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PART 9

Confidential Filing

Situation in Northern Ireland  
Force Levels

IRELAND

Part 1: May 1979

Part 9: March 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>6.3.81</del>		<del>9.6.81</del>					
<del>14.3.81</del>		<del>11.6.81</del>					
<del>14.3.81</del>		<del>26.6.81</del>					
<del>13.3.81</del>		<del>2.7.81</del>					
<del>18.3.81</del>		14.7.81					
<del>21.3.81</del>		<del>17.7.81</del>					
13.4.81		<del>13.8.81</del>					
<del>21.4.81</del>		23.8.81					
<del>6.5.81</del>							
<del>12.5.81</del>							
<del>19.5.81</del>							
<del>20.5.81</del>							
<del>27.5.81</del>							
<del>29.5.81</del>							

Plads  
PREM 19/499

PART 9 ends:-

Interview with Owen Carron MP  
23 Aug.

PART 10 begins:-

N10 to WR + eds 24 Aug.



BBC RADIO ULSTER -- SUNDAY 23 AUGUST 1981

'The World This Weekend'

Interview with Mr Owen Carron MP



On Thursday the majority of the electors who voted in the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election chose as their Member of Parliament, Mr Owen Carron, who in the previous by-election had been the agent for the IRA hunger-striker, Mr Bobby Sands. He had a majority of over 2,000, but the Official Unionists are to consider petitioning for the election to be set aside in the light of a number of cases of personation which they allege occurred. But unless such a petition succeeds, Mr Carron as the duly elected Member of Parliament, and one whose election manifesto rests primarily on the hunger-strikers' five demands - demands which the Government has insisted are not negotiable. All the same, Mr Carron wants to talk to Mrs Thatcher and senior Ministers about the demands. But he made it plain before the election and afterwards that he will not take the Oath and formally enter the House of Commons. This morning on the rather difficult telephone line from his home in Enniskillen, Mr Carron told me why he won't be taking the seat.

Mr Carron:

"Because I don't believe it would serve any useful purpose. I personally would not go to Westminster because the British Government and the people in the House of Commons allowed the last MP, Bobby Sands, to die of hunger. They could have saved his life and yet refused to do so."

Q:

"But you have been elected by the democratic process to represent all the people of Fermanagh and South Tyrone. Wouldn't it be easier for you to do that if your voice could be heard in the Chamber of the House of Commons?"

Mr Carron:

"No, the people who elected me know the policies on which I stood and they understand why I will not go to Westminster for the kind of representation they want is they want a representative who will be easily contactable and I will be available 24 hours a day, and as well as that I will highlight the H-Blocks situation both at home and throughout the world and I believe that there is no need to go to the Parliament at Westminster to do that."

Q:

"But all the same, you have asked, you said that you wanted to see Mrs Thatcher and senior Ministers. Have you had any sort of indication from the Government as to whether they are willing to see you?"

Mr Carron:

Well we haven't formally lodged the request to see Mrs Thatcher yet - that will be done tomorrow, but we do believe there are divisions within the Cabinet in the handling of the H-Blocks issue and my election has presented a golden opportunity to solve the H-Block issue for the British Government to solve it without loss of faith and it is quite clear on the people of Fermanagh and South Tyrone that the people, the Nationalist people in Ireland, want the H-Block issue resolved and that they once again have elected democratically a spokesperson for the prisoners and I believe that the Government has a right and a duty to meet me and to enter into talks with the prisoners on the five demands."

Q:

"But if you say the five demands as far as you are concerned aren't negotiable and the Government says as far as they're concerned they aren't negotiable, what is there to negotiate about?"

Mr Carron:

"Well some people have lives to negotiate about; the two major issues are the issue of work and the issue of association and I think that the Government has a right and a duty to move towards the prisoners and those issues."

Q:

"What do you say, Mr Carron, to charges that you are a Provo spokesman, that you use your election to promote the Provisional IRA's cause here and abroad?"

Mr Carron:

"The people of Fermanagh and South Tyrone know well the policies on which I stood and the facts of the matter are that the majority of the people elected me."

Q:

"What about the people who didn't vote for you in Fermanagh and South Tyrone. How are they going to feel if they haven't got an MP who is fully representing them at Westminster?"

Mr Carron:

"We have always had an MP here who did not go to Westminster and I will do the constituency work and I am willing to do it for all sections of the community as he did it."

Q:

Yes, but do you think that any Protestant Unionist who wants his MP to represent him at Westminster is going to be able to come you with confidence and say, 'Mr Carron can represent my interests'."

Mr Carron:

"Well I think that the Unionists have got to understand that even in Unionist terms, going to Westminster is useless, because for example, one of the most successful MPs that the Unionists probably have is Dr Paisley, goes to Westminster very frequently and yet in his constituency factories are closing down day and daily and he can do nothing to prevent it, so there's nothing to be gained by going to Westminster."

*Releas*

PS TO THE PM.  
NO10 DOWNING STREET.

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 80

CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 131700Z  
FM WASHINGTON 131530Z AUG 81  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2406 OF 13 AUGUST 1981  
INFO IMMEDIATE HMCG NEW YORK, NIO BELFAST,  
INFO SAVING DUBLIN.

MY TELNO 2399: NORTHERN IRELAND: EXTRADITION OF MACKIN.

1. WE HAVE HEARD BY TELEPHONE FROM NEW YORK THAT THE MAGISTRATE HAS RULED IN MACKIN'S FAVOUR. WE DO NOT YET HAVE DETAILS OF THE JUDGEMENT WHICH APPARENTLY RUNS TO 80 PAGES.

2. WE ARE IMMEDIATELY DELIVERING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT A NOTE AS OUTLINED IN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, SEEKING MACKIN'S ARREST.

FCO PASS SAVING DUBLIN.

THOMAS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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*N. Ireland Int*  
*Original filed on*  
*Home Affairs April 80*  
*Chief Secy*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

17 July 1981

*Dear Michael,*

Violence in UK

At her briefing meeting yesterday before the Ottawa Summit, the Prime Minister asked for facts and figures about violence in other countries, which would enable her to put the disturbances in Northern Ireland and in English cities into a proper international perspective.

Northern Ireland

Since the beginning of 1970, 2113 deaths have been attributable to the security situation, an average of 184 per year. In 1980, the number of deaths was only 75. In New York City the number of murders in 1980 was 1,814, in Chicago 863 and in Los Angeles 908.

But proportionate figures related to population have more meaning. In Northern Ireland since 1970 the average annual number of deaths attributable to the security situation per 100,000 of the population has been 12. The figure for 1980 was 5. In New York City in 1980 there were 26 homicides per 100,000 of the population. For Chicago the figure was 29 and for Los Angeles it was 30.

It is important to note that comparisons of this kind are open to certain criticisms. Small cities and rural areas in America, which in many ways would be more comparable to Northern Ireland, have much lower murder rates than the big cities. And the figures given here for US cities are for murders caused mostly by domestic disputes, robberies and intra-criminal violence, whereas in Northern Ireland the deaths result from systematic terrorism.

Urban Disturbances

In England between 3 and 15 July 1981, city rioting caused no deaths but 800 police were injured and there were 3,000 arrests. The number of injured civilians is not yet known but will have been substantially lower than the number of police. The cost of the damage will not be known for some time but a guess, based on an extrapolation of the costs of the Brixton riots, would suggest a figure of about \$90 million.

In riots in Miami on 17-18 May 1980, 16 people were killed

/and

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and 400 injured, and the damage was estimated at over \$100 million. In Los Angeles (the Watts district) in 1965, 34 people were killed and 1032 injured and the damage was estimated at various figures up to \$200 million. In Paris in 1968, over 2,000 people were injured. (The injury figures for recent disturbances in Switzerland, The Netherlands, West Germany and France were much lower than those for the recent city riots in England.)

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (Northern Ireland Office) and John Halliday (Home Office).

*Yours ever*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street



*Kg Vint Ireland*  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 July 1981

*Dear Michael,*

*No.*

LORD PRIVY SEAL'S MEETING WITH IRISH MINISTERS

Under cover of my letter of 10 July, I circulated a draft record of the Lord Privy Seal's meeting with Dr Kelly, Acting Foreign Minister of the Republic of Ireland, and Professor Dooge, Foreign Minister Designate, held last Friday. There are no amendments to the draft and it may be treated as the authoritative record.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (NIO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours,*

*Adam*

A K C Wood  
Assistant Private Secretary  
to the Lord Privy Seal

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1117  
10 July 1981

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Shunt

Dear Michael,

LORD PRIVY SEAL'S MEETING WITH IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER

I enclose a copy of the draft record of the Lord Privy Seal's meeting with the Irish Foreign Minister this afternoon. I will circulate a fair version early next week. I am sending copies to Stephen Boys-Smith (NIO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Adam

A K C Wood

Assistant Private Secretary to  
The Lord Privy Seal

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT 16.00 HRS ON FRIDAY, 10 JULY 1980Present :-

Lord Privy Seal  
 Secretary of State for  
 Northern Ireland  
 Mr J Marshall, Northern  
 Ireland Office  
 Mr R Wade-Gery, Cabinet Office  
 Mr P H C Evers, Republic of  
 Ireland Department  
 Mr A Wood, Private Secretary

Dr John Kelly,  
 Acting Minister for Foreign  
 Affairs Republic of Ireland  
 Professor Jim Dooge,  
 Foreign Minister Designate  
 Mr W Kirwan,  
 Assistant Secretary, Department  
 of the Taoiseach  
 Mr Michael Lilliss,  
 Assistant Secretary, Department  
 of the Taoiseach  
 Mr David Neligan, Department  
 of Foreign Affairs

1. After thanking the Lord Privy Seal for agreeing to receive him and his colleague, Dr Kelly explained that he was Acting Foreign Minister until Professor Dooge was formally nominated Senator and approved as Foreign Minister by the Dáil, which could not be before October.
2. Ir Kelley went on to say that the Taoiseach and Government of the Republic were strongly committed to progress in Northern Ireland as indeed had been the previous Government. The main difference in approach between them was that Fine Gael attached more importance to the views of the majority community in the North. They were strongly in favour of a continuation of the bilateral contacts between the Republic and the United Kingdom. They were all the more unhappy at the occasion for their visit, the hunger strike, which must detract from, and might even frustrate, the object of the bilateral contacts.
3. The hunger strike was, of course, a source of increased tension in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, it also had effects in the South, and indeed had become an element in the destabilisation of public opinion there. This destabilisation had surfaced in the course of the general election on 4 June. Several of the hunger strikers did well and two were elected. McDonnell had missed election by 300 votes only. Had he been successful, the Republic would already have been faced by the

death of a Member of the Dáil. The introduction of the IRA into the political scene, associated as it was with violence, was due to the hunger strike. There could be no guarantee that this introduction would be transient. This development was likely to damage relations with the United Kingdom. Fine Gael and the Labour Party, and even for that matter, Fianna Fail, had set their faces against violence of all kinds. But any Irish Government must carry public opinion with it. They were obliged to walk a difficult path. Any impression that they were over-reacting to British rather than Irish interests, 'collaborating', would make their tasks very difficult. They had to hold the line against murder and in favour of good relations with the UK. It was difficult to do this if on the UK side people who were expected to be flexible did not measure up to Irish hopes. He and his colleague were not here to recriminate. But the Irish Government thought something went wrong. They thought that the British reaction to the ICJP attempts to help was too slow. They were disposed to believe the ICJP accounts and these suggested that there had been an insufficient sense of urgency. He must point out a domestic consideration which went beyond a merely party interest. The next prisoner was likely to die in 10 days' time. He had been elected to the Dáil. The Government did not have a secure grip on the Dáil and had in fact been defeated on almost the first motion before it. They were faced with severe economic and political difficulties. It was a convention that no writs for new elections were issued for a month after the death of a TD. None, therefore, could issue before the Dáil went into recess at the end of July. Nor could a writ be moved during the recess. The Government would, therefore, be faced with a period of three months in which its future was in doubt. In these circumstances, things might be said with an eye to the impending bye-election which could be very damaging.

4. Turning to HMG's contacts with the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace (ICJP), Dr Kelley said that we should not dismiss the importance of the rôle of suspicion amongst the prisoners. It is a dominant issue in their frame of mind. The slightest deviation from what they had been led to expect could have unfortunate effects. He asked that in commenting

the Lord Privy Seal and Northern Ireland Secretary should explain how HMG saw the situation and what the scenario for winding down the hunger strike might be.

5. The Lord Privy Seal wished to make four points. HMG attached the greatest importance to bilateral relations. They considered the last Summit meeting to have been a great step forward. Secondly, they understood the Irish Government's difficulties and sympathised with them. Thirdly, the hunger strike was a source of deep regret, deeper perhaps even than that of the Irish authorities. Fourthly, he must repudiate the suggestion that HMG had lacked a sense of urgency in dealing with the problem. It had been dealt with with the greatest urgency. He asked the Northern Ireland Secretary to address Dr Kelly's remarks about the ICJP.

6. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said he had welcomed the contacts with the Irish Government which he had had in the past and wished to continue the close relationship. Some in the United Kingdom might say that the hunger strike was not the business of the Irish authorities. That was not his view. He had said in the House of Commons that what happened in the United Kingdom was of moment to the Irish authorities and what happened in the Republic of Ireland was of moment to us. It should not be thought that the hunger strike was not a matter of concern or urgency. He had thought of little else since October.

7. The hunger strike was an intensification of the campaign mounted by the IRA a number of years ago, notably in the prisons. The present Government's predecessors in office had ended the special category for prisoners in 1976 with the support of all parties in the House of Commons and he thought also of the Irish Government. It was a matter of principle that those who murdered, assaulted others and attacked property were criminals. At first there had been a refusal to accept the prison regime; this had led to the 'dirty protest'. HMG had found it depressing that there had been talk of our lacking flexibility. In fact, we had shown flexibility. It was the prisoners who had been inflexible. In the course of 1980 HMG had made 12 alterations in the prison regime. The only outcome of those alterations

had been the hunger strike.

8. What was to be done? People not close to the problem believed that the protest was about prison conditions. This was not so. Conditions in the prison were better than almost anywhere else in Europe and certainly much better than in the United States. They could be further improved. The improvements had been accepted by those prisoners who conformed. But HMG was faced with a difficulty: certain prisoners did not accept that they should be treated as were prisoners anywhere. Until a week ago at least they had called for a difference in their treatment from that of other prisoners. Finding little support for this, either in the United Kingdom, or the Republic or from the European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) or the Church, they had changed their line only last week. They claimed that they no longer sought differentiation from other prisoners but they did still maintain their five demands which originally had been conceived as their definition of what in practice was meant by political status.

9. What we had sought to do was to persuade the prisoners, especially the hunger strikers, that we could not concede two principles: there could be no differentiation in the treatment of prisoners on the basis of the motive for their crime; and we could not hand over the running of prisons to the inmates. Accepting the five demands would amount to handing over control. On that no compromise was possible. But we had made changes in the past and could do so again.

10. The ICJP was rightly a highly-respected body and we were prepared to allow them to help. But two points had been made to them. We could not empower them to negotiate for us with the prisoners, and we were not ourselves negotiating with the prisoners directly or through the ICJP. These points were understood by the ICJP. They explored with Mr Alison the exact meaning of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's statement of 30 June and spoke to the prisoners, their families and perhaps to others. They came to certain conclusions and issued a statement. They said a number of things to us and expected us to do a number of things. They were on-the-record

as having recognised that it was their view, not HMG's, that HMG would be under a moral obligation to do what they had suggested. They knew also that the possible reforms mentioned by Mr Alison had been described as illustrative. Professor Dooge interjected that he had difficulty with what had been meant by 'illustrative'. Dr Kelly endorsed this and said that he understood it to mean examples of what would be done which were minima. Mr Atkins said that we had said we would look at these possibilities - there had been no commitment to introduce them.

11. Dr Kelly said that he had been waiting to hear how it would end. The Irish authorities were familiar with the IRA. They had a racial memory of them going back 60 years. A colleague had been murdered by the IRA. They knew well the IRA's approach to the distinction between true and false. But the Irish Government wished to see a settlement of the Northern Ireland problem. It was necessary to avoid the reefs which stood between us and that aim. The hunger strike was one of these. If HMG had not contemplated some advance in the situation, it was not clear to him why they had welcomed the mediation of the Commission. It was because of the responsibility of the ICJP and the conviction which they carried that he and Professor Dooge were here. If it was expected that good offices would contribute to a solution there must have been some room for movement. The ICJP had been optimistic on Monday that they had reached that stage. It had been clearly understood on Monday that an official would present himself the following morning at the Prison. No-one turned up. This failure he described as 'deadly' for McDonnell was within 36 hours of his death. It was this that led to the accusation of a lack of a sense of urgency; and there had been delays the week before. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland explained that it had been quite impossible in UK parliamentary terms for him or Mr Alison to be absent from the House of Commons on Thursday, 2 July, the Renewal Debate. Dr Kelly said that this explanation might be adequate in British terms for the first delay but he could see none for the second one. A small detail reflected the lack of sensitivity which caused him concern. The Commission had told the Irish authorities that at the last conversation which they had had on Monday it had



been said that the official who was to go in on Tuesday would be one who had been present during the discussions and was sensitive to the tone of the discussions. The official who had gone in was the last to fall in to that category. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland pointed out that the Commission had acknowledged that there were differences between our position and theirs. But the fact was that the statement which he had put to the prisoners acknowledged the ICJP's position in three places, two of them explicitly. The proposals concerned had not been turned down but it had been noted that they would require time to arrange. As for the question of which official went in, he would not think it right to judge Dr Kelly's officials and Dr Kelly would understand that he would defend his own.

12. Mr Atkins continued that the fact that the statement had been put to the prisoners not on Tuesday but on Wednesday reflected the seriousness with which we dealt with the question. Mr Alison was a very good Minister but not a Member of the Cabinet. Matters of this importance could not be left to a Junior Minister. But Mr Alison was in Belfast and he himself in London. If the main complaint was this delay of 24 hours, he could say that there were reasons for it.

13. Dr Kelly had asked how all this was going to end. It could end easily and quickly if the protesting prisoners accepted that the sentences of the courts were going to be carried out. People who committed crimes would be kept in prison. They could not be allowed to choose what work they did. If they accepted all this they would find the regime liberal - as it was acknowledged elsewhere to be. The Government would improve it. The regime would be the same everywhere in Northern Ireland. (Indeed, prisoners in prisons in England were complaining and seeking to have the same regime as that in Northern Ireland.)

14. Dr Kelly said that he was not interested in penology nor in uniformity of Government policy, but in a settlement of the problem in Northern Ireland. That could be achieved only by the Irish among themselves. The IRA had got more support from the hunger strike than they had from everything else they had done. The public relations war would not be won by press

releases but by actions of the Government. The line pursued by Mr Heath and the coalition in the Republic in 1973/1974 had been the right one. It might be that the Irish had been too euphoric and the British had certainly been at fault in not standing up to the workers' strike. And the IRA had, of course, done all they could to disrupt it. But his Government believed that Sunningdale, by another name, was the only possibility for the long-term. There had been majority support for it. They wished to re-establish the conditions in which there would once again be support. The hunger strike needed to be got out of the way even at the cost of sacrificing minutiae of principle. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland queried this expression. Professor Dooge said that there was no difference between the Irish authorities and HMG on the question of control of the prisons but the choice of work, for instance, did not seem to them a question of principle. On political status, they were of one mind with us also. The problem was how to move forward from principles to application in practice. Dr Kelly said that the prisoners were fanatical and demented yet they also had principles even if this was hard to believe of murderers, knee-cappers and men who tarred and feathered women. It was difficult for them too to abandon their principles. The scenario described seemed to him to deserve the epithet 'rigid'. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that this was perhaps right for he had principles from which he would not depart.

15. Dr Kelly said he was trying to see how to return to a situation where the problem could be solved. His Government urged the importance of getting back in some way or another to the proposals in which the ICJP thought we had acquiesced on Monday. If mistakes could be avoided it should be possible to save further loss of life. The ball was in HMG's court.

16. The Lord Privy Seal asked whether Dr Kelly intended to say this publicly. That would clearly be an encouragement to the PIRA. Dr Kelly said that he agreed it would not say this since it would cause damage. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland asked that Dr Kelly study carefully both the five demands and the statement which he had made and issued to the prisoners.

The 89 prisoners who had given up the protest were evidence that we stood by what we said, for instance, on the restoration of partially-lost remission.

17. Taking up this point, Professor Dooge said that Mr Alison had written to Bishop O'Mahoney that HMG would contemplate 'imaginative and dramatic action' if the hunger strike was ended and the statement of 30 June had spoken of generous remission. The final statement put to the prisoners on 8 July did not match these descriptions. Mr Kirwan said that the Irish authorities accepted that the regime, including the arrangements for remission was very liberal. They had no doubt that it was the IRA who were the cause of the problem. But they believed that we had been close to defeating the IRA and that the chance had slipped away. They wished to get back to that earlier position. Dr Kelly said that it was not for the Irish to suggest detail but the fiasco had to be retrieved. They had no rôle except to urge that HMG returned to the position of last weekend.

18. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that HMG had not budged. The Irish authorities should not believe that we did not take the question seriously. People had lost their lives. Nor should they underestimate the problems.

19. Dr Kelly said that the number of mediators was not unlimited nor was time unlimited. The Irish authorities thought that the ICJP was reasonably under the impression that a solution was close. HMG should re-establish contact with the ICJP, taking up the position at which they had been when Mr Alison was last in contact with the ICJP. The problem had to be solved. There was no point in lecturing prisoners who were so convinced that they were willing to kill themselves slowly.

20. Mr Atkins said that he took delivery of what Dr Kelly said. But it was clear from the ICJP statement that in two important particulars they recognised that differences had continued between HMG's position and their own. Dr Kelly insisted that he was talking about the total effect of what had happened on the last possible mediators. It had been deeply unfortunate. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that HMG had

issued a statement for the avoidance of doubt in anyone's mind - prisoners or ICJP.

21. Dr Kelly said that all experience when dealing with people like the prisoners was that brinkmanship was the wrong way. If the business was not done now on a reasonable basis, it would be done on an unreasonable basis later. It was the Commission's impression that the hunger strike could be settled on a basis falling short of the five demands. Talking about non-negotiable principles of prison policy was out of place.

22. Professor Dooge said that the Irish authorities had studied Mr Atkins' statement of 9 July. There were differences between that statement and the understanding of the ICJP. These were not differences of principle but of emphasis. But on association and work a solution had been stated differently, positively by the ICJP, negatively by us. Was it not possible to avoid the consequences of more deaths occurring simply because of a difference on points of emphasis. It should not be too difficult - there was no contradiction of principle. He hoped that it would be possible for HMG to stick to the ICJP's formulation. Mr Kirwan noted that there was a difference between the statement handed over to the prisoners and the background paper made available in Dublin on 9 July. Was there a difficulty in making public what we had said privately on these points. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said there was. Dr Kelly said that he recognised that a concession was involved. He recognised also that if the hunger strike was settled, the IRA would try again. But to save a ship in a storm it was worth throwing overboard some luggage labelled 'principle' to get into port before a further storm. Mr Atkins observed that throwing principles overboard would produce a immediate storm. Dr Kelly said that the ICJP were hoping to obtain an undertaking on the timing of improvements. The problem was that a Member of the Dáil would be dying in 10 days' time.

23. The Lord Privy Seal thanked Dr Kelly and Professor Dooge for coming. He regretted that the relationship with the new Government should begin against this background. He asked

what should be said to the press. After discussion there was agreement that the Irish side would say broadly what they had said and the British side would say how they had replied. The Irish noted the need to avoid anything which would encourage the IRA and hence the need to avoid implying that HMG was likely to concede what the Irish had proposed.

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~~Mr Alexander (or)~~ cc Press



WA  
Ireland 2/7  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 July 1981

Dear Willie,

Bishop Tutu: Northern Ireland

You might like to know of an apparent attempt to discredit Bishop Tutu, Secretary-General of the South African Council of Churches, by the sending of a bogus telegram in his name to the Prime Minister.

On 30 April the following telegram was despatched to the Prime Minister from Johannesburg:-

"How can Sands be described a criminal if he in fact strives for political freedom? His cause is a worthy one and the means he employed justify the end. By calling him a criminal acting in the same detestable way as the racist Pretoria regime. Already the actions of your police force can be compared with the brutal and cruel actions of the South African people. The actions of your police force in Brixton against oppressed jobless minorities can be judged to be in the same class as that of the police of South Africa in Soweto during 1976. I urge you to think again and acknowledge Sands as a political prisoner and to give equal rights and opportunities to the oppressed black minority in the UK.

Secretary General South African Council of Churches."

The text of this telegram was forwarded to HM Embassy in Pretoria with a suggested draft reply from the Ambassador provided by the Northern Ireland Office.

Since the telegram seemed to the Embassy to be untypical of Bishop Tutu, the Secretary-General of the South African Council of Churches, as to both style and substance, the Ambassador's reply was delivered personally by John Taylor, Deputy Consul-General in Johannesburg. When Taylor called on Bishop Tutu on 18 June, the latter denied all knowledge of any telegram sent to the Prime Minister. Accordingly Taylor did not leave the Ambassador's letter with him.

/Bishop Tutu

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Bishop Tutu subsequently telephoned the British Council of Churches who in turn spoke to Southern African Department in the FCO. The Council said that in early May the South African Council of Churches conference in Johannesburg had passed a resolution following the death of Bobby Sands. The text of this resolution was telegraphed to the British Council of Churches with the request that it be passed to the Prime Minister. I enclose a copy of the genuine telegram which as you will see is completely different in terms and tone from the bogus telegram of 30 April. The Ambassador is now replying in suitable terms to the genuine telegram.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith in the NIO.

*yours ever*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Text of Tel from SA

PLEASE PASS THIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

RESOLUTION OF S.A.C.C. NATIONAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN JOHANNESBURG  
7TH MAY, 1968

NORTHERN IRELAND

THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES RECORDS ITS DEEP DISTRESS AT THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE AND THE DETERIORATION OF HUMAN RELATIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF BOBBY SANDS ON THE SIXTY-SIXTH DAY OF HIS FAST.

IN EXPRESSING OUR LOVE AND CONCERN FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE BITTER CONFLICT RAGING IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WE WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE UNDERSTAND YOUR PHYSICAL AND SPIRITUAL AGONY. HERE IN SOUTH AFRICA WE ALSO LIVE IN A LAND DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF, WHERE THE BLOOD OF OUR SONS AND DAUGHTERS HAS BEEN SPILLED INTO THE GROUND. IN OUR COUNTRY, AS IN YOURS, PREJUDICE, INJUSTICE, PRIDE, HATRED, FEAR AND INEQUALITY HAVE INCREASED THE TENSION AND ERECTED WALLS OF PARTITION. YOUR TRAVAIL IS OUR TRAVAIL AS WE MOURN THE TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE IN YOUR LAND: WE OFFER OUR LOVE AND SYMPATHY TO ALL WHO HAVE SUFFERED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONFLICT.

RECOGNISING THE VOLATILE NATURE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THIS COUNCIL URGES POLITICAL LEADERS OF ALL PERSUASIONS, AND THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES, TO AVOID STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT EXACERBATE AN ALREADY UGLY SITUATION AND RESULT IN MORE BLOODSHED. WE ALSO CALL ON THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND TO BEGIN HEALING THE WOUNDS OF THEIR WAR-TORN HISTORY ~~TOGETHER~~ AND TO JOIN TOGETHER FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE AND THE COMMON GOOD.

BELIEVING THAT CHRIST HAS COMMISSIONED HIS CHURCH TO EXERCISE A MINISTRY OF RECONCILIATION IN SITUATIONS OF HUMAN CONFLICT AND THAT THE CHURCH IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AS IN SOUTH AFRICA, HAS A SPECIAL ROLE IN ~~BRIDGING~~ BUILDING BRIDGES IN A DIVIDED COUNTRY, WE PRAY THAT ALL CHRISTIANS MAY BE DELIVERED FROM BIGOTRY AND THE DEAD HAND OF THE PAST. MAY THE BARRIERS WHICH SEPARATE CATHOLICS FROM PROTESTANTS BE BROKEN DOWN SO THAT TOGETHER THEY MAY FIND A NEW UNITY IN CHRIST WHICH WILL MAKE THEM TRULY ONE AND TRULY FREE FROM THE FEAR AND ~~FRUSTRATION~~ FRUSTRATION, THE GRIEF AND SEPARATION OF IRELANDS TROUBLED HISTORY.

ENDS

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CORRECTIONS: THIS STATEMENT OF RESOLUTION COMES FROM

BISHOP DESMOND TUTU  
THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

DE CAE  
THANK YOU  
RECEIVED OK AND PASSED

8-6519 SA





File A74

Ireland

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

1 July 1981

PERSONAL

Dear Sir John,

I am sorry that I have not replied before to your letter of 3 June 1981.

I have shown this to the Prime Minister and she was interested to read about your contacts with David O'Connell. She was glad that you spoke to him as you did.

The Prime Minister has also asked me to thank you for your good wishes.

It was very nice to hear from you again.

Yours sincerely,

John Wharmby.

General Sir John Hackett GCB CBE DSO MC

AW

CONFIDENTIAL

*Ireland*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 June 1981

(2)

*Mr Paisley was distorting the facts, as usual (not that Mr Haughey is much less guilty).*

*Prime Minister*

*Dear Michael,*

*RM*

*RM 26/6*

Northern Ireland

You told us that the Reverend Ian Paisley had said that Mr Haughey had implied in an election speech that the British Government shared his view that Northern Ireland was not a viable entity.

It seems most likely that Paisley was referring to a speech that Mr Haughey gave in Wexford on 31 May. I enclose a copy of the report in the 'Irish Times'. The part of the speech dealing with Northern Ireland is classic Haughey in its implication that his talks with the Prime Minister have given him a greater role in Northern Ireland's affairs than is the case. But it does not bear out Dr Paisley's claim; and we are not aware of any text that does.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Noel Cornick, Northern Ireland Office and David Wright, Cabinet Office.

*yours ever*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

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## THE GENERAL ELECTION

# North conflict shows need for strong Government—Haughey

THE VIOLENT and unstable situation in Northern Ireland, with its implications for peace and security in our jurisdiction, urgently underlined the need for a Government to be elected with a good working majority which would enable it to deal with the situation and meet the difficulties, the Taoiseach declared yesterday.

"Only such a Government will be in a position to pursue a clear and consistent policy with the objective of securing a political solution which will bring the cycle of bloodshed and violence to an end," said Mr Haughey.

Speaking in Wexford, the Taoiseach said: "The achievement, by political means, of an Ireland united in harmony and in peace is the major political priority of Fianna Fail. Recent events have tragically proved that we are right in seeing the need for a solution in Northern Ireland as a matter of great urgency in the interest of all the people in every part of Ireland.

"Through the search for a political solution of the underlying problem, and through our efforts to effect a humanitarian solution of the hunger-strikes of recent months, the Government has sought to end violence, avoid deaths and injuries, ease tension and bring about a lasting peace based on justice.

"We continue to urge our humanitarian concern on the British Government, and on all concerned, the view that every effort should be made to resolve the situation through a flexible approach to the prison administration.

### NORTH 'HAS FAILED'

"The starting point of Fianna Fail policy is that Northern Ireland has failed as a political entity. It had always been intrinsically unstable because it is an artificial entity, without any underlying geographic, economic, social or cultural basis.

"The division of Ireland was a

temporary expedient seen by the British Government of the time as necessary to secure a respite, but clearly expected and desired to yield over time to an ultimate settlement based upon reconciliation within Ireland. The entire country was clearly seen as the appropriate entity or framework for a permanent solution.

"Because I am convinced that attempts to bring a settlement on the basis of arrangements brought forward solely in a Northern Ireland context could not succeed, I proposed that the problem needed a fresh approach in a wider context and should be made the subject of a fundamental reconsideration by the two sovereign Governments involved.

That objective has been achieved. The two Governments have agreed on the need to bring forward policies and proposals to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability and to improve relations, and joint studies are under way for this purpose. These studies represent the first steps in a process which will help the two Governments to see in a clearer light the possibility of a solution based on new political arrangements acceptable to all traditions.

"I believe that the voters will entrust to a Fianna Fail Government the responsibility of pressing forward with this political process directed to bringing about a just and lasting peace.

"The violent and unstable situation in Northern Ireland, with its implications for peace and security in our jurisdiction, underline urgently the need for a Government to be elected in this General Election with a good working overall majority which will enable it to deal with the situation and meet the difficulties.

Only such a Government will be in a position to pursue a clear and consistent policy with the objective of securing a political solution which will bring the cycle of bloodshed and violence to an end.

"I am not suggesting that we can achieve a final peaceful settlement this year or next. It would be unrealistic to think that such a solution could be found in any short period of time to such a long-standing and complex problem. What I do say is that steps must be taken to establish a new framework for a political solution.

The policy of this Government in our efforts to provide a political solution to the Northern Ireland problem is clearly the right one, and must be pursued even in the present difficult circumstances until the objective of a peaceful and lasting solution is achieved.

"Responsible leaders of opinion everywhere around the world are all urging that such a solution be found. We will not be deflected from these efforts to resolve the basic underlying problem. Far from deterring us from our efforts, the tragic events of recent times must strengthen our resolve to pursue it with an even greater sense of urgency than ever before," Mr Haughey concluded.

The leader of the Labour Party, Mr Cluskey, said in a statement last night that the current Dublin-London talks must continue even though "there is no evidence that Fianna Fail is more capable than any other party of finding a solution to the Northern problem."

Mr Cluskey said his party welcomed the talks but was concerned about the "inflated expectations raised by the Government concerning the timescale and content of their outcome."

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 June 1981

I attach a record of the conversation which took place between the Prime Minister and the Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P., in the House of Commons yesterday evening.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Roderic Lyne (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Stephen W. Boys-Smith, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE REVEREND IAN PAISLEY, M.P., AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 25 JUNE 1981 AT 1700.

PRESENT

The Prime Minister  
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Mr. Ian Gow, M.P.  
Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander

The Reverend Ian Paisley,  
M.P.  
Mr. P. Robinson, M.P.

Mr. Paisley said that the security situation in Northern Ireland was now very serious. Fifty-three people (27 civilians and 26 members of the security forces) had been murdered by the IRA since he had last met the Prime Minister. The people who lived in the worst affected areas were losing confidence in the will of the security forces to cope with the situation. Following the murder of a cousin of his, Constable Kyle, the murderers, according to Mr. Paisley, withdrew into the village of Carrickmore, a well-known "Republican ghetto". The inhabitants had set up road blocks and the police had been refused entry. The UDR were saying that Carrickmore was now out of bounds. The UDR believed that this was because it had been agreed at a meeting between the heads of the Catholic community and senior police officers a week before the death of Bobby Sands that the police would not enter a number of Catholic areas.

Mr. Paisley claimed that on election day in Carrickmore last month, five IRA men armed with armelites and hand guns had appeared at the polling booths. They had been spotted by the RUC and could have been shot but the local police officer in charge, Superintendent Hill, refused permission. Despite the fact that the area was surrounded by some 50 police, the five IRA men had been allowed to escape. It was widely believed that one of the five had been involved in the murder of Constable Kyle. It was easy to understand the demoralisation of the Protestant community in the face of such events. Unless something was done there would in due course be a vicious Protestant backlash which it would be impossible to contain. People were already saying in Enniskillen that they might as well die fighting the IRA as wait for the IRA to come and get them. Others were thinking of emigrating: two families had recently left for Canada, having had to be taken to Belfast under police guard.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister asked what Mr. Paisley thought should be done. Mr. Paisley said that it should be made clear that the UDR was authorised to operate anywhere in Northern Ireland. Secondly, it should be agreed that when armed members of the IRA appeared in public, the police should be allowed to take them on. The Prime Minister said that the Army and the UDR were deployed in support of the police. It was not for her to tell the police how the job should be done. The Government had made it possible for the size of the RUC to be increased. She understood that recruiting to the UDR was on the increase. From all she had heard, the Army was carrying out its duties splendidly. Mr. Paisley said that he was not questioning the integrity of the armed forces. But he was questioning whether the officers were doing their job properly. The Secretary of State said that it was not for him to tell the Chief Constable or the GOC how to do their jobs. The Chief Constable deployed the UDR as he saw fit. There were certain areas where he preferred to use the regular Army. The UDR was the first line reserve in 50 per cent of all police districts. In other areas, e.g. West Belfast, there were understandable reasons why it might seem preferable to the Chief Constable to use the regular Army. That was a matter for his judgement. Mr. Paisley said he found it extraordinary that the UDR had been able to operate in Carrickmore, in the Short Strand area and elsewhere a week before the death of Sands but not since. The Secretary of State said that in the period after Sands' death the Army had been used more but the situation was now reverting to that which had obtained before the deaths of the hunger strikers.

Mr. Paisley said that all this was of little comfort to the victims and of little comfort to those in the UDR who were being banned from operating in the border areas and prevented from defending their own "homes and homesteads". Why should they be deployed to defend Lord Brookeborough's home rather than the place where they themselves lived. More and more members of the UDR were asking why they were being recruited if they were not being allowed to operate in the areas where their families were. It was widely assumed that this policy was the result of an agreement between the "security chiefs" and the leaders of the Catholic Church that certain areas would be 'no go' areas. It was not tolerable that the views of the Roman Catholics should be given such weight. It was not tolerable

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/that in Carrickmore

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that in Carrickmore tricolours and black flags should be flown and the UDR and the Army should be unable to enter. When the police went in, as they had with him on a recent occasion, they came out again in a hurry.

The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State both repeated that it was not for them to give instructions to the GOC or the Chief Constable. The Government fully recognised the importance of security and provided the means to ensure it. But the officers in charge on the spot had to decide how those means should be deployed. The Prime Minister commented that they might well have considered that more members of the UDR would be killed if deployments of the kind advocated by Mr. Paisley had been made. Mr. Paisley retorted that this would be no comfort to Mrs. Kyle.

Responding to a comment by the Prime Minister that she much appreciated the role of the UDR, Mr. Robinson commented that members of the UDR were unaware of this. He wondered whether it would be possible to confer the Royal title on the UDR, which would be a great boost for their morale. The Prime Minister gave no undertaking but thanked Mr. Robinson for raising the issue.

Mr. Paisley said that he was concerned about the pressures being brought to bear by the Catholic Church on the Government in favour of a compromise with hunger strikers. He found it surprising that statements such as that made by the Catholic Bishops recently did not appear to be read in their entirety. Whatever they might say about violence, they always ended up with the routine charges about the injustices inflicted on the Catholic community. It would be a tragedy if the hunger strikes were brought to an end by concessions on any of the five demands. The Government should not be deceived by Cardinal O Fiaich: he spoke with a double tongue. The Prime Minister said that she thought the Bishops had been courageous and that their statement was a welcome one. Mr. Paisley said that any concessions to the hunger strikers would produce a terrible backlash in the Protestant community. The Prime Minister expressed her gratitude for the fact that so far the Protestant community had not reacted. Mr. Paisley said that the Protestant community had reacted in the way that their leaders had told them to do. He himself had played his part.

/The Prime Minister said

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The Prime Minister said that she recognised this. She thought that the memorial service he had organised to coincide with the Bobby Sands funeral had played an important part in ensuring that media reporting at the time was reasonably balanced. She thought that media coverage in recent weeks of events in Northern Ireland had improved. Mr. Paisley agreed. Mr. Robinson said that the propaganda battle was still being lost in the United States. Mr. Paisley commented that he kept in close touch with Senator Strom Thurmond, a personal friend of his.

Mr. Paisley said that the Prime Minister should take a close look at what was being said by delegates from the Republic of Ireland to the European Parliament. They took the line that the hunger strikers in the Maze were dying simply because of the inhumane treatment they received. Mr. Paisley said he had been "nauseated" by Mr. Haughey's claim in the recent election campaign that Northern Ireland was a "non-viable entity" and that HMG had admitted this. The Anglo-Irish studies were angering people in Northern Ireland increasingly. They were causing an upsurge of hostility towards HMG. The only man in Northern Ireland who supported the talks, John Hume, had received only 17 per cent of the vote in the recent election. Mr. Haughey asserted that the British Government's participation in the talks amounted to a tacit admission of the failure of Northern Ireland. The talks were profiting neither Northern Ireland nor HMG. It was being said that the Secretary of State would soon be seeking to talk to the parties in Northern Ireland about a new initiative. So long as HMG were talking to Dublin, the DUP would not talk to HMG. The Prime Minister said that she hoped Mr. Paisley would reconsider his position. Mr. Paisley said he would not. It was for the Prime Minister to reconsider her policy which was doing damage both to herself and Northern Ireland. The present Parliamentary situation in Dublin gave her the opportunity to change course.

The Prime Minister said that she remained very anxious to find a way to secure peace in Northern Ireland. Mr. Paisley said the only way was to adhere to the ballot box, whatever results it produced.

/The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister should take the initiative to return political responsibility to the people of Northern Ireland. There should be an elected convention or a referendum. If he were defeated, he would be willing to act as a constitutional opposition.

The meeting ended at 1740.

*And*

26 June 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

copy in B/eye  
25 June 1981

*Dear Sir,*

MEETING WITH DR PAISLEY ON 25 JUNE

Noel Cornick sent you yesterday a brief for this evening's meeting with Dr Paisley.

The RUC have given us further information which indicates the mood in which Dr Paisley may approach security issues, in particular the question of what he calls 'no go, no stay' areas. This does not alter the line which we have suggested the Prime Minister should take, but she should be aware of why Dr Paisley feels so personally involved.

The RUC are at present investigating a number of matters either on complaints from Dr Paisley or in which close associates of his have been involved. These arise from "Carson Trail" and such like activities, and from cases in which serious crimes have been committed. His relations with the RUC are accordingly very strained. This state of affairs has been intensified by the murder last week of the RUC(R) Constable Christopher Kyle near Omagh; the family is related to Dr Paisley, and he spent some time there in his youth.

In a BBC interview on 23 June, Dr Paisley announced his intention of confronting the Prime Minister with a number of accusations which arose out of these strong feelings. Amongst these:

- a. the RUC have given up proper policing of places like the largely Catholic village of Carrickmore near Omagh.
- b. the UDR have been prevented from entering a large number of Republican areas.
- c. these rulings stem in part from a deal made between the Chief Constable and leading members of the Roman Catholic community before Robert Sands' death.

The position with regard to the UDR, which is an operational matter

.../2

for the GOC, is well known. In regard to RUC patrolling of sensitive areas, the Chief Constable is working on plans for increased activity; the last thing we want is for this to be seen to be a response to criticisms from Dr Paisley.

*Am,*  
*Stephen*

S W BOYS SMITH

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

24 June 1981

Dear Michael,

... I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's meeting tomorrow with Dr Paisley.

It seems possible that Dr Paisley's main interest at the present stage will relate to the economy, and especially unemployment. That is not covered in the brief enclosed, since we have nothing to add to the material provided with Steve Waghorn's letter of 22 June to Tim Lankester in preparation for the debate on unemployment. Beyond that, Dr Paisley could cover a very wide field and we have provided a line to take (with background notes where appropriate) on the most likely topics.

Yours sincerely,  
Noel Cornick

NOEL CORNICK

A Political and constitutional mattersBackground

With the meeting taking place so shortly after the Northern Ireland Office District Council elections, Dr Paisley may seek to present himself as the leader of unionist opinion in the Province and the person with whom HMG will have to deal in securing future political movement. Moreover the imminence of the renewal debate may lead him to seek some indication of the Government's thinking on constitutional development.

The results of the District Council elections are summarised at annex; they indicate a degree of polarisation on both sides of the sectarian divide, with the Alliance Party vote in the centre being severely squeezed. However it is on the unionist side that the shift is the most dramatic. Although the two main unionist parties emerged from the election on almost equal terms so far as votes and seats are concerned, the result is an undoubted success for the DUP and leaves the official Ulster Unionists in a state of some disarray. Dr Paisley's tactics of spreading alarm over the Anglo-Irish talks and putting himself forward as the most vigorous defender of the union clearly worked. He has established himself as the one charismatic leader the unionists have in Northern Ireland, and the DUP as the dynamic, growing party compared with a UUP in obvious decline.

Political/constitutional progress

Dr Paisley may seek some indication of the Government's thinking on the next step on political development in Northern Ireland. He may also seek to establish himself as the man that the Prime

**F.R.**

Minister should do business with. It would suit him well if he could emerge from No 10 claiming that the Prime Minister accepted his credentials as the key figure on the Northern Ireland political scene.

Any such claim would be resented both by the UUP, who are highly sensitive about the inroads the DUP have made on their support, and by the SDLP who would fear that Paisley's outright advocacy of majority rule for Northern Ireland was prevailing. Paisley is an opportunist who is adept at exploiting anything that furthers his party's cause in Northern Ireland - regardless of the effects in Great Britain. He is also a man who may not respect confidences.

On the political way ahead, recent contacts with the DUP suggest that they remain wedded to full devolution on majority rule lines. However, they have indicated that they might not reject a new Convention which would have a Unionist majority and what they would regard as the future government of Northern Ireland. They also favour a referendum on the way ahead - again in the knowledge that the result would reflect the built-in Unionist majority in Northern Ireland.

Line to take

In advance of any announcement of HMG's plans, the Prime Minister may wish to do no more than emphasise her determination to make political progress in Northern Ireland: and warn that continued intransigence among the Northern Ireland politicians merely encourages impatience and frustration in Great Britain and does not serve the interests of Northern Ireland well.

## DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS RESULTS 1981 (1977 RESULTS IN BRACKETS)

Party	% of 1st preference votes	seats
Democratic Unionist	26.57 (12.7)	142 (74)
Ulster Unionist	26.56 (29.6)	151 (178)
SDLP	17.6 (20.6)	104 (113)
Alliance	8.9 (14.4)	38 (178)
Irish Independence Party	3.9 ( - )	21 ( - )
Republican Clubs	1.7 ( 2.6 )	3 (6)
Peoplè's Democracy/IRSP	1.3 ( - )	4 ( - )
Progressive Unionists	1.3 ( - )	4 ( - )
United Ulster Unionists	1.4 ( 3.2 )	4 (12)
UPNI	1.1 ( 2.4 )	6 (2)
Northern Ireland Labour	0.7 ( 0.8 )	1 (1)
NUPRG	0.45 ( - )	1 ( - )
Others	8.8 ( 8.3 )	52 (62)

**F.R.**

B The economy of Northern Ireland

Unemployment

(See separate brief)

Additionality

The Government's policy on additionality is applied consistently throughout the UK. As part of the UK, Northern Ireland must follow the same rules which apply elsewhere in GB.

Background Dr Paisley is not in favour of UK membership of the European Community. He takes the view, however, that as long as the UK remains a member, Community benefits should be exploited as fully as possible. As such he considers that Community receipts should lead to additional public expenditure and he regularly pursues this line by means of Parliamentary Questions and public statements.

Possible closure of Liverpool/Belfast Ferry: need to maintain competition if European Ferries acquire Sealink.

P & O have had discussions with Government about the route and explained their difficulties. The company have undertaken to maintain the service throughout the summer season. They have not informed Government of any decision affecting the operation of the service beyond that point. Government wish to see the service continue but the commercial decision is one for the company. The Government cannot offer any subsidy to P & O to secure the continuance of this service. To do so would not be compatible with the Government's policy towards shipping.



**F.R.**

### Gas

The Government has confirmed, in Mr Adam Butler's Answer of 12 June, that further studies are needed to determine whether gas from the Kinsale field could be brought to Northern Ireland on terms capable of achieving and maintaining financial viability. In the meantime, the existing gas undertakings in Northern Ireland will not be required to proceed with their arrangements to run down unless they want to do so.

### Electricity

On 5 March the Prime Minister announced in Belfast that steps would be taken to bring NI electricity tariffs more into line with those in England and Wales and to keep them there. This reflected the Government's recognition that the differential between NI tariffs and average England and Wales tariffs was an unreasonable burden on the NI community. [This year's tariff increases have therefore been limited to set NI industrial tariffs at the level of the highest in England and Wales; domestic tariffs are now only 5% above the highest in England and Wales and this gap will be eliminated next year.] These changes will help to improve the lot of every electricity consumer in NI and - by removing uncertainty about future tariff levels - the announcement has also enhanced NI's chances of attracting inward investment. £44.9m from the Contingency Reserve helped to make this possible: there was no interference with already agreed NI spending programmes.

### Set up free ports?

We have already gone some way in this direction with the Enterprise Zones of which there is one in Belfast. Industrialists and entrepreneurs in the Enterprise Zones will enjoy 100% exemption from

**F.R.**

rates for the first 10 years; exemption from Industrial Training Board levies; being subject only to minimal planning controls; inward customs processing relief, and general and private customs warehousing facilities.

Tax free zones

The Government is setting up the Belfast enterprise zone. But there would be considerable difficulty in consistency with NI's status as part of the UK, in treating it significantly differently from other regions.

Harland and Wolff's additional aid

The financial limit agreed for 1981/82 gives the management and workforce an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to the company's future during the coming year. The Government is currently reviewing its longer-term strategy towards the Yard in the light of the company's Corporate Plan and the report of the Diversification Review Team. The recent decision made available £46m for continued support of the company in 1981-2, and permits commercial borrowing by the company up to £10.9m.

"No go" areas for the Army especially the UDR: "no stay" areas for the RUC

There are no such areas in Northern Ireland, nor will any be tolerated. It is obvious that the policing of some areas presents greater problems than others but it remains Government policy to bring about a restoration of normal policing to all areas of Northern Ireland. As far as the UDR is concerned, their deployment is a matter for the GOC. It has long been the established practice, for good reasons, that they are not used in the most difficult Republican areas of West Belfast and West Londonderry. This is in keeping with the statement in the 1969 White Paper on the UDR that it was not the intention to deploy it on crowd control or riot duties in cities.

/If raised: The RUC know nothing about any of their men being prevented by local people from entering Carrickmore to investigate Mr Kyle's murder. But if Dr Paisley had evidence of this, it will be investigated.7

Background. At a loyalist rally in Castlewellan, Co Down, on 22 June 1981 Dr Paisley is reported to have alleged that the Government's placatory policies had led to the setting up of "no-go" areas for the UDR and "no-stay" areas for the RUC within Northern Ireland. This may be an extension of a more specific allegation he is reported as having made, namely that the residents of Carrickmore, Co Tyrone, recently prevented police entering the village to investigate a murder. The RUC deny this. Carrickmore is a largely Roman Catholic village near the scene of the ambush and murder of RUC(R) Constable Christopher Kyle

**E.R.**

on 17 June. The RUC believe that Dr Paisley has some personal involvement with the Kyle family - he may be <sup>a</sup> distant relative - and it could be that he has been fed some local rumour.

Wider powers for police and Army to quell disturbance in Republican areas? Shoot petrol bombers?

The task of the police supported by the Army is to uphold the law: they are doing it magnificently, but they must do it within the law. That means using no more force than is reasonable in the circumstances. Their tactics of using plastic baton rounds to keep rioting crowds at a distance are, on the whole, proving successful.

Prison protest and hunger strikes: Mr Alison's meeting with the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace.

The Irish Commission are entitled to express their views. Dr Paisley will have noted that both they and the Irish Catholic Bishops were forthright in their denunciation of violence - in the latter case, aimed especially at those directing others to die by hunger strike. Mr Alison met this body, which includes members from Northern Ireland, and explained once again the Government's stand, which provides no role for mediators. It is evident from the Commission's subsequent statements that they recognise the Government's position.

Prison escape - extradition from the Republic of Ireland

No comment while the enquiry is proceeding. The UK has not applied for the extradition of the escapers: escape from lawful custody in NI is an offence for which the Irish authorities could proceed of their own volition under the extra-territorial prosecution procedure.

## **F.R.**

### SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE 20 MAY 1981

- 21 May An army patrol found 144 petrol bombs in the Clonard area of Belfast.
- 22 May An army rover group in a 'pig' were ambushed on the Andersonstown Road. The vehicle was hit by an RPG7.
- At 1700 hours Caroline KELLY died in hospital as a result of injuries received during rioting at Aspen Park, Belfast on 19 May. She was struck by a baton round.
- On 21 May rioting occurred in many Republican areas of Londonderry. The disorder resulted in the death of Henry DUFFY, allegedly struck by a baton round.
- 23 May Three Lee Enfield rifles and a quantity of ammunition found in a hide after McCreesh's funeral in Camlough.
- Joseph LYNCH was killed by a RUC landrover which swerved to avoid a group of rioters in Belfast.
- 25 May A UDR patrol was ambushed outside Culladuff, South Londonderry. The driver, Alan RITCHIE, was killed and 3 other soldiers were minor casualties.
- 26 May An RPG7 rocket launcher, an armalite rifle, a pistol and a quantity of assorted ammunition found in a car stopped by the security forces in West Belfast. One of the 2 occupants of the car was shot whilst trying to evade arrest. Both occupants have since been charged with illegal possession of the firearms.
- A sub-machine gun, pistol, 500 rounds of ammunition and assorted parts of 6 sub-machine guns were found at the UDA Headquarters. One man was arrested but has since been released.
- 27 May Mervyn ROBINSON, an off duty policeman, killed by gunmen outside his local pub in Whitecross, Co Armagh.
- 28 May George McBREARTY and Charles MAGUIRE were shot dead by a plain clothes soldier whom they had stopped at gunpoint in Brandywell, Londonderry.

## F.R.

- 30 May Two rifles, a sawn-off shotgun, a home-made sub-machine gun and a quantity of ammunition were found in Ballymacarrett. One man was arrested and has since been charged with possession.
- 31 May WO2 Michael O'NEILL was killed in an explosion whilst clearing a suspected car outside Newry.
- Constable Charles DUNLOP was murdered by 2 youths and a girl whilst on guard duty at the Intensive Care Unit in the Royal Victoria Hospital.
- 3 June Joseph LYNN was killed by gunfire directed at an army foot patrol in the Creggan, Londonderry.
- 4 June One rifle a telescopic sight, a pistol, a quantity of ammunition and petrol and acid bomb-making equipment were found in the Divis Flats. One man was arrested and has since been charged with possession of the various items.
- 5 June Ronald GRAHAM, an off duty part-time UDR soldier, was killed in an ambush while he was delivering groceries to an isolated house near Lisnaskea.
- 10 June Eight prisoners in HM Prison, Crumlin Road, produced 3 handguns and forced the prison officers to allow them to escape. A number of cars were waiting in the area of the prison for the escaping men.
- 13 June At 1300 hours an off duty UDR sergeant was shot near Ballygawley. He was seriously wounded. One of the terrorists was believed to be hit and was taken very seriously ill to Dublin hospital.
- ATO neutralised a booby trap device near Queen's University, Belfast; allegedly it had fallen off Lord Gardiner's car.
- 15 June ATO neutralised a radio controlled explosive device containing 500 lbs of home made explosive in Craigavon.
- 16 June The army found 700 lbs of home made explosive near Bassbrook.

## **E.R.**

17 June Constable Christopher KYLE (RUC'R') was shot dead on his way home from work in Omagh.

20 June Constable Neil QUINN (RUC) was shot dead in a pub in Newry.

There was a mortar attack on Macrory Park Security Force Base. There were 5 army casualties, all listed NSI at Musgrave Park Hospital, and one civilian casualty - a 6 year old boy who is now out of the intensive care unit and his condition is improving.

21 June The army neutralised a command wire explosive device near Greencastle. The device comprised 7 milk churns containing 560 lbs of home made explosive.

Points to make

- 1 At their meeting in London on 21 May 1980, the Prime Minister and Mr Haughey agreed on the importance which they attached to the unique relationship between the peoples of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Ireland and on the need to further this relationship in the interest of peace and reconciliation.
- 2 To this end, at their meeting in Dublin in December 1980 the two Prime Ministers set in hand a series of joint studies covering a wide range of bi-lateral issues.
- 3 The topics being considered are possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic cooperation and measures to encourage mutual understanding.
- 4 The studies are concerned with the relationship between the United Kingdom as a whole and the Republic. They do not deal with the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. That is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland, for Her Majesty's Government and for Parliament at Westminster.
- 5 Of course the Government and people of the Republic watch developments in Northern Ireland with special interest. For their part, the leading parties in the Republic accept that their aspiration to Irish unity can only be achieved with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland.
- 6 There is sometimes misunderstanding about the expression "possible new institutional structures". The joint studies are about ways in which the unique relationship might be further developed. This clearly includes consideration of whether there are aspects of that relationship which might then benefit from fresh institutions. Other countries have devised special arrangements to reflect a special relationship without in any way infringing national sovereignty.



## E.R.

7 A Council of Ireland is not contemplated. That was an institution linking the Republic with Northern Ireland, not with the United Kingdom.

8 If asked about remarks about Irish unity by Mr Lenihan and others, Naturally, I cannot answer for such remarks, but we have made it clear on many occasions that the studies do not touch on the internal government of Northern Ireland or its constitutional position.

9 HMG certainly intends to proceed with the studies; the attitude of any new Government in the Republic remains to be seen when it is clear who will form that Government.

INDEX TO ANNEXES

- A. TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
- B. AIDS TO INDUSTRY
- C. JOB PROMOTIONS
- D. SUPPORT FOR EMPLOYMENT
- E. ELECTRICITY TARIFFS

BACKGROUND - STATISTICSUNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES

	<u>Total Unemployed</u>	<u>Percentage of Employees</u>
1. June 1980	73,031	12.7
May 1981	101,522	17.6
June 1981	103,833	18.0

2. Between September and December 1980 employment in the construction industry in NI fell by 3,050 (9.0%) bringing the total net job loss since June 1979 to 6,750 (18.0%). (In GB construction employment fell by 85,000 (6.8%) in the same period).

3. Substantial falls in employment also occurred in the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing employment in NI fell by 5,150 (14.1%. 2,450 male, 2,700 females) between September and December 1980. Employment in this sector now stands at 119,300 some 20,800 (14.8%) fewer than in June 1979. Of this decline male employment accounts for 11,800 (56.7%). (In GB manufacturing employment fell by 244,000 between September and December 1980 bringing the total fall since June 1979 to 861,000 (9.61%).

4. Government's working assumptions that unemployment (excluding school leavers) in GB will average 2.5 million in 1981/82 and 2.7 million in 1982/83 are the only official indication of future unemployment levels. On the basis of these figures and assuming that the observed past relationship between NI and GB unemployment holds in future, seasonally adjusted unemployment in NI would average around 108,000 in 1981/82 and 116,000 in 1982/83.

EMPLOYMENT

5. Employment in NI reached a peak of 513,650 in June 1979. Since then the decline in employment has gathered momentum and by December 1980 employment levels had fallen to 485,800 - some 25,450 (5.0%) fewer than a year earlier. (In GB 690,000 (3.1%) jobs were lost between June 1979 and September 1980 (latest figures available) compared to 17,400 (3.4%) in NI during the same period).

Within this overall decline, the various sectors displayed different movements. Total employment in the service sector in NI fell by 2,050 (0.6%) between September and December 1980 but for the period June 1979 to December 1980 there was still a net increase of 350 (0.1%) jobs. Of this increase female employment accounts for 2,550 with male employment showing a decrease of 2,200 jobs. (In GB there was a net loss of 128,000 (1.0%) jobs in the service sector in the period June 1979 to Sept. 1980).

AIDS TO INDUSTRY

Grants from Government

NI enjoys the highest level and greatest range of financial incentives available to industry of any region in the UK.

These are:-

- (i) Standard Capital Grants at a rate of 30% towards capital expenditure on machinery and buildings. Comparable grants in GB are Regional Development Grants at a maximum rate of 22%.
- (ii) Selective Assistance to Industry. These are alternatives to Standard Capital Grants and take the form of:
  - Selective Capital Grants at 40%-50%
  - Employment Grants for new projects during the build up period
  - Interest Relief Grants

These are individually negotiable and are subject to firms satisfying criteria which include viability, additionality - jobs would not be available without higher level of assistance job security - that organisation will provide secure jobs for foreseeable future. Selective assistance is available in GB through project grants paid in addition to Regional Development Grants, though these do not provide generous assistance as is available in NI.

Local Enterprise Development Unit (LEDU)

This unit provides a similar range of assistance for small firms employing up to 50 people to that provided for larger firms.

Northern Ireland Development Agency (NIDA)

This agency provides loans, loan guarantees and equity capital for firms. These forms of assistance are available as additional support to that which can be obtained via the Department of Commerce's range of grants.

JOB PROMOTIONS

The total number of jobs promoted by Government incentives to the private sector in the years 1978 to 1980 was 21,286 compared with 13,824 jobs in the previous 3 years. In 1980 6,850 jobs were promoted. These included the Lear Fan aircraft unit (1,250 jobs) and the expansion of the GM subsidiary Fisher Body (800 jobs).

The detailed breakdown of job promotions in Northern Ireland since 1975 by the Government and its agencies has been:

1975	3472
1976	2904
1977	4647
1978	6413
1979	5472
1980	5545
1981 1st quarter	1239
	<hr/>
	29692
	<hr/>

The Local Enterprise Development Unit, which is directly concerned with job promotion for small businesses, has reported a substantial increase in the number of enquiries received so far this year compared to last year.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR EMPLOYMENT

SUPPORT FOR EMPLOYMENT

Youth Opportunities Programme	6,984
Temporary Short-Time Working Compensation Scheme	10,063
Training on Employers' Premises	11,550
Job Release Scheme	960
Enterprise Ulster (Adults exc admin)	952
GTCs, including Attachment Training etc.	729
	<hr/>
TOTAL	31,238

INCREASED SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT MEASURES

Additional £9.4m for 1981/82 towards:-

- (a) YOP increase from 7,000 to 10,000 places -  
40% increase since May 1979
- (b) Temporary Short-Time Working Compensation  
Scheme to continue
- (c) Job Release Scheme to be retained for a further  
year
- (d) Action for Community Employment (ACE) -  
£2.06million in 1981/82.



NI ELECTRICITY TARIFFS

On 5 March the Prime Minister announced in Belfast that steps would be taken to bring NI electricity tariffs more into line with those in England and Wales and to keep them there. This reflected the Government's recognition that the differential between NI tariffs and average England and Wales tariffs was an unreasonable burden on the NI community. This year's tariff increases have therefore been limited to set NI industrial tariffs at the level of the highest in England and Wales; domestic tariffs are now only 5% above the highest in England and Wales and this gap will be eliminated next year. These changes will help to improve the lot of every electricity consumer in NI and - by removing uncertainty about future tariff levels - the announcement has also enhanced NI's chances of attracting inward investment.

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PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland: Prisons and Politics  
(C(81) 36)

BACKGROUND

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has circulated this memorandum in accordance with the conclusions reached by OD at their meeting on 18th June. Since that discussion he has consulted the Home Secretary about his proposal for an advisory body on the special problems of Northern Irish prisons and I understand that the Home Secretary is content that he should defer the establishment of the Committee for the time being, but continue with the preparatory work so as to be in a position to move quickly if and when the opportunity arises.

2. Although the Cabinet have received regular oral reports from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland about the developing situation in Ulster, these reports have mainly concerned day-to-day events. This memorandum offers non-OD members of the Cabinet an opportunity to consider the political problems in Northern Ireland against a wider perspective.

3. When OD discussed the proposed advisory body on Northern Irish prisons, they agreed that it was important that the body should not be given terms of reference which would suggest any weakening in the Government's resolve to resist the demands of IRA prisoners for political status. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has now taken this thinking a stage further in C(81) 36 and proposes not to set up the advisory body at all at the present time; to set it up with terms of reference that covered the problems of the hunger strikers could be interpreted as weakness and could encourage the PIRA and alienate the Protestants, while to set it up with terms of reference that excluded the problems of the hunger strikers could exacerbate moderate opinion in the world generally, and increase the alienation of Catholics in Northern Ireland. There is still a need for the advisory body in the longer term, and preparatory work will go ahead to establish it.

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OD (81) 12  
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Page 2

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4. In his minute to you of 12<sup>th</sup> June, which was circulated to OD, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland argued that there had to be a parallel move on both the prison situation and the question of a more general political initiative. Following the OD discussion on 18th June, only the more general political initiative is proposed for immediate action. The essential question for the Cabinet is whether this is better or worse than nothing.

5. There is a real possibility that the Advisory Council for Northern Ireland may turn out to be a "talking shop" which would be a source of damaging criticism of Government policy but would accept no responsibility for constructive action. Some Northern Irish political parties may refuse to take part in it, and if the SDLP is one of them, there is a risk that the Advisory Council may simply become a sounding board for Protestant opinion in Northern Ireland.

6. On the other hand an announcement to establish an Advisory Council would certainly be regarded by most international opinion as an indication that the Government was trying to make progress, and if the announcement was made on 2nd July before any further hunger strike deaths have taken place, it would not appear to have been wrung out of the Government under duress. There is also the possibility that, if the Government announces a decision to set up an Advisory Council, the Northern Irish political parties will be afraid to refuse to join it in case it turns out to be a significant political development.

7. If the Cabinet agrees in principle with the proposed initiative, there remains the question of timing: is it imperative to be seen to do something before the new wave of hunger strike deaths begin (but also just before the marching season), or could it and should it wait until late summer or early autumn?

HANDLING

8. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should introduce his paper. You will wish in the subsequent discussion to take this opportunity to allow non-OD Cabinet members to express their views on the Government's policy towards Northern Ireland. You may yourself wish to remind the Cabinet that the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies remain a potentially useful link with Dublin, but

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that they are temporarily in limbo while the Republic sorts out the political problems created by the results of the last election. Other points to cover in discussion are:-

- (a) Does the Home Secretary confirm that he is content with the line proposed in C(81) 36 on the establishment of an independent Advisory Body in relation to Northern Irish prisons?
- (b) Does the Cabinet agree with the proposal to set up an Advisory Council for Northern Ireland? Is the timing envisaged right, in terms of Northern Ireland, of Westminster and of world opinion?
- (c) Does the proposed Council raise any particular problems for the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales?
- (d) How does the Chief Whip expect the Government's supporters and Ulster Unionist MPs to react to the Advisory Council proposal? Should there be some preliminary discussion with the latter before an announcement is made? Would it be sold to them as a step towards the re-establishment of the Stormont Parliament?
- (e) Does the Chief Whip, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Lord President agree in relation to the Houses of Commons and Lords that it would be best to announce the establishment of the proposed Advisory Council for Northern Ireland during the course of the debate on the renewal of powers for direct rule on 2nd July?
- (f) What impact does the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary consider that the proposed announcement will have on international opinion? Are there any particular aspects of the proposal which should be emphasised to maximise its impact abroad, particularly in the United States and the Republic of Ireland? I attach a copy of telegram 207 of 22nd June for our Ambassador in Dublin, which is relevant.

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- (g) Are there any points of detail on the proposals for the Advisory Council on Northern Ireland set out in Annex A to C(81) 36? These proposals have the advantage that they avoid the need for any further immediate legislation or elections. But a number of obvious questions are left unanswered. For example, are all the members to advise on questions as they affect Northern Ireland as a whole, or will they be expected to pursue specific district or constituency interests according to the nature of their original election? How far can such a body be trusted to make its own rules up as it goes along?

CONCLUSION

9. Subject to points made in discussion, you may like to guide the Cabinet to agree to invite the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland -

- (i) to set up by administrative means an Advisory Council for Northern Ireland on the basis described in C(81) 36 and to announce this intention in the debate on the renewal of powers for direct rule;
- (ii) to continue with the necessary preparatory work on composition and terms of reference for an advisory body on Northern Irish prisons, but not to announce its establishment at the present time.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

24th June 1981

GRPS 242

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM DUBLIN 22:1430Z JUNE 1981

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 207 OF 22 JUNE 1981

AND TO IMMEDIATE NIO (BELFAST)

MR R M HASTIE-SMITH  
CABINET OFFICE

M.I.P.T.: HUNGER STRIKE

1. I HAD EARLIER SEEN MR O'ROURKE AT THE CANADIAN NATIONAL DAY ON FRIDAY 19 JUNE AND HE SUGGESTED I CALLED ON HIM AND MR NALLY THIS MORNING. I HAVE JUST SEEN THEM SEPARATELY AND THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE:-

(I) MR NALLY MADE THE POINT ALREADY MADE BY DR FITZGERALD THAT THE PRISONERS THOUGHT MORE ABOUT ASSOCIATION WITHIN THE WHOLE BLOCK THAN ANYTHING ELSE (SEE PARA 2 OF MY I.P.T.). HE SAID THAT WITH THE SLIGHTLY IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE IN THE PRISON WE SHOULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY GRANTING ASSOCIATION WITHIN THE BLOCK AND AT THE SAME TIME RESTATE THE COMPLETE PACKAGE OF WHAT IS ON OFFER, AS WAS DONE IN THE STRIKE BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

(II) BOTH MADE THE POINT THAT ALREADY THE IRA AND H-BLOCK CAMPAIGN WAS CAUSING POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE REPUBLIC. WHEN THE NEXT MAN DIES, IF THE STRIKE IS NOT RESOLVED THEN, THE SITUATION WILL BECOME WORSE AND WE SHALL THEN BE IN A PERIOD OF DEATHS FOLLOWING ONE ANOTHER AT RELATIVELY SHORT INTERVALS. WHEN THIS COINCIDES WITH THE MARCHING SEASON, WE SHOULD HAVE TO PREPARE FOR SERIOUS VIOLENCE BOTH IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE REPUBLIC SEMI-COLON

(III) IT THEREFORE SEEMED THAT THE PRICE WE WERE PAYING FOR STANDING UP TO THE IRA STRIKE WAS TURNING OUT TO BE VERY MUCH HIGHER THAN ANYONE COULD HAVE EXPECTED AND THAT OUR NARROW TACTICAL APPROACH TO THE STRIKERS WAS NO LONGER ADEQUATE. SURELY IT WAS WORTH OUR ASKING OURSELVES WHETHER OUR POLICY IN THE PRISONS WAS SO GOOD THAT IT NEED NOT BE CHANGED. OUR FEARS ABOUT PROTESTANT ANGER IF WE GRANTED ASSOCIATION WITH THE BLOCKS WAS UNDERSTANDABLE. BUT COULD WE NOT SIMPLY SAY THAT THE LAW WHICH FORBIDS MILITARY ASSOCIATION AND DRILLING OUTSIDE PRISON WOULD APPLY INSIDE AS WELL?

2. MR O'ROURKE SAID THAT THE TAOISEACH WOULD PROBABLY BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE STRIKE WITHIN A DAY OR TWO.

3. SEE MY I.F.T.

FIGG

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

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GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

seen in my  
folder

Michael Alexander Esq.,  
10 Downing Street  
London  
S W 1

22 June 1981

Dear Michael,

At OD Committee last week (OD(81)<sup>12th</sup> Meeting) my Secretary of State was invited to lay before Cabinet, for consideration on 25 June, a paper which would

- a. consider the composition and terms of reference of a body to advise on the special problems of managing Northern Ireland prisons; and
- b. contain a proposal for the establishment of a non-elective political advisory body.

My Secretary of State will be circulating his paper tomorrow morning. It requires no explanation on point b. above; but as regards point a., having considered the matter further, in the light of the OD conclusion, and after consulting the Home Secretary, my Secretary of State has concluded that he must recommend to the Cabinet that it would be inappropriate to establish at this moment the sort of enquiry on prisons which was envisaged by OD Committee.

OD concluded that, for the reasons recorded in the minutes, there would be objections to setting up a Committee related in any way to the hunger strike. My Secretary of State is now persuaded, on the basis of his further examination of the matter, that there are serious objections to announcing now the establishment of a committee explicitly unrelated to the hunger strike and their security implications. The Home Secretary agrees. The reasons are referred to very briefly in the paper, and it may be useful for me to spell them out here in a little more detail:-

- a. Either it would be regarded as incredible that we should set up such a body unless it was to concern itself with the immediate problem - we should be suspected of creating a route to give concessions - or it would be seen as "fiddling while Rome burns".
- b. The international reaction would be especially severe. It would be likely to convict us of precisely the inflexible and inhumane attitude which we are trying to pin on the other side.

.../

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.../

- c. It would impose an impossible responsibility on the Committee's members. They would be established as a committee to examine the prison regime, but to ignore the hunger strike deaths which would go on around them.
- d. An announcement in the terms proposed would have to say that the Committee was not to concern itself with the hunger strike, and so would imply that we were concerned only with getting the special category prisoners into cells. That would be especially provocative to moderate Catholic opinion. We would be seen by them as saying that we were indifferent to the hunger strikers' deaths, and the troubles on the streets.

... My Secretary of State regards those arguments as particularly compelling at a time when the Irish Catholic Bishops, in their statement of last week (copy attached) have come out in support of so much of our cause. They, like the statement of American Bishops also made last week, commend to both sides the statement of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace. Announcing a committee so emphatically unrelated to the hunger strike or these important statements by Catholic opinion would be seen as a deliberate rejection of their moderation, even though in several points they support the Government's position.

It is for these reasons that my Secretary of State would regard it as most unwise to set up such a committee at this stage - though it will certainly be needed at some stage to consider our longer term problems and preparatory work as agreed by OD can continue. He therefore proposes that in the renewal debate, the only new announcement should be that related to the agreed move on the political front.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD Committee, and to David Wright.

*Yours sincerely,  
Noel Cornick*

NOEL CORNICK

SD

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TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

CATHOLIC PRESS @ INFORMATION OFFICE DUBLIN

ATTENTION: NEWS DESK

STATEMENT FROM THE IRISH CATHOLIC BISHOPS' CONFERENCE ISSUED FROM THEIR MEETING IN MAYNOOTH, CO. KILDARE, TODAY, 17 JUNE 1981:

WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SERIOUS AND DETERIORATING SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE CONTINUING HUNGER-STRIKE IN THE MAZE PRISON AT LONG KESH HAS LED TO INCREASING POLARISATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. NOT ONLY HAS IT CLAIMED THE LIVES OF FOUR YOUNG MEN WITHIN THE PRISON BUT IT HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY MURDER, BOMBING AND STREET VIOLENCE IN WHICH MANY MORE LIVES HAVE BEEN LOST. THE DEATHS OF HUNGER-STRIKERS HAVE ALSO BEEN FOLLOWED BY OUTBREAKS OF ARSON, INTIMIDATION AND WILFUL DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY. THIS HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM, THE PLIGHT OF THE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF INTIMIDATION AND TERROR, THE DEEPENING DIVISIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY, HAVE CONSEQUENCES NOT JUST FOR THE NORTH ITSELF BUT FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE WHOLE ISLAND.

EVERY DEATH AND SERIOUS INJURY THROUGH VIOLENCE CALL FORTH A DEEP AND INTENSE SORROW, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE RELIGION AND POLITICAL OUTLOOK OF THE VICTIM. WE EXPERIENCE AN EQUAL SADNESS AT ALL DEATHS WHETHER THE VICTIMS BE PROTESTANT OR CATHOLIC. WE FEEL EQUAL SYMPATHY AND COMPASSION FOR ALL WHO MOURN.

WE REPEAT WHAT THE NORTHERN BISHOPS SAID DURING THE FIRST HUNGER-STRIKE LAST NOVEMBER:

"THE VIOLENCE IN OUR MIDST HAS GENERATED A HIDEOUS SPIRAL OF MURDER, BOMBING, ROBBERY, THE BREAK-UP OF FAMILIES AND DISRESPECT FOR LIFE ITSELF. IT HAS FILLED GRAVES AND PRISONS. IT HAS EVEN CONTINUED UNABATED IN RECENT WEEKS. WE SOLEMNLY DECLARE THAT THOSE WHO KILL, WOUND, THREATEN OR INTIMIDATE, THOSE WHO PUT PEOPLE IN FEAR OF THEIR LIVES OR ENDANGER THEIR LIVELIHOODS, ARE GUILTY OF EVIL DEEDS CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF GOD. THEY STAND IN CLEAR OPPOSITION TO THE TEACHING OF JESUS CHRIST AS PREACHED IN ALL CHRISTIAN CHURCHES. AS CATHOLICS WE MUST ONCE MORE PROCLAIM A DECISIVE NO TO ALL KINDS OF VIOLENCE."

MANY OF THESE EVILS SPRING FROM THE EXISTENCE OF PRIVATE ARMIES OR PARAMILITARY ORGANISATIONS WHICH CLAIM THE RIGHT TO WAGE WAR. NOT ONLY HAVE THEY SENT OUT THEIR MEMBERS TO CARRY OUT CRUEL AND MURDEROUS DEEDS, BUT THEY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR LEADING YOUNG PEOPLE INTO EVIL BY URGING THEM TO ACTS OF VIOLENCE. WE MAKE OUR OWN THE APPEAL WHICH OUR HOLY FATHER MADE IN DROGHEDA TO THE YOUNG PEOPLE OF IRELAND:

"IF YOU HAVE BEEN CAUGHT UP IN THE WAYS OF VIOLENCE, EVEN IF YOU HAVE DONE DEEDS OF VIOLENCE, COME BACK TO CHRIST, WHOSE PARTING GIFT TO THE WORLD WAS PEACE. ONLY WHEN YOU COME BACK TO CHRIST WILL YOU FIND PEACE FOR YOUR TROUBLED CONSCIENCE AND REST FOR YOUR DISTURBED MINDS".

WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL, HOWEVER, OF THE INJUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND OVER THE YEARS WHICH CREATED A CLIMATE FOR EASY RECRUITMENT BY PARAMILITARY ORGANISATIONS. NOR DID THE PRESENT IMPASSE IN THE

WAZE, WHICH MAKES IT EASIER STILL, ABISE SUDDENLY. STRENUOUS EFFORTS WERE MAKE TO FIND A SOLUTION LAST YEAR. IF THE PRESENT EFFORTS WERE TO FAIL THE CONSEQUENCES THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE ISLAND COULD BE VERY GRAVE INDEED. THERE COULD BE A DANGER OF RESORT TO STILL MORE VIOLENT POLICIES. THERE COULD BE RISKS OF INSTABILITY THREATENING THE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF OUR SOCIETY. WE THEREFORE IMPLORE THE HUNGER-STRIKERS AND THOSE WHO DIRECT THEM TO REFLECT DEEPLY ON THE EVIL OF THEIR ACTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES. THE CONTEMPT FOR HUMAN LIFE, THE INCITEMENT TO REVENGE, THE EXPLOITATION OF THE HUNGER-STRIKES TO FURTHER A CAMPAIGN OF MURDER, THE INTIMIDATION OF THE INNOCENT, THE INITIATION OF CHILDREN INTO VIOLENCE, ALL THIS CONSTITUTES AN APPALLING MASS OF EVIL.

WE APPEAL ALSO TO POLITICIANS AND GOVERNMENTS AND WE REMIND THEM OF THE SOLEMN WORDS OF THE POPE IN DROGHEDA:

''TO ALL WHO BEAR POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AFFAIRS OF IRELAND, I WANT TO SPEAK WITH THE SAME URGENCY AND INTENSITY WITH WHICH I HAVE SPOKEN TO THE MEN OF VIOLENCE. DO NOT CAUSE OR CONDONE OR TOLERATE CONDITIONS WHICH GIVE EXCUSE OR PRETEXT TO MEN OF VIOLENCE. THOSE WHO RESORT TO VIOLENCE ALWAYS CLAIM THAT ONLY VIOLENCE BRINGS ABOUT CHANGE. THEY CLAIM THAT POLITICAL ACTION CANNOT ACHIEVE JUSTICE. YOU POLITICIANS MUST PROVE THEM TO BE WRONG. YOU MUST SHOW THAT THERE IS A PEACEFUL, POLITICAL WAY TO JUSTICE. YOU MUST SHOW THAT PEACE ACHIEVES THE WORKS OF JUSTICE, AND VIOLENCE DOES NOT.''

AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE WE WELCOME THE RECENT STATEMENT ON THE HUNGER STRIKE FROM THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE AND WE COMMEND IT TO BOTH SIDES AS A POSITIVE EFFORT TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE. LIKE THE COMMISSION WE CALL ON BOTH SIDES TO GIVE AN INDICATION OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MOVE TOWARDS A SOLUTION. WE ASK THE PRISONERS AND THOSE WHO SPEAK FOR THEM TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS ON CLOTHING, ASSOCIATION AND WORK WOULD, IF IMPLEMENTED, PROVIDE THE AVENUE FOR A SOLUTION. WE ASK THE GOVERNMENT TO SHOW A CORRESPONDING OPENNESS ON THESE ISSUES.

THE PRESENT DISTURBING SITUATION SHOULD MAKE US ALL THE MORE DETERMINED TO WORK TOGETHER FOR A SETTLEMENT. WE URGE INCREASED UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC AND CLOSER SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. WE APPEAL TO ALL THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES TO WORK TOGETHER FOR THE PROMOTION OF GOSPEL VALUES IN AN IRELAND INCREASINGLY THREATENED BY SECULARIST STANDARDS. WE ASK PEOPLE NOT TO ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE CARRIED AWAY BY DANGEROUS EMOTIONS. WE URGE THEM TO SEEK THE GUIDANCE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT AND TO REDOUBLE THEIR PRAYERS FOR A JUST SETTLEMENT TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT. WE DIRECT THAT AS FROM NEXT SUNDAY PRAYERS FOR PEACE BE INSERTED AMONG THE PRAYERS OF THE FAITHFUL AT ALL PUBLIC MASSES EVEN ON WEEKDAYS.

WE ASK PEOPLE TO PERSEVERE IN PRAYER ALWAYS. WHAT OUR LORD SAYS TO US IS THAT ''WE OUGHT ALWAYS TO PRAY AND NEVER TO LOSE HEART''.

ENDS



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 June 1981

Dear John

Thank you for your letter of 19 May about the Government's policy in Northern Ireland. I need scarcely say that there is much in the letter and the accompanying Annex with which I am in full agreement.

The sad sight, which has recently appeared regularly on our television screens, of our soldiers and policemen in Northern Ireland being attacked by mindless rioters cannot but move responsible, thinking people in all parts of the United Kingdom; and I am well aware of the enormous debt which we owe to those members of the security forces who have given their lives. Time and again I and Humphrey Atkins have made it clear that the Government will not be shaken off course by violence or intimidation of any sort; the sacrifices of the RUC and the Army will not be in vain. We have taken some pains over recent weeks to ensure that people throughout the United Kingdom appreciate the extent of the Government's commitment and determination to maintain policies which are manifestly right.

I acknowledge your concern about the impact of the media on the current situation in Northern Ireland. Terrorism, as you say lives on publicity; but of course the press and television must report the facts. As I said in my speech to the Conservative Women's Conference on 20 May, the press and television have a great responsibility and the line is hard to draw. However, I do not believe that in our democratic society we should seek to impose restrictions on the media other than those which already exist. The actions of the Government in sticking resolutely to democratic principles will ultimately have a far more lasting effect than the propaganda and bullying tactics of our enemies.

/You also mention

*JK*

You also mention the fears and hopes that may be aroused as a result of our developing relations with Dublin. The Government recognises that the establishment of the joint studies between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland is sensitive in certain quarters in Northern Ireland. I recognise that fears have been expressed that the objective of the joint studies is the unification of Ireland. Humphrey Atkins and I have repeatedly made it wholly clear that Northern Ireland's constitutional position within the United Kingdom is not threatened by these studies: the constitutional future of Northern Ireland is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland and for Parliament. I think that the truth of the matter has now got across. For his part Mr Haughey has recognised publicly that his Government's objective of a united Ireland cannot be realised without the consent of the majority of people of Northern Ireland.

The one point on which we differ is your claim that the rejection of full integration with Great Britain (by almost all the political parties in Northern Ireland) gives sustenance to the IRA, by encouraging the hope of some eventual change in Northern Ireland's constitutional status. I really do not believe that that is the case. As I have already said, I think that our commitment to the people of Northern Ireland is absolutely clear - witness my speeches in Northern Ireland on 5 March and 28 May. And maintenance of the union as long as that is the wish of the majority of people in Northern Ireland is in no way inconsistent with our continuing efforts to find a means of transferring responsibilities to locally elected representatives in the Province, in a way that is acceptable to all parts of the community there. After all, at last year's political Conference each of the three parties which attended favoured the devolution of legislative and executive powers, and that was also the preferred solution put forward by the Ulster Unionists in their paper to me at the time. Any suggestion that our approach represents some form of threat to the Province's constitutional position can surely be countered by reference to the Conference Working Paper (Cmnd 7763) and last year's Discussion Paper (Cmnd 7950). Both made it absolutely clear that Northern Ireland's position within the United Kingdom was not at issue.

/Again,

Again, I am grateful to you for writing. Your consistent interest in Northern Ireland's affairs, and your support for the broad thrust of our policies in these testing times, are much appreciated by both Humphrey Atkins and myself.

signed

MT

Sir John Biggs-Davison, M.P.

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

GREAT GEORGE STREET,

LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Mike Pattison Esq  
No 10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

*Recd.* 17 June 1981

1. MODBA to see

2. G.R.

*Please type for PM; cc J.G.*

*Dear Mike,*

I apologise for the delay in replying to your letter of 21 May enclosing one the Prime Minister had received from Sir John Biggs-Davison dated 19 May.

... I attach a draft letter which the Prime Minister might like to send to Sir John.

*Yours sincerely,  
Neil Conry*

*for* S BOYS SMITH

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

To

Enclosures

Copies to be sent to

Sir John Biggs-Davison  
MP  
House of Commons  
LONDON  
SW1A 0AA

(Full Postal Address)

(Full Address, if Necessary)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY ..... Prime Minister .....  
(Name of Signatory)

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The sad sight, which has recently appeared regularly on our television screens, of our soldiers and policemen in Northern Ireland being attacked by mindless rioters cannot but move responsible, thinking people in all parts of the United Kingdom; and I am well aware of the enormous debt which we owe to those members of the security forces who have given their lives. Time and again I and Humphrey Atkins have made it clear that the Government will not be shaken off course by violence or intimidation of any sort; the sacrifices of the RUC and the Army will not be in vain. We have taken some pains over recent weeks to ensure that people throughout the United Kingdom appreciate the extent of the Government's commitment and determination to maintain policies which are manifestly right.

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Again, I am grateful to you for writing. Your consistent interest in Northern Ireland's affairs, and your support for the broad thrust of our policies in these testing times, are much appreciated by both Humphrey Atkins and myself.

also helped  
 copied to  
 Hugo Strick  
 file  
 Pmi Munster

Ref. A05103

MR ALEXANDER

I am submitting separately a brief for tomorrow's discussion at OD of the memorandum by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. By way of an annex to the brief the Prime Minister may like to see the attached intelligence-based analysis prepared by Mr Ranson of the Northern Ireland Office.

2. It stresses the success of the Provisional IRA in the political aspect of their campaign, the risk of alienation of the Catholic community and the need to respond to counter that political success. It is argued that to take no action in the face of PIRA's political campaign is not standing firm, but is admitting defeat in the political arena, with serious implications for security.

3. That argument seems to point to the need for <sup>a</sup>political response; it is not clear that the proposed review of the prisons is particularly relevant to it. I think that the questions remain as in the brief:

- (i) If this is not the time for a review of the prisons, do we need some kind of political initiative?
- (ii) Is the political initiative proposed by the Secretary of State credible and sufficient?
- (iii) Should it be launched now, or after the summer holiday and the marching season?

4. You will no doubt also be drawing the Prime Minister's attention to telegram number 199 of 17 June from Dublin.

(attached)

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

17 June 1981

THE PROVISIONALS - POLITICAL ACTIVITY

From time to time and in particular at the beginning of this year - we have considered whether and under what circumstances the Provisionals might switch the focus of their efforts to the political front - it has sometimes been thought that a consequence of this might be a reduction in the amount of energy and effort they put into their terrorist campaign.

2. The reality is of course that they have for some months been devoting increasing effort to political action, while continuing the "military campaign" at the lower level which their now limited capabilities permit. There is also a third dimension, when circumstances such as the deaths of hunger strikers permit - street violence.
3. An important part of the Provisionals political activity consists of seeking to broaden out their support through the H block campaign thus involving uncommitted members of the minority community in peaceful protest in support of PSF objectives. In a short space of time the Provisionals have demonstrated great skill in manoeuvring cynically and adroitly to attract a significant spectrum of support. The Fermanagh by-election and the Dail elections are the best illustrations of this.
4. We have tended to regard the involvement of the Provisionals in political activity as a development to be encouraged. But it is a development that requires a response from Government, as their terrorist activities receive a response. There is very general agreement that the Catholic community has been disturbed by the hunger strikers' deaths, that it blames Government, that there is a degree of alienation and that the Provisionals are getting more support. Unless their political exploitation of the hunger strike situation - and the resulting recrudescence of support for PIRA - can be countered, then the Provisionals "going political" can succeed, where their terrorist activity has failed, in reversing the progress of recent years towards "normality" and renewing for them a base from which a revitalised terrorist campaign could be launched.
5. It is this process which the suggested Prisons Review and a further round of political activity are presumably intended to counter. If we could find less controversial and more certain means to achieve the objective no doubt we would do so, but all options are difficult and can, and no doubt will, be criticised.
6. If it is argued that to have a review of the prisons is to signal that Government is wavering and if Ministers on this score incline to reject the proposal there is surely a counter argument. To take no action in the face of the Provisionals effective political campaign centred on the hunger strikes is not standing firm, but is admitting defeat in the political arena. This will be proved to be so as the Provisionals gather wider support with serious implications for security and law and order.

D/R

16 June 1981

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES 18

PS

PS/LPS

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

HD/RID

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/EPD INF

HD/NEWS DEPT

...

...

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

N IRELAND OFFICE -- PS TO SEC OF STATE  
RM 66 A/2 GGS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

SIR K STOWE

MR MORIATY

MR MARSHALL

MR BUXTON

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG  
DIO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

GROUPS 320

SECRET

FROM DUBLIN 171014Z JUNE 1981

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 199 OF 17 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE N I O (BELFAST)

HUNGER STRIKE

1. IN MY TELNO 184 OF 4 JUNE I SAID THAT I HOPED WE COULD ANNOUNCE SOME INITIATIVE SHORTLY AFTER THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN. IT NOW SEEMS THAT A NEW GOVERNMENT CAN HARDLY BE FORMED UNTIL AFTER THE DAIL MEETS ON 30 JUNE. SO WE HAVE A LITTLE MORE TIME THAN WE EXPECTED.

HARDLY BE FORMED UNTIL AFTER THE DAIL MEETS ON 30 JUNE. SO WE HAVE A LITTLE MORE TIME THAN WE EXPECTED.

2. I PAID A BRIEF VISIT TO N I O BELFAST YESTERDAY AND LEARNED OF THE NEW SUBMISSION ABOUT A PRISON REVIEW. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ON WHOM I CALLED KINDLY ASKED ME FOR MY COMMENTS. I SAID I THOUGHT THE MOOD IN THE REPUBLIC ABOUT THE HUNGER STRIKE WAS HARDENING AGAINST US FOLLOWING THE SURPRISINGLY HIGH VOTE FOR THE H-BLOCK COMMITTEES CANDIDATES IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS. THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE MATTER ARE BEGINING TO BE OBSCURED HERE BY THE FEAR THAT WE ARE PERHAPS ALLOWING THE STRIKE TO GET OUT OF CONTROL AND FAILING TO RECOGNIZE OR COUNTER ITS DANGEROUS SIDE EFFECTS - POLARISATION IN THE NORTH AND HOSTILITY TO BRITAIN AND POSSIBLE TURBULENCE IN THE SOUTH. BEFORE THE ELECTION IT WAS HOPED THAT OUR OPEN AND ENLIGHTENED ATTITUDE TO MOVES BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD - IF NOT RESOLVE THE QUESTION - AT LEAST ISOLATE THE PROVISIONALS FROM THEIR "HUMANITARIAN" FELLOW TRAVELLERS (WHO ARE NOW CLEARLY MORE NUMEROUS THAN WE THOUGHT AND WHOSE NUMBERS ARE STILL GROWING). THE E C H R INITIATIVE IS NOW SEEN TO HAVE RUN INTO THE SAND. WHAT I THINK IS WANTED IS SOME NEW WAY OF DRAWING IN RESPECTABLE AND WELL-KNOWN FOREIGNERS, PERHAPS FROM WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, IN ANY NEW INITIATIVE WE MAY CONTEMPLATE. THE PROPOSED PRISON REVIEW MIGHT BE A CONVENIENT WAY OF DOING THIS.

3. IN THE PRESENT EMOTIONAL STATE GENERATED BY THE HUNGER STRIKE DEATHS, WE MUST TRY AND GET OUT OF OUR PRESENT DIFFICULTY WHEREBY IRISH MEN ARE SEEN TO DIE IN BRITISH PRISONS AND THE BRITISH CAN'T OR DON'T WANT TO STOP THEM. A REVIEW IN WHICH WELL-KNOWN FOREIGN LEGAL LUMINARIES PARTICIPATED WOULD HELP INTERNATIONALISE OUR DIFFICULTIES AND, PROVIDED OF COURSE THAT THE FOREIGNERS PLAYED THEIR PROPER PART, MIGHT AT LAST TURN THE TIDE IN OUR FAVOUR.

FIGG.

NNNNN

SENT/RECD AT 17:1130Z HMT/JD

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also copied  
to Hunger Strike  
file

Ref. A05101

PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland: Political Development and the Prison Situation

(OD(81) 32 and 33)

BACKGROUND

Since OD discussed political development in Northern Ireland on 18th November 1980 the main events have been the collapse of the initial hunger strike in the Maze; the Dublin Summit and the start of the Anglo-Irish joint studies; the second hunger strike; the Fermanagh by-election; the rioting following the four strikers' deaths; the local government elections in the Province; and the general election in the Republic. The immediate background to the two memoranda which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has now circulated are the discussions which you recently had with the GOC and Chief Constable Northern Ireland at Chequers. They are worried that without some modification of the Government's present stance (to show that the Government is not indifferent to the deaths of the hunger strikers) there is a danger of progressive alienation of moderate Catholic opinion. The converse of this is that a modification of the present stance, at any rate while the succession of hunger strikes continues, could be interpreted by the Protestants as a "surrender" to the PIRA and could inflame Protestant opinion.

2. There has been no significant deterioration in the security situation so far as the general level of terrorist incidents is concerned. The security forces do not doubt that they can contain the terrorists. But they are concerned that the hunger strike deaths are now associated with street violence, which is no doubt well orchestrated but involves people well beyond the hard core of terrorists; they are apprehensive about the reappearance of "no-go" areas in Belfast; and the image of renewed street violence is damaging the prospects of economic recovery for Northern Ireland. If the street violence continues, there is a possibility of the security forces being goaded beyond endurance and

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becoming involved in another "bloody Sunday" type of incident, which would alienate international opinion particularly in the Republic of Ireland and the United States.

3. The difficulties will increase when, as seems likely, a regular series of strikers' deaths begin to take place every 10-14 days, starting early next month and continuing into the indefinite future. In the Irish election the H Block candidates did better than anyone had predicted, polling over 42,000 first preference votes and getting two members elected in Border constituencies. This suggests that the Fermanagh by-election was not a passing phenomenon.

4. In his minute to you of 12th June, which has been circulated to the Committee, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland explains the link between the prison situation and the question of a more general political initiative. Essentially his view is that there must be a move in both areas in parallel for there to be any chance of success for either.

5. The questions posed by Mr. Atkins's two memoranda present an acutely difficult balance of political judgment. Either way, a little bad luck could bring us on to a slippery downhill slope in relation to our entire policy towards Northern Ireland. Progress down this slope might be accelerated by further hunger strike deaths, and a growing "troops out" movement in this country. But it could also be accelerated (if the Chief Constable and the GOC are right) by the lack of any modification in the Government's stance. If we get the balance wrong, we might be forced into thinking in very different terms from the limited sorts of initiative now under discussion.

6. Ministers must take seriously the view of the Chief Constable and the GOC that the setting up of a Departmental Committee on the prison system would reassure the Catholics of the Government's sense of concern, and would thus ease the burden of maintaining law and order. But it would probably enrage the Protestants; it would be seen by them and by the PIRA as a sign of weakness, and it seems unlikely that it would persuade the hunger strikers to give up, even if it did not actually strengthen their belief that they were winning. It could all too easily be seen as a move towards arbitration and thus as a sign of the Government losing political control.

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7. As regards political progress, Mr. Atkins's proposal for an elected advisory body has been under consideration for a long time. The Committee discussed and rejected it in 1979. It might be welcome initially to international opinion, as an indication of political movement. But in Northern Ireland it could be a damp squib; and it could end all too easily as a "talking shop" which would be a source of damaging criticism of Government policy but would not accept any responsibility for constructive action.

8. In judging the balance between action and inaction, the essential criterion must be the need not to jeopardise the very real assets which we still retain. The improvement in the general security situation has been maintained. In the Irish election, although the H Block candidates may have done well in the Border areas, the overall result was certainly not a victory for the extreme Republicans. It is significant that Sile De Valera lost her seat in Dublin South. Much of international opinion has been broadly sympathetic to British policy. Other countries have similar problems, and the West Germans for example let their Baader-Meinhof hunger striker die. The Anglo-Irish joint studies remain a useful link with Dublin which both Mr. Haughey and Dr. FitzGerald are anxious to preserve.

9. I find it difficult to believe that this is the right time for launching a proposal for a Departmental Committee in the prison system. If that view were to be accepted, then the question would be whether we could sit still and do nothing - at least until the autumn - and whether, if it is felt that some move must be made, the political initiative proposed is credible and sufficient on its own.

10. You will also wish to have at the back of your mind the possibility that you may wish to appoint a new Secretary of State before long. The appointment of a new Secretary of State would itself be an important political event and gesture in Northern Ireland. A new Secretary of State would need shots in his political locker; to launch a political initiative now would, to put it at its lowest, diminish his options.

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11. The Secretary of State for Scotland and the Attorney General have been invited for this item.

HANDLING

12. You will wish to invite the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to introduce his two memoranda. You may like to suggest that the Northern Irish prisons situation should be considered first, as a decision on this particular problem will affect the form and timing of any more general political initiative. Discussion should cover the following points -

- (a) Are the Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Scotland content that the proposed terms of reference for the Departmental Committee to review the Northern Irish prison system would not produce awkward repercussions in relation to prisons in the rest of the United Kingdom? Home Office officials are worried by the suggestion that there should be "continuing provision of independent and professional advice on prison policy and practice".
- (b) Is it either desirable or practicable, while the hunger strike continues, to set up this kind of Departmental Committee, which would presumably include members outside Government service? Might the incidence of dying strikers place the Committee under an intolerable strain so far as the timetable of its work and the nature of its recommendations were concerned?
- (c) Would there be any advantage in announcing now that the Departmental Committee will be set up when the hunger strike is brought to an end, linking its creation to the need to consider various administrative problems before the new prison at Maghaberry is opened in 1982? This might go some way towards placating moderate Catholic opinion in Northern Ireland. It might also help to weaken the resolve of the hunger strikers, but it is difficult to set ~~too~~ much store by that.
- (d) Does the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary consider that an initiative on the prisons situation in Northern Ireland is likely to have much impact on international opinion, particularly in the United States? Or is it the political initiative which really matters in this context?

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- (e) Does the proposed political initiative offer enough to be worth pursuing? It was rejected by OD in 1979 as being too slight. Its chances of achieving any success are even more slender now, as they depend on achieving some kind of acceptance by the SDLP of the Government's policy on prisons. The main virtue of the proposal is that it would do something to fill in the current vacuum and indicate a willingness on the part of the Government not to stand still. But would the proposal offer sufficient prospect of progress to be taken seriously at Westminster, in Ireland, and abroad?
- (f) If any political initiative is to be made, what about timing? The renewal of powers debate in the House of Commons on 2nd July would be a good opportunity for an announcement. But soon after that hunger strikers are likely to start dying and the marching season in Northern Ireland will have begun. And Mr. Atkins does not envisage that his meetings with Northern Irish political parties will be completed until about September.
- (g) If there is to be a political initiative on these lines, is it right to start with bilateral discussions with the parties, or is there something to be said for going straight to an announcement of a decision to set up a consultative assembly and letting the talking follow?
- (h) What is the likelihood of the security situation in Northern Ireland deteriorating if the Government takes no initiative? Does the Secretary of State for Defence believe that the security forces will have difficulty in containing the street violence which is likely to take place? Is there likely to be any resurgence of terrorist incidents in the Border areas following the support which has been demonstrated for the H Block candidates?

#### CONCLUSION

13. Subject to the points made in discussion, you may wish to guide the Committee to the conclusion that the initiatives proposed in the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's memoranda both in relation to the prisons situation

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and the general political situation offer insufficient promise of immediate benefit to justify their introduction at this particular time and the associated risk of worsening matters. This applies particularly to the prisons proposal. The Committee might conclude that the proposed talks with local political parties should go ahead, without any commitment at this stage to a Government proposal, but that the Government should stand firm in the prisons situation so long as the hunger strikes continue, while recognising that this may represent a bar to progress so far as talking to the SDLP is concerned.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

17th June, 1981

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

also copied

to Hughes Strickland  
File



M

PRIME MINISTER

NORTHERN IRELAND: THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT

1. I am today circulating to my colleagues on OD two papers (OD(81)32 and 33) for discussion next week. One deals with the political situation in Northern Ireland; the other with the prisons. The two groups of problems, although set out separately, are closely inter-related. Each, within its own field, proposes a new development in the policies we have pursued so far. It seemed to me essential that, in reading these papers, my colleagues should have before them an explanation of why I think the time for movement has now come.

2. On politics, we have said for two years, in two White Papers, that we were looking for the agreement of the local parties, and could not move without that agreement - any move had to be "acceptable" to both sides of the community. I am now convinced:

- (a) that the prospects of such agreement, never good, have receded in recent months;
- (b) that we cannot stand still for the remainder of this Parliament on political development in the North while continuing to pursue - as we are committed to doing - the development of relations with Dublin; and
- (c) that we must therefore contemplate taking a unilateral step now, looking for support to Westminster.

3. On prisons, we have over the last eight months stood firm against the hunger strikers and their demands. And I am quite clear that on our points of principle (no differentiation; and no loss of control) we must continue as firm as ever.

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But there is both room and, I believe, need for movement. I am therefore proposing the setting up of a Committee which we shall certainly need before long to advise us on some difficult medium and long-term problems which we face, and which could also, if we so choose, be charged with the more urgent role of providing a possible way of easing the short-term impasse.

4. These two moves are linked. We have not been wrong in seeking the agreement of local political parties to constitutional change. We have certainly not been wrong in standing firm on the prisons issue. But:

(i) I believe there is increasingly a mood in the country that if we cannot "do something" about "the Northern Ireland problem", we should consider withdrawal. The message which I get loud and clear from every contact I have with broad public and political opinion - including particularly backbench Conservative opinion relayed by the officers of the Party's Northern Ireland Committee - is that the time has come for us to be seen to be making moves, on both fronts, political and prisons, since they reinforce each other. We are not winning friends by doing nothing.

(ii) On the political front it is clear from all our efforts of the past two years that "acceptability" is a chimera. We were right to try to find it. We should be foolish to refuse to acknowledge that it is not to be found. If by the next election we wish to be seen to have made some progress, we must be bold enough to proclaim and pursue a course in spite of local disagreement.

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.../

(iii) On prisons, apart from the longer term problems (which we have to face in any case), I now feel strongly that a continuing, apparently endless, series of deaths from hunger strikes will cumulatively lose us both the catholic population of Northern Ireland and the sympathy of the world opinion. We may outface the hunger strikers; but we shall pay a heavy price for doing so. In my view we must be seen at least to have tried to facilitate a lessening of tension, perhaps leading to a way of ending the strikes. In the perception of the outside world the line between firmness and intransigence is a narrow one.

5. With these considerations in mind I propose in the papers the appointment of some kind of Departmental Committee to consider and advise on the problems in NI prisons. On politics, it is as impracticable as ever to set up without the agreement of the parties any new body exercising executive powers. I am therefore proposing that we should establish an elected advisory body, being an arrangement which we could, if necessary, impose !

6. If the approach to political development proposed in the paper is approved by OD, we have to decide how much I should say in the Renewal Debate in early July before I have completed talks with the local parties. I propose to make it clear in my speech that HMG is persuaded that Northern Ireland needs now some development on the political front; that I have in train discussions with the local political leaders so that I can learn their present thinking; that we recognise that, since a consensus on the way ahead may well be lacking, we shall have press ahead with it; and that we shall publish a White Paper in the autumn with our proposals, to give Westminster and GB opinion generally the

.../

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opportunity to express its view on future development. This would be going a long way towards indicating that HMG will publish and carry forward proposals in the autumn irrespective of the parties' reactions; while avoiding any appearance that the talks with the parties would be a mere charade.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be "H.A.", written in a cursive style.

H.A.

12 June 1981

SD

4.

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(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I attach the papers  
prepared by Mr Atkins for  
the O.A. discussion of N. Ireland.  
The meeting is not till next  
Thursday. But the papers are  
important and you may  
like to look at them over  
the weekend.

Paul

- other papers 00/81<sup>33</sup>  
Huges Strike  
file



RESTRICTED



Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

11 June 1981

~~MODBA~~

MP 19/6/81

Dear Humphrey,

I am most grateful for the speaking notes on Northern Ireland which your office has passed to me.

These will, I am sure, be particularly useful between now and the expected spate of hunger strike deaths starting in early July. I am therefore circulating the notes to all colleagues with the strong recommendation that they take every opportunity, particularly in constituency speeches, to use the material to put across our policy on Northern Ireland.

I would also remind colleagues that we are fighting a propaganda war abroad. Press treatment continues to be a cause for real concern in several parts of the world, most notably the United States, Australia and most of Western Europe, especially Scandinavia and Austria. I would urge colleagues travelling in these areas to make every effort to set out the facts on Northern Ireland to the press.

I am copying this letter with the speaking notes to all Ministers.

*Mrs Lee*

*Francis Pym*

FRANCIS PYM

The Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins, MP  
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Government Offices  
Great George Street  
LONDON

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## SPEAKING NOTES ON NORTHERN IRELAND

1. Government committed to future of NI and wellbeing of all its people just as strongly as to any other part of UK.
2. Men of violence enemies of law abiding citizens everywhere. Vital for the sake not only of NI citizens but whole nation and free world that they do not prevail.
3. Fight against terrorism must continue. Despite recent impressions, fewer bombings and killings in last few years. Overall security situation has improved. Level of violence in 1980 lowest for 10 years.
4. Probably why PIRA and INLA (who murdered Airey Neave) have now turned to prison hunger strike in desperate attempt to heighten tension and create civil unrest.
5. Protest not about prison conditions: as advanced and humane in NI as anywhere in the world. And Government committed to maintaining that position for all prisoners.
6. By their own admission, hunger strike by convicted terrorists is in pursuit of status within the prisons which would set them apart from other prisoners and allow them to organise their own affairs.
7. Not prisoners of war: criminals convicted through independent courts of most serious crimes of violence. Political status wrong in principle. Would only serve to recruit more misguided people to their dwindling ranks and lead to loss of more innocent lives.
8. For the sake of stand taken by democratic governments everywhere against scourge of terrorism - Britain not alone in having to contend with it - there must be no giving way. Not a single government in free world has suggested we should.

9. Hunger strikes to death inevitably make news. But considered editorial opinion in newspapers throughout world overwhelmingly back British government.
10. For as long as it takes, police in NI, supported by Army, will continue fearlessly and fairly to administer the law in face of terrorism. It is the local security forces - Ulster men and women - who are successfully taking the lead in the preservation of law and order. Army's presence gradually scaled down from over 20,000 a decade ago to 11,000 today.
11. There is still unhappily a price to be paid in terms of casualties. We must continue to seek to reduce deaths and injuries. There is no acceptable level.
12. But NI is not a battle ground. Over most of it people go about their lives much as you do on this side of Irish Sea. What you hear and see about terrorism and rioting mainly takes place in a few well defined areas.
13. The Government and the security forces are creating conditions in which all the people of NI can live more peaceful lives. Up to the people themselves and their political leaders to respond. Government will continue to play its part in search for political solution acceptable to people of the Province. And alongside that will seek to consolidate improving relations with our neighbours in Irish Republic, including schemes of practical co-operation for the benefit of all people of the UK and Irish Republic.

8 June 1981

## SECURITY MATTERS

1. Terrorist activity in Northern Ireland has been characterised by periods of relative calm alternating with outbursts of violence. The Provisional IRA's main targets continue to be the RUC and the Army, but there have also been attacks on property in an effort to disrupt the life of the Province. No terrorist group is believed to have the resources to sustain a campaign of violence at a high level, but terrorists are undoubtedly capable of mounting attacks using powerful weapons particularly on isolated targets and have recently been doing so along the border with the Republic of Ireland.
  
2. There has been a steady decline in terrorism in Northern Ireland in recent years. The overall level of violence during 1980 was the lowest since the present campaign began. For example, 1972 saw 10,628 shootings, 1,382 explosions and 468 deaths: the corresponding figures for 1980 were 641, 280 and 75. Indeed, the level of violence in the first 4 months of this year was lower than in the same period last year:

	1.1.80 - 30.4.80	1.1.81 - 30.4.81
Deaths (Security Forces)	14	13
Deaths (Civilian)	22	11
Injuries (Security Forces)	62	149
Injuries (Civilian)	194	151
Explosions	139	72
Shootings	242	123

3. In the days leading up to and following the death of hunger striker

Robert Sands there was increased public disorder on the streets in some areas. Violence has largely taken the form of vehicle hi-jacking, barricades being erected and stones and petrol bombs being thrown at the security forces. Street disorder has now subsided but there have been shooting incidents and 22 deaths during May - eleven members of the security forces and 11 civilians, 4 of whom are known to have been terrorists.

4. There has been widespread publicity about these events and the impression has sometimes been created that the situation is out of control. But this is not so. The security forces have contained the violence that has occurred and have taken firm action to prevent barricades being set up. The security forces have sufficient resources at their disposal to keep the situation under control.
  
5. The police have continued to be successful in arresting and prosecuting persons committing terrorist type offences. In the first four months of this year 220 persons were charged with serious terrorist type offences by comparison with 200 during the same period last year. Long term trends are also encouraging. The regular Army strength in Northern Ireland is currently about 11,000 men. They are deployed in support of the police. The size of the Army's presence is determined principally by the RUC's requirement for military support and as this has declined so have troop levels (from a peak of over 20,000). It has however always been recognised that at times of tension additional reserves might be necessary. This was the reason for the recent deployment to Northern Ireland of the Spearhead Battalion of 600 men (since withdrawn).

Prison protests and hunger strikes

1. Since 1976 a number of prisoners have been engaging in various prison protests in an attempt to blackmail the Government into giving them political or prisoner of war status. Republican prisoners on hunger strike in Northern Ireland abandoned a first hunger strike last December. However, on 1 March 1981 a further hunger strike in support of the demand for "political status" began: it has so far resulted in the deaths of Bobby Sands (who was elected MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone on 9 April 1981) and 3 other prisoners. Five further protesting prisoners are now on hunger strike and this action may be stepped up in the coming weeks. Those prisoners indulging in a "dirty" protest (fouling cells and refusing to wash) ended this form of protest in March this year ostensibly in order to highlight the hunger strikes.

2. HMG has consistently asserted certain principles in respect of prison administration on which it would not be prepared to compromise. These principles are:-

- (i) No political or special category status for any prisoners. Any differentiation of treatment of a certain group or class of prisoners in Northern Ireland is objectionable under this principle. This principle was endorsed by the European Commission of Human Rights in its Partial Decision of June 1980;
- (ii) The prison authorities must remain fully in control of the prison administration and of the major elements of day to day life in the prisons.

Subject to these principles, HMG has shown itself to be flexible and willing to introduce changes in the prison regime for both conforming and protesting prisoners. For example, all prisoners in Northern Ireland are now issued with civilian-type clothing: prison uniform has been abolished. Irrespective of any protests, the Government is keeping under review the scope for improvements in the regime applicable to all prisoners in Northern Ireland.

OFFENCES

HUNGER STRIKER	TERRORIST ORGANISATION	START OF FAST	TIME & DATE OF DEATH	OFFENCES
1. R. SANDS	PIRA	1 Mar.1981	1.17a.m. 5 May 1981	14 yrs for firearms offences
2. F.J.S. HUGHES	PIRA	15 Mar.1981	5.43p.m. 12 May 1981	Life for murder & other offences
3. R.P. McCREESH	PIRA	22 Mar.1981	2.11 a.m.22 May 1981	14 yrs for attempted murder and other offences
4. J.P. O'HARA	INLA	22 Mar.1981	11.29 p.m.:22 May1981	8 yrs for possessing hand grenade
5. J.F. McDonnell	PIRA	9 May 1981		14 yrs for firearms offences
6. B.McLAUGHLIN	PIRA	14 May 1981	Ended fast 6 p.m. 27 May	12 yrs for firearms offences
7. K. DOHERTY	PIRA	22 May 1981		18 yrs for explosives & firearms offences
8. K. LYNCH	INLA	23 May 1981		10 yrs each for 10 assorted offences (firearms, robbery, wounding, hijacking etc.)
9. E.M. HURSON	PIRA	29 May 1981		20 yrs for various explosives offences & conspiracy to murder.
10. T.G.McILWEE	PIRA	8 June 1981		20 yrs for manslaughter and 12 other offences (explosives & arson)

Anglo-Irish Relations

1. Both HMG and the Government of the Republic acknowledge the existence of a unique relationship between the 2 countries and that it is in the interests of both to develop and strengthen this relationship. To this end, Mrs Thatcher and Mr Haughey has set in hand a series of joint studies covering a wide range of bi-lateral issues.

2. The topics being considered are possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. The studies are concerned with the relationship between the United Kingdom as a whole and the Republic. They do not deal with the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. That is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland and for Parliament at Westminster. (We naturally accept that the Government of the Republic watches developments in Northern Ireland with special interest. For their part, the Government of the Republic accepts that their aspiration to Irish unity can only be achieved with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland).

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster  
and Paymaster General  
Privy Council Office  
68 Whitehall  
LONDON SW1

11 June 1981



PRIME MINISTER

*mf*

cc. Mr. Gow  
Mr. Alexander

Crumlin Road Prison Escape

I attach a copy of Mr. Atkins' statement.

Supplementaries followed the predictable pattern for Northern Ireland. Mr. Concannon was broadly content to rest on the enquiry. Irish Members were more concerned about individual pieces of evidence about lax security in the prison. Mr. Molyneaux claimed that one of the arrested solicitors had been interned previously for IRA activities. Mr. Paisley went several steps better by explaining the wicked deeds of various relatives of the said solicitor - one of whom was apparently even now functioning as an election agent for Mr. Haughey: this, Mr. Paisley believed, made it unlikely that the escapees would be properly pursued by the authorities in the Republic. Mr. Paisley had himself "served in the prison" twice, and could confirm from personal experience that clergymen and solicitors were not searched on entry.

Gerry Fitt, in his most statesmanlike mood, implored people to avoid making the escapees folk heroes, and recounted the horror of the murder of Captain Westmacott.

There were other expressions of concern about the situation revealed by the escape, and Mr. Atkins undertook to keep the House informed of the outcome of Mr. Pearce's enquiry. At one point, there were also a series of Points of Order - initially John Biggs-Davison, later supported by Michael Foot - suggesting that the competitive revelations of Mr. Molyneaux and Mr. Paisley were likely to prejudice the prospects of a fair trial for the solicitor whose connections they were listing. The Speaker was not persuaded of the point - to the surprise of the rest of the House, I believe.

\_\_\_\_\_

*MAJ*

11 June 1981

STATEMENT - ESCAPE FROM HM PRISON BELFAST - 11 JUNE 1981

I will, with permission Mr Speaker, make a statement on the escape from HM Prison Belfast. Eight prisoners escaped from HM Prison Belfast yesterday afternoon at about 4.15pm. All of them were at the time on remand. The trial of seven of them had already ended, and the judge is expected to deliver his judgment tomorrow. Four of those were charged with the murder of an Army officer, Captain Westmacott, who was killed when the Army and police surrounded a house in the Antrim Road, Belfast, in May 1980. Two were charged with the murder, in April 1980, of Police Constable Magill. The seventh man, Ryan, was charged with the murder of an RUC constable in 1976 and a former member of the UDR in 1978. The eighth man, Gerard Sloan, was charged with being in possession of explosive. The trial in this latter case had not yet begun.

The escape began while the eight prisoners were in discussion with three solicitors in three separate groups, each group in a cubicle in the visiting room which is some 15 yards inside the main gate of the prison. The prisoners produced 3 pistols. Four prison officers were forced to hand over their uniforms, which were put on by four of the escaping prisoners. The escapers then made their way to the main gate of the prison, severely injuring a prison officer who attempted to prevent them from leaving the visiting area. The prison officer was struck on the head, and is in hospital with

a suspected fractured skull.

At the main gate, prison officers on duty were forced at gunpoint to allow the prisoners to leave. The eight prisoners then went immediately to two cars which were apparently waiting for them. Up to this point they had not discharged firearms. The alarm was raised at the main gate, alerting other prison officers, and the Army and the police. At least one shot was fired by the escapers: fire was returned by Army and the police. Nobody appears to have been hit. The two vehicles were abandoned not far away, and it appears that the prisoners then hi-jacked other vehicles to continue their escape.

The police and army mounted a large-scale operation immediately after the escape. This operation is continuing, but so far none of the escaped prisoners has been arrested.

Immediately after the escape, 2 solicitors and one solicitor's apprentice were arrested and are still in police custody, as are two other men, subsequently arrested in connection with the escape.

I regard the escape of any prisoners, and especially the escape of men subject to such serious charges, as a matter of the greatest concern. At my request, my rt hon Friend the Home Secretary, has made available Mr W H Pearce CBE, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

to conduct an urgent enquiry into security arrangements at the prison relevant to the escape of these eight men and to report to me. The enquiry will begin immediately.

*Ireland*

NOTE FOR THE FILE

James Molyneaux's letter of 12 May has been taken care of by the Prime Minister's reply sent on 28 May (referring to his later letter of 14 May).

9 June 1981

Ireland.

<sup>FILE</sup>  
CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 June 1981

Sean Stephen,

Butter Smuggling into Northern Ireland

The Prime Minister has seen the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's minute to her of 5 June on this subject. She agrees that the retail sale of imperial prepacks of butter in Northern Ireland should be prohibited.

I am sending copies of this letter to Kate Timms (MAFF), Peter McCarthy (Department of Trade) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Rh



OD B

Ireland.

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

AF 17.6.81

MR. WRIGHT  
CABINET OFFICE

Northern Ireland: OD

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Wade-Gery's minute to me of 4 June on this subject. She is content that both papers should be taken at OD on 18 June. She has asked that the paper on "Future Prisons Policy" should be fully coordinated with the Home Secretary before the papers are circulated.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

8 June 1981

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 June 1981

Proscription of the UDA

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 5 June on this subject.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office) and Godfrey Robson (Scottish Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

SP

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010  
CONFIDENTIAL

2



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-938 7022 218 2111/3

MO 19/3

5th June 1981

MS  
Prime Minister  
19  
Purd  
Dear Stephen,

RETURN OF SPEARHEAD

I understand that your Secretary of State agreed this afternoon that the First Battalion, the Royal Regiment of Wales, who were sent over as Spearhead on 6th May, should now return to Aldershot next Monday evening. A replacement battalion has not been requested.

We are not proposing to make any prior announcement of the return of 1RRW, but our Departments are now preparing defensive briefing for the press. I understand that NIO have agreed to cover this subject as part of the briefing being provided on Northern Ireland for Prime Minister's Questions next Tuesday, 9th June.

I am copying this letter to Mike Pattison (No 10) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,  
David Omand

(D B OMAND)

S W Boys Smith Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

6



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq  
PS/Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

5 June 1981

(2)

Prime Minister.

Dear Sir,

There is little choice but to go along with the advice of the operational commanders at present. But the decision not to proscribe the UDA is becoming increasingly difficult to defend on political terms at least.

MT Amb. 5/6

PROSCRIPTION OF THE ULSTER DEFENCE ASSOCIATION

You are aware that we have been looking again at proscription of the UDA, in the light of the recent find of arms at its headquarters. This, and some inflammatory statements made by its leaders in recent months, make a stronger case for proscription than hitherto; to put it at its lowest, they make inaction less easy to defend. It can too easily be made to appear that the RUC is less than even-handed in its attack on terrorists of different persuasions, and that the Government can condone that.

Nevertheless, my Secretary of State does not believe that this is the right moment to act. Proscription might encourage Catholic opinion, especially in the Republic and the Irish/American community in the United States; but if it did not lead to positive results, the pleasure would be short-lived; most Catholic opinion in Northern Ireland itself would have a very low expectation of it from the beginning. Against that, we could expect loyalist violence to increase perceptibly, leading perhaps to confrontation with Republicans on the streets; at the least, compelling the security forces to deal with disturbance on two fronts, not one. Andy Tyrrie, the UDA leader, has done remarkably well in recent weeks to restrain the UDA (and for that matter the UVF) from joining in street violence or undertaking sectarian reprisal. In the wake of proscription, he would lose all control, and the wilder elements would take over. The arrest and charging of suspect UDA men for serious crimes, on which the RUC have a thoroughly good record, would become more difficult; and this is the best proof that we can give that neither we nor the police allow the UDA any favours.

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The Chief Constable is strongly of the view that this is no time to proscribe. He by no means rules it out for the future. But he would prefer it done when the temperature is lower; and he is also hopeful that in the course of time the rank and file may be weaned away from the UDA, leaving a terrorist/criminal organisation of the kind that no-one of goodwill would object to being proscribed. The Army go along with the assessment that there would be no operational advantage, and some possible disadvantage in proscription.

The Secretary of State is anxious that the decision not to proscribe at the present, combined with the possibility that it may prove difficult to make early arrests or to obtain convictions, should not leave the impression that the RUC or the Government are less concerned about the pursuit of members of the UDA who break the law than of others who do so. He has discussed this difficulty at length with the Chief Constable

The RUC are pursuing their investigations energetically, and the Chief Constable is fully alert to the need to do everything possible to secure arrests. He is also aware of the need for the RUC to be seen to be acting and that there must be no question of it appearing less than fully impartial.

The question of proscription will of course remain under review.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday in the Home Office and to Godfrey Robson in the Scottish Office, in view of their direct interest in any action that we should decide to take against the UDA.

*Tom,  
S W*

S W BOYS SMITH

jg

SECRET



Prime Minister

Yes - firmly.  
m

11  
Agree that the sale of butter in imperial prepacks in N. Ireland should be prohibited?

Ans. 5/6

SMUGGLING OF BUTTER INTO NORTHERN IRELAND FROM THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

The Republic of Ireland has an EC dispensation with regard to the requirement that butter be packed in metric quantities and also has large EC and domestic subsidies on the sale of home-produced butter in the Republic. The smuggling of this butter in imperial prepacks into Northern Ireland is causing very serious problems for the dairy and farming industry in Northern Ireland and is increasing the local unemployment difficulties.

The problem of smuggling arises because, although the prepacking and importation of butter into Northern Ireland in imperial quantities is already prohibited, the retail sale of butter in imperial quantities is not. The Northern Ireland administration found itself half way through a procedure of catching up with the Great Britain legislation at the point when the Great Britain administration decided to follow the course of voluntary metrication.

We have no difficulty in enforcing the law with regard to prepacking in Northern Ireland but so far as the illegal importation of butter in imperial prepacks is concerned, this is an entirely different matter. With a land boundary of over 300 miles and profits of around £500 per tonne to be made from smuggling butter our enforcement record has not been good, although we have had a few successful prosecutions. The only way to end this trade would appear to be to prohibit the retail sale of imperial prepacks of butter. Such a prohibition could be easily enforced by our Trading Standards officers.

I believe a decision to legislate should not be seen as breaching our voluntary metrication policy. Indeed it is absolutely necessary to deal with an anomaly which is producing extremely harmful results in terms of both trade and employment. It would be virtually impossible to continue to justify a situation in which goods imported illegally are sold legally to the detriment of our own economy. This view is endorsed by Sally Oppenheim. The necessary legislation would be subordinate legislation laid at Westminster subject to negative resolution.



We are under very strong pressure from the trade and Northern Ireland MPs and it is felt that we must legislate on the matter as soon as possible.

I appreciate that this is a very local problem and would not have brought it to your attention except that I was aware of your special interest in matters involving metrication.

I am sending a copy of this minute to Peter Walker, Sally Oppenheim and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be "H.A.", written over a horizontal line.

H A  
5 June 1981

Ref: B06214

MR ALEXANDER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

*1. Hope that all co-ordination done through Home Secretary on Prison will be completed before the papers to consider them together. Agree to take both papers at O.D. It would clearly be wise to consider them together.*

*with Prime Minister*

*Prisons will be completed before the papers to consider them together.*

*OD*

*Prints 4/6*

Northern Ireland - OD

As Mr Wright told you, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland wishes to circulate two papers to his colleagues in the near future on "Future Political Developments" and "Future Prisons Policy".

2. The first of these papers could appropriately be considered by OD, where previous discussion of that subject has taken place (most recently in November 1980 - OD(80) 24th Meeting). The OD meeting tentatively arranged for 18th June would be suitable. Prisoners and related topics have most recently been discussed in an ad hoc group of Ministers (Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Privy Seal, Home Secretary and Attorney General, with the Defence Secretary also receiving the papers), eg on 20th May (Mr Whitmore's letter to Mr Boys Smith of 21st May); and there have been other ad hoc meetings eg at Chequers on 26th May. Last autumn, on the eve of the first hunger strike, prison clothing in Northern Ireland was discussed in Cabinet (CC(80) 36th Conclusions) following earlier discussion in H (which is of course the right Committee for United Kingdom prisons policy generally). But there is likely to be a clear political link between the two papers Mr Atkins will now be putting forward. On balance, therefore, it would seem sensible to deal with them both at the OD meeting on 18th June. The alternative would be to consider them both at another ad hoc meeting.

3. I should be grateful if you could let me know the Prime Minister's wishes.

R L WADE-GERY

4th June 1981

From: General Sir John Hackett

COBERLEY MILL  
NR CHELTENHAM  
GLOUCESTERSHIRE  
GL53 9NH  
COBERLEY 207

PERSONAL

Clive Whitmore, Esq.,  
10 Downing St.,  
London, SW1.

2.

Prime Minister.

To see.

I know General Hackett  
(was not well) and I have had a  
separate note from him saying we  
can do what we like with his letters.  
3rd June, 1981.

I propose to let Ken Stone have a  
copy.

AKH  
4vi

My dear Whitmore,

No longer necessary.  
AKH 1vii

No one is the worse for good wishes. The Prime Minister has been kind to us. Please find an opportunity to give her ours. I do what I can both in this country, on the Continent and in the United States to make clear whenever possible that, even with some modifications, she has to succeed if we are to recover.

You may also think that she would be interested in the following. Years ago, when I had a house in Co. Donegal I used to know David O'Connell. The house is now sold and I have not seen him for nearly ten years. When, however, it came to his notice that an unidentified Irish voice, purporting to come from Provisional I.R.A., had told me over the telephone that if Bobby Sands died I should too, he rang me up here from Dublin to say that this had not originated at the top. He added, however, "Things are so volatile just now that there are people not entirely under our control." He then went on to ask what chance there was of our "Iron Lady" intervening to grant special status to hunger strikers. I replied very emphatically that, in my view, there was absolutely none whatsoever. The men in question were criminals and would be treated as such, with humanity but without any implication that they were political prisoners.

The irony of this to me was that the last time I saw him was when he came to see me in my house in Donegal in 1972 to put exactly the same question: "What chance was there of political status for convicted members of Provisional I.R.A.?" I gave him precisely the same assurances, couched in the same emphatic terms. A few weeks later ministerial approval was given to special status. It was, of course, withdrawn four years later but that colossal blunder has cost us very dear.

If we were ever to meet I would like to tell you a story which Charlie Haughey (whom I have known pretty well for some years) told me against himself which is very revealing of his attitude to the British in their Irish connection - and rather surprising.

With good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
John Hackett

010  
NIOM(81) 4th Meeting

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ON FRIDAY

29 MAY 1981.

Present: Mr Marshall ( Chairman)

Mr Burns	)	
Mr Buxton	)	
Mr Hawker	)	
Mr Fisher	)	NIO
Mr Avann	)	
Mr Bates	)	
Mr Stephens	)	
Mr Miller	)	MOD
Capt Carter	)	
Major Pheysey	)	
Mr Holroyd		FCO
Miss Drew		Home Office

#### Security

1. Mr Buxton reported that the deaths of the hunger strikers had been tension had remained high so phased that in recent weeks with violence in Belfast and Londonderry and elsewhere in Northern Ireland. PIRA no longer saw any advantage in holding back from "hard" terrorist activities. As regards disorder on the streets, the Security Forces had coped without undue difficulty. However, notwithstanding their efforts to avoid alienating the Catholic population, there had been a perceptible and worrying shift of opinion among Catholics. It was to be hoped that the Prime Minister's visit the previous day would reassure the local population that the Government understood and sympathised with the pressures they faced.

#### Spearhead Battalion

2. Mr Buxton said that the presence of the Spearhead Battalion had been extremely valuable, but that it would be desirable to withdraw it as soon as possible. Mr Stephens agreed, but added that it would be helpful to have it in the Province a little longer to allow the



# SECRET

resident units to catch up on leave; and suggested also that it might be necessary to consider the impact of withdrawal on the Protestant community. It was agreed that an opportune time for withdrawal would be before the next batch of hunger strikers reached a critical condition. The possibility of disputes involving prison officers and ambulance drivers did not affect the departure of the Spearhead Battalion.

## Prisons

3. Mr Marshall reported that the European Commission on Human Rights, which had been anxious to assist in resolving the hunger strike, had now found admissible the two outstanding aspects of the 1978 petition by four protesting prisoners in The Maze. (Complaints under Article 13 about the availability of an effective remedy under the national authority and under Article 8 about prisoners' correspondence). The ECHR would investigate the facts and seek to bring the parties to a friendly settlement. There were advantages, Mr Marshall suggested, in the UK being seen to be reasonably flexible at this stage, though the likelihood of the ECHR's intervention resolving the problem seemed low. Mr Marshall reminded the meeting that with the end of the dirty protest, furniture had been issued to all prisoners; the protesting prisoners, however, were still refusing to wear clothes or to do work.

## Elections

4. Mr Marshall said that the community appeared now to be more polarised than ever before. The Democratic Unionist Party had more than doubled its share of first preference votes. It had secured 26.57% first preference votes as against the Official Unionists 26.56%. The SDLP had lost some ground to the Irish Independence Party but the non-sectarian Alliance Party had been the main loser.

SECRET

5. Following the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election, urgent consideration was being given to how to prevent the election or candidacy of convicted criminals. It was hoped that a quick Bill before the Summer recess would in effect restore the pre-1967 situation.

Renewal of the Emergency Legislation

6. Mr Marshall reminded the meeting that the renewal debate was likely to take place in late June or early July. Mr Buxton said that no changes were proposed at this renewal but the Secretary of State would need to make some comment on the future of the legislation.

Joint Studies

7. Mr Marshall reported that the papers, which had been prepared as a result of the last round of Anglo-Irish meetings at official level, were ready to be sent to the Irish, but a decision still had to be taken on whether it was appropriate to do this while the Republic's election campaign was under way. The fact that no embarrassing statements had been made by the Irish Government during the present period of tension was proof of the value of the London/Dublin talks.

Economic Matters

8. The main points, Mr Burns reported, were that unemployment had now exceeded 100,000; the Government had provided a further guarantee to the De Lorean Car Company; and a worrying number of firms were closing down or in difficulties. Only a few of these difficulties could be attributed to the security situation. The European Parliament were to debate the economic circumstances of Northern Ireland on 18 June, but the discussion was likely to range a good deal wider.

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## Miscellaneous

9. (a) Mr Stephens said that the reduction in the number of Brigade headquarters from three to two was still planned to take place later in the year.
- (b) Mr Miller said that the Medical Committee were concerned about deaths by plastic bullets and, to enable them to reconsider the advice they had given, had asked MOD for information on how the RUC used the weapon. Mr Buxton said that this was likely to be a sensitive subject with the RUC; the Chief Constable felt that PIRA were mounting a propaganda campaign against the plastic bullet.
- (c) Mr Miller mentioned that Irish Regiments, including the Ulster Defence Regiment, would be taking part in "Beating the Retreat" on Horseguards/<sup>Parade</sup> in June. The Metropolitan Police had been consulted and were content.

SIL DIVISION

9 June 1981



Back to  
MosBA after  
despatch

10 DOWNING STREET

MAJ

Prime Minister.

Given that you have  
seen ~~and discussed~~ Mr Polignaux  
& discussed this problem with  
him, the attached letter is  
intended to do no more than  
draw a line under the  
correspondence - at least for  
the time being.

And

Or will there

some more?

Discussed in Belfast yesterday. <sup>no</sup> And  
- 25/5



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 May 1981

You wrote to me on 14 May about recent mortar attacks on the security forces in County Fermanagh, and the subject came up at your meeting with Humphrey Atkins and myself on 14 May. I invited you then to send me whatever information you had on the attacks.

The evidence so far is that the mortars appear to have been manufactured by the terrorists themselves. But the final results of the forensic tests which are being conducted will not be available for a while yet.

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

J.H. Molyneaux, Esq., J.P., M.P.

vb

WJ 27/5  
cc Fu  
Ireland NW.  
co

F.R.


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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

At 1305 hours today, 28 May, a lone, covert, soldier was driving his unmarked car through the Brandywell district of Londonderry. He was stopped by four masked gunmen, two armed with armalites, upon whom he opened fire.

Two of the gunmen were, subsequently, brought into hospital dead, and another was brought in with gunshot wounds (very seriously ill). The soldier did not linger at the scene and therefore did not capture any of the guns but as evidence of fire being exchanged, there were three bullet holes found in the soldier's car.

The gunmen have now been identified as known PIRA members; one of whom, dead, had been on the run for some time.



JONATHAN MARGETTS  
Private Secretary

28 May 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Pattison Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London, S W 1

27 May 1981

Dear Mike

This letter is a copy of NIO  
letter to MAP of 26/5

You asked for a draft letter for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Molyneaux in reply to his letter to her of 12 May about the mortar bomb attacks on Newtownhamilton and Rosslea RUC stations in County Fermanagh on 8 and 9 May respectively. Ten mortar bombs were fired at each police station and both stations were extensively damaged. There were five army casualties. Preliminary forensic tests have indicated that the mortars used in these attacks were of a kind manufactured by the Provisional IRA.

The correspondence has of course been largely overtaken not only by Mr Molyneaux's question to the Prime Minister at question time on 12 May, but by the meeting the Prime Minister and my Secretary of State had with Mr Molyneaux on 14 May when this subject was raised. Mr Atkins said then that there had been some evidence of test firing in the Republic and if Mr Molyneaux had proof of this it would be put to the Irish authorities at once. However you may still think it worth sending Mr Molyneaux a simple reply on .....

.....the lines of the draft attached.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Francis Richards (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely  
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

DRAFT LETTER

FILE NUMBER.....

ADDRESSEE'S REFERENCE.....

To

James H Molyneaux Esq  
JP MP  
House of Commons  
Westminster  
London  
SW1A 0AA

(Full Postal Address)

Enclosures

Copies to be sent to

Hidden copies:

PS/Secretary of State

(Full Address, if Necessary)

LETTER DRAFTED FOR SIGNATURE BY PRIME MINISTER  
(Name of Signatory)

You wrote to me on 12 May about recent mortar attacks on the security forces in County Fermanagh, and the subject came up at your meeting with Humphrey Atkins and myself on 14 May. I invited you then to send me whatever information you had on the attacks.

The evidence so far is that the mortars appear to have been manufactured by the terrorists themselves. But the final results of the forensic tests which are being conducted will not be available for a while yet.



SUBJECT

SECRET



demands set.

Ireland Pt 4 Ireland  
Hunger Strike

Ptt

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 May, 1981

Dear Stephen,

Northern Ireland

As you know the Prime Minister held a meeting at Chequers yesterday evening with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to discuss the present situation in the Province. Sir Kenneth Stowe, General Sir Richard Lawson, Mr Jack Hermon and Mr Ranson were also present.

In response to the Prime Minister's invitation, Mr Hermon said that the situation in Northern Ireland had been developing rather rapidly since mid-April. Prior to that the security forces had succeeded in stabilising the situation. However following the deaths of the four hunger strikers there was a growing tendency for the Catholic community to display sympathy for the 'martyrs'. The Catholics were also becoming alienated from Government policy. There was little sympathy for the PIRA as such and no pressure for the granting of political status or the five demands. But the continuing violence and the activities of Dr Paisley were giving rise to unease and dissatisfaction. There was increasing support amongst the young for the PIRA. PIRA intimidation was becoming more effective, as could be seen from what had happened to Messrs Fitt and Devlin. The police were being forced to abandon foot patrols and to remain in their vehicles. In sum, there was some doubt as to whether the level of security achieved in the recent past could be maintained and a risk that some of the ground won, e.g. in terms of the Catholic community's confidence in the security forces, would be lost. If the Government could dispel the impression of inflexibility and could get over instead that its policy was magnanimous and caring, these risks might be reduced.

General Lawson supported Mr Hermon. He said that the security threat could be contained. Neither the riots nor the scale of terrorist activity were as substantial as in the past. The Government was in no danger of defeat. None-the-less the population were becoming alienated. The PIRA had succeeded in obscuring the fact that they were responsible for the present troubles. The Catholics were looking to HMG for movement of some kind.

/Mr Ranson said

SECRET

Q

Mr Ranson said that the PIRA recognised they could not win through terrorism. Their thinking was concentrated on the need to find a way to win back the support of the Catholic community which they had lost in recent years. They saw the hunger strike, about the launching of which they had had grave doubts, as a way to drive a wedge between the Catholic community and the Government. They knew that the situation was delicately balanced and that their effort might already have "peaked" in PR terms. There might be an opportunity in the next few weeks for the Government to attempt to reassure the Catholic community.

The Prime Minister asked whether there were any specific proposals aimed at securing the objective which had been outlined. It was not easy to envisage a proposal which would be substantial enough to satisfy the Catholic community, and more particularly the hunger strikers, while being sufficiently limited in scope to avoid alarming the Protestants. Mr Herman said that the precedent of the Bennett Enquiry might be helpful. He believed that there would be value in setting up a similarly expert enquiry to investigate prison conditions in Northern Ireland. Its point of departure would be Section 7 of the Prisons Act, 1953. The enquiry might be tasked to consider whether the types of crime, the motives of the criminal and the purpose of imprisonment in Northern Ireland were the same as those in the rest of the United Kingdom. The terms of reference would include no promise of change in prison conditions, nor indeed any acknowledgement of a need for change. A principal objective of setting up the enquiry would be to remove the question of prison conditions from the political arena.

Sir Kenneth Stowe pointed out that the need for an investigation into prison conditions in Northern Ireland had been apparent for some months. He had, for instance, been struck by the absence of specialised psychiatric and psychological advice. There were no penologists in Northern Ireland. The gulf which divided the Protestant prison officers from the largely Catholic prison population was a problem peculiar to Northern Ireland: it had been largely responsible for the breakdown of the situation in the Maze in the weeks after the collapse of the first hunger strike. If it was agreed that there was a case for an initiative on prison conditions, the next four weeks i.e. before the next hunger striker was expected to die, might be the time to launch it.

In subsequent discussion it was confirmed that an enquiry of the kind proposed would cover all prisons and prisoners in Northern Ireland. It was recognised that if the idea were to be pursued it would need to be worked out in considerable detail and would have to be considered by Ministers. Clearly the enquiry could not be mandated to enquire into the five demands or to consider the question of special status for the hunger strikers. But any enquiry would be forced to deal with the question of existing special category prisoners.

It was argued that, even if it was agreed to launch an enquiry into prison conditions, this would not of itself reverse the present trend towards alienation of the Catholic community. A sustained effort, which would have to involve the Prime Minister herself, would be required. It would have to continue for some weeks. This would, in effect, be a major hearts and minds campaign aimed at the Catholic community.

/In a discussion

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

In a discussion of the timing of any initiative, it was suggested that the PIRA would be trying in the days and weeks immediately ahead to intensify the street rioting and to raise the level of terrorist activity. They would also engage in more specifically political activity with the objective of broadening their support in the Catholic community and, perhaps above all, of capitalising on the forthcoming election in the Republic. They could also be expected to renew their efforts to move a writ for a further by-election in Fermanagh. All this suggested that the Government, if it were to take any kind of initiative, should move sooner rather than later.

The Prime Minister said that the Government must be 'rock solid' against any concessions to the hunger strikers or PIRA. She doubted whether the answer to the present situation could be as simple as a statement by her or an announcement of an enquiry into prison conditions. However she agreed that the suggestion of an enquiry into prison conditions should be analysed further. She also agreed that a gesture towards the Catholic community should be made and that it should be made by her in Northern Ireland. If she were to come to Belfast, her visit must have a purpose and should encompass a meeting with religious leaders. She would be prepared, if necessary, to come in the very near future and to make a statement or be interviewed on TV while there. She asked, therefore, that urgent consideration should be given to the timing of her visit and to the programme for that visit.

As you know it was subsequently agreed that the visit should take place tomorrow, 28 May.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roderic Lyne (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Halliday (Home Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely*

*Michael Alexander*

MR - J. BIGGS-DAVISON MP

5/6

21 May, 1981.

I enclose a copy of a letter dated 19 May addressed to the Prime Minister from John Biggs-Davison, M.P., a copy of which has been sent to your Secretary of State.

I should be grateful for the draft of a reply the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Biggs-Davison to reach us here by 5 June please.

M. A. PATTISON

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

FILE

VLB

21 May 1981

I write to thank you for your letter of 19 May addressed to the Prime Minister, which I shall place before her at once.

M A PATTISON

John Biggs-Davison, Esq., M.P.

VLB



RESTRICTED



They tell us that virtually everything we see on television in the UK is sent by satellite to North America and is offered to TV customers in nearly 100 other countries abroad. British Information Services, New York, say that favourable TV film has been prominently shown in the United States, for example the distraught widows of the milkman and the RUC policeman who were recently killed. As regards Western Europe, we have drawn posts' attention to the existence of this favourable film and suggested they try to persuade local stations to use it.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland and Defence, of the Chancellor of the Duchy and to David Wright.

*9 am over,*  
*[Signature]*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



R 21/5

From the Chairman  
Posts and National Girobank  
Ron E Dearing CB

PPS  
Returned

Headquarters Building  
St Martins le Grand  
LONDON  
EC1A 1HQ

Prime Minister

Telephone 01-432 1515

RM

21v

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AA

20 May 1981

Dear Prime Minister,

It was kind of you to write as you did about the work of the Post Office staff in Londonderry.

The postmen are continually showing resourcefulness and fortitude in carrying on with their daily work with a minimum of fuss.

To illustrate from events yesterday, when a mail van was hijacked by rioters, the postman coolly persuaded them to allow him to unload the mail and leaving the mail behind a concrete wall, he went to his brother in law's, borrowed a car, reloaded the mail and carried on to the sorting office.

Again yesterday a parcel containing 6 pounds of explosive was identified by staff in the Belfast Sorting Office.

The policy of our Chairman in Northern Ireland is to handle these events and the continuing dangers elsewhere in a low key and to avoid publicity.

It is however heartening to the staff to receive a quiet word of recognition from you and the Board has asked me to thank you on behalf of all the staff in Northern Ireland.

Yours sincerely

Ron Dearing



GROUPS 175  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FROM DUBLIN 201112Z MAY 1981.  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 20 MAY  
AND TO PRIORITY N I O (BELFAST)

*Irish Minister*  
*MS*

MY TELNO 164.

CAMLOUGH MURDER: IRISH MEDIA REACTIONS

1. THE MURDER BY THE PROVISIONAL IRA OF FIVE BRITISH SOLDIERS NEAR CAMLOUGH IN SOUTH ARMAGH ON 19 MAY IS HEADLINE NEWS IN THE MAIN DUBLIN PAPERS, TODAY, 20 MAY. THE EXTENSIVE REPORTS OF THE INCIDENT INCLUDE THE STATEMENT PUT OUT IN RESPONSE BY THE TAOISEACH, (MY TELNO 164), THE FINE GAEL LEADER, DR FITZGERALD AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE, MR ATKINS.

2. EDITORIAL COMMENT IS CONDEMNATORY OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA. THE IRISH PRESS STATES "THE MURDER OF FIVE BRITISH SOLDIERS NEAR CAMLOUGH... WILL DO NO GOOD FOR THE MEN IN LONG KESH. MRS THATCHER HAS PROVED UNYIELDING IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND THIS LATEST ATROCITY SEEMS CERTAIN TO HARDEN HER ATTITUDE. WE ARE LEFT TO WONDER, NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME, HOW MUCH THESE ALLIES OF THE H BLOCK MEN REALLY CARE FOR THEIR COMRADES ON HUNGER STRIKE." THE IRISH INDEPENDENT ASKS: "LET US NOT HAVE ANY CANT ABOUT THIS BEING AN ACT OF WAR. WAR IS FOUGHT BETWEEN LEGALLY CONSTITUTED ARMIES. THE MURDERERS ARE SELF-APPOINTED KILLERS PERSUING A GOAL WHICH IS OUT OF DATE AND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NO MANDATE FROM THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE OF THIS ISLAND."

TATHAM.

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED

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WED  
MAED  
NEWS DEPT  
SECURITY DEPT  
PUSD  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD

PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR BLAKER  
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SIR A ACLAND  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR ADAMS  
MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR BRAITHWAITE

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10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

You should see this letter  
from John Biggs-Davison about  
Northern Ireland.

We will let you have a draft  
reply.

*MA*

23 May 1981

*mb*

From: John Biggs-Davison, M.P.

Dublin 14/5/81  
21/5  
cc.  
IG ✓



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

19th May 1981

*Dear Prime Minister*

The nation has been commendably steady in the face of "Troops Out" agitation. This is in measure due to your courageous lead.

Yet the television spectacle of troops under petrol bomb attack has added to widespread impatience at continuing terrorism which, though statistically less, depresses morale. It also detains precious Armed Forces.

Since terrorism is an extension of political propaganda, lives on publicity and languishes without it, the role of the media needs urgent examination. It is ironic that Dublin forbids the media appearances of members of proscribed organisations while we do not.

The other factor which encourages terrorism to continue is the hope of blasting, or boring, Government into accepting its demands.

The IRA nourishes such a hope because of public uncertainty about the purport of the Dublin talks and about HMG's intentions for the future governance of Northern Ireland.

The apparent preference of Ministers for devolved government over full integration with Great Britain causes Nationalists to hope, and Unionists to fear, that HMG wants to hold the door open to eventual merger or confederation with the Republic.

The hope and the fear persist despite Humphrey Atkins's welcome intention of improving direct rule.

Both can be removed by the clear adoption, and announcement, of policy for Ulster on the lines set out on the Annex to this letter. They hold good whatever the result of the District Council elections. I am sending Humphrey a copy of both this letter and Annex.

*Yours etc,*  
*John*

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

ULSTER POLICY

In accordance with the will of the overwhelming majority of its people, not all of one faith, as declared by democratic vote in elections and in the Border Poll of 1973, the Union of Northern Ireland with Great Britain will be upheld.

We rejoice at the fidelity of our fellow citizens to the United Kingdom: it stood us in good stead in world war.

We honour the courage and patience of the Northern Ireland people in their suffering; and we look to the Republic of Ireland for ever closer co-operation in the common struggle against terrorism which afflicts South as well as North.

Since the main parties in the province disagree on a form of devolved government but direct rule appears to be the system that divides them least, Northern Ireland will be governed, as Wales and Scotland are governed, with its own structure of local government, an administration sensitive to its ways and just representation in both Houses of Parliament.

The enlargement of representation in the House of Commons is in train.

It is inconceivable that Parliament would ever again be indifferent to Ulster grievances, as it was under the convention of non-interference arising from the existence of a regional Parliament at Stormont.

Parliament is the surest protector of the rights of all.

We respect the culture and traditions of those who legitimately and democratically aspire to a United Ireland.

We trust that it will be of some satisfaction to them that Her Majesty's Government intends to build on the "unique relationship" between the two sovereign states within them so that the Border, marking the frontier between two fellow-members of the European Community may, to adapt words of Kevin O'Higgins, be abolished in our hearts.

The exercise by Northern Ireland of the right of self-determination, implicitly acknowledged by a number of Southern statesmen, precludes a United Ireland in the terms of the Irish Constitution.\*

But, with mutual respect for national sovereignty and the enriching variety of our traditions, we can further the unity of these Islands within the larger unity of Europe.

---

\* The deletion of Article 2 thereof would give confidence to the Unionist people and allay their mistrust of their Nationalist neighbours and of the South. It is to be hoped that this is being discussed with Dublin.

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

2.



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Mike Pattison Esq  
Private Secretary to  
the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London S W 1

*ml*

19 May 1981

*cc Mr Ingham*

*Prime Minister*

*This stay was likely to  
get out at same stage*

*Dear Mike*

FIREARMS FOR THE RUC

*MAP 19/1*

When Roy Harrington wrote to Michael Alexander on 13 February prior to the Prime Minister's meeting with President Reagan, he mentioned inter alia that despite the American ban imposed on the export of Ruger pistols to the RUC, weapons were continuing to be received from the suppliers in this country.

We have so far been able to avoid embarrassing the American authorities by raising this with them and have not pressed the suppliers of the RUC in this country to tell us where they have been obtaining the weapons. Firearms dealers have, however, known about the deliveries and it has been felt for some time that they would eventually become more widely known. This is now happening; Mr Fergus McAteer, Co-chairman of the Irish Independence Party, has evidently learnt what has been taking place, and there is some resultant publicity.

It is difficult to assess how the US authorities may react. Any loss or delay in the delivery of further weapons would not be serious: the Chief Constable has recently said that he has adequate weapons to meet present operational needs. But the propoganda which United States opponents of the Government's Northern Ireland policies will seek to make of the affair will be unwelcome, especially at the present time of acute US interest in events in Northern Ireland. However, our line is that the Government has not been involved in any subterfuge: the Police Authority acted entirely legally in purchasing the weapons within the United Kingdom. It would not be consistent with our past practice to name the supplier, but obviously we would want to emphasise that in purchases of this kind only responsible firms are used, and we have no reason to believe

.../

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.... /

that this was not so in this case. In the interests of security it would not, of course, be appropriate to give numbers or types of weapons used by the police. Defensive briefing is in the hands of the Press Offices.

I will naturally keep you informed of any developments. I am, in the meantime, sending a copy of this letter to Roderic Lyne (FCO).

Yours sincerely  
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

SD

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10689 - 1

OO WASHINGTON  
OO BIS NEW YORK  
OO C G NEW YORK  
GRS 1109

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FM FCO 151700Z MAY 1981  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 745 OF 15 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE BIS NEW YORK, CONSULATE-GENERAL NEW YORK.  
FOR AMBASSADOR  
NORTHERN IRELAND

1. MIPT: TEXT OF PROPOSED LETTER IS AS FOLLOWS:-  
BEGINS

'I WONDER WHETHER I COULD COMMENT ON YOUR EDITORIAL OF 6 MAY ON NORTHERN IRELAND IN WHICH YOU CALLED ON MY GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ACTION IN A NUMBER OF AREAS. I WELCOME YOUR SUPPORT FOR MY GOVERNMENT'S DECISION NOT TO GRANT POLITICAL STATUS TO PROTEATING PRISONERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, BUT I AM CONCERNED THAT YOUR PROPOSALS REFLECT AN IMPERFECT UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND MY GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES THERE. MY GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A HUMANE PRISON SYSTEM IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ACCORDINGLY, THE REGULATIONS AND CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND PRISONS ARE REVIEWED REGULARLY. IN RECENT MONTHS WE HAVE INTRODUCED A NUMBER OF CHANGES. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE COURSE OF 1980 PROTESTING PRISONERS WERE OFFERED, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ENDED THEIR PROTEST, A RANGE OF IMPROVED CONDITIONS IN CONNECTION WITH LETTERS, VISITS, RECREATION, ASSOCIATION AND COMPASSIONATE LEAVE. IN OCTOBER LAST

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YEAR THE GOVERNMENT ENDED PRISON UNIFORM AS SUCH AND REPLACED IT WITH CIVILIAN-TYPE CLOTHING ISSUED BY THE PRISON AUTHORITIES. PRISONERS CAN WEAR THEIR OWN CLOTHES OUTSIDE WORKING HOURS AND AT WEEKENDS.

FURTHER CHANGES MIGHT BE INTRODUCED IN DUE COURSE, BUT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO RESPOND TO BLACKMAIL AND ANY CHANGES WHICH ARE MADE AS OUR PRISONS POLICY DEVELOPS MUST APPLY TO ALL PRISONERS:

2. SUCCESSIVE UK GOVERNMENTS IN RECENT YEARS HAVE MADE IT WHOLLY CLEAR THAT HUNGER STRIKERS WILL NOT BE FORCE-FED. THIS POLICY IS IN LINE WITH THE 'GUIDELINES FOR MEDICAL DOCTORS CONCERNING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT IN RELATION TO DETENTION OR IMPRISONMENT' (THE TOKYO DECLARATION) ADOPTED BY THE 29TH WORLD MEDICAL ASSEMBLY IN TOKYO IN 1975. WE VERY MUCH REGRET THE DEATH OF ANY PRISONER BY HUNGER STRIKE. SUCH DEATHS ARE NEEDLESS AND SERVE ONLY TO INCREASE THE VERY TENSIONS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT AND ALL RESPONSIBLE OPINION WISH TO REDUCE. BUT WE BELIEVE IT WRONG IN PRINCIPLE TO FORCE-FEED A PRISONER WHO, IN THE WORDS OF THE TOKYO DECLARATION, HAS FORMED 'AN UNIMPAIRED AND RATIONAL JUDGMENT' OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING NOURISHMENT.
3. IN DISCHARGING THEIR DUTIES, THE COURTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND OPERATE ACCORDING TO THE LAW WHICH APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL CITIZENS IRRESPECTIVE OF PARA-MILITARY OR ANY OTHER AFFILIATION. SIMILARLY, THE PRISON AUTHORITIES

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OPERATE UNDER THE PRISON RULES WHICH APPLY TO ALL PRISONERS. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF HARSHER TREATMENT FOR THOSE CLAIMING MEMBERSHIP OF CERTAIN FACTIONS.

4. MY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE UTTERLY OPPOSED TO ANY ALLIANCE, COVERT OR OTHERWISE, BETWEEN ANY EXTREMIST PARA-MILITARY GROUPS AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMY AND THE POLICE. ANY SUCH ACTIVITY WOULD BE DEALT WITH SEVERELY.
  
5. THE POSITION OF ALL SO-CALLED PARA-MILITARY GROUPS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IS KEPT UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW. THE ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE AND THE ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO CLAIM TO BE 'LOYALISTS' ARE PROSCRIBED ORGANISATIONS LIKE THE PROVISIONAL IRA. THE HOLDING OF AN ILLEGAL FIREARM BY ANY PERSON IS A SERIOUS CRIMINAL OFFENCE FOR WHICH HEAVY PENALTIES ARE IMPOSED, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE AFFILIATION OF THE OFFENDER.
  
6. WE ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL THE CITIZENS OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO THAT END. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTION ACT 1973 INTRODUCED NEW SAFEGUARDS MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND STATUTORY BODIES THERE TO DISCRIMINATE ON RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL GROUNDS. THAT ACT ALSO SET UP AN INDEPENDENT STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH EXAMINES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LAW IN PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION AND RECOMMENDS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE CHANGES WHICH THEY

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CONSIDER NECESSARY. IN 1977, THE COMMISSION PUBLISHED A REPORT IN WHICH IT STRESSED THAT 'THE EXISTING BODY OF LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND DESIGNED TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS IS IMPRESSIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE UNDER-RATED'. THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 1976 OUTLAWS POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN PRIVATE AS WELL AS PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND SET UP A FAIR EMPLOYMENT AGENCY TO PROMOTE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY. AN INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS BOARD WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1979 TO STRENGTHEN THE INDEPENDENT CONSIDERATION OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE. THE MEMBERS OF EACH OF THESE BODIES ARE DRAWN FROM ALL SECTIONS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND COMMUNITY. I SHOULD ALSO MENTION THAT WE HAVE A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHO INVESTIGATES COMPLAINTS OF MAL-ADMINISTRATION, INCLUDING DISCRIMINATION, AGAINST NORTHERN IRELAND GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND A COMMISSIONER FOR COMPLAINTS WHO DEALS WITH SIMILAR GRIEVANCES AGAINST LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC BODIES.

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN HMG AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC ARE GOOD: WE WANT TO DEVELOP THAT RELATIONSHIP POSITIVELY TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL. TO THIS END, MRS THATCHER AND MR HAUGHEY HAVE SET IN HAND A PROGRAMME OF JOINT STUDIES EMBRACING A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES FOR MUTUAL CONCERN. WE NATURALLY ACCEPT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND WATCHES DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND WITH INTEREST BUT NORTHERN IRELAND'S FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS MUST BE A MATTER

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10689 - 1

FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, HER  
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED KINGDOM  
PARLIAMENT. TO PROCEED ON ANY OTHER BASIS  
WOULD NOT ONLY BE WRONG IN PRINCIPLE, BUT  
WOULD NOT BRING THE PEACE AND STABILITY WHICH  
WE AND ALL THOSE GENUINELY CONCERNED FOR  
NORTHERN IRELAND'S FUTURE EARNESTLY SEEK.'

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED

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FUSD  
PS  
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PS/MR HURD

PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR BLAKER  
PS/PUS  
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CHIEF CLERK  
MR ADAMS  
MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR BRAITHWAITE

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*5/15*

*Comm. Mission*  
*MB*

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OO WASHINGTON  
OO BIS NEW YORK  
OO C G NEW YORK  
GRS 105  
CONFIDENTIAL

*MB*

FM FCO 151630Z MAY 1981

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 744 OF 15 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE BIS NEW YORK, CONSULATE-GENERAL NEW YORK.  
FOR AMBASSADOR

NORTHERN IRELAND

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A DRAFT LETTER FROM YOU TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'NEW YORK DAILY NEWS', COMMENTING ON HIS EDITORIAL OF 6 MAY. IT HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, WHO WOULD LIKE ALL THE SEVEN POINTS MADE IN THE EDITORIAL ANSWERED ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT.
2. IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU OR A SENIOR MEMBER OF YOUR STAFF COULD REPLY AS SUGGESTED WITH ANY STYLISTIC CHANGES YOU WISH.

CARRINGTON

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED

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MR ADAMS  
MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR BRAITHWAITE

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NORTHERN IRELAND

From JAMES H. MOLYNEAUX, J.P., M.P. for Antrim, South.

House of Commons,  
London S.W.1.

See record of  
discussions.

14 May, 1981.

Dear Prime Minister

I thought you might like to consider, in advance of our meeting, some of my thoughts on the current dangerous situation in the province.

1. Like you, and I am sure the great majority of the British people, I find it monstrous and deeply offensive that the police and army should be seen daily on newscreens subject to an endless barrage of vicious weapons and seemingly unable to defend themselves adequately.

Given the hypocrisy of the H Block Committee in laying down conditions for the use of plastic bullets (whilst doubtless ensuring that their street savages are fully instructed in using acid and petrol bombs to full effect) I believe a review of riot equipment in use is long overdue.

Plastic bullets are clearly inadequate in current circumstances and I would suggest that riot guns should in future include intermediate deterrents of special types and that the security forces should be authorised to use them.

2. Recent attacks on the security forces at Newtownhamilton and Rosslea show that the IRA's mortar attack capability has been restored. The weapons used were sophisticated and accurate. Moreover, they were manufactured and tested and practice fired in the Irish Republic.

While it is to be hoped that the authorities in the Republic would take steps to put these IRA units out of action, I have always maintained that in the field of border security we should place no reliance on the Irish Government. The SAS are the answer to cross border terrorism and I would urge that greater use be made of them and other special units.

3. Recognising that assaults on democracy are by no means peculiar to Ulster, and given daily evidence of the growth of terrorism throughout the world, I wonder if you might think the time right for Britain to launch an initiative against terrorism at international level. There are, as you know, historic precedents for such a move. Moreover, you personally, by your consistent and courageous stand on these matters, are better placed than most to give such a lead.

Yours ever

Jim

The Right Honourable Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW1.

RESTRICTED AND PERSONAL

*Ireland*



Permanent Under Secretary

Sir Kenneth Stowe KCB CVO

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Prime Minister.

*With a quick pen.*

Clive Whitmore Esq  
10 Downing Street  
Whitehall  
LONDON SW1

*AM  
13v.*

13 May 1981

*Dear Clive,*

*ms*

Ken asked me to send you the attached copy of an HQNI daily operational brief - the GOC receives these each morning. This one deals with the events of last night and Ken thought it would help to give the Prime Minister an overall impression of the current operational scene in the Province. Needless to say these reports are not normally supplied to the NIO.

There are two general points of particular interest.

- (i) the spasmodic nature of the disturbances;
- (ii) that only relatively low numbers were involved in the various demonstrations and meetings.

*yours sincerely,  
Rob*

R L SMITH

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## DAILY OPERATIONS BRIEF



## NORTHERN IRELAND

3 INF BDE (Pentaloun)

1. There were several H Block vigils following the death of Hughes at 1743 hrs.
2. At 2130 hrs minor rioting occurred in Dungannon
3. Deployment Changes A Coy 1 RS from Ballykinler to Armagh, 122300A May 81.
4. Brigade Statistics
  - 2 x occupied houses searched
  - 2 x areas searched
  - 2665 x vehicles searched

8 INF BDE (Londonderry)

5. There were several H Block vigils following the death of Hughes at 1743 hrs.
6. There was sporadic rioting in Londonderry from 2100 hrs - 0130 hrs.
7. At 0020 hrs one x LV shot was fired at an RUC landrover in the Gobnascale
8. At 0110 hrs the Army found a .303 rifle in the Shantallow
9. Brigade Statistics
  - 18 x occupied houses searched
  - 1 x area searched
  - 154 x vehicles searched

39 INF BDE (Belfast)

10. Francis Hughes died at 1743 hrs in the Maze prison.
11. At 1914 hrs an armed man tried to hijack a covert Army vehicle on the Crumlin Rd.
12. At 2014 hrs the Army OP <sup>(i.e. a placed marksman)</sup> on Divis shot a gunman <sup>(? INLA)</sup> who died in the RVH.
13. At 2023 hrs an Army fired one round at a gunman in Divis Flats.
14. At 2051 hrs 6 x HV shots were fired at an RUC patrol on the Suffolk interface.
15. At 2116 hrs 5 x HV shots were fired at an Army patrol in the Turf Lodge.
16. At 2134 hrs 3 x HV shots were fired at an Army patrol in the Turf Lodge area.  
There was one Army casualty <sup>NSI.</sup>





3 INFANTRY BRIGADEPUBLIC ORDER

TUESDAY Following the death of FRANCIS HUGHES several meetings were held by H Block supporters.

Location	Timings	Numbers
NEWRY	2015 - 2045 hrs	60
CASTLEDERG	2030 - 2200 hrs	40
CROSSMAGLEN	2030 - 2200 hrs	50
COALISLAND	2030 - 2130 hrs	300
DONAGH	2030 - 2130 hrs	100
DUNGANNON	2030 - 2130 hrs	200
CASTLEWELLAN	2140 - 2210 hrs	200
OMAGH	2200 - 2240 hrs	120

PUBLIC ORDER DUNGANNON (1 A and SH)

TUESDAY At 2130 hrs following a memorial meeting for FRANCIS HUGHES a group of 60 youths started to throw PETROL and ACID BOMBS at RUC. Two cars were hijacked and used to make a barricade which was set on fire. The RUC fired 3 x BATON rounds to disperse the rioters and clear the barricade. SHIELDS TIMBER yard and the SECURITY HUT for the Post Office on the BALLYGAWLEY Road were set on fire by PETROL BOMBS. At 2350 hrs 2 x LV SHOTS, followed by a burst of AUTOMATIC fire were heard in the PONDAROSSA ESTATE. Nothing was found in the FU. The town was quiet by 0130 hrs, there were no casualties.

8 INFANTRY BRIGADEPUBLIC ORDER

TUESDAY Following the death of FRANCIS HUGHES several meetings were held by H Block supporters.

Location	Timings	Numbers
LONDONDERRY (BOGSIDE INN - GUILDHALL)	1840 - 2100 hrs	500
LONDONDERRY (SHANTALLOW)	2050 - 2130 hrs	300
LONDONDERRY (CENTRAL)	2100 - 2200 hrs	200
BELLAGHY ( <i>Hughes home town</i> )	1950 - 2315 hrs	30
DRAPERSTOWN	2140 - 2310 hrs	100

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DUNGIVEN	2230 - 2310 hrs	30
GULLADUFF	2230 -	80
MAGHERA	2240 -	50

PUBLIC ORDER LONDONDERRY (2 R ANGLIAN)

TUESDAY At 2100 hrs after a memorial meeting at the GUILDHALL 500 people marched to WATERLOO PLACE, throwing PETROL BOMBS and STONES as they went. The crowd quickly dispersed leaving 50 youths who continued to throw PETROL BOMBS at the RUC and Army. At 2121 hrs a group of 100 youths threw approximately 150 x PETROL BOMBS and 7 x BLAST BOMBS at

42651738 ROSEMOUNT RUC STATION

Pte WILLIAMS 2 R ANGLIAN received minor burns in the attack. At 2151 hrs a group of 150 youths started a fire by throwing PETROL BOMBS at the

42961719 DIVISIONAL LIBRARY.

They threw PETROL BOMBS and BLAST BOMBS at the RUC and Army. One constable was slightly hurt by a blast bomb. At 2343 hrs 4 x BLAST BOMBS were thrown at

44331588 ANNIES BAR, GOBANS SCALE

There were no casualties. The city was quiet by 0130 hrs.

SHOOTING LONDONDERRY (2 R ANGLIAN)

WEDNESDAY At 0020 hrs a RUC mobile patrol was at the junction of

44171583 IRISH ST/HERBERT RD

trying to contain a group of youths who were throwing stones and PETROL BOMBS. One x LV SHOT was fired at the patrol. There were no casualties and no rounds returned. No FU was possible because of the aggro in the area at the time. The FP is believed to have been

90 OLD STRABANE RD

FIND LONDONDERRY (2 R ANGLIAN)

WEDNESDAY At 0110 hrs an Army patrol found a

No 5 MK1 .303 LEE ENFIELD RIFLE fitted with a TELESCOPIC SIGHT and loaded with a MAGAZINE of 9 x ROUNDS.

The rifle was found leaning against the wall of

44032010 43 MOYOLA DRIVE.

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39 INFANTRY BRIGADE

PUBLIC ORDER WEST BELFAST

TUESDAY

At 1743 hrs FRANCIS HUGHES died on HUNGER STRIKE in the MAZE prison. Crowds were quickly gathered by loudspeakers announcing his death and the banging of dustbin lids.

Location	Time	Numbers
SEAFORDE ST, SHORTSTRAND	1830	100
BULLRING, BALLYMURPHY	1830	100
SUFFOLK INTERFACE	1836	100
BEECHMOUNT AVE	1900	300

At 1910 hrs a crowd of 100 people at the junction of FALLS RD/BROADWAY

and a crowd of 150 people at the junction of FALLS RD/WHITEROCK RD

started to throw stones and PETROL BOMBS at the Army and RUC. Youths started to build BARRICADES in

286689 AREEMA DRIVE and at the junction of

342737 CROMAC/ELIZA ST.

There was heavy petrol bombing

345739 EAST BRIDGE ST and

302733 NEW BARNSELY DRIVE

LCPL McCARTHY 1 RWF was burnt by a PETROL BOMB. He was listed NSI at Musgrave Park Hospital.

Several BLAST BOMBS were thrown, one slightly injured 2 x soldiers at an Army outpost in SPRINGFIELD RD.

The City was quiet by 0200 hrs

SHOOTING NEW LODGE (1 SG)

TUESDAY

At 1914 hrs an Army Covert vehicle containing 2 x soldiers stopped at traffic lights on the

CRUMLIN RD

A masked man armed with a handgun got out of the vehicle behind them, and the Army vehicle sped off. It is believed the gunman fired one x round at the Army vehicle while it escaped. The RUC gave chase to the gunman, but he also escaped.

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SHOOTING LOWER FALLS (1 RWF)

TUESDAY

At 2014 hrs the OP on DIVIS TOWER saw a GUNMAN carrying an ARMLITE at the junction of the

330742

CULLINGTREE/MASSAREENE blocks of DIVIS.

The sentry fired one x round hitting the man

EMMANUEL McLARNON

McLARNON dropped the weapon which was picked up by another man who ran off. The OP fired at the second man, but NHC. McLARNON was taken to the RVH where he died later.

SHOOTING LOWER FALLS (1 RWF)

Tuesday

At 2023 hrs an Army patrol saw a masked man with a handgun at a window in the

33057405

DIVIS FLATS

aiming at a joint RUC/Army patrol. The first patrol fired one x round at the gunman who fell backwards from the window.

SHOOTING SUFFOLF (3 RRF)

TUESDAY

At 2051 hrs 6 x HV SHOTS were fired at a static RUC patrol on the

289707

SUFFOLK INTERFACE.

Six x EMPTY cases were found in the FP at

290709

1 STEWARTSTOWN PK

SHOOTING TURF LODGE (1 RWF)

TUESDAY

At 2116 hrs 5 x HV SHOTS were fired at an Army patrol outside the in

220742

ORANMORE ST

No casualties and no rounds returned.

SHOOTING TURF LODGE (1 RWF)

TUESDAY

At 2134 hrs 3 x HV SHOTS were fired at an Army patrol outside

PEOPLES GARAGE.

LCPL THOMPSON 3 RRF was hit in the arm and leg. He was listed NSI at Musgrave Park Hospital. A FP was found at

300735

102E NORGLLEN PARADE

SHOOTING CLONARD. (1 RWF)

TUESDAY

At 2146 hrs 1 x HV SHOT was fired at an Army patrol in

LEOVILLE ST

319742

No casualties, no rounds returned

SHOOTING CLIFTONVILLE (1 SG)

WEDSDAY At 2202 hrs 3 x SHOTS were fired at a static RUC landrover at the junction of

26759 OLDPARK RD/ROSAPENNA ST

Two x rounds returned, NHC, no casualties.

SHOOTING BEECHMOUNT (1 RWF)

WEDSDAY At 2216 hrs 5-6 x SHOTS were fired at an RUC patrol in

7736 BEECHMOUNT AVE

Twenty petrol bombs were also thrown at the patrol vehicles which impeded the FU. No casualties.

FIND WHITEROCK (1 RWF)

WEDSDAY At 2227 hrs an Army patrol found 20 GALLONS of ACID in

8734 WHITEROCK GARDENS

SHOOTING DISTILLERY (1 RWF)

WEDSDAY At 2305 hrs the OP on top of

1735 BROADWAY TOWER

came under fire from the

731 CELTIC PARK area.

At 2334 hrs 1 HV SHOT and 2 LV SHOT were fired at the OP from the same area. No casualties and no rounds returned.

SHOOTING BEECHMOUNT (1 RWF)

WEDSDAY At 0114 hrs there was a small explosion at the junction of

735 BROADWAY/FALLS RD

In the FU at 0127 hrs 10 x ROUNDS were fired at an Army patrol. No casualties and no rounds returned.

SHOOTING BEECHMOUNT (1 RWF)

WEDSDAY At 0151 hrs one x HV SHOT was fired at an RUC landrover at the junction of

34 BEECHMOUNT AVE/FALLS RD

A strike mark was found on the landrover. There were no casualties or rounds returned.

Subject copy:  
United Nations, May 79,  
Visits by Sec General of  
UN, Mr Waldheim.

## CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS  
ON TUESDAY 12 MAY 1981 AT 1530 HOURS

---

Present:-

Prime Minister

Dr. Waldheim

Hon. Douglas Hurd, MP

Mr. Perez de Cuellar

Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

Mr. Mautner-Markhof

Mr. N.C.R. Williams

Northern Ireland

Arising out of a discussion of Prime Minister's question time, which he had just witnessed, Dr. Waldheim asked whether there was hope of progress on Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister was pessimistic. She emphasised the essential role that British troops were playing in preventing a civil war that would engulf the Republic as well as Northern Ireland. She noted that the present Government in the Republic were being unprecedentedly helpful over cross-Border security co-operation.



JS

21/5

Mr - J. MOLYNEUX MP

Chase? 8/6

10 DOWNING STREET

Mortar attacks

From the Private Secretary

12 May 1981

Chase on 26/5  
Coming 26/5  
MA

I attach a letter sent to the Prime Minister today by Mr. James Molyneux, MP. Mr. Molyneux has informed us that he hopes to raise these matters with the Prime Minister at Question time this afternoon. I should be grateful if you could let us have a draft reply by Thursday 21 May, taking into account any exchanges in the House this afternoon.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, to Francis Richards (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Roy Harrington, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

R.H.



JS

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

12 May 1981

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 12 May. This is receiving attention and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

M. A. PATTISON

James Molyneaux, Esq., JP, MP.



From JAMES H. MOLYNEAUX, J.P., M.P. for Antrim, South.



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

12 May, 1981.

cc Mr Gow  
Press

Dear Prime Minister

You will have had reports of the recent mortar attacks on the security force bases in Newtownhamilton, County Armagh, and Rosslea, County Fermanagh. However, reports may not have made it clear that the accuracy of the attacks proved the equipment to have been not only made in the Irish Republic (County Monaghan?), but practice-fired and tested at bases there of which the locations are certainly known to the Irish authorities.

I imagine you will expect the Irish Government to furnish assurances that they have taken all necessary action to eliminate the units concerned.

Yours ever  
Jim

The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP.  
10 Downing Street,  
London, SW1.

FROM: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ



M Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London  
S W 1

*Overlaken.*

*for [unclear]*

12 May 1981

*Dear Mr. Alexander,*

REPLY TO THE FOUR HORSEMEN

In your letter of 7 May you asked for a draft reply to the Four Horsemen's message to the Prime Minister.

..... I attach a draft reply which my Secretary of State has approved. The main part of the reply has been drafted as this week's key message to the people of Northern Ireland (for whom any message to the Four Horsemen is of internal interest) as well as in the USA.

We propose that the Washington Embassy should release the message in the United States as soon as it has been delivered, when the NIO will do likewise in Belfast and London. The full account of what has happened in the Maze since the investigation by the European Commission of Human Rights has been included in an annex with the aim of getting full coverage for that in the United States. Mr Atkins agrees, as does the Ambassador in Washington, that the reply should go from the Prime Minister herself.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Roderick Lyne, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*Yours sincerely  
Kinde Penell*

*P.P.* M W HOPKINS

SD

DRAFT REPLY

1. I am writing to thank you for your message of 6 May. I welcome your clear restatement of your unequivocal condemnation of all violence in Northern Ireland. I welcome too the efforts you have consistently made and are continuing to make to discourage American support for the men of violence in Northern Ireland and to promote better understanding among all the people of Ireland.
  
2. But in your message you say also that you question a posture of inflexibility that must lead inevitably to more violence and death in Northern Ireland. Were that in fact the Government's posture I should question it also. But it is not: and because it is so important that there should be no misunderstanding between us, I welcome this opportunity to make the Government's position clear. I am sending you with this a full account of what has happened in the Maze prison since the protesters' complaints were investigated by an independent international body, the European Commission of Human Rights.
  
3. I believe these facts show that Her Majesty's Government has been prepared to act with great flexibility in the interests of bringing the protests at the Maze to an end. Its actions have been rejected by the prisoners whose sole purpose is to establish a political justification for their appalling record of murder and violence.- a record of killing and maiming which merits no less condemnation in Northern Ireland than it would get in the USA.
  
4. The prisoners, and those who claim to speak for them, have always said and still say, that the protests are not about prison conditions: / they <sup>that</sup> are about the demand for political status

under which the prisoners, not the prison authorities, would determine what the day to day regime within the prison should be. On ~~this~~ the Government will not compromise. It is not prepared, through the granting of political status, in effect to legitimise certain kinds of crime and the pursuit of political ends through violent means: it is not prepared to surrender control of the prisons for which it is responsible: and it is not prepared to be coerced by protest action, in whatever form, into changes of regime for which, in the Government's view, there is no justification on humanitarian grounds, and which on the available evidence would not only fail to bring the protests to an end but rather, by seeming to yield something to coercion, provoke further coercion.

5. It is the Government's profound hope that there will be no more deaths directly or indirectly due to the present hunger strike. Such deaths can serve no purpose: if political status remains their objective then it cannot and will not be conceded: if there are other grounds for complaint against the prison regime, then further recourse to the European Commission remains available - the Government has shown that it is prepared to respond to the Commission's findings and, ~~as we did recently~~, to facilitate in any way it can the Commission's conduct of its investigations.

6. In the meantime, you will wish to know that the Government remains committed to the search for ways in which the people of Northern Ireland can assume greater responsibility for their own affairs, through political institutions in which all sections

of the community can have confidence. It believes that it is through the political process that the best hope for long term peace and stability lies, not through the violence and intimidation practiced by terrorist organisations for some of whose members the present campaign in favour of political status is being mounted. I can assure you that the Government remains determined to build on the unique relationship that already exists between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, to the benefit of all the peoples of these islands.

1. In 1978 the European Commission of Human Rights considered the situation at the Maze Prison in the context of an application made to the Commission by four prisoners. Their main complaint was that their right to freedom of conscience and belief (under Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) was denied them because the prison authorities sought to apply to them the normal prison regime.

2. The Commission in their Decision of June 1980 found that a right to preferential status for a certain category of prisoners was not amongst those guaranteed by the Convention or by Article 9 in particular. The applicants also argued that the regime under which they lived amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The Commission declared that all their complaints under this Article were inadmissible on the grounds that they were "manifestly ill-founded". At that stage many of the prisoners were, as you know, conducting a uniquely disgusting form of protest in which they fouled their cells with food and excreta. They had broken up furniture in their cells and had used it to damage the windows and other fittings. The European Commission recognised that these conditions were self-inflicted. The prison authorities, of course, made arrangements for the cells to be cleaned and repainted at frequent intervals.

3. But among their other findings the Commission emphasised the prison authorities' duty "to keep under constant review their reactions

their reaction to recalcitrant prisoners engaged in a developing and protracted protest" and commented that "efforts should have been made by the authorities to ensure that the applicants could avail of certain facilities such as taking regular exercise in the open air with some form of clothing (other than prison clothing) and making greater use of the prison amenities under similar conditions". It also said that "arrangements should have been made to enable the applicants to consult outside medical specialists even though they were not prepared to wear prison uniform or underwear."

4. Thus the prisoners' claim for political or special status has been investigated recently and decisively rejected by an independent authority of the highest standing; the conditions at the Maze Prison were covered as part of the Commission's investigation and no serious complaint against them was sustained, and the Commission did not, where it felt necessary, hesitate to criticise the Government and the prison authorities.

5. These criticisms were respected and new arrangements to satisfy them have been in force for more than a year. That is not all. During the course of 1980 the protesting prisoners were offered, whether or not they ended their protest, a range of improved conditions in connection with letters, visits, recreation, association and compassionate leave. In October last year the Government ended prison uniform as such in Northern Ireland prisons in favour of the issue of civilian-type clothing in a range of colours and styles. Of these measures, the protesting prisoners had, by the beginning of March this year, made use in some cases of the facility of additional visits

to relatives in ill-health. Apart from that there has been no response.

6. The first hunger strike ended on December 18, 1980. Contrary to what has been alleged, no undertakings were given to the hunger strikers or the remaining protesting prisoners at that time, before it or after: what the Government had sought to do was to explain to all protesting prisoners what facilities and opportunities were available to them within the existing prison regime, which, as was also made clear to them, the Government is committed to maintaining and, as circumstances allow, improving. That explanation stands and the same facilities remain available. When the ending of the first hunger strike failed to lead to the ending of the other protests, the prison authorities, with the full backing of the Government, took the initiative to move 96 of the protesting prisoners into clean cells. When it became clear that those prisoners had stopped fouling their cells, normal cell furniture was provided.

7. This process completed, the next step towards a conforming regime was the issue of the civilian-type clothing. The prisoners refused this, saying that they were not prepared to wear it unless their own clothing was provided at the same time: and that they would take part in no work other than that of cleaning their own cells and receiving full-time education. (The Commission had, incidentally, said in its findings that it did not consider there to be anything inherently degrading or objectionable about the requirement to wear a prison uniform or to work). The Government had no choice but to say it could not accept these conditions. The prisoners'



response, on 27 January, was to smash the furniture they had been given and to damage the fabric of their cells.

8. On March 2 the prisoners engaged in the "dirty" protest at the Maze, and at Armagh, said they were ending this form of protest, but were doing so not as a step towards conformity with the prison regime but in support of the hunger strike which had then just begun. The Government nevertheless welcomed the prisoners' decision to end the conditions that they had imposed upon themselves: the prisoners were transferred to clean cells as quickly as the necessary arrangements could be made: and when they asked for the issue of furniture this was, notwithstanding the actions of January 27, initiated. As in January, the prison authorities responded to this scaling down of protest action by scaling down the punishment awarded, in this case by reducing by half the rate at which the protesting prisoners forfeited remission. For those prisoners who had ended protest action altogether since the previous hunger strike, the prison authorities had already, as they had undertaken, completed a review of remission and, where the prisoner concerned had by a period of conforming behaviour shown that this decision to cease his protest was a firm one, restored some of the remission previously forfeited.

SECRET

jfh

5

Ireland

12 May 1981

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 8 May about the last week's incident near Forkhill.

MODBA

Mike Hopkins, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

CS

SECRET

The Prime Minister agreed to see  
Mr Hume this week.

h.v.  
h.v.

MR. WHITMORE

John Hume

Mr. Hume telephoned at 6.15 p.m. this evening.

He said that there had been some kind of confusion in Belfast over the weekend. On Friday he had made through the NIO a formal request for a meeting with the Prime Minister, following the channels he had used before. He had now been advised today by the NIO that he should approach the Prime Minister's office direct, which he was doing through this telephone call.

I asked Mr. Hume what he specifically wished to discuss with the Prime Minister. He said simply that the situation in Northern Ireland was now critical, and there was very little time left. When he made his request on Friday he had been hoping to see the Prime Minister on Tuesday. He would still be ready to do so, late in the evening if necessary.

I told him that the Prime Minister was with Chancellor Schmidt at Chequers, and would be there until tomorrow. I said that the rest of her programme for tomorrow was very tight, and that I could only convey his request to her. I promised him that we would give him a reply as soon as possible, although it would certainly not be tonight.

I have not gone back to the NIO about this, following the conversation which I reported to you earlier. May we leave it to you to get the Prime Minister's reaction?

M.A. PATTISON

11 May 1981

FILE

R H

*✓ AD 11/5*

8 May, 1981

*King  
we will return  
AD 12/5*

The Prime Minister has seen a copy of the Secretary of State for Industry's letter of 1 May to the Chairman of the Post Office. She also would like to write to Mr Dearing. I enclose her letter. Unless you see objection, I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be forwarded.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

I K C Ellison Esq  
Department of Industry



VLB

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 May, 1981

Dear Mr. Dearing,

Keith Joseph copied to me his recent correspondence with you about the attacks on your sorting office in Londonderry. I too greatly admire the way the staff at the sorting office have carried out their duties in the most difficult circumstances. I should be grateful if you would pass on to Mr. Carty, and, through him, to his colleagues, my congratulations on their fortitude and devotion to duty.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

---

R. E. Dearing, Esq., C.B.

lt.

SECRET

From THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

4



Prime Minister

(2)

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

GREAT GEORGE STREET,

LONDON SW1P 3AJ

An admirable operation -  
+ a good example of cross border  
operation.

Phil

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

8 May 1981

mb

Dear Michael

I promised to let you have some information about the incident near Forkhill late yesterday evening.

Much of the Army deployment in border areas is, of course, still firmly targetted on anti-terrorist operations. The Police/Army Coordinating Group for the Southern Region assessed it as likely that the Provisional IRA would try to infiltrate terrorists across the South Armagh border during the present tension, and patrols were established to intercept the most likely routes. At about 5pm yesterday a member of a covert group of soldiers from the Royal Green Jackets saw a small group of men moving along a hedge, carrying rifles. These men were challenged, and when there was no response soldiers opened fire. There was an exchange of gunfire between the men and the troops, during which some of the terrorists withdrew back across the border. The Garda had been alerted however and were on the scene so quickly that they were able to arrest one of the gunmen, still carrying his rifle. The Army also arrested one of the gunmen, but in doing so noticed what they suspected to be an explosive device. It is suspected that the gunmen were trying to plant bombs in the area (the two men arrested are known to have been involved in the past in placing bombs on the Belfast/Dublin railway line) and the Army are properly being cautious before searching the area thoroughly. A full search is being made, and only when it is complete will we know whether there are any other terrorists, dead or alive, in the area.

This is a typical case of good anticipation by the security forces of the moves the terrorists might make, and of swift effective action by them, coupled with a positive and immediate response by the Garda. We have had a number of instances recently of just such team work.

Yours sincerely  
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS

SECRET

**IMMEDIATE**

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

19 18

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		NO 10 <u>DOWNING STREET</u>

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 081333Z

FM STRASBOURG 083640Z MAY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 26 OF 08 MAY

RFI IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, NEW YORK (UKMIS), EEC POSTS.

FCO PSE PASS IMMEDIATE TO ABBOTT, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, LONDON

MY TELNO 25 TO FCO : NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.  
FROM MARSDEN

1. AFTER A WEEK IN WHICH NORTHERN IRELAND BECAME A DOMINANT SUBJECT IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE PARLIAMENT ADOPTED THE HAAGERUP AMENDED RESOLUTION IN M I F T, SATISFACTORY FROM THE UK POINT OF VIEW. IT WAS SPONSORED BY THE CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS AND OBTAINED THE SUPPORT OF MOST OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS. THE RESULT WAS A CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC GROUP (BRITISH CONSERVATIVES) WHO LOBBIED HARD AND SPOKE WELL. THE VOTE WAS 106 IN FAVOUR, 65 AGAINST AND 17 ABSTENTIONS.
2. UNDER THE NEW PROCEDURES OF THE PARLIAMENT THE COUNTER RESOLUTIONS FROM THE GAULLISTS AND RADICALS ACCORDINGLY FELL.
3. LALOR (IRISH, FIANNA FAIL) INTRODUCING THE GAULLIST GROUP TEXT SET A FAIRLY RESTRAINED TONE FOR THE DEBATE. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF IRISH PEOPLE FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSED THE METHODS OF IRA TERRORISTS BUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MUST ABANDON ITS POSITION THAT IT WOULD NEVER GIVE WAY TO ANYTHING. HISTORICALLY HUNGER

*ms*

IRA TERRORISTS BUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MUST ABANDON ITS POSITION THAT IT WOULD NEVER GIVE WAY TO ANYTHING. HISTORICALLY HUNGER STRIKES HAD A HORRIFIC EFFECT. SOME FLEXIBILITY WAS NEEDED IF THOSE LIKE HIS PARTY WHO BELIEVED IN PEACEFULL PROGRESS BY CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WERE TO BE SUPPORTED. GLINNE (SOCIALIST GROUP LEADER) SAID THE PARLIAMENT WAS CALLING FOR NO SACRIFICE OF PRINCIPLE ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. BUT POLITICAL INITIATIVES MUST BE UNDERTAKEN. FOR RYAN (IRISH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT) IRELAND WAS A DISGRACE FOR THE COMMUNITY: THOUGH THE RESPONSIBILITY WAS FOR MEMBER STATES THE COMMUNITY COULD NOT IGNORE IT. MOLLER (DANISH EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC GROUP) SAW NO VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE ECHR HAD REJECTED SUCH A CLAIM AS WELL AS THAT FOR POLITICAL STATUS FOR PRISONERS IN LONG KESH.

4. THERE WAS SHRILL CRITICISM OF BRITAIN FROM THE LEFT SIDE OF THE HOUSE. KAPROS (GREEK PASOK) SPOKE OF THE BRITISH AS FASCISTS AND COMPARED IRELAND TO COLONIAL CYPRUS. CASTELLINA (ITALIAN RADICAL) SAW THE HUNGER STRIKERS NOT AS MAD TERRORISTS BUT AS STRUGGLERS FOR THE FREEDOM OF IRELAND. THEIR POLITICAL STATUS SHOULD BE RECOGNISED. FIERCEST OF ALL WAS WURTZ (FRENCH COMMUNIST) WHO HAD RETURNED FROM SAND'S FUNERAL, HE SAID, AS MARCHAIS' REPRESENTATIVE BUT HIS VENOM AGAINST THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY, FOR SUPPORTING MRS THATCHER, WAS AS STRONG AS THAT FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

5. BLANEY, ALSO JUST BACK FROM THE FUNERAL, URGED REASONABLENESS ON THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER AND GOVERNMENT. THERE HAD BEEN SLANDEROUS SUGGESTIONS THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE IRA. HE ALSO ATTACKED THOSE WHO HAD DISTRIBUTED BRITISH GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: THIS HAD REFERRED TO THE ALLEGED CRIMES FOR WHICH THE HUNGER STRIKERS WERE CONVICTED BUT THEY HAD BEEN TRIED IN SPECIAL COURTS WITHOUT JURIES.

6. VON HAPSBURG (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT) AND HAAGERUP (LIBERAL) CONDEMNED TERRORISM, URGED A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND SAID THAT THE EEC SHOULD OFFER ANY HELP IT COULD TO NORTHERN IRELAND, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD AND REGIONAL POLICY.

7. MISS DE VALERA CLAIMED THAT THE PRISONERS IN THE H BLOCKS WERE INHUMANELY TREATED AND BEATEN. THE HUNGER STRIKERS WERE NOT SEEKING POLITICAL STATUS BUT SIMPLY HUMANITARIAN IMPROVEMENTS.

8. IN EFFECTIVE SPEECHES JOHN TAYLOR AND LADY ELLES (EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC GROUP) ANSWERED THE DEBATE. JOHN TAYLOR ASKED WHY THERE HAD NOT BEEN MOTIONS OF SYMPATHY FOR THE 2200 PEOPLE KILLED IN RECENT YEARS BY TERRORISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. PRISON CONDITIONS WERE NOT INHUMANE BUT ACCORDING TO THE MAY REPORT OF 1979 RELATIVELY THE



HAD NOT BEEN MOTIONS OF SYMPATHY FOR THE 2700 PEOPLE KILLED IN RECENT YEARS BY TERRORISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. PRISON CONDITIONS WERE NOT INHUMANE BUT ACCORDING TO THE MAY REPORT OF 1979 RELATIVELY THE BEST IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE. IN RESPONSE TO ECHR SUGGESTIONS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD MODIFIED CERTAIN PRISON REGULATIONS, PARTICULARLY ON DRESS, BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE WEARING OF IRA UNIFORMS. LADY ELLES REFERRED TO THE ECHR DECISION REJECTING THE CLAIM OF POLITICAL STATUS, AND TO THE IRA'S STATEMENTS MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEIR AIM WAS POLITICAL STATUS. SHE QUOTED MR FOOT'S STATEMENT ON THIS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. SHE URGED THE PARLIAMENT NOT TO VOTE A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO PRACTISED VIOLENCE. HAFERKAMP, FOR THE COMMISSION, AGREED THAT THE COMMUNITY SHOULD BE READY TO OFFER HELP IN ANY WAY IT COULD.

FCO PSE PASS ALL

CAPE

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

SENT RECD AT 082856Z JM/KRW

265286 PRDRME G  
PAREURO 890129F  
THE RT HON MRS MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER  
10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1

4581  
PS TO PM  
RA.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

AT ITS SITTING OF 7 MAY 1981 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ADOPTED,  
FOLLOWING A DEBATE BY URGENT PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO RULE 48 OF ITS  
RULES OF PROCEDURE, A RESOLUTION ON VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND,  
THE TEXT OF WHICH IS GIVEN BELOW :

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

- RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION OF 17TH OCTOBER 1980 ON TERRORIST  
ATTACKS IN EUROPE (DOC. 1493/80) WHICH EXPRESSED OUTRAGE AT TERRORIS  
T ACTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND HOPEND THAT THE PERPETRATORS  
WOULD BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE,
  - STRONGLY OPPOSING ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCE AND EXPRESSING ITS DERTER-  
MINATION TO CONDEMN ACTS OF TERRORISM IN WHATEVER CIRCUMSTANCES THEY  
ARE COMMITED,
  - DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE VIOLENT SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND,  
INCLUDING THE HUNGER STRIKES OF PRISONERS,
  - RECOGNIZING THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS NO COMPETENCE TO MAKE  
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTHERN IRELAND,
  - EXPRESSING ITS DEEPEST SYMPATHY WITH THE FAMILIES OF 1500 CIVILIANS  
AND THE 600 SOLDIERS AND POLICEMAN WHO HAVE BEEN MURDERED SINCE THE  
TROUBLES IN NORTHERN IRELAND BEGAN,
1. CALLS UPON THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION TO JOIN WITH THE PARLIA  
MENT IN EXPRESSING THEIR READINESS TO OFFER ANY ASSISTANCE THAT MAY  
EASE THE TENSIONS AND THEREBY ASSIST IN SOLVIN THE PROBLEMS IN WAYS  
COMPATIBLE WITH THE WISHES OF THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AND THE  
PEOPLE CONCERNED.,
  2. INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT TO FORWARD THIS RESOLUTION TO THE GOVERN-  
MENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES, THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE EUROPEAN  
COMMISSION.

YOURS SINCERELY

SIMONE VEIL

**NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED**

RID  
NRD  
ECD  
INFORMATION DEPT  
WED  
MAED  
NEWS DEPT  
SECURITY DEPT  
PUSD  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD

PS/MR RIDLEY  
PS/MR BLAKER  
PS/PUS  
SIR A ACLAND  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR ADAMS  
MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR BRAITHEWAITE

**ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
NORTHERN IRELAND**

**THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED**

Chase?



10 B  
8/5

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 May 1981

No : coming on Sunday

Dear Mike

Paul

The hunger strike

As I mentioned to you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister has received a message from the "four horsemen" about the hunger strike. I enclose the text. Clearly we should get a reply off as soon as possible. Subject to your views, I think this should go from the Prime Minister herself. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft by close of play tomorrow, Friday 8 May.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Roderic Lyne (FCO).

Yours sincerely

Paul Alexander

Mike Hopkins, Esq.,  
Northern Ireland Office.

5



Northern Ireland Office  
Stormont Castle  
Belfast BT4 3ST

Lt Gen Sir Richard Lawson, KCB DSO OBE  
GOC  
HQNI  
LISBURN

7 May 1981

*Dear Sir,*

You and your colleagues in the Army in Northern Ireland are greatly to be congratulated on the tact, sensitivity and courage with which they have handled the last few difficult days. There can be no doubt that further tests are to come. I thought you would like to know, therefore, that I reported to the Cabinet this morning and expressed my admiration for the way the RUC and the Army are carrying out their duties. The Prime Minister particularly asked me to pass on to you and to the Chief Constable her own endorsement of this view. I am very happy to do so.

*Yours ever*

*Humphrey Atkins*

PS/S of S (B&L)  
PS/PUS (B&L)  
Mr. Bleboch  
Mr. Marshall  
Mr. Burns.  
Mr. Wyatt  
Mr. Ranson  
Mr. Alexander ✓



Northern Ireland Office  
Stormont Castle  
Belfast BT4 3ST

J C Hermon Esq OBE  
Chief Constable  
RUC HQ  
Brooklyn  
Knock Road  
BELFAST

L<sup>r</sup>  
Rud

17 May 1981

Dear Jack,

You and your colleagues in the Royal Ulster Constabulary are greatly to be congratulated on the tact, sensitivity and courage with which they have handled the last few difficult days. There can be no doubt that further tests are to come. I thought you would like to know, therefore, that I reported to the Cabinet this morning and expressed my admiration for the way the RUC and the Army are carrying out their duties. The Prime Minister particularly asked me to pass on to you and to the GOC her own endorsement of this view. I am very happy to do so.

Yours ever

Humphrey Atkins

PS/S ODS (B & L)  
PS/POS (B & L)  
MR. Bletsch  
MR. Marshall  
MR. Burns.  
MR. Wyatt  
MR. Ranson  
MR. Alexander ✓

B10  
SECRET

3



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 19/3

6th May 1981

*L. P. P. P.*

*Prime Minister*

(2)

*Dear Roy,*

*MS*

*Paul*

The GOC in Northern Ireland has asked for emergency reinforcements to be made available in the Province in order to help him and the Chief Constable deal with the expected increase in violence and disorder during the next few days. The funeral of Sands is due to take place tomorrow and the second hunger striker, Francis Hughes, could die at any time after that. In view of the security advice, your Secretary of State supported this request and the Defence Secretary has therefore now agreed that the Spearhead battalion be deployed to the Province today, together with 30 specialist drivers to man some additional vehicles which are also being sent to the Province.

When reducing the Army's force levels in Northern Ireland over the last year or so, we have always recognised that emergency reinforcements might be needed at times of especially heightened tension. Now is just such a time and my Secretary of State sees these reinforcements as simply a sensible military precaution which should enable the Security Forces to deal quickly and effectively with any outbreaks of disorder as they arise. This should help to contain the situation at an early stage, and so reduce the risk of any further escalation in the level of violence. At this stage it is not possible to say how long the battalion will be required to remain in the Province; we shall have to consider this further as the situation develops.

1

R A Harrington Esq

SECRET



The move will inevitably attract the attention of the media. We shall take the line that their despatch, at the request of the professional security advisers to your Secretary of State, is merely a prudent precaution and that our ability and willingness to reinforce the Province has been a necessary corollary of our policy of withdrawing units when their full time presence is no longer necessary. Defence PR staff are in touch with yours on the details.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10), John Chilcot (Home Office), Francis Richards (FCO) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,  
David Omand

(D B OMAND)

2A

S E C R E T

GRS 150

SECRET

DEDIP

BURNING BUSH

FROM ROME 040430Z MAY 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 138 OF 04 MAY 81

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN (PERSONAL FOR  
AMBASSADOR)

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL DINNER : 3 MAY

NORTHERN IRELAND

1. IN RECOUNTING THE POPE'S VIEW ON POLAND, HAIG SAID IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY FRANCOIS-PONCET THAT THERE HAD ALSO BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF NORTHERN IRELAND. THE POPE HAD SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE THERE (THOUGH NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF SANDS). HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED TO THE POPE THAT "IF THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD NOT EXISTED, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO CREATE IT" THE POPE HAD THEN GONE ON TO MAKE AN ANALOGY BETWEEN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BASQUE PROBLEM, HINTING AT EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT BY THE RUSSIANS IN BOTH CASES. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WAS NOT QUITE SURE WHAT THE POPE HAD MEANT BY SOCIAL JUSTICE.

2. HAIG'S REMARKS WERE ELLIPTICAL TO SAY THE LEAST, AND NOT TOO MUCH SHOULD BE READ INTO THIS INCIDENTAL EXCHANGE.

ARCULUS

LIMITED

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/WED

HD/DEF D

PS

PS/LPS

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

S E C R E T





DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY  
 ASHDOWN HOUSE  
 123 VICTORIA STREET  
 LONDON SW1E 6RB  
 TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-212 3301  
 SWITCHBOARD 01-212 7676

Secretary of State for Industry

| May 1981

R E Dearing Esq CB

②

*Michael - we should  
 write a letter of  
 appreciation to  
 Dear Ron, Ron-Dearing to  
 send to his Northern Irish  
 will sign  
 net,  
 Ronnie Amster*

I am glad that you gave me the copies of the letters you have had from the Chairman of the Northern Ireland Postal Board, describing recent incidents in Londonderry. I very much admire the stalwart performance of all those concerned and would like, through you, to congratulate Mr Carty and all those who work with him.

I am sending on the correspondence and a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Kear*



From the Chairman  
Posts and National Girobank  
Ron E Dearing CB

Headquarters Building  
St Martins le Grand  
LONDON  
EC1A 1HQ

Telephone 01-432 1515

The Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP  
Secretary of State  
Department of Industry  
Ashdown House  
123 Victoria Street  
LONDON  
SW1E 6RB

28 April 1981

*Dear Secretary of State*

THE PROVISION OF POSTAL SERVICES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

I think you will be interested to see the letters I had yesterday and today from our top man in Northern Ireland about the way Post Office staff have responded to the attacks on the sorting office in the city this month.

The sorting office in Londonderry has been the subject of serious attacks on 7 previous occasions and it has been destroyed 3 times. Since the troubles began 13 postmen have lost their lives and another 75 have been injured in Northern Ireland. In spite of all these difficulties the postal service has been continued without interruption and without fuss. Even when offices have been destroyed somehow services have been continued and new premises have been found and gone into operation within a day.

These postmen, are, I am sure you will agree fine public servants of whom the Post Office can be proud.

*Yours sincerely  
Ron Dearing*



DC Carty  
Chairman

North Ireland Postal  
Board

Queen's House  
14 Queen Street  
BELFAST  
BT1 6ER

Telephone 0232 27072

Telex 74141(PONIP G)

Giro 619 1002

Our reference

Your reference

Date

24 April 1981

R E Dearing Esq CB  
Chairman  
Posts and National Girobank  
Postal Headquarters  
St Martin's-le-Grand  
LONDON  
EC1A 1HQ

Dear *Mr. Dearing*

I do not wish to bore you with continuing reports on Londonderry but I thought you might like to see the attached report from the Head Postmaster, Londonderry, of some further incidents at our sorting office there. It conveys the sense of survival under attack very vividly and paragraph 2 illustrates very clearly the loyalty of our staff to the Post Office. In what other business would staff who were off duty come through a riotous situation to save the OMV fleet without being asked? Despite everything the basic principle of "the mail must get through" is being applied.

I have written to the GOC, Army Headquarters NI, Sir Richard Lawson, and the Chief Constable thanking them for their invaluable assistance in saving our fleet and our sorting office over the past few days.

Incidentally, as a matter of interest to you you may wish to know that the father of Bobby Sands (the hunger striker) is employed as a postman in Belfast Head Post Office.

Yours sincerely

D C CARTY

Head Post Office  
LONDONDERRY  
BT48 6AA

23 April 1981

POSTING OFFICE LONDONDERRY - ATTACK BY RIOTERS USING PETROL BOMBS AND OTHER MISSILES ON MONDAY 20 APRIL, TUESDAY 21 APRIL AND WEDNESDAY 22 APRIL 1981.

Rioters attacked the posting office between 1000 hours on Monday 20 April and 0300 on Tuesday 21 April and again between 1530 hours on Tuesday 21 April and 1230 hours on Wednesday 22 April. Attacks of a lesser nature took place on Wednesday afternoon ... only stones were used (Wednesday was the eighth successive day for rioting in Londonderry)


A 20 c ft OMV serial number 0140070 and a 30 c ft OMV serial number 7170311 were destroyed by petrol bombs at the outset of the attack at 1600 hours on Monday 20 April. The postman on security duties alerted the police and fire brigade and then attempted to extinguish the flames. They had to face a hail of stones and petrol bombs from the mob. The mob eventually reached the perimeter wall and when the security forces arrived on the scene and forced the rioters out of the SO yard the fire brigade were able to deal with the fires. The two vehicles are 'Write Offs'. Steps had been taken earlier to disperse 50% of the OMV fleet elsewhere and the staff on duty assisted by other staff who came in to help manage to remove the remainder of the fleet from the SO yard.

Working under cover of darkness the Security Forces sealed the 30' X 5' gap in the perimeter wall on Tuesday night/Wednesday morning. Corrugated metal sheets and steel plates reinforced by metal bars were used to seal the gap in the wall. In addition, one of the scrap OMV's was placed across the damaged wall to strengthen the metal sheets that had been welded in place.

As reported earlier the posting office roof had been damaged following attacks by rioters on Good Friday. Some further damage had been caused but it is not possible to ascertain the full extent of the damage until the civil disturbances cease. No mail was lost and no staff were injured.

Despite the difficulties mail services have <sup>been</sup> maintained though some collections have been advanced and others cancelled because of the prevailing conditions. All letter boxes receive at least an early morning clearance and a clearance to secure connection with the air mail despatch. Some sub offices have had to close for limited periods.

A list of staff who merit an award for commendable action over the past few days will be forwarded shortly.

  
Head Postmaster



DC Carty  
Chairman

Queen's House  
19, Queen's Street  
BELFAST  
BT1 6EP

Telephone 0232 27072

Telex 74141(PONIP G)

Giro 619 1002

Our reference

Your reference

Date

23 April 1981

R E Dearing Esq CB  
Chairman  
Posts and National Girobank  
Postal Headquarters  
St Martin's-le-Grand  
LONDON  
EC1A 1HQ

Dear *R E Dearing*

It was very kind of you to think of the staff in Londonderry and I have conveyed your good wishes to Mr Thorpe.

As you know from your visit to Londonderry our sorting office site is on the edge of "Bogside" and unfortunately is inevitably part of the stage in the ritual riots which occur in that city.

The current rioting has been occurring more or less nightly since 11 April in Londonderry and our staff have reacted in their normal magnificent manner. The major incidents during this period have been as follows:-

11 April

Rioters attacked the sorting office at approximately 0300 hours on Saturday 11 April. The staff on duty acted with resource in extinguishing petrol bombs which landed on the roof of the building and the yard. The security forces eventually dispersed the mob. The Fire Brigade was in attendance but in the event they were not required.

Attempts were made to breach the perimeter fence but the mob were unable to gain entry.

Cleaners had a considerable amount of broken glass milk bottles/cum petrol bombs to clear from the yard, but otherwise no damage was incurred to OMVs or the premises.

17 April

Rioters attacked the sorting office at approximately 0200 hours on Good Friday, 17 April. The staff on duty acted with resource in extinguishing petrol bombs which landed on the roof of the building and the yard. The security forces eventually dispersed the mob; some arrests were made. The Fire Brigade was in attendance and assisted in extinguishing the petrol bombs ... particularly those on the roof of the building.

17 April, (continued)

As on other occasions, attempts were made to breach the perimeter fence but the mob was unable to gain entry. The latest attack was most concentrated (at least 20 petrol bombs plus hundreds of bricks and metal bars, etc, were used). At least 8 sheets of asbestos on the roof were damaged. The security forces have supplied rolls of barbed wire to assist us in strengthening the perimeter fence and the local contractor provided staff to strengthen the fence and make temporary repairs to the roof.

The security forces are aware of our concern at the ferocity of the attacks on the sorting office. The 'leaders' of the mob employ a vehicle to 'service' the rioters with petrol bombs!

21 April


The sorting office yard wall was holed by rioters using picks. Access was not gained to the yard but vehicles moved off the site under heavy armed police protection. Two vehicles were burned by petrol bombs thrown over the wall."

Some adjustments have been made to deliveries and collections but deliveries are being made to all parts of the city despite the difficulties. There is no aggression towards our staff on delivery and staff morale is very high. It seems to flourish in adversity.

Elsewhere in Northern Ireland there has been a measure of difficulty because of riotous situations principally in Belfast. This has resulted in some minor adjustments to collection and delivery services and the closure of some offices.

Our normal reports to PHQ give details of these "happenings" in Northern Ireland but in view of the National publicity at present I felt you might wish to have this wider view of the scene.

Yours sincerely



D C CARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

*Ireland*

OO ABU DHABI DESKBY 211230Z

GR 540

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 211230Z

FM FCO 211205Z APRIL 81

TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 121 OF 21 APRIL

FOLLOWING FOR ALEXANDER, PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY,  
FROM SANDERS, 10 DOWNING STREET

MIPT:

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURITY SITUATION

FOLLOWING IS THE NIO ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION THIS MORNING:-

QUOTE

WEEKEND HOOLIGANISM - STONE AND BOTTLE THROWING - HAS BEEN RUNNING IN LONDONDERRY FOR SOME MONTHS. IN THE LAST WEEK IT HAS TAKEN A TURN FOR THE WORSE. A FOCUS HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY

SANDS' ELECTION - HE IS NOW A FOLK HERO - THE WEATHER HAS BEEN GOOD AND THE SCHOOLS ARE ON HOLIDAY. ADDED IMPETUS WAS PROVIDED BY THE INCIDENT ON SUNDAY IN WHICH TWO YOUTHS WERE KILLED BY AN ARMY VEHICLE.

THE RIOTING IN THE LAST WEEK HAS INCLUDED BOTH STONING AND THE FIRST USE OF PETROL BOMBS IN LONDONDERRY FOR TWO YEARS. LAST NIGHT 7 SHOTS WERE FIRED, THOUGH THIS WAS PROBABLY OPPORTUNISM ON THE PART OF PIRA AND NOT RIOTERS WITH GUNS. CASUALTIES SUFFERED BY THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE BEEN VERY LIGHT AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY HAS BEEN VERY MODEST.

THE FORECAST IS THAT THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE TROUBLE IN LONDONDERRY UNTIL SANDS EITHER DIES OR COMES OFF HIS HUNGER STRIKE. BOTH THE RUC AND THE ARMY ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN CONTINUE TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION. THEY REGARD IT AS SIGNIFICANT THAT, APART FROM MINOR HOOLIGANISM, THE TROUBLE HAD NOT SPREAD TO OTHER PARTS OF NORTHERN IRELAND. THE SECURITY FORCES DO NOT WISH TO SEE ANY CHANGE IN PRESENT POLICIES.

IN SHORT, WHILE TROUBLE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE IN LONDONDERRY, THE CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF ALL CONCERNED IS THAT THEY CAN BE DEALT WITH BY PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND POLICIESMM UNQUOTE

FOLLOWING IS THE POSITION ON DOLOURS PRICE:-

QUOTE

ON SATURDAY THE CONSULTANT PHYSICIAN RESPONSIBLE FOR HER ADVISED THAT HER CONDITION HAD DETERIORATED TO A POINT AT WHICH SHE WAS IN QUOTE IMMINENT DANGER UNQUOTE OF COLLAPSE AND SUDDEN DEATH AND ADVISED THAT SHE BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY. SECRETARY OF STATE HAS SIGNED A LICENCE FOR HER RELEASE ON CONDITIONS IDENTICAL TO THOSE APPLIED TO PAULINE MCLAUGHLIN EARLIER THIS YEAR. THE RESPONSIBLE DOCTORS HAVE BEEN TOLD THE POSITION IN CONFIDENCE. HER PRISON GOVERNOR WILL TELL HER OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S DECISION TOMORROW. SHE WILL REMAIN IN HOSPITAL FOR THE TIME BEING, WHICH ONE FOR THE CONSULTANT TO RECOMMEND.

THERE WILL BE LOYALIST CRITICISM ON THE LINES THAT HER ILLNESS, LIKE HER SISTER'S AND/OR THE MEDICAL ADVICE TENDERED ABOUT THEM, WAS CONTRIVED: AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY DELIBERATELY FAVOURS REPUBLICAN PRISONERS. THIS MAKES IT DESIRABLE THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE SAME TIMESCALE. A PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT ON MISS PRICE IS BEING PREPARED. IT WILL MAKE THREE POINTS:-

- (1) THE DECISION IS IN CONFORMITY WITH EXISTING POLICY (THE LAST PRISONER RELEASED ON MEDICAL GROUNDS WAS A LOYALIST).
- (2) IT WAS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO UNSOLICITED MEDICAL ADVICE.
- (3) THAT ADVICE WAS UNEQUIVOCAL. UNQUOTE.

MIFT REPORTS ON THE EFFECT OF THE VISIT BY THE THREE TDS.

CARRINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN



*Ireland 2*  
*Top copy filed on: -*

*Ireland: Maze Hunger Strike: 262.*

Ref. A04713

MR ALEXANDER.

---

There follows a brief summary of the points made to me by Sir Kenneth Stowe earlier this afternoon, which I reported to you.

2. There is reason to believe that the PIRA have been thinking seriously about an end to the campaign of violence, but feel that they need a success, an avenue to pursue their aims politically, and something more on the prison regime.
3. The Fermanagh by-election has given them the success, and a political opening, which there is reason to think they hope to follow up in the local government elections.
4. The Sands campaign was supported by a considerable amount of money from the Republic, and by Miss Shelagh de Valera, who has previously been recommending a cease-fire. She is probably close to Mr Haughey again, and he probably sees the by-election result as a major success in steering the PIRA away from violence and towards politics.
5. There is reason to believe that the PIRA expect that, if enough of a push can be made in the next 10 days, it will be possible to bring the prison protests to an end.
6. The Security assessment is that, assuming no concession is made on the prison regime or the hunger strike, Sands will die roundabout Easter. His by-election success will make resulting violence sharper. It may last for some days. They feel confident they can contain it.
7. Both communities in Northern Ireland will be watching from their different points of view what the Government's reaction is to the Sands by-election. The Catholics will be hoping and the Protestants will be fearing that the Government will offer some concession as a way out of the hunger strike. This cannot be given, but in the immediate aftermath of the by-election the Prime Minister's reaction should be very low key.

The Northern Ireland Office will propose the following ingredients:

- (a) <sup>What the Prime Minister</sup> ~~What she~~ says should not condemn the electoral process which got Sands elected, though she should of course condemn the violence which got him into the Maze.
- (b) There is nothing we can add to what the Government has already said about the prison regime. The Prime Minister might, however, refer to the "responsible criticism" put forward by the European Commission on Human Rights. There is some reason to believe that in that area might lie the key to meeting the aspirations of the Catholic community on the prison regime: the European Commissioners might have a role to play in examining the prison regime and advising how the authorities should continue to respond to the protest. What the Prime Minister might say should not develop, still less recommend this idea, but she could use words which would be read by people as an indication that the Government have listened to the suggestions of the ECHR.

8. In general Sir Kenneth Stowe emphasised that the by-election had had an extremely unsettling affect and that the Government's response should be very cautious and low key.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

13 April 1981

NIOM(81) 3rd Meeting.

1. CAW <sup>FWL</sup> 23W  
2. MODBA to see MS

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ON FRIDAY 10 APRIL 1981 22/4

Present: Mr Marshall - Chairman

Mr Burns )  
Mr Moriarty )  
Mr Buxton )  
Mr Spence ) NIO  
Mr Corbett )  
Mr Fisher )  
Mr Bates )

Mr Stephens )  
Mr Miller )  
Mr Martin ) MOD  
Lt Col Bateman )  
Mr Farthing )

Mr Evers - FCO

Mr Heaton - Home Office

### Security

1. Mr Burns said that the security statistics were 50% better than for the same period last year (though the quarterly average was close to the average for 1980 as a whole). There had been an increase in the number of good arrests; in a number of cases suspects had been caught "red-handed" so it should be possible to bring charges which were not based solely on interrogation evidence. The security forces had had some narrow escapes, when devices had failed to explode, but these malfunctions were themselves evidence of the security forces' past successes in putting PIRA's "experts" out of action. The steady improvement in security was not reflected in the public's perception of the situation; the intermittent nature of the violence meant that the

→ (reduction in frequency was not noticed. INLA activity now accounted for about half of the violence; by the end of the year they might have replaced PIRA as the main threat.

2. The Paisley "Carson Trail" rallies had not proved any threat to public order, Mr Burns reported. With the possible exception of the last one, they had not been well attended. Paisley had announced that he would be campaigning in Scotland; NIO (Belfast) were considering what other tactics he might adopt.

**E.R.**

H-block demonstrations, and the counter demonstrations arranged by the DUP and the Orange Order, posed more of a threat to public order. The Secretary of State's ban had prevented demonstrations by these three groups in Cookstown on Sunday 5 April; the police had been given notice of similar demonstrations planned for Saturday 11 April (also in Cookstown). The police hoped to persuade the organisers to change their plans, but if this failed they would probably ask the Secretary of State for a further ban.

#### Robert Sands

3. Mr Marshall explained that the Secretary of State had raised in Cabinet the question of what should be done if Robert Sands were elected. A motion could be moved to expel him, but there were indications that some Opposition members would not support this, and other members might have doubts on constitutional grounds about expelling a member who had been quite open about his position and beliefs and had been supported by the electorate on this basis. A sub-Committee chaired by the Home Secretary had met on Thursday evening and had decided to consider the matter again on Monday 13 April. A further point for consideration was whether to seek to amend the law, to prevent a recurrence. In the meantime, the line to be taken was that this was a matter for the House of Commons, and that the Government was taking no action itself. It was to be emphasised that Sands would get no extra privileges, and that the Government's stance on political status was unchanged. It was not clear whether the SDLP had been outwitted, in allowing Sands a clear run, or had connived at this result. The DUP had been bested and lost face.

#### Hunger Strike

4. Mr Marshall told the meeting that Robert Sands was in the prison hospital (where he had just been joined by Francis Hughes, the second hunger-striker)

but this was purely for observation. However, his condition was likely to become critical within the next two or three weeks (earlier, if he stopped taking water or salt) and his supporters could be expected to start making an issue of his condition over Easter.

#### Joint Studies

5. Mr Moriarty reported that a further set of meetings with the Irish was due to take place the following week. Officials had prepared commentaries on the various topics aired at the last meetings and (after approval by Ministers) sent them to Dublin. Similar commentaries from the Irish side were awaited. The study groups were working towards a series of joint reports which would be put before the Prime Ministers for discussion at a 'Summit', possibly in the course of the Summer.

#### Army deployment

6. Mr Stephens said that the withdrawal of 3 Para and consequent re-deployments had gone ahead. The Defence Secretary had approved the reduction in the number of brigade headquarters from three to two and suggested that it should be announced in a low-key statement. The reduction was due to take place in mid-September, but the preparations would become obvious before then; the statement should not therefore be too long delayed, though - it was pointed out - it should be left until after the local elections. 5 - Inniskilling first Irish Dragoon Guards were about to be deployed in Northern Ireland (Fermanagh) - the/ Regiment to be sent to the Province. Though not formally announced, this had become known, but had not attracted unfavourable interest.

#### Economic matters

7. Mr Spence said that while unemployment had for the last few months been holding steady at just below 100,000, it could be expected to increase again soon.

#### Great Britain

8. Mr Heaton reminded the meeting that 18 members of the UVF had recently

SECRET

been arrested in Scotland. Of these, 8 had been released; the police were hoping to bring charges against the other ten.

SIL DIVISION

April 1981.

-4-

SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL**
 NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
 GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
 LONDON SW1P 3AJ

 Michael Alexander Esq  
 No 10 Downing Street  
 London SW1

2 April 1981

 Mrs  
 Prime Minister  
 ———

(2)

Dear Michael

## THE AFTERMATH OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND

You asked for an assessment of feeling in the Province in the wake of the Prime Minister's visit there on 5/6 March.

There is little doubt that the visit had served its immediate purpose conveying reassurance to the Protestant/Unionist population and taking some of the wind from Dr Paisley's sails. The Prime Minister's authoritative statement of the constitutional position and the Government's and her personal commitment to it has made Unionists less receptive to Dr Paisley's "Carson trail" exercise. Her expression of concern about the economy of the Province and the announcement on energy costs was welcomed by all. Some initial criticism from the minority that the visit had been too much angled towards Unionist feelings waned in face of the realisation that the PM had been just as firm in relation to the joint studies.

Reassuring Protestant Unionists is not, however, a one-off job, nor has it been at any time this century. Inevitably the calming effect of the visit has been partially, but far from wholly, dissipated in the succeeding four weeks - with contributions to that end from Dr Paisley. The turnout for Paisley's rallies has, however, been disappointing for him and generally smaller than reported in the media (eg probably no more than half the 30,000 said to have been at Stormont on 28 March). But he has stuck doggedly to his line that the guarantee does not preclude an alleged conspiracy with the Republic aimed at conditioning the majority eventually to accept Irish reunification. Mr Lenihan's equivocal statements have not helped. Though Mr Atkins' firm statement on 23 March and the subsequent meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach in Maastricht have persuaded some Unionists that their fears are misplaced, the overall effect of statements and counter-statements has been to sustain confusion and doubt in public opinion. A period of reticence from Dublin would be helpful.

Many Protestants, while accepting the Government's assurances nevertheless fear that something is going on behind their backs. What this means is that we have to go on repeating reassurances at regular intervals, as the Prime Minister recognised in a TV interview when she was in the Province. We have no other card which will take the trick. There is virtually no help to be expected from moderate Unionists; the UUP are divided and lack firm leadership. They have not yet succeeded in carrying the fight to the DUP, and Mr Molyneux has remained largely - and usually silently - on the defensive. They are worried about further defections to the

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DUP. Nevertheless they have - at last - outwitted Paisley in one important matter by getting their own man nominated in the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election and keeping the DUP out.

Looking to the immediate future Dr Paisley is clearly going to continue his campaign against the Government both in the period leading up to the 20 May District Council elections - and thereafter on the basis of the "mandate" he will claim he has. (He and everyone else expect he will gain votes at the expense of the UUP). What tricks he has still got up his sleeve we do not yet know. He probably has not worked it out himself. But further stunts of a more or less serious kind are to be expected, and it is significant that he is now attacking the Chief Constable personally. The Secretary of State has, of course, commissioned contingency planning on how we could deal with possible Paisley moves which threaten law and order.

Meanwhile Paisley's antics continue against the background of the continuing hunger strike at the Maze Prison. All our contacts confirm that there is little support so far for the hunger strike in the minority community. As Easter and deaths draw nearer, the support is likely to grow and the hunger strike campaign has now received added impetus by the clever move of putting Sands, a leading hunger striker, up as a candidate for the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election. My Secretary of State will be writing separately to the PM and his colleagues this week about the implications of this move. But this much is already clear: it is a move which will ensure substantial media coverage for what had threatened to become a non-event; even if as is likely, the sole Unionist candidate wins because enough Nationalist voters decide that they cannot stomach Sands and abstain, the IRA will be able to claim a factitious level of support for the hunger strike on the basis of votes cast for Sands; and the SDLP who decided not to stand against Sands will be damaged - and regrettably the cause of responsible and non-violent minority opinion will be damaged with them.

To summarise, the Prime Minister's visit was highly effective in reassuring the population at large and slowing down the Paisley bandwagon. The bandwagon has not been brought to a halt however and we shall need to continue to make reassuring noises to the Unionist community as Paisley tries to accelerate his campaign. That campaign coincides dangerously with the now more likely rise in interest in the hunger strike (and thus with the need to calm the minority community) as Easter and hunger strikers' death approach.

Separate comment is called for on reaction to the PM from the Security Forces. As hitherto, the PM's interest and concern was greatly appreciated and the impact on morale is still there. This is a benefit not to be underestimated.

The PM can, in our judgement, feel well satisfied with the impact of her visit. None of our problems is susceptible to a "single shot" solution but the base is well-established for continued expressions of the PM's interest and concern - and for another visit at an appropriate time.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Mike Hopkins*  
M W HOPKINS

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Ireland.*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

30 March 1981

*Dear Richard,*

*for Phil 31/3*

As something to tuck away in the back of your mind, you might like to see the enclosed. The Prime Minister is understandably sensitive about discussions which get near to constitutional issues. And yet middle of the road opinion in Northern Ireland from both communities (including the Lord Mayor of Belfast) and from the Republic are able to sit down and discuss such matters quite freely. Of course it is different when Governments do it. But there are several people in Northern Ireland, many of them Unionists of a sort, who are way ahead of the line that Paisley is denouncing as treason.

*Yours ever,*

*R. Harrington*

R A HARRINGTON

CONFERENCE TIME-TABLE  
MODELS OF POLITICAL CO-OPERATION  
25TH - 28TH MARCH, 1981

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WEDNESDAY MARCH 25TH

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5.00 p.m. Registration - Queen's Elms Residences.  
6.30 p.m. Reception  
7.30 p.m. Dinner - Conference Introduction

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THURSDAY MARCH 26TH

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Chairperson - PROFESSOR LEWIS WARREN  
*Queen's University Belfast.*

8.30 a.m. Current Options: Political Systems & Economics of:

(1) Integration and Devolution	PROFESSOR NORMAN GIBSON <i>New University of Ulster.</i>
10.30 a.m. (2) Independence	MR PAUL ARTHUR <i>Ulster Polytechnic.</i>
11.30 a.m. Coffee	
12.00 All Ireland Perspectives	PROFESSOR JOHN BRISTOW <i>Trinity College, Dublin.</i>
1.00 p.m. Lunch	
2.00 p.m. Panel Discussion	
3.00 p.m. Tea	
3.30 p.m. Democracy & Majority Rule in a Deeply to Divided Society	PROFESSOR AREND LIPHART <i>University of California.</i>
6.00 p.m.	
7.00 p.m. Reception and Dinner	Speaker: DR. CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN <i>Editor in Chief, The Observer.</i>

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FRIDAY MARCH 27TH

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Chairperson -- DR. ANTHONY KENNY  
*Master of Balliol College, Oxford.*

- 9.30 a.m. Federation and Confederation:  
European Examples PROFESSOR A. FROGNIER  
*University of Louvain, Belgium.*
- 11.30 a.m. Coffee
- 11.30 a.m. Confederation and Federation:  
British Commonwealth Experiences PROFESSOR MAURICE VILE  
*University of Kent.*
- 1.00 p.m. Lunch
- 2.00 p.m. De Facto Federalism & Devolution  
in the United Kingdom PROFESSOR BERNARD CRICK  
*University of London, Birkbeck College.*
- 3.30 p.m. Tea
- 4.00 p.m. Theory of Political Integration DR. EMIL KIRCHNER  
6.00 p.m. *University of Essex.*
- 7.00 p.m. Reception and Dinner Speaker: MR. GEOFFREY MARTIN  
*Representative, Commission  
of the European Communities  
Belfast.*
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SATURDAY MARCH 28TH

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Chairperson -- SENATOR CATHERINE McGUINNESS

- 9.30 a.m. The Nordic Model of Neighbourly  
Co-operation. PROFESSOR BENGT SUNDELINUS  
*Institute of Foreign Affairs  
Stockholm, Sweden.*
- 11.30 a.m. An Odd Couple?  
Obstacles & Opportunities in Interstate  
Co-operation between the Republic of Ireland  
and the United Kingdom. DR. PATRICK KEATINGE  
*Trinity College, Dublin.*
- 1.00 p.m. Lunch
- 2.00 p.m. Chairperson -- PROFESSOR DESMOND REA  
to Plenary Discussion  
4.00 p.m.
- 4.30 p.m. Reception Belfast City Hall Host: THE LORD MAYOR OF BELFAST  
ALDERMAN JOHN CARSON
-

## INTRODUCTION

### A CONFLICT OF CULTURES

The conflict in Ireland today is one between different traditions, identities and allegiances. Cultural identity and loyalty to one's group is basic to all who live in Ireland. If these traditions and cultures are to live together in peace and harmony appropriate political structures must be sought.

The legal basis of the present situation in Ireland lies in the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Government of Ireland Act. Many things have changed since then. The British Empire has passed and given birth to the Commonwealth. Europe has been through a major World War; new nations have come into being; and new forms of political co-operation have developed at National, Continental and World levels.

Within Western Europe, the arrangement between three small countries called Benelux, contributed towards the setting up of the European Economic Community. In Scandinavia, countries have come together to form the Nordic Union.

Experience elsewhere shows that there is a multiplicity of ways of democratically governing alienated communities and at the same time protecting minority rights.

Should not the people of these islands examine the solutions of others to conflict situations and thereby to develop new insights that might lead to the solution of their own?

### OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFERENCE

1. By way of a 'back drop' to attempt to understand more clearly the conflict in Northern Ireland, the current political options, their economic implications and their advantages and disadvantages.
2. To make a thorough examination of different models of political co-operation attempted elsewhere by commissioning papers from experts.
3. To consider in detail at a conference the papers and the possible application of the models from elsewhere as elicited in the papers to the particular situation in Northern Ireland.
4. To more widely disseminate the papers.

### CONSULTANTS TO THE CONFERENCE

*Professor Ian Budge, University of Essex*  
*Professor Bernard Crick, Birkbeck College, University of London*  
*Rev. Dr. R. R. Davey, Belfast*  
*Professor Rene Jean Dupuy, University of Nice*  
*Professor Norman Gibson, New University of Ulster*  
*Dr. Patrick Keating, Trinity College, Dublin*  
*Professor Ende McDonagh, University of Notre Dame*  
*Dr. Eddie Moxon-Brown, Queen's University of Belfast*  
*Professor Cornelius O'Leary, Queen's University of Belfast*  
*Dr. John Whyte, Queen's University of Belfast*  
*Dr. A. Stanley Worrall, Belfast*

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FM WASHINGTON 260054Z MAR 81  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1009 OF 25 MARCH 1981  
INFO NIO LONDON NIO BELFAST BIS NEW YORK AND DUBLIN

MY TELNO 955: ARMS FOR THE RUC

1. WHEN I SAW STOESEL ON 24 MARCH I REFERRED TO THE UNSATISFACTORY LINE TAKEN BY THE WHITE HOUSE ON THIS ISSUE. STOESEL WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE QUESTION. I THEREFORE TOOK HIM THROUGH THE PAST HISTORY OF CONGRESSMAN BIAGGI'S ACTIVITIES WITH THE WHITE HOUSE UNDER THE LAST ADMINISTRATION, AND EXPLAINED THE LINE WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TAKEN IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AFTER HER VISIT HERE. I SAID THAT THE LINE WHICH THE WHITE HOUSE HAD TAKEN WAS UNHELPFUL: IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO RECONFIRM THE REFUSAL TO SUPPLY THE WEAPONS. I ASKED WHETHER I SHOULD RESUME MY PREVIOUS PRACTICE, UNDER THE LAST ADMINISTRATION, OF SPEAKING TO WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS DIRECT ON THIS MATTER. STOESEL SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD PREFER TO TAKE IT UP THEMSELVES WITH RICHARD ALLEN.

HENDERSON

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

STANDARD  
RID  
NAD  
CABINET Office

ADDITIONAL DIST:  
NORTHERN IRELAND

COPIES TO:  
NIO LONDON

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cc:- Mr Gow

- Phd*
1. MR ALEXANDER - to see *Beland*
  2. PRIME MINISTER *has seen* *MS*

As the Chief Whip told you, Nicholas Winterton has written to Humphrey Atkins about Northern Ireland. Here is a copy of his letter. You will see that it is generally hostile.

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Do you want to be consulted about Mr Atkin's reply?

*No -* *MS*

18 March, 1981

NICHOLAS R. WINTERTON, M.P.  
(Macclesfield)



16th March 1981 NRW/cmh

Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins MP  
Secretary of State  
Northern Ireland Office  
Whitehall  
LONDON SW1

I understand from the Chief Whip, Michael Jopling, that you were unhappy at the contents of a speech which I made at a meeting a fortnight ago in a Committee Room at the House of Commons.

While indeed, owing to very heavy Parliamentary commitments, I have not attended many Northern Ireland Back Bench Committee meetings or sought to see you or any of your Ministers, my stance on Northern Ireland has long been established and the fact that I have been critical of successive Governments' handling of the Ulster situation is well known.

I think it is significant that the only part of the speech about which you would appear to be concerned, although it was a comprehensive indictment of the Government's policy, should be the phrase and sentence which impugns the Government's honour. This indicates to me that the stand which you take is Party before country. I enclose a copy of the full text of my speech and would refer you to pages 18 and 19. As to the truth behind the allegations which I made, I would remind you that I said it was clear from the semantics that the literal interpretation of the phrase 'the totality of relationships within these islands' i.e. two, and note not countries but islands, that Northern Ireland's constitutional position must be on the negotiating table because it must logically be part of the totality of relationships - that is just plain English.

I feel justified in pointing out that:-

1. communique issued after summits are not carelessly phrased and it is better to err on the side of legal precision in interpreting them rather than to assume that they do not mean what they say, for then the Government can later make it say what it pleases (i.e. the communique), that is if the looser interpretation has been followed, i.e. if we believe the Government now that the phrase was not intended to include Northern Ireland's constitution but it was

/cont inuc

discovered subsequently that the Government was selling Northern Ireland out and it produced a fair accompi. Could not then the Government say "ah well, the communique did say the totality of relationships".

I personally do not believe that the Government's line bears close scrutiny.

2. the Government chose the words of the communique. They have picked the ground on which to fight and if the Government prefers not to disclose any more of their case, then so be it. As a back bencher, one must then make conclusions from the evidence one has, and in addition from the experiences of the past. Too often assurances by Westminster Governments are not worth the paper they are written on, and here I would quote the apparent assurance of the Conservative Party in Opposition given to Bishop Muzorewa in Rhodesia. We all know what happened there and how the Government justified a change in its policy by playing around with the very words of its policy. I also well recall the way that Stormont was prorogued by the Conservative Government under Mr Edward Heath. Both these are perfect examples of the importance of semantics.

Why is it - how can it be - that Brian Lenihan, Foreign Minister of the Republic, has always, since the Dublin summit, contended that Northern Ireland's constitutional position within the United Kingdom was put onto the negotiating table by virtue of that summit while the British Government denies there is a sell out. Perhaps it would be useful to know what the Government might mean by sell out. There are many stages between constitution on the negotiating table and sell out, yet one is gradual sell out and the other is actual sell out. Gradual sell out is all the more insidious for masquerading under "Council of Ireland", "studies into the totality of relationships within these islands" or whatever.

3. it is very disturbing news that the SAS has been withdrawn from South Amagh in return for helicopter surveillance by the Army over the border and the possible surrender of Eire's neutrality in return for the prospect of a united Ireland.

What would the Government be guaranteeing to Eire? It cannot be just hot air for Mr Haughey to face a storm over the loss of neutrality - maybe followed by the siting of nuclear weapons in Ireland. Mr Haughey would need a trump card to get all that through the Dail and perhaps the news to which I have just referred is exactly what he will be promised at the end of the day. Bargains are in the air. Even if the Government denies this specific speculation, there is no doubt in my view that the principle is being pursued. I must make it clear that the attacks which I have made are not personal, but you as Secretary of State are the embodiment of the Government's Ulster policy and must therefore face the music which is not pretty. I would also make it plain at this stage that the



Reverend Ian Paisley, in a television broadcast last week, misquoted and misrepresented me, and I am in touch with him on this matter.

I would pose a number of questions to you:-

1. What is the security policy of the present Government in Ulster?
2. How many troops?
3. What about the 12 years of terrorism?
4. The Stronges' murder?
5. the vulnerability of border communities of British citizens?
6. Am I not right in contrasting the attitude towards terrorism in Ulster with terrorism in the rest of the United Kingdom? It appears that the Government is not treating the IRA as a threat to the United Kingdom as a whole, and until it does there will be no effective response.

I sought therefore, in my speech, to give voice to the real suspicions and apprehension in Northern Ireland, and I would ask you to remember that we are both members of the Conservative and Unionist Party of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I was speaking as a Unionist, and I could guarantee the support of every other Unionist Member of Parliament at Westminster for what I said. Jim Molyneaux, Enoch Powell and Jim Kilfedder have all attacked the Foreign Office. Surely if the Government has nothing to hide it would be best to be utterly frank, for as things are, the Government is playing into Ian Paisley's hands. The summit was obviously a very special occasion, for otherwise why would Lord Carrington and Sir Geoffrey Howe have been involved. It is facile to expect people to believe that it was only another typical summit between EEC Heads of Government, when Mr Haughey himself has called it the "most significant meeting for many years".

I feel I should tell you that I have been advised by my sources in Ulster that the praise expressed by Mrs Thatcher for the role of the Republic in security measures was certainly not appreciated. Surely Eire has only ever suited itself, was not particularly helpful in assisting to apprehend the Stronges' murderers, fails time and again to extradite known terrorists and continues to claim sovereignty over Northern Ireland? I have to pose the question, is Eire a friendly state? Why did they take the United Kingdom to the European Commission of Human Rights when they themselves carry out the same interrogation procedures as our security forces, perhaps even worse. It is an insult to any reasonable person's intelligence to make believe that Dublin wants to help because the only objective it has is to help towards its own ends. What has the Republic ever conceded - only the promise of studies and the like. Very little action has ever been forthcoming. Does, in fact, the British Government's left hand know what its right hand is doing? In saying this, I draw to your attention the case of the Foreign Office taking a house in Holywood, County Down, to talk to the IRA et al without apparently the knowledge of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

/continued

When the then Secretary of State, Roy Mason, found out, he had the place closed down.

Is our Government trying to pretend that the only action in respect of Northern Ireland is that which it admits to and is clearly visible? What about the apparent subterfuge to promote Ian Paisley as the leader of Ulster until he blew cover and reverted to grass roots opinions of our Government's policy? While our Government has honoured the Union, what has it done to promote Unionist unity and therefore The Union?

I personally believe that there is a great deal to be angry about in relation to our Government's policy, and I consider that the comments that I made in my speech are justified and would receive total Unionist support. If the Government just wishes me not to rock the boat, I must say that I consider it more important to show that there are at least some mainland Members of Parliament who care about Northern Ireland's fate, and the Union, and the murder of British citizens and the fear and dread in which they live. May I ask the question as to whether the Prime Minister managed to persuade President Reagan to lift the arms ban on the Royal Ulster Constabulary particularly in view of the President's forcibly expressed views on terrorism, or has Northern Ireland simply been forgotten?

In conclusion, I regret that I must say that I believe that it is rather the Government which is at fault, and my speech is entirely justifiable comment on the Ulster situation.

c.c. Hon. Michael Jopling MP

Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP

Nick: Herewith the  
details.

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TV NEWS INSERT

BBC?1

1245 6.3.81

BBC-1

1740 to \*

BBC-2

1915 from \* to \*

BBC-1

2100 items between \*

THATCHER

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GAVIN HEWITT: \* Within hours of Mrs Thatcher having reaffirmed in the strongest terms that there was no plot to integrate Ireland, Dr Paisley and his Loyalist supporters drove to Government House at Hillsborough where the Prime Minister was staying. Her denials had not allayed their suspicions of betrayal and only a long line of police prevented their marching inside to tell her. After a few shouts they withdrew to a nearby church to sing hymns and to pray against what they see as the creeping process of all Ireland integration.\* Afterwards, an angry Dr Paisley accused the Prime Minister of lying to the people.

MR IAN PAISLEY: \* I have the facts and the facts are these that they are discussing the constitution and this will all come out in the wash. And I brand her exactly <sup>as</sup> Mick Winterton did -- she's lying through her teeth.\*

HEWITT: But it was to industry that Mrs Thatcher turned her attention this morning, visiting two factories in the Protestant estate of Castlereigh. \*The industrial outlook here is particularly bleak and desolate, with seventeen per cent without work -- five per cent more than when the Prime Minister took office. Her first visit was to a family engineering business employing sixty people, a kind of small low-cost enterprise in which she has placed so much faith. Twenty years ago this firm had built their own car -- advanced in engineering, sleek in design. The Prime Minister seemed much impressed. But although proud of their product the firm had never been able to find anyone to develop it.\* It was in recognition of the economic problems here that the Government yesterday announced it was bringing electricity prices into line with those in the rest of the United Kingdom, thereby reducing industry's costs. Although the decision has been welcomed it's been seen as a belated gesture. The high energy costs were an important factor in the collapse of the synthetic fibre industry that has so damaged the province's employment prospects.

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cont. →

Sorry!

NICHOLAS R. WINTERBURN M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

11th March 1981.

Dear Dr. Paisley,

It has been brought to my attention that you have purported to quote me as saying that the Prime Minister is "lying through her teeth" in respect of assurances which she has given (most recently, in Belfast) concerning the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.

I assume that you were making reference to remarks which I made during a speech in the Palace of Westminster on Thursday, 26th February which was subsequently reported in "The Guardian" and other newspapers. As there appears to have been some confusion on your part, I wish to make the following points absolutely clear.

Firstly you misquoted me. Secondly you took my remarks out of context and for your benefit I reproduce here the relevant passage from my speech :

" Much speculation has surrounded what Mrs Thatcher has refused to say ( about the Dublin summit ) and the reasons why she has refused to expatiate upon the communique, to explain for instance the implausibly wide divergence between the two Governments' interpretations of the summit's significance. However, from what was said about studies into "the totality of relationships within these islands" - rather than countries, you will note - it is clear from the very semantics of those words that Northern Ireland's constitutional position has been surreptitiously slipped onto the negotiating table while this Government lies through its teeth that the position of Northern Ireland's position is not in doubt. It is a worrying phenomenon when government through integrity is supplanted by government with deceit."

You will see from this that, however strong the remarks may be - and I do not retract them, the force of my comment was directed towards



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LONDON SW1A 0AA


the assertion that the Government has been less than wholly honest in declining to elaborate on the content and implications of the Dublin summit meeting with Mr. Haughey. I have no reason to doubt the personal honesty and integrity of the Prime Minister in her protestations of personal commitment to the spirit of and constitutional guarantee in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973.

However, what I do fear is the influence exerted upon Government policy on Northern Ireland by departments such as the Foreign Office and the Northern Ireland Office itself and their respective Ministers. It is not inconceivable that their aims on Northern Ireland may be wholly different from those of the Prime Minister. Naturally I am particularly worried by the precedent of Rhodesia where Conservative Party policy in favour of the Internal Settlement, which was warmly and personally endorsed by Mrs. Thatcher both in Opposition and in Government, was skilfully twisted by the direct influence of Lord Carrington and the Foreign Office to the detriment of the Internal Settlement and in particular of the political credibility of Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

I hope that you can now appreciate the true thrust of my criticism which concerns Government policy and is not intended to impugn the personal honour/<sup>of the Prime Minister</sup> for whom I have the highest regard. I regret that you have been led to believe otherwise.

In view of the fact that you have publicly misquoted me to my own embarrassment, I thought it fit to "set the record straight" by writing to you and by circulating copies of this letter to the Prime Minister and to the press.

Yours faithfully,

  
Nicholas R. Winter



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Speech by Mr. Nicholas Winterton, Conservative Member of Parliament for Macclesfield, to the Wales Ireland Scotland England Association (W.I.S.E.) on Thursday 26th February 1981.

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

I want to address you to-day on the subject of Northern Ireland, not merely in its localised context and neither just because it is a topic of constant interest. Rather I believe that there are important aspects of the Government's policy towards Northern Ireland which bear more detailed examination and are of much wider significance when considered against the background of



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more general Government policy in larger spheres. I hope that this will become apparent to you from the criticisms I have to make of this Government's policy record on Northern Ireland to date.

First and foremost, the most worrying aspect of the Northern Ireland crisis is the continuing, unacceptable level of violence perpetrated by the I.R.A. and their fellow travellers. It seems a matter of small moment - to judge from the prevailing attitude of total unconcern which pervades the news media on the subject of I.R.A. violence - that after a period of some twelve years a subversive organis-



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ation of urban guerrillas ( to be polite ), a band of thugs and hooligans to be more accurate, is permitted to levy death and destruction upon British subjects in what is professed to be an integral part of the United Kingdom ; to wage war upon the Queen's subjects and upon Her authority within the very core of her dominions without effective let or hindrance.

The Irish Sea must indeed prove a formidable psychological barrier within the minds of Cabinet Ministers, Labour and Conservative alike, for I can imagine no other part of the United Kingdom in which a terrorist campaign would have been permitted to last





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for such a length of time. I cannot <sup>imagine</sup> any administration at Westminster surviving more than one term of office if it failed to destroy a terrorist threat in any county of England, Scotland or Wales. One need look no further than the various campaigns by the I.R.A. on the United Kingdom mainland, the Angry Brigade Campaign, the activities in the past of extreme Welsh Nationalists and most recently the storming of the Iranian Embassy in London - action first and questions later - to realise that no Government at Westminster is prepared to countenance the proliferation of terrorist activity in



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England, Scotland or Wales.

Yet the people of Northern Ireland are as British as we assembled here to-day. They pay the same taxes, are subject to the same laws and owe allegiance to the same Crown but, through some intellectual sleight of hand, they are, apparently, not entitled to the same security of life, limb and property as are, for example, the inhabitants of Dorset, Cardigan or Fife. Is there any possible explanation for this gross discrepancy?

I think not and to put the matter quite bluntly I wish to put on record my view that the security



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policy of this Government on Northern Ireland, just like that of every previous Government since 1968, is woefully inadequate, a national disgrace and the most contemptible of farces. It is no secret that the paper strength of the British Army's forces on the ground in Northern Ireland bears not the faintest shadow of resemblance to the numbers of troops deployed at any one time. For how else could the I.R.A. act with such impudent impunity in the border areas of the Province to the point of declaring themselves in de facto control of south Armagh.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you can bet your bottom



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dollar that if the violence which is daily occurring in Fermanagh and Armagh were taking place in the constituency of a Cabinet Minister, it would not be allowed to continue for a week let alone twelve years. For it is certain that that Minister's continued tenure of a Parliamentary seat would depend upon the immediate eradication of the terrorist violence. Further, I cannot imagine any lengths to which such a Member of Parliament would not go to help his constituents.

So why, you may ask, these deplorable double standards on Northern Ireland? And how is it that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has the



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nerve to proclaim a falling level of violence in Northern Ireland only weeks after the beastly and physically sickening murders of Sir Norman Stronge and his son at their home, Tynan Abbey in County Armagh. Here was a reminder, if reminder were needed, of the constant and frightening threat to all British families living along the border with the Irish Republic. Nevertheless, this threat which has so often manifested itself in cold blooded murders of innocent civilians has failed to impress, seemingly, a distant Government at Westminster, deaf to the entreaties of a beleaguered population in some of the more peripheral



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counties of this country - but not the less important  
for their <sup>geographical</sup> position.

This is all the more remarkable in that only  
last year Mrs. Thatcher received at Downing Street  
widows of policemen and other security personnel  
from County Fermanagh. That visit seems to have  
failed to make any recognizable impact upon the Gov-  
ernment's lack of resolve to rid Northern Ireland of  
the I.R.A. scourge, even though the memories of the  
assassinations of Lord Mountbatten and Airey Neave  
must still be fresh in everybody's mind.

It grieves me particularly to have to catalogue



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what can only be described as a record of deplorable inactivity on the part of the Government, formed as it is by what has always claimed to be the Party of law and order. Sadly the truth is that Conservative, just like Labour, Governments during the past twelve years have displayed an endemic lack of commitment to the actual, physical elimination of this terrorist threat within the United Kingdom.

As for the Stronge assassinations themselves, they must give the lie to the spurious pretence underlying the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's claim that the security situation in Northe



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Ireland is improving. For if Tynan Abbey, presenting as it did an obvious, identifiable, yet defensible target, was open to a military style assault with explosives and a large body of men so that the Stronges were easily murdered by killers who easily escaped across the Border, then what hope is there for the ordinary, unprotected, British citizen living in that infested countryside?

Is it any wonder that the Stronges' murder should bring such shame upon the Government and is it any wonder that this outrage should have been brushed under the carpet as an uncomfortably embarrassing event





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which simply cannot be made to fit into the official statistics of falling violence. But all the more shame for the grossly casual way in which the Government greeted the news of this tragedy. The expressions of regret by the Secretary of State and the Leader of the House were notable for their blandness and complacency by comparison with the rigorous denunciations from all sections of the Northern Ireland community including the S.D.L.P. and the Republican Clubs.

Yet Sir Norman Stronge, decorated with the Military Cross and the Croix de Guerre (Belgique), twice Mentioned in despatches in the First World War,



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Her Majesty's Lord Lieutenant for Armagh and Speaker of the Stormont House of Commons, as an example of selfless devotion to Queen and country in both public and military life and to fellow Ulstermen ( regardless of creed ) was representative of all that was finest in Northern Ireland. If this Government expects heroes to rise up tomorrow to meet any new external threat to this country's security then they had better begin by treating yesterday's heroes less shabbily. Government reaction to the Stranges<sup>2</sup> murder was deplorably shoddy and I have no doubt that every self-respecting citizen of this country would want to disassociate



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himself from what was tantamount to disrespect to the innocent victims of terrorist violence and an insult to the people of Northern Ireland.

This might be an appropriate point to mention the role of the Dublin Government and the dealings between London and Dublin, not least because there has been a conspicuous lack of success in bringing the Stronges' murderers in the Republic to justice.

Turning to the implications of the recent Dublin summit between Mr. Haughey and Mrs. Thatcher, amid all the confusion and conflicting reports of what in fact was agreed, one thing is absolutely



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clear. Mrs Thatcher has done neither herself nor the Government's policy any good and has done a great disservice to the people of Northern Ireland by maintaining a wall of silence about the content of those talks.

On past performance - particularly of Conservative Governments, I am sorry to say - Ulster Unionists have only the most impeccable reasons to suspect the motives and actions behind this present veil of secrecy.

It is maintained that this was merely a routine meeting of the heads of government of two E.E.C. members



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states, but in truth the presence of both the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, men whose time is indeed valuable, belies the naiveté of such a suggestion - an insult to anybody's intelligence.

Much speculation has surrounded what Mrs. Thatcher has refused to say and the reasons why she has refused to expatiate upon the communique to explain, for instance, the implausibly wide divergence between the two Governments' interpretations of the summit's significance. However from what was said about studies into the "totality of the relationships



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between these islands" - rather than countries, you will note - it is clear from the very semantics of those words that Northern Ireland's constitutional position has been surreptitiously slipped onto the negotiating table while this Government lies through its teeth that the position of Northern Ireland is not in doubt. It is a worrying phenomenon when government through integrity is supplanted by government with deceit.

When one can clearly observe these machinations the denials of which are transparently false, is one really surprised that the Rev. Ian Paisley can whip



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up fear and forboding among the people of Northern Ireland and is it really surprising that he threatens to demonstrate throughout the cities of the United Kingdom mainland to reiterate unionist opposition to the concept of a United Ireland in ANY SHAPE OR FORM HOWEVER IT LAY BE DRESSED UP. I hold no brief for Mr. Paisley, but frankly the Government, through its lamentably inadequate security policy and its clandestine dealings in Dublin has laid itself open to wholly understandable ~~to~~ cries from those who have everything to fear.

And it bears sad but eloquent witness to the



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inverted priorities of the Westminster Government and Parliament that there is more concern voiced over the constitutional propriety of assembling 500 men on an Antrim hillside or about a breach of Parliamentary etiquette according to Erskine May than there ever is on the life and death struggle of the people of Northern Ireland against the I.R.A.

The reasonable demand must be for the Government to stop retreading the Sunningdale path with Dublin while British citizens are being butchered by the I.R.A. The reasonable demand must be for the Government to wipe out the I.R.A. with effective and efficient





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military deployment and furthermore to compel the  
Dublin Government to instantly extradite all terrorists  
wanted in Northern Ireland and to unreservedly renounce  
its constitutional claim over Northern Ireland as tokens  
of its goodwill and good faith before any further  
discussions are held with them.

In any case, why do we bend over backwards to  
please the Dublin Government tainted, from its inception  
to the present day, by association with gun-running  
and in sympathy with the I.R.A. The only reason that  
Dublin has ever co-operated on cross border security  
is because, very late in the day, it was perceived very



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plainly that the I.R.A. to-day is as much a threat to constitutional and democratic institutions in Dublin as much as in London or Belfast.

Dublin deserves no bouquets, for its involvement in Northern Ireland affairs throughout the present Troubles has been governed by a motive of pure self-interest. Unwittingly the real attitude of the Eireann Government was exemplified by the reaction to the " Stardust " fire in Dublin when that was described as the greatest tragedy in Ireland since the War. Horrific as the " Stardust " tragedy undoubtedly was, Mr. Haughey conveniently erased from his mind the I.R.A.'s twelve



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year campaign in Northern Ireland.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I hope that you will recognize the irresistibility of my arguments thus far and you may well ask why they do not prevail. The answer, I fear, is to be found in the shape of the Foreign Office, anxious to smooth out relations with Dublin (as a fellow member of the E.E.C.) by washing its hands of Northern Ireland, a hapless and unwitting victim of circumstance, like Pontius Pilate. In the same way, the Foreign Office is eager to take the expedient course over Gibraltar so as to iron out relations with Spain- a future E.E.C. member - and



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similarly with our important trading partner, Argentina over the question of the Falkland Islands. There is a clearly discernible line of policy throughout extending to the way Rhodesia was disgracefully abandoned to guerrillas (and now it seems to be Namibia's turn) so as to placate the tyrants of black Africa. ¶ When I last criticized the Foreign Office on this tack, I was described as a "great entertainer" by Peter Blaker, typically avoiding the thrust of my criticism. Rhodesia was then held up as a model of Foreign Office achievement, but in view of the events there in recent weeks it appears that Mr. Blaker is the jester if he regards



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the Lancaster House Settlement as something to crow about. Let's wait and see how the tribal rivalries resolve themselves ; let's see what freedom the press is permitted and whether there are ever again " free and fair elections" in the new Zimbabwe. If Rhodesia is an "achievement" then God spare Northern Ireland, ~~the Falkland Islands~~, Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands and Namibia from the consummation of Foreign Office designs upon them.)

It is not altogether improbable, indeed, that the Foreign Office is behind the Government's appalling security policy in Northern Ireland. For



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while the Violence continues the Government retains a frightening psychological lever on unionist opinion in Northern Ireland which might be eventually worn down into acceptance of whatever the Government ~~eventually~~ negotiates with Dublin. Were the violence to stop tomorrow so would end the raison d'être of such close consultations with Dublin on Northern Ireland. This is not so far-fetched when one considers that British Governments have talked to the I.R.A in the past, and for all we know, may be talking to them still.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I cannot express too keenly my sense of unease at the situation in Northern Ireland



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nor my sympathy for its embattled population and I hope that the plight in which they find themselves gives you the same acute concern. For I believe that ~~that~~ there are many aspects of this and previous Governments' handling of Northern Ireland which cast grave doubt upon the honour and integrity of the British people through their elected representatives' and Government's actions.

Cie  
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

17 March 1981.

Dear Richard,

La  
Mund

I do not know whether you saw  
the two letters enclosed. The whole point  
of the joke is that Frank Nibler is, as  
John Taylor well knows, Jim Nohyrenan's  
Private Secretary / Research Assistant. The  
UUP seems to be preparing a somewhat  
contradictory manifesto for the Fermanagh and  
South Tyrone by-election in the correspondence  
columns of the Times. Incidentally,





THE TIMES  
13.3.1981

## Mrs Thatcher's Ulster policy

From Mr Frank Millar

Sir, Unionists will have been much encouraged by the clarity of your analysis (March 7) of Mrs Thatcher's Ulster policy, and your understanding of "the more honest and more credible fears" occasioned by the Prime Minister's attendance at, and subsequent silence about, the Dublin summit. They will recognize, too, the truth of your warning that the activities of Mr Paisley are "an object lesson in how to lose friends and influence people" and a positive encouragement to enemies of the Union in Britain.

However, they may well feel perplexed by the criticism implicit in your challenge to them "to respond constructively to proposals for the administration of the province within the Union".

Since 1977 the Ulster Unionist Party, led by Mr Molyneux, has campaigned for that which you now advocate: "a system of administration as similar as is possible to that established in all other parts of the Kingdom". At that time Mr Heath, who abolished Stormont, saw in this proposal the way to political advance in Northern Ireland. So, too, did Mrs Thatcher, and in the run up to the 1979 election we were told that "local government reform" would be the central plank of her government's Ulster policy.

That it has not been so, and that Ulster has instead been led once more down the path of failed initiatives, is not the fault of Ulster Unionists. Rather the responsibility rests with those in the Northern Ireland Office who have proved either unable or unwilling to contemplate political development in the province other than in the context of legislative devolution.

In October, 1979, Mr Molyneux warned the Secretary of State that his search for agreement on a return to devolution would end in failure. But Mr Atkins's advisers were undeterred, and for 12 months and more actually sought to undermine Mr Molyneux's leadership by promoting Mr Paisley!

The uncertainty and insecurity generated by the collapse of yet another government attempt to find "a solution" is of course further compounded by the rumours emanating from Dublin as to the agenda for Anglo Irish talks.

Last week, in a welcome gesture, Mrs Thatcher stressed her personal commitment to the Union. She now needs to go much further, and allay Unionist fears by demonstrating that, much as she hopes for friendly relations with Dublin, the arrangements for the government of Northern Ireland are not something over which Mr Haughey can expect to exert any kind of veto.

In other words, the Prime Minister should (as you have advised) look anew at her manifesto commitment, and take steps now to establish Ulster's right, not merely to remain within the Union but to be governed in accordance with the principles and practices that obtain in England, Scotland and Wales.

By so doing, Mrs Thatcher can strengthen the hand of responsible Unionism, and give an answer to Mr Paisley and the IRA which neither of them wants to hear.

Yours faithfully,  
FRANK MILLAR,  
Trinity Road, SW17,  
March 11.

THE TIMES  
17.3.1981

## Policy on Ulster

From Mr John D. Taylor, MEP for Northern Ireland (Ulster Unionist)

Sir, I do not know who the Unionists are whom your London correspondent, Mr Frank Millar, claims to represent in his letter (March 13).

However, I must correct him and emphasize that Ulster Unionists here in Northern Ireland have as their main constitutional objective the return of a devolved legislative parliament.

Mr Millar's request "for Ulster to be governed in accordance with the principles and practices that obtain in England, Scotland and Wales" is in contradiction with the policy for devolution as pursued by Ulster Unionists. There is no devolved institution in England, Wales or even Scotland.

As the four main political parties in Northern Ireland—Ulster Unionist, Democratic Unionist, SDLP and Alliance—all campaign for devolution for Ulster, the Prime Minister and our Secretary of State, Mr Humphrey Atkins, MP, would be best advised to concentrate upon this system of government, which is one of the few issues which has common ground amongst the much divided and polarized political parties in the province.

Certainly as Member for Northern Ireland in Europe I recognize the advantage that devolution would be for Ulster's requirements within the EEC.

Yours etc,  
JOHN D. TAYLOR,  
Ulster Unionist Headquarters,  
3 Glengall Street, Belfast,  
March 13.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 904 OF 17 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST AND BIS NEW YORK

M I P T: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT. RA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT QUOTE.

ST PATRICK'S DAY IS NOT ONLY THE FEAST DAY OF A GREAT MAN OF GOD, IT IS A SYMBOL OF THE COMMITMENT OF THE IRISH PEOPLE TO FREEDOM, TO JUSTICE AND TO THE VALUES UPON WHICH WESTERN CIVILISATION ARE BUILT.

WE IN THE UNITED STATES KNOW THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION MADE BY CITIZENS OF IRISH ANCESTRY. FROM OUR REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT DAY, IRISH AMERICANS HAVE BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE DEFENCE OF FREEDOM. BY THEIR LABOUR AND BY THEIR SACRIFICE THEY HAVE BEEN A MAJOR FORCE IN BUILDING OUR NATION.

IT IS THEREFORE GRATIFYING ON THIS ST PATRICK'S DAY TO BE ABLE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE GREAT ROLE IRELAND AND THE IRISH HAVE PLAYED IN DEFENDING AND RENEWING THE VALUES WE CHERISH.

BUT WE ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE VIOLENCE, BLOODSHED AND DESPAIR WHICH NOW HAUNT ALL OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS TRAGEDY CANNOT GO UNNOTICED BY THE UNITED STATES WHICH OWES SO MUCH AND HAS SUCH CLOSE TIES TO THE IRISH.

AS AN AMERICAN PROUD OF HIS IRISH ANCESTRY AND AS PRESIDENT, I RECOGNISE THE VITAL IMPORTANCE TO OUR NATION AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE OF A PEACEFUL, JUST AND SWIFT SOLUTION TO CURRENT PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE PARTIES TO COME TOGETHER FOR A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION. I PRAY AND HOPE THAT THE DAY WILL COME WHEN THE TRAGEDY OF HISTORY WHICH NOW AFFLICTS NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE OVERCOME BY FAITH, THE COURAGE AND LOVE OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE OF THE IRISH.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONDEMN ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE, FOR THESE CANNOT SOLVE NORTHERN IRELAND'S PROBLEMS. I CALL ON ALL AMERICANS TO QUESTION CLOSELY ANY APPEAL FOR FINANCIAL OR OTHER AID FROM GROUPS INVOLVED IN THIS CONFLICT TO ENSURE THAT CONTRIBUTIONS DO NOT END UP IN THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO PERPETUATE VIOLENCE, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY.

I ADD MY PERSONAL PRAYERS AND THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES TO THOSE IRISH -- AND INDEED TO ALL WORLD CITIZENS -- WHO WISH FERVENTLY FOR PEACE AND VICTORY OVER THOSE WHO SOW FEAR AND TERROR.  
UNQUOTE.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TEL NO 903 OF 17 MARCH 1981  
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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT.

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN EARLIER TODAY.
2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT, IN BRIEFING THE PRESS, THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE SAYING THAT THE STATEMENT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT HAS ANY PLANS TO GET INVOLVED IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE. REUTERS ARE ALSO QUOTING A WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN AS AFFIRMING, IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, THAT THE PRESIDENT IS OPPOSED TO THE EMBARGO ON ARMS SALES TO THE RUC.
3. THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM, AND HIS APPEAL TO AMERICANS TO QUOTE QUESTION CLOSELY UNQUOTE APPEALS FOR AID FROM GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT HAVE BEEN THE LEAD IN REPORTS OF THE STATEMENT WE HAVE SEEN SO FAR.
4. IF WE ARE ASKED ABOUT THE ISSUE OF GUNS FOR THE RUC WE SHALL CONTINUE TO REFER TO THE ANSWER GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FOLLOWING HER VISIT HERE.

HENDERSON

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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01- 233 8224

(2)

16 March 1981

The Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP

*Sp. Secretary of State*

*ms*

*Annex 11/16/3*

*rt. 16/3*

BETTER GOVERNMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

Thank you for copying to me your letter of 5 March to Christopher Soames. May I compliment and wish you well on what you are trying to achieve?

As you know from my letter to Hugh Rossi last December, I found the scrutiny team's analysis of the weaknesses of financial control convincing and their recommendations sensible. I can well understand the presentational difficulties you are facing, but like you, I believe that centralising resource control and bringing together the arrangements for developing policy will provide a much firmer basis for administration in Northern Ireland.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Geoffrey Howe, Christopher Soames and Leon Brittan.

*[Signature]*  
Derek Rayner

010

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



*ms*

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

*Prime Minister*

16 March 1981

*You have already seen the statement by the Four Horsemen but you may like to see the NIO comment.*

*Dear Michael*

*Print 16/3*

I attach the text of this year's St Patrick's Day Statement by the "Four Horsemen" which the Prime Minister may care to see.

This statement by the four leading Irish Americans - Senators Kennedy and Moynihan, Speaker O'Neill and Governor Carey of New York - is encouraging and is consistent with our impression in recent months of an increasing awareness of the complexities in Northern Ireland among responsible Irish-American opinion. This was very much in evidence at a recent Ditchley Conference on Ireland at which the Secretary of State, Ken Stowe, and the Chief Constable met a number of influential Americans including the aides to the Four Horsemen. The reference to the legitimate aspirations of both the Protestant and Catholic communities is helpful; and the recognition that Irish unity can only be achieved with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland is a new and especially welcome development. The Horsemen are in effect echoing Mr Haughey's position recorded in the joint communique following the Prime Minister's meeting with him in London on 21 May last year, when the Taoiseach accepted that Northern Ireland's status could only be changed by consent.

I am copying this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), Francis Richards (FCO), Michael Collon (Lord Chancellor's Office) and David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

*Yours sincerely  
Mike Hopkins*  
M W HOPKINS

*For Print*

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TEL NO 859 OF 12 MARCH 1981.  
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INFO SAVING ALL CG'S IN USA.

M I P T: ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE FOUR HORSEMEN.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE FOUR HORSEMEN:

FOUR YEARS AGO, A GROUP OF US, AS IRISH-AMERICANS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE TRAGIC CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND, FIRST JOINED TOGETHER TO ISSUE A ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT CALLING FOR AN END TO THE KILLING AND DESTRUCTION AND URGING OUR FELLOW CITIZENS TO REJECT THE PATH OF VIOLENCE. EACH YEAR SINCE THEN, WE HAVE RENEWED OUR CALL FOR PEACE.

ON THIS ST PATRICK'S DAY 1981, WE TAKE SATISFACTION THAT AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED. WE HAVE SEEN THE DECLINE NOT JUST IN WEAPONS OR FINANCIAL AID, BUT IN THE INSIDIOUS SUPPORT OF THOSE WHO CREATE OR CREDIT THE PROPAGANDA THAT CAN ONLY WORSEN THE VIOLENCE. MORE AND MORE AMERICANS HAVE COME TO UNDERSTAND THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING ANY ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD THAT CAN LEND ITSELF IN ANY WAY TO THE TERROR AND BRUTALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

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WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL GIVE THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO A POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES THAT SEEKS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THAT HELPS BRING TERRORISM TO AN END, THAT DEMANDS RESPECT FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, THAT RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF BOTH THE PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES, AND THAT STRENGTHENS THE TIES BETWEEN TWO OF AMERICA'S CLOSEST FRIENDS -- IRELAND AND GREAT BRITAIN.

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WELCOME THE DAWN OF A NEW IRELAND.

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NAD PS/MR RIDLEY  
INFORMATION D PS/MR BLAKER  
WED PS/PUS  
MAED SIR A ACLAND  
NEWS D CHIEF CLERK  
SECURITY D MR ADAMS  
PUSD MR BULLARD  
PS MR FERGUSSON  
PS/LPS LORD N G LENNOX  
MR BRAITHWAITE

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FM DUBLIN 161645Z MAR 1981

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 16 MAR

AND TO PRIORITY N I O BELFAST

*See final para, overleaf*

TODAY'S IRISH PAPERS GIVE PROMINENCE TO DR GARRET FITZGERALD'S SPEECH IN LONDONDERRY ON FRIDAY 13 MARCH WARNING THAT THE BI-PARTISAN APPROACH TO THE N I QUESTION MAY HAVE ENDED. THIS SPEECH MAY BE SEEN AS THE CULMINATION OF A POLITICAL ROW WHICH WAS SPARKED OFF BY THE FINE GAEL AND THE LABOUR PARTIES ALLEGATION ABOUT A SECRET GOVERNMENT DEAL OVER A DEFENCE ARRANGEMENT WITH US AND A VIOLATION OF THE REPUBLIC'S NEUTRALITY (MY TELNO 50 ). THE CONSEQUENT UPROAR IN DUBLIN CAUSED THE TAOISEACH TO AGREE TO A DEBATE ON TUESDAY 10 MARCH ON A GOVERNMENT MOTION THAT DAIL EIREANN SHOULD CONFIRM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE GUIDED THE DEFENCE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS PREDECESSORS. (IT IS A MEASURE OF RELATIVE PRIORITIES HERE THAT THE DEBATE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY POSTPONED TO THE WEDNESDAY 11 MARCH SO THAT LEADERS OF THE THREE MAIN PARTIES COULD ATTEND THE FUNERAL OF BISHOP BIRCH OF OSSORY.)

2. MR HAUGHEY'S SPEECH DURING THE DEBATE GAVE LITTLE SATISFACTION TO THE OPPOSITION AND THE GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEMS CAME TO A HEAD WHEN THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS , WINDING UP FOR THE GOVERNMENT, PROPOSED THAT THE DEBATE SHOULD BE ADJOURNED. THE OPPOSITION LEADERS CLAIMED THAT THIS HAD BROKEN AN UNDERSTANDING REACHED BY THE THREE CHIEF WHIPS THAT THERE WOULD BE A VOTE . BUT THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO BUDGE. EVEN NOW IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WERE COMPELLED TO DO THIS BECAUSE OF A REVOLT AMONGST THEIR OWN BACKBENCHERS WHICH THEY NEEDED TIME TO SORT OUT OR BECAUSE THE TAOISEACH HAD LEFT INFLEXIBLE INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE CHIEF WHIP BEFORE DEPARTING TO ATTEND A MASS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE STARDUST DISASTER. BOTH OPPOSITION PARTIES NONETHELESS ALLEGED THE ATTEMPTED ADJOURNMENT MADE IT DIFFICULT TO COOPERATE WITH FIANNA FAIL OVER PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS.

3. WHEN A VOTE WAS EVENTUALLY TAKEN ON THURSDAY, FIANNA FAIL VOTED DOWN A LABOUR AMENDMENT CONFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE OF IRISH NEUTRALITY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS WELL AS A FINE GAEL AMENDMENT ASKING THE GOVERNMENT TO CONFIRM THAT A DEFENCE PACT WITH THE U K HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED. THUS THE SITUATION REMAINED AMBIGUOUS AND THIS PROMPTED DR FITZGERALD TO GIVE FRESH IMPETUS TO THE QUARREL BY ALLEGING THAT BIPARTISAN POLICY ON THE NORTH HAD ALL BUT BROKEN DOWN.

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4. IT IS OF COURSE TRUE THAT THE BIPARTISAN POLICY HAD BROKEN DOWN IN THAT THE OPPOSITION KNOWS LITTLE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY, BUT THINGS ARE NOT PERHAPS AS DR FITZGERALD MAKES OUT. DURING THE LYNCH ERA THE LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE BRIEFED CONFIDENTIALLY ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN RETURN THEY REFRAINED FROM ASKING QUESTIONS ABOUT THOSE MATTERS ON WHICH THEY HAD BEEN BRIEFED. BUT DR FITZGERALD AND MR CLUSKEY, WHO FROM THE VERY BEGINNING HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THIR DISLIKE OF MR HAUGHEY, HAVE SO FAR DECIDED TO TURN DOWN THE OFFER OF CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFINGS TO LEAVE THEMSELVES FREE TO ATTACK MR HAUGHEY.

5. THE FUSS AT THE MOMENT IS NOT REALLY ABOUT POLICY TOWARDS THE THE NORTH SEMICOLON IT IS ABOUT OPPOSITION TO MR HAUGHEY. THE SPEECH WHICH HE WAS TO HAVE DELIVERED TO THE ARD FHEIS LAID CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON THE CLAIM THAT HE AND HIS PARTY WERE THE ONLY HOPE OF PROGRESS ON THE NORTH. MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE JOINT STUDIES EXERCISE WILL BE A MAJOR PLANK IN HIS ELECTORAL PLATFORM: THUS THE MORE THE OPPOSITION PARTIES CAN DISCREDIT MR HAUGHEY'S CLAIMS IN ADVANCE, THE BETTER. FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW THEY CAN BE WELL CONTENT WITH WHAT THEY HAVE DONE. BUT IT IS AT LEAST PREMATURE TO SUGGEST THAT THE ELECTION WILL BE FOUGHT ON THE NORTH. THERE IS NO SUGGESTION THE THE S D L P COULD NOT CONTINUE TO WORK WITH LABOUR OR FINE GAEL. INDEED ON R T E ON SUNDAY JOHN HUME , WHILE REGRETTING THAT THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE SOUTH, MADE IT CLEAR THAT HIS LONG-STANDING FRIENDSHIP WITH DR FITZGERALD WAS UNAFFECTED. AND OUR PRESENT EVIDENCE IS THAT THE PARTIES DIFFERENCES ARISE OUT OF THE SECRECY WITH WHICH MR HAUGHEY CONDUCTS HIS POLICY, NOT ON THE POLICY ITSELF.

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NAD PS/MR RIDLEY  
INFORMATION D PS/MR BLAKER  
WED PS/PUS  
MAED SIR A ACLAND  
NEWS D CHIEF CLERK  
SECURITY D MR ADAMS  
PUSD MR BULLARD  
PS MR FERGUSSON  
PS/LPS LORD N G LENNOX  
MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
NORTHERN IRELAND

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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*Ireland*



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR  
NORTHERN IRELAND

*by*  
*And*

Rt Hon Lord Scames CH GCMG GCVO CBE  
Lord President  
Civil Service Department  
London SW1

13<sup>th</sup> March 1981

*Dear Christopher.*

BETTER GOVERNMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

Thank you for your letter of 11<sup>th</sup> March.

I do believe that some form of consultation is inevitable if we are to deal with the departmental organisation for economic development and social affairs successfully. But I take your point that we should separate mention of these studies from the issue of the merger of the Departments of Finance and of the Civil Service. This I propose to do in the terms of the attached revised form of announcement which I now propose to make next week.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

*Yours sincerely*

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*W. Humphrey*

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## DRAFT REPLY

While Direct Rule continues, my immediate priority is to ensure that the Government's security, economic development and social policies are implemented effectively and sensitively. To this end I propose, with the agreement of the Prime Minister, to make the machinery of government of Northern Ireland more efficient and accountable to my direction and control. This is consistent with the allocation of departmental responsibilities to my two Ministers of State which were announced on 7 January and will be done without change to the existing constitutional arrangements.

To achieve more effective deployment of public sector financial and manpower resources, I propose to merge the control functions of the Northern Ireland Departments of Finance and of the Civil Service. Detailed implications of how this merger is to be effected are being examined.

Studies of the departmental organisation required to deal more vigorously and effectively with economic development and social affairs are also in hand.

Consultations with the Staff Sides concerned will now begin. I shall publish my final proposals when I have considered the results of these consultations.

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PS/ SCS (B)  
PS/MR. ALLEN (L+B)  
PS/PUS (L+B)  
SA B. RICHARDS  
MR. W. BELL  
MR. MARSHALL  
MR. BLANCH  
DR. GUILLEY

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ES TO PM

MS

FM WASHINGTON 122335Z MAR 81  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TEL NO 858 OF 12 MARCH 1981  
 INFO IMMEDIATE NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST.  
 PRIORITY BIS NEW YORK, DUBLIN.  
 INFO SAVING, CG'S NEW YORK, ATLANTA, CHICAGO, DALLAS, HOUSTON,  
 SAN FRANCISCO, BOSTON, CLEVELAND, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE.

NORTHERN IRELAND: ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE  
 FOUR HORSEMEN.

1. M I F T CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE FOUR HORSEMEN'S ST PATRICK'S  
 DAY STATEMENT. WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN ADVANCE COPY IN CONFIDENCE,  
 BUT THE TEXT IS LIKELY TO FIND ITS WAY TO THE PRESS AT ANY TIME.

2. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT THIS YEAR IS THE USE OF THE  
 ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT TO LAUNCH THE NEW ORGANISATION  
 QUOTE FRIENDS OF IRELAND UNQUOTE WHICH HAS BEEN INCUBATING FOR  
 SEVERAL WEEKS AND ON WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED. THE  
 ORGANISATION (WHICH HAS THE STRONG BACKING OF SENATOR DODD AND  
 CONGRESSMAN FOLEY, AS WELL AS THE FOUR HORSEMEN) IS DESIGNED TO  
 ATTRACT THE MEMBERSHIP OF CONGRESSMEN WHO MAY HITHERTO HAVE LENT  
 THEIR NAMES TO BIAGGI'S AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR IRISH AFFAIRS. THE  
 FOUR HORSEMEN ARE NOW CIRCULATING THE TEXT OF THEIR STATEMENT  
 TO INTERESTED CONGRESSMEN IN THE HOPE OF ATTRACTING THEIR SIGNATURES  
 AND SUPPORT.

3. OTHER NOTEWORTHY FEATURES OF THE STATEMENT ARE:

(A) THE ABSENCE OF ANY CRITICISM OF THE UNITED KINGDOM:

(B) THE WARM WELCOME FOR THE PROCESS STARTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
 AND MR HAUGHEY AT THEIR DECEMBER MEETING:

(C) THE IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF MR PAISLEY (QUOTE WE REJECT THE  
 MACHINATIONS OF ALL THOSE WHO SEEK FOR THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE TO  
 SUBVERT THIS CONSTRUCTIVE NEW APPROACH UNQUOTE):

(D) THE REAFFIRMATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOAL OF IRISH UNITY  
 BUT WITH NO CALL ON HMG TO EXPRESS AN INTEREST IN IT. THIS IS  
 IN CONTRAST TO LAST YEAR'S STATEMENT AND IS A CHANGE MADE AT THE  
 INSISTENCE OF FOLEY WHO MAINTAINED THAT, WHILE IT WAS IN ORDER  
 FOR THE FOUR HORSEMEN TO STATE THEIR BELIEF IN IRISH UNITY, IT  
 WAS UNACCEPTABLE INTERFERENCE IN THE UK'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND  
 QUITE UNREALISTIC, TO CALL ON THE BRITISH TO PROMOTE THAT GOAL:

(E) THE STRONG EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT ANY SETTLEMENT CAN ONLY  
 BE ACHIEVED WITH THE CONSENT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN  
 NORTHERN IRELAND:

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(F) THE CONDEMNATION OF SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE, BY WORD OR DEED.

4. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THOSE CONCERNED OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS WE HAVE POINTED TO THE RISK THAT ANY STATEMENT BY THE FOUR HORSEMEN COULD FOSTER SUSPICIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND BY OVER-ENTHUSIASTIC ENDORSEMENT, OR INTERPRETATION, OF THE DUBLIN COMMUNIQUE. THE STATEMENT STRIKES A REASONABLE BALANCE IN THIS REGARD. HOWEVER, THE REFERENCE TO OUR HAVING QUOTE COME TO ACCEPT AN AMERICAN DIMENSION IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE UNQUOTE IMPLIES A POSITIVE DECISION ON OUR PART RATHER THAN THE NECESSARY ACCEPTANCE OF A FACT OF LIFE.

5. WE DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY ON THE RECORD COMMENT ON THE ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT THOUGH SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS MIGHT BE DRAWN ON IN BACKGROUND BRIEFING.

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NAD PS/MR RIDLEY  
INFORMATION D PS/MR BLAKER  
WED PS/PUS  
MAED SIR A ACLAND  
NEWS D CHIEF CLERK  
SECURITY D MR ADAMS  
PUSD MR BULLARD  
PS MR FERGUSSON  
PS/LPS LORD N G LENNOX  
MR BRAITHEWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
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FM WASHINGTON 122340Z MAR 81  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TEL NO 859 OF 12 MARCH 1981.  
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO LONDON, NIO BELFAST. PRIORITY DUBLIN, BIS NEW YORK  
INFO SAVING ALL CG'S IN USA.

M I P T: ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE FOUR HORSEMEN.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT BY THE FOUR HORSEMEN:

FOUR YEARS AGO, A GROUP OF US, AS IRISH-AMERICANS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE TRAGIC CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND, FIRST JOINED TOGETHER TO ISSUE A ST PATRICK'S DAY STATEMENT CALLING FOR AN END TO THE KILLING AND DESTRUCTION AND URGING OUR FELLOW CITIZENS TO REJECT THE PATH OF VIOLENCE. EACH YEAR SINCE THEN, WE HAVE RENEWED OUR CALL FOR PEACE.

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PS MR FERGUSSON  
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MR BRAITHWAITE

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*Ireland*



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

The Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP  
Secretary of State  
Northern Ireland Office  
Great George Street  
London SW1P 3AJ

12 March 1981

*R. Humphrey*

*L. Brittan*

BETTER GOVERNMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 5 March to Christopher Soames.

I welcome your proposals which are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of central financial planning and control and to improve the efficiency generally of Government in Northern Ireland. Those are objectives which I heartily endorse and I am naturally pleased that you are taking further strides in this direction in the new range of studies you now propose.

I look forward to seeing the results of those studies in due course, and in the meantime, no doubt your officials will continue to keep mine closely in touch with progress on this front.

I am copying my letter to the Prime Minister, Christopher Soames and to others who received a copy of yours.

*L. Brittan*

LEON BRITTAN

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*Ireland*

Civil Service Department  
Whitehall London SW1A 2AZ  
01-273 4400

The Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins, MP  
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Great George Street  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

11 March 1981

*Fr. Hunt 11/3*

*Dear Humphrey,*

BETTER GOVERNMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

Thank you for your letter of 5 March about your proposals for streamlining the machinery of government of Northern Ireland and making it more efficient.

I entirely accept, of course, that the political constraints on your freedom of action limit the organisational changes which would be acceptable within Northern Ireland. While the new organisational arrangements you have in mind would be less than ideal, I would be more than ready to go along with them if you judge that they will be both politically acceptable and gain the degree of support and co-operation from the staff which would be essential to ensure their success.

I paused, however, over paragraph 2 of your draft statement. As you know, it has not been customary in Great Britain to hold consultations before decisions about the re-organisation of departments are announced. Among the reasons for this is that prior consultation gives those with an interest in the maintenance of the status quo the opportunity to delay and obstruct. I understand that one of the reasons why you consider consultations to be necessary, so far as the organisation for economic and social affairs is concerned, is that much of the work has to be done by non-departmental public bodies in the absence of local authorities in the Province. Does this mean you see some form of consultation as unavoidable? I think it might be worth looking again at the drafting of paragraph 2 of the statement to ensure that the opportunities for delay and obstruction are minimised. One further point. Since you have already decided on the merger of the Departments of Finance and of the Civil Service, I wonder if it might not be more appropriate to confine sub-paragraph (b) to the two studies dealing with economic development and social affairs.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

*Yours ever*  
*Christopher*

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PP DUBLIN  
GRS 608  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM ECO 091634Z MAR 81  
TO PRIORITY DUBLIN  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 41 OF 9 MARCH

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND: DEFENCE

1. IN THE COURSE OF HER VISIT THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE A SERIES OF INTERVIEWS. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE RELEVANT EXTRACTS ON ANGLO/IRISH DEFENCE MATTERS.

2. ITN

INTERVIEWER: WHAT WILL YOU DISCUSS? AN ANGLO/IRISH DEFENCE PACT, FOR INSTANCE?

PM: WE HAVEN'T RAISED THAT WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. IT WOULD NOT BE A MATTER FOR US. DEFENCE WOULD BE A MATTER FOR NATO AS A WHOLE, NOT A BILATERAL MATTER BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

3. BBC

INTERVIEWER: MIGHT THERE BE SOME POSSIBILITY OF A DEFENCE TREATY AT SOME STAGE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND?

PM: A DEFENCE TREATY IS NOT A BILATERAL MATTER IN ANY WAY. WE BELONG TO NATO. THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND IS NEUTRAL. IF SHE WISHED TO DISCUSS DEFENCE IT WOULD BE, I WOULD IMAGINE, WITH A MUCH WIDER GROUPING OF NATIONS.

4. RTE

INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER, IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE OF THE AREAS FOR DISCUSSION DURING THE JOINT STUDIES IS THE POSSIBILITY OF A DEFENCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE IRISH REPUBLIC. IS THAT REALISTIC?

PM: WE HAVEN'T RAISED IT WITH MR HAUGHEY AND WE WOULDN'T REGARD IT AS A BILATERAL MATTER.

INTERVIEWER: SO IT IS NOT BEING DISCUSSED.

PM: WE HAVEN'T, NO.

5. DOWNTOWN RADIO

INTERVIEWER: TURNING TO THE VERY SORT OF SENSITIVE ISSUE IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AT THE MOMENT IS THE WHOLE QUESTION OF

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NEUTRALITY, DEFENCE, ETC. NOW I DON'T KNOW THE BACKGROUND TO THIS WHOLE QUESTION BUT IS IT AN ISSUE?

PM: WE HAVEN'T RAISED DEFENCE MATTERS WITH MR HAUGHEY. WE WOULD NOT REGARD THEM AS A BILATERAL MATTER.

INTERVIEWER: I SHOULD REMIND YOU HOWEVER WITH NO DISRESPECT TO YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE, HE IN FACT INFERRED THE OTHER DAY THAT IT COULD BE AT SOME STAGE AN ISSUE BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND.

PM: WE HAVE NOT RAISED DEFENCE MATTERS WITH MR HAUGHEY. DEFENCE MATTERS ARE OF A MUCH, MUCH WIDER CANVAS THAN BILATERAL.

INTERVIEWER: COULD THE WHOLE QUESTION OF SECURITY THOUGH BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS OF IRELAND BE SORT OF WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK?

PM: WELL WE CERTAINLY HAVEN'T RAISED IT IN THAT FRAMEWORK AT ALL. SECURITY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND HERE MEANS TO US COOPERATION ON CROSS-BORDER MATTERS.

INTERVIEWER: ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AT THE MOMENT ON THE SECURITY QUESTION?

PM: THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION AT THE MOMENT IS EXCELLENT AND I BELIEVE IT IS FOR THE BENEFIT BOTH TO THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC AND OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. TERRORISM IS THE ENEMY OF ALL PEOPLE.

INTERVIEWER: BUT PRIME MINISTER IF I COULD REMIND YOU, IN THE VIEW OF THE LOYALIST PEOPLE, THE PROTESTANT PEOPLE, IN THIS VERY COUNTRY WHERE WE ARE SITTING TODAY, THEY BELIEVE THAT MANY OF THE KILLERS ARE IN FACT HIDING IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND IN MR HAUGHEY'S TERRITORY. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT?

PM: YOU KNOW THERE IS A LAW WHICH OBTAINS IN THE REPUBLIC THAT THEY TOO CAN TRY PEOPLE FOR CRIMES WHICH ARE COMMITTED IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THEY DO TRY PEOPLE.

INTERVIEWER: BUT WITH RESPECT, IT DOESN'T WORK VERY EFFECTIVELY, CERTAINLY TO DATE. WHY AREN'T YOU PUSHING FOR EXTRADITION FOR EXAMPLE?

PM: WE HAVE, INDEED BEFORE MR HAUGHEY'S TIME, RAISED THE QUESTION OF EXTRADITION. WE HAVE NOT IN FACT ACHIEVED AN EXTRADITION AGREEMENT BUT WE HAVE IN FACT ACHIEVED THE POSITION

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10289 - 1

UNDER WHICH PEOPLE CAN BE TRIED IN NORTHERN IRELAND FOR CRIMES  
COMMITTED IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND IN THE REPUBLIC OF  
IRELAND FOR CRIMES COMMITTED IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

INTERVIEWER: . ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THAT SITUATION?

PM: IT IS VERY MUCH BETTER THAN ANYTHING WE HAVE HAD BEFORE.

CARRINGTON

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED  
RID PS/MR HURD  
NAD PS/MR RIDLEY  
INFORMATION D PS/MR BLAKER  
WED PS/PUS  
MAED SIR A ACLAND  
NEWS D CHIEF CLERK  
SECURITY D MR ADAMS  
PUSD MR BULLARD  
PS MR FERGUSSON  
PS/LPS LORD N G LENNOX  
MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.  
NORTHERN IRELAND

## NIOM(81)2nd Meeting

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
ON FRIDAY 6 MARCH 1981

Present:	Mr Marshall	Chairman	
	Mr Burns	)	
	Miss Kelley		
	Mr Moriarty		
	Mr Buxton		
	Mr Corbett		NIO
	Mr Hall		
	Col Dutton		
	Mr Fisher		
	Mr Bates	)	
	Mr Stephens	)	
	Mr Miller		
	Col Morton		MOD
	Mr Farthing		
	Mr Tatham	FCO	
	Mr Heaton	Home Office	

Security

1. Mr Burns reported that the position continued to improve. The statistics of violence and crime had declined, and the number of arrests and charges had risen (a significant number of Loyalists being among those arrested). Among non-terrorist offences, there appeared to be a particular increase in crimes against property. The only noteworthy terrorist incidents of late had been a sizeable spate of incendiary attacks. Mr Burns explained that a campaign of violence had been expected to accompany the hunger strike, but recent information cast some doubt on this: the position was unclear.

Prisons

2. Mr Marshall reminded the meeting that one prisoner had begun a hunger strike, but that the dirty protest had been abandoned. The dirty protesters had been moved into clean cells as fast as possible



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after they decided to end the protest, and had been provided with mattresses and bedding (but no furniture). The main elements of their protest now concerned their claim to wear their own clothes and not to work. Mr Burns confirmed that a few hitherto conforming prisoners had also started to refuse work; it was not clear whether this was a concerted move. The increasing variety of protests called for an equally flexible tariff of punishment. As expected, there had been discontent - and some industrial action - among prison officers over the ending of "dirty protest" allowances.

3. Mr Burns reported that there was no sign of any other prisoner joining the hunger strike yet; it was likely that they would wait for a few weeks, to ensure that Sands was the first to reach the point of death. His condition was likely to become critical around Easter. A campaign of terrorist violence was possible but this risked alienating the humanitarian support there might be for the hunger strike.

4. Demonstrations in support of the strike had not evoked much support; both the number of demonstrations, and those attending, were down in comparison with the previous strike.

#### Joint Studies

5. Mr Moriarty reported that since the last NIOM, terms of reference for the five studies had been discussed and agreed with officials of the Republic. During the following week, initial meetings of each of the five groups were to take place. These first meetings were likely to be tentative and exploratory; it was not altogether clear what the Irish wanted from the meetings, and there was no desire on either side to rush matters. The policy of saying relatively little about the joint studies, Mr Moriarty pointed out, had dis-

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advantages from the NIO standpoint as it aroused unnecessary fears in the Loyalist population. However, other departments involved in these studies wished to retain the low-key approach.

## Political

6. Mr Burns said that the Rev Paisley was not gaining much overt support on his "Carson trail" - only about 1,000 to 3,000 at each meeting. However, this did not mean that other political leaders, or the Protestant community in general, were not worried by the joint studies - they were, but simply did not wish to be associated with the Rev Paisley. In reply to Col Morton, Mr Burns said that the Rev Paisley was not inviting arrest. He was anxious to conclude his 'Carson trail' with a meeting at Stormont on 28 March.

## Force Level Reductions

7. Mr Stephens enquired about the response to the proposal from the Defence Secretary for the withdrawal of one Army unit from Northern Ireland. Mr Marshall said that the Secretary of State had replied on the previous day agreeing. Mr Stephens mentioned that the next stage, which had been proposed, would be the reduction in the number of Brigade Headquarters from 3 to 2. Mr Farthing noted that there was an oral Parliamentary Question the following week on the size of the forces in Northern Ireland, It was not the normal policy to announce force level reductions, but in response to a direct supplementary question the information would have to be given.

## Department Organisation

8. Mr Marshall mentioned that an announcement would be made during the following week of a minor re-organisation in NIO/NICS. The aim was to improve the organisation especially as regards resource allocation .

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Economic Matters

9. Miss Kelley reported that unemployment would probably exceed 100,000 when the next set of figures was released. The other main development on the economic front was the announcement, made by the Prime Minister, that electricity prices would be brought more into line with those in Great Britain, and thereafter kept in line. The latter would be expensive.

SIL Division

13 March 1981

ssd

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NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

18

**IMMEDIATE**

*Ireland*

PS  
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MR FERGUSSON  
HD/RID  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/IPD  
HD/NEWS DEPT

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF STATE  
RM 66 A/2 GGS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

SIR K STOWE  
MR MORIATY  
MR MARSHALL  
MR BUXTON

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG  
DIO

... ..  
... ..

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

**IMMEDIATE**

GROUPS 485  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FROM DUBLIN 061220Z MARCH 1981.  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 OF 06 MARCH

**IMMEDIATE**

PRESS REACTIONS TO PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN BELFAST.

1. ALL THE DUBLIN DAILIES MAKE MRS THATCHER'S SPEECH THE LEAD FRONT PAGE STORY, THE CORK EXAMINER ALSO GIVES IT PROMINENCE. THEY ALL REPRINT EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECH CONCENTRATING ON THE SECTION DEALING WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF NORTHERN IRELAND.
2. THE IRISH TIMES STATES THAT ONE OF THE MAIN PURPOSES OF THE VISIT IS SEEN AS A DESIRE TO ASSURE THE UNIONISTS THAT THERE IS NO FOUNDATION FOR THE REV IAN PAISLEY'S CAMPAIGN OF ACTION. THIS IS ECHOED BY THE INDEPENDENT'S POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT WHO GOES ON TO OBSERVE " IN THE MOST CLEAR CUT TERMS THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MRS THATCHER HAS SET BOUNDRIES TO ANY NEW ANGLO-IRISH DEAL AFFECTING THE NORTH...HER SPEECH IN BELFAST LAST NIGHT TO A CAREFULLY SELECTED AUDIENCE SEEMED TO POINT TO THE ONGOING CIVIL SERVICE LEVEL BEING CONCERNED WITH

TO A CAREFULLY SELECTED AUDIENCE SEEMED TO POINT TO THE ONGOING ANGLO-IRISH TALKS AT CIVIL SERVICE LEVEL BEING CONCERNED WITH RELATIVELY MINOR MATTERS LIKE ENERGY, AGRICULTURE, TRANSPORT, TOURISM, CITIZENS RIGHTS AND SUCH LIKE. NONE OF HER AUDIENCE... COULD HAVE DRAWN THE IMPLICATION THAT ANY POSSIBLE FEDERAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH WAS BEING CONTEMPLATED BY HER OR HER GOVERNMENT."

3. EDITORIAL COMMENT IS SOMEWHAT MIXED. THE IRISH TIMES UNDER THE HEADING "WORDS TO THE WISE" SAYS THAT NOBODY SUPPOSED THAT MRS THATCHER WENT TO BELFAST SIMPLY TO MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT ELECTRICITY PRICES. "SHE HAD POLITICAL POINTS TO MAKE AND SHE MADE THEM WITH HER CUSTOMARY FORCEFULNESS. SHE ALSO GAVE A STRONG HINT ABOUT CONCESSIONS TO THE LONG KESH PRISONERS WHEN SHE SPOKE OF IMPROVING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THEY SERVED THEIR SENTENCES, IN OTHER WORDS CONCESSIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THEM." ON THE REITERATION OF THE GUARANTEE, THE TIMES OBSERVES "THOSE WHO KNOW MRS THATCHER KNOW THAT THIS COMMITMENT IS REAL, THAT SHE IS TELLING THE TRUTH, THAT IT IS SO DOES NOT DISTURB THE MINDS OF DUBLIN POLITICIANS WHO BELIEVE THAT IN SPITE OF IT A UNITED IRELAND CAN STILL BE AT THE END OF THE LONG PROCESS OF THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE TWO ISLANDS AND OF NORTH AND SOUTH. AS TO THE PROCESS INITIATED BY THE DUBLIN CASTLE SUMMIT AND CONTINUED IN THE ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES, SHE RIGHTLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WILL CONTINUE AND THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM THEIR RAPPROCHMENT BY THOSE IN THE NORTH WHO ATTACK IT."

4. THE IRISH PRESS EDITORIAL DWELLS ON PAISLEY'S DISTURBANCES AND SUGGESTS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE VALUE OF PAISLEY'S BULLYBOY TACTICS BY GOING TO THE NORTH AND GOES ON TO SAY THAT NO-ONE WAS IMPRESSED BY WHAT SHE HAD SAID. THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES "IF MRS THATCHER WANTS TO TAKE NEW MEANING FROM HER VISIT, OR SYMBOLISM FROM WHAT HAPPENED ON THE DAY SHE ARRIVED, SHE SHOULD SIMPLY PRESS ON WITH THE DUBLIN TALKS, FORGET ABOUT PAYING A MOULDY ORANGE FORM OF DANEGELD, IGNORE THE BULLIES AND SET ABOUT ENCOURAGING A SITUATION IN WHICH SHE, OR ANY PRIME MINISTER OF OUR NEIGHBOURING ISLE, WILL BE RECEIVED WITH THE DIGNITY THEY DESERVE AND NOT AS THE CHIEF APOLOGIST FOR A DISCREDITING, DISEDIFYING AND HIGHLY DANGEROUS REGIME OF BIGOTRY, SQUALOR AND UNEMPLOYMENT."

FIGG

IMMEDIATE

URGENT

TELEPHONE  
HILLSBOROUGH  
682244

*File*

HILLSBOROUGH CASTLE  
HILLSBOROUGH  
NORTHERN IRELAND

6th March, 1981.

I have received your letter of earlier today and have taken note of its content.

I made my position absolutely clear in the speech which I gave last night in the Parliament Building at Stormont. I enclose a copy of it.

MARGARET THATCHER

The Rev. Ian Paisley, M.P.

6.3.81

To  
The  
P.M.

---

2:152. Helleborough

Prime Minister

6.3.81

You have come to N.I  
to deceive the people.

Hundreds of law abiding  
citizens were not per-  
mitted under your orders  
to make a protest  
against your Treachery  
in Dublin.

Also an attempt was  
made to keep ~~them~~ <sup>them</sup> from  
a Protestant place of  
worship



We recognize this as  
a false taste of what  
you have in store for  
us when you finalize  
your conspiracy with  
Heughey the son of an  
IRA man from Swatara  
and himself an alleged  
gun runner

You cannot intimidate us  
as you tried in your  
speech tonight

We will resist your  
treachery to the DEATH

We have already rejected  
your lies

Gen. Stanley <sup>MP</sup>  
E. M. P.

2.15 a.m. Hillsborough

6.3.81

Prime Minister

You have come to N.I. to deceive the people. Hundreds of law abiding citizens were not permitted under your orders to make a protest against your Treachery in Dublin.

Also an attempt was made to keep them from a Protestant place of worship.

We recognise this as a foretaste of what you have in store for us when you finalise your conspiracy with Haughey the son of an IRA man from Swatragh and himself an alleged gun runner.

You cannot intimidate us as you tried in your speech tonight.

Ulster will resist your treachery to the DEATH. We have already rejected your lies.

Ian Paisley      MP  
Euro MP

*cc. Press*

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

GREAT GEORGE STREET,

LONDON SW1P 3AJ

*Phnd*

Mike Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

*MODBA*

*for the record*

6 March 1981

*MS*

*6/3*

*Dear Mike*

... I attach, in case you have not seen it from another source, a copy of an exchange of correspondence in Belfast between the Prime Minister and Dr Paisley.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Mike Hopkins*

M W HOPKINS

TELEPHONE  
HILLSBOROUGH  
682240

HILLSBOROUGH CASTLE  
HILLSBOROUGH  
NORTHERN IRELAND

6th March, 1981.

Dear Mr. Paisley.

I have received your letter of earlier today and have taken note of its content.

I made my position absolutely clear in the speech which I gave last night in the Parliament Building at Stormont. I enclose a copy of it.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

MARGARET THATCHER

The Rev. Ian Paisley, M.P.

2.15 a.m. Hillsborough

Prime Minister

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You cannot intimidate us as you tried in your speech tonight.

Ulster will resist your treachery to the DEATH. We have already rejected your lies.

Ian Paisley <sup>MP</sup>  
Euro MP

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR  
NORTHERN IRELAND

cc PRESS  
MOOBA  
NTS.

5<sup>th</sup> March 1981

The Rt Hon Lord Soames GCMG GCVO CBE  
The Lord President  
Civil Service Department  
London SW1

Prime Minister

Mr Atkin sets out his proposals for streamlining

*Alan - the reply does not  
mean much to the  
uninitiated*

*I have conveyed the PM's  
comments to Mr Hamilton.*

*N.I. government (on  
efficiency, not political  
grounds) He proposes to  
announce these in an  
awarded question next  
Thursday. Contact?*

*Dear Christopher,*

*f.n. Paul*

BETTER GOVERNMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND - 1/3

I am writing to let you know the progress I have made in carrying out a review of functions within my area of responsibility and my proposals for reducing and simplifying those functions with a view to improving efficiency.

My approach takes account of the absence of agreement between local politicians on an acceptable form of devolved government for Northern Ireland, from which it is clear that there is no realistic alternative to the continuation of direct rule for some time to come. My immediate priority, therefore, is to ensure that the Government's policies for security and the economic and social development of the Province are effectively implemented, under my direction and with as big a reduction as we can achieve in the overlap between the mainly Whitehall-based UKCS in the NIO and the NICS in its several Departments.

To this end I propose to streamline the machinery of central government in Northern Ireland to make it more efficient and more closely accountable to my direction and control while maintaining consistency with the Government's wider policies for the public sector.

The Prime Minister's change of ministerial appointments gave me the opportunity to take a first step in this direction by allocating responsibility for control of resources across the full range of government activity in the Province to Michael Alison as my Deputy, and general oversight of economic and social affairs, including specific responsibility for the development of the Northern Ireland economy as a whole, to Adam Butler.

Studies which I put in hand last year, including an important Rayner Scrutiny of Financial Administration, have demonstrated the need for tighter central control of all the public financial and manpower resources of government in Northern Ireland; for

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co-ordinating the policies of the Northern Ireland Departments and managing them so that they operate so far as possible as a single department, reflecting the inter-connections between my security, political, economic and social policies for the Province; and for concentrating the primary responsibilities of the NIO in Belfast - making the administration of Northern Ireland work as nearly as practicable on a Scottish Office model (although I do not intend to refer to this parallel publicly).

This is now being achieved at official level by means of a Management Group which matches the whole of my responsibilities, with the FUS in the chair and the Head of the NICS as his deputy. They will be charged with co-ordinating policy and resources across the full range of NI government and ensuring positive but sensitive government under my personal direction.

Urgent studies are in hand on the scope for amalgamating appropriate NI Departments to achieve greater central control of policy and resources, especially in the acutely difficult area of industrial and commercial development, coupled with economy of administration. The Rayner Scrutiny recommended the amalgamation of the control functions of the NI Departments of Finance and the Civil Service, and the study of how this can best be done is far advanced. The studies of the organisation of economic affairs and of social affairs will be completed by the end of March. An early announcement is needed in order that these studies may be effectively completed.

My aim is to achieve, as has been achieved in Scotland, an administration for Northern Ireland which incorporates the sense and spirit of a single Department of State. Primary legislation formally to create a single Department (with the abolition of the NICS) is impracticable politically and is in any case not essential. I will proceed by Order in Council under the Northern Ireland Act 1974 (which is subject to affirmative resolution).

My proposals are essentially administrative and have been discussed in some detail with your officials, who have given them their general support. They are wholly in line with the Government's intention to secure greater efficiency and value for money in the public sector, but they will inevitably be seen politically in Northern Ireland. They will be variously criticised as irrelevant to the security and economic needs of Northern Ireland; and as a move towards integration of NI with the UK, and away from devolved government. But with careful presentation the criticism can be effectively dealt with: we can indeed argue positively that my proposals are in fulfilment of our commitment in last November's Queen's Speech to create "arrangements for the Government of Northern Ireland that will better meet the needs of all its people".

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I propose to announce my proposals in the terms of the attached statement on Thursday 12 March (unless you or other recipients of this letter have comments before then).

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the members of OD, Francis Pym and Leon Brittan, and to Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Derek Rayner.

Yours truly

Humphrey

HIDDEN COPIES

PS/Sof S (B)  
PS/Mr Alison (L&B)  
PS/PUS (L&B)  
Sir Brooks Richards  
Mr W Bell  
Mr Marshall  
Mr Blelloch  
Dr Quigley  
Mr Mayne

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BETTER GOVERNMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

Draft Arranged Question

To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, how he proposes to create arrangements for the Government of Northern Ireland that will better meet the needs of all its people?

Draft Reply

While direct rule continues, my immediate priority is to ensure that the Government's security, economic development and social policies are implemented effectively and sensitively. To this end I propose, with the agreement of the Prime Minister, to make the machinery of government of Northern Ireland more efficient and accountable to my direction and control. This is consistent with the allocation of departmental responsibilities to my two Ministers of State which were announced on 7 January and will be done without change to the existing constitutional arrangements.

Is it already?

I now propose:

- a) to achieve more effective deployment of public sector financial and manpower resources by merging the control functions of the Northern Ireland Departments of Finance and of the Civil Service;
- b) to initiate three separate studies on the departmental organisation required to deal more vigorously and effectively with resource management, economic development and social affairs.

Consultations with the Staff Sides concerned with my immediate proposals will now begin. These consultations will continue as the results of the further studies become available. After I have considered the results of these consultations, I shall publish my final proposals.

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND COMMITTEE

Thursday 5 March 1981 at 4.15pm

Prime Minister  
TO SEE PLEASE

PRESENT: Mr. Biggs-Davison (Chair)  
Mr. Benyon  
Dr. Mawhinney  
Mr. Best  
Mr. Brooke  
Mr. McNair-Wilson  
Mr. Viggers  
Mr. Peter Mills  
Mr. Neubert  
Sir Nigel Fisher

GUEST: Mr. T.E. Utley

On the Chairman's invitation, Mr. Utley described to the Committee the general impressions he had formed during a recent visit to Northern Ireland. In unionist circles, both sophisticated and unsophisticated, he had found a total disillusionment with British policy. A group of lawyers had spoken to him of their deeply held fears that the Foreign Office was seeking to disengage from Northern Ireland. According to their interpretation of events, negotiations had been started with Dublin in order to provoke a fierce reaction in Northern Ireland which would prove that the province was ungovernable and thus prepare the way for independence. Paisley (or something more menacing) would be installed in government. If Paisley should form the independent government, all should be well for he was seen as a generous and responsible man who would behave responsibly to the minority. Such a scenario seemed credible to intelligent Unionists because they found it impossible to explain British policy in any other way.

There was a universal expectation that Paisley would sweep the board at the forthcoming local elections. Among the police concern existed about the revival of Protestant paramilitarism. That revival could be halted if the government acted promptly to remove Protestant fears. What was required was concrete evidence that a constitutional deal is not to be done with Dublin. That evidence ought to take the form of a constitutional initiative in the direction of integration. Such an initiative might have three chief elements: a reconsideration of local government, the appointment of an Ulsterman as a Minister, and the establishment of a NI Grand Committee (or some such device).

In answer to questions, Mr. Utley said that Paisley would be 'inevitably driven to advocate an independent Ulster': that it was in 'our political interest to try and revive the official Unionists': that some warmth should be imparted to the relationship between Northern Ireland and Great Britain: and that only integration could reassure unionist opinion.

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COPY 12 OF 20



SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR  
NORTHERN IRELAND

Rt Hon John Nott MP  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministry of Defence  
Whitehall  
London SW1A 2HB

*Dear John,*

Thank you for your letter of 25<sup>th</sup> February about the proposed further reduction of one major unit in Northern Ireland force levels.

As you say, I have discussed this with the Chief Constable and the GOC and we are all agreed that the reduction should go ahead. I have noted that, on account of consequential redeployments and other unit changes, the net effect in practice will be a reduction in the overall force level by no more than about one company. I note, too, that Drumadd Barracks, Armagh, will continue to be used as a battalion headquarters. If the news of the reduction does leak out, this should help to reassure people that there will have been little or no change in practice in the North Armagh area.

I agree, nonetheless, that the reduction will need careful handling should it become public, whether before or after the event. You mention the renewed hunger strike and the May elections in this context. We also need to remember that the Tynan Abbey murders remain fresh in the minds of many people and are likely to do so for some time yet, especially in that area. I therefore attach a good deal of importance to the defensive press brief which, as you say, our officials will jointly be preparing; and I am glad that your officials will be keeping in touch with mine about the detailed planning of the reduction.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary; and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours ever*

*Thompson*

SECRET

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

✓ MJD  
5-3-81  
Hidden Copies:

PS/SoS (B)  
PS/Mr Alison (L&B)  
PS/PUS (L&B)  
Sir Brooks Richards  
Mr Marshall  
Mr Blelloch  
Mr Burns  
Mr Ranson  
Mr Wyatt  
Mr Davenport  
Mr Buxton

Ireland



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 March 1981

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of the Defence Secretary's letter of 25 February to the Northern Ireland Secretary about the withdrawal of a further major unit from Northern Ireland.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. E. ALEXANDER

B.M. Norbury Esq  
Ministry of Defence.

e

PART 8 ends:-

25. 2. 81

PART 9 begins:-

3. 3. 87