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NOTE

Papers CC(79) 80, 93 and 102
were not present at review.

Wayland
6 July 2010

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CC(79)105

COPY NO:

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FORTY-FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the Forty-Fourth
Plenary Session of the Conference, Thursday
13 December 1979.

Lancaster House

13 December 1979

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PRESENT:

UK Delegation

Sir I Gilmour Bt (in the Chair)

Mr R Luce

Mr D M Day

Gen M Farndale

Mr R Renwick

Mr P Fifoot

Mr N M Fenn

Mr C D Powell

Mr R Jackling

Col C Dunphie

Mr B Watkins

Mr A M Layden

Mr S J Gomersall

Mrs A J Phillips

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Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation

Dr S C Mundawarara

Dr J Kamusikiri

AVM H Hawkins

Gen P Walls

Mr K Flower

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Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation

Mr J M Nkomo	Mr R G Mugabe
Mr J M Chinamano	Mr E Z Tekere
Mr J W Msika	Gen J M Tongogara
Mr A M Chambati	Mr E R Kadungure
Mr W Musarurwa	Dr H Ushewokunze
Mr D Dabengwa	Mr J Tungamirai
Mr John Nkomo	Mr S Mubako
Mr L Mafela	Mr W Kamba
Miss E Siziba	Mr R Manyika

SECRETARIAT

Mr R S Dewar

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The session began at 12.20.

THE CHAIRMAN asked whether delegations were yet in a position to respond to the full cease-fire proposals put forward by the British Government on 11 December (Conference Paper CC(79)104).

MR MUGABE asked the Chairman whether the session had been called to obtain the Patriotic Front's response to the proposals or because the Chairman had a statement to convey to the Conference. His delegation had been in the process of discussions with the UK delegation when the meeting had been called - they had asked that it be postponed. THE CHAIRMAN said that the session had been requested by the UK delegation and that of Bishop Muzorewa. It had more than one objective; the first objective was to ask for any responses; the purpose of the second would be mentioned later.

MR MUGABE then pointed out that the situation as from the day before, 12 December, had altered. Although the Conference had not yet reached agreement, the British Government had thought it fit to effect decisions which had not yet taken the shape of an agreement; and an Order in Council had been enacted enabling the Governor to proceed to Salisbury to assume control in terms of executive and legislative authority. In those circumstances the Salisbury government had surrendered its powers to the British Government. Hence there was no Prime Minister of the so-called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, which had given way to Southern Rhodesia, a colony of Britain. The delegation which had been sitting opposite
/represented

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represented the Salisbury regime - which was no longer there. It had surrendered its powers to the Governor. Therefore there was no Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, or Ministers.

Mr Mugabe then questioned the presence of those opposite him and asked whether they should be allowed to speak when they had no further status. Why should the commanders, which had become Her Majesty's commanders, not now sit with the British Government? Their status, he assumed, had been established under the authority of the Governor and they could not be heard to be talking in any terms other than those consistent with their new status as being under the Governor. His delegation had not been consulted on the British action. In their view there were now two parties, the UK and the Patriotic Front, and the Salisbury group no longer legally existed as such. They could not be granted a status at the Conference which had already been taken from them through an Act of Parliament and Order in Council. It would be inconsistent with that Order in Council to allow that delegation to speak. The Patriotic Front argued against them being allowed to represent anyone, unless it was said that they were part and parcel of the British Government - in which case what they said represented the official British viewpoint.

THE CHAIRMAN said that there had always been three delegations to the Conference, those of Bishop Muzorewa, the Patriotic Front and the British Government. The Salisbury delegation had always been
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called Bishop Muzorewa's delegation (never the "Prime Minister's") and that remained the case. He was sure that all accepted that they were close to an agreement; everyone was very desirous of an agreement and he did not want to get involved in any sterile procedural debate over status. The objective of all was to achieve an agreement and bring the Conference to a peaceful and successful conclusion; the only way to do this was for the Conference to end as it began, with three delegations. The Chairman urged that the Conference move on, so that agreement could be reached as soon as possible.

MR MUGABE said that, although the Chairman would make his ruling, this was not a simple matter and his delegation had to make their point. The British had decided to deprive those opposite of a status. When they had sat at the table they had represented the regime. The army had come under the authority of the Governor and the whole cease-fire question was now one to be resolved with the commanders, expressing themselves through the British, and the Patriotic Front. There were now two sides. Now that the British Government had taken over the army, for whom would those opposite speak? Neither Bishop Muzorewa nor Dr Mundawarara had an army unless they argued that they had private armies. The Conference had been talking of the regime's army, which had been taken over by the British Government. A cease-fire could only be reached between those two sides; had those opposite an army to speak for? His delegation's view was that they no longer had that army; hence the two armies were those of Britain, under the Governor, and of the Patriotic Front.

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THE CHAIRMAN said that Mr Mugabe had made his point with cogency. He repeated that the Conference had begun and would end with three delegations. Mr Mugabe's point had been noted. He asked if the Conference could proceed.

MR MUGABE then asked whether his delegation was bound to listen to the Salisbury delegation or whether they could leave.

THE CHAIRMAN said that it would be extremely inconvenient if Mr Mugabe's delegation left; nor would it be understood. Many people throughout the world were looking forward to an early end to the Conference and would not understand it being frustrated by sterile procedural arguments. He asked again if the Conference could proceed.

DR MUNDAWARARA said that he did not feel it proper to make a response to what Mr Mugabe had said. The Chairman had stated the position correctly. The invitation to the Conference had been issued to his delegation in the name of Bishop Muzorewa. Dr Mundawarara then delivered a statement, subsequently circulated as Conference Paper CC(79)107.

THE CHAIRMAN commented firstly that the UK Delegation had in fact received force levels from the Patriotic Front, which was a very useful step forward which would enable the UK Delegation to complete their planning for the assembly process. He was very pleased that Dr Mundawarara's delegation had been able to accept the full British proposals. He said that all

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shared Dr Mundawarara's concern that the cease-fire had to be made effective; there also had to be full assembly. The UK Delegation also agreed that cross-border activity by both sides had to cease. The British Government were in touch with the neighbouring countries about arrangements to see that this happened and would be able to make adequate arrangements to ensure that that part of the agreement was complied with.

MR NKOMO said that Mr Mugabe's remarks were very relevant; and he hoped their serious nature was appreciated. The British Government had sent Lord Soames to be Governor of Southern Rhodesia. He had taken up office the day before and had thus taken control of institutions such as the army. Bishop Muzorewa and Dr Mundawarara had spoken on behalf of that army because of their positions, whether accepted or not. That army was now firmly under the Governor. The Chairman had repeatedly stated in the Conference that the authority of the Governor had to be accepted; the British action had now weakened that position and had created a very dangerous precedent. He hoped that the British were not acting for the sake of convenience. His delegation intended to go through with the exercise and wanted it to succeed. Only the British would be to blame if they put difficulties in the way of the Governor and created precedents in the Conference, which would be quoted when people wanted to deviate.

The Salisbury army was now firmly in the hands of the

/Governor

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Governor; the Governor was responsible to the British Government; all those institutions which had been answerable to those opposite were now answerable to the British. The British could not have it both ways and say the Governor was in control when it was convenient and vice versa when it was not. He asked whether the Chairman would state categorically whether or not that army was in the hands of the Governor. It was a question of realities rather than procedure. He asked the Chairman not to push the matter aside, which could make the Governor's work difficult.

THE CHAIRMAN said that, as he understood it, the Patriotic Front had taken up arms against an illegal regime. As Mr Nkomo had rightly said, legality had been restored at Salisbury under the British Governor who was in full control of the forces and the administration. The objective of the Conference was to complete that process by reaching agreement so that the Patriotic Front forces also became legal under the Governor. Once agreement had been reached everybody's forces would be legal and under the control of the Governor.

The Chairman concluded by saying that he would deplore the Conference getting bogged down in argument about status. Everyone was anxious to reach agreement and bring the Conference to an end so that all could return to Zimbabwe and fight an election

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rather than a war. He again asked Mr Mugabe's and Mr Nkomo's delegation whether they had any further comments on the British proposals put forward on 11 December (CC(79)104).

In response to a question by MR NKOMO concerning the present position of the army, THE CHAIRMAN said that the army was under the Governor. MR NKOMO asked whether Dr Mundawarara was in charge of that army under the Governor. THE CHAIRMAN replied that General Walls was in charge of that army, under the Governor. Dr Mundawarara was a member of a political coalition, who was hoping shortly to fight an election, as were Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe.

MR NKOMO said that he was still not clear about the position of the armies. Were they under the Governor or under the control of the political parties? THE CHAIRMAN repeated that General Walls was under the Governor.

The Chairman then announced that the second purpose of the session was to circulate the Conference documents which he hoped both delegations would study carefully. These embodied the agreements reached at the Conference and those which the UK delegation hoped would be signed at the end of the Conference. The Conference Report and Annexes were subsequently circulated as Conference Paper CC(79)106.

/MR NKOMO

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MR NKOMO asked whether the Chairman was aware that his delegation was engaged in technical discussions with the UK delegation. These were essential and he thought it would be best to complete them first. THE CHAIRMAN said that technical discussions and consideration of the documents were not mutually exclusive. He was sure delegations would find the documents useful.

The session ended at 12.46.

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CC(79)104

COPY NO: 89

CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON

The attached statement by the Chairman,
delivered during the Forty-Third Plenary
Session, contains the British Government's
full presentation on the ceasefire and is
circulated to delegates at his request.

Lancaster House

11 December 1979

CEASEFIRE: ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

1. The substance of the British Government's proposals for a ceasefire has been set out in the Ceasefire Agreement circulated to the Conference. This is in accordance with the ceasefire proposals which have already been agreed. It remains to reach conclusions on matters of practical detail, so that the ceasefire can be implemented.
2. It has been agreed that the purpose of the ceasefire is to bring an immediate end to hostilities and to establish peaceful conditions which will allow elections to take place, the people of Rhodesia to choose their future government and Zimbabwe to become independent on the terms which have been agreed at this Conference. The British Government has accepted direct responsibility for the administration of Rhodesia during the pre-independence period, through the appointment of a Governor with executive and legislative powers. It will be the Governor's duty to administer the country so that free and fair elections can be held under his authority. It is essential therefore that the British Government should state the arrangements which it is prepared to make in connection with a ceasefire, as in connection with all the other matters concerning the pre-independence period on which it has

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made its position clear and on which all parties to the Conference are now agreed. Both sides have agreed to resolve their political differences through elections held under British authority on the basis of a democratic constitution which all have accepted. In these circumstances there can be no justification for any party to continue the war.

3. In further refining our ceasefire proposals I would like to make it clear from the outset that there can be no question of surrender by either side. All the forces which comply with the agreement, which accept the Governor's authority and comply with his directions will retain their arms and equipment, will be treated honourably, and will be lawful. Neither side will threaten the security of the other. A fully effective ceasefire, respected by all the forces, will foster an atmosphere of confidence in which the future Government will be able to resolve post-war military problems and decide the future of all the forces at its disposal.

4. It is impossible for any external authority or force to guarantee that a ceasefire will be effective. Only the parties themselves can ensure this. The purpose of the British Government's proposals is to help the forces to initiate and maintain a ceasefire through arrangements by which they can be separated from their

/present

present inter-locked positions; infringements can be avoided so far as possible and contained where they have taken place; and there can be effective monitoring of each side's conduct. The task of a monitoring force is not and cannot be to compel either side to maintain a ceasefire, or in any sense to guard the forces of one side or the other. Its task is to observe and report on the manner in which the forces maintain the ceasefire agreement and thus give them an assurance that it will not be possible for any force to conduct activities in breach of the ceasefire in disregard of the Governor's instructions.

5. A conflict is at present taking place in which the armed forces of both sides are inter-locked over a wide area of the country. A substantial proportion of the armed forces of one side is also located in positions outside the country. It is necessary to establish the peaceful conditions for elections through an effective ceasefire and the separation of the forces. It follows that steps must be taken which will ensure as far as possible that during the pre-independence period:

- a. There is a cessation of cross-border military activity by both sides;
- b. the forces inside the country cease hostilities and are separated;

/c.

c. all forces which are prepared to cease fire and to accept the Governor's authority are identified and comply with his directions; and

d. forces which do not accept the Governor's authority are unlawful.

6. The first step to be taken to secure these objectives is for the commanders of the forces on both sides in the conflict simultaneously and reciprocally to instruct their forces to desist from all cross-border movement and operations. Compliance with such instructions can be verified and the British Government has already called on the parties to the Conference to reach an agreement on this question without delay.

7. It is crucial to the achievement of a ceasefire within Rhodesia that the Commanders of the forces at present in the country should accept the authority of the Governor and be responsible to him for the maintenance of the ceasefire by all the forces under their command. It is only in this way that the leaders of the political parties and the people as a whole can be assured that the opposing forces have been brought under lawful authority.

8. In the circumstances prevailing in Rhodesia it will not be

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sufficient for the Governor to instruct the forces which have accepted his authority simply to cease firing and remain in their present positions. A ceasefire in these circumstances would have no chance of being preserved and a monitoring force could not be deployed. Nor would any machinery exist through which disputes could be resolved. The British Government's proposals are designed to create the condition for an effective ceasefire by the establishment of such machinery and the disengagement of the forces.

The Ceasefire Commission

9. The British Government has proposed the establishment of a Ceasefire Commission on which the commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces will be represented and which will meet under the chairmanship of the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will meet as often as necessary throughout the ceasefire. It will be established on ceasefire day and will remain in operation until independence day. It will provide a forum in which each side can seek assurance that the ceasefire agreement is being complied with. It will be able to call for reports on breaches of the ceasefire and discuss measures to contain them and to prevent their recurrence.

/Any

Any member of the Commission will be able to raise any question which he believes to be relevant to the maintenance of the cease-fire. The Commission will not give directions to the forces on either side - that will be a matter for the Governor - but will be free to make recommendations to the Governor.

The Monitoring Force

10. The Ceasefire Commission will be assisted by a substantial monitoring force, under the command of the Governor's Military Adviser. The monitoring force will be under United Kingdom auspices, with the participation of contingents from Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji. I would like to pay tribute to the Governments concerned for their contribution to the process of bringing a settlement into effect. The force is on stand-by and can be deployed to Rhodesia within the next few days.

11. The force will number some 1,200 men. It will be equipped with its own vehicles, helicopters and C130 aircraft. It will have an independent and secure radio communications network.

Members of the force will carry personal weapons for their own self-defence. Their uniforms, vehicles and aircraft will carry distinctive insignia which will make them easily recognisable by the forces and by the general public.

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12. When fully deployed, the monitoring force will be in contact with the command structures of the Patriotic Front forces and the Rhodesian forces throughout the country. It will monitor and observe the maintenance of the ceasefire by all the forces. It will also monitor border crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with the ceasefire agreement.

13. Senior officers of the monitoring force will be attached to each of the Joint Operations Commands (JOCs) of the Rhodesian forces. Each of these officers will command a series of monitoring teams which will be attached to the sub-JOCs and company bases of the Rhodesian forces within each JOC's operational area.

14. This organisation will be paralleled in relation to the Patriotic Front forces. A senior officer will be located with a representative of the Patriotic Front forces responsible for each group of assembly places allocated to the Patriotic Front. Under each such officer's command there will be a series of monitoring teams attached to the forces of the Patriotic Front in their places of assembly.

15. We have next had to consider the arrangements under which the forces will disengage and the monitoring force will be deployed. We cannot arrange for the simultaneous deployment of monitoring teams to both sides, because the Patriotic Front forces are diffused

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and will not, at the outset of the process, be identified to the monitoring force. The Rhodesian forces will make the first move by (a) accepting the Governor's authority and agreeing to comply with his directions; (b) the monitoring teams allocated to the Rhodesian forces will then be deployed through their command structure down to company base level; (c) on ceasefire day the Rhodesian forces will disengage from the Patriotic Front forces by moving into the close vicinity of bases to permit the Patriotic Front to assemble their forces.

16. It will then be for the Patriotic Front to assemble their forces via rendezvous points to assembly places at which they can be monitored. The process of assembly will be continuous. For this purpose, it will be necessary for the Patriotic Front, under the auspices of the monitoring force, to send representatives to each of the rendezvous points. The Patriotic Front forces will make their way with their arms and equipment to the rendezvous points, where they will be under the authority of their own Commanders. From there they will move to their assembly places in transport which will be provided for them, with their arms and equipment and under their own command. This movement will take place under the auspices of the monitoring force, who will be in direct communication with the teams attached to the Rhodesian forces so that each side

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can be informed of the other's movements and there can be no misunderstanding of each other's intentions.

17. Monitoring teams will also be established from the outset at the assembly places themselves and will meet the Patriotic Front forces as they arrive. In their assembly places the Patriotic Front forces will retain their arms and equipment and will remain under their own commanders. They will be responsible for the organisation and discipline of their forces.

18. The Patriotic Front delegation have expressed concern about the ability of their commanders to transmit ceasefire orders to their men in the field. But the British Government stands ready, in conjunction with the monitoring force, to arrange whatever facilities the Patriotic Front commanders require to ensure that their orders reach their men in the field. We are prepared to help with this in terms of broadcasting and other radio facilities, transport, etc.

19. By the time the assembly process is complete we shall have reached a point at which the forces which have accepted the Governor's authority are known and identified; the opposing forces have been separated from each other; and monitoring teams are located with the forces of both sides so that their maintenance of the ceasefire can be observed. If any force does not comply with the ceasefire agreement and with the Governor's directions it will be acting

/unlawfully

unlawfully. The commanders on both sides will be answerable to the Governor for the maintenance of the ceasefire by their respective forces. If there are breaches of the ceasefire, it will be for the Commanders to deal with these, through the machinery of the ceasefire commission and with the assistance of the monitoring force. If there are repeated and sustained breaches of the ceasefire, the Governor will have to decide what action to take to deal with these with the forces which have accepted his authority.

20. Our proposals are designed to bring about reciprocal disengagement. The Rhodesian forces will be monitored to the level of their sub-JOCs and company bases from the first day of the ceasefire. These arrangements will apply to the Patriotic Front once they have identified and assembled their forces at places from which they too can be monitored and be in contact with the Ceasefire Commission. It is in their interests that they should do so to enable the arrangements for their security, accommodation and other agreed requirements to be adequately provided for.

21. The assembly places allocated to the Patriotic Front have been chosen in relation to their operational areas and to the requirement that they must not be in close proximity to Rhodesian bases. They must contain certain indispensable facilities, including road access and an airstrip for the re-supply of the Patriotic Front forces and

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and the monitoring teams. We have made a selection of assembly places which meet these criteria, particularly the question of the security of the Patriotic Front forces, about which the Patriotic Front delegation have expressed concern. I would like to make it quite clear that the British Government cannot accept that Patriotic Front forces which assemble under the auspices of the monitoring force and which accept the Governor's authority and comply with his directions will be in any danger of attack from other forces. There could, in these circumstances, be no danger to their security. I am conscious of the concern expressed by the Patriotic Front that their assembly places should not be in close proximity to Rhodesian bases and that they should not be "encircled". There has never been any question of the Patriotic Front forces being encircled. They will be under the authority of their own commanders; and other forces will not be in close proximity to them.

22. Our intention is to circulate to the Conference later today maps prepared by our military experts which will show where the monitoring force will be located in relation to the forces both during the process of assembly and after it has been completed. In doing this, we have taken account of the information which the delegations have given us about their force levels. The Salisbury delegation have
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declared to us their force levels. These will be rendered public as soon as the Patriotic Front have put forward their own force levels. The Rhodesian force levels include all the forces mentioned by the Patriotic Front leaders, including the guard force and auxiliaries. These force levels correspond to our own independent estimates, and we believe them to be realistic.

23. In the absence of any information from the Patriotic Front about their force levels inside Rhodesia, we have been obliged to proceed on the basis of our own independent estimates of those force levels. These estimates reveal an important disparity in numbers between the size of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces. The arrangements we are proposing for disengagement have to take account of this disparity in numbers as well as of other factors, including the need to make use of logistic and other facilities. We have therefore proposed that the Patriotic Front forces should report to rendezvous points which are spread throughout the country and which are in close proximity to all their forces; and that they should then assemble in places which are situated in their operational areas; which are not in close proximity to Rhodesian bases and which are in locations which take account of the need to enable the Patriotic Front personnel assembled in them to feel secure. We have similarly proposed that the Rhodesian forces should be monitored down to the level of their company bases.

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24. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of our having accurate knowledge of the respective force levels. Both the other delegations at this Conference have expressed concern that the other side may have forces inside Rhodesia or may bring forces into Rhodesia which will not be monitored and will not comply with the ceasefire. We have proposed comprehensive arrangements for the monitoring of the Rhodesian forces from ceasefire day. It will not be possible to make similar arrangements for the Patriotic Front forces unless and until they assemble their forces and give us firm assurances that they will not move forces outside the country into Rhodesia.

25. The Patriotic Front delegation have asked on several occasions in this Conference about the dispositions of the Rhodesian forces. The maps which we shall be circulating this afternoon will show that, given the balance of the forces at present inside the country, the monitoring force will be deployed to the forces on both sides in proportions which are related to their respective strengths. The Rhodesian forces will, as I have already said, have dis-engaged to the close vicinity of their bases to allow the Patriotic Front forces to assemble. What happens in the next phase will depend crucially on what happens in the assembly phase. If Patriotic Front forces remain in the field or continue to be introduced from outside the country, those forces will be unlawful. If, however, all Patriotic

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Front forces inside Rhodesia assemble with their arms and there is no further movement by externally-based Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia, there would be no need in those circumstances for the Governor to ask the Rhodesian forces to deploy from their company bases.

26. Finally, I am conscious of the concern on both sides about the situation which might arise after the elections. I have made it clear that if this is the general wish the monitoring force would stay in Rhodesia until the independence government is formed and independence is granted; and would try to help in overcoming any problems which might arise in this period. It will be for the independence government to request whatever assistance it requires in the future training or re-settlement of the forces.

27. Once our maps have been distributed to the delegations this afternoon, we shall have given the Conference the fullest possible exposition of our plans. This is therefore the full presentation of the British Government's ceasefire proposals. The monitoring force is standing by and is ready to go to Rhodesia in the next few days. I have no doubt that, on this basis, it will be possible to bring a ceasefire into effect and to begin the assembly process within the next few days. I hope that when you have studied these papers, this document and the maps, you will be able to give us your earliest possible response.

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CC(79)103

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FORTY-THIRD PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the
Forty-Third Plenary Session of the
Conference, Tuesday 11 December,
1979.

Lancaster House

11 December 1979

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PRESENT:-

UK Delegation

Lord Carrington (in the Chair until 14.35)

Sir I Gilmour Bt

Mr R Luce

Mr D M Day (in the Chair from 14.45 - 14.55)

Gen M Farndale

Mr R Renwick

Mr N M Fenn

Mr G G H Walden

Mr R Jackling

Col C Dunphie

Mr B Watkins

Mr R D Wilkinson

Mr S J Gomersall

Mrs A J Phillips

Mr M C Wood

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Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation

Mr R G Mugabe

Mr E Z Tekere

Gen J M Tongogara

Mr E R Kadungure

Dr H Ushewokunze

Mr J Tungamirai

Mr E Zvobgo

Mr W Kamba

Mr R Manyika

Mr J M Nkomo

Mr J M Chinamano

Mr J W Msika

Mr A M Chambati

Mr W Musarurwa

Mr D Dabengwa

Mr R Austin

Mr L Mafela

Miss E Siziba

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Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation

Dr S C Mundawarara

Mr D C Mukome

AVM H Hawkins

Gen P Walls

Mr K Flower

SECRETARIAT

Mr R S Dewar

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The session began at 14.05.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he would like to read a statement, which he would then have circulated to delegates. He then delivered a statement, subsequently circulated as Conference Paper CC(79)104.

After concluding the statement, the Chairman said that he did not expect an immediate response as all would want to study it. He proposed that the meeting should take a short break and thereafter proceed with the maps.

MR NKOMO asked whether this document replaced or superseded all other Conference documents on this subject. THE CHAIRMAN said that it was a fuller exposition of the British Government's views. The ceasefire proposals (CC(79)87) had been circulated and agreed, subject to the details; his statement represented the details. MR MUGABE asked if the statement was self-sufficient, covering every aspect of the ceasefire. THE CHAIRMAN replied that his statement did not cover all the ceasefire proposals; he was attempting to allay the fears which the Patriotic Front delegation had expressed to the UK Delegation, by setting out the British proposals more fully.

/DR MUNDAWARARA

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DR MUNDAWARARA said that he had no comments to make at that stage; he wished to study the document fully.

The Conference adjourned briefly at 14.35.

It was reconvened at 14.45 with Mr Day in the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN apologised for the fact that Lord Carrington had had to leave to make a statement and said that copies of the maps to which Lord Carrington had referred would by then have been circulated. As Lord Carrington had suggested, delegates might consider his statement (CC(79)104) together with the maps, which showed the proposals for the monitoring of the two forces. If, in the light of study and consideration of the statement and maps, either delegation wanted further detailed clarification or explanation, General Farndale and his staff and other members of the UK delegation would be ready and available to provide this.

MR NKOMO asked whether a smaller map was available. THE CHAIRMAN confirmed that this was the case and said that copies would be made available.

The session ended at 14.55.

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CC(79)101

COPY NO:

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FORTY-SECOND PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the Forty-Second
Plenary Session of the Conference, Friday 7 December
1979.

Lancaster House

7 December 1979

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PRESENT:

UK Delegation:

Sir A Duff (in the Chair)

Mr D M Day

Gen M Farndale

Gen J Acland

Mr R W Renwick

Mr N M Fenn

Mr R Jackling

Col C Dunphie

Mr P J Barlow

Mr B Watkins

Mrs A J Phillips

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Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation

Dr S C Mundawarara

AVM H Hawkins

Mr D Zamchiya

Gen P Walls

Mr P Allum

Mr K Flower

Mr P Claypole

Mr A R McMillan

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Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation

Mr J M Nkomo

Mr R G Mugabe

Mr J Chinamano

Gen J Tongogara

Mr T G Silundika

Mr E Kadungure

Mr A M Chambati

Dr H Ushewokunze

Mr W Musarurwa

Mr E Zvobgo

Mr D Dabengwa

Mr S Mubako

Mr R Austin

Mr W Kamba

Mr L Mafela

Mr R Manyika

Miss E Siziba

Secretariat

Mr J M Willson

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The session commenced at 11.25.

THE CHAIRMAN informed the Conference that the Government would shortly be announcing in the House of Commons that the Governor-Designate for Rhodesia was Lord Soames. This had been foreshadowed in the press, but was now an official announcement.

The Chairman recalled that at the 41st Plenary Session he had asked the other two delegations to give the numbers of their forces. It had been agreed, because each delegation found it difficult to speak first, that it would be acceptable to write the numbers down and hand them to the Chair. He asked whether these figures could now be revealed.

DR MUNDAWARARA said that his delegation did not believe that their force levels were relevant to this exercise, as the Rhodesian forces would not be required to assemble, but would be monitored from their existing bases. In order to facilitate progress at the Conference, he was nevertheless prepared to give them in confidence to the Chairman, on the understanding that they would not be disclosed to anybody. The war was still going on. He would not ask the Patriotic Front to disclose their figures either.

THE CHAIRMAN remarked that this position was not entirely satisfactory. In reply to a question from him, DR MUNDAWARARA said that the figures would be handed over during the course of the day. THE CHAIRMAN then asked whether Mr Mugabe or Mr Nkomo could communicate their force levels.

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MR MUGABE said that the statement made by Dr Mundawarara again raised the problem to which his delegation had referred during the 41st Plenary Session, that is that the movement of forces to disengagement should be on a reciprocal basis, acceptable in terms both of the need to uphold the ceasefire and of the need not to threaten each other. Dr Mundawarara had said that his delegation's forces would not be required to move; this was, however, not Mr Mugabe's understanding. To his knowledge, it was proposed that the Rhodesian forces should move to their own bases and assemble within the structure of those bases. The criterion proposed by Dr Mundawarara affected Mr Mugabe's delegation's willingness to disclose its own figures. He could not accept a position where his side was to be expected to assemble, and therefore disclose its figures, while Bishop Muzorewa's delegation held back from such a disclosure on the basis that their forces would not be required to assemble. Mr Mugabe concluded by saying that his forces were also fighting a war, and should be subject to the same conditions as Bishop Muzorewa's delegation.

THE CHAIRMAN said that any figures communicated confidentially by the Patriotic Front delegation would be treated in the same way as those revealed by Bishop Muzorewa's. Parity would be preserved. The knowledge of the force levels, in particular those of the Patriotic Front forces, was crucial to progress on the details of implementation. The British assembly plan was
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crucially related to the force levels involved in the assembly process. The Chairman asked again to receive the figures as soon as possible.

MR NKOMO said that the question was not simply procedural, but concerned the final position proposed for the Salisbury forces. He had referred to this problem during the 41st Plenary Session. What was meant by the Salisbury army? In Mr Nkomo's view, the Rhodesian forces contained elements which were as diffuse as those within his delegation's liberation force. Would the forces to be disclosed by Dr Mundawarara include the auxiliaries, the territorials, the Pfumo Re Vanhu and the Ziso Re Vanhu? Would they be covered by the ceasefire agreement? There was also the question of privately-owned arms. The territorials were ordinary citizens, and retained their military skills when they were off duty; their weapons would continue to be at their disposal. It was important to have figures for the territorials, so that it would be possible to estimate the number of weapons involved. These were the complications caused by the position adopted by Dr Mundawarara. Mr Nkomo thought that, although Dr Mundawarara wanted confidentiality, the numbers would have to surface at some stage. If a list of the Pfumo Re Vanhu and similar elements were available, at least the Conference would have an idea of the numbers of auxiliaries involved. It would also be useful to know the various divisions of the Salisbury army, which of them was

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to retire to the bases and which was to return to civilian life.

THE CHAIRMAN agreed that the question was complicated, but recalled Lord Carrington's statement that privately-held arms were a fact of life which the police would deal with, as in other countries. The British plan stipulated that, under the ceasefire proposals, all the forces on both sides would be covered by the monitoring organisation.

MR NKOMO asked whether it was difficult to state whether, for example, the territorials would be withdrawn from active service. THE CHAIRMAN said that this would become clear after the disclosure of the Salisbury figures. The British plan was that the Rhodesian forces, other than the police, should be covered by the ceasefire arrangements and the monitoring organisation. By the day on which the Patriotic Front forces would make their first move and show themselves, the monitors would be in place throughout the Rhodesian forces. This would enable the Patriotic Front forces to make their first move in safety, and at a time when disengagement would already have taken place. That was what was required of the Rhodesian forces. The disclosure of their numbers would help to confirm the British arrangements for them. The disclosure of the Patriotic Front force levels would help the British side with regard to the rendezvous and assembly points. The basis of the plan was that there should be no contact between the two sides. Knowledge of the force levels would allow the

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British delegation to assess the size of the problem. The plan so far presented was purely illustrative.

In reply to a question from MR NKOMO, THE CHAIRMAN said that the figures would be used to complete the British plan; on the one side to check that the monitoring organisation covered all the Rhodesian forces, and on the other to make provision for the assembly process for the Patriotic Front forces. There would be no need to communicate these figures to anyone else. In reply to a question from MR MUGABE, THE CHAIRMAN said that he could not give a hypothetical answer regarding the likely British reaction to the disclosure of a round figure for the Salisbury forces. That figure would be considered once it had been disclosed; once the monitoring organisation was deployed, the British side would be in complete touch throughout the Rhodesian forces' structure.

MR MUGABE suggested that the figure might say nothing specific, but just give an overall level. The Salisbury side had guerilla forces, just as did his delegation. Their auxiliaries were deployed throughout the country. Would they have assembly points? They were not part of the structure of the regular army.

THE CHAIRMAN said that all the Rhodesian forces would be monitored. The monitoring organisation would spread through the whole command structure. As had been made clear in previous discussions, the Rhodesian forces had a known structure and chain of command, but it was impossible to make a start with the Patriotic Front forces without a system of assembly areas.

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MR MUGABE asked to whom the structure of the Salisbury forces was known. Numbers for the auxiliaries, Pfumo Re Vanhu and Ziso Re Vanhu could only be known once Bishop Muzorewa's delegation had disclosed them to the British side. Similarly, Mr Mugabe said, the British side would not know his delegation's force levels until they were disclosed.

THE CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation was asking the other parties to reveal their figures. As far as Mr Mugabe's and Mr Nkomo's delegation was concerned, the British side was not asking for the command structure, just the numbers. This would enable the British delegation to complete their plan and assess how many would need to be fed and accommodated. The problem was more manageable on the Rhodesian side.

MR NKOMO repeated that the Salisbury side had considerable forces of an irregular character which were as amorphous as those of the liberation movement. Would these be treated in the same way as the liberation forces? They were not a part of the Rhodesian army, which excluded the auxiliaries, Pfumo Re Vanhu etc. Mr Nkomo referred to a report in "The Observer" of 500 people being trained in a neighbouring country who had now returned to Rhodesia. It was important to obtain a definite position on how these irregulars would fit into the ceasefire plan. In conclusion, Mr Nkomo said that the British side would receive his delegation's figures, possibly that day.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he had been deliberately talking of

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the Rhodesian forces, not the army. It was quite clearly the British position that the Rhodesian forces, both regular and irregular, other than the police forces, came under the ceasefire, and were monitored, disengaged and under the Governor's authority. The British proposals had been put forward in good faith as the only possible way to achieve a ceasefire in a civil war in which the forces of the two sides were inextricably mixed. The Chairman said that his delegation could see the way forward for one side. The British side already had sufficient information about the Rhodesian forces' structure and organisation. Information on their minor bases would become available once the monitoring structure was in place. His delegation also considered that it could do the job for the Patriotic Front side. No progress could, however, be made on this aspect of the arrangements until the numbers were disclosed, and he was glad to hear from Mr Nkomo that the British side would be receiving them.

GEN TONGOGARA said that Dr Mundawarara had said his troops would not go to assembly points because the war was still going on; the Patriotic Front felt the same way. They were prepared to give numbers but Dr Mundawarara said he could not. Could they be given a clue as to what the Rhodesians were going to do?

THE CHAIRMAN reminded General Tongogara that the ceasefire was going to be under the supervision of British authorities, the Governor and the Cease Fire Commissioner. The Chairman said he understood very well the suspicions manifest round the table which

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they were trying to overcome. He said they had gone a long way since the first part of the Conference; they had agreed on a constitution, the pre-independence arrangements and the principles of a ceasefire. They had reached the last stage, which he knew was difficult, but as there was so little left to do he appealed to delegates to try and do it now. Against that background Salisbury were going to provide force levels. It was of course very difficult for all of those on the guerrilla side of the war to show themselves until they felt certain they were going to be safe. The great point of the plan was that the Patriotic Front were not being asked to do anything until the other side was monitored.

The Chairman said he was happy that Dr Mundawarara had accepted the plan of a disengagement on ceasefire day, when it was envisaged that the assembly process would start. From then Rhodesian forces would be watched and under control, under the monitoring arrangements. This was on the first day and did not begin to apply to the Patriotic Front until their forces began to assemble. The second step would be taken by the Patriotic Front. The Chairman thought this was a sensible arrangement.

MR NKOMO asked what was meant by "their forces". The Rhodesians had forces which resembled those of the Patriotic Front. What would they be doing? DR MUNDAWARARA sought to clarify any misunderstanding arising from his statement. He said that when

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he had stated that the war was going on he had said that purely in the context of numbers. Answering Mr Nkomo, he wished to make the point that when the Rhodesian figures were given these would include all their forces. The auxiliaries and all the other groups were together under one command. He assured Mr Nkomo that nothing would be left out.

MR KADUNGURE asked the Chairman whether he had undertaken to accept the suggestion that numbers be given in private and wondered how the Front could be expected to carry on a cease-fire arrangement when an abstract number of forces had to be monitored. He thought Dr Mundawarara had expected the Front members to be registered. THE CHAIRMAN said it was not a question of the types or numbers, but whether they were to be given privately or publicly. At this stage it was an abstract number, but the numbers for Rhodesian and Patriotic Front forces, when they were received, would be real figures. He did not think this an unsatisfactory way of dealing with things.

MR NKOMO said that the principle of giving numbers to the Chairman was accepted, but he was doubtful whether auxiliaries and the rest were included as part of the military force; he was certain that General Walls knew the whereabouts of some of the auxiliaries but the late appearance of some groups which were being trained was another matter. He could not believe that the number would include some of those who had been trained for only several weeks or months. They were like territorials and other

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loose groups, and his delegation would have to be satisfied that these groups were treated in the same way as guerrilla forces. They were definitely not part of the regular Rhodesian Army and he regarded this as a very serious matter.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he agreed that they should all be brought within the ceasefire. He suggested that this point be considered further to find a way to relieve Mr Nkomo's anxiety, and that they should leave it aside at this stage.

MR NKOMO agreed to leave it to the Chairman to consider the position of the Rhodesian forces in the widest sense under the control of monitors. He asked if the meeting could revert to the problem discussed the previous day, that of disengagement. He asked how Rhodesian forces were to be disengaged. DR MUNDAWARARA intervened to ask whether the meeting had a commitment on numbers, to which Mr Nkomo replied that the ^{Patriotic} Front would give numbers in a similar manner to that employed by the Salisbury side.

MR MUGABE asked what the Chairman would do with the figures; in the final analysis the Patriotic Front would be the most ignorant party. MR NKOMO insisted that there should be complete reciprocity in the supply of information. THE CHAIRMAN said that the numbers would be used to complete in detail the full plans for the ceasefire which would be presented later to the Conference. The figures would remain confidential to the UK delegation, and this would be a first step until the Conference considered together whether both sides' numbers would be revealed to the others.

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The numbers would be published when all were agreed but in the meantime they would remain confidential. MR NKOMO asked the Chairman for an assurance that his figures would be kept secret until such time as the Rhodesian side's figures were disclosed. THE CHAIRMAN confirmed that they would remain confidential until it was agreed by all sides to publish at some later stage.

GEN TONGOGARA said that the meeting was taking place to reach a ceasefire settlement with a Cease Fire Commission and a monitoring forces arrangement. He could not see the Commission working without knowing details. He did not think that submitting these figures in private would help. MR MADUNGURE said that the Patriotic Front was suspicious that South African forces would join the Rhodesian forces after a ceasefire because the numbers were being kept secret. The CHAIRMAN said that he could not accept that: the UK delegation's position had been made clear. He sympathised with General Tongogara; it was much easier to make a ceasefire operative if there was enough confidence to reveal details. He asked the delegates to agree that the figures coming to him should be kept confidential for the time being so that the work could go ahead. As soon as confidence grew, and they had seen how things worked out in practice, he was sure the difficulty would be resolved. MR NKOMO then asked the Chairman what was meant by disengagement to existing bases. Did this mean final bases, and would the two sides remain immobilised?

THE CHAIRMAN said that it was necessary to look at it in three

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sequential phases.

- (1) The Rhodesian forces would take the first step to disengage in order to ensure that there was no contact - a complete reversal of the situation at present. From the day the agreement was signed a change of attitude would begin, and by ceasefire day the Rhodesian forces would have taken this first step - they would have disengaged, i.e. they would seek to avoid contact. By ceasefire day the change would be completed, and the monitors would be in position.
- (2) The second phase would be the "assembly period" which, as stated in the British ceasefire proposals, would last for 7 days, when the Patriotic Front would be asked to take the second step - to assemble at rendezvous points under UK auspices, to go to the assembly areas.
- (3) The third phase was after that seven day period, and it could not yet be foreseen how everyone would behave in the ceasefire period. What happened then would depend on how the assembly and disengagement process worked. Rhodesian forces during that third phase would be under the Governor's authority. What the Governor decided to do with the Rhodesian forces would depend on the progress of the assembly process.

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MR NKOMO then queried the second stage, moving from rendezvous points to the assembly places; he asked under whose authority they would be. THE CHAIRMAN replied that they would be under British authority. MR NKOMO asked what would be happening at that time to the Rhodesian forces. THE CHAIRMAN replied that during that assembly period they would be disengaged; their whereabouts would depend on the situation. MR NKOMO said this was the sticking point. If it had not been decided what happened to Rhodesian forces when the Patriotic Front went to their assembly places, then as far as the Conference was concerned the Rhodesian forces remained loose. Where would they be? THE CHAIRMAN said that they would not be near Mr Nkomo's forces. The ceasefire would keep the two sides apart. MR NKOMO stressed that, if his forces had to surface to get to the rendezvous sites, and the Rhodesian forces were in existing bases, these bases had to be known. If his forces moved to these sites, Rhodesian forces had to move to bigger known bases; that is what he called reciprocal movement. It was not possible to expect his forces to go to assembly places unless they knew where the Rhodesian forces were going.

GEN TONGOGARA asked the Rhodesian delegation what they meant by existing bases. Did they mean operational bases? DR MUNDAWARARA said this was not a question to ask his delegation, and suggested seeking clarification from the Chairman. MR NKOMO repeated the question. THE CHAIRMAN said it would depend on the

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location of the operational bases. When the Rhodesian forces were in their bases, the monitoring forces would be supervising them. It could mean moving them, but this would all take place by ceasefire day. The Rhodesian forces would be disengaged. He could not say in advance exactly where they would be, but he stressed that the monitors would be with them.

MR NKOMO said that the Chairman had told the Conference earlier that he was not talking in terms only of the Rhodesian army but of the Rhodesian forces. Did that include the auxiliaries etc? If the Chairman had to know where Patriotic Front forces would be, he expected the Chairman to know where the Rhodesians were. General Farndale should also know this. If the phrase "existing bases" was used, did this mean bases of the regular army and of the irregular groups? How could they be expected to accept a blank cheque - that somewhere on some day the Rhodesian forces would be monitored? It was not balanced.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he did indeed expect, hope and believe that the Patriotic Front forces would be prepared to undertake the second step, once the first step had been taken. The position as regards the Rhodesian forces depended on the exact timing. The process in the first phase was that of withdrawal from contact, which to some extent depended on where the Patriotic Front forces were. Britain's task would be to see that the process of disengagement took place and was complete by ceasefire day and by the beginning of the assembly period.

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The Chairman reiterated his delegation's understanding of the very serious concerns and anxieties that existed on both sides. He again explained the British plan; the Rhodesian forces were being asked to put their forces, including all the auxiliaries, defence forces or however they were defined, under the Governor's authority from Day 1, to be monitored throughout. This process of disengagement would be difficult and dangerous, but had been accepted by the Salisbury delegation: if, as he hoped, the ceasefire proposals were implemented, the Salisbury side would take that important first step; that was the first act of faith in implementing the ceasefire. The Patriotic Front forces were being asked to take the second step and assemble so that they also could be monitored by Britain. Developments thereafter depended on the disengagement process which would be completed once assembly was completed.

MR ZVOBGO said that his delegation thought that the Rhodesians' first step - of disengagement - did not represent a step; rather the real step would be taken by the Patriotic Front forces in moving to rendezvous points which would be definite, known places, and from there to assembly places. The Rhodesians had adapted to the guerrilla war and established many operational bases in small units throughout the country and along the borders of neighbouring states. While the Patriotic Front forces would have given up all their operational places to move to 15 bases, or whatever number, the Rhodesian forces would not be required to give up anything other than to cease firing,

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although they might have, say, 200 or 400 small operational bases, as well as larger ones. He emphasised that both sides would be under the Governor's authority: this would be no detriment to the Salisbury side. The British delegation should have planned for definite bases to which the Salisbury forces would move in two days - there would be no difficulty in such plans. Britain should guarantee that the Salisbury forces would move to bases, just as the Patriotic Front forces would move to assembly places; and that the Salisbury forces should not be allowed to leave these bases just as the Patriotic Front forces would not be allowed to leave theirs. Was the UK delegation prepared to say that the Salisbury forces would not move? If they did not answer such questions there would be no progress. THE CHAIRMAN reiterated that his delegation were not prepared to tie the Governor's hands in advance. It was not true to say that the first step, to be made by the Rhodesian forces, was no real step. Both the first and second steps were real.

MR MUGABE said that repetition did not help; no reciprocity at all was being required of the Rhodesians. Where the Rhodesian forces would withdraw to was not defined; they would know where the Patriotic Front forces would be but not vice versa. The Chairman had referred to the problem of tying the hands of the Governor in advance: was the Governor to be responsible for laying down the basis of the ceasefire? His delegation's understanding was that the ceasefire agreement had to be made and

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sealed and thereafter handed to the Governor. If the Governor was to have to discuss the ceasefire again or determine its extent his delegation would be prepared to discuss these questions with him.

THE CHAIRMAN again explained his delegation's proposals. The first important step was that of disengagement, when the fighting would stop, the Governor's authority would be accepted, and monitoring would take place; thereafter it would be up to the Patriotic Front to take the next step.

The Chairman continued that British planning allowed for an assembly period of 7 days, preceded by a period of a few days, related to the time needed to get monitors in position with the Rhodesian forces and in readiness to meet the Patriotic Front forces. The latter period would extend from the date of agreement at Lancaster House to ceasefire day, which would be the beginning of the assembly period. The British plan envisaged agreement; deployment of a monitoring force; the latter would assure the disengagement; then the Patriotic Front forces would commence to make themselves known to the British monitors.

MR NKOMO reiterated that the Chairman refused to say where the Rhodesians would disengage to. The Patriotic Front would undertake a second step after going to rendezvous points, namely by moving to assembly places; what would be the second step for the Rhodesians after disengagement? The Conference had to

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know the answer, so that the Governor would act with the authority of the Conference. In response, THE CHAIRMAN referred to the ceasefire proposals which had been accepted (CC(79)87) and read out the 2nd sentence of paragraph 9. He explained that if certain existing bases were prejudicial to the disengagement then the forces would no doubt be withdrawn from them. The point was that their distribution and structure was known and they would be monitored from their existing bases. What happened thereafter depended upon the assembly process and, for example, on such questions as the Patriotic Front forces outside Rhodesia and the assurances, which Britain was looking for, that there would be no border crossings during this period. In response to Mr Nkomo's question, he made it clear that the assembly process was a continuous one during the 7 day period. The second step under the British plan would be the assembly process over a 7 day period; the Patriotic Front forces would move at their convenience and in conditions of trust to rendezvous points and as soon as possible from there to assembly places: this did not represent two separate steps. MR NKOMO asked why the Chairman did not merely say that the Patriotic Front should move to places of detention guarded by Rhodesians; the present discussion was wasting the Conference's time. THE CHAIRMAN said that he was saying nothing of the sort. The Patriotic Front forces would not be asked to go to detention. He emphasised that there was no question of the Patriotic Front forces being guarded by Rhodesian forces. As

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he and his delegation had explained that day and on previous occasions, the purpose of the ceasefire plan was to keep the forces disengaged so that they would not be in a position to fight each other. He asked whether delegations could kindly let him have the information he had requested earlier so that progress could be made.

GEN TONGOGARA said that his delegation and that opposite knew each other's existing bases. His delegation were worried because they would be moving to detention whereas the Rhodesian forces would remain in existing bases.

MR SILUNDIKA asked what activities of the Rhodesian forces were referred to in paragraph 9 of the ceasefire proposals (CC(79)87). THE CHAIRMAN said that he could not define in advance what these activities would be - he had explained the reasons why this was not possible. MR SILUNDIKA said that there were two elements, the maintenance of the ceasefire and the activities of the Rhodesian forces: would the latter be confined or be engaged in certain activities? If so, what activities? He also asked for the definition of "bases" in the last sentence of paragraph 6 of CC(79)95. If that document was to instruct the Governor, the Conference had to know the definition of that word. One could not sign something without a precise definition in concrete terms.

THE CHAIRMAN said that the word "activities" covered everything.

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Precisely what these activities would be on the Rhodesian forces' part depended on the situation, on the activities of the other side, on positions, movements and so on. The Rhodesian forces would be under the Governor's direction and control. The Chairman then asked Mr Silundika to clarify his second question.

MR SILUNDIKA reverted first to the "activities" referred to in para 9 of CC(79)87 and in the proposed Ceasefire Agreement (CC(79)95). This, he said, should be interpreted in the same way for both the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury forces, and should be defined precisely. On Clause 6 of CC(79)95 he noted that the monitoring force would be deployed to the command structure and bases of the Rhodesian forces. The command structure was understood, but the term "bases" was in dispute. For the Patriotic Front forces, the British plan involved rendezvous and assembly points; but for the Rhodesian forces the British were talking only of "bases". He asked the Chairman for clarification of this term.

THE CHAIRMAN thought that a previous British paper had referred to "company bases". He would clarify Mr Silundika's point at a later meeting.

MR ZVOBGO asked why his delegation's forces could not be monitored from the rendezvous points. THE CHAIRMAN said that Gen Farndale had explained at the 41st Plenary Session the criteria adopted for selection of the assembly places. A large number of the rendezvous points would not be suitable.

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MR ZVOBGO asked whether the Rhodesian forces would be monitored in their existing bases, regardless of the number of these bases. THE CHAIRMAN repeated that the monitoring force would be deployed through the existing structure and bases. The position would be clearer after the force levels had been disclosed. Then a full presentation of the British plan would be possible. MR ZVOBGO asked whether it was envisaged that the Rhodesian forces would be assembled in 15 bases, as was proposed for his delegation's forces. THE CHAIRMAN thought that this was unlikely to be the number proposed in the final British plan.

GEN TONGOGARA said that it was important to achieve a cease-fire and to stop the shooting. His and the Rhodesian forces had their own existing bases. The problem would be solved if both sides' forces started from their existing bases. Gen Tongogara's forces would show the monitoring teams their bases, as was proposed for the Rhodesian forces. THE CHAIRMAN said that this was a new idea, which was quite contrary to the proposals which had already been accepted. Work could only continue on the basis of those proposals. As soon as the British delegation had the force levels, it could study them and complete its planning. Members of the delegation, and in particular Gen Farndale, would be available for bilateral consultation with the other delegations. The British delegation might themselves wish to discuss the figures once they had been

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received. The next meeting, at which a full presentation of the British plan would be given, would take place once these figures had been absorbed.

MR MUGABE said that it was useless to proceed when no reciprocal or equal basis for the movement of both sides was being proposed. THE CHAIRMAN said that absolute reciprocity in terms of movement was not possible; reciprocal disengagement was possible, so that both sides could be confident that the fighting would not be renewed.

In answer to MR MUGABE's asking whether it was really useful to give the figures, THE CHAIRMAN said that the force levels were required in order to work out the detailed implementation of the ceasefire.

GEN TONGOGARA said that it would be better for his side to undertake not to shoot and to stay in its existing bases. MR NKOMO asked again where the Rhodesian forces would move to once his delegation's forces had moved to the assembly places.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he had tried to answer this point during the session. He proposed that the Conference should adjourn, and reconvene when the British delegation had received and studied the figures.

The session ended at 13.09.

CC(79)100

COPY NO: 89

CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

The attached note is circulated to
delegations at the request of the
Chairman

Lancaster House

6 December 1979

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

The British Government has today introduced into Parliament the Zimbabwe Bill (copy attached) which will enable Rhodesia to be brought to independence on a date to be decided; and which makes consequential provisions in the law of the United Kingdom.

6 December 1979

Zimbabwe Bill

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

The object of this Bill is to make provision for the attainment by Southern Rhodesia of fully responsible status as a republic under the name of Zimbabwe and for connected matters, including the grant of an amnesty.

Clause 1 provides for the establishment of the independent Republic of Zimbabwe and, in consequence, for the cessation of the responsibility for Southern Rhodesia of the Parliament and Government of the United Kingdom. The date of independence will be set by an Order in Council to be laid before Parliament after being made.

Clause 2 and *Schedule 1* make provision relating to nationality. *Clause 2* would amend the British Nationality Act 1948 to remove "Southern Rhodesia" (which, exceptionally for a dependency, has a separate citizenship) from the list of countries whose citizens are also British subjects or Commonwealth citizens. *Schedule 1* saves for a limited period the right of certain categories of persons to be registered as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, notwithstanding that they cease to have one of the qualifying factors, namely Commonwealth citizenship, on the independence of Zimbabwe. (There is a consequential provision modifying the law relating to deportation in *Schedule 2*.)

Clause 3 provides for an amnesty in the law of the United Kingdom, including immunity from any action in tort or reparation, in respect of certain acts. These include the purported declaration of independence on 11 November 1965, the making of purported constitutions for Southern Rhodesia, and acts done in the conduct or on the orders of organisations opposed to the successive administrations which purported to be the government of Southern Rhodesia or Zimbabwe Rhodesia, or by persons resisting such organisations.

Clause 4 enables Her Majesty by Order in Council to modify enactments of the United Kingdom Parliament, or any instrument made under such an enactment, in consequence of Zimbabwe becoming independent as a republic or of the provisions about nationality in clause 2(1). Provision may also be made for regulating the payment of claims against the Government of Zimbabwe out of assets in the United Kingdom. Orders under this Clause would be required to be laid in draft before both Houses of Parliament and approved by resolution of both Houses before being made.

Clause 5 makes provision for modifying any law in the event of Zimbabwe subsequently becoming a member of the Commonwealth. Orders under this Clause would be subject to the same procedure as that proposed for Orders under Clause 4.

Clause 6 and *Schedule 2* provide for the continuance after independence of certain laws in relation to persons and things connected with Zimbabwe notwithstanding its change in status. *Clause 6* and *Schedule 3* would repeal a number of measures and provisions relating to Southern Rhodesia in consequence of the change in its status.

Zimbabwe Bill

ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES

Clause

1. Independence for Zimbabwe.
2. Nationality.
3. Amnesty in respect of certain acts.
4. Powers exercisable in connection with Zimbabwe's becoming independent.
5. Provision in event of Zimbabwe becoming a member of the Commonwealth.
6. Other provisions as to existing laws.
7. Citation etc.

SCHEDULES:

- Schedule 1—Transitional provisions as to applications for registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies.
- Schedule 2—Continuation of certain provisions in relation to Zimbabwe, and savings.
- Schedule 3—Repeals.

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Make provision for, and in connection with, the attainment by Zimbabwe of fully responsible status as a Republic. A.D. 1979

BE IT ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

- 5 1.—(1) On such day as Her Majesty may by Order in Council appoint (in this Act referred to as "Independence Day") for Zimbabwe, Southern Rhodesia shall become an independent Republic under the name of Zimbabwe, and the unexpired provisions of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 shall cease to have effect. 1965 c. 76.
- 10 (2) On and after Independence Day Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the government of Zimbabwe; and no Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or after that day shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to Zimbabwe as part of its law.
- 15 (3) An Order in Council under this section shall be laid before Parliament after being made.
- 2.—(1) In section 1(3) of the British Nationality Act 1948 (which specifies the countries whose citizens are by virtue of that citizenship British subjects) the words "Southern Rhodesia" are hereby repealed as from Independence Day; and accordingly any person who immediately before that day is a British subject by virtue only of his citizenship of Southern Rhodesia shall cease to be a British subject on that day. 1948 c. 56.

(2) The transitional provisions contained in Schedule 1 shall have effect as to applications by citizens of Zimbabwe for registration as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies.

Amnesty in respect of certain acts.

S.I. 1979/1571.

3.—(1) No criminal proceedings or proceedings in tort or for reparation shall be instituted in any court of law in any part of the United Kingdom in respect of any act to which this section applies done, whether in the United Kingdom or in Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere, before the date on which the Governor appointed by Her Majesty under the Southern Rhodesia Constitution (Interim Provisions) Order 1979 entered upon the duties of his office in the seat of government of Southern Rhodesia.

(2) The acts to which this section applies are—

(a) the making with respect to Southern Rhodesia of the purported declaration of independence on 11th November 1965; 15

(b) the purported making of constitutional provision for Southern Rhodesia otherwise than under the authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and in particular the making of any of the instruments styling themselves respectively “the Constitution of Rhodesia 1965”, “the Constitution of Rhodesia 1969” and “the Constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia 1979”; 20

(c) any act (including any act by way of conspiracy or incitement) preparatory or incidental to any act falling within paragraph (a) or (b); 25

(d) any act which would have been lawful if the instruments mentioned in paragraph (b) had been lawfully made;

(e) any act done on or after 11th November 1965 in the conduct or on the orders of any organisation having the purpose of resisting, frustrating or overthrowing the administration purporting to be the Government of Rhodesia or of Zimbabwe Rhodesia established under any of the instruments mentioned in paragraph (b), being an act done in good faith for any of those purposes; 30

(f) any act done in good faith on or after 11th November 1965 for the purpose of resisting or combating any such organisation as is mentioned in paragraph (e) or resisting, or securing the apprehension of, any person acting in the conduct or on the orders of any such organisation. 35

(3) Any criminal proceedings or proceedings in tort or for reparation in respect of any act to which this section applies which are pending in any court in the United Kingdom on the day on which this Act is passed shall be treated as discontinued on that day; and any judgment, order or decree of any court in the United Kingdom given or made before that day in any proceedings in tort or for reparation in respect of any act to which 45

this section applies shall, so far as not enforced before that day, be unenforceable.

(4) In this section "act" includes an omission, and references to the doing of an act shall be construed accordingly.

5 4.—(1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council—

(a) make such modifications of any enactment of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or of any instrument having effect by virtue of such an enactment as appear to Her to be necessary or expedient in consequence of section 1 or 2(1);

Powers exercisable in connection with Zimbabwe's becoming independent.

10 (b) make such provision as appears to Her to be necessary or expedient for regulating the satisfaction of claims against any assets in the United Kingdom owned by, or held by any person on behalf of, the Government of Zimbabwe as the successor in title of the Government of Southern Rhodesia.

15 (2) An Order in Council under this section may be made at any time after the passing of this Act but, if made before Independence Day, shall not come into force before that day.

20 (3) Any provision made by Order in Council under this section after Independence Day may be made with retrospective effect as from Independence Day or any later date.

(4) Subject to subsection (5), any provision made by an Order in Council under this section with respect to any such enactment or instrument as is mentioned in subsection (1)(a) shall, except in so far as the Order otherwise provides, have effect as part of the law of every place to which the enactment or instrument in question extends.

25 (5) An Order in Council under this section shall not have effect as part of the law of any associated state or of any country or territory for whose government, at the date on which the Order is made, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility.

30 (6) The power of modification conferred by subsection (1)(a) applies to enactments and instruments whenever passed or made.

(7) No recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty to make an Order in Council under this section unless a draft of the Order has been laid before Parliament and has been approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.

Provision in event of Zimbabwe becoming a member of the Commonwealth.

5.—(1) If at any time Zimbabwe becomes a member of the Commonwealth, Her Majesty may by Order in Council make such modifications of any enactment of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or of any instrument having effect by virtue of such an enactment as appear to Her to be necessary or expedient 5 in consequence of that event.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), an Order in Council under this section—

1948 c. 56.

(a) may modify subsection (3) of section 1 of the British Nationality Act 1948 (Commonwealth countries having 10 separate citizenship) so as to add Zimbabwe to the countries mentioned in that subsection; and

(b) may repeal or modify any provision contained in Schedule 1 or 2 to this Act.

(3) Any provision made by Order in Council under this section 15 after Zimbabwe becomes a member of the Commonwealth may be made with retrospective effect as from the date of that event or any later date.

(4) No recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty to make an Order in Council under this section unless a draft of the Order 20 has been laid before Parliament and has been approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.

Other provisions as to existing laws.
1958 c. 45.

6.—(1) The provisions of Schedule 2 (continuation of certain provisions in relation to Zimbabwe, and savings) shall have effect.

(2) Section 26(5) of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 25 1958 (construction of references to Her Majesty's dominions) shall be amended as from Independence Day by the insertion of the words " and Zimbabwe " after the words " South Africa ".

(3) The enactments and instruments mentioned in Schedule 3 are hereby repealed as from Independence Day to the extent 30 specified in the third column of that Schedule.

Citation etc.

7.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Zimbabwe Act 1979.

(2) An Order in Council under any provision of this Act may contain such transitional or other incidental and supplementary provisions as appear to Her Majesty to be expedient. 35

(3) In this Act " modifications " includes additions, omissions and alterations, and related expressions shall be construed accordingly.

SCHEDULES

SCHEDULE 1

Section 2

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS AS TO APPLICATIONS FOR
REGISTRATION AS A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND COLONIES

- 5
1. A person whose application for registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies was received but not determined before Independence Day shall be treated for the purposes of his application as if Zimbabwe were a country mentioned in section 1(3) of the 1948 Act.
- 15
2. A person whose application for registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies is received on or after Independence Day shall be treated for the purposes of his application as if Zimbabwe were a country mentioned in section 1(3) of the 1948 Act if the application is made under section 5A(1) of the 1948 Act or section 6(1) thereof as modified by Schedule 1 to the Immigration Act 1971, and is received before the first anniversary of Independence Day or such later date as the Secretary of State may in the special circumstances of any particular case allow. 1971 c. 77.
- 20
3. Notwithstanding the provision in paragraph (a) of section 3(1) of the British Nationality Act 1958 that (subject to limited exceptions) no person shall be registered as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies under section 12(6) of the 1948 Act (as amended by the said section 3(1)) on an application made after the end of the year 1962, a citizen of Zimbabwe (and any of his minor children) may be so registered— 1958 c. 10.
- 25
- (a) on an application made on or after 18th November 1965 which was received but not determined before Independence Day; or
- 30
- (b) on an application received before the first anniversary of Independence Day or such later date as the Secretary of State may in the special circumstances of any particular case allow.
4. In this Schedule "the 1948 Act" means the British Nationality Act 1948. 1948 c. 56.
- 35 Act 1948.

SCHEDULE 2

Section 6(1)

CONTINUATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN RELATION
TO ZIMBABWE, AND SAVINGS*Temporary saving from certain disabilities*

- 40
- 1.—(1) Until the end of the period of twelve months beginning with Independence Day, a citizen of Zimbabwe shall not be subject, in respect of any office, place, or employment held by him immediately before that day, or any qualification to act in any capacity in which he was acting immediately before that day, to any disability imposed in

SCH. 2 the case of aliens by or by virtue of any of the following enactments, that is to say—

1700 c. 2.

(a) section 3 of the Act of Settlement;

1919 c. 92.

(b) sections 4 to 6 of the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919;

(c) any Northern Ireland legislation, or any regulations in force under any such legislation. 5

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) a person who immediately before Independence Day was on leave or otherwise temporarily absent from employment in any capacity mentioned in section 5(1) of the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919 (master etc. of British merchant ship) shall be treated as if he were employed in such employment immediately before that day; and where sub-paragraph (1) applies to any person in respect of any office, place or employment held by him immediately before that day, it shall apply to him also in respect of any office, place or employment to or in which he may be appointed thereafter by way of re-engagement or transfer. 15

(3) If, at the end of the period of twelve months mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), a person to whom that sub-paragraph applies is awaiting determination of an application by him for registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, that sub-paragraph shall apply as if for the period of twelve months there mentioned there were substituted a period ending on the determination of his application. 20

(4) A person who by virtue of section 2(1) ceases to be a British subject shall not for that reason be precluded from remaining a member of a local authority until his membership ceases on some other ground. 25

Colonial probates

1892 c. 6.

2.—(1) The Colonial Probates Act 1892 (which provides for the recognition in the United Kingdom of probates and letters of administration granted in British possessions) shall apply in relation to Zimbabwe as it applies in relation to a British possession, and any Order in Council in force under that Act in relation to Southern Rhodesia immediately before Independence Day shall have effect on and after that day as if any reference to Southern Rhodesia were a reference to Zimbabwe. 30

(2) Nothing in sub-paragraph (1) shall affect the operation of the said Act of 1892 with respect to probate or letters of administration granted before Independence Day by a court in Southern Rhodesia. 35

Maintenance orders

1920 c. 33.

3.—(1) The Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1920 (which provides for the enforcement in England, Wales and Northern Ireland of maintenance orders made in parts of Her Majesty's dominions outside the United Kingdom, and vice versa) shall apply in relation to Zimbabwe as it applies in relation to a part of Her Majesty's dominions, and any Order in Council in force under that Act in relation to Southern Rhodesia immediately before Independence Day shall have effect on and after that day as if any reference to Southern Rhodesia were a reference to Zimbabwe. 45

(2) For the purposes of the application of the said Act of 1920 in accordance with sub-paragraph (1), references in that Act to the governor of a part of Her Majesty's dominions shall, in the case of Zimbabwe, be construed as references to the Minister of Justice.

5 (3) Nothing in sub-paragraph (1) or (2) shall affect the operation of the said Act of 1920 with respect to any maintenance order made before Independence Day by a court in Southern Rhodesia.

10 (4) An order under section 49(2) of the Maintenance Orders 1972 c. 18. (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972 appointing a day for the coming into operation of the repeal by that Act of the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1920 may include provision, to take effect on that day, for the repeal of the preceding provisions of this paragraph.

Company registers

15 4. The following provisions, namely—

(a) sections 119 to 122 of the Companies Act 1948 and sections 1948 c. 38. 116 to 118 of the Companies Act (Northern Ireland) 1960 1960 c. 22 (N.I). (which enable a company registered in Great Britain, or in Northern Ireland, to keep in any other part of Her Majesty's dominions a branch register of its members resident there);
20 and

(b) section 123 of the said Act of 1948 (which enables a company registered in another part of Her Majesty's dominions to keep in Great Britain a branch register of its members resident there),
25

shall apply in relation to Zimbabwe as they apply in relation to a part of Her Majesty's dominions.

Parliamentary and local elections

5.—(1) Where a person by virtue of section 2(1) ceases to be a
30 British subject—

(a) if immediately before Independence Day he was registered in a register of parliamentary electors or local government electors, he shall be treated as remaining a British subject for the purposes of any election at which that register is used;

35 (b) if—

(i) on the qualifying date for a parliamentary or local government election held within the period of twelve months beginning with 16th February in a year to which this paragraph applies he is awaiting determination of an application received before the first anniversary of Independence Day for his registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, and

40

(ii) where the application was made under section 5A of the British Nationality Act 1948 or section 6(1) thereof as 1948 c. 56. modified by Schedule 1 to the Immigration Act 1971, he 1971 c. 77.
45

SCH. 2

was throughout the relevant period ending with that qualifying date ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom,

he shall be treated as a British subject for the purposes of any election at which a register of parliamentary electors or local government electors published in that year is used. 5

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(b)(ii) "the relevant period" ending as there mentioned—

1948 c. 56.

(a) in the case of an application under section 5A of the British Nationality Act 1948, is the period of five years so ending;

(b) in the case of an application under section 6(1) of that Act, is 10 the period beginning with 1st January 1973 and ending as aforesaid.

(3) Paragraph (b) of sub-paragraph (1) applies to the year 1980 and any subsequent year, not being later than such year as the Secretary of State may specify in an order (made by statutory instrument subject to 15 annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament) as the final year to which that paragraph is to apply.

S.I. 1974/648.

S.I. 1969/905.

S.I. 1975/850.

1962 c. 14 (N.I.).

(4) The Representation of the People Regulations 1974, the Representation of the People (Northern Ireland) Regulations 1969, the Representation of the People (Scotland) Regulations 1975 and Schedule 20 3 to the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1962 shall each have effect as if the requirements that may be made under regulation 24(1), regulation 10(1), regulation 24(1) and Rule 8(2) respectively included a requirement that a person who asserts that he is entitled to be registered by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) should make a statutory declaration as 25 to any fact relevant in establishing that entitlement.

Dentists and veterinary surgeons

6. A person who on Independence Day is registered by virtue of a qualification granted in Southern Rhodesia—

1957 c. 28.

(a) in the Commonwealth list contained in the dentists register 30 kept under the Dentists Act 1957, or

1966 c. 36.

(b) in the Commonwealth list contained in the veterinary surgeons register kept under the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966,

shall not cease to be so registered by reason of anything contained in this Act or of any decision as to Zimbabwe's membership of the 35 Commonwealth.

Right of abode in the United Kingdom

7.—(1) Until the end of the period of twelve months beginning with Independence Day—

1971 c. 77.

(a) subsection (1)(d) of section 2 of the Immigration Act 1971 40 (right of abode) shall have effect in the case of a person who—

(i) is a citizen of Zimbabwe, and

(ii) was immediately before that day a citizen of Southern Rhodesia,

as if he had remained a Commonwealth citizen; and 45

(b) subsection (2) of that section shall have effect accordingly.

(2) Section 36 of the said Act of 1971 (power to extend provisions to Channel Islands and Isle of Man) shall apply to the provisions of this paragraph as it applies to provisions of that Act.

SCH. 2

Liability to deportation

5 8.—(1) Until the end of the period of twelve months beginning with Independence Day section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 (which provides that certain Commonwealth citizens ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom are not liable to deportation) shall continue to apply to a person who by virtue of section 2(1) of this Act ceases to be a Commonwealth citizen on that day. 1971 c. 77.

(2) If when that period expires such a person is awaiting the determination of an application made by him for registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, the said section 7 shall continue to apply to him until that application is determined, subject to sub-paragraph (3). 15

(3) In the further period provided for by sub-paragraph (2) a recommendation for deportation under section 3(6) of the said Act of 1971 (recommendation by court convicting of offence punishable with imprisonment) may be made in respect of a person to whom that sub-paragraph applies, but no effect shall be given to such a recommendation unless and until that person's application for registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies is refused. 20

(4) Section 36 of the said Act of 1971 (power to extend provisions to Channel Islands and Isle of Man) shall apply to the provisions of this paragraph as it applies to provisions of that Act. 25

Section 6(3).

SCHEDULE 3

REPEALS

Acts

Chapter	Short title	Extent of repeal	
15 & 16 Geo. 5. c. xvii.	Imperial Institute Act 1925.	In Schedule 2, in paragraph (1)(b), the words "one by the Government of Southern Rhodesia".	5
16 & 17 Geo. 5. c. 40.	Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act 1926.	In section 2(2), the words "the Colony of Southern Rhodesia".	10
18 & 19 Geo. 5. c. 35.	Easter Act 1928.	In the Schedule, in Part I, the words "Southern Rhodesia".	
9 & 10 Geo. 6. c. 45.	United Nations Act 1946.	In section 1(2), the words "Southern Rhodesia".	15
12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6. c. 67.	Civil Aviation Act 1949.	Section 66(2).	
9 & 10 Eliz. 2. c. 11.	Diplomatic Immunities (Conferences with Commonwealth Countries and Republic of Ireland) Act 1961.	In section 1(5), the words "Southern Rhodesia".	20
10 & 11 Eliz. 2. c. 2.	Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Act 1961.	The whole Act.	25
1964 c. 81.	Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964.	Section 8(2).	
1965 c. 76.	Southern Rhodesia Act 1965.	The whole Act.	
1973 c. 45.	Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973.	Section 17(3).	30
1978 c. 2.	Commonwealth Development Corporation Act 1978.	In section 17(1), in the definition of "dependent territory", the words "excluding Southern Rhodesia".	35
1978 c. 33.	State Immunity Act 1978.	In section 4(5), the words "or a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".	
1979 c. 52.	Southern Rhodesia Act 1979.	Section 3(4) and (5).	40

Instruments

SCH. 3

Number	Title	Extent of repeal
5	S.I. 1964/2043. Diplomatic Privileges (Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies) Order 1964.	In Article 2(2), the words "to Southern Rhodesia".
	S.I. 1965/1125. Judicial Committee (Southern Rhodesia) Order 1965.	The whole Order.
	S.I. 1965/1952. Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order 1965.	The whole Order.
10	S.I. 1965/1957. Southern Rhodesia (British Nationality Act 1948) Order 1965.	The whole Order.
	S.I. 1970/892. Southern Rhodesia (Higher Authority for Power) Order 1970.	The whole Order.
15	S.I. 1970/1540. Southern Rhodesia (Matrimonial Jurisdiction) Order 1970.	The whole Order.
20	S.I. 1970/1903. Consular Relations (Merchant Shipping) (Republic of Austria) Order 1970.	In Article 4(a)(i), the words "a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".
	S.I. 1970/1904. Consular Relations (Merchant Shipping) (Kingdom of Belgium) Order 1970.	In Article 4(a)(i), the words "a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".
25	S.I. 1970/1905. Consular Relations (Merchant Shipping) (Kingdom of Denmark) Order 1970.	In Article 4(a)(i), the words "a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".
	S.I. 1970/1907. Consular Relations (Merchant Shipping) (Federal Republic of Germany) Order 1970.	In Article 4(a)(i), the words "a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".
30	S.I. 1970/1909. Consular Relations (Merchant Shipping) (Italian Republic) Order 1970.	In Article 4(a)(i), the words "a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".
	S.I. 1970/1910. Consular Relations (Merchant Shipping) (Japan) Order 1970.	In Article 4(a)(i), the words "a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".
35	S.I. 1970/1911. Consular Relations (Merchant Shipping) (United States of Mexico) Order 1970.	In Article 3(a), the words "a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".
40	S.I. 1970/1913. Consular Relations (Merchant Shipping) (Spanish State) Order 1970.	In Article 4(a)(i), the words "a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".
	S.I. 1970/1917. Consular Relations (Merchant Shipping) (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) Order 1970.	In Article 4(a)(i), the words "a citizen of Southern Rhodesia".
45	S.I. 1972/1718. Southern Rhodesia (Marriages, Matrimonial Causes and Adoptions) Order 1972.	The whole Order.
50	S.I. 1979/1374. Southern Rhodesia (Immunity for Persons attending Meetings and Consultations) (No. 2) Order 1979.	The whole Order.

Zimbabwe Bill

A

B I L L

To make provision for, and in connection
with, the attainment by Zimbabwe of
fully responsible status as a Republic.

*Presented by Sir Ian Gilmour
supported by
Mr. Secretary Whitelaw,
Mr. Attorney General,
Mr. Nigel Lawson and Mr. Richard Luce*

*Ordered, by The House of Commons,
to be Printed, 6 December 1979*

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CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

The attached Speaking Notes, together with the two supporting diagrams, on which General Farndale based his statement during the Forty-First Plenary Session of the Conference are circulated to delegates at the request of the Chairman.

Lancaster House
6 December 1979

THE MONITORING PLAN

GENERAL

1. During the past few weeks I have been listening carefully to the ceasefire talks, and it has been my job to put together a plan. I have now made one which I am sure will do the job providing certain provisos are adhered to. It is a plan that takes in the interests as far as it can of both sides.
2. I would like to describe the plan to you first in general terms and later to say how it works and how I see the organisation set up.
3. First, I must stress the provisos without which my plan cannot work:
 - a). It is absolutely essential that both sides comply with the terms of the ceasefire document;
 - b). It is equally important that both sides operate under their own Commanders and obey the orders of the Governor;
 - c). It is equally important that both sides understand that the Monitoring Force is there to monitor, although I have had to increase its size as a result of points raised during the discussions.
4. The force will have its own independent and secure communications, at least a number of its own vehicles and some of its own helicopters.
5. In general the essentials of the plan are as follows:
 - a). It is built up around a Ceasefire Commission on which the Commanders of both Armies will be represented, and this is the key to the whole plan.
 - /b).

- b). Beneath this there are a series of Lt Cols from the Commonwealth who will be deployed around the country, and will be in charge of a number of monitoring teams.
- c). Each of these Lt Cols will command the teams who will themselves be located at the locations of both sides.

6. The capability of this force is to observe, report and where necessary to investigate and generally help as much as they can.

7. The aim therefore is to monitor the forces of both sides, the airfields and the border crossings.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

8. It is next necessary to describe in general how this organisation will work. (See Annex A).

9. Once the Military Adviser has established the Ceasefire Commission in Salisbury and has linked it by radio to the Lt Cols, the essential framework throughout the country for monitoring will be established.

THE PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT

10. Once the Monitoring Force is established and observing the Rhodesian Forces, it will deploy to assembly places and meet Patriotic Front Commanders. It will then establish rendezvous (RVs) so that the Patriotic Front forces can assemble. They will then arrange routes from these RVs to the assembly places. Patriotic Front forces will assemble at the assembly places under their own Commanders. At these there
/there

there will be water, some accommodation and food will be supplied. Once in the assembly places it will be the responsibility of the Commanders to nominate a Commander who will work together with the Monitors. He will be responsible that his men remain in the assembly places and obey his orders. There is no question of forces being disarmed.

BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE

11. If there is a breach of the ceasefire it will be the duty of the Commander on either side to report it to the nearest monitor as quickly and accurately as possible. The monitor will report the incident to the nearest Lt Col in charge who in turn will if necessary report it to the Ceasefire Commission in Salisbury. Otherwise, he will endeavour to sort it out on the spot.

12. In the event of a major and sustained breach of the ceasefire, the monitoring force could not continue its functions.


SELECTION OF ASSEMBLY PLACES


13. (See Annex B). The Assembly places must:

- a). have water;
- b). have some accommodation;
- c). have road access;
- d). be as near as possible to a C130 airstrip;
- e). be as near as possible to Patriotic Front forces at the time of the ceasefire;
- f). be on suitable ground, which can be monitored.

14. We shall be preparing details of the assembly places which we are trying to draw up in accordance with these criteria. We are getting information from our reconnaissance party now deployed.

Military Adviser
and Staffs





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FORTY-FIRST PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the Forty-First
Plenary Session of the Conference, Thursday
6 December 1979.

Lancaster House
6 December 1979

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PRESENT:

UK Delegation

Sir A Duff

Mr D M Day

Gen M Farndale

Mr R W Renwick

Mr N M Fenn

Mr R Jackling

Col C Dunphie

Mr P J Barlow

Mr B Watkins

Mrs A J Phillips

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Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation

Mr R G Mugabe

Mr J M Nkomo

Mr E Tekere

Mr J Chinamano

Gen J Tongogara

Mr J Msika

Dr H Ushewokunze

Mr A M Chambati

Mr E Zvobgo

Mr W Musarurwa

Mr J Tungamirai

Mr D Dabengwa

Mr W Kamba

Mr R Austin

Mr L Mufela

Miss E Siziba

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Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation

Dr S C Mundawarara

AVM H Hawkins

Mr D Zamchiya

Gen P Walls

Mr P Allum

Mr K Flower

Mr P Claypole

Mr A R MacMillan

Secretariat

Mr J M Willson

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The session commenced at 15.10.

THE CHAIRMAN said that they had now reached the stage of discussion of the details of the practical implementation of the ceasefire proposals. He would shortly ask General Farndale to amplify some of the ideas already set out and accepted. Before doing so, he wished to remind the delegates of what Lord Carrington had said at that morning's session - that he hoped it would be possible for delegations to give preliminary warning to their forces that they would expect to be implementing a ceasefire very shortly.

One of the basic elements of the discussions would be the numbers involved on each side. He asked whether delegations could now let him know the numbers involved, so that they could be in people's minds when they discussed implementation.

MR NKOMO said that, before numbers were discussed, much more information was needed, especially from their Salisbury friends. He said that when the Rhodesian army was mentioned his delegation was not certain what was meant. There were a number of components: the various groups of the regular army; the territorial army; the air force; the auxiliaries; the Pfumo Re Vanhu and the Ziso Re Vanhu; the Grey Scouts and Selous Scouts; and the Police, because when one spoke of joint operations one meant the police, army and air force. Within the police there were para-military groups. It had been said in earlier /meetings

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meetings that the civil police were to be responsible for law and order. Mr Nkomo wanted to know where the line was to be drawn. What were the civil police? What groupings did that include? It would help to know which men were being talked about.

THE CHAIRMAN said they were discussing armed forces on both sides; not the police, who, as had been made clear, would be responsible for law and order in a ceasefire situation. The definition was also unclear with regard to the forces of the Patriotic Front.

MR NKOMO asked again where things stood when they spoke about the military. They would have to remove the police from the joint operational command. Where would they go? He was trying to get an answer from the other side of the table.

THE CHAIRMAN said again that he was still seeking information. He asked whether they were prepared to tell him the numbers of men on each side, to which MR NKOMO replied ^{that} he would provide them in due course. Mr Nkomo then repeated his question about the dividing line between the police and the army. Territorials, for example, were working men and women. Would they be sent back to civilian jobs or were they to be included in the army numbers?

THE CHAIRMAN asked again that each side should give him force levels.

MR MUGABE elaborated on Mr Nkomo's points. Was the Chairman asking for the figures of regular forces only, or did he include the territorials, special units, auxiliaries etc?

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THE CHAIRMAN said that he was referring to the armed forces of both sides, not the police. MR MUGABE asked about para military police. MR DAY said that the UK regarded all the forces under the Commissioner of Police as police, who would all be subject to the authority of the Governor. The armed forces would also be responsible to the Governor through their respective commanders. THE CHAIRMAN said they were envisaging a new situation in which all the commanders were responsible to the Governor, for their respective forces; when numbers were known, these distinctions would become clearer.

DR MUNDAWARARA said that, when Lord Carrington had asked for the numbers of forces, he had not asked for sub-divisions. He had thought that Lord Carrington had been referring to the full forces, the total number of all armed personnel. THE CHAIRMAN said that, if the figures were provided, it would be known what they were all talking about. It was a basic question, as the arrangements regarding the monitoring force would depend on numbers; was this difficult?

MR MUGABE said that his delegation were not in a position to give figures unless the Salisbury delegation was ready to give theirs. THE CHAIRMAN suggested that it might be more acceptable if delegations informed the Chair privately, each side writing down the figures required. MR MUGABE asked why it was necessary to begin with numbers. THE CHAIRMAN repeated again that numbers must be known, and again asked whether they
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could be written down and handed to the Chair. MR NKOMO said that it was not possible during this meeting and MR MUGABE explained that it would be possible at future meetings; they had not really known what procedure was to be followed at the current and future sessions. MR TEKERE said that they knew there were many categories of forces on the Rhodesian side - territorials, regulars, Scouts etc. The question really was how the word "forces" was to be defined. How would they understand the figure given by the other side? It did not seem to him to be much of a problem. THE CHAIRMAN agreed. He said that, on the Rhodesian side, all the men under the command of the Police Commissioner were excluded. The rest of the armed forces had been referred to as defence forces, but there was probably ^a better definition. He was now asking both sides for the figures required, at the next meeting if not at the present one. It could be given in writing if preferred, so that the two sides would not see each others figures.

THE CHAIRMAN then asked whether it would be helpful if General Farndale gave an outline of the way the UK delegation saw the ceasefire being conducted and operating on the ground. MR NKOMO said that it would be useful, provided they were not confronted with proposals to be accepted on the spot. THE CHAIRMAN said that the General would just put forward some ideas, and repeated Lord Carrington's request that they proceed very quickly to implementation. He hoped the delegations would

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frequently meet trilaterally, at whatever level desirable. He said that the whole UK delegation, and in particular General Farndale, would be available to discuss in greater detail any points raised by either delegation between meetings.

GEN FARNDALE introduced the British delegation's proposals for ceasefire monitoring. The Speaking Notes on which his remarks were based were subsequently circulated to delegates at the Chairman's request as Conference Paper CC(79)99. In discussing the concept of operations (paragraphs 8 and 9 of his Speaking Notes), he stressed that he had had to make certain assumptions about force levels, and that the actual numbers involved were important. In order to illustrate the organisation of the monitoring force, General Farndale distributed a diagram which was subsequently circulated as Annex A to his Speaking Notes. In order to demonstrate the principle of assembly for the Patriotic Front forces, he distributed another diagram which was subsequently circulated as Annex B to his Speaking Notes.

At the conclusion of General Farndale's presentation, MR MUGABE said that it showed how the Patriotic Front forces would be brought under the ceasefire agreement. His delegation would wish to ask questions about this plan once they had had time to study it. The plan referred, however, only to one side. Mr Mugabe asked that a similar illustration should be provided for the other side, which showed the final disposition of the Rhodesian forces. It was necessary to know if the Rhodesian

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forces were to retain all their existing bases, some of which were not known to the British side.

THE CHAIRMAN said that the Rhodesian forces would be monitored throughout their existing structure. The Patriotic Front forces, under the British plan, would assemble in order that monitoring teams might be attached to them.

MR MUGABE urged that the principle of reciprocity should not work to the disadvantage of the Patriotic Front forces. THE CHAIRMAN said that the principle was one of reciprocity of disengagement. It was for the Rhodesian forces to disengage first so that the Patriotic Front forces could assemble in safety. MR MUGABE asked whether it was proposed that the Rhodesian forces should undertake a similar disengagement to that required of his delegation's forces, or would they simply declare that they would not attack?

THE CHAIRMAN said that at present the forces of both sides were interlocked throughout Rhodesia. The British proposals were designed to effect a reciprocal disengagement of those forces. The Rhodesian forces would take the first step by disengaging under the supervision of the monitoring force, whose task it would be to help to ensure the Patriotic Front's forces' safety as they assembled. It would then be for the Patriotic Front to take the next step, by beginning to assemble. For this purpose a number of assembly places and a number of rendezvous points would be established, related to the areas in which the Patriotic

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Front forces had been operating. There would be monitoring arrangements throughout the command structure of the Rhodesian armed forces, and they would be required to comply with the Governor's directions. Provided the Patriotic Front forces assembled with their arms, the disengagement would be complete and reciprocal, and neither side would present a threat to the other. The forces of both sides would be under the authority of the Governor.

MR MUGABE asked the Chairman to say in practical terms what the disengagement would entail. From what would the Rhodesian forces be required to disengage? What would be the physical equivalent for them of the Patriotic Front forces moving to assembly points?

GENERAL FARNDALE said that only when the monitoring force had been established and was seen to be observing the Rhodesian forces would there be a move by the Patriotic Front forces to assembly places. It was not possible to be more specific without information on numbers, but it was his intention that the Rhodesian forces would be monitored throughout that time. General Farndale then distributed a diagram (attached as Annex 1 to this summary) showing the proposed monitoring structure throughout Rhodesia. He stressed that this did not pretend to be the actual plan but was purely illustrative, and that he had had to deal in general terms until he received the force level figures. In presenting this diagram, General Farndale explained that the

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black dots represented Lt-Colonels; that the broken lines showed the links with the Rhodesian forces; and the unbroken lines those with the Patriotic Front (or vice-versa). The diagram demonstrated how each Lt-Colonel could independently contact the Ceasefire Commission and represent the forces he was monitoring.

MR MSIKA said that the bases of the Rhodesian forces were intended for combat purposes. From what the British delegation had been saying, these bases would be returned to the Rhodesians so that they would be poised for action. The British side had not indicated that these bases would cease to be occupied. He saw no reciprocal action being required of the Rhodesian forces to match the movement to assembly points, which was being proposed for his delegation's forces.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he wished to return to the basic problem; the British delegation had said from the beginning that each side had a different structure of forces. It could be seen how to monitor the Rhodesian forces at present; the Patriotic Front forces could not be monitored however until after the process of assembly. The purpose of the British proposals was that the initial period would result in the disengagement of the Rhodesian forces from the Patriotic Front forces. The Patriotic Front forces could then assemble freely and safely. The UK Delegation could see no other way of doing this. It was for Britain to see that disengagement took place; it was for the

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Rhodesian forces to carry it out and for Britain to see that it was carried out. The principle was that the Patriotic Front forces would move freely and safely to the places indicated, under their own instructions.

MR NKOMO asked for clarification of the broken and the black lines in Annex 1. GEN FARNDALE confirmed that it did not give exact locations but was merely a diagrammatic illustration.

MR NKOMO asked what the equivalent position for the structure of the Rhodesian forces would be to the proposed assembly points for the Patriotic Front. THE CHAIRMAN replied that the Rhodesian forces already had their locations. They would be monitored throughout their locations. What needed to be arranged was a structure for the Patriotic Front forces which could also be monitored. MR NKOMO asserted that one had to have points already occupied by Rhodesian forces which were equivalent to the proposed assembly places. Would the Rhodesian forces be monitored wherever they moved or at fixed places? What was the equivalent of these assembly places for the Rhodesian forces? GEN FARNDALE replied that bases were the equivalent and, in response to a further question from Mr Nkomo, confirmed that these were permanent and defined. MR NKOMO asked whether there would be movement from these bases. THE CHAIRMAN said that this could not be guaranteed; the Rhodesian forces would be under the instructions of the Governor. MR NKOMO said that this meant nothing; his delegation wanted to know what represented the

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equivalent of assembly places.

THE CHAIRMAN repeated that the situation was not one in which one could have equivalence of that sort. His delegation sought equivalence of disengagement. The critical question was whether, when the Rhodesian forces disengaged, the Patriotic Front forces would assemble. The Rhodesian forces from the beginning of the operation would be required to comply with the Governor's directions. What happened thereafter depended on the assembly process. When the two sides had natural suspicions and anxieties, they would of course be most concerned for the safety of their forces. These anxieties were understood by the UK delegation, who had therefore proposed a workable plan which would meet the anxieties of both sides.

In response to a statement from MR NKOMO that his delegation wished to know the answers to their questions, THE CHAIRMAN replied that Bishop Muzorewa's delegation also wanted to know whether the Patriotic Front forces would assemble. MR NKOMO said that the bases of the Rhodesian forces had to be known and numbered and that there should be no movement from them; they would finally become assembly points. THE CHAIRMAN repeated that the Rhodesian forces would be required to comply with the Governor's instructions.

In response to a question from MR ZVOBGO as to where the Rhodesian forces would disengage to, THE CHAIRMAN said he could

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not say where they would be physically at that time: the plan needed to be discussed in more detail. MR NKOMO asked that similar points for the final assembly of the Rhodesian forces be worked out.

MR TEKERE stated that the UK delegation were saying that it was enough for the Lancaster House agreement to state that the Rhodesian forces would comply with the Governor's instructions, while at the same time stating that the Patriotic Front forces would be at assembly points. That was surely not a good example of equivalence.

THE CHAIRMAN again outlined the position as he saw it. The first step was disengagement by the Rhodesian forces. He wished to know whether the Patriotic Front would then take the next step and assemble, in safety. Both sides had their anxieties; many other anxieties and questions also remained to be discussed, such as that concerning Patriotic Front forces presently outside Rhodesia. The UK delegation had been seeking to begin to explain their plan that day by describing how in the first few days of the ceasefire period the assembly would take place; the first step was disengagement, the second step was assembly.

MR MUGABE reiterated that the British delegation refused to explain disengagement in terms of physical movement of Rhodesian forces. GEN FARNDALE said that disengagement involved the presence of monitors wherever the forces were. MR NKOMO asked whether all movement would be monitored. GEN FARNDALE said
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some degree of assembly was needed before monitoring was possible on both sides. THE CHAIRMAN explained that under the process of disengagement the Rhodesian forces would stand away from where the Patriotic Front forces were believed to be, so that there would be no contact or fighting. The Rhodesian forces would, like those of the Patriotic Front, retain their arms but be supervised by the monitors; thereafter the Patriotic Front forces would assemble. The position would then be known. MR MUGABE asked what the Rhodesian forces would do supposing that the Patriotic Forces moved.

MR MSIKA, referring to Annex B to CC(79)99, asked whether an equivalent diagram for Rhodesian forces could be drawn up. GEN FARNDALE explained that the diagram was designed simply to show assembly. As far as he knew there was no assembly for the Rhodesian forces to carry out; they were already in bases, and would be monitored from them.

MR MSIKA asked whether the British agreed that the bases of the Rhodesian forces were situated throughout the country in order to fight the Patriotic Front. GEN FARNDALE said that both forces were deployed and interlocked. MR MSIKA then asked whether the British plan could make the Patriotic Front feel secure when on the one hand Patriotic Forces disengaged and moved to assembly points, and, on the other, Rhodesian forces remained in places of deployment. GEN FARNDALE explained that Annex B to CC(79)99 described the situation before assembly and was

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intended to explain the process; so far, discussion on it had not proceeded further.

GEN TONGOGARA asked how many operational bases the Rhodesian and Patriotic Front forces had. He and General Walls knew the answer. THE CHAIRMAN replied that the Patriotic Front's operational bases were not known; those of the Rhodesian forces would be known because they would be monitored before the assembly of the Patriotic Front forces. Discussion would be greatly facilitated if the information requested earlier could be provided.

MR NKOMO suggested that monitors should be sent to monitor the Patriotic Front forces where they were. THE CHAIRMAN referred to the British ceasefire proposals which had been accepted (CC(79)87). These spoke of the assembly process which was now being described. MR MUGABE said that his delegation had reserved their position with regard to that because they wanted discussion to take place at that point. THE CHAIRMAN expressed alarm, because he had understood that the Patriotic Front delegation had accepted the ceasefire proposals. The Conference was now trying to succeed by working out the detailed application of the agreement which had been reached in principle. As he understood it, it had been agreed that there was an essential difference in character between the two forces, and it had been on that basis that the British proposals (CC(79)79 and 87) and the Chairman's statement (CC(79)92) had been put forward and represented the basis of British planning. That essential difference between

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the two forces made it necessary to have a plan of the sort proposed.

The Chairman said that his delegation wanted to get down to brass tacks; he suggested an adjournment until the following day, when they could get down to details.

MR TEKERE referred to Annex A to CC(79)99, and said that the Rhodesian side had been well defined by way of numbers, with company - size points. On the Patriotic Front side there were only assembly points. The British proposals on the cease-fire (CC(79)87) already contained a number of assembly points - 15. It was only that day, however, that the British had asked the size of the Patriotic Front forces. What numbers of Patriotic Front personnel would fit into 15 points? How had the figure of 15 been arrived at? In reply, GEN FARNDALE recalled that this had been discussed earlier. The number 15 represented a planning figure, which could not be exceeded. The exact number would depend on the total forces involved. MR TEKERE asked whether, if the figure 15 was hypothetical, other points within official Conference documents might also be considered hypothetical. THE CHAIRMAN replied that this was not the case. The Conference was proceeding from proposals which had been agreed and was now seeking agreement on their practical implementation. MR NKOMO said that the number 15 could be completely disregarded.

DR USHEWOKUNZE suggested that both the Rhodesians and the Patriotic Front should cease firing and cease movement and remain
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in their existing bases under monitors. The CHAIRMAN said that this was not a possible arrangement given the way the Patriotic Front forces were at present deployed. MR MUGABE asked who had said that the Patriotic Front forces were not structured.

THE CHAIRMAN repeated that the British proposals represented the only way of creating monitoring arrangements so that the safety of the Patriotic Front forces could be assured. He repeated that his delegation understood the Patriotic Front's concern about the security of their forces. They would be under the auspices of the monitoring force deployed for the purpose. Provided that assembly was successfully completed the forces would be completely disengaged. His delegation did not accept that in these circumstances there would be any threat to the security of the Patriotic Front forces.

GEN TONGOGARA asked whether there would be movement by the Rhodesian forces to company level assembly points when the Patriotic Front forces moved to assembly points. THE CHAIRMAN replied that they would be monitored down to company level. Monitors would be in company areas. In response to a query from MR MUGABE as to how many bases would be involved, THE CHAIRMAN said this was not yet known.

MR MUGABE stated that the British had to revise their thinking regarding the reciprocal positioning of the forces. Their proposals on this were completely unacceptable. They could not expect the Patriotic Front to assemble their forces in far larger

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groups than the Rhodesians were in their bases: on their side the company was the final point.

THE CHAIRMAN said that this seemed to mean that Mr Mugabe's delegation were going back on what had been already accepted. MR MUGABE and MR NKOMO denied this.

MR CHINAMANO said that if the meeting the following day was to be successful, two errors needed to be corrected. Firstly the General's diagram (Annex B to CC(79)99) seemed to concern only the Patriotic Front movement to various areas: there was no equivalent diagram showing how the Salisbury side would move. Secondly, dialogue was needed for these meetings to be successful: his delegation needed to hear from that across the table.

THE CHAIRMAN reminded the meeting of one particular passage in the ceasefire proposals. He then read paragraph 9 of Conference Paper CC(79)87. He explained that the Rhodesian forces would be monitored from their existing bases. A similar kind of task would be done through the monitoring of the Patriotic Front forces at the assembly points. Britain would undertake to make arrangements for their security, accommodation and feeding at the assembly points. He then read the first sentence of paragraph 10.

In reply to a query from MR NKOMO, THE CHAIRMAN said the draft ceasefire agreement (CC(79)95) contained revised wording which omitted the word "security". MR NKOMO said that his delegation had been very careful in their discussions on the ceasefire,

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precisely because of what the Chairman was now saying. THE CHAIRMAN said that, as far as the Conference had got, Conference Paper CC(79)87 represented agreement on a ceasefire which the Conference was now seeking to apply, amplify and put into detailed language. MR NKOMO said that this could not help. There was no need to hide behind words: this could not bring success.

MR TEKERE pointed out that Lord Carrington had said that the draft ceasefire agreement (CC(79)95) was not a final document but one for discussion. In response to a comment from MR MUGABE, THE CHAIRMAN said that no-one wanted the Patriotic Front forces to surrender. All wanted a ceasefire and the British delegation were making precise proposals to this end.

MR MUGABE said that the Chairman did not know the whereabouts of the Rhodesian operational bases; if he did not know, why did he wish to proceed in this way as if he did? MR NKOMO and MR MUGABE said that the meeting was useless; more discussion was needed. THE CHAIRMAN suggested that they should meet again the next day to discuss the British proposals. MR MUGABE said that the Chairman would have to completely rethink his ideas in regard to the ceasefire. THE CHAIRMAN then asked if Mr Mugabe was refusing the ceasefire proposals. MR MUGABE replied that he was not doing so in respect of the ideas that were acceptable to his delegation, but they would not accept e.g. that the disposition of forces had been accepted. This was for discussion at the meeting. That was what his delegation had said the previous day.

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His delegstion would not be tied to any agreement which did not accord with his previous posture. THE CHAIRMAN said that this was a serious matter; the UK delegation had understood that the Patriotic Front delegation had accepted the principles put forward, and that what remained to be discussed were the details (e.g. timing, location, disposition of forces). MR MUGABE said that the question of the disposition of forces had not been disposed of yet in terms of numbers and location. THE CHAIRMAN said perhaps the meeting could address itself the next day to the question of numbers. Reciprocity was assured by the monitoring force.

DR MUNDAWARARA then asked whether the Chairman could make it clear whether the Patriotic Front had accepted the ceasefire arrangements, particularly in the light of some of the things which the Conference had been discussing at the present meeting.

MR MSIKA then asked if the meeting could refer to what the Patriotic Front had said on the previous day. THE CHAIRMAN then quoted the last paragraph on p.1 of CC(79)94. DR MUNDAWARARA said that there were certain issues which concerned the Chairman which the Chairman would answer. If questions were asked which concerned his delegation, they would answer. THE CHAIRMAN suggested an adjournment so that the next day they could again tackle the implementation of the ceasefire proposals, on the basis of the agreement of 5 December. He asked that both the other

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
delegations be prepared to comment on General Farndale's proposals and give him (the Chairman) the numbers for which he had asked. It was agreed that the next session would be on 7 December at 10 am.

The session closed at 16.55.

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CC(79)97

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CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON

The attached statement, delivered by
Dr Mundawarara during the Fortieth Plenary
Session, is circulated to delegates at his
request.

Lancaster House
6 December 1979

INTRODUCTION

MR CHAIRMAN, ON 26TH NOVEMBER MY DELEGATION ON BEHALF OF THE ZIMBABWE RHODESIA GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR A CEASEFIRE. NOW THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS ALSO ACCEPTED THESE PROPOSALS WE ARE CLOSER TO BRINGING THE WAR TO AN END THAN EVER BEFORE. HOWEVER I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE FRAILTY OF ANY CEASEFIRE WHICH MAY BE ACHIEVED AS A RESULT OF THIS AGREEMENT. INDEED WE ENTIRELY AGREE WITH YOUR OBSERVATION MR CHAIRMAN MADE ON THE 28TH NOVEMBER THAT THE CEASEFIRE CAN ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF THE PARTIES ARE FIRMLY RESOLVED TO MAKE IT WORK.

A PARTIAL CEASEFIRE WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT MUST BE FULFILLED.

IT NEEDS A REALISTIC APPROACH AND A GENUINE WILL ON THE PART OF BOTH SIDES TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO HOSTILITIES. MAY I SAY MR CHAIRMAN ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THIS IS THE ATTITUDE WE WILL ADOPT WITH A REAL SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION. WE PLEDGE OURSELVES TO DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO HASTEN THE END OF THE WAR.

I HAVE REFERRED TO A REALISTIC APPROACH BEING ESSENTIAL. IF WE ARE TO BE REALISTIC THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS WHICH NEED AIRING AT THIS STAGE IN ORDER THAT ALL PARTIES TO THIS CONFERENCE APPRECIATE THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. I WILL DEAL WITH EACH OF THESE SEPARATELY.

/PATRIOTIC

PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES TO ASSEMBLY PLACES

THE CEASEFIRE WILL NOT WORK UNLESS ALL MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ARE PREPARED TO GATHER AT THE PLACES DESIGNATED FOR THEIR ASSEMBLY WITHIN THE PERIOD SPECIFIED. OUR FORCES ARE, AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT MR CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF STRUCTURED ESTABLISHMENTS AND IT IS THEREFORE VERY EASY TO ACCOUNT FOR ALL THEIR MEMBERS. IN THE CASE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES HOWEVER DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS APPLY AS THEY CANNOT BE SO DESCRIBED. ACCORDINGLY IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT, DURING THIS 7 TO 10 DAY PERIOD IN WHICH THE CEASEFIRE IS BEING IMPLEMENTED, ALL MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES MUST ASSEMBLE AT DESIGNATED PLACES OF ASSEMBLY. THIS IS SO THAT THEY MAY BE BOTH PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AND ACCOUNTED FOR. ONLY THOSE WHO ASSEMBLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE OBEYING THE GOVERNOR'S ORDERS. IT MUST BE ACCEPTED BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT ANY PERSON WHO IS REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE IN TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND WHO DOES NOT DO SO WILL BE ACTING UNLAWFULLY.

IN OUR VIEW THE MOST EFFECTIVE FORM OF DISENGAGEMENT WOULD BE FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOST COUNTRIES AND ASSEMBLE AT PLACES WITHIN THESE COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO BE MONITORED. THIS WOULD BE OUR PREFERENCE BUT WE HAVE ACCEPTED THE BRITISH PROPOSALS THAT MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WHO ARE WITHIN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ASSEMBLE WITHIN OUR COUNTRY.

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IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT THAT MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY SHOULD SUBMIT THEMSELVES TO MONITORING AT PRE-DETERMINED PLACES. THESE PLACES WILL BE ZIPRA AND ZANLA BASES IN OUR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND IT IS VITAL THAT THESE BASES BE IDENTIFIED AND THEIR WHEREABOUTS BE MADE KNOWN TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WITHOUT DELAY. ZIPRA PERSONNEL IN ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA WILL BE REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE AT SPECIFIED BASES IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHILE ZANLA PERSONNEL WILL HAVE PLACES OF ASSEMBLY MAINLY IN MOZAMBIQUE BUT ALSO IN BOTSWANA. ACCOUNT MUST NOT BE LOST OF THOSE MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT UNDERGOING TRAINING IN TANZANIA, ANGOLA AND ELSEWHERE OR WHO OTHERWISE MAY BE IN THE PIPELINE.

IT MUST BE ACCEPTED THAT ALL MOVEMENT OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCE MEMBERS FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER SHOULD CEASE IMMEDIATELY THE CEASEFIRE TAKES EFFECT. THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL IN OUR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND IN TANZANIA, ANGOLA AND ELSEWHERE MUST BE FROZEN DURING THE PERIOD OF THE CEASEFIRE BECAUSE ANY SUCH MOVEMENT WILL IMPAIR ITS SUCCESS. THUS ALL CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT OF ARMED MEN MUST CEASE FOR THE FULL PERIOD OF THE CEASEFIRE UNTIL THE ELECTION HAS BEEN HELD AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT INSTALLED. THE REQUIRED CESSATION OF ALL MOVEMENT BY THE SECURITY FORCES INTO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES CAN ONLY BE MAINTAINED SO LONG AS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT OF THEIR FORCES.

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NUMBER OF PATRIOTIC FRONT MEMBERS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR

IT IS IMPORTANT TO APPRECIATE THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES ARE INCLUDED IN THE REQUIREMENT TO ASSEMBLE AND BE MONITORED WITH THEIR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT AT ASSEMBLY PLACES EITHER INSIDE ZIMBABWE RHODESIA OR AT PLACES IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. THIS REQUIREMENT APPLIES NOT ONLY TO MALES BUT EQUALLY TO WOMEN COMBATANTS. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF MONITORING.

IT IS VITAL THAT AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT BE MADE OF THE NUMBER OF PERSONS INVOLVED AND TO THIS END IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER ZIPRA AND ZANLA FORCES SEPARATELY. UNLESS THE PRECISE NUMBER IN EACH GROUP ASSEMBLE AND CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR THE CEASEFIRE WILL NOT BE SUCCESSFUL.

ZIPRA

IN REGARD TO THE NUMBER OF ZIPRA FORCES A STARTING POINT CAN BE TAKEN FROM THE CLAIM BY MR NKOMO ON THE 20TH NOVEMBER 1979 AT THIS CONFERENCE THAT THERE ARE 100 000 ARMED PEOPLE IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS FIGURE INCLUDED ARMED PERSONS ON BOTH SIDES. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT ALL HIS FORCES WERE WITHIN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. IF IT IS ACCEPTED THAT THERE ARE ROUGHLY AN EQUAL NUMBER OF ZIPRA AND ZANLA FORCES AND AFTER TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCES IN THIS OVERALL FIGURE IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THERE SHOULD BE 25 000 ZIPRA PERSONNEL TO ACCOUNT FOR. OUR OWN ASSESSMENT OF ZIPRA FORCES IS HOWEVER

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CONSIDERABLY LESS. WE WOULD ESTIMATE THAT THE NUMBER IS NEARER 20 000 IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA COMBINED AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE CEASEFIRE WE WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE NUMBER IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AT PRESENT IS 8 000. ACCORDINGLY WE INSIST THAT IT IS A CONDITION OF THE CEASEFIRE THAT 8 000 ZIPRA ARMED FORCES ASSEMBLE AT THE DESIGNATED PLACES OF ASSEMBLY IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA.

DESPITE MR NKOMO'S STATEMENT THAT ALL HIS MEN ARE IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA IT IS A FACT THAT INFILTRATION ON A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE CONTINUES FROM ZAMBIA. INDEED THIS INFILTRATION NOT ONLY CONTINUES BUT HAS ESCALATED DURING THE PERIOD OF THIS CONFERENCE AND IS IN FACT STILL INCREASING WHILE WE HERE IN LONDON ARE DISCUSSING THE CEASEFIRE. IN THE RESULT A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF ZIPRA PERSONNEL HAS ENTERED ZIMBABWE RHODESIA RECENTLY IN ORDER THAT THEY WILL BE IN OUR COUNTRY BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE TAKES EFFECT. IT IS CLEAR THAT THEIR ENTRY IS MAINLY TO POLITICISE THE MASSES THROUGH INTIMIDATION. WE WILL BE WATCHING THE POSITION CLOSELY UP TO THE DATE OF CEASEFIRE TO ASSESS WHETHER THE TOTAL FIGURE OF KNOWN ZIPRA FORCES WITHIN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA SHOULD BE ADJUSTED UPWARDS.

ZANLA

MR TONGOGARA IS REPORTED TO HAVE CLAIMED RECENTLY THAT HE HAS 25 000 ARMED MEN INSIDE ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. WE BELIEVE THIS FIGURE IS EXAGGERATED. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS CEASEFIRE

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WE WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE PERSONNEL IN ZANLA FORCES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AMOUNT TO 30 000 MEN. WE ACCEPT THIS CLAIM ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE ARE 20 000 ZANLA PERSONNEL WITHIN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AND THE BALANCE OF 10 000 ARE TO BE FOUND IN MOZAMBIQUE AND TANZANIA INCLUDING THOSE UNDERGOING TRAINING AND IN THE PIPELINE. ACCORDINGLY WE INSIST THAT IT IS A CONDITION OF THE CEASEFIRE THAT 20 000 ARMED ZANLA FORCES ASSEMBLE AT THE DESIGNATED PLACES OF ASSEMBLY IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA.

AS IN THE CASE OF THE ZIPRA FORCES THESE FIGURES VARY WHEN INFILTRATIONS INTO ZIMBABWE RHODESIA TAKE PLACE. IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR US TO MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF THESE INFILTRATIONS AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF LATEST INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO REASSESS AND READJUST THESE FIGURES WHEN THE CEASEFIRE TAKES EFFECT.

MONITORING OF FORCES

AS I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED THE ZIMBABWE RHODESIA DEFENCE FORCES CAN BE MONITORED WITH EASE BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL CONFINED TO ZIMBABWE RHODESIA AND THEY ARE MEMBERS OF ESTABLISHED MILITARY FORMATIONS: THEY BELONG TO UNITS WHICH ARE PROPERLY ORGANISED, DISCIPLINED AND STRUCTURED. AS A CONSEQUENCE THE WHEREABOUTS OF EVERY SINGLE MAN CAN BE ASCERTAINED WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME. THUS THE MONITORING OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DEFENCE FORCES WILL BE A SIMPLE OPERATION WHICH CAN BE EFFECTIVELY CARRIED OUT.

/THE

THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES ON THE OTHER HAND WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO MONITOR SPREAD AS THEY ARE OVER A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES AND DIVIDED DOWN TO SMALL GROUPS OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY IN THE FIELD. HENCE THE NEED FOR THEIR ASSEMBLY AT PRE-DETERMINED PLACES BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. FOR THE SAME REASON MONITORING OF ZIPRA AND ZANLA PERSONNEL MUST ALSO TAKE PLACE IN ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA AND MOZAMBIQUE AND AN ACCOUNT MUST ALSO BE TAKEN OF PERSONNEL OUTSIDE THESE COUNTRIES UNDERGOING TRAINING OR THOSE IN THE PIPELINE. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WILL BE REQUIRED TO UNDERTAKE TO CO-OPERATE FULLY AND WILLINGLY WITH THE MONITORING FORCE AND PROVIDE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED FOR THE MONITORING FORCE TO CARRY OUT ITS TASK.

RESPONSIBILITY OF POLITICAL LEADERS

WE HAVE ALREADY PLEDGED THAT WE WILL DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE. THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT MUST ALSO ACCEPT THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES UPON THEMSELVES TO ISSUE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL PERSONNEL UNDER THEIR CONTROL TO COMPLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. FACILITIES BY WAY OF RADIO, PRESS AND OTHER MEDIA WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THEIR FORCES TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO ASSEMBLY PLACES AND WE UNDERTAKE THAT THOSE FORCES WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO IN SAFETY.

FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS TO DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO PROMOTE THE CEASEFIRE MUST BE REGARDED AS A BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND THEY WILL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THIS FAILURE.

/AT THIS

AT THIS STAGE A MOST IMPORTANT POINT MUST BE MADE. AS YOU KNOW MR CHAIRMAN THE DEFENCE FORCES OF ZIMBABWE RHODESIA ARE NON-POLITICAL. THIS IS NOT THE CASE WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WHO ARE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. THESE FORCES HAVE BEEN RECRUITED SOLELY TO PROMOTE THE POLICIES OF POLITICAL LEADERS. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS MUST, AS PART OF THE CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS, DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THEIR ARMED FORCES. ACCORDINGLY WE INSIST THAT CONTACT BETWEEN THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THEIR FORCES MUST BE CONFINED TO THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR ABIDING BY THE CEASEFIRE. ONCE THESE HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE POLITICAL LEADERS MUST THEREUPON DIVORCE THEMSELVES ENTIRELY FROM THEIR ARMED FORCES AND DEVOTE THEMSELVES TO ELECTIONEERING.

RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDERS

A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY WILL REST ON THE COMMANDERS OF THE VARIOUS FORCES. IT MUST BE ACCEPTED THAT THE COMMANDERS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE MEN UNDER THEIR COMMAND AND FOR ANY INFRINGEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE WHICH OCCURS.

PERIOD OF CEASEFIRE

THE PERIOD STATED IN THE PROPOSALS TO BRING THE CEASEFIRE INTO EFFECT IS 7 TO 10 DAYS. THIS IS ENTIRELY ADEQUATE AND NO EXTENSION CAN BE CONTEMPLATED.

/FUNCTIONS

FUNCTIONS OF DEFENCE FORCES DURING CEASEFIRE AND PERIOD THEREAFTER UNTIL NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED

- a) THE DEFENCE FORCES WILL BECOME SUBJECT TO THE ORDERS OF THE GOVERNOR FROM THE TIME OF HIS ARRIVAL.
- b) IT WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEFENCE FORCES SCRUPULOUSLY TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE.
- c) THE DEFENCE FORCES WILL UNDERTAKE TO DISENGAGE FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

COLLECTION AND ASSEMBLY PLACES

IN THE SPIRIT OF DISENGAGEMENT WE WILL STRICTLY OBSERVE OUR AGREEMENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO INTERFERENCE OR INDEED CONTACT BY OUR FORCES WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES ASSEMBLING AT COLLECTION PLACES OR ASSEMBLY PLACES. AT THE SAME TIME AN UNDERTAKING WILL BE REQUIRED FROM THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT THERE WILL BE NO INTERFERENCE FROM THEIR OWN MEMBERS IN THE PROCESS OF ASSEMBLY OF PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES AT COLLECTING PLACES OR IN THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL BETWEEN THESE PLACES.

THE DESIGNATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF ASSEMBLY PLACES ARE A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY.

REFUGEES AND ABDUCTEES

ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE BY ZAPU IN BOTSWANA AND ZAMBIA AND ZANU (MUGABE) IN

/MOZAMBIQUE.....

MOZAMBIQUE TO RELEASE ALL REFUGEES AND ABDUCTEES AND TO FACILITATE THEIR RETURN TO ZIMBABWE RHODESIA IN TIME THAT THEY MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION. SAFE CUSTODY MUST BE AFFORDED THESE PEOPLE TO PROCEED TO THE DESIGNATED CROSSING POINTS FROM THE COUNTRY CONCERNED INTO ZIMBABWE RHODESIA.

SPECIAL MENTION SHOULD BE MADE OF POLITICAL DETAINEES HELD BY ZAPU IN ZAMBIA AND ZANU (MUGABE) IN MOZAMBIQUE WHO SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED, RELEASED AND IMMEDIATELY ALLOWED TO RETURN IN TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION. WE HAVE ALREADY PLAYED OUR PART IN RELEASING DETAINEES.

CONCLUSION

I SHOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE MR CHAIRMAN AS I BEGAN WITH THE STATEMENT THAT THE CEASEFIRE CAN ONLY BE IMPLEMENTED AND CAN ONLY SUCCEED IF BOTH SIDES CO-OPERATE AND SHOW WILLINGNESS TO MAKE IT SUCCEED. WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN OUR PLEDGE THAT WE WILL CO-OPERATE TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY. WE NOW INVITE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO GIVE A SIMILAR PLEDGE IN A SIMILAR SPIRIT AND IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS THAT THEY WILL BACK THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WITH ENTHUSIASM AND SINCERITY. WE ALSO LOOK TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE MONITORING FORCE TO PLAY THEIR PARTS IN THIS PROGRAMME FOR PEACE IN ZIMBABWE RHODESIA.

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CC(79)96

COPY NO:

39

FORTIETH PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the Fortieth
Plenary Session of the Conference, Thursday
6 December 1979.

Lancaster House
6 December 1979

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PRESENT:

UK Delegation

Lord Carrington (in the Chair)

Sir I Gilmour Bt

Mr R Luce

Sir A Duff

Gen M Farndale

Mr R W Renwick

Mr N M Fenn

Mr G G H Walden

Mr C D Powell

Mr R Jackling

Col C Dunphie

Mr P J Barlow

Mr S J Gomersall

Mr R M J Lyne

Mrs A J Phillips

Mr M C Wood

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Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation

Dr S C Mundawarara

Air Vice Marshal H Hawkins

Mr D Zamchiya

Gen P Walls

Mr P Allum

Mr P Claypole

Mr A R MacMillan

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Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation

Mr J M Nkomo	Mr R G Mugabe
Mr J M Chinamano	Mr E Tekere
Mr J W Msika	Gen J Tongogara
Mr T G Silundika	Mr E R Kadungure
Mr A M Chambati	Dr H Ushewokunze
Mr W Musarurwa	Mr D Mutumbuka
Mr D Dabengwa	Mr E Zvobgo
Mr L Mafela	Mr W Kamba
Miss E Siziba	

Secretariat

Mr J M Willson

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The session began at 11.10.

THE CHAIRMAN said that the Conference had reached agreement on the ceasefire proposals, and they were now at the last stage of the negotiations. He was sure all were agreed that it was essential over the next two or three days to work out the details of the proposals.

He hoped that the ceasefire agreement which he had circulated the previous day (CC(79)95) was acceptable to all parties since it contained the substance of the proposals for the basis of the implementation of a ceasefire. What had to be done now was to reach decisions on the practical details. The first essential was to agree a date on which hostilities would cease; this was in the interests of all the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries. The date had to be as soon as was compatible with the arrangements for the despatch of the monitoring forces to Rhodesia. In the meanwhile he hoped that leaders of both sides would agree to transmit warning orders to prepare their forces for the announcement of a ceasefire agreement. The second issue was to agree practical arrangements for a disengagement and separation of forces and the deployment of the monitoring force. The Rhodesian forces would be monitored throughout their command structure and, as far as the Patriotic Front forces at present inside Rhodesia were concerned, it had been agreed that assembly places should be established at which the monitoring force could be similarly deployed. British military experts had been studying the practical /requirements

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requirements and would be prepared to put proposals to the Conference.

The Chairman continued by saying that one of the first tasks was to establish numbers involved, and he hoped that the Patriotic Front would be able that afternoon to let the experts have estimated force levels inside Rhodesia. To secure an effective ceasefire, it was necessary to agree on securing a cessation of all cross-border military activity from the moment agreement was reached at the Conference. The Governor would be responsible for seeing that the Rhodesian forces carried out this requirement, and it would be necessary to discuss comparable arrangements for Patriotic Front forces outside Rhodesia. He proposed that all these matters be discussed that afternoon under the chairmanship of Sir Antony Duff.

DR MUNDAWARARA said that, as he had stated yesterday, he believed that those negotiations were the most important part of the Conference. Anything aimed at ending the war was of paramount importance; his delegation thought it most important that certain things were laid down in order that the ceasefire should be effective, and he now wished to set out how they considered it should be done.

Dr Mundawarara then delivered a statement, subsequently circulated as Conference Paper CC(79)97.

MR NKOMO said that the Conference now had to consider both the Chairman's opening remarks and those made by Dr Mundawarara in a long and at times provocative statement.

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Such statements were unfortunate at this stage of the Conference, but the Patriotic Front delegation would not be provoked.

Mr Nkomo referred to a number of aspects mentioned in the Chairman's opening remarks. The Chairman had not spelt out in detail his intentions regarding the proposed crossing points. Mr Nkomo supposed that what was meant was crossing points with the four countries bordering Rhodesia, that is Zambia, Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique. The Chairman had particularly mentioned that the Patriotic Front forces not yet in the country should not move after the ceasefire date. It was, however, necessary to point out that there were certain organisations within Rhodesia, apart from South African forces, which had been trained in South Africa and had entered the country from South Africa. Mr Nkomo hoped that in due course the Chairman would be able to say what should be done about this.

Regarding the South African forces themselves, Mr Nkomo recalled the Chairman's assurance at the 39th Plenary Session that under the British Governor there would be no South African forces coming into the country. However, the point was that, since they were already there, they should leave. A number of categories were involved; first there were South African police, which were supposed to have been withdrawn at some stage. Then there were so-called volunteers from South Africa. All these had to be accounted for. If there was to be an effective ceasefire, it was important to understand that all
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foreign elements had to leave - those from Britain, other Western European countries and the United States. In particular, he hoped that the Chairman would say something about reports of an American who threatened the lives of the Patriotic Front leaders. There were also mercenaries in Rhodesia.

In conclusion, Mr Nkomo expressed the hope that the Chairman would be able to conduct the final stage of the Conference without resorting to numerous agreements, sub-agreements and time-limits. His delegation wanted the Conference to work towards a definitive final agreement on the ceasefire. Precisely what procedure was being proposed by the Chairman for the afternoon session?

MR MUGABE stressed his delegation's understanding that the parties at the Conference should now move on an equal footing towards the final stage of the peace agreement. This required great calmness and objectivity from all the parties involved. Dr Mundawarara's statement (Conference Paper CC(79)97) had not been made with the seriousness required for the last stage of the negotiations. He wondered whether Dr Mundawarara had delivered his statement with conviction. For their part, his delegation had been in part provoked and in part amused by it. If the statement was intended seriously, Bishop Muzorewa's delegation would need to revise their attitude completely. Both sides would be entering into a ceasefire agreement as equals. Bishop Muzorewa's delegation was aware of the
/position

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position of the Patriotic Front inside Rhodesia. Far from being vanquished, they had moved the war forward and had been poised for victory. Within two years they could have brought down the present regime. It was better to accept each other as equals.

His delegation was prepared to reciprocate on an equal footing and to perform its side of the bargain. It would not be pushed into a position where it seemed to be surrendering. What was required was an acceptance of equal treatment, conditions, obligations, rights and duties. In that spirit it would be possible to achieve peace, and the conditions necessary for free and fair elections.

THE CHAIRMAN said that what was needed was for everyone to discuss these matters calmly and quickly. As he had said before, time was running out. At the session that afternoon General Farndale would introduce the British delegation's ideas, and it would then be possible to get down to the positive business of the military details and the implementation of the ceasefire on the ground. The Chairman also reiterated his hope that the Patriotic Front would feel able to disclose their force levels at the afternoon meeting.

MR MUGABE said that it might be difficult for his delegation to make a response. The question of force levels was not a major one, and in any case his delegation would not

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give their levels until Bishop Muzorewa's delegation had disclosed theirs. The problem was that his delegation might not have time to respond to the proposals already made by the Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN said that his proposals were simply an indication of what matters needed dicussing.

It was agreed to adjourn until 1500 under the chairmanship of Sir A Duff.

The session ended at 11.45.

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CC(79)95

COPY NO:

89

CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

The attached document is circulated to
delegates at the request of the Chairman.

Lancaster House

5 December 1979

CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

The parties to this cease-fire agreement have agreed as follows:

1. With effect from 2400 hours on [day of signature], all movement by personnel of the Patriotic Front armed forces into Rhodesia and all cross-border military activity by the Rhodesian forces will cease. This agreement will take effect on a basis of strict reciprocity. The British Government will request the governments of countries bordering on Rhodesia to make arrangements to ensure that externally based forces do not enter Rhodesia. Provision will be made to permit the return of civilian personnel to Rhodesia in order to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. Border-crossing points will be established, under the supervision of the monitoring force, for this purpose;
2. With effect from 2400 hours [day before cease-fire day] all hostilities in Rhodesia will cease. The Commanders will issue instructions to the forces under their command to ensure that all contact between the respective forces is avoided. A Cease-fire Commission will be established in Salisbury. The Chairman of the Commission will be the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will consist of equal numbers of the representatives of the Military Commanders of both sides. The Commission will meet as required throughout the cease-fire. Its functions will include:

/(a)

- (a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;
- (b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the cease-fire; and
- (c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.

The Commission will be independent of existing command structures and the Governor may at his discretion communicate direct with the Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front forces concerning the exercise of their respective functions. Any member of the Commission may invite it to discuss any question which appears to him to be relevant to its functions.

3. The British Government will be responsible for the establishment of a monitoring force under the command of the Governor's Military Adviser. This force will assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the forces and assist the Cease-fire Commission in its tasks. The Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces undertake to co-operate fully with the monitoring force and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions.

4. Elements of the monitoring force will be assigned:

- (a) to maintain contact with the command structures of the Rhodesian forces and Patriotic Front forces throughout Rhodesia;

/(b)

- (b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces; and
 - (c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the cease-fire.
5. Members of the monitoring force will carry weapons for their personal protection only and will be provided with vehicles and aircraft carrying a distinctive marking. The force will be equipped with an independent radio communications network.
6. The parties recognise that disengagement of the forces will be essential to an effective cease-fire and the deployment of the monitoring force. On [cease-fire day] the Rhodesian armed forces, under the directions of the Governor, will therefore disengage to enable the Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia to begin the process of assembly. Elements of the monitoring force will be deployed to the command structure and bases of the Rhodesian forces and to assembly places and rendezvous positions designated for the Patriotic Front forces.
7. The Patriotic Front forces at present in Rhodesia will report with their arms and equipment to rendezvous positions (RPs) and will proceed thereafter to assembly places [as indicated on a schedule to be annexed to this agreement]. The process of assembly will take place under the direction of the Commanders of the Patriotic Front forces and under the auspices of the monitoring force.

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8. Movement to assembly places will be completed by 2400 hours on [cease-fire day + 7]. The process of assembly will take place with the assistance of the monitoring force. Arrangements will be made for the accommodation, security and other agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces.
9. The Rhodesian armed forces will comply with the directions of the Governor. There will be reciprocal disengagement by the Rhodesian forces, in relation to the successful accomplishment of the assembly process by the Patriotic Front forces.
10. With effect from cease-fire day, all forces will comply with the cease-fire and with the directions of the Governor. Any forces which fail to comply with the cease-fire or with the directions of the Governor will be deemed to be acting unlawfully.
11. The primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the cease-fire will rest with the Commanders of the forces through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of liaison officers of the monitoring force. The Commanders will ensure, with the assistance of the monitoring force, that breaches of the cease-fire are contained and dealt with. In the event of more general or sustained breaches of the cease-fire the Governor will decide what action to take to deal with them with the forces which have accepted his authority.

/12.

12. The parties undertake to issue clear and precise instructions to all units and personnel under their command to comply scrupulously with the arrangements for bringing the cease-fire into effect. They will make announcements, immediately following the conclusion of this agreement, which will be broadcast regularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain the cease-fire reach all the forces under their command and are understood by the public in general.
13. The parties to this agreement renounce the use of force for political objectives. They undertake to accept the outcome of the elections, to comply with the directions of the Governor and to resolve peacefully any questions relating to the future composition of the armed forces and the training and resettlement of military and civilian personnel.

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CC(79)94

COPY NO:

80

THIRTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth
Plenary Session of the Conference, Wednesday
5 December 1979.

Lancaster House

5 December 1979

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PRESENT:

UK Delegation

Lord Carrington (in the Chair)

Sir I Gilmour Bt

Mr R Luce

Sir A Duff

Mr D M Day

Gen M Farndale

Mr R W Renwick

Mr P R N Fifoot

Mr N M Fenn

Mr G G H Walden

Mr C D Powell

Mr R Jackling

Col C Dunphie

Mr P J Barlow

Mr S J Gomersall

Mr R D Wilkinson

Mrs A J Phillips

Mr M C Wood

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Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation

Mr R G Mugabe	Mr J M Nkomo
Mr E Tekere	Mr J Chinamano
Gen J Tongogara	Mr J Msika
Dr H Ushewokunze	Mr A M Chambati
Mr E Zvobgo	Mr W Musarurwa
Mr W Kamba	Mr D Dabengwa
	Mr R Austin
	Miss E Siziba

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Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation

Dr S C Mundawarara

Dr J Kamusikiri

Air Vice Marshal H Hawkins

Mr D Zamchiya

Gen P Walls

Mr P Allum

Mr P Claypole

Mr A R MacMillan

Secretariat

Mr J M Willson

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The session commenced at 17.16.

THE CHAIRMAN asked whether Mr Mugabe or Mr Nkomo wished to say anything.

MR MUGABE said that his delegation felt that it should make a statement. As the Chairman was aware, his delegation had remained concerned about the disposition of their forces, the grounding of the Rhodesian Air Force and the presence of South African forces. These were issues on which clarification was wanted.

THE CHAIRMAN said that, in relation to the concerns expressed by Mr Mugabe, he could reassure the Patriotic Front delegation:

- (i) that there would be no external involvement in Rhodesia under the British Governor. The position had been made clear to all the governments concerned, including South Africa;
- (ii) that the Rhodesian Air Force would be monitored effectively. The British Government had in mind a monitoring force, adequate to the overall task, in the vicinity of 1200 men.

MR MUGABE said that, in the light of the Chairman's statement of 28 November (Conference Paper CC(79)92) and following discussions with the British delegation, a number of details, including the location and number of places for the disposition of the forces under the British proposals, fell to
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be dealt with under the implementation of the ceasefire. His delegation now felt that the British proposals for a ceasefire provided the basis for an agreement, and for moving on quickly to settle the details of implementation.

THE CHAIRMAN said that this was very good news, and thanked Mr Mugabe for his delegation's acceptance of the British proposals, as clarified by the Chairman's assurances. The Conference could now move on quickly to the implementation of the proposals; they had reached the very last stage of the negotiations. It was essential to complete them very quickly indeed. Discussion of the implementation of the ceasefire need only take two or three days provided that there was goodwill and everyone worked hard. The Chairman added that he and the Lord Privy Seal had that afternoon said in the two Houses of Parliament that the British Government had plans to send the Governor to Salisbury in a very short space of time. He was now circulating to the Conference copies of the proposed Ceasefire Agreement (Conference Paper CC(79)95) which he invited delegates to study overnight.

DR MUNDAWARARA said that he wished to compliment his brothers for finding a way to make it possible for the Conference to make progress towards a ceasefire. He recognised that this was the most important part of the Conference. The war continued to cause death and suffering every day. If a way could be found to end the war quickly, the people of his

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country would be rendered a great service. Real progress had now been achieved, and for his part Dr Mundawarara had found it easiest to help to achieve progress during this part of the Conference. What was now needed was a quick agreement to bring about peace. His people had been suffering for too long. The war was nothing to be proud of; and no one who understood the realities of the war could threaten to prolong it.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he thought everyone could subscribe to those sentiments. He proposed a further plenary session the following day, at a time to be decided through the usual channels, in order to achieve an agreement as quickly as possible. In conclusion, he thanked both delegations for their cooperation. He trusted that this would be the end of what had been a long Conference but, he hoped, a memorable and successful one.

DR MUNDAWARARA urged the need to move speedily. He and his delegation had very little further time. THE CHAIRMAN thought that this applied to both delegations.

The session ended at 17.23.

CC(79)92

COPY NO:

89

CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

The attached statement, delivered by Lord Carrington on 28 November at a bilateral meeting with the Delegation of Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo, is circulated to delegates at his request.

Lancaster House

28 November 1979

LORD CARRINGTON:

1. We have now had a series of bilateral discussions with you. You have raised a number of points about our proposals, and a number of issues in your own paper. I would now like to make a full statement of our position.
2. Although some details of the arrangements will remain to be agreed, agreement on the ceasefire proposals would mean that the parties had agreed on the three broad areas covered by this conference - the Constitution, the pre-independence arrangements, and the ceasefire. Assuming that we can agree on the final details, we would be within reach of the successful conclusion which the people of Rhodesia and neighbouring countries, and indeed the whole of the international community, are anxiously awaiting. Agreement on the ceasefire is, therefore, the third and last of the major tasks to be tackled here, and must be an agreement between the parties to the Conference.
3. Indeed, a ceasefire can only be effective in this situation if the parties are firmly resolved to make it work. Without such commitment, no provisions, however elaborate, could bring about a genuine ceasefire. Thus, the essential element in our ceasefire proposals is that responsibility for the maintenance of the ceasefire will rest with the forces on both sides and their Commanders. This will take effect through a Ceasefire Commission under the chairmanship of the Governor's military adviser. The Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front will be equally represented

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on the Commission which will be established in Salisbury from the beginning of the ceasefire. The Commission will have a central role to play in ensuring the maintenance of the ceasefire and will be the forum in which all matters relating to the ceasefire can be discussed. It will meet as necessary throughout the ceasefire, and, to answer one question raised by the Patriotic Front, it will remain in operation until the independence government has been formed. All the forces which throughout the pre-independence period will have accepted the authority of the Governor will thereafter be expected to accept the authority of the elected government. Self-evidently, therefore, there will be no need for a Ceasefire Commission after independence.

4. The Patriotic Front raised questions about the liaison and monitoring arrangements with the Rhodesian forces. We have explained that these liaison and monitoring arrangements will extend throughout the command structure of the Rhodesian forces, down to company level. We have proposed similar monitoring and liaison arrangements in relation to the Patriotic Front forces. In putting these arrangements into effect, we have to face the practical difficulty that the nature of the two armies - as we have often pointed out in these discussions - is different. We must find a practicable solution to this practical difficulty. The Rhodesian forces are identified and their locations known. That is what we mean when we talk about them being monitored from their existing company bases. The Patriotic Front forces

/are

are not identified and will have to be identified if an effective ceasefire is to come into operation. This will make it possible to set up reciprocal liaison and monitoring arrangements.

5. The Patriotic Front have raised objections to the composition of the Commonwealth monitoring force, which is being organised under British auspices. I cannot accept that any of the countries we have invited to participate in the monitoring group will not be impartial as between the parties to the conflict - and as between the parties engaged in the elections. We have taken the responsibility of organising the monitoring force and have invited certain other countries to contribute to it. We have complete confidence that the force will carry out its duties impartially.

6. The Patriotic Front have raised questions about the size and character of the monitoring force. As I have explained, there may be some misunderstanding about the functions of what are sometimes called "peace-keeping" forces. The role of such forces cannot be to "enforce" a ceasefire if the parties are themselves not prepared to comply with it. To repeat what I said earlier, the ceasefire will only work if the respective forces are determined to make it work. We do not conceive of an intervention force in Rhodesia which would find itself in conflict with the forces involved. It will be for those forces and their Commanders to ensure the maintenance of the ceasefire.

/The role

The role of the monitoring force is to assist the Governor and the parties concerned with the preservation and operation of the ceasefire and in ensuring the security of the forces involved. In this respect it has, I believe, a vital role to play and we shall ensure that it has the personnel it needs to carry out its tasks. What the force will do is to observe and report on the maintenance of the ceasefire by the forces themselves and in so doing assist the Commanders to comply with the ceasefire agreement. This of course cannot happen unless the forces are disengaged. The size of the monitoring force will be related to the tasks it has to undertake. It is now apparent that it will be necessary for that force to be several hundred strong and its final size will be determined in the light of the reconnaissance and other preparations for its deployment. It may be that the eventual size will need to be larger than we had originally contemplated.

7. The Patriotic Front have raised questions about the integration of the forces. I have said on many occasions in the Conference that in our judgement it is not practicable to think in terms of any general integration of the forces before the people of Rhodesia have been given the chance to make their own political choice in elections to be held under the authority of a British Governor. The forces on both sides and their Commanders will be required to give firm undertakings to accept the authority of whatever government is chosen by the people of Rhodesia; just as they are being required to give firm undertakings to accept the authority of the Governor meanwhile. The British Government does accept, however, that consideration will need to be given during the

/interim

interim period to the future and to the need to enable members of the forces who wish to do so to be assisted in returning to civilian life; and for the members of the forces who wish to continue with a military career to be able to do so, subject to the continuing requirement for their services. The British Government are ready to play a part in consideration of these future arrangements.. In particular, if there are members of the forces who want to return to civilian life, we stand ready to help them to do so. We naturally look forward to the time when there is an independent Zimbabwe with a single army. We think that, within the limits of the possible, it makes sense to begin to plan for the future. The monitoring force will remain in Rhodesia until the independence Government has been formed, its authority has been accepted and independence has been granted.

8. The Patriotic Front have raised a series of questions about the disposition of the forces. Once again, our attitude to this is based on the need to have arrangements which are practicable and effective. This will depend crucially on the assembly process. What the British Government have proposed is a process of progressive dis-engagement. On cease-fire day the Rhodesian forces will dis-engage, enabling the Patriotic Front forces - which are not at present identified in known locations - to assemble in secure conditions and without the involvement of the Rhodesian forces or police. There is no question of status or surrender by one party to another. There is no question of one'side being asked to lay down its arms. It is simply a

/question

question of common sense. The Rhodesian forces consist of formed units, whose size and deployment can be ascertained. The Patriotic Front forces, on the other hand, are by their very nature diffused. Before we can effectively monitor the forces of either side, the size and locations of the forces have to be determined to everyone's satisfaction.

9. It is therefore proposed that the Patriotic Front forces will assemble with their arms, under the authority of their own Commanders, in places where their security, accommodation and other agreed requirements will be provided for. The process of assembly will take place under the auspices of the monitoring force. There will be no threat to the security of Patriotic Front forces which assemble under the auspices of the monitoring force and which accept the Governor's authority. Self-evidently, unless the Patriotic Front are prepared to identify and assemble their forces, it will not be possible to achieve an effective cease-fire while they remain in the field with their arms. The Rhodesian forces will be under the authority of the Governor and as the Patriotic Front assemble their forces, there will be reciprocal dis-engagement. In order to enable the process of dis-engagement to be completed, it will be necessary for the Patriotic Front to assemble their forces with their arms. A token assembly would not fulfil the obligation of a cease-fire agreement. We shall therefore need to determine the numbers involved: at present we do not have precise information on the numbers of the Patriotic Front forces.

10. The Patriotic Front have raised questions about the dangers, as they see it, of external military intervention. In this period Rhodesia will have returned to lawful government as a British dependent territory. It will be under the authority of a British Governor. As for deterring foreign intervention and invasion, I cannot envisage circumstances in which any foreign country would be likely to intervene militarily or invade Rhodesia once the country has returned to legality under a British Governor.

11. In short, as I have explained throughout this phase of the Conference all those forces which assemble and identify themselves and accept the Governor's authority and comply with his directions will be acting lawfully. Any Patriotic Front forces which assemble and comply with the Governor's directions will be lawful. Any forces which do not do so will be unlawful.

12. I have been asked at various points in the Conference what will happen in the event of breaches of the cease-fire. I should make it clear once again that the responsibility for maintenance of the cease-fire will rest in the first instance with the forces on both sides and their commanders. They will be represented on the Cease-fire Commission, under the Governor's military adviser. If there are breaches of the cease-fire, the Governor will look to the respective

/Commanders

Commanders to take action to ensure that these do not continue. The monitoring force will also play an essential role in seeking to ensure against breaches of the cease-fire. If there is a break-down of the cease-fire or a failure to assemble the forces, the respective Commanders will also be responsible to the Governor for this. If they can not restore the situation or in the event of a more general break-down the Governor would have to decide what action to take with the forces at his disposal, and which have accepted his authority, in the light of the responsibility for breaches of the cease-fire.

13. In their paper the Patriotic Front have again put forward proposals for the freezing of their forces and the establishment of zones. As we have made clear from the outset, we do not believe that it will be possible to achieve agreement in this Conference on the basis of the allocation of areas to the control of one side or the other, if that is what the Patriotic Front are proposing. Nor would it be possible to hold free elections in such circumstances. The Patriotic Front claim to be in control of very large areas of the country in which martial law is at present in force. Bishop Muzorewa's delegation claim precisely the opposite. Any attempt to demarcate areas of control as between one side and the other would result, in our discussions being prolonged indefinitely, with no prospect of agreement ever being achieved.

14. In the light of the explanations I have given in this reply, copies of which I shall be making available to the Patriotic Front delegation, I hope that the Patriotic Front will be able to accept the ceasefire proposals we have put forward. We must then work out the practical details which will be settled in relation to their implementation.

15. I have stated repeatedly in this Conference that in my judgement there will be very serious dangers in delay in agreeing to a ceasefire and I very much hope, therefore, that you will be able to agree on the basis we have proposed. We shall then be able to make the arrangements for a monitoring force to go to Rhodesia. It will be possible, given the will and a real sense of urgency, to bring a ceasefire into effect within a matter of days. I have no need to emphasise the benefits which would flow from this for all the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries. This is in my judgement the last chance to achieve a peaceful solution by political means. The British Government has shown that it is prepared to play its full part in bringing Rhodesia to legal independence by arranging for elections under a British Governor with full executive and legislative authority. The British Government is also prepared to play its part in helping to bring an end to the war through the ceasefire arrangements we have proposed and by organising a monitoring force with the participation of other Commonwealth governments. It is not in our power to oblige the parties to accept our proposals. You

/have

have to decide whether you are prepared to agree to a ceasefire. If, in the light of the explanations I have given, you are able to agree to a ceasefire on the basis we have put forward, we can proceed forthwith to discuss the arrangements for its implementation. I am circulating copies of this statement.

16. I do not ask you to discuss it now. But time is getting short - I must emphasize that.

17. I have to go to Dublin about the middle of tomorrow morning. I hope that you, Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo, will be able to study this statement overnight and come and see me tomorrow morning and let me know your reactions.

CC(79)91

COPY NO: 89

CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

The attached statement, delivered by the Lord Privy Seal on 28 November at a bilateral meeting with the Delegation of Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo, is circulated to delegates at his request.

Lancaster House
28 November 1979

STATEMENT MADE BY LORD PRIVY SEAL AT A BILATERAL MEETING
WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ON 28 NOVEMBER 1979.

1. I am grateful to you for giving us informally your expanded proposals for the ceasefire arrangements.

Lord Carrington will be giving you a full statement of our position on the main issues this afternoon. In the meantime I should like to make some comments on the basis of your paper.

2. There are elements in the paper which I welcome and with which I do not think anyone participating in this Conference would disagree. I think we can all agree that the final stage of the Conference is to "put the seal on the effort to replace a purely military solution with one which is peaceful and political". We all want all the forces "to cease the hostilities and allow elections to take place", and to establish "a state of security and peace in which free and fair elections can be held and their results respected". We appear to have reached general agreement also on the direct responsibility of the forces to the Governor for the maintenance of the ceasefire, and on the establishment of a Ceasefire Commission under British chairmanship.

3. So far, so good. In some important respects, however, the paper contains proposals which to us seem unlikely to lead to agreement at the Conference.

4. To start with, I am not clear about the reference to the "formal and effective autonomy of the forces during the ceasefire". In the British Government's view no forces in

/Rhodesia

This raises some issues of fundamental practical importance. In the first place, I cannot accept that it will take anything like two months to communicate ceasefire orders to the combatants in the field, still less that even this period should not be fixed in advance but should be determined by an autonomous body (i.e. a Commonwealth Ceasefire Supervisory Commission). In the British Government's view it need not and should not take more than a few days to issue clear and precise ceasefire instructions to all subordinate commanders through their own communications and through public announcements and broadcasts. Our own proposals envisage that such instructions should be issued by all the parties immediately agreement has been reached on a ceasefire and that they should specify the day on which the ceasefire would come into effect. The monitoring force would begin to arrive in Rhodesia as soon as possible after agreement has been reached here, and would be deployed as from the agreed ceasefire day. It is essential that the time which elapses between agreement here and the date of the inception of the ceasefire should be as short as is compatible with what is necessary for the transmission of instructions and the deployment of the monitoring force. It is also essential that all cross-border military activity should cease from the day agreement is reached.

8. On the next section of the Patriotic Front's paper - the demarcation of ceasefire lines and areas - I entirely agree that we cannot expect to hold elections in a country occupied by and divided between two armies. Our own proposals are designed to avoid this by providing for the assembly of the Patriotic Front

/forces

forces at places from which their maintenance of the ceasefire, like that of the other forces, can be monitored. But we cannot possibly hope to reach agreement on the basis of demarcation of areas controlled by one side or the other. The problem in a war of this kind is that ceasefire lines cannot be drawn on the map, because both sides will lay claim to the same territory. What we need to achieve is a disengagement of the forces.

9. You then go on to discuss what you call the removal of structural obstacles to the ceasefire. I must make it clear that the British Government do not envisage the disbandment of particular units in either side's forces or the expulsion from them of any particular categories of individuals. These questions must be reserved for the independence government.

10. The extent to which we can agree with the next section of your paper, on ceasefire observation and supervision, will be clear from what we have said already in plenary meetings and in bilaterals. We do not believe that any outside force can enforce a ceasefire. Nor do we see a role for a Commonwealth Ceasefire Supervisory Commission, as distinct from the Ceasefire Commission we have already proposed.

11. On the question of law and order during the ceasefire, the British Government have already made clear their view that the maintenance of law and order should be the function of the existing civil police, acting under the authority and supervision of the Governor and his police advisers. Proposals for the establishment of a new "combined" police force, or for the

/introduction

introduction of a Commonwealth police element, seem to us to be impracticable.

12. I am not sure what you mean by the section of your paper on exchange of prisoners of war. As far as I am aware, neither side claims to hold "prisoners of war" at present.

13. On the last section of your paper, that on international co-operation, we entirely agree that international co-operation will be essential to the maintenance of the ceasefire. We have made provision for this in our proposals for ensuring that there is a cessation of all cross-border military activity. We are in touch with the governments concerned about this.

CC(79)90

COPY NO:

89

CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

The attached document is circulated to delegates
at the request of Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and
Delegation.

Lancaster House

27 November 1979

PATRIOTIC FRONT

PROPOSALS FOR

A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

INTRODUCTION.

The Ceasefire Agreement is the final stage in the process of Zimbabwe Self-Determination; it will put the seal on the effort to replace a purely military solution with one which is peaceful and political.

The Patriotic Front, as the National Liberation Movement of the people of Zimbabwe, through its armed struggle, and with the support Africa, through the OAU; the world community, through the Non-Aligned States, United Nations, and the Commonwealth; and especially through the sacrifice and dedication of the Front Line States, has reached the threshold of liberation. Britain as the colonial authority has played its part in providing the framework within which the Rhodesian regime and its forces will renounce both their rebellion against the Crown and their military opposition to liberation.

1. Autonomy of the Forces.

1.1. The Ceasefire Agreement must provide that both the National Liberation Armies of the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian Army, as autonomous entities whose authority is founded in the realities of the war and the political realities which give rise to it, agree, in return for an independence constitution and satisfactory interim arrangements leading to free

elections, to cease hostilities and allow the elections to take place.

1.2. The establishment of a Ceasefire in the war of National Liberation in Zimbabwe poses problems which must be fully understood if suitable and mutually acceptable solutions are to be found and permanent peace established. The basic fact is that the Patriotic Front is fighting with a guerrilla army against an incumbent regime using a mainly conventional army. The guerrilla war has reached a substantial level of success which means that the regime is denied administrative control of large areas from which they have been ousted by the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front's campaign has been so successful and has so stretched the regime's resources that we can reasonably claim to be within sight of victory. The regime's superior arms and destructive ability, including its air power, have not been able to match our essential strength, which is our guerrilla deployment.

1.3. The purpose of the ceasefire is not to impose a military disadvantage on either side. Formal and effective autonomy and equality of the forces during the ceasefire is a basic requirement of the Patriotic Front. The interim arrangements have dealt with the matter of formal equality; *de facto* equality in military and security terms for both sides now falls to be dealt with in the Ceasefire Agreement.

1.4. In the interests of achieving demilitarisation and national security the Patriotic Front is prepared to propose a progressive freezing of its forces. The sacrifice and risk this involves

must be understood. By doing this the Patriotic Front forces will have given up not only their essential advantage, that is, their immediate ability to fight as guerrilleros, but also their long term ability to return to the guerrilla war and to defend themselves against annihilation if the peace proves false. By comparison, the regime's conventional army can immediately recover its war making potential if it is merely required to ceasefire.

2. The Nature of the Ceasefire.

2.1. The ceasefire will provide for a declaration by both parties of a general cessation of hostilities by all their military and para-military forces. The Patriotic Front forces will cease the military prosecution of the war of National Liberation both within and from without the country. The Rhodesian forces will cease acts of aggression and violence against the Patriotic Front forces, and the people of Zimbabwe, and against the Front Line States. In effect the ceasefire will provide for the mutual freezing of the armies and the Rhodesian Air Force.

2.2. Given the nature, complexity and extent of the armed conflict, the ceasefire must provide for:-

- (i) effective conditions and machinery to ensure its observation and enforcement,
- (ii) modification of the two forces so as to ensure that the ceasefire will not impose any disadvantage on either side, and

- (iii) establishing progressively a state of security and peace in which free and fair elections can be held and their results respected.

3. The Crucial Role of a Commonwealth Peace-Keeping Force.

3.1. The establishment of secure conditions for free elections is the essential basis of the Patriotic Front's readiness to end the war. An effective ceasefire requires that certain vital guarantees for such conditions must be established.

3.2. The most powerful guarantee of such, is an effective Commonwealth Peace-Keeping Force (including a substantial military force and a body of senior Commonwealth Police officers) to assist in the process of achieving the ceasefire and to enforce it if necessary. The Force would create confidence, and a sense of security and reduce tension, and thus encourage the observance of the ceasefire.

3.3. The force must be made up of States chosen so as to ensure that both parties feel secure. The balance of States involved, which can alone achieve this, requires that the choice of the participating States is made by agreement of the parties to this conference. Likewise the mandate given to the Commonwealth Force must be agreed as a term of the ceasefire.

3.4. Its responsibility must be to the parties, the Governor and to the Commonwealth to carry out its mandate. The Peace-Keeping functions of the Commonwealth Force will be to supervise, enforce and monitor the ceasefire throughout the country, and to carry out any other tasks specified by the ceasefire Agreement.

It must also be capable of deterring foreign intervention and invasion, and of guarding the country's borders. The size of the force will need to be adequate to the task.

4. The Effective Establishment of the Ceasefire. A Process.

4.1. The ceasefire should be regarded as being effective and established only when the processes necessary to ensure that breaches will not occur have been completed. These processes include:-

- (i) the communication of orders to the combatants in the field by their authentic commanders. The Patriotic Front's view is that a minimum of 2 months will be required for this process.
- (ii) the deployment of an effective Commonwealth Force
- (iii) the disbanding of certain military and para-military units whose speciality has been the commission of acts intended to incriminate and liquidate the Patriotic Front and its supporters,
- (iv) the disarming of the civil population,
- (v) the removal or marking of mines or similar devices placed by both sides throughout the country.

4.2. Communication of orders by the Patriotic Front commanders to their men must be direct. This alone can overcome the suspicion and doubt created by repeated fraudulent "ceasefires" called by the Rhodesian regime as part of its psychological warfare against the Patriotic Front. The season, the terrain, and the immense distances create additional problems which mean that to set

an arbitrary time would be unrealistic and dangerous.

4.3. The decision on the successful completion of these processes depends on largely military considerations, and as such it must be taken by an expert authority - the proposed Commonwealth Ceasefire Supervisory Commission in consultation with the belligerents and the Governor. It will mark the date from which the ceasefire will be regarded as being effective, and the end of the first stage of the ceasefire.

5. Demarcation of Ceasefire Lines and Areas.

5.1. The extent of Martial Law areas indicates the extent to which the Rhodesian regime does not control the territory. The Patriotic Front is not prepared to surrender these areas under the guise of agreeing to a ceasefire. A fundamental requirement for the achievement of the ceasefire is a clear agreement on, and demarcation of, the areas controlled by the two sides. This will enable the separation of opposing forces to take place. The nature of the war makes it inevitable that the forces of each side will be behind the lines of the other, so that arrangements to avoid clashes involving such forces are essential.

5.2. However, it would be difficult to hold elections in a country effectively occupied by and divided between two armies. Political freedom would be far too precarious in these circumstances. Accordingly, when the ceasefire has held, the division of the country must be eliminated as the forces of both sides re-group and re-assemble in new positions further apart and under closer control. Their potential for making war will thus be reduced and the commitment on both sides to the political process be enhanced.

6. Removal of Structural Obstacles to the Ceasefire.

6.1. There are serious structural threats to the establishment and maintenance of both the ceasefire and the political freedom necessary for free and fair elections in the Rhodesian system. These include organisations and elements in the military and para-military establishment, whose speciality has been the commission of acts intended to incriminate the Patriotic Front and to liquidate their political supporters. To allow the military and para-military units mentioned in 4.1. (iii) above to continue to exist is to invite a grave risk of large scale subversion of the ceasefire. The disbanding of these units is a condition for the effectiveness of ceasefire. These units include:-

- (i) the Selous Scouts
- (ii) the Grey Scouts
- (iii) the Pfumo re Vanhu,
- (iv) the Auxilaries,
- (v) Private Armies and
- (vi) non-Rhodesians in the Army,
- (vii) Police Anti-Terrorist Unit.

Similarly arrangements must be made to disband the Special Branch and the Ziso re Vanhu whose primary function has been the destruction of the Patriotic Front and its political predecessors.

6.2. The Rhodesian Territorial Army, constitutes a standing and armed threat to a stable ceasefire and should be disarmed and disbanded. The Police Reserve likewise constitutes a standing invitation to ceasefire breaches and should be disarmed and disbanded.

6.3. A separate threat is posed by the existence of a vast private armoury of automatic and other weapons in the hands of Rhodesian civilians. It must be a term of the ceasefire that these civilians be disarmed.

6.4. Another special danger is constituted by the arms industry in the country. These manufacturers must be prohibited from production and the arms controlled.

6.5. Compliance with these conditions must be completed by the time the ceasefire takes effect.

7. Ceasefire Observation and Supervision.

7.1. The Parties will be responsible to the Governor for the observation of the ceasefire, subject to the mandate of the Commonwealth Peace-Keeping Force to supervise, monitor and enforce it. The Governor may give directions to both forces to observe the rights and duties established by the Ceasefire Agreement.

7.2. There will be a Joint Ceasefire Supervisory Commission (JCSC) of representatives of both forces with a British Chairman, to ensure co-operation in the establishment and maintenance of the ceasefire.

7.3. There will be a Commonwealth Ceasefire Supervisory Commission to assist in the establishment and maintenance of the Ceasefire in co-operation with the J.C.S.C. and the Commonwealth Peace-Keeping Force, (CPF). It will be composed of the representatives of the Commonwealth States participating in the C.P.F.

8. Law and Order during the Ceasefire.

8.1. The police force in Rhodesia is a part of the military establishment and under military command. Law and order during the ceasefire period, it has been agreed, must be maintained by the civil police. It is essential for the Ceasefire Agreement to set up criteria and machinery for the determination and establishment of the civil police.

8.2. Special arrangements must be made during the ceasefire for the maintenance of law and order. In the areas demarcated as either Patriotic Front or Rhodesian controlled, the policing must be by combined patrols of Patriotic Front and Rhodesian police established in terms of 8.1. above as civil police, accompanied by a Commonwealth element. After demarcation lines give way to broader 'national' areas and re-grouping, policing on the same combined basis will continue.

8.3. These arrangements must form a part of the ceasefire agreement.

9. The Exchange of Prisoners of War.

9.1. In the final phase of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, as in previous wars of self-determination humanitarian considerations and the spirit of reconciliation demands that captured personnel of both sides must be exchanged.

10. International Co-operation in Respect of the Ceasefire.

10.1. International involvement has been an integral part of the armed conflict between the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian regime. The successful conclusion of the final phase of the struggle will likewise require significant international co-operation.

10.2. This will entail co-operation to support, and to assist in the orderly return of, Zimbabwean refugees and others; in the regulation of international borders, and in general to respect the outcome of the conference.

10.3. South African forces and other foreign military personnel presently in the country must be withdrawn, and undertakings given to refrain from intervention and to respect the sovereignty and the right to self-determination of the people of Zimbabwe.

CC(79)89

COPY NO: 89

CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON

The attached statement, delivered by
Dr Mundawarara during the Thirty-Eighth Plenary
Session, is circulated to delegates at his request.

Lancaster House

26 November 1979

DR MUNDAWARARA:

Mr Chairman: on the 19th November we asked for clarification of various points in the British Government's outline proposals for ceasefire arrangements. On the 22nd November you tabled the document containing details of the British Government's proposal for a ceasefire in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. We have made extensive and careful consideration of the full proposals and we are satisfied that all important issues bearing on the ceasefire arrangements have been brought into clear focus in the two documents you have tabled.

First let me put on record that the British Government's proposals for a ceasefire contain many aspects which we find extremely unpalatable. They involve submission of our forces and police to the authority of a representative of another Government. These same forces would, in respect of these proposed arrangements, be subject not only to supervision by a British Governor but also to the scrutiny at all upper and middle rank structures of military officers from Britain and other countries introduced into our forces as monitoring force. In ordinary circumstances, all these proposed arrangements for ceasefire would amount to an intolerable interference with the sovereignty of our state, the authority of our force commanders and the general functions of our security forces and police.

Furthermore, in our view the fairest and most effective arrangement for the disengagement of the forces should be one which requires the invading forces to return to their initial bases of operation - Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique - and the

/incumbent

incumbent forces to be confined within their own borders.

Mr Chairman, when you presented the basic principles and broad outlines of the British Government's proposals for the ceasefire arrangements on 16th November, you confirmed our own view that after the Conference had reached agreement on the Independence Constitution and on the arrangements for the interim period there no longer was a valid reason for continuing hostilities which merely inflict needless suffering and death on our people and those of the neighbouring countries. In the same statement, you stressed, as we have done on a number of occasions, your concern for a speedy agreement on a ceasefire and an end to these negotiations.

Our own contribution in this regard is unsurpassed. Following the failure of the Geneva Conference in 1976 both leaders of the Patriotic Front were continually invited to participate in the transitional government while direct negotiations for internal settlement were underway. The British Labour Party Government was also invited to participate in the drafting of our constitution. However both the Patriotic Front and Her Majesty's Government rejected the offer. As a result, we had no alternative but to go ahead with our democratic plans.

Whilst the members of the Executive Council of the transitional government were in Washington, we urged the British and American Governments to convene an all party settlement conference without any pre-conditions attached. We even proposed that such a conference should take place within the following two weeks.

/Immediately

Immediately following our elections in April of this year, our Government of National Unity launched a far-reaching amnesty offer to the Patriotic Front leaders and their followers to return home in safety and without fear of arrest, imprisonment, or any other form of penalty for crimes they may have committed. To date our Ministers together with other Members of Parliament have conducted 376 amnesty meetings. A large number of guerrillas have since taken advantage of the campaign and returned home to live in peace. In July this year, and again in response to the Chairman's request at the beginning of this Conference, my Government agreed to observe and maintain a ceasefire if the Patriotic Front were prepared to accept this undertaking. But the Patriotic Front publicly rejected the idea altogether. We are prepared to stop all cross-border operations if the Patriotic Front can accept a similar undertaking. However, there has been no response from the Patriotic Front. Meanwhile the crossing of armed Patriotic Front personnel from Zambia and Mozambique into Zimbabwe Rhodesia is continuing at full scale and we will have to take action to prevent their infiltration. The fact in point Mr Chairman is that we threaten no one and we do not want war, but we have no intention of letting our adversaries destroy our nation.

In our own view legitimate armed struggle for freedom and democracy has already achieved its purpose with the onset of the first majority rule government in April. The government which rebelled against Her Majesty's Government is now out of power. The fact in point is that while the Patriotic Front are merely

/engaged

engaged in fighting the battles of the past, my Government have done more than what is expected of us to bring about an end of the war and effect peaceful and reconciliatory settlement to our national problem.

Mr Chairman, before I make further comment on the expanded British Government's proposals for a ceasefire, I would like with your permission to clear several important points in the interest of this Conference. First of all, it is always annoying for us to listen to the insulting allegations levelled at us by the Patriotic Front delegation. Recently the Patriotic Front have accused my delegation of evading our responsibility and complicating the procedure of the Conference by not tabling our own proposals and refusing to consider any ceasefire proposals other than those put forward by Britain. Clearly these allegations are unfounded and totally unsupported by facts. Let me remind the Conference that I and my delegation did not come to Lancaster House merely to engage in verbal slanging matches and rhetoric contests or to produce a proliferation of the so called formula or position papers. We already have embarked on a comprehensive programme for ending the war as I have indicated above. Rather we came here at the request of the British Government to negotiate an agreement on the basis of what the British Government demanded of us to do in order to correct defects in our constitution, bring about an end to the war and remove trade sanctions against our country.

Furthermore Mr Chairman, the Patriotic Front have now started asking for direct talks with our military commanders.

/You

You Mr Chairman were asked if my delegation objected to this procedure; you rightly indicated that you did not know our attitude on this question. In any case we have not reacted to this suggestion for a number of reasons, but, for the record, I wish now to state our view. For the first seven weeks of this Conference the Patriotic Front delegation consistently denied to acknowledge the very existence of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Government. They stated and I quote, that they were prepared to negotiate only with the British Government. Indeed they completely refused to engage in any direct discussion with us even to the extent of protesting against their having to sit while facing my delegation on this Conference table, and boycotting the British Government's all-Conference delegation reception on account that they did not want to mingle with us. Mr Chairman, in my country the military commanders are responsible to the elected government of the day. If the Patriotic Front wish to negotiate directly with us, they will have to negotiate with my Government. If not, then they must continue to negotiate with the British Government as we have been doing.

If, however, the Patriotic Front accept the British Government's proposals for the ceasefire, a common basis will have been established and therefore we will be ready with the participation of our military commanders to discuss in plenary session their implementation on the basis of what is contained in the detailed British Government's document. I must reiterate our firm position, however, that my delegation will not be prepared to base such discussion on the Patriotic

/Front's

Front's proposals. They envisage, among other things, the partition of our country and the establishment of zones which the Patriotic Front claim to control. My delegation will not accept such arrangements. Nor are there any parts of Zimbabwe Rhodesia which are under the control of the Patriotic Front. Furthermore we are most concerned about the passage of time. We have now been here eleven weeks and we can see no point in further general discussion.

Turning now to the matter of your proposed arrangements for ceasefire, Mr Chairman, I have already indicated that the British Government's proposals for ceasefire are not ideal in some important respects. However, in the light of our over-riding desire to bring about a ceasefire and an end to the war, my delegation, after long and anxious consideration have decided to accept the British Government's proposals for ceasefire arrangements as set forth in both your outline of principles and the detailed document.

While we cannot precisely establish the extent or degree to which these complex arrangements will be successfully implemented, it is our firm view that they, in conjunction with the arrangements for the interim period, provide the best possible framework for the creation and maintenance of an effective ceasefire. It is our understanding that both the arrangements for the interim period and ceasefire are essentially transitional - paving the way for the granting of full responsible status to a new Republic of Zimbabwe. In our hope for the future, we are under no illusion about the magnitude of the task that lies ahead of us for translating these agreements into a real and durable settlement.

/Having

Having accepted the proposals for the ceasefire arrangements I would like to make further observations in relation to the time scale. In the initial proposals tabled by you Mr Chairman on 16th November the time for the ceasefire to come into operation was stated to be not more than 7 to 10 days. It was the stated view of the British Government that this period should be kept as short as possible. We entirely agree. In your fuller proposals tabled on 22nd November this period is not specified with the same degree of clarity as in the earlier document. As far as we are aware there has been no change in the proposals in respect of the time scale and we are therefore assuming for the purpose of our acceptance that this remains at not more than 7 to 10 days.

Finally, Mr Chairman, I would like to reiterate that our acceptance of the British Government's proposals for the ceasefire arrangements, as we have done so in respect of the Independence Constitution and arrangements for the interim period, clearly indicate our strong desire to achieve a final settlement which can lay the foundations for a free, democratic and independent Zimbabwe. What now remains is to bring an end to bitter and unnecessary war. All of us have a grave responsibility to end the armed conflict which for a long time has overshadowed the lives of all our people and nation. We must therefore take immediate action to give effect to this objective by accepting the proposals for ceasefire put before us by the British Government.

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CC(79)88

COPY NO:

89

THIRTY-EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth
Plenary Session of the Conference, Monday
26th November 1979.

Lancaster House

26 November 1979

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PRESENT:

UK Delegation

Sir I Gilmour Bt (in the Chair)

Mr R Luce

Mr D M Day

Gen M Farndale

Mr R W Renwick

Mr P R N Fifoot

Mr N M Fenn

Mr C D Powell

Mr R Jackling

Col C Dunphie

Mr P J Barlow

Mr B Watkins

Mr A M Layden

Mr S J Gomersall

Mrs A J Phillips

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The session commenced at 17.10.

THE CHAIRMAN explained that the Patriotic Front delegation would not be coming to the session. They had attended a bilateral meeting at the Foreign Office that morning and there had been some argument over procedure. A further bilateral meeting would probably be held with them the following day at which the Chairman hoped that progress would be made.

DR MUNDAWARARA delivered a statement which was subsequently circulated as Conference Paper CC(79)89.

THE CHAIRMAN thanked Dr Mundawarara for his statement. His delegation very much welcomed Bishop Muzorewa's delegation's acceptance of the British proposals.

DR MUNDAWARARA asked whether the Chairman could respond to his question regarding the time-scale made in his statement (CC(79)89). THE CHAIRMAN said that considered comments would be given in full plenary session as soon as possible.

MR D C SMITH emphasized the substantial concessions made by his delegation during the Conference: he hoped that the UK delegation would recognize these concessions, which had been made to try to achieve a satisfactory solution in the interests of the welfare of their continent and people. They did not agree with the British proposals simply for the sake of doing so.

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THE CHAIRMAN said that his delegation appreciated these concessions. Agreement would be possible only if concessions were made by all sides.

In reply to a question from DR MUNDAWARARA, THE CHAIRMAN said that the Patriotic Front delegation had been aware that a plenary session had been called; he could not, however, force them to attend. They had not wanted a plenary session to take place at this time, but the British delegation had said that, as a plenary session had been arranged, one would take place. The British delegation responded whenever delegations asked for a plenary session to be held, but could not ensure attendance.

The session ended at 17.30.

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

CC(79)87
CONFERENCE PAPER

COPY NO:

89

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON

The attached document contains the British Government's amplified proposals for the establishment and maintenance of the ceasefire and is circulated to delegates at the request of the Chairman

Lancaster House
22 November 1979

RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS

1. The British Government puts forward the following amplified proposals for the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive monitored cease-fire agreement.

BASIS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

2. The purpose of the cease-fire is to bring an immediate end to hostilities and to establish peaceful conditions which will allow elections to take place, the people of Zimbabwe to choose their future government and Zimbabwe to become independent on the terms which have been agreed at this conference. Given a commitment by all the parties to abide by the results of the elections, it will also provide a basis on which post-war military problems can be resolved by agreement and a lasting peace can be established.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CEASE-FIRE

3. The Commanders of the forces involved will be directly responsible to the Governor for the maintenance of the cease-fire by all the forces under their command.

4. The Governor will be assisted by a British Military Adviser of the rank of Major-General. The Rhodesian security forces and the Patriotic Front will nominate equal numbers of military representatives to a Cease-fire Commission which will be established in Salisbury from the beginning of the cease-fire. The Chairman of the Commission will be the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will meet as required throughout the cease-fire. Its functions will include:

a. ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;

/b.

- b. the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the cease-fire; and
- c. such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.

The Commission will be independent of existing command structures and the Governor may at his discretion communicate with any commander concerning the exercise of their functions. Any member of the Commission may invite it to discuss any question which appears to him to be relevant to its functions.

MONITORING THE CEASE-FIRE

5. The British Government will be responsible for the establishment of a monitoring force which will assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the forces and assist the Cease-fire Commission in its tasks. The organisation will operate under the authority of the Governor and the command of his Military Adviser. The Commanders of the Rhodesian security forces and of the Patriotic Front forces will be required to undertake to co-operate fully with the monitoring force and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions.

6. Elements of the monitoring force will be assigned:
- a. to maintain contact with the Rhodesian security forces and Patriotic Front forces command structures throughout Rhodesia;
 - b. to monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces; and
 - c. to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the cease-fire.

7. For this purpose liaison and monitoring teams will be established as follows.

- a. five liaison teams, each led by a senior officer (ie of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel) will be assigned to maintain contact with each of the security forces Joint Operations Commands (JOCs);
- b. a number of teams of equivalent rank will be assigned to maintain contact with the Patriotic Front forces command structure;
- c. fifteen teams, each led by a junior officer (ie Captain or Lieutenant) will be located with the security forces at sub-JOC level;
- d. a number of teams led by a Lieutenant or Senior NCO will be located at security forces company base level;
- e. up to fifteen teams, each led by an officer, will be located at places designated for assembly of Patriotic Front forces;
- f. up to twelve teams, each led by an officer, will be located at border crossing points; and
- g. two teams, each commanded by an officer of the rank of Flight Lieutenant or Squadron Leader, will be located at military airfields.

8. The force will be organised under British auspices; and the majority of its personnel will be British. The Australian, New Zealand, Kenyan and Fijian governments have agreed to participate in the monitoring force. Members of the force

/will

will carry weapons for their personal protection only and will be provided with vehicles and helicopters carrying a distinctive marking. The force will be equipped with an independent radio communications network.

DISPOSITIONS OF THE FORCES

9. Disengagement of the forces will be essential to an effective cease-fire and the deployment of the monitoring force. The activities of the security forces and their maintenance of the cease-fire will be monitored from their existing bases. In the case of the Patriotic Front forces at present inside Rhodesia, it will be essential that they should assemble at predetermined places so that their maintenance of the cease-fire can be similarly monitored and arrangements can be made for their security, accommodation and other agreed requirements.

10. Up to fifteen such places will be designated for this purpose. In addition, a larger number of intermediate collection points will be designated to which Patriotic Front personnel will report with their arms and ^{equipment} during the initial phase of the cease-fire and from which they will make their way by agreed safe-routes to their assembly places. A Patriotic Front representative and a monitoring team will be present at each intermediate collection point during this phase. The police and defence forces will not be involved in the assembly process and will not be present at the collection points. Patriotic Front personnel will be guaranteed safe passage from the collection points to their assembly places.

CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY

11. A major objective of the cease-fire arrangements must be to secure a cessation of all movement by the security forces into neighbouring

/countries

countries and by the Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia. The Governor will be responsible for ensuring compliance with this requirement by the forces inside Rhodesia. The governments of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique will be invited to agree on effective cross-border liaison arrangements to ensure compliance with this requirement for forces based outside Rhodesia and to prevent cross-border movements by such forces. This will involve the establishment of liaison officers outside Rhodesia. At the same time, provision must be made to permit the return of civilian personnel to Rhodesia during the cease-fire in order to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. Up to twelve border crossing points will be established, under the supervision of the monitoring force, for this purpose.

THE TIME SCALE

12. A fully effective cease-fire cannot come into operation immediately. Time will be required for the transmission of orders to subordinate commanders in the field and for the implementation of the agreed arrangements for the separation of the opposing forces. But it is essential that the cease-fire should be brought into operation quickly if it is to be effective. It is therefore proposed that as soon as agreement has been reached on the cease-fire:-

- a. All parties should issue instructions forthwith for its implementation on a given date. All cross-border military activity will cease. Elements of the monitoring force will be despatched to Rhodesia;
- b. On cease-fire day the Cease-fire Commission will be established. The monitoring force will deploy to the collection points and assembly places for the Patriotic Front forces. All hostilities within Rhodesia will cease. The process of assembly of the forces will begin immediately and should take not more than seven days. The completion of the deployment of the monitoring force will have taken place by then.

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13. During the cease-fire the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order will rest with the police, acting under the Governor's authority and supervision. All forces which have assembled and accepted the Governor's authority and continue to comply with his directions will be acting lawfully. Any forces which fail to assemble, and fail to accept the Governor's authority and abide by the cease-fire agreement, will be acting unlawfully. The primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the cease-fire will rest with the Commanders on both sides, through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of the liaison teams operating with the forces at area level. It will be for the Commanders to ensure, with the assistance of the monitoring force, that breaches of the cease-fire are contained and dealt with. In the event of more general or sustained breaches of the cease-fire, the Governor will have to decide what action to take to deal with them with the forces which have accepted his authority.

INSTRUCTIONS TO MILITARY PERSONNEL

14. The leaders on each side will ensure that clear and precise instructions are issued to all units and personnel under their command to comply scrupulously with the agreed arrangements for bringing the cease-fire into effect. The leaders of the delegations at the Conference will make announcements, immediately following the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement, which will be broadcast regularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain the cease-fire reach all the forces under their command and are understood by the public in general.

THE LONGER TERM

15. An effective cease-fire during the pre-independence period, a peaceful election campaign and an election the result of which

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is accepted and respected by all parties will bring about a permanent end to the war. Many of those at present under arms will wish to return to civilian life. Others will wish to continue to pursue a military career. Decisions on post-war military planning will be a matter for the government which will be constituted following the elections and under which Zimbabwe will become independent. The British Government will be ready to assist with the re-training and resettlement of those elements of the forces which wish to pursue a civil career.

CC(79)86

COPY NO:

89

CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

LANCASTER HOUSE

LONDON

The attached statement, delivered by the Chairman during the Thirty-Seventh Plenary Session, is circulated to delegates at his request.

Lancaster House

22 November 1979

LORD CARRINGTON:

When this Conference opened, I stressed the urgent need to reach an agreement which would bring an end to the war. The Conference has now been in progress for ten weeks. We have reached agreement on the Independence Constitution and on the arrangements which will enable the people of Rhodesia to choose for themselves their future government. There can be no valid reason for the continuation of the hostilities which have brought and are continuing to bring needless suffering to the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries.

In the Conference on 16 November, I said that I hoped it would be possible to reach agreement on a cease-fire within a matter of days. The chances of success will not be improved by further delay. My fears about the consequences of delay have been realised with a sharp increase in tension between Rhodesia and Zambia.

The only solution is rapid agreement in this Conference on a cease-fire and the acceptance by all the forces of the authority of the British Governor. We have reached political agreement. It remains our duty to help you to find a way to work together and to bring the hostilities to an end. The British Government is therefore today tabling full proposals for the implementation of a ceasefire. They will be circulated immediately after this. I repeat that there is an urgent need to take decisions on this. I would ask both delegations to let me know whether or not they can accept our proposals by Monday 26 November.

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In addition as an immediate measure to reduce the danger of a further escalation of the conflict the British Government propose that an agreement should immediately be concluded in order to avoid any further increase in tension between Rhodesia and Zambia. This agreement would have the following elements:

- a. the Rhodesian authorities will give an undertaking that no cross-border operations will be carried out by Rhodesia into Zambia;
- b. the leaders of the Patriotic Front will give an undertaking that, with immediate effect, no further movement of armed Patriotic Front personnel will take place from Zambia into Rhodesia; and
- c. the cooperation of the Zambian authorities will be essential to bring the agreement into effect.

The British Prime Minister has been in touch with President Kaunda about this matter. The elements of this agreement would take effect simultaneously.

I would be very grateful to know the reactions of both delegations in this Conference to that particular proposal and if they would consider it overnight and perhaps let me know tomorrow.

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CC(79)85

COPY NO: 89

THIRTY-SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh
Plenary Session of the Conference, Thursday
22 November 1979.

Lancaster House
22 November 1979

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PRESENT:

UK Delegation

Lord Carrington (in the Chair)

Mr R Luce

Mr D M Day

Gen M Farndale

Mr R W Renwick

Mr P R N Fifoot

Mr N M Fenn

Mr G G H Walden

Mr C D Powell

Mr R Jackling

Col C Dunphie

Mr P J Barlow

Mr B Watkins

Mr A M Layden

Mr S J Gomersall

Mrs A J Phillips

Mr M C Wood

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation

Dr S C Mundawarara

Mr D C Smith

Dr J Kamusikiri

Air Vice Marshal H Hawkins

Mr D Zamchiya

Gen P Walls

Mr P Allum

Mr P Claypole

Mr A MacMillan

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Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation

Mr J M Nkomo	Mr R G Mugabe
Mr J M Chinamano	Gen J M Tongogara
Mr J W Msika	Dr H Ushewokunze
Mr A M Chambati	Mr D Mutumbuka
Mr W Musarurwa	Mr J Tungamirai
Mr D Dabengwa	Mr E Zvobgo
Mr A Ndlovu	Mr S Mubako
Mr R Austin	Mr W Kamba
Mr E Siziba	Mr R Manyika

Secretariat

Mr J M Willson

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The session started at 17.04.

THE CHAIRMAN opened the proceedings by delivering a statement which was subsequently circulated as Conference Paper CC(79)86. He said that he would circulate the proposals referred to in the third paragraph of the statement after he had heard any comments either delegation wished to make. The proposals were subsequently circulated as Conference Paper CC(79)87.

MR NKOMO said that reaching an agreement on the ceasefire as soon as possible was also the aim of the Patriotic Front, but a quick agreement should not be at the expense of going into detail on matters essential for peace. A lasting peace could only be reached if an agreement were worked out covering those elements/essential to bring it about. It had been agreed that small groups should meet for discussions; his delegation had been meeting the British delegation for the last two or three days and had stressed the importance of meeting the Salisbury group. He took a ceasefire to mean a ceasefire between the Patriotic Front forces and the Salisbury regime forces. He had thought that the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury Delegation would meet together, under a British Chairman, to discuss these essentials but this had not happened. How then could they move towards an agreement?

Mr Nkomo went on to say that the other statement made by the Chairman came as a surprise to his delegation. The

/Chairman

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Chairman had said that there was a need for an agreement and had asked for a reply the following day. He was not very certain of the implications of this but if it were about the Salisbury forces' destruction of Zambian infrastructure that could not be attributed to the Patriotic Front forces moving on bridges in Zambia. They were in Zimbabwe; if any bridges were to be destroyed they should be in Zimbabwe, not in Zambia. The Patriotic Front did not use transport which required bridges. This was aggression against Zambia and the British should address themselves to those people who were violating the territorial integrity of Zambia, and not to the Patriotic Front. They had a duty to do that while the men who controlled the Zimbabwe forces were in London.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he would try to answer the two points made by Mr Nkomo. He was glad that Mr Nkomo saw the need for speed in reaching a ceasefire agreement and he felt that as time went on there was a danger that the achievements of the Conference would be lost. If agreement were not reached all those at the Conference would be culpable at this very last stage; he feared that the longer the delay the more likely that was to happen.

Mr Nkomo had said that he would have preferred other sorts of meeting; a Chairman was always in a difficult position on these matters. He could not tell people to meet if they did not want to. What a Chairman had to do was to decide how to achieve the best progress towards an agreement.

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The British delegation had concluded that, in the circumstances, the only way to get progress was to talk individually to the delegations and to obtain their reactions so that they had an idea of their thinking. Both delegations had been good enough to accept, subject to certain reservations, the earlier proposals made by the British Government. The British proposals had been put forward in the real belief that, insofar as was possible, they took account of the fears and difficulties of each side. In a discussion neither side could get all it wanted.

He was now asking both delegations to look at the paper which would shortly be circulated (CC(79)87). It was broader in scope and longer than the previous paper (CC(79)79), and he would like to have their reactions. These were broad proposals which he asked them to accept and details could be thrashed out later. If delegations did not agree to this procedure he did not see how the Conference was to make progress.

On Mr Nkomo's second point, about the situation in Zambia, the Chairman said that he was not seeking to place the blame on anyone. He wanted to achieve a situation in which a ceasefire could be agreed. Over the past few days a situation had arisen in Zambia which, unless steps were taken, could make the work of the Conference much more difficult. If there was no cross-border movement of Patriotic Front forces from Zambia into Rhodesia, then neither the Patriotic Front nor the Zambian Government had any problem. In return, the Rhodesians would

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be asked to give an undertaking not to mount cross-border operations. The object of his proposals was to seek to reduce the tension which had grown in the last few days, and to try to prevent the Conference breaking down at the last moment. He asked the delegations to look at the British proposals and let him know whether or not they could accept them.

MR MUGABE said that the British delegation had suggested that the Conference now proceed to discussions of a second, more detailed, stage of the ceasefire arrangements. The British had already circulated their broad outlines and basic principles; so had the Patriotic Front, but their proposals had not been discussed. There appeared to be a reluctance on the part of the Salisbury group to participate in discussions with the Patriotic Front. If this were so, it should be made clear and the Patriotic Front would consider alternatives. Until this was done, discussions could not proceed; essential principles had not yet been agreed. The Chairman should address himself to the correct procedure. The political aspects of the Conference had been concluded, but the implementation of any agreement would depend on a ceasefire. There were two forces in conflict but he could not see how a ceasefire agreement could be reached on the basis of discussions with the British alone. Were the British involved directly in conflict with the Patriotic Front? How could progress be made without involving the other side? Were the Salisbury delegation prepared to discuss this issue with the Patriotic Front?

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With regard to the attacks in Zambia, he saw no reason why this had been raised at the Conference. The British Government knew who the aggressor was. Why did they not speak directly to them? Attacks of this kind had gone on for a long time and now the British Government suggested restraint should be exercised in respect of the incidents in Zambia. But what about incidents in Mozambique, Botswana and Angola?

THE CHAIRMAN said that the British had put forward the proposal on Zambia in a genuine effort to defuse the situation; it would be a great pity if it were rejected. He merely sought an undertaking that the movement of armed Patriotic Front personnel from Zambia into Rhodesia should cease. The reason which had been given for the action by the Salisbury forces was cross border movement by Patriotic Front personnel. He made no judgement on this; he merely wanted the situation to be defused.

On the earlier matter mentioned by Mr Mugabe, the Chairman said that the Conference had been discussing the British and Patriotic Front proposals for quite some time, and the British had made clear their views on the Patriotic Front proposals. He now wanted the Patriotic Front to look at the second British paper to see whether or not they could accept it. Any detailed points arising could be discussed later.

MR MSIKA said that he personally considered that the Conference had not succeeded in doing what a normal conference would do. The Chairman had admitted that he was
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not able to compel people to discuss matters if they did not wish to do so. The Chairman had earlier insisted that a Governor would be appointed who would carry out certain functions. But why should he be able to do what the Chairman had not been able to do? Was the Chairman trying to say that, though the Salisbury group refused to discuss matters with the Patriotic Front in London, they would do so in Rhodesia? Did he want the Patriotic Front to gloss over problems which could lead to disaster, just because the Chairman wanted a speedy agreement? The two delegations should sit down and discuss matters with the Chairman present. How otherwise could lasting peace be achieved? Was he asking the Patriotic Front to surrender to the Salisbury régime?

THE CHAIRMAN said that what he was asking was that both delegations should accept the basis of the paper which he was about to circulate. MR MSIKA said that the paper did not address the issues. THE CHAIRMAN pointed out that the other delegations had not yet seen the paper. What he was asking was that they should look at the British proposals over the weekend and give him their reaction to it. Criticisms of the way he was running the Conference had been made but there had been a measure of success. No one was asking the Patriotic Front to surrender; he was asking both delegations to agree to the basis of the paper which would now be circulated. The Salisbury delegation had indicated that they were prepared to undertake further discussions on the basis of the original

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British paper. He would be asking the Patriotic Front on the following Monday if, having read the second British paper, they would be prepared to do the same.

MR MUGABE asked whether the Salisbury delegation had refused to negotiate direct with the Patriotic Front under the Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN said that they had not done so to his knowledge, but that they should speak for themselves.

GEN TONGOGARA reminded the Chairman that, during the bilateral meeting with the UK delegation the previous day, the Patriotic Front delegation had asked Britain to request the Rhodesian delegation to meet the Patriotic Front so that these problems could be gone through. At the bilateral meeting the Patriotic Front delegation had insisted that they had laid down the basis of a ceasefire. They wanted the other side to put down their basis for a ceasefire also. These were the two forces in conflict; his delegation could not secure an agreement with Britain. His delegation had expected the Chairman to reply on that point, ie whether the Rhodesians were or were not prepared to discuss matters with the Patriotic Front. The agreement that the Conference was seeking would be put into effect in Salisbury; his delegation could not sit with the Rhodesians in Salisbury if the latter were not prepared to talk to them.

THE CHAIRMAN confessed that he was more interested in proceeding with the substance of the matter than in dealing with procedure. He repeated that he would shortly circulate some detailed proposals, and his delegation would like a

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response to those from both delegations. Both visiting delegations would be involved in that response through participation in the Conference; the Conference could then proceed.

MR NKOMO requested an answer to the question put earlier by Mr Mugabe. THE CHAIRMAN again said that the Salisbury delegation could answer for themselves. MR NKOMO responded that they seemed rather to answer proposals from Britain. If they would not talk, this should be stated.

THE CHAIRMAN reiterated that the visiting delegations had not yet seen the British Government's proposals which were now being tabled and which took account of their discussions with both delegations. He asked the Patriotic Front delegation to be prepared on the following Monday to let him know their views on the proposals. MR NKOMO replied that this was not the British role on this issue.

THE CHAIRMAN said he did not understand how the Conference could proceed unless the British delegation put forward proposals which both sides could accept or reject.

MR MUGABE questioned the procedure to be adopted. His delegation had put forward basic proposals and did not know what the Salisbury delegation thought of them. He did not say that proposals should not be put forward; the question was, however, who were the parties to agree to them and in what form.

THE CHAIRMAN replied that both parties had to agree. The Conference would reconvene to discuss the proposals in order to
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accept or reject them. The Salisbury delegation had not seen the proposals at that point either: their attitude, and that of Mr Mugabe's and Mr Nkomo's delegation, would become known at a subsequent session. He repeated his proposal to circulate the British document, and again requested delegations to consider it and give their answer to it the following Monday.

MR NKOMO made a plea that the Chairman should not act in that way. One could not have a ceasefire by proxy through Britain. He warned the Chairman not to come the following Monday and expect an answer from his delegation without discussions: the Chairman would not get one. The issue needed to be discussed. THE CHAIRMAN reiterated his hope that delegations would look at the proposals and reflect on what he had said.

The session ended at 17.42.

CC(79)84
CONFERENCE PAPER

COPY NO: 89

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON

The attached statement, delivered
by the Lord Privy Seal during the
Thirty-Sixth Plenary Session, is
circulated to delegates at his request

Lancaster House
20 November 1979

We have studied very carefully the Patriotic Front's paper which was circulated to the Conference on 19 November. I welcome this contribution to our discussions, though I am bound to say that in some respects the paper introduces concepts which are unlikely to provide a basis for agreement at this Conference or for a cease-fire which will in practice be observed by the respective forces.

In the first place, I should like to turn to the section of the Patriotic Front's paper which deals with the demarcation of cease-fire areas. By the very nature of the war, the forces are at present, as the Patriotic Front acknowledge, in close contact with each other over wide areas of the country. It is essential that arrangements should be made which will ensure that the cease-fire is not jeopardised by close proximity of the forces.

I do not see how it will be possible to reach agreement on the basis of the allocation of areas to the control of one side or the other, if that is what the Patriotic Front are proposing. The Patriotic Front claim to be in control of very large areas of the country in which martial law is at present in force. Bishop Muzorewa's delegation claim precisely the opposite. Any attempt to demarcate areas of control as between one side and the other would result in our discussions being prolonged indefinitely, with little prospect of agreement ever being reached.

/Moreover,

Moreover, any cease-fire based on demarcation of areas "controlled" or "dominated" by one side or the other is contrary to the basis on which we have been operating in this Conference. If there is an effective cease-fire, all the national territory will be under the control of the Governor. If we accepted that particular areas of the country are to be under the control of one side or the other in the war, we should be talking about a de facto partition of the country. Not only is there no hope of agreeing on how the country should in practice be partitioned; it is also impossible to conceive how in these circumstances a free and fair election can be held, with all parties given an equal opportunity to campaign throughout the country.

The British Government do not accept that it is practicable to envisage a peace-keeping force which will actually enforce the cease-fire. The responsibility for the observance and the maintenance of the cease-fire must rest in the first instance with the respective forces and their commanders. If the forces have agreed to maintain the cease-fire there must be an effective machinery through which both sides can be assured that alleged or threatened breaches of the cease-fire will be investigated and appropriate measures devised to stop such breaches recurring or spreading. The British Government's proposals make provision for this, through the mechanism of a Cease-fire Commission on which the commanders on both sides will be represented. What is not conceivable is that other countries would be willing

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to commit forces whose task would be to intervene between the opposing forces so as to compel them to observe the cease-fire. It would not be practicable to deploy a cease-fire monitoring force except on the basis of the disengagement of the forces in such a way as to ensure that there is minimal risk of contact between them.

I am concerned by some implications of what the Patriotic Front say in their paper about the maintenance of law and order during the cease-fire. I welcome their agreement that this will be the task of the civil police. But they also assert that the cease-fire agreement must set up "criteria and machinery for the determination and establishment of the civil police" and that there should be a police component in a Commonwealth peace-keeping force. We have already made clear that the British Government do not believe it will be practicable during the interim to create a new police force. The police will act under the authority and supervision of the Governor and his police advisers.

The Patriotic Front's paper envisages that certain military and para-military units will be disbanded as part of the cease-fire agreement. All the forces in Rhodesia will be required by the Governor to respect the cease-fire. If any force fails to do so, it will be for him to determine what action should be taken. We do not envisage disbanding any units, either of the Patriotic Front or of the Rhodesian forces.

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I should like now to turn to deal with the questions raised by Dr Mundawarara at yesterday's meeting. He began by asking for clarification of the reference in paragraph 4 of the British delegation's paper to "machinery ... for the assessment and maintenance of the cease-fire". I confirm that this means the machinery described later in the paper - ie the British Military Adviser and his team, the Cease-fire Commission and the monitoring force.

Dr Mundawarara then asked for more information about the size and composition of the monitoring group. We are thinking in terms of thirty-five monitoring teams. The group will be under British auspices. Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji have agreed to contribute to it. The exact size of the group remains to be determined; but it will be several hundred strong.

Dr Mundawarara asked for further information about the assembly of Patriotic Front forces. Disengagement of the forces will be essential to an effective cease-fire and the deployment of the monitoring force. We envisage that all Patriotic Front forces at present inside Rhodesia will assemble during the run-down to the cease-fire at places determined in advance at this Conference. Adequate arrangements must be made for their agreed requirements.

Finally, Dr Mundawarara asked if any party which condoned or advocated violence would be banned and/or excluded from the election. My answer to that is that the Governor will guarantee

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freedom to campaign for any party which is willing to campaign peacefully and lawfully and without resorting to intimidation. All parties participating in the elections must commit themselves to this.

I very much hope that our discussions, whether in plenary meetings or in meetings between experts, can now focus on the main elements in the British delegation's paper. These are that:

- a. the primary responsibility for the observance of the cease-fire will rest with the forces of either side and their commanders;
- b. the military commanders on both sides will be represented on a Cease-fire Commission under the chairmanship of the Governor's Military Adviser;
- c. a cease-fire monitoring force under the United Kingdom's auspices, with the participation of certain other Commonwealth governments, will be deployed, provided there is agreement on a satisfactory basis for the disengagement of the opposing forces;
- d. there must be arrangements for the agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces assembled inside Rhodesia.

We are fully prepared now to begin explaining our proposals in more detail to the other delegations. This process must start at once and I hope there will be further meetings today. Now that we have achieved so wide a measure of agreement on the political framework for a settlement, it would surely be unforgivable to prolong the discussions on a cease-fire.

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CC(79)83

COPY NO. 89

THIRTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the
Thirty-Sixth Plenary Session of the
Conference, Tuesday 20 November 1979

Lancaster House
20 November 1979

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PRESENT:

UK Delegation

Sir I Gilmour (in the Chair)

Mr R Luce

Mr D M Day

Gen M Farndale

Mr R W Renwick

Mr P R N Fifoot

Mr N M Fenn

Mr C D Powell

Mr R Jackling

Mr P J Barlow

Mr R D Wilkinson

Mr S J Gomersall

Mrs A J Phillips

Mr M C Wood

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Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation

Mr R G Mugabe	Mr J M Nkomo
Mr E Z Tekere	Mr J M Chinamano
Gen J M Tongogara	Mr J W Msika
Mr E R Kadungure	Mr A M Chambati
Dr H Ushewokunze	Mr D Dabengwa
Mr J Tungamirai	Mr R Mpoko
Mr S Mubako	Mr A Ndlovu
Mr W Kamba	Mr R Austin
Mr R Manyika	Miss E Siziba

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Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation

Dr S C Mundawarara
Mr D C Smith
Dr J Kamusikiri
Air Vice Marshal H Hawkins
Mr D Zamchiya
Gen P Walls
Mr P K Allum
Mr K Flower
Mr P Claypole
Mr A MacMillan

Secretariat

Mr J M Willson

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The session started at 09.12.

THE CHAIRMAN commenced by delivering a statement subsequently circulated as Conference Paper CC(79)84. He then invited delegations to comment.

MR MUGABE objected to the haphazard procedure proposed by the Chairman. Positions on these crucial matters had to be explained and dealt with in full, not in the cursory manner adopted by the Chairman. His delegation had stipulated basic principles. They had progressed towards the liberation of their country; the Conference should not be a forum for reversing those advances in order to promote the position of the other side. They had several times expressed the fear that the British Government were not really aiming to achieve peace, but rather to create what might seem peaceful conditions on the surface, but which would in fact promote greater chaos. The realities of the struggle had to be taken into account.

His delegation would not therefore be rushed through the British paper (CC(79)79) when doing so would promote further conflict rather than peace. They believed that their proposals (CC(79)82) could bring about peace; the British proposals were not adequate for this purpose.

The Chairman had only replied to one or two of his delegation's basic principles; the remainder had received no comment. Were the other provisions accepted or not accepted? They should be examined one by one and their merits and demerits argued. Conference procedure should not merely entail the

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presentation of the British viewpoint or British replies: what the British said was not always correct.

His delegation wanted to promote the creation of peace, peace in the objective sense; terms of surrender should not be dictated to the Patriotic Front. This was unacceptable.

MR NKOMO said that it was obvious that the Chairman was dismissing the Patriotic Front document without considering the reasons for which it had been tabled. The Chairman had not suggested that both the British and Patriotic Front documents should be examined to discover which of the principles would provide the conditions required for free and fair elections. His delegation would like the issues discussed in full. They were not just aiming at a lull in hostilities, they wanted peace. If the Conference was not ready to discuss peace, it should say so.

Mr Nkomo pointed out that they were talking about a war involving some 100,000 armed men and women scattered all over the country; they were not talking merely about a few bands of guerrillas. He did not think the Chairman realised that. A scheme should be worked out which would provide the conditions for free elections, and enable any party winning elections to have an army or a nucleus of an army to work with. The British proposals seemed to be designed to put the Patriotic Front forces on one side and the Rhodesian forces on the other, with a referee in the middle to keep both where they were. Supposing that this
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happened, what would be done with the two armed forces by the party which won the elections? Would the winning side eliminate the other?

Mr Nkomo questioned whether the British plan created conditions for reconciliation during the crucial interim period. Did the British delegation realise that one could not move to independence with two independent armies facing each other? In such circumstances how could an independent Zimbabwe emerge free of the danger of war? The question before the Conference was one of life and death. They had to be certain that any agreed plan would bring about conciliation between the two fighting forces and among the people: anything short of that was unacceptable. They were here to work for peace and not a piecemeal solution which would bring disaster to the country and chaos to the region.

The Conference should look seriously at the Patriotic Front proposals and discuss those which the British delegation thought would not work.

Referring to those countries which had offered men for monitoring duties, Mr Nkomo asked who had invited them. Whom had the British consulted? Was this a matter on which the British issued instructions or was the Conference here to discuss and consult?

Mr Nkomo said that if the British could explain what they proposed for the two forces after elections his delegation would consider the British paper. Why could the British not
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assist the eventual winner of elections by making an effort to bring the two forces together during the interim period? His delegation would not sign any document which would lead to an escalation of the war, disaster and chaos in the region.

DR MUNDAWARARA said that, having received a reply to the questions he raised the previous day, his delegation were now prepared to discuss the British proposals more fully. However, his delegation's discussions would be confined to the British proposals; they would not take part in discussions of any other proposals. THE CHAIRMAN said that he thought that everyone would agree with Mr Nkomo that all present were working for peace, and with Mr Mugabe that the question of the ceasefire was crucial, as indeed was the whole Conference. It was a mistake to think that the British Government were not prepared to discuss the proposals submitted by the Patriotic Front, and he had given some of the reasons why it was considered that they would not lead to a satisfactory agreement. He said that all the proposals would be discussed in the order of the headings of the British paper. It was not his intention to stampede the Conference but it was to everyone's advantage that the ceasefire negotiations should be concluded as soon as possible. The British delegation had been trying to arrange detailed discussions since the previous Saturday; he was sure that the only way to proceed was by preliminary discussions with both delegations, and in view of what had been said it would be better for these to take place with each delegation separately. It would be the quickest way of

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proceeding, on the understanding that the Conference would meet in Plenary if necessary. He proposed that delegations should be in touch in order to arrange meetings later that morning. He hoped that these discussions would remove some or all of the fears expressed by Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo.

MR NKOMO said that, in the case of bilateral discussions, his delegation would not know what the Salisbury delegation had said to the British, and equally the Salisbury delegation would not know what his delegation had had to say. He felt that it was important for each delegation to know what transpired between the other two. Otherwise it would look to his delegation like an orchestrated way of reaching agreement. This had happened during the discussions on the constitution and on the interim arrangements, and now a similar procedure was contemplated for the much more crucial ceasefire discussions. Perhaps when Mr Day was in Salisbury the British had concluded a deal there. Had the British brought the Patriotic Front to London merely to orchestrate matters?

THE CHAIRMAN said that he believed that the best way to proceed would be to have bilateral talks between the Patriotic Front delegation and his delegation, because they had serious doubts about the British proposals and this was the way to dispel the fears which had been expressed. He therefore proposed bilateral discussions later that day.

GEN. TONGOGARA said that the British delegation should not treat this phase of the discussions as they had the earlier

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ones. The Patriotic Front had put forward their proposals and they expected the Salisbury Delegation to put forward their own proposals, not simply to say they agreed to the British proposals. Attempts to isolate the Patriotic Front would not solve the situation. When the Patriotic Front had started guerrilla warfare they were in small units; the other side had said they would crush them, but they never did. Neither delegation had come to London as losers, but to seek peace. They did not want to leave London saying they had achieved peace when they had not. They did not wish the British Government to rush them; it was important that every possibility should be explored. The British had not fully understood the situation in Zimbabwe; but the Patriotic Front and Salisbury delegations did. If agreement were not reached at the Conference there would never be peace in Zimbabwe.

THE CHAIRMAN said that of course everyone desired peace; all he was now proposing was that discussions proceed with the Patriotic Front in an attempt to dispel their doubts; it was not right to say that the British were trying to isolate them. If these discussions failed, they would have to think of some other way of proceeding, but he strongly urged that this was the right way to proceed.

MR MUGABE said that the problem of irregular procedure had not been solved. At a Conference such as the present one it was important that the views of the parties, in the form of proposals, were known to all the other parties. He felt that

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if a party made proposals to the Chairman, whether in plenary or in bilateral session, these should be made available to the other side. At the Geneva Conference the third party had always been informed of what transpired at bilaterals between the other two; this was not the case with the present Conference. Were secret deals taking place? Was there collusion between the Salisbury delegation and the British? He did not know what proposals had been made by the Salisbury delegation. THE CHAIRMAN said he did not think there was any general procedural point involved; ^{in any Conference} /there were discussions behind the scenes, "through the usual channels". The British delegation had for several days proposed discussions with the Patriotic Front and with the Salisbury delegation; the latter had accepted. They should now proceed with a bilateral meeting as soon as possible to try to resolve the Patriotic Front's doubts.

The session ended at 10.02.

CC(79) 82

COPY NO: 89

CONFERENCE PAPER

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON

The attached document, tabled during the Thirty-Fifth Plenary Session, is circulated to delegates at the request of Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation.

Lancaster House

19 November 1979

PATRIOTIC FRONT

PROPOSALS ON BASIC

PRINCIPLES FOR A CEASEFIRE.

INTRODUCTION

1. The Ceasefire Agreement, made between the National Liberation Armies of the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian Army as equal entities, marks the final stage in the process of Zimbabwean Self-Determination. It will put the seal on the effort to replace a purely military solution with one which is peaceful and political, whereby the parties to the conflict will make a solemn, autonomous agreement to cease hostilities in return for an independence constitution and satisfactory interim arrangements leading to free and fair elections.
2. The Nature of the Ceasefire.
 - 2.1. There will be a declaration by both parties of a general cessation of hostilities in respect of all their military and para-military forces.
 - 2.2. The Ceasefire Agreement must provide proper machinery to ensure its observance and enforcement, and must establish progressively a state of peace in which elections can be held and their results respected.
3. The Crucial Role of a Commonwealth Peace-Keeping Force.
 - 3.1. A substantial Commonwealth Peace-Keeping Force (Army and Police), capable of enforcing the ceasefire, is a fundamental requirement to achieving the confidence and sense of security of the parties. This would encourage the observance of the ceasefire.
 - 3.2. The choice of the Commonwealth States contributing to the Peace-Keeping Force will be critical to inspire mutual confidence, and it must be agreed upon by the conference.

4. The Effective Establishment of the Ceasefire -- A Process.

The purpose of the ceasefire is to achieve an end to fighting and ultimately to ensure conditions of political freedom for elections. The test by which to determine whether or not the ceasefire has taken effect, is whether the processes which enable fighting to stop and free political activity to take place, have occurred.

The decision on the completion of these processes must not be arbitrary but must be taken by an expert authority - the proposed Commonwealth ceasefire supervisory Commission - in consultation with the belligerents and the Governor.

5. Demarcation of Ceasefire Lines and Areas.

5.1. The extent of Martial Law indicates the degree to which the Rhodesian regime's civil administration has been displaced by the Patriotic Front forces. The Patriotic Front is not prepared to surrender its areas under the guise of agreeing to a ceasefire.

5.2. The complexity of the situation demands that the separation of forces be dealt with in two stages:- first, the basic demarcation of areas dominated by one side or the other and the drawing of ceasefire lines; second, in order to provide the necessary political freedom for elections, the re-grouping of both forces.

5.3 It must be provided that re-grouping will take place immediately the ceasefire is declared to be effective. This will reduce the potential for breaches of the ceasefire and conflict, and enhance the commitment on both sides to the political process.

6. The Removal of Structural Obstacles to the Ceasefire.

6.1. There are serious structural threats to the establishment and maintenance of both the ceasefire and the political freedom necessary for free and fair elections in the Rhodesian system. These include military

and para-military units, whose speciality has been the commission of acts intended to incriminate and liquidate the Patriotic Front and its supporters. Unless these units are disbanded there will be a grave risk of large scale subversion of the ceasefire.

6.2 A separate threat is posed by the existence of a vast private armoury of automatic and other arms (currently estimated at 155,000 weapons) in the hands of Rhodesian civilians.

6.3. The Ceasefire Agreement must provide that these units are disbanded and the civil population disarmed.

7. Supervision and Observation of the Ceasefire.

7.1 The parties will be responsible to the Governor for the observance of the ceasefire, subject to the mandate of the Commonwealth Peace-Keeping Force to supervise, monitor and enforce it. The Governor may give directions to both forces to observe the rights and duties established by the Ceasefire Agreement.

7.2. There will be a Joint Ceasefire Supervisory Commission made up of representatives of both forces with a British Chairman, to ensure co-operation in the establishment and maintenance of the Ceasefire.

7.3. A Commonwealth Ceasefire Supervisory Commission will be established, made up of representatives of the States participating in the Commonwealth Peace Keeping Force, to assist in the establishment and maintenance of the ceasefire.

8. Law and Order During the Ceasefire.

8.1. The police force in Rhodesia is a part of the military establishment and under military command. Law and order during the ceasefire period, it has been agreed, must be maintained by the civil police. It is essential

for the Ceasefire Agreement to set up criteria and machinery for the determination and establishment of the civil police.

8.2. Agreement must also be reached to facilitate the movement and use of civil police during the ceasefire.

9. The Exchange of Prisoners of War.

9.1. Provision must be made for the exchange of prisoners of war in the Ceasefire Agreement.

10. International Co-operation in Respect of the Ceasefire:

10.1. International involvement has been an integral part of the armed conflict between the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian regime. The successful conclusion of the final phase of the struggle will likewise require significant international co-operation.

10.2. This will entail co-operation to support, and to assist in the orderly return of, Zimbabwean refugees and others; in the regulation of international borders, and in general to respect the outcome of the conference.

10.3. South African forces and other foreign military personnel presently in the country must be withdrawn, and undertakings given to refrain from intervention and to respect the sovereignty and the right to self-determination of the people of Zimbabwe.

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CC(79) 81

COPY NO:

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THIRTY-FIFTH PLENARY SESSION

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE
LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON

Summary of the proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth
Plenary Session of the Conference, Monday
19 November 1979.

Lancaster House
19 November 1979

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PRESENT:

UK Delegation

Lord Carrington (in the Chair)

Mr R Luce

Mr D M Day

Gen M Farndale

Mr P R N Fifoot

Mr N M Fenn

Mr G G H Walden

Mr C D Powell

Mr R Jackling

Col A Gurdon

Mr P J Barlow

Mr R D Wilkinson

Mr R M J Lyne

Mr S J Gomersall

Mrs A J Phillips

Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation

Dr S C Mundawarara

Dr J Kamusikiri

AVM H Hawkins

Mr D Zamchiya

Mr M A Adam

Mr P Claypole

Mr A MacMillan

Mr Mugabe, Mr Nkomo and Delegation

Mr J M Nkomo	Mr R G Mugabe
Mr J M Chinamano	Mr E Tekere
Mr J W Msika	Gen J M Tongogara
Mr A M Chambati	Dr H Ushewokunze
Mr D Dabengwa	Mr D Mutumbuka
Mr R Mpoko	Mr J Tungamirai
Mr A Ndlovu	Mr S Mubako
Mr R Austin	Mr W Kamba
Miss E Siziba	Mr R Manyika

Secretariat

Mr J M Willson

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The session started at 11.07.

THE CHAIRMAN referred to the British paper circulated to the Conference on 16 November (CC(79)79) and asked whether either visiting delegation now wished to make a response.

MR MUGABE confirmed that his delegation wished to respond. Although they did not propose to comment in detail on the British paper, they wished to observe that it followed the pattern of previous British papers and reflected prior negotiation with the Rhodesian regime outside the Conference. His delegation rejected this type of procedure. He then tabled and read through the Patriotic Front delegation's document "Proposals on Basic Principles for a Ceasefire", subsequently circulated as Conference Paper CC(79)82.

THE CHAIRMAN then invited Dr Mundawarara to speak. DR MUNDAWARARA said that his delegation had carefully considered the British Government's proposals for the ceasefire arrangements (CC(79)79). They noted that these were phrased in general terms, as had been the case in the proposals for the new constitution and for the pre-independence arrangements. Subject to that observation, his delegation would be prepared to discuss these proposals more fully; first, however, there were a number of statements within them which required elaboration in order that they could be fully understood.

- (a) in paragraph 4 of CC(79)79 it was stated that machinery would be established for the assessment and maintenance of the ceasefire. Was this the general reference to what followed later in the paper, including

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the establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Ceasefire Monitoring Group, or did it refer to something else?

- (b) in paragraph 9, it was stated that a Ceasefire Monitoring Group would be established. They wished to know what size of group was contemplated and the names of the Commonwealth countries which would contribute to it.
- (c) in paragraph 10, reference was made to the practical arrangements which would be necessary to avoid the risk of clashes between the existing forces. They asked whether the British Government was in a position to provide details of the arrangements they had in mind.
- (d) another salient matter upon which information was required and upon which the proposals were silent was the position which would arise in the event of a breakdown in the ceasefire. It should be made absolutely clear in the proposals that any party which was responsible for a serious breach or breakdown of the ceasefire would be proscribed and would be excluded from the election.

On receipt of this further information, his delegation would be prepared to contribute constructively to further discussion on the bringing about of a ceasefire.

THE CHAIRMAN thanked Dr Mundawarara; he said that the

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British delegation would answer these questions and comment on Mr Mugabe's and Mr Nkomo's delegation's paper in the very near future. The international community was looking to the Conference for progress and rapid conclusions. Time was moving on and a conclusion was needed within a few days. He proposed to provide answers in plenary session the following morning which would be very closely followed by bilateral discussions so that these matters could be settled as soon as possible.

MR NKOMO said that it was important to be prepared to negotiate an agreement which would work. His delegation wanted a quick agreement; however, they could not ignore the very important issues involved in the sensitive matter of a ceasefire. While his delegation was prepared to do everything possible to achieve an early agreement, this could not be at the risk of ignoring important issues raised in their document.

THE CHAIRMAN said that nothing in the Patriotic Front document would be ignored. These matters had to be discussed as quickly as possible however. He then adjourned the Conference until the following day, at a time to be agreed.

The session ended at 11.22

