

Confidential Filing

The Situation in the Middle East

MIDDLE EAST

PART 1 : MAY 1979

PART 7 : OCTOBER 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
12.10.81							
23.10.81							
27.10.81							
2.11.81							
3.11.81							
- ends - PREM 19 / 532							

PART 7 ends:-

3. 11. 81

PART 8 begins:-

4. 11. 81

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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MR J C MOBERLY

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FM WASHINGTON 040040Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3279 OF 3 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) PRIORITY TEL AVIV,
CAIRO, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT.

U S POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. WHEN I SAW FRANK CARLUCCI (DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY) THIS MORNING, I ASKED HIM ABOUT U S POLICY IN THE AREA POST AWACS. CARLUCCI SAID THAT HUSSEIN'S VISIT WAS GOING WELL. ISRAEL REJECTED THE IDEA OF BRINGING THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES INTO THE PEACE PROCESS - WITNESS THEIR REACTION TO THE SAUDI PROPOSALS AND THE EMPHASIS THEY WERE NOW PLACING ON THE U S/ISRAEL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT GET TOO CLOSE TO THE MODERATE ARABS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AWACS SALE WAS THE OPPORTUNITY IT AFFORDED TO DEVELOP THAT RELATIONSHIP.

2. I POINTED OUT THAT MUCH GREATER DIFFICULTIES WOULD ARISE AS THE AMERICANS GOT INTO TALKS ON THE WEST BANK AND OVER TALKING TO THE PALESTINIANS. CARLUCCI SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD IN THE END HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIANS. BUT THE FIRST STEP MUST BE TO GET SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE GREATEST FAILING OF CAMP DAVID WAS THEIR EXCLUSION FROM IT.

GREATEST FAILING OF CAMP DAVID WAS THEIR EXCLUSION FROM IT.

3. CARLUCCI ADDED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOW SEEKING TO PLACE MAXIMUM PUBLIC EMPHASIS ON THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, SHARON WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH. THE ISRAELIS HAD GIVEN THE AMERICANS AN EXTREMELY AMBITIOUS LIST INCLUDING MEASURES TO ENABLE THEM TO IMPROVE THEIR LONG RANGE CAPABILITY, THE PRE-POSITIONING OF U S A ARMOUR, PRE-POSITIONING OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND REPAIR FACILITIES. THE UNITED STATES COULD AGREE ON THE LAST TWO ITEMS BUT NOT ON LONG RANGE CAPABILITY OR ARMOUR. WEINBERGER HAD ISSUED AN INVITATION YESTERDAY TO SHARON TO VISIT WASHINGTON. I MENTIONED A PRESS REPORT SUGGESTING THAT SHARON HAD REFUSED THE INVITATION. CARLUCCI SAID THAT BEGIN HAD NONETHELESS SOLICITED ONE. SHARON WAS BEING DIFFICULT; HE WANTED A WRITTEN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BEFORE HE CAME.

4. I ASKED IF THE AMERICANS SAW ANY DANGER OF A NEW ISRAELI MOVE IN LEBANON. CARLUCCI SAID THERE WAS NO NEW INTELLIGENCE ON THIS BUT BEGIN MIGHT MAKE A MOVE AT SOME POINT. ISRAELI EFFORTS AT PRESENT WERE CONCENTRATED ON PRESSING THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP HARDER THAN THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT.

5. CARLUCCI'S CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE PROTECTED.

HENDERSON

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FROM TEL AVIV 031040Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 432 OF 03 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

CALL ON ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I HAD MY FIRST MEETING WITH SHAMIR YESTERDAY. HIS MAIN POINTS WERE TO CONFIRM ISRAEL'S REJECTION OF THE FAHD STATEMENT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION AND TO WARN US AGAINST SEEKING TO ATTACH ANTI-CAMP DAVID CONDITIONS TO OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE. ALL IN ALL, HE WAS AS UNCOMPROMISING AS EVER.
2. REFERRING TO YOUR CONVERSATION WITH SHAMIR IN NEW YORK WHEN YOU HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN VISITING ISRAEL IN THE NEW YEAR, I SAID THAT I GATHERED POSSIBLE DATES WERE NOW BEING DISCUSSED. HE NODDED, WHICH I TOOK TO MEAN THAT HE WAS CONTENT WITH THE WAY MATTERS ARE DEVELOPING ON THIS QUESTION.
3. SHAMIR HAD BEGUN BY NOTING THAT OUR EXPECTED ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE SINAI MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE HAD NOT MATERIALISED. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DELAY WAS CONNECTED WITH YOUR VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. NEVERTHELESS, HE WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION AS A MOVE TOWARDS CAMP DAVID. THE EUROPEANS HAD PRESUMABLY CHANGED THEIR MINDS AND DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE BECAUSE OF THEIR WISH TO HELP THE NEW EGYPTIAN REGIME.
4. HE THEN SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ATTEMPT BY THE COMMUNITY TO OBLIGE THEM TO ALTER THE ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT AT CAMP DAVID AND IN THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT. WE WOULD BE MAKING A BIG MISTAKE IF WE THOUGHT THAT IN JOINING THE SINAI FORCE WE COULD FORCE ISRAEL OFF THE CAMP DAVID PATH.
5. I SAID THAT I KNEW WE PLANNED TO LET THE ISRAELIS KNOW BEFORE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE ABOUT PARTICIPATION. THE COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS WERE KEEN TO HARMONISE THEIR PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF SUCH AN IMPORTANT STEP, AND THIS WAS TAKING LONGER THAN WE HAD HOPED. IT WAS CLEAR THAT NOTHING WOULD NOW BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL AFTER YOU HAD VISITED RIYADH. I THOUGHT IT WAS OVER-SIMPLIFYING TO REFER TO A CHANGE OF MIND BY THE EUROPEANS, WHEN IN LONDON AT LEAST THE MATTER HAD STILL BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION WHEN SADAT DIED. BUT HIS DEATH WAS AN ADDITIONAL REASON FOR THE EUROPEANS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF BOTH SIDES OF THE PEACE TREATY

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CARRYING THROUGH THEIR UNDERTAKINGS OVER SINAI. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE COMMUNITY WAS CHANGING ITS POSITION ON CAMP DAVID AS A WHOLE. I EXPECTED COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS TO REITERATE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE VENICE PRINCIPLES WHEN THEY ANNOUNCED A DECISION TO JOIN THE SINAI FORCE.

6. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT TALK OF OTHER APPROACHES ONLY COMPLICATED THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE AREA WHICH REALLY COUNTED, NAMELY THE AUTONOMY TALKS. HE ADDED THAT HE DID NOT LIKE THE EXPRESSION WHICH HE HAD SEEN USED TO DESCRIBE THE EUROPEAN SINAI CONTRIBUTION, THAT IT WOULD MONITOR ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL. ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW AS PROMISED; THE FORCE WOULD ONLY HAVE A ROLE THEREAFTER. I SUGGESTED THAT THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HELPING TO GUARANTEE THE PERMANENCE OF ARRANGEMENTS NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES THEMSELVES.

7. AS REGARDS PRINCE FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS, SHAMIR SAW NOTHING GOOD IN THEM. THEY WERE NOT A PLAN AND THEY DID NOT EVEN MENTION PEACE OR NEGOTIATIONS. THE SAUDIS WERE INHERENTLY ANTI-ISRAEL AND WERE MOTIVATED BY WANTING TO KEEP IN WELL WITH THE PLO.

8. I ASKED IF HE DID NOT SEE THE SAUDI REFERENCE TO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA LIVING AT PEACE AS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION? HE DISMISSED THIS AS ALTOGETHER TOO VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN, ESPECIALLY WHEN COUPLED WITH OTHER POINTS WHICH THE ISRAELIS COULD NEVER ACCEPT. ISRAEL WAS HERE TO STAY, AND DID NOT NEED TO DEPEND ON OTHERS TO RECOGNISE THIS FACT. "IT COULD ALL CHANGE ONE DAY, BUT NOT YET."

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Michael LATHAM MP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1981

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Michael Latham, MP, about the PLO and about the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Latham. It would be helpful if your draft could reach me by Tuesday 10 November.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1981

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 30 October about the PLO and about the Israeli raid on the nuclear reactor in Iraq. Your letter has been drawn to the Prime Minister's attention and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Michael Latham, Esq., MP.

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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Middle East

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FM PARIS 031712Z 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 946 OF 3 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON ROME THE HAGUE

INFO SAVING BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG UKREP BRUSSELS
ATHENS

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MY TELNO. 944: SINAI.

1. IN FURTHER CONVERSATION WITH ME THIS AFTERNOON, ANDREANI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD MIND VERY MUCH WHETHER YOU SETTLED FOR "PARTICIPER" OR "CONTRIBUER" IN THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN.

(B) HE STILL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONSULT M. CHEYSSON (WHO IS MUCH TAKEN UP TODAY WITH THE FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT) ABOUT THE QUESTION OF TIMING OF DELIVERY OF MESSAGES. I EXPLAINED AGAIN YOUR VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS OUGHT TO BE GIVEN TIME TO INFLUENCE THE ISRAELI REACTION. ANDREANI SAID HE FEARED THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE BOUND TO REACT SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY IN ANY CASE BUT HE WOULD ENSURE THAT

THAT THE AMERICANS OUGHT TO BE GIVEN TIME TO EXPRESS
REACTION. ANDREANI SAID HE FEARED THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE BOUND TO
REACT SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY IN ANY CASE BUT HE WOULD ENSURE THAT
M. CHEYSSON WAS AWARE OF YOUR VIEWS ON THIS POINT.

(C) THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD STILL NOT TAKEN ANY DECISIONS ABOUT
THE PRECISE FORM OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MFO. THEY
WERE NOT SURE THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO CONTRIBUTE FRENCH
COMBAT TROOPS, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THEIR RECENTLY INCREASED
COMMITMENT TO UNIFIL. BUT ANDREANI SAW THE OPTIONS AS LYING BETWEEN
THIS AND THE PROVISION OF SOME FORM OF LOGISTIC OR COMMUNICATIONS
SUPPORT, ACCOMPANIED BY NON-COMBATTANT FRENCH PERSONNEL. HE
REPEATED THAT PRESS SPECULATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT BE THINKING
OF ONLY SENDING MATERIAL NOT ACCOMPANIED BY FRENCH PERSONNEL WAS
TOTALLY UNFOUNDED.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

PETRIE

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 031728Z GDS/DD

SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO)

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UK, FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS

1. The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, have decided, subject to their constitutional procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, to contribute to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, at the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States.
2. The decision is a symbol of their determination to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement following negotiations between the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and security for all the states of the area. They welcomed the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that goal. Similarly they welcome the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call for withdrawal contained in Security Council Resolution 242, which specifically declared inadmissible the acquisition of territory by war, and they believe that the international community has a duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East. They are ready to participate also in such arrangements in the other territories currently occupied in the context of Israeli withdrawal. They regard their support for the arrangements associated with Israel's withdrawal from Sinai as quite distinct from and independent of the rest of the Camp David process.
3. In addition, the Four Governments express their firm support for the Egyptian Government and people and their belief in the need for stability and continuity in Egypt. The decision of the Four Governments to participate in the MFO follows from the policy, as stated in the declaration issued at Venice in June 1980 and in subsequent statements. This policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the State of Israel, places equal emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. It also holds that the PLO must be involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

4. The Four Governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

- (i) The force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal and thus facilitating that withdrawal. It has no other role.
- (ii) The force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible: and
- (iii) Participation by the Four Governments in the force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participating in such other international peace-keeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region.

5. The Four Governments pledge themselves to support the MFO. They have informed the governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States that their contribution to the force is made on the basis described above. For their part the Four Governments, with their partners in the Ten, will continue to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in all ways consistent with the principles to which they hold.

SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO)

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE TEN MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The Ten consider that the decision of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to participate in the Multinational Force in Sinai meets the wish frequently expressed by the members of the Community to facilitate any progress in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the principles set out in the Venice Declaration, namely the mutual acceptance of the right to existence and security of all the states in the area, including Israel, and the right to justice for all the peoples, which implies recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination. They believe at the same time that the arrangements associated with Israel's withdrawal from Sinai are distinct from and independent of the rest of the Camp David process.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1981

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The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of Brian Fall's letter to me of 30 October on this subject.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM WASHINGTON 022333Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3267 OF 2 NOVEMBER

INFO JEDDA, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, BEIRUT.

MY TEL NO 3259: U S/ISRAEL

1. THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR COMMITTED SUPPORTERS IN THE U S MEDIA, LIKE SAFIRE, APPEAR DETERMINED TO UNDERCUT WHAT THEY SEE AS A CLOSER U S/SAUDI RELATIONSHIP FOLLOWING THE AWACS DECISION AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER SHIFT OF U S OPINION IN FAVOUR OF FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS.
2. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR, WHO HAS NOW BEEN RECALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS, CALLED ON HAIG ON 30 OCTOBER TO REAFFIRM ISRAEL'S TOTAL REJECTION OF THE FAHD PLAN. EVRON WARNED THAT ANY SHOW OF AMERICAN BACKING FOR THE SAUDI PLAN WOULD BE SEEN AS A WEAKENING OF U S SUPPORT FOR THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. IN AN INTERVIEW ON THE SAME DAY EVRON SAID QUOTE THE VERY FACT THAT THIS PLAN IS PRAISED, EVEN IF THE PRAISES ARE SOMEWHAT RESTRAINED, UNDERMINES THE CHANCES FOR PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS, MUST, OF NECESSITY HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH, ENCOURAGES THE HOSTILE EUROPEAN INTERVENTION AND, OF COURSE, RULES OUT ANY CHANCES THAT THE PALESTINIAN ARABS WILL JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE.
3. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH ABC TV ON 1 NOVEMBER (TEXT BY BAG TO NENAD AND TEL AVIV), BEGIN SAID THAT HE HAD WRITTEN TO REAGAN ABOUT THE SO-CALLED SAUDI PEACE PLAN, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A PLAN TO LIQUIDATE ISRAEL IN STAGES. IT WAS A GREAT OBSTACLE TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND A COMPLETE DEVIATION FROM CAMP DAVID. THERE WERE NO GOOD POINTS IN IT. HE CRITICISED IN PARTICULAR THE SUGGESTION THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW TO ITS 4 JUNE 1967 BORDERS, BECAUSE ITS ENEMIES NOW HAD LONG RANGE KATYUSHA MISSILES AND 135 MM GUNS WHICH WOULD BE INSTALLED ON THE WEST BANK. 200 OF THE LATTER WERE NOW CONCENTRATED IN LABANON. BEGIN ALSO REJECTED THE PROPOSAL FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE WHICH WOULD BE A MORTAL DANGER TO ISRAEL AND WOULD TURN IN NO TIME INTO A SOVIET BASE.
4. BEGIN SAID THAT THE AWACS DEAL HAD NOT CAUSED ANY REASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI NEXT APRIL. HE HOPED THAT AGREEMENT ON THE AUTONOMY ISSUE WOULD BE REACHED BY THE END OF THE YEAR, BUT IF IT WAS NOT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE. HE REGRETTED THAT THE U S HAD NOT APPOINTED A SUCCESSOR TO LINOWITZ. THERE WOULD BE A MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 11 NOVEMBER IN CAIRO AND HE EXPECTED THE U S TO BE REPRESENTED BY A MEMBER OF THE CABINET. BEGIN SAID THAT NOBODY COULD COMPEL THE PALESTINIANS TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT REACHED BY THE U S, EGYPT AND ISRAEL: BUT IF THE INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES DID NOT ACCEPT IT THE STATUS QUO WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE.

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5. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, BEGIN SAID THAT THE SUPPLY OF MODERN AND SOPHISTICATED ARMS TO JORDAN WAS A DIRECT THREAT TO ISRAEL AND THAT HE HOPED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS ALSO COVERED IN BEGIN'S LETTER TO REAGAN). HE SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD NEED ARMS TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST THE GREAT QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS BEING SUPPLIED TO ARAB COUNTRIES, AND STRESSED REAGAN'S PROMISE TO MAINTAIN ISRAEL'S TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

6. ON LEBANON, BEGIN SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT RUSH INTO WAR-LIKE OPERATIONS AND THEY WOULD GIVE HABIB MORE TIME TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIAN SAMs. HABIB HAD PROMISED IN REAGAN'S NAME THAT THE MISSILES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. BEGIN SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HELP THE SAUDIS HAD GIVEN OVER LEBANON BUT ADDED, ENIGMATICALLY, THAT AT THEIR LAST MEETING IN ALEXANDRIA, SADAT HAD MADE A QUOTE VERY CURIOUS AND VERY SERIOUS STATEMENT ABOUT THE SO-CALLED SAUDI ARABIAN CONTRIBUTION UNQUOTE.

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FM FCO 021030Z NOVEMBER 1981

TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 170 OF 2 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADDRESSED A MEETING OF THE CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR RIYADH. THE TEXT OF HIS OPENING SPEECH WILL FOLLOW IN THE VERBATIM SERVICE. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARISES HIS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS:

- Q. IF THE PLO GAVE UP THE COVENANT AND A PALESTINIAN STATE WAS ESTABLISHED ON THE WEST BANK, WHAT GUARANTEE COULD THERE BE THAT SUCH A STATE WOULD BE DENIED OFFENSIVE ARMAMENT?
- A. IF THESE THINGS HAPPENED, THAT WOULD BE THE BEGINNING OF A LONG AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION. AT LEAST IT WOULD HAVE REMOVED THE LOG JAM. IF I WERE AN ISRAELI I WOULD NEED TO BE SATISFIED ABOUT THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. THAT IS A MATTER FOR ISRAELI NEGOTIATION.
- Q. WHY SEEK INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE PLO SINCE IT IS A MURDEROUS, ANTI-DEMOCRATIC, TERRORIST ORGANISATION?
- A. I CONDEMN TERRORISM WHEREVER IT IS FOUND AND HAVE NOTHING TO SAY IN ITS DEFENCE. BUT THE PLO, LIKE IT OR NOT, REPRESENTS THE MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS. IN THE PROCESS OF DE-COLONISING THE BRITISH EMPIRE WE HAVE OFTEN HAD TO DEAL WITH THOSE WHO WERE DENOUNCED AS TERRORISTS. WE DID SO BECAUSE THEY WERE A REALITY. IT NEVER DID ANYBODY ANY GOOD TO IGNORE REALITY.

/Q. ISRAEL

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- Q. ISRAEL FEELS BRITAIN TO BE UNSYMPATHETIC AND PREJUDICED AGAINST HERE. COULD YOU NOT SHOW SOME SIGN OF GOOD WILL LIKE VISITING ISRAEL?
- A. WHEN I SAW MR SHAMIR IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER I SUGGESTED SUCH A VISIT AND I PLAN TO GO TO ISRAEL EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. IT IS TRUE THAT MANY ISRAELIS FEEL THAT BRITAIN IS UNSYMPATHETIC. I REGRET THIS AND REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION IS FAIR.
- Q. LORD CARRINGTON HAS WARNED PROTESTERS AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BEWARE LEAST THEY SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UNION. SHOULD HE NOT TAKE HIS OWN ADVICE OVER THE PLO?
- A. IT IS THE STATUS QUO WHICH PROMOTES THAT CAUSE - THE HOPELESSNESS OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE LONGER IT GOES ON THE MORE LIKELY IT IS THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE WILL INCREASE.
- Q. DOES LORD CARRINGTON STAND BY HIS STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN 1976 THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE MILITARILY INDEFENSIBLE IF THE WEST BANK WERE RETURNED TO THE PALESTINIANS?
- A. YES. IT IS FOR ISRAEL TO BE SATISFIED ABOUT HER SECURITY IN ANY NEGOTIATION (CF. ANSWER TO QUESTION 1 ABOVE).
- Q. IS A PALESTINIAN HOME-LAND CONFINED TO THE WEST BANK NOT UNFAIR TO THE PALESTINIANS SINCE 76PER CENT OF THE FORMER PALESTINE IS NOW PART OF JORDAN?
- A. THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES IN THE PROCESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION. A SOLUTION CANNOT BE IMPOSED ON JORDAN.

CARRINGTON

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NENAD	PS/LPS	LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MAED	PS/MR HURD	MR MOBERLY
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Handwritten initials and signature: "S" above "Hie Miller bar"

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1981

Sinai MFO: Garrison Costs

The Prime Minister has seen the references in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 28 October and the Defence Secretary's minute of 30 October to the costs of the proposed British contribution to the Sinai Multinational Force. She has also seen the Chancellor of the Exchequer's letter of 30 October to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the relevant passages of MISC 42(80)28.

The Prime Minister has noted that the present eventuality was not foreseen by the drafters of MISC 42(80)28. But she has observed that the general effect of that document was to transfer some of the "risk" in these cases from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Ministry of Defence. Given that the Americans intend to pick up the extra costs and that the remaining costs will, apart from allowances, be essentially those which would be incurred wherever the troops were based, the Prime Minister is inclined to think that the charge should be met from the Defence vote. She would be reluctant to see the charge raised against the Central Contingency Fund and considers that it should not be met by the FCO. In her view the "FCO has not got a vote for this kind of expenditure".

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Kerr (HM Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

David Omand, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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Handwritten initials: MM

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 021517Z NOV 81
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1151 OF 2 NOVEMBER
INFO WASHINGTON BEIRUT DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV
INFO SAVING TO JEDDAH AMMAN CAIRO AND PARIS.

WASHINGTON TEL NO 3235: LEBANON.

1. I SAW BRIAN URQUHART ON 30 OCTOBER AFTER HE HAD SEEN DRAPER. HE SAID THAT DRAPER'S MAIN CONCERN DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE AREA HAD BEEN TO REINFORCE US RESTRAINT ON THE ISRAELIS WHO STILL HAD PLANS READY FOR A MAJOR ATTACK EXTENDING NORTH OF THE LITANI. THE AMERICANS HAD ALSO BEEN TRYING TO GET A PARTIAL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, THOUGH URQUHART COULD NOT SEE THIS HAPPEN BEFORE THE LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION NEXT YEAR AT THE EARLIEST. HE HAD TOLD DRAPER THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS HOLDING IN LEBANON BUT THAT IT WAS STILL IN A POLICY VACUUM. THIS WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO RETRIEVE THE SITUATION IF THE CEASE FIRE SUDDENLY COLLAPSED. DRAPER AND HABIB WERE PLANNING TO RETURN TO THE AREA IN MID NOVEMBER PARTLY TO KEEP THE FLAG FLYING AND PARTLY TO PRESS THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE TO GET A MOVE ON.

2. DRAPER HAD SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NO LONGER SEEKING TO MAKE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES. BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEY WERE PREPARED TO MOUNT A LARGE SCALE RESPONSE IF THE PLO SHOULD INFLICT ANY DAMAGE ON NORTHERN ISRAEL. IRONICALLY, SHARON HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT AFTER ALL SEE ANY DIFFICULTY WITH THE IDEA OF THE US/UN PLAN FOR LEBANON.

3. ONE OF THE ISRAELI'S PARTICULAR CONCERNS WAS THE PALESTINIAN 130MM GUNS IN THE TYRE POCKET. URQUHART HAD BEEN SUGGESTING TO THE PLO THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING THE AMERICAN HAND IN EXTRACTING CONCESSIONS FROM THE ISRAELIS IF THESE COULD BE MOVED NORTH OF THE LITANI. THE PLO WERE RELUCTANT FOR MILITARY REASONS TO REMOVE THE GUNS, BUT ARAFAT HAD NOT EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY; HE WAS READY TO CONTINUE TALKING TO GENERAL CALLAGHAN ABOUT IT.

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/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. URQUHART SAID THE FRENCH HAD OFFERED A PARACHUTE BATTALION OF 1,000 MEN TO STRENGTHEN UNIFIL (MY TEL NO 955). AN INCREASE OF THIS SIZE WOULD HAVE TO BE FORMALLY APPROVED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. URQUHART WAS CONSIDERING SOUNDING OUT TROYANOVSKY ABOUT THE LIKELY SOVIET ATTITUDE. THE PLO WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE FRENCH PARATROOPERS WITH WHOM THEY HAD CLASHED IN THE PAST. THE SYRIANS WERE APPARENTLY PREPARED TO SEE UNIFIL STRENGTHENED IF THIS MEANT THAT THE MARJAYOUN GAP COULD BE CLOSED. BUT CALLAGHAN WAS KEEN TO HAVE THE MEN WHETHER OR NOT IT PROVED POSSIBLE TO CLOSE THE GAP.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO JEDDAH AMMAN CAIRO AND PARIS.

PARSONS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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DESKBY 311900Z PARIS WASHINGTON

DESKBY 311930Z BRUSSELS LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE COPENHAGEN DUBLIN

BONN ATHENS ROME

DESKBY 312000Z ALGIERS RABAT TUNIS ABU DHABI ADEN AMMAN BAGHDAD

BAHRAIN BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT

SANAA TRIPOLI TEL AVIV

FM FCO 311830Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 472 OF 31 OCTOBER

AND TO DESKBY 311930Z ATHENS, BRUSSELS, BONN, LUXEMBOURG,

THE HAGUE, COPENHAGEN, ROME AND DUBLIN

AND TO DESKBY 312000Z ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS (EXCEPT JERUSALEM)

AND TO DESKBY 311900Z WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE JERUSALEM

This is the result of a Greek refusal to go along with the original text French reluctance to accept the news Greek text!

And

PARIS TELEGRAM 941 (NOT TO ALL) : SINAI MFO

1. MY RELUCTANT CONCLUSION IS THAT AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN (WHICH IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR US AND APPEARS TO BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE OTHER THREE BEFORE A STATEMENT IS MADE BY THE FOUR) WILL NOT (NOT) NOW BE POSSIBLE IN TIME TO ALLOW MESSAGES TO GO TO CAMP DAVID PARTIES AND OTHER ARABS BEFORE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON MONDAY. MORE TIME WILL THEREFORE BE NEEDED. I CANNOT AGREE TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEING MADE WHILE I AM IN RIYADH, WHICH MEANS THAT IT WILL HAVE TO BE MADE AFTER MY RETURN, IE ON 6 NOVEMBER AT THE EARLIEST. EC POSTS SHOULD INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS ACCORDINGLY AND SAY THAT WE DO NOT (NOT) INTEND TO PROPOSE A NEW TEXT BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.
2. IF WE ARE TO GET DIFFERENCES RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF A BETTER TEXT THAN THE ONE NOW PROPOSED BY THE GREEKS, I SEE NO (NO) ALTERNATIVE TO AN APPROACH TO THE GREEKS BY THE FRENCH, POSSIBLY

mb

AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

FOR PARIS: MIFT (NOT TO ALL) CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM ME TO CHEYSSON ASKING THEM TO DO THIS. IN HANDING IT OVER YOU MAY WISH TO REFER TO THE 6 NOVEMBER DATE (PARA ONE ABOVE).

3. FOR WASHINGTON AND MIDDLE EAST POSTS: AS WILL BE APPARENT FROM THE ABOVE NO (NO) MESSAGES FROM ME CAN NOW BE DELIVERED THIS WEEKEND. APOLOGIES FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE CAUSED.

CARRINGTON

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DESKBY 311900Z
FM FCO 311810Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 473 OF 31 OCTOBER.

M I P T: SINAI MFO

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO CHEYSSON:

AS YOUR PEOPLE WILL BE AWARE I AM DISAPPOINTED THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO AGREE THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN IN TIME FOR OUR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE TO BE ANNOUNCED BEFORE MY VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT WILL BE BEST IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR THE REMAINING DIFFICULTIES TO BE RESOLVED. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT THIS WILL PROVE POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF A TEXT BETTER THAN THE ONE NOW PROPOSED BY THE GREEKS. WE HAVE ALREADY PRESSED THEM HARD AND I THINK THAT THEY ARE NOW MOST LIKELY TO RESPOND TO AN APPROACH FROM YOU. I WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS. YOU WILL OF COURSE WANT TO REFLECT ON WHAT MEANS OF APPROACH WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE BUT I FEEL SURE THAT A MESSAGE TO PAPANDREOU WITH THE AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WOULD HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE IF YOU FELT IT RIGHT SO TO RECOMMEND CARRINGTON

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FM JEDDA 311002Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 718 OF 31 OCTOBER 1981

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, KUWAIT,
ABU DHABI, UKMIS NEW YORK.

AWACS

1. THE BBC REPORTS THAT THE BRITISH PRESS IS FULL OF CONGRATULATIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON HIS SUCCESS WHICH WILL WIN SAUDI GOODWILL AND PROVE THAT HE CAN DEFEAT THE ZIONIST LOBBY. THE SAUDI PRESS, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, IS TAKING A SIMILAR LINE. THE KING HAS SENT A MESSAGE OF THANKS TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRINCE SULTAN HAS ISSUED A FRIENDLY STATEMENT.

2. BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT REFLECT PUBLIC OPINION HERE. THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SENATOR BAKER SHOWS WHAT A PRICE HE HAS PAID IN THE PUBLIC HUMILIATION OF THE SAUDIS. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAVE ACCEPTED THE TERMS WITH A BRAVE FACE. BUT THERE ARE THOSE INSIDE THE FAMILY AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND VERY MANY OUTSIDE, WHO WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO REJECT THE DEAL, WHO INDEED WISH THE VOTE HAD GONE THE OTHER WAY.

3. IN TRUTH, THIS IS A BATTLE WHICH NOBODY HAS WON. THE LOBBY HAS LOST THE VOTE. ISRAEL HAS TO SUBMIT TO THE PRESENCE OF AWACS ON HER BORDERS. THE SAUDIS WILL BE CRITICISED AND SCORNED AT HOME AND ABROAD AND THE CHANCES OF THEIR GAINING ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE EIGHT POINTS WILL BE DIMINISHED. FINALLY, REAGAN HAS FAILED IN HIS MAIN PURPOSE, TO WIN THE SAUDIS' HEARTS AND MINDS.

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DESKBY 312000Z

FM FCO 311900Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1633 OF 31 OCTOBER 81

*Letter T'd
below*

*fs
Randy*

ARAB/ISRAEL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 31 OCTOBER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ABOUT HER TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN. IT SHOULD ARRIVE BEFORE THE PRESIDENT SEES KING HUSSEIN ON 2 NOVEMBER. PLEASE THEREFORE PASS THE MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS :-

DEAR RON.

FIRST MAY I CONGRATULATE YOU MOST WARMLY ON THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE ON AWACS IN THE SENATE. THIS IS GOOD NEWS FOR THE WEST'S FRIENDS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF. AND I AM SURE THEY WILL ALL APPRECIATE YOUR FANTASTIC PERSONAL EFFORTS WHICH LED TO THIS RESULT.

THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE OF THIS NOTE IS TO TELL YOU OF MY TALKS WITH HUSSEIN THIS WEEK. I KNOW HE IS VISITING YOU IN WASHINGTON ON MONDAY NEXT. HE IS A DEEPLY WORRIED MAN THOUGH HE SPEAKS, AS ALWAYS, IN LOW KEY AND WITH THE UTMOST COURTESY. YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL BEFORE YOU SEE HIM TO HAVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE MAIN POINTS WE COVERED IN OUR TALKS.

HUSSEIN TOLD ME THAT ONE OF HIS WORRIES IS THAT EGYPTIANS MAY BE MISLED INTO CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS, ABOUT THE WEST BANK, OVER THE HEADS OF THE PALESTINIANS, WHICH THE LATTER WOULD BE BOUND TO REJECT. HE HIMSELF VERY MUCH HOPES THAT EGYPT WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THE ARAB FOLD, ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNISES THE DIFFICULTIES FOR MANY ARABS, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISREAL: BUT AN AGREEMENT IN THE CURRENT AUTOMONY TALKS THAT WAS REJECTED BY THE PALISTINIANS WOULD SET BACK THE PROSPECTS VERY SEVERELY. HE SAID HE HAD WRITTEN TO MUBARAK IN THESE TERMS.

WE DISCUSSED ALSO FAHD'S EIGHT-POINT PLAN. WE HAD NOT AT THAT TIME OF COURSE SEEN YOUR HELPFUL COMMENT THAT THEY COULD FORM A BEGINNING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ARABS TO ENDORSE FAHD'S POINTS AS THEY STAND AT THE SUMMIT MEETING IN FEZ IF ONLY BECAUSE OF SYRIAN OPPOSITION. NEVERTHELESS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ARABS TO AGREE ON SOMETHING THAT

/was

CONFIDENTIAL

WAS EFFECTIVELY THE SAME, ALTHOUGH EXPRESSED IN DIFFERENT WORDS. THERE COULD BE DANGERS IN THIS IF THE PROPOSALS CAME TO BE REGARDED AS THE IRREDUCIBLE MINIMUM ARAB DEMAND: BUT IF AS YOU HAVE SAID THEY CAN BE PRESENTED AS A NEGOTIATING POSITION, IT WOULD BE VALUABLE.

IN A SURVEY OF THE ARAB WORLD RANGING FROM MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA IN THE WEST TO THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IN THE EAST. HUSSEIN EXPRESSED ANXIETY ABOUT THE SPREADING PROBLEMS THAT AFFLICT SO MANY COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. HE HAS OF COURSE NO TIME FOR QUADHAFI, BUT DOES NOT SEE THE LIBYAN ARMY AS A THREAT EITHER TO EGYPT OR INDEED THE SUDAN - CHAD WAS ANOTHER MATTER. NEARER HOME HE HIMSELF IS CLEARLY WORRIED BY THE CURRENT ISRAELI TENDENCY TO ARGUE THAT THE PALESTINIANS, IF THEY WANT A STATE, SHOULD SEEK IT IN JORDAN. TO THE EAST OF THE RIVER JORDAN. THIS, OF COURSE, IS A POSITION WHICH NO ARAB COUNTRY COULD ACCEPT, AND WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT THE WESTERN POSITION. WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS TAKEN THE VIEW THAT RESOLUTION 242 CALLS FOR PEACE AND WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY TO BE NEGOTIATED TOGETHER, AND THAT MUST MEAN WITHDRAWAL ON THE WEST BANK.

THE ONE RAY OF HOPE, I BELIEVE, IS THAT MORE AND MORE ARABS ARE COMING TO SEE, AND INDEED ACKNOWLEDGE IN PUBLIC, THE NEED FOR GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. THIS MOVEMENT WILL BE SADAT'S MEMORIAL, WHATEVER OTHER ARABS MAY SAY. HUSSEIN OF COURSE HAS LONG BELIEVED IN THE NEED AND NOW FAHD'S PROPOSALS POINT IN THE SAME DIRECTION. IF ONLY THE PALESTINIANS COULD BE BROUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR THEIR READINESS TO NEGOTIATE AND LIVE WITH THE OUTCOME AND IF, IN THEIR TURN, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COULD SHOW SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO ALLOW THE PALESTINIANS TO ENGAGE EVENTUALLY IN NEGOTIATIONS, WHETHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT, WE MIGHT HAVE SOME HOPE OF BRINGING ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION. IT WILL REQUIRE MUCH INGENUITY AND PATIENCE AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL TRY TO PLAY OUR PART EVERY GOOD WISH TO YOU AND NANCY.

YOURS EVER
MARGARET.

ENDS
CARRINGTON

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
NAD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HULD
SIR J GRAHAM
PS/PUS
MR DAY
MR MOSERLY
MR URE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

2
CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

OUTWARD

Department

Drafted by

TELEGRAM

(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY 312000Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) **311900** Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) (Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO **IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON** (precedence) (post) Tel. No. **1633** of **31 Oct**

AND TO (precedence/post)

.....

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

.....

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

PS
PS/LPS
PS/ME Hand
Sir J. Graham
Mr Mokenby
NENAS
MED
NAD

Copies to:-

Mr DAY
Mr URE

No 10 Downing St.

[TEXT]

ARAB / ISRAEL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER ~~FROM~~
 DATED 31 OCTOBER FROM THE PRIME
 MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ABOUT
 HER TALKS WITH KING HUWAIN. ~~PLEASE~~
~~PASS THIS MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT~~
~~AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, TO ARRIVE BEFORE~~
~~HE MEETS KING~~ IT SHOULD ARRIVE
 BEFORE THE PRESIDENT SEES KING HUWAIN
 ON 2 NOVEMBER. PLEASE THEREFORE PASS THE
 MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.


BEGINS [A - B attached] /END

ENDS

2. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY FIRST
AVAILABLE BAG.

31
A

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 October 1981

A
Dear Ron.

First may I congratulate you most warmly on the outcome of the vote on AWACS in the Senate. This is good news for all the West's friends in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. And I am sure they will all appreciate your fantastic personal efforts which led to this result.

The immediate purpose of this note is to tell you of my talks with King Hussein this week. I know he is visiting you in Washington on Monday next. He is a deeply worried man though he speaks, as always, in low key and with the utmost courtesy. You may find it useful before you see him to have a brief account of the main points we covered in our talks.

Hussein told me that one of his worries is that Egyptians may be misled into concluding an agreement with the Israelis, about the West Bank, over the heads of the Palestinians, which the latter would be bound to reject. He himself very much hopes that Egypt will be able to return to the Arab fold, although he recognises the difficulties for many Arabs, not least because of the process of normalisation of relations between Egypt and Israel; but an agreement in the current autonomy talks that was rejected by the Palestinians would set back the prospects very severely. He said he had written to Mubarak in these terms.

/We discussed

We discussed also Fahd's eight-point plan. We had not at that time of course seen your helpful comment that they could form a beginning point for negotiations. He said that he doubted whether it would be possible for the Arabs to endorse Fahd's points as they stand at the Summit meeting in Fez if only because of Syrian opposition. Nevertheless, it might be possible for the Arabs to agree on something that was effectively the same, although expressed in different words. There could be dangers in this if the proposals came to be regarded as the irreducible minimum Arab demand; but if as you have said they can be presented as a negotiating position, it would be valuable.

In a survey of the Arab world ranging from Morocco and Mauritania in the West to the Iran/Iraq war in the East, Hussein expressed anxiety about the spreading problems that afflict so many countries in the area. He has of course no time for Qadhafi, but does not see the Libyan Army as a threat either to Egypt or indeed to the Sudan - Chad was another matter. Nearer home he himself is clearly worried by the current Israeli tendency to argue that the Palestinians, if they want a state, should seek it in Jordan, to the east of the River Jordan. This, of course, is a position which no Arab country could accept, and we have made it clear that it is not the Western position. Western countries have always taken the view that Resolution 242 calls for peace and withdrawal from occupied territory to be negotiated together, and that must mean withdrawal on the West Bank.

The one ray of hope, I believe, is that more and more Arabs are coming to see, and indeed acknowledge in public, the need for genuine negotiations with Israel. This movement will be Sadat's memorial, whatever other Arabs may say. Hussein of course has long believed in the need and now Fahd's proposals point in the same direction. If only the Palestinians could be brought to make clear their readiness to negotiate and live with the outcome and if, in their turn, the Israeli Government could show sufficient flexibility to allow the Palestinians to engage

/eventually

eventually in negotiations, whether direct or indirect, we might have some hope of bringing about a comprehensive peace in the region. It will require much ingenuity and patience and I can assure you that we will try to play our part.

Every good wish to you and Nancy

Love

Raymond

The President of the United States of America

SUBJECT



see Master
Ops

Jordan, June 19, Visit by Hussein

10 DOWNING STREET

file
also.

THE PRIME MINISTER

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T. 152/81**

31 October 1981

fs.
Rmt

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/eventually

eventually in negotiations, whether direct or indirect, we might have some hope of bringing about a comprehensive peace in the region. It will require much ingenuity and patience and I can assure you that we will try to play our part.

Every good wish to you and Nancy.

Yours ever

Raymond

The President of the United States of America

(For favour of
onward transmission
by FIO 1/11/81



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 October 1981

Dear Michael,

Rami Amisler

Rams

PLO

The Prime Minister may have seen reports in the press that Yasser Arafat is expected to visit Saudi Arabia shortly before Lord Carrington, although the exact timing of this visit is not clear. This has given rise to speculation about a meeting, fuelled by the argument that it would be helpful to the Ten in de-fusing Arab criticism of our participation in the Sinai force.

N Lord Carrington doubts whether the Saudis would wish to chance their arm by trying to spring a meeting on him, but they may take the occasion to press for one. We have taken steps to let both the Saudis and the PLO know that there can be no question of a meeting without agreement in advance on its outcome, which would have to include a significant step by the PLO towards acceptance of a negotiated peace involving recognition of Israel's right to live in peace and security.

Johns & Co
L

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

GRS 400

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FM WASHINGTON 302320Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 3259 OF 30 OCT 81

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV JEDDA

ROUTINE CAIRO AMMAN DAMASCUS JERUSALÉM

TEL AVIV TELNO 430 : AWACS DECISION

1. SINCE THE SENATE VOTE ON AWACS THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE DONE ALL THEY CAN TO REASSURE THE ISRAELIS OF THE CONTINUING AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THEIR SECURITY. REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO BEGIN HAS BEEN ECHOED IN PUBLIC COMMENTS BY SENIOR OFFICIALS. MEESE TOLD THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS ON 29 OCTOBER THAT U S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL WERE EXCELLENT AND WOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. BAKER (WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF) TOLD REPORTERS THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE KEPT "QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITATIVELY" AHEAD OF ITS ARAB NEIGHBOURS IN MILITARY CAPABILITY AND RICHARD ALLEN HAS HINTED THAT THE ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE BALANCED BY NEW MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL.

2. OTHER ADMINISTRATION SOURCES ARE HOWEVER QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS WARNING THAT MAJOR NEW ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE ARE UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS IN BOTH ISRAEL AND THE U S. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT NO NEW ARMS SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL ARE ENVISAGED AT PRESENT AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT YET PUT IN A NEW SHOPPING LIST. BUT THEY REMINDED US THAT, WHEN THE F15 ENHANCEMENT/AWACS PACKAGE WAS ANNOUNCED EARLIER THIS YEAR THE ISRAELIS WERE OFFERED AN ADDITIONAL DOLLARS 300 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS TO IMPROVE THEIR AIR DEFENCES: THIS OFFER IS EVIDENTLY STILL ON THE TABLE.

3. REAGAN TOLD JOURNALISTS AFTER THE SENATE VOTE ON 28 OCTOBER IN REPLY TO A QUESTION THAT FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS WERE THE FIRST TIME THAT THE SAUDIS HAD RECOGNISED ISRAEL AS A NATION AND THAT THEY WERE A BEGINNING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY PRAISED SAUDI COOPERATION IN BRINGING ABOUT THE RECENT CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON AND NOTED THAT THE EIGHT POINTS TWICE MENTIONED ISRAEL BY NAME, THEREBY IN EFFECT INDICATING SAUDI RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL.

4. NSC STAFF HAVE TOLD US THAT REAGAN (NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME) "GOT OUT AHEAD OF THE BUREAUCRACY" IN GIVING THIS ANSWER. IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION TO SIGNAL ANY NEW DEPARTURE IN AMERICAN POLICY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TODAY WAS BRIEFED TO REITERATE THE U S ATTITUDE TO THE EIGHT POINTS - THAT THE U S REMAINED FULLY COMMITTED TO CAMP DAVID, THAT THE AMERICANS HAD STUDIED FAHD'S PROPOSALS CAREFULLY AND THAT THEY CONTAINED BOTH POSITIVE ELEMENTS AND PROPOSALS WHICH WERE NOT PRACTICAL AT PRESENT.

HENDERSON

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FROM TEL AVIV 301000Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 430 OF 30 OCTOBER 81

INFO WASHINGTON, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND JERUSALEM.

AWACS DECISION

1. THE OFFICIAL ISRAELI REACTION TO THE U S SENATE'S DECISION TO APPROVE THE SALE OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA HAS BEEN MUTED.
2. AFTER A CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY TO DISCUSS THE DECISION, BEGIN READ OUT A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS DESCRIBING THE SALE AS A SERIOUS DANGER TO ISRAEL AND A THREAT WHICH SHE WOULD DO ALL THAT WAS NEEDED TO OVERCOME. IT ALSO EXPRESSED GRATITUDE TO THOSE WHO HAD CONDUCTED THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE DEAL WITH COURAGE AND DIGNITY.
3. THE STATEMENT ALSO INCLUDED A PASSAGE FROM A LETTER TO BEGIN FROM REAGAN (WHICH REACHED THE ISRAELI CABINET DURING ITS MEETING YESTERDAY) CONTAINING AN ASSURANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINED COMMITTED TO HELPING ISRAEL RETAIN ITS MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE; THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY REMAINED AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR IN U S DECISIONS ON STRATEGIC ISSUES IN THE REGION; AND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD A CONTINUING INTEREST IN WORKING WITH ISRAEL ON A WIDE DIMENSION (SIC) OF STRATEGIC ISSUES, EFFORTS WHICH SERVED MUTUAL INTERESTS. BEGIN REFUSED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON THE STATEMENT, CONFINING HIMSELF TO EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCES WOULD BE REALISED.
4. THE RELATIVELY RESTRAINED TONE OF BEGIN'S STATEMENT REFLECTS THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S APPARENT DETERMINATION TO DO ITS BEST TO MEND FENCES WITH THE U S ADMINISTRATION ON THE AWACS ISSUE, WHILE EXTRACTING THE MAXIMUM MILITARY AND POLITICAL COMPENSATION. THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW LIKELY TO PRESS HARD FOR ADDITIONAL AID AND FOR MORE ADVANCED AMERICAN WEAPONS INCLUDING ELECTRONIC COUNTER-MEASURE DEVICES INTENDED TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY SAUDI POSSESSION OF AWACS AND ENHANCED F15'S. SHARON WILL ALSO SEEK TO PRESS WEINBURGER WHEN HE SEES HIM IN WASHINGTON NEXT MONTH FOR AN EARLY AND SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON THE MODALITIES OF STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION.

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5. THE ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY SHARE SIR N HENDERSON'S VIEW (PARAGRAPH 3 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 3234) THAT THE AMERICANS ARE LESS LIKELY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THEM IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN THE WAKE OF THE AWACS DECISION. BUT THIS HAS NEVER BEEN THEIR MAJOR FEAR. THEIR CONCERN HAS CENTRED ON WHAT THEY SEE AS AN INCREASINGLY CLEAR AMERICAN MOVE AWAY FROM CAMP DAVID AND TOWARDS THE SAUDIS INCLUDING THE EIGHT-POINT PLAN. REAGAN'S PRAISE FOR THE MODERATE SAUDI ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND HIS WELCOME FOR OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CAMP DAVID OPERATIVE FRAMEWORK, WHEN SPEAKING TO REPORTERS IMMEDIATELY AFTER YESTERDAY'S SENATE VOTE, HAVE BEEN TAKEN AS SIGNALLING A SHIFT IN THIS DIRECTION. SO HAS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REPORTED VIEW THAT FAHD'S POINTS REPRESENT A STEP FORWARD IN THE TRADITIONAL SAUDI ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL.

6. THERE IS ALSO CONCERN THAT REAGAN'S VIGOROUS PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN PUSHING THE AWACS DEAL THROUGH THE CONGRESS MAY MARK A NEW STAGE TO ISRAEL'S BROADER DISADVANTAGE IN THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN POLICY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. STRONG AND CONTINUOUS ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO AWACS WAS ALWAYS A CALCULATED RISK BY BEGIN. IN THE END HE HAS GOT THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS: USING UP POLITICAL CAPITAL WITH REAGAN YET FAILING TO STOP THE SALE. AT THIS STAGE HOWEVER THERE IS NO DISPOSITION AMONG ISRAELIS TO CRITICISE BEGIN FOR STANDING UP VIGOROUSLY AS THEY SEE IT FOR ISRAELI INTERESTS.

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TO PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 289 OF 30 OCTOBER

AND TO PRIORITY ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN,
THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME DUBLIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, ADEN,
BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT,
TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, ALGIERS, CAIRO, KHARTOUM, RABAT, TRIPOLI,
TUNIS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO.

TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 28 OCTOBER.

1. GREENSTOCK GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON 30 OCTOBER. HE SAID
THE KING'S VISIT WAS A PRIVATE ONE. HE HAD HAD TALKS WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH HOSTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF STATE. THERE WERE SOME BILATERAL ISSUES, BUT ALSO
SEVERAL POINTS OF GENERAL INTEREST.

SINAI/MFO

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD GIVEN A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF
THE REASONS WHY THE UK AND OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS WERE APPROACHING
A FINAL DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO. THE KING INDICATED
THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE ARGUMENTS BUT THAT HE REGARDED IT AS
ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LINK BETWEEN THIS LIMITED
ACTION AND THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. LORD CARRINGTON TOLD THE
KING THAT OUR STATEMENT WOULD BE EXPLICIT ON THIS POINT.

US POLICIES

4. THE KING REGARDED HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON AS THE
MOST IMPORTANT HE HAD EVER MADE. HE WAS GOING TO SEE WHETHER
THERE WAS ANY BASIS FOR PROGRESS. HE SPOKE OF SADAT'S DEATH AND
RELATED IT TO HIS INABILITY TO SECURE HIS ORIGINAL POLICY AIMS,
BECAUSE OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. SINCE CAMP DAVID IT HAD BEEN
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THOSE IN THE REGION TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARIES.
HENCE THE VALUE OF EUROPEAN ACTION. HE INTENDED TO FIND OUT
WHETHER THE US WAS INTERESTED IN THE HELP OF OTHERS. WE HAD
URGED THE KING TO PUT THE ARAB CASE STRONGLY TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN: THE ARAB CASE HAD NOT YET MADE SUFFICIENT IMPACT ON THE

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US ADMINISTRATION.

EGYPT

5. THE KING SAID HE HAD URGED MUBARAK NOT TO SIGN ANY AGREEMENT WHICH DENIED PALESTINIAN RIGHTS: IF THEY DID THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF RAPPROCHMENT WITH OTHER ARAB STATES, WHICH JORDAN DESIRED. THERE WERE OTHER DIFFICULTIES EG THE PRESENCE OF AN ISRAELI EMBASSY IN CAIRO. THE KING ALSO MENTIONED THE DANGER OF THE AMERICANS.

6. THE KING HAD SAID HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS NOW ANY REASON WHY THE AMERICANS COULD NOT TALK OPENLY WITH THE PLO. THE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES THIS WOULD CAUSE PRESIDENT REAGAN IN THE US WERE POINTED OUT BY OUR SIDE. LORD CARRINGTON HAD WONDERED WHETHER THE ARABS AS A WHOLE COULD ISSUE A STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF PRINCE FAHD'S 7TH PRINCIPLE: IF THE PLO COULD ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THIS STATEMENT THIS MIGHT ALLOW THE US TO TALK OPENLY WITH THEM. THE FORTHCOMING ARAB SUMMIT IN FEZ MIGHT PROVE HELPFUL ON THIS. THE KING SAID NO ONE KNEW WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN THERE. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS WOULD ULTIMATELY FAIL AND THERE WAS SOME TALK ABOUT HOW LONG THIS MIGHT TAKE. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO KING HUSSEIN THAT HIS VISIT MIGHT PROVE AN OPPORTUNE TIME TO GIVE PRESIDENT REAGAN SOME NEW IDEAS FOR USE WHEN THE TALKS FAILED.

SUDAN

7. WE HAD BRIEFED THE KING ON OUR VIEW OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS NOW FACED BY SUDAN HAD FORCED THE SUDAN INTO THE EGYPTIAN CAMP. AS A RESULT OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS WERE KEEPING THEIR DISTANCE. THIS POLICY WAS SHORT SIGHTED AND WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO BRING OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO BE MORE GENEROUS WITH THEIR AID. BASICALLY THE SUDAN'S ECONOMY WAS SOUND BUT THEY NEEDED FINANCE TO TIDE THEM OVER THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. THERE WAS TALK OF ASSISTING THE SUDAN FROM THE COMMUNITY'S FOOD AID PACKAGE.

LEBANON

8. THE KING THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS. SYRIA DID NOT WISH TO ANNEX LEBANON BUT WISHED TO ENSURE A CONTINUATION OF HER INFLUENCE THERE. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE

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WAY SAUDI DIPLOMACY WAS BASED ON MASSIVE SUBSIDIES, EG TO THE SYRIANS.

OMAN

9. WE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE RISKS TO THE SULTAN OF BEING SEEN TO BE TOO CLOSE TO THE US.

THE KING SAID THE SULTAN WAS AWARE OF THESE DANGERS.

LIBYA

10. THE KING SAW LITTLE OR NO MILITARY THREAT TO EGYPT AND NOTED THAT THE SUDANESE WERE ALREADY PLAYING DOWN THE THREAT. HE REFERRED TO THE ENORMOUS WASTE OCCURRING TO RUSSIAN ARMS IN LIBYA CAUSED BY INCORRECT STORAGE AND USE.

MOROCCO AND WEST SAHARA

11. THE KING THOUGHT THAT KING HASSAN HAD MANAGED THINGS CLEVERLY AT THE OAU MEETING IN NAIROBI. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS RELATED WITH A REFERENDUM HE THOUGHT THE KING WOULD FIND A SOLUTION ON THESE LINES.

DEAD SEA CANAL

12. THE JORDANIANS BELIEVED THAT IF THE PROJECT WENT AHEAD, IT WOULD FLOOD THEIR POTASH WORKS ON THE DEAD SEA. DISCUSSION CENTRED ON WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT THE PROJECT AND THE DIFFICULTY IN PREVENTING PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IN THE UK FROM SUBSCRIBING EVEN THOUGH HMG'S ATTITUDE WAS THAT THE PROJECT WAS ILLEGAL.

CARRINGTON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

The Prime Minister
has agreed to the despatch
of the message on condition that
the French are contributing men rather
than matériel. The FCO say that M.
Andreas has given such an assurance to Mr. Bullard.

30 October 1981

Dear Michael,

La.

Rich 30/10

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister's wish to explain to the Americans that the UK contribution to the Sinai Force will remain subject to national decision should be conveyed in a separate letter from the Prime Minister to President Reagan.

I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to the President, using the formula already agreed between the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington.

Yours ever.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN:
SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE

You will recall our talk on the telephone about the Sinai Multinational Force, about which we have since had intensive discussion with our European partners. I am glad to say that, although the decision has posed considerable difficulties for us, Peter Carrington has been able to work out with them a basis for responding to your request, and is now sending a message to Al Haig conveying our agreement.

With this message, Peter Carrington is enclosing the text of the statement which we and our partners will be issuing to announce our participation in the Force. There is, however, one point which is quite deliberately not covered in the statement, and on which I shall not be volunteering publicity - the modalities of control and the duration of our commitment. It is however, quite likely that I shall be pressed for explanations in Parliament. If I am asked, I shall say that our participation in the Sinai Force is a matter for national decision, arrived at after consultation with other interested countries and having regard to the purposes of the Force. Any decision to extend or cut short British participation would similarly be a matter for national decision.

I thought it right to let you know now that this will be my response to questions and that this is the basis on which our contribution will be made.



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

①

To some extent this draft is
 in fact a conflation of Hussein's remarks ^{30 October 1981}
 at lunch as well as with you. But I
 do not think it misrepresents the tenor of his
 statements. The important passage is that sidelined
 on the second page. Apex text? (The Duty
 Dear Michael, Clem has a copy). And 30/10

Arab/Israel

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes it might be useful if the Prime Minister could send a message to President Reagan about her talks with King Hussein. As you know, the King is travelling on to Washington from London for an official visit which is due to start on 2 November. As he told the Prime Minister, this will be a very important meeting for him and equally for American policy and President Reagan personally. A helpful message might serve to prepare the way and at the same time show the President that for all our differences we are working actively for the same aim.

There is an additional reason for recommending such a message. We have been informed in confidence by Nicholas Veliotes, US Assistant Assistant Secretary of State, that there is a debate going on within the US Administration over whether the US should not alter its interpretation of Resolution 242 as it applied to the West Bank so as to bring it more in line with the current Israeli Government's interpretation, namely that the Resolution does not call for any withdrawal, since the Palestinians have at their disposal that part of the original mandate that lies east of the River Jordan. It would be a serious blow to the Arab world, and to European hopes of bringing US policy closer to that of the Ten, if the Administration made such a move.

A draft message is enclosed.

~~_____~~

Yours ever,
Francis Richards
 (F N Richards)
 Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

The immediate purpose of this note is to tell you of
 I spent an hour on 28 October talking to King Hussein, *who will*
know he is *my* *with* *on Monday next,*
 will shortly be visiting you in Washington. He is a deeply

worried man though he speaks, as always, in low key and with
 the utmost courtesy. You may find it useful before you see
 him to have a brief account of the main points we covered in
 our talks. *may I* *most warmly*
 But first let me congratulate you on the outcome

of the vote on AWACS in the Senate. - This is good news for all
 the West's friends in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. *And I am*
sure they will all appreciate your own fantastic
personal efforts which led to this result.

Hussein told me that one of his worries is that the Egyptians
 may be misled into concluding an agreement with the Israelis *about the West Bank*
 over the heads of the Palestinians, which the latter would be
 bound to reject. He himself very much hopes that Egypt will
 be able to return to the Arab fold, although he recognises
 the difficulties for many Arabs, not least because of the
 process of normalisation of relations between Egypt and
 Israel; but an agreement in the current autonomy talks that
 was rejected by the Palestinians would set back the prospects
 very severely. He said he had written to Mubarak in these
 terms.

We discussed also Fahd's eight-point plan. We had not at
 that time of course seen your helpful comment that they
 could form a beginning point for negotiations. He said that
 he doubted whether it would be possible for the Arabs to
 endorse Fahd's points as they stand at the Summit meeting in
 Fez if only because of Syrian opposition. Nevertheless, it
 might be possible for the Arabs to agree on something that was
 effectively the same, although expressed in different words.
 There could be dangers in this if the proposals came to be

/regarded

regarded as the irreducible minimum Arab demand; but if as you have said they can be presented as a negotiating position, it would be valuable.

In a survey of the Arab world ranging from Morocco and Mauritania in the West to the Iran/Iraq war in the East, Hussein expressed anxiety about the spreading problems that afflict so many countries in the area. He has of course no time for Qadhafi, but does not see the Libyan Army as a threat either to Egypt or indeed to the Sudan - Chad was another matter. Nearer home he himself is clearly worried by the current Israeli tendency to argue that the Palestinians, if they want a state, should seek it in Jordan, to the east of the River Jordan. This, of course, is a position which no Arab country could accept, and we have made it clear that it is not the Western position. Western countries have always taken the view that Resolution 242 calls for peace and withdrawal from occupied territory to be negotiated together, and that must mean withdrawal on the West Bank.

The one ray of hope, I believe, is that more and more Arabs are coming to see, and indeed acknowledge in public, the need for genuine negotiations with Israel. This movement will be Sadat's memorial, whatever other Arabs may say. Hussein of course has long believed in the need and now Fahd's proposals point in the same direction. If only the Palestinians could be brought to make clear ~~beyond doubt~~ their readiness to negotiate and live with the outcome and if, in their turn, the Israeli Government could show sufficient flexibility to allow

/the Palestinians

A very long sentence - hard to read. I should like to see a whole without altering the text. not

the Palestinians to engage eventually in negotiations, whether direct or indirect, we might have some hope of bringing about ~~what we all so desperately need~~, a comprehensive peace in the region. It will require much ingenuity and patience and I can assure you that we will try to play our part.

PRIME MINISTER

When talking with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary earlier this week, you expressed a very clear view about responsibility for meeting the costs of our participation in the Sinai Multinational Force. Since there will probably be a triangular argument on this question, it might be wise to make clear your view at an early stage. I attach a draft letter which, if you agree, I will issue on Monday.

Before the letter issues, you should read the attached extract from MISC 42(80)28 which deals with the question of costs which fall between the defence and overseas budgets. I also attach the latest minutes by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary.

30 October 1981

also to the Chancellor - The first being an overview account even to conduct the - correspondents - hand job - a vol. -

Since I dictated the above a further letter has come in from the ^{Chief} Clerk of the Exchequer. It is attached. Would you still like me to write? expedited

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B
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D.

A
MISC 42 (80) 28

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which is one of the few examples of tasks in the margins of the defence and overseas programmes where financial provision can be made in a routine way. Specific budgetary provision can seldom be made for contingencies of an operational kind. While the size of the Defence Budget provides, in principle at least, flexibility to meet sudden emergencies, and the aid programme includes an unallocated element (at present of about 6 per cent), the Diplomatic Budget normally offers little scope for meeting any but trivial contingencies. This gives rise to difficulties over decision making at the margin of the three programmes, ie in areas which do not fall naturally to the Defence or Aid Budgets and cannot be accommodated within the Diplomatic Budget. The Group have identified the main areas concerned, and examined alternative ways of dealing with the funding problems.

THE MARGINS OF THE DEFENCE AND OVERSEAS PROGRAMMES

6. The activities which fall in the margin of the defence and overseas (including aid) programmes may be grouped as follows -
- a. Deployments of forces in connection with threats to dependent territories, including internal security threats.
 - b. United Kingdom force contributions and logistic support for United Nations peacekeeping forces.
 - c. Other deployments of forces outside the NATO area -
 - i Exercises and other training deployments;
 - ii Evacuation of endangered British communities abroad;
 - iii Operational assistance to friendly third world countries;
 - iv Protection of merchant shipping.
 - d. Disaster relief; assistance to civil communities abroad.
 - e. Military training assistance; provision of military advice
 - f. Provision of equipment free, or on subsidised terms.
 - g. Ceremonial deployments; political gestures.

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the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, decisions are invariably reached in consultation with the Defence Secretary and sometimes by Ministers collectively; and the whole Government are of course responsible for their decisions however in practice they are taken.

20. The fundamental purposes of the arrangements for departmental accountability are to enable Parliament to control public expenditure and the Government to define priorities and achieve their objectives in the most economical way. For the latter purpose what is crucial to the question of who should bear responsibility for the expenditure involved in implementing policy decisions is whether a decision taken on the recommendation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary intrinsically involves a certain known scale of expenditure, or whether it is a matter essentially for the judgement of the Defence Secretary to decide what is done, and at what cost, to implement the decision. For example, a decision to contribute a particular level of military assistance to a United Nations peacekeeping force is a matter both of whether and of how much; implementation is subsidiary. It therefore makes sense for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to bear responsibility for meeting the costs entailed. On the other hand a decision to evacuate British citizens from some trouble spot, if military resources need to be used, leaves it very much for the Ministry of Defence to judge the scale of resources required: the cost is a function of military judgements about how to organise the operation and how much opposition to anticipate. The general point here is that financial discipline may be concentrated as effectively on the supply as on the demand side of contingency operations.

21. A decision to determine funding responsibility in the way just described is to lay this responsibility on the Minister who has to judge the amount of resources needed to implement an agreed decision - would relate to the areas of activity listed in paragraph 6 above as follows -

a. Deployments of forces in connection with threats to dependent territories, including internal security threats - MOD, as now.

b. United Kingdom force contributions and logistic support for United Nations peacekeeping forces - FCO, as now.

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- c. Other deployments of forces outside the NATO area (including counter terrorist operations, and the use of the United Kingdom intervention capability) -
- i. Exercises and other training deployments - MOD, as now.
 - ii. Evacuation of endangered British communities abroad, when this cannot be done by civil means - Funding responsibility shifts from FCO to MOD.
 - iii. Operational assistance to friendly third world countries - Funding responsibility shifts from FCO to MOD.
 - iv. Protection of United Kingdom merchant shipping - MOD, as now.
- d. Disaster relief; assistance to civil communities abroad - FCO (ODA or non-aid), as now.
- e. Military training assistance; provision of military advice - FCO, as now.
- f. Provisions of equipment free, or on subsidised terms, to non-NATO countries - FCO, as now.
- g. Ceremonial deployments; political gestures - FCO, as now.

In other words, there would be a transfer of funding responsibility, from FCO to MOD, only in the case of two areas of activity: emergency evacuations (c.ii) and the provision of operational military assistance (c.iii).

22. Under such arrangements, the Diplomatic Budget would be at less risk than at present of being faced with the need to respond to unforeseen contingencies which it could not in practice meet. Funding problems which did not justify resort to the Central Contingency Reserve would be reduced to a point where they could be met by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Miscellaneous Services Subhead. The risk would have been transferred to the Defence Budget. But the national defence effort, as at present defined, would suffer to the extent that the risk materialised. Any decision to deploy forces to meet an unforeseen contingency would remain as now, a decision to forgo other desirable expenditure.



3/7/4

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARYSINAI MFO *TPM'd.*

1. I have seen your minute of 28th October.
2. You are already aware of my reservations about our taking on this task, but I accept the very difficult problem that it poses for you. I believe it is very important that we play no part in this unless the French and others remain firm behind us, that the Saudis agree, and that we reserve our right to withdraw our contribution at any time.
3. As for the nature of our contribution, I should indeed prefer to undertake a task other than the signals function which the US have requested. This would, in fact, be one of the least desirable options from the military point of view. As the attachment to your minute shows, we have identified a range of other options, of which the favoured one would be the Royal Engineers. As an alternative to these, I think we might also consider whether there is scope for a naval option, perhaps on a shared basis with the Italians and some of the other participating nations, provided suitable arrangements can be worked out.
4. As you say in paragraph 7 of your minute, the MOD would expect to recover full costs in line with the usual Treasury rule for any contribution which we made to the Force.
5. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the other members of OD, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Ministry of Defence
30th October 1981

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Tantleman
Private Secretary to the Secy.
(Minute approved by Secy and signed in his absence).



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

30 October 1981

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington, KCMG MC
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs

Dear Peter

SINAI MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE

I have seen your minute of 28 October to the Prime Minister about the proposal that we should provide a British contingent to the Sinai Force. I quite understand the difficulty and delicacy of the negotiations on the strength and composition of the Force. And given the importance of stability in this vital area of the Middle East, I appreciate the need for a ready and rapid UK response to the American initiative.

As for the financing of a UK contribution, I think that the Ministry of Defence are right to take the view that this must be the responsibility of your Department. If the Force is not to be established until April 1982 (as I understand) then the strong probability is that only minor expenditure would be incurred in this financial year, and I understand this could be met without difficulty from within your agreed Programme for 1981/82. As for 1982/83 and subsequent years, any costs would fall to be included in your Programmes as they are agreed after the forthcoming discussion in MISC(62) on 2 November. Any such provision must of course be as realistic as possible. My officials are in touch with yours and with MOD on this matter. The question of drawing on the Contingency Reserve whether next year or subsequently could only arise if the actual cost turned out to be significantly higher than had been foreseen; but even in that event, the initial working presumption would have to be that such an increase should be met from within the Programme as agreed for the year in question. This underlines the importance of arriving at a realistic and reliable estimate of cost at the earliest opportunity, so that it can be taken into account in the MISC(62) discussion.

/I am copying

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I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the other Members of OD, and Sir Robert Armstrong.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

GEOFFREY HOWE

FROM MICHAEL LATHAM M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

30th October 1981

R3111

Dear Prime Minister,

I have been reading with interest and great approval, the official text of the Press Conference which you gave in Kuwait on the 27th September, and I was particularly pleased to see what you had to say about the P.L.O. This is, and remains, a terrorist organisation and it remains committed to the destruction of the State of Israel, however much they may choose to deny it. There are very large numbers of public statements, many of them very recent, to that effect, and if you are short of examples to offer at a future Press conference, I will gladly supply you with many !

Could I perhaps refer to your "total condemnation" of the Israeli raid on the nuclear reactor in Irak. I would like you to consider, if you would be so kind, the attached document published by the Britain Israel Public Affairs Committee. This puts, I would suggest, a rather different perspective on the matter, and it always ought perhaps to be remembered that Irak is still officially at war with Israel, never having signed an Armistice agreement. I do think, perhaps, you ought to ask for the statements in this document to be checked, because if they are correct they do explain very clearly why Israel felt that her basic security was in danger. Foreign Office Ministers have made much of the fact that Irak has signed a non proliferation Treaty but this document would seem to suggest that its signature is, to put it mildly, of limited value.

Yours sincerely,
Michael Latham

The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher M.P.
No. 10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

encl.

IRAQ'S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS — ISRAEL WAS RIGHT

The Israeli raid on the nuclear reactor near Baghdad

Just over a month after the Israelis destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad, the International Atomic Energy Agency revealed that it had long suspected that Iraq's nuclear intentions were not exclusively peaceful (*Financial Times* 13/7/81). Even before the raid, the agency's headquarters in Vienna had proposed to inspect the Iraqi reactor every two weeks, an unprecedented frequency, and to install an automatic camera to watch the core of the reactor to record any tamperings between inspections.

The news that Israel had attacked and apparently destroyed the reactor known as Osirak, in June 1981, produced immediate and widespread criticism from politicians and press around the world.

However, as time went by and the facts became clearer, this predictable reaction moderated. In the weeks which followed, even more evidence to justify Israel's action emerged. But by then the raid had been removed from the front pages and in-depth comment was being reserved for more topical events.

This was a pity because we now know that the Israeli government were not the only ones who were extremely anxious about Iraq's nuclear plans. Indeed it becomes increasingly obvious that Israel's actions, whilst publicly condemned, were privately welcomed by many of those even among the Arab countries, who are most intimately concerned with stability in the Middle East and with nuclear proliferation.

The Osirak was the only nuclear reactor with a power of more than 50 thermal megawatts (it has 70) in a non-nuclear or non-advanced country. It was built for the Iraqis by the French and was a copy of the reactor built in 1966 at Saclay in France. In the view of one Massachusetts Institute of Technology specialist (*International Herald Tribune*, June 10, 1981) 'You use a reactor like that either for metallurgical research or for making plutonium. Since there's no metallurgical industry in Iraq, it has to be for plutonium'.

And plutonium is only required for producing bombs. Furthermore, Iraq had been buying raw uranium (*Wall Street Journal*, June 12, 1981) which is only useful for an Osirak-type reactor if it is being used to produce plutonium for weapons.

- Why does Iraq wish to pursue an energy policy based on nuclear material when it has a plentiful supply of oil?
- Why does it want to move into the nuclear sphere when it has hardly any science-based industry?
- Why did Iraq insist on having weapons grade-enriched uranium for its reactor?
- Why did it purchase very large quantities of uranium from Portugal, Niger and Libya?
- Why did it arrange with an Italian contractor to build three hot-cell laboratories near Baghdad when they would be unsuitable for peaceful purposes?
- Why is the research programme of Iraq's nuclear reactor not published?

Most important of all — why does the world not ask these questions and express anxiety that a regime as reactionary, repressive and unstable as Iraq's, might be manufacturing nuclear weapons? The answer given to this one is — because Iraq has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its reactor is therefore subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

But it turns out that these inspections consist of an audit of records of the purchase of fissionable material, an examination of operational records and a check on the content of the core of the reactor. In theory IAEA inspectors must be given access to everything that concerns fissionable materials. In practice, they only visit what has been declared. Thus any reactors built secretly on other sites escape inspection completely.

The Agency acknowledges that it cannot compel a government to agree to inspections; they have to be by mutual agreement. Thus there are no international standards for inspection. Arrangements differ among all the 114 signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The IAEA had made five inspectors available to inspect the Baghdad reactor. One, an American, was banned by the Iraqis. He later resigned from the Agency saying its system of inspection was inadequate. The Iraqis chose two inspectors, one from the USSR, one from Hungary, and insisted they should only inspect the reactor at night by torchlight.

The Agency report, published in July 1981, expressed concern at Iraq's demands for new fuels not essential for the work they said the reactor was doing, at its refusal of a lower grade of uranium when that was all it needed for peaceful purposes and that it had arranged the building of three hot-cell laboratories with an Italian contractor.

Before the Baghdad reactor was destroyed, a team of French scientists had sent a report to President Mitterand and Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy, saying that they were convinced that the Iraqis had secretly modified the Osirak reactor to produce plutonium outside international controls. They said the Iraqis could produce one nuclear bomb each year and questioned the wisdom of the French supplying enriched uranium. It is certain that Israel was aware of all this long before it was made public.

The evidence pointed to the preparation of a nuclear bomb by Iraq. For whom could it be intended if not for Israel with whom Iraq was at war? Inspection under the Non-Proliferation Treaty has frequently been condemned as inadequate.

Israel decided to destroy the reactor before it was loaded. Another 6-8 weeks and the fall-out from an attack would have killed thousands of people living in and near Baghdad. For Israel the only strategy for survival is a pre-emptive strategy. The International Atomic Energy Agency has conceded that the Israelis saved many lives by striking when they did.

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM TEL AVIV 291050Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 428 OF 29 OCTOBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE JEDDA AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. IN AN INTERVIEW REPORTED BY THE JERSUALEM POST'S DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT TODAY, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT ISRAEL WAS GENUINELY PLEASED THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE PARTICIPATING IN THE MFO. ISRAEL HAD NEVER SAID THAT SHE OPOUSED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION EVEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VENICE DECLARATION.
2. ISRAEL WOULD READ THE COMMUNITY'S ANTICIPATED POLIKY STATEMENT COINCIDING WITH (AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF) A DECISION TO JOIN THE MFO, AND WOULD REACT TO IT ON ITS MERITS. BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT IT TO LAY DOWN CONDITIONS ON EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION WHICH WOULD PROMPT AN ISRAELI REJECTION.
3. SHAMIR IS ALSO QUOTED AS DISMISSING THE THEORY THAT THE EUROPEAN HAD AGREED TO PARTICIPATE AS PART OF AN EVOLVING DIPLOMATIC EFFORT FOCUSING ON FAHD'S PEACE PLAN. THE DECISION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED BY ASSIDUOUS U S PRESSURE ON HER EUROPEAN ALLIES OVER A PERIOD OF MANY MONTHS. SADAT'S ASSASSINATION HAD ALSO SERVED AS A SOBER WARNING TO THE STATES OF THE WEST THAT THE (CAMP DAVID) PEACE EDIFACE NEEDED THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORT. FINALLY, MITTERAND'S ELECTION HAD RADICALLY ALTERED FRANCE'S ATTITUDE TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT AND WAS BEGINNING TO BRING ABOUT CHANGES WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE.
4. AS FOR THE FAHD PLAN, SHAMIR DENIED THAT IT WAS A PEACE PLAN OR EVEN A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION AND SAID ISRAEL NEED HAVE NO REGLETS ABOUT REJECTING IT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NEVER RULED OUT THE PBSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATION WITH THE SAUDIS.

MOBERLY

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WAS NOT
ADVANCED

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FM FCO 291000Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 567 OF 29 OCT
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST
POSTS.

YOUR TELNO. 696: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT

1. WE HAVE HAD THE SAME SUSPICIONS THAT THE PLO MIGHT BE
MANOEUVRING TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT A MEETING WITH ARAFAT IN RIYADH
WITHOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO THE SORT OF CONDITIONAL RECOG-
NITION OF ISRAEL WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DEMANDING FROM THEM. WE
RAISED THIS WITH DAJANI OF THE PLO YESTERDAY. HE SUGGESTED THAT
THE PLO MIGHT HAVE BEEN HOPING THAT WE WOULD WANT TO USE THE VISIT
OURSELVES TO ENGINEER A MEETING, BUT STRESSED THAT ARAFAT HAD NO
INTENTION OF CHASING OR TRYING TO SPRING A MEETING.

2. WE DO NOT IN ANY CASE THINK THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD DELIBER-
ATELY TRY TO MANOEUVRE US IN THIS WAY. IT WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE
PRUDENT IF YOU WERE TO ENSURE THAT THE SAUDIS ARE AWARE THAT WE
WOULD NOT TAKE KINDLY TO ANY SUCH ATTEMPT AND THAT ANY MEETING
WITH ARAFAT WILL NEED TO BE CAREFULLY PREPARED IN ADVANCE.
CARRINGTON

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PM/81/50

PRIME MINISTER

Ronni Painter

You are already familiar with a good deal of this but you may like to see the whole problem set out coherently. If you agree, I will put round a two line letter saying that you agree with the way the Sinai MFO question is being handled.

Yes. not

Hand

1. You will recall that I mentioned in Cabinet on Tuesday that it seemed probable that small scale British participation in the proposed Sinai Multinational Force would be essential in order to avoid the danger of Israel refusing to hand back the rest of Sinai to Egypt on the due date in the spring of 1982. Things have since moved rather quickly and it may be helpful if I set out the current position and a summary of the relevant background.

28/1x

2. The background is briefly that, once agreement in the Security Council on a UN Force as provided for by the Egypt-Israel peace treaty had proved impossible, the Americans were obliged to set up an alternative non-UN Force. They prevailed upon the Fijians and Colombians to provide a battalion each and are providing a further battalion themselves (the Force will be some 2,000 men altogether). Requests to the Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians and Italians to provide back-up (coastal patrol, air patrol, logistics and communications) led eventually to these countries making their participation in effect conditional upon our own. The US therefore approached us in September, saying that our participation was essential to the formation of an effective Force which was in turn essential to ensure Israeli withdrawal. The French were also asked.

3. After lengthy discussions in the Ten, and between the French, Italians and ourselves (and subsequently the Dutch, who volunteered to participate), it was finally agreed on 26 October that the US request should be met, despite the difficulties this was likely to cause for us in the Arab world. To refuse could put at risk the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and therefore

/adversely



adversely affect Egyptian stability in the wake of Sadat's death. It would also have placed a very great strain on our relations with the US, whose influence it is essential to mobilise if progress is to be made towards a comprehensive settlement. Participation also flows naturally from our commitment in the Venice Declaration to participate as necessary in Middle East peacekeeping arrangements on the ground. It was nevertheless agreed, both to preserve our independent role and to mitigate possible adverse Arab reactions that, the four participating governments and the rest of the Ten should make clear publicly that our commitment to the Venice approach to the Middle East remained firm and that our participation in the Sinai Force did not imply support for other aspects of the Camp David process. I / attach a copy of the statement which the four countries propose to make with the agreement of the rest of the Ten.

4. I believe that this response will satisfy the US, while allowing us to maintain a common European line and to limit any damage to our position in the Arab world. Preliminary soundings in Arab capitals tend to confirm this. Moreover our agreement to the US request despite its difficulty for us, which the Americans acknowledge, will put us in a sounder position both to influence US Middle East policy in our direction once the Sinai withdrawal is completed next April and to act as a bridge between the US and Egypt on the one hand and the Arabs opposed to Camp David on the other.

5. On the practical side, the Force will be stationed in the Sinai (mainly in the shaded areas in Zone C shown on the attached / map). The US will be generally responsible for the overall organisation and direction of the Force, and the Commander will be General Bull Hansen from Norway. The details of the status of our personnel in the Force, and their command and control are among the practical and legal arrangements on which the statement of the four makes it clear that agreement will have to be reached.

/They



They will have to be discussed in more detail with the US. We shall also be making clear to the Americans that we reserve the right to withdraw our contribution at any time.

6. The Americans have asked us to provide a Signals Unit of up to one hundred men to operate two communications centres, but we are in a strong position to persuade the Americans to let us assume a different task if the Defence Secretary would prefer. The fact of our participation is more important than its form.

7. On cost, the original US request made clear that the MFO (in practice no doubt the Americans themselves) would pay all the extra costs (transport to and from Sinai, food, lodging, local transportation in Sinai, maintenance of communications equipment, etc). We would be expected to pay 'garrison costs' (ie basic pay and allowances). I understand that officials of the FCO, MOD and Treasury have already been in touch about how the cost to HMG should be met, given that the MOD do not feel that it should be on their vote. There can be no question of the existing FCO vote covering this and my own strong view is that the money should be found from the Central Contingencies Fund. A note is attached setting out the range of possible costs, depending on the nature and size of our contribution.

8. I am sending messages to the Foreign Ministers of the US, Egypt and Israel informing them of where things stand and of the terms in which the intentions of the four European countries will be announced. I am also sending messages to Arab Foreign Ministers to forewarn them of the announcement and put across to them the overriding reasons which led us to take the decision. I anticipate a good deal of public Arab grumbling, particularly from the rejectionist countries, but do not expect their reaction to be taken to the point where it

/would



would damage our economic and commercial interests. It is particularly important in this respect that we have the company of three other members of the Ten, including the French, and the endorsement of the rest.

9. I am copying this minute to other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a stylized, cursive letter 'C' with a horizontal stroke underneath.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, SW1

28 October 1981



STATEMENT BY THE FOUR PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS

The Governments of France, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in consultation and agreement with their partners in the Ten, have decided, subject to their constitutional procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, to contribute to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, at the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States.

The decision is a symbol of their determination to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement following negotiations between the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and security for all the states of the area. They welcomed the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that goal. Similarly they welcome the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call for withdrawal contained in Security Council Resolution 242, which specifically declared inadmissible the acquisition of territory by war, and they believe that the international community has a duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East. They are ready to participate also in such arrangements in the other territories currently occupied in the context of Israeli withdrawal. They regard their support for the arrangements associated with Israel's withdrawal from Sinai as quite distinct from the rest of the Camp David process.

/In



In addition, the four governments express their firm support for the Egyptian Government and people and their belief in the need for stability and continuity in Egypt. The decision of the four governments to participate in the MFO follows from their policy, as stated in the declaration issued at Venice in June 1980 and in subsequent statements. This policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the State of Israel, places equal emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. It also holds that the PLO must be involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

The four governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

- i) The Force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal and thus facilitating that withdrawal. It has no other role.
 - ii) The Force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible:
- and iii) Participation by the four governments in the Force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participating in such other international peace-keeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region.

The four governments pledge themselves to support the MFO. They have informed the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the

/United



United States that the European contribution to the Force is made on the basis described above. For their part the four governments, with their partners in the Ten, will continue to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in all ways consistent with the principles to which they hold.


STATEMENT BY THE REST OF THE TEN

Les partenaires de la France, de l'Italie, des Pays Bas et du Royaume-Uni dans la Communauté Européenne ont été informés par les gouvernements de ces pays de leur intention de répondre favorablement à la demande des gouvernements d'Égypte, d'Israël et des États-Unis, de participer à la Force Multinationale dans le Sinaï.

Ils approuvent la décision de ces quatre gouvernements ainsi que les vues qu'ils ont exprimées à cette occasion. Ils considèrent que la participation à la Force Multinationale est pleinement conforme à la volonté maintes fois exprimée par les dix de faciliter tout progrès en direction d'un règlement global de paix au Moyen-Orient sur la base des principes définis dans la Déclaration de Venise.

Sinai Peninsula

MAP 1





OPTIONS FOR UK CONTRIBUTION TO SINAI MFO

(in order of preference)

<u>Option</u>	<u>Manpower</u>	<u>Cost (£m)</u>
<u>ENGINEERS</u>		
either an RE troop	60	0.7
or a squadron	140-190	2.2
<u>OBSERVER TEAMS</u>		
10 teams plus administration and command HQ	55	0.88
<u>SIGNALS</u>		
either a squadron or COMCEN detachment	120 ↗ 12	1.5 0.15
<u>LOGISTICS</u>		
various possibilities (medical, transport, ordnance, etc)	variable to	0.075 0.429
<u>INFANTRY</u>		
either one battalion	550	6.25
or one company	112	1.62

NOTE

No equipment costs are included since these would fall to the MFO.



Middle East

Blair

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1981

m/east

SINAI MFO

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has seen and approved - without any great enthusiasm - the text enclosed with your letter to me of 26 October. She agrees that the matter should be put to OD in the near future.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FROM FCO 271210 OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1603 OF 27 OCTOBER

AND TO LUXEMBOURG (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

file

SINAI

1. THE US EMBASSY HERE DELIVERED A MESSAGE FROM HAIG TO ME ON 26 OCTOBER.

TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

DEAR PETER

AFTER THINKING OVER OUR DISCUSSION IN CANCUN ON THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO), I MUST STILL CONCLUDE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE UK JOIN IN THIS UNDERTAKING IF IT IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD DIRECTLY BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS THAT THEY ARE READY TO COME IN. BUT THEIR DECISION IS CLEARLY LINKED TO YOUR OWN. THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND PROBABLY NEW ZEALAND AS WELL WILL JOIN IF BRITAIN AND ANOTHER MAJOR EC STATE ARE ALSO PRESENT.

ALTHOUGH I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR MISGIVINGS, THE PROBLEM IS THE NATURE OF THE UK INTERCONNECTING VETO OVER THE PARTICIPATION OF THE OTHERS. THEREFORE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU MAKE IT CLEAR TO YOUR EC COLLEAGUES THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IF A CREDIBLE FORCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TREATY OF PEACE IS TO BE ESTABLISHED. IT WOULD BE A MAJOR SETBACK TO THE WEST IF, FOLLOWING SADAT'S DEATH, WE WERE UNWILLING TO SUPPORT A TREATY OF PEACE FOR WHICH HE RISKED SO MUCH AND WHICH MANY THOUGHT COULD NEVER BE ACHIEVED. AS FOR YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT ARAB REACTIONS, CROWN PRINCE FAHD HIMSELF TOLD ME THAT NEITHER SAUDI ARABIA NOR OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST THOSE

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STATES PARTICIPATING. HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FULL RECOVERY OF SINAI FOR THE EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP AND RECOGNISES THE CRITICAL ROLE THAT THE MFO PLAYS IN THIS. OUR OWN SOUNDINGS IN THE PAST 48 HOURS IN THE CAPITALS OF MODERATE ARAB STATES INDICATE THAT WHILE THE ARAB LEAGUE HAS TRIED TO STIMULATE REACTIONS FROM ITS MEMBERS, MOST OF THE MODERATES WOULD PREFER TO LOOK THE OTHER WAY ENTIRELY OR TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO VERY PRO FORMA REPRESENTATIONS ON THIS ISSUE. CLEARLY, WHAT THEY DON'T WANT IS TO BE ASKED DIRECTLY BY EUROPEAN STATES OR AUSTRALIA ABOUT THEIR POSITION SINCE, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND IN A NEGATIVE VEIN WITHIN THE ARAB CONSENSUS. IF WESTERN STATES MOVE RESOLUTELY TOGETHER ON THIS ISSUE THERE WILL BE NO REPERCUSSIONS FROM THE ARAB STATES.

YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE LEARNED FROM ARAFAT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW VERY HOPEFUL THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WILL BREAK DOWN. THEY ARE LOOKING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH THEY CAN EXPLOIT TO FURTHER THIS GOAL. THUS, ANY FURTHER WAVERING ON OUR PART CAN ONLY FURTHER ENCOURAGE THEM IN THIS DIRECTION. LET ME ASSURE YOU, PETER, IN HANDLING THIS ISSUE WE WILL BE VERY CAREFUL IN OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMENTS NOT TO CHARACTERIZE EC PARTICIPATION AS ANYTHING MORE THAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY OF PEACE. WE CERTAINLY WILL NOT CHARACTERIZE IT AS AN EC UNDERWRITING OF THE ENTIRE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. LET US AGREE TO DISAGREE ABOUT THE MOST APPROPRIATE FORUM IN WHICH TO ADDRESS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. BUT WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO CONSOLIDATE THE TREATY OF PEACE REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE DO ELSEWHERE SINCE ITS VIABILITY IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL IF THERE IS TO BE A PEACE PROCESS IN ANY FORM.

IN YOUR CURRENT DELIBERATIONS IN LUXEMBOURG, I HOPE YOU AND YOUR EC COLLEAGUES WILL FULLY TAKE THE FOREGOING INTO CONSIDERATION. IF YOU DO, I THINK YOU WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT NOT TO TAKE A POSITIVE DECISION FOR PARTICIPATION IN A MANNER THAT WILL PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE TREATY SIGNATORIES. AS I TOLD YOU AT CANCUN, IF ALL OTHERS AGREE TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT BRITAIN, THIS WOULD BE FINE WITH US: BUT MY SOUNDINGS

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SINCE OUR DISCUSSIONS AT CANCUN CLEARLY INDICATE THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE.

IN AN EFFORT TO CLARIFY ANY OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THIS UNDERTAKING, WE HAVE AGREED WITH YOUR PEOPLE THAT NICK VELIOTES WILL ARRIVE IN LONDON LATER THIS WEEK. HE CAN GIVE YOU ANY FURTHER DETAILS YOU REQUIRE ABOUT THE FORMATION OF THE MFO AND WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED FROM OUR SOUNDINGS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND ELSEWHERE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AFTER YOUR MEETINGS CONCLUDE IN LUXEMBOURG.

WITH BEST REGARDS, ALEXANDER M HAIG, JR.

END OF TEXT.

CARRINGTON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1981

L.A. Smith 27/10

Dear Richard

Sinai MFO

/
/
/
To complete the picture in my letter of 26 October, I now enclose copies of Luxembourg telegrams numbers 196 and 197 reporting the discussions over lunch, and a copy of Luxembourg telegram number 204 recording what has been said to the press. The reporting telegrams do not cover the soundings which Lord Carrington made in private about the possibility of others participating if we did not: for obvious reasons Lord Carrington did not wish to make these points over the lunch table to the Ten as a whole; having received a clearly negative reaction, we thought it best not to include the point in telegrams which have been copied to all EC posts.

*Yours ever,
B.J.P.*

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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OO FCO DESKBY 270715Z

OO UKREP BRUSSELS

OO BRUSSELS

OO COPENHAGEN

OO THE HAGUE

OO ROME

OO DUBLIN

OO PARIS

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OO ATHENS

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FM LUXEMBOURG 262030Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 196 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN

UKREP BRUSSELS ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY AND GRAHAM

SINAI PEACEKEEPING FORCE

1. AS EXPLAINED TO BULLARD BY TELEPHONE, IT WAS AGREED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS OVER LUNCH, WITH GREEK RESERVATIONS, THAT THE TEN SHOULD REACH AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE TERMS OF THE STATEMENTS ANNOUNCING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS. SEE MIFT FOR A RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION.

IMMEDIATE

[PS ✓]
[SIR. J GRAHAM]

ADVANCE COPY

~~SECRET~~

2. MR HURD LATER CHAIRED A MEETING OF THE FOUR, ATTENDED BY ANDREANI (FRANCE), BOTTAI (ITALY) AND RUTTEN (NETHERLANDS). AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR ON THE BASIS THAT THE UK, FRANCE AND ITALY WOULD RELUCTANTLY AGREE TO DROP THE REFERENCE TO AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF THE TEXT IN FCO TELNO 65 TO CANCUN, BUT THEY INSISTED ON THE INCLUSION AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE FOLLOWING TWO SENTENCES:

''THEY ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE ALSO IN SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IN THE OTHER TERRITORIES CURRENTLY OCCUPIED, IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY REGARD THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS QUITE DISTINCT FROM THE REST OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS''.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONCURRED.

3. IT WAS ALSO AGREED TO REINSTATE IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE REST OF THE TEN THE PHRASE:

''AINSI QUE LES VUES QU'ILS ONT EXPRIMES A CETTE OCCASION''.

FINALLY THE OTHER THREE AGREED THAT, ON THE BASIS THAT THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE DRAFT PASSAGE FOR INCLUSION IN THE MESSAGES TO HAIG, SHAMIR AND KAMAL HASSAN ALL REQUESTING CONFIRMATION WAS DROPPED, THE PASSAGE IN SQUARE BRACKETS IN FCO TELNO 65 TO CANCUN (''AND THAT IN THE REGION'') SHOULD STAY.

4. THE OTHER THREE ACCEPTED MR HURD'S SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD NOW CIRCULATE TO THE TEN BY COREU THE TEXTS OF THE STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR AND BY THE REST OF THE TEN, ASKING THEM TO SIGNIFY THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE LATTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEREAFTER THE FOUR WOULD NEED TO DISPATCH THEIR LETTERS TO THE US, EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND FOREWARN THE ARABS BEFORE MAKING ANY ANNOUNCEMENT. THIS WOULD TAKE TWO OR THREE DAYS. GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF DIFFICULTY WITH THE GREEKS, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DECIDE NOW WHEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE MADE, BUT THE AIM SHOULD BE TO MAKE IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. SEE MIFT.

CO FCO DESKBY 270715Z

CO UKREP BRUSSELS

CO BRUSSELS

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DESKBY 270715Z

FM LUXEMBOURG 262031Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 197 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS
BONN UKREP BRUSSELS ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

PERSONAL FOR GRAHAM AND PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT: LUNCH AT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 26 OCTOBER;

SINAI: MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECAPITULATED RECENT
EVENTS. THE US WOULD CERTAINLY BE DISAPPOINTED IF THE
EUROPEANS DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE, BUT
ARAB REACTIONS WOULD POSE DIFFICULTIES. THE SAUDIS MIGHT

28 OCTOBER. BUT THE JORDANIANS WOULD PROBABLY OBJECT PUBLICLY, AND THE SYRIANS CERTAINLY WOULD. THE PLO AND THE ARAB LEAGUE HAD TRIED TO WARN AGAINST EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. THE TEN NEEDED TO CONSIDER THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE, AND HOW BEST TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE IF THEY JOINED.

2. M. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOT ORIGINALLY WISHED TO JOIN, BUT THAT SADAT'S DEATH HAD CHANGED THEIR ATTITUDE. THERE WAS NOW A CONSIDERABLE DANGER THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD STAY IN SINAI. THE EVACUATION OF SINAI WAS IMPORTANT TO THE NEW EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH NEEDED EUROPEAN SUPPORT. EVACUATION SHOULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS ARAB RECONCILIATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242. FRANCE THEREFORE ACCEPTED THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATION. THIS DID NOT IMPLY ANY RETREAT FROM THE VENICE DECLARATION, AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE REST OF CAMP DAVID. THE AUTONOMY TALKS COULD NOT SUCCEED AND A NEW BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION WAS NEEDED. THE SAUDIS HAD SAID THAT IF PARTICIPATION RELATED ONLY TO EVACUATION, AND NOT TO THE REST OF CAMP DAVID, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT IT. THE ALGERIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE FORCE INCLUDE SOME NON-NATO PARTICIPANTS (EG NEUTRAL - HE SUGGESTED AUSTRIAN OR SCANDINAVIAN). PARTICIPANTS MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT THEIR COMMITMENT TO THEIR POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINED UNCHANGED.

3. COLOMBO AGREED WITH THE PREVIOUS SPEAKERS. HE SAW IT AS ITALY'S DUTY TO PARTICIPATE - ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS AND WITHIN THE VENICE FRAMEWORK. IF THE FOUR AGREED TO PARTICIPATE, THE TEN MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY DID SO WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THEM ALL, AND ON THE BASIS OF THEIR EXISTING POSITION (VENICE, 242 ETC.) VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE ARABS APPEARED TO THINK THAT PARTICIPATION MEANT ASSOCIATION WITH CAMP DAVID. THIS MUST BE CLEARED UP SOON. ANY STATEMENT ISSUED SHOULD STAY CLOSELY TO THE TERMS OF VENICE (COMMENT: THOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO IT WAS CLEAR HE MEANT THAT IT SHOULD NOT CONTAIN NEW ELEMENTS SUCH AS A REFERENCE TO A PALESTINIAN STATE.) HE WONDERED TO WHOM THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD BE ANSWERABLE. THIS MUST BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CHEYSSON AGREED.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HIS CANDID OPINION WAS THAT THE AMERICAN REQUEST SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE. BUT SINCE IT HAD BEEN HE FELT THAT ON BALANCE IT SHOULD BE MET. REFUSAL TO JOIN A FORCE INTENDED TO FREE ARAB LAND WOULD BE HARD TO JUSTIFY AT HOME. THE ARABS MUST BE CAREFULLY PREPARED BEFORE BEING TOLD OF A DECISION TO PARTICIPATE, AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LEAK OF THIS DISCUSSION. THE TEN SHOULD USE THE POLITICAL COOPERATION MACHINERY TO FINALISE A STATEMENT QUICKLY ON THE DECISION, WHICH SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR - AS M. CHEYSSON HAD SUGGESTED - THAT THE EUROPEAN POSITION WAS UNCHANGED, AND SHOULD SAY THAT PARTICIPATION IMPLIED NO OTHER ASSOCIATION WITH CAMP DAVID. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF NON-PARTICIPANTS WOULD ISSUE A SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE MAIN STATEMENT BY THE FOUR. (CORTERIER (FRG) CONFIRMED THAT THE GERMANS ENDORSED THIS APPROACH). MEANWHILE, THE PRESS SHOULD BE TOLD IF THEY ASKED THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN, BUT THERE WAS IN ANY CASE NO QUESTION OF CHANGING THE EUROPEAN POSITION AS REFLECTED IN THE VENICE DECLARATION.

5. FORTILAS (GREECE) EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION OF POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS. THE PROBLEM WAS WHETHER THEIR DISSOCIATION FROM CAMP DAVID WOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. COULD STEPS BE TAKEN TO ENSURE, BEFORE THERE WAS ANY QUESTION OF THE TEN GIVING THEIR UNANIMOUS CONSENT, THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A VIOLENT ARAB REACTION? THE SECRETARY OF STATE OFFERED NO GUARANTEE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT ARAB REACTION COULD BE CONTAINED.

6. FORTILAS WENT ON THAT WHILE HE DID NOT DISSENT FROM PARTICIPATION BY THE FOUR, HE SAW NO NEED FOR POLITICAL ENDORSEMENT BY THOSE NOT PARTICIPATING. DOOGE (IRELAND) SAID THAT LORD CARRINGTON HAD SPOKEN IN LONDON ON 13 OCTOBER OF CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION. THESE MUST BE MAINTAINED IF ARAB REACTIONS WERE TO BE MITIGATED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FEARED THAT CONDITIONS MIGHT GIVE THE ISRAELIS THE EXCUSE FOR REFUSING TO EVACUATE. IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE EUROPEANS TO MAKE A TOUGH DECLARATION ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT. VAN DER STOEL AGREED STRONGLY. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS COULD DRAFT A SINGLE DOCUMENT TO EXPRESS THE POSITION BOTH OF THE FOUR AND OF THE TEN.

7. SUMMING UP THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE FOUR

7. SUMMING UP, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE FOUR FELT THAT THEY HAD TO PARTICIPATE, BUT WANTED TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE. THERE MUST BE NO PUBLICITY UNTIL THE TEN WERE READY TO MAKE AN AGREED PUBLIC STATEMENT TO ALLOW TIME TO MOLLIFY THE ARABS. HE WOULD TELL THE PRESS THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN, BUT VENICE WAS VENICE. HE HOPED THAT THE GREEKS WOULD NOT DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES; IF SO WE MIGHT HAVE TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT THEM. FORTILAS SAID THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE ON THE SPOT, BUT MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO SO IF MOST OF THE ARABS ACCEPTED EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. COLOMBO SAID THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN UNANIMOUS SUPPORT BY THE TEN FOR A DECISION OF THE FOUR WOULD MAKE A MOCKERY OF POLITICAL COOPERATION. CHEYSSON AGREED, IN MORE ROBUST TERMS. FORTILAS SAID THAT HE WOULD FEEL BETTER IF THE TEN COULD REACH A SIMILAR MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE CYPRUS ASSOCIATION PROTOCOL. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT IT WAS AGREED THAT THE POLITICAL COOPERATION MACHINERY SHOULD BE URGENTLY PUT INTO ACTION TO AGREE THE TERMS OF STATEMENTS. HE DID NOT ENVISAGE FURTHER MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION IN THE TEN.

THOMAS

NNNN

COULD YOU PSE GIVE ME A LIST OF NATO POSTS

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OO DUBLIN

PARIS

OO BONN

OO ATHENS

OO WASHINGTON

OO TEL AVIV

OO CAIRO

OO JEDDA

PP CANBERRA

PP OTTAWA

PP WELLINGTON

PP BAGHDAD

PP DAMASCUS

PP BEIRUT

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FM LUXEMBOURG 262045Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 204 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME
DUBLIN PARIS BONN ATHENS WASHINGTON TEL AVIV CAIRO JEDDA
PRIORITY CANBERRA OTTAWA WELLINGTON BAGHDAD DAMASCUS BEIRUT

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL: SINAI FORCE
FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT

1. AT HIS PRESIDENCY PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE END
OF THE FIRST DAY OF THE COUNCIL, LORD CARRINGTON SAID
THAT THE MINISTERS HAD DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST
AMONGST OTHER THINGS OVER LUNCH. NO DECISIONS WERE

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HO/ECO (2)
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PS/PUS

SIR S. GANNON

MR. S. NOBLE
MR. BULLOCK

ON FIDELITY TO THE VENICE DECLARATION.

AT THE SAME TIME, CHEYSSON WAS BRIEFING TO THE EFFECT THAT A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE HAD INDEED BEEN TAKEN. IT WOULD BE ABSURD NOT TO PARTICIPATE. WORK WAS PROCEEDING ON A STATEMENT TO EXPLAIN THIS DECISION.

3. THE MINISTER OF STATE, MR HURD THEREFORE SPOKE OFF-THE-RECORD TO BRITISH JOURNALISTS. HE REAFFIRMED THE ON-THE-RECORD LINE IN PARA 1 ABOVE. HE EXPLAINED THAT THERE HAD INDEED BEEN NO DECISION AT THE DISCUSSION OVER LUNCH, BUT OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL WEEKS A GRADUAL CONSENSUS HAD EMERGED AMONG THE FOUR AND AMONG THE TEN THAT, ON THE WHOLE, THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE LAY IN AGREEING TO PARTICIPATE, BUT IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LEFT NO DOUBT THAT WE SUPPORTED THE VENICE DECLARATION AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM ARAB LANDS. THE CASE HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED BY SADAT'S DEATH SINCE IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT NOTHING SHOULD IMPEDE THE RETURN OF SINAI. BUT IT WAS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF SAYING YES. THERE WERE A HOST OF RELATED QUESTIONS: HOW DO THE TEN ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE FOUR WHO PARTICIPATE? HOW DO WE REAFFIRM VENICE? WHO SAYS WHAT TO WHOM? THIS IS A COMPLICATED DIPLOMATIC OPERATION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. WORK WAS CONTINUING AND NO DECISION COULD BE ANNOUNCED TODAY. HE HOPED THAT IT MIGHT BE READY WITHIN DAYS RATHER THAN WEEKS.

4. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, MR HURD MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS AMONG OTHERS:

(A) WAS IT TRUE THAT THE GREEKS WERE OPPOSED TO ENDORSEMENT BY THE TEN? THE GREEKS HAD A PROBLEM. WE SHOULD HAVE TO SEE HOW IT WOULD BE RESOLVED.

(B) WERE WE SEEKING NEW CONCESSIONS FROM THE AMERICANS AS THE PRICE OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION? WE WERE NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF BARGAINING. BUT WE WOULD WISH TO MAKE PERFECTLY CLEAR THE BASIS ON WHICH COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS WOULD TAKE PART.

(C) WOULD THE STATEMENT REPRESENT AN ADVANCE ON VENICE?

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 October 1981

Dear Michael

Sinai MFO

Lord Carrington has today in Luxembourg had further talks with his French, Italian and Dutch colleagues on the lines he discussed with the Prime Minister in Cancun. It was clear that others would not be prepared to participate if we did not, and Lord Carrington therefore did not pursue this line to a point which would have provoked a breakdown with a high probability of very damaging press leaks.

The four Ministers went on to consider the draft statement, and reached agreement on the enclosed text. Our three partners now look to us to send it to the Ten by Coreu as soon as possible in order to confirm general endorsement of the line proposed.

The reference in earlier drafts to an independent state for the Palestinians has been dropped, at the insistence of our partners. But sentences have been added at the end of the second paragraph of the statement which usefully make explicit our dissociation from the rest of the Camp David process, and we consider the text to be satisfactory.

Following agreement amongst the Ten, the four European Governments concerned propose to notify the Americans of the terms of our proposed statement and then to approach Arab Governments to explain the reasons for the decision. The timing of the public announcement, which Lord Carrington would propose should be made to Parliament, will depend on the speed with which these stages can be completed.

If the Prime Minister agrees, Lord Carrington would propose to circulate a minute to colleagues in OD to put them fully in the picture, and may wish at that stage to cover issues such as the financing of our contribution which will require further consideration.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand in the Ministry of Defence. There may be points to add when I have had a fuller report of what transpired in Luxembourg.

Yours ever
Frian
(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

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OUT COREU TELEGRAM

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7	DIFFUSION CONFIDENTIEL
8	DISTRIBUTION GENERALE
9	SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO)
10	1. The <u>Presidency</u> wishes to inform partners that the Govern-
11	ments of France, Italy, The Netherlands and the UK have decided
12	to participate in the Sinai MFO on the basis of the statement
13	in the immediately following ^{five} paragraphs.
14	2. BEGINS: The Governments of France, Italy, The Netherlands
15	and the United Kingdom, in consultation and agreement with their
16	partners in the Ten, have decided, subject to their constitutional
17	procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrange-
18	ments, to contribute to the multinational force and observers in
19	Sinai, at the request of the Governments of <u>Egypt</u> , <u>Israel</u> and the
20	<u>United States</u> .
21	3. The decision is a symbol of their determination to achieve
22	a <u>comprehensive</u> peace settlement following negotiations between
23	the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and
24	security for all the states of the area. They welcomed the
25	achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step to-

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OUT COREU TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification
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2 wards that goal. Similarly they welcome the Israeli withdrawal
3 from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call
4 for withdrawal contained in Security Council Resolution 242, which
5 specifically declared inadmissible the acquisition of territory
6 by war, and they believe that the international community has a
7 duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the
8 parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East.
9 They are ready to participate also in such arrangements in the
10 other territories currently occupied in the context of Israeli
11 withdrawal. They regard their support for the arrangements
12 associated with Israel's withdrawal from Sinai as quite distinct
13 from the rest of the Camp David process.

14 4. In addition, the four Governments express their firm support
15 for the Egyptian Government and people and their belief in the
16 need for stability and continuity in Egypt. The decision of the
17 four Governments to participate in the MFO follows from their
18 policy, as stated in the Declaration issued at Venice in June
19 1980 and in subsequent statements. This policy, while insisting
20 on guarantees for the security of the state of Israel, places
21 equal emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their
22 right to self-determination. It also holds that the PLO must be
23 involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

24 5. The four Governments state that their participation in the
25 MFO is based on the understanding that:

26 i) The force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace
27 in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal and thus facilitating that
28 withdrawal. It has no other role.

29 ii) The force is being established in its present form in the
30 absence of a UN decision on an international force and its

31 position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible:

32 and (iii) participation by the ~~three~~ ^{four} Governments in the force
33 will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them
34 from participating in such other international peace-keeping

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OUT COREU TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification
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2 arrangements as have been or may be established in the region.

3 6. The four Governments pledge themselves to support the MFO.

4 They have informed the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the

5 United States that the European contribution to the force is made

6 on the basis described above. For their part the four Govern-

7 ments, with their partners in the Ten, will continue to work for

8 the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in

9 all ways consistent with the principles to which they hold. ENDS.

10 7. The four Governments hope that the other six Governments

11 will agree to make a statement approving the decision they have

12 taken, so that the contribution may be seen as a step taken with-

13 in the framework of European political cooperation. The pro-

14 posed text of such a statement, agreed amongst the four, is as

15 follows.

16 8. BEGINS. Les partenaires de la France, de L'Italie, des

17 Pays Bas et due Royaume-Uni dans la Communauté Européenne ont

18 été informés par les Gouvernements de ces pays de leur intention

19 de répondre favorablement à la demande des Gouvernements

20 d'Égypte, d'Israël et des États-Unis, de participer à la force

21 multinationale dans le Sinaï.

22 9. Ils approuvent la décision de ces quatre Gouvernements

23 ainsi que les vues qu'ils ont exprimées à cette occasion. Ils

24 considèrent que la participation à la force multinationale est

25 pleinement conforme à la volonté maintes fois exprimée par les

26 dix de faciliter tout progrès en direction d'un règlement global

27 de paix au Moyen-Orient sur la base des principes définis dans la

28 déclaration de Venise. ENDS.

29 10. Comments on the text are requested by 1800 GMT on Tuesday

30 27 October. In the absence of comments the four will proceed on

/// 31 the agreed basis.

// 32 11. The four propose to notify the Governments of the United

/ 33 States, Israel and Egypt of their decision and of the terms of

34 their joint statement before a public announcement is made.

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OUT COREU TELEGRAM (CONT)

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FM TUNIS 231230Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 179 OF 23 OCTOBER

INFO ROUTINE BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, UKREP BRUSSELS
INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS

MY TEL NO 178 (NOT TO ALL):

MZ

SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. AT THEIR MEETING ON 23 OCTOBER, THE HEADS OF MISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES TOOK NOTE OF THE DEMARCHES MADE ON 22 OCTOBER BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE TO THE ITALIAN, FRENCH, AND BRITISH AMBASSADORS WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS BY THESE COUNTRIES TO THE SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

2. THE HEADS OF MISSION BELIEVED THAT THOUGH THE DEMARCHES WERE ADDRESSED TO THE THREE COUNTRIES INDIVIDUALLY AND NOT TO THE UK PRESIDENCY AS SUCH, THEY HAD A BEARING ON THE RELATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE WITH THE ARAB STATES - PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE - SINCE IT WOULD BE KNOWN THAT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD HAVE THE APPROVAL OF THE TEN. THE HEADS OF MISSION THEREFORE CONSIDERED THAT THE DEMARCHES SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE SPECIFIC ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENCY.

SUBSTANCE OF THE DEMARCHES

3. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (ABSENT IN LIBYA) TO THE ITALIAN, FRENCH AND BRITISH AMBASSADORS. HE ASKED THEM TO CONVEY TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS VIEW THAT WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE ARAB LEAGUE OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE. HE SAID THAT THE LEAGUE WAS GRAVELY CONCERNED, SINCE SUCH CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR DEPARTURE FROM THE LINE HITHERTO TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND HE BELIEVED THAT MOST ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD SHARE THIS VIEW. PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE WOULD ENTAIL DIRECT ASSOCIATION WITH A PROCESS IN WHICH THESE THREE COUNTRIES HAD NOT SO FAR BEEN INVOLVED. AS SUCH IT WOULD BE TAKEN AS A SIGNIFICANT AND, IN THE ARAB VIEW, A DAMAGING CHANGE OF POLICY. THIS PARTICIPATION WAS NOT ESSENTIAL TO SECURE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AND EARNEST CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN BEFORE TAKING SO SERIOUS A STEP.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO OTHER EC POSTS

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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FM WASHINGTON 231830Z
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CANCUN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 23 OCTOBER

AND TO FCO

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO SAVING JEDDA TEL AVIV

MIPT: US/SAUDI ARABIA; AWACS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS:

DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER:

ON OCTOBER 14, 1981, THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY TO DISAPPROVE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSED SALE OF AWACS SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT AND F15 ENHANCEMENT EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA. WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, ARE CONCERNED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MAY STAND READY TO SELL COMPARABLE NIMROD SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT TO THE SAUDIS. AT THIS TIME IN HISTORY, THE NATO ALLIANCE MUST SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REJECTED THE PROPOSED SALE BECAUSE OF ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL, AND BECAUSE OUR SENSITIVE ARMS TECHNOLOGY COULD BE COMPROMISED OR MADE AVAILABLE TO OUR ADVERSARIES. THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW GENERATION OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS INTO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT CAN ONLY WORSEN THE CHANCES FOR REACHING A LASTING PEACE IN THAT TURBULENT REGION.

IN ORDER THAT THE SENATE MAY BE ABLE TO CONCENTRATE ITS DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AWACS SALE ON THE MERITS OF THE SALE ALONE, WE RESPECTFULLY REQUEST ASSURANCES FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT ANY SAUDI REQUEST FOR BRITISH NIMRODS WILL NOT BE APPROVED AUTOMATICALLY, BUT RATHER, WILL BE GIVEN CAREFUL AND THOROUGH CONSIDERATION. WITHOUT SUCH ASSURANCES, THE AWACS DEBATE IN THE SENATE COULD BECOME ONE OF WHO WILL SUPPLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS TO SAUDI ARABIA, RATHER THAN WHETHER OR NOT SUCH WEAPONS SHOULD BE SUPPLIED IN THE FIRST PLACE.

PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE VITAL TO WESTERN INTERESTS IN THAT REGION. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS TOWARD PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY AND PROMOTING PEACE IN THAT VOLATILE AREA.

ENDS:

FCO PASS SAVING TO JEDDA AND TEL AVIV

HENDERSON

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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SIR A ACLAND

NAD

PS/LPS

MR GILLMORE

NENAD

PS/MR HURD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 231830Z
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CANCUN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 23 OCTOBER

AND TO FCO

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO SAVING JEDDA TEL AVIV

US/SAUDI ARABIA: AWACS

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER (TEXT IN MIFT) SIGNED BY FORTY-EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OPPOSED TO THE AWACS/F15 ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE. THEY SEEK ASSURANCES FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT ANY SAUDI REQUEST FOR BRITISH NIMRODS WILL NOT BE APPROVED AUTOMATICALLY BUT GIVEN QUOTE CAREFUL AND THOROUGH CONSIDERATION UNQUOTE

2. THE CONGRESSMEN'S AIM CLEARLY IS TO INFLUENCE THE SENATE VOTE ON 28 OCTOBER BY UNDERCUTTING THE ADMINISTRATION'S MAIN ARGUMENT. THIS IS THAT IF THE AWACS SALE DOES NOT GO THROUGH THE SAUDIS WILL BUY NIMROD, AND THAT IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW IT IS THEREFORE PREFERABLE FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE US WHO WOULD RETAIN SOME CONTROL OVER ITS OPERATION.

3. OBVIOUSLY WE CANNOT COMPLY WITH THE CONGRESSMEN'S REQUEST. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD REPLY ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S BEHALF THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION REMAINS AS SHE DESCRIBED IT AT HER PRESS CONFERENCE IN KUWAIT ON 27 SEPTEMBER. I WOULD GIVE THEM THE TEXT OF WHAT SHE SAID (AS SET OUT IN KUWAIT TELNO 398), I.E. QUOTE WE STILL HOPE AND BELIEVE THE AWACS SALE WILL GO AHEAD. WE ARE NOT COMPETING WITH THAT. SAUDI ARABIA WISHES TO PURCHASE THE AWACS FOR HER COUNTRY. WE HOPE AND WE SAY PUBLICLY WE HOPE THAT THIS SALE WILL GO THROUGH. IF IT DOESN'T THEN OF COURSE WE HOPE THAT NIMRODS WILL BE CONSIDERED IN LIEU OF THE AWACS. UNQUOTE

FCO PASS SAVING JEDDA TEL AVIV

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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SIR A ACLAND

MR GILLMORE

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FM WASHINGTON 221359Z OCT 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3170 OF 22 OCTOBER 1981
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA
INFO SAVING EC POSTS, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1079: ARAB/ISRAEL.

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONFIRM THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE DISCUSSED CROWN PRINCE FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WITH PRINCE SULTAN IN SAUDI ARABIA. HAIG WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH FAHD WHEN THEY MET IN SPAIN LAST MONTH BUT DID NOT RAISE THE SUBJECT, AS HE HAD INTENDED, WHEN HE SAW PRINCE SAUD IN NEW YORK BECAUSE AWACS MONOPOLISED THEIR DISCUSSION. THERE HAVE BEEN NO EXCHANGES ON THIS BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE SAUDIS SINCE SAUD'S STATEMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND NO DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. THE AMERICANS TOLD THE SAUDIS THAT THEY WELCOMED THEIR INITIATIVE IN PUTTING FORWARD THE EIGHT POINTS. THEY WELCOMED SOME OF THE POINTS, IN PARTICULAR THE SAUDI ACCEPTANCE OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND OF GUARANTEES OF THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE. BUT THEY MADE CLEAR THEIR DISAGREEMENT ON OTHER POINTS AND POINTED OUT THAT SOME OF THESE WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS. THEY ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE SAUDIS' FAILURE TO PROPOSE ANY PROCEDURE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND THE EIGHT POINTS AND TO TAKE MATTERS FURTHER.

3. IT WAS APPARENTLY AGREED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE EIGHT POINTS. BUT THEY TOLD THE SAUDIS THAT IF THE EIGHT POINTS WERE PUSHED TOO FAR TOO QUICKLY IT WOULD UPSET THE ISRAELIS AND REDUCE THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE AMERICANS WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO COME OUT IN PUBLIC AGAINST THE SAUDI INITIATIVE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOTED THAT FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ATTACK ON CAMP DAVID AND THAT THIS MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS TO TAKE A MORE FORTHCOMING POSITION.

4. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE SAUDIS WILL SEEK TO GAIN FURTHER SUPPORT FOR THE EIGHT POINTS IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU AND AT THE ARAB SUMMIT NEXT MONTH, BEFORE INITIATING ANY ACTION IN EITHER THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE AMERICANS WOULD CERTAINLY DO WHAT THEY COULD TO DISSUADE THE SAUDIS FROM TAKING SUCH ACTION. ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR CURRENT DIFFICULTIES OVER THE AWACS DEAL (AND IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FINAL OUTCOME IN THE SENATE) THEY WOULD WANT IF POSSIBLE TO AVOID DAMAGING THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE SAUDIS BY VETOING A SAUDI-SPONSORED RESOLUTION.

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5. I AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTION IN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS THIS THOROUGHLY WITH THE AMERICANS AFTER YOUR VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. MR HURD'S VISIT HERE ON 12/13 NOVEMBER WILL OFFER A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS. OFFICIALS COULD HAVE A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE QUESTION WITH VELIOTES NEXT WEEK.

FCO PASS SAVING ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND TEL AVIV.

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FM TEL AVIV 221245Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 481⁹¹⁰ OF 22 OCTOBER

INFO ROUTINE CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS JERUSALEM WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK

CALL ON ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER

MR BEGIN RECEIVED ME FOR 35 MINUTES AT HIS OFFICE THIS MORNING. 2. HE SEEMED FIT AND RELAXED AND WAS AT HIS MOST AFFABLE. HE WAS ALSO IN DISCURSIVE MOOD, TALKING A GOOD DEAL ABOUT SUCH MATTERS AS THE RECENT ELECTIONS HERE, OPINION POLLS, AND THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S RECENTLY ACQUIRED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DISMISS INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT. ONE OR TWICE I THOUGHT HE DELIBERATELY STEERED THE TALKS AWAY FROM CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. WHEN I STARTED TO BRING UP THE SUBJECT OF THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT, HE INTERRUPTED TO MAKE A POINT ABOUT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE. (HE QUOTED THE TIMES DESCRIPTION OF MR HEATH'S SPEECH, AND WAS CLEARLY STRUCK BY THE WAY THE CONFERENCE HAD RALLIED AGAINST CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT LINE.)

3. MR BEGIN REFERRED TO HIS BRIEF MEETING WITH YOU TWO WEEKS AGO IN CAIRO AND SAID HE KNEW THAT YOU HAD EARLIER EXPRESSED INTEREST TO MR SHAMIR IN VISITING ISRAEL. WERE THERE SOME DATES IN MIND? I SAID I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY, ALTHOUGH I FELT SURE THAT YOU WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHEN A VISIT MIGHT SUIT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT AND I RECALLED YOUR MENTIONING THE NEW YEAR TO MR SHAMIR. MR BEGIN NOTED THAT A VISIT IN 1982 MEANT YOU WOULD NO LONGER BE ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

4. THE TALK THEN TURNED TO NEXT STEPS IN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. I ASKED MR BEGIN IF WE COULD EXPECT ANY SURPRISES OVER THE AUTONOMY TALKS. HE REPLIED THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT SURPRISE ANYONE, BUT IF THERE WERE NO AGREEMENT THAT SHOULD EQUALLY NOT COME AS A SURPRISE. ISRAEL WANTED AN AGREEMENT AND WAS GOING HARD FOR IT. SADAT'S DEATH HAD BEEN A GREAT BLOW. BUT THE REGIME IN EGYPT WAS FIRM AND STRONG. AT HIS LAST MEETING WITH SADAT THEY HAD AGREED TO AIM AT REACHING AGREEMENT IF POSSIBLE BY ABOUT THE TURN OF THE YEAR. MUBARAK HAD REPEATED THIS IN CAIRO THE OTHER DAY. BUT THERE WAS NO SELF-IMPOSED DEADLINE FOR RESOLVING THE AUTONOMY TALKS. THEY WOULD GO ON AS LONG AS NEEDED - IF NECESSARY PAST THE APRIL DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.

5. IN HIS VIEW THE KEY TO PROGRESS OVER AUTONOMY LAY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL CALLED FOR IN THE CAMP DAVID DOCUMENTS. MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE ELECTED. AS TO NUMBERS, THE SOLUTION SHOULD BE TO AGREE UPON A LIST OF FUNCTIONS SUCH AS HEALTH, AGRICULTURE, SCHOOLS AND SO ON - PERHAPS 15 IN ALL - AND THEN HAVE AS MANY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AS THERE WERE FUNCTIONS.

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6. THERE WRE OF COURSE ISSUES WHICH COULD STILL BLOCK AGREEMENT. JERUSALEM FOR INSTANCE. THE EGYPTIANS HAD ARGUED THAT EAST JERUSALEM SHOULD BE UNDER ARAB SOVEREIGNTY. BUT THERE WERE MANY ARAB STATES: WHICH OF THEM WAS MEANT TO BE SOVEREIGN IN THIS CASE? IN ANY EVENT ISRAEL WAS ADAMANT IN REFUSING TO SHARE SOVEREIGNTY OVER JERUSALEM WITH ANYONE.

7. ON THE WEST BANK ISRAEL WAS NOW REPLACING MILITARY BY CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR DEVELOPMENT AFTER 15 YEARS. ISRAEL WAS ALSO PREPARED TO WITHDRAW (HE MUST HAVE MEANT AS PART OF AN AGREED INTERIM REGIME) HER SECURITY FORCES IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA OTHER THAN THOSE FORESEEN IN THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT AS BEING ALLOWED TO REMAIN AT DESIGNATED POINTS. ALTOGETHER, SAID MR BEGIN, IT WAS A REASONABLE PACKAGE AND HE HOPED THE EGYPTIANS AND AMERICANS WOULD SEE IT AS SUCH.

8 TAKING UP HIS REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI, I SAID I HOPED THE UK WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE TREATY IN A PRACTICAL WAY. A DECISION NOW SEEMED LIKELY TO BE TAKEN SHORTLY IN LONDON OVER A BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE SINAI MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE. I ADDED THAT I KNEW THERE WAS A WISH IN LONDON FOR A BETTER DIALOGUE BETWEEN US ON THESE AND OTHER ISSUED.

9. FOR THE LAST FEW MINUTES OF OUR TALK IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ARRIVED NEXT DOOR. MR BEGIN NONETHELESS CONTINUED TALKING ABOUT THE AUTONOMY QUESTION AS IF HE HAD ALL THE TIME IN THE WORLD. AS I STOOD UP TO LEAVE, MR BEGIN MENTIONED THE WORDS VENCICE DECLARATION. HE HOPED I WOULD REPORT TO YOU THAT ISRAEL DID NOT ACCEPT ITS CONTENTS AND NEVER WOULD. A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD BE A MORTAL DANGER TO ISRAEL (HE REPEATED THE PHRASE FOR EMPHASIS). HE GAVE ME NO CHANCE TO RESPOND BUT CONCLUDED WITH A SMILE THAT WE WOULD NEED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION ANOTHER TIME.

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FM MOSCOW 221210Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 646 OF 22 OCTOBER

INFO ROUTINE DAMASCUS, JEDDA, CAIRO, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV

UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING UKDEL NATO, ADEN, ALGIERS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT
TRIPOLI, RABAT, SANA'S, TUNIS.

VISIT BY ARAFAT.

1. ARAFAT ARRIVED ON 19 OCTOBER AND MET BREZHNEV THE NEXT DAY,
WITH GROMYKO, PONOMAREV, AND KORNIENKO ALSO PRESENT.
ARAFAT LAST VISITED UNOFFICIALLY FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND
OFFICIALLY IN NOVEMBER 1979.

2. BREZHNEV INFORMED ARAFAT ON 20 OCTOBER, ACCORDING TO THE
TASS ACCOUNT, OF THE GRANTING OF "OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC STATUS TO
THE PLO REPRESENTATION IN MOSCOW". THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE
HAS HITHERTO BEEN ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AFRO-ASIAN
SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE, BUT HAS IN PRACTICE ENJOYED MOST
DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES. ARAFAT SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON
20 OCTOBER THAT HE WAS PLEASED ABOUT THE GRANTING OF DIPLOMATIC
STATUS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THIS DID NOT IMPLY ESTABLISHMENT OF
A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE.

3. THE TASS REPORT OF THE REST OF THE MEETING WITH BREZHNEV RAN TO FORM. BREZHNEV SPOKE IN GENERAL TERMS OF THE PALESTINIANS' STRUGGLE HAVING WON SYMPATHY AND RESPECT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND OF THE PLO HAVING WON WIDE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. ARAFAT RETURNED THE COMPLIMENTS WITH GRATITUDE FOR SELFLESS SOVIET ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT. US ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE "STRATEGIC ALLIANCE" WITH ISRAEL AND ITS POLICIES TOWARDS LIBYA WERE HEAVILY CRITICISED. BOTH SIDES REJECTED THE PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS, AND CALLED FOR GREATER UNITY OF ACTION BY ARAB STATES. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS A REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE PATH TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

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FM FCO 221800Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CANCUN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 65 OF 22 OCTOBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ATHENS,
INFO ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
FOLLOWING FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY.

MIPT:

SINA PEACEKEEPING FORCE (MFO): DRAFT STATEMENT (REVISE VI)

1. THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT WITH THEIR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, HAVE DECIDED SUBJECT TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES TO AGREEMENT ON THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI, AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES.

2. THE DECISION IS A SYMBOL OF THEIR DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH WOULD BRING JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES AND SECURITY FOR ALL THE STATES OF THE AREA. THEY WELCOMED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THAT GOAL. SIMILARLY THEY WELCOME THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF THE CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242

(WHICH SPECIFICALLY DECLARED INADMISSABLE THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR), AND THEY BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A DUTY TO PLAY ITS PART, AS NECESSARY AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN PEACE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. IN ADDITION, THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS EXPRESS THEIR FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE AND THEIR BELIEF IN THE NEED FOR STABILITY AND CONTINUITY IN EGYPT. THE DECISION OF THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO FOLLOWS FROM THEIR POLICY, AS STATED IN THE DECLARATION ISSUED AT VENICE IN JUNE 1980 AND IN SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS. THIS POLICY, WHILE INSISTING ON GUARANTEES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, PLACES EQUAL EMPHASIS ON JUSTICE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT STATE IF THAT IS THEIR CHOSEN COURSE). IT ALSO HOLD THAT THE PLO MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.

4. THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT:

1) THE FORCE EXISTS SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING PEACE IN SINAI FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THUS FACILITATING THAT WITHDRAWAL. IT HAS NO OTHER ROLE.

II) THE FORCE IS BEING ESTABLISHED IN ITS PRESENT FORM IN THE ABSENCE OF A UN DECISION ON AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND ITS POSITION WILL BE REVIEWED SHOULD SUCH A DECISION BECOME POSSIBLE; AND (III) PARTICIPATION BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS IN THE FORCE WILL NOT BE TAKEN EITHER AS COMMITTING THEM TO OR EXCLUDING THEM FROM PARTICIPATING IN SUCH OTHER INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS AS HAVE BEEN OR MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN THE REGION.

5. THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS PLEDGE THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT THE MFO. THEY HAVE INFORMED THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES THAT THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORCE IS MADE ON THE BASIS DESCRIBED ABOVE. FOR THEIR PART THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS, WITH THEIR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN ALL WAYS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THEY HOLD.

6. DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE TEN.

'LES PARTENAIRES DE LA FRANCE, DE L'ITALIE, DES PAYS BAS ET DUE ROYAUME-UNI DANS LAS COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ONT ETE INFORMES PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS DE CES PAYS DE LEUR INTENTION DE REPOUDRE FAVORABLEMENT A LA DEMANDE DES GOUVERNEMENTS D'EGYPTE, D'ISRAEL ET DES ETATS-UNIS, DE PARTICIPER A LA FORCE MULTINATIONALE DANS LE SINAI.

ILS APPROUVENT LA DECISION DE CES QUATRES GOUVERNEMENTS. ILS CONSIDERENT QUE LA PARTICIPATION A LA FORCE MULTINATIONALE EST PLEINEMENT CONFORME A LA VOLONTE MAINTES FOIS EXPRIMEE PAR LES DIX DE FACILITER TOUT PROGRES E DIRECTION D'UN REGLEMENT GLOBAL DE PAIX AU MOYEN-ORIENT SUR LA BASE DES PRINCIPES DEFINIS DANS LA DECLARATION DE VENISE.'

7. PASSAGE FOR INCLUSION IN THE MESSAGES TO MR HAIG/MR SHAMIR/KAMAL HASSAN ALI.

IN DECIDING TO ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST, THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS BELIEVE IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR THEM TO PUBLISH THE ATTACHED STATEMENT OF THEIR POSITION, WHICH IS IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THEIR KNOWN POLICY AND SPECIFICALLY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT IT WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF THIS STATEMENT THAT WE SHALL MAKE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MFO OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS AND THAT WE AND OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN SHALL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THOSE PRINCIPLES AS THE BASIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR CONFIRMATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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FM FCO 221844Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CANCUN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 64 OF 22 OCTOBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, HAGUE.
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ATHENS.
INFO ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOLLOWING FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY
SINAI PEACE-KEEPING FORCE (MFO)

1. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR CONTRIBUTORS (INCLUDING THE DUTCH) MET THIS AFTERNOON IN LONDON AND HAVE AGREED, AD REFERENDUM, THE TEXTS OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE FOUR CONTRIBUTORS: A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE TEN : AND A PASSAGE FOR INCLUSION IN THE INDIVIDUALLY DRAFTED LETTERS FROM THE FOUR CONTRIBUTORS TO MR HAIG, MR SHARON AND MR KAMAL HASSAN ALI. TEXTS IN MIFT.

2. WE HAVE OBTAINED ALL THE POINTS OF SUBSTANCE IN THE MAIN STATEMENT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE IN THE LAST TWO PARAGRAPHS RELATING TO RECOGNITION OR WELCOME BY EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE US RESPECTIVELY. THE FRENCH, SUPPORTED BY THE ITALIANS, ARGUED ARGUED STRONGLY AND CONVINCINGLY THAT THERE WOULD BE MERIT IN THE STATEMENT SETTING OUT AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN POSITION TO INCLUDE RECOGNITION OR WELCOME BY OTHERS WOULD MAKE IT LOOK AS THOUGH WE REQUIRE SOME LICENCE OR AUTHORITY. THIS POINT OBVIOUSLY CONNECTS WITH THE DRAFT PASSAGE FOR THE LETTER TO MR HAIG AND THE OTHERS AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THAT ARE CONSEQUENTIAL UPON THE CHANGES IN THE MAIN STATEMENT. HOWEVER, WE ARE LEFT WITH A SQUARE BRACKET IN THIS. THE CONSENSUS OF THE GROUP WAS THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO STOP SHORT OF THE SQUARE BRACKET, AGAIN BECAUSE TO INCLUDE IT WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO SEEKING AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS. GRAHAM RESERVED YOUR POSITION ON THIS, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT YOU SHOULD AGREE TO DROPPING IT. IN RETURN, THE OTHERS AGREED TO THE NEW LAST SENTENCE, ASKING FOR EARLY CONFIRMATION, WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OUR POSITION, BY ALL THREE REQUESTING GOVERNMENTS.

3. WE DISCUSSED TIMING. IF MINISTERS AGREE THE TEXTS IN THE COURSE OF TOMORROW WE CAN EITHER DISTRIBUTE THEM AT THE END OF THE MIDDLE EAST WORKING GROUP OR BY COREU. IN SO DOING WE WOULD SAY THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMMENT WE WOULD PROCEED TO THE DESPATCH OF THE APPROPRIATE LETTERS TO MESSRS HAIG AND CO. ON TUESDAY, 27 OCTOBER. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE THOUGHT THAT M. CHEYSSON WOULD WISH TO PUBLISH THE STATEMENT AT THAT TIME, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD OTHERWISE LEAK. GRAHAM STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF RECEIVING AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND THE DISCOURTESY OF PUBLISHING BEFORE RECIPIENTS COULD HAVE RECEIVED OR CONSIDERED THE TEXTS. THE EARLIEST WE COULD EXPECT REPLIES WOULD BE FRIDAY, 30 OCTOBER, WHICH WOULD NOT BE IDEAL IF THE STATEMENT IS TO BE MADE IN PARLIAMENT, WHILE TO WAIT UNTIL MONDAY, 2 NOVEMBER, WOULD BE DIFFICULT, GIVEN THE WEIGHT LEAKS ALREADY, BUT PERHAPS INEVITABLE, THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE SUGGESTED THAT YOU MIGHT LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH M. CHEYSSON EITHER IN MEXICO OR AT LUXEMBOURG, WHERE THERE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY NEXT MONDAY FOR YOUR COLLEAGUES TO MAKE ANY OTHER POINTS THAT THEY MAY HAVE. THE MINISTER OF STATE THINKS THAT THE FRENCH HAVE A REAL POINT. IF WE COULD OBTAIN CLEARANCE BY MONDAY 26 OCT, WE COULD ASK FOR IMMEDIATE ORAL REPLIES WITH CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW IN WRITING. THIS MIGHT PERMIT PUBLICATION ON 27 OR 28 OCT.

4. THE OTHER AMENDMENTS TO THE STATEMENT ARE FOR THE MOST PART SELF EXPLANATORY OR MATTERS OF DRAFTING. THE ONE POINT OF SUBSTANCE IS IN THE FIRST SENTENCE, WHERE THE DUTCH WISHED TO REFER TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND TO DELETE QUOTE IN PRINCIPLE UNQUOTE AND WHERE WE SUGGESTED THE INCLUSION OF QUOTE AND LEGAL UNQUOTE IN ORDER TO COVER THE NEED FOR A STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT.

5. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE POSITION OF THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT WHICH MIGHT, WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THESE EXPLICIT TEXTS, FIND DIFFICULTY. TO MEET THIS POINT IN PART, WE AGREED TO DELETE A SENTENCE FROM THE FRENCH DRAFT FOR THE STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY THE TEN (AINSI QUE LES VUES QU'LS ONT EXPRIMES A CETTE OCCASION) SO THAT THE TEXT SUBMITTED EXPRESSES MERELY APPROVAL OF THE DECISION OF THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS TO PARTICIPATE. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE ATHENS'S URGENT COMMENTS ON THIS ASPECT WITHOUT AT THIS STAGE CONSULTING THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.

6. FINALLY, WE AGREED THAT SINCE THESE TEXTS NOW ONLY CALL FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT FROM THE US AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS THERE WAS NO NEED TO DISCUSS THEM WITH THE AMERICANS IN ADVANCE OF DELIVERY. AT THE MOMENT VELIOTES IS STANDING BY TO TRAVEL TO LONDON IN THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK. THIS WOULD STILL BE USEFUL, ESPECIALLY IF THE LETTER HAD BY THAT TIME BEEN DELIVERED AS ENVISAGED ABOVE.

7. GRAHAM THOUGHT IT ADVISEABLE TO INDICATE TO THE OTHER CONTRIBUTORS THAT JUST AS WE HAD TAKEN A NATIONAL DECISION TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORCE SO WE WOULD HAVE TO RESERVE TO OURSELVES THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW OR ALTER OUR CONTRIBUTION IN THE LIGHT OF NATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND INTERESTS. HE SAID THAT MINISTERS MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE THAT CLEAR IN PARLIAMENT. THE OTHER THREE CONTRIBUTORS AGREED THAT THAT WOULD BE THE POSITION OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS.

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FM FCO 211800Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CANCUN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 23 OF 21 OCTOBER,

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO AND PARIS

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

MEETING WITH HAIG : LEBANON

1. US EMBASSY HERE HAVE GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT (IN STRICT CONFIDENCE - PLEASE PROTECT) OF A MEETING AT YORKTOWN ON 18 OCTOBER BETWEEN HAIG AND MITTERRAND/CHEYSSON IN WHICH THE LEBANON CAME UP. POINTS OF INTEREST ARE:

A) HAIG DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AS STILL CRITICAL. THE ISRAELIS WERE TEMPTED TO TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. ON THREE OCCASIONS RECENTLY THE US HAD HAD TO RESTRAIN BEGIN FROM MAKING A FURTHER INCURSION INTO LEBANON BY TELLING HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE 'GRAVE CONSEQUENCES' FOR US RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HAIG SAID THAT BEGIN SEEMED TO THINK IT POSSIBLE TO INVADE SOUTH LEBANON WITHOUT COMING INTO DIRECT CONFLICT WITH SYRIA.

B) MITTERRAND'S VIEW WAS THAT SYRIA HAD DECIDED NOT TO ALLOW ANY SITUATION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS AND THAT IN PARTICULAR NO ONE COULD BE ALLOWED TO BYPASS THEM TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE PALESTINIANS. MITTERRAND BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT, FOR WHICH MITTERRAND WAS CONVINCED THE SYRIANS WERE RESPONSIBLE. THE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN GETTING ON TOO WELL WITH ALL SIDES. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THAT IF ISRAEL WAS ALLOWED TO TAKE OVER SOUTH LEBANON, SYRIA WOULD TAKE OVER THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. ONLY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PROFIT FROM THIS. MITTERRAND SAID THAT THE BEST WAY FORWARD WAS TO ENABLE UNIFIL TO PROVIDE A REAL BUFFER IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

C) HAIG SAID THAT FRANCE AND THE US SHOULD WORK HARD TOGETHER IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE ON LEBANON WHERE THINGS WERE UNRAVELLING. HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (AUGUST 1982) COULD WELL RESULT IN A SYRIAN PUPPET REPLACING SARKIS. THIS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR BEGIN TO INVADE. THEY SHOULD THEREFORE WORK FOR A REDEPLOYMENT OF SYRIAN FORCES OR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTION. CHEYSSON'S VIEW WAS THAT FOR THE TIME BEING SAUDI ARABIA WERE CONCENTRATING ON THE ARAB SUMMIT AND FAHD'S 8 POINTS. AFTERWARDS HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD BE READY TO BRING THE UN INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON WITH THE OFFICIAL BLESSING OF THE ARABS.

2. ON (A) THERE IS NO MORE EVIDENCE NOW OF AN IMMINENT ISRAELI INVASION OF SOUTH LEBANON THAN WHEN HAIG DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN SEPTEMBER. ADMITTEDLY ISRAEL CAN MOUNT E.G. AIR ATTACKS AT SHORT NOTICE BUT WE WOULD EXPECT TO HAVE AT LEAST SOME WARNING OF PLANNED GROUND ATTACKS. ON (B), MITTERRAND'S THEORY ABOUT THE ASSASSINATION OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT DOES NOT SQUARE WITH THAT OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS (WHO THOUGHT AN IRANIAN GROUP WAS RESPONSIBLE). BUT THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE SYRIANS DO NOT WANT TO SEE THEIR PREDOMINANT ROLE IN LEBANON WEAKENED, AND IN PARTICULAR WANT TO KEEP A FIRM HAND ON THE PALESTINIANS.

3. ON (C), WE THINK HAIG'S ANALYSIS SOMEWHAT OVER DRAMATIC. THE FORTHCOMING ELECTION WILL CERTAINLY ADD TO TENSIONS, BUT THERE IS NOT MUCH HOPE OF ACHIEVING 'REDEPLOYMENT OF SYRIAN FORCES' AND WE DOUBT IF IT IS DESIRABLE TO ENCOURAGE THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THIS WOULD ONLY ADD TO TENSIONS AND IN ANY CASE IS HARD TO RECONCILE WITH THE TEN'S POLICY OF SUPPORTING THE AUTHORITY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON.

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FM FCO 211320Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL CANCUN
TEL NO 015 OF 21 OCTOBER 1981

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FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF P.O. WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1079 OF 20/10

INFO WASHINGTON JEDDA PARIS
INFO SAHARA CAIRO DAMASCUS AMMAN EC POSTS

ARAB/ISRAEL: POSSIBLE EUROPEAN ACTION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. RPINCE SAUD, IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 5 OCTOBER (MY TELS NOS 992 AND 993) CALLED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD SERVE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION: HE PROPOSED THAT PRINCE FAHDS EIGHT POINTS COULD BE USED IN THE FORMULATION OF SUCH A RESOLUTION. I HAVE ALSO SEEN THE FRENCH PAPER ON POSSIBLE ACTION AT THE UN (COREU CPE/BK/ETR 300 OF 18 SEPTEMBER - RECEIVED HERE ON 12 OCTOBER). YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE MY COMMENTS IN ADVANCE OF YOUR VISIT TO RIYADH.

2. WHEN I TOOK MR HURD TO CALL ON BRIAN URQUHART ON 19 OCTOBER, URQUHART SAID THAT HE FELT, AS WE ALL DID, THAT THE ARABS WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED AT THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, DUE TO AMERICAN FAILURE TO FORMULATE A POLICY OTHER THAN STUCKING TO CAMP DAVID TRYING TO ESTABLISH A "STRATEGIC CONSENSUS", AND GRAPPLING WITH INDIVIDUAL CRISES SUCH AS THE BOMBING OF THE IRAQI REACTOR, AWACS ETC. HE THOUGHT THAT THE TIME MUST COME WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO REENGAGE ITSELF WITH THE MAIN ISSUE, IF ONLY TO REDUCE ARAB FRUSTRATIONS HAVING A DEBATE AND TABLING, BUT NOT NECESSARILY VOTING ON, A RESOLUTION MIGHT HELP IN THIS RESPECT, ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT SUCH AN EXERCISE COULD WELL GET OUT OF HAND AND THAT VERY CAREFUL AND LENGTHY PREPARATION WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE ANYONE ACTIVATED THE COUNCIL.

3. AS YOU KNOW, MY OWN VIEW IS THAT, IF WE WENT INTO THE COUNCIL WITHOUT ADEQUATE PREPARATION WITH THE INTENTION OF SECURING THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION COMPLEMENTING SCR 242 IN TERMS OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION ETC, WE WOULD RUN STRAIGHT INTO AN AMERICAN VETO, SOMETHING WHICH IT WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE FOR US TO PRECIPITATE. AT THE SAME TIME, I SEE URQUHARTS POINT AND RECOGNISE THAT SOONER OR LATER THE WHOLE QUESTION WILL HAVE TO COME BACK TO THE COUNCIL AND THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE PLO WILL PUBLICLY DO WHAT WE ARE ASKING THEM TO DO EXCEPT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COUNCIL.

4. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE FIRST THING WE MUST DISCOVER IS WHAT IF ANYTHING THE SAUDIS AND THE AMERICANS HAVE SAID TO EACH OTHER ABOUT THE EIGHT POINTS AND ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE LINES PROPOSED IN PRINCE SAUDS STATEMENT. UNLESS IT TURNS OUT THAT THE SAUDIS AND AMERICANS HAVE BEEN HAVING PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS, I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD DISSUADE THE SAUDIS FROM EITHER ACTIVATING THE COUNCIL THEMSELVES OR ENCOURAGING OTHER ARABS TO DO SO E.G. FOLLOWING THE RABAT SUMMIT IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE BOUND TO LEAD TO AN AMERICAN VETO, THUS PUTTING US ALL IN AN EVEN WORSE POSITION THAN WE ARE NOW IN IN TERMS OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

5. PERHAPS THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE FOR US TO BE TH^{IN}KING IN TERMS OF HAVING A THOROUGH DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON WITH THE AMERICANS, AFTER YOUR VISIT TO RIYADH, ON HOW, IF AT ALL, THEY SEE PROGRESS ON THE FAHD PLAN OR ON ANY OTHER ACTIVITY, IN OR OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, RELATED TO BRINGING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IT WOULD BE VALUABLE TO EXPLORE THIS QUESTION THOROUGHLY WITH THE AMERICANS TO SEE IF THERE MAY BE A MINIMAL POSITION WHICH THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED AT LEAST TO CONSIDER AT SOME POINT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE AND WHICH IT MIGHT BE WORTH OUR FLOATING IN THE MOST TENTATIVE AND PRIVATE WAY WITH THE ARABS.

6. MR HURD HAS SEEN AND AGREED THIS TELEGRAM IN DRAFT.

Middle
East

Rud

Sinai Force: Some Propositions

Israeli withdrawal will not be frustrated because we, the Europeans or the Australians and Canadians do not participate in the force. The Israelis may decide not to withdraw, in which case they will advance many pretexts; and, even if they do withdraw, they will try to secure an additional price by claiming additional difficulties. But, at the end of the day, whether or not they withdraw depends on whether or not the Americans are prepared to make life sufficiently unpleasant for them if they don't.

History - Balfour and the Mandate - gives us a higher profile in the Arab world than any of our EC or Commonwealth partners. Participation is more difficult for us than for them.

It is reasonable for any one Western country to make its participation conditional on there being respectable company - say at least one other serious country in addition to the US. But it is demonstrably absurd for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Italy and the Netherlands all to say that they'd love to participate but won't unless we do.

There is no doubt that moderate Arabs are beginning to despair of current US policy. They don't want to turn to the Soviet Union. The danger is that they will do so faute de mieux. Europe can provide the something better. It would be the height of folly (and very much against Western interests) not to do so.

Ideally, it should be possible for Europe both to ensure that Arab alienation from the US does not leave a vacuum for the Soviet Union to exploit and to contribute to a force designed

/to assist

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to assist what the Arabs ought logically to accept as an essential part of a comprehensive settlement: Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

In practise, however, the association with Camp David is probably enough to damm the venture and to undermine the ability of a participating Europe to contribute to the overall strength of the West by continuing to play an independent role in the Middle East.

Probably, but not necessarily. It is worth making a major effort to persuade the Arabs that European participation will make it easier to secure Israeli withdrawal and a transition from current Egyptian and US policy to acceptance of the Venice principles. This could start with King Hussein's stop-over in London and Lord Carrington's visit to Riyadh.

The Americans are entitled to ask us to participate, and can reasonably expect us to respond favourably unless we have good reasons not to. But they have no justification for insisting that we should ignore the views of other countries in the region and, more especially, of those who are traditionally well-disposed towards the West. They should therefore accept that our participation must be subject to our getting a tolerable response from consultations with the countries in question.

Middle East

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FM WASHINGTON 202220Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3138 OF 20 OCTOBER
INFO OTTAWA.

MY TELNO 3134: SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, WITH WHOM I HAVE HAD A PRIVATE WORD, SAYS THAT MITTERRAND DID INDEED TELL A NUMBER OF PRESS CORRESPONDANTS THAT FRANCE WOULD BE PARTICIPATING. BUT THIS WAS INTENDED TO BE OFF THE RECORD. OFFICIALS HAD TRIED TO WARN HIM AGAINST DOING SO BUT HE PROFESSED NOT TO UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM. I SAID THAT THAT SORT OF THING MADE POLITICAL COOPERATION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND THAT YOU HAD BEEN VERY CAREFUL TO KEEP THE SUBJECT UNDER WRAPS AND THAT YOU WOULD NOT BE PLEASED BY MITTERRAND'S JUMPING OF THE GUN. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT CHEYSSON ALSO WAS VERY ANNOYED. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT, FACED WITH QUESTIONS TODAY ABOUT WHETHER THE STORY WAS TRUE, HE COULD NOT DENY IT BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE THAN HIS LIFE WAS WORTH - WHICH ADMITTEDLY IS NOT MUCH UNDER THE PRESENT REGIME - TO HAVE REPUDIATED THE PRESIDENT.

THE STORY WAS TRUE, HE COULD NOT
BEEN MORE THAN HIS LIFE WAS WORTH - WHICH ADMITTEDLY IS NOT
MUCH UNDER THE PRESENT REGIME - TO HAVE REPUDIATED THE PRESIDENT.

2. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE CANADIAN EMBASSY (PLEASE PROTECT)
THAT THEY WERE TOLD BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY THAT THE THREE
EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAD TAKEN A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE
TO PARTICIPATE. THE AMERICANS SAID THAT THEY WERE DELAYING A
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT SO THAT IT COULD BE MADE FIRST BY THE THREE
GOVERNMENTS. THE CANADIANS RECEIVED THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT
US PRESSURE FOR CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE WAS NOW OFF.

HENDERSON

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 October 1981

Discussed in Cabinet

Dear Michael,

L. Carrington 25/10

The Sinai Peace-Keeping Force (MFO)

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary discussed the MFO with the Prime Minister on the evening of 19 October. He explained that the French had come back to us with two points on the draft statement that we had put to them ad referendum before the discussion between the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington at Blackpool.

The first French point is that, having received a formal request from the Egyptian Government as well as the US that they should make a contribution, they feel that they should put the statement to the governments of the US, Egypt and Israel with a view to all three signifying that they accept it as a statement of the position of the Ten (we believe that this is the position of the Italian Government too). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had taken the view that there was no need for us to communicate directly with the Egyptian or Israeli Governments, who had not been in touch with us, and that the statement that we issued need only refer to the US Government. Nevertheless it would be undesirable if there were a difference between ourselves, the French and the Italians. Accordingly we are now discussing with the French and the Italians a formula for the penultimate paragraph of the draft statement so that it would read:

'They have received confirmation from the governments concerned that they recognise that the European contribution to the Force is made on the basis described above.'

The second French point is of more substance. They wish to drop the last part of the last paragraph ('and the US Government have welcomed this') on the grounds that the latter would be unable to go as far and would be liable to come back with a conditional welcome (eg 'on the understanding that the Europeans' activities are complementary to and do not undermine the Camp David process'), which would be less than satisfactory. Lord Carrington believes it is very important to extract a clear statement from the Americans that they welcome our continued separate role. Assuming we can obtain the agreement of the French and the Italians, therefore, he proposes that we should discuss the draft text with the Americans, making clear however that we have little room for manoeuvre. In the last resort, it would be open to us either to drop the last few words or to seek some other satisfactory wording with which the Americans could live. We have put these arguments to the French in Paris and have just heard that they too have some further textual amendments, which we expect to receive by telegram. It may be necessary to set up a meeting with the French and Italian representatives - probably on Wednesday afternoon - to try to sort these problems out.

/Lord



Lord Carrington discussed with the Prime Minister the best way to deal with the reservation of our right to withdraw our contribution. He said that he believed that to attempt to insert a reservation in the text of the statement would be regarded by our partners, and certainly by the Americans and Israelis, as a wrecking condition. The Israelis, for historical reasons, were suspicious of international peace-keeping forces and a reservation on the lines discussed at Blackpool would be seized upon by them as proof that such forces gave no effective guarantee and that European, especially British, participation was unreliable. That could lead to all the other potential contributors withholding their contributions and, perversely, HMG would be blamed. Accordingly Lord Carrington proposed that the Prime Minister should make it clear to President Reagan at Cancun that she would undoubtedly be asked in the House of Commons about our right to withdraw our contribution and that she would propose to reply as follows:

'Our participation in the Sinai Force is a matter for national decision, arrived at after consultation with other interested countries and having regard to the purposes of the Force. Any decision to extend or cut short this participation would similarly be a matter for our national decision.'

This formula was agreed, the Prime Minister emphasising that she would wish to put it in writing to President Reagan.

Finally, we have taken the opportunity of these further contacts with the French and Italians to make a self-explanatory amendment to the first paragraph in the text sent to the Prime Minister under cover of Lord Carrington's minute of 15 October. The new text spells it out that our decision to contribute has been taken 'in principle and subject to agreement on the practical arrangements'.

I am copying this letter to David Omand in the Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever,
Francis Richards
(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 October 1981

M. L. A.

fs. Paul.

Dear Michael,

Sinai MFO

The Australian Prime Minister wrote to the Prime Minister on 12 October about the Sinai Multinational Force.

I enclose a draft reply which has been approved by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. In his view, the reply need not wait for a final decision on the position to be taken by the French, Italian and British Governments, on which I have written to you separately.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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FM TRIPOLI 190730Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 316 OF 19 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, CAIRO, KHARTOUM, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW AND
MODUK (DI4(B))

YOUR TELNO 475 TO CAIRO: EGYPT/LIBYA.

1. IN RECENT WEEKS, THERE HAS BEEN SOME INCREASE IN LIBYAN MILITARY
MOVEMENTS OF BOTH FREIGHT AND PERSONNEL. BUT THESE SEEM TO
HAVE BEEN LARGELY DIRECTED AT THE SITUATION IN CHAD.

2. I TOO HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF A SUDDEN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF
SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS HERE.

3. ALTHOUGH QADHAFI IS OF COURSE UNPREDICTABLE, IT SEEMS
INCONCEIVABLE THAT HE WOULD LAUNCH A MILITARY ATTACK ON EGYPT
AND ONLY MARGINALLY LESS LIKELY ON SUDAN.

4. IN EGYPT'S CASE, THE SIZE AND WEIGHT OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMED
FORCES WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO LIBYA PLUS THE
KNOWLEDGE THAT WHATEVER THE STATE OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
THE TWO PEOPLES REMAIN CLOSE BY VIRTUE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER
TRADITIONAL TIES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY SO IN EASTERN LIBYA.
QADHAFI, WHO HAS HAD PROBLEMS OF LOYALTY AND MORALE IN HIS ARMED
FORCES IN RECENT MONTHS. WOULD NOT WISH TO RISK FURTHER DISCONTENT

QADHAFI, WHO HAS HAD PROBLEMS OF LOYALTY AND MORALE IN HIS ARMED FORCES IN RECENT MONTHS, WOULD NOT WISH TO RISK FURTHER DISCONTENT OR EVEN A REFUSAL BY THE TROOPS TO TAKE PART IN ANY MAJOR ACTION AGAINST EGYPT.

5. IN THE CASE OF SUDAN, THE LIBYANS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO RESTRICT THEIR ACTIVITIES AGAINST HABRE'S FORCES TO THE BORDER REGION. MORE SUBSTANTIAL ACTION WOULD POSE ENORMOUS AND EXPENSIVE LOGISTIC PROBLEMS. AND THIS WHEN LIBYA IS FACING PERHAPS THE WORST ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AT ANY TIME DURING QADHAFI'S RULE AND WHEN THE CHAD OPERATIONS ARE EATING UP A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF LIBYA'S CURRENT REVENUES. MOREOVER, QADHAFI MUST CALCULATE THAT A LIBYAN ATTACK ON SUDAN WOULD LEAD TO EGYPTIAN INTERVENTION.

6. THE LIBYANS NO DOUBT BELIEVE THAT THEIR SUSZAINED PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE LATE PRESIDENT SADAT AND THEIR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THEY SEEM TO HAVE DECIDED THAT MUBARAK IS NO BETTER THAN SADAT AND MUST BE SUBJECTED TO THE SAME TACTICS. THEY CLEARLY HOPE THAT SIMILAR ACTIVITIES AGAINST NIMEIRI WILL HAVE COMPARABLE RESULTS.

7. THE LIBYAN WAR OF WORDS IS PROBABLY ALSO INTENDED TO DRAW WORLD, AND PARTICULARLY SOVIET, ATTENTION TO A PERCEIVED AMERICAN THREAT TO LIBYAN INTERESTS. A SIMILAR MEDIA CAMPAIGN WAS LAUNCHED BEFORE AND DURING THE US NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE GULF OF SIRTE IN AUGUST. QADHAFI MAY GENUINELY FEEL THAT THE EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS, EG THE ALLEGED CIA PLOT AGAINST HIM, THE SIRTE INCIDENT, THE ARRIVAL OF AWACS AIRCRAFT IN EGYPT, THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A FORTHCOMING US MILITARY EXERCISE NEAR HIS BORDER AND INCREASED US MILITARY AID TO SUDAN WILL CULMINATE IN AMERICAN INSPIRED MILITARY ACTION AGAINST HIM BY ONE OR BOTH OF HIS EASTERN NEIGHBOURS.

8. I WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT QADHAFI TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO REINSURE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, TO MAINTAIN HIS SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN AND SUDANESE OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AND PERHAPS TO TRY TO ORGANISE SOME INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY IN SUDAN.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 262 OF 19 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, CAIRO, KHARTOUM, MOGADISHU, MODUK,
JEDDA

INFO SAVING TEL AVIV, AMMAN, TRIPOLI, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD

WASHINGTON TELNO 3046: US/EGYPT

1. ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS HERE ARE STILL PUTTING IT ABOUT THAT OMAN IS TO PARTICIPATE IN BRIGHT STAR (PARA 4 OF TUR) CDS (GENERAL CREASEY) HAS CONFIRMED MY UNDERSTANDING THAT HE HAS RECOMMENDED (WITH THE SULTAN'S AGREEMENT) THAT IT WILL NOT BE CONVENIENT FOR ANY SUCH MANOEUVRES TO TAKE PLACE IN THE SULTANATE UNTIL NEXT SPRING. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OMANI TROOPS TAKING PART IN THE EXERCISE ELSEWHERE (AS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN IMPLIED IN SOME RECENT BBC BROADCASTS).

2. ALTHOUGH THIS MAY EMBARRASS THE OMANIS WITH THE AMERICANS AT DIPLOMATIC LEVEL, I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF CREASEY DID NOT GET HIS WAY. WHILE HIS REASONS ARE CONCERNED MAINLY WITH THE FACT THAT OMANI FORCES ARE OTHERWISE OCCUPIED (AMONG OTHER THINGS WITH SAS EXERCISE SANDY WANDER), THE PROPOSED TIMING OF BRIGHT STAR WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE OMANIS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF NATIONAL DAY AND GULF AND ARAB SUMMITS.

3. WHILE I DO NOT QUESTION THE JUDGEMENT THAT BRIGHT STAR SHOULD BE POSTPONED SO FAR AS THE SULTANATE IS CONCERNED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT FEEL THAT IT IS THE BRITISH WHO ARE SPIKING THEIR GUNS. GENERAL CREASEY HAS TOLD ME THAT MY US COLLEAGUE FOUND IT DIFFICULT, WHEN HE SPOKE TO HIM ABOUT IT, TO UNDERSTAND THAT CREASEY WAS SQUEAKING WITH AN OMANI VOICE.

FCO PASS SAVING TEL AVIV, AMMAN, TRIPOLI, DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD.

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE

We talked briefly about this problem at the Conference. I see the dilemma which we face but I am greatly concerned that, at a moment, when we are successfully breaking into the market in a major way, - this matter should have arisen. I am surprised to learn of the Saudi attitude - I agree it is crucial. But, like you, I see considerable dangers to us from being drawn into such a Middle East commitment. I shall be interested to see the Statement but I still fear that it will damage us severely with Jordan and the Gulf States, and get us immersed politically in the events of the Region, where we now have much going for us, and can influence events for the good.

2. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Jurthel Darrin
Private Secretary
(Dictated by Mr. Nott
and signed in his absence)

Ministry of Defence

19th October 1981

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GRS 300

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FM CAIRO 150955Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 586 OF 15 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, BEIRUT

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): US/EGYPT: ARAB/ISRAEL *mk*

(see attached)

1. THE US AMBASSADOR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH MOST OF HAIG'S TALK WITH MUBARAK WAS TAKEN UP WITH DEFENCE COOPERATION, THE SUDAN AND THE LIBYAN THREAT, MUBARAK HAD ENDED BY MAKING A STRONG PLEA FOR AN ACCELERATION OF AMERICAN EFFORTS TO PRODUCE TANGIBLE RESULTS IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS. THEREAFTER HAIG HAD HAD A BUSINESS-LIKE SESSION WITH THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, BOUTROS GHALI AND USAMA AL BAZ (WHOSE ROLE NOW SEEMS LIKELY TO BE ENHANCED), WHICH ATHERTON HAD CONTINUED WITH THE SAME TEAM AFTER HAIG'S DEPARTURE.

2. ACCORDING TO ATHERTON THEY HAD MADE A USEFUL ADVANCE IN GETTING EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT THAT THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD BE TREATED SEPARATELY FROM THE AUTONOMY TALKS THEMSELVES, SO THAT THE LATTER COULD MOVE AHEAD. (AS THE EGYPTIANS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN INSISTING THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MUST BE DISCUSSED BEFORE THE AUTONOMY TALKS AS SUCH COULD BE RESUMED THIS SOUNDS LIKE A CONCESSION ON THEIR PART.) ATHERTON SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS HAD ALSO AGREED WHAT SHOULD BE A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH TO THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS, WHICH IS TO BE HELD BETWEEN OFFICIALS ON 21-29 OCTOBER IN JERUSALEM. THEY WILL ~~AIM~~ TO PRODUCE UNDER EACH AGENDA ITEM OR "HEAD OF AGREEMENT" A NUMBER OF OPTIONS FOR LATER DISCUSSION, AND IDEALLY DECISION, BY MINISTERS. THE EGYPTIANS ALSO AGREED TO ABANDON THE RITUAL OF INSISTING AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH ROUND THAT THE THORNIEST QUESTIONS, LIKE THE FUTURE OF EAST JERUSALEM, SHOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE AGENDA.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION, WHICH IS FEATURED IN EGYPTIAN PUBLICITY ABOUT THE TALKS WITH HAIG, ATHERTON SAID THIS WAS LITTLE MORE THAN A PET THEME OF BOUTROS GHALI'S. HE DID NOT THINK GHALI HAD ANY CLEAR IDEA OF WHICH PALESTINIANS MIGHT BE INVOLVED OR HOW TO BRING IT ABOUT.

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FM JEDDA 150955Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 585 OF 15 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM,
JEDDA, DAMASCUS AND MODUK (FOR DI4)

WASHINGTON TELNO 3046 : US/EGYPT.

1. I DEBRIEFED THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY ON HAIG'S TALKS IN CAIRO. THERE IS NOTHING REMARKABLE TO REPORT.
2. ATHERTON SAID THAT THE MAIN THEME IN THE TALKS WITH MUBARAK HAD BEEN THE EGYPTIAN DESIRE FOR SOME EARLY ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES TO REINFORCE ITS COMMITMENT TO EGYPT AND THE SUDAN AND SERVE AS A WARNING TO QADHAFI. THE AMERICANS SUGGESTED TWO SPECIFIC POSSIBILITIES, WHICH THE EGYPTIANS ACCEPTED. ONE WAS THE DEPLOYMENT OF AWACS TO EGYPT, NOW ANNOUNCED (AS BEFORE THEY WILL BE BASED AT QENA). THE OTHER WILL BE THE EARLY TRANSFER TO EGYPT OF FOUR F16S WITH THEIR EGYPTIAN PILOTS WHO ARE NOW UNDER TRAINING IN THE US, TOGETHER WITH THEIR AMERICAN INSTRUCTORS, GROUND CREWS, MAINTENANCE BACK UP ETC. ATHERTON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE MOVE WILL CREATE PROBLEMS AND MAY EVEN DELAY THE TRAINING PROGRAMME, BUT FOR THE EGYPTIANS THE GESTURE IS MORE IMPORTANT.
3. ASKED WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS HAD SHOWN ANY SENSITIVITY ABOUT PUBLICITY, ATHERTON SAID THEY HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IT COULD BE MINIMISED IN THE CASE OF THE AWACS DEPLOYMENT, BUT DID NOT DEMUR WHEN TOLD THAT THE NEWS WAS BOUND TO LEAK AND THEREFORE MIGHT AS WELL BE ANNOUNCED.
4. AS FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR 82, ATHERTON SAID THAT THE FINAL FORM IT WILL TAKE WILL NOT BE KNOWN UNTIL THE TWO AMERICAN TEAMS NOW IN CAIRO AND KHARTOUM HAVE COMPLETED THEIR WORK. IN PARTICULAR IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER EGYPTIAN TROOPS WOULD TAKE PART IN THE JOINT EXERCISE IN THE SUDAN. THE SUDANESE HAD NOT BEEN KEEN ON THE IDEA WHEN IT WAS FIRST MOOTED.

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FM TEL AVIV 151335Z OCT 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 410 OF 15 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON CAIRO AND JEDDA

MS

SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE

- (text attached)
1. THE INDEPENDENT ISRAELI DAILY, HA'ARETZ, PUBLISHES A REPORT TODAY FROM ITS WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT (TEXT IN MIF) WHICH CONTAINS THE FIRST PUBLIC MENTION HERE OF THE US REQUEST THAT BRITAIN SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE.
 2. SAMET IS KNOWN TO HAVE GOOD CONTACTS WITHIN THE ISRAELI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, AND HIS ARTICLE MAY ORIGINALLY HAVE BEEN BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM, ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR FROM THE CONTEXT THAT AMERICAN OFFICIALS ARE NOW DISCUSSING BRITISH (AND OTHERS') POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION OPENLY WITH (AT LEAST ISRAELI) JOURNALISTS.

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FM TEL AVIV 151340Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 411 OF 15 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON CAIRO AND JEDDA

MIPT: SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. TEXT OF HA'ARETZ ARTICLE IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: SAUDI ARABIA IS ONE OF THE MAJOR OBSTRUCTIONS STANDING IN THE WAY OF THE FORMATION OF THE MULTINATIONAL SINAI FORCE. HER INFLUENCE IS PREVENTING EUROPEAN NATIONS, PARTICULARLY BRITAIN, FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE FORCE, IT HAS BEEN LEARNED HERE.

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SO FAR SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING THE AGREEMENT OF ONLY THREE NATIONS - FIJI, COLOMBIA AND URUGUAY. SOURCES IN THE US ADMINISTRATION SAID TODAY (14 OCTOBER) THAT THEY WERE AWARE OF THE CLAIM ABOUT SAUDI INFLUENCE, BUT DID NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO IT.

ALL THE SAME, IT HAS BEEN LEARNT THAT BECAUSE OF SAUDI PRESSURE, BRITAIN, FOLLOWED BY AUSTRALIA, HAS SO FAR REFUSED TO AGREE TO CONTRIBUTE UNITS TO THE FORCE, EVEN THOUGH ONLY A SYMBOLIC PRESENCE IS INVOLVED. NATIONS SUCH AS ITALY HAVE INFORMED THE US THAT THEY ARE WITHHOLDING AGREEMENT UNTIL BRITAIN RECONSIDERS HER POSITION.

THE COMMANDER OF THE FORCE, NORWEGIAN GENERAL BULL HANSEN, IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN MAKING CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON ON THE ORGANISATION OF THE FORCE.

THE DELAYS IN COMPLETING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE ARE CAUSING CONCERN WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH IS EAGER TO HAVE AS WIDE A REPRESENTATION AS POSSIBLE AND WANTS TO PREVENT ISRAELI COMPLAINTS ABOUT ITS COMPOSITION.

THE AMERICANS FORESEE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES IN ENLARGING THE US COMPONENT BEYOND WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN PROMISED. THE MEAGRE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER NATIONS, WHICH WOULD COMPEL THE US TO CARRY THE CHIEF RESPONSIBILITY AS ALMOST THE SOLE PARTICIPANT IN THE FORCE IS LIABLE TO AROUSE CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM. CONGRESS HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SCOPE OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION AT THE APPROVED LEVEL.

UNQUOTE.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

15 October 1981

Dear Brian,

Sinai Multinational Force

The Prime Minister met the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary this afternoon in the Imperial Hotel, Blackpool, to discuss his minute of 15 October about the Sinai Multinational Force.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said he had discussed a possible European contribution to the Multinational Force with his fellow Foreign Ministers of the Ten when they had met in London earlier in the week. In private conversation M. Cheysson had said that he wanted to make it clear that France would not contribute to the Force alone: if she was to participate, it must be as part of a European contribution. Signor Colombo had said much the same. Herr Genscher had said subsequently that the Community must act in concert over the Force, since to do otherwise would both bring about an end to the Venice initiative and would put each member country in difficulties with Egypt, the moderate Arab countries and the United States. There had been general agreement among the Foreign Ministers that the Ten must stand together on this matter. M. Cheysson had then made it plain that France now positively wanted to see a European contribution. He felt that the situation in the Middle East following the assassination of President Sadat was now very grave and that in these circumstances the Europeans should contribute to the Multinational Force. He believed that unless there was such a contribution, there was a danger that the Israelis would not return Sinai to Egypt.

Lord Carrington went on to say that Mr. Haig had spoken to him in Strasbourg yesterday. He had been in touch again with both the Egyptians and the Israelis and the latter were now saying that if an adequate Multinational Force was not assembled, they would not hand back Sinai. Because of the right-wing pressures on them, the Israeli Government were looking for an excuse not to complete the return of Sinai. He had told Mr. Haig that, as the Prime Minister had promised President Reagan in their telephone conversation on Monday of this week, the European Community was now considering the question of a European contribution. Mr. Haig had now telephoned a second time. He had been in touch with the Saudis, and they were now saying that, in the wake of President Sadat's assassination, they wanted the Europeans to participate in the Multinational Force.

/But the

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The United Kingdom had in effect been pushed into a corner. We were now in a position where the French and the Italians were ready to make a contribution, provided Britain did so too; and no doubt M. Mitterrand, who would be visiting Washington later this week, would make this plain. If we were now the sole cause of the absence of a European contribution to the Force, the Americans would blame us. We were accordingly consulting the French and the Italians about a statement which would allow us to contribute non-combatant troops and which would safeguard our position, so far as possible, with the moderate Arab countries. He regretted that we had been forced into this corner in this way but he saw no alternative but to proceed as he was proposing.

The Prime Minister said that she too found the position we were now in thoroughly disagreeable. She did not really believe that Israel would refuse to withdraw from Sinai just because the Europeans had declined to contribute to a Multinational Force: their need to preserve their relationship with the United States would make it impossible for them to take such a line. Her fear was that if we made a British contribution to the Force and the autonomy talks subsequently failed to get anywhere - as they almost certainly would - the moderate Arab countries would vent their frustration with Israel on Britain rather than on the Americans, and this would mean a loss of trade and of jobs in this country. There was also a risk that the Multinational Force might be caught in the middle of renewed fighting between Israel and Egypt. For all these reasons it was essential that the text now under discussion with the French and Italians should make it clear that we retained the right to withdraw the British contribution to the Multinational Force at any time. On this basis she agreed, reluctantly, that we should try to reach agreement with the French and Italians and subsequently with the Americans and the Israelis on a European contribution.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Harold Wilson.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SP

*File have now copied this to
Mrs. NSA will be commenting.
WM 18/10*



BF

*Ag
Amz*

PM/81/46

PRIME MINISTER

Sinai Multinational Force

1. When you spoke to President Reagan on the telephone on 12 October, you said that you would arrange for the question of possible contributions to the Force from European countries to be discussed in the European Community. As you know, Foreign Ministers of the Ten met in London on 13 October and I took the occasion to follow this up.

2. The response was in part predictable. The smaller countries tacitly assumed that the question of participation was not for them; the Germans said that they had not been asked, did not expect to be asked and for historical and constitutional reasons would not be able to provide a contribution; and the French and Italians made it clear that there would be no question of their participating if we did not. The rest was rather more surprising.

3. Cheysson, having made it clear that the French would do nothing without the agreement of the Ten, explained that - although originally very much opposed to the idea of participation - he had changed his mind in the light of the assassination of Sadat and felt strongly that it would be right for there to be a European contribution. Colombo supported Cheysson, though in the lower key. (He no doubt had in mind, though he did not mention, President Mitterrand's visit to Washington on 17 October.) Genscher, having explained the German position on the lines I have

/summarised



summarised above, said that he would support whatever decision was taken by the French, Italians and ourselves and urged the rest of the Ten to do likewise. They readily agreed, while making clear their sympathy for Cheysson's arguments in favour of participation.


4. There is no doubt that, had I been prepared to go along, there would there and then have been a decision by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten that there should be a European element in the Force and that it should be provided by the French, Italians and ourselves. I do not need to rehearse the difficulties this would have caused. On the other hand, it would have been extremely damaging to our relations with the Americans had I taken a line which others could have reported to Washington as British obstruction of a general European willingness to come to the aid of the United States. (As it is, Haig seems to have got the idea that we were seeking to persuade the Europeans not to participate, and I had to speak to him from Strasbourg yesterday to sort things out.) I therefore proposed that we should explore the possibility of making our willingness to participate conditional on our getting from the Americans and Israelis something which would not only serve to protect us against Arab criticism but provide them with some evidence of progress in the direction of Venice. There was general agreement that this suggestion should be followed up, and it was left that we would discuss it further with the French and Italians. The others made it clear that they would support whatever we decided.

5. At Cheysson's insistence these tripartite discussions have got under way rather quicker than I would have wished. We have also found it difficult, given the apparent French
/enthusiasm



enthusiasm for participation, to persuade them and the Italians to think seriously about what price we might get from the Americans: left to their own devices, they would be happy with a statement which did little more than put on record our continuing attachment to Venice. Negotiations in the three are proceeding ad referendum, and I enclose a text which we are discussing with our partners.

6. If this text is accepted by the three and subsequently by the Americans and Israelis (the latter no doubt only under pressure from the former) we shall have gained something in terms of US understanding of the position of the Ten. (The Egyptians should present no problem.) We should also have a good basis on which to explain our action to Arab critics, for whom the statement contains two or three points to which they attach importance, while creating no problem for us. But from the point of view of damage limitation the main point of course is that we should be acting only with the French and Italians and in implementation of a policy decision taken by the Ten collectively. We should not therefore be exposed as we would have been had we decided to act alone or with countries such as Australia and Canada who are clearly not in the same Middle East league as France and Italy.


(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15 October 1981



Sinai Peace-Keeping Force (MFO)

Draft Statement

The Governments of France, Italy and the United Kingdom, in consultation and agreement with their partners in the Ten, have decided to contribute to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, at the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States.

This decision is a symbol of their determination to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement following negotiations between the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and security for all the states of the area. They welcomed the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that goal. Similarly they welcome the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call for withdrawal contained in Security Council Resolution 242, which specifically declared illegal the acquisition of territory by war, and they believe that the international community has a duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East.

In addition, the three Governments express their firm support for the Egyptian Government and people and

/their



their belief in the need for stability and continuity in Egypt.

The decision of the three Governments to participate in the MFO follows from their policy, as stated in the Declaration issued at Venice in June 1980. This policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the State of Israel, places equal emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, including the right to an independent state if that is their chosen course. It also holds that the PLO must be involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

The three Governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

- (i) the Force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal and thus facilitating that withdrawal. It has no other role;
- (ii) the Force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible; and

/(iii)



(iii) participation by the three Governments in the Force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participating in such further international peace-keeping arrangements as may be established in the region.

The three Governments pledge themselves to support the MFO. They have received confirmation from the Government of the United States that it recognises that the European contribution to the Force is made on the basis described above.

For their part the three Governments, with their partners in the Ten, will continue to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East on the basis of the principles to which they hold and the US Government have welcomed this.



Passage for Inclusion in the Messages to President
Reagan

In deciding to accede to the request, the three Governments believe it would be right for them to put out the attached public statement of their position, which is in full conformity with their known policy. In doing so they recognise that you will not necessarily feel able to endorse the positions stated. Nevertheless we feel it is important that you should accept that it will be on the basis of this statement that we shall make our contributions to the MFO. I should be glad also to receive your confirmation that you welcome continued activity by the Ten directed towards giving effect to the principles of the Venice Declaration as the basis for a comprehensive peace in the region.

Middle East

*Mr. Alexander.
You will wish to look
at the file on this*

*WH
16/10*

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FM FCO 151600Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS
TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 143 OF 15 OCTOBER 1981

32183 - 2

SINAI: MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO)

1. THE US GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED US TO PROVIDE A CONTINGENT (PROBABLY A SMALL SIGNALS UNIT) FOR THE MFO WHICH IS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN SINAI UNDER THE EGYPT/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY (PART OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS) WHEN ISRAEL WITHDRAWS FROM THE LAST SLICE OF EGYPTIAN TERRITORY IN SINAI IN APRIL 1982.
2. THERE HAS BEEN A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN, WHO HAVE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COMMON POSITION. THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAVE ALSO BEEN ASKED TO PARTICIPATE, AND THE SEVEN HAVE AGREED THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT WHATEVER DECISION THE THREE TAKE TOGETHER. DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE THREE IS CONTINUING, AND A DECISION IS PROBABLE SOON.

LINE TO TAKE

3. YOU SHOULD NOT RAISE THIS SUBJECT, BUT YOU MAY DRAW ON PARAS 1 - 2 IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS AND SHOULD BE GUIDED BY PARAS 4 - 6 IN DISCUSSION WITH TRUSTED CONTACTS.
4. WE SUPPORTED THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI PEACE TREATY AND WE CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI NEXT APRIL SHOULD PROCEED. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A DUTY TO PLAY ITS PART IN PEACE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST INCLUDING, WHERE NECESSARY, THE PROVISION OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES. PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO WOULD THEREFORE BE ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR POSITION, AND REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE WOULD OPEN US TO THE CHARGE OF INCONSISTENCY. THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS COULD BE EXPECTED TO SAY THAT A REFUSAL DEMONSTRATED THAT WE WERE NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN PEACEMAKING BUT ONLY IN CURRYING FAVOUR WITH THE ARABS.
5. WE ALSO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARGUE THAT ONLY THE AMERICANS CAN PLAY THE NECESSARY PART IN BRINGING ABOUT COMPREHENSIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, BECAUSE ONLY THEY CAN DELIVER THE ISRAELIS. WE HAVE TAKEN GREAT CARE, IN DEVELOPING AN INDEPENDENT MIDDLE EAST POLICY, TO AVOID ANY DIRECT CONTRADICTION WITH AMERICAN POLICY.

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6. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS AT PRESENT ON THE RIGHT LINES. WE HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS, TO WHICH THE AMERICANS ATTACH SO MUCH HOPE, THOUGH WE SHALL NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT DAMAGE THEM. WE ARE ALSO KEENLY AWARE THAT THERE ARE STRONG FEELINGS OF HOSTILITY TOWARDS US POLICY GENERALLY AND CAMP DAVID PARTICULARLY THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD INCLUDING THE SO-CALLED MODERATE ARAB STATES. BRITISH OR EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO, ALTHOUGH LOGICALLY COMPATIBLE WITH OUR POLICIES SINCE THE VENICE DECLARATION OF JUNE 1980, WOULD PROBABLY AROUSE AN INTENSE ARAB EMOTIONAL REACTION. WE SHOULD BE ACCUSED OF HAVING SOLD OUT TO THE AMERICANS, AND THIS MIGHT DAMAGE OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRESENT AMERICAN POLICIES WHEN WE BELIEVE ONE WILL BE NEEDED, THAT IS AFTER APRIL 1982 AND AFTER THE AUTONOMY TALKS REACH THE EXPECTED DEAD END.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY

7. WE ARE NOW EXAMINING WITH THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS THE POSSIBILITY OF ANNOUNCING A DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN A WAY WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO ALL BUT THE MOST EXTREME OPPONENTS OF CAMP DAVID THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, AND THAT PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IN NO WAY REPRESENTS AN ALIGNMENT OF EUROPEAN POLICY WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF CAMP DAVID.

**CARRINGTON
BY TELEGRAPH**

ATHENS	ROME	DOHA	DAMASCUS
BONN	DUBLIN	DUBAI	ALGIERS
BRUSSELS	UKMIS NEW YORK	ABU DHABI	CAIRO
UKREP EC BRUSSELS	BIS NEW YORK	MUSCAT	RABAT
UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS	WASHINGTON	BEIRUT	TRIPOLI
COPENHAGEN	BOGOTA	JEDDA	TUNIS
THE HAGUE	ADEN	KUWAIT	OTTAWA
LUXEMBOURG	AMMAN	TEHRAN	CANBERRA
OSLO	BAGHDAD	TEL AVIV	WELLINGTON
PARIS	BAHRAIN	JERUSALEM	SUVA

[IMMEDIATE]

LISBON	STOCKHOLM	MOSCOW	TOKYO
MADRID	VIENNA	PEKING	

[ROUTINE]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

SINAI PEACEKEEPING FORCE (MFO)

DRAFT STATEMENT

THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT WITH THEIR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, HAVE DECIDED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MULTINATION FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI, AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES.

THIS DECISION IS A SYMBOL OF THEIR DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH WOULD BRING JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES AND SECURITY FOR ALL THE STATES OF THE AREA. THEY WELCOMED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THAT GOAL. SIMILARLY THEY WELCOME THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF THE CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH SPECIFICALLY DECLARED ILLEGAL THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR, AND THEY BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A DUTY TO PLAY ITS PART, AS NECESSARY AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN PEACE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN ADDITION, THE THREE GOVERNMENTS EXPRESS THEIR FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE AND THEIR BELIEF IN THE NEED FOR STABILITY AND CONTINUING IN EGYPT. (SHOULD READ CONTINUITY)

THE DECISION OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO FOLLOWS FROM THEIR POLICY, AS STATED IN THE DECLARATION ISSUED AT VENICE IN JUNE 1980. THIS POLICY, WHILE INSISTING ON GUARANTEES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, PLACES EQUAL EMPHASIS ON JUSTICE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT STATE IF THAT IS THEIR CHOSEN COURSE. IT ALSO HOLDS THAT THE PLO MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.

THE THREE GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT:

1. THE FORCE EXISTS SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING PEACE IN SINAI FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THUS FACILITATING THAT WITHDRAWAL. IT HAS NO OTHER ROLE.
2. THE FORCE IS BEING ESTABLISHED AS IN ITS PRESENT FORM IN THE ABSENCE OF A UN DECISION ON AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND ITS POSITION WILL BE REVIEWED SHOULD SUCH A DECISION BECOME POSSIBLE. AND
3. PARTICIPATION BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS IN THE FORCE WILL NOT BE TAKEN EITHER AS COMMITTING THEM TO OR EXCLUDING THEM FROM PARTICIPATING IN SUCH FURTHER INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS AS MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN THE REGION.

THE THREE GOVERNMENTS PLEDGE THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT THE MFO. THEY HAVE RECEIVED CONFIRMATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THAT IT RECOGNISES THAT THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORCE IS MADE ON THE BASIS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

FOR THEIR PART THE THREE GOVERNMENTS, WITH THEIR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THEY HOLD AND THE US GOVERNMENT HAS WELCOMED THIS.

PASSAGE FOR INCLUSION IN THE MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

IN DECIDING TO ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST, THE THREE GOVERNMENTS BELIEVE IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR THEM TO PUT OUT THE ATTACHED PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THEIR POSITION, WHICH IS IN FULLY CONFORMITY WITH THEIR OWN POLICY. IN DOING SO THEY RECOGNISE THAT YOU WILL NOT NECESSARILY FEEL ABLE TO ENDORSE THE POSITIONS STATED. NEVERTHELESS WE FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD ACCEPT THAT IT WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF THIS STATEMENT THAT WE SHALL MAKE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MFO. YOU SHOULD BE GLAD ALSO TO RECEIVE YOUR CONFIRMATION THAT YOU WELCOME CONTINUED ACTIVITY BY THE TEN DIRECTED TOWARDS GIVING EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION AS THE BASIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION.

MESSAGE ENDS

15 OCTOBER 1981

SUBJECT

cc Master Records

mi
MW.
13x

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON MONDAY 12 OCTOBER AT 1850 HOURS WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS IN BLACKPOOL

RR I'm just fine, and how are you?

MT We're just starting our Party Conference, which is always a feat of endurance.

RR Oh Lord, and I'm interrupting you.

MT Quite alright.

RR First of all, let me express my sympathy. I saw you this morning in the paper here in the New York Times visiting the hospital - one of the young soldiers that was wounded in that terrorist....

MT It was terrible, wasn't it. One of them was only 17½. And there were 2 children.

RR It looked like just a young boy. The world's going to have a little more of that.

MT It's an incident of terrorism that we have to try and stamp out.

RR Yes, yes. Listen, I'm going to be a pest again, and speak to you if I can about our request if you could provide a communication unit to that multinational force.. I've been talking to Al Haig. He got back from Cairo, and with the situation over there now, I just have a feeling that without your contribution we can't get anyone else from Europe. We do have as a Commander that General from Norway is going to command the entire unit, but so far we're only able to get some minor country forces, and I just believe that right now the increased instability in the Middle East - we can be helpful if we had something that looked like more nations of Europe and ourselves that were going to lend a hand there. I know that I'm asking something that you'd run into some opposition on.

/ MT

MT Well we run into a good deal of opposition, but I've just had a letter from Malcolm Fraser saying that he won't take part unless I do, and I'm rather cross because I don't think anyone has a right to try to hinge the whole thing on Britain's position. Indeed I think it's quite wrong because there are two things why we are different. First, the Balfour Declaration on a homeland for the Jews in Israel is of course British, and puts us at odds partly with other people. Secondly, we are the authority which has the mandate over Palestine, and carried out the mandate, and eventually left in 1948 as you know, and therefore to some extent the whole of the Arab world blames us for what happened. So when I thought the request might come, because I know that you asked Malcolm Fraser first, I saw Crown Prince Fahd myself - I had him to lunch at No. 10 - and asked him flat out what would be the effect in the Arab world if we were invited to take part in the Sinai force and he was totally clear about this. He thought it would be very adverse indeed, and would do us harm in the Arab world. Now that is going to put me in double difficulty because I simply cannot afford to lose the business.

RR Who said this to you?

MT Crown Prince Fahd,

RR Well that does put a different slant on it. Let me take that word to Al Haig.

MT You see, I asked him because we do a lot of business with the Arab countries. We need it because we've got a lot of unemployment. And I know it was advice he gave in the greatest possible friendliness. And I'm sure it was right.

RR It is unfair, but the answer that we get from all these other countries is if you'll do it, yes they will. But that is unfair of them.

MT Grossly unfair. I would have thought Australia and Canada could do it if either or the other would do it. That was my understanding.

/ RR

RR Malcolm Fraser indicated that it was his own domestic political situation that was militating against the and showed me a poll where his people had ruled against

MT He couldn't possibly do it alone. He would have to have someone else, and I thought Canada would be enough because neither of them are in the position we are. That was I thought the understanding when we left but I had a letter handed to me just a couple of hours ago indicating he was making our cooperation a condition. But as I say, for the reasons I've given it puts me in an acutely difficult position, and I cannot afford to lose the business. It was just beginning to get - and particularly at this - France would then get the whole lot, and I'd get the unemployment. Which is the last thing I want. And of course, as I say, we were the mandating authority in Palestine in days gone by, and we've just got back to retrieve our reputation. I would discuss it in Europe, but that is an acutely difficult position for us, and I feel very cross that they're attempting, as so frequently they do, to put the whole burden on our shoulders.

RR Well that is the answer we keep getting, that someone else has to do it first. Well, I'm not going to ask you again under these circumstances to do it, and I understand your position very well, and we'll just keep digging here ...

MT Well we'll keep in touch. ... Further discussions in Europe, but I'm not optimistic because of the reasons I've given. They really ought not to put it onto me.

RR All right. Have a good meeting.

(Farewells)



10 DOWNING STREET

U.B.
M. G. Cart

cc with MAP's agreement
to Sir N. Henderson by Fed.

From the Principal Private Secretary

12 October 1981

Dear Borna,

Sinai Multinational Force

President Reagan spoke to the Prime Minister at 1830 this evening about a British contribution to the Sinai Multinational Force.

After expressing sympathy over the Chelsea Barracks terrorist incident, the President got down to brass tacks on a slightly defensive note by saying that he was "being a pest again". He had been talking to Mr. Haig on the latter's return from President Sadat's funeral in Cairo. He believed that with the increase in instability in the Middle East, it would be more helpful than ever if not only American forces were on the ground in Sinai but European nations as well. So far the US had secured the participation of only minor countries in the Multinational Force. All the other countries who had been asked to contribute had made it clear that they were ready to do so only if Britain took part, and he was therefore asking the Prime Minister to agree to provide a communications unit, though he knew that this would not be easy for her.

The Prime Minister said that the President's request put her in an acutely difficult position. The fact was that Britain's position in the Arab world was different from that of any other country. First, we had been responsible for the Balfour Declaration; and second, it was Britain who had exercised the mandate over Palestine until 1948 when we had withdrawn. To some extent the Arab world still blamed the United Kingdom for the present situation in the Middle East. We had gone a long way to retrieve that position but Arab confidence in Britain was still fragile. When Crown Prince Fahd had been in London in the middle of September, she had asked him outright what would be the effect if the United Kingdom accepted an invitation to participate in the Sinai Multinational Force and his response had been absolutely clear. He had said that it would do Britain harm in the Arab world. The fact was that we had a lot of trade with the Arab countries and, in view of our present level of unemployment, we could not afford to see that trade damaged in any way. These considerations did not apply to some of the other countries which could reasonably be expected to contribute to the Multinational Force. She had just had a letter from Mr. Malcolm Fraser saying that Australia could not take part unless Britain and Canada did.

/ In her view

CONFIDENTIAL

In her view it was unfair of him to make this kind of condition. There was no reason why Australia and Canada should not contribute to the Force without any participation from the United Kingdom. She accepted, however, that because of his domestic political situation, Mr. Fraser could contribute only if Canada or a major European nation did so too.

President Reagan said that he saw that the attempt by other countries to make their contribution to the Force conditional upon a British contribution was unfair. Moreover, what Prince Fahd had said to the Prime Minister about a possible British element put a different slant on the matter, and he would discuss this with Mr. Haig. He understood the British position very well, and he would not ask the Prime Minister again for a contribution from the United Kingdom. Instead he would "keep digging".

The Prime Minister said that she would arrange for the question of possible contributions to the Force from European countries to be discussed in the European Community, but she had to warn the President that she was not optimistic about the outcome. She would keep in touch with him.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Foreign Secretary would now raise the matter with his colleagues in the Community.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc,

Sheila Whinnery.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T. 146/81



PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

14 OCT 1981

Mr. Ben Neuman

In the course of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, we discussed Ronald Reagan's message asking us while we were in Melbourne together to consider further our participation in the Sinai Multinational Force. We were not able then to bring our discussions to a conclusion and in any event, they were overtaken by the grievous news of the assassination of President Sadat.

Since then, there have been discussions among our representatives and with Secretary of State Haig at the funeral ceremonies for President Sadat in Cairo and we in Australia have given further consideration to our own attitude towards participation in the force.

I write now to inform you that I have conveyed our decision to Ronald Reagan. I have told him that Australia will agree to participate in the Sinai peace-keeping force subject to Britain and Canada also agreeing to participate. I very much hope that you will.

I have also emphasised that in participating in the Sinai peace-keeping force, we would be concerned that our contribution would have the maximum positive influence in continuing and broadening the peace process in the Middle East. We would be looking to the United States, therefore, to exert and to sustain the strongest pressure to ensure an effective and continuing process in the search for peace.

I do not envisage, for the time being, any public announcement of our decision which is contingent upon decisions by the Canadian and British Governments.

.../2

2.

I look forward to keeping in the closest contact with you about developments in your own attitudes towards participation.

I am writing in similar terms to Pierre Trudeau.

With warmest personal
regards,
Thatcher

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
LONDON SW.1.
UNITED KINGDOM

Middle East
Situation
Cops to Malaysia
file

HL

12 October 1981

The Prime Minister was grateful for your Secretary of State's minute of 8 October reporting on his tour of the Middle and Far East. She has read this without comment.

WILLIAM RICKETT

David Omand, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

KLb



u RB

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 October, 1981

RF

I sent you earlier in the day a copy of the attached letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Malcolm Fraser, about the Sinai Multinational Force. This was handed to me by Mr Michael Curtin from the Australian High Commission this afternoon. He added that he was instructed by Canberra to clarify two points. First, the Government of Australia has not communicated its decision to the Egyptians and Israelis. Second, Canberra will want to consult closely with us, the Canadians, and the Americans over the way in which any decision on this subject is in fact communicated to Egypt and Israel.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Fraser as soon as possible.

W.F.S. RICKETT

F N Richards, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

mm

PN

5:00pm

FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY FROM RICKETT, NO.10

Before the Prime Minister speaks to President Reagan on the 'phone this evening, she should see the following letter to her from Malcolm Fraser. This was handed to me by the High Commission this afternoon after she had left for Blackpool. It confirms that discussions with Mr. Fraser in Melbourne have not shifted him from his position on the Sinai peacekeeping force. FCO are drafting a reply.

Text begins:

Surf

12 October 1981

Thank you for your letter of 12 October, with which you enclosed a letter to the Prime Minister from the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser. This was delivered to me this afternoon by Michael Curtin, and, as I told him, I will place Mr. Fraser's letter before the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

W. F. S. RICKETT

His Excellency The Honourable R.V. Garland

Wb

SECRET



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

12 October 1981

Dear Mr Rickett,

I have been asked by the Australian Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Malcolm Fraser, to convey the enclosed letter from him to your Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, which has been received by telegraph today.

I should be grateful if you could bring this letter to Mrs Thatcher's attention as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Garland
Sec.

R.V. GARLAND

Mr W.F.S. Rickett,
Private Secretary to
the Prime Minister,
Prime Minister's Office,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.

SECRET

SUBJECT

SECRET 10

Text of Letter dated 12 October 1981
from the Rt Hon. Malcolm Fraser to
the Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher

ce R. Lyne
FCO
Memo
ops

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T143A/81

Begins:

My dear Prime Minister,

In the course of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, we discussed Ronald Reagan's message asking us, while we were in Melbourne together, to consider further our participation in the Sinai Multinational Force. We were not able then to bring our discussions to a conclusion and, in any event, they were overtaken by the grievous news of the assassination of President Sadat.

Since then, there have been discussions among our representatives and with Secretary of State Haig at the funeral ceremonies for President Sadat in Cairo and we in Australia have given further consideration to our own attitude towards participation in the Force.

I write now to inform you that I have conveyed our decision to Ronald Reagan. I have told him that Australia will agree to participate in the Sinai Peace-keeping Force subject to Britain and Canada also agreeing to participate. I very much hope that you will.

I have also emphasised that, in participating in the Sinai Peace-keeping Force, we would be concerned that our contribution would have the maximum positive influence in continuing and broadening the peace process in the Middle East. We would be looking to the United States, therefore, to exert and to sustain the strongest pressure to ensure an effective and continuing process in the search for peace.

I do not envisage, for the time being, any public announcement of our decision, which is contingent upon decisions by the Canadian and British Governments. I look forward to keeping in the closest contact with you about developments in your own attitudes towards participation.

I am writing in similar terms to Pierre Trudeau.

Yours sincerely,

(Malcolm Fraser)

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON.

Ends.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 October 1981

*Seen by the
Prime Minister.*

*MW
ka.*

Dear Willie,

Sinai: Multilateral Force

I understand that the Prime Minister is to speak to President Reagan at 3.00 this afternoon. I attach a short brief incorporating the speaking notes drafted for use by the Prime Minister at Melbourne.

The Prime Minister may wish to know before speaking to President Reagan the line which Mr Haig took when he saw Lord Carrington at President Sadat's funeral on Saturday. Earlier efforts to arrange a separate bilateral meeting having failed, they could manage no more than an informal discussion at which Sr Colombo, Mr McGuigan (Canada) and Mr Anthony (Australia) were also present. Mr Haig pressed Lord Carrington very hard on the Multilateral Force. This was, he said, an issue on which President Reagan felt extremely strongly, and was likely to be in touch with the Prime Minister again shortly. Following President Sadat's death, the first priority must be to support Egypt; if the Americans failed to put together a viable Sinai Force the responsibility would be ours. He expressed impatience with the 'interlocking veto' operated by the various countries who declined to participate unless another country did so first, and spoke of a 'parting of the ways' between Europe and the United States on the Middle East. In replying, Lord Carrington emphasised the importance we attached to the European position on the Middle East, which was quite distinct from (though complementary to) the Camp David process. He made it clear that in these circumstances to give a positive reply to the American request would give us very serious difficulty. He suggested, however, making it clear that he spoke without commitment and that the idea would require a good deal of further study, that this difficulty would be much reduced if we were able to show that our agreement to contribute had resulted a significant Israeli concession - such as, for example, an end to new settlement on the West Bank. Mr Haig expressed interest in the idea, and said (rather surprisingly) that he thought that Mr Begin would be prepared to give a commitment of this kind.

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Sr Colombo supported the line taken by Lord Carrington. Mr Anthony and Mr McGuigan merely sounded unhelpful. Lord Carrington made it clear that constraints which applied to Britain in no way obstructed Canada or Australia from contributing to the Sinai Force; there was no 'interlocking veto'.

Yours over.

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq
10 Downing St



SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS:
TELEPHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. Lord Carrington was approached by Mr Haig in Cairo and pressed for a reply. He gave no commitment.
2. The Prime Minister may wish to respond to Reagan along the following lines:
 - i) we remain deeply concerned about the need to make progress towards peace in the Middle East;
 - ii) we are convinced that the European approach must offer something which demonstrates to the Palestinians that they have not been forgotten by the West;
 - iii) logically there is no incompatibility between the policy of the Ten and support of the MFO. But the emotional and political reality in the Middle East is that British participation in the MFO would jeopardise the part we are playing. We believe this to be of very great importance;
 - iv) the death of President Sadat adds a new uncertainty to the situation and we wish to make a considered assessment. We owe the President a reply and this will of course be forthcoming as soon as possible.



cc Far East extract
to Malaysia: Aug 74
Relation

mm/also

mm

MO 25/2/17/2

PRIME MINISTER

I wanted to report on my return on the main points which arose on my recent visits to countries in the Middle and Far East. The last hours of my tour were of course overshadowed by the events in Egypt. The details of my conversation with President Sadat at the outset of my journey have been reported separately (Cairo tel 518) and I shall not enlarge on them here. There were strong voices of dissent at Sadat's policy, and, although Vice President Mubarak seems to be well in control there might be a possibility that the recent pattern will be shaken. -Flag A on Pt B.

Middle East

2. On the broader issues the Arab/Israel problem of course dominated our talks, the Egyptians, or at least Sadat, have been staking a great deal on the resolution of the Sinai issue. There is an undercurrent of hope in Egypt - though not shared by senior Jordanians - that once this is out of the way, she will be able to resume a more overt relationship with other Arab countries. Ironically, the main stumbling block to acceptance was seen as Sadat himself. But there was a good deal of scepticism amongst officials about Israeli commitment to a satisfactory outcome to the autonomy talks. There was also some doubt whether the Israelis would be negotiating seriously and these doubts must now become reinforced with Sadat's death.
3. In Jordan the views were naturally more clear cut. We were taken to a point on Jordan's North West border overlooking the Jordan valley and the West Bank. It brought home, as intended, how strong the feeling



is in Jordan about the Israeli occupation. The Jordanians underlined in familiar terms their hope that we and the other Europeans would put as much pressure as we could on the Americans in respect of Israel.

4. In both countries, and especially in Jordan, there was very real dismay about the apparent understanding between the US and Israel about a future "strategic relationship". President Sadat told me that he had been personally informed by Haig that this amounted to no more than the Israelis providing medical facilities for US forces - a point later echoed in public US statements. I made it clear that the move, if such it was, had nothing to do with us and would be very damaging if it was as significant as early press reports had suggested. The Jordanians were also particularly gloomy about the outcome of the Iran/Iraq war. The stalemate could well continue for a long time.

5. I am confident we have made progress on equipment sales. In Egypt, there was clear satisfaction that the Anglo-Egyptian Swingfire factory was working well. The factory is also very suitable for local production of Rapier and I think we were able to regain some ground on Rapier lost earlier to the French. We also took soundings on a number of items including an early purchase (if credit were available) of 6 patrol boats. But the major new prospect now opening up is for tanks, and the Egyptians made a strong bid to me for a purchase of some 300 Challengers. This was seen not only in terms of co-production, but also finance from Arab - ie Saudi - sources. This may depend on the prospects for better relations between Egypt and other Arab States, although there is probably some Arab finance already in play. The Egyptians as expected laid stress on the importance of soft and extended credit for their prospective purchases, about which I shall be in touch with John Biffen and Geoffrey Howe separately.



6. The visit to Jordan was particularly valuable in terms of defence sales. The Jordanians have also been especially helpful in introducing us as defence suppliers to Iraq and particularly on the repair of captured Iranian Chieftain tanks. On the latter they have provided repair facilities in Jordan, but now feel that the rest of the work would be more sensibly undertaken in Iraq: I shall be in touch with Peter Carrington on this separately.

7. The Jordanians have also helped us considerably over the prospect of aircraft sales to the Middle East. And they will be speaking strongly in favour of the British "family" of aircraft at this month's meeting of their consortium partners. But there are certainly problems ahead. The Jordanians stressed the wish of Iraq to buy the Tornado strike version, though they accepted the need for it to be "sanitised". They also stressed the need for the P110 air combat aircraft to be in service with the RAF as a pre-requisite for its purchase by Arab countries. Considerable emphasis had been laid in the consortium on French undertakings to acquire for the French Air Force the new Mirage 2000 and 4000. I was able to say that we had already earmarked some funds for R&D towards the engine (actually an enhanced RB199 also to be used in the Tornado ADV) for the P110. The Jordanians assured me that this would be very favourably viewed in the consortium.

Far East

8. In Malaysia, the scene was dominated by the Prime Minister's stated intention to examine himself all contracts with British firms. I have reported separately the outcome of my discussion with him on this subject.

9. Despite this, our discussions with the Deputy Defence Minister (the Prime Minister himself holds the Defence portfolio) went well.



We had a useful exchange on the strategic situation in the area, the Malaysians being predictably gloomy about the future cohesion of Thailand. The Malaysians are embarking on a major expansion of their defence programme, and there should be prospects for us as a result, in aircraft and armoured vehicles as well as in defence infrastructure projects. We were criticised on the costs of training and Loan Service Personnel we provide; a subject which I am currently examining. But I stressed here, and to others who made the same complaint, that reduced charges had an opportunity cost to us in terms of our own capability and would be very much easier to contemplate in cases where substantial sales of British defence equipment were involved.

10. In the context of Five Power Defence Arrangement we also discussed the prospects of more joint training and exchanges, possibly using British units in Hong Kong. The Malaysian Military Staffs welcomed this, though their Prime Minister's current attitude to FPDA might require them to stress the bilateral aspects of any such developments.

11. Sales prospects in Thailand seem far less certain. The Americans have largely dominated the market. We sensed however that for a number of reasons, not least the growing links between the US and China (whom the Thais regard as the most significant long term threat), Thailand was anxious to improve their defence relationship with us. But our prospects will depend heavily on being able to offer a good credit package, and an IMS team is today in Bangkok discussing the possibilities.

12. On the wider issues I concentrated in my talks with Thai leaders and in public statements on our support for ASEAN, especially in regard to attempts to resolve the Cambodian problem. The Thais saw Sino/Russian rivalry in the area as the main hindrance to a peaceful solution on Cambodia.

British Forces

13. Finally, I also saw something of the British Forces in Cyprus and Hong Kong and of the Gurkha facilities we maintain in Nepal. I found our Forces in good heart and working well. I was especially interested to see their operations in Hong Kong and I was encouraged by the smooth functioning of the new Defence Costs Agreement.

14. I am copying this minute to the other members of OD, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

MHR Evans

John Nott

(Approved by the Secretary of State
and signed in his absence)

Ministry of Defence
8th October 1981

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 October 1981

Dear Michael,

Israeli Attack on Iraq's Nuclear Facilities

/ I enclose a copy of a message from the Iraqi
President to the Prime Minister referring to her
message to him of 7 July (copy also attached). It
/ does not call for a further reply.

Yours ever,
Francis Richards
(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

303

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 1	
8 JUL 1981	
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PA	Action Taken
-	<i>30 8/1</i>

See T102/R Middle East file. At 6

OO BAGHDAD
GRS 151
CONFIDENTIAL

288

FM FCO 071745Z JULY 81
TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 355 OF 7 JULY 1981
AND TO INFO SAVING TEL AVIV, THE HAGUE, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS
NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, LUXEMBOURG, VIENNA (FOR RES REP IAEA)
YOUR TELNO 357 : IRAQ/ISRAEL

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT HUSSAIN. YOU MAY DO SO ORALLY USING AL-SAMARRAI
AGAIN AS THE CHANNEL.

QUOTE: I WAS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE PASSED THROUGH
MR EBERTON ON 28 JUNE WHICH I WAS ABLE TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON
29-30 JUNE. YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN THE STATEMENT ISSUED
AFTER THAT MEETING WHICH ENDORSED SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 487. I AM SURE YOU WERE RIGHT TO SETTLE FOR
A STRONG UNANIMOUS CONDEMNATION OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK
ON YOUR NUCLEAR REACTOR AND I IN TURN CONGRATULATE YOU
AND MR HAMIADI ON ACHIEVING THAT VALUABLE OBJECTIVE.
UNQUOTE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

X

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MR J MOBERLY

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No. 11, DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

*SUBJECT**of Minto
of*EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ21, QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON SW7 5JGPRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. *T137^A/81*
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION*8.10.81*

A message from Mr. Saddam Hussein, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council - President of the Republic of Iraq to Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.


" I was very pleased to receive your message dated July 7 , 1981, and as I express my satisfaction at the support of the European Council on June ³⁰ 6, 1981, for Security Council resolution No. 487 regarding the Israeli aggression on Iraqi nuclear installations, I would like to emphasize that the expression of indignation at, and deploring, the repeated acts of aggression ^{are} is not any more enough or effective to deter the aggressor. *attitudes*

We believe that such declarations should be transformed into effective action the minimum of which is the execution of all the paragraphs of the said ^{Security Council} resolution and the determination to make the aggressor put his nuclear installation under the inspection of the IAEA and join the NPT. Iraq accepted Security Council resolution No. 487 , which did not include mandatory sanctions against the aggressor, because it realized that the United States would use the right of veto in case of any insistence upon what is required by right and reality. But this matter will be raised during the ordinary session of the General Assembly and the meetings of the International Agency and [we shall highly appreciate] the support of Her Majesty's Government. *would be greatly appreciated.*

Mr Miles
NENAD

Cairo: Meeting with Mr Haig

1. Following several abortive attempts to set up a bilateral meeting in the margins of President Sadat's funeral, the Secretary of State was finally cornered by Mr Haig at the funeral itself. They had a discussion of the Sinai Force, at which Mr Colombo, Mr Anthony (Australia) and Mr McGuigan (Canada) were also present.
2. Mr Haig pressed Lord Carrington very hard on the MFO. This was, he said, an issue on which President Reagan felt very strongly, and would ring the Prime Minister unless we gave an early favourable reply. The main thing now was to support Egypt, and if the Americans failed to put together a viable MFO the fault would be ours. He expressed impatience with the "interlocking veto" operated by the various countries who declined to participate unless another country did so first, and spoke of a "parting of the ways" between Europe and the United States on the Middle East.
3. The Secretary of State responded vigorously. We had our own policy in Europe, and did not share the American assessment of the situation in the Middle East. The Americans would find that they needed this distinct European position post-Camp David; they would have to accept for the time being that the British position was tied in with that of its partners in the Ten, whether they liked it or not. When Mr Haig showed signs of umbrage at this stage, the Secretary of State pointed out that the Europeans had never been consulted about Camp David at the time, and could not be expected to accept responsibility for it now.
4. Signor Colombo supported the line taken by Lord Carrington. Mr Anthony and Mr McGuigan merely sounded uncomfortable. The Secretary of State added to their discomfort by making it clear that the constraints which applied to Britain in no way obstructed them from contributing to the MFO; there was no "interlocking veto".


(F.N. Richards)
Private Secretary

12 October 1981

cc: PS Sir A Acland
PS/LPS Sir J Graham
PS/Mr Hurd Mr Moberly
PS/PUS Mr Mallaby (Planning Staff)

9

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

1516²/05

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 051425Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NO 2967 OF 5 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MELBOURNE, PARIS

Set dist

RST

6/10

MY TELNO 2959: SINAI FORCE

1. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOW TOLD ME THAT HAIG HAS SENT A MESSAGE
TO CHEYSSON ASKING FOR FRENCH PARTICIPATION.

HENDERSON

NNNN

RESTRICTED

GR 110
RESTRICTED
FM BEIRUT 050834Z OCT 81
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 360 OF 05 OCTOBER 1981

FOR NENAD.

PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ABOUT PLO.

1. IN MONDAY MORNING OF 5-11 OCTOBER YOU WILL FIND AN INTERVIEW WITH ABU IYAD WHICH CONTAINS AN EMOTIONAL REACTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ABOUT THE PLO IN KUWAIT (PAGE 37).
2. NONETHELESS ABU IYAD SAYS HE IS READY TO MEET LORD CARRINGTON TO "EXPLAIN THE SITUATION TO HIM".
3. THE FULL TEXT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN KUWAIT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE PLO, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS.

ROBERTS.

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NEWS D.
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SIA J. GRAHAM
MR TOBERCY

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FDW F013/03



OO CANBERRA

GRS 150

SECRET

FM FCO 030042Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 411 OF 3 OCTOBER

mt

Prime Minister.

12/1

3x.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PS TO SOFS
WAS RECEIVED FROM PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 857 OF 2 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MELBOURNE (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), WASHINGTON

UKDEL MELBOURNE TEL NO 1 TO PARIS: SINAI PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.
FROM PETRIE IN ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR-

1. M. CHEYSSON IS IN DUBLIN TODAY. I HAVE SPOKEN BY TELEPHONE
TO THE DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, BORDEVAIX, WHO SAID THAT
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH MR HAIG ON 24 SEPTEMBER M. CHEYSSON
HAD NOT IN ANY WAY ALTERED THE FRENCH POSITION ON THIS QUESTION
WHICH HE HAD EXPLAINED TO LORD CARRINGTON ON 10 SEPTEMBER IN
LONDON. IT WAS A VERY TRICKY ISSUE ON WHICH THE FRENCH WERE
IN NO HURRY TO MOVE, HOWEVER. AFTER SOME PROMPTING, BORDEVAIX
PROMISED TO SPEAK TO M. CHEYSSON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TOMORROW
MORNING AND SEEK HIS VIEWS IN RESPONSE THE THE SECRETARY OF
STATE'S REQUEST.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

FDW G 003/04

ZZ CANBERRA (FOLLOWING IS SENT AT REQUEST OF UKDEL MELBOURNE)

GRS 303

SECRET

FM PARIS 031710Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 858 OF 3 OCTOBER 1981.

INFO IMMEDIATE (FIRST CONTACT) UKDEL MELBOURNE (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), WASHINGTON

MY TEL NO 857 : SINAI PEACE-KEEPING FORCE
FROM PETRIE:

I CALLED ON BOIDEVAIX THIS MORNING, BEFORE HE SAW HIS MINISTER, TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS CLEAR ABOUT YOUR DESIRE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH. HE TELEPHONED ME LATER TO SAY HE HAD SPOKEN ABOUT OUR APPROACH TO M. CHEYSSON, WHO WAS JUST LEAVING FOR THE WEEK-END. CHEYSSON HAD AGREED THAT FRANCE AND BRITAIN MUST HAVE CONCERTED ATTITUDE TO THE AMERICAN SUGGESTION FOR EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI M.F.O. FRANCE, HOWEVER STARTED FROM FURTHER BACK SINCE SHE HAD NOT HAD A DIRECT REQUEST FROM THE AMERICANS. CHEYSSON HAD HAD A DIRECT REQUEST FROM THE EGYPTIANS FOR FRENCH PARTICIPATION (BOIDEVAIX HAD TOLD ME EARLIER THAT CHEYSSON'S REPLY TO THIS HAD NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING, BUT THAT HE HAD NOT SAID NO). THE SINAI MULTILATERAL FORCE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WHEN CHEYSSON SAW HAIG, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO MENTION OF FRENCH PARTICIPATION. THE SAME WAS TRUE OF CHEYSSON'S CONVERSATION WITH THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER. CHEYSSON WAS THEREFORE NOT SURE THAT THE AMERICANS OR THE ISRAELIS ACTUALLY WANTED FRANCE TO PARTICIPATE. HIS OWN ATTITUDE REMAINED AS HE HAD EXPLAINED IT AT BROCKET HALL AND TO CARRINGTON IN LONDON. HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF BRITAIN ITALY DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE M.F.O. (BOIDEVAIX HAD TOLD ME EARLIER THAT COLOMBO HAD TOLD CHEYSSON THE ITALIANS DID NOT WANT TO TAKE PART).

2. I DO NOT THINK THAT M. CHEYSSON HAS YET CLEARED HIS LINE ON THIS WITH THE ELYSEE. IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S STAND ON CAMP DAVID HE WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE TO DO SO AT SOME POINT, PARTICULARLY IF HE DOES RECEIVE A DIRECT REQUEST FROM THE AMERICANS (CF. WASHINGTON TEL NO 2959). OTHERWISE HIS OBVIOUS RELUCTANCE TO COMMIT HIMSELF ANY FURTHER THAN REPORTED ABOVE MIGHT BE OVERCOME BY A MORE DETAILED EXPOSITION OF BRITISH VIEWS, PERHAPS IN A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

HIBBERT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister.

Mr Whitmore - No. 10

FWJ

2x

Sinai Force

I attach some speaking notes designed for use with the Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders which the Prime Minister may find it useful to have by her in Canberra.

FWJ Lyne

PP (B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

2 October 1981

cc: Sir R Armstrong
Sir M Palliser
Mr Alexander

CONFIDENTIAL



SINAI FORCE: TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH AUSTRALIA,
CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND

- i. As things stand, Americans have a 3-battalion force (one each from Colombia, Fiji and US) with an experienced Norwegian Commander. No reason to doubt that this would do the job perfectly well - Americans have never suggested that Israeli withdrawal from Sinai is in doubt because of difficulties over composition of force.
- ii. Neither have Americans argued that Colombian or Fijian commitment is in doubt if others do not participate. Must recognise however that force would look distinctly odd if either did withdraw, and that even now it looks rather embarrassing as a response to US efforts: question of American amour propre, and no doubt that lack of any response to latest appeals will go down badly in Washington.
- iii. Not in any of our interests that US Administration should feel rejected by its Allies, however unreasonable it may be for them to represent in this light a question (Camp David) in which they have never been involved.
- iv. Of the Ten, we, the Italians and more recently the French have been approached. No decision yet, and all see force in argument for doing something to help. On the other hand, quite clear from our soundings in Arab capitals that for EC countries (and certainly for current Presidency) to contribute to Sinai force would be seen as an abandonment of

/the distinctive



the distinctive European role represented by the Venice Declaration and subsequent diplomacy.

- v. In general Western interest that this distinctive role be maintained. In particular, because our efforts to persuade PLO to give some form of conditional acceptance of Israel's right to peace and security are very much alive - informal contacts in train, and response not as negative as might have been expected. In general, because we must do all we can to lessen risk that moderate Arabs, disillusioned with US, will turn to Moscow: the risk is there, and a Western Europe with a distinctive position may have an essential role to play in filling a vacuum which would benefit only the Soviet Union.
- vi. It is a question of keeping all the cards the West has: the European position is one of them and it could be of great importance. For us to join the force would be to throw it away.
- vii. No such disadvantage to Australian, Canadian or New Zealand participation. On the contrary, it would bring a new element of strength to the overall Western hand (and be helpful in terms of influence in Washington).
- viii. Given that Fijians are already involved, could not the three others build on that to provide what might be presented as a Commonwealth element?

SECRET

DEAR MARGARET:

I TRUST THAT YOUR MEETINGS WITH THE OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE COMMONWEALTH ARE GOING WELL AND THAT YOU ARE ENJOYING AN AUSTRALIAN SPRING. THE COMMONWEALTH REMAINS A REMARKABLE AND RESILIENT ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS RETAINED AN IMPORTANT ROLE OVER THE DECADES IN A CHANGING WORLD.

THIS MESSAGE, ALONG WITH A SIMILAR ONE I AM SENDING TO MALCOLM FRASER, CONCERNS BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO) WHICH WE ARE ORGANIZING IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI

FORCES FROM THE SINAI. I WOULD LIKE TO URGE PERSONALLY THAT GREAT BRITAIN CONTRIBUTE A SMALL COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (APPROXIMATELY 100 MEN) TO THIS FORCE. TIME IS GROWING SHORT FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE MFO, AND IF WE ARE TO MEET THE MARCH 20, 1982, DEADLINE, WE MUST HAVE ANSWERS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES WE HAVE APPROACHED, PREFERABLY WITHIN THE NEXT ONE TO TWO WEEKS. THE PRESENCE IN MELBOURNE OF THE LEADERS OF FOUR OF OUR OLDEST AND CLOSEST ALLIES -- YOURSELF, MALCOLM FRASER, ROB MULDOON AND PIERRE TRUDEAU -- AFFORDS AN ELEVENTH HOUR OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSULTATIONS REGARDING THE SITUATION WHICH I BRIEFLY OUTLINE BELOW.

CURRENTLY, WE HAVE COMMITMENTS FROM FIJI AND COLOMBIA TO PROVIDE TWO OF THE THREE BATTALIONS OF INFANTRY, WHICH, WITH A U.S. BATTALION, WILL MAKE UP THE CORE OF THE FORCE. NORWAY HAS AGREED TO MAKE AVAILABLE ONE OF ITS ABLEST OFFICERS, LT. GENERAL BULL-HANSEN, TO COMMAND THE FORCE. IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE MFO'S COMPOSITION, WE NEED AN AVIATION SUPPORT UNIT, A COASTAL PATROL UNIT FOR THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, AND A COMMUNICATIONS (SIGNALS) UNIT. THESE NON-COMBAT UNITS WOULD INVOLVE ONLY SEVERAL HUNDRED TROOPS. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY PREFERABLE FOR THE SIGNALS AND AIR SUPPORT UNITS TO BE PROVIDED BY ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES TO FACILITATE SMOOTH COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE FORCE.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND JOINTLY PROVIDE THE AIR SUPPORT UNIT AND THAT YOUR COUNTRY OR CANADA, OR BOTH, PROVIDE THE COMMUNICATIONS UNIT. ITALY HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE THE COASTAL PATROL UNIT IF OTHER MAJOR WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE INVOLVED. WE ALSO HAVE SUPPORTED AN EGYPTIAN REQUEST TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FOR A POSSIBLE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION.

I KNOW THAT AL HAIG AND PETER CARRINGTON HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER IN NEW YORK, AND THAT PETER HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT BRITISH PARTICIPATION. HE FEELS THAT PARTICIPATION COULD JEOPARDIZE OTHER EFFORTS YOU-ARE MAKING ON BEHALF OF PEACE IN YOUR CAPACITY AS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PRESIDENT. I WOULD OFFER THE COUNTER OPINION -- THAT YOU HAVE MUCH TO GAIN BY DEMONSTRATING TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL YOUR COMMITMENT TO WHAT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED EVEN AS YOU SEEK NEW WAYS TO FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS.

THE REASONS WHY WE BELIEVE IT OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO BE ABLE TO DEPLOY A PEACEKEEPING FORCE THAT HAS THE BROADEST POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT HAVE ALREADY BEEN CONVEYED TO YOUR GOVERNMENT, AND I DO NOT NEED TO RECAPITULATE THEM HERE. I DO, HOWEVER, WANT TO LEAVE WITH YOU MY STRONG PERSONAL CONVICTION THAT OUR ABILITY TO PUT TOGETHER AN EFFECTIVE FORCE IS ESSENTIAL TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL TREATY AND TO MOVING BEYOND THIS TO FURTHER STAGES OF A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

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NANCY STILL GLOWS WHEN SHE RECOUNTS HER VISIT TO ENGLAND FOR THE ROYAL WEDDING. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU NEXT MONTH AT CANCUN, AND I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS AT THE COMMONWEALTH MEETINGS.

WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN.

SECRET

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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 030035Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 2959 OF 2 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MELBOURNE, PARIS

MB

SINAI FORCE

1. I ASKED EAGLEBURGER TODAY IF HE COULD CLARIFY WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE US HAD SAID OR WOULD BE SAYING TO THE FRENCH ABOUT PARTICIPATION. HE REPLIED THAT SO FAR THEY HAD SAID NOTHING. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT THEY, THE AMERICANS, HAD PUT US, THE BRITISH, IN A TICKLISH SPOT BY APPROACHING US ALONE. IT WAS HIS INTENTION THEREFORE TO URGE HAIG TO APPROACH THE FRENCH ASKING THEM ALSO TO PARTICIPATE AND HE WAS PRETTY CONFIDENT THAT HAIG WOULD AGREE.

2. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE APPROACH WERE NOT MADE SOLELY TO US AMONG THE EUROPEANS: AND I ADDED THAT IF ANYTHING WAS SAID TO THE FRENCH COULD THIS BE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT YOU MIGHT WELL BE DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT WITH THE FRENCH OVER THE WEEKEND. EAGLEBURGER UNDERTOOK TO SUGGEST VERY URGENT ACTION TO HAIG.

HENDERSON

NNNN

~~Mr Alexander - No. 10~~

Prints 6/x

Sinai Force: Australian Position

The Secretary of State discussed the matter in confidence with Mr Street in the margins of this morning's session. It emerged that the real Australian worry was over their extensive trade with Iran and Iraq. They felt that if they were to participate in the force and the Arabs retaliated against their trade, there would be an uproar in Australia and an anti-American backlash. Moreover, there had been considerable debate in the press and public opinion polls had been taken on the question of participation: the balance of opinion was heavily against participation. Mr Street went on to say that the Australians had not come to a firm conclusion and that Ministers would be meeting tomorrow morning. It would be easier for Australia to participate if Canada, New Zealand or the United Kingdom were to do so too. (It was clear at least by implication that the Australian position was not that UK participation was essential. Rather, it was important to them that another respectable Commonwealth country should be involved.)

The Secretary of State made it clear to Mr Street that it was very unlikely that we would participate, but no final decision had been reached and we were consulting our European partners.

J. Karney
M (B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

2 October 1981

cc: PS
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DESKBY FCO 020730Z

DESKBY UKDEL MELBOURNE 012330Z

FM WASHINGTON 012254Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2930 OF 1 OCTOBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MELBOURNE AND PARIS.

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UKDEL MELBOURNE TELNO 33 TO FCO: SINAI PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.

1. THIS MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT COMPOUNDS THE DIRTINESS OF THE TRICK, TO USE YOUR DESCRIPTION TO HAIG, OF THE AMERICAN REQUEST FOR OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE. MUCH THOUGH WE MIGHT LIKE TO HAVE DELAYED OR AVOIDED AN ANSWER, LEAVING THE MATTER AS IT STOOD AFTER YOUR REMARKS TO HAIG, I DO NOT THINK THAT WE CAN DO SO NOW.

2. THE DIFFICULTIES FOR US IN ACCEPTING ARISE FROM THE ASSOCIATION WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND WITH AN AMERICAN REGIME THAT HAS BEEN LOOKING INCREASINGLY PRO-ISRAELI: AND THESE ARE PARTICULARLY WORRISOME WHEN YOU ARE HOPING TO HAVE DEALINGS WITH THE SAUDIS AND TO GET ON TO TERMS WITH ARAFAT. HOWEVER, THE DIFFICULTIES OF RESPONDING NEGATIVELY ARE WORTH ANALYSING, AS INDEED ARE THE ADVANTAGES OF PARTICIPATION, SEEN AT ANY RATE FROM HERE:
 - (A) THE EFFECT OF A NO ON THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS ETC WILL BE TO BLAME US IF BY CHANCE THE ISRAELIS DO NOT WITHDRAW, AND IN ANY CASE TO SAY THAT WE ARE MERELY READY TO PAY LIP SERVICE TO SUPPORT CAMP DAVID AND ARE NOT PREPARED TO DO SOMETHING THAT SHOULD ENSURE THE CONTINUED WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY.
 - (B) IF WE WERE INVOLVED IN THE FORCE WE WOULD BE PLAYING A PRACTICAL ROLE IN THE AREA, AND NOT SIMPLY GIVING ADVICE FROM THE SIDELINES. I THINK PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO GET A LITTLE SCEPTICAL ABOUT OUR CONTINUED RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL LINKS: OUR PAPER TIGER IMAGE IS LOOKING SOMEWHAT DOG-EARRED IF YOU WILL PERMIT THE MIXED METAPHOR.

(C) PRACTICAL INVOLVEMENT IN THIS FORCE SHOULD ENABLE US TO TAKE, WITHOUT INVOKING CRITICISM FROM HERE, A MORE FORWARD LINE WITH ARAFAT WITHOUT BEING ACCUSED OF ONE-SIDEDNESS. WE COULD DEMONSTRATE PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE AS EVIDENCE OF OUR BALANCED POLICY. WE COULD TURN IT TO ADVANTAGE IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS, HOWEVER MUCH WE KNOW IN PRACTICE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED US NOT TO HAVE BEEN IN THE FORCE: AND IF, AS I AM SURE YOU DO NOT, YOU HAVE NO INHIBITION ABOUT WORKING BOTH SIDES OF THE STREET, ISRAELI RELUCTANCE TO HAVE US IN MIGHT BE SUBTLY MADE KNOWN TO THE ARABS, WITH CONSEQUENT ADVANTAGE TO OURSELVES.

(D) PARTICIPATION AT U.S. REQUEST COULD GIVE US LEVERAGE IN WASHINGTON IN GENERAL: IN PARTICULAR IT WOULD HELP US TO PRESS THE AMERICANS TO LEAN ON THE ISRAELIS, ESSENTIAL IF THERE IS TO BE A SETTLEMENT.

3. THE ONLY WAY OF SQUARING THIS CIRCLE OF HARM TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS BY ACCEPTING OR HARM OR LOSS OF ADVANTAGE WITH THE AMERICANS BY REFUSING WOULD SEEM TO LIE IN RESPONDING POSITIVELY BUT WITH A QUALIFIED SUGGESTION. A LOT OF COURSE DEPENDS UPON WHETHER OR NOT OTHER EUROPEANS, PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS, WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE PART. WE ARE SURELY ENTITLED TO ASK THE AMERICANS TO HANDLE THIS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO INADVERTENT DAMAGE TO EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BASED ON THE VENICE DECLARATION. THEY ARE ASKING US TO DO SOMETHING THAT WE THINK CONFLICTS WITH OUR POLICIES: WE HAVE A RIGHT IN RETURN TO ASK THEM TO MAKE A COUNTERVAILING MOVE.

4. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO OFFER PARTICIPATION ON TERMS THAT WOULD, IF ACCEPTED BY THE AMERICANS, LIMIT DAMAGE WITH THE ARABS OR, IF REFUSED BY THE AMERICANS, WOULD JUSTIFY OUR FAILURE TO PARTICIPATE. THUS IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SUGGEST TO THE AMERICANS THAT WE WOULD BE READY TO RESPOND FAVOURABLY IF THE REQUEST WAS PUT TO US ON LINES SOMEWHAT AS FOLLOWS:

''THE UNITED STATES, ANXIOUS TO SECURE EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE, HAVE ASKED THE BRITISH (AND OTHER EUROPEAN) GOVERNMENT(S) TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION. IN DOING SO THEY ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEW WAYS THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE ADOPTING TO FURTHER PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (COMMENT: THIS IS IN KEEPING WITH THE LANGUAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER) INVOLVING, AS THESE EFFORTS DO, THE PROMOTION OF THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA''.

5. IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE TO GET THE AMERICANS TO ENDORSE THE SUBSTANCE OF ARTICLE IV OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. THIS RELATES TO MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS: SOME LANGUAGE MIGHT BE DEVISED THAT IN FACT REFLECTED THE FOLLOWING WORDING OF CAMP DAVID: '' THE SOLUTION FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ALSO RECOGNISE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THEIR JUST REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS WAY THE PALESTINIANS WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE....''. BUT IT MUST BE DRESSED UP IN SOME CONTEXT THAT WAS NOT ''CAMP DAVID''. IT HAS GOT TO BE SOMETHING THE ARABS CAN INTERPRET AS A STEP FORWARD. WHEN WE CAME TO EXPLAIN OUR ACTION, WE WOULD BASE OURSELVES ON THE VENICE DECLARATION AND SAY THAT WHAT WE WERE DOING WAS IN KEEPING WITH THAT. WE COULD WELL HINT TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES THAT THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE CONSTITUTED RECOGNITION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF ARTICLE IV OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. OBVIOUSLY ANY RESPONSE ON THESE LINES WILL NEED CONSULTATION WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS.

6. THERE MAY BE BETTER WAYS THAN THIS OF GETTING SOME QUID PRO QUO FOR OUR PARTICIPATION OR SOME WAY OF DILUTING THE DISADVANTAGES TO US IN THE ARAB CONTEXT. BUT MY MAIN PURPOSE IN TELEGRAPHING IS TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE SHADOWS INVOLVED IN REFUSAL AND THE GLEAM OF LIGHT THAT PARTICIPATION MIGHT CAST UPON US.

HENDERSON

SECRET

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Prime Minister

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FM FCO 011700Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MELBOURNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 139 OF 1 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

YOUR TELNOS 32 AND 33 AND PARIS TELNO 854: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN:

SINAI PEACEKEEPING FORCE: THE FRENCH.

1. ANDREANI, WHO WAS NOT AWARE OF DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED IN PARA 1 OF PARIS TUR, TOLD BULLARD TODAY THAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS THAT THEY WOULD WANT TO ACT BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE TEN IF THEY ACTED AT ALL. IF THERE WERE A CLEAR MOVEMENT AMONG THE ANGLO-SAXON COUNTRIES IN FAVOUR OF PARTICIPATION, FRANCE MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO GO ALONG WITH IT. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT APPROACH FROM THE UNITED STATES THAT HE KNEW OF.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

SECRET

FM PARIS 011500Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 854 OF 1 OCTOBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL MELBOURNE (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) ,

WASHINGTON

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From: Minister.
The former seems to
have for themselves in
a bit of a tangle and
not.
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UKDEL MELBOURNE TELNO 32 TO FCO: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN: SINAI PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

1. THE US EMBASSY HAS TOLD US THAT MR HAIG RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN HIS BILATERAL CONVERSATION WITH M. CHEYSSON IN NEW YORK ON 24 SEPTEMBER. MR HIG ENCOURAGED M. CHEYSSON TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE EGYPTIAN REQUEST FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF A FRENCH CONTINGENT. M. CHEYSSON DISPLAYED GREAT RELUCTANCE. HE WAS HOWEVER FINALLY BROUGHT TO CONCEDE THAT "THE DOOR WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLOSED" TO EVENTUAL FRENCH PARTICIPATION.

2. HUM'S LETTER OF 30 SEPTEMBER TO GREENSTOCK (NENAD) RECORDED REMARKS MADE IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) BY A MEMBER OF M. CHEYSSON'S CABINET IMPLYING THAT THE MINISTER HAD BEEN CAUGHT OFF GUARD BY THE EGYPTIAN REQUEST (MADE PERSONALLY BY BOUTROS GHALI AFTER THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING AT CANCUN IN EARLY AUGUST) AND HAD RESPONDED IN A MORE FORTHCOMING WAY THAN HE SUBSEQUENTLY CONSIDERED WISE. ACCORDING TO THIS VERSION OF EVENTS M. CHEYSSON TOLD BOUTROS GHALI THAT HE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE. HOWEVER THE OFFICIAL LINE SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN BY OTHER QUAI OFFICIALS WITH BOTH THIS EMBASSY AND THE US EMBASSY IS THAT M. CHEYSSON DID NO MORE THAN UNDERTAKE TO GIVE THE EGYPTIAN REQUEST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION, WHILE INDICATING THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ACCORDED HIGHER PRIORITY TO THEIR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION (SUCH AS LEBENON) AND WOULD DO NOTHING TO COMPROMISE THESE.

HIBBERT

NNNN

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification

Z

Department

SECRET

Drafted by
(Block Capitals) B J P FALL

TELEGRAM

Precedence

IMMEDIATE

Tel. Extn.

DESKBY FCO 010900 Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
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Despatched

(Date)

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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) SECRET

(Caveat/
Privacy Marking)

(Codeword)

(Deskby) FCO 010900 Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE DESKBY NEXT CONTACT: PARIS WASHINGTON

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

PS
PS/NO 10
Sir M Palliser
Sir R Armstrong

[TEXT]

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN: SINAI PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

1. MIFT contains text of a message received by the Prime Minister on 1 October via American channels.

2. We should be grateful for any background which you, Paris or Washington can provide on the reference in the last sentence of para 5 of the message to American support for the Egyptian request to the French Government. Have the Americans now approached the French and if so where and at what level? Grateful for anything you can find out about French reaction.

3. There is no need for Department to send us points in

Copies to:-

previous papers, but if they have further
thoughts in^{the}light of Reagan's message we shall
be glad to have them by early telegram.

DF 1/10

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

File No.

OUTWARD

Department

rafted by
(Block Capitals) R. M. J. LYNE

TELEGRAM

Tel. Extn.

Security Classification
SECRET
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY ECO 010900 Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
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Despatched

(Date)

(Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) SECRET

(Caveat/
Privacy Marking)

(Codeword)

(Deskby) ECO 010900 Z

TO IMMEDIATE ECO Tel. No. of
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AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE DESKBY PARIS, WASHINGTON
(NEXT CONTACT)

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REPEATED TO (for info) ~~IMMEDIATE DESKBY~~ ~~PARIS WASHINGTON~~

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Following from PRIVATE SECRETARY

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN: SINAI PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

1. See MIPT
2. /Insert A to B attached/

Copies to:-

SECRET

SUBJECT

1

cc Martopolps

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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T131A/8

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WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN.

/// B

SECRET

PART

6

ends:-

Melbourne to Washington Tel 1

1. 10. 81

PART

7

begins:-

Pres. USA to PM

T 133A/81