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831

PREM 19/371

● Relations with S. Africa. ~~---~~

Policy on arms sales to S. Africa.

Internal situation.

FCCD Credits  
D'nis Emissary / J. Hunt. Part 1

SOUTH  
AFRICA

PHI.  
JUNE 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>18.6.79</del>		<del>31.3.80</del>					
9.8.79		<del>12.4.80</del>					
<del>24.9.79</del>		<del>15.4.80</del>					
<del>5.10.79</del>		<del>22.5.80</del>					
<del>8.10.79</del>		<del>2.6.80</del>					
<del>22.10.79</del>		<del>14.7.80</del>					
<del>2.11.79</del>		<del>15.7.80</del>					
5.11.79		<del>22.7.80</del>					
<del>8.11.79</del>		<del>24.7.80</del>					
<del>21.11.79</del>		<del>28.7.80</del>					
<del>23.11.79</del>		<del>14.8.80</del>					
<del>27.11.79</del>		<del>27.8.80</del>					
<del>20.12.79</del>		2.9.80.					
<del>7.2.80</del>							
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<del>11.3.80</del>							
<del>13.3.80</del>							
<del>21.3.80</del>							
<del>24.3.80</del>							
<del>26.3.80</del>							

PREM 19/371

PART 2 begins:-

s/s-trade to Fes.  
~~Cab Off to MODBA~~ 8.9.80

PART 1 ends:-

MODBA to Cab Off 10.10.80

At review, last document found to be  
Pretoria tel no 305, 27 August 1980



GRS 220

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FM PRETORIA 27 1530Z AUG 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 305 OF 27 AUGUST 80

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA,  
GABORONE, MASERU, MBABANE

*Prime Minister*

*MA 28/8*

*mt*

MIPT : CABINET RESHUFFLE

1. SOME RELATIVELY DEAD WOOD HAS BEEN MOVED ELSEWHERE, MOSTLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL AND IN ONE CASE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY IN LONDON. THE 7 NEW MEMBERS IN THE CABINET (WHICH TOTALS TWO MORE THAN BEFORE) ARE FOR THE MOST PART OF HIGHER QUALITY THAN THE DEPARTING. YOU CAN JUDGE DAWIE DE VILLIERS BETTER THAN I, BUT I HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT HIS POLITICAL CLOUT, THOUGH HE MAY, OF COURSE, GROW WITH THE JOB. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HIM AND DU PLESSIS, THE NEWCOMERS LACK PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE.

2. THE BALANCE IN THE CABINET, WHICH ALREADY FAVOURED THE VERLIGTES, HAS BEEN TIPPED SLIGHTLY FURTHER TOWARD THEM. HOWEVER, IT IS PREMATURE TO SUGGEST, AS SOME NEWSPAPERS HAVE BEEN DOING, THAT THIS NOW RE-OPENS THE WAY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO INTRODUCE HIS LONG-AWAITED REFORMS. THE POLITICAL BLOCKAGE HAS NOT BEEN IN THE CABINET ITSELF BUT RATHER IN THE NATIONAL PARTY CAUCUS, WHICH VERKRAMPTE CONTINUE TO DOMINATE. IN THEMSELVES THE CHANGES IN THE CABINET WILL NOT ALTER THIS POSITION, BUT SHOULD THE PRIME MINISTER DECIDE AT ANY STAGE TO PRESS HIS POLICIES THROUGH THE CAUCUS HE IS LIKELY TO HAVE STRONGER ALLIES THAN BEFORE AMONGST HIS GOVERNMENTAL COLLEAGUES. IN FACT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT HE WILL MORE AND MORE TRY TO BY-PASS THE PARTY MACHINE WHEREVER HE CAN AND TO GOVERN MORE THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN THE FUTURE.

3. MR SCHLEBUSCH IS A SENIOR AND RESPECTED MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL PARTY HIERARCHY AND HIS CHOICE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL IS AS GOOD AS ANY. HOWEVER, THE CHOICE OF THE COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN IS HARDLY LIKELY TO REFURBISH THE PREMATURELY TARNISHED LUSTRE OF THE COUNCIL.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

LEAHY

SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD  
S AF D  
OADS  
UND  
NAD  
WED  
ECD  
ESSD  
CABINET OFFICE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

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PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

~~MR DAY~~

~~SIR A AGLAND~~

SIR L ALLINSON

~~LORD N G LENNOX~~

~~MR P H MOBERLY~~

HD/S AF D

HD/C AF D

HD/UND

HD/DEFENCE D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

HD/NEWS D

GRS 550

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PRETORIA 271300Z AUG 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 304 OF 27 AUGUST 80

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA,  
GABORONE, MASERU, MBABANE

*Prime Minister*

*MAD 27/8*

**CABINET RESHUFFLE**

1. THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY (26 AUGUST) ANNOUNCED CHANGES IN THE CABINET. THE APPOINTMENTS, WHICH INCLUDE SEVEN NEW MEMBERS AND SOME ALTERATIONS IN PORTFOLIOS, TAKE EFFECT ON 7 OCTOBER, THE DAY PARLIAMENT ELECTS THE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL. EARLIER THE NATIONAL PARTY CAUCUS ELECTED MR ALWYN SCHLEBUSCH AS THEIR CANDIDATE FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENCY. HIS ELECTION BY PARLIAMENT IS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

THE FULL CABINET WILL BE :-

MR PW BOTHA, PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY.  
(NO LONGER MINISTER OF DEFENCE).

MR S P BOTHA, MINISTER OF MANPOWER UTILISATION.

DR P G J KOORNHOF, MINISTER OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.

DR P G J KOORNHOF, MINISTER OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.

MR H SCHOEMAN, MINISTER OF TRANSPORT AFFAIRS (PREVIOUSLY AGRICULTURE).

SEN O P F HORWOOD, MINISTER OF FINANCE.

MR J C HEUNIS, MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS. (PREVIOUSLY TRANSPORT).

MR H H SMIT, MINISTER OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

MR R F BOTHA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION (ALSO ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FROM MR SMIT FOR RELATIONS WITH SABC).

MR F W DE KLERK, MINISTER OF MINERAL AND ENERGY AFFAIRS.

MR L LE GRANGE, MINISTER OF POLICE.

DR A P TREURNICHT, MINISTER OF STATE ADMINISTRATION AND OF STATISTICS (PREVIOUSLY PUBLIC WORKS, STATISTICS AND TOURISM)

DR L A P A MUNNIK, MINISTER OF HEALTH, WELFARE AND PENSIONS.

DR F HARTZENBERG, MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

DR C V VAN DER MERWE, MINISTER OF WATER AFFAIRS, FORESTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (PREVIOUSLY ADMINISTRATOR ORANGE FREE STATE)

DR G V N VILJOEN, MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION (PREVIOUSLY ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL SWA)

GEN M A DE M MALAN, MINISTER OF DEFENCE (PREVIOUSLY CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE)

MR P T C DU PLESSIS, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (PREVIOUSLY DEPUTY MINISTER OF FINANCE).

DR D DE VILLIERS, MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES, COMMERCE AND TOURISM (PREVIOUSLY AMBASSADOR LONDON).

MR H J COETSEE, MINISTER OF JUSTICE (PREVIOUSLY DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE)

MR H J COETSEE, MINISTER OF JUSTICE (PREVIOUSLY DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE)

- MR S F KOTZE, MINISTER OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND STATE AUXILIARY SERVICES (PREVIOUSLY DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERIOR, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND COLOURED RELATIONS)

2. IN THE SAME STATEMENT MR BOTHA ALSO ANNOUNCED THE APPOINTMENT, ALSO WITH EFFECT FROM 7 OCTOBER, OF DEPUTY MINISTERS AND OF CHAIRMEN OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL COMMITTEES. THEY ARE :-

DEPUTY MINISTERS

MR A S HAYWARD, DEPUTY MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE.

MR G DE V MORRISON, DEPUTY MINISTER OF CO-OPERATION.

MR J J J G WENTZEL, DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEVELOPMENT.

MR PIERRE CRONJE, DEPUTY MINISTER OF STATE AUXILIARY SERVICES.  
(MP FOR PORT NATAL)

MR P J BADENHORST, DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS.  
(MP FOR OUDTSHOORN, CAPE)

MR D W STEYN, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FINANCE, INDUSTRIES AND OF COMMERCE. (MP FOR WONDERBOOM, PRETORIA)

CHAIRMEN OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL COMMITTEES

DR DENNIS WORRAL (MP FOR CAPE TOWN GARDENS), THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE.

MR PUNT JANSON (PREVIOUSLY MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION), THE GROUP RELATIONS COMMITTEE.

DR SCHALK VAN DER MERWE (PREVIOUSLY MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE), THE FINANCE COMMITTEE.

MR BRAAM RAUBENHEIMER (PREVIOUSLY MINISTER OF WATER AFFAIRS, FORESTRY AND CONSERVATION), THE PLANNING COMMITTEE.



MR BRAAM RAUBENHEIMER (PREVIOUSLY MINISTER OF WATER AFFAIRS,  
FORESTRY AND CONSERVATION), THE PLANNING COMMITTEE.

PROF ERNST MARAIS (RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PORT ELIZABETH),  
THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE.

3. THE APPOINTMENT OF MR MARAIS STEYN AS AMBASSADOR IN LONDON  
WAS ALSO ANNOUNCED.

4. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

LEAHY

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 August 1980

~~BH 3-9-80~~

UN Embargo on Provision of Arms to South Africa

As you know, the Prime Minister saw the exchanges of minutes between your Secretary of State, the Secretary of State for Defence, and the Secretary of State for Trade about the UN embargo on provision of arms to South Africa. She asked to see the proposed change in the guidelines, which you set out in your letter to me of 22 August.

The Prime Minister has commented that the change is a significant one, which will result in a lot of individual references. She has some doubts as to whether it will achieve the objectives established for it in relation to the United Nations. If the operation of the new guidelines results in loss of any orders by the UK, she would wish to be informed of this. If necessary, she would wish to have the problem considered further in the Ministerial Committee on Exports.

I am sending copies of this letter to Martin Hall (HM Treasury), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry), Andrew Hardman (Department of Employment) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

N. J. SANDERS

D.J. Neilands, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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S. Africa



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✓ MJD

*From the Secretary of State*

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington  
Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs  
Downing Street  
Whitehall  
SW1

27 August 1980

Dear Peter.

## UN EMBARGO ON PROVISION OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA

I have seen Francis Pym's further note to you of 8 August following your reply of 28 July to his original note. He is now prepared to accept the new guidelines under which export licences would not be granted for goods intended primarily, as well as those intended solely, for military use.

I expressed my doubts in my letter of 24 July about the practical application of the proposed new guidelines and I still have reservations on this point. My overriding concern, as I have said, is that the guidelines adopted should not be interpreted too narrowly and that exports to South Africa are not restricted more than is absolutely necessary. It is most important therefore that all borderline cases should continue to be referred to Ministers.

If you are convinced that the change in the guidelines will be helpful in resisting pressure for more severe restrictions in the United Nations and elsewhere, I am prepared to go along with it. However, I shall keep a close watch on how the new guidelines operate in practice and if they give rise to serious problems or lead to unjustifiable delays to exports, we shall need to look at the matter again.



I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Defence, Industry and Employment and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever  
John

PS. This is on the understanding, of course, that the marginal change in the guidelines is not published.

JOHN NOTT



Prime Minister Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agar Mike

You saw the ministerial exchanges (attached below)

and asked for details of the proposed changes.

22 August 1980

Agree the change in the light of this explanation?

UN Embargo on Provision of Arms to South Africa

MA 22/8

You wrote to Roderic Lyne on 14 August asking about the existing guidelines for the sale of dual purpose equipment to South Africa and the changes which Lord Carrington has proposed.

The existing guidelines were drawn up in response to the imposition of the mandatory UN arms embargo in 1977, but they are broadly similar to those which had been applied under the earlier, voluntary embargo which the UK had applied since 1974. The guidelines apply only to equipment subject to export licensing control which has both a civilian and military application. They state that licences should be granted 'unless the equipment is obviously intended for solely military purposes'. Individual borderline cases are considered on their merits.

The revised guidelines would not restrict ministerial consideration of individual cases. But recommendations by officials would in future be based on the principle that licences would normally be issued for the export of dual-purpose equipment subject to licensing control 'except where it is clear that the equipment is required primarily for its military capability'.

Lord Carrington has explained the arguments in favour of this change in his minute of 28 July and I shall not repeat them. I should, however, emphasise that the intention is not to restrict unnecessarily the scope for UK exports, but to avoid future cases adding to pressure for an extension and tightening of the present Security Council Resolution to impose a total ban on the sale of all dual purpose equipment.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

It is quite a big change and will result in a lot of individual references. I doubt whether it will achieve its U.N. objective. Please let me know if you refer to the new misc which I have, it is results in as long as any other ref.

and Neilands.

(D J Neilands)  
Assistant Private Secretary

Mike Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON



22 AUG 1980

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File



cc: CO

S. Africa

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1980

BF 21.8.80

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has seen the exchanges between the Secretaries of State for Defence and Trade and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about the U.N. embargo on the provision of arms to South Africa.

The Prime Minister would like to see the proposed changes to the guidelines before she reaches a view, although her initial reaction is to endorse the reservations expressed at the outset by Mr. Pym and Mr. Nott. She has seen that Mr. Pym has withdrawn his objections.

The Prime Minister has commented that she sees little reason to revise the guidelines if they cannot be made public anyway.

We have yet to see Mr. Nott's further response, but it would be helpful to have a note of the guidelines and the proposed changes which I can show to the Prime Minister on her return at the end of next week.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

Ministers have been corresponding about the UN embargo on the provision of arms to South Africa. The Foreign Office have suggested some tightening of the guidelines on the export of dual-purpose equipment following the Plessey radar contract. The purpose is to try to prevent the UN itself re-defining or extending the existing arms embargo so as to preclude the export of all dual-purpose equipment. If that happened, Lord Carrington argued that our hands would be much more tightly tied than if we were to exercise voluntary care and discrimination in deciding what equipment to licence. He proposed to revise the guidelines both to help Ministers in deciding on borderline cases referred to them - although each case would still be decided on its merits - and to indicate to officials the kind of cases requiring reference to Ministers. His minute is at Flag A.

Mr. Pym had some hesitation, but has eventually agreed with Lord Carrington's approach - minutes at Flags B and C. Mr. Nott (Flag D) had supported Mr. Pym's original hesitations, and we have not yet heard whether he has also withdrawn his objections.

On the assumption that Mr. Nott now joins the agreement between Mr. Pym and Lord Carrington, are you content to endorse their agreement?

MAP

Where are the new guidelines? If they can't be made public - why revise them. I share Mr. Pym's, Mr. Nott's initial misgivings about changing them.

12 August 1980

non



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MO 26/9/21

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

UN EMBARGO ON PROVISION OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your minute FCS/80/130 of 28th July.

2. In the light of what you say, and subject to any further comment from John Nott, I am prepared to accept the new guidelines. It is important, however, that borderline cases should continue to be referred to Ministers. I hope that the new guidelines will not result in our adopting an unduly restrictive approach and I have asked my officials to monitor closely the workings of the guidelines and to draw to my attention any difficulties that may arise.


3. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Trade, Industry and Employment and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence

8th August 1980

10 11 12 1  
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

17 2 AUG 1980



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S. Africa

NRPA yet

Hand - 29/7

FCS/80/130

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

UN Embargo on Provision of Arms  
to South Africa

1. Thank you for your minute MO 26/9/21 of 15 July.
2. You raise two questions: whether we should change the guidelines for deciding whether to allow the export of dual-purpose equipment to South Africa; and whether we should adopt a more restrictive line on this than in the past.
3. I do not advocate restrictiveness for its own sake, and I share your anxiety that we should do nothing that might needlessly lose us valuable exports. But there is already pressure at the UN, stimulated by the publicity over the Plessey radar contract, to redefine or extend the existing arms embargo so as to preclude the export of all dual-purpose equipment to South Africa. Even if we are able to keep these pressures from coming to a head, we should be in no doubt that any action by us to license further exports of dual-purpose equipment with a primary or even significant military ingredient would greatly reinforce those pressures, to the point where a redefinition or extension of the arms embargo might well become irresistible. In that event our hands would be much more tightly tied than if we were voluntarily to exercise care and discrimination in deciding what equipment to license. Thus by being marginally more restrictive in border-line cases, we may hope not only to avoid a repetition of the embarrassment and controversy over Plessey, but also to refrain from stimulating pressures for even greater restriction which would be binding on us in future cases.
4. If the case for this more selective approach to dual-purpose equipment is accepted, the advantage of the proposed new guidelines is simply that it would help Ministers in making their decisions on border-line cases referred to them (without in any way precluding them from deciding each case on its merits): and it would serve to indicate to officials the kind of cases they need to refer to Ministers, with a pointer towards the

/recommendation

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recommendation they should make. I do not envisage that we should or could make public the change to the new guidelines. If we did, we should risk damaging our ability to defend the decision on the Plessey contract. The important thing is that our future decisions should not provide ammunition for those who want even more rigid restrictions than those implied by the quite modest new guidelines now suggested.

5. In the light of this, I hope you could agree that we should approve the new guidelines, on the understanding that border-line cases will continue to be referred to Ministers.

6. I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Industry, Employment and Trade and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

C  
/

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

28 July 1980

28 JUL 1980



CONFIDENTIAL



*From the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
London, SW1A 2AL

24 July 1980

Dear Peter,

UN EMBARGO ON PROVISION OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA

As you know, Francis Pym sent me a copy of his minute to you of 15 July about the guidelines for licensing exports to South Africa. I would like to add my support to what he says.

I was willing earlier to contemplate changing the guidelines on the understanding that all important and borderline cases would be referred to Ministers for a decision. I continued to feel strongly, however, that the guidelines should not be interpreted too narrowly and that exports to South Africa should not be restricted any more than is absolutely necessary to meet our UN obligations. It is clearly difficult in many cases to determine whether an export is intended primarily for military or for civil use, and I do not think it is helpful to have guidelines that are difficult in practice to apply. On reflection, I am now inclined to support Francis Pym's view that we should leave the guidelines as they are (ie that equipment may generally be licensed unless obviously intended solely for military use) and continue, as we must in any case, to look at borderline cases on their merits.

CONFIDENTIAL



*From the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

I also strongly support the view that we should continue to resist any attempt to extend the scope of the arms embargo.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Defence, Industry and Employment and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours ever  
John*

JOHN NOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

MO 26/9/21



NBPA yet

Ant  
- 16/7

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARYUN EMBARGO ON PROVISION OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA

I understand that, in the light of the controversy last year over the Plessey AR3D radar contract, our officials together with those at the Department of Trade have recently been considering whether any changes should be made in the guidelines for assessing applications for the export of dual-purpose civil and military equipment to South Africa. I believe that their conclusion was that in order to avoid similar difficulties in future, and to respond to criticisms that we were not observing the spirit of the embargo, the existing guidelines - which provide for a licence to be granted except where the equipment in question is obviously intended for solely military purposes - should be modified to provide for a licence to be granted except where it is clear that the equipment concerned is required primarily for its military capability.

I recognise that we should do all we can to avoid a repetition of the problems we faced over the Plessey case, but I am not at all sure that it is necessary or desirable to lay down new guidelines for officials at this stage. Nor do I think that we should be adopting a more restrictive line towards the arms embargo than our predecessors. South Africa is an important market for UK goods, and, although we must clearly abide by our obligations to the United Nations on the arms embargo, I hope that we will do all we can to assist legitimate UK exports to South Africa, and not hamper our hard pressed industries by being excessively strict in our interpretation of our obligations. It should be possible for "borderline" cases with which officials cannot deal under existing guidelines to be referred to Ministers on a case by case basis. I should also add, in this connection, that I hope we will continue to resist any attempt by the UN to extend the scope of the arms embargo.

I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Industry, Employment and Trade, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence  
15th July 1980

[16 JUL 1980]





GRS 650

S E C R E T

SECRET

FM PRETORIA 220750Z JUL 80  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 214 OF 22 JULY 80

MY TELNO 166: SOUTH AFRICAN/SWAP0 CONTACTS

1. IN CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT (21 JULY) WITH DAY AND ME BRAND FOURIE VOLUNTEERED THE INFORMATION THAT DESPITE THE RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSIONS INTO ANGOLA THE ANGOLANS HAD JUST TOLD THEM THAT SWAPO WERE WILLING TO HOLD PRIVATE TALKS ON TWO CONDITIONS. THE FIRST CONDITION IS THAT THE TALKS ARE ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435 AND THE SECOND IS THAT THEY ASSUME THAT IN ATTENDING THE TALKS THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL WILL REPRESENT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. FOURIE SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD CERTAINLY AGREE TO THE FIRST CONDITION AND THAT WHILE THEY COULD NOT EXPLICITLY ADMIT THAT VILJOEN WOULD REPRESENT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN VIEW OF THE LATTER'S WELL-KNOWN OPPOSITION TO DIRECT DEALINGS WITH SWAPO THEY WOULD TRY TO FIND ANOTHER FORM OF WORDS TO MEET THE SECOND CONDITION. THEY COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, GIVE THE ANGOLANS A FULL DESCRIPTION OF VILJOEN'S STATUS AND FUNCTIONS IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS. IT NEED NOT MATTER TOO MUCH IF BOTH SIDES CHOSE TO HAVE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS ON THIS POINT. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS THAT IF THE MATTER LEAKED THEY COULD ANSWER LOCAL CRITICISM THAT THEY HAD THEMSELVES BEEN HAVING SECRET DEALINGS WITH SWAPO. ON NAMIBIAN INTERNAL PARTICIPATION, FOURIE THOUGHT THEY WOULD OVERCOME THE PROBLEM OF INCLUDING ALL INTERNAL PARTIES BY CONFINING REPRESENTATION TO THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL.

2. AT ONE POINT FOURIE SAID, PERHAPS HALF JOKINGLY, THAT IF THE ANGOLANS OR SWAPO NEEDED ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF VILJOEN'S STATUS THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT REFER THEM TO WALDHEIM OR AHTISAARI. WE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT FOR US TO ADVISE THEM, BUT ONCE ANYTHING WAS SAID IN NEW YORK IT WOULD BE ROUND THE UN IN NO TIME. FOURIE TOOK THE POINT AND SAID NOT ALTOGETHER CONVINCINGLY THAT HE DID NOT MEAN IT SERIOUSLY. HE DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE HE HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS AND GERMANS IN SUITABLY VAGUE TERMS ON HIS RECENT VISITS THAT HE HAD SOME INDICATIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE DIRECT CONTACTS WITH SWAPO WE WERE THE ONLY PEOPLE TO WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN IN SUCH AN EXPLICIT WAY. HE ADDED THAT HE NEVERTHELESS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT MCHENRY KNEW MORE OR LESS WHAT WAS IN THE WIND.

S E C R E T

/3.FOURIE

S E C R E T

3. FOURIE SEEMED EXCITED AT THE PROSPECT OF THESE DIRECT TALKS WITHOUT HAVING ANY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THEY MIGHT LEAD TO OR WHETHER INDEED THEY WOULD SUCCEED AT ALL. WE SAID NOTHING EITHER TO ENCOURAGE OR DISCOURAGE HIM. WHEN WE ASKED ABOUT THE LIKELY TIMING HE INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN HAVING THE TALKS UNDER WAY BY THE TIME THEY SENT THEIR REPLY TO WALDHEIM'S LAST LETTER.

4. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IN PURSUING THIS PATH THE SOUTH AFRICANS MAY WELL BE GOING DOWN A BLIND ALLEY AND THAT THE TALKS MAY GET NOWHERE. BUT DAY AND I BOTH FEEL THAT IF THIS IS WHAT THEY AND SWAPO WANT THERE IS NO REASON TO TRY TO STOP THEM. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE ANGOLANS HAVE TAKEN ANY OF THE OTHER FLS INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE. FOR HIS PART FOURIE SEES THE ANGOLAN INITIATIVE AS SOMETHING SEPARATE FROM THE VAGUE SUGGESTIONS FOR AN ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE WHICH OTHER FLS HAVE AIRED.

5. DAY ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO FLOAT THE IDEA THAT IN THE MORE GENERAL CONTEXT OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD CONSIDER REOPENING PRIVATE LINES TO THE ZAMBIANS. FOURIE SEEMED RECEPTIVE.

LEAHY

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South Africa

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 July 1980

Dear Mr. Ntshongane,

Thank you for your letter of 28 June.

The Government has not remained silent about the violent disturbances in South Africa. As you acknowledge, I referred to this in the House of Commons on 19 June. Britain also voted in favour of United Nations Security Council Resolution 475 of 13 June expressing concern at the disturbances. I understand that a delegation from the Anti-Apartheid Movement called on Mr. Luce, Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 26 June specifically to discuss these issues.

The Government has made clear that it finds the policy of apartheid abhorrent and that it deplores the suffering caused by the repressive measures used to enforce apartheid. However, we feel it best to attempt to bring about peaceful change in South Africa by dialogue and contact rather than further ostracism. We have no standing in the case of Mr. Mandela. But, Sir Ian Gilmour told the House of Commons on 16 April that his release would be widely welcomed in this country as a symbol of the desire for reconciliation in South Africa. The Government has also on several occasions voiced its concern to the South African authorities about detentions without trial in Namibia. We have frequently called for the release of such prisoners. We are working for the implementation of the UN plan for the independence of Namibia, which provides for the release of all political prisoners, and which is the best hope for an end to the violence.

/ You mention

JS

You mention the United Nations Security Council debate on 27 June. In this debate the UK Permanent Representative, Sir Anthony Parsons, said clearly that 'We profoundly regret the loss of life and property in Angola. We cannot in any way condone the actions of the South African armed forces.' The UK abstained from voting on Security Council Resolution 475 because of the inclusion of certain language drawn from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter; and above all because adoption of the Resolution would not promote early agreement on implementation of the UN plan for the independence of Namibia to which I have just referred. But while we could not support the Security Council Resolution itself we support its main objectives, South African withdrawal and respect in future for Angolan sovereignty; and we are working as a member of the Five to secure the realisation of the UN plan.

Yours sincerely  
Raymond Thelwell

---

Mr. Abdul S. Minty

ADVANCE COPIES: ODIA

IMMEDIATE

36 South Africa

PS

PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR HURD

ps/advance

PS/PUS

~~MR BUTLER~~ LORD BRIDGES

MISS BROWN

MR J C MOBERLY

Mr Day  
MR EVANS

Mr L Allinson

Hd S.A.K.D.....

HEAD/ES & SD (2)

HEAD/FRE

HEAD/INT. PUS (2)

HEAD/INAD. MAED

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/S OF S FOR ENERGY )  
PS/MINISTER OF STATE )  
FOR ENERGY )

SIR J RAMPTON ) DEPT OF  
MR D LE B JONES ) ENERGY

MR J R BRETHERTON ) THAMES HSE  
CIP DIVN ) SOUTH

MR J WHALEY )

MR J LIVERMAN )

MR I GILLIS. PRESS )  
OFFICE )

MR B HAMPTON )

~~MR R B BIRCHING~~ MUR )

MR J F SLATER TREASURY

MR I MEEK RM 303 DOT  
1 VICTORIA ST

MR J C EDWARDS ) ODMA

MR R L BAXTER )

DO I = (2)

Mr R L Wade-Sey, Cabinet Office

~~No 10 Downing St~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BCG JOHANNESBURG 021115Z JUNE 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 58 OF 2 JUNE

INFO PRETORIA CAPE TOWN EMBASSY, DURBAN, MOD (MODUK) FOR DIA

MIPT NO 57.

SABOTAGE AT SASOLBURG.

1. THE SASOLBURG SABOTAGE REPRESENTS A NEW AND ALARMING ESCALATION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN SOUTH AFRICA. THOUGH THERE IS A LONG HISTORY OF OFTEN RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE ATTACKS ON POLICE STATIONS ETC THERE IS NO PRECEDENT FOR MAJOR SABOTAGE OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES NO ONE HAS YET CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY BUT THE DRAMATIC SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING THE PERPETRATORS' OBJECTIVE WILL AT ONCE CAUSE SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE AUTHORITIES AND BE A MAJOR BOOST TO BLACK MORAL. I CAN FROM MY OWN EXPERIENCE VOUCH FOR THE TIGHT SECURITY AT BOTH SASOLBURG AND SECUNDA WHICH MAKES THE UNDETECTED PLACEMENT OF LARGE QUANTITIES OF EXPLOSIVE EVEN MORE REMARKABLE.

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QUANTITIES OF EXPLOSIVE EVEN MORE REMARKABLE.

2. THE AUTHORITIES ARE UNLIKELY TO REVEAL THE FULL EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE. THE LOSS OF FUEL CAN DOUBTLESS BE MADE GOOD WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY AND EVEN THE LOSS OF CHEMICAL FEEDSTOCKS (INCLUDING REPORTEDLY THAT REQUIRED FOR SYNTHETIC RUBBER) CAN BE REPLACED WITHOUT MUCH TROUBLE IF, AS APPEARS TO BE THE CASE, THE SASOL 1 PRODUCTION FACILITIES ARE UNAFFECTED. THE IMPACT OF THE ATTACK IS THEREFORE MORE PSYCHOLOGICAL THAN MATERIAL.

3. ONE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON THE TIMING OF THE ATTACK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT UNREST WHICH, ALTHOUGH IT MAY HAVE ORIGINATED FROM THE COLOURED SCHOOL BOYCOTT, APPEARS NOW TO HAVE DEEPER ROOTS. HITHERTO THE BLACK COMMUNITY ON THE REEF HAS HELD BACK FROM MORE THAN PERIPHERAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOYCOTT ISSUE. BUT WE MAY NOW BE WITNESSING A NEW TACTIC BY BLACK EXTREMISTS TO EXPLOIT THE CURRENT UNREST. EQUALLY PLAUSIBLE, HOWEVER, IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SABOTAGE WAS DESIGNED TO MARK THE IMMINENT ANNIVERSARY ON 16 JUNE OF THE 1976 SOWETO RIOTS. IF SO, THE SASOLBURG/SECUNDA ATTACKS MAY PRESAGE FURTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE COMING WEEKS.

4. PLEASE PASS TO DEPARTMENTS OF TRADE, INDUSTRY AND ENERGY.

TITCHENER

NNNN

our

S Africa.

23 May 1980

MESSAGE FROM P.W. BOTHA

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. P.W. Botha which we have received via the South African Embassy.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



T 100 B/80

Verw.  
Ref.

*Subject*

REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Kantoor van die Eerste Minister

Prime Minister's Office

CAPE TOWN

1 May 1980

SECRET

**PRIME MINISTER'S**

**PERSONAL MESSAGE**

**SERIAL No. T100B/80**

*Prime Minister*

*rfu*

*Ant*

②

Dear Prime Minister

I am glad to learn from your letter of 28 April 1980 that you found Lord Hunt's report on his extensive talks in South Africa interesting and consider his visit worthwhile.

I agree with you that the exchange has been valuable, particularly as a means of clarifying basic positions. I am confident that a sound foundation has been laid on which we shall be able to build in the future, as the occasion arises.

With best wishes

Yours sincerely

*P W Botha*  
P W BOTHA

*mb.*

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M P  
Prime Minister  
LONDON



S. Africa



SUBJECT.

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 96/80.

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister,

cc. Minister  
off

Lord Hunt has now reported to me on his recent visit to South Africa. I was most interested to hear his very full account of your meetings. I would like to say how grateful I am to you and your colleagues for devoting so much time to your talks with Lord Hunt and for speaking so frankly to him.

From my point of view, I hope from yours too, it has been valuable to have this opportunity of setting out our thoughts on different subjects to you directly and in some detail. The talks have given us a much clearer understanding of your Government's position. This has been a very worthwhile exchange. Thank you for suggesting it.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely

Pieter Botha

The Hon. P.W. Botha

28/4/80.

SECRET.

HS

28



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 April 1980

Lord Hunt

As you know, Lord Hunt called on the Prime Minister on Thursday 24 April to de-brief after his recent visit to South Africa. Since Lord Hunt has already discussed his journey at length with the Department, I will not in this letter record his remarks about South Africa in any detail.

Lord Hunt said that he had formed the impression that Mr. P.W. Botha intended to continue with his efforts to introduce some movement into the internal situation in South Africa. He would for instance continue the effort to remove petty discrimination. However he had no clear idea about his ultimate destination. Lord Hunt said that he himself could see no viable solution to South Africa's problems. He did not think that Mr. Botha would allow his party to split.

The most important way in which HMG could help Mr. Botha would be to try to diminish his sense of isolation. (Lord Hunt compared the feeling in South Africa with that in East Germany). There would not be a great deal that we could do, but small gestures would help. Mr. Botha had already abandoned the idea of the staff discussions envisaged in his original letter to the Prime Minister. But it would be helpful if, for instance, the Prime Minister could send a message; if the South African Ambassador could be seen by the Prime Minister from time to time; and if senior officials, such as Sir Michael Palliser, could go out to South Africa from time to time.

The Prime Minister agreed with Lord Hunt's recommendations. She said she would try to arrange to have Dr. de Villiers down to Chequers at some point.

MIA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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BK

27

File

18 April 1980

BF 25.4.80  
for draft

Lord Hunt's Visit to South Africa

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of Cape Town telegram No. 299 of 15 April in which Mr. Leahy suggests that the Prime Minister should write to Mr. Botha to round off Lord Hunt's talks. The Prime Minister would be content to send a letter along the lines suggested by Mr. Leahy.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SP

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1980

BF 21 April

Dear Michael,

Lord Hunt's Mission

The Prime Minister will have seen the reports from Lord Hunt of his talks with the South African Prime Minister, and Mr Leahy's separate reports of Lord Hunt's discussions on the Namibia problem. For reference I attach copies of Cape Town Tels Nos 278, 279, 282 and 290.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will presumably wish to hear directly from Lord Hunt before any firm conclusions are drawn about his mission. There are some mildly encouraging points in Lord Hunt's reports. The South Africans did not really expect to find a short cut back to the international community through their links with Britain, but Mr Botha was grateful both that we were ready to respond to his suggestion for talks, and that in putting our point of view across we showed a realistic readiness to see their point of view and the very real difficulties facing his Government.

Whether and how we follow up these discussions may be affected to a considerable extent by the South African reply to the United Nations on Namibia, which will probably be delivered in the next few days. The Security Council debate last week on South African troops in south west Zambia may have made the South Africans less willing to show the necessary flexibility, but in talking to Lord Hunt they appeared to be well aware of the importance of keeping things moving forward. The possibility of direct talks with SWAPO, provided it is not seen as a means of gaining time and easing responsibility away from the United Nations, may offer a way of making progress. We are looking to see if there is a way in which we can help to bring the parties together.


We shall be in touch next week about an appointment for Lord Hunt to see the Prime Minister.

yours ever  
Roderic Lyne

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

115 APR 1960



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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 091410Z APR 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 278 OF 9 APRIL

FOR BARDER, SAFD

MY TEL NO 275: NAMIBIA

1. LORD HUNT WILL BE REPORTING ON HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER FURTHER SESSIONS ARRANGED FOR THIS EVENING AND TOMORROW. IN VIEW OF THE FAST-MOVING SITUATION YOU SHOULD HOWEVER KNOW NOW THAT HE SPOKE TO THE PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING AS FORESHADOWED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF MY T U R AND EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT GIVING A REPLY TO DR WALDHEIM WHICH WOULD PRECIPATE A BREAK-DOWN. PIK BOTHA, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, CONFIRMED THAT THE S A G WOULD NOT NOW BE REPLYING UNTIL AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. AT ONE STAGE HE SAID THAT THE REPLY WOULD INDICATE THAT WHILE THE S A G HAD ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE D.M Z THEY STILL REQUIRED CLARIFICATION ON CERTAIN POINTS. HOWEVER, IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE REPLY, AS AT PRESENT INTENDED, WOULD NOT MERELY LIST POINTS FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION BUT WOULD SUGGEST HOW THE S A G THOUGHT THESE POINTS COULD BE RESOLVED. PIK ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE S A G WERE MUCH ATTRACTED BY THE IDEA OF GETTING INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWAPO AND THUS BY-PASSING THE U N. HE RECOGNISED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. WE TOOK THE LINE THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WANTED TO HAVE DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH SWAPO IT WOULD BE FATAL IF, AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ALLOWED THE U N PROCESS TO COME TO A HALT. INDEED IT MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO KEEP IT GOING. THEY SEEMED TO TAKE THE POINT.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO REVERTED TO AN IDEA WHICH HAS BEEN MOOTED HERE BEFORE OF INVITING "SELECTED REPRESENTATIVES" FROM THE FIVE (AND POSSIBLY ONE OR TWO OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AS WELL) TO VISIT NAMIBIA SHORTLY IN ORDER TO GAUGE LOCAL OPINION THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INTERNAL PARTIES AND TO GO ON A CONDUCTED TOUR OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA. MR BOTHA SAID THAT SO MANY PEOPLE HAD STRONG VIEWS ON NAMIBIA WHO HAD NEVER EVEN BEEN THERE AND HE WANTED TO OPEN THEIR EYES TO THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. HUNT DID NOT REACT TO THIS SUGGESTION AND, UNLESS YOU HAVE STRONG VIEWS TO THE CONTRARY, DOES NOT INTEND TO DO SO WHEN HE SEES THE

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/PRIME

*Copy filed  
on Namibia*

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PRIME MINISTER AGAIN TOMORROW AFTERNOON. IT IS, OF COURSE, AN OBVIOUS NON-STARTER, BUT THERE SEEMS NO REASON FOR US TO GO OUT OF OUR WAY TO POUR COLD WATER ON IT AT THIS STAGE WHEN IT MAY NEVER SEE THE LIGHT OF DAY.

3. HUNT ALSO ALLUDED IN A GENERAL WAY TO THE INFORMATION IN MISS FORT'S TELELETTER OF 2 APRIL. NEITHER THE PRIME MINISTER NOR PIK BOTHA GAVE ANY INDICATION OF HAVING HEARD OF IT BEFORE.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER MADE IT UNMISTAKEABLY CLEAR THAT THE S A G HAD NO FAITH WHATSOEVER IN THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE U N. HE DID NOT ADMIT THAT HE THOUGHT SWAPO WERE LIKELY TO WIN ANY ELECTIONS HELD IN THE NEAR FUTURE: BUT HE LEFT HUNT IN NO DOUBT THAT THE S A G HAD NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING NAMIBIA TO GO THE WAY OF RHODESIA. FOR HIS PART PIK DID HIS BEST TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SWAPO WOULD <sup>NOT</sup> WIN FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. IN GENERAL IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ESCAPE THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SAG'S MAIN CONCERN AT PRESENT IS TO PLAY FOR TIME.

4. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT SANCTIONS IN THE NAMIBIA CONTEXT. HUNT STUCK TO THE LINE IN THE BRIEF AND WAS NOT PRESSED FURTHER. HE WILL GIVE A FULLER ACCOUNT OF THIS IN HIS REPORT.

LEAHY

FILES  
SAFD  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR D MAITLAND  
MR DAY  
SIR L ALLINSON  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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SECRET

GRS 750A

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 100720Z APR 1983

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 279 OF 10 APRIL

TOP COPY

*Copy filed  
on Namibia*

FOR BARDER SAFD

MY TELEGRAM NO 278: NAMIBIA

1. LORD HUNT HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WITH GENERAL MALAN AND PIK BOTHA ON NAMIBIA. THE FIRST WAS AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUGGESTION AND THE SECOND AT PIK'S REQUEST.
2. NOTHING VERY NEW EMERGED AT THE MEETING WITH MALAN. HE EXUDED DEEP PESSIMISM ABOUT THE CHANCES THAT THE D M Z COULD ASSURE THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS; AND IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION HE STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT EVEN IF THE S A G COULD BE GIVEN REASONABLE SATISFACTION ON THE DETAILS THEIR ABIDING DISTRUST OF THE PRO-SWAPO BIAS OF THE U N WOULD STILL PRESENT A STUMBLING-BLOCK. HE ALSO SUGGESTED IN AN IMPRECISE WAY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE WELL PLACED TO TAKE SOME INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD OPEN UP NEW POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM. HUNT MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHILE WE WOULD USE, AND WERE INDEED USING, SUCH INFLUENCE AS WE HAD BEHIND THE SCENES TO COUNSEL PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NEED FOR MORE TIME WE WERE NOT DISPOSED TO COME FORWARD WITH ANY NEW INITIATIVE AS SUCH.
3. IN THE DISCUSSION WITH PIK BOTHA ( ATTENDED ALSO BY BRAND FOURIE AND DAWIE DE VILLIERS) IT BECAME CLEARER THAN EVER THAT THE IDEA OF TALKING DIRECTLY TO SWAPO WAS IN THE FOREFRONT OF THEIR MINDS. PIK SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN MUCH EMBARRASSED WHEN VILJOEN HAD ALLUDED TO THIS POSSIBILITY PUBLICLY IN LONDON: FIRST BECAUSE IT MIGHT PUT SWAPO OFF THE IDEA AND SECONDLY BECAUSE IT MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO TORPEDO THE U N NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS SOMETHING THEY NEEDED "LIKE A HOLE IN THE HEAD". THEY FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO KEEP THE LATTER GOING. WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND- AND THEY WERE STILL ONLY THINKING ABOUT IT- WAS THAT "SOMEONE" SHOULD LET NUJOMA KNOW THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK TO SWAPO IF THEY REALLY WANTED THIS. SWAPO WOULD NO DOUBT SET UNACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR ANY SUCH TALKS, SUCH AS THAT THE ONLY SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION WAS HOW TO HAND OVER NAMIBIA TO THEM, BUT SOMEHOW THIS HURDLE MIGHT BE SURMOUNTED. THE S A G COULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE THEMSELVES TO SUGGEST SUCH TALKS BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IT WOULD CAUSE THEM WITH THE INTERNAL PARTIES, BUT IF SOMEONE ELSE COULD PUT THE IDEA FORWARD THEY WOULD FIND IT EASIER TO GET OVER THESE. AT ONE STAGE HE SEEMED TO BE SUGGESTING THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE, SINCE WE HAD A SPECIAL INTEREST IN FINDING A WAY OUT OF THE NAMIBIA IMPASSE. BUT WHEN HUNT EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THIS HE MENTIONED

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/OTHER



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OTHER POSSIBLE INTERMEDIARIES SUCH AS HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY OR SERETSE KHAMA .(HE HAD MENTIONED EARLIER THAT FOLLOWING A CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH M. PONIATOWSKI IN PARIS RECENTLY, WITH M. GISCARD D'ESTAING'S BLESSING, IT SEEMED THAT THE FRENCH WERE TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF PLAYING SOME INTERMEDIARY ROLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH "TWO OR THREE" AFRICAN COUNTRIES).

4. PIK WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT FOLLOWING AN INITIAL CONTACT WITH SWAPO IT MIGHT THEN BE POSSIBLE TO SET UP A LANCASTER HOUSE STYLE ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING SWAPO, TO THRASH OUT A CONSTITUTION AND PERHAPS AGREE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE CONFLICTING GROUPS TO GET USED TO WORKING TOGETHER, SAY OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, HE SAID THAT IDEALLY THEY WOULD LIKE UNITA TO BE INCLUDED BUT REALIZED THAT THIS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE. IN ANSWER TO A FURTHER QUESTION, HE ASSERTED THAT ONCE SWAPO WAS ENGAGED IN TALKS THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF THE UN'S TRYING TO PUT A SPANNER IN THE WORKS.

5. AT ONE STAGE PIK WONDERED OUT ALOUD WHETHER HERMAN TONO JA TOIVO MIGHT NOT HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN THIS WHOLE PROCESS, BUT HE DID NOT PURSUE THE POINT AND NEITHER DID WE.

COMMENT

6. THE DISADVANTAGES OF OUR PERFORMING ANY INTERMEDIARY ROLE OF THE KIND THE SOUTH AFRICANS APPEAR TO HAVE IN MIND ARE OBVIOUS. MOREOVER THERE IS LITTLE TIME TO PLAY WITH IN THE U.N. CONTEXT, PARTICULARLY IF THE TEMPERATURE IS RAISED IN THE CURRENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. IN ANY CASE THE CHANCES THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD BRING OFF SUCH A PLOY, WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY LOOK LIKE A TIME-WASTING DIVERSIONARY TACTIC, CANNOT BE GOOD. BUT YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO PURSUE THE IDEA DISCREETLY THROUGH SOME OTHER INTERMEDIARY. IN THIS CONTEXT COULD OUR EMBASSY IN PARIS PERHAPS ENQUIRE INDIRECTLY ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PONIATOWSKI MEETING?

7. THERE IS NO NEED FOR HUNT TO GIVE AN IMMEDIATE REACTION TO THESE IDEAS WHEN HE SEES THE PRIME MINISTER AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON, BUT BEFORE LONG I SHALL BE ASKED TO SAY WHAT WE THINK OF THEM.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

LEAHY

FILES

S AF D

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR DAY

SIR L ALLINSON

CABINET OFFICE

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S E C R E T

GRS 1,600A

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 101110Z APRIL 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 282 OF 10 APRIL

TOP COPY  
JSS 02016  
11 APR 1980

PERSONAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE  
FROM LORD HUNT.

1. THERE IS NO DIPLOMATIC BAG FROM CAPE TOWN FOR ANOTHER 10 DAYS. I AM THEREFORE SENDING YOU THIS TELEGRAM ABOUT MY DISCUSSIONS WITH P W BOTHA YESTERDAY: AND WILL FOLLOW IT BEFORE I LEAVE WITH A FURTHER TELEGRAM ABOUT TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS AND ALSO AN ASSESSMENT. I WILL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO ELABORATE MORE FULLY ON MY RETURN. THERE WILL BE NO FULL RECORD SINCE IT WAS AGREED THAT NO NOTES SHOULD BE TAKEN (AND PIK BOTHA VOLUNTEERED THAT 'ON THIS OCCASION' THEY WOULD NOT BE TAPING THE CONVERSATIONS EITHER.)

2. I BEGAN BY HAVING ONE AND A QUARTER HOURS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ALONE. IN THE COURSE OF THE INITIAL PLEASANTRIES I GAVE HIM MRS THATCHER'S GOOD WISHES ADDING THAT SHE RECALLED HER MEETING WITH HIM AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EDUCATION AND HOPED TO MEET HIM AGAIN 'SOME TIME'. I THANKED HIM FOR THE HELP HE HAD GIVEN OVER RHODESIA AND STRESSED THE PRIVATE AND INFORMAL NATURE OF THE PRESENT TALKS. HE THEN SPOKE ON THE LINES OF HIS LETTER OF 5 FEBRUARY. THE SOVIET THREAT IN AFRICA WAS A REAL AND GROWING ONE: AND THERE WAS NO STRATEGY FOR MEETING IT. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT PROCEED BY OVERT AGGRESSION BUT WOULD SEEK TO CREATE SITUATIONS WHERE THEY WOULD BE INVITED IN. IN A NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES THEY WERE WELL ON THE WAY TO CREATING SUCH A SITUATION. THE PRESENCE OF THE EAST GERMANS WAS MUCH MORE SINISTER THAN THAT OF THE CUBANS. THE ULTIMATE TARGET WAS SOUTH AFRICA'S MINERAL RESOURCES WHICH, IF ACHIEVED, WOULD PARALYSE THE WEST. YET THE WEST, FAR FROM HELPING, TOOK EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK SOUTH AFRICA AND ASSIST THE SOVIET STRATEGY. HE SPOKE IN THE HARSHEST TERMS ABOUT THE AMERICANS WHOM HE SAID WERE MORE OF A DANGER TO SOUTH AFRICA THAN THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES. SURELY WE OUGHT TO FIND WAYS OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE THREAT AND ON MEANS TO COUNTER IT. BRITAIN HAD A UNIQUE KNOWLEDGE OF AFRICA AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE WISHED TO START BY TALKING TO US. HE RECOGNISED THAT WE WISHED TO SEE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL POLICIES AND HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT MORE WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE CLIMATE OF WESTERN OPINION TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA. THERE WERE HOWEVER SEVERE LIMITS ON HOW FAR AND HOW FAST HE COULD GO. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR THE BLACKS WOULD BE IMPROVED AND IN TALKING ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOMELAND CONCEPT HE USED THE WORD 'CONFEDERATION'. BUT HE HAD TO SAY BLUNTLY THAT MAJORITY RULE WOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE.

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3. AT THIS STAGE I MADE TWO MAIN POINTS. THE FIRST WAS THAT WE WERE UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT. ON THE OTHER HAND THIS THREAT (CF: HIS OWN WORDS ABOUT THE SOVIETS ALWAYS "SEEKING AN INVITATION TO COME IN") SOUGHT TO FEED ON AFRICAN NATIONALISM. IT WAS A MISTAKE TO EQUATE THE TWO: AND ANY POLICY WHICH DROVE THE AFRICANS INTO CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE SELF-DEFEATING. SECONDLY I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT FOR US TO SAY WHAT DOMESTIC CHANGES SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD MAKE. WE WERE NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, ARGUING THAT THEY SHOULD GO FOR ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN A UNITARY STATE. BUT IF RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WERE TO BE IMPROVED ANY CHANGES WOULD HAVE TO BE REAL AND NOT JUST COSMETIC AND WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE SEEN TO CARRY A WIDE MEASURE OF ACCEPTANCE.

4. WE THEN COVERED SPECIFIC POINTS IN GREATER DETAIL:

(A) THE THREAT AND THE STRATEGY TO COUNTER IT

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P W BOTHA IS GIVEN TO USING PHRASES SUCH AS SOUTH AFRICA FACING "TOTAL ONSLAUGHT" FROM COMMUNISM AND THE NEED FOR A "TOTAL STRATEGY" TO COMBAT IT. BUT IS WAS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT HE HAS THOUGHT THROUGH WHAT HE MEANS BY A COMMON ANTI-SOVIET STRATEGY. INDEED WHEN I ASKED HIM AT ONE POINT WHETHER HE WAS TALKING ABOUT SOME KIND OF MILITARY ALLIANCE INVOLVING SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER WESTERN POWERS, OR ACTION TO STABILISE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND IMPROVE SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THEM, HE REPLIED "BOTH". WHAT I DO THINK THIS REFLECTS IS SOUTH AFRICA'S GROWING SENSE OF HER OWN ISOLATION AND HER WISH TO END IT - BUT ON HER TERMS. THE PRIME MINISTER MADE MORE THAN ONE REFERENCE TO DUNKIRK, SAYING THAT IF SOUTH AFRICA HAD TO FIGHT ALONE SHE WOULD DO SO EVEN THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THAT SHE MIGHT NOT SURVIVE THE PROCESS. SHE DID NOT HOWEVER WISH TO BE DRIVEN INTO THIS POSITION OF FIGHTING ALONE AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE HAD WRITTEN HIS LETTER TO MRS THATCHER. COULD WE NOT HAVE COMPREHENSIVE BILATERAL TALKS ABOUT THE WHOLE REGION, COUNTRY BY COUNTRY, WITH A VIEW TO SEEING WHERE WE AGREED AND WHERE WE DIFFERED: AND WHAT ACTION COULD BE TAKEN TO STIFFEN RESISTANCE TO THE SOVIET THREAT? IF WE WOULD NOT TALK TO THEM, NO-ONE ELSE WOULD. I DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO THIS: BUT AGAIN REFERRED (ON THE LINES OF MY BRIEF) TO OUR RATHER DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF THE SOVIET THREAT. THERE WAS NOTHING WE WOULD RATHER SEE THAN SOUTH AFRICA PLAYING HER PROPER PART IN THE WORLD: AND IF HE WAS ABLE TO TAKE THE STEPS WHICH WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THIS HE WOULD FIND A READY RESPONSE FROM US. I ADDED THAT IT MIGHT WELL BE NECESSARY TO PROCEED PRAGMATICALLY AND ON A STEP BY STEP BASIS. TO GIVE HIM HIS DUE HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING BRITAIN TO ACT AS SOUTH AFRICA'S AGENT: BUT UNDOUBTEDLY HE REGARDS OUR EVENTUAL REREACTION TO HIS PROPOSAL

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AS SOME KIND OF TOUCH-STONE. "IF YOU TURN US DOWN WE HAVE NO HOPE WITH ANYONE ELSE AND WILL HAVE TO GO IT ALONE." YET THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT HE IS CONTEMPLATING THE SORT OF STEPS DOMESTICALLY THAT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO HAVE THE CLOSER RELATIONS HE SEEKS.

(B) RHODESIA  
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WE HAD A BIT OF A POST-MORTEM OVER THIS AND HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN FATAL TO MAKE THE BISHOP STAND DOWN FROM OFFICE DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD. BUT FOR THIS HE THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE WON THE ELECTION. HE CLEARLY HAD THE GRAVEST DOUBTS ABOUT MUGABE'S POLICIES IN THE MEDIUM TERM (AND ALSO FEARS MUGABE MAY BE OUSTED BY HIS MORE EXTREME SUPPORTERS): BUT EQUALLY HE SEEMS PREPARED TO GIVE MUGABE A FAIR TRIAL AND NOT TO PREJUDGE THINGS. I SAID THAT OF COURSE NO-ONE COULD FORESEE THE FUTURE BUT THAT WE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH MUGABE HAD BEEN SEEKING ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE AND ALSO BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE SEEMED TO BE KEEPING HIS DISTANCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. P W BOTHA SAID "WE CAN DO MORE FOR HIM ECONOMICALLY THAN YOU" AND REFERRED TO THE NEW LOAN ARRANGEMENTS EVEN THOUGH HE DOUBTED MUGABE'S INTENTION TO HONOUR EXISTING DEETS TO SOUTH AFRICA.

(C) NAMIBIA  
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HE TOOK A VERY ROBUST LINE SAYING THAT IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WAS HE PREPARED TO SELL THE TERRITORY DOWN THE RIVER TO SWAPO: AND THAT IF HE DID SO HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FALL AND BE SUCCEEDED BY AN ULTRA-RIGHT ONE WHICH WOULD OVERTURN HIS MORE LIBERAL INTERNAL POLICIES. HE CONTINUALLY EMPHASISED THE POLITICAL RISKS HE WAS RUNNING OVER NAMIBIA. AT THIS POINT HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS AND THE VETO. I SAID THAT OUR POSITION ON SANCTIONS WAS WELL-KNOWN. WE WERE AGAINST THEM. THE VETO WAS HOWEVER A SEPARATE ISSUE ON WHICH NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. IT WAS ESSENTIALLY A "NO WIN" SITUATION. SANCTIONS WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO ALL CONCERNED AND WOULD BE THE PATH OF CONFRONTATION. YET IF CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES (I DID NOT (UNDERLINED) TALK IN TERMS OF OUR VETOING ALONE) VETOED, THIS WOULD ALSO GREATLY DIMINISH ANY HOPE OF GETTING THE SORT OF RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT HE WANTED AND WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE SOME OF THE LATTER TO TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE SANCTIONS ISSUE INVOLVED A CHOICE WHICH OUGHT TO BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS. I RECOGNISED THE SENSITIVITY OF THE NAMIBIA ISSUE FOR SOUTH AFRICA, BUT IF IT WENT BADLY WRONG IT COULD PUT AN END TO EVERYTHING ELSE HE SEEMED TO WANT. IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PLAY AND TO AVOID AN APPARENT REJECTION OF THE U N PLAN.

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COULD HE GIVE ME ANY IDEA ON THE TIMING AND CONTENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S REPLY TO DR WALDHEIM? HE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PIK BOTHA PRESENT FOR THIS.

5. ACCORDINGLY AT THIS POINT HE WAS JOINED BY PIK BOTHA, FOURIE AND DE VILLIERS: AND THE AMBASSADOR JOINED ME. THE REST OF THE DISCUSSION WAS MAINLY A ONE-SIDED ONE WITH THE TWO BOTHAS SETTING OUT AT GREAT LENGTH THE HISTORY (AS THEY SEE IT) OF THE NAMIBIAN SAGA. ONLY TWO RELEVANT POINTS EMERGED:-

(I) ALTHOUGH THEY APPEARED NOT TO HAVE FINALLY DECIDED ON THE LINE OF THEIR REPLY TO WALDHEIM, IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE ONE DESIGNED TO BUY MORE TIME:

(II) THE POINT REFERRED TO IN CAPE TOWN TELEGRAM NO 278.

6. IN THE AFTERNOON I SAW MALAN AND PIK BOTHA (SEE CAPE TOWN TEL NO 279).

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FILES  
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MR DAY

COPIES TO:  
SIR R ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE  
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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 110940Z APR 1980

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 290 OF 11 APRIL

MY TELEGRAM NO 282

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14 APR 1980	
INDEX	

PERSONAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
FROM LORD HUNT

1. AT YESTERDAY'S TALKS THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PIK BCTHA, FOURIE, DE VILLIERS AND GENERAL MALAN, AND THE AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED ME.
2. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION <sup>GF</sup> AND TACTICS WITH THE AMBASSADOR I DECIDED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE THIS TIME IN THE HOPE OF AVOIDING A SERIES OF QUESTIONS OR REQUESTS TO WHICH I SHOULD HAVE TO GIVE STALLING OR NEGATIVE ANSWERS. THIS TACTIC WORKED SUCCESSFULLY.
3. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT I HAD REFLECTED ON THE PREVIOUS DAY'S DISCUSSIONS WHICH I HAD FOUND VERY HELPFUL: AND, ALTHOUGH I HAD NOT CONSULTED MRS THATCHER OVERNIGHT, I HAD TRIED TO ENVISAGE WHAT HER REACTION TO THEM MIGHT BE. I THOUGHT SHE MIGHT WELL SAY SOMETHING LIKE THIS. WE SEEMED TO SEE EYE TO EYE ON FIVE POINTS VIZ:-
  - (A) THERE WAS A SOVIET THREAT TO THE REGION WHICH NEEDED TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY:
  - (B) SOUTH AFRICA HAD AN IMPORTANT PART WHICH SHE COULD PLAY IN THE REGION AND MORE WIDELY IN AFRICA AND THE WESTERN WORLD:
  - (C) BRITAIN HAD A VERY GREAT INTEREST IN THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF THE REGION AND OF SOUTH AFRICA:
  - (D) WE SHOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO HELP BRING THIS STABILITY AND PROSPERITY ABOUT AND TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO PLAY ITS PROPER ROLE BY USING OUR INFLUENCE WHERE WE COULD:
  - (E) WE COULD DO THIS MORE EFFECTIVELY BEHIND THE SCENES AND COULD IN ANY CASE NOT BE SEEN TO ACT AS A SPOKESMAN FOR SOUTH AFRICA, PARTICULARLY WHEN WE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT HER POLICIES.
4. THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE COULD BUILD ON THESE POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND MAKE OUR INFLUENCE FELT WAS HOWEVER BOUND TO BE GOVERNED BY THE PERCEPTION OF CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE HAD NO INTENTION OF PRESCRIBING WHAT THESE CHANGES MIGHT BE OR, FOR EXAMPLE, PRESSING THEM TO ACCEPT ONE MAN ONE VOTE. WE

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RECOGNISED THAT THEY HAD BUILT AN ECONOMY AND CIVILISATION THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO SEE DESTROYED. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE ESSENTIAL FOR THEM TO MANAGE THE PROCESS OF CHANGE SO THAT IT HAD WIDE-SPREAD DEMONSTRABLE ACCEPTANCE INCLUDING THE NON-WHITE POPULATION. IN THE MEANTIME IT WAS VITAL TO AVOID A MAJOR CONFRONTATION OVER NAMIBIA WRECKING WHAT WAS BOUND TO BE A GRADUAL AND STEP BY STEP PROCESS. I HOPED WE ALSO AGREED THAT THE NEW ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE GIVEN A FAIR CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND THAT THEY WOULD DO ALL THEY COULD TO ASSIST THIS AND THUS TO KEEP MUGABE ON A MODERATE COURSE. AS REGARDS THE SOVIET THREAT, WE BOTH RECOGNISED IT AS REAL AND MENACING BUT WE SAW IT AS LARGELY POLITICAL AND OPPORTUNISTIC WHEREAS THEY SEEMED TO PERCEIVE SOME GRAND MILITARY DESIGN. PERHAPS THIS REFLECTED OUR DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICAL STANDPOINTS. WE SAW THE THREAT IN A WORLD-WIDE CONTEXT WHEREAS THEY WERE NATURALLY PREOCCUPIED WITH AFRICA: AND WE DREW A SHARPER DISTINCTION BETWEEN AFRICAN NATIONALISM AND MARXISM EVEN THOUGH THE TWO COULD OVERLAP.

5. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, TWO POINTS ON WHICH THE PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS HAD LEFT ME UNCLEAR. WHAT DID HE REALLY MEAN BY HIS CONSTELLATION OF STATES IDEA WHICH SEEMED INTENDED TO MARRY DOMESTIC CHANGE WITH BETTER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS? WHO WOULD BE INVOLVED? HOW WOULD IT WORK? WHAT WOULD BE THE CITIZENSHIP POSITION OF AFRICANS OUTSIDE THE HOMELANDS ETC? MY SECOND DOUBT RELATED TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE WHOLE REGION "COUNTRY BY COUNTRY". WHAT HAD HE REALLY IN MIND? TAKE, FOR EXAMPLE, ZAMBIA. WAS HE SAYING THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS WHETHER TO HELP ZAMBIA OR TO DAMAGE HER: OR TO SEEK TO BRING ABOUT CHANGES IN ZAMBIAN POLICIES? THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF SUCH A DISCUSSION WERE OBVIOUS, WHEREAS A GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON MIGHT SERVE LITTLE PURPOSE.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED ME FOR THESE REMARKS AND SAID THAT HE AGREED WE SAW A NUMBER OF THINGS THE SAME WAY. HE WOULD MAKE A NUMBER OF COMMENTS IN REPLY. BY WAY OF PREFACE, HE WOULD SAY HONESTLY THAT HE HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP TO DISLIKE BRITAIN - AND HIS PEOPLE HAD HAD GOOD REASON FOR THAT. BUT HE HAD TO ADMIT OBJECTIVELY THAT SINCE BRITAIN HAD RETIRED FROM THE CENTRE OF THE STAGE THE WORLD'S AFFAIRS HAD TAKEN A TURN FOR THE WORSE.

7. HE PREFERRED NOT TO SPEAK ABOUT "CHANGE" IN THE INTERNAL CONTEXT SINCE RADICAL LEFT-WINGERS TRIED TO MAKE POLITICAL CAPITAL OUT OF IT. HE LIKED TO TALK INSTEAD OF DEVELOPMENT AND OF "UPLIFTING" THE LESS ADVANCED ELEMENTS IN THE POPULATION THROUGH BETTER EDUCATION, TRAINING, HOUSING, HEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT. SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT IN TERMS OF ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN A UNITARY STATE, BUT HE BELIEVED THEY WERE WRONG. JUST AS THE NATIONAL PARTY HAD SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE WHITE MINORITY AS ONE OF ITS FOUNDING PRINCIPLES, SO SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD BE

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THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR THE OTHER PEOPLES. THESE PEOPLES WERE IN ANY CASE TOO DIVERSIFIED AND JEALOUS OF EACH OTHER TO MAKE MAJORITY RULE IN A UNITARY STATE A PRACTICAL ANSWER. (MR BOTHA GAVE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC EXAMPLES TO ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT.) THEY MUST BE HELPED INSTEAD TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. FOR EXAMPLE HE WANTED TO SEE A ZULU NATION AGAIN IN ITS OWN CONSOLIDATED AREA. HE WAS WORKING ON THESE THINGS BUT THEY WOULD TAKE TIME (''MORE THAN JUST A YEAR OR TWO''). PEOPLE HAD TO BE TRAINED TO GOVERN THEMSELVES POLITICALLY.

8. TURNING TO THE CONCEPT OF A CONSTELLATION OF STATES MR BOTHA EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT: THE HOMELANDS WHICH WERE NOT YET INDEPENDENT, THOSE STATES WHICH SOUTH AFRICA HAD HELPED TO INDEPENDENCE (TRANSKEI, BOPHUTATSWANA, VENDA), AND NEIGHBOURING INDEPENDENT STATES. THE FIRST TWO GROUPS WERE PART OF THE RAND MONETARY AREA AND NEEDED TO COORDINATE THEIR POLICIES IN THE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL FIELDS AND OVER SUCH PRACTICAL MATTERS AS TRANSPORT, HEALTH AND WATER RESOURCES. THEY COULD ALSO HAVE CLOSE COOPERATION IN SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THEY SHOULD MEET TOGETHER AT LEAST ANNUALLY AND IN COMMITTEES TO DISCUSS THEIR COMMON PROBLEMS AND COULD HAVE A DEVELOPMENT BANK AND SOME FORM OF JOINT SECRETARIAT. HE WOULD ALSO WELCOME THE PARTICIPATION OF NEIGHBOURING INDEPENDENT STATES ON CONDITION THAT THERE WAS NO INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION HAD MUCH TO OFFER ONE ANOTHER AND SOUTH AFRICA DID NOT WISH TO DOMINATE THE OTHERS.

9. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION MR BOTHA SAID THAT IN THE CONSTELLATION CONTEXT BLACKS IN THE REPUBLIC ITSELF WOULD BE ABLE TO ENJOY A FORM OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF ''HIGHER THAN MUNICIPAL STATUS''. THIS TOO WOULD TAKE TIME SINCE IF THEY WERE GIVEN IT BEFORE THEY WERE READY IT WOULD BE LIKE GIVING A PISTOL TO A CHILD AND TELLING HIM IT WAS READY TO USE.

10. MR BOTHA WENT ON BRIEFLY TO OUTLINE THE SEPARATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HE HAD IN MIND FOR THE COLOURED AND INDIAN POPULATIONS, BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAILS. ON A SEPARATE POINT HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WHY PEOPLE IN THE STATES WHICH SOUTH AFRICA HAD HELPED TO INDEPENDENCE DID NOT LIKE HAVING TO GIVE UP THEIR SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP. A MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE WAS WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM AND IT COULD BE THAT SOMETHING AKIN TO ''COMMONWEALTH CITIZENSHIP'' WOULD BE THE RIGHT ANSWER.

11. ON THE SOVIET THREAT HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED MILITARILY SO FAR FROM THEIR OWN BORDERS. THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION WOULD BE TOO STRETCHED. THEY WOULD WORK INSTEAD THROUGH SURROGATES SUCH AS THE CUBANS AND EAST GERMANS. MOREOVER AS HE HAD FORESEEN WHEN THE BRITISH FLEET WITHDREW FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN



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THE RUSSIANS COULD NOW APPLY THEIR SEA POWER IN THE AREA. AS FOR WHAT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE TOLD US OF RUSSIAN INTENTIONS, HE COULD ONLY SAY THAT UNLIKE SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE OUR INFORMATION ON RHODESIA HAD BEEN BADLY WRONG WHEN WE HAD FORECAST THAT MUZOREWA WOULD EASILY WIN THE ELECTION. (I CONTESTED THIS AND THERE FOLLOWED SOME GOOD-NATURED REPORTEE ABOUT WHO HAD SAID WHAT.)

12. TURNING TO ZIMBABWE MR BOTHA SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A VISIT FROM AN INTERMEDIARY RECENTLY (''NO NAMES NO PACK DRILL'') AND HAD ASKED HIM WHETHER MUGABE WOULD HONOUR RHODESIA'S FINANCIAL DEBTS OF MORE THAN 400 MILLION RAND TO SOUTH AFRICA AND WOULD PREVENT THE ANC FROM USING ZIMBABWE AS A BASE FROM WHICH TO ATTACK SOUTH AFRICA. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD HAD A REPLY HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD MUGABE HAD AGREED ON BOTH POINTS. (HE DID NOT DISPUTE THIS AND IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION AFTER THE MEETING FOURIE CONFIRMED THAT MUGABE WOULD GIVE A WRITTEN ASSURANCE ON THE DEBTS IMMEDIATELY AFTER INDEPENDENCE.) MR BOTHA WENT ON TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN GENERAL THE S A G WOULD SUSPEND JUDGMENT ON THE COURSE OF THEIR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE AND WOULD NOT ENTER INTO ANY NEW OBLIGATIONS (AS DISTINCT FROM FULFILLING PREVIOUS ONES) UNTIL THEY COULD SEE HOW MUGABE'S GOOD INTENTIONS STOOD UP TO THE PRESSURES HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY COME UNDER.

13. AT MY SUGGESTION WE DID NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS FACING US IN NAMIBIA, HAVING GONE OVER THE GROUND THOROUGHLY THE DAY BEFORE. BUT MR BOTHA READILY AGREED THAT WE BOTH HAD GOOD REASONS TO AVOID AN IMMEDIATE CONFRONTATION AND HE EMPHASISED ONCE AGAIN THAT TIME WAS NEEDED. HE REALISED THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO RUSH MATTERS AND HE THOUGHT THE SAME WAS PROBABLY TRUE OF THE GERMANS, FRENCH AND CANADIANS. BUT THE AMERICANS SEEMED BENT ON FORCING THE ISSUE. LIKEWISE THE FRONT LINE STATES. THE LATTER WERE REALLY A VERY DISPARATE GROUP AND HAD SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF THEIR OWN TO CONTEND WITH. COULD WE NOT GET THEM TO SEE THAT THEY WERE ''PLAYING WITH FIRE'' IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND ESPECIALLY IN NAMIBIA? IF THEY FORCED A CONFRONTATION NOW THERE WOULD BE WAR. HE DID NOT WANT A WAR BECAUSE IT WOULD SOLVE NOTHING, BUT I SHOULD MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT, IF WAR CAME THE WHITES IN RHODESIA, WOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY WON IT. HE HOPED WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE THE FLS SEE SENSE, BUT HE WAS NOT PRESSING ME FOR AN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION NOW AND WOULD LEAVE IT AT THAT.

NAMIBIA, WHO  
WERE DIFFERENT  
FROM THE  
WHITES IN

14. THE MEETING ENDED WITH WARM EXPRESSIONS OF THANKS AND GOOD WISHES ON BOTH SIDES.

ASSESSMENT

15. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS VERY GOOD THROUGHOUT: FRIENDLY AND RELAXED BUT NO GLOSSING OVER OF DIFFERENCES. IT WAS INTERESTING

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THAT I WAS NOT PRESSED AT ALL ON SOME OF THE POINTS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT. IN PARTICULAR HE DID NOT RESPOND TO MY QUESTION (PARA 5 ABOVE) ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF MORE DETAILED BILATERAL TALKS. NOR DID HE PICK UP MY REMARK (PARA 2 OF THE T U R) THAT MRS THATCHER HOPED TO SEE HIM AGAIN "SOME TIME" OR SUGGEST AN EARLY MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM. IT IS OF COURSE JUST POSSIBLE THAT HE JUDGED MY REMARKS SO NEGATIVE THAT HE FELT REBUFFED AND WAS WRITING US OFF. ON BALANCE (AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREES) I DOUBT IF THIS WAS THE CASE: AND PIK BOTHA WENT OUT OF HIS WAY, WHEN I SAW HIM AT DINNER LAST NIGHT, TO SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN WELL SATISFIED. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT, AS ON SO MANY OTHER POINTS, P W BOTHA HAD NOT THOUGHT THROUGH THE PROPOSALS IN HIS LETTER BEFORE HE SENT IT AND WAS COMING HIMSELF TO SEE THE DIFFICULTIES IN SOME OF HIS IDEAS. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE HE WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THE POSITION IN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES HE CLEARLY DOES NOT WANT TO BE PRESSED ON THE PRECISE CHANGES HE ENVISAGES IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF. UNDOUBTEDLY HIS LETTER WAS INSPIRED BY A KEEN SENSE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ISOLATION AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT FOR A MOMENT HE FELT WE COULD HAVE SOME KIND OF MAGIC WAND FOR THEM. I THINK HE NOW SEES THAT THIS IS QUITE UNREALISTIC AND THAT HE HAS COME TO THIS CONCLUSION FOR HIMSELF. HIS LAST WORDS TO ME WERE "EVEN IF NOTHING FURTHER COMES OF THIS VISIT I AM GLAD YOU CAME AND I HAVE FOUND OUR DISCUSSIONS VALUABLE". I PROMISED TO REPORT FAITHFULLY EVERYTHING HE SAID.

16. I THINK THAT OUR OPTIONS REMAIN OPEN. WE CAN LET THE WHOLE THING DROP WITHOUT, I JUDGE, CAUSING GREAT SURPRISE OR DISAPPOINTMENT: OR WE CAN SEEK TO FOLLOW UP SOME ASPECTS THROUGH MORE NORMAL CHANNELS: OR WE COULD SUGGEST A MINISTERIAL VISIT (HERE OR IN LONDON) AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. IN THEIR PRESENT SENSITIVE AND ISOLATED MOOD SOME KIND OF FOLLOW UP OF AN INNOCUOUS KIND COULD WELL PAY DIVIDENDS IN RESTRAINING THEM FROM SELF-DEFEATING COURSES.

17. IN SHORT, NO BREAK-THROUGH, BUT WE DID NOT EXPECT ONE. BUT I HOPE NO DAMAGE EITHER. MY OWN FEELING WAS THAT ON BALANCE THE VISIT WAS WORTHWHILE AS A FRIENDLY GESTURE WHICH ALSO SERVED TO BRING OUT MORE CLEARLY WHAT WE COULD AND COULD NOT DO. THE AMBASSADOR WILL OF COURSE REPORT ANY SUBSEQUENT FEED-BACK.

LEAHY

FILES  
HD/S AF D  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DAY

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GRS 650A

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 151015Z APR 1980

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 299 OF 15 APRIL

MY TELEGRAMS NOS 282 AND 290

*Read in full. Lord Hunt will be calling on you shortly.*

*Read*

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER'S EMISSARY

1. LORD HUNT BROUGHT OFF THE DIFFICULT TASK OF SATISFYING THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER THAT WE TAKE HIS PREOCCUPATIONS SERIOUSLY WITHOUT COMMITTING US TO ANY SPECIFIC FOLLOW-UP ACTION. MR BOTHA DID NOT PURSUE THE IDEA OF A MEETING WITH W/MRS THATCHER NOR PRESSED THE SUGGESTION HE MADE AT THE FIRST MEETING WITH LORD HUNT FOR COMPREHENSIVE BILATERAL TALKS. ON THE OTHER HAND BOTH PIK BOTHA AND BRAND FOURIE INDICATED PRIVATELY AT THE END OF THE TALKS THAT THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD GONE WELL.
  
2. WHAT WAS THEIR USEFULNESS TO US? I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO PUT MY FINGER ON IT EXACTLY. BUT I HAVE NOTICED BEFORE THAT EVEN WHERE THERE IS NO OBVIOUS MEETING OF MINDS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS OR OUR BASIC INTERESTS DIFFER THE MERE FACT OF KEEPING THE SOUTH AFRICANS INFORMED OF OUR THINKING AND OF EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH THEM ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS PAYS DIVIDENDS. IN PARTICULAR IT MAKES IT THAT MUCH EASIER FOR THE TWO BOTHAS TO CHECK THEIR NATURAL IMPETUOSITY AND TO REFLECT BEFORE EMBARKING ON A COURSE OF ACTION. THIS WAS APPARENT ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS DURING THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE AND MOST RECENTLY WHEN THE RHODESIAN ELECTION RESULT WAS ON THE POINT OF BEING ANNOUNCED. SIR A DUFF'S VISITS WERE ALSO VERY USEFUL IN HELPING TO KEEP THE SAG STEADY. DURING LORD HUNT'S TALKS IT WAS CLEAR THAT ALTHOUGH BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND PIK BOTHA LIKE HOLDING THE FLOOR THEY ALSO LISTENED CAREFULLY TO WHAT HE HAD TO SAY. THIS MOREOVER AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE NOT INCLINED TO PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO THE VIEWS OF ANY OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENT. THEY REGARD THE AMERICANS AS HOSTILE WITNESSES.
  
3. I UNDERSTAND THE RELUCTANCE TO SEE US "SUCKED INTO" JOINT STUDIES AND THE LIKE AND I SEE NO NEED TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO ANYTHING OF THIS KIND AT THIS STAGE. BUT I HOPE THAT WE CAN KEEP IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING TALKS, FOR EXAMPLE BETWEEN MIDDLE-RANKING OFFICIALS OF THE TWO FOREIGN OFFICES, IN THE REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE VIEWS IN GREATER DEPTH ON BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL QUESTIONS. IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP THE FACT OF SUCH TALKS CONFIDENTIAL. INDEED IT MIGHT GIVE THEM AN UNNECESSARY AIR OF MYSTERY IF WE TRIED. ON THE OTHER HAND IF CIRCUMSTANCES WERE RIGHT, THAT IS IF

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WE WERE NOT AT THE TIME IN THE MIDDLE OF AN ACUTE CRISIS OVER, SAY, NAMIBIA Ø (IN WHICH CASE WE PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE HOLDING THE TALKS ANYWAY) IT SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND WAYS OF PRESENTING THE TALKS TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD IN A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE LIGHT.

4. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE I SHOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SEND A LETTER TO MR BOTHA TO ROUND OFF LORD HUNT'S TALKS. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE WISE TO AWAIT THE SAG'S REPLY ON THE NAMIBIA DMZ BEFORE DOING SO AND, DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THE REPLY, IT MAY WELL BE DESIRABLE TO REFER TO IT IN THE LETTER. THAT APART THE GENERAL LINES OF SUCH A LETTER MIGHT BE AS FOLLOWS. MRS THATCHER HAS BEEN VERY INTERESTED TO HEAR LORD HUNT'S ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS AND HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT WE SEEM TO SEE EYE TO EYE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON A NUMBER OF MAJOR POINTS. (IF IT WAS THOUGHT DESIRABLE TO FILL THE LETTER OUT A BIT, MRS THATCHER COULD RECAPITULATE THE MAJOR POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TEL NO 29Ø.) IT WAS A GOOD IDEA OF MR BOTHA'S TO SUGGEST THESE TALKS. EVEN WHERE WE DO NOT AGREE, THE ISSUES ARE TOO SERIOUS TO ALLOW FOR ANY UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHERE WE EACH STAND. WE ALSO NEED TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE CAN HELP ONE ANOTHER IN TRYING TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS WE BOTH HAVE TO CONTEND WITH. SHE THEREFORE ATTACHES THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH AND SHARING OUR THOUGHTS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS AND IN ANY OTHER WAY WHICH MAY SEEM APPROPRIATE.

*Handwritten signature/initials*

LEAHY

[ COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST ]

FILES

HD/SAFD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR DAY

COPIES TO :

SIR R. ARMSTRONG

CABINET OFFICE

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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



②

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Weekend Box*

*Prime Minister*

14 April 1980

*RMS*

*[Handwritten mark]*

*Dear Michael,*

CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

In your letter of 31 March you said that the Prime Minister had asked whether any work had been done on the feasibility of some form of partition of South Africa.

Most of the work on this subject has been carried out in South Africa. I attach a chapter of a draft paper by the FCO Research Department which summarises the various proposals for partition. I should point out that this is one chapter of a longer paper which looks at many other constitutional proposals.

Geographical partition is in a way what the South African Government is already aiming for through the homelands policy. Three of the ten homelands have already opted for "independence" recognised by no country other than South Africa. Even if it were not for the problem of urban blacks it has become clear that such a solution carries the stigma of apartheid and is not going to offer an acceptable way of reflecting black political aspirations.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

## D. PARTITION

### (i) DEFINITIONS

104. The SPRO-CAS Political Commission defined three types of partition: federative partition; Homeland separatism; and radical partition. Federative partition would involve any of the arrangements described in Sections B<sup>and C</sup> above, including a confederal system with neighbouring independent Black states. Professors Botha and Maasdorp attempted a precise definition of boundaries: Botha, Leistner, ~~and~~ Rhodie<sup>and the NRP</sup> all suggested a combination of federation and confederation; Leistner, Schlemmer, Maasdorp and Thomas envisaged the division of South Africa itself into three areas (White, Black and multiracial), while Marquard sought to include neighbouring states in a federation with the Republic; the PFP, ~~and~~ Hirsch <sup>Tusenius</sup> and <sup>L</sup> decided that the numbers of federal units and their boundaries should be agreed by the parties concerned. Whatever course was recommended, most of these schemes envisaged a consolidation of the Homelands well beyond the boundaries envisaged by the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act and the Government's consolidation plan adopted in 1975. For its part the SPRO-CAS Commission rejected further "balkanisation" as, at best, helping to ease "the impending group conflicts in certain local communities; on the whole, it will only lead to a multiplication of the present difficulties, though perhaps on a smaller scale".

105. The SPRO-CAS Commission defined the Government's policy of self-government and "independence" for its Black "nations" as Homeland separatism. Some apologists have claimed that it was the "traditional liberal solution", which could be traced back to British policies in the Cape and Natal in the nineteenth century. They have also sought guidance from the published works of the late Alfred Hoernlé, a respected political scientist, who wrote in

/1939:

1939: "Total separation into distinct white and black "areas of liberty" must be considered a genuinely liberal ideal, if it means the breaking up of the present caste-society which as a whole can never be free".<sup>(82)</sup> Hoernlé took separation to imply at least partition and the creation of distinct autonomous polities. There would have to be, he said, complete territorial segregation of such a nature that "all Natives resided permanently in the Reserves; and "permanent residence" is a sham, unless the resident makes, or earns, his living where he resides". To start with, this would require a large increase of the Homelands' territory beyond that proposed in the 1936 Act. In the second place, it would require the establishment of genuinely self-governing polities, effectively removed from the control of the White parliament. Thirdly, it would involve complete economic segregation, ie the Homelands must at least be economically self-sufficient. If these conditions were not met, Hoernlé said, then territorial segregation (or separate development today) would really mean segregation in the interests of White domination. He acknowledged that true separation was "practically impossible", owing to the ever-increasing involvement of all population groups in a single economy and the unwillingness of the White man to "surrender ultimate control whatever limited measures of political self-government he might be willing to concede to the Bantu". Nevertheless, he hoped that there were enough Whites who would be prepared to consider it as a goal.

(ii) RADICAL PARTITION

106. Since the 1960s other scenarios have depicted South Africa as a country divided into two (or more) separate states, one largely White, the other (or others) largely Black. In 1960 the economist /brother

<sup>(82)</sup> R F A Hoernlé, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit (1939) (quoted in South Africa's Political Alternatives, page 108 - SPRO-CAS Political Commission).

brother of Sir De Villiers Graaff, Dr Jan Graaff, suggested what he called demotomic partition. He envisaged a negotiated partition between Whites and Blacks with the Black state incorporating the Transkei, Lesotho, Natal, Swaziland, Northern Transvaal, Bophuth-Tswana and Botswana. By including Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Graaff's proposed Black state would cover about 40% of the land area, while the White State would cover 60%. The populations of the two states would be more or less equal in number: 7 million Blacks and 1 million Whites and Indians in the Black State;  $4\frac{1}{2}$  million Whites, Coloureds and Indians and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million Blacks in the White state (1960 figures). Graaff's partition line was drawn to involve as little population removal as possible, though voluntary individual transfers were assumed. The  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million Blacks left in the White state would have no political rights there, but Coloureds would be allowed to vote. The White state would contain virtually all the mines (other than coal), the major areas of industrial development (other than Durban and possibly East London), and the wealthiest agricultural areas (other than the sugar-producing areas of Natal). The Black state would be economically viable with coal, sugar, pineapples, timber, and adequate water; it would have a strong industrial base and a port at Durban, and possibly a second at East London.

107. The Graaff plan was reflected in an article in Encounter (October 1963) by John Mander who stated that partition was the direction in which Dr Verwoerd, the then Prime Minister, and his advisers were moving. Mander said that self-preservation dictated that the Black majority had to be reduced to manageable proportions ("a policy of discarding ballast"). The natural frontiers of a "radical" African Homeland, stretching unbroken from the western Transvaal via the northern Transvaal, Swaziland and Natal to the Eastern Cape and Lesotho, were the Drakensberg mountains. The rest of the Cape Province, the PWV area, the central Transvaal Highveld and the Orange Free State would remain White.



108. Another attempt to sketch a partition scenario and define boundaries was made in 1967 by Edward Tiryakian of Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. (83) Against the background of the failure of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and events in Nigeria, he considered that partition into two separate states would be a more realistic solution of South Africa's problems than a federal arrangement. According to Tiryakian, the Black state would comprise the bulk of the Transvaal, Natal, Lesotho and Swaziland, either as a federal republic or a more centralised state. The White republic would consist of the Orange Free State and the Cape Province, excluding a consolidated Transkei, Ciskei and BophuthaTswana which would be added to the Black state (see Map 6). Half of the Witwatersrand area (including Pretoria) would be in the

/White

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(83) (83) Sociological Realism: Partition for South Africa? (Social Forces,

White state. Johannesburg and the western Rand would be included in the Black state. The latter would have a diversified economy based on the Rand mining area under its control, Johannesburg's heavy industry and the Durban and East London maritime complexes. Many of the White farmers in the Transvaal could be transferred to the White state, while the settled White population of Johannesburg and its environs would have the option of remaining either as permanent citizens of the Black state or as expatriates on temporary visas (and vice versa for Blacks in the White state). Provided the Cape Coloured population were once again placed on the common roll with White voters, universal adult suffrage could operate in both states. Tiryakian added that unrestricted adult suffrage would be a sine qua non for international acceptance of partition.

109. A more detailed partition scenario was painted in 1976 by Jürgen Blenck and Klaus von der Ropp, two German specialists in African affairs. <sup>(84)</sup> In essence, they envisaged South Africa's being divided into two parts, with the boundary between a White state and a Black state drawn from the Botswana border via Sishen and Bloemfontein to a point on the coast between Port Elizabeth and East London (see Map 7). According to their plan the Whites would have to give up the entire Transvaal and Natal, including the Witwatersrand. They envisaged an apportionment of South Africa's GDP in proportion to the size of the respective Black and non-Black populations. Although each of the new states would cover 50% of the country's land area, the Black State would include most of its mining and industrial capacity and account for 74.7% of existing GDP. All gold mines would be in the Black State, but the mineral resources of the northern Cape Province and, eg the automobile industry around Port Elizabeth, would remain in White /hands.

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(84) <sup>(85)</sup> Republic of South Africa : Partition a Solution? (Aussen Politik, Volume 27, No. 3, 1976.)

hands. Blenck and von der Ropp believed that "the axes and poles for future development which are given in the National Physical Development Plan for 1975 almost seem to indicate that the government of South Africa foresees the possibility of a partition along the Sishen-Bloemfontein-Port Elizabeth line." They compared previous development centring on the PWV area with the "strong emphasis" on the Cape Province in the new plan (see Map 9). They thought that the Cape Province "development axis" could be developed further; following a partition "both parts of South Africa would then have at their disposal closed systems with development axes and development poles and adequate transportation infrastructure networks." The Black State would include most of the best rainfall areas. White agricultural development would therefore need unimpeded access to the waters of the Orange river. As it is, the river is to be used to create about 9,000 new agricultural units which could be used to provide farmers in Natal, the Transvaal and the northern Free State with new land. Some 2.7 million Whites, 300,000 Coloureds and 600,000 Indians would have to be resettled in the White State, while one million Blacks would be transferred the other way. Partition, Blenck and von der Ropp maintained, would be a viable solution "if it remains the only alternative to years of bloodshed." If it occurred, the West should offer the Whites "every conceivable guarantee that partition of the territory would not simply be an intermediate stage in a process resulting in a complete takeover of South Africa by the Black South Africans." They should be offered "full membership in the Western defence community", and each of the successor States should be prevented from "sinking into chaos" by the implementation of a new "Marshall Plan". For its part the Black State would have to be unified and not comprise ten separate units, if it was to maintain itself in face of a White South Africa.

190. Whether or not the South African Government was seriously considering a form of partition in the 1960s (cf. paragraph 107), the Broederbond-<sup>influenced</sup>~~controlled~~ South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) has, reportedly, produced two alternative schemes. The first proposal, as described by John de St. Jorre in a recent book,<sup>(85)</sup> envisaged two Black states, approximating to the Graaff/Mander horn<sup>se</sup>shoe formation but separated by a White corridor running from the Transvaal to Durban. Both Port Elizabeth and East London would be ceded to the southern Black state, thus providing it with an economic dynamo. The Black states could organize themselves in a loose or a tight federation, however they chose; they might also link up with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland if an agreed form of association could be found. About 40% of South Africa's land area would then be under Black rule. There would be a sustained drive to reduce the numbers of Blacks in the White state (and vice versa), with the eventual aim being to have no more Blacks than Whites resident there. The Coloureds would be accommodated in self-governing enclaves in the Western Cape, the Witwatersrand and the Port Elizabeth area. The Indians would have a similar enclave around Durban.

191. The second SABRA scheme is reported to involve the creation of four Black regions based on consolidated Homelands (see Map 9). According to a recent report in To the Point (9 February 1979) the SABRA plan, which was announced in 1977, envisaged the consolidation of the Transkei and the Ciskei with Lesotho, Qwaqwa and the Thaba'Nekh segment of Bophuth<sup>a</sup>swana; KwaZulu with Swaziland and KaNgwane; and /Bophuth<sup>o</sup>swana

(85) A House Divided: South Africa's Uncertain Future, pages 25-27 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977).

BophuthaTswana with Botswana. The other Homelands in northern Transvaal (Gazankulu, Lebowa, South Ndebele and Venda) would, similarly, be consolidated into a single region. In each case substantial areas of White land would be exchanged for Black land. Thus, KwaZulu would obtain large areas of northern Natal, including Richards Bay, by ceding areas of territory it currently encompasses in southern Natal. Fragmented pieces of BophuthaTswana in the western Transvaal and the northern Cape would be exchanged for White land in the north-western Transvaal. Similar exchanges would occur in the northern Transvaal and the areas bordering Lesotho. Whether the different groups constituting any region formed one political unit or associated themselves in some other way would be left to them to decide.

192. The most recent partition scenario was drawn by Professor Gavin Maasdorp (cf. paragraphs <sup>73-74</sup>~~75-77~~). (86) His own preference was a federal system (paragraph <sup>73</sup>~~76~~), but his partition scenario was more precise. It involved dividing South Africa into a predominantly non-Black state (Capeland) and a predominantly Black state (Capricornia) (see map 4). The basis of his division was existing economic or planning regions, (87) so that each state had a reasonably strong natural resource base. In all but three of the Cape Province's economic regions the Blacks constituted a minority in 1977. Capeland would encompass 46.8% of South Africa's total

/area

(86)

Forms of Partition, a paper which the World Peace Foundation and the SA Institute of International Affairs will publish shortly.

(87)

South Africa is divided into 76 economic regions, 19 of which are in the Homelands (including the Transkei and Bophutha-Tswana). The National Physical Development Plan divides the country into 42 planning regions, including four metropolitan areas.

area with, before any relocation of population groups occurred, 16.3% of the total South African population. Based on the 1970 census figures, Capeland's population would comprise 27.4% Whites, 48.5% Coloureds, 0.5% Asians and 23.6% Blacks, while Capricornia's population would be 79.3% Black, 15.6% White, 1.8% Coloured and 3.4% Asian. A greater number of Whites would be resident in Capricornia (2.7 million) than in Capeland (.95 million), at least to begin with. Maasdorp assumed that a substantial emigration from Capricornia to Capeland would occur. However, if there was no enforced relocation, 25% of all Whites in Capricornia would have to move for the Whites in Capeland to achieve parity with the non-Whites.

193. In fashioning his partition scenario, Professor Maasdorp made five assumptions: (a) partition would be negotiated at a National Convention; (b) relocation of population groups would be voluntary; (c) universal adult suffrage would apply in both states; (d) their precise boundaries would be influenced by historical factors as well as the need for economic viability; (e) the Transkei, ~~and~~ Bophutha-  
*and Venda* Tswana would be willing to be absorbed into Capricornia. A reduction of the racial income gap would be a high priority in both states, Maasdorp said, particularly if political power in Capeland was in the Coloureds' hands. As it was, Capricornia would have the greater economic potential of the two states. Based on 1972 figures for Gross Geographic Product (GDP), Capeland's GDP would account for 22.5% of the South African total. Agriculture would be relatively more important in Capeland, while mining (including gold and coal) would be in Capricornia. Otherwise the contribution of other sectors to their respective economies would be similar. Both states would have three ports. They would also have closed transport systems. However, since Professor Maasdorp assumed that partition would be agreed by negotiation, close economic relationships

/between

between the two states could also be assumed. Each state would be dependent on the other for the supply of specific goods.

(iii) COMMENT

14. Although Professor Maasdorp assumed that partition would come about by negotiation, he also pointed out that partitions which had occurred elsewhere (eg India, Palestine, Cyprus and Ireland) had usually been the result of armed conflict. In South Africa no population group is likely, in present circumstances, to seek a radical partition of the country into two separate states, as envisaged by Maasdorp, Blenck and von der Ropp or Tiryakian. Such a partition, in particular a division of the vital Witwatersrand region and a largescale transfer of communities from one area to another, is unlikely to be a serious option except as a last resort in the worst circumstances. Only apocalyptic circumstances, ie confrontation and much bloodshed, with or without external intervention, seem likely to cause both Whites and Blacks to consider it seriously. The Whites would then presumably have to negotiate from a position of weakness rather than strength, faced with the stark alternatives of an unwinnable war, integration or partition.

15. Nevertheless, the Maasdorp, Blenck/von der Ropp and Tiryakian "solutions" represent attempts at answering the series of difficult questions which Dr Cowen posed in 1960:

"In South Africa a fair partition would present insuperable obstacles. Where exactly should the boundaries be drawn? Can South Africa's economy sustain the disruption involved in a fair partition? Would there be full and free consultation and consent on the part of all groups in its planning? Have White South Africans the will to face up to the material sacrifice and cost

/which

which would necessarily be involved? How, to be specific, would the gold, diamond and other mines and natural wealth of the country be divided? And, if a fair share of these is not to be given to the non-Whites, will they not demand it when they grow in political organisation and maturity? In short, unless the partition is genuinely fair, what real prospects are there for peaceful co-existence between the White and the non-White territories? And what prospects are there of getting the policy accepted by world opinion?" (88)

Another obstacle, as Professor Schlemmer has pointed out, is that "the transfer of resources will deeply affect the interests of a range of powerful White lobbies and interest groups" (89) Professor Tiryakian suggested that not only should Whites feel they had something to gain from partition, but also Blacks should not feel they were being deprived of what was legitimately theirs. Professor Maasdorp thought that "the key factor may well relate to control of the Southern Transvaal industrial region". Thus, even if the Blacks considered the SABRA and Roelf Botha plans for Homeland consolidation commendable, they would reject them because 60% or more of South Africa and three of the four metropolitan regions, including the PWV area, would remain in White hands. Tiryakian, Leistner, Schlemmer, Thomas and Maasdorp (in his federal plan) have at least recognised the claims of both the Whites and the Blacks on the PWV region by either suggesting its partition or proposing a multiracial or "condominium" solution.

196.

(88) D V Cowen - Constitution Making for a Democracy: an Alternative to Apartheid (Optima, 1960).

(89) Constitutional Change in South Africa, ed. John Benyon, p.271.





¶6. Professor Maasdorp also questioned whether the Coloureds in a new state, whether Botha's Boland or his own Capeland, would see their future as lying with the Blacks or with the Whites. "An increasing number of Coloured people, especially the youth, have been alienated from the Whites by thirty years of separate development and now identify strongly with Black consciousness". However, if a one man, one vote system were to be introduced (as envisaged for both Capeland and Capricornia), Maasdorp thought that the Coloureds might be prepared to sink their differences with the Whites since, being the largest population group in the Cape area, they might then be able to establish political domination. There would have to be a massive relocation of Capricornia Whites for the Coloureds, who had a higher birth rate, to be outnumbered. Moreover, with 350,000 Whites in South Africa holding foreign passports, many Whites might choose to emigrate overseas rather than opt for the Cape.

¶7. By way of contrast, ~~two academics at the University of Cape Town,~~ <sup>(also University of Cape Town),</sup> Professor Anthony de Crespigny and Dr Peter Collins, stated recently that a policy of partition based on radical consolidation of the Homelands had at least four features to commend it: it provided the only hope of avoiding group domination; it would lead to a significant increase in Black political and economic power: it would promote greater self-determination and self-respect; and it would provide a moral framework for South Africa to deal with the demands of Western diplomacy. (90)

(90)

Cape Times, 2 February 1979

114 APR 1960



South Africa

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SECRET  
FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 120845A APR 1980  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 293 OF 12 APRIL

MY TELEGRAM NO 290

LORD HUNT'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE.

1. REGRETTABLY TWO SERIOUS MISTAKES OCCURRED IN THE TRANSMISSION OF THIS TELEGRAM.
2. PARAGRAPH 13 NINTH LINE: "DESPARATE" (SIC) SHOULD READ "DISPARATE".
3. PARAGRAPH 13 FIFTEENTH LINE: SOME WORDS HAVE BEEN OMITTED. IT SHOULD READ "THE WHITES IN NAMIBIA, WHO WERE DIFFERENT FROM THE WHITES IN RHODESIA, WOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY WON IT."
4. THERE IS ALSO A MINOR ERROR IN THE FIRST LINE OF PARAGRAPH 2 WHERE "DISCUSSION AND TACTICS" SHOULD READ "DISCUSSION OF TACTICS".
5. IN THE NINTH SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 15 "HAVE" SHOULD READ "WAVE".

LEAHY

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/FUS  
MR DAY

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SIR R ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE

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
FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 110940Z APR 1980

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 290 OF 11 APRIL

NY TELEGRAM NO 282

*(Files + as ref tel)*



*3* *PS*

ADVANCE COPY

*(H) S.A.F.D*  
*No. Day*

PERSONAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

*No 10 Downing St*

FROM LORD HUNT

*Read in full (you have seen the ref tel)*

*Am*

1. AT YESTERDAY'S TALKS THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PIK BOTHA, FOURIE, DE VILLIERS AND GENERAL MALAN, AND THE AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED ME.

2. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION <sup>OF</sup> TACTICS WITH THE AMBASSADOR I DECIDED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE THIS TIME IN THE HOPE OF AVOIDING A SERIES OF QUESTIONS OR REQUESTS TO WHICH I SHOULD HAVE TO GIVE STALLING OR NEGATIVE ANSWERS. THIS TACTIC WORKED SUCCESSFULLY.

3. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT I HAD REFLECTED ON THE PREVIOUS DAY'S DISCUSSIONS WHICH I HAD FOUND VERY HELPFUL: AND, ALTHOUGH I HAD NOT CONSULTED MRS THATCHER OVERNIGHT, I HAD TRIED TO ENVISAGE WHAT HER REACTION TO THEM MIGHT BE. I THOUGHT SHE MIGHT WELL SAY SOMETHING LIKE THIS. WE SEEMED TO SEE EYE TO EYE ON FIVE POINTS VIZ:-

(A) THERE WAS A SOVIET THREAT TO THE REGION WHICH NEEDED TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY:

(B) SOUTH AFRICA HAD AN IMPORTANT PART WHICH SHE COULD PLAY IN THE REGION AND MORE WIDELY IN AFRICA AND THE WESTERN WORLD:

(C) BRITAIN HAD A VERY GREAT INTEREST IN THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF THE REGION AND OF SOUTH AFRICA:

(D) WE SHOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO HELP BRING THIS STABILITY AND PROSPERITY ABOUT AND TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR SOUTH

(D) WE SHOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO HELP BRING THIS STABILITY AND PROSPERITY ABOUT AND TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO PLAY ITS PROPER ROLE BY USING OUR INFLUENCE WHERE WE COULD:

(E) WE COULD DO THIS MORE EFFECTIVELY BEHIND THE SCENES AND COULD IN ANY CASE NOT BE SEEN TO ACT AS A SPOKESMAN FOR SOUTH AFRICA, PARTICULARLY WHEN WE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT HER POLICIES.

4. THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE COULD BUILD ON THESE POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND MAKE OUR INFLUENCE FELT WAS HOWEVER BOUND TO BE GOVERNED BY THE PERCEPTION OF CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE HAD NO INTENTION OF PRESCRIBING WHAT THESE CHANGES MIGHT BE OR, FOR EXAMPLE, PRESSING THEM TO ACCEPT ONE MAN ONE VOTE. WE RECOGNISED THAT THEY HAD BUILT AN ECONOMY AND CIVILISATION THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO SEE DESTROYED. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE ESSENTIAL FOR THEM TO MANAGE THE PROCESS OF CHANGE SO THAT IT HAD WIDE-SPREAD DEMONSTRABLE ACCEPTANCE INCLUDING THE NON-WHITE POPULATION. IN THE MEANTIME IT WAS VITAL TO AVOID A MAJOR CONFRONTATION OVER NAMIBIA WRECKING WHAT WAS BOUND TO BE A GRADUAL AND STEP BY STEP PROCESS. I HOPED WE ALSO AGREED THAT THE NEW ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE GIVEN A FAIR CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND THAT THEY WOULD DO ALL THEY COULD TO ASSIST THIS AND THUS TO KEEP MUGABE ON A MODERATE COURSE. AS REGARDS THE SOVIET THREAT, WE BOTH RECOGNISED IT AS REAL AND MENACING BUT WE SAW IT AS LARGELY POLITICAL AND OPPORTUNISTIC WHEREAS THEY SEEMED TO PERCEIVE SOME GRAND MILITARY DESIGN. PERHAPS THIS REFLECTED OUR DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICAL STANDPOINTS. WE SAW THE THREAT IN A WORLD-WIDE CONTEXT WHEREAS THEY WERE NATURALLY PREOCCUPIED WITH AFRICA: AND WE DREW A SHARPER DISTINCTION BETWEEN AFRICAN NATIONALISM AND MARXISM EVEN THOUGH THE TWO COULD OVERLAP.

5. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, TWO POINTS ON WHICH THE PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS HAD LEFT ME UNCLEAR. WHAT DID HE REALLY MEAN BY HIS CONSTELLATION OF STATES IDEA WHICH SEEMED INTENDED TO MARRY DOMESTIC CHANGE WITH BETTER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS? WHO WOULD BE INVOLVED? HOW WOULD IT WORK? WHAT WOULD BE THE CITIZENSHIP POSITION OF AFRICANS OUTSIDE THE HOMELANDS ETC? MY SECOND DOUBT RELATED TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE WHOLE REGION "COUNTRY BY COUNTRY". WHAT HAD HE REALLY IN MIND? TAKE, FOR EXAMPLE, ZAMBIA. WAS HE SAYING THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS WHETHER TO HELP ZAMBIA OR TO DAMAGE HER; OR TO SEEK TO BRING ABOUT CHANGES IN ZAMBIAN POLICIES? THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF SUCH A DISCUSSION WERE OBVIOUS. WHEREAS A GENERAL TOUR

THE WAY OF SUCH A DISCUSSION WERE OBVIOUS, WHEREAS A GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON MIGHT SERVE LITTLE PURPOSE.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED ME FOR THESE REMARKS AND SAID THAT HE AGREED WE SAW A NUMBER OF THINGS THE SAME WAY. HE WOULD MAKE A NUMBER OF COMMENTS IN REPLY. BY WAY OF PREFACE, HE WOULD SAY HONESTLY THAT HE HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP TO DISLIKE BRITAIN - AND HIS PEOPLE HAD HAD GOOD REASON FOR THAT. BUT HE HAD TO ADMIT OBJECTIVELY THAT SINCE BRITAIN HAD RETIRED FROM THE CENTRE OF THE STAGE THE WORLD'S AFFAIRS HAD TAKEN A TURN FOR THE WORSE.

7. HE PREFERRED NOT TO SPEAK ABOUT "CHANGE" IN THE INTERNAL CONTEXT SINCE RADICAL LEFT-WINGERS TRIED TO MAKE POLITICAL CAPITAL OUT OF IT. HE LIKED TO TALK INSTEAD OF DEVELOPMENT AND OF "UPLIFTING" THE LESS ADVANCED ELEMENTS IN THE POPULATION THROUGH BETTER EDUCATION, TRAINING, HOUSING, HEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT. SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT IN TERMS OF ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN A UNITARY STATE, BUT HE BELIEVED THEY WERE WRONG. JUST AS THE NATIONAL PARTY HAD SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE WHITE MINORITY AS ONE OF ITS FOUNDING PRINCIPLES, SO SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD BE THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR THE OTHER PEOPLES. THESE PEOPLES WERE IN ANY CASE TOO DIVERSIFIED AND JEALOUS OF EACH OTHER TO MAKE MAJORITY RULE IN A UNITARY STATE A PRACTICAL ANSWER. (MR BOTHA GAVE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC EXAMPLES TO ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT.) THEY MUST BE HELPED INSTEAD TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. FOR EXAMPLE HE WANTED TO SEE A ZULU NATION AGAIN IN ITS OWN CONSOLIDATED AREA. HE WAS WORKING ON THESE THINGS BUT THEY WOULD TAKE TIME ("MORE THAN JUST A YEAR OR TWO"). PEOPLE HAD TO BE TRAINED TO GOVERN THEMSELVES POLITICALLY.

8. TURNING TO THE CONCEPT OF A CONSTELLATION OF STATES MR BOTHA EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT: THE HOMELANDS WHICH WERE NOT YET INDEPENDENT, THOSE STATES WHICH SOUTH AFRICA HAD HELPED TO INDEPENDENCE (TRANSKEI, BOPHUTATSWANA, VENDA), AND NEIGHBOURING INDEPENDENT STATES. THE FIRST TWO GROUPS WERE PART OF THE RAND MONETARY AREA AND NEEDED TO COORDINATE THEIR POLICIES IN THE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL FIELDS AND OVER SUCH PRACTICAL MATTERS AS TRANSPORT, HEALTH AND WATER RESOURCES. THEY COULD ALSO HAVE CLOSE COOPERATION IN SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THEY SHOULD MEET TOGETHER AT LEAST ANNUALLY AND IN COMMITTEES TO DISCUSS THEIR COMMON PROBLEMS AND COULD HAVE A DEVELOPMENT BANK AND SOME FORM OF JOINT SECRETARIAT. HE WOULD ALSO WELCOME THE PARTICIPATION OF NEIGHBOURING INDEPENDENT STATES ON CONDITION THAT THERE WAS NO INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION HAD MUCH TO OFFER

INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION HAD MUCH TO OFFER ONE ANOTHER AND SOUTH AFRICA DID NOT WISH TO DOMINATE THE OTHERS.

9. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION MR BOTHA SAID THAT IN THE CONSTELLATION CONTEXT BLACKS IN THE REPUBLIC ITSELF WOULD BE ABLE TO ENJOY A FORM OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF "HIGHER THAN MUNICIPAL STATUS". THIS TOO WOULD TAKE TIME SINCE IF THEY WERE GIVEN IT BEFORE THEY WERE READY IT WOULD BE LIKE GIVING A PISTOL TO A CHILD AND TELLING HIM IT WAS READY TO USE.

10. MR BOTHA WENT ON BRIEFLY TO OUTLINE THE SEPARATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HE HAD IN MIND FOR THE COLOURED AND INDIAN POPULATIONS, BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAILS. ON A SEPARATE POINT HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WHY PEOPLE IN THE STATES WHICH SOUTH AFRICA HAD HELPED TO INDEPENDENCE DID NOT LIKE HAVING TO GIVE UP THEIR SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENSHIP. A MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE WAS WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM AND IT COULD BE THAT SOMETHING AKIN TO "COMMONWEALTH CITIZENSHIP" WOULD BE THE RIGHT ANSWER.

11. ON THE SOVIET THREAT HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED MILITARILY SO FAR FROM THEIR OWN BORDERS. THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION WOULD BE TOO STRETCHED. THEY WOULD WORK INSTEAD THROUGH SURROGATES SUCH AS THE CUBANS AND EAST GERMANS. MOREOVER AS HE HAD FORESEEN WHEN THE BRITISH FLEET WITHDREW FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN THE RUSSIANS COULD NOW APPLY THEIR SEA POWER IN THE AREA. AS FOR WHAT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE TOLD US OF RUSSIAN INTENTIONS, HE COULD ONLY SAY THAT UNLIKE SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE OUR INFORMATION ON RHODESIA HAD BEEN BADLY WRONG WHEN WE HAD FORECAST THAT MUZOREVA WOULD EASILY WIN THE ELECTION. (I CONTESTED THIS AND THERE FOLLOWED SOME GOOD-NATURED REPORTEE ABOUT WHO HAD SAID WHAT.)

12. TURNING TO ZIMBABWE MR BOTHA SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A VISIT FROM AN INTERMEDIARY RECENTLY ("NO NAMES NO PACK DRILL") AND HAD ASKED HIM WHETHER MUGABE WOULD HONOUR RHODESIA'S FINANCIAL DEBTS OF MORE THAN 400 MILLION RAND TO SOUTH AFRICA AND WOULD PREVENT THE ANC FROM USING ZIMBABWE AS A BASE FROM WHICH TO ATTACK SOUTH AFRICA. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD HAD A REPLY HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD MUGABE HAD AGREED ON BOTH POINTS. (HE DID NOT DISPUTE THIS AND IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION AFTER THE MEETING FOURIE CONFIRMED THAT MUGABE WOULD GIVE A WRITTEN ASSURANCE ON THE DEBTS IMMEDIATELY AFTER INDEPENDENCE.) MR BOTHA WENT ON TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN GENERAL THE S A G WOULD SUSPEND JUDGMENT ON THE COURSE OF THEIR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE AND WOULD NOT ENTER INTO ANY NEW OBLIGATIONS (AS DISTINCT FROM

WOULD NOT ENTER INTO ANY NEW OBLIGATIONS (AS DISTINCT FROM FULFILLING PREVIOUS ONES) UNTIL THEY COULD SEE HOW MUGABE'S GOOD INTENTIONS STOOD UP TO THE PRESSURES HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY COME UNDER.

13. AT MY SUGGESTION WE DID NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS FACING US IN NAMIBIA, HAVING GONE OVER THE GROUND THOROUGHLY THE DAY BEFORE. BUT MR BOTHA READILY AGREED THAT WE BOTH HAD GOOD REASONS TO AVOID AN IMMEDIATE CONFRONTATION AND HE EMPHASISED ONCE AGAIN THAT TIME WAS NEEDED. HE REALISED THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO RUSH MATTERS AND HE THOUGHT THE SAME WAS PROBABLY TRUE OF THE GERMANS, FRENCH AND CANADIANS. BUT THE AMERICANS SEEMED BENT ON FORCING THE ISSUE. LIKewise THE FRONT LINE STATES. THE LATTER WERE REALLY A VERY DISPARATE GROUP AND HAD SERIOUS PROBLEMS OF THEIR OWN TO CONTEND WITH. COULD WE NOT GET THEM TO SEE THAT THEY WERE 'PLAYING WITH FIRE' IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND ESPECIALLY IN NAMIBIA? IF THEY FORCED A CONFRONTATION NOW THERE WOULD BE WAR. HE DID NOT WANT A WAR BECAUSE IT WOULD SOLVE NOTHING. BUT I SHOULD MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT, IF WAR CAME THE NAMIBIA WHO WERE DIFFERENT FROM THE WHITES IN RHODESIA, WHITES IN ~~XXXXXX~~ WOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY WON IT. HE HOPED WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE THE FLS SEE SENSE, BUT HE WAS NOT PRESSING ME FOR AN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION NOW AND WOULD LEAVE IT AT THAT.

14. THE MEETING ENDED WITH WARM EXPRESSIONS OF THANKS AND GOOD WISHES ON BOTH SIDES.

#### ASSESSMENT

15. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS VERY GOOD THROUGHOUT: FRIENDLY AND RELAXED BUT NO GLOSSING OVER OF DIFFERENCES. IT WAS INTERESTING THAT I WAS NOT PRESSED AT ALL ON SOME OF THE POINTS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT. IN PARTICULAR HE DID NOT RESPOND TO MY QUESTION (PARA 5 ABOVE) ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF MORE DETAILED BILATERAL TALKS. NOR DID HE PICK UP MY REMARK (PARA 2 OF THE T U R) THAT MRS THATCHER HOPED TO SEE HIM AGAIN 'SOME TIME' OR SUGGEST AN EARLY MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM. IT IS OF COURSE JUST POSSIBLE THAT HE JUDGED MY REMARKS SO NEGATIVE THAT HE FELT REBUFFED AND WAS WRITING US OFF. ON BALANCE (AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREES) I DOUBT IF THIS WAS THE CASE: AND PIK BOTHA WENT OUT OF HIS WAY, WHEN I SAW HIM AT DINNER LAST NIGHT, TO SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN WELL SATISFIED. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT, AS ON SO MANY OTHER POINTS, P W BOTHA HAD NOT THOUGHT THROUGH THE PROPOSALS IN HIS LETTER BEFORE HE SENT IT AND WAS COMING HIMSELF TO SEE THE DIFFICULTIES IN SOME OF HIS IDEAS. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE HE WOULD BE



DIFFICULTIES IN SOME OF HIS IDEAS. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE HE WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THE POSITION IN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES HE CLEARLY DOES NOT WANT TO BE PRESSED ON THE PRECISE CHANGES HE ENVISAGES IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF. UNDOUBTEDLY HIS LETTER WAS INSPIRED BY A KEEN SENSE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ISOLATION AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT FOR A MOMENT HE FELT WE COULD WAVE SOME KIND OF MAGIC WAND FOR THEM. I THINK HE NOW SEES THAT THIS IS QUITE UNREALISTIC AND THAT HE HAS COME TO THIS CONCLUSION FOR HIMSELF. HIS LAST WORDS TO ME WERE "EVEN IF NOTHING FURTHER COMES OF THIS VISIT I AM GLAD YOU CAME AND I HAVE FOUND OUR DISCUSSIONS VALUABLE". I PROMISED TO REPORT FAITHFULLY EVERYTHING HE SAID.

16. I THINK THAT OUR OPTIONS REMAIN OPEN. WE CAN LET THE WHOLE THING DROP WITHOUT, I JUDGE, CAUSING GREAT SURPRISE OR DISAPPOINTMENT; OR WE CAN SEEK TO FOLLOW UP SOME ASPECTS THROUGH MORE NORMAL CHANNELS; OR WE COULD SUGGEST A MINISTERIAL VISIT (HERE OR IN LONDON) AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. IN THEIR PRESENT SENSITIVE AND ISOLATED MOOD SOME KIND OF FOLLOW UP OF AN INNOCUOUS KIND COULD WELL PAY DIVIDENDS IN RESTRAINING THEM FROM SELF-DEFEATING COURSES.

17. IN SHORT, NO BREAK-THROUGH, BUT WE DID NOT EXPECT ONE. BUT I HOPE NO DAMAGE EITHER. MY OWN FEELING WAS THAT ON BALANCE THE VISIT WAS WORTHWHILE AS A FRIENDLY GESTURE WHICH ALSO SERVED TO BRING OUT MORE CLEARLY WHAT WE COULD AND COULD NOT DO. THE AMBASSADOR WILL OF COURSE REPORT ANY SUBSEQUENT FEED-BACK.

LEAHY

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~~Prime Minister~~

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PERSONAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE  
FROM LORD HUNT.

1. THERE IS NO DIPLOMATIC BAG FROM CAPE TOWN FOR ANOTHER 10 DAYS. I AM THEREFORE SENDING YOU THIS TELEGRAM ABOUT MY DISCUSSIONS WITH P W BOTHA YESTERDAY: AND WILL FOLLOW IT BEFORE I LEAVE WITH A FURTHER TELEGRAM ABOUT TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS AND ALSO AN ASSESSMENT. I WILL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO ELABORATE MORE FULLY ON MY RETURN. THERE WILL BE NO FULL RECORD SINCE IT WAS AGREED THAT NO NOTES SHOULD BE TAKEN (AND PIK BOTHA VOLUNTEERED THAT "ON THIS OCCASION" THEY WOULD NOT BE TAPING THE CONVERSATIONS EITHER.)

2. I BEGAN BY HAVING ONE AND A QUARTER HOURS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ALONE. IN THE COURSE OF THE INITIAL PLEASANTRIES I GAVE HIM MRS THATCHER'S GOOD WISHES ADDING THAT SHE RECALLED HER MEETING WITH HIM AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EDUCATION AND HOPED TO MEET HIM AGAIN "SOME TIME". I THANKED HIM FOR THE HELP HE HAD GIVEN OVER RHODESIA AND STRESSED THE PRIVATE AND INFORMAL NATURE OF THE PRESENT TALKS. HE THEN SPOKE ON THE LINES OF HIS LETTER OF 5 FEBRUARY. THE SOVIET THREAT IN AFRICA WAS A REAL AND GROWING ONE: AND THERE WAS NO STRATEGY FOR MEETING IT. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT PROCEED BY OVERT AGGRESSION BUT WOULD SEEK TO CREATE SITUATIONS WHERE THEY WOULD BE INVITED IN. IN A NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES THEY WERE WELL ON THE WAY TO CREATING SUCH A SITUATION. THE PRESENCE OF THE EAST GERMANS WAS MUCH MORE SINISTER THAN THAT OF THE CUBANS. THE ULTIMATE TARGET WAS SOUTH AFRICA'S MINERAL RESOURCES WHICH, IF ACHIEVED, WOULD PARALYSE THE WEST. YET THE WEST, FAR FROM HELPING, TOOK EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK SOUTH AFRICA AND ASSIST THE SOVIET STRATEGY. HE SPOKE IN THE HARSHTEST TERMS ABOUT THE AMERICANS WHOM HE SAID WERE MORE OF A DANGER TO SOUTH AFRICA THAN THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES. SURELY WE OUGHT TO FIND WAYS OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE THREAT AND ON MEANS TO COUNTER IT. BRITAIN HAD A UNIQUE KNOWLEDGE OF AFRICA AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE WISHED TO START BY TALKING TO US. HE RECOGNISED THAT WE WISHED TO SEE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL POLICIES AND HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT MORE WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE CLIMATE OF WESTERN OPINION TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA. THERE WERE HOWEVER SEVERE LIMITS ON HOW FAR AND HOW FAST HE COULD GO. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR THE BLACKS WOULD BE IMPROVED AND IN TALKING ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOMELAND CONCEPT HE USED THE WORD "CONFEDERATION". BUT HE HAD TO SAY BLUNTLY THAT MAJORITY RULE WOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE.

S E C R E T

3. AT THIS STAGE I MADE TWO MAIN POINTS. THE FIRST WAS THAT WE WERE UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT. ON THE OTHER HAND THIS THREAT (CF: HIS OWN WORDS ABOUT THE SOVIETS ALWAYS "SEEKING AN INVITATION TO COME IN") SOUGHT TO FEED ON AFRICAN NATIONALISM. IT WAS A MISTAKE TO EQUATE THE TWO: AND ANY POLICY WHICH DROVE THE AFRICANS INTO CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE SELF-DEFEATING. SECONDLY I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT FOR US TO SAY WHAT DOMESTIC CHANGES SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD MAKE. WE WERE NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, ARGUING THAT THEY SHOULD GO FOR ONE MAN ONE VOTE IN A UNITARY STATE. BUT IF RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WERE TO BE IMPROVED ANY CHANGES WOULD HAVE TO BE REAL AND NOT JUST COSMETIC AND WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE SEEN TO CARRY A WIDE MEASURE OF ACCEPTANCE.

4. WE THEN COVERED SPECIFIC POINTS IN GREATER DETAIL:

(A) THE THREAT AND THE STRATEGY TO COUNTER IT

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P W BOTHA IS GIVEN TO USING PHRASES SUCH AS SOUTH AFRICA FACING "TOTAL ONSLAUGHT" FROM COMMUNISM AND THE NEED FOR A "TOTAL STRATEGY" TO COMBAT IT. BUT IS WAS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT HE HAS THOUGHT THROUGH WHAT HE MEANS BY A COMMON ANTI-SOVIET STRATEGY. INDEED WHEN I ASKED HIM AT ONE POINT WHETHER HE WAS TALKING ABOUT SOME KIND OF MILITARY ALLIANCE INVOLVING SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER WESTERN POWERS, OR ACTION TO STABILISE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND IMPROVE SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THEM, HE REPLIED "BOTH". WHAT I DO THINK THIS REFLECTS IS SOUTH AFRICA'S GROWING SENSE OF HER OWN ISOLATION AND HER WISH TO END IT - BUT ON HER TERMS. THE PRIME MINISTER MADE MORE THAN ONE REFERENCE TO DUNKIRK, SAYING THAT IF SOUTH AFRICA HAD TO FIGHT ALONE SHE WOULD DO SO EVEN THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THAT SHE MIGHT NOT SURVIVE THE PROCESS. SHE DID NOT HOWEVER WISH TO BE DRIVEN INTO THIS POSITION OF FIGHTING ALONE AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE HAD WRITTEN HIS LETTER TO MRS THATCHER. COULD WE NOT HAVE COMPREHENSIVE BILATERAL TALKS ABOUT THE WHOLE REGION, COUNTRY BY COUNTRY, WITH A VIEW TO SEEING WHERE WE AGREED AND WHERE WE DIFFERED: AND WHAT ACTION COULD BE TAKEN TO STIFFEN RESISTANCE TO THE SOVIET THREAT? IF WE WOULD NOT TALK TO THEM, NO-ONE ELSE WOULD. I DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO THIS: BUT AGAIN REFERRED (ON THE LINES OF MY BRIEF) TO OUR RATHER DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF THE SOVIET THREAT. THERE WAS NOTHING WE WOULD RATHER SEE THAN SOUTH AFRICA PLAYING HER PROPER PART IN THE WORLD: AND IF HE WAS ABLE TO TAKE THE STEPS WHICH WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THIS HE WOULD FIND A READY RESPONSE FROM US. I ADDED THAT IT MIGHT WELL BE NECESSARY TO PROCEED PRAGMATICALLY AND ON A STEP BY STEP BASIS. TO GIVE HIM HIS DUE HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING BRITAIN TO ACT AS SOUTH AFRICA'S AGENT: BUT UNDOUBTEDLY HE REGARDS OUR EVENTUAL REREACTION TO HIS PROPOSAL

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AS SOME KIND OF TOUCH-STONE. 'IF YOU TURN US DOWN WE HAVE NO HOPE WITH ANYONE ELSE AND WILL HAVE TO GO IT ALONE.' YET THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT HE IS CONTEMPLATING THE SORT OF STEPS DOMESTICALLY THAT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO HAVE THE CLOSER RELATIONS HE SEEKS.

(B) RHODESIA  
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WE HAD A BIT OF A POST-MORTEM OVER THIS AND HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN FATAL TO MAKE THE BISHOP STAND DOWN FROM OFFICE DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD. BUT FOR THIS HE THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE WON THE ELECTION. HE CLEARLY HAD THE GRAVEST DOUBTS ABOUT MUGABE'S POLICIES IN THE MEDIUM TERM (AND ALSO FEARS MUGABE MAY BE OUSTED BY HIS MORE EXTREME SUPPORTERS): BUT EQUALLY HE SEEMS PREPARED TO GIVE MUGABE A FAIR TRIAL AND NOT TO PREJUDGE THINGS. I SAID THAT OF COURSE NO-ONE COULD FORESEE THE FUTURE BUT THAT WE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH MUGABE HAD BEEN SEEKING ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE AND ALSO BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE SEEMED TO BE KEEPING HIS DISTANCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. P W BOTHA SAID 'WE CAN DO MORE FOR HIM ECONOMICALLY THAN YOU' - AND REFERRED TO THE NEW LOAN ARRANGEMENTS EVEN THOUGH HE DOUBTED MUGABE'S INTENTION TO HONOUR EXISTING DEBTS TO SOUTH AFRICA.

(C) NAMIBIA  
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HE TOOK A VERY ROBUST LINE SAYING THAT IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WAS HE PREPARED TO SELL THE TERRITORY DOWN THE RIVER TO SWAPO: AND THAT IF HE DID SO HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FALL AND BE SUCCEEDED BY AN ULTRA-RIGHT ONE WHICH WOULD OVERTURN HIS MORE LIBERAL INTERNAL POLICIES. HE CONTINUALLY EMPHASISED THE POLITICAL RISKS HE WAS RUNNING OVER NAMIBIA. AT THIS POINT HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS AND THE VETO. I SAID THAT OUR POSITION ON SANCTIONS WAS WELL-KNOWN. WE WERE AGAINST THEM. THE VETO WAS HOWEVER A SEPARATE ISSUE ON WHICH NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. IT WAS ESSENTIALLY A 'NO WIN' SITUATION. SANCTIONS WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO ALL CONCERNED AND WOULD BE THE PATH OF CONFRONTATION. YET IF CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES (I DID NOT (UNDERLINED) TALK IN TERMS OF OUR VETOING ALONE) VETOED, THIS WOULD ALSO GREATLY DIMINISH ANY HOPE OF GETTING THE SORT OF RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT HE WANTED AND WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE SOME OF THE LATTER TO TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE SANCTIONS ISSUE INVOLVED A CHOICE WHICH OUGHT TO BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS. I RECOGNISED THE SENSITIVITY OF THE NAMIBIA ISSUE FOR SOUTH AFRICA, BUT IF IT WENT BADLY WRONG IT COULD PUT AN END TO EVERYTHING ELSE HE SEEMED TO WANT. IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PLAY AND TO AVOID AN APPARENT REJECTION OF THE U N PLAN.

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COULD HE GIVE ME ANY IDEA ON THE TIMING AND CONTENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S REPLY TO DR WALDHEIM? HE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PIK BOTHA PRESENT FOR THIS.

5. ACCORDINGLY AT THIS POINT HE WAS JOINED BY PIK BOTHA, FOURIE AND DE VILLIERS: AND THE AMBASSADOR JOINED ME. THE REST OF THE DISCUSSION WAS MAINLY A ONE-SIDED ONE WITH THE TWO BOTHAS SETTING OUT AT GREAT LENGTH THE HISTORY (AS THEY SEE IT) OF THE NAMIBIAN SAGA. ONLY TWO RELEVANT POINTS EMERGED:-

(I) ALTHOUGH THEY APPEARED NOT TO HAVE FINALLY DECIDED ON THE LINE OF THEIR REPLY TO WALDHEIM, IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE ONE DESIGNED TO BUY MORE TIME:

(II) THE POINT REFERRED TO IN CAPE TOWN TELEGRAM NO 278.

6. IN THE AFTERNOON I SAW MALAN AND PIK BOTHA (SEE CAPE TOWN TEL NO 279).

LEAHY

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LORD HUNT'S VISIT

1. THIS TELEGRAM IS INTENDED TO SET THE SCENE FOR LORD HUNT'S VISIT. IT IS NOT MEANT TO BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR HIS BRIEF AND HAS MORE TO DO WITH THE MOOD HE WILL ENCOUNTER HERE THAN WITH THE TACTICS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS. WE CAN TALK ABOUT THE LATTER WHEN HE ARRIVES.
2. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SEES THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WHITES AND NON-WHITES IN THIS COUNTRY. SO FAR THIS HAS BEEN REFLECTED MORE IN WHAT HE HAS SAID THAN IN WHAT HE HAS DONE, ALTHOUGH TO HAVE COMMITTED HIMSELF SO FIRMLY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CHANGE IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. SOME EXTERNAL SIGNS OF PETTY APARTHEID HAVE BEEN REMOVED BUT SO FAR THE BASIC DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION REMAINS ON THE STATUTE BOOKS. WHILE NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE POWER-SHARING IN A UNITARY STATE P W BOTHA IS PERHAPS WILLING TO ENVISAGE A MORE EQUITABLE DIVISION OF POWER IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF SOUTH AFRICA THAN MOST WHITES, AND CERTAINLY MOST MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL PARTY, HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN WILLING TO CONSIDER. HOWEVER IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE HAS THOUGHT THROUGH IN SPECIFIC TERMS EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTS TO ACHIEVE OR WHETHER HE SEES CHANGE AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS WITHOUT A CLEAR IDEA OF HIS DESTINATION. WHITES IN GENERAL APPEAR TO ACCEPT CHANGE AS NECESSARY, PROVIDED IT IS NOT TOO MUCH AND TOO FAST.
3. THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION IN RHODESIA CAME AS AN UNWELCOME SURPRISE TO THE SAG AND TO WHITES GENERALLY. AFTER THE INITIAL SHOCK THEIR REACTION HAS BEEN CALMER AND MORE SENSIBLE THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. MUGABE HAS MADE A GOOD INITIAL IMPRESSION AND MOST PEOPLE ARE PREPARED TO WAIT AND SEE HOW HE GETS ON IN PRACTICE BEFORE DRAWING CONCLUSIONS. BLACKS HAVE BEEN GENERALLY PLEASED BY THE RESULT AND THE MORE RADICAL ELEMENTS HAVE TAKEN ENCOURAGEMENT FROM IT. FAR FROM STIMULATING A RETURN TO THE LAAGER THE ELECTION RESULT APPEARS ON THE FACE OF IT TO HAVE CONFIRMED THE PRIME MINISTER AND LIKE-MINDED GOVERNMENT COLLEAGUES (KOORNHOF AND PIK BOTHA) IN THINKING THAT CHANGE HAS TO COME ABOUT HERE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. IF THE AFRIKAANS NEWSPAPERS ARE TO BE BELIEVED, THEY MUST NOW REALISE TOO THAT FOR THIS TO HAPPEN SUCCESSFULLY THERE HAS TO BE GENUINE CONSULTATION WITH GENUINE BLACK REPRESENTATIVES. THIS IS ENCOURAGING. THE ATMOSPHERE COULD, OF COURSE, DETERIORATE IF IN THE NEAR FUTURE MUGABE IS SEEN TO CONFORM MORE CLOSELY TO THE FORK-TAILED MARXIST IMAGE WHICH UP TO A FEW WEEKS AGO HE WAS SO FREELY CREDITED WITH HERE.

S E C R E T

/ 4. NAMIBIA

S E C R E T

4. NAMIBIA IS A DIFFERENT MATTER. IN THIS CONTEXT THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE RHODESIAN ELECTION IS DISTINCTLY UNFAVOURABLE: FEW PEOPLE HERE SERIOUSLY BELIEVE THAT AFTER WHAT HAS HAPPENED THE SAG CAN READILY AGREE TO RUN THE RISK OF ALLOWING SWAPO TO COME TO POWER IN A "FREE AND FAIR" ELECTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE ATTITUDE MIGHT, HOWEVER, CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IF IN A FEW MONTHS TIME IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA ARE TURNING OUT ALL RIGHT. IF, IN THE MEANTIME, INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON NAMIBIA BUILDS UP TO A POINT WHERE ONCE AGAIN THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA LOOMS LARGE, IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE A BRAKING EFFECT ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S PLANS FOR INTERNAL CHANGE HERE. INDEED IT COULD HALT THEM ALTOGETHER. IN SUM NAMIBIA COULD PROVOKE THE SORT OF BACK TO THE LAAGER MOVE WHICH RECENT EVENTS IN RHODESIA HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO BRING ABOUT. OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES OUGHT TO BEAR THAT IN MIND, BUT FROM HERE THERE SEEMS TO BE NO CHANCE OF THEIR DOING SO.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WHAT DOES P W BOTHA WANT OUT OF THIS MEETING? THERE ARE PROBABLY VARIOUS REASONS WHY HE SUGGESTED IT, INCLUDING A STRONG FEELING THAT THE PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE MORE SYMPATHETIC TO SOUTH AFRICA THAN ANY BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN FOR SOME TIME AND UNDERSTAND BETTER THAN ANY OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENT THE THREAT OF COMMUNISM. HE PROBABLY HOPES TO PERSUADE US, AND TO GET US TO PERSUADE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS MISUNDERSTOOD, MISJUDGED AND UNFAIRLY TREATED BECAUSE OF DOUBLE STANDARDS AND THAT HE IS WELL ON THE WAY TO PUTTING RIGHT WHAT IS WRONG IN THE SET UP HERE. IN OTHER WORDS HE WOULD LIKE US TO ACT AS SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL BROKER. AT THE SAME TIME HE MUST REALISE THAT FOR THIS PURPOSE HE CANNOT GET AWAY WITH MERE WINDOW-DRESSING. HE MAY WANT, THEREFORE, TO DRAW LORD HUNT ON WHAT MINIMUM CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA WE SHOULD REQUIRE TO SEE IF WE ARE TO STAND UP FOR SOUTH AFRICA INTERNATIONALLY AND, BETTER STILL, BRING HER BACK INTO THE WESTERN FOLD. OUR OWN OBJECTIVE AT THE MEETING SHOULD BE THE MIRROR IMAGE OF HIS: THAT IS, WE SHOULD TRY TO FIND OUT, WITHOUT MAKING ANY FAR-REACHING COMMITMENTS, HOW FAR AND HOW FAST P W BOTHA INTENDS TO PURSUE

S E C R E T

INTERNAL CHANGE. IT WILL BE RELEVANT TO PROBE HIM ON WHAT HE REALLY HOPES WILL COME OF HIS MUCH TALKED OF CONSTELLATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES. FOR HIS PART LORD HUNT WILL WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WHILE WE SHOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION TO OFFER SOUTH AFRICA ADVICE AND ENCOURAGEMENT AND MAY BE ABLE AT TIMES TO INDUCE GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO DO, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR US TO COME OUT OPENLY AS THEIR INTERNATIONAL PATRON. APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE THIS WOULD MEAN DAMAGING OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE OTHERS TO LOOK MORE POSITIVELY AT WHAT IS HAPPENING HERE.

6. IT IS POINTLESS TO PREDICT HOW THE DISCUSSIONS WILL GO BUT THEY PROVIDE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS FUNDAMENTALS WITH THE SAG. THEY MAY TURN OUT TO BE A DAMP SQUIB. BUT SHOULD THERE BE ANY MEETING OF MINDS, IT IS NOT AN EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT THEY COULD BE OF HISTORIC IMPORTANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. MOREOVER THE TIMING IS RIGHT, SINCE OUR CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAS BEEN GREATLY ENHANCED BY OUR SUCCESS IN RHODESIA.

LEAHY

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From the Private Secretary

31 March 1980

The Prime Minister's Emissary to South Africa

Lord Hunt called on the Prime Minister this afternoon to discuss his mission to South Africa. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was also present.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recalled the genesis of Lord Hunt's mission. Mr. Botha's letter had been received at a time when there was considerable uncertainty about South Africa's attitude towards the situation in Rhodesia. Our response had been designed in part to keep the South Africans in play. Lord Hunt would now be arriving in South Africa at a time when the government were both having to cope with an outcome in Rhodesia that they found distasteful and to take a decision about Namibia. If South Africa were to delay unduly on Namibia, the Front Line States would certainly go on to the offensive. This would in due course force Mr. Mugabe to side with the Front Line States. The situation might rapidly develop to a point where the borders between the Front Line States and South Africa would be sealed with all the consequences this would have for Rhodesia's chances of retaining a moderate approach. It was essential therefore that South Africa should try to be constructive on Namibia. They still had a chance of getting an acceptable Government there. The UK had to work on the Front Line States and on the UN to delay action (although there were already indications that the Zambian Permanent Representative in New York was working for a Security Council Resolution condemning South Africa) and on South Africa to accelerate its consideration of the problem.

Describing HMG's overall policy towards the continent as a whole, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was essential if at all possible to avoid having to choose between Black and White Africa. British interests would best be served if trade and investment were maintained with both the Black States and with South Africa. The significance of the Namibia problem was that a UN Resolution could force us into the position of having to make a choice. If faced with the choice we would almost certainly have to choose South Africa, i.e., we would have to veto a Resolution imposing sanctions on South Africa. (The Prime Minister agreed.) Whether or not we were faced with this choice depended in part on our own handling of the issue in the weeks ahead.

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On our policy towards South Africa itself, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that we should avoid becoming too closely involved. It was difficult to see how the problems of race relations in South Africa would ever be solved: the end result would probably be a bloodbath. We should of course be prepared to give advice to the South Africans if they asked for it, but we should not get into the position of playing "father confessor" to the present regime.

The Prime Minister agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about the need to try to avoid having to choose between Black and White Africa. But she said that there was also a need both to try to bring about an evolution in Black African attitudes towards South Africa, and to give the South African Government encouragement in their effort to develop more enlightened policies within their country. They had had to absorb a number of shocks in recent weeks, e.g., Rhodesia, the difficulties of the international oil market, and the strains within the ruling party. They should not have pressed too hard. We should not attempt to force our views on them. Our line should be that failure to move somewhat faster was likely to be contrary to South Africa's interests and that if South Africa did push ahead, we would offer encouragement. If, for instance, South Africa were to opt for genuinely mixed sport, the UK would take the lead in seeking the repeal of the Gleneagles Agreement. It was important that the UK should not get into a position of appearing to condemn South Africa altogether.

During the discussion agreement was reached on the line Lord Hunt should take on a number of detailed points:-

- (a) Lord Hunt should convey a friendly message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Botha.
- (b) The Prime Minister would be willing in principle to envisage a meeting with Mr. Botha at a suitable moment. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if such a meeting were to be arranged, it would be preferable for it to be held in this country rather than for the Prime Minister to go to South Africa. The Prime Minister agreed that Lord Hunt should take the line proposed in the brief and should not be too discouraging.
- (c) If Mr. Botha were to make proposals suggesting a closer co-operation between the two Governments, e.g., a joint study of the threat to South Africa, Lord Hunt should react cautiously and should avoid being "sucked in".
- (d) Although the South Africans would no doubt have guessed how the UK would vote if faced with a sanctions resolution, Lord Hunt should not give any undertaking to Mr. Botha that we would veto. He should limit himself to saying that a sanctions resolution would face a number of countries with very difficult decisions, and that it would be infinitely preferable to prevent the situation arising.

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- (e) Lord Hunt could hint at the possibility of the South Africans talking directly to SWAPO about the Namibia problem. But, given the danger of appearing to undermine the work of the Five, he should not make too much of this.

During the discussion of the international situation in South Africa, the Prime Minister asked whether any work had been done in this country about the feasibility of some form of partition in South Africa, i.e., on a basis more equitable than that already implemented. I should be grateful if you could let me have a copy of any paper you may have about this.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

George Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 March 1980

*Dear Michael,*

The Prime Minister's Emissary to South Africa

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is bringing Lord Hunt to call on the Prime Minister at 5.00 pm on 31 March. Lord Hunt arrives in Cape Town on 6 April for talks with the South African Prime Minister starting on 9 April. I have already sent you copies of the briefs prepared for him by the FCO.

/ I now enclose self-explanatory briefing for Lord Hunt's call.

*yours ever*

*Rodene Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT



28 MAR 1952



LORD HUNT'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 31 MARCH 1980

BRIEFING BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SUMMARY OF POINTS TO MAKE

1. Lord Hunt's mission is in response to Mr P W Botha's invitation to the Prime Minister to send an emissary. His main purpose should be to bring home to the South African Prime Minister the need for change in South Africa to enable South Africa to rejoin the international community and to repulse the communist threat.
2. Lord Hunt should also deliver a friendly oral message from the Prime Minister, acknowledging the reforms initiated so far and expressing the hope that these will be pursued.

LORD HUNT'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 31 MARCH 1980

BRIEFING BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LINE TO TAKE

OBJECTIVES

1. As Mr P W Botha proposed the talks, Lord Hunt's rôle is primarily responsive. Main objectives:-

(a) To persuade Mr Botha that change in South Africa is the only road to:-

repulse of the communist threat;

a return to the international community;

closer relations with South Africa's natural partners - the West;

peaceful relations with black Africa;

and that a Namibia breakdown could jeopardise all these objectives.

(b) To convince him that the UK and others share these goals but that it is for South Africa to make the necessary moves.

(c) To assure him that the UK also opposes the spread of communism but that there is no long-term military, only a political, solution.

MESSAGE TO MR BOTHA

2. I prefer not to send a further written message. Please tell Mr Botha of our discussion and say I look forward to your report. I realise that Mr Mugabe's victory was a shock, but I welcome South Africa's restrained pragmatic response. I wish Mr Botha well in his efforts to maintain the momentum of reform; and I hope he will agree about the need to match internal progress with external flexibility over Namibia. I am sure his reform policies are right

and that if pursued they may lead South Africa back to the international community where we wish to see her, and that while we can and will acknowledge progress, it is for South Africa to take the necessary steps.





LORD HUNT'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 31 MARCH 1980

BRIEFING BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Lord Hunt's steering brief and the Prime Minister's exchange of letters with the South African Prime Minister are attached as Annexes A, B, C and D.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

27 March 1980

TALKS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER

BRIEF NO PME 1: STEERING BRIEF

FIRST REVISE

A. Probable South African Objectives in Proposing the Talks

1. To seek to convince HMG that the South African Government have embarked on policies of genuine internal reform which are appropriate to the circumstances of South Africa's unique plural society and which are designed to do justice to the legitimate aspirations of the different racial groups, and that externally the South Africans' policy of creating a constellation of moderate states in Southern Africa will operate as a buffer against communism: and to enlist public support from the UK for these policies.
2. To secure UK protection against international pressures including UN sanctions.
3. To pave the way for a meeting between Mr Botha and the Prime Minister, who Mr Botha thinks may prove sympathetic to objectives (1) and (2), and who would give Mr Botha a major boost domestically and internationally by agreeing to meet him.
4. To seek UK cooperation in an ambitious strategic plan for resisting the spread of communist influence in Africa by resistance to radical régimes and movements and support for moderate, anti-communist ones.
5. To divide the UK from its Western partners (especially the other members of the Five): and thus to pre-empt concerted Western pressure.
6. To seek to persuade HMG to restrain Mr Mugabe's government in Zimbabwe from radical policies, or failing that to work for the emergence of a more moderate government.

7. To enlist UK support for (or neutralise UK opposition to) moves towards an internal settlement in Namibia, excluding SWAPO and by-passing the UN plan (also see (2) above).

8. To complain that the mandatory arms embargo inhibits South Africa's ability to combat the Soviet military threat and to test British willingness to supply Nimrods.

B. UK Objectives

9. To show that HMG wants a normal and constructive relationship with South Africa in the commercial, political and other fields, a prospect which can become a reality when South Africa is seen internationally to have adopted positive internal and external policies and to be making progress in putting them into effect.

10. To encourage South Africa to see mutual interest in a correct and cooperative relationship with the new government in Salisbury and to assure them of our readiness to urge this view on the Zimbabwe Government too.

11. To persuade Mr Botha to come to terms with SWAPO in Namibia before escalation of the fighting further radicalises SWAPO leaders and increases their dependence on communist support; and that implementation of the Five's and the UN's Proposal while that remains available (ie not for much longer) at present offers the best available means of accomplishing this.

12. To make the point that even if the Rhodesian election result makes SWAPO more likely to win an internationally supervised election in Namibia, a SWAPO Government might turn out to be nothing like as extreme as expected: and therefore that it might be best to bite the bullet now.

13. To avoid being drawn into a UK role of conspicuously providing international respectability and support for South African policies

which we reject; and to make it plain to the South Africans that we intend to continue working closely with our EC partners and NATO allies in our approach to South Africa.

14. To seek to establish what P W Botha sees as the ultimate objective of his policies of internal reform.

15. To make clear that genuine involvement by South African blacks on a basis which they accept, and a co-operative relationship with other African governments, represent the only reliable protection against the communist threat.

16. To try to give Mr Botha a more balanced view of Soviet policy and intentions.

17. To bring home to Mr Botha that Britain can provide only limited encouragement and support for Mr Botha's policies and that how far we can go depends on how far they are seen to maintain a brisk tempo of reform at home and peaceful, conciliatory attitudes to external problems. We need to discourage unrealistic expectations of us.

18. Without threatening, to warn Mr Botha not to count on support or protection from HMG if South Africa so behaves as to outrage moderate international opinion (eg by internal repression or unacceptable behaviour in relation to South Africa's neighbours, withdrawal of co-operation with the UN on Namibia, or in the nuclear field).

19. To avoid any commitment to a meeting between Mr P W Botha and Mrs Thatcher. The timing of any such meeting would depend on the general international climate and upon obtaining a substantial quid pro quo from the South African side.

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C. Main Points to Make (Points to make on individual subjects are in the relevant briefs.)

20. We take the communist threat in Africa very seriously. It is a menace to UK, South African and general Western interests. We welcome the chance to compare notes with South Africa on the nature, extent and direction of the threat.

21. Communist influence feeds on conflicts and unresolved problems, especially those with a racial content. The only effective counter is to show that problems and conflicts can be resolved with the minimum of violence and without resort to communist support or intervention.

22. African nationalism remains a powerful force. South Africa and the West need to show that we understand it and are prepared to encourage it to mature in ways that will not threaten Western interests or the security of white communities in the continent.

23. The Prime Minister has publicly welcomed Mr Botha's domestic reforms. To enable us to sustain this policy Mr Botha's government needs to keep up the momentum of positive change and provide increasing evidence of willingness to move towards a political system demonstrably acceptable <sup>to</sup> black South Africans which gives them the opportunity of participating in political life and the decision-making process in South Africa as a whole. Cases will inevitably arise in which black South Africans will disagree with white South Africans on matters which concern them both equally. The system must not exclude the possibility that in such circumstances black wishes would prevail. Such progress is also an absolute condition of a more co-operative attitude to South

Africa on the part of neighbouring African countries, as required by the Constellation policy. The removal of superficial discrimination and improvements in black living standards are a start but will not be enough.

24. We genuinely want a better and more positive relationship. The key to this is the provision by South Africa of evidence of early substantial change at home and avoidance of unacceptable behaviour internationally.

25. [If raised] The Prime Minister hopes to meet Mr P W Botha. The timing and purpose of such a meeting will need careful preparation; its timing in relation to South African actions and policies regarding eg Zimbabwe and Namibia will have to be carefully judged; and Mrs Thatcher will need to be able to show that a meeting has been justified by tangible and positive results. We should keep this idea under review.

26. [If raised] A visit by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would be a natural objective for us to work towards when our relations in general have become more normal and when the visit could take place without attracting suspicion and controversy. This will fall into place as and when South African policies bring the Republic back into the international mainstream.

27. We openly oppose <sup>general</sup> sanctions against South Africa. But we have interests in other parts of the world besides South Africa, and it is possible to imagine disastrous circumstances in which Britain could not be justified in using its veto against united world opinion and in defence of actions or policies which we cannot defend. We pray that such a situation will never arise. But

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the British Government could not be expected to assume the full responsibility for protecting South Africa from the consequences of a policy on, for example, Namibia, with which we strongly disagreed and against whose dangers we had repeatedly warned.

28. Time is running out fast for agreement on the UN plan for Namibia. Further delay will soon come to be regarded by many as tantamount to rejection with all its undesirable consequences. Unless South Africa can demonstrate real movement towards a settlement it will become increasingly difficult for Britain to continue to hold the line or to secure more time for you to decide which way to go. Have you concluded from Rhodesia that it is essential to come to terms with black nationalism earlier rather than later? Does this not point to the need for very early direct contacts with SWAPO? If you delay, the price of an eventual settlement will go up steeply: the fighting will escalate, SWAPO will become more dependent on communist support and its leaders will be increasingly radicalised, and South Africa will be held responsible for the rejection of the UN plan. There is a danger of getting so preoccupied with every aspect of how exactly the plan will work at every stage that you may lose a historic opportunity which cannot be on offer much longer.

29. Some will conclude from events in Rhodesia that internationally supervised elections and the surrounding pressures from the UN, OAU etc lead inexorably to hostile Marxist régimes, and the defeat of moderates. But a more accurate reading is that the longer the delay in coming to terms with African nationalism, the greater the opportunities for communist influence and the greater the

/difficulty

difficulty in working out an eventual accommodation. It is vital now to show that South Africa and the West can do more for Zimbabwe's future stability and prosperity than the Russians and the Cubans can; and to go for a settlement now in Namibia to which SWAPO will be committed rather than waiting until violence and communist interference have made an eventual settlement more costly in blood and treasure. It is important to draw the right conclusions from the Soviet attitude to what has happened. The Russians never backed Mugabe. They thought he would not be a useful instrument for them if he came to power. Above all the last thing they wanted was a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia worked out by Britain and the West with the black nationalist parties and the Front Line States. They knew that this could remove an invaluable source of violence, protest and indignation which they could exploit to spread communist influence and sympathy. And they knew it could lead to an independent, internationally recognised Zimbabwe closely associated with the West and willing to pursue a moderate line in exchange for a chance of stability and Western help. The moral for Namibia is obvious. It is the Russians who benefit from continued conflict and war.

30. We are ready to continue this dialogue, privately and quietly, through our Ambassadors and if necessary other channels. We need to ensure that each understands the other's views and intentions and so avoids miscalculations or disappointments: we cannot expect to reach agreement quickly or across the board. We want to listen to South African views, suggestions and analyses, but also to be sure that they will listen seriously to ours.



D. Tactics at the Talks

31. Mr P W Botha and Mr Pik Botha are capable of delivering monologues in a hectoring and dogmatic manner but both have considerable charm which they are likely to use on this occasion and their manner is likely to be confiding. Both will regard the talks as an opportunity to get South African views to the Prime Minister's ear rather than to listen to what we have to say. Moreover the Bothas will probably point to Mugabe's victory in Rhodesia as evidence that UK policy is on the wrong track, fails to respond toughly and effectively to the communist threat, plays into the hands of Marxist extremists and betrays the moderates who are the best hope for Western and white interests. We have a good and effective reply to this (see paragraphs 10 and 29 ) and it is important to make sure that the Bothas hear and absorb it even if they do not accept it.

32. Mr P W Botha is likely to respond very sharply indeed to anything that might carry an undertone of threat - perhaps even to the point of breaking off the talks. The warnings about the consequences of South African rejection of the UN plan for Namibia: the possibility of the UK not being willing to use its veto in certain circumstances to prevent sanctions: and the conditions in which we could contemplate agreement to a meeting with the Prime Minister, will all have to be conveyed as frank and friendly descriptions of inescapable factors rather than as threats or attempts to impose conditions on our willingness to act in a positive way. But if and when Mr P W Botha does talk toughly and frankly, he will not necessarily object if the emissary is equally frank and tough in reply.

33. The best course will probably be to give the Bothas a full opportunity to deploy their case in extenso before attempting to state ours in reply. Interventions to challenge individual points in the South African presentation are likely to lead to sterile and heated disputes. If the emissary has heard the Bothas out in patience, he can reasonably ask for the same treatment when his own turn comes.

34. It will be necessary to stress the importance we attach to confidentiality. If the fact of the talks became known, they would be misrepresented and intense suspicion would be aroused. This would make it difficult for us to continue the dialogue. For similar reasons it would be best to avoid agreed records of the conversations or the preparation of joint papers (which the South Africans may suggest).


35. We know that Mr P W Botha is likely to suggest a private meeting at which only he and the emissary will be present. This could offer opportunities for frank talking but there are snags. The talks will be recorded and transcribed by the South Africans: there is a loss of continuity for HM Ambassador who will have to continue the dialogue after the emissary's departure: and there could be recriminations and arguments later about what was said or agreed, with no-one there to confirm the emissary's account and recollection. It will probably be desirable to agree, if pressed, to a private meeting but it may be prudent to keep it short and to reserve the substantive discussions to occasions when HM Ambassador and others are present.

Southern African Department

17 March 1980

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Verw.  
Ref.

REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Kantoor van die Eersle Minister  
Prime Minister's Office

CAPE TOWN

5 February 1980

Dear Prime Minister

The relations between our nations have not always been good. Indeed, we have been both enemies and allies in war. Reflecting objectively on the history of events since we first came into contact with each other in South Africa, I am drawn to the irresistible conclusion that whenever we have clashed both nations have paid a painful price but whenever we have co-operated both nations have benefited substantially. What is more, the advantages of co-operation have accrued to all the peoples of the Southern African region.

I realise that British and South African interests inevitably diverge. But they also converge. Our interests diverge principally because of the conception which exists of the South African Government's "apartheid" policy. It is not my intention in this communication to discuss the misconceptions which persist in the judgment of my Government's policy in respect of multi-national development. What is important at the present juncture is whether the British Government, with more experience and knowledge of Southern Africa than any other government in the Western world, would not be prepared to re-examine and reassess its long-term interests in Africa and particularly Southern Africa in closer co-operation with my Government on a different basis than has been the case during the past two decades. Recognizing that your Government would in that case wish to exchange views candidly with us *inter alia* on such issues as measures discriminating between people of different colour, I invite you to send a personal emissary to meet with me in order that we may discuss not only questions of principle but also -

- (a) the obstacles in the way of closer co-operation between our Governments;
- (b) possible ways and means of eliminating those obstacles.

I convey this invitation to you not because I am under any illusion as to the views you may entertain on certain aspects of my Government's internal policy. I consider the survival of freedom and democracy of such vital importance that I respectfully suggest to you that you and I share a heavy responsibility to make the most sincere attempt to bridge our differences in order to cultivate the unity of purpose and strength which will be required to resist Russian imperialism. Indeed, your own courageous stand against the extension of Soviet power has played no small part in convincing me that our Governments should proceed immediately to engage in the discussions which I propose.

In saying this, I have also been encouraged by the measure of co-operation which has developed between us in regard to Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, more particularly as I am convinced it reflects a similar underlying assessment of the nature of the struggle for world pre-eminence in our era and of the extent of the threat to the Western democratic free-enterprise system. The lessons of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Wall, the Cubans in Angola and the Soviet doctrine of world domination having been forgotten or simply ignored, it has taken the rape of Afghanistan to open the eyes of the West.

During President Brezhnev's era the Soviet Union has materially increased its power and influence relative to the United States and to the West in general. Its military power has been developed far beyond the requirements of a defensive capacity. There are no signs that the Soviet Union will be satisfied with nuclear or conventional parity. The great preponderance of Soviet tanks and divisions in Europe has been well documented. The Soviet fleet has been transformed into a formidable blue-water navy, backed up with a very substantial and modern merchant marine. Brezhnev has supplemented this with a fleet of missile-carrying submarines, counterbalancing the American Polaris submarines. He has cleverly used détente as a shield and exploited the American setback in Vietnam and the maiming effect of Watergate to promote subversion and instal pro-Soviet governments in the Third World and, at the same time, to impose the Brezhnev doctrine - the right of Russia to intervene in "socialist" countries seeking change. Despite this, he has secured legitimacy through the Helsinki agreements for the boundaries of Eastern and Central Europe, for a quid pro quo which seems to have had little substance. Soviet influence in Europe, in South-East and South-West Asia, in the Middle East, in Southern Arabia, in parts of North, East, West and Southern Africa has grown beyond the point of being ominous. It is real. It has assumed awesome dimensions.

There is no doubt that the Southern African region has now become a prime objective of Soviet ambitions. Control of the vast and valuable reserves of raw materials in our region, in addition to Russia's own resources, would enable her to dominate supplies to the industrial West. Control of South Africa's strategic geographical position, the importance of which is significantly enhanced by her technological sophistication, infrastructural development and industrial capacity, would greatly enhance this dominance. It would in fact tip the global strategic balance in favour of the USSR to a degree matched only by control of the total area of the Middle East.

... You may be interested in the attached interview given by Glagolev. He is not necessarily the final authority on the subject. You will be in a position to evaluate his credibility. Nevertheless, his views flow from a source in the heart of the Soviet hierarchy and confirm what South Africa has long been propounding about Soviet intentions in Africa. The West appears to have been mesmerised by détente and to have discounted the marked increase in Soviet influence in Africa under Brezhnev's leadership because Russia has skilfully worked through surrogates and through the "liberation" movements.

An important part of the Soviet strategy in Africa has been to use the United Nations and international bodies which it controls to drive a wedge between South Africa and the major standard-bearers of freedom, on the pretext that South Africa has transgressed the norms of civilization. Whatever imperfections there may be in South African society, South Africa has a democratic, free-enterprise, Christian society and is spiritually, emotionally and ideologically committed to the democracy of the Greeks, Europeans and Americans. Whatever disabilities may be experienced by segments of our population, successive South African Governments have sincerely worked for their upliftment and progress. We are committed to uphold the human dignity of all persons, irrespective of race or creed. We are committed to the removal of all negative forms of discrimination based on colour. But our problems are complex. Our situation therefore requires understanding and tolerance. My Government is, within the bounds of the constraints imposed by the inertia of human nature, energetically pursuing a policy of ensuring that justice is done to all South Africa's peoples. I can assure you that, having already moved far as fast as possible during my first year of office, I shall continue on the path I have charted. I believe it to be an honourable course and that the West should become aware of this. I should therefore welcome the opportunity of explaining my aims in the light of the options available and current realities.

The Soviet threat of engulfing South Africa is of immediate concern to all of us. The Soviet Union is already established in Ethiopia, Angola and Mocambique, and its influence in other African countries poses a direct threat to the whole of Africa. But the prime target is Southern Africa. That is why the struggle for Zimbabwe/Rhodesia is so important and why Soviet aims in South West Africa must be frustrated, not only in the interests of Southern Africa, but also of the West.


The events in Afghanistan have irrevocably confirmed that the Soviet Union will not hesitate to launch an attack southwards with surrogate forces if it believes that this can be done with impunity. War material has been accumulated in Angola and Mocambique, where, as you know, large tank forces have also been mustered. The build-up is continuing - with inter alia the addition of the technical know-how of the East-Germans.

It is clear to me that, if democratic institutions are to survive anywhere in Africa, a common anti-Soviet strategy for Africa as a whole must be worked out by the West and moderate African leaders and quickly. All anti-Soviet governments in Africa from Egypt to South Africa must be supported, their foreign policies co-ordinated and their differences submerged. It is essential that the countries of Southern Africa should come together to have any chance of maintaining themselves, for otherwise they will fall like dominoes. That is one reason why I am assiduously promoting the creation of a form of confederation or constellation of states in the region.

In view of your clearly stated views on the Soviet threat, I felt it would be constructive to let you have my views on the critical African situation. I would welcome receiving your own views and your ideas as to how we can counter this threat. I hope that your emissary will soon find it possible to visit South Africa for the proposed discussions. South Africa is irrevocably committed to resisting Soviet aggression with all means at its disposal, whatever the consequences. But South Africa could not carry the responsibility in Southern Africa alone.

You will appreciate that if South Africa has to stand alone she must retain the right to act when, where and in whatever manner she deems necessary to promote her own chances of survival, and time is short.

With sincere regards

  
P W BOTHA

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister  
LONDON

# As Comrade Igor Sergeyeovich Glagolev was only saying the other day: Your people should not in any way minimise the Soviet threat. It is official policy. The Russians are determined to take South Africa...

"SUNDAY TRIBUNE" 1.1.1980

IGOR Sergeyeovich Glagolev is absolutely unequivocal: "No matter what you do in South Africa, the Russians are determined to take control of your country and its mineral wealth."

Until October 1976 he was a respected senior research member of the prestige USSR Academy of Science, an adviser on foreign affairs and SALT to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as a foreign affairs consultant to the Soviet Communist Party Politburo.


As such, he was privy to many of the Russian ruling establishment's top secrets and he attended many meetings with foreigners.

His main field of interest was in Russia's relations with the United States and in disarmament. And from 1961 to 1964 he was chief of the sector on disarmament of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Dr Glagolev defected to the United States in 1978 because he says he could no longer stomach the post-Krushchev regime which reversed Krushchev's liberalisation programme and which, most important of all, moved from genuine disarmament to an expansionist foreign policy — the results of which today dominate newspapers around the world.

While Dr Glagolev's main interest was hardly Africa, he became increasingly interested in the continent when it became clear to him that the Soviet Union was giving greater priority to the affairs of South Africa.

In an interview in Washington this week, Dr Glagolev told me: "In 1968 an interagency study group was organised by the secret Department of Foreign Affairs Directorate of Planning. I was chairman of this group and our scholarly predictions on the practical military policy of the Soviet Union in Southern



Igor Glagolev defected to the West in 1978. As a key member of the Kremlin policy-makers for many years, his views on the recent startling changes in Russian strategy for world domination takes on new, forbidding emphasis. He talked in Washington this week to Sunday Tribune Bureau JOHN D'OLIVEIRA.



Africa . . . and the intensity of the war in Southern Africa was stepped up."

But still Dr Glagolev believed the Southern African priorities were relatively low ones for Soviet foreign policy.

"Look, I knew the people in government who studied South Africa. They were all third-raters, the kind of people who were studying Paraguay and countries like that . . . suddenly it all changed."

In 1976 Dr Glagolev attended a meeting at which a top Russian said that the elimination of Western influence in Southern Africa was the major objective of Soviet foreign policy.

"I was astonished that Russia was giving such a high priority to Southern Africa.

"But you must note that the official policy now is to eliminate the existing system in Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular. This is a very harsh objective. It does not mean equal opportunity for all in South Africa or even black majority rule. It means the elimination of the entire system in your country . . . no matter how many people die in the process.

"It is forgotten that the Russians have, directly or indirectly, killed more than 150 million people . . . and they are still killing people in different parts of the world today, this hour, this minute . . . and they

will not hesitate to kill in South Africa."

As a member of the World Peace Council, Dr Glagolev attended a meeting at Moscow's Number 10 Krapotkin Street in 1968 (he was chairman of the council's economic commission at the time): "Some of the members of the council really worked for peace but terrorists were also members and at this meeting Rhodesian terrorists asked for arms to intensify their war. They went with their request to the central committee and they got their arms. There were five representatives. I can no longer remember their names. However, I do not think Nkomo was one of them because he I would have remembered."

The strategy — which has become clear since then — was to follow pro-Russian regimes in Mozambique and Angola with a similar regime in Rhodesia.

"The Russians are determined to take South Africa and to get the full benefit of its tremendous mineral wealth. I do not know right now which is the highest priority, moving into the Persian Gulf and taking its oil or getting control of South Africa's mineral wealth.

"They know that once they take South Africa, once they take its mineral wealth for themselves and can benefit from its strategic position, they will eventually control the world. If they can take South Africa nothing can stop them.

"Remember, this is not conjecture on my part. It is official Soviet policy . . . your people should not in any way minimise the Soviet threat."

Dr Glagolev said everybody knew South Africa had its problems and its shortcomings — "but South Africa is 100 times more democratic than Russia and, should the Russians take control of your country, the black people will be even worse off than they are now . . . they will bear the brunt of the Soviet oppression!"

What should South Africa do?

"There is very little that you can do to prevent the Soviets from fulfilling their ambitions — most of the deterrent should come from the West.

"South Africa should certainly press ahead with its plans to forge an anti-communist alliance with those of its neighbours that it can draw into such an alliance. And South Africa should do everything it can to sort out its internal problems.

"But the main problem is the attitude of the West towards South Africa. Very often one thinks that the West is on the side of the communists.

"The United States should take the initiative and should change its entire attitude towards this area. It should recognise the fact that South Africa, Rhodesia and all the new states in South Africa are an important part of Western civilisation — that they are the West's friends and allies — that they are part of the democratic world, whatever their shortcomings might be.


"Once this is realised, the United States and the West should commit themselves to the defence of the area — with their own military forces if necessary. In addition, Southern Africa should strengthen its own military forces, bringing in people of all colours. Rhodesia has done so successfully . . . but I still doubt whether you will be able to resist the pressure and the infiltration of Soviet surrogate forces on your own."



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C

(21)



JSS 020/6		
15 FEB 1980		

10 DOWNING STREET

14 February 1980

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister,

I have read your letter of 5 February with great care and interest, and I am grateful for the way you have set out your thinking and your concerns so fully and clearly.

We share your concern about Soviet ambitions in Africa and elsewhere. We regard them as a threat, both to our interests and to our way of life. We are determined that our response to that threat shall be vigorous and effective. The international reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan has helped to dispel any tendency towards complacency on the part of other countries and governments which, for the most part, now begin to understand the dimensions of the threat.

We are convinced that the most effective way to counter the spread of communist influence is to find peaceful solutions to problems which might otherwise give rise to violence and conflict and thus provide the pretext for communist intervention. This is one of the reasons why we have worked so hard for an end to the Rhodesian conflict and have actively engaged with the rest of the Five in the effort to defuse the situation in South West Africa/Namibia.

I am heartened by your commitment to the removal of racial discrimination and to a policy of ensuring that justice is done to all South Africa's peoples. I very much welcome your offer to discuss candidly with us the problems that face you and their

/ implications

2  
CONFIDENTIAL

implications for stability and peace in Africa generally.

I do not think we should set ourselves excessively ambitious goals at the outset. We both hope that a more constructive relationship can be developed between our countries. To that end we need to know where our respective analyses of the problems in Southern Africa coincide and where they diverge. Let us start by clearing the ground.

Like you, I am anxious that the process should get under way soon. But the prospects in Southern Africa will be greatly influenced by developments in Rhodesia over the next few weeks. Discussions are likely to be more fruitful if they take place after, rather than before, Rhodesia has completed the election process and is launched as an independent country. It would also help to provide a firm basis for the discussions if they were held at a time when there were clear signs of progress towards the early implementation of the Five's Proposal for South West Africa/Namibia. I suggest therefore that we might aim for the start of the discussions in the second half of next month.

I have not yet settled on my choice of emissary. But I shall wish to send a senior figure who can speak with complete confidence on my and the Government's behalf.

I hope you will be able to confirm that you would be content to proceed on the basis I have suggested. If so I shall ask Mr. Leahy to let you know whom I intend to nominate as my representative for the discussions and to discuss dates for his arrival.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Raymond Stobbe*

The Honourable P. W. Botha.

CONFIDENTIAL



Ref.

D

REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

SECRET

JSS 020/6

Kantoor van die Eerste Minister

Prime Minister's Office

CAPE TOWN

19 February 1980

Dear Prime Minister

It is with appreciation that I have noted your early and constructive response of 14th February as elucidated by Ambassador Leahy. I believe that our common concern about Soviet ambitions and the threat they represent provides a solid basis for the further consultations envisaged.

While I do not, as you know, believe that the discussions between us, based on this assessment of the Soviet danger, should necessarily await the Rhodesian election, I would nevertheless be happy if they could commence in the second half of next month, as you suggest. I view the proposed discussions at this crucial time in southern Africa's history of great importance. I also agree that we should not set excessively ambitious goals at the outset. We must begin with the foundations.

I look forward to hearing who your emissary will be and to meeting him or her in due course.

Yours sincerely

P. W. BOTHA

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister  
LONDON

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*RML*

26 March 1980

*Dear Michael,*

Prime Minister's Emissary to South Africa

Lord Hunt will start briefing this week in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and will be meeting the Prime Minister with Lord Carrington on 2 April prior to arriving in Cape Town on 6 April.

I enclose the briefs which have been prepared for Lord Hunt. I am sending copies of this letter and of the briefs (except No PME 2 which is already available in the Cabinet Office) to David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

I shall be sending you separately a brief for Lord Hunt's call on the Prime Minister.

*yours ever*  
*Rodanz Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

1 /  
FILED IN  
SEPARATE BOX

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

SECRET

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1980

VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA

I confirm that during the period of your mission to South Africa as the Prime Minister's emissary, and during the journeys to and from the United Kingdom, you will be covered by the injury benefit provisions of Section II of the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme. You will also be eligible for medical expenses under the terms of the Diplomatic Service Medical Scheme. Lady Hunt would not, of course, be covered by these provisions.

You will both be entitled to first-class air travel to and from South Africa. I understand that Mr. Wishart of the Cabinet Office is arranging to obtain the tickets for you. There are no special health or visa requirements for South Africa.

You (but not Lady Hunt) may receive a refund of actual hotel costs (for accommodation of the type normally occupied by you on Prudential business) and one-third of Class A subsistence (Class A = Rand 31.50) while you are staying with HM Ambassador, during the period of the mission, plus any reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, eg taxis and hire of transport, in connection with the mission.

In view of the particular circumstances of the visit, I suggest that on your return to the UK, you submit your total claim for reimbursement of fares, accommodation, etc., in the first instance to Miss E. A. Deeves, MBE, Protocol and Conference Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government Offices, Great George Street, SW1, who will then deal with the Civil Service Department who are responsible for the costs.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

The Lord Hunt of Tanworth, G.C.B.

SECRET

South Africa DG  
cc Ruoffin  
18 Feb  
S.A. Repr,  
FWO  
CSD

ABO

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 March 1980

Dear Michael,

Type to issue,

RMS

Visit of the Prime Minister's  
Emissary to South Africa

/ I enclose a formal letter from you to Lord Hunt setting out the terms and conditions of his visit to South Africa.

yours ever  
Rodene Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq  
No 10 Downing Street  
London

SECRET

DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXXX~~~~XXXXXX~~~~XXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Private Secretary, No. 10

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

No. 10 Downing Street

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

*at Hon*  
THE LORD HUNT OF TANWORTH *ECB*  
c/o Mr B L Barder  
Southern African Department  
FCO

Your Reference

~~XXXXXX~~

Secret

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Copies to:

See left-hand column

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA

.....In Confidence

1. I confirm that during the period of your mission to South Africa as the Prime Minister's emissary, and during the journeys to and from the United Kingdom, you will be covered by the injury benefit provisions of Section 11 of the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme. You will also be eligible for medical expenses under the terms of the Diplomatic Service Medical Scheme. Lady Hunt would not, of course, be covered by these provisions.

CAVEAT.....

2. You will both be entitled to first-class air travel to and from South Africa. I understand that Mr Wishart of the Cabinet Office is arranging to obtain the tickets for you. There are no special health or visa requirements for South Africa.

copies to:

Mr T G Streeton  
MBE  
Finance Officer  
FCO

Mr B L Barder  
Southern African  
Department  
FCO

Mr R Baker  
Civil Service  
Department  
Basingstoke

(to be collected by personal safe-hand).

3. You (but not Lady Hunt) may receive a refund of actual hotel costs (for accommodation of the type normally occupied by you on Prudential business) and one-third of Class A subsistence (Class A = Rand 31.50) while you are staying with HM Ambassador, during the period of the mission, plus any reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, eg taxis and hire of transport, in connexion with the mission.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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4. In view of the particular circumstances of the visit, I suggest that on your return to the UK, you submit your total claim for reimbursement of fares, accommodation, etc in the first instance to Miss E A Deeves, MBE, Protocol and Conference Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government Offices, Great George Street, SW1, who will then deal with the Civil Service Department who are responsible for the costs.



26 MAR 1960

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South Africa

16

Lg. Hunt

GRS 200A  
SECRET  
FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 241455Z MAR 1980  
TO IMMEDIATE FCC  
TELEGRAM NO 252 OF 24 MARCH

FOR BARDER, SAFD

YOUR TELNO 152: PRIME MINISTER'S EMISSARY

1. YOU MAY LIKE TO TELL LORD HUNT WHEN YOU SPEAK TO HIM ON WEDNESDAY THAT 10 AM ON WEDNESDAY 9 APRIL AND 3 PM ON THURSDAY 10 APRIL HAVE PROVISIONALLY BEEN PENCILLED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S DIARY FOR THEIR TALKS. I HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED DINNER AT MY HOUSE ON THE EVENING OF 8 APRIL WITH PIK BOTHA, MALAN AND FOURIE: THIS IS TO BE CONFIRMED. I DO NOT KNOW WHEN THE HUNTS PLAN TO ARRIVE ON THAT DAY IN CAPE TOWN FROM GEORGE. IT TAKES ABOUT SIX HOURS BY CAR. I AM GIBVING LUNCH TO GENERAL ARNOLD BROWN OF THE SALVATION ARMY AND HIS WIFE AND THE ARCHBISHOP OF CAPE TOWN AND MRS BURNETT. IF THE HUNTS WOULD LIKE TO JOIN US I SHOULD BE VERY PLEASED. ON THE OTHER HAND IT WOULD BE A RUSH FOR THEM AND IF THEY PREFER TO ARRIVE AFTER LUNCH WE WILL OF COURSE UNDERSTAND. IN ANY CASE I SUGGEST THAT WE LEAVE SOME TIME FREE THAT AFTERNOON FOR A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO OF US.

2. FOURIE ASKED ME WHETHER THE HUNTS WOULD LIKE PROTOCOL TO ARRANGE A SMOOTH PASSAGE FOR THEM AT CAPE TOWN AIRPORT WHEN THEY ARRIVE. I DISCOURAGED THIS AND SAID THAT I THOUGHT HUNT WOULD PREFER TO HAVE NO FUSS AT ALL MADE OF HIM.

3. WILL HUNT ASK THE PRUDENTIAL OFFICE TO ARRANGE THE CAR HIRE ? IT MAY NOT BE SO EASY TO PICK ONE UP ON EASTER SUNDAY WITHOUT A PRIOR RESERVATION.

LEAHY

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- PS/MR LUCE
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- SIR L ALLINSON
- MR DAY
- HD/RHOD D
- HD/NEWS D
- HD/PUSD

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CABINET OFFICE

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South Africa

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kg. Hunt

OO CAPETOWN

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FM FCO 211759Z MAR 80

TO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 152 OF 21 MARCH

YOUR TELNO 243: PRIME MINISTER'S EMISSARY

1. LORD HUNT, WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, WILL TRAVEL BY SA 231 (ETA CAPE TOWN 1005 6 APRIL). ON ARRIVAL THEY PROPOSE TO HIRE A CAR AND DRIVE TO GEORGE TO SPEND SUNDAY AND MONDAY NIGHTS WITH FRIENDS. THEY DO NOT THEREFORE NEED TO BE MET ON ARRIVAL. SHOULD YOU NEED TO CONTACT LORD HUNT AT GEORGE HE WILL BE STAYING WITH MR AND MRS CRAIG (TELEPHONE GEORGE (441) 5587).

2. THE HUNTS WILL RETURN TO CAPE TOWN ON 8 APRIL AND GRATEFULLY ACCEPT YOUR INVITATION TO STAY WITH YOU. LORD HUNT WILL KEEP WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY FREE FOR HIS MAIN BUSINESS. THE PRUDENTIAL WILL HOWEVER BE TELLING THEIR CAPE TOWN OFFICE THAT THEY CAN ARRANGE A PROGRAMME FOR HIM ON FRIDAY. THEY WILL ADD THAT HE IS STAYING WITH YOU SINCE YOU ARE AN OLD FRIEND, AND THAT SINCE HE HAS OTHER BUSINESS ENGAGEMENTS TO FIT IN THEY SHOULD LET YOU KNOW WHAT THEY ARE ARRANGING FOR HIM. THIS SHOULD ENABLE YOU, IF NECESSARY, TO KEEP A SHORT SLOT FOR A POSSIBLE FINAL SESSION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT DAY. WE HAVE HOWEVER SOME RESERVATIONS OURSELVES, ON SECURITY GROUNDS, ABOUT THE IDEA OF A SEPARATE SESSION WITH PIK BOTHA, GENERAL MALAN AND FOURIE. IF LORD HUNT'S TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WERE TO LEAK WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PRESENT IT AS A COURTESY CALL WHILE IN CAPE TOWN FOR OTHER BUSINESS. BUT A SESSION WITH THE OTHER THREE ALSO MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT TO PRESENT. IF THEY REALLY WANT A SEPARATE SESSION WITH HUNT, WOULD IT BE BETTER TO DRESS IT UP AS A SOCIAL OCCASION, PERHAPS AT YOUR RESIDENCE?

3. PLEASE NOTE ONE POINT CAREFULLY ABOUT THE PRUDENTIAL ASPECT. A VISIT BY A UK DIRECTOR (AND ESPECIALLY A NEWLY-APPOINTED ONE) WOULD HARDLY BE JUSTIFIED SOLELY ON ITS OWN ACCOUNT JUST NOW. THE PRUDENTIAL LINE TO THEIR CAPE TOWN PEOPLE WILL THEREFORE BE THAT LORD HUNT IS THERE FOR OTHER UNSPECIFIED BUSINESS INTERESTS

SECRET

(BUT WITH NO HINT ABOUT THE REAL REASON) AND WANTS TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THEM ALSO.

4. THE HUNTS WILL LEAVE FOR JOHANNESBURG ON 12 APRIL AND VISIT THE PRUDENTIAL OFFICE THERE ON 14 APRIL, RETURNING TO LONDON FROM JOHANNESBURG BY BA 050 THAT NIGHT.

CARRINGTON

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SIR L ALLINSON

MR DAY

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CABINET OFFICE

**SECRET**

QRS 310  
SECRET

FM FCO 131734Z MAR 80  
TO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN  
TEL NO 140 OF 13 MARCH 1980

*South Africa* 14.  
*Ls*  
*Am*

PRIME MINISTERS EMISSARY

1. PLEASE INFORM MR PW BOTHA THROUGH WHATEVER CHANNEL YOU THINK APPROPRIATE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE SENDING LORD HUNT OF TAMWORTH (FORMERLY SIR JOHN HUNT, SECRETARY TO THE CABINET) AS HER EMISSARY. YOU SHOULD ENQUIRE WHETHER MR BOTHA WOULD BE FREE FOR THE TALKS WITH LORD HUNT EITHER AT THE BEGINNING OR AT THE END OF THE WEEK BEGINNING 7 APRIL (LORD HUNT'S COMMITMENTS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO COME EARLIER). FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION LORD HUNT IS FREE TO TRAVEL FROM 3 APRIL ONWARDS AND MUST BE BACK IN LONDON ON 15 APRIL. IN ORDER TO ENABLE LORD HUNT TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT ON THE SOUTH AFRICANS OVER NAMIBIA THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO STEER THE SOUTH AFRICANS TOWARDS THE EARLY PART OF THE WEEK WHEN THEY MAY STILL NOT HAVE CONVEYED THEIR DECISION ON THE DMZ TO URQUHART. WHENEVER THE TALKS WITH PW BOTHA TAKE PLACE, LORD HUNT WISHES TO HAVE TIME FOR A FULL BACKGROUND BRIEFING FROM YOU BEFOREHAND. HE MUST ALSO HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR PRIVATE MEETINGS IN CAPE TOWN AND JOHANNESBURG (SEE PARA 2 BELOW).

2. THE OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE OF LORD HUNT'S VISIT WILL BE TO VISIT PERSONAL FRIENDS AND TO HAVE MEETINGS IN CONNECTION WITH HIS DIRECTORSHIP OF THE PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE COMPANY (AND HE WILL IN FACT BE DOING SOME PRUDENTIAL BUSINESS WHILE IN SOUTH AFRICA). PLEASE SUGGEST TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT IF LORD HUNT'S CALL ON MR PW BOTHA ATTRACTS ATTENTION, THEY AND YOU WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT YOU AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD HEARD OF LORD HUNT'S VISIT ON PRUDENTIAL BUSINESS AND IN VIEW OF HIS EMINENCE AS A FORMER SECRETARY TO THE CABINET, THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER HAD INVITED HIM TO PAY A COURTESY CALL FOR AN INFORMAL CHAT, AS HE DOES WITH OTHER DISTINGUISHED VISITORS. THE JOHANNESBURG AND CAPE TOWN OFFICES OF THE PRUDENTIAL HAVE NOT YET HEARD ABOUT LORD HUNT'S VISIT AND NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID TO THEM ABOUT IT FOR THE MOMENT.

CARRINGTON  
FILES  
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PS/PUS  
SIR L. ALLINSON  
MR DAY

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PS/SIR R. ARMSTRONG,  
CABINET OFFICE

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No. 10 DOWNING STREET

**SECRET**

13

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

13 March 1980

Prime Minister's Emissary to  
South Africa

As I have told you on the telephone, there is no objection to the despatch of the draft telegram enclosed with your letter to me of 13 March.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O. D.

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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12.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

13 March 1980

*Dear Michael,*

*with MAFH.*

Prime Minister's Emissary to South Africa

In his letter of 7 March to Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Robert Armstrong recorded that Lord Hunt of Tanworth was willing to act as the Prime Minister's emissary to the South African Prime Minister.

HM Ambassador at Cape Town has recommended that we should inform the South Africans soon of the selection of Lord Hunt and propose dates to them. Lord Carrington recommends that Mr Leahy should be instructed in terms of the enclosed draft telegram, which incorporates a suggested line to take should Lord Hunt's meeting with Mr P W Botha attract attention. I should be grateful if you could let me know whether the Prime Minister is content with these instructions.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*yours ever  
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

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File No. ....

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Security Classification  
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Department .....

Drafted by .....

TELEGRAM

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(Time) .....Z

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(Security Class.) ..... SECRET (Caveat/  
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- CABINET OFFICE

[TEXT]

PRIME MINISTER'S EMISSARY

1. Please inform Mr P W Botha through whatever channel you think appropriate that the Prime Minister will be sending Lord Hunt <sup>of 7am 15th</sup> (formerly Sir John Hunt, Secretary to the Cabinet) as her emissary. You should enquire whether Mr Botha would be free for the talks with Lord Hunt either at the beginning or at the end of the week beginning 7 April (Lord Hunt's commitments make it impossible for him to come earlier). For your own information Lord Hunt is free to travel from 3 April onwards and must be back in London on 15 April. In order to enable Lord Hunt to have maximum impact on the

/South

South Africans over Namibia there would be advantage in trying to steer the South Africans towards the early part of the week when they may still not have conveyed their decision on the DMZ to Urquhart. Whenever the talks with P W Botha take place, Lord Hunt wishes to have time for a full background briefing from you beforehand. He must also have sufficient time for private meetings in Cape Town and Johannesburg (see para 2 below).

2. The ostensible purpose of Lord Hunt's visit will be to <sup>visit personal friends and to</sup> have meetings in connection with his directorship of the Prudential Assurance Company (and he will in fact be doing some Prudential business while in South Africa). Please suggest to the South Africans that if Lord Hunt's call on Mr P W Botha attracts attention, they and you will take the line that you and the South African Government had heard of Lord Hunt's visit on Prudential business and in view of his eminence as a former Secretary to the Cabinet, the South African Prime Minister had invited him to pay a courtesy call for an informal chat, as he does with other distinguished visitors. The Johannesburg and Cape Town offices of the Prudential have not yet heard about Lord Hunt's visit and nothing should be said to them about it for the moment.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



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File

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289

S. Africa

13 March 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S EMISSARY TO MR. P. W. BOTHA

I have discussed Sir Robert Armstrong's letter to Sir Michael Palliser of 7 March on this subject with the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister has agreed that the costs of Lord Hunt's mission should be borne by the CSD and that Lady Hunt's fare should be paid by the Government.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. A. Burns, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Handwritten signature



M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq.



## CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of  
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO  
*Secretary of the Cabinet*

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS  
Telephone: 01-233 8319

SECRET



South Africa 10

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

Ly  
Nms

Ref. A01661

11th March, 1980

Prime Minister's Emissary to Mr. P. W. Botha

Sir Robert Armstrong wrote to Sir Michael Palliser on 7th March about Lord Hunt's appointment as the Prime Minister's emissary to Mr. P. W. Botha.

Among the list of subjects on which Lord Hunt would need briefing, set out on page two of that letter, I should be grateful if you would amend number 6 to read:

"The possibility of developing increased co-operation with South Africa on defence (including intelligence) matters".

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander.

**D. J. WRIGHT**

(D. J. Wright)  
Private Secretary

R. A. Burns, Esq.

SECRET

[SOUTHERN AFRICA] [ADVANCE COPIES]

26

X-14

PS  
SIR I GILMOUR

MR R L WADE-GERY  
CABINET OFFICE

PS/MR LUCE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET (1)

PS/PUS

SIR J ~~WINTHROP~~  
SIR L ALANSON

HD/S AF D

HD/C AF D

HD/UND

HD/DEFENCE D

~~MR FREEMAN LEGAL ADVISER RI K200A~~

HD/NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

(Doyle)

GRS 588

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 102445Z MARCH 1980

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 228 OF 19 MARCH

INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA UKMIS NEW YORK SALISBURY GABORONE MASERU  
MBABANE LUSAKA MAPUTO LUANDA AND WASHINGTON

MIPT: MR P W BOTHA.

IN HIS SPEECH TO NATIONAL PARTY WORKERS AND OFFICIALS ON 8 MARCH, MR BOTHA DEVELOPED THE THEME THAT SOUTH AFRICA COULD NOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF POLITICAL DIVISION AND OPPORTUNISM AT A TIME WHEN THE SURVIVAL OF THE COUNTRY WAS AT RISK, AND WHEN IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE AFRIKANER NATION TO PRACTICE ITS TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY TOWARDS OTHERS.

2. "AT A TIME WHEN THE (RUSSIAN) BEAR IS AT THE FRONT DOOR THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO ARE ARGUING ABOUT IMMORALITY AND SPORT" HE SAID. "SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT NEED AN IMMORALITY ACT TO SURVIVE... A GREATER PRIORITY THAN THE ACT IS THE SURVIVAL OF OUR COUNTRY AND CHRISTIANITY." HE REPEATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER IMPROVEMENTS TO THE IMMORALITY AND MIXED MARRIAGES ACTS, SAYING THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER MIXED MARRIAGES TO BE A SIN, ALTHOUGH THEY ENTAILED REAL PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES.

3. REFERRING TO HIS OWN POLICIES MR BOTHA POSED TWO RHETORICAL QUESTIONS:

A) WAS IT WRONG TO MAKE ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THE ENCIRCLEMENT

A) WAS IT WRONG TO MAKE ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THE ENCIRCLEMENT AND BOYCOTT ACTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA IN RESPECT OF SPORT AND ARMAMENTS?

B) WAS IT WRONG IN A COUNTRY LIKE SOUTH AFRICA WITH ITS HIGH BLACK POPULATION, ITS MILLIONS OF COLOURED AND HUNDRED THOUSANDS OF INDIANS, TO NEGOTIATE IN A SPIRIT OF CONSULTATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION?

4. REPLYING TO THESE QUESTIONS, BOTHA SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA COULD NOT STAND ALONE (ONLY HITLER HAD TRIED, BUT HE HAD FAILED) "PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE THAT SOUTH AFRICA BARRICADE ITSELF AND THAT THE WEST WOULD HELP IT WERE MAKING A BIG MISTAKE ... BRITAIN CANNOT HELP NOR CAN EUROPE SINCE THEY TOO ARE IN DANGER. AMERICA DOES NOT WANT TO HELP... IN AMERICA THERE IS A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT THAT A BIUIKW GOVERNMENT IS A BETTER ONE THAN A STUBBORN WHITE ONE".

5. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN FAVOUR OF A COMMON VOTERS' ROLE OR OBLIGATORY INTEGRATION ("THE NATIONAL PARTY WILL DEFEND THE WHITE MAN, WILL PLEAD FOR HIS POLITICAL RIGHTS, SCHOOLS, CULTURE AND HIS RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION"); HE SOUGHT POLITICAL SOLUTIONS IN ORDER TO BRING TOGETHER AS MANY BLACK, WHITE AND BROWN SOUTH AFRICANS AS POSSIBLE. TO THIS END, "THE GOVERNMENT WILL COME UP WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS IN RESPECT OF THE COLOURED AND THE URBAN BLACKMAN WHICH WILL RESULT IN THE CREATION OF A PROPER CONSULTATIVE BODY - A CONFERENCE OF STATES IN WHICH BLACK, WHITE AND COLOURED WILL BE ABLE TO CONSULT ONE ANOTHER ON MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST, BUT ALWAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF DETERMINATION". TO ANYONE WHO ACCUSED HIM OF BEING PRO-BLACK HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE HIS CONSULTATIONS (WITH NON-WHITES) "AND IF THE PEOPLE REJECT ME BECAUSE OF THIS, THE SOONER THEY DO IT, THE BETTER."

6. MR BOTHA'S SPEECH INCLUDED CALLS FOR PARTY UNITY AS WELL AS FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO HIS TWELVE POINT PLAN.

7. FOR REFERENCES TO NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA IN THE SPEECH SEE MY TELS 217 AND 219. A FURTHER SUMMARY IN THE CAPE TIMES HAS BEEN FORWARDED BY BAG.

LEAHY

PARA 5 LINE 13... HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE HIS CONSULTATIONS (WITH NON-WHITES)

PS

MR R L WADE-GERY  
CABINET OFFICE

/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET (1)

PS/PUS

SIR ~~D. WHITLAND~~

~~Sir L. AUMPTON~~

HD/S AF D

HD/C AF D

HD/UND

HD/DEFENCE D

~~MR FREEMAN LEGAL ADVISOR RM K200A~~

HD/NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

GRS 857A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 101425Z MAR 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 219 OF 10 MARCH 80

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY, GABORONE, MASERU, MBABANE, LUSAKA,  
MAPUTO, LUANDA, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MR P W BOTHA AND THE NATIONAL PARTY

1. MR P W BOTHA'S POWERFUL SPEECH ON 8 MARCH TO A MEETING OF CAPE NATIONAL PARTY OFFICIALS (FOR SUMMARY SEE MIFT) HAS SHARPENED THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE REFORMIST AND THE CONSERVATIVE WINGS OF THE NATIONAL PARTY WHICH HAS BEEN WARMING UP OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS. IT SEEMED EARLIER IN THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SOFT-PEDALLING HIS REFORMIST IDEAS IN ORDER TO DAMP DOWN THE DIVISIONS IN THE PARTY, BUT HE HAS NOW COME OUT FIGHTING. THE IMMEDIATE OCCASION FOR THIS HAS BEEN A SERIES OF PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS BY DR TREURNICHT - IN PARTICULAR REMARKS INTERPRETED AS OVERTURES TO DR MULDER AND HIS SUPPORTERS TO REJOIN THE NATIONAL PARTY (AT A TIME WHEN MULDER WAS STOMPING THE COUNTRY TOWNS, PERSONALLY ATTACKING THE PRIME MINISTER), AND LAST WEEK A SCORNFUL ATTACK ON THE PROPOSAL THAT COLOURED SCHOOL CHILDREN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO COMPETE IN THE ANNUAL CRAVEN WEEK SCHOOLS' RUGBY FESTIVAL. ON THE MULDER ISSUE TREURNICHT WAS FORCED HUMILIATINGLY TO INTRODUCE A MOTION, WHICH WAS PASSED UNANIMOUSLY, IN THE PARTY CAUCUS ON 5 MARCH ATTACKING MULDER AND CALLING ON ALL PATRIOTIC SOUTH AFRICANS TO SUPPORT THE PRIME MINISTER. ON THE CRAVEN WEEK SPEECH THE PRIME MINISTER RESPONDED WITH A VERY SHARP PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY FOR POLITICAL RUCTIONS TO BE CREATED OVER

*(Dentel)*

RESPONDED WITH A VERY SHARP PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY FOR POLITICAL RUCTIONS TO BE CREATED OVER CRAVEN WEEK. NO LAW OF THE COUNTRY WAS BEING TRANSGRESSED. THE TIME HAD COME FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO REALISE THAT ATTITUDES CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT COLOURED PEOPLE WERE LEPERS MUST COME TO AN END. HE COULD NOT ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR BEHAVIOUR WHICH COULD CAUSE FURTHER TENSION BETWEEN WHITES AND COLOURED. THERE WERE MORE SERIOUS MATTERS WHICH MINISTERS SHOULD BE ATTENDING TO.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS SERIOUS AND OPEN BREACH BETWEEN HIMSELF AND TREURNICHT. IT IS AN APPEAL FOR UNITY IN THE PARTY ON HIS OWN TERMS, BUT IT IS ALSO THE MOST UNCOMPROMISING RESTATEMENT OF HIS REFORMIST CREDO SINCE THE PARTY CONGRESSES OF LAST YEAR. HE HAS PULLED NO PUNCHES, PARTICULARLY IN RETURNING TO THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE OF THE IMMORALITY AND MIXED MARRIAGES ACTS. HE HAS SHOWN ONCE AGAIN THAT HIS INSTINCTIVE REACTION TO DISSENT WITHIN THE PARTY RANKS IS NOT TO NEGOTIATE AND ACCOMMODATE BUT TO STAMP ON IT.

3. THE PASSAGE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH ON INVOLVEMENT OF THE URBAN BLACKS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS, THOUGH OBSCURE, REPRESENTS AN APPARENT STEP FORWARD. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE REFERENCE TO A CONFERENCE OF STATES (A NEW TERM) MEANS. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, 'RAPPORT', WHICH USES A DIFFERENT TERM ('CONSULTATIVE BODY'), INTERPRETS THIS AS A REFERENCE TO BRINGING URBAN BLACK REPRESENTATIVES INTO THE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL.

4. IT IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD HAVE COME OUT WITH THIS SPEECH IN THE WAKE OF THE RHODESIAN ELECTION RESULTS. HE COULD EASILY HAVE TAKEN THE OPPOSITE LINE THAT WITH DANGER THREATENING ON THE NORTHERN BORDER NOW WAS THE TIME TO CLOSE RANKS RATHER THAN TO EXPERIMENT WITH NEW INITIATIVES AND IDEAS. IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT HE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RECEPTIVE TO THE ADVICE OF SOME AFRIKAANS PRESS COMMENTATORS THAT THE LESSON FOR SOUTH AFRICA OF THE MUGABE VICTORY IS THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE BLACK NATIONALISTS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA.

5. PIK BOTHA HAS ALREADY MADE A STATEMENT ON TV SUPPORTING THE PRIME MINISTER'S PLEA FOR UNITY AND DECRYING THE TUNNEL VISION OF THOSE WHO DO NOT APPRECIATE HIS OBJECTIVES. HE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS EMPHASISING TO BOTH BLACKS AND WHITES THE NEED TO AVOID THE CATACLYSMIC DISASTER OF A BLACK/WHITE CLASH.




PRIME MINISTER WAS EMPHASISING TO BOTH BLACKS AND WHITES THE NEED TO AVOID THE CATAclysmic DISASTER OF A BLACK/WHITE CLASH. LEADERS HAD TO BE ENCOURAGED TO TALK, TO SEE EACH OTHER'S POINT OF VIEW, AND TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING.

6. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW TREURNICHT WILL TAKE THIS LATEST ATTACK. HE IS A CALCULATING MAN AND NOT THE SORT TO STUMBLE INTO SUCH A CLASH WITH P W BOTHA. ON THE OTHER HAND I HAVE HEARD A NUMBER OF CLOSE OBSERVERS OF THE NATIONAL PARTY SCENE MAINTAIN THAT IT IS BOTHA AND NOT TREURNICHT WHO IS FORCING THE PACE IN THE CONFRONTATION. IN ANY EVENT TREURNICHT APPEARS TO FACE THE DILEMMA OF EITHER BACKING DOWN AND LOSING CREDIBILITY OR LEAVING THE CABINET. THE PRESS ARE ALREADY COUNTING HIS SUPPORTERS WITHIN THE PARTY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A FORMAL SPLIT IN THE PARTY, PRECIPITATING AN ELECTION, CANNOT NOW BE TOTALLY EXCLUDED.

LEAHY

NNNN



file KB  
South Africa

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 March 1980

SOUTH AFRICA: EXPORT CREDIT

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute to her of 28 February about trade with South Africa. She is content that Mr. Nott should write to Senator Horwood in the terms proposed.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD, Ian Ellison (Department of Industry) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER  
M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Stuart Hampson, Esq.,  
Department of Trade,

Ho  
CONFIDENTIAL

M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq.



CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of  
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO  
*Secretary of the Cabinet*

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS  
Telephone: 01-233 8319

SECRET



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

Ref. A01637

7th March, 1980

Prime Minister's Emissary to Mr. P. W. Botha

You and I saw Lord Hunt of Tanworth on 5th March; and I have seen him again this afternoon.

Lord Hunt is very willing in principle to be the Prime Minister's emissary to Mr. P. W. Botha.

There are a number of points of logistics and detail to be sorted out.

First, the Prudential Assurance Company, of which Lord Hunt is now a non-executive director, has considerable interests in South Africa, both in Johannesburg and in Cape Town. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the company have agreed that, while he is in South Africa, Lord Hunt should visit their companies in both places. Among other things, he will be able to explore with them whether they should now set up an office in Salisbury to handle the Rhodesian business which has hitherto been handled from South Africa. These visits will provide a cover for the other purpose of Lord Hunt's trip to South Africa. Nothing has yet been said to the Prudential offices in South Africa about this visit, however, and nothing will be said until our side of it is set up. For the time being, therefore, our Embassy in South Africa should say nothing to the Prudential offices there.

As to dates, Lord Hunt would be free to go from 3rd April and must be back in London on 15th April. During this time he will need to keep some days free for Prudential business. From his point of view the ideal arrangement would be to travel out to Johannesburg on 5th or 6th April, with a view to meetings with Mr. Botha on 7th and 8th April. That timetable could obviously slip a day. He would then go on from Johannesburg to do his other business, returning on 13th or 14th April. The alternative is for him to do his other business first, and to come to Pretoria for meetings with Mr. P. W. Botha at the end of the week beginning 7th April: say, on 10th and 11th or 11th and 12th April. Either way he would want to have time for a full background briefing from our Ambassador before going into his talks with Mr. P. W. Botha.

/Lord

Sir Michael Palliser, GCMG

SECRET

Prime Minister 9A. (2)

I am not sure whether you already know that Lord Hunt has accepted. The timing has slipped a little.

RM  
- 10/13

SECRET

Lord Hunt has decided that he would not want to be accompanied by a senior Foreign and Commonwealth Office official or even by a "staffer" or note-taker. He is content to go into the meetings with Mr. Botha on his own, take his own notes and write his own report. If of course the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wanted to have somebody out in Pretoria while he was there, that would be up to them; but his inclination is to think that is unnecessary, and that Mr. Leahy can provide all that is required by way of support.

Lord Hunt would like to take Lady Hunt with him when he goes. He is not of course seeking any payment by way of honorarium, but hopes that the Government would be prepared to pay Lady Hunt's fare as well as his own to Johannesburg and back.

For the purposes of his visit Lord Hunt will need briefing, which he hopes can cover the following subjects:

- (1) Intelligence assessment of Soviet intentions in Southern Africa.
- (2) Assessment of policies of the new Zimbabwe Government.
- (3) South African internal policies, and the changes we should like to see.
- (4) The state of play on sanctions etc.
- (5) The state of play on Namibia.
- (6) The degree of increased co-operation which we might be prepared to see in our relationships with South Africa on development and defence (including intelligence).

In addition he would welcome personality notes.


He would be prepared to take briefing either in written form or as a "teach-in", but would on the whole prefer it if he could be furnished in the first instance with written briefs, which could then be amplified in subsequent discussions.

I think that the next stage is for a telegram to go to John Leahy, telling him that John Hunt has agreed to be the Prime Minister's personal emissary, and asking him to find out as quickly as possible whether Mr. P. W. Botha would be willing to have talks with Lord Hunt either at the beginning or at the end of the week beginning 7th April. The telegram could also explain about the "cover" arrangements. I think that it would be convenient if I could have an opportunity of seeing the draft of such a telegram before it is actually sent out.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Alexander.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

SECRET



Prime Minister

SOUTH AFRICA : FINANCIAL CREDIT

John Nott sent Peter Carrington a copy of his minute of 28 February to you. In the latter's absence I am writing to say that, although what is suggested goes rather beyond what was originally agreed in OD, we are content with the line John Nott proposes.

2. However we should not become unnecessarily exposed commercially in South Africa for too far ahead in a period of great political uncertainty. We must also avoid excessive political exposure by offering conspicuously more generous credit terms to South Africa than those offered by other Western countries. At the same time we must do everything we can to secure the Tutuka contract and not to prejudice other future public sector business in South Africa. We can and should keep our commercial exposure under review, and look carefully at the effect on it of whatever terms we might offer for future projects as they arise. We did not create any political stir by offering 8-1/2 years for Tutuka. We hope that this further step will also cause no problems.

3. I am copying this minute to other Members of OD, to the Secretary of State for Industry and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

I.H.G.

6 March 1980

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CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A01609

MR. ALEXANDER

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
Export Credit for South Africa

The Prime Minister has asked for advice on the Secretary of State for Trades's proposed reply to the South African request for eight-and-a-half-year terms for the full amount of the macro credit they are looking for.

2. The terms of Mr. Nott's proposed reply go a little beyond what was agreed by OD (OD(79) 12th Meeting). They do, however, maintain the decision to look at projects on a case-by-case basis. They also give the South Africans a slight additional incentive to award the Tutuka project to GEC. The difficulty is that the circumstances in which the South Africans will be seeking extended credit for later projects are hard to foresee and that it will be more difficult, though not impossible, to turn down such a South African request in the light of Mr. Nott's undertaking to consider sympathetically such applications.

3. I understand that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not intending to object to Mr. Nott's proposal and that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is being advised to concur, though reluctantly.

4. It is recommended that the Prime Minister should also agree, after she has seen Lord Carrington's comments.

  
pp. ROBERT ARMSTRONG

5th March, 1980

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CONFIDENTIAL


The Board of Directors of the United States Steel Corporation has approved the proposed merger of the United States Steel Corporation and the Republic Steel Corporation. The merger is being effected by the formation of a new corporation, the United States Republic Steel Corporation, which will be a wholly owned subsidiary of the Republic Steel Corporation.

The terms of the merger are as follows:

- The Republic Steel Corporation shall acquire all the outstanding shares of the United States Steel Corporation.
- The Republic Steel Corporation shall assume all the liabilities of the United States Steel Corporation.
- The Republic Steel Corporation shall issue new shares of its common stock to the holders of the common stock of the United States Steel Corporation.
- The Republic Steel Corporation shall issue new shares of its common stock to the holders of the common stock of the Republic Steel Corporation.
- The Republic Steel Corporation shall issue new shares of its common stock to the holders of the common stock of the Republic Steel Corporation.

The merger is being effected by the formation of a new corporation, the United States Republic Steel Corporation, which will be a wholly owned subsidiary of the Republic Steel Corporation.

-5 MAR 1960



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

I fully support the proposals in the Secretary of State for Trade's minute of 28 February. The positive terms in which he proposes to respond to Senator Horwood will, I hope, be helpful both to GEC in their efforts to win the important Tutuka contract, and in the context of our wider interests in exporting to South Africa.

I am copying this minute to the members of OD Committee and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

5th March 1980


5 MAR 1960



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SECRET



S. Africa 9  
Healey  
file 1/6

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

29 February 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S EMISSARY TO  
MR. P. W. BOTHA

---

As you know, the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had a word about your letter to me of 26 February on this subject. They agreed:-

- (a) that Sir David Fraser's military background was a major drawback;
- (b) that it would be difficult to send a Junior Minister on this mission; and that therefore
- (c) Lord Hunt was their first choice for the mission.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if arrangements could be made for Lord Hunt to be sounded out as soon as possible.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

1030



PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

Prime Minister

Agree, subject to views of  
colleagues?

Yes *[initials]* *[initials]*

..... I have received a letter, a copy of which is attached, from the South African Finance Minister, asking for a macrocredit for South Africa to be reconsidered. You will recall that OD decided against such a macrocredit at its meeting on 5 November (OD(79)12th); it also decided then that, whilst ECGD might offer 8½ year cover for the Tutuka power station contract, that should not be taken as a precedent to extend the present usual limit of 5 years credit cover for South African business. My subsequent letter of 26 November (copy also attached) to Senator Horwood reflects the OD decision.


2. There is still no good reason to concede a macrocredit; such agreements have in the past been signed pretty freely, including with the Soviet Union, and our aim is to separate such political gestures from our trade relations. But our post in South Africa have advised that "rejection without the appearance of further consideration might offend gratuitously in a climate where political considerations have in the past assumed disproportionate importance when final decisions on public sector contracts are being made", and we obviously cannot treat lightly the chance of securing this business. My response to Senator Horwood's letter ought therefore to be positive in order, at least, to assist GEC in their bid for the Tutuka contract (worth about £320m to GEC); and assurances about longer term export credit cover might well clinch that business for GEC and help secure further public sector business which is likely to be available in South Africa.



3. The OD decisions of 5 November on the macrocredit and Tutuka were heavily influenced by the assumed existence of a formal understanding between Governments of the Nine, the US and Canada that no more than 5 years credit cover should generally be given to South Africa, and on the need not to appear to be treating South Africa more favourably over credit than we are ready to treat other countries of similar creditworthiness. Subsequent further research by officials has disclosed that there is no formal understanding as such about the 5 year limit, simply a common practice. An offer to extend ECGD terms given for Tutuka to comparable future business in South Africa would serve to reassure the South Africans and help GEC without enabling others to claim that we are treating South Africa with exceptional favour.

.....  
4. I suggest therefore that I should reply to Senator Horwood in the terms of the attached draft. The timing of that reply is crucial both in terms of helping to secure the Tutuka contract and of the Rhodesian elections and Black African sensitivities about South Africa generally, in case of South African leaks. I would therefore first propose to give our Ambassador in Cape Town, for his own information, the text of the approved draft reply, so that he can advise on the best timing to help GEC. I also propose to ask him to make an immediate informal approach to the South Africans in order to give them some idea of the terms of my proposed reply to Senator Horwood, and to try to elicit a promise from the South Africans to award the Tutuka contract to GEC in return. If that course of action is agreed, officials can agree the terms of the instructions to our Ambassador.

5. I am copying this minute and the attachments to the other OD Committee members and to Keith Joseph and Sir Robert Armstrong. Subject to their comments I should be glad to have your agreement to my proceeding as proposed.

  
J. N.



Ref.: MX. 1.34.2

Postbus 29  
P.O. Box

Ministerie van Finansies  
Ministry of Finance  
Hendrik Verwoerdgebou  
Hendrik Verwoerd Building

RECEIVED 14  
SECRET

TO Mr Clark  
FOR ADVICE (AND  
DRAFT REPLY IF  
APPROPRIATE)  
PLEASE BY:  
19/2/80

COPIES TO:  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]

Kaapstad  
Cape Town  
8000  
SOUTH AFRICA

The Honourable J. Nott,  
Secretary of State for Trade,  
1 Victoria Street,  
LONDON SW1H 0ET.  
ENGLAND.

1980 -02- 06

Dear Minister,

I am most grateful for your letter of 26 November 1979 which I regard as a positive demonstration of the wish on the part of your Government and yourself to expand trade between Britain and South Africa in a meaningful way.

I am particularly gratified that you were able to agree to the 8 1/2 years export credit cover for the Tutuka power station provided, naturally, that British suppliers are awarded the contracts concerned. ESCOM is at present, I believe, engaged in adjudicating the tenders received.

I must admit, though, that I was somewhat disappointed that your Government did not see its way clear at this stage to extend these more favourable terms to the full amount of the macro-credit. Perhaps you would in due course be so kind as to inform me whether the circumstances which gave rise to your Government's present limited decision have changed sufficiently for you to bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion.

I am asking your Ambassador to convey this letter to you, and am arranging for copies to be sent to Dr. the Honourable S.W. van der Merwe, Minister of Industries and of Commerce and Consumer Affairs and to the Honourable R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

With kindest regards,  
Yours sincerely,  
Owen Horwood.

O.P.F. HORWOOD

31A

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE 1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET. Telephone 01-215 7377

cc: S/S  
PS Secretary  
PS Secretary ECUO  
Mr Knighton  
Mr Clarke CRES  
Mr Pantou ECUO.



From the Secretary of State

Senator The Hon O P F Horwood  
Minister of Finance  
Pretoria  
Republic of South Africa

26 November 1979

Dear Minister

I am now in a position to respond to the proposals which you made to me at our meeting in London on 11 October, and also to the message which your Ambassador conveyed to Sir Geoffrey Howe and to Lord Carrington on 25 October, and to me on 31 October. That message concentrated on the need for the Export Credits Guarantee Department to offer 8½ years credit cover for certain public sector projects in South Africa.

My Ministerial colleagues and I have considered very carefully both this proposal and the one for a macrocredit which you developed at our meeting. At that meeting you referred to the declining share of South African public sector orders obtained by British industry in recent years, and of the wish of the South African Government to place more orders with British suppliers. For my part I assured you that the British Government shared the wish to trade with your country, but that in our experience, macrocredits unrelated to firm contracts with British suppliers had considerable drawbacks, and that I believed ECGD would be better able to meet South African needs by considering individual projects as they arise.

In this connection, I am delighted to be able to inform you that we are able to agree 8½ years export credit cover for the Tutuka power station which I understand is the first of the projects you had in mind, assuming of course that the contract is placed with a British





*From the Secretary of State*

supplier. The precise terms will, of course, be settled in the usual way by negotiation between ECGD and the suppliers. In turn, I very much hope that you will now find it possible to confirm that, provided British suppliers are able to satisfy ESCOM on such matters as technical specifications, they will be awarded the Tutuka contract.

I hope that you will regard this letter as positive demonstration of our wish to expand trade between Britain and your country, and that further specific contracts will follow up to the larger figure which we discussed at our meeting.

I am asking your Ambassador to convey this letter to you, and am arranging for copies to be sent to Lord Carrington and to Sir Geoffrey Howe.

Kind regards  
Yours sincerely  
John Nott

JOHN NOTT

**DRAFT**

Addressed to:

Senator the Hon O P F Horwood  
Minister of Finance  
Ministry of Finance  
Cape Town  
Republic of South Africa.

**File No.**

Copies to:

PS/MFT  
PS/PUSS(T)  
Secretary  
Secretary ECGD  
Mr Knighton  
Mr Williams CRE5  
Mr Clarke CRE5

Originated by:  
(Initials and date)

Seen by:  
(Initials and date)

Enclosures:

Type for signature of

.....  
(Initials and date)

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

Thank you for your letter dated 6 February, in which you ask whether the British Government would reconsider its decision, conveyed to you in my letter of 26 November, on a macrocredit.

This proposal has now been carefully re-examined with my Ministerial colleagues. Whilst our conclusion is that the fixing of a specific figure of the kind you had in mind would not offer advantage as compared with the usual ECGD practice of considering individual proposals on their merits, I am pleased to be able to assure you that we are prepared to consider sympathetically applications for credit terms similar to those offered in the case of Tutuka for future major project business placed with British suppliers.

I know you will appreciate that this represents a positive response to your letter, and meets the substance of the request you made at our meeting last year, for greater certainty about the terms that might be available. I accordingly hope that the South African Government will decide to award public sector contracts to British suppliers in line with the figure we discussed last year.


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File No.



I am asking our Ambassador to deliver this letter to you, and to send copies of it to Dr van der Merwe, and Mr R F Botha; copies have also gone to Lord Carrington and to Sir Geoffrey Howe.

With all good wishes,



①

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister -

You will probably want to discuss this with Lord Carrington.

My own view is that Lord Hunt would be an excellent candidate.

Other possibilities might include

Sir Donald Aitken and Lord

Harlech. Lord Carrington has, I

know, a very high opinion of Sir

David Fraser but I wonder whether

Sir David is quite the right man

just now.

(Sir John Killick would,

I fear, have a credibility problem as an intermediary in this context.)

26/2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 February 1980

Dear Michael,

*Original to be a cabinet  
minutes? not*

Prime Minister's Emissary to Mr P W Botha

Now that the Prime Minister's reply to Mr P W Botha has been sent and Mr Botha's agreement received, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that an early decision should be taken on the choice of an emissary of the Prime Minister to visit South Africa in late March for the proposed discussions with the South African Prime Minister and his colleagues. Whoever is chosen will need extensive briefing, and it would be useful for the Prime Minister, ourselves and the emissary himself if an early start could be made on this.

We know from HM Ambassador in Cape Town that the South Africans are thinking of a political figure rather than an official. While Lord Carrington does not think we need necessarily be bound to that view, he considers it important to select someone who can speak with full authority and who is in the Prime Minister's and Lord Carrington's full confidence. In view of Mr P W Botha's short temper and overpowering manner, the emissary will need to be someone not easily cowed or overborne.

Lord Carrington would see some advantage in choosing an emissary from within the present or recent Government service (whether an official or a political figure), to ensure that he or she will speak within the constraints of Government policy and also for reasons of maximum confidentiality. We would also wish the emissary to be able to visit South Africa and call on senior Ministers there without attracting undue attention or provoking speculation; this condition may be more difficult to fulfil.

Against this background, Lord Carrington would put forward the following names for the Prime Minister's consideration. They are set out in his own order of preference:-

- (i) General Sir David Fraser: former Commandant of the Royal College of Defence Studies and UK Military Representative at NATO. The drawback is that, if the purpose of his mission was revealed, the choice of a former member of the armed services could give rise to damaging speculation about military collaboration between Britain and South Africa.
- (ii) Mr Douglas Hurd: as a Minister he could not visit Cape Town unnoticed. We should have to find a plausible explanation for the visit which avoided mention of his

/status



status as a special emissary of the Prime Minister or speculation that he was discussing particularly sensitive subjects. The latter might not be easy, given Mr Hurd's responsibilities within the FCO for defence-related subjects.

(iii) Lord Hunt of Tanworth.

Lord Carrington would be happy to arrange for the person of the Prime Minister's choice to be sounded out on the Prime Minister's behalf.

*yours ever  
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

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*Mr. Punt*

(2)

*South Africa 7*

*Prime Minister*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*As you <sup>know</sup> Mr Botha has now*

London SW1A 2AH

*agreed that the meeting should be in*

*the second half of March: you may* 20 February 1980

*like to see the arguments made.*

*Dear Michael,*

*Punt*

*[Signature]*

RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 18 February about the timing of the visit by a British emissary to South Africa.

The argument in favour of a visit by the emissary earlier than suggested by the Prime Minister in her letter to P W Botha ('the second half of next month') is that put forward by Mr Leahy in the telegram to which you refer: that it is desirable for us to keep in close touch with the South Africans during the period immediately before and after the Rhodesian elections, to secure their continued co-operation over Rhodesia and to give ourselves the best chance of dissuading them from some ill-considered intervention. Mr Leahy's proposal - and it stems from him rather than from the South Africans - was that an early visit by the Prime Minister's emissary might provide a good opportunity for this kind of consultation.

However, in Lord Carrington's view, there are strong arguments against advancing the date for the visit.

What P W Botha has asked for is an opportunity for a high level discussion of the longer term problems of southern Africa and how these might be tackled. If an emissary were to go now he could be dragged into detailed discussion of the prospects in Rhodesia at the expense of wider issues.

There is also the risk that a visit by a special emissary during this period in Rhodesia might give ill-disposed African governments an opportunity to charge that we are acting in collusion with South Africa. In the present highly-charged situation this would be no less damaging for being untrue.

It is clear that the South Africans are anxious to begin a dialogue with the British Government. They hope that this will eventually lead to exchanges of visits at a high level, and perhaps also to public support by us for South Africa. With this expectation in front of them, they have a strong motive for avoiding any ill-considered action over Rhodesia or Namibia which might oblige the Prime Minister to reconsider the emissary's mission. This leverage is likely to be of particular importance over the next few weeks.

Lord Carrington therefore considers that we should treat the need to keep the South Africans fully briefed on Rhodesia as a separate exercise from the wider dialogue envisaged by P W Botha. To deal with the Rhodesian angle he has asked Sir Anthony Duff to pay a

/further

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street





further visit to Cape Town shortly to bring the South Africans up to date on Rhodesia. The Governor will need him in Salisbury during the week immediately before the elections but it should be possible for him to visit Cape Town in the period 27-29 February while the elections are actually in progress. His last visit there went unnoticed by the press. In the meantime instructions have gone to Mr Leahy to keep the South Africans abreast of our thinking.

Lord Carrington's conclusion is that we should stick to the timing for the emissary's visit proposed in the Prime Minister's letter to P W Botha.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)

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SUBJECT

T 32/80



Verw.  
Ref.

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PRIME MINISTER'S REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T32/80

SECRET

Prime Minister

(2)

Kantoor van die Eerste Minister

Prime Minister's Office

CAPE TOWN

19 February 1980

rfg. 27/2

Dear Prime Minister

It is with appreciation that I have noted your early and constructive response of 14th February as elucidated by Ambassador Leahy. I believe that our common concern about Soviet ambitions and the threat they represent provides a solid basis for the further consultations envisaged.

While I do not, as you know, believe that the discussions between us, based on this assessment of the Soviet danger, should necessarily await the Rhodesian election, I would nevertheless be happy if they could commence in the second half of next month, as you suggest. I view the proposed discussions at this crucial time in southern Africa's history of great importance. I also agree that we should not set excessively ambitious goals at the outset. We must begin with the foundations.

I look forward to hearing who your emissary will be and to meeting him or her in due course.

Yours sincerely

P W BOTHA

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister  
LONDON

66

GRS 277A

SECRET

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 191450Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 131 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

T32/80

SERIAL No. ....

MY TEL NO 129: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE

1. PIK BOTHA HANDED ME THIS AFTERNOON THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM MR P W BOTHA TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF 14 FEBRUARY.

BEGINS:

QUOTE

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

IT IS WITH APPRECIATION THAT I HAVE NOTED YOUR EARLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE OF 14TH FEBRUARY AS ELUCIDATED BY AMBASSADOR LEAHY. I BELIEVE THAT OUR COMMON CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET AMBITIONS AND THE THREAT THEY REPRESENT PROVIDES A SOLID BASIS FOR THE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ENVISAGED.

WHILE I DO NOT, AS YOU KNOW, BELIEVE THAT THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN US, BASED ON THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET DANGER, SHOULD NECESSARILY AWAIT THE RHODESIAN ELECTION, I WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE HAPPY IF THEY COULD COMMENCE IN THE SECOND HALF OF NEXT MONTH, AS YOU SUGGEST. I VIEW THE PROPOSED DISCUSSIONS AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME IN SOUTHERN AFRICA'S HISTORY OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. I ALSO AGREE THAT WE SHOULD NOT SET EXCESSIVELY AMBITIOUS GOALS AT THE OUTSET. WE MUST BEGIN WITH THE FOUNDATIONS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING WHO YOUR EMISSARY WILL BE AND TO MEETING HIM OR HER IN DUE COURSE.

YOURS SINCERELY

P W BOTHA

ENDS:

2. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

3. THE ELUCIDATION REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST SENTENCE IS, OF COURSE, A REFERENCE TO MY CONVERSATIONS WITH PIK BOTHA ABOUT THE TWO POINTS MENTIONED IN MY TELEGRAMS NOS 125 AND 129. BOTHA TOLD ME, INCIDENTALLY, THAT MR P W BOTHA HAD QUERIED THESE TWO SAME POINTS WHEN HE WAS SHOWN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

LEAHY

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR D HAITLAND

MR DAY  
MR ASPIN  
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B/F 21. 2. 80.

18 February 1980

RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

The Prime Minister has seen Capetown telegram 121 of 15 February in which Mr. Leahy refers, in the final paragraph, to the timing of the visit by a British emissary. I have explained to the Prime Minister that Sir Antony Duff will be paying a further visit to South Africa in the very near future. The Prime Minister has nonetheless asked that the date of the emissary's mission should be reconsidered.

I should be grateful if you could let me have soon a letter setting out the arguments for and against bringing forward the proposed visit from mid-March.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DSG

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 128 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY SALISBURY

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR. DAY

MR. ASPIN

HD. SAJD.

HD. Rhodesia D.

PS NO/Douglas

(File)

YOUR TEL NO 83: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE

1. I HAD A LONGER SESSION WITH PIK BOTHA YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND GAVE HIM THE ASSURANCE IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF YOUR TUR. HE ACCEPTED THIS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD EXPLAIN IT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. PIK THEN WENT ON TO QUESTION ANOTHER PHRASE IN THE LETTER, NAMELY "I AM HEARTENED BY YOUR COMMITMENT TO THE REMOVAL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION .....". HE ASKED ME WHETHER THIS WAS INTENDED TO PICK UP SOME POINT IN MR BOTHA'S OWN LETTER OR WHETHER IT WAS BASED ON OUR GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES. IF THE FORMER, THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT THINK THAT WE WERE READING TOO MUCH INTO HIS LETTER. I TOLD PIK THAT I HAD ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS THE SAG'S POLICY TO REMOVE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THAT HE HIMSELF HAD ONCE SAID AS MUCH IN THE UNITED NATIONS. IT SADDENED ME THAT HE SHOULD EXAMINE OUR PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER WITH A MICROSCOPE AND LOOK FOR HIDDEN TRAPS. WHEN I MYSELF HAD SEEN THE REPLY WHICH I WAS ASKED TO TRANSMIT I HAD THOUGHT THAT IT WAS VERY POSITIVE BOTH IN CONTENT AND IN TONE AND I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY HE SHOULD THINK OTHERWISE. HOWEVER, IF IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HIM I COULD SAY OFF MY OWN BAT THAT I THOUGHT THE PHRASE IN QUESTION WAS A REFLECTION OF WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD SAG POLICY TO BE. PIK THEN BACKTRACKED AND SAID THAT HE WAS ONLY CONCERNED THAT HIS PRIME MINISTER SHOULD READ THE LETTER IN THE RIGHT WAY. OF COURSE HE ACCEPTED MY EXPLANATION AND HE WOULD GLADLY PASS IT ON, IF IT SHOULD BE NECESSARY. HE ALSO WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT THINK THESE TWO SENTENCES WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED TO ME SPOILED THE GENERALLY POSITIVE TONE OF MRS THATCHER'S REPLY, WHICH HE READILY CONCEDED.

MRS THATCHER'S REPLY, WHICH HE READILY CONCEDED.

3. IN THE END PI WENT AWAY CONTENTED TO SHOW THE LETTER TO THE  
PRIME MINISTER. I TRIED TO MAKE HIM SEE THAT HIS NIT-PICKING  
ABOUT THE LETTER WAS UNWORTHY: AND HE SEEMED TAKEN ABACK WHEN  
I SAID AT ONE STAGE THAT I WISHED HE WOULD BE MORE TRUSTING.

LEAHY

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

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*Please re-consider  
timing of military.*

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LPT 301/15

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SIR D. MATHIAS  
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SECRET

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 121 OF 15 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

*Read in full.*

RHODESIA: POLITICAL SITUATION

1. PIK BOTHA CALLED ME IN YESTERDAY EVENING FOR WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE A WIDE-RANGING AND EARNEST DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN RHODESIA. HE BEGAN BY ASKING ME HOW WE THOUGHT THINGS WERE GOING. I SAID THAT AS HE WOULD KNOW INTIMIDATION BY ZANLA/ZANU HAD REACHED SERIOUS PROPORTIONS IN PLACES, BUT THE GOVERNOR HAD TAKEN VARIOUS STEPS TO PUT A STOP TO IT. I HAD PREVIOUSLY SENT HIM DETAILS OF THE ORDINANCES AND THE PROBLEM AREAS AND HE SAID THAT THE CABINET HAD NOTED WITH APPROVAL HOW FIRM LORD SOAMES WAS BEING. I THEN SAID THAT THE LAST THING WE WANTED TO DO WAS EITHER TO BAN MUGABE AND ZANU ACROSS THE BOARD FROM TAKING PART IN THE ELECTION OR TO POSTPONE THE ELECTION ITSELF. HE REPLIED WITH SOME FORCE THAT HE ENTIRELY AGREED: IT WOULD BE CALAMITOUS TO DO EITHER.
2. PIK THEN CAME TO THE IMMEDIATE POINT HE WANTED TO PUT OVER. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS DOING SO AT THE WISH OF THE PRIME MINISTER, THOUGH WHETHER THIS IS REALLY SO OR HE WAS SAYING IT TO IMPRESS ME I AM NOT SURE, AS HE IS APT TO SAY THIS FAIRLY OFTEN. IT WAS, HE SAID, VITALLY IMPORTANT TO BRING MUZOREWA AND NKOMO TOGETHER AND NOW WAS THE TIME, WITH SMITH TEMPORARILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY, TO DO IT. MUZOREWA WAS IN FACT DOING RATHER BETTER THAN HE HAD BEEN OF LATE



MUZOREWA WAS IN FACT DOING RATHER BETTER THAN HE HAD BEEN OF LATE, BUT HE COULD NOT CARRY THE DAY ALONE. HE MUST BE BROUGHT TO THE POINT OF SOMEHOW LETTING NKOMO KNOW THAT HE (NKOMO) COULD HAVE THE PRESIDENCY AND SOME CABINET SEATS IN A COALITION. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS NOT AN OPEN AGREEMENT BUT A PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM. NKOMO PROBABLY BELIEVED THAT HE COULD GET THESE THINGS WITH MUGABE, BUT HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT MUZOREWA WOULD OFFER HIM. TOGETHER THEY WOULD CERTAINLY GET MORE SEATS THAN MUGABE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD LEVERAGE ON MUZOREWA AND WOULD BE EXERTING IT NOW, BUT THEY WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO WORK ON NKOMO. COULD WE NOT FIND SOME DISCREET WAY PREFERABLY THROUGH A BLACK INTERMEDIARY OF GETTING NKOMO INTERESTED IN THE IDEA OF AN UNDERSTANDING WITH MUZOREWA? IF WE (AND THEY) COULD NOT BRING THEM TO MAKE THE FIRST STEPS TOWARDS A RAPPROCHEMENT, THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO MAKE THEM ON THEIR OWN AND WOULD GO ON CIRCLING ROUND ONE ANOTHER. WE MUST OF COURSE BE CAREFUL TO AVOID EVEN THE SLIGHTEST HINT THAT WE WERE ACTING IN UNISON. INDEED THEY WOULD PROBABLY TELL MUZOREWA "NOT TO SAY ANYTHING TO THE BRITISH".

3. PIK SAID THAT THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL FOR THE FUTURE OF RHODESIA AFTER THE ELECTION. HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT COME WHAT MAY THE FIGHTING WOULD START AGAIN THEN. IF NKOMO AND ZIPRA COULD BE DEFINITELY DETACHED FROM MUGABE AND BROUGHT INTO THE GOVERNMENT, MUGABE AND ZANLA COULD BE DEFEATED. IF NOT THERE WOULD BE CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS, THE WHITES WOULD STREAM OUT OF RHODESIA AND THE RUSSIANS' SURROGATES WOULD BE TEMPTED TO MOVE IN. IT WOULD BE ANOTHER AFGHANISTAN. WHAT WOULD WE DO THEN? WOULD WE SEND IN TROOPS? WHAT WOULD THE S A G THEMSELVES DO? COULD THEY AFFORD TO STAND BY AND LEAVE THE WHITES IN THE LURCH? COULD I IMAGINE WHAT EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON PEOPLE HERE IF THEY SAW PICTURES IN THEIR NEWSPAPERS OF WHITES BEING KILLED AND RAPED WHILE THE S A G DID NOTHING?

4. PIK SAID THAT HE WAS TRYING TO THINK OUT ALOUD; AND HE DID NOT PRESS ME FOR ANSWERS TO HIS STRING OF "WHAT IF" QUESTIONS. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT IN ANY CASE GIVE HIM ANY CUT AND DRIED ANSWERS: WE COULD NOT PROVIDE FOR EVERY CONTINGENCY. WE WERE CERTAINLY AVERSE TO SENDING IN TROOPS, HE MUST KNOW THAT. I COULD UNDERSTAND THE S A G'S PREDICAMENT AS HE HAD DESCRIBED IT. PERHAPS WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT THE WHOLE PROBLEM FURTHER AND DISCUSS IT AGAIN? PIK SAID THAT IT UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR EARLY DISCUSSIONS AS HIS PRIME MINISTER HAD PROPOSED, AS WELL AS THE URGENT NECESSITY OF BRINGING ABOUT THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN NKOMO AND MUZOREWA WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED EARLIER.

5. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION PIK WAS IN A CALM AND REFLECTIVE

5. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION PIK WAS IN A CALM AND REFLECTIVE MOOD. INDEED HE EVEN SAID THAT IT WAS A TIME FOR US ALL TO REMAIN CALM - EXCLAMATION MARK. FOR GOOD MEASURE HE ADDED IN A FRIENDLY WAY THAT HE THOUGHT THE GOVERNOR WAS BEING UNFAIRLY ASSAILED ON ALL SIDES BY THE PRESS AND HE COULD NOT HELP WONDERING WHETHER WE WOULD NOT IMPROVE OUR PUBLIC RELATIONS IN RHODESIA IF WE COULD GET A FRIENDLY JOURNALIST OR TWO TO REPORT IN DETAIL WHAT LORD SOAMES WAS UP AGAINST WITH ZANLA. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS THE PUBLICATION OF SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF INTIMIDATION, IF POSSIBLE WITH SOME PICTURES. I SAID I WOULD PASS THIS IDEA ON.

COMMENT

6. MORE THAN ANYTHING I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT PIK IS NOW GIVING ALL HIS ATTENTION TO THE POST-ELECTORAL SITUATION AND IS INTENSELY WORRIED ABOUT IT. AS WELL HE MIGHT BE, FOR THE S A G COULD EASILY BE FACED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE WITH APPALLINGLY DIFFICULT DECISIONS. IF WE ARE TO INFLUENCE THEM IN THEIR THINKING, THE EMISSARY FOR WHOM THEY HAVE ASKED SHOULD COME HERE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, ASSUMING THAT IT IS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MIND TO SEND SOMEONE. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT IN THAT EVENT P W BOTHA WILL USE THE OCCASION TO TRY TO DRAW US INTO FURTHER COMMITMENTS IN RHODESIA THAT WE DO NOT WISH TO MAKE. BUT AS SEEN FROM HERE IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT AT LEAST WE SHOULD BOTH PUT OUR CARDS ON THE TABLE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

LEAHY

x Sz: A. Botha will pay another visit to S. Africa very shortly.

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IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT

T 28/80

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 28/80

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TO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 75 OF 15 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

MIPT: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR P W BOTHA.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT.

BEGINS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I HAVE READ YOUR LETTER OF 5 FEBRUARY WITH GREAT CARE AND INTEREST, AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE WAY YOU HAVE SET OUT YOUR THINKING AND YOUR CONCERNS SO FULLY AND CLEARLY.

WE SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET AMBITIONS IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE. WE REGARD THEM AS A THREAT, BOTH TO OUR INTERESTS AND TO OUR WAY OF LIFE. WE ARE DETERMINED THAT OUR RESPONSE TO THAT THREAT SHALL BE VIGOROUS AND EFFECTIVE. THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAS HELPED TO DISPEL ANY TENDENCY TOWARDS COMPLACENCY ON THE PART OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND GOVERNMENTS WHICH, FOR THE MOST PART, NOW BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND THE DIMENSIONS OF THE THREAT.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO COUNTER THE SPREAD OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IS TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE GIVE RISE TO VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT AND THUS PROVIDE THE PRETEXT FOR COMMUNIST INTERVENTION. THIS IS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY WE HAVE WORKED SO HARD FOR AN END TO THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT AND HAVE ACTIVELY ENGAGED WITH THE REST OF THE FIVE IN THE EFFORT TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA.

I AM HEARTENED BY YOUR COMMITMENT TO THE REMOVAL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND TO A POLICY OF ENSURING THAT JUSTICE IS DONE TO ALL SOUTH AFRICA'S PEOPLES. I VERY MUCH WELCOME YOUR OFFER TO DISCUSS CANDIDLY WITH US THE PROBLEMS THAT FACE YOU AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY AND PEACE IN AFRICA GENERALLY.

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I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD SET OURSELVES EXCESSIVELY AMBITIOUS GOALS AT THE OUTSET. WE BOTH HOPE THAT A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP CAN BE DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. TO THAT END WE NEED TO KNOW WHERE OUR RESPECTIVE ANALYSES OF THE PROBLEMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA COINCIDE AND WHERE THEY DIVERGE. LET US START BY CLEARING THE GROUND.

LIKE YOU, I AM ANXIOUS THAT THE PROCESS SHOULD GET UNDER WAY SOON. BUT THE PROSPECTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL BE GREATLY INFLUENCED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. DISCUSSIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE FRUITFUL IF THEY TAKE PLACE AFTER, RATHER THAN BEFORE, RHODESIA HAS COMPLETED THE ELECTION PROCESS AND IS LAUNCHED AS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. IT WOULD ALSO HELP TO PROVIDE A FIRM BASIS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS IF THEY WERE HELD AT A TIME WHEN THERE WERE CLEAR SIGNS OF PROGRESS TOWARDS THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIVE'S PROPOSAL FOR SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA. I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT WE MIGHT AIM FOR THE START OF THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE SECOND HALF OF NEXT MONTH.

I HAVE NOT YET SETTLED ON MY CHOICE OF EMISSARY. BUT I SHALL WISH TO SEND A SENIOR FIGURE WHO CAN SPEAK WITH COMPLETE CONFIDENCE ON MY AND THE GOVERNMENT'S BEHALF.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT YOU WOULD BE CONTENT TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS I HAVE SUGGESTED. IF SO I SHALL ASK MR LEAHY TO LET YOU KNOW WHOM I INTEND TO NOMINATE AS MY REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE DISCUSSIONS AND TO DISCUSS DATES FOR HIS ARRIVAL.

YOURS SINCERELY

MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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PLANNING STAFF

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TO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 74 OF 15 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

YOUR TELNO 103: P W BOTHA'S MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO MR P W BOTHA. YOU SHOULD ARRANGE FOR THIS TO BE DELIVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.
2. IN DELIVERING THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY YOU SHOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THESE EXCHANGES AND OF THE PROPOSED TALKS. ANY DISCLOSURES WOULD BE BOUND TO AROUSE DAMAGING SPECULATION AND SUSPICION, PERHAPS TO THE EXTENT THAT IT WOULD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE TALKS TO TAKE PLACE. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT ABOUT THE SUGGESTION THAT THE TALKS SHOULD NOT BEGIN UNTIL LATE MARCH YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT IT COULD NOT BE SENSIBLE TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS UNTIL WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF HOW THINGS WILL TURN OUT IN RHODESIA, AND THIS WILL ONLY BE AFTER THE ELECTIONS AND FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER, IT WOULD CLEARLY BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S EMISSARY TO BE IN CAPE TOWN FOR TALKS WITH MR BOTHA SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN TALKS IN CAPE TOWN WITH THE UN TEAM ON NAMIBIA. IN ANY CASE, PROGRESS ON BOTH RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA WOULD PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE BASIS FOR THE PROPOSED DISCUSSIONS.
3. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS LINK THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY WITH THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN YOUR TELNO 121 YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING THE MATTERS RAISED WITH YOU BY PIK BOTHA AND HOPE TO LET THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE OUR COMMENTS SOON. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF AROUSING SUSPICIONS OF COLLUSION OVER RHODESIA IN THE EVENT OF IT BECOMING KNOWN THAT A SENIOR EMISSARY OF THE PRIME MINISTER WAS VISITING CAPE TOWN FOR TALKS WITH SENIOR SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTERS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE OR VERY SOON AFTER THE RHODESIAN ELECTIONS. FOR THAT REASON WE PREFER TO STICK TO OUR

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*La. Nant*

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ORIGINAL PROPOSAL THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S EMISSARY MIGHT BEGIN HIS DISCUSSIONS NO EARLIER THAN THE SECOND HALF OF MARCH.

4. SEE MIFT.

CARRINGTON

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RHODESIA DEPT

MR BYATT

OADS

MR ASPIN

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PS/MR LUCE


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PLANNING STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T28/80

S Africa  
T 28/80

14 February 1980

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister,

I have read your letter of 5 February with great care and interest, and I am grateful for the way you have set out your thinking and your concerns so fully and clearly.

We share your concern about Soviet ambitions in Africa and elsewhere. We regard them as a threat, both to our interests and to our way of life. We are determined that our response to that threat shall be vigorous and effective. The international reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan has helped to dispel any tendency towards complacency on the part of other countries and governments which, for the most part, now begin to understand the dimensions of the threat.

We are convinced that the most effective way to counter the spread of communist influence is to find peaceful solutions to problems which might otherwise give rise to violence and conflict and thus provide the pretext for communist intervention. This is one of the reasons why we have worked so hard for an end to the Rhodesian conflict and have actively engaged with the rest of the Five in the effort to defuse the situation in South West Africa/Namibia.

I am heartened by your commitment to the removal of racial discrimination and to a policy of ensuring that justice is done to all South Africa's peoples. I very much welcome your offer to discuss candidly with us the problems that face you and their

/ implications

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- 2 -  
CONFIDENTIAL

implications for stability and peace in Africa generally.

I do not think we should set ourselves excessively ambitious goals at the outset. We both hope that a more constructive relationship can be developed between our countries. To that end we need to know where our respective analyses of the problems in Southern Africa coincide and where they diverge. Let us start by clearing the ground.

Like you, I am anxious that the process should get under way soon. But the prospects in Southern Africa will be greatly influenced by developments in Rhodesia over the next few weeks. Discussions are likely to be more fruitful if they take place after, rather than before, Rhodesia has completed the election process and is launched as an independent country. It would also help to provide a firm basis for the discussions if they were held at a time when there were clear signs of progress towards the early implementation of the Five's Proposal for South West Africa/Namibia. I suggest therefore that we might aim for the start of the discussions in the second half of next month.

I have not yet settled on my choice of emissary. But I shall wish to send a senior figure who can speak with complete confidence on my and the Government's behalf.

I hope you will be able to confirm that you would be content to proceed on the basis I have suggested. If so I shall ask Mr. Leahy to let you know whom I intend to nominate as my representative for the discussions and to discuss dates for his arrival.

*Yours sincerely*  
*P. W. Botha*

The Honourable P. W. Botha.

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SECRET

L

14 February 1980

Message to Mr. P.W. Botha

You wrote to me on 12 February enclosing a message from the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of South Africa. As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister was not entirely happy with the proposed text. I enclose herewith the text in the version which the Prime Minister has approved and signed it.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SECRET



Prime Minister

*I would not leave it later than mid-March*  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
*otherwise - it is too much*  
London SW1A 2AH

*You have discussed this with Lord Carrington. If you are content with the draft, I will despatch the telegram &*

12 February 1980

*Dear Michael, submit the text for your signature*

South African Proposal for Discussion with an Emissary of the Prime Minister

*not  
Don't like  
1 1/2 draft  
out.*

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has carefully considered the letter of 5 February to the Prime Minister from Mr P W Botha in Cape Town.

Lord Carrington sees both opportunities and risks in Mr Botha's proposal that the Prime Minister should send an emissary to South Africa for discussions with Mr Botha of the broad global topics which are the subject of the letter. We should suffer serious harm internationally if it became known that we were engaged in this kind of strategic planning with the South Africans, who would not hesitate to leak it if and when it suited them.

However, Lord Carrington considers that talks with the South Africans at the right time and with the right agenda might offer useful opportunities to bring our influence to bear on them. The timing of the talks will be important. A visit by the emissary before the Rhodesian elections could be misrepresented as collusion in planning how to deal with the situation after the election (and Lord Carrington has already told P W Botha that it would not be appropriate for them to meet before independence). It would be difficult for the emissary to be talking discreetly to Mr Botha during the first part of March when a United Nations team will be in Cape Town for discussions with the South Africans on Namibia.

Lord Carrington therefore recommends that the Prime Minister might offer to send an emissary (who could be selected later) for talks in the latter part of March or early in April. Such an offer, if made now, might serve to encourage the South Africans to act in a constructive way over Rhodesia and Namibia during the next few critical weeks.

/Lord Carrington

SECRET



SECRET

Lord Carrington also recommends that we should make it clear that we would envisage a much more limited scope to the discussions than Mr Botha has suggested, both to avoid being drawn into an inopportune commitment to the South Africans without any guarantee of having anything to show for it, and also to protect ourselves against the risk that the South Africans might one day be tempted to leak the text of the Prime Minister's letter.

/ I enclose a copy of a draft reply to Mr Botha from the Prime Minister which is designed to avoid either an unwise commitment to the kind of dialogue which the South Africans want, or a rebuff to a proposal which offers potential opportunities as well as dangers for us. I should be grateful if you would let me know soon whether the Prime Minister agrees. I suggest that we should telegraph the text of the Prime Minister's reply, as approved, to Cape Town for delivery by the Ambassador, with the signed original following by bag. I  
/ enclose a draft telegram to Mr Leahy for this purpose.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R. M. J. Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

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171 FEB 1960



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DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Restricted, Unclassified.

To:- The Hon P W Botha  
Prime Minister  
CAPE TOWN

From  
The Prime Minister  
Telephone No. Ext.  
Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

I have read your letter of 5 February with great care and interest, and I am grateful for the way you have set out your thinking and your concerns so fully and clearly.

We share your concern about Soviet ambitions in Africa and elsewhere. We regard them as a threat, both to our interests and to our way of life. We are determined that our response to that threat shall be vigorous and effective. The international reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan has helped to dispel any tendency towards complacency on the part of other countries and governments which, for the most part, now begin to understand the dimensions of the threat.

We are convinced that the most effective way to counter the spread of communist influence is to find peaceful solutions to problems which might otherwise give rise to violence and conflict and thus provide the pretext for communist intervention. This is one of the reasons why we have worked <sup>so hard</sup> ~~tirelessly~~ for an end to the Rhodesian conflict and have actively engaged with the rest of the Five in the effort to defuse the situation in South West Africa/Namibia.

~~I am heartened by your commitment to justice and the eradication of racial discrimination in South Africa itself, and I very much welcome your offer to discuss~~

/candidly Dd 0532000 800M 5/78 HMSO Bracknell

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*The removal of racial discrimination & a policy of human rights that protects & respects all South African peoples*

*Not  
Critic  
we  
Critic - not  
because  
letter is not attached*

candidly with us the problems that face you and their implications for stability and peace in Africa generally.

I do not think we should <sup>set ourselves excessively</sup> adopt <sup>goals</sup> too ambitious a target

at the outset. ~~By our exchanges over the past months I think that we have developed a much clearer understanding of each other's point of view. I am sure that we can build on that to establish a more constructive relationship. There will be value in defining the main differences between us even if we cannot resolve them all at once.~~

I therefore suggest that the discussions you have in mind should focus on an analysis of the potential sources of conflict, discontent, and instability in central and southern Africa; the means available for defusing them; and the extent to which they may be exploited for the spread of communist influence in the area. Clearly the

prospects in southern Africa will be <sup>greatly</sup> much influenced by developments in Rhodesia over the next <sup>few weeks</sup> month. Such

~~discussions might therefore be more timely and fruitful if they were to take place after, rather than before, Rhodesia has completed the election process and is launched as an independent country. It would also help to provide a firm basis for the discussions if they were held at a time when there were clear signs of progress towards the early implementation of the Five's Proposal for South West Africa/Namibia. I suggest therefore that~~

~~we might aim for the start of the discussions towards the end of next month, or at the beginning of April when the position and prospects in both Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South West Africa/Namibia should be clearer.~~

We both hope that a ~~the basis of the~~ more constructive relationship ~~which we both hope can be~~ developed between our countries. ~~It must be~~ <sup>to that</sup> ~~mutual~~ <sup>steps</sup> ~~understanding~~ <sup>we need to know</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>where our</sup> ~~our~~ <sup>respective analyses of</sup> the problems in ~~both~~ <sup>South</sup> Africa ~~to~~ <sup>guide</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>gulf</sup> Africa ~~to~~ <sup>where they</sup> ~~emerge~~ <sup>emerge</sup>. Let us start by ~~clearing the ground~~ <sup>clearing the ground</sup>.  
Like you I am anxious that the process should ~~get under way~~ <sup>start soon</sup>.  
But the prospects

/I have

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I have not yet settled on my choice of emissary. But I shall wish to send a senior figure who can speak with complete confidence on my and the Government's behalf.

I hope you will be able to confirm that you would be content to proceed on the basis I have suggested. If so I shall ask Mr Leahy to let you know whom I intend to nominate as my representative for the discussions and to discuss dates for his arrival.

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Drafted by BARDER  
(Block Capitals) .....  
Tel. Extn 233 5189

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Copies to:-

(TEXT)

Your telno 103: P W BOTHA'S MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

1. MIFT contains the text of the Prime Minister's reply to Mr P W Botha. You should arrange for this to be delivered as soon as possible. Signed original follows by bag.

2. In delivering the Prime Minister's reply you should stress the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of these exchanges and of the proposed talks. Any disclosures would be bound to arouse damaging speculation and suspicion, perhaps to the extent that it would become impossible for the talks to take place. If the South Africans express disappointment about the suggestion that the talks should not begin until late March or early April

/you



you should point out that it could not be sensible to discuss these matters until we have a better idea of how things will turn out in Rhodesia, and this will only be after the elections and formation of a government. Moreover, it would clearly be inappropriate for the Prime Minister's emissary to be in Cape Town for talks with Mr Botha simultaneously with the South African talks in Cape Town with the UN team on Namibia. In any case, progress on both Rhodesia and Namibia would provide the best possible basis for the proposed discussions.

3. See MIFT.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

file

ds

**CONFIDENTIAL**

S. Africa

11 February 1980

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 7 February, with which you enclosed a further letter to her from the Prime Minister of South Africa. As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister would like to have a word with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about the general nature of the reply before a detailed draft is set in hand.

MIKE PATTISON

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO 81 OF 8/2/80

INFO CAPE TOWN EMBASSY, C G CAPE TOWN, MASERU

*PRIME MINISTER*

*MA 11/2.*

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SOUTH AFRICA/TRANSKEI RELATIONS

1. THE TRANSKEI GOVERNMENT YESTERDAY ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION OF RE-OPENING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND RENEWING ITS DEFENCE PACT WITH SOUTH AFRICA, BOTH OF WHICH WERE SEVERED IN APRIL 1978 WHEN THE DISTRICT OF EAST GRIQUALAND (WHICH TRANSKEI CLAIMS) WAS INCORPORATED INTO NATAL. CHIEF GEORGE MATANZIMA, THE TRANSKEIAN PRIME MINISTER, SAID THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN 'FOLLOWING SOUTH AFRICA'S DETERMINATION TO NEGOTIATE WITH TRANSKEI'.

2. MATANZIMA LINKED THE DECISION TO A BILL (THE BORDERS OF PARTICULAR STATES EXTENSION BILL) WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT A FEW DAYS AGO. THIS BILL GIVES THE STATE PRESIDENT POWERS TO TRANSFER CERTAIN SPECIFIED FARMS AND OTHER PLOTS OF LAND TO TRANSKEI, BOPHUTHATSWANA AND VENDA. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE LAND SCHEDULED FOR TRANSFER TO TRANSKEI WILL IN FACT FULFIL TRANSKEIAN TERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, MATANZIMA REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON THIS, EXCEPT TO SAY 'WE CLAIM ALL THE LAND THAT HISTORICALLY BELONGED TO US. OUR LAND COMMISSION IS BUSY NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN VAN DER WALT COMMISSION ON LAND CONSOLIDATION'.

3. THE TRANSKEI DECISION HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE ACTUAL RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS LIKELY TO BE MADE NEXT WEEK.

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(2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

This is the 2<sup>nd</sup> message from  
the brother that I mentioned to  
you earlier today.

7 February 1980

Dear Michael, *Paul 8/2*

Rhodesia: Letter from the Prime Minister of South Africa

Mr P W Botha has sent a letter (copy enclosed) to the Prime Minister expressing concern at the intimidation of voters being practised in Rhodesia by ZANU(PF) and the continuing breaches of the ceasefire.

Lord Carrington recommends that the Prime Minister's reply should be brief and factual, describing the measures being taken by the Governor to deal with the situation and avoiding any commitment to specific action. I enclose a draft.

A further letter from Mr Botha to the Prime Minister was delivered by the South African Ambassador to Mr Luce this morning. I enclose the top copy. This raises wider issues. We shall submit advice separately on a reply.

*It is a very  
significant letter  
should give  
the broad outline  
reply before a  
draft is set in  
hand*

*Yours ever  
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 071210Z FEB 1980

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 97 OF 7 FEBRUARY

INFO SAVING SALISBURY, GABORONE, MAPUTO, MBABANE, UKMIS NEW YORK  
MASERU*South Africa**mb*SOUTH AFRICA: MR P W BOTHA APPLIES THE BRAKES

1. AFTER THE FIRST THREE FULL DAYS OF THIS YEAR'S PARLIAMENTARY SESSION IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT MR P W BOTHA HAS PUT THE BRAKES ON INTERNAL CHANGE, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.
2. THE STATE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH (MY TELNO 77) GAVE NO POINTERS TO ANY NEW DIRECTION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY OR SIGNIFICANT NEW LEGISLATION. AS EXPECTED, THE NEW LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, DR VAN ZYL SLABBERT, INTRODUCED THE TRADITIONAL NO CONFIDENCE MOTION BY CHALLENGING MR P W BOTHA TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE EXPECTATIONS AROUSED BY HIS COURAGEOUS STAND AT THE NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESSES LAST YEAR.
3. YESTERDAY MR BOTHA ENTERED THE DEBATE. IN A LONG SPEECH, HARSH IN TONE AND DELIVERED ENTIRELY IN AFRIKAANS, HE ATTACKED SLABBERT AMONG OTHER THINGS FOR MISREPRESENTING HIS POSITION. IF EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS HAD BEEN AROUSED THAT WAS THE FAULT OF THE OPPOSITION. HE WAS FOLLOWING IN THE TRADITION OF HIS PREDECESSORS, MALAN, STRYDOM, BERWOERD AND VORSTER, IN A POLICY OF RENEWAL AND PROGRESS. HE WAS LEADING PEOPLE IN A DEMOCRACY AND THEY COULD ONLY BE BROUGHT ALONG BY PERSUASION. A CONTINUED EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO DO AWAY WITH HURTFUL DISCRIMINATION BUT BASIC NATIONAL PARTY PRINCIPLES REMAINED. THERE WOULD NEVER BE BLACK MAJORITY RULE, WHICH WOULD MEAN THE DOMINATION OF ONE GROUP BY ANOTHER. FEDERATION OR CONFEDERATION OR ANY SORT OF "CONSOCIATIONAL" ARRANGEMENTS WERE NOT ENVISAGED. THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE WAS A CONSTELLATION IN THE FORM OF AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATES.
4. AT NO POINT DID MR BOTHA REPEAT HIS THEME AT THE NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESSES THAT SOUTH AFRICA FACED A REAL THREAT OF REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN AND HAD TO CHANGE OR DIE. INSTEAD HE PAINTED A PARTICULARLY LURID PICTURE OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT. THE SOVIET UNION WERE PLANNING THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICA. INTERNAL SUBVERSION WOULD BE RUTHLESSLY STAMPED OUT.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. MR BOTHA'S SPEECH WILL COME A DISAPPOINTMENT TO ALL THOSE BOTH HERE AND ABROAD WHO HOPED FOR SOMETHING BETTER. I HAVE HEARD ON GOOD AUTHORITY THAT THE NATIONAL PARTY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WHO HAVE COME TO THE SESSION AFTER SPENDING SEVERAL MONTHS IN THEIR CONSTITUENCIES HAVE BROUGHT A PRETTY UNANIMOUS MESSAGE THAT THE PARTY FAITHFUL ARE STILL DIGESTING THE CHANGE OF DIRECTION OF LAST YEAR AND ARE NOT READY TO ACCEPT ANYTHING MORE IN THIS SESSION: FURTHER CHANGE MAY BE POSSIBLE NEXT YEAR BUT NOT THIS. MR BOTHA HAS EVIDENTLY NOT FELT ABLE TO GO AGAINST THIS CONSENSUS. ANOTHER REASON WHY HE HAS DECIDED NOT TO FORCE THE PACE MAY BE THAT HE HAS NO CLEAR PERCEPTION OF HIS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OR OF THE NEXT PRACTICAL STEPS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE IT. THE SUSPICION IS GROWING THAT HIS CHAMPIONING OF CHANGE, WHICH TOOK MANY PEOPLE HERE BY SURPRISE, IS MORE A MATTER OF EXPEDIENCY THAN OF DEEPLY-HELD CONVICTION. THIS MAY NOT DO HIM JUSTICE AND I AM WILLING TO SUSPEND JUDGEMENT FOR THE TIME BEING. ON THE EXTERNAL SCENE THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND PENETRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, COMBINED WITH GROWING CONCERN ABOUT URBAN TERRORISM INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA, HAVE CLEARLY ALARMED MR BOTHA, WHO SEES THE DEADLY THREAT OF COMMUNISM CREEPING EVER CLOSER. IN HIS SPEECH YESTERDAY HE DID NOT TAKE HIS PREVIOUS LINE THAT THE GROWING EXTERNAL THREAT REQUIRED SOLIDARITY BETWEEN ALL <sup>THE</sup> RACIAL GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THUS A BETTER DEAL FOR BLACKS. HIS ATTITUDE IS NOW ONE OF DEFIANCE.

6. FULLER REPORT FOLLOWS BY BAG INCLUDING AN ACCOUNT OF BITTER EXCHANGES BETWEEN MR BOTHA AND MRS SUZMAN WHO DEMANDED A PARLIAMENTARY SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE DISCLOSURES BY MCGIVEN ABOUT THE INTERCEPTION OF HER MAIL. P W BOTHA'S RESPONSE WAS UNCONVINCING AND WHEN MRS SUZMAN DESCRIBED HIM AS A COWARD THE SPEAKER, WHO THROUGHOUT DISPLAYED MANIFEST BIAS IN FAVOUR OF THE PRIME MINISTER, ORDERED MRS SUZMAN TO LEAVE THE CHAMBER.

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REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Kantoor van die Eerste Minister  
Prime Minister's Office

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T22<sup>AB</sup>/80

CAPE TOWN

5 February 1980

Dear Prime Minister

The relations between our nations have not always been good. Indeed, we have been both enemies and allies in war. Reflecting objectively on the history of events since we first came into contact with each other in South Africa, I am drawn to the irresistible conclusion that whenever we have clashed both nations have paid a painful price but whenever we have co-operated both nations have benefited substantially. What is more, the advantages of co-operation have accrued to all the peoples of the Southern African region.

I realise that British and South African interests inevitably diverge. But they also converge. Our interests diverge principally because of the conception which exists of the South African Government's "apartheid" policy. It is not my intention in this communication to discuss the misconceptions which persist in the judgment of my Government's policy in respect of multi-national development. What is important at the present juncture is whether the British Government, with more experience and knowledge of Southern Africa than any other government in the Western world, would not be prepared to re-examine and reassess its long-term interests in Africa and particularly Southern Africa in closer co-operation with my Government on a different basis than has been the case during the past two decades. Recognizing that your Government would in that case wish to exchange views candidly with us inter alia on such issues as measures discriminating between people of different colour, I invite you to send a personal emissary to meet with me in order that we may discuss not only questions of principle but also -

- (a) the obstacles in the way of closer co-operation between our Governments;
- (b) possible ways and means of eliminating those obstacles.

I convey this invitation to you not because I am under any illusion as to the views you may entertain on certain aspects of my Government's internal policy. I consider the survival of freedom and democracy of such vital importance that I respectfully suggest to you that you and I share a heavy responsibility to make the most sincere attempt to bridge our differences in order to cultivate the unity of purpose and strength which will be required to resist Russian imperialism. Indeed, your own courageous stand against the extension of Soviet power has played no small part in convincing me that our Governments should proceed immediately to engage in the discussions which I propose.

In saying this, I have also been encouraged by the measure of co-operation which has developed between us in regard to Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, more particularly as I am convinced it reflects a similar underlying assessment of the nature of the struggle for world pre-eminence in our era and of the extent of the threat to the Western democratic free-enterprise system. The lessons of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Wall, the Cubans in Angola and the Soviet doctrine of world domination having been forgotten or simply ignored, it has taken the rape of Afghanistan to open the eyes of the West.

During President Brezhnev's era the Soviet Union has materially increased its power and influence relative to the United States and to the West in general. Its military power has been developed far beyond the requirements of a defensive capacity. There are no signs that the Soviet Union will be satisfied with nuclear or conventional parity. The great preponderance of Soviet tanks and divisions in Europe has been well documented. The Soviet fleet has been transformed into a formidable blue-water navy, backed up with a very substantial and modern merchant marine. Brezhnev has supplemented this with a fleet of missile-carrying submarines, counterbalancing the American Polaris submarines. He has cleverly used détente as a shield and exploited the American setback in Vietnam and the maiming effect of Watergate to promote subversion and instal pro-Soviet governments in the Third World and, at the same time, to impose the Brezhnev doctrine - the right of Russia to intervene in "socialist" countries seeking change. Despite this, he has secured legitimacy through the Helsinki agreements for the boundaries of Eastern and Central Europe, for a quid pro quo which seems to have had little substance. Soviet influence in Europe, in South-East and South-West Asia, in the Middle East, in Southern Arabia, in parts of North, East, West and Southern Africa has grown beyond the point of being ominous. It is real. It has assumed awesome dimensions.



There is no doubt that the Southern African region has now become a prime objective of Soviet ambitions. Control of the vast and valuable reserves of raw materials in our region, in addition to Russia's own resources, would enable her to dominate supplies to the industrial West. Control of South Africa's strategic geographical position, the importance of which is significantly enhanced by her technological sophistication, infrastructural development and industrial capacity, would greatly enhance this dominance. It would in fact tip the global strategic balance in favour of the USSR to a degree matched only by control of the total area of the Middle East.

... You may be interested in the attached interview given by Glagolev. He is not necessarily the final authority on the subject. You will be in a position to evaluate his credibility. Nevertheless, his views flow from a source in the heart of the Soviet hierarchy and confirm what South Africa has long been propounding about Soviet intentions in Africa. The West appears to have been mesmerised by détente and to have discounted the marked increase in Soviet influence in Africa under Brezhnev's leadership because Russia has skilfully worked through surrogates and through the "liberation" movements.

An important part of the Soviet strategy in Africa has been to use the United Nations and international bodies which it controls to drive a wedge between South Africa and the major standard-bearers of freedom, on the pretext that South Africa has transgressed the norms of civilization. Whatever imperfections there may be in South African society, South Africa has a democratic, free-enterprise, Christian society and is spiritually, emotionally and ideologically committed to the democracy of the Greeks, Europeans and Americans. Whatever disabilities may be experienced by segments of our population, successive South African Governments have sincerely worked for their upliftment and progress. We are committed to uphold the human dignity of all persons, irrespective of race or creed. We are committed to the removal of all negative forms of discrimination based on colour. But our problems are complex. Our situation therefore requires understanding and tolerance. My Government is, within the bounds of the constraints imposed by the inertia of human nature, energetically pursuing a policy of ensuring that justice is done to all South Africa's peoples. I can assure you that, having already moved far as fast as possible during my first year of office, I shall continue on the path I have charted. I believe it to be an honourable course and that the West should become aware of this. I should therefore welcome the opportunity of explaining my aims in the light of the options available and current realities.

The Soviet threat of engulfing South Africa is of immediate concern to all of us. The Soviet Union is already established in Ethiopia, Angola and Mocambique, and its influence in other African countries poses a direct threat to the whole of Africa. But the prime target is Southern Africa. That is why the struggle for Zimbabwe/Rhodesia is so important and why Soviet aims in South West Africa must be frustrated, not only in the interests of Southern Africa, but also of the West.


The events in Afghanistan have irrevocably confirmed that the Soviet Union will not hesitate to launch an attack southwards with surrogate forces if it believes that this can be done with impunity. War material has been accumulated in Angola and Mocambique, where, as you know, large tank forces have also been mustered. The build-up is continuing - with inter alia the addition of the technical know-how of the East-Germans.

It is clear to me that, if democratic institutions are to survive anywhere in Africa, a common anti-Soviet strategy for Africa as a whole must be worked out by the West and moderate African leaders and quickly. All anti-Soviet governments in Africa from Egypt to South Africa must be supported, their foreign policies co-ordinated and their differences submerged. It is essential that the countries of Southern Africa should come together to have any chance of maintaining themselves, for otherwise they will fall like dominoes. That is one reason why I am assiduously promoting the creation of a form of confederation or constellation of states in the region.

In view of your clearly stated views on the Soviet threat, I felt it would be constructive to let you have my views on the critical African situation. I would welcome receiving your own views and your ideas as to how we can counter this threat. I hope that your emissary will soon find it possible to visit South Africa for the proposed discussions. South Africa is irrevocably committed to resisting Soviet aggression with all means at its disposal, whatever the consequences. But South Africa could not carry the responsibility in Southern Africa alone.

You will appreciate that if South Africa has to stand alone she must retain the right to act when, where and in whatever manner she deems necessary to promote her own chances of survival, and time is short.

With sincere regards

  
P W BOTHA

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister  
LONDON

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L-7 FEB 1960

S. Africa

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR A DUFF~~

MR R L WADE-GERY  
CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET (1)

~~MR BYATT~~  
LORD N G LENNOX

IMMEDIATE

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HD/S AF D  
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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A  
HD/NEWS D

GR 350  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FROM PRETORIA 201120Z DEC 79  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1018 OF 20 DEC  
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK  
THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS IN NEW YORK ON SOUTH AFRICA

1. IN A STATEMENT YESTERDAY MR PIK BOTHA WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER'S REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA DURING HER SPEECH TO THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION IN THE U S. HE SAID THAT " MRS THATCHER'S POSITIVE STATEMENT ON THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA'S CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THIS RESPECT IS ENCOURAGING. IT CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE RECENT SPATE OF U N CONDEMNATIONS IN SCORES OF RESOLUTIONS PASSED AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. IN HER PUBLIC STATEMENT IN NEW YORK SHE CONFIRMED WHAT SHE TOLD ME WHEN I MET HER IN LONDON TWO MONTHS AGO. SHE IS NOT THE ONLY WORLD LEADER WHO HOLDS THESE VIEWS, BUT SHE CERTAINLY HAS THE COURAGE TO SAY SO OPENLY."

2. EDITORIALS IN THE AFRIKAANS PRESS ALSO PRAISE THE PRIME MINISTER'S COURAGE AND NOTE THAT SHE IS THE FIRST WESTERN LEADER TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECENT CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE OPPOSITION PRESS HAS ALSO REACTED FAVOURABLY. AN EDITORIAL IN OGGENDBLAD NOTES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS  
SEMICOLON THEY UNDERLINE THE WISH IN WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT  
SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY  
WILL BE ON FIRM GROUND WHEN DEFENDING SOUTH AFRICA. THE  
EDITORIAL SAYS THAT IT IS UP TO SOUTH AFRICA TO PURSUE  
CHANGE, BUT SUGGESTS THAT THERE CAN NOW BE MORE RAPID PROGRESS  
TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY OF SEPARATE FREEDOMS, BECAUSE  
IF RESPONSIBLE WESTERN LEADERS WILL LISTEN, UNDERSTANDING  
MAY FOLLOW. BEELD'S EDITORIAL ATTRIBUTES MRS THATCHER'S  
WORDS TO REALISM AND BRITAIN'S TRADING INTERESTS. IT PRAISES  
MR P W BOTHA FOR CREATING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE ELICITED  
FAVOURABLE COMMENT ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA BY A WESTERN LEADER.

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SOUTH AFRICA: MR P W BOTHA'S ACTUAL OR CONTEMPLATED REFORMS

1. WIEHAHN REPORT ON LABOUR LAWS

Main recommendations accepted by South African Government, including registration (ie Government recognition) of black trade unions to which all blacks may belong except international migrants. However, this limits freedom of action of such unions as well as giving them bargaining rights and many black unions have refused to register. Desegregation at work place; equal pay.

2. PHASING OUT OF JOB RESERVATION ON RACIAL BASIS

3. RIEKERT REPORT ON BLACK MANPOWER

Some of the worst features of controls over black labour from the homelands working in cities and mines are removed. Penalties for illegal employment of blacks transferred from employees to employers. Pass laws eased. Families allowed to join workers in white areas.

4. IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF PERMANENCE OF BLACKS IN URBAN TOWNSHIPS AND GRANT OF LIMITED RIGHTS TO THEM

Blacks now allowed to buy own homes in townships on 99-year leases. Encouragement of Community Councils in townships with limited local powers. Cabinet Committees under Mr Koornhof looking into conditions of urban blacks. Visits by P W Botha to townships. (Each represents a dent in strict apartheid theory that black townships are a temporary arrangement or that they are immigrants from homelands with no rights in white South Africa.)

5. POSSIBLE REVIEW OF MIXED MARRIAGES AND IMMORALITY ACTS

No commitment, and no suggestion of outright repeal. But even the suggestion of possible review has caused considerable stir.

6. DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC PLACES

The Government is working to phase out 'petty apartheid'. They have announced that libraries, clubs, circuses, private hospitals, theatres and restaurants may be opened to members of all races by applying for a 'once only' permit. Opening of the first

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/'open'



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'open' business area for all races in Woodstock, a suburb of Cape Town. White businessmen are also to be allowed to participate in business in black areas on a joint venture basis.

7. MORE HUMANE ATTITUDE TO SQUATTER CAMPS AND THEIR REHOUSING  
Dr Koornhof indicated that few of those at Crossroads would be repatriated to their homelands and that most would be rehoused and allowed to continue working in Cape Town area. But recent policy statements have cast doubt on this and it again seems that many (3,000 families) might be returned to homelands. However, Koornhof still promises not to use bull-dozers (as under Vorster).

8. CONSOLIDATION OF HOMELANDS AND REVIEW OF BLACK/WHITE LAND ALLOCATION

Likely to result in less fragmented homelands and marginally more land allocated to homelands compared with white South Africa but this still clearly in context of 'separate development' objectives.

9. PROGRESS IN DESEGREGATING SOME SPORTS

Whites no longer require permits to attend sporting events in black areas. Proclamation R228 is to be ammended to permit sports clubs to serve alcoholic drinks to black guests.

Southern African Department

14 December 1979

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FM PRETORIA 111440Z DEC  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TEL NO 989 OF 11/12/79  
SAVING INFO JOHANNESBURG

TOP COPY

## OPEN PERMITS FOR PUBLIC FACILITIES

1. THE MINISTER OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, MR MARAIS STEYN, ANNOUNCED ON 10 DECEMBER THAT OWNERS OF CERTAIN PUBLIC FACILITIES WOULD HENCEFORTH BE ABLE TO APPLY FOR A "ONCE ONLY" PERMIT FOR MULTIRACIAL USE (INSTEAD OF HAVING TO APPLY FOR A SEPARATE PERMIT FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL OCCASION ON WHICH THEY WISH TO ADMIT NON-WHITES). THOSE FACILITIES INCLUDED ARE:-

- A) LIBRARIES
- B) PRIVATE HOSPITALS-WHERE A PATIENT'S DOCTOR CERTIFIES TO THE HOSPITAL'S MANAGEMENT THAT IT IS IN THE PATIENT'S INTEREST TO BE ADMITTED
- C) ALL THEATRES AND HALLS FOR LIVE THEATRE, QUALITY MUSICAL RECITALS, WEDDING RECEPTIONS AND CONCERTS WHERE PROPER AND ALTERNATIVE FACILITIES BEFITTING THE OCCASION ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN THE AREAS OF THE OTHER POPULATION COMMUNITIES
- D) RECEPTIONS FOR DELEGATES TO CONGRESSES, SYMPOSIUMS AND MEETINGS
- E) GUESTS IN CLUBS
- F) AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL EXHIBITIONS AND CHARITY FETES
- G) DRIVE-IN CINEMAS
- H) CIRCUSES
- I) CAFE-RESTAURANT FACILITIES IN CERTAIN AREAS, TO BE IDENTIFIED AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE RELATIVE LOCAL AUTHORITY.

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2. IN HIS ANNOUNCEMENT THE MINISTER WARNED THAT HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO WITHDRAW THE CONCESSIONS IF IT SHOULD LEAD TO RACIAL FRICTION. HE SAID THAT GOVERNMENT POLICY REMAINED UNCHANGED SEMICLN THAT THE PROVISION OF FACILITIES IN THE SEPARATE RACIAL AREAS WILL PROCEED AND BE "DEVELOPED TO THE LEVEL OF FULLY FLEDGED COMMUNITIES".
3. THE PLACING OF THE ONUS ON THE OWNER TO ACQUIRE A MULTIRACIAL PERMIT DOES NOT OF COURSE OBLIGE HIM TO SEEK ONE. THE ANNOUNCEMENT ALSO DOES NOT AFFECT THE PROVISIONS OF THE LIQUOR ACT, AND THOSE FACILITES WITH LIQUOR LICENCES WILL CONTINUE TO BE BOUND BY THE REGULATIONS OF THE LIQUOR LICENSING BOARD. CINEMAS OTHER THAN DRIVE-INS ARE ANOTHER IMPORTANT CATEGORY WHICH HAS NOT (NOT) BEEN INCLUDED.
4. HITHERTO, EVEN IF AN OWNER WISHED TO OPEN HIS PREMISES TO ALL RACES FOR A PARTICULAR FUNCTION, PROVINCIAL OR MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS OFTEN FORBADE MULTIRACIAL USE, REGARDLESS OF THE READINESS OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO GRANT PERMITS. IT WAS FEARED THAT THIS NEW CONCESSION WOULD ALSO BE BEDEVILLED BY SUCH REGULATIONS. HOWEVER, IN A SUBSEQUENT PRESS STATEMENT, THE MINISTER SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL OVERULE LOCAL AUTHORITIES "IF IT IS IN THE PUBLIC INMEREST" TO DO SO.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
SOUTHERN AFRICA



*From the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

R M J Lyne Esq  
Private Secretary to the Secretary of  
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
London, SW1A 2AH

27 November 1979

*Dear Roderie*

SOUTH AFRICA: EXPORT CREDITS

Thank you for your letter of 23 November 1979.

I am grateful to you for obtaining Lord Carrington's agreement to delivery of the letter for Senator Horwood in the terms drafted.

In Mr Nott's absence Mr Parkinson has agreed that, provided the presentation is in a low key and without apology, our posts in other EEC capitals (and, if you consider it essential, in Washington and Ottawa) be asked to inform the governments concerned of our decision over credit for the Tutuka contract. I understand that FCO officials will be in touch with officials here about draft instructions.

No doubt your officials will co-ordinate the timing of the instructions with ECGD, who are also due to inform our EEC partners through their own channels. Now that the letter to Senator Horwood has been handed over, we take the view that the sooner we notify those who are to be notified, the better. Late notification is more likely to irritate than to reassure.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander at Number 10, Ian Ellison in the Department of Industry and Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Augh Bartlett*

H W BARTLETT  
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

28 NOV 1997



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S. Africa



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 November 1979

Dear Hugh,

*Paul*  
- 23/x1

South Africa: Export Credits

Mr Nott wrote to Lord Carrington on 21 November enclosing a draft letter which he proposed to ask Mr Parkinson to deliver to the South African Ambassador on 26 November in reply to Senator Horwood's request for 8½ years credit cover for a contract for the Tutuka power station.

From discussion between our offices this morning, I understand that Mr Nott signed the letter to Senator Horwood before leaving for Saudi Arabia and that it was his strong view that the letter should not be amended. As you know, we are concerned that, as at present drafted, the penultimate sentence of the letter to Senator Horwood could be taken by the South Africans to imply that subsequent projects would also receive the credit terms which OD agreed we should offer for the Tutuka contract. In order not to leave our position open to misinterpretation, we would have preferred the phrase "up to the larger figure which we discussed at our meeting" to have been deleted from this sentence. However, Lord Carrington is content to let the sentence stand as drafted on the understanding that Mr Parkinson will emphasise, when handing over the letter to Senator Horwood, that while we are keen to expand our bilateral trade and obtain further contracts after Tutuka, the terms offered for Tutuka apply only to this contract.

Mr Nott also raised the question of consultation with our Community partners and other governments. I understand that ECGD consider that they have an obligation to inform other credit insurance organisations within the EEC and their US and Canadian counterparts. If we simply left our partners to learn of our decision to offer improved terms for Tutuka from their own credit insurers or, worse still, from the South Africans or through a leak in GEC, it might appear to them that we had something to hide. Lord Carrington considers that they are less likely to look for some political significance in this decision and less likely to react critically, in a way which might be unhelpful to us over Rhodesia, if we approach them openly and explain the position to them.

If, as I hope, you can agree, officials of our two Departments should arrange for a suitable instruction to go to our Embassies concerned very soon after the South Africans are told of our decision, and when ECGD take parallel action with other credit insurers.

/Lord Carrington

H Bartlett Esq  
Department of Trade

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-2-

Lord Carrington takes Mr Nott's point about not being too mealy mouthed about this; but our partners will get to know anyway and it is better that the facts should be presented to them in the right context.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander at No 10, Ian Ellison in the Department of Industry and Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

23 NOV 1979

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*From the Secretary of State*

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG, MC  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
London, SW1A 2AL

21 November 1979

Dear Peter.

SOUTH AFRICA: EXPORT CREDITS

In accordance with the decisions of OD Committee on 5 November, my officials in consultation with those in other Departments have  
.... prepared the enclosed draft which I propose to send to Senator Horwood in reply to his request for 8½ years credit cover for, inter alia, the Tutuka power station contract.

The intention is that, to avoid disturbance of the Rhodesian negotiations, my letter to Senator Horwood should be delayed until 26 November. I shall be in Saudi Arabia on that date, so I propose that the South African Ambassador should be asked to collect the letter from Cecil Parkinson. He will impress upon the Ambassador that we have courted some political risk in agreeing to 8½ years cover and that we shall take it amiss if our efforts to accommodate the South Africans do not result in a firm order for GEC. Moreover we feel that this indication of our goodwill towards South Africa should bring forward further specific contracts in the near future. He will also request that the South Africans do not publicise our offer.

On the same day ECGD will tell GEC of the terms on which they propose to cover the Tutuka contract.

OD also asked that I consult you as to whether other Governments should be notified of our decision to relax current ECGD terms for

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*From the Secretary of State*

South Africa for Tutuka. I understand that you consider that our Community partners and other governments concerned should be notified by Posts of the action we are taking. I am not myself convinced that this is necessary, when what we are doing is not in breach of the so-called "understanding" entered into by our predecessors, but actually within its terms, which, as I understand them, already allow for credit of more than 5 years to South Africa on strong domestic industry grounds. I would like you to re-consider the necessity of going out of our way to tell all and sundry what we are doing. After all, the whole purpose of this exercise is to win further orders beyond the Tutuka contract. I am not convinced that we always need to behave like perfect gentlemen - when our partners are not always scrupulous in this regard. ECGD will in any case be notifying the other credit insurers concerned.

I am copying this and the enclosure to the Prime Minister, Keith Joseph and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

John Nott  
Edw.

JOHN NOTT

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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
1979





DRAFT LETTER FOR THE SIGNATURE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE

Senator the Hon O P F Horwood  
Minister of Finance  
Pretoria  
Republic of South Africa

I am now in a position to respond to the proposals which you made to me at our meeting in London on 11 October, and also to the message which your Ambassador conveyed to Sir Geoffrey Howe and to Lord Carrington on 25 October, and to me on 31 October. That message concentrated on the need for the Export Credits Guarantee Department to offer 8½ years credit cover for certain public sector projects in South Africa.

My Ministerial colleagues and I have considered very carefully both this proposal and the one for a macrocredit which you developed at our meeting. At that meeting you referred to the declining share of South African public sector orders obtained by British industry in recent years, and of the wish of the South African Government to place more orders with British suppliers. For my part I assured you that the British Government shared the wish to trade with your country, but that in our experience, macrocredits unrelated to firm contracts with British suppliers had considerable drawbacks, and that I believed ECGD would be better able to meet South African needs by considering individual projects as they arise.



In this connection, I am delighted to be able to inform you that we are able to agree 8½ years export credit cover for the Tutuka power station which I understand is the first of the projects you had in mind, assuming of course that the contract is placed with a British supplier. The precise terms will, of course, be settled in the usual way by negotiation between ECGD and the suppliers. In turn, I very much hope that you will now find it possible to confirm that, provided British suppliers are able to satisfy ESCOM on such matters as technical specifications, they will be awarded the Tutuka contract.

I hope that you will regard this letter as positive demonstration of our wish to expand trade between Britain and your country, and that further specific contracts will follow up to the larger figure which we discussed at our meeting.

I am asking your Ambassador to convey this letter to you, and am arranging for copies to be sent to Lord Carrington and to Sir Geoffrey Howe.

*South Africa*

MR R L WADE-GERY  
CABINET OFFICE

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

~~SIR A DUFF~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET (1)

MR BYATT

LORD N G LENNOX

**IMMEDIATE**

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

HD/NEWS D

*Prime Minister*

*[Handwritten signature]*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PRETORIA 081300Z NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 822 OF 8 TH NOV

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON.

BY - ELECTION RESULTS .

1. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A DECADE THE NATIONAL PARTY (NP) HAVE LOST A PARLIAMENTARY BY - ELECTION (EDENVALE) TO THE OPPOSITION (PROGRESSIVE FEDERAL PARTY). HOWEVER THE DURBANVILLE AND WORCESTER SEATS WERE EASILY RETAINED BY THE NP. THE ESHOWE RESULT IS NOT EXPECTED UNTIL LATER TODAY .

2. THE RESULT ARE :-

EDENVALE	YESTERDAY	1977
PFP	6,029	4,863
NP	4,867	5,734
NRP	2,503	1,103
%	70%	73%

	70%	73%		
ELECTORATE	19,183	16,221		
WORCESTER	YESTERDAY	1977	PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION	
			YESTERDAY	1977
NP	6,657	7,523	6,513	
NRP	1,395	-	1,549	UNOPPOSED
HNP	1,047	461	971	
%	71.5	71.5	71.5	
ELECTORATE	13,023	12,410		

#### DURBANVILLE

NP	9,728	10,935	9,531	10,654
PFP	2,853	2,284	2,980	2,490
%	62,5	75	62	75
ELECTORATE	20,537	17,710		

3. THE EDENVALE ELECTION , WHICH WAS BITTERLY CONTESTED BY THE THREE PARTIES INVOLVED , WAS A CRUCIAL TEST FOR DR TREURNICHT AND DR VAN ZYL SLABBERT , THE PFP LEADER , BOTH OF WHOM COMMITTED THEMSELVES PERSONALLY TO THEIR PARTY'S CAMPAIGN . THE NEW REPUBLIC PARTY (NRP) RISKED THE APPROBRIUM OF SPLITTING THE OPPOSITION VOTE (IN 1977, THE SPLIT ALLOWED THE NATIONALISTS TO TAKE THE SEAT) IN THE HOPE THAT THEY COULD DEMONSTRATE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT OUTSIDE THEIR NATAL STRONGHOLDS . THEY FAILED TO DO THIS .

4. EDENVALE , 10 MILES EAST OF JOHANNESBURG AND ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT IN OUR TERMS TO A NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT , GAINED ADDED SIGNIFICANCE AS A BAROMETER OF OPINION BECAUSE OF ITS VARIED

4. EDENVALE , 18 MILES EAST OF JOHANNESBURG AND ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT IN OUR TERMS TO A NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT , GAINED ADDED SIGNIFICANCE AS A BAROMETER OF OPINION BECAUSE OF ITS VARIED ELECTORATE . THE CONSTITUENCY RANGES FROM AFFLUENT SUBURBS (INCLUDING A LARGE JEWISH ELEMENT ) TO AREAS COMPOSED LARGELY OF ARTISANS AND BLUE COLLAR WORKERS FROM THE NEARBY FACTORIES . THE CONSTITUENCY IS 70% ENGLISH SPEAKING AND 30% AFRIKAANS.

5. DESPITE BEING A MARGINAL CONSTITUENCY , THE NATIONAL PARTY MACHINE IN EDENVALE WAS A MESS : A FIRST CANVAS WAS NOT COMPLETE BY ELECTION DAY ( AND FOUR WEEKS PREVIOUSLY ONLY A 13% CANVAS WAS COMPLETE), NP ELECTION LITERATURE WAS LATE AND FEW OF THE SIX THOUSAND - ODD VOTERS WHO HAD MOVED FROM THE CONSTITUENCY HAD BEEN TRACED . THE CAMPAIGN OFFICE WAS DISORGANISED AND FEW OF THE CANVASSERS WERE FROM THE CONSTITUENCY . BY CONTRAST , THE PFP HAD PUT A SUSTAINED EFFORT INTO THEIR CAMPAIGN . THEIR ELECTION OFFICE WAS A MODEL OF EFFICIENCY , THEY WERE COMPLETING A THIRD CANVAS , HAD APPROACHED DOUBTFULS TWICE AND HAD TRACED MOST OF THE NON - RESIDENT VOTERS . THEIR CANDIDATE , WHO HAD LIVED IN EDENVALE FOR THE LAST TEN YEARS , WAS THE ONLY LOCAL RESIDENT OF THE THREE.

6. THE EDENVALE RESULT GIVES VAN SYL SLABBERT A USEFUL BOOST BEFORE HIS FIRST PARLIAMENTARY SESSION AS LEADER . TREURNICHT'S STANDING IN THE NP MUST BE FURTHER WEAKENED : HE HAS LOST A SEAT IN A CONSTITUENCY FOLLOWING A POOR CAMPAIGN FOR WHICH HE MUST BEAR RESPONSIBILITY .

7. BUT THE REAL VICTOR AT THESE BY ELECTIONS WAS THE PRIME MINISTER . HIS EFFICIENT CAPE MACHINE TURNED OUT THE VOTE AT WORCESTER AND DURBANVILLE AND THE HNP AND THE OPPOSITION PARTIES MADE LITTLE IMPACT IN EITHER . THESE RESULTS WILL GIVE FURTHER AMMUNITION TO MR BOTHA TO CLAIM THAT RECENT POOR SHOWINGS BY THE NP REFLECT BAD CONSTITUENCY ORGANISATION IN THE TRANSVAAL (WHERE TREURNICHT IS IN CHARGE) RATHER THAN VOTER DISSATISFACTION AT HIS OWN NEW INITIATIVES .

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FM FCO 072123Z NOV 79

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 773 OF 7 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, DUBLIN, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, ROME, UKMIS GENEVA.

*L. S. Smith*

YOUR TELS NOS. 1449-1450: U.N.G.A. DEBATE ON APARTHEID

1. YOU MAY ACCEPT THE TEXT AS ORIGINALLY DRAFTED (YOUR TELNO. 1438).
2. YOU SHOULD HOWEVER MAKE IT CLEAR TO YOUR COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES THAT WE REGARD THIS AS A STANDARD EXERCISE OF THE NINE. AS THEY KNOW FROM YOUR DISCUSSIONS YESTERDAY, WE HAVE CONSIDERABLE RESERVATIONS ABOUT A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN THE TEXT AND INDEED ABOUT ITS GENERAL FLAVOUR AND LACK OF BALANCE. IF WE HAD BEEN MAKING A UNILATERAL NATIONAL STATEMENT, WE SHOULD NOT HAVE USED THIS KIND OF LANGUAGE. HOWEVER IN THE INTERESTS OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY AT A TIME WHEN AFRICAN ISSUES ARE OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE WE HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PRESS OUR OBJECTIONS TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT.
3. WE HOPE THAT AS IN THE PAST THERE WILL BE A MINIMUM OF PUBLICITY FOR THIS STATEMENT. WE ALSO HOPE THERE WILL BE NO DAMAGING LEAKS ABOUT DISSENSIONS IN THE NINE WHICH MIGHT INVITE PRESS QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR POSITION.
4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY, WE SHALL BE ASKING MR LEAHY TO TELL THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AFTER THE STATEMENT HAS BEEN DELIVERED, THAT OUR ACQUIESCENCE IN ITS TERMS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF H.M.G.'S POLICY IN ALL ASPECTS: THAT WE AGREED TO IT FOR REASONS OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OUR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS IN SEEKING THE SUPPORT OF OUR PARTNERS IN THE NINE ON RHODESIA (WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED IF WE HAD ISOLATED OURSELVES BY PRESSING OBJECTIONS TO THE POINT OF PREVENTING ANY AGREED STATEMENT BY THE NINE): AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE EXPRESSED OURSELVES DIFFERENTLY IF THIS HAD BEEN A U.K. STATEMENT. PRETORIA SHOULD HOWEVER TAKE NO ACTION UNTIL SO INSTRUCTED.

CARRINGTON

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PS/PUS

RHOD D

PS/MR LUCE

MR ASPIN

UND

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SAfrica

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

ECGD Credit for South Africa  
(OD(79) 37)

BACKGROUND

In his paper the Secretary of State for Trade reports a South African request for improved credit terms. Apart from making a request for a "macro-credit line" (which all are agreed should be refused at this stage), Senator Horwood dangled the prospect of contracts totalling over \$1 billion, over the next three years, for which the United Kingdom chances would be greatly improved if we were to offer 8½-year credit rather than continue to follow the line informally agreed with other western countries of limiting credit to South Africa to five years. ECGD consider 8½ years reasonable by normal commercial criteria, and Mr. Nott would like to be able to confirm this to Senator Horwood fairly soon. An immediate decision is needed on the credit terms for a large power station contract on which GEC are in competition with a German company.

2. The Treasury and Bank of England do not necessarily oppose an 8½ year credit for this contract, but have some worries about our total credit exposure in South Africa. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is very concerned that nothing should rock the black African boat at this crucial stage of negotiations over Rhodesia.

HANDLING

3. You may wish to concentrate discussion on the immediate issue of credit terms for the Tutuka contract, first asking the Secretary of State for Trade to introduce his paper and then asking the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Industry for their comments.

4. The discussion will need to cover the following points:-

- (a) Does South Africa primarily want the political benefit of breaking down the present consensus limiting credit to them?

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- (b) How much publicity and opposition might we attract by offering 8½-year credit for the Tutuka contract?
- (c) How much risk is there that we should get the opprobium but still not get the contract because the German company matched our terms and was more competitive (the Treasury has voiced this fear at official level)?
- (d) Is there any way in which we might ensure with the South Africans that an improvement in our credit terms would enable GEC to get the contract?
- (e) How important is it to GEC to get this contract? Has the Secretary of State for Industry anything to add to paragraph 12?

CONCLUSION

5. Subject to the points made in discussion, particularly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary both on substance and timing, the conclusion might be to confirm that we should not offer South Africa the proposed macro-credits, but to agree that we should be prepared to consider ECGD cover up to 8½ years if this will give us a real chance to secure these orders for GEC. The Secretary of State for Trade should be guided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in any public presentation of the decision.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

2nd November 1979



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(b) How much publicity and opposition might we attract by offering

to - see clearly for the Treaty contract?

(c) How much risk is there that we should get the Treaty signed?

and get the contract of business. The Government is not sure that it

is a good idea to have a more confidential (or Treaty) and which is

that is official level?

(d) In the way in which we might engage with the public, should

we have a more confidential (or Treaty) and which is that is

the contract?

(e) How important is it to the Government to have a more confidential

Secretary of State in the industry, taking into account the

CONCLUSION

Subject to the points made in discussion, particularly by the

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, both on substance and timing, the

conclusion is that we should not offer the Treaty at this time.

It is recommended that the Government should not offer the Treaty

at this time. The Government should not offer the Treaty at this

time. The Government should not offer the Treaty at this time.

The Government should not offer the Treaty at this time.

2-NOV-1979



2nd November 1979

Private Secretary

Michael

S. Africa

The tel. I mentioned  
to you last night: plus  
a list of other reforms  
of P.W., some of which  
provide better examples  
to quote.


Rodrigue Lyne.

14/xii

S. Africa

cc MOD  
HMT  
LPS  
LPO  
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 October 1979

Mandatory Arms Embargo against South Africa

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 17 October on this subject. She agrees to the addition of the sentence in paragraph 4 of your letter to the text enclosed with my letter to you of 8 October.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

17 October 1979

*Dear Michael,*

## MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Thank you for your letter of 8 October.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considers it essential that the UK should have an adequate defence against accusations that it is not complying fully with the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

There is likely to be pressure at the United Nations this session for stronger measures to ensure that the embargo is being applied, and closer scrutiny of the performance of member States. The UN Arms Embargo Committee set up to examine compliance with the embargo has already asked the United Kingdom to investigate allegations that the Plessey contract to supply a radar air traffic control system to South Africa constitutes a breach. We should not expose ourselves unnecessarily to further criticism for not having fully complied with the embargo, particularly in a period in which we may face strong criticism in the UN over Rhodesia.

Lord Carrington therefore considers it important that we should be able to show that we have taken some action to comply with paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 418. He would suggest the addition of the following sentence to the draft enclosed with your letter:

"Companies having any such arrangements are therefore invited to review them in the light of the United Nations Resolution."

Lord Carrington believes that without this sentence companies would be uncertain about where responsibility for compliance with paragraph 3 of the Resolution lay. This sentence would make it clear that it is not for the Government to conduct the review called for by the Resolution. We understand that officials in the Departments of Trade and Industry would see no objection to this amendment.

If, as the Prime Minister fears, a notice in Trade and Industry were to give rise to questions about the supply of arms to the Patriotic Front, these could be answered by pointing out that we already take extensive precautions to prevent the supply of arms to the Patriotic Front directly or indirectly from sources in the United Kingdom. If the guerrilla war continued following the granting of legal independence to Rhodesia, we should press other countries to take similar steps. There is of course no prospect of winning support in the United Nations for a mandatory embargo on the supply of arms to the Patriotic Front.

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

/I am



I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*yours ever*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)

118

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CONFIDENTIAL



cc HO  
LCO  
HMT  
MOD  
LPO  
LPS  
D/T  
CO

TMP

*S. Africa*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 October 1979

Mandatory Arms Embargo Against South Africa

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's paper (OD(79)23) of 24 September on this subject.

The Prime Minister is unhappy about the course of action proposed by Lord Carrington. She believes that the reaction of many people to a notice on the lines suggested will be to ask who is going to stop arms going to the Patriotic Front should they continue hostilities. She would prefer that no notice should be published. If, however, it is considered essential to put out a notice then the Prime Minister would wish the text to be along the lines set out in the enclosure to this letter.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other Members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

**M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER**

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*B*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DRAFT NOTICE IN "TRADE AND INDUSTRY"

A notice in "Trade and Industry" of 10 March 1979 gave details of measures taken by the British Government to fulfil the obligations placed on all United Nations member states by Security Council Resolution 418 imposing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

The British Government has to inform the United Nations of the action it has taken under the Resolution. It therefore wishes to draw the attention of companies to operative paragraph 3 of the Resolution which "calls on all states to review, having regard to the objectives of the Resolution, all existing contractual arrangements with and licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles, with a view to terminating them".

**CONFIDENTIAL**



Prime Minister

①

Ref A0375

Accept Lord Carrington's proposal?

PRIME MINISTER

No - I am very unhappy about it. Who is going to stop arms to the Palestine front should they continue hostilities - that will be the decision of many people. I should leave the proposed B.T. notice out. Alternatively

THE MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA (OD(79) 23)

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes that a notice be published in 'Trade and Industry' drawing the attention of United Kingdom companies to operative paragraph 3 (which related to contractual relationships and licences for arms manufacture) of the Security Council Resolution of November 1977 which established the mandatory arms embargo. We should then report our action, together with the extensions of legislation to enforce the arms embargo in the Channel Islands, Isle of Man and Dependant Territories, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. The United Nations Secretariat have accepted our initial reply of April 1978 as substantive and final. This included the statement that 'A review, pursuant to operative paragraph 3 of that resolution, is being undertaken of existing contractual arrangements with and licences granted to South Africa which fall within the scope of that paragraph'. They do not therefore expect us to reply to the Secretary General's further letter of 18 May 1978 which specifically directed the attention of states to paragraph 3. But Lord Carrington is concerned that any controversy over the Plessey radar contracts might reveal our inaction over operative paragraph 3 at a time when in the Rhodesian context we wish to minimise friction with black Africa. These contracts were specifically attacked during the meeting of the United Nations Arms Embargo Committee on 3 October, but the question of our general compliance with operative paragraph 3 of Resolution 418 was not raised.

3. We are aware of some licences and contractual arrangements concluded by United Kingdom firms prior to November 1977 and perhaps still in force. But operative paragraph 3 does not specifically require us to terminate them and the notice in 'Trade and Industry' would merely draw the attention of companies to paragraph 3 and ask them to review such arrangements with a view to terminating them. The Department of Trade do not see this as constituting any threat to our trade.

4. My own feeling is that there are some political risks in this course, though no doubt Lord Carrington has taken them into account. The timing might be unhelpful as regards our relations with South Africa over the continuing Namibia negotiations. It could also risk drawing unnecessary attention to our inaction so far and to the minimal nature of the action now taken after an interval of two years. If, in the context of the Rhodesian Conference, we wish to take urgent precautionary action it might be preferable for the Department of Trade or Department of Industry quietly to draw operative paragraph 3 to the attention of the firms listed in Annex B, even though this might not include all the firms which have such arrangements with South Africa, and to take no further action in response to the letter of 18 May.

5. If you share my doubts you could query the action proposed, on the above lines. But the Defence Secretary and Secretary of State for Industry have accepted Lord Carrington's proposals and the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not intend to comment. Subject therefore to any further views from other OD colleagues (Mr Nott is out of the country) you may prefer to accept Lord Carrington's recommendation without comment.

*Mr.  
PP*

JOHN HUNT

5 October 1979

010

S. Africa



DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY  
ASHDOWN HOUSE  
123 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1E 6RB

Telephone Direct Line 01-212 3301  
Switchboard 01-212 7676

Secretary of State for Industry

CONFIDENTIAL

1 October 1979

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street West  
SW1

NBRN

Paul

Dear Peter

OD (79)23

I have read the note by officials circulated under cover of OD(79)23, and I am content with the recommendations contained in paragraph 4.

In view of the relationship between my Department and British Aerospace and Rolls Royce and their known involvement with South Africa, I think it would look odd if we simply left them to read the proposed notice in Trade and Industry and my officials will take a suitable opportunity to discuss the issue with the two companies after publication of the notice. I am copying this to members of OD.

Yours

Kew

1 OCT 1979



01-405 7641 Ext. 3417

Communications on this subject should  
be addressed to

THE LEGAL SECRETARY  
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS,

LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,

ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,

LONDON, W.C.2.

Our Ref: 400/77/272 B

28 September 1979

G Walden Esq  
Private Secretary  
Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs  
Downing Street  
SW1

*NBPA yet.*

*Dear Sir,*

THE MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

The Attorney General has seen your Secretary of State's Memorandum on this subject (OD(79)23) and has asked me to say that he accepts the recommendations which it makes.

Copies of this letter go to the Private Offices of the other members of OD Committee.

*Yours,*  
*Henry*

H Steel

1 OCT 1979



GR 238

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FM PRETORIA 190830Z SEP  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TEL NO 599 OF 19/9/79  
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNOS 591 AND 592 : TRANSVAAL NP CONGRESS

1. IN THE DEBATE YESTERDAY ON CONSTITUENCY MOTIONS MR P W BOTHA TOOK A CHARACTERISTICALLY TOUGH LINE AND SEEMS TO HAVE IMPOSED HIS AUTHORITY ON THE CONGRESS. HE TOLD THE DELGATES THAT HE COULD NOT LEAD THEM IF THEY DID NOT LIKE HIS POLICIES, BUT IF THEY DID HE WAS AT THEIR SERVICE. HE REFUSED TO GIVE GROUND ON HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS WAS LIMITED TO THE DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES SEMICLN AND THAT IT WAS FOR THE CABINET TO DETERMINE POLICY. ON THE CONSTELLATION, HE SAID HE WAS HEADING FOR A SYSTEM IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE "VOLUNTARY COOPERATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT OR EVEN NON-INDEPENDENT STATES ON MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST". HE DID NOT MIND IF PEOPLE CALLED THAT CONFEDERATION.

2. IN A STYLE WHICH NATIONALISTS RESPECT, BOTHA WARNED THAT DISCIPLINE WOULD BE STRONGLY ENFORCED IN THE CABINET. NO MEMBER OF THE CABINET WHO SPOKE IN PUBLIC AGAINST ANOTHER CABINET MEMBER OR AGAINST AGREED CABINET POLICY WOULD REMAIN IN THE CABINET. THIS WAS CLEARLY AIMED AGAINST DR TREURNICHT AND HIS DISPUTE WITH DR KOORNHOF OVER APARTHEID POLICY. THE FEELINGS OF DELEGATES HOWEVER SHOWED THROUGH CLEARLY WHEN DR TREURNICHT'S OWN SPEECH WAS VERY WARMLY APPLAUDED AND HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RE-ELECTED LEADER OF THE TRANSVAAL PARTY BY ACCLAMATION.

LEAHY

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14 PRETORIA 181220Z SEP

TO PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO 592 OF 18/9/79

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT

1. A LARGE AUDIENCE OF WELL OVER 2,000 DELEGATES, GUESTS AND OBSERVERS GAVE BOTHA A LUKEWARM RECEPTION. APPLAUSE WAS NEVER ENTHUSIASTIC. HIS REMARKS ON THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS (TO DISCUSS PRINCIPLES NOT POLICIES) WERE RECEIVED IN A FRIGID SILENCE. AT ONE POINT A GROUP OF YOUNG HNP (EXTREME RIGHT PARTY) MEMBERS CHANTED SLOGANS AND, WHEN EJECTED, SANG FOR A TIME OUTSIDE THE CITY HALL. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS NOT IN HIS BEST FORM AND WAS THROWN OUT OF HIS STRIDE BY 2 OR 3 HOSTILE INTERRUPTIONS FROM THE FLOOR. NEVERTHELESS, HE PROBABLY CARRIED THE MAJORITY OF THE DELEGATES WITH HIM.

2. BEFORE THE CONGRESS BEGAN, THE HEAD COMMITTEE OF THE TRANSVAAL PARTY MET TO ELECT A VICE-CHAIRMAN TO REPLACE MR JIMMY KRUGER, WHO WAS REQUIRED TO RESIGN ON HIS APPOINTMENT AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE. THERE ARE 3 VICE-CHAIRMEN, THE OTHER TWO BEING MR FANIE BOTHA AND MR H SCHOEMAN, BOTH STRONG SUPPORTERS OF BOTHA. THE PRO-GOVERNMENT PRESS HAD PREDICTED THAT MR F W DE LKERK, ANOTHER "VERLIGTE", WOULD BE ELECTED BUT IN THE EVENT MR BRAAM RAUBENHEIMER, MINISTER OF FORESTS AND WATERS AFFAIRS AND ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING CONSERVATIVES IN THE CABINET WAS ELECTED INSTEAD. MR PIK BOTHA ALSO RAN AND CAME A POOR THIRD. THIS IS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE PARTY HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S REFORMIST POLICIES.

LEAHY

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM PRETORIA 181233Z SEPT 79

PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 591 OF 18 SEPTEMBER.

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

TRANSVAAL NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS.

*Prime Minister.  
Wol van der Post has referred  
to this meeting more than once. He  
says it has been v. important & has  
gone well for P.W. Botha.*

1. THE PRIME MINISTER, MR P W BOTHA, ADDRESSED THE OPENING SESSION OF THE IMPORTANT TRANSVAAL NP CONGRESS LAST NIGHT. IN A LONG (90 MINUTES) SPEECH HE COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND AS HIS DURBAN SPEECH A MONTH AGO, USING SEVERAL TEXTUALLY IDENTICAL PASSAGES. HIS SPEECH AMOUNTED TO A FIRM RESTATEMENT OF HIS COMMITMENT TO CHANGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES AND WITHIN THE CONFINES OF BASIC NP DOCTRINE.

*Phm*

2. BOTHA SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER MEANINGFUL CONSOLIDATION OF THE BLACK STATES (I.E. HOMELANDS) INCLUDING MODERATE ADDITIONS TO THE 1936 LAND QUOTAS. ALTHOUGH HE GAVE NO DETAILS, THE PRESS HAVE PUBLISHED REPORTS OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS THAT THE VAN DER WALT COMMISSION IS ABOUT TO RECOMMEND THE CONSOLIDATION OF BOPHUTHATSWANA INTO ONE SINGLE TERRITORY.

3. THE ONLY NEW POINT IN BOTHA'S SPEECH WAS HIS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE HAD SUMMONED A MEETING BETWEEN THE CABINET AND LEADERS OF BUSINESS AND COMMERCE ON 22 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS THE BASIS OF A CONSTELLATION OF STATES. "I HOPE THAT WITH THE HELP OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR WE CAN BEGIN TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THIS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT MATTER". THE MEETING WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE SETTING UP OF COMMITTEES IN THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND EVENTUALLY FULL SECRETARIATS. "BUT LET US BEGIN WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSTELLATION OF COUNTRIES WHICH WISH TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SERVE THEIR MUTUAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS". POSSIBLE FIELDS OF COOPERATION WOULD BE FOOD, AGRICULTURE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TOURISM, HEALTH AND SECURITY.

4. SEE MIFT.

LEAHY

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
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Tmf  
C.F.  
S. Africa

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 August 1979

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you very much for your letter of 26 June about the former Agreement for the use of Simon's Town Naval Base.

The Prime Minister warmly appreciates the great wealth of goodwill towards Britain among many South Africans, especially those who recall our naval connections.

She also much appreciates your kind invitation to visit Simon's Town, but I fear that there is no prospect of her being able to do so in the foreseeable future. She has also asked me to let you know that - although the Government is not planning to re-open the Simon's Town Agreement - Britain does everything possible to protect South Atlantic sea routes.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Gordon Wilson, Esq.

C.F.

To see, in case  
you wish to note. Or keep?

4

13/8

Tmf

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PRIME MINISTER  
Agree Private Secretary  
reply to letter (Flag A)  
as in attached draft?  
MAP 11/viii

30 July 1979

- Auch less bank.  
Have revised out.

Dear Bryan,

Letter to the Prime Minister from the Mayor of Simon's Town

Thank you for your letter of 9 July. I attach a draft reply which you might send to Mr Wilson. This has been cleared with the Ministry of Defence.

Any move to revive the Simon's Town Agreement would face severe international hostility. In any case, the re-opening of the Suez Canal and the termination of the Beira Patrol in 1975 have removed the need for HM ships to operate round the Cape and therefore to make use of the facilities conferred by the Simon's Town Agreement.

We shall arrange to transmit the reply through HM Consulate-General at Cape Town.

Yours ever

P Lever  
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq  
No 10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

Register No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret,
- Secret.
- Confidential.
- Restricted.
- Unclassified.

To:- Gordon Wilson Esq  
 Mayor of Simon's Town  
 The Mayor's Parlour  
 Municipal Offices  
 PO Box 31  
 Simon's Town 7995  
 Republic of South Africa

From  
 PS/No 10  
  
 Telephone No. Ext.  
  
 Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you very much for your letter of 26 June. *about the former agreement for the use of Simon's Town Naval Base.*  
 As you know, the Simon's Town Naval Base Agreement was terminated in 1975. Since then it has been UK policy not to establish any formal military collaboration with the South African Government because of South Africa's policy of apartheid, to which successive British Governments have expressed themselves opposed. ~~Moreover,~~ <sup>A</sup>adequate measures do however exist for the protection of the South Atlantic sea routes.

The Prime Minister warmly appreciates the great wealth of goodwill towards Britain among many South Africans, especially those who recall our naval connections. The Government regrets that these links could not be resumed so long as South Africa's internal policies remain in their present form.

The Prime Minister <sup>she</sup> also much appreciates your kind invitation to visit Simon's Town, but I fear that there is no prospect of her being able to do so in the foreseeable future. *she has also asked me to tell you*  
*although you know that the job has been is not planning*  
*to re-open the Simon's Town Agreement, Britain does*  
*very much prefer to protect South Atlantic sea routes.*

30 JUL 1979





Mayor of  
SIMON'S TOWN

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 July 1979

I enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Prime Minister by the Mayor of Simon's Town in South Africa, deploring the fact that the Simon's Town Agreement has fallen into abeyance and inviting the Prime Minister to visit Simon's Town. I should be grateful for a draft of a Private Secretary reply which might be sent to Mr. Wilson from No. 10. It would be helpful if this could reach me not later than 27 July.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CF may need to take this over  
in due course: see how it progresses.

P  
9/7

APC

KANTOOR VAN DIE BURGEMEESTER,  
MUNISIPALE KANTORE,  
SIMONSTAD.  
7995



THE MAYOR'S PARLOUR,  
MUNICIPAL OFFICES,  
SIMON'S TOWN.  
7995

GJW/jms

26 June 1979

R217

The Hon. The Prime Minister  
10, Downing Street  
LONDON  
UNITED KINGDOM


Dear Mrs Thatcher,

This letter is addressed to you by myself as a concerned son of South Africa of British stock and whose forbears have lived in this old, small but well known Town, the Cape's second oldest port, since 1848.

This Town, of which I have the great honour to be the Mayor, has had a long, proud, important and intimate relationship with Her Majesty's Royal Navy from 1795, and more especially since the founding of the Royal Naval Base and Dock Yard here in 1814, until the year 1957, when, in terms of the Simon's Town Agreement, our South African Navy took over the responsibility for maintaining the Naval Base, with open access to and availability of the base to ships of the Royal Navy at all times thereafter.

It was a matter of tremendous regret to us in our Town, when your predecessor-in-office decided to allow the Simon's Town Agreement to lapse.

No longer were the long sleek lines of British warships, flying the Royal Naval Ensign, seen in Simon's Bay and cheerful British Jack Tars, welcome guests as always, seen in the streets of this old-world Town.



I am much moved to write this letter to you, Madame, because I believe quite honestly - and it is, no doubt, a view held by so many, not only in our country but also in yours - that the apparently politically expedient decision by your predecessor to allow the Simon's Town Agreement to lapse, cannot redound to the actual benefit of our respective countries, nor even to those who are jointly referred to as "the West", for obvious strategic reasons. I am convinced, as I am sure you are, that the political decision of your predecessor did not then, nor does it now, accord with the strategic planning of the upper echelons of the Royal Navy.

Our Town, due to the long influence of the Royal Navy, is known, even today, as one of the most "British" Towns in South Africa - and I say this quite proudly, notwithstanding my being a truly loyal South African - and the Royal Navy's traditions, its history and its relics are most zealously guarded and maintained by us as part of the make-up of this Town.

Likewise, our South African Navy, so assiduously modelled on its British predecessor, maintains and holds dear its heritage derived from the Royal Navy. Through the veins of so many of our present townfolk of all colours and creeds, courses the blood of their Royal Naval forbears.

Our South African Navy has recently completed a fine new extension to the original magnificent East Yard Harbour Works at Simon's Town, completed in 1910 by Sir John Jackson, and I am sure that we South Africans, indeed all our Townfolk and a vast number of your own compatriots would be delighted, even relieved, for your Government to take the bold, and, if I may say so, logical step to reactivate the Simon's Town Agreement.

What a joy it would be to all us Simonstonians to arise one morning and through the growing light of dawn to make out, and identify once more, as of old, a British Man-of-War, with Royal Naval Ensign proudly blowing at the Jackstaff in our South-Easter.





Even "the West" would rejoice at the fact that the vital sea route around Africa now had two guardians - the Royal and the South African Navies.

May I, therefore, Madame, on behalf of my Town, respectfully suggest to you that you visit us here at Simon's Town and be our Honoured guest, for while, in the process of your visit, you may, at first hand, be so placed to evaluate fully, and thus come to a decision on the future of the Simon's Town Agreement.

With kindest regards.

I have the honour to remain, Madame,

Yours very sincerely

*Gordon Wilson*

GORDON WILSON  
MAYOR

OR 55

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

*South Africa*

DESKBY 190800Z

FM FCO 181325Z JUN 79

TO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 184 OF 18 JUN

*Enter no.  
6/11  
14/6*

FROM PCD YOUR TELNO 363

PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT VILJOEN ON 19 JUNE

BEGINS:

ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR INAUGURATION AS STATE PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, I SEND YOU MY CONGRATULATIONS AND  
GOOD WISHES.

ELIZABETH R.

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

FILES  
PSCD  
SAFD  
IPD  
NEWS.D.  
OADS  
UND.  
ACDD  
NAD.  
WED.  
EID.  
ES9SD  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DIST:

SOUTHERN AFRICA

COPIES TO

MR R. FELLOWES  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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