PART 5

Confidential Filing

The Situation in the Middle East.

MIDDLE EAST

Part 1: May 1979
Part 5: September 1986

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~2.9.80~~		~~9.1.81~~					
~~3.1.80~~		~~12.1.81~~					
~~4.9.80~~		~~15.1.81~~					
~~6.9.80~~		~~26.1.81~~					
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8-12-80							
~~11.12.80~~							
~~5.1.81~~							

PREM 19/530

PART 5 ends:-

Summary of PLO Terrorist Activities

April 87.

PART 6 begins:-

Tel Aviv to Fro Tel 191 1/5.

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC (80) 33rd Conclusions, Minute 1	18.9.80
CC (80) 44th Conclusions, Minute 2	11.12.80
CC (81) 1st Conclusions, Minute 2	8.1.81
OD (81) 14	23.2.81

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed O Wayland Date 19 July 2011

PREM Records Team

R215 to covering letter

Middle East

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

SUMMARY OF PLO TERRORIST ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF ISRAEL

A statistical analysis of PLO terrorist activity the world over apart from Israel - in conjunction with the activity of international terrorist organizations maintaining ties with the PLO - reveals that, in the period between 23 July 1968 and 28 February 1981 -

(a) 281 acts of terror were perpetrated or attempted abroad; in which
(b) 316 persons were killed and 543 wounded;
(c) The PLO operated, or attempted to operate, in 50 countries, including West Germany (40 attacks), France (32), Britain (22), Italy (21), Turkey (20), Holland (13), Greece (12), and Belgium (8).
(D) 85% of the casualties suffered were by non-Israelis;
(e) 44 Israeli citizens were killed and 68 others wounded;
(f) 1973 was the peak year in international terrorist activity: in that year 50 attacks were attempted or perpetrated. Figures for other years:

1975	9 attacks
1976	23 attacks
1977	14 attacks
1978	25 attacks
1979	41 attacks
1980	20 attacks

PLO terror has been called indiscriminate. We may, more correctly, say that it is all too discriminate. The PLO terrorists almost always attack civilians who cannot, or do not have the means to, defend themselves: a nursery at Kibbutz Misgav Am, a busload of children at Avivim, high school youngsters on a holiday at Ma'alot, a Gaza holy man, holiday shoppers in a marketplace or passengers waiting to board a bus.

They carefully avoid attacking military installations or armed military personnel. PLO bombs and bullets have killed Arabs and Jews alike, foreigners and Israelis.

The figures presented below summarize PLO-caused casualties in terrorist attacks within Israel and abroad. The numbers, however, cannot express the anguish and suffering of the victims and their loved ones.

SUMMARY OF PLO TERRORIST ATTACKS IN ISRAEL (1965-1981)

AND THE ISRAEL-ADMINISTERED AREAS (1967-1981)

The following casualties were suffered by Jewish and Arab civilians in PLO terrorist acts perpetrated in Israel (1965 - 1 March 1981) and the Israel-administered areas (1967 - 1 March 1981):

Killed : 745

Wounded : 3817

A statistical breakdown of these figures reveals that, in the Gaza district alone, 281 Arabs have been killed - among them 59 women and 39 children, while another 1,499 have been wounded in such attacks - including 120 women and 245 children.

IIC/215/April 1981

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 19 APRIL 1981

PLO puts demands to Europe

THE Palestine Liberation Organisation has told the Dutch Foreign Minister that the European Middle East initiative will fail unless the 10 EEC countries make three major concessions, writes Sean Toolan from Damascus.

The demands, described by a PLO source as 'non-negotiable,' came towards the end of the week-long Palestine National Council meeting.

PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat met the Minister, Chris Van Der Klauw, on Friday. A PLO source said Arafat demanded complete recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinians, recognition that Palestinians can return to their homes in any part of Israel, occupied or not, and the full right of Palestine as a sovereign State.

Then apparently as Van Der Klauw was leaving, Arafat added another demand: that all negotiations be based on the original United Nations resolution of 1947 that was the start of the Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Van Der Klauw had apparently hoped that the Palestinians could be persuaded, if not to recognise Israel, at least to say they were not intent on its destruction. The Palestinians turned that down.

Arafat is reported to have told Van Der Klauw: 'We have given enough concessions.

GRS 564
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 301130Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 OF 30 APRIL
AND TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, TUNIS.
REPEATED TO (FOR INFO) JEDDA, ALGIERS, ABU DHABI, UKMIS NEW YORK.
SAVING TO (FOR INFO) WASHINGTON, EC POSTS.
YOUR TELNO 179: LEBANON

1. I AGREE THAT THE SITUATION HAS MOVED ON. I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED NOW AT THE NEW ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN THE FIGHING AROUND ZAHLE (YOUR TELNO 182 AND FF). I NOTE YOU CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT DELIBERATELY SEEK MAJOR HOSTILITIES. BUT I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THIS IS A SERIOUS NEW STEP WHICH, TAKEN WITH THE HIGH LEVEL OF THEIR ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH, I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN LET PASS.

2. IDEALLY I WOULD PREFER AN EC DEMARCHE BUT EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THIS CANNOT BE ARRANGED SUFFICIENTLY QUICKLY. PLEASE THEREFORE YOURSELF SPEAK TO THE MFA MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

(A) WE ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE ADMITTED ATTACK ON SYRIAN HELICOPTERS. THIS IS A POTENTIALLY VERY DANGEROUS INTERVENTION IN A VOLATILE SITUATION. IT IS A GROSS INFRINGEMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

(B) THE OBJECTIVE OF US ALL SHOULD BE TO COOL THE SITUATION TO ENABLE ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL CONCILIATION TO SUCCEED. WE ARE SPEAKING TO THE SYRIANS AND OTHERS TO THE SAME EFFECT.

(C) WE ARE CONCERNED THAT ISRAELI SUPPORT, BOTH POLITICAL AND MATERIAL, FOR CHRISTIANS IN THE NORTH SERVES TO WEAKEN RATHER THAN OTHERWISE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY WHICH IT SHOULD BE THE PRIME OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO STRENGTHEN. SUCH SUPPORT RUNS COUNTER TO DECLARED OBJECTIVE OF ISRAELI POLICY TO SEE THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON MAINTAINED.

(D) THE ISRAELIS KNOW WELL OUR VIEWS ON THEIR ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH LEBANON. THE INCREASED LEVEL OF THEIR ATTACKS THERE OVER THE LAST WEEK WHILE THE FIGHTING IN THE NORTH CONTINUES

INTENSIFIES THE RISKS OF ESCALATION.

3. YOU SHOULD INFORM YOUR EC COLLEAGUES OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

4. FOR DAMASCUS. PLEASE SPEAK TO THE MFA AND DESCRIBE THE ACTION BEING TAKEN WITH THE ISRAELIS. YOU SHOULD UNDERLINE MY CONCERN THAT THE SYRIANS SHOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND PRESS THE URGENCY OF ACHIEVING A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

5. FOR BEIRUT. PLEASE INFORM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OF THE ACTION BEING TAKEN. PLEASE ALSO INFORM THE PHALANGE AND DO WHAT YOU CAN TO CONVINCE THEM THAT RESTRAINT ON THEIR PART (E.G. IN RESPECT OF BEIRUT AIRPORT) IS NEEDED. WE WERE ENCOURAGED TO LEARN OF THEIR INTEREST IN THE KUWAIT CONFERENCE.

6. FOR KUWAIT. PLEASE INFORM THE KUWAITIS OF THE ACTION BEING TAKEN, AND THANK THEM FOR THE INFORMATION THEY HAVE GIVEN YOU. YOU MAY SAY THAT I AM KEEN TO HELP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, BUT THAT OBJECTIONS TO 'INTERNATIONALISATION' OF THE PROBLEM IMPLY THAT IT IS FOR RESPONSIBLE ARAB STATES TO TAKE THE LEAD.

7. FOR MOSCOW. UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION, PLEASE GIVE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AN OUTLINE OF THE ACTION WE ARE TAKING AND ASK THEM WHETHER THEY SEE ANY WAY OF GETTING THE SYRIANS TO OBSERVE RESTRAINT.

8. FOR TUNIS (TUNIS TELNO 69). PLEASE SAY TO KLIBI THAT WE ARE URGING RESTRAINT ON ALL THE PARTIES BUT THAT WE BELIEVE THAT ACTION BY THE ARAB LEAGUE AND RESPONSIBLE ARAB STATES IS NEEDED TO CALM THINGS DOWN INSIDE LEBANON, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THIS VIEW IS SHARED BY SOME OF THE ARAB STATES.

9. FOR ALL. WE ARE TAKING ACTION SEPARATELY TO ENGAGE THE AMERICANS, WHO ARE ALREADY ACTIVE ON SIMILAR LINES.

CARRINGTON

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O .
TELNO 1351 OF 30 APRIL 1981,
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, AMMAN, ROUTINE MOSCOW.

LEBANON

1. WHEN I CALLED ON DICK ALLEN TODAY, I TOUCHED ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. ALLEN SAID THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT YET KNOW WHETHER SOVIET ADVISORS HAD ACCOMPANIED THE SAM 6S INTO LEBANON. BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD THE MEANS TO ''TAKE OUT'' THE MISSILES IF THEY DECIDED TO DO SO, AND THAT THE DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO DO SO WAS LIKELY TO BE MADE OVERNIGHT.

2. ALLEN CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS RECENTLY BUT HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT THEIR REPRESENTATIONS HAD CUT ANY ICE. INDEED, THE AMERICANS WERE CONCEREND THAT THE RUSSIANS' ONLY INTEREST WAS IN EXACERBATING THE SITUATION, TO USE THE SYRIANS AS A MEANS OF GETTING BACK INTO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. THE AMERICANS HAD HAD SOME INFORMATION (THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT SURE HOW MUCH CREDENCE TO ATTACH TO IT) THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD TOLD THE SYRIANS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO MATCH ISRAELI ACTION AT EACH POINT AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD RE-SUPPLY THEM WITH ARMS: AND THAT THEY HAD HELD OUT THE PROSPECT OF SOME SOVIET NAVAL MOVEMENT INTO THE REGION.

HENDERSON

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GR520
CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA 301304Z APR 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 319 OF 30TH APRIL 1981
REPEATED ROUTINE BONN, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, MODUK.
SAVING TO ALL OTHER EEC POSTS, ALL GULF POSTS, MOSCOW.

WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA.

1. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON 28 APRIL. HE SAID HE WAS GREATLY RELIEVED: THE ARMS HAD BEEN REFUSED, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, AND THERE HAD BEEN NO DAMAGE TO GERMAN-SAUDI FRIENDSHIP. THE WELCOME AND THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN CORDIAL AND PRINCE FAHD HAD ATTENDED A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE SO AS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT RELATIONS WERE UNHARMED. BUT WESTERING HAD THE IMPRESSION (AND SOME EVIDENCE) THAT PRINCE ABDULLAH (NATIONAL GUARD AND 2ND DEPUTY PM) AND PRINCE SULTAN (DEFENCE) WERE NOT SO HAPPY WITH THE OUTCOME.

2. SCHMIDT HAD EXPLAINED TO FAHD THAT GERMAN LAWS FORBADE THE EXPORT OF ARMS TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE NATO. THESE LAWS WERE THE RESULT OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDE FORMED BY TWO WORLD WARS. THEY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST. ARMS HAD BEEN REFUSED FOR EXAMPLE TO THE SHAH. EXCEPTIONS WERE POSSIBLE BUT THE QUESTION OF A CHANGE OF PRINCIPLES HAD FIRST TO BE EXAMINED. THIS WOULD MEAN A BIG DEBATE AND PARLIAMENT AT THE MOMENT WAS ''SENSITIZED'' ON THIS ISSUE. HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE SAUDIS WOULD NOT EMBARRASS HIM NOW. IF THEY PRESSED FOR AN ANSWER IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ''NO''. BUT A SALE WAS NOT EXCLUDED ''IN FUTURE YEARS''. FAHD HAD THEREUPON SAID HE WOULD DROP THE MATTER. FRIENDSHIP WAS MORE IMPORTANT.

3. THE TWO LEADERS HAD THEN AGREED ON A FORMULA FOR THE PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD RAISED THE MATTER AND EXPLAINED THE GERMAN POSITION. THIS ENABLED THE SAUDIS TO AVOID THE PUBLIC APPEARANCE OF HAVING A REQUEST DENIED.

4. PALESTINE. SCHMIDT HAD TOLD FAHD THAT EUROPE WAS NOT ALTOGETHER HAPPY ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF CAMP DAVID. BUT IT WAS THE INITIATIVE OF THEIR ALLY AND THEY HAD THEREFORE NOT CONDEMNED IT. HENCE THE VENICE DECLARATION, WHICH WAS INTENDED NOT TO HAMPER CAMP DAVID BUT TO PRODUCE SOME PROGRESS WITHOUT PROVOKING A CONFLICT WITH THE U.S. EUROPE INTENDED TO STRESS SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING ''THE RIGHT TO DECIDE WHO TOOK CARE OF THEIR INTERESTS. THE P.L.O. WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ARABS WOULD HAVE TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WITHIN SECURE BOUNDARIES. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ''ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242''. THE FORTHCOMING EURO-ARAB MINISTERIAL MEETING COULD DISCUSS MORE PRECISE FORMULAS.

/5.

5. FAHD HAD AGREED WITH ALL THIS AND HAD EXPLAINED SAUDI OPPOSITION TO CAMP DAVID. HE HAD EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR A GENEVA CONFERENCE OF ALL PARTIES '' IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED WITH THE QUESTION''. HE HAD NOT DEFINED THOSE PARTIES. THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL IN THE AREA AS A NORMALITY COULD BE GUARANTEED, BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF ARAB RIGHTS. FAILURE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM WOULD INCREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE WITH SYRIA AND THE P.L.O. IT WAS WRONG TO PUSH THE P.L.O. TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL, FOR SUCH RECOGNITION WOULD TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF ISRAEL.

6. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE SCHMIDT HAD AFFIRMED THE EUROPEAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND HAD ADDED, AS ''A PERSONAL ACCENT'', THAT THIS PROBABLY MEANT THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE THEMSELVES AS A STATE.

7. SEE MY 3 I.F.T.'S.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

CRAIG

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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Middle East

GR 500 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FM TEL AVIV 300645Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 186 OF 30 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DI4), WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND ROUTINE
AMMAN

MY TELEGRAM NO 185. LEBANON.

1. AN IDF SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED LAST NIGHT THAT ISRAEL HAD EVIDENCE THAT SAM MISSILES HAD BEEN DEPLOYED BY SYRIA IN THE LEBANON. REPORTS THIS MORNING SUGGEST THAT SAM6'S AS WELL AS SAM 2'S ARE INVOLVED, AND ISRAEL IS SAID TO REGARD THIS AS AN ''EXTREMELY WERIOUSLY VIOLATION OF THE STATUS QUO.''
2. EARLIER YESTERDAY MICHAEL ELKINS WHO HAD GOOD IDF CONTACTS WAS TOLD THAT WHEN THE ISRAELIS SHOT DOWN THE TWO HELICOPTERS ON 28 APRIL THERE WERE OTHER TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY INCLUDING HELICOPTERS IN THE AIR AND AIRCRAFT ON THE GOUND AT RAYAKH WHICH WERE DELIBERATELY NOT ATTACKED. THE SUGGESTION WAS THAT ISRAELI ACTION ON 28 APRIL HAD BEEN MEASURE.
3. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT SOMETHING SAID BY A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 27 APRIL TO THE EFFECT THAT SYRIAN ACTION IN LEBANON HAD CHANGED THE STATUS QUO AT LEAST HELPED TO SPARK OFF ISRAELI ESCALATION. I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT SOME OF THE HARDLINERS HERE HAD BEEN MAKING THIS POINT, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT REMARK SEEMS TO HAVE STRENGTHENED THEIR HAND.
4. WHATEVER THE US INTENDED IT LOOKS AS IF THE ISRAELIS WENT FURTHER THAN EXPECTED OR INTENDED. US AMBASSADOR'S DEPUTY, WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM ON HIS CALL ON BEGIN YESTERDAY, TOLD COUNSELLOR LAST NIGHT THAT BEGIN HAD BEEN IN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL AND BELIGERENT MOOD, DESCRIBING THE SYRIANS AS NAZIS BENT ON ANNIHILATING LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AS HILTER HAD LIQUIDATED EUROPE'S JEWS. BEGIN WOULD NOT PERMIT THE SYRIANS TO SUPPLY UNITS ON MOUNT LEBANON BY AIR. BEGIN HAD REFERRED TO INDICATIONS THAT THE SYRIANS WERE CONSIDERING INTRODUCING SAM 6'S (THE US EMBASSY ASKED US TO PRETECT THEM ON THIS POINT) AND SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE SAMS IF THE SYRIANS WENT AHEAD. BEGIN HAD COUPLED THESE WARNINGS WITH ASSURANCES THAT THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO WANT TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIA: IF THE CHRISTIANS MANAGED TO WORK OUT A MODUS VIVENDI WITH KHADDAM, SO MUCH THE BETTER. (US EMBASSY ASSESSMENT REMAINS THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL CONTINUE TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO AIR OPERATIONS OVER NORTH-CENTRAL LEBANON AND ARE NOT CONTEMPLATING LARGE SCALE GROUND INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF THE CHRISTIANS.)

/5. THE RISK

CONFIDENTIAL

5. THE RISK REMAINS THAT BEGIN'S COMMITMENT TO KEEP JOUNIEH OPEN AND ZIPPORI'S STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT ALLOW SYRIAN AIR ACTIVITY IN LEBANESE AIR SPACE (THE FIRST AT LEAST A VERY FAR REACHING IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE COMMITMENT) COUPLED WITH BEGIN'S INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST SAM MISSILES DEPLOYED IN THE LEBANON COULD LEAD TO FURTHER ESCALATION. BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT ISRAEL WOULD GAIN BY BEING DRAWN INTO SUBSTANTIAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH, AND CONTIMUING LIMITED IF SERIOUS INCIDENTS SEEM MORE LIKELY.

ROBINSON

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

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GRS 750
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FM TEL AVIV 301000Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 188 OF 30 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE

EC/MIDDLE EAST: DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE HAGUE MY DUTCH COLLEAGUE TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT VAN DER KLAAUW WAS PREPARED TO MAKE A SINGLE VISIT HERE BUT THAT THE ISRAELI PART OF THE VISIT WOULD BE ON 11 AND 12 MAY, AND HE WOULD STAY ON UNTIL 13 AND 14 MAY TO SEE PALESTINIAN PERSONALITIES, AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS. AFTER 12 MAY HE WOULD NOT WISH TO HAVE FURTHER CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS.

2. KIMCHE RESPONDED YESTERDAY THAT THE IDEA OF DIVIDING THE VISIT IN THIS WAY WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL. IT WAS ONE COUNTRY AND ONE GOVERNMENT AND ISRAEL WOULD ARRANGE ALL MEETINGS INCLUDING THOSE WITH PALESTINIANS, AND THE LATTER AND MEETINGS WITH ISRAELIS SHOULD BE INTERMINGLED THROUGHOUT THE FOUR DAYS THERE SHOULD BE A WORKING SESSION WITH ISRAELIS AT THE END OF THE VISIT, AND ISRAELIS WOULD ALSO ARRANGE A HELICOPTER TOUR OF THE WEST BANK AS THEY HAD DONE FOR THORN.

3. MY DUTCH COLLEAGUE POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT THE WAY THORN'S VISIT HAD BEEN MANAGED. KIMCHE SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN A MISTAKE AND COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A PRECEDENT. KIMCHE DID NOT OBJECT TO MEETINGS WITH PALESTINIANS TAKING

KIMCHE DID NOT OBJECT TO MEETINGS WITH PALESTINIANS TAKING PLACE IN OUR CONSULATE GENERAL, BUT HE REITERATED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD MAKE ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS.

4. MY DUTCH COLLEAGUE HAS REPORTED ACCORDINGLY TO THE HAGUE AND HAS ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS. EC HEADS OF MISSIONS HERE DISCUSSED THIS MORNING. DUTCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT ACCORDING TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS, ALL THEN, BUT PARTICULARLY BRITAIN AND FRANCE (UNFORTUNATELY ILL-REPRESENTED THIS MORNING) HAD INSISTED THAT, IF WE WERE TO MAKE THE CONCESSION OF OFFERING ONE VISIT RATHER THAN TWO IT WOULD ONLY BE ON THE CONDITION THAT THERE WAS A CLEAR DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND THE PALESTINIAN SECTIONS OF THE VISIT. THIS HAD INDEED BEEN KIMCHE'S OWN SUGGESTION TO MY DUTCH COLLEAGUE.

5. WITH SUPPORT FROM THE GERMAN CHARGE I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE ''ONE COUNTRY, ONE GOVERNMENT'' ARGUMENT: THAT A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO SETS OF THE VISITS WAS ESSENTIAL: AND TO ALLOW THE ISRAELIS TO ARRANGE ANY PALESTINIAN PART OF THE PROGRAMME, OR TO CARRY OUT SUCH PROGRAMME UNDER THEIR AUSPICES, WOULD RESULT IN A SERIOUS SACRIFICE OF PRINCIPLE WITHOUT ANY RETURN SINCE NO PALESTINIAN WOULD ACCEPT TO MEET WITH THE DUTCH MINISTER IN THESE CONDITIONS. WHEN THE ISRAELIS HAD TALKED OF OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF THORN MEETING THE PALESTINIANS (HE WOULD NEED A BATTALION OF TROOPS TO ENSURE HIS SECURITY IF HE TRAVELLED ON THE WEST BANK, AND PALESTINIANS MIGHT NOT BE ALLOWED TO VISIT JERUSALEM TO SEE HIM) THE ISRAELIS HAD GIVEN WAY WHEN THORN DUG HIS HEELS IN. IF ISRAEL WAS THIS TIME PREPARED TO FACE THE ODIUM OF BEING SEEN PUBLICLY TO PREVENT THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER SEEING PALESTINIANS ON THE SAME CONDITIONS AS THORN HAD DONE, THAT WOULD BE THEIR AFFAIR.

6. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR WOULD REPORT A CONSENSUS VIEW FROM HERE THAT NO FURTHER CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO THE ISRAELIS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A CLEARLY DIVIDED VISIT, NOR ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING PALESTINIANS THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF EC COUNTRIES OF CONSULS GENERAL IN JERUSALEM. BUT I UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE PUTTING IT ABOUT THAT VAN DE KLAAUW IS FED UP WITH HIS EC MISSION AND COULD BE BROUGHT TO COMPROMISE. YOU MAY THEREFORE SEE ADVANTAGE IN ACTION TO STIFFEN UP THE DUTCH WHICH WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE, TO BE EFFECTIVE, READINESS TO SEE HIS VISIT HERE COLLAPSE ALTOGETHER IF THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT MOVE.

ROBINSON

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FM BEIRUT 290850Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 OF 29 APRIL 1981
INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, MODUK (FOR DI4) AND TEL AVIV

LEBANON.

1. ON 28 APRIL I VISITED EAST BEIRUT AND HAD LUNCH WITH AMIN GEMAYEL. WE WERE JOINED BY FATHER BULOS NAAMAN, HEAD OF THE MARONITE ORDER OF MONKS AND MEMBER OF THE KATAEB POLITICAL BUREAU. HE HAS RECENTLY VISITED SYRIA FOR TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, WHO IS NOW IN LEBANON. IN THE COURSE OF THESE AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED.

2. THERE ARE FOUR MILITARY POSITIONS ON MOUNT SANNIN: GHURFAT AL FRANZAWIYA (GRID REFERENCE 6458 CAPTURED BY THE SYRIANS FROM THE KATAEB) - MZAR (GRID REFERENCE 6262 NOW HELD BY THE LEBANESE ARMY) - AND THE COL OF THE FARAYA-BAALBEK ROAD WITH THE SYRIANS AT THE EAST END (7066) OVERLOOKING THE BEKAA AND THE LEBANESE ARMY HOLDING THE WEST END (6867). WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHETHER KHADDAM WILL INSIST ON TAKING OVER THE WHOLE OF SANNIN WHICH THE KATAEB ALLEGE IS HIS AIM, WHETHER HE WILL AGREE TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO, OR WHETHER HE MIGHT EVEN AGREE TO THE LEBANESE ARMY HOLDING THE PLATEAU. AMIN GEMAYEL STATES THAT FOR THEIR PART THEY WOULD AGREE TO THE ARMY HOLDING THE PLATEAU AND THAT THE KATAEB WILL BE MODERATE IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH KHADDAM.

3. WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT BASHIR GEMAYEL PAID A QUICK VISIT TO ISRAEL ON 26 APRIL. WE ASSUME THAT IT WAS TO OBTAIN ISRAELI SUPPORT DURING THE PERIOD OF KHADDAM'S NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE KATAEB WERE NOT PUSHED TOO FAR AND WE MAY EQUALLY ASSUME THAT THE LAST TWO DAYS OF ISRAELI AIR ACTIVITY ARE IN REPLY TO THIS REQUEST. THE SHOOTING DOWN OF HELICOPTERS IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT SINCE IT INDICATES TO THE SYRIANS THAT THEY CANNOT RESUPPLY ISOLATED MOUNTAIN AREAS IF THE ISRAELIS CHOOSE NOT TO PERMIT THIS. KATAEB CASUALTIES IN THE MOUNTAIN FIGHTING HAVE IN FACT BEEN LIGHT. THE KATAEB ADMIT TO A TOTAL OF 17 KILLED, BUT THEIR MORALE OVERALL HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY SHAKEN.

4. WE CANNOT PREDICT HOW THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WILL GO. THERE IS AN AIR OF DESPERATE OPTIMISM. IT WILL NOT AT BEST BE POSSIBLE IN A 48 HOUR PERIOD FOR THEM TO RESULT IN MORE THAN A REDUCTION IN TENSION AND THE BEGINNING OF TALKS BETWEEN THE FACTIONS. PIERRE GEMAYEL HAD TWO HOURS WITH KHADDAM. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AND OPTIMISM, AND HOPED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WOULD BE REFLECTED ON THE GROUND. CAMILLE CHAMOUN SAID HE WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. THE ISRAELI INTERVENTION MAY, ON THE ONE HAND, FORTIFY THE KATAEB AND ON THE OTHER MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SYRIANS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WITHOUT RISKING A LOSS OF FACE. AT ALL EVENTS IT IS A DANGEROUS STEP WHICH RISKS SPOILING THE VERY DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. ON THE EVENING OF 28 APRIL ZAHLE WAS AGAIN SHELLED BY THE SYRIANS. THIS IS SEEN AS A REACTION TO THE LOSS OF THEIR HELICOPTERS. THE TWO CHRISTIAN MINISTERS FROM ZAHLE HAVE PROVISIONALLY TENDERED THEIR RESIGNATIONS AND A MINISTER OF STATE FOR ZAHLE HAS EXPRESSED HIS SOLIDARITY. IF THERE IS ANY HEADWAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WE WOULD EXPECT THESE RESIGNATIONS TO BE WITHDRAWN.

6. BEIRUT IS QUIET ALTHOUGH ISRAELI AIRCRAFT HAVE AGAIN OVERFLOWN THIS MORNING.

MOORE.
BT

SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/CC TO PM NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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TO PRIORITY FCO
INFO TO PRIORITY BEIRUT DAMASCUS TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 69 OF 29 APRIL 81
SAVING TO WASHINGTON

LEBANON

1. THE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD ME YESTERDAY EVENING HE HAD RECEIVED DISTRESSING REPORTS FROM LEBANON, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE SITUATION HAD DETERIORATED FRIGHTENINGLY AND THAT THE POPULATION WAS CLOSE TO PANIC AFTER LATEST ISRAELI RAIDS. KLIBI ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT AN URGENT APPEAL ON HIS BEHALF TO LORD CARRINGTON FOR HMG TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE WHEREVER SEEMED ADVISABLE IN ORDER TO SECURE RESTRAINT AND AVERT FURTHER BLOODSHED. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL TO BE INFORMED OF WHATEVER ACTION HMG FELT ABLE TO TAKE.
2. I UNDERTOOK TO FORWARD HIS MESSAGE. I SAID THAT WE TOO WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE SITUATION AND THAT IT WAS FOR ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO SHOW RESTRAINT.

FCO PLSE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON

STIRLING

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 184 OF 29 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT DAMASCUS WASHINGTON ROUTINE AMMAN

MIPT: LEBANON

1. ISRAEL CLEARLY BASES HER ACTION YESTERDAY ON HER CLAIM THAT THE UNWRITTEN STATUS QUO WAS BROKEN ON THE SYRIAN SIDE, AND BEGIN WANTED TO IMPLY THAT ISRAEL'S ACTION HAD ONLY BEEN DECIDED ON WHEN THE AMERICANS HAD FAILED TO RESTRAIN THE SYRIANS.
2. WE CAN TAKE AT ITS FACE VALUE BEGIN'S STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT WAR WITH SYRIA NOT TO DRIVE SYRIA OUT OF THE LEBANON. BUT ISRAEL HAS NOW DRAWN THE LINE DANGEROUSLY FAR NORTH AND IN PUBLIC. PERHAPS ISRAEL FEELS CONFIDENT THAT SYRIA WILL ACCEPT THE NEW POSITION AND LEAVE THE SANNINE AND ACCESS TO JOUNYNEH TO THE CHRISTIANS. BUT BEGIN'S REMARKS LAST NIGHT COMMIT ISRAEL PUBLICLY TO KEEPING JOUNYNEH OPEN. THIS IS A SERIOUS NEW STEP AND CONTROL OVER THE NEXT STEP HAS PASSED FROM ISRAELI TO SYRIAN HANDS. DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER ZIPPORI'S COMMENT LAST NIGHT THAT ''ISRAEL WILL NOT TOLERATE SYRIAN ACTIVITY IN LEBANESE SKIES'' COULD ORDINARILY HAVE BEEN DISCOUNTED FROM A KNOWN HARDLINER. BUT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT MAY MAKE A RESTRAINED SYRIAN REACTION THAT MUCH HARDER.

ROBINSON

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FM TEL AVIV 290630Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 183 OF 29 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT DAMASCUS WASHINGTON ROUTINE AMMAN

MY TELEGRAM NO 182: LEBANON

1. IN AN INTERVIEW LAST NIGHT BEGIN CONFIRMED THAT THE ISRAELI AIRFORCE HAD SHOT DOWN A SECOND SYRIAN HELICOPTER (APPARANTLY ABOUT 1600Z) YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. ISRAELI SPOKESMEN HAVE CATEGORICALLY DENIED REPORTS THAT THEIR PLANES ATTACKED SYRIAN GROUND POSITIONS.

2. BEGIN REITERATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT LET SYRIA WIPE OUT THE CHRISTIANS IN LEBANON. ISRAEL'S AIM WAS TO PREVENT THE SYRIANS FROM TAKING CONTROL OF THE SANNINE BECAUSE THIS WOULD ENABLE SYRIA TO DENY TO THE CHRISTIANS THE USE OF JOUNYEH THROUGH WHICH THEIR SUPPLIES HAD TO PASS, BEGIN SAID THAT ISRAEL COULD TAKE STEPS BEYOND SHOOTING DOWN THE TWO HELICOPTERS. BUT HE EMPHASISED THAT ISRAEL HAD NO DESIRE TO GO TO WAR WITH SYRIA. IT WOULD NOT HAVE INTERVENED AS IT HAD IF SYRIA HAD MAINTAINED THE STATUS QUO INSIDE LEBANON. BEGIN HOPED THAT SYRIA AND THE PLO WOULD QUIT LEBANON. BUT IT WAS NOT ISRAEL'S INTENTION TO DRIVE SYRIA OUT BUT RATHER TO PREVENT SYRIA SEIZING THE WHOLE COUNTRY AND ANNIHILATING THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY.

3. BEGIN ALSO SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE SYRIA TO HALT ITS OFFENSIVE, AND REFERRED TO A US APPROACH TO DAMASCUS ON 27 APRIL. BUT SYRIA HAD NOT LISTENED. ISRAELI OFFICIAL SOURCES HERE ARE SAYING THAT THE USE OF AIRCRAFT BY THE SYRIANS IN FIGHTING IN THE LEBANON ''VIOLATED A CLEARLY DEFINED STATUS QUO WHICH HAS EXISTED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE SYRIANS IN LEBANON SINCE 1978 AND THUS COULD NOT BE IGNORED.'' REPORTS ARE SAID TO HAVE REACHED ISRAEL ON 24 APRIL THAT THE SYRIANS WERE USING ATTACK HELICOPTERS AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS, AND WHEN THESE WERE CONFIRMED IT WAS DECIDED TO ACT LESS THE SYRIANS INTERPRET A LACK OF ISRAELI RESPONSE AS AGREEMENT THAT THE STATUS QUO NO LONGER APPLIED.

ROBINSON

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FM WASHINGTON 292235Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1337 OF 29 APRIL 1981
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, ROUTINE AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS

TEL AVIV TELNO 184: LEBANON

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT LEWIS POINTED OUT TO BEGIN IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON AND URGED THE ISRAELIS TO SHOW RESTRAINT. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, THREATEN ANY US SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL IF THE ISRAELIS FAILED TO COMPLY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT THINK THAT THIS MAY ACCOUNT FOR THE ISRAELIS' REFERENCE TO NO PRESSURE OF ANY KIND. BEGIN CONTINUED TO TAKE THE LINE THAT THE SYRIANS SHOULD PULL BACK AND THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT PERMIT A MASSACRE OF LEBANESE CHRISTIANS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN STRESSED TODAY THAT THE AMERICAS HAD NOT GIVEN THE GREEN LIGHT FOR ISRAELI AIRSTRIKES IN LEBANON.

2. THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE SEVERAL DEMARCHES TO THE SYRIANS AND THE SAUDIS. THE SAUDIS HAVE SPOKEN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF REVIVING THE [illegible] BRINGING TOGETHER THE LEBANESE. THE SYRIANS

2. THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE SEVERAL DEMARCHES TO THE SYRIANS AND THE SAUDIS. THE SAUDIS HAVE SPOKEN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF REVIVING THE BEIT EL DIN CONFERENCE, BRINGING TOGETHER THE LEBANESE, THE SYRIANS AND THE SAUDIS. THE SYRIANS HAVE NOT BEEN VERY RESPONSIVE, THOUGH THEY HAVE SAID THAT THEY WANT A POLITICAL NOT A MILITARY SOLUTION. THEY HAVE ASSURED THE AMERICANS THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF ENTERING THE CHRISTIAN HEARTLAND OF METN BUT HAVE GIVEN NO INDICATION OF WHAT THEY INTEND TO DO NEXT. THEY CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT THE KATAEB HAVE DISTURBED THE STATUS QUO BY TAKING UP NEW POSITIONS IN THE MOUNTAINS AND THAT THEY ARE RIGHT TO DISLODGE THEM.

3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT PROFESS TO SEE SOME SLIGHT GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM IN KHADDAM'S CONTACTS IN LEBANON OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS. BUT THEY BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE SYRIANS TO BACK DOWN IN THE FACE OF ISRAELI MILITARY INTERVENTION. THE AMERICANS SAY THAT ISRAELI OVER-FLIGHTS OF ALL PARTS OF LEBANON CONTINUED THROUGHOUT TODAY AND THAT THERE WAS AN ISRAELI AIR STRIKE AT FOUR LOCATIONS NEAR NABATIYE. THE RISK OF FURTHER CLASHES BETWEEN THE ISRALIS AND SYRIANS REMAINS ACUTE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

SECRET MFJ

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29 April 1981

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 27 April about contacts between the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO.

MODBA

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

GR 350
UNCLASSIFIED
FM TEL AVIV 280935Z APR 81
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 180 OF 28 APRIL
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON AND JEDDA

MY TEL NO 165: ISRAEL/UK

1. THE ISRAELI PRESS HAS CONTINUED ITS CRITICAL TONE IN COMMENTING ON BRITAIN, AND ESPECIALLY ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF, IN THE LAST WEEK. SOME OF THE COMMENT IS PRETTY OFFENSIVE.

2. YEDIOT OF 22 APRIL WRITES ''BEHOLD MRS THATCHER DRESSED IN THE LATEST SAUDI FASHION, HER FACE CREASED IN THE SWEETEST OF SMILES, UTTERING APOLOGETICS AND PRAISE WITHOUT END FOR THE PLO''. MAARIV THE FOLLOWING DAY COMMENTS ''THATCHER WHO BROOKS NO COMPROMISES WHEN IT COMES TO FIGHTING TERRORISM IN BRIXTON AND BELFAST SURRENDERS TO SAUDI TERMS DEMANDING THAT ISRAEL MAKES COMPROMISES WITH PALESTINIAN TERROR. MOREOVER SHE DOES THIS EVEN BEFORE THE ARMS DEALS SHE SO DESPERATELY WANTS ARE SIGNED.'' DAVAR ON 26 APRIL SAYS THE PRIME MINISTER IS ''DETERMINED TO REPAIR BRITAIN'S CRUMBLING ECONOMY BY EXPORTING ARMS FOR PETRODOLLARS, UNCONCERNED THAT SHE IS ALSO UPSETTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. AND WHILE THATCHER DONS THE ISLAMIC VEIL, A MEMBER OF HER GOVERNMENT IS NOT ASHAMED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT AGAINST ISRAEL'S AID TO THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS. EVERYTHING IS PERMITTED TO THIS BRITISH ANGLICAN WOMAN IN HER ATTEMPTS TO SELL SOPHISTICATED PLANES TO THE PERSIAN GULF STATES. SOON CARRINGTON WILL ASSUME PRESIDENCY O THE EC AND SMILE AT ARAFAT IN HIS ATTEMPTS TO BREATHE LIFE INTO THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.'' THE SAME PAPER EARLIER COMMENTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN SAUDI ARABIA ''WITH A STRONG DOSE OF HUMILIATION. THIS IS APPARENTLY THE FATE OF BANKRUPTS. MEANWHILE LORD CARRINGTON IS CONTINUING HIS WOOING OF THE PLO AS PART OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR SAUDI FAVOURS.''

3. THE LONDON CORRESPONDENTS OF HA'ARETZ AND DAVAR REPORTED ON 23 APRIL THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERATION OF SOME FORM OF JOINT PRODUCTION BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SAUDI ARABIA OF A SOPHISTICATED FIGHTER PLANE FOR THE SAUDIS.99

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES
ROBINSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
To note.

27 April 1981

Dear Michael,

The Prime Minister will wish to be aware of the possibility that a meeting between Egyptian officials, representatives of the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO may take place in this country after the Israeli elections.

The background is that Mr John Mroz, a representative of the International Peace Academy, a New York-based foundation specializing in peacekeeping studies, has been acting as a messenger between the Egyptians, the Labour Party leadership (Peres and Eban) and Yasser Arafat. He has been keeping both us and the US Government informed. He has told us that it has now been agreed to hold a preliminary Egyptian/Israeli/PLO meeting in Europe. Both meetings would take place in July/August. Their theme would ostensibly be the role of third parties in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Lord Carrington has, in response to a request from Mr Mroz, agreed in principle that we would be prepared to help with practical arrangements (ie, a secure venue, visas, etc.) to enable the second meeting to be held in the United Kingdom. HMG would not be sponsoring the meeting and would not be involved in any other way. It is the firm intention of all three participants that the meeting should receive absolutely no publicity, but Lord Carrington believes that if news of such a meeting leaked, our role in it would not be open to significant criticism and our interests would not suffer.

Lord Carrington is convinced that we should not be seen to discourage contacts of this kind. The meeting may not in the event take place, but even if it does not, the willingness of the Israeli Labour Party and PLO leadership to contemplate it is an encouraging, if in some ways surprising, sign of the private flexibility which exists on both sides. If the meeting does take place successfully, we may be able to help build on its results, including in the context of our Presidency of the Ten.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

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10 DOWNING STREET

27 April 1981

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister's Visit to the Gulf: Message to Chancellor Schmidt

I enclose a copy of the message which the Prime Minister sent to Chancellor Schmidt on Saturday evening about her visit to the Gulf. I understand a copy of the text has already been forwarded to HM Ambassador to Bonn by the Resident Clerk.

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T68A/81

Mr Tebbit.
We spoke. This is to go back to No 10.
Thatcher 22/4

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

(A)

DEAR HELMUT,

YOU WILL HAVE HAD AN ORAL REPORT THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR OF MY DISCUSSIONS IN RIYADH WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD AND SOME OF THE OTHER SAUDI MINISTERS, COVERING IN PARTICULAR THE LINE I TOOK WITH THEM OVER THE TORNADO AIRCRAFT. I THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT YOU MIGHT LIKE TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF MY IMPRESSIONS.

MY RECEPTION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE CORDIAL. THE SAUDIS WERE AT PAINS TO MAKE ME WELCOME. THE ATMOSPHERE OF OUR TALKS WAS EASY AND RELAXED.

PREDICTABLY THE SAUDIS URGED UPON ME THE NEED FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO RECOGNISE THE PLO AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE PALESTINE ISSUE WAS FOR THEM THE TOP PRIORITY WITH THE SOVIET THREAT, WHICH THEY ACKNOWLEDGE, AND INTER-ARAB DIFFERENCES, SOME WAY BEHIND.

MY REPLY WAS THAT WE DO RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THIS WAS NOT IN DOUBT. BUT THERE HAD TO BE A COUNTER-PART. AT PRESENT THE PALESTINIANS WERE COMMITTED IN THEIR COVENANT TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. WE BELIEVED THAT THE PALESTINIANS MUST RECOGNISE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST BEHIND SECURE BORDERS.

I URGED THE SAUDIS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE PALESTINIANS TO BRING ABOUT SUCH RECOGNITION. THE SAUDIS ARGUED THAT WHILE THEY OF COURSE ACCEPTED THE FACT OF ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE IN THE REGION, THEY COULD ONLY EXPECT THE PALESTINIANS TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF RECOGNITION WHEN THE ISRAELIS RECOGNISED THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND AND ACCEPTED THAT JERUSALEM SHOULD BE RESTORED TO ITS PRE-1967 STATE.

DESPITE THEIR FIRM LINE, I SENSED SOME FLEXIBILITY IN SAUDI THINKING. IN A SEPARATE DISCUSSION, THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD DOUGLAS HURD THAT IT WAS UP TO THE PALESTINIANS TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO. HE HINTED THAT THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT POSSIBLY BE PREPARED TO MOVE IF THE COMMUNITY COULD MAKE SOME GESTURE TOWARDS THEM.

I DO NOT WANT TO BUILD TOO MUCH ON THIS. BUT I BELIEVE THAT COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY WE SHOULD USE ALL OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE ARABS TO TRY AND BRING ABOUT SOME MOVE BY THE PALESTINIANS, PERHAPS IN THE FORM OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO BE COUCHED IN CONDITIONAL TERMS, EG IF ISRAEL WERE TO AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM TERRITORY OCCUPIED IN 1967, THEN THE PLO WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND SECURE BORDERS FOR ISRAEL AND INDEED FOR ALL STATES IN THE AREA.

I HOPE YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO URGE THE CASE FOR A MOVE ON THESE LINES. I AM INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT ONLY IF THE PALESTINIANS ARE PREPARED TO MAKE SOME SUCH GESTURE WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO GIVE THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES WHAT WE NEED TO BRING ABOUT A PARALLEL MOVE BY ISRAEL.

I HOPE YOU ENJOY YOUR VISIT. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR IMPRESSIONS.

MARGARET THATCHER

(8)

25 APRIL 1981

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CONFIDENTIAL. T 68A/81

Sent on hotline
25.4.1981

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT
(for despatch on the direct line)

Dear Helmut,

You will have had an oral ~~account~~ 2p.o/l through our Ambassador of my discussions in Riyadh with Crown Prince Fahd and some of the other Saudi Ministers, covering in particular the line I took with them over the Tornado aircraft. I thought however that you might like to have an account of my impressions.

My reception could not have been more cordial. The Saudis were at pains to make me welcome. The atmosphere of our talks was easy and relaxed.

Predictably the Saudis urged upon me the need for the European Community to recognise the PLO and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The Palestine issue was for them the top priority with the Soviet threat, which they acknowledge, and inter-Arab differences, some way behind.

My reply was that we do recognise the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. This was not in doubt. But there had to be a counter-part. At present the Palestinians were committed in their Covenant to the destruction of Israel. We believed that the Palestinians must recognise Israel's right to exist behind secure borders.

I urged the Saudis to use their influence with the Palestinians to bring about such recognition. The Saudis argued that while they of course accepted the fact of Israel's existence in the region, they could only expect the Palestinians to move in the direction of recognition when the Israelis recognised the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland and accepted that Jerusalem should be restored to its pre-1967 state.

Despite their firm line, I sensed some flexibility in Saudi thinking. In a separate discussion, the Saudi Foreign Minister told Douglas Hurd that it was up to the Palestinians

/ to decide

to decide what to do. He hinted that the Palestinians might possibly be prepared to move if the Community could make some gesture towards them.

I do not want to build too much on this. But I believe that collectively and individually we should use all our influence with the Arabs to try and bring about some move by the Palestinians, perhaps in the form of a public statement. Such a statement ~~Such a move~~ would no doubt have to be couched in conditional terms, eg if Israel were to agree to withdraw from territory occupied in 1967, then the PLO would be prepared to negotiate a settlement on the basis of self-determination for the Palestinians and secure borders for Israel & indeed for all states in the area.

I hope you will feel able to urge the case for a move on these lines. I am increasingly convinced that only if the Palestinians are prepared to make some such gesture will it be possible to give the Americans and ourselves what we need to bring about a parallel move by Israel.

I hope you enjoy your visit. I look forward to hearing your impressions.

MARGARET THATCHER

25 April 1981

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 299 OF 24 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS TRIPOLI CAIRO

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO THE FRG

1. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED GENSCHER IF HE BELIEVED WHAT HAIG HAD REPORTED TO THE EFFECT THAT SADAT WAS READY TO QUOTE TAKE OUT UNQUOTE LIBYA. THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH MIGHT BE ENCOURAGING HIM. IF HE WERE SUCCESSFUL THAT WOULD BE CONVENIENT BUT FAILURE WOULD CREATE A MOST UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION. GENSCHER THOUGHT SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WOULD POSE ENORMMOUS RISKS FOR SADAT WHO HAD ALREADY, ON ISRAEL, TAKEN GREAT RISKS FROM THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POINTS OF VIEW AND WAS, MOREOVER, STILL NOT OUT OF THE WOOD. HE DID NOT THINK SADAT WOULD BE PREPARED TO EMBARK ON SUCH A HIGH RISK COURSE IN REGARD TO LIBYA AND SUGGESTED ENQUIRIES SHOULD BE MADKE AT THE ROME MEETING ABOUT WHAT KIND OF GUARANTEES MIGHT HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO SADAT. HE AGREED WITH LORD CARRINGTON THAT SADAT WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE SUDAN.

2. WITH REGARD TO CHAD, LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT NIGERIA HAD HAD A BIG SET BACK IN ITS EFFORTS TOWARDS GETTING AN OAU FORCE TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM. HE DOUBTED THEY WOULD PURSUE THEIR EFFORTS FURTHER AND FELT THAT NO MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO GET THE LIBYANS OUT OF CHAD COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE OAU. PERHAPS HAIG AND FRANCOIS PONCET WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY.

TAYLOR

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 23 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON JEDDA ROUTINE CAIRO

MY TELEGRAM NO 158: US/ISRAEL AND AWACS

1. A FORMAL STATEMENT BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT YESTERDAY EXPRESSED PROFOUND REGRET AND UNRESERVED OPPOSITION TO THE SALE OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE STATEMENT SAID THAT THE SUPPLY OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY TO SAUDI ARABIA WILL UNDERMINE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND CREATE A GRAVE DANGER TO THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. SAUDI ARABIA TOTALLY REJECTED THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD, PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL.
2. THE DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER SUBSEQUENTLY SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD ''TURN TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO EXPLAIN THE ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT''. OFFICIAL SOURCES ARE SAYING THAT EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO BLOCK THE SALE THROUGH ACTION WITH ISRAEL'S FRIENDS IN CONGRESS AND ELSEWHERE. THERE HAS CLEARLY BEEN AN OFFICIAL BRIEFING HERE ON THE LINE THAT THIS ISSUE MAY BE A WATERSHED IN THE HITHERTO CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH THE NEW REGAN ADMINISTRATION, THAT THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ON THE ISSUE, AND THAT NO DEAL WILL BE STRUCK OVER COMPENSATION FOR THE AWACS SALE. ILLUSTRATING THE ARGUMENT THAT THE SALE OF AWACS IS DESTABILISING, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE EVENT OF AN ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE ATTACK, EVEN EXCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, ONE OF ISRAEL'S FIRST TARGETS WOULD BE THE AWACS AND THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE MAJOR RAMIFICATIONS ESPECIALLY AS AMERICAN CREW MEMBERS WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE ABOARD.
3. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAD WHAT THE ISRAELI SIDE SAYS WAS HIS MOST UNPLEASANT MEETING WITH BEGIN YESTERDAY.

SEE MIFT.

ROBINSON

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 23 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON JEDDA ROUTINE CAIRO

MIPT: US/ISRAEL AND AWACS

1. BEGIN PROBABLY SEES ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE IN MAKING A FIRM PUBLIC STAND OVER THIS ISSUE. HE KNOW THAT IT WILL NOT BE DECIDED FINALLY IN WASHINGTON BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS, SO HE CANNOT LOSE, AT LEAST ELECTORALLY. BUT IT IS HARD TO SEE ISRAEL SIMULTANEOUSLY FIGHTING REAGAN'S AWACS DECISION PUBLICLY AND MAINTAINING THAT THE NEW LOVE-IN WITH THE US HAS COME TO STAY. PERHAPS BEGIN CALCULATED, OR WAS ADVISED, THAT REAGAN'S DECISION COULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. THE SUDDEN AND SHARP REACTION HERE SUGGESTS SURPRISE AS WELL AS OPPOSITION.

ROBINSON

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 171 OF 23 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON ROUTINE JEDDA AND CAIRO

MY TELEGRAM NO 169: ISRAEL/US AND AWACS

1. MY US COLLEAGE, WITH WHOM I LUNCHED TODAY, ATTRIBUTES THE NEW TOUGH LINE HERE ON AWACS AS DUE TO A REVISED ISRAELI ESTIMATE OF THEIR CHANCES OF GETTING THE SALE BLOCKED BY CONGRESS RATHER THAN AS HAVING BEEN SPARKED OFF BY REAGAN'S DECISION.

2. LEWIS SAID THAT THE PROSPECTS, INCLUDING REPERCUSSIONS ON US/ISRAEL RELATIONS MORE GENERALLY, LOOKED MESSY FOR THE NEXT FOUR OR FIVE MONTHS.

3. LEWIS SPOKE OF THE OUTCOME OF ISRAEL'S ELECTIONS IN VERY OPEN TERMS, AND I DO NOT THINK THAT HE HAS BEEN FORECASTING RECENTLY THAT PERES'S VICTORY CAN BE ASSUMED.

ROBINSON

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MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1250
AWACS: TALK WITH WEINBERGER
1. IN A CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT, WEINBERGER CONFESSED CONCERN AND SURPRISE AT AWACS DEVELOPMENTS. WHEN THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN RAISED WITH SHAMIR HERE IN FEBRUARY HE HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO THE SALE WOULD ONLY BE PRO FORMA. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE HAD STOKED THINGS UP. NO DOUBT IN ANY CASE THE ISRAELIS WOULD EXPECT TO GET SOMETHING EXTRA FOR THEMSELVES IF THE DEAL WENT THROUGH. BUT HE DID NOT THINK IT COULD SUCCEED IN CONGRESS. THERE WERE ALREADY 60 VOTES IN THE SENATE AGAINST: THERE WERE SUGGESTIONS FOR SPLITTING UP THE PACKAGE. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT HAIG WAS SHOWING A FIRM FRONT. YET THE ARAB WORLD WOULD REGARD THIS ISSUE AS A TOUCHSTONE OF US POLICY TOWARDS THEM. IF THE US GOVERNMENT WENT BACK ON THEIR DECISION THE ARABS WOULD SEE THIS AS EVIDENCE OF OVERWHELMING

US POLICY TOWARDS THEM. IF THE US GOVERNMENT WENT BACK ON THEIR DECISION THE ARABS WOULD SEE THIS AS EVIDENCE OF OVERWHELMING ISRAELI INFLUENCE. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE US ADMINISTRATION TO PUT THE SUBJECT TO THE SENATE AND BE DEFEATED, RATHER THAN NOT PROCEED WITH IT.

2. WEINBERGER REFERRED TO THE PM'S CURRENT VISIT TO THE REGION. HE THOUGHT TO HIMSELF THAT THE SAUDIS MIGHT WELL DECIDE TO GO FOR NIMRODS (QUOTE EXCELLENT PLANES UNQUOTE) AND FORGET AWACS.

3. THIS WAS A VERY PRIVATE CONVERSATION AND I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WEINBERGER'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESPECTED.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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PRIME MINISTER

to see

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From The Minister of State
Douglas Hurd CBE MP

18 April 1981

M/East

Dear Mr Gorst,

MH

attached

Thank you for your letter of 7 April to Lord Carrington. He has asked me to reply.

I fully understand your concern, and that of your constituents. This is indeed a difficult area, and it is important that there should be no misunderstanding about the Government's policy.

Our aim is to make a positive contribution towards a comprehensive and negotiated settlement providing guaranteed and recognised boundaries for Israel and self-determination for the Palestinians. For that aim to become a reality, it will be necessary for the Palestinians to accept Israel's right to a secure and independent future, and for Israel to recognise that the Palestinians must have a say in their own future. Unless these two fundamental principles are reconciled, there can be no peace in the Middle East. These are the principles of the Venice Declaration. The purpose of current European peace efforts is to narrow the differences between the two sides. We can only make progress in this direction if we talk to the parties concerned.

In the case of the Palestinians, including those in the West Bank and Gaza, the only body which can at present claim to have wide support is the Palestine Liberation Organisation. This is why we believe that if there is to be a negotiated settlement, the PLO will have to be associated with it. But if there is to be progress the PLO will have to change. They must abandon violence and they must, as you say, declare openly their willingness to live in peace with Israel.

Our contacts with the PLO which, as you will know from statements in the House, have been going on through officials for some time, are designed to bring about that change. There are at present no plans for Ministers to meet PLO representatives but, as the Prime Minister has made clear in the House, this may be necessary in the context of our Presidency of the European Ten in the second half of this year. You will know that Mr Thorn and Mr Van der Klaauw have both met Arafat in the course of taking forward the Ten's peace efforts. Any contacts we may have with the PLO will not of

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John Gorst Esq MP,
House of Commons.

course affect the position on official recognition, which is in our view appropriate only to States and not therefore to the PLO.

I should add that we see no contradiction between our approach to Middle East peace and our fundamental commitment to a secure and independent future for Israel. Indeed, Israel's right to such a future is the first principle of the Venice Declaration. I know the strong feelings which this matter arouses, and the amount of misunderstanding which exists, or has been created. If you would like to bring a group of your constituents to see me to discuss this further, I should be very glad to see them.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister and the Chief Whip.

Yours sincerely

pp

(Approved by Mr Hurd and signed for him in his absence abroad by his Assistant Private Secretary)

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TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 359 OF 13 APRIL 1981.
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELSNOS 176 AND 179: LEBANON

1. ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS OSTENSIBLY THEIR INITIATIVE, THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN WORKING HERE IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT HAIG AND FRANCOIS-PONCET AGREED IN PARIS ON THREE POINTS:

A) THERE SHOULD BE A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL;

B) CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO URGE THAT URQUHART SHOULD VISIT ZAHLEH (BY THE TIME THIS WAS DONE, URQUHART HAD ALREADY LEFT LEBANON);

C) IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO WORK CLOSELY WITH SARKIS, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT THE LEBANESE COULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE. (SARKIS HAS APPARENTLY TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT HE DOES NOT, WANT ANYTHING DONE UNTIL HE HAS MET THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER).

2. THE FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AND PETREE (UNITED STATES) MET THIS MORNING (13 APRIL) TO DISCUSS (A) ABOVE. LEPRETTE MADE CLEAR THAT THE FRENCH WERE READY TO BE FLEXIBLE. THEY COULD ACCEPT VIRTUALLY ANY FORMULA WHICH COULD BE QUICKLY AND EASILY AGREED. THE US MISSION HAVE ALSO TOLD US THAT FRANCOIS-PONCET

CLEAR THAT THE FRENCH WERE READY TO BE FLEXIBLE. THEY COULD ACCEPT VIRTUALLY ANY FORMULA WHICH COULD BE QUICKLY AND EASILY AGREED. THE US MISSION HAVE ALSO TOLD US THAT FRANCOIS-PONCET HAS WRITTEN TO HAIG TO CONFIRM THE POINTS AGREED IN PARIS AND TO SUGGEST THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD BEGIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THINGS COULD GO EVEN WORSE IN LEBANON. THEY HAVE NOT SEEN THE LETTER BUT UNDERSTAND THAT, WHILE THERE IS NO MENTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, FRANCOIS-PONCET REFERS TO THE POSSIBLE NEED TO ''INTERNATIONALISE'' THE PROBLEM, DESPITE SYRIAN OPPOSITION.

3. MEANWHILE, AT THE REQUEST OF THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS WHO CONTACTED HIM OVER THE WEEKEND, THE IRISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BEGAN INFORM CONSULTATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON. DORR TOLD ME THAT THE IDEA WAS THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

A) A CALL FOR RESTRAINT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE:

B) REAFFIRMATION OF THE NEED TO RESPECT THE INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT:

C) POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

DORR SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE HOW WILL (C) ABOVE WOULD TRAVEL. HE HAD NOT YET TRIED IT OUT ON WALDHEIM, WHO HAD CALLED HIM THIS MORNING. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD REFERRED BOTH TO URQUHART'S ACTIVITIES AND TO THOSE OF AKHUND, THE (PAKISTANI) COORDINATOR OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AID FOR LEBANON. WALDHEIM HAD APPEARED CAUTIOUS ABOUT INVOLVING URQUHART AND HAD PLACED EMPHASIS ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.

4. DORR SAID THAT OF THOSE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ALREADY CONSULTED, THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN THE MOST CAUTIOUS. THEY WANTED TO WAIT TO SEE WHAT INSTRUCTIONS TUENI BROUGHT BACK WITH HIM (HE RETURNS EARLY TOMORROW 14 APRIL). TROYANOVSKY HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL MIGHT BE ON ''SOFT GROUND'' IN DEALING WITH AN INTERNAL PROBLEM OF THIS KIND. HE HAD NOT HOWEVER STOPPED THE INITIATIVE IN ITS TRACKS. THE TUNISIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HE COULD LIVE WITH A STATEMENT, BUT THAT THE LESS ELABORATE IT WAS THE BETTER (SLIM HAS SPOKEN SIMILIARLY TO THE FRENCH). THE CURRENT LEBANESE LINE WAS THAT IT WAS UP TO THE COUNCIL TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR INTERNAL DIFFERENCES, THEY COULD NOT ASK THE COUNCIL TO TAKE ACTION.

5. ON TIMING, DORR SAID THAT HE HOPED TO PURSUE CONSULTATIONS TOMORROW AND PERHAPS EVEN TO HOLD A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL.

5. ON TIMING, DORR SAID THAT HE HOPED TO PURSUE CONSULTATIONS TOMORROW AND PERHAPS EVEN TO HOLD A FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. HE WOULD FIRST TALK TO TUENI. WE ADVISED HIM IF POSSIBLE TO CONFRONT THE RUSSIANS WITH A TEXT AGREED AMONG WESTERN AND NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. BOTH THE IRISH AND THE FRENCH HAVE PREPARED FIRST DRAFTS, NEITHER OF WHICH HAS BEEN CIRCULATED.

6. THE SOVIET PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAD TOLD ME EARLIER THAT, ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT TAKEN A POSITION, THERE WERE THREE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS:-

A) LEBANESE SUPPORT FOR ANY ACTION WAS A SINE QUA NON. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO SEE WHAT INSTRUCTIONS TUENI BROUGHT WITH HIM:

B) THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON:

C) THE POSITION OF THE ARAB GROUP, WHICH WAS NOT YET KNOWN.

7. THE RUSSIANS ARE CLEARLY GOING TO BE THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO ACTION BY THE COUNCIL. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO FINESSE THE LEBANESE INABILITY TO TAKE A CLEAR-CUT POSITION, PROVIDED THE THIRD WORLD MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL CAN BE BROUGHT ON BOARD.

8. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE SPOKEN TO DOBRYNIN IN WASHINGTON. HE TOOK A PREDICTABLE LINE ABOUT WESTERN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LEBANESE CRISIS BUT AGREED TO RECOMMEND THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD URGE RESTRAINT ON THE SYRIANS.

9. F C O PLEASE ADVANCE TO GRAHAM, J.C. MOBERLY AND NENAD.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 133 OF 12 APR

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 560 TO WASHINGTON, PARA 9: LEBANON

1. BRIAN URQUHART (UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL, UNITED NATIONS) AND A MEMBER OF HIS STAFF CALLED THIS MORNING. THEY HAD JUST SPENT 3 DAYS IN LEBANON, ARRIVED IN AMMAN LATE LAST NIGHT AND AHD SEEN BOTH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER EARLIER THIS MORNING. THEY GO TO JERUSALEM LATER TODAY AND PLAN TO ARRIVE IN DAMASCUS ON 15 APRIL BEFORE RETURNING TO NEWYORK ON 17 APRIL.

2. URQUHART (WHO EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS AND HAD NOT YET HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT HIS IDEAS TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL) WAS DISMAYED BY THE TURN EVENTS WERE TAKING IN LEBANON. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT IN HIS VIEW MR HAIG HAD ALMOST CERTAINLY SUCCEEDED IN PREVENTING A LARGESCALE ISRAELI INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, BUT THOUGHT THAT OTHER RECENT US AND ALSO FRENCH MOVES IN THE LEBANON DISPUTE WERE LARGELY WINDOW-DRESSING AND UNLIKELY TO HAVE ANY BENEFICIAL EFFECT. URQUHART THOUGHT THE SYRIANS WERE LOCKED INTO AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION AND WERE FEELING MORE ISOLATED THAN EVER. THEY HAD AS USUAL SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THEMSELVES AN EVEN WORSE PRESS THAN THEIR ACTIONS MERITED, ALTHOUGH HE REMARKED IN PARENTHESIS THAT THE SCALE OF THE SYRIAN BOMBARDMENT OF BEIRUT AND ZAHLE, SOME OF WHICH HE HAD WITNESSED WAS UNPARDONABLE.

3. GIVEN THE PRESENT SYRIAN SENSE OF ISOLATION, ITENSIFIED BY MY HAIG'S FAILURE TO VISIT DAMASCUS, URQUHART THOUGHT THE BEST WAY FORWARD MIGHT BE TO TRY TO FIND SOME FORMULA WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE SYRIANS AT LEAST TO GET THEIR FORCES OUT OF BEIRUT IF NOT OUT OF LEBANON ENTIRELY. HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY WHAT THE JORDANIANS HAD TOLD HIM CONCERNING THE LAST RENEWAL OF THE MANDATE OF THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE BY THE ARAB LEAGUE: ACCORDING TO THE JORDANIANS, THIS HAD ONLY BEEN AGREED THE LAST TIME BY ONE VOTE (WITH ALL THE MAJOR ARAB CONTRIBUTORS TO THE COST OF THE FORCE VOTING AGAINST) AND, WHEN THE MANDATE CAME UP FOR RENEWAL AGAIN IN JULY, IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE A MAJORITY IN FAVOUR. URQUHART WONDERED WHETHER, AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE ARAB STATES THEMSELVES MIGHT BE WILLING TO FIND A WAY IN WHICH THE SYRIANS COULD BE OFFERED A FACE-SAVING DEVICE TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES. HOWEVER, HE READILY AGREED WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT EVENTS MIGHT MOVE TOO QUICKLY FOR THIS PROCESS TO HAVE TIME TO WORK.

4. URQUHART HAD HIMSELF HEARD OF A SUGGESTION THAT HE MIGHT BE SENT TO THE LEBANON AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, BUT THOUGHT THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THERE WAS NOTHING WHATEVER HE COULD CONTRIBUTE AND THAT SUCH A MISSION WOULD BE ENTIRELY FUTILE.

5. I EXPLAINED TO URQUHART THAT, NOT HAVING SEEN ANY OF THE RECENT EXCHANGES ABOUT THE LEBANON WHICH I ASSUMED WERE GOING ON BETWEEN THE FCO AND OUR MISSIONS IN NEWYORK AND BEIRUT, I WAS ILL-PLACED TO COMMENT ON WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME, BUT THAT I WOULD CERTAINLY (AS HE HIMSELF ASKED) PASS ON HIS THOUGHTS IN THE HOPE THAT THKP MIGHT BE OF SOME VALUE TO YOU. I ALSO URGED HIM TO SEE MR WRIGHT IN DAMASCUS IF HE HAD TIME TO DO SO.

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TELNO 281 OF 12 APRIL 1981
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
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INFO SAVING TO SANAA

MR HAIG'S VISIT

1. AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES BEING HEAVILY COMMITTED TO VISITING SENATORS, HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED ON AMERICAN POLITICAL COUNSELLOR ON 11 APRIL FOR DEBRIEFING. BOVIS WAS NOT PRESENT WHEN HAIG MET CROWN PRINCE FAHD BUT WAS ON THE DELEGATION AND HAD SEEN ALL REPORTS, INCLUDING THAT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

2. THE VISIT HAD GONE WELL. ORIGINALLY PRINCE SAUD HAD BEEN BILLED AS HOST BUT FAHD HAD INSISTED ON TAKING OVER. IN ADDITION, HAIG HAD CALLED ON THE KING AND PRINCE ABDULLAH SEMICOLON AND PRINCE SULTAN HAD ATTENDED THE CALL ON FAHD. THERE HAD BEEN A BRIEF CALL ON SAUD, LARGELY DEVOTED TO LEBANON.

ARAB/ISRAEL

3. FAHD HAD TAKEN A PREDICTABLE LINE: PALESTINE WAS THE CENTRAL ISSUE - SOLVE THAT AND YOU SOLVED EVERYTHING SEMICOLON THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT PEACE - SO PEACE WOULD CURB SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. HAIG HAD ARGUED THAT SOVIET THREATS WENT WIDER THAN THE MIDDLE EAST SEMICOLON AND THAT EVEN WITHIN THE MIDDLE EAST THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF SCOPE FOR SOVIET INTERFERENCE EVEN IF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM WERE SOLVED.

4. FAHD HAD CONDEMNED CAMP DAVID AS DIFICIENT ON TWO CRUCIAL POINTS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND JERUSALEM. HAIG HAD REPLIED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION GAVE EQUAL WEIGHT TO THE PEACE PROCESS (ACCORDING TO BOVIS, THIS PHRASE HAS NOW SUPERSEDED CAMP DAVID IN CURRENT STATE DEPARTMENT USAGE) AND TO REGIONAL SECURITY, AND ACCEPTED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM. IN RETURN, HE ASKED THAT THE SAUDIS NOT GIVE PRIORITY TO THE PEACE PROCESS OVER REGIONAL SECURITY. FAHD CONCEDED THAT CAMP DAVID HAD HAD SOME GOOD POINTS, AND HE DID NOT WANT TO BE OVERLY-CRITICAL OF SADAT WHO WAS WORKING FOR THE RIGHT END BY THE WRONG MEANS SEMICOLON BUT IT WAS TIME TO MOVE ON. (IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, BOVIS SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SAUDIS WERE READY TO TALK TO SADAT ABOUT RECONCILIATION).

REGIONAL SECURITY

5. FAHD HAD CRITICISED PRESIDENT CARTER WHOSE POLICIES HAD UNDERMINED AMERICA'S CREDIBILITY AS AN ALLY READY TO HELP MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE REGION. HAIG HAD REPLIED THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WAS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING THE SECURITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY WERE MAKING SIGNIFICANT OFFERS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN AND WOULD ALSO OFFER MILITARY AID TO TURKEY AND SUDAN. FAHD HAD SEEMED TO BE REASSURED BY THESE REMARKS AND SAID THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE STRONG STAND PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS TAKING AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM WORLD-WIDE. HE HAD EVEN ADDED THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD SUPPORT AMERICAN EFFORTS TO COMBAT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND, ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA AND THE TWO YEMENS. IN REPLY TO GRAY'S QUESTIONS, BOVIS SAID THAT HAIG HAD NOT COME TO ASK FOR BASES NOR HAD THERE BEEN ANY DISCUSSION OF PRE-POSITIONING OF EQUIPMENT SEMICOLON HAIG HAD MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT EXPECTING ANY STRATEGIC CONCESSIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR F-15S. THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE.

6. GRAY ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY REFLECTION IN THE SAUDI POSITION OF PRINCE SAUD'S REPORTED FEAR THAT THE WEST (AND NOTABLY THE AMERICANS) WERE MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE OILFIELDS THAN ABOUT THE SURVIVAL OF THE AL SAUD. BOVIS SAID HE HAD SEEN AND HEARD NOTHING ALONG THOSE LINES. HE GAVE A SIMILAR RESPONSE WHEN GRAY ASKED WHETHER THE SAUDIS HAD ATTEMPTED TO DRAW ANY PARALLELS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, WHERE SOME PEOPLE HAD CRITICISED THE AMERICANS FOR FAILING TO SUPPORT THE SHAH AGAINST INTERNAL ATTACK. BOVIS THEN VOLUNTEERED THAT HAIG HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO DO SO WITHOUT SEEMING TO INTERFERE SEMICOLON THOUGH AT ONE POINT, AND FOR REASONS WHICH WERE NOT CLEAR TO BOVIS, FAHD HAD ASSURED HAIG THAT INTERNAL SECURITY IN SAUDI ARABIA WAS VERY GOOD.

ARMS SALES

7. HAIG HAD ASSURED FAHD THAT THE F-15 ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME WOULD GO AHEAD AS ANNOUNCED SEMICOLON BUT THE SALE OF BOMB-RACKS WAS STILL UNDER STUDY (THEY ARE NOT FITTED TO AMERICAN F-15S). AWACS WOULD ALSO BE SUPPLIED, DESPITE STRONG ISRAELI OPPOSITION. (BOVIS COMMENTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY ORGANISE SOME RESISTANCE IN CONGRESS BUT WOULD NOT ''GO TO THE MAT'' ON IT). MILITARY SALES GENERALLY WOULD BE INCREASED - NEWS WHICH DELIGHTED FAHD WHO ADDED, HOWEVER, A PLEA FOR QUICKER DELIVERY THROUGH INCREASED PRODUCTION CAPACITY.

PLO

8. FAHD HAD URGED HAIG TO RECOGNISE THE PLO. HAIG HAD GIVEN HIM NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO THINK THIS WAS LIKELY. BOVIS COMMENTED THAT ACCORDING TO HAIG (SPEAKING PRIVATELY WITHIN THE DELEGATION) PRESIDENT REAGAN STILL VIEWS THE PLO AS MERE TERRORISTS AND IS DISINCLINED TO HAVE ANY DEALINGS WITH THEM AT ALL SEMICOLON AND THERE IS SOME TENDENCY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO SEE PROGRESS AS DEPENDING ON THE EUROPEANS DELIVERING THE PLO WHILST THE AMERICANS DELIVER ISRAEL. GRAY SAID THIS DIVISION OF LABOUR WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EUROPEANS.

LEBANON

9. HAIG HAD EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN AND URGED THE SAUDIS TO INTERVENE. FAHD HAD TALKED OF QUIET, UNPUBLICISED EFFORTS: HE HAD NOT MENTIONED WHO WITH, BUT THE AMERICANS UNDERSTOOD SYRIA.

YAR

10. SULTAN, IN FAHD'S PRESENCE, HAD URGED HAIG TO STEP UP AMERICAN MILITARY SALES TO THE YAR, SO AS TO BOLSTER THE PRESENT REGIME. BOVIS FOUND THIS SURPRISING, BUT IN LINE WITH POSITIVE REMARKS ABOUT THE YAR MADE BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MANSOURI TO THE AMERICAN CHARGE ON 6 APRIL. GRAY SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE OTHER SIGNS OF A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SALEH AND THE SAUDIS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO SANAA

CRAIG

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 102350Z APR 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 354 OF 10 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON TEL AVIV CAIRO

MY TELNO 346: MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE FOR SINAI.

1. JOHN MROZ OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY (IPA), WHO WAS IN ISRAEL AT THE TIME OF HAIG'S VISIT AND RETURNED TO NEW YORK TODAY (10 APRIL), HAS GIVEN GOULDING THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE RESULTS OF HAIG'S DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL. HIS ACCOUNT WAS BASED, HE SAID, ON A LONG CONVERSATION WITH THE U S AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV (LEWIS). THE IPA IS INVOLVED BECAUSE SOME MONTHS AGO THEY PREPARED A POSITION PAPER FOR THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING THE FINAL STAGE OF ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. ACCORDING TO MROZ, THEY ARE NOW BEING USED BY THE U S ADMINISTRATION AS AN UNOFFICIAL CHANNEL OF PRESSURE ON THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT. MROZ SPOKE IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AND ASKED THAT WE SHOULD NOT REVEAL TO ANY OF THE PARTIES WHAT HE HAD TOLD US OR INDEED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO US AT ALL

2. ACCORDING TO MROZ, HAIG HAD AGREED WITH THE ISRAELIS A QUOTE BOTTOM LINE UNQUOTE PACKAGE WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY TO SELL TO THE EGYPTIANS WITHOUT REVEALING THAT IT HAD ALREADY BEEN CLEARED WITH THE ISRAELIS. THIS PACKAGE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

(A) THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD CONSIST OF FOUR BATTALIONS (PLUS LOGISTIC SUPPORT), OF WHICH ONLY ONE WOULD BE AMERICAN. A SECOND BATTALION WOULD COME FROM CANADA OR AUSTRALIA. THE OTHER TWO BATTALIONS WOULD BE MADE UP OF CONTINGENTS FROM A NUMBER OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, INCLUDING SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH DID NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

(B) IT WOULD BE LEFT TO THE EGYPTIANS TO DECIDE EXACTLY WHERE THE U S BATTALION WOULD BE STATIONED.

(C) THE UNITED STATES WOULD FORMALLY DISCLAIM ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND THE RDF.

(D) THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACCEPT UNTSO OBSERVERS IN ZONES A, B AND D (THE LATTER OF COURSE, BEING A MAJOR CONCESSION).

(E) THE ISRAELIS STILL WANTED THE DURATION OF THE U S COMMITMENT TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO BE OPEN-ENDED. BUT HAIG THOUGHT THAT HE HAD PERSUADED THEM THAT CONGRESS SIMPLY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS.

3. MROZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOW STRAINING EVERY SINEW TO TRY TO BRING THE EGYPTIONS AROUND TO THINK IN TERMS OF A PACKAGE ON THESE LINES. AT LEWIS'S REQUEST, MROZ HAD VISITED CAIRO ON HIS WAY BACK FROM ISRAEL AND HAD SUGGESTED TO BOUTROS GHALI THAT THE EGYPTIANS SHOULD ABANDON ANY AIDEA OF A UN FORCE, THAT THEY SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON A COMBINATION OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE PLUS UNTSO OBSERVERS (WHICH HAD BEEN A FAVOURED OPTION IN THE IPA PAPER) AND THAT HIS OWN CONVERSATIONS IN ISRAEL LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS AND THE

ISRAELIS TO MAKE THE CONCESSIONS AT (B), (C) AND (D) ABOVE.

4. MROZ SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND BOTH THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT AND THE LABOUR OPPOSITION IN ISRAEL ANXIOUS TO GET THIS SETTLED QUICKLY: LIKUD BECAUSE THEY WANTED TO CLAIM ELECTORAL CREDIT FOR HAVING COMMITTED THE UNITED STATES TO A ROLE IN SINAI, AND LABOUR BECAUSE THEY WANTED THE WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS TO BE CLEARLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LIKUD IN CASE THINGS GO WRONG LATER ON (LEWIS TOLD MROZ OF AN IDF PAPER ESTIMATING THAT THERE WOULD BE 500 CASUALTIES IN AUGUST WHEN THE TIME CAME TO DISMANTLE THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN SINAI).

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 100 OF 10 APRIL 1981

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

LEBANON SITREP.

1. THE CEASE FIRE OF 8 APRIL STILL HOLDS AT THE TIME OF WRITING SEMICOLON THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SYRIAN MOVES AT ZAHLEH. THE RED CROSS CONVOY EXTRACTED 19 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED FROM ZAHLEH ON 9 APRIL SEMICOLON THE OPERATION WAS VERY STRICTLY CONTROLLED BY THE SYRIANS WHO VETTED THE LIST SUBMITTED BY THE RED CROSS. MANY WOUNDED REMAIN IN ZAHLEH AND SOME ARE NOT PREPARED TO RISK THE PASSAGE THROUGH THE SYRIAN LINES. INITIAL CLEARING UP IS PROCEEDING IN ZAHLEH BUT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS DEPEND ON POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS NOW UNDER WAY.

2. THE CEASE FIRE APPEARS TO BE THE RESULT OF HEAVY SAUDI, FRENCH AND AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE, WITH THE THREAT OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION IN THE BACKGROUND. BUT THERE IS NO PUBLIC SIGN OF ANY REAL MODIFICATION IN THE SYRIAN POSITION WHICH WAS REITERATED TO THE VISITING HEAD OF THE LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT, JUMBLATT. THE NEXT FEW DAYS SHOULD SHOW WHICH WAY THE WIND WILL BLOW SEMICOLON WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC. EVEN IF THE LULL EXTENDS, THERE IS A FAIR CHANCE THAT THE SYRIANS WILL SEEK ANOTHER SLICE OF SALAMI BEFORE LONG. AS REPORTED IN OUR TEL NO 95 AND DAMASCUS TEL NO 111, THE SYRIANS ARE MAKING MUCH PLAY OF THE SECURITY OF THE MAIN ROADS IN THE BEKA'A. THERE IS ALSO SPECULATION ABOUT THE QUOTE ACCORDION UNQUOTE OPERATION IN WHICH IT IS ALLEGED THAT THE KATAEB AND HADDAD WILL JOIN UP BETWEEN ZAHLEH AND JEZZINE. WE REGARD BOTH THESE AS LARGELY RED HERRINGS. IF THE SYRIANS MAINTAIN THEIR CLAIM TO THE RED LINE AND SEEK TO HAVE IT AUTHORIZED IMPLICITLY WHEN THE ADF MANDATE IS DUE FOR RENEWAL IN JULY THEY WILL RUN INTO PROBLEMS.

3. BEIRUT HAS BEEN QUIET AND TRAFFIC CAN NOW PASS DIFFIDENTLY BETWEEN SECTORS VIA CHYAH AND HAZMIYEH.

RESTRICTED

/4.

4. THE ISRAELIS ATTACKED VILLAGES NEAR NABATIYEH ON THE NIGHT OF 9/10 APRIL AND BOMBARDED THE COAST NORTH OF TYRE FROM A NAVAL VESSEL. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT BETWEEN 10 AND 15 PALESTINIANS WERE KILLED.

5. REPORTS ARE JUST COMING IN OF AN ISRAELI AIR STRIKE ON DELHAMIYAH, SOUTH OF DAMOUR.

6. ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY WAS SHOT DEAD ON 9 APRIL -- THE SECOND IN A WEEK.

MOORE.

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Middle East Situation

NENAD

Secretary of State's Discussions with Mr Haig

During the private discussions which preceded the main session of talks this morning, Mr Haig said that he had struck up an excellent personal relationship with President Sadat. In Israel, he had got the strong impression that Peres would win the election, and that Dayan (who had looked pretty ill) would not have much effect on the vote. He was convinced that Peres would be much easier to deal with; and that Peres was not interested in a Jordanian option.

As in the main session, Mr Haig expressed fears about Soviet installations in South Yemen, adding that these threatened the Middle East oil fields. [It is difficult to square this with Mr Haig's remarks about Scud, whose range is only about 200 kms, unless he was talking about an up-dated version.]

President Sadat had told Mr Haig that he was determined to 'take Libya out'. Haig wondered whether he could do this.

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

10 April 1981

cc: PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Sir J Graham
Mr Bullard
Mr J Moberly

Mr Alexander, No. 10

Ltr Rmds

Prime Minister

Rmds

(2)

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AND AT ADMIRALTY HOUSE ON FRIDAY, 10 APRIL: MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

Present:

The Rt Hon Lord Carrington KCMG MC
The Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour Bt MP
Sir Michael Palliser GCMG Permanent Under Secretary
Mr J L Bullard CMG Deputy Under Secretary
Sir J Graham KCMG Deputy Under Secretary
Mr D M Day CMG Deputy Under Secretary
Mr G G H Walden CMG Private Secretary
Mr N M Fenn Head, News Department
Mr F N Richards Private Secretary

Secretary of State Haig
Mr Eagleburger Assistant Secretary for Europe
Mr Veliotes Assistant Secretary for the Middle East
The Hon E J Streator Charge d'Affaires United States Embassy
Mr MacFarlane Counsellor, State Department
Mr T W Simons Counsellor, United States Embassy
Mr Goldberg Executive Assistant

1. Mr Haig said that his visits to Middle Eastern capitals had been a success, but not of the kind that would be reflected in the press or in immediate changes of policy. The real - undeclared - purpose of the visit was to deflect Mr Begin from asking to visit Washington before the Israeli elections (he asked that this information be treated with particular discretion). Apart from this, the visits had three objectives:

(a) to establish personal relations with Arab and Israeli leaders following the change of the US Administration;

(b) to discuss the Soviet dimension, and in relation to the 'strategic consensus' to

/establish

establish that the US objective was to create external security for the Middle East within which the peace process could go ahead. The peace process and external security were complementary rather than rival priorities. This point had been taken wherever he had gone, though less readily in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had, however, clearly been impressed by what they had been told of Soviet capabilities (they had, for example, been shown photographs of SCUD* missiles in the PDRY with a capability to hit Riyadh);

(c) to establish that the US remained committed to the peace process, while accepting that the scope for progress before the Israeli elections was limited. Neither King Hussein nor anybody else had come forward with a more promising alternative. He had not raised the 'Jordanian option', which clearly did not exist in present circumstances.

He felt that he had improved the atmosphere in bilateral relations in each capital visited, and particularly in Cairo and Riyadh. The US were not seeking bases in the Middle East. Some of the noises that had been made on the subject in Washington were simply a domestic subterfuge to obscure US failure in Iran. He well appreciated the need not to place an excessive burden on friendly Arab regimes.

2. Lord Carrington asked whether Mr Haig thought that Arab attitudes to the US would be coloured by US policies on the Arab/Israel issue. In particular, were Saudi Arabia and Jordan expecting that the US would abandon Camp David in return for their recognition of Western interests in the area? Mr Haig said that they were not. They were looking mainly for an assurance that the US would back their existing regimes, and were not interested only in maintaining the security of the Gulf oil installations and the shipping lanes through the Straits of Hormuz, as they had been led to believe by the previous Administration. When he had seen the Saudi Crown Prince, he had been subjected to a monologue on familiar lines, but the atmosphere of the meeting had been entirely changed when he offered this assurance. He remained, however, worried about the fragility of the Saudi regime. There was something of an Alice in Wonderland atmosphere in Saudi Arabia. There was no real stability behind the facade of new buildings and expensive military equipment. There was an obvious parallel with the Shah's Iran.

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*Sic: SCUD missiles have not the range to hit Riyadh from the PDRY

/3.

3. The Secretary of State agreed, but pointed out that Saudi Arabia had a smaller population and greater resources than Iran. The Arab/Israel dispute remained the fundamental issue for Arab countries, and the mainspring of their attitude to everything else. The US decision on its attitude to this issue would either provide the Arabs with real reassurance, or set American efforts in this direction back to square one. Mr Haig said that this view underestimated the complexity of the picture, given the diversity in Arab outlook and structures. The US did not believe that an instant comprehensive solution was the only way to sound a relationship with the Arab world. Arabs must not be encouraged to view Arab security interests purely in Arab/Israel terms, neglecting entirely the threat from the Soviet Union and its proxies. The Secretary of State had not meant to suggest that the Arab/Israel dispute could be solved in the short term. It was, however, necessary to get things moving in the right direction, and for the West to have policies which looked even-handed. This issue coloured Arab attitudes to everything else in a disproportionate way. The Lord Privy Seal agreed. The Arab/Israel issue affect the Arab approach to East/West relations. If Arab states were strongly pro-Western at a time when the West seemed to be leaning towards Israel, this would weaken them domestically, so undermining their security. It was true that King Hussein had no new ideas. But the existence of Camp David formed a road-block preventing him from seeking alternative ways forward. Mr Haig said that the fact that the Carter Administration had been unable to supply King Hussein with anti-tank weapons when he felt most threatened by Syria had produced a deep impression on the King.

4. Mr Haig expressed confidence that Mr Peres would win the Israeli elections. Mr Peres had been in touch with President Sadat. His more flexible approach would not of itself solve the Arab/Israel problem, but would help with the first two steps - agreement to a Sinai peace keeping force before the Israeli election and autonomy talks leading to an agreement by the end of the year. This should suit both Mr Peres and President Sadat. Lord Carrington said that the European position was in limbo until the Israeli election. Thereafter, the Europeans were faced with a commitment to a Euro/Arab summit, now postponed until later in the year. He felt that it might be possible to extract a price for European attendance at such a summit; although the PLO was no longer in the chair on the Arab side, its attendance at a summit would enhance its status. This price might be conditional acceptance by the twenty-three Arab states and the PLO of Israel's right to exist within secure boundaries. Mr Haig feared that this tactic might fragment the PLO and so give Israel an excuse for intransigence. / the West Failure would humiliate/and make the situation much worse. This view was held by all those in Washington who had examined the question. Despite his scepticism he would consider the matter further; it should be discussed by officials.

/5.

5. The Secretary of State said that the PLO themselves were well aware of the risk of fragmentation, and would not accept it unless they judged it acceptable. The fact that they would be accompanied by twenty-three Arab States in endorsing Israel's right to exist should make it easier for them. The Euro/Arab summit would have to be held anyway, and it seemed worth exploiting whatever leverage it offered. Sir John Graham said that there was some sign that the PLO were conscious that they were approaching the point of decision. The judgement of our intelligence experts was that they would be able to carry through a change of course if they wanted to. Mr Haig asked what would happen to the summit if the Arabs refused to pay the price asked. Would it be cancelled? The Secretary of State said that this would be one possibility. Alternatively one could look for another quid pro quo. He himself would be reluctant to attend a summit if no price could be exacted. But others of the Ten might have different views. Mr Haig asked what would happen if the tactic succeeded. Would the Europeans then look to Washington to deliver Israeli acceptance of the PLO? The Secretary of State said that it would be for the Europeans to point out to Israel that the PLO was in effect now ready to sacrifice that part of its covenant which committed it to the destruction of Israel, and this should remove Israeli objections to dealing with the PLO. It might be useful for Mr Haig to probe the views of other European countries, though without revealing to them the very frank account of British views that the Secretary of State had given him. Sir J Graham said that some of the Ten felt more committed to a summit than the UK did.

6. Mr Haig had talked three times to Dobrynin. Soviet attention was evidently focussing on two points. The first was the increase in US military capability, in which they were at last ready to believe. The second related to the Middle East. The Russians were anxious to cut themselves into the peace process, and were concerned about US aims in the Middle East; they were clearly ready to react to US measures by taking corresponding steps of their own, and this was a factor to be included in Western calculations.

IRAN/IRAQ

7. When discussion continued at lunch, Lord Carrington described our efforts to get a little closer to Iran, while keeping good relations with the Iraqis. Hammadi's visit to London had been a success. But we were worried by the position of Iran, where the Americans were in baulk, and the French wholly committed to the Iraqis. We still had some difficulties with the Iranians (eg over weapon supplies and Pyke). But if things went the wrong way in Iran, the Tudeh could benefit. Only the Germans and ourselves could get alongside the Iranians.

/8.

8. Mr Haig said that the Iraqis had learned the hard way about the effectiveness of the Tow missile. Their tank losses were considerable, and they were anxious to secure replacements. Nobody was gaining from the war, and the longer it dragged on the better organised the Tudeh party would become. Meanwhile there was no signs that the Iranian revolution was any less anti-American. The long-term orientation of Iran was important, and he welcomed our efforts to improve relations.

9. The Americans had also had some signals from Iraq, but were careful about responding. They were however maintaining contacts. The Syrians had also sent some signals. They appeared to be upset by his failure to visit Damascus. The Lord Privy Seal stressed the need to avoid isolating the Syrians; it was suggested that Mr Haig and Khaddam might meet at some point when Haig was in Europe. Mr Haig agreed that the Syrians might be looking for alternatives. He wondered whether this was a good moment to pressure them to withdraw from the Lebanon.

10. Mr Veliotes said that the Syrians might agree to the deployment of Lebanese gendarmes, rather than the army (who were considered too Christian). It had also been suggested that both sides might respond to a UN plea to withdraw: the Americans would have no problem about this. Mr Haig said that the Israelis had come close to responding more rashly to recent events, and their frustrations might recur. Mr Veliotes suggested that their restraint might have been due to Haig's presence in Jerusalem.

11. When the discussion reverted briefly to the Middle East at the end of lunch, Lord Carrington said that he ought to make it clear that the European initiative was not limited to 'making enquiries' as Mr Haig had implied to the press after the morning talks; but would in due course be developed. Mr Haig repeated that the Americans needed time. Lord Carrington said that they had a certain amount of time, since nothing was likely to happen before the autumn.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

10 April 1981

Distribution:

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PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Sir A Acland
Sir J Graham
Mr Bullard
Mr J Moberly
Mr P Moberly

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TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1155 OF 8 APRIL 1981
INFO TEL AVIV CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK JEDDA BEIRUT DAMASCUS
INFO SAVING THE HAGUE

CAIRO TELNO 233: AND TEL AVIV TELNO 140: HAIG'S VISITS TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL

1. STERNER, WHO ACCOMPANIED HAIG IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, CONFIRMED TO US TODAY THAT THE AMERICANS REGARDED THE VISITS AS SUCCESSFUL. THE DISCUSSIONS WITH SADAT HAD GONE MUCH AS EXPECTED, ESPECIALLY ON LIBYA/CHAD, SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN. SADAT HAD SHOWN HIMSELF AN ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTER OF HAIG'S STRATEGIC CONSENSUS: STERNER COMMENTED DRILY THAT SADAT SEEMED TO BELIEVE IN IT MORE THAN MANY PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON DID.

2. ON THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR SINAI STERNER CONFIRMED THAT SADAT HAD BEEN MORE RESPONSIVE TO HAIG THAN HIS SUBORDINATE HAD BEEN DURING STERNER'S EARLIER DISCUSSIONS. SADAT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WANTED AGREEMENT ON THE FORCE BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS AND THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN AMERICAN CONTINGENT IN THE FORCE, THOUGH HE CLEARLY SHARED EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS' RESERVATIONS ABOUT ANYTHING WHICH COULD BE REPRESENTED AS U S OCCUPATION OR U S BASES. STERNER COMMENTED THAT U S PARTICIPATION WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY PACKAGED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF EYGPTIAN SENSITIVITIES.

3. STERNER SAID THAT U S SOUNDINGS AT THE UN INDICATED THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE NO MORE THAN SIX VOTES (US, UK, IRELAND, PANAMA AND, SUBJECT TO THE WORDING, JAPAN AND PHILIPPINES) IN FAVOUR OF INSCRIPTION OF A SINAI FORCE ITEM ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGENDA. THE U S HAD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF SECURING THE NINE VOTES IN FAVOUR OF A UN FORCE WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PROVOKE A SOVIET VETO. URQUHART AND WALDHEIM HAD NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. THE NEXT STEP MIGHT THEREFORE BE FOR THE U S TO AGREE WITH THE EGYPTIANS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THAT A UN FORCE WAS NOT ON: A JOINT STATEMENT MIGHT BE ISSUED TO RECORD THIS CONCLUSION. THE WAY WOULD THEN BE CLEAR FOR THE U S TO APPROACH POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORS TO A MULTILATERAL FORCE. STERNER SAID THAT TWO MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WERE ON THE LIST OF THOSE TO BE APPROACHED: THE UK WAS NOT.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. STERNER CONFIRMED HILL'S ACCOUNT (TEL AVIV TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) OF HAIG'S TALKS IN ISRAEL. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TAKEN HEED OF HAIG'S WARNING OF THE DANGERS OF UNILATERAL ACTION IN THE LEBANON, THOUGH BEGIN IN PARTICULAR FELT THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT STAND IDLY BY WHILST LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WERE BEING KILLED. THE ISRAELIS WERE VERY WORRIED ABOUT AWACS FOR SAUDI ARABIA: BEGIN HAD LISTENED PATIENTLY TO HAIG'S EXPOSITION OF THE NEED FOR THIS SALE BUT HAD NOT BEEN CONVINCED AND HAD ASKED HAIG TO RECONSIDER.

5. STERNER SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS NAGGED HAIG TO RESUME THE AUTONOMY TALKS. BURG HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY EMPHATIC ON THIS POINT, ARGUING THAT THE FACT THAT TALKS WERE BEING HELD WOULD ITSELF BE A SIGN OF PROGRESS. HAIG HAD MAINTAINED THAT BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS HE SAW NO PROSPECT THAT THE TALKS WOULD ACHIEVE ANYTHING.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO THE HAGUE.

HENDERSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY
TO THE
MINISTER OF STATE
DOUGLAS HURD

Herewith a copy of John Gorst MP's letter to Lord Carrington, as you requested.

22 April 1981

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON SW1A 2AH

JOHN GORST, M.P.

NF
- 8 APR 1981

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Mr Hurd
Mr Holmes
RRM
9/4

1. Ack
2 NENAD to draft
reply from Mr Hurd
by 15/4

GCPS
PS/Mr Hurd
8/4

7th April 1981

Dear Lord Carrington,

One of the leaders of the Jewish community in North Hendon came to see me specially to discuss the growing concern amongst them of the creeping recognition of the PLO which is being accorded to them as a result of talks that are taking place and may increasingly occur in the near future.

It was made clear to me that the depth of feeling on this subject amongst my Jewish constituents is reaching a very explosive point, and I am now writing to you to make it clear that I fully support the concern of the Jewish community on this issue; and that my support for them, were the matter to be the subject of debate in the House of Commons, would extend, if necessary, to voting against the government having any dealings with the PLO or its leadership.

I would welcome your assurance that my fears and those of my constituents are without any foundation, and that there are no prospects of negotiation or contact between this country or any organizations of which we are members with the PLO - certainly until such time as that organization completely renounces all connection with terrorism and removes from its articles all suggestion that the State of Israel has no right to exist. In short, an essential pre-condition for any contact with the PLO must be their recognition that the State of Israel has every right to exist.

I am sending a copy of this letter to both the Prime Minister and the Chief Whip, so that there should be no misunderstanding about my position in this matter. With an electorate of whom a quarter to one-third are Jewish, it is essential that I make the strongest possible protest on this matter and at the highest level in our party.

Yours sincerely,

John Gorst.

The Rt.Hon.The Lord Carrington, PC,
KCMG, MC,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

GRS 800 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO 071130Z APR 81

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 233 OF 7 APRIL

INFO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA, BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW

MY TELNO 213: VISIT OF US SECRETARY OF STATE.

1. HAIG VISITED CAIRO AS PLANNED FOR 24 HOURS ON 4/5 APRIL. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A LARGE DELEGATION, INCLUDING EX-SENATOR BUCKLEY (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS), MCFARLAN (COUNSELOR, STATE DEPARTMENT), GENERAL VERNON WALTERS (EX-CIA ETC, NOW SPECIAL ASSISTANT), ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES WITH DEPUTIES STERNER AND DRAPER, AND NUMEROUS OTHERS INCLUDING A BIG PRESS CONTINGENT. THE VISIT BEGAN WITH A HALF HOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KEMAL HASSAN ALI AFTER WHICH HAIG AND ALI CALLED ON VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK AT HIS HOME (WHERE HE IS LAID UP WIEVH AN INJURY) LEAVING THE REMAINDER OF THE DELEGATION TO CONTINUE TALKS WITH BOUTROS GHALI. ALI, VICE MUBARAK, GAVE A BILATERAL DINNER IN HIS HONOUR. ON 5 APRIL HAIG HAD A TWO HOUR TETE-A-TETE WITH PRESIDENT SADAT, FOLLOWED (UNUSUALLY) BY A BRIEF PLENARY MEETING WHICH WAS MAINLY DESIGNED TO GIVE THE SENIOR AMERICANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE SADAT. THE VISIT ENDED AFTER THE CUSTOMARY JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE.

2. I DEBRIEFED THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY, WHO FELT THAT THE VISIT HAD BEEN ENTIRELY SUCCESSFUL THOUGH THERE WAS NOT MUCH MORE SUBSTANCE TO IT THAN HAD APPEARED IN THE PRESS. SADAT OPENED THE PRESS CONFERENCE WITH AN EXTREMELY FULSOME TRIBUTE TO HAIG AS THE ''RIGHT MAN IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME'', A VIEW WHICH HE SAID WAS SHARED BY THE EUROPEANS, AND WHICH ATHERTON THOUGHT HAD BEEN MUCH APPRECIATED IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. IN RETURN HAIG ASSURED SADAT ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BEHALF OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS AS A FULL PARTNER AND OF THE CLOSE SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC APPRAISAL HE HAD RECEIVED FROM SADAT AND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S OWN WORLD VIEWS. ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS, HAIG SAID THAT HIS TALKS HAD LEFT HIM OPTIMISTIC AND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE DEDICATED TO MAINTAINING MOMENTUM BOTH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND IN THE CONTEXT OF PEACE KEEPING ARRANGEMENTS IN SINAI WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES BY THE APRIL 1982 DEADLINE. AMERICAN INTEREST IN A SOLUTION WOULD NOT BE LESSENED BY THE SEARCH FOR A STRATEGIC CONSENSUS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE CONCLUDED IN BEST HAIGSPEAK ''BUT WE SEE ALSO THE FUNDAMENTAL INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SENSE OF SECURITY AND THE CONVERGENCE OF STRATEGIC THINKING HERE IN THIS AREA AS A FUNDAMENTAL CATALYST TO MAKING THE PEACE PROCESS MORE SUCCESSFUL AND TO ACHIEVING THE MOMENTUM WE SEEK. THESE ARE NOT CONTRADICTORY BUT MUTUALLY REINFORCING OBJECTIVES. WE PUT EQUAL PRIORITY ON BOTH.''

3. BOUTROS GHALI TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT IN HIS TALKS HE HAD EMPHASISED THE FOLLOWING POINTS (HE HAS SINCE REFERRED PUBLICLY TO THE FIRST THREE):

(I) EGYPT'S STATUS AS A NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY STRATEGY.,

(II) THE PALESTINE CAUSE WAS THE CORE OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION SHOULD UPHOLD LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS INCLUDING SELF-DETERMINATION.,

(III) EGYPT STILL HOPED FOR UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE., IF THIS WAS BLOCKED BY SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE SHE WOULD RESORT TO A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, BUT THIS WOULD HAVE NO RELATION TO US STRATEGY OR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE.,

(IV) HE HAD URGED THE AMERICANS TO PRESS THE ISRAELIS HARD, ON SETTLESMENTS, CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, AND THEIR NEW DEAD SEA CANAL PROJECT.

(V) EGYPT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE.

GHALI SAID THERE SEEMED A DISTINCT LACK OF ENTHUSIASM AMONG THE AMERICANS FOR THE LAST.

4. ON THE ARAB ISRAEL QUESTION ATHERTON SAID SADAT HAD REPEATED HIS CONVICTION THAT THERE WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY BY THE END OF THE YEAR. THEY DID NOT DISCUSS THE JORDANIAN OPTION.

5. ATHERTON SAID THAT HAID HAD GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO MAKE CLEAR TO SADAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO INTENTION OF EXPLOITING THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IDEA IN CONNECTION WITH RDF., SINAI WAS NOT RELEVANT TO GULF SECURITY. AS TO FACILITIES ELSEWHERE IN EGYPT SADAT ASKED HAIG WHEN THE AMERICANS WERE GOING TO RESPOND TO HIS LONG STANDING OFFER OF RAS BANAS. THEY DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF A USER AGREEMENT, ON WHICH SADAT WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO BEYOND AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS., HAIG UNDERTOOK TO SEE WHETHER THIS WOULD SUFFICE FOR CONGRESS.

6. ATHERTON THOUGHT THAT HAIG'S EXCHANGE WITH SADAT ON THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE PROBLEM HAD BEEN THE MOST CONCRETE PART OF THEIR TALK AND HAD MOVED MATTERS FURTHER ALONG THAN STERNER HAD BEEN ABLE TO GET EARLIER IN THE WEEK. WHILE THE EGYPTIANS ARE STILL GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF CONSULTATIONS ABOUT A UN FORCE, AND SADAT IS STILL HOPING FOR A SOVIET VETO, THEY ARE CONCENTRATING IN THEIR TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS ON THE COMPOSITION ETC OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. WITH STERNER THEY HAD PRIVATELY ACCEPTED THAT AMERICAN UNITS, PREFERABLY LOGISTIC AND NON-COMBATANT, SHOULD FORM PART OF A FORCE, BUT HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO HAVE THIS MENTIONED IN ANY DISCUSSION OF FORCE COMPOSITION WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE ISRAELIS ON THE OTHER HAD HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS FORCE COMPOSITION EXCEPT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL AMERICAN ELEMENT. SADAT HAD CONCEDED THIS POINT TO HAIG, SO THAT THERE WAS NOT A PROSPECT

OF A MORE REALISTIC DISCUSSION WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE LIST OF POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORS. I ASKED WHETHER HAIG'S REMARK ABOUT PEACE-KEEPING ARRANGEMENTS PERMITTING COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL REFLECTED ANY SYMPATHY FOR THE ISRAELI LINE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OBLIGATION IS CONDITIONAL. ATHERTON THOUGHT IT WAS SIMPLY POLITICAL REALISM.

6. AFTER THE TRIP GENERAL WALTERS WILL UNDERTAKE A BRIEFING TRIP TO MAGHREB COUNTRIES (HE IS APPARENTLY A FRIEND OF KING HASSAN'S SINCE THE LATTER'S BOYHOOD) AND DRAPER TO IRAQ.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 140 OF 7 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON CAIRO DAMASCUS BEIRUT AMMAN JEDDA AND
THE HAGUE

MY TEL NO 139: (NOW REPEATED TO THE HAGUE AND BEIRUT):

HAIG'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

1. POLITICAL COUNSELLOR, US EMBASSY, BRIEFED HEAD OF CHANCERY ON HAIG'S VISIT TODAY.
2. HILL SAID THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THIS VISIT HAD BEEN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF PREVIOUS VISIT BY EG, MR VANCE IN THE SENSE THAT HAIG'S STRONGLY-HELD PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE RIGHT REGIONAL RESPONSE TO THIS, HAD IMBUED THE TALKS WITH A COMPLETELY NEW TONE. HAIG HAD SPENT A GOOD DEAL OF TIME OUTLING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AS A FACTOR IN THE REGION. THE ISRAELIS HAD RESPONDED WITH THEIR OWN VIEWS ON THE RIGHT WESTERN STRATEGY FOR THE AREA AND HAD EMPHASISED THE GROWING ECONOMIC BURDEN IMPOSED BY THEIR OWN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. WHILE ACCEPTING THE GENERAL THRUST OF HAIG'S PRESENTATION, THEY HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO GO ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF THE DECISIONS (E.G. ON AWACS FOR THE SAUDIS) WHICH THIS NECESSARILY IMPLIED AND HAD PERSISTED IN RETURNING TO THE AWACS QUESTION AT ALMOST EVERY MEETING. BUT HILL DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO MOUNT FURTHER OPPOSITION IN THE CONGRESS THE JEWISH COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ITS OWN LINE ON THE DECISION.
3. THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE TIME FOR DETAILED EXCHANGES ON WAYS OF HELPING THE ISRAELIS MILITARILY (PARA 4 OF MY TUR). BUT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD CONTINUE WITH A DEGREE OF URGENCY IN WASHINGTON.
4. THE ISRAELIS HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN RAISING THE QUESTION OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WHICH THEY DESCRIBED AS WRONG IN ITSELF AND BOUND TO ENCOURAGE MODERATE ARABS, WHO SAW THE EUROPEANS BEING MORE RADICAL THAN THEMSELVES, TO BE LESS COMPROMISING. HAIG REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THE ISRAELI VIEW: VAN AGT HAD GIVEN HIM THE IMPRESSION IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK THAT THERE WAS NO EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IN ANY REAL SENSE. HE WONDERED, THEREFORE, WHY THE ISRAELIS WERE MAKING SO MUCH OF IT.
5. HILL SAID THAT HAIG HAD IN FACT RAISED THE SETTLEMENT QUESTION WITH BEGIN AS ''ONE FRIEND TO ANOTHER'' BUT IMPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT TAKEN THE ISRAELIS SERIOUSLY TO TASK ON THIS POINT. ON JERUSALEM, HILL SUGGESTED THAT THE REMARK QUOTED IN SUB-PARAGRAPH D PARAGRAPH 5 OF MY TUR SHOULD BE IGNORED: HAIG WAS NOT YET FAMILIAR WITH THE LANGUAGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND HAD INDEED REFERRED AT ONE POINT IN A PRIVATE MEETING TO TEL AVIV AS ISRAEL'S CAPITAL. THIS HAD PROVOKED A LENGTHY ISRAELI EXPLANATION OF THE POSITION AS THEY SAW IT.

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6. HILL AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF HAIG'S CONVERSATIONS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE LIKELY TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE LEBANON IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. BUT THE EMOTIONAL PRESSURES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE STRONG, BEGIN BEING APPARENTLY CONVINCED OF HIS DUTY TO PRESERVE LEBANON'S CHRISTIANS FROM TOTAL DEFEAT.

ROBINSON

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FM FCO 021857Z APRIL 81
TO IMMEDIATE PEKING
TELEGRAM NUMBER 186 OF 2 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, WASHINGTON,
PRIORITY TEL AVIV, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,
MUSCAT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK

FOLLOWING FOR WALDEN AND LYNE FROM RICHARDS
JEDDA TELNO 242: US POLICY ON MIDDLE EAST

1. WE AGREE GENERALLY WITH SIR JAMES CRAIG'S ANALYSIS OF THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN PRESSURE ON THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT THE STATIONING OF US FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER, THE INDICATIONS WE HAVE HAD SUGGEST THAT MR HAIG INTENDS HIS VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO BE MAINLY A RECONNAISSANCE. WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE REGION HAVE BEEN COUNSELLING CAUTION AND THIS IS THE MESSAGE THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FROM US AND OTHERS. WE HAVE SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE POINT HAS BEEN TAKEN. WE WOULD EXPECT MR HAIG TO SOUND THE SAUDIS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF STATIONING FORCES, BUT NOT AT LEAST ON THIS OCCASION TO PRESS THE ISSUE TO THE POINT OF DAMAGING US/SAUDI RELATIONS.

2. WE COULD OF COURSE BE WRONG, BUT GIVEN THE FACT THAT MR HAIG IS AWARE OF OUR VIEWS, FURTHER INTERVENTION AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR BEFORE HE LEAVES WOULD INDICATE A DEGREE OF PANIC AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO IRRITATE RATHER THAN CONVINCE. WE THINK THEREFORE THAT ON BALANCE WE MUST NOW LET THINGS TAKE THEIR COURSE.

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FM TEL AVIV 011245Z APR 81

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 126 OF 01 APRIL

INFO CAIRO AMMAN RABAT WASHINGTON JEDDA

MY TELEGRAM NO 117: PERES

1. BEILIN, PERES'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, YESTERDAY (PLEASE PROTECT) TOLD A MEMBER OF CHANCERY THAT PERES HAD SEEN PRINCE MOHAMMED IN LONDON, AND KING HASSAN IN MOROCCO DURING HIS RECENT OVERSEAS TOUR. BEILIN WAS WITH PERES ON THE TOUR.

2. BEILIN DESCRIBED PERES'S MEETING WITH PRINCE MOHAMMED AS ''NOT SERIOUS''. THEY HAD BOTH BEEN GUESTS AT A LUNCH ORGANISED BY MARCUS SIEFF AVD HAD MERELY EXCHANGED SOCIAL GREETINGS.

3. HOWEVER, AT THE MEETING WITH KING HASSAN (WHICH, BEILIN CLAIMED, PERES HAD NOT INITIATED) PERES HAD PUT FORWARD IEDAS WHICH WOULD, HE HOPED, LEAD TO PROGRESS IF HE LED THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. THE TWO MAIN ELEMENTS WERE:

I) AN OPENING ISRAELI DECLARATION OF REDINESS TO NEGOTIATE (BEILIN EMPHASISED ''NEGOTIATE'') OVER JERUSALEM. PERES HOPED THIS WOULD AROUSE SUFFICIENT SAUDI INTEREST TO PROVOKE A RESPONSE, IF ONLY TO DISCOVER EXACTLY WHAT WAS ON OFFER: AND WOULD PROMPT THE SAUDIS TO ENCOURAGE THE JORDANIANS PRIVATELY TO TALK TO ISRAEL ABOUT THE WEST BANK:

II) THE CREATION OF A ''MODERATE ALLIANCE'' COMPRISING ISRAEL, JORDAN, EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND, POSSIBLY, IRAQ.

4. BEILIN SAID, WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, THAT PERES HAD BEEN ''ENCOURAGED'' BY HASSAN'S RESPONSE. NO FURTHER MEETINGS WERE PLANNED BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS IN JUNE. BUT ''INFORMAL CONTACTS'' WOULD CONTINUE THROUGH ACADEMICS AND BUSINESSMEN TO ENSURE THAT EACH SIDE KEPT ABREAST OF THE OTHER'S THINKING.

5. BOTH ELEMENTS IN PARA 3 ABOVE SEEM HIGHLY UNREALISTIC. WHAT WE KNOW OF PERES' IDEAS ON JERUSALEM WILL NOT ATTRACT EITHER THE SAUDIS OR THE JORDANIANS.

ROBINSON [THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM FCO 261900Z MAR 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 498 OF 26 MARCH.

YOUR TELNO 987 OF 24 MARCH : CALL ON HAIG : MIDDLE EAST

1. HAIG'S REFERENCE TO 'THE HEAVY HAND OF ARAFAT IN EL SALVADOR' ECHOES WHAT CASEY HAD TO SAY WHEN HE MET THE LORD PRIVY SEAL ON 19 FEBRUARY WHEN HE REFERRED TO 'AN ARAFAT MISSION IN EL SALVADOR' AND TO THE PLO TRAINING 200 PEOPLE. WE WERE SCEPTICAL, AND THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS ASKED FOR FURTHER INFORMATION FROM THE CIA. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE CIA COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED A REPORT THAT SOME PLO ADVISERS WERE SERVING WITH SALVADORIAN INSURGENTS BUT THAT THEY REGARDED THE REPORT AS UNCONFIRMED AS THEY HAD NO OTHER EVIDENCE OF SUCH ASSISTANCE. THE CIA DID, HOWEVER, SAY THAT THEY HAD A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT THE PLO HAVE FOR SOME TIME TRAINED SALVADORIANS AT CAMPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. NO MENTION WAS, HOWEVER, MADE OF THE FIGURE OF 200.

2. IT SEEMS TO US POSSIBLE THAT ARAFAT HAS HAD LINKS WITH EL SALVADORIAN REBELS (AS WITH SOME OTHER CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICANS) AND THAT SOME MAY HAVE BEEN TRAINED EITHER IN LEBANON OR SYRIA. WE HAVE SEEN A REPORT OF A VISIT BY THE EL SALVADORIAN COMMUNIST LEADER SHAFIQ MANDAL TO DAMASCUS, INCLUDING PUBLIC CONTACT WITH THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. BUT INFORMATION WE HAVE SEEN DOES NOT BACK UP THE SORT OF CLAIM BEING MADE BY CASEY NOR DO WE CONSIDER ON THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US THAT THE IMPORTANCE HAIG APPEARS TO ATTACH TO PLO INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR IS JUSTIFIED.

3. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY VERY DELICATE BUT WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD FOLLOW UP HAIG'S COMMENT IN WHATEVER WAY YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE, WITHOUT OF COURSE REFERRING TO THE CIA COMMENT ABOVE. WE SHOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THE AMERICANS HAVE ANY FURTHER EVIDENCE NOT

AVAILABLE TO US FOR THE STATEMENTS SUGGESTING LARGE SCALE PLO SUPPORT FOR THE EL SALVADOR REBELS. IT WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHAT THE AMERICANS' SOURCES ARE. COULD THEY POSSIBLY BE ISRAELI ?

4. WE SEEM TO HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN PERSUADING THE PLO TO DROP ANY CONNECTION WITH THE IRA, AND THEY NOW PUBLICLY TAKE THE LINE THAT THEIR STRUGGLE RELATES ONLY TO PALESTINE. WOULD THE AMERICANS LIKE US TO TAKE UP WITH THEM THEIR ALLEGED MEDDLING IN EL SALVADOR?

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MR ALEXANDER

Middle East.

The Ruler of Dubai

The Prime Minister agreed over the weekend to see the above on Tuesday, 24 March at 1930 hrs. He has now cancelled this meeting as he returns to his country tomorrow morning. The Foreign Office are rather irritated about this after they had taken considerable trouble to fix it up. Their explanation for his return is that "he might have trouble at home."

CAROLINE STEPHENS

23 March, 1981

Middle East pts

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 15

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 987 OF 24 MARCH 1981,
INFO CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK.
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, TEHRAN, BONN, NEW DELHI, THE HAGUE, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS.

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): CALL ON HAIG: MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH WEST ASIA.

1. I ASKED HAIG WHETHER HE COULD TELL ME ANYTHING ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF A STRATEGIC CONSENSUS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH HE MENTIONED IN HIS TESTIMONY TO CONGRESS LAST WEEK. HAIG ADVISED ME NOT TO LISTEN TO WHAT HE SAID BUT TO WATCH WHAT HE DID EXCLAM.

2. HE SAID THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO HELP PAKISTAN AND THAT ZIA HAD BEEN OFFERED A SUBSTANTIAL PACKAGE OF US MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. HE HOPED THAT THE PAKISTANI RESPONSE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. THEIR REJECTION OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S AID OFFER LAST YEAR HAD BEEN DUE NOT TO THE SMALLNESS OF THE PACKAGE BUT TO THE OVERALL DEMEANOUR OF THE THEN US ADMINISTRATION IN PARTICULAR TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION: PAKISTAN'S CONCERN ABOUT PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN HAD SHARPENED AND HAIG NOW HOPED FOR AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP. HE

SHARPENED AND HAIG NOW HOPED FOR AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP. HE ADDED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD AN INTEREST IN AND A CERTAIN DEPENDENCE ON PAKISTAN, AND THAT HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD PROVIDE FUNDS TO THE PAKISTANIS.

3. TURKEY WAS VERY MUCH PART OF THE CONSENSUS CONCEPT AS IT LOOKED TO THE SOUTH AND EAST AS WELL AS TO NATO. EAGLEBURGER HAD TOLD ME EARLIER THAT HE PERSONALLY HOPED THAT THE MILITARY REGIME WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE IN TURKEY AND THAT THE DESIRE TO SEE EARLY ELECTIONS THERE WOULD NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION IN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PARTICULARLY WEST GERMANY. HAID SAID THAT JORDAN TOO SHOULD BE INVOLVED AS WELL AS EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA: HE SAW SOME PROSPECT OF A RAPPROCHEMENT IN TIME BETWEEN SADAT AND THE SAUDIS.

4. HAIG EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF ARAB CONCERNS THAT THERE SHOULD BE MOVEMENT OVER PALESTINE BUT WAS CONFIDENT THAT THESE COULD BE ACCOMMODATED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE BUT CONCERNED ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF THE PLO AS A POSSIBLE INTERLOCUTOR. HE EMPHASISED THAT THERE COULD BE NO DELUDING OURSELVES ABOUT THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE PLO - IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS WE HAD SEEN THE HEAVY HAND OF ARAFAT IN EL SALVADOR - AND IT BEHOVED US TO BE VERY CAUTIOUS.

5. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD SEEN DOBRYNIN EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON AND THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE FIRST ITEM ON THE SOVIET AGENDA WAS TO BE INVITED BACK INTO THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I INTERJECTED THAT BY GOOD LUCK OR MANAGEMENT THE AMERICANS HAD MANAGED TO HAVE THE SOVIETS EXCLUDED FROM THE PEACE PROCESS, TO WHICH HAIG RETORTED THAT VANCE'S EFFORTS HAD NEARLY LED THEM BACK IN.

6. HAIG THOUGHT THAT THE VIEWS OF SADAT AND PERES WERE NOT TOO FAR APART AND THAT BOTH WOULD LOOK TO SINAI FIRST. I ASKED ABOUT PRESS SPECULATION HERE THAT THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN-MEMBERS OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO USE FACILITIES IN SINAI, PARTICULARLY THE TWO EVACUATED ISRAELI AIR BASES IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE. HAIG SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT THIS WAS NOT ON AND THAT THE SINAI WAS POORLY LOCATED FOR RDF PURPOSES, THOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT THE TWO ISRAELI AIRFIELDS MIGHT BE OF SOME USE. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WERE EXPLOITED AS A FACADE: SADAT COULD NOT LIVE WITH THAT HAIG ADMITTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT THAT THE SINAI FORCE WOULD BE

AS A FACADE: SADAT COULD NOT LIVE WITH THAT HAIG ADMITTED THAT SOME IN THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT THAT THE SINAI FORCE WOULD BE A GOOD VEHICLE FOR PROGRESS ON THE RDF BUT SAID THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF APPROACHING THE SUBJECT FROM THAT ANGLE. INDEED HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO AVOID US PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE BUT THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTING ON IT. VELIOTES ADDED THAT STERNER WOULD BE PAYING A FURTHER VISIT TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT LATER THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS.

7. HAIG AGREED THAT THE GULF COUNCIL FOR COOPERATION WAS A USEFUL DEVELOPMENT AND THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH IT SHOULD BE BUILT UP. THE OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD HIM THAT ALL THEIR PARTNERS IN THE COUNCIL HAD COMPLAINED PUBLICLY ABOUT OMAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE US BUT IN PRIVATE HAD URGED THE OMANIS TO STRENGTHEN THEM.

8. HAIG ADDED THAT AFTER HIS RETURN FROM THE MIDDLE EAST HE HOPED TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH US AND THEN WITH THE FRENCH TO SEE WHAT WE MIGHT DO JOINTLY IN THE REGION WITH SADAT AND OTHERS INCLUDING THE GULF STATES. HE WOULD LOOK TO THE SAUDIS TO HELP OVER PAKISTAN. HE FELT THAT COOPERATION COULD BE DEVELOPED TO THE POINT WHERE IT OFFERED THE IRANIANS AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION AND A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE HAD CHANGED OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS AND THAT THEY NOW REALISED THE BENEFITS OF GREATER COLLABORATION WITH THE US. THEY HAD COME TO REALISE HOW WEAK THEY WERE ON THEIR OWN.

FCO PASS SAVING: ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, DOHA, DUBAI, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANA'A, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, TEHRAN, BONN, NEW DELHI, THE HAGUE, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS.

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FM WASHINGTON 250202Z MARCH 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 986 OF 24 MARCH
INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT.

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): CALL ON HAIG: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

1. I TOLD HAIG OF YOUR CONCERN AT THE RAPID EXPANSION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THIS YEAR AND STRESSED YOUR HOPE THAT DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT HE WOULD BRING HOME TO THE ISRAELIS THE DANGERS OF THEIR POLICY IN THIS AREA. I LEFT A PIECE OF PAPER BASED ON YOUR TELNO 446. I ALSO GAVE HIM A COPY OF HM CONSUL-GENERAL JERUSALEM'S MINUTE OF 9 MARCH ABOUT THE TARKUMIYA SETTLEMENT (NOT TO ALL) AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY THE SETTLEMENT POLICY. THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE PLEASED AT THE PRESENT EXODUS OF THE ARABS FROM THE WEST BANK: BUT IT WAS ONLY COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM FOR THE FUTURE.

2. HAIG SAID THAT WHATEVER VIEW ONE TOOK OF THE LEGAL POSITION, IT WAS VERY CLEAR THAT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY WAS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE SO FAR AS THE PEACE PROCESS WAS CONCERNED. HE DID NOT EXPLICITLY COMMIT HIMSELF TO RAISE THE SUBJECT IN ISRAEL BUT WE HAVE HEARD SEPARATELY THAT OFFICIAL ADVICE FROM THE DEPARTMENT IS THAT HE SHOULD DO SO. I HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT WHERE HIS PERSONAL VIEWS LIE ON THE ISSUE, AND HE LISTENED ATTENTIVELY WHEN I GAVE HIM DETAILS OF THE RECENT STEPPING-UP OF SETTLEMENTS AND OF THE MISERY AND RESENTMENT IT CREATED.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 102 OF 22 MAR

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEWYORK

INFO SAVING TO ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAGHDAD BAHRAIN DOHA DUBAI JEDDA JERSUALEM KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT SANAA TRIPOLI TUNIS.

JORDAN/SYRIA

1. KING HUSSEIN USED THE CELEBRATIONS COMMEMORATING THE 1968 BATTLE AT KARAMEH ON 21 MARCH TO DELIVER A MAJOR SPEECH ATTACKING SYRIA AND DEFENDING JORDAN'S OWN MIDDLE EAST POLICIES. THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

(A) THE KEY TO PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE AREA WAS THE RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, HEADED BY THAT TO ARAB JERUSALEM, MUST BE RESTORED ''INCLUDING THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR DESTINY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR NATIONAL SOIL UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PLO, THEIR SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE.'' SINCE THE RABAT SUMMIT THE WEST BANK AND JERSUALEM HAD BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PLO. KING HUSSEIN WOULD NEVER ABANDON THIS POSITION NOR ANY OF HIS DUTIES TOWARDS THE PLO, PALESTINE AND JERUSALEM SEMICLN

(B) SYRIA HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE ARAB DEFEAT IN 1967 BY REFUSING TO DEPLOY HER AIRFORCE, AT THAT TIME COMMANDED BY HAFEZ AL ASAD. KING HUSSEIN ALSO WONDERED HOW IT WAS THAT SYRIA HAD FAILED TO DEFEND THE 76 KILOMETRES OF HER BORDER WITH ISRAEL ALONG THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AS THE MUCH SMALLER FORCES OF JORDAN HAD HAD TO DEFEND A FRONTLINE OF 560 KMS SEMICLN

(C) AFTER THE 1967 WAR THE SYRIANS FORMED SA'IQAH WHICH, TOGETHER WITH OTHER SIMILAR ORGANISATIONS, AIMED AT UNDERMINING THE UNITY OF PALESTINIAN ACTION SEMICLN

(D) JORDANIAN FORCES HAD GONE TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE THE SYRIANS ON GOLAN IN 1973 EVEN THOUGH JORDAN HAD BEEN TAKEN ENTIRELY BY SURPRISE AND HAD RECEIVED NO FOREWARNING OF THE 1973 WAR SEMICLN

(E) ALTHOUGH JORDAN HAD ORIGINALLY SUPPORTED SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, THE SYRIANS HAD NOT ACHIEVED ANY SOLUTION TO LEBANESE PROBLEMS. INSTEAD THE PALESTINIAN AND LEBANESE PEOPLE WERE NOW HOSTAGES TO THE WHIMS OF THE SYRIAN COMMAND AND THE SYRIANS ACTED AGAINST ANYONE WHO OPPOSED THE SYRIAN REGIME'S PRACTICES IN LEBANON (AN ALLUSION INTER ALIA TO THE MUHEISAN KIDNAPPING) SEMICLN

(F) JORDAN COULD NOT TAKE HER SHARE OF THE YARMOUK WATERS TO WHICH SHE HAD A FIRM AND ESTABLISHED RIGHT. ISRAEL WAS BENEFITTING BY TAKING LARGE QUANTITIES OF WATER FROM THE RIVER JORDAN SEMICLN

(G) SYRIA WAS BEN ON POLARISING THE MIDDLE EAST REGION BETWEEN COUNTRIES SUBSERVIENT TO THE WEST AND OTHERS TO THE SOVIET UNION. SYRIA'S WISH TO INTERNATIONALISE THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT IN THIS

/wsv

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WAY CORRESPOND WITH ZIONIST OBJECTIVES AND IF SYRIA ACHIEVED HER AIM THE WHOLE REGION WAS LIABLE TO EXPLODE SEMICLN

(H) SYRIA WISHED IRAQ TO BE DEFEATED IN THE WAR WITH IRAN SEMICLN

2. KING HUSSEIN HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY PUBLICLY ATTACKED PRESIDENT ASAD AND SYRIA IN SUCH HARSH TERMS. THE SPEECH, WHICH SHOULD BE SEEN AS A DIRECT RESPONSE AT HEAD OF STATE LEVEL TO PRESIDENT ASAD'S SPEECH OF 8 MARCH (DAMASCUS TELNOS 72 AND 74), THUS REPRESENTS A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN SYRIAN/JORDANIAN RELATIONS. WITH BOTH HEADS OF STATE NOW PUBLICLY ATTACKING EACH OTHER, THE PROSPECTS FOR ANY RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE SEEM MORE DISTANT THAN EVER.

3. THE MAIN THEMES IN THE KING'S SPEECH ARE REFLECTED IN TODAY'S EDITORIALS. WE HAVE ALREADY HEARD SOME ADVERSE REACTION AMONG PALESTINIANS, MANY OF WHOM REGRET THIS INTER-ARAB QUARREL HOWEVER BADLY THEY MAY THINK OF THE ASAD REGIME.

4. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF WHEN I SAW HIM THIS MORNING TOLD ME THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD RECEIVED TWO CONFLICTING REPORTS CONCERNING MUHEISEN IN THE LAST 3 DAYS, ONE SUGGESTING THAT HE WAS STILL ALIVE AND BEING HELD BY THE SYRIANS IN LEBANON AND THE OTHER THAT HE HAD BEEN KILLED. GENERAL SHAKER HIMSELF SAID HE VERY MUCH DOUBTED WHETHER HE WOULD EVER GET OUT ALIVE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 278 OF 20 MARCH,
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 274: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

SUMMARY.

1. AFTER ANOTHER 14 HOURS OF INTENSIVE AND AT TIMES TENSE CONSULTATIONS, THE COUNCIL FINALLY REACHED AGREEMENT EARLY THIS MORNING (20 MARCH) ON A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIFT). THE COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY MOVED INTO FORMAL SESSION TO ENABLE THE PRESIDENT TO READ OUT THE AGREED STATEMENT.

DETAILS.

2. THE UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS MET IN THE MORNING. THEY DEPUTED FIJI, NIGERIA, NETHERLANDS AND SENEGAL TO SPEAK ON THEIR BEHALF TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, COMPLAINING ABOUT THE COUNCIL'S FAILURE TO ACT AND STRESSING THE DIFFICULTY OF JUSTIFYING TO THEIR PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE.

3. MEANWHILE, DORR (IRELAND) HAD WORKED OUT VARIOUS NEW FORMULAE FOR REFERRING TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO HADDAD IN TERMS WHICH THE AMERICANS COULD ACCEPT. ONE OF THESE (PARA 4 IN MIFT) FOUND FAVOUR WITH THE NON-ALIGNED, THE US MISSION AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT OFFICIAL LEVEL. AS SOON AS MRS KIRKPATRICK ARRIVED BACK FROM WASHINGTON, THE COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. TO GENERAL RELIEF BOTH SHE AND OVINNIKOV (USSR) AGREED THE IRISH TEXT, SUBJECT TO MINOR AMENDMENTS. PREPARATIONS WERE IMMEDIATELY SET IN HAND FOR THE FORMAL MEETING.

4. THERE WAS THEN AN UNFORSEEN HITCH. THE RUSSIANS HAD INSISTED THAT IF THE NEW PARAGRAPH 4 WAS ACCEPTED THE REST OF THE TEXT SHOULD BE AS AGREED ON TUESDAY EVENING. THIS CONTAINED (IN PARAGRAPH 5) A SENTENCE REPRODUCING THE GIST OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF SCR 425 AND THEREFORE CONTAINING A REFERENCE TO ISRAEL. THIS SENTENCE HAD BEEN THE CAUSE OF ARGUMENT BETWEEN DORR AND MRS KIRKPATRICK THE PREVIOUS DAY. UNFORTUNATELY THE US MISSION HAD NOT FURNISHED HER WITH AN ACCURATE TEXT OF WHAT PETREE HAD AGREED ON TUESDAY. WHEN SHE DISCOVERED THAT THE OFFENDING REFERENCE TO ISRAEL WAS STILL THERE, SHE REPUDIATED THE AGREEMENT JUST REACHED.

5. AT MY WESTERN COLLEAGUE'S (AND THE US MISSION'S) REQUEST I MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS, IN A LONG TETE-A-TETE, TO PERSUADE HER TO ALLOW THE AGREED TEXT TO GO THROUGH, POINTING OUT THAT THE OFFENDING LANGUAGE WAS A DIRECT QUOTATION FROM A RESOLUTION WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT STILL SUPPORTED (AND WHICH THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD INDEED SPONSORED). BUT I MADE NO IMMEDIATE IMPRESSION. WALDHEIM HAD NO BETTER LUCK. BUT AFTER FURTHER LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS, A COMPROMISE WAS FINALLY ACHIEVED AT MIDNIGHT UNDER WHICH THE WHOLE TEXT OF SCR 425 WOULD BE QUOTED VERBATIM AT THE END OF PARA 5 OF THE STATEMENT. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHY MRS KIRKPATRICK AGREED TO THIS SOLUTION (WHICH IS UNWELCOME TO MY ISRAELI COLLEAGUE), FOR THE MAIN EFFECT OF QUOTING SCR 425 IN FULL IS TO RECALL THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON IN 1978.

6. THE ADOPTION OF THIS STATEMENT, ALBEIT BELATEDLY, HAS I HOPE DEFUSED THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS. BUT IT HAS BEEN A LAMENTABLE PERFORMANCE BY THE AMERICANS, WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES DESCRIBED IN MY TEL NO 277. THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN INFURIATING THE NON-ALIGNED, UPSETTING THEIR FRIENDS (INCLUDING WESTERN EUROPEANS AND EVEN THE ISRAELIS IN THE END) AND DELIGHTING THE RUSSIANS. I AM ESPECIALLY WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECT ON THE UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. MRS KIRKPATRICK'S ARROGANCE TOWARDS THEM AND HER TERGIVERSATIONS OVER SCR 425 HAVE LED THEM TO ASK WHAT THEIR SOLDIERS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE DOING IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF SOME

TO BE DOING IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF SOME OF THEM MAKE EARLY REPRESENTATIONS IN WASHINGTON TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY.

PARSONS

NNNN

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 March 1981

Dear Michael,

The Ruler of Dubai

Shaikh Rashid, the Ruler of Dubai and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates, has been in London for ten days or so undergoing medical treatment. It appears he now feels well enough to see visitors and to make calls himself although he is anxious to return to Dubai as soon as possible. Last week Lord Carrington sent him a goodwill message with a gift of flowers and expressed the hope that he would be able to call on Shaikh Rashid in person. In the event, Lord Carrington's attendance at the EC Summit in Holland and his subsequent departure for the Far East make it unlikely that he will have time to see Shaikh Rashid, much as he would wish to. Sir Ian Gilmour may call instead.

But the UAE Embassy have enquiried whether it would be possible for Shaikh Rashid to call on the Prime Minister on Monday or Tuesday (23 and 24 March). Since the Prime Minister will also attend the EC Summit, a call on either of those days is clearly out of the question. But in advance of her visit, it would be greatly appreciated in the UAE if the Prime Minister would agree to set aside half an hour on Wednesday 25 March, assuming that Shaikh Rashid is able to remain in London until then (if there is any likelihood of meeting the Prime Minister, Shaikh Rashid will doubtless delay his departure). Shaikh Rashid has been the effective Ruler of Dubai for more than 40 years. He is one of the leading personalities in the Gulf and in the last two years has shown, as the Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates, a drive and efficiency which have had a profound effect on the functioning of the Federal Government. Under his leadership, Dubai has developed a thriving mercantile economy in which the enormous part played by British companies has been in no small measure due to Rashid's undisguised liking for the British. We always pay as much attention to Dubai as to Abu Dhabi, the neighbouring Emirate which is the federal capital of the United Arab Emirates. We maintain an Embassy in Dubai as well as in Abu Dhabi and visiting British Ministers always go to both Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The Prime Minister herself will be visiting Dubai on 22 April, albeit for only a few hours, and Shaikh Rashid's importance was marked when The Queen went to Dubai in February 1979, on which occasion she awarded a GCMG to Shaikh Rashid.

Yes - Tuesday evening 7.30p -

/Shaikh

Shaikh Rashid speaks no English but he will be accompanied either by the UAE Ambassador, Mr Mahdi Rajir, or by the Charge d'Affaires. Either of these gentlemen would be able to interpret, unless the Prime Minister wished us to provide an interpreter.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 277 OF 19 MARCH 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS.
INFO SAVING CAIRO, AMMAN, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW.

MY TELNOS 263, 267, 274 (NOT TO ALL): ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. THIS ATTEMPT, SO FAR UNSUCCESSFUL, TO AGREE A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE KILLING BY HADDAD'S FORCES OF THREE NIGERIAN SOLDIERS OF UNIFIL HAS BEEN THE FIRST TIME THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION HAS HAD TO DEAL WITH A MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT HAS REVEALED A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT AND TO THE UN GENERALLY. IT HAS LEFT ME AND ALL THE UNITED STATES'S OTHER FRIENDS AND ALLIES HERE (APART FROM ISRAEL) DEEPLY DISTURBED ABOUT THE LIKELY FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS.

2. I HAD ANOTHER LONG TALK WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK YESTERDAY (18 MARCH). WE WENT OVER MUCH OF THE GROUND COVERED IN THE CONVERSATION DORR (IRELAND) AND I HAD HAD WITH HER THE PREVIOUS DAY (PARAGRAPHS 6 - 8 OF MY TELNO 267). IN ADDITION I SAID THAT I HAD NOT WORKED SO HARD FOR CONSENSUS JUST FOR THE SAKE OF A HAPPY ENDING. MY CONCERN WAS WITH THE REAL WORLD. IF THE COUNCIL COULD NOT AGREE A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, THERE WAS A SERIOUS RISK THAT UNIFIL MIGHT BE UNRAVELLED. THE NIGERIANS WERE OUTRAGED BY THE COUNCIL'S FAILURE TO ACT: THEY HAD CALLED A MEETING OF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS FOR TODAY: IF, AS THEY APPARENTLY INTENDED, THEY TOOK THE QUESTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THERE WAS DIVISION THERE, THEY MIGHT WELL WITHDRAW THEIR CONTINGENT. MOREOVER, TO JUDGE FROM WHAT MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD BEEN SAYING THE PREVIOUS DAY, DOUBT WOULD BE CAST ON WHETHER UNIFIL'S PRESENT MANDATE STILL ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL. THE WHOLE OPERATION COULD COME APART, LEAVING HADDAD,

OF THE COUNCIL. THE WHOLE OPERATION COULD COME APART, LEAVING HADDAD, THE PLO, THE ISRAELIS AND THE SYRIANS MILLING AROUND FACE TO FACE WITH NO SCREEN, HOWEVER IMPERFECT, BETWEEN THEM. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYONE WANTED THIS.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK WAS TOTALLY UNMOVED. SHE ARGUED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN FLEXIBLE AND SAID THAT, IF THE SCENARIO I HAD PAINTED WAS TO BE BELIEVED, IT WAS ASTONISHING THAT OTHERS, INCLUDING THE LEBANESE, HAD NOT BEEN FLEXIBLE TOO. THE AMERICANS REGARDED THIS ISSUE AS A TEST CASE OF THEIR CONSISTENCY AND THEIR INSISTENCE ON ABSOLUTE BALANCE. IF ISRAEL WAS MENTIONED, WHETHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, THE PLO MUST BE AS WELL. IF THE AMERICANS ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO BE DRIVEN OFF THE PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION THEY HAD ADOPTED, THEY WOULD BE ON SLIPPERY GROUND.

4. I SAID THAT I COULD UNDERSTAND THIS ATTITUDE. I DID NOT LIKE HALF TRUTHS AND DOUBLE STANDARDS ANY MORE THAN SHE DID. BUT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE DANGER OF AGGRAVATING THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH WOULD BE THE CERTAIN RESULT OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF UNIFIL, MATTERED MORE THAN A HANDFUL OF WORDS IN THE UN. MRS KIRKPATRICK REMAINED ADAMANT, INSISTING THAT IN HER VIEW US NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY HOLDING OUT.

5. MRS KIRKPATRICK'S FOREIGN SERVICE STAFF IN THE US MISSION, WHILE LOYALLY CARRYING OUT HER INSTRUCTIONS, HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DISGUISE FROM US AND OTHER MISSIONS THE DISTASTE THEY FEEL FOR THE TURN US POLICY HAS TAKEN AND THE DIFFICULTIES THEY HAVE HAD IN GETTING TO MRS KIRKPATRICK. SHE HAS SURROUNDED HERSELF WITH YOUNG POLITICIANS AND ACADEMICS, SOME OF THEM WITH DEEPLY HELD PREJUDICES AND MOST OF THEM WITH LITTLE OR NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WHO FLAUNT THEIR CONTEMPT FOR THE UN AND THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES HERE. ON TUESDAY EVENING, WHEN THE BELEAGUERED PETREE WAS DEFENDING THE US POSITION IN THE COUNCIL'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AND TRYING TO OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON IN OUR SUCCESSIVE ADJOURNMENTS, MRS KIRKPATRICK WAS HOSTING A DINNER FOR BLUM (ISRAEL), SENATOR MOYNIHAN AND OTHERS, AT WHICH THERE WERE SIX AFTER DINNER SPEECHES, SOME OF THEM VIRULENTLY HOSTILE TO THE UN INCLUDING THAT OF ONE OF HER OWN STAFF. THIS IS SEEN HERE AS A SIGN OF THE TIMES.

6. THE AMERICAN PERFORMANCE SO FAR IN THIS EPISODE HAS NOT LEFT THEM WITH AN ENHANCED REPUTATION FOR FIRMNESS AND ADHERENCE TO PRINCIPLE. ON THE CONTRARY IT HAS OUTRAGED THE NON-ALIGNED, WHO SENSE ALMOST A DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS TO PROVOKE CONFRONTATION. IT HAS WORRIED THE AMERICANS' ALLIES, WHO ARE ASKING THEMSELVES THE OBVIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR WESTERN SOLIDARITY HERE. AND IT HAS UNDOUBTEDLY DELIGHTED THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS FRIENDS.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO CAIRO, AMMAN, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 267 OF 17 MARCH 1981
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 263: ISRAEL/LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. ALTHOUGH CONSULTATIONS WERE HELD THROUGHOUT THE DAY UP TO 1045PM NEW YORK TIME, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAIN FAILED TO AGREE ON THE TEXT OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THIS WAS ESSENTIALLY BECAUSE THE AMERICANS COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY LANGUAGE WHICH MENTIONED ISRAEL DIRECTLY OR REFERRED TO EXTERNAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO HADDAD. THE RUSSIANS PLAYED A SPOILING ROLE AND AT THE END OF THE DAY DESCRIBED THE UNITED STATES POSITION AS ''DEFIANT'' AND ''UNACCEPTABLE''.

2. EFFORTS TO AGREE A TEXT ARE DUE TO RESUME TOMORROW (18 MARCH). MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, THE NIGERIANS ARE FRUSTRATED AND ANGRY AT THE LACK OF COUNCIL AGREEMENT AND ARE THREATENING TO INSIST ON AN URGENT FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AND POSSIBLY EVEN TO

THE LACK OF COUNCIL AGREEMENT AND ARE THREATENING TO INSIST ON AN URGENT FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, AND POSSIBLY EVEN TO WITHDRAWAL FROM UNIFIL.

DETAIL

3. THE PRESIDENCY'S REVISED DRAFT WAS CIRCULATED OVERNIGHT. THE MAIN NEW FEATURES WERE THE INSERTION OF REFERENCES TO ''THE ISRAELI ARMY'' IN THE SECOND AND FOURTH PARAGRAPHS OF THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 264 AND THE ADDITION OF A SENTENCE STRONGLY DEPLORING THE PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE DE FACTO FORCES.

4. THE FIVE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PLUS JAPAN MET IN MID-MORNING TO DISCUSS THIS REDRAFT. WE SUCCEEDED IN AGREEING A FURTHER REVISION. THIS TOOK ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN (AND BRITISH AND FRENCH) OBJECTIONS TO THE REFERENCES TO THE ISRAELI ARMY, OF AMERICAN INSISTENCE THAT THE SENTENCE DEPLORING THE PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD REFER TO ''ALL OTHER ARMED ELEMENTS OPERATING IN THE AREA'' AS WELL AS TO THE DE FACTO FORCES, OF AMERICAN RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT ANY LANGUAGE ENDORSING PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL OTHER THAN SCR 425, AND OR IRISH CONCERNS ABOUT THE REFERENCES TO FURTHER ACTION BY THE COUNCIL IN THE FIRST AND SEVENTH PARAGRAPHS OF THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 264.

5. DORR (IRELAND) AND I WERE DEPUTED TO PUT THIS REVISED DRAFT TO THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (OUR TACTICS BEING TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT BETWEEN AND THE WEST AND THE NON-ALIGNED WHICH THE RUSSIANS AND THE GDR WOULD THEN FIND IT DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE). THE NON-ALIGNED SHOWED SOME READINESS TO COMPROMISE BUT INSISTED THAT THERE MUST BE A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ISRAEL. DORR AND I AGREED TO PUT TO THE AMERICANS A FURTHER REVISION OF THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH, READING: ''THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS THIS LATEST OUTRAGE BY THE SO-CALLED DE FACTO FORCES, SUPPORTED BY ISRAEL. MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL APPEAL TO ISRAEL AND ALL THOSE WHO SHARE IN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS TENSE SITUATION TO PUT AN END TO ANY FURTHER ACTS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO AN ADDED THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY''. THE NON-ALIGNED PREFERED TO OMIT ALTOGETHER THE SENTENCE ON THE PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE RATHER THAN ACCEPT THE BALANCED VERSION ON WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD INSISTED.

6. DORR AND I THEN CALLED ON MRS KIRKPATRICK. SHE TOLD US STERNLY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY REFERENCE TO ISRAEL. HER STRONG PERSONAL PREFERENCE WAS THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD DO NOTHING IN RESPONSE TO THE LATEST INCIDENTS, WHICH WERE MERELY EPISODES IN A CONTINUING CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. IF THERE HAD

MERELY EPISODES IN A CONTINUING CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. IF THERE HAD TO BE A STATEMENT, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE BALANCED: IF THE DE FACTO FORCES WERE MENTIONED, THERE OUGHT TO BE A BALANCING REFERENCE TO THE PLO: IF ISRAEL WAS NAMED, SO SHOULD SYRIA BE: AND SO ON. IT WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAIG THAT A SINGLE ACT OF VIOLENCE, IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA OR ANYWHERE ELSE, SHOULD NOT BE CONDEMNED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE WIDER CONTEXT IN WHICH IT HAD OCCURRED. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST BREAK THE HABIT OF CONDEMNING KILLINGS BY THE DE FACTO FORCES BUT NOT THOSE FOR WHICH THE PLO WAS RESPONSIBLE.

7. I SAID THAT I COULD SEE THE LOGIC OF HER POSITION BUT I URGED HER TO LOOK AT THE DRAFT STATEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS. SINCE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAD ASSUMED POWER, THE ARABS HAD BEHAVED WELL HERE, KEEPING THEIR HEADS DOWN AND GIVING TIME FOR POLICY TO BE WORKED OUT IN WASHINGTON. MOREOVER SARKIS'S SPEECH IN TAIF HAD DISTURBED THE PLO AND LED THEM TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE. ACCEPTANCE OF SOMETHING LIKE THE PRESENT DRAFT WAS THE PRICE THE AMERICANS HAD TO PAY FOR CONTINUATION OF THIS COMPARATIVELY SATISFACTORY STATE OF AFFAIRS. IF THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT IT, THERE WOULD BE A ROW WHICH WOULD ONLY CAUSE COMFORT TO MOSCOW AND THE EXTREME ARABS. DORR ARGUED THAT THE SOLDIERS OF UNIFIL HAD BEEN SENT TO LEBANON BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO FULFIL CERTAIN TASKS: SOME OF THEM HAD NOW DIED AS A DIRECT RESULT OF TRYING TO CARRY OUT THOSE TASKS: IT WOULD BE INTOLERABLE FOR THE COUNCIL NOT TO EXPRESS OUTRAGE AT THIS.

8. NEITHER DORR NOR I MADE MUCH IMPRESSION. MRS KIRKPATRICK REFERRED REPEATEDLY TO HER PERSONAL DISTASTE ''AS A SCHOLAR'' FOR THE WHOLE EXERCISE, KEPT ON INSISTING THAT THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN APPLYING DOUBLE STANDARDS AND REFUSED TO CONTEMPLATE ANY REFERENCE TO ISRAEL. SHE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT UNIFIL'S PRESENT MANDATE AND THAT SHE WAS NOT AT ALL SURE THAT SHE AGREED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT IT SHOULD EXTEND ITS CONTROL UP TO THE FRONTIER. (ACCORDING TO THE US MISSION (PLEASE PROTECT) THIS IDEA HAD BEEN SOWN IN HER MIND EARLIER IN THE DAY BY BLUM (ISRAEL)). DORR SAID THAT THIS POINT NEEDED FURTHER URGENT DISCUSSION: IF THERE WAS NO LONGER AGREEMENT IN THE COUNCIL ON WHAT UNIFIL SHOULD BE DOING, THAT WOULD HAVE FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS. (PETREE (US) HAS SINCE DRAWN DORR'S AND MY ATTENTION TO A STATEMENT YESTERDAY BY THE STATE DEPT SPOKESMAN REAFFIRMING US SUPPORT FOR UNIFIL AND ITS MANDATE AS SET OUT IN SCR 425). MRS KIRKPATRICK ALSO SAID THAT SHE HAD PROPOSED TO HAIG AND WEINBERGER THAT THE US SHOULD TAKE A NEW INITIATIVE IN THE LEBANON, COVERING INTER ALIA ''NEW GUARANTEES''.

INITIATIVE IN THE LEBANON, COVERING INTER ALIA ''NEW GUARANTEES'' HAIG AND WEINBERGER HAD AGREED TO CONSIDER THIS SYMPATHETICALLY AND SHE HAD SO INFORMED TUENI. WE WILL TRY TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THIS.

9. IT WAS LEFT THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD SEE TUENI AND SLIM (TUNISIA), THE ARAB ON THE COUNCIL, TO INFORM THEM OF THE MAXIMUM MRS KIRKPATRICK WAS PREPARED TO RECOMMEND TO WASHINGTON. THAT MEETING PRODUCED A TEXT WHICH THE AMERICAN MISSION THOUGHT MIGHT HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE IN WASHINGTON. BUT TUENI AND SLIM WERE UNABLE TO SELL IT TO THE REST OF THE NON-ALIGNED.

10. WHEN THE COUNCIL EVENTUALLY MET IN CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE AT 7.30PM WE WERE THUS STILL A LONG WAY FROM AGREEMENT, WITH THE AMERICANS INSISTING ON THE DELETION OF ANY REFERENCE TO ISRAEL AND THE RUSSIANS EGGING THE NON-ALIGNED ON TO STAND OUT FOR REFERENCES BOTH TO ISRAEL BY NAME AND TO EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO HADDAD. LEPRETTE (FRANCE) UNHELPFULLY PROPOSED A COMPROMISE WHICH HE MUST HAVE KNOWN WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE IN WASHINGTON. DORR, WALDHEIM AND I ALL URGED IN VERY STRONG TERMS THE CASE FOR A COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE ISSUE OF A STATEMENT TONIGHT. OVINNIKOV (USSR) PLAYED A SPOILING GAME, IN WHICH HE RECEIVED SOME SUPPORT FROM OTUNNU (UGANDA) BUT LITTLE FROM THE REST OF THE NON-ALIGNED.

11. AFTER TWO ADJOURNMENTS TO ENABLE THE AMERICANS TO OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS. PETREE REITERATED THE AMERICAN POSITON AS IN PARAGRAPH 10 ABOVE. BY THAT TIME WE HAD MANAGED TO GET AGREEMENT TO DROP ALL REFERENCES TO ISRAEL BUT THE AMERICANS COULD NOT ACCEPT DEPLORING THE PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE DE FACTO FORCES. PETREE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WERE NOT SIMPLY PROTECTING A FRIEND AND ALLY. THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND ITS CAUSES WERE COMPLEX. IT WAS WRONG TO SINGLE OUT ISRAEL, EVEN BY IMPLICATION. THE PRESENT TEXT WAS UNBALANCED IN ITS TREATMENT OF THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF PRINCIPLE.

12. IT HAVING BECOME CLEAR THAT AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE REACHED TONIGHT, THE MEETING WAS ADJOURNED, BUT NOT BEFORE THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE HAY WITH THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE. THE ONE BRIGHT SPOT WAS A TUNISIAN SUGGESTION AT THE END THAT THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY AN EXPRESSION OF COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR THE WALDHEIM REPORT AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS.

PARSONS

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 March 1981

Dear Michael,

Saudi Arabia

Jedda telno 172 of 10 March conveyed a translation of Prince Fahd's reply to the Prime Minister's message of 16 February welcoming the announcement of the Co-operation Committee for the Arab States of the Gulf.

/ I attach the original. We have taken a copy for our own files.

Yours ever

Robbie Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

T. 48/81

دولـــة الســـيدة مارجريـــت تاتشـــــر

رئيســـة وزراء بريطـانيـا

تلقيـت رسـالة دولتـك الـتي عـبرت فيـها عن سـرورك بمعرفـة نتيجـة اجتمـاع وزراء دول الخليـج الـذى عقـد فـي الريـاض يـوم ٤ / فبرايـر ، ونتـج عـنه تأسيس مجلس التعـاون لدول الخليـج العربيـة . وانني اذ اعـرب لـك عـن خالـص شـكرى لما حملـته هذه الرسـالة من مشـاعر وتمنـيات طيـبة بهذه المناسـبة مؤكـدا ان دعم امن واسـتقرار الخليج العـربي هو بتكاتـف وتعـاون دول المنطقـة وتظافـر الجهـود الخـيرة لأسـتمرار الامـن والسـلام . وسنعمل مـابوسـعنا مع دول المنطقـة لتبقـى بعيـدة عن كل الصراعات الدولـية لخدمـة الامـن والسـلام الدولـي .

آمـلا ان يكـون في زيـارة دولـتك المقبلـة لبلادنـا دعمـا للتعـاون وتوثيق الصـلات لمافيـه الخير لبلد يـنا .

مع صـادق تحيـاتي وتمنيـاتي الطيـبة .،،

فهـد بن عبد العزيز آل سعود

الرياض في ١ جمادى الاولى ١٤٠١هـ.

الموافـق ٧ مـارس ١٩٨١م.

GR 220
CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA 100604Z MAR 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 172 OF 10 MARCH

MIPT: PRINCE FAHD'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

''IN THE NAME OF GOD THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MRS MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN.

I HAVE RECEIVED YOU EXCELLENCY'S LETTER IN WHICH YOU EXPRESSED YOUR PLEASURE AT LEARNING THE RESULT OF THE MEETING OF MINISTERS OF THE GULF STATES WHICH WAS HELD IN

RIYADH ON 4 FEBRUARY AND FROM WHICH THERE RESULTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF COOPERATION OF THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF. I EXPRESS TO YOU MY SINCERE THANKS FOR THE GOOD FEELINGS AND WISHES ON THIS OCCASION WHICH THIS LETTER CONVEYED, WHILE CONFIRMING THAT SUPPORTING SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE ARAB GULF IS (TO BE ACHIEVED) BY THE SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION OF THE STATES OF THE REGION AND BY THE MUSTERING OF BEST EFFORTS FOR THE CONTUNUATION OF STABILITY AND PEACE. WE SHALL DO ALL WE CAN TOGETHER WITH THE STATES OF THE REGION, SO THAT THEY MAY STAY WELL AWAY FROM ALL INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLES IN THE SERVICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE.

HOPING THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO OUR COUNTRY WILL STRENGTHEN COOPERATION AND CEMENT RELATIONS TO THE BENIFIT OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

WITH SINCERE GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES.

FAHD BIN ABDUL AZIZ AL SAUD

RIYADH, 1 JUMADA I 1401 AH

CORRESPONDING TO 7 MARCH 1981 AD''

CRAIG

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED
MED
P & C D
PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY

cc. M O'D B Alexander

GR600 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM JEDDAH 160909Z MAR 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 190 OF 16TH MARCH 1981.

SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NY, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT.

Read in full.

YOUR TELNO 132: GULF AND THE RDFH(TO JEDDA ONLY).

1. I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO PRINCE SAUD YESTERDAY, 15 MARCH. HE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR ''THESE IMPORTANT WORDS''. HE THEN SPOKE AT LENGTH BUT WAS AT HIS MOST OBLIQUE.

2. THE SAUDIS, HE SAID, AGREED THAT THE MAIN THREAT CAME FROM THE USSR. THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOLVED ONE DAY IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. MEANWHILE THE RUSSIANS WERE UTILIZING IT. THE SOVIET ATTACK WAS THUS TWOFOLD: DIRECT (E.G. AFGHANISTAN) AND INDIRECT (E.G. ARAB/ISRAEL, THE LEBANON, PERHAPS IN THE FUTURE SYRIA/JORDAN). ON ALL FRONTS THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARABS WOULD LIKE TO CO-OPERATE WITH THEIR FRIENDS IN THE WEST, PARTICULARLY THE US AND THE UK, AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. OVER AFGHANISTAN THE BEST WAY WAS TO HELP THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES BY THE PROVISION OF WEAPONS AND TRAINING SEMI COLON BUT PAKISTAN MUST FEEL SECURE. IF THE AMERICANS ANNOUNCED THEY WERE SENDING ARMS TO THE AFGHANS VIA PAKISTAN, PAKISTAN WAS OBLIGED TO REPLY THAT SHE WOULD NOT ALLOW THAT. THIS WAS NOT THE WAY TO REASSURE THE STATES OF THE AREA. '' YOU DON'T NEED TO TEST OUR WILL TO OPPOSE THE USSR: IT IS STRONGER THAN YOURS''. BUT THERE MUST BE A COHERENT AND CONSISTENT POLICY.

3. SINCE I WAS NOT COMPLETELY CLEAR ABOUT THE RELEVANCE OF ALL THIS TO THE CASE AT ISSUE, I ASKED WHETHER HE MEANT THAT HE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN RDF AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING BUT THOUGHT WE SHOULD KEEP QUIET ABOUT IT. NO, HE SAID, THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST DEFINE OUR AIMS AND OUR NEEDS. TO USE THE JARGON, WE MUST DO SOME ''THREAT-ANALYSIS''. WE MUST COVER ALL THE PROBLEMS: WE COULD NOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO THE ISRAEL PROBLEM SQUARE BRACKETS AHA EXCLAMATION MARK CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS. SAUDI ARABIA, AND OTHER ARAB STATES, WANTED TO TAKE PART IN PLANNING BUT THEY MUST CONSIDER THEIR OWN REQUIRMENTS AND THEIR ''THREAT-PERCEPTION''. THE PROPOSED RDF WAS IN ANY CASE QUITE INADEQUATE: A COUPLE OF THOUSAND MEN COULD NOT HALT THE RUSSIANS.

4. WAS HE SAYING THEN, I ASKED, THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE WILLING TO JOIN WITH THE US, THE UK AND OTHER WESTERN

/STATES

STATES IN ASSESSING THE REQUIREMENTS AND PLANNING THE RESPONSE? YES, HE SAID: THAT HAD HAPPENED BEFORE. WHEN MR BROWN HAD BEEN AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE HE HAD COME TO SAUDI ARABIA AND SAT WITH SAUDI PLANNERS. BUT WE MUST SOLVE THE BASIC CONFLICT WHICH PREVENTED THE ARABS FROM JOINING THE WEST IN ITS PLANS. DID I KNOW THAT THE ISRAELIS MADE ALMOST DAILY INCURSIONS INTO SAUDI AIRSPACE? THIS WAS WHAT THEY MEANT WHEN THEY OBJECTED THAT THE SUPPLY OF F15 AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD REDUCE THEIR ABILITY TO MANOEUVRE. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO JOIN THE AMERICANS IN PLANNING RESISTANCE TO SOVIET THREATS, WHILE THIS MORE IMMEDIATE THREAT WAS ON THE SAUDI DOORSTEP.

5. HE WAS SORRY ABOUT THE STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO MRS THATCHER IN AMERICA BECAUSE HE HAD HOPED THAT THE DISCUSSION OF ALL THESE IDEAS COULD WAIT UNTIL SHE CAME TO RIYADH. HE ENQUIRED WHETHER YOU WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING MRS THATCHER AND EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN I SAID YOU WOULD NOT.

6. I AM SORRY ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THIS TELEGRAM. BUT TO SUMMARISE SAUD'S REMARKS WOULD GIVE THEM A LOGIC AND A COHERENCE WHICH THEY LACKED. IT IS CLEAR, THOUGH, THAT HE WAS ON TO HIS MOST FAMILIAR THEME: THE UBIQUITOUS INFLUENCE OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM ON ALL THE OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE AREA. I TOLD HIM THAT YOU HAD FULLY UNDERSTOOD HIS VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT DURING YOUR VISIT HERE IN JANUARY 1980.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

CRAIG

LIMITED
MED
NENAD
DEFENCE D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J MOBERLY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

PS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

PAUL FINDLEY
TWENTIETH DISTRICT
ILLINOIS

MS (2)

March 6, 1981 R16/3

Prime Minister

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, PM
10 Downing Street
London SW1, England

Dear Mrs. Thatcher:

My colleagues in Congress and I were deeply impressed by your visit to Capitol Hill. Indeed, your entire trip to the United States was a great success. We are fortunate to have such good and dependable friends, and I wish you well in the challenges you face.

I particularly want to commend you for the leading role your government is playing in bringing the Palestinians into the peace process. In recent years I have twice met with Yasser Arafat. While urging a course of restraint upon PLO military operations, I have tried to encourage the U.S. government to open talks with PLO officials to explore all avenues that might lead to peace. I was so pleased to see the report that Lord Carrington will soon meet officially with Mr. Arafat in pursuit of this same goal. I know firsthand that such meetings can raise an enormous outcry from friends and foes alike, and that makes me admire your government's courage all the more.

Once again, the British lead the way for all the western world.

Sincerely yours,

Paul Findley

Paul Findley
Representative in Congress

Madba

10 DOWNING STREET

Wad that some power the gift 'd gie us
To see ourselves as others see us.

With the compliments of

DW

So lets admit were really "on the make"
And not pretend we act for Justice' sake.

Amen.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
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Selected Articles

THE JERUSALEM POST

Monday, March 2, 1981

Element of intrusion

ABBA EBAN explains why the European Community's Middle East initiative is untimely and disruptive.

THE REAGAN administration will be doing a great service to international stability if it continues to discourage the Middle Eastern initiative undertaken by the EC governments. Of all the immediate obstacles to the development of the peace process, this is the most untimely and disruptive. Its most conspicuous feature is the absence of self-criticism.

In a region in which we have learned to be thankful for small mercies, the past seven years have seen large results for conciliation. The cease-fire in the Yom Kippur War was followed in December 1973 by the Geneva peace conference, which brought Israeli and Arab representatives at ministerial level around a negotiating table for the first time. Then came the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement of January 1974, the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement of June 1974, the Sinai interim agreement of September 1975, the dramatic journey of Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in November 1977, the Camp David accords of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979.

The Arab-Israeli conflict had moved beyond rhetoric into a contractual phase. And the credit for the breakthrough was widely diffused. Egypt had acted courageously in renouncing the slogans and passions which had nourished Arab policy towards Israel for three decades. Anwar Sadat's reward was the total restoration of the Egyptian territories and interests which Nasser had recklessly put in hazard a decade before.

Israel gave up a naval base, airfields, settlements, access to a neighbouring source of oil and the sense of space and distance whereby Sinai had sheltered Israel's security for 12 years.

American mediation was assiduous and effective at every stage.

Europe contributed nothing at all to the cease-fire or to the disengagement agreements, or to the Camp David success, or to the peace treaty. And the reason for its absence is no less disquieting than the fact itself.

When Israel's survival was in the balance in the early stages of the Yom Kippur war, some European governments refused passage to the American airlift and, in some celebrated cases, withheld spare parts for Israeli tanks, which thus became immobilized.

Shocked by this attitude, both Israel and the U.S. decided in November 1973 that Europe was too vulnerable to Arab economic pressure to play a mediating role. Europe, of course, had a sovereign right to put its particular interests ahead of Israel's survival and Western solidarity. But if it took that view, it could not expect to be taken seriously as a disinterested conciliator in later months.

> "There is nothing mysterious or shameful about Europe's vulnerability to Arab economic pressure, but it is the least condition of intellectual integrity to acknowledge reality and avoid illusion."

AGAINST THIS background, the entry of Europe into the mediating arena today, without the normal condition of being invited by all the parties at issue, has an element of intrusion. Apart from a lack of concern for some of Israel's sensitivities and interests, European leaders adopted a supercilious and envious attitude to the American role.

They damned the Camp David success with faint praise, predicted its failure with zest, and intervened time and time again to divert its course. They have made constant obeisance to the most radical elements in the Arab rejectionist front, especially the PLO, thereby discouraging moderate tendencies in the Arab area — and in Israel.

The motivation for this policy deserves analysis. European leaders have said that the peace process is in chronic deadlock; that the results so far achieved do not amount to a "comprehensive settlement"; and that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty offers no guidance for a solution of the Palestine problem.

There is no validity in any of this. While the Camp David process has at times (including the present) been disappointingly slow, its general rhythm has been spectacular. It has been no slower than the process whereby the European security system was meticulously constructed over several decades between World War II and the Final Act at Helsinki.

Other successes in modern diplomacy, such as the Panama Canal agreement and the Zimbabwe settlement, took more time than has elapsed since the Middle Eastern peace process began after 1973.

Is is frivolous to believe that a conflict as deeply rooted as the Arab-Israel dispute can be resolved by working papers in Brussels conceived in dissociation from Israel's will or interests.

"COMPREHENSIVE" settlements are never "achieved"; they grow as the cumulative result of individual and separate initiatives. Nor is it even faintly true that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty has nothing to teach about a Palestinian settlement.

Israel's signature at Camp David commits it to recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestine people; to the withdraal of the military administration and its replacement by Arab self-government; and to the determination of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza by agreement between Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians.

No similar semantic mobility has yet come from the Palestinian side, owing to the rigorous conservatism of the PLO.

Furthermore, Israeli policy is marked by diversity and fluidity. One of the options which might become operative in due course is that envisaged by the Israel Labour Party. This policy is based on the refusal to accept the idea of a permanent Israeli jurisdiction over the 1.2 million Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza.

We support the idea of an Arab state on our eastern border, extending on both sides of the Jordan and including 2.7 million Palestinians — the vast majority of that nation — in a Jordanian-Palestinian state of which they would be in effective control.

For obscure reasons, Europe seems to prefer a fragmentation of the Palestine people into two entities divided by an artificial boundary, with people of identical national attributes on each side.

This solution seems to fit the Irish and German syndromes and is unacceptable to any part of Israeli opinion. The Jordanian and Palestinian entities are not identical, but it would be absurd to say that they are hermetically distinct.

Labour policy is not what is wrongly called the "Jordan option"; it is an integral solution of two inherently linked problems — the problem of peace between Israel and Jordan and the problems of releasing the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians from non-Arab rule.

BEGINNING WITH the assumption that Israel's agreement is not an essential component of a. Middle Eastern settlement, the EC goes on to formulate plans for complete Israeli withdrawal (contrary to our rights under Resolution 242), the dismemberment of Jerusalem against the will of 75 per cent of its population, and the replacement of Israeli self-reliance by the illusion of European security guarantees.

This last item has done more than anything else to undermine the credibility of the EC initiative in Israeli eyes. It is impossible for us to imagine that European leaders believe in the viability of such guarantees. The would-be guarantors do not even have available forces that are stronger than those of the countries they seek to deter, restrain or protect. The very concept of "guarantee" implies a contingency of using force to protect the recipient of the guarantee. The idea that European forces would fight Arabs, even in conditions of flagrant violation of Israel's borders is too bizarre to deserve consideration. Europe declines even to raise its hand in UN votes against resolutions which it admits to be virulent and harmful, for fear of Arab reaction.

There is nothing mysterious or shameful about Europe's vulnerability to Arab economic pressure, but it is the least condition of intellectual integrity to acknowledge reality and avoid illusion.

In the Afghan, Iranian and Iraqi-Iranian crises, Europe has shown no power of initiative and no complete solidarity with America. It is inconceivable that it would offer Israel more than it already owes to the alliance on which its own security depends.

U.S. policy, despite all its fluctuations, has never lost the idea of a self-reliant Israel willing to undertake full responsibility and sacrifice in its own defence. The EC proposals conjure up a different sort of Israel — stunted, weak, humiliated and dependent on illusory external guarantees. America should assert its own lucid and balanced vision of the Middle East and request a decent reticence and abstention from those who cannot objectively fulfil a conciliatory role. Israel should defend its own image of what it can do for itself and what it can give to the cause of international stability.

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Selected Articles

NOW!

February 27-March 5, 1981

Why Israel fears a booby-trap in Europe's 'short cut' to peace

In an exclusive interview with Christopher Dobson, Israel's envoy to Britain criticises the EEC initiative

While Lord Carrington was trying to win support from President Reagan in Washington this week for the European initiative on the Middle East, Israel's Ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov, spelled out his country's opposition to the initiative in a remarkably frank interview with NOW!

Mr Argov's criticism of the EEC and of the major part being played by Britain in formulating and thrusting the initiative is not perhaps in the strict tradition of diplomacy. As a career diplomat he knows this full well. But Argov has never been known to shirk a confrontation when he feels that the vital interests of Israel are in danger and he is prepared to fight Lord Carrington's initiative to the end.

Referring to the Carrington-inspired settlement in Rhodesia, he warned: "To think in terms of the Middle East as yet another Rhodesia and to apply the same methodology to its problems is impracticable. This is not Rhodesia. This is a complex conflict which calls for a different methodology."

Argov believes that the EEC initiative has reached the point where a document has been drawn up which, if implemented, would "involve some form of imposition" of a settlement on Israel. The document, he says, "is not the kind of thing we are supposed to be privy to. It is the exclusive preserve of the people who put it together. We don't know the exact details of it but we have been able to glean enough . . .

"If the package presently envisaged were to become reality I suspect Israel's condition would become a very precarious one. I'm not suggesting that anyone is purposely advancing a package of this kind in the knowledge that it may produce the results which we feel are inevitable. I do not wish to impugn motives and we have no reason to impugn motives. I assume however that this is a package that is as much influenced and rationalised in terms of European interests as those of the parties immediately involved. It is really a question of European interests versus Israeli interests."

The document, according to Argov, consists of four items:

- The withdrawal of Israel from all of the occupied territories presently under its control, including East Jerusalem. This, Argov points out, was never contemplated under UN Resolution 242, which was carefully drafted by Britain to give flexibility to any settlement.
- A process leading to self-determination by the Palestinians. Israeli fears here concentrate on EEC policy that the PLO — which the Israelis regard as a terrorist organisation — should be associated with the peace-making process and would inevitably assume Palestinian leadership.
- International guarantees of Israel's safety. "Such a package would leave Israel in a defenceless state," said Argov. "Which inspires, I suppose, the next component of the package, which is a combination of guarantees that are supposed to make up for Israel's inability to defend itself. This is a cardinal point. We have always fought our own wars, always defended ourselves and acquitted ourselves fairly well. We must not entrust our defence to others — if only because we cannot fully put our trust in others. This is our national, rather dramatic experience."
- Jerusalem. The city "seems to be earmarked for something considerably less than the united indivisible capital of Israel which it is today and which, I might add, it is going to remain."

Argov added: "This is what we have gleaned from reports. Very far-reaching preparations and conclusions are reached affecting Israel's most vital interests without direct reference to Israeli opinion. And one wonders, therefore, how this is all to be implemented. One must assume that implicit in this is the prospect of some form of imposition."

Later the ambassador expanded, even more bitterly, on the European plan: "Why should Israelis be expected to look upon Europe as qualified to pronounce on matters affecting their most vital interest? What has Europe done for us lately? It will not sell us arms though it has no inhibitions on doing so to some of our most implacable enemies. It has not helped us in any way to finance the enormous price-tag of the Egyptian-Israeli peace. Britain would not even sell us oil now that we no longer have the Sinai oilfields to supply us.

"As for European political support, this is best demonstrated by Europe's inability to do more than abstain on a UN resolution equating Zionism with racism. While the United States has been willing to take risks for the overriding cause of peace, Europeans have abstained from anything that might affect their immediate short-term and primarily economic interests."

Argov said the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt provided the framework for a peaceful, just settlement. "There is every good reason for both parties in conjunction with the United States to get back to the autonomy talks and to see how they could be advanced . . . there is a role for the Palestinians and Jordanians and it is called for by the Camp David process . . . we need not resort to short cuts and hasty, rather shortsighted ideas."

When it was put to him that Mr Begin's policy on the establishment of settlements on the West Bank had not helped the peace process, Argov insisted that "the settlements issue has been inflated out of all proportions, the settlements are not an obstacle to peace."

He agreed that the problem was "in part of our own making. Inevitably there are passions involved on both sides." But, he argued, the settlements are needed to compensate for Israel's deficiencies in defence. "We need trip-wires. Our settlements in the Jordan Valley are the equivalent of your trip-wires on the Rhine."

Did he think those wires would ever be tripped? "Wars in the Middle East have been known to erupt unexpectedly in conditions of impasse and the one thing we should avoid is an impasse. Any attempt to force upon Israel a plan which Israel will not, cannot, accept is tantamount to an impasse."

Middle East
PS

GR 230
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FM DELHI 051100Z MAR 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 187 OF 05 MARCH

YOUR TELNO 113 TO JEDDA: PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ABOUT THE GULF AND RDF

1. THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ABOUT THE RDF AND A POSSIBLE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION HAVE BEEN WIDELY REPORTED HERE. THERE HAS BEEN ADVERSE COMMENT, SOME OF IT EVIDENTLY OFFICIALLY INSPIRED. PARLIAMENTARY INTEREST IS AROUSED (SEE MY TELNO 174). SEVERAL PAPERS HAVE ALSO REPORTED PROMINENTLY AMERICAN PLANS FOR THE EXPANSION OF DIEGO GARCIA.

2. IN VIEW OF INDIA'S RECORD OF OPPOSITION TO GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND HER FEAR THAN WESTERN ACTIONS WILL TRIGGER SOVIET REACTIONS, I INTEND, UNLESS INSTRUCTED RAPIDLY TO THE CONTRARY, TO TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE LINES OF YOUR TUR. I WOULD ALSO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING HERE SHOWED THAT A MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED SEEMED TO THINK THAT THE TROUBLE HAD BEEN SPARKED OFF BY SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE CONSENSUS REACHED ON THE INDIAN OCERAN WAS EVEN-HANDED EG THE REFERENCE IN THE ORIGINAL INDIAN DRAFT TO DIEGO GARCIA WAS DELETED.

3. THE DEVELOPMENTS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE ADD FORCE TO THE RECOMMENDATION IN WETHERELL'S LETTER TO REVOLTA OF 24 FEBRUARY THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE INDIANS A PAPER POINTING UP SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMSON

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GRS 220
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FM BAHRAIN 050856Z MAR 81
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 49 OF 05 MARCH
INFO ROUTINE ABU DHABI DOHA DUBAI JEDDA KUWAIT MUSCAT WASHINGTON

YOUR TEL 113 TO JEDDA: PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ABOUT THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

1. WHEN I TOOK JOHN GRAY (JEDDA) TO CALL ON THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS MORNING THE LATTER SAID IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION THAT HE HAD INDEED BEEN DISTURBED BY THE STATEMENTS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN REPORTED TO HAVE MADE ABOUT THE RDF. BEFORE SUCH VIEWS HAD BEEN MADE PUBLIC HE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED THAT I SHOULD HAVE GONE IN TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HIM.
2. I STRESSED THAT WE HAD TAKEN NO NEW DECISIONS AND THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE THERE WAS ANY QUESTION OF THE USE OF THE PROPOSED RDF. SHAIKH MOHAMMED IN TURN STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF AN RDF. IT WAS A MATTER OF PRESENTATION. THE IMPRESSION HE HAD GOT OF MRS THATCHER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON WAS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PERSUADED THE BRITISH TO ADOPT THEIR CONCEPT OF AN RDF, TO REFUSE TO REGOGNISE THE PLO, AND TO DELAY ACTION ON THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHEREAS HE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO BELIEVE THAT THE REALITY WAS THAT THE BRITISH HAD BEGUN A PROCESS OF EDUCATING THE US ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. WE OF COURSE ENCOURAGED SHAIKH MOHAMMED TO BELIVE THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE REALITY.
3. SHAIKH MOHAMMED CONFIRMED THAT THE THE BAHRAINIS WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE PERIOD 26-28 SEPTEMBER (YOUR TEL 28 TO DOHA).

WALKER

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FM DOHA Ø50931Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 69 OF 5 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT AND JEDDA.
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO.

YOUR TEL 113 TO JEDDA: PM'S REMARKS ABOUT THE GULF AND THE RDF.

1. MINISTER OF INFORMATION LUNCHED WITH ME ON 4 MARCH - BUT REFERRED ONLY BRIEFLY TO THE MATTER. I DISCUSSED IT AT MORE LENGTH TODAY WITH THE NEW POLITICAL DIRECTOR AND MINISTER OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY (SEPERATELY). I GAVE SHAIKH AHMED A LETTER EMBODYING PARAGRAPH 2 TO 4 OF YOUR TUR TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION.

2. THE CRITICAL COMMENTS OF THE QATAR PRESS HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN SPONTANEOUS, BUT EQUALLY CLEARLY REFLECTED GOVERNMENTAL CONCERN. THE POINTS WHICH MINISTER OF STATE AND POLITICAL DIRECTOR MADE TO ME WERE THAT:

(I) THE QATAR GOVERNMENT WAS SURPRISED THAT WE HAD NOT CONSULTED THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE AREA BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER SPOKE PUBLICLY ABOUT SUCH A SENSITIVE MATTER AS SECURITY IN THE GULF SHAIKH AHMED REMARKED THAT EVEN THE AMERICANS HAD REFRAINED FROM COMMENTING ABOUT THE GULF SO FAR: WHILE FRENCH SILENCE HAD ALSO BEEN NOTED. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THIS SITUATION SHOULD HAVE ARISEN JUST BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE AREA.

II) QATAR, LIKE THE OTHER GULF STATES, WERE CONCERNED THAT SUPER-POWER RIVALRY SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF THE AREA. (OF THE AMIR'S LETTER OF 7 FEBRUARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER). REFERENCES TO A WESTERN FORCE IN THE GULF COULD WELL SPUR THE SOVIET UNION TO COUNTER-MEASURES.

(III) TALK OF RESPONSE BY A RDF CONSTITUTED SOMETHING OF AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE AREA, SINCE IT SUGGESTED THAT THEY WERE UNSTABLE AND DEFENCELESS, WHICH IS NOT THE CASE. EVEN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOW JOINED IN WITH A STATEMENT THIS MORNING WHICH ECHOED GULF CRITICISMS. (SHAIKH AHMED COMMENTED THAT THE IRANIANS WERE CURRENTLY TRYING TO WORK THEIR WAY BACK TO FRIENDLIER RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES).

3. IN REPLY, I EMPHASISED HOW MUCH THE PM'S REMARKS HAD CLEARLY BEEN TAKEN OUR OF THEIR REAL CONTEXT, AND UNDULY INFLATED. I READ OUT

/THE TEXT

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THE TEXT OF HER REMARKS TO CORRESPONDENTS IN NEW YORK (RETRACT 17203 MAR) AND POINTED OUT THAT HIS CONSTITUTED NO REAL CRITICISM OF GULF GOVERNMENTS. AND I WENT OVER OUR POSITION AS SET OUT IN MY LETTER.

4. SHAIKH AHMED, HOWEVER, THOUGHT IT REGRETTABLE THAT THIS PRESS FURORE SHOULD HAVE DEVELOPED JUST NOW. THE QATAR GOVERNMENT HAD REFRAINED FROM ADDING ANY PUBLIC COMMENT, NOT WISHING TO CONFUSE THE SITUATION STILL FURTHER, AND BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SHORTLY COMING HERE. BUT HE FORESAW THAT PRESS COMMENT ABOUT ALL THIS WOULD SNOWBALL ALONG THE LINE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S JOURNEY, WHICH WOULD BE A NUISANCE.

5. MOREOVER, HE INFORMED ME THAT ALTHOUGH THE AMIR HAD CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS QUITE CONTENT FOR OUR TREATY OF FRINDSHIP TO CONTINUE IN FORCE AFTER SEPTEMBER (PASSMORE'S LETTER OF 20 FEBRUARY TO HMA ABU DHABI) THE AMIR WOULD BE HAPPIER, IN VIEW OF THESE LATEST PRESS REACTIONS, IF WE COULD AVOID MAKING REFERNCE TO THIS FACT IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE IRAQIS AND THE IRANIANS WOULD BE ONLY TOO READY, AS HE SAW IT, TO SEIZE ON REFERENCES TO THE TREATY AS A NEW DEVELOPMENT AND STIR UP CONTROVERSY ACCORDINGLY. THE IRAQIS IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN UNUSUALLY RETICENT ABOUT THE COUNCIL FOR GULF CO-OPERATION: BUT THEY WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO PASS UP WITHOUT ADVERSE COMMENT ANY REFERNCES TO WHAT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS QATAR ENTERING INTO SOME NEW KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM.

6. ALL THIS WAS SAID BY SHAIKH AHMED IN THE FRIENDLIEST FASHION (JUST AS HE HAD DONE IN OUR DISCUSSION OF QUOTE DEATH OF A PRINCESS UNQUOTE) THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT HERE, HOWEVER, WILL CLEARLY BE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RECORD TO BE SET STAIGHT WITH THE AMIR AND HIS ADVISERS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVINGS.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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4 minutes on reactions to the RAF. On present evidence, I am inclined to agree with the Omanis (below).

GR 190
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FM MUSCAT 050930Z
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 65 OF 5 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA AND MODUK (DS11)
INFO SAVING ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA BAHRAIN KUWAIT BAGHDAD CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS WASHINGTON PARIS BONN UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK SANA'A ADEN TEL AVIV BEIRUT RABAT ALGIERS KHARTOUM TRIPOLI MOSCOW NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD COLOMBO

YOUR TELNO 113 TO JEDDA: RDF

1. I TOOK ACTION ON 5 MARCH WITH UNDER SECRETARY MFA, LEAVING A PIECE OF PAPER EMBODYING PARAS 2 AND 3 OF TUR.

2. YUSUF ALAWI CONFIRMED REACTION FORESHADOWED IN MY TELELETTER TO PALMER NO 558 OF 4 MARCH (NOT TO ALL). HE SAID THAT THE OMANIS WERE ENCOURAGED RATHER THAN DISMAYED BY WHAT MRS THATCHER HAD SAID, AND THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY SO MUCH FUSS WAS BEING MADE ELSEWHERE. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT THINK THAT WE NEED TAKE TOO MUCH NOTICE OF IT. HE ATTACHED PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE KUWAITIS HAD NOT JOINED IN THE CHORUS OF DISAPPROVAL AND ATTRIBUTED THIS TO THE KUWAITI RECOGNITION THAT THEY HAD THEMSELVES AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY BRITISH FORCES WOULD HELP THEM IN TIME OF TROUBLE.

3. I DID NOT QUESTION THIS, BUT I SAID THAT SO FAR AS I WAS AWARE THE ONLY OFFICIAL REACTION HAD BEEN A SAUDI REQUEST FOR ''CLARIFICATION'' (JEDDA TELNO 159 TO FCO)

FCO PASS SAVING TO ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA BAHRAIN KUWAIT BAGHDAD CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS WASHINGTON PARIS BONN UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK SANA'A ADEN TEL AVIV BEIRUT RABAT ALGIERS KHARTOUN TRIPOLI MOSCOW NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD COLOMBO.

LUCAS

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 March 1981

B/F with Secretary

Dear Michael,

Invitation from the Prime Minister of Kuwait

The Kuwait Ambassador delivered the / enclosed letter at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 3 March.

His remarks have been recorded in FCO / telegram No. 87 (copy attached for ease of reference).

We shall be submitting a draft reply for the Prime Minister's consideration in due course.

Yours ever,

Frances Richards

(F N Richards)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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PP KUWAIT
GRS 232
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FM FCO 031800Z MARCH 1981
TO PRIORITY KUWAIT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 087 OF 3 MARCH 1981

YOUR TELNO 159: VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER

1. THE INVITATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER FORESHADOWED IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WAS DELIVERED TO MED BY THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR ON 3 MARCH. HEAD OF MED SAID THAT THE INVITATION WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY CONVEYED TO MRS THATCHER, WHO WOULD PROBABLY BE DELIGHTED TO RECEIVE THIS WARM MESSAGE AT A TIME WHEN THE GULF PRESS WAS VOICING CRITICISM OF REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO HER IN WASHINGTON. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE ADVERSE REACTION TO WHAT SHE HAD SAID SEEMED TO BE SWELLING. THE GULF COUNTRIES HAD HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICY BUT INSTEAD, ACCORDING TO REPORTS, WE SEEMED ENTHUSIASTICALLY TO HAVE ENDORSED IT. HEAD OF MED DREW THE AMBASSADOR'S ATTENTION TO WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD IN FACT SAID, PARTICULARLY ON 28 FEBRUARY, ABOUT OUR HOPE THAT THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED SHOULD BE FREE TO SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS IN THEIR OWN WAY AND OUR READINESS TO RESPOND IF, HAVING ASSESSED THE DANGERS, SUCH COUNTRIES TOOK STEPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES ALONE OR IN REGIONAL GROUPS. HEAD OF MED ADDED THAT, ON ARAB/ ISRAEL, OUR VIEWS HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS AND THAT WE WERE PLEASED TO HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK CLEARLY TO THEM AT THIS STAGE WHEN THEIR POLICY WAS EVIDENTLY STILL IN A FORMATIVE STAGE.

CARRINGTON

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T43/81

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SAVING TELEGRAM

FM DAMASCUS

SAVING TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 to FCO dated 3 March 1981
PS TO PM NO IO DOWNING STREET

RFI Saving to AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV, DOHA, ABU DHABI, WASHINGTON, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MOD(DI4).

Col. Barakat planned to assassinate the Jordanian Prime Minister but was caught. Jordano/Syrian relations continue to deteriorate.

AMMAN TELNO 76 (NOT TO ALL):

SYRIAN CONFESSIONS ON JORDANIAN TELEVISION

1. There has still been no direct reference in the Syrian media to the interview with Colonel Barakat and his associates on Jordan Television on 25 February. Syrian anti-Jordanian propaganda is going full blast, with accusations that the Jordanians are waging a campaign of hatred and distortion, and emphasis on the inevitable punishment awaiting those who plot against Syria and the Palestinian cause. Prominent coverage has also been given to King Hussein's alleged payments from the CIA, and meetings with leading Israelis.

2. It is clear that almost everyone in Syria either saw the broadcast or has had detailed accounts of it. Jamming was ineffective, and the issue of the Jordan Times which carried a full transcript of Barakat's interview was withdrawn only after some copies had already been distributed. Most of our Syrian contacts have shown themselves disgusted, if hardly surprised, by this kind of operation by their Government against a neighbouring Arab State, and compare it with the Muhaisen kidnapping (which most of them also attribute to Rifaat al Asad). References in the television interview to last June's massacre at Palmyra are widely believed, and have probably had an even greater impact. Frequent references by name to Alawites in the Defence Companies were well calculated to increase the resentment already widely felt against both. The interview will have struck most viewers as considerably more convincing than the "revelations" produced on Syrian television in November by Muhammad Ziad Silka (my telno 346).

/3.

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3. It is plausible to conclude that the blatant criminality of this operation (for which the President himself can not be excused responsibility), compounded by its failure (for which his brother must be held responsible), will have further eroded the credibility and prospects of Asad's regime. There is no doubt that the revelations in the interview will have fuelled the widespread public resentment at the activities of the security forces, and will also have exacerbated intercommunal feelings by their stark reminder of the way in which Rifaat's Alawite thugs feel free to behave. But the immediate effect here is more likely to have been to bring home even more clearly to the regime's many opponents the ruthlessness with which the regime is prepared to suppress its enemies, and to hit back at those thought to be supporting the active opposition.

4. Externally, the discovery of this operation has, of course, brought Syria's relations with Jordan to a new low point, and it is difficult to see any early prospect of reconciliation (though my Jordanian colleague has now returned to his post). Elsewhere, Syria's paymasters, all of whom are on close relations with Jordan, must be asking themselves how long they are prepared to support a regime capable of this sort of crime. I would be interested to hear of any reactions from the posts concerned.

5. FCO please pass Saving to all information addressees.

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 85 OF 3 MARCH
INFO WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS BEIRUT BONN

MY TELEGRAM NO 84: EUROPE AND MIDDLE EAST

1. EUROPE'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY, AND BRITAIN AS ITS CURRENT PACE-MAKER3 CONTINUES TO GET WIDESPREAD CRITICAL COMMENT HERE, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

2. ACCOUNTS VARY AS TO THE DEGREE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE US ON THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE SAID TO HAVE FAILED TO WIN REAGAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN PEACE INITIATIVE. THE PRIME MINISTER IS REPORTED TO HAVE PROMISED TO A CLOSED MEETING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THAT BRITAIN WOULD REFRAIN FROM STEPS LIKELY TO IMPEDE THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, AND IT IS SUGGESTED THAT AN ''ARMISTICE'' WAS ACHIEVED BETWEEN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND BRITAIN UNTIL AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS.

3. BUT COMMENT CONCLUDES THAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE ARE DETERMINED TO GO ON WITH THEIR INITIATIVE, DESPITE DIFFERENCES WITH THE UNITED STATES. BRITAIN IS SAID NOT TO HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY AMERICAN OPPOSITION, AND YOU ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO GET THE PLO TO JOIN MIDDLE EAST TALKS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE VENICE DECLARATION, AND IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WILL GATHER MOMENTUM WHEN BRITAIN TAKES OVER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE EEC. THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS ARE SAID TO HAVE COME AS A SURPRISE TO US OFFICIALS AND THERE IS FURTHER DISAPPOINT-MENT AT THE ABSENCE OF DIFFERENCES ON THE BRITISH SIDE.

4. OPPOSITION TO THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IS UNIVERSAL. THE JERUSALEM POST COMMENTS THAT IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT NONE OF ISRAEL'S MAJOR PARTIES, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS, WILL PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON EUROPEAN LINES, AND HA'ARETZ SAYS THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT REGARD THE LUXEMBOURG DOCUMENT EVEN AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE IF EUROPEAN EFFORTS ARE NOT OUTRIGHTLY HOSTILE TOWARDS ISRAEL, THEY ARE AT LEAST AMATEURISH. A BITTER ARTICLE IN THE LABOUR PARTY DAVAR RECALLS THE ANTI-ZIONIST, ANTI-JEWISH AND ANTI-ISRAEL POLICIES OF ATTLEE AND BEVAN AND SAYS THAT ''VERY SOON THATCHER AND CARRINGTON WILL BE AWARDED THE SAME PLACE IN HISTORY AS THEIR PREDECESSORS,

/ATTLEE

ATTLEE AND BEVEN, WHO ARE REMEMBERED WITH AVERSION IN ISRAEL'', AND CONCLUDES THAT IN ORDER TO ''BLOCK THE SPOILERS'' IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PLO, TO FIND ANOTHER PARTNER FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE TERRITORIES AS WELL AS TO THE RANGE OF PROBLEMS AROUND THE PALESTINIANS. IT IS A MATTER OF CHOICE BETWEEN TWO POSSIBILITIES: ONE LEADING DIRECTLY TO AN ESCALATION OF TERROR AND HOSTILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE OTHER TO AN OUTLOOK FOR PEACE, TIME GAINED FOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN THE DIRECTION OF PEACE, AND A US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSSEES

ROBINSON

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3 March 1981

Message from the Amir of Qatar

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 27 February. She agrees that Mr. Brant should thank the Amir for his message on her behalf.

MODBA

M.A. Arthur, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM JEDDA 031135Z MAR 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 160 OF 03 MARCH 1981
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, MUSCAT, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD.

MIPT: RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

1. TODAY'S AL RIYADH (WHICH HAS LATELY PUBLISHED A NUMBER OF ANTI-BRITISH ARTICLES) HAS A FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL ATTACKING THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT.

2. AL RIYADH ACCUSES BRITAIN OF LIVING IN A DREAM WORLD. MRS THATCHER COULD NOT BE BLAMED FOR TRYING TO FULFILL A ROLE WHICH HAS PROVED TOO MUCH FOR MORE EXPERIENCED PEOPLE, BUT SHE SHOULD FIRST PUT HER OWN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HOUSE IN ORDER. THE GULF COUNTRIES HAD EXPELLED THE BRITISH AT A TIME WHEN BRITAIN HAD GREAT LEADERS, THEY WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE RETURN OF BRITISH FORCES AGAIN ''UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS AMBITIOUS LADY''. BRITAIN DID NOT STUDY ITS HISTORY. IF IT DID, IT WOULD SEE THAT IT WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE AT PRESENT.

CRAIG

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 159 OF 03 MARCH 1981
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, BAGHDAD.

MY TELNO 155: PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

1. I WAS SUMMONED TODAY BY THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRINCE SAUD. MANSOURI WAS FRIENDLY AND PERHAPS A LITTLE EMBARRASSED BUT SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY MRS THATCHER'S REMARKS ABOUT THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE AND THE GULF. THEY WERE NOT MAKING A PROTEST: PERHAPS WE HAD BETTER CALL IT A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION.

2. MANSOURI ADDED THAT IT WAS A PITY THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SPOKEN IN SUCH TERMS WHEN SHE WAS, AS IT WERE, ON HER WAY TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAUDIS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OF THEIR OWN.

3. THERE IS A VERY HOSTILE FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL IN AL RIYADH TODAY ON THIS SUBJECT. (SEE MIFT)

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TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 63 OF 3 MARCH
INFO SAVING JEDDA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, WASHINGTON, BIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

M I P T.

1. I GATHER THAT BBC TV NEWS OF 1 MARCH FEATURED THESE AND OTHER GULF PROTESTS.

2. IT IS YEARS SINCE THE MOUSE OF THE QATAR PRESS ROARED AT US LIKE THIS. I WILL TRY TO DISCOVER WHETHER THERE IS ANY REAL FEELING IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES - OR WHETHER IT IS A HARE BEING RUN BY THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION'S PALESTINIAN MAFIA, OR A THEME ORCHESTRATED BY THE SAUDIS. MINISTER (I.E. AMIR'S CHEF DE CABINET) IS TO LUNCH WITH ME ON 4 MARCH, AND I AM SEEING MINISTER OF STATE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFARIS ON 5 MARCH. CERTAINLY GHQ WAS UNAWARE OF IT YESTER-DAY.

3. THIS CRITICISM DOES, HOWEVER, UNDERLINE QATARI SENSITIVITIES ABOUT SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF, RETAILED IN MY SECRET AND PERSONAL TELNO 37.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL EXCEPT BAHRAIN ABU DHABI DUBAI AND KUWAIT.

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Prime Minister

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 OF 3 MARCH
INFO SAVING JEDDA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, WASHINGTON, BIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

MULTINATIONAL RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE FOR THE GULF.

1. PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON 28 FEBRUARY ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF BRITISH MILITARY UNITS TO THE MULTINATIONAL RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE FOR THE GULF HAS BEEN GREETED HERE WITH SOME SURPRINGLY STRONG CRITICISMS IN THE LOCAL MEDIA.

2. THE ARABIC DAILY ''ARRAYAH'' CLAIMED ON 1 MARCH THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN READING BOOKS ON THE GLORIES OF PAST BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND THAT SHE WAS CAPTIVATED BY THE ADVENTURES OF ITS ARMIES IN THE PAST. MRS THATCHER HAD FOUND WILLING LISTENERS IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION FOR HER ''DREAMS'': THE FOREIGN POLICY PLANNERS OF THE REAGAN GOVERNMENT WERE ''MILITARIST''. THE GULF ENJOYED PEACE AND SECURITY AND WISHED TO BE LEFT ALONE. IF THIS PEACE WERE DESTROYED, BRITAIN'S INTERESTS WOULD BE DESTROYED WITH IT, THE NEWSPAPER CONCLUDED.

3. THE ARABIC DAILY ''AL ARAB'' REPORTED IN A SIMILAR VEIN ON THE SAME DAY, SAYING THE PRIME MINISTER HAD UNCOVERED THE REAL FACE OF BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF AND REVEALED A NEW IMPERIALISTIC DRIVE IN THE AREA. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY ''GULF TIMES'' ACCUSED BRITAIN OF DISMAL THINKING AND EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT SHE WAS LINKING HERSELF WITH THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURES IN THE GULF.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL EXCEPT BAHRAIN ABU DHABI DUBAI AND KUWAIT.

BRANT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

LIMITED

MED	PS
NENAD	PS/LPS
DEF D	PS/PUS
PLANNING STAFF	SIR J GRAHAM
NAD	MR J MOBERLY
NEWS D	

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GR 130
CONFIDENTIAL
FM KUWAIT 021000Z MAR 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 179 OF 02 MARCH 1981
GULF INTERVENTION FORCE.

1. THERE HAS BEEN NO OFFICIAL KUWAITI REACTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE U.S. ABOUT BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN A GULF INTERVENTION FORCE. THIS MAY BE BECAUSE OF CURRENT PREOCCUPATIONS WITH THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. THE LOCAL PRESS TOO SEEM TO BE LYING LOW. THEY HAVE MERELY REPRODUCED (PROMINENTLY) CRITICAL PRESS ARTICLES FROM LOWER DOWN THE GULF.

2. GRATEFUL FOR FULL TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS AND A LINE TO TAKE. AS SEEM FROM HERE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD REPEAT OUR EARLIER LINE THAT WE RECOGNISE THAT THE DEFENCE OF THE GULF COUNTRIES IS THEIR RESPONSIBILITY, ADDING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF BRITISH FORCES INTERVENING IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD EXCEPT AT THE REQUEST OF THE GULF COUNTRIES.

CAMBRIDGE.

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GRS 190
RESTRICTED
FM JEDDA 020948Z MAR 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 155 OF 02 MARCH 1981
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, MODUK.

RAPID INTERVENTION FORCE

1. THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN WASHINGTON (OF WHICH WE HAVE SO FAR ONLY SEEN PRESS REPORTS) THAT THE UK IS READY TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MULTINATIONAL RAPID INTERVENTION FORCE TO DEFEND WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE GULF, HAS BEEN REPORTED WIDELY IN THE LOCAL PRESS. WITH THE EXCEPTIONS GIVEN BELOW, THE REPORTS HAVE BEEN FACTUAL RATHER THAN INTERPRETIVE.

2. IN A FRONT PAGE LEADER ON 1 MARCH, AL NADWA CONDEMNED THE STATEMENT SAYING THAT THE AIM WAS NOT THE PRESERVATION OF VITAL INTERESTS, BUT DOMINATION, ESCALATION AND THE CREATION OF ZONES OF INFLUENCE. NADWA RETURNED TO THE CHARGE THIS MORNING, AND THE ARAB NEWS JOINED IN, BOTH OF THEM LINKING MRS THATCHER'S STATEMENT WITH AN INTERVIEW GIVEN BY PRINCE FAHD (WHICH WE BELIEVE APPEARS IN TODAY'S DER SPIEGEL) IN WHICH HE SAID THAT THE GULF STATES DID NOT WANT ANYONE TO PARTICIPATE IN THEIR PROTECTION. THEY COULD DEFEND THEMSELVES IF THEY GOT THE RIGHT ARMS AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE. THE ONLY MISSING FACTOR WAS ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENCE.

3. DIRECTOR OF WESTERN DEPARTMENT IN MFA TODAY ASKED HEAD OF CHANCERY FOR TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON RDF, BUT OTHERWISE MADE NO COMMENT. THE DEPUTY MINISTER YESTERDAY WAS SIMILARLY NON-COMMITTAL. GRATEFUL FOR COPY OF TEXT FOR HANDING OVER TO MFA SOON.

4. REPEATED BY TELELETTER TO BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, MUSCAT, KUWAIT AND BAGHDAD.

CRAIG

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Sir J Graham
Azim J
JC Moberly
PH Moberly

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Prime Minister

Agree that Mr Brand should acknowledge as proposed in the final sentence of this letter.

2/3

Yes no

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 February 1981

Dear Michael

MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE AMIR OF QATAR

(NSC attached) I enclose a message from the Amir of Qatar which replies to the Prime Minister's message to him of 19 January. I enclose a full translation prepared by our Embassy in Doha, but since the Amir's message is rather long, the following summary may be useful.

The Amir - who did not know when he wrote that the Prime Minister would be visiting in April - welcomes the Prime Minister to visit Qatar at any time. He looks forward to another talk with her, following their last meeting in September 1979, and would like to discuss with her security in the region, Afghanistan and the Arab/Israel dispute (the Amir, like most Gulf Arabs, links Afghanistan and Palestine as being similar victims of occupation). The Amir also raises the subject of the recent agreement by Gulf states to set up the Council for Cooperation among the Arab states of the Gulf. (You will recall that the Prime Minister sent the Amir and other Gulf leaders messages of support for this development). Finally, he thanks the UK for its assistance in the fields of defence and security, including the training and equipping of the Qatari Armed Forces.

/When

M O'D B Alexander Esq
PS/Prime Minister
10 Downing Street

When setting our our ideas on the objectives of the Prime Minister's visit to Qatar, we shall take account of the points raised by the Amir. Meanwhile, we see no reason to advise the Prime Minister to reply substantively to the Amir's message. It would be appropriate, however, for Mr Brant to be instructed to convey an oral reply from the Prime Minister thanking the Amir for his message, which had crossed with her own, and looking forward to their talks in April.

Yours ever

Michael Arthur

M A Arthur

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 February 1981

Dear Michael,

Ruler of Umm Al-Qaiwain

Shaikh Ahmad bin Rashid al Mu'alla MBE, the Ruler of Umm Al-Qaiwain, one of the smaller northern Emirates of the United Arab Emiratees, died on Saturday 21 February.

HM Ambassador Abu Dhabi has recommended that a message of condolence should be sent to Shaikh Zaid, the President of the UAE and it would be appropriate if such a message were to go from the Prime Minister. We are also seeking the approval of Buckingham Palace for a message to be sent from The Queen to Shaikh Ahmad's family.

Shaikh Ahmad was an old and valued friend of Britain. During the years when Umm Al-Qaiwain was a protected state in special treaty relations with Britain, Shaikh Ahmad devoted quite a lot of his time to mediating in small but nonetheless contentious border disputes. His services were recognised by the award to him of an MBE in 1950.

/ I enclose a draft message. As funerals in the Arab world take place very soon after death, it would be helpful if we could send a message in the near future.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
Restricted
~~Unclassified~~

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

TO:

HH Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan GCMG
President of the United Arab Emirates

Your Reference

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

It was with great sorrow that I learned of the death of Shaikh Ahmad bin Rashid al Mu'alla of Umm Al-Qaiwain. He was a trusted and valued friend of Britain.

Please convey to your colleagues on the Supreme Council and to Shaikh Rashid bin Ahmad and his family my deepest sympathy at this sad loss.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

COVERING PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1981

Dear Michael,

Mr Hurd's Visit to Saudi Arabia and Oman

I enclose a copy of Mr Hurd's personal report to Lord Carrington on his visit to Saudi Arabia and Oman from 15 - 19 February, which Lord Carrington believes may be of interest.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

COVERING PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary of State

cc: Lord Privy Seal
PUS
Sir J Graham
Mr Moberly
Mr Miers

SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN : 15 - 19 FEBRUARY

In Riyadh I saw three Saudi Ministers including Prince Naif, and in Jedda had a long talk with Prince Saud's deputy Mansouri (Saud was skiing in France). They were all in friendly and confident mood after the success at Taif on Gulf Co-operation. Nothing startling was said. Mansouri put the main message more frankly, indeed indiscreetly, than James Craig had heard it before - that the Saudi Government agreed privately with what Oman, Somalia and Egypt were doing, that they wanted the Russians out of Aden, that they would much rather deal with Egypt than with Syria or Iraq, but this was impossible so long as the man in the Arab street felt that Russia was his friend, because the US was the friend of Israel. Therefore it was up to us British etc etc.

Oman

2. The Sultan's desert style is at the opposite extreme from that of the King of Morocco. After ninety minutes in a helicopter we descended on a simple encampment of green army tents and Range Rovers, far from any human habitation. Here Qaboos will stay for a week, while his subjects come in over the sand dunes with greetings and complaints. In this way he will move slowly south to Salalah. He received us in a small tent without any furnishing except carpets, on which we sat for nearly an hour and a half. He had just one junior minister with him. He was very communicative and charming. He evidently enjoyed his two (very rare) journeys abroad, to the Arab and Islamic summits. He looks forward to the Gulf Co-operation, which he evidently sees as an operation by the Saudis and himself to put some sense into the other Gulf States. He talked firmly, but rather defensively, about his decision to buy tanks and a host of other equipment. He had no major points to make on our own defence effort in Oman. He talked interestingly about the UAE, Aden and his own political plans for Oman (separate record).

3. The next candidate for ordeal by carpet was Waldheim, with whom we later lunched in another tent. He was his usual gloomy self, but could be useful on Palestine - separate record.

/We have

4. We have a problem over Oman which needs more thought. It is illustrated by the Sultan's decision to buy Chieftain tanks, though it goes deeper. In separate talks with me General Watts and two of Qaboos' most intelligent young Ministers made the same points in different words - that Qaboos had decided to buy tanks against advice, without analysis of the threat, without considering that they would require more British LSP (30 at least), that they would upset the defence budget, and that if he was really interested in protecting his throne the money would be better spent on wells, schools and hospitals as subversion was the main threat. General Watts said that Qaboos, "stood on the top of a hill and ordered tanks from the back of an envelope". Hence the strongly maintained view of HM Ambassador that we and the Americans should have argued him away from the tanks - and indeed earlier away from the second squadron of Jaguars.

5. In the present fever about defence sales I do not think you would wish to take the above line. Nor indeed is it now possible, as Qaboos clearly showed me that the decision to buy tanks was a proof of his personal authority, and contrary advice would be unwelcome and unsuccessful (though if they are to be British tanks MOD will have to find the LSP, (mainly NCOs). Moreover, his psychological argument that his soldiers expected to have tanks (Oman 6, PDRY 350 at present) was persuasive to me, though evidently not to his advisers.

6. So he may well be right this time. But it is dangerous to have a lonely, moody man with no heir or close family at the top of an important country, who is apt to take decision by whim without analysis. In Whitehall we have too much paper and too many committees, but he could do with more of both. We may be able to help in this sensitive area of machinery of government. In any case I am sure we should not again allow a gap of almost a year to pass between visits by British Ministers. In Oman the platitude about relying on our wisdom and experience has some truths.

7. We shall also need to consider before the Prime Minister's visit how to respond if the Sultan asks what we would do if Oman is attacked. He will probably be briefed to do this, as some at least of his advisers see satisfactory US and British assurances on the external threat as one way of dissuading him from the accumulation of hardware.

Douglas Hurd.

Douglas Hurd

20 February 1981

Middle East

GRS 400
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 232046Z FEB 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 639 OF 23 FEBRUARY
INFO SAVING TEL AVIV CAIRO

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: MIDDLE EAST

1. THE ISRAELI LOBBY IS LIKELY TO STEP UP ITS CRITICISM AND MISREPRESENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT. AN ARTICLE BY WILLIAM SAFIRE IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES (FULL TEXT BY BAG) GIVES SOMETHING OF THE FLAVOUR. (SAFIRE IS A PROMINENT RIGHT-WING COLUMNIST AND FORMER SPEECH-WRITER FOR NIXON. HE HAS BEEN INVITED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DINNER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER ON 26 FEBRUARY.)

2. SAFIRE CLAIMS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD QUOTE PUT THE SPECIAL BACK IN THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, UNQUOTE BUT THAT QUOTE THE CARRINGTON SHADOW UNQUOTE WILL FALL WHEN THE TALKS TURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST. YOU ARE DESCRIBED AS A DARLING OF THE AMERICAN LEFT AND ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN FRETTING AT THE NEW U.S. RESOLVE IN EL SALVADOR AND SEEKING TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF ARAFAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IS A SCHEME TO REPLACE CAMP DAVID WITH A SIMPLE SELL-OUT OF ISRAEL TO APPEASE THE SAUDIS. GRAHAM'S AND MOBERLY'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK WERE AIMED AT PAVING THE WAY FOR AMERICAN ACQUIESCENCE IN THE CARRINGTON PLAN.

3. SAFIRE CONTINUES -
QUOTE AS THE BRITISH HAVE EXPLAINED IT, THE PLAN IS EMINENTLY EVENHANDED. EAST JERUSALEM WOULD BE TAKEN AWAY FROM ISRAEL, WITH THE CITY DIVIDED OR INTERNATIONALISED. THE WEST BANK WOULD BE CLEARED OF ALL JEWISH SETTLEMENTS AND THE AREA TURNED OVER TO WHATEVER STATE THE WORLD'S PALESTINIAN ARABS CHOSE. THE GOLAN HEIGHTS INVASION ROUTE WOULD BE RETURNED TO SYRIA: AND WHAT IS LEFT OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY WOULD THEN BE ASSURED BY THE PRESENCE OF A U N FORCE READY TO RUN AS SOON AS THE SOVIETS PULLED THE P L O 'S TRIGGER. UNQUOTE

4. SAFIRE ASSERTS THAT YOUR AND REAGAN'S APPROACHES TO THE MIDDLE EAST CLASH: YOU SEE THE ROAD TO INFLUENCE WITH THE GULF STATES TO BE APPEASEMENT OF THE ARAB DESIRE FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE CARVED OUT OF ISRAEL, WHEREAS THE ADMINISTRATION SEES THE ROAD TO POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO BE THE MILITARY PROTECTION OF OIL STATES MENACED BY THE SOVIET MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE THREAT. YOUR APPEASEMENT OF THE

/P.T.O.

P L O WILL HARM AMERICAN INTERESTS. REAGAN IS EXPECTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE U.S. NOW CONSIDERS THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE TO BE UNHELPFUL AND DESTRUCTIVE OF PROGRESS TOWARD PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY. SAFIRE CONCLUDES THAT IF THE PRIME MINISTER DECIDES NOT TO PLAY TRILBY TO YOUR SVENGALI THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE AND THE FREE WORLD WILL BE STRONGER FOR IT.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND CAIRO.

HENDERSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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Middle East

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 February 1981

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 16 February about the call on the Prime Minister by Messrs Winterton, Marlow, Bottomley, Alexander and Temple-Morris. I enclose a / brief for the Prime Minister's use.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

ARAB/ISRAEL: CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY CONSERVATIVE MPs

Points to Make

1. Fully aware of need to end Israeli occupation (and expansion of settlements) and provide arrangements for a decent future for the Palestinians. No doubt of our stand on self-determination for the Palestinians. Ten working hard on practical aspects of a settlement on Venice lines. UK Presidency could have vital role.

2. Will make clear to US Administration our views on need for a new approach. But must work with US, as Arabs themselves appreciate, and with all other parties.

3. Unrealistic to think of sanctions against Israel. Settlement must be freely negotiated, however slow a process this may appear. Also unrealistic to think any US President will exert direct financial or other leverage on Israel.

4. UK and Ten must have clearly evenhanded policy to be effective. This does not rule out criticism of excesses of either side, but means a balance must be maintained if at all possible.

5. Importance of PLO not in doubt. But PLO must abandon terrorism and stop equivocating about the future of Israel. Recognition not appropriate, but will use contacts to influence Organisation in direction of negotiated settlement. Welcome any help MPs can give in getting over to the PLO need for movement by PLO as well as Israel - e.g. by refraining from intemperate public statements on the destruction of Israel.

Essential Facts

1. These are the Conservative members of a group of nine MPs who visited Beirut, Amman and the West Bank from 29 January to 5 February under the auspices of the PLO. A visit to Damascus was planned but cancelled at the last minute because of snow on the road from Beirut. The other (Labour) members of the group were Ernie Ross, Frank Hooley, Robert MacTaggart and Robert Parry.

2. The visit was plagued by administrative difficulties, the PLO having made minimal arrangements, but our posts were able to ensure that in the event things went reasonably smoothly.

3. The members of the group saw Arafat and other senior PLO men in Beirut. In Amman they saw King Hussein and Crown Prince Hassan (their visit coincided, fortuitously, with that of the Lord Privy Seal). They then went on to the West Bank; the first visit there by a PLO-sponsored group of MPs. In the event the Israelis, having withdrawn an earlier offer of ''protection'' made no difficulties. The group were the guests of the Mayor of Nablus, Bassam Shaka'a, who lost his legs in a bomb attack last June and was in Britain (August - December last year) for the fitment of artificial limbs. Despite Israeli restrictions on his travel Mayor Shaka'a was allowed to accompany the visitors widely on the West Bank. Because of the PLO-sponsorship of the visit our Consulate General in Jerusalem did not intervene directly in the arrangements but provided discreet assistance and arranged a reception for the MPs.

4. Six of the nine MPs called on Mr Hurd on 10 February to report on their visit. A copy of the record, which conveys clearly the flavour of the group's views, is attached. The MPs calling on the Prime Minister are likely to argue the case for a closer UK relationship with the PLO,

A

/a speedy

a speedy and concrete European initiative, and (encouraged by King Hussein) European pressure on the US to use her leverage over Israel. The latter point is one frequently made by supporters of the Palestinian cause: Israel will never change policy of her own free will so that a peace settlement must be imposed on her by the US, using the financial and military leverage the Americans already possess.

5. US aid to Israel is indeed considerable ($1.75 billion last year) and Israel is heavily reliant on US military and diplomatic support. But any attempt by the US to put pressure on Israel using these levers would be unlikely to have the desired effect. Moreover there is no possibility of the US President or Congress agreeing to direct pressure of this sort. US influence on Israel will undoubtedly be vital if a settlement is to be attained, but threats to cut off support are likely to decrease this influence rather than the reverse. We have consistently argued that a lasting settlement cannot be imposed on either side and must be freely negotiated between the parties. There are no short cuts compatible with genuine and generally accepted peace. The necessary evolution in Israeli and Palestinian thinking is regrettably slow, but there is no alternative to continuing to work to encourage this process.

A

RECORD OF CALL BY MR ANTHONY MARLOW MP AND OTHERS ON MR HURD AT 4.30 P.M. ON 10 FEBRUARY 1981

Present:

Rt Hon D Hurd CBE MP
Mr S R Sherrington

Mr Anthony Marlow MP
Mr Ernest Ross MP
Mr Peter Temple-Morris MP
Mr Nicholas Winterton MP
Mr Richard Alexander MP
Mr Robert Parry MP

1. Mr Marlow and five of the nine MPs who had recently visited the Middle East under PLO auspices called on Mr Hurd to discuss the visit.

2. Mr Marlow said that the group had been impressed by everyone they had met on the West Bank. He felt that the PLO spoke for most Palestinians there including the professional classes, and that there was a general feeling that Camp David was a sell-out, but the Jordanians did not want a 'Jordanian option' which would isolate them just as Camp David had the Egyptians. Arafat was a moderate, describing himself as 'conservative', who wanted a diplomatic solution. The Arabs were looking to a European initiative.

3. Mr Winterton said that the Israelis were strangling Palestinian efforts by establishing settlements, some of which were not even occupied. He said that he had embarked on the trip as a sympathiser of Israel but that he had changed his position. He stressed that pressure, if necessary in the form of the Arab oil weapon, should be put on the United States to use its financial influence upon Israel to agree to a Palestinian state. He asked that Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington press the point on their forthcoming visit to Washington.

4. Mr Ross said that he had a long conversation with Arafat and promised Mr Hurd a record of it. He was concerned that Arafat would be swept away by the extremists in the PLO if he recognised Israel. He believed that the solution was the formation of a Palestinian state, whereby Israel would be recognised by implication. He spoke of strains within the PLO which would break out unless progress were made, and said that HMG must make clear that the PLO were not terrorists. He was not convinced that Mr Peres would be an improvement on Mr Begin. Mr Winterton thought that the PLO should be brought to the negotiating table with the Israelis and Americans, initially at least, under the Jordanian flag, since King Hussein was respected across the world. Jordan should take over suzerainty of the West Bank pending a plebiscite over its future. There should be a joint Jordanian/Palestinian army, which would allay fears of a 'spare' Palestinian army in the area.

5. There was a general feeling among the group that the mayors were becoming a focal point on the West Bank and that they had a considerable role to play in its future. Mr Ross mentioned that Mayor Shaka'a would be visiting Dundee in the first week of July in connection with its twinning with Nablus.

/6. Mr Marl

6. Mr Marlow said that a UK/Palestinian Parliamentary Group had been set up and that it now had about forty members; Mr Ross stressed the need to maintain a constant flow of exchange between Britain and the West Bank.

7. Mr Hurd said that the impressions brought back by the group were very much the same as ours. We might face a complication because o our tenure of the EC Presidency e.g. in the Euro-Arab dialogue, while the PLO held the Chairmanship of the Arab League. Something more, however, was needed from the Arab side if we were to make progress. Mr Hurd agreed that only the Americans could exert pressure on the Israelis, but this would not be easy. He said that he did not agree with those who described Arafat as a Soviet stooge.

8. There was gratitude and admiration from several members of the group for the efforts of posts in handling what had been a badly organised visit on the part of the PLO.

9. Mr Marlow brought up the refusal of a UK visa to Miss Khatib. Mr Hurd explained that this was a matter to be taken up with the Home Office.

13 February 1981

Distribution:-

PS/Mr Hurd
Mr J C Moberly
NENAD
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Damascus
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HMCG Jerusalem

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With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH

SIR J GRAHAM'S TALKS AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 17 FEBRUARY 1981:

ARAB/ISRAEL

Present: Sir J Graham
Mr R O Miles
Mr A F Goulty

Mr N Veliotes (Assistant Secretary)
Mr S Lewis (US Ambassador to Israel)
Mr M Draper (Deputy Assistant Secretary NEA)
Mr W Cluverius (Office of Special Middle East negotiator)
Mr N Howell (Director NEA)
Mr E Peck (Director NEA)
Mr G Lambrakis (Director NEA)
Mr R Beaudry (Director, Bureau of European Affairs)
Mr R Hass (Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)
Mr P Kaplan (Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff)
Mr W Kinby (formerly of Policy Planning Staff)
Mr J Hirsch (Deputy Director, NEA)

1. Mr Veliotes welcomed the opportunity to exchange views with Sir J Graham. He said that the US Administration was determined to take the steps required to defend its interests abroad against the Soviet threat. This was a global policy; two examples were El Salvador and the visit of the South Korean President to Washington, which was an obvious signal. The Middle East, South-West Asia and Afghanistan were three priority areas for implementation of this policy. The Americans were focussing on South-West Asia. They would also look at the prospects for the Middle East peace process but there would be a considerable time-lag before this could be seriously addressed. The US and its allies should meanwhile strengthen their security ties to counter the Soviet threat.

2. Sir J Graham agreed that SW Asia was a key area, with the Soviet army in Afghanistan and Iran in chaos and its future unpredictable. Arab states were worried. But HMG saw the Arab/Israel dispute as the key to a coherent Western policy in the whole area. Not all the problems would disappear with a peace, but it was difficult for the West to improve its relations with countries under threat from the Russians, while it was seen as the ally of Israel, which those countries regarded as a greater threat. Moderate Arab governments were worried at the radicalisation of their peoples as a consequence of the Arab/Israel dispute. Arab/Israel was therefore the top priority. Camp David had been a terrific breakthrough, both on the ground and psychologically; but it would not be very difficult to get the other Arabs, including the Palestinians, to participate. The process might therefore need to be adapted in order to consolidate and build on what had already been achieved.

/3.

3. Mr Veliotes said that the US did not want to lose any time in tackling the SW Asia security issue. Sir J Graham said that European activity would to some extent fill the gap before the Israeli elections. The gap was not long in historical terms and the Americans would presumably wish to spend the next few months in planning and consulation rather than action. Mr Kaplan said that there would be discussions with the US allies and with regional states in the next few months; this period would not be devoted simply to studies.

4. Mr Miles said that US/European cooperation over Arab/Israel was most important. The Europeans could contribute to a process which the US must lead. The first move was for the Europeans but they needed US understanding and acceptance; the US should refrain from closing options.

5. Mr Veliotos summarised the present American position. They endorsed the Camp David process, intended to build on it and would not contemplate changes in its framework without Israeli and Egyptian agreement. That did not close any options, including that of using the Camp David formula. Mr Kaplan emphasised that nothing should be done by the Europeans which undercut the Camp David process.

6. Sir J Graham said that the preference of Gulf States for protection from afar reflected their desire, which had been fed by their perception of the causes of the fall of the Shah, to avoid too obvious a Western military presence. The rulers, whatever their private feelings, where in a difficult position vis a vis their own public opinion because many Arabs saw the Russians or communists as a lesser threat than Israel. It was partly for that reason that there was a new desire among the moderate Arabs for a negotiated settlment of that problem.

7. Mr Veliotes said that Jordanians recognised that there would be a period of US disengagement from the Arab/Israel issue. In answer to a question Sir J Graham said that he thought Arab states would give the US a fair hearing on SW Asia security provided that the US Administration appeared to have an open mind on Arab/Israel and not to be wedded immutably to the Camp David process.

8. In reply to a question from Mr Sterner on the European initiative, Sir J Graham said that the EC was united on the Middle East issue. He preferred the term 'activity' which was less likely than 'initiative' to arouse unfounded expectations. There were organisational problems in the European Community's political cooperation. Nevertheless working papers had been drawn up dealing with withdrawal, self-determination, guarantees and Jerusalem. These outlined the problems and possible solutions

/but

3. Mr Veliotes said that the US did not want to lose any time in tackling the SW Asia security issue. Sir J Graham said that European activity would to some extent fill the gap before the Israeli elections. The gap was not long in historical terms and the Americans would presumably wish to spend the next few months in planning and consulation rather than action. Mr Kaplan said that there would be discussions with the US allies and with regional states in the next few months; this period would not be devoted simply to studies.

4. Mr Miles said that US/European cooperation over Arab/Israel was most important. The Europeans could contribute to a process which the US must lead. The first move was for the Europeans but they needed US understanding and acceptance; the US should refrain from closing options.

5. Mr Veliotos summarised the present American position. They endorsed the Camp David process, intended to build on it and would not contemplate changes in its framework without Israeli and Egyptian agreement. That did not close any options, including that of using the Camp David formula. Mr Kaplan emphasised that nothing should be done by the Europeans which undercut the Camp David process.

6. Sir J Graham said that the preference of Gulf States for protection from afar reflected their desire, which had been fed by their perception of the causes of the fall of the Shah, to avoid too obvious a Western military presence. The rulers, whatever their private feelings, where in a difficult position vis a vis their own public opinion because many Arabs saw the Russians or communists as a lesser threat than Israel. It was partly for that reason that there was a new desire among the moderate Arabs for a negotiated settlment of that problem.

7. Mr Veliotes said that Jordanians recognised that there would be a period of US disengagement from the Arab/Israel issue. In answer to a question Sir J Graham said that he thought Arab states would give the US a fair hearing on SW Asia security provided that the US Administration appeared to have an open mind on Arab/Israel and not to be wedded immutably to the Camp David process.

8. In reply to a question from Mr Sterner on the European initiative, Sir J Graham said that the EC was united on the Middle East issue. He preferred the term 'activity' which was less likely than 'initiative' to arouse unfounded expectations. There were organisational problems in the European Community's political cooperation. Nevertheless working papers had been drawn up dealing with withdrawal, self-determination, guarantees and Jerusalem. These outlined the problems and possible solutions

/but

but did not constitute a blueprint. The Dutch Foreign Minister was engaged in a further round of consultation which would include talks in Washington. Mr Veliotes confirmed that no date had yet been set for Mr Van der Klaauw's visit. Sir J Graham said that the Europeans wished to focus the minds of the parties on practical issues such as what territory was to be discussed, how self-determination could be effected and which Palestinians should be involved. Mr Veliotes warned of the dangers of solidfying Arab thinking or of endorsing solutions which proved to be non-negotiable. Commitment to an independent Palestinian state for example could prove to be a policy which led nowhere.

9. Sir J Graham said that the key was to move the Palestinians towards recognition of Israel. The Europeans had some leverage over the Arabs because of the latter's desire for a political discussion between Ministers. He thought that the PLO might perhaps be brought to agree to a form of conditional recognition. This would have to be an unequivocal public statement. It could lead to Palestinian involvement in a revamped Camp David process under a new name. The position of the Syrians was important and they must also be brought along.

10. Mr Veliotes observed that the only feasible Jordanian option was the Jordanian/PLO option. The Jordanians would require an unequivocal decision by Fatah to take that course. He wondered whether a declaration of the kind envisaged by the PLO might not lead to its splitting. Sir J Graham said that the internal politics of the PLO were Arafat's problem. If Arafat made the statement he would calculate that he could manage his organisation. Sir J Graham believed that Arafat himself wanted a settlement and was prepared to live in peace with Israel. Mr Miles pointed to the need to establish what quid pro quo the PLO would want, other than European recognition, for a helpful statement. Mr Peres seemed to be fairly open-minded provided that the PLO changed its spots.

11. Mr Lewis warned that Peres' election victory was not certain, particularly now that Mr Dayan had entered the lists. But Peres was likely to lead a coalition government which would contain contradictory elements. He wanted more imaginative diplomacy possibly involved talks with Palestinians. But nobody should assume that any Israeli government could be brought to negotiate with an organisation headed by Arafat. Mr Sterner asked how a step forward by the PLO could be translated into a cutting edge with the Israelis. Sir J Graham suggested an Arab negotiating team including Palestinians but Mr Lewis pointed out that discussions in 1977 had aborted on that point.

12. Mr Lewis said that an absolute majority for Peres could be discounted. His likely dependence on the NRP or Dayan would be a constraint. Peres was naturally inclined to play down his political problems: there were still serious differences of view within the Labour party. Peres was not committed to total withdrawal, self-determination for the Palestinians or an independent Palestinian state. Hence there was a need to stay within the Camp David umbrella and to ensure that the Israel/Egypt relationship prospered.

/13.

13. Sir J Graham pointed out that this would antagonise the other Arabs. President Sadat could not negotiate for the Palestinians and expect them to accept the result. Somehow Palestinian participation, which was foreseen in the Camp David agreements, had to be contrived and the Israelis would have to accept it. Mr Veliotes said that the Europeans should not assume that the Americans would deliver the Israelis if they delivered the Palestinians. That would be to leave the Americans to pick up the pieces. Consultations between the UK and Israel would be essential. Sir J Graham agreed: the UK was determined to maintain links with Israel, to whose security HMG were committed as recently re-affirmed by the Prime Minister.

14. The discussions adjourned for lunch. Sir J Graham took the opportunity during discussion of the Gulf in the afternoon to argue that Israel was not a strategic asset for the West and could not be while the Palestinian problem remained unsettled, except in the case of an all-out nuclear war (Mr Veliotes had urged him privately to put this point on the record).

15. Concluding the day's discussions, Mr Veliotes reiterated US concern over the way European activity on the Arab/Israel question might go in the coming months. He said that some of his colleagues felt that he had not sufficiently stressed this during the morning discussions, and made clear he was speaking for the record. There was very deep and continuing concern at the highest levels of the Administration about this issue. Sir J Graham assured him that we were well aware of this concern and that Lord Carrington and the Prime Minister would be at pains to reassure Mr Haig. We were committed to the security of Israel, we shared US objectives in the Middle East and wanted to work in a complementary way. A comprehensive settlement was not totally impossible.

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SIR J GRAHAM'S CALL ON AMBASSADOR STOESSEL
(UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT),
17 FEBRUARY 1981

Present:

Sir J Graham

Mr R O Miles

Mr A F Goulty

Ambassador W Stoessel (Under-Secretary for Political Affairs)

Ambassador N Veliotes (Assistant Secretary NEA)

Mr W N Howell (Director NEA/ARN)

Mr R Beaudry (Director, Bureau of European Affairs)

Mr R Baker (Under Secretary's Office)

1. Mr Stoessel welcomed Sir J Graham and said that the Americans were looking forward to the visit of the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington next week.

Arab/Israel

2. Sir J Graham, opening a general discussion on the Middle East, said that the Arab/Israel problem and the security of the region were linked. An Arab/Israeli settlement would not end other problems in the area such as Libya/Chad and the Iran/Iraq war. But it would create a better atmosphere in which the West could pursue its common concern about security. He detected a new feeling among moderate Arab Governments - they were now sincere in wanting a settlement. They were worried that the Palestinian issue was radicalising their own people. But they could not align themselves whole-heartedly with the West, as they would wish, while the West was seen as the main supporter of Israel. Arabs viewed Israel as the real threat and most Arabs would prefer rule by Arab communists, who might at least be expected to be Arabs, to rule by Israel.

3. Mr Stoessel asked about Iran in the Arab/Israel context. Sir J Graham doubted its relevance though Iran was of very great strategic importance. He thought that the excesses of the Iranian revolution had discredited it in Arab eyes.

4. Sir J Graham said that Camp David had been a great break-through. It offered a useful precedent for Israeli withdrawal and the dismantling of settlements. Unfortunately an opportunity had been lost when other Arabs had not joined the process as had been intended. They would not do so now. The Israelis destroyed any emerging Palestinian leader on the West Bank. All West Bank Palestinians argued that the

/PLO

PLO reflected their aspirations.

5. Mr Stoessel asked how the PLO were to be persuaded to move towards recognition of Israel. Sir J Graham thought that simultaneous recognition, which President Sadat had mentioned in his speech to the European Parliament, though attractive, might be difficult to achieve. We were pressing the PLO to make a public conditional recognition of Israel. Their view that this would be to play their last card was illogical: recognition of Israel was the 'ante' for entering negotiations, which had to be based on acceptance of the existence of the state of Israel, not a bargaining chip. Arafat had implied recognition of Israel privately and in his recent 'Times' interview and might be persuaded to make a public statement preferably including a statement of the Palestinians' wish to live in peace with all their neighbours, including Israel. There was no question of the Europeans recognising the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian desire for political meetings with European Ministers, including a Ministerial meeting in the context of the Euro-Arab Dialogue with the PLO in the Chair on the Arab side, gave the Europeans some leverage. It would be best of all if the PLO were to accept the Venice Declaration. Sir J Graham asked if the Americans thought it possible to build on the Camp David formula, possibly under a different name. The Israelis seemed wedded to the autonomy talks; this posed difficulties for the Arab side in that the word autonomy implied a higher sovereignty, presumably Israeli, over the occupied territories.

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6. Mr Veliotes wondered whether the PLO might be subsumed in an Arab or Jordanian delegation. Sir J Graham said that King Hussein would not be prepared to contemplate any so-called Jordanian option without a clear mandate from the PLO and other Arabs. Self-determination for the Palestinians should mean a free choice. Israeli objections to a Palestinian state on the West Bank seemed irrational; such a state would be weak and pose less of a threat to Israel than would a larger Jordanian state, dominated by Palestinians.

7. Mr Veliotes asked about Soviet influence in the PLO. Sir J Graham replied that though there were Left Wing elements within the PLO, Arafat professed not to be a communist, and was probably at heart a bourgeois petty capitalist.

8. Mr Stoessel asked about UN Security Resolution 242. Sir J Graham said that the Arabs, very foolishly, were coming close to rejecting it on the grounds that the Palestinians did not get a proper mention. There were obvious difficulties in seeking a further Security Council Resolution on the Middle East to complement 242: these could be side-stepped if the PLO would make a unilateral statement of conditional recognition of Israel. Mr Stoessel observed that it might be easier for the Israelis if the PLO were to accept 242.

9. Sir J Graham said that there was a case for a meeting between Lord Carrington and Arafat during the UK's Presidency of the EC but this was certainly not possible unless the PLO clearly showed that they wanted negotiations. Mr Miles added that the Palestinians had recently offered some fairly ambiguous encouragement. Sir J Graham commented that he had been impressed by Arafat when they had met in Beirut in December.

10. Turning to Israel, Sir J Graham said that it was generally believed that a Labour Government in Israel would bring only a change of style but not of substance on the Palestinian issue. He believed however that there was a significant difference. Begin's commitment was to Eretz Israel as an article of faith: Peres's demand for territory was based on grounds of security, and he was worried about the proportion of Arabswithin an Israeli state. In the course of his recent visit to London, Peres had resisted pressure in public to condemn the PLO and had acknowledged privately that if the PLO were to change its spots it would be a different animal. Peres moreover had said that he saw an urgent need for a settlement within five to ten years, possibly because of the spectre of a nuclear Iraq (though the UK thought this too short a time-frame for that). He had hinted at the possibility of maintaining military settlements on the West Bank for an interim period only.

11. Mr Veliotes agreed that there was a significant difference between Begin and Peres. He asked about Peres's attitude to Jerusalem. Mr Miles said that Peres wanted to tackle it at an early stage immediately after an agreement on autonomy had been achieved, but he saw that a very flexible approach would be required. Mr Miles added in response to a question that we had not pressed Peres on what form an agreement would take or on the nature of a regime for Jerusalem. Peres had talked of discussing first bilateral issues with the Jordanians; this seemed unrealistic. Mr Veliotes speculated that Peres hoped by such discussions, without insisting on political recognition, to build Jordanian confidence. The Jordanians saw Begin as determined to destabilise Jordan. There was some possiblity of a more forthcoming approach from Peres. Sir J Graham said that Peres intended to fight the election on Begin's domestic record. He aimed to preserve maximum flexibility on the international front. He asked how the new American Administration viewed the issue.

12. Mr Stoessel said that it was as yet early days. He thought that the President would follow the Camp David framework and not rush into anything. Careful study and full consultation was needed. The visit of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary would be very valuable in this context. The Americans wished to develop mutual confidence among the parties. Mr Haig was keen to look at the situation in the region from an over-all strategic perspective. Mr Stoessel thought that the European Community could play a role and that the Americans would want to work with the Europeans and keep in touch especially over the PLO. Mr Veliotes added that it was fortunate that the Israeli Elections provided a natural breathing space.

13. Sir J Graham urged maximum flexibility over the next stage of the Camp David process, which of course could not be disowned. The Europeans hoped to work closely with the Americans and to be active in bringing the Palestinians along. He acknowledged the need for the Europeans to maintain good relations with Israel; Begin was suspicious of the European approach but Peres was less so. Sir J Graham stressed that the Europeans were not seeking merely to gain credit with the Arabs: we were /sincerely working for a settlement.

/Iran

Iran

14. Points made in a brief discussion of Iran and the British detainees are recorded in Washington tels nos 563 and 564.

Iran/Iraq

15. Mr Stoessel asked what could be done about the Iran/Iraq war. Sir J Graham thought that there was little that the West could usefully do. Iran was in low water but was still exporting more oil than the Iraqis and would no doubt manage to muddle along. The Iraqis were suffering more power cuts for example. The war might go on for a very long time. Sir J Graham thought that the Iraqis were likely to go for Abadan, Dezful and Ahwaz, but if they moved forward their front line it would be extended and their lines of communication would be stretched. Mr Palme was not optimistic over his chances of achieving a cease-fire, but hoped to secure the release of the ships trapped in the Shatt-al-Arab. However the river might need dredging and the ships might have to be repaired. Sir J Graham thought that even if the release of the ships was achieved it was unlikely to lead to the end of the war. There was however agreement on the land border between Iran and Iraq and it might be possible to build on that, leaving the disputed water way for negotiation. Saddam Hussain's prestige was closely tied to the war. The other Gulf states would probably prefer there to be no decisive victor.

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SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 25 c/81

CONFIDENTIAL

7226 - 1

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RR DUBAI

GRS 267
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 161530Z FEB 81
TO PRIORITY ABU DHABI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 40 OF 16 FEBRUARY
INFO DUBAI

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER ON GULF CO-OPERATION

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO ZAID, WHICH IS SIMILAR TO MESSAGES SENT TO OTHER GULF STATES BUT WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF OTAIBA'S CALL ON HER LAST WEEK.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH YOUR HIGHNESS SENT ME THROUGH HE DR MANA AL OTAIBA. I NEED HARDLY ASSURE YOUR HIGHNESS THAT BRITAIN IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN ITS TRADITIONALLY EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE STATES OF THE GULF, WHILE BRINGING OUR RELATIONSHIP FULLY INTO LINE WITH MODERN CONDITIONS. I HOPE THAT THE MISSION OF GENERAL PERKINS, FOLLOWING ON THE MESSAGE FROM LORD CARRINGTON TO YOUR HIGHNESS, WILL HAVE BEEN A CONVINCING PROOF OF OUR DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE GULF REGION, WHICH IS SUCH VITAL INTEREST TO ALL OF US. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS MOST IMPORTANT SUBJECT WITH YOUR HIGHNESS WHEN I VISIT THE UAE IN APRIL.

MEANWHILE I HAVE BEEN HEARTENED TO LEARN OF THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE MEETING OF GULF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN RIYADH ON 4 FEBRUARY. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARAB GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL IS THE CULMINATION OF DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH I KNOW THAT YOUR HIGHNESS HAS TAKEN A CLOSE INTEREST. I AM CONFIDENT THAT IT

WILL PLAY A VALUABLE ROLE IN CONFRONTING THE DANGERS TO WHICH THE GULF REGION HAS BEEN EXPOSED. PLEASE ACCEPT MY BEST WISHES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE PROCESS OF CO-OPERATION AMONG THE STATES OF THE GULF.

2. GRATEFUL YOU DELIVER IT. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED COPY.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

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SIR J GRAHAM

MR J C MOBERLY

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 25 E/81

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 211
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 161610Z FEB 81
TO PRIORITY KUWAIT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 66 OF 16 FEBRUARY
AND TO PRIORITY BAHRAIN, DOHA

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER ON GULF CO-OPERATION

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRIME MINISTERS OF KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN AND THE AMIR OF QATAR. SHE IS SENDING SEPARATE BUT SIMILAR MESSAGES TO SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN AND THE UAE.

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN OF THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE MEETING OF GULF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN RIYADH ON 4 FEBRUARY. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARAB GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL IS THE CULMINATION OF DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH I KNOW THAT YOUR HIGHNESS (YOUR EXCELLENCY) HAS TAKEN A CLOSE INTEREST. I AM CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL PLAY A VALUABLE ROLE IN CONFRONTING THE DANGERS TO WHICH THE GULF REGION HAS BEEN EXPOSED.

THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE GULF IS OF VITAL INTEREST TO US ALL. IF THERE ARE WAYS IN WHICH BRITAIN CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY WE SHALL DO SO WITH DETERMINATION. I SHALL LOOK FORWARD TO THE CONTACTS ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION THAT WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE COMING MONTHS. MEANWHILE PLEASE ACCEPT MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CO-OPERATION COUNCIL.

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED COPY.

CARRINGTON

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T 25 3/81
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GRS 231
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 161558Z FEB 81
TO PRIORITY JEDDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 89 OF 16 FEBRUARY
AND TO PRIORITY MUSCAT, DUBAI
INFO ABU DHABI

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER ON GULF CO-OPERATION

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRINCE FAHAD, THE SULTAN OF OMAN AND SHAIKH RASHID, FOLLOWING THE OUTCOME OF THE GULF FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN RIYADH ON 4 FEBRUARY. SIMILAR BUT SEPARATE MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO SHAIKH ZAID, TO THE AMIR OF QATAR AND TO THE PRIME MINISTERS OF KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN.

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN OF THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE MEETING OF GULF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN RIYADH ON 4 FEBRUARY. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARAB GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL IS THE CULMINATION OF DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH I KNOW THAT YOUR HIGHNESS (YOUR MAJESTY) HAS TAKEN A CLOSE INTEREST. I AM CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL PLAY A VALUABLE ROLE IN CONFRONTING THE DANGERS TO WHICH THE GULF REGION HAS BEEN EXPOSED.

THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE GULF IS OF VITAL INTEREST TO US ALL. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT WITH YOUR HIGHNESS (YOUR MAJESTY) DURING MY VISIT IN APRIL AND TO REVIEWING WITH YOU APPROPRIATE WAYS IN WHICH BRITAIN MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY. MEANWHILE, PLEASE ACCEPT MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CO-OPERATION COUNCIL.

2. GRATEFUL YOU HAVE MESSAGE DELIVERED. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED COPY.

CARRINGTON

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OK
Middle
East

16 February 1981

Gulf Co-operation: Messages from the Prime Minister

As I have already told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 13 February and has approved the draft texts enclosed with it.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

CS

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

ds

Middle East

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 February 1981

Ref for briefing etc

Arab-Israel Dispute

The Prime Minister has seen the paper enclosed with your letter to me of 30 January on this subject. She has expressed some unhappiness with the approach summarized in it.

She has commented that if we are to play a major role in negotiations in the Middle East, we shall also have to take a major part in the security of the region. As things are at present, we expect the Americans to be primarily responsible for security while we nevertheless aspire to negotiate. In the Prime Minister's view this does not add up.

In view of the Prime Minister's comment, it will clearly be necessary to devote some part of next week's briefing meeting to a discussion of the line that is taken in Washington about policy towards the Middle East.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

&

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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HS

16 February 1981

PS 18/2-8

The Prime Minister is meeting with Messrs. Winterton, Marlow, Bottomley, Alexander and Temple-Morris on this Thursday evening as per the enclosed letter. We would be grateful for a full brief to reach this office by close of play on Wednesday 18 February.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

Chris Jebb, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

N. Alexander

SLe is going to see his group on Thursday at 2130. Briefing from FCO?

C.S.

16/2 Yes please.

Mark

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 February 1981

Dear Michael,

Gulf Co-operation: A Message from the Prime Minister

I understand that the Prime Minister is unconvinced of the wisdom of sending a message of congratulations to Gulf leaders, as suggested in my letter of 10 February, and that she was in any case not happy with the texts proposed.

Lord Carrington considers that the establishment of the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council is a development of sufficient importance to merit a message from the Prime Minister, and in particular endorses a specific recommendation to this effect which Sir James Craig has made with respect to the Saudis. We have for some time been concerned by the imbalance between, on the one hand, the importance of the six Gulf states concerned as markets for our exports and as sources of energy for the Western world, and, on the other, the limited individual defence capability which their meagre demographic resources allow them. The withdrawal of the British in 1971 and the fall of the Shah in 1979 deprived the region of the outside protection on which the smaller Gulf states had ultimately relied for over a century. They have instead had to face the unprecedented dangers of the Iranian revolution's direct threat to their traditional political structures and of the Gulf war, the first major conflict in the region in modern times, which has exposed the fragility of the region's system of security.

It is in response to these dangers that the Gulf states which still have traditional government structures have reached agreement on closer political and military co-operation. To do so they have set aside the disagreements among themselves which have until now hindered co-operation; the inclusion of Oman, for instance, has not always been assumed to be automatic. They have also managed to avoid the veto of their powerful neighbour Iraq, which has in the past been able to cause them a great deal of trouble. While the agreements make no specific mention of defence matters, Gulf ministers have confirmed to British ministers and ambassadors that it is the common defence interest which is the basis of all their discussions. Our traditional links with the Gulf

/states

states, which are still reflectedin the predominant position of Britain as a source of military training, meant the effective British defence of all of them (except Saudi Arabia) until 1971. Lord Carrington believed it would therefore be justified and helpful to our interests for the Prime Minister to send a message of support to Gulf leaders on taking a step which we have (where appropriate) been urging on them as a logical consequence of the ending of outside protection. The Gulf states, which have been reassured of our continuing interest in their security by the despatch of British military missions to review the defence capabilities of Qatar and the UAE, have clearly gone out of their way to tell us the details of the agreement they have just concluded. Lord Carrington therefore believes that they will welcome a message of support from the highest level in the UK. The redrafted message concentrates on the security of the Gulf and British willingness to contribute where appropriate.

In view of the call on the Prime Minister on 11 February by the oil minister of the UAE, who brought a message from Shaikh Zaid, we are sending a specially adapted version of the draft message for Shaikh Zaid alone. This will address the main point of Zaid's message - namely that Britain, so far from losing interest in the Gulf, is determined to show in these critical times that our interest continues, as the Prime Minister's own visit will amply demonstrate.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

DS[redacted] (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

HH Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan GCMG
President of the United Arab Emirates

Your Reference

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.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I am most grateful for the message which Your Highness sent me through HE Dr Mana al Otaiba. I need hardly assure YH that Britain is determined to maintain its traditionally excellent relations with the states of the Gulf,while bringing our relationship fully into line with modern conditions. I hope that the mission of General Perkins,following on the message from Lord Carrington to YH,will have been a convincing proof of our desire to contribute to the security and stability of the Gulf region,which is such vital interest to all of us. I ~~greatly~~ look forward to discussing this most important subject with YH when I visit the UAE in April.

Meanwhile I have been ~~most~~ heartened to learn of the successful outcome of the meeting of Gulf foreign ministers in Riyadh on 4 February. The establishment of the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council is the culmination of discussions in which I know that YH has taken a close interest. I am confident that it will play a valuable role in confronting the dangers to which the Gulf region has been exposed. Please accept my best wishes for the future of the ~~Council for~~ process of Co-operation among the states of the Gulf.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

DSP 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
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Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

TO:

HH Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud GCMG
Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

HM Sultan Qaboos bin Said GCMG GCVO
Sultan ofOman

~~HH Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan GCMG~~
~~President of the United Arab Emirates~~

SUBJECT:

HH Shaikh Rashid bin Said Al Maktoum GCMG
Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and
Ruler of Dubai

Your Reference

Copies to:

I was very pleased to learn of the successful outcome of the meeting of Gulf foreign ministers in Riyadh on 4 February. The establishment of an Arab Gulf Co-operation Council is the culmination of discussions in which I know that YH (YM) has taken a close interest. I am confident that it will play a valuable role in confronting the dangers to which the Gulf region has been exposed.

The stability and security of the Gulf is of vital interest to us all. I greatly look forward to discussing this subject with YH (YM) during my visit in April and to reviewing with you appropriate ways in which Britain might be able to contribute to the maintenance of stability.Meanwhile please accept my very best wishes for the future of the Co-operation Council.

MT.

DS[illegible]11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

TO:

HH Shaikh Sa'ad al Abdullah al Salim Al Sabah KCMG
Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait

HE Shaikh Khalifa bin Sulman Al Khalifa
Prime Minister of the State of Bahrain

HH Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani GCMG
Ruler of the State of Qatar

Your Reference

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

I was very pleased ~~ot~~ to learn of the successful outcome of the meeting of Gulf foreign ministers in Riyadh on 4 February. The establishment of the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council is the culmination of discussions in which I know that YH(YE) has taken a close interest. I am confident that it will play a valuable role in confronting the dangers to which the Gulf region has been exposed.

The stability and security of the Gulf is of vital interest to us all. If there are ways in which Britain can contribute to the maintenance of stability we shall do so with determination. I shall look forward to the contacts on this most important question that will take place between our two countries in the coming months. Meanwhile please accept my very best wishes for the future of the Co-operation Council.

MT.

NICHOLAS R. WINTERTON, M.P.
(Macclesfield)

Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

10th February 1981 NRW/cmh

Dear Margaret,

As you are probably aware, there has recently been an All Party Delegation visiting the Middle East during which meetings were held with Yasser Arafat, King Hussein, Crown Prince Hassan and the Mayors of Nablus and Rammallah, both of whom were recently injured in car bomb explosions.

As the problems of the Palestinians are getting increasingly acute and the United States holds the key to bringing maximum pressure upon the Israelis, I do hope that it may be possible for you to find time to see myself, Tony Marlow, Peter Bottomley, Richard Alexander and Peter Temple-Morris, prior to your visit to the United States when you are to have talks with President Ronald Reagan.

Yours ever,

Nicholas

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 February 1981

Co-Operation Among the Gulf States

HM Ambassador Jedda has recommended that the Prime Minister write a short personal message of congratulations to Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia on the successful outcome of the Riyadh meeting of the Gulf Foreign Ministers. The meeting agreed to the establishment of an Arab Gulf Co-operation Council which will provide the framework for co-operation among the six Gulf States in a variety of fields. Defence matters are not expressly included at the present time, but the Lord Privy Seal was told during his visit to Kuwait this weekend that their inclusion was "implicit".

British Ministers have for some time been encouraging the Gulf States to increase and improve co-operation among themselves following events in Iran and Afghanistan, and in the light of the Iran/Iraq war. Now that they have taken their first steps down this path, Lord Carrington considers that it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send a message of congratulations, not only to Prince Fahd, but also to Heads of Government of all the other Gulf States involved in the scheme. The Kuwaitis and Omanis are claiming to be as instrumental as the Saudis in setting it up and to exclude some Rulers might invite unwelcome comparisons.

HMA Jedda has pointed out that the Saudis have informed the Ambassadors of other Arab States and will shortly inform ambassadors of other states. In view of our close relationship with the Gulf States and the Prime Minster's forthcoming visit to the area it would be welcome if we could get in our message early (and in particular ahead of the French).

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~/letter/~~telegram/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

TO:

HH Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz GCMG
Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

HM Sultan Qaboos bin Said GCMG, GCVO
Sultan of Oman

~~SUBJECT:~~

HH Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan GCMG
President of the United Arab Emirates

HH Shaikh Rashid bin Said Al Maktoum GCMG
Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates
and Ruler of Dubai

Your Reference

Copies to:

I was delighted to learn of the successful outcome of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Gulf States in Riyadh on 4 February when they decided to establish an Arab Gulf Co-operation Council. This is a matter for which I know you have been working extremely hard and I consider it to be a very important development for the Gulf region.

I look forward to discussing this matter with you when I visit your country in April, but until then, please accept my congratulations on the establishment of the Council and the assurance of the United Kingdom's support for its future development.

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Distribution as set out below

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SUBJECT:

I was delighted to learn of the successful outcome of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Gulf States in Riyadh on 4 February when they decided to establish an Arab Gulf Co-operation Council. This is a matter for which I know you have been working extremely hard and I consider it to be a very important development for the Gulf region.

P.M. Please accept my congratulations on the establishment of the Council and the assurance of the United Kingdom's support for its future development.

Distribution:

HH Shaikh Sa'ad al Abdullah al Salim Al Sabah KCMG
Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait

HE Shaikh Khalifa bin Sulman Al Khalifa
Prime Minister of the State of Bahrain

~~HH Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan GCMG
President of the United Arab Emirates~~

HH Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani GCMG
Amir of the State of Qatar

Subject filed on Middle East Nov 79 Arms Sales and Military Assistance to Middle East c.c. Master Ops

Amir

State of Qatar

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 38/81

TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER OF HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR, SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL THANI, TO H.E. THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MRS MARGARET THATCHER, MP.

I am indebted to Your Excellency for Your Excellency's message dated 19 January 1981. I am most grateful to you for taking the trouble to write to me about the extremely important matters with which you dealt in your letter.

1. First of all, I welcome most warmly your proposal to visit our country in the course of this year - at any time suitable for us both. I know that this visit will contribute effectively to the strengthening of the ties of friendship and co-operation between our two countries, for the benefit of both our peoples. It will, moreover, provide a good opportunity for us to exchange views directly on the questions which concern us jointly. At the same time, it will give us the occassion to resume and expand the discussion which we had at our meeting in London in September last year. Since that meeting, the Middle East has experienced major developments which render another such direct discussion not only useful but necessary.

I am also glad that Mr John Nott, having succeeded Mr Francis Pym, will be able to make the visit agreed by our Heir Apparent Shaikh Hamad, at a mutually convenient time.

2. At present, matters are developing in this region in such a way as to arouse concern not only among the states of the area,

but also among all peaceloving states of the World. Such developments may well exacerbate the tension now affecting this area, and thus greatly threaten not only regional, but also international peace and security. I fully understand that Your Excellency's message should deal with the agreement which Mr Brezhnev proposed in his speech to the Indian Parliament on 10 December 1980, in order to put an end to the serious tension to which I refer. In our forthcoming meeting I should like to explain my views on this matter in detail, and my interest in commenting on the contents of your letter. Until then, may I mention - in summary - that in my view there are two essential facts on which I do not foresee any disagreement. First: that security in the whole area is entirely indivisible. If it is disturbed in any one part of it, this will afford a pretext for disrupting it in other parts. Secondly: the maintenance of security in the area is a matter of abiding by the principles, and respecting the values and objectives, to which we are pledged by virtue of our obligations under international law, and the UN Charter. These require that all concerned should refrain from interfering in the affairs of the states of the area, and, a fortiori, refrain from aggression on their sovereignty or the sanctity of their territories, or the rights of their peoples. These also require all concerned not to disregard such aggression or incite it.

On this basis, it is mandatory on all to refrain from aggression and abide by those obligations as they apply to all the states of the area and their peoples - without discrimination. Any such

discrimination - entirely unjustifiable - would brand its proponents, before world opinion, as lacking in objectivity and fairness.

Accordingly, whatever opinions may be entertained about the content, the motives and the objectives of the Soviet proposal under discussion, it may be beneficial - in my view - to find a way to discuss it, so as to open up the debate on security generally in the region. The aim would be to seek a solution to the crisis affecting its security as we all want , in such a way as to realise our common objectives of strengthening peace and security in the area. We should also be able to avert the horrifying dangers threatening the region as long as equitable and complete remedies are lacking for its causes. This should enable us to defuse its capacity to explode at any time.

In reality, how could we, in discussing the maintenance of security in the region, properly approve of proposals designed to prevent foreign interference in the affairs of the Gulf States, and yet disregard the flagrant aggression of Afghanistan? And on this subject, how could we, from another aspect, properly be concerned to remedy the situation in Afghanistan, and yet ignore the cause of Palestine; although the aggression in the second case was much uglier than in the first, and constituted a more flagrant violation of all principles, a worse disregard of all values?

I fully understand the many and diverse difficulties which militate against the effective application of the approach I have

suggested. This is, I think, due to the great complexity of the problems stirred up by developments in our area: so much so, as to make it a most dangerous focal point of tension in international relations. But despite all these difficulties, I do not think I have been unduly theoretical in reaching my view, since I believe that whatever the circumstances of a situation, it is certain that in the final analysis, nothing will hold good except the truth; and facts, principles and values will finally prevail always, and in all spheres.

3. I have no need to add that we, and our sister Arab States of the Gulf, are entirely agreed that one of the best means of maintaining security and stability in our area, and preventing it from becoming the scene of a super-power confrontation, is to work for the development of our countries in all fields, to the best of our abilities. We are, similarly, entirely in accord that we can best develop our own common internal strength in pursuit of that objective, by creating the necessary mechanism to co-ordinate our co-operation and solidarity. I am glad to say that we took the first practical step in that direction when we agreed - as you know - to set up " The Council for Co-operation between the Arab States of the Gulf " .

4. As regards co-operation between our two countries, may I thank Her Majesty's Government for all the valuable assistance it has provided and is providing to our country in the fields of defence and security, by way of training and equipping our armed forces. I hope that continuing contacts between those responsible

for these matters in each country will strengthen our co-operation in this respect.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest esteem and consideration.

Doha, 7 February 1981

Middle East.

GRS 260 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO 021131Z FEB 81

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 88 OF 2 FEBRUARY

INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE

MIPT: MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. I ASKED GHALI WHAT LAY BEHIND RECENT EGYPTIAN STATEMENTS ABOUT PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. GHALI DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN WORKING FOR PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION FOR THE PAST YEAR, LEAVING THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATION THAT IT WAS SADAT'S OPPOSITION THAT HAD HAD TO BE OVERCOME. HE ALSO IMPLICITLY TOOK CREDIT FOR THE MORE ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE THAT SADAT HAD EXPRESSED AT THIS MEETING WITH SIGNOR COLOMBO. GHALI HIMSELF DOES NOT BELIEVE THE EUROPEANS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON DEVISING FACE-SAVING FORMULAS FOR KING HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDIS, AND HOPES WE WILL DEVELOP OUR IDEAS ON SUBSTANCE WITH A VIEW TO INFLUENCING THE AMERICANS. HE WAS TO MEET THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER AT CAIRO AIRPORT ON 1 FEBRUARY AND SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A FURTHER TALK WITH ME AFTERWARDS, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE WHICH CONTINUED TO CAUSE HIM CONCERN.

2. IS THERE ANYTHING MORE YOU CAN TELL ME, EVEN IF ONLY AS BACKGROUND, ABOUT THE STATE OF PLAY ON THE DIALOGUE AND THE EGYPTIAN DIMENSION? THE LAST REFERENCE I HAVE SEEN IS THE HAGUE TELEGRAM NO 10 OF 14 JANUARY. I WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD OCCASIONALLY RECEIVE COPIES OF RELEVANT COREU TELEGRAMS, E.G. UK COREU NO 29 REFERRED TO IN THE HAGUE TUR. DESPITE THE RULES MOST OF THE COLLEAGUES SEEM TO GET THEM.

WEIR

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD
NENAD
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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 January 1981

Dear Michael,

Arab-Israel Dispute

In preparation for talks with the Americans on the Middle East we have prepared a paper which gives some background to European Community policy. It is not proposed that we should actually hand over a copy to the Americans. Although a copy will be attached to the briefs for the Prime Minister's visit, we thought that the Prime Minister might be interested in seeing it in advance.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE IN 1981

Global Background

1. In the Middle East East/West tension has from time to time reached crisis level. Another local conflict leading to direct East/West confrontation cannot be ruled out. There are a number of possible flash points but the Arab/Israel problem, which in turn complicates all other problems in the area, remains the greatest single threat. A Middle East peace settlement is vital for world peace.

2. The Western strategic position, and the US position in particular, is based on certain key points: traditionally Israel, more recently Egypt, and to some extent the Arabian Peninsula. But an analysis of likely contingencies suggests that it is a fallacy to regard Israel as a strategic asset for the West except in the extreme case of total war between East and West. In other contingencies (eg an intervention in Iran or the Gulf) the West would be unable to use its facilities in Israel because of opposition from Arab states.

3. Over the years, the extent of the West's support for Israel has jeopardised the prospects for Western co-operation with the Arab world against Soviet expansionism and increased the opportunities for the spread of Soviet influence in the area. Radicals have been able to use the West's support for Israel as an argument for turning the Arab world towards the Soviet Union. Even Saudi Arabia, if forced to choose between her Arab vocation and her friendship with the West, would choose the former, both for emotional pan-Arab reasons, and because the present government fears, with some reason, that its internal position is likely to be undermined through too close and obvious identification with the West, so long as the latter is seen by the Arab peoples as the principal prop of Israel. The oil weapon was effective enough in 1973; it will be used still more effectively next time.

/4.

4. It is contrary to our interests for the idea to become established that the USA is the champion of Israel while Europe (together with the Soviet Union!) is the champion of the Arabs. This formula will create great tension in the alliance and make no contribution to peace in the region. US and European objectives are the same. Our political and moral commitment to Israel's secure existence remain unshakeable. But this does not involve automatic acceptance of Israeli policies nor absolve us from the responsibility to use our influence on the Israelis.

5. Our objective therefore should be an early solution of the Arab/Israel problem which, while providing for Israel's secure existence, can also deal with the Palestinian problem in a way satisfactory to the Arabs. The European Community believes that such a solution should be based on the principles of Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, self-determination for the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza, and adequate security guarantees for Israel. The absence of a solution to the Arab/Israel problem is likely to prove the rock on which efforts to improve military co-operation between the West and the Arabs founder.

Camp David

6. We must find a way together to build on the tremendous achievements of Camp David, peace on Israel's southern front and Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. But the way forward is no longer through the 'Camp David process' as it has developed and there is a need to take a fresh look and establish a new process, under a new name.

7. The Arabs (apart from Egypt) have maintained co-ordinated strong opposition to the treaty and the autonomy talks. This

/rift

rift in the Arab world can only complicate the search for peace. Ways must be found to involve the Arabs (other than, or in addition to, Egypt), and in particular the moderate Arab states, in peace talks.

8. It is axiomatic that any solution must also be acceptable to the Palestinians, although there is room for debate about how the Palestinians should be defined. The Palestinian Diaspora, which for the present at any rate is dominated by the PLO, is a corroding influence on the political structure of the area. If they are excluded by the definition, autonomy offers them, as opposed to the Palestinians of the West Bank, nothing. On the other hand, many Palestinians of the Diaspora are settled in new countries as full citizens. These probably should be excluded. Be that as it may, no global solution will work or will be accepted by even the moderate Arabs unless it gives some satisfaction to a broad spectrum of the Palestinians in the shape of a place on the map. There are no other options available. Jordan may be a useful intermediary between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and this possibility is explored below. The Palestinians may even opt eventually for some sort of relationship with Jordan, but Israel must be prepared to accept the possibility of an independent Palestinian entity in Gaza and the West Bank, and the PLO (which has the support of the vast majority of Palestinians) must be associated in some way and probably directly involved in negotiations.

British and European Policy

9. The European Community wish to make a concrete contribution to peace but recognise the central role which the US must play. The US and Europe can play independent roles but there must not be rival policies. The Community also recognise that there can be no question of imposing a peace settlement; progress can ultimately only be made with the agreement of both sides. But the stated minimum demands of either side cannot necessarily be taken as a starting point for peace efforts.

/10.

10. Practical progress towards peace is required. Diplomatic posturing will not suffice. In our view, the best guarantee of future stability and of good relations with the Arab world and with Israel lies in a freely-negotiated comprehensive settlement. Only such a settlement can last. British efforts, which are being pursued within the framework of political co-operation among the European Community, are directed towards establishing a framework on which a settlement fair to both sides can be built and moving both sides towards acceptance of it.

11. The principles set out in the Venice Declaration (attached) are such a framework. Essential aspects are its recognition that neither side to the dispute can dictate the shape of a settlement to the other, since the dispute involves rights on both sides which must be reconciled; and that both sides must be able to decide their own future for themselves within a geographical context set by Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and Arab acceptance of Israel's sovereignty inside the borders thus drawn. This framework is flexible and leaves a wide range of options open. Principles of themselves will not provide a settlement. But a settlement which does not have these or similar principles at its heart will not be possible.

12. Within this framework, the Ten will be exploring with the parties in the first half of 1981 the practical problems which would be involved in the implementation of a balanced framework such as that contained in the Venice Declaration. A number of options have been identified which will form the basis of the Ten's talks with the parties. The main aim will be (a) to lay the foundation for negotiations and an ultimate settlement by mutual recognition of rights; (b) to promote a move on both sides away from rhetoric and towards practical issues. In particular, we want to push the Palestinians into working out

/what

what sort of settlement they might accept, eg what relationship do they evisage for a Palestinian entity with its neighbours, including Israel, how can self-determination be exercised, and how can the different factions within the PLO be brought along with a negotiated settlement?

13. The Community believes that 1981 is the right moment for an exploration of this kind. If the Israeli elections lead to the election of the Labour Party, the period immediately after their installation will be crucial to the prospects for progress over the next five years. Every opportunity should be taken to influence their thinking from the outset.

A Jordanian Option?

14. The Israeli Labour Party are committed to negotiations with Jordan on the future of the West Bank. They display optimism that King Hussein will be prepared to respond. The public Labour position is based on the principle of territorial compromise with Israel retaining sovereignty over East Jerusalem and for security reasons over the Jordan Valley strip and the Etzion area. There is no possibility of King Hussein negotiating on this basis. His minimum demand is to be able to claim that he is negotiating for the return of the whole of the West Bank of Jerusalem. He will only negotiate if also assured of sufficient Arab support, in particular PLO willingness to allow him to negotiate the end of the Israeli occupation. He will not try to usurp the PLO's position as representative of the Palestinians. Without Syrian acquiescence he is unlikely to be willing or able to negotiate at all and the chances of such acquiescence are poor.

15. Nevertheless, if the Labour Government could at least leave open the future status of the areas in which Israel wishes to maintain troops and of East Jerusalem, and also accept the possibility of the Palestinians ultimately being able to choose

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their future, not excluding an independent state, useful negotiations between a Labour Government and Jordan (as a friend at court of the Palestinians) are conceivable. We believe that pressure should be exerted on both sides in this direction. Much preparation, however, remains to be done and it is important that nothing is said in public to make it more difficult for King Hussein to accept.

A New Negotiating Framework

16. The basis for multilateral negotiations does not at present exist. It is a mistake to set preconditions on either side before negotiations can take place, but a signal from both Israel and the Palestinians of greater readiness to understand and meet the preoccupations of the other would be of immense value. The European Community will be working for this, particularly with the Palestinian side.

17. We are open-minded about future negotiating frameworks (Geneva-type Conference, proximity talks, direct negotiation etc) but believe that Palestinian involvement in one form or another will be indispensable.

18. The Venice Declaration talks carefully of the need for the PLO to be associated with negotiations. There are no other claimants for the role of representative of the Palestinians, nor are any likely to emerge while present Israeli policies on the West Bank continue. The PLO's public position is unacceptable, its continuing involvement with terrorism a major obstacle to peace, and its internal divisions a stumbling block for the emergence of moderate policy. But to pretend that other Palestinians will be ready to negotiate, or to insist on prior moves from the PLO before dealing with them, will not be useful in bringing the PLO towards a more helpful role. The possibility of other Palestinian groups (eg West Bank representatives) playing a separate role at some stage must not be closed off, but for the present the Palestinians can only be represented either directly

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by the PLO or by negotiators enjoying their confidence. There is sufficient willingness to compromise among the PLO leadership to give some hope for the future.

19. The PLO has close links with the Soviet Union and other East European countries. These countries provide not only diplomatic support but also weapons and training. There are groups within the PLO (eg the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) which hold Marxist views. But for the mainstream leadership, the relationship appears to be little more than a marriage of convenience. The Fatah leadership (particularly Arafat and Qaddumi) have little if any ideological commitment. There is no sense in which they are puppets: the Soviet Union has little control over their actions and follows rather than inspires their views (we believe that the Russians have pressed the PLO to accept Israel's right to exist, as the Russians themselves have always done). It is impossible to predict precisely what would be the relationship between the Soviet Union and any Palestinian entity established as a result of a peace settlement, but we see little reason to believe that such an entity would be Soviet-dominated, with the consequent danger of Soviet military presence. Any Palestinian entity would be weak militarily (it would have to be almost totally demilitarised) and politically; it would be vulnerable to pressure from the surrounding states of Israel and Jordan (both of which would clearly resist Soviet influence); and it would be dependent for economic survival on large-scale aid from the oil-rich Arabs and the West. It is difficult to see the establishment of dominant Soviet influence in these circumstances.

How Can the Parties be Influenced?

20. We enjoy good relations with the Arabs in general and, with the other members of the EC, have established a limited amount of

/credit

credit with them. We shall seek to use this. We are urging the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, to show greater evidence of their good faith. We have sought to make the PLO aware that we are now awaiting a move from them towards acceptance of a peace settlement negotiated with and accepted by Israel. We will use fora such as the Euro-Arab Dialogue to press this, arguing that we can take our efforts no further in its absence.

21. European influence with Israel is very limited in present circumstances. Mr Begin's government have rejected the Venice Declaration, in particular the principle of Palestinian self-determination and the possibility of talks with the PLO. Labour Party leaders have also reacted negatively. If Israel is to be influenced, the US must play the major role. Influence helpful to a peace settlement need not involve use of financial or other leverage. Israel is able largely to ignore the adoption by Europe of a position with which she does not agree. She cannot do the same if US policy differs substantially and openly from her own. We believe that an American move towards more explicit acceptance of the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israel conflict, eg acceptance that ultimately the Palestinians must be allowed to choose how they run the areas from which Israel withdraws without an Israeli veto, would cause a fundamental reappraisal of Israeli policy, particularly on the part of the Labour Party. This could have a profound effect on the prospects for a peace settlement.

22. If a settlement is to be freely arrived at, both sides must be pushed off their respective present positions. There can be no absolute division of labour; but the contacts and influence of the members of the European Community and of the US are different. This should be used.

Near East and North Africa Dept
26 January 1981

EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The Heads of State and Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, including the state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.

2. The Nine Member States of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace.

3. In this regard, the Nine countries of the Community base themselves on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 19 September 1978, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on their bahalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the 34th United Nations General Assembly.

4. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

5. All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognised and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the UN by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including on the ground.

6. A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework

/of the

of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.

7. The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the Nine are endeavouring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles must be respected by all the parties concerned, and thus by the Palestinian people, and by the PLO, which will have to be associated with negotiations.

8. The Nine recognise the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem, for all the parties concerned. The Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access for everyone to the Holy Places.

9. The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.

10. Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

11. The Nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which an initiative on their part could take.

VENICE, 13 JUNE 1980

PRIVATE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(2) London SW1A 2AH

27 January 1981

Thank you for your letter of 15 January.

I am also exclusively concerned with British interests. It is in our interests that we act on the reality of the Middle East, not what we may wish it were like. This is not to say that we accept uncritically what we are told or write off the possibility of future changes, even fundamental ones, but to pretend that things are not as they are can only damage our interests, in both the narrow and broad senses.

There are of course Arab countries that reject any settlement with Israel (although Syria is not quite in this category) and others which are ready to contemplate a settlement and live with Israel. (It is incidentally not true that Saudi Arabia was only critical of Camp David after and because of the Iran debacle; she was anxious to avoid isolating Egypt if at all possible but there was never much doubt about her views on the Palestinian aspects of Camp David. But there is no Arab country which believes a final settlement will be possible without involvement of the PLO and satisfaction of Palestinian claims in some way. (Sadat's claim is simply that the PLO can only be brought in when he has fixed some interim deal with the Israelis.) Jordan and the PLO are hardly friends and their private views about the right future for the West Bank certainly differ in many respects. But even Jordan will not negotiate with Israel without the tacit consent of the PLO, and even then only if she can be sure enough of Arab support. I find it very difficult to think of any circumstances in which Syria (under either its present or any likely future regime) would negotiate with Israel about her occupied territory while the PLO was

The Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph MP /completely

completely left out of negotiations over the West Bank and Gaza. In other words, I see no possibility of Jordan and Syria reaching separate agreements with Israel and 'brushing aside' the PLO. It may just have been possible shortly after the 1967 war, but it is not now, and we will do well to recognise this.

I appreciate that the chances of an Israeli government being prepared to deal with the PLO are poor as things stand, but our aim is to make the PLO into an organisation with which it is possible to deal. Contacts are essential for this. I do not, of course, claim that the PLO is representative in the way that elected leaders are representative (how many governments in the world are elected?), but I am pretty sure that its support among the Palestinians goes a good deal deeper than you suggest. Intimidation exists, of course. but the PLO is seen by virtually all Palestinians as the only leadership they believe can properly represent them in negotiations. They will certainly not accept that Jordan or any other Arab country should claim to speak for them unless the PLO agree to this to bring a settlement nearer.

We are not likely to be seen by the Arabs as a 'soft touch' because we have come to accept that the PLO will not go away. We continue to tell the Arabs home truths that few others are prepared to tell them and to make clear our fundamental commitment to Israel. (You may like to see a copy of my recent speech to the Arab community in Britain.) Our approach is even-handed. Both sides accuse us angrily of bias towards the other, but both will have to come to recognise this for the nonsense it is. I need hardly add that we have not been blindly following the French, as you seem to suggest.

Finally, the assumption in your letter that all will be well if Israel achieves peace with her neighbouring states

/and that

and that the Palestinians are somehow just a pretext for trouble. I do not believe it. Even if these states were prepared to do deals with Israel (which they are not) the problem of the Palestinian people would remain (and let us not forget that one result could be the overthrow of Hussein by Arafat; Arafat in a demilitarised West Bank is far less of a danger, including to Israel, than an irredentist Arafat with Jordan's resources at his disposal). Unless the Palestinians are given a decent future, there will never be peace. That is the sense in which the establishment of a Palestinian entity, state or whatever, is in our British interest.

I am sending a copy of my reply to the Prime Minister.

(CARRINGTON)

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 245

Middle East

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RESIDENT CLERK

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Mr Bullard
Mr Fergusson
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Mr Day
Mr Evans

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MY CALL ON HAIG: MIDDLE EAST.

1. WHEN I CALLED ON HAIG TODAY, I REFERRED TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ESPECIALLY THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM, AS A SUBJECT ABOUT WHICH WE WOULD WELCOME DISCUSSION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, PERHAPS EVEN PRIOR TO YOUR VISIT. AT ALL EVENTS, I KNEW THAT YOU WOULD WISH TO LAY OUT FOR HAIG THE THINKING WHICH LAY BEHIND EUROPEAN POLICY.

2. HAIG REPLIED THAT HE WAS OF COURSE AWARE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA ON THIS, AND ON DEALING WITH THE PLO. BUT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO TALOKING ALL THIS OUT THOROUGHLY WITH THE EUROPEAN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE MORE RESTRICTED FORA. HE REMARKED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT EVEN AFTER THOROUGH DISCUSSION

EUROPEAN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE MORE RESTRICTED FORA. HE REMARKED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT EVEN AFTER THOROUGH DISCUSSION THERE MIGHT NOT BE A CONVERGENCE OF VIEW. BUT HE COULD REASSURE ME THAT THERE WOULD BE NO IMMEDIATE HYPER-ACTIVITY BY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION ON MIDDLE EASTERN MATTERS. THERE WERE, AFTER ALL, A NUMBER OF VERY FLUID ELEMENTS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION: THE CHANGEABILITY OF THE SCENE WITHIN ISRAEL: THE DYNAMIC FORCES BEING GENERATED BY THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT: THE FUTURE OF US RELATIONS WITH IRAN (WHICH WOULD NOT GET ANY WARMER IN THE WAKE OF THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE - QUITE THE CONTRARY).

3. I SUGGESTED TO HAIG THAT ONE SUBJECT THAT YOU WOULD BE KEEN TO DISCUSS WITH HIM WOULD BE THE QUESTION OF HANDLING MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK. HAIG RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY. HE WOULD BE ANXIOUS TO HEAR YOU VIEWS ON THIS. HE RECALLED THE TIME OF OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST OF SUEZ. HE HAD PERSONALLY VISITED THE THEN FOREIGN SECRETARY, AND HAD URGED BRITAIN NOT TO MAKE THIS MOVE: RATHER, WE SHOULD DRAW DOWN OUR FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO IF NEED BE. HAIG HAD FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT BRITISH POWER AND DIPLOMACY WERE NEEDED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SO AS NOT TO LEAVE THE US THERE AS THE SOLE LIGHTNING ROD. HE REGARDED OUR WITHDRAWAL AS A DREADFUL MISTAKE AND HOPED THAT THERE MIGHT NOW BE SOME POSSIBILITY FOR CHANGE. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR GRATIFICATION AT THE PRESENCE OF THE FRENCH FLEET AT HORMUZ. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE OURSELVES WERE NOT ABLE TO DO MORE BECAUSE OF THE SCALE OF OUR COMMITMENT TO SACLANT: TO WHICH HAIG REPLIED QUOTE MISTAKES BEGET MISTAKES UNQUOTE.

4. HE TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT VELIOTES WOULD BE HIS NOMINEE AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, THOUGH CERTAIN CLEARANCES HAD STILL TO BE EFFECTED.

F C O PASS INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, BEIRUT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.

HENDERSON

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File

Subject filed on Middle East Arms Sales and Military Assistance to Middle East

C. Hooker Ops

10 DOWNING STREET

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 7A/81

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 January 1981

Since I had the pleasure of welcoming Your Highness to 10 Downing Street during your visit to this country in September 1979, there have been many important developments in the Middle East affecting your country and region as well as British interests in the Gulf. I was sorry that, because of the change of Ministerial appointment about which he has written to His Highness Shaikh Hamad, Francis Pym was not able to make his planned visit to you earlier this month to discuss these developments, but I am sure his successor, John Nott, will want to come to Qatar as soon as is mutually convenient. I would myself also like to have the opportunity to renew our acquaintanceship and to resume the extremely useful and wide-ranging conversation we had at Downing Street. I would hope to be able to make a visit to Qatar later this year if this were convenient to Your Highness.

Your Highness will recall that we discussed at some length the Soviet Union's attempts to de-stabilise the Middle East. While the recent proposal of the President of the USSR for turning the Gulf into an area of Soviet style peace and security does not add much to what the Russians have been saying for some time, President Brezhnev's remarks were well publicised and were no doubt intended as attractive propaganda. We would naturally all like to see zones of peace in the world where they could be set up with guarantees for continued peace and security. We have taken careful note of the views often expressed by Gulf states that the Gulf should not be turned into an area of super-power confrontation. But perhaps Your Highness will share my view that while the Russian proposals aim to exclude military forces from the Gulf itself, they would be more persuasive if they took account of the deployment of large Soviet forces in Afghanistan, along the frontier with Iran and of the Russian presence in Aden. Russian

/leaders

leaders should demonstrate their attachment to the principles of the non-use of force and non-intervention in the affairs of others by withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Your Highness will know that in the British Government's view the best way to meet the challenges to stability in the Gulf is for the states of the region to increase their co-operation among themselves and to develop suitable structures for greater mutual security. I was heartened to learn that during the Arab Summit Meeting in Amman in November some steps were taken to improve such co-operation. I hope the process will continue.

As for the co-operation between our two countries, I have followed with close interest the development of practical co-operation in the defence field which has taken place in the last two months. I am most grateful for the way in which General Perkins was received in your country and I am very pleased that his advice was both welcome and capable of being transformed into speedy action. We remain ready to co-operate with you as effectively as we can in the fields of defence and security, by training and equipping your armed forces. I hope the continuing close contacts between our countries, including the group of eminent visitors from Qatar whom the Ministry of Defence are delighted to be receiving next week, will help us to identify forms of future co-operation in the defence field which will commend themselves to Your Highness.

Your Highness may recall that when we met in September 1979 I asked you to contact me if you thought that the United Kingdom was in any way less active in the region than you desired. This request, of course, remains; I hope you will not hesitate to do so at any time.

(Sgd) Margaret Thatcher

His Highness Shaikh Khalifah bin Hamad al Thani, GCMG

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ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE

1. THE 12TH ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE OPENED IN TAIF ON 17 JANUARY. IT IS TO BE FOLLOWED ON 24 JANUARY BY THE THIRD ISLAMIC SUMMIT. IRAN, LIBYA AND CHAD HAVE NOT SO FAR TURNED UP AND SEEM UNLIKELY TO DO SO. EGYPT AND AFGHANISTAN WERE NOT INVITED. THE ABSENCE OF FIVE STATES (OUT OF 42) IS DISAPPOINTING TO THE SAUDIS BUT WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA AND ON ITS PRINCIPAL ITEMS.

2. THESE ARE LIKELY TO BE: AFGHANISTAN, THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR (INCLUDING THE THREE GULF ISLANDS, IF THE UAE RAISES THE ISSUE, AS IT SAYS IT WILL) PALESTINE/JERUSALEM AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THE PHILIPPINO MOSLEMS MAY ALSO BE INCLUDED AND POSSIBLY THE TREATMENT OF OTHER MOSLEM MINORITIES.

3. PRINCE SAUD HAS DENIED THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL DISCUSS PURELY INTER-ARAB DISPUTES. BUT THEY ARE BOUND TO COME UP IN THE MARGINS: ABOVE ALL, THECSRAQ/SYRIA AND JORDAN/SYRIA QUARRELS. ONE SUGGESTION CANVASSED IN THE LOCAL PRESS IS THAT THE CONFERENCE MIGHT ADOPT THE AMMAN ARAB SUMMIT DECLARATION AND THUS ALLOW THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT A DECENT WAY OF BACKING DOWN. THERE MAY ALSO BE SOME INFORMAL MOVES ON THE ALGERIAN/MOROCCO DISPUTE.

4. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, TECHNICAL ITEMS SUCH AS A TRADE PROMOTION CENTRE IN TANGIER, AN INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGREEMENT AND A SHIPOWNERS' FEDERATION WILL BE OF LESS INTEREST THAN THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE WEALTHY MEMBER STATES WILL DECLARE AN ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT DECADE ALONG THE LINES OF THE ARAB DECADE DECLARED AT AMMAN, AND IF SO HOW MUCH MONEY WILL IT PRODUCE? THE DRAFT AGENDA PROVIDES FOR EXPANDING THE ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY FUND AND FOR SETTING UP AN ISLAMIC EMERGENCY AID ORGANISATION.

5. THE SAUDIS HAVE REALLY GONE TO TOWN ON THE CONFERENCE. THERE IS BLANKET COVERAGE IN THE LOCAL PRESS AND LAVISH ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR ACCOMMODATING JOURNALISTS AND PROVIDING TELEX AND TELEPHONE LINES. ASTONISHINGLY,

VISAS ARE BEING SHOWERED ON FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. THE OPENING SESSION OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE (WHEN KING KHALID ADDRESSES THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT) WILL BE BROADCAST LIVE BY SATELLITE.

6. A FORTUNE HAS BEEN SPENT ON THE CONFERENCE FACILITIES. FIGURES GIVEN BY THE SAUDIS RANGE FROM SR 250 MILLION TO SR 2 BILLION (£ 31 MILLION TO £ 250 MILLION): WE THINK THE SECOND FIGURE IS NEARER THE TRUTH. MORE WILL BE SPENT ON RUNNING COSTS, INCLUDING SECURITY. THERE ARE TWO NATIONAL GUARD AND THREE ARMY BATTALIONS IN TAIF.

7. INDEED SECURITY IS VERY TIGHT. IN CONTRAST TO THE TREATMENT OF JOURNALISTS IS THAT OF NON-MUSLIM DIPLOMATS. ALL OF US WHO HAVE TRIED HAVE BEEN DENIED PASSES AND THE ROAD TO TAIF IS ''CLOSED FOR REPAIRS'' (A SHUTTLE AIR SERVICE IS OPERATING FROM JEDDA FOR DELEGATIONS AND JOURNALISTS). IF YOU THINK THIS BEHAVIOUR IS ECCENTRIC, I WOULD NOT DISAGREE. NOR, I UNDERSTAND, WOULD DR CHATTI WHO IN THEORY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ORGANISATION.

8. DESPITE THE ENORMOUS EFFORT, I DO NOT EXPECT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE TO PRODUCE ANY SPECTACULAR RESULTS. KING KHALID HIMSELF HAS SAID THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT ISLAMIC HEADS OF STATE SHOULD MEET, EVEN IF NOT ALL THE RESOLUTIONS THEY PASS ARE CARRIED OUT. THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A FAIRLY STRONG RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN. THE SYRIANS, WHO ARE THE MAVERICKS ON THIS QUESTION, ARE EXPECTED TO LIE LOW. BUT LITTLE ACTION WILL RESULT. IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO AGREE A RESOLUTION ON THE GULF WAR AND THERE WILL HAVE TO BE MUCH DISCUSSION IN THE CORRIDORS IF EMBARRASSMENT IS TO BE AVOIDED. THERE WILL PROBABLY BE AN ATTEMPT TO FORM THE SIX-STATE GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE ON WHICH DR CHATTI HAS BEEN WORKING FOR SOME TIME. BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF IRAN SUCH A MOVE CAN HARDLY BE EFFECTIVE. THE RESOLUTION ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE IS UNLIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND THERE MUST BE A DANGER THAT IT WILL BE COUCHED IN EXTREMIST TERMS. IT IS LIKELY TO CALL FOR EARLY ACTION BY THE TEN.

FCO SQXPLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

CRAIG

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]
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JORDAN/MIDDLE EAST

US/JORDAN

1. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT NO DATE HAD YET-BEEN FIXED FOR HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE (AND ALSO THE CROWN PRINCE WHOM I HAD SEEN ON 13 JANUARY) HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN RATHER PUT OUT BY REAGAN'S RECENT COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST (REPORTED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 103 OF 12 JANUARY).

SYRIAN/JORDANIAN RELATIONS

2. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION HAD MADE ANY PROGRESS IN TRYING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND JORDAN. THE KING SAID IT HAD NOT CONTRIBUTED ANYTHING AND THAT HE SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVEMENT AT PRESENT. WHEN I ENQUIRED WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE SYRIAN REGIME COULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE AT SERIOUS RISK, HE DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY BUT SAID HE WAS DOING HIS UTMOST TO ENSURE THAT REPORTS CONCERNING EVENTS IN SYRIA WHICH APPEARED IN THE JORDANIAN MEDIA CORRESPONDED WITH THE FACTS AND HE BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE 90% ACCURATE (THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT OUR IMPRESSION AND SOME OF THE REPORTS HAVE BEEN VERY WIDE OF THE MARK - SEE SINDALL'S TELELETTER TO JENNER OF 14 JANUARY ON JORDAN/SYRIA).

JORDAN/PLO

3. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THEIR LINES OPEN TO THE PLO ON POLITICAL MATTERS FOLLOWING THE PLO'S ABSENCE FROM THE AMMAN SUMMIT. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN

VERY USEFUL POLITICAL TALKS WITH HANI AL HASSAN IN THE MARGIN OF THE RECENT JOINT JORDAN/PLO COMMITTEE MEETING IN AMMAN AND THAT HE WAS EXPECTING TO HAVE A TALK WITH ARAFAT DURING THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT MEETING. HE FELT, THEREFORE, THAT JORDAN HAD DONE QUITE WELL IN KEEPING CONTACTS GOING WITH THE PLO IN SPITE OF THE VERY HEAVY PRESSURE TO WHICH THE PLO WAS BEING SUBJECTED BY THE SYRIANS.

URWICK

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

(1)

Prime Minister

You need not, unless you are interested, read all this. But you should look at the passage on the Arab/Israel dispute. It begins on page 6. It seems to me to be well balanced. Content? — Yes MT

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 January 1981

Dear Michael,

Secretary of State's Speech at the Arab Community Dinner on 21 January

I enclose the draft of a speech which, subject to any views which the Prime Minister may have, the Secretary of State has it in mind to make at the Arab Community dinner on 21 January.

It would be helpful to have any comments before the weekend, if possible.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

(1)

SECRETARY OF STATE'S SPEECH AT THE ARAB COMMUNITY DINNER ON 21 JANUARY

I don't think there has been or could have been a meeting like this before, and I should like to thank the Arab League representative in London most sincerely for doing me the honour of inviting me to address it.

Of course, there has been an Arab Community in Britain for many years, but it was perhaps only in the second half of the seventies that it assumed something like its present size and importance. There were several reasons, bad as well as good; for example, the disruption of Beirut as a commercial and communications centre for the Arab world. Whatever the reasons, Beirut's loss was London's gain, and we welcome you warmly. An impressive total of some 360,000 Arabs now visit London each year. A few years ago there was a fashion of worrying that the Arabs were going to overrun London, to buy us out of house and home. Don't believe it! Perhaps I ought to warn you that London has welcomed and absorbed many other communities in its history. So if some of the best Arab newspapers, some of the biggest Arab businesses, some of the finest Arab restaurants have found their home here - Ahlan wa Sahlan! The late Paul Getty was once asked why it was that, with his companies in America and his oil wells in the Gulf, he nevertheless chose to live in England. He thought for a bit before starting to reply 'Well .... I realise London isn't actually <u>in</u> the Middle East.

/The traffic

The traffic is not all one way and the Middle East has long had a seemingly irresistible lure for British travellers, businessmen and diplomats. The resident British communities in Arab countries now number some 80,000, reflecting much the same diversity of interests as the Arab Community here. Gatherings of local communities such as this could be, and indeed often are, mirrored in your own countries.

The traffic is not a new phenomenon. We all formed part of the 'old world' when it was a smaller place centred on the Mediterranean basin. The roots of European civilisation lie in Greece and Rome, whose own civilizations embraced many parts of the Arab world. The roots of our Christianity lie closer to home in the Holy Land where we, with Arabs both Muslim and Christian, share a common religious heritage.

When later Europe and rising Islam came into conflict these links were not broken. On the contrary, the brilliant Arab civilizations of Damascus, Baghdad, Cordoba, and Cairo kept the flame alight while Europe was passing through its Dark Age. Arab scholars played a vital role in preserving and transmitting the learning of the ancient world, and thus contributed directly to the European renaissance.

/In modern

In modern times this trade in goods and ideas has continued. The world has grown larger, and centres of power have arisen away from the Mediterranean. But we remain neighbours with a common interest in peace and stability, while economically we are as mutually dependent as ever.

Culturally we have of course developed in rather different directions. I do not see this as a cause of concern. On the contrary, a feeling of cultural identity gives a people a sense of national pride which goes beyond dangerous and jingoistic nationalism. Where culture, as in the Arab world, straddles borders, it is a force for unity and co-operation. Nor is there any inherent conflict between Muslim and Western traditions. Indeed, as I said earlier, the two traditions have much in common. There is no need for us in the West to see resurgent Islam as a force hostile to our interests and values. But we naturally hope that this resurgence will spring from the positive impetus of a new confidence and sense of identity rather than from more inward-looking motives. We share a responsibility to ensure that this happens. And for us in the West that responsibility includes ensuring that Islamic values are understood and respected here.

/So talk

So talk of Europe and the Middle East in regional terms is misleading, however useful that may be as a form of shorthand. We are, in reality, interdependent. Economically 7% of Britain's total trade is with the Arab World, and over 5% of your trade is with us. Taking the European Community countries as a whole, 8% of their trade is with you and 38% of your trade with them. Europe relies on Arab countries for some 60% of its oil. You rely on Europe for a great part of the imports necessary for development. This is not a fortuitous arrangement which can be just tossed aside. We need your markets and you need ours.

One expression of this interdependence lies in the Euro-Arab Dialogue.

Equally, politically and strategically we are inter-dependent. And here the European Community is seeking, as you seek, increasingly to speak with a united voice. I know you do not see this European aspiration as a threat. You have been urging it upon us for some time. And, if you have a criticism, it is that we are not moving far or fast enough for your liking. But do not underestimate the progress that has been made toward political co-operation. It is spurred on by the perception that Europe must do more to help solve problems and avert impending dangers.

/Our views

Our views on the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan are well known to you. We have expressed our strong opposition to the Soviet action. The fundamental requirement is that the Russians should withdraw, leaving the Afghan people free to choose their own government. Early last year the Nine put forward a proposal for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan outside the competition of the powers. This offers assurances on which a lasting political settlement could be built. Subsequently we welcomed the decision of the Islamic Conference to appoint a Committee of Three and the initiative of the Islamic countries in tabling the resolution on Afghanistan adopted by the General Assembly in November. All independent countries have a common interest in ensuring that the Russians withdraw from Afghanistan. I hope that our countries can stand together in working for this end in the year ahead.

In the Gulf itself there is the war between Iraq and Iran. The West cannot but view this with concern - both on the wider ground that disputes should be settled peacefully and also because the war puts at risk the stability of the Gulf. So far, the war has been contained but the repercussions of it spreading would be very grave. We are not taking sides. Our concern is to see an early end to the fighting.

/We have

We have welcomed the efforts of the Islamic Conference and the Non Aligned Movement to negotiate and have strongly supported the peace mission of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Mr Olof Palme. It is in all our interests that Iran and Iraq agree soon to come to the negotiating table and to settle their differences by peaceful means.

Arab - Israel dispute

However I know that some of you regard the attitudes and motives of the West on all these problems with, let us say, a tinge of scepticism. This is because of what some see as our failure to dispose of the Arab/Israel dispute. There are those who doubt our will to do so, or accuse us or our allies of double standards. This charge has been put to me on my travels and I repeat it to you bluntly, and not surprisingly to refute it. I should say that I am also accused in rather different quarters of attaching undue importance to the Arab/Israel dispute. I take some comfort from the fact that I am at least attacked from both sides.

My first point is that the West, whether the US or the Nine, cannot solve the dispute. We cannot impose a settlement because such a settlement would not last. Arabs and Israelis must settle their differences by sitting down to negotiate together. But you and the Israelis have not been able to solve the dispute alone. Feelings and suspicions run too deep and many of the differences are wide. There is a need for some intermediary.

/Secondly you

Secondly you should not underestimate the role which the West, and particularly the United States, has played in attempting to find a solution. Where there has been failure it reflects the extreme difficulty of many of the problems. But there has been forward movement. Camp David has not produced the progress on the Palestinian issue which we hoped to see. But it has established the principle of withdrawal from territories occupied by force which was enshrined in Security Council Resolution 242, and has demonstrated that the confidence and trust necessary for peace can be achieved between Israel and an Arab State.

But the problem of achieving a comprehensive peace remains. There is a balance of two interests here, which is psychologically at the heart of the problem. As the Prime Minister put it, speaking in Parliament just after the Venice meeting last year, 'if one people expects to exist behind secure boundaries it cannot deny that right to another people. What one asks for oneself, one must be prepared to accord to others'. The world has learnt that there <u>is</u> a Palestinian people; that it has rights; that the military occupation of territory hurts both occupied and occupier and must be brought to an end; that the establishment of settlements in occupied territory can only make peace more difficult; that the question of Jerusalem cannot be solved simply by a declaration issued by one party to the dispute even though it has physical control of the city; that there is something called the

/PLO which

PLO which is going to have to play a part in settling the problem. I have made myself rather unpopular in some places by spelling all this out.

At the risk of making myself unpopular here as well, I must spell out some facts on the other side. Israel too exists, not merely on the map but as a member of the family of nations. Her future must be secure. A peaceful solution to the Middle East problem must mean that Israelis and Arabs - Palestinians - find a way of living in peace side by side.

I think many, or perhaps most of you, accept this in your hearts. I want to emphasise the importance of facing the facts. Talk of expelling Israel from the UN, or 'liquidating the Zionist entity' does no service to the Arab cause. The only result of saying them is to convince the Israelis that there is no point in trying to negotiate with the Arabs. And negotiations and a just peace settlement without the Israelis are impossible. Each side must accept the rights of the other.

It is precisely in this area of reconciling the rights and interests of the two sides that the European Community believe they can play an important role. This was the purpose of the Venice Declaration last June. This set in train a positive process of consultation and inquiry. M Thorn went out and met those concerned in the area. Since he returned the Nine have been working at the practical implications of the Venice Declaration in greater detail. On 2 December the European Council decided that the process of consultation would continue with renewed urgency.

/There has

There has been some talk of European activity running out of steam. This is the reverse of the truth. The Nine are united in their agreement to move forward and on the basis on which this should be done. The new contacts will not be merely a repetition of the Thorn Mission but a positive process of exploring ideas on key issues such as withdrawal, self-determination, security, and Jerusalem. It would be unrealistic to expect progress too soon but I do believe that 1981 offers opportunities. We are ready to play our part with others, notably the US, in no spirit of competition, in seeing that those opportunities are used to the full. There is a need to take a fresh look at the situation and to aim for a genuine dialogue between all the parties involved. This is what we and the Nine will be doing.

All the problems are important. All are difficult. But perhaps I could pick out two, self-determination and security, because they lie at the heart of the principles stated in the Venice Declaration, and at the heart of the problem itself. The Declaration refers unequivocably to the right of the Palestinians to exercise fully their right to self-determination within the framework of a comprehensive peace. We believe this to be essential for the achievement of a just and lasting peace. But it is balanced in the Declaration by that other requirement - the right to security of all states in the region, including Israel. One cannot be achieved without the other, and without both there will be no peace. I make no apology for repeating myself when I say that the first point is a nettle that Israel must grasp; the second is

/an assurance

an assurance to which the Arabs, including the Palestinians, must be prepared to bind themselves.

My final point is this. Please do not suspect our good faith. There is no Western interest in continuing and dangerous instability in the Middle East. There is no Western interest in dividing Arab from Arab or in keeping Arab and Israeli divided. We wish to maintain good relations with the Arab world and with Israel. I see no reason whatsoever why our friendship with one side should give rise to suspicions on the other. But it gives added point to our efforts to achieve a settlement acceptable to both. As I said earlier we are all interdependent. We share your interest in the stability and prosperity of the Middle East. We all suffer when that is endangered.

jfh

15 January 1981

Secretary of State's Speech at the Arab Community Dinner

The Prime Minister has seen the draft enclosed with your letter to me of 14 January. She is content with the proposed text.

MA

F.N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GR 300
UNCLASSIFIED
FM TEL AVIV 140905Z JAN 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 30 OF 14 JANUARY
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO

MIPT: CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL

1. THE MAIN POINTS ARE:

I) THE DELEGATION ''SHOWED UNDERSTANDING'' OF THE SECURITY FUNCTION FULFILLED BY THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS, RECOGNISING THE NEED TO PROTECT ISRAEL'S COASTAL PLAIN FROM ATTACKS AND SHELLING FROM THE WEST BANK. SHARON HAD SAID ISRAEL'S AIM WAS 300,000 JEWS ON THE WEST BANK. SOME MP'S FELT PRESENT PLANS WOULD PRECLUDE PEACE WITH JORDAN:

II) THE DELEGATION ACCEPTED THE VIEW THAT THE POSITIONS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE EVACUATED UNTIL SYRIA DEMONSTRATED A SINCERE DESIRE FOR PEACE:

III) FOLLOWING THEIR VISIT TO JERUSALEM, THE DELEGATION REGARDED A NEW DIVISION OF THE CITY AS UNTHINKABLE. THE DELEGATION PRAISED ISRAEL FOR FACILITATING FREE ACCESS TO THE HOLY SITES FOR ALL RELIGIONS WHICH HAD BEEN DENIED THE JEWS DURING 19 YEARS OF JORDANIAN OCCUPATION.

IV) THE DELEGATION BELIEVED IT WAS IN THE FIRM INTERESTS OF THE WEST TO SUPPORT ISRAEL AS THE ONLY STABLE DEMOCRACY IN AN INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE MIDDLE EAST AND AS THE WEST'S MOST CONSISTENT ALLY IN THE REGION:

V) THERE WAS A REFERENCE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, AND ITS MENTION OF THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL'S INTEGRITY AND SECURITY.

2. THE ISRAELI PRESS POINT OUT THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME A CONSERVATIVE PARTY DELEGATION VISITED WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS UNDER SHARON'S GUIDANCE. THE COMMUNIQUE MAKES THE MOST OF THIS.

ROBINSON
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PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS
SIR J. GRAHAM
MR. J.C. MOBERLY

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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GR 110
RESTRICTED
FM TEL AVIV 140900Z JAN 81
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 29 OF 14 JANUARY
INFO CAIRO

MY TELEGRAM 19: CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL

1. YESTERDAY'S ISRAELI PRESS CARRIED A SUMMARY OF A LONG COMMUNIQUE SAID TO HAVE BEEN PUT OUT BY THE CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL DELEGATION. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED ON 12 JANUARY FROM THE OFFICE OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANISATION HERE. WE KNOW THAT FIDLER REMAINED BEHIND IN ISRAEL WHEN THE REST OF THE DELEGATION LEFT, BUT WE HAVE NO MEANS OF KNOWING WHETHER THEY AGREED THE TEXT.

2. MAIN POINT OF THE COMMUNIQUE ARE IN MIPT. FULL TEXT BY BAG.

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This does not take us much further forward.

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GR 335
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 141300Z
FM CAIRO 141115Z JAN 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 40 OF 13 JANUARY
INFO ROUTINE MODUK (FOR DUS/PMS) AND THE HAGUE (FOR MR BULLARD)

SECRETARY OF STATES CALL ON PRESIDENT SADAT: MIPT

BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS REMARKABLE AND GRATIFYING HOW FEW BILATERAL PROBLEMS THERE WERE BETWEEN US, BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO MENTION A COUPLE. SADAT HEARTILY AGREED AND RECALLED WITH A LAUGH THAT HE USED TO BE VIOLENTLY ANTI-BRITISH. (HIS WIFE INTERJECTED ''SPEAK FOR YOURSELF''). HOWEVER, HE HAD GREATLY APPRECIATED OUR SUPPORT IN RECENT YEARS, RANGING FROM OUR SUPPLY OF SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT DURING THE 1973 WAR, AND OUR LATE-NIGHT CONSULTATION WITH HIM ABOUT THE SOVIET BID FOR A CEASEFIRE, TO MR WILSON'S HELPFUL INTERVENTION WITH THE ISRAELIS OVER THE SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. SOME PEOPLE NOWADAYS SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT DO BETTER TO ADOPT A MORE BALANCED POSITION BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT AFTER HIS EXPERIENCE OF THE RUSSIANS IN 1973 HE COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE THIS.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN BROUGHT UP THE AOI PROBLEM. HE REGRETTED THE FACT THAT THE COMPANIES HAD FELT OBLIGED TO STOP WORK IN EGYPT BY FACTORS OUTSIDE THEIR CONTROL. BUT HE KNEW LORD ALDINGTON WELL AS AN HONOURABLE MAN AND WAS SURE THAT THE COMPANY WERE ANXIOUS TO DO THEIR BEST TO AVOID HARMING EGYPT'S INTERESTS. HE DESCRIBED THE APPEAL THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FUAD MOHIEDDIN HAD MADE TO ME THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO BRING ABOUT A RECIPROCAL TERMINATION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN FAVOUR OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE COMPANIES HAD NEW MADE NEW PROPOSALS (WHICH I BRIEFLY OUTLINED) AND HOPED THAT THESE WOULD PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY WAY FORWARD. SADAT SAID THAT THE COMPANIES' ACTIONS HAD INDEED BEEN A BLOW TO EGYPT BUT HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR OF THE NEW PROPOSALS. HE WOULD GET VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO FOLLOW THEM UP WITH ME.

/3.

3. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT ON THE OTHER HAND WE FOR OUR PART HAD HAD OUR DISAPPOINTMENTS OVER DEFENCE CONTRACTS WITH EGYPT. SADAT AT ONCE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD HAD A LETTER FROM MRS THATCHER ON THE SUBJECT AND SAID VAGUELY THAT APART FROM HAWK HE WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN HARRIER. SINCE HE SEEMED UNCLEAR ABOUT THE STATE OF THE HAWK CONTRACT AND DISINCLINED TO DISCUSS IT THE SECRETARY OF STATE DID NOT PRESS HIM. LORD CARRINGTON THEN EMPHASISED OUR HOPES OF SUPPLYING RAPIER. SADAT TOOK NOTE AND SAID HE WOULD ASK VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO PURSUE ALL THESE MATTERS WITH US.

WEIR

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An interesting discussion. Read in full.

GRS 1110
CONFIDENTIAL
FM CAIRO 140930Z JAN 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 38 OF 13 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, TRIPOLI, RABAT, WASHINGTON, PARIS AND BONN.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT

1. THE SECETARY OF STATE HAD A ONE AND A HALF HOUR TALK WITH PRESIDENT SADAT YESTERDAY EVENING AT HIS VILLA IN ASWAN. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND INFORMAL. MRS SADAT AND LADY CARRINGTON WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, AS WAS AMBASSADOR ABU SAADA.

CHAD

2. SADAT PLUNGED STRAIGHT INTO CHAD, SAYING THAT THE SITUATION WAS VERY SERIOUS. QADDHAFI'S NEXT TARGET WOULD BE THE SUDAN, WHICH WAS, OF COURSE, EGYPT'S LIFELINE BECAUSE OF THE NILE. PROMPTED PERHAPS BY HAVING JUST SEEN MADAME GISCARD D'ESTAING, AND BEEN INTERVIEWED BY LE FIGARO THE PREVIOUS DAY, HE SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD THE FRENCH HAD SENT TROOPS TO THE AREA, BUT THEY SHOULD HAVE DONE SO SOONER. LORD CARRINGTON MENTIONED THAT THE TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SUGGESTED TO HIM IN TUNIS THAT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE WAS SOMEWHAT AMBIVALENT AND INFLUENCED BY THEIR OIL INTERESTS IN LIBYA. SADAT AT ONCE AGREED AND SAID THAT THEY WERE ALSO INVOLVED IN ARMS DEALS WITH LIBYA. HE RECALLED THEIR OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUS ON OTHER OCCASIONS, EG GISCARD'S STATEMENT ABOUT THE PLO. THEY HAD RECENTLY BEEN SUPPLYING ARMS ALSO TO IRAQ, WHICH LOOKED LIKE GETTING THEM INTO TROUBLE. LORD CARRINGTON OBSERVED THAT BOTH EGYPT AND THE UK, NOT BEING DEPENDENT ON OIL SUPPLIES FROM OUTSIDE, COULD TAKE A MORE OBJECTIVE VIEW. LATER ON, SADAT REMARKED THAT CHAD WOULD BE QADDHAFI'S GRAVE, AND THAT HE ''WOULD SEE TO IT''. HE ONLY WISHED THAT EGYPT HAD A COMMON FRONTIER WITH CHAD, AS WITH LIBYA AND THE SUDAN. ONLY LAST WEEK QADDHAFI HAD TAKEN THE EXTRAORDINARY STEP OF SENDING HIS COUSIN TO SEE SADAT IN HIS VILLAGE, WITH A PROPOSAL THAT THEIR COMMON FRONTIER SHOULD BE REOPENED. SADAT HAD SENT HIM BACK WITH THE ANSWER THAT HE SADAT DID NOT TRUST QADDHAFI.

3. WHEN KING HASSAN'S NAME CAME UP, SADAT REACTED RATHER BITTERLY. HE SAID THAT SOME TIME AGO HE HAD SENT HIM TWO SHIP LOADS OF ARMS WORTH 24 MILLION DOLLARS, AND IN RETURN HASSAN HAD ''SOLD ME TO THE SAUDIS'' (POSSIBLY A REFERNECE TO EGYPT'S EXCLUSION FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AT FEZ IN 1979).

Middle East

CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE EAST

4. ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM, SADAT SPOKE IN VERY SIMILAR TERMS TO THOSE HE USED WITH MR HEATH, AND WAS AGAIN VERY CRITICAL OF KING HUSSEIN. HE RE-TOLD THE STORY OF HOW, WHEN HE WAS AT CAMP DAVID, KING HUSSEIN TELEPHONE HIM FROM LONDON AND ''ASKED TO JOINE''. THEY HAD THEREFORE WRITTEN IN A ROLE FOR JORDAN, AND HUSSEIN HAD THEN BACKED OUT. HUSSEIN WANTED TO GRAB THE WEST BANK, BUT IT WOULD BE DAMAGING IF HE WERE TO GET INVOLVED AT THIS STAGE. HE WOULD ONLY TRY TO CREATE AN IMAGE FOR HIMSELF AS THE DEFENDER OF THE PALESTINIANS. BUT AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS HE SHOULD CERTAINLY SIT DOWN WITH THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS TO NEGOTIATE THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORY, WHICH EGYPT HAD NO WISH TO PREJUDGE. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THE JORDANIAN OPTION WAS A MISNOMER. IT DID NOT AT THE MOMENT EXIST, AS HUSSEIN HAD NO INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE. UNLESS HE NEGOTIATED WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PLO HE WOULD BE CONSIDERED A TRAITOR. YET EVEN IF HE DID NEGOTIATE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PLO AND RECOVERED THE WEST BANK, HE MIGHT FIND THAT HIS THRONE WOULD BE THREATENED BY THE PALESTINIAN MAJORITY. SADAT, A TRIFLE INCONSISTENTLY, AGREED.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT THE OTHER ARABS AND WHETHER THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE REJECTIONISTS AND MODERATES DID NOT OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE LATTER. SADAT REPEATED HIS FAMILIAR THEME THAT THE MODERATES WERE ALREADY EAGER TO MAKE UP, BUT NEEDED A FACE-SAVING FORMULA. HE SPOKE OF THE INDIRECT APPROACH HE HAD HAD FROM THE SAUDIS, URGING HIM TO SETTLE FOR SINAI AND TO LEAVE THE REST TO BE NEGOTIATED BY KING HUSSEIN. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, UNTHINKABLE. HE DID NOT DISAPPROVE OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. HE HOPED IT WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF FINDING A FARMULA TO SAVE THE FACES OF THE SAUDI'S AND OTHER MODERATES SO THAT THEY COULD JOIN IN TALKS AFTER THE AUTONOMY ISSUE HAD BEEN SETTLED WITH PERES. HE WOULD BE READY TO DROP THE OFFENDING TERM ''CAMP DAVID''. HE ALSO REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT SINCE THE MECCA INCIDENT THE COLLAPESE OF THE SAUDI REGIME WAS INEVITABLE SOONER OR LATER: KING HUSSEIN AGREED, THOUGH HE HOPED IT WOULD BE LATER, IN VIEW OF THE 1.2 MILLION DOLLARS ANNUAL SUBSIDY HE RECEIVED FROM THEM.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE EUROPEANS' IDEAS FOR FOLLOWING UP THE VENICE DECLARATION, AND ASKED WHETHER PRESIDENT SADAT THOUGHT THEM USEFUL. HE SAID HE DID, THOUGH THERE SHOULD BE NO ATTEMPT TO AMEND 242, AS IT WAS THE BASIS OF CAMP DAVID

/AND

AND TOGETHER THEY REPRESENTED THE ONLY FIRM COMMITMENT THE ISRAELIS HAD EVER UNDERTAKEN. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED, BUT ARGUED THE CASE FOR INVOLVING THE PLO. WHATEVER ONE MIGHT THINK OF THEIR METHODS, THEY UNDOUBTEDLY REPRESENTED A LARGE SECTION OF PALESTINIAN OPINION AND THEY MUST BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF ISRAEL'S SECURE EXISTENCE, IF THEY WISHED TO SECURE THEIR OWN RIGHTS. THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE BY TALING TO THEM. SADAT ONCE MORE PROFESSED TO AGREE. HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT THE NEED TO COMPLETE THE AUTONOMY TALKS. LORD CARRINGTON POINTED OUT THAT THIS MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT COULD NOT BE DONE WITH BEGIN. SADAT SAID HE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT A LONGISH STALEMATE, INDEED HE WOULD PREFER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS TO TAKE PLACE IN NOVEMBER RATHER THAN JUNE. HE WAS NOT VERY CLEAR ABOUT HIS REASONS, BUT IMPLIED THAT THE TIME WAS NEEDED FOR MODERATE ISRAELI OPINION TO EVOLVE, FOR THE OTHER ARABS TO BECOME MORE RECONCILED, AND FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO FORMULATE ITS POLICIES. HE HAD HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH KISSINGER, AND THOUGHT THAT THE IDEAS HE TOOK BACK WOULD HAVE A HELPFUL INFLUENCE ON REAGAN, THOUGH KISSINGER DID NOT WISH TO GET INVOLVED IN THE DETAILED ISSUES LIKE STRAUSS OR LINOWITZ. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT KISSINGER HAD SERIOUSLY MISREPRESENTED THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDE IN RECENT STATEMENTS, WHERE HE HAD IMPLIED THAT WE WERE WORKING FOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. SADAT ALSO RAISED THE IDEA OF GAZA FIRST, WHICH HE SAID HE HAD AGREED WITH PERES. HE SAID THAT MAYOR SHAWA HAD SENT HIM A MESSAGE ABOUT DAYAN'S PROPOSAL FOR A UNILATERAL AND COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA.

IRAQ/IRAN

7. SADAT SAID HE EXPECTED THE WAR TO END WITHIN TWO OR THREE MONTHS, AS BOTH SIDES WERE BECOMING EXHAUSTED. WITH ANY LUCK THE OUTCOME WOULD BE THE OVERTHROW OF BOTH SADDAM HUSSAN AND KHOMEINI. SADDAM WAS VERY UNPOPULAR WITH THE IRAQI ARMY. (SADAT RECALLEDSHOW HE HAD ADVISED BHUTTO, IN VAIN, TO TAKE CARE NEVER TO ALIENATE THE ARMY). THE SAUDIS WERE NOW VERY WORRIED, THOUGH THEY NORE SOME RESPONSIBILITY BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN FORE-WARNED AND HAD APPROVED SADDAM'S PLAN FOR A BLITZKRIEG AND IN TURN HAD GOT THE GREEN LIGHT FOR HIM FROM CARTER.

AFGHANISTAN

8. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED ABOUT PRESIDENT SADAT'S CONTACTS WITH THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERS, AND HIS ESTIMATE OF THEIR CHANCES. SADAT CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS SENDING THEM ARMS, SPECIFICALLY SWING-FIRE MISSLIES MANUFACTURED IN EGYPT AND SAM 7S. HOWEVER, THEY

COULD NEVER PREVAIL AGAINST THE RUSSIANS. THE ONLY ANSWER WAS TO WORK FOR A GUARANTEED EUTRAL AFGHANISTAN ON THE AUSTRIAN MODEL, WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE RUSSIANS TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT TOO MUCH LOSS OF FACE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN ADVOCATING THIS SOLUTION FOR THE PAST YEAR. SADAT AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT KARMAL COULD NOT SURVIVE A RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE LEADER ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SIDES. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BRING BACK KING ZAHIR SHATR, WHO WAS AN OLD FRIEND OF HIS AND A RESPECTED FIGURE.

9. ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS SEE M 2ND IFT (NOT TO ALL).

CARRINGTON

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PS
PS/LPS
PS/THURD
PS/PUS
SIR J. CRADDOCK
MR J.C TOBERLY

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GRS 209
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FM FCO 121230Z JAN 81
TO PRIORITY TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 12 OF 12 JAN.

YOUR TELNO: 15: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE

1. THE PRIME MINISTER WROTE ON 15 DECEMBER. THE TEXT WAS CLEARED HERE.

2. NEWS DEPARTMENT (WHO HAVE NOT YET HAD ANY ENQUIRIES) WILL IF NECESSARY TAKE THE LINE ON THE RECORD THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER REPRESENTS BRITISH POLICY, WHICH IS IN LINE WITH THAT OF THE EC.

3. UNATTRIBUTABLY THEY WILL SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT UP TO NOW THAT THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL IS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN POLICY AS STATED IN THE VENICE DECLARATION. IF THE PRIME MINISTER'S USE OF THE WORD 'PARAMOUNT' HAS BROUGHT THIS HOME TO THEM, SO MUCH THE BETTER. AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN HER STATEMENT AND THE VENICE FORMULA, REAFFIRMED MANY TIMES BY MINISTERS, CAN ONLY BE MISCHIEVOUS.

4. THE REFERENCE TO A RECENT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GELBERG MAY BE A MISTAKE FOR A LETTER (COPY BY BAG) TO HIM FROM MR HURD ON 2 JANUARY WHICH REFERRED TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AS 'THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF THE VENICE DECLARATION'. THIS LETTER WAS ON SIMILAR LINES TO A LARGE NUMBER WRITTEN BY MINISTERS IN REPLY TO LETTERS FROM ISRAELI SUPPORTERS IN BRITAIN. IT SHOWS OF COURSE THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN MINISTERS OR DEPARTMENTS.

CARRINGTON
LIMITED
NENAD
NEWSD
PS
PS|LPS
PS|MR HURD

PS|PUS
SIR.I.GRAHAM
MR.J.C.MOBERLY

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Discussed with F.C.O. : both texts in question were cleared with them.

FS. Rmds 12/1

GR 215
CONFIDENTIAL
FM TEL AVIV 090945Z JAN 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 15 OF 9 JANUARY

FOR MILES NENAD

YOUR TEL NO 6: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO NAVON AND BEGIN

1. WHEN DID THE PRIME MINISTER WRITE THIS LETTER?

2. I AM TOLD THAT THE DEPARTMENT CLEARED THE TEXT. I HAS BEEN TAKEN HERE AS SHOWING A DIFFERENCE OF POSITION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SECRETARY OF STATE YESTERDAY IN RABAT ACCORDING TO BBC HELD TO THE LINE THAT WE WERE EQUALLY CONCERNED FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND FOR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO FIDLER (THE LAST PERSON TO BE TRUSTED WITH ANYTHING WHICH WAS NOT CRYSTAL CLEAR) GIVES GREATER PMPORTANCE (PARAMOUNT CAN ONLY MEAN THAT) TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

3. THIS MORNING'S ISRAELI PAPERS REFER TO ''A STATEMENT WHICH SEEMS TO DIFFER FROM THE POSITION OF HER OWN FOREIGN OFFICE '' IN A LETTER WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER IS SAID TO HAVE WRITTEN RECENTLY TO GEOFFREY GELBERG, CHAIRMAN OF THE ZIONIST FEDERATION. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ME TO HAVE MUCH PROMPTER INFORMATION ABOUT SUCH LETTERS. THEY WILL BE MISUSED HERE TO THE FULL TO SUGGEST DIFFERENCES WITHIN HMG AND TO EXPOSE THE SECRETARY OF STATE. CAN THEY NOT BE DRAFTED MORE CAREFULLY?

ROBINSON

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NENAD
NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY

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GR 410
CONFIDENTIAL
FM TEL AVIV 090730Z JAN 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 OF 9 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE RABAT WASHINGTON PRIORITY CAIRO AND JEDDA

Read in full.

WASHINGTON TEL NO 35: KISSINGER AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. DAYAN PRESSED ME LAST NIGHT FOR AN INDICATION THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT HIS PROPOSAL FOR UNILATERALLY GIVING AUTONOMY TO PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA. HE HAD SEEN KISSINGER HERE ON 5 JANUARY AND HAD URGED IT ON HIM. DAYAN HAD SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT CAMP DAVID WOULD NOW GET NOWHERE AND THAT THERE WAS NO JORDANIAN OPTION BECAUSE THE KING WOULD NOT PLAY ON ISRAEL'S TERMS. KISSINGER HAD REPLIED THAT THIS WAS ALL VERY WELL BUT IT WAS NOT THE MAIN POINT: THE POINT WAS THAT SADAT WANTED TO GO ON WITH CAMP DAVID, AND TO HAVE HIS PATERNITY ON ANY SOLUTION, AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD GIVE SADAT WHAT HE WANTED. DAYAN SEEMED TO HAVE CONCLUDED (PERHAPS ATTACHING TOO MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO KISSINGER AT THIS STAGE) THAT THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WAS SOLD ON SUPPORTING SADAT AT ANY PRICE, AND THAT SADAT WOULD BE ABLE VIRTUALLY TO DICTATE THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

2. DAYAN WAS CONTEMPTUOUS OF PERES AND HIS PERSISTENCE IN HOPING THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD HELP TO SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM ON ISRAEL'S TERMS. THERE WAS NO HOPE THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD LEND HIMSELF TO A TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE. BUT IF PERES LED THE NEXT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, IT WOULD TAKE ANOTHER YEAR TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE JORDAN APPROACH WAS BANKRUPT. BY THEN, THE GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF WOULD BE SPENDING THEIR TIME PUTTING DOWN RIOTS ON THE WEST BANK.

3. IN RESPONSE TO DAYAN'S QUESTION (PARA 1) I SAID THAT UNILATERAL AUTONOMY WAS SOMETHING FOR WHICH ISRAEL DID NOT NEED THE AGREEMENT OF OTHERS. AS AN INTERIM MEASURE IT WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. BUT IT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO SECURE A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT. IF YOU WISH ME TO ADD OR TO QUALIFY THIS, I SHALL HAVE A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER THE GROUND WITH HIM SHORTLY. THE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF DAYAN'S IDEA GETTING OFF THE GROUND. IT IS ILL-DEFINED, AND THERE IS LITTLE SUPPORT FOR IT IN ISRAEL. BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR TO CONDEMN IT.

ROBINSON

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LIMITED
NENAD PS/MR HURD
MED PS/MR RIDLEY
NAD PS/PUS
UND SIR J GRAHAM
PUSD MR J C MOBERLY
NEWS D MR DAY
PS MR HARDING
PS/LPS CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 550

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DAMASCUS 091130Z JAN 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 12 9-1-81

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, ROUTINE: JEDDA KUWAIT TEL AVIV, CAIRO

SAVING TO C-G JERUSALEM ABU DHABI, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS N.Y.

SYRIA/JORDAN/PALESTINIANS

1. THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ABDUL HALIM KHADDAM, GAVE AN IMPASSIONED SPEECH ON 8 JANUARY, REPRODUCED IN FULL IN THE SYRIAN PRESS, AT THE CELEBRATION IN DAMASCUS OF THE 16TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION, ATTENDED ALSO BY FARUQ QADDOUMI, HEAD OF THE PLO POLITICAL OFFICE. HE ATTACKED JORDAN IN THE STRONGEST TERMS. THE FOLLOWNG IS A SUMMARY.

2. KHADDAM PLEDGED SYRIA'S UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION. THE REVOLUTION DEMANDED PATIENCE AND HARD WORK, NOT THE PURSUIT OF MATERIALISM, WHICH WAS THE ROAD TO SETTLEMENTS WHICH DEPRIVED THE PALESTINIANS OF THEIR RIGHTS. SYRIA FOUGHT FOR A PEACE WHICH DENIED ZIONISM A PRESENCE IN PALESTINE. CAMP DAVID, SADAT'S TREACHERY AND AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE ALL THREATENED THE PALESTIANS. IMPERIALISM HAD NEW AGENTS IN AMMAN STUDYING THEIR ALLOTTED ROLE IN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE THROUGH THE SO-CALLED JORDAN OPTION. IMPERIALISM AND ITS AGENTS BELIEVED THAT BY A FEW ASSASSINATIONS HERE AND THERE SYRIA COULD BE WEAKENED. AMERICA WAS TRYING TO STIR UP MARGINAL CONFLICTS IN THE ARAB WORLD TO FACILITATE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHLESTINIAN CAUSE AND IT HAD SUCCEEDED WITH IRAQ. THE IRAQI REGIME HAD NO MERCY ON ITS PEOPLE. SYRIA HAD FOUGHT FOR ARAB SOLIDARITY, ESPECIALLY WITH THE IRAQI AND JORDANIAN REGIMES, BUT NOW THE EXTENT OF THEIR COMPLICITY WITH IMPERIALISM WAS APPARENT.

/3. SYRIA

Para 3 overleaf is a depressing summary of Syrian attitudes towards Jordan.

MP

3. SYRIA HAD FORGIVEN THE JORDANIAN REGIME ITS LONG HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND ITS BUTCHERY OF THOUSANDS OF NATIONALISTS AND PALESTINIANS. THE REGIME WAS A STRANGE ONE, IMPORTED FROM OUTSIDE JORDAN TO BE IN THE POCKET OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN. SYRIA HAD TAKEN UPON ITSELF THE BURDEN OF ALL THE ARAB NATION, AND THROUGH THE STRENGTH OF ITS ARMED FORCES COULD MOVE IN ANY DIRECTION. ''OUR PEOPLE IN JORDAN MAY BE CONFIDENT THAT MOTHER SYRIA WILL NOT LEAVE THEM FROM TODAY TO SUFFER UNDER THE BURDEN OF THE BLACK REGIME'' WHICH SERVED THE ENEMY. SYRIA WOULD NOT DESERT ITS BROTHERS IN AMMAN, JERASH, MA'AN, KERAK AND AQABA. SYRIA WOULD NOT BE STOPPED BY THE LINES AND BORDERS DRAWN BY BRITISH COLONIALISM AND WOULD EXTEND ITS HAND TO ITS PEOPLE IN JORDAN SO THAT JORDAN WOULD RETURN TO BE A BASE FOR THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION.

4. THE JORDANIAN REGIME SHOULD KNOW THAT IF IT CONTINUED ITS CONSPIRACY THEN IT SHOULD NOT HENCEFORTH LOOK TO BE SAVED BY MEDIATION.

5. SYRIA WAS WITH THE BELOVED PEOPLE OF LEBANON AND FOR LEBANESE NATIONAL UNITY. SYRIA WOULD ALLOW NO-ONE TODAY TO REALISE THE DREAMS WHICH THEY WERE UNABLE TO REALISE UNDER FRENCH COLONIALISM. SYRIA WAS STRONG AND READY TO CARRY OUT ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. LEBANESE UNITY WAS NOT UP FOR NEGOTIATION. THERE WOULD BE NO DIVISION OR FEDERATION, NO CONFEDERATION, BUT ONLY ONE ARAB LEBANON. SYRIA WOULD DEFEND THE PALESTINIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON AGAINST ISRAEL. PALESTINIAN BLOOD WAS SYRIAN BLOOD. THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE CONFIDENT AND PURSUE THEIR LONG PATIENT STRUGGLE. THE ARAB MASSES AND THE SOCIALIST BLOC, LED BY THEIR FRIEND SOVIET UNION, WERE WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND SYRIA IN THEIR TASK. THEY WOULD FIGHT ON UNTIL THE FLAG OF FREEDOM AND DIGNITY FLEW OVER EVERY INCH OF PALESTINE.

6.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO C-G JERUSALEM, ABU DHABI, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS N.Y.

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INFO SAVING JERUSALEM

MY TELNO 31 (NOT TO UKMIS NEW YORK) : US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

1. IN THE EVENT SAUNDERS LEFT LAST NIGHT FOR ALGIERS WITH WARREN CHRISTOPHER FOR IRANIAN HOSTAGE DISCUSSIONS. WE HAVE SPOKEN INSTEAD TO STERNER AND CONSTABLE (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARIES).

2. WHAT THEY SAID CONFIRMS THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S MIDDLE EAST THINKING IS STILL FAR FROM CRYSTALLISED. ATTEMPTS BY MIDDLE EASTERN GOVERNMENTS TO DERIVE INDICATIONS OF FUTURE POLICY FROM KISSINGER'S PRONOUNCEMENTS, CAMPAIGN RHETORIC, PRESS ARTICLES AND COMMENTS BY AMERICAN PERSONALITIES INTERESTED IN EITHER CAUSES OR JOBS ARE UNDERSTANDABLE BUT NOT PARTICULARLY PROFITABLE. STERNER (WHO, LIKE ALL SENIOR OFFICIALS DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST, ADMITS TO NO PRIVILEGED INSIGHTS INTO THE MIND OF REAGAN OR HAIG) CITED THE FOLLOWING AS EVIDENCE OF THIS LACK OF POLICY DEFINITION SO FAR:

A) HAIG HAS CONSIDERABLE EXPERTISE IN GLOBAL STRATEGIC AND EUROPEAN QUESTIONS, BUT LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

A) HAIG HAS CONSIDERABLE EXPERTISE IN GLOBAL STRATEGIC AND EUROPEAN QUESTIONS, BUT LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST. HE IS UNLIKELY TO ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE BOUNCED IN SUCH AN IMPORTANT AREA.

B) UNLIKE MOST OTHER BUREAUX IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE NEAR EAST BUREAU HAS STILL HAD NO INDICATION OF ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED TO BE SERIOUS REPUBLICAN POLICY THINKING. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT THIS IS DUE NOT TO THE MAINTENANCE OF SECRECY OVER SOME WELL THOUGHT-OUT PLAN BUT TO RECOGNITION OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT.

C) THE MEMBERS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT TRANSITION TEAM THEORETICALLY ASSIGNED TO MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS LEFT NO IMPRINT. THE TEAM WHICH HAIG IS STARTING TO BUILD UP AS YET CONTAINS NOBODY QUALIFIED TO FORMULATE POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

D) IT IS ALMOST INEVITABLE THAT BEGIN AND SADAT, NOT TO MENTION HUSSEIN AND POSSIBLY FAHD, WILL BE EARLY VISITORS TO WASHINGTON. THE NEW ADMINISTRATION CAN BE EXPECTED TO WISH TO HEAR THEM OUT BEFORE TAKING ANY IMPORTANT DECISIONS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS LIKELY ALSO TO RECOMMEND TO HAIG THAT HE UNDERTAKE A PROMPT TOUR OF THE AREA HIMSELF BEFORE THE FIRST VISITORS TURN UP.

3. THE FORMAL POSITION ON THE AUTONOMY TALKS NOW IS THAT THERE WILL AFTER ALL BE A TRILATERAL OFFICIAL LEVEL MEETING BEFORE THE INAUGURATION. (THIS HAS BEEN ARRANGED BECAUSE OF THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION TO COMMIT ITSELF TO THE MEETING FORMERLY PROPOSED FOR LATE JANUARY). THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNOW OF NO REPUBLICAN PLANS TO APPOINT A SUCCESSOR TO LINOWITZ; AND THE MATTER IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT LINOWITZ SENIOR DEPUTY, LEONARD, WILL ALSO RESIGN WITH THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION (FOR PERSONAL NOT POLITICAL REASONS). KEEPING CAMP DAVID TICKING CONVINCINGLY WHILE AWAITING THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS MAY NOT, THEREFORE, BE ALL THAT EASY.

CO PASS SAVING JERUSALEM.

HENDERSON

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A number of interesting points. Read in full.

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S AUDIENCE WITH THE KING

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD AN AUDIENCE WITH KING HASSAN IN MARRAKESH YESTERDAY EVENING.

2. THE KING WAS PERSUADED THAT EUROPE HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY ON THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT THERE COULD BE NO SOLUTION WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. EUROPE SHOULD THINK OF WAYS TO ENGINEER THIS, EG BY A NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE. THERE COULD BE NO PAX AMERICANA, OR EURO-AMERICAN PEACE IN THE AREA SEMI-COLON THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED. MOSCOW MIGHT EVEN BE INTERESTED IN A BARGAIN, WHEREBY A FACE-SAVING SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS TRADED AGAINST SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT NOTHING WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNTIL BEGIN WENT. LOGICIALLY, THE ISRAELIS FACED A STARK CHOICE: EITHER THEY SHOULD BOMB ARAB CAPITALS IMMEDIATELY, OR BEGIN THE PEACE PROCESS. IF THEY DELAYED A DECISION FOR A FEW MORE YEARS, IT WOULD BE TOO LATE, SINCE SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD BY THAT TIME POSSESS ATOMIC WEAPONS. ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION WAS INCREASINGLY IN FAVOUR OF A SETTLEMENT.

3. KING HUSSEIN WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, FAVOUR A FEDERAL SOLUTION. THE SIX AND A HALF MILLION PALESTINIANS, WITH THEIR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTACTS, WOULD DROWN THE TWO AND A HALF MILLION JORDANIANS, AND KING HUSSEIN HIMSELF WOULD BE SWALLOWED UP. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A PALESTINIAN STATE SEMI-COLON THE PALESTINIANS WOULD ACCEPT ANY AREA, PROVIDED THEY HAD A HARBOUR.

4. THE KING RESERVED COMMENT ON KISSINGER'S RECENT DECLARATIONS UNTIL HE SAW HIM IN A FEW DAYS TIME. KISSINGER WAS IN THE HABIT OF TYING KNOTS ONLY TO UNTIE THEM HIMSELF. IT WAS NO GOOD REVERTING TO TALK OF A STEP BY STEP SOLUTION: A GIANT STEP FORWARD WAS NOW NEEDED. THE SITUATION HAD NOW BECOME RATHER SILLY: IT WAS LARGELY A QUESTION OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE PLO. EUROPE SHOULD PROMOTE A SOLUTION WHEREBY THE PLO RECOGNISED ISRAEL, IN RETURN FOR ISRAELI RECOGNITION OF THE PLO'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS. THIS COULD BE GUARANTEED BY THE EUROPEANS.

5. THE KING THOUGHT THAT THE SITUATION IN SYRIA WAS CRITICAL. HOWEVER, ASAD WAS PREPARED TO RETREAT WITH HIS ARMY TO THE NORTHERN MOUNTAINS, WHENCE HE SPRANG, AND WHICH HE HAD BEEN CAREFULLY DEVELOPING, IN THE EVENT OF A CIVIL WAR. HE TOLD LORD CARRINGTON IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE SAUDIS HAD PAID THE SYRIANS 300 MILLION POUNDS TO CALL OFF THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE JORDANIANS.

6. LORD CARRINGTON ENQUIRED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OVER THE SPANISH SAHARA. THE KING CLAIMED THAT MILITARILY THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED WITHIN TEN DAYS. POLITICALLY IT MIGHT TAKE RATHER LONGER. A DEVICE WAS NEEDED - NOT NECESSARILY A REFERENDUM - TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE ALGERIANS NOW REALISED THAT MOROCCO WAS NOT PREPARED TO SURRENDER A SQUARE INCH OF SPANISH SAHARA AND PRESIDENT CHADLI WAS SHOWING MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE MOROCCAN POSITION. AGAIN SPEAKING

IN CONFIDENCE, BE MENTIONED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SERIES OF TOP LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE ALGERIANS. THE LIBYANS HAD MADE ENORMOUS MISTAKES IN THIS AND IN OTHER AREAS, FROM WHICH THE MOROCCANS, AMONGST OTHERS, WERE NOW BENEFITTING. THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN CHAD WOULD REBOUND AGAINST THEM, AND MOROCCO WAS NOT ALONE IN LOOKING FORWARD TO WATCHING THE LIBYANS SINK INTO A VIETNAM-TYPE BOG, AS THE PEOPLE OF CHAD ACCUSED GOUKOUNI OF SELLING THEM OUT TO TRIPOLI. GADAFFI'S LATEST MISTAKE HAD BEEN TO PROCLAIM UNION BETWEEN LIBYA AND CHAD.

7. THE KING SOUGHT LORD CARRINGTON'S HELP IN CONNECTION WITH NIGERIAN ATTITUDES TO LIBYA, AND TO THE PROBLEM OF THE SPANISH SAHARA. IN HIS VIEW THERE WERE TWO GROUPS IN THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT, ONE OF WHICH FAVOURED THE LIBYANS, AND WAS BEING SECRETLY SUBSIDISED BY THEM (HE MENTIONED THE NIGERIAN DEFENCE MINISTER AMONGST OTHERS). LORD CARRINGTON MENTIONED THAT, JUDGING BY THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE EXPULSION OF LIBYAN DIPLOMATS, THE NIGERIANS WERE BEGINNING TO GET THE MESSAGE.

8. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD THAT THE AWARD OF THE DAVY LOEWY (NADOR) CONTRACT HAD ADDED SUBSTANCE TO ANGLO-MOROCCAN RELATIONS, AND MENTIONED THAT THE PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD RELAXED RESTRICTIONS ON ARMS SALES TO MOROCCO. THE KING SAID THAT BRITISH FIRMS HAD HIGH QUALITY WEAPONS, AND THAT HE HOPED THAT DISCUSSIONS IN THIS AREA WOULD CONTINUE.

9. THE KING STRESSED AT SEVERAL POINTS THAT HE HOPED THAT CONTACTS BETWEEN US WOULD BE MAINTAINED AND DEVELOPED, INCLUDING IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD. HE MENTIONED THAT HE WOULD BE ATTENDING THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN MECCA ON 22 JANUARY, AND THAT HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY MESSAGE LORD CARRINGTON WISHED TO SEND HIM BEFORE THAT DATE. BRITAIN HAD IN THE PAST BEEN SOMETHING OF A PRISONER OF THE COMMONWEALTH. HE WELCOMED HER RENEWED INTEREST IN FRENCH-SPEAKING NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES. LORD CARRINGTON TRANSMITTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S GOOD WISHES, AND STRESSED HOW MUCH THE QUEEN HAD ENJOYED HER VISIT TO MOROCCO.

10. THE KING REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY TO LORD CARRINGTON, AND HIS CONFIDENCE SHOULD OF COURSE BE FULLY RESPECTED.

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KISSINGER PRESS CONFERENCE

1. DR KISSINGER GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE IN JERUSALEM (FULL TEXT BY BAG) IMMEDIATELY BEFORE LEAVING ISRAEL TODAY.

EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

2. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ON EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT ''TAKING THE AREA AS A WHOLE, THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE CANNOT BE SEPARATED.... THE ISSUES PRESENT THEMSELVES ANALOGOUSLY FOR EACH SIDE, THEREFORE I CONSIDER IT IMPROBABLE THAT THERE CAN BE TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES THAT ARE BOTH CORRECT. ONE OF THESE

EACH SIDE, THEREFORE I CONSIDER IT IMPROBABLE THAT THERE CAN BE TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES THAT ARE BOTH CORRECT. ONE OF THESE APPROACHES IS LIKELY TO BE WRONG.''

3. EUROPE AND THE US SHOULD THEREFORE ADOPT A CO-ORDINATED MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND SETTLE ''WHATEVER DISAGREEMENTS EXIST BEFORE THEY APPROACH THE MIDDLE EAST NATIONS, BECAUSE IF THERE ARE TWO SEPARATE APPROACHES IT IS BOUND TO CREATE TEMPTATIONS TO PLAY OFF EUROPE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. IT MAY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR ARAB NATIONS, FOR ISRAEL, TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION BECAUSE THEY DO NOT KNOW IN RELATION TO WHAT SCHEME IT IS BEING MADE.''

4. DR KISSINGER ADDED THAT HE HAD REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR HIS ''DISAGREEMENT''WITH THE ''SPECIFICS'' OF THE EUROPEAN ''DECISION'' (WHICH WAS) BASED ON THE THEORY THAT IF ''WE COULD ONLY GET A PALESTINIAN STATE QUICKLY, OR RELATIVELY QUICKLY, ALL THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS WOULD BE ERASED OR DISAPPEAR. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THIS IS CORRECT. I THINK THERE ARE MANY ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS.... SEPARATE FROM THE ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. NOR DO I THINK THAT THE BEST APPROACH FOR THEM IS THE WAY OF THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AND I DO NOT SEE HOW IT CAN GO ON INDEFINITELY THAT WE INSIST ON UNITED DEFENCE BUT SEPARATE FOREIGN POLICIES. THAT CANNOT GO ON.''

Was it?

AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS

5. DR KISSINGER:
A) EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF EGYPT'S ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS. WHILE HE CONTINUED TO FAVOUR JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION, IT ''HAD TO BE BROUGHT INTO RELATIONSHIP'' WITH THE EGYPTIAN ROLE IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS. JORDAN HAD TO BE ''BUILT INTO'' THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ''JORDANIAN OPTION'' AND THE AUTONOMY TALKS SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS ALTERNATIVES.
B) DISCLAIMED ANY INTENTION OF URGING MIDDLE EAST LEADERS TO ADOPT ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION OR OF PREPARING HIS OWN PLAN. HE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS AS A FRAMEWORK FOR A SETTLEMENT. JORDAN COULD BE INCORPORATED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK ''AT SOME POINT''. HE HOPED THAT WHEN NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN ''SERIOUSLY'' AGAIN, AND AFTER MR REAGAN HAD MET SADAT AND BEGIN, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO FORM AN OPINION ON THE MOST PROMISING APPROACH. BUT HE WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN HE HAD BEEN BEFORE VISITING THE AREA.

US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

6. AFTER REFERRING TO RECENT SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, ETHIOPIA AND IN SUPPORT OF THE LIBYANS, AND TO SCEPTICISM AMONG MIDDLE EAST LEADERS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE, KISSINGER:

A) SUGGESTED THAT ''SOME VISIBLE AMERICAN PRESENCE.... ALONG THE LINES OF THE FACILITIES.... ALREADY NEGOTIATED BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'' SHOULD BE PLACED ON ''THIS PERIMETER''. THIS WOULD AT LEAST INDICATE THAT ''WE ARE THERE AND THAT ATTACKING KEY COUNTRIES IS NOT A MATTER IN WHICH THE US CAN BE SISINTERESTED''. THE US ALSO NEEDED A STRATEGIC DOCTRINE WHICH ENABLED HER TO BE ''RELEVANT TO THESE CRISES, TOGETHER WITH OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER''. HE WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT LARGE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. WHAT WERE NEEDED WERE FACILITIES FROM WHICH AIR, NAVAL, AND PERHAPS ''SMALL, SPECIALISED GROUND UNITS'' COULD OPERATE. THEIR SIZE REQUIRED TECHNICAL STUDY. BUT A SERIOUS EFFORT HAD TO BE MADE.

B) SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE AN AMIRICAN PRESENCE AT ETZION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT.

SOVIET RESPONSE

7. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE SOVIET RESPONSE, KISSINGER SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD NOT DO ''MUCH MORE'' THAN THEY HAD ALREADY DONE. ''WE CANNOT REFRAIN FROM DOING WHAT IS NECESSARY BECAUSE WE ARE MESMERISED BY THE ILLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS CAN DO ANYTHING THEY WANT AND WE CAN DO NOTHING''.

ROBINSON

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Middle East Defence Sales MODBA

Top Copy: Middle East Defence Sales.

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Prime Minister (2)

A timely & useful discussion.

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RECORD OF A CALL BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS ON SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN ZAID, CROWN PRINCE OF ABU DHABI AND DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE UAE ARMED FORCES IN ABU DHABI ON 6 JANUARY 1981

Present:

The Rt Hon David Howell MP

The Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP

Sir Ron Ellis,
Head of Defence Sales

Sir Frederick Page,
Chairman British Aerospace
(Aircraft Division)

HE Mr David Roberts CMG CVO

Lt Colonel R Jury MVO

Mr C T W Humfrey

HE Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid

HE Rashid Abdulla,
Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs

HE Dr Mana' Said al Otaiba,
Minister for Petroleum

Colonel Muhammad Said al Badi,
Chief of Staff

Mr Zaki Nusseibeh,
Interpreter

1. Mr Hurd said that he remembered his talk with Shaikh Khalifa the previous year about security cooperation between the Gulf states. There had obviously been good progress since then, including, he understood, at the recent Amman Summit. Were the proposals put forward by Kuwait at Amman for Gulf cooperation likely to develop into the defence field? Shaikh Khalifa said that he was very pleased with the steps which had been taken. They had long been sought by the UAE which was glad to see them taking concrete shape. Two conditions were needed to make progress. First, the political interest in the Gulf states should be maintained and, second, that a full time staff should be established.

2. Mr Hurd said that we were anxious to see such cooperation succeed. We were glad to have had quick consultations with the UAE after the outbreak of the Iran/Iraq war and to have arranged visits by General Perkins and Mr Moberly. We wanted our friendship to have a practical and modern aspect. Shaikh Khalifa said that they were very glad to have had these consultations and to feel that they had a long-lasting and concrete friendship with us. This cooperation had now to be developed. Mr Hurd said that the present British Government were trying to play a more active role in the Middle East. It was very important at this time when there was a new US Administration, whose ideas we still had to discover. It had just been agreed that Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington would visit Washington in February. They both hoped to discuss the Middle East with the new US Administration. These would be

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the first discussions between President Reagan and a new European Head of Government.

3. Shaikh Khalifa hoped that the new Reagan administration would be even-handed in their dealings in the Middle East. Mr Hurd said that we hoped that we might be able to help in that direction. Mrs Thatcher had asked him to say that, if Shaikh Zaid agreed and convenient dates could be found, she would like to visit the UAE in Spring, in April. Shaikh Khalifa immediately replied that without having to refer to his father he could say that the Prime Minister would always be welcome. Mr Hurd said that he knew Mrs Thatcher was anxious to see the UAE for herself and discuss some of these questions. Shaikh Khalifa said that they would attach great importance to her visit and only wanted to be told when it would be. Mr Hurd said that we would discuss dates through our Ambassador.

4. Mr Hurd said that in this context of trying to make our friendship modern and practical, the Prime Minister had asked him to mention the Hawk negotiations. He understood that there was a choice to be made and we did not claim a monopoly of supply. But it might become difficult for us to pursue ideas and cooperation if we felt that all the UAE's main procurement policies were directed to other countries and we were left with nothing substantial. He would not have dared say this nor would the Prime Minister have asked him to, if we did not believe that Hawk was a superior aircraft and that the proposals that we had made and could make regarding it would meet the UAE's requirements. Shaikh Khalifa said that the UAE was also very keen that bilateral cooperation should continue and strengthen in all fields, especially military. They were presently studying the purchase of aircraft to meet both training and jet interceptor requirements. He was grateful for and appreciative of British interest and goodwill. He was sure that Mr Hurd would not have raised the matter if he did not consider that Hawk would meet the UAE's requirements. Mr Hurd said that Sir Ronald Ellis and Sir Frederick Page, as the experts, could continue discussions with the UAE's technical experts immediately after the meeting. We believed that "the customer was always right", and that we could meet the UAE's technical requirements when these were known. On training, we believed that the offers we had made were unique and could not be matched, for example the offer of a place at our Central Flying School which had a high reputation. The training of an instructor there would enable Abu Dhabi to begin its own training. If there were any particular points on training, they should let us know. The Prime Minister had instructed that we should do our best to meet any particular suggestions which the UAE might like to raise about training, additional to those already included in our offer.

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5. Shaikh Khalifa readily agreed that his Chief of Staff should discuss with our experts. He asked whether the rumour was true that we had stopped producing the Jaguar aircraft. Sir Frederick Page said that it was not. The Jaguar was very much in production for a number of countries and had been selected for licensed production. There were regular deliveries of the aircraft from British Aerospace's Wharton Division and the French Air Force were still taking deliveries. We would be delivering for several years and commitments extended to the end of this century. HMG had authorised a number of developments of the aircraft. He would be happy to discuss the details with the Chief of Staff. Shaikh Khalifa encouraged this and said that he would be kept informed. He asked about reports of accidents to Jaguar in Oman. Sir Frederick Page said that there had been one case where faulty equipment load had been used resulting in an accident, but the equipment had not been supplied by the UK. Jaguar's record had been good. It used the same basic well proven engine as the Hawk so that there was commonality. The Omanis had been so pleased with the results that they had re-ordered the aircraft. Mr Hurd said that Sultan Qaboos's recent order for a third squadron of Jaguar was the best compliment that could be paid it. Shaikh Khalifa said that he had seen Jaguar on a demonstration flight and had been impressed by it. Mr Hurd asked what the timing would be for a decision on aircraft purchase. Shaikh Khalifa said that a decision would be made quite soon. His experts needed to consider the matter further. A decision had been deferred until his return from Pakistan. He was particularly keen to develop the Air Force including training. He hoped that, as soon as a decision had been made, we could keep the salesmen from him!

6. Turning to the Iran/Iraq war, Mr Hurd said that we saw a military stalemate with fighting continuing, but not particularly intense. No military breakthrough seemed likely by either side. Shaikh Khalifa thought that the really important factor would be whether either side received new supplies of arms. Had the Soviet Union been delivering such supplies? Mr Hurd said that our information was that the Iraqis were displeased with the Soviet Union's performance. They had been receiving deliveries of some arms which had been ordered earlier from the Soviet Union and France, but nothing extra. The Iranians had been looking in the international arms market but had found nothing substantial. The Iranians' foolishness in holding the US hostages had lost them friends. Shaikh Khalifa believed that both sides were feeling exhausted but that the Iranians were the weaker because they had made enemies of everyone. He regretted the destruction in both countries. He had heard that the Iranians had only eight aircraft remaining. Mr Hurd said that we thought they had more aircraft than that though they never got more than fifty per cent of their Air Force into the air and had suffered losses. They were still flying some forty sorties a day, though these tended to be hit and run rather than intensive attacks. They were having increasin

/difficulty

difficulty in getting their Phantoms into the air. Mr Howell added that we thought the Iranian Air Force was still a threat to the oil installations in Iraq.

7. In conclusion, Shaikh Khalifa said that he had been particularly pleased to welcome two British Ministers to the UAE.

(Nicholas Fenn)
8/1

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 1 JANUARY
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AND KHARTOUM.

VISIT TO EGYPT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

1. ON THE EVE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATES VISIT TO EGYPT I OFFER THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS HE WILL FIND HERE.

2. THE INTERNAL SCENE REMAINS QUIET. EGYPTIANS ARE HAPPY THAT THEY CONTINUE TO BE SPARED THE TROUBLES AFFLICTING OTHER AREAS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, FROM IRAN TO MOROCCO: AND THE AUTHORITIES MISS NO OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASISE THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE PROBLEMS OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES AND THE TRANQUILLITY AND RELATIVE PROSPERITY PREVAILING IN EGYPT. WHILE IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO SAY THAT THE SADAT REGIME IS OVERWHELMINGLY POPULAR - THE EUPHORIA BROUGHT BY THE PEACE TREATY HAS LONG SINCE EVAPORTED - THERE IS NOT SIGN OF WIDESPREAD DESCONTENT. SADAT IS ABLE TO RULE WITH A RELATIVELY LIGHT HAND, AND EVENTO TOLERATE SOME OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS HE HAS SET UP. ONLY OCCASIONALLY DOES HE HAVE TO RESORT TO A 99% REFERENDUM OR POLITICAL ARRESTS AND RESTRICTIONS. THOUGH THE PRESS IS TAME COMMENT IS VERY FREE. THE MOST WIDESPREAD, AND JUSTIFIED, CRITICISMS OF HIS REGIME ARE OF FAVOURITISM AND CORRUPTION IN HIGH PLACES AND OF THE ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT WHICH HAS CAUSED A HIGH RATE OF INFLATION, EXTENSIVE SHORTAGES AND BLACK MARKETEERING. CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICIES HAV ALLOWED THE NEW PRIVATE SECTOR OF SOCIETY TO GET RICHER WHILE THE MAJORITY SEE THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING DETERIORATING. THIS AND THE FAST GROWTH IN WESTERN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL PENETRATION HAVE GENERATED ENVY, RESENTMENT AND A DEGREE OF RELIGIOUS REACTION. BUT NONE OF THESE PROBLEMS HAS REACHED BOILING POINT, NOR, AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE, HAVE THEY SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED THE LOYALTY OF THE ARMED FORCES OR THE HIGHLY EFFICIENT SECURITY APPARATUS ON WHOM THE REGIME ULTIMATELY DEPENDS.

3. THE MAIN CENTRES OF DISSENT ARE THE LEFTISTS AND THE RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS. THE FORMER, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE INHERITED THE MANTLE OF NASSERISM AND MAKE AS MUCH AS THEY CAN OF EGYPT'S PRESENT ISLOATION AND (IN THEIR VIEW) SUBSERVIENCE TO AMERICAN INTERESTS, ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE. TOO MANY PEOPLE STILL REMEMBER THE ARBITRARY ARRESTS, THE RUSSIANS, THE AUSTERITY, AND THE WARS.

4. THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS ARE MORE INFLUENTIAL, PARTICULARY AMONG THE YOUNG, AND THE GOVERNMENT TREATS THEM WITH CONSIDERABLE CIRCUMSPECTION. INDEED THE HISTORY OF EGYPTAIN INTERNAL LEGISLATION OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS HAS BEEN A SORT OF CREEPING SURRENDER TO THEIR DEMANDS. ISLAMIC LAW IS TO BE THE BASIS OF EGYPTIAN LAW, ISLAMIC BANKS HAVE BEEN SET UP, TOWNS, AND WHOLE PROVINCES, HAVE FOR PERIODS GONE DRY, BIRTH CONTROL CAMPAIGNS HAVE RUN INTO THE SAND. THIS POLICY OF SLOW APPEASEMENT HAS ALARMED THE CHRISTIAN MINORITY BUT HAS KEPT THE PRESSURE FOR WHOLESALE ISLAMIC REFORM DOWN TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL WHILE PERMITTING THE DRIVE FOR WESTERN STYLE ECONOMIC GROWTH TO CONTINUE.

5. I JUDGE IT WOULD NEED A CONJUNCTION OF ADVERSE EVENTS AND INCIDENTS, AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF STRONG ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES, TO PRODUCE A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE REGIME. MOST EGYPTIANS STILL FEEL THAT SADAT IS THE BEST RULER THEY ARE LIKELY TO GET. OVER THE PAST YEAR HE HAS GOT AWAY WITH A NUMBER OF ACTIONS, LIKE GIVING ASYLUM TO THE SHAH AND SOLICITING THE DEPOLOYMENT OF AMERICAN FORCES TO EGYPT, THAT MOST OBSERVERS EXPECTED TO CAUSE TROUBLE. BUT HIS TOUCH DOES NOT SEEM QUITE AS SURE AS IT WAS, AND HE BADLY NEEDS AN ADVISER WITH THE COURAGE TO SPEAK FRANKLY TO HIM ABOUT THE REGIME'S MORE VULNERABLE POINTS.

6. THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY IS DOING REMARKABLY WELL. FOREIGN EARNING IN 1980 WILL TOTAL NEARLY US DOLLARS 9 BILLION (COMPARED WITH US DOLLARS 5.6 MILLION ON 1979) SO THAT EGYPT'S EXTERNAL TRADE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS, WILL BE IN APPROXIMATE BALANCE. THE CHIEF SOURCES OF THIS IMPROVEMENT HAVE BEEN OIL EXPORTS AND REMITTANCES FROM EGYPTIANS WORKING OVERSEAS BUT THE SUEZ CANAL AND TOURISM HAVE PROVIDED VALUABLE, AND BUOYANT CONTRIBUTIONS. THANKS LARGELY TO THIS HEALTHY EXTERNAL SECTOR EGYPT BOASTS AN ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF ABOUT 10%, AND SOME OF THIS INCREASED PROSPERITY DOES SEEM TO BE TRICKLING DOWN TO THE NEEDIER STRATA OF SOCIETY, ON THE DEBIT SIDE THE MAJOR PROBLEMS ARE INFLATION, WHICH NOW STANDS AT ABOUT 25% (OVER 30% FOR FOODSTUFFS), A SUBSIDY SYSTEM FOR BASIC COMMODITIES WHICH NOW COSTS THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT US DOLLARS 3 BILLION PER YEAR AND WHOSE DISTORTIVE AND DISINCENTIVE EFFECTS GROW STEADILY WORSE, INADEQUATE INVESTMENT ESPECIALLY IN AGRICULTURE, AND AN EXTENSIVE ARRAY OF PRICE AND OTHER CONTROLS ADMINISTERED BY A VAST AND STULTIFYING BUREAUCRACY. THE MAIN ISSUE IN EGYPT TODAY IS NOT AN-ARABISM OR THE PALESTINE CAUSE BUT WHETHER THE COUNTRY CAN ACHIEVE, WITH WESTERN HELP AND BY HER OWN EFFORTS, THE SORT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH WHICH WILL SATISFY THE ASPIRATIONS OF HER BURGEONING POPULATION.

7. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ARE SADAT'S PRIVATE DOMAIN, THOUGH THEY DO NOT GET HIS CONTINUOUS ATTENTION. THERE IS NO SIGN OF A CHANGE OF DIRECTION OF TACTICS. THE ALLIANCE WITH THE US REMAINS CENTRAL TO HIS DOMESTIC AS WELL AS HIS FOREIGN POLICIES, AND THE DEFEAT OF HIS FRIEND JIMMY CARTER CAME AS A SEVERE PERSONAL BLOW. SADAT RELIES ON THE US FOR WEAPONS FOR HIS ARMED FORCES, TECHNOLOGY FOR HIS ECONOMY AND OVER DOLLARS ONE BILLION OF AID (INCLUDING A LOT OF FOOD AID) ANNUALLY FOR PRESENT CONSUMPTION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT.

/HE

HE VIEWS THE US AS AN INDISPENSABLE ALLY AGAINST A SOVIET PLOT TO STRANGLE EGYPT AND IS EAGER TO SEE EGYPT PLAY THE CENTRAL ROLE IN WESTERN PLANS FOR REGIONAL DEFENCE. AS PART OF HIS STRATEGY HE EVEN AIMS TO OVERTAKE THE INFLUENCE OF THE ISRAELI LOBBY IN WASHINGTON, AS A PREREQUISITE FOR A SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. HE SEEMS TO REGARD EUROPEAN INFLUENCE AS MARGINAL. HE CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN THAT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS REPRESENT THE ONLY VALID APPROACH TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, BECAUSE THEY EMBODY THE ONLY BINDING COMMITMENT THAT ISRAEL HAS EVER MADE. HE WILL, THEREFORE, DESPITE WIDESPREAD IF TACIT OPPOSITION IN EGYPT, CONTINUE TO NORMALISE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AT LEAST UNTIL THE REST OF SINAI IS RETURNED IN APRIL 1982. HE WILL NOT BE DETERRED BY THE OTHER ARABS, WHOM HE REGARDS AS WEAK AND MERCENARY (THE SAUDIS AND JORDAN), DANGEROUS AND CRAZY (LIBYA AND IRAQ) OR FACTIOUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE (SYRIA, THE PLO). FOR HIM THE PRESENT DISARRAY AMONG THE ARABS IN THE CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR OWN OSTRACISM OF THEIR NATURAL LEADER, EGYPT. HE IS WILLING TO TALK AGAIN TO THE MODERATES, AND TO HELP DEFEND THEM AGAINST SOVIET ENCROACHMENT, BUT ONLY ON HIS TERMS.

8. THOUGH THERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY UNEASE ACROSS A WIDE SPECTRUM OF EDUCATED OPINION ABOUT CERTAIN TRENDS IN SADAT'S FOREIGN POLICY - THE CONTINUING BREACH WITH THE OTHER ARABS, THE UNREQUITED CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL AND HIS OVER-IDENTIFICATION WITH THE UNITED STATES - HIS IS SUPPORTED BY A BROAD NATIONAL CONSENSUS. IF THE PRESIDENT WERE TO BE REMOVED TOMORROW BY ILLNESS OR A MADMAN'S BULLET VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT COULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE UP THE REINS WITHOUT DIFFICULTY, BUT LACKING SADAT'S AUTHORITY AND STYLE THEY WOULD PROBABLY FIND IT INCREASINGLY NECESSARY TO HEDGE THEIR BETS ON THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 003 OF 5 JANUARY

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO NAVON AND BEGIN

1. A DELEGATION OF THE CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL ARRIVED HERE LAST NIGHT FOR A WEEK'S VISIT. DELEGATION IS FOUR MPS, FIVE MEPS, FIDLER AND FOUR OTHERS. DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE DID NOT COME.

2. FIDLER READ AT THE AIRPORT ON ARRIVAL FROM A MESSAGE HE SAID HE BORE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO NAVON AND BEGIN. REPORTS OF THIS MESSAGE HAD ALREADY APPEARED IN THE ISRAELI WEEKEND PRESS. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SAID TO HAVE EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT THIS OFFICIAL VISIT OF THE CFI FOR A NINE-DAY FACT FINDING MISSION AND TO HAVE ADDED ''THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT''.

3. MY PREDECESSOR QUESTIONED FIDLER'S SUITABILITY TO LEAD FUTURE DELEGATIONS OF THIS KINDA A YEAR AGO. SEE ALSO MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 555. IN CONTRAST WITH OTHER UK PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATIONS WHOSE PROGRAMMES ARE ORGANISED BY ISRAELI PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES OR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL'S PROGRAMME IS ORGANISED BY THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANISTATION. IT INCLUDES A TOUR OF ''JUDEA AND SAMARIA'' WITH GENERAL SHARON INCLUDING THIS YEAR A VISIT TO A SETTLEMENT, A VISIT TO THE GOOD FENCE ''ISRAEL'S OPEN BORDER WITH SOUTHERN LEBANON'', A MEETING WITH MAJOR HADDAD AND A TOUR OF THE GOLAN AND THE GAZA STRIP, THE LATTER UNDER ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCE AUSPICES. THE ISRAELI PRESS ARE GIVING FULL PUBLICITY TO THE PROGRAMME AND SUGGESTS THAT THERE ARE TWENTYFIVE MPS IN THE DELEGATION.

ROBINSON [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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TO IMMEDIATEZFCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 006 OF 5 JANUARY
INFO PRIORITY CAIRO ROUTINE AMMAN JEDDA JERUSALEM WASHINGTON

CAIRO TELS NOS 832 AND 833 AND YOUR TEL NO 3 TO JEDDA:
MEETING WITH SADAT

1. WHEN SADAT SAYS THAT THE ONLY PROBLEM WITH PERES IS HIS ATTACHMENT TO THE JORDANIAN OPTION, AND THEN IT IS ONLY A QUESTION OF TIMING, HE IS KIDDING HIMSELF IF HE THINKS THIS IS A MINOR DIFFERENCE.

2. THE ISRAELI LABOUR PARTY WANTS THE JORDANIAN OPTION BECAUSE IT IS A WAY TO AVOID (OR AT LEAST AVOID RESPONSIBILITY FOR) A PALESTINIAN STATE. THIS CAME OUT VERY CLEARLY WHEN I SAW EBAN A WEEK AGO. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO OPTIONS FOR HUSSEIN: A CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO OR A SINGLE PALESTINIAN/JORDANIAN STATE, (WHICHEEBAN UNTRUTHFULLY SUGGESTED WOULD CONTAIN 90% OF PALESTINIANS). THERE COULD BE NO THIRD OPTION OF A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE. EBAN SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO SHARPEN UP THE CHOICE FOR KING HUSSEIN BY MAKING IT EVEN CLEARER THAT THERE

A WEEK AGO. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO OPTIONS FOR HUSSEIN: A CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO OR A SINGLE PALESTINIAN/JORDANIAN STATE, (WHICHEEBAN UNTRUTHFULLY SUGGESTED WOULD CONTAIN 90% OF PALESTINIANS). THERE COULD BE NO THIRD OPTION OF A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE. EBAN SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO SHARPEN UP THE CHOICE FOR KING HUSSEIN BY MAKING IT EVEN CLEARER THAT THERE WAS TO BE NO SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE. AND WHEN KHALIL SAYS HOW FORTHCOMING PERES WAS IN PRIVATE BECAUSE HE ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF TRUSTEESHIP ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, PERES DID NOT MEAN MORE THAN THE WEST BANK SHORN OF GREATER EAST JERUSALEM, THE JORDAN VALLEY AND ETZION, AND GAZA SHORN OF THE SOUTHERN END: AND HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT MAKE A LPEARATE PALESTINIAN STATE MORE LIKELY THAN WOULD SOVEREIGNTY VESTED IN AMMAN.

3. SEEN FROM TEL AVIV IT IS EVEN LESS EASY TO TAKE SADAT SERIOUSLY WHEN HE PROPOSES (PARA 3 OF CAIRO TELNO 833) ''EQUAL PRIORITY FOR JERUSALEM'' WITH THE GAZA FIRST IDEA, UNLESS HE MEANS NO MORE THAN FLAGS ON HOLY PLACES.

4. BUT IF SADAT HAS NOW CONCLUDED THAT HE MUST WAIT FOR A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL BEFORE NEGOTIATING AN AUNTONOMY AGREEMENT, HE IS TALKING ABOUT A FREEZE WUNTIL THE END OF THIS YEAR, AND CAN HARDLY THEN LOOK FOR AGREEMENT BEFORE THE FINAL SINAI WITHDRAWAL IN 1982.

5. THIS IS WHAT MANY ISRAELIS FEAR: THAT SADAT IS PLAYING THEM ALONG UNTIL APRIL 1982, OR THAT THEY WILL LOSE HIM TO HIS MAKER OR TO A MUBARAK: AND THAT EGYPTIAN POLICY WILL ON EITHER HYPOTHESIS THEN CHANGE. SOME SUGGEST THAT THIS OUGHT TO MAKE BEGIN EAGER TO REACH AGREEMENT QUICKLY. BUT BEGIN KNOWS THAT AN AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO HIM CANNOT BE REACHED. AS PROFESSOR ARENS TOLD ME THE OTHER DAY, IN 20 YEARS EITHER THE ISRAELI ARMY WILL BE WHERE IT IS TODAY OR THERE WILL BE A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE AS A FIRST STEP TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE ISRAELI STATE. IF THE AGREEMENT IS TO BE BETWEEN SADAT AND PERES, IT LOOKS LIKE HAVING TO RECONCILE SADAT'S DETERMINATION TO DEPRIVE HUSSEIN OF SPOILS AND PERES'S DETERMINATION THAT HUSSEIN WILL GET THE SPOILS, LESS EAST JERUSALEM ETC, (WHETHER OR NOT HUSSEIN CAN INDEFINITELY HOLD THEM).

ROBINSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 833 OF 31 DECEMBER

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INFO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, WASHINGTON.

Prime Minister

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT

I ACCOMPANIED MR EDWARD HEATH ON HIS CALL ON PRESIDENT SADAT AT HIS NATIVE VILLAGE OF MIT ABUL QOM. SADAT WAS IN GOOD FORM, IN A TALK LASTING WELL OVER AN HOUR, AND SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU. MUCH OF WHAT HE SAID WAS FAMILIAR STUFF, BUT THERE WERE SOME INTERESTING INSIGHTS INTO HIS IMMEDIATE PREOCCUPATIONS.

2. WE WERE STRUCK BY THE VEHEMENCE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO ANY ROLE FOR KING HUSSEIN. HAVING AGREED THAT HE EXPECTED NO PROGRESS UNTIL BEGIN'S DEPARTURE, SADAT SAID THE ONLY PROBLEM ABOUT PERES WAS HIS ATTACHMENT TO THE JORDANIAN OPTION. HE DID NOT OBJECT TO THE IDEA IN PRINCIPLE, ONLY TO THE TIMING. HUSSEIN'S REAL AMBITION WAS TO RECOVER THE WEST BANK, BUT IF HE JOINED THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW HE WOULD ONLY START ''AUCTIONEERING'' AND TRYING TO BUILD UP AN IMAGE FOR HIMSELF AS A HERO AND CHAMPION OF THE PALESTINIANS MORE CONCERNED FOR THEM THAN SADAT. (I HAVE NOT HEARD SUCH A FRANK ADMISSION BEFORE.) HE HAD THE SAME CRITICISM OF PALESTINIANS LIKE THE WEST BANK MAYORS, WHO WERE CHIEFLY INTERESTED IN PUBLICITY. THEY WOULD WRECK NEGOTIATIONS BY DEMANDING INSTANT INDEPENDENCE. SHAKA'A HAD RECENTLY ASKED TO COME TO EGYPT. HE WOULD BE ADMITTED BUT SADAT WOULD NOT DEAL WITH HIM.

3. ON SUBSTANCE, SADAT CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS STILL KEEN ON (HIS) IDEA OF GAZA FIRST, I.E. AFTER AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY FOR BOTH TERRITORIES. HE PROPOSED EQUAL PRIORITY FOR JERUSALEM IN ORDER TO SATISFY THE SAUDIS AND 800 MILLION MUSLIMS. ASKED WHETHER THE GAZANS WOULD PLAY BALL HE SAID AUTONOMY COULD BE IMPOSED ON THEM WHETHER THEY LIKED IT OR NOT. INDEED HE FAVOURED THE SUGGESTION (ALSO ORIGINALLY HIS) RECENTLY REPEATED BY DAYAN THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW HER FORCES UNILATERALLY AND LET THE PALESTINIANS GET ON WITH GOVERNING THEMSELVES. FOR SADAT MILITARY WITHDRAWAL PLUS FULL INTERNAL SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR 5 YEARS WAS THE ESSENCE OF THE AUTONOMY PLAN. PEOPLE HAD WANTED HIM TO GET INVOLVED IN ARRANGEMENTS COVERING LAND, WATER RESOURCES AND SO ON BUT HE HAD REFUSED: THIS WAS FOR THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES. (THIS IS TYPICAL OF SADAT'S OLYMPIAN VIEW OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND NOT OF COURSE LOGICALLY CONSISTENT WITH HIS INSISTENCE ON EGYPT'S PLAYING AN EXCLUSIVE ROLE UNTIL EVERYTHING IS WRAPPED UP.)

4. THE MOST INTERESTING PART OF SADAT'S REMARKS CONCERNED THE SAUDIS. THE REGIME WAS NOW SERIOUSLY ISOLATED, PRIVY TO BUT

/FEARFUL

FEARFUL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AGGRESSIONS, PAYING 500 MILLION DOLLARS TO ASAD TO KEEP HANDS OFF JORDAN, UNDER ATTACK FROM QADDHAFI, AND SO WEAK INTERNALLY THAT COLLAPSE COULD ONLY BE A MATTER OF TIME. STRICTLY ENTRE NOUS, THE SAUDIS HAD INDIRECTLY SENT TO SADAT A FORTNIGHT AGO A MESSAGE URGING HIM TO SETTLE FOR SINAI AND LEAVE IT TO KING HUSSEIN AND THE SYRIANS TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE SAME SUGGESTION HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM REAGAN'S PEOPLE. SADAT COULD NOT OF COURSE AGREE AS THIS WOULD BE AN ADMISSION THAT EGYPT HAD SIGNED A SEPARATE PEACE. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SAUDIS NEEDED A FACE-SAVING FORMULA TO ENABLE THEM TO JOIN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. IN VIEW OF THE SAUDIS LONG-STANDING RESPECT FOR BRITAIN HE INTENDED TO ASK LORD CARRINGTON TO TRY TO WORK OUT SOMETHING WITH THEM. ASKED IF HE HAD ANY IDEAS ON A FORMULA SADAT SAID IT WAS THE TERM CAMP DAVID THAT THE SAUDIS AND HUSSEIN HAD TO GET RID OF. AL RIGHT HE WAS NOT WEDDED TO THE TERM FOR ITS OWN SAKE AND COULD ACCEPT A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF THE PEACE PROCESS. PROVIDED IT DID NOT JEOPARDISE 242, NOR (PROMPTED BY MR HEATH) RISK LOSING THE ISRAELIS.

5. SADAT WAS FAIRLY LUKEWARM ABOUT THE EUROPEAN ROLE. HE SAID AS USUAL THAT HE HAD WELCOMED THE VENICE DECLARATION AND THORN'S MISSION. HE HOPED THE INITIATIVE WOULD SUCCEED BUT IT COULD NOT DO SO WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE UNITED STATES. ALSO THERE MUST BE NO TAMPERING WITH 242. HE HAD HAD TO STOP PREVIOUS MOVES IN THAT DIRECTION, BY GISCARD AND KREISKY AMONG OTHERS, THOUGH GISCARD'S POSITION HAD SINCE IMPROVED. IN THE CONTEXT OF GULF SECURITY SADAT REPEATED HIS FAMILIER OFFER OF BASE FACILITES IN EGYPT FOR EUROPEAN FORCES.

6. ALL THIS TENDS TO CONFIRM THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY EARLIER PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT SADAT SUSPECTS THAT AN ALTERNATIVE TO CAMP DAVID IS BEING COOKED UP BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN THE SAUDIES AND THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION. HE IS EVIDENTLY GROPING FOR SOME WAY OF GETTING ON THE BAND-WAGGON, OR RATHER OF GETTING THEM ON HIS. I DOUBT WHETHER HE ENVISAGES ANYTHING MORE NOVEL THAN AN OFFER OF PLACES AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE FOR THE MODERATE ARABS AFTER A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE AUTONOMY TALKS, WHICH HE ANTICIPATES WILL QUICKLY FOLLOW A LABOUR ELECTION VICTORY IN ISRAEL. IT WILL BE AS DIFFICULT AS EVER TO GET HIM TO BE MORE PRECISE OR PRACTICAL, BUT I THINK MR HEATH'S TALK HAS PROVIDED ONE OR TWO USEFUL CARDS OF ENTRY FOR YOUR FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH HIM.

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Prime Minister

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TELECON JOY/COUVELL - ARAB ISRAEL

1 LE SOIR OF 27 DECEMBER CARRIED A REPORT CONTAINING WHAT IT CLAIMED WERE THE CONTENTS OF A CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG ON 2 DECEMBER SETTING OUT A NUMBER OF OPTIONS TO BE PUT IN THE COMING MONTHS TO THE PARTIES IN THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT. THE REPORT EMPHASISES THAT THE DOCUMENT DOES NOT REPRESENT A SETTLEMENT PLAN BUT REFERS TO THE VARIOUS THEMES WHICH COULD BE CONTAINED IN ONE, CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION, MODALITIES AND GUARANTEES WHICH COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

2. THE DOCUMENT IS SAID TO CONTAIN FOUR MAIN THEMES: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SELF DETERMINATION FOR PALESTINIANS, SECURITY AND JERUSALEM. IT SAYS THAT IN THE NINE'S VIEW WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES AS ENVISAGED IN

2. THE DOCUMENT IS SAID TO CONTAIN FOUR MAIN THEMES: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SELF DETERMINATION FOR PALESTINIANS, SECURITY AND JERUSALEM. IT SAYS THAT IN THE NINE'S VIEW WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES AS ENVISAGED IN RESOLUTION 242 SHOULD BE TOTAL, RELATE TO ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN JUNE 1967, AND TAKE PLACE WITHIN A MAXIMUM OF TWO YEARS. A VARIETY OF PROPOSALS ARE PUT FORWARD FOR THE TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION OF THESE AREAS DURING THAT PERIOD.
THE DOCUMENT IS SAID TO PROVIDE FOR THE EVACUATION AND DISMANTLING OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITH THE POSSIBLE EXEPTION OF SOME SETTLEMENTS ESTABLISHED BEFORE 1948. THREE OPTIONS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION ARE OUTLINED, TO BE DECIDED BY REFERENDUM: (A) AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, (B) A FEDERATION WITH JORDAN AND (C) A FEDERATION WITH JORDAN AND ISRAEL.

3. CONTINUING, THE DOCUMENT IS SAID TO PROPOSE GUARANTEES TO ALL PARTIES, DEMILITARISED AND SEMI DEMILITARISED ZONES ON BOTH SIDES OF FRONTIERS, SUPERVISED BY UN FORCES, AND OTHER GENERAL PROVISIONS. THE OPTIONS FOR JERUSALEM PROPOSED ARE (A) A RETURN TO INTERNATIONAL STATUS AS PROVIDED BY THE 1947 PARTITION PLAN, (B) DIVISION OF THE CITY WITH THE HOLY PLACES UNDER RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND (C) DIVISION OF THE CITY WITH THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE OLD CITY. IN THE LATTER TWO CASES THERE WOULD BE A COMMON ADMINISTRATION. THE QUESTION OF THE RETURN OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WOULD BE LEFT FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION, AS WOULD BE THE QUESTION OF PLO REPRESENTATION. THESE PROPOSALS ARE SAID TO FORM THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH MR VAN DER KLAUW WILL CONDUCT HIS TALKS DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

4. TODAYS WEEKEND EDITION OF LE SOIR COMMENTS ON REACTIONS. IT SAYS THAT THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN OF TWO EC MEMBER COUNTRIES, ITALY AND WEST GERMANY, HAVE DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF ANY COMMUNITY PLAN, ALTHOUGH AS THE PAPER POINTED OUT, THIS WAS NOT WHAT HAD BEEN CLAIMED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES EXCEPT UKREP BRUSSELS.

WAKEFIELD

NNNN

Translation

A letter from Axel Springer to Henry Kissinger

Axel Springer
(at present: The King David Hotel,
Jerusalem)

December 28, 1980

Dear Henry,

I am glad that you are visiting Israel just now. Time is slipping through our fingers.

On May 3, 1967 I visited President Johnson in Washington. With him was Walt Rostow. With me was Ernst Cramer. Johnson was obviously expecting me to talk about Berlin. But I said:

"Mr President, within a very short time there will be a war in Israel." Johnson was very perturbed and asked how did I know this. I said I had carefully studied conditions in the Middle East, and it had also struck me that Gromyko was in Cairo. But I admitted that some feeling for the future played a part in my conviction. An attribute I very much wished politicians would display.

Meanwhile Goldberg joined the conversation over a direct line from New York.

The President became more and more agitated and asked: "Do you have a solution?"

.../2

I said yes, otherwise I would not have come. My proposal was that Israel must become a member of NATO. All problems would then solve themselves.

They were enthusiastic and Dean Rusk was called for. I spoke to him in the afternoon. He too loudly agreed with my proposal.

Relieved I went home, with freedom before my eyes not only for Israel but for the whole world. It was clear to me that with this arrangement there could be no real problems of oil for the free world.

Henry, what I said at that time still applies today. It need not necessarily be membership of NATO. There are other ways.

From the West Europeans nothing can be expected. The rulers there are chief clerks and big mouths. Apart from the antisemitic Giscard, Helmut Schmidt plays the most evil role. Evil because he is a German.

Bölling was not telling the truth when he denied Schmidt's insults against Begin.

To me Schmidt said: Tell your friend Begin not to start a war in the Middle East. I answered: 1. Mr Begin is not my friend, that would be too great an honor for me. 2. The Israeli Prime Minister would never start a war, for he was responsible for giving away Sinai, which is more that a peaceful gesture.

.../3

I called upon Schmidt to go to Israel and study the military situation there. Arrogantly he interjected that the Israelis understood nothing of modern military arts. I told all this to Genscher, the uncertainty candidate.

Henry, the eyes of all prudent and peace-loving people are turned to Ronald Reagan. I hope to God that he will grasp the situation.

If he fails to do so, I will say again: there will be war in the Middle East and this time it means the great war in this world, the Apocalypse.

I am with cordial greetings the faithful friend of Jerusalem, Washington and Berlin.

Prof. Henry Kissinger
in Jerusalem

Oil before Morality

(About German battle tanks for Saudi Arabia)

by Axel Springer

published in

DIE WELT

February 26, 1981

see page 3
of DIE WELT
(attached)

Oil before Morality

by Axel Springer

What has Brokdorf, the controversial German nuclear power-station site, to do with Saudi Arabia? At first glance it seems illogical to connect thoughts about the bitterly disputed building site in North Germany and the desert sand in the Middle East. But reciprocal forces are at work here: because the West German Government has failed since the early 70s to ensure adequate and prompt supplies of nuclear energy, the Federal Republic has slipped into extreme dependence on Arab oil.

A blackmail situation has developed which has led to the temptation to equip Saudi Arabia with German Leopard tanks - a country which has declared "a holy war of Islam" against Israel. Delivery to an enemy of Israel of the most modern German offensive weapons would be among the worst consequences of a whole chain of harm to German political morality. Oil threatens to embroil our broken people in new, heavy guilt rooted in the past, which is beginning to bear foul blossom in the present and would ripen poisonous fruit in the future.

.../2

West Germany already stands with its back to the wall. Its once solid currency has softened. There is talk of currency control. New taxes are being heaped on the people. The national debt has long risen so that it cannot be discharged. Unemployment is growing. There is unrest in the population. The improved "quality of life" promised a decade ago is turning into a tortured economic life.

This affects almost everybody. And ever and again those in Government point out: the escalation in the price of oil is the root cause of this decline. This creates the illusion that an inevitable fate, a force majeure, is causing the dilemma which drives to debacle. But if nuclear energy had been embraced there would now be a way out of these constraints.

The leaders of the Government parties know this. But they let their left wings obstruct them, retreat before the pressure of violent groups and succumb to time-wasting, paralysing tacking and wriggling.

Other countries had no such inhibitions. Whereas in West Germany only 12 nuclear power stations are working, France has 18 in operation, 29 under construction, 10 projected and 11 planned. By 1990 70 per cent of France's energy requirement will come from nuclear power. In Britain 33 nuclear power

.../3

stations are already producing energy, 10 are under construction. The Soviet Union follows close with 30 reactors in production and 15 under construction; 18 others are to follow. Far ahead of everybody in the peaceful use of atomic power is the USA with 71 working reactors and 170 planned.

Our independence in foreign policy has long been badly damaged, and from Arab oil countries blows the wind in which the Government in Bonn trims its sails. The West German Government's favouring of Palestinian terror organisations and the cold shoulder it turns on Israel were the first consequences of this ethically blameworthy opportunism. And, as it always is with blackmail, these consequences propagate, increase and lead perforce to disaster.

German battle tanks for a country which threatens Israel with war - whoever had prophesied that twenty years ago would have been declared insane. When David Ben Gurion and Konrad Adenauer met to take the first steps towards reconciliation between Jews and Germans such a prophesy could not have been imagined even in a nightmare. Today we have reached this point.

It is disturbing that the representative of the Christian Social Union in Bonn, Friedrich Zimmermann, has also advocated meeting the Saudi-Arabian desire for German arms. His doubt

.../4

that Israel - if its comparable wishes were met - could pay for deliveries show that he puts material considerations above idealistic obligations. Quite different in fact with grave misgivings was the reaction of Herbert Wehner, the Social Democratic floor leader in the Bundestag.

Recently in this space there appeared a profound contribution by the respected Middle East expert, Harald Vocke. He wrote: "Only Israel has ceased to receive German arms for over fifteen years, because a former German Government was intimidated by Arab threats." And further: "... How does the West German Government assess Saudi Arabia's calls for a 'holy war' by Islam, in which Israel is to be the adversary? Israel's vital port of Eilath is only 25 kilometers from Saudi Arabian soil. From the military base in northern Arabia, Tabuq, Saudi Arabian tank formations can thrust through the south of Jordan to Israel's Negev Desert in a few hours."

None of those responsible seems to blush at this. Imperturbably comes the confirmation that Saudi Arabia now also desires "Tornado" fighters from free Europe. Although this transaction is said to have been proposed to Britain, the frightful thought arises that Bonn might ogle with the idea that our fatal financing gap might be closed this way, the gap which has arisen from the development and construction of this ultra-modern fighter-bomber.

.../5

Helmut Schmidt intends to visit Saudi Arabia soon. Israel has waited in vain for over five years for a visit from the West German Chancellor. But he refuses to accept the Israeli Prime Minister Begin as his host, accusing him of endangering peace with his policies. Although it was Begin who made peace with Egypt and gave away Sinai - for this no credit is given to him. Thus breath-takingly has all this got out of balance in the Rhine.

Among our people, who in their great majority stand up for Israel more firmly than many prominent politicians, such false developments, which destroy our credibility, have probably led to more concern about the price of petrol than for morality. Spontaneous protest is mainly raised against supplying U-boats to Chile. But that country threatens no other with war, and U-boats cannot be used for the repression of internal freedom. It is certainly not one of our most urgent tasks to fulfil this wish of Chile's - but it cannot be compared with the Saudis' requirement for German Leopard tanks.

Have they forgotten in Bonn that in two aggressive wars against Israel French arms were used? And shall Franco-German friendship be fulfilled by our denying our special obligation to the Israelis and become accomplices in a "holy" war against them?

.../6

This gallant, free country of the Jews could probably have been best protected if already in the sixties the free world had invited Israel to become a member of NATO. This suggestion came from a private source, only to be ignored.

The danger to Israel is growing. Moscow stands behind Israel's enemies, and Europe - including the Federal Republic of Germany! - is helping to enhance the risk. In Bonn the signs of vulnerability to oil blackmail and anti-atom muscle flexing prevail. And to debts, guilt is added.

File

VLS
23/12

cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

24 December 1980

Thank you for your letter of 11 December.

I share your concern over the expulsion of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhul. We have made our own concern very clear to the Government of Israel at ministerial level and the European Community is also making a joint demarche in Tel Aviv.

The expulsions and other recent events on the West Bank underline the need for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. As you will have seen from the statement issued at the Luxembourg meeting of the European Council on 2 December, we are determined to step up our activity and to continue to work for a settlement. Over the next few months, the European Community will be working hard to seek the widest possible acceptance of the principles of the Venice Declaration. This will require a spirit of compromise from Israel. But progress will also depend on the willingness of the Arab side, including the Palestinians, to express their agreement to negotiate a just and permanent solution with Israel.

I believe that 1981 will offer an opportunity, perhaps through the Euro-Arab Dialogue, for the Arab side to take this historic step towards peace.

I know that the Presidency of the European Community and Lord Carrington will wish to keep in close touch with you throughout 1981. Let us hope that the New Year will be truly a year of peace in the Middle East.

(Sgd) Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Monsieur Chedli Klibi

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جامعة الدول العربية

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Excellency,

Once again, Israel stresses its scorn for world opinion and the international will. In point of fact, Israeli authorities continue inexorably their policies of repression and racial discrimination in the Arab occupied territories, subjecting to all forms of exactions the Palestinian people struggling for its freedom and independence. Their latest more was to expel the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, Merrs Had Kawasmeh and Mohamed Melhem, from their country, despite all U.N. resolutions pertaining to this issue, the repeated injunctions of the N.U. Secretary General, an the pressing pleas of the international community.

Non content with this utter violation of human rights, Israeli authorities resort now to massive arrests, closing down of schools and universities, and a showdown of unspeakable violence to repress popular demonstrations organised everywhere in the occupied territories in protest against the deportation of two of their elected mayors who are being denied the most elementary rights that every constitution throughout the world recognizes : the right for every citizen to live in his country.

../.

جامعة الدول العربية

الأمين العام

As I bring these exactions to your attention, it honours me to call upon your influence so as to pu an end to such pratices as are condemned by international law and rejected by the most basic moral principles.

Please, accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Chedli KLIBI

Secretary General

League of Arab States

Her Excellency Mrs Margaret Thatcher,

Prime Minister of Great Britain

LONDON

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RECORD OF A MEETING WITH MR YASIR ARAFAT, CHAIRMAN OF THE PLO, IN BEIRUT ON 2 DECEMBER 1980

Prime Minister
This is the fuller record mentioned by Lord Carrington this afternoon.
15/XII

1. H M Ambassador Beirut had arranged with the PLO that he and I should go to the office of the PLO's Political Department at 9.00 pm. On arrival we found ''Abu Ja'far'', the deputy head of the Department, and ''Abu Yahya'', an assistant. We chatted with them for about 50 minutes before a telephone call came through to notify us that Arafat's earlier meeting had ended. We went by car, following Abu Ja'far's car, to another block of flats. There was a guard of honour of about half a dozen. We were shown into Arafat's office where, besides him, there was Abu Jihad (Khalilal al-Wazir) and an interpreter. Arafat, who was wearing a surgical collar, gives a much more prepossessing appearance in person than in his pictures: his beard, which is streaked with grey, is short but quite respectable, and he was neatly dressed. He speaks fluent English, only occasionally having to refer to his interpreter for a word or phrase.

2. Having explained my function and my wish to re-educate myself in the affairs of the region, I said that HMG attached prime inportance to the Middle East question, and that with the EC we hoped to make a serious contribution to a settlement of it. He had done a lot of work on the practical issues to which the principles set out in the Venice Declaration give rise and our intention, subject to what Heads of Government decided that day in Luxembourg, was to make further contacts with the parties, through the Presidency, in order to draw out ideas for dealing with thesc practical problems. We should also be talking to the Americans, whose influence with the Israelis would bc essential, in an attempt to nudge them along and to use constructively our contacts with the PLO. We should have to find a new formula and certainly a new label for any peace-making process if all the Arab parties were to be involved. In all this, it would be extremely helpful if the PLO could say in public, what I believed they had said in private, that a negotiated settlement was acceptable to them and that they would recognise Israel, even if that recognition had to be stated as conditional on withdrawal etc.

3. Arafat said this was not fair. He himself had made public statements which implicitly met my point and the Palestine National Council, for example, in its resolutions in 1974, 1977 and as recently as January 1979, had made

/ clear

clear its acceptance of a Palestinian state within such areas as were evacuated by Israel - with the implicit understanding that Israel would exist in the remainder. In the autumn of 1977, the PLO spokesman had welcomed a joint Soviet-US statement to that effect, and although President Carter had subsequently repudiated the statement, Arafat had himself accepted it in March 1978.
It had not been easy for him to take that step. His own father, who had fought against Jewish settlement in the '30s, would regard him now as a traitor.

4. It was not fair, moreover, to ask the PLO to go further, since the Palestinians were the victims. It was their tragedy that they were stateless, homeless, with no passports, no rights. He had had a passport, it was true, but he had felt it right to give it up in order to share the lot of his people, who could not travel or send their children for education, and who, alone of the Arabs, could not even buy land in Lebanon, for example, for a graveyard.

5. Finally, it was not fair that the PLO should be regarded as the tool of others. They were free: they were nobody's slaves. They had attended the Islamabad Conference to discuss Afghanistan despite Soviet and Syrian attempts to prevent them; they would have gone to the recent Amman summit, if King Hussain had been ready to accede to their proposal for a two-week postponement. This decision not to attend had been their own, not Syria's. They had had good relations with the Jordanians up to three days before the conference. The Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath parties were self-proclaimed socialists. Who knew what Libya was? But he, Arafat, was ''not even a socialist'', and yet he alone was treated as an outcast.

6. Asked what the PLO's objection to the Venice Declaration was, Arafat said they had been suspicious of the word ''association'' in the context of the role assigned to the Palestinians: why not ''participation''? We suggested that he was perhaps reading too much into this and that probably the same Arabic word, ishtirak, would be used for both.

7. Asked what role he saw for the Soviet Union in any peace-making process, Arafat said that they must be involved before the final stage, but not necessarily from the start. The Soviet treaty with Syria, he remarked, had more significance than the Soviet treaty with Iraq.

8. Asked about the crisis between Syria and Jordan, Arafat said that it was sufficient to know that it was settled. Both sides had agreed to cool things down.

/ 9. Turning

9. Turning to the Iraqi-Iranian war, Arafat claimed great personal credit, first for persuading the Iranian authorities to declare their intention to respect freedom of navigation in the Straits of Hurmuz, and, secondly, after the Iranian attacks on the Kuwaiti border post at Abdali, for persuading them to repudiate any intention to attack the Amirates. It was important to prevent the war spreading, and he personally had made a major contribution to that. As for the prospects for peace, it was important to avoid the word ''mediation'' which had a bad connotation for Shia's following the betrayal of Ali Ibn Abi Talib in the mediation with Mu'awiya in the 7th century AD. He believed that the non-aligned efforts were more likely to be successful than the Islamic Conference's - he seemed to discount the Secretary General's representative, Olaf Palme. The reason was that the Iranians would argue to any Muslim that since they represented the truth, any good Muslim must support them, while the Iraqis, as Arabs, would argue that any good Arab must support them. This put anybody in the Islamic Conference in an impossible position.

10. Asked about the possibility of evacuating shipping from the Shatt al Arab, Arafat said both sides had agreed to this.

11. The meeting, which was conducted throughout in a friendly and sometimes bantering tone (although Arafat showed signs of passion when talking of the tragedy of Palestine) ended at midnight.

John Graham
(signed in his absence)

9 December 1980

Middle East

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See over

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FM WASHINGTON 090140Z DEC 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 4848 OF 8 DECEMBER
INFO CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN MOSCOW
INFO SAVING BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA HMCG JERUSALEM UKMIS NEW YORK

ARAB/ISRAEL: SENATOR PERCY'S TALKS IN MOSCOW

1. A TELEGRAM TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT FROM THE US AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, LEAKED TO THE NEW YORK TIMES ON 5 DECEMBER, REPORTEDLY RECORDS SENATOR PERCY AS HAVING TOLD GROMYKO THAT HE FAVOURED THE IDEA OF A PALESTINIAN STATE WITH ARAFAT AS ITS ELECTED LEADER: QUOTE THIS WOULD PERMIT ARAFAT TO REALISE HIS WISH TO BE A CHIEF OF STATE BEFORE HE DIES UNQUOTE.

2. DESPITE RICHARD ALLEN'S INJUNCTION TO MEMBERS OF THE TRANSITION TEAMS AND ADVISORY GROUPS TO REFRAIN FROM COMMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS (MYTEL 4767), SEVERAL WERE LISTED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AS HAVING EXPRESSED THEIR DISMAY AND ANGER AT PERCY'S REMARKS. ALLEN HIMSELF, ASKED ABOUT THIS ON 7 DECEMBER IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW, WAS AT PAINS TO DISSOCIATE HIMSELF AND THE PRESIDENT-ELECT FROM PERCY'S COMMENTS, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT PERCY WAS NOT SAYING ANYTHING INCONSISTENT WITH HIS KNOWN PERSONAL VIEWS.

3. PERCY HIMSELF WAS CLEARLY SHAKEN AND FULL OF RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION ABOUT THE LEAK WHEN I SAW HIM LAST NIGHT. HE HAS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED HIS DISMAY AT THE LEAK, CLAIMING THAT THE SHORTHAND OF TELEGRAM LANGUAGE WAS LIABLE TO MISINTERPRETATION, AND PUTTING ON RECORD HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE US COULD NEVER NEGOTIATE WITH THE PALESTINIANS UNTIL THE PALESTINIANS RECOGNISED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND WITHIN QUOTE SENSIBLE BORDERS UNQUOTE. ARAFAT WAS A TERRORIST WHO HAD DONE SOME DASTARDLY THINGS- BUT HE WAS A FACT OF LIFE. PERCY'S STAFF ARE ALSO STRESSING FOR THE RECORD, AS DID ALLEN, THAT THE SENATOR'S MIDDLE EAST REMARKS HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH REAGAN IN ADVANCE.

4. SUSPICION ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF THE LEAK HAS INEVITABLY FOCUSSED ON THE TRANSITION APPARATUS AND IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT ALLEN AND AMBASSADOR NEUMANN HAD ALREADY ON 6 DECEMBER SUMMONED STATE DEPARTMENT TEAM MEMBERS FOR A LECTURE ON LEAKS WHICH WILL BE PASSED ALSO TO THE TRANSITION TEAMS IN OTHER DEPARTMENTS, NOTABLY DEFENCE. TODAY'S WASHINGTON STAR EVENING EDITION QUOTES A SENIOR REAGAN OFFICIAL AS NAMING JOHN CARBAUGH, SENATOR HELMS'S MAN ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT TRANSITION TEAM, AS THE SOURCE OF THE LEAK AND HELMS'S UNCONVINCING DEFENCE OF HIM MAKES IT LOOK ALL TO LIKELY.

FCO PASS SAVING TO BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA JERUSALEM

HENDERSON

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 316 OF 03 DECEMBER 1980
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV,
UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH ARAFAT: JORDAN-SYRIA, THE M E QUESTION AND IRAQ-IRAN.

1. IN THE COURSE OF A TWO HOUR MEETING LATE LAST NIGHT WITH ARAFAT, GRAHAM AND I RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE TENSION BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA. ARAFAT, WHO KEPT BEING INTERRUPTED BY MESSAGES, REFUSED TO ENLARGE ON SYRIAN AND JORDANIAN MOTIVES BUT SAID THAT IT WAS SUFFICIENT THAT THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN ''SETTLED''.

2. MOST OF THE DISCUSSION NATURALLY TURNED ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION AND GRAHAM WILL BE WRITING A RECORD IN DUE COURSE. NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW EMERGED, EXCEPT THAT WHEN CHALLENGED TO STATE THE PLO'S POSITION ON A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF AN ISRAELI STATE, ARAFAT MAINTAINED THAT THIS WAS UNFAIR SINCE CONSISTENTLY SINCE 1974 THE PLO, BOTH IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY HIMSELF AND IN RESOLUTIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL, HAD TACITLY ACCORDED ''RECOGNITION'' TO AN ISRAELI STATE BY CLAIMING FOR ITSELF A PALESTINIAN STATE IN TERRITORIES FROM WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD WITHDRAWN. HE ALSO REFERRED TO HIS PERSONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE JOINT US-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GROMYKO AND THE U S SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE AUTUMN OF 1977.

3. ON IRAN-IRAQ, ARAFAT SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SETTLED IN DUE COURSE: IT WAS ESSENTIAL, FOR REASONS DICTATED BY SHI'A MYTHOLOGY, TO AVOID THE WORD ''MEDIATION'', AND BECAUSE MUSLIMS WERE CHALLENGED TO BACK IRAN AND ARABS TO BACK IRAQ, THE NON-ALIGNED EFFORTS STOOD A BETTER CHANCE THAN THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE'S. UNTIL IT WAS SETTLED, THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO RESTRICT THE AREA OF CONFLICT AND HE CLAIMED PERSONAL CREDIT FOR CAUSING THE IRANIANS TO ANNOUNCE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR THAT THEY WOULD RESPECT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, AFTER THE IRANIAN ATTACKS ON THE KUWAITI FRONTIER POST, TO RENOUNCE ANY DESIRE TO INVOLVE OTHER ARAB STATES, A RENUNCIATION WHICH AYATOLLAH HASHEMI RAFSANJANI HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM ONLY RECENTLY WHEN VISITING LEBANON. ARAFAT SAID THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR

/CONTINUING

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EVACUATING SHIPPING FROM THE SHATT AL-ARAB HAD NOW BEEN AGREED BY BOTH SIDES.

4. WE HAVE TOLD THE PRESS THAT GRAHAM WOULD BE MEETING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIANS DURING HIS VISIT, BUT BY AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO, WILL NOT GO INTO DETAILS OF WHO OR WHEN.

STRACHAN.

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MR J C MOBERLY

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INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, MODUK (D14)
INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 359 (NOT TO ALL): JORDAN/SYRIA

1. I ASKED THE HEAD OF WEST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT PRIVATELY ON 2 DECEMBER WHY HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO REPEAT TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE (MY TELNO 357) THE CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE WHICH HE HAD GIVEN ME ON 26 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 351) THAT THE SYRIANS WERE

See over

1. I ASKED THE HEAD OF WEST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT PRIVATELY ON 2 DECEMBER WHY HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO REPEAT TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE (MY TELNO 357) THE CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE WHICH HE HAD GIVEN ME ON 26 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 351) THAT THE SYRIANS WERE NOT CONTEMPLATING ANY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST JORDAN.

2. JUWEIJATI (WHOSE CONFIDENCE SHOULD PLEASE BE PROTECTED) REPLIED: ''WHEN ONE'S GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN A BLUFF, ONE SHOULD NOT GIVE AWAY ALL THE CARDS.''

WRIGHT
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Middle East

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 4745 OF 1 DECEMBER 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, JEDDA,
UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK
INFO SAVING CAIRO, BEIRUT

AMMAN TELEGRAM 495: JORDAN/SYRIA

1. NEUMANN (JORDAN COUNTRY OFFICER, STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD US THIS MORNING OF A NUMBER OF THINGS THE AMERICANS HAVE DONE OR ARE CONTEMPLATING DOING TO HELP KING HUSSEIN:
A) THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 28 NOVEMBER ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR JORDAN'S SECURITY:
B) THE PENTAGON ARE URGENTLY STUDYING THE JORDANIAN LIST OF MILITARY SPARES AND EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO GIVE AT LEAST SOME EARLY SATISFACTION. THE LIST IS, HOWEVER, LONG AND COMPREHENSIVE, RANGING FROM LIGHT ARMS AMMUNITION TO CLUSTER BOMBS (NEUMANN COMMENTED THAT IF THE JORDANIANS ARE REALLY THAT SHORT OF ESSENTIAL SPARE PARTS, SOME JORDANIAN HEADS SHOULD ROLL):

SPARE PARTS, SOME JORDANIAN HEADS SHOULD ROLL):
C) THE AMERICANS HAVE OFFERED, AND THE JORDANIANS HAVE ACCEPTED, A VISIT BY A US TEAM TO CHECK THAT THE JORDANIAN HAWK MISSILES ARE IN GOOD WORKING ORDER. THE AMERICAN EXPERTS WILL BE TRAVELLING TO JORDAN SHORTLY AND EXPECT TO FIND THE HAWKS IN GOOD SHAPE:
D) THE JORDANIANS HAVE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE SYRIAN ALOUETTE HELICOPTERS WHICH THEY BELIEVE TO HAVE AN ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY. THE PENTAGON ARE LOOKING URGENTLY AT THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING WEAPONRY TO COUNTER THE ALOUETTES:
E) UNDER-SECRETARY NEWSOM HAS SUMMONED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS THE JORDAN/SYRIA TENSIONS:
F) THE US SIXTH FLEET MAY BE MOVED CLOSER.

2. NEUMANN CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE STRESSED TO THE JORDANIANS THEIR UNHAPPINESS AT KING HUSSEIN'S APPARENT INCLINATION TO TURN TO THE IRAQIS FOR SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY IN THE AIR WHICH IS WHERE THE JORDANIANS FEEL AT THE GREATEST DISADVANTAGE VIS-A-VIS THE SYRIANS. THE AMERICANS ARE NOW WORKING OUT HOW TO RESPOND TO KING HUSSEIN'S NOT UNREASONABLE QUESTION ABOUT WHAT THE AMERICANS CAN OFFER INSTEAD. NEUMANN REVEALED THAT PENTAGON AND STATE HAVE AGREED AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO ASK MUSKIE AND BROWN TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HUSSEIN BE ASKED IF HE WOULD LIKE AWACS SUPPORT (SOMETHING HE HAS NOT SO FAR ASKED FOR). THE AMERICANS ARE CONSCIOUS THAT THIS WOULD BE A POTENTIALLY MORE DANGEROUS AND CONTROVERSIAL PROPOSITION THAN THE SAUDI EXERCISE SINCE:
A) IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, THE AMERICAN AWACS WOULD BECOME NATURAL TARGETS FOR SYRIAN AIR ATTACK AND WOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY NEED US FIGHTER ESCORT PROTECTION:
B) THE AWACS WOULD BE TOO VULNERABLE TO BE BASED IN JORDAN ITSELF. SAUDI ARABIA (TABUK) WOULD BE THE OBVIOUS PLACE:
C) THE DISTANCES INVOLVED WERE TOO SMALL FOR THE AWACS TO BE ABLE TO PLAY MUCH OF AN EARLY WARNING ROLE. THEIR USEFULNESS WOULD THEREFORE BE IN THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPACITY. THIS IN TURN WOULD REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND WORKING WITH THE JORDANIAN AIR FORCE.
(PLEASE PROTECT NEUMANN OVER THIS INFORMATION. THE AWACS PROPOSAL MAY NOT GET PAST MUSKIE AND BROWN: AND AMBASSADOR VELIOTES MAY WELL NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT AT THIS STAGE).

3. AMERICAN NERVOUSNESS ABOUT JORDAN TURNING TO IRAQ FOR HELP DOES NOT FLOW ONLY FROM SENSITIVITY OVER ISRAELI REACTIONS - INDEED NEUMANN CONFIRMED THAT SO FAR THE ISRAELIS ARE PLAYING IT COOL (TEL AVIV TEL 547 - NOT TO ALL). STATE DEPARTMENT ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED NOT TO JEOPARDISE THEIR NEUTRALITY IN THE IRAQ/IRAN

CONCERNED NOT TO JEOPARDISE THEIR NEUTRALITY IN THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT. IT WOULD BE ONE THING TO HELP JORDAN AGAINST AN ATTACK FROM SYRIA, ANOTHER TO DO SO IN IRAQI COMPANY.

4. NEUMANN ALSO MENTIONED THAT FROM WHAT THE AMERICANS KNOW OF JORDANIAN TACTICAL THINKING, THE JORDANIANS WILL NOT, IF IT COMES TO AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, WISH TO GET BOGGED DOWN IN A WAR OF ATTRITION (IN WHICH, WITH THEIR SMALLER FORCES, THEY WOULD EXPECT TO COME OFF WORSE), BUT RATHER TO THROW EVERYTHING INTO AN EARLY ALL-OUT ATTEMPT TO DESTROY SYRIAN FORCES.

5. NEUMANN ADDED THAT ALL THIS SHOULD BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF CONTINUING AMERICAN PUZZLEMENT ABOUT THE SYRIANS' REAL INTENTIONS.

FCO PASS SAVING CAIRO, BEIRUT.

HENDERSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 858 OF 30TH NOVEMBER 1980
AND TO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG
REPEATED PRIORITY DUBLIN, PARIS, BONN, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, COPENHAGEN, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV.
SAVING TO TUNIS, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT.

MY TELNO 856: ARABA/ISRAEL

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY DEPUTY MINISTER THUNAYYAN TODAY TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE FROM THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT TO HMG ON THE EVE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING. WE KNOW THAT THE FRENCH AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS WERE ALSO CALLED.

2. THUNAYYAN BEGAN WITH A MESSAGE ON IRAQ/IRAN. (PLEASE SEE MIFT.) HE THEN TURNED TO ARAB/ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT A CLEAR EUROPEAN POSITION WAS NOW NEEDED FROM EUROPE. AN INITIATIVE WOULD BE MOST WELCOME TO ALL ARAB STATES,

AN INITIATIVE WOULD BE MOST WELCOME TO ALL ARAB STATES, BUT PARTICULARLY TO THOSE WHO HAD ATTENDED THE AMMAN SUMMIT. HE SAID THAT THE AMMAN DECLARATION WAS THE CLEAREST STATEMENT YET OF ARAB VIEWS ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE (THOUGH HE ADDED, SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORILY, THAT WE SHOULD READ BETWEEN THE LINES TO GET ITS FULL MEANING). THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED AT RUMOURS THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WOULD POSTPONE AN INITIATIVE UNTIL THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WAS FIRMLY IN THE SADDLE: NOW WAS THE TIME TO INFLUENCE MR REAGAN AND HIS ADVISERS, WHILE THEIR IDEAS WERE STILL FLUID. THE EUROPEANS HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE, ALONGSIDE THE ARABS, IN EDUCATING MR REAGAN IN THE REALITIES OF THE REGION: THE ARABS AT AMMAN HAD DONE THIER BIT, AND NOW WANTED A CORRESPONDINGLY CLEAR STATEMENT OF POSITION FROM THEIR EUROPEAN FRIENDS. IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR MR REAGAN TO JUSTIFY PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESS IF HE COULD POINT TO ADVICE TO THAT EFFECT FROM AMERICA'S EUROPEAN AND ARAB FRIENDS.

3. THUNAYYAN REFERRED TO THE LIST OF FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES ATTRIBUTED TO MR REAGAN AND SAID THAT THE SAUDIS THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WERE LOOKING FOR REACTIONS TO THE LIST: FOR THE SAUDIS IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM SHOULD BE ONLY FIFTH ON THE LIST (AND UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA, THE SECOND PRIORITY, COULD BE DEALT WITH SEPARATELY FROM THE REGIONAL PROBLEM). EUROPE SHOULD MAKE ITS VIEWS KNOWN ON THIS LIST.

4. IN REPLY I DREW ON THE STATEMENTS BY YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER REPORTED IN RETRACTS 56826 NOV, 60227 NOV AND 68528 NOV, USING THE LATTER TO REBUT THUNAYYAN'S CLAIM THAT YOU HAD SAID THIS WAS NOT THE TIME FOR EUROPE TO DO ANYTING (THE WRETCHED IHT HEADLINE AGAIN, I FEAR). THUNAYYAN MADE NO COMMENT OF SUBSTANCE. I SAID THAT I WOULD OF COURSE TRANSMIT THE MESSAGE.

5. IT IS A PITY THE SAUDIS HAVE LEFT THIS DEMARCHE SO LATE. THEIR TIMING IS PROBABLY LINKED TO THE AMMAN SUMMIT. THUNAYYAN'S REMARKS ABOUT AMMAN ARE DISINGENUOUS (IT SHOULD BE EASIER FOR THE MODERATES TO REACH AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE RADICALS), AND HIS ADVICE TO READ BETWEEN THE LINES IS OBSCURE. I INTERPRET IT AS MEANING:

(A) THAT THE MODERATES FEEL AS STRONGLY ABOUT PALESTINE AS THE RADICALS:

THE RADICALS:

(B) THAT THE MODERATES WILL GAIN COMFORT IN THEIR TUSSLE WITH THE RADICALS IF THEY CAN SHOW THAT THEY HAVE INFLUENCE WITH THE EUROPEANS AND THE AMERICANS WHICH CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO PROGRESS ON PALESTINE:

(C) THAT THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT BE WOOED FROM THE SYRIAN EMBRACE IF THE MODERATES COULD SHOW THAT PROGRESS ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS LAY THROUGH THEM (CF. PARA 3 OF AMMAN TELNO 491).

(D) THAT THERE IS NO HOPE FOR CAMP DAVID (OR, PERHAPS, FOR A HUSSEIN INITIATIVE) IN THE SAUDIS BOOK.

SEE MIFT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

GRAY

NNNN

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FM DAMASCUS 290900Z NOV 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 355 OF 29 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
INFO ROUTINE TEL AVIV AND MODUK (D14)
INFO SAVING TO BAGHDAD WASHINGTON AND JEDDA.

MY TELNO 351: JORDAN/SYRIA

1. MY US COLLEAGUE GAVE ME ON 28 NOVEMBER AN ACCOUNT OF A TALK ON THE PREVIOUS DAY WITH THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NASSIR QADDOUR, WHOM HE HAD APPROACHED ON INSTRUCTIONS FOR AN EXPLANATION OF SYRIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ON THE JORDANIAN BORDER.

2. READING FROM A PREPARED PAPER, QADDOUR TOLD SEELYE THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN INTERVENING IN SYRIA FOR SOME TIME, PROVIDING ARMS AND OTHER HELP TO SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS. SYRIA HAD CONFIRMATION THAT THIS HAD HAPPENED OFTEN, AND AT MANY LEVELS. THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN TOLD OF SYRIA'S AWARENESS OF AND CONCERN FOR THESE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING IN CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN ASAD AND HUSSEIN. JORDAN HAD STILL CONTINUED TRAINING TERRORISTS

ASAD AND HUSSEIN. JORDAN HAD STILL CONTINUED TRAINING TERRORISTS ON HER SOIL AND PROVIDING MATERIAL ASSISTANCE.

3. QADDOUR SAID THAT THIS INTERVENTION HAD RESULTED IN MANY INNOCENT DEATHS. A FEW DAYS BEFORE, '' ONE OF OUR JORDANIAN FRIENDS'' WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A CLOSE FRIEND OF KING HUSSEIN (I.E. THE SYRIAN, WHOSE TELEVISION INTERVIEW WAS REPORTED IN MY TEL NO. 346), HAD PUBLICLY REVEALED THE EXTENT OF JORDANIAN INTERVENTION, AND THE EXISTENCE OF MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS IN JORDAN FOR TRAINING TERRORIST ACTIVITY HERE. HE HAD ALSO ''CONFIRMED'' THE COMPLICITY OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE ROYAL FAMILY. SYRIA NOTED THAT JORDAN WAS IN THE ARAB NATION, AND DID NOT WANT WAR WITH HER. HOWEVER, IN THE LIGHT OF JORDANIAN ACTIVITIES, SYRIA HAD TO TAKE MEASURES TO PATROL ITS BORDERS AND TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL. SYRIA DEMANDED THAT KING HUSSEIN EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS, INDICATE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THEM, AND EXPLAIN HOW THIS WAS JUSTIFIED BY ARAB INTERESTS.

4. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, QADDOUR SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHY KING HUSSEIN WAS TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE SYRIAN REGIME. HE CLAIMED, DISINGENUOUSLY, THAT THE MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN TROOPS WAS PURELY CONNECTED WITH JORDANIAN SUBVERSION IN SYRIA, AND UNCONNECTED WITH THE ARAB SUMMIT. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HE DENIED CATEGORICALLY (AS JUWEIJATI HAD TO ME) THAT ANY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST JORDAN WAS INTENDED. HE GAVE SEELYE NO INDICATION WHETHER THESE POINTS HAD BEEN MADE, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, TO THE JORDANIANS.

5. AS REPORTED BY MY DEFENCE ATTACHE, THERE HAVE BEEN FURTHER MOVES OF TROOPS TO THE SOUTH SINCE THIS INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE. FOR A PRESENTATIONAL MOVE (WHICH IS WHAT BOTH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE AND I STILL BELIEVE IT TO BE) THE SYRIANS ARE CERTAINLY PILING IT ON THICK. THE DISINGENUOUSNESS OF QADDOUR'S EXPLANATION IS NOT ENCOURAGING (AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN BELIEVES THAT IT WILL REINFORCE, RATHER THAN ALLAY, KING HUSSEIN'S ANXIETIES ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS). THERE IS ALWAYS THE RISK OF MISCALCULATION ON EITHER SIDE. BUT FOR THE PRESENT, I THINK THAT THE SYRIANS DO NOT (NOT) INTEND TO LAUNCH A MILITARY ESCAPADE ACROSS THE BORDER. QADDOUR DID NOT DISSENT WHEN SEELYE ASKED WHETHER ONE SHOULD INTERPRET THESE MOVES AS A FORM OF ''PRESSURE'' AGAINST JORDAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON AND JEDDA.

HEIGHT

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Prime Minister ②

S.J. Pike
30.11.88

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DESKBY FIRST CONTACT 01 DEC LUXEMBOURG
FM AMMAN 291800Z NOV
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 493 OF 29 NOV
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4), DAMASCUS, LUXEMBOURG: PRIORITY TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON: ROUTINE BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JEDDA, MOSCOW.
INFO SAVING MUSCAT

MY TELNO 490 OF 28 NOVEMBER (NOT TO ALL): JORDAN/SYRIA

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY KING HUSSEIN AT LUNCH-TIME TODAY: HE WAS IN BATTLEDRESS AND EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD ALSO SPENT THE WHOLE PREVIOUS DAY (28 NOVEMBER) WITH HIS ARMED FORCES. HE SAID HE HAD SEEN THE SOVIET AND US AMBASSADORS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUMMIT MEETING AND WAS SORRY HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SEE ME TOO: ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO REQUESTS TO MAKE OF US, HE ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO ENSURING THAT YOU WERE FULLY INFORMED OF JORDAN'S POSITION IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN LEADERS. HE CLAIMED THAT IN SPITE OF THE ABSENTEES THE SUMMIT MEETING HAD BEEN A SUCCESS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENCE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE ARAB LEADERS PRESENT SEMICLN

REQUESTS TO MAKE OF US, HE ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO ENSURING THAT YOU WERE FULLY INFORMED OF JORDAN'S POSITION IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN LEADERS. HE CLAIMED THAT IN SPITE OF THE ABSENTEES THE SUMMIT MEETING HAD BEEN A SUCCESS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENCE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE ARAB LEADERS PRESENT SEMICLN THERE HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, BEEN NO TRACE OF ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE OMANI SULTAN AND THE IRAQI PRESIDENT. BUT HE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED TO DISCUSSING THE CRISIS WITH SYRIA AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WAS WHOLLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE ACUTE DANGER HE FELT JORDAN WAS NOW FACING.

2. THE KING RECALLED THAT A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT (I ASSUME IN THE COURSE OF A HEATED TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WHICH HE TOLD ME AT THE TIME HE HAD HAD WITH PRESIDENT ASAD) THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAD SAID TO HIM THAT SYRIA HAD BEEN 6 MONTHS LATE IN ITS INVASION OF JORDAN. IN THE MEETINGS OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN AMMAN PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT, THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CLEARER OR MORE EXPLICIT. KHADDAM HAD STATED IN THE MOST DELIBERATE WAY THAT A STATE OF WAR ALREADY EXISTED BETWEEN SYRIA AND JORDAN, AND THAT IT WOULD BECOME ACTUAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE SYRIANS HAD ALSO TAKEN "UNPRECEDENTED STEPS" IN LEBANON TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BOTH THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT NOT TO ATTEND. DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING ITSELF, THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES HAD MLLPED TWO MAJOR ATTEMPTS BY PALESTINIAN GUERILLAS BASED IN SYRIA TO STRIKE AT ISRAEL THROUGH JORDAN WHICH, IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE PROVOKED AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON JORDAN WHILE THE SUMMIT MEETING WAS IN PROGRESS (CIRCUMSTANTIAL REPORTS ON THESE HAVE BEEN CARRIED IN THE ISRAELI MEDIA). THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN RECEIVING FOR SOME TIME WARNINGS FROM SOURCES WITHIN THE SYRIAN ARMED FORCES THAT A MOVE AGAINST JORDAN WAS BEING PLANNED (I NOW THINK THIS MUST BE WHAT LAY BEHIND ENQUIRIES TO ME BY THE KING AND THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT AS TO WHETHER WE HAD RECEIVED ANY INFORMATION WHICH COULD THROW LIGHT ON SYRIAN DEVELOPMENTS). ALL THE INDICATIONS REACHING THE JORDANIANS INDICATED THAT A SYRIAN ATTACK, IF IT TOOK PLACE, WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN WITHIN THE NEXT 7 TO 10 DAYS.

3. THE KING SAID THAT, WHILE THE SUMMIT MEETING WAS IN PROGRESS, HE HAD HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT ON WHAT COULD BE DONE IN FACE OF A POSSIBLE SYRIAN ATTACK. THE IRAQIS HAD SAID THEY WOULD PUT SOME OF THEIR FORCES AT JORDAN'S DISPOSAL (HE TOLD MY US COLLEAGUE THEY HAD OFFERED AN ARMOURED DIVISION). THE KING TOLD ME HE HAD REFUSED THIS OFFER, AS HE BELIEVED IT WAS EXACTLY WHAT THE SYRIANS WANTED AND THAT A SYRIAN MILITARY MOVE MIGHT BE BEING PLANNED TO COINCIDE WITH A MAJOR IRANIAN COUNTER-ATTACK WHICH THE IRAQIS WERE EXPECTING WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. HE HAD HOWEVER, AGREED WITH THE IRAQIS THAT THEIR AIR BASE AT H3 SHOULD COORDINATE OPERATIONS WITH THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, SO THAT BOTH

HOWEVER, AGREED WITH THE IRAQIS THAT THEIR AIR BASE AT MU CHOOSE
COORDINATE OPERATIONS WITH THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, SO THAT BOTH
THE IRAQI AND JORDANIAN FORCES WOULD BE BETTER PLACED TO DEFEND
THEMSELVES IN THAT AREA AND PARTICULARLY TO TRY TO PREVENT ANY
SYRIAN ATTEMPT TO CUT THE ROAD LINKING JORDAN AND IRAQ. IRAQI
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND THEIR CIVIL AIRCRAFT FLEET HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISPERSED AWAY FROM AMMAN SEMICLN KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD ALSO
ORDERED THE JORDANIAN AIRLINE TO KEEP AS FEW AIRCRAFT AS POSSIBLE AT
AMMAN AIRPORT AT ANY ONE TIME. HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE IRAQIS
AND SAUDIS CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS IF THE SYRIANS SUCCEEDED IN
CUTTING THE ROAD TO BAGHDAD. ROAD TRAFFIC WOULD TAKE A LONGER
ALTERNATIVE ROUTE FROM AQABA TO IRAQ THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA. THE
SAUDIS HAD IN ADDITION OFFERED TO KEEP ON THEIR AIRFIELDS ANY JORD-
ANIAN AIRCRAFT, CIVIL OR MILITARY, WHICH WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY
REQUIRED.

4. THE SAUDIS WOULD BE SENDING AN ENVOY TO DAMASCUS: WHILE SEEKING
TO DISSUADE THE SYRIANS FROM ANY RASH MOVE, HE WOULD ALSO TELL THEM
THAT THE SAUDIS WERE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING JORDAN. (IN
SPEAKING TO MY US COLLEAGUE, THE KING ADDED THAT HE HAD PARTICULARLY
URGED THE SAUDIS NOT TO GIVE THE SYRIANS THE IMPRESSION THAT THEIR
THREATS WERE HAVING ANY EFFECT ON JORDAN).

5. IF THE SYRIANS CLOSED THEIR BORDER WITH JORDAN, IRAQ WOULD
OF COURSE ALSO CLOSE HER FRONTIER WITH SYRIA. THE JORDANIANS WERE
LOOKING FOR ALTERNATIVE AIR ROUTES IN CASE OF CLOSURE OF SYRIAN
AIR SPACE AND THOUGHT THE BEST ROUTE MIGHT BE OVER WHAT HE TERMED
"LIBERATED SINAI." THE KING THOUGHT THAT AN IRANIAN COUNTER-
ATTACK MIGHT ALSO BE ACCOMPANIED BY ATTEMPTS AT SABOTAGE IN THE
ARAB GULF STATES AND THAT THIS TOO REQUIRED A COORDINATED RESPONSE,
BUT HE DID NOT SAY WHAT IF ANYTHING HAD BEEN DONE ABOUT IT.

6. EMPHASISING ONCE AGAIN THAT HE SAW THE PERIOD OF GREATEST
DANGER AS THE NEXT 7 TO 10 DAYS, THE KING SAID HE VERY MUCH HOPED
THAT WE AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD AVOID PREMATURE STEPS
SUCH AS ADVISING EVACUATION OF OUR COMMUNITIES, WHICH WOULD ONLY
ADD TO THE PRESENT TENSION, AS HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SITUATION
YET WARRANTED IT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD NEVER KNOWN HIS
OWN PEOPLE AND THE ARMED FORCES MORE UNITED. HE HAD DELIBERATELY
NOT CALLED UP RESERVISTS YET, IN AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE POLITICAL
TEMPERATURE DOWN, BUT IN FACT VERY MANY WERE ALREADY JOINING THEIR
UNITS. HE FELT SURE THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES WOULD BE WELL ABLE
TO COPE WITH WHATEVER MIGHT BE IN STORE: HE "HOPED AND PRAYED"
THERE WOULD BE NO ESCALATION, BUT HE COULD NOT RID HIS MIND OF THE
FACT THAT PRESIDENT ASAD HAD BEEN MINISTER OF DEFENCE IN 1970
WHEN SYRIA HAD LAST ATTACKED JORDAN.

7. THE KING SAID HE HAD SEEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR 2 DAYS AGO TO
EXPRESS HIS CONCERN OVER THE CONCENTRATION OF SYRIAN FORCES ON
[illegible] BORDERS. TELLING THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE WOULD HAVE

7. THE KING SAID HE HAD SEEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR 2 DAYS AGO TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN OVER THE CONCENTRATION OF SYRIAN FORCES ON JORDAN'S BORDERS. TELLING THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE WOULD HAVE SUMMONED HIM WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAD BEEN A SOVIET/SYRIAN TREAT THE KING HAD REFERREDTSO THE CLAUSE IN THE TREATY REQUIRING CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BEFORE TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE A THIRD PARTY AND HAD GONE ON TO EXPLAIN HIS BEWILDERMENT OVER RECENT SYRIAN MOVES TO FRUSTRATE THE HOLDING OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE. HE WISHED MR BREZHNEV TO BE IN NO DOUBT THAT JORDAN WOULD MAKE ANY SACRIFICES REQUIRED IN DEFENCE OF HER TERRITORY, JUST AS THE RUSSIANS HAD DONE IN THE LAST WAR. HE THEREFORE WISHED TO KNOW WHAT WAS THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS SYRIA'S PRESENT ACTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF MR BREZHNEV'S EARLIER ASSURANCES TO HIM THAT THE SYRIAN/SOVIET TREATY WAS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY THIRD PARTY, AND WOULD LIKE A SOVIET EXPLANATION OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING. IN SPEAKING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THE KING SAID HE HAD ALSO REFERRED TO REPORTS THAT ELEMENTS FROM SOUTH YEMEN WERE MOVING AGAINST THE NORTH, TO THE RECENTLY INTENSIFIED ETHIOPIAN AIR ATTACKS ON SOMALIA AND TO LIBYAN ACTIONS IN CHAD AND ELSEWHERE. ALL THESE COUNTRIES WERE MORE OR LESS UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE AND HE HAD ENQUIRED WHAT INFERENCES THE ARABS SHOULD DRAW FROM ALL THIS. THE KING SAID THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD HAD NOTHING TO SAY AT THE TIME ON ANY OF THIS AND THAT HE HAD HEARD NO MORE FROM HIM SINCE.

8. THE KING SAID HE HAD ALSO SUMMONED THE US AMBASSADOR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUMMIT AND HAD PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD "KEEP THE ISRAELIS OFF OUR BACKS." HE HAD NOT ASKED FOR ANY US STATEMENT OF SUPPORT AND HAD INSISTED THAT ANY PUBLIC COMMENT THE AMERICANS MIGHT FEEL OBLIGED TO MAKE ON THE CURRENT TENSION BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA SHOULD NOT LOOK AS IF IT WERE BEING MADE IN RESPONSE TO A JORDANIAN REQUEST. THE KING HAD, HOWEVER, EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD RELAX THEIR RESTRICTIONS ON THE SALE OF WEAPONS TO JORDAN AND HAD TOLD VELIOTES THAT "WE ARE STILL SENDING THE SAME ANTIQUATED US TANKS TO MEET THE SYRIAN THREAT NOW AS WE DID IN 1970." THE KING MENTIONED IN PARENTHESIS AT THIS POINT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD GIVEN HIM A LONG LIST OF SPARE PARTS THEY NEEDED, AS THEY WERE GETTING NOTHING FROM THE RUSSIANS.

9. THE KING SEEMED, ABOVE ALL, DETERMINED NOT TO BE CAUGHT NAPPING BY THE SYRIANS AND TO BE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE POSSIBLE SOVIET ROLE. HE KEPT REPEATING HOW SUCCESSFUL THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN IN CEMENTING GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THOSE PRESENT AND HIS RELIEF THAT, IN THE POLARISATION OF THE ARAB WORLD WHICH HAD FOLLOWED CAMP DAVID, IRAQ HAD AT LEAST SIDED WITH JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES RATHER THAN WITH SYRIA AND THE REJECTIONISTS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SYRIAN REGIME WOULD BE FOOLISH IN THE EXTREME TO ATTACK JORDAN. BUT THEY HAD MADE SIMILAR MISCALCULATIONS IN THE

MODERATE ARAB STATES RATHER THAN WITH SYRIA AND THE REJECTIONISTS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SYRIAN REGIME WOULD BE FOOLISH IN THE EXTREME TO ATTACK JORDAN, BUT THEY HAD MADE SIMILAR MISCALCULATIONS IN THE PAST. HE WONDERED IN PARTICULAR WHETHER, IN VIEW OF THE INFORMATION REACHING JORDAN FROM WITHIN THE SYRIAN ARMED FORCES, SYRIAN ARMY UNITS WOULD NECESSARILY REMAIN LOYAL IF ORDERED TO CROSS THE JORDANIAN BORDER.

10. PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH THE KING, I HAD EARLIER TODAY COMPARED NOTES WITH THE US AMBASSADOR. VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT AT LEAST UNTIL 27 NOVEMBER THE JORDANIANS HAD SHARED THE US VIEW THAT SYRIAN TROOP MOVES WERE POLITICAL POSTURING IN RELATION TO THE ARAB SUMMIT AND THAT, HAVING SUCCEEDED IN KEEPING THE SUMMIT IN A FAIRLY LOW KEY, THE JORDANIANS HAD FELT FAIRLY RELAXED. BUT THE CONTINUING SYRIAN BUILD-UP HAD CAUSED THEM TO HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS AND OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS THEY HAD BEGUN TO CONTEMPLATE A WORST-CASE SCENARIO. THIS WAS PARTLY BECAUSE, NOW THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS OVER, THERE SEEMED TO BE SCARCELY ANY OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR SYRIA'S MOVES THAN AN IMPENDING ATTACK ON JORDAN. WHATEVER THEY MIGHT SAY PUBLICLY, THE SYRIANS KNEW QUITE WELL THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE NOT SENDING MEMBERS OF THE MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD INTO SYRIA. NOR WAS MILITARY SUPPORT ON THIS SCALE NEEDED TO INFILTRATE PALESTINIAN GROUPS INTO OR THROUGH JORDAN SEMICLN THE SYRIANS WOULD ALSO KNOW THAT PALESTINIAN INFILTRATORS WERE ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE PICKED UP BY THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES. THEREFORE BY A PROCESS OF ELIMINATION THE JORDANIANS HAD COME TO FEAR THE WORST, ESPECIALLY AS THE SYRIANS HAD ALREADY MISCALCULATED IN BELIEVING THEY COULD PREVENT THE SUMMIT FROM TAKING PLACE AND MIGHT BE MAKING A SIMILAR ERROR IN RELATION TO MILITARY MOVES AGAINST JORDAN.

11. VELIOTES TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD FOR THE PRESENT BE ADVISING AGAINST ANY AMERICAN ACTION TO DISCOURAGE TRAVEL TO JORDAN, STILL LESS TO EVACUATE DEPENDANTS. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS WITH MY EC COLLEAGUES ON MONDAY 1 DECEMBER SEMICLN WE ARE TO RECEIVE A BRIEFING ON THE SUMMIT FROM THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOMORROW MORNING.

FCO PASS SAVING TO MUSCAT

URWICK
BT

[Standard]

IMMEDIATE

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Prime Minister ②

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FM AMMAN 291Ø4ØZ NOV 8Ø
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 492 OF 29 NOV
INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 1ST CONTACT Ø1 DEC LUXEMBOURG: PRIORITY
DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON: ROUTINE BAGHDAD JEDDA TEL AVIV AND UKMIS
NEWYORK
INFO SAVING TO: ABU DHABI ADEN ALGIERS BAHRAIN BEIRUT CAIRO DOHA
DUBAI KHARTOUM KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT SANAA TRIPOLI AND TUNIS.

MY TELNO 49Ø AND 491 OF 28 NOVEMBER: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. KING HUSSEIN GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE AMMAN SUMMIT MEETING HAD ENDED ON 27 NOVEMBER. HIS REFERENCES TO SYRIA ARE COVERED IN MY TELNO 49Ø (NOT TO ALL): FOLLOWING ARE OTHER MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST.

RESOLUTION 242

2. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON THE REFERENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO RESOLUTION 242, KING HUSSEIN STRESSED THAT THIS SECTION HAD BEEN DRAFTED BY ALL THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS (IE AT THE PLENARY

BEEN DRAFTED BY ALL THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS (IE AT THE PLENARY MEETING IN AMMAN OF 20 NOVEMBER PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT SEMICLN HE ... CLEARLY MEANT TO IMPLY THAT IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE ACCEPTED BY ... ARAB STATES INCLUDING THOSE WHICH HAD BEEN ABSENT FROM THE SUMMIT). THE KING SAID JORDAN HAD ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 242 IN SO FAR AS IT ADDRESSED THE IMPERMISSIBILITY OF OCCUPYING AND RETAINING TERRITORIES BY FORCE, ''BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE FEEL THAT RESOLUTION 242 DOES NOT CONTAIN ALL THE FACTORS REQUIRED FOR A JUST AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHTS TO THEIR NATIONAL SOIL..... IT DOES NOT CONTAIN WHAT IT SHOULD, NAMELY A FRAMEWORK THAT COULD LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE, HONOURABLE AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE AREA..... THESE ARE JUST THE LIMITS OF JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 242.....''. IT IS QUITE CLEAR FROM THIS EXPLANATION BY THE KING THAT PRESS REPORTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SUMMIT OR HE HIMSELF HAD REJECTED RESOLUTION 242 ARE QUITE MISLEADING.

RELATIONS WITH THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION

3. ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD VISIT THE UNITED STATES TO MEET THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, KING HUSSEIN SAID THERE WERE AT PRESENT NO ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIM TO DO SO BUT THAT IF HE RECEIVED AN INVITATION AFTER THE NEW PRESIDENT'S INAUGURATION HE WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT THE US TO DISCUSS ''BILATERAL RELATIONS AND ARAB ISSUES.''

4. WHILE DECLINING TO SPECULATE ON WHAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY MIGHT BE, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE WAS WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY AND THOUGHT HE DETECTED A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE US WHICH MIGHT OFFER HOPE FOR A FUTURE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE US AND THE ARABS. THE INCOMING US ADMINISTRATION NOW HAD A FRESH MANDATE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECONSIDER ITS POLICIES. IT WOULD THEN BE POSSIBLE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM FROM THE STANDPOINT OF US NATIONAL INTERESTS. THE KING WENT ON: ''LET US NOT BE PRISONERS OF PAST POLICIES AND PAST MISTAKES..... IF WE APPROACH THE FUTURE WITH DETERMINATION, I BELIEVE THERE ARE GREAT POSSIBILITIES FOR A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE... WITH THE AMERICANS WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST, AND THEREFORE LASTING, PEACE IN THE ENTIRE AREA.''

5. THE KING ALSO STRESSED THAT HE HAD NOT ASKED FOR A MANDATE FROM THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS AT THE SUMMIT MEETING TO SPEAK TO THE AMERICANS ON THEIR BEHALF. HE WOULD DO SO ONLY IN HIS OWN CAPACITY AS JORDAN'S LEADER.

EC INITIATIVE

6. ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A EUROPEAN PLAN FOR PALESTINE, KING HUSSEIN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW OF ONE HAVING BEEN PROPOSED YET.

6. ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A EUROPEAN PLAN FOR PALESTINE, KING HUSSEIN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW OF ONE HAVING BEEN PROPOSED YET. BUT EUROPE WAS EXTREMELY CLOSE TO THE MIDDLE EAST, SHARING ITS INTERESTS AND CONCERNS. HE WENT ON TO SAY: "WE HAVE WELCOMED, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO, THE FEELING AMONG OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS OF WISHING TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WE ALL FACE. I BELIEVE THAT A VERY HEALTHY DIALOGUE BEGAN SOME TIME AGO AND I HOPE THAT IT WILL CONTINUE. WE CERTAINLY FEEL THAT EUROPE COULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN RESOLVING MANY OF THE PROBLEMS THAT MAY, IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECTS IF THEY PERSIST, AFFECT ALL OF US NOT ONLY HERE AND IN EUROPE BUT IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE."

5. IN A REFERENCE TO THE CHANGE WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND JORDAN SINCE THE ABROGATION OF THE ANGLO-JORDANIAN TREATY IN 1957, THE KING SAID THAT THESE RELATIONS WERE NOW FOUNDED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND WERE NOW "PROBABLY MUCH CLOSER AND MORE BINDING THAN THEY HAD EVER BEEN." BRITAIN WAS THE ONLY EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO RECEIVE SPECIAL MENTION IN THIS WAY.

PLO

6. THE KING ONCE AGAIN SAID (AS HE HAD IN HIS SPEECH AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SUMMIT) HOW SAD HE WAS AT THE ABSENCE OF THE PLO FROM THE SUMMIT, WHICH HAD BEEN CONVENED FOR THE SAKE OF PALESTINE, BUT THAT JORDAN STOOD FIRMLY BY THE POSITION ADOPTED AT RABAT THAT THE PLO WAS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS.

GULF SECURITY

7. ASKED WHETHER THE SUMMIT HAD DISCUSSED GULF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS THE FORMATION OF A GULF SECURITY FORCE, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSAL, BUT RATHER AN APPRECIATION BY THE ARABS OF THE NEED TO CO-OPERATE AND TO INCREASE ARAB STRENGTH SO THAT ALL ARABS WOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO DEFEND THEIR TERRITORY AGAINST CHALLENGE FROM ANY QUARTER.

FCO PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

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FM BEIRUT 281116Z NOV 80
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 313 OF 28 NOVEMBER 1980
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

1. MY U S COLLEAGUE HAS JUST RETURNED FROM A WEEK'S CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON. HIS COLLEAGUES FROM CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV AND (I THINK) JORDAN WERE ALSO THERE. DEAN TOLD ME THE FOLLOWING, IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT).

2. HAVING DECIDED THAT HE HAD NOTHING TO LOSE BY TELLING THE TRUTH, SINCE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES HERE, A TRANSFER FROM BEIRUT WOULD HARDLY BE A PUNISHMENT, HE DECIDED TO BE ''BRUTALLY HONEST''. HE TOLD STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AND THE PRESIDENT-ELECT'S LIAISON MEN THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT DECEIVED ITSELF IF IT OVERLOOKED THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTH THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNTIL THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS SETTLED. FAILURE TO GRASP THIS NETTLE WOULD ENSURE CONTINUING ARAB HOSTILITY, AND WOULD CAUSE FRICTION WITH AMERICA'S EUROPEAN ALLIES. EVEN PRESIDENT SADAT COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO SURVIVE FOR EVER HIS PRESENT ISOLATION. DEAN TOLD ME THAT THIS BLUNT WARNING HAD NOT GONE DOWN WELL.

3. HE THOUGHT THE EVOLUTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICY WOULD DEPEND CRITICALLY ON HIS CHOICE OF ADVISERS. AT PRESENT, HIS CAMP SEEMED EVENLY DIVIDED BETWEEN MODERATES AND HARDLINERS. AMONGST POSSIBLE MODERATE SECRETARIES OF STATE, HE MENTIONED SCHULTZ AND HAIG. HE THOUGHT KISSINGER'S MAIN ROLE WOULD BE IN GIVING HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SUITABILITY OF SENIOR OFFICIALS AND DIPLOMATS, AND THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS THERE WOULD BE MANY CHANGES.

4. ON PAST FORM, IT WAS A CREDO OF AN INCOMING ADMINISTRATION TO ASSERT THAT ITS PREDECESSOR HAD BEEN A BUNCH OF INCOMPETENT IDIOTS AND THAT THE FIRST STEP, THEREFORE, WOULD BE TO SEND A TRUSTED EMISSARY TO GET ''THE REAL FACTS''. ALL THIS WOULD TAKE TIME. DEAN SAID THAT PERHAPS THE ARABS COULD TAKE HEART FROM THE FACT THAT REAGAN'S VICTORY HAD BEEN SO OVERWHELMING THAT HE WAS NOT BEHOLDEN TO ANY ONE FACTION.

5. DEAN ALSO REMARKED THAT WHEN HE HAD BEEN SUMMONED TO WASHINGTON, HE HAD NOT BEEN SURE HE WOULD BE COMING BACK.

6. COMMENT. DEAN'S PAST CRITICISM OF ISRAELI POLICIES TOWARDS LEBANON ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE INCENSED THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR LEBANESE CHRISTIAN ALLIES, AND TO HAVE BEEN THE REASON FOR THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE HIM IN AUGUST.

STRACHAN.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 491 OF 28 NOV
INFO ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DOHA, DUBAI, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, LUXEMBOURG, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANAA, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MIPT (NOT TO ALL) AND MY TELNO 489 OF 26 NOVEMBER: ARAB SUMMIT MEETING IN AMMAN.

1. THE MEETING CONCLUDED ON 27 NOVEMBER. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS FROM THE COMMUNIQUE (TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT BEING SENT BY BAG TO ALL).

ARAB/ISRAEL

2. THE DECISIONS OF THE BAGHDAD AND TUNIS SUMMITS WERE REAFFIRMED, IN PARTICULAR THOSE RELATING TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION, AS WAS THE DECISION ANNOUNCED AFTER THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN AMMAN IN JULY TO SEVER ALL RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE WHICH RECOGNISED JERUSALEM AS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL OR TRANSFERRED ITS EMBASSY THERE.

AS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL OR TRANSFERRED ITS EMBASSY THERE.

PLO

3. SUPPORT FOR THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS WAS REPEATED IN STANDARD TERMS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL SENTENCE EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PLO AND ITS FREEDOM TO DECIDE ITS OWN POLICIES.

RESOLUTION 242

4. IT WAS STATED THAT RESOLUTION 242 ''DOES NOT ACCORD WITH ARAB RIGHTS, AND DOES NOT REPRESENT AN APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, IN PARTICULAR THE ISSUE OF PALESTINE.'' KING HUSSEIN ELABORATED ON THIS IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, ON WHICH WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY BY TELEGRAM.

CAMP DAVID

5. ARAB REJECTION OF CAMP DAVID AND THE EGYPT-ISRAEL TREATY WAS REAFFIRMED AND THE EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP ACCUSED OF CONSPIRING TO DESTROY ARAB UNITY. SOLIDARITY WAS EXPRESSED WITH THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE EVENTUAL RETURN OF EGYPT TO ARAB RANKS. US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND THE US ATTITUDE TO THE PLO WERE ALSO CONDEMNED.

IRAN/IRAQ

6. THE COMMUNIQUE:

(A) CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND THE SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS SEMICLN

(B) EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR IRAQ'S LEGITIMATE RIGHTS SEMICLN

(C) WELCOMED IRAQI CO-OPERATION WITH MEDIATION EFFORTS SEMICLN

(D) CALLED ON IRAN TO RESPOND AND APPEALED FOR NON-INTERVENTION BY EACH SIDE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER.

LEBANON

7. ISRAELI AGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON WAS CONDEMNED AND DECISIONS OF THE TUNIS SUMMIT RELATING TO LEBANON REAFFIRMED.

RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE

8. DETERMINATION WAS EXPRESSED TO PURSUE THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE ''TO SERVE MUTUAL INTERESTS AND ACHIEVE MORE UNDERSTANDING OF JUST ARAB DEMANDS ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION.'' THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO CALLED FOR STRENGTHENING OF CONTACTS WITH THE VATICAN AND THE OTHER CHRISTIAN CHURCHES.

ARAB UNITY

9. DEEP CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED OVER THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD AND AN APPEAL MADE FOR INTER-ARAB DISPUTES TO BE SETTLED

9. DEEP CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED OVER THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD AND AN APPEAL MADE FOR INTER-ARAB DISPUTES TO BE SETTLED ''WITHIN THE CHARTER OF ARAB SOLIDARITY LAID DOWN BY THE CASABLANCA SUMMIT OF 1965.''

ECONOMIC MATTERS

10. IT WAS STATED THAT PAN-ARAB SECURITY DEPENDED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOLID ECONOMIC BASE. TO THIS END THE MEETING APPROVED:

(A) A STRATEGY FOR JOINT ARAB ECONOMIC ACTION UNTIL THE YEAR 2000 SEMICLN

(B) A PLAN FOR A JOINT ARAB DEVELOPMENT DECADE (AN IRAQI PROPOSAL), ALLOCATING DOLLARS 5 BILLION OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE POORER ARAB STATES THROUGH SOFT LOANS. SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, KUWAIT, THE UAE AND QATAR COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO PROVIDING THIS SUM. THE DOOR WAS LEFT OPEN FOR FURTHER DONORS AND FOR FUTURE INCREASES IN THE FUND SEMICLN

(C) AN AGREEMENT ON THE INVESTMENT OF ARAB CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD SEMICLN

(D) A ''CHARTER FOR JOINT ECONOMIC ACTION,'' DESIGNED TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND PREFERENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS SEMICLN

(E) AN INCREASE IN THE FUNDS ALLOCATED TO AFRICAN AND ARAB TECHNICAL COOPERATION.

BAGHDAD PAYMENTS

11. THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THE BAGHDAD AND TUNIS SUMMITS IN THE COMMUNIQUE CAN BE READ AS IMPLYING THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER ARAB DONORS WILL CONTINUE THE PAYMENTS AGREED AT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT TO SYRIA DESPITE HER FAILURE TO ATTEND THE MEETING. THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER STATED PUBLICLY IN AMMAN BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE CONFERENCE THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO MEET THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS SHE HAD UNDERTAKEN AT THE BAGHDAD AND TUNIS SUMMITS. KUWAIT, THE UAE, QATAR AND IRAQ ARE ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE AGREED AT THE SUMMIT TO PAY LIBYA'S AND ALGERIA'S BAGHDAD SUMMIT CONTRIBUTIONS TO JORDAN. HOWEVER THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IS QUOTED IN A STATEMENT DATELINED AMMAN ON 26 NOVEMBER AS SAYING THAT COUNTRIES WHICH HAD ABSENTED THEMSELVES FROM THE AMMAN MEETING WOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM THE NEW ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FUNDS AGREED AT THE AMMAN SUMMIT: HE ALSO REMINDED THOSE MEMBERS OF THE REJECTIONIST FRONT WHICH WERE RECEIVING BAGHDAD MONEY (IE SYRIA AND THE PLO) THAT THESE FUNDS CAME FROM COUNTRIES WHICH HAD ATTENDED THE AMMAN SUMMIT AND NOT FROM THEIR COLLEAGUES IN THE FRONT. THE IMPLICATION AT LEAST AS FAR AS IRAQ'S CONTRIBUTION

(IE SYRIA AND THE PLO) THAT THESE FUNDS CAME FROM COUNTRIES WHICH HAD ATTENDED THE AMMAN SUMMIT AND NOT FROM THEIR COLLEAGUES IN THE FRONT. THE IMPLICATION, AT LEAST AS FAR AS IRAQ'S CONTRIBUTION TO SYRIA IS CONCERNED, SEEMS FAIRLY OBVIOUS.

KING HUSSEIN'S CLOSING SPEECH

12. IN HIS SPEECH AT THE FINAL SESSION OF THE MEETING, KING HUSSEIN EXPRESSED SADNESS OVER THE ABSENCE OF CERTAIN ARAB STATES. HE PARTICULARLY DEPLORED THE ''INABILITY'' OT THE PLO TO ATTEND, AND CRITICISED THE VIOLATION OF PREVIOUS SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS GUARANTEEING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PLO AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE LEADERSHIP HAD BEEN KEPT FROM CARRYING OUT ITS DUTY. HE ALSO EXPRESSED REGRET THAT LEBANON HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM ATTENDING THE SUMMIT.

13. THE KING CARRIES HIS IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF SYRIA STILL FURTHER IN A REFERENCE TO THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR: ARAB ARMS SHOULD NOT BE USED AGAINST AN ARAB PEOPLE AND FOR THIS REASON IT WAS ''DISGRACEFUL'' THAT IRAQ WAS BEING STABBED IN THE BACK BY AN ARAB HAND. HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE GRAVE DANGERS PRESENTED BY ARAB DIFFERENCES, BUT SAID THAT JORDAN WOULD CONTINUE TO AVOID RESPONDING TO ''DELIBERATELY CREATED PROVOCATIONS.''

URWICK

NNNN

With the compliments of

GEORGE WARDEN

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 490 OF 28 NOV
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4), DAMASCUS AND WASHINGTON: ROUTINE BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK.

MY DA'S TELNO SIC ACA/U2G OF 270730Z TO MODUK AND DAMASCUS
TELNO 351:
JORDAN/SYRIA

1. IN ADDITION TO THE STRONG IF ONLY IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF SYRIA IN KING HUSSEIN'S CLOSING ADDRESS TO THE AMMAN SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON 27 NOVEMBER (SEE MIFT), KING HUSSEIN SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT RELATIONS WITH SYRIA IN A PRESS CONFERENCE HE GAVE LATER THE SAME EVENING. AT THE BEGINNING HE AVOIDED MENTIONING SYRIA BY NAME, BUT WHEN REPEATEDLY QUESTIONED CONCERNING SYRIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ON THE BORDER WITH JORDAN HE SAID HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT SYRIA WAS PLANNING AGAINST JORDAN. THERE HAD BEEN CLEAR THREATS EVEN AT THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCES FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING, EVIDENTLY INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST JORDAN. HE WENT ON TO SAY: ''A FEW DAYS AGO, THE UNDOF MANDATE ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WAS RENEWED. WE THEN BEGAN TO OBSERVE THE ADVANCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS TO THE REGION NEXT TO THE JORDANIAN BORDER. THEY ARE SYRIAN FORCES. I HOPE THAT NO ARAB WILL COMMIT A MISTAKE AGAINST AN ARAB BROTHER..... ... AND THAT MATTERS WILL DEVELOP NO FURTHER. THESE FORCES MAY BE MOBILISED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES.''

2. IN REPLY TO FURTHER QUESTIONS THE KING ADDED: ''IF THREATS FROM [illegible] WE WILL FACE THEM AS WE HAVE FACED EVERY CHAL-

2. IN REPLY TO FURTHER QUESTIONS THE KING ADDED: ''IF THREATS FROM SYRIA MATERIALISE, WE WILL FACE THEM AS WE HAVE FACED EVERY CHALLENGE TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY. I ABHOR THE IDEA OF ONE ARAB FIGHTING ANOTHER. BUT IF WE ARE ATTACKED FROM ANY QUARTER WE WILL FIGHT WITH ALL OUR STRENGTH TO DEFEND OUR LAND.'' THE KING LATER REFERRED TO PAST JORDANIAN SUPPORT FOR SYRIA, AND DENIED THAT JORDAN HAD INTERVENED IN SYRIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR MASSED TROOPS ON THE BORDER WITH SYRIA. HE REMINDED HIS AUDIENCE THAT PRESIDENT ASAD HAD BEEN THE SYRIAN DEFENCE MINISTER WHEN SYRIAN FORCES ENTERED JORDAN IN 1970.

3. AFTER DELIVERING THIS BLUNT WARNING TO SYRIA THAT JORDAN WOULD RESIST A SYRIAN ATTACK WITH ALL THE MEANS AT HER DISPOSAL, THE KING AVOIDED REPLYING TO A QUESTION ON WHETHER JORDAN HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT FROM HER ARAB ALLIES IN THE EVENT OF A SYRIAN ATTACK (IN RESPONSE TO A SIMILAR QUESTION AT HIS OWN PRESS CONFERENCE, THE IRAQI PRESIDENT CONFINED HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT THE ARABS WOULD ''DENOUNCE'' SUCH AN ATTACK). KING HUSSEIN HOWEVER REITERATED THAT JORDAN WAS IN NO WAY INTERFERING IN SYRIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. AT THE END OF HIS CONFERENCE HE ADMITTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN MORE FRANKLY THAN HE INTENDED.

4. WHILE STRONG ATTACKS ON JORDAN IN THE SYRIAN MEDIA CONTINUE, ISRAELI RADIO IS ALSO CARRYING REPORTS THAT SYRIAN AIRCRAFT OVERFLEW AN AIR BASE IN NORTHERN JORDAN ON 26 NOVEMBER AND THAT JORDANIAN AIRSPACE HAS BEEN CLOSED TO AIRCRAFT FLYING ABOVE 25,000 FEET TO FACILITATE THE TASK OF JORDAN'S AIR DEFENCES. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF EITHER OF THESE REPORTS AND BRITISH AIRWAYS, WHO HAVE A FLIGHT COMING IN LATER TODAY, HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN GIVEN NOTIFICATION OF ANY RESTRICTION ON THE USE OF JORDAN AIRSPACE. NOR HAVE THEY SO FAR RECEIVED ANY INDICATION OF A POSSIBLE SYRIAN MOVE TO CLOSE THEIR AIRSPACE. MY DEFENCE ATTACHE AND HIS STAFF ARE CARRYING OUT EXTENSIVE GROUND RECONNAISSANCE OF KEY AREAS ALONG THE JORDANIAN/SYRIAN BORDER TODAY.

5. I AM SURE THE JORDANIANS SHARE MR WRIGHT'S HOPE THAT THE SYRIANS ARE DOING NO MORE THAN POSTURING. KING HUSSEIN, WHILE REPEATEDLY EMPHASISING HIS WISH TO AVOID A REPETITION OF PAST CLASHES WITH SYRIA, HAS HOWEVER LEFT THE SYRIANS IN NO DOUBT THAT THE JORDANIANS WILL MEET FORCE WITH FORCE IF NECESSARY. THE JORDANIANS ARE IN ANY CASE TAKING NO CHANCES, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE IS OVER.

URWICK
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

(2)

S/S

JORDAN/SYRIA

1. There have been substantial troop movements on the border before and during the Arab Summit now in its final stages in Amman. One and possibly two Syrian divisions have been moved to the border. But on present evidence I agree with HM Ambassador, Damascus, (Damascus telegram No 351) that we should not be unduly alarmed.

attached.

2. The following points are in addition to those in the Damascus telegram.

(i) The Jordanians have told us that they expect Syrian-sponsored infiltration into Jordan in the near future.

(ii) The Americans have told us that two groups of al-Fatah have already been infiltrated into Jordan from Syria and picked up.

(iii) The US assessment on 26 July described the location of the Syrian 9 Division (believed to be joining another division on the border) as 'of critical concern'. They also envisaged the possibility of Israel taking the opportunity to attack Syria.

(iv) Press reports are just coming in (pm 27 November) of a speech by King Hussein at the Summit in which he said that it was 'shameful that an Arab country should stab Iraq in the back' (an apparent reference to Syria); but the King went on to reaffirm support of the PLO.

Oliver Miles

R O Miles
Near East & North Africa Dept
W75 233 6048

27 November 1980

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PS/PUS
Sir J Graham
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FM DAMASCUS 271000Z NOV 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 351 27-11-80

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, TEL AVIV, MODUK DI4, ROUTINE BAGHDAD ,
JEDDA, BEIRUT, MOSCOW

SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS,
UKREP BRUSSELS

MYTELNO 346: SYRIA/JORDAN

1. AS REPORTED SEPARATELY, A MILITARY BUILDUP ON THE SOUTHERN BORDER FACING JORDAN HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME DAYS. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE POSITIONING OF THE UNITS AND FROM OTHER UNUSUAL FEATURES, SUCH AS THE DIGGING-IN AND CAMOUFLAGE OF TANKS AND THE PAINTING OF HEADLIGHTS, THAT THIS IS MORE THAN A ROUTINE MOVE TO REPLACE THE SYRIAN DIVISION NORMALLY STATIONED IN THIS AREA, WHICH HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO LEBANON. MOST OF THE UNITS ARE TO THE EAST OF DERAA, SOME DISTANCE FROM THE ISRAELI BORDER AND OSTENTATIOUSLY LINED PARALLEL TO THE JORDANIAN BORDER.

2. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNSELLOR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS OTHERWISE EVASIVE ON THESE MOVES WHEN I QUESTIONED HIM ON 25 NOVEMBER, BUT HE POINTEDLY DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE ABSENCE OF ANY ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL THEM. THE HEAD OF WEST EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY GAVE ME A CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE ON 26 NOVEMBER THAT THE SYRIANS WERE NOT CONTEMPLATING ANY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST JORDAN, DESCRIBING THE MOVES AS PART OF A ''WAR OF NERVES'' AND A RESPONSE TO JORDANIAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS NEAR THE SYRIAN BORDER (IE PRESUMABLY THE MOVE FROM 21 TO 23 NOVEMBER OF THE JORDANIAN 60 ARMOURED BRIGADE REFERRED TO IN AMMAN TELNO 026 OF 23 NOVEMBER).

3. THE SYRIAN PRESS HAS BEEN MAKING BELLICOSE NOISES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AMMAN SUMMIT, CLAIMING SYRIAN READINESS TO REACT VIOLENTLY TO PLOTTING AND WE HAVE HEARD THAT KHADDAM MADE SOME THREATS DURING THE PREPARATORY MEETINGS. THE OPENNESS WITH WHICH THE MOVES HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT DURING DAYLIGHT NEVERTHELESS LENDS WEIGHT TO MY ASSESSMENT THAT THEY ARE PRIMARILY PRESENTATIONAL RATHER THAN OPERATIONAL, AND DESIGNED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THOSE MEETING IN AMMAN NOT TO FORGET SYRIA IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE SHARES THIS ASSESSMENT, ALTHOUGH HE HAS POINTED OUT TO WASHINGTON THAT THERE IS A ONE IN TEN CHANCE THAT THE SYRIANS MAY BE CONSIDERING

/ SOME OFFENSIVE

SOME OFFENSIVE ACTION, SUCH AS ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT OR A QUICK SKIRMISH AGAINST REAL OR PRESUMED MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD TRAINING CAMPS.

4. LOGIC IS A POOR GUIDE IN THE MIDDLEEAST. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD MOUNT OVERT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST JORDAN, FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED AND AT A TIME WHEN THEIR SAUDI PAYMASTERS ARE IN CONFERENCE THERE. THERE IS ALSO A PARADOXICAL RESTRAINT IMPOSED BY THE SYRIAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY. WE HAVE HEARD THAT KUZNETSOV IS DUE HERE ON 1 DECEMBER FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. IN SPITE THE REPORTED DETERIORATION IN JORDANIN-SOVIET RELATIONS (AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 482 TO YOU), IT SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD MOUNT AN OPERATION AT THIS POINT WHICH WOULD CAUSE GRAVE EMBARRASSMENT TO THEIR SOVIET PARTNERS.

5. THERE IS CERTAINLY AN ELEMENT OF SPECIAL PLEADING IN JUWEIJATI'S CLAIM (PARA 2 ABOVE) THAT THESE MOVES ARE IN RESPONSE TO JORDANIAN MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS NEAR THE BORDER. I CONCLUDE NEVERTHELESS THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE UNDULY ALARMED BY THEM, AND THAT THEY PREIMARILY REFLECT SYRIAN NEUROSIS ABOUT JORDANIAN (AND IRAQI) INTENTIONS.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, UKREP BRUSSELS.

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 283 OF 31 OCTOBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR DI4)

INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV

A deepening account of the Lebanese flare up in Beirut.

BEIRUT TEL NO 281: PHALANGISTS VERSUS NLP IN AIN AL-RUMMANEH.

1. THE 4 DAYS FIGHTING BETWEEN THE 2 CHRISTIAN MILITIAS IN THE SOUTH EAST SUBURBS OF BEIRUT HAS RESULTED IN VICTORY FOR THE PHALANGISTS. ALL NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY (CHAMOUNIST) OFFICES AND BARRACKS APPEAR TO HAVE FALLEN AND THEIR LOCAL MILITIA COMMANDER, HANASH, AND HIS IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE HAVE FLED TO WEST BEIRUT WHERE THEY ARE THE GUESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE SYRIAN ADF. THE FIGHTING ON 29 OCTOBER WAS PARTICULARLY HEAVY, ALTHOUGH, AS IS USUAL IN LEBANESE BATTLES, THE EXPENDITURE OF MUCH AMMUNITION SEEMS TO HAVE RESULTED IN MUCH DESTRUCTION BUT RELATIVELY FEW CASUALTIES. WE HAVE NO FIRM FIGURES BUT SOME LOCAL PRESS REPORTS ESTIMATED 12 DEAD AND 20 WOUNDED.

2. AT ONE STAGE IT SEEMED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD INTERVENE TO STOP THE BATTLE. INDEED THE ADA WAS TOLD BY ARMY HEADQUARTERS THAT THEY WERE GOING IN DURING THE MORNING OF 29 OCTOBER. THIS NEWS WAS BROADCAST ON THE WORLD SERVICE OF THE BBC. THE REALITY WAS DIFFERENT. THE ARMY STOOD BACK AND LET THE PHALANGISTS FINISH THE JOB. THE REASONS/EXCUSES ARE NOW EMERGING. THE DANGER OF BEING CAUGHT IN CROSSFIRE SEMICOLON TO AVOID ADDING A THIRD SOURCE OF FIRING WHICH WOULD HAVE INCREASED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES SEMICOLON AN ORDER TO INTERVENE WAS GIVEN IN PRINCIPLE BUT LOCAL COMANDERS HAD DISCRETION SEMICOLON DIFFICULTIES WITH LINES OF SUPPLY. FROM THE AMERICAN DA WE HAVE HEARD THAT GENERAL KHOURY PERSONALLY VISITED COMPANY COMMANDERS IN AIN AL-RUMMANEH/FURN ES-SHUBBAK AND TOLD THEM THEY WOULD HAVE TO MOVE TO STOP THE FIGHTING. BUT WHEN THE MOMENT CAME THOSE OFFICERS REFUSED TO MOVE THEIR TROOPS BECAUSE THE PHALANGISTS HAD TAKEN THE PRECAUTION OF SEIZING THEIR FAMILIES AS HOSTAGES.

3. THE ARMY'S FAILURE HAS SEVERAL SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE STATE HAS BEEN FURTHER UNDERMINED. NON-CHRISTIAN LEBANESE WILL SEE REASON TO MISTRUST THE IMPARTIALITY OF PRESIDENT SARKIS AND THE ARMY COMMANDER. THE ARMY IN WHOM SO MANY HOPES WERE PLACED HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IN TIMES OF SERIOUS INTERNAL CRISIS IT MIGHT WELL DISINTEGRATE AS IT DID DURING THE CIVIL WAR. NO AMOUNT OF NEW EQUIPMENT, ELABORATE TRAINING AND SINCERE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM LEBANON'S FRIENDS IN THE WEST HAS MADE

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ANY DIFFERENCE TO THE FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESS OF THE VULNERABILITY OF BOTH OFFICERS AND MEN TO PRESSURE ON THEIR FAMILIES. THE PROSPECT OF ANY AGREED FURTHER DEPLOYMENT IN SENSITIVE AREAS OF BEIRUT MUST NOW BE CONSIDERED VERY REMOTE INDEED.

4. THE PHALANGISTS HAVE COMPLETED THE OPERATION WHICH BEGAN ON 7 JULY. THE AIN AL-RUMMANEH SUBURB WAS THE LAST AREA WHERE THE CHAMOUNISTS COULD MUSTER A SIZEABLE MILITARY FORCE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EX-PRESIDENT FRANGIEH'S PRO SYRIAN MILITIA, THE MARADA, IN THE NORTH, THE PHALANGISTS HAVE NOW ELIMINATED THEIR MILITARY RIVALS IN MOST OF THE CHRISTIAN SECTORS OF LEBANON. THE QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER THEY WILL BE SATISFIED WITH THAT OR WHETHER THEY WILL BE TEMPTED TO CARRY THE BATTLE ACROSS THE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DEMARCATION LINE INTO THE NEIGHBOURING MUSLIM SUBURB OF CHYAH. SUCH A MOVE HAS STGATEGIC ATTRACTIONS, THEIR FRONT WHICH RUNS FROM THE PORT WOULD THEN BE EXTENDED SOUTHWARDS TO THE ROAD RUNNING WESTWARDS FROM HAZMIEH VIA GALERIE SIM'AN TOWARDS THE AIRPORT ROUNDABOUT AND ULTIMATELY TO THE SEA, THEREBY GIVING THEM CONTROL OF BOTH MAIN ROADS INTO BEIRUT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE DAMASCUS ROAD. THIS WOULD BE A NASTY BLOW TO THE PALESTINIANS, WHOSE ANXIETY WAS SHOWN DURING THE RECENT FIGHTING BY THE MOVEMENT OF MEN AND MATERIAL BACK INTO CHYAH - AN AREA WHICH THE SHIITE MILITIA AMAL HAD MADE ITS OWN DURING THE EALY SUMMER. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHICH WAY AMAL JUMPS. DURING CLASHES EARLIER THIS YEAR BETWEEN AMAL AND THE PALESTINIANS, AMAL RECEIVED ARMS FROM THE CHAMOUNISTS. THEY MAY THINK THIS DEBT HAS BEEN PAID BY RECEPTION OF THE FLEEING CHAMOUNIST MILITIA. IF THEY WERE MERE OPPORTUNISTS, AMAL MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGE IN CHANGING SIDES AND COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PHALANGISTS. THIS WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS OF BEIRUT FORM A CHAIN OF SHIITE AREAS ALL THE WAY TO THE SEA IN OUZAI. THE SHIITES ARE THUS WELL-PLACED TO CUT THE ROAD TO SIDON AND DEPRIVE THE PALESTINIANS OF THEIR MAIN PORT. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT WHETHER AMAL WILL ADOPT THIS COURSE SEMICOLON IT WOULD LEAD TO MAJOR HOSTILITIES WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND WOULD MEAN A RESUMPTION OF THE CIVIL WAR. BUT THEY MAY USE THE POSSIBILITY AS LEVERAGE ON THE PALESTINIANS IN THE SOUTH AND IN SOUTHERN BEIRUT WHERE THE TWO COMMUNITIES LIVE CHEEK BY JOWL.

5. AS USUAL, REACTIONS OF THE SYRIANS CAN ONLY BE GUESSED AT. CHAMOUN HAS REPEATEDLY DENOUNCED THEIR OCCUPATION SEMICOLON THEY MAY HAVE LET THE PHALANGISTS KNOW THAT THEY WOULD NOT INTERVENE IF THE OLD MAN'S FORCES WERE ONCE AGAIN SAVAGELY REDUCED. WHETHER THE SYRIANS WOULD SEE SIMILAR ADVANTAGE IN THE PHALANGISTS AND AMAL TRYING SOMETHING SIMILAR WITH THE PALESTINIANS, WE SIMPLY CANNOT ASSESS AT THE MOMENT, BUT IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL.

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6. IT IS LITTLE OVER A YEAR SINCE THE LEBANESE ARMY ENTERED AIN AL-RUMMANEH SHOWERED WITH FLOWERS FROM A POPULATION WHICH SAW IN THEIR PRESENCE RELIEF FROM THE INSECURITY WHICH HAD DOMINATED THE AREA SINCE THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR. THEIR UNGLORIOUS DEPARTURE MEANS THAT ONLY BY WINNING A STRAIGHT FIGHT WITH THE PHALANGISTS COULD THEY RECOVER CONTROL. THIS IS UNLIKELY. WHAT BEIRUT MAY NOW FACE IS A RETURN TO THE EARLIER REGULAR FIGHTING BETWEEN THE CHRISTIANS IN AIN AL-RUMMANEH AND THE MUSLIMS AND PALESTINIANS IN CHYAH. AN UNPLEASANT PROSPECT.

7. A MORE ATTRACTIVE OUTCOME WOULD BE PHALANGIST-MUSLIM AGREEMENT TO THE ARMY HOLDING A THIN CORDON SANITAIRE BETWEEN THEM. WE SHALL SEE.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 684 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO UKMIS NEY YORK, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, BEIRUT, JERUSALEM, PARIS AND BONN.

ARAB ISRAEL.

I CALLED YESTERDAY ON BOUTROS GHALI, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM TRAVELS ABROAD. HE WAS AS PESSIMISTIC AS USUAL.

2. HE REPEATED THAT EGYPT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE BEING CONTINUED TO COVER THE GAP UNTIL AND PROBABLY BEYOND THE TRIPARTITE SUMMIT. HE EXPECTED THIS TO SLIP WELL PAST JANUARY, AND IF REAGAN BECAME PRESIDENT IT WOULD BE OFF. HE RECALLED THE 3 SUGGESTIONS HE HAD PUT TO YOU IN NEW YORK (UKMIS TELNO 1347) FOR SPECIFIC GESTURES BY THE NINE, VIZ:-

(A) SPONSORING A CALL AT THE UN FOR AN ADVISORY OPIONION FROM THE ICJ ON THE ISREALI OCCUPTION AND SETTLEMENTS.,

(B) WITHDRAWAL OF AMBASSADORS.,

(C) AID FOR AND ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE HAD FAVOURABLE REACTIONS, PARTICULARLY TO (A) AND (C), FROM THE FRENCH AND GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND ASKED WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN FURTHER THOUGHT TO THE FCO. I SAID I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, BUT WAS PERSONALLY SCEPTICAL WHETHER AN ICJ OPINION COULD ADD ANYTHING OF VALUE TO RESOLUTION 242. HE DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF THE CURRENT CANVASSING OF THE ICJ IDEA AMONG ARAB AND OTHER DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK, BUT DISMISSED IT AS FUTILE UNLESS SPONSORED BY THE EUROPEANS.

3. GHALI MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN HIS VIEW SUCH GESTURES CONSTITUTED THE MOST USEFUL FORM THAT THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE COULD TAKE SINCE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM WE COULD DO LITTLE MORE THAN MAKE DECLARATIONS. I QUESTIONED THIS, AND SAID THAT FOR OUR PART WE HAD HOPES THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP FURTHER IDEAS ON THE DETAILED INGREDIENTS OF A SETTLEMENT, WHICH MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE REFINED IN CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES. GHALI SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT WE HAD ANOTHER TWENTY QUESTION EXERCISE IN MIND, BUT SAW LITTLE FUTURE IN IT AS THE ISREALIS WOULD REFUSE TO TALK.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 434 OF 29 OCT
INFO ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON

PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING IN AMMAN

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE SIX ARAB STATES RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARAB SUMMIT (SEE HEATH'S TELELETTERS TO JENNER OF 8 AND 15 OCTOBER, NOT TO ALL) TOGETHER WITH KADDOUMI OF THE PLO AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE MET IN AMMAN ON 28 OCTOBER AND WILL CONTINUE THEIR DELIBERATIONS TODAY. THE RORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO TOOK THE CHAIR, HAS CLAIMED TO THE PRESS THEY GOT OFF TO A GOOD START.

2. SHORTLY BEFORE THE MEETING OPENED, HOWEVER, TWO OF THE THREE MEN ARRESTED BY THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES FOLLOWING THE MURDER ON 30 JULY OF A PROMINENT SYRIAN POLITICAL EXILE (MY TELNO 297 OF 2 AUGUST) WERE EXECUTED IN A PRISON IN AMMAN ON 27 OCTOBER SEMICLN THEY ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SYRIAN NATIONALS (THE THIRD ASSAILANT, A MEMBER OF THE DIPLOMATIC STAFF OF THE SYRIAN EMBASSY, WAS RETURNED TO SYRIA AT THE TIME). IT IS SOME YEARS SINCE SIMILAR EXECUTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN JORDAN SEMICLN NO DOUBT THEY WERE INTENDED TO SERVE AS A WARNING AGAINST FURTHER SYRIAN-INSPIRED ATTEMPTS AT SUBVERSION IN JORDAN. THE FACT THAT THEY WERE ALLOWED TO TAKE PLACE THE DAY BEFORE THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S ARRIVAL IN AMMAN SHOWS JORDANIAN DISREGARD FOR SYRIAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES. HOWEVER, KADOUMI ARRIVED IN SPITE OF THIS (WITH 14 BODYGUARDS, ACCORDING TO PRINCE HASSAN EXCLAM).

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 4406 OF 28 OCTOBER
INFO TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, JERUSALEM AND MODUK
INFO SAVING BAGHDAD AND JEDDA.

YOUR TELNO 200 TO TEL AVIV: GOLAN

1. KORN, DIRECTOR, ISRAEL AND ARAB-ISRAELI AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT, TOLD US TODAY, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT AS WELL AS THE US AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON BEGIN ON 22 OCTOBER, THE US CHARGE IN TEL AVIV HAD TODAY DELIVERED A STRONG ORAL MESSAGE TO BEGIN FROM MUSKIE, WARNING THAT ANNEXATION OF GOLAN WOULD DO QUOTE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO RESOLUTION 242 UNQUOTE. KORN WAS FRANK ABOUT THE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES WHICH ISRAELI ACTION COULD CAUSE PRESIDENT CARTER DURING THIS LAST FEW DAYS BEFORE 4 NOVEMBER. IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR A BILL TO ANNEX GOLAN TO BE RUSHED THROUGH THE KNESSET THIS WEEK, EVEN IF ANYONE WANTED THAT. BUT THEY HAD JUST HEARD THAT THE LABOUR PARTY APPARENTLY INTENDED TO TABLE A DRAFT BILL OF THEIR OWN. THIS MIGHT BE NO MORE THAN A MANIFESTATION OF PERES' STRUGGLE WITH RABIN. BUT IF BY ANY CHANCE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ACTION ON GOLAN (EG SOME DECLARATION BY BEGIN) THIS WEEK WERE TO LEAD TO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION KORN PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT, IN SPITE OF THE JEWISH VOTE, PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT VETO A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ANNEXATION. KORN THOUGHT IT MORE LIKELY THAT (LIKE THE MOVE OF HIS OFFICE TO E. JERUSALEM) BEGIN WOULD USE GOLAN ANNEXATION AS A THREAT TO BE BROUGHT OUT AT INTERVALS.

2. AS BACKGROUND KORN SAID THAT THE US EMBASSY AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN ALTERNATELY OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC ON THIS QUESTION. AFTER LINOWITZ'S TRIP AT THE END OF AUGUST THE DANGER SEEMED TO HAVE RECEDED. MEMBERS OF THE KNESSET OF ALL PARTIES WHOM THE US EMBASSY HAD CANVASSED HAD VIRTUALLY ALL DEPLORED THE PROSPECT OF A BILL GOING FORWARD THOUGH RELUCTANT INDIVIDUALLY TO BE SEEN TO BLOCK IT. WHAT THEN ALARMED THE AMERICANS WAS BEGIN'S OWN REFUSAL TO COMMIT HIMSELF IN RESPONSE TO AMERICAN PLEAS.

/3. WE TOLD

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3. WE TOLD KORN IN CONFIDENCE THAT MR HURD HAD SPOKEN ABOUT GOLAN TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR. HE SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALSO MADE A DEMARCHE AND VERY LIKELY THE FRENCH TOO. HE BELIEVED THAT ALTHOUGH RELUCTANT TO ADMIT IT THE ISRAELIS FELT THAT THE EAST JERUSALEM AFFAIR HAD TURNED OUT TO BE A SETBACK. THIS MIGHT HELP RESTRAIN BEGIN OVER GOLAN.

FCO PASS SAVING BAGHDAD AND JEDDA.

HENDERSON

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 505 OF 24 OCTOBER
INFO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM

OUR TEL NO 493: GOLAN

1. ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY HERE, THE US AMBASSADOR, TALKING TO HIS STAFF, DESCRIBED HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN ABOUT THE GOLAN BILL ON 22 OCTOBER AS ''IMPASSIONED''. BEGIN HAD MADE NO COMMITMENTS AND SHOWN NO FLEXIBILITY, BUT HAD PROMISED TO CONSULT HIS CABINET (IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHEN).

2. ISRAEL RADIO THIS MORNING QUOTED US ADMINISTRATION SOURCES AS WARNING AGAINST THE PASSAGE OF A GOLAN BILL WHICH WOULD PROVOKE A STRONG REACTION FROM THE US: AROUSE INTERNATIONAL OPPOSTION: AND COULD EVEN BURY THE PEACE PROCESS.

3. YADIN HAS NOW SPOKEN OUT PUBLICLY AGAINST THE BILL. HE IS THE FIRST MINISTER TO DO SO. THE ISRAELI PRESS CLAIM THAT OTHER MINISTERS ARE ALSO HESITANT. BUT THE CABINET ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE TIME TO DISCUSS THE BILL IN DETAIL DURING THE REGULAR CABINET MEETING ON 26 OCTOBER SINCE MINISTERS WILL BE ATTENDING THE DEPARTURE CEREMONY FOR PRESIDENT NAVON'S VISIT TO EGYPT.

4. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF LEWIS (PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE) IS NOT QUOTED.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 677 OF 18 OCTOBER
INFO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, AMMAN, MODUK

MY TELNO 651: EGYPT/US MILITARY COOPERATION

1. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE ANNOUNCED ON 16 OCTOBER THAT 1400 US SOLDIERS WOULD ARRIVE IN EGYPT ON 13 NOVEMBER, ACCOMPANIED BY 12 A-7 AIRCRAFT, FOR JOINT EXERCISES WITH THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES. IN THE NEAR FUTURE AN EGYPTIAN UNIT WOULD HOLD SIMILAR JOINT EXERCISES IN THE US AT EGYPTIAN REQUEST.

2. VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK TOLD THE PRESS ON HIS RETURN FROM WASHINGTON ON 17 OCTOBER THAT THE US WAS STUDYING AN EGYPTIAN REQUEST TO SPEED UP MILITARY SUPPLIES TO EGYPT.

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Prime Minister:

I send you a paper written by Elie Kedourie discussing whether or no the Arab-Israeli question is the fundamental problem of the Middle East.

Hugh Thomas
October 17, 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI QUESTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1- It is very widely believed that the Arab-Israel conflict is the central issue in the Middle East. It is undoubtedly the case that this conflict is the central issue for Israel, for the Palestinians, and for some (but by no means all) Arab states.

2- But for other countries to take for granted the centrality of this issue is to allow the interests and passions of those who are directly involved to distract them from their own, necessarily quite different, interests and priorities.

3- Thus, if we look at the main issues and problems which this country had to deal with in the Middle East during the decades following the establishment of the state of Israel, we find that in fact they had little or nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The evacuation of the Suez Canal base, the Baghdad Pact policy, Nasser's challenge and the Suez expedition, the Iraqi coup d'état of 1958 and the destruction of the Baghdad Pact which followed, the Iraqi attempt to take over Kuwait, the abandonment of Aden and the Gulf, the downfall of the Shah, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: in all those decisions and events with all their consequences for British interests, the Arab-Israeli conflict was not central, but marginal - and sometimes even less than marginal.

4- The same is true today. There are, in this area, three paramount objectives for Great Britain: (a) to prevent the extension of Soviet power and influence, (b) to ensure the security of the sea-lanes between the Persian Gulf and Europe, and (c) to ensure an uninterrupted supply of oil at

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prices which do not continually rise. Assume the Arab-Israeli conflict somehow ended either through a settlement acceptable to the parties involved, or through the disappearance of Israel, it would do nothing to diminish the Soviet interest, or increase the security of the sea-lanes, or bring about the disappearance, or the neutralization, of the cartel operated by OPEC.

5- There is another substantial British interest in the Middle East. Because of their enormous revenues, the oil-producing states constitute a most important market for British exports. But this market does not operate according to ordinary commercial principles. Governments overwhelmingly decide what is to be bought and from whom, and are thus in a position to exact a political price for buying foreign products and services. This naturally sets up a competition between exporting states not only as regards quality, prices and delivery, but also in terms of supporting the political interests of potential or actual customers. Today, this means supporting the stance of one or other of the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli conflict, marginal though this conflict might be to British or other Western interests. But this is a fundamentally unsound position since it means an open-ended and endless series of political demands made by governments which are unstable, unsure of their legitimacy and hence capricious, and upon the satisfaction of which commercial transactions are made conditional: today it is the Arab-Israeli conflict, tomorrow it will be something else. The only real remedy is the dismantling of the cartel; but given that in the short term at any rate this is unlikely to happen, and given that foreign competitors will offer political inducements, HMG will feel bound to offer similar inducements in order to help British exports.

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6- For this reason, and also because the Arab-Israeli conflict is used by the USSR in order to advance its influence and power, it seems sensible to argue that a settlement of the conflict would be very desirable.

7- But as in all political issues, the desirability is relative, not absolute. A settlement exacts a price from, and presents risks for, the parties immediately involved. But those who take it upon themselves to facilitate, or mediate, or press the parties to reach a settlement, may also face risks and have to pay a price, and the question arises whether the risks taken and the price to be paid are justified.

8- We must here consider whether the Arab-Israeli conflict is now as acute as it had intermittently been in the interval between 1948 and 1973. The great difference between the present situation and that which used to obtain is that Egypt has now withdrawn from the anti-Israel coalition. Without Egypt the remaining members of this coalition are likely to consider war with Israel to pose unacceptably high risks. It is difficult to see Syria or Jordan jointly or separately initiating active hostilities against Israel. Their policy must be to persuade or threaten Egypt into rejoining the coalition. But if this policy does not succeed, sooner or later they must work for an accommodation with the enemy. Would therefore not the best policy be, for those outside powers who fear the consequences of a new Arab-Israeli war, to try and make sure that Egypt never rejoins the coalition?

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9- It may be said that this line or argument overlooks two important considerations. First, that even a relatively quiescent Arab-Israeli conflict creates anti-Western hostility among Muslim and Arab states at a time when their support against the Soviet action in Afghanistan is most desirable. It is, however, very doubtful whether the Muslim and Arab states will, even in the absence of an Arab-Israeli conflict, act in unison. Their circumstances, their political attitudes and interests are so varied and sometimes so contradictory that it is chimerical to hope to will them into an anti-Soviet coalition. It is also most doubtful whether such a coalition would have any weight to speak of, or whether it would deter the Soviets from continuing the occupation of Afghanistan, or engaging in other adventures further afield.

10- In the second place, it is feared that continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict might incite Saudi Arabia to place an embargo on the supply of oil to the West. An embargo is an extremely serious matter, and has undoubtedly to be prevented. Satisfaction of Saudi Arabian desiderata over Palestine - if satisfaction is possible - will perhaps avert an embargo. There is, however, no guarantee that an embargo may not be threatened in the future over some other issue. Such a situation is neither safe nor acceptable, and the only way of guarding against it is to neutralize the ability to threaten. In any case, it is by no means clear that Saudi Arabia can afford to put such threats into action. The Powers against whom the embargo is threatened, and the United States in particular, are the only Powers who can shield Saudi Arabia against Soviet designs, and the Soviet encirclement which the Saudis must see as a present and clear danger.

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11- But what is it, in any case, which would satisfy the Muslim and Arab world, and the Saudis in particular? This is not entirely clear - and it is not clear for a good reason, namely that there is no agreement among Arab states about what would constitute a satisfactory or an acceptable settlement. This indeed is one of the most important reasons why the conflict has remained intractable for so long. There are a great many parties to the conflict and their interests are divergent and sometimes irreconcilable.

12- In connexion with a projected settlement, Jerusalem and the PLO are usually mentioned. On both these issues Israelis of all political colours have been adamant; they would not give up Jerusalem, and they would not negotiate with the PLO so long as its objectives are those set down in the Palestine National Covenant - objectives which are incompatible with the existence of Israel as a sovereign state. It is therefore on the cards that any attempt to satisfy the Saudis in this respect would raise tension and even activate what is now a quiescent conflict. The results of new hostilities being unpredictable, the policy of attempting to satisfy the Saudis must thus be seen as equally unpredictable in its consequences. There is no safe and easy way of securing the benefits anticipated from this policy, nor does the objective give any guidance as to the steps or the path by which it is to be reached.

13- Apart from the possibility of new hostilities between Israel and her neighbours - hostilities which may now involve Saudi Arabia - another contingency has to be kept in mind. Let it be assumed that somehow a PLO-governed state is established in the West Bank and/or Gaza. By its nature such a state would be poor, irredentist and unstable. It

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would be a threat as much to King Husain as to Israel. Israel might be thought quite able to defend itself against such a state; but given the preponderance of Palestinians in Jordan, the present regime would be vulnerable to subversion conducted by a Palestinian sovereign state, particularly if this state were to be armed and supported by the Soviet Union and its allies.

14- Another risk incidental to such a policy must be considered. The United States has repeatedly emphasized its commitment to the continued existence of Israel. Other Western countries have taken the same line. Whatever private reservations underlie this public posture, the survival of Israel is widely taken to be somehow associated with Western, and more especially United States prestige in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Soviet Union in particular has, for its own purposes, sedulously propagated this notion. Prestige and power are mutually supportive. If therefore those Powers who are supposed to be Israel's friends are seen to be pressing Israel to give way, this will be ascribed to their fear of Israel's enemies, and their prestige will be to this extent diminished. The Soviet Union - we may observe in this context - is never seen to press its friends to give way.

15- The policy of pressing for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict seems thus fraught with risk and uncertainty. The political advantages to be gained from it seem equally problematic. When it is remembered how many and grave are the other causes of instability and disorder in the Middle East, which will persist regardless of this particular conflict or its outcome, abstention rather than active involvement in this issue seems the wiser course.

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15- This paper was written before the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran. The situation which these hostilities have created, but also in some measure simply unveiled, will serve to reinforce the argument here set out.

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TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 493 OF 17 OCTOBER

INFO DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND JERUSALEM

MY TEL NO 429: GOLAN

1. DESPITE EARLIER AMERICAN OPTIMISM (MY TUR AND YOUR TEL NO157) GEULA COHEN HAS THIS WEEK LAID A PRIVATE MEMBER'S BILL BEFORE THE KNESSET CALLING FOR THE ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE COALITION HAVE SUBMITTED A SIMILAR DRAFT BILL IN ORDER TO PREVENT MRS COHEN AGAIN TRAPPING THE COALITION AND GAINING THE CREDIT. BUT MRS COHEN'S BILL HAS PRECEDENCE.

2. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE KNESSET AND PF THE ISRAELI PUBLIC REGARD THE RETURN OF GOLAN TO SYRIA AS UNTHINKABLE AND MOST SEE ANNEXATION AS THE BEST MEANS OF AVOIDING IT. WITHIN THIS MAJORITY, THE ONLY DIFFERENCES ARE ON TIMING. ONLY A MINORITY OF MEMBERS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE KNESSET CAN CONTEMPLATE VOTING AGAINST THE DRAFTS, ESPECIALLY IN AN ISRAELI ELECTION YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE LABOUR POLITICAL COMMITTEE VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY AGAINST SUPPORTING ANNEXATION AT THIS TIME, THE PARTY IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM ITS GOLAN SETTLERS. MOST OF ITS MKS ARE THEREFORE LIKELY, AT BEST, TO ABSTAIN (ALTHOUGH PERES HAS SAID THAT HE WOULD PREFER A VOTE AGAINST). EVEN FEWER HERUT AND NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY MEMBERS WOULD ABSTAIN.

3. THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTRY RECOGNISE THAT TO PASS AN ANNEXATION BILL AT THIS TIME WOULD BE BAD FOR ISRAEL INTER-NATIONALLY, AND APPEARS TO HAVE PERSUADED SHAMIR OF THIS. BEGIN'S ATTITUDE WILL HOWEVER BE CRUCIAL. WE HAVE HEARD PRIVATELY THAT HE TOLD LABOUR SETTLER'S LOBBYISTS EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT HE SUPPORTED AN ANNEXATION BILL. IF HE WISHES TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF HAVING ENCOURAGED THE BILL, HE COULD USE THE KNESSET POWERS TO REQUIRE A 60 DAY DELAY BEFORE THE FIRST READING OF A PRIVATE BILL. THE TROUBLE IS THAT EVEN IF HE DOES THIS, WHEN IT COMES TO A VOTE AT THE END OF NOVEMBER, THERE MAY WELL NOT BE ENOUGH KNESSET MEMBERS PREPARED TO VOTE IT DOWN.

ROBINSON

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MR J C MOBERLY

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL)

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. SIGNOR COLOMBO HAD NOTED PRESS REPORTS CLAIMING PROGRESS IN THE CAMP DAVID AUTONOMY TALKS, AND SUSPECTED AN ELEMENT OF U.S. ELECTION GIMMICKRY. SHAMIR HAD BEEN QUICK TO CLAIM THAT THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR SHOWED THAT THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT WAS NOT THE ONLY ONE IN THE AREA. LORD CARRINGTON NOTED THAT THE TEMPTATION FOR THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE MORE OF THIS THEME WOULD GROW IF THE JORDANIANS CONTINUED TO BE SO PRO-IRAQI. THE DANGER WAS THAT

ONLY ONE IN THE AREA. LORD CARRINGTON NOTED THAT THE TEMPTATION FOR THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE MORE OF THIS THEME WOULD GROW IF THE JORDANIANS CONTINUED TO BE SO PRO-IRAQI. THE DANGER WAS THAT BEGIN MIGHT SEIZE THE CHANCE TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR JORDAN TO BE SEEN AS A MODERATE ELEMENT IN THE DISPUTE, AND TO BE INVOLVED IN A SETTLEMENT. HE MIGHT ALSO WISH TO PRE-EMPT SHIMON PERES FROM TAKING A DIFFERENT POLICY TO HIS OWN ON JORDAN.

2. COLOMBO WAS WORRIED BY THE LACK OF A UNITED APPROACH IN THE NINE. THE DANGER WAS THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DEFINE OUR POSITION BEFORE THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS. THERE WERE ONLY TWENTY DAYS BETWEEN THESE ELECTIONS AND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL. WE RAN THE RISK OF GOING TO THE SUMMIT WITH NOTHING TO SAY. THIS WOULD DILUTE THE IMPACT OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. WE COULD LOSE AT LUXEMBOURG WHAT WE HAD GAINED AT VENICE. LORD CARRINGTON NOTED THAT THE SAUDIS EXPECTED THE COMMUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE AMERICANS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, RATHER THAN TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM ALONE. BUT HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT WE WERE STILL ACTIVELY WORKING ON THE ISSUE, TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN THINKING AFTER THE ELCTIONS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE INFORMAL POLITICAL CO-OPERATION MEETING ON 25 OCTOBER. LORD CARRINGTON UNDERTOOK TO FEED INTO THIS DISCUSSION SOME IDEAS ON WHAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MIGHT SAY ON ARAB/ISRAEL.

3. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL) ON COMMUNITY ISSUES.

ARCULUS

NNNN

Weekend Box.

(2)

I imagine that there will be a reporte from Lord Carrington on his return.

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY
ASHDOWN HOUSE
123 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1E 6RB
TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE . 01-212 3301
SWITCHBOARD 01-212 7676

Secretary of State for Industry

14 October 1980

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt Hon Lord Carrington KCMG MC
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs
Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Peter.

When I spoke to you about the PLO I explained that I was concerned for British interests. It seemed to me that by encouraging PLO representativeness we encourage, a) the emergence of a Soviet client state, which must be b) irredentist and threatening to Saudi Arabia and to Jordan and c) we intensify Palestinian aspirations (see similar view expressed by Linowitz reported in recent telegram) and Israeli insecurity - both incandescent factors.

You replied that Jordan and Saudi Arabia support the PLO; and that (c) is a risk, but that you always stress the need for the PLO to accept Israel as a condition for representativeness. Ian, to whom I spoke when we flew back together from Paris, adds that the PLO are not a Russian client, and are indeed financed in part by Saudi Arabia.

I would now like to return to the fray!

1) The PLO do seem to be very close to Russia - see attached ... Shapiro article in SURVEY. There seems to be no change in the situation which he describes.

2) Saudi Arabia may provide money - as an insurance premium. They are not adventurous, and seek to be left alone. But they are afraid of the PLO; witness their care not to allow PLO activity in their own country. It is even said that during the Lebanese civil war of 1975-76 they helped financially the Maronites who were fighting the PLO.

3) Whatever the exact truth of the matter, it cannot be gainsaid that the PLO are clients of the Soviet Union - while at the same time receiving help from the Saudis. Is it safe to disregard the Soviet connection, and assume that the Saudis will be able

/to ...

to control a PLO state in Palestine?

Of course it is a British and a Western interest to see an end to the Israeli/Arab quarrel. But a settlement cannot be the outcome of Israel/PLO negotiations. If Israel had bargained as effectively with Syria and Jordan as with Egypt, the PLO would cease to count.

Jordan saw the PLO off in 1970. Syria may use the PLO outside her own borders, but has never given them freedom to act in Syria. When, in 1975-6 the PLO tried to take over the Lebanon, Syria moved in with Maronite agreement and clobbered them.

I have no knowledge of Israel's attitude but I surmise that if it weren't for the danger that the PLO might become officially recognised and might even acquire territorial rights the PLO would not be more than a nuisance.

Any attempt to increase UK arms trade with Saudi Arabia by doing what we think will please and supporting the PLO would be short-sighted if we want peace in the area.

The PLO now has a large following in the Arab areas. But this is largely because it is thought to be winning, to be recognised and supported by the Arab States, by the Soviet Union, by West European powers and even on occasion by some US officials. If this should change, the PLO would soon lose popularity. Who now remembers the Egyptian Wafd which were once thought to have the overwhelming support of the Egyptian people?

It is not the PLO, I suggest, that can liquidate the Arab/Israeli quarrel, but Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Progress towards peace between Israel and Egypt has made much headway. Of course, Egypt will try to obtain as much as practicable from Israel in order to justify its claim to Arab leadership. But Egypt is unlikely to rejoin the anti-Israel coalition. Egypt's pitch has to some extent been queered by European wooing of the PLO. Should not Europe have said to Egypt, "Marvellous - go on!", and encouraged Jordan to do the same?

Of course, the people in Gaza and on the West Bank have to be provided for; but the settlement, if it is to endure, has to be such as not to constitute a threat either to Israel or to Jordan or to give scope to Soviet interference. Only such a settlement can give real security to Saudi Arabia, and we should try to persuade them of this.

On these counts I still maintain that EEC and our policy towards

/the ...

the PLO and our failure to encourage Egypt are likely to reduce rather than increase the stability of the area and are not likely to serve British interests.

I am copying this to the Prime Minister.

If you want to argue with me about Industry I shall make myself as instantly available as possible!

Yours,

Keith

SURVEY (A JOURNAL OF EAST + WEST STUDIES)
VOL. 23 NO 3 SUMMER (1977-7

The Soviet Union and the PLO

Leonard Schapiro

SOVIET policy towards the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has travelled a long way since 1967 and early 1968 when it was attacked in such strong terms as "hysterical" and the like.[1] Interest in the PLO did not develop until after the Six-Day War: its operators now became "partisans." Yassir Arafat visited Moscow with Nasser in July 1968, and again alone in February 1970, but it was only after the expulsion of the Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972 that Arafat on a further visit was given direct Soviet arms supplies: this was part of the Soviet effort to forge a progressive front of Syria, Iraq and the Palestinians.

Soviet official advocacy of a Palestinian state did not occur until the autumn of 1974. In general, the Soviet Union has since then repeatedly made it clear that what it has in mind is an independent state alongside Israel formed on the territories which were occupied by Israel in 1967: the Soviet Union has never openly supported the PLO policy of a "democratic" Arab-Jewish state (i.e. in effect the destruction of Israel), which has remained virtually unchanged over the years (in spite of occasional apparent wavering on the part of the PLO's main component Fatah)—presumably because of fear that this might involve confrontation with the United States. But it has tended to slur over this important divergence from PLO policy: thus, for example, a statement at the close of Arafat's visit to Moscow in November 1975 referred to a proposed Palestinian state "on Palestinian territory," and did not use the usual PLO formula "in the areas to be liberated" or in "all of Palestine." From the Soviet point of view support of the PLO (as will be argued below) is mainly an aspect of its overall long-term aim to polarize the Middle East into a national revolutionary "left" and a conservative pro-American "right." Equally important to the Soviet Union's short-term aims is the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, since this would give it some foothold in Middle East politics which it has been progressively losing since 1972. In view of widespread opposition to PLO participation in such a conference, and uncertainty about the US position on the question, the Soviet Union, up to the end of 1976 at all events (and, in effect, since then as well) has in its official utterances been careful to leave open options which would enable Geneva to re-open without the PLO—while in it propaganda vociferously (at all events since 1975) voicing the demand that the PLO must participate in any conference, usually using words like "participation by the Arab people of Palestine on an equal footing as represented by the PLO"—though occasionally, especially in broadcasts in Arabic, the PLO was described as "the sole"

[1] E.g. *Pravda*, 29 July 1968.

representative. (It should be borne in mind that since there is no definite article in Russian, the frequent English translation "the representative" may sound stronger than intended by the Russian original). Side by side with the Soviet demand for participation of the PLO in the Geneva Conference has gone a determined attempt to establish it as an internationally recognized body—a PLO office was opened in the GDR in 1973 and in Moscow in 1974, and the Soviet Union successfully supported PLO efforts to be heard at and virtually recognized by the United Nations.

One of the perennial problems of the Soviet Union in dealing with the PLO has been the constant tendency within that body to fission between its main element Fatah and the many other components. (Indeed, at the time of writing, virtually open warfare has broken out between the various elements of the PLO and between the PLO and Iraqi-supported terrorists). From the outset the Soviet Union concentrated its efforts on the non-Marxist Fatah, probably regarding it as the best candidate for helping to secure, by its fashionable nationalist claims and its occasional suggestions of moderation, international recognition. But, since 1973 at least, it has also extended its support to the Marxist People's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) led by Hawatmeh and, for a time at any rate, to the Palestine National Front, a Soviet-sponsored Marxist organization created by the Jordanian Communist party. Dr Golan lists the use of terror as one of the factors which have made Soviet relations with the PLO less than smooth over the years.[2] But in view of the terrorist activities of the PDFLP as well as of the evidence which is accumulating of Soviet involvement in Arab terrorism this judgment seems somewhat over-simplified. It is probably true to say that Soviet policy is, in general, more sympathetic to terroristic acts which can be identified as part of a liberation struggle—for example action within Arab territories now in Israeli occupation—(as distinct from hijacking an aircraft or the murder of athletes in Munich) hence this is consistent with the general Soviet policy of insisting on exempting acts committed in the course of a "War of Liberation" from international definitions of "terrorism." But, as will be seen below, there are exceptions even to this distinction of principle in Soviet practice.

The year 1977 brought the Soviet Union both a major success in its Middle Eastern policy, and a major setback: the success was the joint US-Soviet declaration of 1 October in which the United States (in line with the well-known Brookings Report on the Middle East Conflict) agreed with the Soviet proposal that the Geneva Conference should be reconvened, and that the "legitimate interest" of the Palestinian Arabs

[2] Galia Golan, "The Soviet Union and the PLO," *Adelphi Papers, No.* 131, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1977, pp. 3, 19–22. This paper provides a detailed and excellent study of Soviet-PLO relations up to the end of 1976, to which I am much indebted.

should be safeguarded [3]—but said nothing about the participation of the PLO. This agreement with the USA signified a departure by the Soviet Union from its usual insistence, in the course of 1977, that the PLO must participate on equal terms in the Geneva Conference when it was reconvened. The agreement was followed by much diplomatic activity on all sides in preparation for the Conference. But the whole policy suffered a dramatic setback. This was the peace initiative and the Jerusalem visit by President Sadat very shortly afterwards in November. Sadat's motives for his action were immediately interpreted by the Soviet Union as dominated by his desire to counter any move which would enable the Soviet Union to regain influence over any settlement which might result in the Middle East.

Whatever misgivings the PLO may have had about Soviet intentions at Geneva, it was evidently persuaded to accept the agreement of 1 October with good grace, no doubt in the hope that it might prove to be the thin end of the wedge. Arafat at the time described it as "a genuine effort" in the right direction, while urging recognition of the PLO. Some time later he said in an interview that "in our opinion the well-known Soviet-American statement on the Middle East of October 1977 can serve as a firm foundation for a settlement." [4] But throughout 1977 and 1978 Soviet policy towards the PLO continued to show variations in the degree of enthusiasm with which it was offered support. The highlight of Soviet support for the PLO came on 7 April 1977 when Arafat on his 10th visit to Moscow since the opening of a PLO office there, was for the first time received by Brezhnev. According to a Tass statement on the meeting, Brezhnev "reaffirmed" Soviet policy that assurance of the national rights of the Arabs of Palestine was an "inseparable element" of a Middle Eastern settlement, including their right to self-determination "up to" the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Brezhnev also said that the Soviet Union is "invariably" in favour of the participation of the PLO in the Geneva Conference.[5] Arab sources apparently went further in reporting the meeting by adding that Brezhnev had said that the Soviet Union refuses to attend any conference in the Middle East if the PLO does not attend it on equal terms with all parties; and had promised to step up military aid.[6] Arafat, in turn, was lyrical in praise of the Soviet Union's support for the cause of the Palestinian Arabs and for its "economic military and other aid and support." [7] The pattern of Soviet propaganda treatment of relations with the PLO was to remain fairly constant at any rate until the spring of 1978, when the Soviet Union (as will be seen) became increasingly concerned at the disunity of the PLO and the conflicts within it. There is constant emphasis,

[3] Text in *The New York Times*, 2 Oct. 1977.
[4] *The New York Times*, 3 Oct. 1977; *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part I (*S.W.B.*), 4 May 1978. Cf. Interview in *The Guardian*, 3 Jan. 1978.
[5] *Le Monde*, 9 Apr. 1977.
[6] *The Times*, 9 Apr. 1977; *Le Monde*, 14 Apr. 1977.
[7] *Soviet News*, 19 Apr. 1977.

especially but not exclusively, in broadcasts in Arabic on the PLO, usually described as the "sole" legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arabs—a phrase which is, so far as is known, never used in official Soviet statements. On the PLO side, there are repeated, fulsome references to the value and importance of Soviet aid to the Palestinian Arab cause. The United States, Israel and, of course, Egypt are repeatedly assailed for their refusal to recognise the PLO's right to represent the Palestinian Arabs. Propaganda apart, Soviet support for the PLO was reiterated on at least two important occasions. One was in reply by Brezhnev to questions put to him by a *Pravda* correspondent at the end of December 1977; but, more significantly, perhaps, since this was intended as a directive to communists and pro-communists all over the world, was a long article on the legal standing of the PLO in *New Times*, by Igor Blishchenko, who is Secretary of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, an important communist front organization. His case in support of the PLO as "the legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine" rests on six propositions:

(a) The PLO is officially recognized by many socialist and Asian countries, and *de facto* recognized by the Western countries which have allowed it to open information centres.

(b) The PLO is signatory to the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Protection of Victims of War and to a number of other international documents.

(c) The decision of the Rabat Conference in 1974, and the admission of the PLO to the Arab League in Cairo in 1976 as a member of equal rights.

(d) The grant of observer status by the 29th Assembly of the United Nations, and the resolution of the Assembly recognizing the Palestinian people as one of the principal parties to a just and lasting peace "in practical terms" makes PLO participation in peace negotiations "obligatory."

(e) There is no duty on the part of the PLO to recognize Israel, since Israel has not recognized the PLO.

(f) The argument that the PLO should abandon its claim of a democratic state of Arabs and Jews is invalid in view of the Zionist claims and in view of those programmes of ruling Israeli parties which "proclaim as their aim the establishment of a greater Israel extending from the Nile to the Euphrates thus threatening the existence of Arab states." [8]

And on 9 March 1978, on one of his frequent visits to Moscow, Arafat was again received by Brezhnev and assured of the Soviet Union's continued support for the PLO. Brezhnev was showered with much fulsome praise for the Soviet Union in return.

Soviet relations with the hard-line Arab states (Algeria, Libya, Syria,

[8] *New Times*, No. 4, 1978, pp. 20–21.

th[illegible]eople's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Iraq) on the issue of the PLO are too complicated to be examined here. In the course of 1977 the Soviet Union was successful in securing Syrian assent to the proposal that the Geneva Conference should be reconvened, with the participation of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arabs, but was unsuccessful in the case of Iraq (whose relations with the PLO were rapidly deteriorating) and of Libya. (Later in the year, however, President Assad told *The New York Times* that the Arab League could faithfully represent the Palestinian issue at a Geneva Conference).

On the other hand, consistently with its policy of keeping options open, the Soviet Union at the same time as endeavouring to assure the PLO of its unwavering support, was pursuing other possible options. Only a fortnight before Arafat's arrival in Moscow on 4 April 1977, Brezhnev had outlined, in a speech to the Soviet Trades Unions Congress, a plan for a Middle Eastern settlement in which the PLO did not figure at all. This comprised: withdrawal by Israel from all territories occupied by her; demilitarized zones policed by UN teams "possibly" including Soviet, US, British and French contingents; mutual obligations to respect each other's sovereignty, and self-determination for the Palestinian Arabs on the basis of their own state.[9] These proposals, in effect, above all including the guarantee of borders by a United Nations force, in which the Soviet Union was "willing" to participate, formed the basis of the US-Soviet statement of 1 October 1977. (In a broadcast report of this speech in Arabic, Brezhnev was nevertheless reported to have referred to the PLO as "the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arabs."[10]) No doubt the press rumours (presumably ultimately KGB inspired) suggesting that the Soviet Union was prepared to be flexible on the issue of PLO participation and Soviet broadcast denials that the USSR was abandoning the PLO in the course of 1977 are to be explained as part of the ambivalent policy of pursuing alternatives. Looked at from the Soviet point of view, a PLO dominated Arab state on the borders of Israel and Jordan would offer the best of prospects for the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East, which is, beyond doubt, the overriding Soviet objective. Even the inevitable conflicts between the discordant elements inside the PLO might, in Soviet thinking, become less acute if they could all turn their attention to the aim of conquering Israel. Moreover, the Soviet Union might well hope that if the Soviet presence in the PLO state were sufficiently massive, as it presumably would be, the USA might be deterred from intervening to save Israel. However, since the prospect of a PLO state in the face of US, Egyptian and Jordanian (to name only some), to say nothing of Israeli, opposition, may at present seem rather remote, a Soviet military presence in the Middle East in the guise of a UN contingent might offer

[9] *Keesing's Contemporary Archive*, 1977, 28383–28385.
[10] *S.W.B.*, 25 Mar. 1977.

considerable attractions. For one thing, it would provide the KGB with a secure base for subversive operations and could enhance Soviet influence over Middle Eastern positions in other ways as well.

IT is in the general context of the ultimate Soviet aim of expanding to the maximum its influence in the Middle East that recent Soviet policy towards Marxist and left-wing elements within and outside the PLO become of particular interest. With this in mind it is useful to examine an important Soviet analytical article which appeared in October 1977 in the official *Soviet State & Law*. The author is deputy head of the Near Eastern Countries Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main burden of this article is that the Palestine resistance movement, in the person of its true representatives, as distinct from the "prattlers and the open or camouflaged advocates for yesterday's colonizers," has become a part of the general anti-imperialist movement. The 13th session of the Palestine National Council in Cairo in March 1977 rightly laid down the aim of the Palestine movement as the setting up of "an independent national state on its own territory" and the entitlement of the PLO to take part on a basis of equality in all international discussions of the Middle East. (What the author did not point out, however, is that this resolution was repudiated by the leader of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Habash, the following day.) But the essentially nationalist movement of the Palestinian Arabs is acquiring, largely from the example of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, an increasingly anti-imperialist and revolutionary character—in other words (and here he quotes with approval a theoretical work of great significance by K. N. Brutents, who is one of B. N. Ponomarev's deputies in the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU). This kind of nationalist movement reaches socialism "not by class-conscious rejection of capitalism, but through anti-imperialist nationalism." (In plain English: nationalist movements, with proper direction, can be harnessed to the cause of world socialism). On the other hand the radicalization of the ranks of the Palestine Resistance movement leads sometimes to the kind of left extremism that Lenin characterized as the "infantile disease of leftism." The national-democratic nature of the Palestinian movement is the decisive factor in its drawing close to the world revolutionary movement, though it is premature as yet to talk of final victory of the national democratic element in the Palestinian movement.

The core of the problem, according to this author, is the refusal of Israel to take part in a Geneva Conference if the PLO should be present there; on the other hand the Palestinian Arabs are daily growing to realize more and more that the naural allies of their movement are the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. The ultimate outcome of the Palestinian struggle will depend on the result of the struggle going on in the Middle East between the progressive and the imperialist forces, and the extent to which the openly and covertly pro-Western

re[illegible]s in the Arab world can succeed in retarding revolutionary democracy. But it will also depend on what happens inside the Palestinian movement itself: it will depend on whether the progressive elements in the movement get the upper hand, or whether those elements will prevail which are ready to sacrifice the principle of the Palestinian cause for some private advantages of their own or in order to strengthen their own positions. (This sounds like a clear hint at some trends inside Fatah.) Meanwhile, the communist parties in the Arab world are careful not to act prematurely in their relations with the national movements, remembering the words of Lenin to the effect that no social revolution is conceivable without nationalist revolts and without revolutionary explosions "among part of the petty bourgeoisie . . . and without the movement of unconscious proletarians and semi-proletarians masses" against the oppression of the landlords, the Church, etc.

The article then proceeds to grade the Arab states, in favourite Soviet manner, in degree of their utility for the socialist cause. Egypt and Jordan are prepared to make a deal with Israel in order to recover the territories captured from them, as are also Tunisia and Morocco, who recognised the 1947 plan for the partition of Palestine. This is, incidentally, one of the few Soviet statements which appears to accept the Palestinian aim of the destruction of Israel: the position of Tunisia and Morocco is characterized as a compromise with the reactionaries since "it presupposes the recognition by the Arab countries of the fact of Israel's existence, as well as the necessity of concluding a durable peace treaty with Israel." The oil-producing countries, headed by Saudi Arabia, are primarily interested in oil profits and this necessarily makes them politically orientated towards the United States. They support the Palestine resistance movement financially in order to counter their radical critics, but are terrified of any further radicalization of the Palestine movement. The most "sincere" attitude to the Palestinian movement is that of Algeria, Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Libya. The position of Syria and Lebanon is complicated by the invasion of the latter by the former. The article ends by squarely adopting Brezhnev's speech to the Trade Union Congress in March 1977—in other words with a much less than full endorsement of any exclusive rights of the PLO.[11]

The significance of this article is that it shows in a way that, so far as I know, has not been done before or since, the importance which the Soviet Union attaches in its Middle Eastern policy to traditional left-wing revolutionary elements, and above all to the ultimate polarization of the whole area into an increasingly radical, anti-imperialist movement opposed to the traditional conservative Arab states as much as to Israel. The ultimate aim is seen to be a series of uprisings, supported by the Soviet Union, which would end in the defeat of the pro-United States countries before the rising tide of revolution. These

[11] E. D. Pyrlin, "*Palestinskoe natsional'no—osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie i blizhnevostochnoe uregulirovanie*," in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 10, Oct. 1977.

would now include Egypt: since the November 1977 peace initiative Egypt has been repeatedly branded by the Soviet Union as in league with the United States. Whether this Soviet policy is realistic is another question—though it is the case that the Soviet Union has done quite well up to date against the West in its policy of supporting left-wing "national liberation" movements. But it is in the light of this overall policy that Soviet moves in the Middle Eastern arena should be seen. In particular, so far as the PLO is concerned, its largest component Fatah, is non-Marxist, and this may well, in spite of all the propaganda showered in its support (which is, of course, rewarded by PLO propaganda on the virtues of the Soviet Union as the Arab's best friend) affect Soviet policy towards it.

The Sadat initiative in November 1977 took both the Soviet Union and the PLO by surprise. The Soviet reaction to it was predictable—it was a capitulation to American imperialism, it was a plot concerted between Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia (supposed disagreements between Sadat and Begin were a put-up show). It was primarily designed to prevent the Geneva Conference from meeting and in particular to frustrate the legitimate rights of the PLO, and so forth. These charges were broadcast in Arabic from Moscow and repeated or improved on by the PLO, and the whole operation from the Soviet point of view, no doubt was, *inter alia*, intended to serve the aim of polarizing the Middle East into left and right, and cementing the unity of the left. According to Communist reports (*Morning Star* of 3 December 1977) the immediate effect was to cause disunity among the "rejectionists" in conference in Tripoli: Syria, Algeria, South Yemen, Iraq, Libya and the PLO disagreed on the issue of an eventual negotiated peace in the Middle East—a course urged by Arafat.

IN this context, it is worth glancing at Soviet relations with some of the Marxist components of the PLO and with other left-wing organizations in the Arab world. Of the three main Marxist organizations within the PLO, the Soviet attitude to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) whose leader is Habash, has never been cordial, since Habash's open criticism of Soviet peace-making on the basis of the Geneva Conference led to what was in effect a Soviet break with the PFLP in the political sphere,[12] though it is probable that clandestine links have continued in the sphere of terrorist activity. (In September 1974 the PFLP withdrew from the PLO Executive Committee, but remained in the Palestine National Council, which acts as a kind of parliament for Palestinian resistance). The Palestine National Front (PNF), created by the Jordanian Communist Party, was for some years publicized and supported by the Soviet Union. Up to 1976, at any rate, Soviet intentions seem to have been to groom the PNF, in coordination with the Moscow-orientated new Communist Party of

[12] Golan, op. cit. p. 18.

Israel (RAKAH) as a guerrilla resistance movement which would try to take over the West Bank. However, before long the Soviet Union seemed to revert to its policy of supporting the PLO on the grounds that it enjoyed the support of West Bank Arabs.[13] It may be of significance that in August 1977 the PNF was praised in a Soviet broadcast for its effort to secure recognition of the PLO as "sole legitimate representatives" of Palestinian Arabs.[14] The most cordial Soviet relations seem to have been with the People's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) whose leader Hawatmeh, was cultivated by Moscow independently of Arafat.[15] He has paid virtually annual visits to Moscow since 1974, and is apparently used by Moscow as someone whom it looks on as capable of restoring unity in the much-riven PLO, however improbable and unrealistic such a Soviet hope may seem. His most recent visit at the head of a delegation in May and June 1978, when he was received by Ponomarev, was stated in an Arabic broadcast from Moscow to be "to investigate ways to strengthen relations between the Soviet Union and the PLO," and the need for unity was strongly emphasized in the Tass statement on the visit.[16] The visit did indeed come in the aftermath of one of the periodic revolts against Arafat in May 1978 in which the Soviet Union apparently intervened (this is discussed below).

There have also been numerous Soviet contacts with left-wing organizations outside the PLO, especially in 1978. This increased activity has presumably been due to two causes: the Sadat initiative, which made the reconvening of a Geneva Conference unlikely and therefore caused the Soviet Union to look increasingly to the other alternatives, the stepping up of revolutionary activity in the Middle East; and secondly, the increasing disunity in the PLO which made it even less attractive than hitherto as the sole hope for Soviet ambitions. Of course, in some cases these visits may well have been connected with Soviet policies relating to the particular country involved. Thus, in March 1978 a delegation of the Lebanese Communist Party was in Moscow, and in the following month Vilner of the Israeli CP (RAKAH) was received by Suslov, and in June delegates of the "Lebanese Patriotic Forces" on a visit to Moscow stressed their "fraternal unity" with the Palestine resistance movement. Around the same time support was given to the Iraqi Communist Party (21 of whose leaders had been executed by the Iraqi Baath regime in May) by reprinting long extracts from an article in the Communist Party organ. Similarly in May 1978 a Radio Forum on Palestine in Arabic included, apart from Soviet pundits like the Secretary of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Blishchenko and the KGB-controlled Jewish pseudo-General Dragunsky, the Secretaries of pro-communist youth organizations of Lebanon,

[13] Ibid.
[14] *S.W.B.*, 20 Aug. 1977.
[15] Golan, op. cit. pp. 16–17.
[16] *Pravda*, 8 June 1978: *S.W.B.*, 3 June 1978.

Morocco and Israel. Such evidence, which could be multiplied, lends credence to the reports of Israeli observers who toured the area of the Lebanon occupied by the Israelis that "communist influence among the terrorists appears to be much stronger than their support for the Palestinian cause." [17]

The endemic disunity within the PLO has been a matter of constant concern to the Soviet Union. It has been occasionally mentioned in speeches and articles on the Soviet side, and at times admitted by Arafat who has, however, always minimized its importance. Indeed in an interview in March 1978 he stressed that unity had been established in the ranks of the Palestinians,[18] which if true, was at best very temporary. One might suppose that, in an endeavour to make the PLO more acceptable to the international community, and the USA, the Soviet Union would try to persuade it at any rate to show moderation particularly on the question of UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 (which recognizes *inter alia* the right of Israel to live in peace within "secure and recognized boundaries," and restricts the Arab claim to "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem"). There have indeed been frequent press rumours, for example, that the Soviet Union was trying to break the deadlock by introducing an amended version of Resolution 242, which would recognize the rights of the Palestinians to a state, or that the PLO would accept Resolution 242 if Israel recognized the right of the Palestinians to a national homeland. These rumours can be assumed to have emanated from the Soviet Union.[19] Arafat has blown hot and cold on the issue: at one time denying outright rumours that the PLO was ready to recognize Israel,[20] at others leading the Secretary General of the United Nations to believe that it was prepared to recognize Israel.

But, whatever ploys in the diplomatic game the Soviet Union may engage in, it seems to be the case that Soviet pressure on the PLO, and particularly on its leader Arafat, is always in the direction of greater toughness and intransigence, and not in the direction of compromise. This is, indeed, logical policy from the Soviet point of view. Firstly, because if unity is to be preserved within the Palestine resistance movement this can only be achieved by a tough policy on the part of the PLO since this is the only policy which has any hope of uniting the discordant elements within the movement; and secondly, if it is right that the Soviet Union is interested in Arab nationalism only as an aspect of furthering world socialism in the Middle East (as Pyrlin suggests) it is plain that an intransigent policy has much more chance, is indeed the only way, of achieving the kind of polarization in the area that is likely to be beneficial for the advance of communism. Negative support for the view that the Soviet Union may have doubts about placing too

[17] *The Daily Telegraph*, 23 Mar. 1978.
[18] *New Times*, No. 12, 1978, pp. 8–9.
[19] *The Financial Times*, 10 May 1977; *The Guardian*, 6 Sept. 1977.
[20] e.g. *Le Monde*, 12 May 1977.

much of its political hopes on the PLO, as distinct from a wider revolutionary and socialist movement, is provided by the fact that the Soviet Union has made no move to encourage the PLO to set up a Palestinian government in exile—a move which the PLO obviously could not take without Soviet support and approval.

Early in April 1978, according to numerous detailed and circumstantial reports, Arafat struck at the unruly elements within his movement who were demanding more violent action and who in particular opposed Arafat's support for the observance of the cease-fire in Lebanon. About a hundred arrests were reported to have been made.[21] The matter did not end there. In the course of April, Arafat was engaging in the kind of diplomatic ambiguity which characterized him by giving press conferences which suggested (and were so interpreted) that the PLO was prepared to recognize Israel. He also said the same thing privately to senior US, British and UN officials. This provoked violent reaction from the more extremist elements in the PLO, and, reportedly, led to Soviet intervention. At all events, Arafat hastened to correct the impression that he was ready for compromise. In a speech on 27 April and in a television interview in Moscow on 29 April he now proclaimed more clearly the more familiar warlike intention to wage war to the end against the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Agreement with the PLO rebels seemed to have been reached when the Central Committee of Fatah published on 3 May a long communiqué, said to have been approved in advance by the Soviet Union, which followed the line of the extremists to the full, stressed the unity within the PLO, and called for escalation of "the military struggle inside our occupied territories, using the necessary means of struggle against the Zionist occupation." The communiqué did not restrict the intended action to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967: it rejected "the substituted homeland" (meaning clearly a state on the West Bank) and demanded repatriation and establishment of an independent state "on their national soil"—which in Arab terminology means the whole of the territory of what has become known since the British Mandate as "Palestine," Around the same time Arafat gave his usual kind of ambiguously worded interview in Beirut, which could be (and was) interpreted as a sign of willingness to recognize Israel's continued existence. Evidently he was hoping both to conciliate his extremist opponents, and to convey the impression of moderation outside the Middle East, for fear of being excluded from peace negotiations. The suggestion that the PLO might be prepared to recognize Israel, said to emanate from the PLO observer at the United Nations, was, however, denied officially.[22]

There followed feverish activity in Moscow aimed at cementing the newly-proclaimed, and presumably fragile, unity within the PLO. The

[21] E.g. *Le Monde*, 27 Apr. 1978; *The Guardian*, 24 Apr. 1978; *The Daily Telegraph*, 20 Apr. 1978.

[22] See e.g. *S.W.B.*, 4 May 1978; Israel Information Service, based on Arabic sources; *The New York Times*, 2 May 1978; *Le Monde*, 10 May 1978.

mission of Hawatmeh of the PDFLP has already been referred to, with its explicit aim, stated in the Tass report, of recognizing the "urgent necessity of consolidation and unity of action of all branches of the Palestine resistance movement within the framework of the PLO."[23] But Hawatmeh went very much further than merely acting as mediator to restore PLO unity: he, in effect, called for a much wider movement than the PLO represented, distinctly socialist in character, and since the speech was made at a meeting by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Afro-Asian Countries, it is obvious that the appeal was made in concert with the Soviet Union: "We call on the PLO . . . to take a series of initiatives to mobilize all the popular masses behind the plan of action opposed to . . . Zionist imperialism, Arab reactionaries and defeatists." He also demanded a "national popular democratic front" of all the "national democratic, revolutionary democratic and Communist parties" in the Middle East in a united front against "Imperialism, Zionism and right-wing Arab reaction. Further evidence that this move may represent the beginning of a shift in Soviet Middle-Eastern policy from over reliance on the PLO towards an all-out revolutionary policy, is provided by a broadcast commentry in Arabic by the most authoritative Soviet spokesman on the Middle East, Kudryavtsev. This commentary scarcely referred to the PLO, and stressed Soviet support for the national aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs. It was dated 4 May 1978—which was around the time when disunity in the PLO had reached its highest peak.[24] The PDFLP delegation was followed in July by a delegation of Fatah. An Arabic News Agency dispatch, somewhat mysteriously denied that Fatah would raise "specific Palestinian demands," but stressed that the "Palestinian cause is facing a real crisis." It was also stated that the delegation would stay 10 days, which in fact it did.[25] These events seem very emphatically to confirm the report that the Soviet Union was intervening in PLO policy, as one would expect. They suggest two inferences. First, that the Soviet Union will not tolerate conciliatory diplomatic ploys by Fatah in general and by Arafat in particular. And secondly, that Soviet support of the Palestine resistance movement extends far beyond the interests of that movement as such, which is seen by the Soviet Union merely as a part of a much wider Middle Eastern revolutionary process.

IT remains to consider briefly Soviet policy towards terrorism by the PLO. There is no possible doubt that the Soviet Union has for some time past been supplying the PLO with arms, economic aid and training in guerrilla warfare, a fact which is not denied either by the PLO or by the USSR. On the occasion when he met Brezhnev for the first time, Arafat praised Soviet "economic, military and other aid," and a

[23] *Pravda*, 8 June 1978.
[24] *S.W.B.*, 11 May 1978; 6 June 1978.
[25] *Pravda*, 5 Aug. 1978.

Moscow broadcast listed aid given by the Soviet Union as including military aid and the training of cadres in the USSR.[26] These statements apart there is ample and repeated evidence of the quantity of Soviet weapons shipped to the PLO, some of it direct, some of it via Libya, Iraq, North Korea and Eastern Europe, especially Eastern Germany. The shipments are escorted by Soviet naval vessels. Israeli sources have repeatedly confirmed that the military equipment is of great variety and highly sophisticated. There is also ample evidence of the training of guerrillas, in East Germany and elsewhere.

Quite apart from the supply of weapons, the evidence which has been accumulating in the past year or so of Soviet direct and indirect involvement in acts of terrorism makes it very difficult to sustain the view that one of the issues dividing the Soviet Union and the PLO is Soviet disapproval of acts of indiscriminate terrorism against civilians. There has, it is true, been occasional Soviet condemnation of acts of terrorism committed by various groups within the PLO in the past, but not so much in recent years. Even in the past, condemnation was selective—not extending, for example, except tentatively, to condemnation of the PDFLP in 1974 for its attack on an Israeli school, because at the time the Soviet Union was anxious to promote and support its leader Hawatmeh.[27] More recent evidence suggests that the Soviet Union, while not wishing to be openly associated with acts which shock much of world public opinion, nevertheless recognizes the value of such acts both for their part in helping to polarize the Middle East and in promoting unity within the PLO which cannot be achieved by any show of moderation. It is also fully consistent with the characteristic Soviet policy towards the PLO, in the same interest of polarization, of encouraging it in the direction of extremism rather than of diplomacy and conciliation. There are also occasions when an act of terrorism may even be encouraged by the Soviet Union as something which could assist its overall policy. This seems to have been the case of the Tel Aviv attack on 11 March 1978. This action perpetrated by Fatah's terrorist arm, "Black September," only a few days after a visit by Arafat to Moscow, must have been made known by him to the Soviet authorities in advance, if not actually coordinated with them. The attack (which was on a bus carrying civilians, including many children) was immediately, on 12 March 1978, described by Tass as an "armed clash between a detachment of Palestinian guerrillas and Israeli army units" near Tel Aviv, in which "over 30 soldiers were killed."[28] The aim of this jointly planned operation—if such it was—could have been to goad the Israelis into acts of retaliation and thus help to sabotage the Sadat peace initiative. Subsequent terrorist acts like the murder in London of the representative of the PLO or the murder in Cyprus of an Egyptian editor, were variously described by Moscow as acts of the

[26] *Soviet News*, 19 Apr. 1977 and *S.W.B.*, 30 Dec. 1977.
[27] See Golan, op. cit. pp. 20–22.
[28] *S.W.B.*, 14 Mar. 1977.

Zionists or the British—in line with PLO propaganda designed to conceal the extent of dissension within the PLO.

The evidence of Soviet involvement in the training and arming of terrorists (especially Arab terrorists) is at best circumstantial, and based almost entirely on evidence which has been leaked to press correspondents by various intelligence services. According to Western intelligence leaks, for example the leader of "Black September," Abu Jihad, has spent a great deal of time in Moscow, East Berlin, Aden and Tripoli and has recently been helping to organize training facilities and the flow of Soviet arms to Palestinian bases in Cyprus and Lebanon. According to information leaked by the French Security Service (DST) Henri Curiel, one of the founders of the Egyptian Communist Party, recently murdered in Paris, was a KGB agent employed by them to penetrate terrorist organizations, and to assist in escapes and contacts, as well as to provide the Soviet Union with information on their activities. There are many more such stories: they cannot be confirmed, but to dismiss them as imagination would be to fly in the face of what we know for a fact about much of Soviet policy. The evidence does not suggest that the Soviet Union controls or inspires the entire Arab terrorist movement: but it confirms the suspicion that it maintains, whenever possible, contacts with it, is aware of most or much of what is going on, at times encourages specific actions and, in general, does not discourage terrorism. Indeed if the argument advanced above is correct—that Arab nationalism is of subsidiary importance to the Soviet Union as compared with the spread of revolution in the Middle East—a Soviet preference for violence over diplomatic initiative, so far as the PLO is concerned, would be completely logical.

TO sum up, in the course of 1977, at any rate up to the Sadat initiative of November, the Soviet Union stepped up its support of the PLO as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian Arabs at the Geneva Conference, which the Soviet Union was most anxious should be reconvened. At the same time, the Soviet Union was careful not to commit itself finally to support for the PLO and was prepared tentatively to explore courses which could provide it with alternatives to a PLO Palestinian state as a foothold in the Middle East—for example participation in a UN Military guarantee force. In the course of 1978 the Soviet Union, which regards support of Arab nationalism as subordinate to its ultimate aim of the expansion of revolution in the Middle East, stepped up its support of Marxist revolutionary elements both within and outside the PLO. This policy may have been influenced by the growing disunity within the PLO. But support of revolutionary organizations, and of some of their terroristic activities, offers other advantages to the Soviet Union in helping to polarize the Middle East into reactionary and revolutionary "camps," in the traditional form pursued by communist tacticians. However there are two factors which are likely to make continuing and increasing support of the PLO the pivot

Soviet policy. One is the failure of the Soviet Union to acquire a reliable client state in the Arab world. The second is the realization that in an area where the conditions for the development and progress of Soviet-type socialism are unfavourable, the national appeal of the PLO as well as its dependence on the Soviet Union for international support, offer the best chance for the extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East. After Camp David Yassir Arafat made another visit to Moscow and had talks with Gromyko and Kosygin. It was his third official trip this year (he might have been there more often unofficially). The official communiqué published in *Pravda* referred (for the first time) to the PLO as " the sole legitimate representative " of the Palestinian people. The Iraqi-Syrian-PLO *rapprochement* and the Baghdad meeting of the Arab states against the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty have been warmly endorsed by the Soviet Union. In this perspective the role of the PLO is even more enhanced as an element of the general Soviet strategy of " destabilizing " the Middle East. Recent events in Iran have also underlined the dangers of Soviet expansion southwards.

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AMMAN TEL NO 398: ISRAEL/JORDAN

1. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS ANY THOUGHT OF A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST JORDAN IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. BEGIN AND HIS HERUT COLLEAGUES HAVE AS THEIR FIRST PURPOSE THE WINNING OF ISRAEL'S ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR. BEGIN SEES A CHANCE IN THE IRAQ/JORDAN CONNECTION TO DESTROY PERES' APPROACH TO PEACE ON ISRAEL'S EASTERN FRONTIER BY CONVINCING ISRAELIS THAT THERE IS NO JORDANIAN OPTION. COMPARED WITH THIS, TANKS FOR JORDAN IS A SECONDARY ISSUE.

3. QUITE APART FROM THE SUCCESS WHICH BEGIN MAY HAVE IN EXPOSING THE EMPTINESS OF THE JORDANIAN OPTION, MOST ISRAELIS WILL FEEL, AFTER THE LAST THREE WEEKS, THAT THEY NEED TO BE EVEN

MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT MOVES ON THE WEST BANK LIKELY TO DIMINISH THEIR PRESENCE THERE AND THEIR ABILITY TO STRIKE QUICKLY (FOR IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT THE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE BECOMES A REAL POSSIBILITY) IF THE IRAQIS WERE TODISENGAGE SUCCESSFULLY FROM THEIR IRANIAN OPERATION AND START A MILITARY BUILD-UP IN JORDAN.

4. DAYAN, WHO HAS SAID SO MUCH RECENTLY ABOUT UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM, AND HANDING OVER TO JORDAN WITHOUT A PEACE TREATY, MOST OF THE WEST BANK, GAVE AN INTERVIEW WITH ONE OF THE LOCAL PAPERS AT THE END OF LAST WEEK WHICH REFLECTS WHAT WILL BE A WIDESPREAD FEELING HERE. EXTRACTS IN MIFT.

5. MANY ISRAELIS (I BELIEVE A MAJORITY) DO NOT WANT A PERMANENT PEACE SETTLEMENT ON THE TERMS AVAILABLE. THE PUBLIC EMERGENCE OF A CLOSER IRAQ/JORDAN RELATIONSHIP AND THE SYRIAN SOVIET TREATY WILL HAVE STRENGTHENED THIS VIEW. AS I SUGGESTED IN MY TEL NO 287 (NOT TO ALL) THEY LOOK TO THE 1980S TO SOLVE THEIR DILEMMA THROUGH A SUPER POWER CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH WILL SOMEHOW ENSURE WESTERN PROTECTION FOR THEMSELVES. THEY ARE HURT THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT MAKE MORE USE OF THEM STRATEGICALLY, AND ANNOYED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT MOVED TO A MORE CONFRONTATIONAL POSTURE IN THE GULF. BUT (MY TEL NO 463 NOT TO ALL) BEGIN WILL HAVE HOPES THAT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THEIR OWN POWERS OF PERSUASION CAN STILL CHANGE THIS (I.E. ISRAEL THE ONLY DEPENDABLE ALLY.)

6. CONTINUING ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE PLO IN THE LEBANON IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN. IT IS CHEAPER POLITICALLY AND EASIER MILITARILY THAN ANY ADVENTURE ON THE EASTERN BORDER. FOR THE REST IT SEEMS FROM HERE THAT PLAYING UP THE SYRIAN/SOVIET PACT'S IMPLICATIONS IS A BETTER BASIS FOR ISRAELI APPROACHES TO WASHINGTON THAN ATTACKING JORDAN.

7. ONE CONCLUSION MAY SAFELY BE DRAWN FROM RECENT MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS: IT IS GOING TO BE RATHER HARDER FOR PERES TO WIN CONFIRMATION OF HIS LEADERSHIP OF LABOUR: AND HARDER FOR LABOUR TO WIN THE ELECTIONS : AND MUCH HARDER FOR WHOEVER DOES WIN THE ELECTIONS TO PURSUE POLICIES DIFFERENT ENOUGH TO SECURE AN OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT.

ROBINSON

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Gulf conflict poses new questions for Europe

Shlomo Argov

ONCE again there is war in the Middle East: a major war involving large armies equipped with masses of arms which have already inflicted enormous damage on each other. Once again the world is alarmed by the possible consequences and repercussions of a Middle East war; yet for once this is not another Arab/Israeli war but rather a bitter struggle between two Islamic countries sharing a common creed and a joint vital interest in the free flow of their main source of livelihood — oil — as well as a common and virulent enmity against Israel. Two Gulf states engaged in mortal battle to determine whether the Gulf shall be "Persian" or "Arabian."

At the other end of the Middle East, where Egypt and Israel lie, there is peace. There may be argument and disagreement. There may be a difference of perceptions and there may be dispute over modalities. But all these are marginal. The central fact is that Israel and Egypt are committed and determined to protect together the peace that they have achieved for the sake of their peoples and as a bulwark against the vicissitudes that have been a hallmark of the Gulf area ever since the Iranian debacle two years ago.

As the Gulf blows up it is the Egyptian-Israeli peace which keeps the lid on the western end of the Middle East. And those who have come to take this for granted are invited to consider a scenario in which Iran and Iraq wage total war against each other while Egyptian and Israeli armies continue to confront one another instead of being hosts to friendly visits by their respective commanders as the two countries proceed along the path of peace-making.

Contrary to certain impressions, there is no joy nor glee in Israel over the punishment which two of its most extreme enemies presently mete out to each other. Instead we share the deep concern of many at the spectacle of widespread hostilities in an area as fragile and as critical as the Gulf.

For months now European political councils have argued that, much as the problems of the Gulf area were critical for the obvious and salutary reason that this is where 60 per cent of the non-communist world's oil supply comes from, the most pressing and urgent need was to provide a swift solution to the Palestinian problem. Unless this issue was resolved, without much delay — but with very considerable deference to the expectations of the non-communist world's proincipal petroleum suppliers — the Middle East would be plunged into a terrible war that would endanger the life-blood of the non-communist world.

It seems to have mattered little that a framework for a genuine and sincere effort to resolve this same problem had been hammered out at Camp David and a full-fledged peace treaty reached between Egypt and Israel, thus laying an indispensable foundation for that much vaunted "comprehensive settlement." What mattered, apparently, was that these were the preconditions set by the non-communist world's oil suppliers for joining the West in meeting the dangers threatening them from without and from within.

And so for months on end now all available European political resources and every conceivable diplomatic means have been employed in devising a Middle East policy with little relevance to the pressing problems of the Gulf area and equally little regard for its possible counter-productive consequences in the Arab-Israeli sphere.

Thus was an artificial linkage established between an area fast reaching boiling point at the eastern end of the Middle East and its distant antipode now two years into a miraculous peace process. Thus were European summit meetings taken up with such projects as the association of the PLO in, of all things, a peace process. To which end Europe recently issued a major declaration on the Middle East that included not the slightest reference to the clearly explosive situation in the Gulf. Thus was dispatched the President of the EEC Council of Ministers and future President of its Commission on a special mission to the Middle East in order to take soundings of everything *but* the situation in the Gulf. And so it was that Europe, able assisted by its media, ultimately succeeded in inflicting upon itself the most brilliant coup of disinformation that one can recall in recent times.

This is what must inevitably happen when one insists on establishing a totally artificial link between an indigenous crisis at the eastern end of the Middle East and the fortunes of an area a thousand miles away to the West.

It is perhaps too early to predict the consequences of the Iraqi-Iranian war, although it is doubtful that any good will come of it no matter who comes out on top. It may however be timely and instructive to reassess present European thinking on the Middle East, which diverted attention that might otherwise have been better employed on critical needs elsewhere in the area, particularly in the Gulf.

Should such a reassessment take place we would submit that it include an examination also of the following questions.

Is the Arab-Israeli conflict really the central issue of the Middle East of the 1980s, or is the struggle over the economic and strategic assets of the Gulf much more pressing and dangerous? And, would the resolution of the Palestinian problem, on European terms, usher in an era of pastoral peace to the Middle East, or would it merely compound all of the many other regional tensions and conflicts that have not the remotest connection to the Arab-Israeli problem?

Are the Camp David agreements the divisive development which their critics and detractors claim them to be or are they not the centrepiece and prerequisite of any Arab-Israeli peace? Moreover, and especially in the light of present-day events in the Gulf, does the Egyptian-Israeli peace deserve to be dismissed at best as a minor achievement or is it rather a godsend at a time of unprecedented instability in the Middle East and therefore deserving of the fullest support?

Is Israel's intrinsic strength and viability and the disproportionate power it radiates in the region a matter of trivial interest for Europe to the point of taking hasty risks with it in an area as volatile as the Middle East, especially when Western prestige and credibility are at their lowest and Soviet intentions at their most unpredictable?

Is it, therefore, really in the interest of Europe to force upon Israel a settlement that would — in the hypothetical event that Israel were to acquiesce in it — reduce it from a major and positive strategic factor in the area into a truncated entity dependent for its survival on such elusive and illusory things as "third party guarantees"?

Finally, is the Middle East an area into which the West can permit itself to compete with the East by pouring in vast amounts of arms and ammunition without the slightest regard for their possible use by irresponsible and lawless regimes? Perhaps we should all consider ourselves fortunate that the Iraqi-Iranian war is taking place today and not three or four years from now when Iraq is expected to possess an atomic arsenal provided by none other than European countries.

These are some of the questions which we would wish to see examined if European policies are reassessed in the light of present events in the Middle East. The stakes involved are enormous. For Israel and Europe alike.

Shlomo Argov is Israel's Ambassador in Britain.

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Middle East

GR 325
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FM AMMAN 101155Z OCT 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 398 OF 10 OCT
INFO BAGHDAD, JEDDA, TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON
COLQUHOUN (TEL AVIV'S) TELELETTER OF 9 OCTOBER TO JENNER (NENAD):
ISRAEL/JORDAN

1. THE PRESENT ISRAELI PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST JORDANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT IS THE USUAL MIXTURE OF FACT AND FICTION AND HAS AT TIMES VERGED ON THE LUDICROUS. IN ADDITION TO THE ITEMS QUOTED IN TUR, ISRAELI RADIO REPORTS MONITORED HERE HAVE TALKED OF THE EMERGENCY CONSTRUCTION OF AIR RAID SHELTERS, SHORTAGES OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS, STEEP PRICE RISES, A BLACKOUT EVERY NIGHT IN AMMAN AND ORDERS REQUIRING CAR HEADLIGHTS TO BE PAINTED BLUE. NONE OF THESE REPORTS HAS ANY FOUNDATION AND THE JORDANIAN MEDIA HAVE FOUND IT EASY TO RIDICULE THE MORE FAR-FETCHED ITEMS.

2. BUT IT IS OF COURSE TRUE THAT EVER-INCREASING QUANTITIES OF SUPPLIES FOR IRAQ ARE PASSING THROUGH AQABA (SEE MY TELNO 396 OF 10 OCTOBER). THE CURRENT ISRAELI PROPAGANDA AGAINST JORDAN WOULD SEEM TO RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS CONCERNING ISRAELI INTENTIONS, ON WHICH I WOULD VALUE MR ROBINSON'S COMMENTS. SEEN FROM HERE, IT IS NO LONGER CLEAR WHETHER THE ISRAELIS ARE MERELY TRYING TO DAMAGE US/JORDANIAN RELATIONS AND IN THE PROCESS STOP THE US SALE OF TANKS TO JORDAN OR WHETHER THEY MAY NOT HAVE OTHER AND MORE FAR-REACHING PURPOSES AND MAY EVEN BE PREPARING THE GROUND FOR SOME FORM OF INTERVENTION. CERTAINLY THERE IS MUCH APPREHENSION HERE THAT SOMETHING OF THIS SORT MAY BE IN THE MINDS OF THE ISRAELIS. KING HUSSEIN ADMITTED PUBLICLY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 8 OCTOBER THAT HIS SUPPORT FOR IRAQ CARRIED DANGERS FOR JORDAN (SEE PARA 3 OF MY TELNO 395 OF 9 OCTOBER), AND WHEN QUESTIONED BY AMERICAN REPORTERS ON 8 OCTOBER ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE, REPLIED THAT ''THE RISK IS ALWAYS THERE'' AND THAT IF ISRAEL WERE SEEKING TO HUMILIATE THE ARABS ANYTHING WAS POSSIBLE.

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FM FCO 101101Z OCTOBER 1980
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 401 OF 10 OCTOBER
INFO TO PRIORITY EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, JEDDA
LUXEMBOURG TELNO 312: MIDDLE EAST FOLLOW-UP TO THE THORN MISSION

1. WE RETAIN GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE REGULAR POLITICAL CO-OPERATION MACHINERY TO CARRY OUT EFFECTIVELY THE NEW TASKS ENTRUSTED TO IT AND WILL WISH TO PURSUE THIS FURTHER IN THE WORKING GROUP MEETING ON 16-17 OCTOBER. WE CAN ONLY GUESS AT THE REAL REASONS FOR THE FRENCH OPPOSITION TO THE CREATION OF A GROUP TO ASSIST THE PRESIDENCY, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY ARE LIKELY TO SHARE OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY, BUT ASSUME IT SPRINGS FROM THEIR OBJECTION TO ANYTHING THAT SMACKS OF A PERMANENT SECRETARIAT. FOR THE MOMENT, THE FRENCH ARE SHELTERING BEHIND THE ARGUMENT THAT THEY DO NOT WISH TO UPSET THE PRESIDENCY, WHILE THE LUXEMBOURG PRESIDENCY ARE SAYING THAT THEY DO NOT WISH TO UPSET THE FRENCH OR THE DUTCH. THIS IS HARDLY SATISFACTORY.

2. EVEN MORC IMPORTANT THAN THE MACHINERY IS THE SUBSTANCE. WE AND THE FRENCH BOTH WISH THE NINE TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS ACTIVELY AND VISIBLY. BUT THERE MAY ALL THE SAME BE A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE. WE BELIEVE THAT EUROPE HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY AND WISH TO MAKE A CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE EFFORTS IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE NINE CAN GO IT ALONE AND ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE GOODWILL OF THE CAMP DAVID PARTIES AGAINST LIKELY OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS IN 1981. TO PLAY ANY ROLE EFFECTIVELY, THE NINE NEED TO WORK WITH, NOT AGAINST, THE US. WE ARE NOT INTCRESTED IN DRAWING FURTHER PUBLIC ATTENTION TO OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE US AND ISRAEL. WE THEREFORE TAKE THE VIEW THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS A

PERIOD OF SERIOUS BUT LARGELY CONFIDENTIAL WORK DURING WHICH OUR IDEAS WILL BE WORKED OUT AND, IN PARALLEL, TESTED ON THE PARTIES, PARTICULARLY THE ARABS (INCLUDING THE PLO). THIS WOULD MAKE BEST USE OF THE NINE'S ABILITY TO TALK TO ALL THE PARTIES.

3. IT LOOKS AS IF THE FRENCH, ON THE OTHER HAND, MAY WANT A LARGELY PUBLIC EXERCISE, THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS NOT SO MUCH TO MAKE A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTION AS TO DEMONSTRATE THE NINE'S DISTANCE FROM THE US AND TO PUT THE EC IN GOOD STANDING WITH THE ARABS. THEY APPEAR TO WANT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, ON 1-2 DECEMBER, TO ADOPT A POSITION WHICH GOES BEYOND THE VENICE DECLARATION TOWARDS THE ARAB SIDE (EG BY ENDORSING THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO A STATE) AND MAY AMOUNT TO A SET OF PROPOSALS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A PUBLIC EXERCISE OF THIS KIND IN DECEMBER WOULD ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE OR HELP ESTABLISH A LASTING ROLE FOR THE NINE IN PEACE EFFORTS. WHATEVER THE CONTENT OF ANY PROPOSALS, THEY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE REJECTED BY SOME OR ALL OF THE PARTIES ONCE MADE PUBLIC. THE NINE'S EFFORT WOULD THEN BE SPENT. WE WOULD BE SEEN BY THE AMERICANS AND OTHERS AS ENGAGED ONLY IN DIPLOMATIC POSTURING AND ACCORDINGLY DISREGARDED.

4. HOWEVER, WE MAY BE DOING THE FRENCH AN INJUSTICE. IT WOULD IN ANY CASE BE HELPFUL TO ESTABLISH THEIR VIEWS A LITTLE MORE CLEARLY IN ADVANCE OF THE WORKING GROUP MEETING. WITH THE ABOVE AS BACKGROUND, PLEASE APPROACH THE QUAI AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN ORDER TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING BASIC POINTS AND TO EXPLORE FRENCH THINKING ON TIMING AND SUBSTANCE IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE:

(I) WE AGREE WITH THE FRENCH THAT WE SHOULD DO MORE THAN ATTEMPT TO 'FILL THE VACUUM' CREATED BY THE US ELECTIONS. WE NEED TO MOVE INTO A PHASE WHEN EUROPE COMES UP WITH ITS OWN IDEAS. WE NEED, THEREFORE, TO CLEAR OUR MINDS ON SUBSTANCE. BU IN PRACTICE, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE WITHOUT TRYING OUT OUR IDEAS ON THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

(II) WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT WITHOUT SOME CONTINUOUS ACTIVITY IN A GROUP WORKING TO THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF A SIZE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING IDEAS, DRAFTING, AND MAINTAINING CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES (INCLUDING THE US) AS

/ APPROPRIATE

APPROPRIATE (IE A SMALL GROUP),
EFFORTS TO REFINE THE NINE'S THINKING WILL
PROVE UNDULY LABORIOUS AND THE NINE'S EFFORTS WILL REMAIN
LARGELY ACADEMIC. WE HAVE SOME CONCRETE IDEAS OF THE LINES THE
NINE SHOULD NOW PURSUE (FOR YOUR INFORMATION WE HOPE TO
CIRCULATE OUR CONTRIBUTION BEFORE NEXT WEEK'S WORKING GROUP
MEETING BUT ARE NOT YET IN A POSITION TO DO SO).
(III) THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS IS IN PRACTICE LIKELY TO
ARISE IN 1981, AFTER ISRAELI ELECTIONS. THE NINE MUST CONTINUE
TO BE DEMONSTRABLY ACTIVE, BUT TO COME OUT PREMATURELY WITH FAR-
REACHING IDEAS DOOMED TO REJECTION WOULD BE DAMAGING.
(IV) IN OUR VIEW, WHAT IS NEEDED IS A PERIOD OF SERIOUS WORK,
CONDUCTED LARGELY CONFIDENTIALLY. WE SEE CONSIDERABLE DIS-
ADVANTAGES OF BOTH TIMING AND PRESENTATION IN AIMING FOR A MAJOR
PUBLIC (REPEAT PUBLIC) MOVE AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN DECEMBER,
ALTHOUGH THE COUNCIL WILL CLEARLY NEED TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING
CONCERN AND ACTIVITY. WHAT EXACTLY DO THE FRENCH HAVE IN MIND?
DO THEY ENVISAGE A NEW STATEMENT OR A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT PLAN?
HOW DO THEY SEE THE EUROPEAN ROLE AFTER DECEMBER? HOW DO THEY
ENVISAGE CONSULTATION TAKING PLACE WITH THE UNITED STATES?
(V) WE SHOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE NOTEC WITH
THE FRENCH AT EXPERT LEVEL BEFORE THE WORKING GROUP MEETS, EG IN
LUXEMBOURG ON THE EVENING OF 15 OCTOBER IF THE SUGGESTED STARTING
TIME OF 0900 FOR THE WORKING GROUP'S MEETING IS ADHERED TO.

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TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 393 OF 9 OCT 8Ø
INFO ROUTINE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (DI4B) DAMASCUS MOSCOW
TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

JORDAN/SOVIET UNION

1. WHEN SEEING THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF THIS MORNING I ENQUIRED WHETHER HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING KING HUSSEIN ON HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO Moscow (HE IS THOUGHT TO BE LEAVING AMMAN ON 13 OR 14 OCTOBER). GENERAL SHAKER SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GOING WITH THE KING AND THAT HE EXPECTED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE SUPPLY OF SOME ITEMS OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT IN THE AIR DEFENCE FIELD WHICH HAD BEEN MOOTED FOR A LONG TIME. HE DID NOT EXPECT THAT A CONTRACT WOULD BE CONCLUDED DURING THE VISIT. I ENQUIRED WHETHER THE SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION LED BY GENERAL VASILY SERVAG, DESCRIBED AS DEPUTY COMMANDER SOVVIET GROUND FORCES, WHICH VISITED JORDAN FROM 29 SEPTEMBER TO 6 OCTOBER, WAS IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH THE POSSIBLE JORDANIAN PURCHASE OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT. GENERAL SHAKER SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD BEEN VISITING JORDAN MILITARY TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS SEMICOLON THE DATE OF THEIR VISIT HAD BEEN FIXED 6 MONTHS AGO AND WAS IN RETURN FOR AN EARLIER SIMILAR VISIT BY A JORDANIAN TEAM TO THE SOVIET UNION.

3. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELI LOBBY WAS LIKELY TO HAVE A FIELD DAY IN THE UNITED STATES IF JORDAN PURCHASED ANY WEAPONRY FROM THE SOVIET UNION AT THE PRESENT TIME, ESPECIALLY COMING ON TOP OF ACCUSATIONS IN THE ISRAELI MEDIA THAT JORDAN WAS EXTENDING MILITARY HELP TO IRAQ, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF READILY AGREED AND SAID THAT THIS FACTOR WAS VERY MUCH IN JORDANIAN MINDS. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS MADE THE SAME POINT TO LEADING JORDANIANS IN RECENT DAYS.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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TELNO 464 OF 3 OCT
INFO JERUSALEM(PASSED) AND SAVING TO UKREP BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, CAIRO.

JERUSALEM TELNO 127: THORN'S VISIT.

1. MY NETHERLANDS COLLEAGUE, WHO HAD BEEN WITH THORN DURING HIS TALKS WITH ISRAELIS, ADDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION THIS MORNING.

2. SHAMIR HAD TOLD THORN IN NEW YORK THAT SOME PLACES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE LESS SECURE, AND THAT IF HE WANTED TO VISIT NABLUS OR HEBRON, HE WOULD ''NEED A BRIGADE TO PROTECT HIM''. THORN WAS VERY CRITICAL IN PRIVATE OF THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN BRUSSELS'S ROLE IN THE PRELUDE TO THORN'S VISIT HERE THIS WEEK.

3. IN THE EVENT, THORN HAD CLEARLY DECIDED NOT TO TRY TO RESPOND IN DETAIL TO ISRAELI CRITICISM DURING HIS TALKS HERE. HE HAD CUT SHORT HIS TALKS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS, BUT HAD HAD FORTY MINUTES WITH BEGIN WITH OFFICIALS PRESENT A FURTHER TWENTY MINUTES (AT THORN'S REQUEST) ALONE WITH BEGIN. THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON ANYTHING OF SUBSTANCE BETWEEN THORN AND BEGIN DURING THE FIRST PART OF THIS MEETING AND THORN HAD SAID SUBSEQUENTLY THAT NOTHING NEW HAD ARISEN IN THE PRIVATE MEETING. BEGIN HAD REFERRED TO HIS MEETING WITH THE U S PRESIDENT FIXED FOR 12 NOVEMBER, WHEN HE WOULD DISCUSS DATES FOR A TRILATERAL SUMMIT.

4. MERTZ HAD SAID SUBSEQUENTLY THAT ALL THORN'S PALESTINIAN VISITORS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT CAMP DAVID WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM, THAT ISRAEL MUST LEAVE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THAT THE P L O MUST BE ACCEPTED AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIANS, AND THAT THERE MUST BE SELF-DETERMINATION. SOME HAD SAID THAT PALESTINIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND ISRAEL MUST TAKE PART IN THIS SELF-DETERMINATION EVEN IF THEY DID NOT LIVE IN THE TERRITORIES, BUT AFTER THE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION THOSE WHO DID NOT RETURN TO PALESTINE WOULD NOT TAKE A FURTHER PART. SOME ALSO COMPLAINED THAT THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE BEING LEFT INCREASINGLY BEHIND ECONOMICALLY, AND THAT THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO RECEIVE DEVELOPMENT FUNDS FROM ABROAD.

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5. IN CONCLUSION, THORN HAD TOLD MY DUTCH COLLEAGUE THAT HE ATTRIBUTED SOME OF THE RATHER BETTER ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN HIM AND THE ISRAELIS, AND THE LATTER'S FINAL DECISION NOT TO OBSTRUCT HIS MEETINGS WITH THE PALESTINIANS, TO ISRAEL'S FEAR OF MOVES TO EXPEL HER FROM THE U N, AND CONSEQUENT NEED OF EUROPEAN SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE.

6. FCO PSE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

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INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV(PASSED), UKREP BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, PRIORITY
UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, CAIRO, AMMAN, THE HAGUE, ROUTINE
PARIS, BONN, DUBLIN, COPENHAGEN, ROME.

LUXEMBOURG TEL NO 290 TO ME (NOT TO ALL)PARA 7:
EC MIDDLE EAST MISSION
1. M.THORN'S SECOND VISIT HERE WENT OFF WELL.
2. IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS WITHTHE ISRAELIS(COPED WITH MANFULLY BY MY NETHERLANDS COLLEAGUE AND THE CLASH WITH THE JERUSALEM MARCH(MY TEL NO 120, NOT TO ALL), THIS SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME CAME AS A GREAT RELIEF. HAVING EVIDENTLY DECIDED TO MAKE THE BEST OF A BAD JOB, THE ISRAELIS WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO FACILITATE ACCESS TO JERUSALEM BY ALL NINE PALESTINIANS AVAILABLE TO MEET THORN. IN THE EVENT, NONE HAD ANY DIFFICULTY IN GETTING HERE(ALTHOUGH WE FETCHED THE MAYOR OF TULKARM, JUST IN CASE, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE HAD SEEMED UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PLAYING AWAY).
3. UNFORTUNATELY HIS OTHER COMMITMENTS IN BRUSSELS LATER TO-DAY OBLIGED THORN TO BRING HIS DEPARTURE FORWARD BY HALF A DAY AT THE LAST MOMENT(SO YET ANOTHER RETURN TO THE DRAWING BOARD BY

Read in full.

3. UNFORTUNATELY HIS OTHER COMMITMENTS IN BRUSSELS LATER TO-DAY OBLIGED THORN TO BRING HIS DEPARTURE FORWARD BY HALF A DAY AT THE LAST MOMENT(SO YET ANOTHER RETURN TO THE DRAWING BOARD BY EC REPRESENTATIVES HERE). THUS HE HAD ONLY ONE DAY FBR ALL HIS MEETINGS, BOTH WITH THE ISRAELIS AND ARABS. AT LEAST THIS ANSWERED THE QUESTION WHETHER HE SHOULD CONSULT ARAB LEADERS ON THEIR HOME GROUND, SINCE THERE WAS BARELY TIME TO SQUEEZE IN INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS WITH THEM ALL IN JERUSALEM IN THE TIME AVAILABLE (1145 TO 1830: FULL DETAILS FOLLOW BY BAG).

4. AT A QUICK DE-BRIEFING FOR EC REPRESENTATIVES IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS EXHAUSTING PROGRAMME, THORN INDICATED THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE VIRTUAL UNANIMITY OF THE PALESTINIANS HE HAD SEEN IN MAINTAINING, ALBEIICTH NUANCES (PREVIOUS WORK UNDERLINED),THAT THE PLO WAS THE SOLE SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIANS(NB AND THIS FROM A MAINLY MODERATE GROUP- MY TEL NO 108. BUT I SUSPECT THAT FROM THE MAJORITY THIS WAS WINDOW DRESSING FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES. COMMENT BY BAG.THE YEARNING FOR A NATIONAL IDENTITY AND AN END TO THE LONG ISRAELI OCCUPATION HAD ALSO COME ACROSS STRONGLY, AND A WILLINGNESS TO CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY WITH THE ISRAELIS SO LONG AS THE PALESTINIANS COULD HAVE THEIR STATE.

5. FOR THEIR PART, THE ARABS THORN SAW ALL TOLD ME THAT THEY HAD BEEN MUCH IMPRESSED BY HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION AND BY HIS SYMPATHY FOR THEIR POINT OF VIEW. HE HAD HOWEVER EVIDENTLY FOUND IT NECESSARY TO DEFLATE EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS OF THE EC MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE WITH SOME OF THEM.

6. ON THE ISRAELI SIDE, THORN SAID THAT, BY CONTRAST WITH HIS LAST VISIT, HE HAD FOUND BEGIN COMPARATIVELY FRIENDLY, ALTHOUGH AS INTRANSIGENT AS EVER ON SUBSTANCE. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS MAINLY TO BEGIN'S EVIDENT ANXIETY TO ENLIST EC SUPPORT IN ISRAEL'S CURRENT DIFFICULTIES REGARDING HER UN MEMBERSHIP.

HAMLEY

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30 September 1980

Message from Mr. Begin

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 29 September about a reply to Mr. Begin's letter of 19 June. The Prime Minister agrees that we should proceed as you proposed.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

It would be more accurate to say that the Israeli Embassy have let it be known (through David Wolfson) that they have noticed that no reply has been sent. Agree that we may proceed as at A below?

Yes

Mark – 29/9

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 September 1980

Dear Michael,

Message from Mr Begin

I understand that the Israeli Embassy have let it be known that Mr Begin still awaits a reply to his letter of 19 June to the Prime Minister. You will recall that I enclosed a draft reply with my letter of 9 June but that the Prime Minister decided (your letter of 14 July) that she would prefer not to reply to Mr Begin at present.

The only points in Mr Begin's letter which seem positively to require a reply are those in the concluding paragraphs on defence sales to Israel. It is too late to deal with these points alone in a written reply and, if you agree, we would propose that the Department should take the opportunity of their next meeting with the Israeli Embassy to reply on the Prime Minister's behalf.

A

We would, if you agree, take the line proposed in the penultimate paragraph of our draft reply to Mr Begin, ie that the Prime Minister has looked into the circumstances but has nothing to add to the answers already given to the Israeli Government on these items. We could then if necessary clarify any points of detail which the Israelis may raise.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

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Middle East Strategy

EXTRACT FROM THE

SUMMARY RECORD OF DISCUSSION AT THE LUNCH GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AT THE ELYSEE ON FRIDAY 19 SEPTEMBER 1980 AT 1300 HOURS

Present:

The President of the Republic
M. Raymond Barre (Prime Minister)
M. Jean Francois-Poncet (Foreign Minister)
M. Rene Monory (Minister of Economy)
M. Joel le Theule (Minister of Transport)
M. Andre Giraud (Minister of Industry)
M. Pierre Bernard-Raymond (Minister, Foreign Affairs)
M. Jean Sauvagnargues (French Ambassador, London)
M. Jacques Wahl (Secretary General, Presidency of the Republic)

The Prime Minister
The Chancellor of the Exchequer
The Secretary of State for Industry
The Lord Privy Seal
The Secretary of State for Trade
Sir Reginald Hibbert
Sir Robert Armstrong

The Middle East

The President of the Republic raised the subject of the Middle East.

Monsieur Francois-Poncet said that the situation in the Middle East had reached a very dangerous point. The danger was compounded by the Presidential election in the United States: both the main candidates would be impelled by domestic political considerations to say things that would be better unsaid. They would eventually have to be gainsaid; but that process would take time. The initiative taken by the European Council at Venice had been timely and important, and had been welcomed in the Middle East. The Arab countries in particular had responded positively to an initiative which came from another source than the United States. Monsieur Gaston Thorn had been well received in the Arab countries he had visited; less well received in Israel, though since his visit he had received a number of more encouraging messages from Mr. Begin. The European

/Community

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Community must now follow up the initiative by giving more precision and detail to the ideas and concepts in the Venice declaration, with a view to making further progress at the December meeting of the European Council.

The Lord Privy Seal agreed generally with Monsieur Francois-Poncet's analysis and in particular upon the need for building on, and giving greater detail and precision to, the European Council's initiative; but he emphasised the importance of ensuring that any proposals made by the European Community were at least not unacceptable to the United States, whose support was indispensable to progress towards peace in the region.

In discussion it was agreed that one of the matters which would require further discussion in the European Community was the future of the West Bank. The Prime Minister favoured federation of the West Bank in the State of Jordan: there was reason to believe that this could be acceptable to King Hussein. In her judgment the future of Jerusalem was likely to be the most intractable problem, given the views of the Saudi Government. The President of the Republic agreed that inclusion of the West Bank in a federal state of Jordan would be an acceptable solution if it were the choice of the PLO, but it could not be imposed on the PLO. He believed that it would not be possible to withhold recognition from the PLO after 1981. The Prime Minister said that recognition of the PLO must be dependent upon the PLO and the Arab states recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist. The President of the Republic agreed, and said that Arab leaders were in practice ready to accept and recognise the existence of the State of Israel. It was difficult, however, for the PLO and the Arab states to concede Israel's right to exist until the PLO was recognised: some way would have to be found of making the two steps simultaneous.

Iraq-Iran

The Prime Minister said that it was known that France was closer than other Western powers to Iraq: what view did France take of recent developments in relations between Iraq and Iran? Monsieur Francois-Poncet said that until recently he would have said that

Middle East

Prime Minister

You may like to see this record of Lord Carrington's meeting on Wednesday

MAP 19/IX

GRS 575
UNCLASSIFIED
FM F C O 181155Z SEP 80
TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 171 OF 18 SEPTEMBER
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, JEDDA.

FROM NENAD.
BOARD OF DEPUTIES OF BRITISH JEWS.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADDRESSED A PRIVATE MEETING OF THE BOARD ON 17 SEPTEMBER. SEVERAL HUNDRED DEPUTIES WERE PRESENT. THE RECEPTION WAS CRITICAL ON PREDICTABLE LINES BUT LESS SHARPLY AND UNIFORMLY THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. THE TONE WAS ANXIOUS RATHER THAN HOSTILE. THE MEETING WAS OFF THE RECORD AND THE PRESS WERE NOT (NOT) PRESENT.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ANSWERED QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS SEPARATELY AFTER THE MEETING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED TO EXPLAIN WHAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS SEEKING TO DO. HE UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL'S ANXIETIES PARTICULARLY ON SECURITY: THAT PROBLEM HAD TO BE SOLVED. THE VENICE DECLARATION WAS EVENHANDED. RECOGNITION OF THE BALANCING RIGHTS OF ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS WAS BASIC TO ANY SOLUTION. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO BRING THIS ABOUT. EUROPE COULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM ON HER OWN. THOSE INVOLVED HAD TO BE INCLUDED AND NO SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE U.S. M. THORN HAD REPORTED TO EC FOREIGN MINISTERS ON HIS TOUR OF CAPITALS AND WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ON 29 SEPTEMBER. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD DISCUSSED WHERE THE EC SHOULD GO FROM THERE. THIS DISCUSSION HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD MEET AGAIN IN NEW YORK NEXT WEEK.

3. ASKED BY HA'ARETZ WHETHER THE VENICE DECLARATION DID NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY IN RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC PRESSURE THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT NO-ONE COULD ACCUSE THE UK OF NEEDING OIL. HE REFERRED TO LORD HOME'S HARROGATE SPEECH IN 1970. THIS DID NOT DIFFER GREATLY FROM WHAT WAS BEING SAID NOW. ON THE QUESTION OF THE PLO IT WAS UNDENIABLE THAT THEY MUST BE ASSOCIATED WITH A SETTLEMENT. THEY REPRESENTED A LARGE BODY OF PALESTINIANS. THE HISTORY OF DECOLONISATION DEMONSTRATED THAT A REFUSAL TO TALK TO BODIES OF THIS SORT COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED. IN REPLYING TO OTHER QUESTIONS HE ACCEPTED THAT THE MAIN WORRY AT THE MEETING HAD BEEN THAT THE PLO WAS A TERRORIST BODY DEDICATED TO DESTROYING ISRAEL. THE VENICE DECLARATION TOOK CARE OF THAT POINT. WITHOUT PALESTINIAN RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHTS THERE COULD BE NO SETTLEMENT. ASKED ABOUT PLO EXTREMISM HE SAID THAT WHEN ORGANISATIONS HAVE OBJECTIVES WHICH THEY SEE AS BEING FRUSTRATED THEY BECOME MORE EXTREME. IF THEY SEE PROSPECTS OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THEY BECOME LESS SO. HE DENIED ANY CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH PARTIES ON MEETINGS BETWEEN FCO OFFICIALS AND PLO OFFICIALS.

/4.

4. ON JERUSALEM THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ISRAEL'S ACTION IN AUGUST HAD BEEN PROVOCATIVE AND THE CONSEQUENCES FORESEEABLE (A SIMILAR POINT MADE EARLIER DURING THE MEETING ITSELF WAS APPLAUDED BY PART OF THE AUDIENCE).

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WOULD BE WHOLLY OPPOSED TO ISRAEL'S EXPULSION FROM THE UN.

6. ASKED BY ISRAEL TV WHETHER BRITAIN WOULD SUPPORT ISRAEL WITH SUPPLIES OF OIL AND ARMS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPEATED THE STANDARD LINE ON OIL AND SAID THAT ALL REQUESTS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT WERE JUDGED ON THEIR MERITS.

CARRINGTON

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Middle East

Prime Minister

Not essential reading, but worth a glance

MAP 19/IX

GRS 1125 CONFIDENTIAL

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FM CAIRO 181100Z SEP 80
TO ROUTINE FC
TELEGRAM NUMBER 608 OF 18 SEPTEMBER
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA AND UKREP BRUSSELS
SAVING INFO BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT AND KHARTOUM

QHMEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT

1. PRESIDENT SADAT DECIDED TO SEE THE VISITING ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIES TEAM ON 15 SEPTEMBER, AND WITH THEM I HAD TWO HOURS OF HIS TIME AT THE BARRAGE REST HOUSE.

2. HE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING GRATITUDE TO BRITAIN AND THE OTHER EUROPEAN POWERS FOR WHAT THEY WERE DOING TO HELP EGYPT, AND CONCLUDED WITH AN EXPRESSION OF THANKS TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HAVING RECEIVED VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK SO WELL ON HIS RECENT VISIT, AS THE LATTER HAD REPORTED TO HIM. IN BETWEEN, HE USED QUESTIONS FROM THE TEAM TO EXPOUND HIS PPOLICIES AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, CONCENTRATING ON FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS. SITTING SLIM AND NEAT AT THE HEAD OF THE CIRCLE IN HIS DARK GREY SAFARI SUIT, SMOKING HIS PIPE AND MOPPING HIS BROW, HE SEEMED WELL AND ON THE BALL, AND AFTER A TENSE START BECAME INCREASINGLY RELAXED. WHEN WE MADE A MOVE TO LEAVE HALF WAY THROUGH, HE SAID THAT THE DISCUSSION WAS STIMULATING AND SHOULD CONTINUE. AS SO OFTEN WITH PRESIDENT SADAT, EVEN I SUSPECT WITH HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS, IT WAS A ONE-WAY CONVERSATION, BUT NONETHELESS REFRESHING TO HEAR HIS UNVARNISHED OPINIONS AT FIRST HAND.

3. HE WAS AT PAINS TO DECLARE THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WITH ISRAEL WAS COMPLETELY IRREVERSIBLE. WAR HAD BEEN REJECTED AS AN OPTION FOR EGYPT AND THEREFORE, AS EVEN PRESIDENT ASSAD HIMSELF HAD ADMITTED, IT WAS NO LONGER AN OPTION FOR THE ARABS EITHER. EGYPT HAD NO COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE BILATERAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, WHICH HAD BEEN FULFILLED METICULOUSLY. THE EGYPTIANS HAD DONE THE SAME. THEY WOULD GO ON DISCUSSING NORMALISATION (WHICH HE CLEARLY SAW AS PART OF THE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS, IE NOT TO BE USED AS A BARGAINING COUNTER FOR THE AUTONOMY TALKS). ISRAELIS COULD NOW DRIVE ACROSS THE BORDER. BUT THE OTHER PART OF THE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE PALESTINIANS WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL FOR ANY LASTING PEACE. HE HAD ALWAYS MADE IT CLEAR TO MR BEGIN AND THE ISRAELIS THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE EVERY SORT OF SECURITY GUARANTEE, SOVEREIGNTY OF ARAB LAND WAS INALIENABLE. HE HAD HIMSELF NOT MADE CONCESSIONS ON LAND IN SINAI AND NEITHER HE NOR THE ARABLS COULD DO SO FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SETTLEMENTS COULD NOT REMAIN UNLESS THE PALESTINIANS AGREED WITH

THEM. OPEN BORDERS AND GOOD NEIGHBOUR POLICIES WOULD PROVIDE THE ONLY LONG TERM SECURITY FOR ISRAEL. IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS ALL THE EGYPTAINS WERE TRYING TO DO WAS TO SET UP A FRAMEWORK FOR FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOR THE FIVE YEAR INTERIM PERIOD. IT WAS UP TO THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES TO DECIDE WHAT THEY WANTED FOR THE FUTURE, AND NO ONE ELSE COULD DO THIS FOR THEM.

4. AT THE MOMENT THE AUTONOMY TALKS WERE IN DEADLOCK SINCE MR BEGIN, EITHER BECAUSE OF HIS RELIGIOUS VIEWS OR HIS HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, COULD NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO REACH AGREEMENT. HOWEVER THE ISRAELIS HAD NOW ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF A FURTHER TRIPARTITE SUMMIT, WHICH SEEMED THE ONLY WAY OF MOVING FORWARD, AND THERE WOULD THEREFORE BE FURTHER TRIPARTITE PREPARATORY MEETINGS EVEN BEFORE THE US ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH ONE COULD NOT COMMIT THE NEW US PRESIDENT THE THREE SIDES WERE AIMING AT A SUMMIT AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER OR THE BEGINNING OF DECEMBER. AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION MIGHT TAKE TIME, BUT PRESIDENT SADAT EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT IN THE END IT WOULD BE ACHIEVED.

5. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION HE RECOUNTED THE KEY ROLE THAT THE US HAD PLAYED IN THE PEACE PROCESS FROM THE BEGINNING, WITH DR KISSINGER AND THE FIRST DIS-ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. THE AMERICAN ROLE AS A FULL PARTNER IN THE TALKS REMAINED CRUCIAL. HOWEVER, AS HE HAD TOLD M.THORN, BECAUSE OF THE US ELECTIONS IT WAS APPROPRIATE NOW FOR EUROPE TO COME IN AND FILL THE GAP FOR A TIME - PERHAPS AFTER THE ELECTIONS TOO. ANY IDEAS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO KEEP CONTACTS GOING, EVEN A WORLD CONFERENCE OR WHATEVER. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO FIND A FACE-SAVING FORMULA TO BRZIC TOVMTVE MODERATE ARABLS SOMEHOW INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

6. ALTHOUGH ORDINARY ARABLS SUPPORTED EGYPT'S POLICIES THEIR RULERS WERE ALMOST ALL RUNNING SCARED. IT WAS SAD, REALLY, THAT EGYPT HAD BEEN ALIENATED FROM HER ARAB COLLEAGUES AND ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE ON THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT HELPED. BUT BASICALLY THE OTHER ARABLS COULD NOT BE COMPARED WITH EGYPT. EGYPT WAS A STATE WITH A HISTORY AND IDENTITY GOING BACK FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS, FIRST CIVILISATION AND ORGANISED STATE IN THE WORLD. MOST OTHER ARAB STATES WERE ARTICICIAL CREATIONS OF THIS CENTURY. EGYPT WAS A DEMOCRACY (SIC): MOST OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WERE POLICE STATES. EGYPT COULD ACT ON HER OWN WITHOUT THE OTHER ARABLS, BUT THEY COULD DO NOTHING WITHOUT EGYPT. THEY WERE STILL BOYCOTTING EGYPT. BUT THE EGYPTAIN ECONOMY WAS GETTING STRONGER WHILE THEY WERE IN TERRIBLE STRAITS WITH CIVIL WARS, INSURRECTION AND INTER-NECINE ARAB STRUGGLES. THE SAUDI PRINCES AND RULERS OF THE GULF WERE TERRIFIED OF PALESTINIAN BOMBS IN THE OIL FIELDS AND OF BEING MURDERED IN THEIR BEDS. THE MECCA INCIDENT SHOWED THE THREAT THAT EXISTED FROM INSIDE

/THEIR

THEIR OWN COMMUNITIES. BILLIONS OF DOLLARS HAD BEEN FLOWN OUT OF THE COUNTRY TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT SOME WESTERN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAD DECLINED TO ACCEPT ANY MORE. THE ARABLS WERE UNSURE OF US SUPPORT AFTER WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THE SHAH. THEY COULD NOT TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE SHEIKS COULD NOT SPEND ROUBLES IN THE CASINOS OF MONTE CARLO AND GENEVA. THE SITUATION MADE THEM ACT IN AN EXTRMEME WAY, FOR EXAMPLE (IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE INSISTENCE THAT THE PLO SHOULD HAVE OBSERVER STATUS AT THE IMF AND WORLD BANK EVEN IF THE THIRD WORLD SUFFERED) IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES. IT WAS ALL VERY SAD.

7. TURNING TO THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE AREA PRESIDENT SADAT EXPLAINED HIS THEORY, BORN OF EXPERIENCE, THAT THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS WAS TO BE TOUGH. HE HAD KICKED THEM OUT. VIETNAM AND WATERGATE HAD PREVENTED THE AMERICANS FROM ADOPTING A SUITABLY TOUGH ATTITUDE. THE RUSSIANS CONTROLLED A SOUTHERN ARC IN AFRICA FROM ANGOLA TO MOZAMBIQUE, AND AN ARC FROM AFGHANISTAN THROUGH CHAOTIC IRAN (AN UNEXPECTED PRESENT FOR THEM), SOUGH YEMEN AND ETHIOPIA UP TO LIBYA. HE FELT HIMSELF THE TARGET OF THIS DEPLOYMENT. HE WAS PREPARED TO OFFER BASES AT RAS BANAS ON THE RED SEA AND AT QENA TO THE AMERICANS TO ENABLE THEM TO DEAL WITH ANY THREATS OF SUBVERSION IN THE MOSLEM WORLD, AS FAR AWAY AS INDONESIA. ON THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN , HE HAD ADVISED PRESIDENT CARTER TO PLAY IT COOL SINCE THE RUSSIANS WOULD CERTAINLY GET INTO MORE AND MORE TROUBLE WITH THE FIERCELY INDEPENDENT AFGHANS.

8. ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO ASSOCIATE THE RUSSIANS WITH THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, PRESIDENT SADAT SAID IT WOULD NOT. THEIR RECORD SHOWED THEY WOULD ONLY BE DISRUPTIVE. THIS HAD BEEN THE CASE OVER THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN TROOPS TO REINFORCE THE CAMP DAVID ARRANGEMENTS FOR SINAI, ABSURDLY, THIS HAD NOT BEE POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF FEAR OF A SOVIET VETO AND AS A RESULT THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN SINAI WOULD NOT BE UNDER UN AUSPICIES. IT HAD BEEN PROVED THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITH THE US COULD REACH AGREEMENT. ONCE EVERYTHING WAS WRAPPED UP ONE COULD CERTAINLY AT THAT STAGE SEEK A FACE-SAVING FORMULA TO TRY AND ASSOCIATE THE RUSSIANS WITH THE AGREEMENT AND KEEP THEM HAPPY. PERSONALLY HE HAD NOTHING AGAINST THE RUSSIANS EXCEPT THAT HE DID NOT APPROVE OF THE WAY THEY TRIED, AS IN EGYPT IN THE PAST, TO INTERFERE IN OTHER COUNTRIES' AFFAIRS.

9. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL) FOR COMMENTS ON INTERNAL QUESTIONS.

FCO PASS SAVING BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT AND KHARTOUM
BARRINGTON

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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Top copy on Middle East
Austria June 1980
Visit of Chancellor Kreisky

EXTRACT FROM

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHANCELLOR KREISKY OF AUSTRIA ON WEDNESDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER, 1980 AT 1100

Present:

Prime Minister

Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

Chancellor Kreisky

Dr. Lennkh

Dr. Heinrich Gleissner

Middle East

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Chancellor Kreisky said that the situation in the Middle East remained very serious. He did not believe that there was any real chance of a solution so long as the present Israeli Government remained in office - which might be for anything up to a year. He expected Mr. Begin to continue his present "policy of provocation", and to attempt to create more faits accomplis. The Prime Minister commented that she doubted whether Mr. Begin would, in the event, move his office to East Jerusalem. Chancellor Kreisky considered that Mr. Begin was likely to set up a shadow office. He liked to appear to be pursuing tough policies. It was, however, doubtful whether he was a really tough Prime Minister. It would be more accurate to say that he was the prisoner of his prejudices. The Prime Minister, recalling her conversation with Mr. Begin in London last year, agreed.

The Prime Minister asked whether Chancellor Kreisky considered that a new Government in Israel would be likely to take a materially different view from the present Government. Chancellor Kreisky said that although he and Mr. Peres were old friends, he was inclined to be sceptical about the Israeli Labour Party's leader. He was a very tricky man. Nonetheless, Mr. Peres had twice sent close collaborators of his to Vienna to discuss with the Chancellor the Labour Party's plans. The most recent emissary had been in Vienna the previous day. The Labour Party's blueprint had three parts:-

(a) A new Labour Govermment would declare as soon as it took office that there would be a halt in the construction of all settlements in the occupied territories, and that the future of at least some of the recently established settlements would be open to discussion;

(b) The new Government would declare its readiness to return the West Bank to Jordan, except for "some small rectifications". (Mr. Peres seemed to envisage the return of 85% of the West Bank, and the retention, for security purposes, of 15%.)

(c) In the event that King Hussein refused to negotiate on the basis of (a) and (b) above, the new Government would give full autonomy to the West Bank for 5 years, and announce its intention to discuss the future of the West Bank at the end of that period.

Chancellor Kreisky said that while this programme seemed plausible, he was inclined to fear a trick. Since the meeting in Rabat, Jordan had had no right to negotiate about the West Bank. Only the PLO had this right. King Hussein would therefore have to refuse to negotiate, and the option at (c) above would be implemented.

The Prime Minister said that she herself had the feeling that Arafat might be prepared to accept a solution involving the incorporation of the West Bank in Jordan. Chancellor Kreisky said that it was difficult to know what the position of the PLO was. They did not discuss these matters in a balanced way. But it seemed to him that Arafat was saying: "We want the West Bank and the Palestinians as the basis for a Palestinian State. Once this requirement has been met, we would be prepared to discuss

/ Federation

Federation with Jordan.". Mr. Peres, on the other hand, was saying: "We will never accept an independent Palestinian State. But we would be prepared to envisage a Jordanian Palestinian State. We want King Hussein to have overall responsibility because we trust him and his army. Within a federated state, the Palestinians can build up their own autonomous entity with a flag if they so wish." If both sides were speaking the truth it should be possible to bridge the gap in their positions. The possibility would have to be investigated in exploratory talks. If both sides wanted a solution (and Chancellor Kreisky made it clear that he was not confident of this) then a solution could be found.

The Prime Minister expressed some doubt as to whether, if Arafat succeeded in establishing an independent state, he would ever agree to federation with Jordan. However, there was a prior question as to whether a Palestinian state would be viable. Chancellor Kreisky said that Prince Fahd had made it clear to him that the viability of a Palestinian state would not be a problem. The Arabs would guarantee to support such a state. It would be easier for the Saudis to give the necessary subventions than it was for the United States to support Israel. Chancellor Kreisky said that his personal view was that there would be a federated state because Jordan was already a Palestinian state. The people who ran Jordan were Palestinians and Muslim Cherkassians. The Palestinian majority in Jordan would demand federation. A bigger question was perhaps whether King Hussein would be eager to go along with this. Reverting to the Prime Minister's original question, Chancellor Kreisky said that no-one could be sure that a new Government in Israel would bring a solution closer, but at least there would be a changed situation and a better chance of progress.

Chancellor Kreisky added that a change in Government would be very good for President Sadat. He would once again have a partner with whom to negotiate. Recalling her recent

conversation with Vice-President Mubarak, the Prime Minister said that the Egyptians appeared to believe that a gesture on East Jerusalem would be more important than progress on the West Bank and easier for the Israelis to make. The Prime Minister said that in her view a gesture on Jerusalem would be impossible for the Israeli Government at present. Chancellor Kreisky said that Mr. Begin would give up neither East Jerusalem nor the West Bank. The Egyptians had always shown bad judgement both about Israeli attitudes and about the attitude of the rest of the Arab world. Nonetheless, it remained the case that President Sadat was perhaps the most remarkable practical politician of the second half of the 20th century. The Prime Minister observed that President Sadat had been very generous to both Mr. Begin and to President Carter, but did not seem to be getting a proper return for his generosity, particularly from the Israelis. Chancellor Kreisky agreed but added that there were limits to the amount of pressure which could be effectively exerted on Israel. Such pressure was liable to make Mr. Begin more rather than less stubborn. There were also objective limits to the degree of pressure which could be exerted. The Israeli army was the best and most experienced in the region. It was also a pro-western force which it would be impossible to replace. Probably the only effective external pressure would be from the Jewish community outside Israel. It was clear that they disapproved of the present Government's settlements policy and would favour a change of Government. The Prime Minister agreed that this was the attitude of the Jewish community in Britain.

The Prime Minister asked how Chancellor Kreisky saw the situation in Lebanon and Syria. Chancellor Kreisky said that there could be no solution in Lebanon unless the Palestinian problem had first been resolved. As for Syria, it was now a de facto satellite of the Soviet Union. Although President Asad was a considerable figure, he was facing great difficulties and had allowed the Soviet Union to dictate to him. His Foreign Minister was a fellow traveller. It was impossible to foresee how the internal crisis in Syria would be resolved. The possibility that events would follow the pattern of Iran could not be excluded.

/ As regards

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SAVING TELEGRAM

Prime Minister

MAD 19/IX

BY BAG

FROM WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

TO SAVING FCO TEL NO SAVING 44 OF 15 SEPT 80

SAVING TO (INFO) EC POSTS, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT,
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ARAB/ISRAEL

1. Linowitz today briefed EC representatives on his recent trip to the Middle East. He wanted this briefing to be seen as part of the continuing US wish, as expressed by Secretary Muskie when he lunched with EC Ambassadors on 25 July (my tel 2590), to keep in touch on Middle East questions and to ensure that US and EC efforts dovetailed.

2. Linowitz said that he had embarked on his latest Middle East trip without optimism and had warned the President not to expect much. He had returned with a quite different feeling and saw new hope for progress, and a new commitment by both parties to take the peace process forward. He did not wish to overstate this and stressed that it could all still be derailed, but he had detected in his conversations with Sadat and Begin a genuine determination to breathe new life into the Camp David process and to move forward in the search for real autonomy for the Palestinians.

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3. In Jerusalem he had had five hours, spread over two days, tête-à-tête with Begin (which he described as "no easy chore"). The three hour session on the first day had been the frankest, fullest and bluntest conversation he had ever had and left him with little reason to hope that negotiations could be put back on track. Before his second meeting with Begin he had a session with a group of Israeli Cabinet Ministers including Yadin, Sharon and Shamir, to whom he had given a full account of US concerns and of Egyptian concerns as described to the Americans. He also had meetings with Peres and Rabin ("separately" - it seems that all meetings with leading Israelis have to be separate) before his second and more fruitful two hour session with Begin.

4. As a result of these talks he was able to secure Israeli agreement to put to Sadat the text of a statement which called for fou - things:

(i) a recommitment by the parties to the Camp David process as the only viable path towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East;

(ii) as a foundation for the continuing search for peace, a commitment by both parties to strengthen mutual trust and friendship

(iii) resumption of the negotiations at a date to be mutually agreed;

(iv) discussion of the right time and venue for a summit meeting.

5. Linowitz was also able to take Sadat his "impressions" of the Israeli position on certain issues which had become the prime obstacles in the way of continuing negotiations:

(i) Jerusalem. Begin had outlined to Linowitz his view of recent developments over Jerusalem, going over the history of the Cohen Bill and the way in which its introduction, and its endorsement by the Labour party, had put him on the spot. Begin told Linowitz that the Knesset action did not flow from any initiative or desire on his part and was indeed a deep embarrassment to his government. As regards the move of the Prime Minister's office to

East Jerusalem, Begin made no promises, but undertook to give serious consideration to what Linowitz had to say about the grave repercussions of any such move and said that no decision would be taken without Cabinet agreement;

(ii) Settlements. Linowitz had made a strong restatement of the US position on settlements to which Begin had replied in familiar terms. However, at the meeting with members of the Israeli Cabinet, Sharon had assured Linowitz that ~~for~~ the four recently announced settlements would be the last; and the Israelis had found a way of ensuring that Linowitz was aware that Begin knew Sharon would say this;

(iii) Confidence building measures. Linowitz had left with the Israelis a list of recommended steps, eg the freeing of some Palestinian political prisoners, family reunification measures and the removal from the military government of certain functions. While anxious for tactical reasons not to appear to take public credit for anything which might flow from this list, the Americans had detected certain moves already by the Israelis;

(iv) Golan. Linowitz had made it clear that the annexation of Golan would be disastrous and carry serious risks for Israel. It would be a violation both of Resolution 242 and of the UN Charter. He had said the same to Peres and Rabin who had assured him that they would oppose any such move. Begin had given the impression that the risk was not serious and did not use any of the emotional language he had over eg settlements.

6. Begin had also made a strong pitch about his disappointment over the way normalisation was going and his personal hurt about things being said about him in the Egyptian press. He had been plaintive about how little he had got in return for peace with Egypt: a bad press, no visitors from Egypt, attacks on Israel by Egypt in the UN, a diplomatic campaign by Butros Ghali to dissuade African countries from re-establishing relations with Israel and denunciation by his own people.

7. Linowitz had conveyed all this to Sadat who had immediately accepted, indeed welcomed, the issuance of the four point statement. Linowitz attributed Sadat's response to satisfaction over Begin's acceptance of his proposal for a summit, his firm recommitment to the Camp David process, his restatement of the wish for mutual trust and friendship and the possibility of some confidence building measures. As a gesture on his side, Sadat had arranged for Shamir to be invited to Egypt.

8. The upshot was that the statement had been duly issued and a number of steps were being taken to enable negotiations to resume, probably around mid-October. There would be preparatory talks, initially bilateral, with the first trilateral meeting taking place before the end of September. The Americans had left with both sides a document, described variously as "Heads of Agreement" or a "Memorandum of Understanding", which set forth substantive suggestions for most of the issues involved in Palestinian autonomy arrangements. The Americans awaited reactions to their document, but thought it might become the focus of attention at the negotiating table. Linowitz admitted that progress would probably be slow and that patience was needed, but he had the feeling that both sides were genuinely concerned about rising temperatures in the area and agreed that the Camp David path to peace needed to be seriously pursued.

9. In the question and answer period which followed, Linowitz added the following:

(i) Thorn Mission. He said that Begin had sincerely regretted the muddle over the dates for Thorn's visit and Linowitz detected no suggestion that he was deliberately trying to avoid a meeting with Thorn. On the contrary he was disappointed that it had not worked out. That said, Linowitz did not wish to conceal that in Begin's mind there was a danger that the European initiative might be counterproductive for Camp David if it seemed to offer a more productive route for

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Palestinians to follow than joining in whatever autonomy arrangements the negotiations produced. (Asked later whether the US or Egypt shared this "nervousness", Linowitz said that he thought that Sadat did to a lesser extent, and quoted in support of this Sadat's willingness to commit himself to language about the Camp David process being the "only viable path" despite the fact that he had recently received Thorn's visit. Linowtiz admitted that, although he did not doubt the sincerity of European motives, he personally had an anxiety that the fall-out from the European initiative might be to raise false hopes among Palestinians that it offered a more promising way forward);

(ii) Palestinians. There had been a number of unpublicised meetings between Egyptians and Palestinians, Israelis and Palestinians and even Americans and Palestinians. The Americans also had indirect sources for exploring Palestinian thinking (these included the Jordanians). From these the Americans could not say with confidence that the Palestinians would join in, but the signs were that the West Bankers and Gazans recognised that if the negotiations produced a substantive autonomy plan, it would be in their interest to try to do something with it. Much of what the Americans and Egyptians were trying to put into the autonomy plan was based on what the Egyptians had learned of Palestinian wishes. The negotiations were therefore no longer taking place in a vacuum;

(iii) Contacts with other Arab states. Linowitz said that so far the results of his talks had been conveyed, in less detailed form than at this briefing, through American Ambassadors in the area, but he was thinking that more should probably be done to brief them;

/ (iv)

(iv) Lebanon. Lebanon had only been alluded to as one of a number of developments which could damage prospects (the Syria/Libya merger was another) for the peace negotiations. Linowitz did not consider it part of his mandate to pursue the question of Lebanon with the Israelis;

(v) The American document. Linowitz stressed that this contained substantive not procedural proposals and touched on every issue except that of voting rights for East Jerusalem Arabs on which the Americans felt for the moment they were not ready to put forward proposals;

(vi) The "interim" nature of any agreement which might emerge. Linowitz warned against the ambiguities of the word "interim". The Americans envisaged a document which would substantively flesh out the proposals in the Camp David accord which was itself an interim document. Some areas of autonomy could not be settled from the start but the hope was that any agreement would sufficiently point the way for the Palestinians to decide that they would do best to work with it.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 278 OF 9 SEPTEMBER
INFO BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 113 OF 8 SEPTEMBER: THORN MISSION: EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES WITH ARAFAT.

1. I RAISED THIS WITH MERTZ (POLITICAL DIRECTOR, MFA) TODAY. HE CONFIRMED THAT ARAFAT HAD SENT THORN A MESSAGE AFTER THEIR MEETING, IN WHICH ARAFAT HAD REFERRED TO THE PALESTINIANS IN THE LEBANON. ARAFAT HAD SAID THAT HE WAS AFRAID OF A PINCER MOVEMENT AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS BY THE ISRAELIS IN THE SOUTH AND THE MARONITES IN THE NORTH AND HAD DRAWN THORN'S ATTENTION TO THIS DANGER. MERTZ SAID THAT IN HIS REPLY TO ARAFAT, THORN HAD SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THEIR CONVERSATION, HE WAS AWARE OF ARAFAT'S CONCERN. HE WAS ALSO VERY PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THESE ISRAELI MOVEMENTS, WHICH BOTH THREATENED THE LIVES OF CIVILIANS AND ALSO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LEBANON. THORN HAD GONE ON TO TELL ARAFAT THAT HE HAD MADE HIS CONCERN KNOWN TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN BRUSSELS ON HIS RETURN HERE. (THORN HAD DONE SO WHEN HE HAD CALLED THE ISRAELI IN TO DISCUSS HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL). MERTZ SAID THAT ARAFAT HAD PUBLISHED HIS MESSAGE AND THORN'S REPLY.

THOMAS

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 579 OF 6 SEPTEMBER
PRIORITY INFO TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON.
ROUTINE INFO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, JERUSALEM.

MY TELNO 577 AND COLQUHOUN'S TELELETTER OF 4 SEPTEMBER TO HOLMES (NOT TO ALL): EGYPT/ISREAL

1. THE DETAILS OF LINOWITZ'S PACKAGE ARE OBSCURE - IF INDEED THERE ARE ANY. ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A SUMMIT IS BEING PRESENTED HERE AS A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE, IT STILL LOOKS AS THOUGH SADAT HAS ONCE MORE CLIMBED DOWN ON THE AUTONOMY TALKS, WITH PRACTICALLY NOTHING TO SHOW FOR IT, IN RESPONSE TO A PERSONAL APPEAL FROM PRESIDENT CARTER. THIS WILL PRESUMABLY ENCOURAGE THE ISRAELI CHIEF THAT THEY NEED TO MAKE NO CONCESSIONS, AS WELL AS UNDERMINE THE EFFORTS OF THOSE WHO ARE URGING THEM TO DO SO: EG WEIZMAN WHO IS IN EGYPT NOW ON A PRIVATE VISIT. SADAT'S INTERNAL POSITION WILL ALSO HAVE BEEN WEAKENED TO SOME EXTENT, THOUGH FEW EGYPTIANS REMAIN INTERESTED IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS OR BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL GET ANYWHERE WITHOUT MASSIVE, UNLIKELY, US PRESSURE ON ISRAEL.

2. SADAT'S ACTION UNDERLINES THE EXTENT OF HIS CURRENT COMMITMENT TO THE US, HIS DESIRE TO INCREASE PRESIDENT CARTER'S OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS HIM AND HIS DETERMINATION TO AVOID ALLOWING ISRAEL TO REPRESENT HIM AS RENEGING ON THE PEACE POLICY. THESE DEVELOPMENTS ALSO SUGGEST THAT RECENT SPECULATION THAT SADAT WAS MOVING TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION WITH THE SAUDIS MAY HAVE BEEN BASED ON WISHFUL THINKING. ONE OF THE PERTINENT QUESTIONS PUT TO THE PRESIDENT RECENTLY BY ALEXANDRIA UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS ASKED WHETHER IT WAS NOT TIME TO OPEN EVEN AN UNOFFICIAL DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER ARABS. SADAT'S ANSWER WAS THAT IT WAS NOT SO MUCH A QUESTION OF PERSONAL ATTACKS ON HIMSELF, BUT GIVEN THE LONG RECORD OF UNHELPFULNESS THE ARABS HAD DEMONSTRATED, HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO INITIATE A RAPPROCHMENT AT PRESENT.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 577 OF 5 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON,
INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, JERUSALEM.

MY TELNO 572: EGYPT/ISRAEL

1. MR LINOWITZ LEFT YESTERDAY. AT A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GHALI, HE CLAIMED THAT REMARKABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. THE TWO SIDES HAD PLEDGED THEIR COMMITMENT TO CAMP DAVID AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAKE THE AUTONOMY NETOGIATIONS SUCCEED AND TO PREPARE FOR A SUMMIT. BILATERAL TALKS (US/EGYPT AND US/ISRAEL) WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, THE FORMER IN WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK. THE AIM WAS FOR THE TALKS TO BECOME TRIPARTITE.

2. GHALI SAID THAT THE TALKS WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WOULD ENABLE THE PARTIES TO DISCUSS A SUMMIT AGENDA AND THE OBSTACLES WHICH HAD BLOCKED THE TALKS.

3. AL AHRAM, QUTOING A RESPONSIBLE SOURCE, SAYS EGYPT HAS ACCEPTED A US PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON ON 20 NOVEMBER.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 3922 OF 4 SEPT 80.
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA AND JERUSALEM.

CAIRO TELS NOS 571 AND 572 : EGYPT/ISRAEL.

1. THIS STATEMENT AND ACCOUNTS OF A PRESS BRIEFING GIVEN BY LINOWITZ IN CAIRO APPEAR PROMINENTLY IN TODAY'S U.S. PRESS UNDER HEADLINES SUCH AS QUOTE EGYPT, ISRAEL AGREE TO RESUME TALKS UNQUOTE. IMMEDIATELY LINOWITZ TELEPHONED THE NEWS, THE PRESIDENT TOLD A GROUP OF UNION LEADERS IN WASHINGTON THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL WOULD RE-START NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE SOMETIME WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, AND THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT HAD BEEN APPROVED, THUS SLIGHTLY HARDENING THE STATEMENT ITSELF. LINOWITZ IS QUOTED BY THE WASHINGTON POST AS TELLING JOURNALISTS IN CAIRO THAT TALKS WERE TO RESUME IN A MATTER OF WEEKS: THAT NO DATE HAD BEEN FIXED FOR A SUMMIT BUT THE TARGET WAS BY THE END OF THE YEAR: AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS UNDERSTOOD ON BOTH SIDES THAT IT WILL BE AFTER THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS:

BE AFTER THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS:
LINOWITZ IS ALSO REPORTED AS SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO OFFER ANY GUARANTEES TO SADAT FROM BEGIN: QUOTE ''I GAVE HIM IMPRESSIONS RATHER THAN COMMITMENTS''.

2. BOTH THE NSC AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT PLEAD IGNORANCE OF THE DETAILS OF WHAT LINOWITZ HAS AGREED: WE SHALL EXPLORE FURTHER WHEN HE AND HIS PARTY RETURN OVER THE WEEKEND. PROVIDED THERE IS NO FURTHER HITCH AND TALKS RESUME IN (SAY) OCTOBER, THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE ACHIEVED THE MINIMUM HE NEEDS IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS TO GO ON CLAIMING CREDIT FOR CAMP DAVID AS HIS MAJOR AND CONTINUING FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS. (WHICH REAGAN IS NOW TRYING TO BELITTLE, ASCRIBING THE CURRENT LACK OF PROGRESS TO BLUNDERS BY CARTER).

3. NSC HAVE TOLD US THAT BEGIN TELEPHONED PRESIDENT CARTER TODAY, SPOKE BRIEFLY ABOUT THE LINOWITZ VISIT, AND THEN ELICITED AN INVITATION TO THE WHITE HOUSE IN MID-NOVEMBER WHEN BEGIN IS TO COME TO THE U.S. ON A PRIVATE VISIT.

HENDERSON

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VLB

Middle East

3 September 1980

Jerusalem

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 1 September and the text of the draft statement prepared by the Luxembourg Presidency enclosed with it. The Prime Minister is broadly content with the text and with the amendments which the Lord Privy Seal has it in mind to suggest. However, she would prefer that the final sentence should read as follows:

> "They therefore regret to have to make clear that their official representatives will be obliged to avoid all contact in East Jerusalem with the Prime Minister and with his office in its new location there".

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

S. J. Gomersall, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 407 OF 2 SEPTEMBER
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK BEIRUT AMMAN CAIRO WASHINGTON PARIS AND DAMASCUS

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MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM HA'ARETZ OF 29 AUGUST

BEGINS:

"THE AMERICANS HAVE NOW LOST THEIR INFLUENCE AND POWERS OF PERSUASION OVER THE ISRAELI DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT. OR PERHAPS THEY JUST DON'T KNOW AS MUCH AS THEY DID IN THE PAST.... AMBASSADOR LEWIS WAS TOLD THAT IN THE LATEST IDF STRIKE IN THE ARNOON HEIGHTS AMERICAN WEAPONS TOO WERE SEIZED FROM THE TERRORISTS, SUCH AS NO-RECOIL CANNONS.
IN ANY CASE, THE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE USE OF AMERICAN WEAPONS AGAINST THE TERRORISTS MUST BE TOTALLY REJECTED, NOT ONLY BECAUSE BY IT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SEEKS TO LIMIT ISRAEL'S DEFENCE CAPABILITIES BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE FIGHT AGAINST THE TERRORIST ORGANIS-

''THE AMERICANS HAVE NOW LOST THEIR INFLUENCE AND POWERS OF PERSUASION OVER THE ISRAELI DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT. OR PERHAPS THEY JUST DON'T KNOW AS MUCH AS THEY DID IN THE PAST....
AMBASSADOR LEWIS WAS TOLD THAT IN THE LATEST IDF STRIKE IN THE ARNOON HEIGHTS AMERICAN WEAPONS TOO WERE SEIZED FROM THE TERRORISTS, SUCH AS NO-RECOIL CANNONS.
IN ANY CASE, THE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE USE OF AMERICAN WEAPONS AGAINST THE TERRORISTS MUST BE TOTALLY REJECTED, NOT ONLY BECAUSE BY IT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SEEKS TO LIMIT ISRAEL'S DEFENCE CAPABILITIES BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE FIGHT AGAINST THE TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS COUNTS AS AN ALL-OUT WAR AGAINST THOSE WHOSE DECLARED AIM IS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.....
THE AMERICAN ARGUMENT IS HEARD LESS TODAY ALSO BECAUSE CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN'S LINE IS NOW THE DOMINANT ONE IN THE DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT. HIS TUNE IS TO STEP UP THE ASSUALT ON THE TERRORISTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND TO GIVE IT GREATER DRIVE AND INTENSITY.
AS ON OTHER ISSUES, THE INFLUENCE THAT THE CHIEF OF STAFF HAS ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND DEFENCE MINISTER IS, BY FAR, GREATER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER PERSON. AND WHAT IS EASIER THAN CONVINCING MENACHEM BEGIN THAT THERE IS A NEED TO DEAL HARDER BLOWS TO THOSE WHO SENT MURDERERS TO KILL JEWISH CHILDREN IN ANTWERP? THERE WAS NO NEED TO CONVINCE BEGIN TO TAKE A FIRMER LINE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS. ON THIS ISSUE, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF SPEAK THE SAME LANGUAGE.
THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THIS POLICY IS NOT NEW AT ALL. EXTENSIVE IDF ATTACKS ON TERRORIST BASES IN THE ARNOON HEIGHTS DO NOT SIGNIFY A CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF OFFENCE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS. RATHER, THEY SHOW A NEW INTENSITY AND WILLINGNESS TO EMPLOY LARGER FORCES IN A FRONTAL ATTACK.''
ENDS.

ROBINSON

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 406 OF 2 SEPTEMBER
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK BEIRUT AMMAN CAIRO WASHINGTON PARIS AND DAMASCUS

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1185: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. WE HAVE NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE HERE SUGGESTING THAT A FURTHER MAJOR ISRAELI INCURSION INTO LEBANON IS IMMINENT. THE SEVERE JOLT WHICH ISRAEL RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF THE JERUSALEM BILL AND THE DEPARTURE OF EMBASSIES FROM JERUSALEM, APPARENT AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS CAN STILL SUCCEED AND THE IMMINENCE OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY POINT AGAINST EARLY MAJOR ACTION AGAINST THE LEBANON.

2. BUT I HAVE A FEELING THAT FURTHER MAJOR MILITARY ACTION HAS BEEN CONSIDERED HERE, AND IS ON BALANCE LIKELY BEFORE THE MIDDLE

2. BUT I HAVE A FEELING THAT FURTHER MAJOR MILITARY ACTION HAS BEEN CONSIDERED HERE, AND IS ON BALANCE LIKELY BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF OCTOBER.

3. IF ISRAEL RECKONS SHE MUST INTERVENE AGAIN IN THE LEBANON TO DESTROY PLO CAPABILITY, THERE ARE STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR INTERVENING SOON:

A) THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS HANDICAP AN ADVERSE US REACTION, NOTABLY AS REGARDS USE OF US WEAPONS:

B) THE PHALANGIST VICTORY, WHICH ISRAEL MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGE IN EXPLOITING QUICKLY. (THERE ARE RUMOURS HERE OF HIGH LEVEL MILITARY CONTACTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PHALANGISTS.)

C) PROSPECTS IN SYRIA, WHICH MAY MAKE THE PRESENT LOOK THE BEHZ TIME FOR ISRAEL.

4. HADDAD'S LATEST RESTRICTIONS ON UN MOVEMENTS WHICH WILL HAMPER OBSERVATION, AND THE ISRAELI OPERATIONS ON 19 AUGUST AND SUBSEQUENTLY AGAINST PLO RADAR MIGHT ALSO BE PRECURSORS TO SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANT AL.

5. THERE IS ALSO THE PERSONAL FACTOR OF BEGIN. HE HAS BEEN DEFENCE MINISTER FOR OVER THREE MONTHS, AND ENJOYS IT AND GETS ON WELL WITH CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY ARENS' REFUSAL YESTERDAY TO BECOME THE DEFENCE MINISTER, AND MY BELIEF THAT BEGIN WANTED TO KEEP DEFENCE FOR HIMSELF ANYWAY. MIFT REPORTS A SIGNIFICANT PASSAGE FROM AN ARTICLE BY THE BEST INFORMED OF THE ISRAELI DEFENCE CORRESPONDENTS WHICH APPEARED HERE ON 29 AUGUST. BEGIN CLEARLY ENJOYED BEING SEEN WITH ISRAELI TROOPS DURING THE 19 AUGUST OPERATION, AND MIGHT LIKE TO BE SEEN IN CHARGE OF A MAJOR OPERATION. THE PILSUDSKI COMPLEX. (A WELL PLACED ISRAELI OFFICIAL SAID VERY PRIVATELY A FEW WEEKS AGO THAT BEGIN'S MODD OF ELATION WAS SUCH THAT IF A DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST SYRIA WERE TO BE PUT IN FRONT OF HIM HE WOULD SIGN IT WITHOUT READING IT.)

6. THIS IS GUESSING. I MUST REPEAT THAT WE HAVE NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE POINTING TO IMMINENT ACTION. GIVEN THE SPEED WITH WHICH ISRAEL CAN MUSTER, WE MIGHT GET ONLY A FEW HOURS WARNING, IF ANY, BUT MAJOR ACTION IS SUFFICIENTLY ON THE CARDS TO JUSTIFY THE ANXIETY REPORTED IN UKMIS NEW YORK TEL UNDER REF.

ROBINSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 404 OF 2 SEPTEMBER
INFO CAIRO WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING JERUSALEM

WASHINGTON TEL NO 3879: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS REPORTS, LINOWITZ APPEARS TO BE TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER A PACKAGE TO INDUCE SADAT TO REJOIN THE AUTONOMY TALKS. THE FIRST ELEMENT WOULD BE AGREEMENT BY ISRAEL TO POSTPONE INDEFINITELY THE TRANSFER OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM (MY TEL NO 397). THE SECOND ''CONCESSION'' WOULD BE AN ISRAELI GESTURE TO PERMIT SOME ARAB OR MUSLIM CONTROL OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT MOSQUES: PRESS REPORTS SUGGEST THAT ''SENIOR ISRAELI POLICY MAKERS'' BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD ENABLE SADAT ''TO CLIMB DOWN FROM HIS TREE''.

2. LINOWITZ OBVIOUSLY HAD A HARD DAY YESTERDAY WITH BEGIN AND HIS TALKS CONTINUE TODAY. IN TALKING TO THE PRESS, LINOWITZ HAS INDICATED THAT THE ''BALL IS IN BOTH COURTS'' WITH REGARD TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS: AND HAS WARNED THAT IF CAMP DAVID WAS PERCEIVED TO BE DEAD THERE WOULD BE NO WAY TO STAVE OFF A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE WHICH OSTENSIBLY HELD OUT GREATER HOPE FOR THE PALESTINIANS. LINOWITZ DID NOT RULE OUT A TRIPARTITE SUMMIT EVEN BEFORE NOVEMBER, BUT SAID THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PART OF A CONTINUING NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE AMERICANS HAVE PRESENTED BOTHS SIDES WITH A PAPER CONTAINING ALL THE POINTS AGREED ON FOR AUTONOMY BEFORE TALKS BROKE DOWN: IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD FORM THE BASIS OF A DRAFT AGREEMENT.

3. BEGIN, IN AN APPARENT ASIDE TO LINOWITZ IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PRESS MADE SOME DISOBLIGING REMARKS ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THORN WHO HAD TRIED TO INSIST ON COMING TO ISRAEL ON A PARTICULAR DAY.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 September 1980

Dear Michael.

JERUSALEM

There was an exchange of letters last month on the move of Mr Begin's office to East Jerusalem and the possibility of a statement by the Nine on the Knesset law, resting with Mike Pattison's letter of 4 August. No statement was in the event issued.

The Nine have now agreed at official level that, in accordance with past practice in dealing with Israeli offices in East Jerusalem, members of the Nine should refuse to have official contacts with Mr Begin's office if and when it is moved to East Jerusalem (the move has been delayed because the building is not yet ready). The Luxembourg Presidency have proposed a short draft statement incorporating this decision, against the day when Mr Begin's office is finally moved. I enclose a translation of the text and the self-explanatory reply which the Lord Privy Seal proposes to send. As the enclosed telegram no 3697 from Washington makes clear, a decision and statement on these lines would be entirely in line with US policy and practice. The Presidency have asked for our comments by 3 September.

Yours ever

Stephen Gomersall.

S J Gomersall

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT STATEMENT OF THE NINE ON THE MOVE OF MR BEGIN'S OFFICE TO EAST JERUSALEM

Unofficial Translation

'The governments of the Nine member states of the European Community have just learnt of the decision by the Israeli government to implement the transfer to East Jerusalem of the Prime Minister's office. The Nine recall that they do not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem. The Nine deplore this decision of the Israeli government [designed to create a fait accompli]. They therefore regret to have to make clear that their official representatives [in Israel] will be obliged to avoid all contact with the Prime Minister and his office in its new location in East Jerusalem'.

× seems gratuitous & in any case the move is not being accepted by other Govts.

×× Omit because the same presumably applies to official visitors to Israel.

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TELEGRAM NO 3697 OF 5 AUGUST
INFO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JERUSALEM, EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

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YOURTEL 1348: JERUSALEM

1. POSSIBLE MOVE OF BEGIN'S OFFICE. AMBASSADOR LEWIS HAS INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO INITIATE ANY CALL ON BEGIN IN HIS EAST JERUSALEM OFFICE AND TO REFER TO WASHINGTON ANY REQUEST BY BEGIN THAT HE SHOULD CALL THERE. THE AMERICANS HAVE, HOWEVER, TOLD SADAT FORMALLY AND BEGIN INFORMALLY (THROUGH TWO PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH LEWIS) THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR CURRENT PRACTICE OF NOT CALLING ON ISRAELI OFFICIALS IN EAST JERUSALEM. ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT (AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS BELIEVES THAT ONE WILL BE INEVITABLE IF ONLY IN ANSWER TO PRESS ENQUIRIES) ABOUT AN ISRAELI DECISION TO MOVE THE OFFICE WILL STRESS THE CONTINUING NATURE OF AMERICAN PRACTICE RATHER THAN MAKE IT APPEAR A NEW POLICY. SAUNDERS SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT YET ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH BEGIN'S EAST JERUSALEM OFFICE BUT HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THE PROPOSAL IN PARA 2(11) OF TEL AVIV TEL 308 SEEMED RIGHT.

2. KNESSET LAW. THE AMERICANS PLAN NO FURTHER STATEMENT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE KNESSET LAW QUESTION, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY HAVE TO REPEAT THEIR OPPOSITION TO UNILATERAL ACTIONS OF THIS SORT IF THEY ARE CALLED UPON TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT ANY FURTHER SUSPENSION/ POSTPONEMENT OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.

3. SAUNDERS MENTIONED THAT WHEN LEWIS CALLED WITH SISCO ON BEGIN LAST WEEK, BEGIN TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD NOT BE MOVING HIS OFFICE ''FOR A FEW WEEKS.'' LEWIS, WHO IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT BEGIN'S MIND IS MADE UP ON THE MOVE, BELIEVES THAT THIS MERELY REFLECTS THE FACT THAT THE OFFICE IS NOT YET PHYSICALLY READY. SAUNDERS DID NOT ENTIRELY RULE OUT THAT SOME OF BEGIN'S CABINET COLLEAGUES MIGHT PERSUADE HIM THAT THE TIME WAS NOT RIGHT TO MAKE THE MOVE : BEGIN HAD TAKEN HIS DECISION TO DO SO LONG AGO - AT LEAST AS FAR BACK AS CAMP DAVID WHEN HE WAS ALREADY TALKING ABOUT IT - AND MIGHT SEE THE ADVANTAGES OF DELAYING A LITTLE LONGER.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 565 OF 1 SEPTEMBER
PRIORITY INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, AMMAN,
HMCG JERUSALEM.

SAVING TO DAMASCUS, JEDDA, BEIRUT.

WASHINGTON TELNO 3879: ARAB/ISRAEL

1. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD LITTLE IDEA OF WHAT LINOWITZ WOULD TRY TO DO ON HIS CURRENT ROUND OF VISITS EXCEPT TO KEEP THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN. HOWEVER, WITHOUT ANY ISRAELI CONCESSIONS IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT NOW FOR THE EGYPTIANS TO CLIMB DOWN ON THE AUTONOMY TALKS, AS THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY. THEIR POSITION WAS FIRMLY ON RECORD AND JERUSALEM WAS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT TRY, BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, TO MAKE

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2. ATHERTON READ TO ME FROM THE AMERICAN COPY OF SADAT'S THIRD LETTER TO BEGIN, WHICH WAS SHORT AND GENERAL. IN THE LETTER SADAT REMINDED BEGIN THAT HIS OBJECTIVE IN STARTING THE CORRESPONDENCE HAD BEEN TO FIND WAYS OF MOVING FORWARD WITH THE AUTONOMY TALKS. BOTH SIDES WOULD REGRET IT IF IN FUTURE YEARS THEY WERE TO LOOK BACK AND ASK WHETHER IT HAD BEEN REALLY NECESSARY TO MAKE ALL THESE DIFFICULTIES. BUT IT WAS NO USE RAKING OVER OLD ARGUMENTS. BEGIN KNEW THAT EGYPT HAD HONOURED AND WOULD ALWAYS HONOUR ITS COMMITMENTS OVER THE AGREEMENTS. THE LETTER FINALLY REITERATED THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE BEST WAY TO MOVE FORWARD SEEMED TO BE A FURTHER TRILATERAL SUMMIT AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE.

FCO PSE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

BARRINGTON

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 563 OF 1 SEPTEMBER
PRIORITY INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, UKREP BRUSSELS, ROME, PARIS, LUXEMBOURG, BONN, DUBLIN, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, HMCG JERUSALEM.

VISIT OF M. THORN TO EGYPT

1. M. THORN'S VISIT TO EGYPT DID NOT GO WELL. HE HAD IRRITATED THE EGYPTIAN MFA BY CHANGING HIS PLANS SEVERAL TIMES AND PERHAPS ALSO BECAUSE HE DECLINED TO PROLONG HIS SHORT VISIT EVEN THOUGH HIS SUBSEQUENT TRIP TO ISRAEL HAD BEEN CANCELLED. WHEN HE DID ARRIVE, BUTROS GHALI WAS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO PIN PRESIDENT SADAT DOWN, AT THE END OF A BAD TELEPHONE LINE IN ALEXANDRIA, FOR A TIME TO SEE HIM. THORN THEREFORE WASTED MOST OF THE FIRST DAY, 30 AUGUSUT, NOT BEING SUMMONED TO ALEXANDRIA UNTIL 7 P.M. AND GETTING NO DINNER UNTIL AFTER MIDNIGHT. TEMPERS WERE FRAYED. THE FOLLOWING MORNING, THERE WAS TIME ONLY FOR A BRIEF MEETING WITH BUTROS GHALI AND UNDER SECRETARIES (KAMAL HASSAN ALI BEING UNAVAILABLE) BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.

2. IN ALEXANDRIA, THORN DID, HOWEVER, ENJOY ONE AND HALF HOURS ANIMATED TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSION WITH SADAT. THERE WAS NO TIME FOR A PROPER COMMUNITY BRIEFING. WE HAVE ONLY A THIRD-HAND ACCOUNT THROUGH THE DUTCH CHARGE AND THORN GAVE A FEW BRIEF IMPRESSIONS TO EC AMBASSADORS SEEING HIM OFF AT THE AIRPORT. BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW EMERGED THAT THORN FOUND SIGNIFICANT FOR HIS TASK.

3. SOME OF THORN'S IMPRESSIONS WERE CONTRADICTORY. FOR EXAMPLE, HE CHARACTERISED SADAT'S ATTITUDE TO THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE GENERALLY AS UNENTHUSIASTIC. SADAT TOLD THORN HE HAD PRAYED FOR HIM. HE INSISTED THAT THE COMMUNITY SHOULD NOT DIVERGE FROM US POLICIES NOR CUT ACROSS CAMP DAVID. ONLY THE US COULD MOVE THE ISRAELIS. HOWEVER, SADAT DID SAY THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR SOME EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND HELP PRODUCE THE CHANGES NEEDED IN ISRAELI POLICIES (THORN TOLD ME PERSONALLY THAT IN REFERRING TO EUROPEAN ACTION SADAT SPECIFICALLY SPOKE WELL ON YOU).

4. SADAT TOLD THORN THAT THERE WAS JUST A CHANCE THAT BEGIN MIGHT REPLY TO PROPOSALS HE HAD RECENTLY SENT VIA AMBASSADORS OVER JERUSALEM. BUT HE WAS NOT HOPEFUL AND FELT HE COULD EXPECT NOTHING MORE FROM BEGIN. ISRAELI POLICY ON THE SETTLEMENTS HAD TO BE CHANGED AND JERUSALEM ITSELF WAS A VITAL TEST CASE. THE WITHDRAWAL OF EMBASSIES FROM JERUSALEM WAS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. BUT SADAT ALSO SAID AT ONE STAGE THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE ISREAL IN TOO FORCEFUL A WAY OR TO REPLY TO HER PROVOCATION WITH EQUAL STUPIDITIES.

5. SADAT WAS DISMISSIVE OF THE PLO, WHICH HE LUMPED TOGETHER WITH OTHER REJECTIONISTS. ANY EUROPEAN INITIATIVE SHOULD RATHER CONCENTRATE ITS ATTENTION ON JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. HE EXPRESSED SOME HOPE ABOUT BRING THE JORDANIANS (HE REFERRED TO ''MY FRIEND KING HUSSEIN'') AND THE SAUDIS INTO SOME SORT OF DISCUSSIONS, THOUGH HE THOUGHT THE JORDANIANS WOULD NOT MOVE WITHOUT THE SAUDIS. SADAT MADE HIS USUAL DISPARAGING REMARKS ABOUT THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP BUT THORN HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS SOME RAPPROCHMENT IN THE WIND. (THERE IS A RUMOUR HERE THAT SADAT MAY GO ON THE HAJ THIS AUTUMN).

6. SADAT TOLD THORH NOT TO BE WORRIED THAT HE WOULD EVER START A WAR AGAIN. AND WITHOUT EGYPT, NO WAR WITH ISRAEL, WAS POSSIBLE. EGYPT WAS THE COUNTRY RESPECTED IN THE AREA, AS ONE COULD SEE BY NOTING WHO THE MILLIONS OF INDONESIANS HAD CHOSEN FOR THEIR MAN OF THE YEAR EXCLAM. ALTHOUGH NOT ENTIRELY NEGATIVE ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF IRAQ'S CURRENT POLICIES, SADAT WAS SCATHING ABOUT SYRIA.

7. ON THE US ELECTIONS SADAT TOOK THE LINE THAT IS CURRENT AMONG THE EGYPTIAN ESTABLISHMENT: IF CARTER IS ELECTED PROGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS WILL GO MUCH MORE SMOOTHLY, BUT EVEN IF NOT US INTERESTS WILL ASSERT THEMSELVES AFTER A PERIOD OF DIFFICULTY AND BE REFLECTED IN SIMILAR POLICIES(THIS VIEW IS SHARED BY THE US AMBASSADOR HERE).

8. THE TALKS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WENT INTO MORE DETAIL ON TACTICS AND TIMING BUT PRODUCED NOTHING OF INTEREST. BOUTROS GHALI THOUGHT THAT THE PLANS FOR A NEW DEAD SEA CANAL WOULD CAUSE A RUMPUS, AND MADE HIS CUSTOMARY PLEA FOR MORE DIRECT AID TO WEST BANKERS.

9. THORN'S GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT EGYPT WOULD NOW STAND ITS GROUND ON CURRENT POLICIES AND WAIT FOR SOMETHING TO HAPPEN.

BARRINGTON

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