

The Situation in Northern Ireland.  
Force Levels.

Part 8

IRELAND

Part 1: May 1979

Part 8: Aug 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
		BVBA					
<del>19.8.80</del>		25.2.81					
<del>26.8.80</del>		PREM 19/498					
<del>29.8.80</del>							
<del>25.9.80</del>							
<del>5.10.80</del>							
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<del>6.2.81</del>							
<del>14.2.81</del>							
<del>16.2.81</del>							
<del>20.2.81</del>							

PART 8 ends:-

25. 2. 81

PART 9 begins:-

3. 3. 81




 MO 19/3  
 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

 TELEPHONE 01-218 9000  
 DIRECT DIALING 01-218 2111/3

 18  
 Prime Minister  
 25/2

MO 19/3

25th February 1981

Dear Humphrey

I understand that at your meeting with the Chief Constable and the GOC on 2nd February you discussed a further reduction of one major unit in the Northern Ireland Force level. I am writing now to let you know that this proposal has my full support and to seek your formal agreement that we should go ahead with implementing it. The unit being withdrawn is 3 PARA which ends its emergency tour in April.

Although 3 PARA is currently covering the North Armagh/East Tyrone area, the effect of the force reduction will be spread throughout the Province by means of redeployments from elsewhere. The provision of a dedicated Prison Guard Force for the Maze, at about the same time, will also ease the problem.

There will be no closure of barracks or bases, and thus no civilian redundancies, Drumadd Barracks, Armagh, about which Harold McClusker has already been speculating, will continue in use as a base for a battalion headquarters and a regular company.

The Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP



Nevertheless, the reduction will obviously need delicate handling from the point of view of public perception - especially with the threat of a renewed hunger strike coinciding with the lead-up to the local Government elections in May. We will do our best to ensure that the reduction of the consequential redeployments do not become public until they have been accomplished, although previous experience has shown that this cannot be guaranteed. In any event the public presentation, when it becomes necessary, will require great care. Once you have indicated your formal agreement to this proposal my officials will discuss with yours the detailed planning of the withdrawal and the preparation of a Q & A brief for use in the event of leaks.

I am sending copies of this to the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary; and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Buy eve*  
*John*

John Nott

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Ireland*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

20 February 1981

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

(2)

*Prime Minister:*

*To see Lord Abercorn's letter.*

*Dear Michael,*

*for Prime*

*Minister*

I enclose copies of an exchange of personal letters between the Duke of Abercorn and Mr Atkins. You will see that at the end of his letter, the Duke asks that his letter should be made available to the Prime Minister.

*Yours ever,*

*R A Harrington*

R A HARRINGTON

*mt.*



Northern Ireland Office  
Stormont Castle  
Belfast BT4 3ST

His Grace The Duke of Abercorn  
Baronscourt  
Newtownhamilton  
OMAGH  
Co Tyrone

18<sup>th</sup> February 1981

*Dear, James.*

Many thanks for your letter of 9 February telling me that you think the Government has been at fault in its handling of publicity following the meeting between the Prime Minister and The Taoiseach in December. Let me say immediately that I know very well that you wrote solely out of a wish to be helpful and I am grateful for the suggestions you made. I have, as you asked, sent a copy of your letter to the Prime Minister and I know she will study it.

As you say, closer co-operation between the UK and the Republic is highly desirable in the economic field and much has already been done. It is even more desirable in the area of security where I think it is clear to everyone that the terrorist threat can only be overcome by the closest co-operation between the RUC and the Gardai. Much has been done here too and much more can be achieved, given that the will is there. But of course, there are wider fields too. In Europe (indeed in the whole world scene) there are many fields where our interests coincide and where we can increase our influence by acting together rather than separately. There are other fields where our interests do not coincide - there too we are better off discussing (and so understanding) our differences quietly together rather than having it all out publicly round some conference table in front of the television cameras.

This is HMG's firm belief and, let me say, it is our firm intention in the interests of the whole United Kingdom to proceed along with path.

Where the difficulty comes is, as you say, in allaying the suspicions



of those who, for whatever reason, choose to believe that there is something more going on, something detrimental to them and something about which the Government will not talk. There is not, of course, and we are giving a great deal of thought as to how best to dispel these quite unnecessary fears. There are a variety of ways and I welcome your suggestion, made as a result of your own experience. We may well be able to profit from it.

*With best wishes*

*Yours ever*

*Sturges*



BARONS COURT  
OMAGH BT78 4EZ  
NORTHERN IRELAND  
NEWTOWNSTEWART 61470

9th February 1981

Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins, PC MP  
Northern Ireland Office  
Stormont Castle  
BELFAST

Dear *Humphrey*

Although I am naturally extremely concerned with the highly-publicised "show of strength" which took place in County Antrim last week, I must also express my deep concern in regard to the Government's insensitive handling of the Dublin communique and the damaging reticence to inform the war-wary and naturally suspicious Ulster public of the objectives decided upon by the Government.

It has been only too apparent since December that this unfortunate reticence would not only be exploited by extremism which was duly witnessed last week, but would also make the task of middle ground politics even more formidable at the forthcoming local elections which will result in an inevitable shift of support to Mr. Paisley. Thus Northern Ireland will become even more politically unstable and damage further its image problem to the outside world, particularly in regard to attracting inward investment, which is so desperately needed.

*/* continued ....

Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins, PC MP

9 Feb 1981

I have long been an advocate for closer economic co-operation and development between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, and I chaired the Economic and Social Committee Study Group in 1978 on the Londonderry/Donegal Communications Study. I am confident that our report to the two Governments and the Commission was more adventurous and radical than the original report compiled by the joint consultants. Since I was only too aware of accusations of a "Community plot", we adopted a full open approach with maximum involvement of local people; thus we created a constructive climate of co-operation and enthusiasm from all shades of political opinion. Although of course the Government's objectives in this instance appear to be more far-reaching, it is nevertheless unfortunate that the Government is adopting the opposite approach since, as you are only too aware, the Ulster man and woman are not only extremely suspicious of Whitehall, the Northern Ireland Office, but of course the motives of Mr. Haughey. Thus I believe the only way in which the Government can defuse this suspicion is by forming a joint working party comprising of respected and recognised men and women from industry, business, civil service, and trade unions in order to appraise the practicality of the objectives. This format is supported in Dublin by prominent public figures such as Dr. Brendan O'Regan, Chairman of Co-operation North.


/ continued ...

Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins, PC MP

9 Feb 1981

In conclusion, I must stress my full agreement with the whole content of The Times leader dated February 7th, and perhaps your office might agree to forward a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister since it is written with the sole intent of a sincere desire to assist in alleviating a potentially dangerous situation.

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'James Abercorn', written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned above the printed name.

James Abercorn.



cc: NIO  
FCO  
CO

RH.  
Lodman

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

16 February, 1981

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your further letters of 27 January and 4 February.

I do most fully appreciate the strength of feeling in Northern Ireland about recent terrorist outrages. I too was deeply shocked and saddened at the murders of Sir Norman Stronge and James Stronge and also at that of Major Toombs. As you know, these murders have been condemned in the strongest terms by responsible opinion, both in the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Ireland. Our security forces are doing their utmost to bring the assassins to justice; and in this task they have the full co-operation of the security forces in the Republic. Both Governments are very much aware that terrorism represents a threat to law and order on both sides of the border, and are dedicated to its elimination. The border is a complication, as indeed is any international frontier in the control of terrorism. But solid progress has been made in cross-border security co-operation recently. It is of course not perfect, but both Governments are determined to consolidate and, where possible, improve it.

As regards your letter of 4 February about the joint studies being undertaken by officials of this country and the Republic in preparation for discussions later this year between the Taoiseach and myself, the inferences which you draw are not right. The studies take place within the existing constitutional framework in which the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom cannot be changed without the consent of the people of the Province and of Parliament at Westminster. Some in Northern Ireland have claimed

/that

RH.

that there is a conspiracy or a "sell out". I can only repeat, with all the emphasis at my command, that nothing of the sort exists.

Yours sincerely  
Nagant Deltchev

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10 DOWNING STREET

*Re-type please.*

THE PRIME MINISTER

*Dear Tim.*

Thank you for your further letters of 27 January and 4 February.

I do most fully appreciate the strength of feeling in Northern Ireland about recent terrorist outrages. I too was deeply shocked and saddened at the murders of Sir Norman Stronge and James Stronge and also at that of Major Toombs. As you know, these murders have been condemned in the strongest terms by responsible opinion, both in the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Ireland. Our security forces are doing their utmost to bring the assassins to justice; and in this task they have the full co-operation of the security forces in the Republic. Both Governments are very much aware that terrorism represents a threat to law and order on both sides of the border, and are dedicated to its elimination. The border is a complication, as indeed is any international frontier in the control of terrorism. But solid progress has been made in cross-border security co-operation recently. It is of course not perfect, but both Governments are determined to consolidate and, where possible, improve it.

As regards your letter of 4 February about the "joint studies" being undertaken by officials of this country and the Republic in preparation for discussions later this year between the Taoiseach and myself, the inferences which you draw are ~~quite wrong~~ *not right*. The

/studies take place

studies take place within ~~and do not question~~ the existing constitutional framework in which the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom cannot be changed without the consent of the people of the Province and of Parliament at Westminster. ~~In accordance with normal practice, we have agreed with the Government of the Republic that the details of the studies should be kept confidential. Once either we or they depart from that we should rapidly reach a situation where we were in effect conducting the studies in public. I recognise that this has allowed~~ <sup>be in difficulty,</sup> some in Northern Ireland <sup>have</sup> ~~to claim~~ <sup>ed</sup> that there is a conspiracy or a "sell out". I can only repeat, with all the emphasis at my command, that nothing of the sort exists.

~~James H. Molyneaux~~  
~~James H. Molyneaux~~

James H. Molyneaux, Esq., J.P., M.P.

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(Original filed on U.S.A. Part 1  
PM's visit to Washington)



Northern Ireland Office  
Stormont Castle  
Belfast BT4 3ST  
Telephone Belfast 63011

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

Prime Minister

①

13 February 1981

Agree, subject to views of  
Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary,

Dear Michael,

the line is the final paragraph?

Yes not  
Rmk 13/6

FIREARMS FOR THE RUC

The Prime Minister will be meeting President Reagan shortly. You will remember that under his predecessor approval was withheld for the export of Ruger pistols to the RUC. Despite the American ban imposed in 1979, the RUC have continued to receive from their UK suppliers small numbers of Rugers, adding up so far to a total of 1,300 of the 3,000 on order (in addition to the 3,000 already supplied under an earlier export licence). We have taken care not to press the suppliers to tell us where they are getting the guns from, but at least some must be coming direct from the American manufacturers. We have avoided embarrassing the American authorities by raising this with them.

Against this background, and bearing in mind that it is now 2½ years since the first decisions were taken on Rugers, my Secretary of State has commissioned a fresh assessment of the RUC's requirement. The RUC's considered view is that the Ruger has shown itself in practice to be as valuable as expected. It has, however, proved to be too bulky for use in some circumstances, and the Chief Constable would prefer to retain the (slimmer) existing Walther automatics for use by personnel in plain clothes, or in other circumstances where it is desirable to conceal the firearm. In the Chief Constable's considered view, the RUC's needs will be met by a supply of 6,000 Ruger revolvers - as opposed to the 9,000 originally envisaged. My Secretary of State sees no reason to dispute this assessment, and believes that it reflects accurately the improving security situation.

The last 3,000 guns have not yet been formally ordered, and there will now be no need to do so. We still need the 1,700 Rugers which are

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outstanding from the current order, but believe that these will be supplied in the same way as the last 1,300 guns. If there is any shortfall, the Chief Constable believes that the (British) Sterling Magnum revolver (only very recently made available to the RUC for testing) could be an adequate substitute. There is therefore no longer any operational need to press the Americans to grant formally export licences for weapons for the RUC.

There remains the political angle. There has been press speculation that President Reagan will be willing to grant export licences, and the Prime Minister may well be pressed on this issue on her return from Washington. For HMG the best position is for the Americans to lift the ban and for the Prime Minister to be able to say that this has happened. But there is good evidence that Speaker O'Neill remains as deeply opposed as ever, and the assessment of HM Ambassador in Washington is that despite the President's instinctive sympathy for our anti-terrorist effort, instance on our part in reopening the issue might well make it more difficult to gain wider understanding by the US public of our Northern Ireland policies. The point could, if the Prime Minister agrees, be explored further with the State Department before her visit; but if, as we expect, the Americans are reluctant to lift the ban the best approach then seems to be for the Prime Minister to raise the matter briefly and formally with the President with a view to being able to say on her return that she had discussed the subject with the President; that the Chief Constable has advised the Government that the RUC now has sufficient appropriate weapons to satisfy its principal requirements; and that President Reagan has been told this. If necessary it could be added that the Government sees the British-made Sterling Magnum revolver as a candidate for any further revolver supplies required by the RUC; that reflecting the improved security situation the operational requirement has reduced; and that since the ban was imposed the RUC have been able to purchase additional weapons from other sources.

If the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agree,

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the FCO could instruct the Embassy in Washington:

(a) to explore now the prospects of the Americans lifting their ban; if the State Department indicate that the administration is unlikely to agree to this, then the Embassy should,

(b) put to them the proposition that the Prime Minister should raise the matter briefly with President Reagan, with a view to afterwards being able to answer questions at home on the above lines.

These developments will be reflected in the brief for the Prime Minister's visit to Washington.

I am sending copies of this letter to the private secretaries to members of OD, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

R. A. Harrington

R A HARRINGTON  
Private Secretary

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

12 February 1981

Michael Alexander, Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London.

*Dear Michael,*

LETTER OF 4 FEBRUARY FROM MR. MOLYNEAUX

I refer to our conversations about the draft which you circulated last night. We do see difficulties in the approach adopted in it. It will not be welcome to Mr. Molyneaux. He may well notice, and comment on, its inconsistency with what my Secretary of State said in reply to his Supplementary Question of 15 January. Our tactics at the present time should be to avoid antagonising him if we can, but to seek - especially in the light of his relatively helpful statement yesterday - to keep him on side and help him to distance himself from the Paisleyites. Moreover we have reason to believe that the Irish will themselves bring up the question of Article 2 of their Constitution, and it is in our interests that they should do so, since it will enable us to make the point that this is a substantial obstacle to the "mutual understanding" which is one of the objects of the joint studies. From this point of view it would be unfortunate if we had said anything to Mr. Molyneaux to imply that this was not a topic that could be raised.

... You suggested earlier today that, in the circumstances, a solution might lie in a shorter draft, such as the attached, which denies the inferences in Mr. Molyneaux's letter without enlarging on them. There seems to us to be merit in that approach and we would go along with it.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Francis Richards (FCO); also to Robert Wade-Gery in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever,*  
*R. A. Harrington*

R.A. HARRINGTON

## DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

<p>To</p> <p>James Molyneaux, Esq., JP, MP</p> <p>(Full Postal Address)</p>	<p>Enclosures</p>	<p>Copies to be sent to</p> <p><i>Type for PM's Signature</i></p> <p>(Full Address, if Necessary)</p>
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LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your further letters of 27 January and 4 February.

I do most fully appreciate the strength of feeling in Northern Ireland about recent terrorist outrages. I too was deeply shocked and saddened at the murders of Sir Norman Stronge and James Stronge and also at that of Major <sup>Toombs</sup> ~~Tombs~~. As you know, these murders have been condemned in the strongest terms by responsible opinion, both in the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Ireland. Our security forces are doing their utmost to bring the assassins to justice; and in this task they have the full co-operation of the security forces in the Republic. Both Governments are very much aware that terrorism represents a threat to law and order on both sides of the border, and are dedicated to its elimination. The border is a complication, as indeed is any international frontier in the control of terrorism. But solid progress has been made in cross-border security co-operation recently. It is of course not perfect, but both Governments are determined to consolidate and, where possible, improve it.

As regards your letter of 4 February about the "joint studies" being undertaken by officials of this country and the Republic in preparation for discussions later this year between the Taoiseach and myself, the inferences which you draw are quite wrong. The studies take place within and do not question the existing constitutional framework in which the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom cannot be changed without the consent of the people of the Province and of


**F.R.**

Parliament at Westminster. In accordance with normal practice, we have agreed with the Government of the Republic that the details of the studies should be kept confidential. Once either we or they depart from that we should rapidly reach a situation where we were in effect conducting the studies in public. I recognise that this has allowed some in Northern Ireland to claim that there is a conspiracy or a "sell out". I can only repeat, with all the emphasis at my command, that nothing of the sort exists.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

*Indel*  
*5/1*



Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

12 February 1981

*Dear Michael,*

I suggest that for the purposes of briefing the Prime Minister for her questions this afternoon, you may like to have by you ... the enclosed note which my Secretary of State will be using if required during his own questions.

The point which Mr Atkins will be making is not merely that Dr Paisley is assiduously arousing fears which are unfounded, but also that the Government's policies which are in the interest of the UK as a whole including Northern Ireland will be pursued with determination and firmness. If people seek to deflect the Government from its policies by non-parliamentary means that will be accepted and defeated.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Francis Richards in the Foreign Office and Robert Wade-Gery in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever,*

*R A Harrington*

R A HARRINGTON

1. There is no conspiracy. There is no sell out. This is not 1912. There is no Home Rule Bill. No one need set up as a latter day Carson.

2. The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 makes clear that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom cannot be changed without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland. Government does not think to change that Act. The Government of the Republic of Ireland have accepted in terms that that is the basis on which our relations with them are conducted.

3. The corollary of being part of the United Kingdom is acceptance of the authority of the United Kingdom government. The UK Government is conducting its relations with the Republic of Ireland in the interests of the whole of the United Kingdom including Northern Ireland. Whatever so-called Loyalists may protest, good relations between the UK and the Republic are an essential ingredient of progress to peace. The Government do not intend to be diverted from their course either by a claim in the Irish constitution to a part of the United Kingdom, a claim which we do not recognise, or by backward looking intransigents in Northern Ireland.

4. Not only will the Government not be diverted from its policy by threats; if those threats are turned into acts which go outside the law, the law will be applied with total impartiality whoever the lawbreakers are.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 February 1981

*Subject filed as Ireland VS  
Time to Mfg with Lord Brookeborough*

*cc FCO  
CO  
Marker  
Ireland. PLZ: Mfg  
with Talbot*

*Dear Roy,*

Call by Lord Moyola and Lord Brookeborough

As you know, Lords Brookeborough and Moyola called on the Prime Minister at the House of Commons this afternoon. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was also present.

Lord Moyola said that he and Lord Brookeborough had requested a meeting with the Prime Minister before Dr. Paisley's latest antics. However, the parade on the hillside and Dr. Paisley's performance in the House of Commons this afternoon had increased the sense of concern which had led them to suggest a meeting. It looked increasingly likely that Dr. Paisley wanted an independent Northern Ireland in which he would be in absolute control. His tactics might be to go for a head-on collision with the British Government and the Army. He might seek this through a general strike in the course of which he would demand devolved government on his own terms. If he did not get what he wanted and if he could engineer clashes in which some of his followers were killed he would probably opt for a UDI. Lord Moyola said that he might be exaggerating a little but not very much. One should not underestimate Dr. Paisley's ambitions.

One reason for Dr. Paisley's present success was that he had succeeded in manufacturing a great deal of fear and suspicion out of the way the hunger strike and the Anglo/Irish talks in Dublin had been handled. In Northern Ireland today every story and every rumour was believed unless it was instantly denied. It was essential that HMG should institute more effective PR arrangements. Rapid reaction to, and rebuttal of, every allegation was necessary. The Government statements issued after the hillside parade last week had been good but too slow. Lord Moyola also thought that it would be extremely useful if someone in authority would be prepared to confront Dr. Paisley on the television. This would of course be a formidable undertaking but ought to be attempted.

On the general political situation in Northern Ireland, Lord Moyola commented that other political figures were not giving the lead they should. The statement issued by Mr. Molyneux yesterday had been useful but had come too late. There was widespread confusion at present. Dr. Paisley's accusations about what had happened in Dublin were taking hold. He was likely to do well in the local government elections in May. The candidates being put forward by the other Parties were of very low calibre and his own followers would not hesitate to indulge in intimidation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ / Lord Brookeborough

*VLB*



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Lord Brookeborough said that the problem was not only with the talks in Dublin. Although he agreed with Lord Moyola that reassurance about them was required and that it would be, for instance, very useful to spell out what the Working Parties were doing, something else was also required. This was evidence to show the people in Northern Ireland that HMG were actively interested in cementing the unity of the UK. A gesture of this kind would give Dr. Paisley's Protestant opponents something to fight for and with. It would help to limit the number of people who sign his covenant. Neither Lord Brookeborough nor Lord Moyola were very clear about what kind of initiative or gesture was required. They mentioned at various points a Northern Ireland Privy Council; a Council of MPs to advise the Secretary of State; the re-introduction of a Governor or a rephrasing of the formula used by Ministers on the Guarantee. Lord Brookeborough seemed to attach particular importance to the last point. He thought the present language too unenthusiastic and hoped that it would be possible to find a form of words which suggested that HMG actively wanted to keep Northern Ireland within the UK.

The Prime Minister said that any question of a sell-out was, of course, utterly ridiculous. However, she understood the importance of preventing scaremongering from taking hold. The fact was that the more trouble Dr. Paisley created, the less inclined people in the UK would be to continue making the sacrifices which present policy demanded. She wondered whether the people of Northern Ireland would support Dr. Paisley in trying to split Northern Ireland from the UK when they came to realise, eg, the economic consequences of separation. She thought that there would be difficulties about the institutional proposals mentioned by Lord Moyola but would certainly look at the question of the formula used on the Guarantee. The Secretary of State commented that the difficulty about the proposal for a Council of MPs was the absence of any Member from the SDLP in the House of Commons at present. The idea of a Northern Ireland Privy Council was being looked at. On the PR front, he agreed about the need for more voices in Northern Ireland to oppose Dr. Paisley. He wondered whether Lord Moyola and Lord Brookeborough would be prepared to take a hand.

Neither Lord Moyola nor Lord Brookeborough responded to this last point. The meeting ended with both stressing the gravity of the situation in Northern Ireland as they saw it. The next few weeks might offer the last opportunity to cut Dr. Paisley down to size. If it proved possible to do this, he might never regain his support.

I am sending copies of this letter to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely*

*Richard Alexander*

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

jfh

11 February 1981

Reply to Mr. Molyneaux

Further to our telephone conversation just now, I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr. Molyneaux. I should be grateful for comments as soon as possible tomorrow morning.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Francis ~~Richards~~ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Robert Wade-Gery (Cabinet Office).

MODBA

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your further letters of 27 January and 4 February.

I do most fully appreciate the strength of feeling in Northern Ireland about recent terrorist outrages. I too was deeply shocked and saddened at the murders of Sir Norman Stronge and James Stronge and also at that of Major Tombs. As you know, these murders have been condemned in the strongest terms by responsible opinion, both in the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Ireland. Our security forces are doing their utmost to bring the assassins to justice; and in this task they have the full co-operation of the security forces in the Republic. Both Governments are very much aware that terrorism represents a threat to law and order on both sides of the border, and are dedicated to its elimination. The border is a complication, as indeed is any international frontier in the control of terrorism. But solid progress has been made in cross-border security co-operation recently. It is of course not perfect, but both Governments are determined to consolidate and, where possible, improve it.

As regards your letter of 4 February about the "joint studies" being undertaken by officials of this country and the Republic in preparation for discussions later this year between the Taoiseach and myself, the inferences which you draw are without foundation. The question of whether extradition procedures

/should be

should be available in cross-border terrorist cases is certainly among the matters which are proper to be discussed between ourselves and the Government of the Republic. You also refer to the territorial claim to Northern Ireland in the Republic's Constitution. Since we are all agreed that the study of "constitutional structures" has no place in the joint studies, it is perhaps surprising that you should be pressing for the inclusion of such an overtly constitutional issue. But I will of course bear your point in mind.

More generally what matters is, as I and others have said repeatedly, that the studies take place within and do not question the existing constitutional framework in which the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom cannot be changed without the consent of the people of the Province and of Parliament at Westminster. In accordance with normal practice, we have agreed with the Government of the Republic that the details of the studies should be kept confidential. Once either we or they depart from that we should rapidly reach a situation where we were in effect conducting the studies in public. I recognise that this has allowed some in Northern Ireland to claim that there is a conspiracy or a "sell out". I can only repeat, with all the emphasis at my command, that nothing of the sort exists.

James Molyneaux, Esq., JP, MP.

*draw without foundation.*

mention are quite mistaken. The question of whether extradition procedures should be available in cross-border terrorist cases is certainly among the matters which are proper to be discussed between ourselves and the Government of the Republic. ~~As regards your other point, discussion of the territorial claim to Northern Ireland in the Republic's Constitution, I find your position a little puzzling. Since we~~ *you also refer to* ~~are~~ *we* ~~all~~ *are* ~~agreed~~ *are* that the study of "constitutional structures" has no ~~part~~ *place* in the joint studies, it is perhaps surprising that you should be pressing for the inclusion of such an overtly constitutional issue, ~~as the one you mention~~ *that, I will not*

*I will  
[of course*

*bring across your point mind.  
[the proposals for some time*

~~Be that as it may,~~ *the generally* what matters is, as I and others have said repeatedly, ~~the~~ *that* studies take place within and do not question the existing constitutional framework in which the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom cannot be changed without the consent of the people of the Province and of Parliament at Westminster. ~~As is normal in such matters~~ *in accordance with practice,* we have agreed with the Government of the Republic that the details of the studies should be kept confidential. Once either we or they depart from that we should rapidly reach a situation where we were in effect conducting the studies in public. I recognise that this has allowed some in Northern Ireland to claim ~~the existence of~~ *(think that this is)* a conspiracy or a "sell out". I can only repeat, with all the emphasis at my command, that nothing of the sort exists.

James Molyneaux, Esq., J.P., M.P.

SV BOSTER

Master

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AT 3.45 P.M. ON TUESDAY, 10TH FEBRUARY, 1981.

Present: Prime Minister  
The Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MBE, MP.  
Ian Gow.

1. Mr. Powell started off by thanking the Prime Minister for having agreed to see him. The Prime Minister said that, of course, she would always see Mr. Powell.

2. Mr. Powell said that there were two headings under which he wished to group what he had to say:-

(a) Inter-Governmental Relationships.

(i) Mr. Powell said that following the murder of Lord Mountbatten, the murder of the soldiers at Warren Point, and the visit of the Pope to the Republic, there had been a meeting of Ministers in Dublin at which the British and Irish Governments were represented. The result of that meeting had been kept secret. The British Ministers had sought and obtained assurances from the Irish Government about increased/terrorism. The British Ministers were well satisfied with those assurances, but there was a quid pro quo from us. That quid pro quo and those assurances cost Mr. Lynch the Premiership and could not be disclosed. The deal was also fatal to Fitt. The quid pro quo was the recognition by us of the interests and aspirations of the Republic in Northern Ireland. Security did improve but was followed by the inexplicable decision to continue with the inter-party talks in Northern Ireland. Those talks should have been abandoned in April/May 1980, but went on. The Assembly and an election to that Assembly was proposed by the British Government.

/co-operation in defeating

(ii) At the same time, preparations began for the hunger strike, which was timed to start 55 days before Christmas.

(iii) We witnessed the rise and fall of the idea of having an Assembly and elections to it.

(iv) The Northern Ireland Office was satisfied with the help which it received from many quarters, including Dublin.

(v) Then followed the meeting in Dublin on 8th December, 1980. That meeting caused a great deal of unease - it was bound to do so. It caused unease to Mr. Powell.

(vi) In the last week or two, another proposed hunger strike

/was

was being wheeled on again, with the proposal that it should reach its climax in the Spring (Easter) when the second phase of the talks initiated in Dublin would be taking place. "The pieces in the cards which I have built do fit together very tightly".

- (vii) "The ability of the Irish overnment effectively to bring about the defeat of the I.R.A. is exaggerated on our side. It is not possible for the Irish Government voluntarily to co-operate with us in the defeat of terrorism. The improved co-operation in security matters is enforced on the Republic Government by concessions from us. Friendly give and take is not on and we can only secure this extra co-operation by paying to the Irish Government a price which is greater than that co-operation is worth."
- (iix) This mjscalculation has affected British policy for the past two years. We are in a ratchet position. The cards in the hand of the Irish Government are the Maze, the I.R.A. and the Border.
- (ix) Mr. Powell then referred to the Stronge murders, which, he said, had characteristics wholly different from other murders in Northern Ireland. Mr. Powell believed (though he had no specific evidence for this belief) that these murders might have been planned and carried out by persons other than members of the I.R.A.
- (b) Dr. Paisley.
- (i) Mr. Powell said that our Whips Office seemed to have close relations with Dr. Paisley and with the two other members of the Democratic Unionist Party. The impression was given, on both sides of the water, that the Conservative Party was countencancing the D.U.P. at the expense of the Official Unionists and that the Northern Ireland Office had its eye on Dr. Paisley as a possible future Prime Minister of Northern Ireland.
- (ii) In that connection, Mr. Powell said that in January, 1980 Mr. John Taylor had moved his family to Brussels, but that in May his family had returned to Northern Ireland. In July, 1980 Mrs. John Taylor had said to Mr. Powell that it had been indicated to her husband that Dr. Paisley was the first choice of the Northern Ireland Office as Prime Minister.
- (iii) Mr. Powell said that his Party had always supported the Government of the day in upholding the rule of law in Northern Ireland - notably during the strike called by Dr. Paisley in 1977, when support for the Government had been given at considerable risk

risk to the Official Unionist Party.

(iv) Mr. Powell said that he hoped that there could be more relaxed relationships between our Whips Office and the Official Unionists.

3. The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Powell for what he had said but made no comment.

4. The Prime Minister then said that there was just one matter which she wanted to mention to him. Mr. Molyneux had written to the Prime Minister asking whether, in the talks now taking place between the British and Irish Governments, the question of the claim by the Republic to the territory of Northern Ireland could be included. The Prime Minister said that she had, all along, made it clear that only institutional and not constitutional matters were to be discussed. The claim by the Irish Government to the territory of Northern Ireland was undoubtedly a constitutional matter. If the Prime Minister was to seek to raise that constitutional issue with the Irish Government, it would then seek to raise the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, and that was something which the Prime Minister would never agree to discuss.

5. Mr. Powell said that he understood the Prime Minister's reason for not including Article 2 of the Irish Constitution in the talks. He went on to say that he saw the matter differently. He said that if he was contemplating lending his lawn mower to his next door neighbour, when the next door neighbour was claiming that the lawn mower was his, and not Mr. Powell's, he, Mr. Powell, would find it difficult to continue discussions as to whether he, Mr. Powell, should lend the lawn mower to his neighbour.

6. Finally, Mr. Powell said that the sinking of the merchant ship "Nellie M" had raised the whole question of the delineation of the international frontier in the Foyle Estuary and in Carlingford Lough. Mr. Powell said that he hoped that this matter would be included in the current talks.



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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

17.



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

10 February 1981

*Assumed with P.A.*

*for "Amul" 1/2*

*Dear Michael*

DR PAISLEY

*with Madiba?*

... As promised in my letter yesterday evening, I attach a note about Dr Paisley's current activities.

As you will see, we regard his principal motive as to gain votes at the May elections. There is unease in the Loyalist community and there are undoubtedly many who would be prepared to go along with both his views and his methods. But many, including notably the Official Unionists who have dismissed the whole exercise as a vote-catching gimmick, would not. As yet there has been no paramilitary involvement in the demonstrations. There is recent intelligence to the effect that the UDA leader does not believe that the time is right for taking to the streets, but his view could change if he felt the need not to let Dr Paisley make all the running.

My Secretary of State is sure our right course is to remain firm but relaxed at this posturing. However he does intend to consider ways of setting at rest the needless suspicions of the Loyalist community at large. (As you know, we issued a Press Notice yesterday evening and I attach a copy of the text.) We hope, incidentally, to be in a position to anticipate Dr Paisley's future moves.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Mike Hopkins*  
M W HOPKINS

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DR PAISLEY

Dr PAISLEY is presently engaged in trying to win votes, reverting to his old habits of street demagogy and latching on to the Loyalist community's unease following the Dublin summit. Although we had no forewarning of the parade in the Antrim Hills on 5/6 February, PAISLEY's present antics come as no surprise. There have been many indications over the months, both secret and open, that he would be prepared, if otherwise thwarted, to resort to unconstitutional methods to achieve his aims.

2. He followed the Thursday demonstration with a self-congratulatory private Party Conference in Ballymena on Saturday 7 February 1981 called to endorse his action and with a Party Executive meeting on Sunday evening to agree a programme for the coming weeks. At a much heralded press conference in Belfast City Hall yesterday (9 February) he announced a series of rallies in eleven centres, beginning with Omagh on Friday 13 February and culminating with a mass demonstration at Stormont on 28 March (for which formal application has not yet been made). At ~~today's~~<sup>yesterday's</sup> press conference PAISLEY and his supporters publicly signed a covenant pledging that he and his Party "were prepared to go all the way with the people of Ulster", - comparing the present situation with 1912 and 1974. In a radio interview he said he did not expect the rallies to influence the Prime Minister. "We have other things in mind to influence Mrs Thatcher." In answer to a question he said he would not like to use force but it could happen. He would not declare UDI but "if Britain were to break its link with Northern Ireland, we are not going to Dublin".

3. We do not know what PAISLEY has in mind beyond demonstrations. ALLISTER (his chief aide who is also a barrister) has told us the DUP's plan of action would not go beyond the law before May, after which the DUP would go "as far as you make us". ALLISTER has also said that the arrest of PAISLEY or the withdrawal of legally held firearms would provoke violence. PAISLEY is clearly and explicitly modelling himself on Edward Carson, in whom interest has been rekindled by the recent television series on the history of Ireland.

4. There has/.....

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4. There has so far been no paramilitary involvement in any of this activity and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) (the principal Protestant paramilitary organisation which might be concerned) is still considering how it should react. But the UDA leader, TYRIE, and PAISLEY distrust one another and would find it difficult to join forces. For many months the UDA has shown no interest in street demonstrations or industrial action. Should the attitude change we shall very quickly know about it.

**SECRET**

PRESS STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE: 9 FEBRUARY 1981

I have been concerned in the last few days about statements and actions on the part of people in Northern Ireland who claim to see a conspiracy or "sell-out" in the programme of joint studies being undertaken by officials of the UK Government and the Republic of Ireland, following the agreement reached at the meeting between the Prime Minister and Taoiseach in Dublin on 8 December and in preparation for further discussions between them later this year.

I assure the people of Northern Ireland quite categorically that there is no such conspiracy or "sell-out" or indeed any threat to the interests of Northern Ireland in these joint studies. The crucial point is this; the studies take place within, and do not question, the constitutional framework in which the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom cannot be changed without the consent of the people of the Province and of Parliament at Westminster.

The joint studies are an aspect of HMG's responsibility for the conduct of this country's relations with other governments, including that of the Republic of Ireland, one of our EEC partners, in the best interests of the people of the United Kingdom as a whole, including those of Northern Ireland.

The undertaking of this programme of joint studies in no way implies any slackening of the Government's concern for the security of the Province. Quite the contrary. I assure all the people of NI that their protection, against murder and violence and all forms of public disorder, from whatever quarter they arise, is and will remain the Government's overriding concern.

VMS

JOHN COLE (OBSERVER) - INTERVIEW ON NORTHERN IRELAND

Transcript from BBC Radio 4, 'World at One', 9 February 1981

INTERVIEWER : (Brian Widlake) ... Now this is not the first time Mr Paisley has linked himself with Lord Carson, he did much the same when I interviewed him on the 'World at One' on Friday. So I asked ~~xxxxx~~ John Cole, deputy Editor of the Observer and a student of Irish affairs, whether he could see any parallel between Lord Carson and Mr Paisley?

COLE: No I can't, I think it's a very spurious parallel. Carson's methods are a subject of controversy even to this day, as the recent television history series has shown. But what's not in doubt is that in 1912 the Ulster Unionists faced a real threat of being denied self determination and their citizenship of the UK - and I don't think that the Dublin summit offered any such threat. And the second difference is that Carson was the head of an organisation which effectively mobilised the whole Protestant population, who were prepared to run guns for example, and were prepared to fight to resist, effectively, rule from Dublin. And again no such threat exists today. And of course what Paisley is running so far is firearms certificates. I'm not saying that if there were a genuine threat of a united Ireland against the wishes of the majority in the North that there wouldn't be some form of armed resistance, although it would obviously be very different from what it was in Carson's day. But I'm saying really that I don't think that threat exists, and I think ~~that~~ Paisley is using it rather rather cynically.

INTERVIEWER : So do you think that by dragging Carson's name into his campaign Mr Paisley reckons he can get more supporters that way?

COLE: That's right. Mr Paisley is in a difficult position at the moment. He emerged from the European elections at the top of the poll, and therefore regarded himself as the leader of the Ulster Protestants and Unionists. He'd hoped that that he would become Prime Minister in the course of the talks last year with Mr Humphrey Aitkins. In fact, if anything, the failure of those talks has set his career back a bit, and he just looks like another Ulster politician who would like to be Prime Minister. And the Unionists, the official Unionists, are tending to taunt him about that. Now ahead is the only electoral test that 's available in Northern Ireland at the moment, that's the local council elections this May, it's important to Paisley that he wipes out that memory and reasserts himself - and of course Carson is a very potent symbol for that.

INTERVIEWER : Now this document of Mr Paisley's declaing it's unalterable opposition to the involvement of the Irish Government in discussions about the future of Northern Ireland; now Mr Paisley, as you well know, is extraordinarily suspicious of the talks that went on at Dublin and the subsequent study groups that have been set up by the Irish Government and Whitehall to look into ways of consultation and co-operation. Do you think he has any grounds at all for feeling that Mrs Thatcher may be selling Northern Ireland down the drain?

COLE: No, I think Mrs Thatcher showed incredible political ~~ix~~ insensitivity by not facing the House of Commons when she ~~cae~~ back from Dublin. She tried to argue that this was merely another EEC bi-lateral talk between ~~ix~~ two Governments and therefore she didn't need to offer a statement and submit herself to cross examination in the House. And that of course enabled Mr Paisley and ~~ix~~ others ~~ix~~

to build up the suspicions that always exist in Northern Ireland when any talks take place with Dublin. My information is that these talks are going very slowly indeed. One of the reasons for going very slowly is that it suits Mr ~~Haas~~<sup>Haughey</sup> in Dublin to make a certain amount of political capital also. He has been letting it be known that they are talks of the greatest possible significance. And of course that increases the paranoia in Northern Ireland about the possibility of Dublin interference. In fact the talks are at a very mundane level. In the first place they're at official level, they haven't got back to Ministers yet. Secondly, the British Government are determined that they will be very deliberate and slow, and I think Mr ~~Haas~~<sup>Haughey</sup> is content to fall in with that. Thirdly, they cover very ordinary subjects of cross border co-operation and Anglo Irish co-operation, none of which frankly I expect to produce very much. So that the idea that Mr ~~Haas~~<sup>Haughey</sup> is being given a kind of prescriptive right over Northern Ireland's future is really nonsense.

COVERING SECRET  
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Ireland 16*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

9 February 1981

*Dear Michael*

I attach a copy of a note of a discussion last Wednesday between Sir Kenneth Stowe and Mr Enoch Powell: I understand that the Prime Minister asked to see this, in connection with her forthcoming meeting with Mr Powell, when Mr Atkins mentioned it to her on Sunday.

Mr Atkins also mentioned to the Prime Minister that he would let her see, by way of more general background, an assessment of the implications of Dr Paisley's current activities: I hope to send you that as soon as possible tomorrow morning.

*Yours sincerely*  
*M W Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

I visited Mr. Enoch Powell at his home on Wednesday 4 February for an informal talk which lasted nearly 2 hours. The call was at his request and was reported in advance to and approved by the Secretary of State.

2. The conversation fell into two parts. First Mr. Powell gave a fairly brief resume of the conduct of affairs with regard to Northern Ireland by the Government since the last general election (and before), expressing his perplexity as to the Government's motives, his sadness at their lack of understanding of the realities in the Province, and his concern that even now there may be forces at work seemingly intending to drive Ulster out of the Union. There was nothing especially new in what he said except perhaps the emphasis he placed upon his personal regret that his experience, knowledge and known willingness to help the Government both by tendering advice and other means (unspecified) had never been taken up. He plainly felt that had he been listened to, affairs would have been conducted better but nobody seemed to want to talk to him and he was rejected.

3. Secondly, I responded at much greater length (he listening intently the while) by giving Mr. Powell a resume of the same events as seen by Government and myself in particular. I began by saying I had no belief in his conspiracy theory and that although events had certainly not gone as the Government or he had hoped this did not derive from malice on the Government's part. I said that the Government's policy had been consistent in that it wanted and still wanted to give people in Northern Ireland through elected representatives greater responsibilities for their own affairs but it was not the Government who had blocked the way forward. I agreed with his description of the Conference about political development that it was as "predictable and futile" (his words) because, for reasons which we need not go over again, the Official Unionist Party had boycotted it.

4. I took him through the sequence of events post the General Election 1979 chronologically, starting with Sligo Bay and Warrenpoint, which led naturally into an account of the meeting on security which the Secretary of State had with Mr. O'Kennedy

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and Mr. Collins on 5 October 1979. This led on in turn to an account of developments on the security front since then and I gave him straight the Chief Constable's view that there was no matter concerning security in Northern Ireland or the maintenance of law and order in Northern Ireland on which the Chief Constable wanted more than the Republic were giving. I invited Mr. Powell to talk to the Chief Constable himself on this matter. I emphasised this for the specific purpose of demonstrating that there never had been a "price" (his words) paid by HMG to secure the Republic's co-operation on security. I put forward the opinion that Mr. Haughey, sitting at the European Council with 8 other Heads of Government, at least 6 of whom had a terrorist problem could not afford to be equivocal about terrorism. Mr. Powell argued against this - I prefaced my remarks by saying that I did not expect this EEC aspect to have any appeal to him!

5. I gave him a full account of the handling of the hunger strike and told him of our intelligence of an impending renewal; points emphasised were that there had been no deal whatsoever nor would there be, that it had been defeated by a combination of pressures not all of which I was free to disclose but he need not assume by that it was Mr. Haughey who was delivering the pressure; and that from beginning to end the management of that crisis had been in the hands of the Ulster-men who within the NIO dealt with prisons and administration - and they were not of a disposition to do deals with terrorists. I claimed that it was recognised by all sections of the community in Northern Ireland that the IRA had suffered a major defeat. Mr. Powell did not much like this but was half-hearted in contesting it and said that we were still in a compromised position because of the prisoners remaining in special category status. He quoted the Prime Minister's remarks to him in the House as meaning that there was still equivocation and differences of view in the Cabinet about whether or not IRA terrorists should have special status and was suspicious of the "commitments alleged to have been entered into in the past" ... (the attached hansard extract of his exchange with the Prime Minister which he quoted shows by underlining the points about which he was suspicious). I stressed that Ministers were of one mind on this, not divided.

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6. I then referred to the Dublin Summit and said that it was obvious that there seemed to be deliberate misunderstanding. I referred back to the earlier summit of May 21st 1980 and reminded him then of the agreement by Mr. Haughey that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland etc. I said that the communique of 8 December was only open to misinterpretation if one overlooked the starting point which was that it described a discussion between two Heads of Government of sovereign states, one the Republic of Ireland and one the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Of course the communique did not formally describe each Prime Minister in these terms but it was plain enough that they met in those respective capacities and that all that followed in the communique concerned relationships and interests between two sovereign states, not between one sovereign state and another with a third element in some kind of limbo. At this point Mr. Powell was provoked (his words) into attack, denouncing what I had said. He argued that if it truly was a meeting between Head of two sovereign states recognising a common interest then international usage (or words to that effect) would surely have required that, before proceeding further together, one party which laid claim to part of the national territory of the other should give up that claim. I reiterated that the communique between the two Heads of Government was plainly on the basis that any such claim was not accepted and referred back again to the May 21st communique (interestingly the Daily Telegraph of 6 February contains a letter from Mr. David Morrison, which makes the point very neatly -  
... copy attached). Mr. Powell said that I was in effect suggesting that he and I could have a useful discussion on a variety of matters while he claimed ownership of part of the lease of my house while I made no such claim over any part of the lease of his house. I did not follow him into this analogy and at this point he expressed an amiable regret for having been provoked.

7. Mr. Powell made two further comments worth recording. He was dismissive of the whole of what I had said about security co-operation with the Republic although this was conveyed by attitude

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*This is a copy - The original has been extracted and retained under S. 3(4).*

argument.

rather than by substantive/He asked whether I was aware that, as he had reason to believe, there was "more than the IRA involved" in Tynan Abbey. I asked him what on earth he meant, believing that he was implying (as he had done in the past) that agents provocateurs were at work. He replied that the IRA had Middle East connections and it was likely to be Algerians involved. I made no comment beyond saying that I thought we had a lot of information about that attack.\*

~~~~~ \*

8. Mr. Powell then turned to the malevolence issue. He said that I was wrong to think he meant that there was a conspiracy to expel Ulster. It was more "the nature of the beast". He then launched into his familiar attack on officials in the NIO. I was (politely I hope) firm on this: I told him if as I believe he was referring only to UK officials in the NIO (he confirmed that this was so) then surely he understood that he was referring to very few people indeed: myself, a Deputy Secretary in London and Belfast and 5 Under Secretaries. I described the functions of each and said that those principally concerned with political affairs and public relations (Mr. Moriarty and Mr. Wyatt) had joined the NIO after me and that I had chosen each because of his outstanding ability. I got a bit pompous about the integrity of UK civil servants and their support and their commitment to the principle that it was Ministers who determined policy. He was quite unconvinced and urged me to look closely into what was being said and done by senior officials in the NIO because there seemed to be a continuing thrust of policy against the integrity of UK with regard to NI. At this point I gave him an account of how the Secretary of State and I had brought the senior Ulster civil servants more closely into all aspects of policy and that we enjoyed their confidence and support. With characteristic perversity Mr. Powell said that he thought this could have two meanings - either that we were constructing a model for devolution and by implication, expulsion, or, as he would prefer, integration and it was <sup>important to</sup> him that the Government should make clear its intentions. My response was to say that I

\* Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4)

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hoped the outcome would be that we should be better able to tackle the problems of the Province particularly economic and financial.

9. Mr. Powell summed up our discussion by saying that he was grateful for the time we had spent together, that he thought it possible that he could reconcile (his words) the different perceptions that he and I had of the sequence of events, and he seemed to derive some degree of reassurance from that although I would not put any money on it. But, he said, what was left outstanding between us was his concern <sup>about</sup> the nature of the beast and the thrust of officials in Whitehall, and he urged me to give this my attention.

10. As we walked downstairs he returned to the hunger strike and said "do not rely too much on that victory while the special category continues." We parted in good humour (I think) on his door step with my saying that I would of course be pleased to talk to him again if he wished and he indicated that he would so wish.

KRS.

K.R. STOWE  
6 February 1981

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come to an end and for the Minister either to accept responsibility himself or to restore powers to local representatives and local government?

**Mr. Mitchell:** The consultation procedures are an essential and vital link between the Government in Northern Ireland and the local communities, and it is certainly our intention to listen before we act.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the level of rents. The level of rent increases in Northern Ireland is lower by 50p than is on the mainland. That is in addition to the £1 reduction, making the level of rent £1.50 lower in Northern Ireland than it is on the mainland.

**Mr. Peter Robinson:** Is the Minister aware that the people in Northern Ireland would be better served if more functions were given to local government, rather than take away the few rights that it has?

**Mr. Mitchell:** The hon. Gentleman will know that constitutional changes are a matter for my right hon. Friend.

#### Parliamentary Boundary Commission (Report)

10. **Mr. J. Enoch Powell** asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland when he expects to receive the final report of the Parliamentary Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland.

**The Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office (Mr. Michael Alison):** The Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland is required to submit its report to my right hon. Friend before June 1984. I understand that the Commission hopes to be in a position to report well in advance of that date.

**Mr. Powell:** Do the Government recognise that it is in the interests of the democratic process generally in Northern Ireland that the new constituencies, which will be radically different from the existing ones, should be known and determined as soon as possible? Will the Government ensure that there are no obstacles in the way of a much earlier announcement and order being laid before the House?

**Mr. Alison:** I assure the right hon. Gentleman that there are no governmental obstacles in the way of the earliest possible report by the commission but the commission, is an independent body. I was able to tell the right hon. Gentleman in my substantive reply that the commission hopes to be in a position to report well in advance of the 1984 deadline.

**Mr. Nicholas Winterton:** Does my hon. Friend agree that the parliamentary representation in this House is inadequate numerically, and that, failing a satisfactory increase in the number of parliamentary representatives in this House, the Government should give serious consideration to the proper integration of Ulster and Northern Ireland into the rest of the United Kingdom.

**Mr. Alison:** If I may give a purely quantitative reply to my hon. Friend's question, he will note that the Boundary Commission has proposed that there should in due course be 17 seats, rather than the existing 12.

#### Prime Minister (Engagements)

Q1. **Mr. Heddle** asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 15 January.

**The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher):** This morning I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet. In addition to my duties in this House I shall be having further meetings with ministerial colleagues and others.

**Mr. Heddle:** Will my right hon. friend take time today to consider the plight of industrial and commercial ratepayers, particularly those with premises in areas run by extravagant Labour-controlled councils? Will my right hon. Friend consider that perhaps local democracy might receive a much-needed shot in the arm if consideration were given to the reintroduction of the business vote at local government elections?

**The Prime Minister:** Where local authorities ignore the need for making economies, a very heavy burden rests on business, and particularly on small business men, many of whom feel that they have taxation without representation. It can also have a very bad effect on jobs, as small businesses move out to other areas with lower rates. My right hon. friend has the rating system under review, and the aspect of the business and commercial people not having a vote is one that certainly needs to be looked at.

**Mr. J. Enoch Powell:** Now that it has been determined—thanks not least to the Prime Minister's own determination—that political status for any prisoners is inadmissible in Northern Ireland or elsewhere, will she take time to consider how best that status can now be withdrawn from the 350 prisoners in Northern Ireland who still enjoy it?

**The Prime Minister:** A number of us share the view of the Gardiner report that there should not be a separate category of prisoners and that there should be no such thing as special status. As the right hon. Gentleman is aware, both the previous Labour Government and this Government decided that no further people should be admitted to that status. At the present time, apart from anything else, there would be practical reasons why one could not withdraw the special status from the others, because there is just not enough cell accommodation. But I should not wholly rest upon that immediately. There are wide considerations relating to withdrawing retrospectively the terms on which those sentences are being served.

**Sir William Clark:** Will my right hon. Friend take time today to look into the after-effects of strikes? Is she aware that after the engineering strike in 1979 130,000 jobs were lost, and that after the steel strike last year about 110,000 jobs were lost? What conclusions does she draw from that?

**The Prime Minister:** It seems to me that my hon. Friend has drawn the conclusions, almost by virtue of the question, that strikes lose jobs, and the sooner the lesson is learnt the better.

Q1. **Mr. Beith:** Will the Prime Minister find time today to read the speech last night by Sir Leslie Murphy, formerly the chairman of the National Enterprise Board, in which he particularly referred to the board as one of the victims of the battle between the extreme Right and the extreme Left in British politics? Is the right hon. Lady prepared to learn some lessons from that, or will she retreat further into a narrowing group of Right-wing Conservatives?

**The Prime Minister:** I rather thought that that gentleman's speech condemned politicians *carte blanche*.

DAILY TELEGRAPH

6th Feb. 1981

## Guarantee of self-determination in N. Ireland

SIR—Mr Paul Potts reported from Dublin on Jan. 28 that the Republic of Ireland is "looking to Britain to end the constitutional guarantee of self-determination for the people of Ulster."

But in the joint communiqué issued after the meeting between Mrs Thatcher and Mr Haughey in London last May the two Prime Ministers agreed that there could be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland.

Thus, despite widespread speculation at the time that Mr Haughey was going to London to get the Government to "withdraw the guarantee" (whatever that may mean in practice), he did the opposite and "guaranteed the guarantee."

According to your reporter, the Republic is now seeking the "withdrawal of the guarantee," so either Mr Potts has got it wrong or else there has been a dramatic reversal in Irish

Government policy. There was no hint of such a change of policy after the December meeting between the two Prime Ministers.

Indeed, since the communiqué talked volubly about the economic, social and political affairs of the Republic and the United Kingdom being "inextricably linked," one could be forgiven for thinking that the Republic had abandoned its attempt to detach Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and that the political re-integration of the British Isles was being contemplated.

Certainly, it doesn't make much sense to detach one area from a State and attach it to another State when the Governments of these States are mutually agreed that they are "inextricably linked." The more so when the citizens of the area to be transferred are overwhelmingly opposed to the transfer.

DAVID MORRISON  
Belfast.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

9 February 1981

Michael Alexander, Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London  
SW1

*Dear Michael*

... As requested on Friday evening, I enclose a revised draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Molyneaux's letter of 4 February which bases itself upon a reply given by my Secretary of State to a Supplementary Question asked by Mr Molyneaux on Thursday 15 January.

We suggest this letter to Mr Molyneaux should incorporate a reply to his letter of 27 January which was mainly about security matters. (I sent a draft reply to the letter to Nick Sanders on 5 February, so that should now be withdrawn if you agree.)

*Yours sincerely*  
*Mike Hopkins*  
M W HOPKINS



DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

| To                                                                 | Enclosures | Copies to be sent to         |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------|
| James H Molyneaux Esq JP MP<br>House of Commons<br>London SW1A 0AA |            |                              |
| (Full Postal Address)                                              |            | (Full Address, if Necessary) |

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your further letters of  
27 January and 4 February.

I do most fully appreciate the strength of  
feeling in Northern Ireland about recent  
terrorist outrages. I too was deeply shocked  
and saddened at the murders of Sir Norman Stronge  
and James Stronge and also <sup>at KIL</sup> of Major Tombs.

As you know, these murders have been condemned  
in the strongest terms by responsible opinion,  
both in the United Kingdom and in the Republic  
of Ireland. Our security forces are, ~~not course,~~  
doing their utmost to bring the assassins to  
justice; and in this task they have the full  
cooperation of the security forces in the  
Republic. Both Governments are very much aware  
that terrorism represents a threat to law and  
order on both sides of the border, and are  
dedicated to its elimination. The border is

a complication, as indeed is any international frontier in the control of terrorism. But solid progress has been made in cross-border security cooperation recently. It is of course not perfect, but both Governments are determined to consolidate and, where possible, improve it.

As regards your letter of 4 February about the "joint studies" being undertaken by officials of this country and the Republic in preparation for discussions later this year between the Taoiseach and myself, the inferences which you mention are quite mistaken. Humphrey Atkins has himself told you, in reply to your Supplementary Question to him on 15 January, that in his view the Republic's position with regard to Northern Ireland, as expressed in Article 2 of their Constitution, and the question whether extradition procedures should be available in cross-border terrorist cases, are among the matters which are proper to be discussed between ourselves and the Government of the Republic. We have agreed with the Government of the Republic that the details of the talks between officials should - following normal practice - be kept confidential. Once either we or they depart from that we should rapidly reach a situation where we were as good as conducting the studies in public. //

N.P.  
I recognise that, ~~as a consequence, ill intentioned~~  
~~or merely anxious people~~ <sup>There are some</sup> in Northern Ireland, <sup>who</sup> are  
tempted to imagine a conspiracy or "sell-out", ~~where~~  
Nothing of the sort exists. ~~But~~ <sup>As</sup> I and others

have said repeatedly, the studies take place within, and do not question, the <sup>existing</sup> constitutional framework in which the position of Northern Ireland within the UK cannot be changed without the consent of the people of the Province and of Parliament at Westminster.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Ireland.*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

*Telephoned to the Hague  
11.30 a.m. MAF 6/2*

Clive Whitmore Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

6 February 1981

*Dear Clive*

... As requested I attach a line to take on last night's DUP 'rally' for use at No 10 and by the Prime Minister at The Hague.

*Yours sincerely  
Mike Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

NOTE FOR PRIME MINISTER

DUP RALLY IN COUNTY ANTRIM ON NIGHT 5/6 FEBRUARY 1981

BACKGROUND

In a carefully arranged publicity stunt last night, DUP members took journalists to an unidentified location near Ballymena in County Antrim where a body of men about 500 strong was paraded in the presence of Dr Paisley. Paisley made a statement saying that the men had pledged themselves to destroy the plot hatched between Dublin and London. At a pre-arranged signal the men held up pieces of paper which Paisley described as firearms certificates for the legal possession of weapons. He said the men were not an army or paramilitaries but just a sample of the thousands of loyalists prepared to defend Ulster.

LINE TO TAKE

This was nothing more than a publicity stunt by the DUP designed to recapture some of the ground lost by Paisley in recent months in his attempt to gain the majority of loyalist support in the forthcoming local elections. Over-reaction to the incident would suit Paisley's book.

No violence was used or displayed. Paisley's text contains no unambiguous threat of violence. But police are investigating and it will be for the police to decide whether anything unlawful took place. If law was broken then Paisley, as much as any other citizen, will face the due process of the law.

People who arrange this sort of incident actually undermine the fabric of stability in the Province which they claim to be trying to preserve.



(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

I said that I hoped to let  
you have a draft reply to this  
letter this evening. But the  
NIO draft seemed to me too  
negative and I have asked  
them to have another go.

I will submit the result on  
Monday. We ought to aim to  
get it to the Polymenax before  
you see the Powell on Tuesday.

It was in the  
signature folder. I must  
send it back. net 6/2

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



**CONFIDENTIAL**

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

6 February 1981

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

*Dear Michael*

I enclose for the Prime Minister's consideration a draft reply to Mr Molyneaux's letter of 4 February.

Mr Atkins takes the view that the reply should be short and to the point. He believes it would be dangerous to comment, in a private letter, on the scope of the studies - especially on the question of the Republic's territorial claim - although it would be appropriate to reaffirm the Government's position on the point of substance (in the final paragraph of the draft reply).

As for timing, Mr Atkins does not think the letter should be sent in haste: it could appear to Mr Molyneaux that Dr Paisley's antics have led to us to expedite the reply and this would give him no satisfaction.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Mike Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

E.R.

DRAFT LETTER TO:

J.H. Molyneaux, Esq., JP, MP  
House of Commons  
LONDON SW1

FOR SIGNATURE BY: THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your further letter of 4 February about the "joint studies" being undertaken by officials of this country and the Republic in preparation for discussions later this year between the Taoiseach and myself.

The inferences which you draw in your letter are quite mistaken. It may well be that because, as is normal, we keep confidential the details of official studies being undertaken for future consideration by Ministers of the Governments of the Republic and of the United Kingdom, ill-intentioned or perhaps anxious people in Northern Ireland are tempted to suspect a conspiracy or "sell-out", where nothing of the sort exists. As I and my colleagues in the Government have said repeatedly, the studies take place within, and do not question, the constitutional framework in which the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom cannot and will not be changed without the consent of the people of the Province and of Parliament.



From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Ireland*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Nick Sanders Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

*5* February 1981

*Type for PM's signature.*

*Ans 5/2*

*Dear Nick,*

Thank you for your letter of ~~27~~ January enclosing Mr James Molyneaux's letter of the same date to the Prime Minister.

We suggest that the Prime Minister might like to comment on the security points which Mr Molyneaux has raised, as in the attached draft. It does not seem necessary on this occasion to make more than a passing reference to the Anglo-Irish joint studies.

... I am sending a copy of this letter and of the draft reply to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

*Yours sincerely*  
*Mike Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

## DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

To

James H Molyneaux Esq JP MP  
House of Commons  
London  
SW1A 0AA

(Full Postal Address)

Enclosures

Copies to be sent to

(Full Address, if Necessary)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 27 January.

I do most fully appreciate the strength of feeling in Northern Ireland about recent terrorist outrages. I too was deeply shocked and saddened at the murder of Sir Norman Stronge and James Stronge and also of Major Tombs. As you know, these murders have been condemned in the strongest terms by responsible opinion, both in the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Ireland. The security forces are, of course, doing their utmost to bring the assassins to justice; and in this task they have the full cooperation of the security forces in the Republic. Both Governments are very much aware that terrorism represents a threat to law and order on both sides of the border, and are dedicated to its elimination. The border is a complication, as indeed is any international frontier, in the control of terrorism. But solid progress has been made in cross-border security cooperation recently. <sup>(This is of course not)</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> of course not perfect, but both Governments are determined to consolidate and, where possible, improve it.

/Cont...

**E.R.**

I can assure you that I have not lost sight of the points which you made in your letters to me of 10 December and 13 January about our contacts with the Irish authorities.



10 DOWNING STREET

Nike.

N. Ireland.

(a) I sent to the N.I.O. last night a letter from Tim Polynaux about the Anglo-Irish talks & asked for a draft reply by the middle of next week. In the light of Parley & all that I think the P.A. had better reply to-night. I have asked Alan to prepare.

(b) Parley etc may well come up at P.A.'s press conference this afternoon. Perhaps you could ask N.I.O. for

my background + a line  
to take + telephone or  
telegraph it to the Hague.

Paul

5. 2. 21



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 February, 1981

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from James Molyneaux, MP. He has told us, and there seems no reason to doubt him, that the text will not be "divulged or published".

Nonetheless Mr Molyneaux's letter must, of course, receive a substantive reply. I hope that you will agree that the reply should make it clear that we would expect extradition and the question of the Republic's territorial claim to Northern Ireland to come up in the course of the joint studies. Both are "proper matters to be discussed between HMG and the Government of the Republic". (What will be achieved is quite another matter.)

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft text by close of play on Thursday, 12 February.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R Harrington, Esq  
Northern Ireland Office

13

R H

5 February, 1981

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 4 February. This is receiving attention and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

James H Molyneaux, Esq, JP MP

From JAMES H. MOLYNEAUX, J.P., M.P. for Antrim, South



House of Commons,  
London S.W.1.

Personal

4. 2. 81

Dear Jan

The enclosed letter  
is strongly worded,  
with the object of  
strengthening the hand  
of the P.M.

The text will  
NOT be divulged  
or published.

Yours ever

Jim

Jan Gow, Esq MP.



From JAMES H. MOLYNEUX, J.P., M.P. for Antrim, South.

Confidential



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

4 February, 1981.

Dear Prime Minister

See Ireland: Pt 3. Mags with  
Taironeach: Anglo-Irish Protocol

Thank you for your reply of 23 January, which was much appreciated. It was followed within a few days by your written answer to P. Robinson on Monday last and supplementary answer to I. Paisley yesterday.

Short of saying so explicitly, you could not have made it clearer that the Government does not intend to include in the joint studies with the Republic, let alone to make a condition precedent to them, discussion of the territorial claim to Ulster in the Republic's constitution or of the Republic's refusal to accept the international duty of extraditing persons wanted for terrorist offences in Ulster.

I am at a loss to see how anyone could fail to understand the clear message of this to the people of Northern Ireland, namely, that the Government regard Ulster's place in the United Kingdom as expendable and that they are willing to see the terrorist campaign against the province continue from the safe bases which the Republic affords. It is not surprising that more and more people believe that Britain and perhaps the USA are seeking advantages from the Republic at the price of the Union. What neither they nor I can do is to reconcile this with your declaration, which you will recall and which I would still want to think sincere, of being "rock firm for the Union".

Yours ever  
Jim

The Right Honourable Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, SW1.


27 January 1981

I attach a further letter which the Prime Minister has received from James Molyneux, M.P. I should be grateful if you could suggest a draft reply to reach us by Friday 6 February.

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

N.J. SANDERS

Mike Hopkins, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.





2

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

I think you saw this letter  
from Jim Molyneaux. We will let  
you have a draft reply.

MS

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'M. S.' or similar, written in a cursive style.

27 January 1981

From JAMES H. MOLYNEAUX, J.P., M.P. for Antrim, South.

cc:IG



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

27 January, 1981.

Dear Prime Minister

Even before the public rebuff offered to Humphrey in connection with the late Sir Norman Stronge's funeral, I had decided, after being in the province during the weekend, that I ought to let you know personally what have been the reactions to last week's atrocious murders in Tynan, County Armagh, and Warrenpoint, County Down.

As you are aware, these could only happen because the perpetrators knew that in a few minutes they would be back in the territory of the Republic whence they had come and where they would be perfectly safe from punishment or extradition. People simply do not understand how Her Majesty's Government can be about to engage in friendly political discussion with the government of a country whose constitution makes such things possible.

You will not, I know, have overlooked the wider bearings of the points which I put to you in my letter of 10 December; but I did feel that the above might be useful fresh background to any decisions that have to be taken.

Yours ever  
Jim

*PS I take the opportunity of thanking you for your reply of 23 January to my letter of 13 January, which I received on getting back to the House last night. Your confirmation in it that arrangements for joint studies are still at a preliminary stage leads me to hope that what I have written could be found relevant.*

The Right Honourable Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, SW1.

*Ireland*

covering CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 8000 (Switchboard)

MO 19/3

26th January 1981

*NBPA  
Recd 26/1*

*Dear Roy,*

THE TYNAN MURDERS

In case you have not received your copy / I enclose a copy of a telex message to my Secretary of State (just received here) to which I think my Secretary of State will wish to send an early reply. Our officials will, of course, consult yours about its terms.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Michael Alexander at No 10.

*Yours and  
Brian Norbury*

(B M NORBURY)

R A Harrington Esq

covering CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

PLEASE PASS THIS MESSAGE TO MR JOHN NOTT FOR HIS URGENT  
ATTENTION

CONFIDENTIAL

THE TYNAN MURDERS

MEMBERS OF THE MONDAY CLUB ARE HORRIFIED AT THE MURDERS OF SIR NORMAN  
STRONGE AND HIS ONLY SON JAMES, AND OF THE DESTRUCTION OF TYNAN  
ABBEY. WE FEAR THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN ITS QUEST FOR  
THE IMPOSSIBLE POLITICAL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL  
SHADES OF OPINION IN ULSTER, HAS LET THE SECURITY SITUATION  
IN THE PROVINCE GET OUT OF HAND, ONCE AGAIN.

UNLESS YOU TAKE IMMEDIATE POSITIVE ACTION THERE IS A STRONG

POSSIBILITY THAT A NEW SPATE OF REVENGE 'TIT FOR TAT' KILLINGS  
WILL NOW SWEEP THE PROVINCE AND INCLUDE YZ1

IRSD EICVLFULL

SCALE CIVIL W

NEED F RAOFL HMH

B10RPEQWBUSCEN GTRODR

335--

943533345)-44

27562 CABOFF GOLUB THEREFORE CALLS ON HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO  
TAKE A FIRM LINE ON SECURITY WITHOUT DELAY.

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT:-

- (A) GUARDS ARE PROVIDED FOR ALL LEADING UNIONISTS INCLUDING  
EX-MEMBERS OF BOTH PARLIAMENTS ( THE LIVES OF JOHN  
BROOKEBOROUGH, HARRY WEST AND ABERCORN ARE NOW VERY  
MUCH AT RISK)
- (B) SEAL THE BORDER - AT LEAST IN KNOWN TERRORIST INFECTED  
AREAS, AND IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW IN THOSE AREAS  
IN WHICH THE TERRORISTS ARE ACTIVE.

IT IS REGRETTED THAT H.M.G. MUST HOLD ITSELF IN PART RESPONSIBLE  
FOR THE MURDERS AT TYNAN AND FOR THE REPRISALS FROM EITHER SIDE  
WHICH ARE NOW LIKELY AS THE RESULT OF THE LACK OF ATTENTION  
AFFORDED TO LEADING UNIONISTS, ( CORRECTION ATTENTION SHOULD  
READ PROTECTION) COULXX COUPLED WITH ALLOWING  
THE RECENT PUBLIC TRIAL OF THOSE UNFORTUNATE SOLDIERS  
WHO, WHILE DEFENDING THEMSELVES HAPPENED TO KILL, SOME SEVEN  
YEARS AGO, THEIR ASAILANT AND HIS HELPER. DOUBTLESS IT WAS  
FELT THAT JUSTICE WAS BEING DONE BY HAVING SUCH A TRIAL -  
BUT THAT WAS NOT MUCH CONSOLATION TO EITHER SIR NORMAN OR  
MR JAMES STRONGE IN THE MOMENTS BEFORE THEY WERE MURDERED,  
NOR WILL IT BE TO THOSE WHO WILL YET BE MURDERED AS THE CONSE-  
QUENCE OF THIS PIECE OF FOLLY AND INSENSITIVITY TO THE DESPERATE  
SITUATION IN THE BORDER AREAS OF NORTHERN IRELAND, WHERE INTIM-  
IDATION AND TERRORISM ARE RIFE.

THIS LACK OF FEELING FOR CAUSE AND EFFECT IN THE PROVINCE  
HAS BEEN FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE CAPTURE  
AND COURT APPEARANCE OF THE THREE (ALLEGEDLY MIA GUIDED) 'EXTREME  
LOYALISTS', 'AX' WHO ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE SHOT AT MRS MCALISKEY  
AND OTHERS - THESE ATTACKS SHOULD HAVE BEEN PUT DOWN TO INTERNAL  
STRIFE WITHIN THE I.P.A. AS IT IS THESE COURT APPEARANCES WILL,  
IN A FEW DAYS TIME, CAUSE /XXX 'TIT FOR TAT' SHOOTING IN  
CO. TYRONE AS WELL, THOSE REPRISALS, LXXX LIKE THE TYNEXXXX  
TYNAN MURDERS WILL IN XMXIXIXIXE TURN INCITE STILL FURTHER  
REPRISALS, AND COUNTER REPRISALS - ALL OF WHICH MUST BE STOPPED  
BEFORE THEY HAPPEN.

FOR THE SAKE OF EVERYONE IN ULSTER THE MONDAY CLUB CALLS UPON  
HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO TREAT THE WAR IN ULSTER AS A GENUINE  
WAR AND NOT AS AN OUTBREAK OF UNORGANISED CRIME AND MANSLAUGHTER  
SOMEWHERE IN THE HOME COUNTIES.

HER MAJESTY'S SUBJECTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND MUST BE AFFORDED  
THE PROTECTION TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED - OR ALTERNATIVELY  
THEY MUST BE HELPED TO ORGANISE THEMSELVES FOR THEIR OWN  
PROTECTION. THEY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO WAIT XX WAIT PATIENTLY  
TO BE MURDERED.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING OF POSITIVE SECURITY ACTION ALONG  
THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE, IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

JOHN DEVERE WALKER  
THE MONDAY CLUB  
122 NEWGATE STREET  
EC1

88143120USCEN G

PLEASE NOTE SECOND PARAGRAPH SHOULD READ

'TIT FOR TAT' KILLINGS WILL NOW SWEEP THE PROVINCE AND COULD EASILY  
LEAD TO FULL SCALE CIVIL WAR.

THIS MESSAGE IS ALSO BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND.

88143120USCEN G

WEMQ23.1.81



*Ireland*

*I have told Mr Birch that  
the PA is not enamoured of the  
this idea.*

Mr Townley

*fs. 27/1*

NORTHERN IRELAND

*with Atkins  
if required.*

I enclose a copy of a letter from Lord Thorneycroft to the Prime Minister dated 8 January about which we spoke briefly. You will see that he suggests that in present political circumstances it is worth considering the possibility of creating a Northern Ireland equivalent of the Scottish Grand Committee in order to associate Ulster MPs more closely with the administration of Northern Ireland and legislation relating to it. I have not, at this stage, consulted the Northern Ireland Office but have asked Nick Sanders if he can give me any indication of the Prime Minister's views on Lord Thorneycroft's suggestion. In the meantime, the Chancellor would be grateful to be advised on the proposition with particular reference to any considerations he should have in mind in discussions with the Prime Minister and Mr Atkins, if these take place in due course, and with Lord Thorneycroft himself.

RAB

R A Birch

19 January 1981

Copy to: Nick Sanders, No 10 ←



CONFIDENTIAL

file NB  
Ireland

SUBJECT



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 January 1981

Sean Roy,

Call by Mr. Oliver Napier

The Leader of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, Mr. Oliver Napier, called on the Prime Minister this morning. He was accompanied by Mr. Cook and Mr. Cushnahan. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was also present.

Mr. Napier said that the personal interest which the Prime Minister had taken in the affairs of Northern Ireland since coming to office was much valued. In particular her visit to Northern Ireland immediately after the terrible events of August 1979 had been greatly appreciated. Turning to the present, Mr. Napier said that the handling of the hunger strike at the Maze by the Government, and in particular by the Secretary of State, had been excellent. It might come to be seen as a watershed in Northern Ireland affairs. The Prime Minister said that she would have come to Northern Ireland again before Christmas but, for obvious reasons, the situation had been unfavourable. She thanked Mr. Napier for his remarks about the Government's handling of the hunger strike: she herself thought that the Northern Ireland Office had "done marvellously".

The Political Situation

Mr. Napier said that most people in Northern Ireland regarded devolved government as the norm and direct rule as a second best. Unfortunately there were deep disagreements as to how devolution should be implemented. As so often in Northern Ireland, reasonable approaches to problems were excluded by centuries-old myths and fears. Anything which seemed to weaken Northern Ireland's place within the United Kingdom would provoke a Protestant explosion. The determination of the Protestant community to resist movement in the direction of a United Ireland was absolute. It was much stronger than the desire of some elements in the Catholic community to move in the other direction. On the other hand, attempts to institute local government reform would provoke a Catholic explosion. It was abuses at the local government level which had started the civil rights movement in the first place. The Catholic community remained extremely anxious about the likely results of changes in the local government system.

/ Nonetheless,

5

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 2 -

Nonetheless, in the view of the Alliance Party, one could not do nothing. The present political vacuum encouraged the terrorists since it brought the political system into disrepute. Moreover, the relative complacency induced by the current acceptance of direct rule was misplaced. The two communities in Northern Ireland were steadily drifting apart. There was therefore a need to find some form of progress. The present political leaders could not be expected to take the initiative themselves since they had a vested interest in perpetuating their disagreements. In the short term, there was no alternative but to continue with direct rule. But in the medium term, the Government at Westminster should be thinking of setting up an elected assembly on the basis that powers would be transferred to it when its members agreed to use those powers on a non-sectarian basis. This would put the ball in the court of the local politicians who would certainly come under pressure from their own constituencies to take the necessary steps to have the powers transferred to the new assembly. Mr. Napier left the attached paper with the Prime Minister in which his party's ideas are set out in more detail.

Mr. Napier said that he recognised that there could be no question of the Government taking an initiative on these lines in the immediate future. He recognised the delicacy of the security situation. Local government elections were to be held next May. Nothing should be done before then. The Government should, in other words, let some time elapse before making a move. In the ensuing discussion, Mr. Napier commented that whatever the Government did, they should eschew local government reform and the introduction of an Irish dimension. The Prime Minister commented that it had been a "tremendous mistake" to go for both at Sunningdale in 1974.

#### The Security Situation

Mr. Napier expressed warm support for the Government's policy in the security field. He agreed both with the primacy accorded to the role of the police and with the Government's determination to treat those who committed crimes as criminals. He praised both the present GOC and the Chief Constable. He made two suggestions:

- (a) that an effort should be made to increase the confidence of some of the more isolated communities along the border in the security forces. He recognised that an increase in numbers would have little effect on the security situation as such. He thought that nonetheless it might have a useful effect on the morale of the local people;
- (b) that the UDA should be declared a proscribed organisation. This need not be done immediately but was something which the Government should keep under constant review.

/ In a brief

In a brief discussion about the prison situation, the Prime Minister asked Mr. Napier whether he thought that special category status should be continued for those prisoners who already enjoyed it. Mr. Napier said that much as he would himself like to see the special category status terminated, his advice was "to leave well alone". To do otherwise would merely be to create new troubles and new myths.

The Economic Situation

Mr. Napier commented in standard terms on the economic problems of Northern Ireland. He and his colleagues both made it clear that they understood the wider economic problems faced by the Government. They said that nonetheless they sought sympathetic consideration from the Government for an area whose problems were worse than those of others. Poverty and unemployment accentuated the polarisation of the two communities.

The Anglo-Irish Summit

Mr. Napier said that his party supported increased co-operation between the United Kingdom and the Republic. There were many benefits to be gained. However, he cautioned that anything which looked like moving towards a United Ireland would be totally resisted in Northern Ireland. He accepted the Prime Minister's assurance that the Summit communique told the full story. The difficulty was that suspicion was rife in Northern Ireland. It could harden or evaporate according to developments in the next few months. One particular danger was that Government spokesmen in the Republic, in the course of an electoral campaign, might be tempted to exaggerate the significance of what had happened in Dublin. The Taoiseach should be urged to "play it cool". Developments in Anglo-Irish relations could have a considerable effect on the course of the local government campaign in Northern Ireland in the next few months. The Prime Minister made it clear that she had taken the point and that she was most grateful for Mr. Napier's exposition.

I am sending copies of this letter to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*Nicholas Alexander*

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.



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# The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland

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A POLICY DOCUMENT ON GOVERNING NORTHERN

IRELAND WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM

SUBMITTED BY AN ALLIANCE PARTY DELEGATION

TO THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER M.P.

PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

AT A MEETING ON FRIDAY 16TH JANUARY, 1981

## INTRODUCTION

The political vacuum in Northern Ireland is a direct incitement to terrorism and gives hope to terrorists that their campaign will meet with eventual success. This does not of course mean that terrorists and in particular the Provisionals would accept a political solution which might gain broad agreement within Northern Ireland. They would resist any such political solution with increased violence, as they did in 1974, because they realise that democratic structures, acceptable in particular to the minority community, would in the long term be fatal to their hopes. There is therefore a direct relationship between a political solution and an end to violence although it may not be an instantaneous remedy. Until political stability has been achieved in Northern Ireland, violence at some level is therefore likely to be a continuous feature of the next decade. The Provisional I.R.A. and their supporters firmly believe that provided there is a continued political vacuum then they have everything to fight for. It also places them, in their own view, in direct confrontation with the British Government itself which they believe benefits them in two ways. Firstly, they believe it is easier to break the resolve of the British Government rather than a Northern Ireland Government as they consider that a British Government has an infinitely weaker commitment to maintaining the union. Secondly, it enables the Provisional I.R.A. to present their campaign as "a war against the occupying British" rather than what it really is - a war against the overwhelming majority of the people of Northern Ireland itself. On the loyalist paramilitary side, the political vacuum is also seen as a situation in which the I.R.A. have everything to fight for and therefore in which the loyalist paramilitaries have everything to fight against. Violence and political instability therefore beget further violence.

We feel that there is sometimes a temptation for successive governments to try to use English logic in an Irish situation. In Northern Ireland there is a totally different situation politically and historically than in any other part of the United Kingdom. Any proposals put forward will be viewed with infinite suspicion by both sections of a divided community who have learnt by historic precedent that they cannot always accept what is proposed at face value.

### THE DIFFERING ATTITUDES:

The basic and quite immovable determination of the political majority in Northern Ireland is to resist becoming part of a United Ireland and to

remain within the United Kingdom. That majority relies upon the continuous assurances of successive governments and the existing legislation that they are entitled to remain within the United Kingdom while a majority in Northern Ireland so decide. Any steps which were seen however tentatively or slowly as weakening that guarantee or moving in the direction of a United Ireland would provoke massive and determined opposition. In this light we would urge extreme caution in the developing relationship between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Although as a Party we welcome and have consistently supported positive social, economic and security co-operation between the two countries, we are especially conscious of how protestant fears could be aroused and unscrupulously exploited.

The basic attitude of the traditional religious minority is much more complex. There is clear evidence that the vast majority want devolved partnership government within the province. Furthermore all the evidence is that anything less than this would be unacceptable and without their assent Northern Ireland would be equally ungovernable. Many Catholics (but by no means all) have also a longterm aspiration for a United Ireland achieved by and with the consent of the Northern majority. While they do not expect this to be achieved in the foreseeable future, they none the less wish to maintain that aspiration.

One can see therefore that what might look in simplistic terms to be a probable option for governing Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom is not only a non-starter but positively dangerous even to contemplate when seen against the background of the differing political and historic attitudes. It would be useful to examine the possible options individually.

#### THE VARIOUS OPTIONS:

##### (a) Local Government Reform

This term generally refers to either the proposition of creating an additional tier (or tiers) of local government on the pretext that it would democratise decision making or the proposal to give increased powers to local councils. Any problem arising out of the present structure of local government in Northern Ireland stems from the absence of a devolved government (as envisaged by Macrory). To add an upper tier would only bureaucratise further what is an already over bureaucratic structure and in his report Macrory argued against any such additional tier.

However, the main argument against this proposition of increasing powers for local government is the fact that such a move would intensify minority fears and this is understandable. Under the old Stormont system which was so despised by the Catholic community it was the particular abuse of local government powers in such fields as housing, employment, etc., that led to the birth of the Civil Rights movement and consequently where we are today. In fact, one doesn't have to go back in history - many Councils in Northern Ireland are still acting in a discriminatory fashion and even the Association of Local Authorities (the representative body for the 26 District Councils) prevented non-Unionists from being elected to even the most menial posts. With such evidence we can clearly understand why tinkering about with local government reform would be resisted so strongly by non-Unionist parties.

(b) TOTAL INTEGRATION:

There are many good arguments against this approach for sensible and practical reasons from the interests of both the mainland and Northern Ireland itself. Principally, however, it ignores the totally different political and historic circumstances which pertain in Northern Ireland as distinct from the rest of the U.K. It would also alienate nationalist minded politicians in the Irish Republic, the U.S.A. and there is a real danger that it could harden opinion in the Catholic community unnecessarily viz., those Catholics who have a longterm aspiration for a United Ireland by consent might then feel that they were denied the opportunity of ever seeing that aspiration come true and as a consequence could move towards supporting the Provisionals campaign.

(c) ANOTHER SUNNINGDALE PACKAGE:

The 1974 Power Sharing Executive was brought down not because of opposition to the power-sharing concept but because of widespread fear within the majority community about the Council of Ireland. In the Sunningdale negotiations our delegation had expressed concern about the deliverability of the Institutionalised Irish Dimension which unfortunately proved to be prophetic.

There has been many articles written about the U.W.C. strike and all have concluded that the Council of Ireland was the rock upon which Sunningdale perished. Indeed those who organised this strike confirmed this themselves

and indeed in an article in the Belfast Telegraph last year the Strike leaders almost seemed to regret that the baby (power sharing) was thrown out with the bath water.

Therefore a Council of Ireland or any formal institutionalised Irish Dimension will inevitably be seen as a step in the direction of Irish Unity. What its actual powers and responsibilities are is not relevant. It would be seen as a symbol of political movement heading for an eventual United Ireland and as such would meet enormous resistance and create deep fears.

(d) MAJORITY RULE:

In the divided community of Northern Ireland, Majority Rule means in practice that government is permanently entrusted to one section of the community - the Loyalist section. There would be no alternation of Governments as would happen in Westminster. Whatever political rivalry there may be from time to time between the Official Unionist Party and the D.U.P., these Parties would form a coalition to keep out members of the traditional minority. This happens in local government where these parties have between them a working majority. The minority reaction to majority rule would be explosive and almost certainly lead to a boycott of the Assembly and a sharp increase in terrorist support. Successive governments have pledged continuously from 1973 that there would be no devolved Government returned to Northern Ireland unless based upon partnership and participation from both sections of a divided community. We totally support that proposition. Any watering down of that principle would lead to a total rejection of any new devolved institution by the entire religious minority and considerable sections of the religious majority. The Government's Green Paper (Cmd Paper No 7950) put forward two options, one of which was in accordance with this principle but one of which (option B) was certainly not. We were therefore disturbed that the present Government had apparently broken with the principle that power in any new Northern Ireland Assembly must be shared and that this was the price of devolution.



(e) DIRECT RULE:

As neither side of the community is fundamentally opposed to Direct Rule there is a temptation to say that the answer lies in the continuation of Direct Rule with a few modifications. Such a view ignores the underlying malaise which exists under the present system.

Direct Rule in a sense symbolises the total failure of Northern Ireland politicians to achieve agreement and therefore brings the political process itself into disrepute. As it is universally tolerated in Northern Ireland it is an encouragement for Her Majesty's Government to do nothing as it provides a useful fall-back position. This can be an extremely dangerous viewpoint as there is clear evidence that failure to progress on the devolution front and continuation of Direct Rule serves only to result in further community polarisation and hardening of attitudes. The clear illustration of this can best be found if one examines the trends in both tribal camps since 1974 - the S.D.L.P. have become much more hardline nationalists and this has been accompanied by similar developments in Unionism illustrated by the emergence of Paisley as a significantly stronger figure in the Protestant community.

(f) A PARTNERSHIP ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT AN INSTITUTIONALISED IRISH DIMENSION

Successive opinion polls over the last ten years have consistently indicated that a majority on both sides of our divided community would find this acceptable. The Alliance Party believes that it offers the best chance of moving forward and ending the Northern Ireland trauma

Our deep community divisions and resulting lack of common identity is the root cause of all our problems. The one clear way in which this could be resolved would be by the creation of political institutions based upon the principle of partnership coupled with adequate safeguards.

Acceptable structures of government would provide the vehicle for developing a new common loyalty between Catholic and Protestant within Northern Ireland it would also have a major contribution to make in eradicating the root causes of violence. An administration drawn from all major elected groupings in proportion to their elected strength would create political structures which both sections of the community would

not only identify with and support but which together they would also be prepared to defend against the gunmen on both sides. No longer would paramilitaries on either side be able to exploit feelings of alienation and insecurity.

ALLIANCE PROPOSALS:

The failure of the Conference, chaired by the Secretary of State and of subsequent party discussions to come up with an agreed formula for devolution only reinforces our long held opinion that agreement between Northern Ireland political parties is not achievable. All conferences or talks of this kind can do is to narrow down and clarify the areas of disagreement and the areas of general assent. They will not bridge the areas of disagreement.

The initiative now clearly rests with Her Majesty's Government and it is for the government therefore to put forward its proposals to see, not whether parties in Northern Ireland agree with them, but whether they are prepared, with whatever reservations to work the system. We would therefore, call upon the Government as a matter of urgency to take the following steps:-

1. Introduce legislation to set up an Assembly in Northern Ireland elected by P.R.
2. Agree to transfer to that Assembly at least as substantial powers as those contained in the 1973 Constitution Act of both an administrative and legislative nature as soon as an Executive has been set up on a proportional basis involving all major parties who wish to participate provided that such an Executive shall have a simple majority in the Assembly.
3. If such an Executive should fail to achieve a majority in the Assembly after a reasonable period of time has been allowed for that purpose, then Direct Rule will continue until such time as an Executive of such a nature shall be set up.

We again reiterate our view that the need to move quickly to fill the political vacuum is a very high priority for the future peace, prosperity and reconciliation of our community.



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# The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland

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"THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE ALLIANCE PARTY - A CENTRE  
PARTY OF CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS  
IN NORTHERN IRELAND"

Text of a lecture given by  
Alliance Party General Secretary  
at the John F Kennedy School  
of Government, Harvard University, U.S.A.

April 1979

## INTRODUCTION

"The Alliance Party was formed in April 1970. It was founded on the premise that the major problem of Northern Ireland was the division in our community between Protestant and Catholic and that the turmoil which we are now going through had its origins in that division and not in the partition of Ireland. Partition was the result of the divisions and not the cause of them.

"We believed that so long as politics were dominated by tribal parties seeking a sectarian vote, so long would those parties have a vested interest in keeping alive the division and indeed in widening it even further.

"The task of breaking down the traditional sectarian divisions was indeed a formidable one. Coupled with the increasing community polarisation as a result of the continuing violence it was not surprising that the political commentators were writing our epitaph within months of our being formed. However, we proved them wrong. While other parties floundered, not only did we survive, but we went from strength to strength. We are one of the four major political parties in Northern Ireland with almost 15% of the popular vote and in the Westminster election due to be held early next month we expect to improve upon that.

## POLITICAL PROGRAMME

"Our successful challenge to the traditional political parties was mounted on a political programme based upon the four founding principles of the Party which were - Firstly, our primary objective is to heal the bitter divisions in our society by ensuring equality of citizenship and full partnership between Catholic and Protestant at all levels of public and governmental life.

"Secondly, we support the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. Provocative debate about the border has in our view fomented the bitter divisions and tended to hide the real community problem.

"Thirdly, a pragmatic non-doctrinaire approach to social and economic policies.

"And fourthly support for the firm and impartial enforcement of the rule of law. Without this - democracy perishes.

"The first two of these principles, the guaranteeing of partnership between Catholic and Protestant and support for Northern Ireland's constitutional position within the United Kingdom could in effect be termed the 'dual compromise'. They are an attempt to allay the fundamental fears of both the Catholic and the Protestant sections of the community respectively. The main fear of the Catholic community is that it will be denied equality of esteem and its culture and traditions will be stifled and the basic fear of the Protestant community is that it will be forced into a United Ireland against its will.

## THE PARTY ORGANISATION

"Strongly convinced about the soundness of our policies, the Alliance Party commenced the task of organising itself into a professional Political party. A province wide organisation was soon built up with branches covering all parts of Northern Ireland, irrespective of whether they were hard line republican or hard line loyalist areas.

"The basic organising unit of the Party is the Association which corresponds to the various District Councils (there are 26 in Northern Ireland) except in the case of Belfast where instead of one single Association, there are eight corresponding to each District Electoral Area in the city. This is due to the fact that Belfast contains over one third of the population of Northern Ireland. Each Association elects delegates to the Party Council which is the supreme governing body of the Party and meets quarterly in the months of March, June, September and December. The March Council Meeting is the Annual General Meeting of the Party and it elects the National Executive.

#### ELECTORAL RECORD

"Once the organisation had been set up, the Party started to prepare for its first electoral test which was to come in 1973 - the year in which the Northern Ireland Assembly elections were held and out of which the Power Sharing Executive was formed, involving Catholics and Protestants for the first time in the governing of Northern Ireland. This bold and imaginative experiment in cross-community government was to be ill-fated as it was brought down in less than five months by the U.W.C. strike which was organised by loyalist paramilitaries. The Alliance Party supplied two members of the 15 man Power Sharing Executive. Our Party Leader, Oliver Napier was Minister of Law Reform and our Deputy Leader, Bob Cooper was Minister of Manpower Services.

"We fought the elections to the Assembly on a policy of community reconciliation and support for partnership between Catholics and Protestants in government. To that end we supported the British Government's White Paper proposals for the future government of Northern Ireland. We secured 9.2% of the popular vote and won eight of the 78 seats. One of the most interesting points about our performance was that we were successful in having our Catholic Leader, Oliver Napier, elected in the overwhelmingly Protestant East Belfast constituency and our Protestant Deputy Leader, Bob Cooper, elected in the overwhelmingly Catholic West Belfast - indisputable proof of the success of the Party in crossing the sectarian divide.

"After the collapse of the Power Sharing Executive, the British Government adopted a 'wait and see' policy for 12 months. Then in May 1975, it held elections for the Constitutional Convention. The purpose of this elected forum was to -

**"CONSIDER WHAT PROVISION FOR GOVERNMENT WAS LIKELY TO COMMAND THE MOST WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE THROUGHOUT THE NORTHERN IRELAND COMMUNITY".**

"Alliance again won eight seats, pushing its share of the vote from 9.2% to 9.8%. This may seem an insignificant increase but when seen in its proper political perspective it was a very credible performance. The intervening period between the Assembly Elections of 1973 and the Convention Elections of 1975 was one of the most depressing in Northern Ireland's recent history. It was most notable for the fact that it witnessed not only increased terrorist violence but also a most sinister development in the pattern of violence. What happened then was a series of tit-for-tat sectarian killings when people were being slaughtered for no other reason than they were of a different religious faith from that of their assassin. These cold blooded and ruthless slayings not only sent waves of revulsion throughout the community, but also intensified fears, mistrust and greater community polarisation. This was hardly the climate in which the Alliance message of reconciliation would flourish and it was a miracle that the Party survived never mind increased its strength. However, the widespread community fear

and insecurity did not deter Alliance activists, without any regard for their own personal safety continuing to campaign for the party and its policies in areas where maybe the night before one of their own religious faith had been callously slain for reasons of sheer sectarianism. Their personal courage and total commitment to the Alliance ideal kept it alive when all hell was breaking loose in the community at large.

"The Constitutional Convention itself never got to grips with the reality of the Northern Ireland problem. After politicians on both sides of the sectarian divide uttered many platitudes about trust and magnanimity in its early days it came to a fruitless and pointless end. Unable to overcome their basic mistrust of each others intentions and unwilling to risk splitting the cohesion of their respective tribal monoliths agreement was further away at the end of the Convention than it had been at its opening debates. It ended in undistinguished and typically triumphalist fashion with the majority loyalist Unionist coalition (U.U.U.C.) steamrolling its proposals through the Convention, using their numerical advantage with total contempt for any political views differing from their own. The subsequent rejection of the majority Convention Report by the three major parties at Westminster meant that Northern Ireland was to experience another period of political vacuum.

"After the failure of the Convention the British Government adopted a more positive form of Direct Rule. Their clear policy seemed to be that it was up to the politicians of Northern Ireland themselves to reach agreement on devolution but in the meantime Northern Ireland Office Ministers would deal effectively with the security situation and take more initiatives in order to resolve the province's massive social and economic problems.

"It wasn't long, however, before the Northern Ireland electorate had to trip to the polls yet again. May 1977 was the date and the occasion was the Local Government Elections. These are held every four years for the purpose of electing representatives to the various District Councils throughout Northern Ireland. In the absence of a regional parliament these Councils constitute the only elected forum in Northern Ireland. This particular election was immediately preceded by a second Loyalist paramilitary strike but on this occasion because of decisive handling by the present Secretary of State, Roy Mason and the use of the Police in a front line role against the 'strikers' the challenge was easily quelled.

"In the election which immediately followed the Alliance Party made a decisive breakthrough. Our vote shot up dramatically from 9.8% to 14.3%, making us the third largest political party in the province behind the Official Unionists, the S.D.L.P. and ahead of Paisley's party the Democratic Unionist Party. Overnight Alliance had emerged from being a minor party to a major force in Northern politics which would have to be reckoned with for some time to come. The local press reaction at the time reflected the significance of our achievement in their editorials the day after the election.

"The Morning Daily'Newsletter'which has a Unionist outlook and is almost exclusively read by Protestants said:

*'Preliminary results in the local government elections in Northern Ireland show that four main blocs, Official Unionists, the S.D.L.P. the Democratic Unionists and the Alliance Party, have reason for varying degrees of satisfaction.*

*'While the S.D.L.P. have held their strength reasonably well, the Alliance Party have done better and will clearly be a major political force to be reckoned with in future'.*

The 'Irish News' which has a Nationalist outlook and is read almost exclusively by Catholics said:

*'The rapid growth and fine performance of the Alliance Party is a matter for congratulations on two fronts. The Party itself has worked extremely hard and conscientiously for its constituents, dedicated to its belief in crossing the sectarian divide and allying all the people of Northern Ireland in a combined and determined campaign to promote prosperity and to end all violent deeds. Clearly they have won many friends and supporters, and all those voters who returned them in such numbers have shown themselves well able to turn their backs on the old shibboleths and to start again for a better future'.*

"The breakthrough was most dramatic in the East of the Province around Belfast where over two thirds of our population live. In this area Alliance became either the largest or the second largest party on the various District Councils. In Belfast itself, whose Council has the semblance of a pseudo-parliament since the proroguing of the Stormont Parliament, our advances were to have serious repercussions for the traditional Unionist grip on the Council. We now have thirteen members on the 51 strong Council whereas immediately before the election we only had four.

"The present party breakdown in Belfast is, Official Unionist 15, Alliance 13, S.D.L.P. 7, D.U.P. 7, Republican Clubs 3, U.P.N.I. 2, Independent Protestants 2, Independent Catholics 2. Our newly found strength ended the Unionist domination of the Council which had continued ever since it was first established and resulted in the election of the first ever non-Unionist Mayor of the City in June 1978. This took place in the person of David Cook my Alliance Party colleague. As well as being the first non-Unionist Mayor he was also the youngest ever at 34 to hold the post and as his term of office comes to an end it is pleasing to note that many independent political commentators are saying that he is one of the best, if not the best candidate ever to grace the Office. The effect of this achievement cannot be over-estimated as the Lord Mayorship of Belfast is at present the most prestigious elective office in Northern Ireland and it has been regarded up to now as one of the major symbols of Unionist supremacy - but I am glad to say - not any more.

"A number of other significant facts also emerge when one studies the Belfast results in more detail and these should be of great interest to the keen student of political science. In winning thirteen seats we were the only party to have secured representation in each of the eight electoral wards of the city. In the capital of any other country this would have been a meaningless statistic but not so in Belfast. In providing the battleground for the worst excesses of the violence, Belfast has been racked with division and the subsequent polarisation of the city into Protestant and Catholic ghettos reflects the deep divisions in the community at large which is the crux of our problems. Some of these areas are exclusively working class Protestant, others exclusively working class Catholic while the remainder vary in both social class and religious mix. When one understands this point the measure of our achievement can be put in its proper political perspective. It provides indisputable politically scientific evidence of how the party appeal has transcended not only religious barriers but class barriers as well. Furthermore in the overwhelmingly Protestant East Belfast one of our successful councillors was a Catholic while in the overwhelmingly Catholic Lower Falls a Protestant Alliance Councillor was elected. This clearly shows that Alliance candidates are acceptable to both sections of our divided community irrespective of what their own religious beliefs may be. The Belfast situation provides in a stark way a useful illustration of the party's achievements in its short existence. However, you would probably like to know more about the nature of our vote throughout Northern Ireland and what are the characteristics of the typical Alliance voter.

PROFILE OF THE ALLIANCE VOTER

"The Alliance vote is to a large extent concentrated in the East of the Province particularly in the urbanised areas. The same feature is constant in the West although our vote is significantly smaller as our highest polls are recorded in the largish towns. There are probably a number of reasons for this.

"Firstly rural populations are traditionally more conservative and therefore more resistant to change.

"Secondly the situation in the West of the province is so evenly balanced between the two tribal camps that each is going for victory over the other.

"A third possible explanation is that as the East has experienced the major brunt of the violence, death and destruction and therefore having seen at first hand the horrific consequences of sectarian divisions it is more susceptible to policies of reconciliation. On the other hand people in the West may feel that they can afford the luxury of division as this division has not manifested itself in its worst possible form. This, as you can appreciate, is a very hypothetical argument with little to commend it except that there does seem to be a high correlation between areas of high incidences of violence and Alliance strength. A possible explanation for this could be that it is inevitable that the most densely populated areas would experience the worst of the violence and that as Alliance support is to be found in these areas the relationship is purely coincidental. It is an interesting thought nonetheless.

"One question which is probably of great interest to you is how the Alliance vote breaks down into Protestant and Catholic votes respectively. Surprisingly enough it corresponds very much to the actual religious breakdown of the community itself. There are two independent pieces of academic research which have concluded this.

"Mr Brian Wilson a postgraduate student of Professor Richard Rose in a MSc dissertation on the Alliance Party concluded from a survey of the Alliance Party candidates in the Local Government election of 1973 (248 in all) that the religious composition of the Alliance Party was:-

|                                                 |     |                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------|
| Roman Catholic                                  | 33% | compared to the 1971 N Ireland Census (31%) |
| Presbyterian                                    | 20% | compared to the Census figure of 27%        |
| Church of Ireland                               | 24% | as against 22% in the Census return         |
| Other Protestant eg Methodists                  | 12% | compared to 11%                             |
| and either refused or gave no religious details | 11% | against 9% in the Census figures            |

"A poll on 1277 electors carried out by Queen's University lecturer Mr E Moxon-Browne in Autumn 1973 came to remarkably similar conclusions. It assessed the religious breakdown as follows:-

|                   |     |
|-------------------|-----|
| Roman Catholic    | 33% |
| Presbyterian      | 20% |
| Church of Ireland | 24% |
| Methodist         | 7%  |
| Others            | 16% |

The figures are almost identical to those of Wilson and the 1971 Census and I believe that they speak for themselves.



"Regarding the class nature of our Party and support for it both Messrs Wilson and Moxon-Browne assessed the subjective social class breakdown as 66% middle-class, 32% working class, and 2% do not classify themselves. I should add that the stereo-typed middle-class Alliance person tends to be of the progressive social conscience type rather than of the Conservative middle-class. We also expect to poll infinitely higher in working class areas at the next election than we have done up to now.

"Wilson in his dissertation also examined ideological tendencies within the party. His method of doing this was to ask the people whom he sampled how they would vote in a British General Election involving the three major British Parties. 36% indicated preference for the Liberal Party, 32% for the Conservatives and 30% for the Labour Party. Although at first hand these figures would seem to indicate marked ideological divisions within the party it was not borne out by Mr Wilson's further investigation. In the same questionnaire seven questions covering separate issues were asked to test attitudes and to try and measure the diversity or cohesiveness of party opinion. At the end of his findings he concluded that the Party were at least equally as cohesive as the Labour and Conservative Parties as the correlation in answers was much the same as for members of those respective parties when asked similar questions. The fact that there is a marked difference in their preference for different British Parties yet considerable cohesion on the answers to the seven issues is not as contradictory and illogical as it may seem. The present three party system at Westminster is archaic and would have probably fragmented had it not been for the continued use of the 'first past the post' voting system. There is considerable overlap in ideological tendencies between members and supporters of the three parties.

"Indeed it is not unusual to discover that members of theoretically opposing ideological parties have a greater degree of unity in political attitudes than they would have with fellow members of their own respective parties.

#### CONCLUSION

"In the first part of my talk I attempted to provide you with a brief history of the founding of the Party, its basic political philosophy and its subsequent electoral performance. Those who were responsible for its formation could not have chosen a worse time for such a bold venture. They preached community reconciliation at a time when evil men and the path of history seemed determined to widen the gulf between those whom they were trying to reconcile. Yet miraculously we survived, and against all odds emerged from political obscurity as a major political force.

"In the second half I endeavoured to provide a profile of the Alliance voter. From the facts given you can see there is no Alliance stereo-type. Alliance voters can and do differ in terms of religion and ideological tendencies. While there may be normal differences on some issues of detailed policy one thing unites them above all else - and that is the firm belief that the only way forward for Northern Ireland lies in true partnership between Catholic and Protestant. This principle is sacrosanct and all matters of policy will be determined to that end and everything else will be sacrificed in order to achieve that.

"But what of the future, I look forward to the future with more than a fair degree of optimism. I have no doubt that Alliance will continue to make electoral advances. A number of factors are working in our favour.

"Firstly, as the security situation continues to improve and gradually life returns to a degree of normality the tribal politicians are losing their stranglehold on their traditional monolithic bases. They are finding it increasingly difficult to whip up emotions and exploit genuine fears and feelings of insecurity. Instead peoples minds are turning towards peace and reconciliation.

"Secondly, the Alliance Party is a Party of social concern. Our representatives have a record second to none in their service to people. While tribal politicians have chanted the divisive slogans, beat the war drums and waved the political flags in order to perpetuate their own political survival, Alliance representatives have quietly worked away to change the quality of life in the society in which we live. Our approach of 'caring politics' is not going unnoticed by the electorate.

"But most importantly of all, there is a growing groundswell of support in favour of our basic philosophy. More and more people are now beginning to believe that co-operation not conflict, reconciliation not division, peace not violence holds the key to our future.

"Can I end on two pieces of solid evidence. Within the last six weeks there have been two local Council by-elections. One in Derry and one on the outskirts of Belfast. They were contested by Alliance, Official Unionist, D.U.P. and S.D.L.P. In both elections, Alliance topped the poll. In Derry our share of the vote rose from 19% in 1977 to 31% - an increase of 12%, and in Belfast from 30% to 38% - an increase of 8%. This suggests a further swing to Alliance right across the province, from Belfast in the East to Derry in the West. That swing may well elect at least one Alliance M.P. to Westminster in the General Election next month.

"Hopefully at long last the people of Northern Ireland irrespective of religion, class or creed are realising that we have far more in common than that which divides us. Herein lies the key to our problem."

#### Postscript

In the Westminster election that followed one month later Oliver Napier the Alliance Party leader came within 900 votes of winning the East Belfast seat which would have been a major electoral shock.

The total party vote in the election was 22,892 compared to 20,011 in the 1977 local government election and 44,644 in the 1974 October Westminster elections.



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# The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland

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## Northern Ireland - A case for a different approach on public expenditure

### INTRODUCTION

The Northern Ireland economy is in a state of crisis. Traditional industries which have formed the basis of our economy in the past are in rapid decline while the newer industries are in serious difficulties because of the strength of sterling abroad. We cannot generate investment from internal sources and we have all the disadvantages associated with being a geographically remote region which additionally has no sources of indigenous energy. Against such a background the national debate about continued cutbacks in public expenditure assumes an even greater significance. In our discussions with the Secretary of State in the "parallel talks" on the economy in April of last year, we warned that the effect of reducing public expenditure in Northern Ireland would inevitably accelerate our economic malaise. We expressed concern that the then total of 68,000 unemployed could well reach 100,000 if current economic policies were not reversed. Some eight months later we are only 6,000 short of seeing that prophecy fulfilled.

The Alliance Party, even at this late stage makes a special plea for a more flexible approach in Northern Ireland in relation to public expenditure because of our special circumstances and the rather different nature of our economy compared to that of the rest of the United Kingdom.

### A WEAKER ECONOMY:

The Government may well be able to argue regarding the U.K. economy as a whole that cutbacks in public expenditure will be conducive to the eventual growth of the economy. There could well be validity in the view that the enduring of short term hardships will lead to greater benefits in the long term but the problem for Northern Ireland is much more fundamental - can the Northern Ireland economy survive the interim

period? What areas of our economy will survive into the longer term in a healthy enough state in which it can benefit from the upturn in the national economy?

This problem was highlighted even as far back as 1976 when George Quigley the present Northern Ireland Permanent Secretary for Finance in his report entitled "Economic and Industrial Strategy for Northern Ireland" said -

*"Where a region has cyclical unemployment coupled with persistent structural problems, severe cuts may worsen its medium and long term position relative to other regions in a way which makes the prospect of ultimate equalisation increasingly remote. Moreover since the resilience of the more prosperous areas is inevitably superior, the gap between richer and poorer is likely to increase".*

#### PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT:

In 1979 the Service Industry accounted for 61% of our total workforce. Two-thirds of these belong to the public sector. The Construction Industry is another industry which is heavily dependent on public expenditure and cutbacks in capital programmes in Housing, School Building and Health, Roads etc., has brought many parts of this industry to the point of virtual collapse.

Changes in the pattern of public spending therefore in Northern Ireland have much more far reaching implications for the level of unemployment than would have on the mainland. One is also led to ask the question what is the economic saving when one considers that the Government has to pay social security benefit to those who are the new recruits to the dole queue. Even if there was a marginal saving, which is doubtful anyway, would the social arguments not tip the scales in favour of maintaining employment?

#### PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND SERVICES:

When the Alliance Party argues for a more flexible approach to cutbacks we are not asking for preferential treatment for Northern Ireland. In fact what we are asking for is equality of citizenship with our fellow citizens throughout the rest of the United Kingdom. An examination of a number of comparable statistics illustrates the reason why more people in Northern Ireland are living in situations of multi-deprivation which requires substantial government expenditure if these are to be alleviated.

(a) Average expenditure per household on food:

The Northern Ireland household will have to spend £21.56 for their weekly shopping basket whereas their U.K. counterpart will only spend £19.31. The Northern Ireland figure is therefore 11.7% higher than the national average.

(b) Average weekly expenditure for fuel, light and power:

In Northern Ireland this amounts to £7.20 per week compared to £4.76 throughout the U.K. as a whole.

This constitutes a figure of 51.3% above the national average.

(c) Average Household Income:

The average income here in Northern Ireland is £87.41 per week compared to the U.K. average of £106.13.

Therefore Northern Ireland citizens have to meet infinitely higher costs for essential commodities on an income which is only 82% of the national average.

(d) Unemployment in Northern Ireland is 16.3% while the national figure is 9.3%. Almost twice as many people are therefore in receipt of unemployment benefit rather than a wage packet.

(e) Housing:

There are 3½ times as many statutorily unfit homes in Northern Ireland compared to the rest of the United Kingdom. The figure for Northern Ireland is 14% while the national figure is around 4%.

Furthermore, Belfast has 411% more over crowding problems than the average of Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Sheffield and Greater London taken together

(f) In Northern Ireland 8.4% of our population are in receipt of supplementary benefit compared to a national average of 5.7%

The list illustrating the disparity in living conditions between the average citizen in Northern Ireland and his counterpart in another part of the U.K. is a lengthy one and the problem for our people is compounded further as a result of our security problems and continued political instability.

We would therefore urge Her Majesty's Government to provide sufficient capital expenditure to reduce the anomalies.

SPECIAL PROJECTS REQUIRING COMMITMENTS TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE:

Given the state of our economy and the peculiar problems facing the people of Northern Ireland we believe the following projects merit special government consideration.

(a) E.E.C. Aid for Belfast:

The opportunity of receiving substantial additional aid from the E.E.C. should not be lost because of unwillingness on the part of Government to match E.E.C. money.

(b) Gas Pipeline:

We are convinced that it would cost infinitely more to run down the Gas Industry in Northern Ireland. Not only would the building of the pipeline preserve existing jobs but would also create new jobs.

(c) Kilroot Phase 2 Project:

This project is also crucial for resolving our longterm energy problems and has enormous implications for future industrial development. A substantial number of jobs are also dependent upon proceeding with this project.

(d) Enterprise Ulster and other Job Creation projects:

This body was set up not only to provide employment but to provide a rehabilitation programme for the longterm unemployed. In that it has been outstandingly successful and it is tragic that it is facing serious difficulties at the moment because of lack of adequate finance.

Projects for job creation in general should be given priority. Despite earlier Government statements on this matter there is no evidence that sufficient funds have been made available to bring about the necessary growth in this field.

(e) Housing:

The terrible housing conditions in the province speak for themselves. With three and a half times as many statutorily unfit homes as the national average, urgent cash is required.

(f) Agriculture:

The Agriculture Industry is the biggest single employer in Northern Ireland. Over 10% of the total Northern Ireland workforce is employed directly on farms with an additional 4% indirectly dependant on the industry.

Our agriculture situation is fundamentally different from that of Great Britain and we would urge Government to give careful consideration to the case being presently made by the Ulster Farmers Union.

In conclusion, we would reiterate our view that the special problems of Northern Ireland deserve a much more sympathetic approach in relation to public expenditure.

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NIOM (81) 1

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ON  
FRIDAY 16 JANUARY 1981

## Present:

|                |             |
|----------------|-------------|
| Mr Marshall    | Chairman    |
| Mr Burns       | NIO         |
| Miss Kelley    |             |
| Mr Moriarty    |             |
| Mr Buxton      |             |
| Mr Corbett     |             |
| Mr Spence      |             |
| Mr Blackwell   |             |
| Mr Bridges     |             |
| Col Dutton     |             |
| Mr Benger      |             |
| Mr Bates       |             |
| Mr Stephens    | MOD         |
| Mr Farthing    |             |
| Col Morton     |             |
| Lt Col Bateman |             |
| Mr Twiss       |             |
| Mr Thomas      | FCO         |
| Mr Heaton      | Home Office |

*NRAA*  
*23/*

Security

1. Mr Burns, reviewing 1980, said that it had been a good year, with every important indicator showing a decline in terrorist activities. (Non-terrorist crimes had also shown a decline, though the figure was still higher than in 1978.) A marked drop in the violence in the last few months could be attributed at least in part to PIRA's strategy for supporting the hunger strike. At present, PIRA seemed undecided on strategy, but it was to be expected that they would try to resume violence on the scale of early 1980. INLA violence persisted, though on a small scale commensurate with their resources; Loyalist violence was largely reactive in nature.



2. Mr Stephens enquired whether the policy of tackling crime as a whole, as opposed to treating terrorism as an isolated phenomenon, had had any effect on the illegal or quasi-legal activities on the fringes of terrorism. Mr Burns reported some progress here, but pointed out that these activities appeared to contribute less to terrorist funds than had previously been supposed.
  
3. As regards conditions in Great Britain, Mr Heaton reported that although Gerard Tuite was now thought to be back in the Republic, he could well have had some connection with the recent explosions in England. An Active Service Unit was probably still at large in Great Britain, and capable of causing further damage.
  
4. Mr Burns also reported briefly on the shooting of Bernadette McAliskey and her husband, and the murder of a UDR Company Commander, earlier that day.

#### Maze Prison

5. The Chairman reminded the meeting that the hunger strike had ended with no concessions on the Government side in response to the demand for political status (or privileges which would amount in effect to political status). The seven strikers were recovering in the prison hospital.
  
6. Forty of the "dirty protesters" had stopped their protest and become fully conforming prisoners since the end of the hunger strike. A further 96 had given up the dirty protest though they were still "on the blanket". They had been told that civilian-type prison issue clothing was available to them but none of the 96 had yet taken advantage of this. The problem to be faced was whether to allow

E.R.

them their own clothing - as a privilege, this would not normally be allowed to prisoners who were not conforming with prison rules. It was clear that the prisoners were keen to end their protest but also to manoeuvre themselves into a position in which they could claim to have won the substance of their demands.

Fermanagh Area Review

7. Col Dutton reported that this had been completed on 31 October and would be presented to SPM in January. Its conclusions were:

- (i) that the threat was primarily cross-border;
- (ii) that there were therefore major limitations on what could be achieved;
- (iii) that great importance attached to security co-operation with the South;
- (iv) that the current level and method of security was justified more on political than on military grounds.

8. Given the possibility of an improvement in areas where the security situation was at present bad, the Planning Staff were currently looking at areas without extreme security problems. In the next few weeks, they would review the work already done and summarise the conclusions; they might be able to recommend that security co-ordination was no longer so necessary.

Prime Minister's Dublin Visit

9. Mr Moriarty reported that little had been said on security - the main theme had been the Irish desire to establish some sort of debate on relations with Northern Ireland, and this had resulted in the

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● Commitment to a series of joint studies. The outcome suited the UK in that :

- (i) it bound the Irish more firmly into a joint approach on security;
- (ii) it showed the Unionists that they could not expect to exercise a veto on policy developments;
- (iii) any widening of the discussion was to be welcomed given the fruitlessness of discussions held to date within Northern Ireland.

10. Work on the studies was being co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office. The Ministry of Defence were to receive papers, and attend the meetings as necessary. From the UK viewpoint, the security study should be approached in a low key manner. Cabinet Office had suggested that it should be put in the context of defence generally.

Prison Officers Association Dispute

11. Mr Buxton reported that the dispute was coming to an end. Foyle Prison was being closed that day, although the physical security measures were not being dismantled. Mr Heaton said that the dispute might resume: a wide spread revolt against the decision of the poll's national executive was expected in Great Britain.

Water Dispute

12. The Chairman said that if supervisory grades were prepared to co-operate, the strike could be contained for some weeks; if there were no such co-operation, the strike could not be contained. Northern Ireland would be in the same position as the rest of the UK in these circumstances, and the responsibility for handling the matter would rest with the Civil Contingencies Unit.

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Political Situation

13. The Chairman reminded the meeting that the Prime Minister had last November in the Debate on the Address indicated the the Secretary of State would make a statement on ways of making the administration of Northern Ireland more responsive to local needs "in due course". In view of the failure of last year's political initiative, there was little for the Government to say at present and there was in any event no pressure for a statement from the Northern Ireland political parties (partly because of their increasing pre-occupation with the local council elections to be held in May).

Inauguration of President Reagan

14. In response to a question from Mr Stephens, the Chairman said that the UK expected the new US Administration to be less interested than its predecessor in the Northern Ireland issue. The British Embassy in Washington had the necessary briefing, but were not actively pressing HMG's views on the new administration. Mr Moriarty noted that the Prime Minister was to visit the United States in February, and consideration would have to be given to briefing material.

Employment

16. Miss Kelley reported that unemployment had exceeded 95,000 and that 100,000 was likely to be exceeded before long.

SIL Division  
23 January 1981

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

15 January 1981

Miss Caroline Stephens  
10 Downing Street  
London  
SW1

Dear Caroline

Thank you for your letter of 30 December.

... As arranged, I now enclose a briefing for the meeting between the Prime Minister and members of the Alliance Party which will take place tomorrow at 10.15 am.

Yours sincerely  
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH ALLIANCE: FRIDAY 16 JANUARY 1981

Background to Meeting

The initial suggestion from Mr Oliver Napier, Leader of Alliance, for a meeting with the Prime Minister came some time before the 1979 General Election. It was renewed recently at a time when all the Northern Ireland parties are beginning to look to the May local elections which will provide up-to-date evidence of their relative strengths. Alliance, without either a Westminster or a European MP, find it more difficult than other rivals to maintain their position as a political strength to be reckoned with in Northern Ireland. A meeting with the Prime Minister will be helpful to them on that account.

Alliance have indicated that they hope to raise 4 matters at the meeting:

1. The possibility of devolution; -
2. the economy, and particularly the difficulties Northern Ireland will face in joining in the recovery when the recession ends; -
3. security (including H Blocks);
4. Anglo/Irish relations.

Notes on these matters, and personality notes on the three Alliance members expected to attend the meeting, are attached.

Electoral Support

Alliance is the only Northern Ireland party to attract significant support from both sides of the communal divide. Founded in 1970, it draws its main strength from Belfast and the surrounding areas, particularly among middle class voters. It has failed to gain much working class support in either community or to establish itself in the West of the Province.

In elections since 1974 it has generally received 12 to 15% of the provincial vote. In the 1979 General Election Oliver Napier came within 900 votes of beating Peter Robinson in East Belfast. But in the subsequent European Election he made a dismal showing and only took 6.8% of the Province wide vote. The May local elections are thus particularly important to Alliance who hope that they will show that the European result was untypical. A recent opinion poll gave Alliance a surprisingly high 19% of Province wide support.

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Party Policy

In their policies as well as their electoral support Alliance bridge the gap between the 2 major power blocks in Northern Ireland. They support the union with Great Britain and favour the restoration of devolved government to Northern Ireland. But they are as vigorous as the SDLP in demanding a system of government that allows the participation of representatives of the minority as well as the majority community. Alliance also strongly oppose the establishment of local government on the British model in Northern Ireland.

As one of the 4 major parties in the Province, Alliance participated in last year's Political Conference where they consistently took a constructive and (in Northern Ireland terms) moderate line in political discussion. Although on occasions less than wholly realistic about the options open to HMG for political advance Alliance are in general a helpful influence in Northern Ireland politics. They accept HMG's goodwill and sincerity in seeking a political settlement, appreciating the difficulties that the irreconcilable demands of the Unionists and the SDLP present, and acknowledge that any settlement that is not acceptable to both communities would be fatally unstable. They also recognise the value of a close relationship with Dublin; they generally take a reasonable line on security; and they sought to be as helpful as possible during the hunger strike.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTPoints to Make

1. Failure of the parties to reach agreement means that there is not at present sufficient basis for an early move on devolution. Direct rule therefore has to continue.
2. But the search for agreement will not be abandoned. The Government will examine all available ways of encouraging the parties to reach agreement on a form of local administration that would be acceptable to both communities.
3. The principles of acceptability and consent are central to the Government's strategy and no solution will be imposed against either community's wishes. We recognise that that rules out local government reform on the British pattern.
4. The possibility of a "progressive" approach to devolution through the election of an advisory/consultative assembly is one of a number of approaches that are being examined at present.

Background Note

1. Alliance have consistently favoured devolution for Northern Ireland and will be anxious to impress on the Prime Minister the importance of continuing efforts to restore devolved government. When they last met the Secretary of State on 16 December they asked if HMG remained committed to the return of devolution and enquired whether any move towards a devolved assembly would be made in the next twelve months. The Secretary of State confirmed the commitment in Cmnd 7950 to restore devolved government if an agreed system could be found, but gave no commitment on timing.
2. During the talks following publication of Cmnd 7950 last July, Alliance argued strongly in favour of a system of devolved government allowing minority representatives to participate in the Executive. They believe this to be essential if government is to be made acceptable to the minority community at large. At one point Alliance suggested that HMG should impose such a system despite Unionist opposition - in the hope that once imposed, it would oblige those opposed to it to operate it. Their views seem, however, to have moderated more recently. They may favour the election of an Assembly with the power to take on clearly defined powers once the Assembly members agree on how they should be exercised. But above all they will be anxious to receive an assurance from the Prime Minister that the Government is still interested in making political progress, in moving away from direct rule by creating a local political forum, and in making early efforts to do so.



## ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. The Alliance Party is believed to be concerned that the lead time for an economic recovery in Northern Ireland is longer than that in Great Britain. Examination of the major economic indicators, output (index of industrial production) employment and unemployment, of recent years suggests that Northern Ireland's recovery from any period of economic recession will be weaker than Great Britain's because of its smaller industrial base. For example, manufacturing output rose by 4% in NI between 1975 and 1979 compared with over 5% in the UK as a whole.
  
2. The incidence of the present recession on Northern Ireland appears to have come at the same time as in Great Britain: industrial output began to fall in mid 1979 and unemployment, which had been falling in Great Britain and remaining static in Northern Ireland, began to accelerate upwards in December 1979. The fall in output has, however, been sharper in Northern Ireland with manufacturing output in the three months ending October 1980 13.2% down on the same period in 1979 compared with a 9.3% fall in the UK as a whole.
  
3. Irrespective of the lead time, the economic situation in Northern Ireland is gloomy. Unemployment has risen to 16.3% and this conceals pockets of very high unemployment in some areas, such as Strabane and West Belfast. School leavers are badly affected with 6,735 unemployed (2,000 more than usual for the time of year). With the Government's overall economic policy the emphasis has been placed on the stimulation of new activities to enable Northern Ireland to respond more flexibly in future. The main thrust of public expenditure is towards the maintenance of trade, industry, employment and energy programmes with some cutbacks in the planned expenditure on health, social services, education, housing and environmental matters. The Department of Commerce maintained 23,000 jobs in 1979/80 through the provision of selective financial assistance to companies facing short-term difficulties. Moreover,

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Northern Ireland retains its status as the area offering the highest industrial incentives in the UK; some 7,200 jobs were promoted in 1980 compared with some 6,500 in 1979.

Line to Take

I am deeply concerned about the high level of unemployment in Northern Ireland which is caused by the effects of the recession added to an already substantially higher rate of unemployment than elsewhere in the UK.

I believe that for Northern Ireland, as for the rest of the UK, the real solution lies in the determined pursuit of the Government's economic and financial policies which will provide the sound industrial base for the economy of Northern Ireland which is the key to a permanent lowering of the unemployment figures. Even in the difficult conditions of 1980 over 7,200 new private sector jobs were promoted with Government assistance.

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POINTS TO MAKE

A. SECURITY: GENERAL

I remain determined that normal policing will be extended throughout Northern Ireland and that the elimination of terrorist activities will continue. Those who commit acts of terrorism will be brought to justice before the courts. I am grateful for your public support of this policy and for your encouraging those whom you represent to support the RUC and the Army. Success will come only gradually, by dint of persistent work. But we will not be deflected from our objectives by terrorism.

B. DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY

The Army will continue to support the RUC so long as they require military assistance. The Chief Constable and the GOC determine the precise pattern of security force operations and deployment. Both are satisfied that there are sufficient troops in the Province to meet the RUC's requirements for military support, including the border areas.

The deployment of the UDR is essentially a matter for the FOC. But he is fully aware that their skills and training differ from those of the Regular Army and that they still arouse political sensitivities in certain parts of Northern Ireland. There is no simple policy of replacing the Regular Army by the UDR regardless of these factors.

C. PROSCRIPTION OF THE UDA

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland keeps a careful watch on the status of various organisations, including the UDA. He is prepared to proscribe any organisation where proscription would be likely to lead to a reduction in violence, or otherwise help the work of the police. But the most important thing is that any member of any organisation, whether proscribed or not, who commits a terrorist act is liable to prosecution according to the law and faces severe penalties.

Background

A. SECURITY: GENERAL

Alliance are unlikely to produce new proposals on security or criticisms of HMG's policy. In general they support the Government's approach.

Since the ending of the hunger strike PIRA have kept very quiet. There has, however, been a certain amount of violence from other quarters. A "loyalist" group claimed responsibility for the murder of one prison officer and the attempted murder of another on 30 December. Responsibility for the murder of a member of the TAVR in Armagh on 28 December was claimed

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by INLA, who have also said they were responsible for an attack on an RUC patrol in Belfast on 9 January, in which a policeman was seriously injured. It is difficult to forecast developments on the security front, not least because there is evident uncertainty among PIRA themselves about the way ahead. But we must assume that they will recommence attacks in the fairly near future even if the protest in the prisons is gradually brought to an end.

B. DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY, INCLUDING THE UDR

Alliance, impressed by improvements in the RUC's strength, professional ability and growing acceptability among Catholics, are firm advocates of the Army's role being clearly confined to supporting the civil power when and where this remains necessary. They have welcomed the reduction in recent months of the Army's activities in some urban areas, but they continue to see a need, as we do, for substantial numbers of troops in the border regions. They are also keen that the UDR, whose sectarian image remains, should continue to be kept away from the Catholic areas of Belfast.

C. PROSCRIPTION OF THE UDA

In the light of an increase in sectarian attacks in Belfast and belligerent statements from the UDA at the beginning of the hunger strike, Alliance wrote to the Secretary of State on 5 November saying that, unless he proscribed the UDA, they would petition the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that non-proscription amounted to an unfair and partial application of the law. The Secretary of State replied to the effect that the status of the UDA continued to be kept under review. It remains our view, and that of the security forces, that proscription of the UDA at the present time would do more harm than good.

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THE PROTESTS AT MAZE AND ARMAGH PRISONS

Line to Take

1. There have been no deals with the protesting prisoners. The full prison regime in Northern Ireland - which in some respects is in advance of that in Great Britain - can in the nature of things apply only to those prisoners who conform with prison rules.
2. The Government has made it perfectly plain that it will not treat sentenced prisoners differently according to the alleged motives for their crimes, and it cannot and will not abandon its responsibilities by introducing a regime which would either (i) concede the substance of the demands for political status or (ii) hand over effective control of the day-to-day running of the prison to the prisoners.

Background

The hunger strikes at Maze and Armagh ended on 18 and 19 December. Since then 40 prisoners have abandoned the protest at Maze and agreed to conform with prison rules. All these prisoners have been moved to clean, furnished cells, have been given the new prison - issue civilian clothing and have been allowed to send for their own leisure clothes to wear outside working hours during the week and at week-ends. The normal privileges in regard to association, visits, letters and parcels have been restored to them.

All these facilities are available to the remaining prisoners taking part in the protest (429 at Maze on 13 January). It is encouraging that a group of protesters moved to clean cells - some of them equipped with furniture and bedding - on Monday 12 January did not damage or foul them; in the light of this response the Governor moved furniture and bedding into the remaining clean and unfurnished cells the following morning.

The Government intend to repeat this move and hope that all protesting prisoners will, through following this step by step approach, be encouraged to come off the protest altogether, agreed to conform with prison rules, and avail themselves of all that is on offer to conforming prisoners - as made clear in recent statements by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

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ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

Points to Make

1. The primary objective of the strategy laid out in Dublin on 8 December is peace, reconciliation and stability. Joint studies and any proposals that may emerge fall within that aim.
2. These plans are intended to bring the UK and the Republic closer together. Accordingly, they include Northern Ireland, and we intend that they should contribute to Northern Ireland's well-being and stability. But they are not focused on Northern Ireland: it is through its membership of the UK that Northern Ireland is involved.
3. The joint studies will include examination of possible new institutional, not constitutional, structures designed to facilitate co-operation at all levels, official, Ministerial, perhaps Parliamentary.
4. We accept that the Dublin Government watches developments in Northern Ireland with special interest, but decisions on Northern Ireland's future are for the people of Northern Ireland and the UK Parliament.

Background Note

Alliance attach importance to reassurances that the Government of the Republic will not be given a role in determining the political and constitutional future of Northern Ireland. Mr Napier expressed concern on this point when Alliance met the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 16 December.

Following the Dublin meeting on 8 December, the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr Lenihan, suggested that discussion of constitutional changes for Northern Ireland was now "on the table". This interpretation was quickly repudiated in a statement from No.10 on 12 December which said:-

"The Dublin communiqué makes it clear, and the Prime Minister has repeated since, that the subject of joint Anglo-Irish discussions will be possible institutional structures not constitutional structures. The Prime Minister's letter of 10 December to Dr Paisley said Northern Ireland is part of

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the United Kingdom and will remain so unless its people and the Westminster Parliament decide otherwise."

It seems that the Irish Government have taken the point: in a statement on 13 December Mr Lenihan said that there was no question of a constitutional investigation or examination, and that the examination would be of institutional structures only.

In addition to possible new institutional structures, the joint studies will include examination of citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding generally. Arrangements for the conduct of the joint studies are still at an early stage.

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| Extract/Item details:<br><br><i>Personality Notes enclosed with<br/>letter from Hopkins to Stephens<br/>dated 15 January 1981</i> |                                       |
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mb

BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION.

1. NELIGAN (DFA) ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON AND RAISED THE REPORTS PUBLISHED TODAY, 9 JANUARY BY THE TIMES, THE FINANCIAL TIMES AND THE GUARDIAN ON THIS SUBJECT. THE FACT THAT ALL THREE HAD APPEARED SIMULTANEOUSLY SEEMED, HE SAID, TO INDICATE A COMMON SOURCE.

2. NELIGAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE TAOISEACH WAS MUCH EXERCISED ABOUT THESE REPORTS. THE DETAILS OF SECURITY COOPERATION MENTIONED IN THEM WERE HIGHLY EMBARRASSING TO THE IRISH AUTHORITIES. THE TAOISEACH'S OWN LINE ON SUCH MATTERS, AS HE KNEW FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, WAS TO EMPHASISE TO THE SECURITY FORCES THAT THEY MUST GET ON WITH THE JOB, QUOTE BUT NO SINGING AND DANCING UNQUOTE. THE DFA EXPECTED TO RECEIVE QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS HERE ABOUT THESE REPORTS: IT WAS THEIR PRESENT INTENTION TO STICK TO THE STANDARD LINE THAT IT WAS NOT CUSTOMARY TO COMMENT ON SUCH SECURITY MATTERS, THE DETAILS OF WHICH

HERE ABOUT THESE REPORTS. IT WAS THEIR PRESENT INTENTION  
TO STICK TO THE STANDARD LINE THAT IT WAS NOT CUSTOMARY TO  
COMMENT ON SUCH SECURITY MATTERS, THE DETAILS OF WHICH  
COULD NOT BE REVEALED. NELIGAN POINTED OUT THAT THE REPORTS  
WERE NOT ENTIRELY ACCURATE, E.G. THE IMPLICATION IN THE TIMES THAT  
DIRECT ARMY-GARDA COMMUNICATIONS HAD BECOME STANDARD PRACTICE, AND  
THAT THE RECENT INCREASE IN ARMS FINDS BY THE GARDA HAD BEEN  
A RESULT OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION.

3. I TOLD NELIGAN THAT I COULD NOT USEFULLY COMMENT ON THE  
ORIGIN OF THESE REPORTS, WHICH ALL HAD A BELFAST DATELINE, BUT  
THAT I WOULD OF COURSE DRAW THE ATTENTION OF MY AUTHORITIES TO  
WHAT HE HAD SAID.

4. GIVEN THE GENUINE SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY COOPERATION FOR THE  
TAOISEACH, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW HOW I SHOULD REPLY TO THE  
DFA ON THE ORIGIN OF THESE PRESS REPORTS AND WHETHER THEY DID RESULT  
FROM ANY FORM OF OFFICIAL BRIEFING.

STAPLES

NNNNN

SENT/RECD AT 09:2015Z CB/JW

Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP, at the  
Brookeborough Hall, Belfast 5, at 7.45 pm, Thursday  
8th January 1981

① Mr. J. Enoch Powell  
see note -  
② CF.  
MW  
Dr.

The Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, James Molyneaux, is accustomed to declare that, however many other parties may sport the word "unionist" in their title, this Party is the one and only party of the Union in reality. For all that great majority in Ulster whose political will is to preserve and strengthen the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland it is essential to understand that the statement is sober and demonstrable fact and that every vote cast for another party, be it a direct vote or a preference, however low, is a vote given against the Union. One often hears people complaining, though less in recent days than formerly, that the voice and representation of unionism are divided. They are mistaken. It is the opposition to the Union that is divided, divided between open opponents on the one hand - SDLP, Republican Clubs and Sinn Fein - and covert opponents on the other, who masquerade under unionist names while promoting policies and following courses calculated to destroy the Union.

The Union does not consist in common allegiance to the person of the monarch. That allegiance is shared by the Old Commonwealth countries and by the dependencies. Indeed, in the attenuated form of "recognition" of the Crown, it is shared by all the New Commonwealth countries too. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - like the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland before it, and of Great Britain itself earlier still - is a parliamentary union: its sovereign, supreme and unique to itself, is the Crown in Parliament, and the loyalty and duty of all its citizens is to the Crown in Parliament. To uphold the Union is to uphold the integral unity of a single state including Ulster under the Crown in the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

There is much idle chatter - mostly from sources hostile to the

Union itself - about a "guarantee" of membership of the Union, which is supposed to have been given to the people of this province by some section in an Act of Parliament. That notion is not only false but positively harmful. The true guarantee of Ulster as an integral part of the United Kingdom is the same as the guarantee of Wales or Kent - namely, that they are represented in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. That guarantee, which had been weakened and qualified by the Irish Home Rule constitution of 1920, has been restored to its pristine vigour by the virtually unanimous decision of Parliament, now in course of being implemented, that this province shall be represented fairly and fully in the House of Commons. The true guarantee for the future that Ulster shall not cease to be an integral part of the United Kingdom consists not in a piece of paper or a declaration or a clause in a Bill - nor in a hundred pieces of paper, declarations or clauses - but in the fact that the House of Commons would have to reject a part of itself, a thing impossible for it so long as that part, like all the rest, is sent to Parliament by electors whose doing so declares their desire and determination to remain faithful subjects of the Crown in Parliament. It is a guarantee, therefore, which only the people of this province themselves can annul; and not surprisingly, the enemies of the Union, open or covert, are busy all the time trying to persuade them to do just that.

The most open enemies are those least to be feared. The IRA set out to terrorise the people of Ulster into renouncing the Union; but ten years and thousands of casualties later, the IRA and its brood know that they have failed. The people of this province are dedicated to the Union in larger numbers now, at the end of the campaign, than at the beginning, and only a liar would dare to pretend that those numbers are defined by religious affiliation. Equally little are people in the province likely to be inveigled by the arrogant pretensions of the Irish Republic, with Irish American and Continental sympathy, to claim the territory of Northern Ireland

as its own. The enemy who approaches you with his intentions written on a placard for all to read is the least redoubtable. The well-baited trap which led the Prime Minister into Mr Haughey's parlour and provided him with a propoganda coup for home consumption will prove to have been counter-productive because it irritated the government and alerted Parliament.

The real sources of danger to the Union lie elsewhere. They lie in whatever threatens to drive a wedge between the province and the rest of the Kingdom and to create and foment alienation between its people and Parliament.

It is no accident that the <sup>avowed</sup> enemies of the Union, inside and outside the province, are persistent advocates of setting up what are called "devolved institutions" in Ulster. The institutions which they wish to see are not those which in the rest of the Kingdom give the electorate locally a voice in the administration of their own area. The institutions which they wish to see would be pedicular to Northern Ireland and would mark it out as separate and different. They want institutions which would replace or compete with Parliament as the place where all the people of Ulster are represented and where all the laws of Ulster are made.

Alone of the political parties in the province, the Ulster Unionist Party has made it a condition precedent for considering any institutional or constitutional change that it must in no way weaken the Union. Devolution common to all parts of the United Kingdom would leave the position of Parliament and thus the integrity of the Union intact. But once a single part is given devolved government in isolation, its representation in Parliament is called in question. That is why Wales and Scotland refused by large majorities the assemblies and executives which were proposed for them, because they saw what the consequence to them would be. That is why the Portrush Declaration of April 1974, upon which the <sup>United</sup> /Ulster Unionist Coalition/agreed, declared that devolution was no good for Ulster

unless it was in a context of devolution all round.

There is another reason why the enemies of the Union have been strong advocates of devolution for Ulster by itself. They realise that it would bring with it power-sharing, that is, an artificial parity of power between the upholders and the opponents of the Union. So long as Parliament is equally responsible in all parts of the United Kingdom, political minorities in the individual parts are automatically protected. The fact of a permanent Labour majority in County Durham or a permanent Conservative majority in Sussex presents no problem. But if Parliament is to transfer its own authority to a replica of itself set up in a single part of the Kingdom, it will logically insist on provision for safeguarding any permanent minority. In Ulster terms that means giving to the opponents of the Union a veto over the upholders of the Union, implying thereby neutrality and indifference towards the very fact of the Union itself.

When the Ulster Unionist Party declined in principle to be associated with the constitutional conference of 1980 it had the best reasons for doing so, even though these only became evident to some observers later. It did so because it knew that either the conference would be futile or else it would end by creating in Ulster institutions which would alienate it from the rest of the United Kingdom and endow the opponents of the Union with a recognised and over-riding authority. That was a prospect which every other political party in the province was willing to accept. Luckily the danger was averted - not least because of the Ulster Unionist Party's firm stand - and the attempt proved to be abortive: the intended first step along the road to take Ulster out of the Union was aborted, and when the trap laid by Ulster's enemies was sprung it proved to be empty.

A leading role in the whole business had been played by the Democratic Unionist Party and its leader Ian Paisley, who was so deeply involved in the scheme as to assure the province and the world, in tones somewhat above a whisper, that the new show would have been

in operation by now - exactly what ministers and officials in the Northern Ireland Office were confidently counting upon. It was not the first of the Reverend Doctor's predictions to go amiss. It was also not the first, or the last, occasion on which he was to reveal himself as the most resourceful, inveterate and dangerous enemy of the Union.

In 1977 he had plunged the province into a political strike with the avowed intention of coercing the Crown in Parliament to legislate at the dictation of the fomentors of the strike, a strike quite different in character from that of 1974, which was directed not against Parliament but against the misjudgment of the then Secretary of State in establishing an executive that he believed would command adequate public support. The Paisley strike did gratuitous damage to the economy of the province; but that was by no means the worst of it. Had it succeeded, there is no doubt what the reaction of Parliament would have been. It would have concluded, and with justification, that Ulster had withdrawn its claim and cancelled its right to be part of the Union.

Fortunately, despite the misguided actions of certain elements opinion in the province repudiated the strike, and Parliament was able, on the initiative of the Ulster Unionist Party which had remained loyal and unmoved, to go on to re-affirm the Union by increasing Ulster's parliamentary representation to the full quota. Less fortunately for Ulster, Paisley broke his promise to leave public life if the strike failed; and when, in the next session, he dared to show his face again in the assembly which he had publicly described as a collection of "drunkards and lechers", he proceeded to abjure the Union in the most formal and comprehensive way possible, by informing the House of Commons that he owed it no obedience.

Having thus proved himself, by deed and word, the enemy of the Union, it was no cause for surprise when a year or two later he lent himself as a ready tool to the machinations of the Foreign Office and

the Northern Ireland Office in finding a way to prise Ulster out of the Union in defiance of the new Government's election pledges. As if even that was not nafficient, he proceeded to give further proof last month of his ambition to break the Union, in a manner to which the most dedicated or besotted of his followers could no longer close their eyes and ears, by demanding that the question of Ulster's claim and right to the Union should be decided by a single referendum, and by a referendum, what is more, from which Ulster itself was to be excluded. Thus at one stroke did he tear up and repudiate for his part the principle that Ulster remains part of the Union as long as the majority of its own people so wish. If possible, he made the damage greater still by demanding to decide the issue not by the will of Parliament, debating and deciding so grave a subject in due form, maturely and with full responsibility, but by a single snap vote of the electorate of Great Britain, which has been shown in the last five years to change its opinion from 2 to 1 in favour of belonging to the Common Market to 2 to 1 against belonging to it.

James Molyneaux remarked recently that Paisley's demand for a referendum was "designed to bring about an independent Ulster" and was "the most dangerous assault on the Union since Sunningdale". It was a characteristic understatement on our leader's part. He would not have exaggerated if, looking back over the last three years, he had said that Paisley has been, and remains, a greater threat to the Union than the Foreign Office and the Provisional IRA rolled into one. It is a burden which Ulster deserves not to have to carry.



File

Sub

Ireland

30 December 1980

I have now heard that when Mr. Oliver Napier comes to see the Prime Minister on Friday 16 January at 1015 he wishes to be accompanied by Mr. David Cook, the Deputy Leader of the Alliance Party and Mr. John Cushnahan, the General Secretary.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

M.W. Hopkins, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

SC

FILE



**10 DOWNING STREET**

MICHAEL

I hope you are happy  
with three members of the  
Alliance Party rather than  
two?

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'E.S.' with a flourish.

30 December 1980



Chris Stephens.

10 DOWNING STREET

Has he, as requested in my letter of  
24 Dec, said what he wants to discuss?

~~M. Alexander~~ <sup>no.</sup> <sup>3/11</sup>

Print

Oliver Napier

Meeting arranged  
for 10.15 on Friday  
16<sup>th</sup>. S/N.I. informed  
& coming. Told O.N.  
that he could  
bring 1 other.

any special  
briefing required?

C.S.

30/12.

file SK  
cc: Miss Stephens

24 December 1980

BF for mtg

Thank you for your letter of 28 November asking for a meeting with the Prime Minister.

Mrs. Thatcher has asked me to say that she would be pleased to meet you in the New Year. I shall be in touch about arranging a suitable time; in the meantime I should be grateful if you would let me have some idea of the topics which you will wish to discuss with the Prime Minister.

MO'DBA

Oliver Napier, Esq.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ (1)

Michael Alexander Esq  
PS/Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

Prime Minister

Agree to receive Mr Napier?

Recd 23/12/80

22 December 1980

Yes  
no

Type for my signature

Miss Stephens a.g.

Dear Michael

Thank you for your letter of 11 December about Mr Oliver Napier's request for a meeting with the Prime Minister.

Although we understand that the correspondence between the Prime Minister and Mr Napier referred to in the letter dates back to 1978, my Secretary of State still thinks that it would be helpful if a meeting could be arranged. Alliance is the only one of the four main parties in Northern Ireland which claims significant backing from both parts of the community and they have adopted a constructive and helpful attitude both to political development and over the hunger strike. It is therefore in our interests for Alliance to continue to be seen as a political force to be reckoned with in Northern Ireland and a meeting with the Prime Minister would undoubtedly help them in that respect. You will of course recall that the Prime Minister has already seen the leaders of all the other three main Northern Ireland parties.

... If the Prime Minister could therefore find the time we would see advantage in a meeting being arranged. I attach a draft letter to Mr Napier.

Yours sincerely  
Miss Stephens

M W HOPKINS

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

| To                                                                                                            | Enclosures | Copies to be sent to         |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------|
| Oliver Napier Esq<br>The Alliance Party<br>of Northern Ireland<br>88 University Street<br>BELFAST<br>BT17 1HE |            |                              |
| (Full Postal Address)                                                                                         |            | (Full Address, if Necessary) |

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY ..... PS/PRIME MINISTER .....  
(Name of Signatory)

Thank you for your letter of 28 November asking for a meeting with the Prime Minister.

Mrs Thatcher has asked me to say that she would be pleased to meet you in the New Year. I shall be in touch about arranging a suitable time; in the meantime I should be grateful if you would let me have some idea of the topics which you will wish to discuss with the Prime Minister.

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 0170307022X 418 2111/3

MO 19/3

18th December 1980

*Prime Minister* (2)

*not sent 19/11*

*Dear Mike,*

SERVICE LEAVE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

I ought to record the action which we have taken so far over the position of those members of the Armed Forces who wish to take their Christmas leave in Northern Ireland or in the Republic of Ireland. In view of the current assessment of the security situation advice has been sent out to all members of the Armed Forces warning them of the dangers involved, and as a result a number of servicemen have made alternative arrangements. Nevertheless, we estimate that there will be about 3,000 servicemen taking leave in the North and about 300 in the Republic.

Our officials are, with yours, keeping a careful eye on the situation and we would, if it proved essential, go a stage further and stop all leave either in the North or in the Republic or both but we very much hope that this will not be necessary.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10), Paul Lever (FCO), Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*  
*D B Omand*

(D B OMAND)

M W Hopkins Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

jfh


11 December 198D

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 28 November, the receipt of which here was delayed.

Your letter is receiving attention and a reply will be sent as soon as possible.

MA

Oliver Napier, Esq.





jfh

Alliance Party of  
NORTHERN Ireland

30/12

11 December 1980

Chase?

NOLYER

(19/12)

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister received from the Leader of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland. I should be grateful for early advice as to whether or not the Prime Minister should receive Mr. Napier early in the New Year as he requests.

MA

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

1/10

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Nick Sanders Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

10 December 1980

*Dear Nick*

*F. Atkins*

There seems little doubt that Members will raise the question of the 'Dublin Summit' and its aftermath during tonight's debate on the renewal of the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act.

... Mr Atkins will therefore have to be ready to respond and I attach for your information a copy of defensive brief prepared for the purpose.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Paul Lever (FCO).

*Yours sincerely*  
*M W Hopkins*  
M W HOPKINS

die



# THE ALLIANCE PARTY OF NORTHERN IRELAND

Headquarters:  
88 UNIVERSITY STREET,  
BELFAST BT7 1HE

Telephone:  
Belfast 24274/5

28th November, 1980

R6112

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON

Dear Prime Minister,

Before his untimely death your late Colleague Airey Neave had attempted to arrange a meeting between yourself and myself to discuss Northern Ireland Affairs. This was unfortunately postponed at the last minute because you had to participate in a major debate on the economy.

X | In a subsequent letter you indicated that you still wished to have such a meeting. As the Atkins Conference deliberations have now been concluded, I wondered if now would be an opportune time to have such a meeting. I would be grateful if this could be arranged sometime early in the New Year.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Napier  
PARTY LEADER

pls. have a quick look for  
X - CF to GR. But  
probably pre-Election

NOT GR - CF?

FROM:

THE RT. HON. LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, C.H., F.R.S., D.C.L.

13



OB Folder

Ireland

HOUSE OF LORDS,  
SW1A 0PW

17th November 1980

My dear Humphrey.

I write to you on your recent paper on Ulster. You will have by now enough experience of working with me to know that I will back your judgment in all things as being in the best interest of the Province, but it may help to clear my mind if I write you a letter based on my own reflexions about the present state of affairs in a situation which has been going on for 800 years at least. For family and other reasons I have taken a more or less continuous interest at least since March 1914.

Most of the trouble in Ireland during my lifetime has been caused by people who thought they had "solutions" to what was at one time called the Irish problem. The beginning of wisdom is to understand that there is not, and, within our lifetime will never be (without some form of genocide) a final solution. Neither community understands this - and, though there are individuals who do, they form a tiny minority. The reason is that there is no such thing as the Irish people. There are two, mutually hostile, tribes. The problem is not unique in the world. There are Turks and Greeks in Cyprus, Arabs and Jews in what used to be Palestine, Hindus and Moslems in what used to be British India. They owe different allegiances, and for the most part they always will. The Catholic cannot understand why the Protestant, whom he regards as part of a minority within what he regards as his country, i.e. Ireland, cannot conform to the wishes of the majority like any other democrat. The Protestant cannot understand why the Catholic whom he regards as a minority within his country (which he considers for most purposes as the United Kingdom) cannot conform to the wishes of the majority, even within his own Province like any other democrat. The Protestant believes (from his point of view truly) that any concession to the

../2

The Right Hon.  
Humphrey Atkins, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

minority is a form of betrayal. The Catholic regards any concession (and from his point of view he has been proved right since 1829) as only a step on the road to an independent and United Ireland, something to be taken and then made use of as a means towards taking the next step.

This does not mean that our own attitude towards the Province is, or could safely be allowed to become, negative and sterile. The contrary is true. While the aims of both parties are wholly incompatible, they have an urgent and desperate need for a modus vivendi. So have we. So has Dublin. Our task is to find a means within our span of life in office in which effect is given to the requirements of this need despite the irreconcilability in ultimate aim. This involves constant effort and constant ingenuity. It is more urgent now, in a period of economic recession, than at any previous time for many years.

It is pure illusion on the part of moderate Irish Nationalists to believe that any pronouncement of HMG casting doubt on the guarantees offered to the Protestants will bring any greater degree of peace to the people of the Province. It is equally a pure illusion on the part of otherwise sane and moderate Protestants to believe that any degree of "integration" in the United Kingdom will, however long persisted in, produce acquiescence on the part of the Catholic Minority. The first would produce a general strike. The second would produce civil disobedience. Both would increase bloodshed.

On the other hand neither Dublin nor Westminster can wash their hands of the matter. Whilst I would always welcome contact and cooperation between North and South, none is likely to happen on a fruitful scale unless relationships between Dublin and Westminster are warm, healthy and sound.

When you were good enough to invite me to lunch at Hillsborough at the beginning of my present term of office I got the definite impression from talking to those present that, while none of them like direct rule in preference to their own choice, most were prepared to live with it in preference to that of any other party. It was for this reason that, as you will remember, I always believed that our

recent explorations of the possibilities of devolution were a series of model automobiles each of which was equipped with square wheels.

What follows is therefore an assumption that there will in fact be no "break through" as at one time it almost seemed as if Sunningdale might turn out to be. What sunk Sunningdale was I believe the revival of the Council of Ireland. Anything on those lines would, I believe, sink it again. Also, although I was at one time an advocate of a return to local government, I believe that any attempt to carry this out at present would founder on the hostility of the Catholic Minority.

Whatever we may say or do, I believe that our next approach should be on functional rather than democratic lines. This is possible under direct rule. Security co-operation North and South of the border has improved considerably as the result of contacts between the Prime Minister and Haughey. Professional contacts as between lawyers, North and South, and other professionals are certainly to be encouraged. But surely it is in the economic field that north-south-British co-operation offers the best prospects? I would think that it is not beyond the wit of man to restore, protect and improve the electric power links - or possibly set up new, and less vulnerable, links. The whole of Ireland is hopelessly badly housed and under-employed. Would it not be possible to work out a programme, perhaps based on modularly constructed units and inserts?

When you come to the internal affairs of the Province, it might not be impossible to set up small functional Working Parties, not elected, but corresponding very largely to the old Stormont Ministries, and composed of members of both communities, including one to vet and recommend legislation. You would not, of course, ignore the individuals with a history of electoral success in the past. But you need not confine yourself to them. Should they choose to liaise for any purpose with respectable characters south of the border, this is only to be encouraged. I do not see that you sacrifice any principle or have anything to lose by exploring this possibility. Nor, in doing so, do you prejudice the chances of a more ambitious initiative


SECRET

- 4 -

designed to restore democratic devolution should the time prove more favourable than I expect. As one of the working parties might include internal security you might be able to coax more young Roman Catholics into joining the RUC.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister and, as you requested, to the other members of OD, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yrs:

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several loops and flourishes.

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SECRET

12

Cross border projects

Ref. A03564

PRIME MINISTER

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Northern Ireland

(OD(80) 67 and 68)

BACKGROUND

As a result of your meeting with him on 31st October to discuss the Government's future policy, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has produced a policy paper supported by four notes by officials, together with a separate paper on the security and prisons background.

2. OD last discussed general policy in regard to Northern Ireland at their meeting on 10th June, when they approved a draft document for publication setting out the Government's proposals for future discussions regarding the future Government of Northern Ireland. This document was subsequently endorsed by the Cabinet and published, and discussions took place. These have now run out of steam because Northern Ireland politicians have failed to respond to the proposals which have been put to them constructively or in a spirit of compromise.

3. Although the blame for this situation rests with the Northern Ireland political parties, the responsibility for making further progress in this difficult area still rests with the Government. The security situation in the Province has significantly improved. So have relations with the Republic. The two factors are related because a major contribution to the security situation has come from Mr. Haughey's more co-operative approach. We cannot count on these improvements being maintained unless some kind of positive progress can be seen to be taking place on the political front. On the other hand any clear-cut political initiative runs the risk of upsetting one or other of the Northern Irish communities and thereby destabilising the present situation. Thus the Government is condemned to walking along a tightrope. It is unlikely that this OD discussion will achieve a clear-cut definition of long-term Government aims and the means by which these are to be achieved. But in the short term the Secretary of State

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for Northern Ireland needs to have an agreed line on future policy in Northern Ireland which can be set out in the Debate on the Address and subsequently elaborated in reply to Parliamentary Questions. You will also need a clear line for your meeting with Mr. Haughey in December.

HANDLING

4. You will wish to ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to introduce his papers. As there are a lot of these, you may care to suggest that discussion should be structured round the three main objectives for policy identified in paragraph 3 of the covering paper, namely:-

- (a) Security -
- (b) Mr. Haughey and the wider framework -
- (c) Political development within Northern Ireland -

**A.** Security

- (a) Is it agreed that a continuance of the improvement in the security situation should be the first aim of policy? You will wish to ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland whether he has anything to add to the paper he has circulated on this subject. Is the Secretary of State for Defence in agreement with this assessment?
- (b) How is the security situation likely to be affected by the current hunger strike? If this does not have the impact which the organisers are hoping for, is there a chance that a still further improvement in the security situation may follow its failure? Is there any question of a need for immediate military reinforcement over the next few weeks?
- (c) To what extent is it likely to be possible for further security responsibilities to be handed over from the Army to the RUC over the next few months to reduce the number of Army units on emergency tours in the Province? Is the existing handover proceeding smoothly? Is it proving possible to get the troops off the streets and thereby reduce the extent to which they offer themselves as targets?

SECRET



- (d) Is the question of arms for the RUC a live issue still so far as the security forces are concerned? I am told that the new Chief Constable is less keen on Sturm Ruger pistols than his predecessor, and that a limited supply of these weapons has in any case been arriving in Ulster. Does the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary advise that this sleeping dog should be left asleep so far as the United States are concerned?
- (e) How well are intelligence arrangements now working in Northern Ireland as between the military and the RUC? In view of the sensitivity of this matter you may not wish to pursue it in detail in OD but you may seek a general assurance from the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland that there is no particular problem.
- (f) To what extent has the improvement in the security situation depended on an improvement in the performance of the Garda Siochana and the attitude of the Republic?

**B.** Mr. Haughey and the wider framework

Annex D to OD(80) 67 sets out the NIO ideas on this subject. You may wish to ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he has anything to add. In discussions you may wish to cover the following points:-

- (g) Does Mr. Haughey have any clear long-term aims and ideas how he intends to achieve them? The answer to both these questions is probably "no" except in the most general terms. I suspect that the most plausible explanation of Mr. Haughey's position is that he would like to be the Taoiseach who unlocked the door to (if not arrived at) the solution to the Northern Ireland problem; that he is testing us - and specifically you - for your responses, your vulnerable points and your sticking points; and that the tactics to which he is working are to offer us a series of successive openings and concessions: each will appear attractive, the further we go along the more difficult it will be to draw back, and, if we do at some stage draw back, he will (as he hopes) be in a position with his own electorate to blame us for failure.

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- (h) Given the security situation and the political deadlock in Northern Ireland, does the balance of advantage lie in at least listening attentively and receptively to whatever Mr. Haughey has to say, rather than rejecting any possibility of developing "the wider framework"?
- (i) What are the merits of a formal Anglo-Irish conference of the kind which may be favoured by Mr. Haughey? The Committee seem likely to take the view that the disadvantage of such a conference is that it would have a formal agenda and conclusions. In any case the idea has already been unfortunately ventilated by Mr. Hume with the result that the Unionists regard such a proposal with extreme suspicion. You may wish to conclude that you should ride Mr. Haughey off such an idea at least for the time being.
- (j) Would a workable, and less objectionable, alternative be a commitment to twice-yearly consultations between British and Irish Ministers, led by you and the Taoiseach, on the model of our consultations with the French and the Germans (and theirs with each other)?
- (k) Is there any merit in setting up a consultative body of Anglo-Irish Parliamentarians from Westminster and Dublin, to which members of a Northern Ireland Assembly could be added if such an assembly were set up? The thought that access to such a body would be available to Assembly members might encourage Northern Ireland politicians to agree to the setting up of an Assembly.
- (l) Does the Committee agree that the other areas which might be worth further exploration in Anglo-Irish discussions are correctly identified in paragraph 8 of Annex D?
- (m) Does the Committee agree that the ingredients of a formula which you could accept are correctly identified in paragraph 10 of Annex D?
- (n) How can the maximum advantage be wrung from your meeting with Mr. Haughey to undermine the effects of the hunger strike? A report of a fruitful meeting would obviously be useful in the propaganda war.

SECRET



(o) What view is Mr. Haughey likely to take of the progressive approach to devolution set out in Annex C? Will this offer him sufficient promise of progress to make him accept the improvements to direct rule proposed in Annex B which will only be tolerable to him if they are represented as a stepping stone towards a more devolved long-term solution?

C. Future political development within Northern Ireland

- Discussing with  
① Dublin  
② Direct rule - UK/NI  
③ Progressive Assembly -

- (p) Does the Committee agree that some political progress has to be made in Northern Ireland? You may care to put this question particularly to the Secretary of State for Defence, as he may well take the view that it would be preferable from a security point of view to do as little as possible on the political side. Against this the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is likely to argue that some political progress must be seen to be made in order to keep both Mr. Haughey and the Northern Ireland politicians happy.
- (q) Is the choice of political options set out in Annex A agreed? You may wish to ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland whether he has anything to say in amplification of this Annex.
- (r) Is it agreed that the improvements to direct rule identified in Annex B should be pursued as an essential prerequisite to any long-term political progress?
- (s) Does the progressive approach identified in Annex C hold out sufficient hope for it to be worth pursuing? Of the major Northern Irish political parties only Alliance might be willing to entertain it. Does this suggest that it might be wise not to push it too hard as the Government's chosen option but merely to advance it as a possible option for longer-term progress?
- (t) If the idea of a Consultative Assembly is dropped are there any alternative proposals which ought to be considered?

Other general points

(u) You may wish to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary how the outcome of the United States Presidential election is likely to change the American attitude to Northern Ireland. What is

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Mr. Reagan's position likely to be? Is Senator Kennedy likely to emerge as a more significant figure on this issue now?

- (v) You may care to ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he has fully considered the Scottish implications of his proposals.
- (w) You may care to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent there are underlying economic or public expenditure considerations to the present situation and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's proposals which ought to be taken into account.

#### CONCLUSION

5. You may care to wind up the discussion by concentrating on Appendix 1 to OD(80) 67 which sets out some suggested points to be made in the Debate on the Address. You will wish to consider how far these should be modified in the light of points made in discussion. You will also wish to consider to what extent a clear position has been agreed for your forthcoming discussions with Mr. Haughey. If the Committee agrees that we should pursue "the wider framework", you may wish to ask either the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or a group of officials under Cabinet Office chairmanship to develop more detailed ideas in this field. You may wish to invite the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to do further work on his proposals for improvements in direct rule. But you may care to propose that further consideration of "a progressive approach to devolution" should await the outcome of your meeting with Mr. Haughey to see if he has any different ideas on this subject.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

14th November, 1980

SECRET

SP

(reled)

10 November, 1980.

I am now returning the material on Northern Ireland which you forwarded on 12 August as a contribution to the Prime Minister's summer reading.

You will know that the Prime Minister was most interested in this from the fact that we have not been able to extract the material from her until now.

M. A. PATTISON

Sir Kenneth Stowe, K.C.B., C.V.O.

SP

subject

SECRET



file

cc: HIO BK  
CO  
FCO 10

10 DOWNING STREET

a Master Ireland

From the Private Secretary

31 October 1980

Dear Roy,

Northern Ireland

The Prime Minister held a meeting this afternoon with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Home Secretary to discuss the Government's policy towards Northern Ireland. The meeting had in front of it the note by officials on Political Development in Northern Ireland dated 21 October.

It was agreed at the conclusion of the discussion that further work should be done by officials on the options at 10 (i) of the officials' paper ie "Ulsterisation"; 10 (iv) - an elected advisory body; 10 (v) - the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic. The Prime Minister noted that it was essential that knowledge of work under this final heading should be restricted to an extremely limited number of Ministers and officials. The consequences of a premature leak would, in the words of the officials' paper, be explosive. The Prime Minister also expressed interest in seeing maps related to the question of whether one could create viable local government areas - both in Belfast and Northern Ireland as a whole - in which there would be Catholic majorities. It might be helpful if these maps were accompanied by background material describing the difficulties in creating a new local government structure.

There was a brief discussion of possible forms of words on Northern Ireland for use in The Queen's Speech. Mr. Atkins undertook to let the Prime Minister have one or two new formulations on Monday.

Finally, there was a brief discussion about the Prime Minister's forthcoming meeting with Mr. Haughey. She said that if developments at the Maze made a meeting\* at the beginning of December with Mr. Haughey inadvisable, she would be content to meet him in the margins of the European Council Meeting in Luxembourg.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Halliday (Home Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

\* in Dublin

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office

Yours sincerely

Michael Alexander

SECRET

SECRET

9

Ref. A03400

PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland

*Prime Minister  
a brief to update the  
meeting papers in your  
earlier box.  
Duty clerk. 30/10.*

When you and the Home Secretary meet the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland tomorrow afternoon, he will want to bring you up to date on the present security and political situation in Northern Ireland.

2. There are three developments in particular which have changed the situation since the writing of the note by officials dated 21st October and my note of 22nd October:

- (1) The hunger strike, and the Government's decision on civilian clothing, have raised inter-community tension in Northern Ireland to a very high level. The Catholic community are solidly behind the strikers; the majority as solidly against. The decision on clothing has been seen by the Protestant community as a surrender and a betrayal and an outrage. Cardinal O'Fiaich and the BBC conspired to present the decision as a concession which the Northern Ireland Office then tried partly to call back: it was first announced as a decision to allow prisoners to wear their own clothing and then it was made clear that it was a decision to allow them to wear civilian clothing issued by the authorities. So the Catholic community are not as pleased as they might have been. To sum up, these developments have had a very polarising effect.
- (2) The Official Unionist Party collapsed in disarray at their party conference. A resolution in favour of devolution as the long-run aim, and more local government in the shorter term, was rejected. The OUP has no policy, save in so far as Mr. Molyneux came out against a step-by-step approach.
- (3) Dr. Paisley has also let it be known that he sees no future in a step-by-step approach. His Democratic Unionist Party recently cancelled a meeting with the Northern Ireland Office, on the ground that it would not meet people who were negotiating with the IRA (that is Dr. Paisley's formula to describe the concession on civilian clothing).

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3. For the time being it is very difficult to see how the situation can be moved forward. The evolutionary option suggested in paragraph 10(iv) of the note by officials is for the time being unavailable, though perhaps we should not lose sight of it even now as a long-term possibility. The Northern Ireland Office are now turning more towards the idea of tentative exploration within the wider United Kingdom-Ireland framework (the option at paragraph 10(v) of the note by officials). The advantage of this sort of approach is that it can be made to involve everybody with a stake in the matter, including the Irish Government. It would have to be taken slowly, and very carefully prepared, and a lot more thought needs to be given to it before it is possible to say in any detail what it might involve. If, however, this is the approach which commends itself, you will need to take advantage of your visit to Dublin to indicate to the Taoiseach, however tentatively, that this is the way our minds are moving.

4. If as a result of your meeting with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland you come to the conclusion that this is (if not the best) the only way forward, there will have to be some urgent work done before your visit to Dublin. One possibility would be for the Secretary of State to adumbrate these ideas in a paper for OD, on the basis of which work could be done by officials: we are due to discuss Northern Ireland in OD next Friday, 7th November. That loses a week; and, if you thought that there was a sufficient degree of agreement with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland tomorrow, you could authorise immediate work by officials, to start at the beginning of next week. Any discussion of OD at the end of the week would on this basis be provisional and tentative, and it might be better to delay discussion in OD until officials had developed an outline plan as a basis for the discussion.

5. Finally, there remains the problem of what to put in The Queen's Speech on the Opening of Parliament. The formula at present in the draft will not do in the new circumstances. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will

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come to the meeting with three variants. But the situation seems so highly charged and uncertain that it is very difficult to be sure that any words which might be agreed now or next week will still make sense on 20th November. It may be that the best plan will be not to refer to Northern Ireland in the Gracious Speech at all.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

30th October, 1980

SECRET

*cc New Anson*

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

19

PS  
PS/LPS  
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MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON  
HD/RID  
HD/PUSD (2)  
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HD/NEWS DEPT

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE  
RM 66 A/2 GGS  
N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]  
SIR K STOWE  
MR MORIATY  
MR MARSHALL  
MR BUXTON

*HD/NAD* ...

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG  
DIO ~~.....~~

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

RESIDENT CLERK

*[Handwritten signature]*

GRS 300

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4410 OF 28 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON, BIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE DUBLIN.

*See the rather remarkable  
statement on overleaf.*

MIPT: PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER TO BIAGGI,  
RELEASED TO THE PRESS TONIGHT:

BEGINS.

ENDING THE TRAGIC CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS IMPORTANT TO THIS COUNTRY BECAUSE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MORAL ISSUES INVOLVED AND BECAUSE OF THE STRONG TIES SO MANY AMERICANS HAVE WITH IRELAND.

AS PRESIDENT, I FORMULATED THIS COUNTRY'S FIRST COMPREHENSIVE POLICY DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. I SPOKE OUT

AND BECAUSE OF THE STRONG TIES SO MANY AMERICANS HAVE WITH IRELAND.

AS PRESIDENT, I FORMULATED THIS COUNTRY'S FIRST COMPREHENSIVE POLICY DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. I SPOKE OUT ON THIS EARLY IN MY ADMINISTRATION. SPECIFICALLY, I CONDEMNED THE USE OF VIOLENCE AND STATED THAT A PERMANENT SOLUTION WILL COME ONLY FROM THE CONSENT OF ALL THE PARTIES. I HAVE GONE ON RECORD WITH A FIRM OFFER FOR INVESTMENT AND JOB-CREATION ASSISTANCE FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND ONCE A SETTLEMENT IS ACHIEVED, THEREBY PROVIDING PEACEFUL INCENTIVES TO BOTH SIDES.

*Not true*

I HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE LEADERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND OF GREAT BRITAIN TO HELP PROMOTE AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. IN RESPONSE TO MY INVITATION, PRIME MINISTER LYNCH VISITED WITH ME IN THE WHITE HOUSE IN NOVEMBER 1979. ADDITIONALLY, I HAVE BEEN IN CONTINUOUS TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TO URGE GREATER PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE.

AS I SAID IN AUGUST 1977 -- WE HOPE THAT ALL THOSE ENGAGED IN VIOLENCE WILL RENOUNCE THIS COURSE AND COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PEACEFUL PURSUIT OF LEGITIMATE GOALS. THE PATH OF RECONCILIATION, COOPERATION AND PEACE IS THE ONLY COURSE THAT CAN END THE HUMAN SUFFERING AND LEAD TO A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

ENDS

HENDERSON

MNNN

70110 397 8

RESTRICTED

File

289  
Ireland

24 October 1980

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 22 October about the incident in the Twinbrook area of Belfast on 19 October.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

RESTRICTED

GB

510

MOBBA

SECRET



Postponed until next Friday 8

b/w NIO paper.

BIF 30/10/80  
mo

Ref. A03329

PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland

You are due to meet the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 23rd October at 3.00 pm to discuss the next steps in political development in Northern Ireland. As a basis of discussion NIO officials have produced a paper of which I have sent you a copy. The Home Secretary is unable to attend the meeting because of the industrial action by prison officers.

2. Mr. Atkins has sought this meeting in order to consult your views before putting specific proposals before OD, probably on 7th November. OD's conclusions would then be reflected in the line you take when you meet Mr. Haughey in December, and in the reference to Northern Ireland in The Queen's Speech.

3. The bilateral talks with the Northern Irish political parties stemmed from Cmnd 7950. As OD agreed and Cabinet endorsed in June, these talks have now run out of steam. The question is what to do next. Some, including the Secretary of State for Defence, would argue that it would be best to take no new political initiative. On this thesis, the security situation is improving and it would be right to concentrate on maintaining this improvement by a continuance of direct rule in substantially its present form, and a minimum of associated political activity. The weakness in this approach is the fact that it is unlikely to satisfy either Mr. Haughey, who has played a large part in the improvement in the security situation in Northern Ireland, or the politicians in Northern Ireland, who also need to be kept in play.

4. The paper by officials describes the present situation, and sets out a number of criteria by which the relative merits of future courses of action should be assessed. It then sets out a number of possible options for further political developments. These all require the continuance of direct rule for the foreseeable future - not as an end in itself but as a means to some as yet undefined political development. No firm recommendation is made at this stage,

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but the paper inclines towards proposals for a consultative assembly, with the possibility of adding legislative or executive powers later, if agreement could be reached: this is seen as following naturally upon the political talks of the last year.


5. You could conduct your discussion with Mr. Atkins along the following lines:-

- (a) Seek his views on the present political and security situation in Northern Ireland.
- (b) Discuss the proposed criteria in paragraphs 5-8 of his paper. Do these give sufficient weight to domestic political considerations? Do they take sufficient account of the probability of Senator Kennedy being the front runner to be the next Presidential candidate for the Democrats, whether President Carter wins or loses this election? Would not this situation add urgency to the need to find a political solution soon? Do they take sufficient account of the Taoiseach's political needs, with an election due in the next two years?
- (c) Consider the proposed options in paragraph 10. Should these include the "do nothing and concentrate on security" option? It can be argued that any of the other options may produce an effect on the Northern Irish political parties which could worsen the security situation. Should option v) dealing with the "unique relationship" with the Republic be subdivided into two options? There is the possibility of taking these rather incoherent ideas seriously. But there is also the possibility that Mr. Haughey is well aware of their incoherence but wishes to be seen "travelling hopefully" down the road as part of his election campaign. Would this latter option, which in practical terms means doing nothing while talking endlessly about what we might do, create difficulties in Northern Ireland and in Westminster? Certainly in the very short term a harmonious outcome to your meeting with Mr. Haughey in December ought to do much to reduce the impact of the H block hunger strike.

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6. You may decide in conclusion that the future is still too uncertain in Northern Ireland to refer in The Queen's Speech to "bringing forward proposals" with the implication of impending legislation of which the shape has already been decided. A more anodyne phrase such as "will continue to seek a solution on which to base legislation to involve locally-elected representatives in the administration of Northern Ireland" might be preferable. You may also decide that, apart from the "do nothing" option, the broad choice in Northern Ireland appears to be between some form of local government reform (possibly involving "Ulsterisation" of posts or integration into the administration of Great Britain as sub-variants) and the creation of some kind of consultative assembly. Both of these broad options should be put to OD for consideration.



ROBERT ARMSTRONG

(approved by Sir R. Armstrong  
and signed on his behalf)

22nd October, 1980

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The National Archives

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|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
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| PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>498</i> .....<br>(one piece/item number)                                      |                                       |
| Extract/Item details:<br><br><i>Letter from Harrington to Alexander<br/>dated 22 October 1980</i> |                                       |
| CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS<br>UNDER FOI EXEMPTION                                                     |                                       |
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
MR. ALEXANDER

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Political Development in Northern Ireland

The Prime Minister is to meet the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Home Secretary on Thursday, 23rd October, to discuss how the Government should proceed with its initiative in Northern Ireland following the convening of the political conference in January and the publication after the conference of a White Paper setting out the Government's ideas for devolution and giving the minority population a role in Government. I attach a note which has been prepared by officials of the Northern Ireland Office, following discussions with officials of the other departments concerned, to serve as background for the discussion at the Prime Minister's meeting.

2. Sir Robert Armstrong will be sending the Prime Minister a brief on how she might handle the discussion at Thursday's meeting.

  
(D.J. Wright)

21st October, 1980

SECRET

For meeting on Friday  
31/X/80.



(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

mt.

The attached paper was prepared by officials as background for the meeting you were to have held yesterday with Mr Alton about N. Ireland. The discussion has now been postponed until next Friday. You may nonetheless like to have the paper in your weekend box as a basis for reflection. I am sure that Mr Alton would welcome any preliminary reactions you may have.

Ant  
- 24/X

## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND

## A NOTE BY OFFICIALS

Introduction

With the publication of Cmnd 7763 last November and the convening of the Political Conference in January, the Government embarked on an initiative in Northern Ireland to identify the highest level of agreement on how powers of government could be transferred to locally elected representatives. Following the Conference, Cmnd 7950 set out what the Government considered might be an agreed framework for devolution and put forward alternative approaches to the unresolved issue of how the minority could be given a role in government.

2. To date the Government's initiative has produced certain positive results. It has re-opened a constructive dialogue with the parties; the Secretary of State has established a relationship with them; the Government is widely seen to have made honest endeavours to break the deadlock; the principles enunciated in both Cmnd papers have come to be widely accepted by public opinion at large; and, most important, the initiative has been conducted with no adverse impact on security.

3. A satisfactory role for the minority was among the principles that both Cmnd papers insisted should be met before powers could be transferred. In bilateral talks on the basis of Cmnd 7950 the parties have taken up opposing positions on this issue from which they will not budge. The SDLP and Alliance insist that, in the exercise of executive powers of any kind, minority representatives must have seats at the top table; and the SDLP are becoming increasingly critical of any attempt to tackle Northern Ireland's political problems within a Northern Ireland framework, without the involvement (in some way unspecified) of Dublin. The DUP, however, insist that any Executive must be formed from the elected majority alone, while recognising the need for substantial safeguards. The UUP, despite occasional restlessness within the party, refuse to discuss devolved government and follow publicly an "integrationist" line which seeks a new tier of local government (operating under normal majority rule) as a first priority.

4. It is now necessary to decide how to proceed with the Government's initiative and what should be said about it in The Queen's Speech. So far the initiative has entailed no more than consultation and exploration of ideas. Ministers now need to establish what will be the detailed framework within which their political policy for Northern Ireland will develop over the remainder of this Parliament, and this can hardly be deferred beyond the coming Session. As currently drafted the Speech says:

"In Northern Ireland my Government will work towards further improving security and creating the conditions for sound economic growth. They will bring forward proposals for involving locally-elected representatives in the administration of Northern Ireland."

#### Criteria

5. The overriding requirement is to maintain the progress being made on the security front (the Secretary of State for Defence's letter of 22 September to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland refers). The prize of a sustained improvement in security is slowly but surely coming within reach, and with it the prospect of further reducing the army's involvement and of relieving the Rhine Army of the burden of Northern Ireland duties. Political proposals should do nothing, therefore, to impede the security effort, particularly in the coming weeks when the threatened "H-block hunger strike" will raise sensitivities and tensions. Proposals which are seen as a threat to the fundamental beliefs or interests of either community could rapidly undermine our achievements on security.

6. The key factor in the recent improvement in security has been the co-operation received from the Irish Republic which, supported perhaps by Dublin's perception of HMG's sincerity and determination to proceed by agreement taking account of the interests of the minority community, has undoubtedly been strengthened by Mr. Haughey's clear wish to achieve recognition of the "unique relationship" between the United Kingdom and the Republic", which was jointly registered when he and the Prime Minister met in May. We do not yet know the nature of the proposals which he seems certain to make in the near future and which could be of a fundamental nature. But they will demand careful and sympathetic attention as our security policy is best served by sustaining that relationship, which means recognising within it the interest of Dublin in the well-being of the minority community in Northern Ireland, whose "legitimate aspiration" to Irish unity has been acknowledged by successive governments. The Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Haughey will be usefully timed to complement what is said by HMG in The Queen's Speech.

7. The development of the "unique relationship" in general and the Dublin Summit in particular will be viewed with great suspicion by the Unionists. A positive attitude towards Dublin - however cautiously expressed - will need to be matched by the continuation of discussions of political development in the North, in which HMG can demonstrate both its commitment to the majority to protect the constitutional status of the North in accordance with the wishes of the majority and to the principle of acceptability for new institutions. It may be that the failure of Northern Ireland political leaders to agree specific measures for a transfer of responsibility will mean that little development can be achieved in the immediate future but progress on security depends not only on the co-operation of Dublin but also on maintaining in the North (particularly among the Catholic

community) a sense that there is a future for political development. We cannot simply set politics aside and concentrate on security; and the interests of security will be best served by a political process that avoids sudden and unexpected shifts of political direction which could throw people off balance. The Government has committed itself to a policy of restoring responsibility to locally elected representatives; they have invested much political capital in arguing the case - which is a good one - for that policy; and they have aroused expectations in the Province. This too argues in favour of continuing steadily with and building on the process started last November.

8. Other factors to be taken into account are:

- a) the economic situation is a major worry for most people in Northern Ireland - with no local political base, the Government enjoys little support and faces widespread hostility to its economic policies;
- b) the unique two-community problem in Northern Ireland and the tradition of self-government there, must continue to be the basis on which the Government differentiates its policy for the Province from the issue of devolution in Scotland;
- c) it is desirable to bring the local parties to negotiate with each other rather than allowing them the easy way of bilateral exchanges with the Secretary of State.

#### Options

9. It would seem futile to continue the bilateral discussions with the political parties indefinitely in the hope of reaching an accommodation; and dangerous to attempt to impose a scheme derived from Cmnd 7950 in the hope that the local politicians would in practice make it work.

10. A balance of advantage might best be sought, therefore, in the light of criteria suggested in paragraphs 5-8 above, from the following range of options all of which require the continuation of direct rule for some time to come and in any event for the greater part of the remainder of this Parliament.

- i) It would be possible to try to "Ulsterise" direct rule. For example, local men or women representative of both communities might be appointed as an advisory "Commission" in place of the junior Ministers. While this would involve a small number of Ulstermen directly in the administration of direct rule, it will not of itself necessarily lead to political advance although it might be hoped that it would encourage a willingness to participate in non-sectarian government. Such Commissioners could, formally, only be advisers appointed by the Secretary of State and subject to his direction. It is not certain that local politicians

(and leading non-political figures) would find such posts attractive and Parliament might itself balk at a political function being conferred on appointed persons unless the proposal was plainly intended to be transitional. This option might be accompanied by adding modest powers (e.g local planning and minor roads) to those already exercised by the 26 District Councils.

ii) Short of devolution, an attempt could be made to set up a new local government structure in Northern Ireland on the pattern of Great Britain. The central issue of how to involve minority representatives in the exercise of the powers to be discharged remains no less intractable, however, in the context of local government: if anything, it is even more difficult to resolve since the minority have vivid memories of how local authorities in Northern Ireland have abused the powers they were given in the past and they see how they continue to do so even now on occasions. The legislation needed would be contentious and complex, especially since it would entail either the abolition of existing appointed boards e.g the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, which are representative of both sides of the community, or their retention, to the detriment of the new local body or bodies.

iii) A further option is the positive integration of the Northern Ireland administration into that of Great Britain. This would involve abolishing the separate Northern Ireland Civil Service, extending the remit of all the Whitehall Departments to Northern Ireland (on the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise model) and giving Northern Ireland the same legislative provisions in general as Great Britain by means of common Bills. It would logically lead on of course to the introduction of British-style local government, encountering the problems outlined in the preceding paragraph. It would be seen, immediately, as a rejection both of Nationalist aspirations and of what many Northern Ireland Unionists (especially the DUP) regard as their rightful heritage of self-rule.

iv) A more evolutionary option would be to recognise that there was no sufficient base for a transfer of substantial powers but to provide (by modest legislation) for an elected body to be established, initially without executive or legislative powers, which would however have the specific tasks of advising the Secretary of State on matters referred to it, of examining draft Northern Ireland legislation before enactment at Westminster, and of examining and reporting on the work of the Northern Ireland Departments. This body could, either as a specific requirement or simply in its consultative role, consider how an acceptable means of transferring real power could be achieved. Even with the bait of a firm assurance of a transfer of powers once agreement was reached, however, it is possible that any or all of the parties would condemn the proposal and boycott elections or the Assembly itself. All the local parties, and the SDLP in particular, have condemned a local assembly without powers. There could be no guarantee that such a body would resolve the issue of minority participation; the majority might insist on dominating the proceedings; the Assembly could become an irresponsible critic of all

the Government's policies, for there would be no supporters in it. Nevertheless, this "progressive" approach would be a logical and straightforward extension of the Government's initiative; it would give local politicians a positive function however limited; and would provide the political market place in Northern Ireland which is now missing.

v) The present impasse could be used as the opportunity to develop the "unique relationship" with the Republic, accepting that a solution is not to be found exclusively within a narrow Northern Ireland framework. This would mean exploring ideas of the kind which it is expected the Taoiseach will put to the Prime Minister in December e.g. for a Conference between the two Governments, with perhaps representative politicians from the North, to discuss, inter alia, ideas for a new constitutional relationship between the two sovereign Islands with a special place for the Province, which John Hume and John Biggs-Davison have each, in their different ways, been canvassing. This is new territory and much work would need to be done before the practicalities and political implications could be clear. It is apparent that such a widening of the framework (unless carefully handled) carries the risk of an explosive unionist reaction but that any refusal to widen it could jeopardise Mr. Haughey's vital co-operation over border security. Furthermore, on a more narrow tactical point, an outcome of the meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Haughey which suggested that there were real signs that the present impasse was intended to be broken could do a lot to reduce the impact of the H block hunger strike on public opinion (if not on the prisoners themselves), since it may well be designed to reach its climax in the period immediately before Christmas.

11. These options are not, of course, all mutually exclusive, e.g. it would be possible to combine a degree of "Ulsterisation" with the proposal to set up an interim elected body to which local government or wider powers could subsequently be devolved. And the last option, exploration of the "wider framework", could accompany (but hardly precede) such a combination.

#### Conclusion

12. Some consideration has been given contingently to these options but much work remains to be done if the opportunity of legislating this session is to be taken. Ministers are accordingly invited to consider:

- i) whether the criteria which it is suggested should govern further political development of Northern Ireland, as set out in paragraph 5-8, are sound;
- ii) which of the options set out in paragraph 10 (or any combination thereof) should be pursued further; and in the light of that -
- iii) whether the commitment in The Queen's Speech to



"bring forward proposals" in this session, which could cover some but not all of the options set out in paragraph 10, should stand.

Subject to Ministers' directions, it will then be necessary to consider what amplification of The Queen's Speech would be necessary in the debate on the Address and/or in Northern Ireland to give some more substantial indication of the Government's intentions so as to avoid unsettling rumour, especially in the period before and after the Prime Minister's meeting with the Taoiseach. Preparation for that meeting will of course need to take account of the likely shape of the Government's proposals.

21 October 1980

1/43.

010

E.R.

NBPN


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NIOM (80) 6

SEE DISTRIBUTION

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE MEETING - FRIDAY  
10 OCTOBER 1980

I attach for your information a note of last  
Friday's meeting.

*for.* 

B A BLACKWELL  
SECRETARY

16 October 1980

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ON  
FRIDAY 10 OCTOBER 1980

## Present:-

|              |             |
|--------------|-------------|
| Mr Marshall  | Chairman    |
| Mr Blelloch  |             |
| Miss Kelley  |             |
| Mr Moriarty  |             |
| Mr Buxton    |             |
| Mr Corbett   | NIO         |
| Mr Ledlie    |             |
| Mr Spence    |             |
| Mr Blackwell |             |
| Mr Hall      |             |
| Mr Bengier   |             |
| Mr Stephens  |             |
| Mr Miller    |             |
| Mr Farthing  | MOD         |
| Col Bateman  |             |
| Col Wilson   |             |
| Maj Pheysey  |             |
| Mr Heaton    | Home Office |
| Mr Newington | FCO         |

The Chairman opened the meeting by noting that Col Wilson was attending his last meeting and congratulated him on his forthcoming promotion to Brigadier; he then introduced Mr Blelloch who had taken over from Mr Hannigan.

Force Levels

The Chairman said that the reduction scheduled for November was now public knowledge; he thought it no bad thing that the news should be known in advance, particularly as the press had generally given a purely factual account. Mr Blelloch agreed with the Chairman's remarks although it was unfortunate that members of Belfast City Council who had been discussing security developments in Belfast with Army and NIO representatives on the same day that the matter became public had not been informed and felt somewhat aggrieved; this was pure chance as the Public Relations Staff at Lisburn had merely given a straight answer to a direct question about force levels in Belfast asked later on the same day. The only problem was countering the suggestion that the troops be transferred to the Border.

In the event of any future proposals for reductions he thought it

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best that HQNI and HQ RUC should agree between themselves and the put the matter to NIO who would approach Ministers; once agreement had been reached a concerted approach could be made to MOD. The next decision would need to be made in December concerning the roulement unit due to arrive in April.

The Chairman said that when the Grand Central Hotel was vacated it would be returned to the owner. Miss Kelley asked whether the withdrawal of roulement units affected civilian employment; Mr Stephens replied that the effect was marginal.

#### The Yellow Card

The Chairman said that the text of the new Yellow Card was now approved by all concerned; the Secretary of State was most insistent that the revised Pink Card/<sup>to be</sup> issued to soldiers manning VCPs, should be issued at the same time as the Yellow Card. If there was to be any suggestion of the Yellow Card being issued before the Pink Card, MOD should consult NIO first. Mr Stephens confirmed that MOD were clear on this but stated that they might have to come back to NIO if there was a long delay in the revision of the Pink Card; it was now with the Law Officers.

#### Area Reviews

Mr Ledlie said that the review covering Belfast would be issued next week to be considered at SPM on 27 October with a covering note by Sir Brooks Richards. He identified two particular matters as needing more thought. Firstly there was West Belfast; the way ahead was far from clear and although the RUC had achieved a lot, there was still much to do, one major problem being accommodation for the RUC. The Army might well be needed in the same strength for some time to come. Also the present degree of control over the area was impressive and it was questionable whether the RUC could maintain the same level if they took over. The second problem concerned the interface between the security forces and the civil administration; this was of particular importance in West Belfast where there was a need for greater co-operation, especially as resources were likely to become scarcer in the future.

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A border-study on Fermanagh was being considered in draft within the Planning Staff; before it was approved there would be further discussion with the local commanders and consideration of the prominence to be given to Dr Paisley's suggestions. Mr Blelloch said that he regarded Fermanagh as posing the most intractable security problem at present. It was hoped that the replacement of the Garda Chief Superintendent in Dundalk, something which the Chief Constable had been looking for, would improve matters. Col Wilson commented that the RUC did not expect to obtain significant lasting results in the short term from co-operation with the Garda despite their recent successes.

Meeting between Secretary of State and Mr Lenihan on 13 October

The Chairman said that security seemed unlikely to feature largely at the meeting although he noted that very few overflights had taken place since the 5 October agreement last year. Mr Newington said that there was no reason to suppose that the Irish would wish to withdraw the concession; should they suggest this we would express surprise and point out the political difficulties which we would encounter.

The Interconnector

The Chairman said that he was concerned because little seemed to have been achieved since the last meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr Lenihan when it was agreed that work should be carried out with despatch. Mr Blelloch said that he too was concerned to note that the economic and political advantages were balanced by disadvantages over security. Accordingly a holding brief had been prepared for the Secretary of State; he had asked that a full co-ordinated brief be prepared for the meeting between Mr Shaw and Mr Colley. The RUC were certain that no progress could be made during the next few months as the NIES workers had been intimidated and in any case PIRA would immediately blow up the interconnector should it be rebuilt. The Chairman recalled the view taken earlier this year that either the Army or contractors could be used, which would solve the problem of re-connection; but it was impossible to protect the installation once it had been built unless PIRA saw some advantage in maintaining the link. Mr Newington thought that it could be embarrassing if we were to display a lack of urgency after having previously pressed for co-operation with the Garda. Mr Buxton

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the  
thought that we could avoid this problem by demonstrating that both Garda and the RUC had needed to be involved before any work could proceed. The Chairman thought that a solution would only be achieved when circumstances were similar to those when PIRA threatened to cut the rail link and were forced by popular reaction to withdraw the threat. Miss Kelley said that, unfortunately the interconnector was not perceived as vital to the interests of people living in the Republic whereas the rail link was.

## Compensation for property damage caused in the Republic by Army cratering operations

Mr Newington said that the Irish had not been pressing on this issue and were unlikely to raise the matter on Monday; the Treasury would be replying to his letter as soon as possible.

## Border road closures

The Chairman thought that the Irish might raise the matter, but Mr Buxton considered that any complaint would be for the record only.

## Constitutional matters

The Chairman said that a White Paper had been published in which the Government said that although it discerned agreement on the outer framework, there was no agreement on the manner in which devolved power should be exercised and it proposed two alternatives: a) power sharing, (b) some form of majority rule constrained by various devices to protect the rights of the minority. Predictably the SDLP favoured the former and rejected the latter, whilst the DUP took the opposite line; Alliance had rejected majority rule, and the OUP favoured neither line. The Government were now holding further talks and it remained to be seen if agreement could be reached. If, as seemed likely, there was no agreement, then a step-by-step approach might be adopted probably with the aim of setting up a consultative assembly although care would have to be taken as the whole project could collapse following either a boycott or the adoption of wrecking tactics by one of the parties. In view of these considerations the Queen's Speech was unlikely to contain anything of significance.

ny other business

Mr Heaton said that the present head of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch would be retiring shortly for personal reasons. He was due to be replaced by an officer without previous Special Branch experience.

Mr Blelloch said that the result of the Chief Constable's review of the structure and manpower requirement of the RUC should be available in November; as yet NIO in Belfast were unaware of the contents but the Chief Constable clearly saw the future of the RUC as governed not only by manpower requirements but also by the style of operations.

There were four issues concerning prisons; firstly the Northern Ireland Prison Service was being caught up in the general POA action currently being taken on the mainland but, fortunately, to no great extent. Secondly, there was the rather difficult round of negotiations about travel allowances to the Maze. Thirdly, there were the cases of Dolours Price and Pauline McLaughlin; the condition of the former was fairly stable, but that of Pauline McLaughlin was giving cause for concern. She would have to be admitted to hospital and there would be a case conference the following week; she appeared to be close to the state in which Marian Price was when it became necessary to release her. Finally, the Secretary of State had written to his principal colleagues stating that we might be moving towards a change in the Northern Ireland prison regime which might help the H-Block issue. It seemed that matters would be moving fairly quickly from now on.

BF 22/10/80

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PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would like to call on you to discuss his present thinking on the way ahead in Northern Ireland. He has suggested that the Home Secretary should also be present. I have agreed with his office that, subject to your agreement, Mr. Atkins should call on Thursday 23 October at 1500. Agree?

z

Yes      no      think

9 October 1980

Fixed up.  
No Bridging  
required.  
e.f.

14/10.



~~SECRET~~

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Ireland*

5



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

D B Omand Esq  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
London SW1

8 October 1980

*NBPA*

*Numb 8/14*

*Dear Sir,*

NORTHERN IRELAND FORCE LEVELS

Thank you for your letter of 24 September about the planned withdrawal of a further roulement unit in November this year.

As we both know, this matter had been the subject of detailed discussion between the two Departments, and my Secretary of State had already discussed the matter with the GOC and the Chief Constable. I can confirm formally that Mr Atkins is content with the proposed reduction. He notes that the units concerned are now being told.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10), Stephen Gomersall (FCO) and to David Wright in Sir Robert Armstrong's office.

*Yours sincerely,*

*R A Harrington*

R A HARRINGTON

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SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR  
NORTHERN IRELAND

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

6 October 1980

*Irish*

Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Whitehall  
London SW1A 2HB

*NISA*

*Print*

*Dear Francis,*

Thank you for your letter of 22 September setting out the conclusions we had jointly reached concerning military deployment in Northern Ireland. I agree that we can proceed realistically on this basis, and we will now be considering with the Chief Constable the complementary developments in the role of the RUC, their deployment, and the resources required.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Willie Whitelaw, Ian Gilmour and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours ever*

*Philip*

SECRET

**RESTRICTED**  
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*relat 2*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

M Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

*Prime Minister*  
*An unfortunate follow-up to*  
*your meeting with the widows*  
25 September 1980

*Dear Mike*

*MS.*

*to*  
*Wm*

*MAD 25/IX*

Roy Harrington spoke to you yesterday about the murder of Constable Johnston near Rosslea on Tuesday night. Mr Atkins thought the Prime Minister might wish to know that Constable Johnston, who was a full-time member of the RUC Reserve, was one of those identified as being at particular risk by the widows from Fermanagh who met the Prime Minister in June. Mr Johnston lived only a couple of hundred yards from the Border, and had already been identified by the RUC as being at particular risk: senior officers had drawn his attention to the dangers, and steps were taken to reduce the risk. Special security forces patrols were deployed in the area of his home (mostly covert, so we cannot refer to them publicly) and Mr Johnston's working hours were varied daily without notice to ensure that he did not have a regular pattern of behaviour. No doubt partly reflecting the advice he had been given by the RUC, Mr Johnston was on the point of moving home when he was murdered.

Although Mr Johnston's murder is no less callous and unpleasant than murders of off-duty policemen and UDR soldiers earlier this year, it does not seem likely that there will be a repeat of the public anxiety displayed in Northern Ireland early in the Spring, and in June. Much of that well-publicised anxiety was stimulated by Doctor Paisley, who, coincidentally, saw the Chief Constable the day before Mr Johnston's murder, and whose conduct then suggested that he was unlikely to try and exploit this incident. Perhaps equally significant, local councillors have been calling for calm in Fermanagh.

The Government's sympathy for the widow has been swiftly demonstrated by a visit from our Minister of State, Mr Michael Alison: Mr Alison was visiting Fermanagh on departmental business and his diversion to call on Mr Johnston's widow seems to have been well received locally.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Mike Hopkins*  
M W HOPKINS

**RESTRICTED**

SECRET

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 0 - 928 7022 218 2111/3

MO 19/3

24th September 1980

*mf*  
Prime Minister

*First fruits of the general  
policy set out in Mr Pym's  
larger note.*

Dear Roy,

NORTHERN IRELAND FORCE LEVELS

*MA 25/ix*

I understand that your Secretary of State has discussed with the GOC Northern Ireland and with the Chief Constable RUC a plan to withdraw a further roulement unit from Northern Ireland later this year, and that there is general agreement that the reduction should go ahead. I am writing to confirm that the Defence Secretary supports fully this further step which is entirely in line with our general policy.

The unit is the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards and they will be leaving their Belfast area of responsibility on 27th November. The bases they vacate - Flax Street Mill and the Grand Central Hotel - will then close down. We shall be informing the units concerned at the beginning of next week and our Departments are already working on a defensive press brief to be used if news of the redeployment leaks, though as with past reductions, we would not propose making an announcement in advance.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10), Stephen Gomersall (FCO) and to David Wright in Sir Robert Armstrong's Office.

Yours ever,

*David Omand*

(D B OMAND)

R A Harrington Esq

SECRET



Copy No 2 of 10

Page 1 of 3 pages

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000

DIRECT DIALLING 01-218 2111/3

MO 19/3

22<sup>nd</sup> September 1980

Dear Humphrey,

Prime Minister

Mr Pym reports his agreement with Mr Atkins on strategy for steadily reducing the Army's profile in Northern Ireland.

We have each been giving a great deal of thought in recent weeks to the progress of events in Northern Ireland and we agreed that I would set down our conclusions with regard to the deployment of the Army in Northern Ireland, which we have arrived at in full agreement between our two departments.

I use the word progress advisedly because I am sure that the Government can be encouraged at the way in which our policies are now evolving. These developments have been greatly assisted by your well-established machinery for co-ordination in Northern Ireland and the good understanding and total agreement on policy which now exists between our two departments, with the total support of the Chief Constable and the GOC. This accord has played a great part in what I believe we can justifiably claim as positive progress.

I believe that the foundations for the suppression of terrorism in the Province are now firmly laid. But it would be quite wrong in the light of past experience to be complacent or over-optimistic. However the signs are now that the PIRA are in some disarray. The relentless operations by the security forces and the growing pursuit of the terrorist through the Criminal Justice system is allowing us more and more to extend normal policing throughout the Province.

We are agreed that the development and extension of normal policing by the RUC is the focal point of security policy, and our continued aim must be to give them all the support they need while ensuring of course that we do not ask them to take on responsibilities which would run the risk of their developing again into a paramilitary force. It is clear not only that the RUC will require less support from the Army in future, but that a reduction in the Army presence on the streets will actually contribute to the policy of normality. In my view we have

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The Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP



already passed the point at which heavy military presence on the streets is invariably an advantage. I accordingly envisage, increasingly, a reduction of the Army's high-visibility framework operations (particularly in those areas where the RUC are making their greatest strides), thus taking the soldiers more and more out of the public eye while using them more selectively in the anti-terrorist effort.

This will have a particular bearing on the future requirement for roulement units on 4½ month tours, which are expressly intended for highly intensive and sustained operations and are less suited than resident units to a more intermittent style and tempo of operations. I am writing to you separately about the proposal, which I know has already been discussed with you and has your informal agreement, to withdraw a roulement unit from North Belfast in November this year. Given the present thrust on the part of the RUC, and assuming continued success against the terrorist, I think we would both expect to see a further roulement unit withdrawn from Northern Ireland in the Spring of next year and it may well be that we will be able to consider a further reduction by another roulement unit towards the end of next year. These adjustments in the force level may in turn lead to a change in our command arrangements allowing us to withdraw one brigade headquarters from the Province. An important benefit will be that we hope to be able to remove Rhine Army units from the roulement roster, leaving the residual commitment to be met by the permanent garrison and UKLF units. This relief to NATO assigned troops will be most welcome both to the Army and the Alliance.

Also, the current review of the role and future of the UDR should be completed so that it can be put into effect when the time is right.

We both agree that these optimistic intentions are very much subject to certain caveats. Much will depend on the threat from the IRA, both official and provisional, as well as from INLA and from the Loyalist terrorist organisations. This threat must inevitably be continually reassessed, month by month, for we cannot overlook PIRA's continuing ability to mount spectacular attacks, although we must be resolved not to over-react to these when they occur. Our intelligence effort, which has been a vital factor in the progress we have made so far, must be sustained; and its development would need to be considered in detail by the intelligence community. An ordered political development in Northern Ireland is also a necessary pre-requisite as is the continued amelioration, to the best of our ability within available resources, of the economic decline of the



Province. Over and above all, however, in importance is the attitude towards security co-operation adopted by the Dublin Government. The enhanced co-operation from the South continues to be crucial and we must keep the Haughey Government strong in its determination to act on its side of the border against terrorism.

All this said I must express my continuing admiration for the efforts of all those concerned with the formulation and execution of the Government's policies in the Province. I believe that we can take considerable satisfaction in the progress we have made thus far and I hope you will agree with me that we have established a realistic programme for deployment of the Army for the coming year which will complement the development of the RUC's capability.

We agreed that it is essential to preserve secrecy about our intentions with regard to Army deployment. This is an overriding requirement, for any leakage could well inspire a reaction within the Province and thus compromise our plans. We are also agreed that as these intentions are realised there must be the tightest possible co-ordination and control of information so that we speak with one voice about them.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, to Willie Whitelaw, Ian Gilmour and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Francis Pym



THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF  
STATE FOR DEFENCE FOR THE ROYAL NAVY

US of S (RN)/24/1/74

PRIME MINISTER

PAKISTANI CONTRACTORS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

When I dined with you in the House on 29 July I mentioned that I had missed your censure debate speech as I had been visiting 41 Commando Royal Marines in Ulster and that whilst there I had met a Pakistani contractor, known colloquially as a Char Wallah or Sutler.

... You expressed interest in these gentlemen and I have therefore prepared the attached note for your information.

U.S.

29 August 1980

ad

Ireland

for Print

Weekend Box

Prime Minister

(2)

Print  
mb.





NOTE ON PAKISTANI CONTRACTORS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. Although NAAFI operates in the main Northern Ireland Base Areas such as Lisburn, Holywood and Londonderry there are many places where they cannot get staff to serve and this gap is filled by Pakistani contractors (or 'Char Wallahs' as they are commonly known).

2. There are at present about 13 firms of Pakistani contractors serving 23 main, and numerous smaller, locations. Most of them come from the Birmingham area and seem to be related to one another, but this kinship does not stop them competing with each other for regimental contracts in the most recriminatory manner. A contract can be worth at least £5000 depending on the location and this money is paid into each Regimental Institute Fund. In return, the contractor supplies a hot meal/hot drink service 24 hours a day (another reason why NAAFI cannot compete), as well as selling a large selection of goods and reading material. In some locations the contractor also provides a barber. The contract is drawn up between the contractor and the unit and is approved by HQ, Northern Ireland. The system works well and everybody is satisfied.

3. Unfortunately they have also had their share of trouble. On 26 June 1973 a Pakistani contractor, Noon Bass Khan, was wounded in the Lonemoor Road, Londonderry, whilst travelling in his van and on 22 April 1974 Abdul Khalid, a relation of the contractor, was found shot dead in Crossmaglen. On 15 August 1979 two Pakistani contractors were wounded in Belfast on the Springfield Road.

4. Said Khan, the contractor who I met during my visit to 41 Commando, is a relative of Haji Ramatullah who, with the original but rival firm of Hamid Gul, has looked after the RM Commandos ever since the end of World War II. An article from a "Globe and Laurel" of 1959 is attached which gives a good account of how this relationship was established. Hamid Gul still lives in Birmingham (Ramatullah has retired to Pakistan) but his firm is run by a relation, Umar Shah. About three years ago the constant soliciting for contractors reached an unacceptable level and a modus vivendi was worked out whereby Umar Shah looked after 40 and 45 Commandos while Said Khan looked after 41 and 42 Commandos. This arrangement has worked well for two years although it is currently showing signs of wear and tear.

5. The relationship between the Royal Marines and these two firms of contractors has been a success story and has proved extremely beneficial to both parties. However, the contractors do not of course confine themselves to serving the Marines. Many Army units have a similar long association with 'unit sutlers' (as they are also called) and are looked after in very much the same way. Although their contracts are contested just as vigorously, the Army also values very highly the excellent service these sutlers provide to units, especially in Northern Ireland. The contractors do not operate in Great Britain but do offer their services in many overseas stations with the major exception of BAOR.

## HAMID GUL - *Honorary RM*

IT IS TRUE to say that Hamid Gul has "shared the fortune" of 3 Commando Brigade for a number of years. Hamid is a Pakistani contractor from Janozai, Peshawar District, where he was born on 25th December, 1927. He started his service career as a "char wallah" on the North West Frontier in 1939, and graduated to contractor to 44 Commando RM in Colombo in 1944.

He was next associated with the Corps in Malaya, 1950-1952, serving with 45 Commando RM at Sungei Patani, Kedah and Tapeh. It is his proud claim that almost every major jungle patrol was accompanied by a Hamid Gul "char wallah." Hamid's success and popularity during this time was built up by his credit system, whereby accounts were settled each week. He claims that no marine ever failed to settle his debt before leaving the unit.

When the Brigade moved to Malta in 1952, Hamid was not able to follow; however, he kept up a lively correspondence with Commanding Officers on notepaper headed "By appointment to Lieutenant Colonel F. A. Eustace, Royal Marines," until in 1956 he moved to Cyprus to work once again with 45 Commando.

When 45 returned to Malta in 1959, Hamid joined 4 M.L.B.U., ROAC in Cyprus, and he recently visited the United Kingdom to arrange the contract with 42 Commando RM when the unit moves to Singapore next year. During his visit he descended on the Royal Marines Office, and entertained the officers with many anecdotes from his vast experiences with the Corps.

Hamid's family, consisting of mother, father, four brothers, two sisters, wife, two sons and one daughter continue to live in Peshawar District, whilst Hamid functions as a modern camp follower and contractor to the Royal Marines.

Of Hamid Gul "Sandpiper" writes:—

### THE COMING OF HAMID GUL

It was a hot, stifling day in early August, 1950, the heat shimmered over the patches of oily water and in the haze, myriads of tiny flying insects wavered and hovered. High in the colourless sky a Crested Serpent eagle sailed, lonely, seemingly aimless in its search of prey.

Beyond the hazy, steamy thousand acres called Gibraltar Camp, the jungle cut off the outside world but for a furrowed track of deep red sand that twisted through the rubber trees towards the town of Sungei Patani in the state of Kedah.

Based in Gibraltar Camp, which those of long memory will liken to Passchendaele when it rained, as it frequently did with tropical thoroughness, was a Royal Marine Commando whose leisure requirements were catered for only by the more enterprising TQ's.

On the fringe of the grey-green cluster of rubber on the Western edge of Gibraltar Camp one early afternoon, appeared a figure, hesitating—unsure which way to turn. It peered first at the tents and bashas of the Gurkha training camp then, in turn, to the massed tents in the far distance.

Emerging from the vegetation of the Gheebang-Geng Estate, the figure, that of a dark-skinned man in his twenties, wearing a whitish coloured dhoti with an European jacket across the upper part and a bluish turban, arranged into a spike at the back, advanced across the strip of lallang to accost a green-clad Marine Commando, walking stick in hand, who was making his way towards the deepest part of the surrounding ulu.

Hamid Gul, for so the figure was named, was directed to the tent of the Second in Command.

That evening by the trackside in the centre of Gibraltar Camp, a bent figure with a battered frying pan squatted over a guttering fire. "Chip Banjos—Very good"—and very good they were too. The thin trickle of Marines swelled.

Within a week, Hamid Gul had a staff of two Pakistanis and his bill of fare included egg banjos, egg and beans, or even egg, beans and chips.

Within two weeks, an acquired IP Tent, complete with two Six-foot tables displayed a selection of tooth-brushes, soap, shaving cream and nutty. Outside, the further increased staff brewed hot sweet tea and fried suppers to an appreciable throng.

When 45 Commando moved from the state of Kedah, southwards to the jungles of Perak, Fighting Troops were often as much as fifty or sixty miles away from their parent HQ—and from the Base NAAFI which had opened up at Temoh Hill. To each Fighting troop and to each isolated section went one of Hamid's boys to "Set up shop."

How many can recall plodding back from a heavy day squatting to find by the roadside, a bearded char wallah with tea urn on one hip, a rusty Sten gun, which probably didn't work anyway, on the other and a grin from ear to ear as the Marines bantered and bartered and called him, among other things, a "Bewhiskered old Bandit."

In the smallest tented camp from Paradise Park to Colorado, there reigned a char wallah within his tent, surrounded by a galaxy of tea urns and all the good things that go to make life in the Outback more comfortable. His tent was always open from dawn—or even before dawn if the troop had an early call—until long after dark.

At Temoh Hill, the NAAFI did a roaring beer trade after dusk, but it was the old char wallah that dispensed early morning tea, that provided nutty and fags when the NAAFI was shut and provided them even if the Marines were temporarily out of funds.

In 1952, 45 Commando moved from Malaya to the Middle East. In war-torn Cyprus, the firm of Hamid Gul was in evidence, but it is the really early days that we remember best: the days when living was rough and a piping hot meal of egg and chips really went down well. It was in those days that Hamid Gul, the gentleman who came out of the jungle, made himself a name and really became a part of the Commando Brigade.



It was Malaya in the Jungle Operations—1951.

ES TO PM

*Ireland*

*Prime Minister*

RESTRICTED

*MAD*  
*27/8*  
*[Signature]*

GR 80  
R E S T R I C T E D  
FM F C O 261643Z AUG 80  
TO ROUTINE DUBLIN  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 106 OF 26 AUGUST  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND NIO(B)

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN REPORT ON PAGE 2 OF TODAY'S DAILY TELEGRAPH TO THE EFFECT THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ARE EXPECTED TO TABLE A RESOLUTION ON THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY CALLING ON BRITAIN TO DECLARE ITS INTENTION TO WITHDRAW ON A PHASED BASIS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND.
2. THE IRISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES RANG THE HEAD OF RID TODAY, ON INSTRUCTIONS, TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN THIS REPORT. HE ADDED THAT IT APPEARED TO BE A REPETITION OF A SIMILAR STORY WHICH APPEARED IN THE DUBLIN "SUNDAY PRESS" ON 24 AUGUST.

CARRINGTON

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED

RID  
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SECURITY DEPT  
PUSD  
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PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS  
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CHIEF CLERK  
MR ADAMS  
MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSON  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MISS BROWN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

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2

**10 DOWNING STREET**

PRIME MINISTER

Ian Paisley has sent you this copy of the DUP's response to the Government's proposals on Northern Ireland.

Humphrey Atkins has already seen him and will be seeing him again next month. In these circumstances there is not much you can say in a reply to Dr. Paisley. I have acknowledged on your behalf.

MS

19 August 1980

amp  
C. Ian Gow

19 August 1980

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 14 August enclosing a copy of your Party's response to the Government's proposals for devolved government in Northern Ireland.

I will of course place your letter and the document you enclosed before the Prime Minister as soon as she returns from her holiday abroad.

N. J. SANDERS

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.

DSG



14/8/80  
19

Dear Prime Minister,

I enclose a  
copy of the Response which  
my party have made to  
your government's proposals  
for devolved government  
in N. Ireland.

Sincerely,  
Jon Jones



# *Ulster Democratic Unionist Party*

296 ALBERTBRIDGE ROAD, BELFAST, BT5 4PY, NORTHERN IRELAND

Telephone: Belfast 56418/9

Telex: 748059

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THE RESPONSE OF THE ULSTER DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY  
TO HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION  
ON THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND

Presented to the Secretary of State  
for Northern Ireland  
August 1980

THE RESPONSE OF THE ULSTER DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY  
HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION  
ON THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND

INTRODUCTION

This Paper does not purport to be an exhaustive critique of the Government's Proposals; rather it deals only with some of the more salient points as they emerge in the Government's Document.

The Ulster Democratic Unionist Party, being committed to attaining a meaningful and acceptable form of devolution for Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, welcomes the fact of the publication of CMND 7950 "The Government of Northern Ireland Proposals for Further Discussion" as another step along the road to devolution. In this regard we note approvingly the declaration in paragraph 1 of H.M.G.'s hope "to put forward specific proposals for legislation in the next session of Parliament". We trust that this hope will be translated into positive action and that no time be lost in restoring to Northern Ireland workable and reasonable institutions which can enable locally elected representatives to discharge most of the functions of government presently administered in a colonial fashion from London. In this context we welcome H.M.G.'s continuing recognition of the inadequacies and inappropriate nature of Direct Rule as enunciated in paragraph 14. However, we would dispute the claim that Direct Rule has "achieved general acceptance in the Province". Rather it has been tolerated with increasing impatience over these past 8 years, but it has never been, nor will it ever be, accepted as a suitable method of government for Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.

THE WAY TO PEACE

We detect in certain portions of the Document, particularly in paragraphs 9, 21 and 41, evidence of a belief by H.M.G. that political developments can assist in restoring peace in Northern Ireland. Since it is the wanton terrorism of the Provisional I.R.A.



that denies peace to Northern Ireland, the logic of that belief is that the Provisional I.R.A.'s campaign of terror can be assuaged, if not defeated, by the application of some political formula.

As we warned at the Stormont Conference this is dangerous nonsense because no political action, short of the unthinkable - a surrender to the I.R.A.'s demand for a 32 County Republic - will cause the I.R.A. to go away. Essentially only a military defeat of terrorism will bring peace to Northern Ireland. Therefore those republican politicians in Northern Ireland who speak in terms of securing peace by political means and who insist that only adoption of their particular political policy will bring peace, are in reality seeking to hide behind the awful spectre of terrorism and are using the I.R.A. as a political battering-ram to try and persuade H.M.G. into acceptance of their point of view. Let H.M.G. ever remember that terrorism must be eradicated and not accommodated; and that political advantage must be won by argument and not blackmail.

The U.D.U.P. feels constrained to remind H.M.G. that if and when a devolved structure is established in Northern Ireland, of whatever nature, the I.R.A. will unleash a most horrific campaign of terror against it, and against the people of Northern Ireland, and that H.M.G. will need to prepare long and hard to frustrate and defeat their evil plans.

#### SECURITY AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONS

The U.D.U.P. welcomes the recognition in paragraph 11 that a new Northern Ireland administration "should not conduct its business either isolated or excluded from the concern for security which is pervasive" and therefore that "arrangements will thus be needed to give those (locally elected) representatives a voice in security matters". Since we view this issue as being of tremendous importance we are eager to explore further with H.M.G. how best the new Northern Ireland Government can be given a real influence in security matters, because without this its credibility will be so severely undermined as to make its task nigh impossible. We must say that the suggested Advisory

Council mentioned in paragraph 29 would be wholly inadequate for this purpose.

While the U.D.U.P. can face the reality that with the current involvement of the Army in Northern Ireland full Law and Order powers will not be conferred to local institutions in the immediate future, we feel it is imperative that the door should be kept most firmly open so that full Law and Order powers can be transferred at an appropriate time in the future. We therefore urge that in any Act establishing a Northern Ireland Assembly and Government, control over Law and Order should be specially categorised as a "Reserved Matter" so that unlike "Excepted Matters" it could in future become a "Transferred Matter".

In addition the matter could perhaps be submitted to annual parliamentary review so that the issue is kept alive in a manner somewhat akin to the way in which the Emergency Provisions Act and Direct Rule have needed annual renewal. In this way H.M.G. could demonstrate its good intentions on this vital matter and so make devolution without immediate security powers a more acceptable proposition.

However, pending a full transfer of law and order powers, the U.D.U.P. can see no reason why certain aspects of the criminal law could not be transferred immediately. We have in mind those areas which have no direct bearing on the security situation and which surely would be quite proper matters for local control. In this regard we note with hope that paragraph 11 speaks only of it not being realistic at present to confer on a Northern Ireland Administration "full responsibility for the criminal law and the Police and Prison Services". Partial responsibility therefore would seem to be possible and compatible with the Document. We therefore invite H.M.G. to advise us what areas of the criminal law and other related matters it would be prepared to devolve immediately.

Another important step which we feel could be taken to give the new Northern Ireland Assembly credibility, would be the ability to appoint members to the Northern Ireland Police Authority and to receive and debate the Chief Constable's Annual Report.

Most important of all some procedure must be devised to directly involve the Northern Ireland Government in the day-to-day control of security matters. So long as security remains the dominant concern of the people of Northern Ireland then so long will a government in Northern Ireland which has no effective say on security remain largely inept, despised and ineffective. Thus we repeat our suggestion that the Leader of the Northern Ireland Government should be involved along with the Secretary of State, the Chief Constable and the G.O.C. in the regular discussions which take place on security matters. If Law and Order is ever to be transferred to the Northern Ireland Institutions, then it is crucially important to have close liaison maintained between those who presently control security and the Northern Ireland Government; we feel this suggestion is the best way of doing this. To facilitate this exercise and in particular to ensure confidentiality the Chief Executive should be made a member of the Privy Council. Indeed, given the relationship of co-operation and confidence that will need generally to develop in a devolved system between the Secretary of State and the Chief Executive, membership of the Privy Council for the Chief Executive would appear essential so that the necessary exchanges can freely take place in confidence.

Furthermore as the 'Ulsterisation' of the security drive continues with more and more dependence on the R.U.C. and the U.D.R., it is surely politically sensible to develop a parallel involvement of the Northern Ireland Administration in security matters.

FINANCIAL MATTERS

In noting the various figures quoted in paragraph 12 we would make the following comments. The fact that public expenditure in Northern Ireland is 35% above that in G.B. is a reflection, not of unmerited privilege but of our special problems and needs in the fields of unemployment and social deprivation etc, which cannot be matched by other areas of the U.K. Therefore it is only but proper that public expenditure should be correspondingly higher in Northern Ireland, though there are other areas of the United Kingdom where per capita public expenditure is somewhat similar and those areas equally place "a considerable and rising cost on the tax payer". Just as that fact does not jeopardise the position of those other areas as parts of the United Kingdom so, too, we are sure H.M.G. was not suggesting that Northern Ireland's position should be questioned or valued in the context of cost. If self sufficiency were the determining factor in membership of the U.K. then it would be a much smaller country, consisting mainly of London and the South East. Furthermore, we would invite H.M.G. to confirm that the 56% quoted in paragraph 12, as representing the proportion of expenditure financed from local sources in Northern Ireland, takes no account of the many hidden contributions made to the U.K. Exchequer from Northern Ireland, for example, taxation of G.B. based companies with profit making branches in Northern Ireland.

In so far as the funding of expenditure by a Northern Ireland Administration is concerned, we re-affirm our belief that a grant-in-aid method should be used covering all transferred services such as was outlined in CGNI/27. We refer H.M.G. to our proposals made on this matter at the Conference as we feel they are consistent with the requirements of paragraph 13.

We must express some concern over the terminology used in paragraph 13 when it says "but a new Administration in Northern Ireland will have to be involved in deciding how best the public funds available to Northern Ireland shall be spent". The use of the phrase "involved

"deciding" suggests that the new Northern Ireland Administration will not in fact be empowered to make a definite decision on this matter, but will only be involved with others, perhaps the Secretary of State, in reaching a decision. If this were so it would be wholly unacceptable, as a Northern Ireland Government, subject only to the approval of the Northern Ireland Assembly, must be free to discharge the primary function of government in pursuing its own policies which would involve decisions on how much would be spent on the various aspects of government. Clearly the concept of parity will be an effective discipline in this exercise but nonetheless the Northern Ireland Government must be as free as possible within that restriction. Of course the Secretary of State will be involved in helping agree the annual grant needed each year and in securing as much as possible for Northern Ireland in Cabinet negotiations, but the expenditure of the money for transferred matters must at all times be the task solely of the elected Northern Ireland Government and Assembly.

#### THE S.D.L.P. VETO

In considering paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Document the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party notes H.M.G.'s contention, again repeated in paragraph 41, that "new institutions of Government which the minority community cannot accept as its institutions will not bring stability and so will not be worth having". A very fine sentiment no doubt, but one which ignores the fundamental difficulty in Northern Ireland, namely, that no institutions of government in Northern Ireland which keep us wholly within the United Kingdom, in accordance with the wishes of our people, would ever be accepted by the minority community, as represented by the SDLP, because that community as represented does not in the first place accept even the existence of Northern Ireland as a separate political and constitutional entity in Ireland and as an integral part of the U.K. Without first acceptance of the State there can be no acceptance of its institutions, and to date there continues to be no indication of any meaningful or unequivocal recognition of the State of Northern Ireland.

this day the SDLP leadership harp back to the establishment of Northern Ireland and maintain that it was an artificial creation which they do not accept, never mind support. Therefore it is 'pie in the sky' for H.M.G. to speak of a minority community, as represented by the SDLP, accepting the institutions of Northern Ireland when they cannot even accept the existence of Northern Ireland. Likewise the reference in paragraph 19 to "the shared interest of both communities in developing a stable, peaceful and prosperous country" is equally wishful thinking, exceeded only by the Government's fond hope expressed in paragraph 49 that to give the minority as of right places in government would cause them to accept the institutions of Northern Ireland.

The SDLP has made it abundantly clear that it desires a "process of integration" within Ireland and this of necessity involves Northern Ireland ceasing to be part of the U.K. As they made clear in their opening submission to the Conference, the SDLP's only interest in a government for Northern Ireland is as "one of the initial steps" in this process of integration in Ireland, designed to lead to an "agreed Ireland". It is clear therefore that there will be no acceptance of the institutions of government of Northern Ireland by the political leadership of the minority community, such as envisaged by H.M.G., as H.M.G.'s proposals are wholly within a United Kingdom context, whereas the SDLP are interested only in accepting institutions which put Northern Ireland on the road to an all Ireland. Recognition of this reality by the Unionist people of Northern Ireland is the fundamental reason why they will never consent to sharing executive power with the SDLP. They know that to do so would be to share power with those who desire to take Northern Ireland out of the U.K. and hence inevitably any government office held by the SDLP would be abused in the forwarding of that objective. Nonetheless, the Unionist people recognise that "fair and workable" institutions have to be created which afford to all, including those who refuse to accept them, all the protections and safeguards which could reasonably be required.

But H.M.G. is being naive in the extreme if it thinks it can create institutions for Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom which will be accepted by the current political leadership of the minority community. Indeed by setting such a yard-stick to measure the suitability of new institutions, the Government is effectively delivering an unconditional veto to the minority community on any progress towards devolved government for Northern Ireland within the U.K., and this is a veto which will be exercised most eagerly.

H.M.G. should not be ignorant of the fact that the SDLP have a vested interest in the failure of every conceivable suggestion for a devolved government for Ulster within the United Kingdom, including H.M.G.'s current proposals. So that, as has already happened, the SDLP can then say "We told you so, now face up to the fact that only joint Dublin/London action can solve the problem". By offering them such an open ended veto (the real unconditional guarantee) as is contained in paragraph 15 H.M.G. is falling into that trap and is ensuring that nothing it offers within the United Kingdom will or need be accepted by the SDLP.

#### THE UNION

The U.D.U.P. welcomes the re-affirmation of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the U.K. and the continuing intention of H.M.G. to respect our most fundamental of rights, the right to self determination. In this regard we congratulate H.M.G. for standing firm in the face of pressure from Dublin and elsewhere to deny the people of Northern Ireland this right to self determination. In particular we welcome the clear and sensible declaration of paragraph 19 that "the continued position of Northern Ireland within the U.K. is not something which the Government would use as a bargaining counter in order to secure agreement to a particular form of political institution". However, we must say that the stance of near neutrality adopted by H.M.G. on the Union must be a source of great hope and encouragement to the I.R.A., which could so easily have been denied

em by a declaration in favour of the Union as such by H.M.G. and not just a declaration of intention to respect the wishes of Northern Ireland, whatever they may be. As the I.R.A. struggles to break the Union it must encourage it to know that the British Government has of itself no desire to maintain the Union.

In paragraph 20 we are interested to note that H.M.G. seems to accept that to date the minority community have not accepted and respected the fact that Northern Ireland "cannot be separated from the rest of the U.K. without the consent of its people" and that only when it does so should the majority in response "ensure a positive role for the minority community in the arrangements for the government of Northern Ireland". Certainly the SDLP as representatives of the Minority have shown no real signs of accepting and respecting the right of Northern Ireland to exist as part of the U.K., else they could not have advised the Conference in their opening submission that their policy was for Dublin and London jointly to embark upon a process of integration within Ireland irrespective of the views of the Unionists of Northern Ireland. We remind H.M.G. that in their submission the SDLP, after presenting their scheme to produce an All Ireland, said this: "In making these proposals, the SDLP is aware that some parties in the North will initially refuse to participate in this process of creating a solution as they blindly refute the constructive and conciliatory Irish Dimension which it obviously contains. However, short-sighted intransigence must not be allowed to postpone further the political, economic and social stability which the people of Ireland, North and South, so desperately want and deserve. No longer can the veto of one small section of the Irish people be allowed to condemn the vast majority on the island, who wish to live in peace and agreement, to further decades of suffering and strife. The process must start and the dialogue continue without them while leaving the door open for their eventual participation." Where is the acceptance and respect that H.M.G. requires in paragraph 20 from the SDLP of the inalienable right of the people of Northern Ireland to refuse to be separated from the rest of the U.K.? Given the



consistent history of hostility by the political leadership of the minority, as epitomised by the current SDLP stance, to the state of Northern Ireland during its 60 years of existence and to the right of the majority of people in Northern Ireland to insist on remaining part of the U.K. is it any wonder that Unionists adamantly decline to share power in government with them?

Indeed since paragraph 20 puts minority acceptance of the right of the people of Northern Ireland to refuse to be separated from the rest of the U.K. as a pre-requisite to "a positive role for the minority community in arrangements for the government of Northern Ireland", we are inclined to regard paragraph 20, in the context of the SDLP stance, as a vindication of our stand against executive power sharing and as a realisation by H.M.G. that there should be no positive role in government for those, like the SDLP, who refuse to accept that the majority in Northern Ireland have an absolute right to insist on full and continuing membership of the U.K.

#### RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

In response to the exhortation of paragraph 20 that "it is in the interests of both communities to recognise and develop the links that exist between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland", and in response to paragraph 21, the U.D.U.P. would make it clear that while the people of Northern Ireland emphatically reject any institutionalised association or other constitutional relationship with the Republic of Ireland, they have no desire to live in hostility with their neighbours in the Republic of Ireland. But it must be for the people of Northern Ireland alone to decide what should be their relationship to the Republic. Therefore any developments in this direction can only follow the establishment of new institutions in Northern Ireland, when the elected Assembly would decide such matters. Most certainly the issue of the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic must play no part in the establishment of new political institutions in Northern Ireland.

While it is clear that there are areas where co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic could be mutually beneficial, it must be recognised that the constitutional claims made to Northern Ireland in the Constitution of the Republic, and the unreasonable attitude of various Dublin Governments to the vexed issue of extradition and security generally, will undoubtedly inhibit the extent to which co-operation can develop. So long as the Republic continues to operate as an 'Open House' for the Provisional IRA then so long will normal co-operation be rendered impossible. Proper economic co-operation in the nature of practical schemes of mutual benefit, such as one would expect between members of the EEC, could develop but would require a normalisation of relationships and in particular de jure recognition by the Republic of Ireland of the status of Northern Ireland and an abandonment of its claim to de jure sovereignty over Northern Ireland.

The Ulster Democratic Unionist Party is adamant that the new Northern Ireland Assembly and Government must be responsible for dealing with the Government of the Republic of Ireland on all transferred matters and we would not agree to Dublin/London negotiations to the exclusion of Belfast on such issues. We therefore feel it is imperative for the Northern Ireland Assembly to have legislative power to deal directly and effectively with the Dublin Government on such matters.

In respect of other external relationships the U.D.U.P. believes it would be the responsibility of H.M.G. in consultation with the Government of Northern Ireland to ensure that the interests of Northern Ireland are adequately represented in international affairs. In particular with the growing importance of the EEC and other international organisations it may be necessary to have direct representation in Brussels and New York, similar to that obtained in the Home Office after 1940 when an Assistant Secretary from the Northern Ireland Cabinet Office was seconded for service. And when a United Kingdom Minister is negotiating in Brussels on matters in which Northern Ireland has an interest, his Northern Ireland counterpart should attend with him.

OUTER FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT

1. The Ulster Democratic Unionist Party wholeheartedly endorses the recommendation in paragraph 25 for one Province-wide elected Assembly of approximately 80 members.
2. Paragraph 26 recommends STV as the method of Election on the basis of "the special political considerations that apply in Northern Ireland". Unfortunately the Document does not explain what these considerations are and therefore we invite H.M.G. to explain this paragraph more fully. If this was a polite way of saying that under STV the minority community might have more representatives elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly than under a "first-past-the-post" system we would simply remind H.M.G. that the percentage of anti-unionist members elected to the former Northern Ireland Parliament by the "first-past-the-post" method at any election during its history was approximately the same as the percentage elected by STV to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1973 and to the Northern Ireland Convention in 1975. We again, as we did at the Conference, must object to the use of STV as it produces unwieldy, impersonal constituencies with up to 8 representatives, and as it is a system which does not even achieve the representation for tiny parties which PR is designed to secure. We again recommend to H.M.G. a modified list system, which would combine the advantages of the "first-past-the-post" system with a Party List System that provides a high degree of proportionality. In making this recommendation we remind H.M.G. that when STV was introduced to Northern Ireland in 1973 the then Secretary of State, Mr Whitelaw, told the House of Commons that "there is no reason for not changing it if at a suitable time it is thought right that such a change should be made" (Official Report. 16/4/73 Vol. 855 col.164). We suggest that this juncture of a new beginning in devolution for Northern Ireland is a suitable time for change and that the modified list system would be a better choice. However, if STV is persisted with, then we insist that a drastic review of the representation from the 12 constituencies takes place,

because since its introduction in 1973 massive population changes mean that if the same number of representatives were elected from the 12 constituencies as in 1973 then some would be grossly over-represented while others would be grossly under-represented.

3. Paragraph's 27 indication that essentially the powers transferred in 1973 should be transferred again is in our opinion the bare minimum acceptable and we would be eager to ensure that the changes to take account of subsequent developments, which are referred to in paragraph 27, would not involve a reduction in the powers to be transferred. We again remind H.M.G. that law and order etc should be categorised as a "Reserved Matter" so that at the earliest opportunity it can be transferred. Indeed we wish to see the list of matters to be wholly excepted from devolution to be as small as possible and we suggest that only those matters which were excepted in both 1920 and 1973, with all other matters being either reserved or transferred.
4. We can understand and accept the matters covered in paragraph 28.
5. We require substantial clarification on the appointment, operation and function of the Advisory Council suggested in paragraph 29. We are opposed to the creation of a body which in the public mind would be thought to have powers in the areas that it debated, but which in reality would be powerless and a mere talking shop. We have no interest in setting up a body of local representatives who would take the brick-bats for the Secretary of State's decisions but which would have no power to change the policy. Public responsibility without power for Northern Ireland politicians over such crucial issues as law and order might suit Westminster very well, but it is of no interest to the U.D.U.P. We can also see dangers of this body being exalted to a position where it might be seen to overshadow the Northern Ireland Executive and, as that would be intolerable, we are not in the least impressed by the proposition. A better proposition in our view would be for the Assembly itself to form a Subject

Committee to discuss and advise on all non-transferred matters. To properly exercise these functions the committee would need to be able to consult directly, if necessary in camera, with the Secretary of State. This Committee as a microcosm of the whole Assembly largely could serve the same purpose as the Advisory Council but still maintain the "sovereignty" of the Assembly and the standing of the Executive.

6. The Ulster Democratic Unionist Party unreservedly endorses the suggestion of legislative powers for the Northern Ireland Assembly contained in paragraph 31.

Likewise we endorse the recommendation in paragraph 31.

8. We welcome the suggested Departmental Committees of the Assembly, outlined in paragraph 32, believing that such powerful committees will inevitably induce a better standard of government and altogether the most equitable of systems. Since it is the wide powers of these committees that would give them their teeth rather than their method of composition, we feel committees proportionally representative of the Assembly would be most appropriate irrespective of the method of selecting the Executive. But, as we indicated at the Conference, the U.D.U.P. is not unalterably opposed to committees composed 50% of Government supporters and 50% of Opposition, if it is felt that such committees would afford better protection to minorities. Though if such composition prevailed it must be remembered at all times that it is wholly artificial and hence nothing should be contemplated which would allow such artificial creations to permanently frustrate the expressed will of the democratically elected Assembly.

We are particularly interested to hear how H.M.G. would envisage the appointment of the Committees, their Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, especially how it would be determined which members of the Assembly were Government supporters and which were Opposition supporters for

the purposes of appointing these Committees. We would suggest that the vote of approval which would follow the establishment of the Executive in the Assembly should be used to divide the Assembly into two electoral colleges: one consisting of all members who voted in support of the Government and the other consisting of all other members, whether they had voted against the Government or abstained. Then within each college a PR Election should take place to fill the allotted 50% of the places on each committee. With the Chairmanships and Vice Chairmanships allocated perhaps on an annually alternating basis by a Selection Panel Committee. We also wish to hear the Government's view on the proper number of members for each Committee and on the voting powers of the Chairmen.

We note that paragraph 57 describes as 'inadequate' the role provided in scrutiny and watchdog committees for those not in government under Option 2, yet this is the only possible role envisaged by H.M.G. for a loyalist minority which refuses to join in a proportionate government under Option 1. All of which only underscores the fact that a power sharing system can have no effective or adequate role for a minority which on principle refuses to enter the government, whereas a more positive role can be created for those not in government under a majority rule type system.

9. We regret that following the detailed discussion on the question of powers of appeal at the Conference and other related matters, H.M.G. did not feel able to say something more definite in paragraph 33. Furthermore we take strong exception to the indication that the form of the various appeals against discrimination by the Assembly or the Executive would depend on "the shape of the arrangements adopted for the formation of the Executive". Are we to conclude then once more that a loyalist minority outside a Government formed under Option 1 would be afforded less safeguards and protections than a minority outside a Government formed under Option 2? Surely a loyalist minority is just as worthy of protection as a republican minority?

Having noted that paragraph 33 indicates that existing safeguards

and remedies against discrimination should be maintained (that is Part 111 of the 1973 Act) we fail to understand how in addition there may need to be some form of appeal to the Secretary of State or Westminster against allegedly discriminatory acts on the part of the Assembly or Executive, since already under the provision of the 1973 Act such matters can be appealed. By virtue of section 19 of the 1973 Act, discrimination by a Minister is outlawed with a remedy through the Courts. Then section 18 gives the Secretary of State power to refer any provision of the Assembly to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to see if it might be discriminatory. So there obviously is adequate existing machinery for appeals against allegedly discriminatory actions by either the Assembly or the Executive. Any additional appeals, such as suggested in paragraph 33, would be superfluous and indeed a slight on the existing judicial process. The U.D.U.P. feels most strongly that all appeals should be to a judicial body rather than a political body and so on that score, also, we would oppose the additional suggestion of paragraph 33.

We feel a much better way to strengthen the existing procedure is to take up the suggestion, originally made in paragraph 36 of the Working Paper, of allowing a fixed minority of members in the Assembly to activate the existing referral process and so force the Secretary of State to act on allegedly discriminatory provisions or actions. In so far as the size of the stated minority is concerned we repeat our contention, made at the Conference, that it must not be an insignificant number and therefore we would suggest 33% of the elected Assembly.

#### MAJORITY RULE

The D.U.P. is not in the least impressed by H.M.G.'s attack on the Westminster system of Majority Rule and as democrats we find it particularly offensive for H.M.G. in paragraph 44 effectively to say that because it dislikes the result which the ballot box throws up in Northern Ireland, in free and fair elections, that the system

has to be altered to circumvent that result. That is a most calculated slur and slight on the majority of people in Northern Ireland and on the fundamental tenet of democracy. But for this Government, of all governments, to declare such a conclusion on the basis of the reasoning of paragraph 43 is the height of hypocrisy. Because there we are told that because of the "special features of political life" in Northern Ireland, namely the existence of a permanent minority, straightforward majority rule must be suppressed. But did not this same Government promote and encourage the establishment of a majority rule constitution in Rhodesia where there is a permanent white minority with no prospect of ever being elected to government? We therefore invite H.M.G. to explain how if majority rule is suitable for Rhodesia with its permanent minority it is not suitable for Northern Ireland? In Rhodesia the protection of the minority is attained not by guaranteeing them places in government but by special procedures within the elected Assembly. In Northern Ireland a not dissimilar situation exists so why is a true majority rule executive not also permitted?

The U.D.U.P. also rejects the unexplained conclusion in paragraph 45 that the nature of the task of Government in Northern Ireland justifies departure from the Westminster Model of Majority Rule. Even if a devolved Assembly and Government does have a "strong managerial element" what justification is that for saying that the way an elected majority wish to manage those affairs should be tempered and frustrated by the enforced imposition of the policies of those who lost the election? In our view this is a wholly spurious argument that significantly was never raised during the discussion of similar devolution for Scotland.

H.M.G. having lambasted Westminster Majority Rule in Northern Ireland as a failure, the U.D.U.P. was amazed to find that one of the alternative suggestions which H.M.G. made for Northern Ireland was a system essentially the same as one that failed so miserably after less than five months. How incredible that in place of a



system which lasted for 52 years H.M.G. offers a system that  
could be established after just five months.

#### OPTION 1: ENFORCED EXECUTIVE POWER-SHARING

We now come to the two options put forward in the Document in relation to the formation of the Executive. We note first of all that they are alternative approaches and therefore one is as effective as the other in meeting H.M.G.'s requirements on the involvement of the minority. We must express our displeasure at the fact that in presenting two options H.M.G. offered in one of them full-blooded Executive Power Sharing, but in the other did not offer the alternative course, namely uninhibited Majority Rule.

This action has placed the Unionist people at a disadvantage in entering negotiations, since we alone have been asked to enter discussions on the basis of having already conceded important ground.

Now firstly in relation to option number one, let us make it clear that we have no interest in discussing this option nor have we any intention of doing so, apart from once more for the record stating the reasons for our implacable opposition to it. We view this option as no improvement whatever on the iniquitous system which prevailed after Sunningdale, and, since that type of government has already been rejected in total by the people of Northern Ireland, we are not going to waste time discussing it further. There are simply no circumstances in which the U.D.U.P. would ever agree to such <sup>an</sup> enforced power sharing government, nor are there any circumstances in which we would ever serve in such a government. Quite simply we will never sit in government with republicans, such as the SDLP, whose only interest is to destroy the constitutional link which we cherish for this Province.

Any attempt to establish such a government as outlined in option 1 would be vehemently resisted by us. We would contest any election on a platform of committed and unrelenting opposition to such a scheme and if we received majority support we would have demolished the system,

and if we received only minority support we would sit in opposition the power sharing government and seek at every turn to frustrate and defeat it. So let H.M.G. get the message clear and plain, we are not going down the road of option 1 even one inch.

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All the reasons we gave against enforced Executive power sharing at the Conference still stand and apply with equal force to option one, therefore again for the record let us spell them out:-

- (1) There could be no collective responsibility between the members of the Government since they would not owe their position to an electoral mandate or to the choice of the Prime Minister, but to a constitutional guarantee quite distinct from the will of the electorate.
- (2) The Government would not be responsible to the Assembly or to the people if there was a constitutional guarantee that Group A would always be in Government. It would not be possible for the people to change such a government as neither they nor the Assembly would ever be able to vote Group A out of office. In other words, democratic government would cease to exist.
- (3) Every group in government would have an effective veto on every government decision.
- (4) There could be no effective Opposition as in its purest form power-sharing envisages all parties being involved in Government and without an effective Opposition Parliamentary Government becomes a laughing-stock and meaningless.
- (5) A constitution which ensured power-sharing would fail if at a future election a majority of the new Parliament refused to operate the guarantees. No constitutional device can overcome a resolute refusal by a majority of the people to operate it, outside a totalitarian framework. The experiences of 1974 should have taught all concerned that fundamental lesson.

A constitution guaranteeing power-sharing would provide no impetus or incentive for change with regard to political allegiances. It could freeze and fossilize existing party structures and in short institutionalise sectarianism in Government.

- (7) Whereas in countries like Belgium power-sharing has in a measure been acceptable and able to function, it could not operate on the same basis in Northern Ireland because one of the parties with whom power would have to be shared does not unequivocally support the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, and indeed is working to establish the sovereignty of a foreign state over this territory, nor do they give their support to the security forces. To share power in the Cabinet with such people would be a recipe for total disaster and could never be contemplated by the D.U.P., nor should it be advocated by any right-thinking Government.
- (8) Power-sharing makes a mockery of the principle of receiving a mandate. When the electorate endorses the policy of a party they have the right to expect that policy to be implemented. The complications and other considerations involved in a power-sharing administration cannot guarantee the implementation of such a mandate, but rather would produce the ludicrous situation of attempts to implement conflicting mandates.
- (9) Because a power-sharing government would be dependent on so many differing parties it would be a totally ineffective government, unable to move in any direction less it offended one group or another. Whereas H.M.G. has said it requires 'efficient' government.
- (10) It would mean that a majority in electoral terms would cease to have the rights of a majority and therefore such a proposal as enforced power-sharing would be contrary to H.M.G.'s professed

commitment to giving recognition to the rights of the majority. In power-sharing a majority is treated the same as if it were a minority - that is wrong. A Majority must be a Majority and treated as such.

(11) Power-sharing as of right is at total variance with the fundamental concept of 'free elections', as it renders the purpose and outcome of such meaningless. Those who want all parties in Government, irrespective of the election results, should come clean and advocate an end to what would then be the 'farce' of holding elections at all. What is the use of an election as a test of public opinion and as a means of allowing the people to decide who governs them and who does not if the outcome is to be ignored?

(12) Most significantly power-sharing proved not to be the remedy for our troubles in 1974, despite the promises of its advocates. So it is a failed system, to which there should be no return. We are searching for a system acceptable to the people of Northern Ireland, they have most emphatically rejected power-sharing. We must never forget 1974, nor the outcome of every election since then.

For these reasons this Party will never countenance support of, or involvement in, enforced Executive power-sharing.

Hence it is of mere academic interest to us as to which of the methods of formation suggested in paragraphs 47 and 48 could be followed to create this 'trojan horse'. However we must deal with the 'tongue-in-cheek' suggestion in paragraph 47 that a direct election of the Executive would preserve "the primacy of the ballot box" and also the comment in paragraph 48 that in either case of appointment "faith would be kept with the ballot box, since the composition of the Executive would reflect the views of the electorate". One of the most crucial functions of the ballot box through the years has been to

enable the electorate to vote against a particular person or party and to turn a party out of government, but under either suggested system of election this fundamental right would be denied the electorate. Therefore it is utterly improper, if not dishonest, to speak of <sup>Keeping</sup> faith with the ballot box, since the message from the ballot box that Party 'A' is not wanted in government is to be deliberately ignored and defied. So much for reflecting the views of the electorate! Likewise it is not the primacy of the ballot box that is upheld by option 1 but the primacy of the rigged provision of the Constitution Act which says that whether you like it or not you must have all parties in government.

Responding to the appeal in paragraph 49 to consider whether a proportional system of government "would not be the best way to unite both sides of the community in support of new political institutions" we must repeat what we've already said namely that on the basis of the SDLP's proposals to the Conference, and on the basis of republican attitudes for 60 years, it is not possible to attain support from the current political representatives of that community for new political institutions which are wholly within the U.K. Thus in seeking that, H.M.G. is involved in a time wasting exercise, because to succeed Republicans have in reality to become Unionists. Therefore H.M.G. is deceiving itself in its belief, enunciated in paragraph 49, that places in government for the minority would cause it to accept and support the institutions of Northern Ireland as part of the U.K. But even if places in government did induce an acceptance by representatives of the minority community of the institutions of Northern Ireland, of what real value would that acceptance be since it certainly could not be described as genuine as it would be induced by the prospect of office? To be convincing and genuine the minority's acceptance of the institutions would need to be unconditional and proven over a considerable period of time. But just as places in the Government of Northern Ireland in 1973/4 was not enough for the political representatives of the minority, so today, unless tied in with an institutionalised Irish

Dimension, the SDLP are not interested. Therefore in recognition of this reality H.M.G. should bend all its efforts to create a realistic and workable system of government, consistent with basic democratic principles, with all the safeguards and protections which are practicable, and which can be seen by the world to be fair and reasonable.

In this regard we can see some hope in option 2.

OPTION 2: A FORM OF MAJORITY RULE.

There are aspects of option 2 which we reject, but as a basis for discussion we find option 2 generally acceptable insofar as it preserves the crucial notion of the party or parties with a majority in the Assembly forming the Executive.

Before entering into detailed discussion of option 2 let us note with approval the declaration by H.M.G. in paragraph 53 that "the Government believes that the holding of Executive seats is not the only way for minority representatives to participate in and influence the process of government in both the legislative and executive form". We welcome the acceptance of this contention, which we maintained at the Conference, and we reaffirm that our Party has no desire to exclude minority elected representatives from the process of influencing Government, nor do we wish to deny the minority any of the safeguards and protections which all minorities should rightly enjoy.

We endorse and welcome H.M.G.'s rejection of the notion of an Executive being subjected to a weighted majority vote of confidence in the Assembly. Such would be totally unacceptable to us as it would inevitably lead to the type of government which we have already rejected under option 1. A workable form of government is essential for Northern Ireland and a weighted majority condition would certainly make that possible. While option 2 is acceptable insofar as it preserves the fundamental concept of Majority Rule, it would not be in the least acceptable if matters were so arranged as to undermine the Executive and frustrate its performance of the functions of

government. The Executive as democratically based must be allowed to govern. In this regard we are particularly concerned about the contents of paragraph 56 when it says that minority parties should "share responsibility for the administration sufficiently to satisfy themselves that the interests of the minority community are adequately reflected in the decisions of government". That appears to be saying that a minority must have the position of a majority and must not only safeguard itself, which is a legitimate exercise, but be able to insist that its views are reflected in the legislation and administration of the Province. Such a proposition is totally and completely unacceptable to the U.D.U.P. The ballot box should decide who will be in government and then those selected must be free to govern by implementing their own mandated policies, rather than being forced to implement the policies of those rejected for government by the electorate. Of course the minorities and their interests have to be protected but they cannot be put in the position of saying that unless they are satisfied that their policies and views are reflected in the actions of the government they will not work the system. On this point we note with hope the response of the Minister of State, Mr Alison, in replying to the Parliamentary Debate on 9th July, when he indicated that H.M.G. was content with ensuring that the minority parties were able to satisfy themselves that the interests of the minority community are adequately protected or safeguarded rather than reflected in the decisions of the Government. That alteration would meet our point of objection, but as it is such a crucial matter we require the Secretary of State to clarify H.M.G.'s precise position on this point.

#### COUNCIL OF ASSEMBLY

We now come to deal with the proposed Council of the Assembly. While we do not accept the view in paragraph 57 that the powerful back-bench scrutiny committees are not adequate to afford the minority parties the influence and safeguards which they could reasonably require, we nonetheless are prepared to countenance a Council of the Assembly, provided its powers are not such as to render meaningful government impossible or to turn democratic government into a farce. The role

and powers of the Council of the Assembly are therefore crucial to its acceptability or otherwise.

Straightaway we must make the point that by virtue of its composition on a 50/50 basis between Government and Opposition this Council of the Assembly is an artificial, if not a gerrymandering creation, which does not relate to the strength of the parties in the elected Assembly. Therefore it would be intolerable to permit such a body to stand in the way of the democratically expressed will of the electorate so as to frustrate without restriction the actions and wishes of the appointed Government of the Assembly. The democratically composed Assembly must at all times be able to implement its policies and must not be held to ransom or vetoed by any undemocratic creation. This leads us to unreservedly oppose the suggestion in paragraph 58 of blanket blocking powers for the Council of the Assembly in regard to all legislation and the Public Expenditure Programme. We just could not contemplate a Bill or a Public Expenditure Programme, which had been approved by the people's elected representatives in the Assembly, being killed off by any Council in which the majority of the Assembly were deliberately under-represented and the minority of the Assembly deliberately over-represented. Such an exercise would demean democracy and do untold harm to the principle of democratic control through free elections. So blanket blocking powers for the Council of the Assembly are anathema to the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party and would make an already difficult package impossible to recommend to the Unionist people.

The primacy of the Assembly must be maintained at all times. Under the 1920 Act a procedure existed for when the Senate twice rejected a Bill whereby a joint meeting of the two Houses could be convened and a vote taken on the issue; in this way the Senate as a non-elected House was denied a total blocking power. Similarly some way, though clearly a different way, must be found to ensure that the undemocratic Council of the Assembly cannot frustrate the work of the elected House. However we do not wish to see the Secretary of State involved in this process, as suggested in paragraph 58, as he would be subject to too many political pressures and which ever way he moved his standing and



position would suffer in the Province.

Given that the Council of the Assembly is already deliberately disproportionate in its composition to the strength of the parties in the elected Assembly it would be quite improper for the Northern Ireland Government to have to cross a double hurdle of needing 50% plus 1 approval for its legislation etc within such a body. That quite clearly would give the Opposition the double advantage of having an unmerited number of members in the Council and then even with that the ability by simply holding together to block and frustrate the Government. This simply is not the basis for fair and workable Government, rather it is a sure recipe for irresponsible Opposition muscle-flexing and wanton obstruction which would discredit the democratic process and bring government to a standstill. Clearly with the weighted composition of the Council the onus should be on the Opposition to muster up the 50% plus 1 if it wishes to block a Government measure - similar to the power to delay and refer back legislation which presumably would work on the basis of the Opposition having to get 50% plus 1. Why should it be easier for the Opposition to block a Government Bill than to refer it back for further consideration? Surely the opposite should be the case if H.M.G. desires to encourage consultation and consensus. We trust therefore that H.M.G. will seriously re-consider this matter because it appears clear to us that by demanding 50% plus 1 in the Council of the Assembly for the Government to get its legislation passed H.M.G. is creating a charter for irresponsibility which will cripple democratic government and defeat the intended purpose.

We note that it is suggested that all legislations as well as the Public Expenditure Programme should come before the Council for approval. We can see no purpose in every Bill having to come before the Council, since each Bill during its passage through the Assembly will have to pass through the relevant Departmental Committee, also composed on a 50/50 basis. We would therefore suggest that instead of every individual Bill coming before the Council only the Assembly's equivalent to the 'Queen's Speech' should be passed to the Council along

with the Public Expenditure Programme. Therefore the delaying powers and referral powers in relation to individual pieces of legislation would be exercised not by the Council of the Assembly but by the relevant Departmental Committee. This would leave the Council of the Assembly with general advisory powers, which unlike H.M.C. in paragraph 58 we do not underestimate, referral powers in relation to matters which are allegedly discriminatory and consideration of the annual Public Expenditure Programme and the annual 'Queen's Speech', with the powers in this regard tempered by an inability to permanently block progress in the face of Assembly opposition.

Such a system would we believe in the words of paragraph 59 "mark the effective involvement of the minority and secure it a powerful voice in the formulation of policy decisions about the government of the Province and in day-to-day administration".

Having considered and accepted the indication in paragraph 57 that the Chairman of the Council of the Assembly would have no additional voting powers, and realising that deadlock is not unlikely on occasions and that its consequences are undesirable, we would suggest that a better way, which could avoid some of the deadlock and somewhat defuse the situation, might be to have the Council of the Assembly chaired by the Speaker of the Assembly who on occasions of deadlock could use his vote in accordance with the established precedents of parliamentary procedure.

#### THE WAY AHEAD

Since it is abundantly clear that in any elected N.I. Assembly there is always going to be at least a substantial loyalist minority opposed on principle to a power-sharing government, which minority would never join such a government as envisaged in Option 1, and since Option 1 has no "adequate" role for such a minority, and as Option 1 can only succeed in the absence of dissent, is it not evident that the only possible way forward is to legislate for a system based

a refined Option 2? Then the people of Northern Ireland can decide from election to election whether they want to support those who wish to practice executive power-sharing or those who do not. If the power-sharers secure majority support then a power-sharing executive can be formed under Option 2, and those opposed to it can have an adequate and meaningful role by availing themselves of the lavish machinery of Opposition. And if at the next election the electorate give majority support to anti-power-sharers then the roles would be reversed but the structures would remain unaffected. But under Option 1 the structures could not survive such a change of opinion by the electorate. Not only has Option 1 the glaring and irreparable weakness of having no adequate role for an anti-power-sharing minority but it can only survive so long as it encounters suitable election results. Whereas in Northern Ireland we desperately need stability and therefore we need to create a system capable of surviving all election results. Only a system based on the essentials of majority rule can do this.

Furthermore, only the establishment of such a system can be sure to keep faith with the recognition by H.M.G. in its document that any structures to be "lasting and workable" must be acceptable firstly to the majority of the Northern Ireland people and then to the majority of the elected Assembly members.

The establishment of a workable and acceptable Option 2 type system by H.M.G. does not rule out executive power-sharing, rather it gives the electorate the choice of executive power-sharing or majority rule, with the ability to change its mind. Option 1 offers neither of these democratic facilities, but rather denies both.

Therefore H.M.G. should proceed to sponsor legislation for devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, based on the workable and acceptable aspects of Option 2. Then when the legislation is passed it should be submitted for approval to the Northern Ireland electorate in a referendum.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3761 OF 13 AUGUST 1980

AND TO CABINET OFFICE (FOR JIS) BOX 500

SECRET TO PM

NORTHERN IRELAND: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CASES AGAINST NORAID AND THE IRISH PEOPLE

1. THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HEARING THE U S GOVERNMENT'S CASE AGAINST THE NEWSPAPER, THE IRISH PEOPLE, HAS RULED THAT THE CASE WILL BE DISMISSED UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MAKES AVAILABLE TO THE DEFENCE 250 PAGES OF DOCUMENTS WHICH HAVE SO FAR BEEN WITHHELD UNDER THE U S GOVERNMENT'S STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE. THE JUDGE HAS FOUND THAT, WHILE THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS ENTITLED TO WITHHOLD THE DOCUMENTS, IT CANNOT AT THE SAME TIME BOTH UNDERTAKE PROSECUTION AND INVOKE ITS GOVERNMENTAL PRIVILEGES TO DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT BE MATERIAL TO THE DEFENCE. (THIS STRIKES US AS AN EXAMPLE OF QUOTE GREYMAIL UNQUOTE).

2. THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT ARE DESCRIBED BY THE DEFENCE AS INDICATING QUOTE WHEN AND WHERE UNNAMED AGENCIES OF THE BRITISH OR IRISH GOVERNMENTS HAD COMMUNICATIONS OR DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICAN AGENCIES, OR OFFICERS, WHICH MIGHT HAVE RESULTED IN, STIMULATED, OR LED TO THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE INVESTIGATION BY AMERICAN AGENCIES OF THESE AMERICAN CITIZENS' ACTIVITIES ON AMERICAN SOIL, AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THOSE COMMUNICATIONS UNQUOTE.

3. AS ALREADY REPORTED ON OTHER CHANNELS, ALL THE REMAINING DOCUMENTS INVOLVED (WHICH HAVE BEEN SEEN IN PRIVATE BY THE JUDGE) ARE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DOCUMENTS WHOSE RELEASE MUST BE OUT OF THE QUESTION.

4. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAVE ASSURED US THAT NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH ORIGIN OF THE DOCUMENTS WILL BE MADE BY THE JUDGE IF HE DISMISSES THE CASE AGAINST THE IRISH PEOPLE ON 18 AUGUST (THE DATE BY WHICH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE THE DOCUMENTS). THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARE, HOWEVER, CLEARLY CONCERNED AT THE PROSPECT OF LOSING THEIR CASE AGAINST THE IRISH PEOPLE AND AT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE CASE AGAINST NORAID (WALL'S LETTER TO PARRAMORE OF 3 APRIL). THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROSECUTOR HAS WONDERED TO US ALOUD WHETHER SOME OF THE DOCUMENTS OF LOWER CLASSIFICATION MIGHT BE PRODUCED IN COURT TO SATISFY THE DEFENCE. WE HAVE SAID (AS ALREADY MADE CLEAR IN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS ASPECT ON OTHER CHANNELS) THAT, APART FROM THE INTRINSIC SENSITIVITY OF THE DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES, ANY REVELATION OF ANGLO-US INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION OVER NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD BE EXTREMELY DAMAGING.

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5. THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE CASES AGAINST THE IRISH PEOPLE AND NORAID IS IN OUR INTEREST AS BOTH CASES WOULD PUBLICLY AND FORMALLY POINT UP THE LINKS BETWEEN NORAID AND THE PROVISIONAL IRA. BUT THESE SUCCESSES WOULD BE MORE SIGNIFICANT AS PROPAGANDA THAN FOR ANY PRACTICAL INHIBITION ON NORAID'S ACTIVITIES, AND THE BENEFITS OF SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION WOULD BE FAR OUT-WEIGHED BY THE DAMAGE DONE BY THE REVELATION OF SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS IN COURT. WHILE THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARE RELUCTANT TO SEE YEARS OF EFFORT PUT AT RISK, I BELIEVE THEY SEE THE GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEM. THEY CANNOT, IN ANY CASE, ACT WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE FBI, WHICH WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING WITHOUT UK CONSENT.

6. TEXT OF JUDGES FINDING FOLLOWS BY BAG.

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PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
~~KENNETH STOWE~~  
SIR KENNETH STOWE KCB CVO

PUS/64/B

12 August 1980

N Sanders Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

Pus

*Down Mr Sanders*

Clive Whitmore told me (following his letter to Roy Harrington of 5 August) that he would be glad to have ideas which he might put forward to the Prime Minister for background reading with regard to Northern Ireland in the wider context of Anglo/Irish relations.

I am now enclosing two lists: and, in case this is helpful, copies of the material referred to.

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If there is any further information we can give, please do not hesitate to ask.

*Yours sincerely,  
Ken Stowe*

K R STOWE

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Lord Cameron was appointed by the NI Government of Terence O'Neill to report on the disturbances of the autumn of 1968 which mark the beginning of the present phase. He concluded (pages 91-96) that well documented discrimination by Unionist local authorities had given rise to a continuing sense of injustice and grievance among large sections of the Catholic population.

(c) The Downing Street Declaration (August 1969)

A Declaration by Mr Wilson's Government following the sending of British troops to restore law and order.

(d) Constitutional Proposals (March 1973)

Cmd 5259 contained Mr Whitelaw's proposals following the first year of direct rule. Part III contains the proposals which were embodied in the 1973 Constitution Act. Paragraphs 51-53 established the criteria for forming an Executive likely to be widely accepted throughout the community.

(e) The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973

S1 contains the declaration on NI's status; S2 the criteria under which the Secretary of State would devolve authority to the Executive. With the collapse of the Executive and dissolution of the Assembly the central part of the Act is in abeyance, but Part III (prevention of discrimination), and the lists of excepted and reserved matters (Schedules 2 and 3) are still important concepts.

( ) The Northern Ireland Constitution (July 1974)

Cmnd 5675 was published by Merlyn Rees after the collapse of the 1974 Executive. It announced the direct rule arrangements which have continued until now, and an election to a Constitutional Convention.

The Convention was subsequently elected in May 1975. A majority report from the Convention in November 1975 was rejected by the Government for failing to command sufficiently wide-spread acceptance throughout the community.

(g) A Working Paper for a Conference (November 1979)(h) Proposals for Further Discussion (July 1980)(i) Northern Ireland's Public Finance

A brief by the NIO.

(j) Population Map of Northern Ireland

(k) The Quigley Report - a much quoted economic analysis of Northern Ireland economic structure which, although dated, is worth looking at as the clearest exposition of the economic thinking which has brought public expenditure and Government support for industry to their present levels in Northern Ireland.

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A Declaration by Mr Wilson's Government following the sending of British troops to restore law and order.

(d) Constitutional Proposals (March 1973)

Cmd 5259 contained Mr Whitelaw's proposals following the first year of direct rule. Part III contains the proposals which were embodied in the 1973 Constitution Act. Paragraphs 51-53 established the criteria for forming an Executive likely to be widely accepted throughout the community.

(e) The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973

S1 contains the declaration on NI's status; S2 the criteria under which the Secretary of State would devolve authority to the Executive. With the collapse of the Executive and dissolution of the Assembly the central part of the Act is in abeyance, but Part III (prevention of discrimination), and the lists of excepted and reserved matters (Schedules 2 and 3) are still important concepts.

(f) The Northern Ireland Constitution (July 1974)

Cmd 5675 was published by Merlyn Rees after the collapse of the 1974 Executive. It announced the direct rule arrangements which have continued until now, and an election to a Constitutional Convention.

The Convention was subsequently elected in May 1975. A majority report from the Convention in November 1975 was rejected by the Government for failing to command sufficiently wide-spread acceptance throughout the community.

(g) A Working Paper for a Conference (November 1979)

(h) Proposals for Further Discussion (July 1980)

(i) Northern Ireland's Public Finance

A brief by the NIO.

(j) Population Map of Northern Ireland

(k) The Quigley Report

A much quoted economic analysis of Northern Ireland economic structure, although dated, is worth looking at as the clearest exposition of the economic thinking which has brought public expenditure and Government support for industry to their present levels in Northern Ireland.

PART 8 begins:-

NIO to MJS 12.8.80  
~~CAW to NIO 5.8.80~~

PART 7 ends:-

CAW to NIO 5.8.80  
~~NIO to MOBBA 30.7.80~~  
~~March CAW to NIO 5.8.80~~