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PREM 19/387

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PART 5.

Confidential filing

Internal situation

Soviet Military Intervention

System Response to the Soviet Invasion.

AFGHANISTAN

Pt 1 December 1979

Pt 5 April 1980

PREM 19/387

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
15.4.80.		28.8.80		21.5.81			
16.4.80		4.9.80.		5.6.81			
19.4.80		18.9.80		10.6.81			
25.4.80		23.9.80		17.6.81			
4.5.80.		26.9.80		18.6.81			
15.5.80		29.9.80		30.6.81			
16.5.80		13.10.80.		2.7.81			
22.5.80		15.10.80		3.7.81			
29.5.80		27.10.80		5.7.81			
2.6.80.		9.11.80		6.7.81			
5.6.80		13.11.80.		7.7.81			
11.6.80		27.11.80		9.7.81			
13.6.80		4.12.80		28.7.81			
18.6.80		29.12.80		3.8.81			
26.6.80.		12.1.81		13.8.81.			
27.6.80		29.1.81.		26.8.81			
5.7.80.		30.1.81		14.9.81			
17.7.80		2.2.81.		— ends —			
21.7.80		9.3.81					
24.7.80		10.4.81					
11.7.80		15.4.81.					
19.8.80		4.5.81					
15.10.80							

PART 5 ends:-

Moscow Tel 577 14/9/81

PART 6 begins:-

UKmis N.York tel: 896 22.9.81

~~Fco to Moscow cable paper~~ ~~18/9/81~~ 19

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC (80) 19th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	15.5.80
CC (80) 20th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	22.5.80
CC (80) 23rd Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	11.6.80
CC (80) 25th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	26.6.80
CC (80) 33rd Conclusions, Minute 1	18.9.80
CC (81) 4th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	29.1.81
CC (81) 24th Conclusions, Minute 2	18.6.81
CC (81) 25th Conclusions, Minute 2	25.6.81
CC (81) 26th Conclusions, Minute 2	2.7.81
CC (81) 27th Conclusions, Minute 2	9.7.81

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed C Wayland Date 21 July 2011

PREM Records Team

CONFIDENTIAL

Afghanistan

V. negative.

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FM MOSCOW 150445Z SEP 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 577 OF 14TH SEPTEMBER
FOR INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD UKMIS NEW YORK AND NEW DELHI
FOR INFO SAVING KABUL JEDDA UKDEL NATO UKMIS GENEVA TEHRAN
TOKYO PEKING WASHINGTON AND EC POSTS.

YOUR TELNO 572: AFGHANISTAN.

1. I SAW ZEMSKOV TODAY. I TOLD HIM I WANTED TO PURSUE THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN. AFTER YOUR VISIT WE HAD RECEIVED THE RATHER NEGATIVE SOVIET AIDE MEMOIRE OF 22 JULY AND HAD SEEN THE STATEMENT MADE IN KABUL ON 24 AUGUST. A NUMBER OF SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAD COMMENDED THE LATTER AND WE HAD NOTED SOME PARALLELS IN LANGUAGE WITH THE COMMUNITY PROPOSALS FOR INSTANCE IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE KABUL STATEMENT AND PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE COMMUNITY PROPOSALS. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND I WAS NOW INSTRUCTED TO EXPLORE SOVIET THINKING, TO SEE HOW IT HAD DEVELOPED AND TO DISCUSS POINTS IN THE KABUL STATEMENT AFFECTING THE USSR, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THERE WAS IN FACT ANY COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US.

2. A CENTRAL ISSUE ON WHICH I WISHED TO KNOW THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE PROPOSED GUARANTEES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THE 24 AUGUST PROPOSALS SUGGESTED THAT INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES MIGHT BE WORKED OUT AT THE SAME TIME AS TALKS TOOK PLACE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN , PAKISTAN AND IRAN. PRESUMABLY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ITSELF BE ONE OF THOSE GIVING GUARANTEES OF THE CESSATION OF ARMED AND OTHER INTERFERENCE INTO AFGHAN AFFAIRS? ZEMSKOV RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION FULLY SUPPORTED THE AFGHAN POSITION AND THAT THE ANSWER TO MY QUESTION WAS CONTAINED IN THOSE PROPOSALS. THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE USSR AND THE USA WOULD BOTH BE AMONG THE GUARANTORS. I SAID I TOOK IT THAT THIS MEANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD THEREFORE GIVE A GUARANTEE THAT IT WOULD NOT INTERFERE BY MILITARY OR OTHER MEANS. ZEMSKOV SAID THAT THIS WAS THE CASE AND THAT AS THE PROPOSALS MADE CLEAR THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACT TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS ACCEPTEABLE TO THE THREE COUNTRIES MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN. THE SOVIET UNION HAD SAID THIS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHO THE OTHER GUARANTOR POWERS MIGHT BE.

3. I ASKED ZEMSKOV WHAT WOULD BE THE EXACT LINK BETWEEN NEGOTIATING SUCH A GUARANTEE AND SETTING THE TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS REFERRED TO IN THE 24 AUGUST STATEMENT. HE REPLIED THAT THE ASNWER TO THIS WAS ALSO IN THE PROPOSALS AND QUOTED THE PASSAGE IN THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH FROM THE END OF THE STATEMENT SAYING THAT TROOPS WOULD BE PULLED OUT TO THE EXTENT OF THE REALISATION OF THE AGREEMENTS TO CEASE OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

THE SOONER IT WAS MADE IMPOSSIBLE TO INTERFERE IN AFGHANISTAN'S AFFAIRS, THE EARLIER SOVIET TROOPS COULD BE PULLED OUT. I SAID THAT A TIMETABLE WOULD PRESUMABLY MEAN SETTING DEFINITE DATES FOR WITHDRAWALS. WOULD THE IDEA BE TO WORK THESE DATES OUT IN PARALLEL WITH THE AGREEMENTS ON NON-INTERFERENCE? ZEMSKOV SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE. DID I HAVE ANY IDEA OF A TIMETABLE FOR REACHING AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN? I SAID THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS THAT THE HORSE AND CART SHOULD ARRIVE AT THE SAME POINT AT THE SAME TIME. WOULD ANY AGREEMENT BE ONE WITH DATES FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL CLEARLY LINKED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GUARANTEES AND WOULD THE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE BE BOTH PUBLIC AND BINDING? ZEMSKOV AGAIN SAID THAT ALL WOULD DEPEND ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS ON NON-INTERVENTION AND REFERRED AGAIN TO THE KABUL TEXT. I SAID THAT THIS BROUGHT US BACK TO THE LINKAGE OF GUARANTEES AND WITHDRAWAL. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IN A PARALLEL NEGOTIATION SUCH AS THAT SUGGESTED ON 24 AUGUST IT WAS NECESSARY THAT A TIMETABLE FOR GUARANTEES AND FOR WITHDRAWALS SHOULD BE EQUALLY PUBLIC AND BINDING AND SHOULD BE SIMULTANEOUSLY ARRIVED AT. WOULD THIS ALSO BE THE SOVIET UNDERSTANDING? AT THIS POINT SUSLOV, WHO EVIDENTLY FEARED ZEMSKOV MIGHT BE GETTING INTO DIFFICULTIES IF HE CONTINUED TO ANSWER MY QUESTIONS WITHOUT PRIOR BRIEFING, INTERJECTED TO POINT OUT THAT WHAT I WAS ASKING WAS WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE COMMITTED TO WITHDRAWING ITS TROOPS ON SET DATES AT THE SAME TIME AS OTHERS WERE COMMITTED TO CEASING THEIR INTERFERENCE, WHEREAS WHAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNEMENT HAD PROPOSED WAS THAT INTERFERENCE SHOULD FIRST CEASE AND THAT WITHDRAWALS SHOULD SUBSEQUENTLY COMMENCE. ZEMSKOV THEN SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT WAS IN THE AFGHAN PROPOSALS, WHICH THE SOVIET UNION FULLY SUPPORTED.

4. IT WAS IN SOME WAYS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THE TOPICS I HAD RAISED. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. I TOLD HIM MY PURPOSE WAS SIMPLY TO EXPLORE THE SOVIETGOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON POINTS ARISING OUT OF THE AFGHAN PROPOSALS WHICH PARTICULARLY AFFECTED THE USSR. THIS MEANT ABOVE ALL THE QUESTION OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL. HE REPEATED THAT IT WAS TOO SOON TO GO INTO THESE MATTERS. THE SOVIET UNION FULLY SUPPORTED THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS AND WOULD THEREFORE BE PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT THEM. IF THE BRITISH SIDE WISHED TO MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN THEY SHOULD PERSUADE PAKISTAN TO TALK TO AFGHANISTAN. I REMARKED THAT THERE WAS A BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US. I DID NOT WANT ON THIS OCCASION TO GO OVER THE GROUND OF OUR EARLIER TALKS, BUT AS MY GOVERNEMENT SAW IT, THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM WAS THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WAS WHY WE WANTED TO EXPLORE WITH THE SOVIET UNION THE CONDITIONS FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL. HE REMINDED ME THAT GROMYKO HAD TOLD YOU THAT THE FIRST THING TO BE DONE WAS TO CEASE FOREIGN INTERVENTION, END THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AFGHANISTAN AND IMPLEMENT GUARANTEES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE RENEWED. I REPLIED THAT THE PRIMARY PROBLEM WAS THAT OF INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN BY THE SOVIET UNION.

/ 5. WE THEN

5. WE THEN GOT BACK TO MY QUESTIONS. WOULD THE SOVIET UNION GUARANTEE NOT TO REINTRODUCE THEIR TROOPS AS PART OF THE SETTLEMENT? ZEMSKOV SAID THE QUESTION WAS INCOMPREHENSIBLE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE NO REASON TO REINTRODUCE ITS TROOPS IF FOREIGN INTERVENTION WAS NOT RENEWED. THEY WERE ONLY THERE BECAUSE OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO DESIRE TO ESTABLISH BASES OT TO KEEP HER FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN OVER THE LONGER TERM. SHE HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE AFGHAN INTENTION TO REMAIN NON-ALIGNED.

6. MY FINAL QUESTION WAS ON AFGHAN PARTICIPATION. THE 24 AUGUST STATEMENT HAD SIAD THA THE WORKING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AS WELL AS THE SOLUTION OF OTHER QUESTIONS TOUCHING UPON AFGHANISTAN'S INTERESTS MUST BE CONDUCTED WITH AFGHAN PARTICIPATION. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF AFGHAN GROUPS WITH A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THE NATURE OF ANY EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. WOULD THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREE THAT ALL SUCH GROUPS SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT SUCH DISCUSSIONS? ZEMSKOV SAID THE SOVIET UNION RECOGNISED ONLY THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THE OTHERS WERE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS. SUSLOV SAID THAT THE KARMAL GOVERNEMENT HAD MADE A PUBLIC OFFER TO GRANT AN AMNESTY TO ANY REFUGEES WHO WISHED TO RETURN. I SAID IT WAS NO A QUESTION OF THE RETURN OF REFUGEES BUT WHO WOULD TAKE PART IN DISCUSSIONS. EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT SITUATIONS SUCH AS THIS, ALL NEEDED TO BE INVOLVED IN WOURKING OOUT A SETTLEMENT. ZEMSKOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION DEALT WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO TAKE PART WITH APPROPRIATE COUNTRIES IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM. THE INTERNAL QUESTIONS WERE THE CONCERN OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THOSE WHO HAD LEFT THE COUNTRY WOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETURN AND THERE WOULD BE AN AMNESTY. THAT SOLVED THE PROBLEM.

7. WE CONCLUDED BY AGREEING THAT YOU WOULD NO DOUBT WISH TO PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH GROMYKO IN NEW YORK. IF, MEANWHILE, THE MINISTRY THOUGHT THAT A FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD BE HELPFUL I WOULD BE GLAD TO CONTINUE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO KABUL, WASHINGTON, JEDDA, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BURSSELS, PARIS, BONN, ROME, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, DUBLIN, UKMIS GENEVA, TEHERAN, TOKYO AND PEKING.

KEEBLE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

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GRS 330
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DESKBY 270300Z
FM FCO 261728Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 603 OF 26 AUGUST
INFO ROUTINE KABUL, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, JEDDA, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, NEW DELHI, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN.
INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS, TOKIO, PEKING, UKMIS GENEVA.

MY TELNO 602: AFGHANISTAN.

1. WE HAVE NOW HAD A CAREFUL LOOK AT THE KABUL STATEMENT OF 24 MAY. OUR REACTION HAS NOT CHANGED FROM THAT DESCRIBED IN TUR. THE ESSENTIAL WEAKNESS OF THE 14 MAY 1980 PROPOSALS REMAINS IN THE NEW VERSION: THEY CONTAIN NO WAY OF SATISFYING THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND NO GUARANTEES OF A WITHDRAWEL OF SOVIET FORCES.

2. HOWEVER THERE ARE SOME CHANGES IN THE NEW STATEMENT WHICH COULD BE SIGNIFICANT AND ON WHICH FIRYUBIN MAY HAVE GIVEN THE PAKISTANIS CLARIFICATION. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE FORMULATED TO ENABLE YOU TO QUESTION AGHA SHAHI ABOUT ANY ELABORATION OFFERED BY FIRYUBIN AND TO ELICIT PAKISTANI REACTIONS. IN USING THEM YOU SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO EMPHASISE THE SUBSTANTIAL OBJECTIONS WHICH REMAIN AND TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE PAKISTANIS TO ENGAGE IN BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE KARMAL REGIME.

(A) DID FIRYUBIN ELABORATE ON THE SUGGESTION IN PARA 5 OF STATEMENT THAT NEGOTIATIONS OF GUARANTEES AGAINST EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE COULD BE CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS?

(B) DID FIRYUBIN SAY ANYTHING WIHICH MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS THAT GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERVENTION WOULD APPLY TO ITS OWN ACTIVITIES OR ARE THE GUARANTEES SOLELY TO APPLY TO 'INTERFERENCE' FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE USSR?

(C) DID FIRYUBIN SAY HOW THE SOVIET UNION ENVISAGED THE TIMETABLE OF A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES (PARA 6 OF STATEMENT)? OUR INTERPRETATION OF 'REALISATION OF ACHIEVED AGREEMENTS' IS THAT WITHDRAWEL WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY AFTER RESISTANCE ACTIVITY HAD CEASED, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE THE JUDGE OF THIS.

(D) DID DIRYUBIN SUGGEST IN ANY WAY THAT THE KARMAL REGIME MIGHT DISAPPEAR IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT? (THE PAKISTANIS HAVE HAD HINTS OF THIS BEFORE).

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FM DELHI 260759Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 639 OF 26 AUGUST
INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, KABUL
ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN

1. SATHE SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS VERY BAD. THE MUJAHEDEEN LARGELY CONTROLLED THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE SOVIETS WERE NOT SERIOUSLY TRYING TO DISPUTE THIS CONTROL, AND ACCORDING TO INDIAN INFORMATION, SOVIET CASUALTIES WERE A GOOD DEAL LOWER THAN WAS USUALLY CLAIMED IN THE PRESS. THE SOVIETS RELIED ON INEXPENSIVE PUNITIVE RAIDS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE NET RESULT WAS THAT THE LOCAL POPULATION HAD TO SUPPORT THE MUJAHEDEEN AND WERE GETTING CLOBBERED TWICE OVER. HENCE A STEADY DRIFT OF THE POPULATION AWAY FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE EITHER OVER THE BORDER OR INTO THE CITIES. IN THE LONG RUN, THIS WAS FAVOURABLE TO THE SOVIETS. THE PATHANS WOULD DO ANYTHING FOR MONEY AND IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO USE THEM TO CAUSE TROUBLE IN AFGHANISTAN.

2. SATHE SAID THAT BABRAK KARMAL WAS QUITE A DECENT FELLOW, BUT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD HANDLED THE MATTER CLUMSILY AND THAT BABRAK WAS NOW DOOMED. HE COULD NOT EXIST WITHOUT THEM. SATHE GUESSED THAT IF THE PAKISTANIS WOULD TALK WITH BABRAK, THAT WOULD SAVE THE SOVIET FACE SUFFICIENTLY AND WITHIN A FEW MONTHS THEY WOULD GET RID OF HIM.

THOMSON

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Afghanistan

Prime Minister 2

Attached are telegrams reporting the Afghan Foreign Ministers proposals for a political settlement in Afghanistan, and the FCO's initial reaction.

26/8

GRS 180

CONFIDENTIAL
FM KABUL 260730Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 198 OF 26 AUG 81

AND TO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD

RPTD FOR INFO TO MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, NEW DELHI AND WASHINGTON

AFGHANISTAN.

1. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH A GROUP OF FOREIGN JOURNALIST IN KABUL ON AUGUST 25, DOST SAID '' THE DRA STRIVES FOR THE RESTORATION OF PEACE, CALM AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. WE CALL ON OUR NEIGHBOURS- PAKISTAN AND IRAN- TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE TO FIND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES. THIS WILL BENEFIT NOT ONLY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE BUT ALSO THE PEOPLES OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES. OUR PROPOSALS ARE VERY REALISTIC AND HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE PUBLIC IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. WE ARE PREPARED FOR TALKS WITH THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT AT ANY TIME, AT ANY LEVEL ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES AND AT ANY PLACE''.

2. THIS INTERVIEW, TOGETHER WITH DOST'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 24 SETTING OUT AFGHANISTAN'S PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT (MY TELNO 196) ARE CLEARLY DESIGNED TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION OF REASONABLENESS AND FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE DRA AND, AS SUCH, CAN BE SEEN AS PART OF THEIR CAMPAIGN TO WIN SUPPORT AT THE UNGA.

GARNER

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GRS 1290

UNCLASSIFIED
FM KABUL 251030Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 196 OF 25 AUG 81

RPTD FOR INFO TO ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO AND NEW DELHI .

M I P T.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DATED 24 AUGUST OF D R A GOVERNMENT ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT:-

QUOTE

1. THE SECURING OF COMPLETE AND RELIABLE CESSATION OF ARMED AND ANY OTHER INTERVENTION INTO DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN AND CREATION OF CONDITIONS MAKING IMPOSSIBLE THE RECURRENCE OF SUCH INTERFERENCE IN THE FUTURE MUST BE MAIN AIM AND BASIC CONTENT OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

2. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE ARMED INTERVENTION INTO AFGHANISTAN AS WELL AS OTHER SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST IT ARE NOW BEING CARRIED OUT FIRST OF ALL FROM PAKISTANI TERRITORY THE DRA GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY PROPOSED ALREADY AND PROPOSES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN ONCE AGAIN THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES MEET TO DISCUSS THE QEUSTIONS PERTAINING TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIM OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS.

IN THE COURSE OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA WILL BE READY TO CONSIDER OTHER PROBLEMS OUTSTANDING BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN TO NORMALIZE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONS AND TO ENSURE STABILITY AND TRANQUILITY.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA REAFFIRMS ALSO ITS PROPOSAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIM OF WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND MULTIFACETED, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTIRES, INCLUDING THE QUESTIONS OF TRACE, ECONOMIC COOPERATION, TRANSIT AND CULTURAL TIES.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN MUST CONTAIN UNIVERSALLY ACKNOWLEDGED PROVISIONS, CONCERNING MUTUAL RESPECT, SOVEREIGNTY, READINESS TO DEVELOP RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PRINCIPLES OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND NON INTERFERENCE INTO INTERNAL AFFAIRS AS WELL AS

/ INCLUDE

INCLUDE CONCRETE COMMITMENT OF THE PARTIES ON PREVENTING ARMED AND OTHER HOSTILE ACTIVITIES FROM THEIR OWN TERRITORY AGAINST EACH OTHER.

3. CONSIDERING THE CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS BOTH WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN ON BILATERAL BASIS PREFERABLE AND MOST PROMISING, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA AT THE SAME TIME IS READY TO HOLD TRI-LATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IF PAKISTAN AND IRAN EXPRESS SUCH A DESIRE.

HOWEVER, THE LACK OF DESIRE TO START NEGOTIATIONS OF ONE OF THE MENTIONED COUNTRIES SHALL NOT IMPEDE THE COMMENCEMENT OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE OTHER COUNTRY AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF RELEVANT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEM AS WELL AS IT SHOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO THEIR SUBSEQUENT REALIZITION.

IT FOLLOWS THAT THE COUNTRY REFRAINING FROM NEGOTIATIONS IN THE BEGINNING MAY JOIN THEM OR START INDEPENDENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DRA LATER.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA DOES NOT OBJECT TO ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND IRAN WHETHER BI-OR-TRI-LATERAL BEING ATTENDED BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OF HIS REPRESENTATIVE.

4. AS IT WAS DEFINED BY THE DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF JUNE, 18TH 1981, AS WELL AS BY OTHER OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS ON GENERAL AMNESTY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA WILL SECURE FULL FREEDOM AND IMMUNITY TO ALL THE AFGHANS, THAT ARE TEMPORARILY LIVING BECAUSE OF CERTAIN REASONS IN THE TERRITORY OF PAKISTAN AND OTHER NEIGHBOURING COUNTIRES, WHEN THEY RETURN HOME. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA GUARANTEES SECURITY, FREEDOM OF CHOICE OF THE DOMICILE AND EQUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE SOLUTION OF THE LAND QUESTION ON THE BASIS OF AGRARIAN REFORM. THEY WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ALL THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR LIVING, FRUITFUL LABOUR AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES FOR THE WELFARE OF HOME-LAND.

THE NOMADS, TRIBES AND CATTLE-BREEDERS WILL BE PROVIDED NOT ONLY WITH THE RIGHT TO USE PASTURES ON JUST BASE BUT THE THE RIGHT FOR FREE MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY. IT IS MEANT ALSO THAT THE TRADITIONAL SEASONAL MIGRATION OF THE NOMADS FROM AFGHANISTAN TO PAKISTAN AND VICE-VERSA SHALL BE ALLOWED WITHOUT HINDRANCES.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA EXPRESSES ITS AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM TO DISCUSS THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS . HOWEVER, IF SOME PART OF THE AFGHANS DOES NOT WANT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND, THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THEIR FURTHER STAY SHALL ALSO BE DISCUSSED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SO AS TO ACHIEVE NECESSARY AGREEMENTS.

/ 5. RELIABLE

5. RELIABLE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF AGREEMENTS BEING ACHIEVED WITH REGARD TO THE CESSATION AND THE NON-RECURRENCE OF ARMED AND OTHER INTEFFERENCE INTO AFGHAN AFFAIRS MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

THE STATES PROVIDING GUARANTEES SHALL THEMSELVES STRICTLY REFRAIN FROM SUCH INTERFERENCE AND ENHANCE THE ACHIEVED AGREEMENTS BY THEIR AUTHORITY. WITH THIS AIM GUARANTEEING COUNTRIES MIGHT ADOPT A RELEVANT DOCUMENT BY WHICH THEY WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO RESPECT AND OBSERVE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS NON-ALIGNED STATUS. ON ITS OWN BEHALF THE DRA WOULD REAFFIRM ITS LOYALTY TO THE POLICY OF PEACE AND NON-ALIGNMENT, ITS DESIRE TO DEVELOP FRIENDLY TIES WITH ALL THE COUNTIRES AND FIRST OF ALL WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS.

THE WORKING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AS WELL AS THE SOLUTION OF ALL OTHER QUESTIONS TOUCHING UPON AFGHANISTAN'S INTERESTS MUST BE CONDUCTED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE DRA GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME IT DOES NOT OBJECT THAT THE DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE WORKING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES BE STARTED SIMULTANEOUSLY AND CONDUCTED PARALLEL WITH BI-OR TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AMONG AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN. AT THE FIRST STAGE SUCH A DISCUSSION MIGHT BE CONDUCTED IN THE FORM OF INFORMAL MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AND LATER ON AT A RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL FORUM.

6. IN CASE OF CESSATION AND GUARANTEED NON-RECURRENCE OF ARMED INTERVENTION AND ANY OTHER FORM OF INTERFERENCE INTO DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN THE REASONS WHICH CAUSED AFGHANISTAN'S APPEAL TO THE USSR URGING TO SEND LIMITED SOVIET MILITARY CONTINGENT INTO ITS TERRITORY WILL CEASE TO EXIST. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THE WORKING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE WILL RESPECTIVELY GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE BY THE ACCORD BETWEEN THE AFGHAN AND SOVIET SIDES THE ORDER AND TERMS OR IN OTHER WORDS THE TIMETABLE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE PULLOUT OF TROOPS WOULD BE CONDUCTED TO THE EXTENT OF THE REALIZATION OF THE ACHIEVED AGREEMENTS. THAT IS WHY THE SPEEDIER ARE THE ACHIEVEMENT AND REALIZATION OF THE AGREEMENTS, MAKING IMPOSSIBLE THE INTERFERENCE INTO AFGHANISTAN'S AFFAIRS THE EARLIER WOULD BE THE BEGINNING AND COMPLETION OF THE PULLOUT OF SOVIET TROOPS AND VICE-VERSA.

7. IT IS A DEEP CONVICTION OF THE DRA GOVERNMENT THAT THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN. WORKING OUT MAY BE CARRIED OUT STEP BY STEP WOULD NOT ONLY MEET THE INTERESTS OF AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLES OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTIRES, BUT WOULD LEAD TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE TENSION IN THIS REGION AS A WHOLE.

/ IN THIS

IN THIS CONNECTION THE DRA GOVERNMENT DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AROUND AFGHANISTAN BEING DISCUSSED TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTIONS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION IF SUCH AN OPINION PREVAILS AMONG THE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS OF THE DISCUSSION OF BOTH THESE PROBLEMS. BUT THE LACK OF ACCORD WITH RESPECT TO SUCH A JOINT DISCUSSION SHALL NOT BE APRETEXT TO DELAY THE START OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN.

8. IN ANY VARIANT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BILATERAL, TRILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL, IN THAT PART OF THEM WHICH PERTAINS TO THE GUARANTEES THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE PRESENT REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN, THE COMPOSITION OF ITS GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS OTHER INTERNAL AFFAIRS ARE NOT TO BE DISCUSSED. THESE QUESTIONS ARE BEING SOLVED AND WILL BE SOLVED IN THE FUTURE ONLY BY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE BUT NOT BY ANYBODY ELSE.

UNQUOTE

GARNER

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FM KABUL 251015Z AUG 81
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 195 OF 25 AUG 81

RPTD FOR INFO TO ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK
UKDEL NATO AND NEW DELHI .

AFGHANISTAN-POLITICAL SETTLEMTN.

1. M I F T CONTAINS STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER DOST TO COUNCIL OF MINISTFNS ON AUGUST 24 SETTING OUT DRA'S PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

2. IT IS, IN ESSENCE, A RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS OF 14 MAY 1980. THE ONLY CHANGES OF ANY SUBSTANCE ARE:-

(A) AFGHAN AGREEMENT TO TRILATERAL TALKS. THIS IS IN EFFECT, THE EMPTY CHAIR FORMULA SINCE, PART OF THE PROPOSAL IS THAT IF ONE OF THE COUNTIRES IS NOT READY TO PARTICIPATE IT SHOULD NOT PREVENT THE OTHER TWO FROM STARTING TALKS.

(B) AGREEMENT THAT UN SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE TALKS.

3. THE STATEMENT COVERED MATTERS FOR DISCUSSION, INCLUDING THE 4 AGENDA ITEMS AGREE WITH DE CUELLAR DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN. THE TWO POINTS IN PARA 1, WERE ALSO AGREED DIAING THIS VISIT, AND THE STATEMENT IS THUS AN UPDATE OF THE 14 MAY 1980, PROPOSALS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT WAS AGREED WITH DE CUELLAR.

GARNER

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TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 602 OF 25 AUGUST
INFO ROUTINE KABUL, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW,JEDDA, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, NEW DELHI, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN
SAVING OTHER EC POSTS, TOKYO, PEKING, UKMIS GENEVA
YOUR TELNO 410 (NOT TO ALL): AFGHANISTAN

1. WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN A FULL TEXT OF AFGHAN STATEMENT OF 24 AUGUST. REUTERS REPORT THAT DOST INDICATED AFGHAN READINESS TO ENGAGE IN TALKS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER WITH PARTICIPATION BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE.

2. NEWS DEPT ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROLE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WAS IMPLICIT IN THE KABUL REGIME'S READINESS TO RECEIVE DE CUELLAR, AND THAT THESE MINOR AMENDMENTS TO THE 14 MAY 1980 PROPOSALS DO NOT TACKLE THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS: NAMELY THE NEED TO GUARANTEE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE WISHES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES. THEY SEEM DESIGNED TO TRY TO ENHANCE THE STATUS OF THE KABUL REGIME.

3. NEWS DEPT ARE ADDING UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT THE STATEMENT BY DOST COINCIDES WITH THE FIRYUBIN VISIT TO PAKISTAN AND SEEMS DESIGNED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE PAKISTANIS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

4. THIS PRESS LINE ENCAPSULATES OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DOST STATEMENT AS REPORTED BY REUTERS (IF THE STATEMENT GOES FURTHER PLEASE TELEGRAPH TEXT). WHEN YOU SEE AGHA SHAHI YOU MAY AS APPROPRIATE DRAW ON PARAS 2 AND 3 AND ADD THAT WE WOULD REGARD THIS SMALL CONCESSION AS SIGNIFICANT ONLY IF IT PRESAGED A REAL CHANGE OF HEART ON THE PART OF MOSCOW. WE SEE NO SIGN OF THAT SO FAR, BUT YOU COULD ASK FOR AGHA SHAHI'S ASSESSMENT AND ASK WHETHER FIRYUBIN ELABORATED IN ANY WAY.

CARRINGTON

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FM FCO 131520Z AUGUST 81
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 440 OF 13 AUGUST 1981.
INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, ISLAMABAD, TEHRAN, KABUL, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.
INFO ROUTINE TO DELHI, PARIS, PEKING, UKREP BRUSSELS, ALL OTHER EC POSTS, JEDDA TOKYO.

AFGHANISTAN

1. DE CUELLAR GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS RECENT TALKS IN ISLAMABAD AND KABUL WHEN MR HURD AND SIR J. GRAHAM CALLED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON ON WALDHEIM.

2. DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN NO BREAKTHROUGH, HE HAD CONSOLIDATED SOME OF THE GAINS FROM HIS FIRST VISIT TO THE AREA. HE WAS NOW CONVINCED THAT BOTH PAKISTAN AND BABRAK KARMAL WANTED THE UN TO BE INVOLVED. (IRAN REMAINED OUTSIDE THE DEBATE AND WAS NOT PREPARED TO SEE DE CUELLAR: BUT DE CUELLAR DID NOT SEE THIS AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO HIS STRATEGY.) BOTH THE AFGHANS AND THE PAKISTANIS HAD SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN A SETTLEMENT, THE AFGHANS EVEN GOING SO FAR AT THE END OF DE CUELLAR'S TALKS TO ASK THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD NOW CONSIDER A VENUE AND A DATE FOR TALKS. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED ON AN AGENDA THAT WOULD COVER (IN NO ORDER OF PRIORITY) WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, THE QUESTION OF INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THE PROBLEM OF GUARANTEES AND REFUGEES. THERE HAD HOWEVER BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON THE FORMAT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PAKISTANIS WOULD PREFER DE CUELLAR CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS BY MEANS OF 'SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY'. THE PAKISTANIS HAD ALSO AN OBVIOUS PREFERENCE TO DISCUSS FIRST THEIR MOST BURDENSOME PROBLEM OF THE

/REFUGEES.

REFUGEES. DE CUELLAR HAD DISCUSSED THE FORMAT OF TALKS WITH BOTH KARMAL AND THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOSE VIEW WAS THAT THE PROBLEMS WERE TOO COMPLEX TO BE DISCUSSED PROPERLY BY SUCH METHODS. THEY WANTED A JOINT MEETING AT WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HIMSELF WOULD BE PRESENT. BOTH SIDES WANTED TO DISCUSS STRATEGY SEPARATELY WITH WALDHEIM IN NEW YORK BEFORE ANY FURTHER DECISIONS WERE TAKEN. THIS WOULD THEREFORE BE THE NEXT STEP. THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD CALL SEPARATELY ON WALDHEIM NEXT MONTH. DE CUELLAR ADDED THAT WHILE BOTH ZIA AND AGHA SHAHI RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EC INITIATIVE, THEY SAW THE TALKS INVOLVING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS THE ONLY WAY FORWARD TO A SOLUTION.

3. WALDHEIM COMMENTED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL NOT TO TALK OF THESE EXCHANGES IN TERMS OF THEIR RELATION TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS. EACH SIDE SAW THE DE CUELLAR MISSION IN ITS OWN TERMS. THERE WAS CLEARLY A DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH BETWEEN THE AFGHANS, WHO WANTED DIRECT BILATERAL TALKS INVOLVING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AND THE PAKISTANIS WHO, TOGETHER WITH MUCH OF THE WORLD, WERE NOT YET CONVINCED THAT SUCH TALKS WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. MR HURD COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH PAKISTANI ATTITUDES WERE OCCASIONALLY ERRATIC BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURES ON THEM, THEY HAD GIVEN STRONG SUPPORT TO THE EC INITIATIVE, WHICH WAS NOW SUPPORTED BY OVER 70 COUNTRIES. OUR PROPOSALS REMAINED ON THE TABLE: THEY WERE NOT IMMUTABLE BUT WE SAW NO TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IN CHANGING THEM AT PRESENT. HE ASKED HOW DISCUSSION AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON AFGHANISTAN WOULD GO. WALDHEIM SAID THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON HIS REPORT. BOTH SIDES HAD ASKED DE CUELLAR THAT HE PRODUCE A POSITIVE REPORT. HIS INCLINATION WAS TO TAKE IT IN TWO STAGES: TO PRODUCE A FACTUAL REPORT OF HIS EFFORTS, WHICH WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE HAD CHANGED IN THE INTERVENING MONTHS: AND TO FOLLOW THIS UP BY A SECOND REPORT (OR AN APPENDIX TO THE FIRST) FOLLOWING HIS TALKS WITH THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE ASSEMBLY COULD WELL END UP WITH A RESOLUTION SIMILAR TO LAST YEAR'S. MR HURD SAID THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE UN WOULD FIND ITSELF IN A POSITION

OF FACILITATING BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN WITHOUT ANY QUID-PRO-QUO FROM KARMAL HIMSELF. WE WOULD BE UNHAPPY IF THE AFGHAN REGIME GAINED SUCH A DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS. WE NEEDED TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. GRAHAM ADDED THAT KARMAL COULD NOT HIMSELF BIND THE RUSSIANS OVER THE QUESTION OF SOVIET TROOPS.

5. DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND A WORSENING INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE AFGHANS HAD NO REAL POLITICAL LEADERS: FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAD BECOME BETTER ORGANISED AND ARMED (BY SAUDI ARABIA, CHINA, THE US AND EGYPT). WALDHEIM CONCLUDED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM BUT COULD DEGENERATE INTO A FUTILE EXERCISE LIKE THE CAMBODIAN CONFERENCE.

6. DE CUELLAR WAS CLEARLY INCLINED TO PRESS AHEAD INTO THE OPENING WHICH HE THOUGHT HE HAD CREATED. WALDHEIM WAS MORE AWARE OF THE DANGERS, BUT THE IMPRESSION WHICH THEY CREATED BETWEEN THEM WAS NOT ROBUST. OUR COMMENTS MAY FOR THE MOMENT HAVE REDRESSED THE BALANCE IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MIND.

7. INSTRUCTIONS TO CERTAIN POSTS FOLLOW SEPARATELY.

GILMOUR

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 501 OF 6TH AUGUST

FOR INFO SAVING KABUL ISLAMABAD TEHERAN NEW DELHI PEKING PARIS BONN ROME WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 499: PETROV ARTICLE.

1. THE PETROV ARTICLE IN PRAVDA OF 5 AUGUST REPRESENTS IN EFFECT PUBLIC CONFIRMATION OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON AFGHANISTAN OUTLINED IN THE SOVIET AIDE MEMOIRE OF 22 JULY. IT IS PERHAPS SOMETHING TO HAVE FORCED THE RUSSIANS INTO SUCH A DETAILED PUBLIC REBUTTAL. THEY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE PREFERRED TO IGNORE WESTERN IDEAS AND FOR THE WHOLE SUBJECT OF AFGHANISTAN TO BE OUT OF THE HEADLINES DURING THIS AUTUMN'S UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AS IT IS THEY HAVE EVIDENTLY FELT THE PRESSURE ON THEM TO BE SUFFICIENT TO COMPEL THEM TO TAKE A PUBLIC STAND. THEY HAVE GIVEN A FULLER ACCOUNT THAN ANY HITHERTO PUBLISHED HERE OF THE COMMUNITY PROPOSALS, BUT HAVE INGENIOUSLY DISTORTED THE CRUCIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN DISCUSSION IN PHASE 1 AND DECISION IN PHASE 2.

2. THE PETROV ARTICLE CONSTITUTES A REJECTION NOT JUST OF THE EUROPEAN PHOPOSALS IN THEIR PRESENT FORM BUT SEEMS ALSO TO REPRESENT AN ATTEMPT TO SHUT OUT FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE IDEAS ON WHICH IT WAS BASED. IN PARTICULAR PETROV WENT FURTHER THAN THE AIDE MEMOIRE IN SAYING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NEVER NEGOTIATE ON ANY QUESTION CONNECTED WITH AFGHANISTAN WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF AFGHAN REPRESENTATIVES. ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT YET BEEN DRIVEN TO SPELL OUT THEIR VIEW THAT THE KARMAL REGIME IS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THEREFORE THE ONLY AFGHAN BODY WHOSE VOICE SHOULD BE HEARD DURING DISCUSSION OF ANY SETTLEMENT. THE PIECE WILL HAVE MADE EVIDENT TO THE SOVIET READER THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S APPARENTLY TOTAL COMMITMENT TO THE KARMAL REGIME AND THEIR BELIEF THAT NO OTHER REGIME CAN BE ESTABLISHED BY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO THE MAJORITY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. HENCE THE EMPHASIS ON THE 14 MAY 1980 PROPOSALS, THE CLAIM THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE MADE ITS CHOICE THREE YEARS AGO WHEN IT SUPPORTED THE APRIL REVOLUTION, THE SHARPER DEFINITION GIVEN TO THE SOVIET SUGGESTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION MAY BE DISCUSSED ONLY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENTPN AND THE CLAIM THAT NO-ONE ELSE CAN DECIDE FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WHAT SORT OF GOVERNMENT THEY SHOULD HAVE OR WITH WHOM THEY SHOULD BE FRIENDS.

3. THE PRAVDA PIECE WAS ALSO NOTABLE FOR ITS ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES AND TO A LESSER EXTENT ON BRITAIN, COUPLED WITH ATTRIBUTION OF THE PLAN TO BRITISH INSPIRATION AND THE TWO REFERENCES TO YOURSELF AS ''CARRINGTON''.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

BROOKE TURNER

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR E YOUDE
~~MR BULLARD~~
MR FERGUSSON
MR GOODISON
~~MR GILLMORE~~
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)
HD/FED
HD/PUSD (2)
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FM OSLO 061530Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 131 OF 6 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKREP BRUSSELS

AFGHANISTAN

1. HEAD OF POLITICAL SECTION AT THE US EMBASSY HERE, (WHO ARE AT PRESENT WITHOUT AN AMBASSADOR OR SENIOR POLITICAL COUNSELLOR) CALLED TODAY TO DISCUSS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE TOLD US HAD BEEN SENT BY WASHINGTON TO US MISSIONS WORLD WIDE - THOUGH CURIOUSLY, SO FAR AS WE COULD DISCOVER, WITHOUT ANY INSTRUCTION TO RAISE THE MATTER IN LONDON IN OUR PRESIDENCY CAPACITY NOR ANY HINT OF AN INTENTION TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH OUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. THE INSTRUCTIONS ARE THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EXTENSIVE AND "AGGRESSIVE" LOBBYING CAMPAIGN TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNITY'S PROPOSALS ON AFGHANISTAN, BUT COUCHED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PLACE THE MAIN EMPHASIS ON THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN SOVIET REFUSAL TO TAKE PART IN A CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR PROPAGANDA ATTACKS IN OTHER COUNTRIES AGAINST US AND WESTERN POLICIES IN OTHER FIELDS, AND PARTICULARLY ALLEGED US RELUCTANCE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON ARMS CONTROL.

ATTACKS IN OTHER COUNTRIES AGAINST US AND WESTERN POLICIES IN OTHER FIELDS, AND PARTICULARLY ALLEGED US RELUCTANCE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON ARMS CONTROL.

2. HOLMES ASKED WHAT ACTION WE WERE TAKING WITH THE NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES AND, IN CONFIDENCE, WHETHER I THOUGHT THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD RECEIVED FITTED IN WITH THE WAY IN WHICH WE WERE ASKED TO ACT IN NORWAY. I TOLD HIM THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR BOTH IN CONVERSATION WITH YOU AND IN PUBLIC THAT THEY STOOD FULLY BEHIND THE COMMUNITY PROPOSAL ON AFGHANISTAN AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO BE ASKED TO SUPPORT IT. I ADDED THAT JUST BEFORE YOU SAW FRYDENLUND WE HAD RECEIVED CIRCULAR INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE MIGHT ALSO ENCOURAGE GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE THEIR SUPPORT KNOWN IN PRIVATE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER YOU HAD NOT MADE THIS REQUEST TO FRYDENLUND AND I DID NOT THINK, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, THAT IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO DO SO IN THE CASE OF NORWAY. FOR ONE THING IT WAS NOW AN END OF TERM GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS UNLIKELY TO HAVE OCCASION FOR SERIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET MINISTERS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. SECONDLY IF NORWAY WERE TO RAISE THE ISSUE DIRECT WITH THE SOVIET UNION I FEARED THAT IT MIGHT ONLY GIVE AN OPENING FOR FURTHER SOVIET PROPAGANDA ABOUT THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES.

3. HOLMES SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THIS EXPLANATION, AND OF WHAT HE HAD OBSERVED IN THE NORWEGIAN PRESS, HE AGREED THAT THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE A NEED FOR THE US EMBASSY TO ASK THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT EXPRESSLY FOR THEIR SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD TAKE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE COMMUNITY'S PROPOSAL WAS ONE TO WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT FEEL THAT HE COULD DISREGARD THE OTHER PART OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH RELATED TO THE PRESS, PUBLIC AND INTERESTED BODIES IN COUNTRIES WORLD WIDE. THEY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE EXTENSIVE USE OF A GOOD DEAL OF MATERIAL AND WERE CONTEMPLATING AMONG OTHER TINGS MAKING USE OF A LOCAL AFGHANISTAN COMMITTEE (HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION) TO PUT ACROSS A THRUSTING PICTURE OF SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE AND THE NEED FOR NORWEGIANS TO RECOGNISE THE DOUBLE STANDARDS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS EMPLOYING. LINKAGE WITH CSCE WAS ONE OF THE AREAS MENTIONED. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD VALUE OUR ADVICE (WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO ''MOBILISE ALL THE RESOURCES OF THE MISSION'').

4. I SAID THAT WHILE I HESITATED TO ADVISE ANOTHER EMBASSY ON ITS TACTICS, I WOULD BE AGAINST PORTRAYING THE COMMUNITY'S PROPOSAL

4. I SAID THAT WHILE I HESITATED TO ADVISE ANOTHER EMBASSY ON ITS TACTICS, I WOULD BE AGAINST PORTRAYING THE COMMUNITY'S PROPOSAL ON AFGHANISTAN IN A CONFRONTATIONAL LIGHT. THE COMMUNITY WERE TAKING THE LINE THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS DESIGNED TO GET EVERYBODY OFF THE HOOK AND THEREFORE WAS IN SOVIET INTERESTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE AFGHANISTAN PEOPLE - IT WAS A TRULY CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL AND WE WANTED TO BRING HOME TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY HAD A GENUINE INTEREST IN FOLLOWING IT UP. I DID NOT SEE THAT NORWAY WAS IN ANY WAY UNSOUND ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE, EITHER AT GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC LEVEL (IN CONTRAST WITH THEIR ATTITUDES ON THE QUESTION OF NNWFZ). THE NORWEGIANS WERE SENSITIVE TO IMPLIED CRITICISMS AND I THOUGHT "AGGRESIVE" OR CONFRONTATIONAL HANDLING OF THE ISSUE MIGHT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE PRODUCTIVE TO EXPRESS SATISFACTION THAT NORWAY AND THE US WERE SUPPORTERS OF THE COMMUNITY SCHEME WITH A VIEW TO ENCOURAGING WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE ALSO FAVOURED IN THE NNWFZ CONTEXT MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE US SERIOUSLY INTENDED TO START THE TNF ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS. AS FAR AS THE AFGHANISTAN COMMITTEE WAS CONCERNED, I COULD ONLY SPEAK FOR OURSELVES SEMI-COLON I FELT CERTAIN THAT WE WOULD BE INSTRUCTED NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH LOCAL COMMITTEES OF THAT KIND IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

5. WE AGREED THAT I SHOULD REPORT THIS CONVERSATION TO YOU IN YOUR PRESIDENCY CAPACITY AND ASK WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN SIMILAR CONSULTATIONS BY US MISSIONS IN OTHER CAPITALS. FROM WHAT HOLMES SAID, I DEDUCE THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE COME FROM HAIG PERSONALLY. HOLMES SAID THEY WERE COUCHED IN TERMS OF EMOTIONAL ANXIETY. AS SEEN FROM HERE, SUCH BLUNDERBUSS AND INDISCRIMINATE INSTRUCTIONS TO POSTS WORLD WIDE COULD PRODUCE DAMAGING RESULTS. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF THERE IS ANYTHING FURTHER I SHOULD SAY TO HOLMES. PLEASE PROTECT HIS OWN DELICATE POSITION. BY AGREEMENT WITH HIM I HAVE NOT AT THIS STAGE SAID ANYTHING ABOUT OUR CONVERSATION TO OTHER COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS.

BROWN

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From the Private Secretary

28 July, 1981.

I attach a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Ron Brown, M.P., about the situation in Afghanistan.

I should be grateful if you could let us have a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Brown. It would be helpful if your draft could reach us by Wednesday, 5 August.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

28 July, 1981.

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 26 July about Afghanistan.

I will of course place your letter before the Prime Minister at once. You will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Ron Brown, Esq., M.P.

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FM ISLAMABAD 090937Z JUL 81

TO ~~PRTORITY~~ FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 350 OF 9TH JULY

INFO MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN

1. SHAH NAWAZ ALSO TOLD ME THAT THEY HAD JUST HAD ANOTHER VERY THREATENING MESSAGE FROM THE RUSSIANS. THIS WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE QUOTE VERY CONCERNED UNQUOTE ABOUT THE DIRECTION PAKISTAN POLICY WAS TAKING AND SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE ARMS DEAL WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE ARMS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY FIND THEIR WAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO PREVENT THIS. THERE WAS ALSO A HINT THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD INEVITABLY BE INCREASED.

2. THIS SORT OF THREATENING MESSAGE HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO THE PAKISTANIS BEFORE, THOUGH THIS TIME IT WAS IN SOMEWHAT BLUNTER TERMS.

3. THESE MESSAGES COME FROM A PROFESSOR GANKOVSKY IN MOSCOW AND THE PAKISTANIS BELIEVE THAT HE IS A SOVIET GOVERNMENT MOUTHPIECE USED TO CONVEY TOUGH MESSAGES WHILE THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR HERE IS TALKING IN MORE DIPLOMATIC TERMS. BUT THEY WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR OUR ASSESSMENT OF PROFESSOR GANKOVSKY AND THE IMPORTANCE TO BE ATTACHED TO HIS WARNINGS.

4. SHAH NAWAZ SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SPEAKING IN SIMILAR TERMS ONLY TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR.

FORSTER

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TEUEGFAM NUMBER 442 OF 9 JULY
INFO WASHINGTON
SAVING FOR INFO BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

MY TELEGRAM NO 431 : AFGHANISTAN

1. A FURTHER KORNILOV PIECE APPEARED IN TASS OF 8 JULY, IN RESPONSE TO A STATE DEPARTMMENT SPOKESMAN'S COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE COMMUNITY PROPOSALS. KORNILOV DECLARED THAT A SETTLEMENT WAS INCONCEIPPIVABLE WITHOUT THE DRA'S PARTICIPATION. HOWEVER, ''THIS CARDINAL DEMAND'' WAS ''TOTALLY IGNORED AND REJECTED'' BY THOSE BEHIND THE INITIATIVE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE INITIATIVE WAS ''UNACCEPTABLE AND UNREALISTIC''. THE PIE E CONCLUDED WITH A REPETIION OF THE ''CLEAR'' SOVIET POSITION. THE RIGHT WAY TO A SETTLEMENT WAS THE 14 MAY 1980 PROPOSALS.

/ THERE CONTINUES TO BE NOTHING SIGNIFICANT IN THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PRESS.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

KEEBLE

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TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 88 OF 8 JULY
AND TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN OTHER POSTS.
AND SAVING TO ASUNCION, SANTA DOMINGO, TEGUCIGALPA, LIBREVILLE, NUKU ALOFA, TARAWA, ST VINCENT, ANTANANARIVO, ULAN BATOR, CASTRIES, HONIARA, MONROVIA, TORTOLA, SANA'A.
INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA, CG CAPETOWN, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA, UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL OECD PARIS, UKDEL VIENNA.

AFGHANISTAN

1. I PAID A SHORT WORKING VISIT TO MOSCOW ON 6 JULY, PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL'S PROPOSAL ON AFGHANISTAN WITH THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER. I PRESENTED THE PROPOSAL ON BEHALF OF THE TEN EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND EXPLAINED ITS BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE FULLY, STRESSING THAT IT WAS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH A SERIOUS PROBLEM AND HAD BEEN DRAWN UP TO TAKE ACCOUNT SO FAR AS POSSIBLE OF RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ENVISAGE NEGOTIATIONS. GROMYKO DESCRIBED THE PROPOSAL AS UNREALISTIC, IN PARTICULAR ON THE GROUND THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN BY OTHER STATES FROM WHICH HE APPEARED TO EXCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT THE BABRAK KARMEL REGIME SHOULD BE REPRESENTED FROM THE OUTSET. WE DISCUSSED THESE AND OTHER POINTS FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS BUT I FOUND THE SOVIET ARGUMENTS UNCONVINCING.

2. I WAS NOT SURPRISED BY THIS SOVIET REACTION THOUGH IT IS DISAPPOINTING THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED AT PRESENT TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF A REASONABLE PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY AND FOR PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. I THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT AS MANY GOVERNMENTS AS POSSIBLE NOW MAKE THEIR SUPPORT KNOWN BOTH PUBLICLY AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, PRIVATELY, TO THE SOVIET UNION.

3. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED AND, DRAWING ON THE ABOVE AND WITH REFERENCE TO

YOUR PREVIOUS APPROACHES, REQUEST, WHERE THIS IS APPROPRIATE, THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED SHOULD MAKE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN PROPOSAL CLEAR. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO REMAINING IN CONTACT WITH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE PROPOSAL IN THE MONTHS AHEAD AND STRESS THAT IT REMAINS ON THE TABLE AS A REASONABLE PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

CARRINGTON
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Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 7 July 1981, columns 265-269
"Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(Moscow visit)"

Signed O Wayland Date 21 July 2011

PREM Records Team

Afghanistan

STATEMENT ON

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 6 JULY

I paid a short working visit to Moscow for discussions with the Soviet Foreign Minister on 6 July.

My principal purpose was to present to the Soviet Government the proposal adopted by the European Council on 30 June for a two-stage international conference on Afghanistan. Discussion of this matter occupied a full morning of talks.

In explaining the proposal I made it plain that I was speaking on behalf of the Ten member states of the European Community. I emphasised that the problem with which it dealt was one of global significance and whose solution was essential in the interest of peace, stability and the development of East/West relations.

/I

I reminded the Soviet Government that the Ten - and indeed the great majority of the international community - are convinced that the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops is an essential element of any solution.

Mr Gromyko took the view that the proposal by the Ten was, as he put it, 'unrealistic', because the main problem was intervention by others in the affairs of Afghanistan, because it was not stated that the present Afghan regime should participate at the outset and because the proposed composition of the conference was unsatisfactory.

I told him that I did not find these arguments convincing. Mr Gromyko did not say that he rejected the proposal and did not exclude further discussion. For my part I made it plain that the proposal, which has already received an encouraging degree of support in the international community, remains

/on

on the table and that its details are open for discussion.

The brief communique signed at the end of the visit refers to the intention of both sides to continue the dialogue. I have made it clear that as far as I am concerned this means about Afghanistan. I shall now wish to consult with my colleagues in the Ten on the next steps.

I also spoke to Mr Gromyko about Theatre Nuclear Forces, the Madrid Conference and the Middle East. On Theatre Nuclear Forces, I took issue with some of the figures put forward and pointed out that the problem could only be resolved in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States which are due to start before the end of the year.

We agreed that the situation in the Middle East was dangerous and that the right way forward was

/was

a negotiated settlement even though our views on timing and method differed.

We shared the view that if agreement could be reached in Madrid on the area to which new Confidence Building Measures would apply, the way should be clear for a rapid conclusion of the Conference.

AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES] 3b

IMMEDIATE

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PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR E YOUDE
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR DONALD
MR ~~P H MOSERLY~~ D. GILLMORE
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)
HD/FED
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FM MOSCOW 061645Z JUL 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 423 OF 6 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS,
PRIORITY ROME, PEKING, ISLAMABAD, DELHI, TEHERAN, KABUL,
UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, WARSAW.

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FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT

SECRETARY OF STATE'S STATEMENT :
BEGINS
IN ALL MR GROMYKO AND I TALKED TOGETHER FOR 5 HOURS.

WE SPENT THE MORNING TALKING ABOUT AFGHANISTAN AND PERHAPS I COULD CONCETRATE ON THAT. THE SOVIET UNION DIDN'T ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL WHICH I PRESENTED ON BEHALF OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE TEN BUT NEITHER DID THEY SAY THAT THEY REJECTED IT. WHAT THEY DID WAS TO DESCRIBE IT AS UNREALISTIC IN ITS PRESENT FORM, I MUST SAY I FIND THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED FOR THIS UNCONVINCING. THEY SAID THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS

IN ITS PRESENT FORM, I MUST SAY I FIND THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED FOR THIS UNCONVINCING. THEY SAID THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS EXTERNAL INTEVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN BUT DIDN'T INCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION AMONG THE INTERVENERS. I SAID THAT THE SOVIET INTERVENTION WAS THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM, BUT OUR PROPOSAL WAS DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH EXTERNAL INTERVENTION FROM ANY SOURCE. THEY SAID THAT THE PRESENT AFGHAN REGIME MUST BE REPRESENTED IN STAGE ONE, BUT THAT IN POINT OF FACT IS THE PROBLEM WHICH HAS STOPPED NEGOTIATIONS GETTING OFF THE GROUND IN THE PAST, AND OUR PROPOSAL OVERCOMES IT. THEY DESCRIBE THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONFERENCE AS UNREALISTIC. I SAID IT WAS ONLY A SUGGESTION. BUT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE REGION WHO ARE MOST CONCERNED AFTER ALL IN THE MATTER, SEEMED TO BE A REASONABLE COMPOSITION. BUT I ALSO SAID OF COURSE THAT THAT WASN'T IMMUTABLE. NOT THE LAST WORD.

2. I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT THERE ARE BIG DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US. BUT I DON'T THINK EITHER MY COLLEAGUES IN EUROPE OR I EVER EXPECTED EARLY SOVIET ACCEPTANCE. WE WANTED TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION SOMETHING TO REFLECT ON. AND I HOPE THAT WE HAVE, AND I HOPE THAT THEY WILL. CERTAINLY IN MY JUDGEMENT THE PROPOSAL PROVIDES THE BEST HOPE OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH WE WANT AND THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALSO SAID THAT THEY WANT. IT IS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL AND I HOPE THAT ON REFLECTION HERE IN MOSCOW ITS MERITS WILL BECOME CLEARER.

3. IT ISN'T A MATTER BETWEEN THE U.K. AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE BY THE TEN EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND HAS EVOKED MUCH WIDER SUPPORT AND INTEREST EVEN THAN THE TEN. WE YHALL NOW CONSIDER ACTIVELY WAYS IN WHICH THE PROPOSAL CAN BE DEVELOPED. IT WILL BE A NATURAL TALKING POINT IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. FOR EXAMPLE AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHEN I SHALL BE MEETING MR GROMYKO AGAIN. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSAL FURTHER AND THAT'S WHY THE COMMUNIQUE REFERS TO OUR INTENTION TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. THAT IS TO SAY, TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. UNLESS WE MAKE PROGRESS ON THIS PROBLEM THE PROSPECT FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS, EAST WEST AND BRITAIN/SOVIET AREN'T GOOD. SO THE PROPOSAL REMAINS ON THE TABLE AND WE SHALL GO ON WITH IT, WITH OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE TEN WE SHALL CONTINUE TO SEEK THE SUPPORT OF THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHOSE FIRST REACTIONS HAVE GIVEN US A VERY GREAT DEAL OF ENCOURAGEMENT.

THIS AFTERNOON WE DISCUSSED OTHER PROBLEMS THAN AFGHANISTAN.

THOSE FIRST REACTIONS HAVE GIVEN US A VERY GREAT DEAL OF ENCOURAGEMENT.

THIS AFTERNOON WE DISCUSSED OTHER PROBLEMS THAN AFGHANISTAN. WE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES, AT SOME LENGTH. WE DISCUSSED THE MADRID CONFERENCE, THE CDE PROPOSAL. THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAN/IRAQ. I THINK THAT'S ABOUT ALL. WE DIDN'T DISCUSS POLAND IN THE OPEN CONFERENCE, BUT I DISCUSSED OVER LUNCH A NUMBER OF MATTERS WITH MR GROMYKO.

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM ROME 062200Z JULY 1981
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 262 OF THE 6TH JULY 81
FOR INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSLES, ISLAMABAD, KABUL, DELHI, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PEKING, TOKYO, TEHRAN, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, WARSAW, BELGRADE, BUCHEREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, SOFIA, BERNE, VIENNA, STRASBOURG, STOCKHOLM, MADRID, AND PRAGUE.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH GROMYKO 6 JULY: AFGHANISTAN

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN OCCUPIED THE WHOLE MORNING.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HANDED GROMYKO THE TEXT OF THE TEN'S STATEMENT OF 30 JUNE. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN REQUESTED BY THE TEN TO PRESENT THE PROPOSAL ON THEIR BEHALF. IT WAS A GENUINE EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. PAST PROPOSALS HAD HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON THE SITUATION. WE HAD NOTED WITH INTEREST BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN IN HIS SPEECH TO THE CPSU CONGRESS ON 23 FEBRUARY AND HIS STATEMENT IN TBILISI ON 22 MAY. THESE HAD GIVEN HOPE THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND TO MAKE REALISTIC THE PROSPECT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

3. THE PROPOSAL WAS A FRESH ATTEMPT TO OPEN THE WAY TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION. LORD CARRINGTON THEN DESCRIBED THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL, EMPHASISING THAT STAGE ONE WOULD WORK OUT INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BUT NOT TAKE DECISIONS SINCE AFGHAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NOT BE PRESENT. THE PROPOSAL ENVISAGED QUOTE SAFEGUARDS UNQUOTE WHERE MR BREZHNEV HAD REFERRED TO THE SIMILAR CONCEPT OF QUOTE GUARANTEES UNQUOTE. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE NOW TO DEFINE WHICH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD ATTEND STAGE TWO, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE AT THIS STAGE THAT WOULD CREATE AN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LAUNCH A NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND TRY TO CREATE A CLIMATE IN WHICH THAT PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED.

4. THE TEN REGARDED COMPLETE SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAWAL AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF A SOLUTION BUT RECOGNISED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN A STABLE AND FRIENDLY AFGHANISTAN. THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT IMMUTABLE.

5. GROMYKO NOTED THAT THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL WAS FUNDAMENTALLY THE SAME AS THAT TRANSMITTED BY HM AMBASSADOR, MOSCOW ON 23 JUNE. THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED IT UNREALISTIC. IT WAS COMMON GROUND THAT AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED. BUT THE WAY TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION WAS TO END THE EXTERNAL

MILITARY INTERFERENCE WHICH HAD BECOME THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF SOME COUNTRIES. IF MILITARY INTERVENTION CEASED, AND IF GUARANTEES AGAINST ITS RESUMPTION WERE GIVEN, SOVIET FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW IN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. THE FIRST STEP SHOULD BE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, AND ULTIMATELY IRAN. THE MAJORITY OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE WERE HOSTILE TO AFGHANISTAN.

6. GROMYKO ADDED THAT THE PROPOSAL THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD NOT (NOT) TAKE PART IN THE FIRST STAGE WAS DIVORCED FROM REALITY. THE AUTHORS OF THE PROPOSAL WERE GUIDED BY A DESIRE TO ESTABLISH A REACTIONARY REGIME IN KABUL. THE DEFINITIVE SOVIET CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT REALISTIC. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD PERHAPS PRESENT A FORMAL REPLY IN DUE COURSE BUT ITS POSITION SHOULD BE CLEAR FROM WHAT GROMYKO HAD SAID.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD IF ITS AUTHORS HAD CONSIDRED IT UNREALISTIC. MANY OTHER IDEAS, INCLUDING THAT OF BILATERAL PAKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN TALKS, HAD BEEN TRIED BUT HAD FAILED. MUCH OF THE THINKING BEHIND THE PROPOSAL WAS BASED ON BREZHNEV'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINLSTER OF 6 MARCH, FROM WHICH LORD CARRINGTON QUOTED. THE FACT THAT THE FIRST STAGE AIMED ONLY AT A PROVISIONAL SETTLEMENT AND ONLY OF INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS EXPLAINED WHY AFGHAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NOT BE PRESENT. THE TEN DID NOT ENVISAGE A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE SOUGHT ONE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN. OVER TWO MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES DID NOT FIND THE PRESENT REGIME ACCEPTABLE. AS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONFERENCE, WE HAD SUGGESTED THE OBVIOUS CANDIDATES BUT THIS MATTER COULD BE DISCUSSED. WE HAD TALKED TO A NUMBER OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WHO HAD ENCOURAGED US TO GO FORWARD (THOUGH CHINA WAS RATHER NON-COMMITTAL).

8. GROMYKO SAID THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF PRINCIPLE: THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT BELIEVE OTHER COUNTRIES HAD ANY RIGHT TO SAY WHAT AFGHAN REGIME WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THIS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO QUESTIONING WHETHER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE. LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT THERE WAS

A DIFFERENCE OF PERSPECTIVE. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, INTERFERENCE CAME FROM ONE DIRECTION., IN THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE FROM ANOTHER. THE PROPOSAL WAS DESIGNED TO REMOVE ALL EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, FROM WHEREVER IT CAME.

9. GROMYKO THEN ARGUED, IN QUICK SUCCESSION, FIRST THAT THE ORGANISATION OF ARMED INTERFERENCE WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER, THEN THAT IT WAS AN INTERNATIONAL ONE. HE COULD NOT SEE WHY PEOPLE WERE SO SCARED OF THE AFGHAN REGIME. WE SHOULD INVITE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REGIME TO VISIT THE UK OR SEND OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO AFGHANISTAN TO SEE THE SITUATION FOR OURSELVES.

10. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HE WOULD REFLECT ON THE SOVIET REACTION AND WOULD REPORT GROMYKO'S COMMENTS TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE TEN. IF THEY HAD ANY COMMENTS HE WOULD CONVEY THEM TO GROMYKO. THE PROBLEM WAS STILL LIKELY TO BE WITH US WHEN HE MET GROMYKO IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT THE DISCUSSION SHOULD CERTAINLY CONTINUE THEN. BUT ANY PROPOSALS SHOULD ''STEER CLOSER TO REALITY''.

11. LORD CARRINGTON LATER GAVE REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMUNITY EMBASSIES IN MOSCOW A SUMMARY BRIEFING BASED ON THE ABOVE. EC POST AND WASHINGTON MAY DRAW UPON IT AND SAY THAT WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH GOVERNMENTS ABOUT POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS IN DUE COURSE. UKDEL NATO MAY BRIEF NATO COLLEAGUES.
OTHER POSTS TO WHOM THIS TELEGRAM IS REPEATED SHOULD REGARD ITS CONTENTS AS BEING FOR THEIR OWN INFORMATION FOR THE TIME BEING. WE SHALL LET THEM KNOW SHORTLY HOW MUCH OF THE ABOVE SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS AND WHAT SHOULD BE SAID TO THEM ABOUT NEXT STEPS.

ARCULUS

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

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FM MOSCOW 061600Z JUL 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 423 OF 6TH JULY

FOR INFO PRIORITY NATO POSTS DUBLIN MADRID UKREP BRUSSELS EAST BERLIN WARSAW SOFIA BUDAPEST BUCHAREST AND PRAGUE

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH GROMYKO, 6 JULY: TNF

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO REPEAT KNOWN POSITIONS. HE WELCOMED SOVIET READINESS FOR TALKS ON TNF AND THE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO START THEM IN 1981. HE SAW TWO DIFFICULTIES: THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED THAT NATO WOULD GAIN AN ADVANTAGE IF THE DECISION OF DECEMBER 1979 WAS IMPLEMENTED, AND NATO BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MOROTORIUM WOULD PERPETUATE SOVIET SUPERIORITY. THE FIGURES AVAILABLE TO THE UK DID NOT BEAR OUT THE SOVIET ARGUEMENTS, AND NO DOUBT THE REVERSE WAS THE CASE. THE QUESTION OF FIGURES WAS ONE FOR EXPERTS RATHER THAN FOREIGN MINISTERS.

2. GROMYKO TOOK A RATHER HECTORING AND VERY ANTI-AMERICAN LINE. HE REPEATED THE CLAIM THAT NATO ALREADY HAD A SUPERITRITY OF 1.5 TO 1 IN QUOTE THROWABLE NUCLEAR WEIGHT UNQUOTE. THE MODERNISATION OF SOVIET MISSILES AND THE DEPLOYEMENT OF SS20S WOULD CHANGE THIS BALANCE VERY LITTLE. THE AMERICANS REACHED THEIR CONCLUSIONS ONLY BY SUCH DEVICES AS EXCLUDING AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AMERICAN BOMBERS BASED IN EUROPE. THE AMERICAN MILITARY WERE NO FRIENDS OF THE TRUTH, AND EUROPEAN STATESMENT WERE VICTIMS OF DECEIT OR MINSINFORMATION. LORD CARRINGTON SHOULD LOOK DEEPER INTO THE MATTER. THE SOVIET UNION STOOD FOR APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF ''ROCKET-NUCLEAR WEAPONS'' AND FOR EQUAL SECURITY. THEY WERE READY TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE IN NATURAL CONJUNCTION WITH THAT OF AMERICAN FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS.

3. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT NEITHER SIDE MUST BE DISADVANTAGED BUT REPEATED HIS POINT THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN BY ESTABLISHING AGREEMENT ON THE FACTS. GROMYKO REVERTED TO THE ARGUMENT THAT SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS COULD NOT REACH THE UNITED STATES, WHEREAS AMERICAN FBS COULD REACH THE SOVIET UNION. WAS THIS A FACTOR TO BE IGNORED ? AMERICAN MEDIUM RANGE WEAPO S IN EUROPE WERE TANTAMOUNT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN SALT 1. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS PLAYED A POLITICO-MILITARY ROLE.

4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE CONVERSATION WAS FOLLOWING A STANDARD COURSE. HIS OWN CALCULATIONS SHOWED A SOVIET SUPERIORITY

/OF FOUR

OF FOUR TO ONE AT THE POINT WHERE GROMYKO HAD SPOKEN OF AN INFERIORITY OF ONE TO ONE AND A HALF.5ETHE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WOULDHAVE TO SIT DOWN AND TALK, TAKING ACCOUNT OF EACH OTHER'S ARGUEMENTS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE READY FOR SUCH TALKS, BUT THE AMERICAN SYSTEM WAS SUCH THAT TIME WOULD BE NEEDED TO PREPARE FOR THEM.

5. GROMYKO MAINTAINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT REALLY WORKING IN THIS DIRECTION. THE AMERICANS HAD EMBARKED ON THE ROAD OF DECEIT. THIS MIGHT SUIT SOME ALLIES WHO DID NOT CHOOSE TO MAKE THE EFFORT TO STUDY THE FACTS. EVENTUALLY THE TWO SIDES WOULD SIT DOWN AND PUT THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WAS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS DELIBERATELY DECEIVING ITS ALLIES WHILE PRESSING AHEAD WITH ONE HALF OF THE 1979 DECISION. IF AMERICA CONTINUED THE LINE OF UPSETTING THE EXISTING BALANCE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE COMPELLED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION. IF LORD CARRINGTON DID NOT SEE THIS, IT WAS PERHAPS BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN SUPPLIED WITH FALSE DATA. IT COULD NOT BE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST TO PLAY FALSE WITH THE FACTS: IT COULD TOO EASILY BE EXPOSED BY THE NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION WHICH HAD BEEN ADOPTED AS THE BASIS FOR VERIFICATION OF SALT I.

6. LORD CARRINGTON CLOSED THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE NOTE THAT NATO'S GLCMS AND PERSHIN 2S WOULD NOT BE OPERATIONAL UNTIL 1983, WHICH LEFT TIME FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW DUE TO START IN 1981.

7. BULLARD BRIEFED COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS HERE THIS EVENING ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING.

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FM MOSCOW 052200Z JUL 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 421 OF 5TH JULY
FOR INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON BONN PARIS ROME
PEKING ISLAMABAD DELHI TEHRAN KABUL UKMIS N Y BIS N Y
AND UK REP BRUSSELS.

FOLLOWING FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT FROM FENN.
SECRETARY OF STATES VISIT TO MOSCOW.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO GORDON MARTIN BBC EXTERNAL SERVICES, ON THE AIRCRAFT BETWEEN GATWICK AND MOSCOW ON SUNDAY, 5 JULY. FOLLOWING IS EDITED TRANSCRIPT:

Q: LORD CARRINGTON, INITIAL REACTION FROM MOSCOW PERHAPS LOOKS A LITTLE DISCOURAGING, IS THAT YOUR ASSESSMENT?

A: I THINK ITS RATHER DIFFICULT TO KNOW, I WOULD HAVE BEEN ASTONISHED IF THE REACTION HAD BEEN, ''LETS ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS AND GO AHEAD WITH THE CONFERENCE''. I DON'T THINK THATS A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION IS LIKELY TO DO. SOME OF THE REACTIONS HAVE BEEN RATHER NEGATIVE, OTHERS NOT QUITE SO NEGATIVE. I HOPE I SHALL BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN THAT WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING IS REASONABLE AND COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO EVERYBODY.

Q: AND YOU DON'T FEEL IN ANY CASE THAT WHAT APPEARED IN TASS SO FAR IS THE LAST WORD ON THE SOVIET SIDE ?

A: I WOULD VERY MUCH HOPE NOT. I THINK SOME OF IT WAS FAIRLY PREDICTABLE, BUT OF COURSE I SHALL KNOW MUCH MORE TOMORROW WHEN I SEE MR GROMYKO. I WOULD HOPE THAT MR GROMYKO WOULD LISTEN CAREFULLY TO WHAT I HAVE TO SAY ON BEHALF OF THE COMMUNITY, AND IF HE WANTS CLARIFICATION OR HAS OTHER IDEAS TO PUT FORWARD THEN OBVIOUSLY THEY WILL BE LOOKED AT. BUT I HOPE HE WILL AGREEN THAT THE IDEA OF THE CONFERENCE IS A GOOD ONE BECAUSE MR BREZHNEV CERTAINLY SAID EARLIER ON, SOME MONTHS AGO, THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE A SETTLEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN BY MEANS OF A CONFERENCE.

Q: WHAT DO YOU THINK THE OUTCOME PRECISELY OF YOUR TALKS WITH MR GROMYKO MIGHT BE ?

A: IT COULD BE ONE OF THREE THINGS, COULDNT IT? IT COULD BE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONFERENCE., ASKING FOR MORE DETAILS OR MAKING SUGGESTIONS., OR A FLAT REFUSAL. IN ORDER OF DESIRABILITY, OBVIOUSLY THEY ARE IN THAT ORDER. FRANKLY, I DON'T EXPECT OUTRIGHT ACCEPTANCE, AND I SHOULD BE DISAPPOINTED BY OUTRIGHT REFUSAL. I WILL BE SOMETHING IN BETWEEN.

/ Q: PUTTING YOURSELF

Q: PUTTING YOURSELF IF POSSIBLE INTO THE SHOES OF THE PEOPLE IN THE KREMLIN, IS THERE ANY GOOD REASON WHY THE RUSSIANS SHOULD WISH TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN TO JOIN IN A CONFERENCE ?

A: I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THERE WAS. I THINK ONE GOOD REASON IS THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN ALIENATED THE THIRD WORLD. THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT IT, THEY HAD AN ENORMOUS NUMBER OF COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD, WELL OVER 100 VOTING AGAINST THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. THATS NOT SOMETING WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD FIND VERY SATISFACTORY. EQUALLY THEY HAVE HAD SOME TROUBLE IN AFGHANISTAN ITSELF. I DON'T BELIEVE IT'S IN THEIR INTERESTS TO ALLOW THIS OT GO ON. OF COURSE THERE HAS TO BE A SOLUTION WHICH SETTLES THE PROBLEM FOR BOTH SIDES. I THINK IT'S POSSIBLE TO DO THAT, AS I SAID A YEAR OR SO AGO, BY A NEUTRAL, NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN.

Q: YOU HAVE ALWAYS STRESSED, SIR, THAT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN IN THE FOREFRONT OF WORLD OPINION. IS THIS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY YOU ARE COMING TO MOSCOW ?

A: THE MAIN REASON I AM COMING TO MOSCOW IS TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE SOVIET UNION OF THE GOOD POSSIBILITIES OF ACCEPTING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITYS PLAN. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE CAN GET A SETTLEMENT TO THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM IT WOULD REMOVE A VERY DANGEROUS PROBLEM IN THE WORLD - IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH WEST ASIA, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ONE SHOULD TRY TO DO THAT BECAUSE IT DESTABILISES THE AREA AND IT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT ANY OF US WANT. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT ANY OF US ARE GOING TO ACCEPT THE PERMANENT OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN BY THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE MADE IT ABUNDANTLY PLAIN THAT THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

Q: DO YOU THINK THERE IS NOT A RISK THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT TAKE YOUR VISIT AS ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR WISH FOR A NORMALISATION , IN OTHER WORDS THAT WE ARE ANXIOUS TO TALK TO THEM ALMOST ON THEIR OWN TERMS ?

A: I DON'T THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT THAT IS THE CASE. I HAVE SOME HERE, AS I SAY TO PROPOSE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE SHALL TALK ABOUT OTHER THINGS TOO, BUT WE HAVE MADE IT FAIRLY PLAIN THAT THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN IS SOMETHING WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE VERY IMPORTANT IF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST CAN BE NORMALISED.

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Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES]

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/LPS
~~PS/CH BLAKER~~
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR E YOUDE
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR DONALD
MR ~~P H MOBERLY~~ GOODISON
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)
HD/FED
HD/FUSD (2)
HD/UND
HD/SEAD
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HD/EESD
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NO 10 DOWNING STREET

ASSESSMENTS STAFF
CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

GR 610
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 021430Z
FM MOSCOW 021250Z JUL 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 401 OF 2 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PRIORITY WASHINGTON
SAVING FOR INFO PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI,
PEKING KABUL.

MR

IMMEDIATE

EC INITIATIVE ON AFGHANISTAN : SOVIET REACTIONS (see para 5)

1. THERE HAVE BEEN TWO TASS COMMENTS BEARING ON THE INITIATIVE, THE SECOND OF WHICH WAS REPRINTED IN TODAY'S PRAVDA, AND BRANDT HAS DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH PONOMAREV, THOUGH NOT WITH BREZHNEV. BRANDT HAS TOLD THE PRESS HE PLANS TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE LATER THIS WEEK ABOUT AFGHANISTAN.

2. PONOMAREV TOLD BRANDT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY FOR

2. PONOMAREV TOLD BRANDT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION BUT SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD THREE PRECONDITIONS:

(A) INTERVENTION FROM THE TERRITORY OF PAKISTAN SHOULD CEASE AND SHOULD NOT BE RENEWED : IF THAT SITUATION CAME ABOUT, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ''WITH PLEASURE'' BE ABLE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN.

(B) AFGHANISTAN SHOULD REMAIN NON-ALIGNED.

(C) THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN BORDER SHOULD BE GUARANTEED.

PONOMAREV DID NOT REFER SPECIFICALLY TO A REQUIREMENT THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KARMAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY DISCUSSIONS.

3. THE TWO TASS PIECES SIMILARLY REPEATED EXISTING SOVIET POSITIONS. THE FIRST, WHICH WAS NOT REPRODUCED IN THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PRESS, REFERRED REPEATEDLY TO THE ''CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAMME'' PUT FORWARD BY THE DRA ON 14 MAY 1980. THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AFGHANISTAN WAS ENTERING AN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS PHASE WITH THREATS OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY WEAPONS. ANY ATTEMPT TO TALK TO AFGHANISTAN FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH WAS, HOWEVER, FUTILE. THE SOVIET UNION ACTIVELY SUPPORTED AFGHANISTAN'S PEACE INITIATIVES AND PUT THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NORMALISATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE. THE USSR WAS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN SETTLING THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN BUT ONLY THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THIS CASE.

4. THE TASS REPORT REPRINTED IN PRAVDA OF 2 JULY WAS BASED ON CRITICISM OF THE WELCOME GIVEN BY HAIG TO THE ''SO-CALLED'' INITIATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ''BASED ON BRITISH PROPOSALS''. WASHINGTON'S WELCOME WAS MOTIVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ''IS IN FACT DIRECTED AT EXCLUDING THE MAIN AND BASIC SIDE - THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANSTAN - FROM THE QUEST FOR A SETTLEMENT''. THE PIECE NOTED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, BASED ON BRITISH PROPOSALS, WOULD BE CHIEFLY WESTERN COUNTRIES AND CHINA. IT STATED THAT A REALISTIC WAY TO APPROACH A SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN WAS OFFERED BY THE DRA'S 14 MAY 1980 PROPOSALS, AND STRESSED THAT ''QUESTIONS CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN'S

WOULD BE CHIEFLY WESTERN COUNTRIES AND CHINA. IT STATED THAT A REALISTIC WAY TO APPROACH A SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN WAS OFFERED BY THE DRA'S 14 MAY 1980 PROPOSALS, AND STRESSED THAT ''QUESTIONS CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN'S INTERESTS CANNOT BE DISCUSSED, STILL LESS DECIDED, WITHOUT THE DRA GOVERNMENT'S PARTICIPATION OR WITHOUT ITS KNOWLEDGE''. THE SOVIET UNION ACTIVELY SUPPORTED AFGHANISTAN'S PEACE INITIATIVES AND SAW THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF NORMALISING THE SITUATION IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE. IT WAS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN A SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN BOTH SEPARATELY AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF BUT ONLY THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM COULD BE DISCUSSED. THE ONLY WAY TO PEACE WAS THROUGH TALKS ON A BROAD CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS NOT BY MEANS OF ESCALATING AGGRESSION OR ATTEMPTS ''BY SOME CIRCLES IN THE WORLD TO DECIDE THE DESTINY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE BEHIN ITP BACK''.

5. I DOUBT WHETHER EITHER PONOMAREV'S STATEMENT OR THE PRESS REPORTS SHOULD BE SEEN AS BEING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE. IN ESSENCE THEY ARE A RESTATEMENT OF EXISTING SOVIET POSITIONS.

6. I SHALL TELEGRAPH SEPARATELY ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BRANDT VISIT.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

KEEBLE

[NOT PASSED BY C.O.D.]

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

%9)7/ ØØ6/3Ø

Afghanistan

PP LUXEMBOURG

GR 26Ø
CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA 3ØØ6ØØZ JUN 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 44Ø OF 3Ø JUNE
AND TO LUXEMBOURG, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD.

SAVING TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 48Ø TO NEW DELHI : AFGHANISTAN.

1. WHEN I RANG GHAZZAWI TO FIX AN APPOINTMENT HE ASKED ME TO CALL ON 29 JUNE SINCE BANDARI WAS STILL HERE AND WOULD BE SEEING FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD THAT AFTERNOON.

2. I ACCORDINGLY CALLED ON GHAZZAWI ON 29 JUNE, HANDED OVER THE TEXT IN LUXEMBOURG TELNO 12Ø (STRESSING THAT IT WAS A DRAFT AND SUBJECT TO FINAL APPROVAL BY THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT). I SAID THAT WE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY LOBBYING ON BEHALF OOSTHE PROPOSAL WHICH THE SAUDIS FELT ABLE TO UNDERTAKE. I SAID THAT THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S FIRST REACTION WAS NOT DISCOURAGING BUT THAT HE HAD QUESTIONED SIR J THOMSON ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS ASPECT. I THEN USED THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA 1 OF TUR. I ALSO TOLD GHAZZAWI OF SIR C KEEBLE'S DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW. GHAZZAWI ASKED WHETHER IT WAS TRUE THAT YOU WOULD BE GOING TO MOSCOW AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT COMMENT AUTHORITATIVELY IN ADVANCE OF ANY ANNOUNCEMENT BUT SUCH A MOVE SEEMED QUITE LIKELY. GHAZZAWI APPROVED, REPEATING HIS EARLIER REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR ACTIVE DIPLOMACY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. I ADDED THAT THE INDIANS MIGHT HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY IF THEY COULD BE BROUGHT TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL IN MOSCOW: PERHAPS THIS WAS SOMETHING WHICH THE SAUDIS COULD SUGGEST TO THEM. GHAZZAWI NODDED BUT MADE NO OTHER COMMENT. HE DID, HOWEVER, RAISE ARNJI THE QUESTION OF SPONSORSHIP, SHOWING A CLEAR PREDELICTION IN FAVOUR OF INDIA. I REPLIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 1 OF YOUR TELNO 375.

GRAY

NNNN

GR 840
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 231630Z
FM MOSCOW 231440Z JUN 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 364 OF 23 JUNE
INFO PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, ISLAMABAD

YOUR TELS NOS 366, 383 AND 393 : AFGHANISTAN.

1. I TOOK KORNIENKO THROUGH THE COMMUNICATION SET OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON AND HANDED HIM THE TEXT. I ADDED ORALLY THE POINTS IN PARAS 3 , 4 AND 6 OF YOUR TEL 365 (OTHER THAN POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS FOR THE AGENDA AND WITH APPROPRIATE AMENDMENT OF 6 (C)). KORNIENKO SAID HE WOULD INFORM GROMYKO AND LET US HAVE A CONSIDERED REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE HAD, HOWEVER, TWO POINTS TO MAKE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN ON A PERSONAL BASIS:

(A) WE HAD SUGGESTED THE FIRST STAGE OF A CONFERENCE WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHOUT AFGHAN REPRESENTATIVES BEING PRESENT. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN HAD REPEATEDLY EMPHASISED THAT MATTERS CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN COULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITHOUT DRA REPRESENTATIVES. YET IT SEEMED THAT THE SECOND STAGE WOULD BE CONCERNED ONLY WITH ''IMPLEMENTATION'' OF DECISIONS REACHED IN THE FIRST STAGE. I POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE WAS IN TWO STAGES, THE SECOND WAS SEEN AS AN INTEGRAL PART. I DREW HIS ATTENTION AGAIN TO THE PRECISE WORDING ''AIM TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS PRDPOSED AS A RESULT OF STAGE ONE ...''. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT BREZHNEV IN HIS MESSAGE TO THEENMVOCVVAE MINISTER AND ON OTHER OCCASIONS HAD CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF AFGHANISTAN IN TERMS WHICH SEEMED TO US COMPATIBLE WITH STAGE ONE OF OUR PROPOSALS. KORNIENKO SAID IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE ALWAYS TO PUT EVERYTVING INTO EVERY SPEECH OR MESSAGE BUT THAT HE COULD ONLY EMPHASISE THAT IT WAS NOT A PROMISING APPROACH TOZSUGGEST THAT MATTERS DIRECTLY CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITHOUT AFGHAN REPRESENTATIVES BEING PRESENT OR BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

(B) KORNIENKO ASKED, SECONDLY, IN WHAT SENSE WE WERE USING THE WORD ''REPRESENTATIVES'' IN WHAT WE HAD TO SAY ABOUT STAGE TWO. WHO WOULD DECIDE WHO WOULD REPRESENT AFGHANISTAN ? I SAID THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD NO DOUBT BE LOOKED AT AT THE CONFERENCE AND DURING THE CONSULTATIONS WE HOPED COULD BE ARRANGED BETWEEN YOURSELF AND GROMYKO. KORNIENKO REPLIED THAT IF WE HAD IN MIND REPRESENTATIVES OTHER THAN THOSE OF THE LEGITMATE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, HE HAD TO SAY THAT THIS, TOO, WAS NOT A PROMISING APPROACH.

2. I THEN SAID TO KORNIENKO THAT IT WAS NOT JUST A MATTER OF WORDS. THERE WERE REAL PROBLEMS, BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL, CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN. WE WANTED TO CONSIDER THESE SERIOUSLY DURING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GROMYKO AND YOURSELF AND THEN IN A CONFERENCE. THE ZIMBABWE NEGOTIATIONS HAD SHOWN THAT EVEN APPARENTLY INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS COULD YIELD TO PATIENCE AND SKILL BUT FOR THIS TO HAPPEN THERE HAD TO BE A READINESS FOR THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT LESS THAN THEY MIGHT CONSIDER IDEAL. KORNIENKO ANSWERED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN CONCERNED AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND ALSO IRAN TO SOME DEGREE. THERE WERE MANY AFGHANS IN PAKISTAN AND IT WAS FROM THERE THAT ARMED INCURSIONS OCCURRED. HE WONDERED WHY ANYONE WOULD WANT TO HINDER A DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN AS THE US AND OTHERS HAD DONE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR WHEN THE PAKISTANIS HAD RENEGED ON THEIR INITIAL ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH A DIALOGUE. I REPLIED THAT THE PROBLEM THE UNITED NATIONS WAS ADDRESSING WAS THE REAL PROBLEM, THAT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. KORNIENKO CLAIMED NOT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIS PRECLUDED DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. WHY WAS IT NECESSARY TO LOOK FOR A ROUNDABOUT WAY WHEN DIRECT ONES WERE AVAILABLE ? I SAID THAT IT WAS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY AND IN AFGHANISTAN WERE WIDER THAN THOSE HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT WE HAD PUT FORWARD THE APPROACH I HAD JUST OUTLINED. IT HAD BEEN PREPARED WITH VERY GREAT CARE AND WITH AN EYE TO THE PROBLEMS SEEN BY THE SOVIET UNION. I HOPED IT WOULD BE GIVEN VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

3. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION KORNIENKO RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE TIMING OF YOUR VISIT. I STRESSED THAT 3 AND 4 JULY REPRESENTED YOUR VERY STRONG PREFERENCE. KORNIENKO ASKED WHETHER THE 1ST OR FOR EXAMPLE THE 2ND WAS EXCLUDED, OR WHETHER ANY OTHER DATES MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW YOUR PROGRAMME BUT I THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY. TIMING WAS TIGHT AND YOU HOPED 3/4 JULY MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. AS I WAS LEAVING THE HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT TOLD ME HE THOUGHT GROMYKO MUST HAVE SOME FIRM ENGAGEMENT ON 3 JULY. I THEREFORE INDICATED THAT IF IT WERE REALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO RECEIVE YOU ON THE DATES WE HAD SUGGESTED, YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE ROOM IN YOUR OWN PROGRAMME ON 16/17 JULY.

FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER IF REQUIRED.

KEEBLE

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LIMITED
EESD
SAD
ECD (E)
PCD
PLANNING STAFF
DEF D
NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR GILLMORE
MR GOODISON

GRS 700

CONFIDENTIAL

Afghanistan

DESKBY 170800Z

CONFIDENTIAL

FM THE HAGUE 170600Z JUN 81

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 188 OF 17 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN AND UKDEL NATO (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

YOUR TEL NOS 365 AND 366 TO MOSCOW (NOT TO ALL) : AFGHANISTAN

1. AT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS' DINNER HERE ON 16 JUNE BULLARD RECALLED THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROPOSED INITIATIVE, DESCRIBED THE STRONG SUPPORT WHICH IT HAD ALREADY ATTRACTED FROM E.G. PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES, OUTLINED THE CONSULTATIONS ENVISAGED FOR THIS WEEK (INCLUDING NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION) AND ASKED FOR AGREEMENT THAT THE PROPOSAL BE LAUNCHED AS AN INITIATIVE OF THE TEN BY FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THEIR MEETING ON 22 JUNE. BULLARD HAD EARLIER DISTRIBUTED A REVISED DRAFT PROPOSAL BASED ON THE VERSION HANDED OVER IN COMMUNITY CAPITALS BUT TAKING ACCOUNT OF SECOND THOUGHTS IN LONDON AND THE FRENCH COMMENTS COMMUNICATED ON 15 JUNE.

2. A COMPLETE TOUR DE TABLE REVEALED UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF A NEW INITIATIVE TO BE LAUNCHED SOON BY THE TEN AND COMPRISING A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN TWO STAGES.

3. HOWEVER ROBIN (FRANCE) ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THE LAUNCHING OF THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE POSTPONED AT ANY RATE UNTIL 29 JUNE ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:-

(A) THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR POLITICAL COOPERATION SUBJECTS ON 22 JUNE WOULD BE BRIEF AND SOME OF IT WOULD BE TAKEN UP BY THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S REPORT ON HIS MIDDLE EAST MISSION. THE AFGHAN INITIATIVE WOULD REQUIRE PROPER DISCUSSION BY MINISTERS, NOT MERELY RUBBER STAMPING BY THEM, AND THEY MIGHT THEN NEED TO CONSULT THEIR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

(B) THE PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE GREATER IMPACT IF IT WERE LAUNCHED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, WHICH HAD MADE IMPORTANT STATEMENTS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN IN THE PAST AND WAS THE RIGHT BODY TO DO SO THIS TIME. FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS TO PREEMPT THIS BY A WEEK WOULD LOOK STRANGE.

4. ROBIN'S SUGGESTION WAS UNFORTUNATELY SEIZED UPON BY THE OTHER POLITICAL DIRECTORS, SOME OF WHOM HAD ALREADY SHOWN SIGNS OF NERVOUSNESS AT THE PACE OF EVENTS. IT WAS ARGUED THAT LEAKS WERE NOT NECESSARILY INEVITABLE, AND THAT IN ANY CASE IT WOULD BE NO BAD THING IF THE WORD GOT ABOUT THAT A MOVE BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON AFGHANISTAN WAS IMPENDING. ONLY PFEFFER (FRG) HINTED THAT GENSCHER WOULD RATHER ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH THE INITIATIVE THAN ALLOW SCHMIDT TO DO SO.

5. A SECOND TOUR DE TABLE ON THE TEXT PRODUCED A NUMBER OF COMMENTS, SOME HELPFUL. DURING THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION ROBIN GAVE BULLARD VALUABLE SUPPORT IN DISCOURAGING WILD SUGGESTIONS E.G. FOR ENLARGING PARTICIPATION IN STAGE ONE BY THE INCLUSION OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES FROM AFRICA.

6. ABOUT MIDNIGHT ROBIN REVERTED TO HIS THEME THAT THE ONLY WAY TO JUSTIFY OMITTING AFGHAN REPRESENTATIVES FROM STAGE ONE WAS TO LIMIT ITS AGENDA TO AN AREA FROM WHICH THEY ARE EXCLUDED BY DEFINITION, VIZ. THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION, AS IN GISCARD'S PROPOSAL OF SOME MONTHS BACK. PARA 4 OF THE BRITISH DRAFT EVEN AS NOW AMENDED DID NOT QUITE MEET THIS POINT.

7. BELGIUM AND GREECE HOPED THAT SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO GIVE THE TEN AS SUCH A CONTINUING ROLE IN EVENTS, AT LEAST COSMETICALLY, AFTER THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN LAUNCHED.

8. BULLARD EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE IDEA THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS MIGHT NOT BE READY ON 22 JUNE TO TAKE A DECISION ON A PROPOSAL WHICH BY THEN THEY WOULD HAVE HAD 10 DAYS TO STUDY. ON THE FRENCH SCENARIO IT WOULD BE A MIRACLE IF THERE WERE NO LEAKS BETWEEN 22 AND 29 JUNE, GIVING THE RUSSIANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOOT THE PROPOSAL DOWN BEFORE IT TOOK OFF. THE U.K. WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER ITS POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF THE APPARENT PREFERENCE FOR THE LATER DATE. THERE WAS A LIMIT TO THE CAPACITY OF THE BRITISH PROPOSAL TO ABSORB WELL-MEANT VARIATIONS.

9. THE MEETING ENDED WITH PARTNERS EARNESTLY APPEALING TO THE U.K. TO DRAW ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE STRONG SUPPORT GIVEN TO THE SUGGESTION OF AN INITIATIVE BY THE TEN AND NOT TO ABANDON THIS IN FAVOUR OF A NATIONAL PROPOSAL.

10. COMMENT. ROBIN'S INTERVENTION APPEARED DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE POSITION OF MITTERRAND. YOU MAY WISH TO DEFER THE PROPOSED APPROACH BY SIR C. KEEBLE TO THE RUSSIANS AND ANY STATEMENT BY SIR C. ROSE TO NATO PENDING DISCUSSION WITH BULLARD, WHO SHOULD REACH THE F.C.O. BY 0830Z TODAY.
MANSFIELD

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

SAD
EESD
MED
FED
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ECD (E)
CABINET OFFICE

A Afghanistan.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 151100Z JUN 81
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NUMBER 366 OF 15 JUNE
INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN : PROPOSED VISIT TO MOSCOW
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMUNICATION:
QUOTE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE GIVEN SERIOUS THOUGHT TO THE MEMORANDUM ON A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL QUESTIONS WHICH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LONDON CONVEYED TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY ON 23 APRIL. IN PARTICULAR, CAREFUL NOTE HAS BEEN TAKEN OF WHAT WAS SAID IN THE MESSAGE ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR A DIALOGUE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AGREE THAT IN A DIFFICULT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION REMAIN OPEN AND ACTIVE. LORD CARRINGTON WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO PROPOSE THAT HE SHOULD COME TO MOSCOW FOR A SHORT WORKING VISIT EARLY IN JULY TO HOLD POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WHICH DEMAND ATTENTION AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. A PARTICULARLY URGENT QUESTION IS THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS WAS MENTIONED IN THE RECENT EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV, AND AGAIN IN THE SOVIET COMMUNICATION OF 23 APRIL. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE NOTED THE EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS ON THE SOVIET SIDE TO TAKE PART IN A SETTLEMENT OF THIS PRESSING PROBLEM.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO WAYS IN WHICH AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT, IF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT COULD BE FOUND BY WHICH ALL PARTIES CONCERNED COULD ABIDE, THIS WOULD DO MUCH TO IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND FACILITATE A RETURN TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS.

IT IS HOPED THAT BOTH THE BRITISH AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT THE AIM OF A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE AN AFGHANISTAN WHICH IS TRULY INDEPENDENT AND WHOSE INDEPENDENCE IS RESPECTED BY ALL

COUNTRIES. ON THE BASIS OF THIS COMMON GROUND, THE FOLLOWING IDEAS ARE PUT FORWARD FOR CONSIDERATION.

THE UNITED KINGDOM CONSIDERS THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SHOULD BE HELD ON AFGHANISTAN. THIS CONFERENCE SHOULD BE IN TWO STAGES. THE AIM OF THE FIRST STAGE WOULD BE TO PROPOSE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT CAN BE ASSURED, THROUGH THE CESSATION OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT SUCH INTERVENTION IN THE FUTURE.

STAGE ONE OF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE ATTENDED BY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PAKISTAN, IRAN, INDIA AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE TO TAKE PART.

THE FIRST STAGE WOULD ONLY PROPOSE MEASURES. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE THAT IT SHOULD DECIDE MATTERS RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN IN THE ABSENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

THE SECOND STAGE WOULD THEREFORE INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. IT WOULD AIM TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE PROPOSALS WHICH EMERGED FROM STAGE ONE AND ON OTHER MATTERS DESIGNED TO ASSURE AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE AS AN INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED STATE.

IN PUTTING FORWARD THESE IDEAS, THE UNITED KINGDOM IS LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION WHICH WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. AFGHANISTAN MUST BE ENABLED TO LIVE ON GOOD TERMS WITH ALL NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, AND SHOULD ALSO BE PROTECTED FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE FROM ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER.

LORD CARRINGTON LOOKS FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE IDEAS FURTHER DURING THE VISIT HE PROPOSES TO MAKE TO MOSCOW. THEY REPRESENT A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WHICH SHOULD LEAD TO A RESOLUTION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. UNQUOTE.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED	DEFENCE DEPT	
EESD	NEWS DEPT	SIR J GRAHAM
SAD	PS	MR BULLARD
ECD(E)	PS/LPS	MR FERGUSSON
PCD	PS/MR HURD	MR GILLMORE
PLANNING STAFF	PS/PUS	MR GOODISON

COPY SENT TO No 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 151030Z JUN 81
TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NUMBER 365 OF 15 JUNE
INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

AFGHANISTAN : PROPOSED VISIT TO MOSCOW

1. I SHOULD LIKE TO PAY A SHORT WORKING VISIT TO MOSCOW IN EARLY JULY TO HELP CARRY FORWARD OUR INITIATIVE ON AFGHANISTAN.

2. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE SEEK A CALL ON FRIDAY 19 JUNE ON GROMYKO OR A DEPUTY MINISTER TO HAND OVER THE TEXT IN MIFT. YOU SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, ASK FOF THE APPOINTMENT UNTIL RECEIPT OF CONFIRMATION BY TELEGRAM FROM THE HAGUE THAT THE TEN POLITICAL DIRECTORS HAVE AGREED ON 1o JUNE THAT OUR PROPOSALS CAN GO FORWARD FOR ENDORSEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 22 JUNE. IT MAY ALSO BE NECESSARY TO AMEND THE LANGUAGE USED TO DESCRIBE OUR PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN IN THE LIGHT OF DISCUSSION BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS.

3. THE COMMUNICATION IN MIFT IS NOT A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO GROMYKO. YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, MAKE IT CLEAR THAT YOU ARE DELIVERING IT ON INSTRUCTIONS. THE MESSAGE MAKES NO SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ON DATES. YOU SHOULD SUGGEST 3-4 JULY AS MY STRONG FIRST PREFERENCE AND SEEK TO AVOID SUGGESTING ALTERNATIVES. IF PRESSED, HOWEVER, YOU MAY MENTION 16-17 JULY BUT SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IS VERY MUCH OUR SECOND BEST. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT I SEE ADVANTAGE IN A VISIT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IN JULY AND THAT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIND ALTERNATIVE DATES LATER IN OUR PRESIDENCY.

4. IF THE RUSSIANS ASK ABOUT THE AGENDA, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT I WOULD WISH TO FOCUS ON AFGHANISTAN AND TO EXPLAIN THE THINKING BEHIND OUR PROPOSALS. OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH COULD BE DISCUSSED INCLUDE THE MIDDLE EAST, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN EUROPE, ARMS CONTROL ISSUES INCLUDING TNF, AND CSCE, AS WELL AS BILATERAL RELATIONS. BUT I SEE NO NEED FOR A FORMAL AGENDA. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT I SEE THIS AS A WORKING VISIT WITH THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM OF PROTOCOL AND FORMALITY WHICH IS WHY THE PROPOSED VISIT WILL NOT

/BE

BE FOLLOWING THE STRICT PROTOCOL SEQUENCE. MY OBJECTIVE, WHICH I HOPE GROMYKO WILL SHARE, IS TO HOLD WIDE-RANGING AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE RECENT CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS.

5. IF THE RUSSIANS REQUEST ADVANCE INFORMATION ON TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, SIZE OF PARTY ETC, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE AN EARLY INDICATION OF THESE ONCE WE HAVE THE SOVIET RESPONSE ON THE PROPOSAL ITSELF AND ON DATES. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, I SHOULD WISH TO ARRIVE IN MOSCOW ON THE EVENING OF THURSDAY 2 JULY AND DEPART ON THE MORNING OF SATURDAY 4 JULY.

6. FCO TELNO 789 TO WASHINGTON SETS OUT THE MAIN POINTS OF OUR PROPOSAL ON AFGHANISTAN, BUT THE COMMUNICATION IN MIFT CONTAINS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT LANGUAGE ON SOME ASPECTS WHICH WE SHALL BE PUTTING TO OUR EC COLLEAGUES ON 16 JUNE. IN PRESENTING THE PROPOSAL YOU SHOULD DRAW ON MIFT AND EXPLAIN THAT:

A. THE PROPOSAL IS IN ACCORD WITH BREZHNEV'S STATEMENTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO HOLD SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF AFGHANISTAN. THE FIRST STAGE IS LIMITED TO PROPOSING INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. YOU SHOULD NEVERTHELESS MAKE CLEAR THAT THE SECOND STAGE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PROPOSAL AND THAT THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE IS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT ENDORSED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF AFGHAN OPINION.

B. THE PROPOSAL IS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO FIND A WAY TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION.

C. WHILE THE IDEAS OUTLINED IN THE PROPOSAL ARE OF BRITISH ORIGIN, THEY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH OUR EC PARTNERS AND THE TEN ARE LIKELY TO ANNOUNCE THE PROPOSAL ON 22 JUNE AS A PROPOSAL OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

7. IF GROMYKO PROBES OUR IDEAS, YOU SHOULD IN GENERAL DECLINE TO BE DRAWN AND TAKE THE LINE THAT I SHOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS THEM IN GREATER DETAIL DURING MY VISIT. BUT YOU MAY SAY THAT:

A. OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THIRD WORLD AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE REVEALED A CONTINUING WIDESPREAD INTEREST

/IN

IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT FF THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM.

B. I AM PUTTING OUR IDEAS TO THE RUSSIANS WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE REST OF THE TEN IN ADVANCE OF THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT AS A CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT BREZHNEV AND THE PRIME MINISTER, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE REFERENCES IN THE POPOV MEMORANDUM TO THE NEED FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATION AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL BETWEEN US. IF YOU THINK IT APPROPRIATE, YOU COULD ALSO REFER TO THE SPECIFIC REMARKS ABOUT A BILATERAL DIALOGUE OVER AFGHANISTAN MADE BY SUSLOV IN LONDON IN LATE MAY.

8. BULLARD WILL INFORM THE AMERICAN, FRENCH AND GERMAN POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON 15 JUNE OF MY INTENTION TO VISIT MOSCOW, BUT WILL TELL OTHER POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE TEN ON 16 JUNE ONLY THAT WE SHALL BE BRIEFING THE RUSSIANS ON THE AFGHANISTAN INITIATIVE ON 19 JUNE. I SHALL TELL MY COLLEAGUES IN THE TEN ON 22 JUNE OF THE PROPOSED VISIT.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

NNNN

LIMITED
EESD
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ECD(E)
PCD
PLANNING STAFF

DEFENCE DEPT
NEWS DEPT
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS

SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR GILLMORE
MR GOODISON

GR 470
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PEKING 120730Z JUN 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELNO 423 OF 12 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 312: AFGHANISTAN

1. I CALLED ON HUANG HUA ON 12 JUNE AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. I ALSO DREW THE PARALLEL BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA (PARAGRAPH 6 OF YOUR TUR). I WAS NOT ASKED ABOUT HAIG (YOUR PARAGRAPH 4).

2. HUANG HUA THANKED US FOR GIVING HIM THIS ADVANCE INFORMATION. HE AGREED THERE WAS A RISK OF WANING INTERNATIONAL INTEREST AND FAVOURED EFFORTS TO KEEP THE AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIAN ISSUES ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA SO AS TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS AND VIETNAMESE. THE SOVIET UNION AND VIETNAM HAD ALREADY REFUSED INVITATIONS TO THE FORTHCOMING CAMBODIA CONFERENCE BUT IS A RESOLUTION WAS PASSED AT THAT CONFERENCE ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS IT WOULD GIVE POLITICAL AND MORAL SUPPORT TO THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND ACHIVE POSITIVE RESULTS. ALTHOUGH THE VIETNAMESE HAD MET MANY DIFFICULTIES THEY WOULD NOT WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIA AND IN THE CHINESE VIEW ONE CONFERENCE WAS PROBABLY NOT ENOUGH. THERE SHOULD BE MORE.

3. AS REGARDS AFGHANISTAN, HUANG HUA EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO BE EVEN MORE OBDURATE, THOUGH PERHAPS MORE CUNNING, THAN THE VIETNAMESE. THE SOVIET MOVE INTO AFGHANISTAN WAS A STRATEGIC ONE WHICH HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN LIGHTLY AND UNLESS THE RUSSIANS MET MAJOR DIFFICULTIES THEY WOULD NOT BACK DOWN. AFGHAN RESISTANCE HAD BEEN STRONGER THAN MANY EXPECTED AND SO LONG AS MATERIAL HELP WENT TO THE RESISTANCE FIGHTERS THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY ON FOR A LONG TIME. THEIR MORALE WAS HIGH AND THERE WERE LOTS OF THEM. ONE OF THE REASONS FOR SOVIET HESITANCY OVER INTERVENTION IN POLAND WAS THE DIFFICULTIES THEY ENCOUNTERED IN AFGHANISTAN.

4. TURNING TO OUR PROPOSAL, HUANG HUA SAID THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FAVOURED THE GENERAL UK POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN, MATERIAL AID SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE RESISTANCE FORCES AND PRESSURE MAINTAINED BY WORLD OPINION. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, MAKE NO SPECIFIC COMMENT AT THIS STAGE ON OUR PROPOSAL. IT WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. PERHAPS LATER THE CHINESE WOULD PUT SOME QUESTIONS, INCLUDING WHAT TERMS WE WERE THINKING OF OFFERING SO AS TO ATTRACT SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAWAL.

/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. I EMPHASISED THAT MANY DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL HAD STILL TO BE WORKED OUT. WE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION BUT CONSIDERED THAT IF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WAS TO BE MAINTAINED WE WOULD NEED TO PUT FORWARD SERIOUS, WELL THOUGHT OUT PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTIONS. WE WOULD REMAIN IN TOUCH AND DO OUR BEST TO ANSWER ANY CHINESE QUESTIONS.

COMMENT

6. THIS IS PROBABLY AS GOOD AS RESPONSE AS WE COULD EXPECT. UNQUALIFIED CHINESE SUPPORT WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO DO OUR INITIATIVE MUCH GOOD. THEY WILL PROBABLY KEEP SOME DISTANCE FROM IT, AS THEY DID WITH THE ASEAN PROPOSAL ON CAMBODIA. THEY WILL SEE MERITS IN IT AS A MEANS OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS, BUT AS HUANG HUA'S GENERAL COMMENTS INDICATED, WILL GIVE IT LITTLE CHANCE OF ACHIEVING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

CRADOCK

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

SAD
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UND — WED
ECD (E)
CABINET OFFICE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ENCIPHERED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

file

Afghanistan

BK

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 June 1981

Afghanistan

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 9 June describing the further steps which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary intends to take to promote our proposal for an international conference on Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister agrees that Lord Carrington should proceed on the basis described in your letter. However, the Prime Minister remains very conscious that the proposed visit to Moscow is being arranged against the background of a deteriorating situation in Poland. She assumes that if the Soviet Union were to take any overt action against the Poles, Lord Carrington's visit to Moscow would be cancelled at once.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

This is the follow up to your conversation with the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary last week. The link between Afghanistan & the visit to Moscow is clearly made.

I continue to find the timing a little odd in the Polish context. But one can argue that once the Ten have endorsed the initiative, the sooner Lord Carrington puts it to the Russians the better. It is of course well understood that if the Russians take overt action against the Poles, the visit will be instantly cancelled. Content for Lord C to proceed as he proposes? Yes - Poland permitting. 9.6.81.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 June 1981

Dear Michael,

Afghanistan

Clive Whitmore's letter of 21 May conveyed the Prime Minister's agreement to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 20 May in which he described the steps he would be taking to promote a proposal by the Ten for an international conference on Afghanistan.

First reactions to the proposal have been most encouraging. Genscher and Cheysson have both said that they support it. The Americans have also said that they see no difficulty and we understand that a message to this effect will shortly reach us from Haig. We made a particular point of carefully consulting the Netherlands Presidency who again reacted favourably. Sir John Graham visited Pakistan at the end of last week to present our ideas to the President and Foreign Minister. President Zia (who asked Graham to convey his good wishes to the Prime Minister) and Agha Shahi were also attracted by the proposal and said that Pakistan would support it - but they will be careful as to how they react initially to the announcement to avoid the appearance of collusion. They made no objection to the participation of India, although they hope this can be presented as representation of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware of the further action that Lord Carrington contemplates. We shall be giving the rest of the Ten an outline of our proposal today in the hope that they will have time to study it and convey their agreement at the next meeting of Political Directors on 16 June. Before the formal announcement of the proposal at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on 22 June we propose to brief the Saudi Foreign Minister (on 10 June), the Australian Foreign Minister (on 12 June), and the Japanese Foreign Minister (on 17 June). On 17 June we would also brief NATO and, in capitals, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. On the following day we shall brief the UN Secretary-General, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, the Saudis (in Jedda), India, Iran and Japan. We are still considering the best time to brief the Chinese.

The important step, however, is the approach to the Soviet Union. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary intends to instruct HM Ambassador, Moscow, to reply on 19 June to the message passed to Lord Carrington by Ambassador Popov on 23 April. Sir Curtis Keeble would tell the Soviet Union that Lord Carrington was interested in a meeting with Gromyko at which he would discuss a number of subjects, in particular

/Afghanistan

Afghanistan, on which we had some ideas about a possible solution. He would then describe in outline the proposed international conference on Afghanistan and suggest that Gromyko and Lord Carrington should meet on 3/4 July.

An approach on these lines would, as agreed, tie the visit to Moscow clearly to the Afghanistan initiative. It would give the Russians advance notice before the Foreign Ministers of the Ten announced the proposal on 22 June. We believe that some advance warning is desirable since our general approach is to give the Russians no easy excuse for rejecting the proposal (if they were simply informed by public announcement they could the more easily reject it as a propaganda move). But the proposed timing should be insufficient for the Russians to make disparaging public comment or to come back with a formal rejection, before 22 June; and the offer of a visit to discuss it should have a similarly inhibiting effect on Soviet public comment.

Lord Carrington believes that a visit at the time proposed (there is no easy alternative in the first half of July) would have the additional advantage of creating another reason for the Russians to hesitate over intervening in Poland. As the Prime Minister knows, Lord Carrington has invited the Polish Foreign Minister to come here next week, partly for the same purpose.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O D'B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

RR UKDEL NATO

RR ATHENS

RR BRUSSELS

RR COPENHAGEN

RR DUBLIN

RR LUXEMBOURG

RR ROME

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IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

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Head SAD
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PS/LPS
PS/Mr Blaker
Mr Bullard
Mr Goodison
Mr Ferguson
RC

PS/Pus

No 10 (2)

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 070122Z JUN 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1750 OF 6 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, THE HAGUE, ISLAMABAD, ROUTINE KABUL, DELHI MOSCOW, JEDDA, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK, PEKING, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, OTHER EC POSTS (ALL PERSONAL FOR HEAD OF MISSION).

CHEYSSON VISIT TO WASHINGTON: AFGHANISTAN.

1. AT HIS MEETING WITH COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS TODAY, THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT NORMALLY THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD HAVE GONE ON TO MOSCOW AFTER VISITING WASHINGTON. BUT HE WAS NOT DOING SO THIS TIME BECAUSE OF AFGHANISTAN.

2. CHEYSSON SPOKE FAVOURABLY OF THE BRITISH PROPOSAL. HE THOUGHT THAT THE TWO-STAGE IDEA WAS PREFERABLE TO THE PREVIOUS ONE. HE ALSO SAID THAT HAIG FAVOURED THE BRITISH PLAN. (I NOTICED THAT THE DANISH J AMBASSADOR, WHO WAS SITTING NEXT TO ME, SEEMED SOMEWHAT BAFFLED BY THIS REFERENCE. BUT, DEPENDING ON HOW ALERT MY COLLEAGUES WERE, THERE IS CLEARLY A RISK THAT CHEYSSON HAS LET THE CAT OUT OF THE BAG.)

HENDERSON

NNNN

Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES] 30

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
~~SIR E YOUDE~~
~~MR BULLARD~~
MR FERGUSSON
MR DONALD
MR ~~P H MOBERLY~~ Gillmore
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)
HD/FED
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/UND
HD/SEAD
HD/SAD (4)
HD/EESD
HD/NAD
HD/DEF D
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NEWS D
Hd/WED
Hd Planning Staff.

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ASSESSMENTS STAFF
CABINET OFFICE

ADVANCE COPY

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IMMEDIATE

FM ISLAMABAD 051000Z JUN 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 5TH JUNE
INFO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, JEDDA, PEKING, TOKYO, DELHI, UKDEL NATO AND EC POSTS,

YOUR TELNO 789: AFGHANISTAN

1. GRAHAM SAW AGHA SHAHI, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SHAH NAWAZ, THIS MORNING. HE PRESENTED OUR PROPOSAL ON THE LINES OF THE BRIEF. HE HAD NOT SEEN YOUR TELS NO'S 461 AND 463 (NOT TO ALL) BEFORE THE MEETING BUT IN ANY CASE LEFT OPEN WHETHER THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE A BRITISH INITIATIVE, WITH THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE TEN, OR AN INITIATIVE BY THE TEN: AND INDICATED THAT PRELIMINARY US REACTIONS WERE GENERALLY FAVOURABLE. GRAHAM GAVE AGHA SHAHI A PIECE OF PAPER SETTING OUT THE PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE TWO STAGES OF THE CONFERENCE.

SETTING OUT THE PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE TWO STAGES OF THE CONFERENCE.

2. AGHA SHAHI SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS A WELL-THOUGHT OUT, FLEXIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PIECE OF WORK, WHICH WAS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH PAKISTAN'S OWN THINKING. WE COULD CONVEY PAKISTAN'S AGREEMENT TO IT. HE HAD ONE POINT ON THE WORDING OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE: HE WOULD PREFER THE WORDS IN STAGE I (A) QUOTE THE CESSATION OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTION UNQUOTE TO BE AMENDED TO REFLECT THE WORDING IN THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION AT DELHI. THE PRESENT WORDING MIGHT ALLOW THE RUSSIANS TO CLAIM THAT WE HAD CONCEDED THEIR ALLEGATION THAT THE PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY INTERVENTION THROUGH PAKISTAN AND IRAN. WE UNDERTOOK TO CONSIDER THIS.

3. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE, BUT IN THE END THE PAKISTANIS AGREED THAT OUR IDEAS ABOUT THIS WERE LOGICAL AND DEFENSIBLE. THEY MADE NO POINT ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF INDIA, SAW NO DIFFICULTY IN THE INCLUSION OF THE SECRETARIES GENERAL OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE UN, OR, IF IT SEEMED NECESSARY, OF AN EAST EUROPEAN. CUBA (PRESIDENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED) WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

4. AGHA SHAHI ASKED PARTICULARLY ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAUNCHING THE PROPOSAL. WHEN TOLD THAT OUR THINKING, AS IN PARA 1, HE WELCOMED IT. IF IT WAS A BRITISH OR EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, PAKISTAN WOULD RESPOND IN THE FIRST INSTANCE RATHER CAUTIOUSLY, AND WOULD FOLLOW THAT ABOUT A WEEK LATER WITH A LESS RESERVED WELCOME. TACTICALLY THIS WOULD AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF COLLUSION.

5. SHAHI SAID THAT ONE ADVANTAGE OF OUR PROPOSALS WAS THAT IT MIGHT SERVE TO CONCENTRATE THE MINDS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE: FACED WITH THE NEED TO PRODUCE REPRESENTATIVES THEY MIGHT EVEN MANAGE TO SINK THEIR DIFFERENCES. HE AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN HOLDING THE CONFERENCE IF THE SOVIET UNION REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE.

6. GRAHAM OUTLINED OUR PROPOSED TIME-TABLE OF APPROACHES. AGHA SHAHI MADE NO OBJECTION AND SUGGESTED NO ADDITIONS. AS TO IRAN, HE THOUGHT THE BEST COURSE WAS FOR US TO PUT THE PROPOSAL TO THEM AS WE PROPOSED, AT WHATEVER LEVEL WE COULD ACHIEVE: PAKISTAN WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT IT ONCE IT HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED AND THEIR POSITIVE RESPONSE MADE PUBLIC. THEY WERE AT PRESENT PRESSING IRAN TO RECEIVE DE CUELLAR AND WOULD NOT WISH TO CONFUSE THAT ISSUE BY RUNNING ANOTHER PROPOSAL (BUT SHAHI RAISED NO DIFFICULTY OVER THE UN OPERATION RUNNING IN PARALLEL TO OUR OWN).

TO RECEIVE DE CUELLAR AND WOULD NOT WISH TO CONFUSE THAT ISSUE BY RUNNING ANOTHER PROPOSAL (BUT SHAHI RAISED NO DIFFICULTY OVER THE UN OPERATION RUNNING IN PARALLEL TO OUR OWN).

7. AGHA SHAHI REPEATED HIS DOUBTS ABOUT THE IDEA OF A UN-SPONSORED COMMITTEE ON AFGHANISTAN, BUT SAID IT COULD BE KEPT IN RESERVE. A CONFERENCE ABOUT THE REFUGEES WAS QUITE SEPARATE FROM OUR PROPOSAL AND COULD HAPPEN IN ANY CASE.

8. AGHA SHAHI SAID THAT PAKISTAN WAS UNDER CONTINUING SOVIET PRESSURE. THEIR RECENT HIGH LEVEL VISITOR QUOTE SPEAKING PERSONALLY UNQUOTE A MEANINGLESS ASSURANCE IN RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY HAD WARNED THEM THAT THEY WERE IN A STATE OF UNDECLARED WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH THE SOVIET UNION'S FRIENDS, AND, IN A REFERENCE TO SUPER-POWER RELATIONS HAD SAID THAT WHEN TWO ELEPHANTS FIGHT, OR MAKE LOVE, THE GRASS GETS TRAMPLED.

9. GRAHAM MAY SEE ZIA TO-MORROW BUT, IN SUM, THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL AS A REALISTIC WAY OF KEEPING UP THE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS, WITH THE ADVANTAGE THAT IF THEY WERE TO AGREE TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE, IT COULD LEAD TO A REALISTIC SETTLEMENT. (AGHA SHAHI SEEMED MORE OPTIMISTIC THAT SHAH NAWAZ, OR WE, COULD BE, BUT HE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CREATION OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE US AND SOVIET UNION TO REACH AN AGREEMENT AS PART OF THEIR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP.)

MASEFIELD

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

21 May 1981

Dear Brian,

AFGHANISTAN

The Prime Minister has seen Lord Carrington's minute of 20 May 1981 about Afghanistan.

She is content that he should take the first steps to launch a British initiative on the lines he proposes in his minute.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Brian Fall Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PM/81/28

PRIME MINISTER

Afghanistan

1. It remains our aim to bring about a solution to the Afghanistan problem involving Soviet military withdrawal, freedom for the Afghans to have a government of their choosing and satisfactory arrangements for the return of the refugees. To this end we and like-minded countries have been trying to encourage two forms of pressure on the Soviet Union: resistance activity in Afghanistan and international diplomatic pressure. Resistance activity continues at a high level and shows no sign of slackening. But international pressure has been reduced. The US decision to lift the grain embargo and the consequent EC decisions may be interpreted as a weakening of the Western attitude. Pakistan is preoccupied with a new US aid offer and is no longer leading diplomatic activity. Waldheim's current efforts to find a way forward are unlikely to come to anything. No major UN or other discussion of Afghanistan is planned before the UN General Assembly in the autumn. With the change of President in France Giscard's earlier proposal for an international conference is not likely to be pressed.

2. I have therefore concluded that the United Kingdom should take the initiative to stimulate fresh diplomatic activity. My aim is that after careful initial consultations with our principal allies and the Pakistanis, and wider consultations later, the Ten would propose at the end of June that an international conference on Afghanistan be convened, perhaps in Geneva, in October/November. It would be presented as a conference in two stages. Stage One would be very much

/like

like Giscard's proposal and would involve discussions by the Permanent Members of the Security Council, Pakistan and certain others of external factors such as the cessation of external intervention and the establishment of guarantees for an independent Afghanistan. Stage Two would be attended additionally by representatives of Afghan opinion and would aim to reach agreement on the international arrangements proposed by Stage One and all other matters necessary to promote the return of Afghanistan to independence and non-aligned status. This proposal would avoid some of the difficulties of Giscard's proposal eg by making provision for Afghan opinion to be involved in the second stage. The difficult question of who should represent the Afghans does not have to be settled now. But it is clearly essential for them to participate in any settlement of the problem and any proposal which does not recognise that from the outset is likely to encounter much criticism both from the Afghans and more widely.

3. The likelihood is that the Soviet Union will reject the proposed Conference. It has so far shown no serious disposition to negotiate. The primary purpose of the proposal is therefore to renew diplomatic pressure and rekindle interest. But there is an outside chance that the Russians will be prepared to consider a device which offers them a chance of withdrawal without loss of face. We shall in any case present the proposal as a serious attempt to promote a solution.

4. Much more work will be necessary on the details but my colleagues should be aware of the basic idea before we begin consultations about it with selected countries next week.

/I am

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CARRINGTON)

20 May 1981

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract from a Middle

Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and

Sec / General of the United Nations - House of Commons

Tuesday 12 May at 1530 hrs

Subject copy: United Nations, May 79, Visit by Sec General of UN Mr. Waldheim.

Afghanistan

Dr. Waldheim said that Mr. Brezhnev had welcomed the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices and the mission of Mr. Perez de Cuellar. The Russians had also accepted that the United Nations should participate in regional talks on the problem, whereas they had previously insisted that the UN could only be an observer. It remained to be seen what this would mean in practice. It was far from certain that the Russians were interested in moving forward. When the Prime Minister expressed reservations about allowing the puppet regime to participate in talks, Dr. Waldheim said that in Soviet eyes Karmal was expendable. Mr. Hurd drew attention to the importance of adhering to the principles of the General Assembly's Resolution, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Dr. Waldheim replied that there was no prospect of withdrawal without negotiations. He added that even the Pakistanis now saw some merit in ambiguity about the relationship between current diplomatic activity and the Resolution. In response to a question about the position of Pakistan generally, Dr. Waldheim said that Mr. Shahi had been greatly impressed by the offers of assistance he had now received from the United States but was anxious to avoid giving the impression of alliance with the Americans, thus prejudicing Pakistan's position in the Non-Aligned and Islamic Movements.

CONFIDENTIAL

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BURNING BUSH

FROM ROME 040300Z MAY 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 134 OF 04 MAY 81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, DELHI, ISLAMABAD

UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/HIGH COMMISSIONER)

QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL DINNER IN ROME, 3 MAY:

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/INDIA

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE TO DISPEL THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST WAS COMING ROUND TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. HE SUGGESTED THAT SOMETHING ON THE LINES OF GISCARD'S IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD DO NO HARM AND WOULD KEEP THE ISSUE BEFORE THE PUBLIC AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

2. HAIG THOUGHT THAT THIS SHOULD BE CLEARED FIRST WITH THE PAKISTANIS. THEIR VIEW WAS CRUCIAL. THEY HAD SEEMED VERY WORRIED A FEW WEEKS AGO, BUT THEY WERE HAPPIER NOW THAT THE SAUDIS HAD PROMISED THEM 5 BILLION DOLLARS. THE UNITED STATES WAS ALSO GIVING 100 MILLION DOLLARS THIS YEAR AND 2 BILLION OVER 5 YEARS. THIS WOULD MAKE MRS GHANDI NERVOUS, BUT INDIA ALREADY HAD BOTH MORE TROOPS AND MORE EQUIPMENT, AND WAS BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT TO CONCLUDE ANOTHER ARMS DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

3. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT GISCARD'S PROPOSAL HAD BEEN LAUNCHED BUT NOT PUSHED. AFTER THE FRENCH ELECTION IT WOULD BE REVIVED. BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN IDEA OF THE GENERAL PICTURE. IF THERE WERE TO BE SOVIET CONCESSIONS, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL.

4. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION INTERVENED BY FORCE IN POLAND, THE 4 POWERS SHOULD STATE OPENLY THAT THEY WOULD HELP THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. GENSHER THOUGHT THAT WORLD PUBLIC OPINION DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE WEST HAD NOT RESPONDED TO AFGHAN CALLS FOR HELP . THIS WAS A POLITICAL WEAPON, AND THE WEST SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS SELF-EVIDENTLY IMPOSSIBLE.

ARCULUS

LIMITED

HD/PLANNING STAFF	MR BULLARD
HD/SAD	MR FERGUSSON
HD/EESD	SIR J GRAHAM
HD/NAD	MR DAY
HD/MED	MR URE
PS/PUS	MR J MOBERLY

PS
PS/LPS

SECRET

LUK 906/15

LGI 276/15

PP F C O

PP DELHI

PP KABUL

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 385
CONFIDENTIAL
FM ISLAMABAD 150930Z APR 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 224 OF 15TH APRIL
INFO PRIORITY DELHI, KABUL ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 221: AFGHANISTAN: UN REPRESENTATIVE'S VISIT

1. THE MFA HAVE GIVEN ME AN ACCOUNT OF DE CUELLAR'S TALKS AND HE HIMSELF ASKED THE UNDP REPRESENTATIVE HERE TO BRIEF ME.

2. BECAUSE OF A FAULT IN THE UNMOGIP PLANE IN WHICH DE CUELLAR INTENDED TO FLY TO KABUL HE HAD TO BORROW PRESIDENT ZIA'S PLANE. HE THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO CLEAR THE DETAILS WITH THE AFGHANS AND ALSO WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE THEREFORE CALLED ON THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE, SMIRNOV, WHO HAD BEEN HIS COLLEAGUE AT THE UN IN THE EARLY 70S. IN THE COURSE OF HIS CALL HE BRIEFED SMIRNOV ON THE TALKS AND FELT OBLIGED TO PUT THE US AND UK IN THE PICTURE AS WELL. HE WILL GIVE A FURTHER BRIEFING TO THE NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR, FOR THE EC, WHEN HE TRANSITS ISLAMABAD ON HIS WAY BACK FROM KABUL TO NEW YORK VIA PARIS.

3. DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS BRIEFED NOT TO TAKE A POSITIVE ROLE OR TO PRESENT ANY SORT OF FORMULA BUT TO ACT AS A BRIDGE IN CASE EITHER SIDE WISHED TO MOVE FORWARD. IN HIS PRESENTATIONS HE HAD SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED ANY REFERENCE TO THE UNGA RESOLUTION. HE HAD SEEN BOTH AGHA SHAHI AND THE PRESIDENT AND HAD GAINED THE CLEAR IMPRESSION FROM ZIA AT LEAST THAT THERE WAS SOME, LIMITED ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AS THE PAKISTANIS WERE PREPARED TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE AVENUES WHERE AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED WITHOUT CLOSING ANY DOORS AT THIS STAGE. HE HOPED THE AFGHANS WOULD TAKE A SIMILAR LINE BUT HE WAS NOT EXPECTING EARLY PROGRESS. HE HAD TRIED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO GO TO TEHRAN BUT COULD NOT ESTABLISH A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION AND THEREFORE SAW NO POINT IN GOING THERE. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD APPARENTLY BEEN AFFABLE THROUGHOUT.

4. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL AT THE MFA, TANVIR AHMAD KHAN, SAID THAT THE PAKISTAN POSITION HAD BEEN A PRELIMINARY ONE AND CONFINED TO A RE-STATEMENT OF THEIR POSITION AS EXPLAINED TO YOU DURING YOUR VISIT HERE LAST MONTH. THEY HAD NOT DEVIATED FROM THEIR INSISTENCE ON A TRILATERAL APPROACH AND THE PAKISTANIS HAD SUPPORTED DE CUELLAR'S WISH TO GO TO TEHRAN. THEY EXPECTED DE CUELLAR TO MOVE SLOWLY AND FOR THERE TO BE SEVERAL MORE VISITS TO CAPITALS IN THE REGION.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

MASEFIELD

Afghanistan Fib

(copy)

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 330
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 130930Z
FM DELHI 130622Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 389 OF 13 APRIL

FOLLOWING FOR SIR J GRAHAM AND SAD

YOUR TELNO 319: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT AND AFGHAN REFUGEES

1. IN ORDER TO MINIMISE THE RISK OF A PREMATURE LEAK, WE PROPOSE TO INFORM MAIWAND AND WAKMAN AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT (PROBABLY THE MORNING OF 17 APRIL) THAT SIR J GRAHAM WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE THEM THOUGH WE MAY HAVE TO BRING THIS FORWARD A BIT IF THEY MAKE PERSISTENT ENQUIRIES. WE SUGGEST THAT THE BEST TIME FOR THE MEETINGS (WHICH WOULD OF COURSE BE SEPARATE) WOULD BE BETWEEN 1400 AND 1440 HOURS ON 17 APRIL (IE ALLOWING 20 MINUTES FOR EACH) AND THAT THE VENUE IN EACH CASE SHOULD BE THE HIGH COMMISSION. THIS IS THE PERIOD SET ASIDE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE: WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT SIR J GRAHAM'S ABSENCE FROM IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY NOTED. IT ALSO HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT FOR HIM TO SEE MAIWAND AND WAKMAN BEFORE THE END OF THE DELHI PROGRAMME.

2. WE WOULD NOT PROPOSE TOHUOLUNTEER TO THE INDIAN SIDE THAT GRAHAM IS MEETING THE AFGHANS. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE INDIANS ASK ABOUT HIS WHEREABOUTS WE RECOMMENDTZHAT WE SHOULD TELL THEM THAT HE HAD GONE TO THE HIGH COMMISSION TO MEET ONE OR TWO AFGHAN EXILES, EXPLAINING THAT THEY HAD REQUESTED AN INTERVIEW WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH WE HAD TURNED DOWN AS WE HAD THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR HER TO MEET THEM.

3. WE PROPOSE TO ASK MAIWAND AND WAKMAN NOT TO PUBLICISE THEIR MEETINGS WITH SIR JOHN GRAHAM. HOWEVER, CLEARLY WE CANNOT RELY ON ANY ASSURANCES THEY MIGHT GIVE. IF THE STORY SHOULD BREAK, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE HIGH COMMISSION AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE IN RESPONSE TO ANY PRESS ENQUIRIES:

''WE RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF TWO AFGHAN REFUGEE ORGANIZATIONS IN DELHI TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESENT A COMMUNICATION. IN THE LIGHT OF HMG'S CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, IT WAS AGREED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEE ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD CALL ON A MEMBER OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY.''

4. GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION THAT YOU ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS.

THOMSON

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LIMITED

SAD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR DONALD

File in Afghanistan

Mr Coles - South Asian Department

Help for the Afghan Resistance

During the private discussions which preceded the main session of talks this morning, Lord Carrington raised the question of arms for the Afghan resistance, and described our own efforts. Mr Haig signified that he knew what was being done; and said that he had briefed President Reagan (presumably after the President's recent public remarks).

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

10 April 1981

cc: PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Sir A Acland
Mr Bullard
Sir J Graham

Mr Alexander, No. 10

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Lyne
Prime Minister (4)
Well worth while.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 March 1981

Dear Michael, 26/3

Film on Afghanistan

George Walden wrote to you on 3 November 1980 about the film on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office commissioned from the Central Office of Information, I understand that the Prime Minister subsequently saw it.

You may be interested to know that the film has now appeared on television in 35 countries and been shown to Heads of State, Ministers, officials and journalists in many others. Saudi Arabian TV showed it during the recent Islamic Heads of State Conference.

For a total cost of only £34,000, including the Arabic, French and Spanish versions, we have had good value for our money. We considered it prudent to try to avoid attribution, but in the case of Channel 13 New York the film was introduced as "made on behalf of the British government". There has been no direct reaction from the Russians, although they complained to the Government in Sierra Leone and to the French (sic) Ambassador in Zaire.

We are thinking of producing a follow-up film for screening in September.

Yours ever

Robbie Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 280
UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 102345Z MAR 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 831 OF 10 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW, KABUL ROUTINE NEW DELHI, PEKING, CAIRO, JEDDA
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN.

MY TEL NO 809: US AID TO AFGHAN RESISTANCE.

1. US PRESS OF 10 MARCH HIGHLIGHTS REAGAN'S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS YESTERDAY IN A TV INTERVIEW ABOUT US READINESS TO SUPPLY ARMS TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. HE SAID THAT IF SUCH REQUESTS WERE RECEIVED, HE WOULD CONSIDER COMPLYING WITH THEM. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD REALLY OBJECT BUT THE POINT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH HAIG AND OTHERS, AND WITHOUT REFLECTION ON ALL THE RAMIFICATIONS.

2. REAGAN ALSO REACTED STRONGLY AGAINST THE USE OF THE WORD QUOTE REBELS UNQUOTE FOR THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. THEY WERE FREEDOM FIGHTERS, PEOPLE FIGHTING FOR THEIR OWN COUNTRY WHO DID NOT WISH TO BECOME A SATELITE STATE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

3. THESE REMARKS WERE RAISED AT STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS CONFERENCE ON 10 MARCH. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAD NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO INTERPRET THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS, WHICH WERE VERY CLEAR. THE US HAD ALWAYS OPPOSED THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND REGISTERED THEIR ADMIRATION FOR THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS THERE. IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTIONS, THE SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED THAT GAILANI HAD RECENTLY BEEN SEEN BY MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE US TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE BREZHNEV LETTER AND SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A SUMMIT MEETING.

FCO PASS SAVING UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN.

HENDERSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

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ECD (E)

CABINET OFFICE

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

GPS 320

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Afghanistan

FM WASHINGTON 092042Z MAR 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 809 OF 9 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR PS/S OF S, DUS(P) AND DS5), UKDEL NATO

ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, KABUL, MOSCOW

INFO SAVING NEW DELHI, PEKING, CAIRO, JEDDA, PARIS, BONN

WEINBERGER ON AFGHANISTAN

1. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH CBS TELEVISION YESTERDAY (TEXT BY BAG) WEINBERGER WAS ASKED, IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION OF US/SOVIET COMPETITION IN SOUTH WEST ASIA, WHETHER THE US SHOULD SUPPLY ARMS COVERTLY TO THE AFGHAN REBELS. WEINBERGER, WHO HAD EARLIER EMPHASISED THAT US PLANS FOR INCREASING THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH WEST ASIA MUST BE DEPENDENT UPON THE WILLINGNESS OF HOST NATIONS TO ACCEPT SUCH A PRESENCE, SAID THAT ANYTHING WHICH WOULD DISCOURAGE THE SOVIETS FROM FURTHER ADVENTURISM WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. HOWEVER SUCH A POLICY COULD ONLY SUCCEED IF IT WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN REBELS. THE US COULD NOT FORCE ITS PRESENCE ANYWHERE IT WAS NOT DESIRED UNLESS WAR WAS ACTUALLY UNDERWAY.

2. ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOW DECIDED TO SEND ARMS TO THE AFGHAN REBELS, WEINBERGER REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT NOT SPECIFICALLY. SUCH A DECISION WOULD ONLY BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM THE REBELS.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TODAY TO THEIR SPOKESMAN, IN CASE THE ISSUE IS RAISED AT HIS NOON PRESS CONFERENCE : QUOTE I HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S REMARKS. AS A GENERAL RULE, THE US GOVERNMENT DO NOT COMMENT ON THIS KIND OF QUESTION. BUT YOU SHOULD NOT DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS FROM THAT UNQUOTE.

4. WE DO NOT THINK THAT WEINBERGER'S APPARENT INTENTION TO ACCORD ANALOGOUS TREATMENT TO GULF STATES AND TO AFGHAN REBELS REFLECTS A CONSIDERED POSITION. SOME CONFUSION WAS EVIDENT IN THESE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

FCO PASS SAVING DELHI, PEKING, CAIRO, JEDDA, PARIS AND BONN

HENDERSON

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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9 March 1981

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister received from Lord Bethell during her visit to Washington. The Prime Minister saw the letter in Washington but did not, so far as I know, raise Lord Bethell's points with President Reagan.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply on the general issues raised which the Prime Minister could send to Lord Bethell. It would be helpful if this could reach me by Wednesday 18 March.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DSG

DS

CC720

Afghanistan

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 February 1981

Dear Mr. Brown,

Thank you for your letter of 16 January.

The regime in Afghanistan was installed as a result of the Soviet invasion and has been kept in power by the presence of some 85,000 Soviet troops. The opposition of the Afghan people to the regime is demonstrated by the continuing fighting in nearly every province of Afghanistan and by the massive exodus of refugees (now about 1.4 million) to Pakistan.

I have no intention of inviting Mr. Babrak Karmal to London.

The resolution of the United States General Assembly of 20 November 1980, supported by 111 countries including the United Kingdom but not the Soviet Union, called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. I very much hope that the UN Secretary-General will soon appoint a representative to promote a solution, and that that representative will secure an undertaking from the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops as the resolution requires. So far the Soviet Union has made no commitment in that respect. The absence of such a commitment is the main obstacle to a solution to the problems brought about by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Ron Brown, Esq., M.P.

JS

file

ds

2 February 1981

President Giscard's Proposal for an International Conference on Afghanistan

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 28 January on this subject.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GB

GRS 470
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 3018002
FM BONN 3014152 JAN 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 OF 30 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON ISLAMABAD
NEW DELHI MOSCOW
INFO SAVING JEDDA KABUL

TELECON GLADSTONE/GOODALL, 27 JANUARY:
FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN: FRG VIEWS

1. THE GERMANS WERE NEITHER INFORMED NOR CONSULTED BY THE FRENCH BEFORE GISCARD'S REPORTED ANNOUNCEMENT ON TELEVISION ON 27 JANUARY. BLECH WAS PARTICLARLY SURPRISED TO LEARN FROM US OF THE IMPENDING ANNOUNCEMENT SINCE HE WAS TO HAVE TALKS WITH ROBIN THE NEXT DAY AND AFGHANISTAN WAS ON THE AGENDA. BUT THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT EVEN ROBIN HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROPOSAL. WE TODAY SOUGHT A PRELIMINARY GERMAN REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE MFA (VON PFETTEN).

2. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FRENCH HAD DELIVERED GISCARD'S MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV IN MOSCOW ON 23 JANUARY. HAIG HAD SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN CONSULTED BEFOREHAND AND, SO FAR AS THE GERMANS KNEW, THE UNITED STATES WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY TO SO BE CONSULTED. THE GERMANS HAD NO OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL BUT EXPECTED TO HEAR MORE DURING THE FRANCO-GERMAN CONSULTATIONS NEXT WEEK.

3. HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE SEEN AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF CONSIDERABLE FRENCH ANNOYANCE WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THE LAST YEAR. THE FRENCH CONSIDERED THAT THEY HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY MISLED BY THE RUSSIANS AFTER GISCARD'S MEETING WITH BREZHNEV IN WARSAW ON THE QUESTION OF RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS. THEY HAD DEMONSTRATED THEIR PIQUE SUBSEQUENTLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND THIS PROPOSAL WAS ANOTHER WAY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS. ANOTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENT WAS, OF COURSE, THE IMMINENCE OF THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. GISCARD NO DOUBT WISHED TO PROFILE FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY.

4. ON THE PROPOSAL ITSELF, VON PFETTEN SAID THAT, FIRST IT WAS WELL TIMED IN RELATION TO THE IMMINENT ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN NEW DEHLI. IT MIGHT SERVE TO COUNTER ANY INDIAN ATTEMPT, UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE, TO REDUCE DISCUSSION BY THE NNA'S OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN.

5. SECONDLY, IT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE EC'S POSITION ABOUT A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN.

6. THIRDLY, IT WAS NOT IRRELEVANT TO PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS. THE GERMANS HAD ALWAYS FAVOURED MAKING MORE OF THE WILLINGNESS EXPRESSED BY PAKISTAN EARLY LAST SUMMER TO HAVE INSPECTION TEAMS ON ITS BORDER TO VERIFY PAKISTAN'S NON-INTERFERENCE. BUT IT WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOT CONSULTED THE PAKISTANIS BEFORE MAKING THE PRESENT PROPOSAL. THE PAKISTANIS WERE ANNOYED ABOUT THIS AND HAD ALREADY REACTED UNFAVOURABLY. PRIOR CONSULTATION MIGHT HAVE AVOIDED THIS.

7. VON PFETTEN EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE AT THE ABSENCE OF MORE GENERAL PRIOR CONSULTATION BUT ONLY MILD REGRET THAT THE GERMANS HAD NOT BEEN BROUGHT IN ON IT. HE SUMMED UP GERMAN INITIAL REACTIONS AS BEING RESONABLY POSITIVE.

8. THE PROPOSAL HAS NOT MADE A BIG SPLASH IN THE GERMAN PRESS. THERE HAVE BEEN BRIEF FACTUAL REPORTS OF GISCARD'S INTERVIEW. THE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG'S CORRESPONDENT IN PARIS SUGGESTED IN YESTERDAY'S EDITION THAT GISCARD WAS CONCERNED TO CORRECT THE PRESENT LUCKLESS IMPRESSION OF FRENCH FORIEGN POLICY. TODAY'S AND YESTERDAY'S PAPERS REPORT RETICENCE IN MOSCOW ABOUT THE PROPOSAL.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO JEDDA KABUL

WRIGHT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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GRS 400
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 291000Z
FM ISLAMABAD 290900Z JAN 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 37 OF 29 JANUARY
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, DELHI, UKDELNATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK AND JEDDA.

PARIS TELNO 50: PAKISTAN PRESS REACTION TO FRENCH PROPOSALS ON AFGHANISTAN.

1. AGHA SHAHI'S SHARP REACTION IN TAIF TO GISCARD'S PROPOSALS ARE WIDELY REPORTED IN TODAY'S PAKISTAN PRESS, TOGETHER WITH IS COMMENT THAT PAKISTAN AS THE COUNTRY MOST AFFECTED SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED. (PAKISTAN'S AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE WHO WAS IN TAIF HAS BEEN ORDERED BACK TO PARIS TO SEEK URGENT CLARIFICATION).

2. A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE BY Z A SULERI (EDITOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OWNED PAKISTAN TIMES) WHO IS TRAVELLING WITH ZIA AND AGHA SHAHI APPEARS UNDER THE BANNER HEADLINE QUOTE GISCARD THWARTS TRIPARTITE TALKS UNQUOTE. HE SPECULATES THAT FRANCE, WITH ITS EXCELLENT MIDDLE EASTERN CONTACTS, HAS TIMED ITS PROPOSAL AT THE INSPIRATION OF QUOTE THE WEST UNQUOTE BECAUSE THEIR NOMINEES HAD FAILED IN TAIF TO THWART THE PASSAGE OF THE ISLAMIC RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN THOUGH IT HAD QUOTE QUITE A ROUGH PASSAGE UNQUOTE. THERE HAD BEEN A STRONG LOBBY AGAINST ANY TALKS WITH THE AFGHAN REGIME BUT QUOTE PRACTICAL STATESMANSHIP PREVAILED AND THE INITIATIVE FOR TALKS WAS NOT CURBED UNQUOTE.

3. THE ARTICLE, WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTS BRIEFING BY AGHA SHAHI, MAINTAINS THAT BECAUSE THE WEST HAS BEEN WORRIED ABOUT SOVIET PRESSURE ON POLAND AND THE POSSIBILITY OF TROUBLE ON ITS OWN DOORSTEP, IT HAS BEEN QUOTE ANXIOUS TO KEEP THE AFGHAN ISSUE ON THE BOIL UNQUOTE AND THOUGHT PAKISTAN WAS NOT QUOTE PLAYING THEIR GAME UNQUOTE. THE FRENCH PROPOSAL WAS QUOTE ESPECIALLY BAFFLING UNQUOTE AS THE WEST HAD PREVIOUSLY REJECTED A SIMILAR PROPOSAL BY AGHA SHAHI IN THE SUMMER OF 1980. ITS TIMING NOW AND MANNERS MADE NO SENSE. COUPLED WITH THE FACT THAT INDIA WOULD TRY ITS BEST TO QUOTE SNATCH CREDIT FOR THE PAKISTANI MOVE UNQUOTE AT THE NAM CONFERENCE IN DELHI NEXT MONTH, GISCARD'S PROPOSALS WOULD SERVE TO DELAY DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO FIX A TIMETABLE FOR THE TRIPARTITE TALKS ALTHOUGH MOSCOW COULD IN FACT QUOTE CUT THE GORDIAN KNOT WHENEVER IT LIKES UNQUOTE.

/4.

4. MR HURD'S STATEMENT TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE THAT THE PROPOSAL NEEDED TO BE LOOKED AT MORE CAREFULLY IS QUOTED IN A SECTION ON INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE FRENCH PROPOSALS.

FORSTER

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD
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FED
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ECD (E)
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

Prime Minister.
The line proposed seems right.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 January 1981

Dear Michael, Rich – 28/1

President Giscard's Proposal for an International Conference on Afghanistan

On French television last night, President Giscard announced a French initiative on Afghanistan.

He said he had proposed to the Soviet Union and the other nations concerned a conference on ending foreign intervention in Afghanistan. He had sent a message to Brezhnev (on 26 January according to Reuter's report of the interview) and had been in touch with other potential participants. His plan was to bring together all nations which were either accused or suspected, rightly or wrongly, of interfering in Afghan affairs as well as other countries who clearly had a role to play in the search for a solution. He said he had in mind the Soviet Union, about whose intervention there could be no doubt, and also the other Permanent Members of the Security Council, Iran, Pakistan and India. The Islamic community should participate in a manner yet to be determined. In answer to a question, he said that the Afghan government itself would not need to participate since the conference would not discuss the status of Afghanistan. It would rather deal exclusively with the question of ending external intervention in Afghanistan. This could be achieved by a simultaneous and verifiable undertaking by all participants. Afghanistan would thus be permitted to return to its status of a non-aligned country.

The Secretary-General of the Elysee gave the Ambassador advance warning of this announcement early on the afternoon of 27 January, the day of the speech. Wahl made the following points in addition to those which were made in Giscard's speech. The Soviet Union had never provided details of the foreign interference which it alleged was taking place in Afghanistan. Nevertheless they had expressed interest in a political settlement e.g. at the Giscard/Brezhnev meeting in Warsaw. Pakistan's attitude had also evolved and it was interested in the initiation of talks. Wahl said the conference would be under UN auspices but the Elysee's verbatim transcript does not record Giscard as having made this point.

The idea of a conference on Afghanistan was mentioned by the French during consultations in a very restricted group in May 1980, but it has not to our knowledge been heard of subsequently until Giscard made his remarks on the television yesterday.

/There

There is doubtless a strong element of electioneering in this move. Giscard is anxious to demonstrate to domestic opinion, particularly after events in Chad, that he remains capable of pursuing an independent foreign policy and taking the diplomatic initiative. This doubtless explains at least in part his failure to consult the 10, the United States or Pakistan in advance. This omission is not unprecedented but is a particularly blatant example of inadequate consultation; Giscard himself, in the same interview, called for greater consultation between the United States and her main allies. The French made no mention of the initiative last week when the European political co-operation machinery spent a good deal of time discussing and agreeing to a French proposal for a demarche by the Presidency to the UN Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference emphasising that the position of the 10 on Afghanistan had not changed.

We do not know for certain when Giscard informed Brezhnev of his proposal but it looks as though the Russians were told before anyone else. The US Embassy here tell us that their people in Paris were notified at noon on 27 January. The US Embassy in Paris are seeking clarification of certain points in Giscard's statement and are under instructions to say that they would have appreciated fuller advance consultation, but not to make an issue of this. In public the State Department are taking the line that they were notified in advance, look forward to further consultations, and will give serious study to the proposal. They will say nothing about the substance for the time being but apparently see some positive elements in the proposal.

We plan to say nothing in public which would inflate its importance. In evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee this morning the Minister of State (Mr Hurd) took the line after consulting Lord Carrington that the proposal seemed to be essentially procedural. The Committee did not press him on whether we had been adequately consulted but the point came up in passing. If the press take up the point we propose to say that we were informed in advance but were not given time for detailed consultations.

We shall now be studying urgently the substance of the French proposal. While it has a certain logic, it raises many questions. It is not clear how it can be linked to Pakistan's proposal for tripartite talks under the aegis of a UN representative. Because it excludes both the Kamal regime and the resistance, it is unlikely to appeal to either of them. The Soviet attitude will be crucial, but our initial reaction is to doubt whether they will agree to participate in such a conference. If this is right, they will have to incur the embarrassment of rejecting a possible opening for negotiations. When we have done further work on the substance we propose to seek clarification of certain

points from the French and to take the opportunity to express regret at the lack of advance consultation.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F Richards)
Private Secretary)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES] 31

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR E YOUDE
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR DONALD
MR P H MOBERLY
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)
HD/FED
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/UND
HD/SEAD
HD/SAD (4)
HD/EESD
HD/NAD
HD/DEF D
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NEWS D

RC

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

ASSESSMENTS STAFF
CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

One gets a little weary of French gimmicks. I don't whether this will turn much harder than its predecessors.

ADVANCE COPY

Read w/ full.

GRS 620
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 271633Z JAN 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 47 OF 27 JANUARY 1981
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, DELHI, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK, KABUL, JEDDA, UKDEL NATO.

NEW FRENCH PROPOSAL ON AFGHANISTAN

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON AND TOLD ME THAT HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO WARN ME OF A POINT WHICH WOULD COME OUT IN THE TELEVISION BROADCAST WHICH PRESIDENT GISCARD WILL BE GIVING TONIGHT TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE, MOSTLY ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN THE SERIES OF TELEVISION BROADCASTS WHICH HE GIVES FROM TIME TO TIME. WAHL SAID THAT HE WAS TALKING TO ME AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A FELLOW PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS WELL AS A NEAR PARTNER.

2. WAHL BEGAN BY REFERRING TO THE PERSISTENT SOVIET CLAIM THAT THERE HAD BEEN INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THAT THIS HAD PROVOKED THE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NEVER PROVIDED ANY DETAILS OF THE FOREIGN INTERVENTION WHICH IT CLAIMED. NEVERTHELESS

AFFAIRS AND THAT THIS HAD PROVOKED THE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NEVER PROVIDED ANY DETAILS OF THE FOREIGN INTERVENTION WHICH IT CLAIMED. NEVERTHELESS THE SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN TRYING TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. MR BREZHNEV FOR EXAMPLE HAD INDICATED THIS TO PRESIDENT GISCARD AT THEIR WARSAW MEETING IN 1980. IN THINKING OF WAYS AND MEANS OF REACHING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID NEGOTIATIONS SIMPLY WITH THE BABRAK KARMAL REGIME AS THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO RECOGNITION IN RETURN FOR NOTHING. THE ATTITUDE OF PAKISTAN HAD EVOLVED AND PAKISTAN NOW SHOWED INTEREST IN HAVING SOME SORT OF TALKS ON THE SUBJECT.

3. BEARING ALL THESE POINTS IN MIND PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD ARRIVED AT THE THOUGHT THAT A WAY FORWARD MIGHT BE TO ARRANGE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL THE POWERS CAPABLE OF INFLUENCING AFGHANISTAN FROM THE OUTSIDE. WHILE IT WAS FOR THE AFGHANS TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FATE, A CONFERENCE ON THE LINES DESCRIBED MIGHT FIND A WAY OF EXCHANGING ASSURANCES OF NON - INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD GET ROUND THE FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET POINT ABOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

4. PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD IN MIND PROPOSING A CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES TO WHICH ALL AFGHANISTAN'S IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURS AND THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE INVITED. INDIA WOULD BE INCLUDED AS A NEAR NEIGHBOUR. THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA WOULD BE INCLUDED BOTH AS NEIGHBOURS AND AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. THE AIM WOULD BE TO ARRIVE AT SIMULTANEOUS COMMITMENTS ON NON - INTERFERENCE AND NON - INTERVENTION. A KEY QUESTION WOULD BE THE WAY IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE REPRESENTED. PRESIDENT GISCARD WOULD NOT HIMSELF SUGGEST HOW THIS MIGHT BE SOLVED.

5. WAHL SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SAY HOW FAR THE PRESIDENT WOULD GO IN HIS TELEVISION BROADCAST IN SKETCHING HIS IDEA. IT WOULD BE A GOOD DEAL LESS FAR THAN HE WAHL HAD GONE WITH ME.

6. I COMMENTED THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THIS WAS AN ENTIRELY NEW PROPOSAL WHICH HAD NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROPOSALS UNDER DISCUSSION OR THE POINTS SUGGESTED BY FRANCE IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION. WAHL CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT IT BORE NO RELATION TO THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECURITY GENERAL VISITING THE REGION FOR TALKS FOLLOWING AGA SHAHI'S INITIATIVE OF 3 HANUARY. I ASKED WHETHER THE IDEA WOULD BE THAT THE CONFERENCE

THE REGION FOR TALKS FOLLOWING AGA SHAHI'S INITIATIVE OF 3 HANUARY. I ASKED WHETHER THE IDEA WOULD BE THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD HAVE AS ITS AIM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN, SINCE WAHL HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE UNDER UN AUSPICES. HE GAVE NO DIRECT ANSWER TO THIS AND SAID THAT THE AIM WOULD BE, AS HE HAD SAID, TO ARRIVE AT MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON NON - INTERVENTION AND NON - INTERFERENCE. I ASKED IF ANY OF THE PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS, ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN, HAD GIVEN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AN INDICATION OF SYMPATHY FOR THEV

PROPOSAL. WAHL SAID THAT NONE HAD BEEN CONSULTED, BUT ADVANCE NOTICE WAS BEING GIVEN.

HIBBERT.

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 271748Z JG/MJC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1981

Dear Nick,

Letter from Mr R Brown MP - Afghanistan

Your letter of 20 January refers.

I attach a suggested draft reply to Mr Brown's letter of 16 January.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

N Sanders Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Mr R Brown MP
67 Rilton Avenue
Edinburgh EH5 2HP

Your Reference

Copies to:

GR
for PM pl
CcIc

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 16 January.

The Government do not have, nor do they propose to have, substantive dealings with a régime installed as a result of a Soviet invasion and is kept in power by the presence of some 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The opposition of the Afghan people to the régime is demonstrated by the continuing fighting in nearly every province of Afghanistan and by the massive exodus of refugees (now about 1.4 million) in Pakistan.

The resolution of the United States General Assembly of 20 November 1980, supported by 111 countries, including the United Kingdom but not the Soviet Union, called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. I very much hope that the UN Secretary-General will soon appoint a representative to promote a solution, and that that representative will secure an undertaking from the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops as the resolution requires. So far the Soviet Union has made no commitment in that respect. The absence/

Enclosures—flag(s).....

absence of such a commitment is the main obstacle to a solution to the problems brought about by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6R
rctypepl
MS

Dear Mr. Brown.

Thank you for your letter of 16 January.

~~The Government do not have, nor do they propose to have, substantive dealings with a~~ The ~~regime~~ in Afghanistan was installed as a result of ~~a~~ the Soviet invasion and has been kept in power by the presence of some 85,000 Soviet troops ~~in Afghanistan~~. The opposition of the Afghan people to the regime is demonstrated by the continuing fighting in nearly every province of Afghanistan and by the massive exodus of refugees (now about 1.4 million) to Pakistan.

? I have no intention of inviting Mr. Babrak Karmal to London.

The resolution of the United States General Assembly of 20 November 1980, supported by 111 countries including the United Kingdom but not the Soviet Union, called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. I very much hope that the UN Secretary-General will soon appoint a representative to promote a solution, and that that representative will secure an undertaking from the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops as the resolution requires. So far the Soviet Union has made no commitment in that respect. The absence of such a commitment is the main obstacle to a solution to the problems brought about by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Ron Brown, Esq., M.P.

file

DSG

20 January 1981

I attach a letter the Prime Minister has received from Ron Brown MP. I think that it merits a quick reply, and I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft by close of play on Thursday 22 January.

N. J. SANDERS

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

File

089

20 January 1981

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 16 January about Afghanistan. I will of course place your letter before her at once and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

N. J. SANDERS

Ron Brown, Esq., M.P. (Leith)

2

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Here is an outrageous letter from Ron Brown MP suggesting you should inivte President Karmal to come to London. We will let you have a draft reply.

MS

20 January 1981

CC IG
Pressoffice 20/1

R. Brown
67 Pilton Avenue
Edinburgh. EH5 2HP

16 Jan 1981

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON

R80/1

Dear Prime Minister,

AFGHANISTAN

I am sure you will be interested to know that during my recent visit to Afghanistan I met President Babrak Karmal. He explained his country's position, saying that Soviet troops would leave immediately he secured agreement with neighbouring countries over the Afghan border.

When I pressed him on this point, he stressed that he wanted early negotiations to resolve this matter.

He seemed sincere and I think his offer should be tested by inviting him to talks with yourself in London.

I look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ron Brown

MP for Leith

Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES] 30

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR E YOUDE
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR DONALD
MR P H MOBERLY
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)
HD/FED
HD/PUSD (2)
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HD/SAD (4)
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HD/NAD
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~~PS~~

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ASSESSMENTS STAFF
CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO. 13 OF 12TH JAN
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
INFO ROUTINE KABUL, NEW DELHI, JEDDAH.
INFO SAVING BONN, PEKING, PARIS.

ADVANCE COPY

MY TEL NO. 10 (NOT TO ALL)
AFGHANISTAN

1. I SAW SHAH NAWAZ TODAY. HE DESCRIBED THE LATEST RUSSIAN MOVE AND THEIR THREE NEW CONDITIONS IN THE SAME TERMS AS IN WASHINGTON TEL NO. 88. HE SAID HE HAD NOW SEEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND HAD TOLD HIM:-

(I) PAKISTAN WAS PREPARED TO AVOID MENTIONING THE UN RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY IN ANY PUBLIC EXCHANGES ~~IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT, BUT~~ THE FACT WAS THAT THEY WERE BOUND BY THAT RESOLUTION AND BY THE EARLIER RESOLUTIONS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

(II) THE TALKS HAD TO BE TRIPARTITE. IF, HOWEVER, THE IRANIANS WWERE APPROACHED AND REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE, THEN A DIFFERENT SITQOTION WOULD ARISE.

(III) THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MUST ALSO VISIT MOSCOW SINCE THE KEY TO THE PROBLEM LAY THERE.

SHAH NAWAZ WENT ON TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE PROPAGANDA EMANATING FROM KABUL AND MOSCOW TO THE EFFECT THAT PAKISTAN HAD MADE MAJOR CONCESSIONS. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR RETALIATED BY COMPLAINING ABOUT THE PAKISTAN PRESS. SHAH NAWAZ ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE ASSOCIATION OF THIRD COUNTRIES, I.E. INDIA, WITH THE PROBLEM (SATHE'S VISIT TO KABUL AND MRS RATEBZAD'S VISIT TO DELHI), IF THE INTENTION WAS FOR THE NAM TO SET UP SOME SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AFGHANISTAN, THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO PAKISTAN.

2. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTIONS, SHAH NAWAZ MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

(A) IN THE INITIAL APPROACH FROM THE RUSSIANS THE QUESTION OF THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE VISITING MOSCOW HAD NOT AT ANY STAGE BEEN MENTIONED, THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY REFUSED THIS.

(B) IF THE IRANIAN S REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE, THE PAKISTANIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE TALKS ALONE.

(C) THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THESE TALKS TAKING PLACE IN KABUL, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE ELSEWHERE.

(D) THE UN REPRESENTATIVE WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENT AND PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS.

3. SHAH NAWAZ CONFIRMED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS REFUSED THE CONDITIONS IN PARA 1 ABOVE THEN THE WHOLE DEAL WAS OFF. I HAD TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY OF LEAVING HIM A NOTE BASED ON FCO TEL NO.87 TO RABAT, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT THIS HAD BEEN TO AN EXTENT OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD YOUR WORRIES. HE ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE PAKISTANIS WOULD NOT MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION WITHOUT A SIGNIFICANT QUID PRO QUO.

4. NEVERTHELESS, THIS RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIANS IS NOT QUITE AS ROBUST AS ZIA'S REACTION DESCRIBED IN WASHINGTON TEL NO.88 AND THERE

4. NEVERTHELESS, THIS RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIANS IS NOT QUITE AS ROBUST AS ZIA'S REACTION DESCRIBED IN WASHINGTON TEL NO.88 AND THERE PS CLEARLY A WILLINGNESS, AT LEAST IN THE MFA, TO MAKE CERTAIN TACTICAL CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO GET TALKS GOING, WHILE NOT CONCEDING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES. IN OUR DISCUSSION, SHAH NAWAZ STILL SEEMED TO HOPE THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT RESPOND FAVOURABLY AND HE WAS CLEARLY WILLING TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM TO DO SO. E.G. BY NOT SPELLING OUT THE CONNECTION WITH THE UN RESOLUTION. HE ENDED WITH SOME EMOTIONAL REMARKS TO THE EFFECT THAT PAKISTAN WAS CONTINUALLY BEING LEFT TO FACE THIS MENACE ON THEIR OWN AND THAT IT WAS EASY FOR THOSE NOT IN THE FIRING LINE TO URGE THOSE WHO WERE TO STAND FIRM.

5. THIS FEELING OF ISOLATION IN THE FACE OF A SUPER POWER IS OF COURSE THE KEY TO THEIR ATTITUDE. THEY ARE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO GET SOME SORT OF DIALOGUE GOING IN THE HOPE OF LESSENING THE TENSION AND ARE WILLING TO GET PRETTY NEAR TO THE 14 MAY PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO DO SO. THEY FEEL THAT THEIR EFFORTS TO INTERNATIONALISE THE PROBLEM ALWAYS END UP IN THEIR BEING LEFT CARRYING THE CAN. BUT OF COURSE TO AN EXTENT THEY HAVE BROUGH THIS ON THEMSELVES BY CONSTANTLY TAKING A LEAD AND NOW BY BEING PREPARED TO GET INTO TRIPARTITE OR EVEN BILATERAL TALKS. I DO NOT THINK THERE IS MUCH THAT WE ALONE CAN DO ABOUT ALL THIS EXCEPT TO CONTINUE TO GIVE THEM THE SORT OF REASSURANCES, ADVICE AND GUIDANCE THAT WE HAVE BEEN GIVING TO DATE, WHICH THEY VERY MUCH WELCOME. WHAT THEY REALLY NEED IS FIRMER AND MORE CONSISTENT PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS FROM THE REST OF THE FREE WORLD, AND PARTICULARLY FROM THE AMERICANS. ALSO MATERIAL HELP FROM THE SAUDIS. IN THE SHORT TERM, IT WOULD BE A CONSIDERABLE HELP IF FRIENDLY NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, SUCH AS BANGLADESH, COULD TAKE A FIRM LINE AT THE NAM CONFERENCE (SHAH NAWAZ TOLD ME THAT THE INDIANS ARE HAWKING ROUND A BLAND RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN WHICH THE PAKISTANIS HAVE TOLD THEM IS INADEQUATE AS IT OMITS KEY ELEMENTS).

FCO PSE PASS SAVING BONN, PEKING, PARIS.

FORSTER

CCN PARA 1.
(I) PAKISTAN WAS PREPARD TO AVOID MENTIONING THE UN RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY IN ANY PUBLIC EXCHANGES , BUT THE FACT WAS THAT THEY ETC.....

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 360
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY FCO 110900Z
DESKBY ISLAMABAD 110400Z
FM WASHINGTON 102120Z JAN 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 88 OF 10 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD
INFO ROUTINE CAIRO (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK KABUL NEW DELHI JEDDA
INFO SAVING BONN PEKING PARIS

YOUR TELNO 15 TO JEDDA: AFGHANISTAN.
1. WE SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO MRS COON (STATE DEPARTMENT). SHE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED US OF THE RESULTS OF A MEETING IN ISLAMABAD EARLIER TODAY BETWEEN AMBASSADOR HUMMEL AND ZIA.

2. AFTER HUMMEL HAD SPOKEN ALONG THE LINES INDICATED IN MY TELNO 51, ZIA INFORMED HIM THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, SMIRNOV HAD JUST CALLED ON SHAH NAWAZ TO QUOTE CLARIFY UNQUOTE THE SOVIET AND AFGHAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROPOSED DIALOGUE WITH PAKISTAN.

3. SMIRNOV HAD MADE THREE SPECIFIC POINTS, ALLEGEDLY AT THE REQUEST OF THE BABRAK REGIME:
(I) THE IRANIANS SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE DIALOGUE:
(II) THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD ONLY BE AN OBSERVER AT THE TALKS. HE COULD BE PRESENT BUT NOT PARTICIPATE IN THEM: AND
(III) THERE WOULD BE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TALKS AND THE UN RESOLUTION.
SMIRNOV MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BEING RECEIVED IN MOSCOW.

4. ZIA DESCRIBED THIS AS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SOVIET/AFGHAN POSITION. ACCORDING TO THE US REPORT, HE FELT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD PULLED THE RUG FROM UNDER HIM. HE HAD TOLD HUMMEL THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE TO BE FIRMER THAN EVER, AND IMPLIED (BUT DID NOT STATE EXPLICITLY) THAT THE PROPOSED DIALOGUE WAS NOW A NON-STARTER.

5. THE INITIAL US ASSESSMENT HERE IS THAT THE INITIATIVE TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE BABRAK REGIME HAS FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST BEEN DERAILED AND THAT THE PAKISTANIS ARE

 /LIKELY

LIKELY TO FEEL EMBARRASSED AT THE WAY THEY HAVE BEEN LED DOWN THE GARDEN PATH BY THE RUSSIANS, THEY CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON THE REASONS FOR THE SOVIET VOLTE-FACE, WHICH WILL LAY MOSCOW OPEN TO FURTHER CHARGES OF INFLEXIBILITY ON THE AFGHAN ISSUE.

6. RESIDENT CLERK: PLEASE INFORM COLES (HD/SAD)

FCO PASS SAVING BONN PEKING PARIS

HENDERSON

STANDARD

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CABINET OFFICE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

COPIES SENT TO
NO 10 DOWNING STREET

Immediate

AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES] 31

PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
SIR E YOUDE
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR DONALD
MR P H MOBERLY
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)
HD/FED
HD/PUSD (2)
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NO 10 DOWNING STREET

ASSESSMENTS STAFF
CABINET OFFICE

GRS 705
CONFIDENTIAL
FM KABUL 291100Z DEC 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 353 OF 29 DECEMBER 1980
AND TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI .
RPTD FOR INFO TO ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO,
MODUK (D14)

SAVING FOR INFO TO UKMIS NEW YORK (FCO PSE PASS) .

MY TELNO 351: AFGHANISTAN: SITREP.

INTERNAL SECURITY.

1. RIOTING BROKE OUT IN TWO AREAS OF KABUL AROUND 1030 TODAY. AROUND THE MONEY BAZAAR AND THE SPINZAR HOTEL AREAS , BOTH NEWAR THE RIVER SEPARATING THE OLD TOWN AND THE NEW, GROUPS OF UNIFORMED MEN RAN THROUGH THE STREETS THROWING STONES AT WINDOWS AND CARS. SOME REPORTS REFER TO POLICEMEN WHILE OTHERS SAY SOLDIERS. ALL WINDOWS OF THE RUSSIAN LIBRARY/BOOKSHOP WERE SMASHED. MANY SHOP WINDOWS WERE BROKEN, SEVERAL PRIVATE

SMASHED. MANY SHOP WINDOWS WERE BROKEN, SEVERAL PRIVATE CARS AND TWO MILITARY JEEPS, THOUGHT TO BE SOVIET, DAMAGED. SOME SHOTS WERE HEARD BUT WE HAVE NO REPORTS OF ANY CASUALITIES. SHOPS CLOSED QUICKLY AND PEOPLE STREAMED OUT OF THE AREA.

2. RIOT POLICE AND SOVIET SOLDIERS QUICKLY ARRIVED ON THE SCENES AND THE TROUBLE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE SPREAD. ARMOURED VEHICLES WERE MOVED ON TO THE BRIDGES OVER THE RIVER AND GUARDS REINFORCED ON MINISTRIES. THE ROAD TO THE PALACE WAS BLOCKED TO TRAFFIC AND SOLDIERS POSTED EVERY 10-15 METRES. BY MIDDAY M124 AND M18 HELICOPTERS WERE MAKING LOW PASSES OVER THE TOWN. THE PASSES SEEMED TO GO OVER THE SEVERAL AFGHAN MILITARY BARRACKS, BUT THIS COULD BE COINCIDENTIAL. AROUND MIDDAY ALSO TRUCKS OF SOLDIERS, AFGHAN AND SOVIET, WERE MOVED INTO TOWN, ALSO SOME GUN-CARRIERS WITH MACHINE GUNS MOUNTED, TRACKED APC'S AND SCOUT CARS.

3. THERE COULD BE A STRONG PRESUMPTION THAT THIS DEMONSTRATION WAS ANTI-SOVIET BUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF ONLY UNIFORMED MEN, WHETHER POLICE OR ARMY, IS ODD.

4. THE ROAD OUT OF KABUL TO THE NORTH IS REPORTED AS BEING CLOSED TO TRUCKS AND BUSES TODAY AND SOME ACCOUNTS SPEAK OF FIGHTING IN AND FOR THE SALANG PASS A VITAL LINK IN THE MAIN SOVIET SUPPLY ROUTE. THE SITUATION IS ALSO REPORTED AS BEING ACTIVE IN NANGAHAR PROVINCE, AND IN JALALABAD ITSELF, AND IN LOGAR.

T5. BABRAK HAS PUBLISHED A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENCE MINISTER RAFIEE REPUTING ALLEGATIONS IN WESTERN MEDIA THAT CUBAN AND BULGARIAN TROOPS ARE FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN.

POLITICAL.

6. THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY ON 27 DECEMBER OF THE SOVIET INVASION, REFERRED TO BY THE REGIME AS EITHER THE ''HEROIC UPRISING'' OR THE '' NEW LIBERATING PHASE OF THE REVOLUTION,'' WAS MARKED IN KABUL BY THE CLOSURE OF MANY SHOPS AND BY A LARGE MEETING IN THE HQ OF THE R C WHICH ANNOUNCED PLANS FOR THE FORMATION OF

THE HQ OF THE R C WHICH ANNOUNCED PLANS FOR THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT.

7. IT IS NOT FULLY CLEAR WHAT STRIKE WAS CALLED FOR. NONE OF THE NIGHT-LETTERS SAID TO HAVE CIRCULATED HAS YET SURFACED. MOST ACCOUNTS SPEAK OF A CALL FOR A 24 HOUR STRIKE TO INCLUDE SHOPS, OFFICES AND GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. THE RESPONSE WAS PATCHY. IN SOME AREAS OF TOWN, ALL SHOPS WERE CLOSED, IN OTHERS, MOST STAYED OPEN: IN SOME CASES SHOPS OPENED UNTIL THE AUTHORITIES HAD CHECKED THEM AS BEING OPEN, AND THEN CLOSED: OVERALL, PERHAPS 40% CLOSED. MOST OFFICES AND ALL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS WERE OPEN, BUT ABSENTEEISM, ON VARIOUS PRETEXTS, IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN HIGH. THE TOWN WAS NOTICEABLY EMPTIER THAN USUAL DURING THE DAY AND DESERTED AFTER DARK. AS A PROTEST AGAINST THE INVASION AND OCCUPATINON OF ONE'S COUNTRY, IT WAS NOT IMPRESSIVE.

8. THE MEETING ON 27 DECEMBER WAS OF ALL ORGANS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE USUAL PARTY ORGANISATIONS BUT INCLUDED ALSO VARIOUS NON-PARTY DIGNITARIES AND TRIBAL REPRESENTATIVES. PLANS WERE DISCUSSED, A 44 MEMBER COMMISSION SET UP, AND A RESOLUTION ADOPTED TO PREPARE FOR THE FIRST CONGRESS OF THE NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT, TO BE HELD AT THE END OF THIS AFGHAN YEAR (20 MARCH) OR EARLY NEXT YEAR. THE COMMISSION WILL DRAFT A CHARTER FOR THE CONGRESS, SETTING OUT OBJECTIVES, DUTIES, METHODS OF WORK ETC. REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL SECTIONS AND STRATA OF SOCIETY ARE INVITED TO APPLY TO THE COMMISSION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONGRESS. IT MAY BE THAT THIS IS INTENDED TO BE THE LONG-PROMISED L O Y E J I R G A H BUT WITH THE BASIC DIFFERENCE THAT ATTENDANCE WILL BE BY INVITATION AND NOT THROUGH ELECTION. BARBRAK'S SPEECH TO THE MEETING DREW THE PARAMETERS FAIRLY CLEARLY: " THE BASIC DUTY OF THE NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT IS TO PUBLICIZE, EXPLAIN AND IMPART THE POLICY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE D R A TO THE MASSES....."

9. IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT NUMBERS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IN KABUL AND IN CERTAIN PROVINCES, AND THE FOUR IRANIANS (MY TELNO 327) HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO MARK THE ANNIVERSARY.

10. MANY AREAS OF KABUL HAVE BEEN HIT BY LONG ELECTRICITY CUTS DURING THE PAST WEEK: NO EXPLANATION HAS BEEN GIVEN.

11. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THE CURRENT RUMOURS, WIDELY HEARD, OF THE DEFECTION OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ABDURRASHID ARYAN, SAID TO HAVE GONE TO PAKISTAN, AND THE KILLING OF AIR FORCE CHIEF GHULAM SAKI.

OF THE DEFECTION OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ABDURRASHID ARYAN, SAID TO HAVE GONE TO PAKISTAN, AND THE KILLING OF AIR FORCE CHIEF GHULAM SAKI.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

12. NO RESTRICTION.

CCCN PARA 1.... LINE 3... NENEAR THE RIVER

HOWELL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Afghanistan

GRS 350
CONFIDENTIAL
FM ISLAMABAD 040745Z DEC
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1377 OF 4 DECEMBER
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, DELHI.
INFO SAVING KABUL.

AFGHANISTAN AFTER UNGA

1. PAKISTAN CABINET WAS IN SESSION ALL YESTERDAY DISCUSSING MAINLY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND AGHA SHAHI SENT FOR ME THIS MORNING TO TELL ME THE UPSHOT: SHAH NAWAZ WAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. BROAD CONCLUSION REACHED WAS THAT PAKISTAN'S POLICY OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD REMAIN FLEXIBLE WITHIN CERTAIN PARAMETERS. THEY WANT TO KEEP THE DOOR OPEN FOR THE RUSSIANS AND THEY ARE STILL GETTING INDICATIONS FROM RUSSIAN SOURCES THAT, DESPITE TROYANOVSKY'S TOUGH LINE, THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THE PAKISTANIS WOULD THEREFORE BE PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN ANY REASONABLE PROPOSITION, INCLUDING A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL HIMSELF TO KABUL AND EVENTUALLY SOME SORT OF CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN. THE PARAMETERS ARE THAT ALL THIS MUST BE UNDER UN AUSPICES, THAT THERE CAN BE NO RECOGNITION OF BABRAK KARMEL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, THOUGH THIS MIGHT COME AT THE END, AND THAT THERE MUST BE AN EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS. THE PAKISTANIS ARE FULLY ALIVE TO THE DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS OF SUCH A POLICY (AND AGHA SHAHI SAID BLUNTLY THAT HE HAD BEEN DOUBLE CROSSED OVER THE WORD ''HOPE''), BUT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE THEY SEE IS TO MAINTAIN A RIGID POSTURE WITH THEIR BORDER AREAS, ETC., COMING UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE.

3. I TOLD AGHA SHAHI THAT I WOULD REPORT THESE VIEWS TO YOU. HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY THOUGHTS WE HAVE.

4. HE AGAIN REVERTED TO THE PRESSURES ON PAKISTAN AND THEIR ISOLATION AND WAS PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE HOSTILE CAMPAIGN BEING MOUNTED BY THE INDIANS. THE PAKISTANIS WERE UNABLE TO ACCOUNT FOR THIS AND DID NOT THINK THAT THEY HAD GIVEN ANY CAUSE FOR OFFENCE. HE WAS WORRIED THAT SOME SECRET AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED DURING THE BREZHNEV VISIT FOR THE INDIANS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN FROM THE OTHER SIDE, AND, AFTER THE BREZHNEV VISIT, HE WOULD MUCH WELCOME OUR ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN POLICY AND ATTITUDES.
FORSTER

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

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SED	CABINET OFFICE
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CONFIDENTIAL

Private
& Confidential

MR. ALEXANDER
Pass.

c/o American Club
95 Piccadilly
London W1
3 December 1980

10

Lord Carrington
House of Lords
London W1

Dear Lord Carrington,

I spoke to Mr. Ghafoorzai on Tuesday November 19 just before I left for London. Apparently the Afghans are still making progress towards a Government-in-Exile, but not as quickly as he had previously hoped. One reason is that Professor Sayyaf has been in Germany and was not able to be in New York for the recent meetings. While Professor Sayyaf is a very important man, there are other important Afghans who should be brought into the Government-in-Exile and Mr. Ghafoorzai has been talking to several who are in New York. Mr. Ghafoorzai explained to me that they are presently at somewhat of an impasse in that promise of arms is needed to give them the final push necessary to have them come together in a Government-in-Exile, yet they need to form this government first in order to be credible in asking for arms. Clearly a catalyst is needed.

Further to your invitation, Mr. Ghafoorzai told me he would welcome the opportunity to meet with one of your officials in order to have an exchange of views on the situation in Afghanistan. Mr. Ghafoorzai said he would be happy to meet with whomever you thought to be the most appropriate man. A first meeting in New York or Washington would be somewhat easier for him than London, but this can be arranged according to your wishes.

Incidentally Professor Frye told me that he thought Mr. Ghafoorzai would probably be the Foreign Minister in an Afghanistan Government-in-Exile.

Yours sincerely,

Robert Laidley.

Robert Laidley.

Copies to: Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Sir Nicholas Henderson
Graham Archer - Foreign Office

Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 560

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 271814Z NOV 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1885 OF 27 NOVEMBER
INFO MOSCOW ISLAMABAD AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 1873 : AFGHANISTAN : FOLLOW UP TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE.

1. I SAW WALDHEIM THIS MORNING. I SAID THAT YOU HAD SEEN AGA SHAHI IN LONDON YESTERDAY. MY INSTRUCTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE VERY STRONG VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, WERE TO URGE THE EARLY APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. OUR PREFERENCE WAS FOR A DISTINGUISHED NEUTRAL FIGURE FROM OUTSIDE THE SECRETARIAT. IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THIS MOVE WAS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF 14 MAY. THERE WAS VERY STRONG FEELING IN LONDON THAT THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN MUST BE KEPT IN FRONT OF THE WORLD IN ORDER TO PRESSURISE THE RUSSIANS INTO DOING THE RIGHT THING. OTHERWISE THERE WAS A CONTINUING RISK TO PEACE AND SECURITY AND INEVITABLE DAMAGE TO DETENTE.

2. WALDHEIM SAID HE AGREED FULLY. HE HAD BEEN GIVING MUCH THOUGHT TO THE PROBLEM. HE WISHED THAT AGA SHAHI HAD ACCEPTED HIS ADVICE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH EASIER IF THE RESOLUTION HAD QUOTE REQUESTED UNQUOTE THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, BUT AGA SHAHI HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO PROVOKE THE SOVIET UNION. HE BELIEVED THEY WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO COOPERATE UNDER THE PRESENT FORMULA. BUT WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD TALKED BEFORE THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED TO TROYANOVSKY WHO WARNED HIM THAT IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO NORMAL (AND RECENT) PRECEDENT TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. (THIS IS INDEED TRUE).

3. ALTHOUGH WALDHEIM HAD HEARD BEFORE THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED FROM A RUSSIAN MEMBER OF THE SECRETARIAT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SUCH AS GUNNAR JARRING AND THAT THIS MESSAGE HAD EVEN BEEN PASSED TO THE AMERICANS AND THE PAKISTANIS, HE NOW BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS A TACTICAL MOVE BY THE RUSSIANS TO GET THE RESOLUTION MODIFIED. THUS WHEN WALDHEIM WARNED SYTENKO (SECRETARIAT) THAT HE MUST NOW PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION, THE REACTION HAD BEEN NEGATIVE.

4. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE SAW TWO POSSIBILITIES. HE COULD APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OR HE COULD VISIT THE PARTIES HIMSELF EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR AS HE HAD DONE IN THE CASE OF CAMBODIA. HE UNDERSTOOD THE WISH TO PUT THE RUSSIANS INTO A CORNER AND EMBARRASS THEM, BUT HE WONDERED WHAT PURPOSE THIS WOULD SERVE. HE HAD TALKED TO DOST, (AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER) BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. HE HAD BEEN AGAINST A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, BUT HAD SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY WALDHEIM.

5. I SAID THAT I SAW THE DILEMMA. BUT I POINTED OUT THAT IF WALDHEIM VISITED KABUL HE WOULD LEND POLITICAL RESPECTABILITY TO THE KARMAL REGIME. A DISTINGUISHED NEUTRAL FIGURE, WHO MIGHT COME FROM THE THIRD WORLD, WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO TURN DOWN, PARTICULARLY IF THE APPOINTMENT WAS WELCOME TO A MAJORITY OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES.

6. WALDHEIM CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE RECOGNISED THAT HE MUST DO SOMETHING CONCRETE. HE FELT THAT A MEMBER OF THE SECRETARIAT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT THAN AN OUTSIDER, BUT HE HAD AN OPEN MIND. HE WOULD SEE TROYANOVSKY EARLY NEXT WEEK AND HE EXPECTED A TOUGH DISCUSSION. HE HAD SPOKEN TO SYTENKO IN ADVANCE SO THAT TROYANOVSKY WOULD BE PREPARED.

7. MY US AND CHINESE COLLEAGUES HAVE HAD SIMILAR SESSIONS WITH WALDHEIM. I AM KEEPING MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE INFORMED.

PARSONS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

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[NOT ADVANCED]

GR 800

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 260800Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260125Z NOV 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1873 OF 25 NOVEMBER 1980
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD.

Read in full.
MG

MY TELNO 1827: AFGHANISTAN: FOLLOW UP TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE

1. AGHA SHAHI HAS SEEN WALDHEIM TWICE RECENTLY. ON 20 NOVEMBER (BEFORE THE VOTE WAS TAKEN) HE URGED WALDHEIM TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. WALDHEIM HAD CLEARLY BEEN INFLUENCED BY TROYANOVSKY'S REPRESENTATIONS AND STRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES FACING HIM IN ANY FOLLOW-UP ACTION. HE THEN PROPOSED THAT HE ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN SHAHI AND DOST (THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER) ON THE SAME BASIS AS HE HAD ARRANGED FOR THE THAI AND VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO MEET EARLY IN THE GA. (WALDHEIM HAD PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED THIS TO DOST WHO HAD SIMPLY SAID HE WOULD NEED INSTRUCTIONS). SHAHI SAID THE PROPOSAL WAS PREMATURE AND THE FIRST REQUIREMENT WAS FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. THE REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD MAKE AN INITIAL TOUR OF ALL THE CAPITALS INVOLVED AND IF THEREAFTER IN THE LIGHT OF HIS REPORT WALDHEIM CONSIDERED THAT A CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES WOULD BE WORTHWHILE, PAKISTAN MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE IDEA BUT ONLY IF IT WAS HELD STRICTLY UNDER THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S AUSPICES.

2. MY PAKISTANI COLLEAGUE (NAIK) HAS TOLD ME THAT SHAHI SAW WALDHEIM AGAIN TODAY (25 NOVEMBER). WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT THE SIZE OF THE VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, AS HAD THE RUSSIANS. BUT HE REMAINED WARY ABOUT TAKING POSITIVE ACTION. SHAHI THEN GAVE WALDHEIM A PEP TALK INSISTING ON HIS CARRYING OUT THE CLEAR MANDATE GIVEN TO HIM BY 111 MEMBER STATES. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE WAS EXPECTING A DEMARCHE FROM THE OTHER FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT HE WOULD THEN HAVE TO HAVE ANOTHER DIFFICULT MEETING WITH TROYANOVSKY WHOM HE HAD NOT SEEN SINCE BEFORE THE VOTE.

3. SHAHI DISCUSSED WITH WALDHEIM HIS IDEAS ON WHO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MIGHT BE. HE SAID THAT A MAN OF INTERNATIONAL STATURE WAS REQUIRED AND HAD IN MIND A NEUTRAL EUROPEAN. THE PAKISTANI PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR ASTROM, CURRENTLY SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO PARIS AND FORMERLY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE SWEDISH MFA. ALTERNATIVELY SIGISMOND MARCUARD, THE SWISS PERMANENT OBSERVER HERE, WOULD BE A GOOD CHOICE. ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WERE CUT (TOO PARTI PRIS FOR THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT), AS WERE THE SOUTH AMERICANS (TOO REMOTE FROM THE AREA). THE ONLY AVAILABLE AFRICAN OF SUFFICIENT STANDING WOULD BE SALIM OF TANZANIA, BUT HIS AMBITIONS IN THE UN MIGHT COUNT AGAINST HIM. NAIK CONFIRMED

TO ME TONIGHT THAT ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT HAVE IDEAS ABOUT APPOINTING SOMEONE FROM WITHIN THE SECRETARIAT, THE PAKISTANIS' STRONG PREFERENCE REMAINED FOR A WELL-KNOWN OUTSIDER.

4. NAIK SAID THAT AGHA SHAHI LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE ABOVE WITH YOU TOMORROW.

5. THE AMERICANS HAVE SPOKEN TO THE FRENCH AND CHINESE ENCOURAGING THEM TO MAKE DEMARCHES TO WALDHEIM. THE FRENCH HAVE NOT YET REACTED BUT THE CHINESE HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS INDEPENDENTLY TO GO AHEAD AND WILL DO SO THIS WEEK. THEY WILL STRESS THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT: THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S MANDATE SHOULD CONCENTRATE SOLELY ON WITHDRAWAL: AND THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO IMPLY RECOGNITION OF THE KABUL REGIME.

6. THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WILL SEE WALDHEIM TOMORROW (26 NOVEMBER). IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS THE CHINESE WILL BE MAKING, THE AMERICANS WILL SAY THAT THEIR PREFERENCE FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IS FOR AN OUTSIDE FIGURE WITH WORLD STATURE. THEY WILL POINT OUT THAT THE REJECTION OF SUCH AN ENVOY WOULD DISCREDIT THE UNCO-OPERATIVE COUNTRY RATHER THAN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHILE REJECTION OF A LESSER KNOWN UN OFFICIAL COULD DAMAGE THE PRESTIGE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THEY WILL TELL WALDHEIM THAT THEY BELIEVE THAT, IN CARRYING OUT HIS MANDATE, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL NEED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS, PAKISTANIS, AND AFGHAN NATIONALIST GROUPS, INCLUDING REFUGEES AND RESISTANCE LEADERS. THEY WILL ALSO EMPHASISE THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ITSELF IS THE SOLE SOURCE FOR THE MANDATE AND THAT THEY WOULD FIND UNACCEPTABLE ANY ALLUSION, HOWEVER VAGUE, TO THE 14 MAY PROPOSALS.

7. I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD MAKE A SIMILAR DEMARCHE TO WALDHEIM ON THURSDAY OR FRIDAY.

F C O PLEASE PASS SEPARATE ADVANCE COPY FOR PS, SOS.

PARSONS

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

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Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 800
CONFIDENTIAL
FM ISLAMABAD 131115Z NOV 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1356 OF 13 NOVEMBER
INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, DELHI, UKDEL NATO.
INFO SAVING KABUL.

PAKISTAN/ AFGHANISTAN

1. I HAD A ROUND-UP WITH AGHA SHAHI YESTERDAY EVENING. HE LEAVES AGAIN FOR NEW YORK ON 15 NOVEMBER FOR THE AFGHANISTAN DEBATE.

2. HE WAS IN A SOMBRE AND PESSIMISTIC MOOD, MAINTAINING THAT THE WORLD SITUATION HAD ALTERED GREATLY TO PAKISTAN'S DISADVANTAGE IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. THIS WAS LARGELY DUE TO THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR WHICH HAD DISTRACTED ATTENTION, PARTICULARLY OF THE MUSLIM WORLD, FROM AFGHANISTAN. AS A RESULT OF THIS THE RUSSIANS NOW FELT ABLE TO TAKE A TOUGHER LINE. EARLIER, RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS HAD HINTED THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A UN REPRESENTATIVE AND THAT BABRAK KARMEL MIGHT BE REPLACED. NOW THE LANGUAGE WAS STRONGER AND BABRAK KARMEL WOULD NOT HAVE SPOKEN ON RETURN AS HE DID WITHOUT RUSSIAN PROMPTING. MRS GANDHI WAS ALSO MAKING ANTI-PAKISTAN REMARKS AND AGHA SHAHI SAID THAT HE WAS MUCH WORRIED THAT THE BREZHNEV VISIT TO INDIA MIGHT BE USED TO GET THE INDIANS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN FROM THE OTHER SIDE.

3. ON IRAN/IRAQ, THE EARLIER INITIATIVES HAD REACHED A DEAD END: THE NON-ALIGNED ONE BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES OVER THE INCLUSION OF ALGERIA, AND THE ISLAMIC ONE BECAUSE OF IRANIAN REFUSAL TO ANSWER A REQUEST TO ACCEPT A MISSION. HE WAS SCATHING ABOUT IRAN. THE COUNTRY WAS RUN BY IGNORANT MULLAHS WITH NO IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND WITH A SINISTER LEFT-WING ELEMENT BEHIND THEM. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS INCAPABLE OF FORMULATING ANY COHERENT POLICY. ON THE ONE HAND THE IRANIAN PRESS AND RADIO ATTACKED PAKISTAN: ON THE OTHER HAND, REQUESTS FOR HELP (HE DID NOT SPECIFY THEM) WERE RECEIVED TO ACCEDE TO WHICH WOULD COMPROMISE PAKISTAN'S NEUTRALITY. THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE SEEKING TO REBUILD THEIR POSITION IN IRAN AND HAD DECIDED THAT THIS SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY OVER RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, WHICH ANYHOW HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STICK WITH THE RUSSIANS FOR ARMS AND SUPPLIES. THE ISLAMIC WORLD WAS IN DISARRAY AND HE HAD NEVER KNOWN SUCH INTERNAL DIVISION AND BITTERNESS, IN COMPLETE CONTRAST TO THE UNITY AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN MAY.

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4. ON THE UN RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN HE WAS DEFENSIVE AND CLEARLY STILL SMARTING UNDER THE CRITICISMS. HE MAINTAINED THAT IT WAS THE BEST THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IF IT HAD BEEN STRONGER, IT WOULD HAVE LOST THE SUPPORT OF SEVERAL OF THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, INCLUDING KUWAIT. HE REPEATED HIS ASSURANCE TO YOU THAT HE WOULD CLARIFY THE VAGUE LANGUAGE PARTICULARLY ON GUARANTEES IN HIS SPEECH INTRODUCING THE RESOLUTION. HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL TO US FOR OUR SUPPORT AND WAS STILL CONFIDENT THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD ATTRACT MORE VOTES THAN BEFORE.

5. COMPLETING THE GLOOMY PICTURE, HE SAID THAT THE CHINESE WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESOLUTION AND THOUGHT THAT PAKISTAN WAS WEAKENING. HE DERIVED LITTLE COMFORT FROM THE AMERICAN ELECTION AND REMINDED ME THAT IT WAS THE REPUBLICANS WHO HAD LET PAKISTAN DOWN IN THE 1971 WAR WITH INDIA. AS FOR THE SAUDIS, THEY CONTINUED TO PRESS PAKISTAN TO TAKE A STRONG LINE OVER AFGHANISTAN, BUT FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY MONEY IN SUPPORT. THEY HAD NOW COME UP WITH AN OFFER OF MONEY WHICH WAS ALMOST AS DERISORY AS THE AMERICAN OFFER. ZIA WANTED TO DECLINE IT, BUT AGHA SHAHI HAD URGED HIM TO ACCEPT.

6. AFTER TRYING TO PUT SOME HEART INTO HIM, I SAID THAT I WAS BOUND TO BE ASKED IN LONDON WHETHER PAKISTAN'S STAND ON AFGHANISTAN WAS WEAKENING AND WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES WERE OF THEM COMING TO AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE RUSSIANS. WHAT SHOULD I REPLY? HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAS STOOD FIRM UP TO NOW AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. HE RECITED THE REASONS WHY THEY HAD LITTLE CHOICE. THEY WOULD NOT TALK TO BABRAK KARMEL DIRECTLY SINCE ANY RECOGNITION OF HIM MUST COME AT THE END AND NOT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS. FOR A DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS TO WORK, THEY WOULD HAVE TO OFFER MORE THAN RECOGNITION OF THE DURAND LINE, ATTRACTIVE THOUGH THAT WOULD BE FOR PAKISTAN: BABRAK KARMEL WOULD HAVE TO GO AND THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW, OTHERWISE THE REFUGEES WOULD STAY IN PAKISTAN AND THE RESISTANCE WOULD CONTINUE. BUT HE WARNED ME THAT IF THE PRESSURES INCREASED AND IF PAKISTAN WAS LEFT ALONE TO FACE THEM, THEN THEY MIGHT IN THE END HAVE TO MAKE THE BEST DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS THEY COULD.

7. HE IS OF COURSE TIRED AFTER THE EXERTIONS OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS AND BY TEMPERAMENT IS GIVEN TO UPS AND DOWNS. HE HAS ALSO COME UNDER A LOT OF CRITICISM, NO DOUBT INTERNALLY AS WELL AS EXTERNALLY, EITHER FOR BEING TOO WEAK OR TOO STRONG.

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/HIS

HIS MANOEVURINGS AND INITIATIVES OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS HAVE, AT THE END OF THE DAY, LEFT THE SITUATION UNCHANGED. BUT, ALTHOUGH THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF BLACKMAIL AND EMOTION ABOUT ALL THIS, HIS DEPRESSION STEMS BASICALLY FROM THE GENUINE FEELING OF ISOLATION AND OF PAKISTAN'S WEAKNESS FACED BY LARGE HOSTILE COUNTRIES ON BOTH SIDES. HOWEVER, IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION OF WHAT MORE WE COULD DO TO HELP, HE COULD SUGGEST NOTHING EXCEPT THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE WITH AND STRENGTHEN THE SUPPORT WE WERE ALREADY GIVING.

FORSTER

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AFGHANISTAN STANDARD

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL

HS

4 November 1980

Film on Afghanistan

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 3 November on this subject. She would like to see the film on Afghanistan and I should be grateful if you could arrange for a cassette to be provided.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

ERB

George Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Sending copy.

Afgh.

GR230
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

This is the answer to Mr Geny Neale's question.

FM ISLAMABAD 091145Z NOV 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 1347 OF 9 NOV 80
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KABUL, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK.
SAVING FOR INFO MOD D14.

YOUR TEL 911 (NOT TO ALL): WAKHAN SALIENT.

1. THE PAKISTAN OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY REPORT WHICH WAS PICKED UP BY THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES HERE USED THE WORD ''ANNEXATION'' IN VAGUE AND NON-POLITICAL TERMS. THE MAIN KIRGHIZ TRIBES EVACUATED THE SALIENT MANY MONTHS AGO AND MOVED INTO PAKISTAN FROM WHERE THEY WOULD LIKE TO GO TO ALASKA (SEE ITV PROGRAMME ''AFGHAN EXODUS'' OF 29 JULY). THE SALIENT CONSISTS MAINLY OF A VERY HIGH PLATEAU UNDER SNOW FOR 4-5 MONTHS OF THE YEAR AND SUITABLE ONLY FOR SUMMER GRAZING. IT IS VIRTUALLY INACCESSIBLE SAVE FOR MULE TRACKS WHICH GIVE SOME ACCESS FROM THE NORTH, SOUTH AND WEST BUT NOT, WE UNDERSTAND, FROM THE EAST, IE CHINA. THE AGENCY REPORT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD OVER THE MONTHS MOVED UNITS INTO THE AREA (MAINLY TADJIK TROOPS, AS REPORTED ON OTHER CHANNELS IN JULY) AND WERE IMPROVING THE ACCESS FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE SALIENT WHICH ALTHOUGH AN EXTREMELY MOUNTAINOUS PIECE OF TERRAIN WAS CREATED ON THE MAP TO SEPARATE BRITISH INDIA AND TSARIST RUSSIA.

2. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE MOVED TROOPS INTO THE SALIENT, THOUGH THERE WOULD SEEM LITTLE POINT IN A PREMANENT MILITARY OCCUPATION: ANYHOW, THEY HAVE THE POWER TO OCCUPY IT LIKE OTHER PARTS OF AFGHANISTAN WHENEVER THEY WISH. BUT ANNEXATION WOULD BE A POLITICAL ACT AND PRESUMABLY THE RESULT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND BABRAK KARMAL. SHAH NAWAZ AND OTHERS WHOM I HAVE TACKLED DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THERE WAS NY TRUTH IN THE AGENCY STORY WHICH WAS ALSO CARRIED BY THE ECONOMIST SOME WEEKS AGO.

3. SAD REGISTRY PLEASE PASS TO MOD.

FORSTER

LIMITED
SAD
MR DONALD

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

RESTRICTED

1949 - 1

Mr Colvin
Mr Lewis

PP ISLAMABAD
RR MOSCOW
RR KABUL
GRS 64
RESTRICTED
FM FCO 061215Z NOV 80
TO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 911 OF 6 NOVEMBER
INFO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KABUL

1. ON 5 NOVEMBER BRITISH PRESS CARRIED NEWS AGENCY REPORTS FROM PAKISTAN TO THE EFFECT THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE 'ANNEXING THE WAKHAN SALIENT IN AFGHANISTAN'. TWO PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN TABLED. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS.

CARRINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Bernie Ramsden

(1)

Would you like to see the film? It sounds interesting. Yes pl

Rob 3/XI

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 November 1980

Dear Michael,

Film on Afghanistan

The Prime Minister may be interested to know that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office recently commissioned the Central Office of Information to produce a film on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The COI completed the film, entitled "Afghanistan 1980", last week and copies are being distributed worldwide (except in North America for copyright reasons) through our posts.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have been active in producing written material on Afghanistan and since shortly after the Soviet invasion have been producing an attributable round-up of Afghanistan topics called "Afghanistan Report". Our aim has been to ensure that international opinion does not forget, or acquiesce in, the Soviet occupation and that pressure on the Russians to withdraw their troops is maintained.

We are now seeking to drive this message home visually. The film, which lasts 28 minutes, has been compiled from news film available commercially from British, French, American and Soviet sources. It emphasises the suffering, destruction and loss of life caused by the occupation and makes it clear that the Russians remain unwelcome in Afghanistan. It makes good viewing and should make a strong impression on the audiences we aim to influence. Versions with the commentary in Arabic, French and Spanish are being produced and we hope that the film will make a definite impact in the Third World, and especially in the politically important Islamic countries. While it is mainly for television, our posts will also be able to show it to invited audiences or loan it to influential contacts. Distribution of the film has been timed to coincide with the current session of the UN General Assembly, which is likely to debate Afghanistan some time in mid-November.

/The

The film contains no reference to its origins, though credits name the sources of the material. Our posts have, however, been authorised to agree to its being attributed to the London Television Service (a branch of the COI) if overseas television stations insist. The Russians are in any case certain to learn of the film's origin fairly quickly and could criticise the Government for having authorised it. We do not however believe that we should take any such criticism too tragically; the film does no more than present in a different medium the facts of the situation, on which the Government has made its position clear.

If the Prime Minister would like to see the film at any stage, we could arrange, in conjunction with the COI, for a cassette to be provided for No 10.

Yours ever

G G H

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Afghan 3c

GR 680

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM ISLAMABAD 271210Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1333 OF 27 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE KABUL, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW AND JEDDA

INFO SAVING DACCA, PARIS AND BONN

YOUR TELNO 872 TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON TELNO 4362:
AFGHANISTAN AT THE UNGA

1. I SAW SHAH NAWAZ, SECRETARY OF GENERAL MFA, TODAY. I SAID THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT I THOUGHT THAT YOU WOULD WELCOME THE LATEST PAKISTANI THINKING ON THE DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION. THE LATTER LOOKED TO ME PRETTY WEAK COMPARED TO THE JANUARY RESOLUTION. WAS THIS BY DESIGN FOR TACTICAL REASONS OR WAS IT THE BEST THEY COULD GET THROUGH THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE?.

2. SHAH NAWAZ SAID THAT IT WAS THE FORMER RATHER THAN THE LATTER. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE POSSIBLE TO HAVE GONE FOR A TOUGH RESOLUTION AND IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE RIGHT COURSE. HOWEVER, A TOUGH RESOLUTION WOULD SIMPLY HAVE LEFT THE WHOLE POSITION DEADLOCKED WITH NOTHING GAINED AND PROBABLY AN EROSION OF SUPPORT AT THE UNGA. A LESS CONFRONTATIONAL RESOLUTION STOOD A CHANCE OF INCREASING THE VOTE AT THE UN AND OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE SOME MOVE. THE RUSSIAN OBJECTIVE WAS TO ''BUILD A WALL'' ROUND AFGHANISTAN SO THAT THEY COULD SUBDUE THE COUNTRY OVER A PERIOD OF TIME WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE THEY WANTED TO PREVENT THE PROBLEM BEING INTERNATIONLISED. IT WAS PAKISTAN'S OBJECTIVE TO KEEP THE PROBLEM INTERNATIONAL. HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF RUSSIAN MOVEMENT AND THAT HE EXPECTED THEM TO OPPOSE THE RESOLUTION. BUT THAT WOULD NOT PREVENT THEM HAVING TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE IF THEY THOUGHT THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO MAKE A MOVE.

3. I SAID THAT CLEARLY IT WAS STILL THE RUSSIAN OBJECTIVE TO GET THE PAKISTANIS TALKING TO BABRAK KARMAL AND THAT THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE RESOLUTION MIGHT BE USED TO MANOEUVRE THE PAKISTANIS INTO THAT SITUATION. I REMINDED HIM OF GENERAL ZIA'S ROBUST LANGUAGE IN LONDON. SHAH NAWAZ REPEATED FIRMLY THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF HAVING DEALINGS WITH BABRAK KARMAL. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE AMERICANS, AFTER INITIAL DOUBTS ABOUT THE RESOLUTION, HAD NOW TOLD THE PAKISTANIS THAT THEY ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS THE BEST COURSE AT THE MOMENT AND THAT GERMANS HAD EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS. HE HOPED THAT I WOULD REASSURE YOU THAT THEY WERE NOT WEAKENING IN THEIR STAND AND THAT THEY GENUINELY BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED.

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4. ON THE ATTENDANCE OF THE RESISTANCE LEADERS IN NEW YORK HE WAS MORE ILL AT EASE AND EVASIVE. HE REFERRED TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING THE RESISTANCE LEADERS TO COOPERATE AND SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE. AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN ISLAMABAD AND IN GENEVA THEY HAD ALL BEEN MORE OR LESS UNDER CONTROL, BUT THEY COULD NOT CONTROL THEM IN NEW YORK AND CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE WOULD BE DONE IF THEY INDULGED IN PUBLIC FEUDING. NEVERTHELESS, THE PAKISTANIS WOULD LIKE THEM TO GO AND WERE STILL CONSIDERING THE QUESTION.

5. OF COURSE, AGHA SHAHI IS MAKING THE RUNNING IN NEW YORK, BUT SHAH NAWAZ SEEMED REASONABLY WELL IN TOUCH WITH HIS THINKING AND SPOKE WITH CONVICTION ABOUT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. PROBABLY THEY HAD MORE DIFFICULTY WITH THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE THAN HE LET ON (HE REFERRED AT ONE STAGE TO THE FACT THAT THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN STRENGTHENING THE DRAFT SOMEWHAT) AND THERE IS STILL AN ELEMENT OF WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RUSSIAN COOPERATION. BUT I COULD DETECT NO SIGN THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ''IN CAHOOTS WITH THE RUSSIANS'' AND HIS LANGUAGE WAS FAIRLY ROBUST THROUGHOUT. ONLY ON AFGHAN RESISTANCE REPRESENTATION DID HE SEEM UNHAPPY (NO DOUBT BECAUSE HIS SYMPATHIES LIE WITH GAILANI, TO WHOM HIS WIFE IS RELATED, AND AGAINST THE MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS). I THINK THEY HAVE PERSUADED THEMSELVES RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS THE BEST BET AT THE MOMENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING DACCA, PARIS AND BONN.

FORSTER

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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Afghanistan

17

27 October, 1980.

Message to President Carter

I enclose the Prime Minister's reply to President Carter's message of 15 October in the form in which it has issued this morning over the direct line. As you will see, it is virtually identical with the text enclosed with your letter to me of 24 October.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RRB

Group/Class ..... PREM 19

Piece 387

Message from Prime Minister to President Carter (T.211/80) dated 27 October 1980 (+ 1 draft and 2 other versions)

Paper extracted and temporarily retained under Section 3(4) pending completion of review.

(date) ..... 21 July 2011

(Signed) ..... D McLaryland

Afghanistan

GRPS 70

UNCLASSIFIED

FM ISLAMABAD 260825Z OCT 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 1330 OF 26TH OCT 80
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOD (D14), UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 1307: AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN BORDER.

1. THERE HAS BEEN A FURTHER BORDER INCIDENT TEN MILES INSIDE PAKISTAN TERRITORY IN NORTH WAZIRISTAN. 6 MI 24 HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS ATTACKED AN UNPROTECTED AFGHAN REFUGEE CAMP BETWEEN MIRAN SHAH AND DATTA KHEL FOR ABOUT 10 MINUTES AT 3.45P.M. ON 24 OCTOBER. THREE PEOPLE WERE INJURED. THE INCIDENT HAS BEEN REPORTED BY THE OFFICIAL NEWSAGENCY WITHOUT COMMENT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING MOSCOW, KABUL, NEW DELHI

FORSTER
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[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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17

Afghanistan

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From the Private Secretary

15 October 1980

BF 22/10/80

Message from President Carter

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received this afternoon from President Carter. The timing and the contents of the message seem to me equally surprising but no doubt we should send a reply in due course.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

9

Group/Class PREM 19

Piece 387

Message from President Carter to Prime Minister (T202/80) dated 15 October 1980

Paper extracted and temporarily retained under Section 3(4) pending completion of review.

(date) 21 July 2011

(Signed) CMWayland

GR 800 CONFIDENTIAL

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FM KABUL 131000Z

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 297 OF 13 OCOTBER 80.

INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (D14).

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 296 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.

POLITICAL.

1. A NEW PASSPORT LAW HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED, WHICH IS SAID TO MAKE PASSPORTS AVAILABLE TO ALL, PRICE 200 POUNDS. NOT MENTIONED IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT, IS THE INDEMNITY OF A FURTHER 500 POUNDS REQUIRED AGAINST NON-RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN.

2. AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN SIGNED WITH THE USSR FOR OIL AND GAS PROSPECTING IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN, AND WITH BULGARIAN RADIO FOR CO-OPERATION WITH RADIO AFGHANISTAN.

3. A JOINT MEETING OF THE POLITBURO AND THE PRESIDIUM OF THE RC WAS HELD ON 11 OCOTBER BUT APPEARS TO HAVE DECIDED ONLY TO APPOINT TWO COMMISSIONS, ONE TO STUDY AN INCREMENT IN SALARIES FOR EMPLOYEES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, AND ONE TO STUDY THE AWARD OF MEDALS AND HONOURS FOR DEFENCE OF THE HOMELAND.

INTERNAL SECURITY.

4. THE CURFEW IN KABUL HAS BEEN EXTENDED FROM 12 OCTOBER BY 2 HOURS, AND IS NOW FROM 10 P.M. TO 5 A.M. THE OFFICIAL EXPLANATION IS SIMPLY THE LONGER HOURS OF DARKNESS WITH THE APPROACH OF WINTER. THE ACTUAL REASON MUST BE THE INCREASING INCIDENCE OF MUJAHIDEEN ATTACKS AROUND KABUL. FIRING IS HEARD NIGHTLY AND HEAVY, THOUGH SHORT, EXCHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE OVER THE LAST WEEK IN TWO RESIDENTIAL AREAS, WAZIR AKBAR KHAN AND MICROROVAN, AND IN THE TWO SUBURBS OF KHAIRKHANA AND DARULAMAN. THE STREETS ARE VIRTUALLY DESERTED FROM 8 P.M. ON 9 OCTOBER AT 1415 A GUARD OUTSIDE THE HOUSE OF A LOCAL DIGNITARY, IN SHARE NAU, THE SHOPPING CENTRE OF THE NEW TOWN AREA, WAS SHOT AND KILLED FROM A PASSING CAR. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THE BBC REPORT OF THE AMBUSH OF A TRUCKLOAD OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS. THERE HAS BEEN A NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND RUSSIAN TROOPS MOVING THROUGH TOWN. MORE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS HAVE BEEN FLYING OUT OF KABUL OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS, AND EARLY TODAY THERE WERE SEVERAL JET PASSES OVER THE TOWN. ARGUMENT IS HEARD APENLY IN THE TOWN AND PARCHAMISTS WHO TRY TO DEFEND THEIR POSITION GET SHORT SHRIFT : ''WHERE ARE THESE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS, THESE CHINEESE ? THEERE ARE NONE. THE FIGHTERS ARE AFGHANS, FIGHTING FOR AFGHANISTA

5. WE HAVE REPORTS OF INCREASIING TENSION IN KABUL BETWEEN THE POLICE, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF KHALQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR, GULABZOI, AND THE ARMY UNDER PARCHAMIST MINISTER OF DEFENCE, RAFIEE. TTHIS TROUBLE SEEMS TO BE IN THE UPPER ECHELONS OF BOTH SERVICES, BOTH MINISTERS HAVING GATHERED THEIR CLOSE ADHERENTS AROUND THEM. THERE IS A TRADITION OF RIVALRY BETWEEN THESE TWO SERVICES WHICH HAS LED TO BLOODSHED UNDER PREVIOUS REGIMES.

6. THERE WAS PERTURBATION IN THE KABUL GIRLS' SCHOOLS OVER INJECTIONS GIVEN LAST WEEK TO ALL GIRLS OF 15. WILD STORIES SPREAD ABOUT THE ALLEGED PURPOSE OF THE INJECTIONS BUT THE FUSS SEEMS TO HAVE DIED DOWN.

7. THE ROAD KABUL TO JALALABAD REMAINS UNSAFE AND BAKHTAR, THE DOMESTIC AIRLINE, IS OPERATING 3 FLIGHTS MOST DAYS TO JALALABAD. THE STRETCH JALALABAD TO THE BORDER POST AT TORKHAM SEEMS SAFE AND MANY PASSENGERS FOR PAKISTAN ARE FLYING TO JALALABAD AND GOING BY ROAD FROM THERE.

8. ON THE NIGHT OF 10 OCTOBER THE MUJAHIDEEN LAUNCHED ANOTHER ATTACK ON CHARIKAR, THE CAPITAL OF PAREAN PROVINCE, SOME 60 KMS NORTH OF KABUL. THE OFFICE OF THE CHEMICAL FERTILIZER CORPORATION WAS BURNED DOWN, A PATROL VEHICLE ATTACKED AND BURNED AND ABOUT 6 PEOPLE KILLED.

9. REPORTS COMING IN INDICATE THAT, FOLLOWING THE PANJSHIR OPERATION, A CONSIDERABLE BATTLE HAS BEEN GOING ON IN THE GHORBAND VALLEY, LEADING FROM KABUL TO THE SHIBA PASS WHICH GIVES ACCESS TO THE CENTRAL PROVINCE OF BAMIYAN. THERE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN HEAVY CASUALTIES AGIN ON BOTH SIDES.

10. THE MEDIA CONTINUE TO CLAIM SUCCESSES AGAINST THE RESISTANCE FORCES, CURRENTLY IN BADAKSHAN, ZABUL, FARYAB, KUNDUZ AND JAUZJAN PROVINCES. A GROUP OF 450 STUDENTS RETURNED FROM THE SOVIET UNION ON 8 OCTOBER AND ALL WERE SENT OFF THE SAME DAY, WITHIN HOURS, TO A BATTLE AREA.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

11. NO RESTRICTION.

FCO PLASE PASS SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK.

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THIS TELEGRAM
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ADVANCED

Afghanistan

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 October 1980

Foreign Affairs Committee: Government Reply to Report on Afghanistan

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 9 October, and the draft Government Observations on the Foreign Affairs Select Committee Report on Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister is content with the draft and the proposed timing of publication.

I am copying this letter to Robin Birch (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office) and Peter Moore (Chief Whip's Office).

N. J. SANDERS

E.R. Worsnop, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DR

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GREETINGS

THE PRIME MINISTER 10 DOWNING STREET
SW1

WE WISH YOU A [redacted] HAPPY BIRTHDAY AND HOPE YOU WILL HAVE CONTINUED
SUCCESS IN YEARS TO COME STOP THANKING YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT
IN THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE YOURS FAITHFULLY
SAYED AHMAD GAILANI NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT OF AFGHANISTAN

COL 10 SW1

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SOUTH WESTERN DISTRICT OFFICE
TUBE ROOM
01-834 9100
14 OCT 1980
SW1P 1AA

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No objection MJS.

2
PRIME MINISTER
To see this draft reply
on Afghanistan
MJS
10/10

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 October 1980

R Sanders.
No objection
Mrs 10/x
cc Press Office

N Sanders Esq
10 Downing Street
London
SW1

Dear Nick,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE : GOVERNMENT REPLY TO REPORT ON AFGHANISTAN

The Foreign Affairs Committee published their Report on Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and its Consequences for British Policy on 12 September (HC 745). We now propose to publish as a White Paper on Wednesday 22 October the Government's Observations on the Report. The draft has been approved by the Secretary of State.

I attach for your information a copy of these Observations which remain confidential until publication.

I should be grateful if you, and those to whom I am copying this letter with enclosure, would kindly confirm that there is no objection to publication.

Yours ever,

Eric.

E R Worsnop
Parliamentary Clerk

cc: R Birch Esq
Office of the Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster
70 Whitehall
London
SW1

P Moore Esq
Government Chief Whip's Office
12 Downing Street
London
SW1

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FIFTH REPORT FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

SESSION 1979/80

AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR BRITISH POLICY

OBSERVATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT

PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS BY COMMAND OF HER MAJESTY OCTOBER 1980

FIFTH REPORT FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE SESSION 1979/80:
AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR BRITISH POLICY

GOVERNMENT REPLY

1. The Government are glad that the Foreign Affairs Committee has undertaken a major study of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its consequences for British policy. The invasion was a most striking illustration of the Soviet Union's determination to ~~consolidate and extend~~ extend and consolidate its influence, in disregard for the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

2. The Government welcome the Committee's Report as a valuable and comprehensive study of the invasion and its consequences. In general the Government share the views expressed by the Committee. Except on the minor points discussed below, the Government agree with the Recommendations of the Committee's Report, many of which reflect policies which the Government have been following and will continue to pursue.

Recent developments

3. Since the Committee's hearings were completed, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue by military means its aim of imposing upon the Afghan people a government which they could not be persuaded by peaceful means to accept. There is no sign that the Afghan people are becoming reconciled to the Soviet presence. The popular resistance is still fighting back and large areas of the country are not under continuous Soviet control. The feuds among the Afghan communists persist. Refugees continue to leave Afghanistan in large numbers. Over one million of them are now living in Pakistan in very difficult conditions. The Soviet occupying forces are building barracks and seem to anticipate a long stay. As the second winter of the Soviet occupation approaches, the situation is very far from being stabilised.

4. The Soviet Union has not so far displayed a readiness to negotiate seriously about a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. Soviet proposals seem to be designed to secure international recognition for the Babrak Karmal regime and to avoid any commitmen to withdraw Soviet forces.

British policy

5. The Government have continued to condemn the occupation of Afghanistan and to call on the Soviet Union to end it. The Government's objective is a political settlement involving the total withdrawal of Soviet forces and freedom for the Afghan people to have a government of their own choosing. The Governmen have continued to discuss with other countries, including the Soviet Union, the British suggestion that such a settlement should permit Afghanistan to resume its traditional status of neutrality and non-alignment free from the interference of outside powers.

6. The Government agree with the Committee's Recommendation 1 that pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces must be maintained. They will continue to work actively to this end, in the United Nations and elsewhere. In this connection, the Government consider it necessary to maintain the economic measures taken jointly by Western countries against the Soviet Union after the invasion. In particular, the Government will continue to play their part in discussions on how the COCOM system can be used to maintain tight control over the export of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union.

7. The Government note that the Committee heard no evidence to suggest that the invasion of Afghanistan was part of a grand strategy on the part of the Soviet Union to extend its influence to the Persian Gulf and threaten Western oil supplies. The Government share the view that the Soviet Union probably has no specific timetable for further advances. But any prudent Western policy must take account of the Soviet Union's evident willingness to use any means including force to further its objective of gaining influence in other countries at the expense of the West, particularly in areas where the latter's interests are intimately involved. And, as the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said

in evidence to the Committee, the Soviet Union, as a result of the occupation of Afghanistan, is now better placed to promote instability in South Asia and the Gulf area. Soviet forces are closer to the Gulf and this had made a significant difference to the balance of forces in the region.

8. With reference to the Committee's Recomendation 2, the Government are very conscious of the need to work for closer consultation among the NATO Allies. The purpose of consultation should include the elaboration of a coherent policy which will leave the Soviet Union in no doubt of the West's determination and ability to resist expansionism, as advocated in paragraph 98 of the Committee's Report. The Government agree that, while NATO does not have a military role outside its Treaty area, developments elsewhere in the world affect the vital interests of every member of the Alliance. Those NATO countries which have the resources to do so should take steps to defend the interests of the West and its friends wherever these may be threatened. In the political field, the Government believe it important to work for closer contacts and, where appropriate, joint action with friendly countries outside the Alliance, notably Japan and Australia. ~~One recent example of the latter was the visit by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to Japan at the end of September 1980.~~ The cooperation between the Nine and Japan in responding to events in Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East has been encouraging.

9. The Government favour cooperation among Western and like-minded countries in a policy in ~~two~~ three broad parts. The first part should be the extension of a kind of military deterrence into new areas, by means of measures undertaken by individual countries on the lines described in paragraph 100 of the Report. The ~~second~~ third part of the policy should be political and economic efforts concerted much more systematically than in the past, to support key states in the developing world in their efforts to strengthen, individually and collectively, their independence and to reduce their vulnerability to outside pressure and interference.

should be the continuation of the economic measures referred to in paragraph 6 above. The second

Reads "should be the continuation of the economic measures referred to in paragraph 6 above. The ..."

10. The Government have stated their intention of maintaining channels of communication with the Soviet Union, to discuss international and bilateral matters of genuine importance. The Government agree with the Committee's Recommendation 8 that it is necessary to maintain the CSCE process and to pursue measures of arms control. Such measures should contribute to security and should be balanced and properly verified. The Government take note of the Committee's view in the same Recommendation that further consideration should be given to the working definitions of 'detente'. However, as the evidence given to the Committee by Mr Blaker, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, implied, the Government do not believe that the Soviet Union is likely to be influenced by agreed understandings about general concepts but rather by Western actions designed to make certain possible types of Soviet initiative unlikely on balance to advance Soviet interests. The Government do not accept the view mentioned in paragraph 29 of the Report that to regard detente as 'indivisible' may be a luxury which the Europeans cannot afford. One implication of this view might be that the Europeans cannot afford to oppose Soviet expansionism in the developing world. In the Government's opinion, the example of Afghanistan supports the contrary view.

11. The Government have reservations about the idea (paragraph 104 of the Report) of seeking a process of detente in and around the Indian Ocean and the Gulf to complement and presumably resemble the policy of detente in Europe. Where there are clear lines of demarcation between the two military groupings in Europe, the areas of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf consist largely of non-aligned states. The Government therefore doubt whether detente can be applied in these areas in the way which has proved possible in the different circumstances prevailing in Europe. However, the Government decided in June 1980 that the United Kingdom should join the United Nations ad hoc Committee on the question of an Indian Ocean Peace Zone and will play their part in that Committee's deliberations.

12. The Government share the Committee's view that the utmost importance should be attached to seeking a solution to the MIddle East problem. They stand by the Venice Declaration quoted in

Recommendation 7 of the Report. The Government are determined to contribute to a peaceful settlement in any way they can. The Government strongly supported Monsieur Thorn's recent fact-finding mission to the Middle East. They are pleased that Britain's relations with Saudi Arabia are once again close and cordial.

13. The Government agree with the Committee on the importance to be attached to the development of the West's relations with Third World countries. They believe that the invasion of Afghanistan may have helped to show that most developing countries have far more interests in common with the West than with the Soviet Union. The latter's unimpressive record as a donor of economic aid illustrates the same point.

14. Three particular countries were mentioned in Recommendation 5 of the Committee's Report. The first was Yugoslavia, to which the Prime Minister paid a very successful visit from 24-26 Septembe 1980. This first-ever official visit by a British Prime Minister should help greatly to develop the traditionally excellent relations between the two countries. The second country mentioned was Turkey. Britain has long been an active participant in international aid programmes for Turkey. The circumstances that led up to the assumption of power by the military leaders in Turkey, notably the rising level of political violence, are well understood. The members of the Nine have expressed the hope that it will be possible to restore democratic government before long. The Government are firmly convinced of the importance of Turkey's continuing to play its key role in the Western Alliance and making further progress towards stability and prosperity. The third country mentioned was Pakistan. The Government much admired the leading role played by the Islamic countries, and notably Pakistan, in diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. The Government will continue to support those effor They will also continue to contribute as much as possible to effor to overcome Pakistan's economic problems. British aid in 1979-8 stood at £13.6 million. In 1980-81 there will be ~~this figure should be more than doubled, through~~ expenditure of £20 million under the regular aid programme and of up to £7.7 million towards the purchase by Pakistan of British cargo ships. In addition Pakistan benefits to the extent of £4 million per year from an agreement on relief

of official debt payments to Britain. Pakistan also receives United Kingdom Military Training Assistance on special terms.

5. Recommendation 3 of the Committee's Report called on the Government to render assistance to Afghan refugees through the United Nations High Commissioner. The Government provided £120,000 of emergency relief for the refugees in January 1980. They later contributed £1.4 million as the British share of the European Community's response to the UN High Commissioner's appeal. In addition, they have provided £0.5 million to the UNHCR as a separate bilateral contribution.

16. The Government agree with Recommendation 4 about the need to do everything possible to help secure the release of the American hostages in Iran. The Government are continuing to consult with the Nine on this subject. The holding of the hostages remains entirely inadmissible. It is also politically anomalous, since any threat to Iran's independence comes from the Soviet Union and not from any Western country. Although it has been necessary to withdraw British representation from Tehran because of the present difficult and uncertain period in bilateral relations, there has been no break in diplomatic relations and the Government hope to re-establish normal representation as soon as possible. They favour equally strongly the restoration of good relations between Iran and the West as a whole.

17. With reference to Professor Erickson's remarks, recorded in paragraphs 668 and 678-680 of the Minutes of Evidence, to the effect that he had no contact with the Government, the Government wish again to draw attention to the letter sent to the Committee's Chairman by Mr Blaker, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, on 7 May 1980. This included the passage inserted as a footnote to paragraph 764 of the Minutes of Evidence.

GPS36Ø
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK Ø722ØZ OCT 8Ø
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1462 OF 7 OCTOBER
INFO WASHINGTON PARIS BONN ISLAMABAD KABUL JEDDA DACCA UKDEL NATO

MY TEL NO 1451 AND YOUR TELNO 852 TO ISLAMABAD:
AFGHANISTAN AT THE UNGA

1. I TALKED TO AGHA SHAHI TODAY (7 OCTOBER). HE SAID THAT THE DRAFTING GROUP WAS WORKING ON A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CERTAIN PRINCIPLES EG SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, GUARANTEE OF AFGHAN NON-ALIGNMENT. THEY HAD DROPPED THE IDEA OF A FOLLOW UP COMMITTEE OF THE GA. THE SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSED STRONG OPPOSITION TO THIS. AT PRESENT, THEY WERE THINKING ONLY IN TERMS OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE PARTIES. THIS MIGHT NOT EVEN BE INCLUDED EXPLICITLY IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

2. SHAHI SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT HOPE TO KEEP THE VOTE UP ON ANYTHING STRONGER. THE STRENGTH OF SOVIET OPPOSITION HAD ALARMED A NUMBER OF MEMBERS AND THE BULK OF THE ARABS WERE UNWILLING TO CO-OPERATE IN SCOURGING THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE OF THEIR STRONG RESENTMENT OF AMERICAN PARTIALITY TOWARDS ISRAEL, AS WELL AS THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH THE IRAN/IRAQ CRISIS.

3. I ASKED SHAHI WHETHER THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS WOULD PUT UP AN ADEQUATE PERFORMANCE HERE. HE WAS NOT SANGUINE. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO PROBLEMS. FIRST THERE WERE TOO MANY GROUPS AND THEY FLATLY REFUSED TO AMALGAMATE. SECONDLY, EACH GROUP WAS SPLIT INTERNALLY IN THAT THOSE WITH SUFFICIENT EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD TO LOBBY EFFECTIVELY HERE WERE DISLIKED AND DISTRUSTED BY THE MORE FUNDAMENTALIST MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUPS.

4. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE AND OF OTHER INDICATIONS, EG MY TEL NO 1438, THE OUTLOOK IS NOT PROMISING, AND THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT WE WOULD ONLY MAKE THINGS WORSE IF WE OR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE US, WERE TO PRESS THE MUSLIMS TO SHOW MORE DETERMINATION.

/S.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY MODERATE NON-ALIGNED STATES IN THE GENERAL DEBATE HAVE BEEN GRATIFYINGLY ROBUST AND, AS THE AFGHANISTAN DEBATE APPROACHES, THE PAKISTANIS AND OTHER MOSLEMS MAY WELL FEEL UNDER PRESSURE NOT TO PERMIT A FIASCO. THIS COULD LEAD TO SOMETHING BETTER THAN THE PRESENT DEPRESSING OUTLOOK.

PARSONS

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

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AFGHANISTAN

STANDARD

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SED	CABINET OFFICE

GRS 275 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM ISLAMABAD 290745Z SEP 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1307 OF 29 SEPTEMBER

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, NEW DELHI.

SAVING INFO MOSCOW, KABUL AND UKDEL NATO

Afghanistan

MY TEL 1305: SOVIET PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN BORDER

1. THERE HAS BEEN A SECOND FRONTIER INCIDENT IN WHICH, ACCORDING TO A PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ANNOUNCEMENT, SIX AFGHAN HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS MADE AN UNPROVOKED ROCKET ATTACK ON THE NAWA BORDER POST IN MOHMAND AGENCY (JUST SOUTH OF THE BAJAUR AGENCY) AT 0945 HOURS ON THE MORNING OF 28 SEPTEMBER. THE ROCKETS FIRED FROM 2,000 YARDS, FELL NEAR THE POST. CIVIL ARMED FORCES MANNING THE POST ARE SAID TO HAVE ENGAGED AND BEATEN BACK THE GUNSHIPS. NO CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED ON THE PAKISTAN SIDE. THE AFGHAN CHARGE WAS SUMMONED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO RECEIVE A PROTEST.

KASHMIR

2. IN PARALLEL A FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN HAS VIGOUROUSLY DENIED A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF 27 SEPTEMBER ALLEGING A DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION ALONG THE INDO-PAKISTAN BORDER. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO INCIDENT ON THE INDO-PAKISTAN BORDER, THAT IT REMAINED COMPLETELY CALM, AND THAT THEREFORE NO QUESTION AROSE OF ANY PROTEST BEING LODGED IN THIS CONTEXT. HE REGRETTED THAT QUOTE FALSE STORIES WERE BEING SPREAD TO SPOIL INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS UNQUOTE, BUT WAS CERTAIN, THAT QUOTE THIS MISCHIEVOUS EFFORT WOULD NOT SUCCEED UNQUOTE.

COMMENT

3. WHETHER THIS CONTINUING SOVIET PRESSURE IS TIME TO COINCIDE WITH ZIA'S VISIT TO THE UN AS SPOKESMAN OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD, OR IS DESIGNED TO REMIND THE PAKISTANIS OF THE WEAKNESS AND DANGER OF THEIR POSITION, THE PAKISTANIS FOR THEIR PART SEEM TO BE ROBUSTLY DEFENDING THEMSELVES PHYSICALLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW AND UKDEL NATO.

FORSTER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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AFGHANISTAN

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LVO NR 291/26

FDW G 61/26

OO BELGRADE (DESKBY 260700Z)

GRS 220

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260700Z

FM F C O 260043Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
(FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 218 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1980

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1328 OF 22 SEPT INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW AND KABUL.
FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY:

M I P TS (NOT TO ALL)

MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE AND UN SECRETARY-GENERAL:

AFGHANISTAN.

1. LORD CARRINGTON AND DR WALDHEIM AGREED THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE FEELING ISOLATED AND UNSURE OF THEIR SUPPORT, HENCE THEIR DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE. THE PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO AVOID DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BABRAK KARMAL REGIME. WALDHEIM SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF A CONFERENCE, AND HAD ARGUED THAT A CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE AMERICANS AND THE CHINESE AS A MEANS OF ATTACKING THE SOVIET UNION. LORD CARRINGTON RECOGNISED THE DIFFICULTY OF MAINTAINING THE PREVIOUS WIDE SUPPORT FOR A UN RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN, AND SAID THAT IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO INCORPORATE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN ANY GA RESOLUTION.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

CYPHER

0426/26

TOP SECRET COPY NO 2 OF TWO COPIES R.H

Afghanistan 12

This is a copy. The original has been extracted and retained under S. 3(4)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

23 September, 1980

Publicity for the Resistance in Afghanistan

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 19 September to Michael Alexander about * ~~~~~ * Afghan tribesmen to take films of Russian atrocities and military activities in Afghanistan.

She has commented "Excellent".

C A WHITMORE

~~ passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

A Wayland
21.7.11

Paul Lever, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TOP SECRET

Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 800

Prime Minister
To see all
MAP

CONFIDENTIAL
FM KABUL 221028Z
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 281 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 80.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW,
UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (D14).

INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 278 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.
POLITICAL.
1. THE SOVIET DEFECTOR INSIDE THE AMERICAN EMBASSY DECIDED, AFTER AN INTERVIEW WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR TABEYEEV, TO WITHDRAW HIS APPLICATION FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM. HE LEFT WITH TABEYEEV ON 21 SEPTEMBER (MY TELEGRAM NO 280 NOT TO ALL REFERS). THE MEASURES OF SURVEILLANCE AND HARASSMENT OF WESTERN EMBASSIES APPEAR TO HAVE CEASED.
2. THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR HAS DELIVERED A LETTER FROM MRS GANDHI TO BABRAK KARMAL. THE KABUL NEW TIMES REPORTS THE LETTER AS SAYING THAT ''...THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS TRIED TO SEE THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IN ITS NORMAL AND DESIRABLE COURSE..... AND WOULD PURSUE ITS EFFORTS TOWARD OBTAINING A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.'' THE INDIAN EMBASSY SAY THE LETTER IS IN REPLY TO ONE FROM BABRAK AND CONTINS NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE.
3. PLANS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED TO ESTABLISH ELEVEN STATE FARMS IN DIFFERENT PROVINCES COVERING AN AREA OF ABOUT 92,000 ACRES. THEY WILL EMPLOY ABOUT 192 ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF AND 1,176 AGRICULTURAL WORKERS.
4. A COMMISSION HAS BEEN APPOINTED TO ENSURE THERE IS NO FUEL SHORTAGE THIS WINTER. MEASURES ENVISAGED INCLUDE GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE STORAGE, DISTRRIBUTION AND SALE AT FIXED PRICES OF WOOD AS WELL AS INCREASED PRODUCTION OF COAL.
INTERNAL SECURITY.
5. A LEAFLET PUT OUT BY ONE OF THE RESISTANCE GROUPS GIVES ITS ACCOUNT OF THE PANJSHER OPERATION. IT PREDICTABLY RECOUNTS A MASSIVE SOVIET PUSH WITH THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS, 500 TANKS AND AIR SUPPORT. IT CLAIMS 1500 SOVIET KILLED OR INJURED, 35 TANKS AND 1 HELICOPTER DESTROYED : ON THE RESISTAANCE SIDE, 20 MUJAHIDEEN AND 100 CIVILIANS KILLED AND 208 VILLAGES DESTROYED BY BOMBARDMENT. THE ROAD TO THE PANJSHER HAS BEEN RE-OPENED.
6. IN PAKHITA THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN DROPPING LEAFLETS TELLING THE PEOPLE THEY SHOULD EXPIATE THEIR GUILT IN THE MURDER OF MINISTER OF FRONTIER AFFAIRS, FAIZ MOHAMMED, WHO HAD BEEN SENT TO HELP THEM, AND SHOULD NOW PUNISH OR TURN OVER THOSE WHO WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

7. THE GOVERNMENT HAS REPORTED SUCCESSES AGAINST REBELS IN KUNDUZ, BADAKSHAN, BALKH, FARYAB, SAMANGAN, ZABUL AND HERAT.

8. REPORTS FROM KANDAHAR AND HERAT INDICATE CONTINUED INCIDENTS OF SHEELING AND OF HOUSE SEARCHES, AND DAILY KILLINGS AS A RESULT OF INTERPART STRIFE. THERE ARE REPORTS FROM PARWAN AND SOME OTHER PROVINCES OF AN INCREASE IN BREAK-INSS AND OTHER FORMS OF DISORDER.

9. THE INDIANS HAVE A REPORT FROM THEIR CONSUL AT KANDAHAR OF AN OOUTBREAK OF FIGHTING AT KARZ ON 11 SEPTEMBER BETWEEN AFGHAN AND SOVIET SOLDIERS. THE INCIDENT WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY SOVIET MISBEHAVIOUR TOWARDS AFGHAN WOMEN WHILE CONDUCTING HOUSE SEARCHES. SOME 50 AFGHANS WERE KILLED OR INJURED. THERE WERE SOVIET CASUALTIES ALSO BUT NO DETAILS ARE KNOWN. THE REPORT SAYS THAT OTHERWISE KANDAHAR IS SLOWLY BECOMING MORE NORMAL AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IS IMPROVING.

10. THE TURKISH MILITARY ATTACHE CLAIMS TO HAVE IT ON GOOD AUTHORITY THAT THERE ARE NOW 3 EAST GERMAN MEDICAL COMPANIES IN AFGHANISTAN, OPERATING FIELD HOSPITALS AT DOSHI, SHINDAND AND KHAIR KHANA.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

11. PARAS 9 AND 10 ARE NOT SUITABLE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

HOWELL.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
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CONFIDENTIAL

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FM ISLAMABAD 210735Z SEPT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO. 1295 OF 21ST SEPT

INFO IMMEDIAT UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

MY TELNO 1293: AFGHANISTAN

1. RIAZ PIRACHA, FOREIGN SECRETARY, WHO IS JUST BACK FROM MOSCOW, HAS TOLD ME THAT HE FOUND THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE UNCOMPROMISING AND UNCHANGED. THEY INSISTED THAT THE AFGHAN PROBLEM COULD ONLY BE SOLVED BY BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN, AND WHEN THE OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE CEASED. THE OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE WAS PART OF A WORLDWIDE CONSPIRACY BY THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA TO ENCIRCLE THE USSR (OTHER EXAMPLES WERE CITED). IN AFGHANISTAN THIS CONSPIRACY HAD STARTED AT THE TIME OF 1978 REVOLUTION AND HAD FORCED THE RUSSIANS TO TAKE COUNTER ACTION IN DECEMBER 1979. THE TRUSSIANS WERE OPPOSED TO INTERNATIONALISING THE PROBLEM AND WOULD RESIST ANY MOVES IN THE UN AND PARTICULARLY AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

2. I DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET A DETAILED ACCOUNT FROM RIAZ PIRACHA, BS

UT IT LOOKS AS IF AGHA SHAHI WILL HAVE TO THINK AGAIN ABOUT HIS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IDEA, THOUGH HE MAY STILL WISH TO PURSUE IT AS A DEVICE TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS AND TO SECURE THE NECESSARY VOTES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

FORSTER

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AFGHANISTAN

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TOP SECRET

This is a copy. The original has been extracted and retained under S. 3(4)

Prime Minister
MAP 19/ix

2.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 September 1980

'Excellent' MT

Dear Michael,

Publicity for the Resistance in Afghanistan:

* [redacted] *

Filed on Soviet Union August 1979 Policy Towards.

In my letter of 26 June I mentioned * [redacted] * Afghan tribesmen to take films of Russian atrocities and military activities in Afghanistan.

The first two batches of film produced * [redacted] * were processed in London last month, and excerpts appeared in BBC television news on 3 and 26 August. The excerpts shown by the BBC included shots of Mujahideen flourishing their weapons, moving through rough terrain in guerilla formation and standing over a wrecked Soviet helicopter and military vehicles that had been knocked out.

The film * [redacted] * was passed indirectly to Visnews, who produced two sequences of about 4 minutes each for distribution to their subscribers. Visnews never knows which of their subscribers show any particular item; but they expect that, in addition to the screening already given on the BBC, some of the film will have appeared in North and South America, Japan and other states round the Pacific, including Australia and some ASEAN countries. It is also likely to have been shown in many Western European countries, and possibly also in Romania and Poland.

The first batch of film was in the hands of the BBC before the Olympics closed, though unfortunately the BBC did not show it until immediately afterwards.

In all 26 cameramen have now been trained, and teams have been equipped and despatched. * [redacted] * the latest cameraman to return came back on 12 September, bloody and tattered having lost everything except his cameras and film after becoming involved in a heavy Soviet attack on a Mujahideen headquarters near Jalalabad. They hope for good shots from his film, which is now on its way back to the UK.

Yours ever
G. W.

(G G H Walden)

~ Passages deleted and retained under Section 3(4)
OKWayland
21.7.11

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

TOP SECRET

Afghanistan (Secret)

10

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE AT THE ELYSEE ON 19 SEPTEMBER AT 1030

Present:

Prime Minister	President Giscard d'Estaing
Lord Privy Seal	Monsieur Barre
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	Monsieur Francois-Poncet
	Monsieur Leclercq

Afghanistan

At the invitation of President Giscard, M. Francois-Poncet described how the French Government saw the present position in Afghanistan. It looked as though the Soviet Union had decided not to make a major effort to crush the rebellion in Afghanistan now. This would have involved doubling or trebling their present force in Afghanistan. But there was no evidence of any weakening in the determination of the Soviet Government to suppress the rebellion in due course. They now seemed to envisage a continuing effort at the present level lasting two or three years. On the political front, one of their main aims would be to exert pressure on the Pakistan Government with a view to forcing them to deal with Babrak Karmal. They would hope in this way to create a situation in which they could continue their military effort without interference. Soviet political pressure was already producing results, and the Pakistan Government were showing increasing signs of concern about Soviet intentions. Mr. Gromyko had told M. Francois-Poncet recently that "once there had been one Pakistan; now there are two; one day there might be four". The consequence of all this was Agha Shahi's proposal for a conference at which Afghanistan would be represented by the Babrak Karmal regime alone.

M. Francois-Poncet said that it was incumbent on the international community to ensure that the present situation was not accepted. Appropriate pressure had to be exerted on the Soviet Union to convince them of this. Action should be taken in the United Nations. More should be done to help Pakistan, particularly perhaps by the United States.

Finally there was the question of what should be done for the Afghan rebels. The French Government's understanding was the United States was doing very little. M. Francois-Poncet understood that the American Government had discussed the question of aid to the Afghan rebels in great depth, and decided against a major effort. Mr. Muskie appeared to believe that for the American Government to give major help to the Afghan rebels would be to risk entanglement on the Vietnam model. He had also been heard to say "we do not want another Spanish Civil War situation". If this were the attitude of the US Administration, it threw a new light on the tough statements they had been making earlier in the year.

The Lord Privy Seal said that he agreed that no major Soviet effort against the rebels seemed to be in prospect. He also agreed that there was no sign of a Soviet withdrawal. Neither side seemed to be gaining much ground. Agha Shahi was showing signs of pulling back from his previous position. The British Government were trying to stiffen his resolve. We agreed that a conference attended only by representatives of Babrak Karmal would amount to recognition for his regime. We hoped therefore that if a conference were to be held, representatives of the Afghan rebels would be invited. An alternative approach would be a special meeting of the General Assembly. It would also clearly be necessary to find ways of giving more support to Pakistan. The financial support given by the Saudi Government so far had been disappointing. In general the situation was rather depressing.

On the question of military aid to the Afghan rebels, the Lord Privy Seal said that he thought the United States might be doing more than M. Francois-Poncet had acknowledged. M. Francois-Poncet said that they might be doing a little more but not much. The Prime Minister added that whatever equipment they were supplying it was not sophisticated. M. Francois-Poncet agreed and said that he had been surprised at how primitive the arms which th

Russians had displayed as having been captured from the rebels had been. The war in Afghanistan was being largely fought by helicopters. Modern anti-helicopter weapons were extremely effective. He did not understand why they had not been supplied in large quantities to the rebels. After he had left office Mr. Vance had told Lord Carrington that of the twenty million dollars appropriated for aid to the rebels only two million dollars had then been spent. If this was so, American policy was wrong. After all, if the Soviet Union succeeded in crushing the Afghan rebellion, the question of international acceptance of the Soviet invasion would be resolved. The only factor which prevented acceptance of the fait accompli was the fact that the fighting continued. It was extraordinary that the four western powers had never had a high level discussion of their strategy in the region.

President Giscard recalled that in the first half of the year the West had encouraged the Soviet Government to look for a political solution and that the Russians had briefly seemed to be considering such a solution. But time had passed, and there had been no further signs of any reduction in the Soviet military presence or of a major political initiative. The Russians seemed to be playing for time. Their threats against the Pakistan Government were having an effect. The international community had been impressed by the lack of action on the part of the West.

One useful element in the initial reaction of the United States Government had been their decision to acquire additional bases in the area. Their effort to do so should be supported. France had used her links with the Somali Government to persuade them to agree to the American request. France had a base in Djibouti. Although there was no organised cooperation between the French and American Governments in the area, there had been exchanges of views. Broadly speaking, the question of bases had been settled in a satisfactory way.

/ It would

It would also be important to keep the Afghanistan issue alive in the United Nations. There should be a debate in the General Assembly where it was to be hoped that members of the Nine would speak frankly. The idea of a special session should be discussed. President Giscard said he had no objection to the idea, but the modalities would need to be analysed. The West should try to ensure that there was a vote in the General Assembly at least as favourable as last time. The Prime Minister wondered whether such a vote was attainable. President Giscard said that no doubt some votes would be lost, but perhaps others would be gained. In any case there should be an organised effort to get out the maximum vote.

The position of Pakistan was a key one. If the Pakistan Government were to collapse or to soften its position, the situation might dissolve. President Zia was due to visit the United States in a few weeks. Perhaps he could visit Europe on his way back. The French Government had it in mind to invite him to Paris in order to give him visible support. As regards support for the Afghan guerillas, he was conscious that SAM 7 missiles had been used against French helicopters in Chad. These had been supplied by the Russians using the Libyans as cover. He did not therefore feel too many inhibitions on the principle of supplying the Afghans. Presumably the Americans were trying to supply the Afghans with Soviet made arms, but were having difficulty in finding them and in organising supply routes. The whole question should be reviewed by the Allies. We should be considering how to use the on-coming winter to supply the Afghan guerillas and ensure that they were not destroyed next year. A co-ordinated effort was needed. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, the Lord Privy Seal said that he thought some Soviet arms were getting through but not enough.

Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

To see all

MAP 19/IX

GR 550
CONFIDENTIAL
FM KABUL 180442Z
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 278 OF 18 SEPTEMBER 80.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW,
UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (DI4).
INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.
MY TELEGRAM NO 273 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.
POLITICAL.

1. THERE HAS BEEN NO LOCAL COMMENT ON THE SOVIET DEFECTOR IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY (REPORTED SEPARATELY). ADDED SECURITY MEASURES OF SURVEILLANCE AND SEARCH OUTSIDE WESTERN EMBASSIED CONTINUE. MOST OF OUR CARS ARE ALSO FOLLOWED. I AM PROTESTING THIS MORNING TO PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA.

2. A NEW LAW ''THE PENAL LAW FOR CRIMES AGAINST COMBAT PREPARATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE DRA'' HAS BEEN PASSED. IT IS OFFICIALLY DESCRIBED AS DESIGNED IN PART TO ''STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RUNNING AWAY FROM MILLITARY SERVICE''.

3. A DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON 17 SEPTEMBER PROVIDES FREE ELECTRICITY TO ALL MOSQUES IN AFGHANISTAN.

4. BABRAK'S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS OF JOURNALISTS, WHICH OPENED ON 15 SEPTEMBER, STRESSED TO ROLE OF JOURNALISTS IN CULTIVATING THE NECESSARY SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL ATTITUDES AND IN COUNTERING THE POISONOUS PROPAGANDA OF IMPERIALISM.

5. A TASS ARTICLE ALLEGING BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN STOCKPILING AMERICAN, AND PRODUCTION OF HER OWN, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT PORTON DOWN HAS BEEN REPRODUCED IN THE LOCAL PRESS.

6. AN AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL CO-OPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN SIGNED BY DR ANAHITA RATEBZAD, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, WHO HAS SUBSEQUENTLY LEFT ON ANOTHER TOUR TO USSR, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA.
INTERNAL SECURITY.

7. THERE IS NO HARD INFORMATION ABOUT THE OPERATION IN THE PANJSHER. MOST REPORTS CICULATING CONSIDER IT A FAILURE FOR THE SOVIETS, IN WHICH THEIR HEAVY ARMOUR WAS TRAPPED AND THEIR CASUALTIES HEAVY. HOWEVER, THE INDIAN MILITARY ATTACHE (PLEASE PROTECT) CONSIDERS THE ACTIONA SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS FOR THE SOVIETS IN CONTAINING THE RESISTANCE FORCES AND IN BLOCKING OFF THE REGION EAST OF KABUL AND SOUTH OF PANJSHER, THUS COMPARTMENTALISING THE RESISTANCE EFFORT.

8. AN EDITORIAL IN THE LOCAL PRESS ON 15 SEPTEMBER ABOUT THE CAMAPIGN AGAINST THE REBELS REMARKS UPON ''AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT WHICH IS BEING NOTICED IN THE SURRENDER OF ARMS BY THOSE WHO HAD BEEN DECEIVED BY THE REBELS TO TAKE UP ARMS AND CARRY OUT SUBVERSIVE ACTS''. REPORTS OF SUCH SURRENDER OF WEAPONS USUALLY DESCRIBE THE WEAPONS AS OF US AND CHINESE MANUFACTURE.

8. IN KABUL, SHOOTINGS AT NIGHT SEEM TO HAVE INCREASED AGAIN OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. A LARGE CONVOY MAINLY OF FUEL TANKERS PASSED THROUGH TOWN FROM THE AIRPORT GOING NORTH ON 16 SEPTEMBER. AERIAL ACITIVITY REMAINS LIGHT. FIGHTING HAS BEEN REPORTED AROUND KARIZMER 17KMS NORTH OF KABUL AND ON 17 SEPTEMBER SOME 40 KMS TO THE EAST, WHERE RESISTANCE FORCES ATTACKED MILITARY UNITS AROUND SAROBI.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

9. NO RESTRICTION.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

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GRS 745

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FM FCO 091845Z AUG 80
TO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 783 OF 9 SEPTEMBER.
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA, KUWAIT
INFO ROUTINE KABUL, DACCA, PARIS, BONN, PEKING, BUCHAREST,
UKDEL NATO
INFO SAVING LUXEMBOURG.

YOUR TELNO 1284 OF 9 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL): AFGHANISTAN

1. THE MINISTER OF STATE (MR HURD) DISCUSSED THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN THE LATTER PASSED THROUGH HEATHROW ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK TODAY.

2. AGHA SHAHI COVERED MUCH OF THE GROUND DEALT WITH IN HIS CONVERSATION REPORTED IN YOUR TUR, INCLUDING THE POINTS IN PARAGAPH 1(3). HE STRESSED THAT THE COMMITTEE OF THREE'S EFFORTS HAD BEEN PREJUDICED BY (A) THE DETERIORATION IN QOTBZADEH'S POSITION IN IRAN AND THE CONSEQUENCE THAT IRAN COULD NO LONGER PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN THE COMMITTEE, AND (B) THE GROWTH OF ARAB ANGER ABOUT AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON ARAB/ISRAEL AND ARAB DISINCLINATION IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO ALIENATE THE RUSSIANS BY ACTION OVER AFGHANISTAN. THERE HAD BEEN A WEAKENING IN ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED RESOLVE ON AFGHANISTAN. AS FAR AS EUROPE WAS CONCERNED, PAKISTAN HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED BY THE REACTIONS EXCEPT THOSE FROM BRITAIN.

3. IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO DEVISE AN INITIATIVE TO PREVENT THE CUBANS OR THE INDIANS TAKING OVER THE PROCESS. HE DEFENDED HIS PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE. BABRAK KARMAL WOULD HAVE TO ATTEND. THE RESISTANCE COULD NOT PARTICIPATE (BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS WOULD WALK OUT) BUT THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO SEND A DELEGATION TO LOBBY PARTICIPANTS.

4. THE ROMANIANS HAD BEEN CONSIDERING A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN. AGHA SHAHI HAD OBJECTED THAT THIS WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF BABRAK KARMAL AND WOULD AVOID THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

5. THE RUSSIANS HAD SO FAR REJECTED AGHA SHAHI'S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE THOUGH THE ROMANIANS STILL WISHED TO TRY TO PERSUADE THEM TO ACCEPT IT. AGHA SHAHI CONFIRMED THAT A PAKISTAN DELEGATION WOULD GO TO MOSCOW ON 12/13 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS ITEMS ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S AGENDA, BUT THAT ON AFGHANISTAN THEY WOULD SIMPLY LISTEN AND REPORT.

6. HIS MAIN NEW POINT WHICH HE PARTICULARLY ASKED TO BE KEPT SECRET RELATED TO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RULER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF KUWAIT IN ISLAMABAD THE PREVIOUS DAY. ACCORDING TO AGHA SHAHI, SHEIKH SABAH HAD EXPRESSED SYMPATHY WITH THE EXPOSED POSITION OF PAKISTAN VIS A VIS THE SOVIET UNION AND HAD ADVISED THAT PAKISTAN ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS. KUWAIT WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE OVER THE INITIATIVE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND WOULD SOUND OUT THE SAUDIS. BUT THEY FELT THAT IT SHOULD BE CONFINED TO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES (INCLUDING BABRAK KARMAL) AND EXCLUDE THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. SABAH HAD APPARENTLY BEEN UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT OUR IDEAS FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR A SPECIAL COMMITTEE.

7. MR HURD SAID THAT ONE OF OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERNS ABOUT AGHA SHAHI'S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE INCLUDING BABRAK KARMAL WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD THEREBY GAIN A CONCESSION WITHOUT ANY MOVE ON THEIR PART. THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES HAD TAKEN A LEAD WHICH WE IN THE WEST HAD RESPECTED. FOR THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO ABANDON ITS PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE STATUS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WOULD BE A BIG STEP BACKWARDS. IT WAS NOT LOGICAL TO ALLOW DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE AMERICANS OVER ISRAEL TO PREVENT CONTINUED PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS OVER

AFGHANISTAN. AGHA SHAHI SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS WHAT BACKING COULD BE MOBILISED FOR ANY GIVEN POLICY. PAKISTAN RETAINED AN OPEN MIND ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNGA. BUT THEY FEARED THAT ANY VOTE ON THIS OR A SIMILAR PROPOSAL COULD WELL REVEAL A DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES OPPOSED TO THE RUSSIANS.

8. IT WAS AGREED THAT THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED FURTHER WHEN I SEE ACHA SHAHI IN NEW YORK LATER THIS MONTH. HE SAID HE WOULD THEN BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO REPORT ON THE MOOD OF THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES (AFTER THE FORTHCOMING MEETING IN MOROCCO). FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

9. WE SHALL NOW REFLECT FURTHER, BEARING IN MIND THE CONSIDERATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TUR, UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1235 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 3943. WE SUSPECT THAT AGHA SHAHI WAS PUTTING INTO THE MOUTHS OF THE KUWAITIS ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE STRONG IN HIS OWN MIND. TOWARDS THE END HE SPOKE CONFIDENTIALLY OF MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE UNITY OF PAKISTAN FROM THE USSR, AND RENEWED DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIA. HE NO LONGER THINKS IT SAFE FOR PAKISTAN TO GIVE A LEAD.

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MR J MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON

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Afghanistan.

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GR 160
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FM PEKING 090825Z SEP 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 566 OF 9 SEPTEMBER
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, KABUL, WASHINGTON, DELHI, UKMIS
NEW YORK
INFO SAVING PARIS BONN JEDDA UKDEL NATO DACCA AND LUXEMBOURG

YOUR TELNO 458: AFGHANISTAN

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY TOOK ACTION WITH DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SECOND ASIAN DEPARTMENT ON 9 SEPTEMBER, SPEAKING AS INSTRUCTED. MME ZHU QING SAID THAT THE PAKISTANI IDEA OF A CONFERENCE WAS ''TO AN EXTENT GOOD'' IN THAT IT WOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. ON THE OTHER HAND THE PROPOSAL THAT KARMAL ALONE SHOULD ATTEND, ''DISCARDING'' THE RIGHTS OF THE RESISTENCE MOVEMENT, WAS UNFORTUNATE. THE PROPOSAL FURTHERMORE DID NOT MENTION THE RIGHT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN POLITICAL SYSTEM. MME ZHU DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY TO THE SUGGESTION THAT, IF THEY HAD NOT ALREADY DONE SO, THE CHINESE SHOULD MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN TO THE PAKISTANIS, BUT INDICATED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY HAD ''SOME CONTACTS'' ON THE SUBJECT., AND SHE DECLARED THAT CHINA WOULD OPPOSE ANY CONFERENCE AT WHICH KARMAL ALONE WAS REPRESENTED.

2. MME ZHU DID NOT DEMUR AT THE OUTLINE OF ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF YOUR TELNO 755 TO ISLAMABAD.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1284 OF 9TH SEPTEMBER
INFO WASHINGTON ROUTINE JEDDA, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, DELHI,
KABUL, PARIS, BONN, PEKING, UKDEL NATO.
INFO SAVING DACCA, LUXEMBOURG, TEHRAN.

Read in full

YOUR TEL NO. 1463 TO WASHINGTON: AFGHANISTAN

1. AMERICAN AMBASSADOR SAW AGHA SHAHI ON 7 SEPTEMBER. FULL ACCOUNT OF MEETING WILL NO DOUBT BE AVAILABLE IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST:-

(I) AGHA SHAHI DEFENDED HIS PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN THE SAME TERMS AS TO ME AND SHOWED NO SIGNS OF WEAKENING. HE ARGUED AGAINST THE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES PUT FORWARD BY THE AMERICANS.

(II) HE LAID MORE STRESS THAN HE HAD TO ME ON THE NEED TO PRE-EMPT AN INDIAN OR CUBAN LED NON-ALIGNED INITIATIVE. HE ALSO SHOWED ANXIETY TO HAVE SOMETHING CLEAR CUT OR UNDER WAY TO PRESENT TO ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FOREIGN MINISTERS NOW DUE TO MEET IN NEW YORK ON 6 OCTOBER.

(III) HE STRESSED THAT PAKISTAN HAD BEEN FACING THE SOVIET THREAT ALONE WITH NO MORE THAN MORAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FROM OTHERS (IMPLICATION BEING THAT SHE WAS NOW LAUNCHING HER OWN INITIATIVE TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM). HE REVEALED THAT THEY HAD HAD VERY THREATENING SIGNALS FROM THE RUSSIANS. HE WAS ALSO WORRIED ABOUT THE INDIAN ATTITUDE, E.G. THE ALLEGATIONS OF PAKISTAN HAND IN INDIAN COMMUNAL RIOTING.

(IV) RECENT ROMANIAN ENVOY (PUNGAR) HAD TOLD THEM THAT BREZHNEV HAD ASSURED CEAUCESCU THAT RUSSIANS WOULD WITHDRAW UNDER CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED CONDITIONS. ROMANIAN IMPRESSION WAS THAT RUSSIAN ATTITUDE WAS MORE FLEXIBLE THAN PAKISTANIS AND OTHERS THOUGHT. THEY HAD DISCUSSED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND ITS POSSIBLE COMPOSITION WITH ROMANIAN ENVOY WHO ARGUED IN FAVOUR OF SMALLER CONFERENCE. IT WAS LEFT THAT ROMANIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL QUOTE MEETING UNQUOTE.

(V) INITIAL SOVIET REACTION TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HAD BEEN NEGATIVE BUT IN LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS RUSSIANS HAD INVITED PAKISTANIS TO SEND A DELEGATION TO DISCUSS UN AGENDA ITEMS, (THERE HAD IN THE PAST BEEN SIMILAR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS). RIAZ PIRACHA, FOREIGN SECRETARY, WOULD THEREFORE BE GOING WITH NIAZ NAIK TO MOSCOW (BETWEEN WARSAW AND BUDAPEST) ON 13 AND 14 SEPTEMBER WITH A BRIEF TO EXPLAIN PAKISTAN POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN BUT NOT TO NEGOTIATE.

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2. I DO NOT THINK THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS ARE GOING TO BE ABLE TO DEFLECT AGHA SHAHI. AMERICANS WILL PROBABLY HAVE ANOTHER GO AT HIM IN NEW YORK AND ALSO AT GENERAL ZIA WHO WILL BE IN THE US EARLY IN OCTOBER, BUT THIS WILL BE A BIT LATE AND IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT AGHA SHAHI IS MAKING THE POLICY. ONLY HEAVY PRESSURE FROM OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES AT OR BEFORE 6 OCTOBER MEETING IS LIKELY TO SHIFT HIM AND THE SAUDIS WILL CARRY THE MOST INFLUENCE WITH HIM. (HABIB CHATTI MIGHT HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY). OTHERS WHO MIGHT SWAY HIM ARE JORDAN, UAE AND BANGLADESH, BUT ANY WIDESPREAD LOBBYING ON OUR PART WOULD OF COURSE DO MUCH DAMAGE TO OUR POSITION HERE IF KNOWN. UNLESS WE CAN COME UP WITH SOME NEW AND CONVINCING IDEA WHICH WOULD SERVE HIS PURPOSE OF FILLING THE DIPLOMATIC VOID QUICKLY AND PRE-EMPTING THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE, IT MIGHT BE BEST IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO GO ALONG WITH THE CONFERENCE IDEA, WHILE CONTINUING TO REPEAT OUR GRAVE MISGIVINGS, AND WORK ON WAYS TO MINIMISE THE POTENTIAL DANGERS AND TO TURN THE CONFERENCE TO OUR ADVANTAGE BY KEEPING THE RUSSIANS IN THE DOCK. WEAK POINTS IN AGHA SHAHI'S SCENARIO WHICH MIGHT BE WORKED ON ARE:-

(I) THE POSITION OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. WE MIGHT ARGUE THAT FREE WORLD OPINION WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND EXCLUDING THEM FROM THE CONFERENCE, QUITE APART FROM THE DIFFICULTIES THIS MIGHT CAUSE FOR PAKISTAN WITH A MILLION REFUGEES AND THE RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP ON HER SOIL. TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE A MAJOR VICTORY FOR THE RUSSIANS. IF SOME ROLE FOR THEM CAN BE WORKED OUT IT WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS AND BABRAK KARMAL TO GO ALONG WITH THE CONFERENCE (WHICH IS NO DOUBT WHY AGHA SHAHI DOES NOT SEE A ROLE FOR THEM).

(II) THE TIMING OF AGHA SHAHI'S CONFERENCE. I IMAGINE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS COULD GET OFF THE GROUND BEFORE JANUARY, IN WHICH CASE THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING WOULD HAVE AMPLE SCOPE TO DECIDE ON AN UNHELPFUL LINE FOR THEIR PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE TO TAKE. THIS POINTS TO SOMETHING LIKE A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OR AN INDIVIDUAL WHICH COULD BE OPERATING BEFORE JANUARY.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO DACCA, LUXEMBOURG, TEHERAN.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 3874 OF 28 AUGUST 1980
INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK NEW DELHI KABUL AND JEDDA
INFO SAVING DACCA LUXEMBOURG TEHRAN PARIS PEKING AND BONN

YOUR TELNO 754 TO ISLAMABAD: CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN

1. PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF ISLAMABAD TELNO 1257, WE ACTED YESTERDAY ON PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WITH MRS JANE COON (STATE DEPARTMENT), WHO WARMLY WELCOMED THIS ACCOUNT OF YOUR THINKING

2. SHE COMMENTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS THINKING ON SIMILAR LINES. THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT OF THEIR AFGHANISTAN COMMITMENT. OUR IMMEDIATE TASK AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE ON THEM AND HIGHLIGHT THEIR ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN. INSTRUCTIONS WOULD SHORTLY GO TO THE U S EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD TO PUT THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS TO AGHA SHAHI ABOUT HIS IDEAS FOR A U N CONFERENCE.

3. AS MUSKIE HAD SAID IN JULY, THE U S WANTED TO SUPPORT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, WHICH SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LEAD. WE SHOULD AVOID MAKING THE ISSUE SIMPLY ANOTHER CASE OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION. U S SOUNDINGS AMONG A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER COUNTRIES ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TO AFGHANISTAN HAD NOT SO FAR REVEALED ANY SIGNIFICANT EROSION OF SUPPORT FOR ANOTHER U N RESOLUTION SIMILAR TO THAT OF JANUARY. IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE ASSEMBLY DEBATE SHOULD FOCUS ON THE SOVIET ROLE AND ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN AND STRONG STATEMENTS FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MEMBERS WOULD BE NEEDED.

4 THE U S BELIEVED THAT THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIE IN ARRANGING APPROPRIATE FOLLOW-ON TO THE U N DEBATE. TENTATIVELY THEY WERE THINKING OF SOME OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING:

(A) INCLUDING IN THE RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN THE APPOINTMENT OF A COMMITTEE TO REPORT TO THE ASSEMBLY AND THE COUNCIL ON PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION:

(B) A CALL FOR INCREASED INTERNATIONAL AID TO AFGHAN REFUGEES, WITH A POSSIBLE CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS ORGANISED BY THE THIRD COMMITTEE:

(C) SOME FORM OF RECOGNITION OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE (PERHAPS BY ARRANGING FOR THEM TO ADDRESS THE ASSEMBLY OR OTHER U N BODIES):/(T)

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(D) THE AUTOMATIC INCLUSION OF AN AFGHANISTAN ITEM ON THE NEXT ASSSEMBLY AGENDA:

(E) DISCUSSION IN THE THIRD COMMITTEE OF THE FEBRUARY REPORT BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WITH PROVISION FOR FOLLOW UP NEXT YEAR BY THE COMMISSION:

(F) PROMOTION IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS OF SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS USED IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH EAST ASIA.

5. THE U S HAD FOLLOWED WITH CARE AGHA SHAHI'S STATEMENTS ABOUT A POSSIBLE U N CONFERENCE. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE MANDATE FOR ANY CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO FOCUS ON THE AIMS SET BY THE ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, ESPECIALLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHANS. IT MUST AVOID ANY LINKAGE WITH AN ENDING OF RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES. THE U S WERE CONCERNED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT TRY TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON AID TO THE RESISTANCE (AND MRS COON ADDED THAT SHE TOOK OUR OWN POINT - PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELNO 755 - ABOUT THE DANGER OF EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF THE CONFERENCE). IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ATTENDANCE BY BABRAK REP-RESENTATIVES SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO IMPLY SOME SORT OF RECOGNITION.

6. IT WAS HARD TO SEE HOW THE RUSSIANS COULD ACCEPT A CONFERENCE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. INSTEAD, THE U S EXPECTED THEM TO RETURN TO THE BABRAK PROPOSALS OF MAY, WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U S AND (PRESUMABLY) THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. THE MESSAGE TO AGHA SHAGI CONCLUDED THAT U S RE-EMPHASISED THAT ANY CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED FIRMLY ON THE JANUARY U N RESOLUTION, EVEN IF CONFRONTATION WITH THE RUSSIANS WERE THE RESULT, AND SOUGHT HIS VIEWS BOTH ON THE IDEAS ABOVE AND ON HOW THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, JUST AS THE ASSEMBLY OPENED, MIGHT BEST BE HANDLED.

7. MRS COON ADDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOW GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO YOUR VIEWS ABOUT A SPECIAL SESSION.

F C O PASS SAVING DACCA LUXEMBOURG TEHRAN PARIS PEKING BONN

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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Prime Minister

Afghanistan 29/8

GR 650
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FM KABUL 280438Z
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 259 OF 28 AUGUST 80.
CNFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, AND MODUK (DI4).
INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 254 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.
POLITICAL.

1. IN THE COURSE OF A CALL ON HIM BY THE NEW FRG CHARGE ON 26 AUGUST, SOVIET AMBASSADOR TABEYEV MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS :

(A) SOVIET TROOPS WERE IN AFGHANISTAN ONLY AS ADVISERS, TO HELP REBUILD THE AFGHAN ARMY. THEY WOULD BE WITHDRAWN ''AND THE TIME FOR THIS IS NOT FAR AWAY''.

(B) THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WAS GETTING INCREASED SUPPORT IN THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY IN RELIGIOUS CIRCLES. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS IN PART TO THE SUCCESSFUL VISITS BEING PAID BY GROUPS OF CLERGY TO THE USSR.

(C) INTERNAL STABILITY WOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR AND THEREAFTER BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN, FOR WHICH THE GROUND WAS ALREADY PREPARED, WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

(D) PAKISTAN OUGHT TO SEAL HER BORDERS IF SHE WANTED TO LIVE IN PEACE. THE PAKISTANI REGIME WAS WEAK, COULD BE TOPPLED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY AND THE SOVIETS HAD THE MEANS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THAT TOPPLING. THE DURAND LINE WAS ANOTHER REASON FOR PAKISTAN TO BE VERY CAREFUL. FOR THE SOVIETS TO SEAL THE BORDER WOULD TAKE AT LEAST 20 FULLY EQUIPPED DIVISIONS.

(E) THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS TO THE REBELES COULD CREATE A DANGEROUS SITUATION. THE RUSSIANS HAD EVIDENCE OF THE SUPPLY OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND IF ANY OF ''OUR'' PLANES WAS BROUGHT DOWN, THIS COULD NOT GO WITHOUT RETRIBUTION. SOME OF THE WEAPONS HAD BEEN SOVIET GIFTS TO THE EGYPTIANS AND WERE BEING REPLACED WITH THE EGYPTIANS BY AMERICAN ARMS.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENT LOCALLY ON THE REPORT ON THE BBC FARSI SERVIE ON 26 AUGUST THAT A FURTHER FOUR MINISTERS IN AMIN'S GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN EXECUTED.

3. A 60- MEMBER DELEGATION OF WORKERS AND TRADE UNION MEMBERS HAS LEFT FOR A TOUR OF EAST GERMANY. A FURTHER GROUP OF 100 CLERGY HAS LEFT FOR THE USSR.

4. A POLITBURO RESOLUTION HAS INSTRUCTED THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE UNIONS OF AFGHANISTAN TO DRAW UP A CHARTER OF CRAFT UNIONS. ALL PLACES OF WORK WILL BE OBLIGED TO PROVIDE A FULLY-EQUIPPED ROOM FOR UNION ACTIVITIES AND FREE TRANSPORTATION

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AND COMMUNICATION FACILITIES FOR THE UNION. 1.5 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SUM OF SALARIES WILL HAVE TO BE SPENT FOR ''CULTURAL AND PUBLIC SPORTS PURPOSES''. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST UNION MEMBERS WILL BE FORBIDEN, STANDARDISED CONTRACT OF WORK WILL BE INTRODUCED AND A LABOUR LAW WILL BE DRAFTED.

5. THE DECISIONS OF THE 3RD PLENUM CONTINUE TO BE PUBLICIZED AND EMPHASIZED AT MEETINGS AROUND THE COUNTRY. THE PURPOSE SEEMS TO BE OF A PART WITH THE PUBLICITY GIVEN OF LATE TO RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES, TO ADDUCE, BY STRESSING THE THREAT, AN EXPLANATION FOR THE LEAVY ATTACKS BEING LAUNCHED IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY.

6. A WIDESPREAD BLOOD DONOR CAMPAIGN, LESS THAN WHOLLY VOLUNTARY, IS UNDER WAY. MANY AFGHANS, WHO HAVE NOT BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE FREE DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET CONSUMER GOODS, NOW SAY THEY ARE BEING MADE TO PAY FOR USELESS PAIR OF SHOES WITH THEIR BLOOD.

INTERNAL SECURITY.

7. HEAVY FIGHTING WITH MANY CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES WAS RELIABLY REPORTED 3 DAYS AGO IN KAPISA PROVINCE, AROUND THE TOWNS OF NEJRAB ANND TAGAB.

8. AIR ACTIVITY OUT OF KABUL REMAINS LIGHT. AUTOMATIC SMALL ARMS FIRE IS HEARD SPORADICALLY, BOTH BY DAY AND BY NIGHT, AND ORANGE FLARES ARE SEEN BY NIGHT IN THE SKY OVER CERTAIN AREAS OF TOWN.

9. THE ROAD TO JALALABAD HAS BEEN REOPENED.

10. WE RECEIVE AN INCREASING NUMBER OF REPORTS OF INDISCIPLINE AMONGST SOVIET TROOPS, IN KABUL AND IN THE PROVINCES, THE REPORTS ARE USUALLY OF FORCED ENTRY, RAPE AND LOOTING.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

11. PARA 1 IS NOT SUITABLE FOR THE PRESS.

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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Prime Minister

MP 27/8.

GR 600
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FM KABUL 260435Z
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 254 OF 26 AUGUST 80.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (DI4).

INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 252 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.
POLITICAL.
AN ECONOMIC ADVISORY COUNCIL HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH BABRAK KARMAL AS CHAIRMAN AND THE MINISTERS OF PLANNING, FINANCE, COMMERCE AND TRANSPORT AND TOURISM AS MEMBERS : BUSINESSMEN WILL ALSO BE ELECTED TO THE COUNCIL.
2. A NUMBER OF APPOINTMENTS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED TO THE SUPREME COURT : ALL BUT THREE ARE SAID TO BE NON-PARTY MEMBERS. SENIOR APPOINTMENTS HAVE ALSO BEEN ANNOUNCED AT SEVERAL MINISTRIES AND AS GOVERNORS OF SEVERAL PROVINCES.
3. AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN SIGNED WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO KABUL AIRPORT, INCLUDING THE EXTENSION OF THE RUNWAY AREA BY 1600 METRES, INSTALLATION OF NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND MODERNIZATION OF THE TERMINAL. THE WORK WILL BE STARTED THIS YEAR, LAST 2 YEARS AND COST FOUR AND A HALF MILLION ROUBLES.
4. PROPAGANDA AGAINST ALL ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION CONTINUES BUT PAKISTAN FIGURES NOTICEABLY LESS : SHE IS NOW MAINLY ACCUSED OF ALLOWING HER TERRITORY TO BE USED BY THE ARCH ENEMIES, US AND WORLD IMPERIALISM (OFTEN INCLUDING BRITAIN BY NAME) AND CHINESE HEGEMONISTS.
5. A GIFT OF 10 TONS OF COMMODITIES, INCLUDING MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND PRINTING MATERIALS, HAS ARRIVED FROM THE GDR.
INTERNAL SECURITY.
6. REPORTS CONTINUE TO COME IN OF FIGHTING IN THEE ARA BETWEEN SHAKADORA AND CHARIKAR, AND IN PAGHMAN, AND NUMBERS OF REFUGEES FROM THESE VILLAGES ARE COMING TO KABUL. THESE REFUGEES ARE MAINLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND MOST FIND SHELTER WITH PEOPLE OF THEIR OWN TRIBE IN KABUL. THERE ARE INDICATIONS ALSO OF A NUMBER OF BUSINESSMEN MOVING WITH THEIR FAMILIES FROM PROVINCIAL CENTRES, WHICH THEY CONSIDER INCREASINGLY UNSAFE, INTO KABUL. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KABUL IS UNCHANGED. IF THERE IS ANY PATTERN TO SOVIET MILITARY TACTICS AT PRESENT, IT SEEMS TO BE TO HIT HEAVILY AT AREAS SURROUNDING THE MAJOR TOWNS, PERHAPS TO PRODUCE AND MAINTAIN A SAFE CORDON : SEVERAL REPORTS SAY THAT AFTER AN ATTQACK ON A VILLAGE, ALL THE CATTLE ARE TAKEN AWAY, PRESUMABLY TO REMOVE BOTH THE INCENTIVE TO RETURN AND THE FOOD SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR INSURGENTS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

7. THE ROAD TO JALALABAD HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR SEVERAL DAYS, CONINCIDING WITH REPORTS OF FIGHTING AROUND THE CITY. THE SCORES OF TRUCKS CARRYING THE MELON CROP TO PAKISTAN HAVE RETURNED TO KABUL AND MELON PRICES HAVE DROPPED BY 30 PERCENT. THERE WAS AN AIR AND GROUND BOMBARDMENT 3 DAYS AGO AT QALAT, ABOUT 150 KMS THIS SIDE OF KANDAHAR.

8. AIR ACTIVITY OVER KABUL IS GENERALLY LIGHT BUT SEVERAL CONVOYS OF MILITARY VEHICLES HAVE MOVED OUT OF THE CITY OVER THE LAST 3/4 DAYS.

9. THERE IS A RENEWED SPATE OF RUMOURS ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF CUBAN MILITARY ADIVSERS WORKING WITH AFGHAN MILITARY UNITS : THEY ARE SAID TO BRING GREATER EXPERIENCE OF GUERILLLA TACTICS THAN THE SOVIETS. THERE ARE SOME 35 CUBANS KNOWN TO BE IN KABUL BUT THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO BE STUDYING PERSIAN AT THE UNIVERSITY.

10. A GERMAN TOURIST WAS SHOT AND KILLED A FEW DAYS AGO SOME 5 KMS THIS SIDE OF JALALABAD. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER HE WAS SHOT BY INSURGENTS OR CAUGHT IN THE CROSS-FIRE.

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FM KABUL 210446Z

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 252 OF 21 AUGUST 80.

INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (DI4).

INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

Prime Minister

MTD 21/8.

MY TELEGRAM NO 248 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.

POLITICAL.

1. A SPECIAL ENVOY FROM PRESIDENT CEAUCESCU OF ROMANIA HAS BEEN IN KABUL FOR 2 DAYS AND HAD TALKS WITH BABRAK, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER KESHTMAND AND FOREIGN MINISTER DOST. THE VISIT IS GIVING RISE TO SPECULATION THAT SOME ROMANIAN INITIATIVE OVER AFGHANISTAN IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

2. THE SIXTY-FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF INDEPENDENCE WAS CELEBRATED ON 19 AUGUST. BABRAK'S SPEECH SAID THAT BRITISH IMPERIALISM HAD NOW BEEN REPLACED BY AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND REPEATED THE PROMISE THAT THE LIMITED CONTINGENT OF SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN WHEN SUITABLE GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE WERE GIVEN. A DISPLAY OF CAPTURED WEAPONS WAS PUT ON AND A STATEMENT MADE ACCUSING THE US, BRITAIN, CHINA AND OTHER REACTIONARIES OF USING PAKISTAN AS A BASE FOR UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AFGHANISTAN AND OF USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

INTERNAL SECURITY.

3. THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS OF HEAVY SHELLING BY SOVIET/ AFGHAN FORCES FROM THE EARLY HOURS OF 20 AUGUST ONWARDS AROUND THE VILLAGE OF SHAKADARA, SOME 20 KMS NORTH OF KABUL, AND FROM THERE FURTHER NORTH THROUGH MIR BACCHAKOT TO BAGRAM. THIS AREA HAS BEEN THE SCENE OF FIGHTING SEVERAL TIMES OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS (MY TELEGRAM NO 219).

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

NO RESTRICTION.

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HOWELL [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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AFGHANISTAN

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SED	CABINET OFFICE

[NOT ADVANCED]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Prime Minister. 2

You need to see this summary for OD members alongside the more restricted information below.

MF 20/8.

FCS/80/141

MEMBERS OF OD

Help for the Afghan Resistance

1. In view of the continuing Parliamentary and press interest in the Afghan efforts to resist the Soviet occupation it may be helpful to my OD colleagues if I briefly set out the position on a number of questions.

2. Supply of Arms

When the head of one of the resistance groups, Mr Gailani, was in Britain recently he referred to the need for anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and ammunition and small arms (.303) ammunition, though he made no specific requests. From information available to us I am satisfied that arms are getting through to the Afghan resistance. I do not think therefore that we need or should get into the business of supplying arms to the resistance ourselves although I would, of course, look at any specific requests on their merits. Public admission or even suspicion that we were considering or were actually supplying arms would not be helpful to the Afghans themselves, would embarrass the Pakistanis and could provoke reactions from the Russians. Our main tactic of bolstering Islamic and non-aligned opposition to the Russians will be spoilt if the conflict in Afghanistan takes on the appearance of an East/West confrontation. Our public line which has been used on several occasions in Parliament should therefore be that it is desirable that the Afghan resistance should have the wherewithal to oppose the Soviet invasion; that arms appear to be getting through; and that it is not helpful to the Afghans themselves to be specific about the sources.

3. Other Forms of Assistance: Medical Supplies, Clothing or Food

The logistics present considerable problems and to some extent the arguments against arms supplies apply here too. But I am looking into the possibilities. We may need to consider action in the early autumn if the situation of the resistance worsens with the approach of winter and an increase in Soviet military activity.

/4. Publicity

4. Publicity

The level of recent publicity about Soviet activity within Afghanistan seems to me to have been satisfactory both in the press and on television. We shall do what we can to maintain this during the coming months by briefing the media with suitable material which comes our way.

5. Diplomatic Activity

We shall continue to probe Soviet intentions, though without much hope of finding any flexibility. We are in close touch privately with the Islamic countries about wider international action, in particular at the United Nations General Assembly which starts in September. So long as there is no sign that the Soviet Union is prepared to envisage an acceptable political settlement, our objective will be to make the consequences of their continued occupation as burdensome as possible.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

19 August 1980

GR 900

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Prime Minister

MAP 21/8

FM KABUL 181012Z
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 248 OF 18 AUGUST 80.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (DI4).
INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 245 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.

POLITICAL.

AN AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF HIGHT AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION WAS SIGNED DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF THE SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTER. THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR, INTER ALIA :

(I) 1500 SCHOLARSHIPS FOR AFGHANS IN THE USSR :

(II) 43 SOVIET LECTURERS FOR KABUL UNIVERSITY :

(III) A NUMBER OF RESEARCH AND POSTGRADUATE SCHOLARSHIPS IN THE USSR :

(IV) RUSSIAN LANGUAGE COURSES IN THE AFGHAN INSTITUTES OF AGRICULTURE AND OF MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING :

(V) THE SUPPLY OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TEXTBOOKS TO KABUL UNIVERSITY.

1. THIS REPRESENTS A FURTHER AND HEAVY INJECTION OF SOVIET INFULENCE WHERE IT MATTERS FOR THE FUTURE.

2. A YOUNG PIONEERS ORGANISATION HAS BEEN SET UP TO PROVIDE RECREATIONAL FACILITIES FOR DEPRIVED AND DESTITUTE CHILDREN. THE SPEECHES MARKING THE OCCASION SUGGEST RECREATION THROUGH INDOCTRINATION.

3. A PRESS CONFERENCE WAS GIVEN AT THE MFA ON 17 AUGUST TO DISPLAY A SELF-CONFESSED REBEL, SAID TO BE AN IRANIAN, WHO MADE PREDICTABLE REVELATIONS ABOUT INSURGENT ACTIVITIES AROUND THE COUNTRY, CIA INVOLVEMENT AND WEAPONS OF WESTERN ORIGIN. THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN NO MENTION IN KABUL OF THE ITEM CARRIED ON OTHER MEDIA THAT OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS HAD BEEN CAPTURED, AND WE KNOW OF NONE.

4. BABRAK KARMAL ATTENDED EID PRAYERS IN THE MOSQUE IN THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE AND ISSUED AN EID MESSAGE. SOME 400 PRISONERS, FROM KABUL AND THE PROVINCES, WERE ANNOUNCED TO HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO MARK EID.

5. MINISTERS CONTINUE TO ADDRESS MEETINGS IN THE PROVINCES, PARTICULARLY THE PROBLEM PROVINCES, MOST RECENTLY IN GHAZNI AND HERAT.

6. THE AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS OF SARWARI TO MONGOLIA, MOKAMEL TO IRAQ, AND ABEDI TO TURKEY (MY TELEGRAM NO 237) WERE ANNOUNCED ON 17 AUGUST, WITH THAT OF ABDUL RAUF BENAWA (MY LETTER OF 7 FEBRUARY TO SAD REFERS) TO LIBYA. ALSO IN

/THE

THE PIPELINE ARE THE APPOINTMENTS OF 5 MFA OFFICERS AS CHARGES IN HAVANA, EAST BERLIN, BONN, ISLAMABAD AND UN NEW YORK. THESE OFFICERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE ONE FOR BONN, ARE ALL SENIOR CAREER DIPLOMATS AND THEIR PLACES ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN BY PARTY PURISTS.

INTERANL SECURITY.

7. THE LEVEL OF AUTOMATIC SMALLARMS FIRE HEARD AT NIGHT AROUND KABUL HAS INCREASED OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS OF A FIRE FIGHT IN KHAIRKHANA SUBURB ON 16 AUGUST WITH SEVERAL KILLED, OF FIRING ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE AIRPORT ON 15 AUGUUT, OF THE ASSASSINATION OF A NEPHEW OF TARAKI IN THE CENTRE OF KABUL ON 14 AUGUST, AND OF ATTACKS ON TWO HOUSES OF RELATIVES OF BABRAK IN KAMARI VILLAGE IN THE SHEWAKI SUBURK A WEEK AGO. THE PICTURE IS EVEN WORSE IN A NUMBER OF PROVINCES, KUNDUZ, HERAT, JALALABAD, PARWAN, KAPISA, WITH REPORTS OF ASSASSINATIONS AND ATROCITIES. THE PROPORTIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO KHALQ V PARCHAM AND TO RESISTANCE V PARTY WORKERS IS UNDETERMINED. THERE ARE ALSO A FEW REPORTS OF ATROCITIES AGAINST RUSSIAN CAPTIVES.

8. AERIAL ACTIVITY OUT OF KABUL IS AT A NORMAL LEVEL AND HELICOPTERS AND JETS WERE SEEN LAUNCHING ATTACKS IN PAGHMAN ON 16 AUGUST.

9. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS, RELIABLE BUT SO FAR NOT WHOLLY CONFIRMED, OF A HEAVY ATTACK BY SOVIET/AFGHAN FORCES, ON HERAT TOWN, SAID TO HAVE BEEN LARGELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF RESISTANCE FORCES, ABOUT ONE WEEK AGO. IF THE REPORTS TURN OUT TO BE TRUE, THIS ATTACK ON A MAJOR TOWN, WITH WAHT MUST HAVE BEEN THOUSANDS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, MARKS A DEPARTURE IN SOVIET MILITARY TACTICS. THIS SORT OF OPERATION MUST BE ONE THEY BADLY WANTED TO AVOID, BUT HAVING ALLOWED THE TOWN TO SLIDE INTO CHAOS, (MY TELEGRAM NO 240) ORDER WOULD HAVE TO BE RESTORED AT SOME TIME.

10. THERE IS SAID TO BE A HIGH-RANKING SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION IN KABUL AND THE GOVERNMENT GUEST HOUSE WHERE THEY ARE SAID TO BE STAYING HAS SPROUTED POWERFUL LOOKING ANTENNAE.

11. KABUL RADIO ANNOUNCED ON 17 AUGUST THE ROUTING OF A 400 STRONG BAND OF INSURGENTS AROUND PULE KHUMRI, DEFEATED BY A COMBINED FORCE OF AFGHAN MILITARY AND VOLUNTEER PARTY MILITANTS.

12. THE CURFEW HAS BEEN RESTORED TO 11 P.M. AFTER THE END OF RAMADAN.

/13.

13. VISAS.
FOR SEVERAL DAYS ALL REQUESTS FOR ENTRY VISAS AT KABUL AIRPORT HAVE BEEN REFUSED AND PASSENGERS TURNED BACK. NO ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN MADE AND IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS IS A TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT MEASURE.
PRESS DISTRIBUTION.
14. PARAGRAPH 6 IS NOT SUITABLE AND PARAGRAPH 9 IS PROBABLY BETTER OMITTED UNTIL WE ARE CERTAIN WHAT HAPPENED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK.

HOWELL. (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... PREM 19 ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... 387 ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: Letter from Lever to Pattison dated 18 August 1980	
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MIP Afghanistan

THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Summary

The 'limited' Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has turned out to be very limited indeed and does not foreshadow any change in Soviet policy. However, taken together with recent moves on TNF and MBFR, it could indicate growing Soviet awareness of international pressure.

1. The announcement by TASS on 22 June that the Soviet Union was withdrawing from Afghanistan some army units whose continued presence was not necessary 'at present' did not foreshadow more than a token withdrawal. The number of troops withdrawn was less than the 10,000 originally said to be involved. It seems likely that the men and equipment concerned were found unsuitable for the Soviet Army's counter-insurgency role in Afghanistan and were withdrawn in order to relieve the logistic burden.

2. The timing of the announcement was designed to coincide with the seven nations economic summit in Venice and the meeting of the Islamic 3 man Committee in Geneva, and perhaps also to influence athletes as yet undecided about whether to go to the Moscow Olympics. Thus the Russians made a diplomatic virtue out of what was in any case expedient for the army. The announcement also came just before a Plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee at which Afghanistan was evidently the main subject of discussion. Speaking at the meeting, Brezhnev pledged further help to Kabul in building and protecting the April 1978 revolution. He again denied suggestions that the Soviet Union was trying to break through to 'warm seas' or to gain access to Middle East oil, claimed that the Soviet Union had had no choice but to intervene in Afghanistan and said that the limited withdrawal had been made possible by the routing of counter revolutionaries and interventionists.

3. The last point may have been intended to reassure the Soviet domestic audience. But reports emanating from Afghanistan do not in fact suggest that the Soviet Union is any closer to its aim of imposing a military solution. Nor does the limited Soviet withdrawal bring with it any guarantee about future Soviet force levels in Afghanistan or remove the potential threat to Pakistan or the Gulf. Nevertheless, Soviet propaganda is arguing that the withdrawal demonstrates goodwill and should be followed up by concessions from other protagonists. However, there appears to have been no other change in the Soviet position, which continues to be based on the Babrak proposals of 14 May. The Russians still insist that complete withdrawal cannot be discussed before guarantees of non-interference from outside are given and seen to be effective, and depends on the future survival of the regime in Kabul.

/4.

4. The resolution issued by the CPSU Central Committee on 23 June was uncompromising about relations with the West, highly critical of the United States and aggressive about Soviet military capability. However, it reiterated Soviet interest in the preservation of 'detente'. During and since Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow there have been further signs of Soviet interest in reversing the deterioration in East-West relations. On TNF, the Russians appear to have dropped the precondition (which they themselves imposed) that NATO must reverse its decision of 12 December 1979 before negotiations on long range theatre nuclear forces could take place. But they seem to have substituted the one-sided demand that American Forward Based Systems be included in the negotiations. They have also made a move in the MBFR negotiations. But it leaves untouched the central problem of data and contains no response to Western proposals for Associated (verification and stabilisation) Measures. There is as yet no evidence that the move was prompted by a genuine desire for progress rather than by the political circumstances of Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow.

5. It seems likely that the limited Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the moves on TNF and MBFR indicate at least a tactical desire on the part of the Soviet leaders to appear reasonable, though without giving anything of substance away. The main purpose is probably to distract attention from the Soviet Union's real aims in Afghanistan and to encourage the West to conduct business as usual in East-West relations and ultimately to acquiesce in the occupation of Afghanistan. It is also possible to conclude from Soviet behaviour that the weight of international pressure following the invasion of Afghanistan is at last receiving some attention in Moscow. However, it is equally clear that there is no early prospect of Soviet willingness to engage in serious negotiations about Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

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Prime Minister

To see all

MAP 11/8

GR 450
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FM KABUL 110810Z
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 243 OF 11 AUGUST 80.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (D14)
INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 240 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.
POLITICAL.

1. THE NEED FOR PARTY UNITY CONTINUES AS THE MAIN THEME IN PARTY STATEMENTS. BABRAK CALLED ON THE AFGHAN WOMEN'S ORGANISSATION TO CLOSE RANKS SO THAT ''THERE MAY REMAIN NO SELF-CENTERED CRITICISMS, INAPPROPRIATE RIVALRIES, COMPETITIONS AND SELFISHNESS''. THE CHIEF OF THE AFGHEN SECURITY FORCES, SAR RAWZA WAL, MADE THE SAME CALL TO A MEETING OF PROVINCIAL AND PARTY ACTIVISTS AND ADDED THAT THE GOERNMENT INTENDS TO ''STRENGTHEN THE POLICE ORGANS AND ENHANCE THEIR CAPABILITY''.

2. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI PARLIAMENTARY DECISION TO DECLARE JERUSALEUM THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL.

3. IT IS EXPECTED THAT NEW CHARGE D'AFFAIRES WILL SHORTLY BE ANNOUNCED FOR ISLAMABAD AND MOSCOW. THERE IS NO SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF WHY REPRESENTATION IN MOSCOW REMAINS AT CHARGE LEVEL, UNLESS THE POST OF AMBASSADOR IS BEING KEPT FOR SOME IMPORTANT EXILE. THERE IS ALSO A REPORT, SO FAR UNCONFIRMED, THAT MINISTER OF INTERIOR GULABZOI IS TO GO AS AMBASSADOR TO WARSAW.

INTERNAL SECURITY.

4. SECURITY HAS BEEN NOTICEABLY TIGHTENED IN AND AROUND KABUL OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS WITH WIDESPREAD SEARCHES OF VEHICLES BY DAY AND BY NIGHT. IT MAY BE AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT TOO MANY WEAPONS BEING AROUND THE TOWN OVER EID (12-14 AUGUST).

5. AERIAL ACTIVITY OVER KABUL AND MOVEMENT OF MILITARY CONVOYS HAS BEEN LIGHT. ON 7 AUGUST THERE WAS SOME BOMBING BY HELICOPTERS IN THE BAGRAMI/SHEWAKI AREA JUST OUTSIDE KABUL, REASON NOT KNOWN, PROBABLY SUSPECTED PRESENCE OF INSURGENTS. FIGHTING ON A MODERATE SCALE ON 7 AUGUST AND INVOLVING RUSSIAN TROOPS WAS REPORTED FROM THE AREA AROUND KALAKAN, SOME 40 KMS NORTH OF KABUL.

/6.

6. PUBLICITY CONTINUES FOR GOVERNMENT SUCCESSES AGAINST COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE PROVINCES CURRENTLY FEATURED ARE SAMANGAN, BALKH AND HERAT. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN FIGHTING IN FARYAB AND BADGHIS, AND SUCCESS STORIES MAY BE EXPECTED FROM THERE ALSO.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

7. PARA 3 IS NOT SUITABLE FOR PRESS TREATMENT.

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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Prime Minister
To see all

MAD 7/8.

FM KABUL 070712Z
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 240 OF 7 AUGUST 80.
INFO ROTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (D14).
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO 237 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.
POLITICAL.
1. A MEETING OF PARTY ACTIVISTS WAS HELD IN KABUL TO EXPLAIN THE CALL FOR UNITY MADE AT THE THIRD PLENUM OF THE PDPA. BABRAK'S SPEECH STRESSED THE PRIME DUTY OF ALL PARTY MEMBERS TO ANNIHILATE FOREIGN MERCENARIES, MOST OF WHOM, HE SAID, HAD ALREADY BEEN WIPED OUT. HE PRESENTED FLAGS TO CERTAIN VOLUNTEER GROUPS IN APPRECIATION OF THEIR STRUGGLE.
2. LOCAL PUBLICITY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO A REPORT SAID TO HAVE APPEARED IN THE ''PATRIOT'' IN DELHI THAT BRITAIN AND THE US ARE USING THE SURVEY TEAM ON THE KARAKORAM HIGHWAY FOR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING.
3. KABUL TV SHOWED ON 6 AUGUST THE WELCOME AFFORDED IN THE UK TO ATHLETS RETURNING FROM THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS.
4. AN AGREEMENT ON CO-OPERATION TO DEVELOP HEALTH SERVICES HAS BEEN SIGNED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTERS OF FOREIGN TRADE AND OF TRANSPORT HAVE ARRIVED IN KABUL.
5. THERE HAS BEEN A SHORTAGE OF PETROL IN KABUL FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND TODAY ALL PETROL STATIONS HAVE RUN DRY.
INTERNAL SECURITY.
INTERNAL SECURITY.
6. RELIABLE REPORTS FROM HERAT INDICATE AN INCREASE IN VIOLENCE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF RAMADAN, SOME THREE WEEKS' AGO, WITH FREQUENT STREET BATTLES BY BOTH DAY AND NIGHT BETWEEN AFGHAN TROOPS AND RESISTANCE FORCES. THE OLD TOWN IS VIRTUALLY A NO-GO AREA FOR GOVERNMENT FORCES WITH ARMED BANDS OF INSURGENTS IN PLAIN EVIDENCE. THESE BANDS ARE FOR THE MOST PART DISORGANISED AND POORLY ARMED, AND THE ACTIVITIES OF BANDIT ELEMENTS AMONGST THEM IN DEMANDING MONEY AND SUPPLIES UNDER THREATS ARE SAID TO HAVE AROUSED RESENTMENT. THE RUSSIANS ARE IN LITTLE EVIDENCE WITHIN HERAT BUT ARE HEAVILY CONCENTRATED AROUND THE CITY. THEIR MAIN CONCERN SEEMS TO BE THE SECURITY OF THEIR SUPPLY ROUTE RUNNING NORTH TO SOUTH : REGULAR IN-COMING CONVOYS OF PETROL TANKERS AND OF ARMOURED VEHICLES ARE SEEN, WITH OCCASIONAL ROCKET LAUNCHERS, AMMUNITION TRUCKS AND LOADS OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE INFILTRATING SOME RESITANCE GROUPS AND REMOVING RESISTANCE LEADERS SO IDENTIFIED.
7. PUBLICITY CONTINUES TO BE GIVEN TO THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY BANDS IN CERTAIN PROVINCES. KUNDUZ PROVINCE AND TOWN HAVE RECEIVED PARTICULAR MENTION OF

/LATE WHERE

LATE WHERE THE SITUATION FOR SOME TIME HAS BEEN SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED IN HERAT, WITH RESISTANCE FORCES DISRUPTING MUCH OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

8. AERIAL ACTIVITY OF ALL KINDS HAS BEEN VERY LIGHT OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. REPORTS STILL COME IN OF FIGHTING BETWEEN GOVERNMENTT AND RESSISTANCEE FORCES IN LOGAR, MOST RECENTTLY AROUND BARAKI BARAK AND PULE ALAM.

9. THERE IS A REPORT FROM A GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCE,, ALTHOUGH THE MACABRE NATURE OF THIS ONE STRAINS CREDULITY, OF A TTIIED AND SEALED SACK CONTAINING THE HEADS OF 5/6 RUSSIANS BEING DUMPED ON 5 AUGUST BY THE MICROROYAN COMPLEX OFF APARTMENTS IN KABUL WHERE MANY RUSSIANS LIVE.

PRESS DISTRIBUTIONN.

10. ANY OF THE ABOVE COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR PRESS TREATMENT.

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

Afghanistan

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GRS 270
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FM ISLAMABAD 240850Z JUL 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1084 OF 24 JUL
INFO KABUL, MOSCOW.
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK DELHI

RUSSIAN ATROCITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

1. WE HAVE OBTAINED ON LOAN FROM THE MUJAHIDEEN FRAGMENTS OF TWO OR POSSIBLY THREE RUSSIAN BOOBY TRAPS, WITH CLEARLY VISIBLE RUSSIAN MARKINGS, CURRENTLY SAID TO BE IN USE IN AFGHANISTAN. THEY ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE DESCRIBED IN RADIO NEWSREEL ON ABOUT 16 JULY BY THE RESIDENT BBC CORRESPONDENT HERE, TOWYN MASON.

2. THE DEVICES ARE REPORTEDLY DROPPED BY AIR IN A CONTAINER WHICH SCATTERS SMALLER PLASTIC DEVICES DESCRIBED AS HAVING TWO QUOTE WINGS UNQUOTE, ONE QUOTE FAT UNQUOTE WITH EXPLOSIVE IN IT AND THE OTHER QUOTE THIN UNQUOTE AND INNOCUOUS. THE BOOBY TRAPS ARE GREEN IN COLOUR AND HARD TO SPOT AGAINST GRASS OR BUSHES, BUT ALSO SEEM TO BE DESIGNED TO LOOK LIKE TOYS OR BIRDS SO THAT WOMEN AND CHILDREN MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO PICK THEM UP (OTHER DEVICES WHICH WE HAVE NOT SEEN ARE SAID TO LOOK LIKE WATCHES OR BUNDLES OF BANK NOTES). PEOPLE INJURED BY THESE DEVICES ARE NOW IN THE ORTHOPAEDIC WING OF THE LADY READING HOSPITAL IN PESHAWAR.

3. THE NINE FRAGMENTS WE HAVE OBTAINED HAVE BEEN SENT TO COLES, SAD, BY BAG TOGETHER WITH A ROLL OF FILM. WE HAVE DISCREETLY ASKED THE MUJAHIDEEN AND THE PRESS TO LET US HAVE MORE OBJECTS (ESPECIALLY LARGER OR MORE PHOTOGENIC PIECES) OR PHOTOGRAPHS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE. BUT WE ARE NATURALLY MOST ANXIOUS NOT TO EMBARRASS THE PAKISTANIS.

4. THESE BOOBY TRAPS WOULD SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY UNPLEASANT DEVICES AIMED AT INJURING WOMEN AND CHILDREN. WHETHER OR NOT THEIR USAGE VIOLATES GENEVA CONVENTIONS OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL CODES, WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR WIDE-SPREAD USE IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS AND WITH THE PRESS AND TELEVISION TO SHOW UP THE RUSSIANS.
FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK.

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Afghanistan file KB7

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 July 1980

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 23 July about assistance for the Afghan resistance. She agrees that we should meet the US Government's request.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G. G. H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 387 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: Letter from Walden to Alexander dated 23 July 1980	
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FM DELHI 210740Z JUL 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 570 OF 21 JULY

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, KABUL

Afghanistan

MY TELS NOS 556 AND 567: AGHA SHAHI'S VISIT: AFGHANISTAN.

1. WHEN I SAW THE INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY ON 19 JULY, I ASKED HIM IF THERE WAS ANYTHING HE COULD TELL ME ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE WITH AGHA SHAHI ON AFGHANISTAN. I SAID THAT PRESS REPORTS HAD INDICATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN QUITE A LENGTHY DISCUSSION AND THAT IT HAD SEEMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MEASURE OF AGREEMENT. DID HE THINK THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING IN THE OUTCOME WHICH COULD BE BUILT ON?

2. SATHE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE PRESS REPORTS WHICH HAD INDICATED EXTENSIVE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES HAD BEEN ABSOLUTE NONSENSE. ON AFGHANISTAN, IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THERE WERE STILL DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ABOUT THE ORDER IN WHICH STEPS TOWARDS SUCH A SOLUTION SHOULD TAKE PLACE, BUT THESE DID NOT APPEAR INSURMOUNTABLE. THUS FAR, THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING.

3. IN THE INDIAN VIEW, IT FOLLOWED THAT TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE INTERESTED PARTIES. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE PARTIAL RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN A CLEAR SIGNAL, TO WHICH THE PAKISTANIS WOULD HAVE BEEN WELL-ADVISED TO RESPOND. SOME FEW DAYS AGO, THE INDIANS HAD BELIEVED THAT THE PAKISTANIS WOULD INDEED RESPOND POSITIVELY. WHEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO ISLAMABAD HAD HAD AN INTERVIEW WITH ZIA PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE AND HAD BEEN GIVEN A FAREWELL DINNER BY THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARY, HE HAD BEEN TREATED EXTREMELY WARMLY AND COMPLIMENTS HAD BEEN PAID TO HIM ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE HE HAD PLAYED IN SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS. THIS HAD BEEN A REMARKABLE DEVELOPMENT, CONSIDERING THAT AT ONE TIME ZIA HAD REFUSED ABSOLUTELY EVEN TO SEE ASIMOV.

4. THE INDIANS HAD THEREFORE BEEN ALL THE MORE DISAPPOINTED WHEN AGHA SHAHI HAD AGAIN INSISTED, DURING THE TALKS IN DELHI, THAT IT WAS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO TALK TO THE KARMAL REGIME. HE HAD CLAIMED TO BE BOUND BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE RESOLUTION (WHICH THE INDIANS KNEW VERY WELL HAD BEEN DRAFTED BY THE PAKISTANIS THEMSELVES). I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT AT ONE POINT, THE ISLAMIC COMMITTEE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME WAY TOWARDS GETTING ROUND THIS OBSTACLE, AND SATHE AGREED. HE THOUGHT FURTHER THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE THAT THE FIRST STEP WOULD HAVE TO BE TALKS WITH THE KARMAL REGIME IN KABUL AND THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE TALKS WITH BOTH THE RUSSIANS AND THE AFGHANS IN MOSCOW OR ELSEWHERE, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS DID NOT CONSTITUTE RECOGNITION.

/5. I ASKED SATHE

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5. I ASKED SATHE WHETHER HE SAW ANY PROSPECT OF RESOLVING THIS IMPASSE OR WHETHER HE SAW ANYONE WHO COULD ACT AS A CATALYST FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT PAKISTAN'S RELUCTANCE TO MOVE TOWARDS TALKS WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE ''LOOKING OVER THEIR SHOULDERS''. IN REPLY TO MY QUERY, HE SAID THAT HE HAD THE SAUDIS IN MIND.

6. I SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE PAKISTANIS TO CONSIDER ANY FORM OF TALKS WITH THE AFGHAN REGIME WHILE THEY HAD SO MANY AFGHAN REFUGEES ON THEIR SOIL. SATHE SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY HE BELIEVED THE LONGER THE AFGHAN REFUGEES WERE THERE THE MORE DIFFICULT THE PAKISTANIS WOULD FIND IT TO COPE WITH THEM. THE PAKISTANI PATHANS WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY UPSET AS THEY SAW THESE REFUGEES RECEIVING DOLES, UNDERCUTTING THEM IN THE LABOUR MARKET AND, ASSISTED BY THE REMISSION OF GOVERNMENT TAXES, INCREASINGLY TAKING TO THE TRANSPORT BUSINESS IN THE FRONTIER AREAS.

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FM KABUL 17Ø736Z
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 227 OF 17 JULY 8Ø
AND TO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD.

CLASH BETWEEN PAKISTANI AND SOVIET/AFGHAN FORCES.

1. THE JAPANESE CHARGE ASKED ME TODAY WHETHER I HAD HEARD A REPORT THAT SOME 1Ø DAYS AGO A CLASH TOOK PLACE ON THE PAKISTANI SIDE OF THE BORDER BETWEEN PAKISTANI AND SOVIET/AFGHAN FORCES LEAVING SEVERAL SOVIET SOLDIERS DEAD.

I REPLIED THAT I HAD NOT.

HOWELL.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T138/80

PARIS FROM LONDON
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6Ø3Ø2/ØØ1
BT
IMMEDIATE Ø9173ØZ JUL
PARIS FROM LONDON
SECRET GOVERNMENTAL ØØ18
BT
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 26 JUNE ABOUT YOUR AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH MR. GROMYKO. I AGREE WITH YOU ABOUT THE NEED TO CONTINUE PROBING THE SOVIET POSITION IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME SOVIET TROOPS LAST MONTH. OUR OWN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE RUSSIANS RECENTLY AND MY OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH YOURS ABOUT THE CONTENT OF THESE EXCHANGES. IN THE LATEST DISCUSSION, ON 2 JULY, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ZEMSKOV WAS TOTALLY NEGATIVE AND INDICATED NO MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THE COMPLETE LACK OF GIVE ON THE SOVIET SIDE DURING HELMUT SCHMIDT'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT BREZHNEV IN MOSCOW.

I NOTE THAT IN HIS REMARKS TO YOUR AMBASSADOR, MR. GROMYKO DID NOT MENTION BARBRAK KARMAL BUT REFERRED INSTEAD TO AN AGREEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN OR WITH KABUL. THIS MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE CONSIDERING SOME CHANGES OF PERSONNEL IN THE AFGHAN REGIME. PERHAPS THE POINT WILL BECOME CLEARER WHEN YOU RECEIVE MR. BREZHNEV'S CONSIDERED REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE.

I ENJOYED OUR DISCUSSIONS AT VENICE AND HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN.

WITH BEST WISHES,

MARGARET THATCHER

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

9 July 1980

Afghanistan

You enclosed with your letter to me of 8 July a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Giscard d'Estaing. I enclose the text of the message in the form in which it was sent over the direct line this afternoon.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

NM

(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

I have somewhat amended & shortened our F.Co. draft. The letter is intended to convey ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ scepticism about the prospects to get with a willingness to keep in touch with the French.

If you are content with something on these lines, we will send it on the Quick wire. No need to sign.

Agree Ltr?

Yes pse

MT

9/7/80

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

To go on the Brezhnev line.

To : President Valery Giscard d'Estaing.

9 July 1980

My dear President,

Thank you for your message of 26 June about your Ambassador's discussion with Mr. Gromyko. I agree with you about the need to continue probing the Soviet position in order to establish the significance of the withdrawal of some Soviet troops last month. Our own Ambassador in Moscow has been in contact with the Russians recently and my officials have been keeping in touch with yours about the content of these exchanges. In the latest discussion, on 2 July, Deputy Foreign Minister Zemskov was totally negative and indicated no movement in the Soviet position. This is consistent with what seems to have been the complete lack of give on the Soviet side during Helmut Schmidt's talks with President Brezhnev in Moscow.

I note that in his remarks to your Ambassador, Mr. Gromyko did not mention Barbrak Karmal but referred instead to an agreement with Afghanistan or with Kabul. This might suggest that the Russians are considering some changes of personnel in the Afghan regime. Perhaps the point will become clearer when you receive Mr. Brezhnev's considered reply to your message.

/I enjoyed

I enjoyed our ~~exchanges~~ discussions at Venice and hope that we can continue to keep in touch about developments concerning Afghanistan.

With best wishes,

Margaret Thatcher.

His Excellency Monsieur Valery Giscard d'Estaing

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Please retype as amended. PL 9/7

8 July 1980

Dear Michael,

Afghanistan

Thank you for your letter of 26 June with which you transmitted the text of a message from President Giscard d'Estaing to the Prime / Minister. I now enclose a draft reply which Lord Carrington suggests the Prime Minister might send.

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: President Giscard d'Estaing

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thankyou for

~~I was grateful to you for informing me in~~ your message of 26 June about ~~of~~ your Ambassador's discussion with Mr Gromyko. ~~about the partial withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.~~ ~~I too think that it is worthwhile~~ I agree with you about the need to continue probing the Soviet position for signs of movement, and ~~Our own Ambassador has also~~ been in contact with the Russians recently. ~~My~~ officials have been keeping in touch with yours about the content of these exchanges. In the latest discussion, ~~which took place~~ on 2 July, Deputy Foreign Minister Zemskov was totally negative and indicated no movement in the Soviet position. This is consistent with what ~~I understand to be~~ seems to have been the complete lack of give on the Soviet side during Helmut Schmidt's talks with President Brezhnev in Moscow.

in order to establish the significance of the ~~factual~~ withdrawal of some Soviet troops last month. Our own Ambassador in Moscow has

I note ~~however~~ that in his remarks to your Ambassador, Mr Gromyko did not mention Babrak Karmal but referred instead ~~only~~ to an agreement with Afghanistan or with Kabul. This might suggest ~~could be a hint~~ that the Russians are considering some changes of personnel in the Afghan regime. ~~and it will be interesting to see whether~~ Perhaps the point will become clearer when you receive President Brezhnev's considered reply to your ~~there are any similar indications in the considered~~ message. ~~reply which you will presumably receive from Mr Brezhnev.~~

/ enjoyed

/...

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I enjoyed our exchanges at Venice and hope that we can continue to keep in touch about developments concerning Afghanistan.

With best wishes

Afghan.
Read Lisnell.

GR 580
CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA 050800Z JUL
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 502 OF 5 JUL 80

INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD TEHRAN UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

SAVING TO KABUL DELHI PARIS BONN AND UKDEL NATO

YRTELNOS 359 AND 366: AFGHANISTAN

1. I CALLED ON CHATTY 3 JULY AFTERNOON BEFORE RECEIPT OF SECOND TUR AND DELIVERED MESSAGE IN FIRST TUR. LEAVING COPY OF MY SPEAKING NOTES.

2. CHATTY SAID THAT KARMAL'S INITIAL REPLY TO HIS INVITATION TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO GENEVA FOR TALKS WITH THE COMMITTEE OF THREE HAD BEEN PROMISING: KARMAL HAD OFFERED TO SEND DOST IN HIS CAPACITY AS A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE PARTY FOR A MEETING ON 25 JUNE. CHATTY HAD ACCEPTED. BUT KARMAL HAD SUBSEQUENTLY INSISTED THAT DOST COME AS FOREIGN MINISTER AND THAT THE TLAKS WITH THE COMMISSION BE BILATERAL. CHATTY HAD REPLIED THAT THE FIRST CONDITION WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND THET THE SECOND WAS ONLY ACCEPTABLE IF IT DID NOT RULE OUT CONTINUED TALKS BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE RESISTANCE, ALSO BILATERALLY (CHATTY COMMENTED THAT IT WAS IN ANY CASE FAR TOO EARLY FOR TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS). KARMAL HAD NOTYET COMMENTED ON THIS REPLY, AND CHATTY GHOUGHT THE CHANCES OF HIS DOING SO IN ''ACCEPTABLE TERMS'' WERE VERY SLIGHT.

3. CHATTY SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE OF THREE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS KARMAL FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THEIR TERMS BUT APART FROM THAT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE ANY OTHER MOVES BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE BEFORE UNGA. AS FOR MOVES BY OTHERS, HE SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT ASSOCIATE ITSELF PUBLICLY WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CONFERENCE OR THE COMMITTEE: EVEN EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT (HE INSTANCED CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE VENICE SUMMIT) WERE EMBARRASSING BECAUSE THE REINFORCED THE ARGUMENTS OF THE SYRIANS, LIBYANS, IRAQIS ETC THAT THE ICO WAS PLAYING THE IMPERIALISTS' GAME FOR THEM. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS PARALLEL ACTION BY WESTERN STATES, HAVING THE SAME OBJECTIVES, BEING CAREFUL NOT TO OBSTRUCT THE ICO, BUT OSTENSIBLY FOLLOWING A SEPARATE LINE. HE SAID THAT HMG'S MORE DISCREET CONTACTS AND COORDINATION OF EFFORT WITH THE ICO WERE MORE HELPFUL THAN RINGING STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE COMMITTEE OF THREE, LIKE THAT OF PRESIDENT CARTER. HE THOUGH THAT ONE AREA WHERE HMG MIGHT USEFULLY ACT IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE UNGA WASIN RALLYING SUPPORT AMONG NON-MUSLIM COMMONWESKALT COUNTRIES. THE BATTLE AT UNGA WOULD BE MUCH HARDER THIS TIME: SOME HAD LOST ENTHUSIASM AND OTHERS WERE UNDER VERY STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE RUSSIANS.

/ 4. I ASKED

4. I ASKED CHATTY HOW HE NOW SAW ARRANGEMENTS FOR A TRANSITION FROM THE BARBAK KARMAL REGIME TO A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE TRANSITION THROUGH A NEUTRAL PRIME MINISTER ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT WISH TO RETREAT IGNOMINIOUSLY: IT WOULD WANT WITHDRAWAL WITH HONOUR AND WITH EVIDENT JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS ACTIONS. HE THOUGH THE MOST LIKELY FAVOURABLE OUTCOME WOULD BE A LONG DRAWN OUT STRUGGLE, IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOTBE DEFEATED BUT IN WHICH THE RESISTANCE WOULD NOT BE CRUSHED. WHEN STALEMATE WAS WELL-ESTABLISHED THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WAYS OUT: BUT THEY MUST FIRST BE BROUGHT TO REALISE THAT IF DEFEAT WAS NOT POSSIBLE, NEANTVIMTG WAS VICTORY. CHATTY THOUGHT THE WHOLE PROCESS MIGHT TAKE TWO OR THREE YEARS AT LEAST.

5. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

GRAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1980

Dear Michael,

Sayed Ahmed Gailani

You have asked to see the record of Mr Gailani's discussions with Mr Hurd and FCO officials. These are attached. Mr Gailani accepted that these meetings should take place on a confidential basis and he has not in subsequent public statements said anything about the content of these discussions. After his call at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office he gave a press briefing. He has also recorded an interview for the BBC World Service and has spoken at Chatham House.

Mr Gailani is a figure with quiet dignity and with an apparent bias in favour of moderate democratic government. But he admitted that he had not himself been into Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion and was vague in most of what he said about the situation on the ground within the country: he did not give the impression of being a dynamic leader and there must be some doubts as to whether his group is as effective as he claims.

Mr Gailani's general appeal to Western nations for arms has been picked up in the media. Although Mr Gailani did not specifically ask us to supply 303 ammunition, Lord Carrington has asked for this question to be examined.

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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-2 JUL 1980
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SUMMARY RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE THE HON DOUGLAS HURD CBE MP, AND SAYED AHMAD GAILANI AT NOON ON FRIDAY 27 JUNE IN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Present

The Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP	Sayed Ahmad Gailani
Mr G R Archer	Mohammed Gailani
Mr C T Humfrey	
Mr R D Lavers	

1. After welcoming Mr Gailani, Mr Hurd asked him for his assessment of the military situation in Afghanistan. Mr Gailani said that 'with empty hands our people are fighting very well'. The Soviet Union was using the latest weapons especially helicopter gun-ships. The freedom fighters were doing their best against the Soviet invaders and their puppet government. Mr Hurd asked in which part of the country were Mr Gailani's resistance fighters active. He replied mostly in the South and North-east especially Paktia, but nevertheless he had groups operating throughout Afghanistan.

2. Turning to the question of co-operation between the different resistance organisations, Mr Gailani said that he was not satisfied with this. There was a basic problem. He believed in democracy but others favoured dictatorship, albeit of an Islamic nature. Mr Gailani thought that the extremists had little support within Afghanistan. Conversely as a religious leader, he had a following perhaps as large as 4 or 5 million. When asked by Mr Hurd whether the groups were trying to overcome their differences of approach, Mr Gailani said they were doing their best. A Loya Jirga had been set up in Peshawar. Mr Archer asked for more information about the Jirga. Mr Gailani gave an account of the historical origins of the Jirga as an institution. He mentioned that he himself had attended Jirgas in the reign of the last king. All tribes were represented on the Jirga; they selected members who were sent to it. Mr Archer asked whether the Jirga had the backing of all the parties in the alliance. Mr Gailani said that he could not say that this was true of other

/groups.

groups. But power was in the hands of the people. The parties had a role in the Islamic Front. If they wished they could enter the Jirga as representatives of the various components of the alliance.

3. Mr Hurd asked about the meeting the previous weekend in Switzerland with the Islamic Conference's Standing Committee. Mr Gailani thought it had not been bad. The resistance groups had explained their ideas to the Committee and provided details of their requirements. As an aside Mr Gailani said that he recognised that any government of an independent Afghanistan would have to reach a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. But they did not want Soviet troops in Afghanistan nor did they want their puppet government. Mr Hurd said we recognised that the Babrak Karmal regime would not survive long without Soviet troops.

4. Returning to the question of greater unity among the resistance groups, Mr Hurd asked whether Mr Gailani saw any further possibilities. He thought Mr Gailani would be asked about this when he met MPs in the House of Commons. Mr Gailani reiterated that some leaders favoured a Khomeini-style course of Islamic fundamentalism. He instanced the Aizb-e-Istani and Jamick-e-Islami parties. But this did not fit in with Afghanistan's own traditions.

5. Looking ahead, Mr Gailani told Mr Hurd that the fighting would go on over the next five months and for longer, though in the winter it was hard to fight effectively. But if the freedom fighters had help from Arab countries and Western Europe, the fighting would continue for over 50 years. Mr Hurd asked whether Mr Gailani had noticed the increased publicity, which we had been striving for, in the British press in recent months. Mr Gailani said yes. When asked about the type of help the freedom fighters needed, he said anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons together with ammunition. In particular, ammunition was required of 303 calibre as that was what the resistance fighters used. They also needed food.

/6. The.....

6. The conversation turned briefly to the desperate plight of the refugees, the complete absence of any form of government in the countryside, and Soviet tactics. The latter had not changed. Russian troops did not leave their tanks as they knew they would otherwise get shot. Mr Gailani said he was skeptical about the reports of Soviet troop withdrawals. Mr Hurd said we would keep up the pressure on the Soviet Union. We would have to consider the question of helping the Afghan resistance movement. Mr Gailani said time was of the essence. The summer was the fighting season. In the winter his people would be at a disadvantage.

7. The meeting ended at 12.30 pm with Mr Hurd expressing his admiration for the bravery of the freedom fighters.

cc: Private Secretary
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Mr Blaker
PS/PUS
Mr Bullard
Sir A Acland
Mr A E Donald
EESD
MED
Planning Staff
Research Dept
News Dept
PUSD

Chanceries:
Islamabad
Kabul
Delhi
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Paris
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MEETING BETWEEN MR ARCHER AND MR LAVERS OF SOUTH ASIAN DEPARTMENT WITH SAYED AHMAD GAILANI AT THE OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY CLUB, 5.30 PM 25 JUNE 1980

1. Mr Gailani, his son Mohammad and Mr George Miller, who has been arranging a programme for Mr Gailani in the United Kingdom, accepted an invitation to meet the Acting Head of South Asian Department and Mr Lavers for a private meeting outside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Our idea was that this should be a preliminary to a decision whether to invite Mr Gailani for a discussion in the office. (It has subsequently been agreed that Mr Hurd will see him for a private meeting.

2. Mr Archer welcomed the opportunity to meet Mr Gailani and ask him about the United Islamic Front of Afghanistan, the Islamic Alliance and the meeting in Switzerland with the Committee of Three established by the Islamic Conference.

3. Mr Gailani said that he had come to Britain to see his family but that he also was interested in obtaining publicity for the struggle of the Afghan people against the Soviet Union. He welcomed the opportunity to obtain a Foreign Office view about this. In response to a question he said that he represented only his own group. There was no suggestion of a mandate from the other leaders of the Alliance. He was critical of some of the other leaders and in particular of the Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami. He said that both were ultra conservative groups aiming to replace the one party dictatorship of the Parcham group with a one party dictatorship led by other groups. His own group had substantial following within Afghanistan, but none of the groups could claim to represent the Afghan people. The only way of forming a truely representative national government would be for election to be held. Questioned on this, he qualified his statement to say that it would probably be necessary to use a council or jirga system to elect representatives. The Afghan people would want a non-communist government, but he accepted that any government would have to have a viable relationship with the Soviet Union. In this he differed from some of the other resistance leaders. But it was a fact of life. The Soviet Union would settle for nothing less and geographical and economic needs made this inevitable.

3. Mr Archer asked about Soviet tactics. Mr Gailani said that the Soviet Union had discovered that the only way to deal with the national resolve to oppose their invasion was to aim at the total destruction of Afghan villages. Most of the engagements were commenced at Soviet initiative. He thought that they were deliberately trying to clear border areas with a view to disrupting supply routes. The Afghans needed not only arms but also food and clothing. He alleged that the Soviet Union was using both gas and napalm , but was unable to substantiate his allegations about napalm when pressed. He said there was plenty of evidence of the use of disabling gas. The Soviet forces were experiencing considerable casualties. The Afghans could not attack them effectively during the day and were vulnerable to attacks by helicopter/gun-ships. But at night Soviet troops were vulnerable and many were being killed. The Soviet Union had withdrawn all the Moslem forces from the Soviet Islamic Republics as they were buying copies of the Koran and saying that they were increasingly out of sympathy with the war.

/4.

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4. Mr Gailani confirmed that there were major rifts between the Parcham and Khalq wings of the Karmal regime.

5. The meeting ended with discussion about publicity. Mr Gailani has not brought publicity material with him but will give a press conference, and interview to the BBC World Service and will be willing to appear on television if this can be arranged. This is being pursued through News Department who have given details of Mr Gailani's where-abouts to the BBC.

6. Mr Gailani's English appears to be good. He hesitated only a couple of times where he was prompted by his son. He is a Westernised figure, mild mannered and not outwardly aggressive. He had to be drawn by questions to presenting his case and there was a disappointing absence of detail in what we obtained from him during the meeting.

South Asian Department
26 June 1980

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 July 1980

Dear Michael,

Afghanistan

As you know, our News Department have come under persistent pressure recently on the question of the supply of arms to the resistance movement in Afghanisan. After considerable discussion in the Department, Lord Carrington accepted the attached line for use with the press. In his appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons this morning, he himself used points (i) to (iv). Our News Department will be using the remaining points unattributably as from today.

Yours ever

GGH

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Q: In the BBC Panorama programme of 23 June 1980, Lord Carrington said that the West might have to consider whether or not to supply arms to ''the freedom fighters in Afghanistan''.

(a) How far was this possibility explored at the Venice Summit?

(b) What is the British attitude to such a possibility?

(c) What is his assessment of the strength, cohesion and durability of the rebels' challenge?

A. As the Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on 24 June, the question was discussed at Venice ''only very much in the margins''. It was not raised at the conference.

B. The British attitude is as follows:

(i) The thrust of the government's policy remains to promote a political settlement, the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops and a neutral, non-aligned and independent Afghanistan.

(ii) It is also important that the Resistance should have the arms it needs to operate against the Soviet invaders. And arms do seem to be getting through.

(iii) The question where the arms come from - for instance from the complex networks of the international arms trade - is not the central question.

(iv) I doubt whether it would be helpful to the Afghans themselves to be more specific about

/their

their sources.

(v) I am not saying that we are, or are not, supplying arms to the freedom fighters, though it is not necessary for every possible supplier country to become involved. Still less am I excluding the possibility of supplying arms in the future. But the objective remains a political settlement.

C. The will to continue the fight against the Russians continues. They can win daylight encounters with the freedom fighters but have at present insufficient forces deployed in Afghanistan to control the whole countryside. They are vulnerable to attack by the resistance at night. One of the problems has been the disunity of the resistance.

GR 360
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 022214Z JULY 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 965 OF 2 JULY

YOUR TELNO GUIDANCE 64: AFGHANISTAN

1. I AM GLAD TO SEE FROM PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT WE INTEND TO ALLOW THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES TO MAKE THE RUNNING IN MODILISING FURTHER INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS.

2. I SAY THIS BECAUSE THE WESTERN REACTION TO AFGHANISTAN AND TO THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN IS INCREASINGLY BEING QUOTED HERE AS AN EXAMPLE OF WESTERN DOUBLE STANDARDS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY APPARENT IN THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON JERUSALEM. SOME OF THE NON-ALIGNED ARE DISPOSED TO ARGUE THAT THE WEST WAS BEING HYPOCRITICAL. IT HAD BEEN MAKING AN ENORMOUS HULLABALOO ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION'S INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING CRANKING UP THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND ABOUT THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES, INCLUDING CALLING FOR CHAPTER 7 ACTION AGAINST IRAN. BUT IT CONTINUED TO SHOW CONSIDERABLE RELUCTANCE TO PILLORY OR PUNISH ISRAEL WHICH QUOTE HAS INVADED ARAB COUNTRIES AND HAS HELD A MILLION PALESTINIANS HOSTAGE FOR 13 YEARS UNQUOTE OR FOR THAT MATTER SOUTH AFRICA QUOTE WHICH HAS ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED NAMIBIA FOR MANY YEARS AND THINKS NOTHING OF INVADING NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES UNQUOTE.

/3.

3. IN THE RECENT JERUSALEM DEBATE, BLUM (ISRAEL) HELPED TO FAN THESE FLAMES BY SARCASTICALLY ACCUSING THE ISLAMIC STATES OF MAKING A FUSS ABOUT JERUSALEM WHEN THEY REALLY MEANT KABUL. THIS INFURIATED THE MOSLEMS AND MUST HAVE HELPED THE RUSSIANS TO ENCOURAGE THE SPREAD OF THE LINE IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, CONSPICUOUS WESTERN ACTIVITY IN THE UN ON AFGHANISTAN MAY ONLY RESULT IN STRENGTHENING THESE COUNTER-ACCUSATIONS AND AT THE SAME TIME CAUSE SOME EMBARRASSMENT TO OUR FRIENDS IN THE NAM.

5. IF THERE IS TO BE ACTION IN THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY, I AM REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN LEAVE IT TO THE ISLAMIC STATES TO INITIATE IT AND THAT ALL WE NEED DO IS TO PLAY A DISCREET SUPPORTING ROLE.

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AFGHANISTAN

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FM F C O 021021Z JUL 80
TO PRIORITY JEDDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 359 OF 2 JULY
AND TO ISLAMABAD AND TEHRAN
INFO KABUL DELHI WASHINGTON PARIS BONN UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK

AFGHANISTAN

1. PLEASE SPEAK TO HABIB CHATTY ON THE FOLLOWING LINES (IF HE IS OUT OF JEDDA PLEASE REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE FOR ACTION WHEREVER HE MAY BE):

QUOTE
WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND I SAW THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 17 JUNE WE DISCUSSED THE USEFUL WORK OF THE 3 MAN COMMITTEE IN KEEPING UP THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND MORE GENERALLY IN PROMOTING THE ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE AFGHAN CRISIS. AGHA SHAHI GAVE US AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR APPROACHES TO THE RUSSIANS AND THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE MEETING WITH THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERS IN SWITZERLAND OVER THE WEEKEND 20/21 JUNE. AGHA SHAHI ALSO EMPHASISED YOUR JOINT VIEW THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SHOULD RETAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THE EFFORTS TO SEEK A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM CAUSED BY THE SOVIET INVASION.
I AM VERY CONSCIOUS OF THIS LAST CONSIDERATION AND AM SURE IT IS BEST THAT YOU SHOULD REMAIN IN THE LEAD. BUT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF YOU COULD LET US KNOW THE COMMITTEE'S THINKING ON WHAT STEPS YOU MIGHT TAKE BETWEEN NOW AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING IN SEPTEMBER. THIS WILL HELP US TO FORMULATE OUR OWN VIEWS ON WHAT WE SHOULD DO NEXT. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW WHAT OPPORTUNITIES YOU SEE OF PROMOTING FURTHER INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE IN THAT PERIOD FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND HOW YOU ASSESS THE PREOSPECTS FOR A MEETING, ON ACCEPTABLE TERMS, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REGIME IN KABUL.
UNQUOTE

2. (FOR ISLAMABAD AND TEHRAN). YOU SHOULD SPEAK TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO MAKE THE POINT THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THEY CAN KEEP US FULLY IN THE PICTURE ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES. WE WOULD FIND IT PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO KNOW WHAT PREPARATIONS THEY ENVISAGE FOR THE UNGA AT WHICH AGHA SHAHI CLEARLY ENVISAGED THAT PAKISTAN AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WOULD WISH TO TAKE LEAD ON AFGHANISTAN.
CARRINGTON [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 209 OF 30 JUNE 80.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (D14).

MY TELEGRAM NO 206 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.

POLITICAL.
1. THE DECLARATION OF THE VENICE SUMMIT REGARDING AFGHANISTAN HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY, BAKHTAR, AS ''OPEN INTERERENCE IN THE INTERANL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN.'' THE STATEMENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME SOVIET TROOPS HAD BEEN MADE AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND CREATED CONDITIONS FAVOURABLE FOR THE STARTING OF TALKS ON NORMALISING RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN.
2. THE AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANISTATION HELD A CONFERENCE IN KABUL 25-28 JUNE IN SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION. THE CONFERENCE WAS OPENED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER KESHTMAND AND BABRAK KARMAL ADDRESSED THE CLOSING SESSION.
3. MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE SARBILAND HAS GONE TO PRAGUE FOR TALKS ON CULTURAL COOPERATION.
4. A DELEGATION FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IS IN KABUL AND HAS HAD TALKS WITH ZEARY AND NOOR AHMED NOOR.
5. THE PICTURE WITHIN THE AFGHAN ADMINISTRATION IS ONE RIVEN WITH RIVALRIES, WHERE WORK IS ALMIST AT A STANDSTILL. EACH SECTION IN EACH DEPARTMENT IS SAID TO HAVE AN AGENT OF PARCHAM, OF KHALQ, OF THE INSURGENTS, AND OF THE KGB. THE RESULT OFTEN RESEMBLES LOW FARCE.
INTERNAL SECURITY.
6. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF HELICOPTER ACTIVITY OVER KABUL DURING THE LAST 3 DAYS. DURING THE EVENING OF 28 JUNE, THE HELICOPTERS WERE FLYING LOW, TO THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF FLARES, OVER THE KABUL POLYTECHNIC AREA WHERE IT IS RUMOURED 8-20 RUSSIANS HAAD BEEEEN KIDNAPPED. MACHINE GUN FIRE WAS HEARD AROUND THE AREA.
7. THE GOVERNMENT PUT OUT A STATEMENT ON 28 JUNE DESCRIBING A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION AT SURKHRUD, NANGAHAR PROVINCE, IN WHICH 50 REBELS WERE KILLED AND 20 CAPTURED. STATEMENTS ARE

ALSO BEING MADE ABOUT THE BURNING OF SCHOOLS, HOUSES AND HOSPITALS, AND ABOUT INSTANCES OF KIDNAPPING AND THEFT, ON THE PART OF THE REBELS. THIS APPEARS TO REPRESENT A CONSCIOUS CHANGE IN PUBLIC RELATIONS POLICY FROM THE PREVIOUS PRETENCE THAT NOTHING WAS HAPPENING.

ECONOMIC.

8. AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED ON 29 JUNE WITH THE USSR FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL COMPLEX AT HAIRATAN, BETWEEN MAZAR-I-SHARIF AND TERMEZ ON THE RUSSIAN BORDER. THE COMPLEX WILL COST 26 MILLION ROUBLES, TAKE 3 YEARS TO BUILD AND WILL PROVIDE, AMONGST OTHER THINGS, WAREHOUSING FOR 330,000 TONS OF COMMODITIES.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

9. ANY OF THE ABOVE COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR PRESS TREATMENT.

HOWELL

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FM WASHINGTON 272140Z JUN 80
TO PRIORITY F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2385 OF 27 JUNE.
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO,
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW.
INFO SAVING KABUL.

CUR TELNO 2378 : U.S. POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN.

1. WE ASKED BOB BARRY (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY EUROPEAN BUREAU, STATE) TO COMMENT ON WHAT THE PRESS HAS BEEN REPORTING AS AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR A ''TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT'' OVER AFGHANISTAN. BARRY SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING REALLY NEW OR DIFFERENT ABOUT AMERICAN THINKING AND THE WHOLE MATTER HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT OVER-WRITTEN PUBLICLY. THE AMERICANS HAD CONSULTED WITH THE UK AND WITH OTHER CLOSE ALLIES IN THE SERIES OF PREPARATORY MEETINGS BEFORE VENICE ABOUT THE LANGUAGE THAT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN USED. THE IDEA OF A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT WAS NO MORE AND NO LESS THAN THE RECOGNITION OF SOMETHING WHICH HAD FEATURED IN ALL THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD SO FAR INCLUDING THOSE BY THE UK AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE: NAMELY THAT WHILE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS REMAINS THE CENTRAL PREMISS OF ANY POLITICAL SOLUTION, THIS WAS NOT SOMETHING THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED OVERNIGHT. A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT COULD INVOLVE AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE OR THE UNHCR

Why weren't we told

OR INDEED OTHER VARIANTS, BUT THE AMERICANS WERE ANXIOUS NOT TO BE OVER-PRECISE AT THIS STAGE SINCE THIS WOULD ONLY INVITE A SOVIET BRUSH-OFF.

2. BARRY SAID THAT PRESS REFERENCES TO AMERICAN IDEAS BEING CONVEYED TO THE RUSSIANS THROUGH THIRD PARTY CHANNELS WERE ''NOT ACCURATE''. HE ADMITTED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY REPORTS IN TODAY'S EAST COAST PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT GISCARD WAS OPPOSED TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S CALL FOR AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE PUTTING OUT SOME BRIEFING EXPRESSING THIS SURPRISE AND REITERATING THEIR COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, WHILE POINTING OUT THAT SOME INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WOULD INEVITABLY BE REQUIRED TO COVER SUCH ASPECTS AS SECURITY, REFUGEE SETTLEMENT ETC.

FCO PASS SAVING KABUL.

HENDERSON [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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FM WASHINGTON 262045Z JUN 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2378 OF 26 JUNE 1980,
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, ROUTINE MOSCOW.

U S POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN

1. TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST REPORTED PROMINENTLY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PROPOSING A ''DECENT AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION'' OF THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS THAT WOULD PROTECT THE SOVIET'S ''LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTEREST''. A ''SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL'' ABOARD PRESIDENT CARTER'S AIRCRAFT BETWEEN BELGRADE AND MADRID IS QUOTED AS HAVING ELABORATED ON THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AT THE YUGOSLAV STATE DINNER, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ''TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT'' TO FACILITATE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

2. THE PRECISE NATURE OF THIS TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT WAS APPARENTLY NOT SPELT OUT, BUT IS SAID TO INCLUDE THE SUGGESTION OF AN ISLAMIC PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THE IDEA WAS REPORTEDLY FIRST PUT FORWARD BY PRESIDENT CARTER IN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT TITO IN FEBRUARY. ACCORDING TO U S SOURCES IT WAS RAISED AGAIN IN GENERAL TERMS BY SECRETARY MUSKIE AT HIS MAY MEETING WITH GROMYKO. THE PRESS QUOTES U S SOURCES AS SAYING THAT A MORE DETAILED VERSION OF THE PLAN INCLUDING THE IDEA OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS WAS LATER RELAYED BY MUSKIE TO GROMYKO THROUGH THIRD PARTY CHANNELS. A SEPARATE ARTICLE ON THE N A T O MEETING AT ANKARA STATES THAT DESPITE PRESIDENT CARTER'S REFERENCE TO TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN BELGRADE AND SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS ON THE IDEA BY BRZEZINSKI, SECRETARY MUSKIE ''DID NOT BROACH ANY SUCH PLAN TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIES, ACCORDING TO U S AND EUROPEAN OFFICIALS''.

3. THE SAME SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL IS QUOTED TO THE EFFECT THAT ''WE RECOGNISE THAT THE SOVIET HAS A LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN NOT BEING TRANSFORMED INTO AN ANTI-SOVIET OUTPOST''. ACCORDING TO HIM THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL CALLS FOR A GUARANTEE OF AFGHAN NEUTRALITY AND AN IMPLICIT U S RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET INTEREST IN THAT NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY IN RETURN FOR FULFILMENT OF THE DEMAND FOR A COMPLETE TROOP WITHDRAWAL. ''BUT WE ARE NOT IN A NEGOTIATING SITUATION WITH THEM BECAUSE AT THIS STAGE THEY THEMSELVES HAVE TO RETHINK WHAT WENT ON. ... IT COULD TAKE THEM A LONG TIME, IT IS NOT EASY TO CHANGE BASIC DECISIONS''.

HENDERSON. [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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SIR A ACLAND
~~MR CORTAZZI~~
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
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MR P H MOBERLY
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FM ANKARA 261400Z JUNE 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 26 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON BONN PARIS BRUSSELS HAGUE
ROUTINE ROME LISBON ATHENS COPENHAGEN OSLO OTTAWA MOSCOW
SAVING TO LUXEMBOURG REYKJAVIK UKMIS NEW YORK PRAGUE EAST BERLIN
WARSAW BUDAPEST SOFIA BUCHAREST BLGRADE STOCKHOLM VIENNA
HELSINKI UKDEL VIENNA.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING .
MIPT : EAST/WEST RELATIONS: AFGHANISTAN

1. IN HIS INTERVENTION IN THE RESTRICTED SESSION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, ARMS CONTROL ANJ CSCE/CDE.
2. THE ECONOMIC,POLITICAL AND MILITARY OUTLOOK WAS SUCH THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST SIX MONTHS WERE PROBABLY ONLY A FORETASTE OK A DIFFICULT TIME AHEAD FOR THE ALLIANCE. DESPITE NATURAL DIFFERENCEU OF APPROACH, REFLECTING DIFFERING INTERESTS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL EXIGENCIES , THE ALLIANCE'S UNDARLYING UNITY WAS AS STRONG

DIFFERENCEU OF APPROACH, REFLECTING DIFFERING INTERESTS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL EXIGENCIES , THE ALLIANCE'S UNDARLYING UNITY WAS AS STRONG AU AVER. THE WEST SHOULD MAINTAIN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT MUST SHOW ITS CONTINUING RESERVE AND MINIMISE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGEDRIVING. THE THREE PERCENT GOAL AND T N F D DECISIONS WERE FIXED POINTS IN THE ALLIANCE RESPONSE.

HE AGREED WITH FIRSDON THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON T N F UNLESS THE ALLIANCE PERSEVERED WITH ITS MODERNIZATION PLANS . HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE VIEWS IN THE STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL PUT OUT AT VENICE HAD EXPRESSED THE FEELINGS OF OTHER ALLIES.

3. COPING WITH THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE THIRD WORLD WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE MANAGEMENT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. WHILE NATO BOUNDARIES COULD NOT BE EXTENDED, THE WEST MUST RECOGNISE THAT ITS COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS WERE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY EVENTS BEYOND EUROPE. IMPROVING THE NORTH/SOUTH ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WAS ONE WAY TO REDUCE THE SCOPE FOR SOVIET MEDDLING. THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH WERE IN A POSITION TO DO SO SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THEY WERE DOING ENOUGH TO REINFORCE STABILITY OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA, WHETHER BY MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE OR BY MAINTAINING A CAPABILITY FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CASE OF NEED. WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS RESOURCES, THE U K WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD.

ARMS CONTROL

4. ARMS CONTROL SHOULD NOT BE SEEN EITHER AS A FAILURE O PRIMARILY AS A MEANS TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. IT HAD TO BE BASED ON THE RECOGNITION OF AREAS WHERE MUTUAL RESTRAINT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH EAST AND WEST. THIS LED TO THREE CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, ARMS CONTROL WAS NOT DEAD: THE SEARCH FOR AREAS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT MUST GO ON. SECOND, THE ALLIANCE'S POLICIES MUST BE GUIDED MAINLY BY A HARD-HEADED ASSESSMENT OF ITS SECURITY INTERESTS. THIRD, WESTERN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD FOSTER MORE REALISTIC, IF LIMITED, PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL. DIFFERENCES IN THIS VITAL AREA WOULD BE RUTHLESSLY EXPLOITED BY THE EAST, WHILE GREATER REALISM ABOUT ARMS CONTROL IN THE WEST AND A MORE DELIBERATE EFFORT TO EXPOSE SOVIET PROPOSALS AS PROPAGANDA COULD INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. ARMS CONTROL WAS MUCH MORE ABOUT SECURITY THAN ABOUT DETENTE.

CSCE/CDE

5. WESTERN SOLIDARITY WOULD BE ESSENTIAL AT MADRID IF THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT TO HAVE A FIELD DAY FOR WEDGEDRIVING. EASTERN PROPOSALS WOULD BE TIGHTLY CO-ORDINATED BY THE SOVIET UNION. WESTERN INTERESTS LAY IN THE PURSUIT OF GENUINE DETENTE. THIS REQUIRED A THORCUGH REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. BUT THE

UNION. WESTERN INTERESTS LAY IN THE PURSUIT OF GENUINE DETENTE. THIS REQUIRED A THOROUGH REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. BUT THE WEST SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD DO BUSINESS ON A REALISTIC BASIS PROVIDED THAT THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR WERE RESPECTED.

6. ON THE FRENCH CDE PROPOSALS, THE WEST HAD AN INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING CBMS WHICH GENUINELY CONTRIBUTED TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND WOULD APPLY TO ALL OF EUROPE. PROGRESS IN THE VERIOUS BASKETS SHOULD BE KEPT IN BALANCE,
BUT THE WEST HAD REAL INTERESTS TO PURSUE IN THE MILITARY FIELD AND MUST PRESS AHEAD WITH WORKING OUT AN AGREED POLICY IN TIME FOR MADRID.

L

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO LUXEMBOURG REYKJAVIK UKMIS NEW YORK PRAGUE EAST BERLIN WARSAW BUDAPEST SOFIA BUCHAREST BELGRADE STOCKHOLM VIENNA HELSINKI UKDEL VIENNA .

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Afghanistan

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From the Private Secretary

26 June, 1980.

BF 2-7-80

Afghanistan

Afghanistan

I enclose the text of a message which the Prime Minister has received in the last few minutes from President Giscard about the exchanges between the French and Soviet Governments on the withdrawal of some Soviet units from Afghanistan.

You will, no doubt, let me have in due course the draft of a reply which the Prime Minister might send to President Giscard.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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6c

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T134/80

4

ZZ 26103RZ
LONDRES DE PARIS
SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL 671

TO:MME MARGARET THATCHER
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI
10 DOWNING STREET LONDRES

DE:VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

PARIS LE 26 JUIN 1980

MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE.

POUR REPONDRE A LA COMMUNICATION SOVIETIQUE DU 20 JUIN DERNIER DONT JE VOUS AVAIS INFORMEE LORS DU SOMMET DE VENISE, J'AI INVITE MON AMBASSADEUR A MOSCOU A FAIRE PART AUX AUTORITES SOVIETIQUES DU MESSAGES SUIVANT :

- L'ANNONCE ET LA REALISATION DU RETRAIT DE CERTAINES UNITES MILITAIRES SOVIETIQUES CONSTITUAIT, DANS L'EVOLUTION DE LA CRISE, UN ELEMENT NOUVEAU ET POSITIF.

- CETTE DECISION PRENDRAIT TOUTE SA SIGNIFICATION SI ELLE S'INSCRIVAIT DANS UN CALENDRIER DE RETRAIT DE L'ENSEMBLE DES FORCES SOVIETIQUES.

- LES DISPOSITIONS DEVRAIENT EGALEMENT ETRE ARRETEES POUR ASSURER AU PEUPLE AFGHAN LA POSSIBILITE DE DETERMINER LIBREMENT SON AVENIR A L'ABRI DE TOUTE INGERENCE EXTERIEURE ET PERMETTRE A L'AFGHANISTAN DE RETROUVER SON STATUT DE PAYS NON ALIGNE.

L'AMBASSADEUR A ETE RECU PAR M. GROMYKO LE 25 JUIN POUR LUI FAIRE LA COMMUNICATION PRESCRITE ET LUI DEMANDER DE LA TRANSMETTRE A M. BREJNEV. LE MINISTRE A FAIT LES OBSERVATIONS SUIVANTES EN INDIQUANT QU'IL NE POUVAIT S'AGIR, A CE STADE, QUE DE SON OPINION PERSONNELLE :

Z 261037Z JUN 80

- LE RETRAIT DE CERTAINES TROUPES SOVIETIQUES EST UN PAS IMPORTANT AFIN D'AMELIORER LA SITUATION CREEE AUTOUR DE L'AFGHANISTAN. CE FAIT, EN SOI IMPORTANT CAR IL S'AGIT D'UNE MESURE MILITAIRE, EST AUSSI LE SIGNE DE L'INTENTION DE L'U.R.S.S. DE NE PAS LAISSER SON CONTINGENT MILITAIRE A PERPETUITE EN AFGHANISTAN COMME CERTAINS L'ONT PRETENDU EN OCCIDENT.

- EN CE QUI CONCERNE LE SOUHAIT DE VOIR INSCRIT CE PAS DANS UN CALENDRIER GENERAL DE RETRAIT, IL DOIT ETRE CLAIR QU'IL NE PEUT S'AGIR DE RETRAIT TOTAL AUSSI LONGTEMPS QUE SE POURSUIVENT LES INGERENCES EN AFGHANISTAN A PARTIR DES TERRITOIRES DU PAKISTAN ET DE L'IRAN. L'UNION SOVIETIQUE A REALISE UN PAS IMPORTANT.. MAINTENANT, LA BALLE EST DANS LE CAMP DES PAYS QUI CONTINUENT L'AGRESSION CONTRE L'ETAT AFGHAN ET DE CEUX QUI INSPIRENT LES VOISINS DE L'AFGHANISTAN. CEUX-CI DOIVENT ENTREPRENDRE DES PAS CORRESPONDANTS POUR CESSER LES INGERENCES. ILS DOIVENT ACCEPTER UN ACCORD AVEC L'AFGHANISTAN ET L'ETABLISSEMENT DE RELATIONS PACIFIQUES AVEC CE PAYS. QUANT AUX ETATS QUI, COMME LA FRANCE, NE SONT PAS DIRECTEMENT CONCERNES MAIS PEUVENT INFLUENCER LA SITUATION, ILS DOIVENT ENCOURAGER L'IDEE QU'IL FAUT ACCEPTER DES POURPARLERS ET UN ACCORD AVEC KABOUL. C'EST AINSI QUE LE PROBLEME POURRA ETRE RESOLU. LES ACCORDS DOIVENT ETRE EFFECTIFS ET GARANTIS.

- EN CE QUI CONCERNE LA "DIRECTION AFGHANE", IL S'AGIT D'UN PROBLEME EXCLUSIVEMENT INTERNE. PERSONNE NE DOIT LE RESOUDRE A LA PLACE DU PEUPLE AFGHAN, NI DONNER A CELUI-CI DE CONSEILS SUR CE QUE DOIT ETRE LE REGIME OU LA DIRECTION DE L'AFGHANISTAN.

- POUR CE QUI EST DU STATUT DE NON ALIGNEMENT, L'AFGHANISTAN EST UN PAYS NON ALIGNE. QUI POURRAIT L'AFFIRMER AVEC PLUS DE SURETE QUE LA DIRECTION AFGHANE ELLE-MEME QUI EST SEULE EN MESURE DE DIRE SI L'AFGHANISTAN EST UN ETAT NON-ALIGNE OU S'IL A UN AUTRE STATUT.

TELS SONT LES COMMENTAIRES FAITS PAR M. GROMYKO DONT J'AI JUGE INTERESSANT DE VOUS INFORMER DANS L'ESPRIT DES ECHANGES DE VUES QUE NOUS AVONS EUS SUR CETTE QUESTION A VENISE.

AVEC L'EXPRESSION DE MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS.

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

BT

Afghanistan

Prime Minister

'FLASH' (2)

The French may well be inclined to argue that Gromyko's reply leaves the way open for further exchanges; & that they should be the intermediary. Giscard was very prompt in circulating this message.

[illegible] 30/6

ZZ 261Q3QZ
LONDRES DE PARIS
SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL Q71

TO:MME MARGARET THATCHER
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI
1Q DOWNING STREET LONDRES

DE :VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

PARIS LE 26 JUIN 198Q

Yes - [illegible] - half way to [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible]

MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE,

POUR REPONDRE A LA COMMUNICATION SOVIETIQUE DU 2Q JUIN DERNIER DONT JE VOUS AVAIS INFORMEE LORS DU SOMMET DE VENISE, J'AI INVITE MON AMBASSADEUR A MOSCOU A FAIRE PART AUX AUTORITES SOVIETIQUES DU MESSAGES SUIVANT :

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- CETTE DECISION PRENDRAIT TOUTE SA SIGNIFICATION SI ELLE S'INSCRIVAIT DANS UN CALENDRIER DE RETRAIT DE L'ENSEMBLE DES FORCES SOVIETIQUES.

- LES DISPOSITIONS DEVRAIENT EGALEMENT ETRE ARRETEES POUR ASSURER AU PEUPLE AFGHAN LA POSSIBILITE DE DETERMINER LIBREMENT SON AVENIR A L'ABRI DE TOUTE INGERENCE EXTERIEURE ET PERMETTRE A L'AFGHANISTAN DE RETROUVER SON STATUT DE PAYS NON ALIGNE.

L'AMBASSADEUR A ETE RECU PAR M. GROMYKO LE 25 JUIN POUR LUI FAIRE LA COMMUNICATION PRESCRITE ET LUI DEMANDER DE LA TRANSMETTRE A M. BREJNEV. LE MINISTRE A FAIT LES OBSERVATIONS SUIVANTES EN INDIQUANT QU'IL NE POUVAIT S'AGIR, A CE STADE, QUE DE SON OPINION PERSONNELLE :

Z 2610302 JUN 80

- LE RETRAIT DE CERTAINES TROUPES SOVIETIQUES EST UN PAS IMPORTANT AFIN D'AMELIORER LA SITUATION CREEE AUTOUR DE L'AFGHANISTAN. CE FAIT, EN SOI IMPORTANT CAR IL S'AGIT D'UNE MESURE MILITAIRE, EST AUSSI LE SIGNE DE L'INTENTION DE L'U.R.S.S. DE NE PAS LAISSER SON CONTINGENT MILITAIRE A PERPETUITE EN AFGHANISTAN COMME CERTAINS L'ONT PRETENDU EN OCCIDENT.

- EN CE QUI CONCERNE LE SOUHAIT DE VOIR INSCRIT CE PAS DANS UN CALENDRIER GENERAL DE RETRAIT, IL DOIT ETRE CLAIR QU'IL NE PEUT S'AGIR DE RETRAIT TOTAL AUSSI LONGTEMPS QUE SE POURSUIVENT LES INGERENCES EN AFGHANISTAN A PARTIR DES TERRITOIRES DU PAKISTAN ET DE L'IRAN. L'UNION SOVIETIQUE A REALISE UN PAS IMPORTANT., MAINTENANT, LA BALLE EST DANS LE CAMP DES PAYS QUI CONTINUENT L'AGRESSION CONTRE L'ETAT AFGHAN ET DE CEUX QUI INSPIRENT LES VOISINS DE L'AFGHANISTAN. CEUX-CI DOIVENT ENTREPRENDRE DES PAS CORRESPONDANTS POUR CESSER LES INGERENCES. ILS DOIVENT ACCEPTER UN ACCORD AVEC L'AFGHANISTAN ET L'ETABLISSEMENT DE RELATIONS PACIFIQUES AVEC CE PAYS. QUANT AUX ETATS QUI, COMME LA FRANCE, NE SONT PAS DIRECTEMENT CONCERNES MAIS PEUVENT INFLUENCER LA SITUATION, ILS DOIVENT ENCOURAGER L'IDEE QU'IL FAUT ACCEPTER DES POURPARLERS ET UN ACCORD AVEC KABOUL. C'EST AINSI QUE LE PROBLEME POURRA ETRE RESOLU. LES ACCORDS DOIVENT ETRE EFFECTIFS ET GARANTIS.

- EN CE QUI CONCERNE LA ''DIRECTION AFGHANE'', IL S'AGIT D'UN PROBLEME EXCLUSIVEMENT INTERNE. PERSONNE NE DOIT LE RESOUDRE A LA PLACE DU PEUPLE AFGHAN, NI DONNER A CELUI-CI DE CONSEILS SUR CE QUE DOIT ETRE LE REGIME OU LA DIRECTION DE L'AFGHANISTAN.

- POUR CE QUI EST DU STATUT DE NON ALIGNEMENT, L'AFGHANISTAN EST UN PAYS NON ALIGNE. QUI POURRAIT L'AFFIRMER AVEC PLUS DE SURETE QUE LA DIRECTION AFGHANE ELLE-MEME QUI EST SEULE EN MESURE DE DIRE SI L'AFGHANISTAN EST UN ETAT NON-ALIGNE OU S'IL A UN AUTRE STATUT.

TELS SONT LES COMMENTAIRES FAITS PAR M. GROMYKO DONT J'AI JUGE INTERESSANT DE VOUS INFORMER DANS L'ESPRIT DES ECHANGES DE VUES QUE NOUS AVONS EUS SUR CETTE QUESTION A VENISE.

AVEC L'EXPRESSION DE MES SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS.

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

BT

GRS 420
UNCLASSIFIED
FM MOSCOW 231245Z JUN 80
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 426 OF 23RD JUNE
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, TEHRAN, JEDDA, KABUL,
ISLAMABAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, AND UKMIS GENEVA.

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET ATTACKS ON THE MEETING IN GENEVA AND THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

1. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS CARRIED SEVERAL HIGHLY CRITICAL REPORTS ON THEGGENEVA MEETINGZ UNDER SUCH HEADLINES AS ''PROVOCATIVE VENTURE'' AND ''CRUDE INTERFERENCE''. PRAVDA OF 22 JUNE FOR EXAMPLE REFERRED TO THE ''SO-CALLED COMMITTEE ON AFGHANISTAN..... CREATED ON THE DIRECT ORDERS OF IMPERIALIST AND REACTIONARY CIRCLES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RECENT SESSION OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE''. INSTEAD OF DISCUSSING THE REAL PROBLEM - OPEN INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS BY PAKISTAN, IRAN AND CHINA WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE USA, EGYPT AND OTHER REACTIONARY REGIMES - THERE HAD BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO PUT ON ONE LEVEL THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE ARMED BANDIT GROUPS.

2. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE, THE ARTICLE WENT ON, TO PASS OVER THE UTTERANCES OF THE OIC GENERAL SECRETARY CHATTY, WHO HAD CALLED ON THESE GROUPS TO UNITE SO AS TO EARN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION, OR, IN OTHER WORDS, HELP IN THE FORM OF MONEY AND ARMS FROM THOSE WHO WERE INTERESTED IN WHIPPING UP THE AFGHAN QUESTION. IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH WAS ALSO CRITICISED FOR CLAIMING THAT THERE WAS A 'DUTY' TO HELP THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT BANDIT FORMATIONS AND ''THREATENING SOME SORT OF SECOND STAGE OF ARMED STRUGGLE, IMPLYING HELP WITH ARMS TO THE BANDITS, DISGUISED AS 'STRUGGLERS FOR ISLAM' ''.

3. GHOTBZADEH WAS AGAIN ATTACKED IN A SEPARATE ARTICLE BY TASS COMMENTATOR, KORNILOV, PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA OF 19 JUNE. THIS TOOK HIM TO TASK FOR HIS ATTEMPTS TO DISCOVER SOVIET ''INTRIGUES'' AGAINST IRAN AND HIS INSINUATIONS'' ABOUT SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN. MAYBE THE ANSWER TO WHY HE DID THIS, KORNILOV SUGGESTED, LAY IN HIS WORDS THAT IN CERTAIN CIRLCES OF IRAN THERE WAS A WISH TO OCCUPY THEMSELVES, AS IN PAKISTAN, WITH THE CREATION OF A BASE FOR REBELS. BUT, KORNILOV WENT ON, THERE MIGHT

/ ALSO

ALSO BE ANOTHER REASON, AS YET UNSPOKEN. THE SOVIET UNION HAD OFTEN MADE CLEAR ITS READINESS TO DEVELOP GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF STABILITY. SUCH A PERSPECTIVE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT SUIT SOME PEOPLE INSIDE IRAN. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAD RECENTLY REMARKED THAT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ''MIGHT SUFFER DEFEAT NOT FROM THOSE CONQUERED BY SATAN BUT FROM ITS OWN PEOPLE''. ANTI-SOVIET INVENTIONS WERE NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF IRAN BUT COULD ONLY SUIT THOSE WHO LONGED FOR OTHER TIMES AND ORDERS, WHEN THE FATES OF THE PEOPLES WERE RULED BY IMPERIALISM.

FCO PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, TEHRAN, JEDDA, KABUL, ISLAMABAD, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKMIS GENEVA.

KEEBLE (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FM VENICE 231148Z JUN
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO.034 OF 23 JUNE 1980,
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, PARIS, BONN, ROME, TOKYO,
PRIORITY MOSCOW, KABUL, ANKARA, UKDEL BRUSSELS.

FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT

MIPT

AFGHANISTAN: PRESS.

CORRESPONDENTS HAVE IDENTIFIED LORD CARRINGTON'S LINE AS MORE ''DISMISSIVE'' OF THE SOVIET MOVE THAN THE PUBLIC COMMENTS OF OTHER SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY DOVE-LIKE BRIEFING FROM BRZEZINSKI. I HAVE TELEGRAPHED THE MAIN POINTS IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE BOTH THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS INDEED SCEPTICAL AND THAT HE MADE THE POINT THAT THE MOVE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED OUT OF HAND. THE KEY NOTE IS THAT NOTHING LESS THAN TOTAL SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IS ACCEPTABLE.

FCO PLEASE PASS

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FM VENICE 231130Z JUN
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO. 033 OF 23 JUNE 1980,
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, PARIS, BONN, ROME, TOKYO,
PRIORITY MOSCOW, KABUL, ANKARA, UKDEL BRUSSELS.

FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT
AFGHANISTAN: PRESS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO THE ''TODAY'' PROGRAMME AND GAVE AN ON THE RECORD BRIEFING TO BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE AFGHANISTAN COMMUNIQUE ON 22 JUNE. THE FOLLOWING WERE THE MAIN POINTS HE MADE.

2. IT WAS ''AN EXCELLENT COMMUNIQUE REFLECTING A COMPLETE IDENTITY OF VIEW''. LORD CARRINGTON UNDERSCORED PARTICULARLY THE POINT THAT THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS UNACCEPTABLE BOTH NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.

3. ASKED ABOUT SOVIET MOTIVES IN ANNOUNCING A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL ON THE EVE OF THE CONFERENCE, HE SAID THEY WERE FAIRLY TRANSPARENT:

(A) IT REFELCTED SOVIET DISQUIET ABOUT THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND THE FEAR THAT SOME MORE ATHLETES OR COUNTRIES MAY DECIDE NOT TO PARTICIPATE.

(B) IT WAS AN ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE VENICE SUMMIT. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE COMMUNIQUE THAT THIS ATTEMPT HAD FAILED.

(C) IT REFLECTED SOVIET DIFFICULTIES ON THE GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN, THE SUCCESS OF THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND THE POSITION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

4. INVITED TO COMMENT ON THE VIEW ATTRIBUTED TO THE FRENCH THAT THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT WAS ''SIGNIFICANT AND IMPORTANT'' HE SAID THAT HE PREFERRED TO BE A LITTLE MORE CAUTIOUS. WE DID NOT YET KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT IT TO FORM A DEFINITE VIEW. WE HAD BEEN ASKING FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FOR SOME TIME AND IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG TO DISMISS THIS OUT OF HAND BUT THERE WERE TOO MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS. WHICH TROOPS WERE BEING WITHDRAWN? WOULD THEY RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE SUMMIT OR AFTER THE OLYMPIC GAMES? IF 10,000 WERE WITHDRAWN, 75,000 WOULD REMAIN AND THAT WAS 75,000 TOO MANY. THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE NUMBER OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN WAS ZERO. ASKED WHETHER HE WAS SAYING THAT THE SOVIET STATEMENT WAS COSMETIC, LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT

/ HE

HE WOULD NEED TO BE CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.

5. ASKED WHETHER CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WOULD BE GOING TO MOSCOW WITH A MANDATE FROM THE SEVEN, LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT SCHMIDT HIMSELF HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS GOING AS THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR. HE HAD NOT SOUGHT A MANDATE EITHER FROM THE SEVEN OF FROM THE NINE. BUT HE HAD OF COURSE CONSULTED EXTENSIVELY WITH HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES AND WOULD BE IN MOSCOW WITH THESE CONSULTATIONS FRESH IN HIS MIND. IT WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT HE WOULD SEEK TO PROBE AND ELUCIDATE SOVIET INTENTIONS.

EILBECK

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FOVEN 5/22

GG VENICE (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) DESKBY 221200Z

M. Alexander

GPS.1000
UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS GENEVA 221100Z JUNE 80
DESKBY FCO AND VENICE 221200Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 295 OF 22/6/80
IMMEDIATE INFO VENICE FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON MOSCOW ISLAMABAD KABUL

MY IPT: AFGHANISTAN

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE:

BEGINS

WHILE WE ARE NOT IN FAVOUR OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH THE SO-CALLED GOVERNMENT OF KABUL AND ARE ALSO AGAINST THE DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH THE AGGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT OUR JEHAD AND STRUGGLE IS THE ONLY MEANS TO OVERCOME AFGHANISTAN'S CRISIS AND WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE THE ENEMY UNDERSTAND IS THROUGH THE BARREL OF OUR GUNS: BUT BECAUSE WE CONSIDERED THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF AFGHANISTAN SHARE OUR CAUSE AND THE SAME FEELING TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN, AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPALINING TO THE COMMITTEE THAT APART FROM FACING THE ENEMY IN THE BATTLE FIELD, WE ALSO RELY ON THE ARMS OF LOGIC AND UNDERSTANDING, AND THAT COULD PUT OUR JUST CASE BEFORE THE COMITY OF NATIONS, WE HAVE DECIDED TO ACCEPT WITH PLEASURE THE INVITATION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE AND WE PROMISE FIRMLY OUR COOPERATION FOR THE VERY PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN ORDER THAT THEY SHOULD BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE WORLD AT LARGE, OUR VOICE AGAINST THE TYRANNY IMPOSED BY THE ENEMY.

WE FURTHER STRIVE FOR ESTABLISHING AND ORGANISING A UNIFIED FRONT OF MUJAHEDEEN AND OUR EFFORTS FOR THIS IMPORTANT AIM WILL REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THEREFORE WE HAVE ALL UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED TO PUT FORWARD THE FOLLWOING PROPOSALS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE:

(Q1) THE AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WOULD LIKE TO GIVE EVERY ASSURANCE TO ITS ENEMIES AND TO ALL ITS FRIENDS THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES IT WOULD FOLLOW A TRULY INDEPENDENT AND GENNINELY ISLAMIC PATH. THE AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, WHICH HAS EVEN DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD OF THEIR STRUGGLE RESOLVED NOT TO ATTACH ITSELF TO EITHER BLOCK WOULD NEVER ACCEPT TO BE DICTATED TO BY THEM WHEN THE LIBERTY OF AFGHANISTAN IS REGAINED AND AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED IN THE COUNTRY. IT WOULD PURSUE A POSITIVE AND ACTIVE NON-ALIGNED POLICY AND FREE JUDGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. THEREFORE, IT REQUESTS THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO ENSURE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN ITS WORK IN VIEW OF ITS STATUS AS A LEGITIMATE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT.

(2) THE ARGUMENTS AND REASONS ON WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS BASED ITS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND CONTINUE TO OCCUPY THE TERRITORY OF AFGHANISTAN ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A) THE SUPPORT OF THE SO-CALLED SAUR REVOLUTION AND
B) THE CLAIM THAT IT HAS BEEN INVITED TO SEND ITS ARMED FORCES TO AFGHANISTAN.

FIRST OF ALL WE BELIEVE THAT THE SO-CALLED SAUR REVOLUTION WAS NOT A REVOLUTION, IT WAS A COUP D'ETAT CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE. IT NEITHER REFLECTS THE WILL AND ASPIRATION OF THE NATION NOT DOES IT ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF EVEN ONE PER CENT OF THE POPULATION. THE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE CALLED FOR THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE SOVIET UNION IS ALSO FACED WITH THE SAME DIFFICULTY AS THE SO-CALLED SAUR REVOLUTION AND THEY DO NOT ENJOY ANY SUPPORT WHATSOEVER EVEN OF ONE PER CENT OF THE AFGHAN NATION. THEREFORE, THERE REMAIN NO REASON FOR THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ACCORDINGLY REQUESTS THE STANDING COMMITTEE TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION UNDERSTAND THAT IT MUST STOP SUPPORTING A VERY FEW PEOPLE AND RESPECTING THE WILL AND ASPIRATION OF THE AFGHAN NATION, WITHDRAWITS ARMED FORCES FROM THE COUNTY IMMEDIATLEY.

(3) THE STANDING COMMITTEE SHOULD PERSUADE THE MEMBERS STATES OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO SEVER ALL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN VIEW OF ITS CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MEETING.

(4) THE MEMBERS STATES OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AS THE LEGITMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN. THIS WOULD BE A LOGICAL SEQUEL TO THE NON- RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT IN KABUL.

(5) THE STANDING COMMITTEE SHOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO RAISE TH
E
THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION OF SIXTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSIONOF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

(6) THE STANDING COMMITTEE SHOULD PROPOSE THE HOLDING OF A SUMMIT MEETING OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES ON THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN.

(7) A SPECIAL FUND SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE FOR WHICH RESOURCES SHOULD- BE PROBIDED BY MUSLIM STATES, MEMBERS OF OPEC, THE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN GENERAL AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES.

8) A SPECIAL UN CONFERENCE SUCH AS THE ONE HELD LAST MONTH ON KAMPUCHEA SHOULD BE CONVENED TO PLEDGE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE AFGHAN REFUGEES AND THE SUFFERING PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN STRUGGLING FOR THEIR LIBERATION.

9) AT THE CONFERENCE OF ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS TO BE HELD IN NEW YORK THE SITUATION OF AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFGHAN-ISTAN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE INVITED TO PART-ICIPATE IN THIS CONFERENCE.

10) AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SHOULD BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE 11TH ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON AFGHANISTAN.

11) OFFICES FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF THE AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE OPENED IN NEW YORK, GENEVA AND IN THE CAPITALS OF THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.

12) THE SECURITY GENERAL OF THE UN SHOULD BE ASKED TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT HIS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON AFGHANISTAN ACCORDING TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

THESE WERE A FEW PROPOSALS SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE AFGHAN-ISTAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE. IN LIGHT OF THE JUST AND RIGHTEOUS STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHAN MUSLIM PEOPLE AND THE UNFORTUNATE SITUATION WITH WHICH THEY ARE CONFRONTED, IT IS THE EARNEST EXPECTATION OF THE MOVEMENT THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL GIVE ACTIVE AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO THESE PROPOSALS IN THE COURSE OF ITS ACTIVITIES THUS ENSURING THE GENUINE ASPIRATION OF OPPRESSED AFGHAN NATION.

WOULD ALMIGHT Y ALLAH HELP THE STANDING COMMITTEE TO FOLLOW SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE HIS SATISFACTION.

ENDS.

MARSHALL

NNNN

CCNN LAST LINE PARA2 FIRST WORD SHOULD READ''WITHDRAW''
BLUR AFTER RAISE IN PARA 5 IS NOTHING

SENT/ RECD AT 22/1220Z PLF/JM

QSL AT 22/12245Z PDG

CONIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS GENEVA 221205Z JUNE
DESKBY FCO (221230Z)
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 294 OF 22 JUNE
AND TO IMMEDIATE VENICE (DESKBY 221230Z) (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KABUL
AND ISLAMABAD

MY TELSNO 291 AND 292 AND TELECON/RESIDENT CLERK:

AFGHANISTAN

1. PAKISTAN MISSION CONFIRM THAT THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE STANDING COMMITTEE IS UNCHANGED FROM TEXT IN MY SECOND TUR.

2. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE RESISANCE LEADERS.

3. AS YOU SEE THE MUJAHEDEEN STATEMENT IS WIDE RANGING AS WELL AS BEING COUCHED IN STRONG TERMS. AGHA SUAHI WAS ASKED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE WHY THE STANDING COMMITTEE HAD NOT INDICATED HOW FAR IT ENDORSED WHAT THE MUJAHEDEEN WERE SAYING. HE EXPLAINED IN REPLY THAT THIS WAS NOT THE TASK OF THE COMMITTEE. BUT CHATTI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD OBVIOUSLY TRANSMIT THE STATEMENT TO THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

4. I AM NOT CLEAR HOW FAR THERE WILL BE ANY SPECIFICALLY UNITED NATIONS FOLLOW UP IN GENEVA. IF THE IDEA OF A HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIAN LINES IS PICKED UP THE BALL COULD START ROLLING IN ECOSOC HERENEXT MONTH. MEANWHILE THERE WILL CLEARLY BE A BATTLE OF WITS IN NEW YORK WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THE LATEST SOVIET MOVE WITH THE FRENCH WILL BE A FACTOR. WE NEED TO USE THE OUTCOME OF THE MONT PELERIN MEETING TO BEST ADVANTAGE. YOU MAY ALREADY HAVE CONSIDERED ASKING THE ITALIANS TO ENSURE RAPID AND EFFECTIVE DISTRIBUTION OF THE VENICE COMMUNIQUE.

5. SEE MY IFT.

MARSHALL

Mr. Alexander

Mr Alexander
PS/PUS
PUS
Mr. Fenn
Sir R. Arculus

FOVIN2/22

OO VINICE

GRS 750

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 2200252 JUN 80
TO IMMEDIATE VENICE
TELEGRAM NO 46 OF 22 JUNE
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF RESIDENT CLEARK
WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS GENEVA

BEGINS
OTP
UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS GENEVA 212230Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 292 OF 21 JUNE

MY IPT: AFGHANISTAN

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT:-

BEGINS
THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, COMPRISING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, ESTABLISHED BY THE RESOLUTION OF THE 11TH SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TO SEEK WAYS AND MEANS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS IN AFGHAN-ISTAN, HELD ITS SECOND MEETING AT MONT PELERIN, SWITZERLAND, ON 20 AND 21 JUNE 1980.

2. PURSUANT TO ITS MANDATE IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED RESOLUTION TO SEEK WAYS AND MEANS, INCLUDING APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED. FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, THE STANDING COMMITTEE WELCOMED THE PARTICIPATION IN THE MEETING OF THE DELEGATION OF THE MUJAHEDEEN OF AFGHANISTAN.

3. THE STANDING COMMITTEE LISTENED WITH CARE AND ATTENTION TO IMPORTANT, WIDE RANGING AND INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS MADE AT THE MEETING BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MUJAHEDEEN. IT HEARD WITH DEEP CONCERN AND SYMPATHY, THE REPRESENTATIVES DESCRIPTION OF THE SUFFERINGS AND PLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE WITHIN AFGHANISTAN AND OF THEIR URGENT NEED FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY FOOD, MEQICAL AND OTHER AID WHICH IS URGENTLY NEEDED FOR THE SICK AND WOUNDED. TAFGHAN MUJAHEDEEN STRESSED THAT IN VIEW OF THE INCREASING HARDSHIPS AND DEPRIVATIONS OF EVEN BASIC NECCESSITIES OF LIFE, MATERIAL HELP FOR THEIR CAUSE WAS MORE URGENT THAN EVER. THEY CALLED FOR ADEQUATE AND TIMELY SUPPORT FROM THE MUSLIM WORLD AND ALL PEOPLES FOR THEIR JUST STRUGGLE.

4. THE COMMITTEE ASSURED THE MUJAHEDEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLITICAL AND MORAL SUPPORT OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AS PLEDGED IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFERENCE.

5. THE STANDING COMMITTEE NOTED WITH DEEP CONCERN THE WIDE-SPREAD SUFFERINGS INFLICTED ON THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE AGED, AND THE INCREASINGLY GRAVE SHORTAGES OF FOOD, CLOTHING, MEDICAL AID AND ESSENTIAL NECESSITIES OF LIFE CAUSED BY THE WHOLESALE DESTRUCTION OF ENTIRE VILLAGES AND CROPS, THE POISONING OF WATER SUPPLIES AND OTHER SUCH ACTIONS RESULTING FROM MILITARY ACTION BY FOREIGN FORCES.

6. THE STANDING COMMITTEE TOOK NOTE OF THE AFFIRMATION BY THE MUJAHEDEEN LEADERS OF THEIR DETERMINATION TOPER-SEVERE IN THE RESISTANCE AGAINST FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION AND OCCUPATION, UNTIL THE LIBERATION OF THEIR COUNTRY AND THE RESTORATION OF THE INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED STAUTUS OF

AFGHANISTAN IN THE COMITY OF NATIONS.

7. THE STANDING COMMITTEE EXPLAINED TO THE LEADERS OF THE MUJAHEDEEN THAT ITS MANDATE, AS PROVIDED UNDER THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE, IS TO EXPLORE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS WITHIN THE FRAME-WORK OF THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES: IE. THE IMMEDIATE TOTAL AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS STATION-ED ON THE TERRITORY OF AFGHANISTAN: RESPECT FOR THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS ISLAMIC IDENTITY: RESPECT FOR THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM, FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE OR COERCION: AND THE CREATION OF THE RIGHT CONDITIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT AN EARLY RETURN OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES TO THEIR OWN LAND IN SECURITY AND HONOUR. THE STANDING COMMITTEE ASSURED THE MUJAHEDEEN OF ITS SCRUPULOUS ADHERENCE TO THESE BASIC PRINCIPLES IN THE COMMITTEES SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS THROUGH CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

8. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MUJAHEDEEN EXPRESSED THEIR WILL-INGNESS TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE STANDING COMMITTEE STRICTLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED PRINCIPLES.

9. THE STANDING COMMITTEE NOTED WITH DEEP CONCERN THAT IN THE WAKE OF THE SOVIET UNIONS' MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHAN THE MILITARY AND NAVAL PRESENCE OF THE SUPER POWERS IN THE REGION OF THE SOUTH WEST ASIA AND IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS SHARPLY INCREASED, POSING A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.

10. THE STANDING COMMITTEE DECIDED, WHILE PURSUING A PEACE-FUL SOLUTION ALONG THE ABOVE MENTIONED LINES, TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MOBILIZE AND OBTAIN ALL POSSIBLE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE SUFFERING PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING THE SUPPLY OF FOOD, CLOTHING, MEDICAL AID AND OTHER NECESSITIES OF LIFE OF WHICH THEY ARE BEING DEPRIVED, AS ONE OF THE COSEQUENCE OF THE INTENSIFICATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS BY FOREIGN FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

11. THE STANDING COMMITTEE DECIDED TO MEET FROM TIME TO TIME IN THE PURSUIT OF A PEACEFUL AND HONOURABLE SOLUTION IN ACCORD-ANCE WITH THE TERMS OF ITS MANDATE. TO THIS END IT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED WILL ALSO ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE COMMITTEE.

12. THE COMMITTEE WILL SUBMIT A REPORT ON ITS ACTIVITIES TO THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MIN-ISTERS IN SEPTEMBER 1980.

13. THE STANDING COMMITTEE EXPRESSED ITS DEEP GRATITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SWISS CONFEDARATION FOR THE FACILITIES PROVIDED FOR THE HOLDING OF THE MEETING AT MONT PELERIN.

ENDS

2. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER IF NECESSARY.

3. SEE MIFT.

MARSHALL

NNNN

SSENT AT 00427Z RD

DE VENEZIA 80

Mr. Alexander

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS GENEVA 212200 Z JUNE

DESKBY FCO AND VENICE 22 0600Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 21 JUNE
AND TO IMMEDIATE VENICE (DESKBY 220600) FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

INFO PRIORITY BERNE, ISLAMABAD, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KABUL
AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 151: AFGHANISTAN

1. THE MEETING BETWEEN THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERS IS DUE TO END THIS EVENING. THE STANDING COMMITTEE WILL ISSUE A STATEMENT (PROVISIONAL TEXT, GIVEN TO ME IN CONFIDENCE BY MY PAKISTANI OPPOSITE NUMBER, MARKER, IN MY IFT TO FCO ONLY) LAYING EMPHASIS BOTH ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THE NEED FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ON ITS OWN INTENTION OF PURSUING ITS MANDATE BY MEETING FROM TIME TO TIME. IT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT QUOTE THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED UNQUOTE WOULD ENTER INTO CONSULTATION. AS YOU KNOW THE KABUL REGIME BOYCOTTED THE MEETING.

2. I SAW THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFLY THIS EVENING. HE GAVE ME HIS REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT GAILANI (SEE MY SECOND IFT, NOT TO ALL) HE LEAVES FOR PARIS AND NEW YORK TOMORROW, JUNE 22 WHERE HE WILL TAKE PART IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON JERUSALEM. HE REITERATED THE NEED FOR EUROPEAN SUPPORT AND EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCFEMEUVRABFLOEWHZ

ERATED THE NEED FOR EUROPEAN SUPPORT
AND EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCFELEUVRABFLOEWHZDAOTNOERVLOERATED THE NE
AND EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE AMERICANS WERE BEHIND THEIR ACTION. IT MUST BE A NON-ALIGNED INITIATIVE. THERE IS A CRITICAL REFERENCE IN THE STATEMENT TO THE QUOTE SHARP INCREASE UNQUOTE IN THE MILITARY AND NAVAL PRESENCE OF THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE REGION OF SOUTH WEST ASIA AND IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THIS POSED A THREAT TO THE SECURITY

OF TH COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, ESPECIALLY THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.

3. PUBLICITY, PLUS A POSSIBLE INCREASE IN THE COHESION OF THE RESISTANCE LEADERS, IS THUS THE MAIN OUTCOME OF THE MEETING.

4. THE RESISTANCE LEADERS ARE ALSO DUE TO ISSUE THEIR OWN STATEMENT. MARKER SAYS THAT IT WILL BE IN VERY STRONG TERMS. THE SWISS MEDIA HAVE ALREADY GIVEN THE MEETING EXTENSIVE COVERAGE. THE STANDING COMMITTEE HAD IN MIND THE VALUE OF GENEVA AS A MEANS OF MAINTAINING UNITED NATIONS CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE ISSUE

OF THE ISSUE

5. ACCORDING TO MARKER, WHO WILL BE GOING WITH AGKA SHAHI TO NEW YORK, PAKISTANI OBJECTIVES WITHIN THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMEPC WILL BE TWO FOLD. TO MOBILISE SUPPORT AMONG NON-ISLAMIC COUNTRIES. AND TO COUNTER CUBAN AND INDIAN TACTICS. THEY ARE SEEKING TO ENLIST THE HELP OF THE YUGOSLAVS THE IRANIANS ARE A DRAG ON THEIR WORK. CHATTI, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE APPARENTLY HAS THE TASK OF TRYING TO PURSUE CONTACT WITH THE KABUL REGIME.

6. SEE MIFT.

MARSHALL

NNNN

Afghanistan

GRS 480

CONFIDENTIAL

See over

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO 181930Z JUN 80
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 18 JUNE 1980,
INFO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, WARSAW.

VAN WELL'S VISIT TO MOSCOW AND SOVIET POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN.

1. AT THIS MORNING'S COUNCIL PAULS (FRG) GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF VAN WELL'S PREPARATORY TALKS WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MALTZEV AND WITH GROMYKO IN MOSCOW ON 12 JUNE.

2. VAN WELL HAD SAID TO MALTZEV THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT SHOULD BE SEEN AS PART OF THE SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD AGREED ON. THESE BECAME ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN DIFFICULT TIMES. THE CONTRACTUAL AND POLITICAL BASIS OF FRG/SOVIET RELATIONS AND BILATERAL RELATIONS MORE GENERALLY SHOULD BE COVERED DURING THE VISIT: BUT THE EMPHASIS WOULD BE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE GERMANS HAD IN MIND THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL CRISIS, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, CSCE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS AND THE NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM.

3. VAN WELL ALSO DISCUSSED WITH MALTZEV THE MODALITIES FOR SIGNING A LONG TERM PROGRAMME RELATED TO THE 1978 FRG-SOVIET COOPERATION AGREEMENT, AND WENT ON TO EMPHASISE THAT THE GERMANS HOPED THAT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE END OF SCHMIDT'S VISIT WOULD BE A SHORT ONE.

4. THESE LARGELY TECHNICAL EXCHANGES WITH MALTZEV WERE FOLLOWED BY HALF AN HOUR WITH GROMYKO WHO REFERRED POINTEDLY TO THE WISHES OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME TO THE VISIT. THE AGENDA ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE GERMANS WAS LARGELY ACCEPTABLE, BUT AFGHANISTAN SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME PIVOTAL TO THE TALKS. GROMYKO HOPED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE FINAL DOCUMENT AND SUGGESTED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD SUBMIT A DRAFT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

5. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION PAULS SAID THAT HE WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT BUT IMAGINED THAT FRG AND SOVIET DRAFTS FOR A COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE EXCHANGED IN ADVANCE OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT.

6. HARDY (CANADA) FOLLOWED WITH A STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN BASED ON A CONVERSATION OF 11 JUNE IN MOSCOW BETWEEN AMBASSADOR FORD AND A SOVIET OFFICIAL DESCRIBED BY FORD AS A RELIABLE INDICATOR OF TOP

/LEVEL

CONFIDENTIAL

LEVEL SOVIET POLITICAL ATTITUDES. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL HAD SAID THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECLARED AIM OF THE OLYMPIC BOYCOTT, TO QUOTE GET THE SOVIETS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN UNQUOTE, HAD NOT WORKED. FORD REPLIED THAT THIS WAS ONLY PART OF THE AIM: THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE BOYCOTT WAS A PROTEST AGAINST THE INADMISSABLE USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO TAKE OVER A NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL HEATEDLY REPLIED THAT CANADIAN POLICY SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS GOING TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN: QUOTE WE WILL NEVER LEAVE AND FURTHERMORE YOU AND THE REST OF THE WORLD WILL SOON ENOUGH COME TO ACCEPT IT UNQUOTE. FORD QUERIED QUOTE LIKE CZECHOSLOVAKIA ? UNQUOTE, TO WHICH THE ANSWER WAS QUOTE EXACTLY UNQUOTE.

7. I HAVE GIVEN THIS VERBATIM TO PRESERVE THE VIVIDNESS OF FORD'S ACCOUNT. FORD NOTED THAT THE STATEMENT CAME OUT SPONTANEOUSLY AND CATEGORICALLY. HE BELIEVES IT TO REFLECT THE BASIC BREZHNEV/GROMYKO VIEW.

8. COPIES OF PAULS' AND HARDY'S SPEAKING NOTES TO FOLLOW BY BAG TO FCO.

ROSE.

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Afghanistan cc MOD FCO JS

Subject filed on Pakistan : June 1980 : Visit of Pakistan Foreign Minister

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 June 1980

CALL BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF PAKISTAN

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Agha Shahi, called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. He was accompanied by the Pakistan Ambassador and by Mr. Riaz Pivacha. Mr. Blaker was also present.

After an exchange of courtesies, Mr. Agha Shahi described to the Prime Minister the background to the establishment of the Committee of Three by the Islamic Conference. He did so in terms very similar to those which he had used with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary earlier in the day. The Prime Minister said that the establishment of the Committee of Three had been an admirable initiative. The Soviet Government was sensitive to the pressure of world opinion. The Islamic Conference had done well to sustain this pressure, especially in the non-aligned movement. The conditions being laid down by the Soviet Government for a withdrawal from Afghanistan seemed impossible to meet. The position of a number of tribes across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan meant that the Soviet requirement for an end to "interference" was unrealistic. In the circumstances it was not easy to envisage a formula which would lead to a Soviet withdrawal.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Agha Shahi for his views on what sort of government the Afghans would choose if free to do so; whether they would ever learn to cooperate; and whether they would continue to resist the Russians. Mr. Agha Shahi said that there were some distinguished emigres, e.g. Dr. Yussuf, who might have a role to play. However, it was important not to focus too much attention on them for the moment. As regards the leaders of the Resistance, the Committee of Three were conferring political status on them by agreeing to meet them in Geneva. The Babrak Kamal regime would collapse as soon as the Soviet troops departed. Mr. Agha Shahi had made it plain to the Russians that he and his colleagues had no interest in promoting a government hostile to the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was clear that no purpose would be served by installing another puppet regime. If there was to be peace in Afghanistan, the

/new Prime Minister

new Prime Minister would have to be a man respected by the Afghans. Unfortunately, it looked as though the Soviet Government wished to prevent the Standing Committee from making progress. It seemed that they would prefer the Cubans or the Indians to be making the running.

As regards the ability of the Afghans to continue to fight against the Soviet troops, Mr. Agha Shahi said that they had kept the insurgency going for six months against all expectations. They had the will to go on doing so. However, they were suffering great hardship. The Soviet troops dominated the roads and were trying to starve the Afghan forces out of the hills. Moreover, the Afghans found it difficult to cope with the M24 helicopter. They needed anti-helicopter missiles. The Pakistan Government was being pressed to supply the Afghans with arms. However, Mr. Agha Shahi feared that if and when the insurgents succeeded in bringing down helicopters in large numbers, the Russians were likely to react against Pakistan. The position of the Pakistan Government would be impossible if the Russians, or a section of the Afghan army, were to seize a slice of Pakistan territory. Pakistan had no adequate defensive infrastructure in the west of the country.

Reverting to the general political situation, Mr. Agha Shahi said that Chancellor Kreisky, President Ceausescu and Chancellor Schmidt all backed the Islamic Conference initiative. If the Soviet Government were interested in withdrawal, there were real prospects that the Committee of Three would make progress. If, however, their objective was to seek a strategic advantage, then they would no doubt remain in Afghanistan, bringing in more troops if necessary. They would be well placed to act against Western interests in future. Pakistan's own position had been weakened, not only by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but also by the change of government in India. When Mr. Desai visited the Soviet Union in 1979 he had been asked to exert pressure against Pakistan in order to divert Pakistan attention from Afghanistan. Mr. Desai had refused, but Mrs. Gandhi was, of course, altogether more unpredictable. If the West were to try to match in Pakistan the massive arms deal which Mrs. Gandhi had just signed with the Soviet Union, they would have to supply equipment to the value of $6 to 8 billion. Mrs. Gandhi was undermining her country's status as a member of the non-aligned movement.

Mr. Agha Shahi said that it was against this background that he wished to convey to the Prime Minister his Government's modest requests for assistance from HMG. They hoped that they might be supplied with:- a few Sea King helicopters armed with Exocet missiles; night vision devices; laser range finders; mortar locating equipment; surface to surface missiles (equivalent to the American Harpoon missile); and a fleet oiler or destroyer tender. He hoped that the equipment could be provided on easy terms and with the

/earliest

earliest possible delivery date. Mr. Agha Shahi also said that his Government were worried about the Indian Jaguars. The Mirages which the Pakistan Air Force were at present operating were not good enough. But it might be that they would have to continue to make do with them. The Prime Minister said that she would ensure that the Pakistan Government's requests were looked into.

In the non-military field, Mr. Agha Shahi said that his Government would welcome help with building up the infrastructure in the west of the country, particularly the roads and other forms of communication. Finally, he hoped it might be possible for a British team of experts in local government to be sent to Pakistan. President Zia was anxious to devolve powers to the country's regions and districts. Before embarking on a programme, he wished to have the benefit of British advice and expertise. The Prime Minister said that we would do everything we could to help.

At the end of the discussion, the Prime Minister asked Mr. Agha Shahi about the present situation inside Pakistan. Mr. Agha Shahi said that there was a strong feeling that Pakistan was standing alone. If it was possible for the Pakistani Army to be reasonably well equipped, there would be a regrowth of confidence. If, however, the equipment was not forthcoming - and the armed forces had had no new equipment for many, many years - pessimism would take over and the national will to resist external pressure would weaken.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Original to Euro PD,
Cannot Mtg in Venice PR4.

UNCLASSIFIED
FM VENICE 131515Z JUNE
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO. 24 OF 13 JUNE 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MOSCOW ISLAMABAD DELHI TEHRAN JEDDA
ROUTINE TOKYO ALL EC POSTS UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK KABUL.

EUROPEAN COUNCIL VENICE 12/13 JUNE
AFGHANISTAN

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON AFGHANISTAN.

QUOTE.

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL HAS NOTED WITH DEEP CONCERN THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN.

THESE DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS INCREASE STILL FURTHER THE SUFFERINGS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THEY EMPHASISE THE GENUINELY NATIONAL NATURE OF THE RESISTANCE OFFERED BY AN ENTIRE PEOPLE. THEY THREATEN TO JEOPARDIZE THE CLIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FOR A LONG TIME TO COME.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WISHES TO REAFFIRM ITS CONVICTION THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO FIND WITHOUT DELAY THE MEANS OF REACHING A SOLUTION WHICH, IN KEEPING WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WOULD ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS AND THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE OF THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. IT REITERATED ITS VIEW THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND IN AN ARRANGMENT WHICH ALLOWED AFGHANISTAN TO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE COMPETITION AMONG THE POWERS AND TO RETURN TO ITS TRADITIONAL POSITION AS A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATE.

IT RECALLS THAT IT PROPOSED IN LUXEMBOURG, ON 28TH APRIL, THAT THE GREAT POWERS AND THE NEIGHBOURING STATES SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY COMMITMENTS TO THIS END: IN PARTICULAR, THEY SHOULD AGREE TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN, TO REFRAIN FROM ANY INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND RENOUNCE ANY STATIONING OF TROOPS ON ITS SOIL OR ANY FORM OF MILITARY ASSOCIATION WITH IT.

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL SHARES THE CONCERN EXPRESSED AND THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY THE 11TH CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ISLAMIC STATES ON THE CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAS NOTED WITH GREAT INTEREST THE CREATION BY THIS CONFERENCE OF A COMMITTEE TO SEEK WAYS AND MEANS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF THE GRAVE CRISIS IN RESPECT TO AFGHANISTAN.

THE COUNCIL REPEATED ITS READINESS TO SUPPORT ANY MEANINGFUL INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO PROMOTE A SOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS.

UNQUOTE.

EILBECK

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AFGHANISTAN

Prime Minister

MP 13/VI

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FM KABUL 120435Z
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 199 OF 12 JUNE 80.
AND TO ROUTINE NEW DELHI.

DELHI TELEGRAM NO 449 : AFGHANISTAN.

1. THIS TELEGRAM SHOULD NOT BE PASSED TO THE AMERICANS. NOR SHOULD ITS CONTENTS BE DISCUSSED WITH THEM.

2. ALL SUBSTANTIVE REPORTS FROM HERE ARE COPIED TO DELHI.

3. AMERICAN REPORTING FROM KABUL HAS CONTAINED EXAGGERATION AND FABRICATION OF WHICH I HAVE SPECIFIC AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. AMERICAN AND OTHER WESTERN JOURNALISTS WHO CAME TO KABUL IN JANUARY, SEVERAL OF WHOM ARE NOW IN DELHI, WERE OUTSPOKEN IN THEIR CRITICISM THEN OF AMERICAN EMBASSY BRIEFING WHICH THEY CONSIDERED AN ATTEMPT TO USE THEM IN A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE. THAT SAID, THE AMERICANS GET MORE INFORMATION FROM MORE SOURCES THAN ANY OTHER WESTERN MISSION : BUT THE ACCURACY OF IT IS ANOTHER MATTER.

4. I REPORTED HELICOPTER SORTIES INTO THE HILLS BEHIND PAGHMAN AND THE PRESENCE OF INSURGENTS THERE IN MY TELEGRAM NO 189 OF 2 JUNE. THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING VISIBLE OR AUDIBLE FROM KABUL TO SUBSTANTIATE REPORTS OF HEAVY CLASHES THERE. I WAS WITHIN 3/4 MILES OF PAGHAMAN ON 10 JUNE AND SAW AND HEARD NOTHING TO INDICATE FIGHTING.

5. IN KABUL IT IS THE INDIAN EMBASSY WHO HAVE, IN MY VIEW, THE BEST NETWORK OF RELIABLE SOURCES, INCLUDING CONSULATES IN KANDAHAR AND JALALABAD. IF BRITISH JOURNALISTS CAN FIND A WAY IN TO INDIAN REPORTING, THIS MIGHT BE MORE REWARDING.

HOWELL.

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PS/MR RIDLEY
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LORD N G-LENNOX
MR DONALD
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
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[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM VIENNA 1216OOZ JUN 8O
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 205 OF 12 JUNE
AND TO PRIOTIY ISLAMABAD, ROUTINE NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING KABUL

Prime Minister
Mr Shahi calls on you next week. Two relevant tels.
MAP 13/VI

VISIT BY PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER.

1. AGA SCHAHI MADE A SURPRISE VISIT TO VIENNA ON 11 JUNE. ON HIS EUROPEAN TOUR HE HAD ALSO SEEN CEAUSESCU IN BUCHAREST AND SCHMIDT IN BONN. IN VIENNA HE SAW KREISKY FOR A 40-MINUTE MEETING BEFORE THE CHANCELLOR LEFT FOR OSLO AND ALSO REIT-BAUER (PUS,MFA).

2. THE FOLLOWING DEBRIEFING HAS BEEN GIVEN TO US BY THE MFA IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT). SCHAHI SAID THAT THE REASON FOR HIS TOUR WAS TO EXPLAIN THE CURRENT THINKING OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN. THIS WAS BASED ON FOUR ELEMENTS:

(A) IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET OCCUPYING FORCES:
(B) RECOGNITION OF AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY:
(C) ANAFGHANISTAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH FREE AND QUOTE UNINFLUENCED UNQUOTE ELECTIONS:
(D) AFGHAN REFUGEES SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY.

3. SCHAHI LAID THE GREATEST EMPHASIS ON (A). HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC NATIONS FOR FAILING TO EXERT MORE PRESSURE ON THE USSR TO FORCE WITHDRAWAL. IF SUCH PRESSURE WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, HE FEARED THAT THE USSR WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEIR QUOTE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE UNQUOTE OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WOULD ANYWAY AT SOME STAGE BE NECESSARY: THE USSR WOULD BE UNABLE TOTALLY TO CONTROL AFGHANISTAN . THEY HAD BADLY MISINTERPRTED THE SCALE OF MILITARY RESISTANCE AND AFGAN NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS.

4. ON (C), THE PAKISTANIS HAD LEARNED FROM THE RUSSIANS THAT THE USSR WAS INCLINED TO WELCOME THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE'S INITIATIVE, BUT CONSIDERED ANY POLITICAL SOLUTIONS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT QUOTE EXISTING FACTS UNQUOTE- IE. THE PRESENCE OF KARMAL. HOWEVER, KARMAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE PAKISTANIS BECAUSE ANY RECOGNITION OF HIS POSITION WOULD CONSITUTE LEGITIMISATION OF THE SOVIET INVASION.: AND IN ANY CASE WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT HE HAD NO CHANCE OF RETAINING POWER. THE PAKISTANIS HAD IN MIND A GOVERNMENT OF QUOTE NATIONAL /RECONCILIATION

RECONCILIATION UNQUOTE . AFTER SUCH A GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, ALL AFGHAN AFFAIRS INCLUDING THE PROGRESS OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION SHOULD BE LEFT TOTALLY IN THE HANDS OF THE AFGHANS.

5. SCHAHI HAD BEEN OUTSPOKEN IN HIS CRITICISM OF CUBA'S ROLE. THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE DID NOT TRUST THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. CUBA, WHICH HAD QUOTE LOST ALL ITS CREDIBILITY UNQUOTE, WAS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. MALMIERCA'S MEDIATORY ACTIVITY
WAS QUOTE MEDDLING UNQUOTE. (THIS POINT WAS MADE TO REITHBAUER NOT, UNFORTUNATELY, TO KREISKY).

6. THE PAKISTANIS STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE OLYMPIC BOYCOTT. THIS WAS AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO DEMONSTRATE TO SOVIET PUBLIC OPINION WORLDWIDE DISPLEASURE. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE EUROPEANS ON THE BOYCOTT QUESTION.

7. IN RESPONSE TO AUSTRIAN QUESTIONS, THE PAKISTANIS HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHAT THEY DESCRIBED AS THE DERISORY US OFFER OF DOLLARS 200 MILLION MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE SCALE OF THIS AID, WHICH WOULD BE USED PURELY FOR PAKISTANI DEFENCE, WAS TOTALLY INSUFFICIENT IN ANY WAY TO ALTER THE CURRENT BALANCE OF POWER AWAY FROM THE SOVIETS IN THE REGION. SCHAHI CLAIMED THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE GIVING NO AID TO THE REBELS. (IN CONTRAST, GHOTZBADEH HAD TOLD KREISKY ON THE CHANCELLOR'S RECENT VISIT TO TEHERAN THAT THE IRANIANS WERE PROVIDING AID TO THE AFGHAN REBELS).

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO KABUL.

GORDON (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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INFO SAVING TO UKDEL OECD (PARIS TO PASS)

PAKISTAN AID CONSORTIUM MEETING

FOLLOWING FROM UK DELEGATION

1. THE MAIN FEATURE OF TODAY'S SESSION WAS A STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN DELEGATION EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RESCHEDULING OF PAKISTAN'S EXTERNAL DEBT BOTH OFFICIAL AND OFFICIALLY GUARANTEED, PROVIDED PAKISTAN FIRST INCLUDES AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF WHICH INVOLVES UPPER TRANCHE DRAWINGS. (TEXT IN MIFT). IT IS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE REFERENCE TO OFFICIALLY GUARANTEED DEBT REFERS TO AMERICAN PRIVATE DEBT GUARANTEED BY EXIM BANK, OR ONLY TO DEBT GUARANTEED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, PROBABLY THE LATTER.

2. HURRELL SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM VERY MUCH WELCOMED THIS ANNOUNCEMENT. HE NOTED THAT THIS DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN IN EXCEPTION TO THE US GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF RESCHEDULING ONLY IN CASES OF IMMINENT DEFAULT. HE HOPED THIS WOULD BREAK THE LOGJAM. OTHER DELEGATIONS ALSO WELCOMED THIS DECISION, WHILST AGREEING THAT RESCHEDULING SHOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON AN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF FOR A PROGRAMME OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. THE GERMANS ALSO ASKED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS COVER DEBTS TO ALL MAIN CREDITORS, NOT JUST THE CONSORTIUM COUNTRIES. DURING SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION THE IMF DELEGATION SAID THAT SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN COULD INVOLVE SUMS AS LARGE AS 1 BILLION SDR'S (APPROXIMATELY DOLLARS US 1.3 BILLION), WHICH AN EFF DRAWING COULD PROVIDE.

3. THE PAKISTANI DELEGATE WAS GLAD OF THIS CHANGE OF HEART ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABOUT A NEW

APPROACH TO THE FUND, HE WAS UNDERSTANDABLY NON COMMITTAL: HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN WOULD BE RECONSIDERING WHETHER AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE MADE. TALKS MIGHT BE HELD WITH THE IMF IN THE LATE SUMMER. AT PRESENT HIS FINANCE MINISTER FELT UNABLE, IN VIEW OF THE UNCERTAINTIES IN THE AREA SUCH AS THE INFLOW OF REFUGEES, TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO FULFIL COMPLETELY THE QUARTERLY TARGETS WHICH THE IMF MIGHT REQUIRE. BUT IF THERE COULD BE SOME FLEXIBILITY, AN AGREEMENT SEEMED FEASIBLE. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING TO BORROW FROM THE IBRD UNDER THE NEW STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LENDING FACILITY.

4. IT IS EXPECTED THAT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PAKISTAN MAKES AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF, THERE WILL BE A MEETING OF CREDITORS TO DISCUSS THE DEBT QUESTION AROUND THE END OF THE YEAR, BUT THIS DATE DEPENDS ON THE PROGRESS OF THE PROPOSED IMF TALKS. A PRELIMINARY MEETING TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE APPROPRIATE FORUM WILL BE HELD IN PARIS ON 3Ø JUNE, BEFORE THE SRI LANKA/INDIA CONSORTIUM MEETINGS.

5. SEE MIFT.

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 558 OF 5 JUNE 80
INFO KABUL, WASHINGTON, ISLAMABAD, JEDDA AND MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 553 : AFGHANISTAN.

1. WHEN I SAW QOTBZADEH ON 3 JUNE HE SPOKE WITH FEELING ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. WHATEVER THE ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE ON THEM: OTHERWISE IRAN WOULD CERTAINLY BE THE NEXT VICTIM. HE HOPED THE WEST WOULD NOT RELAX ON THIS ''EVER''. HE HAD DELIBERATELY RESISTED PROPOSALS TO WIDEN THE THREE-MAN CONTACT GROUP FORMED AT THE ISLAMABAD CONFERENCE TO INCLUDE SUCH ORGANISATIONS AND COUNTRIES AS THE PLO AND MOROCCO, BECAUSE ON THE ONE HAND IRAN AND PAKISTAN WERE THE NATURAL CHOICES, BEING NEIGHBOURS OF AFGHANISTAN, AND BECAUSE THE PLO AND SUCH COUNTRIES AS MOROCCO WOULD BE SEEN AS RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN PARTISANS RESPECTIVELY.

2. I REMARKED THAT THE LINES HE SEEMED TO BE WORKING ON SEEMED VERY CLOSE TO YOUR OWN IDEAS WHICH HAD BEEN APPROVED IN THE EC. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I WONDERED WHETHER HE WAS NOT RISKING RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S NORTHERN PROVINCES BY ADOPTING SUCH A FORTHRIGHT POSITION AND SPEAKING OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHANI INSURGENTS. QOTBZADEH SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD INTERFERE WHATEVER IRAN DID: IT WAS IN THE RUSSIANS' INTEREST TO KEEP IRAN WEAK SO THAT THEY COULD DOMINATE IT.

GRAHAM

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Original :
Dr Brown visit :
USA : May 1980

RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 2 JUNE 1980 AT 1630 HOURS

Present:

Afghanistan

Prime Minister	Dr. Harold Brown
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	HE Mr. Kingman Brewster
Defence Secretary	Mr. David McGiffert
Sir Robert Armstrong	General Carl Smith
Mr. R.L. Wade-Gery	Assistant Secretary of Defense Mr. T. Ross
Mr. C.A. Whitmore	
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union

Dr. Brown said that Afghanistan was so important not because it was vital territory from the point of view of the United States or its allies, but because of what it might portend for the future. There had been an impressive Soviet build up in global terms since 1970. Despite the good response by the Alliance which the 3 per cent per annum defence improvement programme represented, the Russians now regarded themselves as militarily equivalent to the West or even superior. They might well be tempted to seek advantages from this state of affairs and therefore to contemplate further operations of the Afghanistan type. Actual military invasions were perhaps unlikely. The greater danger was of the Russians using their military power as an instrument for political intimidation. They were already having some success in this respect in the Moslem world. The Prime Minister said that the British Government fully agreed. One major danger was that world opinion might simply come to accept the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The Soviet military build up was alarming not just in quantitative terms but also because of the great qualitative improvements which the Russians had been able to make. Dr. Brown said that one should not be too worried about improvements in the quality of Soviet equipment. Quantitatively the Russians had the advantage, as had always been the case. But in many areas the West still retained a big technological lead. On the other hand the Russians were helped by the fact that they tended to have two generations of military equipment for each single generation in the West. Moreover

the Warsaw Pact equipment was always interoperable.

The Prime Minister asked about Soviet chemical and bacteriological weapons. Dr. Brown said that it was not clear that the Russians had used nerve gas in Afghanistan although they might well have enabled the Vietnamese to do so in Kampuchea. More generally, however, the Soviet lead in chemical weapons was alarming. The Americans own capability was obsolete; and the Alliance would suffer a big penalty in any conflict if they were the only side which had to operate in protective clothing. As regards bacteriological weapons, his own opinion was that the recent accident in the Soviet Union had probably originated with anthrax bacteria stored for military purposes. There was a certain amount of circumstantial evidence of this, although nothing could be proved.

Responses to Afghanistan

a. Military. Dr. Brown said that the Americans would be able to stand up to the Russians in South West Asia. They would have to spend $30-40 billion or more over the next 5-6 years to improve their Rapid Deployment Forces. They would also be improving their forces in Europe and North East Asia, but not as rapidly as would otherwise have been the case. Hence the need for the Europeans and Japanese to contribute more in those areas. American public opinion was inclined to criticise the Allies for not doing enough. That was natural. European public opinion might well feel the same about the Americans. The Prime Minister said that Britain had no such feelings about the Americans. Dr. Brown acknowledged that Britain was a welcome exception in this respect.

b. Diego Garcia. Dr. Brown said that the United States Government needed very urgent permission from the British Government to indicate to Congress that the proposed American improvement plans for 1980 and 1981 were agreed between the two sides. The Prime Minister said that she was ready to give this permission. The British Government's attitude was that the security interests of the Americans were the same as the

/security

security interests of Britain and the West as a whole. For this reason the British Government were also well disposed towards the American proposals for more substantial expansion in Diego Garcia in 1982 - 1985. Negotiations on this subject should therefore proceed as planned. But it had to be recognised that the issue was already a very sensitive one in domestic and parliamentary terms in Britain, and that there would also be political problems vis-a-vis India and other countries in the area. The British Government's domestic problems over Diego Garcia were perhaps comparable to the United States Government's domestic political problems over the supply of weapons for the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was unhelpful in terms of the British domestic situation for too much emphasis to be placed on Diego Garcia by American spokesmen e.g. the remarks by Mr. Warren Christopher the previous week. Dr. Brown agreed that too much publicity had been given to the United States ships carrying military equipment, which in practice moved between many different locations; their crews were civilian and their presence certainly did not turn Diego Garcia into a military base. The Prime Minister asked when the Americans wished to announce agreement on the 1982-1985 expansion programme. Dr. Brown said that this would not be necessary before the autumn. Mr. McGiffert commented that it was almost certain to leak sooner. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the negotiations would need to cover not only the physical expansion of United States facilities, but also the arrangements for consultation on their use.

c. COCOM. Dr. Brown said that the Americans wished to see the controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union tightened in three respects. First, the exceptions procedure should be suspended; the Germans seemed likely to be co-operative on this, although the French were being more difficult. Second, there should be tighter restrictions on computer technology; this was an area where the Russians

/ were badly

were badly behind, in the military as well as the civilian field. Third, new restrictions should be imposed in the field of process controls; American business men would not like this, but the fact remained that improvements in Soviet steel production, for example, enabled the Russians to build more tanks. In general, it was important for Defence Ministries and Foreign Ministries to be involved in COCOM policy as well as Ministries of Commerce. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Britain agreed that the exceptions procedure should be suspended and would consider the other proposals. One difficulty might be if neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland were unwilling to co-operate. Japan might also be a problem. Dr. Brown thought that Japan would agree to suspend the exceptions procedure but might be more hesitant about controls on computer technology. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the United States would be raising COCOM matters at the NATO meeting in Ankara. Dr. Brown said that he would consult Mr. Muskie about that. He himself would certainly be raising the subject with Chancellor Schmidt in the near future. The Prime Minister asked whether the Americans agreed that the Russians should not be provided with oil exploration technology, despite the argument that this would bring the Soviet Union on to the world oil market. Dr. Brown said his own view, with which not all his colleagues agreed, was that the West should sell the Russians tools for oil exploration but not the technology for manufacturing such tools. This would enable the Russians to achieve higher production but would create a situation in which maintenance of that production would depend on continuing Western goodwill. He did not wish to increase the temptation for the Russians to intervene in the Middle East.

d. Other measures. Dr. Brown referred briefly to restrictions on grain exports. The Americans believed that they had prevented the Russians meeting about half their current shortfall of 17 million tonnes. This would be a serious blow. But it was unlikely that the same success could be achieved

next year when a better Soviet harvest was expected. As regards the Olympic Games, the boycott had clearly had some success. The United States Government understood that the British Government had done everything in their power to discourage British participation.

GLCM Basing

Answering a question from Dr. Brown the Prime Minister said that it would be politically impossible in Britain to have all the United States GLCMs based at Greenham Common. Hence the proposal for a second base, at Molesworth. The Defence Secretary said that the distribution between the two bases would probably need to be in the proportion of 6:4 rather than 7:3 as the Americans had proposed. The distribution should in any case not be made public. Dr. Brown said that the extra cost of having two bases rather than one would be $17 million non-recurrent and $3 million annually recurrent; or rather more if the distribution was 6:4 rather than 7:3. Since the argument for two bases was political rather than military, it would be very difficult to persuade Congress to approve this extra money. The Prime Minister said that the British Government welcomed the basing of United States GLCMs in Britain, which would be an important part of the defences of the free world, but they did not feel they could contribute to the cost of basing. Two bases would surely have military as well as political advantages over one base. It was in any case in American interests that political criticism in Britain should be minimised. The members of Congress, who were themselves politicians, could surely be persuaded to recognise a domestic political imperative. They should also be urged to bear in mind the rapidity with which, at a crucial moment, Britain had agreed to accept an extra flight of GLCMs and, more generally, the very large amounts of United States military equipment which Britain purchased.

Polaris Replacement (This part of the discussion has been recorded separately; the record has been retained by the Secretary of the Cabinet.)

Afghanistan

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(See over)

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 189 OF 2 JUNE 80.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK(DI4).

MY TELEGRAM NO 187 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.
POLITICAL.

1. BABRAK KARMAL GAVE AN EMOTIONAL SPEECH TO A MEETING OF THE DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATION OF AFGHAN YOUTH ON 29 MAY. HE ADMITTED THE MISTAKES MADE DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE REVOLUTION, MAINLY FROM A FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND AFGHAN SOCIETY, AND SAID THESE WOULD TAKE YEARS TO REMEDY : HE CALLED ON THE YOUTH TO TAKE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW, REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY.

2. MR SAMED AHMED, A DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER UNDER THE KING'S REGIME AND IMPRISONED IN PULE CHARKI FOR 13 MONTHS UNDER TARAKI/ AMIN, IS REPORTED AS MAKING A STATEMENT IN PESHAWAR DETAILING THE CRUELTIES PRACTISED IN PULE CHARKI AND IN PARTICULAR BY ASSADULLAH SARWARI, THEN HEAD OF THE SECURITY POLICE AND NOW DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.

3. AN EXHIBITION OF WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM INSURGENTS IS ON DISPLAY TODAY IN KABUL. THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE HAVE TELEPHONED TWICE WITH AN INVITATION TO ATTEND SO PRESUMABLY ANOTHER PROPAGANDA EXERCISE IS INTENDED.

4. A RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TEACHING LABORATORY HAS BEEN OPENED IN KABUL UNIVERSITY.

5. NO STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN HELD DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS.

INTERNAL SECURITY.

6. THERE HAS BEEN HEAVY AERIAL ACTIVITY OVER KABUL DURING THE LAST 3 DAYS, BOTH TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS. MEN AND MATERIALS HAVE BEEN OFFLOADED FROM THE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. SOME OF THE HELICOPTERS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN OPERATING SORTIES INTO THE HILLS BEHIND PAGHMAN, SOME 20 KMS OUT OF KABUL, AND VILLAGERS IN PAGHMAN REPORT INSURGENTS COMING DOWN INTO THE VILLAGE AT NIGHT SEEKING FOOD. THE AREA OF LOGAR/WARDAK HAS ALSO TAKEN BOMBARDMENT SINCE 29 MAY. THERE ARE REPORTS OF ATTEMPTS BY INSURGENTS TO INFILTRATE NUMBERS INTO KABUL FROM THESE AREAS BUT WITH ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS. THE INSURGENTS SCLAIM TO HAVE INFILTRATED 8000-10,000 TRAINED MEN INTO KABUL BUT THIS CLAIM IS LIKELY TO BE MUCH EXAGGERATED.

7. ONE RUMOUR WIDELY HEARD AND BELIEVED IS THAT EXECUTION SQUADS, WITH LISTS OF PARTY WORKERS, NOW OPERATE IN KABUL AND OTHER MAJOR TOWNS. WE HAVE ONE REPORT, FROM A GOOD SOURCE, OF 18 SUCH KILLINGS IN KABUL DURING 1-26 MAY. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTS DAILY KILLINGS IN DOUBLE FIGURES IN KANDAHAR, WITH NO POLICE FOLLOW-UP ACTION. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT KHALQ/

PARCHAM KILLINGS FORM PART OF THESE FIGURES. IN KANDAHAR, SHIA LEADERS ARE SEEN DISTRIBUTING LEAFLETS AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF KHOMEINI AND OF ASIF MOHSEINI (AN AFGHAN SHIA LEADER NOW OPERATING FROM TEHRAN). IN HERAT, MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE SARBILAND'S CONVOY WAS AMBUSHED SOME 10 DAYS AGO BETWEEN THE TOWN AND THE AIRPORT : HIS BROTHER WAS SHOT AND DIED ON 28 MAY IN KABUL. WE HAVE REPORTS OF FIGHTING NEAR JALALABAD FROM THE MIDDLE OF MAY AND OF A BOMB EXPLOSION IN A CINEMA IN JALALABAD ON 21 MAY, INDURING 30/40 PEOPLE. A NUMBER OF SCHOOL BUILDINGS HAVE BEEN BURNED DOWN : A TRAVELLER ON THE ROAD PULE KHUMRI TO KABUL REPORTS 8 OR 9. A BIG, MODERN HOSPITAL ON THE ROAD FROM KABUL TO THE LOGAR VALLEY HAS ALSO BEEN BURNED DOWN.

8. RUSSIAN CASUALTIES INCREASED CONSIDERABLY DURING MAY. ONE RELIABLE SOURCE INSIDE THE MAIN MILITARY HOSPITAL IN KABUL ESTIMATES ABOUT 600 RUSSIANS ADMISSIONS DURING MAY OF WHOM ABOUT 200 DIED. AN AVERAGE FIGURE OF ADMISSIONS FOR THE TOW PREVIOUS MONTHS IS ABOUT 150. FURTHER ADMISSIONS WILL HAVE BEEN MADE TO OTHER HOSPITALS.

9. THERE IS A RELIABLE REPORT THAT TWO BULGARIAN TRUCKS OPERATING ON THE ROAD BETWEEN HERAT AND THE IRAN BORDER WERE SHOT WITH BAZOOKAS AROUND 25 MAY AND BOTH DRIVERS KILLED. ALL INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT IS NOW SAID TO HAVE STOPPED ON THAT ROAD.

PRESS DISTRUBUTION.

10. ANY OF THE ABOVE COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR PRESS TREATMENT.

HOWELL.

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 187 OF 29 MAY 80.

INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (DI4).

MY TELEGRAM NO 184 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.

POLITICAL.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER DOST GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 27 MAY TO PROTEST AT AFGHANISTAN'S EXCLUSION FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND TO REJECT AS INVALID ANY DECISIONS OF THE CONFERENCE. (COPY OF STATEMENT AND ACCOMPANYING NOTES TO FCO BY BAG). DOST MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS :

A) THE RING-LEADERS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS BASED IN PAKISTAN AND IRAN COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. ''THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN ARE PARTICULARY OUTRAGED BY THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE HEAD OF THE IRANIAN DELEGATION WHO INCLUDED INTO HIS DELEGATION SOME OF THESE PEOPLE, THE PAID AGENTS OF IMPERIALISM AND REACTION''.

B) THE GOVERNMENT WAS STUDYING THE CONFERENCE IDEA OF A COMMITTEE ''FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ITS RELEVANCE TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC PROPOSALS WE MADE ON 14 MAY.'' ''WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE MERE FACT THAT, ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS, THAT COMMITTEE IS GOING TO CONSULT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA IS A RECOGNITION OF THE PLAIN FACT THAT IT IS OF NO AVAIL WITHOUT THE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA''.

C) THE GOVERNMENT ''CATEGORICALLY REJECTS'' ANY IDEA OF CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER UN OR OTHER AUSPICES.

2. STUDENT TROUBLES CONTINUE BUT IN A LOWER KEY. AT ONE SCHOOL ON 27 MAY THE PUPILS SMASHED THE WINDOWS AND TROOPS WERE CALLED TO SURROUND THE SCHOOL. THERE ARE REPORTS OF SEVERAL SCHOOLS IN THE PROVINCES, AND OF ONE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF KABUL, BEING BURNED DOWN. IN KABUL SOME PUPILS HAVE BEEN EXPELLED, OTHERS SUSPENDED, AND SOME TEACHERS ARRESTED, OTHERS DISMISSED.

3. THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE JAMIATUL ULAMA (RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS) HAS RETURNED FROM A VISIT AT THE INVITATION OF HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART TO THE CENTRES OF MUSLIM RELIGION IN THE USSR.

INTERNAL SECURITY.

/4.

4. ON THE ROAD FROM KANDAHAR TO HAZARAJAT, THE INSURGENTS HAVE SET UP ROAD TOLLS, THE CURRENT RATE BEING AFGHANIS 2000 (NEARLY £20) PER VEHICLE. FEW TRAVELLERS ARE SAID TO HAGGLE.
PRESS DISTRIBUTION.
5. ANY OF THE ABOVE COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR PRESS TREATMENT.

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Prime Minister

To see all this repeat of a Brezhnev speech

MP 29/5.

cc'd. Middle East Situation Pt 3.

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FM MOSCOW 2813Ø5Z MAY 8Ø
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 365 OF 28TH MAY
FOR INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, ROME, KABUL, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, ISLAMABAD, DELHI AND ADEN.

SOVIET POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. IN THE COURSE OF A SHORT SPEECH GIVEN YESTERDAY AT A DINNER FOR THE VISITING GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PDRY PARTY, ALI NASER MOHAMMED, BREZHNEV INCLUDED PASSAGES ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. THE SECTION ON AFGHANISTAN WAS COMPARATIVELY LENGTHY. WASHINGTON HAD USED AFGHANISTAN AS A PRETEXT TO JUSTIFY ITS OWN AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS. BUT NEITHER AFGHANISTAN NOR THOSE WHO WENT TO ITS ASSISTANCE HAD ATTACKED OR THREATENED ANYONE. SIMILARLY ETHIOPIA HAD NOT TROUBLED ANYONE BEFORE EXTERNAL FORCES BACKED BY THE WEST HAD DESCENDED UPON HER.., AND ANGOLA HAD NOT

BY THE WEST HAD DESCENDED UPON HER... AND ANGOLA HAD NOT ATTACKED ANYONE BUT BEEN ATTACKED BY BANDS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES AND MERCENARIES EQUIPPED BY NATO. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT REMAINED DEAF TO THE AFGHAN REQUEST FOR HELP, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE ACTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN'S ENEMIES '' PRESENTED A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF OUR SOUTHERN BORDER''. THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED ABOVE ALL THE REMOVAL OF THE REASONS WHICH HAD MADE IT NECESSARY. ''A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS QUITE POSSIBLE. ITS ESSENCE IS A GUARANTEED ENDING OF ARMED INCURSION INTO AFGHANISTAN BY THE FORCES OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION FROM THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBOURING STATES.''

3. BREZHNEV DESCRIBED THE PROGRAMME PUT FORWARD BY THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AS ''SOLID PROPOSALS'' WHICH THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPTED AND SUPPORTED. THE FIRST MOVE WAS NOW UP TO AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBOURS, ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN. ''THE QUESTION OF THE TIMESCALE FOR BEGINNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHAN TERRITORY AND OF FURTHER STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION COULD BE DECIDED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE APPROPIATE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF THE ENDING AND NON-RESUMPTION OF ALL FORMS OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. IT WOULD ALSO, OF COURSE, BE DECIDED IN AGREEMENT WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT.''

4. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BREZHNEV ARGUED THAT THE CAMP DAVID POLICY HAD NOW CLEARLY REACHED AN IMPASSE AND THE THE US WAS PROCEEDING TO AN OPEN ASSERTION OF ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND THE SURROUNDING REGIONS OF ASIA AND AFRICA. THIS, AND ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION AGAINST THE LEBANON, HAD CREATED A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND CONTIGUOUS COUNTRIES. IT WAS TIME TO RETURN THE QUESTION OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT TO THE ''ONLY CORRECT CHANNEL'' WITH THE COLLECTIVE EFFORTS OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES INCLUDING THE PLO.

F C O PSE PASS TO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS,

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 134 OF 27 MAY 80.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND MODUK (DI4).

MY TELEGRAM NO 132 : AFGHANISTAN : SITREP.

POLITICAL.

1. MUCH IS BEING MADE OF THE FIRST DRA TEACHERS' CONGRESS WHICH WAS HELD IN KABUL 24-26 MAY. DELEGATIONS FROM 13 SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, MOSTLY LED BY DEPUTY MINISTERS OF EDUCATION, ARE PARTICIPATING. BABRAK'S OPENING ADDRESS STRESSED THE SOCIAL AS WELL AS EDUCATIONAL ROLE THE REFORMED EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM MUST PLAY IN THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY : IN HIS INTRODUCTORY SECTION HE DISMISSED INSURGENT GROUPS OUTSIDE AFGHANISTAN AS OF NO RELEVANCE AND THANKED ''REAL'' MOSLEM NATIONS SUCH AS LIBYA, SYRIA, ALGERIA, YEMEN AND PLO FOR THEIR SUPPORT AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

2. RUMBLINGS OF STUDENT DISCONTENT CONTINUE DAILY. A NUMBER OF STUDENTS AND SOME TEACHERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED. ATTEMPTS AT ARREST IN KABUL UNIVERSITY ON 24 MAY LED TO FURTHER CLASHES. THERE ARE SEVERAL REPORTS, ONE OR TWO RELIABLE, THAT UP TO SEVEN DEATHS RESULTED FROM THE TROUBLES ON 21 AND 22 MAY. SOME GIRLS' SECONDARY SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR A DAY BUT TROUBLE RESTARTS WHEN THEY REOPEN. AT ONE SCHOOL THE GIRLS HAVE BURNED ALL THE SCHOOL RECORDS AND REPORTS ETC. THE AUTHORITIES SEEM AT A LOSS TO KNOW HOW TO HANDLE THE STUDENTS, AND THE POLICE AND SOLDIERS ARE SHOCKED TO THEIR CHAUVINISTIC CORE BY THE OUTRAGEOUS INSULTS THESE NORMALLY DEMURE GIRLS SCREAM AT THEM. BABRAK HAS BEEN HERE FEFORE AS HE WAS OFTEN THE ORGANISER OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE RULES OF THE KING AND OF DAOUD AND THEN BITTERLY ATTACKED REPRESSION OF THE STUDENTS. I HAVE NOT SEEN ANY RUSSIAN TROOPS INVOLVED IN ANY OF THESE DEMONSTRATIONS.

3. CONSUMER GOODS SUPPLIED AS GIFTS BY THE USSR ARE BEING DISTRIBUTED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF KABUL AS WELL AS IN THE PROVINCES. RECEIPIENTS ARE PHOTOGRAPHED LOOKING SUITABLY GRATEFUL.

INTERNAL SECURITY.

4. REPORTS FROM THE WESTERN TOWNS OF HERAT AND KANDAHAR ADD TO THE PICTURE OF A DETERIORATING LAW AND ORDER SITUATION. THE INSURGENTS HAVE MOVED INTO THESE TOWNS AND WITH A MIXTURE OF ASSASSINATION OF LEADING GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS AND THREATS TO GOVERNMENT SERVANTS ARE DISRUPTING MANY ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS. IN BAMIYAN THE GOVERNOR AND SEVERAL OF HIS SUPPORTERS HAVE BEEN KILLED. FOUR DAYS AGO IN CHARIKAR A LEADING PARCHAMIST WHO WAS HEADMASTER OF ONE OF THE LOCAL SCHOOLS, WAS KILLED WITH HIS FAMILY. THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AT KABUL UNIVERSITY WHO HAD KILLED A GIRL STUDENT WHO HAD GOT HOLD OF A SUB-MACHINE GUN, WAS HIMSELF EXECUTED IN HIS HOUSE. THE INFLUENCE OF THE INSURGENTS SEEMS HIGHER THAN EVER BEFORE IN TOWNS AS WELL AS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

5. TWO OF THE RUSSIAN UNITS WHICH HAD BEEN STATIONED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF KABUL, AT KARGHA AND BEYOND THE BALA HISSAR, HAVE BEEN MOVED, HOPEFULLY NOT TOO FAR.

PRESS DISTRIBUTION.

6. ANY OF THE ABOVE COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR PRESS TREATMENT.

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Prime Minister

To glance at whole tel.

MAY 28th

MY TEL NO. 668

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

1. DISCUSSIONS WITH SOME OF THE FRIENDLY PARTICIPANTS HAVE ADDED SOME FURTHER DETAILS AND IMPRESSIONS. THE VARIOUS PALESTINE RESOLUTIONS, TRADITIONALLY TAKEN AS THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA, WENT THROUGH WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. THE IRANIAN RESOLUTION ALSO WENT THROUGH UNANIMOUSLY. A CERAIN AMOUNT OF WORK HAD TO BE DONE ON QOTBZADEH TO GET HIM TO ACCEPT THE REFERENCE TO THE HOSTAGES, BUT THE TONE OF THE DEBATE HAD BEEN SO ANTI-AMERICAN (THERE HAD BEEN ONLY ABOUT FIVE SPEECHES CRITICAL OF IRAN AS OPPOSED TO ABOUT TWELVE IN JANUARY) AND QOTBZADEH HAD SUCCEEDED IN PLAYING SUCH A PROMINENT ROLE ON THE AFGHAN QUESTION THAT HE WAS IN A MELLOW MOOD. NONE OF MY CONTACTS KNOWS OF ANY MOVES BEHIND THE SCENES TO EXERT FURTHER PRESSURE ON IRAN AND I SUSPECT THAT THERE WERE NONE SINCE IN THE PREVAILING ATMOSPHERE TO GET A MENTION OF THE HOSTAGES AT ALL WAS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT.

2. THE AFGHANISTAN RESOLUTION PRESENTED THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY. EVERYONE, INCLUDING THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT, WAS PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE RENEWED CONDEMNATION OF THE RUSSIANS AND THE MAIN DEBATE WAS OVER THE COMPOSITION OF THE FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE. THE SAUDIS LOBBIED STRONGLY TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS UNFAIR TO LEAVE THE MAIN BURDEN FOR DEALING WITH THE AFGHAN PROBLEM ON PAKISTAN AND GOT MOROCCO TO PROPOSE A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF THE NEIGHBOURS AND MUSLIM REPRESENTATIVES FROM ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA (AT ONE STAGE THIS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN EXPANDED INTO A PROPOSAL FOR A 12 MEMBER COMMITTEE). IT WAS NOT SO MUCH THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT WHO SABOTAGED THIS AS THE REFUSAL OF IRAN TO HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH MOROCCO A MOROCCAN PROPOSAL AND THE DISINCLINATION OF A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, E.G. BANGLADESH AND JORDAN, TO GET MIXED UP IN THE PROBLEM. SO THE 3-MAN COMMITTEE EMERGED AS A COMPROMISE. ONE OF MY CONTACTS SAYS THAT IT WAS ENVISAGED THAT IF THE 3-MAN COMMITTEE, WHICH WAS SPECIFICALLY EMPOWERED TO TALK TO BABRAK KARMAL BUT ONLY AS ONE OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND ON A PAR WITH THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS, GOT NOWHERE, THEN THE MATTER WOULD BE RAISED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PERHAPS PRECEDED BY ANOTHE EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. OTHER CONTACTS HAD NOT HEARD OF THIS SCENARIO, WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN AGREED BY A SMALLER GROUP BEHIND THE SCENES, BUT THERE IS A REFERENCE TO A INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN THE FINAL RESOLUTION.

3. ALL AGREE THAT QOTBZADEH'S ROLE IN CREATING IN PUBLIC AN EMOTIONAL ANTI-RUSSIAN ATMOSPHERE WAS A GREAT HELP AND PUT THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT ON THE DEFENSIVE THROUGHOUT: THEIR OPPOSITION WAS MORE MUTED THAN EXPECTED.

4. MY CONTACTS STRESS TWO MAJOR AND DISQUIETING IMPRESSIONS THEY RECEIVED FROM THE CONFERENCE:-

(I) THE STRENGTH OF THE ANTI-AMERICAN AND ANTI-WESTERN FEELING WHICH RAN THROUGH ALL THE DEBATES. THIS WAS NOT ENTIRELY DUE TO THE AMERICAN ACTION IN IRAN BUT SPRINGS MAINLY FROM FRUSTRATION OVER PALESTINE AND ANGER AT THE AMERICAN HANDLING TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION. THE WEST IN GENERAL AS THE ALLIES OF THE US NOW SHARES THIS OPPROBRIUM AND THIS MADE IT UNPROFITABLE TO INTRODUCE ANY SCHEME, LIKE OUR NEUTRALITY PROPOSALS, WHICH WAS KNOWN TO HAVE A WESTERN BLESSING OR ORIGIN.

(II) THE WANING ENTHUSIASM FOR HELPING PAKISTAN OVER AFGHANISTAN. THE EMOTIONS OF LAST JANUARY HAVE DIED AWAY, OTHER PROBLEMS LIKE IRAN HAVE COME TO THE FORE AND THERE IS A GROWING TENDENCY FOR MANY COUNTRIES NOT TO WANT TO GET MIXED UP WITH A DANGEROUS GREAT POWER ISSUE AND TO BE CONTENT TO LEAVE IT TO PAKISTAN AND IRAN AS THE COUNTRIES MOST CONCERNED TO MAKE THE BEST OF IT.

5. DESPITE THIS, THE INITIAL REACTION OF THE PAKISTANIS IS RELIEF AND SATISFACTION THAT THE CONFERENCE KEPT AFGHANISTAN IN THE FOREFRONT AND RENEWED THE CONDEMNATION OF THE RUSSIANS: IT ALL WENT OFF VERY MUCH BETTER THAN THEY HAD FEARED. BUT THEY HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH SOMETHING VERY CLOSE TO THE RUSSIAN/AFGHAN PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY IF, AS THE RUSSIANS HERE ARE PUTTING ABOUT, MOSCOW REFUSES TO RECEIVE THE COMMITTEE UNTIL THEY HAVE HAD TALKS WITH BABRAK KARMAL. IT WILL BE A DIFFICULT HAND FOR AGHA SHAHI TO PLAY, PARTICULARLY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH QOTBZADEH. THE PRESENT PROPOSAL IS THAT THE COMMITTEE SHOULD MEET PROBABLY IN TEHRAN WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO CONSIDER HOW TO PROCEED. THE PAKISTAN CABINET HAS HAD LONG SESSIONS ALREADY ON THE QUESTION AND I WILL TRY TO GET A READING OF THEIR VIEWS OVER THE NEXT DAY OR SO.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.

FORSTER

[REPETITION TO TEHRAN REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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No 10.

Mr Lyne
Private Office

/ 1. I attach a letter from President Zia of Pakistan to the Prime Minister. I would be grateful if you could pass it on to the Private Secretary. The text of the letter has already been transmitted by telegram.

Gordon Thom
G Thom
South Asian Department

22 May 1980

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FROM DELHI 200755Z MAY
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 403 OF 20 MAY 1980
INFO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, KABUL, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

MY TWO IPTS: AFGHANISTAN, INTERNAL SITUATION

1. I ALSO SPOKE LAST NIGHT TO GRIFFEN, THE NO 2 AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN KABUL, WHO COMES DOWN HERE PERIODICALLY FOR R AND R. MUCH OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY IS NO DOUBT KNOWN TO YOUR FROM KABUL AND WASHINGTON, BUT HE WAS EMPHATIC THAT BOTH THE RUSSIANS AND THE AFGHAN REGIME HAD BEEN COMING UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES ON THE GROUND. FAR FROM THE EXPECTED RUSSIAN SPRING OFFENSIVE HAVING MATERIALISED, THERE HAD BEEN WHAT WAS IN EFFECT A REBEL SPRING OFFENSIVE. HIS EMBASSY DID NOT NOW BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP A GRIP ON THE SITUATION WITHOUT BRINGING IN SUBSTANTIAL REINFORCEMENTS.

2. SPECIFICALLY N:-

(A) HERAT (WHERE HE CLAIMED THAT THE EMBASSY HAD A GOOD SOURCE) HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY REBELS ON 23 APRIL AND PARTS OF IT HAD BEEN HELD BY THE INTERMITTENTLY EVER SINCE (BUT SEE KABUL TUR). THEY HAD ESTABLISHED A SECURE LINE OF COMMUNICATION TO THE IRANIAN FRONTIER:

(B) A RUSSIAN ATTACK IN THE PANSHIR VALLEY HAD BEEN DRIVEN BACK WITH LOSSES, THE REBELS APPARENTLY POSSESSING SOME FORM OF ANTI-TANK WEAPON, POSSIBLY BAZOOKAS:

(C) THERE HAD BEEN HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE GHAZNI/WARDAK AREA AND THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE HEADWAY IN A DRIVE TOWARDS THE CENTRE OF THE COUNTRY. THERE HAD BEEN VARIOUS REPORTS INDICATING THAT A LARGE CONVOY HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY AMBUSHED ON THE KABUL/KANDAHAR ROAD, WITH THE CAPTURE OF FOOD, ARMS AND AMMUNITION:

(D) IN JALALABAD, AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN THE REGIME AND THE REBELS WHEREBY THE REBELS KEPT AWAY FROM THE TOWN AND THE REGIME'S TROOPS KEPT OUT OF THE COUNTRYSIDE:

(E) THERE HAD BEEN SOME RECENT HEAVY FIGHTING AT BAGRAM, POSSIBLY INSTIGATED BY DEFECTING AFGHAN TROOPS:

(F) DEFECTIONS IN THE AFGHAN ARMY WERE CONTINUING:

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(G) THE RUSSIANS WERE HEAVELY ENTRENCHED AROUND KABUL, BUT THERE WAS PERIODIC FIGHTING IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD. HE PERSONALLY HAD SEEN HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS UNDERTAKING SORTIES OUT OF KABUL AIRPORT OF NOT LONGER THAN HALF-AN-HOUR'S DURATION:

(H) BRIDGES HAD BEEN DESTROYED ON THE KABUL KANDAHAR AND HERAT/ KANDAHAR ROADS.

(I) A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE RUSSIANS WAS THE SUPPLY OF WHEAT, WHICH WAS HAVING TO BE BROUGHT IN BY LORRY. HE ESTIMATED THE ANNUAL NEEDS FOR THE RUSSIAN TROOPS AND THE AFGHAN TOWNS TO BE OF THE ORDER OF HALF A MILLION TONS. HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE SUPPLY PROBLEM GENERALLY WAS A MAJOR AND COSTLY HEADACHE FOR THE RUSSIANS.

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AFGHANISTAN

Record of a conversation between the PM and the Sec-General of the United Nations at 10 Downing Street on Tuesday 20 May 1980 at 1630 hrs.

Visit of Sec-General

Afghanistan

9. The Prime Minister said the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thought the Russians might be looking for a way out, possibly seeking to withdraw their troops, provided they could leave behind a regime which would be their puppet. She took the more cynical view that the Russians would remain for a very long time. They were bringing in their families. All their activity was designed to get us to accept the present situation. They disliked criticism, however: we should continue to stress with the non-aligned that the Afghan people had the right to choose their own destiny but that they would never be allowed to do so by the Russians. The best hope was that Afhanistan might become another Finland, not that they had very much in common historically. The Chinese were glad to think that the Russians were bleeding to death in Afghanistan and Cambodia: these great haemorrhages might suit China, but we took a different view. The Russians wanted us to go to Madrid; if we did, she would want to be pretty outspoken.

10. Sir A. Acland suggested that the new proposals did not represent anything very new. They talked about the frontiers with Pakistan and Iran, but said nothing about the Afghan/Soviet or Chinese frontiers. Sir D. Maitland thought it was astute of the Russians to suggest that they would get out if only the Afghan/Pakistan frontier could be controlled: neither Britain nor Pakistan had ever been able to control the mountainous tribal area, where people could come and go. There had been a disquieting reference in Mr. Gromyko's talk with Lord Carrington in Vienna to the social changes that would be needed in Afghanistan, but there were some points on which it was worth seeking clarification. We should maintain the pressure, but ask some questions. The Prime Minister said we could test the seriousness of the Soviet position by asking if they were ready to name a date for withdrawal. Sir A. Acland suggested the answer might be that certain conditions must be fulfilled first. The Prime Minister noted that the Russians had annexed one state about every 10 years; more frequently if you counted those taken over by proxy. It was only a question of time before they marched into another.

/Dr. Waldheim

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11. Dr. Waldheim shared the Prime Minister's view. He was convinced the Russians would not leave so long as there was no solid Afghan Government to support their policy. The occupation was a firm decision of the Politburo, as had been the invasion of Czechoslovakia. When he had asked Mr. Gromyko to explain the latest proposals, Mr. Gromyko had said there were 1/2 million Afghans in Pakistan supported by the Western powers and that so long as this new aggression was being prepared, there was no reason for the Russians to withdraw. The Prime Minister thought it an astounding proposition that Afghans could not return to Afghanistan, except for those of whom Mr. Gromyko approved. She was disturbed that the action being taken was largely confined to diplomacy. The Germans and French were keeping up their trade contacts. Despite American efforts on wheat, this was still getting through to the Soviet Union. The UK had not had much success in reducing the supply of technology. The Olympics would not be real but, apart from words and condemnation in the UN, little else had been done. The Russians must be seen to be isolated. If people said we must talk, the last card would have gone. Dr. Waldheim was encouraged by developments at the UN on both Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The non-aligned, under Yugoslav leadership, had switched positions. The Prime Minister said this was the most important thing which had happened. Cuba's chairmanship of the non-aligned movement had been wholly frustrated, nowhere more so than at the UN. This should be kept up. The picture would change if nothing was done and Afghanistan and Pakistan were allowed to fall.

/Middle East

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
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SIR A ACLAND
~~MR CONNELL~~
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
MR BULLARD

MR P H MOBERLY
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AND KABUL

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY:

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR GROMYKO

1. LORD CARRINGTON MET MR GROMYKO FOR JUST OVER AN HOUR THIS M MORNING. HE BEGAN BY ASKING GROMYKO ABOUT SOVIET IDEAS ON CSCE AND THE MADRID MEETING. THE SOVIET UNION HAD PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS ON CBM'S AND DISARMAMENT WHICH WERE NOT DISSIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE FRENCH. PERHAPS WE COULD ALL MAKE A STEP FORWARD ON THIS BASIS, THOUGH PROGRESS WOULD ALSO BE NEEDED ON OTHER BASKETS. HE AGREED WITH THE SOVIET VIEW THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED AT MADRID UNLESS SOMETHING USEFUL SEEMED LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING. GROMYKO SAID THAT MADRID MUST BE WELL PREPARED, AND HELD IN A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT WOULD GIVE AS GOOD

MUST BE WELL PREPARED, AND HELD IN A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT WOULD GIVE AS GOOD AS SHE GOT IF OTHERS USED THE MEETING FOR DEMAGOGIC DECLARATIONS, AS HAD HAPPENED IN BELGRADE. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED AM

WHAT IT CALLED A CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT, BUT COULD CONCEIVE OF A TWO STAGE MEETING, THE FIRST ON CBM'S AND MILITARY DETENTE AND THE SECOND ON DISARMAMENT. MADRID MIGHT GIVE LIFE TO THIS IDEA, THOUGH HE DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOMETHING CONCRETE BEING PUT FORWARD AT MADRID ITSELF. IF NOT, A MANDATE COULD BE GIVEN BY THE MADRID MEETING TO AN ENSUING CONFERENCE. SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD INJECT SOME WARM AIR INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE.

2. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT MADRID WOULD BE LESS WARM IF A SOLUTION WERE NOT FOUND OVER AFGHANISTAN. THE HISTORICAL BACK-GROUND SHOWED THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS A NATURAL BUFFER STATE, AND THAT THE ONLY ANSWER TO THAT COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS WAS TO ENSURE THAT NO POWER EXERCISED INFLUENCE THERE TO THE DETRIMENT OF OTHERS. BUT THERE WAS NOW A REVIVAL OF FEARS IN THE WEST AND ESPECIALLY THE US (BRITAIN WAS SELF SUFFICIENT) ABOUT OILD AND THE GULF. HENCE OUR PROPOSALS FOR A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN BADLY RECEIVED IN THE THIRD WORLD. WE HAD ALSO LOOKED CAREFULLY AT THE RECENT AFGHAN PROPOSALS TO SEE WHETHER THEY COULD BE BUILT ON. THERE SEEMED TO BE A GERM OF AN IDEA IN ALL THIS. A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WITH GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE, MIGHT SUIT BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST.

3. GROMYKO DISMISSED WESTERN OPEN QUOTES PROPAGANDA CLOSE QUOTES OVER SOVIET AMBITIONS IN OIL PRODUCING AREAS AS OPEN QUOTES SHEER NONSENSE CLOSE QUOTES. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO INTENTION OF AFFECTING THE OIL INTERESTS TO THE US, BRITAIN OR ANYONE ELSE IN THAT AREA, THOUGH EVERYONE WAS ENTITLED TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO SEE IRAN AS ANINDEPENDENT STATE. IF BRITISH NEUTRALITY PROPOSALS MEANT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN ,(AND THERE SEEMED TO BE A STRONG DOSE OF THIS IN THEM) THEY WERE UNACCEPTABLE .BUT IF WE MEANT RESPECT FOR THE PRESENT INDEPENDENT REGIME , THAT WAS A DIFFERENT MATTER.

4. LORD CARRINGTON WELCOMED AND TOOK NOTE OF GROMYKO'S ASSURANCES ON THE GULF AREA. YET THE SCALE OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN HAD AROUSED CONCERN. GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER WE ACCEPTED THE PRESENT AFGHAN LEADERSHIP, OR WHETHER WE WANTED TO CHANGE IT? LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT THE BABRAK REGIME ONLY EXISTED BECAUSE OF SOVIET SUPPORT. IF IT WERE SHOWN THAT THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES WANTED IT, THAT WAS FINE, THOUGH A MILLION REFUGEES SEEMED TO HAVE VOTED WITH THEIR FEET. GROMYKO SAID THAT WE COULD BELIEVE WHAT WE WANTED BUT WHAT

THOUGH A MILLION REFUGEES SEEMED TO HAVE VOTED WITH THEIR FEET. GROMYKO SAID THAT WE COULD BELIEVE WHAT WE WANTED . BUT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS AGREEMENT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WITH APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES ON NON-INTERFERENCE. THIS WOULD CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS. WE WOULD THEN SEE THAT THE AFGHANS COULD MANAGE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. HE DENIED CATEGORICALLY THAT SOVIET TROOPS WERE FIGHTING IN AFGH

THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. HE DENIED CATEGORICALLY THAT SOVIET TROOPS WERE FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN, OR INTERFERING THERE IN ANY WAY. BUT THERE MUST BE POLITICAL GUARANTEES ON NON INTERVENTION BEFORE THEY COULD BE WITHDRAWN. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT ALL OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE MUST STOP. BUT AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW TROOPS MUST BE REACHED AT THE SAME TIME. WE WOULD OBJECT TO CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE CONTINUED.

5. GROMYKO REPEATED THAT THERE MUST BE PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN, AND ALSO BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN (THOUGH THERE WERE LESS ARMED INTRUSIONS FROM IRAN) ON THE CESSATION OF ALL INTERFERENCE. SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST HAVE THE APPROPRIATE POLITICAL GUARANTEES. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT OPPOSED TO OTHER STATES TAKING PART IN SUCH GUARANTEES, IF THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED CONSIDERED THIS NECESSARY. HE KNEW THE PAKISTANIS HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR FRONTIER WITH AFGHANISTAN, AND THIS PROBLEM MUST ALSO BE RESOLVED. WE MUST GET IT INTO OUR HEADS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DEFINITELY WITHDRAW ONCE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD HOWEVER BE A PROCESS IN ITSELF, AND COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED AS QUICKLY AS THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. BUT THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL TOO WAS OPEN TO NEGOTIATION, AND COULD BE RAISED BY PAKISTAN IN TALKS WITH AFGHANISTAN. A NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN WOULD SUIT THE SOVIET UNION. MUSKIE HAD NOT OBJECTED TO IT, AND IT SHOULD SUIT US TOO. WE SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE PAKISTAN LEADERSHIP THE NEED FOR TALKS WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THERE WAS NO WAY TO SETTLE THE SITUATION IN THE REGION WITHOUT SUCH DISCUSSIONS.

6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT A GUARANTEE OF NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS HAD TO GO HAND IN HAND . IT MIGHT TAKE TIME TO WITHDRAW , BUT THE DECISION TO DO SO COULD BE TAKEN IN A FEW SECONDS. SOME PEOPLE MIGHT BE SUSPICIOUS IF THERE WERE A DELAY BETWEEN THE SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THE AFGHANS MUST BE ALLOWED TO DECIDE WHO THEY WANTED TO GOVERN THEM AND THERE SHOULD BE NO SOVIET INTERFERENCE EITHER THROUGH TROOPS OR POLITICAL ADVISERS. WE WA NTED A TRULY NEUTRAL

ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.
THE AFGHANS MUST BE ALLOWED TO DECIDE WHO THEY WANTED TO GOVERN THEM AND THERE SHOULD BE NO SOVIET INTERFERENCE EITHER THROUGH TROOPS OR POLITICAL ADVISERS. WE WANTED A TRULY NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN.

7. GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT SOVIET FORCES HAD ENTERED AGHANISTAN BY REQUEST UNDER AN AGREEMENT WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, AND COULD ONLY BE WITHDRAWN BY AGREEMENT WITH THAT GOVERNMENT, AND NOT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. BUT BOTH THE SOVIET AND AFGHAN GOVERNMENTS HAD SAID THAT THE TROOPS WOULD GO FOLLOWING AN AGREEMENT WITH POLITICAL GUARANTEES. LORD CARRINGTON SURELY HAD NO DOUBTS IN HIS OWN MIND: WHY THEREFORE WAS HE MAKING DIFFICULTIES?

8. IN A BRIEF PRIVATE EXCHANGE AT THE END OF THE MEETING, LORD CARRINGTON TOLD GROMYKO THAT OUR POSITIONS MIGHT NOT BE AS FAR APART AS THEY SEEMED, THOUGH SIMULTANEITY WAS IMPORTANT. GROMYKO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH.

9. THE ONLY OTHER SUBJECT RAISED WAS THE PROPOSED MEMORIAL IN LONDON TO THE OPEN QUOTES VICTIMS OF YALTA CLOSE QUOTES. GROMYKO AFFECTED AMAZEMENT THAT HMG SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN A PROJECT OF THIS NATURE , GIVEN THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD PARTICIPATED AT YALTA. HE GATHERED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF HAD AGREED TO ITS ERECTION. HE COULD ONLY REGARD THIS AS A HOSTILE ACT, OF WHICH DUE ACCOUNT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVEMENT WAS LIMITED TO THE DECISION NOT TO WITHHOLD PERMISSION FOR THE MEMORIAL TO BE ERECTED ON CROWN LAND. SOME OF HIS FELLOW COUNTRYMEN INTERPRETED HISTORY RATHER DIFFERENTLY FROM MR GROMYKO.

GORDON
PARA FOUR LINES 14 AND 15 PLSE KK

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TICV
I REPEATED THIS FROM THEIR OWN AFFAIRS LINES 14 AND 15 RAED AS FOLLOWS ....

THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. HE DENIED CATEGORICALLY THAT SOVIET TROOPS WERE FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN, OR INTERFERING THERE IN ANY WAY.

Afghanistan

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TO FLASH VIENNA
TELEGRAM NO 126 OF 16 MAY
INFO FLASH ISLAMABAD

Summary of FCO reaction to Soviet proposals

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM MAITLAND

AFGHANISTAN
MIPT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO AGHA SHAHI.
BEGINS:
1. I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO YOU TO KNOW OUR REACTIONS TO THE PROPOSALS ANNOUNCED BY THE BABRAK KARMAL GOVERNMENT ON 14 MAY AND TO THE CALL BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES FOR A WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE.

2. I THINK THAT IT IS CLEAR TO US ALL THAT THESE MOVES HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY TIMED WITH A VIEW TO INFLUENCING DISCUSSION CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE BETWEEN WORLD LEADERS IN VIENNA AND THE DISCUSSIONS THAT YOU ARE ABOUT TO HOLD IN ISLAMABAD. BOTH MOVES ARE INSPIRED BY THE RUSSIANS. BOTH WOULD INVOLVE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF BABRAK KARMAL BEFORE ANY QUESTION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL ARISES. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THE OBJECTIVE IS TO CONFIRN THE STATUS QUO IN AFGHANISTAN. FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW THE PROPOSALS ARE UNSATISFACTORY.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, THESE SUGGESTIONS COULD BE AN INDICATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM WHICH IS OF COURSE WHAT BOTH YOU AND WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING. THAT THIS IS SO IS I THINK DUE IN LARGE PART TO THE SUSTAINED POLITICAL PRESSURE THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, WE IN THE WEST AND OTHERS HAVE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ISSUE.

/4. THE

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4. THE RESPONSE TO THE KABUL PROPOSALS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT IF THE RUSSIANS ARE TO BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT A MORE REALISTIC SETTLEMENT THAT THE FACT OF THESE PROPOSALS BEING MADE SHOULD NOT REDUCE OUR RESOLVE TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE AFGHANS TO DECIDE ON THEIR OWN FUTURE. I HOPE THAT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WILL GIVE STRONG SUPPORT TO THESE DEMANDS.
IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MOVE TO RECOGNISE THE BABRAK REGIME AND THAT THE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THEM IS MAINTAINED.

5. AS YOU KNOW WE HAD ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERING HOW A CONFERENCE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. THERE ARE VARIOUS FUNDAMENTAL POINTS TO RESOLVE: AN AGENDA, TIMING, WHICH COUNTRIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE, HOW AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE REPRESENTED, WHO SHOULD PRESIDE. THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS FOR A WORLD CONFERENCE ARE SOMETHING RATHER DIFFERENT. THEY ENVISAGE A LARGE GATHERING EMBRACING COUNTRIES FROM ALL REGIONS OF THE WORLD TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF GLOBAL ISSUES, NOT JUST AFGHANISTAN, AND FOCUSSING PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE. THIS IS NOT AT ALL WHAT WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING IN RELATION TO AFGHANISTAN AND WE WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFUL THAT IT IS NOT USED BY THE RUSSIANS TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE CAREFUL PREPARATION OF AN INITIATIVE WHICH OFFERS A REAL PROSPECT OF A SOLUTION. ENDS

CARRINGTON

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SIR D MAITLAND
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MR FERGUSSON
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FE/6421/C/1
(A2, A3, A4, B)

16 May 80

Departmental and Afghanistan Special Distribution.

C. AFGHANISTAN

Government Statement on Resolving Relations with Iran and Pakistan

Kabul home service in Pashto 1530 gmt (and also Tass in English 1832 gmt) 14 May 80

Text of statement:

Statement by the DRA Government

With the victory of the national and democratic Sowr revolution of 1357 [1978] the people of Afghanistan have chosen their final path and have embarked on the construction of a new society based on the principles of equality and justice free from the exploitation of man by man. The new society of Afghanistan is founded on deep respect and observance of the national, historical, cultural and religious traditions of our people, and the serious observance of the principles of the sacred religion of Islam and the freedom of performing religious rites in the manner that the law guarantees for the people.

The people of Afghanistan want to create a new life for themselves by developing relations of friendship, peace and co-operation with its neighbouring Moslem countries and all the countries of the world. [Tass added here: "But they had to be faced with crude interference, including armed interference, in the internal affairs by imperialist and other reactionary forces."] The people of Afghanistan are resolved to defend the freedom and independence of their homeland and their right to determine their own social and economic [Tass: "socio-political] system. The DRA Government, while stressing that the Basic Principles of the DRA are based on the principle of peaceful coexistence and the active and positive policy of non-alignment, is determined to search for a political solution which will ensure a full and guaranteed end to acts of aggression against Afghanistan and acts of subversion and other forms of foreign interference in the internal affairs of the country. In this way, the tension that has come about in this region can be removed and differences solved by peaceful means and the holding of talks. The programme for such a political solution can be based on the following:

(1) The DRA Government proposes to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran that bilateral talks should be started to prepare an appropriate agreement to promote friendly and all-round relations and co-operation for the benefit of the two sides.

The DRA Government also proposes to the Government of Pakistan that talks should be held to prepare a bilateral agreement on normalizing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Such agreements should contain acceptable provisions regarding mutual respect for national sovereignty and a readiness to develop relations based on the principles of good-neighbourliness and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, as well as an undertaking of fundamental responsibility in the area not to permit armed activities or other hostile acts from the territory of one against the other.

(2) The DRA Government once again calls upon the Afghans who are temporarily living, for various reasons, in the territories of Pakistan and other neighbouring countries to return to their homeland, and stresses that under the general amnesty which was declared in the very first Government statement dated 11th Jadi 1358 [1st January 1980] and subsequent statements they will be accorded respect and their freedom and complete immunity will be guaranteed. They will be free to chose the place where they wish to live and their occupation, and all the necessary facilities will be provided for them.

The DRA Government calls on the Pakistan authorities and those of the other neighbouring countries to provide the necessary facilities for the return of these persons to Afghanistan. Notwithstanding this, if some of the Afghans do not wish to return to their homeland, then issues concerning them could also be solved in the course of bilateral talks.

(3) As soon as the DRA Government arrives at solutions acceptable to both parties as stated in the first and second proposals, and as soon as relations are restored between Afghanistan and its neighbours, the DRA Government will be ready to examine other aspects of bilateral relations, including those issues which have been the subject of dispute for a long time.

(4) In proposing to hold bilateral talks with its neighbouring countries without any pre-conditions whatsoever, the DRA Government earnestly expects that after the start of these talks no hostile activities should continue against Afghanistan. In this way, from the very start of the process for a political solution, practical measures should be taken which convincingly prove that armed interference and other forms of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan are being ended by the governments taking part in such talks [Tass: "On the side of all states involved in this interference"].

(5) The DRA Government believes that apart from a series of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Afghanistan and Iran, necessary political guarantees by certain governments that may be acceptable to Afghanistan and other parties to the bilateral agreements should be regarded as an inalienable part of the political solution. This, in the view of the DRA, could include [Tass: "must be"] the Soviet Union and the USA.

The basic theme of such guarantees must consist of the fact that the guarantor countries will themselves respect Afghanistan's bilateral agreements with Pakistan and Iran and protect them within their respective jurisdictions. So far as the USA is concerned, such guarantees must include a clearly expressed commitment to ban subversive activities against Afghanistan including those being launched from the territory of other countries.

(6) The DRA Government declares that the question of the withdrawal of the limited military contingents of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan must be resolved within the context of the political solution. Putting an end to military aggression and guaranteeing that military aggression and other forms of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan are not repeated will remove the factors which forced the Government of Afghanistan to ask the Soviet Union to dispatch the said contingents to its territory.

The issue of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan relates specifically to the solution of the question of effective guarantees in connection with bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Afghanistan and Iran.

[Tass inserts the following passage here; "(7) the Government of the DRA declares that in the process of political settlement notice shall be taken also of military-political activity in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area by the states which do not belong to that area."]

Sharing the concern of other countries over the increased US military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the DRA Government supports the relevant proposals on turning this region into a zone of peace, dismantling all military bases, and taking measures aimed at relaxing tension and strengthening the region's security.

In putting forward these proposals for a political solution, the DRA Government once again declares [Tass: "most explicitly"] that issues pertaining to the interests of Afghanistan cannot be discussed or solved without the participation of the Government of Afghanistan or by ignoring it. At the same time, the DRA Government considers as beneficial the efforts of other governments to ease the way for the beginning of talks. In this connection, the DRA Government welcomes and supports the initiative of the Republic of Cuba as Chairman of the non-alignment movement as well as its bona fide efforts.

The DRA Government hopes that the basic programme for a political solution as proposed by Afghanistan will meet with understanding and favourable reaction from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The DRA Government anticipates that its proposals on normalizing relations with Pakistan will be met constructively and positively by the Government of Pakistan. In this way, it will be possible to make a practical start for the solution of the above issues by negotiations.

Other Reports

Alleged Czechoslovak military presence The AFP issued the following report (in English 1444 gmt 14 May 80): "An Afghan rebel leader claimed today [14th May] that 5,000 Czechoslovak troops had arrived in Afghanistan about 10 days ago to reinforce the Russian military strength. Mohammad Amin Wakman, Secretary General of the Afghan Social Democrat Party, told a press conference that the Afghan freedom-fighters were "now fighting the Warsaw Treaty". Mr Wakman, who confirmed the second anti-Russian uprising in Kabul in late April, predicted that "a new intensive phase of the resistance" would begin on 22nd May, first day of the Jowza month. Mr Wakman said that, in the new phase, his party and other anti-Russian elements would "take strong and collective steps to frustrate the military actions of the Russians"..."

Budget figure for 1980-81: Development plan problems (FE/6373/C/3) A commentary broadcast by Kabul radio's English service (1900 gmt 13 May 80) included the following passage: "The State Budget for 1359 [1980-81], as proposed by the Council of Ministers and endorsed by the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee and approved by the Revolutionary Council, amounts to 33,759 million afghani. This represents an increase in the State revenue and the expenditures as well. The budget of this size, which is unprecedented as compared with those in the past years, is indicative of the large and ambitious programmes undertaken by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in different walks of the lives of the people living in this country." Turning to the development plan for the same year, the commentary said that the achievement of the plan's targets depended to a great extent on maintaining peace and security throughout the country. It was regrettable, it added, that the enemies of the revolution were always trying to put obstacles in the way of the PDPA and government's development efforts, but this would not stop the struggle of the Party and government to serve the people's interests.

State Bank council meeting The Supreme Council of the [State] Bank of Afghanistan held a meeting on 13th May presided over by Abdol Wakil, the Minister of Finance. Attending the meeting were Soltan Ali Keshtmand, Vice-President of the Revolutionary Council, Deputy Premier and Minister of Planning, and the Ministers of Commerce, Mines and Industries, and Agriculture. The organization and budget of the Bank of Afghanistan for 1359 [1980-81], was approved and ratified after some modifications. The symbol of the Bank of Afghanistan, which will be used in future bank notes and other banking documents instead of the State symbol, was confirmed and approved. Soltan Ali Keshtmand gave valuable instructions to the Bank's Executive Committee on improving the country's banking system and the role of the central Bank. The Supreme Council instructed the Bank's Executive Committee to prepare a comprehensive report on the financial and material position of the country and submit it to the Supreme Council. (Kabul home service in Pashto 1430 gmt 13 May 80)

Vice-President received N Korean envoy Vice-President and Deputy Premier Asadollah Sarwari received the DPRK Ambassador, Yi Chong-nim, on 13th May for a courtesy call. (Kabul home service in Pashto 1430 gmt 13 May 80)

GR 280
UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 151203Z MAY 80
TO F L A S H VIENNA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 85 OF 15 MAY.

MY 21PTS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY FCO SPOKESMAN 15 MAY:

1. FROM ACCOUNTS WE HAVE SEEN THE PROPOSAL SHOWS LITTLE IF ANY CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS SOVIET AND AFGHAN POSITION. IT WOULD RESULT IN CONFIRMATION OF THE STATUS QUO SINCE THE KABUL REGIME WOULD OBTAIN PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN RECOGNITION AND SECURE FRONTIERS WITH THOSE COUNTRIES BEFORE THE SOVIET UNION GAVE ANY UNDERTAKING TO WITHDRAW. THE ARRANGEMENT FORESEEN WOULD CONTAIN NOTHING ABOUT THE SOVIET/ AFGHAN FRONTIER SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ASSURANCE THAT THE RUSSIANS, IF THEY WITHDREW, WOULD NOT INVADE AGAIN.
2. NONETHELESS IT IS SATISFACTORY THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEM PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT RATHER THAN RELYING ON BRUTE FORCE. THIS SHOWS THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE.
3. HOWEVER, THE PROPOSAL IS BASED ON THE UNFOUNDED ALLEGATION THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN RESULTS FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS. AS WAS RECOGNISED BY 104 MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS ARISEN BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET INVASION. THEIR TROOPS MUST BE WITHDRAWN AND AFGHANISTAN MUST REGAIN ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE OF A NEUTRAL AND GENUINELY NON-ALIGNED STATE. THIS CONCEPT WHICH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS ADVANCED, AND WHICH HAS BEEN ATTRACTING WIDE SUPPORT AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, OFFERS AN EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.
UNATTRIBUTABLE
4. THE AFGHAN PROPOSAL SEEMS TO BE A TACTICAL PLOY AIMED AT INFLUENCING VIEWS BEFORE THE FORTHCOMING ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN ISLAMABAD. IT IS ALSO PROBABLY DESIGNED TO DISARM THOSE WHO ARE PRESSING FOR A BOYCOTT OF THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. ITS TIMING HAS ALSO NO DOUBT BEEN DETERMINED BY THE PLANNED MEETINGS IN VIENNA AT THE END OF THIS WEEK BETWEEN MR MUSKIE AND MR GROMYKO AND LORD CARRINGTON AND MR GROMYKO.

CARRINGTON

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Afghan Proposals

The Secretary of State spoke briefly to journalists on his arrival at Vienna Airport this morning about the Soviet proposals on Afghanistan. Attached is a summary account of what he said.

Paul Lever

(P Lever)

15 May 1980

SUMMARY RECORD

The Secretary of State commented briefly and guardedly to a few journalists at the airport. He said that at first glance there seemed to be no alteration in principle in the Soviet position, and in particular no guarantee that Soviet troops would be withdrawn. He would look at the proposals carefully however. The fact that the Russians were prepared to talk about a non-aligned Afghanistan was not discouraging and could perhaps be built on. He imagined that the Soviet statement was not unconnected with Muskie's presence in Vienna, and perhaps his own (ie his own presence in Vienna too). Soviet ideas might be worth exploring and would no doubt feature - as would his own - in his talk with Gromyko.

GRS 725 CONFIDENTIAL

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FM VIENNA 151650Z MAY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 155 OF 15 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, NEW YORK, ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW, KABUL,

INFO PRIORITY HAVANA, PEKING, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY

1. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE CHNCELLOR SEEMED SCEPTICAL ABOUT PROPOSALS FOR A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN. THE CHANCELLOR EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE EVERYONE HAD RECOGNISED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD LONG EXERCISED A CERTAIN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH THEY WOULD NEVER GIVE UP. MOREOVER, BABRAK KARMAL WAS NOT A QUISLING. THE WEST SHOULD NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE AS IT HAD WITH KADAR. THE FIRST NEED WAS FOR AN INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN, THEN ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE AFGHANS AND THE PAKISTANIS (WHOM HE DISTRUSTED). KARMAL WAS IN HIS VIEW READY TO DO SOMETHING ON REFUGEES, EG OVER THE RETURN OF PROPERTY. THERE WAS ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION. BUT HE RECOGNISED THAT THESE MOVES NEEDED TO BE CONNECTED WITH THE EVACUATION OF TROOPS.

2. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE MILLION REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN WERE A MEASURE OF THE UNPOPULARITY OF KARMAL'S GOVERNMENT. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE A SOLUTION WHICH DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS FACT. PERHAPS THE WEST HAD TOO EASILY ACCEPTED THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE RUSSIANS. BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN A PUPPET GOVERNMENT. HE COULD NOT SEE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD WITHDRAW WITHOUT LEAVING BEHIND A SITUATION FAVOURABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION: YET SUCH A SITUATION WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. THE CHANCELLOR SUGGESTED THAT THE FINNS WERE AN EXAMPLE WHERE THE RUSSIANS HAD RESPECTED THE DETERMINATION OF A PEOPLE NOT TO SUCCUMB TO OCCUPATION, AND WHERE THE RUSSIANS HAD DRAWN THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY SHOULD NOT STAY ON. THE SAME WAS NOT TRUE OF EG THE CZECHS , BUT COULD BE OF THE AFGHANS. DEMOCRACY IN AFGHANISTAN WAS AN ILLUSION, BUT THERE HAD TO BE A POLITICAL SOLUTION. HE HAD BEEN GIVEN A 'NON PAPER' BY A FORMER AFGHAN PRIME MINISTER ARGUING FOR A MEETING BETWEEN DIFFERENT INTERNAL POLITICAL AFGHAN GROUPS (THE EXTERNAL GROUPS WERE ALL ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS), IN A COUNTRY WHERE THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO PRESSURE OR INTERFERENCE. THE PAPER HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS NO CHOICE BUT TO COLLABORATE WITH KARMAL, WHOSE ENTOURAGE WAS BETTER THAN THAT OF AMIN.

/3. LORD

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3. LORD CARRINGTON RECALLED THAT HISTORICALLY AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN A BUFFER STATE. WE KNEW THAT THE AFGHANS WISHED TO BE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED, IF LEFT TO THEMSELVES. HE HAD NOTHING AGAINST KARMAL, PROVIDED THAT THE AFGHANSTHEMSELVES WANTED HIM . THE TROUBLE SPRANG FROM THE IMPOSITION OF A GOVERNMENT BY THE RUSSIANS, WHO SEEMED TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO GO BACK IN AGAIN EVEN IF THEY WITHDREW. WHATEVER THE REASONS FOR THEIR OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE FACT WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD DESTABILISED THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BY THEIR ACT. THEY HAD ALSO UPSET INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM, AS WELL AS IRAN, AND HAD ALSO GIVEN SATISFACTION TO THE CHINESE,

HO WERE CONTENT TO SEE THE RUSSIANS BOGGED DOWN. WHAT WORRIED HIM ABOUT THE CHANCELLOR'S APPROACH WAS THAT IT IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF THIS INSTABILITY, BY ACCEPTING THE SOVIET RIGHT TO MAINTAIN A PUPPET GOVERNMENT AND TO WALK IN WHEN THEY WISHED.

4. THE CHANCELLOR DISPUTED THIS. HE HAD TOLD THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS AN INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLUTION, AND NOTE A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE PRESENT AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. REPORTS OF THE CUBAN'S TALKS WITH THE YUGOSLAVS AND THE INDIANS SUGGESTED THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HIS ANALYSIS SEEMED TO COINCIDE WITH THAT OF THE CHANCELLOR. BUT PROGRESS COULD ONLY BE MADE THROUGH PRESSURE FROM THE NON-ALIGNED , THIRD WORLD AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS. OUR PROPOSALS FOR NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT GAVE THE RUSSIANS A FACE-SAVING WAY OUT, AND WERE ATTRACTIVE TO THE NON-ALIGNED. HOWEVER, HE RECOGNISED THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTATION.

5. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE SAW NO DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THEIR VIEWS. ONE OF HIS VICE PRESIDENTS HAD TOLD FIDEL CASTRO THAT ON THIS OCCASION THE CUBANS WERE THE SPOKESMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT RATHER THAN A COMMUNIST COUNTRY, AND SHOULD PROTECT THEIR MEMBER WHO HAD BEEN INVADED AND AVOID A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE WORLD SITUATION. CASTRO HAD APPEARED TO ACCEPT THIS. THE CHANCELLOR THOUGHT THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT AS HOPELESS AS IT LOOKED. HE AGREED THAT AFGHANISTAN, AS A NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY, WAS NOT IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY, THE SUBJUGATION OF WHICH THE WEST HAD ACCEPTED. BUT HE ALSO OBJECTED TO PARALLELS IN THE PRESS BETWEEN OUR NEUTRALITY PROPOSALS FOR AFGHANISTAN AND THE SITUATION IN AUSTRIA. (LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO COMPARISON). SOME NEUTRAL COUNTRIES IN EUROPE COULD HELP THE SITUATION EVEN IF THEY COULD NOT SOLVE IT.

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6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE CHANCELLOR'S THINKING. KREISKY WELCOMED THIS, AND ASKED FOR A FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL SITUATION. THIS IS BEING ARRANGED FOR THE EARLY EVENING OF TOMORROW 16 MAY.

GORDON

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GRS 45p
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FM LUXEMBOURG
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 14 MAY
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

In my experience, Soviet Diplomats do not have "personal views". Whatever they say is said for a reason.

AFGHANISTAN: CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LUXEMBOURG

1. ON 13 MAY MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE, OUDOUMIAN (A FORMER MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE OF ARMENIA), RETURNED MY INITIAL CALL. WE SPOKE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. I EXPLAINED THE BRITISH POSITION. I SAID THAT WE WANTED A SOLUTION WHICH RESPECTED AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND WHICH ALLOWED ALL CONCERNED TO FEEL SECURE. WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN PROPAGANDA. WE WANTED TO WORK THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY. WE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT RUSSIA, LIKE EVERYONE ELSE, HAD NATIONAL INTERESTS. BUT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, NOR INDEED TO A GREAT MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

2. OUDOUMIAN SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS POSITION. RUSSIA ALSO WANTED A SOLUTION. SHE DID NOT WANT TO KEEP HER TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN INDEFINITELY. BUT SHE HAD A LONG AND SENSITIVE FRONTIER TO DEFEND SEMI-COLON AND SHE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE EFFORTS OF COUNTRIES LIKE CHINA AND PAKISTAN TO DESTABILISE AFGHANISTAN BY MEANS OF WHAT AMOUNTED VIRTUALLY TO A CONDITION OF UNDECLARED WAR. BUT BEFORE THE SOVIET FORCES WITHDREW, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD IN FUTURE REMAIN NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED. (I ASKED HIS INTERPRETER TO REPEAT THIS FORMULA AND HE DID SO).

3. I ASKED OUDOUMIAN WHAT FORM OF GUARANTEE THE SOVIET UNION HAD IN MIND. HE SAID, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, THAT IN HIS VIEW IT SHOULD BE A GUARANTEE BY ALL THOSE COUNTRIES WHO HAD A PARTICULAR INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN. HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR CHINA, PAKISTAN, IRAN, THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND, QUOTE OF COURSE UNQUOTE, THE SOVIET UNION. AFTER SOME FURTHER QUESTIONING, OUDOUMIAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CERTAINLY NOT FAVOUR THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS LEADING TO ANY SUCH INTER-NATIONAL GUARANTEE BECAUSE, QUOTE AS I WOULD WELL KNOW UNQUOTE,

/THE

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THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT REGARD THE UNITED NATIONS AS A SERIOUS FORUM FOR SUCH A QUESTION. OUDOUMIAN SAID, AGAIN SPEAKING PERSONALLY, THAT HE WOULD FAVOUR A SPECIFIC CONFERENCE OF THE COUNTRIES MOST CONCERNED IN THE MATTER. HE MAINTAINED THAT ANY GUARANTEE WOULD HAVE TO BE FORTHCOMING BEFORE SOVIET TROOPS WITHDREW BUT HE DID NOT DISPUTE MY PROPOSITION THAT THIS WAS A CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION AND THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND THE POWER OF DIPLOMACY TO HANDLE THE LINKED ISSUES OF WITHDRAWAL AND GUARANTEE IN PARALLEL.

4. OUDOUMIAN WAS SPEAKING IN MY SITTING ROOM WITH ONLY HIS INTERPRETER PRESENT AND I WAS STRUCK BY A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF BOMBAST IN HIS TONE: THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT TO BLUSTER AND NO NONSENSE ABOUT RUSSIA SIMPLY RESPONDING TO A FRIENDLY CALL FOR HELP FROM KABUL WHICH WERE THE DOMINANT THEMES OF OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WHEN I PAID MY FIRST CALL ON HIM ON 27 MARCH.

THOMAS

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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AFGHANISTAN

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(AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 14 MAY 1980)

GRS 310

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FM MOSCOW 131630Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 131800Z
TELNO 318 OF 13 MAY
RPTD PRIORITY INFO TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, VIENNA AND ROME

OUR TELNO 245: APPROACH TO USSR ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

1. SUSLOV SUMMONED ME THIS AFTERNOON TO DELIVER WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENT IN REPLY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S REPRESENTATIONS OF 11 APRIL. THE TEXT OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY IS RECORDED IN MIFT.

2. I TOLD SUSLOV WE SHARED THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN. I WOULD CONVEY TO YOU WHAT HE HAD SAID. I THOUGHT HOWEVER THERE WOULD BE DISAPPOINTMENT IN LONDON ON THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET ANSWERS WERE IMPRECISE. THE SOVIET STATEMENT DID NOT , FOR EXAMPLE, GO INTO THE QUESTION OF HOW GUARANTEES AND SOVIET WITHDRAWAL COULD BE LINKED. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATEMENT, NOTABLY IN THE REFERENCES TO ALLEGED INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN FROM OUTSIDE AND TO THE IMPOSITION OF NEUTRAL STATUS ON AFGHANISTAN, WAS WHOLLY AT VARIANCE WITH OUR VIEW, AND SOUGHT FURTHER CLARIFICATION: BUT SUSLOV SAID HE WAS NOT AUTHORISED TO GO BEYOND THE TERMS OF THE STATEMENT. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT AGAINST A DIALOGUE WITH BRITAIN ON AFGHANISTAN. BUT FACTS HAD TO BE RESPECTED. THOSE WHO WISHED TO EXPLOIT THE AFGHAN QUESTION AGAINST USSR WOULD GET NOWHERE. HE REPEATED THAT WHAT HE HAD TO SAY REPRESENTED THE OFFICIAL SOVIET POSITION EVEN THOUGH IT COULD NOT IN THE NATURE OF THINGS SET OUT ALL THE CONSIDERATION IN SOVIET POLICY OVER AFGHANISTAN.

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. THIS SOVIET REPLY, WHICH IT HAS TAKEN THE MFA OVER A MONTH TO PRODUCE SINCE THE AMBASSADOR'S REPRESENTATIONS, IS CLEARLY TIMED TO SET THE STAGE FOR YOUR MEETING WITH GROMYKO. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCERN AMID ITS DREARY REPETITION OF FAMILIAR SOVIET POSITIONS ANY POINTS WHICH MIGHT ENABLE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TO BE MADE, THOUGH IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE STATEMENT TWICE REFERS TO THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE TENSE SITUATION OVER AFGHANISTAN.
THE ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS, HOWEVER, SHOW LITTLE OR NO DISPOSITION TO SEEK SUCH A SOLUTION ON ANY BUT SOVIET TERMS

BROOKE TURNER

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 317 OF 13TH MAY
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AND VIENNA.

MIPT

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT:

''THE MFA HAS THE HONOUR TO COMMUNICATE THE FOLLOWING IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTIONS TOUCHED ON IN THE STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH SIDE ON 11 APRIL.

1. AS HAS EARLIER BEEN STATED TO THE BRITISH SIDE THE SOVIET UNION IS IN FAVOUR OF POLITICAL MEANS IN LIQUIDATING TENSION AROUND AFGHANISTAN. IN ORDER HOWEVER THAT THESE MEANS SHOULD PRODUCE GENUINE RESULTS IT IS ESSENTIAL FIRST OF ALL THAT THE CAUSES WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE TENSION SHOULD BE REMOVED AND SPECIFICALLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FULL AND GUARANTEED CEASATION OF ARMED AND EVERY OTHER SORT OF INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. ATTEMPTS TO GET ROUND THIS FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION, SUCH AS ARE MADE IN THE BRITISH STATEMENT OF 11 APRIL, CERTAINLY DO NOT DEMONSTRATE THE REALISTIC NATURE OF SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE SEARCH FOR MEANS OF LIQUIDATING TENSION CONNECTED WITH AFGHANISTAN.

2. THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET SIDE, EXPRESSED BEFOREHAND AND CONFIRMED AGAIN HERE, IN FAVOUR OF A POLITICAL REGULATION OF THE SITUATION IN CONNECTION WITH AFGHANISTAN HAS NEVER MEANT AND DOES NOT MEAN WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS AND DECIDE WITH ANY OTHER PARTY WHATSOEVER QUESTIONS RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA AND WITHOUT ITS PARTICIPATION. ON THE CONTRARY WE HAVE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING AND WITH ALL PRECISION UNDERLINED THE UNACCEPTABILITY AND LACK OF PROSPECTS IN ALL ATTEMPTS TO ACT IN SUCH A MANNER. SO FAR AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA IS CONCERNED IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT IT HAS REPEATEDLY ANNOUNCED ITS READINESS TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF PAKISTAN AND IRAN ON THE NORMALSIATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THEM ON A STABLE BASIS OF EQUALITY, RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTEFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF EACH OTHER. THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS PART WELCOMES THIS COURSE OF

/THE

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA. APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AFGHANSITAN AND PAKISTAN AND BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN COULD, IT SEEMS TO US, BE UNDERWRITTEN BY GUARANTEES FROM CERTAIN STATES EACH OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE BOTH TO AFGHANISTAN AND TO THE OTHER PARTY. IT IS ALSO WELL KNOWN THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRA HAS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED - AND THIS IS NOW ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DRA - THAT IT INTENDS TO UPHOLD THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME IT HAS EXPRESSED WITH COMPLETE CLARITY ITS NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TO PLANS TO IMPOSE UPON AFGHANISTAN SOME SORT OF ''NEUTRAL'' STATUS WHOSE AIM WOULD BE TO LIMIT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE AFGHAN STATE AND CREATE CONDITIONS FOR CONTINUING INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

3. AS FAR AS CONCERNS THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LIMITED CONTINGENT OF SOVIET TROOPS AT PRESENT IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE REQUEST OF ITS GOVERNMENT, THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION REAMAINS ON THIS QUESTION AS WE HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED IT BOTH PUBLICLY AND DIRECTLY TO THE BRITISH SIDE. IT IS THEREFORE HARDLY NECESSARY TO SET IT OUT ONCE AGAIN. IN THE SAME WAY SPECIAL ''EXPLANATIONS'' COULD HARDLY BE REALY NECESSARY IN LONDON AS TO WHY THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE USSR WOULD BE THREATENED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT IN AFGHANISTAN WITH THE AID OF EXTERNAL FORCES OF A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF TTHIS COUNTRY INTO A HOSTILE MILITARY PLACE D'ARMES ON THE SOUTHERN BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UUNION.

BROOK TURNER

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AFGHANISTAN

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T102/80.

MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MUHAMMAD ZIA-UL-HAQ,
PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN, TO THE
RT. HON. MRS MARGARET THATCHER, MP
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

I greatly appreciate your message in regard to the preservation of the non-aligned and neutral status of Afghanistan and the approaches you have made to the Soviet Union in this context. We have also noted the various statements on this subject made by the Soviet leadership, some of which have found mention in your message.

You would be aware that the most recent announcements from Moscow and Kabul as well as other interested quarters have sharply modified the earlier statements referred to in your message and diminished the hope that the Soviet Union might be genuinely responsive to a proposal for a neutral Afghanistan. In these statements both Moscow and Kabul have categorically rejected such a status for Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union continues to speak in many voices with the manifest purpose of allowing itself the maximum room for manoeuvre. Its objective is to ensure that any withdrawal of Soviet troops will take place only on its own terms, the principal aim

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being to preserve the puppet regime in Kabul and prevent the erosion of the strategic and ideological gains achieved by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Under these circumstances while agreeing that it would be useful to adopt a flexible approach and continue to explore openings we regard the possibility of a positive Soviet response to the various initiatives which have so far been taken as unpromising.

Your message contains a reference to Mr. Brezhnev's statement of October 1963 in which he praised Afghanistan's policy of neutrality and non-participation in military blocs. We find that the 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union goes even a step further and binds both parties "to refrain from all armed or unarmed intervention" in the internal affair of each other. Of course the 1931 Treaty has now been overtaken by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of December 1978 which permits the Soviet Union to intervene at the request of the Afghan Government. The Soviet Union has inducted troops in Afghanistan under the cover of this Treaty. The ambiguities and contradictions surrounding the initial Soviet military move into

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Afghanistan have now been ironed out by the formal agreement signed in Moscow during the visit of Shah Mohammad Dost.

Mindful of the grim implications which the Afghan situation has for Pakistan I have publicly made certain suggestions indicating Pakistan's readiness to participate in guarantees safeguarding the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and preventing non-intervention in its internal affairs as part of a comprehensive political settlement with the primary aim of ensuring the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In doing so, I have only reaffirmed Pakistan's existing position.

I have offered the inspection of refugee camps on our soil by any impartial agency to verify the fact that no intervention is taking place from our side and have even suggested the induction of an international peace force consisting of Islamic or non-aligned countries under the U.N. auspices to be posted inside Afghanistan in order to ensure that accords arrived at are implemented. It goes without saying that participation by Pakistan in guarantees would require reciprocal guarantees from Afghanistan that it will not interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs and will acknowledge and respect

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the established international frontier between the two countries.

The most important problem facing us today is the presence of more than 700,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the creation of conditions enabling them to return to their hearths and homes in safety and honour. This would be possible only when conditions within Afghanistan improve to a point as would persuade the refugees that they can do so.

More recently I have had a visit from the Foreign Minister of Cuba who brought a letter from Dr. Castro suggesting direct talks between me and Babrak Karmal in Havana under his auspices. I have informed Dr. Castro that this is not possible in view of our adherence to the Resolution of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference which embargoes any contact with the Babrak Karmal regime till such time as Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. I have also advised Dr. Castro that if he wishes to play a role in his capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement to resolve the Afghan crisis we would support such a move which should specifically ensure the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the return of refugees to their homeland.

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The key element in the Afghan situation remains the attitude of the Afghan people to the regime imposed upon them by force of Soviet arms. Their sustained opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the face of heavy odds and their refusal to become subservient to any outside force may be the decisive factor in bringing the Soviet Union, sooner or later, to the Conference table.

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TO PRIORITY ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER POSTS
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INFO ADEN HAVANA KABUL MOSCOW TRIPOLI
INFO SAVING LIBREVILLE SANAA YAOUNDE.
FCO TELEGRAM NO 119 TO ANKARA AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 20 REFER:
AFGHANISTAN NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT

1. OUR PROPOSAL FOR A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN IS STEADILY GATHERING SUPPORT AND BEING CARRIED FORWARD BY OTHERS, EG HABIB CHATTY, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. IT WAS ENDORSED IN THE DECLARATION ISSUED AT THE END OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG ON 27/28 APRIL (THE RELEVANT PART OF THE TEXT IS IN MIFT).

SOVIET REACTIONS.

2. WE HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF BILATERAL EXCHANGES WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THESE WE HAVE OUTLINED OUR IDEAS, BUT HAVE DELIBERATELY NOT ENTERED INTO DETAIL IN ORDER NOT TO PROVIDE THE RUSSIANS WITH EASY TARGETS TO KNOCK DOWN AND THUS DISMISS THE PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND. THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS BEEN TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BUT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT, FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, THEY ARE NOT READY TO DEPART FROM THEIR OWN PRE-CONDITIONS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE SAID THEY WILL NOT WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS UNTIL ASKED TO DO SO BY THE KABUL REGIME, AND THAT THERE CAN BE NO TALK OF WITHDRAWAL UNTIL ALLEGED INTERFERENCE FROM OUT-SIDE AFGHANISTAN STOPS. THEY HAVE ALSO SAID THAT THE FUTURE STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN CANNOT BE DECIDED WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE BABRAK REGIME. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID SAYING THAT THE CONCEPT OF A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHAN-ISTAN IS UNACCEPTABLE. THERE SEEMS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE RUSSIANS CAN BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT OUR IDEA AS A BASIS FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS STAGE. BUT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE IT WIDELY AS A MEANS OF EXERTING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PRESSURE AND FACING THE RUSSIANS WITH QUESTIONS TO WHICH THEY HAVE NO CONVINC-ING ANSWER. WE ALSO INTEND TO CONTINUE OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE

/RUSSIANS

RUSSIANS.

3. MEANWHILE, SOVIET EFFORTS ARE BEING DIRECTED TO GETTING RECOGNITION FOR THE BABRAK GOVERNMENT AND TRYING TO DIVIDE AND WEAKEN OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. WE CONSIDER THIS TO BE THE REAL AIM OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT PLAN ANNOUNCED ON 17 APRIL, WHICH WE BELIEVE WAS PREPARED BY THE RUSSIANS. IT CALLS FOR

A) BILATERAL TALKS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN:

B) A REGIONAL CONFERENCE FOR A PEACE FRAMEWORK-

C) REGIONAL TALKS TO REDUCE LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY SPENDING:

D) TALKS TO REDUCE TENSION: AND

E) CONSULTATIONS AMONG LITTORAL STATES ABOUT INDIAN OCEAN AND GULF PEACE ZONE UNDER INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES.

IT ECHOES OLD SOVIET IDEAS ABOUT ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, NOR OF AFGHANISTAN'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS.

4. DURING HIS VISIT TO PARIS FROM 23-25 APRIL MR GROMYKO DISCUSSED SOVIET POLICY AT LENGTH WITH THE FRENCH. HIS THESIS REMAINED THAT THE PROBLEM STEMMED FROM EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, MAINLY FROM PAKISTAN (HE SPOKE LITTLE OF INTERFERENCE FROM IRAN). HE CLAIMED THAT THE ONLY WAY OUT WAS AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE BABRAK REGIME AND THE PAKISTAN (AND IRANIAN) GOVERNMENT. MR GROMYKO ENVISAGED A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN WHICH, AFTER A SERIES OF DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE WOULD END, GUARANTEES WOULD BE GIVEN BY THE MAJOR POWERS (PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, THOUGH THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT EXCLUDED) THAT INTERFERENCE WOULD CEASE, AND FINALLY SOVIET FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE FRENCH HAVE TOLD US THAT GROMYKO'S AIM WAS QUITE CLEARLY TO LEGITIMISE THE PRESENT REGIME IN KABUL. GROMYKO CONCEDED THAT THE REBELS NUMBER TENS OF THOUSANDS. HE CLAIMED THAT INFILTRATION WOULD BE FAR WORSE IF THE SOVIET ARMY WAS NOT PRESENT.

5. THE SOVIET UNION SEEMS TO HAVE PERSUADED CUBA, AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, TO MAKE THE RUNNING FOR THEM IN AN EFFORT TO DRUM UP SUPPORT FOR SOVIET AIMS. MALMIERCA,

THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER, LEFT HAVANA ON 29 APRIL ON HIS THIRD TOUR IN CONNECTION WITH AFGHANISTAN, PLANNING TO VISIT VIENNA, TEHRAN, COLOMBO, BELGRADE AND POSSIBLY OTHER CAPITALS INCLUDING ISLAMABAD. MEANWHILE THE CUBAN VICE-PRESIDENT, ALMEIDA, HAS BEEN TOURING AFRICAN CAPITALS. THE CUBANS HAVE TRIED TO PERSUADE THE PAKISTANIS TO TALK DIRECT TO THE BABRAK GOVERNMENT. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE BOUND BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE RESOLUTION TO HAVE NO CONTACTS WITH THE AFGHAN REGIME. CUBAN EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED AT WINNING SUPPORT AMONGST MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AS WELL AS IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE FOR A SOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL.

NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL.

6. THERE IS SO FAR LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS GAINING GROUND WITH THESE INITIATIVES. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT, IF THERE IS TO BE ANY HOPE OF PERSUADING THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN AND TO ACCEPT A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED GOVERNMENT THERE, THAT THE MOMENTUM OF OUR OWN PROPOSALS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. SOLID SUPPORT AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WILL BE ESPECIALLY VALUABLE. IT IS HELPFUL THAT HABIB CHATTY PROPOSES HIMSELF TO PRESS HIS OWN THINKING ON NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT AT THE CONFERENCE. HE HAS APPARENTLY GIVEN CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO THE QUESTION OF HOW TO PRODUCE A NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT IN KABUL. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE ALSO BEEN ACTIVE IN PRE-CONFERENCE LOBBYING, ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT THAT THEY HAVE AIMED MAINLY AT THE NEED TO RE-AFFIRM CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION. ELSEWHERE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME ENCOURAGING RESPONSES TO THE NEUTRALITY PROPOSAL, BUT THE PALESTINE AND IRANIAN SITUATION WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN IN THE FOREFRONT AT THE CONFERENCE. AMONGST THE NON-ALIGNED, WE SENSE THAT THE INDIANS ARE INCREASINGLY DISENCHANTED WITH SOVIET ACTION, THOUGH NOT YET READY TO SPEAK OUT. THEIR THINKING TENDS TOWARDS 'AN INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN', AND THEY AVOID (POSSIBLY BECAUSE INITIALLY THEY CONFUSED NEUTRALITY AND DEMILITARISATION) THE TERM NEUTRALITY. THIS IS NOT A SERIOUS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US: PROVIDED ANY SOLUTION ESTABLISHED GENUINE INDEPENDENCE, THIS WOULD BE WHOLLY IN

/KEEPING

KEEPING WITH OUR AIM OF A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN.

7. ANOTHER IDEA THAT MAY BE INTRODUCED AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IS THAT OF AN ISLAMIC PEACEKEEPING FORCE, WHICH COULD INCLUDE ALGERIANS, SYRIANS, IRAQIS AND PAKISTANIS. EVEN IF THIS CAME TO NOTHING, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO OPPOSE.

8. WITHIN THE NINE THE ITALIANS HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR THE NEUTRALITY CONCEPT TO BE WORKED OUT IN DETAIL. WHILE WE RECOGNISE THAT A STAGE WILL ARRIVE WHEN DETAILED DISCUSSION IS NECESSARY, WE HAVE SO FAR CONSIDERED THE BEST TACTIC TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS GUESSING WHAT PRECISELY WE HAVE IN MIND. WE ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO AVOID HAVING THE INITIATIVE TAGGED AS SOLELY A 'EUROPEAN' IDEA, AND FOR THIS REASON WOULD PREFER THAT THE ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES SHOULD NOW TAKE THE LEAD IN DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT.

9. (ALL POSTS). WHERE THE RESPONSE OF HOST GOVERNMENTS HAS BEEN EVASIVE OR LESS FIRM THAN IT COULD BE, EG MUSCAT, BELGRADE AND BAHRAIN (WALKER'S TELELETTER OF 10 APRIL TO MIERS AND LUCAS' TELE-LETTER OF 15 APRIL TO MIERS), POSTS SHOULD SPEAK AGAIN TO HOST GOVERNMENTS DRAWING ON THE PARAGRAPHS ABOVE (INCLUDING PARAGRAPH 7) AND ON PARAGRAPHS 13 AND 14 AS APPROPRIATE AND URGING CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, AND FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

SIMILAR ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN POSTS
WHERE THE CUBAN EMISSARIES HAVE BEEN SELLING THEIR 'INITIATIVE'. IN PARTICULAR, POSTS IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SHOULD STRESS THE IMPOR-TANCE OF FIRM ACTION BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM. POSTS SHOULD ALSO STRESS THE CONTINUING EVIDENCE OF WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION WITHIN AFGHANIS-TAN TO THE BABRAK GOVERNMENT AND SOVIET FORCES. TRANSCRIPTS OF RECENT BBC WORLD SERVICE NEWS ITEMS ARE IN MY SECOND IFT AND MY TELNO 68 TO VIENNA (NOT TO POSTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED RETRACT 180). THESE PROVIDE USEFUL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF SUSTAINED AFGHAN OPPOSITION.

10. POSTS SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH COLLEAGUES OF THE NINE ABOUT CARRYING OUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENCY. MEANWHILE WE ARE INFORMING PARTNERS IN CAPITALS OF THE NINE OF THE INSTRUCTIONS BEING SENT TO OUR POSTS, MAKING CLEAR THAT THESE WILL

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BE IMPLEMENTED IN CONSULTATION WITH COLLEAGUES OF THE NINE.

11. (FOR RABAT) IN VIEW OF BOUCETTA'S COMMENTS (DAWBARN'S LETTER OF 14 APRIL TO WHITE REFERS), WE ARE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF A MESSAGE TO HIM.

12. (FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON) CANBERRA TELEGRAM NO 286 REFERS. CONTINUING AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND INTEREST IS WELCOME. IN SEPTEMBER A REGIONAL COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IS DUE TO BE HELD IN DELHI, AND WE ARE BEARING IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COULD BE A SUITABLE OCCASION ON WHICH TO SECURE A PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET ACTIONS, WITH WHICH THE INDIANS WOULD BE ASSOCIATED. A SUMMARY OF WORLDWIDE REACTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

IRAN.

13. THE IRANIANS ARE ATTEMPTING TO MOUNT A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN PRESENTING THEMSELVES AS THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, IT IS THEIR CONTINUED ILLEGAL DETENTION OF THE US HOSTAGES WHICH POSES THE REAL THREAT TO STABILITY. WHERE APPROPRIATE, YOU SHOULD URGE STATES ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR IRAN, WHOSE EMBASSY IN LONDON WAS ITSELF RECENTLY OCCUPIED AND THE STAFF TAKEN HOSTAGE, BUT LATER RELEASED, TO MAKE A MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE AND RELEASE THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATS.

(TO ARAB COUNTRIES). IN PARTICULAR, THE EQUIVOCAL ATTITUDE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES TO SUCH ILLEGAL ACTION, AS EVIDENCED BY THE REFUSAL OF THEIR AMBASSADORS IN LONDON TO MEDIATE OVER THE SIEGE OF THE IRANIAN EMBASSY EXCEPT IN ORDER TO NEGOTIATE A SAFE DEPARTURE FOR THE TERRORISTS, ONLY SERVES FURTHER TO ENDANGER STABILITY, AND INDEED TO PUT AT RISK THE ENTIRE WORLD DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THEMSELVES.

ARAB/ISRAEL.

14. THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAS TRADITIONALLY CONCERNED ITSELF PRIMARILY WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. THE ARABS HAVE TENDED TO ARGUE THAT THEY CANNOT COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE WEST OVER AFGHANISTAN BECAUSE WESTERN POLICIES IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE HAVE NOT TAKEN SATISFACTORY ACCOUNT OF ARAB AND ISLAMIC CONCERNS. THEY HAVE EQUATED ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB LAND, PARTICULARLY EAST

/JERUSALEM

JERUSALEM, WITH SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, AND ARGUED THAT THE FORMER IS MORE IMPORTANT TO THEM. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR IN RESPONSE TO THIS ARGUMENT THAT WE RECOGNISE THE URGENCY OF THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT INVOLVING AN END TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND SATISFACTION OF LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS. WHILE WE CONTINUE TO HOPE FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME FROM THE CAMP DAVID AUTONOMY TALKS, EUROPE IS READY TO HELP KEEP MOMENTUM GOING IN PEACE EFFORTS IF THE AMERICANS ARE UNABLE TO DO SO. WE WISH TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IN THIS SEARCH. BUT WHILE PROGRESS IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER REGIONAL STABILITY, IT WILL NOT OF ITSELF GET THE RUSSIANS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN OR REMOVE THE THREAT TO OTHER ISLAMIC COUNTRIES FROM SOVIET EXPANSIONISM.

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MIPT: AFGHANISTAN: REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ZIA:

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT ZIA'S REPLY TO MRS THATCHER:

QUOTE I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR MESSAGE IN REGARD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRAL STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE APPROACHES YOU HAVE MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS CONTEXT. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT MADE BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, SOME OF WHICH HAVE FOUND MENTION IN YOUR MESSAGE.

YOU WOULD BE AWARE THAT THE MOST RECENT ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MOSCOW AND KABUL AS WELL AS OTHER INTERESTED QUARTERS HAVE SHARPLY MODIFIED THE EARLIER STATEMENTS REFERRED TO IN YOUR MESSAGE AND DIMINISHED THE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE GENUINELY RESPONSIVE TO A PROPOSAL FOR A NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN. IN THESE STATEMENTS BOTH MOSCOW AND KABUL HAVE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED SUCH A STATUS FOR AFGHANISTAN.

THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO SPEAK IN MANY VOICES WITH THE MANIFEST PURPOSE OF ALLOWING ITSELF THE MAXIMUM ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. ITS OBJECTIVE IS TO ENSURE THAT ANY WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS WILL TAKE PLACE ONLY ON ITS OWN TERMS, THE PRINCIPAL AIM BEING TO PRESERVE THE PUPPET REGIME IN KABUL AND PREVENT THE EROSION OF THE STRATEGIC AND IDEOLOGICAL GAINS ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WHILE AGREEING THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ADOPT A FLEXIBLE APPROACH AND CONTINUE TO EXPLORE OPENINGS WE REGARD THE POSSIBILITY OF A POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE VARIOUS INITIATIVES WHICH HAVE SO FAR BEEN TAKEN AS UNPROMISING.

YOUR MESSAGE CONTAINS A REFERENCE TO MR. BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 1963 IN WHICH HE PRAISED AFGHANISTAN'S POLICY OF NEUTRALITY AND NON-PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY BLOCS.

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WE FIND THAT THE 1931 TREATY OF NEUTRALITY AND MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION GOES EVEN A STEP FURTHER AND BINDS BOTH PARTIES '' TO REFRAIN FROM ALL ARMED OR UNARMED INTERVENTION'' IN THE INTERNAL AFFSDR OF EACH OTHER. OF COURSE THE 1931 TREATY HAS NOW BEEN OVERTAKEN BY THE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP OF DECEMBER 1978 WHICH PERMITS THE SOVMNEOV-,89, TO INTERVENE AT THE REQUEST OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THE SOVIET UNION HAS INDUCTED TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE COVER OF THIS TREATY.THE AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS SURROUNDING THE INITAL SOVIET MILITARY MOVE INTO AFGHNAISATN HAVE NOW BEEN IRONED OUT BY THE FORMAL AGREEMENT SIGNED IN MOSCOW DURING THE VISIT OF SHAH MOHAMMAD DOST.

MINDFUL OF THE GRIM IMPLICATIONS WHICH THE AFGHAN SITUATION HAS FOR PAKISTAN I HAVE PUBLICLY MADE CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS INDICATING PAKISTAN'S READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN GUARANTEES SAFEGUARDING THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN AND PREVENTING INTERVENTION IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AS PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH THE PRIMARY AIM OF ENSURING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. IN DOING SO, I HAVE ONLY REAFFIIRMED PAKISTAN'S EXISTING POSITION.

I HAVE OFFERED THE INSPECTION OF REFUGEE CAMPS ON OUR SOIL BY ANY IMPARTIAL AGENCY TO VERIFY THE FACT THAT NO INTERVENTION IS TAKING PLACE FROM OUR SIDE AND HAVE EVEN SUGGESTED THE INDUCTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE CONSISTING OF ISLAMIC OR NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES UNDER THE U.N. AUSPICES TO BE POSTED INSIDE AFGHANISTAN IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT ACCORDS ARRIVED AT ARE IMPLEMENTED. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT PARTICIPATION BY PAKISTAN IN GUARANTEES WOULD REQUIRE RECIPROCAL GUARANTEES FROM AFGHANISTAN THAT IT WILL NOT INTERFERE IN PAKISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND WILL ACKNOWLEDGE AND RESPECT THE ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING US TODAY IS THE PRESENCE OF MORE THAN 700,000 AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN AND THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS ENABLING THEM TO RETURN TO THEIR HEARTHS AND HOMES IN SAFETY AND HONOUR. THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN CONDITIONS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN IMPROVE TO A POINT AS WOULD PERSUADE THE REFUGEES THAT THEY CAN DO SO.

MORE RECENTLY I HAVE HAD A VISIT FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF CUBA WHO BROUGHT A LETTER FROM DR. CASTRO SUGGESTING DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN ME AND BABRAK KARMEL IN HAVANA UNDER HIS AUSPICES. I HAVE INFORMED DR. CASTRO THAT THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE IN VIEW OF OUR ADHERENCE TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE WHICH EMBARGOES ANY CONTACT WITH THE BABRAK KARMEL REGIME TILL SUCH TIME AS SOVIET TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN FROM AFGHANISTAN. I HAVE ALSO ADVISED DR. CASTRO THAT IF HE WISHES

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/TO

TO PLAY A ROLE IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO RESOLVE THE AFGHAN CRISIS WE WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE WHICH SHOULD SPECIFICALLY ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMELAND.

THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE AFGHAN SITUATION REMAINS THE ATTITUDE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO THE REGIME IMPOSED UPON THEM BY FORCE OF SOVIET ARMS. THEIR SUSTAINED OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE FACE OF HEAVY ODDS AND THEIR REFUSAL TO BECOME SUBSERVIANT TO ANY OUTSIDE FORCE MAY BE THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN BRINGING THE SOVIET UNION, SOONER OR LATER, TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

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Top Copy: Germany Feb 80, Visit of Strauss

Extract from the meeting record of visit from Afghanistan

Herr Joseph Strauss on 25 April 1980

AFGHANISTAN

Herr Strauss said that when he had visited President Carter he had told him that he thought that existing treaties, trade agreements and contracts with the Soviet Union should be observed. Measures against the Soviet Union should not automatically be extended to the Soviet Union's satellites unless those countries were helping the Russians to circumvent the steps taken against them. He believed, however, that the COCOM list should be extended and that the West should reduce and eventually eliminate barter deals with the Soviet Union, since these normally gave the Russians high technology in exchange for basic commodities and allowed them to build up their strategic strength. He had also told President Carter that he thought that NATO, and especially the Federal Republic, must improve its military capability. He thought that Germany should replace its Leopard I tanks with the Leopard II in 1983 rather than 1985 and that they should pass on their Leopard I tanks to Turkey. Germany should also deploy six more anti-

/submarine frigates

submarine frigates in the Atlantic and improve the arrangements in Germany for receiving US reinforcements. The European allies should also build up a long-range air transport capability which could be used for operations like that in the Congo in 1978. Herr Strauss added that the Federal Government had decided, with total support from the CDU/CSU, that there should be no Government financial support for German athletes who went to the Moscow Olympic Games. In his view there should be no participation whatsoever in the Olympic Games: there should be no ifs and buts about it.

The Prime Minister said that her views on the Olympic Games were well known. There never had been any question of the British Government making money directly available for sportsmen to take part in the Games. Money to support the British participants was being raised privately, but she had now ended her association with the appeal for funds.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1536 OF 19 APRIL 1980
INFO PARIS AND BONN.

IRAN/AFGHANISTAN/USA

1. WHEN I SAW BRZEZINSKI TODAY HE EXPRESSED MORE CONCERN ABOUT AFGHANISTAN THAN IRAN. AFGHANISTAN WAS SHOWING UP THE PROBLEM OF RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND REVEALING MORE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAN DID IRAN.

2. ON IRAN, HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES TO CONSULT TOGETHER. IT WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF THEY COULD ACT MORE OR LESS ON THE SAME LINES THAN IF ONE OR TWO OF THE COUNTRIES ADOPTED FAR-REACHING MEASURES BUT THEREBY GOT OUT OF LINE WITH THE REST.

3. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT SOME OF THE SPECULATION IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THE DISCORD WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON IRAN WAS EXAGGERATED: IT WAS ALSO COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. NOT ONLY DID IT HEARTEN THE OTHER SIDE BUT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS TO BE SOME CRITICISM OF THE ALLIED BY THE US AUTHORITIES JUST PRIOR TO THE MEETING OF COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE 21ST THAT COULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO ACT RESOLUTELY BECAUSE THEY THEN COULD LAY THEMSELVES OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF YIELDING TO AMERICAN PRESSURE. BRZEZINSKI SAID HE ACCEPTED THIS ENTIRELY BUT ADDED THAT I MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WERE POLITICAL REASONS IN THE USA FOR URGING THE ALLIES TO DO MORE. IN QUOTING THIS I DO NOT WISH TO GIVE YOU THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICANS ARE CYNICAL ABOUT IT AND SEE ALLIED SUPPORT PURELY IN TERMS OF US DOMESTIC POLITICS. I AM QUITE SURE THAT FOR MANY REASONS THEY WANT ALLIED SOLIDARITY. MOREOVER, THOUGH BRZEZINSKI MAY SEE THE HOSTAGE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE, US PUBLIC OPINION IS THOROUGHLY STEAMED UP: AND THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO CONTROL IT. I AM ALSO PRETTY SURE THAT IF ALLIED AND US PRESSURE DO NOT SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES THE US WILL RESORT TO FURTHER STEPS WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE CUTTING OFF OF WESTERN EUROPEAN TRADE WITH IRAN. DOES THIS SUGGEST THAT IF WE ARE GOING TO HAVE THIS TRADE CUT-OFF ANYWAY, WE MIGHT AS WELL TAKE THE CREDIT FOR IT AND DO IT OURSELVES AS AN ACT OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY?

4. ON AFGHANISTAN, BRZEZINSKI THOUGHT THAT THE TALK OF CONFLICT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WAS NOT EXAGGERATED. THERE REALLY WERE QUITE DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT AND OF HOW TO MEET THE THREAT AS BETWEEN THE USA ON THE ONE HAND AND EUROPE ON THE OTHER. I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK THAT THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOU COULD BE ACCUSED OF A DIFFERENT PERCEPTION THAN THAT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF WHAT WAS INVOLVED.

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5. BRZEZINSKI ASKED ABOUT THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO REACH FINAL CONCLUSIONS TO FAR AS THE BRITISH TEAMS WERE CONCERNED. BUT THE BRITISH OLYMPIC COMMITTEE WERE NOT ACTUATED BY POLITICS, LET ALONE BY ANTI-AMERICANISM: IT WAS SIMPLY THAT THEY HAD A NAIVE BELIEF THAT THE OLYMPIC GAMES COULD BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM POLITICS.

6. I ASKED BRZEZINSKI WHETHER PRESIDENT CARTER WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S REACTION. HE LEFT ME IN NO DOUBT THAT HE WAS. SCHMIDT HAD SPOKEN HERE ON USUAL LINES ABOUT HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GERMANS IN THE EAST AND FOR MAINTAINING THE LINKS INVOLVED IN DETENTE. OBVIOUSLY SCHMIDT'S TNF STATEMENT HAS CAUSED ANNOYANCE.

7. STRAUSS HAS BEEN IN WASHINGTON FAIRLY RECENTLY AND I THINK THAT HE HAS MADE A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON THE AUTHORITIES HERE.

8. AFTER BRZEZINSKI HAD SPOKEN AGAIN ABOUT HIS CONCERN OVER THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THE POST-AFGHANISTAN SITUATION, I SUGGESTED THAT AS A FIRST STEP IT WOULD HELP TO TRY TO GET CLOSER AGREEMENT ON WHAT WE THOUGHT SOVIET INTENTIONS WERE AND WHAT THEIR MILITARY POSSIBILITIES COULD BE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. BRZEZINSKI COMMENTED THAT EACH COUNTRY'S ANALYSIS WOULD REFLECT WHAT THEY WANTED THE SITUATION TO BE RATHER THAN WHAT IT REALLY WAS.

9. I ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT US POLICY ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION HAD THE EFFECT OF HAM-STRINGING THE UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, AT ANY RATE SO OTHERS SAW IT. PREDICTABLY, BRZEZINSKI AGREED ENTIRELY.

10. AS YOU WILL SEE, THERE IS AN UNTIDY BUT HIGHLY IMPORTANT MESS FOR YOU TO TALK ABOUT WHEN YOU COME HERE: AND THE AMERICANS, AS I HAVE OFTEN INDICATED, ARE LONGING FOR IDEAS FROM US. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF TELLING BRZEZINSKI ABOUT YOUR POSSIBLE DATES.
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1367 OF 17 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI WASHINGTON NEW YORK MOSCOW PEKING
KABUL ISLAMABAD PARIS BONN TEHRAN
SECRETARY OF STATE'S CALL ON MRS GANDHI
FOLLOWING FROM WALDEN

Read in full (& compare with conversation with Zia, Marches).

1. LORD CARRINGTON CONGRATULATED MRS GANDHI ON HER RECENT ESCAPE FROM AN ASSAILANT. MRS GANDHI AT FIRST DISMISSED THIS AS ONE OF THE HAZARDS OF LIFE, BUT THEN SAID SHE WAS SURE THAT SOMEONE WAS BEHIND THE ASSAILANT, AND MENTIONED ONE GEORGE FERNANDEZ.
2. LORD CARRINGTON THANKED MRS GANDHI FOR HER LETTER TO MRS THATCHER ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, AND SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO READ ABOUT SIR J THOMSON'S DISCUSSIONS WITH MRS GANDHI WITH INTEREST. MRS GANDHI SAID THAT IT WAS HER IMPRESSION THAT BOTH SIDES HAD MOVED A BIT ON AFGHANISTAN. MR FRASER HAD TOLD HERTHAT MORNING PROVIDED THE RUSSIANS WITHDREW, PEOPLE DID NOT MIND WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT WAS LEFT BEHIND. IN RESPONSE TO A QUIERY FROM LORD CARRINGTON, MRS GANDHI SAID SHE PRESUMED THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE IF NOT EXACTLY PRO-SOVIET, NOT UNFRIENDLY TO MOSCOW, AND A GOVERNMENT THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD TRUST. LORD CARRINGTON OBSERVED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS LEFT A PRO-SOVIET GOVERNMENT BEHIND, IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO LAST LONG. THE MORE REASSURING SUCH A GOVERNMENT WAS TO THE RUSSIANS, THE LESS ACCEPTABLE IT WOULD BE TO THE AFGHANS. MRS GANDHI WAS INCLINED TO CONTEST THIS. SHE HAD RECENTLY BEEN TOLD BY AN INDIAN WHO HAD TRAVELLED IN AFGHANISTAN THAT AMIN'S DISAPPEARANCE HAD BEEN WELCOMED BY PUBLIC OPINION. ONLY WHEN IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE THERE TO STAY HAD THIS FEELING CHANGED. SHE THOUGHT THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE TAKING A MORE REALISTIC VIEW OF AFGHANISTAN AT THE MOMENT, PARTLY BECAUSE FEELING AGAINST ZIA INSIDE THE COUNTRY WAS RISING. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME CRITICISM THAT ZIA WAS NOT BEING TOUGH ENOUGH OVER AFGHANISTAN. MRS GANDHI DISAGREED.
3. ON INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS, MRS GANDHI SAID THAT BOTH SIDES WERE TRYING TO IMPROVE MATTERS. BUT PRESIDENT ZIA WAS IN A VERY WEAK POSITION. THE BALUCHIS HAD BEEN AGAINST HIM FOR SOME TIME, AND THERE WAS NOW NO GROUP THAT WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE PRESIDENT, INCLUDING THE PUNJABIS WHOSE ALLEGIANCE HE HAD WEAKENED BY HIS DISMISSAL OF A NUMBER OF GENERALS. HANGING BHUTTO HAD NOT DONE HIM MUCH GOOD, AND HAD CONSOLIDATED OPPOSTION AGAINST HIM.
4. LORD CARRINGTON DESCRIBED PROGRESS ON OUR INITIATIVE FOR A NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, STRESSING THAT HE DID NOT INSIST TOO MUCH ON THE WORDS USED TO DESCRIBE OUR PROPOSAL. IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO WORK, IF IT EVER DID. BUT IT HELPED THE NON-ALIGNED AND THIRD WORLD MOVEMENT TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS. IT WOULD BE DAMAGING FOR EVERYONE IF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN BECAME REGARDED AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI. MRS GANDHI OBSERVED THAT NO COUNTRY TOOK MUCH NOTICE OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION

IF IT FELT THAT ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE. THE RUSSIANS HAD THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD A PROGRESSIVE PRO-SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, AND WERE DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW THE COUNTRY TO BECOME A SPRINGBOARD FOR TROUBLE-MAKING AGAINST THEIR ASIAN REPUBLICS UNDER AMIN. THEY WERE ALSO AFRAID OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THERE AS A DANGER THAT THE ISSUE MIGHT NOW BECOME CONFUSED WITH THAT OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGES. AMERICAN PATIENCE WAS NATURALLY WEARING THIN, BUT ANY MEASURES AGAINST IRAN COULD SPREAD CONFLICT IN THE WHOLE AREA. HE ASKED HOW MRS GANDHI THOUGHT PRESSURE COULD BE PUT ON THE IRANIANS TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES. MRS GANDHI WAS NOT SURE WHO WAS IN CHARGE IN IRAN, AND WONDERED WHO WAS BEHIND THE STUDENTS. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT KHOMEINI'S SON AND THOSE IN THE AYATOLLAH'S ENTOURAGE, ESPECIALLY BEHESTI, WERE VERY POWERFUL, AND HOPED THAT PRESSURE COULD BE BROUGHT ON THEM.

6. AFTER A BRIEF AND UNORIGINAL DISCUSSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, MRS GANDHI RAISED THE QUESTION OF PAKISTAN RE-JOINING THE COMMONWEALTH. SHE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF THE PAKISTANIS BEING INVITED TO RE-JOIN. THE TIME WAS NOT RIPE, AND THERE WERE ENOUGH REGIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE COMMONWEALTH ALREADY. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE CANADIANS, RATHER THAN OURSELVES, WERE ACTIVE OVER THIS. IT WAS A QUESTION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE TO DECIDE. HOWEVER, HE WONDERED WHETHER THE INDIANS WOULD OBJECT IN THE LONGER TERM. MRS GANDHI PREFERRED TO SEE HOW THINGS WENT FIRST.

7. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HOPED MR RAO COULD VISIT LONDON SOON. MRS GANDHI SAID THAT SHE HAD TOLD HER MINISTERS TO AVOID GOOING ABROAD UNLESS IT WAS UNAVOIDABLE. MANY MEMBERS OF THE LAST GOVERNMENT HAD SPENT MOST OF THEIR TIME ABROAD. THIS HAS CAUSED POPULAR RESENTMENT. LORD CARRINGTON HOPED THAT MRS GANDHI MIGHT RELAX HER RULE IN THE CASE OF MR RAO LATER IN THE YEAR, AND THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER COULD VISIT BRITAIN, PERHAPS AROUND THE TIME OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE U N.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1366 OF 17 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON NEW YORK MOSCOW KABUL ISLAMABAD PARIS BONN

THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S CALL ON PRESIDENT ZIA

FOLLOWING FROM WALDEN

1. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON RHODESIA (WHICH THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED AS A POLITICAL MIRACLE), THE PRESIDENT ASKED ABOUT PROGRESS ON OUR PROPOSAL FOR A NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAND. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT COMPLETELY NEGATIVE, THOUGH THERE WAS MORE INTEREST IN THE THIRD WORLD. PROGRESS WOULD OBVIOUSLY ONLY COME IN THE LONG-TERM, BUT IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE AND DEMONSTRABLY FAIR IDEA TO PUT THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WRONG. IT ALSO HELPED TO PREVENT THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN FROM BECOMING A TACITLY ACCEPTED FAIT ACCOMPLI. HE ASKED ABOUT THE RECENT VISIT TO ISLAMABAD OF THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

2. PRESIDENT ZIA SAID THAT MALMIERCA HAD CALLED ON HIM WITH A LETTER FROM CASTRO. THE CUBANS HAD PROPOSED THAT THE PAKISTANIS SHOULD TALK DIRECTLY TO BABRAK KARMAL, AND AVOID CONDEMNING THE RUSSIANS TOO OPENLY WHO HAD BEEN PUT ON THE SPOT BY THE U N RESOLUTION AND BY THE ISLAMIC CONCERENCE. IN GENERAL, THE PAKISTANIS SHOULD BE MORE REALISTIC. CASTRO WOULD BE READY TO MEDIATE, WHETHER FROM CUBA, IN EUROPE OR ELSEWHERE. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD DISPOSED OF MALMIERCA QUICKLY, TELLING HIM THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAD BEEN READY TO TALK TO DAOUD AND TARAKI, BUT NOT TO BABRAK WHO HAD RIDDEN IN ON SOVIET TANKS. THIS WOULD BE AGAINST HIS PERSONAL AND NATIONAL CONSCIENCE, AND AGAINST THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. CASTRO, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND BLUE-EYED BOY OF THE SOVIET UNION, SHOULD USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH THE RUSSIANS TO GET THEM OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. IN REPLY, MALMIERCA HAD SAID THAT THE CUBANS DID NOT APPROVE OF THE SOVIET INVASIONS, AND THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED WHY THEY DID NOT TELL THE RUSSIANS THIS. HE HAD SENT MALMIERCA BACK WITH A LETTER FOR CASTRO. TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

3. THE PRESIDENT'S ANALYSIS WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD COME TO STAY IN AFGHANISTAN. HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT QUOTE PUNISHED UNQUOTE THE PAKISTANIS SO FAR, ALTHOUGH HE WAS ONLY HELPING REFUGEES FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND NOT INTERFERING IN AFGHANISTAN. THE RUSSIANS COULD FIND EXCUSES IF THEY WANTED. THEY HAD OVERFLOWN PESHAWAR SIX WEEKS AGO, BUT HE HAD RESTRAINED HIS CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE FROM SHOOTING THE RUSSIANS DOWN. THEY WERE STILL SENDING PLANES TO RECONNOITRE PAKISTANI TERRITORY AND LARGE SCALE SOVIET SUBVERSION WAS UNDERWAY IN BALUCHISTAN AND SIND. LARGE SUMS OF MONEY WERE INVOLVED, BUT THE PAKISTANIS HAD TAKEN COUNTER MEASURES. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT, THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO OCCUPY SOUTHERN BALUCHISTAN AND ENCIRCLE IRAN.

4. THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS WERE DOING A GOOD JOB, AND IT WAS A PITY THAT THE PAKISTANIS COULD NOT HELP THEM. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM WITH BRZEZINSKI. THE MOSLEM COUNTRIES WERE ALL WILLING TO HELP, BUT THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS WANTED WEAPONS NOT MONEY. IT WAS TRAGIC THAT THEY WERE USING ARMS OF 1914 VINTAGE, WHEN EVEN A MODERN MACHINE-GUN COULD BRING DOWN A HELICOPTER GUNSHIP. HE HAD ASKED AMERICAN CONGRESSMEN WHY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WERE NOT DOING MORE, AND HAD REMINDED THEM THAT NO-ONE HAD OBJECTED TO CHINESE AND RUSSIAN HELP FOR VIETNAM. THE AFGHANS NEEDED A SAFE SANCTURARY, SUCH AS THE N. VIETNAMESE HAD ENJOYED IN HANOI: HE IMPLIED THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE ON PAKISTANI SOIL. TIME WAS NOW SHORT: WHEN THE SNOW FINALLY MELTED IN THREE WEEKS, THE RUSSIANS WOULD LAUNCH A BIG OFFENSIVE WHICH COULD DISCOURAGE RESISTANCE AND INCREASE REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN TO A MILLION.

5. THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MEETING IN MID-MAY WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN LAST TIME. THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN DOING THEIR HOMEWORK WITH THE PALESTINIANS, LIBYANS, SYRIANS, ALGERIANS AND YEMENIS, WHO MIGHT PROPOSE A RESOLUTION EQUATING SOVIET INTERVENTION WITH INTERFERENCE FROM PAKISTAN, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF EXCALPATING THE RUSSIANS. MR AGHA SHAHI SAID HE WOULD STRESS AT THE MEETING THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, AND WOULD EXPRESS READINESS TO GIVE GUARANTEES ON NON-INTERFERENCE. HE WOULD ALSO MAKE PLAY WITH THE NEED FOR CONDITIONS TO BE CREATED IN AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD ALLOW REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME. THIS WAS THE ONLY LEVER TO PROMOTE A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. IF THERE WERE TO BE A SETTLEMENT A COMPROMIS E PERSONALITY ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHANS WOULD BE NEEDED. MEANWHILE THE PAKISTANIS DEPENDED ON THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS TO KEEP THE CAMPAIGN GOING.

6. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED ABOUT INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE VISIT OF MRS GANDHI'S ENVOY, SWARAN SINGH, HAD BEEN A USEFUL EXERCISE. SINGH HAD TOLD HIM NOT TO WORRY ABOUT THE SECURITY OF HIS EASTERN FRONTIER AND ASSURED HIM THAT THE INDIANS WANTED A STRONG AND STABLE PAKISTAN. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED WHY MRS GANDHI DID NOT SAY THIS PUBLICLY. BUT HE HAD NOT BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY THE VISIT, AND WAS HOPEFUL OF BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE INDIANS. ALHA SHAHI SAID THAT MRS GANDHI WANTED TO ELIMINATE AMERICAN INFLUENCE IN THE AREA, AND OBJECTED TO CLOSER PAKISTANI/U S RELATIONS. HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT A SUGGESTION THAT A CONFERENCE OF THE HELSINKI POWERS SHOULD BE HELD TO DISCUSS

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THE GULF. THIS WOULD GIVE THE RUSSIANS A LOCUS STANDI IN THE AREA. HE WAS AFRAID OPINION IN EUROPE MIGHT DEVELOP IN FAVOUR OF SUCH A CONFERENCE. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THIS UNLIKELY. IT WAS TRUE THAT SOME MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD PROPOSED WERE EMBARRASSING FOR SOME EUROPEANS (EG THE GERMANS BECAUSE OF OSTPOLITIK). BUT THE PUSSIANS WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN DIVIDING THE AMERICANS FROM EUROPE. HE SAW THE TENDENCY TO FORGET WHAT HAD HAPPENDED IN AFGHANISTAN AS A GREATER DANGER AND ASKED WHETHER THE PAKISTANIS COULD HELP TO ENSURE THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES WAS REACHING THE WEST. THE PRESIDENT SEEMED TO TAKE THE POINT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1365 OF 17 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING WASHINGTON NEW YORK MOSCOW BONN PARIS KABUL ISLAMABAD

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER

FOLLOWING FROM WALDEN

1. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT, DURING HIS VISIT TO KUALA LUMPUR, HE HAD FOUND THE A S E A N COUNTRIES, AND ESPECIALLY THE THAIS, VERY CONCERNED ABOUT CAMBODIA. HUANG HUA THOUGH THAT THE THAIS WERE WORRIED THAT THE SOVIET ADVENTURE IN AFGHANISTAN HAD INCREASED THE POSSIBILITY OF VIETNAMESE RETALIATION ACROSS THEIR BORDER. BUT IT SEEMED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE RESTRAINED THE VIETNAMESE IN ORDER NOT TO PROVOKE FURTHER INTERMATIONAL HOSTILITY. THEIR PRESENT AIM WAS TO AVOID PUBLICITY ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, ISOLATE THE AMERICANS BY SPLITTING THEM FROM EUROPE, AND CONDEMN CHINA. THEY WERE REINFORCING THEIR MILITARY ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT COMBINING THIS WITH A PEACEFUL OFFENSIVE, HINTING THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT, BUT ON THEIR OWN CONDITIONS. THEY WOULD WANT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO GUARANTEE THE NEUTRALITY OF AFGHANISTAN AND UNDERTAKE NOT TO INTERFERE. THEY WANTED THE WORLD TO RECOGNISE THE LEGITIMACY OF THEIR INVASION AND MILITARY PRESENCE, AND TO DEPRIVE THE AFGHANS OF THE RIGHT TO RESIST AND OTHERS OF THE RIGHT TO ASSIST THEM. IN THIS WAY THE RUSSIANS HOPED TO TURN THE TABLES ON THE WEST. THE SIGNATURE OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN TREATY ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS MEANT THAT ANY REAL NEGOTIATION WOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE.

2. THE RUSSIANS WERE IN AFGHANISTAN TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A THRUST TO THE GULF. IT WAS NOT A LOCAL, ISOLATED ACTION, BUT A DECISION TAKEN AFTER DUE CALCULATION. THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN TRYING TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE PAKISTANIS AT SOVIET BEHEST TO PROMOTE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. EVEN A PRELIMINARY CONTACT WOULD BE DANGEROUS SINCE IT WOULD DETRACT FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND BEGIN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH KABUL.

3. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY BAD MOVE. BUT THE QUESTION WAS WHERE WE WENT FROM HERE. OUR VIEW WAS THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, IE WHAT THE AFGHANS WOULD LIKE IF LEFT ALONE. THE EXCUSE THE SOVIET UNION HAD USED FOR THEIR INTERVENTION WAS FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND THE THREAT TO THE SOVIET BORDERS. UNDER OUR NEUTRALITY PROPOSALS, THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE DEPRIVED OF THIS EXCUSE. EVEN IF THE PROPOSAL WERE NOT PRACTICABLE IMMEDIATELY, IT WAS A GOOD POLITICAL MOVE, AND THE THIRD WORLD AND THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES MIGHT TAKE IT UP. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WAS THAT OF GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI, WHICH WOULD BE THE WORST OUTCOME OF ALL.

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4. HUANG HUA REPEATED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE USING TALK OF NEGOTIATIONS AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO GAIN TIME AND TO PREVENT COMMON ACTION AGAINST THEM. THEY KNEW THAT THERE WAS AN ECONOMIC DEPRESSION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THAT TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE EAST WERE IMPORTANT. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO SPLIT THE WEST AND PLAY FOR TIME IN THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD ALL FORGET AFGHANISTAN. THIS MADE IT NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS, NOT ONLY FROM THE WEST BUT THROUGH THE THIRD AND ISLAMIC WORLDS. THE ONLY WAY THIS COULD BE DONE WAS BY A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL INVOLVING PRIOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND GURANTEES. AN ADDED DANGER WAS THAT THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM WAS GETTING CAUGHT UP IN THE QUESTION OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN TEHERAN. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN VERY PATIENT, BUT ANY ACTION THEY TOOK IN IRAN COULD RUB OFF ON THE AFGHAN SITUATION.

5. HUANG HUA AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S AIMS, BUT HAD DOUBTS ABOUT OUR APPROACH. THREE THINGS WERE NECESSARY:

A) WE SHOULD INSIST ON THE RUSSIANS ABIDING BY THE U N AND ISLAMIC RESOLUTIONS, IE ON THE TOTAL, UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL TROOPS:

B) THE AFGHANS SHOULD REGAIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE, NEUTRALITY AND ISLAMIC CHARACTER OF THEIR COUNTRY.

C) JOINT ACTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AGAINST THE RUSSIANS, AND THEIR ATROCITIES SHOULD BE EXPOSED. THE AFGHAN PEOPLE SHOULD BE GIVEN POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT IN THEIR RESISTENCE. WE SHOULD NOT TIE OUR OWN HANDS.

6. ALL THIS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH TO FORCE THE RUSSIANS OUT. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE AND TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE RUSSIANS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN THEIR OWN BLOC, AND TO ISOLATE THEM INTERNATIONALLY. ONLY IN THIS WAY COULD ONE PREVENT THEM THRUSTING FURTHER TOWARDS THE SOUTH AND THE SEA LANES. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS, BUT THOUGHT THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO PURSUE HIS NEUTRALITY PROPOSALS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

7. HUANG HUA RAISED VERY BRIEFLY THE ANGLO-CHINESE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT. HE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD EXAMINE THE PROBLEMS IN DETAIL. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ABOUT TO MAKE THE SAME POINT TO HUANG HUA.

8. HUANG HUA SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN PEKING AT THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER.

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SOAMES

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FM WASHINGTON 170008Z APR 80
TO PRIORITY F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1490 OF 16 APRIL.
INFO BONN, PARIS.

mr.

AFGHANISTAN

1. AT THE FOUR-POWER LUNCH TODAY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR GAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM PARIS ON WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR A SPECIAL STATUS FOR AFGHANISTAN:

(A) SUCH A STATUS MIGHT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF PUTTING AFGHANISTAN INTO A STATE OF TUTELAGE:

(B) IT WOULD INVOLVE COMMITMENT BY AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT - YET WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PRESENT AFGHAN GOVERNMENT:

(C) IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES COULD EXPRESS AN OPINION ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ON SUCH A STATUS:

(D) AS REGARDS GUARANTEES BY THIRD PARTIES WE SHOULD BE VERY CAUTIOUS TO DO NOTHING THAT MIGHT JUSTIFY SUBSEQUENT INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE:

(E) AS REGARDS THE DURAND LINE, THE FRENCH THOUGHT IT BEST TO KEEP QUIET ABOUT THE FRONTIER SO THAT ATTENTION SHOULD NOT BE DISTRACTED TO THAT ISSUE.

2. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS THE FRENCH WERE THINKING OF SOMETHING IMPRECISE COVERING THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF AFGHANISTAN IN WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD SAY THAT THEY WOULD RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF AFGHANISTAN, AND WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO SEND IN ANY TROOPS OR TRY TO MAKE THE COUNTRY JOIN ALLIANCES. EVENTUALLY SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE TAKEN NOTE OF BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR DESCRIBED THE REASONS THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD GIVEN HIM AT A RECENT LUNCH, FOR THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN BUT I DO NOT CONSIDER THEM WORTH TELEGRAPHING, OR INDEED RECORDING. HE ALSO REFERED TO GROMYKO'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO PARIS.

HENDERSON

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 April 1980

Message to President Carter : NATO Meeting

Your letter to me of 11 April contained a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Carter's message to her of 7 April. The Prime Minister approved your draft over the weekend and it has, as you know, been despatched. I enclose a copy of the signed text.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), and with its enclosure, to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

KRB

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Copy also on Iran

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GRS 920
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FM BONN 141646Z APR 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 321 OF 14 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, TEHRAN, EC POSTS

IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN

1. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAS RETURNED TO THE STAGE AFTER HIS EASTER BREAK. AT PARTY MEETINGS IN HAMBURG ON 11 APRIL AND ESSEN ON 13 APRIL AND IN AN INTERVIEW WITH BILD ZEITUNG ON 14 APRIL HE MADE HIS FIRST SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENTS SINCE PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN.

2. HIS MAIN POINTS WERE:

A) COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE FINAL PHASE BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR ONE WERE UNFORTUNATELY NOT COMPLETELY FALSE. THE PROCESS OF ESCALATION WAS SLOWER NOW THAN IN THE SUMMER OF 1914: AND THE MILITARY IN THE MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES CONCERNED WERE PLAYING NO DECISIVE ROLE. BUT PEOPLE WERE THINKING IN MILITARY TERMS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOVIET UNION.

B) UP TO NOW THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD NOT DEVELOPED ANY ADEQUATE STRATEGY FOR AVOIDING CRISES AND THEY DID NOT TALK OPENLY ENOUGH TO EACH OTHER ABOUT THEIR BASIC OBJECTIVES AND NEEDS. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THEM TO PUT THEMSELVES IN EACH OTHER'S SHOES.

C) THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD UP TILL NOW ADVISED THE US AGAINST MILITARY ACTION AND AGAINST ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN. BUT IF NECESSARY THE FRG WOULD, TOGETHER WITH HER EC PARTNERS, TAKE PART IN BOYCOTT MEASURES, EVEN IF THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THEM LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE.

D) IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM BILD ZEITUNG HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD BEEN LEFT IN THE LURCH BY THE FRG. HE HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING LIKE THAT FROM THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF.

E) ASKED IF AN OIL CRISIS WOULD LEAD TO A COLD WINTER FOR THE GERMANS HE SAID THAT HE WOULDN'T GO THAT FAR. BUT HEATING OIL, PETROL AND DIESEL COULD BE IN MUCH SHORTER SUPPLY AND MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE. IT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO CONVERT TO COAL FOR DOMESTIC HEATING AND IN INDUSTRY.

F) ASKED ABOUT MILITARY ACTION TO FREE THE HOSTAGES HE SAID THAT THERE WERE VERY CLEAR CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OVER MILITARY ACTION EG IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE BASIC LAW PERMITTED ONLY ONE EXCEPTION (TO OPERATING EXCLUSIVELY INSIDE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC) AND THAT WAS FOR THE AREA WHICH WAS PRECISELY DEFINED IN THE NATO TREATY. THAT AREA DID NOT INCLUDE THE MIDDLE EAST.

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3. GENERAL BRANDT, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE BUNDESWEHR, MADE MUCH THE SAME POINT IN A SPEECH OVER THE WEEKEND AT THE FRG STAFF COLLEGE IN HAMBURG: QUOTE NATO IS AN ALLIANCE FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA AND NOT AN ALLIANCE FOR THE DEFENCE OF ITS MEMBERS' MANY-SIDED INTERESTS ALL OVER THE WORLD UNQUOTE.

4. HERR GENSCHER ALSO SPOKE OUT STRONGLY OVER THE WEEKEND. IN A TV INTERVIEW HE SAID THAT ALL EFFORTS MUST NOW BE DIRECTED TO LEAVING NO DOUBT ABOUT THE SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS AND THE AMERICANS. WASHINGTON HAD NOT IN FACT SET ANY DATE FOR ITS PARTNERS TO REACH A DECISION OVER IRAN. BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO QUOTE TO DO SOMETHING SOON UNQUOTE. THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE EC TREATIES SHOULD BE USED FOR ANY MEMBER STATE WHICH UNLIKE THE FRG DID NOT HAVE AT ITS DISPOSAL THE NECESSARY LEGISLATION FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. THAT WOULD MAKE COLLECTIVE ACTION POSSIBLE.
(DR PER FISCHER, DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT HAS A DETAILED PIECE IN TODAY'S EDITION OF DIE WELT, ARGUING THAT ARTICLE 113 OF THE TREATY OF ROME PROVIDES THE NECESSARY BASIS - TRANSLATION OF ARTICLE FOLLOWS BY TOMORROW'S BAG).

5. COMMENT. SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER ARE APPROACHING THE ISSUE FROM SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT ANGLES, THE FORMER STRESSING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CRISIS AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF US POLICIES, THE LATTER (AT ANY RATE IN PUBLIC) FOCUSSING ON THE OVERIDING NEED FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE US. BUT THEY APPEAR TO HAVE REACHED COMMON GROUND ON THE PROPOSITION THAT THE MOMENT IS NEAR WHEN SANCTIONS WILL BE JUSTIFIED, WITHOUT DISGUISING THEIR SCEPTICISM AS TO WHETHER SANCTIONS ARE LIKELY TO PROVE EFFECTIVE.

6. PUBLIC OPINION HAS MOVED IN THE SAME DIRECTION. THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATION OF GERMAN INDUSTRIES (BDI) HAS SAID THAT ALTHOUGH A LIMITATION OF EXPORTS TO IRAN WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR A NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES, THE BDI WOULD LOYALLY IMPLEMENT A DECISION IN FAVOUR OF SANCTIONS IF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WERE TO TAKE IT. LAST WEEK THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF GERMAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (DIHT) SAID THAT HE SAW A BASIS FOR SANCTIONS, THOUGH HE DID NOT WANT TO BE OVER-ZEALOUS. THERE HAS MOREOVER BEEN A CLEAR CONSENSUS IN THE PRESS FAVOURING ACTION TO SUPPORT THE US: AND THE OPPOSITION ARE CALLING FOR FIRM STEPS. MARX, CDU/CSU FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN, HAS DEMANDED DECISIVE MEASURES OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICANS, SAYING THAT LONG COMMUNIQUES WITH HIGH-SOUNDING WORDS WERE NOT ENOUGH. BOTH HE AND KIEP (CDU) HAVE SAID THAT A RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SHOULD BE ONE OF THE STEPS (THE GOVERNMENT HAVE STUCK TO THEIR LINE THAT AT THE MOMENT THEY THINK THIS WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN SHOULD BE USED IN THE INTERESTS OF THE HOSTAGES). OPINION WITHIN THE SPD

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IS MORE CRITICAL. WISCHNEWSKI HAS DOUBTED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS AND EGON BAHR HAS SAID THAT AN EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN, EVEN IF SUPPORTED BY EUROPE, JAPAN, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, WOULD STILL LEAVE HOLES AS BIG AS A BARN DOOR UNLESS THE IMPORTANT ISLAMIC COUNTRIES CAME ALONG TOO. BUT THE GENERAL IMPRESSION HERE IS THAT A WELL PREPARED CONSENSUS IN FAVOUR OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS EMERGING, PREFERABLY UNDER COMMUNITY COVER. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT DO, SHOULD IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY NOT BE PREPARED TO GO THAT FAR.

GOODALL

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Subject 2

T80/80

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T80/80

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your further message of 7 April. I much appreciate the spirit in which you have received my earlier comments.

I am pleased that you regard as useful the idea that we should discuss political and security issues at Venice. For my part I agree that the presence of Foreign Ministers at the NATO meeting already scheduled for 13 - 14 May would enhance proceedings. Your Permanent Representative at NATO has now informed his fellow members of the Defence Policy Committee of your proposal and the British Representative expressed his personal support for it, which he is now being instructed to confirm. I understand that your initiative was generally well received by other Alliance representatives as well.

Since the meeting is only a little over a month away, preparations for it will have to be intensive and thorough if it is to achieve its aims. I for my part am ready to do all in my power to help.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The President of the United States of America

13.4.80

SECRET

file. RLt

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 11 April 1980

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to acknowledge your letter of 10 April. I will, of course, arrange for the enclosed letter which you sent from Mrs Gandhi to be brought to the immediate attention of the Prime Minister.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Dr. I P Singh

COVERING SECRET

Message passed to Resident Clerk for despatch (2230) 13.4.80

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 April 1980

Prime Minister.

The Foreign Secretary's programme is going to be very crowded in mid-June. But, as he says, a positive response seems essential. I have had the draft tipped up in final form to save time. Agree?

Yes pls

Paul 11/4

Dear Michael,

Message from President Carter: NATO Meeting

Nick Sanders' letter of 8 April asked for advice on the handling of a message from President Carter to the Prime Minister proposing that the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers scheduled for 13-14 May should become a joint Foreign Ministers'/Defence Ministers' meeting.

President Carter's proposal has now been put forward at NATO by the US Permanent Representative. As explained at NATO, the US proposal is that Foreign Ministers should attend the second day of the Defence Ministers' meeting to give joint Ministerial approval to the decisions taken. This is considerably less ambitious than what President Carter seemed to have in mind in his message to the Prime Minister which appeared to envisage the adoption of a package of political measures by the Alliance.

Whatever the exact intentions of the Americans, the proposal for a joint meeting avoids many of the objections to which President Carter's earlier Summit proposal was open. The Foreign Secretary is sure that circumstances require a positive response.

I attach a draft reply which has been approved by the Foreign Secretary. I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosures to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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DSR 11 (Revised)

SECRET

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
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Unclassified

TO: President Carter

Your Reference

Copies to:

att to FCO & MA 11.4.

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CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your further message of 7 April. I much appreciate the spirit in which you have received my earlier comments.

I am pleased that you regard as useful the idea that we should discuss political and security issues at Venice. For my part I agree that the presence of Foreign Ministers at the NATO meeting already scheduled for 13-14 May would enhance proceedings. Your Permanent Representative at NATO has now informed his fellow members of the Defence Policy Committee of your proposal and the British Representative expressed his personal support for it, which he is now being instructed to confirm. I understand that your initiative was generally well received by other Alliance representatives as well.

Since the meeting is only a little over a month away, preparations for it will have to be intensive and thorough if it is to achieve its aims. I for my part am ready to do all in my power to help.

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Subject filed on 1 Jan
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UKMIS NEW YORK, TEHRAN, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE,
KABUL, OTTAWA, TOKYO.

MY TELNO 1428 (NOT TO ALL): THE UNITED STATES AND THE ALLIES

1. FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, BRZEZINSKI DELIVERED LAST NIGHT TO THE SAME BODY WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS ''SOME FRANK REMARKS'' ON THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE.

2. HE SAID THAT THE HISTORY OF NATO WAS A BI-CONTINENTAL SUCCESS STORY. EUROPE HAD BEEN RECONSTRUCTED, PEACE AND PROSPERITY ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC HAD BEEN PROMOTED, AND AN EQUALITY WELCOME TO THE US BETWEEN THE ALLIES HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. BRZEZINSKI PAID TRIBUTE TO DIPLOMATIC SUCCESSES BY OTHER ALLIES (THE GERMANS AND OSTPOLITIK, THE FRENCH IN ZAIRE, THE BRITISH IN ZIMBABWE SHOWING ''CONSUMATE SKILL AND PERSISTENCE'', AND THE JAPANESE IN THE ASEAN REGION).

3. BUT ALLIANCES HAD TO PASS THROUGH CRITICAL TURNING POINTS. ''THE CRISES IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN CONFRONT US WITH SUCH A CRUCIAL PERIOD. IN THE CASE OF IRAN ... OUR RESTRAINT IS NOT INEXHAUSTIBLE AND NOT ALL THE MEANS OF REDRESS AVAILABLE TO US HAVE YET BEEN APPLIED. WE LOOK TO OUR ALLIES TO SUPPORT THE SANCTIONS FOR WHICH THEY VOTED (AT THE UN) AND WHICH THE SOVIET UNION VETOED, SINCE SUCH SOLIDARITY COULD RENDER UNNECESSARY THE APPLICATION OF OTHER MEASURES''.

4. THE CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN ALSO INVOLVED INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS. SOVIET ASPIRATIONS TOWARDS THE PERSIAN GULF, GIVEN THEIR PRESENT PROXIMITY, COULD NOT BE FORECAST WITH CERTAINTY. BUT ALL THE ALLIES WERE NOW VITALLY DEPENDENT ON OIL SUPPLIES FROM A VOLATILE REGION WHOSE OWN SECURITY, FROM INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND EXTERNAL THREAT, WAS NOW IN QUESTION.

5. MANY JOURNALISTS HAD ASKED IN RECENT WEEKS WHY THE ALLIES WERE NOT DOING MORE TO RESPOND TO THIS CRISIS. ''THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE PROPERLY CONCERNED WITH THE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT QUESTION. THE POSITIVE FACT IS, NONE OF OUR MAJOR ALLIES DISAGREES WITH OUR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MOVE INTO AFGHANISTAN ... MOREOVER, THE ALLIES HAVE ASSURED US THAT, IN ADDITION TO SHARING OUR VIEWS OF THE SITUATION'S GRAVITY, THEY CONCUR IN THE NECESSITY OF A CONCERTED RESPONSE ... MUCH AS WE WELCOME SUCH DECLARATIONS, WE FEEL THAT THEY SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED

/ BY TANGIBLE

BY TANGIBLE MEASURES.'' THE WORLD'S THREE CENTRAL STRATEGIC ZONES - WESTERN EUROPE, THE FAR EAST AND SOUTH WEST ASIA - WERE FUNDAMENTALLY INTER-DEPENDENT. APPROPRIATE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONCLUSIONS SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE FACT THAT INSTABILITY IN ONE AREA THREATENED THE OTHERS. ONLY WHEN SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE ALSO FOLLOWED BY CLEAR ACTIONS WOULD THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE THEIR AFGHANISTAN ADVENTURE AS A MISTAKE AND DESIST FROM SIMILAR DEPREDATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

6. BRZEZINSKI CONTINUED THAT THERE WERE THOSE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC WHO ASCRIBED THE LACK OF A MORE FORCEFUL RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE TO FEARS OF JEOPARDISING A DECADE'S DETENTE, OR DISRUPTING COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE EAST, OR INTERFERING WITH A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP ENCOURAGED BY MOSCOW. SOME ALSO SUGGESTED EUROPEAN INDECISION MIGHT BE MOTIVATED BY DOUBTS ABOUT THE STEADINESS OF US LEADERSHIP. ONE COULD NOT, TO BE BOTH CANDID AND REALISTIC, DISMISS THESE FACTORS. HOWEVER ALLIANCE DECISIONS IN RECENT MONTHS (THE LTDP, THE 3 PERCENT BUDGET INCREASE, AND THE TNF DECISIONS) BELIED THE IDEA OF WEAK OR UNCERTAIN LEADERSHIP.

7. ''WHATEVER THE REALITY OF SUCH DOUBTS AND UNCERTAINTIES, HOWEVER, WE ON THIS SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT EITHER GENUINE DETENTE OR OUR COMMON SECURITY IS DIVISIBLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A CHALLENGE WHICH MAY AFFECT ALLIED INTERESTS MORE RAPIDLY AND DRASTICALLY THAN EVEN OUR OWN.'' THE US AND HER ALLIES NEEDED TO ASK SOME SEARCHING QUESTIONS:

(I) WITH THE RUSSIANS IN AFGHANISTAN COULD WE CONDUCT BUSINESS AS USUAL?

(II) SHOULD WE SUBSIDISE SOVIET MILITARY POWER BY GIVING THEM ADVANTAGEOUS COMMERCIAL CREDITS?

(III) SHOULD WE FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT AND EXPERTISE?

(IV) COULD WE AFFORD NOT TO FULFIL THE NATO SUMMIT COMMITMENTS TO INCREASE DEFENCE SPENDING?

(V) SHOULD WE GIVE INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY TO SOVIET AGGRESSION BY LETTING WESTERN ATHLETES PARTICIPATE IN THE OLYMPICS?

8. THE US APPRECIATED THE PARTICULAR SITUATIONS OF EACH OF THE ALLIES, FOR EXAMPLE, GERMANY WAS A DIVIDED NATION, BONN COULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT TO THE FATE OF THOSE GERMANS UNDER COMMUNIST RULE, AND BERLIN OCCUPIED A SPECIAL POSITION. ''THESE ARE MAJOR CONCERNS. I DO NOT SLIGHT THEM. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT A PROPER BALANCE CAN AND MUST BE STRUCK BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND THE NEED FOR A TANGIBLE EXPRESSION OF COLLECTIVE ALLIED RESOLVE.''

9. ''WE ACCEPT, INDEED, WE ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSE THE DIVISION-OF-LABOUR CONCEPT. BUT THAT DIVISION MUST BE EQUITABLE IN SACRIFICE AND EFFORT, AS WELL AS IN RHETORIC.'' THE US HAD

/ ALREADY

ALREADY MADE SACRIFICES OF HER OWN (GRAIN SALES, THE OLYMPICS, INCREASED DEFENCE SPENDING, STRENGTHENED COMMITMENT IN SOUTH WEST ASIA).

10. ''THE US IS MORE THAN EVER COMMITTED TO THE VITAL PURPOSES OF THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP. BUT THE BURDENS, AS WELL AS THE BENEFITS OF THAT PARTNERSHIP MUST BE RECIPROCALLY BORNE. THE PLURALISTIC NATURE OF AN ALLIANCE SUCH AS OURS CARRIES WITH IT THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY. PLURALISM WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY IS A WORKING PRESCRIPTION FOR ANARCHY: PERHAPS EVEN WORSE, IT POSES THE RISK OF OPERATIONAL PARALYSIS. RESPONSIBILITY, LIKE DETENTE, LIKE SECURITY ITSELF, IS NOT DIVISIBLE.''

11. BRZEZINSKI CONCLUDED ''I PROMISED AT THE OUTSET TO BE FRANK IN THESE REMARKS: THE TIMES REQUIRE THAT WE AND OUR ALLIES BE WILLING TO MAKE HARD CHOICES AND REAL SACRIFICES. UNLESS WE PROVE OURSELVES CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TOGETHER TO THE CHALLENGE WHICH THE PROJECTION OF SOVIET POWER HAS POSED ON THE VERY PERIMETERS OF INTERESTS VITAL TO US ALL, OUR COMMON SECURITY WILL BE IMPERILLED.''

12. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION BRZESINSKI SAID ''WE EXPECT TO BE SATISFIED'' WITH THE RESPONSE FROM THE ALLIES BUT ADDED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WOULD BE BEFORE THEY MADE WHAT HE WOULD CONSIDER A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE. ''YOU CANNOT SET MECHANICAL TIMETABLES ON WHAT IS A POLITICAL PROCESS ..... BUT WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY FLAGS OF MAJOR DEMOCRACIES TO BE MARCHING DOWN THAT PATH IN MOSCOW'' DURING THE OLYMPICS.

13. TO A QUESTION ABOUT ACTION TO FREE THE US HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN, BRZEZINSKI REPLIED ''WE ARE DEALING WITH THE LIVES OF 53 OF OUR COUNTRYMEN. WE'RE DEALING WITH RADICAL FANATICS. WE WILL NOT STAND IDLY BY IF A SINGLE ONE IS HURT. WE DO NOT DENY OURSELVES THE RIGHT TO USE ANY MEANS TO WHICH WE ARE ENTITLED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. I AM WEIGHING MY WORDS VERY CAREFULLY. I THINK YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT I MEAN. WE INTEND TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE''.

FCO PASS SAVING BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, KABUL, OTTAWA, AND TOKYO.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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UKMIS NEW YORK.
INFO SAVING BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE,
TEHRAN, KABUL.

Subject filed in Iran Sec^t Pt 6

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ALLIES.

1. PRESIDENT CARTER DELIVERED A WIDE RANGING ADDRESS YESTERDAY TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS WHICH WAS PROMINENTLY REPORTED ON THE MAJOR TELEVISION NETWORKS AND IN TODAY'S EAST COAST PRESS. KEY EXTRACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

NATIONS ASK FOR LEADERSHIP - AT THE SAME TIME THEY DEMAND INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION.
THEY ASK FOR AID - BUT REJECT INTERFERENCE.
THEY ASK FOR UNDERSTANDING - YET OFTEN DECLINE TO UNDERSTAND US IN RETURN.
SOME ASK FOR PROTECTION - BUT ARE WARY OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF ALLIANCE.
NO SINGLE SITUATION SO AGGRAVATES OUR PEOPLE - SO TESTS OUR MATURITY - SO TRIES OUR PATIENCE - SO CHALLENGES OUR UNITY - AS DOES THE CONTINUED CAPTIVITY OF OUR FELLOW AMERICANS IN THE TEHRAN EMBASSY.
FOR LONG MONTHS, OURS HAS BEEN THE RESTRAINT OF STRENGTH - DESPITE OUTRAGEOUS PROVOCATION. I DO NOT REGRET THAT RESTRAINT.
BUT IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY - BECAUSE IRAN WOULD NOT ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR OWN INTERESTS - FOR US TO ACT AGAIN. THE STEPS I HAVE TAKEN THIS WEEK TO END DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND IMPOSE SANCTIONS ARE FIRM AND SUBSTANTIVE, AND WE HOPE THEY WILL BE PERSUASIVE.
AMERICA WILL CONTINUE THE CAREFUL AND CONSIDERED EXERCISE OF ITS POWER.
WE WILL PURSUE EVERY - AND I REPEAT - EVERY LEGITIMATE USE OF THAT POWER TO BRING OUR PEOPLE HOME, SAFE AND FREE.
WITH A RETURN TO RATIONALITY, INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS NEED NOT BE IRAN'S FATE. BANKRUPTY - POLITICAL AS WELL AS MORAL - NEED NOT BE ITS FUTURE.
IF INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE IS A THREAT, THAT THREAT DOES NOT COME FROM THE UNITED STATES.
HISTORICALLY, AMERICAN STRENGTH HAS BEEN USED TO HELP THE COUNTRIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF AREA PROTECT THEIR STABILITY AND RETAIN THEIR SOVEREIGNTY.
WE CANNOT KNOW WITH CERTAINTY THE MOTIVATIONS OF THE SOVIET MOVE INTO AFGHANISTAN - WHETHER AFGHANISTAN IS THE PURPOSE OR THE PRELUDE. REGARDLESS OF ITS MOTIVES, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT

/ THE SOVIET

THE SOVIET INVASION POSES AN INCREASED THREAT TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS IN THE REGION AND TO THE WORLD'S ACCESS TO VITAL RESOURCES AND SEA LANES.
AND IF THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN DOES INDEED FORESHADOW A PATTERN OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR FOR THE NEXT DECADE, THEN AMERICANS MUST ACCEPT THE TRUTH THAT WE ARE IN FOR CHALLENGING AND DIFFICULT TIMES.
IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT IN ANY WAY CONDONE SOVIET AGGRESSION.
NEITHER WE NOR OUR ALLIES WANT TO DESTROY THE FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS THAT HAS YIELDED CONCRETE BENEFITS FOR SO MANY PEOPLE, BUT ULTIMATELY, IF WE CONTINUE TO SEEK THE BENEFIT OF DETENTE WHILE IGNORING THE NECESSITY FOR DETERRENCE, WE WOULD LOSE THE ADVANTAGES OF BOTH.
IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OUR INTENTIONS BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. THE MEASURES WE HAVE TAKEN AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE INVASION WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL THERE IS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THEN AND ONLY THEN, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN WITH AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS IN A GUARANTEE OF TRUE NEUTRALITY AND NONINTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WE SUPPORT THE RESTORATION OF A NEUTRAL NONALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WITH A GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO THE WISHES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.
WE THUS FACE WHAT COULD BE A PROTRACTED PERIOD OF INCREASED STRAIN IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. TO ENHANCE STABILITY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD, WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A STABLE MILITARY BALANCE, BOTH THROUGH OUR OWN STEADY DEFENSE MODERNIZATION AND THROUGH NEGOTIATED ARMS LIMITS THAT ARE EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE. THIS OBJECTIVE - A STABLE BALANCE - IS ADVANCED BY THE SALT II TREATY. IN A PERIOD OF HEIGHTENED TENSIONS IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT WE HAVE RELIABLE CONSTRAINTS ON THE COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS. SALT IS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. I REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY, AND THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO ABIDE BY ITS OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO TAKE NO ACTION INCONSISTENT WITH ITS INTENT OR PURPOSE, SO LONG AS THE SOVIETS ACT WITH SIMILAR RESTRAINT.

2. THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ABOUT THE OLYMPICS ARE BEING REPORTED BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

FCO PASS SAVING: BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE TEHRAN AND KABUL.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Dr. I.P. Singh
Acting High Commissioner

No -489/AHC/80

INDIA HOUSE
Aldwych - London WC 2

10 April 1980

Dear Prime Minister

I have the honour to forward herewith a sealed cover from the Prime Minister of India addressed to you. - on 4/4 (6 April 1980)

With assurances of my highest consideration

(I.P. Singh)

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW 1

Encl:

PART 4 ends:-

PM to Mr Reedy 9.4.80

PART 5 begins:-

India High Commission to PM 10.4.80