

PART 5

Confidential File

Meetings with the Taoiseach


Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

Anglo-Irish Summit

IRELAND

Part 1: May 1979

Part 5: Oct 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
23.10.81							
28.10.81							
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PART 5 ends:-

Transcript of Press Conference of 6/11/87,

PART 6 begins:-

MODBA 6 reo of 9/11/87

Ireland

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Prime Minister

MR. ALEXANDER

Content? Print - 6/11

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies: White Paper

in questions

I attach a proof copy of the White Paper, now due to be published on Wednesday 11th November at 2.30 pm. I should be grateful for the Prime Minister's authority to arrange for the paper to be printed.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

(seen by Sr. R Armstrong & signed on his behalf).

A need

6th November, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

Transcript by
JAMES LEE of:

Ireland

PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER
ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1981

PRIME MINISTER

Ladies and Gentlemen,

You know that we have had the meeting between the Taoiseach and myself today, accompanied by both Foreign Secretaries, and also by Mr. Prior and by Mr. O'Leary and Nigel Lawson - Mr. O'Leary on energy and industry and Mr. Lawson on energy with us.

We have published a communique, which I believe you have. Attached to that communique is a summary of the studies which were set in train nearly a year ago. The Taoiseach and I were very concerned that, apart from the studies on security, the full studies should be published. I do not want it to be thought that there is anything behind what we have decided other than the wish to establish the warmest and most friendly relations, to try to reduce tensions and to make constructive and practical plans for progress; but I do not want anyone to think that we are keeping back any documents other than those on security, for obvious reasons. The full documents will therefore be published next Wednesday.

I would expect, because we are publishing documents, to make a statement in the House on Tuesday. As you know,

I usually answer questions on Tuesday. We also have an Anglo-Italian summit on Monday, so it will not be possible to make a statement then and I would expect to make a full statement to the House of Commons on Tuesday, and the studies will be published simultaneously in London and in Dublin on Wednesday.

The atmosphere of the meeting: warm and friendly, practical and constructive. I think we could also say workmanlike, because you will see from the communique that it tries to mark steady progress forward and I think, if I might sum it up this way, I think both Jim Prior and I would agree: we really look forward to the time when these meetings are not so remarked upon as they are at present. We want them to be really more in the normal course of our work and it is with that in mind that we are setting up the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental Council. A rather big name; what it really means is within that framework there will be frequent meetings between ministers and officials, again to discuss practical problems, to try to reduce tensions, to try to establish the most friendly possible relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.

I think perhaps you might have had time to read the communique and the summary. Can I ask now for questions?

QUESTION

Prime Minister, may I start by asking you if you could explain more precisely the term on page 4 of the communique where you say - paragraph 10 - the practise of economic cooperation would in itself generate cooperation. Could you be more precise about what you hope it might lead on to in terms of development?

PRIME MINISTER

It seems to me almost a statement to stand on its own. The more we do cooperate together on the several matters - and you will see some of them set out in the summary; there are many matters, a number of energy matters, for example, as you know, we are considering, if the price is right, whether we should purchase gas from Kinsale; we are considering the re-connection of the electric grid between Northern Ireland and the South. There are many aspects of cooperation; you will find some of the subjects set out in para 9 of the summary and it just seems to me sound common sense that if you work together on these practical matters that is the way to go ahead to achieve greater cooperation in all spheres.

PETER SNOW (BBC)

Paragraph 8, Prime Minister: The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed it would be for the parliaments concerned to consider whether there should be an Anglo-Irish body at

parliamentary level. Can you tell us whether it is your personal wish that there should be a body at parliamentary level?

PRIME MINISTER

At the moment there is an Anglo-Irish group of MPs, as you know, and they make contacts with one another from time to time. This is a matter for Parliament to discuss in the first instance, and I think we shall be guided by their wishes. We have to be guided by their wishes, because no such body would succeed unless it were the wish of those members to be a part of it, and we felt the first thing to do was to publish these studies - this is where that suggestion comes from - and see what response it evokes. Obviously, we here are trying to work for the most friendly relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. We believe that that is in the interest of both countries and of all our peoples.

QUESTION

Do you foresee at any stage Northern Ireland's constitutional position being debated at this level?

PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland's constitutional position is in fact governed, as you know, by the Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, section 1, which says: "It is hereby declared

that Northern Ireland remains part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom and it is hereby affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part of it cease to be part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1 of this Act." That is the law of the land. It cannot be changed without reference to Parliament and I cannot see Parliament lightly changing that section, and that is why you will find in the communique in paragraph 5: "The Prime Minister affirmed, and the Taoiseach agreed, that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that if that consent were to be expressed as the result of a poll conducted in accordance with the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, the British Government would of course accept their decision and would support legislation in the British Parliament to give effect to it." It is all governed by the law of the land at present.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, could I ask you please how the Anglo-Irish Inter-Governmental Council would differ exactly from the present system of regular contact between ministers and officials?

PRIME MINISTER

I think it gives a more formal framework and I think it will lead to more regular contacts, more frequent contacts, between ministers and officials, but it is not going to be a body with an enormous secretariat or anything of that kind. You could say that the first meetings to take place under its aegis were the kind of meeting that we have had today, and we shall hope to have another one in Dublin next spring. The Secretary of State also has frequent contacts with the Republic of Southern Ireland and the Energy Ministers will, but also a lot between officials. So it is not a great big new bureaucratic body; it is a framework under which these contacts between ministers and officials take place.

QUESTION (SAME QUESTIONER)

Is it in fact any different from the continuity of cooperation that you talked about last December. Is there any progress at all in fact?

PRIME MINISTER

I think perhaps it gives it a new impetus. I would describe it that way, but please, may I make it quite clear again and again, we do wish to have the most friendly relations with the Republic of Ireland.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, you said that you wished in future meetings of this kind were not so remarkable - I think those were your words. Are you suggesting then that perhaps the expectations, particularly in Dublin, of the outcome of this meeting were perhaps couched a little too high?

PRIME MINISTER

I do not know what the expectations were in Dublin. I know we have been working on these studies between officials for quite a time, but I think if the meetings were slightly more regular and not so remarked upon, then I think the relationship would go to a normal, friendly relationship. I stress "normal", I stress "friendly", I stress "relationship" and I think that that would be better both for the United Kingdom and for the Republic.

QUESTION

Do you feel that greater cooperation can bring about political settlement?

PRIME MINISTER

A political settlement in Northern Ireland really has to be a matter for the Secretary of State and for the United Kingdom Government in Northern Ireland. I think anything that helps to reduce tension, to reconcile the differences between the two communities in Northern Ireland, is good.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, sorry to come back to you here, would you care to describe your feelings if, for instance, tonight - as he has done earlier today - the Rev. Ian Paisley, among others in the Unionist community - described what has happened today as a sell out and once again accused you of betraying the heritage which he claims you are supposed to be safeguarding?

PRIME MINISTER

But I think he will find it very difficult when we have actually put in the communique Section 1 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. At least he will find it difficult if accuracy governs his comments.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, do you dissent from the Taoiseach's belief that the great majority of the people in Ireland would like Ireland to be united?

PRIME MINISTER

I do not comment on what the Taoiseach said is his belief in the actual communique. There are things which the Taoiseach has said and there are things which I have said. What I have to consider in considering the future of Northern Ireland is Section 1 of the Act to which I have referred, and

that gives a guarantee to the people of Northern Ireland that there will be no change in their constitutional status except with the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

QUESTION

I.e., until they breed themselves into the republic?

PRIME MINISTER

The "i.e." is yours, not mine!

QUESTION

Mrs. Thatcher, you mention Anglo-Irish parliamentary cooperation at the appropriate time. Is an appropriate time when there would be a devolved administration in Northern Ireland and have you any plans for one?

PRIME MINISTER

Well, the appropriate time would be for both the parliaments to decide. That is why one suggests that this be discussed and debated in Parliament. It could not go ahead unless the Members of Parliament wish it to go ahead. May I say there is already an Anglo-Irish all-party body in the United Kingdom.

QUESTION

Would there be an input from any Northern Ireland devolved Assembly and have you any plans for a devolved Assembly?

PRIME MINISTER

As we have not got a devolved Assembly at the moment, I think the question is just a little bit hypothetical.

QUESTION

Would it not be desirable to have some sort of Northern Ireland representation on this Council immediately?

PRIME MINISTER

Which Council are we talking about?

QUESTION

We are talking about the cooperation council that you have set up today. The Inter-Governmental Council.

PRIME MINISTER

I have the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. He has been with me all day.

QUESTION

I am not talking about at ministerial level; I am talking about many MPs and perhaps even officials, even officials of the Northern Ireland Office; will they be involved in this Council?

PRIME MINISTER

But Northern Ireland Office officials include many people from Northern Ireland. The Inter-Governmental Council will consist of visits between Ministers and Officials and, of course, some of those officials will be officials from Northern Ireland Office.

MR. PRIOR

When I went to Dublin 10 days ago, I took with me the Head of the Northern Ireland Office, Mr. Ewett-Bell, and he has been with us all day today, so I think that we want to extend this wherever we can and wherever it is practical to do so.

PRIME MINISTER

The answer to your question: "Would it not be better.." is: they already are.

QUESTION

When do you foresee the stage when Northern Ireland MPs will have a voice on this Council?

PRIME MINISTER

Northern Ireland MPs would come in a parliamentary group. As far as I am aware, they are perfectly free to be part of the Anglo-Irish all-party group already. When you come to Members of Parliament, it is for them to consider whether they would wish to set up the kind of body which is referred to in the communique. The pattern of the communique, really, is

cooperation, for consideration at three levels: one we have set up - the Inter-Governmental Council, that is the governmental cooperation between Ministers and officials - for consideration of Parliament, whether they wish to have a closer cooperation that is represented at the moment by the Anglo-Irish group of MPs - that is the parliamentary level - for them to consider, and you know full well that one can never never do any attempted dictation to Parliament; it is for them to say, in response to a suggestion, whether they find it a good suggestion or not. And then you want the kind of advisory committees of ordinary folk, the Königswinter type of cooperation. We have one with Germany - Königswinter -; we have a Bordeaux Council with France. But you see the pattern: cooperation at the government level; cooperation at the parliamentary level; cooperation at the level of people who have interests both in the United Kingdom and in the Republic.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, I wonder if you could elaborate slightly on the Advisory Committee you see working in association with the Council. What role do you see this committee playing and who would serve on it? Could this be a place for community leaders from the north, for instance, in Northern Ireland, to serve on?

PRIME MINISTER

Well, again, this is what I would call the third level. You have got the governmental level, the parliamentary and an advisory level. There is no more formal thought to it than that, except that we would want it to consist of a number of ordinary people in ordinary organisations, and we have not formulated it any further than that at the moment.

Some people would interpret it as more of the kind of meetings we have at Königswinter and the Bordeaux Council which next year we are having in Edinburgh, so we have an Anglo-Germany advisory council and an Anglo-French advisory council. Whether it gets any more formal than that, I would doubt, but it is there to recognize that if you are going to have closer and closer cooperation and closer friendship between the peoples, it is not only a matter for governments and parliaments, it is a matter for people as well.

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister, in that sense, could you - since you obviously place great store by your efforts to create closer cooperation and this is seen as an advance on last summer - could you say now how you expect the people of Northern Ireland to respond to your attitude?

PRIME MINISTER

There are always two parts to this and I always stressed it in two parts. The guarantee to the people of Northern Ireland remains; it is enshrined in our law. At the same time, we believe it is in the best interests of the people of Northern Ireland and the people of the whole of the United Kingdom to have friendly relations with the Republic of Ireland.

You know, some of the relationships we have are quite unique. You have only to look at the privileges we extend to one another. They do stem from history and they are much closer in fact than with any other Community country.

We have always said: on the one hand, of course, the guarantee remains; it is enshrined in law, but we do wish to work in the closest friendly relationship with the Republic, and I have not said very much about security because one does not normally, but we do work very closely indeed on security matters, because the Republic of Ireland is just as anxious as we are to eliminate violence and terrorism, which we both recognize as striking fundamentally at democracy itself.

QUESTION (American CBS)

I think the American public would be wondering after the Summit today whether, if there is to be a political solution of any order for Northern Ireland, is it going to come about as a result of joint efforts between London and Dublin - between these two governments - or is it just an affair for the United Kingdom?

PRIME MINISTER

What happens in Northern Ireland has to go through the United Kingdom Parliament and is a matter for the United Kingdom and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is constantly working to find a solution, but I must say that anything which helps to reduce tensions and anyone who can help to reduce tensions is making a positive contribution towards finding a solution and to reconciling the two communities in Northern Ireland.

QUESTION

And that would be the Irish Republic's only role, Prime Minister?

QUESTION

On extradition, Prime Minister, was that discussed and if not, was there anything specific that Unionists could take as comfort from today's talks?

PRIME MINISTER

I hope that they will find quite a bit of comfort in the communique. I repeat again, the guarantee remains; it is to everyone's advantage that one lives at peace, in friendliness and in cooperation with one's neighbours. I have to say it again and again, but that ought to be the normal course of events and we are trying to seek to make it the normal course of events. Extradition was mentioned but was not discussed in any great detail because, as you know, we

have no difficulty with it and actually practise extradition from the United Kingdom to the Republic of Ireland. I think that our friends in the Republic would find very very great difficulty in having extradition themselves.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, could I ask you..the previous Taoiseach, Mr. Haughey, with whom you commenced these joint Anglo-Irish studies, indicated in recent days that he felt the time was appropriate for the setting up of an Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Council. In fact, he said that to fail in setting it up would be a failure on the part of his successor. Now, why do you believe the time is inappropriate for some formal parliamentary body of that kind?

PRIME MINISTER

Look! It is not for me to tell Parliament what to do and I am sure that the Taoiseach feels the same. It is not for the Taoiseach to tell Parliament what the Members of Parliament should do and, indeed, if one were to attempt to do so, it would be harmful to what one wished to do and not helpful. You cannot run a parliament that way! You can make a suggestion and then see if Parliament responds and then it is for them to indicate whether they wish to take it further. But I think you got hold of the wrong end of the stick, because I doubt very much whether Mr. Haughey would have thought that in any way he could tell his parliament what to do. I am sure he would not indeed. I mean, we are all much too much parliamentarians for that! And we hope to keep our Members

of Parliament with us and that would be a classic way of getting them all against one!

QUESTION

But at what point would you propose to put the suggestion to Parliament here that this body could be set up?

PRIME MINISTER

The suggestion is in the joint studies that will be published on Wednesday. I think it is in the Summary and it is in the communique, so it is not a question of putting it to them. The joint studies will be published as a House of Commons paper in full - it will be there. It is not a question of putting it to them - it is all there for them all to discuss, and I expect they will wish to discuss and debate quite a lot of it.

QUESTION

So Prime Minister, does this amount to a recommendation to the British Parliament from the British Government?

PRIME MINISTER

No. What it suggests, it says, is just precisely what we mean. Paragraph 8: "The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed it would be for the parliaments concerned to consider at an appropriate time whether there should be an Anglo-Irish body at parliamentary level comprising members to be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected Assembly that may be established in Northern Ireland."

QUESTION

So you conceive that a back-bench MP might put down a motion....picking up the suggestion?

PRIME MINISTER

These matters are discussed between the parties. There is already an Anglo-Irish group which operates between the United Kingdom Parliament and the Republic of Ireland Dail. That is already in existence. You would expect them to have a look at it and see whether they thought it could be extended. That group is not a party political thing; it consists of members from all parties.

QUESTION

Mrs. Thatcher, in the same way - this is a voluntary group that is established at the moment I understand - in the way that you are formalizing ministerial and official contacts, would you intend formalizing voluntary contacts like that in a parliamentary council of some kind?

PRIME MINISTER

There are, in Parliament, a number of groups. There is an Anglo-Irish, there is an Anglo-almost everything. That is a feature of parliamentary life. It would for them and other Members of Parliament to consider whether they wish to make a

more formal framework, but it must be for them to consider. The suggestion is made and it must be for them to consider and it says: "at an appropriate time". Whether they consider it now, whether they would wish to extend it to include European members is a matter for them. There is at this moment no devolved Assembly in Northern Ireland, but you could not possibly do anything more than put up the suggestion, when you are dealing with Members of Parliament. You put up a suggestion, then it has to come from them, and any attempt to force it would not help.

QUESTION

Would you accept, Prime Minister, the thought that your Government is now edging in the direction of the Labour Party's newly-declared policy on Northern Ireland?

PRIME MINISTER

No, before you go any further!

QUESTION

...Ireland by consent...

PRIME MINISTER

No, I am not departing one word from the Act of the previous Conservative Government which the Labour Party did not depart from in government, that the guarantee remains, and that the constitutional status in Northern Ireland would not be changed except by consent of a majority of the people, and I hope I have made that clear again and again and again.

It is for those people to say, and the way and time they say is all laid down in that Act, and I accept what they say.

QUESTION

But that would not be inconsistent with saying that you nevertheless prefer a unification of Ireland, but by consent?

PRIME MINISTER

I am sorry! It would be inconsistent, because you are trying to put words into my mouth as to what I hoped the result of any poll would be. That is not for me to say. It is for me to say that I accept the will of the majority.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, would you agree that there is a widespread feeling in Northern Ireland that even if the British Government is standing by its 1973 Act, it is doing so with an absolute minimum of enthusiasm, and that if there could be some way found of almost getting shot of the problem of Northern Ireland, the British Government would respond with a great deal of enthusiasm and that this may underline some of the anxieties of the Protestants?

PRIME MINISTER

I would not accept what you are saying or the way in which you are saying it. When you have something that is enshrined in law, you do not get up and shout it from the

housetops every day, but it is there and everyone knows it is there and the fact that it is enshrined in law and that that law could only be changed by another Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom Parliament, is the greatest possible guarantee there could be.

QUESTION

Prime Minister, you have said that you agreed on the desirability of restoring electricity interconnection between the two parts of Ireland and that is an interconnection that has been blown up many times and it looks as though it probably will be again in future. Do you intend to restore that interconnection?

PRIME MINISTER

What you have said is just one of the factors one has to take into account and this is one of the things that is being considered now. I am very well aware of that problems; very well aware, but the gas pipelines are not so blown up.

QUESTION

Is there a plan, though, at all, to try and restore that interconnection?

PRIME MINISTER

They are considering these matters now. There is no point unless you can restore it in such a way that it is less likely to be blown up.

QUESTION

Would that also mean that until there is some kind of political resolution then you also will not restore that interconnection?

PRIME MINISTER

It would not necessarily mean that. There are ways and ways of doing these things, some of which make them less easily blown up.

QUESTION

Cross-border courts, Prime Minister. Were they discussed as an alternative to extradition, the beefing-up or increased interest by the DPP in the North in putting evidence up so that it could be considered in a court in the South?

PRIME MINISTER

No. The legal side is also dealt with in the communique in paragraph 6. "Noted with approval the efforts now being made under criminal law jurisdiction legislation to ensure that those who committed crimes in one country should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other and invited the British and Irish Attorneys General to consider what further improvements to that end might be possible." So the matter goes over to them for their further consideration.

Gentlemen, I have to say that some people are gradually leaching away, apparently to go to another rival press conference

that is going to take place at 6 o'clock at which I think you will probably hear very similar comments to those that you have heard from me, and I hope you will enjoy both equally as much! Thank you very much for coming!

NSD memo:

Lester

W.S.

Pant

RECORD OF PLENARY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
AND THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER, AN TAOISEACH, HELD AT
10 DOWNING STREET ON FRIDAY, 6 NOVEMBER 1981

Present:

The Prime Minister	Dr Garret FitzGerald TD
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Mr M O'Leary TD
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland	Senator J Dooge
The Secretary of State for Energy	Dr E Kennedy
Mr Ian Gow MP	Mr D Nally
Sir Leonard Figg	Mr S Donlon
Sir Robert Armstrong	Mr D Neligan
Mr P Woodfield	Mr M Lillis
Mr W E Bell	Mr L Hourican
Mr R L Wade-Gery	Mr W Kirwan
Mr J A Marshall	Mr F Murray
Mr C A Whitmore	Mr D Grafton
Mr C C Wilcock	Mr F O'Muircheartaigh
Mr M O'D B Alexander	
Mr B Ingham	
Mr P H C Evers	

1. After arrangements had been agreed for the Prime Minister to give a press conference at 5.00 pm and the Taoiseach a press conference at 6.00 pm, the Prime Minister welcomed the Irish side to the Plenary. She said that her talk with the Taoiseach that morning had centred on the communiqué. It was proposed that the communiqué to be issued that afternoon should have attached to it a summary reflecting the Joint Studies and that the Joint Studies themselves should be published next Wednesday. She would herself almost certainly make a statement in the House of Commons on Tuesday and understood that the Taoiseach was to make a statement in the Dáil at the same time.

2. There followed a discussion of the advisability of not publishing in the summary to be attached to the Communiqué any passage reflecting the Joint Study on Security. After consideration it was agreed to delete those paragraphs in the Joint Report which referred to security matters and to make consequential amendments to the Communiqué.

3. Attention then turned to the text of the Communiqué to be issued. This was agreed after discussion, devoted especially to the language to be used to describe HMG's attitude to any decision of a majority in Northern Ireland in favour of constitutional change.

4. The Prime Minister then invited Lord Carrington to say what he and his colleagues had discussed that morning.

5. Lord Carrington said that the discussion had been divided between Community questions, Energy questions and Northern Ireland questions. As far as Community questions were concerned, they had discussed the Mandate. They had noted that there was not much time to do more than seek to get hard and fast guidelines agreed. It was to be hoped that flesh could be put on these without reopening the questions of principle. This process should be pursued by bilateral discussions. He had himself also raised Insurance and the question of liberalisation of Air Fares. He had asked Senator Dooge that the Irish should not stand in the way of British proposals in the EC. Senator Dooge had undertaken to look at the questions. Professor Dooge said that he was content with this summary. In answer to the

Prime Minister's question, Lord Carrington said that the Middle East had only been discussed informally at lunch.

6. The Secretary of State for Energy said that the three Energy questions discussed were those mentioned in the communiqué: the supply of gas from Kinsale to Northern Ireland - there was agreement that this was an economic proposition, the question was whether terms could be agreed. The North/South Interconnector had been discussed and there was agreement that this was an economic proposition and desirable but that there was a problem over security. As for the East/West Interconnector there was no security problem but the economics were doubtful. There was agreement that the best way forward was to undertake further economic and technical studies. The Tánaiste agreed. He added that the interruption of the North/South Interconnector was a political victory for the IRA. There had been consideration of whether it would be possible to restore the interconnector so that it supplied a limited area in Armagh and interference with the interconnector would mean automatic discontinuation of supply. He confirmed that the Irish side were ready to discuss the supply of Kinsale gas and wished to see a feasibility study for the East/West connector. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that he would ask Mr. Butler to take up the question of a supply of gas from Kinsale with his opposite number as soon as possible. Price was the key issue. He doubted whether it would be possible to introduce now an arrangement whereby destruction of the interconnector brought with it immediate local penalties. This would be too transparent.

7. The Prime Minister asked about other issues: about the papers on Economic Cooperation and Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland mentioned Cooperation North. The Taoiseach explained that this was a private organisation concerned to establish closer relations between the two parts of Ireland without strings. It had had considerable success. There had been no adverse feedback, even from extremists in the North. The question was whether it should be given assistance by Government. He felt some hesitation. Funding by Government might lead it to become suspect. Senator Dooge said that Cooperation North had received some support from the Community under funds reserved for the Republic of Ireland but had absorbed almost the totality of these funds and this was not desirable. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that he would like to help. The Prime Minister noted that it would be a pity if Cooperation North broke down. The money might come from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Vote. She thought spontaneous efforts of this sort were the most valuable.

8. The Prime Minister said that she knew that the Irish Government, like the UK authorities, were concerned about terrorism. She asked about the political problems which terrorism created. The Taoiseach said that there had been significant successes lately against the IRA but little but the level of violence had risen. In the last year or two it had become the case that when intercepted, terrorists shot policemen. This was a worrying development, though it did increase public antipathy to the terrorists. There had been a significant riot in Dublin but, no doubt because of the sharp reaction to it, there had been no recurrence.

The police response to it had been a bit rugged. It was hard to judge the political support of the IRA. Surveys suggested that it was small. But there had been much more support for the H-Block candidates than had been expected. The issue had now diminished in importance. He was happy to say that co-operation between the police forces in North and South was very close. Exchange of intelligence and information was very effective but it would never be possible to eradicate terrorism without eradicating its causes.

9. The Prime Minister asked whether polarisation of the communities which had been observed was disappearing. The Taoiseach said that it was in the Republic but from such information as he had had at second hand he found it hard to assess the position in Northern Ireland. What he had said about the constitution had helped with middle-class unionists but he doubted whether this was the case among working-class unionists. He was concerned that the SDLP should retain the bulk of the support of the minority. If that did not happen the consequences of polarisation could show in 6 months' time or so.

10. The Prime Minister asked how he thought that the Joint Studies would be received in the Republic. The Taoiseach said that expectations had been raised in November that had since been somewhat reduced. It was hard to say what the expectation was now. He hoped that there would be a positive reaction. He would of course present the communiqué positively. But the Opposition would wish to get the credit for what had been done. The Prime Minister noted that this was why the decision had been taken to publish. Accusations could then

be avoided. The Prime Minister noted that the Opposition in the United Kingdom was no longer pursuing a bipartisan policy on Northern Ireland. The Tánaiste interjected that he doubted however if they would see anything in the Joint Studies to attack. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said the problem was rather that Dr Paisley would attack the Joint Studies.

11. The Taoiseach said that he was concerned at the suggestion that there might be an increase in powers of local government. Several Councils had recently been found guilty of discrimination of one sort or another and he handed over a paper recording instances. His Government had doubts about any proposal to devolve further powers. That being said, he would be very happy to see progress towards devolved government though it was a very difficult field. He would be happy to talk about this question with the British Government. The Irish Government had good contacts with everyone in the North except paramilitaries. There had been times when it was difficult for the British to be informed. The Irish Government would be ready to help. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said in that connection that he would like to pay more visits to the South to discuss these matters.

12. In answer to a question from the Prime Minister, the Taoiseach said that the Irish authorities used every opportunity to influence the Americans. He hoped to invite the Friends of Ireland to come to Ireland soon and hoped they would visit also Northern Ireland. They had shown goodwill and were very courageous in their attacks on the terrorists. The Irish had done what they could to head-off Biaggi. Mr Prior interjected

that he had much admired Senator Dooge's speech at the United Nations.

13. The Prime Minister suggested that she and the Taoiseach should agree that they would both present their meeting positively. They would note that nothing had been said that would affect the neutrality of the Republic. They could describe the meeting as friendly, constructive and practical. The Taoiseach agreed with this but indicated that he would prefer to avoid any comparison with the last meeting.

14. The meeting ended at 4.20 pm.

Ireland

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH, 6 NOVEMBER, 1981

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

*F. Reidy
Conclusions
revised*

The Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP, had discussions today, 6 November, at 10 Downing Street with the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald, T.D. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Rt Hon The Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt. Hon. James Prior, MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Rt Hon Nigel Lawson, MP, Secretary of State for Energy. The Taoiseach was accompanied by the Tanaiste and Minister for Industry and Energy, Mr Michael O'Leary, T.D., and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator James Dooge.

2. The meeting was the first between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach since Dr. FitzGerald took office. They discussed a number of international questions and a range of issues arising in the European Community which are to be considered at the European Council in London on 26 and 27 November.

3. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach affirmed the importance which their two Governments attached to the maintenance and development of close Anglo-Irish relations.

4. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed on the need for efforts to diminish the divisions between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland and to reconcile the two major traditions that exist in the two parts of Ireland. Such a development could come about only on the basis of mutual respect

/as between

as between those traditions to the achievement of which the Taoiseach has made a public commitment.

5. The Taoiseach affirmed that it was the wish of the Irish Government and, he believed, of the great majority of the people of the island of Ireland, to secure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace. The Prime Minister affirmed, and the Taoiseach agreed, that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that, if that consent were to be expressed as a result of a poll conducted in accordance with the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, the British Government would of course accept their decision, and would support legislation in the British Parliament to give effect to it. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that both Governments were ready to join in promoting arrangements which might help to reduce tensions between and to reconcile the peoples of the two parts of Ireland.

Co-op:
NINE

6. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach reiterated their resolute opposition to violence, and commended the level of co-operation between the security forces of the two countries. They noted with approval the efforts now being made under the criminal law jurisdiction legislation to ensure that those who committed crimes in one country should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other, and invited the British and Irish Attorneys General to consider what further improvements to that end might be possible.

/7. The Prime Minister

7. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach received a joint report (annexed to this communique) on studies made by officials from both countries of possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. The papers on which this report is based will be published next Wednesday. For security reasons the study on security matters will not be published.

8. Recognising the unique character of the relationship between the two countries, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach have decided to establish an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council through which institutional expression can be given to that relationship between the two Governments. This will involve regular meetings between the two Governments at Ministerial and official levels to discuss matters of common concern. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that it would be for the Parliaments concerned to consider at an appropriate time whether there should be an Anglo-Irish body at parliamentary level comprising members to be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected assembly that may be established for Northern Ireland. They also agreed to work towards the establishment of an advisory committee associated with the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council on economic, social and cultural co-operation, with a wide membership.

9. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach noted that each country afforded the other's citizens most of the rights and privileges available to its own. The Taoiseach indicated that the arrangements for the grant of voting rights at parliamentary elections

to British citizens resident in the Republic were well advanced and that he hoped to have the necessary legislation introduced soon.

10. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed on the need to intensify economic co-operation between the two countries and between the two parts of Ireland. They expressed the hope that such co-operation would make a contribution towards the improvement of the economy throughout the two countries and that the practice of economic co-operation would, in itself, generate further co-operation. They gave special consideration to the question of co-operation on energy matters. They noted that assessments of the possibility of the supply of natural gas from the Kinsale field to Northern Ireland had suggested that such a project might be viable, and that discussions of the terms on which gas might be supplied were now in train. They agreed on the desirability of restoring electricity inter-connection between the two parts of Ireland. They also agreed that economic and technical studies should be pursued on the possibility of an electricity link across the Irish Sea.

11. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach looked forward to holding their next meeting in the Spring of next year in Dublin in the framework of the new institutional arrangements agreed upon at this meeting.

1. At their meeting in Dublin on 8 December 1980, the Prime Minister and the then Taoiseach commissioned joint studies covering possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding, in order to assist them in their special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands. These joint studies were undertaken by senior officials of the two governments. In carrying out their task officials bore in mind the already close relations between the two countries and their common membership of the European Community. The outcome of the studies, other than that on security matters, is as follows.

POSSIBLE NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

2. Officials noted that the unique relationship to which the two joint communiqués of May and December 1980 referred was the result of geography, history and population movements. The joint studies brought out the variety of contacts between the two countries. They confirmed that in many fields relations and co-operation were closer and more extensive than between other countries in Europe where a particularly close relationship had been given specific institutional expression. Officials agreed that, over a very wide range, these relations involved common interests and mutually beneficial exchanges but recalled that the communiqué of 8 December 1980 had recorded agreement that the full development of the links between the two countries and their peoples had been put under strain by division and dissent in Northern Ireland.

3. Officials considered how the development of the unique relationship between the two countries might appropriately be enhanced by giving it more comprehensive institutional expression, without impeding the many informal links; and in this context examined the following possibilities -

i. the establishment of an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to provide the overall framework for intergovernmental consultation, at Head of Government, Ministerial and official levels, on all matters of common interest and concern with particular reference to the achievement of peace, reconciliation and stability and the improvement of relations between the two countries and their peoples; and what might be the component elements of the structure, its functions and certain aspects of its operation;

ii. how the parliamentary links between the two countries might most appropriately be developed as the natural and desirable complement to the establishment of a new intergovernmental body;

iii. the establishment, as an adjunct to the proposed intergovernmental Council, of an Advisory Committee on economic, social and cultural co-operation, with a wide membership reflecting vocational interests;

iv. the establishment as an interim measure, pending the creation of an Advisory Committee as at iii. of an "Anglo-Irish Encounter" organisation, under the direction of an Executive Board composed of independent public figures of repute and ability and government representatives, with the major function of organising high-level conferences on the Koenigswinter model.

CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

4. Officials reviewed the rights and privileges on the one hand, and the obligations and duties on the other, of citizens of each country residing in the jurisdiction of the other. The areas looked at were eligibility to vote and to stand for elective offices; employment in the civil and armed services; legal rights and obligations (including jury service); social rights; consular protection; and freedom of movement.

5. It was noted that, in the absence of a written Constitution on the British side, the various rights and obligations are defined by specific Acts of Parliament, which Parliament being sovereign can later amend. The role of the Courts in this context is to interpret legislation. On the Irish side, by contrast, there is both specific legislation covering a similar range of subject matter and a written Constitution guaranteeing fundamental human rights. Proposals to alter the Constitution must be approved not only by Parliament but also through a referendum. The Courts have power to strike down legislative Acts held by them to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

6. It was further noted that each of the two countries maintained provisions which ante-dated the requirements of their common European Community membership and afforded in different ways privileged treatment to the citizens of the other. Indeed, each accorded the other's citizens virtually all the rights and privileges available to its own. At the same time a number of differences were identified, notably in respect of the two countries' practices in relation to the control of movement of non-citizens; and in respect of the qualifications for local elections in Northern Ireland as compared with Great Britain.

7. Officials noted the decisions of the Irish authorities to extend voting rights in national elections to resident British citizens. Officials also reviewed possibilities for dealing with other differences; but made no agreed proposals for doing so.

2 years

8. Officials considered a wide range of existing and potential areas of economic and technical co-operation, both bilateral and in the context of the two countries' common membership of the European Community, and made recommendations as to how these might be encouraged and developed. They agreed that the machinery of Anglo-Irish Economic Co-operation (AIEC) had proved effective within its terms of reference in fostering the development of economic and technical matters of mutual interest. If a new inter-governmental institution were established as envisaged in their work on institutional structures, the Steering Group on AIEC (and its subordinate groups) or a comparable official level body might appropriately be placed under the aegis of that new institution.

9. Among the subjects considered were -

- future co-operation on energy, in particular the possibilities for electricity interconnection (both across the land border and across the Irish Sea) and for the supply of gas from the Kinsale field to Northern Ireland and the exploitation of new energy technologies;
- the exchange of information on pollution of the Irish Sea and co-ordination of responses to pollution emergencies;
- broadcasting of television and radio programmes direct to the home from a satellite;
- co-operation in the field of animal and plant health;
- the facilitation of economic development in Lough Foyle, Carlingford Lough and the nearby offshore areas;
- industrial development, particularly of small and craft industries;
- trade promotion;
- industrial training;
- tourism;
- continuing co-operation in the economic development of border areas;
- science and technology.

10. Officials believed that further work in this field would make a contribution towards the improvement of the economies of these islands and that the practice of economic co-operation would in itself generate further co-operation.

MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

11. Officials analysed the reasons for misconceptions in each country over attitudes and Government policies in the other, and considered measures that the two Governments might appropriately take, jointly or separately, to remove such misconceptions and improve mutual understanding.

12. It was recognised that, as between Britain and the Republic, the problem appeared to be more one of lack of knowledge than of misconception. This might be remedied by efforts aimed at a more intensive exchange of information. As between North and South in Ireland the problem went deeper. In this context the issues which were relevant were the constitutional "claim" and the "guarantee"; and Church/State relationships. Action to reduce misunderstanding of these matters would clearly be needed. Institutional arrangements were also required, deliberately framed to reduce suspicion and distrust, together with measures to make more effective the prosecution of offenders who seek to evade justice by crossing from one side of the border to the other. Moreover, greatly increased contacts and joint endeavours in appropriate fields, as well as intensified information exchanges, might all offer some hope of progress.

13. Officials noted that there existed already a welcome multiplicity of contacts and that it was desirable that these should continue and be developed. In this context they considered a range of possibilities including -

- increased contacts between officials concerned with youth and sport activity and the scope for increased co-operation between sporting organisations in both parts of Ireland;
- the development of the already considerable contacts between vocational and community relations groups in both parts of Ireland;
- in the field of education, increased exchanges between teachers and inspectors as well as between pupils and students; particularly the potential for more use by students from the South of tertiary education facilities in Northern Ireland;
- the active pursuit of co-operation between the Open University and the proposed Distant Study Unit of the National Institute for Higher Education in Dublin;
- the establishment of a formal scheme for interchange of officials;

the encouragement and expansion of close co-operation and contacts between the Arts Councils, North and South, in Ireland; and between both of these Councils and the Arts Councils in Great Britain.

2 November 1981

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER
IN HONOUR OF AN TAOISEACH DR. GARRET FITZGERALD, TD, ON FRIDAY,
6 NOVEMBER 1981 AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

The Prime Minister

An Taoiseach Dr. Garret Fitzgerald

An Tanaiste Mr. Michael O'Leary, TD

Senator J.C.I. Dooge

His Excellency the Irish Ambassador

Mr. Dermot Nally

Mr. Sean Donlon

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington

The Rt. Hon. James Prior, MP

Sir Robert Armstrong

Sir Leonard Figg

Mr. Michael Alexander

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON FRIDAY, 6 NOVEMBER 1981

Mr. Sean Donlan

Sir Leonard Figg

HE The Irish Ambassador

Senator J.C.I. Dooge

Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington

PRIME MINISTER

AN TAOISEACH DR. GARRET
FITZGERALD

An Tanaiste Mr. Michael O'Leary

Rt. Hon. James Prior

Sir Robert Armstrong

Mr. Dermot Nally

Mr. Michael Alexander

ENTRANCE



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

cc. Morris
L. Keeler
S. Jones

Original in Ireland
Situation Force heads
PHO.

6th Nov. '81

Dear Prime Minister,

Before your meeting today with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland I wish to remind you again of your repeated pledge in the House of Commons and elsewhere that the affairs and future of Northern Ireland are the concern only of your Government, the Parliament of this United Kingdom and the people of Northern Ireland.

By and since the Dublin Summit of 8th. December 1980 you appear to me and the Unionist people of Northern Ireland, whom I represent, to have broken that pledge. By embarking upon Joint Studies with Dublin in respect of "the totality of relationships within these islands" the affairs and future of Northern Ireland have inevitably become the subject of negotiation with Dublin. Naturally great constitutional uncertainty and unease have resulted in Northern Ireland, which have not been mitigated by words of assurance as these are repudiated by continuing contrary action.

The people of Northern Ireland ask only to be allowed to live their lives within the United Kingdom in peace and security. We neither seek nor want any say in the affairs or future of the Republic of Ireland and all we ask from Dublin is reciprocation.

I would be failing in my duty if I did not remind you that there are simply no circumstances in which the people of Northern Ireland will either accept or acquiesce in any involvement by the Republic of Ireland in the affairs of their Province. Therefore an Anglo/Irish Council, which has been mooted in recent weeks, would meet with the united, relentless and unqualified opposition of the Unionists of Northern Ireland, as such a body would inevitably confer on the Republic influence and control over the affairs and future upon part of this United Kingdom.

The suggested All-Ireland Court would be equally anathema to my people as they would see it as an overt and giant step towards the creation of an All Ireland State. Since the judicial system is such an inherent



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

part of the administration of any state the creation of an All Ireland Court would destroy the constitutional sovereignty of Northern Ireland as part of this United Kingdom. Therefore no member of the Republic's Judiciary must ever be allowed to exercise any jurisdiction over Northern Ireland. Only straight forward extradition will ever solve the problem of cross border terrorism. I have no doubt that your Government is quite capable of securing this from the Republic and therefore I urge you to concentrate on doing so.

I also wish to take this opportunity to restate to you our opposition to the creation of any all Ireland institution under the guise of economic co-operation. Northern Ireland's natural economic links are with the rest of the United Kingdom and it would be intolerable to foster alternative artificial links with the Republic since such would not be a means in themselves but rather a means to ^{an} end of encouraging political unification in Ireland.

Normal economic cooperation between neighbouring states, quite properly has its place, and, indeed, has always existed between Northern Ireland and the Republic, but such does not require the formalised institutions which are reported to have been recommended by the Joint Studies. Cooperation between ~~the two~~ political Units so that eventually the two might be one is utterly unacceptable, and, since this is the self confessed motivation of the Republic in seeking cooperation with Northern Ireland, I trust you will begin to appreciate and respect the views of the people of Northern Ireland on this subject.

I therefore urge you to abandon any motion that through economic fusion in Ireland there can be induced political fusion. The unalterable antipathy of the people of Northern Ireland to any political involvement by or with the Republic of Ireland is absolute and is only too capable of tangible manifestation if you today seek to force Northern Ireland down a road which it will never go.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

LONDON SW1A 0AA

Surely as Prime Minister of this United Kingdom you have a bounden duty to protect the sovereignty and unity of the Kingdom and, therefore, to day I urge you to discharge that duty firmly and unequivocally by refusing to countenance anything which involves foreigners in the affairs of our state or which weakens, or is capable of weakening, Northern Ireland's position as a integral part of the United Kingdom. I can but conclude by saying that should you fail in this your duty then the Ulster Unionists will not fail in their resulting duty to take whatever steps are necessary to defend their citizenship, heritage and rights.

Sincerely

Tom R. K. Paisley

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



CONFIDENTIAL

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

6 November 1981


Dear Michael

fs
Am

As arranged with John Marshall, I enclose two factual notes on the cases of the two men who escaped from Crumlin Road prison in Belfast and who are now in custody in the Republic. These are the cases which were referred to in the course of the Prime Minister's briefing meeting last night.

We suggest that you should keep these by you in case they are raised in the course of the plenary session this afternoon. It seems to us unwise to prompt the Prime Minister to take the initiative in raising them since it is difficult for heads of government to have a fruitful exchange on individual cases of this kind. The broader issues are of course covered in the "Northern Ireland: Security" brief - VMV(81)10.

I am copying this to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.


S W BOYS SMITH

CONFIDENTIAL

E.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

MICHAEL JAMES RYAN

1. Escaped while awaiting trial for two murders (one an RUC Reservist, the other an ex-UDR man). 3 attempted murders, membership of PIRA and unlawful possession of firearms. He had confessed to all the murders and attempted murders.
2. Arrested in the Republic on 10 October.
3. If application were made for his extradition it would probably fail since he would plead that his offences were 'political' and the Republic Courts, would, on past form, release him.
4. It would be possible to bring a case in the South on the original charges. This possibility is still under consideration by the DPP. It may be that he will not favour this course if he thinks Ryan will successfully renege on his confession, remembering that if acquitted in Dublin he cannot be charged again with the same offences should he return to the North.
5. He was charged in Dublin on 29 October under the extraterritorial legislation with escaping from lawful custody, attempted murder and possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life (both of the latter in connection with the escape).

CONFIDENTIAL

E.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

ROBERT JOSEPH CAMPBELL

1. Escaped after being convicted of murder, attempted murder, and possession of firearms and ammunition with intent.
2. Sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment on the first two counts (30 years recommended minimum) and 20 years on the third.
3. Arrested in the South on 22 September.
4. He cannot be tried again for the same offences, but he was charged on 4 November in Dublin under the extra-territorial legislation on the charges of escaping from lawful custody in the North and of attempted murder - associated with the escape.
5. If application were made for his extradition it would probably fail since he would plead that his offences were 'political' and the Republic Courts would, on past form, release him.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

NORTHERN IRELAND COMMUNIQUE

1. I am still very concerned about paragraph 5 of the revised draft Communique.
2. I think that we are making too many concessions to the Irish, are receiving too little in return, and will increase suspicions even among moderate, reasonable Unionists who want, perfectly understandably, to remain part of the United Kingdom.
3. I suggest that the second sentence in paragraph 5 should be re-drafted as follows:-

"The Prime Minister affirmed that Northern Ireland would remain an integral part of the United Kingdom unless and until the majority of the people of Northern Ireland decided otherwise. The Taoiseach agreed that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that, if that consent were to be expressed as a result of a poll conducted in accordance with the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, the British Government would accept their decision".
4. This change is not, in terms of language, substantial; however, I do think that in the current deeply suspicious climate among even moderate Unionists, the change would have a significant effect upon moderate Unionist opinion.

6th November 1981

IAN GOW

cc. Michael Alexander



From the Secretary of State

RM saw brief but did not raise

fs

RM

William Rickett Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London, SW1

5th November 1981

Dear Willie,

IRISH RAILWAYS

We have just learnt from British Rail Engineering Limited (BREL) (the British Rail manufacturing subsidiary) that an order they had been pursuing for 124 coaches worth £25m (up to £10m of which would go the private sector in the United Kingdom) appears to be slipping away from them without their being given the chance to compete. BREL are taking this up direct in Dublin, but if a suitable opportunity occurs during tomorrow's talks, my Secretary of State agrees that a low key mention of it by ... the Prime Minister would be useful. I attach a brief.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland and for Transport and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours Sincerely,

Jonathan Rees

J N REES
Private Secretary



ORDER FOR 124 PASSENGER COACHES FOR THE IRISH RAILWAY

British Rail Engineering Ltd (BREL - the BR manufacturing subsidiary), as the established supplier of passenger coaches to the Irish were encouraged by CIE over the past eighteen months to submit offers for their new coach requirements. Alternative packages have been submitted, the most recent being in August 1981. The value is approximately £25m, with UK content ranging from £19m to £25m Sterling - depending on the amount of Irish and UK content of labour and parts. The UK private sector share would be up to £10m.

2 The attractive features of the BREL offers were:-

(a) maximum flexibility in meeting CIE's objectives, including assistance in training Irish personnel to set up manufacturing facilities in the Irish Republic.

(b) The product is in current production for BR and is admirably suitable for CIE's needs.

(c) Northern Ireland Railways could benefit from using similar coach types and possible use of common repairs facilities in the Irish Republic.

(d) Competitive prices and financial arrangements, fully supported by HMG and the banks.

BREL now understand that CIE intend to negotiate with a German supplier without obtaining revalidated UK prices which have effectively fallen during the past six months. This order would effectively contribute to employment in the UK and the Irish Republic, and to opportunities for collaboration between the Irish Republic, the Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. BREL are protesting vigorously to CIE and the Irish Ministry of Transport. They have just sought Government support. The meeting of the Anglo/Irish summit provides an opportunity to see that BREL are given a fair chance.

LINE TO TAKE

I understand that your Government has authorised CIE to buy new passenger coaches. I hope that the potential UK supplier, British Rail Engineering, will be given every opportunity to participate in the current bids. Recent exchange rate movements effectively mean that their price is lower now than it was six months ago.

Department of Trade
5 November 1981

The Alexander

*Important case
to see this*

J. J. S/n

IRISH TIMES: THE TAOISEACH DR FITZGERALD IS EXPECTED TO URGE MRS THATCHER TO REINTRODUCE THE COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT IRISH UNITY BY CONSENT, AS AGREED AT SUNNINGDALE WHEN THEY MEET IN LONDON TOMORROW THE PAPER REPORTS.

DR FITZGERALD IS KNOWN TO HOLD THE VIEW THAT THE NEGATIVE MANNER IN WHICH SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE INTERPRETED THEIR GUARANTEE TO REMAIN IN NI SO LONG AS THE MAJORITY WISH IT AS BEING UNHELPFUL AND HAS INHIBITED CHANGE. QUOTING A GOVERNMENT SOURCE IN DUBLIN THE REPORT SAYS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONSIBILITY NOT ONLY IN RELATION TO SECURITY IN NI BUT TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS POLITICAL MOVEMENT AS WELL.

A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE UDA WAS SHOT DEAD LAST NIGHT IN HIS HOUSE IN SYLVIO STREET ON THE SHANKILL ROAD LESS THAN HALF A MILE FROM WHERE THE ORGANISATION'S LOCAL COMMANDER WAS KILLED TWO AND A HALF WEEKS AGO. ARTHUR BETTICE (35) WAS IN THE FRONT ROOM OF HIS HOUSE WITH HIS COMMON LAW WIFE AND 8-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER WHEN A GUNMAN WALKED THROUGH THE FRONT DOOR AND SHOT HIM AT POINT BLANK RANGE. THE GUNMAN ESCAPED IN A WAITING CAR.

A WEEK AGO CHARGES AGAINST BETTICE FOR POSSESSING FIREARMS AND BEING A MEMBER OF THE ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS WERE DROPPED AT BELFAST MAGISTRATES' COURT.

A MAN CLAIMING TO REPRESENT THE UFF LATER PHONED NEWSPAPER OFFICES AND SAID THE ORGANISATION ADMITTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SHOOTING, ALLEGING THAT THE VICTIM HAD GIVEN THE POLICE INFORMATION ABOUT ARMS CACHES WHILE IN CUSTODY.

MR WILLIAM CLARK, US DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WHO WILL VISIT IRELAND EARLY NEXT MONTH IS ALSO EXPECTED TO TRAVEL TO LONDON FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

THE FORMER CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUDGE AND A CONFIDANT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS RECENTLY GIVEN OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AMERICAN POLICY ON IRELAND AND HIS VISIT IS BEING INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION OF RENEWED US INTEREST IN THE NI PROBLEM.

THE DISCLOSURE THAT MR WILLIAM CRAIG HAD BEEN TO DUBLIN FOR TALKS WITH THE TAOISEACH RECEIVED A PREDICTABLY MIXED REACTION FROM NORTHERN POLITICIANS, THE UNIONISTS BEING CRITICAL AND MR GERRY FITT PRAISING THE FORMER UNIONIST MP FOR HIS COURAGE. MR CRAIG SAID HE WOULD RETURN TO DUBLIN FOR MORE TALKS IF NECESSARY.

THE REV ROBERT BRADFORD MP SAW THE CRAIG VISIT AS ONLY STRENGTHENING THE TAOISEACH'S CLAIM THAT THE REPUBLIC SHOULD HAVE A SAY IN NI AFFAIRS, BUT HAROLD MCCUSKER MP, UNIONIST, RAISED NO OBJECTION TO THE TALKS PROVIDED MR CRAIG WAS ACTING IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY.

IRISH INDEPENDENT: ITS EDITORIAL SEES IT AS DIFFICULT FOR ANY FOREIGNER TO UNDERSTAND HOW AN IRISHMAN VISITING ANOTHER PART OF IRELAND SHOULD MAKE NEWS, BUT MOST IRISHMEN WILL REGARD THE CRAIG VISIT AS ONE OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE..... IF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED OR ACTUALLY MADE THEN, ACCORDING TO MR CRAIG, A COMPLETELY NEW POLITICAL CLIMATE WILL HAVE BEEN CREATED. AND HE REGARDS THE TAOISEACH'S APPROACH AS ONE OF THE MOST IMAGINATIVE FOR THE PAST 50 YEARS. THE ONLY QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE ARE, FIRST, HOW MANY MORE SHARED HIS VIEWS IN THE NORTH AND SECONDLY WHAT HAS BROUGHT ABOUT THIS VERY FRANK FRIENDLINESS. THE FIRST, THE PAPER SAYS, CANNOT EVEN BE GUESSED AT AT THE MOMENT. THE SECOND MAY ARISE FROM HIS REALISATION THAT SHOULD DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT OF SOME KIND COME TO THE NORTH AND SHOULD THE CONSTITUTION IN THE REPUBLIC BE CHANGED THEN THERE ARE NO BARRIERS TO CO-OPERATION BETWEEN DUBLIN AND BELFAST ADMINISTRATIONS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. "AND THIS IS A FORWARD-LOOKING APPROACH".

THE POLITICAL EDITOR, IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE QUEEN'S SPEECH, CLAIMED THAT CONFUSION SPREAD AMONG THE ENTIRE UNIONIST AND LOYALIST ESTABLISHMENT IN THE NORTH YESTERDAY NOT ONLY OVER THE CRAIG VISIT TO DUBLIN, BUT OVER THE MOUNTING SUSPICION THAT BRITAIN IS ABOUT TO LEAVE THE INTRANSIGENT LOYALIST LEADERSHIP OUT IN THE COLD AND EMBARK ON A NEW CHAPTER IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WITH THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT.

NEWS LETTER: THE EDITORIAL PREDICTABLY ON TOMORROW'S MEETING AND THE QUEEN'S SPEECH YESTERDAY SAYS THAT IF THERE IS ANY CERTAINTY IN TOMORROW'S TALKS IT IS THAT BOTH PRIME MINISTERS HAVE BEEN WELL INFORMED OF THE ATTITUDE OF UNIONISTS WHICH SHOULD LEAVE THEM IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE PRACTICAL LIMITS OF THE DISCUSSION AS FAR AS NI IS CONCERNED. IT SEES AS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THE COHESION THAT IS BEGINNING TO EMERGE OF DUP AND OFFICIAL UNIONIST POLICY AND, IT SAYS, JOHN TAYLOR ENCAPSULATES UNIONIST THINKING ON WHICH A PROFITABLE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP MIGHT BE BUILT - IMPROVED BORDER SECURITY, AN ADVANCE TOWARDS EXTRADITION, THE ABOLITION OF THE OFFENDING ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE SOUTHERN CONSTITUTION AND RECOGNITION BY DUBLIN OF THE DESIRABILITY OF NORMAL POLITICS HERE.

IRISH NEWS: THE EDITORIAL DESCRIBES CRAIG AS A MAN WHO HAS ALWAYS HAD THE COURAGE OF HIS CONVICTIONS AND SAYS IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT ONE PROMINENT UNIONIST HAS HAD THE INDEPENDENCE OF MIND AND THE CONFIDENCE IN HIS OWN VIEWS TO CONSIDER DR FITZGERALD'S OFFER THAT THEY SHOULD INTEREST THEMSELVES IN THE WELFARE OF BOTH PARTS OF IRELAND AND CO-OPERATE IN IMPROVING ALL OF IT.

+++++ENDS+++++

CONFIDENTIAL

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT MEETING

Attached is the revised draft communique agreed at the Prime Minister's briefing meeting this evening.

Cabinet Office

5 November 1981

DISTRIBUTION

Mr Alexander, No 10 (4)
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Lord Privy Seal
Secretary of State for Energy
Sir Robert Armstrong
Sir Michael Palliser
Sir Donald Maitland
Sir Leonard Figg
Mr Woodfield
Mr Bell
Mr Wade-Gery
Mr Marshall
Mr Evers
Mr Wenban-Smith

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ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

1. The Prime Minister, The Right Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, had discussions today, 6 November, at 10 Downing Street with the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Right Hon The Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Right Hon James Prior MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Right Hon Nigel Lawson MP, Secretary of State for Energy. The Taoiseach was accompanied by the Tanaiste and Minister for Industry and Energy, Mr Michael O'Leary TD, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator James Dooge.
2. The meeting was the first between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach since Dr FitzGerald took office. They discussed a number of international questions and a range of issues arising in the European Community which are to be considered at the European Council in London on 26 and 27 November.
3. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach affirmed the importance which their two Governments attached to the maintenance and development of close Anglo-Irish relations.
4. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed on the need for efforts to diminish the divisions between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland and to reconcile the two major traditions that exist both in Northern Ireland and in the Republic. Such a development could come about only on the basis of mutual respect as between those traditions to the achievement of which the Taoiseach has made a public commitment.
5. The Taoiseach affirmed that it was the wish of the Irish Government and, he believed, of the great majority of the people of the island of Ireland, to secure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace. The Prime Minister affirmed, and the Taoiseach agreed, that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that, if that consent were to be expressed as a result of a poll conducted in accordance with the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, the British Government would accept their decision.

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6. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach reiterated their resolute opposition to violence, and commended the level of co-operation between the security forces of the two countries. They agreed that additional efforts should now be made to ensure that those who committed crimes in one country should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other and invited the British and Irish Attorneys General to give urgent consideration to how this could best be achieved.

7. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach received a joint report (annexed to this communique) on studies made by officials from both countries of possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. The papers on which this report is based, other than that on security matters, will be published next Tuesday.

8. Recognising the unique character of the relationship between the two countries, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach have decided to establish an Anglo-Irish Co-operation Council through which institutional expression can be given to that relationship at inter-Governmental level. This will involve regular meetings between the two Governments to discuss matters of common concern. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed that it would be for the Parliaments concerned to consider at an appropriate time whether there should be an Anglo-Irish body at parliamentary level comprising members to be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected assembly that may be established for Northern Ireland. They also agreed to work towards the establishment of an advisory committee associated with the Anglo-Irish Co-operation Council on economic, social and cultural co-operation, with a wide membership.

9. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach noted that each country afforded the other's citizens most of the rights and privileges available to its own. The Taoiseach indicated that the arrangements for the grant of voting rights at parliamentary elections to British citizens resident in the Republic were well advanced and that he hoped to have the necessary legislation introduced soon.

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10. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach approved a range of activities for the improvement of economic co-operation between the two countries and in particular between Northern Ireland and the Republic. They expressed the hope that such co-operation would make a contribution towards the improvement of the economy throughout the two countries and that the practice of economic co-operation would, in itself, generate further co-operation. They gave special consideration to the question of co-operation on energy matters. They noted that assessments of the possibility of the supply of natural gas from the Republic to Northern Ireland had suggested such a project might be viable and that discussions of the terms on which gas might be supplied were now in train. They agreed on the desirability of restoring electricity interconnection between the two parts of Ireland. They also agreed that economic and technical studies should be pursued on the possibility of an electricity link across the Irish Sea.

11. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach looked forward to holding their next meeting in Dublin in the framework of the new institutional arrangements agreed upon at this meeting.

5 November 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: A05892

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MR. ALEXANDER

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

In your minute of 2nd November to Sir Robert Armstrong you mentioned that as regards paragraph 36 (now 34) of the study on mutual understanding the Prime Minister wondered whether it was the case that we should like to see more students from the South in (higher education in) Northern Ireland.

2. The Northern Ireland Office's answer to this query is Yes. They are confident that the Province's three higher education institutions (Queens, Coleraine and the Polytechnic) would themselves like to see more students from the Republic. The number of Southern students there in 1980-81 is only about 150 compared with 230 in 1976-77 (out of a total roll today of 12,000). Meanwhile some 700 Northern Ireland students are attending courses in the Republic. Such interchange has not in the past been the subject of political controversy in Northern Ireland. Indeed Coleraine, which is undersubscribed, badly needs any extra students it can get. Were it to close from lack of demand, Mr. Ross of the UUP (in whose constituency it is) and Dr. Paisley (whose constituency benefits from it commercially) would be among the chief mourners.



D.J. Wright

5th November 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

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MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

HD/RID

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HD/IPD

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MR WHITFIELD
MR MARSHALL
MR MORIARTY *M. G. Angel*
MR HARRINGTON

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO

... ..
... ..

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

OO N I O (B)

GROUPS 175

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM DUBLIN 051315Z NOVEMBER 1981.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 375 OF 05 NOVEMBER.

AND TO IMMEDIATE N I O BELFAST

IMMEDIATE

ANGLO - IRISH SUMMIT: IRISH PRESS EXPECTATIONS.

1. ALL THE MAIN PAPERS CARRY TODAY STORIES BY THEIR POLITICAL CORRESPONDENTS ON WHAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT EXPECTS FROM THE SUMMIT. THESE CLEARLY REFLECT GOVERNMENT BRIEFING. THE MAIN POINTS ARE:

A) THE IRISH HOPE THE PRIME MINISTER WILL SUPPORT IRISH UNITY BY CONSENT 'AS AGREED AT SUNNINGDALE': NEGATIVE BRITISH INTERPRETATIONS OF THE GUARANTEE HAVE BEEN UNHELPFUL.

IONS OF THE GUARANTEE HAVE BEEN UNHELPFUL.

- B) JOINT STUDIES SHOULD BE PUBLISHED - IF AGREED THIS IS LIKELY TO BE WITHIN A WEEK. BUT THE SECURITY STUDY WILL REMAIN SECRET.
- C) THE IRISH EMPHASIS WILL BE ON NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS RATHER THAN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS. UNLIKELY THAT GREAT EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON A THREE-TIER ANGLO-IRISH COUNCIL.
- D) POLITICAL VACUUM IN THE NORTH IS DANGEROUS. THE IRISH WOULD LIKE EARLY MOVES TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM ALLOWING ALL SECTIONS OF THE POPULATION TO SHARE IN GOVERNMENT.
- E) THE PRIME MINISTER EXPECTED TO RAISE EXTRADITION BUT THE TAOISEACH WOULD SAY THAT IT IS OPEN FOR THE NORTH TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE UNDER THE CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION ACT. OTHERWISE AN ALL-IRELAND COURT COULD BE CONSIDERED.
- F) PROGRESS LIKELY ON ENERGY TOPICS; MR LAWSON'S PRESENCE HAS BEEN NOTED.

FIGG.

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

MEMORANDUM.

SUCCESSFUL ANTI-SUBVERSION ACTION - 5.10.81 to 5.11.81.

1. Arrest of two PIRA men (McGurk and Ginley) found manning command wire which was connected with bomb located across Border (Monaghan). (McGurk is a particularly important capture - believed to have been involved in a number of cross-border murders).
2. Arrest of two PIRA men found in possession of explosives (Roscommon). (Beattie and O'Reilly).
3. Discovery of 550 rounds of assorted ammunition and explosives. (Castlebellingham, Co. Louth).
4. Recovery of Northern Ireland Electricity Board van which was hi-jacked in Northern Ireland. (Found at Faughart, Dundalk). Being prepared for subversive activity and to be used to get through Northern Ireland checkpoints and massive attack on RUC.
5. Philip Neary, who was extradited from UK, convicted in Special Criminal Court in connection with explosives factory find in 1975.
6. Patrick McDonald and Danny Hamill (both INLA) convicted and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment at Special Criminal Court for kidnapping and Robbery 3 months ago.
7. Break up of 3 INLA kidnapping arrangements about a month ago designed to raise funds for terrorist activities.
8. Breakthrough by intelligence into DUNNE kidnapping and finding of hi-jacked vehicles North of Border. Ransom money North and South intercepted. (One million pounds). Shootout with gang on Border.

9. RYAN and CAMPBELL, escapees from Crumlin Road Prison, Belfast, arrested and charged before Special Criminal Court. They will also be charged with serious crimes in the Republic.
10. Finding of revolver, air pistol and ammunition at Dromad on Border on 16.10.81.
11. Finding of M1 Carbine rifle, 2 .303 rifles assorted ammunition and walkie talkie radio at Clonmany, Co. Donegal on 25.10.81.
12. The curtailing of funds to PIRA and INLA intensified in past two weeks.
13. Armed Raid on Togher P.O., Cork on 6.10.81. Three PIRA men, Gibson, Leahy and Boyle arrested after shootout. Money recovered £10,000.

Note: There is an increasing pattern of PIRA shootouts with police when intercepted by detective task forces.

14. Also enclosed is a list of arms, ammunition and explosives for the period 30.1.81 to 30.9.81 which have been recovered. The component parts referred to relating to explosive equipment accounted for 300 sq. ft on the flat of timing devices and related equipment for bomb making. The PIRA subversives involved are awaiting trial.

ARMS, AMMUNITION, EXPLOSIVES seized by the Gardai
from January 1st., 1981 until 30th. September, 1981.

152 Firearms (Including Rifles, Shotguns, Pistols,
Revolvers, Machineguns Etc.)
12,087 Rounds of Ammunition
3,023 Cartridges
251 Bullets
23 Magazines
43 Sticks of Gelegnite
81 Detonators
199 Spent Shells
132 Ammunition Clips

In addition to the above large quantities of Cordtex, Frangex,
Ammonium Nitrate/Nitrobenzine, Detonating Fuse and Electric
Wire were seized. A large amount of component parts of firearms
and explosive equipment was also seized including timing devices
and various items of radio equipment.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

pm seen

5 November 1981

*Prime Minister
to see.*

Dear Michaels

N.P.G. Mitchell

Duty Clerk 5/11/81

Anglo/Irish Summit: 6 November: Community

Budget

/
/

We have heard that Dr Fitzgerald plans to raise the issue of Britain's net budget contribution in the light of the new Commission estimates which were published this week. I enclose a table showing the figures involved and a short brief.

I am copying this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office) and John Kerr (Treasury).

*yours ever
R M J Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St



UK NET BUDGET CONTRIBUTION

Points to make

1. We shall need to examine these new Commission estimates with care. If it is true that our adjusted net contribution in respect of 1980 and 1981 will turn out to be lower, that is very satisfactory, because the 30 May Agreement left us paying a large net contribution even though we are one of the poorer Member States. The problem of 1982 and later years remains to be solved.
2. Even on latest Commission estimates, UK unadjusted net contribution is unacceptably high, and is continuing to rise. Could well be over 2000m ecu in 1982. No justification for UK as one of less prosperous Member States, to be in this position.
3. One of the main reasons for the reductions in the estimates seems to be the overall reduction in estimates of FEOGA guarantee expenditure. This in turn is almost entirely the result of higher than expected world agricultural prices which cannot be precisely predicted but are usually cyclical. In so far as this has made some limited improvement in the UK's position therefore, it is likely to be temporary.
4. The conclusion which we would expect other Member States to draw about the nature of future corrective arrangements is that they should not involve lump sum refunds agreed on an ad hoc basis, but should achieve a more rational and defensible pattern of net contributions/receipts by adjusting the actual budget outcome on the basis of objective criteria. Such arrangements should continue as long as the problem exists.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The table shows the original estimates of our net contribution made at the time of the Agreement of 30 May 1980 and the new estimates just published by the Commission. The new estimates are substantially lower. One of the main reasons for this has been a reduction in overall CAP expenditure, mainly caused by high world agricultural prices.
2. The 30 May Agreement does not say explicitly what should happen to our refunds if our unadjusted net contribution turns out lower than expected. Some Member States have argued that in these circumstances our refunds should be cut. Our own interpretation is that the Agreement gives us minimum net refunds. This accords with the history of the negotiations in which we argued for a limit on our net contribution but the other Member States insisted on specifying a lump sum refund and that is what was finally agreed. The net contribution estimates were only included in the text of the Agreement because they were the threshold above which the risk-sharing formula was to apply. Other Member States have therefore only themselves to blame if this Agreement on lump sum refunds has turned out to be better for us than they expected. We would certainly not wish to raise this issue and if it is assumed by Doctor Fitzgerald that our refunds will not be cut, we should be careful not to lead him to question this.
3. The main points which the Irish may make are that our budget problem has been exaggerated, that we should do less well in 1982 because we have done better than expected in 1980 and 1981, and that any new corrective mechanism should be temporary and limited because of the impossibility of producing accurate forecasts.

UNIT: m ecu

1980

1981

30 May Agreement

Unadjusted net contribution	1784	2140
Refund	<u>1175</u>	<u>1410</u>
<i>Estimated</i> Adjusted net contribution	609	730
	—	—

New Commission Estimates

Unadjusted net contribution (reduction from 30 May estimate)	1521 (-263)	1505 (-635)
30 May Refund	<u>1175</u>	<u>1410</u>
Adjusted net contribution	346	95
	—	—
Adjusted net contribution in £m (1 ecu = 58p)	200	55

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

5 November 1981

PERSONAL

fg. *[Handwritten signature]*

Dear Michael,

ANGLO IRISH SUMMIT: PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

*- see NOTE MOPBA
5/11/81*

... I attach a letter about proportional representation.

The subject came up at the Secretary of State's meeting with the Taoiseach last week. The Secretary of State made quite clear that he did not think it would be helpful for Dr FitzGerald to pursue this question with the Prime Minister in so far as Westminster elections were concerned. It seems that the Secretary of State's hints are not to be acted upon. In addition, Dr FitzGerald revealed that he is Honourary President of the Electoral Reform Society in Great Britain, which favours PR here and has close links with the Republic. The Secretary of State similarly steered Dr FitzGerald away from mentioning this point, which may or may not come up. It is not referred to in the letter below which you may wish to show the Prime Minister but is something that I think the Secretary of State may want to mention privately when he sees the Prime Minister at 5 pm this evening with a view to giving her his impressions of judgements on the Taoiseach. You may not be present at that preliminary session and I thought you would like to know.

*Mans,
Steyle*

S W BOYS SMITH



17 Grosvenor Place

SW1X 7HR

5th November 1981

My dear Patrick

I attach a copy of the latest version of the draft
communique for tomorrow's meeting which I have been
asked to transmit to you as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely
Eamon

Eamon Kennedy
Ambassador

Mr P H C Eyers
Republic of Ireland Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Encl

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT : DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

1. The Prime Minister, The Right Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP, had discussions today, 6 November, at 10 Downing Street with the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald TD. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Right Hon. The Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Right Hon. James Prior MPMN, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Right Hon. Nigel Lawson MPMN, Secretary of State for Energy. The Taoiseach was accompanied by the Tanaiste and Minister for Industry and Energy, Mr Michael O'Leary TD, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator James Dooge.
2. The meeting was the first between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach since Dr. FitzGerald took office. They discussed a number of international questions and a range of issues arising in the European Community which are to be considered at the European Council in London on 26 and 27 November.
3. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach affirmed the importance which their two Governments attached to the maintenance and development of close Anglo-Irish relations.
4. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed on the need for efforts to diminish the divisions between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland and to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland. Such a development could come about only on the basis of mutual respect as between those traditions to the achievement of which the Taoiseach has made a public commitment.
5. The Taoiseach affirmed that it was the wish of the Irish Government and, he believed, of the great majority of the people of the island of Ireland, to secure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of the majority of the people of Northern

Which went
both
in the R.I.
NI

Ireland. The Prime Minister said that, if the time came when a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wished to unite with the people of the Republic, the British Government would ^{accept} ~~support~~ their decision. (Pending this ~~the~~ British Government would be ready to join in working towards any arrangements for the conduct of their affairs that might be acceptable to the people of the two parts of Ireland).

6. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister reiterated their resolute opposition to violence, and commended the level of co-operation between the security forces of the two countries. They agreed that additional efforts should now be made to ensure that those who committed crimes in one country should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other (and invited the British and Irish Attorneys-General to give urgent consideration to (how this could best be achieved and specifically to) the possibility of establishing a new court which would be comprised of judges from, and could sit and have jurisdiction in, both parts of Ireland).

7. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach ^{annexed} ~~considered~~ a joint report (annexed to this communique) on studies made by officials from both countries of possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. The papers on which this report is based, other than that on security matters, will be published next Tuesday.

8. Recognising the unique character of the relationship between the two countries, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister have decided to establish an Anglo-Irish () through which institutional expression can be given to that relationship at inter-Governmental level. This will involve regular meetings between the two Governments to discuss matters of common concern. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agree that this body should consider proposals, for recommendation to the Parliaments concerned, for the establishment of a complementary body at the

parliamentary level comprising members to be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected assembly that may be established for Northern Ireland. They also agreed to work towards the establishment of an advisory committee linked to the Anglo-Irish () on economic, social and cultural co-operation, with a wide membership.

9. The Taoiseach and Prime Minister noted that each country afforded the other's citizens most of the rights and privileges available to its own. The Taoiseach indicated that the arrangements for the grant of voting rights at parliamentary elections to British citizens resident in the Republic were well advanced and that he hoped to have the necessary legislation introduced soon.

10. The Taoiseach and Prime Minister approved a range of proposals set out in the joint studies for the improvement of economic co-operation between the two countries and between the North and the South in Ireland. They expressed the hope that such co-operation would make a contribution towards the improvement of the economy throughout the two countries and that the practice of economic co-operation would, in itself, generate further co-operation. They gave special consideration to the question of co-operation on energy matters. They noted that assessments of the possibility of the supply of natural gas from the Republic to Northern Ireland had suggested such a project might be viable and that discussions of the terms on which gas might be supplied were now in train. They agreed on the desirability of restoring electricity interconnection between the two parts of Ireland. They also agreed that economic and technical studies should be vigorously pursued on the possibility of an electricity link across the Irish Sea.

11. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister looked forward to holding their next meeting in Dublin in the framework of the new institutional arrangements agreed upon at this meeting.

PRIME MINISTER

Briefing Meeting for the Anglo-Irish Summit

The following points seem to me to require resolution this afternoon, either at your meeting with Mr. Prior or at the briefing meeting.

Administrative

- a) Assuming the Tanaiste (Mr. O'Leary) is to be allowed to participate initially in the tête-à-tête - as you have already agreed - how should this best be managed? Should the Northern Ireland Secretary be present for the first 15 minutes?
- b) Can a decision about a joint press conference be left until shortly before lunch tomorrow? If, in the event it proves impossible to persuade Dr. Fitzgerald to join you before the press, how should you proceed?
- c) Should you make a statement about the Summit in the House of Commons next week?

Substantive

Clearly discussion tomorrow is going to focus on the communique. It may be that you will have to discuss it during the tête-à-tête. Language will have to be agreed on the following points:-

1. The Anglo-Irish Co-operation Council.
2. Voting rights in the UK and the Republic.
3. Joint studies.
4. The situation in the North.
5. Guarantee.
6. The Anglo-Irish court.

7. M.P.'s Irish Organisation,

Paul

5 November 1981

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

1. STEERING BRIEF *(PM's comments attached)*
2. REPUBLIC OF IRELAND: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION
3. THE JOINT STUDIES: PROGRESS AND FUTURE
4. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
5. CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
6. SECURITY MATTERS
7. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
8. MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
9. POLITICAL SITUATION
10. SECURITY
11. POSITION IN THE PRISONS
12. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUES
 - a. MANDATE
 - b. INSURANCE
 - c. AIR FARES
 - d. AID FOR NORTHERN IRELAND HOUSING
13. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
 - a. ARAB/ISRAEL
 - b. IRAN/IRAQ
 - c. EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND POLAND
 - d. AFGHANISTAN
 - e. SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA
14. "CO-OPERATION NORTH"
15. N. IRELAND: BATON ROUNDS

*This set destroyed. Set
preserved in CAB 133*

*R. Ponner
18. 11. 10*

Anglo Irish Summit; p 5

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VMV(81)1

COPY NO

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29 October 1981

Carroll

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT

STEERING BRIEF

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I don't like the
Committee. It will
give credit, but
is the work.
Would rather not have
a committee
met.

Introduction

1. This is the first meeting at Head of Government level since Dr Fitzgerald took office; the second in the series begun in Dublin last December, as a result of the agreement with Mr Haughey to have regular bilaterals. The timing fits in with the United Kingdom view that such meetings should take place at least once a year, though the Irish may still hanker after more frequent meetings.

2. The meeting takes place at a convenient moment. On the Irish side, Dr Fitzgerald's administration has begun to settle down (though his tiny parliamentary majority may lead him to come unstuck). He has shown himself resolute against terrorism and, on balance, after a shaky start, helpful over the hunger strike; and has shown political courage in tackling head-on the Republic's constitutional claim to Northern Ireland. Within Northern Ireland, the hunger strike has ended, the security situation remains under control and the appointment of a new Secretary of State gives the Government a breathing space in which to regain the initiative

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and to consider how best to restore devolved government to Northern Ireland. Finally the ideas thrown up by the Joint Studies provide a means of giving substance to the two Governments' desire for better bilateral relations.

3. The underlying objectives of the two Governments differ in emphasis. The Irish wish to see the eventual reunification of the island but accept that this can be brought about only by consent. The United Kingdom does not regard this objective as realistic while it remains incompatible with the wishes of the vast majority of Northern Ireland's inhabitants. Both Governments share the objective of good relations with each other, an end to terrorism throughout Ireland and greater happiness and prosperity for the people of Northern Ireland. In the absence of direct political progress in Northern Ireland, closer relations between Dublin and London generally offer the prospect of an improved climate for security cooperation and for reconciliation between the two parts of the community in Northern Ireland.

Objectives

4. It is suggested that the Prime Minister's aims should be:
 - a. To maintain, and if possible, enhance the Irish commitment to our common efforts against terrorists.
 - b. To confirm HMG's continuing commitment to closer Anglo/Irish relations and the Joint Studies, and to confirm our willingness to keep the Irish Government fully informed about our policies in Northern Ireland.

time, other Ministers will meet separately. The Prime Minister will be giving a lunch for Ministers and a few officials; other officials will lunch separately. There will be a plenary meeting after lunch. A list of those attending is at Annex A. The proposal for a joint press conference which would be held in the Vickers Theatre, Millbank Tower, will be discussed by officials on 2 November in the light of the Prime Minister's wish to have either a joint press conference or none at all. Personality Notes are at Annex B.

Agenda

7. The subject matter falls into three broad sections:

- a. The Joint Studies
- b. Northern Ireland
- c. Other Business, including world political issues and EC affairs.

I can't discuss Northern Ireland with the Taoiseach. I can only discuss co-opt between the U.K. & the Republic

Handling of Business

8. It is likely that the Prime Minister's tête-à-tête with the Taoiseach will be devoted primarily to Northern Ireland and the Joint Studies, with Sir R Armstrong and Mr Nally participating in discussion on the latter subject. During this time the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Senator Dooge, can discuss other bilateral matters and Community issues. The Secretary of State for Energy can discuss energy matters with Mr O'Leary. The afternoon session

No

can if necessary be devoted to wrapping up any issues outstanding from the morning and bringing together the separate discussions on energy and EC issues. It would also give an opportunity for discussion of world affairs and for finalising the Communiqué.

The Joint Studies

9. The briefs on each Joint Study are selective in that they highlight the main issues arising from each. The key issues are:

a. General

Dr Fitzgerald may press for the reports to be published. The Prime Minister may wish to argue that only the summary should be published. Proposals for publishable texts are being submitted to the Prime Minister separately. Dr Fitzgerald is not expected to refer to his predecessor's idea of the studies leading to a special Summit Meeting devoted to considering 'the totality of relationships within these islands', which was referred to in the Dublin Summit communiqué last December.

b. Institutional Structures

Dr Fitzgerald is likely to press for the early establishment of a parliamentary group, involving politicians from the North, in addition to the proposed

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Michael Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

5 November 1981

Dear Michael,

*kg
Smith*

ANGLO IRISH SUMMIT: PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

We understand that in the private session with the Prime Minister on Friday, the Taoiseach may refer to what he sees as the desirability of proportional representation being used in Northern Ireland for Westminster elections. The Prime Minister may wish to be aware of the background to Dr FitzGerald's views.

The single transferable vote system of proportional representation is used in all Northern Ireland elections other than Parliamentary elections. It is also used for all elections in the Irish Republic. Dr FitzGerald is a keen proponent of PR(STV). He would like to see PR(STV) used in Northern Ireland because he believes that in Parliamentary elections minority parties - in particular the SDLP - come off disproportionately badly under the first past the post system (10 of the 12 Northern Ireland seats are held by Unionists; with the 17 seats that will shortly exist the SDLP may also not do well if the Nationalist vote is split by the existence of extreme Republican candidates). Successive Governments have of course always resisted the use of proportional representation in Parliamentary elections in Northern Ireland since it has been considered undesirable to have members of the same House elected by different methods.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Man
Steph*

S W BOYS SMITH

CONFIDENTIAL



NB used.

fn

Am

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 November 1981

Dear Michael,

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT : POSSIBLE STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

There will be considerable Parliamentary interest in Friday's Anglo-Irish Summit. We have been considering how this might best be dealt with, and in particular whether to advise that the Prime Minister should make a statement to the House of Commons.

In the past, statements have not been made after bilateral summits with Community partners and there is clearly a danger that to make a statement after any particular summit would elevate it in an undesirable way.

That being said, you may recall that after the Dublin Summit in December last year there was widespread feeling in the House of Commons that the Prime Minister should have made a statement. The Leader of the Opposition pointed out that the Communiqué described discussions as 'extremely constructive and significant' and argued that any extremely constructive, fresh and significant decisions on such matters should be reported to the House of Commons. Some MPs may draw attention to the commitment that the Prime Minister made in a written reply to a question from Mr Michael Brown on 25 March that 'If (the Joint Studies) led the two Governments to make recommendations on matters of policy, they would of course place them before their respective Parliaments in the normal way.'. Moreover, on this occasion it seems likely that the decision will be taken to publish not only the Report of the Steering Group to the Prime Minister but also four out of the five Joint Studies. The Lord Privy Seal has vivid recollections of the

/anxieties

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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anxieties and doubts expressed by normally quite sensible people in Northern Ireland following the absence of a statement last December.

In all the circumstances, the Lord Privy Seal thinks that the balance of advantage lies with the Prime Minister making a statement. The publication of the Report and the Joint Studies in connection with the summit make the summit sufficiently different to avoid the statement becoming an unwelcome precedent. The statement could be short and draw very largely on the Communiqué. It need not say anything of substance that would not be said in reply to Parliamentary Questions. I enclose a possible first draft.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (Northern Ireland), Julian West (Energy), David Heyhoe (Leader of the House of Commons), Murdo Maclean (Government Whip's Office) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Adam

A K C Wood
Assistant Private Secretary
to the Lord Privy Seal

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DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

I should like, with permission, Mr Speaker, to make a statement on the discussions that I held with the Taoiseach on 6 November.

This was a regular meeting in the series that we hold with the Irish Government on a similar basis to those that we hold with the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy.

Right Honourable and Honourable Members will wish to know that this was a successful meeting and that decisions were taken at it that gave it a particular significance. I thought therefore that it would be appropriate, on this occasion, to make a statement.

Dr FitzGerald and I discussed a number of international questions and a range of EC issues. We also gave attention to carrying forward the commitment that I entered into with his predecessor to move to closer relations between our two countries. We found that our minds were close on the benefits that closer relations could have for all the peoples of both countries. We agreed that it was wrong that those who committed crimes in one country should be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other and we agreed that urgent consideration should be given to how this could best be achieved, given the constitutional and political realities in both countries.

/We

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1981

to Pmt

Dear Michael,

Anglo-Irish Summit

I enclose a copy of the draft programme. I should be grateful for your urgent approval.

There are two outstanding issues which are being dealt with separately. These are:-

- (a) the question of whether or not the Tanaiste should attend the Prime Minister's Tete-a-Tete with the Taoiseach; and,
- (b) whether or not there should be a joint press conference.

*yours ever
R M J Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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PROGRAMME

THURSDAY 5 NOVEMBER

1800

Arrival at London Heathrow Airport by special aircraft, De Havilland Suite (handling by Aer Lingus) Terminal 1.

Met by:

Sir David Muirhead, Special Representative for the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

His Excellency Dr Eamon Kennedy Irish Ambassador.

Sir Leonard Figg, HM Ambassador, Dublin

Brigadier J A C Cowan, Secretary, Government Hospitality Fund

Mr D L S Coombe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Colonel Philip Worrall, Government Hospitality Fund

Wing Commander Tommy Cody, Escort Officer, Government Hospitality Fund

Group Captain Philip Heal, Escort Officer Government Hospitality Fund

1820 approx

Leave London Heathrow Airport

1900

Arrive at the Irish Ambassador's Residence, 17 Grosvenor Place, SW1

[1905

Remainder of the Official Suite arrive at the Carlton Tower Hotel, Cadogan Place SW1

1955

Official Suite leave Hotel for the Residence]

2000

Private Dinner
17 Grosvenor Place, SW1

FRIDAY 6 NOVEMBER

1120 Leave the Residence

1130 Arrive No 10 Downing Street. Met by the Prime Minister The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP.

Photocall

1131 Tête-à-tête talks between An Taoiseach Dr Garret FitzGerald TD and the Prime Minister The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP with Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr D Nally in attendance.

1130 HE Dr Eamon Kennedy, Sir Leonard Figg, Mr M O'Leary Senator J Dooge, Mr S Donlon, Mr D Neligan, Mr M Lillis and Mr F Murray (or Mr W Kirwan) arrive Ambassador's entrance, Foreign and Commonwealth Office for talks with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington and with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, The Rt Hon James Prior MP, and The Rt Hon Nigel Lawson MP, Secretary of State for Energy.

1300 for 1315

Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government.
Host: The Prime Minister, The Rt Hon Maragret Thather MP. 10 Downing Street.

British

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, Prime Minister
Lord Carrington,
The Rt Hon James Prior MP.
Sir Leonard Figg
Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr Michael Alexander

Irish

An Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald
Mr Michael O'Leary
Sen James Dooge
HE Dr Eamon Kennedy
Mr D Nally
Mr Sean Donlon

1300 for 1315

Luncheon for officials. Host: Mr E A J Fergusson
India Office Council Chamber, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

British

Mr E A J Fergusson
Mr P Woodfield
Mr W E Bell
Mr R L Wade-Gery
Mr J A Marshall
Mr CC Wilcock
Mr P H C Eyers

Irish

Mr D Neligan
Mr L Hourican
Mr F Murray, or
Mr Kirwan
Mr M Lillis
Mr P Dempsey, Irish Embassy
(+2 officials from the Irish Embassy).

1430 to 1600

Plenary, 10 Downing Street

SATURDAY 7 NOVEMBER

0925

Leave the Residence

1000

Arrive London Heathrow Airport,
De Havilland Suite, Terminal 1

1015

Depart by Special Aircraft.

Wing Commander Tommy Cody,

Colonel Philip Worrall

Brigadier J A C Cowan

Sir Leonard Figg

His Excellency Dr Eamon Kennedy

Sir David Muirhead, Special Representative
of the Secretary of State

will bid farewell

Rolls Royce

Dr Garret FitzGerald
Irish Ambassador
Special Branch Officer

Car A

Mr Frank Murray
or Mr Walter Kirwan
Mr Michael Lillis
Colonel Philip Worrall

Car 1

Mrs Fitzgerald
(Mrs Kennedy)
Group Captain P Heal

Car 2

Mr Michael O'Leary
HM Ambassador to Dublin
Mr L Hourican

Car 3

Senator James Dooge
Mr Sean Donlon
Wing Commander Tommy Cody
Special Branch Officer

Car 4

Mr D Neligan
Mr Dermot Nally



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
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Prime Minister

Wm
4/11

for
Paul,

Ref. A05897

MR. ALEXANDER

The Taoiseach has made clear that, in the context of his "crusade" to make the Republic's constitution less unattractive to Northern Protestants, he will be hoping for a response from the Prime Minister which would be helpful to him. The response he is looking for is the restatement of the British guarantee in the Summit communique on 6th November in more positive terms. We have made clear to the Irish that the Prime Minister would not say anything which suggests any watering down of the guarantee's terms, but she might be prepared to look at something like a repetition of the pledge in the Sunningdale communique to support any future wish by the majority in Northern Ireland to become part of a united Ireland. I suspect that the Taoiseach will press for more, but in the end be happy to settle for what he can get.

It never
had any
legal
status

2. We have never withdrawn that pledge. We could not do so now without provoking a major breach in our relations both with Dublin and with moderate Catholics in Northern Ireland. We should be assumed to be doing the equivalent of withdrawing it if the Taoiseach could claim and state publicly that we had refused a request to restate it. But we do not necessarily have to restate it in precisely the Sunningdale form of words. Various formulations have been suggested by the Irish and ourselves at official level in the present context; others have been used on other occasions; and others are imaginable. I attach at Annex A a comparative list, which the Prime Minister may find useful both as a basis for discussion at her briefing meeting on 5th November and if we have to move fast when negotiating the final communique text on 6th November. This list has been prepared in consultation with the NIO and fulfils the remit in the final sentence of their brief VMV(81) 9.

3. Our Sunningdale pledge in 1973 was the quid pro quo for Dublin's public acceptance that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of its people so desired. Indeed the two undertakings were set out in parallel columns in paragraph 5 of the Sunningdale communique (copy attached at

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Annex B). If we cast any doubt on the continuing validity of the Sunningdale pledge, we could put the Taoiseach into some difficulty at home in relation to his acceptance that unification could come only with the consent of the majority of the people in Northern Ireland: any suggestion that he was reneging on that could much alarm Unionist opinion in the Province.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.



ROBERT ARMSTRONG

4th November, 1981

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The Converse of the Guarantee: Formulae

I. Sunningdale Text

The British Government solemnly declared that it was and would remain their policy to support the wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The present status of Northern Ireland is that it is part of the United Kingdom. If in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland should indicate a wish to become part of a united Ireland, the British Government would support that wish.

II. Draft Communique for 6th November 1981: British officials' proposal

The Prime Minister said that, if the time came when a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wished it to unite with the Republic, the British Government would accept their decision.

III. Draft Communique for 6th November 1981: Irish officials' proposal

Pending such consent [by the majority in Northern Ireland to a change in the Province's constitutional status] the British Government would be ready to join in working towards any arrangements that might be agreed by the people of the two parts of Ireland for the conduct of their affairs.

IV. Communique for 6th November 1981: earlier Irish proposal

The Prime Minister stated that the people of Great Britain pursues no interest of its own in Northern Ireland. Her Majesty's Government would be happy to join in working towards any arrangements that might at any time be agreed by the people of the two parts of Ireland for the Government of that island.

V. Communique of 6th November 1981: earlier British draft, not shown to Irish

The Prime Minister noted that the majority of the people of Northern Ireland wished it to remain part of the United Kingdom; if, however, a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wished it to unite with the Republic, the United Kingdom Government would accept their decision.

VI. Cmnd 7950 of July 1980 (on Mr Atkins' conference on the future government of Northern Ireland)

Statutory provision exists for the wishes of the Northern Ireland electorate to be tested at intervals by a "border poll", and successive Governments have made it clear that those wishes ... will be respected

VII. Mr Alison in the House of Commons in November 1979

If they (the majority of the people of Northern Ireland) want Irish unity, the Government will not stand in their way.
~~the Government will not stand in their way.~~

VIII. The Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 16th December 1980

With regard to the future of the people of Northern Ireland, it remains as I have frequently said - they stay with the United Kingdom until they express the wish to do the contrary and that wish is confirmed by this House of Commons and the Upper House.

IX. The 1981 Labour Party Conference agreed that the Party's aim should be

"to help bring about the unification of Ireland by agreement and consent between the two parts of Ireland"

Following is the communiqué :

1. The Conference between the British and Irish Governments and the parties involved in the Northern Ireland Executive (designate) met at Sunningdale on 6, 7, 8 and 9 December 1973.

2. During the Conference, each delegation stated their position on the status of Northern Ireland.

3. The Taoiseach said that the basic principle of the Conference was that the participants had tried to see what measure of agreement of benefit to all the people concerned could be secured. In doing so, all had reached accommodation with one another on practical arrangements. But none had compromised, and none had asked others to compromise, in relation to basic aspirations. The people of the Republic, together with a minority in Northern Ireland as represented by the SDLP delegation, continued to uphold the aspiration towards a united Ireland. The only unity they wanted to see was a unity established by consent.

4. Mr. Brian Faulkner said that delegates from Northern Ireland came to the Conference as representatives of apparently incompatible sets of political aspirations who had found it possible to reach agreement to join together in government because each accepted that in doing so they were not sacrificing principles or aspirations. The desire of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, as represented by the Unionist and Alliance delegations, remained firm.

5. The Irish Government fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status.

The British Government solemnly declared that it was, and would remain, their policy to support the wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The present status of Northern Ireland is that it is part of the United Kingdom. If in the future the majority of the people of Northern Ireland should indicate a wish to become part of a united Ireland, the British Government would support that wish.

6. The Conference agreed that a formal agreement incorporating the declarations of

the British and Irish Governments would be signed at the formal stage of the Conference and registered at the United Nations.

7. The Conference agreed that a Council of Ireland would be set up. It would be confined to representatives of the two parts of Ireland, with appropriate safeguards for the British Government's financial and other interests. It would comprise a Council of Ministers with executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role, and a Consultative Assembly with advisory and review functions. The Council of Ministers would act by unanimity, and would comprise a core of seven members of the Irish Government and an equal number of members of the Northern Ireland Executive with provision for the participation of other non-voting members of the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive or Administration when matters within their departmental competence were discussed. The Council of Ministers would control the functions of the Council. The Chairmanship would rotate on an agreed basis between representatives of the Irish Government and of the Northern Ireland Executive. Arrangements would be made for the location of the first meeting, and the location of subsequent meetings would be determined by the Council of Ministers. The Consultative Assembly would consist of 60 members, 30 members from Dail Eireann chosen by the Dail on the basis of proportional representation by the single transferable vote, and 30 members from the Northern Ireland Assembly chosen by that Assembly and also on that basis. The members of the Consultative Assembly would be paid allowances. There would be a Secretariat to the Council, which would be kept as small as might be commensurate with efficiency in the operation of the Council. The Secretariat would service the institutions of the Council and would, under the Council of Ministers, supervise the carrying out of the executive and harmonising functions and the consultative role of the Council. The Secretariat would be headed by a Secretary-General. Following the appointment of a Northern Ireland Executive, the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive would nominate their representatives to a Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers would then appoint a Secretary-General and decide upon the location of its permanent headquarters. The Secretary-General would be directed to proceed with the drawing up of plans for such headquarters. The Council of Ministers would also make arrangements for the recruitment of the staff of the Secretariat in a manner and on conditions which would, as far as is practicable, be consistent with those applying to public servants in the two administrations.

8. In the context of its harmonising functions and consultative role, the Council of Ireland would undertake important work relating, for instance, to the impact of EEC membership. As for executive functions, the first step would be to define and agree these in detail. The Conference therefore decided that, in view of the administrative complexities involved, studies would at once be set in hand to identify and, prior to the formal stage of the conference, report on areas of common

interest in relation to which a Council of Ireland would take executive decisions, and, in appropriate cases, be responsible for carrying those decisions into effect. In carrying out these studies, and also in determining what should be done by the Council in terms of harmonisation, the objectives to be borne in mind would include the following:

(1) to achieve the best utilisation of scarce skills, expertise and resources;

(2) to avoid, in the interests of economy and efficiency, unnecessary duplication of effort; and

(3) to ensure complementary rather than competitive effort where this is to the advantage of agriculture, commerce and industry.

In particular, these studies would be directed to identifying, for the purposes of executive action by the Council of Ireland, suitable aspects of activities in the following broad fields:

(a) exploitation, conservation and development of natural resources and the environment;

(b) agricultural matters (including agricultural research, animal health and operational aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy), forestry and fisheries;

(c) co-operative ventures in the fields of trade and industry;

(d) electricity generation;

(e) tourism;

(f) roads and transport;

(g) advisory services in the field of public health;

(h) sport, culture and the arts.

It would be for the Oireachtas and the Northern Ireland Assembly to legislate from time to time as to the extent of functions to be devolved to the Council of Ireland. Where necessary, the British Government will co-operate in this devolution of functions. Initially, the functions to be vested would be those identified in accordance with the procedures set out above and decided, at the formal stage of the conference, to be transferred.

9. (i) During the initial period following the establishment of the Council, the revenue of the Council would be provided by means of grants from the two administrations in Ireland towards agreed projects and budgets, according to the nature of the service involved.

(ii) It was also agreed that further studies would be put in hand forthwith and completed as soon as possible of methods of financing the Council after the initial period which would be consonant with the responsibilities and functions assigned to it.

(iii) It was agreed that the cost of the Secretariat of the Council of Ireland would be shared equally, and other services would be financed broadly in proportion to where expenditure of benefit accrues.

(iv) The amount of money required to finance the Council's activities will depend upon the functions assigned to it from time to time.

(v) While Britain continues to pay subsidies to Northern Ireland, such payments would not involve Britain participating in the Council, it being accepted nevertheless that it would be legitimate for Britain to safeguard in an appropriate way her financial involvement in Northern Ireland.

10. It was agreed by all parties that persons committing crimes of violence, however motivated, in any part of Ireland should be brought to trial irrespective of the part of Ireland in which they are located. The concern which large sections of the people of Northern Ireland felt about this problem was in particular forcefully expressed by the representatives of the Unionist and Alliance parties. The representatives of the Irish Government stated that they understood and fully shared this concern. Different ways of solving this problem were discussed; among them were the amendment of legislation operating in the two jurisdictions on extradition, the creation of a common law enforcement area in which an all-Ireland court would have jurisdiction, and the extension of the jurisdiction of domestic courts so as to enable them to try offences committed outside the jurisdiction. It was agreed that problems of considerable legal complexity were involved, and that the British and Irish Governments would jointly set up a commission to consider all the proposals put forward at the Conference and to recommend as a matter of extreme urgency the most effective means of dealing with those who commit these crimes. The Irish Government undertook to take immediate and effective legal steps so that persons coming within their jurisdiction and accused of murder, however motivated, committed in Northern Ireland will be brought to trial, and it was agreed that any similar reciprocal action that may be needed in Northern Ireland be taken by the appropriate authorities.

11. It was agreed that the Council would be invited to consider in what way the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms would be expressed in domestic legislation in each part of Ireland. It would recommend whether further legislation or the creation of other institutions, administrative or judicial, is required in either part or embracing the whole island to provide additional protection in the field of human rights. Such recommendations could include the functions of an Ombudsman or Commissioner for Complaints, or other arrangements of a similar nature which the Council of Ireland might think appropriate.

12. The Conference also discussed the question of policing and the need to ensure public support for and identification with the police service throughout the whole community. It was agreed that no single set of proposals would achieve these aims overnight, and that time would be necessary. The Conference expressed the hope that the wide range of agreement that had been reached, and the consequent formation of a power-sharing Executive, would make a major contribution to the creation of an atmosphere throughout the community where there would be widespread support for and identification with all the institutions of Northern Ireland.

13. It was broadly accepted that the two parts of Ireland are to a considerable extent inter-dependent in the whole field of law and order, and that the problems of political violence and identification with the police service cannot be solved without taking account of that fact.

14. Accordingly, the British Government stated that, as soon as the security problems were resolved and the new institutions were seen to be working effectively, they would wish to discuss the devolution of responsibility for normal policing and how this might be achieved with the Northern Ireland Executive and the Police.

15. With a view to improving policing throughout the island and developing community identification with and support for the police services, the governments concerned will co-operate under the auspices of a Council of Ireland through their respective police authorities. To this end, the Irish Government would set up a Police Authority, appointments to which would be made after consultation with the Council of Ministers of the Council of Ireland. In the case of the Northern Ireland Police Authority, appointments would be made after consultation with the Northern Ireland Executive, which would consult with the Council of Ministers of the Council of Ireland. When the two Police Authorities are constituted, they will make their own arrangements to achieve the objectives set out above.

16. An independent complaints procedure for dealing with complaints against the police will be set up.

17. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will set up an all-party committee from the Assembly to examine how best to introduce effective policing throughout Northern Ireland with particular reference to the need to achieve public identification with the police.

18. The Conference took note of a reaffirmation by the British Government of their firm commitment to bring detention to an end in Northern Ireland for all sections of the community as soon as the security situation permits, and noted also that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland hopes to be able to bring into use his statutory powers of selective release in time for a number of detainees to be released before Christmas.

19. The British Government stated that, in the light of the decisions reached at the Conference, they would now seek the authority of Parliament to devolve full powers to the Northern Ireland Executive and Northern Ireland Assembly as soon as possible. The formal appointment of the Northern Ireland Executive would then be made.

20. The Conference agreed that a formal conference would be held early in the New Year at which the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive would meet together to consider reports on the studies which have been commissioned and to sign the agreement reached.

Sunningdale Park,
9th December 1973.

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Prime Minister

You will wish to discuss this at her briefing meeting tomorrow

lm
4/11

Ref. A05889

MR. ALEXANDER

I understand that you have now received, via the Irish Ambassador, a formal request that the Tanaiste, Mr. O'Leary, who is the leader of the Irish Labour Party which is the other partner in the Government Coalition, should attend the first 15 minutes of the conversation between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach on Friday morning.

2. Mr. Nally mentioned this to me on the telephone this morning. He said that Mr. O'Leary was "behaving rather strangely", and that the Taoiseach felt obliged to make this request in order to placate the Tanaiste.

3. As you know, the Tanaiste insisted on being present when the Taoiseach saw the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland last week.

4. There are other precedents. Last time there was a Coalition of Fine Gael and the Irish Labour Party in Dublin, Mr. Cosgrave, the Fine Gael Taoiseach, was accompanied on his first visit to London by his Tanaiste, the then leader of the Irish Labour Party; they came together to see the Prime Minister's predecessor, and in fact he entertained them both. The only difference was that they came so quickly after the election which they had just won that they had not yet formally taken office.

5. It is clearly very difficult for the Prime Minister not to accede to this request. The problem, of which Mr. Nally is fully aware, will be how to get the Tanaiste out once he has been allowed in. Mr. Nally's suggestion was that he and I might remain outside for 15 minutes, and then come in, as a signal to the Tanaiste to depart. I wonder whether a better plan might be for the Prime Minister to have the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland with her for the first 15 minutes, so that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland could take the initiative and lead the Tanaiste out after 15 minutes, if he showed no signs of moving on his own account. He could then take the Tanaiste over to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to join Lord Carrington and Senator Dooge.

6. No doubt the Prime Minister will wish to discuss this at her briefing meeting tomorrow.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

4th November, 1981

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MG

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-Irish Summit: The Draft Communiqué

(attached)

You will, I think, want to spend some part of tomorrow's briefing meeting discussing the draft Communiqué. You may like to have one or two personal thoughts on it.

There seem to me to be two basic points to bear in mind:

- (a) The improved relationship between London and Dublin is an achievement of yours which you want to preserve and build upon. In the short term it aids the development of cross-border security co-operation. In the longer term it is an essential component of any solution in the North. (I do not think it would have been conceivable two years ago for Dr. Fitzgerald to take the line he has about the Irish Constitution.) Therefore you do not want the Communiqué to leave the impression that this meeting has been less successful than the last two. At the same time, of course, you want to avoid giving the impression that there has been a "sell out". The balance between these two considerations, which are of equal importance, is a matter of judgement;
- (b) You have to weigh at each point in the text the disadvantages of language that could be interpreted as giving the Taoiseach a voice in the North against the advantages of committing him to formulations that are helpful to you.

On both (a) and (b) it seems to me that publishing the ^{joint} studies will leave you less vulnerable to innuendo and criticism from Dr. Paisley and his ilk.

On your specific points:


/ (a)

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- 2 -

- (a) Paragraph 5. This, I think, merely blesses the conclusions of the study on structures which have already been approved by Ministers. The Chairman would be the host country's senior representative and the membership would vary at different levels;
- (b) Paragraph 6. The first sentence is essentially factual. As regards the second sentence, I agree that the Taoiseach's offer is small beer but we can hardly stop him making it if he wants to;
- (c) Paragraph 8. The points I make above are relevant. The language marks little if any advance on previous Communiqués. It would be rather useful to have the Taoiseach's agreement that there are indeed two major traditions in Ireland (a geographical expression);
- (d) Paragraph 9. Again, see above. The acceptance by Dublin of the guarantee is essentially a plus for us. The first square bracketed passage is, I think, based on Sunningdale. The second bracket is Irish and unacceptable;
- (e) Paragraph 10. This is an attempt to do something serious about extradition. Again, there is a choice to be made between practical advantage and possible criticism about "creeping unification".



4 November 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Communique

("B" in the margin of passages in square brackets denotes words suggested by the British side; "I" similarly denotes words suggested by the Irish side)

1. The Prime Minister, the Right Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, had discussions today, 6 November, at 10 Downing Street with the Taoiseach, Dr Garret FitzGerald TD. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Right Hon The Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Right Hon James Prior MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Right Hon Nigel Lawson MP, Secretary of State for Energy. The Taoiseach was accompanied by the Tanaiste and Minister for Industry and Energy, Mr Michael O'Leary TD, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator James Dooge.

2. The meeting was the first between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach since Dr FitzGerald took office. They discussed a number of international questions and a range of issues arising in the European Community which are to be considered at the European Council in London on 26 and 27 November.

3. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach reaffirmed the importance they attached to the maintenance and development of close Anglo-Irish relations.

4. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach ^{to} considered a joint report (annexed to this communique) on studies made by officials from both countries of possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding. The papers on which this report is based, other than that on security matters, will be published soon. *or Tues. 10 Nov.*

5. Recognising the unique character of the relationship between the two countries, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach have decided to establish an Anglo-Irish [] through which institutional expression can be given to that relationship at inter-governmental level. This will involve regular meetings between the two Governments to discuss matter of common concern. The

*Chairman?
Membership?*

Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agree that this body should consider proposals, for recommendation to the Parliaments concerned, for the establishment of a complementary body at the Parliamentary level comprising members to be drawn from the British and Irish Parliaments, the European Parliament and any elected Assembly that may be established for Northern Ireland. They also agree to work towards the establishment of an Advisory Committee, linked to the Anglo-Irish [] on economic, social and cultural co-operation, with a wide membership.

6. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach noted that each country afforded the other's citizens most of the rights and privileges available to its own. / The Taoiseach indicated that the arrangements for the grant of voting rights at parliamentary elections to British citizens resident in the Republic were well advanced and that he hoped to have the necessary legislation introduced soon.

7. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach approved a range of proposals set out in the Joint Studies for the improvement of economic co-operation between the two countries and between the North and the South in Ireland. They expressed the hope that such co-operation would make a contribution towards the improvement of the economy throughout the two countries and that the practice of economic co-operation would, in itself, generate further co-operation. They gave special consideration to the question of co-operation on energy matters. They noted that assessments of the possibility of the supply of natural gas from the Republic to Northern Ireland had suggested such a project might be viable and that discussions of the terms on which gas might be supplied were now in train. They agreed on the desirability of restoring electricity interconnection between the two parts of Ireland. They also agreed that economic and technical studies should be vigorously pursued on the possibility of an electricity link across the Irish Sea.

8. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed on the continuing need to diminish the divisions between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland and to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland. Such a development could come about only on the basis of mutual respect as between those traditions, to the achievement of which the Taoiseach had made a public commitment.

*The Joint Studies
don't add
up
This will be
revised with
some changes*

*We must not
lose the Northern
Ireland
in Ireland?*

Handwritten note: ~~... ..~~

Handwritten note: said that

Handwritten note: as the July 1973 provided

B

9. The Prime Minister and ~~the Taoiseach~~ agreed that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach affirmed that it was the wish of the Irish Government and, he believed, of the great majority of the people of the island of Ireland, to secure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace.

I

The Prime Minister said that, if the time came when a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wished it to unite with the Republic, the British Government would accept their decision. [and recognised that such consent did not at present exist. Pending such consent the British Government would be ready to join in working towards any arrangements that might be agreed by the people of the two parts of Ireland for the conduct of their affairs]

B

10. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach affirmed their resolute opposition to violence, and commended the level of co-operation between the security forces of the two countries. They endorsed the view that those who committed crimes in one country should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction by seeking refuge in the other, and invited the British and Irish Attorneys General to give urgent consideration to how this could best be achieved, including the possibility of establishing a new Court which could be comprised of judges from, and could sit and have jurisdiction in, both parts of Ireland.

11. The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach looked forward to holding their next meeting in Dublin in the framework of the new institutional arrangements agreed upon at this meeting.

Ref: A05896

MR ALEXANDERAnglo-Irish Joint Studies

In my minute of 2 November to the Prime Minister (A05881) I said that the texts for publication, as finally agreed with the Irish, of the summary and four of the actual studies (ie all except security) would be submitted shortly. They have now been circulated as corrigenda to VMV(81) 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. These texts take account of all the changes agreed upon by OD(AI) and subsequently approved by the Prime Minister, plus a small number of further changes suggested by the Irish. On one point we did not get all that we wanted: the Irish agreed only to the deletion of the second part, not the whole, of the last sentence of paragraph 5 of the structures study. But we had earlier accepted that, since the sentence in question was a description of Irish views, we could not absolutely insist on its deletion.

2. One noticeable but unimportant change has been made to the citizenship study at Irish request. This is the omission of two paragraphs expressing Irish hopes that their legislation to allow United Kingdom citizens to vote in Dail elections would not be found unconstitutional.

3. Now that the security study is unlikely to be published, the summary has been slightly changed to gloss over the fact that security did not, as many Unionists might have wished, cover questions of operational cross-border cooperation. Paragraph 10 of the summary also now excludes any reference to the gathering of evidence as a subject for special official attention. This excision was made at Irish request, on grounds of discretion.

4. As regards the mechanics of publication, provisional arrangements have been made for the texts of the four studies to be issued here as a White Paper at 2.30 pm on 10 November. The Irish will publish them simultaneously in Dublin. The summary will be published with the communique on 6 November and will also be included in our White Paper.

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5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Lord President, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State for Energy.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

4 November 1981

conqueror

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Prime Minister *to Mr. Egan*

You will wish to discuss
this at your briefing
meeting tomorrow.

Wm. J. M.

W. J. M.

Ref. A05895

MR. ALEXANDER

Anglo-Irish Summit

In my minute of 2nd November to the Prime Minister (Ref. A05881), I discussed in paragraph 5 the arrangements for a press conference.

2. Since I wrote that minute, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has stressed the importance of having a joint press conference: only a joint conference will avoid the danger of wedge-driving.

3. Accordingly I spoke to Mr. Nally this morning, to say that on further reflection the Prime Minister remained very much of the view that it would be desirable to hold a joint press conference, so that failure to do so was not misinterpreted as a sign of failure (or relative lack of success) of the Summit meeting itself. Mr. Nally promised to report this view to the Taoiseach.

4. When he came back to me this evening, Mr. Nally said that the Taoiseach remained nervous about what was proposed. If the Summit was (from his point of view) successful, he would welcome a joint press conference and it would be valuable to him at home. If it was not successful (in his terms), then a joint press conference could be damaging to him at home. Mr. Nally thought that the Taoiseach would be prepared to agree that there should be a joint press conference, if he could be told that the Prime Minister would be willing to see the sentence at the end of paragraph 9 of the draft communique, or something on similar lines, included in the final version of the communique.

5. I did not have any intention of being drawn into a bargaining discussion with Mr. Nally on these lines. I said, therefore, that I thought that it was not possible to anticipate in that way the discussion which the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach would be having on Friday morning. I would, however, see whether it might be possible to defer a decision, so that the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach could consider jointly towards the end of their tete-a-tete meeting on Friday morning whether to hold a joint press conference.

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6. It would clearly be disastrous to schedule a joint press conference and then in the event not to hold it. If we cannot get ~~the~~^{an} commitment in advance out of the Irish, without making concessions which we do not want ^{to} make, the only possibility of holding a joint press conference will be to arrange it at relatively short notice on Friday. That would mean taking a decision shortly before lunch, and setting up the arrangements for a joint press conference at 4.00 pm. I have had some discussion of this with Mr. Ingham. It would just be practicable, provided that it was acceptable in security terms not to insist upon full accreditation. But I am afraid that Mr. Ingham would have the problem of explaining to the press why no arrangements were being made for a joint press conference before then, given that joint press conferences had become the norm for the Prime Minister's meetings with other European Heads of Government.

7. I expect that the Prime Minister will want to discuss this at her briefing meeting tomorrow afternoon. I incline, however, to the view that, given that we cannot arrange a joint press conference in advance, we should try to arrange one on the day: we should hope that the Prime Minister's meeting with the Taoiseach goes sufficiently well to encourage the Taoiseach to agree, and we should take a decision shortly before lunch to hold a joint press conference at 4.00 pm or thereabouts.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

4th November, 1981

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FM DUBLIN 031800Z NOV 1981

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

IMMEDIATE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 372 OF 03 NOVEMBER

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE N I O (BELFAST)

PRESS ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

1. NELIGAN TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT THEY WOULD TRY AND PERSUADE THE TAOISEACH TO GIVE A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING FRIDAY'S TALKS. HE ALSO TOLD ME THAT DR FITZGERALD WOULD BE ANSWERING JOURNALISTS' QUESTIONS IN THE IRISH EMBASSY LATER THAT EVENING AND THAT THE HOUSE WAS NOW BEING LIGHTED AND WIRED ACCORDINGLY. EVEN IF A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE IS POSSIBLE IT IS LIKELY, THEREFORE THAT THERE WILL BE SOME ADDITIONAL COMMENTS PUT OUT ON THE IRISH SIDE, GIVEN THE TAOISEACH'S HABIT OF ANSWERING QUESTIONS AT CONFERENCES

CONFERENCE IS POSSIBLE IT IS LIKELY, THEREFORE THAT THERE WILL BE SOME ADDITIONAL COMMENTS PUT OUT ON THE IRISH SIDE, GIVEN THE TAOISEACH'S HABIT OF ANSWERING QUESTIONS AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH. IN VIEW OF THIS, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO GIVE R T E AN INTERVIEW. R T E WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE ONE FOR THEIR SUNDAY LUNCHTIME RADIO PROGRAMME. THIS WOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT THE IRISH PUBLIC WERE GIVEN AN AUTHORITATIVE AND DIRECT BRITISH VIEW OF MAJOR POINTS FROM THE SUMMIT.

2. IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE UNABLE TO GIVE AN INTERVIEW, I HOPE THAT MR PRIOR WOULD CONSIDER SO.

FIGG

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NNNN

SENT AT / RECD AT 031825Z DH/DD



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

The Prime Minister has seen your minute to her of 2 November about Friday's Summit meeting with the Taoiseach. The Prime Minister is broadly content with the arrangements but, as I have already told Mr. Wade-Gery, she is unhappy with the communique. She believes that it would be interpreted, at least in some quarters, as "a sell out". The Prime Minister would not be prepared to include in the communique language along the lines quoted in your para. 7.

I am sending copies of this minute to John Halliday (Home Office), Roderic Lyne (FCO), David Heyhoe (Lord President's Office), Stephen Boys-Smith (Northern Ireland Office), Stephen Gomersall (Lord Privy Seal's Office), Julian West (Department of Energy) and Jim Nursaw (Law Officers' Department).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

3 November 1981

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Ref. A05881

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-Irish Summit

*I just want to agree
that Communism. The last one
I was a lobby issue. The
present text would be
agreed as well. I
not.*

Mr. Nally, Secretary to the Irish Government, and I met here today to discuss arrangements for your meeting with the Taoiseach on 6th November. He was accompanied by his Ambassador and a representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs; I by representatives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Northern Ireland Office and the Cabinet Office.

Joint Studies

2. Mr. Nally made clear that the Taoiseach was likely to wish to publish both the agreed summary (as an annex to the Summit communique) and, early next week, the actual studies on structures, citizenship, economics and understanding but not the study on security. I reserved your position. But, having in mind your view that publication might prove inevitable (Mr. Alexander's letter of 19th October to Mr. Wright) and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's similar conclusion in the light of Dr. FitzGerald's fear of Mr. Haughey publicly revealing knowledge of the five texts (Mr. Hopkins's letter of 30th October to Mr. Heyhoe), I agreed that we should plan on the basis that that might be what you and the Taoiseach would decide on. I did not press for the publication of a shortened version of the security study; given the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's disposition to agree that none of it should be published even if the other four studies were published.

FLAG A

B

3. Mr. Nally and I therefore agreed ad referendum on suitable texts, for publication, of the summary (amended to take account of non-publication of the security study) and of the four studies other than security. These will be submitted to you and your colleagues shortly. The texts of the studies take account of all the changes agreed on by OD(AI) last week and of a small number of further changes suggested by the Irish. It was agreed that, if the studies were to be published, they should be published simultaneously by the two Governments, but that otherwise the mechanics of publication would be a

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matter for each side separately. On our side I thought that we would table the documents in the Library of the House - so that they were available to Members by the time you answer questions on 10th November - and probably follow up by issuing them as a White Paper; Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials are now considering the details of this.

Summit Arrangements

4. Mr. Nally and I agreed that, subject to your and Dr. FitzGerald's views, the Summit should be organised as follows.

- (a) The Irish party (Taoiseach, Tanaiste, Foreign Minister, Ambassador and six or seven officials), who will be coming to London on Thursday evening, should arrive at 10 Downing Street at 11.30 am on Friday. After a photo call, you and Dr. FitzGerald should meet alone, with Mr. Nally and myself as notetakers, until lunchtime. During this time the rest of the Irish team should hold a single separate meeting in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State for Energy and British officials. This separate meeting will discuss European Community issues among others. Mr. Nally will do his best to prevent the Tanaiste trying on "coalition leadership" grounds to get in on your tete-a-tete (as he did on Mr. Prior's meeting with Dr. FitzGerald last week); the existence of a single meeting below Prime Minister level will make it easier to sidetrack Mr. O'Leary in this way, and will also suit us in that Mr. Prior will be concerned both in some of the energy questions which the Tanaiste is scheduled to discuss with Mr. Lawson and in many of the questions likely to be discussed by Lord Carrington and Senator Dooge.
- (b) Lunch at No. 10 should be six a side. The Irish team should be the Taoiseach, their two other Ministers, their Ambassador, Mr. Nally and Mr. Donlon (the influential ex-Ambassador to Washington who has just become Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs). Ours should be yourself plus five out of the following: your three colleagues, Sir Leonard Figg, myself and Mr. Alexander. Other members of the Irish team will be given lunch in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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(c) There should be a plenary session after lunch, at 2.30 pm or when you are ready.

5. The Taoiseach, who will not be returning to Dublin until early on Saturday, is at present minded to give a separate press conference of his own at the Irish Embassy as soon as the Summit is over (the Irish Embassy are already telling the press to expect this at 6.00 pm, with a number of separate interviews thereafter). There is clearly no possibility of his agreeing to do without press conferences altogether. So I concentrated on stressing your preference for a joint press conference, as being in accordance with your normal practice at bilaterals with other European Community Heads of Government; and on arguing the merits of this as a means of lessening the danger of wedge-driving. Mr. Nally undertook to report. But I formed the clear impression that Dr. FitzGerald would not be deflected from giving a press conference on his own rather than jointly. If he insists on holding his own press conference separately, I am afraid that you will have to hold a press conference yourself. If you did not, reporting in the weekend press would be too much coloured by whatever Dr. FitzGerald has chosen to say.

Communique

6. Given the prospect of no joint press conference, I thought it right to seek to negotiate a draft communique text with Mr. Nally, to give us at least some measure of joint control over how the upshot of the Summit is publicly presented. I made clear that none of my suggestions had been approved by you or your colleagues, and that everything in this area was therefore ad referendum. In response to our draft tabled last week (and attached to the Steering Brief YMV(81) 1) Mr. Nally produced a very "Irish green" draft which had been seen by Irish Ministers but patently went a great deal further than he had any real hope of pushing us. After a good deal of negotiation we evolved, without commitment, and ad referendum on both sides, the attached draft. So far as the British side is concerned, the draft is intended to maintain a momentum in Anglo-Irish co-operation, without making any undue concessions to "greenness". As you will see, it offers alternative British and Irish wording in one key passage in paragraph 9, as well as including a joint reserve on the title of the proposed

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intergovernmental structure and an Irish reserve (which Mr. Nally expects no difficulty in lifting) on the idea of referring next steps in the extradition/extra-territorial legislation field to the two Attorneys General.


7. The draft follows the order of our draft which you saw over the weekend, proceeding from the general (Anglo-Irish relations) to the particular (Northern Ireland). The Irish draft had gone straight into Northern Ireland, and then proceeded to the joint studies. Mr. Nally thought that the Taoiseach might want to argue for that sequence; so we agreed that the draft could be treated as a series of "building blocks" to be used in whatever order Dr. FitzGerald and you might agree. The Irish also clearly continued to hanker after something like the following wording from their original draft, which we managed to exclude from this draft:

No

"The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach share a deep concern about the political, social and economic problems of Northern Ireland which have caused immense human suffering. They share a commitment to taking every measure within their power to eliminate the causes of this tragedy".

We thought that this implied a greater degree of responsibility for the Taoiseach in relation to the affairs of Northern Ireland than we could accept. But I should not be surprised if the Taoiseach presses you to include words on these lines.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Lord President, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Lord Privy Seal, the Secretary of State for Energy and the Attorney General.



ROBERT ARMSTRONG

(approved by Sir R. Armstrong
and signed on his behalf)

2nd November, 1981

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NEWSPAPER DIGEST - MONDAY 2 NOVEMBER 1981

IRISH TIMES:

IN A MOVE TO DEFUSE UNIONIST FEARS AND TO COUNTER UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS IN THE SOUTH DR FITZGERALD IS EXPECTED TO PRESS MRS THATCHER TO PUBLISH THE BULK OF THE MATERIAL FROM THE JOINT ANGLO-IRISH STUDIES WHEN THEY MEET IN LONDON ON FRIDAY. GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN THE REPUBLIC SAY THE TAOISEACH FAVOURS THE RELEASE OF ALL THE DOCUMENTATION - WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE JOINT STUDIES ON SECURITY - BUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ON SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION.

THE PAPER ALSO REPORTS THAT DR FITZGERALD WILL ARGUE THE MERITS OF AN ALL-IRELAND COURT AND ITS ATTENDANT STRUCTURE AS A MEANS OF COMBATTING TERRORISM AT FRIDAY'S SUMMIT. GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN DUBLIN ADMITTED YESTERDAY THAT THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN ON THE ISSUE, WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARGUING IN FAVOUR OF EXTRADITION.

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE IN THE REPUBLIC WILL IT IS UNDERSTOOD MAKE A DECISION TODAY ON WHETHER TO RELEASE A UDA PRISONER FRED PARKINSON, WHO IS SERVING 12 YEARS IN JAIL IN DUBLIN. SOURCES CLOSE TO THE UDA IN THE NORTH ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE MINISTER WILL ORDER PARKINSON'S RELEASE AND ALSO THAT TWO OTHER UDA PRISONERS WILL SOON BE MOVED TO NEW CELLS.

REPORTING ON YESTERDAY'S PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN ANNUAL MEETING THE PAPER SAYS LIKE MOST SUCH OCCASIONS IN THE PAST THIS WAS "AN ANNUAL RENEWAL OF THE FAITH, AND A WEEKEND TO MEET OLD COMRADES ALTHOUGH THE MEETING PLACE HELD SUFFICIENT BELLICOSE MEMORABILIA TO REMIND EVERYONE THAT THIS WAS AN ORGANISATION WITH A WAR ON ITS HANDS".

CHANGEBEINGREPORT SAYS, GLA THE SPLIT 11 YEARS AGO WHICH DIVIDED REPUBLICANISM INTO "REFORMED" OFFICIALS AND "ARMED STRUGGLE" PROVISIONALS AND SIGNS PERHAPS OF AN INSECURITY ABOUT POLITICAL DIRECTIONS NOW BEING ALTERED. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL STRUCTURE ADOPTED BY THE PROVISIONAL MOVEMENT IN THE MID-SEVENTIES IS AS NOW AS GOOD AS GONE AND THE MEN WHO CALL THE SHOTS THESE DAYS ARE THE HARDENED, MOSTELY YOUNG NORTHERNERS. THE SOUTHERN ELEMENT IN THE ORGANISATION FEEL THAT CONTROL IS STEADILY SLIPPING NORTH OF THE BORDER INTO THE HANDS OF A TIGHT HARD CORE AND THE DECISION TO CONTEST NI LOCAL ELECTIONS AND TAKE SEATS, IF WON, WAS CARRIED.

Cir Ireland

cc. David Wright
Michael Alacardas.

FROM BELFAST THE PAPER REPORTS THAT FROM MIDNIGHT
LAST NIGHT PROTESTING REPUBLICAN PRISONERS IN
THE MAZE AND ARMAGH AGAIN STARTED TO LOSE REMISSION
WITH THE EXPIRY OF A 28-DAY MORATORIUM ON THE
LOSS OF PRIVILEGES ANNOUNCED BY THE NIO AT THE END
OF THE HUNGER STRIKE AND SOURCES CLOSE TO THE
PRISONERS SAID LAST NIGHT THAT THEY HAD BEEN
PUTTING PRESSURE ON BRENDAN MCFARLANE THEIR LEADER
IN THE MAZE, TO ACCEPT THE PACKAGE OF REFORMS BEING
OFFERED BY THE NEW SECRETARY OF STATE.

IRISH INDEPENDENT:

LEADS WITH THE STORY OF PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN
ANNUAL CONFERENCE AND THE NEWS THAT DELEGATES WERE
TOLD THAT THE BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN BRITIAN WILL
CONTINUE. THE STATEMENT BY THE ARMY COUNCIL DID
NOT AS WAS EXPECTED INDICATE THAT THE BOMBING WOULD
BE EXTENDED FROM LONDON TO OTHER BRITISH CITIES.

THE CATHOLIC AUXILIARY BISHOP OF DUBLIN
DR O'MAHONY SAID YESTERDAY "THIS ISLAND IS
TOO SMALL FOR PEOPLE TO LIVE TOGETHER AS
STRANGERS". HE CONDEMNED THE ATTITUDE OF
THOSE PEOPLE SOUTH OF THE BORDER WHO SAID
"AS LONG AS IT REMAINS UP THERE WE ARE HAPPY
DOWN HERE" AND SAID THERE WAS MUCH THERE COULD

BE DONE IN THE SPIRIT OF GENUINE LOVE, RECONCILIATION
AND PEACE BY ORDINARY PEOPLE.

IRISH PRESS:

THE PROVISIONAL IRA IN SOUTH ARMAGH YESTERDAY GAVE
AN ASSURANCE TO A CROSSMAGLEN HOUSEWIFE THAT
THEY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HER HUSBAND'S DISAPPEARANCE
11 WEEKS AGO. 55 YEAR-OLD CHARLES ARMSTRONG HASN'T
BEEN SEEN SINCE HE LEFT HOME ON AUGUST 16 TO PICK
UP A FRIEND ON THE WAY TO CHURCH. THE FOLLOWING DAY
HIS GREY DATSUN CAR WAS FOUND IN DUNDALK.

THE EDITORIAL ON PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN ANNUAL
CONFERENCE POSES THE QUESTION - CAN A PARTY
REALLY BE ACCEPTED AS POLITICAL IN THE NORMAL SENSE
OF THE TERM WHILE IT REMAINS SUBJECT TO THE DICTATES
OF A MILITARY WING? AND SAYS THAT THAT IS THE CRUCIAL
QUESTION WHICH PROVISIONAL SINN FEIN WILL ULTIMATELY
HAVE TO FACE UP TO IF THE ELECTROAL STRATEGY OUTLINED
AT THE WEEKEND IS TO HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF REALITY.
..... ESTABLISHED PARTIES, AND PARTICULARLY THE SDLP,
MAY NOT RELISH THE NEW CHALLENGE, BUT IT IS NEVERTHELESS,
A DEVELOPMENT TO BE WELCOMED AND ENCOURAGED BY
ALL WHO FEEL THAT THE BALLOT, NOT THE BULLET IS THE
WAY FORWARD. THE TROUBLE OF COURSE IS THAT THE
PROVISIONALS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. THEY
WOULD LIKE TO GO POLITICAL WHEN IT SUITS THEM, AS IN
THE RECENT HIGHLY EMOTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
HUNGER STRIKE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING
A MILITARY WING THAT ADVANCES ITS IDEOLOGY AT THE
POINT OF GUN. THE ELECTORATE, NORTH AND SOUTH,
HAS THE RIGHT, INDEED THE RESPONSIBILITY TO ASK
WHETHER A VOTE FOR A PROVISIONAL CANDIDATE IN AN
ELECTION IS, IN FACT, A VOTE ALSO FOR THE PROVISIONAL
IRA AND ITS POLICIES AND ITS METHODS.

IRISH NEWS:

THE EDITORIAL - A DELICATE MATTER -POINTS OUT THAT TODAY MARKS THE START OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PRISONERS IN THE MAZE AND ARMAGH TO DECIDE WHAT WORK THEY SHOULD UNDERTAKE. THE DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE NIO THE PAPER SAYS INDICATES THAT PRISONERS ENDING THEIR PROTEST WILL HAVE A WIDE CHOICE OF USEFUL ACTIVITIES BUT A LEADING MEMBER OF THE HELP THE PRISONERS COMMITTEE HAS URGED THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND LORD GOWRIE TO KEEP A WATCHFUL EYE ON HOW THE ALLOCATION PROCEDURES ARE HANDLED. "THE MATTER IS A DELICATE ONE IN VIEW OF THE LONG AND DEEPLY PAINFUL PRISON DISPUTE, AND IN THE HANDS OF "HARDLINERS" AMONG THE AUTHORITIES COULD PRODUCE DIFFICULTIES AND SETBACKS.IT MUST BE VERY SINCERELY HOPED BY ALL THE PEOPLE OF NI THAT THESE TWO MEN (MR PRIOR AND LORD GOWRIE) WILL NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE IN ANYWAY DEFLECTED FROM THE FRUITFUL COMPLETION OF THEIR PRESENT TASK.

+++ENDS+++

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file

BK

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

The Prime Minister has seen your minute to me of 30 October on this subject. As I have already informed Mr. Wade-Gery, she agrees with the changes which you propose to the Joint Studies and does not wish to add to them. Her only comment related to paragraph 36 of the paper on measures to encourage mutual understanding. The Prime Minister wondered whether it was the case that we would like to see more students from the South in Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister also agrees that if a decision to publish the Joint Studies is taken, the security report should appear in a shortened version.


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2 November 1981

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cc: LPS
CDL
MOD
TRADE
ENERGY
CH. SEC. HMT
HO (Mr. Raison)
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

2 November 1981

From the Private Secretary

Dear Stephen,

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies:
Irish Voting Rights in Northern Ireland

The Prime Minister has seen the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's minute to her of 28 October on this subject. She agrees that the question of removing restrictions on voting rights for Irish citizens in Northern Ireland local elections should not be pursued at the moment.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD(AI) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John Smith
Richard Alexander

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

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BK

Ireland

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fw
Energy
Ch. Sec. HM/T
CO

BK

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1981

Natural Gas for Northern Ireland

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's minute to her of 29 October on this subject.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roderic Lyne (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Julian West (Department of Energy), Terry Mathews (Chief Secretary's Office, HM Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Stephen Boys-Smith, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office

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BK

① Yes - the
one cannot

Prime Minister

Agree (a) that these deletions will suffice
to make the studies publishable; +
(b) that a shortened version of the
Security Study should be published - if a
Anglo-Irish Joint Studies decision to publish is taken.

Ref. A05854

MR. ALEXANDER

Yes

Hug A

Your letter to Mr. Wright of 19th October indicated that, though the Prime Minister did not wish the five individual reports on the joint studies to be published in addition to the summary, she saw force in the Taoiseach's argument that they might need to be. She therefore wanted their texts reviewed carefully with an eye to possible publication.

2. The argument that they might need to be has been strengthened by the Taoiseach's point, made to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, that Mr. Haughey will know that the five individual reports existed (at any rate in draft) before he left office, and cannot be depended upon to keep this knowledge to himself.

3. Officials have now considered interdepartmentally what deletions or other changes would be required in the five texts in order to protect United Kingdom interests in the event of publication. Their conclusions have been approved by OD's Ministerial Sub-Committee on Anglo-Irish Relations (which as you know includes the Lord President, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Lord Privy Seal) and are set out in red ink in the following paragraphs of the texts annexed to this minute.

- Annex A (Structures): paragraphs 6, 9 and 10. mb.
- Annex B (Citizenship): paragraphs 13, 24 and 56. mt.
- Annex C (Security): paragraph 7. out.
- Annex D (Economic): paragraphs 2, 5, 11, 30, 33, 39, 41, 42 and 47.
- Annex E (Understanding): paragraphs 13, 16, 22, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 44.

4. The deletions are relatively few in number and small in extent; but this is not surprising, given that the possibility that they might eventually become public, by unauthorised means if not by official publication, has never been absent from our minds.

Should be more incidents for the South?

Mean.

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5. The first of these changes (in paragraph 6 of Annex A) will be possible only if the Irish agree, since the sentence we should like to delete is specifically attributed to the Irish side; but for the same reason the change is not in fact essential from our point of view. In all other cases we should be able to insist on our changes, or something equivalent to them, as a condition of publication. Similarly the Irish will no doubt have their own list of changes needed before publication, in order to protect Irish interests; and we shall normally have to accept these. When I see Mr. Nally here on 2nd November to discuss Summit arrangements I will put our list to him, collect his and report.

6. I should be grateful for confirmation that the Prime Minister agrees with the proposed British changes and does not wish to add to them. The changes in Annexes A and B are the only ones directed to protecting ourselves from major Unionist criticisms. The changes in the other three Annexes cover less sensitive ground and are more purely presentational.

7. Particular consideration was given to whether changes should also be sought in two other places, viz.:

- (a) The reference to possible emergency meetings of the proposed new intergovernmental Council, in Annex A, paragraph 11 (third sentence).
- (b) The argument about extradition in Annex C, paragraph 14.

The conclusion was that this would not be necessary.

8. Officials have assumed that, if any of these five studies are to be published, all should be. The Ministerial Sub-Committee did not dissent. There is one qualification. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has noted (his Private Secretary's letter of today's date to the Lord President's, copied to you) that the Irish may want to publish only a shortened version of the Security Report and to make it clear that the rest is being held back on security grounds; and he considers that there could be advantage in this from our point of view. I should be grateful for your confirmation that the Prime Minister would be content for me to be guided accordingly at my meeting with Mr. Nally.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

flag 8. — 30th October, 1981

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Joint Study on Possible New Institutional Structures

Report to Joint Steering Group.

Terms of Reference and meetings

1. The general terms of reference for the Joint Studies, as agreed at the Joint Steering Group on 30 January, 1981 are as follows:-

"Having regard to the degree of mutual understanding reached by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach at their meetings on 21 May and 8 December, 1980 as expressed in the communiqués issued following those meetings and in particular the reference to the need to bring forward policies and proposals -

- i. to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability and
- ii. to improve relations between the peoples of the two countries,

the Working Groups are asked to make proposals to assist the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach in their special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands".

2. The specific terms of reference for the Joint Study on Possible New Institutional Structures, as agreed at the same Steering Group meeting, are as follows:-

"To identify possible new institutional structures which might help in achieving the broad objectives described in the communiqués of 21 May and 3 December, including the scope for improving existing arrangements for co-operation and consultation.

To consider the role of any new institutional structures in relation to measures which might be recommended in the other joint studies".

3. The Joint Study Group met in Dublin on 11 March and in London on 13 April. This report was finalised at a restricted meeting between the two Group leaders in Dublin on 5 August.

4. The Group noted that the unique relationship to which the Joint Communiqués of 1980 referred was the result of geography, history and population movements within these islands. In many fields relations and co-operation between the two countries are closer and more extensive than exist between other countries in Europe where a particularly close relationship has been given specific institutional expression. There was agreement that, over a very wide range, these relationships involve common interests, mutually beneficial exchanges and developing co-operation. At the same time, the communiqué of 8 December 1980 had recorded agreement that the full development of the links between the two countries and their peoples had been put under strain by division and dissent in Northern Ireland. This would need to be taken fully into account in considering possible new institutional structures.

5. The Group have seen it as the purpose of their work to put forward proposals on possible new institutional structures that would correspond adequately to the complexity of the Anglo-Irish relationship and would be calculated to enhance the elements of concord and reduce the elements of discord in the relationship. They should be flexible and resilient, should have a reasonable chance of proving to be durable, and should have the capacity to evolve. They should contribute to the improvement of relations between the Governments and the peoples of the two countries without inflaming old or engendering new suspicions in either country.

Ambit of Study

6. It was agreed that the present studies took place, and that the work of any new institutional structures should similarly take place, within a constitutional

framework in which the factual position of Northern Ireland within the UK cannot be changed without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland and the agreement of Parliament at Westminster; and that any constitutional change could therefore only come about on the basis of such consent and agreement. Subject to this it was agreed that no structure should be excluded which, in the view of either side, could contribute, over whatever timescale, to the objectives agreed by the Heads of Government. ~~The Irish side reaffirmed the wish to secure the unity of Ireland by agreement and in peace, and indicated the intention to table papers on institutional structures which might come into existence on the basis of consent in the future.~~

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7. The Group noted that existing arrangements for co-operation and consultation included, in addition to normal European Community and diplomatic contacts, the following:-

- a. Regular Prime Minister/Taoiseach meetings, accompanied by other Ministers, as appropriate, once or twice a year.
- b. Ad hoc Ministerial meetings.
- c. Occasional meetings of the Joint Steering Group on Anglo-Irish Economic Co-operation, and more frequent meetings of a number of sub-groups on North/South co-operation, communications, energy, customs, etc.
- d. Direct informal contacts between Government Departments (both Dublin/Belfast and Dublin/London).
- e. Meetings of the Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Group every two years, alternately in Dublin and London. (The last such meeting was in Dublin in March, 1980 and there is to be another in November, 1981).

8. The Group examined a number of other models of political co-operation particularly in Europe. These included various aspects of the European Community, the Benelux arrangements, the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council, the Franco-German Co-operation Treaty, arrangements between the United Kingdom and France and the Federal Republic of Germany, including the Anglo-French Council and the Koenigswinter Conference, and certain institutional arrangements between Australia and New Zealand and between the United States, on the one hand, and Canada and Mexico, on the other hand. While acknowledging that there were useful elements in some of these models, the Study Group concluded that no one such model provided a basis for what was likely to be required in the unique Anglo-Irish context.

A new Anglo-Irish Institutional Structure

9. It was agreed, having regard to the considerations set out above, that initially attention should focus on the possibility of establishing a new Anglo-Irish institutional structure ~~from whose purview no aspect of the totality of relationships within these islands should be excluded.~~ ^{Irs} The specific functions would require consideration in the light of progress in other areas of joint study and would be subject to agreement between the two Governments, but a basic purpose would be to contribute to the achievement of peace, reconciliation and stability and the improvement of relations between the peoples of the two countries.

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Inter-Governmental Structure

10. It was agreed that the initial step might be the establishment of a joint inter-governmental structure. This might appropriately be called the Anglo-Irish [Council] [Co-operation Council] [Standing Conference]. It should have flexible characteristics permitting it to subsume many of the existing patterns of contact between the executive branches of Government, although informal contact between Ministers - and between officials - on a non-institutional

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basis should of course continue wherever appropriate. The body would meet at Head of Government, Ministerial or official level. Meetings at Head of Government level, at which Heads of Government would be accompanied by Ministerial colleagues as appropriate and as agreed for each occasion, would take place once or twice a year. At each such meeting Heads of Government would receive reports of the activities of the Council at other levels since their previous meeting. Different counterpart Ministers could meet in pairs or groups, with each such meeting constituting a meeting of the Council whenever both sides so agreed in advance. The framework of the Council would allow for discussion of matters of common interest and concern to the two Governments, including (where so agreed by both Governments) cross border co-operation and other matters of common interest between the two parts of Ireland. As in the past there would continue to be regular meetings between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied as appropriate by other Departmental Ministers concerned, to review ~~the full range of~~ North-South matters. A senior official Committee of Ministers' Deputies might meet in a North-South or East-West configuration, as appropriate, to prepare the work of the Ministers, or as otherwise necessary.

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11. Other aspects of the character and functions of the Council will require further consideration to take account of the results of other studies. Within the framework of the Council there should be the closest bilateral consultation on matters relating to the achievement of peace, reconciliation and stability or the improvement of relations between the peoples of the two countries. Provision could also be made for emergency meetings to consider current problems of an urgent nature of concern to both Governments. There might also be provision for the establishment by the Council, subject to any necessary process of law, of ancillary bodies including corporate bodies, in particular areas of economic co-operation or areas concerned with the promotion of mutual understanding, where joint activity might be agreed to be desirable.

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Legal Basis.

12. It would be possible to establish some form of Anglo-Irish Ministerial Council without legislation in either country, for example on the basis of statements in the respective Parliaments. A formal inter-governmental agreement in writing could (but need not) be used to establish it. If this were done, the agreement would have to be laid before the Dáil, and it would be normal to take similar action with the United Kingdom Parliament.

Inter-Parliamentary Relations

13. It was agreed that it would be a natural and desirable development for the establishment of a new inter-governmental body to be complemented at an appropriate moment by the development of an inter-parliamentary body.

14. In the British view, this should be further considered in the light of experience and of opinions which might over time be expressed by members of either or both of the two national Parliaments (or by British or Irish members of any other relevant parliamentary body, such as the European Parliament or any Assembly which might be established locally in Northern Ireland). In the meantime, efforts should be made to deepen and broaden the activities and composition of the existing Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Group.

15. The Irish side considered that it would be helpful if the report of the Group dealt with the manner in which the parliamentary structure should be developed and with its composition, ambit and purposes. In their view, the parliamentary element could initially be constituted through an Anglo-Irish parliamentary committee as a natural development of the existing, rather loosely structured Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Group. The objectives would be to widen the composition of the existing Group, to provide a more regular and systematic pattern of inter-parliamentary exchanges and to deepen and broaden the activities undertaken by focussing them on a more structured agenda, related to the work of the inter-governmental body. The proceedings could be conducted in public or in private. The aim would be to promote

constructive discussion which would subsequently facilitate the transformation of the consultative committee into a constituent part of the Anglo-Irish Institution.

16. The Irish side thought it useful to give preliminary consideration to the appropriate composition of the parliamentary group under the new circumstances created by the establishment of an inter-governmental body and in the light of the objectives cited in paragraph 15. They considered that the guiding principle should be equitable representation of the various political interests and traditions within these islands. Members of the Committee could be drawn, not only from Dail Eireann and the House of Commons but also from other representative bodies, including the European Parliament, the House of Lords and Seanad Eireann. Apart from the obvious benefits of parliamentary exchanges, the Irish side saw the committee as providing a forum for the participation of representatives from Northern Ireland in the new institutional structures. They considered that, in view of the special circumstances within these islands and in order to permit the adequate representation of both sections of the community there, the Northern Ireland membership should be composed in proportion to the size of the different parts of the community there and should be a significant component of the committee. In the absence of an elected Assembly in Northern Ireland representatives could be chosen on the basis of appointment by the Secretary of State on the nomination of, or after consultation with, leaders of political parties. More generally the Irish side recognised that consultation with political interests and with the appropriate parliamentary authorities should be undertaken immediately following a decision to establish an intergovernmental body with the objective of having the group working in its new format as soon as possible.

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17. The Irish side saw the ambit and purposes of the committee as corresponding to those of the inter-governmental body. Its functions would essentially be consultative, advisory and review in nature. It could discuss the activities of the inter-governmental body and review the work of ancillary bodies, on the basis - but not exclusively so - of an annual report on co-operation from the inter-governmental body. Members might receive an allowance in respect of attendance.

Secretariat

18. The nature and extent of the Secretariat of an Anglo-Irish Institution would clearly be related to the nature and scope of its functions and activities. Initially, however, each Government should designate an official to act as a Secretary of the Council and each of the two Secretaries would be responsible for ensuring the provision of a secretariat for the activities of the Council.

Finance

19. The Council should be free to agree on the joint expenditure of any funds made available by the two Governments (under their normal procedures) for purposes of common interest, although such agreement should clearly not be a prior condition for any unilateral expenditure by either Government.

Structures for Exchanges on a Wider Basis.

20. It was agreed that it would be advantageous to provide a forum for contact between persons other than Ministers, parliamentarians and officials. It was felt that the objective should be to work towards the creation of an Advisory Committee on economic, social and cultural co-operation, associated with the Council. Foreign models which were considered here were the Economic and Social Advisory Council within the Benelux arrangements and the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community. As the principal

objective should be the promotion of contact and exchanges across a wide front of economic activity and of society within these islands, the membership should be reasonably large and in composition should reflect vocational interests. These features may require that the full meetings would take place not more than twice a year, although the body itself could perhaps make provision for separate meetings, at more or less frequent intervals, of any subsidiary bodies it established. The objective should be to have procedures a good deal more flexible and pragmatic than those of the EC body. However, it can be envisaged that the Committee would advise the Council on economic and social matters referred to it, would be able to issue opinions on its own initiative in fields to be determined, and would present an annual report on the state of economic, social and cultural co-operation, including recommendations.

21. The Group considered that some time would be needed to assess how an Advisory Committee might best operate in the light of the development of closer co-operation. They considered, however, that there was an immediate need, as an interim measure, to provide a satisfactory structure for the promotion and review, in a central forum, of contacts and exchanges between wider economic, social and cultural circles. An "Anglo-Irish Encounter" organisation should be established and financed, at least in part, by the two Governments, under the direction of an Executive Board composed of independent public figures of repute and ability and Government representatives. The Group thought that the proposed body, rather than concentrating on constitutional or political problems within these islands, as some existing bodies have tended to do, should seek, in its activities, to comprehend different aspects of the totality of relationships. Its major function should be to organise a high-level annual conference on the Koenigswinter model, which could bring together participants drawn from wider circles than those traditionally concerned with the discussion of Irish questions. Trade unionists, agriculturalists and Irish/~~British~~ residents in Britain/Ireland might be included as well as industrialists, academics, journalists, church leaders, politicians and

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officials. Smaller periodic seminars on specialised themes could also be arranged. There could be a changing participation or involvement appropriate to the subject.

22. Ideas generated at such conferences (or seminars) might usefully be considered by the two Governments at appropriate meetings of the Council.

14 October, 1981.

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ANGLO/IRISH STUDIESJOINT STUDY ON CITIZENSHIP RIGHTSReport of Joint Study Group.I. INTRODUCTION

1. Following the agreement contained in the Communiqué issued after the Dublin meeting between Heads of Government in December 1980, the following general terms of reference were given: "Having regard to the degree of mutual understanding reached by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach at their meetings on 21 May and 8 December 1980 as expressed in the communiqués issued following those meetings and in particular the reference to the need to bring forward policies and proposals (1) to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability and (2) to improve relations between the peoples of the two countries, the Working Groups are asked to make proposals to assist the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach in their special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands". The specific terms of reference of this Group were:-

"(1). To review the rights and privileges accorded to citizens of each country while residing within the jurisdiction of the other, including those relating to voting, social security, employment and consular protection; to compare these with the rights and privileges enjoyed by citizens of the host country; and to consider whether the rights and privileges could be further assured, harmonised and extended on a mutual basis.

(2). To review the obligations and duties of citizens of each country residing within the jurisdiction of the other, including those in respect of taxation and jury service; and to compare these with the obligations and duties of citizens of the host country.

(3). To consider any anomalies revealed by these reviews and whether they might usefully be rectified".

2. The Group held 3 meetings — in Dublin on 12 March and 29 September 1981 and in London on 14 April 1981 — and agreed this report.

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II. BASIS ON WHICH RIGHTS ARE CONFERRED

3. The Group noted, at the outset of their work, that the constitutional arrangements to describe and protect the rights and privileges of citizens are fundamentally different in the two countries. On the Irish side there is a written constitution, capable of being amended only by referendum of the people. On the United Kingdom side the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy means that no specific provisions are entrenched; while, in addition, in certain matters, different provisions obtain in Northern Ireland, as compared with Great Britain, under the terms of earlier delegated legislative authority.

4. This basic difference of approach is reflected, for example, in defining the persons whom each country regards as being entitled to its citizenship, or, more immediately relevant for the purpose of this study, as being citizens of the other. Irish citizenship is held by all persons born in Ireland, North and South, (with a very few exceptions in the case of people born in the North) and their descendants born abroad (subject to a registration condition at the third generation stage). Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies ("United Kingdom citizenship") may be acquired by birth, descent, registration or naturalisation. All United Kingdom citizens are also British subjects, a term which also includes citizens of other countries within the Commonwealth. United Kingdom citizenship is under review and is to be replaced by a new British citizenship. Because of the high incidence of dual nationality and the ease of movement in the Common Travel Area it is difficult to produce accurate figures for the numbers of citizens of one country resident in the other. Estimates derived from the 1979 Labour Force Survey indicate that there may be 500,000 Irish citizens resident in Great Britain.

5. The Group noted, incidentally, that both countries are party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Both have accepted the optional Articles of that Convention relating to the right

of individual petition and the jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights, so that an individual who feels that a human right protected by the Convention has been violated has the possibility of obtaining a binding judgement against the responsible Government.

IRISH ARRANGEMENTS

6. The Irish Constitution (1937) guarantees certain fundamental rights and entitlements, provides for the practical exercise by the people of their sovereignty expressed in Dail and Presidential elections and referenda, and establishes the jurisdiction of the Courts, which extends to Constitutional issues. The list of fundamental rights set out in the Constitution is not exhaustive, and all of these rights will be protected by the Courts, to the extent that incompatible legislation and administrative acts will be struck down. In common with the United States Constitution, which it resembles in some respects, it is designed to protect the rights of citizens and, as such, does not explicitly protect the position or rights of British subjects.

7. In practice, however, the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution are not regarded as being reserved for citizens. Although some of the relevant Articles of the Constitution refer to "citizens" and others use such terms as "persons", an examination of the factual position and case-law* illustrates firstly, that no non-citizen who has raised a Constitutional issue before the Courts has failed to get a full hearing and reasoned decision or, to put it another way, that no non-citizen has had such a case dismissed

* Examples are:-

In the matter of Paul Singer (97 I.L.T.R.)

Nicalaou v An Bord Uchtala (1966 I.R.)

Littlejohn v Minister for Justice (Judgements of 24.1.74 & 18.3.76 unreported)

Somjee v The Minister for Justice and the Attorney General (Judgement of 20.12.1979, unreported)

Shaw v DPP (Judgement of 17.12.80, unreported).

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because of absence of locus standi; secondly, that in practice, non-citizens avail themselves of Constitutional remedies, sometimes with and sometimes without success; thirdly, that it is the exception rather than the rule for the issue of citizenship to be adverted to by the Court.

8. In addition to the protection of fundamental rights afforded by the Constitution, ordinary legislation and the common law cover the complete range of rights and obligations of persons (citizens or otherwise) present in the State, as is the case with those countries which have no written Constitution. Persons born in Britain visiting or resident in Ireland are in a special position in that they are completely exempt from the orders controlling aliens made by the Minister for Justice under the Aliens Act 1935.

UNITED KINGDOM ARRANGEMENTS

9. In the United Kingdom rights and privileges are provided under specific legislative authority which may be interpreted by the Courts but which can be changed only by Parliament.

10. Irish citizens in the United Kingdom enjoy also the protection provided to all persons by the anti-discrimination laws. In Great Britain all persons, including Irish citizens, are subject to, and protected by, the provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976. That Act makes discrimination on racial grounds unlawful in the fields of employment, education and the provision of goods, facilities, services and premises (for the purpose of the Act "racial grounds" means any of the following: colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins). In Northern Ireland the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 makes it unlawful for public bodies to discriminate against any person on the grounds of religious belief or political opinion, and renders discriminatory legislation void; and the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in relation to employment on those grounds.

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11. In addition, the Race Relations Act 1976 amended the Public Order Act 1936 to make it a criminal offence in Great Britain to publish or distribute written matter, or use in any public place or at any public meeting, language which is threatening, abusive or insulting and likely, having regard to all the circumstances, to stir up racial hatred against any racial group in Great Britain. In Northern Ireland, to which the Race Relations Act does not extend, the Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act (Northern Ireland) 1970 makes it an offence to stir up hatred against, or arouse fear of, any section of the public on grounds of religious belief, colour, race or ethnic or national origin.

12. Section 2 of the Ireland Act 1949 which was passed at the time when Ireland ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth and severed its last formal links with the British Crown, provides that Ireland is not to be treated as a foreign country and that its citizens resident in the United Kingdom, while they could no longer be regarded as Commonwealth citizens, are not to be regarded as aliens.

OBSERVATIONS

13. The Group noted that these provisions reflected an intention on the part of each country to accord to each other's nationals special treatment - better in certain important respects than that subsequently provided for through the obligations of their common EC membership. At the same time the Group recognised that the ~~differences of approach~~ ^{two approaches} result in certain ~~anomalies~~ ^{differences} which are commented upon in greater detail in later paragraphs of this report.

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III. SPECIFIC RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

(a) VOTING RIGHTS

IRELAND

(1) National Elections

14. At present, only resident Irish citizens may vote at elections to the Dail, at presidential elections and at any referendum to amend the Constitution (the results of which are binding).

15. All resident citizens of the European Community may register to vote at the election of Irish representatives to the European Parliament.

16. At their meeting in December 1980, the then Taoiseach told the Prime Minister that, following examination of the constitutional, legal and other aspects of the matter, he was prepared to present proposals to effect an extension of the Irish franchise to permit United Kingdom citizens to vote at elections to the Dail. The Irish side said that it was the intention of the present Irish Government to introduce legislation to this effect.

17. The Irish side were hopeful that legislation to extend the voting rights in Dail elections to United Kingdom citizens would not be found to be unconstitutional. If their hopes are realised, then the possibility of the extension of voting rights in other elections by legislation can be considered as can a similar extension of the right to stand for election. They noted that comparable franchise provisions in the USA constitution conferring voting rights on citizens were found by the US Courts to be incapable of extension to non citizens, but the Irish side were hopeful that the Irish Supreme Court would not follow this precedent.

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18. It was noted that before signing a Bill and promulgating it as law the President of Ireland may refer it to the Supreme Court for an opinion as to its constitutionality. It was the view of Irish officials that a Bill to extend the franchise would probably be referred to the Court in this way. This would forestall a situation arising in which the results of an election were challenged on the grounds that the franchise had been extended unconstitutionally, and as such would be highly desirable.

19. The British side welcomed the Irish intention to introduce legislation which would, if passed, result in greater reciprocity in voting rights at national elections. They noted however, the possible constitutional difficulties in the way of such legislation.

(2) Local Elections

20. All qualified persons regardless of nationality may register to vote in Irish local elections.

UNITED KINGDOM

(1) National Elections

21. The voting rights of Irish citizens resident in the United Kingdom are identical to those enjoyed by British subjects, including Commonwealth citizens, as far as the franchise used at national elections in the United Kingdom is concerned i.e. elections to the Westminster Parliament, the election of United Kingdom representatives to the European Parliament, and at such referenda as have been held. There are certain statutory disqualifications which are common to British subjects and Irish citizens, and only those citizens entered on an electoral register are entitled to vote. Residence is a necessary qualification for electoral registration. This is not defined as far as the electoral law in Great Britain is concerned, but the courts have indicated that "overnight" residence on the qualifying date (10 October) is not sufficient and a degree of "constructive" residence is required.

22. The residence requirement for electoral registration in Northern Ireland is specified in legislation as being 3 months continuous residence preceding the qualifying date. This definition of residence applies equally to people coming from Great Britain as to people originating in other countries.

(2) Local Elections

23. As far as local elections are concerned, the franchise in Great Britain is, with the exception of Peers of the Realm who cannot vote at Parliamentary elections, identical to that in use in national elections and, in practical terms, only one register is prepared. The British Government has reserved its position with regard to the proposal to extend the franchise at local elections to all resident Community citizens as suggested by the EEC Heads of Government in 1974, so Irish citizens resident in Great Britain remain in a special position compared to other non-British subjects.

24. In Northern Ireland, the franchise for local and Assembly elections is confined to persons born in Northern Ireland or who have been continuously resident in the United Kingdom for the previous 7 years, provided that they are British subjects or were on the Northern Ireland Register of Electors in 1962 and have resided in Northern Ireland for the 3 months preceding the qualifying date. In effect, this excludes a number of Irish citizens and British subjects resident in Northern Ireland from voting at local and Assembly elections and comparison between the different registers in use in Northern Ireland suggests that about ~~5,000/6,000~~ ^{5/6,000 people may be affected in this way.} potential electors may be ~~disfranchised in this way.~~

(b) QUALIFICATION TO STAND FOR ELECTION

(1) Legislature (Lower House)

IRELAND

25. All resident and qualified non-citizens may stand at local elections. Only citizens may stand for election to the Dail, but any extension of the right to vote at elections for the Dail would not automatically apply to the right to stand at such elections. In the case of European Parliament elections,

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all resident EC citizens may vote but only persons entitled to be elected to the Dail may be eligible for election.

UNITED KINGDOM

26. In Great Britain, any British subject (including Commonwealth citizens) or Irish citizen of 21 years or over and not otherwise disqualified may, irrespective of residence, be nominated for election to the Westminster Parliament or the European Parliament. There are certain residential requirements, however, for election to, and service on, local authorities. Essentially these require either residence in (or, in the case of the lowest tier of local government in England and Wales, residence adjacent to) the electoral area, or employment in (or, as before, adjacent to) the area. In Northern Ireland the qualifications for candidature at Westminster and European elections are the same as those which apply in Great Britain. So far as local and Assembly elections are concerned, much the same residential qualifications apply as in Great Britain; but candidates must also be British subjects or have been on the Northern Ireland Register of Electors in 1962.

(2) Legislature (Upper House)

27. As far as membership of the Upper House of the legislature is concerned, only Irish citizens may sit in the Seanad. An Irish citizen may sit and vote in the House of Lords provided that, like a member of the House of Commons, he takes an oath (or affirmation) of allegiance to the British Sovereign. There is no requirement that members of the Dail and Seanad should take an oath of allegiance of any kind.

(c) QUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC SERVICE POSITIONS

28. As for the opportunities which citizens of each country resident in the other have to serve in the public services of their host country, the position is as follows:-

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(1) Civil Service

29. There is no statutory barrier to the employment of non-citizens in the Irish Civil Service. However the Irish Civil Service Commissioners are empowered to insert in the regulations for any competition held by them a nationality clause, limiting the competition to Irish citizens. Such a clause is normally inserted in the case of open competition examinations. It is not normally inserted in the case of competitions for professional and technical posts.

30. In the United Kingdom, Irish citizens have exactly the same rights of access to all positions in the Home Civil Service as do British subjects. Irish citizens may also join the Diplomatic Service, but before appointment they must undertake to become UK citizens as soon as possible after appointment if not already such.

31. Entry to the Northern Ireland Civil Service is not statutorily limited to British subjects. However the Northern Ireland Civil Service Commission makes rules restricting entry to British subjects except when exemption is justified in the public interest (usually when professional or technical skills are required).

(2) Local Government Service

32. Under the Irish system which is centralised and operates on the basis of regulations made by the Minister for the Environment, no nationality requirement is imposed either in the competitions held by the Local Appointments Commission (relating to local authority professional and technical posts, Chief Executive posts - such as County and City Managers, Town Clerks - and certain other statutory provisions) or in those held by the local authorities themselves for clerical/administrative posts.

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33. In the United Kingdom appointment to local government posts is the responsibility of the local authority concerned.

(3) Armed and Defence Forces

34. There is in general no legislative bar to an alien enlisting in the Irish Defence Forces but it would be expected that a candidate should ordinarily reside in Ireland. On the recruitment of officers, the Defence Act 1954 (section 41) states:

"each of the following persons shall be eligible to be appointed to be an officer of the Permanent Defence Force or the Reserve Defence Force, that is to say:-

- (a) Irish citizens
- (b) any other persons specially approved by the Minister".

The Irish side stated that the approval referred to at (b) would normally be given in the case of officer recruitment where specialised technical knowledge is required.

35. In the United Kingdom, there are residence requirements which apply equally to British subjects and to Irish citizens. Recruits who are Irish citizens are, however, required to apply for registration as U.K. citizens in order to enable them to obtain a British passport. This is a practical requirement which facilitates overseas travelling arrangements and does not prejudice recruits' status as Irish citizens.

36. There is no provision in either United Kingdom or Irish law for compulsory service in the armed forces. It was noted, however, that when conscription had been in force in the United Kingdom it was applied to Irish citizens resident in Great Britain in the same way as citizens of the United Kingdom. The Irish side noted that this had been a sensitive issue in the past and would be so again if conscription were ever reintroduced within the United Kingdom in future.

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(4) Police

37. There is no restriction on the recruitment of non-Irish citizens to serve in the Garda Siochana.

38. There are no nationality restrictions which would prevent the recruitment of Irish citizens into the police forces of the United Kingdom, provided that they are otherwise suitable and make a declaration of allegiance.

(d) THE LEGAL SYSTEM

(1) Jury Service

39. In Ireland eligibility to serve on a jury is confined to citizens between 18 and 70 who are registered as Dail electors. U.K. citizens are not therefore eligible at present. The Irish side saw no difficulty in granting eligibility for jury service to U.K. citizens by changing the law - a change which would not create any difficulty under the Constitution.

40. In the United Kingdom, lists of jurors are prepared from the local government electoral register. In Great Britain Irish citizens qualify on an equal basis with British subjects.

41. The obligation to serve on a jury in Northern Ireland is restricted to those who are eligible to vote at local elections there.

(2) The Legal Profession

42. The Irish and United Kingdom Bars have agreed reciprocal arrangements for those already qualified; there are no nationality restrictions on those seeking qualification. There are no similar reciprocal arrangements as far as qualified solicitors are concerned, but in neither country is access to the profession confined on nationality grounds.

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(3) Judicial Appointments

43. There are no nationality qualifications for prospective appointees to the Bench and judiciary in either country. No person may hold judicial office in the United Kingdom, however, without taking the Oath (or affirmation) of allegiance to the Sovereign.

(e) SOCIAL RIGHTS

44. The Group considered the arrangements which exist in both countries to provide for the basic social needs of the resident population, including education, social service, housing and employment.

45. Neither country imposes any citizenship qualifications for the provision of education, save that ex-patriate citizens of both countries are favoured with other EC countries in fees for tertiary studies.

46. Neither country imposes citizenship qualifications on eligibility for local authority housing. Local authorities in both countries sometimes impose residence qualifications for public housing and give preference to applicants from the immediate locality, but these rules do not involve considerations of citizenship.

47. As for social security, EC regulations in force in both countries provide equal access to the basic contributory and non contributory benefits. Certain special benefits do require proof of residence but do not relate to citizenship.

48. The Irish scheme of last resort is the supplementary welfare allowance. Every person whose means are insufficient to meet his needs and those of his dependants is entitled to this benefit. In Great Britain, the supplementary benefit scheme is available on an equal basis to newly arrived Irish citizens as to all British subjects. ~~In Northern Ireland a person arriving from the South or anywhere else outside the United Kingdom does not qualify for~~

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supplementary benefit until he has been resident in Northern Ireland for a period of 5 years immediately preceding the date of claim. The British side stated that this requirement did not prevent people in urgent need who were newly arrived in Northern Ireland from receiving assistance, because regulations allow for urgent case payments for those who have no statutory entitlement to benefit.

49. Equal access to employment rights is guaranteed under the provisions of various EC Directives. Citizens of either country working in the other have equal rights under the legislation relating to trade unions, employment protection, sex discrimination and equal pay.

50. The Group noted that a Double Taxation Convention expressly forbids any differentiation in the field of taxation between Irish citizens and United Kingdom citizens. It was noted also that a British subject resident in Ireland receives preferential treatment over other aliens in that section 153 of the Income Tax Act 1967 (whereby Irish citizens living abroad may claim certain relief on income arising in Ireland) applies also to British subjects.

51. In both countries, the obligation to pay local rates depends entirely on occupation of property. The obligation under Irish law to pay rates on private dwellings was abolished in 1977/78.

(f) CONSULAR PROTECTION

52. The Irish side placed on record their appreciation of the consular protection given to Irish citizens by British missions in third countries. They stated that they had been helped considerably by British Diplomatic and Consular Missions in a number of third countries where there is no resident Irish representative and also in countries where there is resident Irish representation but where distance or difficulty of communication may hinder the mission in dealing

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with an emergency situation involving an Irish citizen. In all cases the Irish authorities tried to restrict requests for assistance to emergency situations only in recognition of the fact that British Missions should not be expected to deal with routine consular matters on their behalf. Both sides hoped that the same level of assistance and cooperation would be forthcoming in the future. The British side confirmed the intention of continuing to offer, within staffing resources, the same degree of cooperation, and the Irish side welcomed this.

(g) Freedom of Movement

53. Ireland and the United Kingdom constitute a Common Travel Area. In Ireland UK citizens born in the United Kingdom do not have to register under the Irish Aliens Act no matter how long they intend to stay in Ireland; they do not require permission to work or engage in business; they may not be refused leave to land, even if coming from a third country, and they cannot be deported. Certain Irish citizens may be deported from or refused entry to the United Kingdom but many are completely exempt from immigration control and none has to register as an alien nor seek permission to work no matter how long he intends to stay.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

54. As is evident from the detailed material in this report, and apart from the differences summarised in the following paragraph, citizens of the United Kingdom resident in Ireland and Irish citizens resident in the United Kingdom enjoy virtually all the rights and privileges of citizens of the host country, reflecting the unique relationship between the two countries.

55. The main differences can therefore be summarised as follows:

- (a) In the United Kingdom, Irish citizens are treated differently from UK citizens in respect of the following matters:

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- (i) Northern Ireland only: voting at local and Assembly elections (para. 24)
 - (ii) Northern Ireland only: right to stand for election to local authorities (para. 26)
 - (iii) Northern Ireland only: public service positions (para. 31)
 - (iv) Northern Ireland only: the right/obligation to serve on juries (para. 41)
 - (v) Northern Ireland only: statutory entitlement to supplementary benefit (para. 48)
 - (vi) United Kingdom: deportation and refusal of entry (para. 53)
- (b) In Ireland, United Kingdom citizens are treated differently from Irish citizens in respect of the following matters:
- (i) the right to vote at Dail elections, presidential elections and referenda (paras. 14-18)
 - (ii) the right to stand for election to the Dail (para. 25)
 - (iii) public service positions (para. 29)
 - (iv) the right/obligation to serve on juries (para. 39)
 - (v) treatment under the Aliens Act (para. 53).

56. ~~The Group noted that three anomalies identified in paragraphs 23, 25 and 41 (voting at local and Assembly elections in Northern Ireland, right to stand for election to Northern Ireland local authorities, Northern Ireland jury service) stemmed from the requirements contained in the Electoral Law (N.I.) Act, 1962, and that all three could be removed by amendment of that legislation. The Irish side questioned the justification for these anomalies and urged that they be rectified at an early opportunity. The British side took note of the Irish view and pointed out that any consideration of changes in the electoral provisions would have to take place in a context wider than that of this joint study. The Irish side also expressed the hope that early action would be taken about the position on eligibility for public service in~~

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~~Northern Ireland; the British side for their part noted the restrictions on the eligibility of British citizens for entry into the Irish Civil Service. The Irish side noted the liability of certain Irish citizens to deportation from and refusal of entry to Great Britain and hoped that the relevant provisions would be kept under review. The British side noted that the exemption from Orders under the Aliens Act did not extend to U.K. citizens not born in the United Kingdom.~~

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14 October, 1981.

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JOINT STUDY ON SECURITY MATTERSReport of Joint Study GroupBackground

1. Following discussions between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach in Dublin on 8 December, 1980, the Study Group were given the following terms of reference:-

- a. To consider and make recommendations on the scope for increased co-operation as fellow members of the western Community, over the arrangements made by each of the two countries to ensure their security internationally in modern circumstances.
- b. To review co-operation between the authorities of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Ireland concerning the administration and working of the criminal law.

2. The Study Group has held two full meetings, in Dublin on 11 March and in London on 13 April. This report, agreed by the leaders of the British and Irish sides at a further meeting in Dublin on 19th August, 1981, sets out the main points raised in the Study Group's discussions.

Ambit of the Studies

3. It had been agreed by the Steering Group for the Joint Studies that existing cross border police co-operation would not be the subject of substantive discussion by the Study Group on Security Matters. With this in mind the Study Group exchanged notes on the following areas where there appeared to be possible opportunities for increasing co-operation:-

Part (a) of terms of reference

- I. Maritime Emergencies and Safety
- II. Movements of Aircraft
- ~~III. Transmission of Information on Shipping and Aircraft~~
- ~~III~~ IV. Civil Defence
- IV. Military Matters

Part (b) of terms of reference

- V ~~VI~~. Administration and Working of the Criminal Law
- VI ~~VII~~. The Problem of Insufficient Public Understanding of the Present Level of Security Co-operation
- VII ~~VIII~~. Methods of Ensuring that those who Commit Terrorist Offences are successfully brought to Justice.

Only the main points emerging in these notes are summarised in this report on the basis that each side has available the full supporting documentation.

General Observations

4. As will be seen from the later parts of this report a wide range of areas of activity has been identified in which for many years there has been routine co-operation of a practical kind between the relevant British and Irish authorities. The Study Group noted that such contacts and co-operation were valued, and agreed that there was scope in many of these areas for developing existing links. In most cases this could best be left to those directly concerned.

External Aspects of Security

5. Maritime Emergencies and Safety. Under this heading the following main points emerged:-

a. Air/Sea search and rescue. Each country's maritime search organisation includes a military element, in the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and the Irish Air Corps. British support for longer range search and rescue operations is valued by the Irish. Liaison visits by the units concerned recommenced in 1979, after a break of 11 years, and it is hoped to build on these links with a view to co-ordination of rescue activities and joint exercises. The Study Group considered that such further development of the existing co-operation would be of mutual benefit and should be encouraged.

b. Hydrographic Survey. There has been a significant measure of cooperation over many years in relation to hydrographic surveys and charting of waters off the Irish coast which has been of considerable mutual value. The principal activity has been by the British Hydrographer of the Navy which since the 1920's has carried out surveys of the Southern and Western Approaches to Ireland and, periodically some inshore surveys, by agreement with the Irish authorities. In this context a major survey of Irish harbours was undertaken in the period 1963-1971.

The Hydrographer's current programme includes surveys off the west and south coasts outside territorial limits, to between 6 and 10 miles from the Irish coast, for completion by 1983. Other surveys of Irish waters and harbours are undertaken on a limited scale, on behalf of harbour authorities and other interested bodies such as the Commissioners of Irish Lights and oil companies. Data from the various sources cited and from reports by merchant shipping and by the Irish Naval Service are pooled for the purposes of revision of charts. In both countries, the inadequacies of some charts and the shortage of resources for civil hydrographic surveys are acutely felt.

The British Hydrographer is currently undertaking a full modernisation of charts of Irish waters in close consultation with the Irish authorities.

The Irish Government have received a report from the Irish National Board for Science and Technology concerning the development of an Irish hydrographic survey programme and will give full consideration, inter alia, to the possibility of further co-operation with the British Hydrographer.

The Study Group considered that the agencies directly concerned should be encouraged to develop further the long-standing co-operation in this field.

c. Fishery Protection. Since the introduction on 1 January 1977 of British and Irish fishery limits extending to 200 miles or median lines, the fishery protection forces of the two countries have co-operated in the patrolling of over-lapping areas of the fishery zones. Arrangements are now being made under which each country will notify the other when a vessel spotted fishing illegally moves from the waters of the one to those of the other. The officials directly concerned have had useful discussions on enforcement and conservation, and see scope for expanding co-operation on these increasingly important matters. The Study Group agreed that this should be pursued by direct contacts between the authorities concerned.

6. Movements of Aircraft. The discussions under this heading focussed on the arrangements whereby RAF aircraft might divert to Irish airfields in an emergency, and on the procedures for obtaining diplomatic clearance for overflights of Irish territory by RAF aircraft unrelated to operational security co-operation.

a. Emergency Diversions. The RAF maintain a system under which 10 airfields in the United Kingdom are designated and equipped as Master Diversion airfields for use by diverted aircraft or in an emergency. Where adverse weather conditions or the nature of an emergency preclude the use of a designated airfield, U.K. military aircraft are able, if necessary, to request emergency diversions to Irish airfields through the appropriate air traffic control channels. They will continue to enjoy this facility. The question was raised as to whether the existing arrangements would need to be developed or improved. The British side indicated that they were not at present seeking such improvements and it was agreed that this possibility could be explored in future, as necessary.

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b. Diplomatic Clearance. Existing procedures work well for handling block bids and for obtaining clearance at short notice for an average of 25 overflights per month of Irish territory by RAF aircraft, mainly transport aircraft en route to the United States and the Caribbean. The Irish side indicated that under existing legislation it would not be possible to waive diplomatic clearance for such flights but that they could consider whether in cases where flights additional to those included in block bookings were required at short notice, it might be possible where appropriate to convey diplomatic clearance.

~~7. Transmission of Information~~

~~The Study Group took note of long-standing arrangements for the transmission of information about movements of certain fishing vessels, the exchange and control of meteorological information in time of war, and the control in wartime of radio transmissions and navigation lights. It was noted that these arrangements continued in operation. Certain possible extensions and improvements were identified under one heading. It was agreed that pursuit of these and other discreet contacts on all aspects of the various arrangements would be for the technical levels concerned.~~

78. Civil Defence

The Study Group noted that co-operation and contacts between the civil defence organisations of the two countries was longstanding and had embraced training activities, participation by observers in the respective national exercises related to warnings and monitoring of nuclear fallout, agreements on exchange of information and other contacts. It was also noted that the organisations concerned would welcome the further development of co-operation. The Study Group considered that this was desirable and could be pursued at technical level.

British proposals to update a 1965 agreement on the exchange of information about nuclear attacks and their effects are under consideration by the competent Irish authorities. It is hoped to arrange a meeting later this year for detailed discussion of the procedures.

Each country plans to send observers to the other's warning and monitoring exercise in November, 1981. The possibility of conducting a joint exercise in March, 1982 is under consideration.

The Study Group agreed that there could be particular advantage in possible co-operation in respect of the civil defence function in both parts of Ireland and that the scope and nature of such co-operation could be explored in contacts between appropriate authorities.

~~8.9.~~ Military Matters

In the context of arrangements for overseas training generally, members of all three arms of the Irish Defence Forces have attended training courses in the United Kingdom: in particular all deck officers of the Irish Naval Service have received their initial training at Dartmouth; and Irish Army personnel attended courses in 1980 connected with the purchase of the Scorpion Tank and 105mm gun. A substantial increase in attendance at courses in military and commercial establishments is expected in 1981.

~~9.10.~~ Liaison in other fields is maintained as necessary by ad hoc visits.

In view of the interest and involvement of British and Irish forces in United Nations forces, it was agreed that there was scope here for discussions.

~~10.11.~~ The United Kingdom has always been a major supplier of equipment for the Irish Defence Forces and it is expected that this will continue to be the case in the future. The value of defence equipment involved is about £6 million a year and the range of equipment involved in 1980 was quite wide. A United

Kingdom Defence Sales Organisation team visited Dublin in March 1981 to review ways of developing co-operation and some possibilities were identified, in particular equipment for the offshore patrol vessels which the Irish Navy are building. It was also suggested that it might be possible for Irish contracts personnel to attend some Ministry of Defence contracts courses if the Irish authorities so wish. In deciding on the types of equipment to be purchased, the Irish authorities regard it as important to have freedom to choose the equipment which is regarded as the most suitable for the Defence Forces, taking all relevant factors into consideration. As a normal rule, however, British manufactured equipment would be fully considered in making such a choice. The Study Group considered that it would be mutually advantageous to continue the existing satisfactory liaison between the competent authorities in both countries.

11 ~~12.~~ Administration and Working of the Criminal Law

The criminal law was understood to comprise the creation of offences and penalties, the prosecution of offenders (including powers of investigation of offences), and the implementation of penalties.

The Study Group noted that the criminal law in both parts of Ireland shared an origin in the common law and in pre-1921 statutes and that there are close similarities in many facets of judicial practice. As well, there are certain similarities of population, social conditions, attitudes and numbers of offenders which may make some comparisons between North and South more useful than between either and a much larger or quite different jurisdiction e.g. England and Wales, or Scotland. The Group considered that, having regard to these similarities there would be mutual benefits from consultations between those concerned with these matters in the two parts of the island and that arrangements should be made for such exchanges of view. These exchanges would be concerned with the normal run of criminal law questions, leaving matters involving terrorism to be discussed separately.

The Study Group noted that certain aspects of criminal law and procedure were under active consideration in Dublin, and that a Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure had recently reported for England and Wales. It was agreed that there could be mutual advantage in discussions between those directly concerned with these matters in both countries.

Areas of common concern which could be valuable subjects for an exchange of views and information include the treatment of young offenders; cross border arrangements for the supervision of mentally-disordered offenders; police powers of search and arrest and problems associated with sexual offences and offences of indecency.

The Study Group envisaged that a channel of communication should be established between the Department of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General in Dublin and the Home Office, Northern Ireland Office, the Law Officers' Department in the United Kingdom, with the object of exchanging views on a continuing rather than a one-off or ad hoc basis.

12.13. The Problem of Insufficient Public Understanding of the Present Level of Security Co-operation.

The Study Group also considered the problem of insufficient understanding of the level of cross-border security co-operation. In the context of the totality of relationships which form the framework of the joint studies, it is important not only that there should be effective co-operation between the Garda Siochana and the Police Forces of the United Kingdom, but that the relationship between these Police Forces and between the authorities of the two countries should be perceived by the public to be effective in preventing crime and in catching, prosecuting and punishing those responsible for crime in both jurisdictions. It was agreed that there has been a degree of deliberate misrepresentation of the sincerity of the Irish Government's commitment to deal with terrorism. However

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it was accepted that many well-intentioned people in Northern Ireland may not have the same understanding of the true position as the British Government who fully accept the extent and effectiveness of the efforts being made by the Irish authorities in the fight against terrorism.

It was agreed that one of the reasons for this is that, for good reasons, details of operational co-operation between the police forces are not made public. The public is then unaware when security successes owe much to cross-border co-operation.

The Irish authorities have for some years past arranged for parties of journalists from Northern Ireland and Britain to be conducted on extensive tours of the border by members of the Garda Siochana and the Irish Army. The authorities are satisfied that these tours have contributed in some measure to convincing people in these islands of the Irish Government's wholehearted commitment to deal with violence. These tours will be continued. In addition, the Garda Siochana have been successful particularly in the past two years in uncovering caches of arms, ammunition, explosives etc, and these seizures have received very wide media coverage. The Gardai will ensure that publicity will continue to be afforded to such finds subject of course to security requirements.

The Study Group gave further careful consideration to this matter but have found it difficult to identify additional measures that might be adopted to deal effectively with the problem. Measures in the publicity field have to be very carefully judged to ensure that they do not endanger lives, that they do not affect the flow of information to either police force and that they are not otherwise counter-productive.

It was moreover accepted that a major arms find in the South or a successful prosecution for a serious offence committed in Northern Ireland of a person apprehended in the South would be likely to have greater impact on public opinion than a great deal of briefing.

The Study Group considered that it would be helpful to the interests of both Governments to keep this problem under close review.

13 14. Methods of ensuring that those who commit terrorist offences are successfully brought to justice.

The Study Group took note of the strongly felt desire on the part of the great majority of people within these islands that persons who committed crimes of violence should not be able to escape prosecution and conviction, whether because of inability to secure or have brought forward satisfactory evidence of their guilt, their exploitation of the border to evade arrest, a claim on their part to be acting for political motives or otherwise. The gathering of evidence and the apprehension of suspected persons are matters for operational co-operation which it has been agreed should be pursued through the normal channels and would not be considered by the Group. It was agreed that where suspected persons were apprehended, the principal obstacle in securing convictions, as distinct from obtaining extradition, was in securing evidence that was admissible and sufficient to discharge the necessary burden of proof.

The British side drew attention to the view widely held in the United Kingdom that the Irish authorities should change their stance on extradition for terrorist offences, under which a person could in effect secure immunity from extradition by claiming to belong to a terrorist organisation with political objectives. The Irish side pointed out that Irish law in relation to extradition for political offences is in line with the practice of States and with generally accepted principles of international law. It was the Irish view that the enactment of legislation to permit extradition for such offences would represent a departure from those principles and would consequently be repugnant to the Irish Constitution. An amendment of the Constitution would therefore be required which could only be effected by a favourable vote of a majority of the people voting in a referendum.

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The Irish side concluded that, in current circumstances and taking all aspects of the matter into consideration, the balance of advantage - in terms of promoting peace, reconciliation and stability and improving the relations between the peoples of the two countries - is against the promotion of any such constitutional amendment. In view of the acknowledged desire within these islands that those committing crimes of violence should not escape conviction, both sides expressed the hope that more effective ways might be found of bringing such criminals to justice.

The Study Group agreed in any case on the importance of improving the gathering of evidence and other aspects of the operation of the reciprocal extra-territorial legislation which both sides wish to see used effectively. On this it was agreed that the police and the Law Officers' Department in both countries should hold early consultations to examine what scope exists for such improvements.

14 October 1981.

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JOINT STUDIES: ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Report of the Joint Study Group

Introduction

1. As well as the general terms of reference for the Joint Studies, agreed at the meeting of the Joint Steering Group on 30 January 1981, the Study Group had the following specific terms of reference, agreed at the same meeting:-

'To examine the scope for still closer economic and technical cooperation, both bilaterally and in the context of membership of the European Community, including the possibilities for:-

- i. resolving differences, and removing obstacles which may inhibit economic or social development;
- ii. reducing the impact of the land and sea frontiers on the everyday lives of the peoples of both countries;
- iii. further facilitating trade and communications;
- iv. mutually beneficial collaboration in respect of industrial and regional development and energy;
- v. harmonising and/or co-ordinating the position of the two countries in multilateral economic and technical organisations.'

2. The Joint Study Group met in Dublin on 12 March and 15 September and in London on 14 April. ~~In addition to these meetings, the two sides exchanged papers on the subjects considered.~~

3. This report on the results of the Group's deliberations to date is in two parts. Part I describes the general scope and conclusions of the Group's work. Part II lists the particular subjects studied, and the conclusions arrived at on them.

Part I : General

Existing Cooperation

4. Before their first meeting both sides had conducted surveys across a wide range of governmental activity which clearly showed that a substantial amount of economic and technical cooperation already exists between the two countries. Many subjects are coordinated multilaterally under EC programmes or by international agencies such as the International Energy Agency. But the Group were glad to note the large amount of bilateral work between public, semi-state and private bodies. Indeed, in many instances the effectiveness of existing bilateral contacts is a notable manifestation of the unique relationship. They agreed that in areas in which cooperation was already satisfactory there would in general be no advantage in disturbing existing working arrangements.

5. In fact, substantial progress was made during the period of the Joint Studies by two working parties, namely the Interconnection Working Party (Electricity) and the Communications Group (transport, tourism and related matters). These groups had been set up and were operating under the Steering Group on Anglo-Irish Economic Cooperation, a committee of senior officials set up following agreement between Prime Minister Callaghan and Taoiseach Lynch in September 1977. The Group foresaw the need for the continuance of a senior official body, having a similar role, ~~of review and initiation~~, within the framework to be proposed by the Study Group on Possible New Institutional Structures. The existing official level Steering Group or a comparable body might become a sub-group of an institutional structure at Ministerial level and would pursue the matters of economic cooperation which would be of interest to ~~the Ministerial~~ *that* institution.

6. Closer cooperation could open the way to greater and mutually advantageous rationalisation and harmonisation of effort in a range of development fields notably between North and South. In particular co-ordinated or joint efforts could be of advantage to deprived border areas. This matter could be examined at an appropriate stage in the future.

Multilateral Cooperation

7. In accordance with their mandate, the Group also made an examination of the scope for harmonising and/or co-ordinating the position of the two countries in multilateral economic and technical organisations.

8. In many cases a degree of harmonisation already takes place through the regular contacts between member States of the Community arranged on the occasion of meetings of virtually all international economic and technical organisations.

9. Given the frequency of such co-ordination à dix, it was not considered desirable to consider rigidly systematic meetings between British and Irish delegations to international fora. It was not felt that bilateral harmonisation should take place for its own sake. Its desirability should be objectively and pragmatically assessed on each side and agreed upon when found advantageous.

10. In such cases it was the Group's view that it should normally be the case that harmonisation and/or co-ordination should take place between Irish and United Kingdom delegations to the international organisation in question, without excluding the possibility that the gravity of the issues arising might lead both sides to agree to meet at another level for the same purpose.

Range of Subjects Studied

11. The Group agreed that in examining the scope for still closer economic and technical cooperation it would be artificial to group subjects solely according to the five headings of the terms of

reference and that it would be more appropriate to group related areas together, using the terms of reference as a broad guideline. It soon became clear that, given the almost limitless range of potential subjects, we would have to restrict the range of our deliberations. The Group therefore agreed to limit their study of specific subjects to those in which one side - or both sides - had a particular interest or particularly wished to see closer cooperation. Given the technical nature of most of the subjects, it was also clear that a forum as general as the Group was not suitable for detailed discussion of them. ~~Considerations of confidentiality also restricted access to technical advice.~~ The Group therefore concluded that they should concentrate on suggesting how best substantial cooperation on these subjects might be carried forward, and discussed them only to the extent necessary for this.

12. Among the subjects to which the Group had thus limited their study there was a wide variation in importance. In some the potential benefits were slight and it was agreed that there would be little advantage in their being considered by Ministers. In others, there was agreement that existing cooperation was sufficient and that the topics were being extensively pursued by appropriate bodies. Within both of these groups it was possible to identify problems which had arisen, but the Group were satisfied that they could be handled at working level and so agreed to leave them for resolution to the appropriate officials.

13. This process led to the Group's singling out and discussing at more length a number of topics to which they thought an impetus could be given in the context of the Joint Studies. It was therefore decided to recommend to the Steering Group a short list of subjects to which the attention of the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach should particularly be drawn:-

Energy Matters;
Oil Spillage and Marine Pollution;
Direct Broadcasting by Satellite;
Animal and Plant Health;
Lough Foyle and the Territorial Sea.

PART II : Specific Subjects Studied

(A) The Group's findings on the topics listed in the previous paragraph are as follows:-

i. Energy

14. The Group agreed that collaboration on energy questions would be to the mutual advantage of both countries.

15. The economic and technical factors which have to be taken into account in assessing the possible benefit of electricity interconnection between the two countries have been examined by the Interconnection Working Party (IWP) which was set up with Ministerial approval in April 1980. The Group agreed that in considering the conclusions of the IWP the two Governments would also wish to take wider considerations into account.

16. The IWP in its report concluded:-

"(i) North/South Interconnection. Restoration as a matter of priority was highly desirable; it would provide the cheapest and quickest way of bringing benefits to both North and South. Questions of security were outside the terms of reference of the Working Party.

(ii) Other interconnections between North and South. There appeared to be no case for proceeding either with a multi-link scheme at 110 KV or with a submarine interconnection.

(iii) Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) - Electricity Supply Board (ESB) link. On the assumptions used, and on the basis that oil prices rise by a factor of 2-3 in real terms by the year 2000, a link would be economic. It would chiefly benefit the Electricity Supply Board. However, assumptions on both capital costs and fossil fuel prices were subject to a number of uncertainties. Final judgement would

depend on the discount rate used by the utilities; and Governments would have regard for public expenditure considerations.

(iv) Northern Ireland Electricity Service (NIES) - South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) link. Considerable further work was needed before any final decision could be taken."

17. The discovery and exploitation of natural gas off Kinsale has introduced the possibility of cross-border gas as well as electricity interconnection. The economics of a pipeline to Belfast are being examined by the Department of Commerce (Belfast) using information made available by the Department of Industry and Energy (Dublin). The authorities in Belfast have employed consultants who have completed a preliminary engineering study and are in the course of completing a market evaluation. Contact on development is being maintained between the two Departments.

18. A relevant factor in relation to electricity and gas inter-connection is the possible availability of E.C. assistance.

19. Both countries are devoting resources to the development of energy technologies which would reduce dependence on imported oil. This is an objective to which both countries are committed along with their partners in the European Community and the International Energy Agency. It may therefore be appropriate to work together, in the first instance, through multinational co-operative programmes. The interests of the two countries are, however, particularly close together in the exploitation of certain renewable resources e.g. wind energy and biomass and on fluidised bed combustion for coal. Exchanges on these topics will continue between the appropriate governmental and non-governmental bodies.

ii. Oil Spillages and other Marine Pollution

20. The Group agreed that, in view of the substantial common interest in preventing pollution of the Irish Sea, questions of oil spillages and any other marine pollution should be included

as a priority subject in the joint study on economic cooperation. Both sides would welcome continuation of the contacts already established, with a view to the exchange of information and the co-ordination of response to marine pollution emergencies. Besides oil counter-pollution measures, discussion might also extend, if desired, to any questions of legitimate concern about discharges from the land on either side into the Irish Sea.

iii. Direct Broadcasting by Satellite

21. The Group agreed that the broadcasting of television and radio programmes direct to the home from a satellite (direct broadcasting by satellite or DBS) is a subject that is likely to assume importance in the future. It is currently a subject of interest to many countries. Some, including France and Germany, have announced plans to establish DBS services from about 1984 onwards.

22. In the United Kingdom the Home Office has recently published a study of the implications of establishing a United Kingdom direct broadcasting satellite by about 1985, which would be the earliest practicable date, or by about 1990. The study covers the technical, financial and resource implications of such a service, the implications for broadcasting in the United Kingdom, the possible industrial benefits, and likely developments in Europe. The study aims to provide a factual summary of the various options and their implications on which decisions about a United Kingdom DBS service can be based.

23. One of the issues that the report addresses is the possibility of co-operation between the United Kingdom and other countries in the construction and/or operation of direct broadcasting satellites. The United Kingdom indicated that it would welcome any views which the Irish Government might have on it, and indeed discussions about the issues which DBS raises for both countries. The Irish side agreed that discussions should take place on whatever possibilities there might be in this area.

iv. Animal and Plant Health

24. For geographic reasons there are obviously many common interests between the two countries on matters concerning animal and (to a lesser degree) plant health. Because of the geographical separation of the island of Ireland there are also common interests within it, e.g. in safeguarding against the introduction of exotic diseases, in the monitoring of animal health on both sides of the land frontier, in controlling animal movement across it.

25. Insofar as existing co-operation is concerned, consultation and co-operation between the two countries both formal and informal are exceptionally good. Meetings between officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland and the Department of Agriculture in Dublin take place frequently at various levels. They cover such topics as the arrangements for trade between the countries in the light of variations in animal and plant health, the approach to EC proposals and consultation on eradication and control of endemic diseases and on methods of preventing importation of major epizootic diseases.

26. It was agreed that animal and plant health is an important subject and that it is clearly essential that the departments concerned should continually strive to maintain the highest possible standards, particularly for certain animal diseases. These matters often require rapid action by the departments concerned and the consultation arrangements between them should have the flexibility necessary to meet this requirement. The Group thought that the existing arrangements, which are informal but close, were effective, and that the relevant Departments should continue to keep closely in touch and assess continually whether or not the arrangements could be improved. The Irish side suggested that the possibility of establishing formal institutions in the field of animal and plant health to operate on an all-Ireland basis could be the subject of further study.

v. Lough Foyle and the Territorial Sea

27. The Group agreed that the absence of an agreed delimitation of these waters might inhibit economic development, particularly oil exploration. The United Kingdom side proposed that the ideal solution would be to fix boundaries in Lough Foyle and Carlingford Lough extending out to the limit of the territorial sea. However the Irish side pointed out that this subject had considerable constitutional and policy implications and, referring to the existing Foyle Fisheries Commission, said that they would favour joint administration of the seabed. It was agreed that this was an important subject which should be further studied by the relevant experts.

(B) Other Subjects Considered:

i. Communications

28. The AIEC Communications Sub-Group has met at six-monthly intervals since 1978 and has done a lot of useful work on subjects such as road-haulage, air and shipping services, tourism, bus services, transport infrastructure (in an EC context) and the effects of privatisation of Sealink on Irish Sea ferry services.

29. The Group agreed that it would be valuable to examine in the near future matters connected with roads and vehicles, specifically co-ordination of speed limits; regulations concerning vehicle construction, equipment and use; EC directives concerning driving licences; and road safety.

30. On Inland Transport questions, the two countries frequently hold similar views. ~~In particular there is close convergence of approach on policies directed towards freedom of lorry movement in the EC, especially through increases in the multi-lateral quota.~~ It was therefore agreed that opportunities for more closely linked ~~action on this and other EC inland transport issues could be taken~~ *action in this field in EC and other multilateral bodies should be taken* up as they arise.

31. The Group considered it desirable that co-operation in these areas should be actively pursued whether in the forum of the

Communications Sub-Group of the AIEC or within the framework of whatever new institutional arrangements may be agreed.

ii. Science and Technology

32. The Group exchanged views on the possibilities for co-operation on a range of scientific and technological matters of mutual interest to both countries.

33. The Irish side favoured the development of some formal bilateral arrangements in specific areas. However, ^{given the present ways in} ~~in the absence of formal~~ ^{which science and technology were co-ordinated in the United Kingdom,} ~~institutional arrangements for co-ordinating science and technology within the United Kingdom,~~ the United Kingdom side thought that the prospects for formal bilateral arrangements were limited. It was noted, however, that many matters were already being pursued multilaterally, particularly under the auspices of the International Energy Agency and various EC programmes; and that there were numerous contacts between institutions and individuals engaged in similar areas of research in our two countries. The Group therefore concluded that these existing contacts generally offered the best initial channel for new proposals for closer bilateral co-operation. In reaching this conclusion, the Group were conscious that the AIEC and its sub-groups would continue to offer an opportunity for officials of either country to raise any specific proposal if they were not satisfied with the degree of co-operation at the technical level.

34. The Group noted that both countries had an interest in the development of techniques for the handling, the transport and combustion of coal as well as in the exploitation of offshore hydrocarbon resources and that these areas may provide opportunities for fruitful bilateral collaboration between appropriate government agencies and commercial undertakings in the two countries.

35. The Group were glad to note the high level of interchange between universities and other research institutions in each country.

36. The Group considered certain fields of modern technology such as biotechnology, electro-optics and computer-aided design. As research and development in fields such as these tends to be industry-led in the United Kingdom, the Group concluded that co-operation should be pursued by stimulating contacts between commercial companies, with direct Governmental collaboration in any area where this would be appropriate.

iii. European Community Matters

37. The Group recognised that it would be desirable for senior officials to consider and consult on a number of Community policies, particularly ones in the formative stage, in which the two countries have common or similar interests which closer co-operation might enable them to promote more effectively within the Community. Among the areas considered suitable for consideration in this context were proposals in connection with an action programme on the environment and the creation of a transport infrastructural fund together with topics such as air transport, regional matters and information technology. It was envisaged that further topics might arise which could be considered if it were mutually agreed that this would help to promote common interests. Consideration of these issues could take place in the context of whatever new structure emerges in the institutions group. (See also paragraph 38 below)

iv. Consultation on Measures for Improvement of Agricultural Structures

38. The structural conditions that exist in the farming sectors on both sides of the border are broadly similar. Because of this, the Group recognised that periodic consultation between the United Kingdom Agriculture Departments and the Irish Department of Agriculture in relation to measures for the improvement of agricultural structures, and particularly, measures proposed by the European Community in this field would be of mutual benefit.

v. Continuing Co-operation in the Border areas

39. It was agreed that steps should be taken at official level with a view to ensuring a harmonious and co-ordinated approach to economic development in the border areas with specific reference

to the question of special EC measures. ~~Officials should also examine ways of rationalising certain activities of central and local government in border areas.~~

40. In relation to the most recent of the cross-border studies (Erne Catchment Area) it was agreed that there would be advantage in a degree of Ministerial involvement in monitoring progress on the implementation of the recommendations in the study, although the nature of this Ministerial involvement would to some extent depend on the outcome of the joint studies on institutional structures. Both Governments have studied the recommendations in the Erne Catchment report and action is being taken to follow them up as considered appropriate and as resources permit.

vi. Industrial Development

41. To the extent that industrial development is dependent on the attraction of overseas investment, the Group recognised that the scope for co-operation in Ireland between North and South on the one hand, and ~~Ireland and Britain~~ ^{the Republic and the United Kingdom} on the other hand, is limited, since it has to be recognised that all areas are, in fact, competitors in the search for and the attraction of internationally mobile industrial investment. However the possibilities in this regard might be further explored particularly in the context of closer co-operation.

42. The Group agreed that there is scope for co-operation in Ireland between North and South in the encouragement of small industries and craft industries in border areas. To this end, informal discussions have taken place and are continuing between the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) and the Northern Ireland Department of Commerce. It was agreed that discussions of this topic in any other forum would only duplicate ~~the discussions already taking place~~ ^{the contacts already made} and to which the IDA and the Northern Ireland Department of Commerce are committed.

vii. Trade Promotion

43. The Irish side proposed an examination of the possibility of agreeing on a limited programme of joint activities on a North/South basis, mentioning specifically market research, trade missions, seminars and participation in trade fairs and store promotions. The United Kingdom side observed that trade promotion in Northern Ireland, though grounded essentially upon the services available in the United Kingdom as a whole, is supplemented by a recently introduced programme of Department of Commerce (Belfast) initiatives. The Group agreed that discussions should continue between the Department of Commerce and the Department of Trade, Commerce and Tourism (Dublin) to consider, with the necessary regard to all financial and other constraints, a possible limited programme of joint promotion activities, although naturally without prejudice to Northern Ireland's continuing fundamental reliance upon United Kingdom export promotion.

viii Trade Facilitation

44. The Group agreed that further cooperation was desirable between the British quasi-governmental organisation, the Simplification of International Trade Procedures Board (SITPRO), and its newly formed Irish counter-part (IREPRO). Contacts between the two bodies have already been established. In particular SITPRO and IREPRO should be able to assist with studies of documentary and other problems affecting roll-on, roll-off ports in the two countries. The Group suggest that SITPRO and IREPRO should be asked to submit a joint progress report, in due course, to the Anglo-Irish Economic Cooperation Steering Committee, or to whatever suitable framework evolves in the institutional area.

ix. Industrial Training

45. Many of the problems of industrial training (including management training) are similar in the North and South of Ireland and officials of AnCO, (An Chomhairle Oiliuma - the industrial training authority in the South) and the Department of Manpower Services already meet to exchange views at senior management level from time to time. Bearing in mind the possible value to both countries of avoiding unnecessary duplication of facilities and of cooperating

in providing additional facilities in particular areas of activity or particular geographical areas, it was agreed to invite the senior management of both organisations to report on the position and scope for development, including the relevance where appropriate of European Social Fund assistance.

x. Tourism

46. It is agreed that there may be scope for further cooperation between the British Tourist Authority and Bord Fáilte in the promotion of tourism into these islands from third countries. The Northern Ireland Tourist Board could also be involved.

47. There is a certain amount of cooperation at present between these three bodies in a tripartite committee which meets irregularly and on an informal basis. Matters relating to tourism have also been discussed and considered in the context of an AIEC sub-committee. There was agreement that examination was needed inter alia of the ways in which more visitors, especially from distant countries, might be encouraged to come to these islands. The United Kingdom side considered that it would be sufficient for the existing tripartite committee to be asked to do this work. The Irish side felt that the existing tripartite arrangement was inadequate due to the limited authority of the Irish Tourist Board and the consequent necessity for the involvement and participation of officials from the government department responsible for tourism. The Irish side therefore suggested that the improved cooperation envisaged could best be achieved by the establishment of a committee from the Government Departments responsible for tourism together with representatives from the tourist boards; ^{and that} This committee, to be called the Tourism Cooperation Committee, would report in the above context to whatever new structures emerged in the Institutions Group.

xi. Common Public Sector Purchasing

48. The Group agreed to recommend that the relevant officials should discuss whether there is scope for cooperation in purchasing which would be mutually beneficial to both Governments.

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Conclusion

49. The Group hoped that these measures would make a contribution towards the improvement of the economy of these islands and that the practice of economic cooperation will in itself generate further cooperation.

14 October 1981

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JOINT STUDIES: MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
Report of Joint Study Group

Introduction

1. The general terms of reference for the Joint Studies, as agreed at the Joint Steering Group on 30 January, 1981 are as follows:-

"Having regard to the degree of mutual understanding reached by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach at their meetings on 21 May and 8 December, 1980 as expressed in the communique issued following those meetings and in particular the reference to the need to bring forward policies and proposals:-

- i. to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability; and
- ii. to improve relations between the peoples of the two countries.

The Working Groups are asked to make proposals to assist The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach in their special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands."

2. As well as the general terms of reference the Study Group had the following specific terms of reference, agreed at the same meeting:-

- '1. To analyse the reasons for misconceptions in each country over attitudes and Government policies in the other.
2. To consider measures which the two Governments might take, jointly or separately, to remove such misconceptions and improve mutual understanding; including measures in the

fields of youth and other exchanges, secondment of officials, and co-operation over educational, scientific and cultural matters.

3. To consider measures which might be taken in co-operation with non-governmental organisations.'

3. The Joint Study Group met in Dublin on 12 March and on 15 September, and in London on 14 April. In addition to these meetings, the two sides exchanged papers on the reasons for misconceptions and on the specific subjects considered.

4. The Group's report on the results of their discussions is in two parts. Part I is an analysis of the reasons for misconceptions in each country. Part II lists the particular subjects studied and the conclusions arrived at.

Part I : Analysis of reasons for mutual misconceptions

5. The terms of reference of the joint study call for an analysis of misconceptions in each country over attitudes and government policies in the other.

6. The subject is potentially a very large one, and within the confines of this report it is not practicable to do more than identify briefly some salient themes.

7. A distinction worth making at the outset is between misconceptions which consist essentially of beliefs without any contemporary factual basis and those that are more in the nature of perceptions which, though they may be distorted or exaggerated, rest on some foundation of fact.

8. A second preliminary point is that as between the Republic and Great Britain, though misconceptions exist on both sides, the picture is not a balanced one. The presence in Great Britain of large numbers of people of Irish descent, many with relations in Ireland, is one feature of this. Another is the considerable penetration of the Republic by the media - in particular television and the press of Great Britain, to which there is little reciprocal

counterpart; moreover, coverage of British news in Irish newspapers is much fuller than that of Irish news in British papers. More generally, therefore, Great Britain looms larger in Irish consciousness - political, economic and cultural - than does the Republic in Great Britain's, and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that many people in Britain exhibit a lack of conception about the Republic rather than misconception. As between the South and North of Ireland, the picture is quite a different one: the degree of knowledge of one another - and the scope of mutual misconception - is much greater.

9. Culturally, the many similarities within the two countries obscure important differences. There is a common language, legal systems with a common foundation, and many similar institutions. But Irish politics, education, pastimes, wide areas of culture and many areas of State organisation all differ greatly from their United Kingdom counterpart. These differences - and the cultural and political significance of the Irish language for many Irishmen - are not fully appreciated in the United Kingdom.

10. The shared history of the two countries is paradoxically the cause of a good deal of mutual misconception. Most people in Britain have little appreciation of how past history colours contemporary Irish attitudes to Britain and of the continuing sense of grievance flowing from the non-fulfilment of the aspiration to the political unification of the island of Ireland. For their part, many people in Ireland seem reluctant to accept that the United Kingdom in the 1980s includes Northern Ireland primarily because of the continuing wish of a majority of the people in the political unit created sixty years ago as the consequence of arrangements which themselves recognised the difficulty of reconciling opposing allegiances within a single political entity.

11. Mutual misconceptions within the island arise essentially between Unionists (mainly Protestants) and Nationalists (mainly

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Catholics) rather than between the inhabitants of Northern Ireland and the South. Those misconceptions inevitably centre round "the national question". The majority of people in Northern Ireland see the Nationalists' aspiration to national unity, motivated as it is by the belief that the division of Ireland did not resolve the Irish question, as an unfriendly or threatening attitude: disinterest in, or opposition to, that aspiration is not totally confined to the Protestant community. Its expression as an overt claim to the territory of the Northern counties is a particular grievance and hindrance to mutual understanding.

12. Hence the statutory provision that Northern Ireland will not cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of its people - commonly referred to as the "guarantee" - is regarded by Northern Unionists as an important assurance. In fact it simply records a constitutional reality which would exist whether or not it was expressed in statutory language. The view that a simple repeal, real or threatened, of the statutory provision of the "guarantee" would bring about more tolerant attitudes among Northern Unionists is a misconception: rather, the reverse would apply. In the Republic, while the guarantee itself is not challenged and is regarded as a statement of fact, the constant repetition of the guarantee formula by the British Government to political groups which sometimes appear to be actively opposing its policies is not understood. This use of the guarantee is seen as having a negative effect and it is felt that the formula should be accompanied by a compensating call for reconciliation in the island of Ireland and compromise which the divided society of Northern Ireland requires. Moreover despite the assurance afforded by the guarantee, the Unionist community is seen as not possessing the confidence to enable it to embrace policies of moderation.

13. Linked with this perception is a general belief in the South that Northern Unionists have failed to appreciate sufficiently the aspirations and grievances of the minority community, and that measures to prevent them from suffering discrimination have not been adequate. The Irish Roman Catholic believes that

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denominational prejudice partly underlies the discrimination formerly practised against and attitudes still prevailing towards the minority community in Northern Ireland. This is an area where it is difficult to unravel fact, myth, and the influence of social and economic forces devoid of discriminatory intent. There may be inadequate appreciation in the South of the institutional and administrative changes of recent years and the ~~continuing~~ ^{steps taken} efforts to develop counter-discriminatory measures.

14. Unionist antipathy to the idea of unification is undoubtedly reinforced by fears that it would threaten the survival of the Protestant community. Falling Protestant numbers in the South since independence are cited as evidence. Northern Protestants believe that the influence of the Roman Catholic church in the South is excessive and oppressive, and cite as examples the attitudes to inter-faith marriage, divorce and contraception. The view in the South is that these are perceptions that are fast becoming out-dated. It is no longer possible to speak of a society uniformly dominated by Roman Catholic attitudes. Certain values of social and religious behaviour in the South have been changing rapidly in the past decade. The impact of rising living standards, urban living and a growing and younger population is not generally perceived or understood in Britain and Northern Ireland. Irish Roman Catholics for their part cite the active involvement of Protestant ministers of religion in Northern Ireland politics as evidence of a prevailing denominational influence there. The prominent part played by religious influences in shaping social and cultural attitudes is thus a feature that North and South share, in marked distinction to most parts of Great Britain.

15. A further hindrance to mutual understanding that needs to be mentioned is the widespread belief among Northern Unionists that people in the South are pre-occupied with the grievances of the Nationalist minority in the North and have little concern or understanding for the position of the Unionists. It is particularly difficult for Unionists to accept that terrorists who have committed crimes in Northern Ireland should be able to

avoid extradition from the South by pleading that their crimes are "political", although the Irish position is that this results from the application under the Irish Constitution of the practice of States and the generally accepted principles of international law in relation to extradition.

16. To sum up the general picture is one of a variety of misconceptions relating both to public attitudes and to government policies. As between Britain and the Republic the problem appears to be largely one of lack of conception and might be answered by efforts aimed at a more intensive exchange of information eg. through closer co-operation between the broadcasting authorities. As between Northern Ireland and the South, the problem went deeper. In this context the issues which were relevant were the "constitutional claim" and the "guarantee"; and Church/State relationships. Action to reduce misunderstanding of these matters would clearly be needed. ~~Institutional~~ Arrangements are also required to reduce suspicion and distrust, and measures to make more effective the prosecution of offenders who seek to evade justice by crossing from one side of the border to the other. Moreover, greatly increased contacts and joint endeavours in appropriate fields, as well as intensified information exchanges may all offer some hope of progress.

Part II : Specific subjects discussed

a. Youth and Sport

i. Exchanges

17. The Group noted that there was already considerable North-South contact at various levels.

18. Ministers of State with responsibility for Youth and Sport have met in the North and the South on three occasions since 1976. Officials with responsibility for these areas have met in the North and the South on five occasions since 1976. Two formal meetings between the National Sports Councils have taken place since the Irish Sports Council - COSPOIR - was founded in 1978, one in Newcastle, Co Down and one in Dublin. Northern Ireland is represented on COSPOIR by two members. An officer


of the Northern Ireland Sports Council staff is a member of the Long Distance Walking Routes Committee of the Irish Department of Education and the South had representatives on both the Northern Ireland Training Board and the Northern Ireland Mountain Reserve Co-ordinating Committee. A number of other contacts at official level take place on an ad hoc basis on matters of mutual concern. Both sides agree that exchanges of these kinds are of considerable value and that they should be encouraged and, where possible, expanded.

19. Regarding exchanges between youth and sport groups in North and South, a specific grant scheme was initiated in the South in 1980 to enable such groups to visit Northern Ireland, and to foster greater understanding between young people on both sides of the border. On the Northern side there are general schemes for the support of group visits by youth clubs.

20. The Irish Department of Education intends to discuss with Irish youth organisations and the relevant authorities in Britain and Northern Ireland the possibility of establishing an Irish-British exchange scheme for young people. There already exists the recently formed British and Irish Federation of Youth Clubs which has the aim of promoting contact between young people in a youth activity context.

21. On the British side, the Group noted that the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges, which now has an office in Belfast, would have a useful part to play in youth group exchanges.

22. Both sides agreed that there was scope for developing activity in the Youth and Sport area and that additional contacts should be encouraged. Both sides considered that the approach should be one of building constructively on the quite considerable foundations of existing activity generated over the past number of years. ~~It was further agreed that the best hope for success in this area lay in a low-key approach.~~




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ii. Sporting Organisations

23. The Group agreed that there was room for increased North-South co-operation in the field of sporting organisations. Many are already on a 32-County basis but some, notably soccer and athletics (including cycling), are split.

24. In the case of cycling, discussions are at present taking place between the Irish Cycling Federation, the National Cycling Association and the Northern Ireland Cycling Federation with a view to greater co-operation particularly in regard to international representation.

25. The Irish side said that they would welcome similar discussion in the remaining areas where division exists.

iii. Community Relations

26. The Group noted that there were already considerable contacts between community relations groups in Northern Ireland and the South, with joint efforts on the promotion of childrens' holidays, work camps, church services and conferences. There is scope for developing this and extending it within the community work field although it was agreed that in some instances, community groups might flourish better without the involvement of the two Governments.

b. Education

i. Exchanges

27. Both sides acknowledge the volume of exchanges already taking place in the educational area. Many such exchanges occur spontaneously, in both directions, and precise quantification cannot be made.

ii. Pupils

28. On the initiative of the Northern Ireland Committee of UNESCO secondary students from the South have visited the North. A visit South by Northern students is planned. Both sides agreed that there was scope for developing such exchanges under the auspices of UNESCO and that measures to this end should be actively pursued.

iii. Students

29. The Irish side acknowledged the part played by the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges in London including Irish English-language assistants in their induction courses and wished to reciprocate should such prove feasible in the future. On a North-South basis, limited student visits have already taken place between teacher-training institutions. Both sides agreed that these exchanges should be developed as resources allow. Again, UNESCO was seen as a suitable vehicle.

iv. Teachers

30. Both sides agreed that the informal contacts already existing between teachers' centres in Ireland and Great Britain should be expanded where possible and that contacts between teachers' centres in North and South should be encouraged. The area of teacher exchanges between North and South would require further exploration. Cross-border participation in in-service training courses should be fostered. At university and other third level, both sides considered that the various institutions should be encouraged to develop further their relationships.

v. Inspectors

31. Both sides welcomed the increasing number of contacts between the Inspectorates in Northern Ireland and the South and would encourage the development of further links. Discussions at senior level have already taken place on an occasional basis, and the Group agreed that there would be value in establishing these on a more regular basis.

vi. Schools Curriculum

32. The Group noted that the Irish Council of Churches and the Justice of Peace Commission had been co-operating on a project to provide Peace Education material for schools. In the South, the Peace Week Committee promoted a Schools Conference each year for all Ireland. In Northern Ireland, the Churches Central Committee for Community work (comprising official representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of Ireland and the

Presbyterian and Methodist Churches, promoted a schools history competition, designed to dispel myths in the teaching of Irish history.

vii. Higher Education Places

33. Both sides agreed that there was scope for encouraging and supporting attendance by students from the South at higher education courses at institutions in Northern Ireland. It was a matter of regret that the number of ^{students from the South} ~~Irish students~~ attending courses in Northern Ireland had declined in recent years to the present level of some 200 students. This compared with about 700 students from Northern Ireland at institutions in the South. There was some shortage of higher education places in the South, particularly in the areas of electronic engineering, civil and structural engineering, and mechanical engineering.

~~34. Some of the institutions in Northern Ireland (especially the New Ulster University at Coleraine, and the teacher training colleges in Belfast) had the capacity to handle more students than were currently enrolled there. However the specific areas in which the Irish side expressed interest were not well represented at the New Ulster University (which did not provide engineering courses). At Queens University Belfast and the Polytechnic there was already a considerable excess of applicants over places for the various undergraduate electronic engineering courses there which had already been expanded. However the Department of Education for Northern Ireland believed that in civil and structural engineering and in mechanical engineering it would probably be possible for Queens University Belfast and the Polytechnic to cater for some additional students without any significant increase in resources.~~

~~35. It was agreed that efforts should be made to promote the increased take-up of places in Northern Ireland's institutions by students from the South in those areas of specific interest to the South.~~

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However, it was also noted that many of the areas of study which were mainly of interest to the South were themselves oversubscribed in Northern Ireland. But it was thought that

³⁴
36. It was noted by both sides that higher education institutions in Northern Ireland were already fully open to, and welcomed, students from the South, and that they would like to see more of them. Even in academic fields where the South did not suffer from a shortage of places, there were benefits, in terms of improved mutual understanding, in student exchanges. Students from the South competed for places on equal terms with other applicants; the financial arrangements were uniform throughout the European Community.

³⁵
37. While the above remarks were made in the context of undergraduate studies it was suggested that the scope for increased Irish participation at post-graduate level should also be explored. Here again Irish applicants would be welcome, and in fact the possibility of increasing post-graduate provision was in some respects greater than at undergraduate level, even in the electronics and engineering fields, and the student support implications might be less difficult for the South (given the shorter length of most post-graduate courses).

³⁶
38. A further opportunity for increasing cross-border movements of students presented itself in the field of sandwich courses in engineering (including electronic engineering). There were many practical as well as academic advantages in sandwich courses, not the least being that potential employers who take students on sandwich placements (of up to one year) were well placed to assess the suitability of the student as a potential employee; many students were in fact given employment on completion of their courses by the firm with whom they had their placement. There was a shortage of suitable placements in Northern Ireland for the students currently enrolled on sandwich courses there, and it was for consideration whether suitable placements could be found for some of these students in the South. This would be of considerable practical help to the institutions in Northern Ireland; would make a contribution to developing better cross-border contacts and understanding; and might also help Irish firms to recruit suitably qualified graduates. In view of these potential advantages it was agreed that the possibility of finding such placements should be explored.

viii. Open University

³⁷
39. The Irish side expressed interest in establishing contacts with the Open University and other relevant institutions as it saw scope for co-operation between these institutions and the proposed Distant Study Unit of the National Institute for Higher Education in Dublin. This co-operation would be aimed at making existing courses available to students in the South and possibly to the joint promotion of new courses. At present the Open University's students are drawn solely from the United Kingdom because of the need for student counselling and tutorial arrangements which are organised on a regional basis. One such region is Northern Ireland, with the Regional Office in Belfast. What regional arrangements would be required to make the University's distant learning facilities more widely available in the South would need to be established in discussion between representatives of the British and Irish Governments and the Open University itself. Associated questions which should also be the subject of discussions between these parties would include the validation of qualifications, broadcasting arrangements and finance. The University's educational materials are already marketed extensively outside the United Kingdom through Open University Educational Enterprises, Ltd. Discussions with this company would be a means of establishing the terms on which these materials could be made available - or special ones produced - to meet Irish requirements. The British side welcomed in principle the interest of the Irish side and stated its willingness to arrange such discussions. Both sides agreed that these discussions should be actively pursued.

c. Secondment of Officials

³⁸
40. The Group agreed that there did not appear to be any serious difficulty, in principle, in setting up a formal scheme for the interchange of officials. The two sides accordingly invited experts to prepare a draft Memorandum of Understanding. The scheme might operate on the following lines:-

- a. Officials taking part would be young, able administrators or specialists of high potential.
- b. Officials would undertake responsible work either in a specific post or on specific projects of value to the receiving Department.
- c. A small number of exchanges are envisaged with a minimum period of secondment of six months; longer periods, if mutually convenient, would not be ruled out.
- d. Officials on secondment would continue to be paid their salaries and any foreign allowances by their own Departments in each country. No reimbursement would be made between the receiving and borrowing Departments.

d. Culture : Co-operation between Arts Councils

³⁹
~~41~~. The Irish side proposed that one institution be established to administer arts policy for the whole island. This presented technical problems for the British side. British cultural policy is administered through distinct bodies, the Arts Councils and the British Council. The responsibilities of the former are restricted to the United Kingdom and those of the latter to Foreign and Commonwealth countries. Their terms of reference are restrictive and they are financed through different Departments of State through different votes for different purposes.

⁴⁰
~~42~~. The Group noted that close co-operation is now well established between the Irish Arts Council and the Arts Council of Northern Ireland over a wide range of their activities. They also noted the development of closer and regular contacts between both Councils and the Arts Councils of Scotland and Wales, sub groups of the Arts Council of Great Britain, in areas of common interest. The Group were of the view that all of these contacts and activities should be encouraged and expanded.

3. Co-operation with Non-governmental Organisations Special Interest Groups

⁴¹
43. The Group had the strong impression that, particularly among the professions, there was already a wide range of contacts taking place spontaneously. There is, however, scope for increasing them. There would need to be consultation with semi-official bodies, such as, on the British side, the British Council, which now incorporates the Inter-University Council, and the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges. The question of the secondment of officials, where direct official action can itself produce results, is considered separately above.

ms
~~44. Care should be taken to avoid overt official encouragement of contacts where it might interfere with exchanges already working well between private organisations.~~

14 October 1981

CONFIDENTIAL
From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

B



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

David Heyhoe Esq
Private Secretary to Lord President
of the Council
Whitehall
LONDON SW1A 2AT

1801 T30 08
p/w submission (due from
Cabinet Office) to the P.A.

30 October 1981

Dear David

My Secretary of State has seen OD(AI)(81)17 about possible publication of the Anglo-Irish joint studies.

In his view the analysis of the texts have revealed fewer requirements for excision than might have been feared, though one or two of them are significant and could prove contentious. There is perhaps more risk of embarrassment from the shortage in some of the reports of positive, important proposals, a problem which applies particularly to the Report on Security Matters. If that were to be published it would be necessary to explain why the Steering Group excluded from the Study what to most people in Northern Ireland would be the most important aspect, viz cross-border security co-operation. Furthermore, the Irish statement in paragraph 14 of the Report, that their position on extradition is supported by international law, could not be allowed to pass unchallenged. However, Dr Fitzgerald is himself uneasy about the security report, and may readily agree - indeed, may propose - that the others be published in full but that only a shortened version be issued on the security report, with the explanation that the nature of the topic makes full publication inappropriate. My Secretary of State would regard that as a reasonable way of handling the problem.

Mr Prior recognises that, whatever is published, Unionist extremists are likely to allege the existence of hidden understandings; and no doubt Dr Fitzgerald's opponents will allege that Mr Haughey's achievements have been watered down. Given the fact that Mr Haughey knows five Study Groups were set up and that he will be likely to press hard for publication of the full texts, Mr Prior would be willing to go along with publishing the other four texts, with the amendments suggested in the paper of 28 October. He suggests that the summary should be published as well for the convenience of journalists, many of whom may not then trouble with the full texts.

I am copying this to Private Secretaries to other members of OD(AI), to Michael Alexander at No 10, and to David Wright and Robert Wade-Gery in the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely
Mike Heyhoe

M W HOPKINS
KW

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON SW1P 3AJ

Handwritten initials

Prime Minister

(4)

Michael Alexander Esq
No. 10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Useful background reading for next week's meeting.

Handwritten initials
29 October 1981

Dear Michael,

Handwritten initials

... I attach notes of the tete a tete between the Secretary of State and the Taoiseach on 27 October and of the subsequent plenary meeting. The points which emerged have already been taken in hand in the further preparation of material for the Summit on 6 November.

A | As you know, there is to be a briefing meeting at No. 10 at 5.30 on 5 November. The Secretary of State would find it helpful if before then he could have a private word with the Prime Minister to convey his personal assessment of the Taoiseach. We have already mentioned this to Caroline Stephens; perhaps there will be a moment before the briefing session starts. I would be grateful if she could let us know.

*Now,
Seyle*

Caroline: Is 'A' in hand?

*Yes - arranged for meeting
re: A - 2/11*

S W BOYS SMITH

CONFIDENTIAL

F.R.

cc: PS/SofS (L&B) -M
PS/Ministers (L&B) -M
PS/PUS (L&B) -M
Mr Marshall
Mr Blelloch -M
Mr Angel
Mr Wyatt -M
Mr Buxton -M
Mr Burns
Mr Harrington
Mr Chesterton
Mr Blatherwick -M
Mr Gilliland -M
Miss Christopherson
HM Ambassador, Dublin
PS/Sir Robert Armstrong

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE TAOISEACH, BARRETSTOWN CASTLE, CO KILDARE, 27 OCTOBER 1981

TETE A TETE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE TAOISEACH

Present:

Secretary of State
Mr S W Boys Smith

Dr Garret Fitzgerald TD,
Taoiseach
Mr Michael O'Leary TD,
Tanaiste
Mr Nally

Anglo-Irish Relations and Political Affairs in Northern Ireland

The Secretary of State outlined to the Taoiseach the way his mind had been moving on affairs in Northern Ireland. He had tried in his speech to the Conservative Party Conference to open up the question of more exchanges with the Republic, which he believed were important and should increasingly be seen as unexceptional. He was keen to prompt thought and discussion in Northern Ireland although the differences between committed people in both communities remained very great. He had tried to show to the majority on the one hand that the economic situation in the Province was very serious and that its improvement was being hindered by the lack of political progress; and he had also drawn their attention to the way in which people in Great Britain were less tolerant than they had been of the inability of the two communities to work together even though they remained firm in their support of the security forces and sympathetic about the effects of violence on Northern Ireland.

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F.R.

He believed that the climate of opinion in Northern Ireland was changing and that messages of this kind were being understood. On the other hand he had, to give one example, reminded the SDLP of the difficulty of making progress towards the sort of scheme for a federal Ireland which they had outlined to him the preceding week and he had expressed his concern to them about the reaction if they sought to advance at too fast a rate.


For his part, the Secretary of State said his thinking was at an early stage. He did not personally believe that the total integration of Northern Ireland with Great Britain was a practicable way to move. Nor did he think that Stormont could be restored in the form in which it had existed until 1972. He also believed that direct rule could not be continued for the indefinite future. He could not at this stage however go further and indicate how political advance might be made.

In further discussion, and in response to questions from the Taoiseach and the Tanaiste, the Secretary of State said he had tried to draw to people's attention the association which existed between economic and political development in Northern Ireland. He would wish to give thought to such questions as the powers of district councils. At this stage he was sceptical about the practicability of power sharing and he pointed out that many in the majority believed it was they who had made all the concessions since 1972. He would like to see the emergence eventually of arrangements acceptable to both Governments which also met the aspirations and fears of both communities in the North. He believed that the development of links between London and Dublin were an important element. He was keen to do all he could to encourage close links and would like to see Belfast drawn in to give the relationship a Northern Ireland dimension. The development of Anglo-Irish relations could not however have a sudden or dramatic impact on affairs in the North: it was a question of slowly seeking to take things forward.

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The Taoiseach noted the Secretary of State's views. He believed that politics in Northern Ireland were atrophied at the moment. They were also unbalanced: on the minority side the SDLP was broadly moderate and was therefore exposed to being undermined by extremists. But a substantial element of the political representation of the majority was already extreme. He was anxious to help establish the kind of environment in Anglo-Irish relationships which would facilitate developments in the North, and also to foster these relationships for their own sake. Exchanges between the two countries should be seen in both these lights and he did not want them to be surrounded by needless secrecy.



The Taoiseach referred to a scheme he had evolved in 1978 for an assembly in Northern Ireland which would elect a Provincial Prime Minister by simple majority but in which the Government would have to command the support of some 80% of the members, although he was not wedded to that precise figure. This would ensure that minority interests were represented in Government. He did not now put this scheme forward officially as Taoiseach and realised that there were alternative ideas. He appreciated it was hard to impose power sharing directly but commended to the Secretary of State the need to seek means nevertheless of drawing into the government in Northern Ireland representatives of all communities. The people of the North were probably more ready to see some kind of power sharing than were their political leaders. He did not wish to press the Secretary of State further on his ideas, realising that he would need time to feel his way ahead.

In further discussion the Taoiseach and Tanaiste made the following additional points:

(i) The Taoiseach drew the Secretary of State's attention to remarks by Dr Paisley in an interview in 1971 and again in a little-reported speech in Londonderry in November 1979 which indicated that the DUP leader might at heart be ready to work for close relations with the Republic so long as the majority remained in control. But he realised Dr Paisley might not be able to carry

his followers along that road.

(ii) The Taoiseach referred to the visit he had recently received from a group of Northern Ireland business and professional men. He felt their spokesman, Mr McCartney, had been under some pressure from his colleagues not to go too far and that they had not been united in their views. They were not therefore consistent in what they had said publicly or in their written and oral presentations to him. But he welcomed the approach. He had in addition received indications that a number of moderate unionists and others welcomed the steps he had taken over the Irish Constitution.

(iii) The Tanaiste urged the Secretary of State vigorously to convey the message that things were changing in Northern Ireland, as well as in Great Britain and the Republic, and that unionists needed to adapt their ideas to these changes.

In conclusion the Secretary of State said he was unable to answer the Taoiseach's and Tanaiste's questions on the timescale of developments in Northern Ireland. Timing, like presentation, was delicate and was of crucial importance. He noted that the Taoiseach would like to advance as fast as possible, accepting the need not to trip on the way. He welcomed the Taoiseach's hope that the outcome of the Summit on 6 November would provide the background against which he could proceed. He was anxious that nothing should be said or done which would give an impression that made his task more difficult. The process of opening up discussion and widening political understanding could only be slow and must be handled with care.

The Guarantee

The Taoiseach referred to his "crusade" to change the Constitution of the Republic. He had been pleased by the recent debate in the Dail; the Irish Government was now in a stronger position, three Socialist TDs being more ready to give support than they had been.

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He now hoped to make progress, but it would take some six months to work up ideas into detailed proposals. He would succeed only if there was seen to be a response. The formulation of the Guarantee on the border was crucial in this respect. He drew the Secretary of State's attention to the wish expressed by King George V in 1920 that the Council of Ireland would bring North and South closer together. He also referred to the formulation of the Guarantee at Sunningdale. In his view, the UK Government had never pursued that declaration in positive terms. He was anxious to see a form of words for the Guarantee which expressed support for unity if that should be the wish of people in Northern Ireland. Such a statement would be of great help to him and he doubted if he could succeed without it.

The Tanaiste in further discussion emphasised the importance of a reformulation of the Guarantee. He went on to point out that it would in addition be valuable if the UK Government could publicly accept a continuing role in the process of reconciliation and so in creating the situation in which the people of Northern Ireland would give their consent to change.

The Secretary of State noted the views of the Taoiseach and the Tanaiste and referred to what had been said after the talks between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach's predecessor in May 1980. He pointed out the difficulty in being seen to encourage unity and so in creating a reaction in Northern Ireland which would slow rather than hasten the achievement of that goal. He was sure they were aware of this risk.

Publication of the Joint Studies

The Taoiseach reminded the Secretary of State of his wish that Anglo-Irish relations should not be conducted with undue secrecy. He was concerned lest the publication only of the summary of the Joint Studies should encourage some people to think that there was more which was being kept secret. This would expose both Governments to the charge of subterfuge. The summary would be seen to be very thin. Moreover, his predecessor would know of the

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existence of the Joint Studies and might press him for the publication of the full reports. He would find it hard to deny their existence in those circumstances. This would create further suspicion about the whole exercise and would lose the Taoiseach much of the useful credibility he now had amongst moderate unionists. He wondered therefore about the reaction of the British Government to the publication of the full reports, subject to reviewing the texts to make them suitable and accepting that much of the security report might need to be omitted. He would like the matter to be considered further before 6 November.

The Secretary of State noted the Taoiseach's views. It was important for Anglo-Irish relations not to be hindered by suspicions which might result from unnecessary secrecy and agreed that both Governments should consider the matter for the Summit meeting. He could not however give any undertaking.

All Ireland Court

The Taoiseach referred to the difficulties extradition created for the Irish Government. A change in the Constitution would require a referendum and he did not think that that was a road which he could follow. It was important therefore to gain the maximum from the extra-territorial provisions. Their effective implementation was hindered by difficulties over evidence and in particular because Police officers from the North could not at present undertake interrogations in the Republic. He hoped that the establishment of an All Ireland Court would open the way to overcoming this difficulty. Interrogation by British Police officers of suspects detained in the Republic raised a number of sensitivities but he hoped they could be lessened if there was an All Ireland Court. And he said that if such a court were set up the Irish Government could try to overcome the difficulty with interrogations.

The Secretary of State emphasised to the Taoiseach the great importance of effective co-operation on security. It was hard to explain to people at large what were the Republic's difficulties with extradition. He greatly welcomed the co-operation given and the way in which it had been seen to work in recent days, especially with the Dunne kidnapping and the arrest of two people in the Republic preparing to explode a device in Northern Ireland. If there was not seen to be effective security co-operation, progress would be much harder and many of the things which the Taoiseach would like to see would be more difficult to achieve. On the All Ireland Court, he noted the Taoiseach's views and suggested that the Attorneys General of the two countries should examine the matter further.

Economic Affairs

The Taoiseach said that the Irish Government was keen to see the establishment of a gas pipeline and awaited the views of the UK Government. If security problems could be overcome it would also welcome the re-establishment of the electricity interconnector.


The Secretary of State noted the Taoiseach's views and pointed out that on gas the outcome would depend on the price charged. There would no doubt have to be some hard bargaining.

In further discussion the Secretary of State said that he had been impressed by the sincerity and enthusiasm of Dr O'Regan of Co-Operation North, whom he had recently met. He noted that the organisation was seeking financial support from both Governments as well as from the European Commission and elsewhere. He thought this was a matter which could be examined in more detail and that the Taoiseach might wish to mention it to the Prime Minister.

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The Taoiseach expressed his support for Co-Operation North and said he was anxious to encourage the establishment of a network of links between organisations in the North and the South. At the moment, a good many more people travelled from North to South than in the other direction and he would like to encourage more citizens of the Republic to conduct business in Northern Ireland. He noted what the Secretary of State said about the wish of Co-Operation North for Government funds and pointed to the possible damage that such support could do for the organisation's credibility in Northern Ireland.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "S. W. Boys Smith". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above a horizontal line that extends to the right.

S W BOYS SMITH
28 October 1981

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F.R.

cc: PS/SofS (L&B)-M
PS/Ministers (L&B)-M
PS/PUS (L&B)-M
PS/Mr Bell (L&B)-M
Mr Marshall
Mr Blelloch -M
Mr Angel
Mr Wyatt -M
Mr Buxton -M
Mr Burns
Mr Harrington
Mr Chesterton
Mr Blatherwick -M
Mr Gilliland -M
Mr Doyne-Ditmas -M
Miss Christopherson
Miss Davies -M
HM Ambassador, Dublin
PS/Sir Robert Armstrong

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN
IRELAND AND THE TAOISEACH, BARRETSTOWN CASTLE, CO KILDARE,
27 OCTOBER 1981

PLENARY MEETING

Present:

Secretary of State
Mr Woodfield
Mr Bell
Sir Leonard Figg
Mr Marshall
Mr Boys Smith

Dr Garret FitzGerald TD,
Taoiseach
Mr Michael O'Leary TD,
Tanaiste
Professor James Dooge,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr D Nally
Mr S Donlon
Mr E Kennedy
Mr D Nelligan
Mr M Lillis
Mr F Murray
Mr M Burke
Ms M Hennessy

Publication of the Joint Studies

The Taoiseach said he was concerned that publication only of the summary of the Joint Studies would expose both Governments to the charge that they were not revealing the full extent of the exercise on which they had been engaged. He accepted that the texts of the reports would have to be reviewed to ensure that they were suitable for publication and that much of the security report might have to be omitted before it could be made public. But he was inclined to

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think that publication of the documents was in principle desirable. He was personally committed to unionists in Northern Ireland not to be secretive about the studies, although he accepted that it would be right to acknowledge that part of the security report had been omitted. He feared that his predecessor, who knew what work was in hand, would ask about the reports and that he would be obliged to acknowledge their existence. This would be very unsatisfactory for both Governments. The Tanaiste also believed that publication would help the Irish Government in its efforts to obtain agreement to the changes it had proposed to the Constitution.

The Secretary of State said that the Taoiseach's points were noted and would be reported to the Prime Minister. A decision would have to be reached at the Summit meeting on 6 November. He appreciated the need to avoid undue secrecy and knew that officials were examining the documents against the possibility that they might be published. But publication would not of itself remove the risk that firm unionists would accuse the two Governments of failing to reveal everything.

Anglo-Irish Co-operation Council or Standing Conference

The Taoiseach hoped that at the Summit meeting on 6 November a decision could be taken to establish an Anglo-Irish Council. The practical effects might not be large, but it would give a constructive framework within which relations might be conducted. It would also show to unionists that the joint studies had been about practical matters and not about the constitution of Northern Ireland.

A crucial element in this institution would in the Taoiseach's view be the Parliamentary one. In that lay the possibility of bringing Northern Ireland politicians into the exercise, as he believed was important. But there were at present practical difficulties. There was no basis on which politicians from the North could be selected in any large numbers in a way which fairly reflected the interests of the minority. The Convention had been dissolved; the MEPs,

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although more representative, numbered only three; and the Westminster MPs were not fully representative of the minority. He wondered if it would be possible to draw on the Northern Ireland MPs and MEPs, or perhaps only on the MEPs, for the time being, involving in due course the members of an eventual assembly. This scheme would make possible the early establishment of the Parliamentary dimension of a Council and its later extension to incorporate full representation from Northern Ireland. This would have the additional advantage of giving an incentive to people to set up and seek election to an assembly, which would become a route to the Council. He doubted if unionist politicians would boycott the Council because to do so would leave the field to the SDLP. He was not wedded to any particular formula. This was something which could be left open in the communique issued after the Summit.

The Secretary of State noted the Taoiseach's views. The Co-operation Council or Standing Conference, or whatever it was called, needed careful handling; this applied particularly to the Parliamentary dimension. The impact of an announcement about a Standing Conference could be judged only in the wider context of the general announcement emerging from the Summit. If the flavour was wrong the Conference proposal could be undermined. He thought the idea of drawing on the MEPs, with or without the MPs, and involving members of an assembly as and when it might come into existence was something which could be considered further. But if only the MEPs were involved, at least in the initial stages, there was a risk that unionists would reject the whole proposal.

The following further points were noted in discussion:

(i) Mr Bell drew attention to the need to show how the Standing Conference would bear on affairs in Northern Ireland. Unionists would ask what it was for and only they could decide whether to participate.

(ii) The difficulty in achieving adequate representation for the minority in Northern Ireland underlined in the view of the Irish Government the need for proportional representation. They were concerned that even with 17 Northern Ireland MPs after the next general election the minority would still be under-represented, but appreciated that the introduction of proportional representation for Westminster elections raised very fundamental questions.

All Ireland Court and Security

The Taoiseach hoped that the possibility of establishing an All Ireland Court could be examined by the two Governments. It was a complex question to which a good deal more thought would have to be given.

The Secretary of State agreed that the establishment of a court required examination and noted that the Taoiseach was willing for the two Attorneys General to look into it. The matter could not be settled on 6 November. He pointed out how sensitive was the question of cross border co-operation on security. He stressed the value of emphasising how extensive that co-operation was and of showing how it could be strengthened by promoting closer links between the UK and the Republic. This would be helpful to the position of the UK Government when it was criticised, as no doubt it would be by some strong unionists, about the nature of the talks with the Taoiseach. He realised that cross border co-operation was a complex matter, as the Taoiseach and Professor Dooge pointed out, and that by its very nature the co-operation could not always be spoken about. He appreciated too the Taoiseach's prompt intervention to deny recent inaccurate reports in the Irish Press about the Dunne kidnapping. But this kind of co-operation was nonetheless very significant for opinion in the North.

The Guarantee

The Taoiseach, referring to the tete a tete he had had with the Secretary of State, proposed that officials of both Governments might examine possible formulations of the Guarantee in preparation for the Summit meeting. He emphasised the importance of a reformulation in positive terms which indicated the UK Government's readiness, in the sense agreed at Sunningdale, to support any wish expressed by the people of Northern Ireland for unity with the Republic. The UK Government had in recent years phrased the Guarantee in more negative terms, referring only to the fact that Northern Ireland would not cease to be part of the UK without the consent of the people. By not drawing out the positive element in the Sunningdale formulation the UK was seen by people in the Republic to be more committed to the union than he believed it was. He would like to convey the idea that it was not for Great Britain's sake, but for the sake of Northern Ireland only, that Northern Ireland remained part of the UK.

The Taoiseach knew that a fine judgment had to be made about the risk of a unionist reaction to any such positive formulation. But it would help change the approach of people in the Republic if it was understood that the UK Government was not committed for its own sake to the union. He realised that the development of Anglo-Irish relations was very significant, and was to be encouraged, but it was not perceived in the Republic as having any important direct bearing on Northern Ireland. It would not therefore do much of itself to encourage a change of attitudes in the Republic. By changing these attitudes an atmosphere could be created which in its turn might help encourage a broader-minded approach by unionists in the North. He also believed that a re-formulation of the Guarantee in the sense he suggested would help the SDLP maintain its position against extremists; this was important.

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The Tanaiste referred to the "unmovable rock" of unionist leadership, and urged the Secretary of State to remind unionists of the way in which circumstances were changing. For his part he would like the UK to go further and to accept a continuing responsibility for advancing the process of reconciliation in Ireland. He wanted the UK Government to be seen both to be supporting the integration of Northern Ireland with the Republic and to be committed to the process of achieving it. He hoped this could be mentioned in the communique to be issued after the Summit.

The Secretary of State noted the views of the Taoiseach and the Tanaiste and agreed that officials should examine the formulation of the Guarantee. It was important, however, not to see the Guarantee in isolation. Much would depend for example on what was said after the Summit about security co-operation. Although he thought that the conclusions likely to emerge from the Summit, such as the inter-Government Committee and more economic co-operation, would be entirely acceptable in Great Britain, there would be widespread suspicion in Northern Ireland. He believed that the formulation the Tanaiste proposed went too far and that it would be counter-productive. He believed that unionist opinion was shifting but he did not want it to be pushed so hard as to provoke a reaction on which extremists could build. He understood the Taoiseach's desire to strengthen the position of the SDLP, and was keen himself that they should resume their position on the political stage. But their views on Irish unity were pretty radical and could not be readily accommodated without provoking a brisk unionist response. He admired and respected what the Taoiseach was proposing to do to change the Constitution of the Republic and appreciated the Taoiseach's motive in wishing to remove barriers to greater understanding between North and South. But it was for that very reason that he did not want to provide the grounds on which the existing barriers could be strengthened. He believed that by concentrating on new and existing links between the two countries and between North and South the border might come to be seen as less significant, and that this was the way to proceed.


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Economic Affairs

The Secretary of State expressed interest in the establishment of a gas pipeline between the Republic and Northern Ireland. He pointed out that the price charged for the gas would determine whether the scheme could proceed.

The Secretary of State drew the Taoiseach's attention to the difficulties caused in Northern Ireland by the illicit importation of subsidised bread from the Republic. In 1979 there had been a rationalisation of the bread industry in Northern Ireland and one bakery had been closed. The remaining business was enough for the surviving bakers but their position was now being undermined by the sale in Northern Ireland of bread from the Republic on which the subsidy for domestic consumption had been paid. The matter was arousing considerable concern in the North. The Secretary of State suggested that officials from the two countries should examine the matter. Dr Paisley was amongst those taking an interest in the question, and it could additionally be helpful to be able to tell him, if he challenged the Secretary of State's visit to the Taoiseach, that bread was one of the subjects which had been discussed.

The Taoiseach noted what the Secretary of State said, although he was not aware of the problem. He was advised by an official present that the matter was sub judice in the Republic and that it might therefore be difficult for it to be discussed by officials, but it was clear to nobody in what way it could be sub judice. The Taoiseach agreed that it should be examined further.



S W BOYS SMITH
29 October 1981



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Prime Minister

To Mr. ...

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Prime Minister

I am writing to let you know my views on how the question of the possible supply of natural gas from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland might be handled in the context of the Anglo-Irish summit.

2. You will recall that in response to suggestions coming from the Republic that they would be willing to supply natural gas to Northern Ireland from the Kinsale field Humphrey Atkins suspended the rundown of the Northern Ireland gas industry which was then under way and set in motion detailed studies into the Irish proposition.

3. Those further studies have now been completed. They have incorporated not only the findings of specialist consultants on the likely demand for the gas and engineering aspects but also additional relevant information from the South about its plans for a Cork/Dublin pipeline. They were aimed at establishing whether and on what terms a supply of Kinsale gas to Northern Ireland would be capable of achieving and maintaining financial viability. The results of the studies show that, if the terms were right, a pipeline project could provide the basis of a viable gas supply to at least the major potential demand centre of Belfast - and possibly on a wider scale within the Province - at less cost to public funds than would be involved in a closure of the entire gas industry in the Province. The assessments are made on the best information coming forward at official level on the price we are likely to be charged for supplies of gas and on the prices we can charge consumers. The supply price is a critical factor in the viability of the whole project; and I believe it will have to be determined at Ministerial level.

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
4. There is no doubt in my mind that we must go forward to complete the assessment. We certainly could not suggest on the basis of the work carried out so far that a project involving Kinsale gas is unlikely to be financially viable. While a detailed security assessment has yet to be completed, the initial view of the Security forces is that such considerations would not present a major obstacle if it were decided to implement a pipeline project.

5. In all the circumstances I am firmly of the view that nothing would be gained and much credibility stands to be lost if we do not go forward into discussions with the South and I therefore propose to proceed on that course. A project of this nature fits well into our declared intention of seeking further areas for practical North/South economic co-operation.

6. It was implicit in our announcement last June that we would seek to reach a final decision on the Kinsale proposition by the end of this year and it will therefore be necessary to move immediately on to this next stage if we are to have any chance of meeting that timetable. I propose to ask Adam Butler to make contact with his opposite number in the Republic and to arrange a meeting on the matter as soon as possible. I will keep you and Cabinet colleagues fully posted on the outcome of the further talks with the Republic and if they produce terms for a supply of gas which favour that proposition against a closure of the gas industry here then I would, of course, wish to consult widely on the implications.

7. The Irish will undoubtedly want to discuss the matter at the summit and it will help our negotiating position if they make the running. I see advantages to us in impressing upon them at the highest political level that the price is the crucial factor. I am recommending that the communique should note that the supply of Kinsale Gas to Northern Ireland might be viable and that the responsible Ministers will now negotiate about the terms.

8. I am also writing to Peter Carrington, Leon Brittan and Nigel Lawson to put them in the picture. A copy of this minute goes to Sir Robert Armstrong.



JAMES PRIOR

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(1)



Prime Minister

Prime Minister

Agree not to pursue this for
the time being. *And 30/x*

ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES: IRISH VOTING RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

pt 4

At the meeting of OD(AI) on 8 October there was some discussion of the restrictions on voting rights for Irish citizens in Northern Ireland local elections. It was agreed that I should consider whether we might be justified in changing the residence requirements in return for some concessions from the Irish.

I should make clear first that voting rights in Parliamentary elections in Northern Ireland as in Great Britain apply equally to British subjects and Irish citizens. They are not at issue. However voting rights in Northern Ireland local elections are a different matter.

There is at present a complex combination of statutory requirements, enacted during the time of Stormont, relating both to residence and nationality. Under the residence requirements a voter must have been continuously resident in Northern Ireland for three months up to the qualifying date; and also, if not born in Northern Ireland, the voter must have resided in the United Kingdom for seven years. In addition, under the nationality requirements, the vote is only available to British subjects or persons who were on the Northern Ireland Electoral Register prior to 1962. This restriction was introduced by Stormont in 1962, from which date Irish citizens (unless already on the register) lost their entitlement to vote in NI local elections.

Thus, no amount of modification of the residence requirements alone will give Irish citizens the vote in NI local elections that they enjoy in Parliamentary and GB local elections. It is the nationality requirement that affects and is objectionable to the Irish. However to change the nationality requirement, particularly as an outcome of the joint studies, would take us into direct confrontation with the Unionists. Paisley would be presented with a highly emotive issue that he would fully exploit by charging us with allowing citizens of a "foreign" and "hostile" country to have a say in Northern Ireland's internal affairs. If our relationship

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with Dublin continues to develop, we may eventually reach a stage where we might consider allowing Irish citizens the same voting rights in NI elections as they have in GB. But I am convinced that do so at the present time would inflame Unionist suspicions and make our work in improving relations with the Republic considerably more difficult.

There remains the possibility of relaxing the residence requirement, even though it would be of no direct help to us in our dealings with Dublin. I see no objection in principle to removing the requirement for seven years residence in the United Kingdom. It is an out-moded provision that serves no useful purpose and disfranchises British subjects now resident in Northern Ireland but who were not born there and who, for one of any number of reasons, have resided outside the UK at some point over a period of seven years. However I have reservations about taking such action at the present time. Any amendment to the law of this kind, however insignificant, would be linked to the joint studies. It would therefore arouse Unionist suspicions while not achieving any compensatory improvement in our relations with the Irish. I would prefer therefore to wait for an occasion when the seven year residence requirement can be repealed without unnecessarily souring the political atmosphere.

An opportunity to remove the residence requirement could be provided by any Representation of the People Bill dealing with electoral law in general. Were such a Bill introduced as a result of the Home Secretary's review of electoral law and procedures the Irish might well press us to remove both the residence and the nationality requirements and we should need to be prepared for this.

Copies of this minute go to members of OD(AI) and Sir Robert Armstrong.



J P

28 October 1981

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RESTRICTED



*Alfred. R. Wright
informed.
Paul*

Ref. A05809

MR. ALEXANDER

Briefing Meeting for Anglo-Irish and Anglo-Italian Summits,
5.00 pm, Thursday 5th November

The briefing meetings for these two Summits are to take place consecutively, beginning at 5.00 pm. Although the briefing for the Italian meeting is likely to be simpler and shorter, it would be preferable if the Irish briefing could take place first since the Secretary of State for Energy who should attend is committed to a TV interview that evening and would need to leave by 5.45 pm. For this reason also it would be very helpful if, within the Irish briefing, energy matters could be taken early on.

Anglo-Irish Summit

2. We would recommend that the following Ministers should attend:

Lord Privy Seal (Lord Carrington does not get back from Saudi Arabia in time, although he will participate in the Summit itself)

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

Secretary of State for Energy

and also the following officials:

Sir Michael Palliser)

Sir Leonard Figg)

Mr. P.H.C. Eyers)

} Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr. P.J. Woodfield, Northern Ireland Office

Sir Donald Maitland, Department of Energy

Sir Robert Armstrong)

Mr. R.L. Wade-Gery)

} Cabinet Office

Sir Frank Cooper, Ministry of Defence

Anglo-Italian Summit

3. The Italian Prime Minister will be accompanied only by his Foreign Minister and, apart from Community issues, much of the discussion will be taken up with international questions. We therefore propose that the Lord Privy Seal should attend for this briefing accompanied by the following officials:

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Sir Kenneth Couzens, Treasury
Sir Michael Palliser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Sir Brian Hayes, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Sir Robert Armstrong)
Mr. M.D.M. Franklin) Cabinet Office

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "D.J. Wright", is written over a horizontal line.

D. J. WRIGHT

26th October, 1981

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1) WR. ^{hww 23/10}
2) C.F.

Cabinet Office,
70 Whitehall,
London SW1

22 October 1981

PS(81) 26

Dear Private Secretary,

Anglo-Irish Summit

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the forthcoming Anglo-Irish Summit.

The objectives for the visit have not yet been approved by the Prime Minister but her office have suggested that briefing should go ahead on the basis of those set out at Annex A. The list of briefs to be prepared, with an indication of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex B. Instructions on format are at Annexes C and D. Those preparing briefs should note carefully the details on the format of briefs set out in Annex C, particularly (b) on the structure of briefs.

70 copies of each brief should be sent to the Cabinet Office as soon as they are ready, and should in any event arrive no later than 12.00 noon on Friday, 30 October. They should be addressed to Mr W Ewing in Committee Section, who should be consulted (tel. no. 233 7628) about any technical points arising.

I should also be grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Office could arrange for the circulation of a draft steering brief to the recipients of this letter in advance of Sir Robert Armstrong's meeting to discuss the steering brief, which is now planned for Wednesday 28 October.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Ian Bancroft, Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Douglas Wass, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Kenneth Clucas, Sir Peter Carey, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Donald Maitland, Sir Peter Baldwin, Sir Brian Hayes, Sir James Hamilton, Mr Phillip Woodfield, Sir Antony Duff and Mr Robin Ibbs, and to Michael Alexander, No 10 and Jim Nursaw in the Law Officers' Department.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) D. J. WRIGHT

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ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

1. To maintain, and if possible, enhance the Irish commitment to our common efforts against terrorists.
2. To confirm Her Majesty's Government's continuing commitment to closer Anglo-Irish relations and the Joint Studies and to confirm our willingness to keep the Irish Government fully informed about our policies in Northern Ireland.
3. To make clear to the Taoiseach the limits imposed on Her Majesty's Government's freedom of action by the facts of life in Northern Ireland.
4. As a necessary contribution to those objectives, for the Prime Minister to establish a good working relationship with Dr FitzGerald.
5. To gain Irish support on European Community issues of concern to us.
6. To influence Irish positions on international questions and to encourage them to work closely with us in the Security Council.

PROBABLE IRISH OBJECTIVES

1. For Dr FitzGerald to establish the kind of working relationship with the Prime Minister which will enhance his ability to achieve early progress on his other aims.
2. To explain Dr FitzGerald's ideas on relations between North and South and in particular the role of his plans for constitutional development; and to seek a British response helpful to his advocacy of these changes. To put across his ideas on giving a political dimension to the follow-up to the Joint Studies by involving politicians from Northern Ireland in the process.
3. To press for political progress in Northern Ireland on lines which would preserve the position of moderate Catholic politicians.
4. On EC matters, to emphasise the importance to the Irish economy of the Common Agricultural Policy and the consequent need to safeguard Irish interests in the course of restructuring.
5. On international issues, to assert the Republic's neutral line and separate identity,

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR THE ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

<u>VMV(81)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In Consultation with</u>	
1.	Steering Brief	FCO/NIO/ Cabinet Office		
2.	Republic of Ireland: Political and Economic Situation	FCO		
<u>The Joint Studies</u>				
3.	The Joint Studies: Progress and Future	Cabinet Office) In consultation) with the) Government) Departments) most closely) involved in) each Study	
4.	Institutional Structures	Cabinet Office		
5.	Citizenship Rights	Home Office		
6.	Security Matters	Cabinet Office		
7.	Economic Co-operation	FCO		
8.	Measures to Encourage Mutual Understanding	FCO		
<u>Northern Ireland</u>				
9.	Political Situation	NIO		
10.	Security	NIO		
11.	Position in the Prisons	NIO		
<u>Other Briefs</u>				
12.	European Community Issues			
	(a) Mandate	FCO	Treasury MAFF	
	(b) Insurance	Trade	FCO Treasury	
	(c) Air Fares	Trade	FCO	

<u>VMV(81)</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>
13.	International Affairs	
	(a) Arab /Israel	FCO
	(b) Iran/Iraq	FCO
	(c) East-West Relations and Poland	FCO
	(d) Afghanistan	FCO
	(e) South Africa/Namibia	FCO

INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex D. Those preparing briefs should pay particular attention to ensuring that the following instructions are fully observed:

Content

- (a) Briefs should be concise. Each brief should if possible be no more than four sides long.
- (b) The main body of each brief should comprise two sections, a concise list of Points to Make, followed by a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.
- (c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained with all the information required on that particular subject. Briefs should not be divided into separate self-contained sub-sections.

Layout

- (d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.
- (e) As shown in the specimen at Annex D, the top page only of each brief should contain the following details: the symbol and number of the brief in the top left-hand corner (e.g. VMV(81) 10) with the date of production below; a copy number in red at the top right-hand corner; the visit heading; the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible.
- (f) At the foot of the last page and on the left-hand side, briefs should bear the name of the originating Government Department and the date of origin.

Reproduction

- (g) Briefs should be reproduced throughout on white paper, with each page bearing a security classification at top and bottom (as in Annex D). Care should be taken that the reproduction method employed results in clear readable copies.

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- (h) It is important that on arrival at the Cabinet Office, briefs should be complete in all detail - collated, stapled and copy numbered and ready for immediate circulation.

Updating

- (i) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, an addendum should be prepared. It should be set out in the form described at (e) above, with the brief number (e.g. VMV(81) 10 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when an addendum is in preparation. Revised briefs and corrigenda should be similarly treated.
- (j) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex B require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

CLASSIFICATION

ANNEX D

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

VMV(81) Serial Number as specified in Annex COPY NO. in red

Date

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT

Leave 1½"
margin

SUBJECT Insert subject in capitals

Brief by name of originating Department, eg Foreign and Commonwealth Office

At the foot of the last page:-
left-hand side

Originating Government Department, eg Foreign and Commonwealth Office or Department of Industry, not a subordinate section or division

Date of origin

CLASSIFICATION

PART 4 ends:-

20-10-87

PART 5 begins:-

22-10-87