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PREM 19/512

Vints to London by King Hussein

Part 1

JORDAN

June 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
5.6.79							
7.6.79		27.10.81					
11.6.79		28.10.81					
18.6.79		31.10.81					
20.9.79		13.11.81					
21.9.79		17.11.81					
27.9.79		18.11.81					
11.1.80		-Pt Ends-					

PREM 19/5/12

PART 1 ends:-

FCO to WR 18/11/81

PART 2 begins:-

CS to PM 1/7/82



Top copy + document filed on Middle East Situation Part 8
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH
18 November 1981

cc. to Mr Richards under my comf. [Signature]

Dear Willie,

Call by King Hussein

King Hussein promised the Prime Minister in the course of the discussion at No 10 yesterday morning to give her a copy of the document he had given to President Reagan during his visit to Washington. The Jordanian Ambassador accordingly called yesterday afternoon on Graham and delivered the enclosed package. He said that he himself had not seen a copy of the document but that he believed that it was in English. Graham thanked the Ambassador and will repeat this to the King today when he accompanies the Lord Privy Seal on the latter's call.

We shall be grateful if you could let us have a copy of the document in due course.

Yours ever,
[Signature]
(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Willie Rickett Esq
10 Downing St



Jordan

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 November, 1981.

Call by King Hussein

I enclose a record of the conversation which took place here this morning between the Prime Minister and King Hussein of Jordan.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Master set.
Middle East Situation: Pg 8.

SUBJECT.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON 17 NOVEMBER AT 1000 HOURS

Present

The Prime Minister
Sir John Graham
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

King Hussein
HE Mr. Ibrahim Izziddin

* * * * *

King Hussein's visit to Washington

The Prime Minister said that the media had suggested that King Hussein's visit had been extremely successful and that a close rapport had been established between the King and President Reagan. Had President Reagan in fact understood the message the King was giving him? King Hussein said that the President had been extremely warm and cordial. He had spoken bluntly to the President and at the end of their first meeting had left with him a copy of his speaking note. (He had also sent copies to his friends.) At their second meeting together President Reagan said that the King's presentation had been an "eye-opener". The President had confessed to not having as much background as he should have.

The President remained hopeful of finding a way through. He aimed to make sure that Israeli withdrawal from Sinai took place and would then press for further progress. However, the professionals with whom the King had spoken in Washington anticipated very serious difficulties. They were deeply concerned about current Israeli attitudes. They thought there might be difficulties even about the withdrawal, although they were determined to keep the Israelis under pressure. They were pessimistic about progress once the withdrawal had been completed. For his part, the King had urged them not to smother Egypt and to leave to her the possibility of getting closer to the other Arab States. The King characterised the present situation as a "juggling act" designed to ensure that the Israeli withdrawal went through.

CONFIDENTIAL /The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that she had two concerns at present:

(a) the difficulties which had arisen over the European contribution to the Sinai MFO. She was determined to ignore so far as possible Mr. Haig's remarks about Lord Carrington. She was inclined to think that these flowed from a false report of some kind received by Mr. Haig. But the difficulty over what to say about the MFO was genuine. The fate of the West depended, of course, on the United States, but this did not mean that the Europeans had to follow the Americans slavishly. We owed them our judgement. We intended to contribute to the MFO but that did not change our views on the best course to follow. We were committed to the return of Sinai to Egypt but not to any other part of Camp David. We had to say something to Parliament to make it clear that we adhered to the Venice Declaration. The Americans had got their way on the MFO: it was therefore distressing that a diplomatic incident had been allowed to arise;

(b) the current attitudes of the Israeli Government. The Israelis were at present in an extremely aggressive frame of mind. Their reaction to the AWACS decision and to the setting up of the MFO was very worrying, the more so since this was a time when we needed more agreement rather than disagreement. Had the American Government taken on board the fact that President Sadat had been rendered vulnerable by the absence of movement for two years in the follow-up to Camp David? Unless there was progress after the return of Sinai, President Mubarak might find himself in similar difficulties. King Hussein said that he thought this message had gone home in Washington.

King Hussein said that in general he had spoken very plainly to the Americans. He had told them that until a solution to the Palestinian problem was found, Israel was enemy No. 1 of the Arab people, the United States enemy No. 2, and Communism, despite being the fundamental threat, only enemy No. 3. Somehow, the Americans had to improve their image in the region. The

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/ Prime Minister

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- 3 -

Prime Minister asked whether King Hussein had succeeded in conveying to President Reagan that the so-called Jordanian option was a non-starter? King Hussein said that he thought he had. Indeed, President Reagan had apologised for past statements on this question which had betrayed a lack of background briefing. Sir John Graham recalled that President Reagan's briefing had consisted in large part of a paper by Mr. Rostow. King Hussein indicated that he was familiar with the paper in question and said that attempts to have it rebutted had failed.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Reagan had given any indication of being aware of the inherent difficulties in the autonomy negotiations or of the problems likely to arise in trying to persuade the Palestinians to participate in elections under the resulting arrangements. King Hussein said that at least at their second meeting the President had indeed shown more awareness of the problems. He had also made clear his anger with the Israelis over their recent behaviour. The Prime Minister commented that Mr. Begin's position at present seemed stronger than ever. King Hussein agreed that Mr. Begin had sizeable support at this stage.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Americans had given King Hussein any written response to the paper he had left with the President. King Hussein said that he had asked for such a response but had not yet received it. The Prime Minister said that she would herself be glad to have a copy of King Hussein's paper. It would be essential that the exchange in Washington should not be an isolated one. It would be essential to follow up the exchange "week after week". King Hussein agreed.

The Prime Minister asked whether there had been any signs of willingness on the part of the Americans to enlarge the peace process. King Hussein said that he had not seen any. However, he had told President Reagan that there was a large measure of consensus between the Arabs and their friends in Europe as to what the elements of a settlement should be. Even the Soviet Union seemed to be speaking along the same lines. The President

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/ had appeared

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had appeared to take the point. The Prime Minister said that President Reagan's welcome for Prince Fahd's initiative had been significant. This no doubt owed much to King Hussein's intervention. King Hussein said that he had told the Americans that while he recognised the difficulties about the refusal of the PLO to recognise Israel, (and vice versa), he could not understand why the Americans were not prepared to be in direct contact with both parties. He had reminded them that President Sadat had suggested that President Reagan should talk to the PLO. King Hussein said that he remained willing/ ^{to act} as an intermediary but there would have to be direct contacts at some stage.

Sir John Graham said that he did not think the Americans would make any significant move until Sinai had been safely returned. They did not wish to risk further upsetting Israel in her present mood. They were also worried about the possibility of an Israeli attack on Lebanon. It was for this reason that they urged caution on the Europeans. The King and the Prime Minister both agreed that nothing was likely to happen until after the Sinai withdrawal and that, indeed, the Americans were unlikely to reply in full to King Hussein's approach until that time. Sir John Graham stressed the awkwardness of the gap in the next four or five months. On the one hand, there had to be enough movement to prevent the extremists in the PLO taking over from the moderates. On the other hand, the United States could not go so far that Israel dug in and refused to carry out the withdrawal. We had to be prepared for a major effort after 25 April.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Arabs really wanted Sinai back on the present terms. King Hussein said there would be a major argument at the Arab Summit in Fez. The confrontation states and the PLO could well adopt an extreme attitude and might urge Egypt, for instance, to abandon the Camp David process. He himself intended to work for the return of Sinai and to urge the others to concentrate on the period after that. The Prime Minister hoped that the Summit would endorse the Fahd plan, in particular its seventh point, and urge conditional recognition. This would put Israel on the spot. King Hussein agreed that this would be the ideal outcome.

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/King Hussein


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King Hussein reverted to the question of the Lebanon. He confirmed that Mr. Haig was extremely worried about the possibility of an Israeli attack which might then develop into a major confrontation in Syria. The Prime Minister wondered whether the Israelis would use hostilities in the Lebanon as an excuse for not withdrawing from Sinai. Sir John Graham said that there ought to be no link. The ceasefire in South Lebanon was in fact holding well. There were some signs of helpful movement on the part of the PLO. These were being encouraged by the United Nations. But Israel was reluctant to do anything that seemed to imply a measure of agreement with the PLO.

The Prime Minister thanked King Hussein for his visit. She repeated that she would be grateful to receive a copy of the paper he had left with President Reagan. It was essential that the effort to make progress should continue and that we should avoid a vacuum. The present time was one of opportunity. If we let the chance slip, it might not return.

The discussion ended at 1035.



17 November 1981

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 November 1981

Dear Michael,

King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister

I enclose briefing for King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister at 10.00 hours on 17 November.

It has not yet been seen by the Secretary of State, but a copy will go in his weekend box.

Yours ever,

F N Richards
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER :
17 NOVEMBER AT 10 AM

Points to make

Arab-Israel

1. Pleased to hear that King's visit to Washington successful.
Some signs of shift in US thinking (eg Reagan on Fahd) but
Israelis putting pressure on them.

Fahd principles

2. Lord Carrington encouraged by visit to Riyadh. Saudis
seeking Arab support at Fez. Great opportunity for Arabs to
show that they are ready to negotiate peace with Israel.

3. Ten cannot endorse Fahd - too specific on some points for
negotiation. But welcome as common Arab negotiating position.
Looking to period post - April 1982 for further progress towards
comprehensive settlement.

Sinai MFO

4. Four would-be participants discussing with US, who made
request. Believe should be able to find a basis on which we can
participate while making clear commitment to existing Venice policy
and independence of other aspects of Camp David process.

Lebanon

5. Did King discuss with Americans? Israelis making threatening
noises. But so far Americans have successfully restrained them
from invasion. Hope Habib will be able to build on ceasefire
when he returns to area.

6. Recent meeting of Arab Follow Up Committee produced useful
decisions. Remains to be seen if they can be implemented. Saudis

/told



told Lord Carrington they still hoped for progress. Hope there will be some movement before campaign for Presidential election (August 1982) closes off possible compromises.

Secretary of State's visit to Jordan and Syria

7. Secretary of State looking forward to visit to Jordan in the Spring.

Israeli excavations in Jerusalem [if raised]

8. Fully recognise special importance of Jerusalem to all parties. Britain will not accept any unilateral initiative to change the status of the City. We have always made clear our view that Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem is illegal.

West Bank and Gaza

9. Disturbing that Israeli military administration is cracking down again on West Bank, after disturbances at Bir Zeit and elsewhere.

10. Israel's decision to 'civilianise' administration of West Bank/Gaza more publicity than substance so far. What is King's view of proposals? Will any Palestinians be persuaded to accept senior positions?



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER:

17 NOVEMBER AT 10 AM

Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrives on 15 November and leaves on 18 November. The visit is as usual a private one. The King is on his return journey to Amman from the United States, where he paid a State visit on 2 and 3 November followed by a private visit to the West Coast and to Canada. The King was due to see Mr Trudeau during his visit to Canada.

2. The King accompanied by Queen Noor will visit New Scotland Yard on the afternoon of 17 November. The visit was arranged at the King's request, apparently out of no more than personal interest.

A 3. Records of the King's call on the Prime Minister and his
B discussion with the Secretary of State on 28 October are attached.

Arab-Israel

4. King Hussein was pleased with his visit to Washington, where he seemed to establish a good relationship with President Reagan. Washington telnos 3317 and 3347 reporting the visit are attached. The press has since reported that King Hussein told the Americans that he was willing to negotiate with Israel on the basis of the Fahd principles. The Americans have informed the Israelis, who have unsurprisingly rejected this offer.

5. Further background material on the Secretary of State's visit to Riyadh is attached (Riyadh telno 3). The Jordanians, although initially reserved about the principles (perhaps because of traditional Saudi-Hashemite hostility) have since indicated that they support them fully.

/Sinai



Sinai

E 6. The latest position is set out in Washington telnos 3383-4 and FCO telnos 493-4 to Paris (attached). We are still discussing with the Greeks the text of the statement by the Ten. There are clearly rumours about Arab reaction. If we can obtain Greek agreement to the texts as now proposed, the next step is to work out a timetable for delivering the letters to the US, Egypt and Israel governments, making our national statements and releasing the statement of the Ten. When King Hussein was in London he appeared relatively relaxed about our participation as long as it was made clear that we were not involving ourselves in Camp David as a whole. It is important that the announcement be made as long in advance of the FeZ Summit as possible, since the temptation for the Arabs to put pressure on us not to participate will otherwise be irresistible. It would be useful to enlist the King's support against Arab retaliation on participants in the Force.

Lebanon

7. Haig remains worried about an Israeli invasion. Israeli ministers have made statements warning that they may have to take action against Palestinian groups in South Lebanon whom they accuse of having violated the ceasefire (in fact except for the occasional incident the PLO have been content to gain political credit by keeping the ceasefire). Although the Israelis could mount air, sea or limited ground attacks at short notice, we believe that they are unlikely to move against the Palestinians before Habib's next visit, now due in early December (but not yet announced by the Americans).

8. The chances of Habib making progress in building on the ceasefire in ways envisaged by the now defunct US/UN plan (eg further deployment of UNIFIL) are not good. Although the PLO have hinted that they might make concessions in exchange for Israeli movement, the Israelis are adamant in refusing any move which would mean in effect negotiating with the PLO. In any case they are in no mood for concessions. The Americans have told us that Habib's main aim will be to prevent any deterioration in the
/situation



situation and to boost the Saudi role in Central Lebanon.

9. In Central Lebanon the ministerial meeting of the Arab Follow Up Committee (AFUC) on 7 November produced decisions as expected on coastal monitoring to prevent illegal imports of arms, and measures to lessen tension on the demarcation line in Beirut. Chances of successful implementation are slim. But meanwhile security in West Beirut has recently improved following a Syrian move to disarm all militias there. There is evidence however to suggest that the Syrians, while pretending to be helpful, may be quite happy to see AFUC make little progress until after the Presidential elections (August 1982). There is likely to be more tension and less incentive to compromise as the election approaches.

10. Lord Carrington told the Saudis during his recent visit how much we appreciated their efforts in Lebanon. The Saudis do not despair of making progress and hinted that they would try to have the Presidential election postponed.

Secretary of State's visit to Jordan

11. The Secretary of State has agreed to visit Jordan and Syria in the early part of 1982. The Jordanians welcome the visit at any time suitable to Lord Carrington.

Israeli excavations in Jerusalem

12. This is a long standing Arab complaint. It has recently been revived by the Jordanians, who have circulated a note in Amman as well as at the UN demanding that pressure be brought to bear on Israel to stop excavations in Jerusalem.

13. The allegations, some wildly exaggerated, are that Israel's true purpose in continuing excavations in Jerusalem is to progressively 'Judaize' the City by obliterating Arab and Islamic monuments. The Jordanians also claim that recent excavations are undermining the Temple Mount on which the Al Aqsa Mosque, the



third most holy sanctuary in Islam is situated.

14. UNESCO has debated the issue regularly. The Ten have consistently abstained on the grounds that resolutions produced by the Arabs were either highly political (and therefore unsuitable for UNESCO) or contained highly exaggerated claims. Arab allegations are not borne out by the annual reports of the UNESCO Director General's Special Representative, Professor Lemaire, who, while making minor criticisms of the Israeli work, has stated that there is no threat to the structure of the Temple Mount.

15. The Syrians repeated Jordanian complaints against the Israelis in a recent UN resolution. All the Ten abstained. We want to avoid having to pronounce on the rights and wrongs of the Israeli excavations, and prefer to reply on our already stated position on Jerusalem, ie that Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 is in contravention of the 4th Geneva Convention and that we will not accept any unilateral initiative to change the status of the City.

West Bank

16. The Israeli Military Administration has recently resorted to curfews, roadblocks and the closure of the main Arab university at Bir Zeit in response to a series of demonstrations. Following the stabbing of an Israeli settler in Hebron last month, houses of two suspects were demolished and the house of a third sealed up.

17. The demonstrations were sparked off mainly by an Israeli decision to replace military personnel in the Military Administration by civilians, and to recruit local Palestinians to senior positions (while retaining the Military Government as the supreme authority). Palestinians see this move as the first step towards formal annexation of the West Bank.

18. Although a civilian governor of the West Bank has been appointed, it is doubtful whether the Israelis will succeed in



persuading Palestinians to take up senior positions. The
Defence Minister, Mr Sharon, may only be hoping to create the
illusion of a new initiative to help boost the autonomy talks,
and attract enough Palestinians into senior positions to
convince the Americans that real 'autonomy' has been achieved.

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FM WASHINGTON 052300Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3317 OF 5 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO

INFO SAVING TO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, JERUSALEM

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9 NOV 1981	
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US/JORDAN

1. HOWELL (COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR THE LEVANT) BRIEFED US TODAY ON KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON FROM 2-5 NOVEMBER WITH REAGAN, BUSH, HAIG AND WEINBERGER. THE KING ALSO HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. HE HAS NOW LEFT WASHINGTON FOR A VISIT TO CALIFORNIA.
2. HOWELL DESCRIBED THE VISIT AS A RESOUNDING SUCCESS. REAGAN AND HUSSEIN HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP. HOWELL THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE KING AND THAT HE WAS COMING TO REALISE THAT ARABS WHO OPPOSED THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS WERE NOT NECESSARILY MONSTERS.
3. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN REASSURING HUSSEIN, BY THEIR REFERENCES TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN QUOTE THE UNIQUE AND ENDURING CHARACTER OF JORDAN UNQUOTE THAT THEY DID NOT ACCEPT THE SHARON THESIS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE IN JORDAN.
4. THEY ACCEPTED THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS NOT GOING TO JOIN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS BUT HAD NEVERTHELESS GIVEN HIM SATISFACTION BY REAFFIRMING THE US COMMITMENT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 I.E. WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES IN RETURN FOR PEACE. HOWELL COMMENTED THAT HE HAD HAD QUITE A STRUGGLE TO GET THIS LINE ACCEPTED IN THE US BUREAUCRACY: THE CLINCHING ARGUMENT HAD BEEN THAT 242 WAS THE FOUNDATION OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND HAD BEEN ACCEPTED AS SUCH BY BEGIN. HE ADDED THAT THE EXTENT OF POSSIBLE MINOR BORDER ADJUSTMENTS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE KING. VELIOTES TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS: THE JORDANIANS HAD MAKE KNOWN THEIR VIEWS ON THEM IN ADVANCE OF THE KING'S VISIT.
5. HOWELL SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN USEFUL DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ISSUES AND THAT HUSSEIN BROADLY SHARED THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN SATISFIED BY THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED ON ARMS SUPPLIES (OF WHICH HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE DETAILS) BOTH DURING THE KING'S VISIT AND AT THE MEETINGS OF THE US/JORDAN MILITARY COMMISSION WHICH PRECEDED IT. HE ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO INTENTION AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT OF SUPPLYING MOBILE I-HAWK MISSILES OR ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. THE JORDANIANS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO CHOOSE THEIR MOMENT FOR PUTTING SALES PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS. THIS WOULD BE DONE WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

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Gas 300
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FM WASHINGTON 070040Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3347 OF 6 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN TEL AVIV CAIRO

INFO SAVING BEIRUT DAMASCUS BAGHDAD MOSCOW JERUSALEM JEDDA

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RECEIVED REGISTRY NO. ,, 9 NOV 1981	
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MY TELNO 3317 : US/JORDAN

- 20
1. STOESSEL TOLD ME ON 5 NOVEMBER THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD DONE HIS BEST TO PLAY DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS FOR THE SUPPLY OF SAMS. HE HAD SAID THAT THE NECESSARY TRAINING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW SO THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A LOT OF RUSSIANS IN JORDAN.
 2. STOESSEL SAID THAT HUSSEIN HAD APPROACHED THE AMERICANS FOR SIMILAR WEAPONS BUT HAD NOT BEEN CONTENT WITH THE TERMS AND DATE OF DELIVERY. HE THOUGHT THAT THE KING MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN HOIST WITH HIS OWN ATTEMPT AT BLACKMAIL.
 3. STOESSEL ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HUSSEIN HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND THAT HE HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD BASIS OF RELATIONS WITH REAGAN.

4. IN A SPEECH TODAY TO THE LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL HUSSEIN SAID
QUOTE

I AM AWARE THAT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT IS REGARDED IN THE UNITED STATES AS A GREAT AND HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT. FOR OUR PART, WE SEE THE FAILURE OF CAMP DAVID NOT IN WHAT IT DID BUT IN WHAT IT FAILED TO DO. WE REJOICE IN EGYPT'S RECOVERY OF SINAI AND, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ATTAIN A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH ISRAEL AND ALL HER NEIGHBOURS CAN ENJOY FOR ALL TIME IN OUR PART OF THE WORLD WHERE THE SECURITY OF ALL CAN BE GUARANTEED. SUCH A PEACE MUST HOWEVER ACCORD TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE EXACTLY THE SAME TERMS THAT CAMP DAVID ACCORDED TO EYGP ISRAEL MADE A DEAL WITH EGYPT TRADING TERRITORY FOR PEACE. THE SAME PRINCIPLES MUST APPLY TO OTHERS, PARTICULARLY TO THE PALESTINIANS, IN TERMS OF THEIR FULL RIGHTS OVER THEIR NOW OCCUPIED NATIVE SOIL. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS I WOULD SUGGEST THAT A REAL SECURE LASTING PEACE IS ISRAEL'S FOR THE ASKING UNQUOTE.

FCO PASS SAVING BEIRUT DAMASCUS BAGHDAD MOSCOW JERUSALEM JEDDA
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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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FROM RIYADH 341923Z NOV 81

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JH

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 OF 4 NOVEMBER.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, JEDDA, PARIS, BONN, PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND OTHER EEC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO RIYADH : ARAB ISRAEL :FAHD PROPOSALS

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD TWO HOURS OF TALKS WITH PRINCE SAUD THIS MORNING, FOLLOWED BY A SHORT CALL ON THE KING AND TALKS WITH PRINCE FAHD (AT BOTH OF WHICH PRINCE SAUD WAS PRESENT). THE SAUDI PROPOSALS WERE THE MAIN TOPIC OF THE TALKS WITH SAUD AND FAHD : DISCUSSION OF OTHER SUBJECTS (INCLUDING THE SINAI FORCE) IS RECORDED SEPARATELY.

2. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SAUDI PROPOSALS WAS NOT IN ANY NOVELTY IN THEIR COMMENTS BUT IN THEIR CONSOLIDATION INTO A SINGLE PACKAGE TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IF ENDORSED AT THE FEZ SUMMIT, THEY WOULD REACH A NEW LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE. ARAFAT HAD GIVEN THEM CONSTANT SUPPORT UP TO AND DURING HIS VISIT TO RIYADH WHICH ENDED ON 3 NOVEMBER. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN A CONSTANT MEASURE OF OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSALS WITHIN THE PLO, GENERALLY REFLECTING OUTSIDE INTERESTS, NOT LEAST THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW, ARAFAT HAD FOUND THE RUSSIANS FORTHCOMING ON SOME NON-SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE PLO, BUT OPPOSED TO THE 8 POINTS, SA'UD THOUGHT THAT THE PLO WOULD SUPPORT THE 8 POINTS AT THE SUMMIT. THE LIBYANS WOULD BE OPPOSED, AS (THOUGH WITH LESS DETERMINATION) WOULD THE SYRIANS (PRINCE ABDULLAH LATER TOLD ME HE BELIEVED THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT OPPOSE). THERE WAS NOW A PROSPECT OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS ON THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ACHIEVED SINCE CAMP DAVID. IN ANSWER TO MY QUERY, HE SAID THAT UNANIMOUS ENDORSEMENT AT FEZ WOULD NOT BE ESSENTIAL, PROVIDED THAT A LARGE MAJORITY INCLUDING THE PLO WERE IN FAVOUR. HE HOPED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THIS CONSENSUS TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY US REACTIONS, WHICH HE HOPED REFLECTED A TURNABOUT IN US OPINION.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ONE COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT ANYTHING TO HAPPEN UNTIL NEXT APRIL: THE EGYPTIANS COULD NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE OF COURSE UNTIL THEY HAD SINAI BACK. OBVIOUSLY THE NEXT STEP MUST BE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THOSE MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED, WHO WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE THE PLO. IF THE PLO ACCEPTED A STATEMENT AT FEZ WHICH SIGNALLED THAT SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LEAD TO RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE EUROPEANS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS. US ATTITUDES DID INDEED

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/SEEM

SEEM TO BE EVOLVING AWAY FROM THEIR EARLIER EXCLUSIVE PREOCCUPATION WITH SOVIET DOMINATION TO MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS (AS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW). THIS EXPLAINED THE SHARP ISRAELI REACTION TO THE 8 POINTS. THEY FEARED THAT THEY WERE SO OBVIOUSLY REASONABLE THAT THE WEST WOULD ENDORSE THEM. THE AMERICANS MUST BE PERSUADED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE LINES REPRESENTED THE ONLY WAY FORWARD: HE HOPED THAT THE COMBINED EFFORTS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT AND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (WHERE ONE MIGHT CONSIDER WHETHER A HELPFUL STATEMENT COULD BE MADE) MIGHT DO SOMETHING TO ACHIEVE THIS.

4. PRINCE SA'UD RAISED THE QUESTION OF CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY THE PLO. HE HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT FALL INTO THE VICIOUS CIRCLE IN WHICH THE US HAD BECOME CAUGHT BY PLACING CONDITIONS ON ITS WILLINGNESS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS. THE PROSPECT OF A DIALOGUE MIGHT BE ONE ELEMENT WHICH WOULD HELP MOVE THE PALESTINIANS, BUT THE CART MUST NOT BE PUT BEFORE THE HORSE. PALESTINIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE 8 POINTS WOULD GIVE 80 PER CENT OF CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION, AND THIS QUESTION SHOULD NOT THEREAFTER REMAIN AN OBSTACLE TO DIALOGUE. HE AGREED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ATTACK ANY SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE TO CAMP DAVID. HE WAS, HOWEVER, CONCERNED THAT THE US APPEARED TO WANT THE 8 POINTS TO REMAIN AS GENERAL PRINCIPLES WHICH THE ARABS WOULD KEEP IN MIND IN THEIR APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, RATHER THAN A FIRM NEGOTIATING POSITION. HE WAS REMINDED OF THE FLEXIBILITY AND COMPROMISE WHICH THEY HAD SOUGHT FROM SADAT AT THE OUTSET OF THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS. NOTHING WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH DID NOT HAVE A CLEAR-CUT BASIS. THE US ARGUMENT SEEMED BASED ON THE FALSE PREMISE THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT SECURE ENOUGH TO COMPROMISE: WOULD ISRAEL EVER EXPRESS MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WHICH FELL SHORT OF GUARANTEED MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF THE ARAB STATES? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT VELIOTES HAD BEEN WORRIED THAT THE 8 POINTS WOULD BECOME A BOTTOM LINE PRESENTING A RIGID ARAB POSITION: PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PERHAPS BEEN MORE EXPLICIT IN SPEAKING TO THE SAUDIS. THE ARABS NEEDED A COMMON POSITION TO RECONCILE THE INTERESTS OF THE VARIOUS ARAB PARTICIPANTS: ACCEPTING THE 8 POINTS COULD NOT POSSIBLY MAKE THEIR POSITION MORE RIGID THAN IT ALREADY WAS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BRITAIN ALREADY HAD CONTACTS WITH THE PLO. BUT IF THE EC PRESIDENCY COULD EXACT A PRICE FROM ARAFAT FOR A MEETING, THIS WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON US THINKING WHICH AN UNCONDITIONAL MEETING COULD NOT HAVE.

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IF, AFTER FEZ, ARAFAT WOULD CONFIRM HIS CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE AMERICANS THAT THE PLO WAS NO LONGER THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION DEDICATED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL THAT ISRAEL CLAIMED IT WAS, WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO DIRECT AMERICAN CONTACT WITH THE PLO AND PLACE THEM UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO MOVE THE ISRAELIS TOWARDS NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO. PRINCE SA'UD REPEATED THAT HE HOPED THAT LORD CARRINGTON COULD MEET ARAFAT WITHOUT FURTHER CONDITIONS ONCE THE PLO HAD ACCEPTED THE 8 POINTS. THE PLO EXISTED TO LIBERATE OCCUPIED PALESTINE, AND COULD NOT ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION AT THIS STAGE WITHOUT DESTROYING IS OWN CREDIBILITY. TO PUSH ARAFAT TO GO FURTHER THAN HE COULD WOULD DO THE PEACE PROCESS A DISSERVICE. THE PLO COULD ONLY COME CLOSER TO CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION THAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE 8 POINTS AS PART OF THE OUTCOME OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS HARD TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO NEGOTIATE WHILE PLO SPOKESMEN (EG QADDOUMI LAST SUMMER) CONTINUED TO SAY THAT THEY COULD NEVER LIVE AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL. EVEN AN OBLIQUE INDICATION THAT THE PLO WOULD LIVE AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL AFTER SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE US AND ISRAEL TO TALK TO THE PLO. PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT WE SHOULD IGNORE EXTREMIST RHETORIC. HOWEVER SADAT'S FATE WOULD WARN ARAFAT AGAINST GETTING OUT ON A LIMB. IT WAS TO THE US THAT PRESSURE NOW NEEDED TO BE APPLIED.

6. SIR J GRAHAM SAID THAT THE QUESTION WAS ONE OF CLARITY. WE HAD TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT WE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT THE RIGHT OF STATES IN THE AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE INCLUDED ISRAEL. EXTREMIST RHETORIC MADE PROGRESS DIFFICULT. PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT CLARITY MIGHT NOT IMPROVE THINGS. EVERYBODY KNEW THAT THE RIGHT OF STATES TO LIVE IN PEACE INCLUDED ISRAEL. BUT ONLY MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE US COULD FRUSTRATE THE AIM OF EXTREMIST RHETORIC, WHICH WAS TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS IMPOSSIBLE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT BE UNWILLING TO MAKE ANY CONTENTIOUS MOVES ON THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE SCARS OF THE AWACS DEBATE FRESH ON HIM.

7. IN TALKS WITH PRINCE FAHD, THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGAIN ARGUED THAT ENDORSEMENT OF THE 8 POINTS AT FEZ AND SUBSEQUENT MORE EXPLICIT CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLO OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE COULD OPEN THE WAY FIRST TO A EUROPEAN AND THEN AN AMERICAN DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT THAT TO ZE SIRST WITH HIS ENDORSEMENT OF THE 8 POINTS WOULD HELP THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. DESPITE SOME OPPOSITION IN THE PLO, THE ARAFAT FACTION SEEMED TO BE IN A POSITION TO DELIVER THIS SUPPORT. IF, AFTER FEZ, EUROPE AND THE US COULD ACCEPT THE 8 POINTS, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ADDRESS THEM.

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8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS USED ARAB NON-RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS AN EXSCUSE FOR REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE. THEY WOULD CLAIM THAT PRINCE FAHD'S 7TH POINT DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR RIGHT TO EXIST, BECAUSE THE ARABS DID NOT RECOGNISE THAT ISRAEL WAS A STATE. IF, FOLLOWING HIS TALKS WITH PRINCE FAHD AND PRINCE SA'UD, HE WERE TO SAY IN RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTIONS, THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT IN THE SAUDI VIEW THE SEVENTH POINT INCLUDED ISRAEL, WOULD FAHD FEEL OBLIGED TO CONTRADICT HIM? PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS, AS A COUNTRY IN THE REGION, NATURALLY INCLUDED. BUT WHY DID ISRAEL NOT FIRST ACCEPT THE 8 POINTS, AND OFFER CONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL PROVIDED THAT THE ARABS RECOGNISED THE ISRAELIS' RIGHT TO EXIST? INSTEAD, THEY REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE STATUS OF THE GAZA STRIP OR THE WEST BANK: THEY WANTED TO RECEIVE AND TO GIVE NOTHING. THE MAIN SUBJECT OF THE EIGHT POINTS WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE: THE 7TH POINT DEALT WITH ONE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS.

9. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE SAUDI PROPOSALS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO SEE A WAY AHEAD. HE HOPED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL COULD SAY SOMETHING HELPFUL ABOUT THEM. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE TEN TO ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT BEFORE THE FEZ SUMMIT MEETING ENDED ON 28 NOVEMBER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THIS WOULD STIMULATE AN UNHELPFUL REACTION FROM THE MORE EXTREME ARAB GOVERNMENTS. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT IT WOULD, ON THE CONTRARY, PUT THEM UNDER PRESSURE TO BE MORE

FORTHCOMING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, BUT COULD MAKE NO PROMISES. NOR WOULD HE BE ABLE TO OFFER MORE THAN A GENERAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT: THE TEN WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ENDORSE EACH INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPLE. PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT THE SAUDIS NEEDED FIRST A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE TEN BEFORE THE FEZ SUMMIT DEBATED THE 8 POINTS, AND SECOND A REACTION FROM THE TEN IF A STATEMENT BASED ON THEM WAS MADE AT FEZ. PRINCE FAHD ADDED THAT IF THIS OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST, IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE WHEN THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER.

10. FOR DISCUSSION OF THE SINAI FORCE AT THESE TWO MEETINGS, SEE MIFT.

FCC PASS ALL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3383 OF 10 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE TO EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 490 TO PARIS: SINAI FORCE

1. WE HAD A FURTHER MEETING WITH HAIG TODAY, FOLLOWING THE SAME FORMAT AS YESTERDAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 3363).

MIFT CONTAINS THE RECORD AGREED BY THE FOUR NOTETAKERS.

2. I SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT INSTRUCTIONS, CHANGING THE ORDER SO AS TO CONCLUDE BY FOCUSING ON THE NEW DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE FOUR. HAIG IMMEDIATELY VOLUNTEERED THAT THIS WAS AN EXCELLENT STATEMENT AND THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH IT. HE SHOWED SOME UNEASE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS STATEMENT AND THE FULLER STATEMENTS TO BE MADE BY EACH GOVERNMENT IN EXPLANATION OF THEIR DECISION. HE WONDERED WHY ANY FURTHER STATEMENT WAS NECESSARY. HE APPEARED FINALLY TO ACCEPT THE EXPLANATION THAT THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD USE THE MATERIAL WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN OUT OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFT IN EXPLAINING THE DECISION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT NATIONAL PRACTICE, TO THEIR PARLIAMENTS OR PUBLIC. BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE SHALL HEAR MORE FROM HIM ON THIS WHEN HE HAS THOUGHT ABOUT IT. I SENSED A CONCERN THAT ~~SOME~~^{FOUR} SIMILAR STATEMENTS MAY BE SEIZED ON BY THE ISRAELIS AS OVERRIDING THE STATEMENT COMMUNICATED TO THEM. (THERE WAS A SLIGHT AMBIGUITY BETWEEN THE FRENCH INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH APPEARED TO ENVISAGE ABSOLUTELY IDENTICAL STATEMENTS, AND OUR OWN WHICH REFERRED TO USING THE WHOLE OF THE STATEMENT IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. IN EXPLAINING OUR INTENTIONS TO HAIG WE LEFT ROOM FOR SOME FLEXIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE FORM THOUGH NOT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATERIAL TO BE PRESENTED.)

3. HAIG'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN WAS WITH THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THEN TEN, WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT UNDO THE GOOD EFFECT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR. HE AGAIN QUESTIONED WHY ANY STATEMENT OF THE TEN WAS NECESSARY AND ARGUED FOR A DELAY BEFORE PUBLICATION AND FOR ONE TEXTUAL CHANGE. (THE TEXTUAL CHANGE IS NOT VERY SIGNIFICANT (SEE MIFT) AND THE THREE AMBASSADORS AND I AGREED SUBSEQUENTLY TO RECOMMEND IT TO OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS AS IT TENDS TO BRING THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN CLOSER INTO LINE WITH THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR.) THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND I TOLD HAIG THAT WE SAW NO PROSPECT FOR DELAY BUT THAT WE WOULD REPORT HIS SUGGESTION. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR STRUCK A MORE EFFUSIVE NOTE AND TOLD US AFTERWARDS THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY HAIG'S CONCERN ON THIS POINT AND WOULD RECOMMEND DELAY TO ROME.

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4. HAIG WAS AGAIN VERY CALM AND EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS ONLY LOOKING FOR WAYS TO CARRY THE OPERATION FORWARD AND TO AVOID POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ISRAELIS WHICH COULD UNDO THE WHOLE EFFORT AND LEAD TO A MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. AFTER THE FORMAL DISCUSSION HAD ENDED HE COMMENTED THAT WE HAD MADE VERY GOOD PROGRESS TODAY.

5. THE ONLY IMMEDIATE OUTSTANDING QUESTION IS THEREFORE THE POSSIBLE TEXTUAL CHANGE IN THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN AND THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT COULD BE DELAYED AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE OTHER STATEMENTS. WE SHALL NEED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS.

6. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/MR HURD FOR SIR N HENDERSON BY 0830 HOURS.

FRETWELL

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3384 OF 10 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIAT EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV

MIPT : SINAI FORCE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE AGREED REPORT :

1. HEADS OF MISSION OF THE FOUR SAW SECRETARY HAIG THIS EVENING. THE BRITISH CHARGE SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED INSTRUCTIONS.

2. HAIG SAID THAT THE REVISED STATEMENT OF THE FOUR WAS EXCELLENT. HE COULD NOT VISUALISE HOW ANYONE COULD TAKE OFFENCE AT IT. BUT HE HAD PROBLEMS WITH THE REST OF THE FOUR'S MESSAGE WHICH SEEMED LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO THE SAME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AS THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT OF THE FOUR.

3. HAIG STRESSED THAT WE WERE ALL FACING A COMMON PROBLEM. HE WAS ONLY OFFERING HIS BEST JUDGMENT OF WHAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS WHILE TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF ALL THOSE CONCERNED

4. ON THE PROPOSED NATIONAL STATEMENTS THE FOUR HEADS OF MISSION EMPHASISED THAT ALL THE POINTS IN THE FOUR'S ORIGINAL DRAFT STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE. HAIG EXPRESSED SOME UNEASE, PARTICULARLY AT THE PROSPECT THAT THE SAME POINTS WOULD BE MADE IN ALL FOUR CAPITALS AND THAT PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS MIGHT LEAD THE BRITISH TO GO FURTHER EVEN THAN THAT STATEMENT.

5. ON THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE TEN HAIG COMMENTED THAT HE COULD NOT CONTEST THE FIRST SENTENCE. DESPITE BEGIN'S RECENT STATEMENT, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO INSIST THAT THE EC HAD THE RIGHT TO STICK TO THE VENICE DECLARATION. THE REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION WAS TROUBLESOME BUT LESS SO IN THIS CONTEXT. HOWEVER THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT WAS UNNECESSARILY ABRASIVE. HE THEREFORE WISHED TO SUGGEST THAT IT SHOULD BE AMENDED BY THE REPLACEMENT OF THE WORDS QUOTE ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI UNQUOTE BY QUOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT/ISRAEL TREATY UNQUOTE.

6. HAIG MADE CLEAR HIS STRONG PREFERENCE THAT THERE BE NO STATEMENT AT ALL BY THE TEN. IF THERE HAD TO BE SUCH A STATEMENT HE HOPED THAT IT COULD BE AMENDED AS HE HAD PROPOSED AND THAT HIS EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A DELAY OF SOME TEN DAYS BETWEEN THE ISSUE OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR AND THAT OF THE TEN COULD BE ACCEPTED. IS SUCH A DELAY WERE NOT POSSIBLE, AT LEAST HE HOPED THAT THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN WOULD BE AMENDED.

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7. HAIG COMMENTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PRESSING FOR THE LATEST TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR OF WHICH THEY HAD SEEN AN EARLIER VERSION. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THEIR LIKELY REACTION TO THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN. (IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD THIS TEXT) IN CONCLUSION HAIG SAID THAT HE REMAINED WORRIED BUT THAT GOOD PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE.

8. THE FOUR HEADS OF MISSION AGREED SUBSEQUENTLY TO RECOMMEND THAT THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN BE AMENDED AS HAIG SUGGESTED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WORDING WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE AMENDMENT ALREADY AGREED TO IN (1) OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR.

2. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/MR HURD (TO SHOW TO SIR N HENDERSON).

FRETWELL

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 493 OF 11 NOVEMBER 81

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN,
COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, ATHENS, UKREP BRUSSELS.
INFO PRIORITY ALL ME POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TOKYO, LISBON,
MADRID, ANKARA, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE, LONDON,
10-11 NOVEMBER.

SINAI FORCE

SUMMARY

1. THE DISCUSSION CONCERNED THE BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION BY THE UK, FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS IN THE SINAI FORCE. (OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSION ARE BEING TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY). WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE GREEKS, THE TEN WERE GENERALLY CONTENT WITH THE PROCEDURE PROPOSED TO THE AMERICANS (WASHINGTON TELNOS. 3383-4 - NOT TO ALL) AND WITH THE AMENDMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN PROPOSED BY HAIG. THE GREEKS UNDERTOOK TO SEEK THEIR GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT. DISCUSSION ON THE RELATIVE TIMING OF NATIONAL STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR AND THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN WAS INCONCLUSIVE. MIFF CONTAINS THE VARIOUS TEXTS AS THEY NOW STAND, SUBJECT TO GREEK AGREEMENT.

DETAIL

2. BULLARD (PRESIDENCY) CIRCULATED A NOTE EXPLAINING WHERE THE FOUR HAD GOT TO IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS, INCLUDING THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNICATION TO BE GIVEN BY THE FOUR TO THE US, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS AND THE PROPOSED US AMENDMENT TO THE TEN'S STATEMENT. HE ADDED THAT WE WERE NOW HOPEFUL THAT AN EARLY AND SATISFACTORY SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND ON THIS BASIS. REININK (NETHERLANDS) AND DUPONT (FRANCE) AGREED AND

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SAID THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSED US AMENDMENT TO THE TEN'S STATEMENT. BOTTAI (ITALY) ALSO AGREED. HE SUGGESTED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE PROPOSED US AMENDMENT THE TEN SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DROP FROM THE LAST SENTENCE OF THEIR STATEMENT THE WORDS 'AND INDEPENDENT OF'. TO SAY THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE DISTINCT FROM THE REST OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. KIMBERG (DENMARK) SUPPORTED THIS AND SUGGESTED THAT SIMILAR CHANGES BE MADE IN THE MATERIAL TO BE USED BY THE FOUR IN THEIR NATIONAL STATEMENTS. HOWEVER PHRYDAS (GREECE) RECALLED THE DIFFICULTY HIS GOVERNMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD WITH THE TEXTS, BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR THAT ACCEPTANCE OF CERTAIN WORDING WOULD IMPLY AGREEMENT WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. HE FEARED THE CHANGE PROPOSED BY THE US TO THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN, HOWEVER SMALL IT MIGHT SEEM, WOULD CREATE THE UTMOST DIFFICULTY FOR GREECE. HE THEREFORE RESERVED HIS POSITION.

3. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT THE REST OF THE TEN EXCEPT GREECE WERE CONTENT BOTH WITH WHAT WE HAD PROPOSED TO THE US AND WITH THE US AMENDMENT TO THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN, WITH OR WITHOUT THE FURTHER AMENDMENT SUGGESTED BY BOTTAI. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS INCLUDING THE UK APPEALED TO THE GREEKS TO ACCEPT THE US AMENDMENT. THE EGYPT-ISRAEL TREATY WAS A CORRECT APPLICATION OF RESOLUTION 242 AND COULD LEGITIMATELY BE SEPARATED FROM THE REST OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. PHRYDAS UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THESE REPRESENTATIONS TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND TO TRY TO ELICIT A REPLY FROM THEM TOMORROW 12 NOVEMBER.

4. BULLARD THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF TIMING. THE FOUR COULD NOT YET SAY WHEN THEY WOULD WISH TO ISSUE THEIR NATIONAL STATEMENTS, WITH WHICH THE LETTER FROM THEM TO THE US, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO BE PUBLISHED. BUT THE QUESTION ALSO AROSE OF THE US REQUEST FOR A GAP BETWEEN NATIONAL STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR AND THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN. ONE CONSIDERATION WAS THAT TEN STATEMENTS HAD MORE IMPACT WHEN ISSUED ON THE OCCASION OF A MINISTERIAL MEETING. THIS POINTED TO THE TEN MAKING THEIR STATEMENT EITHER AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 17 NOVEMBER OR AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON 26/27 NOVEMBER, DEPENDING ON WHEN THE FOUR ACTED. MACKERNAN

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(IRELAND) SAID HE COULD AGREE WITH THIS PROCEDURE. BUT THE IMPORTANT GAP WAS BETWEEN DELIVERY OF THE LETTER BY THE FOUR TO THE THREE CAMP DAVID PARTIES AND THE FOUR'S NATIONAL STATEMENTS. WOULD NOT A SHORT GAP LEAD TO A STRONG ISRAELI REACTION, NO MATTER HOW SATISFIED THEY MIGHT BE WITH THE LETTER ITSELF? REININK SAID THAT THE GAP BETWEEN NATIONAL STATEMENTS AND THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. DUPONT SAID THAT NATIONAL STATEMENTS AND THE TEN'S STATEMENT SHOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS OR AS NEARLY SO AS POSSIBLE. PFEFFER (FRG) WAS INCLINED TO AGREE. HE SAW THE ARGUMENT FOR A MINISTERIAL MEETING ISSUING A STATEMENT BY THE TEN BUT IN OTHER RESPECTS A GAP HAD MANY DISADVANTAGES.

5. BULLARD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENCY WOULD NEED TO CONSULT WITH THE OTHER THREE WOULD-BE CONTRIBUTORS ON THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE TIMING OF THE DELIVERY OF THE LETTERS TO THE US, EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND OF NATIONAL STATEMENTS. THEREAFTER WE WOULD CIRCULATE BY COREU A SUGGESTED TIMETABLE INCLUDING THE TIMING OF STATEMENT BY THE TEN, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 494 OF 11 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN,
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INFO PRIORITY ALL HE POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TOKYO, LISBON,
MADRID, ANKARA, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA.

MIPT:

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE:
SINAI FORCE.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT PROPOSED BY THE FOUR TO THE US FOR A
LETTER FROM THE FOUR TO THE US, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS:
'THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM, AFTER CONSULTING THEIR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, HAVE DE-
CIDED, SUBJECT TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND TO AGREEMENT
ON THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI, AT THE REQUEST OF THE
GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. THE FOUR
GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IS BASED ON
THE UNDERSTANDING THAT:

- (I) THE FORCE EXISTS SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING PEACE
IN SINAI FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IT HAS NO OTHER ROLE:
- (II) THE FORCE IS BEING ESTABLISHED IN ITS PRESENT FORM IN THE
ABSENCE OF A UN DECISION ON AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND ITS
POSITION WILL BE REVIEWED SHOULD SUCH A DECISION BECOME POSSIBLE:
- (III) PARTICIPATION BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS IN THE FORCE WILL
NOT BE TAKEN EITHER AS COMMITTING THEM TO OR EXCLUDING THEM FROM
PARTICIPATION IN SUCH OTHER INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ARRANGE-
MENTS AS HAVE BEEN OR MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN THE REGION: AND
- (IV) PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENT IS WITH-
OUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR WELL KNOWN POLICIES ON OTHER ASPECTS OF

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THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA.'

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE TEN, INCLUDING THE PROPOSED US AMENDMENT (ORIGINAL TEXT IN BRACKETS) BUT NOT THE PROPOSED ITALIAN AMENDMENT:

'THE TEN CONSIDER THAT THE DECISION OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN SINAI MEETS THE WISH FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO FACILITATE ANY PROGRESS IN THE DIRECTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION, NAMELY THE MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO EXISTENCE AND SECURITY OF ALL THE STATES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING ISRAEL, AND THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES, WHICH IMPLIES RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THEY BELIEVE AT THE SAME TIME THAT ~~THESE~~ ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY (WITH ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI) ARE DISTINCT FROM AND INDEPENDENT OF [THE REST OF] THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.'

3. FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT BASIC TEXT FOR USE IN NATIONAL STATEMENTS GIVEN ONLY TO THE OTHER THREE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS: 'WE HAVE AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROPOSED MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI. WE AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS HAVE NOTIFIED THE UNITED STATES, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS OF THIS IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS: (TEXT OF PARA. 1 ABOVE).

THIS DECISION IS A SYMBOL OF OUR DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH WOULD BRING JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES AND SECURITY FOR ALL THE STATES OF THE AREA. WE WELCOMED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THAT GOAL. SIMILARLY WE WELCOME THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF THE CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH SPECIFICALLY DECLARED INADMISSIBLE THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

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HAS A DUTY TO PLAY ITS PART, AS NECESSARY AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN PEACE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE ALSO IN SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IN THE OTHER TERRITORIES CURRENTLY OCCUPIED IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE REGARD OUR SUPPORT FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY AS QUITE DISTINCT FROM AND INDEPENDENT OF THE REST OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.

IN ADDITION, WE WISH TO EXPRESS OUR FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE AND OUR BELIEF IN THE NEED FOR STABILITY AND CONTINUITY IN EGYPT. OUR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO FOLLOWS FROM THE POLICY, AS STATED IN THE DECLARATION ISSUED AT VENICE IN JUNE 1980 AND IN SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS. THIS POLICY, WHILE INSISTING ON GUARANTEES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, PLACES EQUAL EMPHASIS ON JUSTICE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. IT ALSO HOLDS THAT THE PLO MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.

WE PLEDGE OURSELVES TO SUPPORT THE MFO. WE ALSO REPEAT THAT, TOGETHER WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN ALL WAYS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH WE HOLD.'

CARRINGTON

STANDARD

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MED	ES & SD
NAD	ERD
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3 pm
Friday

The Greeks and Italians
have asked if we are
giving a community
briefing. I think
we should, and it
also covers Libya

15/11
29/10

VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN: DISCUSSION OVER LUNCH

1. There was a wide-ranging discussion over lunch on 28 October. The following is a very summary record, since on most of the topics covered, very little new emerged and no notes were taken.

Lebanon

2. The King said that there was little progress or prospect of progress. The Syrians were not out to annex Lebanon, but undoubtedly made a reconciliation difficult because they wished to ensure a continuation of their own influence there. In this context, he was critical of Saudi policy. They seemed to think that massive subsidies were the answer to every problem. In the crisis at the end of November 1980 the Jordanians had welcomed Saudi mediation, but had been much concerned to discover that Syrian agreement to withdraw their forces from the frontier had been bought by a massive Saudi donation.

Oman

3. At one point I picked up a remark by King Hussein to the Prime Minister about the dangers of the Americans 'embracing' Egypt too obviously. I said that the King, as we knew, had a close relationship with Sultan Qaboos. We found ourselves in a somewhat embarrassing position, since in speaking both to the Omanis and to the Americans we might be thought to be concerned solely for our own position in Oman, but we had been worried by the risks to Qaboos of too manifest and obvious embrace by the Americans. The King said that the Sultan was very alive to this danger and was worried about it. He agreed that, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the Sultan needed to take account of his own public opinion.

/Libya

Libya

4. Although the King had spoken earlier at the meeting with the Prime Minister of Libya as an arsenal of Soviet arms, he agreed, and indeed volunteered, that much of the Soviet equipment supplied to Libya was in effect rusting or deteriorating in the sun. He agreed that there was little or no military threat to Egypt and noted that the Sudan was already beginning to play the threat down. He said that it was difficult to discern any consistent thread in Libyan policy, but it was noticeable that when really isolated Qadhafi became more amenable. Mr Moberly made the point that all the Libyans tended to defer to Qadhafi and it was his assessment that it was Qadhafi that called the tune. General Khammash remarked that there were strains of insanity in Qadhafi and in Libyan policy.

5. Speaking of Chad, the Secretary of State made the point that one had to admit that if it were truly the case that Libya had been invited in by Goukouni, they had a not unreasonable position. After all, we supported the intervention of Senegal in Gambia at the invitation of the Gambian Government.

Morocco and West Sahara

6. King Hussein had mentioned the situation in West Sahara to the Prime Minister. Over lunch, he agreed with the Secretary of State that King Hassan had managed things very cleverly at the OAU meeting in Nairobi. Asked whether King Hassan was sincere in his acceptance of a referendum, the King said that some solution along those lines had to be found. The Jordanian Ambassador remarked that one difficulty would be the definition of the Saharians. King Hussein recounted a bizarre story, to match our own experiences at the time, of how he had received an emissary from King Hassan with a draft letter, which he was invited to sign, to the President of France urging the latter to press King Hassan to agree to self determination in West Sahara. Curious as it was, he said that he had signed it.

The Dead Sea Canal

7. There was some discussion of whether the Israelis were serious in this project and the Jordanian Ambassador expressed anxiety that they were obtaining subscriptions from individuals, especially in the Jewish community in Britain. The King said that the project, if it were carried through, would inundate the Jordanian potash works on the Dead Sea and do a lot of damage. We tried to explain the difficulties of preventing private individuals from subscribing, even though the Government's official attitude was that the project was illegal.

Tornado/P-110

8. The King said that he was entirely content with the information he had received from BAe. The Spaniards had asked him about the P-110 and he wondered how he should respond. It

/was

was agreed that this should be left to us. I mentioned that it seemed to us that there was likely to be continuing difficulty over obtaining FRG agreement to the sale of Tornado. I should be grateful if Defence Department could follow this up with Defence Sales and keep Amman and Madrid informed.

Khalid Tank


9. In response to Mr Blaker's question, the King said that he was content with the progress on resolving the technical problems of the Khalid tank and remarked that two or three tanks had already arrived in Jordan.

Military Training Courses

10. The King said that there were no problems on this front and cooperation was going well. Mr Blaker expressed our readiness to cooperate in any way.

Hospital of St John and Jerusalem

11. The Secretary of State thanked King Hussein for his efforts to raise funds for the hospital in the UAE.


John Graham

28 October 1981



Subject filed on
Middle East
Site: PE 7

Jordan
file

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T. 152/81**

31 October 1981

fs. *[Signature]*

Dear Ron.

First may I congratulate you most warmly on the outcome of the vote on AWACS in the Senate. This is good news for all the West's friends in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. And I am sure they will all appreciate your fantastic personal efforts which led to this result.

The immediate purpose of this note is to tell you of my talks with King Hussein this week. I know he is visiting you in Washington on Monday next. He is a deeply worried man though he speaks, as always, in low key and with the utmost courtesy. You may find it useful before you see him to have a brief account of the main points we covered in our talks.

Hussein told me that one of his worries is that Egyptians may be misled into concluding an agreement with the Israelis, about the West Bank, over the heads of the Palestinians, which the latter would be bound to reject. He himself very much hopes that Egypt will be able to return to the Arab fold, although he recognises the difficulties for many Arabs, not least because of the process of normalisation of relations between Egypt and Israel; but an agreement in the current autonomy talks that was rejected by the Palestinians would set back the prospects very severely. He said he had written to Mubarak in these terms.

/We discussed

We discussed also Fahd's eight-point plan. We had not at that time of course seen your helpful comment that they could form a beginning point for negotiations. He said that he doubted whether it would be possible for the Arabs to endorse Fahd's points as they stand at the Summit meeting in Fez if only because of Syrian opposition. Nevertheless, it might be possible for the Arabs to agree on something that was effectively the same, although expressed in different words. There could be dangers in this if the proposals came to be regarded as the irreducible minimum Arab demand; but if as you have said they can be presented as a negotiating position, it would be valuable.

In a survey of the Arab world ranging from Morocco and Mauritania in the West to the Iran/Iraq war in the East, Hussein expressed anxiety about the spreading problems that afflict so many countries in the area. He has of course no time for Qadhafi, but does not see the Libyan Army as a threat either to Egypt or indeed to the Sudan - Chad was another matter. Nearer home he himself is clearly worried by the current Israeli tendency to argue that the Palestinians, if they want a state, should seek it in Jordan, to the east of the River Jordan. This, of course, is a position which no Arab country could accept, and we have made it clear that it is not the Western position. Western countries have always taken the view that Resolution 242 calls for peace and withdrawal from occupied territory to be negotiated together, and that must mean withdrawal on the West Bank.

The one ray of hope, I believe, is that more and more Arabs are coming to see, and indeed acknowledge in public, the need for genuine negotiations with Israel. This movement will be Sadat's memorial, whatever other Arabs may say. Hussein of course has long believed in the need and now Fahd's proposals point in the same direction. If only the Palestinians could be brought to make clear their readiness to negotiate and live with the outcome and if, in their turn, the Israeli Government could show sufficient flexibility to allow the Palestinians to engage

/eventually

eventually in negotiations, whether direct or indirect, we might have some hope of bringing about a comprehensive peace in the region. It will require much ingenuity and patience and I can assure you that we will try to play our part.

Every good wish to you and Nancy.

Yours ever

Roosevelt

The President of the United States of America

(For favor of
onward transmission
by RCO 1/11/81)

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Jorde

28 October 1981

King Hussein

I enclose a record of the conversation which took place here earlier today between the Prime Minister and King Hussein.

MODBA

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TMP/DS

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON WEDNESDAY,
28 OCTOBER 1981 AT 1200 HOURS

Present:-

Prime Minister	King Hussein
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	General Khammash
Sir John Graham	H.E. Mr Ibrahim Izziddin
Mr. M.O'D. B. Alexander	

AWACS

The Prime Minister commented on the great efforts being made by President Reagan to secure the passage through the Senate of the agreement to sell Saudi Arabia AWACS. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it now looked as though the President might win. King Hussein questioned whether it would be altogether disastrous if the President were to lose. The Prime Minister asked whether defeat in the Senate would not be humiliating for both President Reagan and the Saudi Government. King Hussein replied that the humiliation had already occurred. If the Senate approved the sale, it would of course be the end of a period of agony. But if the sale was rejected, the US Administration might be prompted to consider a different approach to the problems of the Middle East. They might ask themselves who had more authority, President Reagan or Mr. Begin. The Prime Minister commented that King Hussein seemed to be ready to make a virtue of whatever decision was reached by the Senate.

Sinai MFO

The Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to explain the situation on the Sinai Multilateral Force. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the British Government had been put in a difficult position. The

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/Americans

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Americans had asked Australia, New Zealand and Canada to contribute to the Force. The Australian Government had, in effect, invited their Press to ascertain whether or not Australian participation would be acceptable to the Australian public. Public opinion polls had appeared to suggest that 80 per cent of the Australian electorate disliked the prospect. As a result the Australian Government, and subsequently the New Zealand Government, had said that they could only contribute if HMG also did so.

The Americans had then approached the UK. We had made it clear to them that we had hoped not to be asked. We pointed out the difficulties which participation raised for us and said we could only consider joining in if our European allies were also involved. Egypt had asked France who, somewhat surprisingly, had agreed. Italy had volunteered. Both had made UK participation a condition of their own participation. The situation therefore was that unless we agreed, the five others would refuse. We should then be accused of sabotaging the return of Arab land to Arabs. After some hesitation, we had decided to make a contribution. We were doing so:-

- (a) because we wanted to see Sinai returned to Egypt; and
- (b) because, in our view, our support for the arrangements could be differentiated from our attitude towards the rest of the Camp David process.

The statement which the four participating Governments would be issuing would be explicit on the latter point and would make it clear that we saw the return of Sinai in the context of Resolution 242 and its declaration that the acquisition of territory by war was inadmissible. We considered our position would be respectable and defensible. Crown Prince Fahd and Prince Saud, to whom the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had spoken in Cancun, had been inclined to accept that our participation in the arrangements would be tolerable provided we, and our European partners, distanced ourselves from Camp David.

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It would of course have been better if we had not been asked to provide a contingent. But if we had refused we would probably have lost our ability to influence the United States in the future. Moreover it was possible to perceive a slight shift in the position of the US Administration towards the PLO. President Reagan had referred to the PLO while he was in Cancun. Insofar as his position had moved, this was probably due to the activities of Mr. Begin. If the MFO could be successfully launched and if there could be general acceptance of Principle 7 in Crown Prince Fahd's list, a situation might be created in which it would be possible for the United States to enter into overt contact with the PLO. The Prime Minister said that the difficulty about the MFO had been that everyone's participation had depended on that of the UK. She herself had protested at the situation in which we had been put and had stressed the special nature of our position in the Middle East.

But it had become clear that a UK presence, however small, was needed to give respectability and stability to the arrangements. We had therefore agreed. There was now a need to build on this to secure a shift in American opinion. King Hussein indicated that he understood the arguments advanced by the Prime Minister and by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. He regarded it as essential that there should be no link between this limited action and the Camp David process. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary confirmed that the statement to be issued by the participating Governments would be explicit on this point.

US Policy on the Middle East

King Hussein said that he regarded his impending visit to Washington as the most important he had ever made. He was going to see if there was any basis for progress. President Sadat's death had been due to his inability to carry out the programme he had laid down, e.g. in his appearance before the Knesset. He had been frustrated and let down by Israeli intransigence. Events on the ground bore no relation even to those agreements which had been reached. Israeli policy on settlements was an obvious example. It was now being claimed in Israel that there was no Palestinian problem, only a Jordanian problem. The tilt towards

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/Israel

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Israel in US policy had to be corrected. Since Camp David it had been impossible for anyone to act independently or for those in the area to act as intermediaries. Hence the welcome accorded to the efforts of the Europeans at Venice and subsequently. If the US was determined to forge ahead on its own, an impossible position would be created. He hoped therefore to find out whether they were interested in seeking the help of others.

The Prime Minister said that she did not think the autonomy negotiations would get anywhere. She thought that King Hussein would receive a more sympathetic hearing from President Reagan himself than from Mr. Haig and his officials. King Hussein said that he had been told that President Reagan would listen. He hoped to be able to get him to do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Mr. Haig had no idea what he was going to do if the autonomy talks failed. King Hussein therefore had a good opportunity to implant new ideas in President Reagan's mind. There was a blank sheet on which to write.

King Hussein said that he had heard that even before President Sadat's death Egypt had had no proposals for further action before April next year, i.e. after Israel had withdrawn from Sinai. This would have been a disaster itself. The initiative always seemed to be in the hands of the trouble-makers. He himself had written to President Mubarak to wish him well. He had suggested that President Sadat was a victim of his inability to implement his programme in full. He had urged President Mubarak to avoid giving legitimacy to any approach which would deny the rights of the Palestinians generally or of the rest of the Arabs in Jerusalem. He was anxious to see Egypt back in the Arab family. He had offered President Mubarak a dialogue. So far he had had no reply. The Prime Minister said that the re-opening of a dialogue between Egypt and Jordan could be very important. Sir J. Graham asked whether, if Egypt indicated that she was ready to re-join the fold, the other Arabs would be prepared to accept the results of the "normalisation" of Egyptian relations with Israel, e.g. the

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presence of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. King Hussein said that this was indeed a major difficulty. He did not know the answer to the question. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary wondered whether Israel in the event would hand back Sinai or whether they would be nervous about the freedom of action which the return of the territory would give to Egypt. Again King Hussein said that he was uncertain as to the answer.

King Hussein said that he did not see why the United States could not open direct contacts with the PLO. He had said as much to ex-President Nixon recently and had asked him to convey the message to the US Administration. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that some prior move by the PLO would be necessary. The Americans were formally committed not to talk to the PLO unless and until the PLO had renounced terrorism and accepted Resolution 242. Hence the United Kingdom's efforts to break the log jam. King Hussein said that two of the principles left behind him by Dr. Kissinger had been unhelpful. He had asserted:-

- (a) that a strong Israel would also be responsible; and
- (b) that there should be no contacts with the PLO unless the conditions mentioned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had been fulfilled.

There was now no reason why the Americans should not talk to the PLO. The Prime Minister commented that President Reagan would encounter major difficulties at home if he were to meet Yaser Arafat. Those difficulties might be less if he were, for instance, to see some of the Palestinian Mayors. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that sooner or later the Americans would have to talk overtly to the PLO. They had already done so privately.

King Hussein said that the tragedy was that American attitudes towards the area were so superficial. The strategic consensus was unreal. It was important that the Americans should not "smother" Egypt. The Foreign and Commonwealth

/Secretary

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Secretary said that President Reagan and Mr. Haig had a different sense of priorities from others. Mr. Haig in particular saw the problem in the Middle East primarily as one of global strategy. He thought in terms of the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, of Islamic fundamentalism and so forth. He regarded the Arab/Israel dispute as secondary. This was of course wrong. The Arab/Israel dispute was crucial. If it could be resolved, other problems might become easier to deal with. A powerful speech by King Hussein pointing this out might be helpful. The Prime Minister said that the Arab/Israel dispute served, if anything, to increase Soviet influence in the area. It was a pity that security considerations made it so difficult for President Reagan to visit the Middle East. She agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that it would be an excellent idea if King Hussein were able to put specific propositions to the US Administration. The Arab case had never made the impact which it should in the United States. This was part of the reason for the trouble with the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggested that it would be helpful to think in terms of a timetable. Perhaps nothing should be attempted until the autonomy talks had collapsed and Sinai had or had not been returned to Egypt. But could not the Arabs as a whole issue a statement along the lines of Prince Fahd's seventh principle recognising the right of all states in the area to exist in peace. If the PLO would associate itself with this statement the US could take it up as evidence of a PLO willingness to recognise Israel and talks could get underway with the PLO.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister suggested that Israel would do its best to prevent the autonomy talks from collapsing. Sir J. Graham agreed. He thought that Israel's approach, under the influence of Mr. Sharon, would be relatively subtle. They would try to keep the talks with Egypt going. They would talk about autonomy leading to self-determination even if in fact they saw it as autonomy leading to incorporation. The whole issue might lead eventually to further elections in Israel. The Prime Minister observed that she had never believed there could be such a thing as autonomy of a people without their having autonomy over the land which they inhabited. Sir J. Graham said that the Americans had regarded the transition from autonomy to self-determination as more or less self-evident. However Mr. Begin did not. Mr. Sharon was now trying to set up what might, somewhat unkindly, be described as a "quisling" group on the West Bank. This attempt would no doubt fail but it had to be given a chance to do so. The Prime Minister said that any form of interim government was bound to fail. Sir J. Graham said that Mr. Begin, like Mr. Ian Smith, might not realise this. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he doubted whether the Israeli ideas would ever get off the ground. King Hussein agreed.

The Jordanian Ambassador said that it was vital that Egypt should not sign any agreement with Israel related to autonomy. The Egyptian Foreign Minister had seemed very forthcoming after his recent visit to Israel. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if Egypt did sign anything, it would be the end of any chances of a rapprochement between Egypt and the other Arab nations. King Hussein said that an entirely new approach was needed. President Mubarak must not give legitimacy to a process which had no chance of success. The Prime Minister said that she thought an Egyptian agreement with Israel would isolate President Mubarak and indeed put his life in jeopardy. She wondered whether Mr. Haig understood this. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that unfortunately the Americans regarded the autonomy talks as all that was available to them. They preferred to have something rather than nothing.

King Hussein then reviewed the problems in the area as a whole. He mentioned, in rapid succession, Mauritania, Libya, Sudan, South Yemen, North Yemen, Lebanon, Iran/Iraq, the Gulf and even Greece.

/He

He stressed the need for American understanding if these difficult problems were to be tackled successfully. The Prime Minister said that she was sure he would find President Reagan receptive. The President had to work under the limitations imposed by Congress and by the views of his electorate. The Israelis were, of course, excellent lobbyists. Nonetheless, if President Reagan could be brought to understand the Arab case, he would take action. No doubt the Saudis would already have put much of the case to him. King Hussein said that the Saudis were extremely polite, so much so that they failed to put their arguments convincingly. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that they were so polite that they often left a misleading impression. King Hussein said that he doubted whether the Saudis would ever provide a rallying point for the Arabs as a whole. But they would "go along" if matters could be put on a better course. The Prime Minister asked whether the Gulf Co-operation Council could not play a role. King Hussein said that the next summit might be helpful. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked about the meeting at Fez. King Hussein, while acknowledging that the meeting would be very important, said that he did not know what would happen there. The Prime Minister noted the co-incidence of dates with the European Council Meeting and said that those involved in the two meetings should try to keep in touch.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the problem with the Americans was they still did not appear to understand the extent to which they were alienating the moderate Arabs. King Hussein should try to persuade them of this. Sir J. Graham said that the Americans did not realise that leaders like King Hussein and King Khalid had problems of public opinion to deal with. They tended to regard Middle East governments as autocracies which could ignore the views of their citizens. If one forced one's friends to do unpopular things, eventually one undermined them. King Hussein said that he agreed fully. This had, of course, been President Sadat's problem. The handling of the question of Jerusalem was important in this context. Jerusalem mattered to all Arabs. It could never be merely the capital of Israel.

Sudan

Sir J. Graham drew attention to the problems of the Sudan.

He said that these were primarily economic. Events had forced Sudan into the Egyptian camp. As a result the Sudanese Government was being kept at arms length by the other Arab governments. This was a very short-sighted policy. If President Nimeiri did not get financial assistance, he would be forced to take extremely unpopular measures. The Sudanese economy should, eventually, be a relatively strong one. What he needed now was money to tide him over a difficult period. King Hussein agreed about the nature of the problem. The Prime Minister asked whether food aid would be any good. Sir J. Graham said that it ought to be possible for the European Community to make sugar available to him but there would be difficulties with other sugar producers. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in any case we must make sure that some of the Community's recent food aid package went to the Sudan. Sir J. Graham said that it would be more helpful if other Arab governments, like Saudi Arabia and Iraq, could be more generous and consistent with their assistance. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he would mention the matter to the Saudis during his visit next week.

The discussion ended at 1250.

Handwritten signature

28 October 1981

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1981

Paul Jorda

Dear Michael,

/ I enclose copies of briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with King Hussein tomorrow. The briefing is being submitted separately to Lord Carrington in Luxembourg.

*Yours ever,
B J P*

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER
ON 28 OCTOBER AT 12 O'CLOCK

Points to Make

Arab-Israel

1. Strong feeling among EC Partners that we should participate in Sinai force. Important that Israeli withdrawal should be got out of the way smoothly and that Egypt have support. No question of weakening of commitment to Venice approach or comprehensive settlement.
2. Looking to period after Sinai withdrawal when a new start must be made to peace efforts involving Americans, Europeans, Arabs and Israel. On Arab side Fahd may prove a useful basis for a joint Arab approach (chances of Arab Summit endorsement?). US must be brought round to more acceptable policy: with participation in Sinai Europe now in better position to influence them.
3. Important part of picture is need for PLO to move towards respectability. Conditional recognition of Israel only route available. Hope King will support this approach. Presidency could meet Arafat on this basis.

Lebanon

4. Encouraging that ceasefire is still holding in the South. But worrying that no progress is being made in building on it. We continue to support US/UN ideas. Does the King see any prospect of eg further UNIFIL deployment being accepted by both sides? Will Syria help to persuade the PLO? Meanwhile little progress in achieving national reconciliation. Diminishing chances of compromise as Presidential elections (August 1982) approach. How does the King see the future in Lebanon? What in his view are Syria's ambitions there?

Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal [if raised]

5. We regard the Israeli project as planned as contrary to international law. Made this clear in Parliament earlier this



year, have also told Israel privately, on behalf of the Ten, that Israel should obtain Jordan's consent for any project affecting the Dead Sea.

6. Some evidence that Israelis have not yet fully assessed practical and political implications of the Canal project. But will continue to oppose present project eg in discussion at UN.

Israeli excavations in Jerusalem [if raised]

7. Fully recognise special importance of Jerusalem to all parties. Britain will not accept any unilateral initiative to change the status of the City. We have always made clear our view that Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem is illegal.

Iran/Iraq War

8. Recent fighting near Abadan and bombing in Kuwait reminder of the danger to region if fighting were to spread. How do you assess peace prospects?

Tornado/P110

9. Welcome Jordanian interest in UK Family of aircraft. Is there any further information needed on Tornado/P110 for consortium meeting in Baghdad? We hope our briefing meets your needs. Potential for joint collaboration over development of P110.

Spanish interest in Tornado/P110 (Defensive)

10. Appreciate your talking in King Juan Carlos in general terms about P110. The Spanish already have considerable information on Tornado. We are looking into the ways in which Spain might be associated with the consortium.

Hawk

11. Pleased that Hawk evaluation went well.



Repair of Captured Chieftain (Defensive)

12. Possibility of repair work in Iraq presents us with difficulties as regards our position of neutrality during the conflict.

Khalid Tank (Defensive)

13. Everything possible is being done to ensure the technical problems can be overcome.

14. Secretary of State looking forward to visit to Jordan and will discuss dates for the visit (either 18-24 January or 12-20 April).

Smith Case

flag 15. See separate brief.



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER:
28 OCTOBER AT 12 NOON

Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrives on 27 October and leaves on 1 November. The visit is as usual a private one. King Hussein is visiting London on his way to Washington where he will pay a State Visit on 2 and 3 November. He is accompanied by General Khammash, Minister of Court. King Hussein will pay a private visit to the West Coast of America (probably Los Angeles) and also visit Canada where he will meet Mr Trudeau before returning to London on, or about, 15 November. King Hussein paid brief visits to most Gulf States and Iraq (but not to Saudi Arabia) before coming to the UK.
2. Records of the King's last call on the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State's call on the King are attached.

Arab-Israel

3. The Jordanians are likely to react badly to our decision to participate in the Sinai Force, but we have kept the Jordanian Ambassador here briefed and the King will be aware of the general background. The Secretary of State's lunch will be a valuable opportunity to defuse the likely Jordanian reaction.
4. The Jordanian reaction to Sadat's death was muted. The King had already on several occasions expressed an interest in promoting Egypt-Arab reconciliation. His enthusiasm for this is likely to be increased, but the Jordanians will nevertheless be looking to President Mubarak to move away from Camp David first.
5. The Jordanian reaction to the Fahd principles has also been muted. They have no grounds on which to disagree with them, but dislike the Saudi sponsorship. They have professed scepticism about their impact. It would be useful to persuade the King of the merits of a unified Arab approach behind Fahd, whether or not the Saudi label remains; & in particular of the value of securing explicit PLO endorsement of the principles with irreproachable Arab cover.



LEBANON

Play C Southern Lebanon (Map attached)

6. The ceasefire negotiated by President Regan's Special Representative, Mr Habib, in July is still holding. There have been some violations. But in general the PLO seem to be content to gain political credit and respectability by being seen to behave responsibly. The Americans tell us that they have had to restrain the Israelis from making further attacks on Palestinian bases in Lebanon. According to them the Israelis have now decided that for the time being they should abandon their strategy of pre-emptive strikes, and give American efforts at building on the ceasefire a chance.

7. Whether this means that the Israelis are prepared to countenance some of the ideas in the US/UN plan (now officially regarded by the US and UN as a working document only) remains to be seen. The plan envisaged staged mutual concessions (eg mutual withdrawal of heavy weapons, further deployment of UNIFIL) by both the PLO and the forces of Israel's protégé in Southern Lebanon, Major Haddad. Hitherto Israel had refused to consider such concessions on the grounds that to do so would be in effect to enter into negotiations with the PLO. But they now seem to have greater faith in UNIFIL, and might accept its wider deployment.

8. General Callaghan, the Commander of the UN interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recently met Arafat. The latter was naturally unwilling to consider concessions by the PLO without parallel movement by the Israelis (although the latter claims to have removed their heavy weaponry from the Haddad enclave). But he hinted that the PLO might accept further deployment of UNIFIL at the expense of some PLO positions.

9. Mr Habib is due to return to the area in November. But the Americans have not yet announced this.

Central Lebanon

10. The situation in Beirut deteriorated in late September/early

/October



October with a wave of car bomb attacks in which at least 80 people died and over 400 were injured. We do not know who was behind the attacks, for which an obscure organization called the Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners has claimed responsibility. There is no evidence to support the inevitable Arab accusations that Israel was responsible. The situation remains fragile.

11. Efforts by the Arab Follow-Up Committee (consisting of representatives of Kuwait, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon) to bring about national reconciliation between the multitude of warring factions in the country continue without much tangible success as yet. The Committee is next due to meet in Lebanon on 7 November. As a first step the Committee is attempting to stop the illegal import of arms. Syrian insistence that such an arms embargo should also apply to the PLO has alarmed the latter, and relations between the two are strained at present.

12. There is some doubt about whether Syria wants AFUC to make much progress, and some evidence to suggest that she may be content to maintain the status quo until after the Lebanese Presidential elections in August 1982, in the interests of seeing a candidate of her choice elected.

Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal

13. The proposal, which the Israeli government approved on 29 March 1981, is for a canal carrying salt water from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea. It will cross the (Israeli occupied) Gaza Strip, but not the West Bank, and enter the Dead Sea at a point in pre-1967 territory. The aim is to exploit the drop to the Dead Sea for hydro-electricity, producing 15% of Israel's peak energy demands on completion of the canal in 8-10 years time.

14. The Jordanians claim, and the Israelis deny, that the Canal will damage their agriculture and industrial investments in the Jordan Valley and around the Dead Sea. The Jordanians, Egyptians and the Arab League have condemned the project as inter alia illegal under international law.



15. HMG's position was set out in Mr Hurd's answer to an inspired PQ on 30 July 1981 (text attached). Our opposition to the project is based essentially on two points: firstly, that the project is contrary to international law as it involves unlawful work in occupied territory and infringes Jordan's legal rights in the Dead Sea and neighbouring regions, secondly, that the proposed canal is bound to prejudice the future of the Gaza Strip which in our view should be determined as a general peace settlement, and will inevitably complicate the task of making peace. The British Ambassador in Tel Aviv made a demarche on these lines, on behalf of the Ten, to the Israeli Government on 10 August. The Israelis have rejected the legal and political arguments, and have now circulated a note at the UN seeking to justify the project.

16. There are some signs however that the Israeli Government is re-examining both the practical and political problems of the project. The last government was anxious for electoral reasons to convey the impression that there were no problems and that speedy progress would be made. Wiser counsels may now prevail.

Israeli excavations in Jerusalem

17. This is a long standing Arab complaint. It has recently been revived by the Jordanians, who have circulated a note in Amman as well as at the UN demanding that pressure be brought to bear on Israel to stop excavations in Jerusalem.

18. The allegations, some wildly exaggerated, are that Israel's true purpose in continuing excavations in Jerusalem is to progressively 'Judaize' the City by obliterating Arab and Islamic monuments. The Jordanians also claim that recent excavations are undermining the Temple Mount on which the Al Aqsa Mosque, the third most holy sanctuary in Islam is situated.

19. UNESCO has debated the issue regularly. The Ten have consistently abstained on the grounds that resolutions produced by the Arabs were either highly political (and therefore unsuitable for UNESCO) or contained highly exaggerated claims.

/Arab



Arab allegations are not borne out by the annual reports of the UNESCO Director General's Special Representative, Professor Lemaire, who, while making minor criticisms of the Israeli work, has stated that there is no threat to the structure of the Temple Mount.

20. The Syrians have repeated Jordanian complaints against the Israelis in a UN resolution this week. We are confident of securing agreement of all members of the Ten, except possibly Greece (who want to take a stronger pro-Arab line), to abstain. We want to avoid having to pronounce on the rights and wrongs of the Israeli excavations, and prefer to rely on our already stated position on Jerusalem, ie that Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 is in contravention of the 4th Geneva Convention and that we will not accept any unilateral initiative to change the status of the City.

Iran/Iraq War

21. War flared up at the end of September when Iraqis were pushed back across the Karan River ending the (incomplete) siege of Abadan. Iranians received a boost to their morale, but on 29 September some of their top military commanders were killed in a plane crash. Iraqis are reportedly massing in Susangerd area.

22. Iranians have said in October that they regard the Islamic Conference as the most suitable mediators. (Peace efforts have also been made by the Non-Alligned Movement and Olaf Palme for the United Nations). But recent successes on land will probably strengthen Iranian resolve to fight on.

23. Jordan staunchly supports Iraq in war. A lot of military equipment supplied to Jordan finds its way to Iraq. Jordan services Iraqi military equipment and thereby gains useful revenue.

Bombing of Kuwaiti Oil Installation

24. The Kuwaitis alleged that three Iranian aircraft attacked Kuwaiti oil installations on 30 September setting fire to an oil gathering centre but causing no casualties. The Iranian Foreign Ministry issued an outright denial that their aircraft had been



involved but Mr Haig revealed to the US House of Representatives that AWACS aircraft had monitored the attack from Iran. Kuwait has protested to Iran. Sandwiched as she is between Iran and Iraq, she must be only too well aware that her position is not strong. She is unlikely to take any retaliatory measures against Iran.

Syria/Jordan

25. The Jordanians are very sensitive on the subject of their troubles with Syria. Relations continue at a very low ebb, although the threat of attack by Syria has receded and the war of words is in abeyance. Commercial relations continue as normal.

Defence Sales

26. Tornado/P110. Ministers agreed on 24 July that our primary objective should be to focus Arab interest in P110 and also in Hawk. It was necessary to promote P110/Tornado/Hawk as a family of aircraft but there remain reservations over Tornado supply to Iraq on both security and political grounds. We do not want to put at risk the prospects of P110 and Hawk by openly admitting that the sale of Tornado to Iraq could prove difficult. The German attitude on sales of military equipment to sensitive areas, is the subject of review. This will not be completed before the end of 1981. The question of funding is crucial to P110. There is at present no provision in the Defence Budget for an aircraft of this type. However, when Mr Nott visited Jordan he said that there may be an RAF requirement for P110 in the late 1980's, but that prospects for full UK government involvement would be very much influenced by the possibilities of association in a joint venture with Arab funds. Iraq's expression of interest in Tornado has raised security problems. These have been explained to and are understood by the Jordanians. Sanitized brochures on the aircraft were given to the Jordanians in late September for passing to consortium members. The next step is the consortium meeting which may be held in Baghdad in late November.



27. SPANISH INTEREST IN TORNADO/P110

King Hussein discussed the Tornado/P110 project with King Juan Carlos in the summer. Dr Abdullah Toucan (Technical Adviser to King Hussein) asked the Managing Director of Defence Sales whether the Spanish Air Force could be briefed on the project. There is no objection to this on security grounds. But Spain's participation in the consortium might be unwelcome to other members and would make an already complex project even more difficult. The manufacturers see Spain as a customer for Tornado, and we must be careful not to cut across their marketing interests (although MOD do not see any difficulty in this). Spain's aspirations to join NATO suggest that we should deal with them direct, with the sale of Tornado as the first priority. We do not know how attached King Hussein is to securing Spain's participation, but it would seem best to try to dissuade him if we can do so without offence.

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

28. The King continues to be helpful in pursuing sales prospects. Jordan offered repair facilities for the Chieftain tanks captured by Iraq in the Gulf War but the Jordanians now feel that the repair work should be undertaken openly in Iraq. This will need to be addressed by Ministers shortly.

DEFENCE SALES TO JORDAN

29. Mr NOTT visited Jordan in September and Sir R Ellis visited in August.

HAWK

30. Following a visit by the Red Arrows in March, an evaluation of Hawk took place in Jordan in August. King Hussein told the Head of Defence Sales that Jordan would buy Hawk if Iraq did. The Jordanians are interested in Hawk as an advanced trainer; funds may be a problem.

KHALID

31. Deliveries of the 274 Khalid Tanks contracted for in

/1979



1979, are now proceeding in accordance with the revised plan drawn up in May. Problems have occurred with steering units. Work is continuing to try to correct the steering fault. The problems have been identified and Jordan has been assured of HMG's best possible engineering support to keep the tanks operational.

32. The Jordanians have approval to give one Chieftain ARV to Oman.

DEFENCE TRAINING

33. King Hussein has recently expressed his deep regrets that MOD service training which was stepped up at this request in 1979, has now become too expensive for Jordan. Mr Nott, when visiting Jordan recently, undertook to see what could be done to remedy this problem. Work is still in progress.

LOW LEVEL AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM

34. Jordan has signed a contract with the Soviet Union for the supply in 1982 of SAM 8s and ZSU 23/4 guns. Amman telno. 399 reporting this is attached. The stationing of Soviet technicians in Jordan might present serious security problems. The Jordanians are aware of our concern. The King has said no Soviet experts will be stationed in Jordan.

VISIT BY C-in-C, JAF

35. General Shaker, C-in-C JAF will spend a week in London from 9-13 November as guest of the CDS. He is due to call on the Secretary of State on 10 November.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO JORDAN AND SYRIA

36. The Secretary of State has agreed to visit Jordan and Syria in either January or April 1982. The dates 18-24 January and 12-20 April are free. The Syrians have not yet given any indication which date is the more preferable. The Jordanians welcome the visit at any time suitable to Lord Carrington but

/have

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have pointed out that the weather is better in April. The Jordanian Foreign Minister has suggested that the dates are discussed with King Hussein.



KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON PRIME MINISTER ON 28 OCTOBER
AT 12 O'CLOCK

IRAQ: JOHN SMITH

Points to Make:

1. Thank you for handing over letters from Smith's mother and wife to President Saddam Hussein in May. We continue to urge the Iraqis to show clemency over this unfortunate case. So far, alas, without success.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Mr John Smith, Hestair Dennis executive, sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in February 1980, following conviction on charges of attempted bribery of Iraqi official. Iraqi co-defendants executed. Although Smith pleaded 'not guilty', the Iraqis produced considerable evidence to substantiate the charges.
2. King Hussein's intervention with Iraqi President last October on behalf of another Briton imprisoned in Iraq, Mr Sparkes, led to his release on 5 November. King Hussein also raised the Smith case. The Iraqis have indicated a willingness to exchange Smith for an Iraqi assassin (Hassan) who is serving a life sentence in the UK. We have made it clear that we cannot agree to this proposal.
3. Lord Privy Seal raised the Smith case with King Hussein in February. In April Secretary of State gave King Hussein a letter from Smith's mother to the Iraqi President, which King Hussein personally handed over in May with another letter he had received from Smith's wife. The Iraqis have not acknowledged any of these missives.
4. UK Ministers continue to raise the case on all occasions, the latest being Mr Biffen during his visit to the Baghdad Trade Fair (1-15 October) and Mr Hurd with the Iraqi Foreign Minister on 5 October.
5. Smith's wife went to Baghdad from 14-21 October and visited her husband daily. Smith has had more restrictive prison regime imposed on him since mid-August. Embassy Baghdad currently discussing this with Iraqi authorities.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON 8 APRIL 1981 AT 0930 HOURS

Present:

Prime Minister	King Hussein
The Hon. Douglas Hurd MP	His Excellency Mr. Ibrahim Izziddin (Jordanian Ambassador)
Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander	

* * * * *

US/Jordanian Relations

The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Haig's visit to Jordan had been successful. When she had herself been in Washington in February, she had told President Reagan that relations between President Carter and King Hussein had not been good and that the US should make an effort to improve them. King Hussein said that Mr. Haig's visit had been a very good one. There had been a full discussion of the problems in the area and the threats to it. He had had the impression that the Prime Minister's visit to Washington had had a great impact on those whom she had met there. There seemed to be an entirely different atmosphere. The Prime Minister said that the visit had gone off well. The new Administration wanted advice and were prepared to consult right across the board. Mr. Haig had appeared keen to get to grips with the situation in the Middle East. Had he given any hints to King Hussein as to how he intended to proceed? King Hussein said that Mr. Haig seemed anxious to learn about the situation in the Middle East from the leaders involved. He did not think that the Americans would elaborate a new policy until these exploratory discussions had been completed. But they clearly recognised that Communist influence in the area was of great concern and that the Palestinian problem lay at the root of the instability in the region.

The Arab/Israel Dispute

King Hussein said that the Arab/Israel dispute was responsible for the divisions within a people whose background and traditions would place them naturally in the free world. He had made it plain to Mr. Haig that he was deeply grateful to his European friends for their Middle East initiative. It had helped to prevent the further polarisation in the area which was sought by the Zionists and the Communists. This polarisation posed a great danger. A spark in the Middle East could set off an explosion which would destroy the world. Europe's policy had given the Arabs the possibility of hope for the future. The United States should welcome this. They should also welcome the opening it gave to them to educate US opinion about what was happening. The Prime Minister recalled an earlier conversation with King Hussein in which he had said that there was no-one in the United States putting the Arab case. The new Administration were very conscious of this.

The Prime Minister said that it was not easy to envisage the next steps towards a solution of the dispute. Mr. Van der Klaauw was pursuing his discussions. But he was not a very dynamic character. She would have wished that it had been possible to make more rapid progress with the clarification of attitudes commissioned at Venice. Everything in fact depended on how the US saw the way ahead and with whom they intended to deal.

King Hussein said that he had discussed this with Mr. Haig and had told him that the Palestinians would have to be involved. He was keeping in close touch with the moderate Palestinian leadership. Unfortunately they were to some extent hostages of events. Great pressures tending to the destruction of the moderate leadership were building up. The moderates had asked him to suggest to the Prime Minister that she should consider using him as a channel for communication. This would enable contacts to be

/ kept out of

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kept out of the public eye. The Americans themselves had said that at some point, perhaps before very long, they would like to make contact with the PLO, perhaps through the Jordanians or the Saudis. King Hussein said that he had stressed the need for the Americans to avoid dealing with "anyone who comes along". The Prime Minister said that she thought the idea of using King Hussein as a channel of communication was a good one. The US and British Governments had the same difficulty about contacts with the PLO: they gave rise to pressure from the Jewish community and from Israel. Mr. Hurd asked whether it would be possible to prevent the Palestine National Council, which was due to meet shortly, giving rise to the usual kind of inflammatory statements. Could King Hussein do anything? King Hussein said that he would try. Since the meeting was being held in Syria, the Council would be under considerable pressure. *unhelpful?* Nonetheless, he was not hopeful.

The Prime Minister asked whether there was any sign of an alternative group of Palestinian leaders emerging. She recalled a previous conversation with King Hussein in which he had told her that the Israeli Government were preventing this. King Hussein said that attempts to encourage such a group continued. The overwhelming majority of Palestinians were anxious for a lasting and honourable peace. There was a continuing struggle between the moderates and other elements. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister about the longer-term objectives of the PLO, King Hussein limited himself to saying that his Government's contacts with the PLO were very promising. The Prime Minister asked whether the PLO would continue to cause difficulties even after a solution to the main problem had been found. Would they, for instance, try to stir up trouble in the Gulf? Would they continue to be under the influence of the Soviet Union? King Hussein said that only very small groups were under Soviet influence. The majority of the Palestinians were very responsible. Although Israeli policy encouraged extremism, he could not see that the majority of the Palestinians would, if given the opportunity, choose anything other than peace, freedom and prosperity.

- 4 -

The Prime Minister said that she thought we were now at the beginning of a period of a year or 18 months when a solution in the Middle East might become possible. Nothing would happen until after the Israeli election but then the United States would make its move. It would not be easy to choose the right direction but President Reagan and Mr. Haig would want to make real progress. (The assassination attempt would have enhanced President Reagan's authority - assuming he emerged fit and well.) The European initiative had been meant to prevent the development of a vacuum and to give Europe influence on the United States. There must be no competition between Europe and the United States. They would have to work together to help the countries in the area find a solution. It would be important to recognise that the Arab/Israel dispute and the difficulties in the Gulf were part of the same problem. The Americans had a tendency to parcel things up separately and to ignore the links between them. She had told President Reagan that it would not be possible to ignore the Palestinian issue in dealing with the Gulf. King Hussein said that if anyone could influence President Reagan, it would be the Prime Minister. The United States had lost a great deal of ground during President Carter's Administration. The period needed for the new Administration to organise itself was likely to be a dangerous one. The Prime Minister commented that she was sure King Hussein and President Reagan would get on very well together.

Syria

Mr. Hurd asked about Syria's attitude to Middle East peace efforts. Were they likely to veto attempts to make progress? King Hussein said that he found the present policy of the Syrian Government "deeply shocking". They seemed to live for today and give no thought to the longer term. They had signed a treaty with the Soviet Union after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The treaty was in some ways worse than similar ones signed with the Soviet Union by other Arab countries. Syria's attitude towards Middle East peace efforts was obstructive to progress of any kind. Their

performance in Lebanon was "unbelievable". Their intention appeared to be to keep the country destabilised in order that they could bargain over its future. This had created the danger of intervention by Israel. Relations between Syria and Jordan had seriously deteriorated. Syria was a negative influence in the region as a whole.

The Prime Minister asked whether Syria's policy reflected the country's internal problems. King Hussein agreed that these were very serious, but said that they were not an excuse for turning guns on innocent people. Syria had become, like Libya, an arsenal. Who was the arsenal to be used against? The Prime Minister asked whether she was right in thinking that the situation on Jordan's border with Syria had been defused for the moment. King Hussein agreed that this was so but added that the Syrian build-up continued and that tension might well be renewed at some stage. The reason for Syria's attitude lay in Jordan's support for Iraq. Jordan had had no option but to offer this support. Iran's activities were a threat to the whole region. Exacerbation of the divisions between the Sunni and the Shia would have terrible consequences. It would be far worse than Northern Ireland.

Iran/Iraq War

The Prime Minister said that she could not at present see any end to the hostilities between Iran and Iraq. King Hussein said that one might have hoped that the war might have led to the coming to power of patriotic elements in Iran but this had not so far happened. The situation was in some ways rather ominous. No way forward would be possible unless there was a cease-fire, but this posed great difficulties. He had visited the battlefield himself and had seen that the terrain would make it impossible for Iraq to withdraw from its present positions except on the basis of a lasting solution. There was nowhere for them to establish defensive positions between their present lines and the

/ border which

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border which would place the Iranians once again within a few miles of Baghdad. The Iraqis claimed that they had no desire to humiliate Iran. But if no solution was found, the Iraqis might have no choice but to push further.

The Prime Minister said that renewed hostilities between Iran and Iraq would be a cause for great concern. They would bring to an end present efforts to restore the supply of oil from the two countries. This would have a very bad effect on oil prices and, therefore, on efforts to bring the recession to an end.

UK/Iraq Relations

The Prime Minister said that the visit to London by the Iraqi Foreign Minister had been very successful. It was clear that the Iraqi Government were anxious to distance themselves from the Soviet Union and improve their relations with the West. Closer relations should be certainly be possible. She was most grateful to King Hussein for the help he was giving in our discussions with the Iraqis about the supply of military equipment. She was also grateful for the King's help in securing the release of Mr. Sparkes. King Hussein said that the Iraqis had also been pleased by the outcome of the Foreign Minister's visit. Their mood was now very anti-Soviet. He hoped that Iraq would develop into a positive force in the area. This would be very helpful in counterbalancing the influence of Syria.

Rapid Deployment Force and the Gulf

The Prime Minister said that she had been upset by the reception given to the remarks she had made in the United States about the Rapid Deployment Force. The RDF was basically a good idea. She hoped that the United States would go ahead with its establishment. If they did, the United Kingdom would make a modest contribution. The fact was that



the world was now a "kaleidoscope of hostilities". One never knew where trouble might break out next. Of course she had in mind the possibility that the trouble between Iran and Iraq might spread to the Gulf. But equally there might be problems in Africa or anywhere else. Those directly concerned would of course have to rely on themselves in the first instance. But they would also need their friends. If there were an RDF in existence, one could react. If there were not, one could not. No-one, of course, was asking for stationing rights.

King Hussein indicated that he agreed. Jordan had been preparing herself to offer help within the limits imposed by her means. There were two aspects to the present situation - in the first place there was the need to make progress on the question of Palestine (the Prime Minister interjected that this was the main problem); beyond that there was the general polarisation of the region. The Soviet Union was, of course, anxious to gain control of the energy resources there. This danger was already on the doorstep. The Arab countries had a duty to defend themselves. But it had been recognised at the recent Arab Summit that it would take Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States a long time to develop a capability to defend themselves. If there was a Soviet move, the Arabs would need more than their own strength.

North Yemen

The Prime Minister asked whether there was anything new to be said about the situation in North Yemen. King Hussein said that the Saudis continued to deal with the situation in the wrong way. They wanted to control what happened in the YAR but they did not want to create a strong state because they feared it would pose a threat to them. Jordan remained very close to the country's leadership but they no longer had the same kind of involvement there as they had had in the past.

/ Egypt

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Egypt

The Prime Minister asked whether relationships between Egypt and the other countries in the region were improving. King Hussein said that relations with Sudan had been restored. He added that if Egypt were prepared to rest content with what it had already achieved with Israel and would stop trying to determine the future of the Palestinians, this would be very helpful.


Tornado

The Prime Minister commented that King Hussein would shortly have the opportunity to fly Tornado. She was very anxious to push ahead discussions on the possible sale. She thought that the Federal Republic would "come to an accommodation". The German Government had been rather slow to move but she did not anticipate any overriding difficulty. It would be helpful if King Hussein could make his views clear to the Chancellor. Chancellor Schmidt had his own problems, but she was sure that he would come along once he realised that there was a real interest on the part of the Arabs. Mr. Hurd said that there was something of a chicken-and-egg situation but that the omens were quite good. King Hussein said that the Prime Minister's messages had been relayed to the other Heads of Government concerned. The position of the Federal Republic would be crucial. The fact that the Saudis were having difficulty over the purchase of the Leopard tank and that the Iraqis had been denied the supply of a number of helicopters already contracted for by the Germans was unhelpful. King Hussein added that the prospect of a new air superiority fighter based on Tornado was very exciting. A particular attraction would be that the project was conceived of as an all-British one.

/ Prime Ministerial

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Prime Ministerial Visit



The Prime Minister said that she was very much looking forward to her visit to the Gulf. King Hussein said that he was sorry not to be receiving the Prime Minister in Amman. The Prime Minister said that when she came to Jordan it would have to be a visit specially for that purpose.

The discussion ended at 1030.

8 April 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON KING HUSSEIN AT CLARIDGES: LO AM
ON 15 APRIL

Present:

The Secretary of State

HM King Hussein

Mr J C Moberly

HE Mr Ibrahim Izzidin, Jordanian
Ambassador

Mr F N Richards

Mr M K Jenner

ARAB/ISRAEL

NFJ 397/2

23 APR 1972

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[Handwritten initials]

1. Lord Carrington asked what the King believed we should do on Arab/Israel when we assumed the Presidency in June. King Hussein said we should hold to our present course. The greatest contribution the EC had to make was in terms of American attitudes. The Americans were still not fully aware of the Arab case, the Arabs themselves had not presented it adequately. The central problem was the divisions between the Arabs and the West. The Arabs were part of the free world, it was difficult to combat communism while these differences remained. Europe had given hope of a solution. Talk of RDF etc missed the essential point. He believed that Mr Haig had understood this more towards the end of his talks with him than at the beginning. His talks with Mr Haig had been very cordial. Mr Haig had explained that he was there to listen and learn. The King felt he had absorbed what he was told.

2. The Secretary of State said the Mr Haig appeared to have understood more when he saw him last week than he had when they met in Washington six weeks before. His great difficulty was American public opinion on the PLO; he could only go so far in accepting the PLO as part of the peace process. It was unfair to judge any organisation by its congresses but statements such as those on the Soviet Union coming out of the PNC in Damascus gave American public opinion the impression the PLO were extremists and did not help. Could anything be done? King Hussein said that the PLO were virtual hostages of the Syrians. He had sent the PLO messages before the Congress and had seen the Head of their Political Section and warned them of the need for moderation. But the Syrians and Libyans were working for radical statements. Fatah's intention was to resist and he was confident they would. Extreme statements did not reflect the views of the responsible majority. As for a Palestinian State he did not see this as inevitably Soviet dominated. Syria was a more serious problem in this respect. He added that the PLO had told him that they had contact with Western countries through a variety of channels which were not sufficiently secure. They wanted a dialogue but not through individuals who reported their messages to the Syrians and Russians.

they had asked him whether such contracts, particularly with the UK, could be through Jordan. Lord Carrington said that this was very useful to know.

3. The Secretary of State said that one of the factors limiting American room for manoeuvre was the Palestinian covenant. A Ministerial meeting of the Euro-Arab dialogue was due later this year. If there could be agreement then by the 23 Arab States and the PLO on acceptance of Israel, conditional on Israeli acceptance of Palestinian rights, this would be a tremendous advance in respect of public opinion. King Hussein thought this might be possible. Such an approach would not be contrary to Resolution 242 nor to the decisions of the Baghdad Summit. But the Euro-Arab dialogue meeting would be very large; might this not be taken up beforehand with the PLO? Mr Moberly said that the PLO were represented in the preparatory discussions. Ahmad Sidqi Dajani had not opposed the idea but it was not clear how influential he was. King Hussein said that he was close to Arafat but inter-Arab differences would be a problem at such a meeting. Mr Moberly said that one possibility would be agreement on a communique including reference to the Venice Declaration. Lord Carrington said that this would have to be agreed beforehand. The PLO would not give away their bargaining card, so recognition would have to be conditional. He hoped the King would let him know if there was any move we could make or if there was anything we were doing which he felt was the wrong approach. King Hussein said he would help in any way he could.

ISRAEL

4. Asked about Mr Peres's election chances the King thought he might win. But there were many serious internal problems. Despite considerable help from the Carter Administration Israel's economic problems were bad. He hoped this would have some effect on Israeli policies. One of Mr Haig's aides had said that Mr Haig had not discussed Peres's ideas with the King because he was not convinced by them. Lord Carrington said that when Mr Peres was here he appeared to be convinced of the need for a settlement and to be more flexible than Begin, but his suggestions were wholly unrealistic. The so called Jordanian option did not exist. King Hussein said it was designed to drive a wedge between the Jordanians and Palestinians and to sow doubts. Lord Carrington could not believe that Mr Peres and Mr Eban, both intelligent men, would not move towards something different if they really wanted a settlement. We had to try to push them but they were suspicious of us. The Americans would have to be involved.

SYRIA

5. King Hussein said that he was very unhappy at Syrian policies, particularly their links with the Soviet Union; the Friendship Treaty was very worrying. They were becoming more and more of a threat. They had taken delivery of 260 T72 tanks so far this year (part of a total holding of 580). Who would they use them against? He thought they might in time be used against their own Alawite Minority. The Syrian people were very unhappy but Rifat al-Asad's forces came to almost half the army and Alawites held high positions in other units. Lord Carrington asked whether they were genuinely annoyed that Mr Haig had not gone to Damascus or whether it was a smokescreen. Was there any point in going to Damascus as Van der Klaauw and the LPS had done?

/King

They had asked him whether such contracts, particularly with the UK, could be through Jordan. Lord Carrington said that this was very useful to know.

3. The Secretary of State said that one of the factors limiting American room for manoeuvre was the Palestinian covenant. A Ministerial meeting of the Euro-Arab dialogue was due later this year. If there could be agreement then by the 23 Arab States and the PLO on acceptance of Israel, conditional on Israeli acceptance of Palestinian rights, this would be a tremendous advance in respect of public opinion. King Hussein thought this might be possible. Such an approach would not be contrary to Resolution 242 nor to the decisions of the Baghdad Summit. But the Euro-Arab dialogue meeting would be very large; might this not be taken up beforehand with the PLO? Mr Moberly said that the PLO were represented in the preparatory discussions. Ahmad Sidqi Dajani had not opposed the idea but it was not clear how influential he was. King Hussein said that he was close to Arafat but inter-Arab differences would be a problem at such a meeting. Mr Moberly said that one possibility would be agreement on a communique including reference to the Venice Declaration. Lord Carrington said that this would have to be agreed beforehand. The PLO would not give away their bargaining card, so recognition would have to be conditional. He hoped the King would let him know if there was any move we could make or if there was anything we were doing which he felt was the wrong approach. King Hussein said he would help in any way he could.

ISRAEL

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/King



King Hussein thought it was a smokescreen. He accepted that Syrian isolation should not be encouraged but they had to be cut down to size otherwise their approach was to bargain for their own interests not for eg. Palestinian or Lebanese interests. Mr Moberly asked whether, if there was movement towards a settlement with wide support in the Arab world, Syria could effectively block movement. King Hussein did not think they could do much in such circumstances. But they blackmailed (he did not say how) the Gulf States and the Saudis (eg. if the Syrians shouted loud enough they got their money).

IRAN/IRAQ

6. The King said that the Islamic mediators had wasted a golden opportunity to get immediate negotiations going. The Iraqis had set out to humiliate Iran but if nothing happened soon they would feel compelled to move again. Lord Carrington said that he had seen Aga Shahi and President Zia in Pakistan; their preoccupation had been that Iran should not fall under Soviet domination. King Hussein said he feared the same for Iraq. He noted that they had moved significantly away from the Soviet Union. Lord Carrington said that the Iraqi Foreign Minister's visit here had been most useful. He was very grateful for the King's help in removing Anglo/Iraqi tensions.

THE GULF

7. King Hussein hoped that Iraq and Saudi Arabia could continue to work together for security in the Gulf. There had been a good start with improved Iraqi relations with both Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. He hoped the Saudi approach to the potential threat from N Yeman would change. There were 1.5 million Yemenis in Saudi Arabia.

EGYPT

8. Lord Carrington said that he had found President Sadat in January much more prepared than he had been six months before to mend fences with Saudi Arabia. In his optimistic way he looked for agreement on autonomy with Peres 'within a month'. Thereafter he would bring in the other Arabs. He had his sights set on Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982 while not wishing to seem to feather his own nest at Palestinian expense. King Hussein thought Peres would need a lot of persuasion to meet that autonomy deadline. If the scenario did not work out Sadat would have to decide what to do; he hoped he could move back towards the Arabs.

CONCLUSION

9. The Secretary of State apologised on behalf of HMG for the difficulties with Customs over the King's aircraft when he arrived in London. There had been no intention to infringe sovereign immunity (the King accepted this graciously). The Secretary of State also asked if he could leave with the King a moving letter from Mr Smith's mother and asked whether there was anything further the King could do to help. King Hussein accepted the letter. He had also had one from Mr Smith's wife. He would do what he could.



10. The meeting ended at 10.45.

Distribution:-

PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Mr Bullard
Sir J Graham
Mr J C Moberly
NENAD
MED
Research Dept


CHANCERIES

Amman	Washington
Damascus	Paris
Beirut	Bonn
Baghdad	Rome
Tel Aviv	The Hague
Jeddah	UKMIS New York
Kuwait	Tunis
Doha	
Muscat	
Abu Dhabi	
Cairo	
Jerusalem	



LEBANON

— INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
— ROAD



SYRIA

Tripoli

Hirmil

Shikkar

Qanate

LEBANON

Ba'albek

Jounie

BEIRUT

Hammana

Rayak

Khalde

Bhamdoun

Aley

Shtaoura

Zahle

Masnaa

SYRIA

Sidon

BEKAA VALLEY

Djezzine

DAMASCUS

Rachaya

Arnoun

Mt. HERMON

Nabatiyah

ARQUB

UNIFIL

Marjayoun

Ch. Beaufort

Khiam

Jebel Rous

Tyre

UNIFIL

Qiryat Shmouna

Qnaitra

CHRISTIAN FACILITY

ISRAEL

Nahariya

British Shipbuilders

Mr. Thornton asked the Secretary of State for Industry whether he has received British Shipbuilders' annual report and accounts for 1980-81.

Mr. Tebbit: My right hon. Friend today, in accordance with sections 17(9) and 18(6) of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977, has laid before each House copies of British Shipbuilders' annual report and accounts for 1980-81.

Post Office Pension Fund

Mr. Blackburn asked the Secretary of State for Industry whether he has yet taken a decision on the future of the Post Office pension fund.

Mr. Kenneth Baker: I have sent the following letter to Sir Henry Chilver, the chairman of the Post Office.

You wrote to Keith Joseph on 26 January with the Post Office Board recommendation that the present pension fund should be split into two following the creation of British Telecommunications. Your letter also contained other possible solutions for the future of the Fund. Since then, Bryan Stanley of the POEU, has written to Keith reflecting the views of five of the unions involved and Sir Daniel Pettit wrote on behalf of the Trustees. We have also had letters from Kenneth Glynn of SPOE and the pensioners organisations, and either Michael Marshall or I have held meetings with all interested parties so that everyone has been able to explain their views. The whole subject of pensions has also been debated in both Houses of Parliament on a number of occasions during the passage of the BT Act.

This is a complex problem, and one that is rightly viewed as one of the most important decisions consequent on the re-organisation of the Post Office. I have been greatly helped in understanding the issues involved by the meetings that I have had with you, the Trustees and the unions. Pensions affect the lives of all who work in the Post Office and British Telecommunications, and the need to safeguard the position of all pensioners and members of the fund is reflected in the BT Act. As you know, section 33(3) requires the Secretary of State to amend any order which would otherwise place any individual in a worse position than he would have been in if the order had not been made.

I would very much have preferred to use the powers in the Act to implement a solution which had the consent of all parties but my discussions have shown that is not possible. It is clear to me, as I think to everyone else, that there will be a need to maintain discrete accounts of the pension liabilities and assets relating to the staff and pensioners of each corporation. That will be necessary to meet the requirements of the Inland Revenue. Having given very careful thought to all the arguments that have been advanced I also believe that the unions and management of each corporation should be free to consider pensions and related benefits without being obliged by the pension arrangements themselves to have reference or regard to the other corporation.

For these reasons, I think there should be separate pension schemes for BT and the Post Office, each with its own trust deed and separate body of trustees. To my mind, and without prejudice to the nature of the investment arrangements, this implies that there should be scope for the two sets of trustees to adopt different investment policies, should they wish to do so. The Trust Deed for the Post Office will remain substantially unchanged but a new deed will have to be prepared for BT. I need hardly say that I would not, indeed could not, approve any new scheme for BT which did not embody the same level of pensions and other benefits and the same level of funding arrangements as the present Post Office scheme. I would be grateful if you could begin the preparation of such a scheme and the associated trust deed in consultation of course with the unions.

This does, of course, leave open the question of the investment arrangements for the two schemes, and in particular whether there should be a common investment organisation and fund. The arguments here seem finely balanced and I have an open mind. In any case I should much prefer the question to be resolved by those most directly involved, that is the trustees, members of the scheme, and the corporations who carry the onus

of making good any deficiencies. I hope, therefore, that you can begin consultations with the unions and the present trustees of the investment arrangements for the two schemes.

I think it important that the uncertainty about the future investment arrangements should be removed as quickly as possible. I would like to see the period within which the interim measures operate kept to a minimum and the new arrangements in force, if at all possible, within a year from the appointed day. This points to an early decision on the investment arrangements and I would be grateful if you would report the results of your consultations before the end of September.

I would be prepared to give effect to any reasonable agreed solution and the Lords amendments to the previous pensions clause were designed to make sure that all likely options are indeed possible.

I am copying this letter to the General Secretaries of the unions and to Sir Daniel Pettit, and also to Sir George Jefferson and Ron Dearing.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Republic of Ireland (Foreign Minister)

Mr. Michael Brown asked the Lord Privy Seal when next he expects to meet the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Ireland.

Sir Ian Gilmour: The Irish Minister for Industry, Commerce and Tourism, Dr. Kelly, is acting Foreign Minister until the Foreign Minister designate, Professor Dooge, has his appointment confirmed by the Irish Parliament. I expect next to meet them at the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels on 14-15 September.

Maze Prison (United States Government)

Mr. Michael Brown asked the Lord Privy Seal whether he has had any recent contacts with the United States Government on matters arising from the hunger strike in Her Majesty's prison, Maze.

Sir Ian Gilmour: No.

Mediterranean—Dead Sea Canal

Mr. Needham asked the Lord Privy Seal what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to the proposal by Israel to build a canal linking the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea.

Mr. Hurd: The project as planned is contrary to international law, as it involves unlawful works in occupied territory and infringes Jordan's legal rights in the Dead Sea and neighbouring regions. No official support will be given by Her Majesty's Government in respect of the project.

Diplomatic Service (Language Training)

Mr. Wilkinson asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement on the comments on language training in the Diplomatic Service made by the Foreign Affairs Committee in its recent report.

Mr. Hurd: The Committee's recommendations will be studied carefully. Its views on language training in the Diplomatic Service are generally helpful. But certain percentage figures as presented in this report may be misleading.

The most important question in this field is whether those Diplomatic Service staff whose official duties bring them into regular contact with foreign Governments have



14

GRS 530

SECRET

SECRET UK EYES ALPHA

FM AMMAN 211730Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 399 OF 21 OCT

INFO MODUK (DI4B), BAGHDAD, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 394: JORDANIAN PURCHASE OF AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION

1. I AND MY DA SAW THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF THIS MORNING IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UK AND, IN VIEW OF CONFLICTING REPORTS WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THE JORDANIANS HAD IN FACT CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE PURCHASE OF AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT, I ASKED HIM IF HE COULD TELL US THE LATEST STATE OF PLAY. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF BEGAN BY CONFIRMING THAT THE DEAL HAD ALREADY BEEN SIGNED. HE SAID THAT ONLY SAM 8S AND ZSU 23/4 GUNS (AND NOT SAM 6S, AS HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN OTHER REPORTS) WERE BEING PURCHASED AND DELIVERY WOULD TAKE PLACE DURING 1982.
2. JORDAN HAD BEEN INFLUENCED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS IN TAKING THIS DECISION:
 - A. JORDAN'S URGENT NEED FOR A MOBILE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM HAD BEEN CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN IN THE CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIA LAST NOVEMBER. THE FIXED POSITION HAWK BATTERIES WHICH JORDAN AT PRESENT POSSESSED WERE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A MOBILE SYSTEM AND WERE VERY VULNERABLE WITHOUT LOW LEVEL PROTECTION: INDEED A SENIOR VISITING US OFFICER HAD RECENTLY REMARKED THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD TAKE THE HAWK EMPLACEMENTS OUT IN 20 MINUTES.
 - B. NO OTHER SYSTEM OF MOBILE LOW-LEVEL AIR DEFENCE WAS AVAILABLE TO JORDAN AT THIS TIME AND THE AMERICANS HAD, AS WE KNEW, JUST CANCELLED THEIR OWN ROLAND PROGRAMME.
 - C. JORDAN WOULD BE THE FIRST ARAB COUNTRY TO OBTAIN SAM 8S AND INDEED THE FIRST COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC TO DO SO. IT WAS AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH THE JORDANIANS FELT THEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO FORGO.
3. I ASKED GENERAL SHAKER ABOUT A POSSIBLE SOVIET TECHNICAL PRESENCE IN JORDAN. HE ADMITTED THAT PERHAPS 20-25 SOVIET TECHNICIANS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SERVICE THE NEW WEAPONRY ON ARRIVAL, BUT CLAIMED THAT NO PERMANENT SOVIET IN-COUNTRY PRESENCE WOULD BE REQUIRED (ALTHOUGH HE SPOKE WITH LITTLE CONVICTION). HE SUBSEQUENTLY MODIFIED THIS BY SAYING THAT, IF A HANDFUL OF SOVIET TECHNICIANS WERE PRESENT IN JORDAN, THE JORDANIANS WOULD TAKE THE UTMOST CARE TO "SEAL THEM OFF" AND ENSURE THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO OTHER EQUIPMENT IN THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES.

SECRET

/4.



SECRET

4. I ASKED GENERAL SHAKER IF THERE WAS ANY TRUTH IN RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT IRAQ HAD CONCLUDED A MAJOR NEW DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT. HE SAID THAT, AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THIS WAS NOT SO AND THAT UNFORTUNATELY THIS MEANT THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD NOT BE ABLE, AS MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN DESIRABLE, TO DO THEIR TRAINING ON SAM BS IN IRAQ. IRAQ HAD, HOWEVER, CONCLUDED A VERY LARGE DEAL FOR THE PURCHASE OF ROLAND MISSILES FROM THE FRENCH AND INTENDED PASSING SOME OF THESE TO JORDAN SEMICLN BUT THEY WOULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SAM BS, WHICH JORDAN WAS ACQUIRING FROM THE RUSSIANS (PRESUMABLY BECAUSE DELIVERY WOULD BE LONG DELAYED)

5. GENERAL SHAKER EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING TO ME AS A TRUSTED FRIEND AND THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD NOT YET INFORMED THE AMERICANS OF THEIR DECISION. THEY WANTED TO DO THIS IN THEIR OWN WAY (I UNDERSTAND FROM THE US AMBASSADOR THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL BE SPENDING A DAY OR TWO TALKING TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND GIVING PRESS INTERVIEWS IN WASHINGTON AFTER THE FORMAL PART OF HIS VISIT IS OVER AND THE JORDANIANS WILL PRESUMABLY NEED TO THINK VERY CAREFULLY ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON THE MISSILE DEAL IN THIS CONTEXT AS WELL AS IN THEIR OFFICIAL TALKS). MY US COLLEAGUE WAS STILL HOPING TODAY (HE LEAVES FOR THE US ON 22 OCTOBER) THAT THE KING WOULD DELAY SIGNING THE DEAL UNTIL AFTER HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

URWICK

LIMITED
DEF.D
ACDD
NENAD
MED
NEWS.D
EES D
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ALLAND
SIR J GRAHAM
MR MOBERLY
MR GILLMORE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

2
SECRET

Private Secretary


cc: PS/No 10
News Department
MED
Defence Department

cc R. Kyss
Hfa

~~SA~~
Rant-26/10

KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM:
27 OCTOBER TO 1 NOVEMBER

1. I have agreed with the Jordanian Ambassador the following line to be taken for use with enquiries from the press:
2. King Hussein is paying a private visit to the United Kingdom from 27 October to 1 November. He will take the opportunity to call on the Prime Minister and to meet Lord Carrington for talks on a number of subjects concerned with the situation in the Middle East.



26 October 1981

I S Lockhart
Near East and North Africa
Department 233 4059

126 OCT 1991

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 220500Z
FROM UKDEL CANCUN 212345Z OCT 81.
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 6 OF 21 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN.

NF 5391/2		
RECEIVED REGISTRY NO.		
25 OCT 1981		
INDEX	PER	REGISTRY
	PA	Action Taken
	de	se

FOLLOWING FOR LYNE FROM ALEXANDER, UK DELEGATION, CANCUN

BEGINS:-

YOUR TELNO. 20: LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN.

31 THE PRIME MINISTER HAS APPROVED THE DRAFT MESSAGE IN YOUR
TEL UNDER REFERENCE SUBJECT TO THE AMENDMENT OF THE FINAL
SENTENCE TO READ "I KNOW YOU WILL UNDERSTAND".

ENDS.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TICKELL

LIMITED
NENAD
PCD
MEI
PS
PS/KPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J. GRAHAM
MR MOBERLY

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

cc Markle
GPS 100

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL No. *J 148 99/10*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 211719Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CANCUN
TEL NO 20 OF 21 OCTOBER 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

NFS 397/2

RECEIVED: **POSTERY NO.**
23 OCT 1981

INDEX	PA	Action Taken
	<i>to</i>	<i>yl</i>

FOR FALL AND ALEXANDER.
LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN ON 28 OCTOBER.

1. AS YOU KNOW THE CENSURE MOTION ON 28 OCTOBER OBLIGES THE PRIME MINISTER TO CANCEL HER WORKING LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS OFFERED LUNCH IF THIS IS ACCEPTABLE.

2. THIS NEEDS TO BE EXPLAINED TO KING HUSSEIN. ONE WAY TO SOFTEN THE BLOW WOULD BE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE KING ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

BEGINS:

YOUR MAJESTY,

I AM VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING YOU AGAIN ON 28 OCTOBER AND TO OUR TALKS. BECAUSE OF URGENT AND UNEXPECTED BUSINESS IN PARLIAMENT THAT DAY, I AM DEEPLY SORRY THAT IT WILL NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO OFFER LUNCH FOLLOWING OUR TALKS. HOWEVER, LORD CARRINGTON WOULD BE MOST HAPPY TO DO SO. I HOPE THIS WILL BE ACCEPTABLE.

MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS.

3. (FOR AMMAN). THE POSITION HAS BEEN EXPLAINED TO THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO MAY ALREADY HAVE REPORTED.

C WA FORWARD TO MEETING

CARRINGTON
LIMITED
NENAD
PCD
MED
PS
PS/HPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J. GRAHAM
MR MOBERLY

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 211718Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CANCUN
TEL NO 20 OF 21 OCTOBER 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

*Mr Alexander
Secretary of State would
prefer this with the
amendment, it
agrees! L. T. L.*

FOR FALL AND ALEXANDER,
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ACCEPTABLE. *I know you will understand*

MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS.

3. (FOR AMMAN). THE POSITION HAS BEEN EXPLAINED TO THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO MAY ALREADY HAVE REPORTED.

C WA FORWARD TO MEETING

CARRINGTON

File No.
 Department
 Drafted by
 (Block Capitals)
 Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY 0800Z 22 Oct Z

FOR
 COMMS. DEPT.
 USE

Despatched

(Date)
 (Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
 (Security Class.) (Caveat/ Privacy Marking)
 (Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE LONDON Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO
 REPEATED TO (for info) **AMMAN (IMMEDIATE)**

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Following for Lyne from Alexander, UK Delegation, Cancun

BEGINS

Your tel. no. 20: lunch for King Hussein.

The Prime Minister has approved the draft message in your tel under reference subject to the amendment of the final sentence to read "I know you will understand".

ENDS

Copies to:-



Jordan

CONFIDENTIAL

Agreed.

Am

Mr M O'D B Alexander

Relations with Jordan

I attach a self-explanatory telegram from our Embassy in Amman. You will see that it mentions ^{the} a possibility of inviting King Hussein to spend a day or two in London en route to or from Washington at the beginning of November.

Lord Carrington would like to authorise our Embassy to take soundings of the Jordanians, as proposed in the telegram. However, before doing so, I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would be free to receive King Hussein in the period in question, and would agree to do so.

RMJ Lyne

(R M J Lyne)

5 October 1981

RESTRICTED

QQAHO05.3))33 .RR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 021705Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY UKDEL MELBOURNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 157 OF 2 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN AND JEDDA

PRIORITY

*By Set
PS for action
1/13 3/10*

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY:

YOUR TELNO 12 (NOT TO JEDDA): POSSIBLE VISIT BY SECRETARY OF STATE TO JORDAN.

1. THERE IS NO ROOM IN THE DIARY FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VISIT TO AMMAN ON EITHER SIDE OF THE VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA (3-5 NOVEMBER) AND KING HUSSEIN IS DUE TO BE IN WASHINGTON FROM 2-3 NOVEMBER (WE DO NOT KNOW HIS TRAVEL PLANS). NONETHELESS IT IS WORTH TAKING TROUBLE TO KEEP THE JORDANIANS FAVOURABLE TO THE EUROPEAN APPROACH AND TO THE FAHD INITIATIVE, AND WE RECOMMEND EITHER A STOP-OFF IN AMMAN ON THE WAY FROM SAUDI ARABIA OR AN INVITATION TO KING HUSSEIN TO STOP OFF IN LONDON ON HIS WAY TO OR FROM WASHINGTON. IF THE TIMING FITTED, TALKS IN LONDON ON KING HUSSEIN'S WAY OUT WOULD BE PREFERABLE, AS SIGNIFYING CONSULTATION WITH THE JORDANIANS RATHER THEN MERELY KEEPING THEM INFORMED. THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD ALSO LEAVE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN SETTING UP LORD CARRINGTON'S PROGRAMME IN RIYADH.
3. A STOP-OFF OF THIS NATURE WOULD NOT SATISFY THE JORDANIAN INTEREST IN A FULL OFFICIAL VISIT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BUT SHOULD HOLD THE POSITION PROVIDED THAE PROSPECT OF SUCH A VISIT CONTINUED TO BE EXPLORED.
4. DO YOU AGREE THAT AMMAN SHOULD TAKE SOUNDINGS OF THE JORDANIANS ON THIS BASIS?

CARRINGTON

FILE

VLB

CONFIDENTIAL

Jordan

8 April 1981

Call by King Hussein

King Hussein of Jordan called on the Prime Minister this morning. Mr. Hurd was also present. I enclose a record of their discussion.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

F. N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

VLB

CONFIDENTIAL

cc. Hester act.

SUBJECT

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON 8 APRIL
1981 AT 0930 HOURS

Present:

Prime Minister	King Hussein
The Hon. Douglas Hurd MP	His Excellency Mr. Ibrahim Izziddin (Jordanian Ambassador)
Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander	

* * * * *

US/Jordanian Relations

The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Haig's visit to Jordan had been successful. When she had herself been in Washington in February, she had told President Reagan that relations between President Carter and King Hussein had not been good and that the US should make an effort to improve them. King Hussein said that Mr. Haig's visit had been a very good one. There had been a full discussion of the problems in the area and the threats to it. He had had the impression that the Prime Minister's visit to Washington had had a great impact on those whom she had met there. There seemed to be an entirely different atmosphere. The Prime Minister said that the visit had gone off well. The new Administration wanted advice and were prepared to consult right across the board. Mr. Haig had appeared keen to get to grips with the situation in the Middle East. Had he given any hints to King Hussein as to how he intended to proceed? King Hussein said that Mr. Haig seemed anxious to learn about the situation in the Middle East from the leaders involved. He did not think that the Americans would elaborate a new policy until these exploratory discussions had been completed. But they clearly recognised that Communist influence in the area was of great concern and that the Palestinian problem lay at the root of the instability in the region.

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/ Arab/Israel

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The Arab/Israel Dispute

King Hussein said that the Arab/Israel dispute was responsible for the divisions within a people whose background and traditions would place them naturally in the free world. He had made it plain to Mr. Haig that he was deeply grateful to his European friends for their Middle East initiative. It had helped to prevent the further polarisation in the area which was sought by the Zionists and the Communists. This polarisation posed a great danger. A spark in the Middle East could set off an explosion which would destroy the world. Europe's policy had given the Arabs the possibility of hope for the future. The United States should welcome this. They should also welcome the opening it gave to them to educate US opinion about what was happening. The Prime Minister recalled an earlier conversation with King Hussein in which he had said that there was no-one in the United States putting the Arab case. The new Administration were very conscious of this.

The Prime Minister said that it was not easy to envisage the next steps towards a solution of the dispute. Mr. Van der Klaauw was pursuing his discussions. But he was not a very dynamic character. She would have wished that it had been possible to make more rapid progress with the clarification of attitudes commissioned at Venice. Everything in fact depended on how the US saw the way ahead and with whom they intended to deal.

King Hussein said that he had discussed this with Mr. Haig and had told him that the Palestinians would have to be involved. He was keeping in close touch with the moderate Palestinian leadership. Unfortunately they were to some extent hostages of events. Great pressures tending to the destruction of the moderate leadership were building up. The moderates had asked him to suggest to the Prime Minister that she should consider using him as a channel for communication. This would enable contacts to be

/ kept out of

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- 3 -

kept out of the public eye. The Americans themselves had said that at some point, perhaps before very long, they would like to make contact with the PLO, perhaps through the Jordanians or the Saudis. King Hussein said that he had stressed the need for the Americans to avoid dealing with "anyone who comes along". The Prime Minister said that she thought the idea of using King Hussein as a channel of communication was a good one. The US and British Governments had the same difficulty about contacts with the PLO: they gave rise to pressure from the Jewish community and from Israel. Mr. Hurd asked whether it would be possible to prevent the Palestine National Council, which was due to meet shortly, giving rise to the usual kind of inflammatory statements. Could King Hussein do anything? King Hussein said that he would try. Since the meeting was being held in Syria, the Council would be under considerable pressure. Nonetheless, he was not hopeful.

The Prime Minister asked whether there was any sign of an alternative group of Palestinian leaders emerging. She recalled a previous conversation with King Hussein in which he had told her that the Israeli Government were preventing this. King Hussein said that attempts to encourage such a group continued. The overwhelming majority of Palestinians were anxious for a lasting and honourable peace. There was a continuing struggle between the moderates and other elements. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister about the longer-term objectives of the PLO, King Hussein limited himself to saying that his Government's contacts with the PLO were very promising. The Prime Minister asked whether the PLO would continue to cause difficulties even after a solution to the main problem had been found. Would they, for instance, try to stir up trouble in the Gulf? Would they continue to be under the influence of the Soviet Union? King Hussein said that only very small groups were under Soviet influence. The majority of the Palestinians were very responsible. Although Israeli policy encouraged extremism, he could not see that the majority of the Palestinians would, if given the opportunity, choose anything other than peace, freedom and prosperity.

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/ The Prime Minister

E. R.

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The Prime Minister said that she thought we were now at the beginning of a period of a year or 18 months when a solution in the Middle East might become possible. Nothing would happen until after the Israeli election but then the United States would make its move. It would not be easy to choose the right direction but President Reagan and Mr. Haig would want to make real progress. (The assassination attempt would have enhanced President Reagan's authority - assuming he emerged fit and well.) The European initiative had been meant to prevent the development of a vacuum and to give Europe influence on the United States. There must be no competition between Europe and the United States. They would have to work together to help the countries in the area find a solution. It would be important to recognise that the Arab/Israel dispute and the difficulties in the Gulf were part of the same problem. The Americans had a tendency to parcel things up separately and to ignore the links between them. She had told President Reagan that it would not be possible to ignore the Palestinian issue in dealing with the Gulf. King Hussein said that if anyone could influence President Reagan, it would be the Prime Minister. The United States had lost a great deal of ground during President Carter's Administration. The period needed for the new Administration to organise itself was likely to be a dangerous one. The Prime Minister commented that she was sure King Hussein and President Reagan would get on very well together.

Syria

Mr. Hurd asked about Syria's attitude to Middle East peace efforts. Were they likely to veto attempts to make progress? King Hussein said that he found the present policy of the Syrian Government "deeply shocking". They seemed to live for today and give no thought to the longer term. They had signed a treaty with the Soviet Union after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The treaty was in some ways worse than similar ones signed with the Soviet Union by other Arab countries. Syria's attitude towards Middle East peace efforts was obstructive to progress of any kind. Their

CONFIDENTIAL / performance

performance in Lebanon was "unbelievable". Their intention appeared to be to keep the country destabilised in order that they could bargain over its future. This had created the danger of intervention by Israel. Relations between Syria and Jordan had seriously deteriorated. Syria was a negative influence in the region as a whole.

The Prime Minister asked whether Syria's policy reflected the country's internal problems. King Hussein agreed that these were very serious, but said that they were not an excuse for turning guns on innocent people. Syria had become, like Libya, an arsenal. Who was the arsenal to be used against? The Prime Minister asked whether she was right in thinking that the situation on Jordan's border with Syria had been defused for the moment. King Hussein agreed that this was so but added that the Syrian build-up continued and that tension might well be renewed at some stage. The reason for Syria's attitude lay in Jordan's support for Iraq. Jordan had had no option but to offer this support. Iran's activities were a threat to the whole region. Exacerbation of the divisions between the Sunni and the Shia would have terrible consequences. It would be far worse than Northern Ireland.

Iran/Iraq War

The Prime Minister said that she could not at present see any end to the hostilities between Iran and Iraq. King Hussein said that one might have hoped that the war might have led to the coming to power of patriotic elements in Iran but this had not so far happened. The situation was in some ways rather ominous. No way forward would be possible unless there was a cease-fire, but this posed great difficulties. He had visited the battlefield himself and had seen that the terrain would make it impossible for Iraq to withdraw from its present positions except on the basis of a lasting solution. There was nowhere for them to establish defensive positions between their present lines and the

/ border which

E.R.

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border which would place the Iranians once again within a few miles of Baghdad. The Iraqis claimed that they had no desire to humiliate Iran. But if no solution was found, the Iraqis might have no choice but to push further.

The Prime Minister said that renewed hostilities between Iran and Iraq would be a cause for great concern. They would bring to an end present efforts to restore the supply of oil from the two countries. This would have a very bad effect on oil prices and, therefore, on efforts to bring the recession to an end.

UK/Iraq Relations

The Prime Minister said that the visit to London by the Iraqi Foreign Minister had been very successful. It was clear that the Iraqi Government were anxious to distance themselves from the Soviet Union and improve their relations with the West. Closer relations should be certainly be possible. She was most grateful to King Hussein for the help he was giving in our discussions with the Iraqis about the supply of military equipment. She was also grateful for the King's help in securing the release of Mr. Sparkes. King Hussein said that the Iraqis had also been pleased by the outcome of the Foreign Minister's visit. Their mood was now very anti-Soviet. He hoped that Iraq would develop into a positive force in the area. This would be very helpful in counterbalancing the influence of Syria.

Rapid Deployment Force and the Gulf

The Prime Minister said that she had been upset by the reception given to the remarks she had made in the United States about the Rapid Deployment Force. The RDF was basically a good idea. She hoped that the United States would go ahead with its establishment. If they did, the United Kingdom would make a modest contribution. The fact was that

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the world was now a "kaleidoscope of hostilities". One never knew where trouble might break out next. Of course she had in mind the possibility that the trouble between Iran and Iraq might spread to the Gulf. But equally there might be problems in Africa or anywhere else. Those directly concerned would of course have to rely on themselves in the first instance. But they would also need their friends. If there were an RDF in existence, one could react. If there were not, one could not. No-one, of course, was asking for stationing rights.

King Hussein indicated that he agreed. Jordan had been preparing herself to offer help within the limits imposed by her means. There were two aspects to the present situation - in the first place there was the need to make progress on the question of Palestine (the Prime Minister interjected that this was the main problem); beyond that there was the general polarisation of the region. The Soviet Union was, of course, anxious to gain control of the energy resources there. This danger was already on the doorstep. The Arab countries had a duty to defend themselves. But it had been recognised at the recent Arab Summit that it would take Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States a long time to develop a capability to defend themselves. If there was a Soviet move, the Arabs would need more than their own strength.

North Yemen

The Prime Minister asked whether there was anything new to be said about the situation in North Yemen. King Hussein said that the Saudis continued to deal with the situation in the wrong way. They wanted to control what happened in the YAR but they did not want to create a strong state because they feared it would pose a threat to them. Jordan remained very close to the country's leadership but they no longer had the same kind of involvement there as they had had in the past.

/ Egypt

Egypt

The Prime Minister asked whether relationships between Egypt and the other countries in the region were improving. King Hussein said that relations with Sudan had been restored. He added that if Egypt were prepared to rest content with what it had already achieved with Israel and would stop trying to determine the future of the Palestinians, this would be very helpful.

Tornado

The Prime Minister commented that King Hussein would shortly have the opportunity to fly Tornado. She was very anxious to push ahead discussions on the possible sale. She thought that the Federal Republic would "come to an accommodation". The German Government had been rather slow to move but she did not anticipate any overriding difficulty. It would be helpful if King Hussein could make his views clear to the Chancellor. Chancellor Schmidt had his own problems, but she was sure that he would come along once he realised that there was a real interest on the part of the Arabs. Mr. Hurd said that there was something of a chicken-and-egg situation but that the omens were quite good. King Hussein said that the Prime Minister's messages had been relayed to the other Heads of Government concerned. The position of the Federal Republic would be crucial. The fact that the Saudis were having difficulty over the purchase of the Leopard tank and that the Iraqis had been denied the supply of a number of helicopters already contracted for by the Germans was unhelpful. King Hussein added that the prospect of a new air superiority fighter based on Tornado was very exciting. A particular attraction would be that the project was conceived of as an all-British one.

/ Prime Ministerial

Prime Ministerial Visit

The Prime Minister said that she was very much looking forward to her visit to the Gulf. King Hussein said that he was sorry not to be receiving the Prime Minister in Amman. The Prime Minister said that when she came to Jordan it would have to be a visit specially for that purpose.

The discussion ended at 1030.

8 April 1981



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 April 1981

Dear Michael,

Call by King Hussein on the
Prime Minister

/ The King is calling at 9.30 am on
8 April. I enclose a brief. So far as
we know General Shaker will not
accompany the King on this call. But
the Jordanian Ambassador may.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 9.30 AM ON 8 APRIL

Points to make

Arab-Israel

1. Next steps for Europe depend on results of Van der Klaauw mission, together with results of Israeli elections. Evolution of US policy also important. Options for the future open: UK ready to be active in Presidency if circumstances indicate progress is possible.
2. But too much should not be expected from Europe. In current phase of peace efforts, Arabs can make the most effective contribution to peace by demonstrating readiness to accept Israel. Jordan's influence on the PLO vital. Important that Palestine National Council meeting produces helpful result.
3. Syrian attitude to European efforts has moderated. But how can Syria be brought into the mainstream of peace efforts? Progress very difficult without at least tacit Syrian acquiescence.

Security in the Gulf

4. Gulf states' recent progress towards closer cooperation is welcome. How do you see it developing? We recognise local states should take the lead in determining their security requirements.

Defence Sales

- American Tel
112 - Flag
5 Tels.*
5. Tornado. Refer to letter of 31 March. Anxious to meet Arab requirements in any way we can. Germans have problems but expect we can reach accommodation. Important they should be in no doubt about strength of Arab interest. Helpful if Jordanians could speak to them direct.
 6. Stand by Tornado proposals and attach importance to reputation as reliable source of supply. Confident that satisfactory arrangements can be made.
 7. Sales to Iraq. Grateful for King's assistance. HDS had most useful visit to Baghdad in March.

/8. Sales

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8. Sales to Jordan. Keen to help meet Jordan's further defence needs. Rapier meets low-level air defence requirements well. What are the prospects?

9. How did Red Arrows' visit go? Any Jordanian interest in Hawk.

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Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrives on 7 April and leaves on 18 or 19 April. It is as usual a private visit but with more official engagements than usual. The occasion of the visit is the Sovereign's Parade at Sandhurst on 10 April at which the King will represent the Queen. Prince Abdullah (his eldest son by his second (English) wife, Princess Muna) is passing out that day. Prince Abdullah is taking a Short Service Commission in the British Army and will be staying at Sandhurst until September and thereafter joining the 13/18th Hussars.

2. The King will also address the Army Staff College at Camberly on 8 April. He will see Mr Nott (when Defence Sales matters will be discussed in detail) and Lord Carrington on 15 April. He will fly Tornado on 14 April. The King is accompanied by the Jordanian Commander in Chief, General Sharif Zeid Bin Shaker.

3. The Record of the King's last call on the Prime Minister is attached. *(on 10.9.80: record removed at review)*

A

Arab/Israel

4. The Lord Privy Seal visited Jordan at the beginning of February and Mr Van der Klaauw went at the end of February. Both visits served to underline Jordan's continuing strong support for the European initiative. The Jordanians were careful not to give Mr Van der Klaauw any hint that they might be prepared to play a role going beyond the Arab concensus. This fits in with King Hussein's current concern to demonstrate to the rest of the Arab world that he has no plans to fall in with a separate agreement with the Israelis (as the Syrians allege) even if the US should put pressure on him to do so. He has on several recent occasions stressed his acceptance of the PLO as the Palestinians' sole representative.

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Both to the Lord Privy Seal and to Mr Van der Klaauw the Jordanians expressed concern at the implications of Jerusalem being dealt with separately from the other occupied territories in the EC Working Paper. HM Ambassador now believes they are reassured that this does not imply that the requirement for Israeli withdrawal does not apply equally to Jerusalem, but that it reflects the special political and religious complications of the Jerusalem issue.

6. The King will have seen Mr Haig just before leaving for London. This will be an opportunity to compare impressions of US policy.

7. Despite the Jordanian breach with Syria (see below) and Syria's hold (not least in Lebanon) over the PLO the King has managed to keep open his lines to the PLO. Working contacts have continued and the King saw Arafat twice during the Islamic Summit at Taif. He told the LPS that he had briefed Arafat on the positive evolution of European views. He had put it to Arafat that he should represent the Palestinians and no other party and asked him whether he could carry a settlement through. Arafat had seemed nervous that the moment of decision might now be arriving. The Palestine National Council (the PLO "parliament") meeting due to begin in Damascus on 11 April will be a useful sign of the trend of PLO thinking.

Syria/Jordan

8. The Jordanians are preoccupied with their dispute with Syria. Since the confrontation on the border last November the momentum has been maintained by the discovery (and public disclosure) of a Syrian plot to assassinate Prime Minister Badran and the abduction of the Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut (for which the Jordanians hold Syria responsible). We have tried to be as helpful as we can without getting

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drawn into the dispute. We spoke to the Syrians after the Muheisen kidnapping and asked them to help, through their military presence in Beirut, in tracing the Chargé.

9. The Jordanians are very sensitive on the subject of their troubles with Syria. We were mildly rebuked last November when (in an effort to help) we told their Ambassador here that we did not believe Syrian troops were on the border in sufficient strength to attack. The Jordanians accused us of minimising the Syrian threat.

Iran/Iraq

10. The King's close political support for Iraq in the Gulf war continues. Aqaba continues to be the main channel of bulk imports to Iraq. But there are still no Jordanian troops in Iraq. The King visited Iraq in March.

Gulf Security

11. The King takes the view that both Iraq and Jordan have a place in discussions of Gulf security *and is somewhat put out by their exclusion.* Crown Prince Hassan speaking to Ministers in London last month emphasised the need to avoid an internal threat to the Gulf States and said that bringing in outside forces would feed extremism. Six Gulf States (Saudi Arabia plus the five small Gulf States) are to have a meeting at Head of State level in Abu Dhabi on 26 May to ratify the agreement reached in Riyadh on 4 February for the setting up of governmental machinery to coordinate political and economic cooperation. (The Prime Minister sent a message of congratulations to Gulf leaders after the 4 February agreement.) Though defence cooperation has not been mentioned publicly, Gulf ministers have told us privately that their common defence interest underlies all their efforts. The

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Iraqis, though apparently favouring these developments, probably wish to join - and so to lead - the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Defence Sales

B 12. Tornado. The Prime Minister's exchanges of messages with King Hussein are attached with Amman telno 116 reporting the King's reaction on receipt of the Prime Minister's letter of 31 March. By then the King had seen a MOD/BAe presentation of Tornado in Amman. HB Ambassador believes the King's interest to be well and truly aroused but that he is still worried whether we shall be able to overcome German reservations. The Ambassador explained the difficulty of persuading the Germans that Tornado sales were a serious prospect; the King suggested that his exchange with the Prime Minister might be released to the Germans and that the Jordanians themselves approach the German Ambassador in Amman. We have replied that we believe the latter most likely to be effective.

13. MOD's talks in Bonn on 27 March established that the Germans will be unlikely to produce a decision on sales to the Middle East before the summer. But they raised no objections to our bilateral marketing efforts.

Defence Sales to Iraq

C 14. The King has been particularly helpful in pursuing sales prospects in Iraq. Lord Trenchard's report to the Prime Minister on the recent visit to Amman and Baghdad by HDS is attached.

Defence Sales to Jordan

15. The first batch of the 274 advanced Chieftain tanks ("Khalid")

/which

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which we contracted to sell in November 1979 is due for delivery in June. Sir Ronald Ellis will be discussing the programme separately with General Bin Shaker.

16. There is a further sales prospect in Rapier. Jordan's confrontation with Syria last November pointed up her lack of an adequate low level air defence system and Iraq is providing the money to fill the gap. The King saw a non-firing demonstration of towed Rapier in February (tracked Rapier broke down) and a firing demonstration has been arranged for later this month. The RJAF seem interested in towed Rapier; the army seems likely to buy the French competitor Roland.

17. The King has recently expressed new interest in Hawk. The Red Arrows accompanied by a BAe team visited Amman in late March.

Defence Training

18. The King asked the Prime Minister in September 1979 for help in training the Jordanian Armed Forces. Since then DMAO have produced several detailed reports on Jordanian training requirements and training assistance both in the UK and in Jordan has been stepped up.

D 19. A Personality Note on the Jordanian Ambassador, who may accompany the King, is attached.

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TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 23 JANUARY

AND TO JEDDA, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DOHA, MUSCAT,

INFO TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, BONN, ROME, PARIS.

MIPT: TORNADO

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:

BEGINS. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS ARE CLOSE TO MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT THE LONG TERM RE-EQUIPMENT OF YOUR AIR FORCES. AS YOU KNOW, THE TORNADO AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN BOTH A STRIKE AND INTERCEPTOR VERSION AND IS ABOUT TO ENTER SERVICE IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, TOGETHER WITH THE GERMAN AND ITALIAN AIR FORCES. IT WILL BE THE MOST ADVANCED AIRCRAFT OF ITS TYPE IN THE WORLD.

2. I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS WITH YOU AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES THE SALE OF THIS AIRCRAFT AND FOR THIS PURPOSE IS PREPARED TO LAY ON A PRESENTATION AND EVALUATION FLIGHT AS SOON AS YOU WOULD WISH. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONSULT OUR OTHER PARTNERS IN THE PROJECT EVENTUALLY ONCE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AN INTEREST IN TORNADO BUT I THOUGHT I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW OF THE UK'S POSITION AND TO SAY HOW DISAPPOINTED WE WOULD BE IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF ARMS SUPPLIES, IF A DECISION OF THIS NATURE WERE TO BE TAKEN WITHOUT ANY OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE VERY REAL ALTERNATIVES THAT EXIST.

3. PERHAPS YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW DIRECTLY IF YOU WISH US TO INITIATE THE ACTION I HAVE PROPOSED. MESSAGE ENDS.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED

MEMO

DEF D

WED

15

15/4/81

15/7/81 HURD

15/4/81

SIR J. GRAHAM

SIR A. ACLAND

T. J. ROBERT

T. P. DE BELLE

T. FERGUSON

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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INFO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR HDS AND DI4)
ROUTINE BONN AND JEDDA
INFO SAVING ABU DHABI DOHA KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT ISLAMABAD ROME
TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

amh
cc/Amman (5)
SA USA Calder
DIY
MOB
9/21

YOUR TELNO 22 OF 23 JANUARY (NOT TO RABAT AND ISLAMABAD):
TORNADO

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S REPLY TO THE PRIME
MINISTER'S MESSAGE IN YOUR TUR:

BEGINS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

JUST UPON MY DEPARTURE TO THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT I RECEIVED
YOUR MESSAGE ON THE SUBJECT OF TORNADO.

A GROUP OF COUNTRIES IN OUR AREA INCLUDING IN ADDITION TO
JORDAN, IRAQ, KUWAIT, THE GULF STATES, OMAN AND SAUDI ARABIA
(WE HAVE ALSO TALKED TO MORROCO AND ADVISED PAKISTAN OF OUR
THOUGHTS) HAVE BEEN TALKING FOR A WHILE OF THE NEED TO GRADUALLY
STANDARDIZE OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT UPON THE MOST MODERN SYSTEMS
THAT MEET OUR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS. WE HAVE FELT A GROWING URGENCY
TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION TO ENHANCE OUR CAPABILITIES INDIVIDUALLY
AND COLLECTIVELY IN THE FACE OF COMMON THREATS, BY HAVING COMPATIBLE
SYSTEMS AND THE UNIVERSAL TRAINING AND ABILITIES TO USE THEM,
TOGETHER WITH ESTABLISHING WITHIN THE AREA ALL FACILITIES TO
SERVICE AND MODIFY WHEN NECESSARY, AND IMPROVE UPON THEM THROUGH
SENDING OUR PEOPLE, IN RELEVANT CASES, TO WORK WITH THEIR
MANUFACTURERS SO THAT THEY CAN THEN REPRESENT THE NUCLEUS OF A
TECHNOLOGICALLY ABLE AND QUALIFIED ELEMENT WITHING THIS AREA
WHICH CAN CHANGE US, IN TIME, FROM BEING PURE CONSUMERS OF
MANUFACTURED SYSTEMS, TO COUNTRIES THAT ARE ABLE TO DEPEND
GROWINGLY ON THEIR OWN HUMAN RESORCES TO SERVICE, MODIFY AND
INPROVE MANUFACTURED SYSTEMS LEADING TO AN ABILITY TO HANDLE
MODERN TECHNOLOGY.

WE HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR A NEW AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER WITH
ADVANCED ARMAMENTS AND ELECTRONICS WHICH CAN ADEQUATELY MEET
THE CHALLENGE UNTIL THE END OF THE CENTURY AND POSSIBLY BEYOND,
AND WE HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR AN AIRCRAFT THAT CAN MEET OUR
REQUIREMENTS FOR A LONG-RANGE FIGHTER BOMBER THAT CAN DEAL WITH A

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/VARIETY

VARIETY OF GROUND TARGETS, TOGETHER WITH ELECTRONIC PACKAGES AND EQUIPMENT TAILORED TO MEET OUR EVERY REQUIREMENT. OUR TENDENCY HAS BEEN TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE SUPERPOWERS AND PARTICULARLY TOWARDS THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. WE FEEL THAT FOR MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO BE ABLE TO KEEP ABREAST OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND OBVIOUSLY WHEN COLLECTIVELY WE APPROACH POSSIBLE SUPPLIERS, THE MATERIAL COSTS WOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERABLY MORE ACCEPTABLE DUE TO THE SIZE OF THE ORDERS. THE VITAL QUESTIONS ARE:

A. WHERE CAN WE GET OR HELP DEVELOP AND THEN RECEIVE THE MOST SUITABLE RANGE OF EQUIPMENT?

B. EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT IF NOT MORE SO BASED ON PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, IS WHAT SATISFACTORY GUARANTEES CAN WE ALL RECEIVE THAT EQUIPMENT WILL BE FORTHCOMING - BOTH CONTRACTED FOR OR ANY IMPROVED EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE USED BY US ON OUR AIRCRAFT YET TO BE DEVELOPED AT LATER STAGES - WITHOUT ANY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARISING THAT MIGHT CAUSE THE MANUFACTURERS TO STOP OR TEMPORARILY HALT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ORIGINAL AGREEMENT WHICH IS, AFTER ALL, ONE REASON WHY WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND AWAY FROM THE MONOPOLIES OF THE SUPERPOWERS. A PROMISING AIRCRAFT NOT YET FULLY DEVELOPED IS THE D. MIRAGE 4000 AND A DIALOGUE HAS BEEN ONGOING BETWEEN US AND BOTH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THE MANUFACTURERS ON THIS ISSUE. WE HAVE GONE A LONG WAY IN DEFINING OUR TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS AS AGAINST THE PRESENT AND FORESEEN THREATS. WE DID NOT CONSIDER TORNADO DUE TO -

1. THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S RELUCTANCE TO SELL ARMS TO OUR AREA.

2. OUR UNCERTAINTY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS GUARANTEEING THE FULFILMENT OF AN AGREEMENT UNTIL "A" IS RESOLVED AND ALSO IN VIEW OF PRECIOUS EMBARGOES WHICH WE, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE AFFECTED BY FROM TIME TO TIME DUE TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPOSED UPON US BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

3. TORNADO IS A DEVELOPED AIRCRAFT WHICH APPEARS EXCELLENT IN ITS ORIGINAL ROLE SEMICOLON HOWEVER, THE A.D.V. VARIANT SEEMS MORE SUITED TO INTERCEPT AND DESTROY LONG-RANGE ENEMY BOMBERS FROM GREAT DISTANCES, RATHER THAN BEING ALSO A SUPERIORITY FIGHTER.

E OBVIOUSLY ALL OF THESE IMPRESSIONS ARE INCONCLUSIVE SINCE WE HAVE AS YET NEVER HAD THE CHANCE TO LOOK SERIOUSLY AT TORNADO PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF YOUR MESSAGE AND ALSO SINCE TORNADO IS AN UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT TO US TECHNICALLY BEYOND WHAT IS AVAILABLE IN PUBLICATIONS.

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/I HAVE

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I HAVE RELAYED YOUR MESSAGE TO ALL CONCERNED AND SENSED AN INTEREST TO LOOK AT TORNADO BASED ON THE ANSWERS WE ALL RECEIVE FROM YOU OVER THE QUESTIONS I AM NOW RAISING. HOWEVER, I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS PRESSING AND THAT TALKS ON THE D. MIRAGE 4000 AIRCRAFT ARE FAIRLY WELL ADVANCED AND IT IS THUS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE RECEIVE FROM YOU DEAR PRIME MINISTER, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY YOUR KIND RESPONSES WHICH WOULD EITHER GIVE US THE CHANCE TO LOOK AT TORNADO IN BOTH VARIANTS AS WELL AS D. MIRAGE 4000 OR TO CONTINUE ON OUR ORIGINAL COURSE.

WITH MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND SINCEREST WISHES,

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN I

ENDS.

2. ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW IN CONFIDENTIAL BAG LEAVING HERE ON 25 FEBRUARY.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

URWICK

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
DEFENCE D
WED
AS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUNG
SIR J GRAHAM
SIR A ACLAND
MR JC MOBARLY
MR PH MOBARLY
MR FERGUSSON

[PASSED SAVING
AS REQUESTED]

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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GRS 458

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DESKBY 310745Z

FM FCO 301420Z MARCH 81

TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 113 OF 30 MARCH

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (SIC Z8G)

MIPT

1. TEXT BEGINS:

YOUR MAJESTY,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 18 FEBRUARY. I AM GLAD TO HEAR THAT MY MESSAGE ABOUT TORNADO REACHED YOU IN TIME FOR YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES TO TAKE NOTE OF IT AT THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT. I AM ALSO MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE TROUBLE YOU HAVE TAKEN TO SET OUT THE VARIOUS FACTORS AFFECTING YOUR THINKING ON A NEW ADVANCED COMBAT AIRCRAFT.

FOR OUR PART WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES WISH TO STANDARDISE THEIR MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DEVELOP AN INDIGENOUS MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY OF THEIR OWN. WE WELCOME THE SPIRIT OF CO-OPERATION IN WHICH YOU DISCUSSED THESE OBJECTIVES WITH US AND WE ARE READY TO ASSIST YOU IN ANY WAY WE CAN IN ACHIEVING THEM. I HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED A REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION WHICH YOU AND YOUR SENIOR COMMANDERS HAD WITH SIR RONALD ELLIS AND MR JEFFS EARLIER THIS MONTH. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE WARM WELCOME WHICH YOU EXTENDED TO THEM AND I HOPE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ANSWERED SOME OF THE POINTS IN YOUR LETTER. FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF OUR PROPOSALS WILL BE CONVEYED TO YOU IN THE PRESENTATIONS WHICH BRITISH AEROSPACE ARE MAKING IN AMMAN ON 30 AND 31 MARCH AND WE VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO ARRANGING A FLIGHT IN TORNADO FOR YOU DURING YOUR VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM IN APRIL.

AS I BELIEVE YOU ARE NOW AWARE, OUR PROPOSALS CENTRE ON A NEW AIRCRAFT BASED ON TORNADO TECHNOLOGY BUT SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES BY THE LATE 1980S. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS AIRCRAFT WILL BE SUPERIOR TO

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THE MIRAGE 4000 AT ABOUT THE SAME COST. IF YOU DECIDED TO PURSUE THIS COURSE, A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE UK AND WE WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER WHAT INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION WITH THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WOULD BE FEASIBLE. MEANWHILE, PENDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW AIRCRAFT, WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO OFFER THE TORNADO AIRCRAFT IN BOTH THE IDS AND ADV VERSIONS WHICH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR SUPPLY IN 3 TO 4 YEARS' TIME.

I HAVE MADE A PERSONAL APPROACH TO HERR SCHMIDT ON THIS. OUR PROPOSALS MAY PRESENT SOME DIFFICULTY FOR THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT BUT I EXPECT THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION. AS I AM SURE YOU WILL APPRECIATE, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT OUR GERMAN AND ITALIAN PARTNERS SHOULD BE FULLY AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF ARAB INTEREST IN THE AIRCRAFT.

YOU ALSO ASKED ME ABOUT CONTINUITY OF SUPPLY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUR REPUTATION AS A RELIABLE ARMS SUPPLIER AND I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH PROVIDE THE SAFEGUARDS WHICH YOU REQUIRE.

I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN DURING YOUR VISIT HERE IN APRIL.

MARGARET THATCHER

CARRINGTON

LIMITED

DEFD

NENAD

MED

WED

SIR J GRAHAM

SIR A ACLAND

MR J MOBERLY

MR. P. MOBERLY

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FM AMMAN 311625Z MAR 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 116 OF 31 MAR

AND T^O IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PS/HDS)

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD

INFO SAVING TO BONN

YOUR TELS NOS 112 AND 113: TORNADO.

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN TODAY SHORTLY AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF TWO DAYS OF PRESENTATIONS ON TORNADO BY A BRITISH AEROSPACE TEAM (ON WHICH MY AIR ATTACH IS TELEGRAPHING A SEPARATE DETAILED REPORT). THE KING HAD IN FACT ASKED ME TWICE IN THE LAST 24 HOURS WHEN HE COULD EXPECT A RESPONSE TO HIS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF 18 FEBRUARY: THE ARRIVAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY COULD NOT THEREFORE HAVE BEEN MORE TIMELY. THE KING READ IT CAREFULLY, WAS EVIDENTLY WELL PLEASED WITH ITS CONTENTS AND SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE MATTER FURTHER WITH MRS THATCHER AT THEIR MEETING IN LONDON ON 8 APRIL.
2. THE KING SAID HE HAD BEEN QUITE SATISFIED WITH THE PRESENTATION HE HAD ATTENDED ON 3rd MARCH BUT THAT HE HAD NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF HIS AIR FORCE ADVISERS ON THE MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE EARLIER TODAY. HE SAID IT WAS, HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL ASPECTS WHICH WORRIED HIM MOST AND PARTICULARLY WHETHER WE WOULD SUCCEED IN OVERCOMING THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S RESERVATIONS. WHEN I REFERRED TO THE DIFFICULTY WE WERE HAVING IN CONVINCING THE GERMANS THAT THE SALE OF TORNADO TO MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES WAS A SERIOUS PROSPECT (BONN TELNO 194 OF 23 MARCH REFERS) THE KING SAID HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE PRIME MINISTER BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO HERR SCHMIDT OR AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IF THIS WOULD HELP. HE WOULD ALSO CONSIDER ASKING THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF TO SPEAK TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR HERE.
3. THE KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT GERMAN RELUCTANCE TO SELL LEOPARD II TO SAUDI ARABIA AND ALSO THEIR REFUSAL TO SUPPLY HELICOPTERS TO IRAQ FOR WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO CONTRACTS HAD MADE A PARTICULARLY BAD IMPRESSION ON THE IRAQIS. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE COMMUNICATING THE GIST OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSAIN WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO AND HE MADE IT CLEAR HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO CARRYING THE IRAQIS WITH HIM FROM THE OUTSET ON TORNADO. YOU WILL SEE FROM MY AIR ATTACHE'S TELEGRAM ON THE TORNADO PRESENTATIONS THAT, WHILE THE JORDANIANS SEEM TO BE FOCUSSED MAINLY ON THE PROPOSED NEW AIR SUPERIORITY AIRCRAFT DERIVED FROM TORNADO WHICH WOULD BE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY TO MEET ARAB REQUIREMENTS, THE IRAQIS SEEM TO BE SHOWING GREATER INTEREST IN THE IDS VARIANT OF TORNADO.
4. THE MOD SALES/BAE TEAM WILL OF COURSE BE REPORTING MORE FULLY ON THEIR RETURN. I HAVE, HOWEVER, SEEN THE KING ON FOUR SEPARATE OCCASIONS DURING THE LAST 48 HOURS AND BELIEVE HIS INTEREST HAS BEEN WELL AND TRULY AROUSED. ABOVE ALL, I THINK HE HAS GRASPED

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THE ADVANTAGES TO THE ARABS OF ENTERING INTO ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF A FAMILY OF AIRCRAFT WHICH ALREADY EXISTS RATHER THAN THE MIRAGE 4000 WHICH IS STILL ONLY IN PROTOTYPE FORM. BUT THE FRENCH HAVE A LONG LEAD AND WE STILL HAVE A LOT OF LEEWAY TO MAKE UP, PARTICULARLY ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS. THE FACT THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL NOW BE ACCOMPANIED ON HIS VISIT TO THE UK BY DR TOUQAN, HIS SCIENTIFIC ADVISER, IS A MOST ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT AND BAE AND MOD SALES ARE ALREADY PLANNING AN APPROPRIATE PROGRAMME FOR HIM.

FCO PASS SAVING TO BONN

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

URWICK

LIMITED

DEF-D

NENAD

MED

WED

SIR J. GRAHAM

SIR A. ACLAND

MR. J. C. MOBERLY

MR. P. H. MOBERLY

SECRET

(C)



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 6621 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

D/MIN/TT/19/7

Mr. Crosby
Mr. Jenner
Rem
24/3

23 March 1981

MED
cc RP

PS/LRP
PS/WR/blend
PS/PUS
Sir T. Graham
Mr Bullard
Sir A. Adams

Dear Prime Minister

As you know from the letter from Peter Carrington's office dated 4th March, Sir Ronald Ellis, Head of Defence Sales, had discussions with the Iraqis on the overhaul of Chieftain tanks, and the long term supply of new tanks, in the course of his visit to Jordan from 10th to 13th March. The subject of Tornado was also discussed with King Hussein and Lieutenant General Sharif Zeid bin Shaker, Commander in Chief, Jordanian Armed Forces. I thought you would wish to know the outcome of his visit.

Mr P. P. ...
Mr J. ...
NEWA 17
Def. Dept

By arrangements made by King Hussein, Sir Ronald Ellis, accompanied by the Assistant Under Secretary of State (Sales), was flown in a Royal Flight aircraft to Baghdad on Thursday, 12th March, returning the same day, where meetings took place with President Saddam Hussain, Air Chief Marshal Adnan Khairallah Tulfah, Deputy Premier and Minister of Defence, and senior officers. A short record of both the principal meetings is attached. As you will see, the President particularly asked that his good wishes and message should be passed to you.

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24/3

These meetings represent a significant step forward in establishing a working relationship with Iraq, which, if we play it well, should produce both political and major commercial benefits. Contracts worth over £150m have been concluded in the last six months including one for £34m (for armoured recovery vehicles through Jordan) during Sir Ronald's visit. It is clear that they are disenchanted with the Soviets and wish to develop their contacts with Western countries, but not the United States, and without impinging on their independence as a country. Our willingness to supply arms will be a key indication of our intentions and the test case could

/ be ...

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP

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be our assistance in overhauling and repairing the 140 or so captured Chieftain tanks.

The President was realistic about the political difficulties of supplying armaments to them whilst the war continued, and said he did not wish to cause any country difficulties in this respect. In our case, he is agreeable to arranging the repair of tanks through Jordan, and on other sensitive items is prepared to negotiate, if necessary, on the basis that supply could not take place during the current conflict.

Contrary to earlier advice from Jordan, the Iraqis did not ask for the supply of new tanks and this, therefore, is not an issue at this stage. The refurbishment of the captured tanks is the first priority and it has been agreed that a small team from International Military Services should pay a further visit to Iraq to categorise those that only need maintenance to bring them into running order, and those that would need repair in Jordan. Spares would be supplied to Jordan and HDS made it clear that we could not supply ammunition whilst the war is on. Nevertheless, as discussed in OD on 29th January, our role in restoring these tanks to fighting trim could cause the Government difficulties when the matter became public, which we must assume it will.

Fortunately, the IMS exercise will take three to four months to complete, during which time advice on the line to take in public will be prepared and submitted for consideration by OD together with the circumstances under which it will be proposed the work should be undertaken, and whether it should go ahead.

In all this, we have to acknowledge the active part played by King Hussein in helping us get thus far with Iraq. Although he has his own interests much at heart, he obviously feels that he now has a special relationship and trust with the United Kingdom.

As regards Tornado, King Hussein welcomed the UK initiative as an alternative to the French option. A British Aerospace team will be visiting Amman on 28th March to make a presentation of Tornado and their proposals for collaboration on an advanced aircraft for the 1990s and beyond to meet the requirements of the Arab countries. This is the start of a long haul and one can be sceptical of the outcome (particularly as the Jordanians appear to be looking to the Iraqis and not the Saudis as their main partner), but the immediate purpose is to counter the French initiative which we appear to have accomplished so far.

/ Plans ...

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
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Plans are also in hand for King Hussein to fly Tornado next month; an invitation has also gone to the Saudis and one will shortly go to Sultan Qaboos to send a team over to evaluate the aircraft. We have had to be careful in this respect not to let the Omanis, for the time being at least, get too far ahead of the Jordanians, who see themselves as the leaders on this project.

All this is going ahead on the basis that we do not get a negative response from the Federal Republic of Germany to your message to Herr Schmidt. He has now sent you a temporising reply and officials have been invited to go to Germany to discuss the Middle East requirement. In these circumstances we shall still press ahead on a national basis.

A reply to King Hussein's letter is being prepared separately and will be with you shortly.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Carrington. He may feel that we are pressing ahead too fast, but if we don't I fear we could end up by letting the market go to French and American aircraft and there are naughty suggestions that the Germans would not mind selling Leopard while holding us up on Tornado.



Lord Trenchard

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

MEETING WITH THE DEPUTY PREMIER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL ADNAN KHAIKHALAH TULFAH
THURSDAY 12 MARCH 1981

1. HDS stressed that there was no lack of willingness on the part of UK Ministers to supply defence equipment to Iraq but there were three major problems involved.
2. The first was that Iraq was at war with Iran and this raised difficult political issues regarding neutrality, etc: we could not be seen to be unduly favouring one side in the conflict. Secondly, Western prices were bound to be greater than those that they had enjoyed from the Soviets. Thirdly, there was the problem of security and the presence of Soviet Advisers and the KGB in the country. Our equipments were largely designed for use in NATO and in many cases therefore were highly classified. We would have to consider a security agreement to ensure that our information was safeguarded.
3. The Minister of Defence welcomed HDS's visit and said that he fully accepted that these were real difficulties. On the first point they were pragmatic and were prepared to deal through Jordan if necessary, or not accept deliveries until the conflict was ended. He knew of the difference in prices but provided these we put forward were reasonable he did not regard this as an insuperable problem and suggested this was left to the experts. On the question of security, it was important to Iraq to show that there was no leakage of information. They had received requests from several sources, including the UK, for information on damage to equipments and had refused all of them. They would not give us information on the T.72 or the Soviets information on Chieftain. The same applied in respect of the French equipment they had.
4. HDS commented that in the light of the Minister's remarks he thought we had enough basis on which to negotiate and he would report back accordingly to his Secretary of State.
5. The Minister of Defence concluded the discussions by saying again how welcome the meeting was. It was a surprise and very sudden and he hoped that the next visit would be longer. He understood that we had already begun detailed discussions with Lt Gen Jenab and hoped that these would be constructive in agreeing the way ahead. Lt Gen Jenab had his full authority to discuss these matters.

MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN AND HEAD OF DEFENCE
SALES - THURSDAY 12 MARCH 1981

1. After the initial courtesies the President said that before they went on to discuss the main purpose of HDS's visit, which he well understood, he thought it was essential to get the politics right. We should realise that his people had thought badly of the British for reasons that we were well aware of - indeed they had been hostile. The Government was bound to take account of the people's views although it was not always the deciding factor and it had been his wish for some time to have good relationships with the UK. Indeed, he had told our Ambassador this in 1969 but doubted if the message had been understood. In those days perhaps Saddam Hussain was not as well known as he is today and not enough importance was attached to what he had said. However, that was now all behind us and he welcomed our visit. The President went on to say that the majority of opinion in the country was still against dealing with the US but that too could well change.

2. The proof of other country's intentions towards Iraq lay in the willingness to supply them with armaments. All countries wanted to take advantage of commercial trading relationships but one was not possible without the other. He desired to have good relations with European countries such as ourselves, France, Italy and Germany and once these had been established, for his part the links would be honoured and should be to the benefit of both parties. He quoted the example of France where he had allowed them to uplift oil at \$2 per barrel less than he could have got, but the French part of the bargain was to deliver the Mirage aircraft which they had on contract.

3. The President went on to say that although he wished to establish friendly relationships with other countries they had learnt from hard experience that these must be without prejudice to an independent Iraq, without alignment to any side.

4. He now welcomed the fact that UK Ministers took a favourable view towards Iraq and he very much hoped that when the conditions were right the Prime Minister and other Ministers would visit his country. Dr Hammadi, the Foreign Minister, was currently in UK having discussions. Turning to the purpose of HDS's visit he said that he understood that in the current circumstances the supply of certain arms could be politically embarrassing. He did not want to put any country in that position and he mentioned, as an example, a message he had just sent to President Giscard d'Estaing saying that if the continued supply of the Mirage aircraft was embarrassing during the French election campaign then Iraq would be prepared to wait. He confirmed that he was agreeable to using Jordan if necessary, if it was more convenient to arrange supply through that country, and he also

accepted that the supply of certain other items could be conditional on the cessation of the conflict with Iran. He asked for his greetings and message to be conveyed to the Prime Minister.

5. Discussion continued after lunch but this was largely about his political philosophy which he thought was not very well understood outside Iraq. He believed that it was essential to take account of the opinion of the people and to look after the interests of the majority! They all had to work together for the common good and he would not tolerate any actions to the contrary even from his own family. He told us that just recently in a traffic accident his 16 year old son had gone to draw his revolver and for this his son was still in jail. Other relatives who had sought to take advantage of their position had been confined to primitive quarters and fed with the minimum means of sustenance.

Comment

6. The President gave the appearance of a man who was rather tired and weary but he was impressive in the deliberate and clear way in which he spoke. He seemed to be totally realistic about the problems of supplying them with arms whilst the current conflict continued. It is clear that he has a high opinion of King Hussein who, he said, was not a man of the monarchy but of the people and would not be able to stay in power without the popular support he now enjoyed. There was no doubt about his wish to deal with the UK but we shall be judged by what we achieve and not by what we say. The opportunities for very large business of all kinds in the defence field are there to be exploited if we have the will and determination to do so.

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IZZIDDIN, IBRAHIM

Ambassador to London.

Born 1934, Amman. A graduate of the American University of Beirut (BA Political Science). A career civil servant, he has filled a remarkably wide variety of posts in the public service, in the Ministry of Communications, the Prime Minister's office, the Department of Press and Publications, the Press Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alia, the then Ministry of Culture and Information, and the Royal Hashemite Diwan (Court) where he was Press Secretary to the King. Has served as Ambassador in Berne and Bonn before his present posting. He had a very good reputation with the Germans in Bonn and expresses the intention of keeping actively in touch with the FCO and more widely with moulders of opinion in London.

Married, but with no children. He is regarded as intelligent, honest and straightforward. His wife comes from a rich Circassian family. They are both friendly and enjoy Western social life. Reputedly keen on sports.

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cc. Middle East: Arms Sales to

Middle Eastern Countries: Pt 2.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~932 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 26/9/19

7th April 1981

John Michael

KHALID TANKS FOR JORDAN

You will already have received briefing from the FCO for King Hussein's call tomorrow on the Prime Minister. I am writing however, to mention one supplementary point of which she ought to be aware, concerning the delivery of the first batch of Khalid tanks to Jordan. (There is a short background note on the tank order at paragraph 15 of the 'Essential Facts' brief).

There are continuing development problems with the TN37 gearbox which have not been resolved and on which tests are still being conducted. The Commander of the Jordanian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Sharif Zaid bin Shaker, is being told this evening by Sir Ronald Ellis, Head of Defence Sales, that the gearbox is still giving slight problems but that, to ensure that the Jordanian Army is not inconvenienced, we will be providing both the material and manpower to cope with any gearbox failures which might occur in the early period of its service. The cost of this support will be met by the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister is advised not to raise the subject with King Hussein but, as the latter may be aware of the problem before the meeting, the Prime Minister will wish to know the line which Sir Ronald Ellis has taken. If there is any significant reaction from General bin Shaker, I will let you know early tomorrow morning.

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M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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I am sending a copy of this letter to Francis Richards (FCO) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
J D S Dawson

(J D S DAWSON)

-7 APR 1981



COMMUNICATIONS



Jordan
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Dear Caroline, ^{cl.} 23/3.

20 March 1981

King Hussein's Visit to Britain

This is to confirm that we have now rearranged the King's call on the Prime Minister and it is now fixed for 09.30 on 8 April.

Yours ever
C. Jebb.

(C Jebb)
Assistant Private Secretary

Miss Caroline Stephens
10 Downing Street
LONDON



Send

10 DOWNING STREET

Note for the Kilo

I told Chris
Jebb that since
he would have
16300 - Tuesday
7th April or 0930
on Wednesday
8th April. No
alternative being
offered.

es.



Jordan
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 March 1981

Dear Caroline,

King Hussein's Visit to Britain

You indicated yesterday that if King Hussein were unable to see the Prime Minister at 4.30 on 7 April, there might be time available in the Prime Minister's diary on 8 April.

The Ministry of Defence, who are arranging the King's programme have said that 10.30-11.30 on 8 April would be possible or from 6.00 pm onwards that evening. Please let me know whether either of these times is possible for the Prime Minister. The Secretary of State returns from the Far East on 9 April.


Yours ever
C. Q. G. Jebb.

(C Q G Jebb)
Assistant Private Secretary


Miss Caroline Stephens
10 Downing Street

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS



16 MAR 1961



Jordan jfh

BF 6/4/81

3 March 1981

Visit by King Hussein

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 2 March. She would be happy to see King Hussein on 7 April at 1630 for an hour.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a brief the previous day.

MODBA

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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(1)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

You could see him
after questions on Tuesday,
2 April - Agree?

2 March 1981

Yes
think 2/3 out

Dear Michael,

Visit by King Hussein

King Hussein is planning to visit London in April. He has told our Ambassador in Amman that he very much hopes that it may be possible for him to meet the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington while he is here. I imagine the Prime Minister would, as usual, wish to see him.

Yes

We do not as yet have any firm dates but the Ambassador suggests that we might work on the basis of the King being here during the week beginning 6 April and he is sure that, if the Prime Minister were to offer a time then, the King would arrange his visit to include it. The King is due to address the Staff College at Camberley on 8 April and will be at Sandhurst, where he is taking this years Sovereign's Parade, from the afternoon of 9 April until the afternoon of 10 April. Sometime on 6 or 7 April might therefore be best.

If the Prime Minister agrees, the Secretary of State would welcome the opportunity to attend the meeting.


Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing st

RESTRICTED

2 MAR 1981



Postage and communication charges

are always included



Jordan

LPO/
VLS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 September 1980

Dear Stephen,

Call by King Hussein

As you know, King Hussein of Jordan called on the Prime Minister this morning.

I enclose a record of their discussion.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

S. J. Gomersall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

VLS

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING
HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AT 1200 ON 10 SEPTEMBER
1980

Present:

Prime Minister

King Hussein

Sir John Graham

His Excellency Mr. Ibrahim Izziddin

Mr. Michael Alexander

Arab/Israel dispute

King Hussein said that he had had a good meeting with M. Gaston Thorn when he had visited Amman recently. He had also made it possible for M. Thorn to establish contact with representatives of the Palestinians in Jordan. The Prime Minister said that the terms in which M. Thorn would report on his visit to the Middle East were not yet clear. He was due to meet the other Foreign Ministers of the Nine on 15/16 September but it seemed that he might decide to report to them orally rather than in writing. Looking to the next stage, it had been suggested that the Presidency should attempt to clarify a number of detailed questions with Arab Governments before the Arab Summit later this year. During his tour, the Saudi and Kuwaiti Governments had proposed to M. Thorn that the occupied territories on the West Bank should be returned to their pre-1967 owners subject to subsequent clarification of their status. Would this be acceptable to King Hussein?

King Hussein said that it was essential that neither the principle of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories nor the rights of the Palestinians to exercise self-determination should be compromised. The Jordanian Government had resisted attempts to propose a package envisaging Israeli withdrawal, and a UN mandate leading to direct transfer of control to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. This would be contrary to the principle of self-

/ determination.

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determination. As regards the question of Israeli withdrawal, the Israeli Government had successfully diverted attention to the question of autonomy. The basic principle must not be lost to sight. The Prime Minister asked whether there was any difficulty about UN recognition of Jordanian "ownership" of the West Bank. The Jordanian Ambassador said that there was no problem and that the UN had in fact recognised Jordan's rights. Sir John Graham asked whether a transitional period under UN administration with a referendum at the end would be acceptable to the Jordanian Government. King Hussein confirmed that this would be entirely acceptable. What would not be acceptable would be direct transfer to the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

King Hussein said that he understood M. Thorn had carried away an impression that there was confusion in the Arab ranks and that, in particular, the Saudi Government felt that the key to the situation was in the hands of the United States. His own view was that the position of the United States was critical but that the key to this in turn lay with Europe. Had it not been for the European initiative, hope would have been lost in recent months. A barrier had been created between the Arabs and the United States over the years which prevented the American people acquiring a full understanding of the Arab position. This barrier still existed. The only way of overcoming it would be a dialogue between the Europeans and the United States. This would, among other things, help to educate the US public. After years of standstill in the Middle East, Europe had injected a new element into the situation.

The Prime Minister said that as she understood it, King Hussein believed that the role of Europe in the next stage would be to bring influence to bear on the United States/ ^{in order that} they in turn could bring pressure to bear on Israel; and, more generally, to keep something moving in order that hope should not die in the Middle East. King Hussein confirmed that this was his view. He hoped that the Europeans would be prepared to outline the principles of a settlement, i.e. self-determination for the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal and security for all. No such statement of principles had been made since Article 242 had been drawn up. In response to a comment by his

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/ Ambassador

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Ambassador that this would represent a new peace process, King Hussein said that it would be the peace process. Sir John Graham asked whether King Hussein saw any merit in a new Resolution supplementing Resolution 242 and saying something about the Palestinians, who did not figure in the original Resolution. King Hussein said that such a Resolution would have to come. It might be a new Resolution or an addition to Resolution 242. Commenting on the circumstances in which the previous Jordanian attempt to launch such a Resolution had been frustrated, Sir John Graham said that there might now come a point when a new Resolution would be helpful to the United States. The Prime Minister said it would be important to ensure both that a new Resolution did not distract attention from the need for Israeli withdrawal and that there was some practical follow-up. She understood King Hussein's feeling that the Camp David process had run into the ground and that a Summit was unlikely to change this appreciation. Therefore there was a role for Europe. The Governments of the Nine would have to decide soon the form of the next round of their activity. One difficulty was that many people were still paying lip service to Camp David .

King Hussein confirmed his view that nothing more was to be expected from Camp David. Despite the recent agreement to resume negotiations, the Israelis were taking the position that Linowitz's visit had achieved nothing. The Prime Minister said that it was very hard on President Sadat that he had been forced, by his own loyalty to his friends, to agree to the resumption of negotiations. This had weighed more heavily than Mr. Begin's failure to respond to President Sadat's clear statement that talks should not be resumed without an Israeli declaration on East Jerusalem. Vice President Mubarak had told her that Jerusalem was now the most important stumbling block in the way of progress. King Hussein said that he also believed that Jerusalem held the key to a solution. It was more important than the entire Palestinian issue. Without an adequate solution to the problem of Jerusalem, there could be no peace. The Prime Minister said Europe and, she thought, the United States, were united in rejecting Mr. Begin's move of his office to East Jerusalem. They would make this clear if and when the move took place. As regards the US Presidential Elections,

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the imminence of which had recently played so large a role in discussions about the Arab/Israel dispute, her own fear had always been that the electoral campaign would force the candidates to take up positions which would prevent progress for many months after the election had taken place. This now seemed to be happening. It gave additional importance to Europe's role in the months ahead.

Referring to her previous discussion with King Hussein (on 24 June), the Prime Minister asked if anything had happened about King Hussein's suggestion to President Carter that a way should be found to enable Palestinian opinion on the West Bank to express itself other than through the PLO. King Hussein said that there had been no developments. Indeed, the Israeli authorities were taking even firmer measures than before. He had recently seen the Mayor of Nablus (who was extremely grateful for the medical help he was receiving in London). The Mayor had reminded him that he could not meet the other West Bank Mayors without prior permission from the Israeli authorities. Difficulties had even been made about his wife travelling to Jerusalem from Nablus in order to seek legal advice following her husband's arrest. The Prime Minister recalled that M. Thorn had wished to meet the West Bank Mayors during his recent tour. Sir John Graham said that the meeting had been prevented by the Israelis. Although it had been made to look as though the difficulty had been a question of dates, he thought it had probably been a difficulty of substance. The Prime Minister said that she thought it would be useful if facts like these could be made more widely known in the United States.

The Prime Minister asked about the likely date of the Israeli elections and whether King Hussein thought that a Labour Government would be easier to deal with than Mr. Begin. King Hussein said that he did not think Mr. Begin was in major difficulties at home. He would probably be able to hold on to power throughout the life of the present Parliament, i.e. for another year or so. As regards the views of the present Opposition in Israel, he had been told that Mr. Peres was seeking support in Europe, e.g., from the Austrians.

/ In asking

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In asking for this support, he did not seem to be advancing new ideas. He was merely expressing good intentions. King Hussein had advised his friends that they should ask Mr. Peres for more concrete suggestions about the way ahead. Nothing tangible had yet emerged. Sir John Graham said that he thought a Labour Government might be more open to argument than Mr. Begin. King Hussein agreed but said that he was not sure that the practical differences between the positions of the two Governments would be all that marked. The Labour Party had been in power between 1967 and Mr. Begin's assumption of office, and little headway had been made.

General Situation

Referring to the general situation in the Middle East, King Hussein said that the two or three months would be a period of danger. Phalangist ambitions to form their own state in the Lebanon might lead to an explosion and to Israeli intervention. Similarly the proposal for unity between Libya and Syria, which was born of despair and could not last, might be a pretext for an Israeli adventure. The Prime Minister agreed about the dangers ahead. Referring to relations between Libya and Syria, she asked whether it was the case that the Syrians got money from Arab States so long as the Golan Heights were occupied by Israel. King Hussein confirmed that Syria was in receipt of funds. This was in recognition of Syria's status as a confrontation state and because there were Syrian troops in the Lebanon. Sir John Graham commented that, ironically enough, Libya was the worst payer.

Having thanked King Hussein for his help in Saudi Arabia recently, the Prime Minister asked whether the situation had improved. King Hussein said that his officials sensed a desire for fruitful co-operation on intelligence matters. This was encouraging by contrast with previous Saudi attitudes. Nonetheless he was still receiving reports which gave rise to concern about the future. The Saudi Government had plans which envisaged raising per capita income in Saudi Arabia to absurd levels.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister asked about the situation in North Yemen. King Hussein said that there was nothing new to report. There had recently been a meeting between the Yemenis and the Saudis but he did not know the outcome. As regards the Gulf, it had been suggested to him that he should take the opportunity of the forthcoming Arab Summit to expose to the Gulf leaders some of the internal, as well as external, dangers which threatened the region. He hoped that this might lead to improved co-operation among the various Governments concerned.

The situation in Iran continued to give rise to great concern. He had heard that the recent coup attempt in Iran had been exposed by the Tudeh party. He drew the conclusion that the Tudeh were only too happy to see the chaos continue and that they were preparing a take-over. Sir John Graham expressed some doubts as to whether the Tudeh were all that widely organised. The present situation in Iran was such that it was often sufficient merely to make an accusation to bring a politician down. This was what had happened to Entezam, a close associate of Bazargan. King Hussein did not dissent, but said that nonetheless confusion could only be to the Tudeh's benefit. The Prime Minister said that she had learnt recently that the work at the Talbot factory in Iran was almost at a standstill. Sir John Graham said that the problem was that the factory were unable to handle the flow of kits from the United Kingdom. They had already piled up more stock than they could deal with. ^{The} deterioration seemed to have set in since June. The Prime Minister commented that the economy seemed to be breaking down.

The discussion ended at 1250.

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10 September 1980

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COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 September 1980

Dear Michael,

The Prime Minister has agreed to see King Hussein at 12.00 noon on Wednesday, 10 September. I enclose a brief for this meeting.

Mr Urwick has to return to Amman that day and will unfortunately not be able to attend. Sir J Graham will, if the Prime Minister agrees, represent the FCO.

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'M A Wickstead'.

M A Wickstead
Assistant Private Secretary
to the Lord Privy Seal

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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CALL BY KING HUSSEIN ON THE PRIME MINISTER
AT 12 NOON ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1980

Points to Make

Arab/Israel

1. Grateful for King's continuing support for European activity. M. Thorn reporting to Foreign Ministers on 15/16 September; will consider thereafter how the Nine should pursue their views.

2. Saudis and Kuwaitis have suggested to Thorn that occupied territories should be returned to pre-1967 owners with self-determination for the Palestinians to be worked out later. Would the King find such an approach workable? Would the other Arabs agree to a period of 'Jordanian trusteeship'? Could it be reconciled with Mr Peres's ideas?

3. What are the prospects for the Arab Summit in Amman in November? Any chance of positive proposals?

Anglo-Saudi relations

4. Grateful for King's intervention with the Saudis. Gratifying that relations have now been restored.

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Essential Facts

1. King Hussein arrived for a private visit on 1 September; he is expected to stay until 12 September. He attended the Farnborough Air Show on 5 September, where he met Mr Pym, and visited the Royal Ordnance Factory in Leeds (where the Chieftain tanks which are being sold to Jordan are made) on 8 September.
2. The record of the Prime Minister's last meeting with the King on 24 June is attached.

Arab/Israel

Annex 'A'

3. A copy of Amman telegram number 306 reporting M. Thorn's talks with the King in early August is attached. The King said that he had sought to persuade the more sceptical of his Arab colleagues to take the European initiative seriously. He stressed the need to maintain momentum and suggested a Euro-Arab Ministerial meeting, not necessarily in the context of the Dialogue. He saw advantage in that this would directly involve those, like the Syrians, who were difficult. (We would have serious difficulties with such a meeting, since it could achieve little in practice, would offend the Egyptians and would cause problems for us because of PLO participation.) For the remainder the talks elicited little new, although Thorn appears to have left with a clearer idea of the limited room for manoeuvre which the Jordanians have.
4. When Thorn visited Saudi Arabia later in August and probed the procedural and legal aspects of Israeli withdrawal the Saudis suggested that the occupied territories could be handed back to their pre-1967 owners with Palestinian self-determination following at a later stage. The Kuwaitis made a similar suggestion with the elaboration that the transfer of authority could be negotiated with Jordan, Egypt and Syria. There could then be a conference of all the parties concerned, including Israel and the PLO, to 'decide the future of Palestine'. This

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coincides with the prospect of a Labour Government in Israel next year committed to early negotiation with Jordan for the return of the greater part of the West Bank. The difficulties would be likely to arise over (a) gaining broad Arab acceptance for such an approach, (b) the likelihood of Arab insistence on some Israeli pre-commitment on self-determination (Mr Peres remains firmly opposed to a Palestinian state), and (c) the future of those territories (eg security zones on the West Bank borders and East Jerusalem) from which the Labour Party would be unwilling to withdraw. But the Prime Minister might sound out the King on how far along this road he would be prepared to go.

Anglo-Saudi relations

- Annex B. 5. At his last meeting with the Prime Minister King Hussein undertook to contact the Saudis on our behalf. He subsequently told HM Ambassador that he had spoken personally to the Saudi Foreign Minister and asked him to convey to King Khalid his hope that Saudi/UK relations could be restored.

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MIDDLE EAST THORN MISSION

1. M. GASTON THORN VISITED AMMAN FROM 7-10 AUGUST. HE SAW KING HUSSEIN, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE ALSO HAD TWO HOURS OF GENERAL CONVERSATION WITH A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF WEST BANKERS, ARRANGED BY AND HELD AT THE HOUSE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE WAS TAKEN FOR A HELICOPTER TOUR OF THE JORDAN VALLEY AND ALSO FITTED IN A DAY TRIP TO PETRA. HIS AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN COULD ONLY BE ARRANGED AT THE LAST MINUTE ON 10 AUGUST AND HE DEPARTED IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER FOR PALMA WHERE HE WAS DUE TO MEET MR. KREISKY. HE COULD ONLY THEREFORE SPARE TIME TO GIVE LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE A QUICK FIVE MINUTE BRIEFING AT AMMAN AIRPORT BEFORE BOARDING HIS PLANE. M. THORN SAID THAT, BECAUSE OF THIS M. MERTZ WOULD PROVIDE A FULLER BRIEFING ABOUT THE AMMAN VISIT AFTER HIS RETURN TO LUXEMBOURG. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE BRIEFING WERE AS FOLLOWS:

2. JERUSALEM.

KING HUSSEIN HAS SAID HE WAS ABOUT TO ISSUE A "VERY STRONG" STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM. JERUSALEM WAS "HIS CONCERN" ABOVE ANYONE ELSE'S AND, NOW THAT HE WAS BACK IN AMMAN, HE FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-ARAB REASONS TO MAKE A FIRM PRONOUNCEMENT. HE WAS TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER AT A CABINET MEETING AFTER M. THORN'S DEPARTURE. KING HUSSEIN HAD REACTED COOLY TO REPORTS IN THE JORDANIAN PRESS TODAY THAT PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT CONVENE A CAMP DAVID SUMMIT TO DISCUSS JERUSALEM. HE THOUGHT SUCH A SUMMIT MIGHT ONLY TURN OUT TO BE "A PIECE OF GADGETRY" AND WONDERED WHY, IF IT TOOK PLACE, IT WOULD ONLY CONCERN ITSELF WITH JERUSALEM.

3. EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.

KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMED HIS APPROVAL OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. HE BELIEVED THAT, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, ONLY EUROPE WAS IN A POSITION TO PLAY A SERIOUS ROLE OVER THE MIDDLE

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EAST IN WHICH THE [REDACTED] THE DISPUTE COULD HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE. HE HAD DIFFICULTY PERSUADING SOME OF HIS ARAB PARTNERS THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY SEMICOLON BUT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO CONVINCE THEM OF THIS EVEN THOUGH HE ATTRACTED CRITICISM FOR DOING SO. KING HUSSEIN STRESSED THAT THE EUROPEANS MUST NOW MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM SEMICOLON ONE VISIT WAS NOT ENOUGH. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A EURO-ARAB MEETING AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THIS MIGHT BE HELD WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE BUT NOT NECESSARILY SO. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF SUCH A MEETING WERE TO INVOLVE AT LEAST A WIDE GROUP OF MINISTERS FROM BOTH SIDES SEMICOLON THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF DIRECTLY INVOLVING THOSE SUCH AS THE SYRIANS WHO WERE DIFFICULT. M. THORN SAID THE JORDANIANS DID NOT NECESSARILY EXPECT IMMEDIATE RESULTS FROM HIS PRESENT MISSION SEMICOLON BUT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EUROPEAN ACTIVITY BEING SEEN TO CONTINUE.

4. OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

THE KING HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT IN ADVANCE BY ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ONLY THEREAFTER COULD THE WAY BE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION OF SECURITY BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES. M. THORN HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS AN ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL RATHER THAN AN ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WAS THE ESSENTIAL AND NON-NEGOTIABLE STARTING POINT FOR THE JORDANIANS, AND REFERRED TO HINTS MADE IN SIMILAR VEIN BY ARAFAT (PARA 13 OF BEIRUT TELNO 197).

5. JORDAN/PLO

THE KING HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LEARNING WHAT YASIR ARAFAT HAD HAD TO SAY TO M. THORN. THE KING SAID THAT JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE PLO CONTINUED DOWN A "NARROW BUT CLEARLY DEFINED PATH". JORDAN'S POSITION VIZ-A-VIZ THE PLO WAS ONE OF "UNDERSTANDING BUT NOT PERMISSIVENESS".

6. SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT

THE JORDANIANS HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR POSITION THAT NEITHER OF THE SUPERPOWERS COULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT SEMICOLON IN ADDITION TO THE ROLE WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO PLAY, IT COULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOME SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AT SOME STAGE.

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7. M. THORN'S MEETINGS WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WERE LARGELY DEVOTED TO A JORDANIAN PRESENTATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK AND ISRAELI POLICIES THERE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER MADE PARTICULAR MENTION OF JORDAN'S POLICY OF KEEPING THE BRIDGES OPEN BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST BANKS NOTWITHSTANDING CRITICISM FROM SOME OTHER ARAB STATES. JORDAN SAW THIS POLICY AS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE LOCAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND THUS TO ENCOURAGE THE PALESTINIANS TO STAY PUT RATHER THAN EMIGRATE. JORDAN FEARED THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO IMPORT CHEAP AND DOCILE EGYPTIAN LABOUR TO THE WEST BANK IN ORDER TO UNDERMINE THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE WEST BANKERS. M. THORN ASKED WHETHER, IN THE EVENT OF A SOLUTION, ALL THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO GO. THE FOREIGN MINISTER FIELDDED THIS BY OBSERVING ONLY THAT A CONTINUANCE OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WOULD PREVENT THE RIGHT SORT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FEELING DEVELOPMENT AMONGST WEST BANKERS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE AN ENTITY OF THEIR OWN. HE SPECULATED THAT THE FUTURE OF ANY SETTLEMENTS MIGHT BE LINKED DIRECTLY TO THE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS ALLOWED BACK TO THEIR HOMES BY THE ISRAELIS SEMICOLON AND THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR ISRAEL, VIA THE OIL RICH ARAB STATES, FOR SETTLEMENTS THAT WERE DISMANTLED.

8. COMMENT.

THE JORDANIANS CLEARLY WELCOMED M. THORN'S VISIT NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCONVENIENCE TO THEM OF ITS TIMING AND THE LAST MINUTE CHANGES INFLICTED BY M. THORN ON THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR HIM. M. THORN HAD OF COURSE ALREADY SEEN BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND THE LATE ABDUL HAMID SHARAF HERE ON 30 JUNE AND THUS ALREADY HAD AN IDEA OF WHAT HE COULD EXPECT TO HEAR ON THIS VISIT. HOWEVER, HE REMARKED JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE THAT HE NOW UNDERSTOOD BETTER WHY JORDAN, WITH HER REPUTATION AS A MODERATE, HAD LINED UP WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES AND HAD REJECTED INVOLVEMENT IN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. I DEDUCE FROM THIS REMARK THAT, PRIOR TO THIS VISIT, M. THORN MAY NOT HAVE FULLY APPRECIATED JORDAN'S LIMITED ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND HER UNWILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES SUCH AS ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL AND THE FULL RESTORATION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. AT THE SAME TIME M. THORN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN CONFIRMING THE JORDANIAN VIEW THAT EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

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9. POSTSCRIPT

M. WAGNER CONFIRMED TO ME THAT M. THORN STILL HOPED TO PAY A WEST BANK VISIT TO TALK TO THE MAYORS AND OTHER LOCAL PERSONALITIES SEMICOLON BUT THAT TIMING OF THIS WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION.

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OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN
JORDAN AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY 24 JUNE AT 0915 HOURS

Present: Prime Minister King Hussein
Mr. J.C. Moberly Sharif Abdul Hamid
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander Sharaf

* * * * *

King Hussein said that, although his reception by President Carter in the United States had been very warm, their talks together had not achieved a great deal. He had tried to convince the President that whatever progress might have been made in the Camp David talks, no lasting solution to the Arab/Israel dispute could be achieved through the Camp David process. It was time to think of the challenge that would remain once the Camp David stalemate had been recognised. President Carter, on the other hand, clearly remained of the opinion that no other approach to the problems had yielded results and that the Camp David effort should be continued. He and President Carter now understood each other's position better, but there was still no agreement on how to proceed. The Prime Minister said that she had discussed the Middle East situation with President Carter in Venice. She had told him about the disagreeable letter she had received from Mr. Begin and had had the impression that President Carter did not care for Mr. Begin's policies any more than she did. President Carter evidently intended to push ahead with the Camp David talks and was thinking in terms of a two or three year time scale. He was conscious that Mr. Begin had originally said he would never withdraw from the Sinai and hoped that he might also change his mind about the West Bank. President Carter did not appear to be thinking in terms of broadening the Camp David talks. He was deeply opposed to the idea of a separate Palestinian state which he thought would probably be taken over by someone sooner or later. The Prime Minister said that her own view was that it would be far better for any Palestinian political entity to be tied to another state. Confederation with Jordan would be the best outcome. An independent state would be prey to outside influences.

/ King Hussein

King Hussein confirmed that President Carter had taken the same line with him as with the Prime Minister on the question of a Palestinian state. The matter was one of deep concern to the Jordanian Government. They were not prepared to attempt to prejudge the outcome of the exercise of self-determination by the Palestinians. But his own view was that a "Palestinian state" would not in the event prove dangerous and would not be controlled by radicals. Given the chance, he felt that the Palestinians would move to something which everyone could accept. Sharif Sharaf said that the problem of how the Palestinians would exercise their right to self-determination was academic so long as Israel pursued its present policy. The Prime Minister agreed, but said that it would nonetheless be useful to have the various options examined. If the various possible outcomes could be analysed and discussed, it might become easier for the Palestinians to see the advantages of a moderate approach. This consideration had been much in the minds of the European Heads of Government in issuing their recent declaration.

King Hussein said that there had been some discussion between him and President Carter about ways in which the Palestinians could advance their point of view. The Americans seemed to be looking for a group of Palestinians who would press the Palestinian case. King Hussein said that he, of course, had referred to the PLO. The Americans had given the usual answer about the need for the PLO to recognise Israel's right to exist. The Americans had suggested that a separate group of Palestinians might be included in the Egyptian delegation to the Camp David talks, but the Jordanians had, he hoped, dissuaded them from pursuing the idea. Sharif Sharaf said that King Hussein had instead floated the idea that West Bank opinion should be given some way to express itself. If the voice of non-violent protest could be channelled into some kind of assembly, this might one day be of great help in finding a way to peaceful self-determination. Of course the idea of such an assembly would not be practical unless international pressure was brought to bear on Israel. President Carter seemed to be only now discovering how oppressive Israeli measures in the West Bank had been.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister asked which Palestinians might be prepared to raise their voice in the way the Jordanians had in mind. 'Would it be for instance, the West Bank mayors or Palestinian intellectuals?' Sharif Sharaf acknowledged that many of the intellectuals were associated with the PLO. However, the idea of a Palestinian Congress in which the Palestinians would press their demands peacefully seemed worth pursuing. The Jordanian Government would cooperate provided that it was agreed that the Israelis would not attempt to suppress it and provided it remained outside the Camp David framework. President Carter seemed to see possibilities in this. He had concluded the discussion of the idea by saying that it should be explored while the Camp David process continued.

The Prime Minister asked what hope there was for peaceful progress when the Fatah were issuing such violent declarations as that which followed their recent meeting in Damascus. She of course understood that many Palestinians argued that a peaceful approach had got them nowhere. Sharif Sharaf commented that the PLO were more moderate in private than in public. As regards their public posture it was similar in many respects to that of the Likud. King Hussein said that, unfortunately, there were governments, e.g. those of Syria, Libya and South Yemen, whose attitude was completely unhelpful. This related to their links with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister, noting that there was little chance of any move on the part of the United States until after the Presidential election, asked whether there was likely to be further violence on the West Bank in the coming months. King Hussein said that Mr. Begin's decision to move his office to East Jerusalem was bound to provoke trouble and might well lead to further violence. The Prime Minister asked whether all the natural leaders of the Palestinian people were now committed to the PLO and its violent policies. King Hussein said that they were all in it or sympathetic to it. Sharif Sharaf added that this would remain the case so long as the PLO represented the resistance to Israeli oppression. The Prime Minister said that she had hoped that some Palestinians would be prepared to dissociate themselves from the methods of the PLO. King Hussein said that he had been encouraging moderate Palestinians to join the PLO

/ precisely

precisely in the hope of tempering its methods. Sharif Sharaf said that it was very difficult for any Palestinian to condemn the PLO's activities at present. The same trend to violence was, of course, apparent in Israel. Unless an alternative and peaceful road could be offered to the Palestinians to achieve their objectives, the violence would continue to escalate. Events in Rhodesia had demonstrated this. The PLO were no more extreme than other organisations which had fought for their people's independence. The Prime Minister agreed that unless people could be given the hope of achieving their objectives peacefully, they would take to terrorism. It had taken a great deal of international pressure to persuade Mr. Mugabe to opt for the ballot box. The United Kingdom could not have done it alone.

Sharif Sharaf said that he had reminded President Carter that both Mr. Begin and Mr. Shamir had terrorist backgrounds. President Carter had acknowledged the point, but had added that while the Jordanians were talking about principles, he was interested in methods. He agreed that the Palestinians should have a homeland. The question was how it could be achieved. The Jordanian reply had been that Camp David was not the way. President Carter spoke logically but he lacked experience of the events of the last 30 years. He did not seem to be conscious that the Israeli attitude to the West Bank was quite different from their attitude to Sinai. They had been prepared to give up Sinai in return for the neutralisation of Egypt, but had never indicated a willingness to make the same sort of gesture to the inhabitants of the West Bank. They were still, of course, engaged in establishing settlements there.

The Prime Minister said that everyone condemned the Israeli Government's settlement policy. Even the Jewish community in this country disapproved. There were signs that public opinion in Israel itself was turning against the policy. However, she doubted whether much progress towards an agreement would be made in the next few months. Indeed it would probably prove difficult to make progress so long as Mr. Begin remained in office. There would have to be change in the political situation within Israel. She hoped that the European initiative could achieve something. The Israelis would put themselves in the wrong if they refused to receive a

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representative of the EC Presidency. Both Sharif Sharaf and King Hussein said that the European statement had been helpful. It had encouraged moderate Arab opinion. In the long run it would help President Carter.

The Prime Minister said that President Carter had clearly learnt a lot from his meeting with King Hussein. His attitude in Venice had been different from that when he had met the Prime Minister in Washington before Christmas. It was a pity the meeting with King Hussein had not taken place earlier. King Hussein said that President Carter had acknowledged that the delay in arranging a meeting had been a mistake.

At the end of the meeting, King Hussein mentioned that he had discussed regional security, particularly in the Gulf area, during his visit to Washington. It had been agreed that the Americans and Jordanians should look at the problems together. The Prime Minister said that there was a need for contingency plans. But she doubted whether these could be worked out at Summits. Sharif Sharaf agreed.

The Prime Minister commented that the United Kingdom still remained out of favour with the Saudi Government and that this was very worrying. King Hussein said that as soon as he returned to Amman he would get in touch with the Saudi authorities and see what could be done. Sharif Sharaf said that in private the Saudis admitted that they had over-reacted. Mr. Moberly said that the latest signals from Jeddah were more encouraging.

The discussion ended at 1000 hours.

Paul

25 June 1980

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 14P 25

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

MIDDLE EAST: FOLLOW-UP TO THORN MISSION

1. I ASKED MERTZ (POLITICAL DIRECTOR, MFA) TODAY HOW HE SAW THE FOLLOW-UP DEVELOPING.

2. AS I SUSPECTED, THORN HAS TAKEN A DRAFT OF HIS REPORT ON HIS MISSION AWAY WITH HIM THIS WEEK TO GREECE ON HOLIDAY. MERTZ SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED TO THORN THE ALMOST UNANIMOUS WISH OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS LAST WEEK (THE FRENCH APART) FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE SIGHT OF THORN'S PIECE OF PAPER. BUT MERTZ SAID THAT THORN WAS STILL HESITANT ABOUT COMMITTING HIS THOUGHTS TO WRITING. MERTZ THOUGHT THAT THORN WOULD MAKE AN ORAL PRESENTATION TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN BRUSSELS ON 15 SEPTEMBER AND KEEP HIS DRAFT UP HIS SLEEVE. IF THERE WAS A STRONG DEMAND FOR A WRITTEN REPORT, THORN WOULD PRODUCE IT A FEW DAYS LATER. MERTZ SUGGESTED THAT MINISTERS WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH TIME IN BRUSSELS NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO TACKLE THE SUBJECT AGAIN A WEEK LATER IN NEW YORK AND IN OCTOBER AS WELL.

3. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FOLLOW-UP, MERTZ SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH KING HUSSEIN, PARTICULARLY BEARING IN MIND THE ARAB SUMMIT AT THE END OF NOVEMBER. HE SAW ADVANTAGE IN DRAWING UP A LIST

..... TO PUT TO THE ARABS. SO WHAT DID THEY

THE END OF NOVEMBER. HE SAW ADVANTAGE IN DRAWING UP A LIST OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO PUT TO THE ARABS: EG WHAT DID THEY MEAN BY SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO WHOM WOULD THEY HAND THE TERRITORIES BACK? ALTHOUGH THE ARABS WERE PROFOUNDLY DIVIDED, IT WOULD BE VERY DESIRABLE TO SEE IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO REACH AN ARAB CONSENSUS ON THESE POINTS. AND THE PROCESS WOULD FILL IN TIME. MERTZ ALSO SAW MERIT IN PRINCIPLE IN INTRODUCING A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. HE SAID, HARPING BACK TO THE LAST POLITICAL DIRECTOR'S MEETING, THAT ALTHOUGH ROBIN HAD PRESENTED THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR WORKING OUT A PLAN OF ACTION LEADING TO A GLOBAL STATEMENT IN A RATHER STARK WAY, MERTZ WAS CLEARLY ATTRACTED BY THE SUGGESTION. HE SAW ADVANTAGE IN HAVING A PLAN EVEN IF IT COULD ONLY BE IMPLEMENTED GRADUALLY. MERTZ SAID THAT THORN HAD BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO COULD MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE MISSION. THEY HAD EVEN CONTEMPLATED SUGGESTING PAUL HELMINGER (MINISTER OF STATE, MFA) BUT HAD ABANDONED THE IDEA BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH VERY GOOD, HE LACKED THE NECESSARY INTERNATIONAL STANDING. NOR WOULD IT BE PRACTICABLE TO LAUNCH THORN'S SUCCESSOR (EG COLETTE FLESCH) INTO THE FRAY JUST FOR DECEMBER. THE MAIN REQUIREMENT WOULD BE TO FIND SOMEONE OF STATURE. SIMONET MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY. MERTZ SAID THAT THORN WOULD WANT TO MAINTAIN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES HE HAD MET. BUT THORN WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EMBARK ON A FURTHER PROTRACTED MIDDLE EAST TOUR GIVEN HIS MANY OTHER COMMITMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. THORN HAD ONLY MANAGED TO DO HIS WALK-ABOUT BY CRAMMING IT INTO THE SUMMER BREAK. MERTZ WONDERED WHETHER ANY FOREIGN MINISTER, PARTICULARLY FROM ONE OF THE LARGER PARTNERS WITH MORE BILATERAL COMMITMENTS THAN LUXEMBOURG, COULD MANAGE THE PHYSICAL COMMITMENT INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OTHER OBLIGATIONS. THIS PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION, COUPLED WITH POSSIBLE DUTCH HESITATIONS, MADE MERTZ TAKE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IDEA ALL THE MORE SERIOUSLY.

4. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

THOMAS

NNNN

SENT AT 091400Z DG

B/F

^{John}
9/9/80

1 September, 1980.

Visit by King Hussein to London

The Prime Minister has seen George Walden's letter to me of 29 August about King Hussein's forthcoming visit to this country. She would be happy to see King Hussein here at No.10 on Wednesday, 10 September, at 12 noon. I should be grateful if you could let me have a brief the previous evening.

The Prime Minister would be content for Mr. Urwick to be present.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

C. Jebb, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

WJFM



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Would you like to see King Hussein on Wednesday 10 September when our Ambassador will be in London?

There is an E meeting in the morning; you are giving the Cheshire handicapped school children tea; and you have the "Now" dinner speech in the evening. We could therefore fit in King Hussein at 12 noon on a busy day.

Agreed
m.
MAD

29 August 1980



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 August 1980

Dear Michael,

Visit by King Hussein to London

King Hussein will be making a further private visit to London between 1-11 September. He will be visiting Farnborough on 5 September and the production line of the Chieftain tank at RAF Leeds on 8 September.

The King has invariably seen the Prime Minister during his several visits to London over the last year and HM Ambassador in Amman has recommended that the Prime Minister should, if there is time, receive him again on this occasion. He points out that the King sets great store by these meetings which have been an important factor in the helpful role Jordan has played in supporting the European initiative with the other Arabs.

We have no pressing business to discuss with King Hussein but a meeting now would helpfully build on the goodwill established by the Prime Minister's previous meetings and provide an opportunity to hear the King's views on progress of the Thorn Mission and Arab reactions to it.



HM Ambassador returns to Amman from leave on 10 September and would be available to attend a meeting before that date if the Prime Minister wished. The Secretary of State will be on holiday at this time.

G G H Walden

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
Private Secretary
No 10

29 AUG 1950



FILE

VLB

Jordan.

25 June 1980

Call by King Hussein

King Hussein of Jordan called on the Prime Minister yesterday as arranged.

I enclose a copy of the record of their discussion.

M ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SL

D.R.

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

Copied to Master Ser.
Middle East (Situation)
Saudi Arabia (Relations)

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY 24 JUNE AT 0915 HOURS

<u>Present:</u>	Prime Minister	King Hussein
	Mr. J.C. Moberly	Sharif Abdul Hamid
	Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	Sharaf

* * * * *

King Hussein said that, although his reception by President Carter in the United States had been very warm, their talks together had not achieved a great deal. He had tried to convince the President that whatever progress might have been made in the Camp David talks, no lasting solution to the Arab/Israel dispute could be achieved through the Camp David process. It was time to think of the challenge that would remain once the Camp David stalemate had been recognised. President Carter, on the other hand, clearly remained of the opinion that no other approach to the problems had yielded results and that the Camp David effort should be continued. He and President Carter now understood each other's position better, but there was still no agreement on how to proceed. The Prime Minister said that she had discussed the Middle East situation with President Carter in Venice. She had told him about the disagreeable letter she had received from Mr. Begin and had had the impression that President Carter did not care for Mr. Begin's policies any more than she did. President Carter evidently intended to push ahead with the Camp David talks and was thinking in terms of a two or three year time scale. He was conscious that Mr. Begin had originally said he would never withdraw from the Sinai and hoped that he might also change his mind about the West Bank. President Carter did not appear to be thinking in terms of broadening the Camp David talks. He was deeply opposed to the idea of a separate Palestinian state which he thought would probably be taken over by someone sooner or later. The Prime Minister said that her own view was that it would be far better for any Palestinian political entity to be tied to another state. Confederation with Jordan would be the best outcome. An independent state would be prey to outside influences.

/ King Hussein

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- 2 -

King Hussein confirmed that President Carter had taken the same line with him as with the Prime Minister on the question of a Palestinian state. The matter was one of deep concern to the Jordanian Government. They were not prepared to attempt to prejudge the outcome of the exercise of self-determination by the Palestinians. But his own view was that a "Palestinian state" would not in the event prove dangerous and would not be controlled by radicals. Given the chance, he felt that the Palestinians would move to something which everyone could accept. Sharif Sharaf said that the problem of how the Palestinians would exercise their right to self-determination was academic so long as Israel pursued its present policy. The Prime Minister agreed, but said that it would nonetheless be useful to have the various options examined. If the various possible outcomes could be analysed and discussed, it might become easier for the Palestinians to see the advantages of a moderate approach. This consideration had been much in the minds of the European Heads of Government in issuing their recent declaration.

King Hussein said that there had been some discussion between him and President Carter about ways in which the Palestinians could advance their point of view. The Americans seemed to be looking for a group of Palestinians who would press the Palestinian case. King Hussein said that he, of course, had referred to the PLO. The Americans had given the usual answer about the need for the PLO to recognise Israel's right to exist. The Americans had suggested that a separate group of Palestinians might be included in the Egyptian delegation to the Camp David talks, but the Jordanians had, he hoped, dissuaded them from pursuing the idea. Sharif Sharaf said that King Hussein had instead floated the idea that West Bank opinion should be given some way to express itself. If the voice of non-violent protest could be channelled into some kind of assembly, this might one day be of great help in finding a way to peaceful self-determination. Of course the idea of such an assembly would not be practical unless international pressure was brought to bear on Israel. President Carter seemed to be only now discovering how oppressive Israeli measures in the West Bank had been.

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/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister asked which Palestinians might be prepared to raise their voice in the way the Jordanians had in mind. Would it be for instance the West Bank mayors or Palestinian intellectuals? Sharif Sharaf acknowledged that many of the intellectuals were associated with the PLO. However, the idea of a Palestinian Congress in which the Palestinians would press their demands peacefully seemed worth pursuing. The Jordanian Government would cooperate provided that it was agreed that the Israelis would not attempt to suppress it and provided it remained outside the Camp David framework. President Carter seemed to see possibilities in this. He had concluded the discussion of the idea by saying that it should be explored while the Camp David process continued.

The Prime Minister asked what hope there was for peaceful progress when the Fatah were issuing such violent declarations as that which followed their recent meeting in Damascus. She of course understood that many Palestinians argued that a peaceful approach had got them nowhere. Sharif Sharaf commented that the PLO were more moderate in private than in public. As regards their public posture it was similar in many respects to that of the Likud. King Hussein said that, unfortunately, there were governments, e.g. those of Syria, Libya and South Yemen, whose attitude was completely unhelpful. This related to their links with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister, noting that there was little chance of any move on the part of the United States until after the Presidential election, asked whether there was likely to be further violence on the West Bank in the coming months. King Hussein said that Mr. Begin's decision to move his office to East Jerusalem was bound to provoke trouble and might well lead to further violence. The Prime Minister asked whether all the natural leaders of the Palestinian people were now committed to the PLO and its violent policies. King Hussein said that they were all in it or sympathetic to it. Sharif Sharaf added that this would remain the case so long as the PLO represented the resistance to Israeli oppression. The Prime Minister said that she had hoped that some Palestinians would be prepared to dissociate themselves from the methods of the PLO. King Hussein said that he had been encouraging moderate Palestinians to join the PLO

/ precisely

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

precisely in the hope of tempering its methods. Sharif Sharaf said that it was very difficult for any Palestinian to condemn the PLO's activities at present. The same trend to violence was, of course, apparent in Israel. Unless an alternative and peaceful road could be offered to the Palestinians to achieve their objectives, the violence would continue to escalate. Events in Rhodesia had demonstrated this. The PLO were no more extreme than other organisations which had fought for their people's independence. The Prime Minister agreed that unless people could be given the hope of achieving their objectives peacefully, they would take to terrorism. It had taken a great deal of international pressure to persuade Mr. Mugabe to opt for the ballot box. The United Kingdom could not have done it alone.

Sharif Sharaf said that he had reminded President Carter that both Mr. Begin and Mr. Shamir had terrorist backgrounds. President Carter had acknowledged the point, but had added that while the Jordanians were talking about principles, he was interested in methods. He agreed that the Palestinians should have a homeland. The question was how it could be achieved. The Jordanian reply had been that Camp David was not the way. President Carter spoke logically but he lacked experience of the events of the last 30 years. He did not seem to be conscious that the Israeli attitude to the West Bank was quite different from their attitude to Sinai. They had been prepared to give up Sinai in return for the neutralisation of Egypt, but had never indicated a willingness to make the same sort of gesture to the inhabitants of the West Bank. They were still, of course, engaged in establishing settlements there.

The Prime Minister said that everyone condemned the Israeli Government's settlement policy. Even the Jewish community in this country disapproved. There were signs that public opinion in Israel itself was turning against the policy. However, she doubted whether much progress towards an agreement would be made in the next few months. Indeed it would probably prove difficult to make progress so long as Mr. Begin remained in office. There would have to be change in the political situation within Israel. She hoped that the European initiative could achieve something. The Israelis would put themselves in the wrong if they refused to receive a

/ representative

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
representative of the EC Presidency. Both Sharif Sharaf and King Hussein said that the European statement had been helpful. It had encouraged moderate Arab opinion. In the long run it would help President Carter.

The Prime Minister said that President Carter had clearly learnt a lot from his meeting with King Hussein. His attitude in Venice had been different from that when he had met the Prime Minister in Washington before Christmas. It was a pity the meeting with King Hussein had not taken place earlier. King Hussein said that President Carter had acknowledged that the delay in arranging a meeting had been a mistake.

At the end of the meeting, King Hussein mentioned that he had discussed regional security, particularly in the Gulf area, during his visit to Washington. It had been agreed that the Americans and Jordanians should look at the problems together. The Prime Minister said that there was a need for contingency plans. But she doubted whether these could be worked out at Summits. Sharif Sharaf agreed.

The Prime Minister commented that the United Kingdom still remained out of favour with the Saudi Government and that this was very worrying. King Hussein said that as soon as he returned to Amman he would get in touch with the Saudi authorities and see what could be done. Sharif Sharaf said that in private the Saudis admitted that they had over-reacted. Mr. Moberly said that the latest signals from Jeddah were more encouraging.

The discussion ended at 1000 hours.



25 June 1980

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 June 1980

MS
Mr Moberly will be in attendance.

Dear Michael,

King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister
on 24 June

King Hussein is calling on the Prime Minister at 9.15 am
/ on 24 June. I attach a brief.

We do not yet know who will be with the King. But the
Jordanian Prime Minister, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, is
expected to be coming home with him from Washington and may
well accompany him on this call.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

CONFIDENTIAL

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT 9.15 AM ON 24 JUNE

Points to Make

Arab/Israel

1. Glad that Jordan has welcomed European statement. Intended to be a balanced contribution, which will be followed up with contacts through Presidency. Jordan very important port of call.
2. Disappointed by Israeli reactions, and also by negative attitudes of Syria and PLO. Would appreciate Jordan's help in getting across to PLO leadership that we take seriously intransigent statements such as that of Fatah Congress. Very damaging to Palestinian image in the West. If the PLO do not respond to Western acknowledgement of their role, Europe can go no further.
3. Peres has spoken of 'Jordanian' solution bypassing the Palestinians if he comes to power. If this is not a serious option worried that Peres might commit himself too inflexibly to this solution. Is there anything Hussein can do?

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. King Hussein is stopping over in London on his way home from his official visit (16-18 June) to the United States. The purpose of this call is to report to the Prime Minister on that visit. The King has spoken of also calling on President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt on his way home but we are not sure of his plans. The record of the Prime Minister's last meeting with the King on 28 May is attached. *(removed at review)*

2. Since then the King and Queen Noor were received by The Queen on 13 June (no record). They were unable to accept the Prime Minister's invitation to Trooping the Colour because one of the King's daughters was undergoing a tonsillitis operation at that time.

EC statement on the Middle East

3. The Jordanian reaction has, on the whole, been helpful. The Prime Minister issued a statement describing the Venice declaration, as a positive step in the right direction 'although not quite enough in itself to advance in practice the cause of justice and peace in the area'. He drew attention to the emphasis in the declaration on full Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian self-determination, rejection of Israeli measures in occupied Jerusalem, opposition to settlements, and the call for PLO involvement in negotiations. But he concluded that the EC should turn its words into action.

4. Speaking separately to HM Ambassador Sharif Sharaf said that he had deliberately taken the lead in drawing attention to the positive aspects of the declaration in order to get ahead of other less enthusiastic Arab reactions. He said that he was personally well pleased with its contents. Lord Carrington spoke on the telephone to the King in London on 15 June; the King said nothing of substance.

Visit to Washington

5. Washington telnos 2307 and 2308 reporting the King's visit are attached. The King took a moderate and constructive line in public, although there was only a passing reference to the EC initiative. In private, there appears to have been a useful discussion particularly on means of bringing the Palestinians into the negotiations; but Hussein still appears to have no clear ideas of his own on the subject. Aiming off for optimism in the State Department briefing the visit seems to have been successful more in re-establishing relations between King Hussein and President Carter than in bridging the still considerable gap between them. The King might need to be advised not to expect the Americans to be as forthcoming publicly on Palestinian involvement as they have been in private.

6. The King has since announced US agreement to sell him 200 M-60 tanks (presumably to replace older American tanks). This may well ~~have~~ been premature given the difficulties which the State Department foresee in gaining Congressional approval. Our own contract for sale of 274 advanced Chieftain tanks (signed last November for

/delivery

delivery between 1981-3) is not at risk. The prospect of future Chieftain sales might be diminished if the US deal comes off. But there has as yet been no discussion of further Chieftain sales.

7. A personality note on the Jordanian Prime Minister who may attend this meeting is attached. The Prime Minister will recall meeting Sherif Sharaf with the King last September.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2307 OF 19 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, HMCJ JERUSALEM,
UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. HUSSEIN ACCOMPANIED BY, AMONG OTHERS, QUEEN NOOR, ABDUL HAMID SHARAF AND GENERAL BIN SHAKER, ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON ON 16 JUNE. HIS OFFICIAL TALKS WERE ON 17 AND 18 JUNE: HE MADE A MAJOR SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ON 19 JUNE: AND IS STAYING ON FOR TWO PRIVATE DAYS, LEAVING ON 21 JUNE. HE HAD TWO SESSIONS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, ONE WITH DEFENCE SECRETARY BROWN AND A WORKING LUNCH WITH MUSKIE. HE ALSO SPENT TIME WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A DINNER IN HIS HONOUR ON 17 JUNE.

2. THE KING'S VISIT RECEIVED COMPREHENSIVE BUT NOT UNIVERSALLY FRIENDLY MEDIA ATTENTION (CBS SHOWED SADAT'S REMARKS DESCRIBING HUSSEIN AS A MONEY-MOTIVATED OPPORTUNIST AS PART OF A NEWS ITEM ABOUT THE KING'S ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON). BUT THE PRESIDENT'S UNDERTAKING ON 13 JUNE THAT HE WOULD EXERCISE HIS PERSUASION ON THE KING TO JOIN CAMP DAVID (MYTEL 2253) HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN MUCH TONED DOWN BY OFFICIAL BRIEFING, ONE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL GOING SO FAR AS TO TELL THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTER THAT THIS PROMISE WAS QUOTE UNINTENDED UNQUOTE. IN HIS REMARKS TO THE PRESS AFTER THE SECOND MEETING WITH HUSSEIN, CARTER SAID QUOTE WE HAVE NOT TRIED TO CHANGE EACH OTHER'S MINDS ABOUT THE APPROACH, OR THE TECHNIQUE OR THE PROCEDURE TO BE USED. BUT WE DO AGREE COMPLETELY WITH THE ULTIMATE GOALS: THAT IS THE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS, THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO HAVE A VOICE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE, THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND A COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST PEACE FOR THE REGION. SO IN ALMOST EVERY INSTANCE OUR ULTIMATE GOALS ARE PARALLEL OR THE SAME, AND WE HAVE EXPLORED WAYS TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR APPROACH. UNQUOTE HUSSEIN IMPLICITLY ENDORSED THIS LINE DESCRIBING DISCUSSIONS AS QUOTE EXTREMELY FRUITFUL... WE UNDERSTAND BETTER THE US POSITION. WE HAVE HAD THE CHANCE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BRING TO YOU AND OUR FRIENDS IN THE US OUR FEELINGS THAT A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE MUST COME IN THE AREA. UNQUOTE

3. GENERALLY SPEAKING THE MEDIA, ESPECIALLY ON THE FIRST DAY, CLAIMED TO DETECT A SOMEWHAT TENSE CORRECTNESS IN THE CARTER/HUSSEIN ENCOUNTERS AND TRIED TO READ DISAGREEMENT INTO THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN'S DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRST MORNING'S TALKS AS QUOTE

/Both

BOTH VERY FRANK AND EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE UNQUOTE.
THE NEW YORK TIMES ALSO REPORTED ON 19 JUNE THAT HUSSEIN HAD A
HARD TIME ON THE HILL, QUOTING REPRESENTATIVE ROSENTHAL OF NEW YORK
AS DESCRIBING THE TONE AS QUOTE SHARP, THE SHARPEST I HAVE EVER
HEARD IN A MEETING WITH A FOREIGN LEADER. UNQUOTE FOR HIS PART,
HUSSEIN DECLARED HIMSELF QUOTE VERY, VERY SATISFIED WITH ALL THAT
HAS HAPPENED DURING MY VISIT HERE ... AND VERY PLEASED THAT WE ARE
FRANK WITH EACH OTHER. UNQUOTE

4. IN HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB (WHICH WAS BROADCAST
LIVE ON THE NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO NETWORK) HUSSEIN ARGUED FORCEFULLY
THAT RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
WAS THE KEY TO THE JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH
JORDAN SOUGHT. WHILE ASSERTING HIS FAITH IN QUOTE STEADY AND
FRANK COMMUNICATION UNQUOTE BETWEEN THE US AND THE ARABS, HE WARNED
THAT AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO A QUOTE PECULIAR AND INDEFENSIBLE
UNQUOTE CONCEPT OF ISRAELI SECURITY WHICH APPEARED TO EQUATE
SECURITY WITH CONQUEST, THUS CONDONING ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM,
CONTAINED THE SEEDS OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE US AND
THE ARAB WORLD. NEITHER MORALITY NOR ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST
JUSTIFIED US SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI POLICIES OF ANNEXATION AND DENIAL
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH RESULTED IN QUOTE ALIENATION OF ESSENTIALLY
FRIENDLY PEOPLE, THE RADICALISATION OF THE MODERATES AMONG THEM,
AND THE POSSIBLE DISRUPTION OF THE NORMAL EXCHANGE OF INTERESTS
IN THE MAJOR AREAS OF TRADE, ENERGY AND CULTURE UNQUOTE. A
SEPARATE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WOULD NOT LEAD
TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT SO LONG AS ISRAEL INSISTED ON SETTLING
OCCUPIED LANDS; AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LAND OCCUPIED SINCE
1967 COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND
NATIONAL FREEDOM. HUSSEIN REFERRED TO JORDAN'S RECORD AS THE MOST
ACTIVE ARAB COUNTRY IN PURSUIT OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE,
TO HER COOPERATION WITH SUCCESSIVE UN AND US ENVOYS AND TO HIS OWN
TALKS WITH FOUR AMERICAN PRESIDENTS ALL OF WHOM HAD ASSURED HIM
THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM. QUOTE I AM CONVINCED THAT THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE, ONE THEY UNDERSTAND THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WILL DEMAND OF THEIR GOVERNMENT A BALANCED
POLICY AND WILL SUPPORT A PRESIDENT SEEKING TO CORRECT PAST MISTAKES
AND RE-ESTABLISH A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB WORLD.
UNQUOTE HE DEFENDED THE BAGHDAD AND TUNIS SUMMIT DECISIONS AS MOVES
DESIGNED TO PROMOTE PEACE; BUT THESE HAD BEEN THWARTED BY ISRAEL'S
POLICIES OF SETTLEMENTS AND REPRESSION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
JORDAN'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PLO WERE DESIGNED TO OPEN AVENUES
TO PEACE, NOT CLOSE THEM. PROGRESS TOWARDS A FREE AND PEACEFUL
PALESTINIAN HOMELAND WAS THE PREREQUISITE TO PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST: ONCE PEACE WAS ESTABLISHED, MUTUAL SECURITY GUARANTEES
COULD BE BUILT INTO IT; BUT A PEACE WHICH GUARANTEED PALESTINIAN
SELF-DETERMINATION AND FREEDOM WOULD BE NATURALLY SELF-PERPETUATING.

THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD ENDORSED THESE PRINCIPLES (HUSSEIN'S ONE OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION). HUSSEIN CONCLUDED BY APPEALING TO THE US TO SHARE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE HONOURABLE AND GENUINE PEACE DESIRED BY JORDAN, THE PALESTINIANS AND ALL ENLIGHTENED ARAB OPINION.

5. THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD ADDED LITTLE, BUT HUSSEIN ELEGANTLY DECLINED AN INVITATION TO EXPRESS CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S LACK OF CONTINUITY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE INSTEAD PAID TRIBUTE TO CARTER'S COURAGE, THE INTEREST HE HAD SHOWN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HIS SINCERE DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION OF THE AREA'S PROBLEMS. QUOTE HE HAS GIVEN ME MORE TIME OVER THIS SUBJECT THAN WAS THE CASE IN THE PAST WITH ALL THE GREAT PEOPLE THAT HELD THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I HOPE THAT THE FUTURE WILL SEE US WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER UNQUOTE.

6. SEE M I F T

F C O PASS SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

FRETWELL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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FM WASHINGTON 192357Z JUNE 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2308 OF 19 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM,
UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

M I P T

1. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION AT THE WAY THE VISIT HAS GONE, DISMISSING AS SIMPLY INACCURATE THE ATTEMPTS BY THE MEDIA TO FIND NEGATIVE ASPECTS. CARTER'S UN-HELPFUL CURTAIN-RAISING INTERVIEW WITH THE JEWISH EDITORS HAD EVIDENTLY NOT DONE ANY HARM. EVEN ON THE HILL, WHERE HUSSEIN HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO SOME TOUGH QUESTIONING, HE HAD ANSWERED WELL AND, IF THERE WAS ANY JUSTICE, SHOULD HAVE DONE MUCH TO RESTORE HIS IMAGE.
2. SAUNDERS TOLD US THAT THE PRIME PURPOSE OF REESTABLISHING THE CARTER/HUSSEIN RELATIONSHIP WAS ACHIEVED. THIS VISIT WAS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW PERSONAL CONTACT GENUINELY COULD CLEAR THE AIR AND RE-ESTABLISH CORDIALITY AFTER A LONG PERIOD OF PUBLIC RECRIMINATION AND INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING. THE TWO MEN HAD FULLY EXPLORED AND DISPOSED OF THEIR MUTUAL GRIEVANCES. THE FACT THAT BOTH MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD LASTED TWICE AS LONG AS SCHEDULED REFLECTED THEIR RESTORED MUTUAL ESTEEM AND FRIENDSHIP, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR DISCUSSION HAD INTERESTED THEM BOTH.
3. THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD AIRING OF HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. THOUGH MAINTAINING THE POSITION THAT HE WISHED THE KING COULD JOIN IN, CARTER HAD ENDED BY ASSURING HUSSEIN THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS POSITION AND THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM TO CHANGE IT. DISCUSSION HAD THEN MOVED TO WAYS AND MEANS OF RELATING THE PALESTINIANS TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. CARTER HAD ASKED HUSSEIN TO GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO HOW PALESTINIAN ATTENTION COULD BE FOCUSED NOT MERELY ON WHAT THEY AIM FOR AS THE END RESULT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BUT RATHER ON THE SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH THEY FELT THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK TO BE DEFECTIVE AND ON WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE TO ESTABLISH A NEGOTIATION TO WHICH THEY COULD BE RELATED WITHOUT DIRECT INVOLVEMENT. THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS NOT EXPECTING ANYONE TO ABANDON THEIR ULTIMATE GOALS. BUT HE HOPED THAT HUSSEIN COULD EXPLORE WITH HIS PALESTINIAN CONTACT HOW, GIVEN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH CAMP DAVID AS SUCH, THEY MIGHT RELATE THEMSELVES TO SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION WHICH, WHILST DIFFERENT FROM CAMP DAVID, WAS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH IT. SAUNDERS

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AGREED WITH MY SUGGESTION THAT THIS APPROACH WAS CLOSE TO THE CONCEPT UNDERLYING THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. (SAUNDERS MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF ASKING ME TO ENSURE THAT WE KEPT ALL THE ABOVE TO OURSELVES. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO PRESENT IT TO OTHER EUROPEANS; THEY WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISK OF LEAKS WHICH MIGHT ENABLE THE ISRAELIS TO CLAIM THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE LOOKING FOR WAYS ROUND THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO DEAL WITH THE PLO).

4. I ASKED SAUNDERS WHETHER HUSSEIN HAD VOLUNTEERED ANY THOUGHTS ON HOW THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT THUS BE BROUGHT IN. HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN EASIER TO AGREE ON APPROACHES THAT HAD TO BE RULED OUT. CLEARLY; THERE WAS NO SCOPE FOR TRYING TO INSERT THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION; INDEED, THEY WOULD NOT ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH ANYTHING THAT WAS SEEN TO SMACK OF CAMP DAVID. HUSSEIN HIMSELF (CONTRASTING HIS OWN ATTITUDE WITH THAT OF THE IRAQIS AND THE SYRIANS) HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHAT CAMP DAVID HAD SO FAR ACHIEVED BUT HAD BEEN FIRM THAT THE PROCESS WAS INCOMPLETE. SAUNDERS INTERPRETED THIS AS MEANING THAT IN HUSSEIN'S VIEW A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE A MOVE AWAY FROM THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, THOUGH NOT TO SOME BRAND NEW FORUM.

5. OTHER ISSUES DISCUSSED INCLUDED REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND LEBANON. THERE WAS LITTLE BILATERAL SUBJECT MATTER AND THE QUESTION OF U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES SEEMS NOT EVEN TO HAVE BEEN RAISED BETWEEN THE KING AND CARTER. NEUMANN (JORDAN COUNTRY OFFICER, STATE DEPARTMENT) HAS TOLD US THAT, ON THE ADVICE OF THEIR FRIENDS ON THE HILL, THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE DELIBERATELY DELAYED NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S. WISH TO SELL JORDAN 100 TANKS UNTIL 23 JUNE, IN ORDER TO AVOID ARMS SUPPLIES BECOMING THE MAIN FOCUS OF HUSSEIN'S MEETING WITH CONGRESSMEN. THE SAME NOTIFICATION WILL MENTION JORDAN'S WISH TO PURCHASE A FURTHER 100 TANKS THEREAFTER. NEUMANN ANTICIPATES TROUBLE ON THE HILL AND A CHANCE FOR ISRAELI SUPPORTERS THERE TO ERODE HUSSEIN'S SUCCESS.

FCO PASS SAVING BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

FRETWELL

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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ABDUL HAMID SHARAF SHARIF

Born Baghdad 1939, younger brother of Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf. His father was Regent of Iraq briefly in 1940 following the pro-Nazi 'Golden Square' coup. Studied Philosophy and International Relations at AUB. Joined the MFA in 1962. Director-General of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service 1963. Assistant Head of the Royal Diwan 1964. Minister of Information 1965-7. Ambassador in Washington 1967-71. Jordanian Permanent Representative at the United Nations in 1971-1976.

He made a considerable impression in Washington, where he was the youngest Arab Ambassador. At the UN he gained wide respect, both in the Arab group and outside, for his intelligent, moderate, and often courageous, presentation of his Government's case. Described as outstanding among Arab Ambassadors in New York, and is one of Jordan's most able diplomats. Head of the Royal Diwan (court) 1976-9.

His diplomatic experience has resulted in his playing a much more significant role in the conduct of foreign affairs than his predecessor did as Head of the Diwan or as Prime Minister; particularly now that Zeid Rifai is (if only temporarily) hors-de-combat, Sharaf has become one of the King's closest and most trusted advisers and confidants.

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FM WASHINGTON 202100Z JUN 80
TO ROUTINE F C O
TEL NO 2316 OF 20 JUNE 1980
INFO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO.

MY TEL 2308 AND TELECON FORTESCUE/JENNER: U S TANKS FOR JORDAN.

1. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS YESTERDAY CONFIRMED TO THE PRESS THAT THE U S HAD AGREED TO SELL JORDAN 100 M60 A3 TANKS, EQUIPPED WITH NIGHT VISION SCOPES AND LASER RANGEFINDERS, AT AN ESTIMATED VALUE OF DOLLARS 160 MILLION: AND THAT, IF THIS DEAL GOES THROUGH CONGRESS, JORDAN INTENDED TO ASK FOR A FURTHER 100 TANKS.

2. OFFICIALS ARE, HOWEVER, REPORTED TO HAVE INSISTED THAT THE SALE HAD BEEN AGREED IN ADVANCE OF KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT AND DID NOT REPRESENT A BLANDISHMENT HELD OUT BY PRESIDENT CARTER TO MAKE HUSSEIN MORE COOPERATIVE OVER CAMP DAVID. THE DECISION HAD RESULTED FROM AN AMERICAN JUDGEMENT THAT THIS SALE WOULD NOT DISTURB THE MILITARY BALANCE OR POSE A THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY. ACCORDING TO RICHARD BURT IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES QUOTE THE TANK DEAL WITH JORDAN... WAS EVIDENTLY MOTIVATED BY A GROWING FEAR IN WASHINGTON THAT THE KING, AT THE SUGGESTION OF IRAQ, WAS PREPARING TO SIGN A LARGE ARMS AGREEMENT WITH MOSCOW UNQUOTE. AND THE WASHINGTON POST WRITES QUOTE THE PROPOSED SALE IS VIEWED WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AS A GESTURE THAT WILL HELP THE U S TO RECOUP SOME OF ITS INFLUENCE WITH HUSSEIN AND HIS ARMED FORCES UNQUOTE. THE POST ALSO ASSUMES THAT THIS PROPOSED SALE WILL BE OPPOSED BY ISRAEL, AND, QUOTING ISRAELI SOURCES, CLAIMS THAT AMBASSADOR EVRON HAS ALREADY BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS OF ISRAEL'S QUOTE STRONG AND SERIOUS CONCERN UNQUOTE. THE PRESS BRACKETS THE OPPOSITION TO BE EXPECTED FROM ISRAEL AND HER SUPPORTERS HERE TO SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES EXPECTED OVER THE SAUDI REQUEST FOR EXTRA EQUIPMENT FOR THEIR F15S (MY TELNO 2279).

3. ONE RESULT OF THE FRONT PAGE COVERAGE OF THE TANKS IS THAT REPORTING OF KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL-PRESS CLUB ON 19 JUNE IS MINIMAL AND RELEGATED DEEP INTO INSIDE PAGES OF THIS MORNING'S PRESS (THOUGH IT DID RECEIVE GOOD COVERAGE IN YESTERDAY EVENING'S WASHINGTON STAR).

4. THE JORDANIAN INTENTION ALSO TO BUY CHIEFTAINS IS MENTIONED, THE NEW YORK TIMES REFERRING TO QUOTE MORE THAN 200 UNQUOTE AND THE WASHINGTON POST TO 250 CHIEFTAINS.

FRETWELL

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File

Jordan ^{DJG}

B/F 20.6.80.

18 June 1980

I am writing to confirm that King Hussein will be paying a call on the Prime Minister at 0915 on Tuesday 24 June at 10 Downing Street. Could your brief please reach us by close of play on Friday 20 June?

I also confirm that Mr. J.C. Moberly will be attending.

CS

Malcolm Adams, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DSS

PRIME MINISTER

c. Mr. Alexander

King Hussein is going to be over here on 23 June (you will be in Venice). Would you be prepared to see him on the morning of Tuesday 24 June, which is at the moment free for your Summit Statement?

Ed.

Yes no

12 June 1980

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29 May 1980

As you know, King Hussein of Jordan called on the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon.

I enclose a copy of the record of that meeting.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Cc Middle East Pt 3
Situation

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RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET AT 1730 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 28 MAY 1980

Present: Prime Minister
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Mr. M.A. Pattison

King Hussein
Ambassador of Jordan

* * * * *

The Arab/Israel problem

The Prime Minister invited King Hussein's views on the Middle East situation after the expiry of the 26 May deadline. King Hussein said that all he had foreseen in his last discussion was evolving. The deadline would come and go with no solution. On the ground, the situation was worse than ever. Tensions in the occupied territory had heightened still further. The idea of self-government was even further off than before, and hopes and aspirations had collapsed. United States credibility had continued to disappear in the area. For the Arab and Muslim nations, their natural place was with the free world, but they were now in a state of confusion. It had been his hope that, if 26 May passed with no progress, even the United States would see a European initiative which they could support as serving their best interests. He had been invited to Washington in June and had accepted.

The Prime Minister reported that the Egyptian Vice-President had been in London the previous day. The Egyptians were upset by the Knesset move on Jerusalem. They were not proposing to continue with the autonomy talks. The Vice-President had understood that President Carter would attempt to persuade Mr. Begin to give an undertaking that there would be no change in status before the talks were concluded. He hoped that something might come of this in the next few days. If that failed, the Egyptians would try to find other initiatives to avoid leaving a vacuum. The Prime Minister had spoken of the possibility of European moves, but had explained her understanding that any move for a United Nations Security Council resolution would be vetoed by the United States. King Hussein had serious doubts about the possibility of President Carter obtaining an undertaking from Mr. Begin. But if that failed,

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this would simply demonstrate still further the current weakness of the United States. The Prime Minister asked what would happen if there was no movement on the diplomatic front. King Hussein said that the occupied territories could erupt with very little further provocation. This would lead to bloodshed and chaos on a scale which none of the parties concerned would wish to see. For example, towns were now under martial law for days on end. The tensions were not confined to the issue of settlements. Rumours and intelligence available to the Jordanians also suggested that the Israelis were planning further military action in Southern Lebanon beyond the current UN lines. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggested that neither Egypt or the United States had any viable alternative other than the pursuit of the autonomy talks. Neither might expect significant progress from them at present, but the run-up to the US election illiminated any other action. Israel might now feel that it had obtained all that it could from the talks. The Prime Minister commented that only the United States could pressurise Israel. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there was no future in a UN resolution, if this would lead to a US veto, when only the US ultimately had the means to solve the problems. King Hussein did not want to see his country's friends embark on a course which could not produce results. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that the US had not only lost face and credibility, but had antagonised the Arab world as a whole. It ran the risk of encouraging more of the Arab world to look to the USSR. In the period until the US Government could then become active after their election, there was a dangerous gap which mischief-makers might try to fill. Britain and other Western allies could only try to paper the cracks in the interim. Although there were occasionally suggestions that President Carter would attempt to take a firmer line with the Israelis after the US primaries, this seemed out of the question unless both US presidential candidates could share an approach. The US system did not encourage this.

The Prime Minister commented that there had been a similar position before the previous US election, when the problem had also required urgent attention. During King Hussein's last visit, they had discussed alternatives for the West Bank. She doubted whether enough had yet been done to sort out the various possibilities.

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She recognised the difficulty of preparing definite options, because much had to be left to evolve in the negotiations. But there was room for more work. On his last visit, King Hussein had spoken of the possibility of a loose federation with Jordan: it was after all Jordanian territory which had been annexed in 1967. King Hussein believed such an arrangement possible for the future. He and Mr. Arafat had several times discussed future arrangements. The ties between Jordan and Palestine were great. There would remain a problem of borders and Jordan had a need for and right to the same kind of border guarantees as the Israelis. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that the Israelis would never accept an outside guarantor, but would need to be confident in their own security. This would require some kind of demilitarisation of the West Bank. The Prime Minister saw little prospect of genuine mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO; but if this were ruled out, there was no real hope for a solution. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that genuine recognition would be a long, slow process. Aims would have to be established and all would have to recognise that much time would be needed to achieve them. King Hussein said that every passing day added to the difficulties. For Jordan, there was no picture of the future. In the meantime, there were pressures in all directions. He had, for example, recently found that the PLO had been under intense pressure from Libya, and he had had to open doors to the more responsible element in the PLO to counter this. Jordan wanted Palestine to exist as a force for peace, but was given no prospect of moving in that direction. The Prime Minister said that Israel would argue that any Palestinian state would be a Marxist vehicle. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that current Israeli policies only tended to make this more likely.

King Hussein said that Jordan had tried all avenues since 1957, but had found no room to manoeuvre. The basic ingredients were lacking. If Jordan were to decide to join the negotiations, there was a real risk of self-destruction, creating what Israel feared most, an extremist take-over in both Jordan and Palestine. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recognised that King Hussein could not volunteer the federation idea: it had to evolve through

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the PLO, from discussion of self-determination. King Hussein said that, in speaking of self-determination, Jordan had always been confident that the result would move in the direction of some link with Jordan, and some promise of stability. When hope was absent, extremists thrived. The Prime Minister said that she had always stressed to the Israelis that the denial of legitimate rights bred terrorism. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary speculated that Mr. Weizman's recent resignation might be a sign of some new internal political development in Israel. It was possible to visualise a Perez/Weizman coalition being pushed in the right direction. But this kind of speculation was unacceptable in Israel.

The Prime Minister asked what could now be done. By the time King Hussein visited the US, President Carter would know whether he had made progress with Mr. Begin. King Hussein said that the Middle East were very much expecting a European initiative. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that a declaration might cover the political rights of the Palestinians, self-determination, Jerusalem, and the settlements issue. But the declaration was unlikely to have a lasting impact: there should be some other activity. The Ambassador said that a framework for action was necessary. The Prime Minister said that most countries in the area had recognised the PLO as the sole negotiator. This created great difficulties for some countries. Was there no-one else, less identified with terrorism, to whom they could talk? King Hussein said that the US and Israel knew that he could have got the Palestinians to agree that he could speak for them. Jordan had been ready to accept its responsibility. But Jordan could not bargain over basic rights in the territory. If Resolution 242 were implemented, Jordan could act as an intermediary for the PLO and for the Arab world. But they had no basis on which to act. Jordan had tried to secure worthwhile commitments from the US after Camp David, but the US could offer nothing, after all the time which had passed and all the attempts which had been made. The Prime Minister noted that the withdrawal provisions of Resolution 242 had not been implemented. After 13 years, there was some tendency to forget the pre-1967 structure of the area. But Resolution 242 recognised that the West Bank was not part of Israel, and by

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implication that it was Jordanian. Jerusalem and Palestine tended now to be seen as part of Israel. The US had given up much of its bargaining power, Egypt had got what it most wanted, and as a result the rest of the Arab world was alienated. The Israelis were in the territory, and apparently in no hurry to pursue changes. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary noted that the Western world were likely to be the greatest sufferers from the lack of movement. Mr. Begin had crossed the most difficult hurdle by opening discussions with the Egyptians. It now seemed that others were needed to follow this lead.

The Prime Minister said that a European statement might not contribute much to the situation but few other practical steps seemed to be open. King Hussein, apologising for the naivete of his question, asked whether Jordan and Britain were meant to be friends and partners or not. Why should Britain and the Europeans always follow in US footsteps? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary acknowledged that a sensible step would be an even-handed Security Council resolution, supplementary to 242. But the US had warned that it would veto any resolution however sensible. Thus, while the tabling of a resolution might be a signal to the moderate Arabs, it would gain little more, and would be most damaging in the US pre-election campaigning. It could drive the candidates to give undertakings which would tie their hands for a long period after the election. There seemed little prospect of making progress with either candidate in the electoral period. Some European diplomatic activity seemed to be indicated. King Hussein said that Jordan was fighting despair in the area. This created ideal conditions both for the local radicals and for potential Russian influence. The Prime Minister said that King Hussein's talks with President Carter^{would} come at a valuable time, between the European Council and the Venice Economic Summit. The European declaration should have been settled by then, and work would be in hand on the follow-up. It would be most helpful to learn of the outcome of the King's discussions in Washington. King Hussein said that he would inform the Prime Minister from Washington of what had happened, and would endeavour to call in London on his way back.

/ Other Middle East problems

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cc Saudi Arabia No 79
Saudi/uk Relations
Internal Situation

- 6 -

Other Middle East problems

In response to the Prime Minister's question about Saudi Arabia, King Hussein said that many Saudis realised that they had overlooked any relation to Britain. He sincerely hoped for a normalisation of relations before long. He found the mood in the country a little more relaxed. Saudis were beginning to address themselves to their internal problems, but not much had yet happened and the dangers remained. There was still hostility towards Saudi Arabia in the rest of the area. He saw little significance in Prince Fahd's New York Post interview, and had not interpreted it - as suggested by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary - as an olive branch to Egypt. The Gulf was nervous about the future. Iraq seemed to be interested in returning its relationships to a more natural plane, as they prepared to host the non-aligned summit. In the area as a whole, the communist threat helped to encourage people to stand together. In respect of Algeria he had great faith in the President's wisdom and good sense, but was not sure that he had yet consolidated his position. He was still puzzled by the grouping of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya and Syria.

The meeting concluded at 1830 hours.

28 May 1980

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SAVING TO CAIRO DAMASCUS TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON

KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BRITAIN

1. KING HUSSEIN'S AIRCRAFT LEFT AMMAN MORE THAN AN HOUR BEHIND SCHEDULE THIS MORNING. THE TOLD ME AT THE AIRPORT HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER LATER TODAY AND THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE HE WOULD CUT OUT THE PLANNED REFUELLING STOP AT GENEVA IN ORDER TO ARRIVE IN TIME FOR HIS APPOINTMENT WITH MRS THATCHER THIS AFTERNOON. HE INTENDS REMAINING IN LONDON UNTIL 3 JUNE.
2. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS KING HUSSEIN, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER IN SEPARATE INTERVIEWS HAVE ALL REITERATED TO A VISITING GROUP OF BRITISH MEMEBERS OF PARLIAMENT THE NECESSITY FOR SOME KIND OF EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. AS THE KING PUT IT, MOVEMENT WAS NEEDED ON THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND NEEDED SOON. IDEALLY SUCH AN INITIATIVE SHOULD EVENTUALLY INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE: HE CLAIMED NOT TO KNOW EGYPT'S TRUE POSITION, BUT SAID THAT AS FAR AS SADAT HIMSELF WAS CONCERNED HE WAS INCLINED TO LET BY-GONES BE BY-GONES. PRINCE HASSAN WAS EVEN MORE SPECIFIC IN STATING THAT JORDANIANS DID NOT IN ANY WAY EXPECT THE US TO REPUDIATE THE OBVIOUS GAINS FROM CAMP DAVID AND HE ACCEPTED THAT THE EUROPEANS WERE NOT LIKELY TO LAUNCH AN INITIATIVE IN FACE OF A US VETO.
3. ALL THREE WERE RELUCTANT TO BE DRAWN ON PRECISELY WHAT FORM AN INITIATIVE SHOULD TAKE. BUT THE PRIME MINISTER IN PARTICULAR CALLED FOR A SPECIFIC STATEMENT OF POSITION FROM THE EUROPEANS, NOTABLY ON THE NEED FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION: ACTIVITY FOR ITS OWN SAKE MERELY DESIGNED TO FILL THE GAP UNTIL A NEW US PRESIDENT WAS IN OFFICE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT.
4. KING HUSSEING WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO TELL THE VISITING MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND JORDAN HAD NEVER BEEN CLOSER OR BETTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 May 1980

Dear Michael,

The Prime Minister has agreed to see
/ King Hussein today at 5pm. I enclose a brief.

We do not yet know whether the King will
be accompanied at this meeting. The Jordanian
Ambassador and the Commander-in-Chief may do so.
Personality notes on them are included.

Yours WTA


Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING SECRET

28 MAY 1950



PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN AT 5.00PM ON 28 MAY

Points to Make

Arab/Israel

1. European concern to maintain momentum of peace process. No decisions yet taken. Need for consensus of all involved including US. Ideas to be considered at European Council in June.
2. Need to bring in the Palestinians. Security Council resolution one possible means. Has the King any other ideas? What is his advice on timing?
3. Any possibility of Jordanian involvement in a renewed peace process?
4. Accept political importance of PLO, but problem of their acceptance of Israel's right to exist. Can Jordan help bring this home to them?

UK/Saudi Arabia

5. Grateful for Jordanian willingness to help. Preparing proposals to improve links with the media on both sides. Hope Ministerial statements (eg Lord Carrington's on 22 May) will improve atmosphere.

Afghanistan

6. Essential to keep pressure on the Soviet Union. Pleased Conference reiterated strong condemnation of Soviet presence and call for withdrawal. How does King see the outcome?

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. King Hussein is making a brief private visit to London, arriving on 28 May and leaving probably on 3 June, to attend a reunion of former students of Queen Victoria College in Alexandria. He also expects to spend one or two days in London in mid-June on his way to the United States having just accepted an invitation from President Carter to Washington on 16 and 17 June. He withdrew his acceptance of an earlier invitation to Washington in April when it turned out this would clash embarrassingly (for him) with the visits of President Sadat and Mr Begin. King Hussein was last here privately in January. A record of his conversation with the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington on that occasion is attached. (REMOVED AT REVIEW)

Arab/Israel

2. The King's views on the centrality of this issue have not changed. The failure of the autonomy talks to make real progress have done no more than confirm his judgement of Israeli intentions. With his failure at the Tunis summit last November to gain Arab approval of his own proposals for an alternative approach to Camp David (the details of which are not clear) he has continued to press for a European initiative. He sees the dangers of a vacuum over the next 6-8 months and the need for some contingency plan to pre-empt the Russians filling this vacuum. His preference remains for a UN resolution which would endorse Palestinian rights; if the Russians were not to sabotage any initiative some such forum which included them would have to be found. He told HM Ambassador last week that, in his view, the need for an EC initiative was consequently greater than ever. And he was intending when answering questions about his US visit (which will not be announced until next month) to reaffirm this view.

3. King Hussein remains deeply opposed to any Jordanian involvement in the peace process which could either be construed as

/acceptance

acceptance of Camp David or would cut across the PLO's role as representatives of the Palestinians. He has consistently said that, if Israel withdraws from the occupied territories, it would be for the Palestinians to decide what links, if any, they wished to have with Jordan.

4. The Jordanians have lobbied for effective Security Council action to ensure the return of the three West Bank leaders deported by Israel after the terrorist attack in Hebron. We have voted for both Security Council resolutions calling for the return of the three.

5. It is too early to judge the full implications of Mr Weizman's resignation as Israeli Defence Minister. Our preliminary view is that this is a coalition rather than Government crisis which Mr Begin should survive. But Mr Begin is already having difficulty in filling the vacant post. His preferred candidate yesterday was Mr Shamir but the Democratic Movement opposed the consequent proposed appointment of a liberal, Mr Moda'i, to the Foreign Ministry. Mr Sharon (Agriculture) has threatened to resign if he does not get the job. Another candidate mentioned is Moshe Arens (Chairman of the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee). All those mentioned are hardliners and with Mr Weizman's departure a relatively moderate voice in the Cabinet has gone. Although the occasion of his resignation was proposed new cuts in the Defence Budget his differences with Mr Begin over eg conduct of the autonomy talks and settlement policy in the West Bank go deeper. The Defence Minister is responsible for the Administration of the occupied territories.

Regional Security

6. King Hussein might be asked for his views on the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference at Islamabad. Jordanians had beforehand been pessimistic as to the outcome. They feared that attention might be concentrated on the abortive US rescue attempt in Iran at the expense of condemnation of the Soviet Union and had been lobbying

/for

for a moderate initiative to forestall attempts to this end by in particular Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO. While sympathetic to our proposals for a neutral Afghanistan the Jordanians have doubted whether the time was yet ripe for launching such an initiative with any hope of success.

UK/Saudi Arabia

7. The Jordanian Prime Minister told HM Ambassador in April that the Jordanians would do what they could to repair the damage done by 'Death of a Princess'. The Minister of State, Marwan Qasem, discussed it with Prince Saud when he visited Saudi Arabia with his Prime Minister in mid-April. Qasem reported that he had done his best to explain our difficulties in dealing with an independent media but that the Saudis flatly disbelieved that we could not have done more. King Hussein himself visited Saudi Arabia in late April. He reported that the Saudis said little on the subject apart from suggesting a conspiracy in Europe and the United States to defame the Saudi regime. He appears not to have pleaded our cause himself but commented that the Saudis had played their hand in such a way as to attract publicity for a film which was of little intrinsic worth.

8. The King also visited Iraq earlier this month and took the opportunity to suggest that Iraq normalise her relations with the US and put her relations with ourselves on a better footing. Saddam Hussein replied that in principle he was willing to do so, but that the time was not yet ripe. The King believes Saddam had in mind Iraq's forthcoming hosting of the Non-Aligned Conference.

King Hussein's visit to Moscow

9. Following reports in April that King Hussein was planning to visit Moscow in mid-May, the Americans asked for our support for their efforts to seek to persuade him to postpone his visit to a more propitious time and particularly to avoid a visit coinciding with the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference. HM Ambassador raised this with the Jordanian Prime Minister who confirmed that

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the King had been considering when to respond to a longstanding Soviet invitation and that limited purchases of Soviet military equipment were likely to be considered. HM Ambassador suggested that the visit might be postponed until at least later this year. The King's acceptance of the Soviet invitation has since been announced but no date fixed. The Russians have produced dates which conflict with the King's visit to the US in June and the King has regretted.

Military Cooperation with Jordan

10. The contract for the sale of 274 advanced Chieftain tanks was signed last November. The contract for the support package (spares, ammunition etc) was signed in April. The latter caused last minute problems. The Jordanian Armed Forces found that they had over-committed the Baghdad Funds available for arms purchases and asked for credit on the support package and, retrospectively, for an element of credit on the main tanks contract already concluded on cash terms. This we were able to agree (not without difficulty).

11. Following King Hussein's request to the Prime Minister last September for assistance in training the Jordanian Army the Director of the Military Assistance Office, General Fursdon, visited Jordan in January and produced a comprehensive report of the Army's training requirements. King Hussein is reported to be well pleased with the result and MOD are currently following up consequent Jordanian requests for specific training assistance.

12. A personality note on King Hussein is attached, with notes on Sharif Zeid Bin Shaker and the Jordanian Ambassador both of whom may accompany the King at this meeting.

1 HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, HM KING

King of Jordan since 11 August 1952.

Born Amman 1935. Educated Bishops School, Amman, Victoria College, Alexandria, Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952. He himself has survived unscathed many attempts on his life. Acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal, a schizophrenic. The major events of his reign have been: March 1956, dismissal of Glubb Pasha; 1956-58, a series of threats to his throne: Sulaiman Nabulsi's National Socialist Government, the Ali Abu Nuwar (qv) plot, and the overthrow and massacre of the Hashemites in Iraq; 1960, assassination of his Prime Minister, Hazza Majali; 1965, Prince Hassan proclaimed Crown Prince; 1963-7 period of considerable economic growth in Jordan; 1967, six-days war with Israel; 1970-1, civil war leading to the expulsion of the Fedayeen from Jordan; 1971, assassination of his Prime Minister, Wasfi al-Tell, in Cairo; 1972, announcement of plan for United Arab Kingdom (East and West Banks); 1973, October war with Israel; 1974, Rabat Conference ended King Hussein's isolation in the Arab world and opened the way for the establishment of his close personal understanding with President Asad. 1976, the Development Conference to launch Jordan's 5-year plan symbolised the recovery of the Hashemite Kingdom from the effects of the 6-days war and of the disorders which followed it.

In his early years King Hussein was often regarded as something of a playboy, but with the passage of time he has acquired a formidable skill in steering his small country through the treacherous currents of Middle East war and politics. He now appears to be wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and the Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck, he has shown the ability to take sensible decisions in times of crises.

At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and implicitly, therefore, renounced his claim to the West Bank. Nevertheless, moved as he is by a belief in the historic mission of the Hashemites, King Hussein has not in reality abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank if there is ever to be an Arab/Israel settlement.

By natural inclination, as well as a result of a conscious assessment of the best interests of the Hashemites, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has faltered in this general alignment only for brief periods, eg when reacting against the political tutelage of General Glubb, in his frustration over the catastrophic results of the 6-days war for Jordan, or when faced in 1976 with initial Western reluctance to supply Jordan with a suitable air defence system.

For most of his reign King Hussein has exercised a tight control over all major foreign and defence policy issues. He is less interested in economic questions and has devolved responsibility for planning in this field on Crown Prince Hassan. In pursuing his very personalised style of government King Hussein's biggest asset has been his very warm, friendly and outgoing personality. He has

to this to good effect in maintaining by personal contact the loyalty of the Armed Forces, the supreme importance of which he has always recognised.

In relation to Israel King Hussein recognises the futility of extreme policies. His willingness to contemplate full peace with Israel is genuine but his freedom of manoeuvre has always been limited by the need to keep in step with his Arab neighbours and to take account of the views of the Palestinian half of Jordan's population, and by his dependence on the United States' continued economic and military assistance. In the light of the re-armament of Israel since 1973 he recognises how far the Arabs have to go before they have a credible military option but he is well aware that Jordan could be compelled by circumstances to enter a further Arab/Israel war.

Despite the King's increasingly mature political judgement born of long experience, he remains essentially practical and non-intellectual in his approach to his country's problems. To his warm friendliness he adds an undoubted courage without which he could have hardly survived in the face of military defeat, the frequent hostility of his Arab neighbours and the resentment of his Palestinian subjects.

In his personal life the tragic death in a helicopter crash in 1977 of his third wife, Queen Alia, affected him more deeply than any of the other disasters to which he has been exposed in his reign. His marriage (in June 1978) to his fourth wife, Noor (née Elizabeth, or Lisa) Halaby, is nevertheless to all appearances one of genuine affection. It may also help to provide a stable family life for the King's two young children by Alia. Despite complaints at the King's choice of another non-Arab, non-Muslim girl to marry, the marriage has not attracted the considerable public criticism aroused by the King's wedding to Princess Muna. Shortly before the marriage the King announced that Prince Ali, his infant son by Alia, would become next in the line of succession to Prince Hassan, cutting out any sons of the King's fourth marriage as well as his two sons by Muna (and presumably any sons born to the Crown Prince and Princess Sarvath, who have young daughters). By this means King Hussein sought to avoid later argument and to strengthen the Hashemite throne for the future by underlining its pure Arab character.

King Hussein has recently suffered on more than one occasion from slight heart trouble. Provided, however, that he continues to be able to avoid assassination attempts and accidents and that his health remains good, there seems no reason short of an all-out Arab/Israel war with all the uncertainties that this would bring, why he should not remain King of Jordan for some time to come. For the time being his neighbours, other than Iraq, and his financial backers are likely to conclude that their interests will continue to be best served by the maintenance of the Hashemite regime in Jordan and by King Hussein remaining at the head of it.

10 ZEID BIN SHAKER, SHARIF, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

Commander-in-Chief, Jordan Armed Forces since January 1976.

Born Amman 4th September 1935, son of the Amir Shaker who migrated to Jordan with the late King Abdullah. Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and Sandhurst in 1954/55. Appointed ADC to the King after the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. Involved in the 1957 plot; posted as Assistant Military Attaché to London in April 1957. Recalled and dismissed from the army November 1957. Reinstated as a Captain in 1960. Attended the Long Armour Course in the United States in 1962. As a Major in 1963 he commanded First Armoured Infantry Regiment and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in the same appointment. In 1964 he attended the US Command and General Staff College and then took command of the important 60 Armoured Brigade. Given accelerated promotion to Colonel in November 1965 and appointed Military Assistant to the King. Acquitted himself well in the 1967 war. Promoted Brigadier July 1968 as Commander Royal Armoured Corps, and in late 1969 took command of 3 Armoured Division; as the 3rd was then Jordan's only Armoured Division this was a key appointment. He became unpopular with the Fedayeen, who suspected him of fomenting plots "to liquidate the revolution", and along with Sharif Nasser, was dismissed in June 1970. His eclipse did not last for long however, as in August 1970 he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) 1970-1972. He played a considerable part in the negotiations with the Fedayeen following the fighting in September 1970 and won grudging praise from some of them for his ability. Promoted to Major General in April 1971, appointed Chief of Staff, 5 March 1972, and promoted Lieutenant General in November 1974. Appointed Commander-in-Chief in January 1976.

Despite his chequered career and his lack of military field experience he is firmly established at the head of the Armed Forces where he has been either ACOS Operations, Chief of Staff or C-in-C since 1970. He mixes very little with the officers and soldiers and is therefore not well known by them. In February 1974, following the military disturbances at Zarqa, the discontented soldiery, whom he had let down, called for his replacement as Chief of Staff. At that time he was distrusted.

In the absence of any obvious successor he is likely to remain in his present position for some years yet. He is competent and has been responsible for many of the improvements in the Armed Forces since holding the top three posts in the Army.

He was married on 4 September 1957 to Miss Nawzad Sati who was at that time the niece of Dr Shawkat Sati, King Abdullah's doctor. Sharifa (Nawzad) Zeid is also the niece of Mr Iklil Sati (qv), a prominent Amman businessman and undeclared agent for Marconi.

He is goodlooking, ambitious, socially polished, and close to the King. He has considerable private means. He and his wife speak excellent English. He lives in a large and luxurious villa, paid for by the King, on the exclusive and heavily-guarded Hummar ridge outside Amman. His son, Shaker, (b. 1961) entered a Preparatory School at Seaford in 1972, and is now at Eastbourne College. He has a daughter Nesrine (b. 1959) who was at school in England and is now at Santa Clara University, USA.

51 IZZIDDIN, IBRAHIM

Ambassador to London.

Born 1934, Amman. A graduate of the American University of Beirut (BA Political Science). A career civil servant, he has filled a remarkably wide variety of posts in the public service, in the Ministry of Communications, the Prime Minister's office, the Department of Press and Publications, the Press Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alia, the then Ministry of Culture and Information, and the Royal Hashemite Diwan (Court) where he was Press Secretary to the King. Has served as Ambassador in Beme and Bonn before his present posting. He had a very good reputation with the Germans in Bonn and expresses the intention of keeping actively in touch with the FCO and more widely with moulders of opinion in London.

Married, but with no children. He is regarded as intelligent, honest and straightforward. His wife comes from a rich Circassian family. They are both friendly and enjoy Western social life. Reputedly keen on sports.

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*Briefing to follow
AJ 28.5*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 May 1980

Dear Michael,

Visit by King Hussein to London

King Hussein is proposing to visit London next week. The timing is not entirely certain but he is expecting to arrive on the afternoon of 28 May and stay here for about three or four days. He may also be passing through London for a day or two in mid-June on his way to the United States.

He has told HM Ambassador that he would warmly welcome the opportunity to meet the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington on one or other of these visits. The Prime Minister has had useful meetings with King Hussein on both his previous visits and the Secretary of State recommends that she should, if possible, see him on this occasion. In view of the uncertainty of the King's programme some time on 29 or 30 May would appear best.

Yours *ASV*

Paul


(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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27 MAY 1950

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Jordan

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24 January, 1980.

Call by King Hussein

I have sent you under a separate letter the main part of the record of yesterday's conversation between the Prime Minister and King Hussein. I enclose herewith a record of the exchanges on the possibility of our offering the Saudis help with counter-subversion. This is, clearly, of particular sensitivity.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 January, 1980.

Call by King Hussein

King Hussein of Jordan called on the Prime Minister yesterday evening. I enclose a copy of the record of their discussion. Given the sensitivity of much that was said, e.g., about the position in Saudi Arabia, I should be grateful if the record could be given a particularly limited distribution.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. OD. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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✓ Master Set
Saudi Arabia (Nov 79)
'Saudi/UK Relations.'

RECORD OF PART OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON WEDNESDAY 23 JANUARY
1980 AT 1630

Present:

The Prime Minister

King Hussein

The Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary

Mr. J.C. Moberly

Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

* * * * *

Saudi Arabia: Counter-Subversion

In the course of the discussion (recorded separately) about the situation in Saudi Arabia, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Saudi Arabia needed help in the sphere of counter-subversion. King Hussein said that there was little time left and what time there was should be used effectively. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the PDRY Government owed much of their stability to a very efficient East German who ran their intelligence service. If Prince Fahd were prepared to employ someone similar in Saudi Arabia to build up his intelligence machine, the situation in the country might be much improved. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister as to whether there was someone suitable in this country, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that even if there was not, one or other of the Western Governments could surely produce someone. He asked whether King Hussein would be prepared to put this suggestion to Prince Fahd. King Hussein said that he would do so.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether there was any organisation at present in existence. King Hussein said that there was and that the Saudis possessed a good deal of highly sophisticated equipment. The difficulty was that there was no-one who knew how to use it effectively or who was prepared to act on the information produced. For instance, he had been told that the Saudi Arabian authorities knew about the intention to occupy the Great Mosque in Mecca two months before the event but had failed to take any effective counter-action. Mr. Moberly said that a further

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problem would be to persuade the Saudi Government to accept an outsider. The Bahraini Government, for instance, already had someone performing the kind of role envisaged by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. But the Saudis were notoriously xenophobic. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that nonetheless it ought to be possible for them to accept one or two people. The Prime Minister said that she was reluctant to accept that nothing could be done. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that one thing that could be done would be to maintain the flow of intelligence reports about Soviet intentions which were being passed to the Saudi authorities. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that precautions would be taken to ensure that information passed to the Saudis did not fall into the wrong hands. Mr. Moberly said that action was in hand. The information would be passed through our Ambassador in Saudi Arabia.

Am.

23 January 1980

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from which they could operate throughout the region. (King Hussein described it as a wedge dividing the Muslim world in half.) If the Russian advance was to be contained certain things were necessary:

- (a) The Islamic reaction, which had been very good so far, must be sustained. It would not be enough for the Islamic Conference to meet at the weekend and to think it would suffice to issue a single condemnation. There had to be a continuing process in which outrage would be expressed and action taken;
- (b) Pressure from the non-aligned world would have to be sustained;
- (c) The dangers of Communist subversion would have to be brought home to the countries of the region, notably Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The leaders whom he had met on his recent tour of the area had a worrying tendency to accept that subversion happened in other countries but not in their own. Moreover, they tended to take a simplistic view of the threat and to under-estimate the sophisticated nature of subversion today. Saudi Arabia, for instance, was "ripe for plucking".

The Arab/Israel Problem

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he agreed with King Hussein about the threat to the unity of the region posed by the continuing failure to find a solution to the Arab/Israel problem. Everyone he had spoken to on his tour confirmed that this issue bedevilled everything. It affected the attitude of the countries in the region to each other and to the United States since they believed the United States was unwilling to use its muscle to force the Israeli Government to reach an agreement. The Camp David process was clearly going to prove inadequate in satisfying Arab opinion, still less that of the Palestinians. In a Presidential year American Administrations tended to have two Middle East policies: their real policy and that which was advanced for electoral purposes. It was important for other Western

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governments to bear this in mind ^{and} / to avoid undermining the position of the American Administration by reacting to the second policy. If they did so and if President Carter was re-elected, the willingness of his Administration to pursue a constructive policy in future would be undermined. On the other hand, if other governments did nothing, the position in the Middle East would deteriorate.

Against this background, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether King Hussein thought there would be any future in a European or British initiative in favour of a Security Council Resolution which:

- (a) recognised the rights of the Palestinians; and
- (b) involved recognition by the Palestinians of Israel's right to exist.

It would not be easy to produce such a Resolution because the spectrum of opinion within the European Community was so wide. It stretched from the French, who might be said to have a view not dissimilar from that of Iraq, to the Dutch who tended to support the Israelis. Nonetheless, perhaps the effort should be made. King Hussein said that it would be extremely helpful if one or more European Governments were able to get the process moving. He had tried a similar initiative himself in the autumn. But the decision of Arab Governments at Tunis has fallen far short of what he had hoped for. They had failed to evolve a united position. Commenting on the significance of the Arab/Israel issue for the region as a whole, King Hussein noted that it did not make it easy for him to respond quickly to appeals from President Carter for help in dealing with the Afghanistan situation or the situation in Iran. Jerusalem was also a matter which affected the emotions and beliefs of the people throughout the Arab world. As regards the hostages, one million Arabs had been living in occupied land since 1967.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that a European initiative would enable the governments concerned to maintain an appearance of active involvement in the region. This would be the more important since the Camp David process was likely to run into the sand in March or thereabouts. Mr. Moberly commented that the

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President might well attempt to extend the period of negotiation for electoral reasons but that there was no reason why there should not be negotiation on a European initiative going on in parallel with the Camp David process. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that neither Mr. Vance nor Mr. Brzezinski had ruled out the idea of a European initiative when he had mentioned it to them. The difficulty in getting anywhere would be that Israeli policy had become completely ossified.

Iraq and Syria

The Prime Minister asked about the situation in Iraq and Syria. King Hussein said that he was in close contact with the governments of both countries. The situation in Iraq was good at present. In Syria it was not. President Asad was facing difficulties there. He had reacted by adopting more radical, left-wing policies. Paradoxically, though pursuing an anti-Islamic course within Syria, he had succeeded in maintaining good relations with Ayatollah Khomeini.

Saudi Arabia

King Hussein said that he was deeply worried about the situation in Saudi Arabia. Shortly before the events in Mecca, Prince Abdullah had visited him in Amman and had asked for his views on the position in Saudi Arabia. He had been very frank in reply. He had told Prince Abdullah that the Saudi Arabian Royal Family was not playing its proper role in uniting the people or building up support for the Saudi Government in the country as a whole. Nor was it doing all it could in the Middle East generally to improve the chances of other governments to resist the threat to which they were exposed. He had criticised the Saudi Arabian Government's failure to support the Yemen Arab Republic. (On this point Prince Abdullah had replied that the Saudi Government had spent millions but had incurred only resentment. They wanted to strengthen the Yemen Arab Republic but were not afraid of the consequences of doing so.) King Hussein had criticised the blatancy of corruption in ^{Saudi} ruling circles. He had said that although the Muslim faith ought to be a source of strength to Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Government had allowed subversives to penetrate the country in the name of religion. The Soviet Union were known to be training people to do this.

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Paragraph deleted and closed, 40 years,
under a FOI Exemption.

Wayland

30 August 2011

The Prime Minister asked who were the most competent members of the Royal Family. King Hussein said that Prince Abdullah was a good man. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he had been favourably impressed by the Foreign Minister, Prince Saud. However, he was a young man and in the hierarchical atmosphere had to do what he was told. As regards the others, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said he had the impression that Prince Fahd was running the country but that he had deteriorated in recent months. He gave no signs of having a grip on the situation.

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Prince Sultan also seemed less effective than previously. King Hussein agreed. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked about Prince Saud. King Hussein said that he did not have much influence. Indeed, he had not long ago been on the verge of resigning because of his lack of access to the King and the Prime Minister.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the difficulty was to know how the outside world could intervene. He asked whether there was anyone else in the Arab world apart from King Hussein himself who could speak frankly to the Saudi Arabian Royal Family. The Prime Minister said it was clear that nothing would happen unless they could be spurred into action. It was no good having a Prime Minister who was cut off from his people and his advisers. The Government should be loved or feared rather than the object of indifference. Saudi Arabia was, after all, the key to the area. King Hussein wondered whether the Americans could not say something. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the difficulty for any Western intermediary was, in sum, that he was the wrong colour. It was not an easy thing for any outsider to tell the Government of Saudi Arabia that they should pull themselves together. The only person who could influence the Saudi Royal House was, in his view, King Hussein. King Hussein did not dissent.

Yemen

The Prime Minister expressed concern about the reports that the Government of the Yemen Arab Republic was turning to the Soviet Union for arms. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Saudi Government had played the hand poorly and that relations between the Saudi Government and the YAR had deteriorated. King Hussein confirmed that events in the Yemen were developing in an unfavourable direction and that this was the result of Saudi clumsiness. It was important for the West to deal directly with the Government of the YAR. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that this would have to be a task for the Americans. The last time they had worked through the Saudi Government. Unfortunately much of the equipment supplied had never been passed on to the Yemenis by the Saudis. The Prime Minister said that it was essential the situation should not be allowed to deteriorate further. If

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the two Yemeni states got together and fell further under Soviet influence, the whole of the free world would be placed at risk. King Hussein, agreeing, said that a united Yemen might well turn on Oman. He had recently told the Americans that they had to help the YAR. The Americans had indicated that they would be taking action soon. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary added that he had given the same message to Mr. Vance. Moreover, Congressman Solarz, who had recently visited Sana'a, took the same view as King Hussein and was also in touch with Mr. Vance.

Oman and The Gulf

Commenting on the situation in Oman, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he had the impression that there were too many white faces there. Sultan Qaboos had a bit of time in hand, but perhaps not a great deal. Some of the other Gulf Emirates seemed ripe for trouble. King Hussein agreed. Mr. Moberly commented on the absence so far of effective coördination among the Gulf States for their own defence. The Prime Minister said that if there were no improvement in the defences in the Gulf, the whole area was bound to become extremely vulnerable. She wondered whether, if the EEC/Gulf dialogue could be developed, it should not contain a security as well as an economic element. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he thought the dialogue would take time to gather momentum. Mr. Moberly said it would be important to work bilaterally with the States in question.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked King Hussein for his opinion as to whether US bases, about which Mr. Bartholomew was currently holding exploratory discussions, would be acceptable in the area. King Hussein said that would depend on progress on the Arab/Israel problem. If progress could be made, there would be no difficulty. The Arab world could assume its natural place as part of the free world. The Arab states could work together with the West gathering strength through proper planning for the future. The danger, however, was that there would be no progress on the Arab/Israel issue and that divisions within the Arab world would make cooperation impossible. If the Omanis gave the Americans a base in the absence of such progress, there might well be trouble. It might be less difficult for Oman to offer the Americans the

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prospect of facilities at a time of crisis. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he had had the impression during his recent visit that Sultan Qaboos would agree to facilities for the Americans. King Hussein repeated that he was sure that the Omanis would not give the Americans a base though they might offer them facilities. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary wondered whether an offer of facilities would not in the event be represented as an offer of a base.

Iran

King Hussein said that he, in common with many other Arab leaders, had been deeply angered by the taking of hostages in Iran. As he had already noted, the Iranian Government was acting in a way alien to Muslim traditions and their own interests. The Prime Minister said that the difficulty for the West in finding a solution was that the foreign policy considerations were not necessarily the same as those relating to the hostages. Events in Afghanistan had altered the situation completely. The problem was a terrible one for President Carter. HMG had been anxious to demonstrate their support lest the Americans, in the absence of such support, should adopt a more extreme course of action. But it was difficult now to know how to help. Iran must determine her own destiny: at present there seemed to be no rhyme or reason there. King Hussein, agreeing with the Prime Minister, said that everyone in the Middle East was confused about where to take their stand on the Iranian issue. The Prime Minister said that once the problem of the hostages had been resolved it would be possible for the Governments of the free world to unify their policy towards Iran and Afghanistan.

Oil

King Hussein said that another very serious problem in the area, which was of course connected with the situation in Iran, was that of the uncertainty in the oil market and the instability of oil prices. The Iranian crisis had driven up prices and he was now concerned about the consequences if the Soviet Union entered the oil market in a more substantial way. The Prime Minister agreed about the need for greater stability in oil prices. At present there was, in fact, a surplus in oil production. But purchases of oil for stock-piling purposes was driving up the price. If

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Iran were to break up, it might be impossible to re-establish stability in the oil market in the foreseeable future. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that he was ^{not} convinced that a number of oil producing states would ^{not} limit production if it became apparent later this year that there was a surplus.

Conclusion

King Hussein commented at the end of the discussion that he thought there was an awareness and an alertness in the Middle East to the crisis that faced the area. Governments realised that the identity and the future of their countries were at stake. There was a deep desire to address problems carefully. The Prime Minister said that the British Government, if asked, would do as much as they could to help. There would have to be a continuing process of coordination and action.

The discussion ended at 1740.

AmA
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23 January 1980

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Jordan



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 January 1980

Dear Michael,

CALL BY KING HUSSEIN ON THE PRIME MINISTER
ON 23 JANUARY

King Hussein is to call on the Prime Minister for tea on 23 January at 4.30 pm. Lord Carrington will also attend, together with John Moberly, if the Prime Minister agrees.

/ I enclose a brief for the occasion with personality notes on the King, the Minister of Court, and the Jordanian Ambassador (who can be expected to accompany him), and a copy of the record of the King's previous meeting with the Prime Minister in September.

Yours etc


Paul

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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22 JAN 1980



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CALL BY KING HUSSEIN ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 23 JANUARY

Points_to_Make

Regional_Stability

1. Grateful for King's assessment of the Soviet threat in the region particularly after recent visit to Gulf and Saudi Arabia.
2. Hope Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference on 26 January will clearly condemn Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Need for sustained and effective action with Islamic and regional countries taking a lead. Would Jordan be prepared to join a concerted boycott of Olympics ?
3. Hope conference will provide an opportunity for helping over US hostages in Tehran.

Arab/Israel

4. Understand why Arab reaction to Afghanistan complicated by lack of confidence in US peace efforts on the basis of Camp David agreements and agree on need for urgent progress towards a comprehensive settlement. But Afghanistan is the immediate problem and risk of Soviet mischief-making if Arabs seek to exploit Afghanistan to pressure Americans: US policy not going to change overnight, particularly in an election year.
5. Too soon to write off autonomy talks, but agree prospects poor. Not easy to see way forward but ready to weigh in at the right moment. Attracted by a new Security Council Resolution but Arabs seem divided. Would PLO accept a resolution reaffirming 242 supplemented by a paragraph on Palestinian rights ?

PL0_(Defensive)

6. Still await a commitment by them to a negotiated settlement. Can leadership deliver this ? Will not let political sensitivity of dealings with PLO stand in the way of peace efforts.

Sale_of_Tanks_and_Aircraft

7. Welcome signature of contracts for sale of tanks and Tristar aircraft. Neither without difficulty; glad to see successful

/resolution

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resolution of air services negotiations.

Rhodesia

8. Grateful for King's warm message of congratulations on success of Lancaster House talks.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. King Hussein arrived in London on 19 January and will stay for about ten days. This is a private visit to accompany his youngest daughter who acquires an urgent facial operation in London. Queen Noor who is pregnant was unable to accompany the child herself.

Regional Stability

2. Jordan voted for the General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan and was involved from an early stage in moves to set up the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference now arranged for 26 January. Just before coming to London the King visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. In the king's conversations with HM Ambassador both before and after this trip it has been clear that his reactions to Afghanistan are influenced by his continued suspicions of US intentions (he has expressed scepticism at America's 'discovery of Islam') and his almost total preoccupation with the Arab/Israel conflict. He says that while he does not underestimate the very grave dangers which the Soviet action represented for Arab countries he is concerned at how the Arabs would react if the United States were compelled to take military action against Iran. He sees the Palestinian problem as central; so long as it remains unresolved the area would be divided within itself and ill-placed to withstand the Soviet threat. Recent events therefore make it more rather than less urgent to make progress in the Middle East. The Islamic Foreign Ministers conference would have to deal with Arab/Israel as well as Afghanistan if it were to carry conviction.

3. The King told HM Ambassador that although he had detected an underlying nervousness the Gulf rulers were facing up to the situation better than he had expected. He had spoken frankly to

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the Sultan of Oman of the need to put his house in order and had found the Sultan confident. He was more concerned at the prospects of the Saudis putting their own house in order and saw signs of differences between King Khalid and Prince Fahd. He was also worried by continued strains between Saudi Arabia and YAR. The Yemenis recently resumed arms purchases from the Soviet Union. King Hussein would prefer the Saudis to match the offer, but their talks with the YAR Prime Minister in Riyadh seemed disappointing.

Arab/Israel

4. President Sadat and Mr Begin had a fourth summit meeting in Aswan from 7 - 10 January, intended to give the autonomy talks political direction. In the event, there was a wide measure of agreement over the dangers of Soviet influence in the wake of Afghanistan but no progress or understanding on autonomy. There was disagreement in particular over East Jerusalem, which President Sadat regards as part of the area to be granted autonomy, and Mr Begin as a non-negotiable part of Israel. Nevertheless President Sadat did not block measures to begin normalization of relations, as the treaty requires. He also revived the idea of implementing autonomy first in Gaza (which lacks the sensitivity of the West Bank for Israel) as a possible means of allowing further progress. The Israeli Government reaction is not yet clear, but they will not risk making concessions for Gaza which they would not be prepared to extend to the West Bank. The anti-Sadat Arabs are likely to regard the scheme as further evidence that President Sadat is betraying the Palestinians, particularly since Gaza was under Egyptian administration from 1948-67.

5. Following the summit, there was a further round of talks at working level. This resulted in public rejection by each side of

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the other's concept of autonomy. In particular the Israelis rejected the idea of legislative powers for the self-governing authority. This was inevitable at a certain stage, when the issues of substance were addressed, and the subsequent angry exchanges are unlikely to presage an imminent breakdown of the talks. The principal result is to increase the pressure on the Americans to put forward proposals of their own to try to bridge the gap. The Americans have been expecting this; their chief negotiator, Sol Linowitz, is visiting the area at the end of January, (he calls on Lord Carrington on 25 January). The Americans have indicated that they believe events in Afghanistan increase the need for progress soon on Palestinian autonomy. US views are much closer to Egypt's than to Israel's.

6. There is meanwhile no sign of Arab opposition to Sadat relenting. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt remain very poor. Nevertheless there are no new alternative Arab ideas with any wide measure of support. Most are vaguely in favour of action under UN auspices, but there is little sign of pressure to resume the Security Council debate on the Palestinian issue which was adjourned without a vote in August 1978. Jordan's advocacy of a new positive Arab strategy appeared to fall on deaf ears at the Tunis Summit last November. King Hussein looks to others, particularly Europe, for new efforts. The Arabs are aware of our general support for a new Security Council resolution which goes further than 242 in dealing with Palestinian political rights; but there is a gap between their view of what it should contain ie unequivocal endorsement of PLO demands, and our own, which is that while the Palestinian right to determine their own future in the context of a negotiated settlement could be included, 242 must be strongly reaffirmed and accepted by the PLO.

7. Developments in the occupied territories have tended to confirm Arab/Jordanian fears of Israeli intentions. Mr Begin's government are committed to intensify further the settlement process (despite lack of funds). There is also continuing talk in Israel of the desirability

of changing the legal status of the occupied territories.

New Jordanian Government

8. King Hussein appointed a new government on 19 December. The new Prime Minister Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, formerly Head of the Royal Court, has been the King's closest adviser for some years. He accompanied the King when he called on the Prime Minister in September. Such a change had been widely forecast; the previous government of Mudar Badran has served a record term of over 3 years. No fundamental change is apparent or expected in Jordan's external policies. The new government had however committed itself to a number of internal reforms; improved public participation in policy making, educational reform, more equal distribution of wealth, greater decentralisation of local government, elimination of corruption etc etc. These are areas in which the government has been criticised in the past and is clearly an attempt to ensure internal stability. The new Cabinet is younger and in many cases technically well qualified (it also includes the first woman minister in Jordan in charge of a new Ministry of Social Development) but sweeping change will be difficult to achieve.

Sale of Tanks and Military Training

9. The Prime Minister discussed these subjects with King Hussein at their meeting in September. Good progress has been made on both. The contract for sale of 274 Shir tanks to Jordan was signed on 28 November. The total value of this contract is £266 million. Negotiations for the sale of £100 - £150 million worth of support equipment spares and ammunition are now under way. On military training exploratory visits were exchanged late last year and the Director of Military Assistance Overseas, General Fursdon, is now in Jordan to advise on Jordanian requirements in greater detail. The new Jordanian government has committed itself to strengthening the armed forces. But no further Jordanian requests for substantial arms purchases are current and we believe they will wish to digest the tanks

purchase first before possibly approaching us for further supplies.

Aircraft Sales

10. A contract for the sale of 5 Tristar aircraft powered by Rolls Royce RB 211 engines was also signed on 21 December. The Jordanians attach importance to the provision in the contract for the establishment of a central servicing facility for Rolls Royce engines in Amman. The Jordanians linked this contact with successful renegotiation of air service arrangements. Their original demands were excessive and it was only with considerable difficulty that agreement was reached whereby passenger capacity would be increased by mutual agreement as increased traffic generated by fare reductions justified it.

Rhodesia

11. The King sent a warm message of congratulations to the Prime Minister on the conclusion of the Lancaster House negotiations (copy attached). The Prime Minister will wish to take this opportunity to thank the King.

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201407Z DEC 79

00 IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 513 OF 23 DEC 79

T175/797

FOR RESIDENT CLERK

1. THE HEAD OF THE ROYAL COURT TODAY GIVES ME THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

WE WERE DEEPLY GRATIFIED TO HEAR OF THE REMARKABLE BREAKTHROUGH IN THE PEACE TALKS ON THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA PROBLEM.

YOUR PERSISTENCE, REMARKABLE STATESMANSHIP, AND DEEP COMMITMENT TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WERE DECISIVE FACTORS IN BRINGING ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

WE SINCERELY HOPE THE PARTIES CONCERNED WOULD ADHERE TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE TO ENABLE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO LEGALITY AND EVENTUAL INDEPENDENCE WHICH THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA COULD ACCEPT.

WE ALSO HOPE YOUR ENERGIES WOULD CONTINUE IN THE SAME SPIRIT TO HELP BRING ABOUT PEACE TO OTHER TROUBLED AREAS OF THE WORLD ESPECIALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IS URGENTLY NEEDED NOT ONLY BY THE PEOPLE OF THE AREA BUT THE WORLD OVER.

WITH MY BEST WISHES AND REGARDS.

MOST SINCERELY

YOUR FRIEND

HUSSEIN

1. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY NEXT DAG.

HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, HM KING

King of Jordan since 11 August 1952.

Born Amman 1935. Educated Bishops School, Amman, Victoria College, Alexandria, Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952. He himself has survived unscathed many attempts on his life. Acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal, a schizophrenic. The major events of his reign have been: March 1956, dismissal of Glubb Pasha; 1956-58, a series of threats to his throne: Sulaiman Nabulsi's National Socialist Government, the Ali Abu Nuwar (qv) plot, and the overthrow and massacre of the Hashemites in Iraq; 1960, assassination of his Prime Minister, Hazza Majali; 1965, Prince Hassan proclaimed Crown Prince; 1963-7 period of considerable economic growth in Jordan; 1967, six-days war with Israel; 1970-1, civil war leading to the expulsion of the Fedayeen from Jordan; 1971, assassination of his Prime Minister, Wasfi al-Tell, in Cairo; 1972, announcement of plan for United Arab Kingdom (East and West Banks); 1973, October war with Israel; 1974, Rabat Conference ended King Hussein's isolation in the Arab world and opened the way for the establishment of his close personal understanding with President Asad. 1976, the Development Conference to launch Jordan's 5-year plan symbolised the recovery of the Hashemite Kingdom from the effects of the 6-days war and of the disorders which followed it.

In his early years King Hussein was often regarded as something of a playboy, but with the passage of time he has acquired a formidable skill in steering his small country through the treacherous currents of Middle East war and politics. He now appears to be wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and the Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck, he has shown the ability to take sensible decisions in times of crises.

At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and implicitly, therefore, renounced his claim to the West Bank. Nevertheless, moved as he is by a belief in the historic mission of the Hashemites, King Hussein has not in reality abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank if there is ever to be an Arab/Israel settlement.

By natural inclination, as well as a result of a conscious assessment of the best interests of the Hashemites, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has faltered in this general alignment only for brief periods, eg when reacting against the political tutelage of General Glubb, in his frustration over the catastrophic results of the 6-days war for Jordan, or when faced in 1976 with initial Western reluctance to supply Jordan with a suitable air defence system.

For most of his reign King Hussein has exercised a tight control over all major foreign and defence policy issues. He is less interested in economic questions and has devolved responsibility for planning in this field on Crown Prince Hassan. In pursuing his very personalised style of government King Hussein's biggest asset has been his very warm, friendly and outgoing personality. He has

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used this to good effect in maintaining by personal contact the loyalty of the Armed Forces, the supreme importance of which he has always recognised.

In relation to Israel King Hussein recognises the futility of extreme policies. His willingness to contemplate full peace with Israel is genuine but his freedom of manoeuvre has always been limited by the need to keep in step with his Arab neighbours and to take account of the views of the Palestinian half of Jordan's population, and by his dependence on the United States' continued economic and military assistance. In the light of the re-armament of Israel since 1973 he recognises how far the Arabs have to go before they have a credible military option but he is well aware that Jordan could be compelled by circumstances to enter a further Arab/Israel war.

Despite the King's increasingly mature political judgement born of long experience, he remains essentially practical and non-intellectual in his approach to his country's problems. To his warm friendliness he adds an undoubted courage without which he could have hardly survived in the face of military defeat, the frequent hostility of his Arab neighbours and the resentment of his Palestinian subjects.

In his personal life the tragic death in a helicopter crash in 1977 of his third wife, Queen Alia, affected him more deeply than any of the other disasters to which he has been exposed in his reign. His marriage (in June 1978) to his fourth wife, Noor (née Elizabeth, or Lisa) Halaby, is nevertheless to all appearances one of genuine affection. It may also help to provide a stable family life for the King's two young children by Alia. Despite complaints at the King's choice of another non-Arab, non-Muslim girl to marry, the marriage has not attracted the considerable public criticism aroused by the King's wedding to Princess Muna. Shortly before the marriage the King announced that Prince Ali, his infant son by Alia, would become next in the line of succession to Prince Hassan, cutting out any sons of the King's fourth marriage as well as his two sons by Muna (and presumably any sons born to the Crown Prince and Princess Sarvath, who have young daughters). By this means King Hussein sought to avoid later argument and to strengthen the Hashemite throne for the future by underlining its pure Arab character.

King Hussein has recently suffered on more than one occasion from slight heart trouble. Provided, however, that he continues to be able to avoid assassination attempts and accidents and that his health remains good, there seems no reason short of an all-out Arab/Israel war with all the uncertainties that this would bring, why he should not remain King of Jordan for some time to come. For the time being his neighbours, other than Iraq, and his financial backers are likely to conclude that their interests will continue to be best served by the maintenance of the Hashemite regime in Jordan and by King Hussein remaining at the head of it.

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58 ● HAMMASH, AMER, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL (RETD)

● Court Minister since 1976.

Born 1924 at Salt of a family of Turkish origin previously settled in Nablus for many years. No formal education after the age of 18. An original member of the Arab Legion Artillery. ADC to several different Prime Ministers 1955-7; Commander, Royal Jordanian Artillery 1957-62; Director of Planning and Organisation, JAA 1962-5; Chief of Staff, promoted Major-General 1965; promoted Lt-General 1968; removed from his position when Sharif Nasser (qv) became Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; Minister of Defence and Transport for a short period, after which he retired from public life, to re-emerge in 1972 as King Hussein's Special Adviser on Gulf affairs. He also held a watching brief for the King on purchase and sales of military equipment.

Although Khammash has described himself as "only a simple soldier", he is in fact one of the best brains in Jordan, well able to handle a complex of military, economic, commercial, technological, political and diplomatic problems. In the period 1967-9 he was one of the three key men upon whom the security of the King and of Jordan depended. His recent job involved him in frequent visits, as the King's personal emissary, to Oman, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where he handled such subjects as Jordanian military assistance to the Gulf States and since his appointment as Court Minister, he has continued to undertake such missions, as well as fulfilling the other tasks that go with the job. He favours continued Jordanian alignment with the West, and has a deep personal affinity for Britain, though he does not allow this to cloud his view of where Jordan's best interests lie.

In conversation he prefers the light touch even when seriously discussing important subjects, though he has little time for people not properly informed on the details of the subject under discussion. He has no hobbies outside his work, though he is an avid newspaper reader. Speaks excellent English. Married. Two sons and one daughter, of whom the elder boy (expelled from Wellington) and the daughter are being educated in the UK.

IZZIDDIN, IBRAHIM

Ambassador to London.

Born 1934, Amman. A graduate of the American University of Beirut (BA Political Science). A career civil servant, he has filled a remarkably wide variety of posts in the public service, in the Ministry of Communications, the Prime Minister's office, the Department of Press and Publications, the Press Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alia, the then Ministry of Culture and Information, and the Royal Hashemite Diwan (Court) where he was Press Secretary to the King. Has served as Ambassador in Berne and Bonn before his present posting. He had a very good reputation with the Germans in Bonn and expresses the intention of keeping actively in touch with the FCO and more widely with moulders of opinion in London.

Married, but with no children. He is regarded as intelligent, honest and straightforward. His wife comes from a rich Circassian family. They are both friendly and enjoy Western social life. Reputedly keen on sports.

52 JOUDEH, DR SAMI

Businessman.

Born near Ramallah (West Bank) about 1930. Educated in the USA; PhD in International Relations.

He started as a civil servant in the Department of Civil Aviation. He entered parliament and has been Minister of National Economy. In 1973 he joined the Jordan Economic Development Trading Co. as a partner. The other partner is Khaled Rifai (his brother-in-law; his wife is a step-sister of Zeid al-Rifa'i; qv).

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Mr Tenthams (NEV40)

EE PS

PS/CPJ

S. J. M. Howard

PS/PJS

Mr Burtwell

20 September 1979

J. M. Moberly

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Dear Paul,

*The Tenthams
for call. i
18/9/79*

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

King Hussein of Jordan called on the Prime Minister at 1800 this evening as planned. I enclose a copy of the record of the discussion.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN
JORDAN AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1800 HOURS

Present:

Prime Minister .

Mr. J.C. Moberly

Mr. Michael Alexander

King Hussein of Jordan

Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf

Sherif Zeid bin Shaker

H.E. Ibrahim Izziddin

* * * * *

The Middle East Situation

King Hussein said that he thought there was a growing understanding of the need to take another look at the situation in the Middle East. The Camp David process had reached the limits of its possibilities. Mr. Strauss would get no further. Egypt had already exceeded all the limits of what might have been expected. The prestige of the United States had suffered greatly. What was required was a different approach. It would need to involve other nations and the Palestinians themselves. In this way a means of extricating the United States from its present position might be found. The Jordanian Government was in direct touch with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).

The Prime Minister asked whether there were any signs that the PLO were prepared to place less reliance on terrorism and more on negotiation. She was one of those who recoiled somewhat from the idea that the PLO should be accepted as the sole representative of the Palestinians. Were there no spokesmen who were not terrorists? King Hussein said that he had been trying to distance the PLO from some Arab states and also to make them more representative of the Palestinians as a whole. He had recently been pleasantly surprised by the attitude being adopted by the PLO. Their approach was more mature than in the past. They had raised specific issues with him, particularly in relation to the future relationship between a West Bank controlled by the Palestinians and Jordan. King Hussein said that he was unwilling to take the lead in the discussion of future options. He was for Palestinian self-determination. Whatever the Palestinians decided the Jordanian Government would accept. He was

CONFIDENTIAL / was very ready

was very ready to pursue the dialogue with the Palestinians and had told them he awaited their proposals about the future. Mr. Arafat had said the previous day that he intended to resume discussion of this subject as soon as King Hussein returned from the General Assembly. The Prime Minister asked whether King Hussein would accept a loose federal relationship between the West Bank and Jordan. King Hussein said that the relationship would certainly pose problems for Jordan but that his people felt very close to the Palestinians. They had a duty to them, as members of one family, to aid them in seeking the recovery of their land. Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf said that the Jordanian Government was willing to consider any relationship with whatever entity resulted from the free choice of the Palestinian people. The King was prepared to give this message to everyone.

The Prime Minister asked how progress could be made in the immediate future. King Hussein said that he was trying to formulate the new Arab position. He hoped that a cross-section of Arab representatives would soon be able to discuss together how far Resolution 242 was still valid; what changes should be made in it; and what principles a new settlement should incorporate. He thought this work could be done reasonably quickly. He intended to bring forward in New York the outline of a new Resolution or at least the principles on which it might be based. He did not wish to push ahead too rapidly. Indeed, he had been urging on the PLO for some time the need to go slowly in order to avoid a confrontation with the United States and a possible veto on a Resolution incorporating moderate Arab views. The Prime Minister agreed about the need not to make matters too difficult for the United States.

The Prime Minister asked whether the PLO still had difficulty in recognising publicly the right of Israel to exist. King Hussein said that there had to be a balanced approach to the problem. On the one side the Israelis had to recognise the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and agree to withdraw from the occupied territories; on the other side, the Palestinians would have to recognise the right of Israel to exist. Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf said that King Hussein had been focussing on moderating the position of the PLO. The Palestinians had for many years asserted their rights to all the territory of Israel. The acceptance of an Israeli

state, eg through an amended Resolution 242, presented major psychological and political difficulties for them. However, they were moving in that direction. So was Arab opinion in general as could be seen by the contrast between the present position and that at the time of the rejectionist Arab summit a year ago.

Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf went on to say that there was, however, another side to the question where European Governments, and in particular the United Kingdom, could help. The necessity for Israel to accept the right of the Palestinians to self-determination had not been sufficiently stressed. If Western Governments did not try now to break the deadlock there was a risk that the opportunity would be lost. The present powerlessness of the United States increased the significance of Europe's position. The United Kingdom had been lagging behind some of its partners. If the United Kingdom were to push in the direction of a more explicit recognition of Palestinian rights and of the need for Israel to move, this would be of great assistance. If Israel came to realise that the position of her principal supporters in Western Europe and North America was shifting, this would make an enormous difference.

The Prime Minister said that she had told Mr. Begin during his visit to London that political autonomy on the West Bank was meaningless unless it meant autonomy over the territory as well. However, it was very hard for the Israelis, after generations of suspicion, to adjust to a new situation. It was difficult for them to believe that the Arabs genuinely accepted their right to exist. But a stable solution to the problems of the Middle East was of the greatest importance both for the West and for Israel itself. Jordan's doubts about the Camp David process appeared to have been justified and another approach might have to be found. If there were to be mutual assurances about self-determination for the Palestinians and Israel's right to exist they would have to be given simultaneously.

The Prime Minister asked King Hussein about the American position and his Government's contacts with the United States. King Hussein said that, as a result of Camp David, the United States was no longer able to play its proper role in the Middle East.

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- 4 -

Their political and material commitment to Israel was too great to enable them to be neutral. It would be a service to them to find a new approach. Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf said that the Jordanian Government had been promised by President Johnson that the United States would throw its weight behind the implementation of Resolution 242 but nothing had happened. They were now therefore less interested in formulations than in intentions. What was needed were binding commitments. Recent contacts between the United States and Jordan had been difficult and unsatisfactory. There had been a good deal of confusion.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Jordanian Government had given any thought to the details of the self-determination process. What question would be put to the Palestinians; would the process be in one or more stages? Many Western Governments would, for instance, be happier if they knew that the results of self-determination would be a federal relationship between the Palestinian West Bank and Jordan. King Hussein said that this would be a question for negotiation. The Jordanians had written a paper on the subject. They had discussed this with the United States before Camp David. They had come to the conclusion that there were dangers in being too specific. The King did not dissent when the Prime Minister said that she had the impression the Jordanian Government were thinking in terms of a two-stage process ie agreement on withdrawal and self-determination followed by a decision about the nature of the Palestinian administration. Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf said that agreement on the basic issue would create a new climate. But he said that if Jordan were to be asked to take responsibility for the Palestinians, Jordan would need to be strengthened. He did not see any difficulty, however, in principle about developing a programme to absorb the Arab labour at present being employed on Israeli construction projects.

Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf concluded the discussion of the Middle East problem by reiterating that Jordan hoped for the help of the United Kingdom in pushing for an alternative approach to the problem. This approach should have concern for the Palestinians at its heart. The PLO had agreed not to force the issue. They were willing to accept co-existence with Israel but now they wanted to know what to do next. A special effort was needed.

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Tanks

The Prime Minister referred to the discussion which Sherif Zeid bin Shaker would be having at the Ministry of Defence the following day about the sale of British tanks to Jordan. She said she was anxious to see the negotiation successfully completed. HMG were prepared to supply the tanks at cost price. The Prime Minister said she was advised that an agreement could be concluded. It was her wish that it should be concluded. She wished to see the historic ties between the United Kingdom and Jordan in this field restored. She intended to ask later the next day about the progress that had been made. Sherif Zeid bin Shaker said that he hoped it would prove possible to complete the negotiations at his meeting.

He said that his Government were also looking for political agreement on the despatch of a number of British training missions to Jordan. He envisaged the training teams spending six months to a year in Jordan. The details could be worked out after the decision of principle had been taken. The Prime Minister said she favoured the idea and would take an interest in the progress of the discussions about it.

The discussion ended at 1910.

Handwritten initials

20 September 1979

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B/F 22.1.80.

Jar
Jordan

18 January 1980

Dear Mr. Pringle,

Further to my conversation with you this afternoon, I am writing to confirm that King Hussein is paying a call on the Prime Minister at 1630 hours on Wednesday, 23 January and he will be accompanied by the Foreign Secretary. Could you please send us a brief to reach us not later than Tuesday, 22 January.

Yours sincerely,

Jar

pp

CAROLINE STEPHENS

R.E. Pringle, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



WITH
THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE
PRIVATE SECRETARY

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, WHITEHALL

LONDON, S.W.1A 2HB

Jordan

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Prime Minister:

I have told the FCO, that I thought you would be prepared to see King Hussein if he comes to London (as he probably will) & if mutually convenient dates can be found.

Need not

Am

GR 70
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FM MUSCAT 111300Z JANUARY 1980
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 26 OF 11 JANUARY
AND TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
INFO ANKARA JEDDA ISLAMABAD NEW DELHI WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO
UKMIS NEW YORK BONN PARIS AND SANAA.

YOUR TELNO 14 TO FCO: POSSIBLE MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN.

1. I SHALL BE HAPPY TO CALL ON KING HUSSEIN ON MY WAY BACK FROM DELHI. ON PRESENT PLANS I COULD ARRIVE IN AMMAN AT APPROXIMATELY 1300 HOURS LOCAL ON 18 JANUARY AND REMAIN FOR A COUPLE OF HOURS. WOULD HM AMBASSADOR AMMAN PLEASE FIND OUT WHETHER THIS WOULD BE CONVENIENT FOR THE KING. IF IT IS NOT, I SHALL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO CALL ON HIM WHEN HE IS IN LONDON.

LUCAS

ms

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Jordan



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-93XXXXX 218 2111/3

CONFIDENTIAL

MO 26/9/19

27th September 1979

for Pym 29/9

Dear Wilson,

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 21st September recording the Lord Chancellor's comments on my Secretary of State's minute to the Prime Minister of 20th September.

I have shown Mr Pym your letter. He has asked me to let you know that, as regards the price for the tanks, this has been negotiated as the best that it has been possible to obtain in the face of stiff competition from America and Russia for the contract; it has in fact been possible to reduce our price by incorporating redundant material from the earlier contract repudiated by the Iranian Government. ECGD cover is being provided since Jordan is now considered a better risk than previously since funds are being made available to King Hussein by the Baghdad summit Arab States.

As to the potential use of the tanks, the Lord Chancellor will recall that when OD considered the sale the Committee did so in the light of an intelligence assessment that while the tanks would improve Arab

/ capability ...

W Arnold Esq.,
Lord Chancellor's Office

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2

capability they could not do so to an extent to threaten Israel's superiority during the next five years. OD therefore concluded that the benefits of the sale outweighed the possible political objections to sale to a confrontation State.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to the Secretaries of State for Industry and for Employment; and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,
Brian Norbury*

(B M NORBURY)

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28 SEP 1979



FROM THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



Jordan
HOUSE OF LORDS,
SW1A 0PW

Your ref MO 26/9/19

21 September 1979

Dear Brian,

Lg. Pmt

King Hussein's call on the Prime Minister

The Lord Chancellor has seen your Secretary of State's minute to the Prime Minister of 20 September. He has commented as follows:-

"I hope the arrangements for payment will be adequate, as well for certainty as to price. I hope also that these tanks will not be used for a war against Israel".

Copies of this letter go to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to the Secretaries of State for Industry and Employment and to Sir John Hunt.


Your sincerely,

William Arnold

W ARNOLD

Brian Norbury Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
London S W 1

25 SEP 1979



CONFIDENTIAL



of Defence: take of
5402 tanks to Jordan may 79
File Top
Jordan

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 September 1979

Ken Binn,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

You wrote to me earlier today giving an amended line for the Prime Minister to use with King Hussein in respect of the possible sale of British tanks to Jordan.

The Prime Minister raised the question with King Hussein. I enclose a copy of the relevant extract from the record.

The Prime Minister was inclined to think that even the revised line contained in your letter displayed too much reluctance on our part. She has asked me to ensure that the Defence Secretary is aware of her wish that the deal should be concluded. She does not agree that the question of the application of cost escalation to down payments should be allowed to cause difficulties.

The Prime Minister also hopes that we will be able to respond favourably to the request made by the Jordanian Commander-in-Chief for assistance in training the Jordanian armed forces.

I am sending copies of this letter to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

Sp

B.M. Norbury, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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File



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 September 1979

Dear Paul,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

King Hussein of Jordan called on the Prime Minister at 1800 this evening as planned. I enclose a copy of the record of the discussion.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

gc.

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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de Mater.
Defense: May 79 Sale
of SMIC transfer to Jordan
Middle East Situation
May 79

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN
OF JORDAN AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1800 HOURS

Present:

Prime Minister	King Hussein of Jordan
Mr. J.C. Moberly	Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf
Mr. Michael Alexander	Sherif Zeid bin Shaker
	H.E. Ibrahim Izziddin

* * * * *

The Middle East Situation

King Hussein said that he thought there was a growing understanding of the need to take another look at the situation in the Middle East. The Camp David process had reached the limits of its possibilities. Mr. Strauss would get no further. Egypt had already exceeded all the limits of what might have been expected. The prestige of the United States had suffered greatly. What was required was a different approach. It would need to involve other nations and the Palestinians themselves. In this way a means of extricating the United States from its present position might be found. The Jordanian Government was in direct touch with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).

The Prime Minister asked whether there were any signs that the PLO were prepared to place less reliance on terrorism and more on negotiation. She was one of those who recoiled somewhat from the idea that the PLO should be accepted as the sole representative of the Palestinians. Were there no spokesmen who were not terrorists? King Hussein said that he had been trying to distance the PLO from some Arab states and also to make them more representative of the Palestinians as a whole. He had recently been pleasantly surprised by the attitude being adopted by the PLO. Their approach was more mature than in the past. They had raised specific issues with him, particularly in relation to the future relationship between a West Bank controlled by the Palestinians and Jordan. King Hussein said that he was unwilling to take the lead in the discussion of future options. He was for Palestinian self-determination. Whatever the Palestinians decided the Jordanian Government would accept. He was

CONFIDENTIAL / was very ready

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- 2 -

was very ready to pursue the dialogue with the Palestinians and had told them he awaited their proposals about the future. Mr. Arafat had said the previous day that he intended to resume discussion of this subject as soon as King Hussein returned from the General Assembly. The Prime Minister asked whether King Hussein would accept a loose federal relationship between the West Bank and Jordan. King Hussein said that the relationship would certainly pose problems for Jordan but that his people felt very close to the Palestinians. They had a duty to them, as members of one family, to aid them in seeking the recovery of their land. Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf said that the Jordanian Government was willing to consider any relationship with whatever entity resulted from the free choice of the Palestinian people. The King was prepared to give this message to everyone.

The Prime Minister asked how progress could be made in the immediate future. King Hussein said that he was trying to formulate the new Arab position. He hoped that a cross-section of Arab representatives would soon be able to discuss together how far Resolution 242 was still valid; what changes should be made in it; and what principles a new settlement should incorporate. He thought this work could be done reasonably quickly. He intended to bring forward in New York the outline of a new Resolution or at least the principles on which it might be based. He did not wish to push ahead too rapidly. Indeed, he had been urging on the PLO for some time the need to go slowly in order to avoid a confrontation with the United States and a possible veto on a Resolution incorporating moderate Arab views. The Prime Minister agreed about the need not to make matters too difficult for the United States.

The Prime Minister asked whether the PLO still had difficulty in recognising publicly the right of Israel to exist. King Hussein said that there had to be a balanced approach to the problem. On the one side the Israelis had to recognise the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and agree to withdraw from the occupied territories; on the other side, the Palestinians would have to recognise the right of Israel to exist. Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf said that King Hussein had been focussing on moderating the position of the PLO. The Palestinians had for many years asserted their rights to all the territory of Israel. The acceptance of an Israeli

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state, eg through an amended Resolution 242, presented major psychological and political difficulties for them. However, they were moving in that direction. So was Arab opinion in general as could be seen by the contrast between the present position and that at the time of the rejectionist Arab summit a year ago.

Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf went on to say that there was, however, another side to the question where European Governments, and in particular the United Kingdom, could help. The necessity for Israel to accept the right of the Palestinians to self-determination had not been sufficiently stressed. If Western Governments did not try now to break the deadlock there was a risk that the opportunity would be lost. The present powerlessness of the United States increased the significance of Europe's position. The United Kingdom had been lagging behind some of its partners. If the United Kingdom were to push in the direction of a more explicit recognition of Palestinian rights and of the need for Israel to move, this would be of great assistance. If Israel came to realise that the position of her principal supporters in Western Europe and North America was shifting, this would make an enormous difference.

The Prime Minister said that she had told Mr. Begin during his visit to London that political autonomy on the West Bank was meaningless unless it meant autonomy over the territory as well. However, it was very hard for the Israelis, after generations of suspicion, to adjust to a new situation. It was difficult for them to believe that the Arabs genuinely accepted their right to exist. But a stable solution to the problems of the Middle East was of the greatest importance both for the West and for Israel itself. Jordan's doubts about the Camp David process appeared to have been justified and another approach might have to be found. If there were to be mutual assurances about self-determination for the Palestinians and Israel's right to exist they would have to be given simultaneously.

The Prime Minister asked King Hussein about the American position and his Government's contacts with the United States. King Hussein said that, as a result of Camp David, the United States was no longer able to play its proper role in the Middle East.

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- 4 -

Their political and material commitment to Israel was too great to enable them to be neutral. It would be a service to them to find a new approach. Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf said that the Jordanian Government had been promised by President Johnson that the United States would throw its weight behind the implementation of Resolution 242 but nothing had happened. They were now therefore less interested in formulations than in intentions. What was needed were binding commitments. Recent contacts between the United States and Jordan had been difficult and unsatisfactory. There had been a good deal of confusion.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Jordanian Government had given any thought to the details of the self-determination process. What question would be put to the Palestinians; would the process be in one or more stages? Many Western Governments would, for instance, be happier if they knew that the results of self-determination would be a federal relationship between the Palestinian West Bank and Jordan. King Hussein said that this would be a question for negotiation. The Jordanians had written a paper on the subject. They had discussed this with the United States before Camp David. They had come to the conclusion that there were dangers in being too specific. The King did not dissent when the Prime Minister said that she had the impression the Jordanian Government were thinking in terms of a two-stage process ie agreement on withdrawal and self-determination followed by a decision about the nature of the Palestinian administration. Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf said that agreement on the basic issue would create a new climate. But he said that if Jordan were to be asked to take responsibility for the Palestinians, Jordan would need to be strengthened. He did not see any difficulty, however, in principle about developing a programme to absorb the Arab labour at present being employed on Israeli construction projects.

Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf concluded the discussion of the Middle East problem by reiterating that Jordan hoped for the help of the United Kingdom in pushing for an alternative approach to the problem. This approach should have concern for the Palestinians at its heart. The PLO had agreed not to force the issue. They were willing to accept co-existence with Israel but now they wanted to know what to do next. A special effort was needed.

CONFIDENTIAL / Tanks

Tanks

The Prime Minister referred to the discussion which Sherif Zeid bin Shaker would be having at the Ministry of Defence the following day about the sale of British tanks to Jordan. She said she was anxious to see the negotiation successfully completed. HMG were prepared to supply the tanks at cost price. The Prime Minister said she was advised that an agreement could be concluded. It was her wish that it should be concluded. She wished to see the historic ties between the United Kingdom and Jordan in this field restored. She intended to ask later the next day about the progress that had been made. Sherif Zeid bin Shaker said that he hoped it would prove possible to complete the negotiations at his meeting.

He said that his Government were also looking for political agreement on the despatch of a number of British training missions to Jordan. He envisaged the training teams spending six months to a year in Jordan. The details could be worked out after the decision of principle had been taken. The Prime Minister said she favoured the idea and would take an interest in the progress of the discussions about it.

The discussion ended at 1910.

Handwritten signature

20 September 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

*cc. Defence May 79
Sale of SHIR tanks to
Jordan*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-930 7022

CONFIDENTIAL

20th September 1979

MO 26/9/19

for Pym 20/9

Dear Michael,

KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE
PRIME MINISTER

You told me this morning that the Prime Minister wished to take a more forthcoming line with King Hussein in respect of the possible sale of tanks to Jordan than was envisaged in the brief sent you by Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) under cover of his letter of 19th September. We have now secured a copy of Paul's letter; and I have consulted my Secretary of State.

Mr Pym strongly supports the Prime Minister's desire to be as positive as possible with King Hussein; and I attach a revised line to take which has been agreed between FCO and MOD officials accordingly. You will note that the Prime Minister is now being advised to express HMG's willingness to conclude a deal provided that we are not asked for further concessions on price, and to seek the King's agreement to further negotiations to re-arrange the proposed financial package in a form more acceptable to Jordan, and still acceptable to us in terms of the eventual financial return.

Mr Pym has asked me to add that in his view this is an important deal that could show substantial long term

/ profits ...

M O'D B Alexander Esq.,
10 Downing Street

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profits. This sale presents the first opportunity for many years to get a commercial foothold in Jordan, with all the advantages that could give us, and while there remain a number of problems to be resolved, Mr Pym believes that we have the basis of a deal on the price and conditions under discussion.

Mr Pym would propose to speak in similar terms to the Jordanian Commander in Chief when the latter calls on him tomorrow morning; I should accordingly be most grateful for urgent advice on the outcome of the Prime Minister's discussion with King Hussein.

I am sending copies of this letter to Paul Lever (FCO); the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD, and to the Private Secretaries of the Secretaries of State for Industry and Employment; and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincere
Boris Norbury*

(B M NORBURY)

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KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER
ON 20TH SEPTEMBER

Points to Make

Tanks

I assure you that we have every intention of concluding the sale of these 274 Shir I tanks to you.

However, this cannot be at the expense of the British taxpayer.

The concessions on price so far amount to £260m and there is no room for any more.

But, we stand ready to negotiate on the overall financial arrangements to make these more acceptable to you.

I hope you can agree that our people should now get together quickly to resolve these final details of the deal on this basis.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 372 OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1979,
INFO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW
YORK, WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

MY TEL NO 358 (NOT TO JEDDA) : JORDAN/PLO

1. KING HUSSEIN LEFT AMMAN THIS MORNING FOR LONDON. HE IS STOPPING OFF IN SWITZERLAND FOR A FEW HOURS TO SEE KING KHALED. THE JORDANIANS LET IT BE KNOWN TWO DAYS AGO THAT THE SAUDIS (ALMOST 5 MONTHS LATE, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT OF COURSE MENTIONED IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT) HAD PAID THE SECOND INSTALMENT OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROMISED TO JORDAN AT BAGHDAD FOR 1979. AMOUNTING TO US DOLLARS 119 MILLION.
2. YASSER ARAFAT ARRIVED IN AMMAN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON FROM DAMASCUS, ACCOMPANIED BY ABU MAIZER AND YASSER ABED RABBO (BOTH MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PLO) FOR SEVERAL HOURS OF TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN. THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HEAD OF THE ROYALL COURT, GENERAL KHAMMASH AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (ALL OF WHOM LEFT FOR LONDON THIS MORNING WITH THE KING) ATTENDED THE TALKS ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE.
3. THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY AT THE AIRPORT THIS MORNING TO FIND OUT FROM ANY OF THE PARTICIPANTS HOW THE TALKS HAD GONE. SIGNIFICANTLY, ON THIS OCCASION ARAFAT AND HIS PARTY WERE RECEIVED AT THE ROYAL PALACE IN AMMAN RATHER THAN AT THE MILITARY BASE AT MAFRAQ. TODAY'S JORDANIAN PRESS ECHOING THE LINE IN THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE JORDAN NEWS AGENCY, CLAIMED THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN COMPREHENSIVE AND WIDE-RANGING, AND HAD "REVIEWED MEANS OF STRENGTHENING JOINT ARAB ACTION AND CO-OPERATION ... IN THE LIGHT OF DECISIONS ADOPTED DURING PREVIOUS MEETINGS OF THE TWO SIDES". THE JORDANIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENT SAYS THE TWO SIDES AGREED ON THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO SETTING UP A "NATIONAL ENTITY" ON THEIR LAND BUT DID NOT REFER SPECIFICALLY TO A PALESTINIAN STATE.

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4. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME HOW MUCH HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS LONDON VISIT AND IN PARTICULAR TO SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER.

URWICK

FILES

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PS/KPS

PS/MRHURD.

PS/PUS

SIR A. DUFF.

MR J.C. MOBERLY

MR PH MOBERLY

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FM AMMAN 191035Z SEPT
TO ROUTINE FCO
TEL NO 369 OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1979,
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK.

Prime Minister

(2 lls)

And

SAVING BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV,
WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

HEATH'S TELELETTER OF 7 SEPTEMBER TO JENNER (NOT TO ALL) :
JORDANIAN ATTITUDE TO CAMP DAVID.

1. IN A MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT BEFORE THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ON 17 SEPTEMBER ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER RE-ITERATED JORDANIAN REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENTS THEMSELVES AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HE CHARACTERISED AS AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY HAD ENCOURAGED ISRAEL TO ATTACK SOUTH LEBANON AND TO ESTABLISH NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE ISRAELI DECISION TO ALLOW ISRAELI CITIZENS TO BUY LAND ON THE WEST BANK, IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, SHOWED THE AGREEMENTS WERE INTENDED TO SERVE ISRAEL'S EXPANSIONIST POLICIES RATHER THAN BEING A FIRST STEP TO A JUST SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 25 SEPTEMBER WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BE CONDUCTED WITHIN A SOUND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND WOULD RESTATE THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE BASED.

2. ANSWERING QUESTIONS AFTER HIS STATEMENT, BADRAN EXPLICITLY DENIED SUGGESTION THAT JORDAN MIGHT SEEK TO JOIN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND THAT THE KING'S 1972 PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED ARAB KINGDOM COMPRISING BOTH BANKS OF THE JORDAN AND THE GAZA STRIP WAS ABOUT TO BE REVIVED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

URWICK

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 September 1979

Prime Minister

Paul 19/9

Dear Michael,

King Hussein's Call on the Prime Minister

King Hussein is to call on the Prime Minister at 6.00 pm on 20 September.

We have told the Jordanian Ambassador that we should prefer the meeting to be kept as small as possible, and that we hope the King would bring no more than one or, at most, two advisers with him. The Ambassador undertook to make this clear to the King; he will probably be accompanied by his principal Foreign Affairs Adviser, Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, and by the Ambassador, though it is just possible that one of the two places may be taken by the Jordanian Commander-in-Chief, Sherif Zeid bin Shaker. John Moberly, the Assistant Under Secretary who supervises Middle East Affairs in the FCO, will attend from here.

/ I enclose a brief and personality notes.


Yours WEL

Paul

Paul Lever
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

179th SEP 1979



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KU KING HUSSEIN'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER ON 20 SEPTEMBER

Points to Make

Tanks

1. Hope that negotiations for sale of 274 Shir I tanks can be satisfactorily concluded. MOD have made a number of concessions on price but cannot quote terms which will involve a loss on the deal.

/If raised_7 No commitment at this stage to equip a second division.

Arab/Israel

2. How does King Hussein see the way forward? What chances of the PLO taking a more responsible and helpful position, eg. towards terrorism and recognition of Israel?

3. Alia Re-equipment

We hope that Alia will take up their option on Tristar aircraft equipped with the Rolls Royce RB211. Traffic rights are a question for the Department of Trade. Understand that negotiations on that point are to commence in October.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. King Hussein is in London from 20 - 23 September on his way to New York where he will address the United Nations General Assembly. He is accompanied by Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, his Foreign Affairs Adviser, by the Commander-in-Chief, Zeid bin Shaker, and by the Minister of Court, General Amer Khammash.

TANKS

2. The Defence Secretary informed King Hussein during his visit to London in June of HMG's readiness to proceed with negotiations for the supply of 274 Shir I tanks. The Head of Defence Sales visited Jordan twice in August for detailed negotiations. The Jordanian Commander-in-Chief is to call on Mr Pym on 21 September, and King Hussein has said that he hopes it will be possible to reach agreement on the sale during his visit to London. Broad agreement has been reached with the Jordanians on price (£820,000 per tank), on delivery, and on cost escalation (limited to 8% compound per annum). But a number of problems remain. The Jordanians argue strongly that cost escalation should not apply to down payments. The price of £820,000 has however been quoted on the assumption that it would apply and any change would involve the introduction of additional interim payments. On our own side, it seems likely that the cost of limiting cost escalation to 8% could involve a commitment of public funds in the region of £30 - 40 million. Mr Pym will be seeking his colleagues' approval for this, but a decision is unlikely to be made before the Commander-in-Chief returns to London on 27 September. If approval were not forthcoming MOD might have to revise the terms of their quotation with the consequent likelihood that negotiations will fail. We need to assure the King that the present negotiating problems are commercial. The Jordanians are also negotiating with the Americans for the supply of M60 tanks and have received offers for Russian T72 tanks. If the Shir purchase is concluded, Jordan may still buy a (smaller) number of M60 tanks from the United States.

/ ARAB/ISRAEL

ARAB/ISRAEL

3. Hussein, with the majority of other Arabs, is opposed to the Camp David agreements. He considers that the autonomy proposals perpetuate Israeli control and that once Israel and Egypt have normalised their relations the United States will lose interest in securing Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 occupied territories. This scepticism has been enhanced by continued Israeli expansion of settlements on the West Bank.

4. Since Camp David, Hussein has begun to restore Jordan's links with the PLO. Arafat has visited Jordan twice this year and met Hussein at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana. Hussein has told HM Ambassador that he has the impression Arafat was now more willing to seek guidance and assistance from Jordan and has speculated about the possibility of the PLO and Jordan working out a joint proposal to break the present deadlock.

5. Negotiations based on the Camp David agreements are continuing and President Sadat visited Israel earlier this month. Sadat has opted for progress first on the bilateral Israel/Egypt items (particularly Israeli withdrawal from Sinai) and progress in the talks on Palestinian autonomy is very slow.

| This has only served to strengthen Arab, and Jordanian opposition
| to the talks.

ALIA_RE-EQUIPMENT

6. Alia, the Royal Jordanian airline needs up to five new aircraft with a possible option on four more. Alia, Saudi, Gulf and other Middle East airlines have recently agreed to try to standardise their purchasing policy. The Alia order could influence the sale of at least another twenty and perhaps as many as sixty aircraft in the Middle East as a whole.

7. The Jordanians have signed a Letter of Intent for the purchase of five Lockheed Tristar aircraft, equipped with RB211 engines. They have made this conditional on early agreement to improved landing rights for Alia at Heathrow Airport. A

/ Jordanian

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Jordanian official visited London for informal talks with the Department of Trade on this point in September and formal negotiations will begin in October. The Department of Trade hope to find an acceptable compromise but cannot be bound by commitments entered into by Lockheed to link aircraft purchases and landing rights.

MINISTERIAL VISITS

8. Lord Carrington may meet King Hussein in New York next week. Mr Hurd is to visit Jordan from 9 - 11 October.

Near East and North Africa Department
19 September 1979

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JORDAN: VITAL STATISTICS

1. UK Trade with Jordan (£m)

	1976	1977	1978
Imports (% change over previous year)	0.9 (+28)	2.0 (+122)	6.7 (+23)
Exports (% change over previous year)	56.0 (+51)	49.0 (-12)	68.0 (+38)

Britain is Jordan's fourth largest supplier after USA, Japan, FRG

2. UK aid to Jordan (£m)

	1977/8	1978/9
Capital aid	4	4
Technical cooperation	1	1
aid and trade contingency fund	4	5

Most of Jordan's aid comes from Arab states, the UN and USA (see 3)

3. Jordan's trade statistics (US\$m)

	1978 (estimated)
Exports fob	310
Imports cif	1502
Remittances (250,000 Jordanians in the Gulf)	457
Aid	393
of which Arab governments	278
UN Agencies	56
USA	52
Others	7

Exchange rate: 1 Dinar = \$3.27 = £1.6

4. Economy (GNP in US \$ at 1978 current prices)

Labour force	:	382,800
Unemployed	:	2%
GNP total	:	\$2.33 bn.
GNP per capita	:	\$1,165
GNP growth rate	:	8%
Gross fixed investment	:	31% of GNP
% shares of GDP:		

services	62.1
industry and mining	20.2
agriculture	10.5
construction	7.2

rate of wage increase: 17.5% (1977; weighted average)
 increase of Cost of Living index 7.0% (1978)

5. Demography

Area	:	92,700 km ²
Population	:	2,000,000; 43% urban
Population growth rate	:	3.2% pa
Infant mortality rate	:	97 per 1000
Resident British community	:	800

HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, HM KING

King of Jordan since 11 August 1952.

Born Amman 1935. Educated Bishops School, Amman, Victoria College, Alexandria, Harrow; shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952. He himself has survived unscathed many attempts on his life. Acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal, a schizophrenic. The major events of his reign have been: March 1956, dismissal of Glubb Pasha; 1956-58, a series of threats to his throne: Sulaiman Nabulsi's National Socialist Government, the Ali Abu Nuwar (qv) plot, and the overthrow and massacre of the Hashemites in Iraq; 1960, assassination of his Prime Minister, Hazza Majali; 1965, Prince Hassan proclaimed Crown Prince; 1963-7 period of considerable economic growth in Jordan; 1967, six-days war with Israel; 1970-1, civil war leading to the expulsion of the Fedayeen from Jordan; 1971, assassination of his Prime Minister, Wasfi al-Tell, in Cairo; 1972, announcement of plan for United Arab Kingdom (East and West Banks); 1973, October war with Israel; 1974, Rabat Conference ended King Hussein's isolation in the Arab world and opened the way for the establishment of his close personal understanding with President Asad. 1976, the Development Conference to launch Jordan's 5-year plan symbolised the recovery of the Hashemite Kingdom from the effects of the 6-days war and of the disorders which followed it.

In his early years King Hussein was often regarded as something of a playboy, but with the passage of time he has acquired a formidable skill in steering his small country through the treacherous currents of Middle East war and politics. He now appears to be wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and the Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck, he has shown the ability to take sensible decisions in times of crises.

At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and implicitly, therefore, renounced his claim to the West Bank. Nevertheless, moved as he is by a belief in the historic mission of the Hashemites, King Hussein has not in reality abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank if there is ever to be an Arab/Israel settlement.

By natural inclination, as well as a result of a conscious assessment of the best interests of the Hashemites, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has faltered in this general alignment only for brief periods, eg when reacting against the political tutelage of General Glubb, in his frustration over the catastrophic results of the 6-days war for Jordan, or when faced in 1976 with initial Western reluctance to supply Jordan with a suitable air defence system.

For most of his reign King Hussein has exercised a tight control over all major foreign and defence policy issues. He is less interested in economic questions and has devolved responsibility for planning in this field on Crown Prince Hassan. In pursuing his very personalised style of government King Hussein's biggest asset has been his very warm, friendly and outgoing personality. He has

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used this to good effect in maintaining by personal contact the loyalty of the Armed Forces, the supreme importance of which he has always recognised.

In relation to Israel King Hussein recognises the futility of extreme policies. His willingness to contemplate full peace with Israel is genuine but his freedom of manoeuvre has always been limited by the need to keep in step with his Arab neighbours and to take account of the views of the Palestinian half of Jordan's population, and by his dependence on the United States' continued economic and military assistance. In the light of the re-armament of Israel since 1973 he recognises how far the Arabs have to go before they have a credible military option but he is well aware that Jordan could be compelled by circumstances to enter a further Arab/Israel war.

Despite the King's increasingly mature political judgement born of long experience, he remains essentially practical and non-intellectual in his approach to his country's problems. To his warm friendliness he adds an undoubted courage without which he could have hardly survived in the face of military defeat, the frequent hostility of his Arab neighbours and the resentment of his Palestinian subjects.

In his personal life the tragic death in a helicopter crash in 1977 of his third wife, Queen Alia, affected him more deeply than any of the other disasters to which he has been exposed in his reign. His marriage (in June 1978) to his fourth wife, Noor (née Elizabeth, or Lisa) Halaby, is nevertheless to all appearances one of genuine affection. It may also help to provide a stable family life for the King's two young children by Alia. Despite complaints at the King's choice of another non-Arab, non-Muslim girl to marry, the marriage has not attracted the considerable public criticism aroused by the King's wedding to Princess Muna. Shortly before the marriage the King announced that Prince Ali, his infant son by Alia, would become next in the line of succession to Prince Hassan, cutting out any sons of the King's fourth marriage as well as his two sons by Muna (and presumably any sons born to the Crown Prince and Princess Sarvath, who have young daughters). By this means King Hussein sought to avoid later argument and to strengthen the Hashemite throne for the future by underlining its pure Arab character.

King Hussein has recently suffered on more than one occasion from slight heart trouble. Provided, however, that he continues to be able to avoid assassination attempts and accidents and that his health remains good, there seems no reason short of an all-out Arab/Israel war with all the uncertainties that this would bring, why he should not remain King of Jordan for some time to come. For the time being his neighbours, other than Iraq, and his financial backers are likely to conclude that their interests will continue to be best served by the maintenance of the Hashemite regime in Jordan and by King Hussein remaining at the head of it.

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ABDUL HAMID SHARAF, SHARIF

Head of the Royal Diwan.

Born Baghdad 1939, younger brother of Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf. His father was Regent of Iraq briefly in 1940 following the pro-Nazi "Golden Square" coup. Studied Philosophy and International Relations at AUB. Joined the MFA 1962. Director-General of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service 1963. Assistant Head of the Royal Diwan 1964. Minister of Information 1965-7. Ambassador in Washington 1967-71. Jordanian Permanent Representative at the United Nations 1971-1976.

He made a considerable impression in Washington, where he was the youngest Arab Ambassador. At the UN he gained wide respect, both in the Arab group and outside, for his intelligent, moderate, and often courageous, presentation of his Government's case. Described as outstanding among Arab Ambassadors in New York, and is one of Jordan's most able diplomats. He was brought back to succeed Mudar Badran (qv) as Head of the Diwan in 1976.

His diplomatic experience has resulted in his playing a much more significant role in the conduct of foreign affairs than his predecessor did as Head of the Diwan or does now as Prime Minister; particularly now that Zeid Rifai is (if only temporarily) hors-de-combat, Sharaf has become one of the King's closest and most trusted advisers and confidants.

10 ZEID BIN SHAKER, SHARIF, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL

Commander-in-Chief, Jordan Armed Forces since January 1976.

Born Amman 4th September 1935, son of the Amir Shaker who migrated to Jordan with the late King Abdullah. Educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, and Sandhurst in 1954/55. Appointed ADC to the King after the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. Involved in the 1957 plot; posted as Assistant Military Attaché to London in April 1957. Recalled and dismissed from the army November 1957. Reinstated as a Captain in 1960. Attended the Long Armour Course in the United States in 1962. As a Major in 1963 he commanded First Armoured Infantry Regiment and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in the same appointment. In 1964 he attended the US Command and General Staff College and then took command of the important 60 Armoured Brigade. Given accelerated promotion to Colonel in November 1965 and appointed Military Assistant to the King. Acquitted himself well in the 1967 war. Promoted Brigadier July 1968 as Commander Royal Armoured Corps, and in late 1969 took command of 3 Armoured Division; as the 3rd was then Jordan's only Armoured Division this was a key appointment. He became unpopular with the Fedayeen, who suspected him of fomenting plots "to liquidate the revolution", and along with Sharif Nasser, was dismissed in June 1970. His eclipse did not last for long however, as in August 1970 he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) 1970-1972. He played a considerable part in the negotiations with the Fedayeen following the fighting in September 1970 and won grudging praise from some of them for his ability. Promoted to Major General in April 1971, appointed Chief of Staff, 5 March 1972, and promoted Lieutenant General in November 1974. Appointed Commander-in-Chief in January 1976.

Despite his chequered career and his lack of military field experience he is firmly established at the head of the Armed Forces where he has been either ACOS Operations, Chief of Staff or C-in-C since 1970. He mixes very little with the officers and soldiers and is therefore not well known by them. In February 1974, following the military disturbances at Zarqa, the discontented soldiery, whom he had let down, called for his replacement as Chief of Staff. At that time he was distrusted.

In the absence of any obvious successor he is likely to remain in his present position for some years yet. He is competent and has been responsible for many of the improvements in the Armed Forces since holding the top three posts in the Army.

He was married on 4 September 1957 to Miss Nawzad Sati who was at that time the niece of Dr Shawkat Sati, King Abdullah's doctor. Sharifa (Nawzad) Zeid is also the niece of Mr Iklil Sati (qv), a prominent Amman businessman and undeclared agent for Marconi.

He is goodlooking, ambitious, socially polished, and close to the King. He has considerable private means. He and his wife speak excellent English. He lives in a large and luxurious villa, paid for by the King, on the exclusive and heavily-guarded Hummar ridge outside Amman. His son, Shaker, (b. 1961) entered a Preparatory School at Seaford in 1972, and is now at Eastbourne College. He has a daughter Nesrine (b. 1959) who was at school in England and is now at Santa Clara University, USA.

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58

KHAMMASH, AMER, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL (RETD)

Court Minister since 1976.

Born 1924 at Salt of a family of Turkish origin previously settled in Nablus for many years. No formal education after the age of 18. An original member of the Arab Legion Artillery. ADC to several different Prime Ministers 1955-7; Commander, Royal Jordanian Artillery 1957-62; Director of Planning and Organisation, JAA 1962-5; Chief of Staff, promoted Major-General 1965; promoted Lt-General 1968; removed from his position when Sharif Nasser (qv) became Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; Minister of Defence and Transport for a short period, after which he retired from public life, to re-emerge in 1972 as King Hussein's Special Adviser on Gulf affairs. He also held a watching brief for the King on purchase and sales of military equipment.

Although Khammash has described himself as "only a simple soldier", he is in fact one of the best brains in Jordan, well able to handle a complex of military, economic, commercial, technological, political and diplomatic problems. In the period 1967-9 he was one of the three key men upon whom the security of the King and of Jordan depended. His recent job involved him in frequent visits, as the King's personal emissary, to Oman, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where he handled such subjects as Jordanian military assistance to the Gulf States and since his appointment as Court Minister, he has continued to undertake such missions, as well as fulfilling the other tasks that go with the job. He favours continued Jordanian alignment with the West, and has a deep personal affinity for Britain, though he does not allow this to cloud his view of where Jordan's best interests lie.

In conversation he prefers the light touch even when seriously discussing important subjects, though he has little time for people not properly informed on the details of the subject under discussion. He has no hobbies outside his work, though he is an avid newspaper reader. Speaks excellent English. Married. Two sons and one daughter, of whom the elder boy (expelled from Wellington) and the daughter are being educated in the UK.

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51 IZZIDDIN, IBRAHIM

Ambassador to London.

Born 1934, Amman. A graduate of the American University of Beirut (BA Political Science). A career civil servant, he has filled a remarkably wide variety of posts in the public service, in the Ministry of Communications, the Prime Minister's office, the Department of Press and Publications, the Press Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alia, the then Ministry of Culture and Information, and the Royal Hashemite Diwan (Court) where he was Press Secretary to the King. Has served as Ambassador in Berne and Bonn before his present posting. He had a very good reputation with the Germans in Bonn and expresses the intention of keeping actively in touch with the FCO and more widely with moulders of opinion in London.

Married, but with no children. He is regarded as intelligent, honest and straightforward. His wife comes from a rich Circassian family. They are both friendly and enjoy Western social life. Reputedly keen on sports.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 September 1979

F.S. Pmt - 24/9

Dear Michael,

King Hussein of Jordan

King Hussein of Jordan is making a short private visit to London from 20-23 September. He will be accompanied by one or two close advisers and the Jordanian Commander-in-Chief. The King is on his way to the United Nations General Assembly. While they are here, the Commander-in-Chief is to continue negotiations with the Secretary of State for Defence for the purchase of 274 Shir tanks, as agreed by OD. There are some continuing difficulties over price on which, we understand, the Defence Secretary will shortly consult his colleagues, but a sale looks very probable.

Lord Carrington will be seeing King Hussein himself in New York. He believes, however, that it would be useful if the Prime Minister were to offer to see the King briefly, perhaps over tea, on 20 or 21 September. Although the King was here and saw the Prime Minister as recently as June, it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could take this further opportunity to assure the King of our readiness to supply the tanks he wants if the price can be agreed. Moreover, the Middle East issue is bound to figure largely at the United Nations during the Autumn and an exchange of views with King Hussein at this stage could prove most valuable. His central position among the moderate Arab states, who are nevertheless opposed to the Egypt/Israel negotiations, makes his views of particular importance.

If the Prime Minister agrees to see King Hussein, Lord Carrington suggests that it might be preferable to do so on this occasion informally and without too many officials present. King Hussein would probably wish to bring with him his principal foreign affairs adviser, Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, and perhaps the Commander-in-Chief, Sherif Zeid Bin Shaker. Numbers on our side could be comparably limited.

Yours *GEN*

Paul


(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

19 SEP 1979



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Jordan
file 16
Copy to Master Set of records
Middle East, May 79, Site
Defence, May 79,
Shir Tarkenton
Jordan
18 June 1979

Dear Paul,

THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 18 JUNE 1979

The Prime Minister entertained King Hussein of Jordan at a working lunch at No. 10 today. The King was accompanied by his Foreign Affairs Adviser, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf; by the Commander in Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces, Sharif Zeid bin Shaker; and by the Jordanian Ambassador. The Secretary of State for Defence, the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Douglas Hurd and Mr. John Moberly were present. The following is a summary of the main points which arose in discussion during the meal.

The Prime Minister gave King Hussein an account of her conversation with Mr. Begin over lunch at No. 10 on 23 May. King Hussein commented that the US had in his view given away all the cards which would have enabled them to bring pressure to bear on Mr. Begin, including the possible withholding of military equipment and of oil supplies. Mr. Sharaf expressed the view that the Europeans should adopt a stronger position with regard to Israeli policies which would, in turn, help the US to stiffen its stance on the issues of withdrawal, Jerusalem and Palestinian rights. King Hussein said that he had taken up with the Israelis the question of withdrawal and the implementation of Resolution 242 on numerous occasions but had always been given a negative response, even before Mr. Begin took office. The Prime Minister told King Hussein what Vice President Mubarak of Egypt had said to her about Mr. Begin's brinkmanship at Camp David and said that it might be necessary for the negotiators on the West Bank issue to go to the brink before Mr. Begin would move. The Prime Minister went on to say that, as she had told Vice President Mubarak, it was very important for all those concerned to keep close to Saudi Arabia although she recognised that President Sadat had made some ill-considered remarks about the Saudis. Mr. Sharaf recalled that King Hussein had stood alone in giving a public welcome to President Sadat's original initiative, while at the same time stressing the need for an appropriate response from the Israelis; this response had, however, never materialised and President Sadat's clumsiness in handling his relations with the Arab world had contributed further to the deterioration of the situation. The Prime Minister pointed out that President Sadat was confronted with economic problems of immense gravity, including a rapid increase in the population of his country; these difficulties had spurred him on in the search for a settlement. King Hussein repeated that the Americans had now given the Israelis everything for which they could have asked and found themselves unable to influence Israel any more.

/King Hussein

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King Hussein added that, throughout the quest for a settlement, he had constantly stressed that it was essential to involve all parties in it. He had recently been in touch with the Soviet Government about the implementation of Resolution 242 and a possible return to Geneva. The Soviet response had indicated that the Soviet Union was now opposed to a revival of Geneva: they simply wanted abrogation of the peace treaty and the replacement of President Sadat. King Hussein commented that the Russians clearly thought that time was on their side, that Arab and Israeli positions would harden and that this would eventually bring the regional instability from which they would hope to profit. This was one reason why he saw the revival of the peace process as a matter of such urgency. When Mr. Hurd asked the King whether it might be possible to reopen the Geneva negotiations without the Soviet Union, King Hussein replied that if all those concerned agreed to resume these negotiations, the Soviet Union would have to do so too.

The Prime Minister said that Mr. Begin clearly believed that he had succeeded in splitting the Arab world, that he had in his pocket an agreement which would protect Israel from combined Arab attack and that, consequently, he could afford to stand pat on what he had achieved and make no effort to move on to the next stage. Mr. Sharaf said that King Hussein had been saying for years that this was the Israeli tactic. In the long term, however, the tactic was mistaken since it ruled out the comprehensive settlement which alone could give Israel security. The Camp David Agreements had reinforced Mr. Begin's divisive course while making a comprehensive settlement virtually impossible to achieve.

King Hussein said that Jordan now found herself in a difficult position since both the United States and the Soviet Union were opposed to going back to the Security Council and Geneva. The breakdown of the negotiations on the West Bank could be quite close and he therefore believed that the Arab world should before long make a restatement of its position. In preparing for this, the Arabs should keep in close touch with their European friends in order to be sure of making their move at the right time. It would not, however, be a good idea to remain inactive for too long.

When Mr. Hurd asked King Hussein whether he expected trouble on the West Bank, the King confirmed that the period of relative quiet there was coming to an end. Mr. Sharaf pointed out that, despite Israeli propaganda to the contrary, the Israeli occupation was by no means benevolent. The West Bank was subjected to chronic exploitation of its water resources and its labour: Jordan had taken the firm decision to help the West Bankers by, for example, purchasing their produce and paying municipal salaries; this constituted a drain on Jordan's resources. East Jerusalem and a growing area around it had been incorporated into Israel and the character of the city transformed. General Shaker said that Israel's "security measures" on the West Bank included the collective punishment of the local population; in a recent incident, school children had thrown themselves out of top storey windows in order to escape a search of their school by Israeli troops. There was, however, a news blackout on episodes of this kind. Mr. Sharaf said that if present Israeli policies on the West Bank continued, the whole area would have been transformed, and depopulated of its Arab inhabitants to such an extent by the time the negotiations came to any conclusion that the need for them would have disappeared. King Hussein said that before his departure people had told him jokingly in Amman that he should urge the Americans to stop making statements criticising Israeli settlement policy, since such statements invariably resulted in the creation of

a new settlement. There were large numbers of teachers and students in Jordan who had been obliged to leave the West Bank because their colleges and schools had been closed down.

The Prime Minister asked what was the best result which could be expected from the talks on the West Bank. Mr. Sharaf said that, according to Camp David, the next steps would be the creation of the self-governing authorities, the establishment of political autonomy and then a further round of negotiations about the future status of the West Bank. One of King Hussein's fundamental objections to the Camp David Agreements was that they said nothing about the future status of the Palestinians; they contained no assurance of ultimate self-determination for the Palestinians. Mr. Hurd pointed out that the Americans argued that once an autonomous community had been established the local people would quickly begin to demand sovereignty as well. Mr. Sharaf replied that Mr. Begin had said recently that he would arrest any local people who did so. Mr. Sharaf went on to say that it was now up to the Europeans and others to create an atmosphere which would compel Israel to change her policies. When the Lord Privy Seal said that it would be important for the Europeans to avoid doing anything which could undermine Mr. Strauss' efforts by casting doubts on the validity of the current negotiations, Mr. Sharaf said that the Jordanians wanted to build on the Camp David process rather than upset it but pointed out that it should be possible for the Europeans to support the negotiating process while calling upon Israel in strong terms to allow it to produce results. King Hussein said that everybody regarded Resolution 242 as the right basis for any settlement, but the Resolution itself was being eroded by the passage of time.

King Hussein said that he would be talking to the Syrians about the redefinition of the Arab position which he had in mind; these discussions would take place within a small group of Arab states and would not include all the participants in the Baghdad Conference. Mr. Sharaf explained that King Hussein believed that unless a unified Arab position could be maintained, radical opinion in the Arab world would become even stronger. King Hussein confirmed that he saw his main task as being to keep the Arab world together, which was an essential pre-condition of frustrating Communist plans for the extension of their influence in the region. A just settlement would help the moderate elements among the Arabs.

The Lord Privy Seal said that the Palestinians had moved towards at least a position of de facto recognition of Israel; it would be very helpful to their position viz a viz the West if they were to move one step further. King Hussein agreed but pointed out that Israel, too, had to make a move. Palestinians in Lebanon were now under daily attack; the King recalled arguing at the very first Arab Summit, in 1964, that the Arab/Israel conflict should not be allowed to spill over into the Lebanon. He thought that the Syrians should announce a deadline for their withdrawal, thus giving the Lebanese an incentive to find their own solutions to their problems. Mr. Sharaf commented that Lebanon had virtually been partitioned and King Hussein added that the Israelis might be pursuing a long term plan for controlling the Litani River.

/Mr. Sharaf

Mr. Sharaf emphasised once more the view he had expressed at the outset, namely that pressure from outside would be needed to achieve acceptable results from the peace process and that there should be a demonstration of the collective will of the West to give Israel what she needed for her security but insisting that the Palestinians should be given their legitimate rights as well. In the present situation, the position of the moderate Arabs was gradually being eroded and the rejectionist case was being proved. The Prime Minister said that all that could be done for the moment was to wait and see what came out of the negotiations on the West Bank. When King Hussein asked whether consideration could be given to ways in which Europeans could help the situation, the Prime Minister said that this could indeed be discussed both in Strasbourg and in Tokyo. The Jordanian Ambassador said that any statements would have to embody a more explicit emphasis on self-determination than had previous statements. King Hussein indicated that the UK should be able to exercise a helpful and very necessary influence on the US in these matters.

In a reference to Jordan's requirement for UK Shir I tanks, Mr. Sharaf said that Jordan needed to be strengthened by her traditional allies. The Prime Minister replied that the British Government recognised that the UK was Jordan's traditional friend and supplier and that they would, therefore, negotiate the sale of the Shir tanks. The Defence Secretary confirmed that negotiations were already under way. Mr. Sharaf said that King Hussein had been telling all the Arab Governments that the UK tank was the best one.

After King Hussein's departure, the Prime Minister indicated that she would be quite prepared to ask President Carter, when she met him in Tokyo, to exert pressure on Mr. Begin to put an end to his policy on settlements and to accept the principle of Palestinian sovereignty for the West Bank. Mr. Moberly gave her a summary of current attitudes within the Nine to a possible statement on the Middle East. Mr. Hurd told the Prime Minister that it would be a mistake for the Nine to rush into a statement for the sake of making one; the time for this would be when the current negotiations showed signs of running into the sand. I should be grateful for advice on whether, in the light of the Prime Minister's talk with King Hussein, the brief on the Middle East which has been provided for the Prime Minister's use at Strasbourg needs any revision; and on the terms in which the Prime Minister might raise the Middle East issue with President Carter in Tokyo.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,
Brian Cawley.*

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER IN HONOUR OF HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN I OF
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN ON MONDAY, 18 JUNE 1979
AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

The Prime Minister

His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

His Excellency the Jordanian Ambassador

Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf

His Majesty's Principal Foreign
Affairs Adviser

Sharif Zeid bin Shaker

Commander in Chief of the
Jordanian Armed Forces

The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP

The Rt. Hon. Sir Ian Gilmour, MP

The Hon. Douglas Hurd, MP

Mr. John Moberly

H.M. Ambassador, Amman

Mr. Bryan Cartledge

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON MONDAY, 18 JUNE

Mr. Bryan Cartledge

The Hon. Douglas Hurd

Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf

HE The Jordanian
Ambassador

THE PRIME MINISTER

The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym

HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN I

Sharif Zeid bin Shaker

The Rt. Hon. Sir Ian Gilmour

Mr. John Moberly

ENTRANCE

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-930 7022 218 2111/3

CONFIDENTIAL

MO 25/8

15th June 1979

Prime Minister

SH
14/6

Dear Bryan,

The Defence Secretary called on King Hussein at the Jordanian Embassy at 4.30 pm today. King Hussein was accompanied by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Bin Shaker.

After a discussion of the political situation in the Middle East, in which the King saw a role for Britain, he turned to the subject of military cooperation. He hoped to extend the level of cooperation with Britain through the purchase of Shir 1 tanks. He would like to equip two divisions with these tanks, a total of 608 in all. King Hussein did not, however, press for a commitment to supply enough for the second division. General Shaker explained the problems which Jordan saw over the financial arrangements. Not only was the price high, but we required a Variation on Price (VOP) Clause. If inflation in Britain ran at 17½%, Jordan would soon find the basic price of £800,00 rising to over £1M, including training, ammunition and spares. In addition, the requirement for a down-payment for 30% of the value of the order with another 30% due six months later presented difficulties since the sums available from various Arab States to finance the purchase would not cover these sums. King Hussein referred to his purchase of Mirage F1 aircraft from France and the willingness of Algeria to help him purchase Soviet tanks. But he had reached the view that the only alternative tank suitable for Jordan was the Soviet T72, and he was in principle not in favour of buying from the Soviet Union, in view of the political consequences. Jordan was also considering, for the longer term, purchase of the tracked form of Rapier surface-to-air missile originally developed for Iran.

/ The ...

B G Cartledge Esq
No 10 Downing Street

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2.

The Defence Secretary informed the King that HMG was ready to proceed with negotiations to supply the 274 Shir 1 tanks, but explained our need to satisfy Parliament about the financial terms of the contract. Though buying from the Royal Ordnance Factories would give Jordan a better bargain, than purchasing from a private company, it meant that all the financial details had to be exposed to public view. There was therefore not much scope for altering the financial terms we had proposed though he would discuss with Sir Ronald Ellis what detailed changes might be possible.

I am copying this letter to Paul Lever (FCO) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


Roger Fisher

(R L L FACER)

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15 JUN 1979



COMPLIMENT

Prime Minister

Mr Tomkys (NENAD)

JW
1/4/76Secretary of State's Call on King Hussein


The Secretary of State called on King Hussein at 1030 this morning. Most of their discussion was centred on the situation in the Middle East. King Hussein made clear that, although the Arab countries who were opposed to the Camp David process would now need to reassess their position, he did not think that they would reach any different conclusions to those of the Baghdad Summit. There seemed no likelihood whatever, given Mr Begin's clear views, that the autonomy negotiations would lead to practical results. The rate at which the Israelis were creating new settlements on the West Bank was now becoming almost a joke. There was in any case no way in which the Egyptians could speak for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. It was regrettable that the Americans had given up all their leverage on the Israelis for such meagre results. Lord Carrington said that he too was sceptical about the chances of achieving real progress in the autonomy negotiations. But, since the Camp David agreement was now a fact of life, the negotiations must be given a chance. There would be a problem however in judging the moment at which to conclude that they had failed and that some alternative approach was required. He asked whether King Hussein had any viable alternative to suggest. King Hussein replied that the Geneva process had been going quite well before President Sadat's initiative in visiting Jerusalem had put paid to it. There had been virtual agreement on a joint PLO/Arab delegation. There was now a new spirit among the Arabs. The Baghdad meeting had been a positive one in that it had affirmed the commitment of all Arab states to a peaceful solution. It would now be necessary to build on this.

Lord Carrington said that he had met Mr Begin for the first time two weeks previously. His fear was that Mr Begin would now feel that he had done something good in negotiating the Camp David agreement and would stand pat on it. Now that the risk of war with Egypt had been effectively neutralised, there was little compulsion on the Israelis to show flexibility. The time-scale envisaged for the future negotiations under Camp David seemed dangerously long. It would be difficult for the other Arab states simply to wait on the side lines and the risks to President Sadat's position would increase. King Hussein agreed that President Sadat would be in an extremely difficult position. He had promised so much to the Egyptians and would find it very difficult to deliver. Lord Carrington said that it was important to ensure that President Sadat survived. He hoped that the split in the Arab world would, at the very least, not become any deeper. He asked how King Hussein viewed the prospects for the Lebanon. King Hussein replied that it was hard to be other than pessimistic. There was real danger of a partition of the Lebanon between Syria and Israel, with the Israelis gaining control of the head waters of the Jordan river. A solution could only be reached among the Lebanese themselves.

/ Lord Carrington

Lord Carrington also mentioned his concern about the situation in Oman, following the events in Iran. King Hussein said that he shared this concern. He had sent an envoy and a very frank letter to Sultan Qaboos warning him of the dangers of his present form of administration. He could not understand why the Sultan was putting himself in a position where he antagonised everyone. Lord Carrington commented that he was surrounded by too many expatriates including too many British who told him only what they thought he wanted to hear. Sir A Parsons had recently visited him and had spoken at some length but it was not clear whether the message had really got through.

Finally Lord Carrington mentioned that Mr Pym, who would be calling on King Hussein that afternoon, would bring good news about the sale of Chieftain tanks. There was no political inhibition on their sale to Jordan. The British Government would no doubt have to take some flak from the Israelis about a decision in principle to supply, but would justify it on the grounds that Britain was a traditional supplier to the Jordanian armed forces.


P Lever

15 June 1979

cc: PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Sir A Parsons
Mr J Moberly
Mr Munro (MED)
HM Ambassador Amman
Mr Cartledge - No 10
Mr Facer - MOD

15 JUN 1979

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 June 1979

*Brief
A back of
file*

Dear Bryan,

*A. A.
Bry
15/6*

Prime Minister's Lunch for King Hussein:
18 June

As requested in your letter of 7 June, I enclose briefs on Arab/Israel and Jordan: Bilateral Questions for the Prime Minister's lunch with King Hussein on 18 June, together with personality notes on the King, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf and Sharif Zeid bin Shaker.

Yours ever

P Lever

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN, 18 JUNE

LINE TO TAKE

Arab/Israel

1. Understand Jordan's misgivings about the Camp David agree-
ments and the difficulty for the King of taking part in negotiations
without adequate assurances on Israeli withdrawal.
2. But the Egypt/Israel Treaty is a fact and we should see what
can be built on it. Autonomy negotiations should be given a chance.
Jordan should not discourage West Bank inhabitants from playing a
part in them, if they see opportunities to improve their position.
3. Israel's expansion of settlements is losing her sympathy with
US opinion. Signs of growing doubts in Israel too. Arabs should
exploit this feeling by coming forward with constructive and
plausible proposals of their own.
4. In particular they should urge the PLO to be realistic and commit
themselves to acceptance of Israel's right to exist side by side with
a land for the Palestinians.
5. Look to Jordan to work closely with Saudi Arabia to find positive
ways to influence President Sadat and eventually to re-establish a
dialogue.
6. Britain ready in principle to explore ways to get negotiations
back into multilateral channels if autonomy negotiations founder.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The King is likely to concentrate on setting out Jordan's position and the reasons why Jordan and most other Arab countries cannot endorse the Camp David agreements. The King's basic fear is that by endorsing autonomy as an interim solution for the West Bank, the American commitment to secure eventual Israeli withdrawal has been irretrievably weakened, that limited autonomy for the Arab population will lead to eventual assertion by Israel of sovereignty over the West Bank and that in particular East Jerusalem will remain under Israeli control. His fears have been strengthened by the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements and reiteration of Israel's claims to sovereignty over the West Bank since the Camp David agreements were signed.

2. The King's attitude to the Camp David agreements has gone through several phases. Although placed in a very delicate position vis-a-vis other Arab governments by the role ascribed to Jordan in the agreements without any consultation with him, he did not initially condemn them. But his growing conviction that the only outcome would be a bilateral peace which would leave the position on the West Bank unaffected, reinforced by pressures from his radical neighbours particularly Syria and Iraq, led him at the autumn Arab summit in Baghdad to outright rejection of the Camp David agreements and a leading role in rallying Arab opposition to them. He also began to restore Jordan's links with the PLO. Relations with the US deteriorated sharply: the King accused the US Administration of bringing unfair pressure on him to join negotiations. More recently some slight softening of his views can be detected. There have been hints that Jordan will not



discourage West Bankers who wish to be associated with the autonomy negotiations. The King seems resigned to giving the negotiations a chance before proceeding with alternative proposals. But his basic scepticism remains unchanged.

3. It would be useful to find out rather more of the King's thinking on alternative ways forward. He has in the past talked of a return of negotiations to the Security Council or to a Geneva Conference but realises that neither is practical for the time being.

4. The King attaches particular importance to the question of settlements. He was distressed that HMG abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning settlements in March. His other main concern is the status of Jerusalem. His position on the ultimate status of the West Bank is ambiguous. He has conceded that only the PLO can negotiate on the future of the West Bank and has accepted the right of the Palestinians to an independent state.

But an outcome by which the inhabitants of the West Bank freely chose the option of federation or confederation with Jordan would be acceptable to him.

5. The King's internal position is reasonably secure despite the inherent tensions between the Palestinians and the East Bankers. He sees Arab unity as an important prop to his own position. Reconciliation with the PLO has caused some concern in the army: the King is likely to move slowly. Although there have been some signs of Islamic revival they do not seem to constitute a threat to the regime.



PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN, 18 JUNE

JORDAN: BILATERAL QUESTIONS

Line to takeTanks

1. Confirm HMG ready to enter negotiations for the supply of 274 Shir I tanks, if satisfactory terms can be agreed. But no commitment at this stage to supply more. Prefer to avoid publicity.

RB 211

2. We hope Jordan will choose Rolls Royce engines for the Alia fleet. Rolls Royce prepared to establish an overhaul and repair facility in Jordan.

3. RB 211 now a candidate for Airbus. Would Alia be interested in this combination?

Medical Scholarships (defensive)

4. Britain ready in principle to help. Looking at ways and means. Understand Queen Noor discussed it with British Council in Amman recently.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

Tanks

1. The Defence Secretary will have informed the King that HMG is ready to proceed with negotiations with him over the supply of 274 Shir I tanks, but will wish to consider the outcome of negotiations on the terms before the sale is completed. We should prefer to avoid publicity while the negotiations are in progress.
2. The King may press for a commitment to supply a further 325, enabling him to re-equip both of Jordan's armoured divisions. This would represent a major increase in Jordan's armed strength with implications for the military balance in the area, and would need further consideration.

RB 211

3. Alia, the Royal Jordanian Airline, needs up to five new aircraft, with a possible option on four more. Alia, Saudia, Gulf and other Middle East airlines have recently agreed to try to standardise their purchasing policy. The Alia order would influence the sale of at least another twenty, and perhaps as many as sixty aircraft.
4. The Rolls Royce RB 211 engine is a strong contender to power several of the available aircraft: it could be fitted to the Lockheed Tristar, Boeing 747, or the Airbus. An order for 25 Tristars or Boeings with RB 211 would be worth about £170 million to Rolls Royce. For commercial reasons Rolls Royce appear to be pressing Tristar, as the likely winner, although sales of RB 211/Airbus would make it easier for them to justify the cost of certifying the engine on a significant number of Airbuses. Rolls Royce have proposed to Alia that a workshop be established in Jordan to overhaul the engines. The Vice-Chairman of Rolls Royce hopes to discuss the prospects with King Hussein in London.



5. From HMG's point of view, sales of RB 211/Airbus would provide the biggest balance of payments advantage. We also need to be careful, vis-a-vis our Airbus partners, in pushing the sale of an American aircraft against Airbus.

Medical Scholarships

6. Queen Noor has asked for our assistance in obtaining places on professional training courses in Britain for medical ancillary workers. We should like to help. But places are hard to find and few Jordanians have the right qualifications. The British Council are discussing Jordan's needs with relevant officials in Amman.

7. King Hussein commented to the then Prime Minister last year that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe offered much more assistance to Jordanian students than did Western Europe. We have not been able to find a radical solution to this problem (eg on a Community-wide basis). We subsequently increased from 46 to 65 the number of British Council and ODA scholarships Britain could offer annually to suitable candidates from Jordan.



JORDAN: VITAL STATISTICS

1. UK trade with Jordan (£m)

	1976	1977	1978
Imports (% change over previous year)	0.9 (+28)	2.0 (+122)	6.2 (+310)
Exports (% change over previous year)	56.0 (+51)	49.0 (-12)	68.0 (+38)

Britain is Jordan's fourth largest supplier after USA, Japan, FRG

2. UK aid to Jordan (£m)

	1977/8	1978/9
Capital aid	4	4
Technical cooperation	1	1
aid and trade contingency fund	4	5

Most of Jordan's aid comes from Arab states, the UN and USA (see 3)

3. Jordan's trade statistics (US\$m)

	1978 (estimated)
Exports fob	310
Imports cif	1502
Remittances (250,000 Jordanians in the Gulf)	457
Aid	393
of which Arab governments	278
UN Agencies	56
USA	52
Others	7

Exchange rate: 1 Dinar = \$3.27 = £1.6

4. Economy (GNP in US \$ at 1978 current prices)

Labour force	:	382,800
Unemployed	:	2%
GNP total	:	\$2.33 bn.
GNP per capita	:	\$1,165
GNP growth rate	:	8%
Gross fixed investment	:	31% of GNP

% shares of GDP:		
services		62.1
industry and mining		20.2
agriculture		10.5
construction		7.2

rate of wage increase: 17.5% (1977; weighted average)
 increase of Cost of Living index 7.0% (1978)

5. Demography

Area	:	92,700 km ²
Population	:	2,000,000; 43% urban
Population growth rate	:	3.2% pa
Infant mortality rate	:	97 per 1000
Resident British community	:	800



HUSSEIN BIN TALAL, HM KING

King of Jordan since 11 August 1952

Born Amman 1935. Educated Bishops School Amman, Victoria College, Alexandria, Harrow; Shortened course at Sandhurst 1952/53. He was present when his grandfather, the Amir Abdullah, was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952. He himself has survived unscathed many attempts on his life. Acceded to the throne in the following year on the deposition of his father, Talal.

In his early years King Hussein was often regarded as something of a playboy but with the passage of time he has acquired a formidable skill in steering his small country through the treacherous currents of Middle East war and politics. He now appears to be wholly serious and dedicated in his efforts to preserve the Hashemite Kingdom and to protect the interests of his people, both East Bank Jordanians and the Palestinians. Allied to a measure of luck, he has shown the ability to take sensible decisions in times of crises.

At the Rabat Conference in October 1974 King Hussein recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and implicitly, therefore, renounced his claim to the West Bank.

Nevertheless, moved as he is by a belief in the historic mission of the Hashemites, King Hussein has not in reality abandoned his belief that his family will have an important role to play with regard to the West Bank if there is ever to be an Arab/Israel settlement.

By natural inclination, as well as a result of a conscious assessment of the best interests of the Hashemites, King Hussein has always been strongly pro-Western. He has faltered in this general alignment only for brief periods, eg when reacting against the political tutelage of General Glubb, in his frustration over the catastrophic results of the 6-day war for Jordan, or when faced in 1976 with initial Western reluctance to supply Jordan with a suitable air defence system.

Despite the King's increasingly mature political judgement born of long experience, he remains essentially practical and non-intellectual in his approach to his country's problems. To his warm friendliness he adds an undoubted courage without which he could have hardly survived in the face of military defeat, the frequent hostility of his Arab neighbours and the resentment of his Palestinian subjects.



ABDUL HAMID SHARAF, SHARIF

Head of the Royal Diwan

Born Baghdad 1939, younger brother of Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf. His father was Regent of Iraq briefly in 1940 following the pro-Nazi "Golden Square" coup. Studied Philosophy and International Relations at AUB. Joined the MFA 1962. Director-General of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service 1963. Assistant Head of the Royal Diwan 1964. Minister of Information 1965-7. Ambassador in Washington 1967-71. Jordanian Permanent Representative at the United Nations 1971-76.

He made a considerable impression in Washington, where he was the youngest Arab Ambassador. At the UN he gained wide respect, both in the Arab group, and outside, for his intelligent, moderate, and often courageous, presentation of his Government's case. Described as outstanding among Arab Ambassadors in New York, and is one of Jordan's most able diplomats. He was brought back to succeed Mudar Badran (qv) as Head of the Diwan in 1976.

His diplomatic experience has resulted in his playing a much more significant role in the conduct of foreign affairs than his predecessor did as Head of the Diwan or does now as Prime Minister; particularly now that Zeid Rifai is (if only temporarily) hors-de-combat, Sharaf has become one the King's closest and most trusted advisers and confidants.



ZEID BIN SHAKER, SHARIF, LIEUTENANT GENERAL

Commander-in-Chief, Jordan Armed Forces since January 1976

Born Amman 4th September 1935, son of the Amir Shaker who migrated to Jordan with the late King Abdullah. Educated at Victoria College Alexandria, and Sandhurst in 1954/55. Appointed ADC to the King after the dismissal of Glubb Pasha.

He is firmly established at the head of the Armed Forces where he has been either ACOS Operations, Chief of Staff or CINC since 1970. He mixes very little with the officers and soldiers and is therefore not well known by them. In the absence of any obvious successor he is likely to remain in his present position for some years yet. He is competent and has been responsible for many of the improvements in the Armed Forces since holding the top three posts in the Army.

He is goodlooking, ambitious, socially polished, and close to the King. He has considerable private means. He and his wife speak excellent English. He lives in a large and luxurious villa, paid for by the King, on the exclusive and heavily-guarded Hummar ridge outside Amman. His son, Shaker (b. 1961) entered a Preparatory school at Seaford in 1972, and is now at Eastbourne College. He has a daughter Nesrine (b. 1959) who was at school in England and is now at Santa Clara University, USA.



Jordan

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

cc Miss Hemen
Mrs Goodchild

London SW1A 2AH

SW
12/6

11 June, 1979

Dear Bryan,

The Prime Minister's Lunch for King Hussein, 18 June

Thank you for your letter of 7 June on this subject.

I confirm that the Lord Privy Seal, Mr Hurd and Mr John Moberly will be able to attend the Prime Minister's lunch on 18 June. I understand that the Secretary of State for Defence will attend as well. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, who will be in Paris that day for an EEC Political Cooperation meeting, will be unable to be present. He will, however, call on the King at 11.00 am on Friday 15 June.

I understand that the Prime Minister has now agreed that King Hussein should be accompanied by the Jordanian Ambassador and by two advisers. They will be Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, the King's principal foreign affairs adviser, and Sharif Zeid bin Shaker, the Commander in Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces. We have explained to the Jordanian Ambassador the reasons which make it impossible to arrange a lunch at which Queen Noor could also be present.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Facer in the Ministry of Defence.

Yours etc

Paul

Paul Lever
(Private Secretary)

B Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
London S W 1



Jordan
c.c. Mrs. Goodchild

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 June 1979

1) B/F 11-679
2) 15-6-79

THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN, 18 JUNE

I have been told by the Department, and now by the Jordanian Ambassador as well, that Queen Noor will be in London with King Hussein during his forthcoming private visit. I have informed the Prime Minister of this, but she wishes, in view of her very heavy commitments during the period of the King's visit and the consequent difficulty of arranging both a session of talks with him and a "social" lunch which Queen Noor could attend, to maintain her original intention to offer the King a working lunch for a small number of guests.

The Prime Minister hopes that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (or, if he is away from London, the Lord Privy Seal), the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Hurd, and Mr. John Moberly will be able to attend. She assumes that King Hussein will be accompanied by the Jordanian Ambassador, and there will be room for one other Jordanian guest if the King is to be accompanied on his visit by, for example, his Minister of Court or another adviser. I should be grateful if you would confirm as soon as possible that the UK invitees will be able to attend.

It would be helpful if briefing for the Prime Minister's discussion with King Hussein could reach me not later than noon on Friday, 15 June.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roger Facer in the Ministry of Defence.

E. G. CARTLEDGE

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

Your lunch for King Hussein, 18 June

We have learned from the Jordanian Embassy that King Hussein, who will be in London on a private visit, will be accompanied by Queen Noor. The Ambassador is not, he assures me, suggesting that you should include Queen Noor in your lunch for King Hussein if this would be in any way inconvenient, but he thought you would wish to know that Queen Noor will be in town.

This is awkward. It would not be appropriate to invite Queen Noor to what is by design a working lunch. In theory, you could convert the lunch into a social one and have separate talks with King Hussein before or after the meal, or on another day; but your diary is very full, especially on 18 June, and economy of time was part of the idea of suggesting a working lunch.

In the circumstances, I suggest that you stick to a working lunch and that I convey a message from you to the Jordanian Ambassador explaining that your very heavy commitments during that week will not make it possible for you to have separate talks with King Hussein and that you hope very much that Queen Noor will understand if you give the lunch on 18 June for King Hussein alone. I suggest that you might also send a very magnificent bouquet to Queen Noor on her arrival, and shall arrange this if you agree.

Would you be content with the following guest list for the working lunch:

Prime Minister

King Hussein

Lord Privy Seal (Lord Carrington will be away at a Ministerial meeting in Brussels)

Secretary of State for Defence

Mr. John Moberly (former Ambassador in Amman and now Under Secretary in charge of Middle East affairs in the FCO)

Jordanian Ambassador

Mr. Cartledge

/King Hussein

King Hussein may well have an adviser or Minister of Court with him, who would of course be included. Is there anybody else whom you yourself would wish to invite?

Byd. Forrestland?

We must state to a working lunch,
The Queen would not enjoy such an
occasion and it would alter everything
including the food. but if we turned
it into a social occasion.

6 June 1979

arb.

Jordan

CONFIDENTIAL

JS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 June 1979

B/F 15679

VISIT TO LONDON BY KING HUSSEIN

You wrote to Bryan Cartledge on 2 June about King Hussein's proposed visit from 13 to 19 June.

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has agreed to give a small working lunch for King Hussein at 1315 on Monday 18 June.

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KRB
✓



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Could you agree
to give King Hussein a

Small working lunch on Monday, 1 June 1979

18 June? It is a very full day, but you could give him
from 1315 to 1515, when you wish to go over to the Home.

Dear Bryan,

Bul
4/10

Visit to London by King Hussein

King Hussein of Jordan has told HM Ambassador at Amman that he proposes to visit London from 13 to 19 June. His main purpose would be to see the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.

The King is, of course, a firm friend of Britain and an influential voice in the Middle East. There are a number of important subjects to be discussed with him: the general Middle East situation, the possible sale of Shir tanks to Jordan (due for consideration by Ministers on 11 June in OD) and Jordan's interest in the purchase of the Tristar aircraft with Rolls Royce engines. The King has normally in the past been received by the Prime Minister of the day. He is likely to see President Giscard during his visit to France for the Paris Air Show immediately before coming to London. He will have noted the reception accorded to Mr Begin.

Lord Carrington recommends therefore that the Prime Minister should invite the King to No 10 during his visit. It would be much appreciated if the invitation could take the form of a working lunch. Lord Carrington would himself propose to call on the King during his stay.

I should be grateful if you could let me know the Prime Minister's views. The King has asked the Ambassador to inform him at once if there is any difficulty over the proposed dates.

Yours etc

A friend and

Paul


P Lever
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

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
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