAD INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION, EG THE ELECTION COMMISSION AND THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE, WHICH

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/ALLOWED

ALLOWED HIM TO HAVE A SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR VIEW OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND WHICH DEFINITELY PROVIDED HIM WITH THE CAPACITY TO CHECK ON ANY SPECIFIC INSTANCE (HE CITED THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE REPORT ON THE INCIDENT AT ASSEMBLY POINT BRAVO WHERE THE RSF HAD BEEN SHOWN TO BE AT FAULT AS A RESULT OF AN INDEPENDENT REPORT AND THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER'S REPORT ON CONDITIONS AT MOUNT DARWIN WHICH HAD CORRECTED AN EARLIER RHODESIAN SITUATION REPORT). HE ALSO USED THE GOVERNOR'S RESPONSE TO THE ARREST OF MR GARFIELD TODD AS A FURTHER ILLUSTRATION OF THE GOVERNOR'S ABILITY TO ACT WHEN INFORMED OF A SITUATION BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GOVERNOR COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO OVERSEE THE ACTIONS OF EVERY STATE EMPLOYEE. MR SHORE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE BRITISH PURPOSE AND WILL TO BRING ABOUT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, AND TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE ORIGINAL PF AS A UNIT WOULD OBTAIN A MAJORITY OF THE SEATS CONTESTED.

4. KAUNDA WENT ON TO ASK ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH PRESENCE AND ON BEING TOLD THAT IT WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE A PHASED PROCESS ASKED WHAT WOULD THEN HAPPEN TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AT THE VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN WHICH THEY WERE KNOWN TO BE IN RHODESIA. MR SHORE SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TO THE NORTH END OF BEIT BRIDGE HAD BEEN "CRAZY" BUT A LOT OF WATER HAD FLOWN UNDER THAT BRIDGE AND OTHERS SINCE. HE HAD LOOKED VERY HARD IN RHODESIA FOR EVIDENCE OF DEPLOYMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS BUT HAD NOT FOUND ANY. FRANKLY HE WOULD BE VERY SURPRISED IF THEY WERE THERE IN ANY NUMBER AS IT WOULD SO DISADVANTAGE SOUTH AFRICA AND BRITAIN IF ANY UNIT WAS FOUND. MOREOVER, IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO UNCOVER SUCH UNITS GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS OF VARIOUS DESCRIPTIONS ON THE GROUND. KAUNDA SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA COMPLICATED THE POSITION. THEY WERE INHERENTLY ANTI-MARXIST AND HE FEARED WHAT THEY WOULD DO IF IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE COMBINED PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD WON THE ELECTION AND PROPOSED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT COALITION. MR SHORE SAID HE DOUBTED VERY MUCH IF SOUTH AFRICA WOULD ACT OPENLY AGAINST THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF WORLD OPINION. KAUNDA RESPONDED THAT SUCH CRITICISMS HAVE NOT STOPPED THEM BOMBING IN NAMIBIA AND ZAMBIA AND MR SHORE SAID THAT WHILST HE UNDERSTOOD THE PRESIDENT'S ANGER HE THOUGHT THAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT ONCE ONE HAD REACHED THE ELECTORAL STAGE. CHONA INTERVENED TO ASK WHAT MR SHORE MEANT BY "OPEN" INTERFERENCE BY SOUTH AFRICA. WOULD IT NOT BE EASIER TO HIDE THEM IN RHODESIAN UNIFORM? MR SHORE SAID THAT A TROJAN HORSE OF THIS NATURE WOULD BE EQUAL TO A SECOND UDI. IN HIS VIEW THE EUROPEAN POPULATION DID NOT HAVE THE WILL TO SUSTAIN A SECOND UDI AS THE BITTER EXPERIENCE OF THE FIRST UDI HAD BROUGHT THEM TO THE POSITION THEY NOW OCCUPIED. KAUNDA SAID THAT HE "HOPED AND PRAYED" THAT MR SHORE WAS RIGHT AS "WE HAVE A GREAT OPPORTUNITY AND OUR FEAR IS THAT WE SHALL LOSE IT". MR SHORE ARGUED THAT SURELY THIS WAS A GREAT STRENGTH AS THE FEAR OF LOSING THE OPPORTUNITY WAS COMMON TO ALL PARTIES. KAUNDA

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CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT SOUTH AFRICA, LIKE ZAMBIA, SHOULD PLEDGE ITSELF TO RESPECT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS AND NOT TAKE IT UPON THEMSELVES TO JUDGE THE DEGREE TO WHICH LAW AND ORDER MUST BREAKDOWN IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY INTERVENTION. I TOLD KAUNDA OF OUR APPROACH TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, IN WHICH WE HAD REMINDED THEM OF OUR OBJECTIONS TO ANY EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE RHODESIAN PROCESS.

5. COMMENT (UNDERLINED) THIS WAS AN ENCOURAGING MEETING AND I THANKED MR SHORE FOR HIS CONDUCT OF IT. KAUNDA RAISED NO NEW POINTS AND WHILST HE DWELT ON SOUTH AFRICA, AND I JUDGED HIS CONCERN TO BE GENUINE, THE IMPRESSION WE ALL GAINED WAS THAT HE WAS RE-STATING HIS POSITION AND FEARS MAINLY FOR THE RECORD RATHER THAN DEMANDING ANY FURTHER ACTION ON OUR PART OR THREATENING ACTION ON HIS PART AT THIS STAGE. THE MEETING WAS VERY WARM IN TONE WITH KAUNDA LISTENING VERY CLOSELY TO MR SHORE. HE WAS NOT COMBATIVE AND APPEARED TO WANT REASSURANCE. HE WAS TOTALLY UNEMOTIONAL AND THERE WAS NO SIGN WHATSOEVER THAT HE WANTED TO DO ANYTHING FURTHER TO ROCK THE BOAT. I SOUNDED CHONA ON ZAMBIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE FLS SUMMIT BUT RECEIVED A CRYPTIC REPLY.

NEILSON

FILES

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FUSD	NEWS D
PLANNING STAFF	PS
CCD	PS/LPS
FRD	PS/MR LUCE
ECD (E)	PS/MR RIDLEY
UND	PS/MR HURD
LEGAL ADVISERS	PS/MR MARTEN
(MR FREELAND)	PS/PUS
ECON D	SIR D MAITLAND

SIR A ACLAND
LORD N G LENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CPO

ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY

30

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/NEWS DEPT

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PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GRS 360

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANBERRA 250915Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 152 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA WASHINGTON AND UMMIS
NEW YORK

MY TELNO 146 : RHODESIA

ADVANCE COPY

1. IN MY ABSENCE ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO SYDNEY, THE MINISTER WAS SUMMONED BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE DFA THIS EVENING. PARSONS, WHO EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S INSTRUCTIONS, SAID THAT AFTER MY CONVERSATION WITH MR FRASER (REPORTED IN MY TUR) LAST FRIDAY, THE ONA AND DFA HAD BEEN ASKED TO LOOK AGAIN AT THEIR MATERIAL AND TO REVIEW THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE FACTS. THE REVIEWED ASSESSMENTS HAD NOW BEEN PUT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THEY CONFIRMED THE AUSTRALIAN VIEW THAT WE HAD NOT DONE JUSTICE TO NYERERE'S CRITICISMS. THERE WAS ENOUGH OF A GRAIN OF TRUTH IN SOME OF THEM TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AND NOT TO BE DISMISSED OUT OF HAND.

2. THE ASSESSMENT LISTED THE CONTINUING PROPOGANDA EFFORTS BY THE RSP AND THE AUXILIARIES IN DEFIANCE OF GOVERNMENT HOUSE INSTRUCTIONS, THE PROBABLE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS IN THE CHURCH

BOMBINGS, THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE CORDON SANITAIRE AROUND ASSEMBLY AREAS BY RSF FORCES AND THE UNWARRANTED ARREST OF A MUGABE AIDE (SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED) AS INSTANCES OF THE GRAIN OF TRUTH IN NYERERE'S CRITICISMS. PARSONS SAID HOWEVER THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ANXIOUS TO AVOID A WRANGLE ON THESE MATTERS MOST OF WHICH WERE NOW WATER OVER THE DAM. THE ESSENTIAL MATTER WAS TO WIN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS AND NYERERE PLAYED A CRITICAL ENOUGH ROLE IN AFRICAN AND NON-ALIGNED FORA FOR IT TO BE WORTH MAKING THE EFFORT TO MOLLIFY HIM.

3. DIDGEON POINTED OUT THAT MRS THATCHER HAD GONE TO A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE TO ANSWER NYERERE'S CRITICISMS; THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR DISMISSING THESE OUT OF HAND. NEVERTHELESS THE FACT REMAINED THAT THE OVERWHELMING NUMBER OF BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE AS EXAMINED BY THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION, ON WHICH ZANU (PF) HAD A SEAT, WERE ATTRIBUTABLE TO ZANLA. IT ALSO HAD TO BE RECALLED THAT THE GOVERNOR HAD TO TRY TO KEEP ALL PARTIES HAPPY - NOT JUST NYERERE'S CLIENTS. PARSONS AGREED THAT NKOMO TOO HAD HARD WORDS TO SAY ABOUT ZANLA INTIMIDATION. IN DISCUSSION WITH AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, NKOMO RESERVED HIS MOST TRENCHANT CRITICISMS FOR THE RHODESIAN ARMY.

4. PARSONS CONCLUDED BY PRAISING THE ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT HAVING COME SO FAR WE WOULD NOT TRIP AT THE LAST FENCE. IF THE AUSTRALIANS APPEARED OVERANXIOUS IT WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE GENUINELY CONCERNED TO HELP US.

CCN FIRST WORD OF PARA 3 SHOULD READ DUDGEON

TEBBIT

NNNN

RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES] 28

765
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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/LR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

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RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~DESKBY 260900Z FEB~~

FM MONROVIA 251730Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 45 OF 25 FEB 80

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY ADDIS ABABA DAR ES SALAAM

MIPT:RHODESIA

FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME TODAY AND GAVE ME MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER WHICH HE READ OUT. I SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A REFERENCE TO ENDING ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT THE PRESIDENT SEEMED TO BE SINGLING OUT FOR INDIVIDUAL MENTION THE QUOTE SINS UNQUOTE OF THE BRITISH. WHAT ABOUT PF INTIMIDATION? DENNIS SAID WITH A HALF SMILE THAT THE BRITISH QUOTE SINS UNQUOTE WERE OVERPOWERING. I ASKED IF THE MESSAGE WAS THE VOICE OF LIBERIA OR THE OAU. DENNIS SAID THAT IT WAS A MIXTURE. THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE ALL VIOLATIONS UNQUOTE WAS THE AUTHENTIC VOICE OF LIBERIA. HE THEN ADDED THAT A COPY WAS BEING SENT TO PRESIDENT NYERERE.

2. I THEN SAID THAT I HAD HEARD A RADIO REPORT THAT NIGERIA WOULD ENCOURAGE MUGABE TO CONTINUE THE WAR

IF HE HAD NO ROLE IN THE POST-ELECTION GOVERNMENT. WAS THIS THE OAU VIEW? DENNIS SAID THAT IF THIS HAPPENED THE OAU WOULD BE SPLIT, BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE REPORT REFLECTED THE VIEW OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT. I THEN ASKED ABOUT THE MEETING OF FRONT-LINE STATES CALLED TO DISCUSS RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN. DENNIS SAID THAT WHATEVER TANZANIA DID LIBERIA WOULD NOT BREAK RELATIONS.

CCN AFTER QUOTE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT. UNQUOTE INSERT
HE HAD BEEN ASSURED BY THE FRONT LINE STATE FOREIGN MINISTERS THAT THEY WOULD RECOGNISE THE RESULT OF A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION.
FCO PASS

DOUBLEDAY

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
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~~DESKBY 260900Z FEB 80
FM MONROVIA 251600Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO~~

TELEGRAM NUMBER 44 OF 25 FEBRUARY 1980

IMMEDIATE

INFO IMMEDIATE [SAVING] SALISBURY ADDIS ABABA DAR ES SALAAM
MIFT RHODESIA

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT TOLBERT
BEGINS: MADAM PRIME MINISTER: ON THE EVE OF ELECTIONS IN
ZIMBABWE, I GREET YOU ONCE AGAIN IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT
AND PEOPLE OF LIBERIA AND IN MY CAPACITY AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN
OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. GRAVE CONCERNS ABOUT
THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED BY AFRICA AS REFL-
ECTED IN RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE
LIBERATION OF AFRICA, THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE OAU
RECENTLY HELD IN ADDIS ABABA AS WELL AS PRONOUNCEMENTS BY MANY AFRI-
CAN HEADS OF STATE, THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THESE ACTIONS AND
PRONOUNCEMENTS HAS BEEN TO ENSURE THE FULL AND IMPARTIAL IM-
PLEMENTATION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT BY YOUR GOVERNMENT,
THE ADMINISTERING POWER. THAT IS WHY AFRICA HAS NOT HESITATED
TO CALL ATTENTION TO MEASURES TAKEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNOR
IN RHODESIA WHICH DO NOT CONFORM TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
AGREEMENT SUCH AS THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES
AND MERCENARIES IN RHODESIA EVEN AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE

SOUTH AFRICA CONTINGENT FROM BEIT BRIDGE, THE IMPEDED REPAT-
RIATION OF ZIMBABWEAN REFUGEES AND EXILES AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF
RHODESIAN SECURITY AND AUXILIARIES WHICH HAVE LED TO REPORTED
INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE, HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION. IT IS
OUR EARNEST HOPE, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, THAT DESPITE MANY
DIFFICULTIES, YOUR GOVERNMENT (GPS UNDEC) HAS SUCCESS IN TAKING
THE NECESSARY ACTIONS THAT WILL BRING AN END ALL
VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS BY ANY OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED
THERE TO AND THEREBY CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE IN ZIMBABWE CONDUCTIVE
TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. IT WOULD BE OF GREAT CREDIT
TO YOUR COUNTRY AND PARTICULARLY TO YOUR GOVERNMENT IF THE RHODESIAN
QUESTION WHICH HAS PLAGUED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR SO LONG
COULD BE PEACEFULLY RESOLVED AS ENVISAGED IN THE L H AGREEMENT.
WE ARE OF COURSE COMMITTED TO RESPECT ONLY THE CHOICE OF THE
PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE FREELY AND FAIRLY EXPRESSED BY THEM. THUS
OUR CONSUMING CONCERN AS MANIFESTED IN OUR VARIOUS EXCHANGES WITH
YOU, HAS BEEN THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DISRUPT THE
COURSE SO PAINSTAKINGLY CHARTED IN LONDON BY WHICH INDEPENDENCE
WITH MAJORITY RULE IS TO BE ATTAINED IN ZIMBABWE THROUGH THE
THE ELECTION OF A GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD MERIT THE RESPECT AND
RECOGNITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE PEOPLE OF
ZIMBABWE WHO HAVE SUFFERED THROUGH MANY YEARS FOR THIS NOBLE
OBJECTIVE DESERVE NOTHING LESS. FOR US IN AFRICA, IT WOULD BE
A GOOD GESTURE ON THE PART OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THE
TEAM FROM THE OAU SECRETARIATE WHICH HAS BEEN INVITED TO
WITNESS THE ELECTIONS, TO REMAIN IN RHODESIA A FEW DAYS AFTER SO THAT
THEY WOULD BE PRESENT IN THE TERRITORY WHEN THE RESULTS OF THE
ELECTIONS ARE ANNOUNCED SINCE THEY WILL BE ARRIVING IN RHODESIA
BARELY TWO DAYS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS COMMENCE. WE DO NOT PERCEIVE
THAT THIS SHOULD CAUSE ANY INCONVENIENCE TO THE GOVERNING
AUTHORITY. AS WE LOOK FORWARD WITH GREAT OPTIMISM TO USHERING THE NEW
NATION OF ZIMBABWE INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, LET ME TAKE
THIS OCCASION TO ONCE AGAIN WISH FOR YOUR ABUNDANT SUCCESS IN ALL
THAT YOU SHALL DO FOR THE PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY, FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE EQUITABLE AND JUST
WORLD ORDER AND FOR THE PROMOTION OF FREEDOM AND HUMAN DIGNITY
FOR OPPRESSED PEOPLE. PLEASE ACCEPT MADAM PRIME MINISTER THE
RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM,
SINCERELY

W R TOLBERT JR

PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU
FCO PASS
DOUBLEDAY

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/PUSD (2)

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HE/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FCK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SALISBURY 241700Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 795 OF 24 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM AND GABORONE.

RHODESIA/MOZAMBIQUE.

1. IN THE COURSE OF SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH FLOWER AND WALLS THIS MORNING, LARGELY ON OTHER MATTERS, WE GLEANED A FEW THINGS ABOUT THEIR VISIT TO MAPUTO YESTERDAY.
2. THEY HAD SEEN (MORE OR LESS IN A GROUP IT SEEMS) MABOTE, GUEBUZO, VIEIRA AND SOME OTHERS. FLOWER HAD GONE OFF IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS WITH CHISSANO (BY WHOM HE WAS IMPRESSED). THE MOZAMBIKAN ATTITUDE WAS AMICABLE, AND BECAME WARMER DURING THE DAY. THERE SEEMS NO DOUBT THAT THE MOZAMBIKANS WANTED TO INDICATE A PERCEIVED NEED FOR GOOD RELATIONS.
3. THE TALK HAD BEEN QUITE LARGELY ABOUT MUGABE. CHISSANO HAD SAID THAT MUGABE WAS NOT A MARXIST. **NOT EVEN A COMMUNIST** WHY

3. THE TALK HAD BEEN QUITE LARGELY ABOUT MUGABE. CHISSANO HAD SAID THAT MUGABE WAS NOT A MARXIST, "NOT EVEN A COMMUNIST". WHY WERE THE RHODESIAN MEDIA SO AGAINST HIM? WHY WAS EVERY BODY SO HOSTILE TO HIM? WHY DID THE ESTABLISHMENT NEVER TALK TO HIM? IN REPLY WALLS AND FLOWER GAVE THEIR VIEWS ON ZANLA AND ZANU(PF) BEHAVIOUR IN RHODESIA: BUT ADDED THAT THEY WOULD BE VERY READY TO TALK TO MUGABE AS THEY DID TO NKOMO AND OTHERS, IF HE WOULD TALK TO THEM. THE MOZAMBICANS SAID THAT THEY WOULD SEE TO IT THAT MUGABE WAS PREPARED FOR THIS.

4. THE MOZAMBICANS COMPLAINED ABOUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEM. WALLS SAID THAT WHAT WENT ON ACROSS THE MOZAMBIQUE/SOUTH AFRICAN BORDER WAS NOT RHODESIA'S BUSINESS: BUT HE DID KNOW (HE TOLD THEM) THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD BEEN TALKING TO THE MOZAMBICANS ABOUT THE NEED NOT TO SUPPORT ANYONE WHO RETURNED TO THE WAR IN RHODESIA AFTER THE ELECTION. THE MOZAMBICANS DID NOT DENY THIS, BUT DID NOT GIVE ANY SUCH UNDERTAKING. THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT MUGABE WOULD FORM THE GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF ANY SORT OF ACCEPTANCE OF MUZOREWA AS A RESPECTABLE FIGURE.

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FM F.C.O. 231455Z FEB 80

TO F L A S H MAPUTO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 57 OF 23 FEBRUARY

AND TO FLASH SALISBURY

INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, GABORONE, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA,
NAIROBI, CAPETOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA AND
CANBERRA.

*fn
vms*

YOUR TELS 119 AND 120.

RHODESIA: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL.

1. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO RETAIN MACHEL'S CO-OPERATION
MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH YOU
SHOULD DELIVER AS SOON AS SALISBURY HAVE CONFIRMED CERTAIN POINTS
(SEE BELOW).
2. TO SOME EXTENT MACHEL APPEARS TO BE FOLLOWING A LINE AGREED
WITH NYERERE AND KAUNDA, WITH THE AIM OF MAXIMISING PRESSURE ON
US AND JUSTIFYING REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE ELECTION RESULTS. WE HAVE
ALWAYS RECOGNISED THAT MOST AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD FIND IT HARD
TO COME TO TERMS WITH A RESULT WHICH DID NOT BRING THE PF - AND
INCREASINGLY THIS MEANS MUGABE - TO POWER. ON THE OTHER HAND,
THE OBJECTIVE REASONS FOR MACHEL TO WANT AN END TO THE WAR ARE
NO LESS STRONG. IT IS PROMISING THAT WALLS'S VISIT IS STILL ON.
3. THE VOICE OF FREE AFRICA BROADCASTS AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR
MOZAMBICAN DISSIDENTS ARE OBVIOUSLY OF VERY GREAT CONCERN TO
MACHEL. I HOPE THAT VOICE OF FREE AFRICA IS NO LONGER BROADCASTING.
WE SHOULD AIM TO GIVE MACHEL THE FIRMEST POSSIBLE ASSURANCES ON
THESE POINTS: COULD SALISBURY PLEASE CLARIFY THE LATEST
POSITION URGENTLY AND BEFORE YOU DELIVER THE MESSAGE.
4. I ALSO HOPE THAT IT MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNOR TO
MEET MACHEL, THOUGH I RECOGNISE THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS LEAVING
SALISBURY AT THIS JUNCTURE. IF MACHEL IS PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE
FOR SUCH A MEETING, IS IT POSSIBLE THAT HE COULD GO ON ONE OF THE
POLLING DAYS?
5. IN THE LIGHT OF ADVICE FROM CAPE TOWN (CAPE TOWN TELNO 144) I DO
NOT PROPOSE TO ASK THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO INTERVENE WITH MACHEL.
CARRINGTON

FILES

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PUSD	NEWS D
PLANNING STAFF	PS
CCD	PS/LPS
FRD	PS/MR LUCE
ECD (E)	PS/MR RIDLEY
UND	PS/MR HURD
LEGAL ADVISERS	PS/MR MARTEN
(MR FREELAND)	PS/FUS
ECON D	SIR D MAITLAND

**ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY**

SIR A ACLAND
LORD N G LENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CPO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Rhodesia



Mr Alexander
To see

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I had the Bureau

London SW1A 2AH

Check at 1430 that these

23 February 1980

telegrams will be despatched at

Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street

1441
23i

Over draft

Dear Private Secretary,

RHODESIA/MOZAMBIQUE

President Machel of Mozambique has summoned the Chargé d'Affaires in Maputo to deliver a bitter attack on our policy in Rhodesia. This is potentially a serious set-back: Machel's help was essential during the Lancaster House Conference in getting the Patriotic Front to the point of signature, and he has continued to be co-operative in the period since the Governor's arrival in Salisbury. Machel's attitude after the elections will be crucial in deciding whether Mugabe is able to continue to prosecute the war.

Many of the complaints made by Machel reflected those in the messages to the Prime Minister from Nyerere and Kaunda and presumably represent an agreed line. However, the allegations that Voice of Free Africa broadcasts continue from Rhodesia, and that the Rhodesians are continuing to support Mozambican dissidents, are more serious. The Governor gave the Head of the Mozambican Liaison Office firm assurances earlier this month that the broadcasts would be suspended and that Rhodesian support for Mozambican dissidents had ceased. The Governor's staff are now investigating urgently to discover whether it is the case that either or both are continuing. There is some inconclusive evidence from other sources of continuing support for dissidents.

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On the more positive side, you will have seen the separate report that General Walls has been invited to visit Mozambique and intends to go there on 23 February. So far as we know, the arrangements for this visit stand, despite Machel's talk with the Chargé d'Affaires. It is also relevant that the Mozambican Government have not, so far, attacked us publicly.

In view of the importance of retaining President Machel's co-operation and support, Lord Carrington believes that it would be extremely useful if the Prime Minister were to send an urgent personal message to him.

I enclose a draft.

Yours ever,

Sturtevant

(Resident Clerk for)
G G H Walden

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
 Department **R** RHODESIA
 Drafted by **C D POWELL**
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn. **3466**

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence FLASH
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) **CONFIDENTIAL** (Caveat/Privacy marking)
 (Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO **FLASH** **MAPUTO** Tel. No.of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) **FLASH SALISBURY**

AND SAVING TO
 REPEATED TO (for info) **IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, GABORONE, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, NAIROBI, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA, CANBERRA**

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-
 Rhodesia Policy

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

Your tels 119 and 120:

RHODESIA: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL

1. We must do all we can to retain Machel's co-operation. MIFT contains text of a message from the Prime Minister which you should deliver as soon as Salisbury have confirmed certain points (see below).
2. To some extent Machel appears to be following a line agreed with Nyerere and Kaunda, with the aim of maximising pressure on us and justifying refusal to accept the election results. We have always recognised that most African governments would find it hard to come to terms with a result which did not bring the PF - and increasingly this means Mugabe - to power. On the other hand, the objective reasons for Machel to want an end to the war are no less strong. It is promising that Walls's visit is still on.

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3. The Voice of Free Africa broadcasts and external support for Mozambican dissidents are obviously of very great concern to Machel. I hope that Voice of Free Africa is no longer broadcasting. We should aim to give Machel the firmest possible assurances on these points: could Salisbury please clarify the latest position urgently and before you deliver the message.

4. I also hope that it may still be possible for the Governor to meet Machel, though I recognise the difficulty of his leaving Salisbury at this juncture. If Machel is prepared in principle for such a meeting, is it possible that he could go on one of the polling days?

5. In the light of advice from Cape Town (Cape Town telno 144) I do not propose to ask the South Africans to intervene with Machel.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.
 Department Rhodesia
 Drafted by C D Powell
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence FLASH
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) (Caveat/ Privacy marking)
 (Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO FLASH MAPUTO Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO
 REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA,
 GABARONE, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, NAIROBI, CAPETOWN, WASHINGTON,
 UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA, CABERRA

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution: -

Rhodesia Policy

Copies to: -

Handwritten signature

[TEXT]

MIPT: RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MACHEL

1. Following is text of Prime Minister's reply:

'Dear President Machel,

I have received Mr Doble's report of his talk with you on 21 February. He has also conveyed your greetings for which I am very grateful.

Our two Governments have worked most effectively together over the past few months to achieve the aims we share of peace in Rhodesia and fair elections in which the people can chose their Government freely.

/We

We have advanced a very long way towards that goal. I hope that we can continue to work together over the crucial weeks ahead.

One of the most heartening achievements of the brief period since the Governor's arrival in Salisbury has been the normalisation of relations between Rhodesia and your country. The opening of a Liaison Office in Salisbury, the re-opening of the border, the re-establishment of communications, the successful return of those of your forces who had been fighting in Rhodesia, have shown the benefits of peace. Now is the time to consolidate them and ensure that they are preserved. I am very conscious of the great contribution made by your Government to this process.

I can assure you there is no question of Britain authorising a campaign against ZANU and Mr Mugabe. There are nine parties taking part in the elections. We shall accept the outcome regardless of which of them, either singly or in combination, is able to form a Government with a majority in the House of Assembly. We are not concerned with their policies: it is for the people of Rhodesia to choose which party or parties shall govern. Our legitimate concern is in seeing strict compliance with the Agreements signed at Lancaster House. The Governor has taken action against those responsible for breaches of these agreements and undertakings irrespective of which party they belong to. Where examples of misbehaviour by the auxiliaries or the Rhodesian forces have been brought to the Governor's attention, he has investigated them and taken disciplinary action. He has also taken more general powers to deal with intimidation by any party. He has made only very limited use of these powers

so far. I hope that there will not be cause to use them more extensively. But I am sure you will agree that a fair election cannot take place where intimidation of voters is allowed; it is vital that everything possible be done to put a stop to it. I am sure that you will use your undoubted influence to this end.

I can give you a firm assurance that there is no question of our planning with any party or any government for Mr Mugabe to lose the elections or to close the frontier with Mozambique. Nor would Britain condone any external intervention in Rhodesia. In the light of certain statements which have been made, steps have been taken to ensure that our views are properly understood.

I am seriously concerned by what you say about continued broadcasts by 'Voice of Free Africa' and support from Rhodesian territory for opponents of your government. As Mr Honwana was informed on 9 February, strict instructions were given that broadcasts of Radio Free Africa should be suspended. We were also able to assure him that all Rhodesian support for dissidents in your country had ceased. If this is not the case, it would be a very serious matter and I hope that you will make available to me urgently any evidence which you have. As I have told you, our aim is that relations between Rhodesia and Mozambique

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Mozambique should be peaceful and friendly. I hope, equally, that you will make clear that you would not be able to support any party which, after the elections, sought to return to the war.

The elections for which we have worked are now only a matter of days away. I sincerely believe that they will be as fair as possible under the circumstances, remembering that we are only a few short weeks away from the end of a savage war, and that all parties will be able to take part in them on an equal footing. I know that many African governments have received complaints from Mr Mugabe and his followers of bias against them. The complaints which we receive from other parties that they have been put at a disadvantage have been no less forceful. This is only to be expected in elections held under these conditions. But we have gone to great lengths to ensure that the people of Rhodesia can choose their government freely, and there are now over 100 official observers from many countries and organisations present in Rhodesia to see that this is the case.

I was pleased to hear that General Walls is to visit Mozambique. I know that Lord Soames also hopes for an opportunity to meet you. It is important that we should remain in the closest touch. With your continued support we can, and will, successfully discharge our responsibilities.

With my best wishes.

Margaret Thatcher.'

CONFIDENTIAL

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23 FEB 1960

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject 1

Rhodesia

GR 800
CONFIDENTIAL
FM F C O 231455Z FEB 80
TO FLASH MAPUTO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 58 OF 23 FEBRUARY
AND TO FLASH SALISBURY
INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, GABORONE, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA,
NAIROBI, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTTAWA, CANBERRA.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T37/80

MIPT: RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MACHEL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY:

QUOTE

DEAR PRESIDENT MACHEL,

I HAVE RECEIVED MR DOBLE'S REPORT OF HIS TALK WITH YOU ON 21 FEBRUARY. HE HAS ALSO CONVEYED YOUR GREETINGS FOR WHICH I AM VERY GRATEFUL.

OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE WORKED MOST EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS TO ACHIEVE THE AIMS WE SHARE OF PEACE IN RHODESIA AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN WHICH THE PEOPLE CAN CHOOSE THEIR GOVERNMENT FREELY. WE HAVE ADVANCED A VERY LONG WAY TOWARDS THAT GOAL. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER OVER THE CRUCIAL WEEKS AHEAD.

ONE OF THE MOST HEARTENING ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE BRIEF PERIOD SINCE THE GOVERNOR'S ARRIVAL IN SALISBURY HAS BEEN THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND YOUR COUNTRY. THE OPENING OF A LIAISON OFFICE IN SALISBURY, THE RE-OPENING OF THE BORDER, THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE SUCCESSFUL RETURN OF THOSE OF YOUR FORCES WHO HAD BEEN FIGHTING IN RHODESIA, HAVE SHOWN THE BENEFITS OF PEACE. NOW IS THE TIME TO CONSOLIDATE THEM AND ENSURE THAT THEY ARE PRESERVED. I AM VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION MADE BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO THIS PROCESS.

I CAN ASSURE YOU THERE IS NO QUESTION OF BRITAIN AUTHORIZING A CAMPAIGN AGAINST ZANU AND MR MUGABE. THERE ARE NINE PARTIES TAKING PART IN THE ELECTIONS. WE SHALL ACCEPT THE OUTCOME REGARDLESS OF WHICH OF THEM, EITHER SINGLY OR IN COMBINATION, IS ABLE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT WITH A MAJORITY IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. WE ARE NOT CONCERNED WITH THEIR POLICIES: IT IS FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO CHOOSE WHICH PARTY OR PARTIES SHALL GOVERN. OUR LEGITIMATE CONCERN IS IN SEEING STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED AT LANGASTER HOUSE. THE GOVERNOR HAS TAKEN ACTION AGAINST THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR BREACHES OF THESE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERTAKINGS IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH PARTY THEY BELONG TO. WHERE EXAMPLES OF MISBEHAVIOUR BY THE AUXILIARIES OR THE RHODESIAN FORCES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE GOVERNOR'S ATTENTION, HE HAS INVESTIGATED THEM AND TAKEN DISCIPLINARY ACTION. HE HAS ALSO TAKEN MORE GENERAL POWERS TO DEAL WITH INTIMIDATION BY ANY PARTY. HE HAS MADE ONLY VERY LIMITED USE OF THESE POWERS SO FAR. I HOPE THAT THERE WILL NOT BE CAUSE TO USE THEM MORE EXTENSIVELY BUT I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE THAT A FAIR ELECTION CANNOT TAKE PLACE WHERE INTIMIDATION OF VOTERS IS ALLOWED: IT IS VITAL THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BE DONE TO PUT A STOP TO IT. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL USE YOUR UNDOUBTED INFLUENCE TO THIS END.

/I CAN

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I CAN GIVE YOU A FIRM ASSURANCE THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION OF OUR PLANNING WITH ANY PARTY OR ANY GOVERNMENT FOR MR MUGABE TO LOSE THE ELECTIONS OR TO CLOSE THE FRONTIER WITH MOZAMBIQUE. NOR WOULD BRITAIN CONDONE ANY EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN RHODESIA. IN THE LIGHT OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE, STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT OUR VIEWS ARE PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD.

I AM SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT CONTINUED BROADCASTS BY QUOTE VOICE OF FREE AFRICA UNQUOTE AND SUPPORT FROM RHODESIAN TERRITORY FOR OPPONENTS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT. AS MR HONWANA WAS INFORMED ON 9 FEBRUARY, STRICT INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN THAT BROADCAST OF RADIO FREE AFRICA SHOULD BE SUSPENDED. WE WERE ALSO ABLE TO ASSURE HIM THAT ALL RHODESIAN SUPPORT FOR DISSIDENTS IN YOUR COUNTRY HAD CEASED. IF THIS IS NOT THE CASE, IT WOULD BE A VERY SERIOUS MATTER AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL MAKE AVAILABLE TO ME URGENTLY ANY EVIDENCE WHICH YOU HAVE. AS I HAVE TOLD YOU, OUR AIM IS THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND MOZAMBIQUE SHOULD BE PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY. I HOPE, EQUALLY, THAT YOU WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT YOU WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT ANY PARTY WHICH, AFTER THE ELECTIONS, SOUGHT TO RETURN TO THE WAR.

THE ELECTIONS FOR WHICH WE HAVE WORKED ARE NOW ONLY A MATTER OF DAYS AWAY. I SINCERELY BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL BE AS FAIR AS POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, REMEMBERING THAT WE ARE ONLY A FEW SHORT WEEKS AWAY FROM THE END OF A SAVAGE WAR, AND THAT ALL PARTIES WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE PART IN THEM ON AN EQUAL FOOTING. I KNOW THAT MANY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE RECEIVED COMPLAINTS FROM MR MUGABE AND HIS FOLLOWERS OF BIAS AGAINST THEM. THE COMPLAINTS WHICH WE RECEIVE FROM OTHER PARTIES THAT THEY HAVE BEEN PUT AT A DISADVANTAGE HAVE BEEN NO LESS FORCEFUL. THIS IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED IN ELECTIONS HELD UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. BUT WE HAVE GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA CAN CHOOSE THEIR GOVERNMENT FREELY, AND THERE ARE NOW OVER 100 OFFICIAL OBSERVERS FROM MANY COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS PRESENT IN RHODESIA TO SEE THAT THIS IS THE CASE.

I WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT GENERAL WALLS IS TO VISIT MOZAMBIQUE. I KNOW THAT LORD SOAMES ALSO HOPES FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET YOU. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH. WITH YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT WE CAN, AND WILL, SUCCESSFULLY DISCHARGE OUR RESPONSIBILITIES.

WITH MY BEST WISHES.
MARGARET THATCHER.

UNQUOTE.

CARRINGTON

FILES

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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
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PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND

SIR A ACLAND
LORD N G LIENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
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ADDITIONAL DIST
RHODESIA POLICY

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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MR DAY

MR ASPIN

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RKK200A

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PP LUANDA

IMMEDIATE

PP ADDIS ABABA

PP CAPE TOWN

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PP WASHINGTON

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

GR 150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DESKBY FCO 231030Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 230945Z FEBRUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 190 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, GABORONE, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA, ADDIS ABABA,

CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. MY READING OF THIS MEETING IS THAT PRESIDENT NYERE HAS FINALLY MORE OR LESS GIVEN UP ON TRYING TO INFLUENCE THINGS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS AND IS NOW CONCENTRATING ON BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT MUGABE IS INCLUDED IN WHATEVER GOVT IS FORMED FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS.

2. I THINK HIS FEAR THAT IF MUGABE IS EXCLUDED THE WAR WILL CONTINUE IS SINCERE (HIS OWN BEHAVIOUR IS, OF COURSE, UNLIKELY TO DO ANYTHING TO DISCOURAGE IT). I ALSO THINK HE GENUINELY BELIEVES THAT NKOMO WILL BE DESTROYED POLITICALLY IF HE GOES INTO A COALITION WHICH EXCLUDES MUGABE. WHATEVER DISAGREEMENTS THEY HAVE HAD IN THE PAST, NKOMO MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY WISE TO APPEAR TO IGNORE NYERERE QUITE SO MUCH AS HE SEEMS TO.

3. IF NKOMO DOES BELIEVE THAT AFRICA WILL ACCEPT ANY GOVT IN WHICH HE IS INCLUDED, I SHARE MR BROWN'S DOUBTS (LAGOS TELNO 226) AS TO WHETHER THIS BELIEF IS NECESSARILY WELL-FOUNDED.

MOON

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IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

MR ASPIN

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PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

GR 550

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 231030Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 230930Z FEBRUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 189 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, GABORONE, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA,
ADDIS ABABA, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELS NOS 57 AND 58

RHODESIA:

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE YESTERDAY 22 FEBRUARY, AND WAS CALLED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING WHEN I SPOKE AS IN SALISBURY TELEGRAM NO 748.
2. NYERERE SAID HE DID NOT LIKE THE STEPS WE WERE TAKING WITH REGARD TO TRAINING ARRANGEMENTS FOR ZANLA AND ZIPRA. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY FAVOURED THE CREATION OF A JOINT ARMY BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, BUT NO ONE ELSE HAD WANTED IT. SINCE THAT HAD NOT BEEN DONE AT THE TIME, HE NOW THOUGHT IT BEST THAT WE SHOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED. I REPEATED THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE BEING

FULLY DISCUSSED WITH MR NKOMO AND MR MUGABE, AND HE AGREED THAT IT WAS UP TO THEM TO DECIDE WHAT THEY WANTED. (I THINK THIS REACTION WAS JUST ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF NYERERE'S DEEP SUSPICION OF ALL WE DO).

3. NYERERE THEN TURNED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. HE EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT THAT SUCH A MESSAGE COULD BE SENT, BUT DID NOT GO INTO IT IN DETAIL BEYOND ASKING RHETORICALLY, HOW CAN ANYONE TRY TO SAY THAT THE USE OF "THOSE THUGS" (THE AUXILIARIES) IS NOT A BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT AND THAT THEY ARE NOT ELECTIONEERING? HE SAID HE HAD HEARD THE GOVERNOR'S CALL TO THE PF FORCES TO REMAIN IN THE ASSEMBLY PLACES AFTER THE ELECTIONS; HE AGREED WITH THAT, PROVIDING THAT THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE AUXILIARIES ALSO REMAINED IN THEIR BARRACKS. NONE OF THIS WAS SAID WITH MUCH CONVICTION, AND IT WAS CLEAR HE REALISES THAT WE HAVE SAID ALL WE HAVE TO SAY.

4. NYERERE WENT ON TO SPEAK ABOUT THE POST-ELECTION ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT. WHAT WAS WANTED WAS A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD MEAN AN END TO THE WAR. THIS HAD TO BE A GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED AND ACCEPTED. BUT IF THE BRITISH GOVT "BENT OVER BACKWARDS" TO PRODUCE A GOVT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WHITES AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. I SAID THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS, AND I ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT NKOMO AND MUGABE WOULD DO IF EACH (AND THEY BOTH APPEARED CONFIDENT) WON A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SEATS. HE DECLINED TO GIVE A DIRECT ANSWER AND EXPRESSED FEAR THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF A PF GOVERNMENT, AND TO EXCLUDE MUGABE. SPEAKING WITH SOME PASSION HE WARNED THAT WE WOULD PUT NKOMO IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION AND DESTROY HIM POLITICALLY "JUST AS THE BISHOP HAD DESTROYED HIS OWN POPULARITY". HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT NKOMO WAS ALREADY LOSING GROUND.

5. IN CONCLUSION NYERERE CAME BACK TO THE THEME OF THE OVER-RIDING NEED TO ACHIEVE PEACE. WE SHOULD ALL BE WORKING TO BRING ABOUT A PF GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THIS WOULD BRING PEACE (THOUGH HE WENT OUT OF HIS WAY, FOR THE RECORD, TO SAY THAT HE WOULD STILL ACCEPT A MUZOREWA GOVT IF IT CAME ABOUT THROUGH FAIR ELECTIONS). HE WARNED THAT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE MISLED INTO THINKING THAT THE AFRICAN STATES WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO CONTINUE THE WAR IF FORCED TO DO SO. I SAID THAT WE WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRESIDENTS KAUNDA AND MACHEL, NO ONE WANTED PEACE MORE THAN WE DID, AND I REPEATED WE WOULD RESPECT THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS.

WE WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRESIDENTS KAUNDA AND MACHEL. NO ONE WANTED PEACE MORE THAN WE DID, AND I REPEATED WE WOULD RESPECT THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS.

6. SEVERAL TIMES NYERERE SAID WE SHOULD NOT BE FRIGHTENED OF A RADICAL GOVT COMING TO POWER IN RHODESIA. THIS COULD NOT HAPPEN. THE POLITICAL FORCES AGAINST IT WERE TOO STRONG. MUGABE COULD NOT MAKE RHODESIA A MARXIST STATE EVEN IF HE WANTED TO.

MOON

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/NEWS DEPT
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PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 354

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO FIRST CONTACT

DESKBY SALISBURY FIRST CONTACT

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FM NAPUTO 231701Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY PRIORITY CAPE TOWN LAGOS WASHINGTON

UKHIS NEW YORK LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUANDA NAIROBI

ADDIS ABABA

NY TELNO 126: MOZAMBIQUE/RHODESIA

1. WHEN CHISSANO HANDED OVER THE LETTER, I HAD HALF AN HOUR'S DISCUSSION ALONE WITH HIM. HE WAS CALM, REASONED, CRITICAL BUT NOT HOSTILE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND NOT AS FOREIGN MINISTER.

2. HE THOUGHT HMG HAD MISJUDGED THE TYPE OF WAR. WE HAD SAID THAT GENERAL WALLS WAS A PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER AND WOULD OBEY OUR ORDERS, WHICH HAD NOT HAPPENED. WE HAD TRIED TO CLASSIFY THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS INTO MILITARY AND POLITICAL PEOPLE, WHEN INEVITABLY MOST WERE BOTH. SOME OF THE BEST POLITICIANS WERE IN THE FORCES AND SO WERE DEBARRED FROM CAMPAIGNING; NHONGO HAD BEEN

THE FORCES AND SO WERE DEBARRED FROM CAMPAIGNING: NHONGO HAD BEEN FORBIDDEN TO SPEAK AT RALLIES. CITING HIS TREPIDATION WHEN FIRST BROUGHT HERE BY THE PORTUGUESE DURING THE TRANSITION, HE SAID THAT WE HAD APPRECIATED NEITHER THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING THE PF TO ACCEPT THE CONTINUANCE OF MUCH OF THE RHODESIAN STATE MACHINERY, NOR THEIR FEELINGS WHEN THE RHODESIAN FORCES PATROLLED UNCHECKED KILLING PF MEN WHILE THEIR FIGHTERS WERE CONFINED. OUR BIAS AGAINST MUGABE WAS EVIDENT, HE SAID. IN SIR A PARSONS' SPEECHES AT THE UN, THERE WAS NO HINT OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS. HE HAD HASTENED TO HEAP ALL THE BLAME FOR INTIMIDATION ON ZANU(PF). ANY MISDEEDS OF ZANU(PF) WERE EMPHASIZED: BUT WHEN UANC PEOPLE TRIED TO ASSASSINATE MUGABE, IT SEEMED AS IF WE WERE ALLOWING JUSTICE TO TAKE ITS COURSE WITH NO PARTICULAR PUBLICITY.

3. CHISSANO RECALLED THAT THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE HAD ALL BUT BROKEN DOWN OVER THE STATUS OF FORCES AND S AFRICAN TROOPS. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ONLY AFTER THE PF HAD BEEN TOLD THAT S AFRICAN TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND BOTH FORCES CONFINED TO BARRACKS. THE FLS HAD PRESSED THEM TO SIGN, ON THIS UNDERSTANDING. WHEN I POINTED OUT THE ACTUAL WORDING HE SAID THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS HAD LED THE PF (AND THE FLS) TO BELIEVE THAT THE WORDING WAS NECESSARY TO GAIN RHODESIAN AGREEMENT, BUT THAT IN FACT THE S AFRICAN TROOPS WOULD GO AND RHODESIANS FORCES BE CONFINED TO BARRACKS. WE HAD THUS IGNORED THE SPIRIT OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT.

4. I SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO JUDGE OUR ACTIONS BY THE TEXT OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND NOT BY WHAT SOME WOULD HAVE LIKED IT TO BE. UNLIKE FRELIMO, ZANU(PF) HAD NOT WON THE WAR: WE THUS COULD ONLY OPERATE BY AGREEMENT WITH ALL PARTIES. MUCH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. SO FAR THE CLASHES BETWEEN THE RHODESIANS AND THE PF HAD BEEN AMAZINGLY FEW: IN THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE CASES WHEN GUERRILLAS WERE FOUND OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY POINTS, THE MONITORING FORCE AND POLICE WITH PF OFFICERS HAD MANAGED TO DEFOUSE THE SITUATION. THE RHODESIAN FORCES HAD ONLY BEEN CALLED OUT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH LANCASTER HOUSE, AFTER FLAGRANT ZANLA CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. ALL THE OTHER PARTIES WERE PRESSING THE GOVERNOR TO TAKE ACTION ABOUT ANU(PF) INTIMIDATION: SO FAR HIS ACTIONS HAD BEEN MEASURED AND MILD. WE WERE DETERMINED TO HAVE ELECTIONS AS FAIR AS POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WERE OF COURSE HORRIFIED BY ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ON MUGABE. ANG AND MOZAMBIQUE AGREED ON SO MUCH - THE NEED FOR A TRULY INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE RULED BY THE MAJORITY, AS WELL AS FOR PEACE AND COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVIVAL IN THE AREA. WE HAD COOPERATED UP TO NOW: I HOPED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO.

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 136 B / 80**

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)
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HD/PUSD (2)
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER F3K200A

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCC AND SALISBURY 231600Z
FM MAPUTO 231335Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 127 OF 23 FEBRUARY
INFO TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA UKMIS NEW
YORK

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MACHEL

1. MIPT

YOUR EXCELLENCY

ON FEBRUARY 21, I RECEIVED HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN MAPUTO TO INFORM HIM OF OUR ANXIETIES IN RELATIONS TO THE GRAVE
EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE. AFTER THIS MEETING, I THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO
INFORM YOU OF THESE ANXIETIES IN WRITING.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE DEVOTES ITS GREATEST EFFORTS
IN THE DEFENCE OF PEACE, TO THE CREATION OF A CLIMATE
OF PEACE AND STABILITY, GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS
AND COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. BECAUSE WE
HAVE LIVED THROUGH SIXTEEN YEARS OF WAR, WE VALUE PEACE AS SOMETHING
VERY PRECIOUS IN LIFE AND AS A FUNDAMENTAL CONDITION FOR THE
PROSPERITY AND WELLBEING OF PEOPLES.

PROSPERITY AND WELLBEING OF PEOPLES.

YOUR EXCELLENCY IS AWARE OF THE ROLE THAT WE HAVE PLAYED, IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE AND IN THE SEARCH FOR MEANS TO RE-ESTABLISH PEACE, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY BETWEEN MEN IN THAT COUNTRY.

IN RELATION TO ZIMBABWE THE EXCLUSIVE AIMS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE ARE TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS:

- THE END OF THE RACIST REBELLION AGAINST THE BRITISH CROWN;
- THE END OF THE RACIST COLONIAL SYSTEM OF DOMINATION;
- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ZIMBABWE TRULY INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC, STABLE AND PROSPEROUS, HAVING GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS AND ACTING FOR THE PROSPERITY AND PEACE OF THE REGION.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE HAS NEVER SOUGHT AND IS NOT SEEKING TO CHOOSE THE LEADERSHIP OR THE ROAD TO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FOR ZIMBABWE. OUR STATE CONSIDERS THAT THESE ARE THE EXCLUSIVE AND INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE, RIGHTS TO BE EXERCISED WITHOUT ANY EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, PRESSURE OR THREATS WHATEVER. THESE RIGHTS ARE INTIMATELY LINKED TO THE DIGNITY AND HONOUR OF A PEOPLE AND ITS STATE.

WE HAVE ALWAYS OPPOSED ANY RACIST POLICY WHATSOEVER. WHEN WE SPEAK OF EQUALITY OF MAN, WE ARE NOT REFERRING TO SOME VAGUE, ABSTRACT ASPIRATION, BUT TO A CONQUEST, HARD-WON BY OUR PEOPLE.

ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, WE HAVE STATED, BOTH TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND ITS PREDECESSORS, THAT WE CONSIDERED THE ZIMBABWE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, NAMELY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN ITS TWO COMPONENT PARTS, AS AN ALLY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WEAPONS IN HAND AND WITH THE SACRIFICE OF ITS FREEDOM FIGHTERS' LIVES SOUGHT TO PUT AN END TO THE REBEL REGIME. IT SOUGHT TO DESTROY THE REGIME WHICH BROKE ITS OATH OF ALLEIGANCE TO THE BRITISH CROWN. IT SOUGHT TO DESTROY THE REGIME WHICH OFFENDED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL MORALITY AND THE LEGALITY OF THE CROWN, BY HANGING THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE, HER MAJESTY'S SUBJECTS.

WE HAVE WORKED WITH THE ZIMBABWE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY, GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH ZANU-FP. WE HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO TRANSMIT TO THEM OUR CONCERN THAT THE STRUGGLE SHOULD NOT BECOME A RACIAL WAR, THAT THE WHITES SHOULD NOT BE DEFINED AS THE TARGET.

TRANSMIT TO THEM OUR CONCERN THAT THE STRUGGLE SHOULD NOT BECOME A RACIAL WAR, THAT THE WHITES SHOULD NOT BE DEFINED AS THE TARGET. ● CAN SAY THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE GREATEST RECEPTIVENESS TO THIS ADVICE. ZANU-FP WAS ABLE TO WAGE WAR WITHOUT MAKING THE WHITE MAN ITS TARGET. IT WAS ABLE TO PREVENT THE WAR OF LIBERATION BECOMING A RACIAL WAR, WHICH WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE REBELS. EVEN AFTER SUCH BARBAROUS MASSACRES AS THOSE AT NYAZONIA AND CHIMOIO, AS WELL AS SO MANY OTHERS, WHICH FOR ALL TIME WILL BE A DISHONOUR FOR THE MEN WHO ORDERED THEM AND CARRIED THEM OUT, ZANU-FP DID NOT ALLOW ITSELF TO FALL INTO THE TRAP OF RACIAL VENGEANCE.

THE LANCASTER HOUSE TALKS TOOK PLACE WITH OUR SUPPORT. ALL THE PARTIES MADE PLEDGES AT THESE TALKS, ESPECIALLY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WHICH COMMITTED ITSELF TO GUARANTEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PLEDGES.

RESOLUTION NO 468 WAS APPROVED AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH THE APPROVAL OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT. THIS RESOLUTION REAFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLES AGREED ON AT LANCASTER HOUSE AND DEMANDS THAT ADDITIONAL MEASURES BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE PROCESS AGREED TO IN LONDON IS CARRIED OUT.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, IN VOTING FOR THE RESOLUTION, HAS UNDERTAKEN A PLEDGE OF HONOUR.

SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED. THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT CAME INTO EFFECT. THE PROSPECT OF PEACE AROSE IN OUR REGION.

TODAY THE PROSPECT OF PEACE, THE HOPE FOR FAIR, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE AND THE HOPE FOR A TRULY INDEPENDENT AND UNITED ZIMBABWE, CONTRIBUTING TO PROSPERITY, COOPERATION AND PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, ARE VANISHING.

DAILY, THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY, SOLDIERS OF THE FORMER REBEL ARMY, AUXILIARIES, SETTLERS AND MERCENARIES CARRY ARMS AND MOVE FREELY. ONLY THE ZANLA AND ZIPRA FORCES ARE CONFINED AS WAS AGREED.

THE CONFINEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT EXCLUSIVELY, AND HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S DEPLOYMENT, AS LEGAL FORCES, OF FORCES WHICH IN THE RECENT PAST COMMITTED TREASON AGAINST THE CROWN, CONSTITUTE EXTREMELY GRAVE FACTS. IT IS A HUMILIATION TO THE DIGNITY OF THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS TO BE TREATED AS DEFEATED FORCES, AS A REBEL FORCE THAT MUST BE CONFINED. IT IS DANGEROUS TO ENTRUST THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY PATROLLING AND THE DEFENCE OF THE BORDERS TO FORCES WHICH

CONFINED. IT IS DANGEROUS TO ENTRUST THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY PATROLLING AND THE DEFENCE OF THE BORDERS TO FORCES WHICH HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME OF TREASON, WHICH HAVE COMMITTED WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND HAVE CARRIED OUT AGGRESSION AGAINST NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.

THE FUNCTIONING, WITH THE SANCTION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNOR, OF THE SO-CALLED COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS, THE DAILY ISSUING BY THE HEADQUARTERS OF WAR COMMUNIQUES, THE TERM 'TERRORISTS' USED OFFICIALLY IN THESE COMMUNIQUES FOR THOSE WHO FOUGHT AGAINST THE REBELLION AND FOR THEIR COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE, ARE FACTS WHICH HUMILIATE THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND IMPEDE THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND PEACE IN ZIMBABWE.

WE HAVE NOTED THAT DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES ARE TAKEN AGAINST THE PATRIOTIC FRONT COMPONENTS, ESPECIALLY AGAINST ZANU-PF.

AS AN EXAMPLE, WE CALL ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT ZANU-PF HAS SYSTEMATICALLY BEEN HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONDUCT OF ITS SYMPATHISERS, TO THE POINT WHERE AREAS OF HUGE SUPPORT FOR THIS PARTY ARE THREATENED WITH EXCLUSION FROM THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

IN CONTRAST, NO MEASURES ARE CONSIDERED AGAINST THE PARTY OF WHICH THOSE WHO CONFESSED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE OF THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST THE ZANU-PF PRESIDENT ARE MEMBERS.

THIS EXAMPLE DEMONSTRATES THE DOUBLE STANDARDS OF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN RHODESIA.

PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE WAS THE FACT THAT THE POLICE AT SALISBURY AIRPORT CONFISCATED AND PHOTOCOPIED A LETTER FROM THE LEADERSHIP OF ZANU PF TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE.

WE HAVE NOTED THE INCREASE IN ARMED ATTACKS AND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST THE MOST PROMINENT LEADERS OF ZANU-PF, ESPECIALLY ITS PRESIDENT, MR ROBERT MUGABE.

WE NOTE THAT TERRORIST FORCES, COMPOSED OF MERCENARIES OF VARIOUS ORIGENS, INCLUDING MOZAMBIKAN, ARE STILL STATIONED IN RHODESIA, FLANNING, ORGANISING AND LAUNCHING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE, WITH WHICH HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS.

RELATIONS.

WE NOTE THAT THE ZRBC BROADCASTING STATION IN SALISBURY CONTINUES TO BROADCAST FROM ITS STUDIOS A PROGRAMME ENTITLED "A VOZ DA AFRICA LIVRE", WHICH CONSTITUTES A DIRECT APPEAL FOR THE OVERTHROW BY VIOLENT AND SUBVERSIVE MEANS, OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE. THE CONTINUATION OF THESE BROADCASTS IS CONTRARY TO THE ASSURANCE GIVEN US BY THE OFFICE OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNOR. IT CONSTITUTES A FLAGRANT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A STATE WITH WHICH HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAS FRIENDLY RELATIONS. IT CONSTITUTES A HOSTILE ACT.

WE NOTE THAT GREAT DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN CREATED FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES. LESS THAN A WEEK FROM THE ELECTIONS, THE GREAT MAJORITY OF REFUGEES STILL CANNOT RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

WE NOTE THE CONCENTRATION OF THE FORCES OF THE OLD REBEL RHODESIAN REGIME ON OUR BORDERS AND WE HAVE NOTED THE VIOLATION OF OUR AIR SPACE BY THE AIRCRAFT OF THE OLD REBEL AIR FORCE. THIS CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS AND THESE VIOLATIONS OF OUR AIR SPACE ARE TAKING PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH CROWN IS ALREADY REESTABLISHED IN THE TERRITORY. THEY CONSTITUTE ACTS OF HOSTILITY AGAINST A GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

THIS SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES, WHICH IS NOT AN EXHAUSTIVE LIST, IS A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN. IT BECOMES EVEN MORE SO WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL INTERVENE IN RHODESIA AND ITS LAUNCHING OF A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN TO CREATE PRETEXTS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DIRECT AGGRESSION AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE.

THE CROWN REPRESENTATIVE'S TACIT APPROVAL OF HOSTILE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN AGAINST OUR COUNTRY FROM RHODESIAN TERRITORY, THE SOUTH AFRICAN THREATS, THE CONCENTRATION OF FORCES ON OUR BORDERS, THE SENDING OF SOUTH AFRICAN ARMoured CARS TO RHODESIAN TERRITORY UNDER THE ODD PRETEXT THAT THEY ARE NEEDED TO CARRY BALLOT BOXES - THESE THINGS OBLIGE US TO DEMAND A CLARIFICATION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

WE THEREFORE CALL UPON HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO DO THE FOLLOWING:

1. FULFIL ITS DUTY TO GUARANTEE THE PHYSICAL SAFETY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE ELECTION CANDIDATES, IN PARTICULAR OF THE LEADERS AND CANDIDATES OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WHO HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BEEN THE TARGET OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AND DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES.
2. FULFIL ITS DUTY OF GUARANTEEING THE PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS PROCESS AND PREVENT INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL FORCES FROM JEOPARDISING BY VIOLENCE THIS PROCESS OR ITS RESULT.
3. FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS IN TERMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL NORMS WHICH REGULATE PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES BY ORDERING THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND OTHER STATES BORDERING ON RHODESIA.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

IN THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE, THERE ARE STILL MORE THAN 5,000 ARMED COMBATANTS OF ZANU-PF. THESE COMBATANTS REMAIN IN OUR TERRITORY BECAUSE OF THE EXTREMELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME ALLOWED FOR REGROUPING AND BECAUSE OF THE OBSTACLES PLACED IN THE WAY OF THEIR RETURN TO RHODESIA.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROLLING THESE FORCES, IN LINE WITH THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

IT WILL, HOWEVER, BE VERY DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE TO ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CASE OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE OR AGGRESSION IN ZIMBABWE, IN THE CASE OF INTERNAL ATTEMPTS TO UPTURN BY FORCE THE DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL PROCESS OR ITS RESULTS, OR IF THERE IS A CONTINUATION OF ATTEMPTS TO KILL THE LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO IMPEDE AN UNDERSTANDABLE DECISION BY THESE FORCES TO JOIN THEIR COMPATRIOTS

LIBERATION MOVEMENT. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO IMPEDE AN UNDERSTANDABLE DECISION BY THESE FORCES TO JOIN THEIR COMPATRIOTS TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF THEIR LEADERS AND DEFEND THE INTEGRITY OF THEIR COUNTRY.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

ON TRANSMITTING TO YOU THE GRAVE CONCERNS OF OUR GOVERNMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO REAFFIRM OUR DECISION TO COOPERATE IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, TO ENSURE THE EMERGENCE OF A ZIMBABWE WHICH IS TRULY INDEPENDENT, UNITED, STABLE, DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL, WITH RELATIONS OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND COOPERATION, A ZIMBABWE WHICH IS A FACTOR FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF THE MATTERS REFERRED TO IN THIS LETTER, I WILL TRANSMIT ITS CONTENTS TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE FRONT LINE STATE, THE HEADS OF STATES OR GOVERNMENT OF THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, THE CHAIRMEN OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION.

I ASK YOU EXCELLENCY TO TRANSMIT TO HER MAJESTY MY CORDIAL GREETINGS; PLEASE RECEIVE MY COMPLIMENTS AND HIGHEST REGARDS.

SAMORA MOISES MACHEL
PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

ENDS

DCBLE

CCM LAST SECTION PARA ONE LINE FOUR FOR EMERGENCY
PLEASE CORRECT TO EMERGENCY

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DEKSBY 231600Z

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
AL Qyatt
MR ASPIN

+34

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

IMMEDIATE

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

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RESIDENT CLERK
GRS 230

CONFIDENTIAL

DEKSBY FCO AND SALISBURY 231600Z
FM MAPUTO 231315Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 126 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY PRIORITY CAPE TOWN LAGOS WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUANDA NAIROBI
ADDID ABABA

R MY TELNO 119: RHODESIA/MOZAMBIQUE

1. FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO HANDED ME TODAY A LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT MACHEL TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE IMPLIED THAT MACHEL
HAD DECIDED TO WRITE, AS HE HAD BEEN TALKING LOOSELY ON 21
FEBRUARY AND WANTED A PRECISE MESSAGE TO BE
PASSED TO HMG.

2. THE LETTER HAS SOME SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES. IT IS LESS ABUSIVE
AND DOES NOT ACCUSE US OF PLOTTING WITH THE RHODESIANS AND SOUTH
AFRICANS TO EXCLUDE MUBAGE. THERE IS LESS EMPHASIS ON THE
ALLEGED CAMPAIGN AGAINST ZANU(PF). IT REAFFIRMS THAT
MOZAMBIQUE IS NOT TRYING TO CHOOSE THE LEADERS OF ZIMBABWE. IT
ENDS WITH A REASSERTION OF MOZAMBIQUE'S DECISION TO COOPERATE
IN GUARANTEEING THE SUCCESS OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.
HOWEVER, HE NOW SPECIFICALLY MENTIONS THE DANGER OF BANNING
ELECTIONS IN ZANU(PF) AREAS. HE CALLS THE VOICE OF FREE AFRICA

MOZAMBIQUE IS NOT TRYING TO CHOOSE THE LEADERS OF ZIMBABWE. IT ENDS WITH A REASSERTION OF MOZAMBIQUE'S DECISION TO COOPERATE IN GUARANTEEING THE SUCCESS OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, HE NOW SPECIFICALLY MENTIONS THE DANGER OF BANNING ELECTIONS IN ZANU(PF) AREAS. HE CALLS THE VOICE OF FREE AFRICA, AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS AND TROOPS ON THE BORDER 'HOSTILE ACTS', THE CESSATION OF WHICH HE REQUESTS. THERE IS ALSO A VEILED THREAT TO UNLEASH THE 5000 ZANU(PF) TROOPS HERE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. HE COPIES THE LETTER TO UNCLE TOM COBLEY AND ALL.

3. I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S ANSWER SHOULD BE DELAYED TO DEAL WITH BOTH MESSAGES. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS ANYTHING THAT SHOULD BE SAID QUICKLY, YOU COULD INSTRUCT ME TO MAKE SOME BRIEF EARLY RESPONSE TO CHISSANO ABOUT THE VERBAL MESSAGE, ADDING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO BOTH WILL FOLLOW.

4. TEXT IN MIFT NOT TO ALL. ORIGINAL IN BAG TO FCO.

DOBLE

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 231445Z SMAP/JCG

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

+ 27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT. (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

me

FLASH

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SALISBURY 220859Z FEB 80

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 768 OF 22 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE MAPUTO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN LAGOS WASHINGTON UKMIS
NEW YORK LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUANDA NAIROBI AND ADDIS
ABABA.

MAPUTO TELNOS 119 AND 120: MOZAMBIQUE/RHODESIA.

1. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT BEFORE THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN
T U R S TOOK PLACE GENERAL WALLS HAD RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM
THE MOZAMBIKAN GOVERNMENT TO VISIT MAPUTO. WE ENCOURAGED HIM TO
ACCEPT. HE WAS KEEN TO DO SO IN ANY CASE, BUT SUBJECT TO AN
ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD BE RECEIVED AT A LEVEL AT WHICH SERIOUS
BUSINESS COULD BE DONE (IE MACHEL AND/OR THE HEAD OF THE MOZAMBIKAN
ARMED FORCES). WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS NOW RECEIVED SUCH AN
ASSURANCE AND IS PLANNING TO VISIT MAPUTO ON 23 FEBRUARY. BUT THIS
IS SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF PROGRESS.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL

Ric

ED

Rhodesia

CONFIDENTIAL

*B/F 25.2.80
end way
by Tel to Lusaka.*

22 February 1980

Rhodesia: Message to President

Kaunda

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has seen and approved the draft message from her to President Kaunda enclosed with your letter of 21 February.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R M J Lyne Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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GC

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

+27

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

MR ASPIN

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D
HD/UND
HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 507
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 221300Z FCO
DESKBY 221330Z SALISBURY
FM LAGOS 221130Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

DESKBY

TELNO 226 OF 22 FEBRUARY.

AND TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY,

RPD INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, CAPETOWN, GABERONE,
NAIROBI, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SALISBURY TELNO 724: RHODESIA.

1. I AM SORRY THAT INDISPOSITION FROM A TROPICAL BUG HAS RESTRICTED MY REPORTING AND COMMENTING ON RHODESIA IN THE LAST TWO DAYS.

2. MY AUSTRIAN COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ME THAT WHEN HE CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 20 FEBRUARY HE WAS SHOCKED TO FIND A MARKED CHANGE IN THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE. PROFESSOR AUDU TOLD HIM : (A) THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOW CONCLUDED THAT HMG

HAD BETRAYED THE TRUST CONFIDED IN IT BY AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH: (B) THAT NIGERIA WOULD NOT RECOGNISE A GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE MUGABE AND (C) IF MUGABE REFUSED TO ACCEPT SUCH A GOVERNMENT AND RESUMED THE FIGHTING, NIGERIA WOULD SUPPORT HIM.

3. IN AN INTERVIEW IN TODAY'S DAILY TIMES (REPORTED IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM), PROFESSOR ABUO HAS NOW STATED PUBLICLY THAT MUGABE MUST FORM PART OF THE RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT OTHERWISE THE LIBERATION WAR WILL CONTINUE WITH NIGERIA'S SUPPORT.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND RECENT REPORTS FROM GOOD SOURCES INDICATE THAT LEADING ELEMENTS IN THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT STILL PREFER NKOMO TO MUGABE. BUT IT APPEARS THAT THEY WILL NOW ONLY ACCEPT A COALITION OF NKOMO AND MUGABE AND WOULD REJECT A NKOMO/MUZOREWA COALITION. IN THAT CASE NKOMO'S BELIEF THAT AFRICA WILL ACCEPT ANY GOVERNMENT IN WHICH HE IS INCLUDED DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE WELL FOUNDED. AS SEEN FROM HERE, HE HAS HIMSELF TO BLAME TO SOME EXTENT IN THAT HE HAS ALLOWED MUGABE TO WIN THE PROPAGANDA WAR. WHILE I UNDERSTAND HIS RELUCTANCE TO DENOUNCE MUGABE IN PUBLIC, HE SHOULD HAVE DONE MUCH MORE IN PUTTING ACROSS HIS VIEW OF EVENTS TO AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN PRIVATE. THE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI THAT I HAVE BEEN URGING FOR THE LAST TWO WEEKS HAS STILL NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING AS FAR AS I KNOW, DESPITE NKOMO'S PROMISE TO LORD SOAMES ON 19 FEBRUARY. NOW THAT THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN UP A PUBLIC ATTITUDE IN SUPPORT OF MUGABE, A MESSAGE FROM NKOMO MIGHT NOW BE TOO LATE: BUT IT REMAINS OUR ONLY CHANCE TO MODIFY THE NIGERIAN ATTITUDE.

5. AS I AM STILL INDISPOSED, I SHALL SEND ONE OF MY STAFF TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (YOUR TEL NO 215) TO SHAGARI. AT THE SAME TIME I WILL ASK FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE MINISTER FOR NEXT MONDAY WHEN I SHALL GO OVER THE GROUND WITH HIM. IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF I COULD BE INFORMED BY NO LATER THAN 0800Z ON 25 FEBRUARY WHETHER NKOMO HAS IN FACT SENT A MESSAGE TO SHAGARI AND IF SO, WHEN AND BY WHAT CHANNEL.

BROWN

NNNN

SUBJECT.

cc. [unclear]
[initials]

CONFIDENTIAL

18857 - 1

ZZ LUSAKA
RR WELLINGTON
RR CANBERRA
RR ADDIS ABABA
RR LAGOS
RR DAR ES SALAAM
RR GABORONE
GRS 1230
CONFIDENTIAL

fm [unclear]
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No: *T 36 AA/80*

FM FCO 201320Z FEBRUARY 1980
TO FLASH LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NO 107 OF 22 FEBRUARY
AND TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

INFO ROUTINE MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON

RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA

1. YOU SHOULD CONVEY THE REPLY BELOW TO KAUNDA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT DELIBERATELY DOES NOT PICK UP ALL THE POINTS IN KAUNDA'S MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY THOSE MADE BY KAUNDA TO THE BELGIAN OBSERVER, WITH THE ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HERE. YOU WILL WISH TO GO OVER THE GROUND ON OTHERS WITH ZAMBIAN OFFICIALS.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

DEAR KENNETH

1

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18857 - 1

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF 15 FEBRUARY. I STRONGLY SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO RESTORE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS TO THEIR NATURAL WARMTH AND TO WORK TOGETHER. WE BOTH HAVE THE SAME AIM FOR RHODESIA: THAT THE ELECTION SHOULD BE AS FAIR AS POSSIBLE AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS ELECTED SHOULD BE TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA. IT IS NO SMALL ACHIEVEMENT IN ITSELF TO GET TO THE POINT WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO HOLD ELECTIONS IN WHICH ALL THE PARTIES CAN TAKE PART.

BUT IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT ALL THE PARTIES SHOULD FEEL THAT THEY HAVE A FAIR CHANCE. MY GREATEST CONCERN IS THAT NOTHING SHOULD JUSTIFY ANY PARTY IN SAYING IN ADVANCE THAT THE ELECTION WILL NOT BE FAIR AND REFUSING TO TAKE PART: OR REFUSING AFTERWARDS TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS ON THE GROUNDS THAT UNFAIR TACTICS HAD DEPRIVED THEM OF THEIR CHANCE TO APPEAL DIRECTLY TO THE PEOPLE DURING THEIR CAMPAIGN.

SEVERAL PARTY LEADERS HAVE TOLD THE GOVERNOR THAT THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CAMPAIGN IN MUCH OF THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. THEIR DIFFICULTIES HAVE INCLUDED THE ABDUCTION AND MURDER OF PARTY WORKERS AND OFFICIALS. THEY HAVE URGED THE GOVERNOR TO TAKE ACTION TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION, REMINDING HIM OF THE PROMISE WE GAVE AT LANCASTER HOUSE THAT NO PARTY WHICH PRACTISED SYSTEMATIC INTIMIDATION WOULD BE ALLOWED TO WIN THE ELECTIONS UNFAIRLY. MANY OF THEIR COMPLAINTS ARE SUPPORTED BY OUR ELECTION SUPERVISORS AND BY THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE.

THERE IS NO QUESTION OF THE GOVERNOR BEING BIASED OR ONE-SIDED IN TAKING ACTION TO DEAL WITH UNFAIR PRACTICES. FOR INSTANCE, IT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO HIS NOTICE THAT POLITICAL PAMPHLETS HAVE BEEN DROPPED BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT. HE HAS GIVEN CLEAR ORDERS THAT THIS ACTIVITY, WHICH IS IMPROPER, SHALL CEASE IMMEDIATELY.

I WILL NOT REPLY IN GREAT DETAIL TO ALL THE OTHER POINTS

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YOU MAKE. I WAS ABLE TO TALK TO MISS CHIBESEKUNDA ABOUT SOME OF THEM, AND MR NEILSON WILL BE ABLE TO BRIEF YOUR OFFICIALS ON THE OTHERS. BUT I REALLY WAS VERY SURPRISED TO READ WHAT YOU HAD SAID TO THE BELGIAN OBSERVER ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ARE NOT ALL OVER THE COUNTRY OR IN THE PLACES YOU SUGGEST: NOR IS THERE ANY QUESTION OF OUR HAVING INVITED SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN. THERE ARE SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN FORCES, ALONG WITH OTHER NATIONALITIES, BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES OF EITHER SIDE IN THIS PERIOD. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT ALL THE RHODESIAN FORCES SHOULD BE EFFECTIVELY MONITORED AND THIS IS THE CASE. IF YOU PROVIDE ME WITH DETAILS OF WHERE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE TRAINING ZAMBIAN DISSIDENTS, I WILL HAVE AN INVESTIGATION MADE IMMEDIATELY.

WE HAVE MADE A PARTICULAR EFFORT TO MONITOR THE AUXILIARIES. WHERE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THEM HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO BE TRUE, THE GOVERNOR HAS DISCIPLINED THEM. IN SOME CASES ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE COURTS. IF YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS, I WILL ASK THE GOVERNOR TO INVESTIGATE THEM IMMEDIATELY AND REPORT THE RESULTS TO ME.

THE REASON WHY THE GOVERNOR HAS TO DEPLOY SOME OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES, INCLUDING THE AUXILIARIES, IS THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND ZANLA FORCES HAVE NOT ASSEMBLED AND ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR VERY MANY BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE. YOU CAN SEE THAT THIS IS THE CASE IF YOU LOOK AT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND: IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY ALL IS PEACEFUL AND THE CAMPAIGN IS PROGRESSING NORMALLY. THERE ARE SCARCELY ANY AUXILIARIES IN THE AREA. BUT IN THE EAST, WHERE THERE IS VIOLENCE AND TURMOIL, THE GOVERNOR HAS TO DEPLOY FORCES TO DEAL WITH THIS, JUST AS THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS ENVISAGED.

IT IS TRUE THAT THE GOVERNOR HAS CALLED UP RESERVISTS FOR THE SHORT PERIOD OF THE ELECTIONS. THIS IS A NECESSARY

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STEP TO GUARD THE POLLING STATIONS, TO PROVIDE PEACEFUL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH PEOPLE CAN BE SURE THEY WILL NOT BE HARMED WHEN GOING TO VOTE AND TO ESTABLISH POLLING STATIONS IN SOME OF THE FAR AWAY RURAL AREAS. UUR ELECTION STAFF WILL BE THERE TO ENSURE THAT THE VOTERS ARE NOT INTIMIDATED AT THE POLLS. AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE ARE SENDING OVER 500 POLICEMEN FROM BRITAIN TO REINFORCE THEIR EFFORTS.

IT REALLY IS NOT THE CASE, KENNETH, THAT THE GOVERNOR DEPENDS ON THE RHODESIANS FOR ALL HIS INFORMATION. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN SO IN THE BEGINNING. BUT NOW WE HAVE THE MONITORING FORCE, THE ELECTION SUPERVISORS ALL ROUND THE COUNTRY, AND OUR OWN POLICE ADVISERS WHO PROVIDE INDEPENDENT INFORMATION AND ARE ABLE TO CHECK REPORTS WE ARE GIVEN. AND HOW CAN YOU SAY THAT THE GOVERNOR HAS NO AUTHORITY WHEN YOU CONSIDER ALL THE POSITIVE STEPS HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO TAKE SINCE HE ARRIVED IN RHODESIA: THE FREEING OF POLITICAL DETAINEES: THE END TO CENSORSHIP AND EXECUTIONS: PUTTING A STOP TO THE ATTACKS ON ZAMBIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES: GETTING THE MAIZE SHIPMENTS RESTARTED? OF COURSE THERE IS NOT COMPLETE CONTROL, DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF EVERY MINOR OFFICIAL. BUT OVERALL THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WE ARE IN CHARGE.

I WAS WORRIED BY WHAT YOU SAY IN YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE REFUGEES AND HAVE ENQUIRED INTO IT STRAIGHT AWAY. I BELIEVE THAT THE REPORTS REACHING YOU ARE EXAGGERATED. WE HAVE LOOKED IN DETAIL INTO THE ALLEGATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE ABOUT TORTURE AND ILLTREATMENT. BUT WE HAVE FOUND NO EVIDENCE FOR THEM, THOUGH THERE WAS ONE VERY SAD ACCIDENT WHEN SOME RECENTLY RETURNED REFUGEES WERE KILLED WHEN THEY WERE MISTAKEN FOR BANDITS AT NIGHT. THERE HAS TO BE SOME SCREENING OF THE REFUGEES TO MAKE SURE THAT MILITARY PERSONNEL DO NOT RETURN IN VIOLATION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS. BUT WE HAVE ARRANGED THAT THE MONITORS AND OUR POLICE ADVISERS SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO EVERY STEP OF THE SCREENING PROCESS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO MISTREATMENT.

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KENNETH, I OF COURSE AGREE THAT THERE ARE MANY DANGERS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. WE ARE DOING OUR BEST TO KEEP THEM UNDER CONTROL AND WE NEED YOUR HELP. IT IS VITAL THAT THOSE COUNTRIES WHO HAVE NO DIRECT INTEREST IN SEEING THIS ENTERPRISE SUCCEED AND HAVE NO WISH TO SEE PEACE BETWEEN RHODESIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE AND CAUSE TROUBLE. I RESPECT YOUR PLEDGE TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF A FAIR ELECTION. WE WANT WHAT IS BEST FOR THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS, THAT IS A STABLE GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL BRING THEM PEACE AND PROSPERITY. IT IS FOR THEM TO DECIDE WHO SHOULD BE IN THAT GOVERNMENT. BUT IF WE LET ANY PARTY, AND I MEAN ANY PARTY, USE UNFAIR MEANS, THERE IS A TERRIBLE RISK THAT EVERYTHING WE ACHIEVED WITH YOUR HELP WILL BE PUT IN JEOPARDY.

IF YOU HAVE FURTHER CONCERNS, PLEASE GET IN TOUCH WITH ME STRAIGHT AWAY AND WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO SORT THEM OUT. PLEASE CONTINUE TO WORK WITH US FOR WHAT WE BOTH WANT AND YOUR COUNTRY, ABOVE ALL, DESERVES.

YOURS

MARGARET THATCHER
END OF TEXT

CARRINGTON

FILES
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OADS
NAD
FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
CCD
FRD
ECD(E)
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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
ECON DEPT

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
SIR A ACLAND

LORD N G LENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CFO

ADDITIONAL DIST.
RHODESIA POLICY

IMMEDIATE

● IODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

MR ASPIN

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

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X 00 FCO DESKBY 221000Z X

PP SALISBURY

PP DAR ES SALAAM

PP LUSAKA

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 400

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DESKBY 221000Z

FM CANBERRA 220235Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 146 OF 22 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA WASHINGTON AND UKMIS
NEW YORK

attached.
YOUR TELEGRAM 97: RHODESIA

1. I SAW MR FRASER THIS MORNING AND TOOK HIM THROUGH ALL THE POINTS IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, ALSO LEAVING WITH HIM A WRITTEN VERSION OF THEM.
2. HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAD MADE AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE TO SEE MR PEACOCK.
3. MR FRASER MADE THE POINT WITH REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 2 (A) OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT NYERERE DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH MR FRASER TRY TO EXONERATE MUGABE, ALTHOUGH HE DID CLAIM THAT MUGABE WAS TRYING TO SECURE COMPLIANCE FROM HIS FORCES. MR FRASER SAID THAT NYERERE'S MAIN POINT WAS THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD BE CALLED TO ORDER, NOT JUST MUGABE.
4. MR FRASER SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE POINT IN PARAGRAPH 2 (B), BUT DID NOT ALTOGETHER AGREE WITH POINT 2 (C) ON WHICH HE AGAIN EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT NYERERE HAD AN INTEREST IN A SETTLEMENT AND THAT HE WOULD ONLY SUPPORT MUGABE IN A CONTINUATION OF THE STRUGGLE IF HE BELIEVED THAT HE HAD BEEN UNFAIRLY TREATED.
5. MR FRASER SAID THAT SO FAR AS HE COULD MAKE OUT BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN GENERAL AND ON ALL SIDES, BUT THAT WHEN THESE WERE RELATED TO THE BITTERNESS OF RHODESIAN HISTORY THE OUTCOME SO FAR HAD PROBABLY BEEN AS GOOD AS COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. I SAID THAT OUR VIEW AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE GOVERNOR AND HIS PEOPLE IN SALISBURY WAS QUITE DIFFERENT; THE VAST PREPONDERANCE OF THE BREACHES HAD COME FROM MUGABE'S PEOPLE AND IT WAS THEIR BEHAVIOUR WHICH HAD NECESSITATED THE USE OF RHODESIAN FORCES.
6. I TOLD MR FRASER THAT I WAS RATHER DISTURBED TO DETECT A DIFFERENCE OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN US ON THE FACTUAL SITUATION. HE KEPT REVERTING FOR INSTANCE TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AUXILIARIES, TO THE INCIDENT IN WHICH HE SAID SOME OF MUGABE'S PEOPLE WERE SHOT WHEN COMING IN TO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS, TO IRRESPONSIBLE STATEMENTS BY MUZOREWA, TO AN ALLEGED DECLARATION BY GENERAL WALLS THAT HE WOULD DECLARE WAR ON MUGABE IF MUGABE WON, TO THE BLOWING UP OF CHURCHES BY RHODESIAN TROOPS WHO IN ONE CASE HAD BLOWN THEMSELVES UP IN THE PROCESS, TO THE DROPPING OF ANTI-MUGABE LEAFLETS BY THE RHODESIAN AIR FORCE. HE EVEN SAID THAT IN SOME RESPECTS IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT OUR WORRIES WERE A MIRROR IMAGE OF NYERERE'S. I SAID THAT IF HE CARED TO LET ME HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE HAD BEEN ADVISED WAS THE FACTUAL SITUATION IN THESE RESPECTS, I WOULD TRY TO GET AN AUTHENTIC VIEW ON

SITUATION IN THESE RESPECTS, I WOULD TRY TO GET AN AUTHENTIC VIEW ON IT BECAUSE IT SEEMED A PITY IF OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS DIFFERENT ON MATTERS OF FACT. HE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO CONSIDER DOING THIS, BUT EMPHASISED THAT HIS MAIN POINT WAS THAT, EVEN IF HE WAS WRONG IN HIS INTERPRETATION OF NYERERE'S BONA FIDES (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED), IT REMAINED TRUE THAT THE POLITICS OF THE SITUATION REQUIRED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE TO ABILITY TO UNDER-CUT NYERERE'S ARGUMENTS.

TERBIT

MINN

MS

Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T35 A/20

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GRS 1312

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FM FCO 1030Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 218 OF 21 FEBRUARY
AND TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY PRIORITY LUSAKA, ABIDJAN, KINSHASA,
NAIROBI, LILONGWE, ACCRA, FREETOWN, LUANDA, ADDIS ABABA,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT SHAGARI

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT SHAGARI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 14 FEBRUARY. I AM GLAD THAT
YOU FEEL ABLE TO SHARE YOUR CONCERN WITH ME AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME.
I NEVER DOUBTED THAT THE TASK THAT WE SET OURSELVES AT LUSAKA
WOULD BE DIFFICULT. INDEED IT IS, BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO
OUR UTMOST TO ENSURE THAT ELECTIONS ARE HELD IN CIRCUMSTANCES AS
FAIR AS WE CAN MAKE THEM.

THESE LAST STAGES ARE THE MOST CRUCIAL AND THE MOST
DIFFICULT. POLITICAL PASSIONS ARE HIGH IN RHODESIA.
ALLEGATIONS AND COUNTER-ALLEGATIONS WILL INEVITABLY FLY. WE
SHALL NEED TO KEEP A COOL HEAD IF WE ARE TO DISCHARGE OUR TASK
AND WE SHALL RELY MUCH ON THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF FRIENDS
LIKE NIGERIA. I THEREFORE PARTICULARLY WELCOME YOUR ASSURANCE
THAT YOU REMAIN READY TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US IN ACHIEVING A
PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY TRANSFER OF POWER IN ZIMBABWE.

IT WAS ALWAYS CLEAR THAT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE
LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE WOULD ONLY WORK IN PRACTICE IF ALL
THE PARTIES ABIDED BY WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED. A CRUCIAL
ELEMENT IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. IN
THE WESTERN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, WHERE MR NKOMO'S FORCES WERE
ACTIVE, THE CEASEFIRE IS WORKING WELL. VERY FEW OF HIS FORCES
HAVE FAILED TO ASSEMBLE AND IN CONSEQUENCE VERY FEW RHODESIAN
SECURITY FORCES, INCLUDING AUXILIARIES, ARE DEPLOYED IN THAT

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AREA. IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY HOWEVER, THE SITUATION IS FAR LESS SATISFACTORY. SEVERAL THOUSAND OF MR MUGABE'S ZANLA FORCES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY PLACES, TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND TO IGNORE ANY BROADCAST INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CONTRARY. THIS IS CONFIRMED BY STATEMENTS WHICH SOME OF THE ZANLA PERSONNEL HAVE MADE TO OUR OWN POLICE ADVISERS AND TO THE MONITORING FORCE. THE CEASEFIRE IS FAR FROM BEING FULLY EFFECTIVE IN THESE AREAS AND IN CONSEQUENCE IT HAS REMAINED NECESSARY FOR SOME OF THE SECURITY FORCES, INCLUDING AUXILIARIES, TO BE DEPLOYED THERE.

FURTHERMORE OUR ELECTION SUPERVISORS, WHO ARE DEPLOYED AROUND THE COUNTRY, REPORT WIDESPREAD INTIMIDATION OF VOTERS IN LARGE AREAS OF EASTERN RHODESIA. OTHER PARTIES ARE PREVENTED FROM CAMPAIGNING. THEIR CANDIDATES HAVE BEEN ABDUCTED. INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN THREATENED WITH VIOLENCE OR DEATH IF THEY DO NOT VOTE FOR ZANU(PF) AND TOLD THAT THE WAR WILL START AGAIN IF ZANU(PF) DO NOT WIN THE ELECTIONS. ALL THE OTHER PARTIES, INCLUDING MR NKOMO'S HAVE PROTESTED VIGOROUSLY TO THE GOVERNOR ABOUT THIS.

IF ANY ONE PARTY IS SEEN TO GET AWAY WITH SYSTEMATIC BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENTS AND OTHER COMMITMENTS ACCEPTED AT LANCASTER HOUSE THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT THE OTHER PARTIES WILL FEEL NO LESS FREE TO ACT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE AGREEMENT. THAT WOULD PLACE IN JEOPARDY ALL THAT WAS ACHIEVED AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA AND SUBSEQUENTLY. THE GOVERNOR HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED TO ALL THE POLITICAL LEADERS THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF PUTTING AN END TO INTIMIDATION AND OF COMPLYING STRICTLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU WILL USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO URGE ON MR MUGABE THE RISKS OF THE COURSE WHICH HIS PARTY IS FOLLOWING IN MUCH OF THE COUNTRY.

ANOTHER SOURCE OF OBVIOUS CONCERN IS THE ATTACKS OR ATTEMPTED ATTACKS ON POLITICAL LEADERS. THE GOVERNOR AND THE POLICE HAVE THESE DANGERS VERY MUCH IN MIND. MR MUGABE IS GIVEN FULL PROTECTION BY HIS OWN BODYGUARDS AND BY THE RHODESIAN POLICE UNDER ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE GOVERNOR AND AGREED WITH

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MR MUGABE PERSONALLY. THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE OF THE ATTACKS ON HIM HAVE BEEN ARRESTED. INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE TO FIND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECOND. THE POLICE ARE ALSO GIVING FULL PROTECTION TO THE OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS.

I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON SOME OF THE PARTICULAR POINTS WHICH YOU RAISED IN YOUR LETTER. WE HAVE LOOKED INTO THE ALLEGATIONS THAT THERE ARE MORE THAN 3,000 SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN THE RHODESIAN DEFENCE FORCES. THERE ARE A FEW HUNDRED SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN FORCES, AS THERE ARE FOREIGNERS IN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES. WE MADE CLEAR AT LANCASTER HOUSE THAT WE WOULD NOT SEEK TO 'PURGE' THE FORCES OF EITHER SIDE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, THOUGH SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS OF FRELIMO WERE RECENTLY REPATRIATED TO MOZAMBIQUE AT PRESIDENT MACHEL'S REQUEST.

I HAVE DEALT ABOVE WITH THE REASON FOR CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF AUXILIARIES IN THE EASTERN PART OF RHODESIA. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THEY ARE NOT ACTING AS 'BULLY BOYS' FOR ONE OF THE PARTIES IN THE ELECTION. THEY ARE INTEGRATED INTO THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES. OVER THE PAST SIX WEEKS THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE HAVE DEVOTED A MAJOR PART OF THEIR EFFORTS TO MONITORING THE AUXILIARIES. THEY HAVE COVERED VIRTUALLY EVERY AUXILIARY DETACHMENT AND HAVE INTERVIEWED THE LOCAL POPULATION. THEIR GENERAL CONCLUSION IS THAT, WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS, ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION OR ACTION BY THE COURTS, THE AUXILIARIES ARE FULFILLING THEIR ROLE AS PART OF THE DEFENCE FORCES AND ARE NOT ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. A NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS MADE BY MR MUGABE ABOUT THE AUXILIARIES ARE BEING INVESTIGATED IN DETAIL. BY CONTRAST, THE UNASSEMBLED ZANLA FORCES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO ANY MONITORING.

THE RHODESIAN POLICE ARE, IN GENERAL, DISCHARGING A DIFFICULT ROLE WITH COMMENDABLE FAIRNESS. THE GOVERNOR HAS RECEIVED VERY FEW COMPLAINTS ABOUT THEM AND MR NKOMO HAS PRIVATELY COMMENDED THEIR CONDUCT TO HIM. AN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT IS THAT THE POLICE HAVE IN A NUMBER OF AREAS BEEN UNDERTAKING JOINT PATROLS WITH DETACHMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLED PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

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I UNDERSTAND THE CONCERN WHICH LEADS YOU TO SUGGEST THAT THE SIZE OF THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE SHOULD BE INCREASED AND THAT IT SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN SECURITY DUTIES ON THE GROUND. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE EITHER PRACTICABLE OR POSSIBLE. THE SIZE AND THE ROLE OF THE MONITORING FORCE WAS AN ISSUE WHICH WAS DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH, AND WAS SETTLED, AT LANCASTER HOUSE. IT WAS MADE CLEAR THEN THAT THE FORCE WOULD NOT BE AN INTERVENTION FORCE BUT THAT ITS ONLY FUNCTION WOULD BE TO MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE AND REPORT BREACHES. WE HAVE TO STICK CAREFULLY TO WHAT WAS AGREED BY THE PARTIES AT LANCASTER HOUSE. THE PRESENT FORCE IS FULLY ADEQUATE FOR ITS PURPOSE AND IS REPORTING CEASEFIRE BREACHES, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHICH IS CLEARLY INDICATED IN THE ATTRIBUTIONS AGREED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION.

WITH THE ELECTIONS NOW JUST A WEEK AWAY WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO OUR VERY BEST TO MAKE THEM AS FAIR AS WE CAN IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE ARE SENDING OUT MORE THAN 500 BRITISH POLICEMEN TO HELP IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE POLLING STATIONS. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIAL BRITISH STAFF ALREADY IN RHODESIA WITH OUR ELECTION COMMISSIONER. WE ARE ALSO PROVIDING FULL FACILITIES FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS.

I HOPE THAT THIS LETTER WILL ASSUAGE SOME OF THE CONCERNS WHICH YOU EXPRESSED AND WILL HELP YOU TO UNDERSTAND OUR DIFFICULTIES AND ANXIETIES AS WE EMBARK ON THE FINAL STAGES OF OUR TASK IN LEADING ZIMBABWE TO INDEPENDENCE.

I AM SURE THAT WE SHALL HAVE YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT. IT WOULD BE A TREMENDOUS HELP IF YOU AND FELLOW LEADERS IN AFRICA COULD MAKE QUITE CLEAR THAT YOU WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY PARTY WHICH SOUGHT TO RESTART THE WAR AFTER THE ELECTIONS. THIS WOULD GIVE ALL PARTIES IN RHODESIA THE ASSURANCE THAT THE VERDICT OF THE PEOPLE WILL BE ACCEPTED AND THAT THE JUDGEMENT OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ON THE ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE DEPENDENT ON WHICH CANDIDATE WINS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO REMAINING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU.

CARRINGTON

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
SIR A ACLAND

LORD N G LENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
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RHODESIA POLICY

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TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 763 OF 21 FEBRUARY 1980

A potential hostage to fortune is my view. I believe the F.C.S. is being advised against a message on these lines.

M I P T

FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED DRAFT MESSAGE TO GENERAL WALLS.

DEAR PETER,

CHRISTOPHER SOAMES HAS BEEN KEEPING ME INFORMED DAILY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA. I HAVE NO NEED TO TELL YOU THAT I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THEM WITH THE CLOSEST ATTENTION. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION OF THE COOPERATION YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES ON THE NJOC HAVE GIVEN US THROUGHOUT THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY DIFFICULTIES, MOST OF WHICH HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY OVERCOME. WE ARE NOW ENTERING A CRITICAL PHASE. I AM FULLY CONSCIOUS OF HOW HIGH THE STAKES ARE FOR YOU AND FOR US: AND ABOVE ALL FOR RHODESIA.

PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THE USEFUL DISCUSSIONS I HAD WITH TONY DUFF LAST WEEK, I AM AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS YOU ARE FACING, AND IN PARTICULAR OF THE EXTENT OF BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND OF INTIMIDATION BY ZANLA. I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY INDICATIONS THAT, IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS, AS A RESULT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND OF THE POLICE, AND OF THE PRESSURE WE HAVE BEEN PUTTING ON MUGABE, THERE HAS BEEN AN IMPROVEMENT IN SOME AREAS. FURTHERMORE, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT BISHOP MUZOREWA'S CAMPAIGN IS MAKING GOOD PROGRESS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY.

I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO BAN ZANU(PF) FROM THE ELECTIONS AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS DECISION WAS RIGHT. THERE WILL BE FAR BETTER PROSPECTS OF FUTURE STABILITY AND ACCEPTANCE OF RHODESIA IF THE PROBLEM CAN BE DEALT WITH BY POLITICAL MEANS. THE GOVERNOR HAS TAKEN POWERS TO ENABLE HIM TO TAKE ACTION, IN ONE OR MORE ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS, AGAINST A PARTY IN BREACH OF THE AGREEMENTS: OR TO DECIDE THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES FAIR ELECTIONS CANNOT BE HELD IN SOME PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. WE DISCUSSED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASSIONS IN LONDON THE PROBLEMS WHICH WERE LIKELY TO BE POSED BY NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS: AND I DO NOT EXCLUDE A DECISION THAT THE GOVERNOR WILL HAVE TO MAKE USE OF THESE POWERS. BUT I AM BOUND TO SAY THAT USE OF THEM IS CERTAIN TO TRIGGER VERY WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF OUR CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS: AND THAT WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF A GOOD MANY OF OUR FRIENDS, INCLUDING SOME OF THE COUNTRIES WHOSE FUTURE ATTITUDE IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO RHODESIA, FOR ACTION OF THIS KIND. THEN THERE IS THE RISK THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD PRECIPITATE AN IMMEDIATE EXODUS FROM THE ZANLA ASSEMBLY PLACES. IN THE MIDST OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AND THIS WOULD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEPRIVING MUGABE OF 3 OR 4 SEATS WHICH, WOULD PROBABLY NOT AFFECT THE CHANCES OF FORMING THE SORT OF COALITION WE ARE ALL NOW CONSIDERING.

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I AM SETTING OUT THESE PROBLEMS BECAUSE I WISH TO TELL YOU FRANKLY OF MY CONCERN THAT WE SHOULD NOT MAKE USE OF THESE POWERS UNLESS WE FEEL IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO DO SO. WE CAN BE MUCH MORE CONFIDENT ABOUT GETTING A FAIR MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESULT IF WE DO NOT NEED TO DO SO.

AS YOU KNOW, IT IS OUR HOPE THAT AFTER THE ELECTIONS IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH THE KIND OF GOVERNMENT - IN ALL PROBABILITY A COALITION GOVERNMENT - WHICH WILL GIVE RHODESIA THE PROSPECT OF MODERATE GOVERNMENT.

WE ALL WANT TO SEE THE ELECTIONS OPEN UP FOR RHODESIA THE PROSPECT OF A MODERATE GOVERNMENT WITH WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE AND A DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR. I BELIEVE THAT THOSE OBJECTIVES MAY BE WITHIN OUR GRASP. THEY CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF WE WORK VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, AND DIRECT OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO SEEKING TO ACHIEVE THE KIND OF OUTCOME WHICH HAS BEEN OUR OBJECTIVE FROM THE OUTSET.

I WOULD ASK YOU TO REFLECT ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS LETTER, TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM WITH CHRISTOPHER SOAMES AND, AS NECESSARY, LET ME HAVE YOUR RESPONSE THROUGH HIM.

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SIR A. ACHLAND
MR BULLHARD
MR DAY
MR STRATTON
MR ASPIN

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Bonnie Printer

(2)

Private Secretary

You asked for an account of the meeting yesterday of Commonwealth Heads of Mission. Lord Campton saw the Rumpal this morning. I attach a record of the talk. Print - 22/2

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

- 1 The Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa discussed Rhodesia this morning for 4½ hours. The meeting was called by the Tanzanian and Zambian High Commissioners.
- 2 The Tanzanian High Commissioner set the tone with a dis-oblising statement indicating that his government no longer had trust in HMG or Lord Soames and inviting the Committee to agree:
 - (a) that the responsibility for supervising the elections should now become a joint responsibility of Britain and the Commonwealth and
 - (b) that the Governor should order all Rhodesian forces and auxiliaries back to their bases.
- 3 During the subsequent discussion most representatives took up this theme and expressed varying degrees of concern and anxiety at the situation in Rhodesia. A number of High Commissioners drew attention to the Daily Telegraph article of 20 February (copy attached) recording the divergence of view between the statement issued by Government House and the views of one of our own election supervisors.
- 4 A fuller record of the meeting is being prepared, suffice it to say at this stage that many of the interventions were based on misleading information and some showed little disposition to wish to acknowledge the true facts.
- 5 The Tanzanian proposal for joint supervision of the elections did not evoke much response. Several High Commissioners

/argued



argued that it was far too late to introduce any such proposal. Others pointed out that the Commonwealth had for several years been arguing that Rhodesia was a British responsibility and that it was hardly appropriate now to seek to share in that responsibility.

6 The outcome of the meeting was that the Secretary-General was instructed to inform the Secretary of State of the concerns and anxieties expressed by High Commissioners. A proposal that a critical press statement should be issued was abandoned after opposition from a number of High Commissioners including Botswana, Malawi and Sierra Leone. The specific points which Mr Ramphal was instructed to raise were:

- (a) to call on the Governor to order all Rhodesian forces back to their bases;
- (b) to stop all combined operations communique;
- (c) to remove all South Africans from Rhodesia;
- (d) for HMG to denounce the latest South African statement on intervention in Rhodesia; and
- (e) to convey concern at the use of South African vehicles in the logistic arrangements for the elections.

7 Although I realise that this will not be welcome to the Secretary of State I recommend that he should if at all possible find 15 minutes tomorrow to see Mr Ramphal.

D. M. Day

21 February 1980

D M Day

Copied to:

PS/Mr Luce

PS/PUS

Mr Powell, Rhodesia Department

By MICHAEL FARR
at Mount Darwin, north-east Rhodesia

THE British election supervisor for Rhodesia's Mount Darwin area yesterday denied an assertion by Government House that it was impossible for any party other than Mr Mugabe's ZANU (PF) to campaign there.

"It's just not true," Mr John Mousley told reporters and election observers in the small settlement of Mount Darwin.

To prove his point he produced figures which showed that there have been 58 political meetings in the area in the past six weeks.

They showed that Mr Mugabe's ZANU wing of the Patriotic Front had held one meeting in January and eight so far this month.

The Rev. Ndbanangi Sithole's ZANU had held 11 meetings in January and 11 this month. While Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC had nine January meetings and 17 in February. Mr James Chikerema's ZDP had held one meeting this month.

Warned by Soames

Though Mr Joshua Nkomo's PF-ZAPU was not included in Mr Mousley's figures, party officials said a meeting was being held yesterday.

The tribal trustlands centred on Mount Darwin were named by Government House in Salisbury on Monday as areas worst infected by intimidation instigated by Mr Mugabe's ZANU (PF).

At a meeting last week with Mr Mugabe, Lord Soames, the Governor, warned the nationalist leader that unless there was a drastic reduction in political intimidation in at least 23 of the country's 55 administrative districts the party would be disenfranchised in those areas.

But despite Government House's view of his area, Mr Mousley insisted that the level of intimidation did not at present justify disenfranchisement.

As well as naming the areas most affected by intimidation, Government House has produced a map with red shading showing where "it was impossible" for parties other than ZANU (PF) to campaign, and blue for places where the situation for other parties "was difficult."

Admitting that there was some intimidation, mostly of a psychological kind, Mr Mousley said: "I would have thought this was 'blue area'."

'Go and see'

When Mr Nicholas Fenn, the Governor's spokesman, introduced the intimidation map, he invited the Press and observers to see for themselves what the situation really was.

"If you do not believe what you see on the map, go and ask the other eight parties," he said.

When I spoke yesterday to

representatives of all the main parties in the area they said that intimidation had not prevented them campaigning.

Mrs Emmie Ncube, one of the UANC candidates for Mashonaland Central, said intimidation had not stopped the party from holding more meetings than any other.

Nevertheless, she said, five meetings had to be cancelled and it was difficult to campaign in certain areas.

She mentioned tribal trustlands where guerrillas of Mr Mugabe's ZANLA forces and especially Mjumbas, the youths in their employment, were responsible for intimidation.

Mr Cyril Chimanga and Mr Martin Ngwenya, election agents for Mr Nkomo's PF-ZAPU, said they had had no problems campaigning but had got off to a late start because of the delay in getting cars. They blamed intimidation on the security force "auxiliaries" loyal to Bishop Muzorewa.

Election agents present for the other parties, the ZDP, the Rev. Sithole's Zanu and Zanu (PF), all complained about the activities of the Auxiliaries who, they said, hindered campaigning in the trustlands.

When I went to the Karuyana "protected village," where African farmers are compelled to live under Auxiliary protection, village elders complained bitterly of the political pressure which the Auxiliaries exerted on them. As far as they were concerned all the intimidation they had been subjected to came from the brown-uniformed Auxiliaries.

Mr Joseph Kaparadza, a ZANU (PF) candidate for the province, said the party's main problem was the time it took for the police to give it permission to hold meetings.

AUSTRALIA TO SEND SHIPS TO INDIAN OCEAN

By Our Melbourne Correspondent

Australia has announced a major upgrading of its forces. Defence spending will be increased by seven per cent. over the next five years, and for the first time, heavy emphasis will be placed on the Indian Ocean.

The Government plans to order a fourth guided missile frigate immediately. Military airfields in western and north-western Australia will be upgraded; new airfields will be built and the naval base at Cockburn Sound near Perth

"MUGABE'S RIVALS
PLAY DOWN
"INTIMIDATION" "

DAILY TELEGRAPH

20. 2. 80.

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats RESTRICTED	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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CLASS	3 RESTRICTED	
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FROM FCO	6 FROM FCO 221145Z FEBRUARY 80	
TO RE/ADD	7 TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY	
TELEGRAM NO	8 TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9 SEE SHEET ATTACHED	
	10 CALL BY COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL	
	11 1. Ramphal was deputed by the Commonwealth Committee on	
	12 Southern Africa yesterday to express concern to me about events	
	13 in Rhodesia. I saw him for half an hour this morning, and began	
	14 by thanking him for his helpful remarks to Commonwealth	
	15 representatives at the UN recently.	
	16 2. Ramphal said that, although the Tanzanian High Commissioner	
	17 had taken the lead in the Committee, an unusually broad spread of	
	18 representatives had spoken up about Rhodesia. They included the	
	19 Indian, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi, and even Pacific representatives	
	20 There was general anxiety that implementation of the Rhodesian	
	21 settlement did not appear to be even-handed, although the	
///	22 Tanzanian suggestion that the Commonwealth should be directly	
//	23 involved in supervision of the elections had been seen as a non-	
/	24 starter.	
	25 3. Ramphal suggested that we should get closer to the concept	
NNNN ends telegram		Catchword of
File number	Dept S/S OFFICE	Distribution POLICY DISTRIBUTION
Drafted by (Block capitals) R LYNE		FCO RHODESIA DEPARTMENT
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch <i>RuL 22/ii</i>		
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
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2 of the non-deployment of the Security Forces and auxiliaries, and
3 should not rely too much on the fine print of the Lancaster
4 House Agreement. The Patriotic Front had "substantially"
5 assembled their forces. The non-assembly of 5000 guerillas should
6 not release the Security Forces from all their obligations. I
7 reminded Ramphal both of the precise wording of the Lancaster
8 House Agreement and of the specific warning which I had given
9 during the Conference that if breaches of the ceasefire took
10 place the Governor would have to deploy the forces ^{ac} ~~excepting~~ his
11 authority. Of course I should have preferred it if no
12 deployment had been necessary.

13 4. Ramphal referred to the danger that the guerillas would not
14 remain in the assembly places after the election. He suggested
15 that the Governor should not only appeal to the guerillas to
16 stay put, but should address a matching appeal to the Security
17 Forces to exercise restraint. He also hoped that we could keep
18 the monitoring concept alive after the election. I said that I
19 was worried both about the safety of the monitors at certain
20 assembly places and about the danger that their sudden
21 disappearance could lead to a general exodus. We were trying
22 to make the best possible arrangements on a camp by camp basis.
23 I told him of the proposals for a tour of Zipra camps by Walls
24 and Nkomo, and for offers of civil and military training.

25 5. Ramphal complained about the adversary tone of statements
26 made by Government House. I took strong exception to this. We
27 had received a flood of complaints of this nature. Those
28 making them, including the Commonwealth Committee, took no account
29 that eight out of the nine parties in the election had complained
30 to us that they could not campaign in certain areas. The absurd
31 protests made in the Commonwealth Committee about the use of
32 South African mine-protected vehicles was a further example of
33 one-sidedness. I reminded Ramphal that the South Africans had
34 provided vehicles for the CHGM at Lusaka; and that the MPVs

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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1 <<<< *essential*
 2 were ~~central~~ to provide safe transport for election officials
 3 and observers, including Commonwealth observers. Who else could
 4 provide the vehicles? Ramphal appeared to accept that this was
 5 a foolish complaint, but said that any form of South African
 6 involvement was an emotive issue.
 7 6. Ramphal said that he had received a coded message from
 8 Dayal about intimidation. It expressed grave concern at the
 9 Governor's ordinances number 7 and 8: and said that the
 10 information supplied to Government House was at variance with
 11 the Commonwealth group's personal observers. Any ^{ations} ^{vo} indication of
 12 the ordinances would be a fundamental contradiction of the
 13 Lancaster House Agreement and would render the work of the
 14 Observer Group "infructuous". Dayal urged Ramphal to do all in
 15 his power to head off action under the Ordinances. I replied
 16 that I had no doubt that acts of intimidation had been committed
 17 by all the major parties: it would be astonishing if this had
 18 not occurred: but ~~the~~ ^{by} intimidation of Zanu (PF) made the ^{that}
 19 activities of the others pale into insignificance. I suggested
 20 Ramphal should talk to Nkomo about this: ^{he} ^a was very angry.
 21 There was a significant danger that Muzorewa and Nkomo would
 22 repudiate an election affected by intimidation.
 23 7. I told Ramphal that it was most unhelpful that the
 24 Commonwealth Secretariat had briefed the press about a "Crisis of
 25 confidence over the Governor's administration" when the Committee
 26 had agreed not to issue a public statement on this subject.
 27 Ramphal was embarrassed and said that he would look into this.
 28 8. We also dealt briefly with the Commonwealth Committee's
 29 complaints about ^{the} continuing issue of Combined Operations
 30 Communiques; the removal of all South Africans from the
 31 Rhodesian Forces; and the recent South African press briefing on
 32 possible military intervention in Rhodesia. On the latter point,
 33 I said ^{for his personal information} that South African Ministers were clearly embarrassed, and
 34 there were signs that they were already acting to counter the

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Catchword

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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 unauthorised press briefing. I ^{id} do not believe that the South
 Africans wished to intervene militarily in Rhodesia.

CARRINGTON
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FM SALISBURY 211830Z FEB 80

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 762 OF 21 FEBRUARY 1980

1. DUFF HAS BEEN THINKING OVER THINGS SINCE YOU AND I TALKED ON THE TELEPHONE THIS MORNING AND HAS PUT THE POSITION TO ME AS FOLLOWS.

(A) WALLS AND HIS COLLEAGUES, RELYING ON THE LANCASTER HOUSE "FORMULA" (PARAGRAPH 2 OF FCO TELEGRAM NO 97 TO LUSAKA), EXPECT US TO WORK TOWARDS AN ELECTION WHICH, WITHIN THE LIMIT OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE, IS MORE OR LESS FREE AND FAIR. MOREOVER, AFTER A FURTHER BOUT OF HARSH SPEAKING BETWEEN WALLS ON THE ONE HAND, AND ACLAND AND RENWICK ON THE OTHER, LAST WEEK, WALLS IS CURRENTLY BEING REASONABLE AND COOPERATIVE. HIS LINE IS THAT WE MUST WORK TOGETHER RATHER THAN AGAINST EACH OTHER.

(B) THE WHITES BELIEVE THAT IF MUGABE GETS TOO FAR AHEAD IN THE ELECTION, THE RESULT, IF THEY DID NOTHING TO CORRECT IT, WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR THEM. THEY ENVISAGE MUZOREWA QUITTING IN DISGUST AND/OR HIS FOLLOWERS AND OTHER BLACK MEMBERS JOINING MUGABE. THE RESULT WOULD BE IN EFFECT A "MUGABE GOVERNMENT". IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WOULD HAVE EITHER TO LEAVE THEMSELVES - OR TO TAKE ACTION TO PREVENT IT.

(C) TO PREVENT SUCH AN OUTCOME, WALLS WOULD BE CAPABLE OF DRASTIC ACTION, IF HE FELT HE HAD BEEN ABANDONED BY US. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT (ESPECIALLY IF, AS IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE, ZANLA ELEMENTS HAD BEGUN TO DRIFT AWAY FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREAS) TO CONTRIVE A RESUMPTION OF THE FIGHTING IN CIRCUMSTANCES FOR WHICH THE RHODESIANS MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY BE BLAMED. HE MIGHT CALCULATE THAT IF HE DID THIS JUST BEFORE THE ELECTION RESULTS WERE ANNOUNCED, THIS WOULD FORCE TOGETHER THE SORT OF COALITION HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE (WHITES, NKOMO AND MUZOREWA) AGAINST MUGABE, BEFORE NKOMO AND MUGABE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET TOGETHER TO FORM THEIR OWN COALITION. HE MIGHT EVEN BE ABLE TO OBTAIN NKOMO'S PRIOR AGREEMENT TO SUCH AN ENTERPRISE.

(D) IF WE DID TAKE SOME COMPARATIVELY MINOR ACTION AGAINST MUGABE JUST BEFORE THE ELECTION (E.G. BY ANNOUNCING THE ABRIGATION OR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTION IN ONE OR TWO AREAS) WALLS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT TAKE ANY PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION: AND WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO FEEL THAT, AFTER THE ELECTION, WHATEVER THE RESULT (UNLESS IT WERE A COMPLETE MUGABE LANDSLIDE, ABOUT WHICH HE COULD PROBABLY DO NOTHING) WE WOULD BE WORKING WITH HIM AND OTHERS TOWARDS AN ANTI-MUGABE COALITION. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE EASIER TO HOLD NOT ONLY THE WHITES BUT, THROUGH THE WHITES, THE BISHOP AND HIS PARTY, TOGETHER.

(E) APART FROM THE EFFECT ON WALLS, AND WHETHER OR NOT HE WERE TO TAKE PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION JUST BEFORE THE ELECTION RESULTS WERE ANNOUNCED, THERE IS A DISTINCT DANGER OF THE BISHOP'S MORALE COLLAPSING IF THE ELECTION GOES BADLY AGAINST HIM. IF WE HAD NOT STIFFENED HIM, BY TAKING SOME ACTION AGAINST MUGABE BEFOREHAND, AND IF HE QUIT SAYING THAT THE WHOLE THING WAS UN-FREE AND UNFAIR, WE SHOULD BE LEFT IN A VERY DIFFICULT POLITICAL POSITION. 2. TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, THE WHITES, EVEN THOUGH THEY ACCEPT THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO DO ANYTHING VERY DRASTIC, ARE HOPING THAT WE WILL DO JUST ENOUGH

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Read in full.
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(A) TO DEPRIVE MUGABE OF A FEW SEATS THAT MIGHT WELL BE CRUCIAL IN THE POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE AFTER THE ELECTION - EVEN THOUGH THEY WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE VERY CRUCIAL IN TERMS OF LOGICAL COALITION-FORMING:

(B) TO KEEP UP THE MORALE OF THEMSELVES AND THE BISHOP AND TO GIVE THEM CONFIDENCE THAT WE ARE STILL WORKING TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL PRODUCE A MODERATE GOVERNMENT: AND INDEED TO RETAIN OUR INFLUENCE WITH NKOMO, SO AS TO HELP TOWARDS THE NECESSARY COALITION-MAKING.

3. TO REAIN NKOMO'S CONFIDENCE IS NO LESS IMPORTANT. HE IS EXPECTING US TO TAKE SOME ACTION VIS-A-VIS MUGABE. IF WE DISAPPOINT MUZOREWA, WALLS AND NKOMO, WE RISK THE MILITARY RE-STARTING A WAR, IN THE HOPE OF FORCING A NKOMO/MUGABE SPLIT AND THEREBY GIVING THEMSELVES A CHANCE (HOWEVER MIS-JUDGED) TO GET ON TOP OF THE WAR.

(B) AT A MINIMUM, WE LOSE THEIR COOPERATION OVER BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY MATTERS.

4. THE MILITARY COOPERATION ASPECT IS IMPORTANT. IF WE ARE NOT GOING TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST MUGABE AT THE END OF THE DAY, WE SHALL HAVE TO LET THE RHODESIANS KNOW THIS PRETTY SOON. WE SHALL THEN PROBABLY LOSE THE CHANCE TO OBTAIN SENSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS AT THE ASSEMBLY AREAS (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO 749): AND THEIR COOPERATION OVER THE SAFETY OF THE MONITORING FORCE.

5. FINALLY, DUFF POINTS OUT THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE COULD AVOID THE DILEMMA (INTERNATION REPERCUSSIONS ON THE ONE HAND, INTERNAL COLLAPSE ON THE OTHER) IF WE COULD PERSUADE THE RHODESIANS TO GET SO FAR AHEAD WITH THE BUSINESS OF COALITION-FORMING THAT ACTION AGAINST MUGABE BECAME UNNECESSARY, SINCE THE PARTIES CONCERNED WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY CONFIDENT OF THE POST-ELECTION SITUATION TO FACE IT WITH EQUANIMITY.

6. THOUGH I DON'T GO ALONG WITH ALL OF THIS, I CERTAINLY AGREE THAT IN ORDER TO LESSEN THE RISK OF TROUBLE WITH WALLS WE SHOULD PRESS EVEN MORE STRONGLY ON THE COALITION IDEA, AND IN AN EFFORT TO CARRY THEM WITH US TO BELIEVE THAT ACTION AGAINST MUGABE (SO VERY UNDESIRABLE IN INTERNATIONAL TERMS) WAS UNNECESSARY. WE WILL DO THIS BY ALL THE MEANS OPEN TO US. BUT I BELIEVE, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONNECTION, THAT A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM YOU TO WALLS WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL. WOULD YOU CONSIDER SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF MIFT. TO BE OF ANY USE IT SHOULD REACH HIM IF POSSIBLE TOMORROW FRIDAY, OR AT LATEST ON SATURDAY.

SOAMES:

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PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR D. MAITLAND

SIR A. ACLAND

MR BULLHARD

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SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

IMMEDIATE

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SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM SALISBURY 211654Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 759 OF 21 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA
PRETORIA CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA
PRIORITY OTTAWA WELLINGTON NAIROBI AND SUVA
RHODESIA: SITREP 21 FEBRUARY

1. THE HIGH LEVEL OF VIOLENCE (RELATIVE THAT IS TO THE CEASEFIRE RATHER THAN THE WAR) CONTINUES, ESPECIALLY IN THE EAST. THERE WERE 10 CONTACTS, 5 LAND-MINE EXPLOSIONS CAUSED BY RECENTLY LAID MINES, ONE MURDER, 2 ROBBERIES ATTRIBUTED TO GUERILLAS, 3 ARMS CACHES WERE LOCATED AND THERE WAS ONE RAPE. 11 GUERILLAS WERE CAPTURED AND 2 F P L M SURRENDERED. THERE WERE 4 DEATHS. WIDESPREAD DESTRUCTION OF U A N C POSTERS WAS REPORTED IN MUROMO T T L. MONITORING FORCE PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN AN ATTACK BY ABOUT 10 ARMED Z A N L A GUERILLAS, BUT THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES. THERE WERE 22,065 IN THE ASSEMBLY PLACES THIS MORNING.
2. THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION IS TO TOUR ALL ASSEMBLY POINTS OVER THE NEXT 4 DAYS. THE INTENTION IS TO GET TOGETHER Z I P R A, Z A N L A AND SECURITY FORCE COMMANDERS, THE POLICE AND THE MONITORING FORCE SO THAT INSTRUCTION WILL BE GIVEN TO INCREASE POLICE PRESENCE IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS, TO IMPROVE LOCAL LIAISON AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE GUERILLAS, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY FORCES PRESENCE IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS.

FCO PASS ALL
SOAMES

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR DAY

MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)

MR R L WADE GERY)

MR P M MAXEY)

MR GOULTY)

MR W N WENBAN SMITH)

DIO)

CABINET OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 211527Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 749 OF 21 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO NAIROBI
CAPE TOWN LAGOS WASHINGTON CANBERRA WELLINGTON SUVA UKMIS NEW YORK
RHODESIA: PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES

1. AT HIS REGULAR COORDINATION MEETING WITH THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR YESTERDAY AFTERNOON GENERAL WALLS PUT FORWARD AN IMAGINATIVE PROPOSAL WHICH, IF IT IS CARRIED OUT, COULD HELP TO STABILISE THE SITUATION IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS OVER THE ELECTION PERIOD.
2. WALLS SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD PROPOSE TO NKOMO THAT HE AND NKOMO SHOULD TOUR THE Z I P R A ASSEMBLY AREAS TOGETHER. WALL WOULD RE-ASSURE THE P F FORCES ABOUT RHODESIAN INTENTIONS AND NKOMO WOULD ORDER THEM TO REMAIN IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS, TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE AND OBEY ORDERS. IF NKOMO ACCEPTED THIS PROPOSAL A SIMILAR OFFER WOULD BE MADE TO MUGABE. BUT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WITH Z A N L A MIGHT HAVE TO PROCEED MORE CAUTIOUSLY SINCE IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER IT WOULD BE SAFE FOR WALLS TO VISIT SOME OF THE Z A N L A ASSEMBLY AREAS, EVEN IF ESCORTED BY MUGABE. WALLS HAS NOW SUCCEEDED IN CLEARING THIS IDEA WITH MUZOREWA. HE WILL PURSUE IT DIRECT WITH NKOMO. WE SHALL OURSELVES MENTION IT TO NKOMO LATER TODAY.
3. PLANS ARE MEANWHILE GOING AHEAD FOR THE MOVE OF THE 750 Z I P R A AT ASSEMBLY AREA LIME ON 25 FEBRUARY TO A CAMP AT ESSEXVALE ALSO UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE MONITORING FORCE WITH RHODESIAN PARTICIPATION. THIS WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL NEARER THE TIME.
4. THERE IS ALSO PROGRESS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT RHODESIAN PRESENCE IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS. BEGINNING ON 22 FEBRUARY THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION - GENERAL ACLAND, GENERAL BARNARD (R S F) AND THE TWO P F MILITARY COMMANDERS - WILL VISIT THE ASSEMBLY AREAS TO ARRANGE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT PRESENCE FROM THE POLICE SUPPORT UNIT (THE POLICE PARA-MILITARY WING) AND POSSIBLY ALSO THE INTRODUCTION OF LIAISON OFFICERS FROM THE RHODESIAN ARMY IN EACH ASSEMBLY AREA. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS PRESENCE SHOULD FACILITATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MONITORING FORCE FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREAS. FURTHER TEL FOLLOWS ON THIS LATTER ASPECT.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

IMMEDIATE

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/IR LUCE
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MR DAY
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MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

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RESIDENT CLERK

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 212331Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 359 DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, LUSAKA, GABORONE, MAPUTO, LAGOS,
ADDIS ABABA, CAPETOWN AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 350: RHODESIA

1. A DISTURBING FEATURE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HERE HAS BEEN THE WAY IN WHICH THE ZAMBIANS HAVE LED THE ATTACK ON THE GOVERNOR'S HANDLING OF THE PROBLEM OF INTIMIDATION. THE REQUEST FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY WAS STRONGLY URGED IN THE AFRICAN GROUP BY THE ZAMBIANS. AFTER THE COUNCIL'S DECISION ON THE PROPOSED "OBSERVER MISSION", MUTUKWA, THE ZAMBIAN ACTING REPRESENTATIVE, MADE A PREPARED STATEMENT, CLEARLY ON INSTRUCTIONS, IN WHICH HE INCLUDED MANY OF THE POINTS IN KAUNDA'S PRESS BRIEFING (LUSAKA TELNO 196). HE LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SPECIFIED SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS IN RHODESIA AND OFFERED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF IT TO ANY INTERESTED MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MUTUKWA HAS NOW ASKED TO SEE WALDHEIM URGENTLY THIS AFTERNOON TO CONVEY A MESSAGE FROM KAUNDA.

2. I CANNOT ADD TO MR NEILSON'S SPECULATION ON KAUNDA'S MOTIVES

AFTERNOON TO CONVEY A MESSAGE FROM KAUNDA.

2. I CANNOT ADD TO MR NEILSON'S SPECULATION ON KAUNDA'S MOTIVES (LUSAKA TELNO 200) BUT, JUDGED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE ZAMBIAN REPRESENTATIVE HERE, KAUNDA'S VIEW OF THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED MARKEDLY SINCE MY LAST MEETING WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRONT LINES STATES ON 13 FEBRUARY (MY TELNO 302). AT THAT MEETING THE ZAMBIAN CONTRIBUTIONS WERE ON THE WHOLE CONSTRUCTIVE AND SEEMED TO BE SEEKING INFORMATION WHICH WOULD HELP THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT TO DEFEND THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION. YESTERDAY, THE ZAMBIAN STATEMENT COULD NOT BEAR THIS INTERPRETATION. PERHAPS THE ZAMBIANS ARE COMING UNDER STRONG AFRICAN PRESSURE TO ENSURE THAT, IF NKOMO TEAMS UP WITH ANYONE, IT IS MUGABE NOT MUZOREWA.

3. THE ZAMBIAN ATTITUDE HERE IN THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD WILL BE CRUCIAL, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY LEAD THE AFRICAN GROUP ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AT PRESENT, IT LOOKS DEPRESSINGLY AS THOUGH KAUNDA IS GOING THE SAME WAY AS NYERERE.

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 211330Z FEB

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 186 OF 21 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY (PERSONAL FOR S A DUFF)

PERSONAL FOR HEAD OF RHODESIA DEPT

MY TELNO 182: RHODESIA

1. I DO NOT SEE THE FULL PICTURE, BUT I DO FEEL THE FULL WEIGHT OF THAT PART OF AFRICAN OFFICIAL OPINION WHICH IS HOSTILE TO THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING, AND I WONDER IF WE ARE SUFFICIENTLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HOW HEAVILY THAT OPINION MAY BEAR DOWN ON NKOMO.

2. A MAIN ELEMENT OF NKOMO'S STRENGTH IN THE PAST HAS BEEN THE SOVIET SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE WHICH HE HAS RECEIVED. I DO NOT KNOW IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAY CONTINUE OR HOW NKOMO MAY FEEL IF HE IS DEPRIVED OF IT. BUT, LOOKING AT THINGS FROM THIS POST, IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT IF NKOMO AND MUGABE TOGETHER WIN SUFFICIENT SEATS TO FORM A COALITION GOVT (WHICH IS THE RESULT THAT THE GREATER PART OF THE AFRICAN WORLD WISHES TO SEE) NKOMO WOULD HAVE THE COURAGE REQUIRED TO RESIST AFRICAN PRESSURES, AND TO ALLY HIMSELF IN THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT WITH OTHER PARTIES TO THE EXCLUSION OF MUGABE.

MOON

FILES

RHOD J.

EAD

P.S

PS/LPS

PS/ALUCE

PS/PUS

SIR D HAYLAND

ALDAY

AL ASPIN

[COPIES SENT TO #10 JOONING ST.]

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM DAR ES SALAAM 211030Z FEBRUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 182 OF 21 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, MAPUTO, LUANDA, GABORONE, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, CAPE TOWN, UMNIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

RHODESIA

1. THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED TO-DAY ON MR FOMU, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, ON OTHER MATTERS.

2. MR FOMU SPOKE IN A VERY REVEALING WAY ABOUT HOW THE TANZANIANS SAW THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA AFTER THE ELECTIONS. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT WE, OR EVEN THE SOUTH AFRICANS, COULD REALLY WANT A MUZOREWA/NKOMO COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH EXCLUDED MR MUGABE. THIS WOULD INEVITABLY DRIVE MUGABE BACK TO WAR. FOMU SAID THAT TANZANIA AND OTHER AFRICAN STATES WERE PUTTING MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON NKOMO TO ENTER A GOVERNMENT WITH MUGABE. IF THE RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS WAS SUCH AS TO LEAVE NKOMO THE CHOICE BETWEEN FORMING A GOVERNMENT

WITH EITHER MUZOREVA OR MUGABE FOUM SAID NKOMO "WOULD BE TOLD"
BY THE AFRICAN STATES TO JOIN WITH MUGABE (AND THE IMPLICATION WAS
THAT HE WOULD BE LEFT WITH NO CHOICE).

3. IT WOULD SEEM FROM THIS THAT TANZANIA HAS SUCCUMBED COMPLETELY
TO MUGABE'S BLACKMAIL THAT IF HE DOES NOT ACHIEVE A POSITION IN
GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE ELECTIONS (HOWEVER FAIR) HE WILL CONTINUE
THE WAR.

4. MR NKOMO IS PRESUMABLY AWARE OF THE PRESSURE WHICH MUGABE
IS EXERTING ON THE FRONT LINE STATES, ASSUMING THAT, AS FOUM
SAID, HE HIMSELF IS BEING STONGLY PRESSED BY SOME OF THE AFRICANS
ON THE NEED TO FORM A COALITION WITH MUGABE. CALCULATION THAT,
IN THE LAST RESORT, IS LIKELY TO BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO RESIST
SUCH CONCERTED AFRICAN PRESSURE MAY BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN
HIS APPARENTLY STUBBORN DETERMINATION NOT TO BURN HIS BOATS BY
ANY PUBLIC CRITICISM OF MUGABE.

MOON

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
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MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
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DESK BY 211100Z FEB 80

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 211030Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 143 OF 21 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELS NOS 87 AND 88

RHODESIA: SOUTH AFRICA

about the circumstances in which S.A. might intervene in Rhodesia

1. I SAW BRAND FOURIE ABOUT THIS THIS MORNING AND LEFT A COPY OF THE REUTERS REPORT WITH HIM. HE GROANED WHEN HE SAW IT AND SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED ENQUIRIES FROM SOUTH AFRICAN POSTS OVERSEAS ABOUT SIMILAR REPORTS OF WHAT HAD BEEN SAID AT THE BRIEFING. THE BRIEFING HAD BEEN A MISTAKE AND HE WAS VERY ANGRY ABOUT IT. HE HAD SPOKEN TO GENERAL MALAN, WHO HAD SAID THAT HE HAD NOT AUTHORISED IT. FOURIE TOLD ME THAT AS SOON AS I HAD LEFT HE WOULD BE SEEING THE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE TO GIVE HIM A ROCKET.

2. FOURIE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE WHATSOEVER IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION AS EXPRESSED BY THE PRIME MINISTER

DESBY

LAST YEAR (IN A BBC TV INTERVIEW LAST MAY HE SAID "BUT IF THERE IS AN ATTEMPT ON THE PART OF FOREIGN INTERESTS AND FOREIGN POWERS TO CREATE CHAOS IN RHODESIA BY FOREIGN INTERFERENCE, THEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT WILL HAVE TO TAKE COGNISANCE OF SUCH A STATE OF AFFAIRS." MR BOTHA HAS SAID SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME ON OTHER OCCASIONS.) THE LAST THING THAT SOUTH AFRICA WANTED TO HAVE TO DO WAS TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN RHODESIA. INDEED HE COULD PUT IT STRONGER THAN THAT AND SAY THAT THEY WOULD DREAD IT.

3. I TOLD FOURIE THAT YOU WOULD BE RELIEVED TO HEAR WHAT HE SAID. HOWEVER, THERE WAS MORE TO IT THAN THAT. NEWS DEPARTMENT WERE ALREADY BEING ASKED ABOUT IT AND THERE COULD BE QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT. COULD THE SAG NOT MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE PRESS THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ADVANCE ON WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID? IF THIS COULD BE DONE, IT MIGHT PERHAPS AVOID OUR HAVING TO SAY THAT WE HAD TAKEN THE MATTER UP WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE REUTER REPORT. FOURIE TOOK THE POINT STRAIGHT-AWAY AND SAID THAT HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER. (PIK BOTHA IS ABROAD, AS YOU KNOW). PERHAPS THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO ARRANGE FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION TO PUT AN APPROPRIATE QUESTION TO THEM.

4. PRESS REPORTS HERE HAVE BEEN MORE CIRCUMSPECT THAN THE REUTERS REPORT. THUS THE PRO-GOVERNMENT "CITIZEN" YESTERDAY PUT ALL THE EMPHASIS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA HAVING TO MOUNT A MILITARY RESCUE OPERATION IN THE EVENT OF A WHITE EXODUS FROM RHODESIA. TODAY'S AFRIKAANS PAPERS TEND TO DO THE SAME OR TO IGNORE THE ISSUE ALTOGETHER.

5. FORTUNATELY FOURIE WAS SUFFICIENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE NOT TO ASK ME ABOUT THE REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE MOD'S MONTHLY BRIEFING IN LONDON ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF THE CMF (YOUR TEL NO 548 TO SALISBURY). THIS IN TURN IS A SENSITIVE MATTER FOR THE SAG.

LEAHY

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RODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/MR LUCE
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MR DAY

MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
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FM SALISBURY 211707Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 141 OF 21 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO UKMIS GENEVA UKMIS NEW YORK MAPUTO PRIORITY
GABORONE

YOUR TELNO 226: RETURN OF REFUGEES

1. ONLY 7 REFUGEES RETURNED TODAY FROM ZAMBIA, A FURTHER 42 ARE ON THEIR WAY FROM LUSAKA AND ARE DUE TO CROSS TOMORROW MORNING. U N H C R HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THERE ARE NO MORE REFUGEES IN THE PIPELINE AND RHODESIAN OFFICIALS WELL THEREFORE BE STOOD DOWN TOMORROW UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION.
2. U N H C R TELL US THAT 3 OUT OF THE 40 RETURNED TO ZAMBIA ON 18 FEBRUARY COMPLAINED TO U N H C R OFFICIALS AT LIVINGSTONE OF ILLTREATMENT BY THE RHODESIAN POLICE (THEY INCLUDED JOHN GAZI). HOWEVER, ALL THREE WERE MEDICALLY EXAMINED ON 19 FEBRUARY AND NO (NO) EVIDENCE OF ILLTREATMENT WAS FOUND.
3. MORRIS (U N H C R) THINKS THAT U N H C R MAY HAVE BEEN MISLED BY NKOMO AS TO THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN THE LUSAKA AREA WHO WANTED TO RETURN TO RHODESIA BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. WE DO NOT OF COURSE DISPUTE THAT THE REPORTS IN THE ZAMBIAN PRESS OF ILLTREATMENT OF REFUGEES HAVE ACTED AS A DETERRENT. BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT MANY LESS THAN 9,000 FROM THE LUSAKA AREA WERE READY TO RETURN AT THIS STAGE. IF THIS PROVES TO BE THE CASE (MORRIS IS CHECKING THE POSITION) WE SHALL ASK HIM TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ACCORDINGLY.
4. LIAISON ON THE MOZAMBIQUE BORDER BETWEEN RHODESIA AND MOZAMBIKAN OFFICIALS HAS IMPROVED. YESTERDAY 337 YOUNG MEN, 306 WOMEN AND 407 YOUNG CHILDREN (INCLUDING BABES IN ARMS) RETURNED. THE TOTAL WAS THEREFORE 1,050. TODAY 650 REFUGEES RETURNED, OF WHOM LESS THAN 300 WERE MEN. TOTAL REPATRIATED FROM MOZAMBIQUE NOW STANDS AT 9,526.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

[RHODESIA: POLICY:

ADVANCE COPIES]

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MR DAY
MR ASPIN

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SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

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RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 530

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DESKBY SALISBURY 212030Z

FM MAPUTO 211755Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 21 FEBRUARY

INFO TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

PRIORITY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK
CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON

MIPT: MOZAMBIQUE/RHODESIA

1. SO FAR THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ATTACKED US PUBLICLY. SO PRESIDENT MACHEL MIGHT BE HOPING TO INFLUENCE US BY STERN WORDS AND WE MIGHT STILL BE ABLE TO RETAIN HIS COOPERATION. BUT HIS COOPERATION BEFORE HAS SUDDENLY TURNED TO HOSTILITY, WHEN HE THOUGHT THAT WE HAD ACTED DECEITFULLY (VIZ HIS 15 SEPTEMBER 1978 SPEECH AFTER WE HAD BEEN IMPLICATED IN THE SMITH-NKOMO MEETINGS). THIS SEEMS TO HAVE HAPPENED AGAIN.

2. MACHEL WILL FACE A VERY DIFFICULT DECISION: WHETHER TO SUPPORT MUGABE IF HE TRIES TO CONTINUE THE WAR. THE DESPERATE STATE OF THE ECONOMY IN MOZAMBIQUE REQUIRES PEACE. MACHEL HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO A MAJOR

CAMPAIGN TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE PEOPLE: IF THE WAR RESUMES, THIS IS BOUND TO FAIL, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN HIM LOSING CREDIBILITY AND SUPPORT HERE. HE THEREFORE PROBABLY STILL DEVOUTLY HOPES THAT

THE WAR IS AT AN END (MY TELNO 116 NOT TO ALL) AND FOR AN OUTCOME IN RHODESIA WHICH HE CAN ACCEPT. BUT HIS SUPPORT FOR MUGABE SEEMS FIRM: IF HE FAILS TO WIN OUTRIGHT, HE WILL PRESS FOR A MUGABE-NKOMO COALITION.

3. MACHEL MIGHT STILL ACCEPT A COALITION EXCLUDING MUGABE, BUT ONLY IF IT EMERGES FROM AN ELECTORAL PROCESS WHICH SEEMS AS FAIR AS POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE HAS BEEN IRRITATED BY MUGABE IN THE PAST, SPECIALLY OVER HIS FAILURE TO ACHIEVE TRUE PF UNITY: MUGABE'S INSISTENCE ON CAMPAIGNING SEPARATELY COULD HAVE ADDED TO THIS IRRITATION. HONWANA TOLD ME LAST YEAR, THAT MACHEL HAD A HIGH REGARD FOR NKOMO AS A VETERAN NATIONALIST POLITICIAN. SO IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT NKOMO INTENDS TO INFORM MACHEL OF THE SITUATION (PARA 6 OF SALISBURY TELNO 724): HE SHOULD BE KEPT UP TO THIS.

4. MACHEL WOULD HELP ZANU(PF) OPPOSE MILITARILY ANY S AFRICAN INVASION OR WHITE COUP. BUT THERE WILL ALSO BE GREAT PRESSURES ON HIM TO OPPOSE ANY "NEO-COLONIALIST" SOLUTION. BANNING ELECTIONS IN ANY ZANU(PF) CONTROLLED AREAS WOULD, I THINK, LEAD MACHEL TO SUPPORT MUGABE IN OPPOSING THE RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS AND EVEN IN CONTINUING THE WAR (AS LORD SOAMES INFERRED IN SALISBURY TUR).

5. I STILL BELIEVE THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR WILL BE MACHEL'S ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO POSE A THREAT TO FRELIMO. (THE SOUTH AFRICAN SABRE RATTLING ON HIS SOUTHERN FRONTIER WILL NOT HAVE HELPED.) IT WILL BE DIFFICULT ENOUGH TO TRY AND GET HIS SUPPORT FOR A COALITION EXCLUDING MUGABE AND SUPPORTED BY SMITH, WHOSE FORCES WILL LARGELY BE BASED ON THE RHODESIAN ONES. BUT IF SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE HERE CONTINUES IT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE IMPOSSIBLE. IF THE WAR AGAINST FRELIMO IS CONTINUING ANYWAY, THERE IS LITTLE INCENTIVE FOR HIM TO DESERT MUGABE (SEE ALSO MY TELNO 101 NOT TO ALL). I THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE RHODESIANS BE PERSUADED TO STOP SUPPORTING THE RESISTANCE (SINCE MY TELNO 174 NOT TO ALL MY MLO HAS BEEN TOLD BY OUR G1 INT IN SALISBURY THAT IT IS ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTINUING.) SURELY THEY CAN BE BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND THAT TO STOP IT IS IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS?

It may of course be the S. Africans rather than the Rhodesians who are giving the support.

6. IN SHORT, IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF RETAINING MACHEL'S COOPERATION, I THINK THAT WE MUST REFRAIN FROM BANNING ELECTIONS IN ANY AREA, STRIVE TO PERSUADE HIM OF OUR IMPARTIALITY AND OF ZANU'S MISDEEDS (BUT HE IS ONLY LIKELY TO BELIEVE NKOMO) AND END ONCE AND FOR ALL THE VOICE OF FREE AFRICA BROADCASTS AND RHODESIAN SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE. GIVEN MACHEL'S SELF-IMPORTANCE AND THE FORM OF HIS MESSAGE, I HOPE THAT AN EARLY REPLY CAN COME AS A LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

DOBLE

PLEASE NOTE THAT MR DOBLE NOW WANTS BOTH THESE TELES TO BE DESKBY 223923Z IN FCO IS THAT OK

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
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DESKBY SALISBURY 212000Z

FM MAPUTO 211710Z FEB 88

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 OF 21 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

PRIORITY CAPE TOWN LAGOS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LUSAKA
DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE LUANDA NAIROBI ADDIS ABABA

MOZAMBIQUE/RHODESIA

1. I HAD AN 80 MINUTE MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL AT HIS REQUEST. HE WAS WORRIED, AND BITTER ABOUT HMG. HE ASKED FOR HIS REMARKS TO BE TRANSMITTED URGENTLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, TO WHOM HE SENT GREETINGS. HE SAID HE WAS SPEAKING FOR THE FLS AND INDEED FOR AFRICA.
2. HIS AIM HAD ALWAYS BEEN PEACE AND A ZIMBABWE WHERE ALL COULD LIVE AS EQUALS, REGARDLESS OF COLOUR; THUS HE HAD BEEN THE MAIN SUPPORTER OF ZANU. WE SHOULD REGARD THEM AS OUR ALLIES IN ENDING SMITH'S REBELLION.
3. HOWEVER, INSTEAD OF AN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN, THERE WAS A MASSIVE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ZANU AND MUGABE, BY SMITH AND MUZOREWA WITH HMG'S BACKING, ACCUSING HIM OF BEING A RACIST AND A COMMUNIST, WHICH

HE WAS NOT. WHITE EMPLOYERS, MUZOREWA'S ARMY AND THE RHODESIAN FORCES, WERE INTIMIDATING AFRICANS NOT TO VOTE FOR MUGABE. THE CAMPAIGN EXTENDED TO HIS ASSASSINATION. SMITH SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO ACT, IF MUGABE WON THE ELECTIONS - IE PREPARED FOR ANOTHER 1965: S AFRICA THREATENED TO INVADE IF HE WON: WE SAID NOTHING.

DID WE REALLY BELIEVE ELECTIONS SUCH AS THESE COULD BE CALLED FREE AND FAIR? WHAT WAS HMG'S ROLE IN RHODESIA? THERE WERE TWO POWERS, US AND THE RHODESIANS: THE LATTER WERE IN CONTROL. YET WE HAD PLANNED WITH SMITH AND S AFRICA THAT MUGABE HAD TO LOSE THE ELECTIONS THEN THE FRONTIER WOULD BE CLOSED AND ZANLA DESTROYED: RHODESIAN AND S AFRICAN TROOPS WERE POISED ALONG THE MOZAMBICAN FRONTIER. IF NECESSARY, WE WOULD ORGANIZE A COUP TO EXCLUDE MUGABE. MUZOREWA EVEN INSULTED HIMSELF AND MOZAMBIQUE, WITH OUR AUTHORITY, BY CITING IT AS THE EXAMPLE OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF MUGABE WON. AFTER ALL HE HAD DONE FOR THE SUCCESS OF LANCASTER HOUSE AND TO GET ZANU TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS, OUR ACTIONS AMOUNTED TO A BETRAYAL OF MOZAMBIQUE'S TRUST.

4. HE HAD AGREED TO MILITARY LIAISON. OUR MLO WAS GIVEN UNPARALLELLED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT HERE. WHAT WAS THE POINT OF HIS OFFICE IN SALISBURY? WHAT WOULD AFRICA SAY, IF HIS REPRESENTATIVES WERE JUST SITTING IN SALISBURY WATCHING THE DESTRUCTION OF ZANU AND THE KILLING OF MUGABE? MILITARY LIAISON HAD MEANT THE SEALING OF FRONTIERS. HE WAS PREVENTING 5000 TRAINED ZANLA TROOPS FROM ENTERING RHODESIA. BUT WE DID NOTHING ABOUT ATTACKS ON MOZAMBIQUE. CONTRARY TO OUR ASSURANCES, VOICE OF FREE AFRICA WAS STILL OPERATING YESTERDAY AND THE RHODESIANS CONTINUED TO VIOLATE MOZAMBIKAN AIRSPACE AND SUPPORT THE 'RESISTANCE' HERE. WHAT SORT OF COOPERATION WAS THIS? RHODESIA AND S AFRICA WOULD USE THE RESISTANCE AS A PRETEXT FOR INVADING MOZAMBIQUE. OUR ACTIONS WERE LEADING TO A CIVIL WAR AND A RACIAL WAR, IN WHICH THE BLACK RHODESIAN SOLDIERS WOULD TURN INTO THE MOST BRUTAL KILLERS OF WHITES. WE WERE FANNING TRIBALISM BY PLAYING OFF ONE LEADER AGAINST ANOTHER (HE DID NOT MENTION NKOMO ONCE).

5. I DENIED THESE ACCUSATIONS, BUT FEAR I MADE LITTLE IMPRESSION. WE HAD CERTAINLY NOT AUTHORISED MUZOREWA TO INSULT MOZAMBIQUE. WE WERE ORGANIZING AS FAIR ELECTIONS AS POSSIBLE IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE FINDINGS OF THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION AND OF OUR POLICE AND ELECTORAL COMMISSIONERS SHOWED ZANU TO BE TO BLAME FOR MOST OF THE VIOLENCE: ALL THE OTHER LEADERS WERE PRESSING US TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT ZANU(PF) INTIMIDATION. WE WERE NOT TRYING TO PROMOTE OR BLOCK ANY LEADER. WE WERE AS APPALLED AS HIM BY THE ATTEMPTS ON MUGABE'S LIFE: THE DEATH OF

APPALLED AS HIM BY THE ATTEMPTS ON MUGABE'S LIFE: THE DEATH OF
A LEADER COULD SHATTER THE CEASEFIRE QUICKER THAN ANYTHING. SCOTLAND
YARD POLICE WERE GUARDING EACH OF THEM. I WAS VERY DISTURBED BY THE
NEWS OF THE RESISTANCE: THE GOVERNOR HAD INVESTIGATED AND ASSURED
US THAT RHODESIAN SUPPORT FOR IT HAD STOPPED.

6. HOWMANA SAID THAT THIS SUMMED UP THE PROBLEM. THEY KNEW FROM
BITTER EXPERIENCE THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE GOVERNOR ON THE
RESISTANCE WAS FALSE. THE GOVERNOR IN GOOD FAITH WAS ACTING ON
FALSE RHODESIAN INFORMATION IN OTHER FIELDS.

7. SEE MIFT NOT TO ALL.

DOBLE

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SENT /RECD AT 211847Z SMAP/
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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

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Hope list?

Yes out

Phs 21/2

21 February 1980

Dear Michael,

Rhodesia: Message from President Kaunda

When the Zambian High Commissioner delivered President Kaunda's message on 19 February, the Prime Minister undertook to consider the points in it urgently.

Although Kaunda's message contains many of the standard African complaints, it is a good deal more positive in tone than Nyerere's letter. In particular it demonstrates a wish to get back on to a better footing in our bilateral relations. This could be very useful in the period immediately ahead. Lord Carrington thinks that it would help us to retain Kaunda's goodwill if the Prime Minister could send a further reply. This need not take up all the detailed points in Kaunda's letter. Mr Luce has already discussed some of these with the Zambian High Commissioner. Others - eg, the request for more assembly places for the Patriotic Front - are probably included largely for the record. I enclose a draft.

At his meeting with Miss Chibesakunda, Mr Luce dealt with the rather wild public criticism of our role in Rhodesia made by President Kaunda since he wrote to the Prime Minister. Lord Carrington considers that so far as possible we should continue to treat this as a separate matter from the exchange of private messages. The draft reply to Kaunda therefore alludes only very briefly to his recent remarks.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

STATIONER'S OFFICE

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21 FEB 1960



OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 201320Z FEBRUARY 1980
PRE/ADD	7	IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NO
	9	IMMEDIATE SALISBURY
	10	REPEATED INFO MAPUTO
	11	REPEATED INFO GABORONE
	12	REPEATED INFO DAR ES SALAAM
	13	REPEATED INFO LAGOS
	14	REPEATED INFO ADDIS ABABA
	15	REPEATED INFO WASHINGTON
	16	REPEATED INFO UKMIS NEW YORK
	17	REPEATED INFOR CANBERRA
	18	REPEATED INFO OTTAWA
	19	REPEATED INFO WELLINGTON
	20	

21 RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA
 /// 22 1. You should convey the reply below to Kaunda as soon as
 // 23 possible. It deliberately does not pick up all the points in
 / 24 Kaunda's message, particularly those made by Kaunda to the
 25 Belgian Observer, with the Zambian High Commissioner here.

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK		Catchword You will wish	
File number		Dept S/S OFFICE		Distribution Rhodesia Policy	
Drafted by (Block capitals) R M J Lyne					
Telephone number 233 4641					
Authorised for despatch					
Comcen reference		Time of despatch			

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	Page 2
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<<<<

1 <<<<
 2 You will wish to go over the ground on others with Zambian
 3 officials.
 4
 5 2. Following is text:
 6 Dear Kenneth
 7 I was very pleased to receive your letter of 15 February. I
 8 strongly share your desire to restore our bilateral relations
 9 to their natural warmth and to work together. We both have the
 10 same aim for Rhodesia: that the election should be as fair
 11 as possible and that the government which is elected should be
 12 truly representative of the people of Rhodesia. It is no
 13 small achievement in itself to get to the point where it is
 14 possible to hold elections in which all the parties can take
 15 part.
 16
 17 But it is also important that all the parties should
 18 feel that they have a fair chance. My greatest concern is that
 19 nothing should justify any party in saying in advance that
 20 the election will not be fair and refusing to take part; or
 21 refusing afterwards to accept the results on the grounds
 22 that unfair tactics had deprived them of their chance to appeal
 23 directly to the people during their campaign.
 24
 25 Several party leaders have told the Governor that
 26 they have been unable to campaign in much of the eastern part
 27 of the country. Their difficulties have included the abduction
 28 and murder of party workers and officials. They have urged
 29 the Governor to take action to deal with the situation,
 30 reminding him of the promise we gave at Lancaster House that no
 31 party which practised systematic intimidation would be allowed
 32 to win the elections unfairly. Many of their complaints are
 33 supported by our election supervisors and by the Commonwealth
 34 Monitoring Force.

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword There is no
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	Page 3
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1 <<<<

2 There is no question of the Governor being biased or one-
3 sided in taking action to deal with unfair practices. For
4 instance, it has been brought to his notice that political
5 pamphlets have been dropped by military aircraft. He has given
6 clear orders that this activity, which is improper, shall cease
7 immediately.

8
9 I will not reply in great detail to all the other points
10 you make. I was able to talk to Miss Chibsekunda about some
11 of them, and Mr Neilson will be able to brief your officials
12 on the others. ^{But} I really was very surprised to read what you had
13 said to the Belgian Observer about South African forces in
14 Rhodesia. I can assure you that South African forces are not
15 all over the country or in the places you suggest; nor is
16 there any question of our having invited South African forces
17 in. There are South Africans in the Rhodesian forces, along
18 with other nationalities, but we have always said that we
19 would not interfere with the composition of the forces of either
20 side in this period. What is important is that all the
21 Rhodesian forces should be effectively monitored and this is
22 the case. If you provide me with details of where South Africans
23 are training Zambian dissidents, I will have an investigation
24 made immediately.

25
26 We have made a particular effort to monitor the
27 auxiliaries, ~~and~~ where complaints against them have been shown
28 to be true, the Governor has disciplined them. In some cases
29 action has been taken by the courts. If you have any specific
30 complaints, I will ask the Governor to investigate them
31 immediately and report the results to me.

///

//

/

32
33 The reason why the Governor has to deploy some of the
34 Rhodesian forces, including the auxiliaries, is that several

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword thousand
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

Page
4

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1 <<<<
2 thousand ZANLA forces have not assembled and are responsible
3 for very many breaches of the ceasefire. You can see that
4 this is the case if you look at the situation on the ground:
5 in the Western part of the country all is peaceful and the
6 campaign is progressing normally. There are scarcely any
7 auxiliaries in the area. But in the East, where there is
8 violence and turmoil, the Governor has to deploy forces to
9 deal with this, just as the Lancaster House agreements envisag-
10 ed. ^{NP} It is true that the Governor has called up reservists
11 for the short period of the elections. ~~But~~ This is a necessary
12 step to guard the polling stations, to provide peaceful
13 conditions under which people can be sure they will not be
14 harmed when going to vote and to establish polling stations
15 in some of the far away rural areas. Our election staff will
16 be there to ensure that the voters are not intimidated at the
17 polls. As you will know, we are sending over 500 policemen
18 from Britain to reinforce their efforts.

19
20 It really is not the case, Kenneth, that the Governor
21 depends on the Rhodesians for all his information. This might
22 have been so in the beginning. But now we have the Monitoring
23 Force, the Election Supervisors all round the country, and our
24 own police advisers who provide independent information and are
25 able to check reports we are given. And how can you say that
26 the Governor has no authority when you consider all the
27 positive steps he has been able to take since he arrived in
28 Rhodesia; the freeing of political detainees; the end to censor-
29 ship and executions; putting a stop to the attacks on Zambia
30 and other countries; getting the maize shipments restarted?
31 Of course there is not complete control, down to the level
32 of every minor official. But overall there is no doubt that we
33 are in charge.

///

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34

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Catchword

I was worried

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	Page 5
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1 <<<<
 2 I was worried by what you say in your message about the
 3 refugees and have enquired into it straight away. I believe
 4 that the reports reaching you are exaggerated. We have looked
 5 in detail into the allegations which have been made about
 6 torture and illtreatment. But we have found no evidence for
 7 them, though there was one very sad accident when some recently
 8 returned refugees were killed when they were mistaken for
 9 bandits at night. There has to be some screening of the refugees
 10 to make sure that military personnel do not return in violation
 11 of the Lancaster House Agreements. But we have arranged that
 12 the monitors and our police advisers should have access to
 13 every step of the screening process to ensure that there is
 14 no mistreatment.

16 Kenneth, I of course agree that there are many dangers
 17 in the present situation. We are doing our best to keep them
 18 under control and we need your help. It is vital that those
 19 countries who have no direct interest in seeing this
 20 enterprise succeed and have no wish to see peace between Rhodesia
 21 and her neighbours, should not be allowed to interfere and
 22 cause trouble. I respect your pledge to accept the outcome of
 23 a fair election. We want what is best for the people of
 24 Rhodesia and her neighbours, that is a stable government
 25 which will bring them peace and prosperity. It is for them to
 26 decide who should be in that government. But if we let any
 27 party, and I mean any party, use unfair means, there is a
 28 terrible risk that everything we achieved with your help will
 29 be put in jeopardy.

/// 31 If you have further concerns, please get in touch with
 // 32 me straight away and we will do our best to sort them out.
 / 33 Please continue to work with us for what we both want and your
 34

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword	country
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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<<<<
your country, above all, deserves.
Yours
Margaret Thatcher
End of text
CARRINGTON
NNNN

M.T.

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/

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21 FEB 1980



CONFIDENTIAL

File

B/C 25-2-80
and may be tel blages
Rhodesia
DSC

21 February 1980

RHODESIA: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI

The Prime Minister has seen and approved the text of the message from her to President Shagari enclosed with your letter to me of 20 February. As I mentioned to you on the telephone, she has queried the reference to the continued presence of "foreigners" in the Patriotic Front forces. You have undertaken to clarify this point before the message is despatched.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CB

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard,

20 February 1980, columns 444-450

"Rhodesia"

Signed Wayland Date 22 July 2010

PREM Records Team

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 February 1980

*Agreed
Who are the
"foreigners" in the
Anglo-American
relations
have gone back to
Prime Minister*

Dear Michael, *Apex text (it is v. similar to that which you sent yesterday to Pres. Nyerere)?*

Rhodesia: Message from President Shagari

Am - 2/2

President Shagari has sent the Prime Minister a further message about Rhodesia (copy enclosed for ease of reference). It makes a number of familiar allegations about the Governor's administration and completely ignores the problems caused by ZANLA intimidation. President Shagari may well have been stimulated to send it by President Nyerere, who has sent a much fuller message making very similar points. He may also have been influenced by the Nigerian member of the Commonwealth Observer Team who was recently back in Lagos and is known to be extremely biased in favour of Mugabe. I enclose a draft reply which takes account of points suggested by the Governor and by the High Commissioner in Lagos. (Copies of relevant telegrams are enclosed for ease of reference).

If we are to have a prospect of enlisting President Shagari's support with Mugabe before the elections, it is important that the reply should go soon. I will arrange for it to be despatched by telegram as soon as the Prime Minister has approved it.

*yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

	↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC
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TEL NO

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6	FM FCO 1030Z FEB 80
7	TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	AND TO SALISBURY
10	AND TO PRIORITY LUSAKA, ABIDJAN, KINSHASA, NAIROBI, LILONGWE,
11	ACCRA, FREETOWN, LUANDA, ADDIS ABABA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
12	RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT SHAGARI
13	1. Please pass the following reply from the Prime Minister to
14	President Shagari as soon as possible.
15	Dear Mr President
16	Thank you for your letter of 14 February. I am glad that
17	you feel able to share your concern with me at this crucial time.
18	I never doubted that the task that we set ourselves at Lusaka
19	would be difficult. Indeed it is, but we are determined to do
20	our utmost to ensure that elections are held in circumstances as
21	fair as we can make them.
/// 22	These last stages are the most crucial and the most
// 23	difficult. Political passions are high in Rhodesia.
/ 24	Allegations and counter-allegations will inevitably fly. We
25	shall need to keep a cool head if we are to discharge our task

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword and
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Rhodesia Policy
Drafted by (Block capitals) R A C Byatt		
Telephone number 233 6119		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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1 <<<<
2 and we shall rely much on the support and understanding of friends
3 like Nigeria. I therefore particularly welcome your assurance
4 that you remain ready to work closely with us in achieving a
5 peaceful and orderly transfer of power in Zimbabwe.
6 It was always clear that the agreements reached at the
7 Lancaster House Conference would only work in practice if all
8 the parties abided by what had been agreed. A crucial
9 element is the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. In
10 the western parts of the country, where Mr Nkomo's forces were
11 active, the ceasefire is working well. Very few of his forces
12 have failed to assemble and in consequence very few Rhodesian
13 security forces, including auxiliaries, are deployed in that
14 area. In the eastern part of the country however, the
15 situation is far less satisfactory. Several thousand of
16 Mr Mugabe's ZANLA forces have been instructed to remain
17 outside the assembly places, to engage in political activity and
18 to ignore any broadcast instructions to the contrary. This is
19 confirmed by statements which some of the ZANLA personnel have
20 made to our own police advisers and to the monitoring force.
21 The ceasefire is far from being fully effective in these areas
22 and in consequence it has remained necessary for some of the
23 security forces, including auxiliaries, to be deployed there.
24 Furthermore our election supervisors, who are deployed
25 around the country, report widespread intimidation of voters in
26 large areas of eastern Rhodesia. Other parties are prevented
27 from campaigning. Their candidates have been abducted.
28 Individuals have been threatened with violence or death if they
29 do not vote for ZANU(PF) and told that the war will start again
30 if ZANU(PF) do not win the elections. All the other parties,
31 including Mr Nkomo's, have protested vigorously to the Governor
32 about this.
33 If any one party is seen to get away with systematic
34 breaches of the agreements and other commitments accepted at

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword Lancaster
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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1 <<<<
 2 Lancaster House there is a real danger that the other parties
 3 will feel no less free to act irrespective of the agreement.
 4 That would place in jeopardy all that was achieved at the Common-
 5 wealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka and subsequently.
 6 The Governor has repeatedly stressed to all the political
 7 leaders the crucial importance of putting an end to intimidation
 8 and of complying strictly with the terms of the Lancaster House
 9 agreements. I very much hope that you will use your influence
 10 to urge on Mr Mugabe the risks of the course which his party is
 11 following in much of the country.
 12 Another source of obvious concern is the attacks or
 13 attempted attacks on political leaders. The Governor and the
 14 police have these dangers very much in mind. Mr Mugabe is given
 15 full protection by his own bodyguards and by the Rhodesian police
 16 under arrangements made by the Governor and agreed with
 17 Mr Mugabe personally. Those responsible for one of the attacks
 18 on him have been arrested. Investigations continue to find
 19 those responsible for the second. The police are also giving
 20 full protection to the other political leaders.
 21 I would like to comment on some of the particular points
 22 which you raised in your letter. We have looked into the
 23 allegations that there are more than 3,000 South African troops
 24 in the Rhodesian defence forces. There are a few hundred South
 25 Africans in the Rhodesian forces, as there are foreigners in the
 26 Patriotic Front forces. We made clear at Lancaster House that
 27 we would not seek to "purge" the forces of either side during the
 28 interim period, though several hundred members of FRELIMO were
 29 recently repatriated to Mozambique at President Machel's request.
 30 I have dealt above with the reason for continued deployment
 31 of auxiliaries in the eastern part of Rhodesia. I can assure
 32 you that they are not acting as "bully boys" for one of the
 33 parties in the election. They are integrated into the
 34 Rhodesian security forces. Over the past six weeks the

Is this still true?

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 4
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1 <<<<
 2 Commonwealth monitoring force have devoted a major part of their
 3 efforts to monitoring the auxiliaries. They have covered
 4 virtually every auxiliary detachment and have interviewed the
 5 local population. Their general conclusion is that, with very
 6 few exceptions, all of which have been subject to disciplinary
 7 action or action by the courts, the auxiliaries are fulfilling
 8 their role as part of the defence forces and are not engaging in
 9 political activity. A number of complaints made by Mr Mugabe
 10 about the auxiliaries are being investigated in detail. By
 11 contrast, the unassembled ZANLA forces are not subject to any
 12 monitoring.

13 The Rhodesian police are, in general, discharging a
 14 difficult role with commendable fairness. The Governor has
 15 received very few complaints about them and Mr Nkomo has
 16 privately commended their conduct to him. An encouraging
 17 development is that the police have in a number of areas been
 18 undertaking joint patrols with detachments of the assembled
 19 Patriotic Front forces.

20 I understand the concern which leads you to suggest that
 21 the size of the Commonwealth monitoring force should be increased
 22 and that it should be involved in security duties on the ground.
 23 However, I do not believe that it would be either practicable or
 24 possible. The size and the role of the monitoring force was
 25 an issue which was discussed at great length, and was settled,
 26 at Lancaster House. It was made clear then that the force would
 27 not be an intervention force but that its only function would be
 28 to monitor the ceasefire and report breaches. We have to stick
 29 carefully to what was agreed by the parties at Lancaster House.
 30 The present force is fully adequate for its purpose and is
 31 reporting ceasefire breaches, the responsibility for which is
 32 clearly indicated in the attributions agreed unanimously by the
 33 Ceasefire Commission.

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34 With the elections now just a week away we shall continue

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 5
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1 <<<<
 2 to do our very best to make them as fair as we can in the
 3 circumstances. As you will know, we are sending out more than
 4 500 British policemen to help in the supervision of the polling
 5 stations. This is in addition to the substantial British staff
 6 already in Rhodesia with our Election Commissioner. We are also
 7 providing full facilities for the Commonwealth observers.
 8 I hope that this letter will assuage some of the concerns
 9 which you expressed and will help you to understand our
 10 difficulties and anxieties as we embark on the final stages of
 11 our task in leading Zimbabwe to independence.
 12 I am sure that we shall have your understanding and support.
 13 It would be a tremendous help if you and fellow leaders in
 14 Africa could make quite clear that you would not support any
 15 party which sought to restart the war after the elections. This
 16 would give all parties in Rhodesia the assurance that the verdict
 17 of the people will be accepted and that the judgement of African
 18 Governments on the elections will not be dependent on which
 19 candidate wins.
 20 I look forward to remaining in close touch with you.
 21
 22 CARRINGTON
 23 NNNN
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CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 97 OF 20 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

P S TO PRIME MINISTER
10 DOWNING ST

YOUR TELNOS 128 136 AND 137 (NOW REPEATED TO OTHERS) RHODESIA.

1. I WILL SEE MR PEACOCK AT 11.30 ON 22 FEBRUARY. I CANNOT UNFORTUNATELY GIVE HIM LUNCH BUT MR BLAKER WILL DO SO. WE SHALL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE HIGH COMMISSION HERE ON THE DETAILS.

2. OUR INTERPRETATION OF NYERERE'S POSITION IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF MR FRASER. SINCE THE MEETING OF FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS ON 10 JANUARY NYERERE HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN ORCHESTRATING A CAMPAIGN AGAINST OUR ADMINISTRATION OF RHODESIA. HIS AIMS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN: (A) TO EXONERATE MUGABE FROM ANY BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENTS. THIS VIEW IS NOT SHARED BY ANY PARTY IN RHODESIA INCLUDING NKOMO. (WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU SALISBURY TELNO 724 CONTAINING LORD SOAMES' REPORT OF HIS LATEST CONVERSATION WITH NKOMO ON WHICH YOU MAY DRAW IN TALKING TO MR FRASER).

(B) TO WIN THE MAXIMUM INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR QUOTE HIS UNQUOTE CANDIDATE IN THE ELECTIONS: IE MUGABE: AND

(C) TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR REFUSING TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF ANY ELECTIONS WHICH DO NOT BRING MUGABE TO POWER.

TO ACHIEVE THESE AIMS HE HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN PROMOTING ACTION AT THE OAU AND THE UN WITH THE AIM OF DISCREDITING OUR STEWARDSHIP IN RHODESIA. HIS LATEST MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER SHOWS THAT HE IS ALMOST ENTIRELY IMPERVIOUS TO MASSIVE BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENTS PERPETRATED BY MUGABE'S SUPPORTERS WHILE CONTINUING TO MAKE ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE AUXILIARIES WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE. WE HAVE REPEATED TO YOU THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THIS LATEST MESSAGE ON WHICH YOU MAY ALSO DRAW IN SPEAKING TO MR FRASER.

3. PLEASE TELL MR FRASER THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ARE GRATEFUL FOR HIS INTERVENTIONS WITH KAUNDA AND NYERERE. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM KAUNDA EXPRESSING THE DESIRE TO RESTORE CORDIALITY AND CO-OPERATION IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE RESPONDING APPROPRIATELY AND WILL RECIPROCATATE KAUNDA'S DESIRE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH OVER RHODESIA DURING THE CRUCIAL FEW WEEKS WHICH LIE AHEAD.

4. NYERERE'S POSITION IS VERY DIFFERENT. HE WAS CONSISTENTLY UNHELPFUL DURING THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT HE IS ENTIRELY COMMITTED TO MUGABE'S VICTORY IN THE ELECTIONS AND WILL NOT ACCEPT A RESULT WHICH DOES NOT BRING MUGABE TO POWER. THIS IS MAKING ANY RATIONAL DIALOGUE WITH HIM EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IN CONTRAST TO THE POSITION WITH E.G. MACHEL AND KAUNDA.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ THE PRIME MINISTER

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS DEALT PATIENTLY AND AT LENGTH WITH NYERERE'S CONCERNS IN THE TWO LENGTHY MESSAGES WHICH SHE HAS SENT HIM. NYERERE FOR HIS PART SEEMS UNABLE TO ACCEPT THAT MUGABE AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE BREAKING THE AGREEMENTS BY CARRYING OUT INTIMIDATION ON A MASSIVE SCALE. IF ONE TRACES NYERERE'S ACTIONS SINCE EARLY JANUARY ONE FINDS A PATTERN OF CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED OPPOSITION TO OUR ADMINISTRATION, RUNNING THROUGH THE MEETINGS OF FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AT BEIRA IN EARLY JANUARY; THE SUBSEQUENT MEETING OF THE OAU LIBERATION COMMITTEE IN DAR ES SALAAM; THE DESPATCH OF MR MKAPA (FOREIGN MINISTER) ON A MISSION THROUGH AFRICA AND CUBA TO WIN SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION TO OUR ADMINISTRATION; THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN NEW YORK; AND FINALLY THE OAU MINISTERIAL MEETING IN ADDIS ABABA. IN ALL THESE TANZANIA HAS TAKEN THE LEAD AGAINST US, ACCUSING THE GOVERNOR OF BIAS WHILE EXONERATING MUGABE AND HIS PARTY FROM ANY BLAME. IN EFFECT NYERERE HAS BEEN WAGING MUGABE'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.

5. THE PICTURE INSIDE RHODESIA IS VERY DIFFERENT (AS WE HOPE THE AUSTRALIANS WILL REALISE FROM THE BRIEFINGS GIVEN TO THEIR HIGH COMMISSION HERE, THE MATERIAL WHICH WE AND SALISBURY HAVE SENT YOU, AND THE REPORTS OF THEIR OWN OBSERVERS). YOU SHOULD DRAW ON APPROPRIATE MATERIAL INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO NYERERE TO BRING MR FRASER UP TO DATE. IN PARTICULAR YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE:

(A) THE SCALE OF ZANLA INTIMIDATION, AND NKOMO'S VIEWS ON IT:

(B) THE FACT THAT THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS DO NOT REQUIRE THE RHODESIAN FORCES TO BE QUOTE CONFINED TO BARRACKS UNQUOTE. THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY WOULD REMAIN IN THE VICINITY OF THEIR COMPANY BASES HAVE NOT BEEN MET, BECAUSE ZANLA HAVE FAILED TO ASSEMBLE ALL THEIR FORCES. THERE ARE SEVERAL THOUSAND AT LARGE IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. THEY HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STAY OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY AREAS BY THE ZANU(PF) LEADERSHIP:

(C) THE AUXILIARIES ARE CLOSELY MONITORED BY THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE. ALL COMPLAINTS AGAINST THEM ARE INVESTIGATED, AND VERY FEW ARE FOUND TO BE WARRANTED. THE PROBLEM OF THE AUXILIARIES IS INSIGNIFICANT IN COMPARISON WITH THAT PRESENTED BY ZANLA INTIMIDATION:

(D) THE PICTURE IN RELATION TO MR NKOMO'S FORCES IS QUITE DIFFERENT. THEY HAVE ASSEMBLED AND ARE OBSERVING THE CEASEFIRE. MR NKOMO IS AS WORRIED AS OTHER POLITICAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LEADERS ABOUT ZANLA INTIMIDATION. HIS CANDIDATES HAVE BEEN ABDUCTED AND HE HAS BEEN PREVENTED FROM CAMPAIGNING IN LARGE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY:

(E) THE POLICE ARE INVESTIGATING THE RECENT CHURCH BOMBINGS. IT COULD BE WRONG TO JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS BEFORE THE INVESTIGATIONS ARE COMPLETE.

6. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO EXPLAIN TO MR FRASER THAT THE MAIN RISK AT PRESENT IS THAT, BECAUSE OF THE SCALE OF ZANLA INTIMIDATION, OTHER PARTIES INSIDE RHODESIA WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS AS FAIR. THIS WOULD PUT AT RISK ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. IT WAS MADE QUITE CLEAR AT LANCASTER HOUSE THAT ANY PARTY WHICH PRACTISED SYSTEMATIC INTIMIDATION WOULD RISK FIRM ACTION AGAINST IT. THIS WARNING WAS OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE IN GETTING THE INTERNAL PARTIES TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT THE GOVERNOR SHOULD NOT ALLOW MUGABE TO GET AWAY WITH BREAKING HIS COMMITMENTS. WHETHER THE GOVERNOR HAS TO USE THE POWERS WHICH HE HAS TAKEN WILL DEPEND UPON ZANLA'S BEHAVIOUR BETWEEN NOW AND THE ELECTIONS. BUT MR FRASER SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT LORD SOAMES IS UNDER VERY HEAVY PRESSURE TO DO SO FROM ALL THE PARTIES INSIDE RHODESIA INCLUDING NKOMO.

7. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE POINTS MORE FULLY WITH MR PEACOCK. IN THE MEANTIME, I HOPE THAT MR FRASER WILL RECOGNISE THAT NYERERE'S VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA REALLY IS DISTORTED AND BASED ON PARTIAL AND INACCURATE INFORMATION FROM MUGABE. HE CAN REASSURE NYERERE THAT OUR AIM REMAINS TO HOLD THE FAIREST POSSIBLE ELECTIONS AND THAT WE WILL HAND OVER POWER TO WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM SUCH ELECTIONS. WE HOPE SIMILARLY THAT NYERERE WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY PARTY WHICH SEEKS TO RETURN TO THE WAR AFTER ELECTIONS. WE SHALL BEAR IN MIND MR FRASER'S SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENT TITO'S FUNERAL WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION WITH KAUNDA AND NYERERE.

CARRINGTON

FILES
RHOD DEPT
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PLANNING STAFF
CCD
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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
ECON DEPT

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
SIR A ACLAND

LORD N G LENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CFO

ADDITIONAL DIST.
RHODESIA POLICY

Free

DSG

Rhodesia

20 February 1980

BF 28.2.80

MESSAGE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

I enclose a copy of the text of a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Malcolm Fraser which has just been delivered here. No doubt you will be letting me have advice in due course as to whether or not it is necessary for the Prime Minister to receive Mr. Peacock.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SL

Five

20 February 1980

Thank you for your letter of 20 February enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from the Australian Prime Minister. I have, of course, brought Mr. Fraser's message to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. R. Fernandez, Esq.

20 February 1980

BY PRIVATE NOTICE

*La Mr Peter Shore (Tower Hamlets, Stepney & Poplar): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, if he will make a statement on recent developments in the Rhodesian elections.

SIR IAN GILMOUR

The situation has not changed substantially since my statement of the 13th of February. Elections on the 'White Votes' roll took place on the 14th of February.

The Governor is continuing his consultations with party leaders with the aim of stemming political intimidation, which is making it extremely difficult for the majority of parties to campaign in certain areas.

Although there has been a disturbing number of violent incidents, the total number of casualties since ceasefire day is less than frequently occurred in a single week previously. Investigations are being pursued into a number of incidents including the bombings in Salisbury on the night of the 14th of February.

/540 volunteers

540 volunteers from the police will travel to Salisbury this weekend to reinforce supervision of polling stations. We are grateful for the splendid response from the volunteers and are sure that their presence will make a material contribution to the prevention of intimidation at the polls.

SUBJECT

Text of a Letter from the Prime Minister
of Australia, The Rt Hon. Malcolm Fraser,
to the Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime
Minister

~~PRIME MINISTER'S~~

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T34/80

Text begins:

In recent days, I have been in touch with Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda at the request of your High Commissioner to Australia, Sir Donald Tebbit, and have reported the results of these discussions to Sir Donald.

Now, in the light of further assessments we have made here, I am asking Andrew Peacock to rearrange his plans to enable him to visit London briefly on his way to Washington for next week's ANZUS meeting.

My reason for doing so is primarily to enable Andrew to register with Peter Carrington (and I hope it may be possible for you to see him also) the seriousness with which we view the developing situation in Rhodesia.

I believe that a point has now been reached when all the efforts of the last few months stand in the greatest jeopardy. On our assessment, avoidable risks are being taken which could seriously affect the acceptance of the results of the elections, such that all that has been achieved so far would have been to no avail.

I know there is a belief in some quarters that Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda have reached a position of irretrievable partisanship. I can only say that I am far from convinced that that is the case, and having in mind the influence which they could bring to bear in those critical early days after the election, I urge you to take the initiative in seeking to re-establish the warm personal relationship between the three of you which so evidently developed at Lusaka.

I do not wish to go into more detail by letter. Andrew Peacock can put very well to Peter Carrington the particular concerns that we have in our minds here. But I thought I should write to you to make it clear that it is only because of the extreme gravity with which we view the present situation that I am asking Andrew to undertake this special mission.

Text ends.

20 February 1980

20 FEB 1980



SERIAL NO.

In recent days, I have been in touch with
John Waters and Kenneth Lamba at the request of your
High Commissioner to Australia, Sir Donald Johnston, and
have reported the results of these discussions to Sir
Donald.

Now, in the light of former assessments we
have made here, I am asking Andrew Lawson to re-examine
his plans to enable him to visit London briefly on his
way to Washington for next week's AMUS meeting.

My reason for doing so is primarily to enable
Andrew to register with Peter Gorington (and I hope it
may be possible for you to see him also) the seriousness
with which we view the developing situation in Rhodesia.

I believe that a point has now been reached
when all the efforts of the last few months stand in the
greatest jeopardy. On our assessment, Rhodesia risks
the being eaten which could seriously affect the progress
and the results of the election, and that all that
has been achieved so far would have been to no avail.

I know there is a belief in some quarters that
John Waters and Kenneth Lamba have reached a position
of irreconcilable disagreement. I can only say that I am
far from convinced that that is the case, and having in
mind the influence which they could bring to bear in
those critical days after the election, I urge you
to take the initiative in seeking to re-establish the
warm personal relationship between the three of you which
so effectively developed at Lusaka.

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Andrew Lawson can tell you well to Peter Gorington the
particular reasons that we have in our mind here. But
I thought I should write to you to make it clear that
as only because of the extreme gravity which we view
the present situation, I am asking Andrew to undertake
this special mission.

Yours faithfully,

10 February 1980

T/84/80



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

AUSTRALIA HOUSE STRAND WC2B 4LA TEL. 01-438 8209

Acting
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

(2)

Prime Minister

RM

20 February 1980

Dear Mr Alexander,

I have been asked by the Australian Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Malcolm Fraser, to convey the attached text of a letter of 20 February from him to your Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher.

I should be grateful if you could bring this letter to Mrs Thatcher's attention as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Roy Fernandez

(R.R. Fernandez)

Mr Michael Alexander,
Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs)
to the Prime Minister,
Prime Minister's Office,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.

no
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 27678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:
Our ref:

C.151/4/2

19 February 1980


COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Notice of Meeting

This is confirm that at the request of the High Commissioners for Tanzania and Zambia, a meeting of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa will be held at Marlborough House on Thursday, 21 February 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

The purpose of the meeting will be to consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia leading up to the elections which will take place from 27 to 29 February.

Copies as before


A.C. Bundu
Acting Secretary
Commonwealth Committee on
Southern Africa

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

CABLES: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1
TELEX: 77678
TELEPHONE: 01-839 3411 Ext:

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE,
PALL MALL,
LONDON, SW1Y 5HX

Your ref:
Our ref:

C.151/4/2


18 February 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa

Attached is a copy of the minutes of the Committee's meeting held on 15 February, 1980.

Copies as before


A.C. Bundu
Acting Secretary
Commonwealth Committee on
Southern Africa

Encl.

Group/Class..... PREM 19
Piece..... 345

Commonwealth Committee on
Southern Africa: Minutes of
meeting (CSA(80) 2nd Mtg)
held on 15 February 1980

Paper extracted and
temporarily retained
under Section 3(4)
pending completion of
review.

(date)..... 22 July 2010

(Signed)..... W. Jaylana

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

S
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
~~MR DAY~~
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 ~~DOWNING~~ STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

me
IMMEDIATE

Read in full.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 191910Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 724 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO PERSONAL FOR HEADS OF MISSION WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

E E C POSTS LAGOS NAIROBI GABORONE LUSAKA CAPE TOWN

RHODESIA: NKOMO'S VIEWS

1. NKOMO CAME TO SEE ME, AS PART OF A ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LEADING POLITICAL FIGURES, THIS AFTERNOON. WE HAD A GOOD TALK WITH MOST OF THE TIME SPENT REVIEWING THE SITUATION IN THE RUN UP TO THE ELECTIONS.
2. NKOMO SAID THAT HIS PARTY REMAINED UNABLE TO CAMPAIGN IN MUCH OF THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY - VIRTUALLY THE WHOLE OF MANICALAND, THE RURAL AREAS OF MASHONALAND EAST AND A LARGE PART OF VICTORIA PROVINCE. HE DESCRIBED THE DIFFICULTIES HIS CAMPAIGN HAD ENCOUNTERED AND THE ABDUCTION AND MURDER OF SOME PARTY WORKERS AND OFFICIALS.
3. I ASKED NKOMO WHAT HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT THIS SITUATION. I EXPLAINED THE VERY GREAT DIFFICULTY OF TAKING CERTAIN KINDS OF ACTION TO CORRECT IT. NKOMO SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD INITIALLY BEEN AGAINST THE IDEA OF DECLARING THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES FAIR ELECTIONS COULD NOT BE HELD IN CERTAIN AREAS, HE COULD NOW SEE LITTLE ALTERNATIVE TO THIS. WE AGREED THAT THE WORST AFFECTED AREAS WERE THE RUSHINGA/RUDZI REGION IN THE NORTH-EAST; THE BUHERA/MARANKE

REGION IN MANICALAND; AND THE BELINGWE AREA OF MIDLANDS/VICTORIA PROVINCE. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT I HAD AS YET TAKEN NO DECISION AS TO ACTION THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN TO CORRECT THE EFFECTS OF INTIMIDATION. ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY LIMITED IN SCOPE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT OVER 90 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION SHOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS ON THE DATES PROPOSED. ANOTHER METHOD MIGHT BE TO POSTPONE THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORST AFFECTED AREAS. EVEN ACTION OF THIS KIND WOULD ATTRACT SEVERE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM. HOW MUCH SUPPORT COULD WE COUNT ON FROM HIM?

4. NKOMO SAID THAT AT LANCASTER HOUSE I HAD BEEN GIVEN FULL POWERS TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. IT WAS BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SO. HE HAD DRAWN THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE COUNTRY TO MY ATTENTION. IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT. IF WE DID HE WOULD NOT MAKE A PUBLIC DECLARATION OF SUPPORT; BUT HE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT CRITICISE THE ACTION WE TOOK. HIS POSITION WOULD BE WELL ENOUGH UNDERSTOOD ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA.

5. I SAID THAT WE WERE BY NO MEANS SURE THAT HIS POSITION WAS WELL ENOUGH UNDERSTOOD ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. NKOMO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA. AT OUR INSISTENCE HE AGREED TO SEND A MESSAGE (POSSIBLY THROUGH A PERSONAL EMISSARY) TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HE COULD SAY PUBLICLY THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACTION TO CORRECT THE EFFECTS OF INTIMIDATION, AND TO SAY AGAIN - AS HE HAS ALREADY DONE - THAT THERE ARE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY IN WHICH HE IS COMPLETELY UNABLE TO CAMPAIGN.

6. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT, IF THE RESULT LOOKED LIKE BEING A TOLERABLE ONE, IT WOULD IDEALLY BE BEST TO DO NOTHING. APART FROM THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS THERE WAS A DANGER THAT ANY ACTION WOULD PUSH Z A N L A OUT OF THE ASSEMBLY PLACES; AND POSSIBLY PUSH MOZAMBIQUE BACK INTO SUPPORT FOR MUGABE. NKOMO'S LINE WAS THAT IF HE WAS IN THE GOVERNMENT HE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. HE WOULD HIMSELF BE TRYING TO TELL PRESIDENT MACHEL WHAT WAS HAPPENING. IF WE TOOK NO ACTION, HOW COULD WE SAY THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE FAIR? HE HAD MADE HIS POSITION CLEAR TO THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS. I SAID THAT I HAD LITTLE FAITH IN THEM, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE FACT THAT NKOMO CONTINUED TO BANG ON TO THEM ABOUT THE MISDEEDS OF THE AUXILIARIES WHICH, HE WELL KNEW, WERE ON A VERY MUCH SMALLER SCALE.

7. I THEN DISCUSSED HOW NKOMO SAW THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT. HE CLEARLY HOPES THAT HE WILL BE PRIME MINISTER. HE WOULD WISH TO FORM A COALITION WITH TWO OF THE OTHER THREE AFRICAN PARTIES WHOM HE EXPECTS TO GET ANY SEATS (MUZOREWA, MUGABE AND SITHOLE) AND WITH THE WHITES. HE SEEMS PSYCHOLOGICALLY ADJUSTED AT THE PRESENT TO THE FACT THAT HE MAY BE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO FORM AN ANTI-MUGABE COALITION (THOUGH POSSIBLY WITH SOME Z A N U (P F) ELEMENTS IN IT). THIS IS OBVIOUSLY, COULD CHANGE WITH EXTERNAL PRESSURE OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTS. BUT AT

COULD CHANGE WITH EXTERNAL PRESSURE OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTS. BUT AT THE MOMENT HE IS VERY BITTER ABOUT THE TREATMENT HEATED OUT TO HIM BY MUGABE. HE MUST ALSO FEAR THAT HE MAY GET FEWER SEATS THAN MUGABE DUE - HE GENUINELY BELIEVES - IN GREAT PART TO INTIMIDATION.

8. IN A SEPARATE MEETING WITH GENERAL ACLAND AND RENWICK, NKOMO TRIED TO FIND AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM TO BRING SOME Z I P R A TROOPSE INTO TRAINING AT ESSEXVALE NEAR BULAWAYO. HE WOULD WANT THE OFFER TO BE MADE JOINTLY TO Z I P R A AND Z A N L A: BUT IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD START WITH Z I P R A. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE WILL NOW BE PREPARED TO GIVE CLEAR ORDERS TO DABENGWA TO PUT THIS INTO EFFECT.

9. MUZOREWA SENT ME A MESSAGE THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH HIS CAMPAIGN WAS MOVING FORWARD IN CERTAIN AREAS, HE WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WERE OTHER AREAS IN WHICH HE SIMPLY COULD NOT CAMPAIGN AT ALL (THE AREAS IN QUESTION ARE THOSE DISCUSSED WITH NKOMO). IT WAS FOR ME TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF ANY ACTION WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN AND ITS CHARACTER. BUT IF NO ACTION WERE TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE EFFECTS OF INTIMIDATION, HE WOULD NOT REGARD THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS AS FAIR.

10 WE ARE NOW IN THE DIFFICULT POSITION OF HAVING MUZOREWA AND ALL THE OTHER PARTIES PRESSING US OPENLY TO TAKE ACTION TO CORRECT THE EFFECTS OF INTIMIDATION BY MUGABE: AND NKOMO EXPRESSING HIMSELF EQUALLY STRONGLY, BUT PRIVATELY, IN THE SAME SENSE. I SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT THE OPTIONS NOW OPEN TO US. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ANY POSITIVE ACTION TO ADJUST THE SITUATION ARE OBVIOUS IN TERMS OF THE LIKELY REACTIONS ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA AND ON THE PART OF MANY OF THE OBSERVERS, AND THE RISK OF REACTION BY MUGABE. WE MUST HOWEVER ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NO LESS SERIOUS DANGER THAT IF NO ACTION IS TAKEN THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED BY NKOMO, MUZOREWA OR THE WHITES.

11. I REGARD NKOMO'S POSITION AS THE KEY. HE SAID HIMSELF THAT WE SURELY REALISED THAT IF HE ENDED UP IN THE GOVERNMENT, IT WOULD GAIN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. THERE WAS NO DESIRE WHATEVER ON THE PART OF ZAMBIA OR BOTSWANA TO GO BACK TO THE WAR. IF WE CAN KEEP NKOMO WITH US I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS INDEED THE KEY TO OUR ABILITY TO FORM A WIDER COALITION HERE, LEADING TO THE DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR: AND TO OUR ABILITY TO GAIN A MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL ACQUIESCENCE (AND WE HAVE NEVER REALLY BEEN ABLE TO HOPE FOR MORE THAN THAT) IN THE OUTCOME.

12. IN SHORT - THERE ARE OBVIOUS RISKS IN TAKING ANY ACTION VIS-A-VIS MUGABE: BUT THERE IS A REAL DANGER ALSO OF LOSING THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER SIGNIFICANT FIGURES PLUS THE RHODESIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS IF NOTHING IS DONE.

IT IS A FAIR OLD DILEMMA AND I SHALL BE LENDING ALL MY ATTENTION TO THIS PROBLEM OVER THE NEXT FOUR DAYS WITH A VIEW TO SENDING YOU MY RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE WEEK-END.

IT IS A FAIR OLD DILEMMA AND I SHALL BE LEADING ALL MY ATTENTION
TO THIS PROBLEM OVER THE NEXT FOUR DAYS WITH A VIEW TO SENDING
YOU MY RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE WEEK-END.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING TO YOU ON THE TELEPHONE WHEN YOU'RE
BACK FROM ROME.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

100

ADVANCE COPY

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
MR. BYATT
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 191420Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 196 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, UKMIS NEW YORK ; PRIORITY GABORONE,
MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS , ADDIS ABABA ; ROUTINE BRUSSELS.

ZAMBIA / RHODESIA

1. LOCAL PRESS CORRESPONDENTS WERE SUMMONED AT SHORT NOTICE THIS MORNING TO STATE HOUSE, WHERE PRESIDENT KAUNDA WAS ADDRESSING BELGIAN SENATOR MONCEAU, WHO IS SHORTLY VISITING SALISBURY AS BELGIAN ELECTION OBSERVER. ACCORDING TO LOCAL REUTERS CORRESPONDENT, FROM WHOM WE HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT, KAUNDA WAS IN A RELATIVELY CALM MOOD, YET WHAT HE HAD TO SAY WAS UNHELPFUL.

2. KAUNDA SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE THAT BRITAIN HAD INVITED SEVERAL BATTALIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS INTO THE COUNTRY AND SAID THAT THE ZAMBIANS KNEW EXACTLY WHERE THEY

WERE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ELECTIONS COULD NOT/NOT BE FREE AND FAIR. HE PREDICTED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (HE APPEARED TO USE THIS TERM IN ITS OLD SENSE TO MEAN THE ALLIANCE OF ZAPU AND ZANU) WOULD STILL WIN. BUT WHEN THIS WAS PERCEIVED, THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WOULD STAGE A COUP.

3. OTHER POINTS MADE BY KAUNDA INCLUDED:

- (A) SUSPICION ABOUT THE TRUE REASON FOR THE REQUEST TO SOUTH AFRICA FOR "ARMoured CARS". HE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL BUT APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT AS A RESULT SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF BALLOT BOXES. (I HAVE WRITTEN TO KASANDA TO CLARIFY POSITION) SEMI-COLON
- (B) THERE WERE NOW TWO GOVERNMENTS IN RHODESIA (THAT OF LORD SOAMES AND THAT OF GENERAL WALLS, THE LATTER BEING IN MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL) SEMI-COLON
- (C) THE USUAL POINTS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND AUXILIARIES. THE FORMER WERE "ON THE RAMBAGE" IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT. THE LATTER WERE "RUTHLESS THUGS", LOYAL TO MUZOREWA AND WERE KILLING AND MAIMING INNOCENT PEOPLE SEMI-COLON
- (D) HE CRITICISED THE ARREST OF GARFIELD TODD AND CONDEMNED THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST MUGABE SEMI-COLON
- (E) THE TWO SELOUS SCOUTS KILLED LAST WEEK HAD BEEN PLACING BOMBS IN CHURCHES IN THE HOPE THAT MUGABE WOULD BE BLAMED. (I HAD EARLIER BROUGHT MEA UP TO DATE ON FACTS OF INVESTIGATION).

4. AT THE RISK OF STATING THE OBVIOUS, THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW PRONOUNCED ON THESE ISSUES WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, AT LEAST PUBLICLY. IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHY KAUNDA CHOSE THIS MOMENT. HE MAY FEEL A NEED, FOLLOWING THE OAU MEETING, AND REPORTS (BY TELNO 190) THAT MUGABE IS DOING BETTER THAN THE ZAMBIANS EXPECTED, TO REAFFIRM HIS CREDENTIALS WITH THE RADICALS. SINCE THE END OF LAST WEEK ZAMBIAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF RHODESIA HAS BEEN FAIRLY MILD. BUT TOMORROW'S PAPERS WILL PROBABLY LET RIP.

NEILSON

G 199/19

LPT 435/19

OO FCO

OO SALISBURY

GRS 907A

SECRET

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 191535Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 15/// 134 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

ROME TEL NO 1 TO CAPE TOWN

Read in full.

(19)

1707

Hd Rhodesia Dlx (10)

H.S. Afr. S.

Hd PWD (2)

IMMEDIATE

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attached.

RHODESIA: POLITICAL SITUATION

1. AS PIK BOTHA IS LEAVING THIS AFTERNOON FOR A VISIT TO EUROPE FROM WHICH HE WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL THE WEEKEND I THOUGHT IT BEST TO SUGGEST ANOTHER SESSION WITH HIM TODAY IN ORDER TO GO OVER THE POINTS IN THE TUR WITH HIM. HE FOR HIS PART TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAND OVER TO ME MR P W BOTHA'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER (MY TEL NO 131) AND TO LET OFF STEAM TO ME ABOUT THE HOSTILE ATTITUDES OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS (SEE BELOW).

~~Note D-S~~

2. ON THE MAIN POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 3-7 IN THE TURSPIK HAD THE FOLLOWING TO SAY:-

(A) HE WAS GLAD TO HAVE YOUR COMMENTS AND, FOR THE MOST PART, AGREED WITH THEM.

(B) HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, THINK THAT A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IN WHICH ALL THE PARTIES ARE REPRESENTED WAS A STARTER. IT HAD BEEN TRIED IN ANGOLO AND HAD NOT WORKED. THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES WOULD NOT ACCEPT A GOVERNMENT INCLUDING MUGABE AND MUGABE HIMSELF WOULD PROBABLY NOT WANT TO TAKE PART IN IT.

(C) THE SOUTH AFRICANS' PRESENT CALCULATIONS WERE THAT MUZORENA

* The list of Mr Botha's reply is on its way. The S. Africans have accepted labels for the second half of March: they have moved v. fast. And

X

THE 1980 APPEALS PRESENT CALCULATIONS WERE THAT MUZOREWA WOULD GET 39 SEATS, MUGABE 39 AND NKOMO 17-18. IF THE GOVERNOR COULD "TIGHTEN THE SCREWS" EVEN FURTHER ON ZANLA TO STOP THEIR INTIMIDATION MUZOREWA MIGHT IMPROVE HIS POSITION BY A FURTHER 10% TO 15% AND THIS WOULD MAKE A DECISIVE DIFFERENCE. ALREADY THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE URBAN "INTELLECTUAL" BLACKS WERE REACTING AGAINST ZANLA'S INTIMIDATION AND BRUTALITIES AND WERE MOVING TOWARDS MUZOREWA. IF, AS SEEMED POSSIBLE, SITHOLE COULD PICK UP 4 OR 5 SEATS AT THE EXPENSE OF NKOMO AND MUZOREWA COULD IMPROVE HIS POSITION A LITTLE MORE, THE CHANCES OF PERSUADING NKOMO TO JOIN WITH MUZOREWA WOULD BE THAT MUCH IMPROVED. HE HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT WE WOULD ENSURE THAT MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE, INDEED ALL OF THE "NON-INTIMIDATION PARTIES", RECEIVED AS MUCH PUBLICITY AS POSSIBLE. AS HE HAD MENTIONED TO ME THE OTHER DAY, IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT MUGABE WAS GETTING TOO MUCH PUBLICITY AND MUZOREWA TOO LITTLE.

(D) HE AGREED THAT IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTION THE ATTITUDE OF THE WHITES WOULD BE CRUCIAL AND HE WAS REALLY WORRIED ABOUT IT. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE INTENDED TO CUT AND RUN AS SOON AS THE ELECTION WAS OVER. MR MULDOON'S RECENT STATEMENT, WHICH HE HAD SEEN ON TELEVISION HERE, THAT THE NEW ZEALANDERS INTENDED TO DO JUST THAT WOULD MAKE THE WHITES VERY NERVOUS, SINCE IT WAS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT THE NEW ZEALANDERS WERE CLOSE TO US.

(E) HE WAS NOT SO SURE THAT MUGABE MIGHT NOT DECIDE TO PULL OUT BEFORE THE ELECTION, PARTICULARLY IF HIS PROSPECTS IN RELATION TO MUZOREWA SEEMED TO BE ON THE WANE. THIS UNDERLINED THE WISDOM OF OUR DECISION NOT TO BAN HIM AS SUCH AND TO CONCENTRATE INSTEAD ON LOCAL ACTION TO PUT AN END TO INTIMIDATION. BUT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE THAT MUGABE MIGHT TRY TO FORCE US TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST HIM.

3. PIK WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH BOTSWANA, MOZAMBIQUE, LESOTHO AND ZAMBIA. HE SAID THAT THE SAG NOW INTENDED TO PUT THE SCREWS ON THEM ALL TO STOP HARBOURING ANC TERRORISTS. HE HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, SPOKEN TO FOREIGN MINISTER MOGWE THE OTHER EVENING AND HAD SAID THAT UNLESS BOTSWANA GOT RID OF THE ANC PEOPLE IN HER MIDST THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD GO IN AND TAKE THEM OUT THEMSELVES. HE HAD GONE ON TO TELL MOGWE THAT IF BOTSWANA WISHED TO TAKE SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON THIS THE SAG WOULD WELCOME IT BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLOSE THE BORDER WITH BOTSWANA. MOGWE HAD RUNG HIM BACK TO SAY THAT

OPPORTUNITY TO CLOSE THE BORDER WITH BOTSWANA. MOGWE HAD RUNG HIM BACK TO SAY THAT HE WAS INVESTIGATING THE MATTER. PIK WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE BATSWANA. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THEY WERE ALSO DELIVERING A STRONG MESSAGE TO THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT TODAY EXPLAINING THAT UNLESS THEY STOPPED HARBOURING MEMBERS OF THE ANC THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER ECONOMIC COOPERATION FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THE ANC WERE, HE SAID, INFILTRATING FROM MOZAMBIQUE INTO SWAZILAND AND KING SOBHUZA WAS IN FEAR AND TREMBLING OVER THEIR ACTIVITIES. THE SAG WERE ALSO INTENDING TO TELL THE ZAMBIANS THAT THEY COULD NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER SUPPLIES, SINCE THEY HAD NOT PAID THEM FOR WHAT THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED. THE SAG CERTAINLY DID NOT INTEND TO DONATE THEM WHILE ZAMBIA KEPT SPITTING IN THEIR FACE. BY THIS TIME PIK HAD WARMED TO HIS THEME AND I WAS, THEREFORE, SOMEWHAT RELIEVED WHEN HE SAID THAT THE SAG WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING "HARSH OR EXPLOSIVE, SINCE THIS IS NOT OUR WAY". BUT HE SOMEWHAT BELIED THIS LAST REMARK BY SAYING THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD REALLY HAD ENOUGH OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND IF NOBODY ELSE WOULD STAND UP TO THEM, THEY WOULD. ON THE OTHER HAND THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF BECOMING INVOLVED IN A STRAIGHT WHITES VERSUS BLACKS WAR; THERE WERE PLENTY OF BLACKS WHO WOULD SUPPORT THEM (HE DID NOT ELABORATE).

4. THE EARLIER PART OF OUR CONVERSATION ON RHODESIA WAS, I BELIEVE, VERY USEFUL. THE SECOND PART WAS RATHER LESS SO, PARTICULARLY AS PIK BECAME MORE EXCITED AS HE WENT ON. FOR THIS LAST REASON I AM INCLINED TO LAY OFF A BIT IN CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT HE SAID. IT IS, NEVERTHELESS, CLEAR THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE GETTING FED UP WITH THE WAY IN WHICH THEIR CLOSE NEIGHBOURS TRY TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS IN ACCEPTING SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WHILST ATTACKING SOUTH AFRICA IN PUBLIC.

5. MAY I LEAVE IT TO THE DEPARTMENT TO DECIDE WHETHER TO PASS ON THE GIST OF PARAGRAPH 3 TO OTHER POSTS?

LEAHY

CCN PSE AMEND TELNO TO READ 134

NNNN

11
Rhodesia

19 February, 1980.

Message to President Nyerere

As I have already mentioned on the telephone, the Prime Minister has approved the text of the message from her to President Nyerere enclosed with your letter to me of 19 February.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CB

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 February 1980

①

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister

Agree text?

Print - 19/2

Message from President Nyerere

With your letter of 18 February you enclosed the message from President Nyerere to the Prime Minister which the Tanzanian High Commissioner delivered.

I enclose a draft reply. Many of President Nyerere's points have already been dealt with in conversations with the High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam and we have not taken them all up in the draft reply. If we are to get Nyerere to take some action with Mugabe before the elections - and there are some signs that he is beginning to appreciate the extent of ZANLA intimidation - the message should issue as soon as possible.

The draft reply to President Nyerere has been approved by the Lord Privy Seal.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London

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Subject

T 33/80

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. *T 33/80*

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GRS 1290
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 191500Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM
TELEGRAM NUMBER 56 OF 19 FEB,
AND TO SALISBURY, NAIROBI, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, ACCRA,
LAGOS, MONROVIA, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, DAKAR, KINSHASA, LUSAKA,
FREETOWN, KINGSTON, LILONGWE, BANJUL, MBABANE, ABIDJAN,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, EEC POSTS, OTTAWA, CANBERRA,
WELLINGTON

MIPT: PRESIDENT NYERERE'S MESSAGE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY:
DEAR PRESIDENT NYERERE.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER. I THINK YOU KNOW MY VIEWS ON
MANY OF THE POINTS WHICH YOU HAVE RAISED. SIR PETER MOON HAS
DEALT VERY FULLY WITH OTHERS IN MEETINGS WITH YOU AND MEMBERS OF
YOUR GOVERNMENT.

THE PRESENT ROLE OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES, OF WHICH THE
AUXILIARIES FORM A PART, STEMS FROM WHAT WAS AGREED AT LANCASTER
HOUSE. THE AGREEMENTS PROVIDED THAT THE RHODESIAN FORCES SHOULD
FIRST DISENGAGE TO THE VICINITY OF THEIR BASES TO ALLOW THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES TO ASSEMBLE. IT WAS MADE CLEAR THAT
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN THEREAFTER WOULD DEPEND CRUCIALLY ON THE
SUCCESS OF THE ASSEMBLY PHASE. THE SENTENCE ACTUALLY USED BY
LORD CARRINGTON IN HIS STATEMENT OF 11 DECEMBER READ: 'IF ALL
PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES INSIDE RHODESIA ASSEMBLE WITH THEIR ARMS
AND THERE IS NO FURTHER MOVEMENT BY EXTERNALLY-BASED PATRIOTIC
FRONT FORCES INTO RHODESIA, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED IN THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE GOVERNOR TO ASK THE RHODESIAN FORCES TO
DEPLOY FROM THEIR COMPANY BASES.'

ALTHOUGH A LARGE NUMBER OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES DID
ASSEMBLE, REGRETTABLY THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT OF ARMED
MEN ACROSS RHODESIA'S BORDERS AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE CAME INTO
EFFECT, SOME OF IT BY PF FORCES WHICH HAD ARRIVED IMMEDIATELY
BEFOREHAND FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.

THERE IS INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE, WHICH COMES NOT FROM

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RHODESIAN SOURCES BUT FROM OUR OWN POLICE ADVISERS AND THE MONITORING FORCE, THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND ZANLA FORCES HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO ASSEMBLE. THEY REMAIN AT LARGE IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY AND, IN THE TERMS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT, ARE UNLAWFUL. THEIR ACTIVITIES HAVE INCLUDED INTIMIDATION OF THE RURAL POPULATION, INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGITIMATE CAMPAIGNING OF OTHER PARTIES AND WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, THE GOVERNOR IS ENTITLED, INDEED BOUND, TO EMPLOY FORCES UNDER HIS AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY, IN CONTRAST, CONDITIONS ARE GENERALLY PEACEFUL, AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF RHODESIAN FORCES INCLUDING THE AUXILIARIES IS SCARCELY NECESSARY.

IT IS TRUE THAT AUXILIARIES ALSO PERFORM GUARD DUTIES FOR TEAMS TRYING TO RE-ESTABLISH THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF SCHOOLS, CATTLE DIPS AND SO ON IN THE RURAL AREAS. THIS IS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF ATTEMPTS BY ZANLA FORCES TO INTERFERE WITH THE RETURN TO NORMALITY AND TO PREVENT THE RURAL POPULATION FROM BEGINNING TO ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. I CANNOT AGREE THAT THIS ROLE IS REPREHENSIBLE OR ILLEGAL: ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS HUMANE.

THERE IS A FURTHER VERY IMPORTANT POINT. THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE HAS DEVOTED A MAJOR PART OF ITS EFFORTS OVER THE LAST SIX WEEKS TO MONITORING THE SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES. THEY HAVE COVERED VIRTUALLY EVERY AUXILIARY DETACHMENT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND HAVE INTERVIEWED THE LOCAL POPULATION IN AREAS WHERE AUXILIARIES ARE PRESENT. THE GENERAL CONCLUSION IS THAT, WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS (ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION OR ACTION BY THE COURTS), THE AUXILIARIES ARE FULFILLING THEIR ROLE AS PART OF THE DEFENCE FORCES AND ARE NOT ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. MR MUGABE HAS MADE A NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS. THESE ARE, OF COURSE, BEING INVESTIGATED BUT MANY OF THOSE INVESTIGATED SO FAR HAVE PROVED TO BE UNFOUNDED. BY CONTRAST THE UNASSEMBLED ZANLA FORCES ARE OF COURSE NOT SUBJECT TO MONITORING.

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YOU GO ON TO SUGGEST THAT THE RIGHT COURSE WOULD BE FOR BRITAIN TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ITS OFFICIALS IN RHODESIA AND EXPAND THE MONITORING FORCE. AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE ARE PROVIDING 500 BRITISH POLICEMEN TO SUPERVISE POLLING STATIONS IN RURAL AREAS: THIS IS A DIRECT COUNTER TO INTIMIDATION AS WELL AS AN ADDITIONAL CHECK ON THE CONDUCT OF THE POLL. THE MONITORING FORCE IS FULLY ADEQUATE FOR ITS TASKS, WHICH ARE TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE AND REPORT BREACHES. WE DO NOT NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE: THE EVIDENCE IS ALL TOO PLAIN AND IS REFLECTED IN THE STATISTICS OF THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION'S REPORT. WHAT WE NEED IS EFFECTIVE ACTION TO DEAL WITH THEM AND WITH INTIMIDATION: AND THIS WE SHALL GET ONLY WHEN THE LEADERS CONCERNED FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS AND ARE NOT GIVEN ANY GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN BREAK THEIR UNDERTAKINGS WITH IMPUNITY.

YOU REFER TO THE PRESENT SITUATION AS 'TERRIBLE'. THAT HARDLY SEEMS TO ME AN APPROPRIATE TERM WHEN ONE COMPARES THE POSITION NOW WITH THAT ONLY A FEW SHORT WEEKS AGO. BUT THERE ARE VERY CLEAR RISKS. I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ATTACKS ON MR MUGABE AND OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES. THE GOVERNOR IS TAKING STEPS TO DEAL WITH THIS, AND SOME ARRESTS HAVE BEEN MADE.

HOWEVER, BY FAR THE GREATEST DANGER IS THE INTIMIDATION WHICH IS BEING PRACTISED BY MR MUGABE'S PARTY THROUGHOUT THE EASTERN PROVINCES. THIS IS NOT A JUDGEMENT ARRIVED AT LIGHTLY: IT IS BASED ON EVIDENCE PAINSTAKINGLY ASSEMBLED BY THE ELECTION SUPERVISORS WE HAVE DEPLOYED IN THE AREAS CONCERNED, AND ON REPORTS FROM THE MONITORING FORCE AS WELL AS FROM SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS FROM OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES, FOR WHOM IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO CAMPAIGN FREELY. PARTICULARLY PERNICIOUS HAVE BEEN THE THREATS TO CONTINUE THE WAR IF ZANU(PF) LOSES THE ELECTION. AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE COMPLAINED, MR NKOMO HAS BEEN

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OUTSPOKEN IN HIS CRITICISM OF ZANU(PF) INTIMIDATION AND HAS CALLED FOR URGENT AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES BY THE GOVERNOR TO BRING IT UNDER CONTROL.

AS YOU KNOW, LORD SOAMES HAS TAKEN POWERS TO PENALISE THOSE WHO PRACTISE INTIMIDATION. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL PROVE A DETERRENT. HE HAS SO FAR HAD TO USE THE POWERS IN ONLY A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF CASES. BUT UNLESS THERE IS A MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION IT MAY BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO HOLD FAIR ELECTIONS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. IF THE GOVERNOR DOES NOT TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM, THERE IS A REAL RISK THAT ONE OR MORE OF THE OTHER PARTIES WILL DECIDE NOT TO RECOGNISE THE ELECTIONS IN CONSEQUENCE OF ZANU(PF)'S ACTIVITIES. I NEED NOT TELL YOU WHAT A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION THIS WOULD CREATE.

IT WAS AGREED AT THE LUSAKA MEETING THAT BRITAIN WOULD ORGANISE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS TO DETERMINE THE ISSUE OF WHO WOULD GOVERN RHODESIA ON INDEPENDENCE. WE MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT THIS RESPONSIBILITY, BUT ONLY FOR THE LIMITED PERIOD NEEDED TO ORGANISE ELECTIONS. IF THE ACTIVITIES OF ANY PARTY PREJUDICE THE HOLDING OF FAIR ELECTIONS, THE FUTURE POSITION WOULD BE IN DOUBT.

WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS WHICH WILL BE AS FAIR AS POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT TIME IS SHORT, AND IT WILL REQUIRE A MAJOR EFFORT BY THOSE IN AFRICA WHO WISH TO SEE US SUCCEED IN THIS TASK TO CONVINCE ZANU(PF) OF THE RISKS OF THE COURSE ON WHICH IT IS AT PRESENT EMBARKED. OTHERWISE EVERYTHING WHICH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AT, AND SINCE, LUSAKA COULD BE PUT AT JEOPARDY.

THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND INDEPENDENCE WILL BE EXCEPTIONALLY DELICATE. WE HAVE WORKED OUT SOME POSITIVE STEPS TO DEAL WITH THE POSITION OF THE PF FORCES IN THE ASSEMBLY PLACES. SIR P MOON WILL BRIEF YOU ON THESE. AT THE SAME TIME,

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IF WE ARE TO GET THROUGH SUCCESSFULLY, IT WILL BE VITAL THAT YOU AND OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT YOU WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY PARTY WHICH DECIDES TO CONTINUE THE WAR AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND ADD YOUR INFLUENCE TO OURS IN URGING CALM AND RESTRAINT. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL GIVE US YOUR CO-OPERATION OVER THIS.

CARRINGTON

FILES
RHOD DEPT
OADS
NAD
FUSD
PLANNING STAFF
CCD
FED
ECD(E)
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
ECON DEPT

DEF D
IFD
OID
NEWS D
FS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
SIR A ACLAND

LORD N G LENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CFO

ADDITIONAL DIST.
RHODESIA POLICY

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File CC master JPH

SUBJECT



6/F 25.2.80

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 February 1980

Dear Rosene,

Message from President Kaunda

The Zambian High Commissioner called on the Prime Minister this morning to deliver the enclosed message from President Kaunda.

The Prime Minister thanked Miss Chibesakunda for the message and said that she would arrange for the points made in it to be considered urgently. She added that Mr. Nkomo's performance in Rhodesia since his return there had been marvellous. It was a pity that others had not achieved the same standards. Miss Chibesakunda said that her Government had also been pleased by the performance of ZAPU. However they were deeply perturbed by reports available to them about the situation in Rhodesia. There were three points which President Kaunda had asked her to draw to the Prime Minister's attention.

In President Kaunda's judgement it was unfortunate that Mr. Garfield Todd had been arrested. Mr. Todd had been trying to act as a bridge between the various parties in Rhodesia. It was to be hoped that, in view of his helpful activities over a long period, the charges against him would be dropped. The Prime Minister said that the handling of Mr. Todd's case was entirely a matter for the Rhodesian authorities and would be decided in Rhodesia. However it was not beyond the bounds of possibility that matters would turn out in the way President Kaunda hoped.

Miss Chibesakunda said that there were still a large number of South African troops in Rhodesia. Their activities were not conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. Their presence on the borders of Rhodesia was a threat to the neighbouring countries, in particular Zambia, and to the internal parties. The Prime Minister said that she did not, of course, know in detail where the South African members of the Rhodesian Armed Forces were deployed but that in any case the threat to the electoral process in Rhodesia lay elsewhere. The situation in the West and North of the country was relatively calm and campaigning was taking place there. In the East, on the other hand, intimidation was rife. Mr. Nkomo had complained about it and was unable to campaign there. If the efforts being made by the

/other parties

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other parties were not reciprocated by ZANU there was a real possibility that Mr. Nkomo and Bishop Musorewa might withdraw from the elections. There were only eight days left before voting began. It was essential that every effort should be made to end the intimidation and to make it possible for a free and fair election to take place on the due date.

Miss Chibesakunda raised the question of the difficulties being encountered by refugees wishing to return to Rhodesia from Zambia. She said that a few days previously about 70 men had been returned on the grounds that they had undergone military training in Zambia. The Prime Minister pointed out that military personnel should not be crossing the border now. If they were not already in assembly areas, they should remain in Zambia. In any case the programme to return the refugees had, taken as a whole, been a major achievement. Over 25,000 people had returned to Rhodesia in the last month. She was sure that the difficulties on the Zambian border could be sorted out.

Miss Chibesakunda said that President Kaunda recognised what had been achieved so far. He was anxious that those achievements should be preserved. He wished to remain in close touch with the Prime Minister in the period remaining before the elections took place. It was essential that there should be mutual confidence between the British and Zambian Governments. The Prime Minister agreed about the need for mutual confidence and about the need to remain in touch. The elections were so close that the very real difficulties which remained should not be allowed to affect them. She hoped that President Kaunda would make a renewed effort to help resolve the problem of intimidation.

You will no doubt be considering the desirability of an early reply from the Prime Minister to President Kaunda.

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



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CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
OF ZAMBIA, 19 FEBRUARY 1980

RHODESIA

Points to Make

1. Will study President Kaunda's message carefully and reply in due course.
2. Grateful for Zambia's moderating influence at recent OAU Foreign Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa. Resolution was one-sided and damaging; but we did avoid a return to the UN, which would have raised the temperature dangerously. Important that countries which have no direct stake in a settlement in Rhodesia should not be allowed to call the tune.
3. Remain very concerned by widespread intimidation by supporters of Mr Mugabe. Mr Nkomo and other parties have been complaining strongly about this.
4. Have the Zambian Government received any direct account of Mr Nkomo's views on the present situation and his own prospects? We welcome the work he has done for reconciliation between the communities. He will clearly have a vital role to play after

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/the



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the elections.

[DEFENSIVE - If raised]

5. Refugees

Return of refugees from Zambia started well, but delays have occurred due to necessary screening of incoming refugees to make sure no trained ZIPRA forces enter Rhodesia as refugees (we are obliged by the Lancaster House Agreement to make sure that no military personnel cross the border until after the elections). We have investigated reports of ill-treatment of some refugees, and are satisfied that they are unfounded. Understand Zambians have also had some problems getting refugees assembled for return. Hope the operation will run smoothly from now on.

6. Auxiliaries

Auxiliaries are closely monitored by the Commonwealth forces (whereas the three or four thousand of Mr Mugabe's guerrillas who have failed to assemble are not). The Monitors' conclusion is that, with very few exceptions, all of which have been subject to disciplinary action or action by the courts, the auxiliaries are fulfilling their role as part of the defence forces.

7. Governor too dependant on Rhodesian administration

Not so. Governor has enough British advisers to make independent checks on information supplied by Rhodesians. Information on, for example, ZANLA guerrillas having received orders not to

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/assemble



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assemble and to intimidate, came from British police advisers who heard admissions given by captured ZANLA personnel, without any pressure. Allegations of ill-treatment of refugees have been investigated by members of Governor's staff.

Rhodesia Department

February 1980

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Essential Facts

FLAG A

1. A copy is attached of the message sent by the Prime Minister to President Kaunda on 6 February. This message re-established direct contact between the Prime Minister and the President following the latter's outburst over the Rhodesian raids on Zambia last year.

2. Though the Zambian press and some Zambian officials continue to be hostile over Rhodesia, we have recent indications that Kaunda himself understands our difficulties and believes we are acting in good faith. This probably reflects private contacts between him and Nkomo.

3. However, the Acting High Commissioner in Lusaka has very recently reported indications that some Zambian officials may be becoming to regard Mugabe as a better bet. This would be an unwelcome development.

Rhodesia Department

February 1980

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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ZZ LUSAKA

OO DAR ES SALAAM

GRS 837

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FM FCO 061110Z FEB 80

TO F L A S H LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 OF 6 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA

1. DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON ON 4 FEBRUARY THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION IN A RECENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THAT PRESIDENT KAUNDA WOULD LIKE TO RESUME NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM. THIS IS IN LINE WITH THE APPROACH YOU RECEIVED FROM CHONA LAST MONTH. AS IT HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO SEE CHONA TO DELIVER MY REPLY, I CONSIDER IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FOLLOW UP THE KAUNDA/FRASER APPROACH DIRECTLY.

2. PLEASE ARRANGE THEREFORE FOR THE DELIVERY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT IT IS A STRICTLY PERSONAL MESSAGE AND ENSURE THAT IT IS DELIVERED DISCREETLY, AND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
BEGINS

DEAR KENNETH, IT IS SOME TIME SINCE WE WERE IN TOUCH. IT HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF CONCERN TO ME THAT ISSUES HAVE ARISEN WHICH HAVE PUT OUR RELATIONS UNDER A TEMPORARY CLOUD. I KNOW WE WOULD BOTH LIKE TO SEE ANGLO/ZAMBIAN RELATIONS RESTORED TO THEIR CUSTOMARY CORDIAL AND FRIENDLY STATE AND, AS ALWAYS, I SHOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HEAR FROM YOU ABOUT ANY STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE TO ACHIEVE THIS.

WITH ONLY THREE WEEKS TO GO UNTIL THE RHODESIAN ELECTIONS,

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF I WERE TO LET YOU KNOW HOW I SEE THE SITUATION IN THAT COUNTRY. AS YOU KNOW, OUR OBJECTIVE THROUGHOUT HAS BEEN TO HOLD A FAIR ELECTION WHICH WILL ENABLE THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA TO CHOOSE THEIR GOVERNMENT FREELY. I HAVE BEEN VERY IMPRESSED BY MR NKOMO'S EFFORTS, SINCE HIS RETURN, TO CREATE A BASIS FOR CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ALL COMMUNITIES. THIS AUGURS WELL.

THERE HAVE, INEVITABLY, BEEN PROBLEMS. BUT CONSIDER WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. RHODESIA IS AGAIN AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS, WITH ALL THE BENEFITS WHICH THIS CAN BRING: THE REOPENING OF THE BORDERS: A START TO THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, OVER WHICH WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND CO-OPERATION: JOINT PATROLS BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S FORCES AND THE RHODESIAN POLICE: AND A DRAMATIC DROP IN CASUALTIES SINCE CEASEFIRE DAY. THE OBJECTIVE, WHICH WE BOTH SHARE, OF A STABLE GOVERNMENT BASED ON MAJORITY RULE, IS WITHIN REACH.

I MUST TELL YOU, HOWEVER, THAT I AM SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE DANGER TO THE SETTLEMENT PRESENTED BY INTIMIDATION OF VOTERS. THIS IS REACHING A LEVEL WHERE, IF IT CONTINUES UNCHECKED, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY TO TAKE PLACE IN CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN SOME FAULTS ON ALL SIDES, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT ZANLA FORCES HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GREAT MAJORITY OF INCIDENTS AND THAT ELEMENTS OF THEM HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY PLACES IN ORDER TO PRACTISE INTIMIDATION IN THE RURAL AREAS. OUR HIGH COMMISSION CAN GIVE YOU FULL DETAILS OF THE INCIDENTS CAUSED BY ZANLA. ALL THE OTHER PARTIES HAVE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THIS. IT HAS REACHED A POINT WHERE MR NKOMO HAS BEEN UNABLE TO HOLD MEETINGS IN CERTAIN AREAS, AND OFFICIALS OF HIS PARTY HAVE BEEN ABDUCTED BY ZANLA. IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HOLD OTHER PARTIES TO THEIR COMMITMENTS IF THIS ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF ZANLA IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE.

THE GOVERNOR HAS ANNOUNCED THAT HE WILL IMPOSE PENALTIES ON ANY PARTY WHICH CONSISTENTLY ACTS IN BREACH OF THE AGREEMENTS. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE A DETERRENT. BUT IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL THAT MR MUGABE SHOULD ALSO BE MADE TO FEEL THE CONCERN OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THIS. RESOLUTIONS AT THE OAU AND THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH MAGNIFY PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE RHODESIAN FORCES, WHILE COMPLETELY IGNORING BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE AND INTIMIDATION BEING PRACTISED BY ZANLA, ONLY ENCOURAGE THE BELIEF THAT THE ELECTION CAN BE WON BY UNFAIR MEANS. THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY THOSE WHO DO NOT WISH TO SEE FAIR ELECTIONS AND WOULD PREFER A CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE RHODESIA'S INTERESTS AT HEART, OR THOSE OF HER NEIGHBOURS, WHO WOULD BE SO BADLY AFFECTED BY THE COLLAPSE OF THE SETTLEMENT.

I URGE YOU VERY SINCERELY TO USE YOUR INFLUENCE OVER THESE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO ENSURE THAT NO ENCOURAGEMENT IS GIVEN TO THOSE WHO PRACTISE INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF RESPONSIBLE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS. THIS WILL REQUIRE THOSE WHO ARE TRULY COMMITTED TO THE SETTLEMENT TO SPEAK OUT OPENLY AGAINST ABUSES WHICH THREATEN TO PUT ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AT RISK. I ALSO URGE YOU TO DO ALL YOU CAN TO AVOID FURTHER CONFRONTATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND OAU: THE ELECTION CANNOT BE FOUGHT IN NEW YORK OR ADDIS ABABA, IT HAS TO BE WON WITH VOTES FREELY CAST AT THE POLLING STATIONS IN RHODESIA ITSELF. THIS IS NOT A TIME FOR RESOLUTIONS AND PROPAGANDA: A DETERMINED STAND IS NEEDED AGAINST THE REAL DANGERS TO THE GOAL OF FREE ELECTIONS, AND IT CAN ONLY BE MADE BY THE GOVERNMENTS WHOSE INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE.

I HOPE THAT WE CAN STAY CLOSELY IN TOUCH ON THESE PROBLEMS DURING THESE CRUCIAL WEEKS.

WITH BEST WISHES
YOURS SINCERELY
MARGARET THATCHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

17276 - 2

ENDS

CARRINGTON

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OO CAPE TOWN
OO SALISBURY
OO FCO

Sir D. Hartland

Mr Day

Mrs. Aspin

Hd of Rhodesia D

Hd of S. Af D

Hd/PUS D

No 10 Downing St

X 10

Read in full.

GRS880
SECRET

FM ROME 181900Z FEB 69
TO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 18 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, FCO.

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

YOUR TELNO. 121; RHODESIA: POLITICAL SITUATION

1. IT IS REASSURING THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE COME TO REALISE THAT NKOMO IS THE KEY TO THE POST-ELECTION SITUATION AND THAT HE MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY GOVERNMENT IF THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS IS TO WIN SUFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD FOR THEM AND PRESUMABLY FOLLOWS THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH WALLS AND FLOWER. IT IS USEFUL TOO, THAT THEY ARE READY TO BRING PRESSURE ON MUZOREWA TO ACCEPT A COALITION WITH NKOMO SEMICOLON FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION - WE DO NOT WANT TO PUSH THE SOUTH AFRICANS TOO FAST - THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO MEAN NKOMO AS PRIME MINISTER AND MUZAREWA AS PRESIDENT.

2. AS YOU KNOW, AT PRESENT WE INTEND TO DELAY SENDING ANY EMISSARY FOR THE WIDER TALKS SUGGESTED BY P W BOTHA UNTIL AFTER RHODESIA REACHES INDEPENDENCE, TO AVOID CHARGES OF COLLUSION. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT SIR A DUFF WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT CAPE TOWN AGAIN BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, TO KEEP THE SOUTH AFRICANS ABBREAST OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. IN THE MEANTIME, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PURSUE, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED, THE DIALOGUE WITH PIK BOTHA, WITHOUT GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE

Letter coming on this point.

DIALOGUE WITH PIK BOTHA, WITHOUT GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE ESTABLISHING FORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

3. IN YOUR NEXT SESSION WITH HIM, YOU SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT WE AGREE WITH HIS BASIC ANALYSIS THAT THE OUTCOME MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE STABILITY IN RHODESIA AND AN ADEQUATE MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION IS A COALITION BETWEEN MUZOREWA, NKOMO AND THE WHITES. THE COOPERATION SHOWN BY NKOMO AUGURS WELL FOR THIS, IF THE ELECTORAL ARITHMETIC WORKS. YOU SHOULD INFORM BOTHA OF NKOMO'S AGREEMENT TO PUT 750 ZIPRA PERSONNEL UNDER TRAINING WITH THE RHODESIA FORCES, UNDER MONITORING FORCE SUPERVISION, THIS WEEK, AND OF HIS COMPLAINTS ABOUT MUGABE AND ZANLA'S ACTIVITIES.

4. HOW TO REACH THIS OUTCOME WILL INEVITABLY BE A VERY DELICATE MATTER. WE CANNOT OURSELVES OPENLY PROMOTE IT WITHOUT INCURRING CHARGES OF INTERFERENCE. NOR WILL IT HELP IF IAN SMITH AND THE RHODESIA FRONT TRUMPET THE NEED FOR SUCH A COALITION. IT HAS TO BE RECOGNISED THAT NKOMO WILL COME UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS TO RESTORE HIS TIES WITH MUGABE SEMICOLON AND THAT MUGABE HIMSELF WILL BE ANXIOUS TO HAVE NKOMO WITH HIM, BECAUSE HE KNOWS THAT HIS PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WITHOUT HIM ARE SLIM. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO AVOID INCIDENTS OR STATEMENTS - NOT LEAST BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT - WHICH HAVE THE EFFECT OF DRIVING NKOMO AND MUGABE BACK TOGETHER.

5. NONTHELESS, WE AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD WORK DISCREETLY ON MUZOREWA TO ACCEPT SUCH A COALITION. THEY SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE QUESTION OF THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP IN SUCH A GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO INFLUENCE NKOMO TOWARDS THIS OUTCOME, AND ENCOURAGE CERTAIN AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS, E.G. THE ZAMBIANS AND THE KENYANS TO WORK ON BOTH HIM AND MUZOREWA.

6. BUT WHILE THIS LOOKS THE BEST OUTCOME NOW, NOONE CAN GUARANTEE THAT THE ELECTION RESULTS WILL ALLOW IT. WE MAY HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH A DIFFERENT SOLUTION, E.G. A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IN WHICH ALL THE PARTIES ARE REPRESENTED. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO WORK SINGLE-MINDEDLY FOR ONE SOLUTION AND NEGLECT OTHER POSSIBILITIES. IT IS NOT OUR ASSESSMENT THAT SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD NECESSARILY SPELL CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS, PROVIDED NKOMO HAS A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN IT. WE THOROUGHLY AGREE WITH BOTHA'S JUDGEMENT ON THE NEED TO KEEP CALM AND HOPE THAT HE WILL CONVINCING THE WHITES OF THIS SEMICOLON PARTICULARLY

SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD NECESSARILY SPELL CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS, PROVIDED NKOMO HAS A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN IT. WE THOROUGHLY AGREE WITH BOTHA'S JUDGEMENT ON THE NEED TO KEEP CALM AND HOPE THAT HE WILL CONVINCE THE WHITES OF THIS SEMICOLON PARTICULARLY IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ELECTIONS. IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO AVOID ANY HASTY AND ILL-JUDGED REACTIONS BY THE WHITES BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT. WILD TALK ABOUT THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF CERTAIN OUTCOMES TO THE ELECTIONS COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF MAKING THEM MORE LIKELY.

7. YOU SHOULD END BY TELLING BOTHA THAT I REMAIN REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT WE SHALL GET THROUGH TO THE ELECTIONS. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT MUGABE WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO PULL OUT, AND THAT THE PROSPECTS OF A STABLE GOVERNMENT THEREAFTER ARE QUITE GOOD. I SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN HIS ASSESSMENT AND IN WHAT HE IS HEARING FROM THE WHITES IN RHODESIA. I HOPE THAT HE WILL KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU ON THESE ISSUES OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

8. FCO PSE PASS ADVANCE COPIES TO:-

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)

PS

PS/LPS

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR DAY

MR ASPIN

RHODESIA DEPT. (HEAD)

SOUTH AFRICAN DEPT. (HEAD)

PUSD (HEAD)

NO. 10

ARCULUS

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No. 10 DOWNING STREET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 February 1980

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister

Rhodesia: Withdrawal

You told me that the Prime Minister would like to be informed on our plans for withdrawal from Rhodesia after the elections.

Our intention is that the interval between elections and independence should be as brief as possible. The basic constitutional formalities - appointment of a Prime Minister, election of a senate and of a President elect - should require only about two weeks. The key factor will be the time needed to choose a Prime Minister with wide enough support to form a government and this will in turn depend upon how clear cut the election results are. A period of manoeuvre over the formation of a coalition is likely. We shall probably not be able to set a date for independence until after the appointment of a Prime Minister. It is likely, therefore, that the period will be two or three weeks though in a very unstable situation it would be possible to cut short the constitutional formalities and arrange a speedier withdrawal.

Withdrawal of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force was discussed by Lord Carrington and the Defence Secretary on 15 February. They agreed that any needless risk to the monitors must be avoided, but that the disengagement should be conducted in such a way that the PF forces were not alarmed. Otherwise there would be a risk of precipitating an exodus from the assembly places, which is what we want to avoid. The Governor has already asked Nkomo and Mugabe to instruct their forces to remain in the assembly places after the elections (Nkomo has agreed) and will shortly be explaining to them how we see the process of withdrawal, so that the PF forces can be briefed in good time.

Decisions on the exact timing and rate of withdrawal will have to be taken by the Governor and General Acland in the light of the situation on the ground. But present thinking is that withdrawal would begin on 29 February or 1 March and be phased over the period between the elections and independence. The first stage would be withdrawal of monitors from the PF assembly places. Where it is safe to do so and the PF themselves want it, some monitors may be left at police posts in the vicinity of the assembly places to act as a channel of communication between the PF forces and the Rhodesian police and civil authorities who will take over responsibility for the administration of the assembly places. Where it is clear that the Patriotic Front forces are likely to leave the assembly places immediately after the elections (and this is likely to be the case with some ZANLA) and the

/monitors



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monitors would in consequence be at risk, they would be withdrawn immediately. Monitors could be left longer at ZIPRA assembly places and with the PF commanders and the Rhodesian JOCs where they can play a useful liaison role. Other elements of the Monitoring Force would continue, until independence, to supervise the training of PF forces with the Rhodesian army, on which it is hoped to make a start this week.

The Governor and his staff are also making a major effort to get the Rhodesian administration to think constructively about the handling of the PF forces. Agreement has been reached on the payment of resettlement grants to those who wish to go back to civilian life; and a salary will be paid from 1 March to those members of the PF forces who remain in the assembly places.

The above assumes relatively stable conditions after the elections. If there is a major breakdown of law and order or some form of coup, it might be necessary to consider a reinforced withdrawal, using forces from the UK (up to three battalions could be made available). Work has been done on this, on a contingency basis, by the Ministry of Defence. It was agreed by Lord Carrington and Mr Pym that knowledge of it would be restricted as closely as possible.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury in the MOD.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

SECRET

Extract from record of meeting between the Prime Minister
and the President of Kenya at 10 Downing Street
on 18 February 1980 at 1220 hrs

Present:

The Prime Minister	President Moi
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	The Hon. Charles Njonjo, EGH, MP
Mr. Richard Luce, M.P.	The Hon. Dr. R.J. Ouko, MP
Mr. D.M. Day	The Hon. Dr. Z.T. Onyonka, MP
Mr. J.A. Robson	The Hon. K.N.K. Biwott, MP
Mr. Michael Alexander	The Hon. G.G. Kariuki, MP
Mr. Charles Anson	Mr. J.G. Kiereini
	HE Mr. Shadrack Kimalel

Rhodesia

After welcoming President Moi, the Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to speak on the current situation in Rhodesia. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said he first wished to thank the Kenyan Government for their forthright support for HMG's policies on Rhodesia during and after the Lancaster House Conference. The Kenyan contingent in the monitoring force had been a great success. We were grateful for Kenya's counsels of moderation in the OAU and with fellow members of the Commonwealth. But there was now a serious threat to a successful outcome in Rhodesia because of the high level of intimidation, particularly from ZANU(PF) in Eastern Province. The Governor had had to take powers to counter this. It would be intolerable if Mr. Nkomo and Bishop Muzorewa felt compelled to withdraw from the election, leaving the field to Mr. Mugabe's followers who were the main source of intimidation. Assuming all parties went forward and the poll was successfully carried through, it was still impossible to predict the result. Perhaps nobody would win; and perhaps that would be the best outcome. The danger was that Mr. Mugabe might not accept this, if the poll went against him. The most satisfactory result might be one in which Mr. Nkomo was persuaded to form a coalition government; and one which Mr. Mugabe might be willing to join later.

/President Moi

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- 2 -

President Moi said Kenya hoped that all the parties would join in a government for an independent Zimbabwe. Political support in Zimbabwe depended on tribal groupings, and this made a coalition of all parties the most desirable. He was aware that President Nyerere had been helping Mr. Mugabe. He would give such support as he could to Mr. Nkomo (with whom he had spoken on the telephone the previous day). Mr. Nkomo was the key to the formation of a national government. The Prime Minister said that President Machel had also been helpful.

President Moi said that a satisfactory outcome on Rhodesia was essential. It would be decisive for Namibia and for Southern Africa as a whole. If things went wrong in Rhodesia this would be equally decisive, in the opposite sense: first for Zaire, and perhaps also for Zambia. It was therefore most important that the British Government should continue to give full support to President Kaunda so that he could abandon his project to obtain arms from the Soviet Union. It would be a serious setback if the Russians secured a base in Zambia. He understood why Britain had found it difficult to supply arms to Zambia, but he feared that this might have been a mistake. We must avoid creating an Ethiopian situation by default. The Prime Minister suggested that Kaunda's fears might be allayed if Mr. Nkomo came to power. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that it had been the Rhodesian attack on the Zambian bridges, to which President Kaunda wrongly believed we were privy, that had marred our relations with Zambia.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that, despite the serious current difficulties, we should take heart at what had been achieved since the Lancaster House Conference. Dr. Ouko agreed and said that he had spoken out in defence of Britain at the OAU Meeting in Addis Ababa. The moderates were by no means beaten. After a discussion of the numbers of seats the parties might win, President Moi said that it was vital that Mr. Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Smith should secure enough seats to form a coalition. If they held together, Mr. Mugabe must lose.

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/Olympic Games

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*Rhodesia
a Master Set*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 February 1980

Message from President Nyerere

As you know, the Tanzanian High Commissioner, Mr. Nsekela, called this afternoon to deliver the signed copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Nyerere. I enclose the text. As you will see it is a message received by telegram some time ago.

In handing over the message Mr. Nsekela said that President Nyerere was concerned about breaches of the Lancaster House agreement. He regarded the Governor's failure to confine the Rhodesian Security Forces and the auxiliaries to their barracks as a very serious breach. The Prime Minister said that the British Government were also concerned that the Lancaster House agreement should be observed. However, the real source of anxiety was the scale of intimidation being practised by Mr. Mugabe's party. The West of Rhodesia was clear of intimidation and all parties could campaign. The East of the country, on the other hand, was by now almost completely intimidated. It was impossible for parties other than ZANU(PF) to campaign there. In a recent 24 hour period, there had been 16 serious cases of intimidation. Several thousand ZANLA guerillas were still outside the Assembly areas.

The Prime Minister said it was essential that President Nyerere and other leading figures in the OAU should not give the impression that they were backing intimidation. Mr. Nkomo's behaviour had been perfect. President Nyerere should be encouraging the ZANU(PF) to behave likewise. The Prime Minister asked Mr. Nsekela to ensure that President Nyerere received her message that intimidation in Rhodesia must cease. Mr. Nsekela said that he would do so.

The meeting lasted about eight minutes in all.

In discussion as I showed him out, Mr. Nsekela made little attempt to dispute my contention that the real threat to the electoral process came from ZANU(PF). However, he argued repeatedly that President Nyerere would not and could not bring public pressure to bear on Mr. Mugabe until the Governor took

/public action

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public action to confine the auxiliaries to their barracks.
I made the obvious points but to no avail.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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~~MR. BYATT~~
MR ASPIN

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P. M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

RESIDENT CLERK

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FM SALISBURY 181800Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 703 OF 18 FEBRUARY 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LUANDA
PRETORIA CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON LAGOS UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA
PRIORITY OTTAWA WELLINGTON NAIROBI AND SUVA

RHODESIA: SITREP 16, 17, 18 FEBRUARY

1. OVER THE LAST 3 DAYS THERE HAVE BEEN 49 POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS, BUT THEY WERE IRREGULARLY DISTRIBUTED, WITH ONLY 6 IN THE LAST 24 HOUR PERIOD. THEY INCLUDED 25 CONTACTS, 10 SHOOTINGS, 2 MURDERS IN WHICH 3 WERE KILLED, ONE ATTEMPTED MURDER AND ONE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE DETONATION. A PARTICULARLY GRUESOME MURDER WAS COMMITTED IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY BY 8 ARMED ZANLA GUERRILLAS: 5 LOCALS WERE ACCUSED OF BEING ZAPU SUPPORTERS, THEIR HANDS WERE TIED TOGETHER AND THEY WERE BEATEN SEVERELY. THEY WERE THEN BURIED ALIVE. TWO, INCLUDING A GIRL, MANAGED TO CLAW THEIR WAY OUT, TWO MORE DIED AND ANOTHER GIRL IS MISSING. THERE WAS AN EXPLOSION LATE LAST NIGHT WHICH DESTROYED A BUILDING WHICH HOUSED THE OFFICES OF THE UANC, ZANU AND ZANU(PF) IN MONOMATAPA TOWNSHIP IN ~~CHWELA~~ TWO AUXILIARIES WHO WERE PRESENT AT A ZANU(PF) DAILY AT

LATE LAST NIGHT WHICH DESTROYED A BUILDING WHICH HOUSED THE OFFICES OF THE UANC, ZANU AND ZANU(PF) IN MONOMATAPA TOWNSHIP IN GWELO. TWO AUXILIARIES WHO WERE PRESENT AT A ZANU(PF) RALLY AT INYAZURA ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON WERE ATTACKED BY A CROWD AND ONE WAS KILLED. THERE IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN A NEAR RIOT WHICH WAS ONLY QUIETENED DOWN BY CALLING IN POLICE RESERVISTS. THERE HAS BEEN A LATE REPORT THAT ON 12 FEBRUARY 15 ZAPU PARTY WORKERS WERE SURROUNDED BY MUJIBAS ARMED WITH PANGAS AND KNOBKERRIES. TWO ESCAPED AND THE FATE OF THE REMAINDER IS UNKNOWN. A LARGE AHMS CACHE HAS BEEN FOUND IN A ZANU AREA IN THE NORTH WHICH INCLUDED ONE 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE, A LARGE MORTAR, MINES, SMALL-ARMS AND RELATED AMMUNITION. THIS MORNING THERE WERE 21,843 IN THE ASSEMBLY PLACES.

2. CONSIDERABLE CONCERN HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE DISCOVERY THAT POLICE AIRCRAFT HAVE DROPPED PAMPHLETS PRAISING DEMOCRACY AND CRITICISING COMMUNISM ALONG WITH STRAIGHTFORWARD MATERIAL INSTRUCTING LOCALS HOW TO VOTE. FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY, DESPITE ALL THIS THERE WAS A FURTHER DROP ON SATURDAY IN THE SOUTH EAST. MORE PAMPHLETS ARE HELD IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY, BUT CLEAR ORDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN NOT TO DISTRIBUTE THEM.

ASSEMBLY AREAS

3. THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN INTRODUCING A POLICE PRESENCE AT ASSEMBLY AREAS ROME AND PAPA. THE POLICE HOPE TO START STAYING OVERNIGHT IN THEM FROM THE NIGHT OF 20/21 FEBRUARY. SOME ZIPRA COMMANDERS, ACCOMPANIED BY THE BRITISH ZIPRA COMMISSIONER, HAVE MADE A SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO THE BASE OF A COMPANY OF THE FIRST RHODESIA DEFENCE REGIMENT, WHICH IS A BLACK REGIMENT WITH WHITE OFFICERS. A CLINIC ESTABLISHED JOINTLY BY THE MONITORING FORCE AND RHODESIAN CIVILIANS A WEEK AGO NEAR ASSEMBLY AREA FOXTROT HAS ALREADY TREATED 2000 CIVILIANS. RECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN A DISTURBING DEGREE OF ABSENTEEISM OF ZIPRA PERSONNEL FROM ASSEMBLY POINTS KILO AND LIMA, 58 AND 35 RESPECTIVELY AT PRESENT, WHICH IS NEVERTHELESS LOW BY ZANLA STANDARDS. IN RECENT DAYS A TOTAL OF NEARLY 300 ZANLA GUERRILLAS HAVE COME INTO ASSEMBLY POINTS AS A RESULT OF TUNGAMIRAI'S BROADCAST, BUT THIS REPRESENTS LESS THAN 10% OF THOSE WHO ARE STILL OFFSIDE.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

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[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR DAY

Mr Day

MR ASPIN

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HE/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)

MR R L WADE GERY)

MR P M MAXEY)

MR GOULTY)

MR W N WENBAN SMITH)

DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

PP GABERONE

PP ADDIS ABABA

GRS 400

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DESKBY FCO 181030Z X *Rec'd late*

DESKBY SALISBURY 181100Z

FM LAGOS 180925Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 203 OF 18 FEBRUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,

UKHIS NEW YORK

PRIORITY GABERONE AND ADDIS ABABA.

SAVING TO MONROVIA.

YOUR TELNO 197: RHODESIA: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT SHAGARI

1. ALTHOUGH THE TONE OF THE MESSAGE IS STILL RELATIVELY MODERATE, THE SUBSTANCE IS THOROUGHLY UNSATISFACTORY AND, AS LORD SOAMES POINTS OUT (SALISBURY TELNO 680), CONFIRMS

MISREPRESENTATION BY IKOKU. APART FROM THE POINTS MENTIONED BY LORD SOAMES, THE MAIN FEATURE IS THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO INTIMIDATION BY ZANLA.

2. I SUPPORT LORD SOAMES' RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POINTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE REPLY, WHICH I HOPE WILL BE SUPPORTED WHERE APPROPRIATE BY SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, EG OF COURT ACTION AGAINST AUXILIARIES. WE SHOULD EMPHASISE POSITIVE POINTS SUCH AS THE PROGRESS ON REFUGEES AND THE APPOINTMENT OF 500 ADDITIONAL STAFF TO ASSIST THE ELECTION SUPERVISORS. AS REGARDS ZANLA INTIMIDATION, WE HAVE A CREDIBILITY PROBLEM. WELL DISPOSED NIGERIANS DO NOT SUGGEST THAT WE INVENT THE INCIDENTS OF ZANLA INTIMIDATION BUT THEY TEND TO BELIEVE THAT WE RELY FOR OUR INFORMATION ON RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES WHO HAVE AN INTEREST IN AT LEAST EXAGGERATING THESE INCIDENTS. WE SHOULD THEREFORE EMPHASISE THAT THE REPORTS OF INTIMIDATION ARE CONFIRMED BY THE MONITORING FORCE, BY THE ELECTION SUPERVISORS AND IN MANY CASES AGREED BY THE CEASE FIRE COMMISSION WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE ZANLA MEMBER.

3. HOWEVER, IN THE LAST RESORT THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT OUR VERSION OF EVENTS WHEN IT RUNS COUNTER TO THAT REPORTED IN PERSON BY THEIR OWN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE OBSERVER TEAM. THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT NKOMO SHOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI EXPRESSING HIS CONCERN ABOUT ZANLA INTIMIDATION. AT HIS LAST MEETING WITH LORD SOAMES NKOMO PROMISED TO SEND A MESSAGE TO SHAGARI (SALISBURY TELNO 619). WE NEED TO KNOW URGENTLY WHETHER HE HAS DONE SO, AND IF SO BY WHAT CHANNEL. I FEAR THAT IF HE SIMPLY GAVE A MESSAGE TO THE NIGERIAN OBSERVERS IT MIGHT BE DELIBERATELY DELAYED OR DISTORTED IN TRANSMISSION. IF MY SUGGESTION THAT NKOMO SEND AN ENVOY IS NOT PRACTICABLE, THEN I RECOMMEND THAT HE SHOULD SEND A MESSAGE THROUGH JUS REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON AND THE NIGERIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER THERE. I CAN ONLY REPEAT THAT WITHOUT URGENT ACTION ON THESE LINES WE HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF RESTORING OUR CREDIBILITY HERE.

4. SEE ALSO NIFT REPORTING A NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON 15 FEBRUARY EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT RECENT ACTIONS BY THE GOVERNOR.

FCO PSE PASS SAYING MONROVIA

BROWN

[RHODESIA: POLICY:

ADVANCE COPIES]

36

IMMEDIATE

PS/SIR I GILGOUR
PS/ER LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
Mr Byatt
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY)
MR GOULTY)
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)
CABINET
OFFICE

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/PUSD (2)

PA has seen

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

RESTRICTED

FM SALISBURY 171215Z FEB 80

ADVANCE COPY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

IMMEDIATE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 689 OF 17 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK LUSAKA NAIROBI MAPUTO OTTAWA GABORONE
DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS MONROVIA WELLINGTON WASHINGTON PRETORIA
ADDIS ABABA CANBERRA
PRIORITY PEKING MOSCOW DAKAR KINSHASA KHARTOUM EAST BERLIN TOKYO
E E C POSTS KINGSTON BRIDGETOWN MEXICO CITY DACCA NEW DELHI
SINGAPORE GEORGETOWN FREETOWN MANILA PORT LOUIS PORT OF SPAIN
LILONGWE VALLETTA TUNIS BANJUL COLOMBO ACCRA KUALA LUMPUR NICOSIA
OSLO STOCKHOLM LISBON MADRID ATHENS MBABANE ABIDJAN
INFO SAVING NASSAU MASERU CASTRIES SUVA PORT MORESBY HONIARA
NUKUALOFA VICTORIA TARAWA UKDEL NATO SCFIA BUDAPEST BUCHAREST
BELGRADE CAIRO ALGIERS TRIPOLI RABAT TEHRAN PRAGUE KUWAIT
RHODESIA: Z A N L A ACTIVITY

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF Z A N L A ACTIVITY OVER THE LAST
24 HOURS:

1. Z A N L A GUERRILLA KILLED AT 16.00 HRS ON 15 FEBRUARY IN

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF Z A N L A ACTIVITY OVER THE LAST 24 HOURS:

1. Z A N L A GUERRILLA KILLED AT 16.00 HRS ON 15 FEBRUARY IN THE SINOIA AREA:

2. AT 12.35 HRS ON 16 FEBRUARY Z A N L A GUERRILLAS OPENED FIRE ON THE U A N C OFFICES IN BINDURA.

3. AT 17.15 HRS ON 15 FEBRUARY 3 Z A N L A MEMBERS THREW A GRENADE INTO A HUT IN THE MANGWENDE T T L.

4. AT 04.45 HRS ON 16 FEBRUARY, ATTACK BY 8 Z A N L A GUERRILLAS IN THE MAKONI T T L. 3 MUJIBAS CAPTURED.

5. AT 14.00 HRS ON 16 FEBRUARY ATTACK BY 15 ARMED Z A N L A GUERRILLAS IN THE CHIDUKU T T L. 1 GUERRILLA CAPTURED.

6. AT 23.30 HRS ON 15 FEBRUARY, ATTACK BY AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF Z A N L A GUERRILLAS AT PENHALONGA.

7. AT 13.45 HRS ON 16 FEBRUARY, ATTACK BY 20 Z A N L A GUERRILLAS AT PENHALONGA.

8. AT 17.59 HRS ON 15 FEBRUARY ATTACK BY Z A N L A MUJIBAS IN THE WEDZA T T L. ONE CAPTURED MUJIBA INDICATED AN ARMS CACHE.

9. AT 21.00 HRS ON 15 FEBRUARY, TWO AFRICAN GIRLS REPORTED TORTURE INVOLVING THIRD DEGREE BURNS BY Z A N L A GUERRILLAS (EVACUATED TO RUSAPE HOSPITAL).

10. AT 08.00 HRS ON 16 FEBRUARY, ATTACK BY 3 Z A N L A GUERRILLAS IN THE SABI T T L.

11. DURING THE NIGHT OF 15/16 FEBRUARY MURDER OF A VILLAGE IN THE MUTAMBARA T T L BY Z A N L A GUERRILLAS.

12. AT 09.00 HRS ON 15 FEBRUARY, GRENADE ATTACK BY 5 Z A N L A GUERRILLAS IN THE GUTU T T L.

13. AT 09.00 HRS ON 15 FEBRUARY SEPARATE ATTACK BY 17 Z A N L A GUERRILLAS IN THE GUTU T T L.

14. AT 13.25 HRS ON 16 FEBRUARY, ATTACK BY Z A N L A GUERRILLAS IN THE CHIBI T T L.

15. AT 14.55 HRS ON 16 FEBRUARY ATTACK BY AN ESTIMATED 50 Z A N L A GUERRILLAS ON THE NDOWOYO T T L.

15. AT 14.55 HRS ON 16 FEBRUARY ATTACK BY AN ESTIMATED 50 Z A N L A GUERRILLAS ON THE NDOWOYO T T L.

16. AT 20.40 HRS ON 15 FEBRUARY, ATTACK ON U A N C OFFICIALS BY Z A N L A ON THE CHILIMANZI T T L.

2. IN THE PRECEDING 24 HRS THERE WERE Z A N L A ATTACKS IN THE MANGWENDE, CHIDUKU, WEDZA, MUROMO, CHIOTA AND CHIKWANDA T T LS: AND AT PENHALONGA, CHIPINGA AND FEATHERSTONE. IN SHORT THE CEASE-FIRE WHICH IS ALMOST FULLY EFFECTIVE OVER THE ENTIRE WESTERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY, HAS SCARCELY COME INTO EFFECT AT ALL OVER A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE Z A N L A AREA OF OPERATIONS.

3. IN ADDITION, THE ABDUCTION WAS DISCOVERED ON 12 FEBRUARY OF 15 PATRIOTIC FRONT (NKOMO) PARTY WORKERS BY 50 MUJIBAS ARMED WITH KNIVES IN THE NTOKA T T L. IN THE MANGWENDE T T L AT 22.00 HRS ON 13 FEBRUARY THREE VILLAGERS FROM THE MURENGE KRAAL WERE ABDUCTED BY SUPPORTERS OF Z A N U (P F) AND TAKEN TO EIGHT ARMED Z A N L A GUERRILLAS. THEY WERE ACCUSED OF BEING PATRIOTIC FRONT SUPPORTERS, BECAUSE THEY HAD ATTENDED NKOMO'S RALLY AT MSEWA. THEY WERE TIED UP, BEATEN AND THROWN ALIVE INTO GRAVES BESIDE THE NYAGUI RIVER. THREE OF THEM DUG THEIR WAY OUT OF THE GRAVES DURING THE NIGHT AND REPORTED TO THE POLICE. ONE OF THEM IS BADLY INJURED. POLICE INVESTIGATING THESE MURDER HAVE RECOVERED THE BODIES OF THE OTHER TWO.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY:

ADVANCE COPIES]

PS (19)
SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR ~~DAY~~ ~~DIATT~~
~~LORD N G LENNOX~~
MR ASPIN

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

ADVANCE COPY

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HE/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

PA has seen

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SALISBURY 161530Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 685 OF 16 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO, NAIROBI,
CAPE TOWN, LAGOS, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, SUVA, UKMIS
NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 649: FUTURE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

1. AFTER SOME PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION WITH TUNGAMIRAI (POLITICAL
COMMISSAR, ZANLA), SLATER AND COL PARKER BOWLES, THE MONITORING
FORCE LIASON OFFICER AT P F HEADQUARTERS, CALLED TODAY ON MUGABE
TO EXPLAIN OUR OFFER. MUGABE WAS AT HIS SILKIEST.

2. SLATER EXPLAINED THAT OUR PROPOSAL WAS TO TAKE A ZANLA
CONTINGENT, SAY 600 MEN, FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREAS TO A SPECIAL
TRAINING CAMP. THE CAMP WOULD BE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
MONITORING FORCE, ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD BE SOME RHODESIAN PARTICIPATION
IN THE TRAINING. BEFORE GOING INTO TRAINING, THE MEN WOULD
EXCHANGE THEIR PRESENT WEAPONS FOR RHODESIAN WEAPONS. THEY WOULD
PROBABLY BE DRESSED IN A "NEUTRAL" UNIFORM, NEITHER RHODESIAN
NOR ZANLA.

3. MUGABE SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY HEARD OF THIS PROPOSAL FROM KNOMO AND WAS IN FAVOUR OF IT. BUT 600 MEN WAS NOT ENOUGH; WHY NOT OR 3,000? SLATER REPLIED THAT 600 WAS NOT A FIRM CEILING BUT THE TRAINING RESOURCES AVAILABLE WERE LIMITED. MUGABE SAID THAT 600 WOULD DO FOR A START, BUT IF WE COULD TAKE MORE HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL. IF NO RHODESIAN ARMY CAMP OF SUFFICIENT SIZE WAS AVAILABLE, THEN PERHPAS ONE OF THE ASSEMBLY AREAS COULD BE TAKEN OVER AND REDESIGNATED AS A TRAINING CAMP. MUGABE SAID THAT THE TRAINING SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE BEFORE THE ELECTION. THE DETAILS COULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE MONITORING FORCE AND THE ZANLA MILITARY COMMANDERS.

4. MUGABE THEN ASKED WHAT WE THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS IN THE PERIOD DURING AND IMMEDIATLY AFTER THE ELECTIONS. SLATER REPLIED THAT DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD THE ASSEMBLY AREAS COULD BECOME UNSTABLE; WE THEREFORE WANTED MUGABE TO ISSUE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ZANLA PERSONNEL IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS TO REMAIN THERE AND TO OBEY INSTRUCTIONS. MUGABE SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY ISSUE SUCH ORDERS, PROVIDED THAT WE COULD ASSURE HIM THAT THERE WAS NO RISK THAT THE ASSEMBLY AREAS WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO SURPRISE ATTACK BY THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES.

5. MUGABE THEN TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE MONITORING FORCE. HE SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE MONITORING FORCE SHOULD REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY AFTER INDEPENDENCE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE STABILITY, TO PRESIDE OVER THE INTEGRATION OF THE FORCES AND TO TRAIN THE NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY. SLATER REMINDED MUGABE OF PARAGRAPH 26 OF YOUR STATEMENT TO THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE ON 11 DECEMBER. BUT IF THE POST-INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT ASKED FOR A TEAM TO HELP WITH MILITARY TRBINING THENVTHIS COULD CERTAINLY BE CONSIDERED.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL

SOAMES

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES!]

38

PS

/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR DAY

Mr Byatt

MR ASPIN

.....

HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

HD/UND

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HE/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)

MR R L WADE GERY)

MR P M MAKEY)

MR GOULTY)

MR W N WENBAN SMITH)

DIO)

CABINET
OFFICE

PA has seen

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SALISBURY 161240Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 680 OF 16 FEBRUARY 1980

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

INFO IMMEDIATE LAGOS

PRIORITY LUSAKA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE UKMIS NEW YORK AND
ADDIS ABABA.

INFO SAVING MONROVIA.

RHODESIA.

1. PRESIDENT SHAGARI'S MESSAGE REFLECTS MIS- REPRESENTATIONS BY IKOKU, THE NIGERIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER TEAM, WHO IS DISTINGUISHING HIMSELF BY BIAS (UNCHARACTERISTICALLY FOR A NIGERIAN) IN FAVOUR OF ZAMU(PF). WE HOPE THAT THE REPLY WILL REFUTE FIRMLY THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE ARE "OVER THREE THOUSAND SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS" IN THE RHODESIAN DEFENCE FORCES. THERE ARE IN FACT A FEW HUNDRED SOUTH AFRICANS IN THE RHODESIAN ARMY. THE SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES ARE NOT "OFFICIALLY DEPLOYED BULLY-BOYS" FOR THE UANC. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POINTED OUT TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI THAT THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE HAVE DEVOTED A MAJOR PART OF THEIR EFFORTS OVER THE LAST SIX WEEKS TO THE PROCESS OF MONITORING THE SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES. THEY HAVE NOW COVERED VIRTUALLY EVERY AUXILIARY DETACHMENT AND HAVE INTERVIEWED THE LOCAL POPULATION. THE GENERAL CONCLUSION IS THAT, WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO DIS-

PROCESS OF MORTGAGING THE SECURITY FORCE
NOW COVERED VIRTUALLY EVERY AUXILIARY DETACHMENT AND HAVE INTER-
VIEWED THE LOCAL POPULATION. THE GENERAL CONCLUSION IS THAT,
WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO DIS-
CIPLINARY ACTION OR ACTION BY THE COURTS, THE AUXILIARIES ARE
FULFILLING THEIR ROLE AS PART OF THE DEFENCE FORCES IN THEIR
"HOME GUARD" ROLE AND IN RESTORING NORMAL ACTIVITY IN THE
RURAL AREAS. THE CRITICISM OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE IS
PARTICULARLY UNFAIR (AND, APART FROM ISOLATED COMPLAINTS,
WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE SUPPORTED BY NKOMO). I HAVE EXPRESSED MY
CONCERN ABOUT THE ATTACKS ON LEADING MEMBERS OF ZANU(PF) :
THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE OF THE TWO ATTACKS ON MR MUGABE HAVE BEEN
ARRESTED. MR GARFIELD TODD WAS OF COURSE RELEASED ON THE DAY OF
HIS ARREST (AND FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION WE HOPE THAT THE
CHARGES AGAINST HIM WILL BE DROPPED).

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL INCLUDING SAVING

SCAMES

NNNN

[RHODESIA: POLICY:

ADVANCE COPIES]

34

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
Mr Byatt
MR ASPIN

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

ADVANCE COPY

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

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HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

PA has seen

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM SALISBURY 161235Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO 679 OF 16 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA UKMIS GENEVA UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY MAPUTO GABORONE ADDIS ABABA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS NAIROBI
AND EEC POSTS.

MY TELNO 126 (NOT TO ALL): RETURN OF REFUGEES.

1. OVER 28,000 REFUGEES HAVE RETURNED TO RHODESIA SINCE 21 JANUARY. IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 4 FEBRUARY (WHEN REPATRIATION FROM ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE BEGAN) OVER 10,000 REFUGEES RETURNED TO RHODESIA, IN LINE WITH THE PLANNING FIGURE WHICH RHODESIAN OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED AT THE MEETING IN LONDON ON 4 JANUARY.

2. UNHCR HAVE INFORMED US THAT REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES FROM BOTSWANA ENDED YESTERDAY AFTER A TOTAL OF 19,500 REFUGEES HAD RETURNED (OF WHOM ALMOST 2,000 RETURNED UNDER THEIR OWN STEAM BEFORE THE REPATRIATION OPERATION BEGAN). ABOUT 40 FAMILIES HAVE ELECTED TO STAY AT THE DUKWE REFUGEE CAMP IN BOTSWANA. IT THEREFORE APPEARS THAT THE 22,000 REFUGEES ORIGINALLY THOUGHT TO BE IN CAMPS IN

THAT THE 22,000 REFUGEES ORIGINALLY THOUGHT TO BE IN CAMPS IN BOTSWANA WAS AN OVERESTIMATE.

3. THE RETURN OF REFUGEES FROM MOZAMBIQUE HAS BEEN GOING SMOOTHLY SINCE 4 FEBRUARY AND 6,700 REFUGEES HAVE SO FAR RETURNED. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE MOZAMBICANS THAT THE INCLUSION OF A HIGH PROPORTION OF YOUNG MEN OF MILITARY AGE AMONG RETURNING REFUGEES, AS AT PRESENT, CAN ONLY SLOW DOWN THE RATE OF REPATRIATION.

4. THE ONLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN WITH THE RETURN OF REFUGEES FROM ZAMBIA. THIS IS LARGELY BECAUSE AS NKOMO HIMSELF HAS TOLD US HE WISHED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE RETURN OF FORMER ZIPRA PERSONNEL. ALL BUT 680 OF THE 4,000 REFUGEES WHO HAVE SO FAR RETURNED FROM ZAMBIA HAVE BEEN YOUNG MEN OF MILITARY AGE. THE POLICE HAVE NATURALLY HAD TO EXERCISE CAREFUL CONTROL. HOWEVER ONLY 125 HAVE BEEN DETAINED AS SUSPECTED MILITARY PERSONNEL. OF THESE 51 HAVE NOW BEEN RETURNED TO ZAMBIA AND 34 HAVE BEEN RELEASED AND SENT HOME. THE REMAINING 40 WILL BE PROCESSED AS QUICKLR AS POSSIBLE. THERE IS NO(NO) EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATIONS OF ILLTREATMENT AND TORTURE OF REFUGEES WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN SUCH PROMINENCE BY THE ZAMBIAN PRESS. (THOUGH ALL ALLEGATIONS ARE THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED).

5. WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO NKOMO UNTIL 18 FEBRUARY (HE IS IN BULAWAYO). WE SHALL POINT OUT THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF MISTREATMENT ARE BEING THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED, THAT THE ASSISTANT POLICE ADVISERS AND COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE WILL ENSURE EVEN CLOSER SUPERVISION THAN HITHERTO OF THE VARIOUS STAGES OF REPATRIATION AND THAT WE HOPE THAT FOR THEIR PART THE PF WILL ENSURE THAT NO MORE MILITARY PERSONNEL RETURN AMONG THE REFUGEES. WE HOPE THAT LUSAKA WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PUT THE SAME MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE ZAMBIANS AND TO PF OFFICIALS. WE HOPE THAT THE FLOW OF REFUGEES FROM ZAMBIA WILL RESTART AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS MENTIONED IN MY TELNO 110 TO NAPUTO THE RECEPTION CENTRES IN GWAI AND UMTALI WILL HAVE TO BE CLOSED DOWN BETWEEN 24 FEBRUARY AND 3 MARCH TO RELEASE POLICE AND HOME AFFAIRS PERSONNEL FOR ELECTORAL DUTIES.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL

SOAMES

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

PART 14 ends:-

Kaunda to PM T 31/80 15/2/80

PART 15 begins:-

Salinbung to 1679 16/2/80