

TOP SECRET.

CONFIDENTIAL FILINGS

The modernisation of Theatre Nuclear Forces
(TNF) in Europe

DEFENCE

Part 1: May 79
Part 2: Dec 79

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
5.12.79							
7.12.79							
13.12.79							
21.12.79							
22.12.79							
4.1.80							
9.1.80.							
11.1.80							
23.4.80.							
25.4.80							
6.5.80.							
24.6.80.							
16.7.80							
5.2.81							
10-3-81							
ends-							

PREM 19/4/12

PART 2 ends:-

PM to Zuckerman 10.3.81

PART 3 begins:-

8/5 MOD to PM Mo18 20.10.82



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R6

Defence

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 March 1981

Dear Solly

Thank you very much for your letter of 12 February 1981 about the neutron bomb.

I found it very helpful to have your views before my visit to Washington. Clearly the neutron bomb is an issue to which we and our allies are likely to have to give a good deal of attention over the coming months.

Thank you for writing in such detail

(sgd) M T

Lord Zuckerman, O.M., K.C.B., F.R.S.

AK



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

NEUTRON BOMB

I showed you the letter from Lord Zuckerman about the neutron bomb at Flag A while we were in Washington, but I ~~do~~ not believe you had time to read it.

Sir Robert Armstrong has now submitted comments from Dr. Press on Lord Zuckerman's thesis (Flag B).

I doubt whether it would be sensible for you to engage with Lord Zuckerman in a discussion of the merits or otherwise of the neutron bomb, and I therefore suggest that you send him a simple reply on the lines of the letter immediately below.

J.W.

9 March 1981

PERSONAL



Ref. A04412

MR WHITMORE

Just before we left for Washington I forwarded *— May A.*
to you a letter which Lord Zuckerman had sent to the
Prime Minister about the LBW (low blast weapon).

--- 2. You may like to see the attached copy of a note
by Dr Press, commenting on Lord Zuckerman's letter.

Prime Minister.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

9 March 1981

PERSONAL

B

to minute
Sturpe

PERSONAL

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Thank you for your minute A04333 of 25th February inviting my comments on a letter dated 12th February 1981 from Lord Zuckerman to the Prime Minister.

2. Lord Zuckerman's letter ostensibly concerns the so-called 'neutron bomb' but in doing so he coalesces three issues. The first is a recurring debate about the overall utility of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons - whatever their nature. The second is the continuing problem of matching defence spending to the cost of ever-increasingly complicated and competitive weapon systems, whatever their intended role. The third is the 'neutron bomb' itself. I presume my comments are requested in respect of the latter and particularly in view of the wide misunderstandings that have arisen about its origin, its effects, its military utility and whether it should be produced and deployed.

3. The case for or against a particular weapon should, in my view, be supported by a fuller exposure of the characteristics of that weapon than is given in a letter apparently directed mainly against the use of any nuclear weapons in battlefield situations. This same lack on the part of media reporting has led to much public emotion and heat rather than light about the 'neutron bomb'. To avoid the same omission in this minute, I include an Annex setting out the relevant characteristics of an enriched radiation warhead (popularly known as the 'neutron bomb'). To do so is not to claim that perceived military advantages, or claims for possibly enhanced deterrence, necessarily outweigh the general case against the escalating risks of using any tactical nuclear weapons in a battlefield situation.

4. The historical references in the unnumbered paragraphs 2 and 3 of Lord Zuckerman's letter seem to me misleadingly abbreviated. Whatever the part played by individuals singled out, the references appear to discount the original impetus from basic research in radiation enhancement carried out

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under the United States Atomic Energy Commission (then the responsible Government Agency for nuclear weapon research and development): the associated studies elicited by the United States Department of Defense and a formal recommendation "to ensure early and timely development of nuclear weapon systems which maximise prompt radiation".

5. Unnumbered paragraph 3 does not make clear whether it was the so-called neutron bomb that was specifically "voted down on scientific and military grounds" prior to 1972-73 or whether it was tactical nuclear weapons as a total category, when the then United States Secretary of Defense (Mr. McNamara) concluded that a European theatre nuclear war would be a losing battle for both sides. He then ruled against a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons, although he did accept the nuclear armed Lance missile because of its longer range. That in itself must have imposed dimensions much more compatible with an ERW than a SFW. If Mr. McNamara's action was the "voting down" referred to it was reversed under subsequent Secretaries of Defense - Mr. Laird, and particularly Mr. Schlesinger who, in 1973, with emphasis on flexible deterrence, re-opened interest in the possibilities of enhanced radiation warheads. His action led on to the present situation, including the development of an enhanced radiation warhead for the Lance missile.

6. In unnumbered paragraph 4, the quotation from an as yet unpublished United Nations report contains nothing that does not follow from the known one-sixth, one-third and one-half power relationship described in paragraph 4 of my Annex to this minute. As presented, the quotation fails to inform the reader that proponents of an enhanced radiation warhead do not claim value for it at anything other than a very low yield - certainly not at intermediate or large yields. I have not seen data to enable me to comment on manufacturing costs but I wonder how the "more constraints" statement fits the fact that United States plans are to deploy the enhanced radiation warhead with the Lance missile.


7. The remaining unnumbered paragraphs in Lord Zuckerman's letter fall mainly within the two continuing issues to which I have referred earlier in this minute and which I have not seen as within the scope of these comments.

PERSONAL

Standard
fission
weapon

PERSONAL

8. It is not clear, from his letter, whether Lord Zuckerman's disapproval of the "neutron bomb" is based specifically on its nature and characteristics, or on his case against the deployment of any tactical nuclear weapons in battlefield situations. If the weight of argument finally favours the latter then, in that context, there would obviously be no point in adding enhanced radiation warheads to the spectrum of nuclear weapons already available. But if tactical nuclear weapons are to be deployed in battlefield situations, ~~then~~ quite apart from the dimensions of what can be delivered by the Lance missile or other artillery, should one forgo opportunities to minimise significantly the collateral damage arising from their use? What 'humanitarian' reasons could be advanced for then favouring the use of higher yield standard fission weapons to achieve the same military effect as enhanced radiation weapons of yield lower by about one order of magnitude?


(R. Press)

2nd March 1981

PERSONAL

Enhanced Radiation Warhead Characteristics


1. An "enhanced radiation warhead"(ERW) - widely but imprecisely known as the "neutron bomb" - does not embody a new principle, as appears to be publicly perceived. The concept has been known for more than twenty years and enhanced radiation devices have been under development since the early 1960's. (The first test of one such was, I think, in 1963.) An ERW is a nuclear warhead designed to produce significantly more and/or higher energy output(s) of neutrons, or X-rays, or gamma rays, or a combination of these initial nuclear radiations, than would be produced by a normal or standard fission warhead (SFW) of the same total yield. It produces lower levels of blast and thermal energy output relative to the initial (prompt) nuclear radiation.
2. In a standard fission warhead the partition of total energy output(yield) would be as 5: 10: 50: 35 per cent for initial nuclear radiation, residual radiation, blast and thermal energy respectively; for a hypothetical enhanced radiation warhead the corresponding partition of energy would be as 30 : 5 : 40 : 25 per cent. It is this considerable increase in initial nuclear radiation, simultaneously with the reductions in other forms of energy output, that has caused the design of such a device to be called an "enhanced radiation warhead". It could have been called a "reduced blast" warhead and might have inspired much less public opposition if it had been!
3. All nuclear detonations emit neutrons, as well as blast and thermal energy. The fundamental distinction between an ERW and other more fission-dominated nuclear warheads, of very low yield, is that the fusion process utilised in an ERW causes the higher proportion of initial nuclear radiation, in the total energy release, to contain neutrons of higher but fixed energy. Their energy is fixed by the nature of the nuclear processes occurring in the warhead and their range in air is governed mainly by their initial energy. Thus, even as the total yield of a warhead is increased the lethal range of the neutrons is not significantly increased.
4. Whereas the lethal range (about 1300 metres) of ERW neutrons, plus the gamma radiation created by the neutrons interacting with surrounding atoms, increases only as the one-sixth power of increasing yield, the damaging effects

of blast and heat increase as the one-third and one-half power respectively. They, therefore, relatively rapidly become the major effects of nuclear detonations of increasing yield. Thus, for an increase of a factor of ten in yield, the increase in range for initial radiation effects would be by about 40 per cent while it would be about 100 per cent for blast effects and about 200 per cent for thermal effects. Hence an ERW of high yield would become indistinguishable from a standard fission warhead in gross effects and would make no practical sense. Its potentially major military effect is therefore limited to low yield tactical devices in specific battlefield situations, where troop safety distances for radiation effects would be relatively small, as would the distances at which effects on non-combatants would tend to insignificance.

5. The main military selling point for the ERW concept is that, since initial nuclear radiation would be the main mechanism for producing combat ineffectiveness among troops with a degree of protection against blast and thermal flash, calculation shows that a one kiloton enhanced radiation warhead could kill about twice as many tank crew men as a ten kiloton standard fission warhead, and with blast damage limited to an area about one-fifth as large. An ERW can also of course be more readily adapted to the Lance missile or other artillery.

6. The term "residual radiation", used earlier in this Annex, refers to radiation from fission products in debris clouds and then fall-out after a nuclear detonation has taken place. As a side advantage of ERW, it may be noted that the quantity of fission products per kiloton of total yield would be much reduced for ERW detonations while, at the same time, the reduction factor of ten in yield, relative to a SF detonation to achieve the same military effect, would further reduce the total formative of fission products.

7. In sum, the enhanced radiation warhead, or so-called 'neutron bomb', when seen in a strictly military context could be regarded as a 'reduced blast' weapon producing a high level of combat ineffectiveness in enemy troops while simultaneously reducing collateral damage from blast and thermal effects: improving safety distances for one's own troops: reducing fission product fall-out, particularly at longer range, and also casualties to non-combatants in areas near the combat zone. It is not a new concept giving rise to phenomena of increased destructive capability when compared with the current range of nuclear weapons.


2nd March 1981

Ref: A04297



Prime Minister.

AW
25/2

MR. WHITMORE

Lord Zuckerman has asked me to forward the attached letter to the Prime Minister about the neutron bomb.

2. I am asking Dr. Press, present Adviser on these matters, if he would like to comment on the letter; but I am not copying it to anyone else, at any rate at this stage.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

25th February 1981

A

THE SHOOTING BOX,
BURNHAM THORPE,
KINGS LYNN,
NORFOLK.
BURNHAM MARKET 359

The Rt Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

12th February, 1981

Dear Prime Minister,

During the course of a recent stay in St. Thomas's Hospital, where I had to spend a few days undergoing some running repairs (I returned here on Tuesday) I came across several references to the so-called neutron bomb, and saw that you had had to deal with a question put to you in the House on February 5. Since the issue may come up in the course of your Washington visit, I thought you might like to have these personal notes to add to whatever official brief on the subject with which you are provided.

Like all these things, the idea of an enhanced radiation bomb dates way back to the late fifties, when the men in the weapons laboratories and in the Rand Corporation, dreamed up every variety of weapon to do this, that and the other, and having done so, then tried to find buyers in the Services or in industry to back them up. One which they tried to sell us when I was CSA in Defence, was called the Davy Crockett, a sub-kiloton weapon which every soldier carried across his shoulder. It was a piece of military nonsense, not only because it allowed of no control, but because when one set aside the fallout problem, it was a pretty expensive way to bring about localised destruction. Davy Crockett's progenitor was one Johnny Foster, then in the Livermore Laboratory and later to become Director of Defence Research and Engineering in the Pentagon.

Another current idea was what people now call the neutron bomb, to which the Rand Corporation gave birth, the man who was mainly responsible (or who claims to be) being Sam Cohen, who, if not the father, is certainly the salesman who got the weapon returned to the map in 1972/73 after it had been voted down on scientific and military grounds before. But these things never die. There are people in industry and in the Services ready to pursue Cohen's idea, regardless of the arguments against.

Technically, the bomb is so made that a major part of its explosive energy comes from the fusion of deuterium with tritium, and so that in theory nuclear radiation would be lethal at somewhat greater distances than in the case of a fission bomb. But as a detailed U.N. report which is about to become available points out (and I know the author of the Report, and he can be relied upon utterly), "for intermediate and large yields, the destructive radius of blast far exceeds that of nuclear radiation, since a doubling of blast kill radius can always be achieved by an 8-fold increase of yield, whereas the same 8-fold increase of yield from 0.5 KT to 4.0 KT fusion yield adds only about 250 m to the prompt lethal radius of nuclear radiation effects. Thus, a hypothetical "neutron bomb" which derived all its energy from fusion, would at 10-kiloton yield have about equal radius of blast kill and radiation kill. Only in

the energy range of 1 KT would the kill radius due to high-energy neutrons considerably exceed that of the same weapon due to blast. Thus, the "enhanced radiation weapon", as represented by the neutron bomb, should more properly be called a "suppressed blast weapon". It is more costly to manufacture and has more constraints on its delivery than does a 10-KT weapon of the same radiation kill-range and greater blast kill. One must ask whether there is much military benefit associated with a modest suppression of blast."

But there are other military arguments which make a nonsense of the concept. I'll cite only three.

1. Troops and armour dispose themselves in the field in relation to the fire they are likely to encounter. I can't imagine Russian tanks aligned at the right distances to optimise the effect of anti-tank weapons, whatever their nature.

2. Radiation would not kill immediately; some of the tanks in the field of fire would still come on. What then? A rain of nuclear bombs?

3. The Russians aren't going to have teams of physicists waiting to rush in to say that the enemy has been firing such and such radiation weapons. They'd reply with whatever nuclear weapon suited them; if weapons with a desired radiation field, then with increased blast as well.

I never did understand why President Carter chose the neutron bomb to become a divisive issue in NATO politics - in response, I presume, to some re-assurance which Helmut Schmidt wanted about America's commitment. There were other symbolic nuclear weapons that might have been selected, which would not have incurred the odium of being called the 'capitalist's weapon'.

Another thing I noticed in my week's reading was a piece in last week's Economist entitled 'More money means less readiness'. I attach a photocopy. The story is all too true. I spelt it out in 1965 in a Lees Knowles Lecture in a section which I called 'The Inexorable Law' of R. and D. If you could spare a moment, glance at the photocopy I attach of the relevant paragraphs. If you have time to read what I said then, just think of what has happened in the past fifteen years. We have not been able to give to defence a bigger real share of the GNP. We have had to reduce our commitments. We have had to reduce the number of new weapon systems. We have had to make our forces smaller. In fact, the consequences of a trend which was already to be seen then, have turned out to be worse than I ever imagined.

I would not be at all surprised if the Americans now spend tens of billions of dollars on laser-armed satellites, etc. - but I would also be prepared to bet that these things will never materialise. All one can hope that the Russians don't mistake the word for the deed, or the fulfillment of an advertised objective, and that the present state of mutual deterrence is not disturbed.

*Jonathan
Sally*

Lord Zuckerman

Latin America.

Yet the dramatic effect of this was muffled by the news that Mr David Stockman, the young director of the office of management and budget, was proposing to take away a third of Mr Haig's foreign aid money. The Americans give foreign economic aid—rather less per head than most western countries—for several reasons. The least arguable one, certainly when persuading a reluctant congress, has traditionally been national security: foreign assistance is the coin of Soviet containment in the third world. Mr Haig's and Mr Stockman's signals could hardly have been more crossed. Mr Stockman, like Mr Haig, believes aid should be given in American national interests. But paradoxically he thinks there should be less of it, not more.

What Mr Stockman proposed in his memorandum, "Foreign Aid Retrenchment", was to cut the Carter requests for foreign aid in 1982 of some \$8 billion to about \$5.5 billion. Anticipating such a step, the Carter administration had raised next year's request by \$2m, from \$6m, a real increase of 14%. So Mr Stockman was cutting from a high level. His proposal shocked none the less, and not only for its cuts in bilateral aid. Mr Stockman proposed halving the United States' pledge of \$3.4 billion over the next three years to the International Development Agency, the World Bank's soft-loan affiliate for the poorest nations, welshing on other commitments to cognate banks, and withholding voluntary contributions from international organisations that did not always march to an American tune.

Backed with protests from leaders in congress and from America's principal allies, Mr Haig counter-attacked. As a result, many of Mr Stockman's proposals will be softened. The most contentious one—halving the IDA pledge—will be fudged, by asking congress to authorise funds for the three years as promised but to stretch the outlays over a longer period.

It is still unclear how aid, under Mr Reagan, is to be fitted into policy towards the third world. It seems, however, that there will henceforth be less American promotion of social reform, fewer complaints about human rights and a more robust use of both economic and military assistance. That, of course, is easier said than done. The limitations of aid as a precision instrument are nowhere clearer than in Central America. And that is especially so when congress and the various arms of the administration are trying to tug it in different directions, as happened last year with Nicaragua. The new administration is much less sympathetic to the government there than Mr Carter

was (see page 12); in El Salvador, by contrast, it wants to bolster the present rulers. That is bad news for the American ambassador to El Salvador, Mr Robert White. He was criticised by several members of the Reagan transition team as a meddling reformer, and he, in turn, criticised them for making a crisis worse. So when the new team took over, it was only a matter of time before it and Mr White parted company. He was recalled to Washington and, at the weekend, fired in all but name.

Some observers of this change have suggested it was made to impress conservatives in Washington complaining that they have been cut out of the appointments. It is obviously also a strong signal, intended as such, to the government in El Salvador. To underline the message, Mr Haig has said that military aid to El Salvador will probably be increased.

Lest the new administration needed further to underline that human-rights considerations would play a small part in foreign policy, Mr Reagan greeted the South Korean president, Mr Chun Doo Hwan, at the White House this week. A reprieve for the condemned opposition leader, Mr Kim Dae Jung, was the administration's condition for the visit. Commutation of Mr Kim's sentence to life imprisonment, and probable exile, was cited by American officials to make two points. One was that behind-the-scenes pressure on behalf of political prisoners is more effective than public campaigns. The other is that South Korea's defences are too important to American interests to allow human-rights considerations to interfere.

The administration wanted Mr Chun to feel at home. The periodic human-rights report from congress, required by law, lists, as in past years, many violations of human rights in South Korea. A delay in its publication was arranged until after President Chun had gone. At the end of his talks with Mr Chun, Mr Reagan assured the South Korean that America's forces would remain. Officials added that security exchanges, suspended during recent years, would be resumed.

Defence

More money means less readiness?

WASHINGTON, DC

During last year's debate in the senate over the treaty to limit strategic arms, Senator Sam Nunn publicly bargained his support of Salt-2 for an administration commitment to long-term increases in defence spending. The new administra-



Facts of flying for Weinberger

tion's commitment to just such real increases might therefore be expected to have received a hearty and unqualified endorsement from the senior senator from Georgia.

But the defence business is full of surprises these days. Not only was Mr Caspar Weinberger assailed as a "budget cutter" by the conservatives who advised President Reagan on defence during the campaign. He was enjoined by Senator Nunn during an armed services committee hearing last week to read, mark, learn and inwardly digest a report on the consequences of Pentagon spending that challenges many cherished defence assumptions.

"Defence Facts of Life" is the work of a Pentagon analyst called Mr Franklin Spinney. Originally delivered orally to Senator Nunn's manpower and readiness subcommittee last December, it argues—using classified air force data—that, for the air force at least, higher defence spending alone may be as much a problem as a solution.

Mr Spinney points out that the armed forces have been investing in ever more complicated weapons over the past 30 years, despite the fact that defence budgets have remained more or less constant, in real terms, since the end of the Korean war (with the exception of the Vietnam years). That in itself might be seen as support for all the arguments on the need to spend more. But Mr Spinney goes on to examine in detail one area where there has been steady real growth—fighter planes. From 1973 to 1980 the budget for fighter planes grew at an annual average rate of 10.4% in real terms. In those years the air force invested no less than \$52 billion in new equipment in this area. The result, however, has been a decline

both in numbers of aircraft and in readiness. Quite simply, the more the air force invests in sophisticated aircraft and support equipment, the less ready it is to fight a war. For example, the F-15, a complex fighter, is "non-mission capable" 44% of the time. The F-111D, which carries some even more sophisticated electronic equipment, is out of action 67% of the time. The much more simple A-10 has a better record, being out of action only 33% of the time.

One argument for this greater reliance on high technology in weapons systems has been the shortage of manpower. But again, on Mr Spinney's figures, the problem and the solution have become mixed. Demands on manpower for maintenance have increased by 40% since the early 1960s. The F-15 has its breakdowns diagnosed by "black boxes" on board: these are then removed to be analysed with the help of an advanced computer which needs a highly skilled man to operate it. In the last three months of 1980, 33 of these precious personnel, as important as the pilots in keeping the aircraft in the air, came up for re-enlistment. Not one chose to sign on again.

The exodus of pilots from the air force has been well publicised—the loss rate was 65% last year, up from 25% in 1976. Mr Spinney says that the pilots are not leaving the air force because of low pay. They are leaving, according to a survey carried out at the Air Force Academy, because they are not able to do much flying. Too many of those smart aircraft are sitting on the tarmac. The F-15, for example, can manage only 16 sorties a month.


Like Mr Nunn, Mr Weinberger is said to be giving close study to "Defence Facts of Life". The air force is not pleased about that.

Jerry Brown

The medium is the message

SAN FRANCISCO

For those who thought Governor Jerry Brown of California the consummate devotee of television politics, it may come as a surprise that he has switched preference to a new medium: money. His discovery of money's political importance coincides with his pondering upon his own future. Within the next six months he will decide if he wishes to run for the senate in 1982 (still uncertain), seek a third term as governor (possible but unlikely) or follow the example of his immediate predecessor, Mr Ronald Reagan, and prepare himself for a presidential try



in 1984 via the citizen-savant route, writing columns in the press, lecturing on the national dinner circuit and putting in regular television appearances.

Performing on television may be Mr Brown's forte, but the prospect of newspaper columns reveals a change of style. Print has become a new fascination for this apostle of electronic communication who, until lately, disdained preserving copies of his speeches for posterity. Indeed he has never even committed those speeches to paper, but for six years has ad-libbed almost every appearance. By this indifference to formal speech-making, he expressed his revulsion at conventional politics.

It is in keeping with Mr Brown's new approach to the mechanics of political success that today his least utterance is taped, typed, printed and made available for distribution to all who ask. He still spurns speech-writers. Not even the usual signature-writing machine for letters is used in his office. But he has a new respect for the permanence of type. He has started his own newsletter, "Cornerstones", an unashamed propaganda-sheet. He is also considering an official governor's newsletter, less overtly political, which will report on events in California's government, presumably improving upon press accounts.

These changes, together with increased attention to computer mailing lists and a new diligence in attending meetings he formerly found boring, suggest that Mr Brown is nursing long-range political goals. He still sees himself as the Democratic party's sometime future hero. The pretensions of Senator Edward Kennedy or Mr Walter Mondale in the same direc-

tion do not deter him. As first step, he is out to rebuild the Democratic party in California. The key to this effort is his ability to amass campaign money and his new-found enjoyment in spending it.

In recent months Mr Brown has been preoccupied with fund-raising. Even immediately after the collapse of his presidential hopes at the Wisconsin primary in April, he found that he could draw political donations. In short order he paid off his own debt and began building a political fund, roughly \$250,000, which he could dispense to those he favoured in local and state elections. With a year-round programme of fund-raising dinners in prospect, the governor hopes to amass a political war chest of \$1m by the end of the year. Officials who support issues dear to the governor, such as energy conservation or toxic-waste control, are likely to be the chief beneficiaries.

An expansion of such fund-raising to the national level may take place within weeks. The governor's staff is considering forming a nationwide political action committee to allow Mr Brown's beneficence to spread outside California. Such a fund could support a move by the governor towards the senate, if that develops. He is not the only person rumoured to be interested in Senator S. I. Hayakawa's seat, which comes up in 1982; Mr Gore Vidal (the novelist), Miss Maureen Reagan (daughter of the president) and Mr Barry Goldwater Jnr have also been mentioned.

The governor's priority is to find and keep his allies at home. To that end, he has already given some \$65,000 to help Democrats in the upper house of the California legislature. He is also trying to keep track of his grass-roots support. In December the Los Angeles Times discovered that a computer leased with state funds, ostensibly for state purposes, was being fed the names of Brown campaign supporters. In future the names of those who volunteer personal support for the governor will be filed in a computer in his fund-raising headquarters.

Atlanta

Pornography retreats

ATLANTA

Mr Hinson McAuliffe, a devout Southern Baptist of puritan persuasions, is claiming victory in his 10-year joust with pornography in Atlanta. As solicitor-general for Fulton County, the most populous in the Atlanta metropolitan area, Mr McAuliffe is empowered to issue warrants and pros-

SIR SOLLY ZUCKERMAN

Scientists and War

THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON
MILITARY AND CIVIL AFFAIRS



HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON

1966

If a country wishes its forces to live up to the standards set by the arms race between the super-powers, it must re-equip them at frequent intervals with weapons which are more sophisticated and therefore much more expensive than previous equipment. Considerations of the absolute size of the economy come into play at this point. The cost of developing a weapon system of a given degree of sophistication is much the same in all advanced industrialized countries. But the greater the 'buy' over which these costs can be spread, the lower the resultant unit cost. For this reason alone, the United States and the Soviet Union by their very size can, therefore, always expect to produce sophisticated weapon systems more cheaply than we can in Britain.

Let us suppose that as the Gross National Product rises, as a result of the greater productivity of a more or less static working population—the latter being Britain's lot at the moment—defence continues to draw off the same proportion each year. Would we be able, as the Americans say, 'to buy more defence', because of the greater absolute amount of money that would be going to the armed forces? (I am speaking, of course, in terms of money values standardized to take account of the effects of inflation.) The answer is 'No'. New aircraft, new surface-to-air missiles, new radars cost more than their predecessors, while improvements in the sophistication or effectiveness of our own weapon systems tend to be cancelled out by those of our enemies' weapons. A more expensive offensive system is countered by an even more expensive defence. The net result is an increase in expenditure on defence equipment by both parties—I am talking here about the race between the Western and Soviet blocs—and usually an increase in the security of neither.

But, on the other hand, if one side or the other unilaterally curtailed its defence expenditure, it would soon find itself at a military disadvantage. This is the fear that lies behind the arms race. The pace of this race is not of our determining; it is set for the world by the two super-powers.

We also have to remember that about half of the annual defence vote is consumed by pay, pensions, housing, feeding and clothing. The other half goes on building of one sort or another—for example, barracks and airfields—on the purchase of weapons, including ships and aircraft, and on research and development. As fast as the Gross National Product rises, so there is a corresponding rise in the cost of providing for the men the Services need. Only to a small extent do our forces consume goods whose relative costs are decreasing as a result of increases in productivity in the

industries concerned. Assuming that the proportion of the G.N.P. that goes to defence remains constant, this means that, at best, not more than the same proportion of the defence budget would be available each year for procurement and research.

But as everyone knows, the absolute amount available is already not enough, in our own case, to provide what the forces believe they need.

Each new generation of weapons, as I have already emphasized, costs more than its predecessor. Unless, therefore, we were prepared to spend an increasing proportion of our Gross National Product on defence, we could afford increasingly expensive re-equipment only if we accepted forces of a diminishing size (diminishing, that is, in terms of uniformed manpower, not necessarily of fire-power). In fact, as the British Government's economic plan has indicated, it is hoped that defence spending over the next five years will be held so that by 1970 it does not exceed £2,000m. at 1964 prices.

The consequences of the costs of increasing sophistication—which we would have had to face sooner or later, whether or not £2,000m. had been set as the ceiling of defence expenditure for 1970—can be abated to a certain extent, but are none the less inescapable. The first measure which to some extent mitigates is choosing weapons that are being produced in greater quantity than the ones they replace. This, in practice, would mean a smaller variety of equipment—and since weapons are usually highly specialized for different roles, the result might be having to give up certain military roles. Another measure which could mitigate would be to lessen the load of research and development costs—which, as I have said, are rarely less than one-half of the cost of development and production—by co-operating with other countries. A third and related measure is trying to avoid the research costs—if possible entirely—by buying weapons that are being produced abroad in quantity for several countries.

But not one of these measures is more than a palliative. Even with larger scale production, new equipment tends to be much more expensive than what precedes it. (Indeed, it is so expensive that without special efforts at standardization it is bound to be ordered in smaller quantities than before). The long-term consequences are, therefore, inescapable. If we are to be efficient in defence, we cannot plan on allowing our equipment to become obsolete. Equally, we cannot assume that a rising share of the Gross National Product will be allotted to defence. Therefore, the alternatives between which we are forced to choose are to plan on altering our tasks so as to avoid the need to introduce some of the most expensive new weapon systems; or to make our forces smaller; or a combination of both these measures.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Subject filed on
Netherlands: Dec 80:
PMVG with Van Agt in The Hague Policy*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 February 1981

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister's Visit to The Hague, 6 February: Enhanced
Radiation Warheads (ERW)

The Embassy at The Hague have advised us that Mr van Agt may raise ERW following the US Secretary of Defence's press conference on 3 February. The Prime Minister may find it useful to have the following comments to supplement the brief on defence issues already provided (Brief No PMVG(81)3).

Ministers here have not yet had to address themselves to the ERW problem because US policy has remained unchanged since April 1978 when President Carter deferred any final decision on ERW. In recent months, however, there have been numerous indications that the new US Administration would want to look again at ERW deployment in Europe as part of its general review of military policies. Weinberger's off-the-cuff reference to "the opportunity that this weapon gives to strengthening theatre nuclear forces is one that we very probably would want to make use of" is yet another such indication, but it is not yet a firm US Government position.

The military case in favour is much as it was in 1977/78. It is generally recognised that ERWs provide a useful deterrent against massed armoured attack. But the political context has changed significantly. Even in 1977/78, ERW was an emotive issue for European public opinion. This is unlikely to be any less today. But in addition the Alliance is now in the process of implementing the TNF modernisation package. There is much opposition in Western Europe to TNF modernisation, particularly in the countries where basing of cruise and Pershing II missiles is planned (UK, FRG, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands). A decision to deploy ERW now could result in greatly increased anti-nuclear opinion and thus jeopardise the TNF modernisation programme which has become an important symbol of Alliance solidarity on nuclear issues.

The Dutch have major political problems over TNF (see brief No PMVG(81)3). There has already been widespread opposition in the Dutch Parliament to the latest US statement and calls for the Dutch Government to oppose ERW deployment on Dutch soil on the grounds that the weapon lowers the nuclear threshold. Our Embassy's initial view (telno 43, copy enclosed) is that if the Americans press the ERW issue there will be no hope of the Dutch being able to take a positive decision to accept TNF basing in the Netherlands.

/The

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The Prime Minister may wish to draw on the following points if Mr van Agt raises the subject:-

a) This is a difficult issue on which the British Government have not yet taken a view. We are considering it carefully in view of the indications that the new US Administration may be considering ERW deployment.

b) It is generally recognised that there is an important deterrent case for ERWs. But we do not want to overload political circuits in Europe and thereby endanger TNF.

(c) The Americans must understand the political difficulties posed by ERW in Europe and realise that this issue should so far as is possible be kept out of the public domain. But where public debate is unavoidable, it is up to Governments to correct fundamental misconceptions about the nature of ERW and give a lead to informed debate on this, as on other nuclear issues (see brief No PMVG(81)3).

I am copying this letter to Brian Norbury in the Ministry of Defence and David Wright in the Cabinet Office.


Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Francis Richards', written in a cursive style.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL



X4

HAGFO 002/05

OO F C O

PP MODUK (DS17)

PP UKDEL NATO

PP WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE

PP BONN

ADVANCE COPY

PP BRUSSELS

Hd Def D
Hd WED
Hd News D
Sj A Aclad
M P Moberly

GRS 240

CONFIDENTIAL

FM THE HAGUE 051425Z FEB 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 43 OF 5 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17), UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, BONN AND BRUSSELS

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS

YOUR TELNO 40 TO BONN : ERWS

1. WEINBERGER'S REMARKS HAVE ALREADY AROUSED STRONG PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY REACTIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS. THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ERW DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE ANY LESS VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED HERE THAN IN 1978: AND HOSTILITY TO ANY US ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE THEM WOULD BE LIKELY TO ENGULF SUCH SIGNS AS THERE HAVE BEEN OF A RALLY TOWARDS A MORE HELPFUL ATTITUDE ON TNF STATIONING.

2. OPPOSITION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN 1978 TO ERW REACHED A PITCH PERHAPS MORE INTENSE (AND MORE ORCHESTRATED) THAN IN ALMOST

2. OPPOSITION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN 1978 TO ERW REACHED A PITCH PERHAPS MORE INTENSE (AND MORE ORCHESTRATED) THAN IN ALMOST ANY OTHER NATO COUNTRY. A PUBLIC PETITION WAS SIGNED BY MORE THAN A MILLION PEOPLE; THE THEN MINISTER OF DEFENCE, KRUISINGA, RESIGNED; AND IN LATE OCTOBER THE SECOND CHAMBER PASSED, ONLY THE VVD (LIBERALS) AND TWO SMALL RIGHT-WING PARTIES VOTING AGAINST, A MOTION "REGRETTING PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION" (THE HAGUE TELNO 342 OF 1978). THE STRENGTH OF FEELING IN THE COUNTRY FOLLOWING WEINBERGER'S REMARKS IS ILLUSTRATED BY UNIVERSALLY CONDEMNATORY COMMENT IN THIS MORNING'S PRESS AND THE PUTTING DOWN OF A MOTION IN THE SECOND CHAMBER, NOT YET VOTED ON BUT SUPPORTED BY THE PVDA (LABOUR), D'66 AND AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT (PROBABLY A MAJORITY) IN THE CDA (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS) CALLING FOR ERW'S NOT TO BE DEPLOYED AND FOR DUTCH FORCES NOT TO BE EQUIPPED WITH THEM.

3. IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS THERE IS, REGRETTABLY, LITTLE PROSPECT OF THE NETHERLANDS ADOPTING A SIGNIFICANTLY LESS HOSTILE OR EMOTIONAL ATTITUDE IN ANY INTER-GOVERNMENTAL DISCUSSIONS OR BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH NATO PARTNERS.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

TAYLOR

NNNN

SENT AT 05/1457.+ -2AW

RECD AT 05/1457Z IJC

0/0

Defence

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 July 1980

MO

Prime Minister

(2)

Paul - 16/7

Dear Michael,

Negotiations on Theatre Nuclear Forces:
The German position

You asked for a note on this subject in the light of the Prime Minister's exchange with Mr Callaghan in the House of Commons on 15 July (Hansard Col 1229). The terms in which Mr Callaghan spoke appeared to suggest that Chancellor Schmidt put proposals to President Brezhnev which differed in some way from the approach of other allies to TNF arms control.

It is true that there had earlier been speculation, prompted by public remarks of the Chancellor's, that he favoured a moratorium on the deployment of new TNF systems by both East and West pending negotiations. However, in his talks with Mr Brezhnev, he seems to have proposed no more to the Russians than that they should unilaterally refrain from deploying further SS20 missiles in the period between now and the first deployment of new Western systems in 1983, in order to permit negotiations. We understand that President Brezhnev rejected this idea, on the grounds that it would involve an unreciprocated concession by the Soviet Union.

For the rest, the Chancellor has made it quite clear that the position which he reflected in his talks in Moscow was precisely that agreed in the NATO decisions of 12 December last year.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD).

Yours etc

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

CONFIDENTIAL



cc MOD JS

Defence.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 June 1980

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from the Belgian Prime Minister about TNF. Since this is a reply to the Prime Minister's letter of 6 May, no further action would seem to be called for.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KRB



LE PREMIER MINISTRE

Brussels, June 12th 1980

②

*Prime Minister
+ fa. And*

Dear Prime Minister,

I read with much appreciation the considerate views expressed in your letter of May 6, in the TNF deployment problem and I want to thank you for your offer of support.

I am fully aware, as are my Colleagues the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, of the crucial importance of a prompt decision in this matter. Belgium's - and more or less the Alliance's - credibility is indeed at stake; and we recognize that substantial negotiations will only be possible as soon as our firmness and determination to preserve the military balance will appear devoid of any doubt.

Belgium is, however, presently undergoing a period of basic readjustment and constitutional change. The debate on devolution matters, which has given way to a government crisis, is still in progress. In these circumstances, it is of paramount importance to preserve the broadest possible consensus on matters of national security and on our contribution to the Alliance solidarity. Nothing could be gained by a


./. .

The Right Hon. Margaret THATCHER, M.P.
Prime Minister
10, Downing Street
LONDON

political course resulting in the collapse of that consensus, which prevailed for more than thirty years.

I intend, with my Colleagues the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, to work on the TNF deployment matter in the coming weeks with the objective of reaching the necessary decision.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Wilfried Martens", written in dark ink. The signature is positioned above a solid horizontal line that underlines the name.

W. MARTENS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 June 1980

Thank you for your letter of 23 June addressed to Mr. Whitmore. The message which you enclosed from your Prime Minister has been brought to Mrs. Thatcher's immediate attention.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency Monsieur Robert Vaes, KCMG.



AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE

London, 23rd June 1980

encl.

Dear Mr. Whitmore,

My Prime Minister,
Monsieur Martens, has asked
me to transmit the enclosed
letter to Mrs. Margaret Thatcher.

*Yours sincerely,
Robert Vaes*

Robert Vaes,
Ambassador.

Clive Whitmore, Esq.,
Principal Private Secretary to the Prime
Minister,
10 Downing Street
S.W.1



LE PREMIER MINISTRE

Brussels, June 12th 1980

SUBJECT.

cc. Minister set
opt

(2)

Prime Minister

+ f.a.

And

~~IL FLO~~
No

mb

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 125A/80

Dear Prime Minister,

I read with much appreciation the considerate views expressed in your letter of May 6, in the TNF deployment problem and I want to thank you for your offer of support.

I am fully aware, as are my Colleagues the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, of the crucial importance of a prompt decision in this matter. Belgium's - and more or less the Alliance's - credibility is indeed at stake; and we recognize that substantial negotiations will only be possible as soon as our firmness and determination to preserve the military balance will appear devoid of any doubt.

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
./.

The Right Hon. Margaret THATCHER, M.P.
Prime Minister
10, Downing Street
LONDON

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I intend, with my Colleagues the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, to work on the TNF deployment matter in the coming weeks with the objective of reaching the necessary decision.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Wilfried Martens". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above a horizontal line that underlines the name.

W. MARTENS

GR 800

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FM BRUSSELS 201306Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 152 OF 20 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, MODUK (DUSP AND DS12)

INFO PRIORITY BONN AND THE HAGUE

INFO SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, OSLO, LUXEMBOURG, OTTAWA, LISBON,

REYKJAVIK, PARIS, COPENHAGEN, ROME, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

Prime Minister

MA 23/VI

TNF MODERNISATION: BELGIUM AND THE ANKARA NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING.

MS

1. AS I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED, IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE BELGIANS WILL DO NO MORE AT ANKARA THAN MAKE A TEMPORISING STATEMENT SEEKING TO EXPLAIN THE REASONS FOR THEIR FAILURE TO REMOVE THEIR 12 DECEMBER RESERVATION ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT. THEY WILL ARGUE THAT AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT CRISIS IN MARCH AND APRIL, THE CONSULTATIONS BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY TO WHICH THEY HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE PROMISED SIX MONTHS PERIOD. THEY WILL PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE ANY COMMITMENT AS TO EITHER WHEN THEIR DECISION WILL NOW BE TAKEN OR WHAT FORM THE EXTERNAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS, TO WHICH THEY ATTACH IMPORTANCE FOR DOMESTIC REASONS, WILL BE CARRIED OUT. BUT THE BEST INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED OF MARTENS' OWN THINKING AND THAT IN THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS THAT SOME TIME IN OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER IS THE SORT OF DATE THEY ARE CONSIDERING. NOTHOMB HIMSELF HAS STILL NOT, I THINK, MADE UP HIS MIND WHETHER TO GO TO EASTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS AND/OR PERHAPS MOSCOW. HE WILL NO DOUBT WANT TO TAKE SOUNDINGS AT ANKARA ON THIS, PARTICULARLY OF THE GERMANS IN THE LIGHT OF SCHMIDT'S OWN FORTHCOMING MOSCOW TRIP.

2. WHILE IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO GIVE THE BELGIANS EVERY ENCOURAGEMENT TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS QUICKLY, THERE ARE DANGERS IN THIS OF PROVOKING A SIMILAR ANTI-AMERICAN, OR EVEN ANTI-ATLANTICIST, REACTION TO THAT ALREADY EVIDENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. LUNS' DEMARCHE TO MR MARTENS LAST WEEKEND, WHICH WAS LEAKED WHOLESALE BY LUNS' OFFICE, HAS RECEIVED PROMINENT AND IN SOME CASES CRITICAL TREATMENT IN THE BELGIAN PRESS. THE SOCIALISTS ARE PARTICULARLY OUTRAGED AND TOBACK HAS PUT DOWN AN URGENT INTERPELLATION IN THE CHAMBER ACCUSING LUNS OF BLATANT INTERFERENCE IN BELGIUM'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. SENIOR CONTACTS BOTH IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S CABINET AND IN THAT OF THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (WHO IS NOW THE SENIOR SOCIALIST MINISTER IN THE GOVERNMENT) HAVE EXPRESSED TO US THEIR DISQUIET AT THE MOUNTING PUBLIC PRESSURE WHICH IS BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR ON BELGIUM ON THIS ISSUE. THEY FIND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY NOTHING IS BEING SAID TO THE DUTCH WHOSE DEFENCE BACKSLIDING HAS IN THEIR VIEW MUCH MORE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE THAN THE CURRENT BELGIAN DIFFICULTIES. THEY ALSO ARGUE THAT THE PRESENT TIMING IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT DOMESTICALLY SINCE WITHIN THE COALITION THE SOCIALISTS ARE INVOLVED IN A BITTER DISPUTE WITH THE LIBERALS OVER THE BUDGET AND OTHER SOCIAL/ECONOMIC MEASURES

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MEASURES WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE DECIDED BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY RECESS. THEY MAINTAIN THAT IF MARTENS WERE TO CONFRONT THE SOCIALISTS OPENLY NOW ON THE TNF ISSUE, THIS COULD LEAD THE LATTER TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT SEMI COLON WHEREAS IF THE GOVERNMENT SUCCESSFULLY SURVIVES THE PRESENT HORSETRADING SESSION, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THEY CAN PUSH THE TNF DECISION THROUGH IN THE EARLY AUTUMN.

3. AS YOU KNOW MY OWN FEELING HAS BEEN THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS MORE LIKELY TO BECOME WEAKER IN THE AUTUMN, PARTICULARLY AS THE STRAINS ENGENDERED BY A NEW BOUT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON DEVOLUTION MEASURES WILL BECOME MORE ACUTE THEN. BUT UNDOUBTEDLY MARTENS IS FINDING THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE COALITION MORE PRECARIOUS THAN HE HOPED AT THE OUTSET OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FORMATION. ON BALANCE HE WILL CONTINUE TO FIND IT HELPFUL TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE PRIVATELY TO THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER PARTIES THE STRENGTH OF ALLIANCE FEELING ON TNF AND DEFENCE ISSUES. BUT THE DIVIDING LINE IS A NARROW ONE AND HE CANNOT AFFORD TO HAND TO THE SOCIALISTS A READY-MADE PLATFORM ON WHICH TO WHIP UP PUBLIC SENTIMENT OVER A SMALL COUNTRY LIKE BELGIUM BEING PUSHED AROUND BY HER LARGER ALLIES. MARTENS' REASONS FOR DROPPING SIMONET STEMMED LARGELY FROM THIS FEAR.

4. WHILE SOME SORT OF APPROACH TO MARTENS IS STILL, I CONSIDER, THE BEST WAY TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON DEFENCE ISSUES, THERE MIGHT BE ADVANTAGE, NOW THAT THE DEFENCE BUDGET CUTS SEEM LESS SEVERE THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED, IN DEFERRING AN APPROACH UNTIL AFTER ANKARA. THIS COULD ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ANY BILATERAL EXCHANGES YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO HAVE WITH NOTHOMB AT ANKARA ITSELF. HOWEVER IT IS MADE, ANY CONFIDENTIAL DEMARCHE TO THE BELGIANS SHOULD IN MY VIEW BE:-

A. COUCHED IN MODERATE TONES

B. CONSTRUCTIVE, IE SHOW UNDERSTANDING FOR THE BELGIANS' NEED TO CONSULT BOTH EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY AND

C. UNDERLINE OUR OWN CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO SEEK ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT.

5. PUBLICLY WE SHOULD AVOID MAKING STATEMENTS WHICH SINGLE OUT BELGIUM FOR CRITICISM. WE WOULD DO BETTER TO CONFINE OUR ATTITUDE TO ONE OF EXPRESSING GENERAL CONCERN TO SEE THE 12 DECEMBER DECISIONS IMPLEMENTED BY THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE AND AT THE SAME TIME TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE BROADER FRONT OF ARMS CONTROL AND SALT II AND III.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVINGS

WAKEFIELD

FILES	NAD	SIR A AGLAND
DEFENCE D	PS	MR BOLLARD
WED	PS/KAS	MR FERGUSON
FRSD	PS/MR HURD	MR AH MOBERLY
SFD	PS/AUS	
	SIR D MAITLAND	

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

2

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Free

255
Defence

6 May 1980

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

I enclose a signed letter from the Prime Minister to the Belgian Prime Minister about the forthcoming Belgian decision on TNF. This is a slightly amended version of the text enclosed with your letter to me of 5 May.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

ABO

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 May 1980

Dear Michael,

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF): BELGIAN DECISION

As you will recall, Lord Carrington last week recommended that the Prime Minister should take the opportunity of the Luxembourg Summit to raise with M Martens the forthcoming Belgian decision on TNF.

In the event neither Mrs Thatcher nor Lord Carrington were able to raise the question. Lord Carrington still thinks that we should approach the Belgians on this matter, given the importance of the TNF programme to the Alliance and the continuing Soviet attempts to disrupt it. Since the main obstacle to a positive Belgian decision remains the domestic political one, and since M Martens is best placed to overcome this, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary feels that a message from the Prime Minister to M Martens would be the best way.

/ I enclose a draft message which the Prime Minister might wish to send.

Yours etc

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Paul".

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
His Excellency

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

M. Wilfried Martens

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF)

.....In Confidence

I had hoped to have an
~~Unfortunately I was unable to take the opportunity~~
to raise with you
~~of our meeting in Luxembourg on 27/28 April to raise with~~
~~you the question of the decision on lifting the~~ *your Government's*
~~reservation on basing American ground launched cruise missiles~~ *(the matter is*
~~in Belgium. Since I regard it as a matter of great im-~~ *Unfortunately this proved impossible and, since this is*
~~portance/I am sending you this personal message instead.~~ *portance to the Alliance, a letter*

CAVEAT.....

I fully understand the difficulties you face, ~~in~~
~~approaching this matter.~~

~~Nevertheless,~~ *But* I believe that a positive
decision is, ~~for two reasons,~~ *There are two reasons.* essential.

First, further postponement of the Belgian decision
at this particular moment would be ~~especially~~ *gravely* damaging
~~for~~ *to* the Alliance and ~~for~~ *to* transatlantic relations. The
Americans, rightly in my view, regard the TNF package
agreed last December as evidence
of their commitment to the defence of Europe. To put
last December's achievement at risk now would impose a
further major strain on relations with the Americans
in Europe
at a time when we/can ill afford this.

Enclosures—flag(s).....:

Secondly, the decision last December to defer
approval for basing the new American missiles in Belgium
was ~~taken~~ *intended* to allow an assessment to be made of Soviet
/willingness

CONFIDENTIAL

willingness to negotiate on TNF. As we are all aware, the Russians have been utterly uncompromising on arms control in spite of repeated American attempts to start discussions. I believe that the only way to bring the Russians to the negotiating table is to ^{demonstrate} ~~show them~~ that the Alliance is firm in its intention to modernise its theatre nuclear forces. Further delay in your decision would only encourage them to continue their attempts to undermine the modernisation programme and divide the Alliance, thus setting back the prospects for negotiating agreed limitations.

I hope therefore that in spite of your difficulties you will be able to ^{take} ~~deliver~~ a positive decision in time for the Ankara meeting of the North Atlantic Council. If there is anything the British Government can do to help you to achieve this I hope you will not hesitate to let me know.

CONFIDENTIAL



BK 3

ce: fco

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 May 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T105/80

Dear Prime Minister,

Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF)

I had hoped to have an opportunity to raise with you in Luxembourg the question of lifting your Government's reservation on basing American ground launched cruise missiles in Belgium. Unfortunately this proved impossible and, since the matter is of great importance to the Alliance, I am sending you a personal letter instead.

I fully understand the difficulties you face.

But I believe that a positive decision is essential. There are two reasons.

First, further postponement of the Belgian decision at this particular moment would be gravely damaging to the Alliance and to transatlantic relations. The Americans, rightly in my view, regard the TNF package agreed last December as evidence of their commitment to the defence of Europe. To put last December's achievement at risk now would impose a further major strain on relations with the Americans at a time when we in Europe can ill afford this.

Secondly, the decision last December to defer approval for basing the new American missiles in Belgium was intended to allow an assessment to be made of Soviet willingness to negotiate on TNF.

/ As we are all

289

As we are all aware, the Russians have been utterly uncompromising on arms control in spite of repeated American attempts to start discussions. I believe that the only way to bring the Russians to the negotiating table is to demonstrate that the Alliance is firm in its intention to modernise its theatre nuclear forces. Further delay in your decision would only encourage them to continue their attempts to undermine the modernisation programme and divide the Alliance, thus setting back the prospects for negotiating agreed limitations.

I hope therefore that in spite of your difficulties you will be able to take a positive decision in time for the Ankara meeting of the North Atlantic Council. If there is anything the British Government can do to help you to achieve this I hope you will not hesitate to let me know.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Monsieur Wilfried Martens

Prime Minister's Office 5
Top Copy on Euro Pol. Pt 3:
Euro Council Mtg Luxembourg
April 1980

Ant - 27/4

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

Mr Moberly
DS

Secretary of State

Ant

EUROPEAN SUMMIT : THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF)

- A
1. A senior member of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has approached Mr Scott (UKDEL NATO) unofficially on the question of the forthcoming Belgian decision on TNF. The gist of his message was that it would be very helpful if the Prime Minister were to take the opportunity of the European Summit to speak to her Belgian colleague making clear to him the serious dangers of displaying any sign of hesitation at this stage.
 2. Securing the right Belgian decision is of heightened importance in the light of Chancellor Schmidt's recent suggestion for a moratorium on TNF deployments. The Department last week recommended that the Secretary of State should raise the matter bilaterally with both Herr Genscher and M. Simonet.
 3. In view of this unusual Belgian approach and the importance we attach to the Belgian decision, I recommend that the Prime Minister should be asked to raise the matter in Luxembourg. It would be preferable for her to speak to Mr Martens bilaterally, but if (as I understand may be the case) there is no suitable opportunity for this, Mrs Thatcher could raise it in the course of the discussion on East/West relations scheduled for the evening of 27 April. In this case, it would be important to prevent conversation being widened into a discussion of Chancellor Schmidt's recent statements or of the line he will take on TNF if he goes to Moscow. The Germans have undertaken in the first instance to consult the Americans, the French and ourselves on this. Its discussion in a wider forum is not likely to be

/ helpful

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

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helpful (or indeed welcome to the Germans) for the time being.

4. I submit a draft letter to Mr Alexander, together with Points to Make.

D. Logan

25 April 1980

D B C Logan
Defence Department

cc: PS/PUS
Sir A Acland
Mr Bullard
Mr Fergusson
WED

*PS / LPS
PS / Mr Hurd*

*I agree. So does Mr Guinness (MOD).
We know that the Americans are much
concerned at the Belgian position; & have
been lobbying them to take the required
decision before the NATO Foreign Ministers
meet in June.*

Chris Woods

25/4/80

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

SECRET

Registry
No.

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.To:- M O'D B Alexander
No 10 Downing Street

From

Mr Walden

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

EUROPEAN SUMMIT : THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

~~As you know,~~ ^{The} Belgian Government is due to take its delayed decision on the stationing of theatre nuclear forces (TNF) in Belgium by June. Our fears that the domestic political situation in Belgium may lead to a postponement of the Belgian decision (or, worse still, a negative one) have been reinforced by Chancellor Schmidt's recent suggestion for a moratorium on TNF deployment.

A senior member of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday took the unusual step of approaching unofficially our Deputy Permanent Representative at NATO to express his concern about the situation. He said he thought it would be very helpful if the Prime Minister were to take the opportunity of the European Summit to speak to Mr Martens on the matter. The Foreign Secretary feels that it would be desirable to take up this suggestion: the current crisis in transatlantic relations makes Alliance solidarity on the TNF question particularly important.

I attach Points to Make for the Prime Minister's use. It would be preferable for the Prime Minister to speak to Mr Martens bilaterally. But if this is not possible the Prime Minister could raise the subject at the discussion on East/West relations scheduled for the evening of 27

/ April

SECRET

The telegram
has been
copied to you.

SECRET

concentrate on the Belgian angle ○

April. In this case it would be important to ^{avoid the} prevent conversation being widened into a discussion of Chancellor Schmidt's recent statements or of the line he will take on TNF if he goes to Moscow. The Germans have undertaken in the first instance to consult the Americans, the French and ourselves ^{about his visit} ~~on this~~, ^{It is} Their discussion in a wider forum is not likely to be helpful (or indeed welcome to the Germans) for the time being.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD).

SECRET

EUROPEAN SUMMIT : THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF)

Points to Make with Mr Martens

1. Understand difficulties in TNF decision in present Belgian political circumstances. Nevertheless further postponement very damaging both for Alliance posture towards Soviet Union and for transatlantic relations at time of serious tension.
2. Russians uncompromising on arms control in spite of repeated US attempts to start TNF negotiations. So no reason for further delay. Russians would regard postponement or, worse still, negative Belgian decision as opportunity to exploit Alliance disarray. US on other hand would regard it as allied disaffection on important US commitment to defence of Europe.

PERSON FROM UKDEL NATO WITH YOUR CGT SERIAL NUMBER ON IT

IMMEDIATE

XX
1316

DELFO 005/24

ADVANCE COPY

OO FCO

GRS 382

MR PH. MOBERLY

SECRET

FM UKDEL NATO 241230Z APR 80

RC

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 183 OF 24 APRIL 1980,
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (PERSONAL FOR DUSP),
INFO SAVING BRUSSELS (PERSONAL FOR CHARGE D'AFFAIRS).

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PH MOBERLY FROM SCOTT.

BRUSSELS TELNO 93 : TNF.

YOUR OPPOSITE NUMBER

1. CASSIERS, ~~YOUXPOQNAV KCRZWH RZJ~~ IN THE BELGIAN MFA, ASKED TO SEE ME THIS MORNING ABOUT THE SITUATION ON TNF, EXPLAINING THAT BECAUSE OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS HE PREFERRED TO USE AN UNOFFICIAL CHANNEL (HE IS AN OLD FRIEND OF MINE) RATHER THAN CONVEY A MESSAGE THROUGH HM EMBASSY OR THE BELGIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. HE DESCRIBED THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN TERMS VERY SIMILAR TO THOSE REPORTED BY HM EMBASSY, AND SAID THAT HE FEARED THERE WAS A REAL DANGER THAT, IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAMME, THE FLEMISH SOCIALISTS WOULD MAKE IT A CONDITION OF THEIR PARTICIPATION THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT SHOULD INSIST ON A FURTHER DELAY IN ITS TNF BASING DECISION, POINTING TO THE DUTCH EXAMPLE. IF THIS HAPPENED, THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOCIAL CHRISTIAN AND LIBERAL PARTIES MIGHT EVENTUALLY CAVE IN.

2. CASSIERS THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF MRS THATCHER WERE TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT ON 28 APRIL TO SPEAK TO MR MARTENS, EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE COURAGEOUS BELGIAN DECISION ON 12 DECEMBER AND SYMPATHY WITH THE CURRENT CRISIS, BUT MAKING CLEAR TO HIM THE SERIOUS DANGERS OF DISPLAYING ANY SIGN OF HESITATION AT THIS STAGE. SHE COULD POINT OUT THAT THE AMERICANS HAD THREE TIMES ATTEMPTED TO ELICIT SOVIET AGREEMENT TO LRTNF NEGOTIATION, AND THAT NEITHER THESE ATTEMPTS NOR CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S RECENT INITIATIVE HAD HAD THE SLIGHTEST EFFECT.

3. CASSIERS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IF AGREEMENT ON THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED BY 10 MAY THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE ELECTIONS, AND THIS WOULD INEVITABLY DELAY THE TNF BASING DECISION. BUT THE PRACTICAL REASON FOR THIS WOULD BE CLEAR, AND THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES THEREFORE MUCH LESS DAMAGING,

4. I TOLD CASSIERS THAT WE WOULD CERTAINLY WISH TO DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO HELP, AND THAT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY ENSURE THAT HIS MESSAGE WAS CONVEYED TO THE RIGHT QUARTER. I HOPE HM EMBASSY WILL AGREE THAT IT WOULD INDEED BE OF GREAT HELP IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE WILLING TO SPEAK AS CASSIERS SUGGESTED. BUT THE FACT THAT HE DID SO MUST OF COURSE BE KEPT TO AS FEW PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BRUSSELS.

ROSE.

IMMEDIATE

NNNN



cc FCO

Defense

VLB

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER **PRIME MINISTER'S** 11 January 1980**PERSONAL MESSAGE****SERIAL No.** T 6^{AB}/80

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your message of 15 December.

We too found the outcome of the NATO meeting on 12 December on theatre nuclear forces highly satisfactory. Besides its obvious importance for the security of the West, the decision demonstrated the political will of the Alliance in the face of internal difficulties and an intense Soviet propaganda campaign.

I share your conviction that we should remain sensitive to the special problems facing our Dutch and Belgian colleagues. This is necessary to preserve and build on the consensus already in the Alliance. I also believe that events since you sent your message - in particular the Soviet military intervention of Afghanistan - have made it all the more important to strengthen the political cohesion of the Alliance. This places a special responsibility on our two countries, along with the Federal Republic and the United States, to give a lead to our other allies.

I am very much looking forward to welcoming you here on 29 and 30 January.

All best wishes

Yours sincerely

MT

His Excellency Signor Francesco Cossiga

jfh



Defence
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 January 1980

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 4 January enclosing the text of a message to the Prime Minister from the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Signor Cossiga. As requested I enclose a draft reply.

I am sending copies of this letter together with its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SIGNOR COSSIGA FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

[My Dear Signor Cossiga]

Thank you for your message of the 15 December.

We too found the outcome of the NATO meeting on 12 December on theatre nuclear forces highly satisfactory. Besides its obvious importance for the security of the West, the decision also demonstrated the political will of the Alliance in the face of internal difficulties and an intense Soviet propaganda campaign.

I share your conviction that we should remain sensitive to the special problems facing our Dutch and Belgian colleagues. This is necessary to preserve and build on the consensus already in the Alliance. I also believe that events since you sent your message - in particular the Soviet military intervention of Afghanistan - have made it all the more important to strengthen the political cohesion of the Alliance. This places a special responsibility on our two countries, along with the Federal Republic and the United States, to give a lead to our other allies.

/I

Enclosures—flag(s).....

^{am} I very much look ^{ing} forward to ^{welcoming} ~~meeting~~ you ^{here} on
29 and 30 January.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 January 1979

B/f 9-1-80

I enclose the text of a message to the Prime Minister from the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Signor Cossiga. Despite the fact that the message is dated 15 December and despite the fact that Signor Ducci called on the Prime Minister yesterday, the message was only received here today.

I should be grateful to receive as soon as possible the text of a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Signor Cossiga.

I am sending copies of this letter together with its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

SD

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

File

BK



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 January 1980

Thank you for your letter of 2 January enclosing a message to the Prime Minister from Signor Cossiga. I have of course brought Signor Cossiga's message to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

I have also shown the Prime Minister the greetings card addressed to her by the President of the Italian Republic. She was, of course, most grateful to receive this.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

8

His Excellency Signor Roberto Ducci

old
The Italian Ambassador
to the United Kingdom

23

London, 2nd January, 1980

My dear Margaret,

I take pleasure in enclosing herewith a message, together with a rough translation, addressed to the Prime Minister by the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Signor Francesco Cossiga.

I avail myself of this opportunity to forward also a card addressed to Mrs. Thatcher by the President of the Italian Republic, Signor Sandro Pertini.

Yours sincerely
R. Ducci

Roberto Ducci

Encs.

M.O. B. Alexander, Esq.,
Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

GRS..430

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW 220845Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 859 OF 22/12

RPTD INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO.

- Defence*
1. GROMYKO'S SPEECH AT THE LUNCH FOR THE VISITING PRESIDENT OF ANGOLA INCLUDED THE FIRST HIGH LEVEL SOVIET STATEMENT ON TNF. GROMYKO SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO SPEAK BY BREZHNEV, WHO WAS UNABLE TO ATTCCD BECAUSE OF A 'CATARRHAL INDISPOSITION'.
 2. AFTER AN INTRODUCTORY PASSAGE PRAISING SOVIET-ANGOLAN RELATIONS AND SOVIET POLICIES TOWARDS AFRICA GROMYKO CONTINUED BY SAYING THE USSR OPPOSED ANY INCREASE IN THE ARMS RACE AND SUPPORTED PEACEFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES. THE SOVIET UNION HAD RECENTLY MADE PROPSALS FOR IMPROVING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, AND DEMONSTRATED ITS GOODWILL IN A PRACTICAL MANNER. NATO HAD ANSWERED BY DECIDING TO TURN THE FRG, BRITAIN AND ITALY INTO LAUNCHING PADS FOR NEW US NUCLEAR ROCKETS, DIRECTED AGAINST THE USSR AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT, WHILE THE US GOVERNMENT HAD PROCLAIMED AN UNPRECEDENTED PROGRAMME OF DEFENCE SPENDING COVERING MANY YEARS AHEAD. THIS WAS A CHALLENGE TO THE DESIRE OF ALL PEOPLE FOR PEACE, AND FLOUTED THE VITAL INTERESTS OF MANY COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF NATO. " WE CANNOT BUT NOTE THAT THE MOST ACTIVE ROLE IN REALISING THESE FATEFUL NATO PLANS HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THOSE WHOSE ARMIES, WITHIN THE MEMORY OF OUR GENERATION, WERE USED FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SOWING DEATH AND DESTRUCTION OVER THE WHOLE CONTINENT."
 3. NATO'S DECISION, GROMYKO SAID, WAS AN ATTEMPT TO UPSET THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE , RECENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED AS EXISTING BY CARTER AMONG OTHERS. 8% "THIS DECISION FURTHER MEANS THAT THE LEADERS OF NATO PREFERRED NOT TO RESPOND TO OUR CALL FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND A START TO HONEST NEGOTIATIONS, BUT TO CUT THE GROUND FROM UNDER SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AND DESTROY THEIR

/VERY BASIS."

VERY BASIS." IT WAS A DELUSION TO THINK ONE COULD TALK TO THE SOVIET UNION FROM A "POSITION OF STRENGTH". NATO WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH MILITARY SUPERIORITY. THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR ALLIES WOULD TAKE CARE OF THEIR SECURITY, BUT DID NOT WANT TO BALANCE "ON THE EDGE OF WAR". "AS BEFORE, WE CONSIDER OUR PRINCIPAL TASK THE STRUGGLE FOR A SECURE PEACE AND DETENTE, AGAINST THE PLANS OF AGRESSIVE-MILITARIST FORCES".

4. GROMYKO REFERRED TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND SAID THE TIME HAD COME TO SAY A DECISIVE 'NO' TO THOSE PUSHING FOR AN INCREASE IN THE ARMS RACE. THOSE IN FAVOUR OF PEACEFUL CO-OPERATION AND AGAINST THE COLD WAR NEEDED TO WORK TOGETHER BY REAL MEASURES TO CUT ARMS EXPENDITURE. THEY OPPOSED "FEVERISH REARMAMENT COVERED UP BY HYPOCRITICAL CALL FOR 'NEGOTIATIONS' UNDER CONDITIONS DICTATED BY THE OTHER SIDE"

KEEBLE

FILES
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PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
MR P H MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
NATO

BY BAG

FROM PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL
SAVING TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

TEL NO 121 SAVING TO FCO OF 21 DECEMBER 1979

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO UKDEL NATO, BONN, BRUSSELS,
THE HAGUE, ROME, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

MY TEL NO 980: TNF MODERNISATION: FRENCH ATTITUDES

1. Over the past week, the French Communist Party have mounted a major campaign against the NATO agreement on TNF modernisation. The full weight of the PCF machine has been mobilised. The Party daily l'Humanité has devoted its front page and editorial comment to the subject for several days, publishing blown-up photographs of the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In conjunction with the Communist CGT Union and over a dozen pacifist and other fringe political groups, the PCF organised a protest march in Paris on 20 December, in which about 10,000 people are reported to have participated (80,000 according to l'Humanité). The National Assembly also debated (and rejected) on 20 December a censure motion put down by Communist Deputies which described the NATO decision as likely to lead to an escalation of the arms race, increased international tension and FRG control over sophisticated nuclear weapons. The PCF motion accused the French Government of being "accomplices" in NATO's decision and prepared to see Europe and France transformed into "a nuclear battlefield for the benefit of the United States and the FRG".

2. At the outset of this campaign last week, the PCF called on the French Socialist Party to associate themselves with it. The Socialists' initial response was to point to the inconsistencies in the PCF's position in calling for joint action on an issue in which France was not directly involved, while failing to respond to Socialist calls for cooperation on domestic issues of more direct concern to the French electorate. They also emphasised the Soviet Union's responsibility in provoking NATO into the TNF decision by deploying the SS20. After several days in which the debate between the two parties degenerated into the sort of slanging match which has typified Socialist-Communist relations since the breakdown in their alliance two years ago, the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party decided neither to support the PCF censure motion nor to participate in the protest march. The Socialist statement pointed to the absence of any consultation before the PCF proposal was launched, the Communist refusal of joint action on other subjects and the background of hostile PCF attacks on the Socialist Party. "The Socialist Party does not", the statement said, "come running when the Communist Party blows the whistle". The PCF have described the Socialist decision as clear proof that they are closely aligned with Washington and the Elysée.

/3. As

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3. As reported in paragraph 3 of my TUR on French attitudes to TNF modernisation, the PCF have supported the Soviet line more aggressively than on any other political issue in recent years. It is not easy to deduce the Communists' motives for this, since there was little likelihood of whipping up popular opposition to nuclear weapons on the TNF question. It does not directly involve France and there is a wide national consensus in support of France's own nuclear forces. The Communist Party's motivation is probably to be found in a combination of the following factors:-

- (a) It saw a chance of embarrassing the Socialist Party on the question of nuclear weaponry. The Communist Party is probably not interested in the possibility of an electoral victory by the Left in the 1981 Presidential elections and more interested in doing anything which damages the Socialist Party, puts strain on it and consolidates the Communist electorate.
- (b) By giving the Socialists little choice but to reject the Communist call for support against TNF modernisation, the Communists have added Defence to the other issues on which to attack their former allies.
- (c) The PCF's campaign fits in with a probable need to bring the Party closer to Moscow after a period of keeping a certain distance, at least in appearances. They have much to gain in material terms from better relations with Moscow. Given the importance which the Soviet leadership attach to the TNF issue (and the pressure which they will certainly have exerted on the PCF), this was an ideal occasion for the PCF to demonstrate willingness to follow Moscow's line. Pravda has given a sort of blessing by publishing an article by Gaston Plissonnier of the PCF Secretariat criticising the Socialists.
- (d) In attacking TNF modernisation while not wavering in their support for France's own nuclear forces, the PCF leadership may also have hoped to silence any dissidents in the Party who remain unhappy with the Party's 1977 decision to support France's independent nuclear capability. By ensuring that the PCF's commitment to this policy is not in doubt and by attacking the Government and the Socialists for allegedly supporting US and German nuclear objectives, the Communists can pose as more resolute defenders of French independence than other political parties.

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NATO THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNISATION

NATO does not aim to engage in an arms race. The first responsibility of the Government is, however, the security of the nation, and we must, therefore, ensure that our forces are adequate to deter aggression. This does not, of course, mean that NATO has to match the military forces of the Warsaw Pact weapon for weapon. But we must possess a fully adequate number and range of defensive forces to ensure that we have the flexibility to respond to any level of attack.

The Soviet Union continues to enhance its military capability at a time when it has virtual parity with the United States at the strategic level. In particular it has made major improvements in its theatre nuclear weapons, with the introduction of new and highly accurate SS-20 ballistic missiles and the Backfire bombers which are capable of striking targets throughout Western Europe. These new Soviet deployments also increase the vulnerability of NATO's long-range theatre nuclear force - the UK Vulcan and US F111 aircraft based in the UK - which is, in any case, relatively small and ageing.

Accordingly NATO Ministers decided in Brussels on 12th December both to modernise the Alliance's own forces and to make a parallel

2.

arms control approach to the Soviet Union. The modernisation programme will involve the deployment by the US in Europe of 108 Pershing II ballistic missile launchers and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM). Apart from the UK where 160 GLCMs will be based, Germany, Italy and Belgium have agreed to accept basing (subject to review in six months time in the last case). The Netherlands Government will take a decision in 1981 on deployment in their country. The missiles will start to be deployed in about three years time. The vast majority of the cost will be found by the US.

The Ministers agreed that NATO should not increase its reliance on nuclear weapons. As an integral part of the programme, 1000 US warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as possible, and as the new missiles are deployed, further warheads will be removed one-for-one.

The parallel arms control approach will consist of an offer by the United States to the Soviet Union to begin negotiations as soon as possible on land-based theatre nuclear systems. The aim will be to achieve agreed limitations based on the principle of equality between the two sides and which are adequately verifiable. NATO hopes that these negotiations - on which the European countries will be closely consulted - will lead to a more stable

/ military

military relationship in Europe, at lower levels of nuclear armaments. Fresh approaches are also being made to the Soviet Union for mutual and balanced force reductions in the conventional field and other ways of promoting stability in Europe.

The Government believes that the outcome of the Alliance's deliberations is highly satisfactory, reflecting the aims of maintaining deterrence and defence while improving detente between East and West. The basing of these new systems in the UK will not increase the risk of a nuclear attack on this country; apart from the fact that nuclear weapons are already deployed here, our political, geographic and industrial importance has always made the UK an obvious target in the event of aggression against the West.

With the US we shall now be assessing where the 160 GLCMs should be stationed in the UK. Full account will be taken of environmental considerations but the final decision will be governed mainly by military factors. We shall make an announcement about the chosen locations as soon as practicable. This will be followed by full consultations with local authorities about the works programme involved (eg the hardened bunkers required to give protection against attack and to meet our stringent safety standards).

Paymaster General's Office
Whitehall SW1

21 December 1979

GRS 720

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Prime Minister ⁽²⁾

FM BONN 200950Z DEC 79

TO ROUTINE FCO


TELEGRAM NUMBER 804 OF 20 DECEMBER

INFO WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, MOSCOW

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDEL VIENNA, BMG BERLIN

PS TO PRIME MINISTER
10 DOWNING ST

21.12.79



LRTNF: NATO DECISIONS: FRG VIEWS

1. MINISTER ASKED VON DER GABLENTZ (FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE) ON 19 DECEMBER HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND IN PARTICULAR THE CHANCELLOR, ASSESSED THE OUTCOME OF LAST WEEK'S NATO MINISTERIAL DECISIONS ON LRTNF AND ARMS CONTROL. GABLENTZ SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S REACTION COULD BE SUMMED UP AS QUOTE QUALIFIED SATISFACTION UNQUOTE. THE DECISIONS WHICH THE GERMANS JUDGE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM IN EUROPE HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE FRG HAD SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED BEING SINGLED OUT AS THE ONLY CONTINENTAL COUNTRY WHERE THE NEW WEAPONS WOULD BE DEPLOYED. THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNIQUE HAD BEEN UNANIMOUS HAD PRESERVED THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE. THE DECISIONS REFLECTED THE EVOLUTION OF A NEW ALLIANCE PHILOSOPHY WHEREBY STEPS TAKEN TO MAINTAIN STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM WENT HAND IN HAND WITH PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL. THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE HARMEL DOCTRINE AND PROVIDED VALUABLE GUIDANCE FOR THE FUTURE. THE PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT THESE DECISIONS (COMBINED OF COURSE WITH THE IRAN CRISIS) HAD BROUGHT BONN AND WASHINGTON CLOSER TOGETHER AND RELATIONS WITH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WERE NOW MUCH CLOSER THAN SIX MONTHS AGO. FINALLY, ALL THIS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT SERIOUSLY PREJUDICING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

2. ON THE CONSEQUENCES FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS, THE CHANCELLOR'S FEELING WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOW IMPOSE A PERIOD OF QUOTE FREEZE UNQUOTE, DURING WHICH THEY MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO TAKE SOME COUNTER ACTION IN THE ARMAMENTS FIELD. THIS FREEZE WOULD HOWEVER BE OF COMPARATIVELY SHORT DURATION. AT THE END OF IT, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD COME ROUND TO NEGOTIATING ON THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE ALLIANCE'S ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE. THE RELATIVELY RESTRAINED AND CAREFULLY BALANCED SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO THE NATO DECISIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THIS ASSESSMENT.

3. THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GERMANS TO TEST THE WATER WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN

/JOINT

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JOINT COMMISSION IN BONN AT THE END OF JANUARY, AT WHICH TISHANOV (?) WOULD MEET LAMBSDORFF AND ALSO BE RECEIVED BY THE CHANCELLOR. MEANWHILE THE POSSIBILITY WAS STILL OPEN THAT THE CHANCELLOR MIGHT VISIT MOSCOW EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR AND THAT QUOTE SOME SERIOUS BUSINESS UNQUOTE MIGHT THEN BE DONE.

4. ASKED ABOUT COMMENT IN THE GERMAN PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD NOW DIVIDED ITSELF INTO FIRST AND SECOND CLASS PARTNERS, GABLENTZ SAID IT WAS TRUE THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE SMALLER ALLIES RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO TAKE EFFECTIVE PART IN THE MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS BY THE ALLIANCE: EVEN GOVERNMENTS LIKE THE DUTCH, WHOSE PUBLIC OPINION FAVOURED NATO, HAD FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO GO ALONG WITH WHAT THEY RECOGNISED WAS NECESSARY. A DIVISION INTO FIRST AND SECOND CLASS ALLIES MUST OF COURSE BE PREVENTED. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS NOT UNHELPFUL THAT THE RISK OF SUCH A DIVISION SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF COMMENT. THE EXISTENCE OF THIS RISK HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN GETTING THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS TO FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. IT HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE WITH THE ITALIANS, WITH WHOM THE GERMANS HAD BEEN IN CLOSE AND INTENSIVE CONTACT SINCE COSSIGA'S VISIT TO BONN IN SEPTEMBER. THE ITALIANS WOULD NO DOUBT NOW SEEK TO CASH THIS PARTICULAR CHEQUE, STRESSING THEIR RIGHT TO BE TREATED AS FIRST CLASS PARTNERS.

5. ASKED WHETHER THE WHOLE EPISODE HAD NOT HAD THE EFFECT OF CONFIRMING THE FRG IN A POSITION OF DE FACTO LEADERSHIP AMONG THE EUROPEAN ALLIES, GABLENTZ SAID THAT THIS WAS TO SOME EXTENT TRUE BUT THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD ALL ALONG MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FRG WAS PRECLUDED FROM ASSUMING AN EXPLICIT LEADERSHIP ROLE. GERMAN INFLUENCE HAD BEEN EXERCISED INDIRECTLY AND OWED A GREAT DEAL TO THE CHANCELLOR'S OWN PERSONAL AND INTELLECTUAL AUTHORITY ON THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT. IF THE CHANCELLOR HAD BEEN A POLITICAL FIGURE OF MEDIOCRE OR QUOTE NORMAL UNQUOTE STATURE THE OUTCOME MIGHT HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFERENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDEL VIENNA AND BMG BERLIN

WRIGHT

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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SAVING TELEGRAM

BY BAG

FROM PARIS

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TO FCO TELNO 120 SAVING OF 19 DECEMBER

REPEATED SAVING TO OTHER EEC POSTS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, BONN
AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 631 TO MOSCOW: MESSAGES FROM PRESIDENT BREZHNEV
ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

1. The Deputy Diplomatic Adviser at the Elysée has given us an account of President Giscard's reply to the letter sent by President Brezhnev in mid-October, which dealt mainly with TNF modernisation. Levitte said that President Giscard's letter (which was handed over in Moscow on 10 December) was low-key. It began by recalling France's special position over TNF modernisation (which Brezhnev had acknowledged in his own message). France had not been a member of NATO's integrated military organisation since 1966 and this had allowed her to play an individual role in deepening detente in Europe. The motives which had led General de Gaulle to withdraw from NATO's integrated military organisation remained valid, and the French position remained unchanged. France had not participated either directly or indirectly in the decision on TNF modernisation: to have done so would have meant in effect that France had rejoined NATO.

2. The letter went on to say that this did not mean that France was unconcerned about problems likely to affect the security of Europe. France had adopted a positive attitude towards SALT II, and her approval had carried all the more weight given the independence of French defence policy. The French government favoured the pursuit of strategic negotiations. These should lead not only to a reduction in the rate of the growth of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, but also to genuine reductions, both qualitative and quantitative. As for other negotiations, it was not for France to pronounce on MBFR, in which she did not participate. However, the French government welcomed as a positive gesture the Soviet decision to withdraw 20,000 troops from Eastern Europe.

3. President Giscard's letter then went on to discuss the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). After recalling its main features, President Giscard expressed the hope that there would be a rapprochement of French and Soviet views. Levitte said the letter did not go into detail regarding Soviet objections to the French proposal. It noted that there were certain convergences between the CDE and the proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact. In conclusion, it expressed the hope that Franco/Soviet

/discussions

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discussions on security issues would develop. The aim was not to look for the lowest common denominator but to find ways of achieving greater complementarity between the French and Soviet positions.

4. It seems clear that the message, unsurprisingly, was chiefly designed to draw attention to France's apartness in European military matters and therefore her suitability to be a continuing partner in a privileged dialogue with the Soviet Union. The message also brings out the importance to the French government of its CDE proposal as being France's own special contribution to disarmament and military détente. It takes the wind out of the sails of Gaullist and left-wing opposition while giving France its own home made ticket to Europe's top tables.

5. A brief article in Le Figaro of 18 December, giving a very limited outline of Giscard's letter, concludes with the comment that it was no accident that the President had waited until the eve of the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels before replying.

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DEFENCE D

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Subject filed in ⁴ USA Visit
Policy : Nov 79

Extract from Record of Meeting between P.M.

and President Carter, Washington 17.12.79 (Pt 4)

Defence

The Prime Minister asked whether the Soviet Union was still expanding its military capacity. The President said that the Soviet Union next year would be spending 13% of its GDP on defence. The American figure was nearer 5%. After the Prime Minister had said that Britain would be going up to about 5.5%, the President commented that he found it less difficult now than two or three years previously to adopt a strong military posture. There was public support for such a policy and less and less disparity between the line advocated by the administration and by Congress. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary noted that the decision to deploy GCLMS had caused no difficulty. The Prime Minister said that the only difficulty on defence in the UK lay within the Labour Party. She said that the American Government were being very generous in providing the GCLMS and thereby helping the UK to defend itself.

The President said that he had been very pleased about the Alliance's decision on TNF modernisation. It was a pity that it had been impossible to secure a unanimous decision. But the Belgian position, at least, was reasonably firm. His own conviction, based by now on a great deal of experience, was that one must negotiate with the Russians from a position of strength. The only consequence of negotiating from weakness was that Soviet demands increased.

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/ The President

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The President thanked the Prime Minister for the help the British Government had given on SALT II. The Prime Minister asked about the timing of the ratification debate. The President said that Congress was bogged down on a number of very challenging pieces of legislation. He expected to get the SALT treaty on the floor of the Senate in the New Year and that five or six weeks of debate would follow. The issue was still in doubt. He himself thought that the treaty would be ratified but whatever the outcome, it would be March or April before a decision was reached. Mr. Vance said that he thought it might be possible to complete the process by the end of February.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there would be a timing difficulty if ratification was delayed until March or April. The weaker brethren in NATO, who attached importance to the arms control side of the TNF modernisation agreement, would be upset. It might be necessary to set up an informal internal group. This would be much worse than putting the matter into SALT III. The President described the efforts he was putting in to getting progress. He had been meeting two Senators a day for some time to talk about the problems. But support for SALT was not as strong as it had been. The discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba had set matters back for several weeks. However there was now a good chance that Messrs. Kissinger and Ford would rally to support of the treaty. The President said that he had a genuine concern that if the SALT II was not ratified there might be a strong move in Europe towards neutralisation. Recognition of this was affecting the mood of the Senate. Moreover the rumours that Great Britain was not in favour of SALT had been disproved. It would of course be useful if the Prime Minister could make the strongest statement possible in favour of ratification. The Prime Minister said that she had already done this. She had assumed that ratification would take place. The President said that he hoped she was right. But the SALT decision was still in the balance.

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 457 OF 17 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS17), UKDEL NATO, OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDEL
VIENNA AND MOSCOW

INFO SAVING ATHENS, ANKARA, LISBON AND REYKJAVIK.

Prime Minister

MY TELNO 454 : TNF MODERNISATION - NETHERLANDS POLITICAL SCENE.

1. A BUSY POLITICAL WEEK-END HAS DONE NOTHING TO CLARIFY THE PROSPECTS FOR THE VAN AGT COALITION OR TO DISPEL CONFUSION OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY. IN THE DEBATE ON 19 DECEMBER THE OPPOSITION WILL MOUNT AN ALL OUT ATTACK; BUT WHETHER ENOUGH MEMBERS OF THE TWO COALITION PARTIES WILL SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

2. AMONG THE QUESTIONS ON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW IMPALED IS THE EXTENT OF THEIR ENDORSEMENT OF THE MODERNISATION DECISION GIVEN THAT THE U S SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE AND LUNS STRESSED THAT IT WAS UNANIMOUS. WHICH DOCUMENT COMMITS THE NETHERLANDS, THE COMMUNIQUE (AS BROWN, LUNS, THE LIBERALS AND THE OPPOSITION MAINTAIN) OR THE IDD AND ITS FOOTNOTE (AS THE CDA AND THE GOVERNMENT ASSERT)? WHY IS THERE NO RECORD IN EITHER DOCUMENT OF AGREEMENT THAT THE NETHERLANDS WOULD REDUCE NUCLEAR TASKS IF IT EVENTUALLY ACCEPTS GLCMS WHEN SCHOLTEN SAID THIS IN THE NAC AND VAN AGT REPEATED IT TO PARLIAMENT? WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CONDITION, SOUGHT BY THE CDA AND ENDORSED BY THE GOVERNMENT, THAT THE NETHERLANDS COULD ONLY ACCEPT MODERNISATION IF SALT II WERE RATIFIED? IN SHORT, EVEN IF REVERSAL OF THE MAJORITY PARLIAMENTARY OPINION AGAINST PRODUCTION AND STATIONING IS ACCEPTED, TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE CDA VERTREKUNTEN - LIMITED PRODUCTION BUT DELAYED STATIONING - BEEN HONOURED?

3. THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE SINCE BRUSSELS DOES NOT INSPIRE CONFIDENCE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE IN ANSWERING SUCH QUESTIONS TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE LIBERALS AND WIN BACK ENOUGH DISSIDENT CDA MEMBERS. MUCH OF THE PRESENT CONFUSION IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO VAN AGT'S ERROR OF JUDGEMENT IN ANNOUNCING THE NETHERLANDS' POSITION TO PARLIAMENT ON 12 DECEMBER BEFORE HE KNEW THAT IT WAS NOT SPELLED OUT IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

4. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY GONE A LONG WAY TO ADMITTING THAT IT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF TNF MODERNISATION AS SUCH. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE SALT II CONDITION IN BRUSSELS VAN DER KLAUW IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT IF SALT II WERE NOT RATIFIED A NEW SITUATION WOULD ARISE: DUTCH STATIONING CONDITIONS WOULD NOT BE FULFILLED, BUT " WE CERTAINLY WANT TO REMAIN INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE NEW ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS". VAN AGT HAS BEEN MORE OPEN (TO THE PRESS ON 14 DECEMBER); THE NETHERLANDS POSITION HAD BEEN LARGELY DETERMINED BY THE US ARGUMENT THAT IF THE DUTCH REJECTED MODERNISATION THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO PLAY NO FURTHER ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE NETHERLANDS HAD ALSO TO AVOID DOING ANYTHING WHICH WOULD MAKE RATIFICATION OF SALT II MORE DIFFICULT.

5. ADDRESSING THE CDA CONGRESS ON 15 DECEMBER, VAN AGT SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD OBTAINED THE BEST POSSIBLE RESULT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES: THE CDA (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) VERTREKUNTEN HAD PROVED UNSALEABLE IN NATO AND THE TERMS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY MOTION OF 6 DECEMBER EVEN LESS SO. HE NONETHELESS INSISTED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WAS "ONLY A PRESS STATEMENT" AND THAT THE NETHERLANDS' RESERVATION WAS CLEARLY RECORDED IN THE FOOTNOTE TO THE IDD AND IN THE COUNCIL MINUTES. IN GIVING VAN AGT STRONG SUPPORT, THE CDA CONGRESS BROUGHT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE DISSIDENTS. ITS ONLY RESOLUTION CALLED FOR THE EARLIEST START ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SALT III: ITS PREAMBLE CONTAINED ONLY A MILD EXPRESSION OF REGRET THAT NATO WAS UNABLE TO ADOPT THE NETHERLANDS POSITION ON MODERNISATION.

6. VAN AGT'S POSITION IN PARLIAMENT REMAINS DANGEROUSLY BALANCED: THE MORE SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN CONVINCING THE CDA, THE GREATER THE RISK THAT HE WILL ALIENATE THE LIBERALS. THE LIBERAL LEADER RIETKERK WARNED VAN AGT ON 16 DECEMBER OF DIFFICULTIES IF HE BELITTLED THE BRUSSELS COMMUNIQUE. YET THERE ARE FACTORS WHICH WORK IMPORTANTLY IN VAN AGT'S FAVOUR. THE LIBERALS ARE KEEN TO MAINTAIN THE COALITION (THEY REALISE THAT IN ANY FUTURE ARRANGEMENT THEY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE EXCLUDED). IF THE GOVERNMENT FELL THE CDA'S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS WOULD AT BEST

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BE POOR AND THE FUSION OF ITS THREE CONSTITUENT PARTIES INTO A SINGLE WHOLE SIGNIFICANTLY SET BACK. VAN AGT HIMSELF IS THE CDA'S MAIN ELECTORAL CARD, (HE WOULD OF COURSE BE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE AS THE SENIOR CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT IN A NEW LABOUR DOMINATED COALITION).

7. WHETHER THESE FACTORS WILL BE ENOUGH TO WIN THE NECESSARY CDA VOTES WITHOUT LOSING THE LIBERALS MUST REMAIN UNCERTAIN. AN EDITORIAL IN A LEADING DAILY SUMMED IT UP NEATLY ON FRIDAY: "WILL THE TEN DISSIDENTS REALLY BRING DOWN THE CABINET DOMINATED BY THEIR OWN PARTY BECAUSE THEY DID NOT "WIN" ENOUGH IN THE NATO COUNCIL? THAT QUESTION ASSUMES RATIONAL POLITICAL JUDGEMENT. BUT IF THE EMOTIONAL FACTOR, SO PROMINENT IN THE TNF DEBATE IN THE NETHERLANDS, CONTINUES TO PREVAIL AMONG THE DISSIDENTS, THE LIFE OF THE CABINET HANGS ON A SILKEN THREAD."

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MR BULLARD
MR P H MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
NATO

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T169A/79T

ROUGH TRANSLATION

SUBJECT

T169A/79T

Rome, 15 December 1979

"Prime Minister and dear Friend,

I wish to express to you my satisfaction for the action we undertook, in close cooperation with other countries and in particular with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, to arrive at the difficult decisions adopted by the NATO Council in Bruxelles on 12 December. In the opinion of my Government, as well as of the major political forces in Italy, they are useful and indeed essential for the security of the Alliance. It is to be hoped that they will assist the re-launching of the negotiations for arms control and limitation, including theatre nuclear forces.

I am convinced moreover that it was wise to grant special concessions to Belgium and the Netherlands. I think that it is now necessary to undertake a discreet and friendly diplomatic action in order to strengthen the ties of friendship with these countries, besides those already existing within the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC. On my part, I wish to assure you that it is my intention to move, also with personal initiatives, in this direction.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

Francesco Cossiga."



04568/UCD

IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI
DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA

Roma, 15 dicembre 1979

Scerifile e come Amici,

desidero vivamente compiacermi per l'azione che abbiamo svolto in stretto collegamento anche con altri Paesi, ed in modo particolare con gli Stati Uniti e con la Repubblica Federale di Germania, e che ha portato alle decisioni adottate a Bruxelles il 12 dicembre scorso. Si tratta di decisioni che io ed il mio Governo, così come le principali forze politiche italiane, pur nel grande sforzo che si è dovuto compiere all'interno del nostro Paese, consideriamo essenziali ed utili per la sicurezza dell'Alleanza e per il rilancio di trattative per il controllo e la limitazione degli armamenti anche nel settore delle forze nucleari di teatro.

Ritengo inoltre che sia stato saggio accordare concessioni speciali al Belgio ed ai Paesi Bassi. Nei confronti di questi due Paesi penso che occorra tuttavia svolgere ora una discreta ed amichevole azione diplomatica per rinforzare con essi i vincoli di amicizia, oltre ai comuni vincoli all'interno dell'Alleanza Atlantica e della Comunità Economica Europea. Per quanto mi concerne desidero assicurarLe che sono pronto ed ho intenzione di muovermi in tal senso, anche con iniziative personali.

Mi creda,

Ino des. unv

f. Longi

S.E.
Margaret Thatcher
Primo Ministro del Regno Unito

L O N D R A

PRIME MINISTER

Defence
PA
M

I need report only one part of the exchanges following Mr. Pym's Statement on theatre nuclear forces this afternoon. There was pressure from all sides for an early debate on nuclear weapons, and Mr. Callaghan said that if time was provided he he would want to take the opportunity to express his own views.

Subsequently, the Speaker refused a request from Bill Rodgers for an SO 9 debate on consultations arising from the NATO meeting this week - which was explicitly intended to include your consultations in the United States. The Speaker hinted that he hoped that there would be an early debate anyway.

Leger Carter

Duty Clerk

pp Nick Sanders

13 December 1979

PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT
MODERNISATION OF NATO'S LONG RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES

With your permission, Mr Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a statement about the NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers' meeting in Brussels yesterday to consider proposals for modernisation of the Alliance's Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces, and a parallel arms control offer. A copy of the communique issued at the end of the meeting is being placed in the Library.

Faced with the rapid growth in Soviet long range theatre nuclear capability, notably the deployment of large numbers of modern SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers, at a time when the Alliance's own equivalent forces are increasing in age and vulnerability, we concluded that some modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear capability is essential.

The modernisation programme will involve the deployment in Europe of US owned and operated systems comprising 108 Pershing II ballistic missile launchers, which will replace the same number of the existing Pershing IA, and 464 ground launched cruise missiles. All 14 NATO countries concerned have agreed to support the programme, and certain infrastructure costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. As far as basing is concerned, Germany, Italy and Belgium in addition to

/ ourselves ...

2.

ourselves, have agreed to stationing, subject in the Belgian case to a six-month deferment of implementation while arms control developments are monitored. The Netherlands will take a decision in 1981 on deployment in their territory. The first deployments should take place in about three years' time.

We will discuss with the United States where the 160 cruise missiles to be deployed in the United Kingdom should be stationed; I will make a statement about this as soon as practicable.

As an integral part of the programme, we also agreed that the United States should withdraw 1,000 of their nuclear warheads from Europe as soon as possible, and that the remaining stockpile will not be increased as the 572 warheads associated with the modernisation programme are introduced.

In parallel with this modernisation programme the United States will make an offer to the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on the limitation of both Soviet and US land-based long-range theatre nuclear systems. The intention is that their bilateral negotiations should begin as soon as possible. They will be based on the principle of equality between both sides; any limitations will have to be adequately verifiable. The aim

/ will be ...

will be to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe, and hence a more predictable and manageable situation at a lower level of armaments. Because of the particular importance of these negotiations for the European members of the Alliance a special consultative body is to be set up within NATO to follow the negotiations on a continuous basis.

HMG has, as I have earlier made clear, fully supported the Alliance effort to reach agreement on this programme, which I believe is essential if we are to avoid a dangerous gap emerging in NATO's theatre nuclear capability. Such a gap would weaken the Alliance's strategy of flexible response and so cast doubt on the credibility of our deterrent. The decision reached yesterday is a dramatic reaffirmation of the American commitment to the defence of Europe. This decision is also a demonstration of the cohesion and political will of the Alliance to respond to a growing Soviet threat and to resist a massive Soviet propaganda campaign. My right honourable and noble Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and I therefore regard the outcome of the Alliance's lengthy and careful deliberations as highly satisfactory. We must now hope that the Soviet Union are now willing to negotiate seriously on the limitation of theatre nuclear systems.

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: CC (79) 25th Conclusions, Minute 3 (extract)

Date: 13 December 1979

Signed AWayland Date 24 February 2011

PREM Records Team

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard
Columns 1540-1561

13/12/79
Theatre Nuclear Forces

Signed *AWayland* Date *24 February 2011*

PREM Records Team

(Copy 1 filed on Defence May 79-UK Det.)

Ref. A0940

PRIME MINISTERModernisation of NATO's Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces
and the replacement of Polaris

As agreed at the MISC 7 meeting on 6th December, the Defence Secretary will make a statement at Cabinet on 13th December under Foreign Affairs on the outcome of the NATO Ministerial meeting on 12th December on the proposals to modernise NATO's theatre nuclear weapons, and the parallel arms control proposals.

2. Following his statement you may care to inform Cabinet that, at your meeting with President Carter on 17th December in Washington, you will be exploring the possibilities of a suitable replacement for the U. K. Polaris force in the early 1990s. The Americans are very anxious that, at this stage, you should not be specific about which particular possibility you may have in mind.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

12th December 1979

VLS.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 December 1979

lf 13/12

Thank you for your letter of 12 December. As you will know, the Prime Minister told the Leader of the Opposition at Question Time in the House yesterday that she hoped that your Secretary of State would make a statement tomorrow. We look forward to seeing a draft as soon as possible tomorrow morning.

I am copying this letter to John Stevens (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), Mike Richardson (Lord Privy Seal's Office), Richard Prescott (Paymaster General's Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office), Charles Cumming-Bruce (Chief Whip's Office, House of Lords) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

N. J. SANDERS

D. T. Piper, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

Re

JA



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930702~~ 218 6169

D/S of S PS/2

12th December 1979

Dear Nick,

We have discussed on the telephone the Defence Secretary's wish that on his return from the NATO Defence Planning Committee on Thursday he should make a statement to the House about the meeting. The purpose of the statement would be to announce NATO's decision on a programme for the modernisation of the Alliance's long-range theatre nuclear weapons and a parallel arms control approach to the Soviet Union. A draft of the statement would be circulated as early as possible on Thursday.

As you know, considerable interest has been shown in this subject on both sides of the House over recent months, and it has not been possible to respond favourably to the requests which MPs have made on several occasions to the Prime Minister, the Leader of the House and the Defence Secretary for a full-scale debate on LRTNF modernisation. On two successive days this week unsuccessful attempts have been made by the Opposition to persuade the Speaker to allow a debate under Standing Order No 9.

I understand from the Leader of the House's office that, although pressure on the Parliamentary timetable this Thursday is already very great, time for a statement could be found if necessary. I would be grateful if you would confirm that the Prime Minister agrees that Mr Pym should make such a statement on Thursday.

/ I am ...

Nick Sanders Esq
10 Downing Street



2.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Lord Privy Seal, the Paymaster General, the Government Chief Whip and the Secretary of the Cabinet. I am also sending a copy to the Whips' Office in the House of Lords who will wish to consider whether, in the event of the statement being made in the House of Commons, it should be repeated in the House of Lords.

Yours ever

D T Piper

(D T PIPER)



Original in G/R
cc MOD
19.

C.F. to note

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 December 1979

Dear Mr. Newens.

Thank you for your letter of 28 November about cruise missiles.

NATO's Defence and Foreign Ministers will be meeting in Brussels on 12 December to decide on a programme for the modernisation of NATO's long-range theatre nuclear weapons and a parallel arms control approach to the Soviet Union. The proposed programme includes the basing in the United Kingdom of 160 US owned and manned Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, which would be assigned to NATO. As in the case of the F111 aircraft which are already based in this country, I am satisfied that current arrangements are adequate to ensure that the British Government would have a proper role in any decisions concerning their use in war.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

S. Newens, Esq., M.P.

JS

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DESKBY UKDEL NATO 071000Z

OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 071300Z

FM THE HAGUE 070840Z DEC 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 430 OF 07 DECEMBER

AND TO MODUK

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO AND WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BONN, BRUSSELS, ROME, COPENHAGEN, MOSCOW

MIPT: TNF MODERNISATION

1. OUR TRANSLATION OF MOTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS

THE CHAMBER

- CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO PURSUE A POLICY DIRECTED TOWARD THE REDUCTION OF THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
- OF THE VIEW THAT EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO AVOID A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN EUROPE BY BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE SOVIET UNION:

PRONOUNCES ITS CONVICTION THAT IN THE FORTHCOMING NATO CONSULTATIONS NO AGREEMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A POSITIVE DECISION ON PRODUCTION AND STATIONING OF THE PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH MEANS ALSO THAT THE NETHERLANDS CANNOT NOW AGREE TO THE STATIONING OF A NUMBER OF PERSHING II AND/OR CRUISE MISSILES ON ITS TERRITORY.

ENDS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 OF 07 DECEMBER.

AND TO MODUK (DS17)

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO AND WASHINGTON.

INFO PRIORITY BONN, BRUSSELS, ROME, COPENHAGEN, MOSCOW.

INFO ROUTINE OSLO, ATHENS, ANKARA, OTTAWA, PARIS, LUXEMBOURG,
AND UKDEL VIENNA.

INFO SAVING LISBON AND REYKJAVIK.

THE HAGUE TELNO 416: TNF MODERNISATION.

1. THE DEBATE IN THE NETHERLANDS PARLIAMENT ON 6 DECEMBER ENDED WITH THE PASSAGE BY 76 VOTES TO 69 OF AN OPPOSITION MOTION ASKING THE GOVERNMENT TO APPROVE NEITHER PRODUCTION NOR STATIONING OF MODERNISED TNF. IN SPITE OF AN EMOTIONAL APPEAL TO HIS CDA PARTY COLLEAGUES BY SCHOLTEN, TEN OF THEM (NINE FROM THE ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY PARTY) VOTED WITH THE OPPOSITION. TEXT OF THE MOTION IN MIFT, NOT TO ALL. A CDA MOTION DESIGNED TO DETER CDA DISSIDENTS FROM VOTING WITH THE OPPOSITION, WAS WITHDRAWN.

2. THIS RESULT MUST HAVE TAKEN THE GOVERNMENT BY SURPRISE. IT WILL BE A SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT TO VAN AGT AND VAN DER KLAUW IN THEIR TALKS TODAY WITH PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON. AND IT MAKES IT HARD TO SEE WHAT RESULT SCHOLTEN AND VAN DER KLAUW CAN BRING BACK FROM BRUSSELS NEXT WEEK WHICH COULD PREVENT THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT. AFTER THE RESULT WAS KNOWN DR VAN DER KLAUW COULD ONLY SAY THAT CABINET WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW TO REACT WHEN IT MET ON SATURDAY 8 DECEMBER.

3. THE LEFT WING OF THE CDA HAS NOW SHOWN ITS HAND AND WILL FIND IT HARD TO TURN BACK. (TWO WELL-KNOWN ABOLITIONISTS WERE ABSENT, SO THE ANTI-NUCLEAR LOBBY IS IN FACT 12). EVEN FULL NATO AGREEMENT TO THE CDA PRINCIPLES (VERTREKPUNTEN) WOULD PROBABLY

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/NOT

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NOT SATISFY THEM. THE LIBERALS, THE JUNIOR COALITION PARTY, HAVE STATED THAT THEY COULD NOT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT IF IT CAUSED A SPLIT IN NATO, AND THAT IF THE WORST COMES TO THE WORST THEY WILL PUT PEACE AND SECURITY BEFORE SURVIVAL OF THE CABINET. AND VAN DER KLAUW, HIMSELF A LIBERAL TOLD PARLIAMENT ON 4 DECEMBER AND AGAIN ON 6 DECEMBER THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT PURSUE A POLICY ON TNF WHICH DID NOT COMMAND A PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY.

4. THE CABINET AT THEIR MEETING ON 8 DECEMBER TO DECIDE THEIR LINE FOR THE NAC MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON 12 DECEMBER, HAVE SOMEHOW TO RECONCILE THE IRRECONCILABLE. THEY CAN PROBABLY DO LITTLE MORE THAN GRIT THEIR TEETH AND FOLLOW THROUGH TO THE BITTER END OF THE POLICY EXPLAINED TO THE NPG BY SCHOLTEN AND DEVELOPED IN SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS, ADJUSTED AS MAY BE BY THE RESULTS OF VAN AGT'S VISITS TO BRUSSELS, ROME, LONDON AND WASHINGTON. BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RESIGNATION (AND POSSIBLY A GENERAL ELECTION, FOUGHT LARGELY ON THE TNF/NATO ISSUE, WITH FUNDAMENTAL POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES TO NETHERLANDS FOREIGN POLICY) CANNOT BE EXCLUDED.

5. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OWN APPROACH TO THE BRUSSELS MEETING ON 12 DECEMBER IS THAT IT WILL NOT NOW BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE THE "DUTCH TRICK". THE QUESTION OF OFFERING FURTHER CONCESSIONS TO THE DUTCH, AS PART OF A PACKAGE IN WHICH THEY ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF DEPLOYMENT OF 572 WEAPONS, IS NOW ACADEMIC: THEY WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO ENSURE PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT, AND NATO WOULD HAVE UNNECESSARILY WEAKENED ITS HAND VIS-A-VIS THE WARSAW PACT.

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Extract from the PM's meeting with Mr Van Agt,
PM Netherlands on 6 December 1979

Theatre Nuclear Force Modernisation

Mr. van Agt said that, so far as the possibility of securing agreement for NATO's TNF proposals was concerned, the present situation in his country was bad and getting worse from day to day. The public mood in the Netherlands showed some signs of mass psychosis. The wave of feeling had begun to gather force two or three weeks previously. By now 50% of the sermons in the churches were dealing with the subject. The issue was endangering the

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Subject file Netherlands

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- 2 -

survival of the Government. The fall of a NATO Government on a NATO issue would be a very serious development. The Prime Minister agreed.

Mr. van Agt said that, in his judgement, a majority of the electorate would, like the Danes, favour a moratorium, i.e., no decision either on production or deployment of cruise missiles. The Prime Minister asked whether this was regardless of the Soviet reaction. Would a Soviet failure to produce a quid pro quo have any effect on Dutch opinion? Mr. van Agt said that it would not.

In these circumstances, the Dutch Government had, in Mr. van Agt's view, three options:-

- (a) To accept the NATO proposals as they stood. This would be political suicide. The present Government would fall and would almost certainly be replaced by a Government whose views would be significantly less palatable to NATO;
- (b) To go along with Dutch opinion and to tell the Alliance that they had no discretion to accept the NATO proposals. In these circumstances the Government would survive, but there would be no NATO decision. This would represent a major step towards the isolation of the Netherlands within NATO;
- (c) To find a position midway between those summarised above. This was what Mr. van Agt himself hoped to do. He had discussed the matter with his Foreign Minister, Mr. van der Klaauw, and his Defence Minister, Mr. Scholten, but with no other members of Cabinet. The midway position would

/ be

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be to say that the Dutch Government could not commit themselves to agreement now on deployment of cruise missiles, but that they would make a "commitment to commit". This would mean expressing a willingness to accept the missiles in, say, two years time, i.e. at the end of 1981 if by that time it was clear that arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union had produced inadequate results. It would be crucial in any such formula to be clear as to who would make the judgement about the results of the arms control negotiations. The answer should be given by the Alliance as a whole, rather than by the Dutch Government on their own.

Mr. van Agt said that his third, and preferred, option would also involve two further features. The Government would have to criticise publicly the scale of the proposed programme. They would point out that NATO had opted for a figure very close to the upper end of the range identified by the High Level Group. They would also wish to raise questions about the relationship between the decision to deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and the offer in the MBFR Option III proposal to withdraw 36 Pershing Is. Secondly, Mr. van Agt said, the Dutch Government would ask to be allowed to relinquish some of their present nuclear assignments as soon as they accepted the TNF modernisation programme. Mr. van Agt concluded his presentation by remarking that he did not feel ashamed of the posture he had been forced to take up. His own views on NATO were

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firm, but, however heroic it might be, to take a strong stand now would be fruitless. It would merely result in his Government being overthrown, and an administration more hostile to NATO being installed in its place.

The Prime Minister asked whether, even if his Government lost a vote on TNF modernisation, they could not hope to survive a subsequent vote of confidence on the future of the Government as a whole. Mr. van Agt said that the vote of confidence would be lost. The Dutch were "a people of theologians". They were highly individualistic, and preoccupied by matters of conscience. There was a deep reluctance in the country to accept any nuclear weapons. This had become focussed on the TNF issue. Anti-nuclear sentiment was increasing in the younger generation. A further factor was that a minority within the CDA Party had always had considerable distaste for the present coalition. They felt that there should have been a centre/left coalition, rather than a centre/right coalition. The number who felt like this was relatively small, but they were crucial to the survival of the Government, and now had the issue they needed.

The Prime Minister asked whether those who objected to the TNF deployment were not aware of the threat from the Soviet deployment of the SS20 missile. Mr. van Agt said that the general feeling was that it would be better to be occupied than destroyed. Better, in other words, to be red than dead. The Prime Minister asked whether the Dutch would allow others to defend them. Mr. van Agt said that he thought the answer was yes. The Prime Minister said that NATO would have to go ahead with the decision to deploy long-range theatre nuclear weapons, otherwise, the Alliance would lose

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its purpose. The Netherlands could reserve its position while waiting to see what the attitude of the Soviet Government was in arms control negotiations. The Russians were at present playing a traditional psychological game in order to try to discourage NATO from taking decisions. They must not be allowed to get away with this. Mr. van Agt indicated assent. He said that he did not want to block a decision provided it was possible for the other members of the Alliance to go ahead without him.

At this point in the discussion, the Prime Minister and Mr. van Agt decided to move to dinner. But before joining the guests, Mr. van Agt said that he should put on record that the official purpose of his mission had been to advocate, on behalf of the Dutch Government as a whole, the splitting of the NATO decisions on production and on deployment of long-range theatre nuclear weapons. The Dutch Government's official position was that the decision on 12 December should be in favour only of production of the missiles. A decision to deploy them should be taken only in two years time, and only if arms control negotiations had failed to produce results. He would be telling the Press that he had argued the case, but that he had failed to persuade the Prime Minister. He did not intend to revert further to the point.

At dinner, the participants in the tete-a-tete discussion were joined by the Dutch Ambassador, Mr. Fack, and by Mr. van Agt's Press Adviser, Mr. van der Weil. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir John Taylor, Lord Bridges, and Mr. P.H. Moberly were also present.

/ Mr. van Agt

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Mr. van Agt summarised what he had said to the Prime Minister about the options, as he saw them, that were open to his Government. He confirmed that he would be prepared to go along with a NATO decision on modernisation. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary expressed doubts as to the credibility of a position in which the Netherlands was an odd man out. Mr. Moberly said that he regarded Mr. van Agt's third option as the least difficult of the various possible courses that might have been taken. However, it would, inevitably, mean that there would be a second decision point facing NATO. The Prime Minister said that it would be essential that this second decision point should be for the Netherlands alone, and should be limited to the question of deployment.

Mr. Moberly asked whether the Dutch commitment would be to the full programme, as proposed by NATO, with a question mark only over the Dutch contribution. Mr. van Agt did not give a direct reply. He commented on the interaction of the Dutch and the Belgian decisions. After the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had expressed some optimism on the latest developments in Belgian thinking, Mr. van Agt said that he thought the Belgian decision might well come as a disappointment. However, he hoped he had persuaded M. Martens, the Belgian Prime Minister, to postpone his Government's decision until the evening of Monday, 10 December. He planned that the Dutch Cabinet should take its decision the same evening, so that the two decisions would be independent. His own Cabinet did not yet know that this was his intention.

After Mr. Moberly had repeated that the commitment to a full programme was of great importance, Mr. van Agt said that, as he had

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already told the Prime Minister, his Government would have to criticise the size of the programme. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he hoped, in this event, that Mr. van der Klaauw would not be too hostile. He asked whether, if the total was reduced, the Dutch Government would accept a reduced share. Mr. van Agt said that they would not.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked what would happen if the present Dutch Government resigned. Mr. van Agt said that there would have to be new elections early in 1980. The polls were showing a swing to the left, and the coalition partners were losing support. There would be a high probability of a centre/left Government, and some possibility of a left wing Government, which would be a new development for the Netherlands. The source of the swing seemed to be opposition to efforts that the present Dutch Government had made to limit public expenditure. Everyone was in favour of cuts which affected someone else. There was a good deal of tension between the Government and the trade unions.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 December 1979

New Rhodesia

CALL BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR

The U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Kingman Brewster, called on the Prime Minister this morning to discuss her forthcoming visit to Washington and New York. A number of issues were touched on briefly.

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister commented that it would be very awkward for her if the United States was still applying sanctions against Rhodesia at the time of her arrival and if there were by then a British Governor in Salisbury. Mr. Brewster said that he was conscious of the problem and would make sure it was understood in Washington when he returned there early next week. However, he could give no undertakings about the reaction of the Administration. He assumed the wording used in recent statements, and in particular the reference to a thirty day period, reflected an effort to bridge the positions of those who wanted no procrastination in the lifting of sanctions and those who wanted no automaticity.

Defence

In the course of some rather random remarks about defence matters, Mr. Brewster said that the wish of the U.S. Administration to separate the timing of the decision on theatre nuclear force modernisation and on the Polaris succession should not be read as having any implications for the attitude of the Administration on the second issue.

Iran

Mr. Brewster said that the President was, inevitably, pre-occupied with the Iranian situation. It would be very useful for him to be able to discuss with another Head of Government the implications of the crisis and to hear the views of an outsider on what might be done. The President had been receiving advice from a very limited number of advisers. These advisers

/ were themselves

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were themselves disinclined, for obvious reasons, to discuss the problem, particularly the question of contingency plans, with a wider circle. Mr. Brewster said that he hoped that if the Prime Minister had ideas of her own she would spell them out. The President would very probably keep his own ideas to himself, but a discussion would nonetheless, in Mr. Brewster's view, be useful.

Mr. Brewster said that two members of the U.S. Treasury, Messrs. Carswell and Mundheim (?) would be coming to London tomorrow to talk to the Treasury and the Bank of England about the freezing of Iranian assets. They would be bearing a letter to the Prime Minister from President Carter on the question.

Ulster

Mr. Brewster said that the question of arms sales to the RUC was tied up with the primaries rather than with the national elections. As a result it was likely to be very difficult for the President to move in the immediate future. The Prime Minister said that she would have to raise the question nonetheless. Mr. Brewster said that he understood this.

Oil Sales

Mr. Brewster referred briefly to American unhappiness at the impact of the BNOC decision to charge in advance for future oil sales. The American authorities were taking the line that this made it harder to keep the Saudi Arabians, Kuwaitis and others in line in resisting further price increases. BNOC's position had symbolic significance. The Prime Minister made it clear that she did not share this analysis.

I am sending copies of this letter to Martin Hall (HM Treasury), Bill Burroughs (Department of Energy), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Ref.A0831

PRIME MINISTERMISC 7: Long Range Theatre Nuclear Force Modernisation
and Arms Control

BACKGROUND

This subject was last discussed at MISC 7 on 19th September when the Secretary of State for Defence was authorised to agree that this country should accept the basing of 144 American-owned Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) with discretion to go up to 160 if necessary. The Defence Secretary subsequently exercised this discretionary power. In his minute to you dated 3rd December, Mr Pym now reports on the present state of play. In parallel, in his minute dated 23rd November, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has described the proposed approach to arms control as set out in a report by the NATO Special Group. Both matters can be covered in the same discussion.

HANDLING

2. You could start by inviting the Secretary of State for Defence to introduce his minute on the modernisation proposals. The points to be covered in subsequent discussion can be divided into the three categories of

- a. immediate specific issues
- b. presentational points
- c. longer term policy issues.

- a. Immediate specific issues

- (i) If the Dutch decide not to participate in the GLCM programme, what should the United Kingdom do? Although there is likely to be no argument about going ahead with our part of the programme in these circumstances, if the question of the possible redistribution of the Dutch share arises (as it might), this is more difficult. There is no particular military significance about the 572 figure and the United Kingdom is already prepared to take more than its original share at some additional cost. But the United States may well be keen to maintain the overall total of 572 missiles, because



it provides a higher total than a figure diminished by the Dutch share for subsequent arms control negotiations under SALT III. It may also be argued that a reduction on the 572 total will be seen as a weakness on the part of the Alliance as a whole, and that it would be right to put the Dutch under moral pressure by redistributing their share to more robust allies. Finally, there may have been some agreement between the United States and the FRG, when the latter's total was reduced by 16, that if other allies sought to reduce or evade their share, the FRG would reassume a larger figure. With these considerations in mind the Committee may wish to agree to the Defence Secretary's recommendation that we should be willing to take a modest further increase, say 16 (the Dutch were due to take 48 GLCM) and that we should not take a prominent position in the Alliance in arguing against redistribution.

This recommendation is not made in the Defence Secretary's minute. Presumably he is going to make it orally.

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(ii) Are the last minute reservations expressed by the new Danish Government likely to affect the position seriously either in terms of general agreement to the proposals, or the specific numbers of new weapons to be deployed?

b. Presentational points The Defence Secretary mentions some public concern in East Anglia which he regards as manageable (paragraph 6 of his minute). What does this amount to? Has there been any significant general reaction to the unattributable briefing of Defence correspondents which took place in the Ministry of Defence on 30th October? The Defence Secretary's suggestion of making a statement to the House of 13th December following the NATO Ministerial meeting on 12th December seems sensible. Should he inform the Cabinet on 6th December of his intentions? One particular presentational problem which may arise concerns the so-called 'specific understanding' between your predecessors and the American President, which you renewed last June, that the use of nuclear weapons by United States forces stationed in this country would be a matter for joint decision by the two Governments. This understanding dates back to October 1951 and was last publicly reaffirmed in 1962 (Hansard col.797 6th November 1962).



United States officials have confirmed in private that these assurances still hold good in relation to their GLCM proposals, but they have asked us not to refer to them in public, if possible, presumably because they have not offered safeguards to the same extent to all other allies. Nevertheless under pressure it may be necessary to refer to the continuance of these assurances, and the Americans accept this.

c. Longer term policy issues The Defence Secretary suggests that we should shelve the issue of acquiring any GLCMs of our own because we could not produce warheads for any new United Kingdom system before 1990. But this means that when the Vulcans give place to the shorter range Tornados in 1982/83, this country will have no national long range theatre nuclear forces. It can be argued, for reasons which you saw demonstrated at the exercise on 22nd October, that one Polaris submarine on patrol may lack credibility as a national nuclear deterrent if there is no intermediate nuclear stage whereby this country can indicate to a potential aggressor that it has the will to resist. Should the Ministry of Defence be invited to give further thought to the relative importance of "sub-strategic nuclear options" in our national nuclear armoury, and report back to MISC 7 on the point?

3. Turning to arms control you will wish to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary if there is anything he wishes to add to his minute to you of 23rd November. The points to be covered in subsequent discussion are

a. Does principle 2, stipulating that arms control negotiations involving TNF should be conducted within the SALT III framework, create a risk that it will override principle 6 which seeks to exclude non-United States allied systems from such negotiations? Are we likely to increase such a risk if we acquire our own GLCMs in due course?

b. Have we any idea how far the United States might be prepared to cut back the 572 launchers in their TNF modernisation proposal as part of the SALT III negotiations?



- c. Is it realistic to bring in Backfire, as principle 12a seeks to do, without expecting the Russians to insist on United States long range bombers being included?
- d. What are the special consultative arrangements envisaged under principle 3? Are they likely to hold good if and when SALT II gets to the stage of Congressional ratification?
- e. What are the chances of the Continental allies accepting this approach to arms control? Is there still likely to be pressure to make SALT II ratification a prerequisite for a decision on TNF modernisation? If so, what are the implications?

CONCLUSION

4. Subject to the points made in discussion, the Meeting might be guided on TNF modernisation
 - i. To note the position set out in the Defence Secretary's minute;
 - ii. to agree that this country should take a modest further increase in our allocation of United States-owned GLCM if the Dutch share has to be redistributed;
 - iii. to agree that this country should not take the lead in arguing against such a redistribution of the United States wishes it to take place;
 - iv. to agree that the Defence Secretary should inform the Cabinet on 6th December and Parliament on 13th December of the decisions which have been taken;
 - v. to agree that the possibility of acquiring United Kingdom GLCMs with United Kingdom warheads should be kept under review but that no steps should be taken to procure United Kingdom GLCMs with United States warheads held on a 'dual-key' basis;



and on TNF arms control

vi. to agree that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should endorse the plan before NATO for a negotiation on Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces;

vii. to invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to inform the Cabinet of this decision on 6th December at the same time as they are informed about the decisions on the modernisation of Theatre Nuclear Forces by the Defence Secretary.

RC

4th December 1979



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 December, 1979.

Thank you for your letter of 29 November enclosing the text of Mr. Gromyko's statement and answers at his Press Conference in Bonn last month. The text has been read here with interest.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Monsieur V.I. Dolgov

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PRIME MINISTER

LONG RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNISATION

The purpose of this minute is to report, for the meeting of MISC 7 on 5th December, the current position on the modernisation of NATO long range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF); and to make proposals on public presentation.

The Position in the Alliance

2. Attitudes in the Alliance, apart from those in the Netherlands and Denmark, are encouragingly robust. President Brezhnev's 6th October initiative has been if anything counterproductive. The Americans have put their full weight behind the proposed programme, and made it clear they attach great importance to it. Of the five European countries asked to accept basing, the FRG, Belgium and Italy all share our positive attitude. Provided a broad consensus is maintained most of the "non-basing" countries seem likely to give the political support and modest financial contributions asked of them.

3. The Dutch position remains difficult. Popular anti-nuclear sentiment and opposition within the main coalition party have put the Government in an awkward situation. The key Ministers support the programme, but are aware that if they cannot command a Parliamentary majority to endorse their final decision the Government may fall.

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It was probably helpful that the Dutch were virtually isolated at the recent meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in The Hague and we need not despair of their eventually joining an Alliance consensus, although their position in December will probably not be known until the last minute, and their decision could be conditional on the ratification of SALT II.

4. I am sure that we must be willing to go ahead even if the Dutch cannot go along with a collective decision in December, leaving it open for them to join later. I believe that our main partners take a similar view. I suggest, therefore, that we should continue to give the Americans robust support in maintaining the concept and substance of the proposals. The new Danish Government have also unexpectedly expressed last minute reservations and proposed that the Alliance decision should be postponed by six months. We, the Americans and Germans have all made it clear in very strong terms that this would be unacceptable, and surprisingly both the Dutch and Norwegians have also said that they do not support the idea. Although the Dutch and Danish positions make the situation more uncertain, I am still reasonably optimistic that -albeit with some difficulty - the programme will be agreed on 12th December, provided that no further unexpected obstacles arise.

Basing in the UK

5. There has been some public concern, especially in East Anglia (which is a possible but by no means certain choice for basing) about GLCM basing in the UK, but I regard this as manageable. We are continuing to pay particular attention to public presentation, and the media coverage has so far been generally favourable.

The Possibility of UK Owned Missiles

6. At our last meeting I undertook to put forward recommendations about the possibility of acquiring UK owned GLCMs with UK warheads to replace the sub-strategic long range capability we shall lose when the Vulcan gives way to the shorter range Tornado in 1982/3. Although there are attractions in such a course, it would not presently be

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practicable. Because of the manpower shortages in our nuclear warhead programme explained in my minute to you of 1st November and assuming that we are to have a Polaris successor (and to give the necessary priority to a new warhead for it), on current indications we could not, so far as can be estimated at present, procure a warhead for any other new UK system before about 1990. There is the additional consideration that it would be difficult for us to resist the inclusion of any UK owned GLCM force in SALT II negotiations involving TNF.

7. This does not mean we have to rule out at this stage the possibility of acquiring our own GLCMs from the US and fitting UK warheads. To do so would not presently be politic given our discussions with the US on the Polaris successor. I therefore suggest that we should decide, and inform the US, to defer action on this for the present but to keep the possibility under review in the light of political, military and resource developments, including the situation at Aldermaston.

8. There is some indication that the US may suggest to us that we should buy GLCMs for use with US warheads on the standard "dual-key" basis. I see little attraction in such an idea; they would involve us in large costs without the benefits of operational independence. I therefore recommend that if the US put forward proposals on these lines I should not offer them any encouragement.

Public Presentation

9. We have not formally made public our decision to accept basing of US GLCMs, although we have informed our Alliance partners, and there seems to be a pretty general assumption by British public opinion that we shall. We have, however, made clear our strong support for the proposed programme, and although the Germans, Belgians and Italians are likely to announce their formal decision shortly before the 12th December meeting, I see little value in any further UK statement before then. We shall need to inform Parliament of the collective Alliance decision as soon as possible after it has been taken, and I therefore propose that I

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should make a statement in the House on 13th December after my return from Brussels.

10. I am sending copies of this minute to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

FR

3rd December 1979

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET

SERIAL No. T157A/79T

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 December 1979

Your Excellency

Thank you for the letter which your Ambassador delivered on 15 October, summarising the ideas set out in your speech on 6 October in East Berlin.

The British Government have welcomed the announcement that you intend to withdraw troops, tanks and other equipment from the German Democratic Republic; we take this as an encouraging sign that you too are concerned to make progress in the negotiations in Vienna and that it will be possible to reach agreements there leading to equal collective ceilings for NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. We have also noted with interest your ideas for expanding the scope of confidence building measures. We shall take these ideas seriously into account when preparing for the Madrid CSCE Review Conference, at which we and our Allies will have proposals of our own to make. We have welcomed in particular the indication that the Soviet Government would be willing to discuss the possibility of limiting long range nuclear weapons relevant to the European theatre. This is very much in line with thinking in NATO, where this subject has been under intense discussion for many months.

While I note what you say about the numbers of medium range bombers and missile launchers in the European part of the Soviet Union, I cannot overlook the fact that the overall capability of Soviet nuclear systems within range of Western Europe has greatly increased during this decade. At a time when NATO has not introduced any new land-based long range theatre nuclear systems, the latest Soviet systems have been deployed in substantial numbers. As a result the Soviet Union's capability in this area has significantly improved in terms of warhead numbers, accuracy

/and survivability.

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and survivability. This development has created an imbalance between the Soviet and Western forces, which has given rise to widespread anxiety in Western Europe. It is to prevent this imbalance from becoming more serious in the next decade that NATO is considering plans to modernise its long range theatre forces and to make full use of the opportunities for arms control. We attach equal importance to both parts of this programme.

In a speech which I delivered in Luxembourg on 18 October, I explained that the restoration of a military balance in Europe was not an end in itself but that it was the necessary condition for the development of relations between East and West. I argued for a realistic dialogue designed to build on our interests where they coincide and to limit the consequences where they conflict. It is in this spirit that I have studied your letter. The British Government look forward, in the coming months, to building on several of the ideas which you have put forward.

I also note your assurance that the Soviet Union does not seek military superiority. But I hope that you for your part will understand the real concern in Western Europe that, while the central strategic balance is being stabilised through SALT, there is a growing disparity in long range theatre nuclear capabilities, which adds to the existing imbalance in conventional forces in Central Europe. This imbalance cannot be ignored in the realistic pursuit of better East/West relations to which the British Government is committed.

Yours sincerely

MT

His Excellency Mr. Leonid Ilich Brezhnev

PART 1 ends:-

USSR Embassy to MODBA 29.11.79

PART 2 begins:-

PM to Brezhnev 3.12.79