PART 8

Confidential Filing

The Situation in the Middle East

MIDDLE EAST

PART 1: May 1979

PART 8: Nov. 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~5.11.81~~		~~7.12.81~~					
~~12.11.81~~		~~18.11.81~~					
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PART 8 ends:-

UKdel Nato Tel 482 11.12.89

PART 9 begins:-

Paris Tel 1113 11.12.89

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC (81) 35th Conclusions, Minute 2	5.11.81
CC (81) 36th Conclusions, Minute 3	12.11.81
CC (81) 37th Conclusions, Minute 2	19.11.81
CC (81) 38th Conclusions, Minute 2	26.11.81
CC (81) 39th Conclusions, Minute 2	3.12.81
CC (81) 40th Conclusions, Minute 2	10.12.81

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed R Wayland Date 8 September 2011

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FM UKDEL NATO 111205Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 482 OF 11 DECEMBER 1981,
INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS) WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, TEL AVIV,
INFO PRIORITY (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS) OTHER EC POSTS, CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA, DAMASCUS.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

BILATERAL BREAKFAST WITH MR HAIG: SINAI MFO.

1. HAIG SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO THANK LORD CARRINGTON FORMALLY FOR WHAT HE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD DONE IN A MATTER WHICH HE KNEW HAD BEEN VERY DISAGREEABLE FOR BRITAIN. THE CONCLUSION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT LORD CARRINGTON'S EFFORTS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROPOSED REPLY BY THE FOUR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO SHAMIR'S LETTER WAS QUOTE RIGHT ON THE MARK UNQUOTE AND HE HAD URGED CHEYSSON TO ACCEPT IT. IF ISRAEL CONTINUED TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES THE UNITED STATES WOULD QUOTE BE DOWN ON HER WITH BOTH FEET UNQUOTE. HAIG ADDED THAT NOTHING WAS MORE INSIDIOUS THAN SOME ISRAELI OPERATIONS. IF LORD CARRINGTON WAS THE CURRENT ISRAELI BOGEYMAN, HAIG HIMSELF HAD SUFFERED TOO IN THE PAST.

2. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HE HOPED THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING. HE WAS IN NO WAY OPPOSED TO AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING CAMP DAVID, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT CAMP DAVID WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH.

3. HAIG SAID HE HOPED IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL AND THAT THIS WOULD NEVER BE OTHERWISE. LORD CARRINGTON COMMENTED THAT THE UNITED STATES NEEDED TO HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH EVERY COUNTRY IN THE AREA.

ROSE.

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FM AMMAN 101315Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 485 OF 10 DEC

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, PRIORITY ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG ROME UKREP BRUSSELS BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS.

YOUR TELNO 219 TO UKDEL NATO: FRENCH POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE END OF THIS MORNING IN MY CAPACITY AS PRESIDENCY REPRESENTATIVE. MR QASEM SAID HE WISHED TO EXPRESS FORMALLY THE SHOCK AND DISMAY WHICH REPORTS OF RECENT FRENCH STATEMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST HAD CAUSED IN JORDAN. HE WAS SEEKING THROUGH THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN PARIS (THERE IS NO FRENCH AMBASSADOR HERE AT PRESENT), AND WAS ALSO FORMALLY ASKING BRITAIN IN HER PRESIDENCY ROLE FOR AN OFFICIAL TEXT OF:

A. WHAT M. CHEYSSON HAD ACTUALLY SAID TO THE PRESS IN ISRAEL (I TOLD QASEM THAT WE, LIKE THE JORDANIANS, HAD SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN A TEXT: QASEM SAID HE WAS RELUCTANT TO JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT SEEING THE PRECISE WORDS USED BY M. CHEYSSON, BUT SEE PARAGRAPH 2 BELOW) SEMICLN

B. COMMENTS BY THE FRENCH OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN ON M. CHEYSSON'S REMARKS SEMICLN

C. PRESIDENT MITTERAND'S LATEST COMMENTS TO THE MEDIA ON THE MIDDLE EAST, OF WHICH REPORTS ARE CARRIED IN THE JORDANIAN PRESS TODAY.

2. QASEM WENT ON TO SPEAK AT LENGTH ON THE UNBALANCED NATURE OF RECENT FRENCH STATEMENTS, WHICH SEEMED TO LAY THE EMPHASIS ENTIRELY ON ISRAEL'S NEED FOR SECURE BOUNDARIES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OR TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS: THE FACT OF THE MATTER WAS THAT SINCE 1948 ISRAEL HAD EXPANDED HER TERRITORY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ARABS, NOT THE OTHER WAY ROUND. COMMENTS BY M. CHEYSSON WHICH SEEMED PARTICULARLY TO HAVE GOT UNDER QASEM'S SKIN INCLUDED HIS ASSERTION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WOULD STAND BY ISRAEL IF ATTACKED. QASEM SAID THAT THE ARABS HAD THE RIGHT TO EXPECT SOMETHING BETTER FROM THE FRENCH, BOTH AS A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BY COMMENTS OF THIS KIND, THE FRENCH WERE PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE MORE EXTREME ARAB STATES, WERE DESTROYING THE POSITION OF THE ARAB MODERATES AND WERE JEOPARDISING ANY PROSPECT OF FUTURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA SEMICLN

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SUCH ONE-SIDED REMARKS WERE DISASTROUS BOTH FOR THE MAJORITY OF ARAB STATES AND FOR THE EUROPEANS THEMSELVES. THERE WAS MUCH MORE IN THE SAME VEIN, AND QASEM RECALLED WITH SOME BITTERNESS THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY TAKEN THE LEAD AT THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING PRIOR TO THE FEZ SUMMIT IN HEADING OFF THE DEMANDS OF EXTREMIST ARAB STATES FOR STRONG MEASURES AGAINST EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE SINAI MFO.

3. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ENDED BY ASKING AGAIN FOR IMMEDIATE CLARIFICATION ON:

A. WHAT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE NOW WAS ON THE MAIN QUESTIONS AT ISSUE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SEMICLN

B. WHAT THE EUROPEAN POSITION WAS IN REGARD TO WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BY FRENCH LEADERS IN RECENT DAYS.

4. QASEM SAID THAT HE WOULD BE INFORMING THE PRESS OF HIS DEMARCHE TO ME THIS MORNING AND OF THE REQUESTS HE WAS PUTTING BOTH TO BRITAIN AS THE PRESIDENCY AND TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT (IN DOING THIS HE MAY PARTLY BE RESPONDING TO LOCAL PRESS COMMENT: SEE MY TELNO 484 WHICH I AM NOW REPEATING TO UKDEL NATO). HE ALSO SAID HE INTENDED SEEING THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DURING HER VISIT TO JORDAN, WHICH STARTS THIS EVENING, AND WOULD CONVEY TO MME VEIL IN STRONG TERMS JORDANIAN DISLIKE OF RECENT FRENCH STATEMENTS.

5. I DID WHAT I COULD TO ALLAY QASEM'S EVIDENT ANXIETY ABOUT EUROPEAN MIDDLE EAST POLICY, SAYING THAT YOU WERE SEEING M. CHEYSSON IN BRUSSELS AND ALSO THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD RECENTLY SENT A MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN REAFFIRMING OUR RESOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION AND TO THE PURSUIT OF AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER ON 12 DECEMBER, WHEN THE KING RETURNS FROM AQABA WHERE HE HAS BEEN RECEIVING KING JUAN CARLOS OF SPAIN). AS A PARTING SHOT, QASEM RECALLED IRONICALLY THAT WHEN M. CHEYSSON HAD VISITED JORDAN IN AUGUST, HE HAD SHOWN A MARKED TENDENCY TO MAKE EXAGGERATEDLY PRO-ARAB REMARKS PUBLICLY AND THAT QASEM HIMSELF HAD HAD TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT THERE WERE LIKELY TO BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 563 OF 9 DECEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME, THE HAGUE
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTHER EC POSTS
MIPT: SINAI FORCE

1. FOLLOWING IS REVISED TEXT:

BEGINS. I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER OF 3 DECEMBER. I NOTE THE VIEWS OF THE US AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS EXPRESSED IN THE STATEMENT WHICH WAS PUBLISHED ON 3 DECEMBER, A COPY OF WHICH YOU ENCLOSED.

2. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS INVITED BY THE US GOVERNMENT, WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI IN A LETTER FROM MR HAIG TO ME OF 2 SEPTEMBER. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S FORMAL REPLY TO THIS REQUEST, EXPRESSING READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORCE, WAS CONVEYED IN MY LETTER TO MR HAIG OF 21 NOVEMBER, OF WHICH I SENT YOU A COPY UNDER COVER OF MY LETTER OF 22 NOVEMBER. OUR AGREEMENT WAS MADE PUBLIC IN A STATEMENT OF 23 NOVEMBER. I SUBSEQUENTLY WROTE TO MR HAIG ON 26 NOVEMBER A LETTER THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS AGREED WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS. IN IT I CONFIRMED AS THE JOINT US-ISRAEL STATEMENT NOTES, THAT QUOTE NEITHER THE FOUR NOR THE TEN HAVE ANY INTENTION OF SEEKING TO PUT ANY GLOSS ON THE VARIOUS AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL, STILL LESS ON THE EGYPT/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY ITSELF .... WE ALL RECOGNISE THAT THE FUNCTION OF THE MFO IS AS DEFINED IN THE RELEVANT EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI AGREEMENTS, NO MORE AND NO LESS ..... WE HAVE ATTACHED NO POLITICAL CONDITIONS, LINKED TO VENICE OR OTHERWISE, TO OUR PARTICIPATION. WE COULD NOT OF COURSE ACCEPT AN ISRAELI CONDITION THAT WOULD PREVENT US FROM PURSUING OUR OWN WIDER

MIDDLE EAST POLICY.UNQUOTE THAT REMAINS THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS AS APPROPRIATE THE VARIOUS LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT ARISE AND UPON WHICH AGREEMENT WILL BE NECESSARY. ENDS

CARRINGTON

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FROM FCO 092001Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 562 OF 9 DECEMBER.

AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME, THE HAGUE.

REPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTHER EC POSTS.

SINAI FORCE.

1. AS HAIG IS DUE IN ISRAEL THIS COMING WEEKEND AND REGARDS HIS VISIT AS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE AN END TO THESE EXCHANGES, THE AMERICANS ARE PRESSING US FOR A RESPONSE TO THE US-ISRELI STATEMENT. THE FRENCH, ALONE OF THE THREE, HAVE NOT YET REPLIED.

2. A COMMON POSITION AMONG THE FOUR MAY BE EASIER TO ESTABLISH ON THE BASIS OF ONE OR TWO AMANDMENTS TO THE DRAFT TEXT GIVEN IN MY TELNO 547. IN PARTICULAR, THE FRENCH SHOULD BE CONTENT WITH THE PROPOSAL (FROM THE DUTCH) TO OMIT THE WORDS QUOTE WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FORCE UNQUOTE IN THE LAST SENTENCE. THIS ALLOWS THE FOUR GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND CAN BE EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICANS IN TERMS OF THE NEED FOR A SPEEDY RESPONSE. THE WORDS QUOTE AS APPROPRIATE UNQUOTE COULD BE SUBSTITUTED.

3. THE OTHER AMENDMENTS ARE:
(A) THE INSERTION OF THE WORDS QUOTE AS THE JOINT US-ISRAELI STATEMENT NOTES UNQUOTE IN THE PASSAGE DESCRIBING MY LETTER OF 26 NOVEMBER TO HAIG, WHICH ADDS NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE BUT OFFERS A NOTE OF REASSURANCE TO THE ISRAELIS: AND

(B) THE ADDITION OF TWO FUTHER SENTENCES FROM PARARAPH 4 OF MY LETTER OF 26 NOVEMBER WHICH REFER TO OUR WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT SETTING CONDITIONS (QUOTE WE HAVE ATTACHED.... MIDDLE EAST POLICY). THE FIRST IS AS PROPOSED BY VELIOTES (WASHINGTON TELNO 3704). THE SECOND IS AN ESSENTIAL BALANCE TO IT, WITHOUT WHICH THE IMPRESSION WILL BE LEFT THAT WE ARE DISTANCING OURSELVES FROM VENICE. EITHER BOTH THESE SENTENCES SHOULD BE ADDED OR NEITHER.

4. FULL REVISED TEXT OF DRAFT REPLY IS IN MIFT. PLEASE SEEK EARLY COMMENTS FROM THE THREE.

CARRINGTON.

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FROM TEL AVIV 090840Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE (DESKBY 091000Z) FCO

TELNO 482 OF 9 SEPTEMBER 81

INFO IMMEDIATE (DESKBY 091000Z) UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) AND PARIS

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROUTINE AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA AND UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING CG JERUSALEM.

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

1. M CHEYSSON'S ONE-DAY VISIT HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED BY THE PRESS. THE ISRAELIS ARE OVERJOYED AT THE LINE HE TOOK, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE VENICE DECLARATION BEING OVERTAKEN (DEPASSE) (LAST WORD UNDERLINED) AND FRENCH UNWILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT ANY FURTHER MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE BY THE COMMUNITY.

2. BEFORE HE LEFT YESTERDAY CHEYSSON GAVE A BRIEFING AT THE AIRPORT TO COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WERE AT PAINS TO SHOW THAT RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL SHOULD NOW BE REGARDED AS NORMAL AGAIN. PRESIDENT MITTERAND WOULD BE COMING HERE ON 10 FEBRUARY. THERE WOULD BE OTHER MINISTERIAL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. HE HIMSELF HAD HAD 5 HOURS OF TALKS WITH THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER. FRANCE WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH SIDES IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. HE HOPED THE ANOMALY OF YEARS OF COOLNESS AND MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN FRANCE AND ISRAEL WAS NOW A THING OF THE PAST.

3. HE HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS OF THE FRENCH VIEW THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN BY SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS. THERE WAS NO PLACE FOR FRANCE, THE COMMUNITY, THE UNITED STATES OR ANYONE ELSE TO LAY DOWN A DETAILED PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE AREA. THIS SHOULD BE FOR THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TO WORK OUT. BUT HE HAD REMINDED SHAMIR THAT THE COMMUUWTY WAS AN INTERESTED OUTSIDER AND WAS ENTITLED TO ITS THOUGHTS AND IDEAS ABOUT THE WAY FORWARD, FRANCE FOR EXAMPLE HAD FOUND THE FAHD EIGHT POINTS QUOTE INTERESTING UNQUOTE.

4. THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR SINAI HAD ONLY BEEN BRIEFLY DISCUSSED. THE ISRAELIS HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT IF THE EUROPEANS JOINED THE FORCE WELL AND GOOD, BUT IT WOULD BE NO GREAT LOSS IF THEY DID NOT. THE FRENCH HAD EARNED CREDIT HERE FOR OFFERING TO PARTICIPATE.

5. CHEYSSON SAID THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN REASSURING OVER THEIR INTENTIONS ON WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. THEY HAD REITERATED THAT THEY WOULD HONOUR THEIR UNDERTAKINGS. CHEYSSON TOLD US THAT HE WAS STRUCK HOWEVER BY ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON THE NEED TO ALLOW TIME (A YEAR, TWO YEARS, THREE YEARS) FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF FINAL WITHDRAWAL TO SINK IN AFTER NEXT APRIL. THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE WAS THAT THEY WOULD REFUSE TO BE HUSTLED QUICKLY INTO ANY NEW MOVE.

6. ONE SUBJECT ON WHICH CHEYSSON AND SHAMIR HAD DISAGREED WAS IN THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE PALESTINAIANS. CHEYSSON HAD MADE CLEAR THE FRENCH VIEW THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WERE ENTITLED TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND A HOMELAND (PATRIE) (LAST WORD UNDERLINED).

7. THE VEBANON HAD SCARCELY LREN LIVERED IN HIS TALKS, AT ANY RATE LESS THAN HE WOULD EAVE LIKED. NOR HAD FRENCH ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL BEEN DISCUSSED. HE HAD MERELY EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY ABSOLUTE BAR TO SUCH SALES.

8. I TOLD M CHEYSSON THAT HE WAS BEING REPORTED BY THE BBC AS HAVING CALLED THE VENICE DECLARATION ABSURD. WAS THIS CORRECT? HE DENIED THAT HE HAD USED ANY SUCH PHRASE. HE HAD HOWEVER MADE THE POINT THAT IT WOULD BE ABSURD FOR ANYONE TO PORTRAY THE VENICE DECLARATION AS BEING HOSTILE TO EGYPTIAN OR AMERICAN EFFORTS AT PEACEMAKING (BY WHICH I TOOK HIM TO MEAN CAMP DAVID).

9. THERE IS OF COURSE MUCH SPECULATION HERE AS TO HOW THE CHEYSSON VISIT MAY AFFECT THE POSITION OF FRANCE'S PARTNERS ON THE MIDDLE EAST INCLUDING VENICE. IN ANSWER TO ENQUIRIES I AM TAKING THE LINE THAT COMMUNITY POLICY REMAINS AS STATED AND THAT ANY CHANGE WOULD BE A MATTER FOR THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE. AN EDITORIAL IN TODAY'S ''JERUSALEM POST'' SUGGESTS THAT CHEYSSON'S NEW APPROACH SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY SIMILAR SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE PART OF OTHER EUROPEANS AND BRITAINS IN PARTICULAR.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1Ø9Ø OF Ø9 DECEMBER 1981
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND ALL EC POSTS
INFO SAVING TO BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA CAIRO

MY TEL NO 1Ø89: FRANCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. THE NEW SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE QUAI D'ORSAY, M FRANCIS GUTMANN, WAS GUEST TODAY AT MY MONTHLY LUNCH FOR THE COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS. I HAD ARRANGED FOR THE QUAI TO BE WARNED THIS MORNING THAT M CHEYSSON'S VISIT TO ISRAEL WAS SURE TO BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION.

2. M GUTMANN'S OPENING POSITION WAS THAT NOTHING HAD CHANGED AND THERE WAS REALLY NOTHING TO EXPLAIN. THE PRESS HAD GOT HOLD OF THE WRONG END OF THE STICK AND THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY FOR PARTNERS IN ACCOMMODATING THEMSELVES TO WHAT M CHEYSSON HAD SAID. ACCORDING TO M GUTMANN, THE MINISTER HAD IN FACT UPHELD EVERY PRINCIPLE WHICH WAS DEAR TO THE TEN AND CONFUSION WAS BEING CAUSED BY SIMPLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF CERTAIN WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS.

BY SIMPLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF CERTAIN WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS.

3. I TOLD THE GROUP THAT I HAD PASSED TO M CHEYSSON'S CABINET AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM YOU TO THE EFFECT THAT YOU HOPED THAT M CHEYSSON WOULD BE READY, WHEN HE ARRIVED IN BRUSSELS THIS EVENING, TO GIVE YOU AND THOSE OF HIS COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES WHO WERE PRESENT THERE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF FRENCH POLICY IN RELATION TO ISRAEL AND THE ARABS AT THE PRESENT TIME. M GUTMANN OBSERVED THAT HE COULD IMAGINE THAT THERE MIGHT BE A CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT IN BRUSSELS BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANY NEED FOR DISCUSSION. HE SAID HE WAS SURE THAT UNDER BRITISH CHAIRMANSHIP ANY DIFFICULTIES WHICH MIGHT EXIST WOULD SOON BE RESOLVED. I SAID THAT I TOO WAS AN OPTIMIST AS REGARDS BRITISH CHAIRMANSHIP, BUT NEVERTHELESS THERE WAS SOME HARD WORK OF CLARIFICATION WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE.

4. VARIOUS OF MY COLLEAGUES JOINED IN, NOTABLY THE GERMAN, ITALIAN AND NETHERLANDS AMBASSADORS, WITH SOME SUPPORT FROM THE BELGIAN LUXEMBOURG AND GREEK AMBASSADORS. THE POINT WAS MADE THAT EVERY GOVERNMENT HAD ITS PUBLIC OPINION TO DEAL WITH AND IT WAS NOT GOING TO BE EASY TO CONVINCE THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION THAT THE SITUATION WAS UNCHANGED AND THAT THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FRANCE AND HER PARTNERS. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT ABOUT DIFFICULTIES WITH PUBLIC OPINION, THE NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE PRECARIOUS UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT AND THE GREEK AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE DANGERS OF DOWNGRADING A PIECE OF THE TEN'S ACQUIS, IN THE FORM OF THE VENICE DECLARATION, WHEN THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD ACCEPTED IT AS ACQUIS RATHER THAN OUT OF DEEP CONVICTION.

5. AS THE DISCUSSION PROCEEDED M GUTMANN RETREATED TO SEMANTIC SUBTLETIES. THE VENICE TEXT WAS A DECLARATION AND NOT AN INITIATIVE AND M CHEYSSON HAD THEREFORE NOT BEEN SAYING THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING WRONG WITH IT OR THAT THERE COULD NOT BE SIMILAR POLICY STATEMENTS BY THE TEN IN THE FUTURE. HE HAD INTENDED TO CONVEY ONLY THAT THE TEN AND OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS COULD NOT IMPOSE SETTLEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS REGARDS M CHEYSSON'S COMMENT THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION WAS DEPASSE, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT HE HAD SAID DEPASSE (OUT OF DATE) AND NOT PERIME (INVALIDATED). EVERYTHING MOVED ON IN THE WORLD AND THE VENICE DECLARATION WAS NOT AS FRESH AS VARIOUS RECENT EVENTS. M CHEYSSON HAD CERTAINLY NOT SAID THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION WAS ABSURD OR THAT ANYTHING IN IT WAS ABSURD, ONLY THAT IT WOULD BE ABSURD OF ISRAEL TO REGARD IT AS A HOSTILE

VENICE DECLARATION WAS ABSURD OR THAT ANYTHING IN IT WAS ABSURD, ONLY THAT IT WOULD BE ABSURD OF ISRAEL TO REGARD IT AS A HOSTILE MEASURE.

6. THE ASSEMBLED AMBASSADORS COMBINED THEIR EFFORTS TO POINT OUT TO M GUTMANN THAT EVEN IF IT WAS AGREED AMONG THE TEN THAT IN ESSENCE NOTHING WAS CHANGED, THERE WAS STILL AN ACUTE DIFFICULTY IN EXPLAINING THE SITUATION TO THE PRESS AND PUBLIC. M GUTMANN SAID THAT THE FRENCH SIDE WOULD OF COURSE PLAY ITS PART IN MAKING THE NECESSARY EXPLANATIONS.

7. AT ONE STAGE HE WAS INCLINED TO BELITTLE THE VENICE DECLARATION, SAYING THAT IT DID NOT MEAN MUCH AND HAD NOT HAD ANY EFFECT. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT THE VALUE OF SUCH DECLARATIONS WAS. SEVERAL OF US ANSWERED HIS RHETORICAL QUESTION BY EXPLAINING THE GRADUAL PROCESSES OF POLITICAL COOPERATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT UNDERMINING THE SLOW STEP-BY-STEP BUILD-UP OF EUROPEAN POSITIONS. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ON THIS SUBJECT.

8. THE BENELUX AMBASSADORS BROUGHT IN THE QUESTION OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE FOUR TO THE MULTI-LATERAL FORCE IN SINAI. M GUTMANN TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS TO SAY HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR FRANCE TO AVOID ANY ENDORSEMENT OF THE US/ISRAELI INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE FOUR WERE ACTING. HE TRIED TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT OTHERS, AND PARTICULARLY THE UK, WERE IMPRUDENTLY ANXIOUS TO SAY MORE THAN WAS DESIRABLE. I TOOK HIM UP ON THIS AND SAID THAT NONE OF THE FOUR HAD ANY WISH TO ENDORSE THE ISRAELI INTERPRETATION, BUT SOMETHING WAS GOING TO HAVE TO BE SAID AND THE PROBLEM WAS, AS USUAL, TO FIND AN EXACT FORM OF WORDS IN MULTI-PARTITE CONSULTATION.

9. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT, M GUTMANN ASSURED THE AMBASSADORS THAT HE WOULD TELL M CHEYSSON OF THE GENERAL FEELING WHICH HE HAD ENCOUNTERED THAT SOME SORT OF CLARIFICATION WAS REQUIRED.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1Ø89 OF 9 DECEMBER 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) PRIORITY
TEL AVIV WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN
THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG ROME UKREP BRUSSELS ATHENS
INFO SAVING BEIRUT DAMASCUS JEDDA CAIRO

MY TELNO 1Ø82 AND YOUR TELNO 56Ø (NOT TO ALL): CHEYSSON IN ISRAEL

1. LUCET (DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST) TELEPHONED THIS MORNING (9DECEMBER) TO SAY THAT NO OFFICIAL TEXT OF M. CHEYSSON'S REMARKS AFTER THE DINNER WAS YET AVAILABLE BUT THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT IN SOME RESPECTS THE AGENCY REPORTS WERE MISLEADING. IN PARTICULAR:

A) M. CHEYSSON HAD NOT REPEAT NOT SAID THAT THE VENICE DECLARATION WAS ''ABSURD''. HE HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE ABSURD FOR THE ISRAELIS TO REGARD VENICE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR AGAINST THEM. HE HAD SAID THAT VENICE WAS ''OVERTAKEN'' BECAUSE OF NEW ELEMENTS, NOTABLY EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI PEACE FORCE AND THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT THE PALESTINIANS OUGHT TO HAVE A HOMELAND WITH ''STATE STRUCTURES''.

AND THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT THE PALESTINIANS OUGHT TO HAVE A HOMELAND WITH ''STATE STRUCTURES''.

B) M. CHEYSSON HAD NOT SAID THAT THE TEN HAD NO ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE HAS SAID THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR THE TEN TO TRY TO IMPOSE AN INITIATIVE ON THE BELLIGERENTS, BUT THEY HAD EVERY RIGHT, GIVEN THEIR INTERESTS IN THE AREA, TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO HELP THE BELLIGERENTS TO MAKE PROGRESS.

2. LUCET SAID THAT NONE OF THIS CONSTITUTED A DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS FRENCH POLICY.

3. THE FRENCH MORNING PRESS TODAY (9 DECEMBER) SEEMS TO BASE ITS REPORTS MORE ON ISRAELI THAN FRENCH SOURCES WITH EXTENSIVE QUOTATIONS FROM MR SHAMIR'S SPEECH BUT NOTHING SPECIFIC FROM M. CHEYSSON'S. THE GENERAL TENDENCY IN THE PRESS HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT APPREHENSIVELY TO TRY TO EXPLAIN AWAY WHAT M. CHEYSSON HAS SAID, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING IN SOME CASES THAT ON THE FACE OF IT M. CHEYSSON HAS OPERATED A SPECTACULAR SWITCH IN FRENCH POLICY. MOST PAPERS PUT THE EMPHASIS ON THE IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ONLY LE QUOTIDIEN POINTS OUT THE CONTRADICTIONS IN M. CHEYSSON'S POSITION, COMMENTING THAT HAVING GONE SO FAR IN ISRAEL'S DIRECTION M. CHEYSSON MIGHT HAVE TO GO EQUALLY FAR IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION WHEN HE NEXT VISITED AN ARAB COUNTRY. THIS AFTERNOON'S LE MONDE SITS ON THE FENCE.

4. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A FULL AND RELIABLE TEXT OF M. CHEYSSON'S WORDS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE FROM FRENCH SOURCES. THE QUAI IS OBVIOUSLY UNDER ORDERS TO EVACUATE WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT IT IS DODGING SO AN UNTENABLE POSITION. AS SEEN FROM HERE IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT M. CHEYSSON, ANXIOUS ABOVE ALL TO IMPROVE FRENCH AND HIS OWN RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL (PARTLY FOR INTERNAL SOCIALIST PARTY REASONS), AND INDULGING HIS VICE OF ORAL IMPROVISATION, TRIED TO BE CLEVER AND ''INDEPENDENT'' BY GOING BEYOND VENICE. IN DOING THIS HE WAS STRETCHING MORE THAT USUAL THE LICENCE WHICH THE FRENCH HABITUALLY ALLOW THEMSELVES WITH REGARD TO ANY JOINT POSITION OF THE TEN (OR FOR THAT MATTER OF ANY OTHER GROUP TO WHICH FRANCE BELONGS). BUT THE PLOY HAS GIVEN A FINE OPPORTUNITY TO THE ISRAELIS, HELPED BY AN INTERNATIONAL PRESS EVER-EAGER FOR DRAMATIC CONFRONTATIONS, TO TRY TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE REST OF THE TEN. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE QUAI SHOULD NOW BE PRETENDING THAT NO CHANGE HAS OCCURED AS FRANCE'S DEPENDENCE ON ARAB OIL AND MARKETS

SURPRISING THAT THE QUAI SHOULD NOW BE PRETENDING THAT NO CHANGE HAS OCCURED AS FRANCE'S DEPENDENCE ON ARAB OIL AND MARKETS REMAINS UNDIMINISHED. THE ARABS WILL NO DOUBT BE READY WITH THEIR OWN REMEDIES IF FRENCH EXPLANATIONS OF M. CHEYSSON'S REMARKS FAIL TO CONVINCE THEM (ONE OBVIOUS ONE WOULD BE TO BUY HAWK INSTEAD OF ALPHA JET).

5. YOUR ORAL MESSAGE (TELEPHONED TO ME BY THE PUS) THAT YOU WOULD BE GLAD IF M. CHEYSSON WOULD COME TO BRUSSELS LATER TODAY PREPARED TO GIVE A CLEAR EXPLANATION OF FRENCH POLICY, SO THAT YOU AND, IF HE WISHES, HE CAN MAKE SOME REASONALBE PUBLIC STATEMENT, HAS BEEN PASSED TO M. CHEYSSON'S CABINET. THEY SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN M. CHEYSSON'S INTENTION TO BRIEF HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES IN BRUSSELS ON HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH HE HAD OALREADY OF COURSE BRIEFED COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS BEFORE LEAVING ISRAEL (TEL AVIV TELNO 482 TO FCO).

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

HIBBERT

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SENT/RECD AT ⌀9164⌀Z GDS/DP

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FROM FCO 041730 DECEMBER 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1879 OF 7 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK.
SINAI: OUR TELNOS 547 AND 548 TO PARIS AND TELECON GREENSTOCK/GOULTY

1. I HAVE SEEN THE PROPOSED US FORMULA FOR A EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE US/ISRAELI STATEMENT. THE US EMBASSY HERE AGREED NOT TO MAKE A FORMAL APPROACH TO US HAVING HEARD THAT WE ALREADY HAD THE FORMULA BUT HAD ALREADY PROPOSED A DRAFT REPLY TO OUR THREE EUROPEAN PARTNERS. YOU SHOULD THANK THE AMERICANS FOR THEIR SUGGESTION BUT EXPLAIN TO THEM THAT WE ARE CONCERTING A RESPONSE WITH OUR THREE EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND HAVE SUGGESTED A LINE WHICH THE FOUR OF US MIGHT TAKE IN REPLY TO MR SHAMIR'S MESSAGES. YOU SHOULD NOT GIVE THE AMERICANS THE TEXT, EXPLAINING THAT IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO DO SO WHILE IT IS UNDER DISCUSSION WITHIN THE FOUR, BUT YOU MAY GIVE THEM AN INDICATION OF ITS GENERAL LINES. (AS WE HAVE DONE WITH US EMBASSY HERE).
2. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT I CONTINUE TO WISH TO AVOID FURTHER COMPLICATIONS OVER THIS ISSUE. I AM READY TO DO MY BEST TO MEET LEGITIMATE ISRAELI POINTS AND BELIEVE THAT WITH A LITTLE GOOD WILL WE CAN NOW WRAP UP THIS PROBLEM. BUT I AM DISAPPOINTED BY THE ISRAELI REQUEST TO US FOR CONFIRMATION OF OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, DESPITE THE ASSURANCES WE RECEIVED FROM THE AMERICANS TO THE CONTRARY. I HOPE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL BE PREPARED TO DO THEIR UTMOST, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THESE ASSURANCES, TO ENSURE THT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT REACT TO OUR EVENTUAL REPLY IN A WAY WHICH WOULD CAUSE A FURTHER DAMAGING ROW.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3704 OF 7 DECEMBER 1981,
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, ROUTINE TO OTHER E C POSTS,
TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK CAIRO.

YOUR TELNO 1879: SINAI

1. FRETWELL SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO VELIOTES AND EXPLAINED THE GENERAL LINES OF THE DRAFT REPLY TO SHAMIR.

2. VELIOTES EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE COULD INCORPORATE IN OUR QUOTATION FROM YOUR MESSAGE TO HAIG OF 26 NOVEMBER THE STATEMENT THAT QUOTE WE HAVE ATTACHED NO POLITICAL CONDITIONS, LINKED WITH VENICE OR OTHERWISE, TO OUR PARTICIPATION UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL BOTH TO JUSTIFY THE ACCOUNT THE AMERICANS HAD GIVEN THE ISRAELIS OF THAT MESSAGE, REFLECTED IN THE U S/ISRAELI JOINT STATEMENT, AND BECAUSE IT WAS A POINT OF IMPORTANCE FOR THE ISRAELIS.

3. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD CERTAINLY DO THEIR BEST TO WARD OFF A DAMAGING ISRAELI REACTION TO OUR EVENTUAL REPLY. HE NOTED THAT HAIG WOULD BE IN ISRAEL ON 13 DECEMBER.

HENDERSON.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 795 OF 07 DEC

INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, UKREP BRUSSELS, RABAT, CAIRO, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, ALL OTHER EC POSTS.

INFO SAVING MOSCOW AND ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

MY TELNO 793: FEZ SUMMIT AND THE 8 POINT PLAN

1. THIS LOOKS LIKE A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE MFA AND FAHD: I.E. THE MFA HAVE GONE ALONG WITH THE CONTINUATION OF THE PLAN BUT HAVE PRESUADED FAHD TO LET SAUDI ARABIA STEP OUT OF THE LIMELIGHT. TO SOME EXTENT IT HAS OVERTAKEN THE RECOMMENDATION IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 790 (NOT TO ALL) IN SO FAR AS WE NOW KNOW THAT THE MODERATE ARABS INTEND TO PERSEVERE.

2. BUT WE STILL DO NOT KNOW FOR CERTAIN WHETHER FAHD REMAINS ENTHUSIASTIC AND IS BEING HELD BACK SOMEWHAT BY THE MFA SEMICOLON OR WHETHER HE IS FEELING RELIEVED THAT THE CUP HAS PASSED FROM HIM (AS MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE THINKS). AND WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE MFA'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM IS SHARED BY PRINCE SAUD HIMSELF. SO I STILL SEE ADVANTAGE IN SENDING OUT A PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE WITH MR HURD SO AS TO EXPLORE FURTHER HOW FAR THE SAUDIS' HEARTS ARE IN THE PLAN AND HOW FIRMLY THEY WILL PERSIST IF OPPOSITION CONTINUES, WHETHER INSIDE THE KINGDOM OR AMONG OTHER ARAB STATES. A VISIT BY MR HURD WOULD HAVE THE OTHER ADVANTAGE OF MAKING A PUBLIC GESTURE OF CONTINUED EUROPEAN INTEREST, PARTICULARLY IF HIS VISIT WAS ENDORSED BY THE COMMUNITY AND HE CAME IN A PRESIDENTIAL ROLE.

3. I FLOATED THIS IDEA AT A MEETING OF COMMUNITY HEADS OF MISSION ON 6 DECEMBER, POINTING OUT THAT SINCE THE SAUDIS HAD ADOPTED ARGUMENTS SUGGESTED TO THEM BY EUROPE (PARA 4 OF MY TUR) WE HAD AN OBLIGATION, AS WELL AS AN INTEREST, TO SUPPORT THEM. THE GERMAN WAS STRONGLY IN FAVOUR. THE FRENCHMAN WAS ABSENT. THE REST, AS USUAL, WERE EITHER SILENT OR SAID THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENTS BEFORE EXPRESSING A VIEW.

4. THE GERMAN SUGGESTED THAT THE SAUDIS WERE OVER-OPTIMISTIC IF THEY REALLY THOUGHT THAT 15 ARAB STATES WOULD SUPPORT THE 8 POINTS SEMICOLON HE INSTANCED MAURETANIA. THOUGH I KNOW NOTHING OF THE MAURETANIAN ATTITUDE, I THINK HE IS PROBABLY RIGHT. ANOTHER QUESTION TO EXPLORE WITH THE SAUDIS?

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

CRAIG

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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file

PM/East

7 December 1981

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN

I enclose a copy of a letter from the Minister in the U.S. Embassy under cover of which he forwarded a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan. A copy of the latter is also enclosed.

The Prime Minister has seen and noted President Reagan's message. As you will see, it is a reply to earlier messages from Mrs. Thatcher. It does not appear to require a reply.

A. J. COLES

CS

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

File

857

7 December 1981

Thank you for your letter of 4 December enclosing a message from President Reggan to the Prime Minister. This has been brought to the Prime Minister's attention.

A. J. COLES

The Honourable Edward J. Streator.

GRS 1200
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FM JEDDA 061035Z DEC 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 793 OF 06 DEC
INFO UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, RABAT, CAIRO, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, ALL OTHER EC POSTS

INFO SAVING MOSCOW AND ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

THE FEZ SUMMIT AND THE EIGHT POINT PLAN.

1. I WAS SUMMONED YESTERDAY BY THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, TOGETHER WITH MY FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES. WHEN I QUERIED THIS RATHER CURIOUS SELECTION OF AMBASSADORS IT TURNED OUT THAT MANSOURI WAS INTENDING TO ADDRESS ''THE MOST IMPORTANT'' OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMUNITY. I EXPLAINED MATTERS TO HIM AND IT WAS AGREED THAT I WOULD SUMMON ALL THE COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES TOMORROW AND GIVE THEM THE RESULTS OF OUR MEETING WITH MANSOURI BUT WITHOUT REVEALING THAT THE FRENCH AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS HAD BEEN WITH ME. MANSOURI SAID HE WOULD BE TALKING TO OTHER AMBASSADORS AND MENTIONED THE AMERICAN AND THE JAPANESE.

2. MANSOURI SAID HE WANTED TO GIVE US AN ACCOUNT OF THE SUMMIT AND TO DISCUSS WHERE THE PLAN HAD GOT, WHAT IT WAS INTENDED TO DO ABOUT IT AND HOW EUROPE COULD HELP.

3. THE SAUDIS, WHEN THEY PUT DOWN THE PLAN ON THE SUMMIT AGENDA, HAD CALCULATED THAT 15 MEMBERS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE WOULD SUPPORT THEM AND THAT 6 HAD RESERVATIONS. OF THESE LIBYA AND PDRY WERE OUT-AND-OUT REJECTIONISTS AND COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO AGREE. IRAQ AND ALGERIA TRADITIONALLY WENT ALONG WITH WHATEVER THE PLO WANTED. THE PLO WAS EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THE PLAN. THAT LEFT SYRIA. EFFORTS WERE MADE, AS WE WOULD HAVE SEEN, TO PERSUADE SYRIA AND IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SUMMIT THE SAUDIS WERE HOPEFUL. IN THE EVENT SYRIA PLAYED THE KEY ROLE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING.

4. KHADDAM'S CRITICISM WAS CONCENTRATED ON POINT 7. IT WAS REASONABLY OBJECTIVE AND THERE WAS NO ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA. RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL WAS IN THE SYRIAN VIEW THE ARABS' ONLY CARD AND NOT TO BE PLAYED UNLESS THE REST OF THE 8 POINTS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL AND THE USA, OR AT LEAST THE LATTER. THE SAUDIS HAD ARGUED THAT THEY WERE NOT ASKING FOR THE CARD TO BE PLAYED, ONLY TO BE SHOWN. RECOGNITION WAS TO BE PURELY CONDITIONAL (MANSOURI'S WORDS WERE TAKEN ALMOST VERBATIM FROM THE ARGUMENTS USED BY YOU ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS).
THE PLO MINISTER, QADDOUMI, WENT ALONG WITH THE SYRIANS, LARGELY (MANSOURI CLAIMED) BECAUSE THE PLO WAS UNDER SYRIAN PRESSURE.

5. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE PLAN WAS GOING TO BE OPPOSED BY SIX OF THE ARAB STATES, THE SAUDIS THOUGHT TO WITHDRAW IT ALTOGETHER. BUT THE OTHER MODERATES REFUSED AND IT HAD BEEN LEFT ON THE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT. INDEED NOW IT WAS THE OTHER MODERATES WHO WERE INSISTING ON PROMOTING THE PLAN. WE WOULD HAVE NOTICED RECENT STATEMENTS BY KING HUSSAIN AND KING HASSAN. THE MODERATES WERE DETERMINED THAT THE VOICE OF 15 STATES SHOULD NOT BE CAST ASIDE BECAUSE ONE STATE, SYRIA, WAS OPPOSED. SO THE PLAN HAD NOW BECOME THE MODERATES' PLAN AND NOT SAUDI ARABIA'S AND THE MODERATES WOULD GO AHEAD AND WOULD REJECT MODIFICATION OF POINT 7 (MANSOURI SAID SYRIA AND THE PLO HAD OFFERED TO ACCEPT THE PLAN IF POINT 7 COULD BE AMENDED). WITHOUT POINT 7 THE PLAN WOULD BE ''UNBALANCED AND UNACCEPTABLE TO INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY''.

6. THE EUROPEAN MEDIA HAD MISINTERPRETED THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT, DESCRIBING IT AS A FIASCO AND A DEFEAT FOR SAUDI ARABIA. BUT THE PROCESS WAS NOT REPEAT NOT FINISHED: SO THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO DEFEAT. MANSOURI SAID HE WAS ASKING US FOR TWO THINGS:

(A) EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE PLAN, PUBLICLY AND OFFICIALLY PRONOUNCED, AT AS HIGH A LEVEL AS POSSIBLE:

(B) EUROPEAN HELP IN ENLIGHTENING THE WESTERN MEDIA. HE KNEW WE COULD NOT DIRECT OUR PRESS BUT WE COULD EXPLAIN. OUR JOINT AIM MUST BE TO ENCOURAGE THE PLO TO ESCAPE FROM SYRIAN SHACKLES: HE BELIEVED THAT THE PLO WERE AT HEART IN FAVOUR OF THE PLAN BUT WERE UNABLE AT THE MOMENT TO TAKE AN INDEPENDENT POSITION.

7. I SAID I WAS SURE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD WELCOME THE DECISION TO PERSEVERE WITH THE PLAN. BUT IF THEY WERE TO GIVE IT PUBLIC SUPPORT THEY WOULD NEED THE ARABS, AND PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA, TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE FIRM INTENTION WAS(LAST WORD UNDERLINED) TO PERSEVERE.
MANSOURI REPLIED THAT HASSAN AND HUSSAIN HAD ALREADY STATED THE ARABS' INTENTION TO PERSEVERE. IT WAS NO LONGER THE SAUDIS' PLAN: SO WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT SAUDI ARABIA TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PROMOTING IT.

 / 8. THE

8. THE FRENCHMAN ASKED ABOUT A TIME-TABLE: WHEN WOULD THE NEXT SUMMIT TAKE PLACE ? MANSOURI SAID THERE WAS NO HURRY. SOUNDINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TO MEET FIRST. MEANWHILE IT WAS HOPED TO GIVE THE PLAN A PUSH HERE AND THERE.

9. THE FRENCHMAN ALSO ASKED WHETHER IT WAS THE SAUDI INTENTION TO APPLY PRESSURE TO SYRIA, POINTING OUT THAT SYRIA RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE FINANCIAL AID FROM SAUDI ARABIA. MANSOURI UNDERSTANDABLY DID NOT ANSWER DIRECT BUT SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE TRYING TO PERSUADE SYRIA TO CHANGE ITS VIEW: THERE MIGHT BE A TRADE-OFF. I SAID I HOPED THE SAUDIS WOULD NOT BUY SUPPORT FOR THE PLAN BY AGREEING TO JOIN IN CONDEMNATION OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO. MANSOURI LAUGHED DEPRECATINGLY.

10. COMMENT LATER, AFTER OUR COMMUNITY MEETING.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

CRAIG

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

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Covering 10 Secret

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

December 4, 1981

(4).

Prime Minister.

4.12

Dear Mr. Alexander:

In the absence of the Ambassador, I am forwarding the enclosed message from President Reagan to the Prime Minister which was received at the Embassy this afternoon. The original will be delivered later.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Streator
Minister

Enclosure:
SECRET

Mr. Michael Alexander,
Private Secretary (Overseas Staff)
to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London W1.

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 230
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DESKBY 041300Z PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE.
FM FCO 041700Z DEC
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELNO 548 OF 4 DEC
AND TO ROME, THE HAGUE,
INFO WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK,
OTHER EC POSTS.

M I P T: SINAI.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SHAMIR'S LETTER:

''DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE,

I AM IN RECEIPT OF YOUR COMMUNICATION OF THE 22ND OF NOVEMBER 1981, CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF A BRITISH CONTINGENT IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI (MFO).

AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE U.S. AND ISRAEL HAVE RECENTLY HELD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS, AS A RESULT OF WHICH A JOINT U.S. -ISRAEL STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED TODAY, A COPY OF WHICH I ATTACH.

IN ENDORSING THE JOINT STATEMENT BY THE U.S. AND ISRAEL, THE ISRAELI CABINET ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING DECISION WHICH I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION:

''THE CABINET DECIDED TO APPROVE THE DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE JOINT U.S.-ISRAEL STATEMENT REGARDING THE CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS.

''THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL COMMUNICATE THE JOINT STATEMENT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO AND WILL ASK THEM TO CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.''

I TRUST THAT YOU WILL APPRISE ME OF YOUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THESE PRINCIPLES.

/ I AM

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I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ISRAEL IN THE NEW YEAR AND AWAIT THE ARRANGEMENT OF A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS.

PLEASE ACCEPT THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

YITZHAK SHAMIR
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS''

CARRINGTON

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DESKBY PARIS, THE HAGUE AND ROME 041800Z
FROM FCO 041400 DECEMBER 81
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 547 OF 4 DECEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME, THE HAGUE,
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTHER EC POSTS
SINAI

1. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF SHAMIR'S LETTER. WE ASSUME THAT LETTERS IN THE SAME TERMS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE OTHER THREE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTORS. IT IS DISAPPOINTING THAT US ASSURANCES THAT WE WOULD NOT BE CALLED UPON TO RESPOND TO THE US/ISRAELI JOINT STATEMENT HAVE NOT BEEN BORNE OUT. SHAMIR 'S CAREFUL REFERENCE TO QUOTE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT UNQUOTE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE STATEMENT DOES NOT OVERRIDE THE CABINET DECSION TO ASK US TO CONFIRM OUR QUOTE ACCEPTANCE UNQOTE. OF THE PRINCIPLES.

2. OUR AIM IS TO GET THIS ISSUE OUT OF THE WAY ONCE AND FOR ALL, WHILE AVOIDING A REPLY TO SHAMIR WHICH WOULD IN ANY WAY SUGGEST ENDORSEMENT ON OUR PART OF THE TERMS OF THE US/ISRAELI JOINT STATEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT A REPLY CAN BE DEVISED WHICH MEETS US AND ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS WHILE PRESERVING OUR POSITION SUFFICIENTLY. WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE THREE REPLYING TO SHAMIR IN THE SAME TERMS.

3. FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED REPLY, WHICH COULD BE ADAPTED AS NECESSARY TO SUIT NATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. YOU SHOULD SHOW THIS TO HOST GOVERNMENTS DRAWING ON THE ABOVE AS APPROPRIATE AND AS FOR THEIR COMMENTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION TO SEND A REPLY TO SHAMIR BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK, AFTER CONSULTING THE AMERICANS, AND WOULD APPRECIATE REPLIES IN THE COURSE OF MONDAY 7 DECEMBER IF POSSIBLE. PARIS SHOULD DO THEIR BEST TO ENSURE THAT CHEYSSON SEES THE DRAFT BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR ISRAEL

BEGIS: I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER OF 3 DECEMBER. I NOTE THE VIEWS OF THE US AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS EXPRESSED IN THE STATEMENT WHICH WAS PUBLISHED ON 3 DECEMBER, A COPY OF WHICH YOU ENCLOSED.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS INVITED BY THE US GOVERNMENT, WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI IN A LETTER FROM MR HAIG TO ME OF 2 SEPTEMBER. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S FORMAL REPLY TO THIS REQUEST, EXPRESSING READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORCE, WAS CONVEYED IN MY LETTER TO MR HAIG OF 21 NOVEMBER, OF WHICH I SENT YOU A COPY UNDER COVER OF MY LETTER OF 22 NOVEMBER. OUR AGREEMENT WAS MADE PUBLIC IN A STATEMENT OF 23 NOVEMBER. IN A SUBSEQUENT LETTER TO MR HAIG ON 26 NOVEMBER, THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS AGREED WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS, I CONFIRMED THAT QUOTE NEITHER THE FOUR NOR THE TEN HAVE ANY INTENTION OF SEEKING TO PUT ANY GLOSS ON THE VARIOUS AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL, STILL LESS ON THE EGYPT/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY ITSELF ..... WE ALL RECOGNISE THAT THE FUNCTION OF THE MFO IS AS DEFINED IN THE RELEVANT EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI AGREEMENTS, NO MORE AND NO LESS UNQUOTE. THAT REMAINS THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FORCE THE VARIOUS LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT ARISE AND UPON WHICH AGREEMENT WILL BE NECESSARY. ENDS

4. WE SHALL NOT BE SEEKING PUBLICITY, AND WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THE LESS SAID THE BETTER. IF ASKED, WE SHALL SAY ONLY THAT WE ARE STUDYING THE ISRAELI COMMUNICATION BUT WE MAY HAVE TO ADD IF PRESSED THAT OUR POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE REMAINS AS STATED

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PRIME MINISTERS
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 171/81
Same as 1.12.81

SUBJECT

SECRET

Dear Margaret:

I greatly appreciate your messages of October 31 and November 4. Their constructive contents were heartening and reinforced my renewed hope for a Middle East peace settlement. These messages, along with the earlier views concerning Arab attitudes which you were good enough to share with me in your letter of October 1, attest to the continuing value of our cooperative efforts in the area and to the strength of our own relationship.

It was good to have your congratulations on the AWACS outcome. I am convinced that the sale will directly contribute to greater stability in the Middle East and to broadening the basis on which a genuinely evenhanded resolution of the problems there can be found. In that connection, I am particularly grateful for your decision to participate in the Sinai Force. I know how difficult this decision was for your government, and I fully understand the approach you plan to take publicly should you be pressed for explanations in Parliament.

I am also exceedingly grateful for the information you passed on concerning your talks with King Hussein in London, which I made good use of during his visit here.

I believe my talks with the King were successful. We certainly got along very well. We did express great concern over his seemingly irrevocable decision to buy Soviet air defense systems. In reply, he went to great lengths to explain to us that he didn't really want to do this but that he found himself in a bind, that the deed was done, but that he would keep to a minimum the number of Russians in Jordan and that, if he could get U.S. or Western counterparts on satisfactory terms, he would get rid of the Soviet weapons and probably sell them to Iraq.

Weapons aside, the main purpose of his trip was to find out if we still supported the integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom and what our views on the peace process are. I think we managed to convince him rather well. In fact he said that his meetings had been the most successful he had had in Washington. The reason for this is that I think he left convinced that we are not going

SECRET

to abandon him. I believe he is also convinced that our interpretation of Resolution 242 is one that anticipates withdrawal for a negotiated peace as the fundamental basis for a settlement on the West Bank and Gaza.

There is no doubt that much remains to be done in the Middle East and that time is pressing upon us. Nevertheless, I feel confident that we are on the right track and that your own invaluable assistance has greatly improved our prospects for eventual success.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London.

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 172/81

SUBJECT

T 172/81

FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 December 1981

cc Mgte
Op

Thank you for your messages of 22 November about President Reagan's remarks on Jerusalem and of 27 November about the results of the Arab Summit in Fez. Douglas Hurd was in Washington when I received your first message and I therefore asked him to urge the Americans to do whatever they could to clarify their policy in a satisfactory way. I was glad to hear subsequently that the President had been able to give you reassurance about American policy on the future of Jerusalem. We are all aware of the sensitivity of this issue, and I know that President Reagan is determined to pursue a policy which can lead to justice and security for all concerned in the Middle East.

I was also very grateful to have your account of the Fez Summit. You will understand that, although we entertained no exaggerated expectations about what might come out of the Summit, we nevertheless hoped that the result would show clearly Arab determination to pursue a positive and constructive approach to the Palestinian issue. We were therefore disappointed at the news that the Summit had been so quickly suspended. The difficulties of your task and that of your colleagues are, however, well understood here. I am glad that you had in mind the position of Egypt, which has not yet totally

/recovered

recovered the Sinai, and the difficult problems of timing this causes. We ourselves have these same considerations very much in mind.

I am encouraged that despite these difficulties the majority of the Arab states felt able to offer support to what Crown Prince Fahd put forward in August. I hope that you will not be deterred from continuing to press for a united and positive Arab position on the basis of which negotiations with Israel might be able to start in earnest. I remain convinced that if the Arabs, in particular the Palestinians, can show convincingly that they are ready to live in peace with Israel as part of a negotiated settlement this will go a long way to breaking the present impasse.

I agree that in these difficult circumstances we must stay in very close touch and continue to co-operate in the interest of a just, honourable and lasting peace in the Middle East. I can assure you that for our part we remain resolutely committed to the principles set out in the Venice Declaration and to the pursuit of an active role in the Middle East, seeking the acceptance of these principles by all concerned. Whatever the discouragement we shall not give up our efforts. I know from our recent discussions at the European Council that my colleagues in Europe share this view, although we thought it right not to issue any new statement on the Middle East at this delicate stage.

(sgd) M T

His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal, G.C.V.O.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office document

Reference DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 215/81

Description Syria: Valedictory Despatch

Date 4 December 1981

The above FCO document, which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed A Wayland Date 8 September 2011

PREM Records Team

PS TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET

RESTRICTED

GR 280

RESTRICTED

FROM TEL AVIV 031355Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 475 OF 3 DECEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE.

MY TELNO 471: SINAI FORCE

1. THE ISRAELI CABINET DULY MET THIS MORNING AND A STATEMENT WAS ISSUED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS. ACCORDING TO THE ISRAEL MFA THIS READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE THE CABINET DECIDED TODAY TO APPROVE THE AMENDED DRAFT OF THE JOINT US/ISRAEL STATEMENT REGARDING THE CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL COMMUNICATE THIS STATEMENT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO AND WILL ASK THEM TO CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE JOINT STATEMENT. UNQUOTE.

2. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY EXPECT THE SEQUENCE TO BE:

(A) SIMULTANEOUS ISSUE OF THE STATEMENT IN JERUSALEM AND WASHINGTON, FOLLOWED BY -
(B) BILATERAL MESSAGES FROM SHAMIR TO YOU AND TO THE OTHER 3 FOREIGN MINISTERS WHICH WILL BE CONVEYED BY THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN EACH CAPITAL. (AT A DINNER EARLIER THIS WEEK SHAMIR TOLD ME THAT HE HOPED TO ANSWER YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE SINAI FORCE AS SOON AS THE LATEST ROUND OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND WASHINGTON WAS COMPLETED.)

/3

RESTRICTED

3. ACCORDING TO REPORTERS WHO QUESTIONED THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPOKESMAN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CABINET MEETING, THE LATTER SAID THAT THE FOUR WILL MERELY HAVE TO CONFIRM THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO AND WOULD HAVE TO SAY, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, THAT THE PRINCIPLES INCLUDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ARE CLEAR TO THEM ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO SAY THIS PUBLICLY. HOWEVER, THE MFA SPOKESMAN, SPEAKING SEPARATELY TO OTHER REPORTERS, SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW THE FOUR WOULD HAVE TO CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE JOINT STATEMENT. HE ADDED THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT ASKING THE FOUR TO RETRACT ANYTHING BUT TO CONFIRM THE PRINCIPLES IN THE STATEMENT. THE EXPECTATION HERE REMAINS THAT IT WILL IN ANY EVENT BE PUBLISHED VERY SHORTLY.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

GRS 420 **CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL
FM JEDDA 020920Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 790 OF 02 DEC
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, UKREP BRUSSELS

SAVING ALL GULF POSTS

THE SUMMIT AT FEZ: ARAB-ISRAEL

1. IT IS RIGHT TO BE DISAPPOINTED AT THE ARABS' FAILURE TO ENDORSE FAHD'S SEVENTH POINT. THAT FAILURE SETS THE CAUSE OF PEACE BACK AND WILL MAKE THE ISRAELIS, UNDERSTANDABLY, EVEN MORE RELUCTANT TO MODIFY THEIR RIGID STANCE.

2. BUT WE SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN A STEP BACK: ONLY A FAILURE TO TAKE A STEP FORWARD. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT ALL THE ARABS EXCEPT THE LUNATIC FRINGE (EVEN SYRIA) WOULD INDEED ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL IN THE CONTEXT OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT: IT IS SIMPLY THAT THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO SAY SO NOW. THEIR ATTITUDE IS FOOLISH. BUT WE ARE USED TO THAT.

3. IN ANY CASE WE CANNOT AFFORD TO RELAX OUR EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. IT IS STILL THERE, DAMAGING OUR INTERESTS, CONFRONTING US WITH THE NEED CONSTANTLY TO MAKE AGONISING CHOICES, THREATENING TO INVOLVE THE SUPERPOWERS IN A MIDDLE EAST WAR AND TO DRIVE THE ARABS INTO SOVIET ARMS.

4. WE NEED TO FIND OUT WHAT THE SAUDIS INTEND TO DO NEXT. IS FAHD FEELING DEFEATED? HUMILIATED? DISGUSTED? RELIEVED OF AN UNWELCOME BURDEN? IT IS NOT MUCH USE ASKING PRINCE SAUD OR HIS OFFICIALS SINCE WE KNOW THEY ARE NOT VERY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE 8 POINTS ANYWAY AND DUBIOUS WHETHER SAUDI ARABIA OUGHT TO BE TAKING ANY INITIATIVES. WOULD YOU THEREFORE CONSIDER ASKING THE PRIME MINISTER TO INSTRUCT ME TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO FAHD AND THUS PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A DISCUSSION.

5. SUCH A MESSAGE MIGHT BEGIN WITH AN INDICATION OF THE DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE EC SUMMIT WITH THE NEWS FROM FEZ, OUR FORECAST OF THE LIKELY EFFECT ON ISRAELI ATTITUDES, AND OUR CONCERN HOW WE SHOULD NOW PROCEED WITH A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE SEMI COLON THEN AN INQUIRY ABOUT WHAT WENT WRONG, THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE OPPOSITION AND THE SUPPORT FOR THE FAHD PLAN, THE PROSPECTS FOR ITS REVIVAL AT A FUTURE SUMMIT SEMI COLON FINALLY A REQUEST FOR FAHD'S VIEWS ON THE POSSIBLE EUROPEAN ROLE. NO DOUBT YOU WOULD HAVE OTHER QUESTIONS TO ASK AND COMMENTS TO MAKE.

6. AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE A MESSAGE CARRIED PERSONALLY BY, SAY, MR HURD. THAT WOULD BE A MORE PUBLIC GESTURE OF SUPPORT FOR THE SAUDIS AFTER THEIR DEFEAT. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT,

/WHEREAS

CONFIDENTIAL

WHEREAS I WOULD (ON PAST FORM) SEE FAHD ALONE, SAUDI PROTOCOL WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE SAUD TO ACCOMPANY MR HURD, IN WHICH CASE FAHD MIGHT NOT BE SO FREE WITH HIS PERSONAL VIEWS. AND THERE MIGHT (I DO NOT KNOW) BE COMMUNITY DIFFICULTIES WHILE WE ARE STILL IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CHAIR.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ALL GULF POSTS

CRAIG

STANDARD

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WED
RID

MAED
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ESID
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

15

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PS
PS/[redacted] LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J C MOBERLY

HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND

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PUSD (2)
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[redacted]CLERK

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

GRS 420
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FM JEDDA 020920Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 790 OF 02 DEC
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, UKREP BRUSSELS

SAVING ALL GULF POSTS

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The FCO will comment on this.

3. IN ANY CASE WE CANNOT AFFORD TO RELAX OUR EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. IT IS STILL THERE, DAMAGING OUR INTERESTS, CONFRONTING US WITH THE NEED CONSTANTLY TO MAKE AGONISING CHOICES, THREATENING TO INVOLVE THE SUPERPOWERS IN A MIDDLE EAST WAR AND TO DRIVE THE ARABS INTO SOVIET ARMS.

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FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ALL GULF POSTS

CRAIG

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

PM has seen texts.
NRBPM
2/XII

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 December 1981

Dear Michael,

Jerusalem and US/Jordan Relations

I wrote to you on 23 November about King Hussein seeking the Prime Minister's help over President Reagan's public statement on the future of Jerusalem.

King Hussein's manuscript letter to the Prime Minister has now been received, and is enclosed together with enclosures.

A draft reply from the Prime Minister to this message will be included in a draft reply to a further message from King Hussein to the Prime Minister about the Arab Summit meeting (Amman telno 463) about which I am writing separately.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

* enclosures King Hussein to PM 22.11.81 T 1614c/81
King Hussein to Pres Reagan 21.11.81
King Hussein to Haig 22.11.81
} filed in date order

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

SECRET

9

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Type for PUS's signature

3/12

2 December 1981

Dear Michael,

I wrote to you on 23 November about King Hussein's message to the Prime Minister of 22 November enclosing copies of his messages to President Reagan and Mr Haig about the President's statement on Jerusalem. Mr Hurd spoke to Mr Haig about this, as agreed, on 25 November. Mr Haig explained that the President had sent the King a message which it was hoped would set things straight. We have not been able to obtain from the Americans the full text of President Reagan's message to the King, but it apparently emphasised that US policy on Jerusalem was based on four key points:

i) Jerusalem should be preserved as a physically undivided city:
ii) there should be free access to the Holy Places for all who wish to practise their faith:
iii) the future status of Jerusalem should be resolved through negotiations among all parties concerned:
iv) unilateral actions concerning Jerusalem taken since the 1967 war should not prejudice the ultimate status of the city.

It seems clear from what Mr Haig told Mr Hurd that the President had been impressed by King Hussein's message and wanted in future to ensure that the King was kept fully informed on US policy in the same way as the Egyptians.

The Prime Minister has not yet sent a reply to King Hussein's message. You will now have seen that the King has sent a further message (Amman telnos 462 and 463) seeking to reassure us about the outcome of the Fez Summit. The King's account of Fez cannot be taken at face value; it is clearly in his interests to show both that the moderate Arab cause is still alive and that he and his fellow moderates put up a good fight in Fez against difficult odds. Nevertheless it is encouraging that the King should be so anxious to reassure us. Lord Carrington believes that in return we should encourage

/him

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him to press on, and reassure him about our own policy.

I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to the King in response to both his messages.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

DSR 11 (Revised)

MESSAGE

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

KING HUSSEIN
Morocco

GCVO

Your Reference

Copies to:

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.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your messages of 22 November about President Reagan's remarks on Jerusalem and of 27 November about the results of the Arab Summit in Fez. Douglas Hurd was in Washington when I received your first message and I therefore asked him to urge the Americans to do whatever they could to clarify their policy in a satisfactory way. I was glad to hear subsequently that the President had been able to give you reassurance about American policy on the future of Jerusalem. We are all aware of the sensitivity of this issue, and I know that President Reagan is determined to pursue a policy which can lead to justice and security for all concerned in the Middle East.

I was also very grateful to have your account of the Fez Summit. You will understand that, although we entertained no exaggerated expectations about what might come out of the Summit, we nevertheless hoped that the result would show clearly Arab determination to pursue a positive and constructive approach to the Palestinian issue. We were therefore disappointed at the news that the Summit had been so quickly suspended. The difficulties of your task and that of your colleagues are, however, well understood here. I am glad that you

/had

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SECRET

had in mind the position of Egypt, which has not yet totally recovered the Sinai, and the difficult problems of timing this causes. We ourselves have these same considerations very much in mind.

I am encouraged that despite these difficulties the majority of the Arab states felt able to offer support to what Crown Prince Fahd put forward in August. I hope that you will not be deterred from continuing to press for a united and positive Arab position on the basis of which negotiations with Israel might be able to start in earnest. I remain convinced that if the Arabs, in particular the Palestinians, can show convincingly that they are ready to live in peace with Israel as part of a negotiated settlement this will go a long way to breaking the present impasse.

I agree that in these difficult circumstances we must stay in very close touch and continue to cooperate in the interest of a just, honourable and lasting peace in the Middle East. I can assure you that for our part we remain resolutely committed to the principles set out in the Venice Declaration and to the pursuit of an active role in the Middle East, seeking the acceptance of these principles by all concerned. Whatever the discouragement we shall not give up our efforts. I know from our recent discussions at the European Council that my colleagues in Europe share this view, although we thought it right not to issue any new statement on the Middle East at this delicate stage.

SECRET 10

SUBJECT

T 171/81 S/C MASTER OPPS

This is the same as Reagan to PM 4.12.81

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

AR 11/12

December 1, 1981

h.a.

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 171/81

Dear Margaret:

P8 P7

I greatly appreciate your messages of October 31 and November 4. Their constructive contents were heartening and reinforced my renewed hope for a Middle East peace settlement. These messages, along with the earlier views concerning Arab attitudes which you were good enough to share with me in your letter of October 1, attest to the continuing value of our cooperative efforts in the area and to the strength of our own relationship. P6

It was good to have your congratulations on the AWACS outcome. I am convinced that the sale will directly contribute to greater stability in the Middle East and to broadening the basis on which a genuinely even-handed resolution of the problems there can be found. In that connection, I am particularly grateful for your decision to participate in the Sinai force. I know how difficult this decision was for your government, and I fully understand the approach you plan to take publicly should you be pressed for explanations in Parliament.

I am also exceedingly grateful for the information you passed on concerning your talks with King Hussein in London, which I made good use of during his visit here.

I believe my talks with the King were successful. We certainly got along very well. We did express great concern over his seemingly irrevocable decision to buy Soviet air defense systems. In reply, he went to great lengths to explain to us that he didn't really want to do this but that he found himself in a bind, that the deed was done, but that he would keep to a minimum the number

of Russians in Jordan and that, if he could get U.S. or Western counterparts on satisfactory terms, he would get rid of the Soviet weapons and probably sell them to Iraq.

Weapons aside, the main purpose of his trip was to find out if we still supported the integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom and what our views on the peace process are. I think we managed to convince him rather well. In fact, he said that his meetings had been the most successful he had had in Washington. The reason for this is that I think he left convinced that we are not going to abandon him. I believe he is also convinced that our interpretation of Resolution 242 is one that anticipates withdrawal for a negotiated peace as the fundamental basis for a settlement on the West Bank and Gaza.

There is no doubt that much remains to be done in the Middle East and that time is pressing upon us. Nevertheless, I feel confident that we are on the right track and that your own invaluable assistance has greatly improved our prospects for eventual success.

Sincerely,

Ronald

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

GRS 660 CONFIDENTIAL FM TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 012220Z DEC 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3635 OF 1 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, ROUTINE CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, TRIPOLI, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

U.S./ISRAEL

1. WEINBERGER AND SHARON SIGNED A MOMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION IN WASHINGTON ON 30 NOVEMBER (FULL TEXT BY BAG).

2 THE MEMORANDUM STATES THAT U.S./ISRAEL STRATEGIC COOPERATION IS DESIGNED AGAINST THE THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE REGION (WHICH IS NOT DEFINED) CAUSED BY THE SOVIET UNION OR SOVIET-CONTROLLED FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION INTRODUCED INTO THE REGION. STRATEGIC COOPERATION IS NOT DIRECTED AT ANY STATES WITHIN THE REGION BUT IS INTENDED SOLELY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AGAINST THIS THREAT.

3. THE MEMORANDUM PROVIDES THAT STRATEGIC COOPERATION WILL INCLUDE THE FIELDS OF MILITARY COOPERATION, JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES, INCLUDING NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA, COOPERATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF JOINT READINESS ACTIVITIES AND OTHER AREAS WITHIN THE BASIC SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT, SUBJECT IN EACH CASE TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

4. THE MEMORANDUM PROVIDES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COORDINATING COUNCIL TO COORDINATE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO JOINT WORKING GROUPS, TO MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COOPERATION UNDER THE AGREEMENT AND TO HOLD PERIODIC MEETINGS TO DISCUSS AND RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. (THE PRESS REPORTS THAT WEINBERGER WILL ATTEND THE FIRST SUCH MEETING, TO BE HELD IN ISRAEL IN JANUARY). THE JOINT WORKING GROUPS ARE TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, AS WELL AS COOPERATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND IN DEFENCE TRADE, AND OTHER FIELDS WITHIN THE BASIC SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT, SUCH AS QUESTIONS OF PRE-POSITIONING, AS AGREED BY THE COORDINATING COUNCIL.

5. THE PENTAGON HAVE TOLD US THAT THE MEMORANDUM IS VERY MUCH ON THE LINES OF THE AMERICAN DRAFT AND THAT THE ISRAELIS, WHO WANTED CLOSER COOPERATION SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL, WILL BE CORRESPONDINGLY DISAPPOINTED. THE AMERICANS HAD INSISTED FOR EXAMPLE THAT THE AGREEMENT DEFINE STRATEGIC COOPERATION AS DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT, WHEREAS THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT WANTED IT TO BE RESTRICTED IN THIS WAY.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. ACCORDING TO THE PENTAGON THE REFERENCE TO PRE-POSITIONING IS TO BE INTERPRETED AS REFERRING ONLY TO MEDICAL SUPPLIES. THIS WAS NOT SPELT OUT AS THE ISRAELIS FEARED THAT IT WOULD BECOME THE SUBJECT OF RIDICULE. BUT THE PENTAGON HAVE NO INTENTION, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, OF BROADENING THIS ASPECT TO INCLUDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE EXERCISES ENVISAGED FOR THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA WILL BE LOW KEY: THE AIR ELEMENT WILL COVER ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND AIR SEARCH AND RESCUE TRAINING.

7. THE AMERICANS HOPE THAT THE RESTRICTION OF THE SCOPE OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION AND PUBLICATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING IN FULL WILL HELP TO KEEP ARAB REACTION TO A MINIMUM. A PENTAGON OFFICIAL IS VISITING SAUDI ARABIA TO BRIEF THE SAUDIS ON THE AGREEMENT, BUT THE AMERICANS DO NOT PLAN TO BRIEF OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

F C O PASS SAVING TO: ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANA'A, TUNIS.

HENDERSON

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

STANDARD

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

SUBJECT
cc Master
Cpl

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الرئيس

Subject copy filed on
The President Egypt Aug 80
Visit of Egyptian Ambassador

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 1695/81

Cairo, November 30, 1981.

Dear Prime Minister Thatcher

On behalf of the people of the Arab Republic of Egypt, I would like to express to you and your friendly people our heartfelt gratitude for your decision to contribute to the Multinational Force and Observers. Such a courageous decision clearly reflects your profound understanding of the situation in the Middle East and the goals we are striving to achieve. In the Treaty of Peace we signed with Israel in March 1979, we set a model for security arrangements based on the respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the fundamental rights of each Party.

On the other hand, we signed that Treaty as an inseparable part of a comprehensive settlement that covers all aspects of the dispute. Certainly, the taking of this step will facilitate the process of bridging the gap that still exists between the Arabs and Israel on the Palestinian question. We are determined to continue our tireless efforts until an equitable solution is reached for this problem.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

The President

الرئيس

We have always believed that Europe was uniquely qualified to play a constructive role in the peace efforts. Geographic proximity, the mutuality of interest and the undeniable link between peace and stability in the Middle East and the security and prosperity of Europe render an active European role most indispensible and beneficial. Your decision to participate in the MFO reaffirms that belief. It also puts Europe in a better position to contribute to the maintenance of security in other parts of the region.

I intend to consult with you regularly and put you fully in the picture with respect to the autonomy talks. I will be very pleased to receive your views and invaluable advice. On the other hand, we are determined to strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation between our two countries and peoples in all fields. I wish you total success in your endeavors.

Sincerely,

Hosny Mubarak

MOHAMMED HOSNI MUBARAK

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

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GRS 161
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DESKBY 301430
FM FCO 301315Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1830 OF 30 NOV
REPEATED INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, THE HAGUE, ROME, PRIORITY TEL AVIV
TEL AVIV TELNO 467: SINAI FORCE

1. EXPLICIT ENDORSEMENT (PARA 2 OF TUR) IS BOUND TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FOUR AND THE AMERICANS WILL KNOW THIS. IT MAY NEVERTHELESS HELP THEM TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS NOT TO INSIST ON THIS IF YOU REPEAT THE POINT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE EUROPEANS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO REQUIRE ANY ENDORSEMENT BY OTHER PARTIES OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THEIR OWN POLICY NOR TO SPECIFY ANY EXTRA CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION. THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES HAVE INDICATED TO US THAT NO RESPONSE WOULD BE NEEDED TO ANY US-ISRAELI STATEMENT (PARA 3 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 3601). A REQUEST FOR EXPLICIT ENDORSEMENT OF A STATEMENT CLEARLY AT VARIANCE WITH KNOWN EUROPEAN POLICY WOULD BE A NASTY SURPRISE AND WILL INEVITABLY CAUSE PROBLEMS.

CARRINGTON

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GRS 322
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DESKBY 301300Z PARIS ROME THE HAGUE
FROM FCO 301030Z NOVEMBER 81
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 531 OF 30 NOVEMBER
AND TO THE HAGUE ROME
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK OTHER EC POSTS.
SINAI MFO

1. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET ARE TO DECIDE THIS MORNING WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE JOINT STATEMENT PROPOSED BY THE US (WASHINGTON TELNOS 3600 AND 3601 NOT TO ALL) AND ON THAT BASIS TO ACCEPT OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE. WE DO NOT YET KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE TERMS OF THIS STATEMENT WILL BE OR WHEN IT WILL BE ISSUED IT IS CLEARLY DESIRABLE THAT THE FOUR SHOULD RESPOND COLLECTIVELY TO IT AND IN A WAY WHICH WILL CAUSE AS FEW FURTHER COMPLICATIONS AS POSSIBLE. IF THE STATEMENT IS AS ENVISAGED BY HAIG AND VELIOTES WE BELIEVE THAT THE FOUR SHOULD MAKE A LOW KEY STATEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE WE HAVE NOTED THE JOINT US/ISRAELI STATEMENT. AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR WE HAVE ATTACHED NO POLITICAL CONDITIONS TO OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MFO AND FULLY ACCEPT THAT THE FORCE HAS BEEN SET UP PURSUANT TO THE EGYPT/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY AND WILL OPERATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS. OUR VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF OUR PARTICIPATION TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AS A WHOLE AND OUR COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN POLICY AS SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY WERE MADE CLEAR IN THE STATEMENTS WE ISSUED ON 23 NOVEMBER. WE ARE GLAD THAT ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN ABLE TO AGREE TO OUR OFFER OF PARTICIPATION. UNQUOTE.

2. PLEASE SPEAK URGENTLY TO HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE ABOVE LINES. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON WASHINGTON TURS TO EXPLAIN WHAT WE BELIEVE IS LIKELY TO BE IN THE US/ISRAELI JOINT STATEMENT. YOU SHOULD URGE THAT NO STATEMENT BE MADE UNTIL A JOINT POSITION HAS BEEN COORDINATED BETWEEN THE FOUR. ONCE WE KNOW THE EXACT TERMS OF THE STATEMENT WE PROPOSE TO CLEAR A JOINT RESPONSE. MEANWHILE

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WE WOULD APPRECIATE URGENT COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED LINES OF SUCH A RESPONSE AS ABOVE.

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 786 OF 30 NOV
INFO ROUTINE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, CAIRO

SAVING TO ALL OTHER EC POSTS AND ALL OTHER ME POSTS

MIPT (NOT TO ALL)
ARAB SUMMIT: MFO SINAI

1. THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, MANSOURI, TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT FEELINGS HAD RUN HIGH ON THIS SUBJECT AMONG THE ''REJECTIONIST STATES'' (HE MEANT THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT STATES) AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN FEZ. THERE HAD BEEN CALLS FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF ARAB AMBASSADORS FROM THE FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAD AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO. IF THE SUMMIT HAD PROCEEDED THERE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN A CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION. SO THE POSTPONEMENT HAD NOT BEEN ALL LOSS.

2. IN THE DISCUSSION THE SAUDI DELEGATION HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY FOR THE ARABS TO ADOPT A POSITION ON EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. THEY SHOULD WAIT TILL THE SITUATION WAS CLEARER.

3. FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 785 OF 30 NOV

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, ALGIERS, TRIPOLI, RABAT, UKMIS NEW YORK

SAVING ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

MY TELNO 780: FEZ SUMMIT AND THE SAUDI PEACE PLAN

1. I SAT NEXT TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, MANSOURI, IN THE AEROPLANE COMING BACK FROM RIYADH YESTERDAY. HE HAD RETURNED FROM FEZ THE PREVIOUS DAY.

2. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF TOUGH TALK AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING, THOUGH NO ONE (NOT EVEN KHADDAM) HAD USED RUDE LANGUAGE ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA. THEY NEVER DID EXCLAMATION THE SYRIAN, IRAQI, PLO AND PDRY MINISTERS HAD BEEN FIRMLY OPPOSED TO THE EIGHT POINTS (WHICH MEANT IN EFFECT TO POINT NO 7). LIBYA'S POLICY WAS WELL-KNOWN. THE ALGERIANS HAD ON THE WHOLE BEEN AGAINST BUT HAD BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET. MANSOURI'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT ALGERIA MIGHT HAVE GONE ALONG WITH THE EIGHT POINTS IF THE PLO HAD ACCEPTED THEM. SO PERHAPS MIGHT IRAQ. INCIDENTALLY HE SAID THAT QADDOUMI, THOUGH MODERATE BY COMPARISON WITH HABASH AND HAWATIMEH, WAS NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE CONSIDERED A MODERATE IN FATAH TERMS.

3. THE OPPOSING FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD DEPLOYED VARIOUS ARGUMENTS. SOME HAD SAID, AS USUAL, THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL WAS THE ARABS' TRUMP CARD AND SHOULD NOT BE PLAYED NOW. OTHERS HAD SAID THAT THE TIMING WAS NOT RIGHT FOR THE ARABS TO FORMULATE DEMANDS OR EVEN THAT IT WOULD NEVER BE TACTICALLY WISE FOR THE ARABS TO FORMULATE THEIR DEMANDS: THEY SHOULD LET THIRD PARTIES DO THAT, EITHER THE THIRD WORLD OR EUROPE EXCLAMATION OTHERS HAD SUGGESTED THAT TACTICALLY THE ARABS SHOULD FORMULATE EXTREME DEMANDS (E.G. THE 1947 PARTITION PLAN) AND WAIT TO BE NEGOTIATED INTO CONCESSIONS. OTHERS, NOTABLY THE SYRIANS, HAD ARGUED THAT THE 8 POINTS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF THEY WERE PREVIOUSLY ENDORSED BY THE US.

4. AT THE END OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING KING HASSAN HAD DECIDED THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN GOING ON WITH THE SUMMIT. IN THE ABSENCE OF SO MANY HEADS OF STATE THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF A CHANGE OF HEART BY THE OPPONENTS OF THE SAUDI PLAN. MANSOURI THOUGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSTITUTIONALLY POSSIBLE FOR KHADDAM TO ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE PERSUADED TO CHANGE. KING HASSAN HAD THEREFORE CONSULTED FAHD AND THEY HAD AGREED THAT ONLY THE LEBANON SHOULD BE DISCUSSED (BECAUSE THE LEBANESE HAD ASKED FOR A SUMMIT TO DEAL WITH THEIR PROBLEM) AND THAT THE SUMMIT SHOULD BE CLOSED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS.

5. THE SAUDI DELEGATION (PRINCE SAUD, THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRY, QUSAIBI, AND MANSOURI HIMSELF) HAD THEN RECOMMENDED TO FAHD THAT HE SHOULD WITHDRAW THE SAUDI PLAN FROM THE AGENDA. FAHD HAD AGREED BUT THE SUPPORTERS OF THE PLAN HAD INSISTED THAT THE SUBJECT SHOULD REMAIN ON THE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NEXT ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AND THEREAFTER AT THE NEXT SUMMIT. MANSOURI DID NOT GIVE MUCH FOR ITS CHANCES. HE NOTED THAT SINCE THE PLAN HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT ARAFAT'S ATTITUDE HAD NOT BEEN SMOKED OUT.

6. MANSOURI WAS PRETTY RELAXED ABOUT NHI OUTCOME. HE FELT THAT SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD NEVER ALLOW ITSELF TO GET AHEAD OF THE PACK OVER PALESTINE. LET OTHERS CARRY THE BURDEN. IF THE 8 POINTS HAD BEEN ENDORSED AT FEZ, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE BEEN LED INTO CONFRONTATION WITH THE US. THERE IS AN ECHO HERE OF WHAT MANSOURI SAID TO ME IN SEPTEMBER (SEE MY TEL NO 587 NOT TO ALL).

7. ALL THIS CONFIRMS THE IMPRESSION WE HAVE HAD HERE FOR SOME TIME THAT THE 8 POINTS WERE FAHD'S PLAN AND HAD BEEN PREPARED WITHOUT THE MFA BEING CONSULTED. EVEN SO I SHOULD NOT EXPECT FAHD TO BE OVERWHELMINGLY DISAPPOINTED. TALK OF SAUDI HUMILIATION IN THE BRITISH PRESS IS FARFETCHED. INDEED MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE CATEGORISED THE REACTIONS OF THE MAIN PARTICIPANTS AS LIKELY TO BE THE FOLLOWING: SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS - DELIGHTED SEMI COLON FAHD RELIEVED SEMI COLON AMERICANS QUIETLY PLEASED. FAHD WILL NOW FEEL THAT HE HAS DONE HIS BIT FOR PEACE. IF HIS EFFORTS HAVE FAILED IT IS NOT HIS FAULT. SOMEONE ELSE MUST NOW TRY.

8. WHO IS THE SOMEONE ELSE? AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT LOOKS LIKE EUROPE, WORKING ON THE AMERICANS. WE COULD ARGUE THAT TO SOME EXTENT THE SAUDI INITIATIVE HAS FAILED BECAUSE OF THE LUKEWARM AMERICAN REACTION, NOT TO SAY HOSTILITY, TO IT (SEE THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 3 ABOVE).

9. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ALL OTHER ME POSTS.

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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DESKBY 010700Z
FM WASHINGTON 010156Z DEC 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3623 OF 30 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, THE HAGUE, ROME, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, UKMLS NEW YORK, PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS.

MIPT: SINAI FORCE

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT JOINT U.S./ISRAEL STATEMENT

QUOTE

THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL GOVERNMENTS NOTE THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL GOVERNMENTS HAVE REVIEWED THE PARTICIPATION OF THESE FOUR COUNTRIES IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS WHICH THEY HAVE PROVIDED TO THE U S A ON NOVEMBER 26:

THAT THEY RECOGNISED THAT THE FUNCTION OF THE MFO IS AS DEFINED IN THE RELEVANT EGYPTIAN/ISRAEL AGREEMENTS, AND INCLUDES THAT OF ENSURING THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE TREATY OF PEACE.

THAT THEY HAVE ATTACHED NO POLITICAL CONDITIONS, LINKED TO VENICE OR OTHERWISE, TO THEIR PARTICIPATION.

THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL UNDERSTAND THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES AND ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

THE BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IS THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL ORIGINATED IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE PROTOCOL SIGNED BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND WITNESSED BY THE U S A ON 3 AUGUST 1981, BASED UPON THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ON 26 MARCH 1979.

ALL OF THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MFO AND OF ITS CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS, INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENTS THAT MAY BE FORMED THROUGH EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION, ARE DEFINED IN THE TREATY OF PEACE AND PROTOCOL AND THERE CAN BE NO DEROGATION OR RESERVATION FROM ANY OF THEM. AS PROVIDED IN THE PROTOCOL, ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE MFO UNDERTAKE TO CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE PROTOCOL UNDER

THE

THE DIRECTION OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL APPOINTED BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL. THE MFO SHALL EMPLOY ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PREVENT ANY VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MFO WILL SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY OF PEACE AND THE PROTOCOL:

(A) THE OPERATION OF CHECKPOINTS, RECONNAISANCE PATROLS AND OBSERVATION POSTS ALONG THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND LINE B, AND WITHIN ZONE C.

(B) PERIODIC VERIFICATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ANNEX I WILL BE CARRIED OUT NOT LESS THAN TWICE A MONTH UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES.

(C) ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF A REQUEST FROM EITHER PARTY.

(D) ENSURING THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE TREATY OF PEACE.

THE U S A UNDERSTANDS AND APPRECIATES THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL REGARDING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE FOUR EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTORS IN EXPLAINING THEIR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO TO THEIR OWN LEGISLATURES AND PUBLICS.

THE U S A RECOGNISES THAT SOME POSITIONS SET FORTH IN THE STATEMENTS ARE AT VARIANCE WITH ITS OWN POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS WELL AS POSITIONS HELD BY ISRAEL AS A PARTY TO THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE U S A AND ISRAEL RECOGNISE THAT THE POSITIONS HELD ON ANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM IN THE AREA BY ANY STATE WHICH AGREES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO DO NOT AFFECT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THAT STATE TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE PROTOCOL WHICH WAS NEGOTIATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U S A OF 26TH MARCH 1979, AND WHICH IS DESIGNED TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE TREATY OF PEACE, WHICH WAS CONCLUDED PURSUANT TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

THE TREATY OF PEACE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH THE MFO IS ESTABLISHED, REPRESENTS THE FIRST STEP IN A PROCESS AGREED ON AT CAMP DAVID WHOSE ULTIMATE GOAL IS A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE U S A AND ISRAEL REITERATE THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AS THE ONLY VIABLE AND ONGOING NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THEY RENEW THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAKE EARLY MEANINGFUL PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS.
HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 010152Z DEC 81

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3622 OF 30 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, THE HAGUE, ROME, TEL AVIV, CAIRO,

UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS

SINAI FORCE

1. VELIOTES HAS SHOWN ME THE DRAFT US/ISRAEL STATEMENT, THE RESULT OF EIGHT HOURS' NEGOTIATION. HAIG HAD NOT AUTHORISED HIM TO GIVE ME THE TEXT BUT ONLY TO SHOW IT TO ME, A FORM OF SOPHISTRY THAT DID NOT PREVENT ME WRITING THE TEXT DOWN AS GIVEN IN MIFT.

2. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD ACCEPTED THE TEXT EXCEPT FOR A FEW MINOR AND IMPROVING NIT-PICKS. THE PRESENT INTENTION WAS THAT IT WAS GOING TO BE ISSUED AT NOON WASHINGTON TIME TOMORROW, 1 DECEMBER.

3. ACCORDING TO VELIOTES, HAIG HAD TAKEN A VERY TOUGH LINE WITH SHAMIR. HE HAD EMPHASISED THAT ISRAEL MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHED TO HAVING THE FOUR EUROPEAN POWERS TAKING PART IN THE FORCE. HE HAD ALSO STRESSED THE POSITIVE ROLE THAT YOU HAD BEEN PLAYING IN THIS BUSINESS. SHAMIR HAD STARTED OUT WITH AN EXTREME POSITION, SAYING THAT THOSE TAKING PART IN THE FORCE MUST QUOTE RENOUNCE VENICE UNQUOTE. THE WORDING EVENTUALLY AGREED TO WAS, IN VELIOTES'S VIEW, SATISFACTORY FROM THE EUROPEAN STANDPOINT. (VELIOTES SAID PRIVATELY THAT HE HIMSELF COULD NOT SEE IN WHAT WAY THE DRAFT STATEMENT EASED THE ISRAELI POSITION, BUT IT WAS NO GOOD TRYING TO UNDERSTAND.) AFTER IT HAS BEEN FINALLY APPROVED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET, SHAMIR APPARENTLY INTENDS TO CONVEY IT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT UNDER COVER OF A MESSAGE REFERRING TO YOUR MESSAGE TO HIM TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR ETC.

4. I ASKED WHAT THIS COVERING MESSAGE WOULD SAY. COULD I BE SURE THAT IT WOULD NOT ASK US TO CONCUR IN THE JOINT STATEMENT? VELIOTES SAID THAT THIS WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING. THE COVERING MESSAGE WOULD BE PURELY DECLARATORY. HOWEVER, HE RANG UP THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR WHO ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING.

5. I EMPHASISED THAT WE COULD NOT ENDORSE SOME OF THE LANGUAGE IN THE STATEMENT AND IT WOULD GREATLY COMPLICATE THINGS IF WE WERE ASKED TO DO SO. VELIOTES INSISTED THAT THE TEXT CONTAINED NO SNAGS FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AND NO PROVOCATIONS. IT HAD ALSO TAKEN ACCOUNT OF EGYPTIAN SENSITIVITIES. HE TOLD ME THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS: THEIR ATTITUDE WAS THAT THEY DID NOT GIVE A DAMN ABOUT THE TEXT PROVIDED IT DID NOT PRECLUDE THE FOUR EUROPEAN POWERS FROM TAKING PART IN THE FORCE.

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6. THE TEXT DID NOT SAY, SO VELIOTES EXPLAINED, THAT THE US SHARED ISRAEL'S CONCERN ABOUT THE EUROPEAN STATEMENTS. IT MERELY SAID THAT IT UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATES ISRAELI CONCERN. I SAID THAT THIS WORD QUOTE APPRECIATES UNQUOTE WAS NOT VERY SATISFACTORY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, PARTICULARLY BEARING IN MIND THE PUBLIC QUOTE WARM WELCOME UNQUOTE GIVEN BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE FOUR'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE. THERE WERE OTHER PHRASES IN THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT TO WHICH WE COULD NOT SUBSCRIBE. VELIOTES SAID THAT IT WAS A POLITICAL STATEMENT AND HE IMPLORED US TO STOP LAWYERS GETTING ANYWHERE NEAR IT.

7. REFERRING TO VELIOTES'S ACCOUNT OF THE GREAT DISTANCE THE ISRAELIS HAD COME DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, I ASKED HIM TO WHAT HE ATTRIBUTED THIS. DID HE THINK THAT FEZ HAD PLAYED A PART? HE SAID THAT HAIG'S VIEW AND HIS WAS THAT YOUR LETTER HAD QUOTE TURNED THE WHOLE ATMOSPHERE AROUND UNQUOTE. THE ISRAELIS WERE DELIGHTED WITH IT. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE HAD TOLD VELIOTES THAT IT WAS YOUR LETTER THAT HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE CHANGE FROM THE VERY HARD LINE ORIGINALLY ADOPTED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET.

8. IN CONCLUSION, I REITERATED THE DIFFICULTY THAT IT WOULD PRESENT TO US, AND FOR THAT MATTER TO THE OTHER EUROPEANS, IF WE WERE ASKED TO REACT TO THIS STATEMENT. VELIOTES EMPHASISED THAT NOTHING FROM US WOULD BE NECESSARY. WHAT HE HOPED FOR WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REACTION FROM THE EUROPEANS.

9. IN LETTING ME HAVE A SIGHT OF THIS TEXT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE CERTAINLY NOT OPENING THE WAY TO ANY AMENDMENTS FROM US. INDEED I THINK THEY ARE ASSUMING THAT THE TEXT WILL BE PUBLISHED BEFORE ANY SUCH PROPOSALS CAN BE FORTHCOMING. HAIG IS EVIDENTLY VERY PLEASED WITH WHAT HE HAS ACHIEVED AND BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE EUROPEANS TO LIVE WITH THIS FORM OF WORDS WITHOUT THIS IMPLYING ANY RENUNCIATION OF THEIR OWN EXPLANATIONS FOR PARTICIPATING.

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FM WASHINGTON 301605Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3610 OF 30 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS THE HAGUE ROME PRIORITY TEL AVIV AND CAIRO.

YOUR TELNO 1830 : SINAI FORCE

1. I HAVE SPOKEN TO STATE DEPARTMENT WHO HAVE SAID CATEGORICALLY THAT NO EXPLICIT ENDORSEMENT WILL BE EXPECTED OF US. THE AMERICAN LINE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT THEY WERE SEEKING EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE BUT IN DOING SO DID NOT REQUIRE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO MODIFY THEIR POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THE US-ISRAEL STATEMENT, ABOUT WHICH THEY WERE STILL WAITING TO HEAR SOMETHING FURTHER FROM TEL AVIV, WAS DESIGNED TO BE NON-PROVOCATIVE.

2. VELIOTES UNDERTOOK TO LET US HAVE THE TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

HENDERSON

GR 1350
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FM AMMAN 281005Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 463 OF 28 NOV
INFO PRIORITY RABAT WASHINGTON ROUTINE BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK
SAVING TO (FOR INFO) OTHER ME POSTS AND EC POSTS.

MIPS:
BRIEFING MESSAGE DATED 27 NOVEMBER TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN ON THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

BEGINS:

''THE TWELFTH ANNUAL ARAB SUMMIT WAS OPENED AND CHAIRED BY H.M. KING HASSAN II UNDER EXTREMELY DIFFICULT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. WHEN THE MEETINGS WERE FINALLY ADJOURNED TO A FUTURE DATE, WHICH I WOULD EXPECT TO BE WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED THAT THIS TWELFTH SUMMIT RESUME ITS MEETINGS IN MOROCCO. I FELT THIS TO HAVE BEEN A MOST POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, AND STRESS THAT THE CLARITY OF VISION AND PURPOSE DISPLAYED BY KING HASSAN TOGETHER WITH HIS ABILITIES IN CHAIRING THE MEETINGS COURAGEOUSLY WERE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THIS OUTCOME. IT WAS A PLEASURE TO WORK WITH HIM ON THIS OCCASION AND WE COOPERATED FULLY IN ACHIEVING THE SAID RESULTS.

THE PRINCIPLE AND OBVIOUS ROOT CAUSE OF OUR DILEMMA IN THIS SUMMIT WAS THE APPARENT FACT OF THE GROWING POLARISATION AND ALLIANCE OF EXTREMES OF ZIONISM AND COMMUNISM WHICH JEOPARDIZES THE FREEDOM AND FUTURE OF THE ARAB WORLD. TRUE ARAB IDENTITY, SECURITY AND INTERESTS COINCIDING REALISTICALLY WITH THE GENUINE INTERESTS OF THE U.S., U.K. AND EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD. OUR FEELING TODAY IS THAT THIS POLARISATION EQUALLY AFFECTS THE STABILITY OF THESE AREAS AND WORLD PEACE.

THIS RADICAL ALLIANCE HAS MANIFESTED ITSELF CLEARLY IN ISRAELI AS WELL AS RADICAL ARAB SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S MENACING POSTURE TOWARDS IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA, THE GULF STATES AND OMAN IN INCREASING IRAN'S MILITARY CAPABILITY IN HER WAR WITH IRAQ. THE HOSTILE AND NEGATIVE RADICAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FAHD SAUDI ARABIAN PEACE PLAN BASED AS IT IS ON UNITED NATIONS' RESOLUTIONS AND EARLIER ARAB SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS IS IDENTICAL TO THE HOSTILITY MANIFESTED BY ZIONISM AND ISRAEL TOWARDS IT. THE EXTREME PRESSURES EXERTED ON THE P.L.O. LEADERSHIP FOR IT TO COMMIT POLITICAL SUICIDE IN OPPOSITION TO THE PLAN IS FURTHER PROOF OF THE REALITY OF THE SAID ALLIANCE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE RADICALS ALSO HELD MANY OTHER CARDS TO PLAY AT/THE

THE SUMMIT IF IT HAD CONTINUED WHICH WERE REVEALED AT THE PRELIMINARY FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETINGS. THESE INCLUDE:

1) DENUNCIATION OF SO-CALLED AMERICAN ISRAELI STRATEGIC ALLIANCE.

2) THE JERUSALEM ISSUE.

3) THE ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF ARAB SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

4) THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND PHYSICAL CHANGES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE PROPOSED MEDITERRANEAN DEAD SEA CANAL.

5) THE ISRAELI MILITARY THREAT AND POTENTIAL AND ITS GROWTH OVER THE YEARS, WITH U.S. SUPPORT.

6) THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

7) EGYPT WAS ALSO TO BE A TARGET AS THE ABOVE MENTIONED DEVELOPMENTS WERE ACCELERATED SINCE THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS SEMICLN ANOTHER TARGET TO BE DENOUNCED.

8) IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SPOKE OF 4,000 (FOUR THOUSAND) TANKS AND 300,000 (THREEHUNDRED THOUSAND) TROOPS WHOSE USE AND OBJECTIVES IS DEBATABLE CONSIDERING THE QUALITY OF THEIR TRAINING AND SUCH STOCK- PILING OF EQUIPMENT IS SIMILAR TO THAT IN LIBYA AND SOUTH YEMEN.

AT THIS TIME, WE WOULD HAVE HAD TO CHALLENGE THE POSSIBLE APPEAL TO EGYPT TO RENOUNCE THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS WITHOUT THE TOTAL RECOVERY OF HER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SEMICLN AN APPEAL IN ANY EVENT WHICH EGYPT WOULD HAVE REFUSED DESPITE OUR CONCERN OVER THE GLOBAL EFFECT OF TODAY'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORDS.

ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE AND AN INWARD LOOKING ARAB POSITION, COUPLED WITH EGYPT'S REACTION WOULD HAVE DESTROYED ANY POSSIBILITY OF FENCE-MENDING WITH EGYPT. FURTHER STILL, SYRIA HAD, AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING, PROPOSED DRASTIC DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC ACTIONS AGAINST THE E.E.C. PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROPOSED SINAI PEACE KEEPING FORCE.

/UNDER THESE

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, KING HASSAN AND I AGREED, TO MOVE FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUMMIT ON THE BASIS, INTER-ALIA, OF THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD OF SYRIAN HAD FAILED UNEXPECTEDLY TO ATTEND. THE SUMMIT, AS THE TERM IMPLIES, WILL BE ATTENDED BY HEADS OF STATE OR NUMBER TWOS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THEIR COUNTRIES TO MAJOR DECISIONS. MY FEELING FOR SUITABLE TIMING BEING POSSIBLY JUNE OF 1982. KING HASSAN AND I MET SHORTLY THEREAFTER WITH H.R.H. PRINCE FAHD WHO HAD INSISTED ON WITHDRAWING THE PEACE PLAN DUE TO THE INJUST CRITICISM OF IT AND UNACCEPTABLE SLANDER OF HIS COUNTRY. KING HASSAN AND I TOLD HIM THAT WE OPPOSED THIS COURSE OF ACTION OF WITHDRAWING A PLAN WHICH HAD NOW BECOME A JOINT ARAB COURSE OF ACTION ADOPTED AND SPONSORED BY THE MAJORITY OF ARAB STATES THAT HAD ACCEPTED IT.

THESE POINTS WERE CONVINCINGLY DISCUSSED BY THE HEADS OF STATE IN THE CLOSED MEETINGS. I FEEL SATISFIED THAT ARAB NATIONAL INTERESTS HAVE BENEFITTED BY THE MAJORITY'S SPONSORING OF THE PEACE PLAN. ALL OTHER AGENDA ITEMS WERE DEFERRED TO THE NEXT SESSION OF A FUNCTIONING SUMMIT TOWARDS WHICH KING HASSAN, PRINCE FAHD AND I WILL WORK IN CLOSE CO-OPERATION WITH LIKE-MINDED HEADS OF STATE.

WE SHALL TRY TO MOBILISE ALL RESOURCES FOR THE SUMMIT SUCCESS. MY FEELING OVER TIMING AGAIN BEING NOT BEFORE JUNE. WE DID HOWEVER AGREE ON THE AGENDA ITEM ON THE LEBANON AND ARAB RESOURCES WILL BE MOBILISED TOWARDS LEBANON'S RECONSTRUCTION.

I CAN SAY NOW THAT MORE THAN EVER WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR FRIENDS AND IN WORKING SERIOUSLY AT GIVING MEANING TO OUR FRIENDSHIP THROUGH CO-OPERATION FOR A BETTER TOMORROW IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST OF A JUST, HONOURABLE AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.''

ENDS

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM AMMAN 280935Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 462 OF 28 NOV
INFO PRIORITY RABAT WASHINGTON ROUTINE BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK
SAVING TO (FOR INFO) OTHER ME POSTS AND EC POSTS.

MY TELNO 461: ARAB SUMMIT MEETING

1. FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING HE GAVE EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS YESTERDAY MORNING REPORTED IN MY TUR, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN WAS IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN LATER IN THE DAY AFTER FURTHER TELEPHONE DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN. THE CROWN PRINCE TOLD ME OF THE KING'S ACUTE CONCERN THAT THE EUROPEAN LEADERS MIGHT, ON THE BASIS OF MISLEADING INITIAL REPORTS ON THE FEZ SUMMIT, CONTEMPLATE ABANDONING THE MODERATE ARABS AND ALSO THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION. I TOLD THE CROWN PRINCE THAT I PERSONALLY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF THIS HAPPENING.

2. FINALLY, WELL AFTER MIDNIGHT, THE CROWN PRINCE HAD DELIVERED TO MY HOUSE THE TEXT OF A BRIEFING MESSAGE ON THE FEZ CONFERENCE WHICH KING HUSSEIN HAD ASKED SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO THE PRIME MINISTER AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE (TEXT IN MIFT SEMICLN ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG). THE CROWN PRINCE HAD MENTIONED WHEN BRIEFING THE EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS YESTERDAY THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ABOUT THE CONFERENCE (PARAGRAPH 1 OF MY TUR), BUT AS FAR AS I CAN DISCOVER HE HAS NOT SENT ANY SIMILAR MESSAGE TO OTHER EUROPEAN LEADERS.

3. WHILE THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS OF THE KING'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER ARE A REPLAY OF FAMILIAR JORDANIAN THEMES (THE DANGERS OF POLARISATION OF THE ARAB WORLD AND THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE BETWEEN ZIONISM, COMMUNISM AND THE ARAB RADICAL STATES) THERE ARE ALSO SOME POINTS OF INTEREST:

A) THE EXTREME PRESSURE EXERTED ON THE PLO TO OPPOSE THE FAHD PLAN SEMICLN

B) THE STRONG CARDS HELD BY THE RADICAL ARAB STATES, WHICH THEY SEEM TO HAVE PLAYED TO SUCH GOOD EFFECT IN THE PRELIMINARY FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING THAT THE MODERATES LED BY MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN DECIDED TO ADJOURN THE SUMMIT MEETING UNTIL A LATER DATE SEMICLN

C) SYRIAN CLAIMS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING THAT THEY COULD FIELD 300,000 TROOPS AND 4,000 TANKS AGAINST ISRAEL, AND SYRIAN PRESSURE FOR DRASTIC ARAB DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST EC COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE SINAI PEACEKEEPING FONE SEMICLN

D) THE EFFECTIVE WORKING ALLIANCE FORGED BETWEEN KING HASSAN, PRINCE FAHD AND KING HUSSEIN DURING THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE, WHICH RESULTED IN THE FAHD PLAN BEING KEPT ON THE TABLE AND IN THE WILLINGNESS OF THE MODERATE MAJORITY AT THE CONFERENCE TO ADOPT AND SPONSOR THE PLAN IN SPITE OF RADICAL OPPOSITION.

4. IF KING HUSSEIN'S INTERPRETATION IS CORRECT, IT NOW LOOKS AS IF THE MODERATES WILL BE WORKING FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE FAHD PLAN AT AN ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN JUNE AND THAT IF IN THE END THEY CANNOT CARRY THE RADICAL ARAB STATES WITH THEM, THEY WILL GO AHEAD WITH IT NONETHELESS. MUCH SEEMS LIKELY TO DEPEND ON HOW FAR THE SAUDIS ARE WILLING TO USE THEIR FINANCIAL MUSCLE TO BRING AT LEAST SOME OF THE ARAB RADICAL STATES INTO LINE SEMICLN THE PLO'S POSITION IN PARTICULAR IS LIKELY TO BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT IN THE COMING MONTHS. CONTINUED EUROPEAN ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE VENICE DECLARATION WILL OF COURSE BE VITAL FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE MODERATE ARAB STRATEGY.

5. I HOPE WE CAN THEREFORE GIVE KING HUSSEIN THE REASSURANCE HE IS SEEKING. THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THE MESSAGE IN MIFT (WHICH THE KING CAN OF COURSE BE EXPECTED TO RELAY TO KING HASSAN AND PRINCE FAHD) MIGHT ALSO COVER THE KING'S EARLIER LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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FM WASHINGTON 280045Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3601 OF 27 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, TEL AVIV

MY TELEGRAM NO 3600: SINAI FORCE

1. FRETWELL HAS NOW SPOKEN TO VELIOTES WHO ADDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

2. SHAMIR STARTED OUT THIS MORNING FROM AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION WHICH WOULD HAVE RULED OUT ANY CHANCE OF AGREEMENT. HAIG HEARD HIM OUT, THEN MADE A PRESENTATION DRAWING HEAVILY ON YOUR MESSAGE. THIS HAD A TREMENDOUS IMPACT AND UNDERMINED THE ISRAELI ARGUMENTS. THE REST OF THE DAY WAS SPENT PUTTING TOGETHER THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT. THIS WOULD INCORPORATE A PARAPHRASE OF CERTAIN POINTS IN YOUR MESSAGE BUT NO ACTUAL QUOTATIONS FROM IT. THE STATEMENT WOULD REFER TO CLARIFICATIONS RECEIVED ON 26 NOVEMBER AND WOULD TAKE UP SUCH POINTS AS NOT PUTTING ANY GLOSS ON THE VARIOUS AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL, RECOGNITION THAT THE FUNCTION OF THE MFO IS AS DEFINED IN THE RELEVANT EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT (ADDING A REFERENCE TO ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION) AND THERE BEING NO POLITICAL CONDITONS TO PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE. THE REMAINDER OF THE STATEMENT WOULD SET OUT AT LENGTH US AND ISRAELI VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF THE FORCE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TREATY OF PEACE ETC.

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3. VELIOTES BELIEVED THAT IF THE STATEMENT ISSUED IN ITS PRESENT FORM THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR ANYONE TO REPLY TO IT. HE REPEATED HAIG'S EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE TO YOU FOR PROVIDING THE MATERIAL WHICH HAD MADE SUCCESS AT TODAY'S MEETING POSSIBLE. HE ADDED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL CALL BEGIN TOMORROW TO WISH HIM A SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY FROM HIS ACCIDENT AND TO URGE HIM TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT AS NOW DRAFTED.

4. VELIOTES ASKED THAT WE SHOULD NOT MAKE DETAILS OF THE STATEMENT AVAILABLE TO OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS BEFORE SUNDAY. HE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISK OF A LEAK. WE HERE WILL SIMPLY INFORM THE OTHER THREE EMBASSIES THAT A STATEMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED AND MAY ISSUE ON SUNDAY AND THAT WE UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS INTENDED NOT TO BE CONTROVERSIAL.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3600 OF 27 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, TEL AVIV

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1802: SINAI FORCE

1. HAIG TELEPHONED FRETWELL THIS EVENING, IN MY ABSENCE. HE SAID HE HAD SPENT A LONG HARD DAY WORKING OUT A JOINT STATEMENT WITH SHAMIR. THEY HAD FINALLY AGREED A DRAFT, WHICH WAS AD REFERENDUM TO THE ISRAELI CABINET. HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GIVE US THE DRAFT BEFORE IT HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET ON SUNDAY, BUT HE DID NOT THINK WE WOULD HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY WITH IT.

2. HAIG SAID THAT THE COMMENTS IN YOUR MESSAGE OF LAST NIGHT HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL TO HIM. THE JOINT US/ISRAELI STATEMENT WOULD DERIVE LARGELY FROM THEM. THE STATEMENT WOULD EXPLAIN THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF THE US AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS ON THE ONE HAND AND THOSE EXPRESSED IN THE STATEMENTS OF THE FOUR CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES ON THE OTHER, BUT THERE WOULD BE NO CRITICISM OF ANY SPECIFIC ELEMENT OF THE FOUR STATEMENTS. THE US WOULD EXPRESS UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT THE STATEMENTS, RECOGNISING THAT SOME ASPECTS WERE AT VARIANCE WITH US AND ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. THE STATEMENT WOULD TAKE UP POINTS FROM YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT NOT HAVING ATTACHED POLITICAL CONDITIONS, LINKED WITH VENICE OR OTHERWISE, TO PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE ETC.

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3. HAIG CONCLUDED BY REITERATING HIS GRATITUDE FOR YOUR TIMELY INTERVENTION. HE WAS EVIDENTLY CONCERNED TO REASSURE US ABOUT THE CONTENT OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT. HE NOTED THAT IT MIGHT POSSIBLY REAPPEAR HERE IN LESS AGREEABLE FORM AFTER SUBMISSION TO THE ISRAELI CABINET, BUT THOUGHT THAT AFTER TODAY'S EFFORTS WE WERE NEAR TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THIS LONG EXERCISE.

4. WE WILL TRY TO OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS OF THE DRAFT.

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3 Cables on Hussein's reaction to Fez.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 461 OF 27 NOV

INFO PRIORITY RABAT WASHINGTON ROUTINE BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK

INFO SAVING OTHER ME POSTS, EC POSTS.

ARAB SUMMIT MEETING.

1. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, WHO IS ACTING AS REGENT IN KING HUSSEIN'S ABSENCE, SUMMONED THE GERMAN AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS AND MYSELF (THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAS LEFT AND NOT YET BEEN REPLACED) TO BRIEF US ON THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE, ON THE BASIS OF TELEGRAMS RECEIVED FROM KING HUSSEIN AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM. HE SAID THAT, WITHOUT SEEKING TO PREEMPT THE PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH KING HASSAN WAS DUE TO GIVE SHORTLY, HE WANTED TO INFORM THE EUROPEAN LEADERS MEETING IN LONDON THAT THE RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE HAD NOT BEEN AS MEAGRE AS PRELIMINARY REPORTS INDICATED. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT KING HUSSEIN, WHO IS SPENDING A FEW DAYS IN SPAIN BEFORE RETURNING TO AMMAN ABOUT 1 DECEMBER, WOULD ALSO BE SENDING A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN OVER THE WEEKEND ABOUT THE CONFERENCE.

2. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN HEATED EXCHANGES BOTH IN PLENARY SESSIONS AND IN PRIVATE BETWEEN THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES AND WHAT HE TERMED THE ''ADEN CLUB MEMBERS,'' PARTICULARLY SYRIA. HOWEVERTHE MOROCCANS, JORDANIANS AND SAUDIS HAD WORKED TOGETHER VERY CLOSELY AND HAD RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM THE OTHER MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH HAD ATTENDED THE AMMAN SUMMIT A YEAR AGO. AS A RESULT MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND IN PREPARING FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT MEETING (WHICH KING HASSAN WAS AIMING TO CONVENE WITHIN 3 MONTHS, ALTHOUGH KING HUSSEIN THOUGHT 6 MONTHS WAS MORE LIKELY). PRINCE FAHD'S PLAN HAD BECOME AN ARAB PLAN AND WOULD REMAIN ON THE AGENDA DESPITE PRESSURES FROM THE ''ADEN CLUB'' TO HAVE IT REMOVED. THERE WOULD NOW BE MORE TIME TO MAKE PROPER PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT ARAB SUMMIT MEETING AND PARTICULARLY TO LOOK AT ITEM 7 OF THE FAHD PLAN. IN THIS SENSE, THEREFORE, THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED BY THE FULL AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD WITH KING HASSAN AND PRINCE FAHD. THE CROWN PRINCE UNDERSTOOD THAT IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE KING HASSAN WOULD STATE CLEARLY THAT THE PEACE OPTION WAS STILL OPEN.

3. PRINCE HASSAN SAID IT WAS STILL TOO SOON TO SAY WHETHER THE ''ADEN CLUB'' COUNTRIES WOULD ATTEND THE NEXT SUMMIT CONFERENCE,

/ BUT

BUT IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BE FORCED TO DECLARE THEMSELVES AND TO CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THE PEACE OPTION. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE CONTINUING *DIVISIONS* WITHIN THE PLO SEMICLN FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE ARAB PHARMACISTS CONFERENCE RECENTLY HELD IN AMMAN THERE HAD BEEN SEPARATE DELEGATIONS FROM THE PLO AND THE WEST BANK. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, THE CROWN PRINCE SAID THAT THE JORDANIANS ALSO HAD INFORMATION THAT THE SYRIANS WERE VERY SHORT OF MONEY AND THAT THE SAUDIS HAD WITHHELD THE LAST PAYMENT DUE TO SYRIA UNDER THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID THE SAUDIS WERE VERY DISSILLUSIONED BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURES TO WHICH THEY HAD BEEN EXPOSED ON ACCOUNT OF THE PRINCE FAHD PLAN.

4. THE ONLY ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED WAS THAT DEALING WITH ASSISTANCE FOR LEBANON. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TIMELY BECAUSE OF MR PHILIP HABIB WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE AREA SHORTLY SEMICLN HE WAS EXPECTED IN AMMAN ON 5 DECEMBER. THE CROWN PRINCE SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE IDEA FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEBANON, WHICH HAD BEEN FLOATED BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO MOROCCO, WOULD NOT GET FAR SEMICLN HE HAD SUMMONED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN TO SEEK CLARIFICATION, BUT THE LATTER HAD BEEN WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SUBJECT.

5. THE CROWN PRINCE ENDED BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED HE HAD SAID ENOUGH TO SHOW THAT THERE HAD INDEED BEEN SOME POSITIVE OUTCOME FROM THE CONFERENCE AND THAT THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES HAD DISPLAYED THEIR DETERMINATION TO KEEP THE PEACE OPTION ALIVE.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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TO PRIORITY F C O
TELNO 3559 OF 25 NOVEMBER 1981,
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, BEIRUT,
INFO SAVING CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, RABAT.

YOUR TELNO 1787: JORDAN/US

1. WHEN HE SAW HAGI TODAY, MR HURD REFERRED TO THE KING OF JORDAN'S CONCERN (WHICH HE HAD COMMUNICATED TO THE PRIME MINISTER) ABOUT THE STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRESIDENT. HAIG SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SENT THE KING A MESSAGE WHICH HE HOPED WOULD SET THINGS STRAIGHT.

2. THE TROUBLE HAD OCCURRED, SO HAIG EXPLAINED, BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN VICTIMISED BY JEWISH INTERVIEWERS (JUST AS HE, HAIG, HAD BEEN, AS HE KNEW TO HIS OWN COST BECAUSE IT HAD COMPLICATED HIS RELATIONS WITH YOU), WHO HAD ASKED HIM IF HE STUCK BY A STATEMENT HE HAD MADE DURING THE CAMPAIGN ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1980. STRAIGHTFORWARD MAN THAT HE IS, HE HAD REPLIED SIMPLY TO THE EFFECT THAT HE STUCK BY HIS STATEMENT. BUT HE HAD NOT MEANT TO ENUNCIATE A NEW POLICY FOR THE USA RELATING TO JERUSALEM. HAIG EMPHASISED THAT THE STATEMENT OF THE 15TH HAD BEEN A ''CAMPAIGN STATEMENT''.

3. HE ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM FROM NOW ON TO ''PLUG HUSSEIN IN'' IE TREAT HIM ROUGHLY THE SAME CONFIDENCE AS THE EGYPTIANS ON THESE MATTERS. MR HURD WELCOMED THIS.

FCO PASS SAVING : CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT.

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INFO SAVING TO CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA RABAT UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 1797: JORDAN/US

1. KING HUSSEIN LEFT FOR THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON THE MORNING OF 24 NOVEMBER (AS FORECAST IN MY TELNO 449) AND IT WAS NOT THEREFORE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO ACT ON THE INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR.

2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY TELNO 453 (TO FCO ONLY) THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN DID IN FACT SEND A MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN CONCERNING JERUSALEM PRIOR TO THE KING'S DEPARTURE FOR MOROCCO. I UNDERSTAND IT TOOK THE FORM OF A PERSONAL LETTER OF REASSURANCE TO THE KING ON THE US ATTITUDE.

3. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF I COULD RECEIVE REVISED INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT I MAY SAY TO THE KING ON HIS RETURN FROM MOROCCO, IN THE LIGHT OF MR HURD'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON. I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO OBSCURE THE FACT THAT WE TOOK NO ACTION WITH THE AMERICANS PRIOR TO THE KING'S DEPARTURE FOR FEZ

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSES

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VLB

25 November 1981

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 24 November. Mr. Fraser's message has, of course, been brought to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

His Excellency The Honourable
R. V. Garland

FILE

VLB

25 November 1981

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from the Prime Minister of Australia about Australia's participation in the Sinai MFO. Mr. Fraser's letter does not seem to require a reply.

Subject to your views, I think this latest communication relieves us of the necessity to reply to Mr. Fraser's earlier letter of 14 October to which, as you know, no substantive answer was ever sent.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET MFJ 7

25 November 1981

Jerusalem and US/Jordanian Relations

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 23 November on this subject and has read the enclosed telegrams describing King Hussein's dismay at President Reagan's recent statement about Jerusalem. After some hesitation, the Prime Minister decided that it would not be right to send a message to President Reagan. She therefore agreed, as I have informed you on the telephone, that Mr. Hurd should speak in Washington along the lines set out in the draft telegram attached to your letter.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
m

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Middle East

25 November 1981

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 25 November containing three messages to her from the President of the French Republic. President Mitterrand's messages have, of course, been brought to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

His Excellency Monsieur Emmanuel de Margerie

FILE

VLB

25 November 1981

I enclose a reply which the Prime Minister has today received from President Mitterrand to her message to him of 14 November on Sinai MFO.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

F. N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
LONDRES

L'AMBASSADEUR

25th November, 1981

Dear Prime Minister, 2nd + 3rd a different files

I have just received three messages addressed to you by the President of the French Republic.

I enclose them herewith.

Yours sincerely

Ernmanuel

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

T 165/81

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 165/81

Prime Minister
FYA

(2)

MESSAGE DE MONSIEUR FRANCOIS MITTERRAND,
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

A

THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.
PRIME MINISTER

Paris, le 25 novembre 1981

"Chère Madame le Premier Ministre,

J'ai bien reçu votre message du 14 novembre concernant la participation de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Italie et des Pays-Bas à la force multinationale qui doit être établie dans le Sinai.

J'ai tenu ces derniers jours le plus grand compte de vos suggestions à ce sujet.

Je suis heureux de voir que nos efforts communs ont abouti de façon positive.

Sincèrement vôtre et meilleurs sentiments personnels.

signé : François Mitterrand"./.

T 165/81

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

PARIS, le 24 novembre 1981

Chère Madame le Premier Ministre,

J'ai bien reçu votre message du 14 novembre concernant la participation de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Italie et des Pays-Bas à la Force multinationale qui doit être établie dans le Sinaï.

J'ai tenu ces derniers jours le plus grand compte de vos suggestions à ce sujet.

Je suis heureux de voir que nos efforts communs ont abouti de façon positive.

Sincèrement vôtre et meilleurs sentiments personnels,

François Mitterrand

François MITTERRAND

Madame Margaret THATCHER
Premier MInistre de Grande-Bretagne

L O N D R E S

GR 210

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FROM TEL AVIV 241230Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 460 OF 24 NOVEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, CAIRO, PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE.

OUR TELNO 458: SINAI MFO

1. THE TEXTS OF OUR NATIONAL STATEMENT AND THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN WERE DELIVERED YESTERDAY TO AMOS GANOR, DIRECTOR OF EUROPE II DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA. HE READ THEM THROUGH BUT MADE NO COMMENT.

2. THE MFA SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET WILL DISCUSS AND DECIDE ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF PROBLEMS RELATED TO PARTICIPATION (BY THE FOUR) IN THE MFO. THE NEXT REGULAR CABINET MEETING WILL BE HELD ON SUNDAY. THE SPOKESMAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE EUROPEAN STATEMENTS ''WOULD SEEM TO BE IN CONTRADICTION TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS''.

3. HEADLINES IN ALL TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS SUGGEST THAT THE TERMS OF THE EUROPEAN STATEMENTS MAY LEAD TO ISRAELI REJECTION, WITH PARTIUCULAR CRITICISM ADDRESSED TO OUR NATIONAL STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT. PRESS COMMENT IN THE MORNING DAILIES CONCENTRATES ON THE BRITISH STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE MFA NOW HAVE ALL FOUR TEXTS.

4. THE INDEPENDENT HEBREW-LANGUAGE MORNING DAILY ''HA'ARETZ'' CLAIMS THAT THE BRITISH STATEMENT WAS TOTALLY REJECTED IN JERUSALEM. WHILE THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE JERUSALEM POST QUOTES ''MINISTRY SOURCES'' AS SAYING THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO ''SLAM THE DOOR'' AT THIS STAGE.

5. EDITORIALS IN THE AFTERNOON DAILIES ''MA'ARIV'' AND ''YEDIOT ACHRONOT'' (BOTH INDEPENDENT) CALL FOR REJECTION OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION ON THE BASIS OF THE STATEMENTS ISSUED.

MOBERLY

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SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

T 163/81

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

Prime Minister (4)

24 November 1981

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 163/81

Fm. Pres

My dear Prime Minister,

A telegram from my Prime Minister asks me to convey to you the following text of a letter, the original of which is en route by diplomatic bag:

Begins -

"My dear Margaret,

As you know, on 22 October I announced Australia's decision to contribute, on certain conditions, a contingent to the Sinai Peacekeeping Force. The principal condition was that, in the interests of obtaining the broadest possible international acceptance of the Force, there be significant European participation.

I therefore welcome the decisions of Britain, France, the Netherlands and Italy to participate in the Force. Since your decisions give the Force a broad international balance and, at the same time, more than adequately fulfil an important condition of the Australian Government, I have now advised President Reagan as well as Prime Minister Begin and President Mubarak of our agreement to participate in the Force.

With warmest personal regards,

Malcolm Fraser."

Sincerely,

R.V. GARLAND

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 350

UNCLASSIFIED

FM ATHENS 241130Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 389 OF 24 NOV 1981
RPTD PRIORITY INFO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO
PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE

SAVING OTHER EC POSTS.

SINAI MFO

1. WHEN RELEASING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN TO THE PRESS ON 23 NOVEMBER, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ADDED THE FOLLOWING NATIONAL STATEMENT :

'' THE GREEK GOVERNMENT MADE IT CLEAR TO ITS PARTNERS IN THE COMMUNITY FROM THE BEGINNING THAT, WHILE IT WAS READY TO FACILITATE ANY EFFORT FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF THE WELL KNOWN PRINCIPLES WHICH IT HAS REPEATEDLY PROCLAIMED, NAMELY THE NEED FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN STATE AND THE NEED FOR THE PEACEFUL AND SECURE EXISTENCE OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION IT WAS NOT READY TO ACCEPT ANY CONNECTION WITH THE PROCEDURES FORESEEN BY THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, AGREEMENTS WHICH IT HAS NEVER RECOGNISED AS ABLE TO ENSURE THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION.

ON THE BASIS OF THIS GREEK POSITION, WHICH WAS FINALLY ACCEPTED, THE DECISION OF THE FOUR WESTERN POWERS TO SEND TROOPS FOR THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN SINAI IS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, WITH WHICH THE PARTICIPATION BY THE FOUR COINCIDES ON ONE POINT NLY, NAMELY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM SINAI. THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH IS DESIRED BY ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNITY INCLUDING GREECE, INDEPENDENT OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS.

/CONSEQUENTLY

CONSEQUENTLY THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN HAS CLARIFIED, AS THE GREEK GOVERMENT WISHES, THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DESIRES A COMPREHENSIVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EXISTENCE AND SECURITY OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION AND THE NEED FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO EXERCISE FULLY ITS RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION, WITH THE SETTING UP OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ''.

2. AS YET THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PRESS COMMENT OF SUBSTANCE. THE PRO-GOVERNMENT PRESS HAVE TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE COMMUNITY HAS ACCEPTED THE GREEK POSITION ON SINAI.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

SUTHERLAND

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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SECRET

6

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

This must be particularly galling for King Hussein after the "success" of his visit to Washington. On balance I think the weight of the argument must be against your sending a message. Agree text of the telegram at Flag 'A'?

(1)

23 November 1981

Dear Michael,

Jerusalem and US/Jordanian Relations

King Hussein has reacted sharply to President Reagan's recent public statement that he would prefer Jerusalem to remain unified under Israeli sovereignty. He has asked the Prime Minister for help in persuading President Reagan to undo the damage.

In a meeting in Washington with Jewish leaders on 19 November, President Reagan was trapped into making a statement that he would 'prefer Jerusalem to remain unified under Israeli sovereignty, with assured access for all to the Holy Places'. The White House subsequently issued a statement claiming that the President's response did not reflect any change in US policy, which is that Jerusalem should remain undivided, with free access to the Holy sites, but that the future status of the city should be determined through negotiations. The President's reference to Israeli sovereignty is described as his 'personal preference'. The State Department have advised their Middle East Embassies to review their security.

King Hussein, who had just returned to Amman from a successful visit to Washington, clearly feels badly betrayed. His messages to President Reagan and to Mr Haig (Amman telnos 447 and 448) describe the White House 'clarification' as inadequate, emphasize the difficult position in which the King is now placed as an advocate of US/Arab friendship, particularly just before the Fez Summit, and urge the Americans to produce a clear public statement to repair the damage. The US Charge d'Affaires has followed this up with a recommendation that President Reagan should send a message to King Hussein before the King's departure early on 24 November for Fez. He has told our Ambassador (Amman telno 449) that an independent approach from the Prime Minister to President Reagan might make the difference in persuading the President to send such a message. I attach, for ease of reference, copies of the Amman telegrams in question.

It is difficult to refuse a request from one who has deserved as well of us as King Hussein. Moreover our interests coincide with his in wanting to undo as much as possible of the damage done in relation to Arab opinion by President Reagan's

/remarks,

SECRET

remarks, and in wanting to see the cause of moderation getting the best possible hearing at the Fez Summit. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Americans will feel able to go very much further than the existing White House statement. If, moreover, we throw our full weight behind King Hussein's approach to President Reagan, there may be some at least in Washington who will suspect us of having engineered it. The Americans do not necessarily know that we have been given the full text of the King's messages.

Lord Carrington therefore believes that on balance it would be better for the Prime Minister not to send a message to President Reagan. He believes, however, that it would be useful to instruct Mr Hurd, who is now in Washington, to raise the issue in general terms at a high level in the State Department, to encourage the Americans to give the King as much reassurance as possible about US policy. I attach a telegram which, if the Prime Minister agrees, we would propose to send to Washington and to Amman.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

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GR 130

DESKBY

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DESKBY 231130Z NOV

FM AMMAN 231111Z NOV

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 449 OF 23 NOV

MY TELNOS 445/448: JORDAN/US

1. THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, SPEAKING IN CONFIDENCE, TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE YESTERDAY TO DRAPER AND VELIOTES IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT URGING THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOULD SEND AN IMMEDIATE MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN ON JERUSALEM, PREFERABLY TO REACH HIM PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM AMMAN ON THE MORNING OF 24 NOVEMBER. THE MESSAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE OF A KIND WHICH THE KING COULD USE AT FEZ IN ORDER TO OFFSET THE ILL EFFECTS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REMARKS TO LEADERS OF THE US JEWISH COMMUNITY ON 19 NOVEMBER.

2. EMPHASISING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND DID NOT OF COURSE WISH TO BE QUOTED, THE US CHARGE THOUGHT THAT AN INDEPENDENT APPROACH FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT MIGHT JUST MAKE THE DIFFERENCE IN PERSUADING THE PRESIDENT TO SEND SUCH A MESSAGE.

URWICK

NNNN

Member's Speeches (Upper Galleries)

Mr. Speaker: Order. I want to make a brief statement, but one that is not unimportant, further to the ruling that I gave on Tuesday last, that in future my eye is more likely to fall on those hon. Members who occupy places in the Chamber proper than on those who are using the Side Galleries. The House has authorised the making of a continuous tape recording of our proceedings for the purposes of sound broadcasting. The Side Galleries are not equipped with microphones, so no adequate recording can be made of speeches or interventions by hon. Members occupying those Galleries. I wish to make it clear, therefore, that until the House instructs me otherwise I do not propose to call hon. Members to speak from the Side Galleries, unless their reason for being there is that the Floor of the House and their normal side of the House is full.

Later——

Mr. Leslie Spriggs (St. Helens): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to question you about the statement that you made a few moments ago. In view of what has transpired over a number of years since broadcasting commenced in the Chamber, will the power of editing be taken away from the present Editor and put in your hands, because it appears to me that the Editor has edited out a number of questions and answers on transport?

Mr. Speaker: I have every confidence in and am deeply grateful to those who report our proceedings in the House. I shall, of course, look into the matter that the hon. Gentleman has raised.

Sinai Multinational Peacekeeping Force

Mr. Speaker: I call the Lord Privy Seal to make a statement.

Mr. Dennis Canavan (West Stirlingshire): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I shall take points of order as I normally do, after statements.

Mr. Canavan: My point of order concerns the Lord Privy Seal's statement.

Mr. Speaker: Very well.

Mr. Canavan: Some hon. Members have an unfair advantage over others, in that they get advance copies of the statements while the rest of us have to wait until the Minister makes the statement at the Dispatch Box. Is it in order for this privilege to be extended to members of the Social Democratic Party, who have flouted the will of their electorate?

Mr. Speaker: I do not decide to whom copies of statements are given, but certain courtesies are observed in the House, as I well know.

3.35 pm

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Humphrey Atkins): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement on the request of the United States Government for a British contribution to the proposed multinational force and observers in Sinai. We and the Governments of France, Italy and the Netherlands, who received similar requests, have notified the United States, Egyptian and Israeli Governments of our agreement in the following terms:

"The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, have decided, subject to their constitutional procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, to accede to the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States to contribute to the multinational force and observers in Sinai. The four Governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

(i) The force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal. It has no other role.

(ii) The force is being established in its present form in the absence of a United Nations decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible.

(iii) Participation by the four Governments in the force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participation in such other international peace-keeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region; and

Participation in the MFO by the four Governments is without prejudice to their well-known policies on other aspects of the problems of the area."

This decision is a symbol of our determination to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement following negotiations between the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and security for all the States of the area. We welcomed the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that goal. Similarly, we welcome the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call for withdrawal contained in Security Council resolution 242, which specifically declared inadmissible the acquisition of territory by war, and we believe that the international community has a duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the

[Mr. Humphrey Atkins]

parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East. We are ready to participate also in such arrangements in the other territories currently occupied in the context of Israeli withdrawal. We regard our support for the arrangements associated with the implementation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as quite distinct from and independent of the rest of the Camp David process.

In addition, we wish to express our firm support for the Egyptian Government and people and our belief in the need for stability and continuity in Egypt. Our decision to participate in the MFO follows from the policy, as stated in the declaration issued at Venice in June 1980 and in subsequent statements. This policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the State of Israel, places equal emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. It also holds that the PLO must be involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

We pledge ourselves to support the MFO. We also repeat that, together with our partners in the Ten, we will continue to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in all ways consistent with the principles to which we hold.

The Ten, as a whole have made a statement in support of our decision to participate in the following terms:

> "The Ten consider that the decision of France, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom to participate in the multinational force in Sinai meets the wish frequently expressed by members of the Community to facilitate any progress in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of mutual acceptance of the right to existence and security of all the States in the area and the need for the Palestinian people to exercise fully its right to self-determination."

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East): I think that the House will feel that it is important that the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel should be followed by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai. However, it is still unclear after the Lord Privy Seal's statement whether either the Arabs or the Israelis welcome participation in the force, whose purpose is to keep the peace thereafter.

We have all followed with bewilderment the muddle of the past few weeks, during which the Foreign Secretary and certain British ambassadors in the Middle East have played a conspicuous role. The statement raises more questions than it answers, and I propose to ask some of the questions.

First, is Britain planning to provide the force with troops as well as equipment? Are the other partners to the agreement also providing troops as well as equipment?

Secondly, I think that medieval schoolmen must have had something to do with the drafting of the basis on which the force is being contributed. I have been trying to find my way through the clauses and subordinate clauses that the Lord Privy Seal has read. Do I understand that this contribution is not connected with the Camp David agreement and that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai is seen by Her Majesty's Government and the other contributors to the force as implementing, in part, resolution 242 of the Security Council? Does their decision follow from the Venice declaration, rather than from anything else?

If I am right in believing that that is so, will the Minister tell us whether the Israeli Government have accepted the statement as the basis on which we should contribute troops? Does the PLO also approve?

Finally, I return to a question that I raised during the recent foreign affairs debate. The decision of the Western powers is clearly an essential response to American requests, rather than to requests from Israel or the Arabs. Has the United States in return clarified its Middle East policy, which is currently in a state of extraordinary confusion? There would be a good deal of concern on both sides of the House if, in practice, our contribution to the force implicated us in developments of American policy in the Middle East which we could not support.

Mr. Atkins: The right hon. Gentleman asked whether we were contemplating the provision of troops. The details remain to be worked out in detail—*[Interruption.]*—but it is our understanding and our offer that troops will be available. We are given to understand that it will not be very many and that they will be support troops.

Mr. Bob Cryer (Keighley): How many?

Mr. Atkins: The answer to the question asked by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) is "Yes". That applies to our European colleagues.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the connection with Camp David. As I said in my statement, the offer on our behalf is in support of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. He will remember that I said in my statement that we regard that as separate from the rest of the Camp David process. He asked also whether the Israelis would accept it. I hope that they will. The Israelis have been informed of our acceptance, but in accordance with the treaty they have the right of veto. However, it is our hope that they will accept the offer made by us and the other three Governments in the Ten.

The United States is clearly aware of our position and that of the Ten. It accepts that we are not departing from it, although we are glad to make this contribution in the manner that I have described.

Mr. Healey: I do not want to press the right hon. Gentleman again, but he must be more specific in answering my final question. The House well knows, and so does the world, that American policy in the Middle East is in a state of some disarray. Nobody in the United States or outside really knows what it is. During the recent foreign affairs debate I asked the right hon. Gentleman to assure the House that Britain would not offer a contribution to meet the American request unless American policy was clarified in a way satisfactory to us. Has there been any such clarification of American policy in the past two weeks?

Mr. Atkins: As the right hon. Gentleman well knows, I do not answer for United States policy. I have said before, and I say it again, that the United States has its own policy, which is based on what it did in 1978. It understands clearly that we have our own policy, which we shall continue to pursue, and it accepts that.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I propose to allow 20 minutes for questions on this statement before we move on to the second statement. If right hon. and hon. Members are brief that should be adequate.

OUT TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE 232300Z

ZCZC 1 ZCZC
GRS 2 GRS
CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS 4
DESKBY 5 232300Z
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PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 AND TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
10 REPEATED TO FOR INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, JERUSALEM
11 SAVING TO (FOR INFO) CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT, UKMIS NEW
12 YORK .
13 For PS/Mr Hurd
14 AMMAN TELNOS 445-448 AND 449 (now being repeated to you):
15 JORDAN/US
16 1. The last TUR contains a suggestion by the US Charge
17 in confidence that an independent approach from the Prime Minister
18 to President Reagan might make the difference in persuading the
19 President to send a reassuring message to King Hussein.
20 2. We doubt if the Americans will be able to go much
21 further than their quote clarifying unquote statement
/// 22 (Washington telno 3518) and I do not believe it would be
// 23 appropriate for the Prime Minister to act on this suggestion.
/ 24 But in his talks with the State Department tomorrow morning Mr
25 Hurd could indicate tactfully that the King has made us aware

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File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) F N RICHARDS		
Telephone number 233 4831		
Authorised for despatch		
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of his anxieties, that we sympathize with the difficult position in which President Reagan's statement has placed him (despite the White House clarification) and that at this particularly sensitive time we believe it is important that the King should be given as much reassurance about US policy as possible. Exploitation of President Reagan's statement by the radicals at the Fez Summit will be to the disadvantage of us all and we shall do our best also to steady the King.

3. The Prime Minister does not intend to reply herself to King Hussein's message, until the US reaction (if any) to the King's messages is known. But HMA Amman should tell the King that the Prime Minister and I are very conscious of his difficulties, and that we are ready to do what we can to help. We have therefore decided to take advantage of Mr Hurd's presence in Washington to urge the Americans to give him any help they can.

CARRINGTON

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword

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Spare.

A. K. C. Wood.

23/1.

With the Compliments
of the
Private Secretary
to the
Lord Privy Seal

Middle East

SINAI FORCE: STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL, 3.30 p.m. MONDAY, 23 NOVEMBER, 1981

With permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement on the request of the US Government for a British contribution to the proposed Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai. We and the Governments of France, Italy and the Netherlands, who received similar requests, have notified the United States, Egyptian and Israeli Governments of our agreement in the following terms:

QUOTE: The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, have decided, subject to their constitutional procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, to accede to the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States to contribute to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai. The Four Governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

(i) The Force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal. It has no other role.

(ii) The Force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible.

(iii)

(iii) Participation by the Four Governments in the Force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participation in such other international peacekeeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region; and

(iv) Participation in the MFO by the Four Governments is without prejudice to their well known policies on other aspects of the problems of the area. UNQUOTE

This decision is a symbol of our determination to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement following negotiations between the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and security for all the states of the area. We welcomed the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that goal. Similarly we welcome the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call for withdrawal contained in Security Council Resolution 242, which specifically declared inadmissible the acquisition of territory by war, and we believe that the international community has a duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East. We are ready to participate also in such arrangements in the other territories currently occupied in the context of Israeli withdrawal. We regard our support for the arrangements associated with the implementation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as quite distinct from and independent of the rest of the Camp David process.

In addition, we wish to express our firm support for the Egyptian Government and people and our belief in the need for

/stability

stability and continuity in Egypt. Our decision to participate in the MFO follows from the policy, as stated in the declaration issued at Venice in June 1980 and in subsequent statements. This policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the State of Israel, places equal emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. It also holds that the PLO must be involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

We pledge ourselves to support the MFO. We also repeat that, together with our partners in the Ten, we will continue to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in all ways consistent with the principles to which we hold.

The Ten as a whole have made a statement in support of our decision to participate in the following terms:

QUOTE: The Ten consider that the decision of France, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom to participate in the multinational force in Sinai meets the wish frequently expressed by members of the Community to facilitate any progress in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of mutual acceptance of the right to existence and security of all the states in the area and the need for the Palestinian people to exercise fully its right to self-determination. UNQUOTE

jd

Alan - really not for CF?
see record of mtg with President Mubarak.
Kay 26/11

Kay
Heath
24/11

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 November 1981

Dear Julian

Thank you for your letters of 12 and 19 November about South Africa and the Middle East. I am, as always, most grateful to you for letting me have the benefit of your views.

signed

MT

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.

jfh

TOP SECRET

58

22 November, 1981

Dear Secretary of State,

I feel it is imperative to appraise you of the fact that:-

1. We are facing a real and serious problem, which setbacks our ability to erase convincingly the totally negative effects of the President's statement.

2. The adverse effects of the said statement are far-reaching in affecting the outcome of the impending Arab Summit. Throughout the Arab and Muslim World it is the most sensitive subject of the entire Middle East affecting Muslims and Christians alike. The explanations I have received from our respective Embassies do not form a suitable basis of clarification.

3. I sympathize in advance with our host at the Arab Summit, His Majesty King Hassan of Morocco, who heads the Islamic Summit's Commission for the Recovery of the Rights in Jerusalem, and realize the unenviable situation all your friends are now facing as a result of the said statement. I hope you understand and fully appreciate this fact.

4. To anyone it must seem that what the President of the United States of America "preferred for Jerusalem" can only be what the Government of the United States "preferred for Jerusalem". With all due respect and appreciation, all subsequent messages to me do not as yet hold the same weight as the President's publicly declared preference. The effects of these messages cannot be equally counter-balanced on the same scale.

5. My understanding of the United States Government's position and policy was that it stood for an international Jerusalem, meaning both Israeli and Arab Jerusalem, in terms of the combined municipal boundaries of the City. Based on the United Nations Partition Plan the United States Government never officially recognized the claims of sovereignty by either side, i.e. Israel and Jordan prior to the 1967 War.

Continued/... 2 6. If this

6. If this is still the valid policy of the United States Government then it should be reaffirmed, otherwise one cannot escape the conclusions that there has been a drastic change of policy.

7. Possible progress could be recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Israeli part of the City of Jerusalem and recognition of Arab sovereignty over the Arab part of the City as it stood prior to the 5th of June 1967. If this is possible it requires further clarification, particularly as the whole issue is one of claims to sovereignty.

8. In any event, principles are the fundamental prerequisite to any possible future negotiations and without their reaffirmation no progress can be achieved based on the unacceptable premise of the dictates of conquest.

9. Negotiations, based on principles clearly defined between men of goodwill, should aim at the implementation of the said principles. Such a plan of action should be inclusive of details of legitimate property claims of either side following the outbreak of hostilities and the subsequent United Nations Partition Plan of 1947.

10. A natural goal, and in the context of a just and durable peace, is free access to all the Holy Places by all believers in God. A possible outcome is that Jerusalem can come to represent the meaning and essence of Peace to all whenever men of goodwill choose to make it so.

With these points in mind the vital questions brought about by the President's statement require urgent clarification and remain unanswered todate.

1. Against this background, the statement that "The policy of the United States Government is that the status of Jerusalem must be settled through negotiations" is inadequate and at best confusing, unless and until the principles recognized by the United States Government as the foundation of any negotiations are clearly clarified and reidentified.

Continued/... 3 2. I am

2. I am uncertain and confused by the reference the President made to me on U.S. policy on Jerusalem, and I am anxious to receive clarification on this point, since I do not recall hearing the outline of such a policy in any detail. If the President implied no change in U.S. policy then I urgently request clarification of the outline of your present position.

3. Although of indirect concern, I must add that the Presidential statement must be prejudicial to the Egyptian negotiating position.

4. Finally, I find it imperative to repeat my request for the United States reactions, in writing, on all the points raised in my Talking Points presented on may recent visit to Washington. The purpose would be to ensure a clear understanding and to avoid any possible future misinterpretation of any subject or issue.

With my warmest regards,

Your Sincere friend,

Hussein I.

The Secretary of State
Alexander Haig, Jr.
The State Department
Washington D.C.

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FM AMMAN 221750Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 448 OF 22 NOV
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA RABAT TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK AND JERUSALEM

MY TELNO 445: JORDAN/US
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO MR HAIG MARKED TOP SECRET AND DATED 22 NOVEMBER.

BEGINS

DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE,
I FEEL IT IS IMPERATIVE TO APPRAISE YOU OF THE FACT THAT:-

1. WE ARE FACING A REAL AND SERIOUS PROBLEM, WHICH SETBACKS OUR ABILITY TO ERASE CONVINCINGLY THE TOTALLY NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

2. THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE SAID STATEMENT ARE FAR-REACHING IN AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF THE IMPENDING ARAB SUMMIT. THROUGHOUT THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD IT IS THE MOST SENSITIVE SUBJECT OF THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST AFFECTING MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS ALIKE. THE EXPLANATIONS I HAVE RECEIVED FROM OUR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES DO NOT FORM A SUITABLE BASIS FOR CLARIFICATION.

3. I SYMPATHIZE IN ADVANCE WITH OUR HOST AT THE ARAB SUMMIT, HIS MAJESTY KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO, WHO HEADS THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT'S COMMISSION FOR THE RECOVERY OF THE RIGHTS OF JERUSALEM, AND REALIZE THE UNENVIABLE SITUATION ALL YOUR FRIENDS ARE NOW FACING AS A RESULT OF THE SAID STATEMENT. I HOPE YOU UNDERSTAND AND FULLY APPRECIATE THIS FACT.

4. TO ANYONE IT MUST SEEM THAT WHAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ''PREFERRED FOR JERUSALEM'' CAN ONLY BE WHAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ''PREFERRED FOR JERUSALEM.'' WITH ALL DUE RESPECT AND APPRECIATION, ALL SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES TO ME DO NOT AS YET HOLD THE SAME WEIGHT AS THE PRESIDENT'S PUBLICLY DECLARED PREFERENCE. THE EFFECTS OF THESE MESSAGES CANNOT BE EQUALLY COUNTER-BALANCED ON THE SAME SCALE.

5. MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND POLICY WAS THAT IT STOOD FOR AN INTERNATIONAL JERUSALEM, MEANING BOTH ISRAELI AND ARAB JERUSALEM, IN TERMS OF THE COMBINED MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY. BASED ON THE UNITED NATIONS PARTITION PLAN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT NEVER OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED THE CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY BY EITHER SIDE, I.E. ISRAEL AND JORDAN PRIOR TO THE 1967 WAR.

6. IF THIS IS STILL THE VALID POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THEN IT SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED, OTHERWISE ONE CANNOT ESCAPE THE CONCLUSIONS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A DRASTIC CHANGE OF POLICY.

7. POSSIBLE PROGRESS COULD BE RECOGNITION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISRAELI PART OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM AND RECOGNITION OF ARAB SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ARAB PART OF THE CITY AS IT STOOD PRIOR TO THE 5TH OF JUNE 1967. IF THIS IS POSSIBLE IT REQUIRES FURTHER CLARIFICATION, PARTICULARLY AS THE WHOLE ISSUE IS ONE OF CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY.

8. IN ANY EVENT, PRINCIPLES ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL PREREQUISITE TO ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND WITHOUT THEIR REAFFIRMATION NO PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED BASED ON THE UNACCEPTABLE PREMISE OF THE DICTATES OF CONQUEST.

9. NEGOTIATIONS, BASED ON PRINCIPLES CLEARLY DEFINED BETWEEN MEN OF GOODWILL, SHOULD AIM AT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAID PRINCIPLES. SUCH A PLAN OF ACTION SHOULD BE INCLUSIVE OF DETAILS OF LEGITIMATE PROPERTY CLAIMS OF EITHER SIDE FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES AND THE SUBSEQUENT UNITED NATIONS PARTITION PLAN OF 1947.

10. A NATURAL GOAL, AND IN THE CONTEXT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE, IS FREE ACCESS TO ALL THE HOLY LAND PLACES BY ALL BELIEVERS IN GOD. A POSSIBLE OUTCOME IS THAT JERUSALEM CAN COME TO REPRESENT THE MEANING AND ESSENCE OF PEACE TO ALL WHENEVER MEN OF GOODWILL CHOOSE TO MAKE IT SO.

WITH THESE POINTS IN MIND THE VITAL QUESTIONS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT REQUIRE URGENT CLARIFICATION AND REMAIN UNANSWERED TODATE.

11. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE STATEMENT THAT ''THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS THAT THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM MUST BE SETTLE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS'' IS INADEQUATE AND AT BEST CONFUSING, UNLESS AND UNTIL THE PRINCIPLES RECOGNIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS THE FOUNDATION OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS ARE CLEARLY CLARIFIED AND REIDENTIFIED.

12. I AM UNCERTAIN AND CONFUSED BY THE REFERENCE THE PRESIDENT MADE TO ME ON U.S. POLICY ON JERUSALEM, AND I AM ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE CLARIFICATION ON THIS POINT, SINCE I DO NOT RECALL HEARING THE OUTLINE OF SUCH A POLICY IN ANY DETAIL. IF THE PRESIDENT IMPLIED NO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY THEN I URGENTLY REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF THE OUTLINE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION.

13. ALTHOUGH OF INDIRECT CONCERN, I MUST ADD THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT MUST BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATING POSITION.

14. FINALLY, I FIND IT IMPERATIVE TO REPEAT MY REQUEST FOR THE UNITED STATES REACTIONS, IN WRITING, ON ALL THE POINTS RAISED IN MY TALKING POINTS PRESENTED ON MY RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO ENSURE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING AND TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE MISINTERPRETATION OF ANY SUBJECT OR ISSUE.

WITH MY WARMEST REGARDS,
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN I

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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FM AMMAN 221712Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 447 OF 22 NOV.
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA RABAT TEL AVIV UKMIS
NEWYORK AND JERUSALEM

MY TELNO 445: JORDAN/US
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN MARKED TOP SECRET AND DATED 21 NOVEMBER.

BEGINS:
DEAR MR PRESIDENT,
I MUST ADMIT THAT UPON MY RETURN TO JORDAN MY ENTHUSIASM WAS ALMOST DEFLATED WHEN I WAS INFORMED OF YOUR RECENT STATEMENTS ON JERUSALEM FOLLOWED BY FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. THE UPROAR WHICH I HAVE HAD TO FACE ON MY FIRST DAY BACK HOME - I SHALL LEAVE AGAIN ON 24 NOVEMBER TO ATTEND THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN MOROCCO - IS JUSTIFIED. IT IS FELT EQUALLY BY ALL ARABS, AND PROBABLY BY ALL CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS, RATHER THAN PURELY BY THE PALESTINIANS. MY IMPRESSIONS AND HOPES FOLLOWING MY VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, WHICH I HAD CONVEYED TO MY PEOPLE AND MANY FIRENDS PRIOR TO MY ARRIVAL IN AMMAN, REFERRED TO AN EVEN-HANDED, POSSIBLE FUTURE U.S. POLICY. THIS REFERENCE TO THE ROOT CAUSE OF GENERAL INSTABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOTABLY THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM, NOW SEEMS TO BE OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE.

I LEAVE FOR MOROCCO SEVERELY SET BACK IN CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE OF THOSE WHO HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO IDENTIFY ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES AS ONE AND THE SAME IN TERMS OF ANIMOSITY TO THE ARABS AND THE DENIAL OF THEIR RIGHTS.

MANY OF MY FIRENDS AND COLLEAGUES HAVE, IN THE PAST, ALWAYS LEFT THE ONUS OF FACING THE RADICAL ONSLAUGHT TO ME. I HAD NOT EXPECTED IT TO BE ANY DIFFERENT THIS TIME. YET, I AM EVEN FURTHER HANDICAPPED AT THIS MOST IMPORTANT MEETING. THE BATTLE AGAINST POLARISATION OF THE ENTIRE AREA AND ITS FUTURE MAY NOW BE AFFECTED BY THE RUG BEING SWEPT FROM UNDER MY FEET, SO TO SPEAK, THROUGH THE UNFORTUNATE STATEMENTS ON JERUSALEM. THEIR TIMING, MR. PRESIDENT, REGRETTABLY COINCIDED WITH MY HOME-COMING FROM MY MEETINGS WITH YOU.

I WOULD NEVER PRESUME, SIR, TO CHALLENGE YOUR STATEMENTS BUT I DO FEEL THAT I HAVE A RIGHT TO DO SO IF THEY NOT ONLY AFFECT MY PEOPLE AND MYSELF BUT UNDERMINE RIGHTS THAT GO BEYOND US TO THOSE RIGHTS OF SO MANY IN THIS WORLD, CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM ALIKE WHO HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS WITH THE JEWS IN THE CITY OF JERUSALEM. I HAVE, SIR, I FEEL THE RIGHT OF A FRIEND WHO IS GENUINELY SEEKING TO CONSOLIDATE OUR FRIENDSHIP TO ASK YOU, WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND WHERE DO WE STAND

/ NOW?

NOW? THAT IS IN TERMS, EVEN OF OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS, OF SECURING THE JUST, HONOURABLE AND LASTING PEACE, IN THIS AREA WHICH I NONETHELESS BELIEVE IS OUR FINAL GOAL.

ACCORDING TO RESOLUTION 242 JERUSALEM IS OCCUPIED TERRITORY. JERUSALEM IS NOT EVEN A SECURITY ISSUE. IT TOOK ISRAEL LONGER TO REACH THE WALLS OF THE OLD CITY THAT IT TOOK THEM TO REACH THE BANKS OF THE SUEZ CANAL IN 1967. WE CHOSE TO VACATE IT RATHER THAN BE INDIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE HOLY CITY. THE U.S. POSITION ON JERUSALEM DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER RESOLUTION 242 WAS OF FULL RECOGNITION OF OUR RIGHTS. THE U.S. MADE THE EXCEPTION OF NOT GOING ALONG WITH THE CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY, FROM EITHER SIDE, OVER THE CITY AS A WHOLE. ON JERUSALEM, THE PARTITION PLAN CALLED FOR THE STATUS OF THE SEPARATE ENTITY TO BE RESOLVED INTERNATIONALLY. FURTHERMORE, THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN SEARCH OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO INCLUDE, IN OUR VIEW, A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF ARAB PROPERTIES IN ISRAEL AND WESTERN PRE-1967 JERUSALEM.

ISRAEL HAS, MR PRESIDENT, BEEN IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN DEFIANCE OF THE U.S. AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY. ISRAEL ANNOUNCED AND EXERCISED ANNEXATION OF NOT ONLY ARAB JERUSALEM, AS IT WAS, BUT HAS EXPANDED THE CITY LIMITS TO INCORPORATE ONE-FIFTH OF THE ENTIRE OCCUPIED WEST BANK. HOW THEN, IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT STATEMENTS, CAN IT BE ARGUED NOW THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT CHANGED FROM ITS TRADITIONAL POSITION? AND WHERE IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND AMERICAN POSITIONS?

I HOPE YOU BEAR WITH ME, MR PRESIDENT, WHEN I PLEAD WITH YOU NOT TO PERMIT ANY QUARTER TO TAMPER WITH THE FACTS BEFORE PLACING THEM BEFORE YOU, FOR WHATEVER SHORT-SIGHTED, LIMITED AND DISASTROUS ENDS THEY MAY HAVE IN MIND.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT YOUR GREAT RESPONSIBILITIES CANNOT PERMIT A PERSONAL EXAMINATION OF EVERY ISSUE PLACED BEFORE YOU. BUT, EQUALLY, I HATE TO BE PLACED IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO DISTURB YOU, BY BEING COMPELLED TO DO SO TIME AND AGAIN, BECAUSE OF OBVIOUS FLAGRANT MISREPRESENTATIONS OF FACTS WITH THEIR CONSEQUENT SAD RESULTS. I AM, SIR, DEEPLY UNHAPPY TO FIND MYSELF IN SUCH A SITUATION.

/ IF I HAD

IT I HAD NOT COME TO KNOW YOU MY FFIEND I WOULD HAVE JUMPED TO THE WRONG CONCLUSIONS. BUT I KNOW YOU AND YOUR INTERESTS IN A JUST PEACE AND YOUR REGARD FOR MORALS, PRINCIPLES AND FAIRNESS. I AM THUS EVEN MORE VEXED WHEN I SEE UNNECESSARY DAMAGE OCCUR. THIS ADVERSELY AFFECTS YOUR IMAGE, WHICH IS THAT OF THE UNITED STATES SEMICLN EQUALLY, YOUR INTERESTS AND THE CAUSE OF YOUR PARTNERS IN FREEDOM, RANGING FROM EGYPT TO JORDAN, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA AND THE MAJORITY OF ARAB STATES. IS THERE ANYTHING MY FRIEND THAT YOU COULD DO TO HELP TO CLARIFY AND RECTIFY THE SITUATION? IS THERE ANYTHING, SIR, BEYOND THE DIPLOMATICALLY WORDED AND VAGUE STATEMENTS WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON, AND WHICH DO NOT AND WILL NOT BE CONVINCING, IN ENABLING US TO KEEP OUR HEADS HIGH AT FEZ OR ANYWHERE ELSE SEMICLN TO ENABLE ME TO APPEAR BEFORE MY GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, AS WELL AS ALL THE ARABS PARTICULARLY AT FEZ, AS A CONVINCING ADVOCATE OF ARAB-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP AND COMMONALITY OF INTERESTS IN A BETTER TOMORROW? THE ANSWER CAN ONLY COME FROM YOU AND AS I ENDED MY TALKINGS POINTS, WHICH I LEFT WITH YOU, THE FUTURE OF OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS IS FOR THE MOST PART IN YOUR ABLE HANDS.

WITH MY WARM PERSONAL WISHES,
I AM,
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN I

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FM F C O 221926Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 517 OF 22 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG BRUSSELS
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS ROME THE HAGUE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
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SINAI FORCE

1. PARA 2 BELOW CONTAINS TEXT OF COREU TELEGRAM TO BE DESPATCHED EARLY ON MONDAY 23 NOVEMBER. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD ENSURE THAT POLITICAL DIRECTORS SEE IT SOON, AND PLEASE DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON WASHINGTON TELNOS 3526-7, TEL AVIV TELNO 457 AND CAIRO TELNO 647 TO ANSWER QUESTIONS THEY MAY HAVE.

2. COREU TEXT BEGINS:

PARTNERS WHO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE PRESIDENCY'S EMBASSIES DURING THE WEEKEND WILL BE AWARE THAT AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON SATURDAY MORNING ON A STATEMENT BY THE TEN AS PROPOSED IN COREU NO 3827. FOLLOWING THIS IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE UNITED STATES FOUND THE TEXTS AND PROCEDURES PROPOSED BY THE TEN AND THE FOUR PARTIPATING COUNTRIES ACCEPTABLE.

THE AMBASSADORS OF UK, FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS IN WASHINGTON THEREFORE DELIVERED MESSAGES TO MR HAIG LATE ON THE EVENING OF 21 NOVEMBER (WASHINGTON TIME). AMBASSADORS OF THE SAME FOUR COUNTRIES IN CAIRO AND TEL AVIV DELIVERED IDENTICAL MESSAGES TO THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE MORNING OF 22 NOVEMBER. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT WELCOMED THE MESSAGES. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT SAID THAT THEY WOULD REPLY IN DUE COURSE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION BY THE ISRAELI CABINET.

THE UK WILL MAKE A NATIONAL STATEMENT CONCERNING ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MFO, AS ENVISAGED AT 1530 GMT. THIS STATEMENT WILL FOLLOW THE LINES AGREED AMOUNG THE TEN AT AN EARLIER STAGE. AT THE SAME TIME, ACTING IN ITS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENCY THE UK WILL RELEASE THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN. THE PRESIDENCY WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF PARTNERS COULD NOT THEMSELVES RELEASE THE TEXT OF THE TEN'S STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE PRESIDENCY.

FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY THE PRESIDENCY ANNEXES BELOW THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE SENT BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN

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CONFIDENTIAL

A. MESSAGE FROM THE FOUR

THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, AFTER CONSULTING THEIR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, HAVE DECIDED, SUBJECT TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND TO AGREEMENT ON THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS, TO ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI. THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT:

(I) THE FORCE EXISTS SOLELY FOR THE PRUPOSE OF MAINTAING PEACE IN SINAI FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. IT HAS NO OTHER ROLE.

(II) THE FORCE IS BEING ESTABLISHED IN ITS PRESENT FORM IN THE ABSENCE OF A UN DECISION ON AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND ITS POSITION WILL BE REVIEWED SHOULD SUCH A DECISION BECOME POSSIBLE.

(III) PARTICIPATION BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS IN THE FORCE WILL NOT BE TAKEN EITHER AS COMMITTING THEM TO OR EXCLUDING THEM FROM PARTICIPATION IN SUCH OTHER INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS AS HAVE BEEN OR MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN THE REGION.

(IV) PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR WELL-KNOWN POLICIES ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA.

B. TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN.

THE TEN CONSIDER THAT THE DECISION OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN SINAI MEETS THE WISH FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO FACILITATE ANY PROGRESS IN THE DIRECTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE BASIS OF THE MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO EXISTENCE AND SECURITY OF ALL THE STATES IN THE AREA AND THE NEED FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO EXERCISE FULLY ITS RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

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FM AMMAN 221655Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 446 OF 22 NOV
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA RABAT TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK AND JERUSALEM

MY TELNO 445: JORDAN/US.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S HANDWRITTEN MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATES 22 NOVEMBER.

BEGINS:
DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I FELT IT IMPERATIVE TO SEND YOU IN GREAT CONFIDENCE COPIES OF OUR RECENT MESSAGES TO OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS. WE ARE INDEED FACING A SERIOUS AND UNEXPECTED PROBLEM. IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU COULD KINDLY DO TO GET WASHINGTON TO UNDO SOME VERY SERIOUS DAMAGE WHICH THEY HAVE CAUSED US ALL, IT WOULD BE IN OUR COMMON INTEREST.

I THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR MANY KINDNESSES AND SEND YOU MY WARMEST REGARDS WISHES AND HIGHEST ESTEEM.

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,
HUSSEIN I

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 161 Ac/81

Dear Prime Minister,

I felt it imperative to send you in great confidence copies of our recent messages to our American friends. We are indeed facing a serious and unexpected problem. If there is anything you could kindly do to get Washington to undo some very serious damage which it have caused us all it would be in our common intrest.

I thank you once again for your many kindnesses and send you my warmest regards wishes and highest esteem

Your Sincere friend,

22nd November 1981

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

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FM AMMAN 221630Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 445 OF 22 NOV
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROUTINE BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA RABAT TEL AVIV UKMIS NEWYORK AND JERUSALEM
SAVING (FOR INFO) OTHER M.E. POSTS.

JORDAN/UNITED STATES

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COMMENTS TO JEWISH LEADERS IN THE US ON 19 NOVEMBER THAT HE WOULD PREFER JERUSALEM TO REMAIN UNIFIED UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY, WITH ASSURED ACCESS FOR ALL TO THE HOLY PLACES, HAVE PROVOKED A PREDICTABLY STRONG REACTION HERE. KING HUSSEIN'S PERSONAL EMBARRASSMENT HAS BEEN ALL THE MORE ACUTE BECAUSE THESE COMMENTS WERE MADE SHORTLY AFTER HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND ON THE EVE OF THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING IN FEZ.

2. I WAS SUMMONED BY THE KING TODAY TO BE GIVEN A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER TOGETHER WITH COPIES OF HIS MESSAGES TO THE US PRESIDENT AND TO MR HAIG. TEXTS ARE IN MY 3 IFTS REPEATED SAVING TO ALL TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESSEES EXCEPT WASHINGTON. ORIGINALS FOLLOW BY BAG TO THE FCO.

3. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME THAT, WHILE HE STILL BELIEVED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO BE A FUNDAMENTALLY DECENT MAN, REAGAN HAD MADE THE POSITION OF JORDAN AND OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES, NOTABLY SAUDI ARABIA AND MOROCCO AS HOST, AT THE FEZ SUMMIT VIRTUALLY UNTENABLE BY HIS REMARKS. HE WOULD VERY GREATLY APPRECIATE ANYTHING THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOURSELF COULD DO TO PERSUADE THE PRESIDENT TO REPAIR SOME OF THE DAMAGE HE HAD CAUSED.

4. I WARNED THE KING THAT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE WOULD BE ANNOUNCED TOMORROW, ALSO ON THE EVE OF THE FEZ SUMMIT. HE WINCED, BUT THEN ASKED WHETHER OUR STATEMENT WOULD STILL CLEARLY DISSOCIATE THE EUROPEAN ROLE FROM CAMP DAVID. I SAID THAT IT WOULD AND UNDERTOOK TO HAVE A COPY DELIVERED TO HIM ON THE MORNING OF 23 NOVEMBER. IN GENERAL HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FEZ SUMMIT, WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD BE A VERY DIFFICULT MEETING.

5. THE US PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON JERUSALEM HAVE HAD A VERY BAD PRESS HERE OVER THE LAST 2 DAYS, AND HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS POTENTIALLY A TURNING-POINT IN US/ARAB RELATIONS. JORDANIAN PAPERS ASK HOW PRESIDENT REAGAN CAN STATE THAT US POLICY IS BASED ON UN RESOLUTION NO 242 WITH ITS UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE AND AT THE SAME TIME SUPPORT THE EXTENSION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST JERUSALEM

THE US PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ARE ALSO SEEN AS A REJECTION OF THE SAUDI PEACE PLAN. ONE LEADING NEWSPAPER CALLS ON ARAB LEADERS AT FEZ TO STATE CLEARLY THAT THERE CAN BE NO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES UNLESS ARAB JERUSALEM IS RETURNED TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY.

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21 November, 1981

Dear Mr President

I must admit that upon my return to Jordan my enthusiasm was almost deflated when I was informed of your recent statements on Jerusalem followed by further clarifications from the White House. The uproar which I have had to face on my first day back home - I shall leave again on 24 November to attend the Arab Summit Conference in Morocco - is justified. It is felt equally by all Arabs, and probably by all Christians and Muslims, rather than purely by the Palestinians. My impressions and hopes following my visit to the United States, which I had conveyed to my people and many friends prior to my arrival in Amman, referred to an even-handed, possible future U.S. policy. This reference to the root cause of general instability in the Middle East, notably the Arab-Israeli problem, now seems to be of little consequence.

I leave for Morocco severely set back in confronting the challenge of those who have always sought to identify Israel and the United States as one and the same in terms of animosity to the Arabs and the denial of their rights.

Many of my friends and colleagues have, in the past, always left the onus of facing the radical onslaught to me. I had not expected it to be any different this time. Yet, I am even further handicapped at this most important meeting. The battle against polarisation of the entire area and its future may now be affected by the rug being swept from under my feet, so to speak, through the unfortunate statements on Jerusalem. Their timing, Mr. President, regrettably coincided with my home-coming from my meetings with you.

Continued/... 2 I would never

I would never presume, Sir, to challenge your statements but I do feel that I have a right to do so if they not only effect my people and myself but undermine rights that go beyond us to those rights of so many in this world, Christian and Muslim alike who have equal rights with the Jews in the City of Jerusalem. I have, Sir, I feel the right of a friend who is genuinely seeking to consolidate our friendship to ask you, what has happened and where do we stand now? That is in terms, even of our mutual interests, of securing the just, honourable and lasting peace in this area which I nonetheless believe is our final goal.

According to Resolution 242 Jerusalem is occupied territory. Jerusalem is not even a security issue. It took Israel longer to reach the walls of the Old City than it took them to reach the banks of the Suez Canal in 1967. We chose to vacate it rather than be indirectly responsible for serious damage to the Holy City. The U.S. position on Jerusalem during the negotiations over Resolution 242 was of full recognition of our rights. The U.S. made the exception of not going along with the claims of sovereignty, from either side, over the City as a whole. On Jerusalem, the Partition Plan called for the status of the separate entity to be resolved internationally. Furthermore, the subject of negotiations in search of a comprehensive peace would also have to include, in our view, a solution of the problems relating to Israeli annexation of Arab properties in Israel and Western pre-1967 Jerusalem.

Israel has, Mr. President, been in violation of international law and in defiance of the U.S. and the world community. Israel announced and exercised annexation of not only Arab Jerusalem, as it was, but has expanded the City limits to incorporate one-fifth of the entire occupied West Bank. How then, in the light of recent statements, can it be argued now that the U.S. has not changed from its traditional position? And where is the difference between the Israeli and American positions?

I hope you bear with me, Mr. President, when I plead with you not to permit any quarter to tamper with the facts before placing them before you, for whatever short-sighted, limited and disastrous ends they may have in mind.

Continued/... 3 It is obvious

It is obvious that your great responsibilities cannot permit a personal examination of every issue placed before you. But, equally, I hate to be placed in the position of having to disturb you, by being compelled to do so time and again, because of obvious flagrant misrepresentations of facts with their consequent sad results. I am, Sir, deeply unhappy to find myself in such a situation.

If I had not come to know you my friend I would have jumped to the wrong conclusions. But I know you and your interests in a just peace and your regard for morals, principles and fairness. I am thus even more vexed when I see unnecessary damage occur. This adversely affects your image, which is that of the United States; equally, your interests and the cause of your partners in freedom, ranging from Egypt to Jordan, including Saudi Arabia and the majority of Arab States. Is there anything my friend that you could do to help to clarify and rectify the situation? Is there anything, Sir, beyond the diplomatically worded and vague statements which we have received from Washington, and which do not and will not be convincing, in enabling us to keep our heads high at Fez or anywhere else; to enable me to appear before my Government and people, as well as all the Arabs particularly at Fez, as a convincing advocate of Arab-American friendship and commonality of interests in a better tomorrow? The answer can only come from you and as I ended my Talking Points, which I left with you, the future of our mutual interests is for the most part in your able hands.

With my warm personal wishes,

I am,

Your sincere friend,

Hassan II.

President Ronald Reagan
President of the United
States of America
The White House
Washington D.C.

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DESKBY CAIRO TEL AVIV 220615Z
DESKBY ALL OTHER POSTS 220930Z
FROM FCO 212140Z NOV 81
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1773 OF 21 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL AVIV, ALL ME POSTS,
PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, BONN, DUBLIN, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS,
BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG.
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK
SINAI MFO

1. WE ARE AIMING FOR ANNOUNCEMENT IN PARLIAMENT ON MONDAY, 23 NOVEMBER AT 1530 GMT. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL CONTAIN THE TEXT OF OUR FORMAL COMMUNICATION TO THE US, AND THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN. POSTS SHOULD NOW TAKE ACTION ON THE MESSAGES IN MY TELNOS. 918-923 TO UKREP BRUSSELS WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

(A) FOR WASHINGTON: THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE MESSAGE TO HAIG IN MY TELNO. 919 SHOULD BE OMITTED: AND IN PARA 1 AFTER QUOTE AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS UNQUOTE INSERT QUOTE TO ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES UNQUOTE. YOU SHOULD TAKE ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TODAY 21 NOVEMBER, IN COORDINATION WITH THE OTHER THREE.

YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WE UNDERSTAND (FROM CONVERSATION BETWEEN CHEYSSON AND SIR J GRAHAM) THAT STATE DEPT ARE SATISFIED WITH STATEMENT AND TIMING ALTHOUGH HAIG WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NO STATEMENT BY THE TEN (YOUR TELNO 3522). YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE AMERICANS THE TIMETABLE WE SHALL BE FOLLOWING AND SAY THAT WE WE SHALL BE COMMUNICATING THIS TEXT UNDER COVER OF SEPARATE MESSAGES TO SHAMIR AND KAMAL HASSAN ALI TOMORROW MORNING, 22 NOVEMBER. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE MESSAGE TO SHAMIR WILL CONTAIN REFERENCES TO THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY DESIGNED TO REASSURE THE ISRAELIS ON THIS SCORE.

/ YOU

YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WE WILL NOT BE GIVING TO THE ISRAELIS OR EGYPTIANS AT THAT STAGE THE TEXTS EITHER OF OUR NATIONAL STATEMENT OR OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN. THIS IS TO AVOID PUTTING THEM IN A POSITION OF HAVING TO REACT TO THEM. HOWEVER WE INTEND TO GIVE THEM THE TEXTS OF BOTH SHORTLY BEFORE DELIVERY ON 23 NOVEMBER (WE SHALL SIMILARLY GIVE THE AMERICANS THE TEXT OF OUR NATIONAL STATEMENT BEFORE ITS DELIVERY, BUT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONSIDER ANY FURTHER CHANGE TO THE TEXT SINCE IT WILL ALREADY BE IN THE HANDS OF THE OPPOSITION).

(B) FOR TEL AVIV: YOU SHOULD HAND OVER THE MESSAGE TO SHAMIR IN MY TELNO. 920 AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON SUNDAY, 22 NOVEMBER, ALTERING THE DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT IN PARLIAMENT TO 23 NOVEMBER, AND COORDINATING WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS. YOU SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME SPEAK AS IN MY TELNO. 918.

(C) FOR CAIRO: YOU SHOULD ACT WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI ON THE BASIS OF THE MESSAGE IN MY TELNO. 921 AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON 22 NOVEMBER AND SPEAK IN SIMILAR TERMS TO TEL AVIV. YOU ALSO SHOULD COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF THE OTHER THREE.

(D) ARAB POSTS (BUT SEE (E) BELOW FOR SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT ARAFAT) SHOULD HAND OVER MY MESSAGE (AS AMENDED BELOW) ON THE EVENING OF 22 NOVEMBER OR MORNING OF 23 NOVEMBER. THEY SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE IN PARLIAMENT ON 23 NOVEMBER AND STRESS THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY UNTIL THEN. FINAL TEXT OF OUR NATIONAL STATEMENT, TO BE HANDED OVER WITH THE MESSAGE, IS IN MIFT. I APPRECIATE THAT IN MANY IF NOT MOST CASES IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACT AS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO THE HIGHEST AVAILABLE OFFICIAL WITH A REQUEST THAT IT BE TRANSMITTED URGENTLY TO FEZ. YOU SHOULD COORDINATE LOCALLY AS BEFORE. RABAT SHOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO GET COPIES OF MY MESSAGE AND THE TEXT OF THE NATIONAL STATEMENT TO ALL MINISTERS IN FEZ, INCLUDING KLIBI. (THE DIFFICULTIES OF THIS ARE WELL UNDERSTOOD HERE.)

(E) BEIRUT SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) PASS A MESSAGE AS SUCH FROM ME TO ARAFAT AS PREVIOUSLY ENVISAGED, BUT SHOULD GIVE THE PLO AT

A SUITABLE LEVEL THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE SAYING THAT IT IS BEING ADDRESSED TO ALL ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND AS FAR AS POSSIBLE LEAVING VAGUE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS FORMALLY FROM ME AND TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED. RABAT SHOULD TAKE REINFORCING ACTION AS APPROPRIATE IN FEZ.

(F) THE MESSAGE FROM ME TO THE ARABS SHOULD BE AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: OMIT THE THIRD SENTENCE BEGINNING QUOTE OUR IMMEDIATE TASK UNQUOTE IN PARA 2. IN PARA 3, AMEND THE FIFTH SENTENCE BEGINNING QUOTE IN AGREEING TO PARTICIPATE UNQUOTE TO MAKE TWO SENTENCES AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE IN AGREEING TO PARTICIPATE, WE ARE DEMONSTRATING IN A PRACTICAL WAY OUR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ARAB TERRITORY BY WAR. WE ARE ALSO DEMONSTRATING TO THE AMERICANS THAT PRESERVATION OF THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE IS FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIANS RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE TERRITORIES FROM WHICH ISRAEL IS REQUIRED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 TO WITHDRAW UNQUOTE. IN PARA 5, OMIT THE LAST SENTENCE BEGINNING QUOTE WE SHALL USE UNQUOTE.

(G) FOR DAMASCUS AND RABAT: THE ADDITION OF QUOTE INCLUDING GOLAN UNQUOTE GOES IN NOT IN PARA 3 (AS INSTRUCTED IN MY TELNO 923, PARA 5) BUT IN PARA 5 AFTER QUOTE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY UNQUOTE.

2. PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE ABOVE PROCEDURE CORRESPONDS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT'S UNDERSTANDING (BUT THE TEXTS OF THE MESSAGES TO SHAMIR AND ALI, AS WELL AS TO THE ARABS ARE NATIONAL TEXTS AND NOT FOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR PARTNERS: THEY WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED, THOUGH MAY OF COURSE LEAK). THEY SHOULD SAY THAT WE INTEND OUR NATIONAL STATEMENT TO INCLUDE THE TEXTS BOTH OF THE FORMAL COMMUNICATION TO THE US AND, AT THE END, THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN. WE ASSUME THEY WILL DO LIKEWISE. THEY SHOULD ALSO SAY THAT WE HAVE DELIBERATELY INCLUDED REFERENCES TO THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY IN THE MESSAGE TO SHAMIR. THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD US THAT THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR THE ISRAELIS GIVEN THE OMISSION FROM THE FORMAL COMMUNICATION OF THE FOUR OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE TREATY. WE HOPE THEY WILL DO THE SAME, BUT THAT IS UP TO THEM. (THIS SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, EG

/MY

MY TELNO 517 TO PARIS.)

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 228 OF 21 NOVEMBER

FEZ SUMMIT: QATARI VIEWS.

1. I CALLED ON THE AMIR THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT. HE WAS IN EXCELLENT FORM AND ASKED ME TO REPORT THE FOLLOWING.

PLO.
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2. ARAFAT TOLD HIM ON 16 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO. 226) THAT THE PLO WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH PRINCE FAHD'S PROPOSALS. THE PLO WERE WILLING TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL, PROVIDED ISRAEL RECOGNISED THE PLO FIRST. THE AMIR TOLD HIM THIS WAS UNREALISTIC AND ARAFAT REPLIED THAT A CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION BY EACH OF THE OTHER WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PLO PROVIDED IT WAS UNDER SAUDI GUARANTEES.

LEBANON.
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3. ARAFAT WAS WORRIED THAT A FRESH UPHEAVAL IN LEBANON WOULD DISRUPT MODERATE ARABS' EFFORTS TO MOVE TOWARDS PEACE. THE AMIR COMMENTED TO ME THAT HE HAD HEARD SIMILAR REPORTS THROUGH HIS SYRIAN CONTACTS. ON THREE OCCASIONS DURING OUR TALK THE AMIR STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE WEST TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL DURING THE CRITICAL PERIOD AHEAD. I COMMENTED, DRAWING ON MY LEBANON EXPERIENCE, THAT THERE WAS AN EQUAL NEED FOR THE ARABS TO RESTRAIN THE PALESTINIAN FACTIONS WHO TRADITIONALLY ASSISTED BREAKDOWNS OF LAW AND ORDER. WAS ARAFAT IN CONTROL OF THE PLO? THE AMIR REPLIED THAT HE HAD PRESSED ARAFAT ON THAT POINT AND HAD FOUND THE LATTER MORE THAN USUALLY CONFIDENT: THE DIFFERING PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY PLO SPOKESMEN WAS TO BE EXPECTED. (NOTE: THE AMIR CLAIMS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PLO SINCE MANY SENIOR MEMBERS LIVED IN DOHA AND HAVE FED AT THE QATARI TABLE EVER SINCE).

ARAB SUPPORT FOR FAHD.
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4. THE AMIR WAS CONFIDENT THAT ''80 PER CENT'' OF THE ARABS, INCLUDING THE PLO, WOULD ENDORSE FAHD'S PROPOSALS AT FEZ. THE SAUDIS WERE WORKING ON SYRIA WHO WERE ''BARGAINING HARD''.

/SINAI MFO.

SINAI MFO.

5. HE CONFIRMED THE SECRET AGREEMENT AT THE GCC SUMMIT IN RIYADH (MY TELNO. 222) AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT BASING EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION ON CAMP DAVID. I ASSURED HIM THE POINT WAS WELL TAKEN AND OBSERVED THAT, SO FAR AS I KNEW, THE FORCE DID NOT ORIGINATE IN CAMP DAVID BUT AROSE FROM U.S. BILATERAL REQUESTS. THE AMIR EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE SINAI FORCE AND THE POSSIBILITIES THEREAFTER OF CLOSER EUROPEAN/ARAB ACTION BASED ON THE FAHD PRINCIPLES.

U.S. POLICY.

6. THE AMIR DISPLAYED NONE OF THE ANTI-U.S. ATTITUDES PREVALENT AMONGST HIS ADVISERS. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GENERAL APPROACH TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.

MED PLEASE COPY AS NECESSARY.

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FM TEL AVIV 200900Z NOVEMBER 81

TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 456 OF 20/11/81
INFO BEIRUT DAMASCUS CAIRO JEDDA WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS UKREP BRUSSELS PARIS AND ROME

FOLLOWING FOR GRAHAM: YOUR TELNO 280 TO BEIRUT: LEBANON

1. I AGREE WITH THE DESCRIPTION OF ISRAELI EDGINESS IN YOUR PARAGRAPH ONE. I ALSO AGREE (YOUR PARA 3) THAT WE WOULD BE WRONG TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ISRAELIS CALLING OFF THEIR FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. BUT I CONTINUE TO REGARD THIS AS UNLIKELY. NOR DO I BELIEVE AT PRESENT THEY ARE LOOKING FOR A PRETEXT.

2. THE REASONS WHICH LED ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT IN THE FIRST PLACE STILL BROADLY APPLY, INCLUDING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY RELIEF TO ISRAEL OF THEIR MOST FORMIDABLE ARAB NEIGHBOUR NO LONGER POSING AN ACTIVELY HOSTILE THREAT AND IF POSSIBLE BEING ON TERMS APPROACHING NORMAL. SADAT'S DEATH AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS MAY HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE RISKS OF WITHDRAWAL FOR ISRAEL. BUT HAVING COME THIS FAR IN CARRYING OUT THE PEACE TREATY AND ALREADY GIVEN UP HALF SINAI, THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE EVEN WORSE OFF THAN BEFORE IFTHEY WERE TO REVERSE THE WHOLE PROCESS AND RISK LOSING EGYPT AGAIN TO THEIR RING OF ENEMIES. I AM CONSTANTLY STRUCK BY HOW MUCH POLITICAL CAPITAL THE ISRAELIS FEEL THEY HAVE INVESTED IN PEACE WITH EGYPT. ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT ACTUALLY BRING THEM THE NORMALISATION FOR WHICH THEY YEARN, A CLEAR MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS HAVE PERSUADED THEMSELVES THAT THE LOSS OF SINAI IS A WORTHWHILE PRICE FOR MAKING THE ATTEMPT AT PEACE. THIS IS NOT JUST CONFINED TO BEGIN AND HIS SUPPORTERS. MOREOVER ALL CAN SEE THAT IF THE PEACE GAMBLE WITH EGYPT WERE RENOUNCED, THERE WOULD BE NO READILY AVAILABLE COURSE LEFT TO ISRAEL OTHER THAN TO BATTEN DOWN THE HATCHES AGAINST AN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE ARAB WORLD. CERTAINLY MY US COLLEAGUE TAKES THE VIEW THAT BEGIN, HAVING MADE HIS CALCULATIONS AND COMMITTED ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW NEXT APRIL, STILL MEANS TO CARRY IT THROUGH FOR THE SAKE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST AS WELL AS HIS OWN REPUTATION.

3. SIMILARLY I DOUBT IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD STAND TO GAIN BY POSTPONING THEIR WITHDRAWAL AS IS SOMETIMES SUGGESTED. IF THEY ARE GOING TO DO IT AT ALL, BETTER FOR THEM TO STICK TO THEIR UNDERTAKING AND GET IT OVER AT THE APPOINTED DATE. ADMITTEDLY AS THE DEADLINE APPROACHES THE PROBLEM OF CAJOLING OR FORCING SETTLERS TO LEAVE NORTHERN SINAI WILL BECOME INCREAINGLY ACUTE AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR HOW THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WILL HANDLE THIS. BUT MY GUESS IS THAT BEGIN WILL NOT BE DEFLECTED ON THAT ACCOUNT AND WILL JUDGE THAT PUTTING OFF A CONFRONTATION WITH THE SETTLERS WILL ONLY WEAKEN HIS HAND WITH THEM IN THE LONG RUN.

4. A MAJOR ISRAELI INCURSION INTO LEBANON COULD OF COURSE UPSET THESE CALCULATIONS, FOR IN THE WAKE OF REACTIONS TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORY EITHER ISRAEL HERSELF OR EGYPT MIGHT NO LONGER BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN THE PEACE TREATY. BUT I WOULD SEE THAT AS A CASUALTY OF ISRAELI ACTION IN LEBANON (AND ONE WHICH PRESEMABLY GIVES BEGIN PAUSE) RATHER THAN A DELIBERATE PRETEXT BY ISRAEL FOR RENEGING ON THE SINAI WITHDRAWAL. IF THE ISRAELIS MOVE INTO LEBANON I BELIEVE THE DECISIVE REASON WILL BE THEIR VIEW OF THE SITUATION ON THEIR NORTHERN BORDER, NOT SINAI.

5. COLLAPSE OF THEIR HOPES FOR PEACE WITH EGYPT WOULD LEAVE ISRAELIS IN SUCH A BITTER AND DISILLUSIONED MOOD THAT IT IS HARD TO SEE OTHER ATTEMPTS TO PRESSURISE THEM INTO NEGOTIATIONS HAVING MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCESS FOR A LONG TIME TO COME.

6. ALL THIS TO MY MIND ARGUES FOR OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE. IF THE ISRAELIS CAN, WITH US HELP, BE PERSUADED TO SWALLOW THE ACCOMPANYING STATEMENTS, THIS SHOULD REVIVE SOME OF THEIR CONFIDENCE AND STRENGHTEN THOSE WHO WANT TO CARRY THROUGH WITHDRAWAL.

FCO PASS SAVING TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS AND ROME

MOBERLY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

The performance of the French on this issue beggars belief. I do not think there is much point in your trying to follow every twist in this bizarre saga: we are now once again trying to agree a statement by the Ten! I will brief you tomorrow on where we stand.

MT
29/X1

PRIME MINISTER

There have been further developments on the Sinai multi-national force. The Greeks have put forward new texts for a statement by The Ten, which the Foreign Secretary feels will cause more trouble with the Americans. Lord Carrington has concluded that it is no longer worth trying for a statement by The Ten. The French agree with him. He intends to work for a statement by the four who will be participating, and individual national statements, but no statement by The Ten. I hope that you can agree that he should proceed in this way. He intends to make a statement on Monday.

CWFSR

Agreed

20 November 1981

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 November 1981

Dear Michael,

Sinai MFO

You will need a report of the position we have reached in our consultations with the rest of the Ten. It was left on Tuesday that the French and the Greeks would try to agree a formula, ad referendum to the rest of us, for the statement to be made by the Ten (agreement having been reached on the communication to the US, Israel and Egyptian Governments and on the national statement to be made by the // four contributors). I enclose the text of the last two documents.

The draft statement of the Ten reads as follows:

> The Ten consider that the decision of France, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom to participate in the Multinational Force in Sinai meets the wish frequently expressed by the members of the Community to facilitate any progress in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East [on the basis of the principles set out in the Venice Declaration].

The difficulty between the French and the Greeks turns on the Greek insistence that the statement of the Ten should conclude with the words 'on the basis of the principles set out in the Venice Declaration'. The French (because, as a Government, it was not they but their predecessors who signed this Declaration) can only accept the reference to the Venice Declaration if the text goes on to spell out the principles referred to. Various formulae have been discussed, but none has satisfied both Greeks and French. Today, after further negotiations with the French, the Greeks came up with three courses any of which they could accept, as follows:

a. no statement by the Ten;

b. an alternative phrase to end the statement by the Ten as follows: 'on the basis of the mutual acceptance of the right to existence and security of all the states in the area and the need for the Palestinian people to exercise its right to self-determination'; or

c. their original wording - 'on the basis of the principles set out in the Venice Declaration'.

/It seemed

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It seemed to Lord Carrington this morning, and this was the view of the Italian and Dutch Governments, that the new Greek wording (b. above) was inadequate in that it omitted the phrase 'including Israel' after 'security of all the states in the area', a key point in the Venice Declaration itself and now a matter of controversy arising out of the Fahd proposals. He therefore believed that it would be better to go ahead without a statement by the Ten, if the French could not accept the original formula as in c. above. We put this to the French, but to our surprise M. Cheysson, despite an earlier indication from the Elysee that the French Government attached little importance to a statement by the Ten, is now insisting on such a statement. Moreover, he tells us that he is prepared to accept the Greek formula as in b. above.

We are under great pressure of time. It is highly desirable in Lord Carrington's view that we should make our announcement not later than Monday 23 November. If we fail to do that we run into the period of the Arab Summit at Fez with the risk that they adopt resolutions there committing themselves, in order to deter us, to possibly unpleasant actions against us. It will then be very difficult for us to back down, but on the other hand we should have to take our decision in the worst possible circumstances. Lord Carrington is keen therefore to act tomorrow with the Americans, on Sunday with the Israelis and the Egyptians and make the announcement on Monday. This argues for accepting the formula worked out between the French and the Greeks, inadequate as it may be. In fact, its disadvantages will be much reduced because it is Lord Carrington's intention that the statement of the Ten should be used at the end of our national statement (see the enclosure) in which there is the phrase 'this policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the state of Israel ...'. It will be absolutely clear therefore that when we speak of all states in the area we include Israel and our own statement will have specified Israel. Besides, as we and our partners in the Ten all recognise Israel*, it cannot be plausibly argued that the reference in the statement of the Ten to 'all the states in the area' does not include Israel (the Israeli argument that the Fahd principles do not include Israel turns on the point that the Arabs do not recognise Israel as a state).

* (though the Greeks do not as yet have diplomatic relations)

Accordingly we are now trying to persuade the Italian and Dutch Governments that this formula is acceptable, provided, as we do, that we make our positions clear in our national statements. Subject to their agreement we shall be putting this proposal to the rest of our partners in the Ten in the hope that they will agree the formula in time for us to act in Washington tomorrow morning, Washington time. It has been a long and tedious road, with the French playing a thoroughly unconstructive part.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

LETTER FROM THE FOUR TO THE US, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS

The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, have decided, subject to their constitutional procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, to accede to the request of the governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States to contribute to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai. The four governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

(i) The force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal. It has no other role.

(ii) The Force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible.

(iii) Participation by the four governments in the Force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participation in such other international peacekeeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region.

(iv) Participation in the MFO by the four governments is without prejudice to their well-known policies on other aspects of the problems of the area.

DRAFT BASIC TEXT FOR USE IN NATIONAL STATEMENTS [GIVEN ONLY TO THE OTHER THREE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS]

'We have agreed to participate in the proposed Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai. We and the governments of France, Italy and the Netherlands have notified the United States, Egyptian and Israeli Governments of this in the following terms:

'The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, are ready, subject to their constitutional procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, to contribute to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, at the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States. The Four Governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

(i) The Force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal. It has no other role

(ii) The Force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible.

(iii) Participation by the Four Governments in the Force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participation in such other international peacekeeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region: and

(iv) Participation in the MFO by the Four Governments is without prejudice to their well known policies on other aspects of the problems of the area.'

This decision is a symbol of our determination to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement following negotiations between the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and security for all the states of the area. We welcomed the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that goal. Similarly we welcome the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call for withdrawal contained in Security Council resolution 242, which specifically declared

/inadmissible

inadmissible the acquisition of territory by war, and we believe that the international community has a duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East. We are ready to participate also in such arrangements in the other territories currently occupied in the context of Israeli withdrawal. We regard our support for the arrangements associated with the implementation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as quite distinct from and independent of the rest of the Camp David process.

In addition, we wish to express our firm support for the Egyptian Government and people and our belief in the need for stability and continuity in Egypt. Our decision to participate in the MFO follows from the policy, as stated in the declaration issued at Venice in June 1980 and in subsequent statements. This policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the State of Israel, places equal emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. It also holds that the PLO must be involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

We pledge ourselves to support the MFO. We also repeat that, together with our partners in the Ten, we will continue to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in all ways consistent with the principles to which we hold.'

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
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AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 202130Z LUXEMBOURG, BONN, DUBLIN, COPENHAGEN, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, 210800Z ATHENS
REPEATED TO (FOR INFO) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK
SINAI FORCE

1. An attempt to get the other three contributors to agree to go ahead without a statement of the Ten foundered on French refusal. However the French have told us that they are prepared to accept the formula proposed by the Greeks (Athens telno 372), according to which the Ten's statement would read:

"The Ten consider that the decision of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to participate in the multi-national force in Sinai meets the wish frequently expressed by members of the Community to facilitate any progress in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of mutual acceptance of the

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	Classification and Caveats		Page
	CONFIDENTIAL		2

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rifht to existence and security of all the states in the area and the need for the Palestinian people to exercise fully its right to self-determination."

2. I have reluctantly concluded that, if we are to take action before Fez, we have no option but to accept this wording, although its omission of special reference to Israel is a serious presentational deficiency, particularly in the light of current attention on the seventh principle of Crown Prince Fahd. We are therefore putting it in a COREU to the Ten asking for their agreement. We have spoken separately to the Italians and Dutch, pointing out that in the case of the Four the position is covered by an explicit reference to Israel's right to exist in national statements. The Italians have reluctantly agreed on this basis. The Dutch have promised an answer early on 21 November.

3. Grateful if other EC posts (except Paris and Athens) could now seek the urgent agreement of their host governments to this formula, explaining that this is the only basis on which we believe agreement in time for announcement on 23 November is possible. Grateful for replies by 211200Z. WHile their own positions will not be covered, as are the contributons, by national statements, they will of course be free to make statements in explanation.

4. (For Washington) We realize that this may be unwelcome to the Americans. We have briefed the Embassy here in detail. They think that Haig may wish to put pressure on the French to accept action without a statement by the Ten. We have pointed out to them that if they go to the French it will be absolutely clear that they are doing so on the basis of information given by us and that this would place us in an impossible position.

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CF - Background note is Confidential

cc FCO

JPH

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 November 1981

Dear Richard.

Thank you for your letter of 30 October about the PLO and the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

You referred to my remarks in Kuwait about the PLO. Both Peter Carrington and I have said on several occasions that Israel cannot be expected to negotiate with an organisation which does not first disassociate itself, in unambiguous terms, from past statements implying its commitment to the destruction of Israel. A clear statement by the PLO that it was ready to accept Israel, provided Israel recognised the Palestinians' legitimate political rights, would be a major step forward. We shall continue to press for such a statement from the PLO.

I have studied with care the document prepared by the Britain/Israel Public Affairs Committee about the Israeli raid on the nuclear reactor in Iraq. The allegations in that paper are simply not supported by the facts. Iraq, unlike Israel, has acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has agreed to submit all her nuclear facilities to international safeguards, including inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Director-General of the IAEA made it clear after the raid that safeguards had been satisfactorily applied and that all nuclear material at the reactor was satisfactorily accounted for. He was also satisfied that the use of the reactor for the production of plutonium would not have been feasible without detection by IAEA inspectors. There is thus no reason to believe that Iraq was using the reactor, or the associated facilities, for other than

/peaceful

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peaceful purposes. We do not believe that Iraq had the capacity to manufacture fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Of course, Israel has legitimate concerns about her security, and the Israeli Government inevitably faces difficult decisions in ensuring her protection. But the system of international law and international safeguards has been established to avoid precisely the sort of situation which Israel clearly feared. It may be argued that the Treaty is imperfect. But we believe it does significantly diminish the prospect of further nuclear weapons proliferation and that it thereby contributes to world peace and stability. We would like to see all states working to reinforce, rather than to undermine, it. Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty, and her raid on the Iraqi nuclear facility, constitutes a set-back to the cause of non-proliferation.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret

Michael Latham, Esq., MP.

FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,
SWIW 9AA
TEL: 01-235 1543
01-235 7409

Confidential

19th November, 1981.

Dear Margaret,

I was in Cairo at the weekend with Bill Mclean and Robert Cranborne. We went at the invitation of the Foreign Minister, General Kamal Hassan Ali. His invitation apparently followed a speech I made on 5th November in the foreign affairs section of the debate on the Address.

We had very cordial and full talks first with President Husni Mubarak whom I knew only slightly and later with the Foreign Minister whom I have known for some time. As the whole problem of the Middle East is very much on the agenda, I have thought it right to let you have fairly detailed records of these talks based on notes taken by Bill McLean and Robert Cranborne at the time. We had a short but helpful meeting with our Ambassador Michael Weir and paid a courtesy call on the Empress Farah of Iran who is an old friend of mine.

Our visit received extensive coverage on Cairo television and in their press. This went well beyond the intrinsic interest of anything I had to say. It probably indicates the importance the Egyptian Government attach to demonstrating to their public that they have friends in Europe who share their broad approach to the Middle East problem. It may also be their way of signalling to other countries where they stand.

The broad if necessarily tentative conclusions which I reached at the end of our visit are as follows; and here I would stress that they are purely my interpretation of what was said to us the record of which is attached.

1. The Egyptians attach paramount importance to securing the final withdrawal of the Israelis from the Sinai by April 25th 1982. They believe the Israelis to be firmly committed to this withdrawal but recognise that there are sections of Israeli public opinion which would like to go back on the agreement or postpone its fulfilment ~~and perhaps over-estimate their importance.~~ They would welcome our participation in the Sinai multinational force and see some positive merits in Prince Fahad's plan. They are, however, very anxious to avoid any initiatives or declarations which could be seen as superceding Camp David and might thus interfere with the withdrawal process e.g. by incurring an Israeli veto on the composition of the multi national force.

2. The Egyptians do not expect to get a detailed agreement on autonomy for the West Bank or Gaza before April 1982. They hope, however, to have constructed a framework which would enable Palestinian representatives to emerge in the occupied territories. It would then be for these representatives and the Jordanians, hopefully with Saudi encouragement, to take over the business of negotiations with Israel. The Egyptians would

continue to give their support but would no longer play a primary role. Other Arab countries must resort to negotiation as they had done rather than confrontation.

3. The Egyptians believe the Saudis will mend their fences with Egypt progressively. At the moment there is a truce in the war of words. Once the Sinai phase of Camp David is completed they believe the Saudi position will come much closer to their own. They and other Arabs will have to accept that negotiation pays and confrontation does not.

4. They accept the principle of Palestinian self-determination. But they do not believe that the moderates in the PLO can decide PLO policy so long as the Syrians remain in the Lebanon and thus have the main body of the PLO under their physical control and so indirectly that of Moscow. Accordingly they see two possibilities of achieving a settlement. One would be by bringing the Soviets into the peacemaking process. To this, they, and I imagine the USA would be strongly opposed. The other would be to secure the withdrawal of the Syrians from the Lebanon and some disarmament of the PLO with a consequent change of regime in Damascus.

5. Resistance to Soviet Imperialism remains their prime objective and they see close cooperation with the United States as the best way of organising it. They are indeed impatient to see the United States build up extensive military stockpiles and servicing facilities in Egypt itself as well as within the general area of the Gulf.

6. I am always sceptical of assessments of personalities. Sadat, after all, was Nasser's man until Nasser died and Sadat overthrew his policies. I do not know President Husni Mubarak at all well. He struck me, however, as more down to earth and more concerned with the practical problems of reorganising the Egyptian economy and administration than either of his predecessors. There was certainly little of the wideranging and perhaps unrealistic geopolitical vision which characterised my conversations with Sadat or for that matter Nasser. Internal pressures may lead the new President - as they so often have in the past - to seek an external role. If so, my guess would be that he would seek it in the Nile Valley, the Red Sea and North Africa more than in the Asian Middle East. But this can only be a guess. "Dissimulation" as Disraeli wrote (apologies for coded language!) is the secret of oriental policy."

In conculsion I would venture to suggest that we should consider paying more attention to Egypt than we have done in the recent past and put the Palestinian problem on the backburner at least until April 1982. It may prove easier to solve once the success of Sadat's policies where Egypt is concerned have been established beyond doubt.

Yours ever,

Julian.

Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

P.S. ....

P.S.

As the records of the talks are rather long I have sidelined what seem to be the more significant sections.

I am copying this letter to Peter Carrington and to John Nott.

CONFIDENTIAL

M/East

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Cabinet: Foreign Affairs

Sinai: overnight news

The French Foreign Minister spoke to President Papandreou of Greece on the telephone this morning and the French have since told HM Ambassador in Paris that they expect to have the last problems ironed out by this afternoon. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary also spoke to the French Foreign Minister late last night.

19th November 1981

R L WADE-GERY

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: B06337

TNF brief copied to:

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Cabinet: Foreign Affairs

You will wish to report briefly to your colleagues on today's Anglo-German Summit, covering both Community affairs (on the rest of which Mr Elliott is briefing you separately) and other aspects (including East-West relations in particular).

2. No Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister will be present, because the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has to be in Brussels (as does Mr Hurd) and the Lord Privy Seal in Strasbourg. In their absence you may wish to refer to the one subject they would certainly have raised, viz. Sinai, on the lines of the attached FCO brief. I will let you have a supplementary note if there are significant developments on this overnight.

FLAG A

3. You may also feel you should mention the speech President Reagan is making today on TNF arms control negotiations, in the light of tomorrow's press reaction and of anything which may have been said on the subject in your talks with Chancellor Schmidt. If so, you could draw on the second FCO brief attached.

FLAG E

4. No other topics need be covered. There have been no important new developments on Poland. The deadlock over the UN Secretary General is likely to continue for some time and if raised could therefore be left for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to deal with next week.

Northern Ireland

5. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would like to report briefly on the latest situation in the Province, in the aftermath of Mr Bradford's murder and with particular reference to Dr Paisley's intentions. Your colleagues will no doubt be expecting this, although no item is formally on the agenda, and you could conveniently take it after Community Affairs. You will wish to ensure that he covers the decision to send out the Spearhead Battalion, which I gather was taken in your absence very late last night.

18th November 1981

R L WADE-GERY

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CABINET: 19 NOVEMBER

Sinai MFO

Points to Make

1. Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels on 17 November were unable to reach final agreement on the texts associated with the announcement of participation by ourselves, the French, the Dutch and the Italians. But points of disagreement are relatively minor and reflect Greek and French inability to agree changes without reference back to Presidents Papandreou and Mitterrand. Mitterrand and Papandreou are now trying to sort the problem out between them.

2. Relations with US over the issue have improved considerably. The Americans accept that we are making a genuine effort to meet their concerns over the possible Israeli reaction. But they continue to be nervous about the Israelis; Mr Haig rates the chances of the Israelis agreeing to our participation as less than 50/50.

3. Continuing disagreement over texts has led to a timing problem. We wish to get the announcement out of the way before the Fez Summit if at all possible in order to prevent further attempts by the Arabs to put pressure on us by threatening retaliation.

Essential Facts

FLAG

B/ 1. Strasbourg telno 92 (attached) records the latest position in the Ten. The argument between the Greeks and the French over the text of the statement by the Ten does not appear to us to be one of substance and we hope that the French and Greeks should be able to sort it out between them without too much difficulty. Brussels

C/ telno 4314 (also attached) records our latest discussions with the Americans. We did not know how Mr Haig will react to our inability to accept three of his four new suggestions but the State Department are aware at official level that continuing attempts by the Americans to change the texts risk being counter productive and unravelling

D/ the whole package. The latest version of the texts are attached.

2. We had hoped to make the announcement in Parliament on 19 November, having delivered messages to the US, Egypt and Israel and also Arab countries forewarning them of this, but this is no longer possible. We still hope to make the announcement before the Fez Summit, which begins on 25 November, but the next day on which both the Commons and Lords are sitting is Tuesday 24 November. We note that the question of European participation is on the agenda for the Fez Summit and that some countries, notably Syria, are pressing for a decision by the Arabs to retaliate against us if we decide to go ahead.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 92 OF 17 NOVEMBER
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EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: MEETING OF MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS 17 NOVEMBER : SINAI FORCE.

SUMMARY

1. FAILURE TO AGREE ON THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE TEN ON THE SINAI FORCE AS A RESULT OF A DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND FRENCH OVER WHETHER THE TEXT SHOULD FINISH WITH THE WORDS QUOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION UNQUOTE (GREEKS) OR QUOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THEY ADHERE UNQUOTE (FRENCH). CHEYSSON HAS NOW AGREED THAT MITTERRAND SHOULD TELEPHONE PAPANDREOU TO TRY AND SORT THIS OUT.

2. AGREEMENT THAT THE TEXT OF THE FOUR SHOULD BE AMENDED (FROM THE VERSION IN FCO TELNO 494 TO PARIS) AS FOLLOWS: IN FIRST SENTENCE DELETE QUOTE HAVE DECIDED UNQUOTE SHOULD SUBSTITUTE QUOTE ARE PREPARED UNQUOTE. IN SAME SENTENCE FOLLOWING QUOTE LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS UNQUOTE ADD QUOTE TO ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES UNQUOTE. IN (I) DELETE QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL UNQUOTE.

DETAIL

3. TEXTS WERE DISCUSSED FIRST BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND THEN BY MINISTERS. IT QUICKLY EMERGED THAT ALL EXCEPT FRANCE WERE RELUCTANTLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CHANGES TO STATEMENT BY THE TEN PROPOSED BY THE GREEKS (IE OMIT ALL LANGUAGE AFTER QUOTE VENICE DECLARATION UNQUOTE- OPTION A IN ATHENS TELNO 359). CHEYSSON (FRANCE) HOWEVER INSISTED EITHER THAT THE TEXT SHOULD CONTINUE AS FAR AS THE WORDS QUOTE SELF DETERMINATION UNQUOTE OR THAT IT SHOULD NOT MENTION THE VENICE DECLARATION BY NAME BUT SHOULD INSTEAD READ QUOTE THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THEY ADHERE UNQUOTE FULL STOP HARALAMBOPOLOUS (GREECE) MAINTAINED THAT HE HAD COME TO T THE MEETING BRIEFED ON THE BASIS THAT THE TEN COULD ACCEPT THE GREEK PROPOSAL FOR THE SHORTENED TEXT AND WAS UNABLE TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER DRAFTING. AN ATTEMPT BY THE GREEK POLITICAL DIRECTOR TO CONSULT PAPANDREOU FAILED AND HARALAMBOPOLOUS REFUSED TO CONSIDER SEEKING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM ATHENS. OTHERS APPEALED TO THE GREEKS TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY POINTING OUT THAT THE REMAINING GAP BETWEEN THEIR POSITION AND WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRENCH WAS TINY AND THAT

/THE

THE TEN LOOKED INCREASINGLY RIDICULOUS BY THEIR FAILURE TO AGREE SEMI COLON BUT WITH NO SUCCESS. THESE ARGUMENTS WERE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES AND BY THE END TEMPERS WERE FRAYED. AT THE END OF LUNCH NOTHOMB (BELGIUM) WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER, IF THE TEN COULD NOT AGREE ON A STATEMENT, THE FIVE NON-PARTICIPANTS (WITHOUT THE GREEKS) MIGHT MAKE NATIONAL STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT. DOOGE (IRELAND) AND OLESEN (DENMARK) INDICATED THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THIS AN ACCEPTABLE APPROACH.

4. DURING LUNCH YOU TOLD OTHER MINISTERS THAT WE HAD KEPT THE UNITED STATES INFORMED ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE TEXTS AND GAVE THEM THE GIST OF HAIG'S LATEST MESSAGE AND PROPOSALS. NOONE WAS IN FAVOUR OF ISSUING THE TEXT FROM BRUSSELSRATHER THAN LONDON SEMI COLON NOR WAS THERE ANY SUPPORT FOR MAKING THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN LATER THAN NATIONAL STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR. AT GREEK INSISTENCE OTHERS RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO DROP THE REFERENCE TO THE PEACE TREATY FROM THE LETTER BY THE FOUR.

FCO PSE PASS ALL

CAPE

(Repetition to .....SANAA..... referred to ..... Ministerial Council, repeated as ..... to other posts.)

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FM UKREP BRUSSELS 171712Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 4314 OF 17 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

1. WHEN YOU SAW EAGLEBURGER HERE THIS EVENING YOU TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW HIM MR HAIG'S MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 916) AND TO EXPLAIN TODAY'S EVENTS IN THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE TEN. YOU EMPHASISED THE CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS TAKEN UP BY GREECE AND FRANCE. YOU WERE HOPING TO GET THE FRENCH PRESIDENT TO SPEAK TO THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER. BUT IT MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE A POSITION AMONG THE TEN, AND WE MIGHT HAVE TO CONSIDER GOING AHEAD WITHOUT GREECE, OR OTHER POSSIBILITIES. THE PROSPECTS WERE UNCERTAIN AND THE DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE TEN WERE AT LEAST AS GREAT AS THOSE WITH THE UNITED STATES.

2. ON MR HAIG'S FOUR SUGGESTIONS, YOU SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH SOME COMPROMISE INCLUDING USE OF THE WORD ''DECIDED''. THE SECOND SUGGESTION WAS NOT GOING TO BE FEASIBLE: GREECE WOULD IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES ACCEPT ANY REFERENCE TO THE EGYPT/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY, EVEN IN THE COMMUNICATION BY THE FOUR WHICH GREECE WAS ONLY BEING ASKED TO SUPPORT, NOT TO SIGN. THE THIRD AND FOURTH SUGGESTIONS WERE NOT FEASIBLE EITHER: THE FOUR WERE AGREED THAT THEIR NATIONAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE COVERING STATEMENT BY THE TEN, AND THE LATTER MUST BE ISSUED IN THE PRESIDENCY CAPITAL, NOT THE COMMUNITY CAPITAL. BUT IF THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVE WAS LESS PUBLICITY FOR THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN, THIS WAS MORE LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED BY PUTTING IT OUT IN LONDON AS A FOOTNOTE TO THE FOUR NATIONAL ANNOUNCEMENTS, RATHER THAN PUBLISHING IT ON ITS OWN IN BRUSSELS SOME DAYS LATER.

3. EAGLEBURGER WAS NOT INFORMED IN DETAIL ON THE SUBJECT AND HAD NOT SEEN HAIG'S MESSAGE, BUT PROMISED TO PASS YOU POINTS TO HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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SIR J GRAHAM
MR MOBERLY

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LETTER FROM THE FOUR TO THE US, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS

The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, have decided, subject to their partners in the Ten, to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, accede to the request of the governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States and to contribute to the Multinational Force and observers in Sinai. The four governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

(i) The force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal. It has no other role.

(ii) The Force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible.

(iii) Participation by the four governments in the Force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participation in such other international peacekeeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region.

(iv) Participation in the MFO by the four governments is without prejudice to their well-known policies on other aspects of the problems of the area.

TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN

'The Ten consider that the decision of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to participate in the multinational force in Sinai meets the wish frequently expressed by the members of the community to facilitate any progress in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the principles [set out in the Venice Declaration] [to which they adhere].'

DRAFT BASIC TEXT FOR USE IN NATIONAL STATEMENTS [GIVEN ONLY TO THE OTHER THREE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS]

'We have agreed to participate in the proposed Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai. We and the governments of France, Italy and the Netherlands have notified the United States, Egyptian and Israeli Governments of this in the following terms:

'The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, are ready, subject to their constitutional procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, to contribute to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, at the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States. The Four Governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

(i) The Force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal. It has no other role.

(ii) The Force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible.

(iii) Participation by the Four Governments in the Force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participation in such other international peacekeeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region: and

(iv) Participation in the MFO by the Four Governments is without prejudice to their well known policies on other aspects of the problems of the area.'

This decision is a symbol of our determination to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement following negotiations between the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and security for all the states of the area. We welcomed the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that goal. Similarly we welcome the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call for withdrawal contained in Security Council resolution 242, which specifically declared

/inadmissible

inadmissible the acquisition of territory by war, and we believe that the international community has a duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East. We are ready to participate also in such arrangements in the other territories currently occupied in the context of Israeli withdrawal. We regard our support for the arrangements associated with the implementation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as quite distinct from and independent of the rest of the Camp David process.

In addition, we wish to express our firm support for the Egyptian Government and people and our belief in the need for stability and continuity in Egypt. Our decision to participate in the MFO follows from the policy, as stated in the declaration issued at Venice in June 1980 and in subsequent statements. This policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the State of Israel, places equal emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. It also holds that the PLO must be involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

We pledge ourselves to support the MFO. We also repeat that, together with our partners in the Ten, we will continue to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in all ways consistent with the principles to which we hold.'

E

TNF NEGOTIATIONS: NOTE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S USE IN THE CABINET ON 19 NOVEMBER 1981

1. Mr Haig has outlined the main elements in the proposed US negotiating position for talks due to start with the Russians in Geneva on 30 November in a letter to Lord Carrington.

2. The main feature of the position outlined in Mr Haig's letter is the adoption of the ''zero level outcome'' as a central component in the American position. ''Zero'' is defined as the dismantling of all SS20s and the retirement of SS4s and 5s in exchange for cancellation of the NATO modernisation programme.

3. In a major foreign policy speech delivered today President Reagan described the American negotiating position in similar terms. He also proposed that negotiations on strategic weapons, with the objective of securing substantial reductions, should start as soon as possible next year. In addition, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union should work for equality at lower levels on conventional forces in Europe and urged the Soviet Union to agree to the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe to negotiate confidence building measures.

4. The final meeting of NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG) to concert the American TNF negotiating position will be held on 20 November. FCO officials envisage that, thereafter, Lord Carrington will write to the Prime Minister to inform her of the situation.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

18 November 1981

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET

copy of this covering letter is filed on Jordan: Visits to London by King Hussein June 1979

Mr Alexander
A copy for the FCO is attached.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 November 1981

Prime Minister

King Hussein's presentation was indeed rather outspoken.

20/XI

Dear Willie,

Call by King Hussein

King Hussein promised the Prime Minister in the course of the discussion at No 10 yesterday morning to give her a copy of the document he had given to President Reagan during his visit to Washington. The Jordanian Ambassador accordingly called yesterday afternoon on Graham and delivered the enclosed package. He said that he himself had not seen a copy of the document but that he believed that it was in English. Graham thanked the Ambassador and will repeat this to the King today when he accompanies the Lord Privy Seal on the latter's call.

We shall be grateful if you could let us have a copy of the document in due course.

Yours ever,

Frances Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Willie Rickett Esq
10 Downing St

Richard - this is the most copied argument that has been presented by the Arabs would in that context find display considerable friendship to American thoughts.

May I have a word about the present? Shall I see him to do so

Israeli friends

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING TOP SECRET

None.

Copy of attached papers returned to F. Richards FCO 3/12/81

copy of this paper returned to F. Richards FCO. 3/12/82

TOP SECRET

copy 1 of 2 copies

TALKING PAPER

I. INTRODUCTION

THROUGH CIRCUMSTANCES AND GOD'S FAVOR, OR LACK OF IT, I HAVE BEEN THE LEADER OF JORDAN FOR 29 YEARS. WE HAVE EXPERIENCED AND SURVIVED ABOUT EVERY CRISIS A COUNTRY COULD CONCEIVABLY FACE IN ITS HISTORY. PERHAPS, SHARING THE UNDERSTANDING DERIVED FROM THAT HISTORY IS ONE CONTRIBUTION I CAN MAKE TO OUR PARTNERSHIP, BECAUSE MISUNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN AT THE ROOT OF MANY AREA PROBLEMS, INCLUDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JORDAN. I THINK, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WERE TOO MANY UNNECESSARY MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS. I HOPE THEY CAN BE CLEARED UP DURING THIS VISIT AND ELIMINATED IN THE FUTURE.

II. THE SECURITY ISSUE

A. General.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW THE ISSUES I CONSIDER IMPORTANT TO OUR RELATIONSHIP AND THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS WE BOTH FACE. THEY ALL CONCERN PEACE AND SECURITY WHICH ARE, BY DEFINITION, INTERDEPENDENT - YOU CANNOT HAVE ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER.

YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH SECURITY IN THE AREA. WE ARE EVEN MORE SO, BECAUSE WE LIVE THERE. LET ME COMMENCE WITH OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

B. Jordan's Internal Security.

MY FIRST RESPONSIBILITY IS TO INSURE THE SECURITY, UNITY

AND CLARITY OF VISIONS IN MY OWN COUNTRY. WITHOUT THIS WE ARE OF NO USE TO OURSELVES, MUCH LESS ANYONE ELSE. WE HAVE A GOOD RECORD. FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS, WE HAVE ENJOYED A PERIOD OF INTERNAL STABILITY PROBABLY UNMATCHED IN THE AREA. THE BASE LINE FOR THIS WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1970. AT THAT TIME, WE SIMULTANEOUSLY: TURNED BACK AN INVASION OF 70,000 SYRIAN TROOPS; NEUTRALIZED 25,000 UNFRIENDLY IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED IN OUR COUNTRY; AND SUBDUED A MAJOR INTERNAL PLO REVOLUTION WHICH, HAD WE FAILED, WOULD HAVE LEFT JORDAN LIKE LEBANON OR WORSE. I THINK WE TAUGHT EVERYONE A LESSON. IMPORTANTLY, WE ALSO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO JUDGE RATHER ACCURATELY WHAT WAS POLITICALLY POSSIBLE AND WHAT WAS NOT, AND TO TAKE RISKS ACCORDINGLY. A RULER CANNOT ADOPT POLICIES WITH WHICH HIS PEOPLE WILL NOT IDENTIFY, WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS LEADERSHIP. THE TEST OF THAT PUDDING IS STABILITY AND, INDEED, AT TIMES SURVIVAL. FROM OUR EXPERIENCE WE THINK WE KNOW WHAT THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE PALESTINIAN DIMENSION.

WE HAVE MAINTAINED STABILITY DESPITE THE FACT THAT OVER ONE HALF OF OUR POPULATION ARE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES WHO WERE EVICTED FROM THEIR ORIGINAL HOMES. WE OPENED OUR DOORS TO THEM, OFFERED THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO RE-ESTABLISH THEIR DISRUPTED LIVES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR RIGHTS IN THEIR LAND AND HOME OF ORIGIN. NO OTHER COUNTRY WAS AS MAGNANIMOUS. BUT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE MORE THAN REPAID OUR HOSPITALITY. THEY ARE AMONG THE MOST RESOURCEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE MEMBERS OF OUR SOCIETY. OUR EXPERIENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT SIMPLE JUSTICE AND GOODWILL CAN BE A

BASIS FOR SECURITY AND PEACE, AND IS AN EXAMPLE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

IN SUM, OUR INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IS SOUND, DESPITE EVERY FORM OF EXTREME ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE IT.

C. JORDAN'S EXTERNAL SECURITY ROLE.

1. GENERAL.

JORDAN IS THE GEOGRAPHIC AND STRATEGIC HUB OF THE EASTERN ARAB WORLD. WE BORDER ISRAEL, SYRIA, IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA AND, BY EXTENSION, THE GULF STATES. WE ARE MORE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY REGIONAL SECURITY, OR LACK OF IT, THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY. WE ARE ALSO IN A POSITION TO DO THE MOST ABOUT IT.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO DEFEND ARAB IDENTITY AND FREEDOM AND, HENCE, TO THE SURVIVIAL OF THE SAUDI AND GULF REGIMES, TO THE CONTAINMENT OF SYRIA, AS LONG AS IT IS HOSTILE AND RADICALLY ORIENTED, TO THE PRESERVATION AND EVOLUTION OF IRAQ, AND TO THE SUPPORT OF PAKISTANI SECURITY.

I BELIEVE THESE ARE ALSO YOUR GOALS. BUT YOU CANNOT ACHIEVE ANY OF THEM DIRECTLY OR ALONE. ISRAELI INTERVENTION IN ANY ARAB DISPUTE OR CRISIS WOULD COMPLETELY POLARIZE THE AREA. IN OUR CONVICTION THIS IS AN ISRAELI AND COMMUNIST OBJECTIVE. BECAUSE ISRAEL IS YOUR PERCEIVED SURROGATE, HER INTERVENTION WOULD DESTROY YOUR POLITICAL POSITION AND THAT OF YOUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA. SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF HAVE MORE THAN THEY CAN DO TO PROTECT THEMSELVES, INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY, AND JORDAN IS THE ONLY EASTERN ARAB COUNTRY CAPABLE OF INTERVENING MILITARILY TO SUPPORT THOSE REGIMES. IRAQ IS MAINLY DEPENDENT ON JORDAN'S PORT

FOR ITS MILITARY SUPPLIES AND A FRIENDLY ALLY. I THINK THE UNITED STATES IS MISSING A BET BY NOT IMPROVING ITS TIES WITH IRAQ. IRAQ HAS PREVENTED THE EXPORT OF KHOMEINI'S RADICAL RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION, IS A POTENTIAL ALLY AGAINST SOVIET INCURSION IN IRAN, AND, TOGETHER WITH JORDAN, CAN CHECKMATE SYRIA.

IN REGARD TO THESE REGIMES THERE ARE LIKELY SITUATIONS WHICH COULD DEVELOP IN WHICH ONLY ARAB INTERVENTION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE OR POSSIBLE. IF SO, JORDAN WOULD BE THE ONLY COUNTRY CAPABLE OF INTERVENING MILITARILY.

2. ISRAEL.

WE HAVE THE LONGEST BORDER WITH ISRAEL, AND THE MOST SECURE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IN TERRORISM. WE PROTECT NOT ONLY OURSELVES AGAINST IT BUT OUR NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING ISRAEL, AND WE HAVE DONE IT SUCCESSFULLY.

3. ARAB/SOUTH ASIA.

AS A MATTER OF POLICY, WE HAVE PROVIDED EXTENSIVE MILITARY AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO OUR AREA FRIENDS - SECRETLY AS WELL AS OPENLY. WE HAVE BOTH TRAINED AND COMMANDED MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN THE GULF. OUR SOLDIERS FOUGHT IN OMAN AND SUPPLIED NORTH YEMEN. WE SUPPORTED PAKISTAN IN ITS WAR WITH INDIA, AT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST. WE DID ALL OF THIS WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND OCCASIONAL ASSISTANCE. SO WE ARE NOT NEW TO REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS OR PROJECTS.

4. CURRENT JOINT U.S. COOPERATION.

WE ARE ALSO PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN SECRET JOINT REGIONAL SECURITY PLANS AND OPERATIONS WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT.

THEY ARE MORE ADVANCED THAN ANY IN THE AREA. YOUR COMMANDERS TELL ME THE ASSOCIATION IS AS PROFESSIONAL AS ANY THEY HAVE EXPERIENCED.

5. PROBLEM.

AS AN ASIDE, LET ME TELL YOU SOMETHING ELSE THEY SAID. IT IS AN IRONIC EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF PROBLEM WE FACE. WE HAVE IMMOBILE FIXED ADVANCED HAWK ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES FROM THE U.S. THEY ARE ANCHORED IN CEMENT EMPLACEMENTS. YOUR COMMANDERS COMPLAINED, DURING RECENT JOINT EXERCISES, THAT THEY WERE SITTING DUCKS WHICH COULD BE KNOCKED OUT BY ANY HOSTILE, DETERMINED FORCE IN MINUTES, LEAVING OUR JOINT FORCES TOTALLY VULNERABLE. THEY CONSIDERED THIS A SERIOUS PROBLEM AND SAID WE NEEDED, LIKE EVERYONE ELSE, MOBILE MISSILES. I DID NOT EXPLAIN THAT WE HAD IMMOBILE MISSLES BECAUSE THE ISRAELI LOBBY PRESSURED THE AMERICAN CONGRESS TO PROHIBIT THE SALE OF A MOBILE SYSTEM TO JORDAN. SHOULD THE SITUATION ARISE, WE COULD NOT PROTECT OUR FORCES. THE GREATER IRONY IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO DELIVER TO US SOME OF THEIR MOST SOPHISTICATED MOBILE ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS. INCREDIBLY, THE SOVIETS COULD CONCEIVABLY BE PROVIDING WEAPONS TO PROTECT POSSIBLE JOINT U.S. OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES. I AM SURE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU ARE AS CONFUSED AS I BY SUCH CONTRADICTIONS OF PURPOSE. I HOPE WE CAN BEGIN TO SORT THEM OUT.

6. JORDAN'S MILITARY PROBLEM IN RELATION TO NEIGHBORS.

ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAVE A RELATIVELY OPEN MILITARY PIPELINE TO THE UNITED STATES. SYRIA HAS A SIMILAR PIPELINE TO THE SOVIET

UNION. SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAQ HAVE ABUNDANT FUNDS AND CAN PURCHASE WHATEVER EQUIPMENT THEY NEED FROM SEVERAL SOURCES. JORDAN HAS NEITHER AN OPEN PIPELINE NOR FUNDS. AS A RESULT, OUR MILITARY DISADVANTAGE INCREASES WHILE WE FACE, AT THE SAME TIME, GREATER POTENTIAL EXTERNAL THREATS THAN ANY OF OUR NEIGHBORS.

D. CONCLUSION.

DESPITE THE IRONIES, WE DO HAVE MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND WE ARE PREPARED TO PLAY A STRONG REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE. FRANKLY, I DOUBT IF THERE IS ANYONE ELSE WITH THE CREDENTIALS, CREDIBILITY AND COURAGE TO DO SO. WE COULD, IN EFFECT, BE AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT IN CHALLENGING ANY EXTERNAL OR IDEOLOGICAL THREAT TO THE AREA. WE ARE PREPARED, WITHIN OUR POLITICAL AND MILITARY LIMITS, TO EXPAND OUR EFFORTS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

III. THE INTERRELATION OF SECURITY AND PEACE

A. GENERAL.

I MENTIONED AT THE BEGINNING THAT SECURITY AND PEACE ARE, BY DEFINITION, INTER-DEPENDENT. THE ABSENCE OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT CAUSE OF INSECURITY AND INSTABILITY IN THE EASTERN ARAB WORLD. ANY REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THAT ESSENTIAL TRUTH WILL FAIL IN ITS PURPOSE. I SPEAK AS A FRIEND, WHO BELIEVES IN WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO DO, AND AS ONE WHOSE COUNTRY IS VITALLY AFFECTED BY THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF YOUR EFFORTS.

B. ARAB PUBLIC OPINION AND THE UNITED STATES.

EVERY ARAB LEADER IS FACED WITH THE FACT THAT ALL OF HIS CITIZENS CONSIDER ISRAEL GUILTY OF ILLEGAL AND UNJUST CONQUEST AND

OCCUPATION OF ARAB LAND AND PEOPLE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES, BY WHAT IS PERCEIVED AS UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT OF ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY SINCE CAMP DAVID, IS GUILTY OF AIDING AND ABETTING THAT OCCUPATION. YOU AND I MAY NOT LIKE IT, BUT IT IS A POLITICAL FACT OF LIFE. IN THE ABSENCE OF REAL PEACE PROGRESS, THAT ATTITUDE WILL NOT CHANGE. IT IS AN ATTITUDE WHICH THE SOVIETS, AND RADICALS ARE EXPLOITING AT THE EXPENSE OF BOTH OF US.

I RECENTLY COMPLETED AN EXTENSIVE POLITICAL TOUR OF MY COUNTRY. I WAS DISMAYED BY THE LEVEL OF ANTI-ISRAELI AND ANTI-AMERICAN HOSTILITY EXPRESSED AT EVERY GATHERING. IT WAS THE MOST INTENSE I HAVE WITNESSED. WE WERE ABLE, IN THE PAST, TO DEFLECT OR SUPPRESS THE LATENT HOSTILITY, WHICH PEOPLE HELD BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION, BY OFFERING A SEMBLANCE OF THE HOPE WE HAD THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARING TO ACT, THAT PROGRESS WOULD COME AND THAT PEACE WAS AROUND A NEARBY CORNER. AFTER FOURTEEN YEARS AND THE FAILURE OF SEVEN PEACE PROCESSES IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE, FOR ANYONE TO BELIEVE THAT ANYMORE. I AM PROUD TO HAVE EARNED, OVER LONG HARD YEARS, THE CONFIDENCE OF MY PEOPLE. I HAVE NEVER MISLED THEM. IF I AM NOT CONVINCED OF WHERE WE ARE GOING I CANNOT CONVINCE THEM. NOR CAN ANY OTHER LEADER. THAT IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO DO SOMETHING BELIEVABLE, URGENTLY. I WILL TAKE RISKS BUT THEY WILL NOT BE ENOUGH IF THE FOUNDATION OF TRUST IS NOT STRENGTHENED. THE SOVIETS AND YOUR OTHER OPPONENTS ARE GETTING A FREE RIDE BECAUSE OF THIS SITUATION.

C. THE CONTRADICTIONS OF U.S. MIDDLE EAST SECURITY EFFORTS.

THE DILEMMA OF MIDDLE EAST SECURITY CAN BE SUMMED UP IN

THREE FACTS: (1) THE ARABS PRESENTLY HAVE TWO ENEMIES, ISRAEL AND THE SOVIET UNION; (2) THE UNITED STATES HAS ONLY ONE, THE SOVIET UNION; AND, (3) OUR ENEMY, ISRAEL, IS YOUR FOREMOST ALLY. MOREOVER, MOST ARABS CONSIDER ISRAEL A MORE DANGEROUS ENEMY THAN THE SOVIET UNION. ONE IS PHYSICALLY FAR REMOVED, THE OTHER IS IN PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ARAB LAND AND PEOPLE.

IT IS NOT EASY TO RECONCILE THESE FACTS OR TO FORM A COMMON SECURITY CONCENSUS IN THE FACE OF THEM. WE ARE, IN EFFECT, TRYING TO RIDE TWO HORSES AT THE SAME TIME. IF WE WANT THE AREA TO RIDE THE ANTI-SOVIET HORSE ISRAEL MUST BE REPLACED AS PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE. THE ONLY WAY THAT CAN BE DONE IS TO END THE OCCUPATION. THE U.S.-ISRAELI CONNECTION WILL, IN TIME, MAKE THE UNITED STATES -- NOT THE SOVIETS -- PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER TWO. THIS WILL COMPROMISE YOU AND JEOPARDIZE YOUR FRIENDS. THAT IS WHY AN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE IS CRITICAL TO OUR SECURITY AND TO YOURS AND ALSO TO THE ISRAELIS.

IV. THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

A. JORDAN'S VALIDITY.

1. ORIGINS.

I WOULD LIKE TO MOVE FROM THE QUESTION OF REGIONAL SECURITY TO THE QUESTION OF PEACE. IN SOME CIRCLES IT SEEMS TO HAVE BECOME MORE A QUESTION OF WHERE WE HAVE BEEN THAN WHERE WE ARE GOING. I KNOW WHERE WE HAVE BEEN AND WOULD LIKE TO CLEAR UP SOME MISCONCEPTIONS IN THAT REGARD. ON JULY 24, 1922, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS GRANTED A MANDATE TO GREAT BRITAIN COVERING THE TERRITORIES OF PALESTINE AND TRANS JORDAN. ARTICLE 24 EXPLICITLY

ALLOWED GREAT BRITAIN TO EXCLUDE THE REGION EAST OF THE JORDAN RIVER, NAMELY TRANS JORDAN, FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE MANDATE. THIS WAS DONE LESS THAN TWO MONTHS AFTER THE MANDATE WAS GRANTED. ON SEPTEMBER 16, 1922 THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS APPROVED A SEPARATE ADMINISTRATION FOR TRANS JORDAN UNDER THE BRITISH. IN 1946 BRITAIN RECOGNIZED THE INDEPENDENCE OF TRANS JORDAN, AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TERMINATED THE MANDATE OVER TRANS JORDAN, BUT NOT OVER PALESTINE. SO JORDAN HAS ENJOYED A CONTINUOUS AND DISTINCT EXISTENCE FOR 59 YEARS.

THE MANDATE OVER PALESTINE ENDED IN 1948 WHEN THE BRITISH WITHDREW. WHAT FOLLOWED IS THE SOURCE OF THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS WE STILL FACE TODAY.

2. RECOGNITION.

IN 1947 THE UNITED NATIONS PREPARED A PLAN TO PARTITION PALESTINE INTO SEPARATE ARAB AND JEWISH STATES. THE ARABS IN PALESTINE GREATLY OUTNUMBERED THE JEWISH PEOPLE. THEY HAD LIVED IN PEACE AND HARMONY SIDE BY SIDE FOR CENTURIES. THE ARABS WERE NOT CONSULTED ON THE PARTITION PLAN AND DID NOT APPROVE IT. WHEN THE PARTITION WAS IMPOSED, DESPITE ARAB OBJECTIONS, WAR ERRUPTED. IT ENDED WITH AN ARMISTICE IN 1949, WITH THE NEW STATE OF ISRAEL IN OCCUPATION OF ADDITIONAL TERRITORY. WHAT WAS LEFT WAS ANNEXED TO JORDAN. THE UNITED NATIONS ACCEPTED JORDAN'S MEMBERSHIP IN TACIT ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF JORDAN'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK AND THE ENTIRE WORLD HAS DEALT WITH JORDAN FOR THE PAST 26 YEARS IN EXPRESS RECOGNITION OF THAT FACT. I AM AFRAID MR. SHARON IS AS CONFUSED WITH HIS HISTORY AS HE IS WITH HIS

GEOGRAPHY, AT LEAST PUBLICLY. IN 1967, ISRAEL INVADED EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN, OCCUPYING THE LAND UP TO THE PRESENT LINE, AND THE 1 1/2 MILLION PEOPLE WHO LIVED THERE. THE QUESTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN WHICH ISRAEL ARE WE ASKED TO RECOGNIZE AND WHICH ISRAEL DOES THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT?

B. U.N. RESOLUTION 242 - PURPOSE, INTERPRETATION AND COMMITMENT.

IN THE FALL OF 1967 THE UNITED NATIONS MET TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND TO THAT PURPOSE ADOPTED RESOLUTION 242. I ATTENDED THOSE SESSIONS AND NEGOTIATED ON BEHALF OF THE ARABS. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG NEGOTIATED ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF ISRAEL, WITH WHOSE LEADERS HE WAS IN DIRECT AND CONSTANT CONTACT. THROUGH THOSE NEGOTIATIONS THE UNITED STATES, EGYPT AND JORDAN REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION ON WHICH AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG ASSURED US ISRAEL WAS "ON BOARD."

THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, FORMULATED BY THE UNITED STATES, WERE, IN EFFECT, TOTAL PEACE FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE REGARDING JORDAN WAS "WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK OF JORDAN WITH MINOR, RECIPROCAL BORDER RECTIFICATIONS." AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG EXPLAINED THAT ANY RECTIFICATIONS WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF "STRAIGHTENING OUT" THE BORDER UNDER MUTUAL AGREEMENT.

WE HAD OFTEN REGARDED THE OLD BORDER LINE WHICH WAS THE ARMISTICE LINE OF 1949 AS IN NEED OF MINOR RECTIFICATIONS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS ANYWAY, SUBJECT TO MUTUAL AGREEMENT, BUT I MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT I COULD NOT BARGAIN AWAY AN INCH OF PALESTINIAN TERRITORY OR AN IOTA OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, ARAB

JERUSALEM WAS TO RETURN TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY AND IN A CONTEXT OF PEACE ALL OF JERUSALEM COULD THEN BE THE ESSENCE OF PEACE BETWEEN ALL BELIEVERS IN THE ONE GOD. THE BORDER FOR EGYPT WAS TO BE THE OLD, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY, BUT GAZA AND ALL OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES WOULD BE RETURNED. WE ARGUED THE NEED FOR GAZA AND THE WEST BANK TO BE LINKED TOGETHER UNDER ONE UMBRELLA. FINALLY, IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT PEACE AND SECURITY WOULD BE GUARANTEED ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS. ON THE BASIS OF THIS AGREEMENT EGYPT AND JORDAN ACCEPTED U.N. RESOLUTION 242. ITS IMPLEMENTATION WAS PROMISED WITHIN A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING SIX MONTHS.

C. UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT U.N. RESOLUTION 242.

THAT WAS FOURTEEN YEARS AGO, UNDER PRESIDENT JOHNSON. SINCE THEN, PRESIDENTS NIXON, FORD AND CARTER HAVE CONFIRMED TO ME THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT WAS A SUCCESSION OF MISSIONS, PLANS AND PROCESSES TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 242, ACCORDING TO THE AGREED TERMS. FIRST CAME THE JARRING MISSION, THEN THE ROGERS PLAN, TWO SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEES AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. JORDAN ACCEPTED AND SUPPORTED EACH OF THESE EFFORTS. ISRAEL OPPOSED ALL OF THEM. AS A RESULT THEY ALL FAILED. THEN FOLLOWED THE KISSINGER PLAN: PIECE-MEAL DISENGAGEMENTS AND PIECE-MEAL PEACE, SUPPOSEDLY LEADING TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND TOTAL PEACE. DISENGAGEMENTS WERE TO TAKE PLACE IN SUCCESSIVE ROUNDS WITH EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN. THE FIRST DISENGAGEMENT WITH EGYPT, SINAI I, AND WITH SYRIA WERE ACCOMPLISHED. WHEN IT CAME TO JORDAN'S TURN,

ISRAEL OBJECTED, KISSINGER BACKED OFF AND, INSTEAD, EFFECTED A SECOND DISENGAGEMENT FROM EGYPT, SINAI II. LATER KISSINGER TOLD ME THE BIGGEST MISTAKE HE MADE IN HIS PEACE EFFORTS WAS HIS FAILURE TO PRESS ISRAEL ON DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN. HE SAID HE MISSED A "GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY." WE HAD TOLD HIM THAT AT THE TIME. WE ALSO TOLD HIM THAT THE JORDAN RIVER, WHICH WAS THE OCCUPATION LINE, WAS FOR ISRAEL, A PSYCHOLOGICAL NOT A MILITARY BARRIER. SINAI II, IN 1974, MARKED THE END OF THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS. AND THE WEST BANK CONTINUED UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION. THROUGHOUT THE SEVEN YEARS FROM 1967 TO 1974, I DID EVERYTHING IN MY POWER TO PERSUADE AND ENCOURAGE ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES TO HONOR THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER RESOLUTION 242 - TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FOR TOTAL PEACE - WITH NO SUCCESS.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT U.N. RESOLUTION 242.

OUR FAILURE RESULTED IN THE DECISION TAKEN AT THE CONFERENCE IN RABAT IN 1974, BY ALL THE ARAB STATES, DESIGNATING THE PLO AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WE ACCEDED IN THAT DECISION AFTER A BITTER STRUGGLE IN WHICH WE WERE ALONE. IT WAS, AND IS, OUR BELIEF THAT REGARDLESS OF WHO REPRESENTS THE PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THE PURPOSE OF THAT REPRESENTATION IS TO FREE THEM FROM OCCUPATION AND PROVIDE THEM THE RIGHT AND OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. THAT IS WHAT JORDAN WOULD HAVE DONE IF THE LAND HAD BEEN RETURNED TO HER. AND THAT IS WHAT MUST HAPPEN IF THERE IS EVER TO BE PEACE OR SECURITY FOR ANYONE IN THAT AREA. THERE OBVIOUSLY CAN BE NO MEANINGFUL

SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WITHOUT THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES. BY DEFINITION THE PLO IS A TRANSITIONAL REPRESENTATION, PENDING THE LIBERATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

THESE NUMEROUS, UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 242 HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN AN IMPEDIMENT TO PEACE. THEY SUBSTITUTED PROCEDURES FOR SUBSTANCE, WHICH BECAME DISTRACTIONS TO OUR REAL PURPOSE AND AN EXCUSE FOR FAILURE. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE TERMS EMBODIED IN RESOLUTION 242, AND THE AGREEMENTS ON WHICH IT WAS BASED, HAVE BEEN OVER-COMPLICATED. A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES IN THOSE AGREEMENTS - TOTAL PEACE FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL - IS ALL THAT IS NEEDED TO COMMENCE IMPLEMENTATION.

E. CAMP DAVID ACCORDS - JORDAN VIEW.

THIS BRINGS US TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE. IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT THEIR PEACE TREATY WAS BASED ON JUST SUCH A PRIOR COMMITMENT - TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FOR TOTAL PEACE.

EVEN THOUGH I HAD NO PRIOR NOTICE OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S TRIP TO JERUSALEM, I ENDORSED EVERYTHING HE SAID IN HIS KNESSET SPEECH AS AN INDIVISIBLE PEACE PACKAGE, AND TOLD HIM SO. WE EXCHANGED LENGTHY LETTERS BEFORE HE ENTERED THE CAMP DAVID TALKS AND AGREED COMPLETELY ON THE POSITIONS HE WOULD TAKE. I WISHED HIM LUCK. BEFORE THE TALKS ENDED HE CALLED ME IN LONDON FROM CAMP DAVID TO TELL ME THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE DEADLOCKED, THAT ISRAEL WAS RESPONSIBLE, AND HE WAS PREPARING TO LEAVE. SINCE I WAS VISITING MOROCCO AND HIS ROUTE HOME TOOK HIM THROUGH MOROCCO WE PLANNED A

MEETING THERE. A FEW DAYS LATER, WHILE IN SPAIN, I WAS SHOCKED BEYOND BELIEF AT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CONTENTS OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. I PROMPTLY RETURNED TO JORDAN. I NEVER SAW THE LATE PRESIDENT SADAT AGAIN. THE ACCORDS WHICH WERE SIGNED WERE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH HIS KNOWN AND CLEAR ANNOUNCED EARLIER POSITION OUTLINED IN HIS KNESSET SPEECH. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS SADAT WAS THE VICTIM OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE, AND ALL THE PRESSURES EXERTED UPON HIM, TO WHICH HE FINALLY SUCCUMBED. DESPITE THIS I DID NOT ACTIVELY OPPOSE CAMP DAVID.

I VIEWED CAMP DAVID AS A STEP BACKWARD FROM THE AGREEMENTS ON RESOLUTION 242, AND, WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF EGYPTIAN LEVERAGE, A WEAKENING OF THE ARAB POSITION AND OF THE PROSPECT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. IN THE FACE OF BEGIN'S DECLARED POLICY OF ANNEXATION, I DID NOT THINK IT WOULD WORK. EVENTS HAVE JUSTIFIED THAT VIEW. THE PROPOSED ISRAELI CANAL BETWEEN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE DEAD SEA, INFRINGING ON OUR RIGHTS AND IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, DESIGNED AMONG OTHER THINGS TO COOL ATOMIC REACTORS, PROVES, BY THE DURATION OF ITS CONSTRUCTION, THAT ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING FIVE YEARS AFTER SIGNING THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, OR AT ANY TIME, UNLESS FORCED TO DO SO. ACTUALLY CAMP DAVID HAS PROVIDED THE MOST CONVENIENT FORMULA DEVISED TO DATE FOR BEGIN TO AVOID A SETTLEMENT AND TO CHANGE THE FACTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SO THERE WOULD BE NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE. BEFORE SADAT'S DEATH, THE EGYPTIANS SENT US A REPORT STATING THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT WERE STILL DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED ON EVERY MAJOR ISSUE.

F. After Camp David.

If this is the case we obviously must look for other solutions. If the United States cannot convince Israel, should we not consider the inclusion of others who are willing to help?

The solution is simple and it is not new: give us what you gave Egypt, a commitment to total withdrawal in return for a commitment to total peace and the Arabs will negotiate the details. The only obstacle to peace is Begin's refusal to make that commitment.

G. Israel's Middle East Policy.

1. Objectives.

We have evidence concerning the Likkud Government's Middle East policy objectives. They contain four main points:

(1) Separate peace with Egypt - splitting it from the rest of the Arab world;

(2) Annex the West Bank, Gaza and Golan - increase settlements, make no territorial concessions;

(3) Establish Israel as the only reliable U.S. ally in the Middle East - discredit Arab moderates and undermine their relations with U.S.;

(4) No recognition of the PLO or Palestinian rights - stigmatize Palestinians as terrorists and blunt any reference to self-determination.

2. Consequences.

The consequences of such a policy are the end to a meaningful peace progress, the isolation of Israel and the United

STATES, POLARIZATION OF THE AREA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE ELIMINATION OF ARAB MODERATION. IRONICALLY, THESE ARE ALSO THE POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB RADICALS. THEY ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND YOUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA.

WHEN BEGIN'S COALITION FIRST CAME TO POWER, I ARGUED WITH MANY OF MY AMERICAN FRIENDS THAT IT WAS NOT THE ISRAELI ECONOMY OR THE POLITICAL SCANDAL WITHIN ISRAEL THAT BROUGHT THEM TO POWER. BEGIN'S RETURN TO POWER, FOLLOWING ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION ON IRAQ AND LEBANON, SADLY PROVES THAT A SIZEABLE MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS IDENTIFY WITH HIS POLICIES AND SUPPORT THEM.

H. U.S. MIDDLE EAST OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS.

YOUR BASIC OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE: (1) MILITARY SECURITY FOR ISRAEL; (2) PEACE; AND (3) PROMOTION OF U.S. INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD.

AS YOUR FOREMOST ALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BEGIN SHOULD LOGICALLY SUPPORT YOU IN REACHING ALL THESE GOALS. BUT HE IS SUPPORTING YOU IN ONLY ONE, ISRAEL'S OWN MILITARY SECURITY, AND UNDERMINING YOU ON THE OTHER TWO. WE CAN SUPPORT YOU ON ALL THREE, EVEN ISRAELI SECURITY, BUT ONLY WITHIN HER OWN BOUNDARIES, NOT OURS.

FOR SOME YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS OPERATED ON THE THEORY THAT IF ISRAEL HAD CLEAR MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE ARABS SHE WOULD FEEL SECURE ENOUGH TO MAKE THE CONCESSIONS NECESSARY FOR PEACE. THE OPPOSITE HAS HAPPENED. BEGIN HAS USED HIS SUPERIORITY FOR GREATER REPRESSION AND AGGRESSION AND TO EXTRACT FURTHER

CONCESSIONS FROM THE ARABS. I ARGUED WITH DR. HENRY KISSENGER MANY TIMES OVER THIS TO NO AVAIL. IT IS A POLICY WHICH HAS NOT WORKED.

I. BEGIN WEST BANK POLICY.

BEGIN'S WEST BANK POLICY HAS EXCEEDED THE LIMITS OF TOLERATION. IT HAS DESTROYED ANY CONFIDENCE THE PALESTINIANS HAD IN ISRAELI PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. IF THE REPRESSION DOES NOT CEASE AND THE SETTLEMENT POLICY IS NOT CURTAILED, THE PALESTINIANS WILL NOT JOIN ANY PEACE PROCESS. BEGIN'S BOMBING OF IRAQ AND OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS IN LEBANON HAS SERIOUSLY EXACERBATED THE HOSTILITY. IT IS INFECTING ATTITUDES THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN JORDAN WITH A POPULATION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, MEMBERS OF WHOSE FAMILIES ARE LIVING UNDER THIS REPRESSION. IT IS MORE THAN A POLITICAL PROBLEM, IT HAS BECOME A HUMAN TRAGEDY. AGAIN, IN THE POPULAR ARAB PERCEPTION, THE UNITED STATES, AS ISRAEL'S PROTECTOR, IS BLAMED FOR FAILING TO IMPOSE ANY RESTRAINT. THIS HAS UNDERMINED YOUR CREDIBILITY AND EMBARASSED YOUR FRIENDS. RECENT AMERICAN STATEMENTS THAT THERE IS NOTHING ILLEGAL ABOUT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, WERE PARTICULARLY DAMAGING IN THIS REGARD. EVERY FOREIGN OFFICE IN THE WORLD, THAT I KNOW OF, CONSIDERS THE SETTLEMENTS, AND ISRAELI TREATMENT OF THE OCCUPIED POPULATION, IN DIRECT AND CONTINUOUS VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. WHY IS THIS PERMITTED? EVERYONE ON THE WEST BANK AND IN JORDAN FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES, BY ITS FINANCIAL AID TO ISRAEL, IS, IN EFFECT, FUNDING THESE ILLEGALITIES. THIS IS A REAL PROBLEM FOR ME AND MANY OTHERS IN THE ARAB WORLD.

BEGIN'S WEST BANK POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES ARE NOT ONLY DANGEROUS BUT INDEFENSIBLE. WE KNOW HE WILL NOT ABSORB THE POPULATION AS CITIZENS, IF ONLY BECAUSE IT WOULD DESTROY THE CHARACTER OF THE JEWISH STATE. YET HE WILL NOT GIVE THEM FREEDOM. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVES ARE TO KEEP THE PEOPLE IN BONDAGE, WITHIN A VASSAL ISRAELI STATE, OR DRIVE THEM OUT. EITHER IS AN INVITATION TO DISASTER FOR EVERYONE.

J. WEST BANK SOLUTION.

THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE WEST BANK PROBLEM IS SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE THERE UNDER CONDITIONS OF TOTAL FREEDOM FROM OCCUPATION. THIS IS NOT A DANGEROUS PRINCIPLE. IT IS FUNDAMENTAL TO YOUR OWN BELIEFS. IT IS THE BASIS OF ISRAEL'S OWN CLAIM TO EXISTENCE. WHATEVER THE WEST BANKERS DETERMINE, THEY WILL HAVE CLOSE TIES WITH JORDAN. JORDAN IS THEIR ONLY ACCESS TO THE ARAB WORLD. THEY HAVE BEEN JORDANIAN CITIZENS SINCE 1949. HALF OF OUR POPULATION ARE MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES. THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE NOT ECONOMICALLY VIABLE. THEIR TRADE AND ECONOMY WOULD HAVE TO BE INTEGRATED WITH JORDAN'S. NEITHER WE NOR THE SAUDIS WANT A RADICAL, PRO-SOVIET PALESTINIAN STATE ON OUR BORDERS, ANY MORE THAN ISRAEL DOES. WE SURROUND THE AREA AND WOULD INFLUENCE IT. NOR ARE THE PEOPLE ON THE WEST BANK RADICAL, OR PRO-SOVIETS. WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH HUNDREDS OF WEST BANKERS DAILY. THEY HAVE BEEN THE MOST DOCILE OCCUPIED POPULATION IN MODERN HISTORY. THEY WANT ONLY TO END ENEMY OCCUPATION AND REGAIN THEIR DIGNITY AND RIGHTS. IF THEY WANT A FEDERATED RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN WE WILL AGREE. WE OFFERED SUCH A RELATIONSHIP YEARS

AGO. THIS PROBABLY MAKES THE BEST SENSE FOR EVERYONE. SADAT, THE SAUDIS AND PRESIDENT CARTER HAVE ALL SUGGESTED IT. WE WILL NOT PROMOTE IT, BUT WE WILL ACCEPT IT. BUT WE MUST FIRST GET ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW AND, THAT IS PRIMARILY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

V. JORDAN'S ROLE IN THE AREA

JORDAN HAS SEVERAL ROLES IT CAN PLAY IN THE AREA IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES.

A. REGIONAL SECURITY.

B. HELP END EGYPT'S ISOLATION. EGYPT IS A MOST IMPORTANT PART OF THE ARAB WORLD. ITS ISOLATION IS DANGEROUS. THE SINAI MUST BE RETURNED TO EGYPT, BUT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MUST EGYPT BE FORCED TO AGREE IN GIVING LEGITIMACY TO ISRAEL'S INFRINGEMENT ON ANY PALESTINIAN OR ARAB RIGHTS, OR MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN RIGHTS IN JERUSALEM. SUCH A COURSE WOULD BRING UNTOLD DAMAGE TO EGYPT AND THE AREA.

C. CONTINUE AS A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON IRAQ AND SERVE AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE WEST.

D. PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN NEUTRALIZING RADICALS AND RADICAL REGIMES.

E. MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF.

F. INFLUENCE PLO MODERATION ON TERRORISM AND PEACE AND HELP SAVE THE PLO FROM FALLING UNDER RADICAL INFLUENCES.

G. SUPPORT REALISTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF U.N. RESOLUTION 242.

VI. ADDED PEACE THOUGHTS

A. IDEALLY, IF THE UNITED STATES POSITION SINCE THE ADOPTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, IS AS WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD IT TO BE, IT IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE EEC POSITION WHICH IN TURN IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE PROCLAIMED POLICIES OF THE USSR AND THE MAJORITY OF NATIONS IN THE WORLD. IN VIEW OF THIS, SHOULD NOT THE UNITED STATES INITIATE A JOINT EFFORT WITH ALL OF THEM TO ESTABLISH A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE?

B. SHOULD NOT THE UNITED STATES RECONSIDER TALKING TO THE PALESTINIANS DIRECTLY? IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO DEMAND A PRIOR RECOGNITION BY THE PLO OF ISRAEL OR HER RIGHT TO EXIST, WHEN ISRAEL DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF A PALESTINIAN PEOPLE OR ANY RIGHTS THEY HAVE ON WHAT HAS BEEN FOR CENTURIES THEIR NATIONAL SOIL. THE ONLY FAIR SOLUTION IS SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION.

THE OBVIOUS WAY TO SECURE A CONSTRUCTIVE PALESTINIAN ATTITUDE IS THROUGH A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACTING ALONE AS AN EVEN-HANDED MEDIATOR, OR WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE EFFORT. THAT WAS ONE OF SADAT'S LAST APPEALS TO THE U.S.

C. A UNITED NATIONS OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA COULD BE ACCEPTABLE AS AN INTERIM BETWEEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

D. WE MUST DETERMINE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT WHERE WE GO FROM HERE. THE NEXT ARAB SUMMIT WILL CONVENE

LATER THIS MONTH. WE ARE DETERMINED TO STRUGGLE FOR ANY REALISTIC AND FAIR APPROACH TO RESOLVE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. A COMMUNALITY OF VIEWS WILL ENABLE US TO CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY IN THAT REGARD.

IV. CONCLUSION

MR. PRESIDENT, I AM DEEPLY AWARE THAT MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF THESE COMPLICATED ISSUES ARE AN INHERITANCE OF PAST ERRORS AND MISJUDGEMENTS. YET WE HAVE TO FACE THEM. WE NEED TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE RATHER THAN DEAL WITH CRISES AS THEY CONFRONT US. I KNOW YOU, SIR, AS A MAN OF HONOR, WISDOM AND COURAGE. I AM CERTAIN, WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE FACTS AND APPRECIATION OF THE DANGERS, THAT AN AMERICAN POLICY WILL EMERGE WHICH WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO THE CHALLENGE.

OUR MEETING, COULD RESULT IN THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA OF SOLID COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR NATIONS IN EVERY FIELD. I HAVE SOUGHT SUCH A PARTNERSHIP THROUGHOUT MY POLITICAL LIFE. THE FUTURE OF OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS IS FOR THE MOST PART IN YOUR ABLE HANDS.

THANK YOU.

GRS 900
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FM CANBERRA 180515Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 514 OF 18 NOVEMBER
REPEATED PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
ROUTINE WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO.

FCO TELNO 455.
SINAI MFO : AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER.
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECTION ON SINAI OF LONG TV INTERVIEWED ON 15 NOVEMBER WHICH WAS PRIMARILY ABOUT DOMESTIC POLICY.

QUESTION
PRIME MINISTER, COULD WE MOVE ON TO ANOTHER UNRELATED SUBJECT BUT IT IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE. IT IS THAT OF THE COMMITMENT OF AUSTRALIAN TROOPS TO THE SINAI. IT SEEMS TO US FROM WHAT HAS BEEN REPORTED OVERSEAS IN THE LAST WEEK THAT THE EUROPEAN NATIONS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ARE IMPOSING CONDITIONS ON THEIR COMMITMENT WHICH MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT. HOW DO YOU READ THAT SITUATION AT THE MOMENT?

PRIME MINISTER
WELL, ON YOUR READING OF YOUR NEWSPAPERS YOU ARE PROBABLY NOT FAR WRONG. I DO NOT KNOW THAT I HAVE ANY SPECIALISED KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORDS THAT THE EUROPEANS WANT TO USE, BUT I DO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A VERY GREAT PITY INDEED IF THE PLACEMENT OF CONDITIONS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF A COUNTRY TO PROVIDE FORCES PREVENTS THAT MULTINATIONAL FORCE TAKING PLACE, BECAUSE YOU HAVE A FEW BASIC TRUTHS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY PROPOSALS FOR PEACE, BUT IN SPITE OF ALL ITS DEFICIENCIES, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE THINGS THAT HAVE FLOWN OUT OF THAT, THAT IS THE ONLY PROPOSAL THAT HAS GOT ANYWHERE. THAT IS THE ONLY PROPOSAL THAT HAS MADE ANY PROGRESS. FOR THE EUROPEANS TO BE SAYING THERE IS THE VENICE PLAN, OR THE SAUDI ARABIAN PLAN OR WHATEVER, THAT IS ONE THING, BUT TO JEOPARDISE CONTINUED PROGRESS ON THE ONE BASIS WHICH HAS SO FAR ACHIEVED SOMETHING, WHICH OFFERS THE PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING A GOOD DEAL MORE, I THINK WOULD BE VERY UNFORTUNATE INDEED. NOW, I DO KNOW THAT THERE ARE NEGOTIATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN ABOUT THE KINDS OF WORDS THAT MIGHT BE USED. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT OUR VIEWS ARE WELL KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES, THAT THEY WOULD BE KNOWN TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

QUESTION
BUT THE WORDS, THE DELICACY OF WORDS, SURROUNDS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, DOESN'T IT THOUGH?

PRIME MINISTER
OH, OF COURSE IT DOES, YES.

QUESTION

QUESTION
WHERE DO WE NOW STAND ON THIS PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. IT SEEMS TO ME, AND CORRECT ME IF I AM WRONG, THAT ONLY AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES PERSIST WITH THE ABSOLUTE PROPOSITION WE WILL NOT RECOGNISE THE PLO. FIRST SHOULD I ASK, AM I RIGHT.

PRIME MINISTER
RECOGNISE I THINK IS PROBABLY THE WRONG TERM. BUT, IF A COUNTRY OR A GROUP OF PEOPLE WAS COMMITTED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF AUSTRALIA, COMMITTED TO INVADING US FROM THE NORTH AND DRIVING US OUT THROUGH TASMANIA OUT INTO THE SEA, WOULD WE FEEL LIKE NEGOTIATING WITH THEM?

QUESTION
BUT CAN YOU SOLVE - THIS IS THE EUROPEAN ARGUMENT - CAN YOU SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WITHOUT DEALING WITH THE PLO, THE PLO AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE.

PRIME MINISTER
I HAVE SAID IN OTHER AREAS AND IN OTHER ARENAS THAT IF THE PLO REMOVED THAT PLANK IN THEIR POLICY, IF THEY WERE PREPARED TO SAY OF COURSE ISRAEL EXISTS, OF COURSE THE STATE OF ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST, OF COURSE WE DO NOT WISH TO DESTROY THE STATE OF ISRAEL, WANT WE WANT TO DO IS ESTABLISH A BASIS IN WHICH WE ALSO CAN LIVE, AND LIVE IN PEACE, WELL THEN UNDER THOSE KINDS OF CIRCUMSTANCES I THINK THERE WOULD BE MANY PEOPLE WHO MIGHT WANT TO TALK WITH PALESTINIANS. IT WOULD BE VERY HARD UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ISRAEL TO REFUSE TO TALK WITH PALESTINIANS. BUT WHILE THE PLO SAY ISRAEL MUST PERISH, ISRAEL MUST DIE, WHY SHOULD ISRAEL TALK WITH THEM? IT IS VERY EASY FOR THE PALESTINIANS, FOR THE PLO, TO ALTER THAT PLANK IN THEIR POLICY AND IN A FORTHRIGHT WAY OPEN UP THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH CAN BUILD ON WHAT SO FAR HAS BEEN ACHIEVED THROUGH THE DAMP DAVID ACCORDS. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT IF THE EUROPEANS REALLY WANT TO BE HELPFUL IN THIS SORT OF AREA THAT WHAT THEY OUGHT TO BE DOING IS BRINGING MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE PLO TO DROP THAT PLANK IN THEIR PARTICULAR POLICY. SO I MAKE NO APOLOGIES WHATSOEVER FOR THE POLICY OF AUSTRALIA AS IT IS. AND EVEN IF OTHER COUNTRIES DO CHANGE THEIR VIEW, I STILL THINK AUSTRALIA'S POLICY, THAT ATTITUDE, IS SOUNDLY BASED.

QUESTION
I JUST WONDER, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THIS PRIME MINISTER, WHETHER THE CONDITIONS WHICH YOU PUT ON THE COMMITMENT OF AUSTRALIAN TROOPS IN THE SINAI WHEN YOU SPOKE IN THE PARLIAMENT STILL APPLY, AND THAT IS A CONDITIONAL COMMITMENT BASED ON WHETHER OR NOT AS YOU SAID AT THE TIME, BRITAIN AND CANADA, BUT APPARENTLY SINCE MODIFIED TO BRITAIN AND THE SUBSTANTIAL EUROPEAN COMPONENT.

AS

AS OF NOW, WOULD YOU BE PREPARED TO SAY THAT IN CIRCUMSTANCCES THAT MIGHT OCCUR AUSTRALIA WOULD STILL BE PARTICIPATING EVEN IF THOSE ORIGINAL CONDITIONS DIDN'T APPLY.

PRIME MINISTER
WELL, WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID WE WANT A BALANCED FORCE. THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH I THINK THE GOVERNMENT HOLDS TO STRONGLY. DURING THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IT LOOKED TO US, AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS THAT MAYBE YOU WOULD ACHIEVE THAT BALANCE BY BRITAIN AND CANADA BEING PART OF THE FORCE, BY THE EFFORTS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE AND ITALY AND WHATEVER. THAT IS, I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT, A PRETTY BALANCED FORCE. I REALLY BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST IF, BY INSISTING ON CERTAIN WORDS, THE EUROPEANS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THAT FORCE, IN A BALANCED WAY TO COME INTO BEING, BECAUSE WHAT IS IMPORTANT WITH THE INTEREST OF THE EUROPEANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS A SIGNIFICANT EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT. IN OUR ORIGINAL STATEMENT WE HAD THAT WITH THE INVOLVEMENT OF BRITAIN. IF THERE WERE TO BE NO EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT I THINK THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED PEACE, FOR PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD BE VERY MUCH DIMINISHED.

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FM FCO 171337Z NOVEMBER 81
PRIORITY TO CANERRA
TEL NO. 455 OF 17 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO.

Text attached.

SINAI MFO: REPORTED STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

1. ACTING ON MY INSTRUCTIONS GRAHAM TODAY SUMMONED THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED IN REUTERS YESTERDAY TO MR FRASER CRITICISING EUROPEAN NATIONS, ESPECIALLY BRITAIN, FOR QUOTE PLACING STRINGENT CONDITIONS ON THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MFO, UNQUOTE CONDITIONS WHICH COULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT UNQUOTE. GRAHAM SAID THAT SO FAR AS WE WERE AWARE, THE ONLY GOVERNMENT THAT WAS PLACING A CONDITION ON ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO WAS THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, AT THAT, A CONDITION WHICH WE FOUND UNACCEPTABLE IN THAT IT DIRECTLY INVOLVED BRITAIN, ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO MR FRASER IN THE SUMMER THAT WE HAD NO WISH TO BE DRAGGED IN.

2. GARLAND SAID THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING BUT PRESS REPORTS OF WHAT MR FRASER HAD SAID, BUT WAS TAKING STEPS TO OBTAIN A TRANSCRIPT. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE COULD ONLY UNDERTAKE TO REPORT WHAT GRAHAM HAD SAID. APART FROM THE POSSIBILITY THAT MR FRASER HAD BEEN MISQUOTED IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE HADBEEN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM IN THE COURSE OF A TELEVISION INTERVIEW AND THAT HE WAS HANDLING THE MATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF AUSTRALIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS.

3. ACCEPTING THAT THE FULL TRANSCRIPT MIGHT SHOW A DIFFERENT PICTURE, GRAHAM COMMENTED THAT IT WAS UNREASONABLE TO DRAG BRITAIN IN TO A DOMESTIC POLITICAL AUSTRALIAN ISSUE.

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FM PARIS 171730Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 989 OF 17.11.81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON BONN ROME THE HAGUE UKREP

BRUSSELS ROUTINE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS

MY TEL NO: 985 (NOT TO ALL) : SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. WHEN I SAW M. BEREGOVOY AT THE ELYSEE THIS AFTERNOON I ASKED HIM WHETHER PRESIDENT MITTERAND HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MR PAPANDREOU FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO HIM AT THE WEEKEND. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT WANTED TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE DETAILS OF THE SINAI QUESTION WITH PAPANDREOU UNTIL HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO HAVE A WIDER REVIEW OF THE SITUATION AFTER GIVING M. CHEYSSON A CHANCE TO SORT IT OUT. M. CHEYSSON WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN BRUSSELS TODAY AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD SEE M. CHEYSSON TOMORROW AND WOULD THEN DECIDE WHETHER HE NEEDED TO INTERVENE AT ALL.

2. M . BEREGOVOY WENT ON TO SAY THAT AS FAR AS FRANCE WAS CONCERNED IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL TO HAVE A STATEMENT BY THE TEN. I SAID THAT HE WAS SURELY AWARE THAT AT AN EARLIER STAGE FRANCE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY KEEN TO HAVE A STATEMENT BY THE TEN, MORE KEEN THAN SOME OTHER PARTNERS. M. BERGOVOY SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH M. CHEYSSON AT THAT STAGE BUT HE COULD REPEAT THAT FRANCE WAS NOT PARTICULARLY KEEN ON A STATEMENT BY THE TEN AND THAT IT WAS A PITY THAT A PROCESS OF MODIFICATION AND AMENDMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE. I SAID THAT BRITAIN, BEARING THE BURDEN OF THE PRESIDENCY, HAD FELT BOUND TO PURSUE LOYALLY THE SEARCH FOR A CONSENSUS AMOUNGST THE TEN ONCE THE IDEA OF A STATEMENT BY THE TEN HAD BEEN LAUNCHED WITH FRANCE AS ONE OF THE PROMINENT ADVOCATES OF IT. BRITAIN HAD MADE PROGRESS WITH GREECE OVER THE WEEKEND AND HAD HOPED THAT FRANCE WOULD GIVE SOME HELP. THERE SEEMED A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE WHOLE MATTER WOULD BE SORTED OUT IN BRUSSELS TODAY WHERE THE MINISTERS AND POLITICAL DIRECTORS WERE PRESENT.

3. AT ONE POINT M. BEREGOVOY WAS INCLINED TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE TEXTS HAVING BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE US GOVERNMENT IN SUCH A WAY THAT MR HAIG COULD ASK FOR THEM TO BE CHANGED. I POINTED OUT THAT THE EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND THE UNITED STATES NEEDED TO COOPERATE TOGETHER ON MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTIONS EVEN IF THEY DID NOT AGREE ON ALL POINTS,

AND M. BEREGOVOY CONCEDED THAT

THIS WAS SO.

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subject copy filed on:- Jordan: Visits to London by King Hussein: June 79 Middle East

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON 17 NOVEMBER AT 1000 HOURS

Present

The Prime Minister
Sir John Graham
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

King Hussein
HE Mr. Ibrahim Izziddin

* * * * * *

King Hussein's visit to Washington

The Prime Minister said that the media had suggested that King Hussein's visit had been extremely successful and that a close rapport had been established between the King and President Reagan. Had President Reagan in fact understood the message the King was giving him? King Hussein said that the President had been extremely warm and cordial. He had spoken bluntly to the President and at the end of their first meeting had left with him a copy of his speaking note. (He had also sent copies to his friends.) At their second meeting together President Reagan said that the King's presentation had been an "eye-opener". The President had confessed to not having as much background as he should have.

The President remained hopeful of finding a way through. He aimed to make sure that Israeli withdrawal from Sinai took place and would then press for further progress. However, the professionals with whom the King had spoken in Washington anticipated very serious difficulties. They were deeply concerned about current Israeli attitudes. They thought there might be difficulties even about the withdrawal, although they were determined to keep the Israelis under pressure. They were pessimistic about progress once the withdrawal had been completed. For his part, the King had urged them not to smother Egypt and to leave to her the possibility of getting closer to the other Arab States. The King characterised the present situation as a "juggling act" designed to ensure that the Israeli withdrawal went through.

The Prime Minister said that she had two concerns at present:

(a) the difficulties which had arisen over the European contribution to the Sinai MFO. She was determined to ignore so far as possible Mr. Haig's remarks about Lord Carrington. She was inclined to think that these flowed from a false report of some kind received by Mr. Haig. But the difficulty over what to say about the MFO was genuine. The fate of the West depended, of course, on the United States, but this did not mean that the Europeans had to follow the Americans slavishly. We owed them our judgement. We intended to contribute to the MFO but that did not change our views on the best course to follow. We were committed to the return of Sinai to Egypt but not to any other part of Camp David. We had to say something to Parliament to make it clear that we adhered to the Venice Declaration. The Americans had got their way on the MFO: it was therefore distressing that a diplomatic incident had been allowed to arise;

(b) the current attitudes of the Israeli Government. The Israelis were at present in an extremely aggressive frame of mind. Their reaction to the AWACS decision and to the setting up of the MFO was very worrying, the more so since this was a time when we needed more agreement rather than disagreement. Had the American Government taken on board the fact that President Sadat had been rendered vulnerable by the absence of movement for two years in the follow-up to Camp David? Unless there was progress after the return of Sinai, President Mubarak might find himself in similar difficulties. King Hussein said that he thought this message had gone home in Washington.

King Hussein said that in general he had spoken very plainly to the Americans. He had told them that until a solution to the Palestinian problem was found, Israel was enemy No. 1 of the Arab people, the United States enemy No. 2, and Communism, despite being the fundamental threat, only enemy No. 3. Somehow, the Americans had to improve their image in the region. The

Prime Minister asked whether King Hussein had succeeded in conveying to President Reagan that the so-called Jordanian option was a non-starter? King Hussein said that he thought he had. Indeed, President Reagan had apologised for past statements on this question which had betrayed a lack of background briefing. Sir John Graham recalled that President Reagan's briefing had consisted in large part of a paper by Mr. Rostow. King Hussein indicated that he was familiar with the paper in question and said that attempts to have it rebutted had failed.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Reagan had given any indication of being aware of the inherent difficulties in the autonomy negotiations or of the problems likely to arise in trying to persuade the Palestinians to participate in elections under the resulting arrangements. King Hussein said that at least at their second meeting the President had indeed shown more awareness of the problems. He had also made clear his anger with the Israelis over their recent behaviour. The Prime Minister commented that Mr. Begin's position at present seemed stronger than ever. King Hussein agreed that Mr. Begin had sizeable support at this stage.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Americans had given King Hussein any written response to the paper he had left with the President. King Hussein said that he had asked for such a response but had not yet received it. The Prime Minister said that she would herself be glad to have a copy of King Hussein's paper. It would be essential that the exchange in Washington should not be an isolated one. It would be essential to follow up the exchange "week after week". King Hussein agreed.

The Prime Minister asked whether there had been any signs of willingness on the part of the Americans to enlarge the peace process. King Hussein said that he had not seen any. However, he had told President Reagan that there was a large measure of consensus between the Arabs and their friends in Europe as to what the elements of a settlement should be. Even the Soviet Union seemed to be speaking along the same lines. The President

/ had appeared

had appeared to take the point. The Prime Minister said that President Reagan's welcome for Prince Fahd's initiative had been significant. This no doubt owed much to King Hussein's intervention. King Hussein said that he had told the Americans that while he recognised the difficulties about the refusal of the PLO to recognise Israel (and vice versa), he could not understand why the Americans were not prepared to be in direct contact with both parties. He had reminded them that President Sadat had suggested that President Reagan should talk to the PLO. King Hussein said that he remained willing to act as an intermediary but there would have to be direct contacts at some stage.

Sir John Graham said that he did not think the Americans would make any significant move until Sinai had been safely returned. They did not wish to risk further upsetting Israel in her present mood. They were also worried about the possibility of an Israeli attack on Lebanon. It was for this reason that they urged caution on the Europeans. The King and the Prime Minister both agreed that nothing was likely to happen until after the Sinai withdrawal and that, indeed, the Americans were unlikely to reply in full to King Hussein's approach until that time. Sir John Graham stressed the awkwardness of the gap in the next four or five months. On the one hand, there had to be enough movement to prevent the extremists in the PLO taking over from the moderates. On the other hand, the United States could not go so far that Israel dug in and refused to carry out the withdrawal. We had to be prepared for a major effort after 25 April.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Arabs really wanted Sinai back on the present terms. King Hussein said there would be a major argument at the Arab Summit in Fez. The confrontation states and the PLO could well adopt an extreme attitude and might urge Egypt, for instance, to abandon the Camp David process. He himself intended to work for the return of Sinai and to urge the others to concentrate on the period after that. The Prime Minister hoped that the Summit would endorse the Fahd plan, in particular its seventh point, and urge conditional recognition. This would put Israel on the spot. King Hussein agreed that this would be the ideal outcome.

King Hussein reverted to the question of the Lebanon. He confirmed that Mr. Haig was extremely worried about the possibility of an Israeli attack which might then develop into a major confrontation in Syria. The Prime Minister wondered whether the Israelis would use hostilities in the Lebanon as an excuse for not withdrawing from Sinai. Sir John Graham said that there ought to be no link. The ceasefire in South Lebanon was in fact holding well. There were some signs of helpful movement on the part of the PLO. These were being encouraged by the United Nations. But Israel was reluctant to do anything that seemed to imply a measure of agreement with the PLO.

The Prime Minister thanked King Hussein for his visit. She repeated that she would be grateful to receive a copy of the paper he had left with President Reagan. It was essential that the effort to make progress should continue and that we should avoid a vacuum. The present time was one of opportunity. If we let the chance slip, it might not return.

The discussion ended at 1035.

17 November 1981

Confidential

Note of a talk with Major General Kamal Hassan Ali at the Foreign Ministry, Cairo on Sunday, 15th November, 1981 at 1.30 p.m.

Present:

The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Major General Kamal Hassan Ali

The Minister's Private Secretary

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.
Colonel Neil McLean
Viscount Cranborne, M.P.

After recalling earlier conversations and expressing regret over the murder of President Sadat, Mr. Amery wondered whether it was not the Arab world that was isolated from Egypt rather than the other way round? The Minister agreed warmly and quoted with approval a leading article which had just appeared in Al Madina, a Saudi owned paper, published in Kuwait, which had ~~agreed~~ argued: "peace with Israel is inevitable". The Minister thought many of the Arab states were now drawing closer to the Egyptian position. The war of words in the press and on the radio had practically stopped. The peace process would continue to grow.

The Minister welcomed the proposal for a European contribution to the multi-national force in Sinai and thought the Fahad plan was encouraging in its implicit recognition of Israel. But the Europeans must be careful not to create difficulties which might upset Israel and slow down or even stop the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

He was frankly worried about Israel which he described as suffering from "unlimited suspicion". He had noted press reports of the possible formation of a coalition Government in Israel and recalled that the Israelis only went in for coalitions when they faced some grave national difficulty. He thought ~~the~~ a coalition government might mean one or 3 things.

1. A decision to evict Israeli settlements in Sinai by force. This might involve bloodshed.

2. A decision not to withdraw from Sinai by April 1982. He

thought this unlikely but as a soldier had to take account of the worst case.

3. A political preparation for an attack on South Lebanon with the object of ejecting the Syrians and breaking up the PLO military organisation.

The Minister repeated his view that he thought it unlikely that Israel would postpone their withdrawal. Israel had made a pact to withdraw from Sinai not only with Egypt but with the rest of the world. An attack on the PLO and Syrians in South Lebanon would be more understandable. It would be a preemptive bid, rather in the style of 1967, to knock out the increasing strength of the PLO and the Syrian presence in the Bekkaa Valley. It would be a limited war. The Israelis would not go as far as Damascus. But if they were successful, which he seemed to assume, this would probably lead to the fall of the Assad Government and the end of the Alawite supremacy in Syria.

If Israel adopted the third course, Egypt would not interfere. Indeed its non intervention would be Egypt's first test of its commitment to the Camp David agreement. Egypt would keep faith with Israel.

The Minister then turned to the autonomy talks. These had been very disappointing. The initiative in raising the talks to ministerial level had come from the Israeli side. In the event the Israelis had had nothing new to propose. Presumably they had failed to reach agreement in their own cabinet before the meeting.

There were important differences between Israel and Egypt about the concept of autonomy.

1. The first concerned the structure of the representative body. This was important because the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were an educated people and such a people had to have representative government. Egypt wanted to see about 100 representatives who would elect a council of 13 to 17 members ~~into the administration~~. as an administrative body.

2. The Egyptians wanted autonomy to be based on the whole area of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis wanted it based on the population as distinct from the land. Of the (?)100,000 hectares in question, about one third was state land, mostly mountainous and rocky and partly settled by Israelis already. The second third belonged to Palestinians who had emigrated or to the WAKF. The final third belonged to existing inhabitants. In the Israeli view autonomy only applied to them.

3. There was the problem of Jerusalem. Of its 400,000 inhabitants, 115,000 were Arabs. In the Egyptian view these should also be represented in the autonomous institutions. Israel disagreed.

Egypt could not compromise with Israel on these three points (i.e. the size of the representative body, its constituency, and Jerusalem).

Egypt's objective however, was to establish a framework within which further negotiations could take place after the final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982. Thereafter Egypt's responsibility must diminish. It would be up to the Palestinians and Jordanians to discuss ~~the details~~ with Israel the issues of internal security, foreign affairs and defence which were separate subjects to any rights secured under autonomy. This would involve simultaneous recognition between Israel and the Palestinians and so, presumably, the PLO.

The PLO, however, was severely fragmented. The larger part, as much as 80%, was moderate. The others owed allegiance to more extreme Arab states. The question was would the activist tail wag the dog? The moderate bulk of the PLO depended on Syria and thus on the Soviets, because their main body and armed forces were situated in the Lebanon which was under Syrian control. They could do nothing without Syrian and so Soviet approval.

The Foreign Minister regarded the PLO as an essential ingredient in any settlement. He believed that the problem

The Israelis could not help withdrawing in the end. If they

should be solved within 2-3 years. ~~If Israel~~ tried to absorb Gaza and the West Bank there would be more ARabs than Jews in Israel. This prospect would oblige Israel to be as flexible as Egypt had been.

But there was one cause for concern. Prince Saud bin Faisal had made an offer to the Russians to approve Prince Fahad's plan and join in discussing it. The Soviets unexpectedly had said "yes". This could be interpreted in one of two ways. Perhaps the SAudis were nodding in Moscow's direction to obtain Libyan and Syrian support at the Arab Summit. Alternatively the Soviets were trying to get in on the act by the back door. The question was, who was pulling whose leg? If it were a purely tactical manoeuvre on the part of the Saudis there would be no harm. But the Minister did not want to see the Soviets brought back into the Middle East.

The conversation then turned to Chad. The Minister was not convinced that the Libyans had in fact withdrawn. He thought they would probably try and stay in the uranium rich northern province. They might, however,have withdrawn from the capital in order to secure the arms deal they were negotiating with the French. Ghadaffi had unbounded ambitions but his support for the Polisario was not an expression of Libyan expansionism but came purely from a desire to destroy King Hassan of Morocco.

Turning to the Horn of Africa the Minister said that although the Ethiopian regime was a Soviet puppet they were now fairly quiet in their relations with the Sudan. They had not tried to stir up the South Sudanese. Eritrea was also quiet. There was still a problem between Ethiopia and Somalia but President Ziad Barre had proved himself a great survivor.

Looking across the Red Sea the situation in North Yemen was deteriorating steadily and could be a danger to the Saudis unless they developed a more positive policy. The Americans understood this but had so many points of relative friction with

the Saudis that they hesitated to press them where the Yemen was concerned.

In conclusion the Minister expressed the view that the American military capability in the area would develop quite rapidly once they had established effective stockpiles and servicing arrangements in Egypt.

Note of a meeting with President Husni Mubarak at the Presidential Palace, Cairo on Sunday, 15th November, 1981 at 11.30 p.m.

Present:

President Husni Mubarak

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.
Colonel Neil McLean
Viscount Cranborne, M.P.

After an initial exchange of courtesies, the President explained that he had just received Khalid Mohieddin, the left wing leader. Mohieddin had come to protest against martial law and the restrictions on the press and to explain his opposition to certain aspects of Camp David. The President had told him that martial law was necessary particularly for his sake. Without it the Fundamentalists would "break your neck first of all because they look on you as a Communist". The President went on to say that he did not regard Mohieddin as a Communist but that he had contacts with the Soviets and was indeed pro-Soviet. He had made it clear to him that he would not allow anyone to act as a channel for foreign propaganda. He was not going to sit on his hands and allow the Soviets to come back and dominate Egypt. The President added that on Camp David he had told Mohieddin that there was no other way in which the Sinai could have been recovered. It could not have been done by war. So why was Mohieddin complaining? What would he have done? Mohieddin apparently agreed but said that he could not say so publicly since he had opposed Camp David in public from the beginning.

The President went on to say that the autumn had been a time of great trouble for Egypt but now things were much quieter and the universities were open again. A number of people had been arrested and were awaiting interrogation. When this was completed the Government could decide what further steps to take. But as at present advised, he did not think that foreign powers had been directly involved in President Sadat's assasination.

Mr. Amery asked whether relations with Saudi Arabia were improving. The President replied that he had good unofficial

contacts with the Saudis and had received private messages of condolence after the murder of President Sadat. Mr. Amery recalled that President Sadat had told him that Egypt could make friends with the Saudis whenever it wanted to. Had the time come? The President said that he preferred to move slowly. The essential thing was to complete the Camp David agreements and not give the Israelis any reason to go back on or postpone their withdrawal from the Sinai. Both Mr. Begin and Mr. Peres had assured him that they would stick to the Agreement and he believed them. "War has been erased from the Israeli/Egyptian vocabulary" Nevertheless, there were voices raised in Israel urging at least postponement of withdrawal.

The President went on to speak of the autonomy talks. He did not expect to reach a detailed agreement by April 25th 1982 but he hoped there might, by then, be a framework within which more detailed negotiations with Israel could be carried on by Palestinians and Jordanians, hopefully with Saudi encouragement. Egypt would naturally do what it could to help. But the Egyptians could not be expected to assume the main responsibility. This must be left to the parties directly concerned. The Egyptians could not be expected to fight other Arab states battles for them. When the Israelis had bombed the Bagdad reactor some Arab Governments had called on Egypt to take action against Israel. But what had they done themselves? All Iraq had done had been to refer the question to the UN. So why should Egypt fight Iraq's battles for her?

The President went on to talk about the PLO. This was a mixture of different groups divided into a pro-Syrian, pro-Iraqi and pro-Libyan faction - and all paid for by the moderate Arab states! The PLO could only follow a united line of policy if its three backers were in agreement. Of the three Syria was the most important because it had physical control of the main PLO bases in South Lebanon.

The President doubted whether the PLO leaders were really very keen on peace with Israel. If a Palestinian state were

established, financial contributions from Saudi Arabia would go to the new State and not to individual leaders, to the detriment of their Swiss Bank accounts. The President did not regard the Fahad proposals as a serious or effective plan but rather as a possible starting point for talks. The Venice initiative too had some merit. But the PLO could only negotiate seriously if the Syrians, and so the Russians, gave them the green light.

Mr. Amery mentioned that Lord Carrington was trying hard to involve the PLO in the peace process. The President commented "God help him", this in a tone that conveyed exasperation rather than benison. For his part he was inclined to doubt whether the Palestinian question would be settled for "50 years". But that, he added, was a purely private view. He went on to say that he had been told, also privately, by "a senior member of the Saudi ARabian Royal family" that the Saudis were not really all that interested in a settlement for the Palestinians. They would agree to terms with Israel if a solution could be found for Jerusalem. He believed this view was shared by other Saudis and perhaps some of the Gulf rulers.

Turning to Syria, the President doubted whether the Syrians really wanted a settlement of the Palestinian problem as this would end their chances of extracting money from the rich Arab states. The Golan Heights were worthless land but provided a reason for keeping the Syrian army on the alert and so for extracting money from the Saudis. Golan was really "a furnished flat for which the rich Arabs pay the rent".

The President expanded at some length on the mercenary character of the Syrians. He claimed that earlier this year Prince Abdullah of Saudi ARabia had paid the Syrians $500 million just to withdraw from the Jordan border which they had never really intended to attack. They had apparently even mentioned the sum of $16 billion as their price for pulling out of Lebanon!

Nevertheless, after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, Hafiz Assad could be in a tight corner. Assad's Government had pursued a policy of confrontation with Israel. Egypt had opted instead for negotiation. All Sinai would shortly be in Egyptian hands. The Syrian people would begin to realise the mistakes of what was anyway a very unpopular and minority government. This might well prove fatal to Assad's regime.

Colonel McLean asked what sort of regime would follow? The President thought that on balance it would be another pro-Soviet regime. If it were an anti Russian regime this would be a great defeat for the Russians, too great perhaps for them to accept, though obviously desirable.

Turning to Jordan the President said that King Hussein could expect a great deal of trouble from the Palestinians. Nevertheless, after the return of Sinai, King Hussein must be associated with the next phase of talks about the West Bank. But it would be very difficult to pin King Hussein down. "He is very clever but you can never catch him. Even when you have him in your grasp he slips out". He accompanied this remark with a graphic gesture as of one trying to grip an eel.

The President then turned to Libya. He thought that President Ghadaffi was experiencing some difficulty at home because of a shortage of liquid cash. He had,however, received private assurances from Ghadaffi that Libya would not attack Egypt. Ghadaffi had also sent him a private message, just after President Sadat's murder, but the timing of it had been in such contrast with Ghadaffi's public statements as to be "impolite". Anyway he did not want to negotiate with Libya "while this madman is at the helm". When Mr. Amery remarked that it would be constructive if Egypt had access to Libya's oil resources, the President smiled appreciatively but said "Yes, but that is something we cannot discuss".

The President discounted reports of concentrations of Libyan troops on the Chad/Sudan border. The country was too inhospitable

to sustain the presence of an army for long. He also thought the reports of fighting between the troops of the Chad Defence Minister and the Chad Foreign Minister were false. They might have been invented to give the Libyans an excuse to return to Chad should Ghadaffi later wish to do so.

On the subject of the Soviet stockpile of arms in Libya, the President said that this stockpile was indeed substantial. Ghadaffi had bought the arms at a time when he believed the Americans were stockpiling arms in Israel. He had planned himself to establish a parallel stockpile for a pan Arab war against Israel. The President, however, predicted that Libya would find that there was a desperate shortage of spare parts. He had had some experience of Soviet methods when commanding the Egyptian air force. He had found, then, that there were not even spare tyres or engines for Russian supplied Migs. It was the classic Russian technique for keeping control of weapons they supplied.

He personally had a poor opinion of the Libyan armed forces "We gave them a good drubbing when we bombed Tobruk in 1977 and destroyed the airport facilities and some aeroplanes on the ground". He believed some Russian advisers had also been among the casualties.

Mr. Amery asked how the President saw the outlook in Iran. He thought the opposition to Khomeini strong but very divided. There was not much hope of doing anything until a strong man arose inside the country, probably from the armed forces. His own guess was that the Soviets would strike next in Poland which would be "very bad for Europe" but he himself was more seriously concerned about Iran. It was the Middle Eastern country most vulnerable to Soviet expansion.

Colonel McLean asked about the situation in Yemen. Here the President was very critical of the Saudis for having no positive policy. He spoke with disapproval of a Saudi prince

who had told him that the Saudis had no quarrel with Aden and this at a time when the Russians were building a major new airfield and expanding their naval facilities. He thought the situation in North Yemen was deteriorating seriously and that this could be disastrous for the Saudis.

Mr. Amery said how much he had been encouraged by President Reagan's general approach to the international situation. The President agreed warmly. He found the Americans (how) reacted much faster than they had under President Carter who had been rather slow. He liked General Haig very much. In particular he was grateful to the Americans for their swift reaction to the murder of President Sadat. He was very pleased with the "Bright Star" manoeuvres which had just started, though he had not yet had any detailed report about them.

Strategically he thought it essential that there should be an American presence in the area of the Gulf and judged that Maseira could serve very well for this purpose. He was, however, doubtful about the present American military capability in the area. But this could be greatly improved once they began to establish stockpiles of war materials in Egypt and facilities for servicing weapons. He did not want American bases on Egyptian soil but would give them all facilities.

He welcomed the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia as evidence of American determination to defend Western oil supplies. He could not understand why the Israelis had made such a fuss about the AWACS planes. As an air force officer he knew that they would remain under effective American control with American technicians on board and on (the) ground installations. If the Saudis had not bought them the Americans would have stationed them there anyway. The only difference was that the Saudis had paid $10 billion for what they could have had for free!

GRS 9ø
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 141445Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 981 OF 14 NOV 81
INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS BRUSSELS DUBLIN COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG BONN WASHINGTON CAIRO TELAVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TEL NO 5ø5 AND TELECON RESIDENT CLERK/HUM: SINAI: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

1. ACTION TAKEN (IN THE ABSENSE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE) WITH THE ELYSEE DUTY OFFICER. THE LATTER HAD ALREADY ALERTED THOSE CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT AND HE UNDERTOOK TO BRING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT'S IMMEDIATE ATTENTION, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WAS ACTUALLY PRESENT IN THE ELYSEE. HE SAID HE WOULD LET THE EMBASSY KNOW IN DUE COURSE WHAT ACTION THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE T TAKING.

2. M CHEYSSON'S CABINET HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE MESSAGE.

HIBBERT

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
ECD(E)
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM
MR BULLARD
MR HANNAY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 156/81

T156/81

CONFIDENTIAL

36745 - 1

ZZ PARIS
GRS 296
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 141100Z NOV 81
TO FLASH PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 505 OF 14 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS BRUSSELS DUBLIN COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG BONN WASHINGTON CAIRO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK
SINAI: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, ONCE YOU HAVE RECEIVED TELEPHONED CONFIRMATION FROM THE RESIDENT CLERK.

2. BEGINS: I AM NOT SURE HOW CLOSELY YOU WILL HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION BY FRANCE AND BRITAIN, TOGETHER WITH ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS, IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN SINAI.

3. THE SITUATION TODAY, I UNDERSTAND, IS THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, ALONE AMONG THE TEN, IS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT IN ITS PRESENT FORM THE STATEMENT OF SUPPORT TO BE ISSUED BY THE TEN.

They have also asked for changes in the communication to be made by the four Governments to the United States, Egypt and Israel.

4. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO URGE THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER TO RALLY TO THE CONSENSUS IN THE TEN FOR THE SAKE OF THE WIDER INTERESTS WHICH ARE AT STAKE. I BELIEVE THAT THE CHANCES OF MONSIEUR PAPANDREOU RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL WOULD BE GREATLY INCREASED IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR YOU, MR PRESIDENT, TO USE YOUR PERSONAL INFLUENCE WITH HIM IN THE SAME SENSE. IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE RESOLVED WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. I THEREFORE VENTURE TO HOPE THAT, IF YOU SHARE MY VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER, YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO TELEPHONE TO MONSIEUR PAPANDREOU TODAY. ENDS.

5. WHEN YOU DELIVER THE MESSAGE YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT WE ARE APPROACHING THE FRENCH BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP THAT THE PRESIDENT ENJOYS WITH MONSIEUR PAPANDREOU. YOU MIGHT ALSO REMIND THE ELYSEE THAT THE FRENCH WERE AMONG THOSE WHO FELT MOST STRONGLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A STATEMENT BY THE TEN.

CARRINGTON

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WED	CABINET OFFICE	

CONFIDENTIAL

BF for tel.

10 DOWNING STREET

Michael ~~Alexander~~,

Attached is the message sent by the PM to President Mitterrand.

The PM commented "Does Lord Carrington remember that at the last European Council President Mitterrand was the least in favour of the statement." With this proviso she was content with the message.

Lord Carringtons Office said that he was aware of President Mitterrand position and this had been taken into consideration when drafting the message.

Steve Seary
14/11/81.

PS Note sentence that was added to message after we had spoken to you. This was cleared by PM.

Mufaxed to Chequers at 1100 on 14/11/81

Prime Minister cleared

Agree text of message below?

S.J. Pike
Duty clerk
14.11.

Private Secretary
NUMBER 10

SINAI FORCE

1. The Greek Government remains unwilling to agree to the statement to be issued by the Ten in support of the participation by the UK, France, Italy and The Netherlands in the Sinai Force.

2. In the circumstances, the Foreign Secretary believes we should ask the French President to speak to the Greek Prime Minister later today. Lord Carrington is convinced that the best way of doing this would be for the Prime Minister to send President Mitterrand a message along the lines of the attached draft.

3. If the Prime Minister agrees to the message, I shall arrange for its immediate delivery by our Embassy in Paris.

14 November 1981

D G Manning
Resident Clerk

cc:

Private Secretary
Mr Bullard
Mr Miles, NENAD

DRAFT

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

"I am not sure how closely you will have been following the efforts to establish a basis for participation by France and Britain, together with Italy and The Netherlands, in the Multinational Force to be established in Sinai.

The situation today, I understand, is that the Greek Government, alone among the Ten, is unwilling to accept in its present form the statement of support to be issued by the Ten. *

The British Ambassador in Athens has been instructed to urge the Greek Prime Minister to rally to the consensus in the Ten for the sake of the wider interests which are at stake.

I believe that the chances of Monsieur Papandreou responding to this appeal would be greatly increased if it were possible for you, Mr President, to use your personal influence with him in the same sense. It is highly desirable that the matter should be resolved without further delay. I therefore venture to hope that, if you share my views on the substance of the matter, you will feel able to telephone to Monsieur Papandreou today."

* They have also asked for changes in the communication to be made by the four Governments to the United States, Egypt and Israel.

Middle East.

CONFIDENTIAL

36745 - 1

ZZ PARIS
GRS 296
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 141100Z NOV 81
TO FLASH PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 505 OF 14 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS BRUSSELS DUBLIN COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG BONN WASHINGTON CAIRO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK
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4. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO URGE THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER TO RALLY TO THE CONSENSUS IN THE TEN FOR THE SAKE OF THE WIDER INTERESTS WHICH ARE AT STAKE. I BELIEVE THAT THE CHANCES OF MONSIEUR PAPANDREOU RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL WOULD BE GREATLY INCREASED IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR YOU, MR PRESIDENT, TO USE YOUR PERSONAL INFLUENCE WITH HIM IN THE SAME SENSE. IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE RESOLVED WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. I THEREFORE VENTURE TO HOPE THAT, IF YOU SHARE MY VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER, YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO TELEPHONE TO MONSIEUR PAPANDREOU TODAY. ENDS.

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CARRINGTON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 November 1981

Type for PM's signature

Dear Michael,

Your letter of 3 November enclosed one from Mr Michael Latham MP to the Prime Minister about the PLO and the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

/ I attach a draft reply. This does not attempt to deal with all the claims made by the Britain Israel Public Affairs Committee, but concentrates on the main issues, where the paper is either obviously incorrect or ignores the key arguments. But the Prime Minister may like to see the more detailed comments on the BIPAC / paper in the enclosed background note.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:
Mr Michael Latham MP

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 30 October about the PLO and the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

You referred to my remarks in Kuwait about the PLO. Both Peter Carrington and I have said on several occasions that Israel cannot be expected to negotiate with an organization which does not first dissassociate itself, in unambiguous terms, from past statements implying its commitment to the destruction of Israel. A clear statement by the PLO that it was ready to accept Israel, provided Israel recognized the Palestinians' legitimate political rights, would be a major step forward. We shall continue to press the PLO to make such a statement.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

As for the Israeli raid on the nuclear reactor in Iraq, I have studied with care the document

/prepared

prepared by the Britain/Israel Public Affairs Committee. I have to say, however, that I see nothing in it to alter the condemnation of the raid, which I expressed in the House of Commons shortly afterwards, and which was repeated subsequently in the resolution of the UN Security Council.

The allegations in the Committee's paper are simply not supported by the facts. Iraq, unlike Israel, has acceded tothe Non-Proliferation Treaty and has agreed to submit all her nuclear facilities to international safeguards, including inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Director-General of the IAEA made it clear after the raid that safeguards had been satisfactorily applied and that all nuclear material at the reactor was satisfactorily accounted for. He was also satisfied that the use of the reactor for the production of plutonium would not have been feasible without detection by IAEA inspectors. There is thus no reason to believe that Iraq was using the reactor, or the associated facilities, for other than peaceful purposes. We do not ~~therefore~~ believe that Iraq had the capacity to manufacture fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Of course, Israel has legitimate concerns about her security, and the Israeli Government inevitably faces difficult decisions in ensuring her protection. But the system of international law and international safeguards has been established to avoid precisely the sort of situation which Israeli clearly feared. It

/may

may be argued that the Treaty is imperfect. But we believe it does significantly diminish the prospect of further nuclear weapons proliferation and that it thereby contributes to world peace and stability. We would like to see all states working to reinforce, rather than to undermine, it. Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty, and her raid on the Iraqi nuclear facility, constitutes a set-back to the cause of non-proliferation and to the prospects of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.

Background

1. Certain assertions in the BIPAC paper are, as far as we know, simply not true:-

(i) The IAEA had not proposed to inspect the Iraqi reactor every two weeks

(ii) Osirak is not the only nuclear reactor greater than 50MW in a non-nuclear weapon state.

(iii) The IAEA report did not express 'concern at Iraq's demands for new fuels'.

(iv) The IAEA has not 'conceded that the Israelis saved many lives by striking when they did'.

2. Iraq (unlike Israel) is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and all her nuclear facilities are subject to international safeguards. We are confident that any diversion of the reactor fuel for weapons purposes or the illicit irradiation of natural uranium to produce plutonium would risk almost certain detection.

3. Although ways are being studied of reducing the need to use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civil nuclear research reactors, that developed for use in Osirak type reactors - so called caramel fuel - is not yet proven. It was first inserted into a French reactor in mid 1979, and power has been increased by stages. We are not however sure whether the reactor has yet been brought to full power or if the caramel fuel has been irradiated to its full capacity. In these circumstances, there is nothing surprising in Iraq's acquisition of HEU.

4. There is no published information about transfers of natural uranium to Iraq. States party to the NPT, such as Iraq, are required to report the quantities involved to the IAEA, but such reports are confidential between the state and the Agency and are not published. However, the BIPAC are on strong ground here in that we do have cause to believe that the Iraqis have been

/attempting

attempting to build up unsafeguarded stocks of natural and depleted uranium. For obvious reasons, these suspicions cannot be released publicly.

5. While the argument for attacking before the reactor was operational and 'hot' is understandable, the BIPAC estimate of the radiation hazard caused by such an attack is greatly exaggerated. An attack on a research reactor could cause some radiation release, but even if the reactor were fully operational, it would be unlikely to have spread as far as Baghdad.

6. Although Iraq may have a 'plentiful supply of oil' at present, this does not mean that she has no need to secure long term energy supplies by reducing her dependence on a single source of energy. Moreover, as a party to the NPT, Iraq has the right to obtain the benefits of modern technology for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes - and to expect other NPT parties to co-operate with her to that end.

7. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the associated safeguards regime are, of course, less than perfect. But to argue that the raid on the Iraqi reactor was justified because of the possible existence of other and undeclared nuclear facilities, seems ludicrous. There is no evidence to suggest that any such facility exists. If it did, the Iraqis would be unlikely to use the safeguarded reactor for illicit purposes and its destruction would therefore serve no purpose.

GR 350
CONFIDENTIAL
ECLIPSE
FM WASHINGTON 130031Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3404 OF 12 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, TEL AVIV

JEDDA TELNO 748: ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF SAUDI AIR SPACE

1. EHRNMANN, DESK OFFICER FOR SAUDI ARABIA, TOLD US TODAY THAT THE ISRAELI INCURSIONS ON 9 NOVEMBER WERE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF AN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN CARTER AND BEGIN IN 1979 THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT OVERFLY SAUDI ARABIA AND THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD KEEP THEM INFORMED OF ANY CHANGES IN SAUDI DEPLOYMENTS AT TABUK. EHRNMANN ADMITTED THAT, APART FROM THE ATTACK ON THE IRAQI REACTOR, THERE HAD PROBABLY BEEN ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS IN VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT, BUT NOTHING ON A SCALE COMPARABLE TO THE INCURSIONS OF 9 NOVEMBER.

2. EHRNMANN SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD DENIED THE 9 NOVEMBER INCURSIONS WHEN THE AMERICANS FIRST TACKLED THEM ABOUT IT, BUT HAD ADMITTED THEM AFTER THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE SAUDIS. HE SAW THE INCURSIONS AS PART OF THE ISRAELI CAMPAIGN TO WEAKEN US/SAUDI RELATIONS AND AS A SIGNAL TO THE AMERICANS THAT THE ISRAELIS NO LONGER TRUSTED THEM TO FULFIL THEIR PART OF THE CARTER/BEGIN AGREEMENT. THE ISRAELIS WERE INCREASINGLY TREATING SAUDI ARABIA AS A QUOTE FRONTLINE STATE UNQUOTE.

3. EHRNMANN WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE LIKELY AMERICAN REACTION. BUT HE ADDED THAT ONE OF SHARON'S STAFF, TAMIR, WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS INCIDENT WITH THE PENTAGON THIS WEEK.

4. EHRNMANN SPECULATED THAT AMONG THE REASONS FOR THE SAUDI DECISION TO PUBLICISE THESE INCURSIONS WERE THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF KEEPING THEM QUIET, THE SIMULTANEOUS MEETING OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL IN RIYADH, AND SAUDI ANNOYANCE AT THE PUBLICITY GIVEN IN ISRAEL AND THE US TO THE RECENT STRANDING OF AN ISRAELI NAVAL PATROL-BOAT ON THE SAUDI COAST. THE SAUDIS FOR THEIR PART HAD RESPONDED TO A US REQUEST (ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF) TO GIVE THIS INCIDENT NO PUBLICITY.

HENDERSON

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FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,
SWIW 9AA
TEL: 01-235 1543
01-235 7409

Personal & Confidential

12th November, 1981.

Dear Margaret, R16

I was in South Africa in the second part of October and had talks with Ministers in Pretoria as well as businessmen and others in Johannesburg.

I put down below a few thoughts on some of the main issues in Southern Africa.

Namibia

South AFrican Ministers appreciate that the Reagan administration is the most friendly American Government they are likely to find. They will accordingly cooperate sincerely with Washington, though that doesn't mean that they won't fight their own corner hard.

The Namibia issue is not simple as you will know. Agreeing constitutional principles is almost as difficult as agreeing a detailed constitution. In what they ~~ask~~ call "Phase II", the administrative problems - status of Civil Servants, relations with UN, provision for law and order etc. - bristle with difficulties. I should be surprised if the timetable for "independence" could be completed even in theory, before the early summer of 1983. And, of course, the local SWA parties may prove difficult and can count on a good deal of support within the Nationalist Party itself.

Basically this is a tougher problem than Rhodesia. The FCO wanted to get rid of the Rhodesia problem. The South Africans don't really want to get rid of Namibia and will try to avoid doing so until it seems a reasonably safe proposition.

Then there is the question of how to enforce constitutional safeguards even if they are agreed. A lot here will depend on the wider context under which Independence comes about. To risk a SWAPO victory in SWA while neighbouring Angola remains a one-party state, virtually occupied by the Soviets and Cubans, could be very dangerous for South AFrican and indeed Western interests. Short of a South AFrican reconquest of the territory, there would be little to stop a SWAPO Government calling in Cubans or other Soviet allies from Angola.

If, on the other hand, the Soviets and Cubans were withdrawn from Angola, if, moreover, the Angolan Oppostion parties - UNITA and FNLA - were recognised in some form or other, a SWAPO victory in Namibia would not present much of a danger to South AFrican or to other interests generally and any subsequent SWAPO regime could be controlled or contained.

This issue, of course goes beyond the remit of the 5 power Contact Group and will be mainly for discussion between Washington and Pretoria. I suspect however, that in practice, progress over Namibia may well depend, as far as Pretoria is concerned, on how far we can move towards the decolonisation of Angola. It is, to say the least, a little odd to insist on free elections in Namibia and the withdrawal of "foreign" troops when Angola has never had elections of any kind and is occupied by Warsaw Pact and Cuban forces.

For my own part, I think it would be to our advantage to link the two questions of Namibia and Angola. If we could get the Soviets out of Angola militarily and politically, this would be a great gain. If we cannot, it might well be better to let Namibia go on as it is.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

I did not go to Zimbabwe but discussed the situation with both South AFricans and Rhodesians like Harold Hawkins and Peter Walls. Their general impression was pretty pessimistic. The whites have been leaving to and through South Africa in even larger numbers than the published figures suggest. The farmers of course have to stay because they cannot liquidate their assets and many older people choose to stay. The main drain is among the under 50s, particularly technicians, skilled workers and civil servants. The effect on the economic and administrative infrastructure is already visible.

This process seems likely to continue as the Mugabe regime adopts policies and strikes attitudes increasingly unfriendly to the whites. Nkomo and his friends are equally unhappy at the prospect of a one party state. Muzorewa and Sithole may already be in personal danger. The advent of North Korean arms and instructors has inevitably increased the sense of uncertainty.

I don't believe the South Africans are deliberately seeking to destabilise Zimbabwe. But they could do so and have made it plain that they will not tolerate any practical support for the African National Congress. They are prepared for everyday cooperation but on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect. Theyare not prepared to accept alleged internal political pressures on Mugabe as justifying unfriendly rhetoric or gestures.

How Zimbabwe will develop may well turn on how the Namibia problem is solved. If it is accompanied by the Soviet/Cuban withdrawal from Angola the prognosis could be hopeful. Otherwise a steady deterioration seems more likely.

General

The South AFrican economy remains very strong and its growth rate impressive. Notable growth areas, I was told, are Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Phillipines. Trade with Black Africa continues to grow, and increasingly openly.

Inspite of many previous disappointments the South Africans seem convinced that their rapprochment with the United States is for real, because dictated by genuine strategic and economic considerations.

Discussions about internal reforms continue but are bogged down at the moment by the boycott of Coloured and Asian councils by their community leaders. The Prime Minister is also under growing pressure from his breakaway right. But he, Pik Botha, and General Malan make up a strong team.

Looking ahead I have a hunch that South Africa may move away from the Westminster type to a more presidential system. This would enable the President to nominate ministers and officials from other races without undermining the basic structure of white supremacy.

Ted Heath's speech in South AFrica was coldly received, so I was told by half a dozen people who heard it. The more sophisticated assessed it as directed to Social Democrat and Liberal opinion in Britain. Ministers resented that he had been their guest the day before but gave no indication of what he was going to say. Even opponents of the Government regretted his demand for "one may one vote". Coming from a former Tory PM it was bound to give the impression that the much lesser but still substantial reforms now under discussion would earn South AFrica no good will abroad.

Yours ever,

Julian.

Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

PS. Sorry for the delay in sending this letter but I had to go to Poland between drafting and signing it.

Middle East Rtb

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 November, 1981

Sinai Multinational Force (MFO)

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 6 November on this subject. Francis Richards' letter to me of 11 November records the view of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Clearly there will have to be a Ministerial discussion of the problem once a final decision on British participation has been announced.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Kerr (HM Treasury), Francis Richards (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

J D S Dawson, Esq
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

MODFM
seen

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 November 1981

Dear Michael,

Sinai Multinational Force (MFO)

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has seen Jonathan Dawson's letter to you of 6 November. TPM

He remains of the view that the arrangement suggested by the Prime Minister, as recorded in your letter of 2 November to David Omand, is the right one.

We shall need to discuss the detailed arrangements for the Force with the Ministry of Defence and the Americans as soon as a final decision on British participation has been announced, and the Americans have responded to our offer of a contingent of Royal Engineers. Clearly the issue of funding will have to be resolved before then.

I am copying this letter to John Kerr (HM Treasury), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Jonathan Dawson (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

GR 350 CONFIDENTIAL

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FM JEDDA 110950Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO Tlm No 748 of 11.11

RPTD FOR INFO TO PRIORITY TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF SAUDI AIRSPACE.

1. REPORTS OF MONDAYS INCIDENT WERE (MOST UNUSUALLY) CARRIED ON THE FRONT PAGES OF ALL LOCAL NEWSPAPERS YESTERDAY. PREVIOUS VIOLATIONSIF SAUDI AIRSPACE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN DENIED BUT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY AT THE END OF THE GCC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING PRINCE SAUD ADMITTED THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS NOT THE FIRST. HE DESCRIBED IT AS A NEW ACT OF AGGRESSION WHICH DEMONSTRATED TO THE WORLD THE AGGRESSIVE NATURE OF ISRAEL'S POLICIES. THE ARAB WORLD, HE SAID, WAS ALREADY FAMILIAR WITH THE TRUE NATURE OF ISRAEL. SAUD ADDED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT (NOT) MAKE A FORMAL PROTEST AT THE UNIHMTED NATIONS.

2. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (WHO WAS IN RIYADH YESTERDAY) HAS TOLD ME THAT THE SAUDIS WERE VERY UPSET AT THE INCIDENT, WHICH THEY HAD FIRST FEARED WAS EITHER THE START OF, OR A DRESS REHEARSAL FOR, AN ATTACK ON TABUK. ACCORDING TO MURPHY, THE INCIDENTS INVOLVED NOT ONLY ISRAELI JET FIGHTERS BUT ALSO A HAWKEYE AIRCRAFT. HE SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD GOT THEIR MISSILES INTO POSITION AND HAD BEEN IN A VERY HIGH STATE OF ALERT. HE HAD NO HARD INFORMATION ON THE REASONS FOR THE ISRAELI ACTION, BUT THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS SIMPLY WANTED TO GIVE A FRIGHT TO ARABS WHO WENT AROUND TOUTING PEACE PLANS.

3. MURPHY THOUGHT THAT THE SAUDIS HAD REALISED THAT AFTER ALL THE FRANTIC ACTIVITY AT TABUK, THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP THE INCIDENT QUIET: AND PRINCE SULTAN'S DENIAL A MONTH AGO THAT SIMILAR INCIDENTS HAD OCCURRED HAD ASTONISHED AND ANNOYED RESIDENTS OF TABUK. THEY HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO GIVE IT MAXIMUM PUBLICITY. HE AGREED WITH ME, HOWEVER, THAT ANOTHER (AND PROBABLY MORE SUBSTANTIAL) REASON FOR THE PUBLICITY WAS THE PROPAGANDA VALUE OF SHOWING THE ISRAELIS TO BE AGGRESSIVE AND WARLIKE WHILE THE ARABS ARE DOING THEIR UTMOST TO SECURE PEACE IN THE REGION.

GRAY

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 748 OF 11.11
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ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF SAUDI AIRSPACE.

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GRAY

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Mr Alexander
No 10

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FM WASHINGTON 110133Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3385 OF 11 NOVEMBER

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY
MR HURD'S VISIT

1. I UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM OVER THURSDAY'S VOTE BUT I SHOULD RECORD THAT A SECOND CANCELLATION OF MR. HURD'S VISIT WOULD PROVOKE ACUTE DISAPPOINTMENT HERE WHEN SO MUCH ATTENTION IS FOCUSSED ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS AND HIS VISIT WOULD PROVIDE SUCH AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION OF THEM IN DEPTH. THERE IS ALSO A RISK THAT CANCELLATION WILL BE INTERPRETED BY THE MEDIA AS CONNECTED WITH CURRENT DISAGREEMENTS, WHICH SOME OF THE PRESS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC ARE TRYING TO STIR UP. FROM ALL POINTS OF VIEW IT WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL BETTER IF THE VISIT COULD TAKE PLACE AS PLANNED.

FRETWELL

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PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J GRAHAM

Copies to
Mr Alexander No 10

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3384 OF 10 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIAT EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV

MIPT : SINAI FORCE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE AGREED REPORT :

1. HEADS OF MISSION OF THE FOUR SAW SECRETARY HAIG THIS EVENING. THE BRITISH CHARGE SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED INSTRUCTIONS.

2. HAIG SAID THAT THE REVISED STATEMENT OF THE FOUR WAS EXCELLENT. HE COULD NOT VISUALISE HOW ANYONE COULD TAKE OFFENCE AT IT. BUT HE HAD PROBLEMS WITH THE REST OF THE FOUR'S MESSAGE WHICH SEEMED LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO THE SAME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AS THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT OF THE FOUR.

3. HAIG STRESSED THAT WE WERE ALL FACING A COMMON PROBLEM. HE WAS ONLY OFFERING HIS BEST JUDGMENT OF WHAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS WHILE TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF ALL THOSE CONCERNED

4. ON THE PROPOSED NATIONAL STATEMENTS THE FOUR HEADS OF MISSION EMPHASISED THAT ALL THE POINTS IN THE FOUR'S ORIGINAL DRAFT STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE. HAIG EXPRESSED SOME UNEASE, PARTICULARLY AT THE PROSPECT THAT THE SAME POINTS WOULDBE MADE IN ALL FOUR CAPITALS AND THAT PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS MIGHT LEAD THE BRITISH TO GO FURTHER EVEN THAN THAT STATEMENT.

5. ON THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE TEN HAIG COMMENTED THAT HE COULD NOT CONTEST THE FIRST SENTENCE. DESPITE BEGIN'S RECENT STATEMENT, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO INSIST THAT THE EC HAD THE RIGHT TO STICK TO THE VENICE DECLARATION. THE REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION WAS TROUBLESOME BUT LESS SO IN THIS CONTEXT. HOWEVER THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT WAS UNNECESSARILY ABRASIVE. HE THEREFORE WISHED TO SUGGEST THAT IT SHOULD BE AMENDED BY THE REPLACEMENT OF THE WORDS QUOTE ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI UNQUOTE BY QUOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EGYPT/ISRAEL TREATY UNQUOTE.

6. HAIG MADE CLEAR HIS STRONG PREFERENCE THAT THERE BE NO STATEMENT AT ALL BY THE TEN. IF THERE HAD TO BE SUCH A STATEMENT HE HOPED THAT IT COULD BE AMENDED AS HE HAD PROPOSED AND THAT HIS EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A DELAY OF SOME TEN DAYS BETWEEN THE ISSUE OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR AND THAT OF THE TEN COULD BE ACCEPTED. IS SUCH A DELAY WERE NOT POSSIBLE, AT LEAST HE HOPED THAT THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN WOULD BE AMENDED.

7. HAIG COMMENTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PRESSING FOR THE LATEST TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR OF WHICH THEY HAD SEEN AN EARLIER VERSION. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THEIR LIKELY REACTION TO THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN. (IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD THIS TEXT) IN CONCLUSION HAIG SAID THAT HE REMAINED WORRIED BUT THAT GOOD PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE.

8. THE FOUR HEADS OF MISSION AGREED SUBSEQUENTLY TO RECOMMEND THAT THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN BE AMENDED AS HAIG SUGGESTED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WORDING WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE AMENDMENT ALREADY AGREED TO IN (I) OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR.

2. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/MR HURD (TO SHOW TO SIR N HENDERSON).

FRETWELL

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 3383 OF 10 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE TO EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 490 TO PARIS: SINAI FORCE

1. WE HAD A FURTHER MEETING WITH HAIG TODAY, FOLLOWING THE SAME FORMAT AS YESTERDAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 3363).
MIFT CONTAINS THE RECORD AGREED BY THE FOUR NOTETAKERS.

2. I SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT INSTRUCTIONS, CHANGING THE ORDER SO AS TO CONCLUDE BY FOCUSSING ON THE NEW DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE FOUR. HAIG IMMEDIATELY VOLUNTEERED THAT THIS WAS AN EXCELLENT STATEMENT AND THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH IT. HE SHOWED SOME UNEASE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS STATEMENT AND THE FULLER STATEMENTS TO BE MADE BY EACH GOVERNMENT IN EXPLANATION OF THEIR DECISION. HE WONDERED WHY ANY FURTHER STATEMENT WAS NECESSARY. HE APPEARED FINALLY TO ACCEPT THE EXPLANATION THAT THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD USE THE MATERIAL WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN OUT OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFT IN EXPLAINING THE DECISION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT NATIONAL PRACTICE, TO THEIR PARLIAMENTS OR PUBLIC. BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE SHALL HEAR MORE FROM HIM ON THIS WHEN HE HAS THOUGHT ABOUT IT. I SENSED A CONCERN THAT SOME SIMILAR STATEMENTS MAY BE SEIZED ON BY THE ISRAELIS AS OVERRIDING THE STATEMENT COMMUNICATED TO THEM. (THERE WAS A SLIGHT AMBIGUITY BETWEEN THE FRENCH INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH APPEARED TO ENVISAGE ABSOLUTELY IDENTICAL STATEMENTS, AND OUR OWN WHICH REFERRED TO USING THE WHOLE OF THE STATEMENT IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. IN EXPLAINING OUR INTENTIONS TO HAIG WE LEFT ROOM FOR SOME FLEXIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE FORM THOUGH NOT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATERIAL TO BE PRESENTED.)

3. HAIG'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN WAS WITH THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THEN TEN, WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT UNDO THE GOOD EFFECT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR. HE AGAIN QUESTIONED WHY ANY STATEMENT OF THE TEN WAS NECESSARY AND ARGUED FOR A DELAY BEFORE PUBLICATION AND FOR ONE TEXTUAL CHANGE. (THE TEXTUAL CHANGE IS NOT VERY SIGNIFICANT (SEE MIFT) AND THE THREE AMBASSADORS AND I AGREED SUBSEQUENTLY TO RECOMMEND IT TO OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS AS IT TENDS TO BRING THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN CLOSER INTO LINE WITH THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR.) THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND I TOLD HAIG THAT WE SAW NO PROSPECT FOR DELAY BUT THAT WE WOULD REPORT HIS SUGGESTION. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR STRUCK A MORE EFFUSIVE NOTE AND TOLD US AFTERWARDS THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY HAIG'S CONCERN ON THIS POINT AND WOULD RECOMMEND DELAY TO ROME.

4. HAIG WAS AGAIN VERY CALM AND ENPHASIZED THAT HE WAS ONLY LOOKING FOR WAYS TO CARRY THE OPERATION FORWARD AND TO AVOID POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ISRAELIS WHICH COULD UNDO THE WHOLE EFFORT AND LEAD TO A MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. AFTER THE FORMAL DISCUSSION HAD ENDED HE COMMENTED THAT WE HAD MADE VERY GOOD PROGRESS TODAY.

5. THE ONLY IMMEDIATE OUTSTANDING QUESTION IS THEREFORE THE POSSIBLE TEXTUAL CHANGE IN THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN AND THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT COULD BE DELAYED AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE OTHER STATEMENTS. WE SHALL NEED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS.

6. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/MR HURD FOR SIR N HENDERSON BY 0830 HOURS.

FRETWELL

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 3370 OF 10 NOVEMBER

M I P T : SINAI FORCE

1. IN A LONG ARTICLE IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES ENTITLED QUOTE BRITISH DOUBT CAMP DAVID TERMS CAN BRING A MID-EAST PEACE UNQUOTE. APPLE DESCRIBES DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EUROPEAN, PARTICULARLY BRITISH, AND AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON THE MIDDLE EAST QUOTING BRITISH OFFICIALS IN LONDON EXTENSIVELY.

2. TRACING THESE DIFFERENCES BACK TO THE START OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, APPLE QUOTES A SENIOR DIPLOMAT AS SAYING QUOTE NEITHER WE NOR ANYONE ELSE IN WESTERN EUROPE WANTED TO SHOOT CAMP DAVID IN THE BACK, BUT WE THOUGHT THAT NOTHING MUCH WOULD HAPPEN BEYOND THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. WE HAVE BEEN PROVED RIGHT. AND OUR CONCERN HAS BEEN INCREASED BY THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE ISRAELIS, THE FAILURE OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS ON THE WEST BANK AND THE RATTLED PERFORMANCE OF WASHINGTON IN THIS AND OTHER FOREIGN-POLICY AREAS UNQUOTE.

3. REFERRING TO LORD CARRINGTON'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, CRITICISMS OF EUROPEAN POLICY MADE BY HAIG AND RECENT REMARKS BY BRITISH AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT AND JEDDA AS CONFIRMING A EUROPEAN VIEW THAT CAMP DAVID HAS RUN ITS COURSE, AN OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS IS QUOTED AS SAYING QUOTE I DO NOT FOR A MINUTE UNDERESTIMATE THE PROBLEMS THE AMERICANS FACE WITH THE ISRAELIS. EVERY TIME WASHINGTON STARTS TO SHIFT EVEN SLIGHTLY, THE ISRAELIS SCREAM BLUE MURDER. BUT IT IS A FACT OF LIFE THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, AND WE SEE IT AS OUR ROLE TO WORK TOWARD THAT GOAL WHILE THE AMERICANS MAINTAIN THEIR LINKS TO ISRAEL. WITH BETTER UNDERSTANDING, THE TWO APPROACHES COULD COMPLEMENT AND NOT THREATEN OR HARM ONE ANOTHER. UNQUOTE

4. REVERTING TO THE CHARGE BY CRITICS OF EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT IT IS SPURRED MORE BY CONCERN OVER SUPPLIES OF OIL THAN ANYTHING ELSE, THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT EUROPEAN FEARS THAT CAMP DAVID WAS NOT ENOUGH AND THAT A WAY NEEDS TO BE FOUND TO BRING IN THE PLO WERE HEIGHTENED BY SADAT'S ASSASSINATION. A BRITISH OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT SADAT HAD QUOTE BEEN LEFT DANGLING BY AMERICAN RELUCTANCE TO LEAN ON THE ISRAELIS, WITH THE RESULT THAT HE WAS SENT TO HIS DEATH BY AN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WHOSE PRISONER HE HAD ALL TOO UNWITTINGLY BECOME. UNQUOTE

/5.

5. ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF THE SINAI FORCE, APPLE SAYS BRITISH AND OTHER EUROPEAN OFFICIALS HAVE DENIED THAT THEY ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN INSISTING ON A STATEMENT EXPLAINING THE BASIS ON WHICH THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE FORCE QUOTE THE AMERICANS CONSTANTLY HAVE TO COVER THEMSELVES WITH THE ISRAELIS, UNQUOTE A BRITISH OFFICIAL COMMENTED. QUOTE SURELY THEY MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IF WE ARE TO PLAY ANY USEFUL ROLE IN BRINGING THE BROADER ARAB COMMUNITY INTO THE PROCESS, WE MUST PROTECT OUR FLANK AS WELL. FRANKLY, EVEN WITH A STATEMENT, WE'RE GOING TO TAKE FLAK. UNQUOTE

6. ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY SAYING THAT AN ATTEMPT TO SORT OUT THE QUOTE THE RARE DIPLOMATIC UPSET BETWEEN LONDON AND WASHINGTON IS ALREADY UNDER WAY UNQUOTE IN THE SHAPE OF MR HURD'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND SIR N HENDERSON'S PRESENCE IN LONDON FOR CONSULTATIONS.

FRETWELL

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Mr Patterson.

Can you please apply
last one below to N
Kinchin Smith.

MR WHITMORE

1.

Prime Minister

Both Michael Alexander
and I think this would not
be a good idea. The position
of Bishop Habgood, whom they put to
lunch, would be very difficult.

Michael Kinchin Smith, the Archbishop of Canterbury's Lay Assistant, mentioned what follows to me today.

A party from the British Council of Churches (all the Churches except the Roman Catholics) recently visited the Middle East. According to Kinchin Smith, the party set off with an open mind but came back firmly believing that the Palestinians must somehow be formally involved if any settlement is to be worked out.

Kinchin Smith wondered if the Prime Minister would be interested in receiving three or four members of this BCC party, to hear an account of this Middle East visit. The Bishop of Durham, Bishop John Habgood, would almost certainly be one of those who would come, should the Prime Minister be willing to see them.

Kinchin Smith was confident that the Archbishop would be ready to write to the Prime Minister to ask if she would be prepared to see this Church group, but would not of course want to pursue this if the idea would not be welcomed here.

CVP

Balm applied.
No further action needed.
CVP. 13/11.

10 November 1981

GR 450 CONFIDENTIAL

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DESKBY FCO 091100Z NOV 81

FROM TEL AVIV 090930Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 443 OF 9 NOVEMBER 81

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND PRIORITY CAIRO.

MY TELNO 442: SINAI MFO

1. AFTER THE REGULAR ISRAELI CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY, THE CABINET SECRETARY STATED OFFICIALLY THAT, IN ISRAEL'S VIEW, THE SINAI MFO WOULD NOT SUPERVISE ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI.

2. NAOR ADDED THAT THERE WAS NOT, AND WOULD NOT BE, ANY REFERENCE TO THE VENICE DECLARATION (PRESUMABLY IN THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR OR THE TEN JUSTIFYING PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE). THE ONLY DOCUMENTS WHICH SERVED AS A BASIS FOR THE FORCE'S ESTABLISHMENT WERE THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT, THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY, CARTER'S LETTER TO SADAT AND BEGIN, ATTACHED TO THE TREATY, AND THE AGREEMENT TO SET UP THE FORCE. THE OMISSION OF REFERENCES TO OTHER DOCUMENTS (AGAIN, PRESUMABLY, IN THE STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR OR TEN JUSTIFYING PARTICIPATION) WAS FOR ISRAEL AN ULTIMATE CONDITION FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE FORCE.

3. THE JERUSALEM POST'S DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT ASLO QUOTES ISRAEL SOURCES AS SAYING THAT IF AN INDIVIDUAL EC COUNTRY WERE TO LINK TAKING PART IN THE MFO DIRECTLY WITH THE VENICE DECLARATION, ISRAEL WOULD NOT AGREE TO ITS PARTICIPATION.

4. I INTERPRET THE ISRAELI CABINET'S STATEMENT, AND THE GLOSS IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, AS IMPLYING THAT ISRAEL WOULD REGARD ANY MENTION OF VENICE IN THE FOUR, OR THE TEN'S, STATEMENT JUSTIFYING PARTICIPATION AS GROUNDS FOR A VETO. BUT IF THE SOURCES QUOTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE ARE TO BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE, WE MIGHT, WITH STRONG AMERICAN SUPPORT, GET AWAY WITH THE APPROACH PROPOSED IN PARA 6 OF YOUR TEL ADDRESSED PARIS NO 488: FOR THE ISRAELIS A FIRM DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE STATEMENT JUSTIFYING THE FOUR'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE AND NATIONAL RE-STATEMENTS OF GENERAL POSITIONS IS CLEARLY VITAL. HOWEVER, THE INCLUSSION OF THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PART 1 OF THE TEXT IN YOUR TELNO 1653 TO WASHINGTON, IN OUR NATIONAL STATEMENT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE TOO MUCH FOR THE ISRAELIS TO SWALLOW.

5. I SHALL

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5. I SHALL BE LUNCHING WITH THE US AMBASSADOR TOMORROW AND WILL PROBLE HIM ON HOW HE SEES THE POSITION HERE (PARAGRAPH 5 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 3311). BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT AN ACCUMULATION OF EVENTS - THE UNCERTAINTIES AFTER SADAT'S DEATH, THE AWACS DECISION, THE BEGINNINGS OF AN APPARENT US TILT TOWARDS THE SAUDIS AND, IN PARTICULAR, TOWARDS THE FAHD PLAN - HAS BROUGHT THE ISRAELIS TO A STATE OF NEAR PANIC. THE FOUR'S INTENTION, AS THE ISRAELIS SEE IT, TO PLAY DOWN CAMP DAVID WHEN JUSTIFYING PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MFO, AND TO SPECIFICALLY LINK ISRAEL'S (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) BETE NOIR, THE VENICE DECLARATION, WITH THEIR JUSTIFICATION OF THE DECISION, HAS THUS COME VERY MUCH AS A LAST STRAW HERE.

6. THE CURRENT ISRAELI STATE OF MIND IS EXEMPLIFIED BY SHAMIR'S REMARKS YESTERDAY WHEN HE IS QUOTED AS TELLING A VISITING AMERICAN JEWISH GROUP THAT THE REACTION OF THE WEST, AND ITS PRESENT ATTITUDE TO THE OIL-PRODUCING STATES, MIGHT CAUSE ISRAEL TO REASSESS HER ATTITUDE. ISRAEL HAD REACHED, EVEN PASSED, THE LIMIT OF HER CONCESSIONS, BOTH IN THE SOUTH AND IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. SHE COULD NOT AFFORD TO CONTINUE TO TAKE RISKS THAT WERE MET ONLY WITH DEMANDS FOR MORE RISKS.

MOBERLY

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FM FCO 091145 NOVEMBER
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 276 OF 9 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS
CAMP DAVID, VENICE AND SINAI: PUBLIC STATEMENTS
1. THE WEEKEND PRESS HAS MADE RATHER A MEAL OF STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO H M AMBASSADORS IN JEDDA AND BEIRUT ABOUT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS BEING ABOUT TO QUOTE EXPIRE UNQUOTE, OR BEING QUOTE FINISHED, MORE OR LESS UNQUOTE. WHILE WE HAVE NO PARTICULAR QUARREL WITH WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ALREADY, IT MIGHT BE AS WELL IF H M REPRESENTATIVES WERE TO DECLINE TO GIVE FURTHER PUBLIC INTERVIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT UNTIL THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE IS RESOLVED.
2. H M REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD OF COURSE REFER TO NEWS DEPARTMENT ANY REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW ON BRITISH RADIO OR TELEVISION, OR IN BRITISH PUBLICATIONS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3363 OF 9 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK CAIRO TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 488 TO PARIS: SINAI FORCE

1. THE FRENCH, ITALIAN AND NETHERLANDS AMBASSADORS AND I ACTED TODAY ON THE BASIS OF PART ONE OF THE INSTRUCTIONS IN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION AMONGST THE FOUR THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD SHOWN MARKED RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THE LEAD, ARGUING THAT THIS WAS A PRESIDENCY RESPONSIBILITY. I ACCORDINGLY AGREED TO SPEAK FIRST. I FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS TEXTUALLY AND EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS AN AGREED APPROACH BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS. THE THREE AMBASSADORS PARTICIPATED EQUALLY IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION. THIS SHOULD HAVE DISPELLED ANY IMPRESSION THAT THE UK WAS OUT IN FRONT OF THE OTHERS.

2. A RECORD OF THE CALL FOLLOWS IN MIFT. EACH EMBASSY HAD A NOTE-TAKER PRESENT AND THE RECORD HAS BEEN AGREED AMONGST THEM. IT WAS LEFT THAT THE THREE AMBASSADORS AND I WOULD SEND OUR OWN SEPARATE IMPRESSIONS AND NOT ATTEMPT TO PRODUCE A COORDINATED REPORT BECAUSE OF THE LATENESS OF THE HOUR. HOWEVER WE HELD A BRIEF DISCUSSION AFTER THE CALL AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF DISAGREEMENT.

3. HAIG LISTENED CAREFULLY TO OUR PRESENTATION AND REPLIED VERY CALMLY. HE WENT THROUGH THE REASONS WHICH HE SAW FOR FEARING THAT THE STATEMENT AS ORIGINALLY DRAFTED WOULD PRODUCE SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE ISRAELIS AS WELL AS ON THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST SCENE. HE EMPHASIZED STRONGLY THAT HE WAS IN NO WAY CRITICAL OF OUR MOTIVES AND THAT HE GREATLY APPRECIATED THE EFFORT WHICH THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS HAD MADE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST DESPITE THE DISADVANTAGES WHICH THEY SAW. THERE WAS A HINT OF APOLOGY FOR HIS STRONG REACTION LAST WEEK, WHICH HE EVIDENTLY FELT IT NECESSARY TO TRY TO JUSTIFY.

4. IN ONE RESPECT HOWEVER HAIG WENT FURTHER THAN HE HAD DONE PREVIOUSLY. HE SUGGESTED THAT RECENT PUBLICITY ABOUT THE EUROPEAN POSITION HAD MADE OUR VIEWS SO CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS REALLY NO NEED FOR ANY STATEMENT AT ALL ABOUT PARTICIPATION

IN THE MFO. IN SUMMING UP AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CALL I SAID THAT I SAW NO POSSIBILITY THAT THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS COULD UNDERTAKE A STEP OF THIS IMPORTANCE WITHOUT MAKING A STATEMENT. I REITERATED HOWEVER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE INSTRUCTIONS, THAT WE WOULD REFLECT ON THE VARIOUS POINTS HE HAD MADE AND WOULD ON OUR PART BE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO BRIDGE THE GAP.

5. TODAY'S DISCUSSION HAS GONE SOME WAY TO CLEARING THE AIR AND TO ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH TO DISCUSS THE CONTENT OF THE STATEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PART 2 OF THE INSTRUCTIONS IF IT IS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DO SO. ALTHOUGH HAIG PROBABLY REALISES THAT HIS ORIGINAL CRITICISMS WENT TOO FAR HE REMAINS ACUTELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISRAELI REACTION AND THERE IS NO PROSPECT THAT HE WILL COME ROUND TO EXPRESSING APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFT STATEMENT. THE THREE AMBASSADORS, ESPECIALLY THE DUTCH, ASSUME THAT WE WILL SEEK A FURTHER APPOINTMENT WITH HAIG ON 10 NOVEMBER IN ORDER TO ACT ON PART 2, WITH ANY CLARIFICATIONS OR COMMENTS YOU WISH TO SEND US. IT WOULD BE CONVENIENT TO HAVE A DRAFT OF THE CONCLUDING SENTENCE IF IT IS AVAILABLE BY THEN.

6. I SEE ADVANTAGE IN ACTING ON 10 NOVEMBER IF POSSIBLE. FEW US OFFICIALS WILL BE AVAILABLE ON 11 NOVEMBER WHICH IS A PUBLIC HOLIDAY HERE. ON 12 NOVEMBER MR HURD WILL HOLD TALKS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE UNDULY FOCUSSED ON THIS ONE IMMEDIATE ISSUE.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 3364 OF 9 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, TEL AVIV.

M I P T: SINAI FORCE

1. FOLLOWING IS THE AGREED RECORD:

1. HEADS OF MISSION OF THE FOUR CALLED ON HAIG THIS AFTERNOON. THE BRITISH CHARGE, REPRESENTING THE PRESIDENCY, EXPLAINED THAT THEY WISHED TO RESPOND TO HAIG'S COMMENTS LAST WEEK ON THE PROPOSED STATEMENT OF THE FOUR. HE THEN READ OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN FULL.

2. HAIG EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THIS COMMUNICATION. HE STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WELCOMED THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE FOUR TO RESPOND TO THE AMERICAN REQUEST. IT WAS A PITY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD HAD WIND OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT OF THE FOUR BEFORE THE AMERICANS HAD SEEN IT: THEY HAD MADE A VERY STRONG DEMARCHE TO THE AMERICANS ABOUT IT. HE KNEW THAT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE WAS NOT FREE OF RISK. BUT THERE WAS AFTER ALL NO REASON TO SUSPECT THAT ANYONE COULD HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT WHERE THE EUROPEANS STOOD ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. HAIG SAID THAT THE PROPOSED STATEMENT RISKED BEING REJECTED BY ISRAEL WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES - WORSE RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT AND THE FORMATION OF A FAR LESS CREDIBLE FORCE. TWO OF THE FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD ANYWAY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THEIR INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE. THE FORCES IN ISRAEL OPPOSED TO THE RETURN OF THE SINAI WOULD BE STRENGTHENED AND THE WHOLE PROBLEM COMPLICATED. PARANOIA IN ISRAEL WAS THE HIGHEST HAIG HAD EVER SEEN. THE REASONS INCLUDED THE CUT-OFF OF US ARMS AFTER THE RAID ON THE IRAQI REACTOR, THE DEATH OF SADAT, GROWING CONDEMNATION (RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY) OF BEGIN, FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS AND NOW THIS ISSUE. WE RISKED BRINGING ABOUT THE WORST POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES BY DERAILING THE PEACE PROCESS AND TRIGGERING PRECIPITOUS ISRAELI ACTION IN LEBANON.

4. HAIG SAID THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEKEND - THE INCREASED LEVEL OF TENSION, SPECULATION FROM RIYADH AND UNFORTUNATE ISRAELI RHETORIC MADE THE POSITION HE HIMSELF HAD TAKEN LAST WEEK EVEN MORE CREDIBLE. THE SITUATION WAS NOW MORE SERIOUS. LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY BE SEEN BY THE ISRAELIS AS INFLAMMATORY COULD BE FATAL. HAIG COMMENTED THAT IF SOME OF THE ASSURANCES THE FOUR HAD NOW OFFERED HAD BEEN MADE EXPLICIT IN THE STATEMENT WE WOULD NOT HAVE SUCH A PROBLEM. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ANY STATEMENT WAS NEEDED. HE WOULD PREFER NO STATEMENT OF THE FOUR AND THAT EACH CAPITAL SIMPLY EXPLAINED ITS OWN PARTICIPATION AS IT SAW FIT, OR THAT THEY REFER IN A COMMON STATEMENT TO THE THREE CONDITIONS ALREADY IN THE STATEMENT (AS AMENDED BY THE AMERICANS).

5. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS HAIG SAID THAT IF THE PROPOSED STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR AND THE TEN WERE PUBLISHED NOW IT WOULD HAVE AN EVEN WORSE EFFECT THAN LAST WEEK: HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID GIVING THE ISRAELIS A PRETEXT FOR ACTION WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE LOOKING FOR ONE: HE UNDERSTOOD THE EUROPEANS' NEED TO EXPLAIN THEIR POSITION TO ARAB STATES, BUT ON THE BASIS OF CONSULTATIONS PREVIOUSLY CARRIED OUT BY THE AMERICANS, DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WOULD BE SEVERE ARAB REACTIONS. THE FOUR EMPHASISED THEIR DESIRE TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. HAIG AGREED AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE WAY THE EUROPEANS HAD HANDLED THIS SITUATION. IN CONCLUSION THE BRITISH CHARGE SAID THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD WISH TO REFLECT ON WHAT HAD BEEN SAID AND REVIEW THEIR POSITIONS IN THE HOPE OF BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THEM. HE ADDED ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE OPTION OF MAKING NO STATEMENT AT ALL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS.

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TRANSCRIPT OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND LORD CARRINGTON ON SATURDAY 7 NOVEMBER

PM: Good morning, Peter.

FCS: Good morning, Margaret.

PM: Have you seen the front page of the Telegraph?

FCS: Yes.

PM: Outrageous isn't it?

FCS: Absolutely. Actually it went all right, didn't it?

PM: I'm not talking about Ireland, I'm talking about Haig referring to Mr. Carrington.

FCS: Oh, well, I mean the whole thing ..... this is really what I rang you about. Can you bear to have a word about it all?

PM: Yes, sure. I just didn't want you to have to come in early tomorrow morning. Yesterday on the whole went all right I think.

FCS: I thought it was rather good.

PM: Ian wasn't terribly pleased, Ian Gow you know thinks we should do everything to strengthen the union.

FCS: I don't think you could have done less. I think he was quite right about support.

PM: Ian? Yes he was.

FCS: But I think that in the context that you did it it was perfectly all right.

PM: Yes, he got his word support in in the right context. I thought he looked a bit disappointed Gareth.

FCS: He did quite well on the television.

PM: Did he? I didn't see him.

FCS: Yes, he came over perfectly satisfied and rather nice. I think that given one is in an impossible position it wasn't too bad.

PM: No, no, good. And then we've got Monday. However, we've got other things to talk about at the moment.

FCS: I don't think Monday will be too difficult. And I think they want to help. I thought I'd better go in and meet them.

PM: I think it's an enormous help if you do because I met Mitterrand as you know at Northolt and who else ..... But Helmut never comes out to the aircraft to meet one.

/FCS:

FCS: No, he doesn't.

PM: I think it's absurd.

FCS: Absolutely. But I thought they might contrast their ..... if just Douglas went. On the multinational Sinai thing, the four Political Directors of the participant countries met last night. Have you seen what they said?

PM: No.

FCS: Well, what they have recommended is that we ask the four Ambassadors in Washington to go in to Haig and to explain to him that in the statement there is absolutely nothing new at all, that it is in point of fact a statement, a straight re-statement, of what we've always said, that we're not asking the Americans to agree to it. It's in no sense a condition and that it doesn't alter our position, or the Americans' position, one jot, and that if they could explain that to the Israelis, that it's merely a re-statement of our position which we find necessary for our own domestic consumption, we feel sure that that would be all right. If the Americans say "No", we would then suggest to them, either at that meeting or later on, that we should issue a statement - the four of us - a very short statement saying that we are prepared to, subject to the necessary agreements, go in to do the multinational force. And at the same time, in our own national Parliaments, make that statement which they object to. Now this was, if you remember, something that Haig suggested .....

PM: ... Yes. I remember that .....

FCS: Well, from our point of view, that's perfectly all right. The French are rather unwilling to do it. I mean, they're being even tougher than saying the whole thing is intolerable. But I don't see any harm in that.....

PM: ..... What do you mean saying the whole thing is intolerable? They're saying that the idea that we can't make our own statement is intolerable?

FCS: Yes. And they won't change one word of it.

PM: Good Lord. They've turned tail - again.

FCS: Yes, again. I think they may do it again. But at the moment they're being absolutely adamant that there is no way in which the thing could be turned round. The Dutch are being, you know, we musn't offend the Americans, the Dutch are saying and therefore we must abandon the whole statement and just go in unconditionally. But I think the Dutch have been persuaded by the French and the Italians that that's not really a very sensible thing to do.

PM: Well, you saw Begin's loud noises, that no-one would be allowed to take part in Sinai Force unless it linked them in totally to Camp David.

/FCS:

FCS: But of course he's got himself a let-out. I mean what he said was that any statement which condemned Camp David which ours doesn't. I mean, really, the more you read that statement the more it's the least one can say.

PM: Well, I'm really cross with Haig, Peter, I really am. They've got everything they want and I think this is ridiculous and I cannot understand what is happening over there.

FCS: Well, what I find a little bit odd is that, I mean I talked to Al Haig in Cancun as you know and told him all our problems about joining the Force, and he said, you must do it, please do it, and so on. We go out of our way to do it and don't put them in any particular difficulty. I've not said anything - on my trip to Saudi Arabia or anywhere else - which could be construed as in the least bit difficult and he turned round and says that sort of thing, about adjectival pronouncements and so on.

PM: Well, it's ridiculous. He must be in a terrible state.

FCS: He must. But, I mean, I'm not going to respond, of course. I shall just say that I think there must be a misunderstanding or something .....

PM: .... and we carry on ...

FCS: and we carry on. But I am a little bit worried about the consequences. I mean, if Al Haig is going on like this, the consequences to European-American relations, coupled with what he's doing about the nuclear thing, it's going to be quite serious. We don't want, you know we really don't want to fall out with the Americans or they with us I would have thought.

PM: No, this is why I just don't understand it.....

FCS: ..... no, nor do I ....

PM: .... in any way. I haven't seen the telegrams, last night's telegrams. Do we know anything about how the Hussein visit went?

FCS: How what?

PM: Hussein's visit went.

FCS: Yes, it went rather well.

PM: Did he get his message over?

FCS: Well, who knows? He then came out in Washington in support of the Saudi 8 principles ..... Hussein.....

PM: Hussein, yes, which was really rather good.

FCS: Very good. But you see what is so irritating about the whole thing is that I haven't come out in support of the eight principles. What I've come out and said is that this is a

/ movement

movement on the part of the Arabs, and in particular the Saudis. They have in effect recognised Israel, they are prepared for a negotiated peace settlement which they never were before, and they've said so publicly, isn't this something on which we can build?

PM: Yes. And Prince Fahd made it perfectly clear that the seventh one referred to Israel.

FCS: That's right. I think that the problem is, I don't know, but I would think there were two problems. First, that the Americans had a very sharp reaction from the Israelis about the AWACS sale and that they've taken fright, that Begin is so unpredictable that he may do something which is either, you know, not give Sinai back or do something in the Lebanon, and that they must use every possible persuasion, go very calmly, to prevent him doing it. I think that maybe the first thing. The second thing which is only a suspicion of mine, and I have no evidence of it, is that when, you know, the Israelis didn't want European participation in the Sinai Force, there is a possibility I think that when Haig persuaded them to accept this he said, well look, if they come in to the Multinational Force, that means the end of Venice.

PM: Yes, that's quite possible.

FCS: And when we issue a statement saying it isn't, he can't sell it to the Israelis.

PM: Yes, but that's very strange because I'd understood that one of the arguments being used was unless we joined the Multinational Force Begin would probably not withdraw.....

FCS: That's right.

PM: ..... from Sinai, and it's very strange then to have it said that he didn't want you to join.

FCS: Well, the Israelis certainly didn't want the Europeans to join.

PM: Why?

FCS: Because of Venice.

PM: Oh, I see. But you mean that without us joining he would still have withdrawn from Sinai?

FCS: Well, the Americans are arguing it both ways.

PM: Yes, I know. Yes, I saw the Henry Brandon note. It is all very worrying.

FCS: Well, it is worrying. And, unfortunately, he appears to have got it in for me.

PM: What Haig?

FCS: Yes. I mean we've heard from other nets that he's got it in for me. And I really don't know why.

/PM:

PM: Has he? But, look, you practically got him what he wanted.

FCS: Yes, I know. I think he must be under terrific pressure, don't you?

PM: Yes. I mean the note that I saw from Henry Brandon indicated that he felt he was really rather isolated.

FCS: Yes. Anyway, I think what we must do is to be absolutely .....

PM: ..... I think we must be quite firm and it's all a misunderstanding but if you don't like it with the Force, we'll do it in our own Parliament but done it will be.

FCS: And, also I think, at the same time, not join in any personal row about Mr. Carrington and adjectival pronouncements. I think just leave it alone. Don't you think?

PM: Oh, let's now get involved in any personal row. No, it's totally undignified to get involved in a personal row. All right.

FCS: I hope they've sent you the telegrams. I think they're quite sensible. They're very good and I've no doubt that you would agree with what's said as long as you agree with the line.

PM: Yes, I agree with the line.

FCS: OK. Well, I don't need to worry you any more.

PM: No. Oh, Peter, there was one thing I wanted to say. I looked at your Honours List and do you remember we had a letter from the Palace about Armand Hammer. Do you remember? To K Armand?

FCS: I'd forgotten that, yes.

PM: Well, I think we ought to do it. I'll raise it with Clive on Monday.

FCS: Could I just have a look at the correspondence. You know that there is some unease about his relations with the Soviet Union?

PM: Yes, I do, but he has done so much for this country.

FCS: Could I take it back with me and I'll talk to you on Monday.

PM: Yes, all right.

FCS: Have as restful weekend as you can and I'll see you tomorrow.

PM: All right, Peter. Thank you. Goodbye.

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DESKBY 071930Z
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3352 OF 7 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV CAIRO PARIS THE HAGUE ROME
ROUTINE OTHER EEC POSTS AMMAN AND JEDDA

MY TELNO 3325: SINAI

1. A FURTHER ARTICLE BY GWERTZMAN ON THE FRONT PAGE OF TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES QUOTES ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT UNEXPECTED PROBLEMS HAD DEVELOPED IN EFFORTS TO SECURE BRITISH AND EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE. A STATEMENT WHICH THE EUROPEANS HAD PROPOSED TO ISSUE EARLIER THIS WEEK WAS REGARDED AS SO OFFENSIVE TO ISRAEL THAT THE UNITED STATES PERSUADED THE EUROPEANS NOT TO ISSUE IT AND TO REVIEW THEIR POSITION.

2. GWERTZMAN SAYS THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM IS THAT THE EUROPEANS WANT TO INSURE THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE DOES NOT SEEM TO RUN COUNTER TO THE VENICE DECLARATION WHICH ISRAEL REJECTED. YOU ARE SAID TO HAVE ANTAGONIZED THE ISRAELIS BY YOUR PRAISE OF THE SAUDI PEACE PLAN.

3. A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE WAS VERY SUSPICIOUS OF BRITISH MOTIVES.
QUOTE : I THINK THAT THE BRITISH REALLY DO NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE AND ARE TRYING TO DRAFT A STATEMENT THAT WILL COMPEL THE ISRAELIS TO REJECT THEIR PARTICIPATION UNQUOTE

4. THE STATE DEPARTMENT COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR ISRAEL AND ARAB/ISRAEL AFFAIRS HAS EXPRESSED TO US HIS REGRET AT THE APPEARANCE OF THIS ARTICLE AND HAS ASSURED US THAT IT WAS NOT IN ANY WAY AUTHORISED BY THE DEPARTMENT. THEIR OFFICIAL LINE WITH THE PRESS IS THAT THEY CANNOT GIVE DETAILS OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT. WE ARE TAKING THIS STATE DEPARTMENT LINE WITH US AS ONE OF THEIR BETTER RECENT JOKES.

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Bernie Rhinkin.

MO 3/7/4 Mr Nott says he won't pay for the MFO. The FCO haven't any money. We must wait now until we see if there is going to be a UK contribution at all. At that juncture there will have to be a meeting – unless you want me to say that you have decided the MOD should pay.

Yours Michael

10/XI

6th November 1981

SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE

AE7

Thank you for your letter of 2nd November which I have shown to my Secretary of State.

As you recognise it is of course perfectly true that the main conclusions of MISC 42(80)28 are not strictly relevant to the present case. That agreement related to certain well defined instances in which costs, hitherto met by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, or in dispute, would be borne by the Ministry of Defence. The participation for policy reasons in a multinational force is already covered by established procedures. We already take part in such operations under the auspices of the United Nations, and the Sinai operation would have been one such if the Security Council could have been prevailed upon to agree. In those cases there has never been any doubt or question about the appropriate financial arrangements: the Ministry of Defence recovers full costs. Indeed paragraph 20 of MISC 42(80)28 says: ". . . a decision to contribute a particular level of military assistance to a United Nations peacekeeping force is a matter both of whether and how much: implementation is subsidiary. It therefore makes sense for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to bear responsibility for meeting the costs entailed."

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has no voted provision for this expenditure this year, but neither has my Secretary of State. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's letter of 30th October summarises the procedures to be followed. My Secretary of State agrees that it is the proper responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to present to Parliament the decision to provide a United Kingdom contingent to the Sinai Force, to obtain approval for the necessary funds and to account for the expenditure.

M O' D B Alexander Esq

Finally, as regards the question of how much of the costs we should seek to recover, my Secretary of State has already referred, in his minute of 30th October, to the existing Treasury rule governing this point. The Prime Minister's point about extra costs to this Department is valid in relation to postings or attachments of very short duration. For longer term commitments - and there is no time limit for our commitment to the Sinai Force - we will have to provide additional manpower resources to be able to guarantee continued availability of our contribution, eg by building this requirement into our manpower assumptions, and recruiting and training numbers over and above those required to accommodate the levels envisaged in our current planning.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Kerr (HM Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

Jonathan Dawson.

(J D S DAWSON)

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 327 OF 6 NOV 1981

RPTD IMMEDIATE INFO TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, THE HAGUE

PRIORITY INFO TO OTHER EC POSTS

SINAI FORCE

1. GREECE IS NOT A PRINCIPAL IN THIS EXERCISE. BUT GREEK RESERVATIONS COUPLED WITH THE SCEPTICAL INEXPERIENCE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN COOPERATION WITH THEIR PARTNERS DELAYED AGREEMENT ON THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN. HAVING GOT THEM ON BOARD IT IS, AS SEEN FROM HERE, IMPORTANT, NOT ONLY IN DEMONSTRATING THE UNITY OF THE TEN, BUT IN SECURING THEIR CONTINUED ADHESION TO THE COMMUNITY AND INDIRECTLY TO THE NATO ALLIANCE, THAT WE SHOULD HOLD TO THE TEXT TO WHICH THEY HAVE SUBSCRIBED. STEARNS, MY U.S. COLLEAGUE, ACCEPTS THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT. IT MIGHT, PARTICULARLY THE ALLIANCE POINT, HAVE SOME WEIGHT IN WASHINGTON IF HAIG REVERTS TO THE VIEW (WASHINGTON TEL NO 2 TO RIYADH PARA 13) THAT A COMMUNITY STATEMENT IS SUPERFLOUS. AND A DELAY OF TEN

1. GREECE IS NOT A PRINCIPAL IN THIS EXERCISE.BUT GREEK RESERVATIONS COUPLED WITH THE SCEPTICAL INEXPERIENCE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN COOPERATION WITH THEIR PARTNERS DELAYED AGREEMENT ON THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN.HAVING GOT THEM ON BOARD IT IS, AS SEEN FROM HERE, IMPORTANT, NOT ONLY IN DEMONSTRATING THE UNITY OF THE TEN, BUT IN SECURING THEIR CONTINUED ADHESION TO THE COMMUNITY AND INDIRECTLY TO THE NATO ALLIANCE, THAT WE SHOULD HOLD TO THE TEXT TO WHICH THEY HAVE SUBSCRIBED. STEARNS, MY U.S. COLLEAGUE, ACCEPTS THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT. IT MIGHT, PARTICULARLY THE ALLIANCE POINT, HAVE SOME WEIGHT IN WASHINGTON IF HAIG REVERTS TO THE VIEW (WASHINGTON TEL NO 2 TO RIYADH PARA 13) THAT A COMMUNITY STATEMENT IS SUPERFLOUS. AND A DELAY OF TEN DAYS (WASHINGTON TEL NO 3302 PARAGRAPH 3) MIGHT GIVE THE GREEKS AN EXCUSE TO TRY TO WRIGGLE OUT. NOTE IN THE CONTEXT OF PROCEDURES THAT THE NEW GREEK PARLIAMENT WILL NOT MEET UNTIL NOVEMBER 16

AND PAPANDREOU WILL CERTAINLY NOT WISH TO HAVE A STATEMENT ON SINAI AT THE OPENING SESSION.

2. FOTILAS, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, HAVING JUST LEARNED FROM COREU 3670 ABOUT THE DELAY IN PUTTING OUT THE STATEMENTS EXPRESSED DISMAY TO ME LAST NIGHT AT WHAT HE TERMED THE AMERICANS '' ANTI-EUROPEAN'' BEHAVIOUR. HE HOPED THAT THE TEN WOULD PROCEED AS AGREED.

SUTHERLAND

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FROM TEL AVIV 060800Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 442 OF 6 NOVEMBER 81

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY CAIRO AND JEDDA.

MY TELS NOS 440 AND 441: SINAI MFO

1. SPEAKING IN EILAT YESTERDAY, BEGIN IS QUOTED IN TODAY'S ISRAELI PRESS AS SAYING THAT THE BRITISH AND OTHER EUROPEAN CONTINGENTS TO THE SINAI MFO COULD STAY AT HOME IF THEIR PROPOSED PARTICIPATION WAS LINKED TO UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS.

2. BEGIN IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE CRITICISED YOU FOR HAVING SAID THAT BRITISH PARTICIPATION WAS INTENDED TO SUPERVISE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI: ''IF LORD CARRINGTON THINKS THAT THE TASK OF THE SYMBOLIC BRITISH UNIT WILL BE TO SUPERVISE OUR WITHDRAWAL....OR TO REALISE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION, THEY MIGHT AS WELL KNOW IN LONDON AND THE OTHER CAPITALS THAT WE WILL NEVER AGREE TO IT.'' THE EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT REFER TO VENICE, WHICH THE KNESSET HAD UTTERLY REJECTED BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY, IN ANY STATEMENT JUSTIFYING PARTICIPATION.

3. ISRAELI OFFICIALS ARE ALSO, HOWEVER, QUOTED AS REFUSING TO SAY THAT BRITIAIN WAS ''DISQUALIFIED'' FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE MFO. ONE SENIOR OFFICIAL TOLD THE JERUSALEM POST'S DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT THAT ISRAEL WOULD AWAIT THE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS' JUSTIFICATION OF THEIR DECISION TO TAKE PART, THE IMPLICATION, AS THE POST SEES IT, BEING THAT IF THE COMMUNITY DID NOT EXPLICITLY LINK THE DECISION WITH AN ANTI-CAMP DAVID STATEMENT, ISRAEL WOULD NOT SEEK TO ''DISQUALIFY'' THE EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS.

4. THE JERUSALEM POST ALSO CONTAINS A REPORT FROM ITS WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBING HAIG AS BEING FORCEFUL IN TELLING SIR N HENDERSON THAT YOUR STATEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA CRITICAL OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS WERE UNHELPFUL. WELL-PLACED AMERICAN OFFICIALS ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HAIG HAD TOLD HENDERSON THAT THE US WANTED THEM STOPPED. HAIG WAS ALSO SAID TO HAVE BEEN ''AROUSED'' WHEN COMMENTING ON YOUR REMARKS DURING A MEETING WITH 200 JEWISH LEADERS IN NEW YORK ON THE EVENING OF 4 NOVEMBER. 5.

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5. BEGIN'S REMARKS WERE HIGHLY-CHARGED. BUT I DO NOT THINK THEY ESSENTIALLY ALTER THE ASSESSMENT IN MY TURS, WHICH IS SHARED BY MY COLLEAGUES OF THE OTHER 3 PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS HERE.

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DESKBY FCO 0609002

FROM TEL AVIV 0608002 NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 442 OF 6 NOVEMBER 81

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY CAIRO AND JEDDA.

MY TELS NOS 440 AND 441: SINAI MFO

1. SPEAKING IN EILAT YESTERDAY, BEGIN IS QUOTED IN TODAY'S ISRAELI PRESS AS SAYING THAT THE BRITISH AND OTHER EUROPEAN CONTINGENTS TO THE SINAI MFO COULD STAY AT HOME IF THEIR PROPOSED PARTICIPATION WAS LINKED TO UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS.

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GR 165
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FM WASHINGTON 070045Z NOV 81
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3348 OF 6 NOVEMBER
INFO CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, PARIS
INFO SAVING JERUSALEM, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND JEDDA

ARAB/ISRAEL

1. STOESSEL TOLD ME ON 5 NOVEMBER, IN SURPRISINGLY CATEGORICAL TERMS, THAT THE AMERICANS HOPED TO HAVE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT BY APRIL. HE AGREED WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR MUBARAK THAN FOR SADAT TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ABOUT ARAB RIGHTS ON THE WEST BANK. BUT HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO ENGAGE SOME (UNSPECIFIED) PALESTINIANS IN THE TALKS.

2. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, WHO WAS PRESENT, SAID THAT REAGAN HAD ASKED MITTERRAND WHETHER HIS SUPPOSITION THAT ARAFAT WAS A BAD GUY AND THE PLO A BUNCH OF TERRORISTS WAS RIGHT OR EXAGGERATED. MITTERRAND HAD REPLIED THAT ARAFAT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HIS CHOICE BUT THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ANYONE ELSE WHO COULD CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIANS, HE HAD THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS ARAFAT OR NOTHING.

FCO PASS SAVING. JERUSALEM, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND JEDDA

HENDERSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 3325 OF 6 NOVEMBER 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, CAIRO, PARIS, THE HAGUE, ROME,
ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS AND JEDDA.

SINAI.

1. AN ARTICLE BY GWERTZMAN IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES ASSERTS THAT HAIG PROTESTED TO ME ON 4 NOVEMBER ABOUT REMARKS MADE BY YOU CRITICISING THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS AND ENDORSING FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS.

2. GWERTZMAN QUOTES FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF HAIG'S MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF AMERICAN JEWISH ASSOCIATIONS LATER ON 4 NOVEMBER. HAIG IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD ME THAT ''IT IS ONE THING FOR A FELLOW TO SIT ON THE SIDELINES AND INDULGE IN THEOLOGY AND TO ESTABLISH GOALS THAT REPRESENT THE PERFECT IN CONTRAST TO THE GOOD AND ACHIEVABLE AND PRAGMATICALLY DESIRABLE. IT IS ANOTHER THING TO HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DO IT. IT IS A VERY LUXURIOUS POSITION FOR OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS TO BE IN. THEY CAN MAKE THEIR OWN OBSERVATIONS WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES. THERE ARE INDIRECT CONSEQUENCES. THEY ARE VERY SEVERE IN ISRAEL TODAY''.

TODAY''.

3. HAIG IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT HE HAD URGED YOU ''TO COOL IT'' AND TO HAVE ADDED ''I WOULD SUSPECT THAT IF MR CARRINGTON HAS TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF PRESIDENT REAGAN OF BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE IN PRACTICAL TERMS BY INTERNATIONAL WORLD OPINION OF THE OUTCOME OF THIS VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION, THAT HE MIGHT BE MORE CIRCUMSPECT WITH HIS ADJECTIVAL PRONOUNCEMENTS''.

4. HAIG DESCRIBED THE EUROPEANS AS FRUSTRATED AND SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN FREQUENTLY CLOSER TO THE ARABIST POINT OF VIEW. HE SAID THAT THE NEW SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE HAD ''PERHAPS A GREATER BALANCE'' AND THAT THE DUTCH WERE ALSO MORE BALANCED.

5. (COMMENT) THIS IS ANOTHER IN THE SERIES OF ERRATIC STATEMENTS WHICH HAIG HAS BEEN MAKING RECENTLY ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS. HE IS CLEARLY FEELING EXPOSED AND UNDER PRESSURE. THOUGH IT IS OFFENSIVE, I RECOMMEND THAT WE ALLOW IT TO PASS WITHOUT A PUBLIC REJOINDER: A FURTHER PUBLIC AIRING OF OUR DIFFERENCES WOULD ONLY RAISE THE TEMPERATURE AND MAKE A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OVER THE SINAI FORCE MORE DIFFICULT. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS ENQUIRIES WE ARE CONFIRMING THAT I MET HAIG AND THAT THE SINAI (BUT NOT YOUR COMMENTS ON THE FAHD PLAN) WERE DISCUSSED. WE SHALL NOT GIVE DETAILS.

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FM WASHINGTON 052300Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3317 OF 5 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, CAIRO
INFO SAVING TO BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, JERUSALEM

US/JORDAN

1. HOWELL (COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR THE LEVANT) BRIEFED US TODAY ON KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON FROM 2-5 NOVEMBER WITH REAGAN, BUSH, HAIG AND WEINBERGER. THE KING ALSO HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. HE HAS NOW LEFT WASHINGTON FOR A VISIT TO CALIFORNIA.

2. HOWELL DESCRIBED THE VISIT AS A RESOUNDING SUCCESS. REAGAN AND HUSSEIN HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP. HOWELL THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE KING AND THAT HE WAS COMING TO REALISE THAT ARABS WHO OPPOSED THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS WERE NOT NECESSARILY MONSTERS.

3. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN REASSURING HUSSEIN, BY THEIR REFERENCES TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN QUOTE THE UNIQUE AND ENDURING CHARACTER OF JORDAN UNQUOTE THAT THEY DID NOT ACCEPT THE SHARON THESIS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE IN JORDAN.

4. THEY ACCEPTED THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS NOT GOING TO JOIN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS BUT HAD NEVERTHELESS GIVEN HIM SATISFACTION BY REAFFIRMING THE US COMMITMENT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 I.E. WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES IN RETURN FOR PEACE. HOWELL COMMENTED THAT HE HAD HAD QUITE A STRUGGLE TO GET THIS LINE ACCEPTED IN THE US BUREAUCRACY: THE CLINCHING ARGUMENT HAD BEEN THAT 242 WAS THE FOUNDATION OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND HAD BEEN ACCEPTED AS SUCH BY BEGIN. HE ADDED THAT THE EXTENT OF POSSIBLE MINOR BORDER ADJUSTMENTS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE KING. VELIOTES TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS: THE JORDANIANS HAD MAKE KNOWN THEIR VIEWS ON THEM IN ADVANCE OF THE KING'S VISIT.

5. HOWELL SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN USEFUL DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC ISSUES AND THAT HUSSEIN BROADLY SHARED THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN SATISFIED BY THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED ON ARMS SUPPLIES(OF WHICH HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE DETAILS) BOTH DURING THE KING'S VISIT AND AT THE MEETINGS OF THE US/JORDAN MILITARY COMMISSION WHICH PRECEDED IT. HE ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO INTENTION AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT OF SUPPLYING MOBILE I-HAWK MISSILES OR ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. THE JORDANIANS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO CHOOSE THEIR MOMENT FOR PUTTING SALES PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS. THIS WOULD BE DONE WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

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6. THE AMERICANS FOR THEIR PART WERE RELAXED ABOUT THE PROPOSED JORDANIAN ARMS DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HOWELL SAID WAS FAR ADVANCED AND WOULD BE FINANCED BY THE IRAQIS. HE INDICATED THAT HE SAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PURCHASE OF SOVIET SAMS AND THEIR DEPLOYMENT.

7. HUSSEIN HAD RAISED IN FAMILIAR TERMS THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN - DEAD SEA CANAL. THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN A LINE SIMILAR TO OUR OWN - THAT THERE WOULD BE NO OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION IN OR FINANCING OF THIS PROJECT. BUT THEY HAD NOT GIVEN THE JORDANIANS A VIEW ON THE PROJECT'S LEGALITY.

FCO PASS SAVING BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, JERUSALEM.

HENDERSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3311 OF 5 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, EC POSTS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1666 : SINAI : MFO

1. IN THE ABSENCE OF HAIG AND VELIOTES I SPOKE THIS MORNING TO EAGLEBURGER WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ONE OF VELIOTES' DEPUTIES, DRAPER. I TOOK THEM CAREFULLY THROUGH ALL THE POINTS IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THIS ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS WOULD BE BROUGHT DIRECTLY TO HAIG'S ATTENTION.

2. EAGLEBURGER HAD ONLY ONE POINT OF SUBSTANCE TO MAKE. HE SAID THAT HAIG FULLY ACCEPTED THAT ANY GOVERNMENT HAD TO JUSTIFY ITS DECISIONS TO ITS OWN PARLIAMENT AND IT WAS ENTIRELY FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE WHAT TO SAY ON THIS SCORE. HOWEVER, HAIG THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DESTRUCTIVE IF ANY OF THE GOVERNMENTS WERE TO

THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DESTRUCTIVE IF ANY OF THE GOVERNMENTS WERE TO STATE THAT THE POSITION THEY WERE EXPRESSING WAS THAT OF THE TEN OF THE FOUR AS A GROUP. HAIG HOPED THAT THIS CONSIDERATION WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS SO THAT THEY WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT RESONANCE IN TEL AVIV. HE ALSO HOPED THAT THERE COULD BE A LITTLE DELAY BETWEEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF PARTICIPATION AND THE ISSUE OF THESE EXPLANATIONS IN PARLIAMENTS ETC. I SAID THAT HOWEVER THE STATEMENTS WERE WORDED ONE COULD NOT AVOID CONFIRMING IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION THAT SIMILAR STATEMENTS WERE BEING MADE ELSEWHERE. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THIS COULD BE HANDLED BUT REPEATED HAIG'S VIEW THAT ANYTHING WHICH WAS PRESENTED AS A STATEMENT OF THE POSITION OF THE TEN OR THE FOUR WOULD BE DAMAGING. I LEFT IT THAT WE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS AFTER FURTHER CONSULTATIONS IN EUROPE TOMORROW.

3. EAGLEBURGER DID NOT ATTEMPT TO REBUT THE POINTS IN YOUR TELEGRAM, BUT SAID PRIVATELY THAT VELIOTES FELT QUOTE BADLY USED UNQUOTE IN RELATION TO HIS TALKS IN LONDON. VELIOTES HAD ACKNOWLEDGED IN LONDON THAT THE US HAD A VERSION OF THE STATEMENT FROM THE ISRAELIS BUT HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THIS WAS AN EARLIER DRAFT AND THAT THE US NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT IT. THE US HAD THEN REASSURED THE ISRAELIS ON THIS BASIS. THEY HAD ASSUMED THAT THE REVISED DRAFT WOULD NOT ONLY DROP THE REFERENCE TO A PALESTINIAN STATE BUT WOULD AVOID ANY EMBELLISHMENT OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. I REPLIED BY RESTATING RELEVANT POINTS IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

4. EAGLEBURGER DREW A MORAL FROM ALL THIS ABOUT THE DANGERS HE FORESAW FOR EUROPEAN/US RELATIONS IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS AND THE PROBLEM FOR THE AMERICANS IN KEEPING ABREAST OF DISCUSSIONS AND DECISIONS IN POLITICAL COOPERATION. HE HAD NOTHING SPECIFIC TO SUGGEST AND SAID THAT HE WAS ONLY SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF, NOT FOR HAIG. HE VENTURED THE PRIVATE THOUGHT THAT MISUNDERSTANDING MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE US HAD BEEN SHOWN THE DRAFT STATEMENT DURING VELIOTES' VISIT TO LONDON.

5. MY OWN READING OF THIS SITUATION IS THAT THE PROFESSIONALS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE PROBABLY NEITHER SURPRISED NOR DISMAYED WHEN THEY SAW THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT. VELIOTES DID NOT REACT AT ALL STRONGLY TO IT. BUT HAIG SEEMS TO HAVE FLOWN OFF THE HANDLE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOW HAVE TO JUSTIFY THIS BY SHOWING THAT THEY WERE NOT FULLY IN THE PICTURE. HAIG REMAINS ACUTELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISK OF A VIOLENT ISRAELI REACTION. (THE US AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV HAS EVIDENTLY REPORTED THAT HE HAS NEVER SEEN THE ISRAELIS IN SUCH A STATE OF TENSION AND UNCERTAINTY [illegible] AND THE FAVOURABLE REFERENCES

NEVER SEEN THE ISRAELIS IN SUCH A STATE OF TENSION AND UNCERTAINTY AS THEY ARE AFTER THE AWACS DECISION AND THE FAVOURABLE REFERENCES BY US LEADERS TO FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS.) HAIG EVIDENTLY BELIEVES THE ISRAELIS MAY BE ABOUT TO GO OVER THE EDGE AND WANTS TO DO EVERY-THING POSSIBLE TO STOP THEM. HE IS VIEWING THE EUROPEAN STATEMENT EXCLUSIVELY IN THIS LIGHT: INDEED HE IS EXPORTING ON TO THE EUROPEANS THE PRESSURE HE IS GETTING FROM THE ISRAELIS BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR THAT WASHINGTON IS GETTING CLOSER TO SAUDI ARABIA.

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FM WASHINGTON 051740Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3309 OF 5 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO JEDDA, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN

INFO SAVING ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS, OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

RIYADH TELNO 3: ARAB ISRAEL: FAHD PROPOSALS

1. PRINCE SA'UD'S HOPE THAT US REACTIONS TO THE FAHD PROPOSALS REFLECT A TURNABOUT IN US OPINION IS LIKELY TO BE DISAPPOINTED.

2. VELIOTES TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE FEARED THAT FAHD HAD MISINTERPRETED RECENT WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON HIS EIGHT POINTS. AT HIS MEETING WITH HAIG IN SPAIN IN SEPTEMBER FAHD HAD NOT PRESSED FOR THE US TO COMMENT PUBLICLY ON HIS PROPOSALS, THOUGH HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT THEY WOULD BE USEFUL TO THE AMERICANS AS A MEANS OF EXERTING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL IN THE CAMP DAVID CONTEXT. SINCE THEN HOWEVER THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN URGING THE AMERICANS TO COME UP WITH SOME MORE FAVOURABLE PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE PROPOSALS. VELIOTES HIMSELF HAD DONE THIS IN THE COURSE OF TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE LAST MONTH. BUT THIS HAD NOT BEEN PICKED UP BY THE PRESS: HENCE THE FURTHER PUBLIC COMMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LAST WEEK.

3. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE TRAPPED BETWEEN THE SAUDI DESIRE FOR FAVOURABLE US COMMENT ON THE FAHD PROPOSALS AND ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT THEY BE REJECTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD THEREFORE DECIDED TO SAY NOTHING MORE IN PUBLIC ABOUT THE MATTER. THERE WAS GREAT UNCERTAINTY AND ANXIETY IN ISRAEL AT PRESENT WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO DAMPEN DOWN: IT WAS NOT IN US INTERESTS THEREFORE TO MAKE ANY FURTHER HIGH-PROFILE PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THOUGH THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO REAFFIRM THEIR FULL COMMITMENT TO CAMP DAVID.

4. ALLEN TOLD A GROUP OF SENATORS YESTERDAY THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS WAS THE ONE ROUTE TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HAIG TOLD THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THAT THE ONLY THING TO WHICH THE US WAS COMMITTED FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.

5. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF VELIOTES' COMMENTS TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS:
(I) (ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL) THE US BELIEVE THAT WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATED PEACE. THEY DO NOT ACCEPT FAHD'S REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL FROM QUOTE ALL TERRITORY UNQUOTE.

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(II) (SETTLEMENTS) THIS SHOULD BE FOR NEGOTIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF DETERMINING PEACE.
(III) (FREEDOM OF WORSHIP) THE US IS IN FAVOUR OF THIS.
(IV) (RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION) THIS IS ESSENTIALLY TAKEN FROM UN RESOLUTIONS WHICH THE US HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED SINCE 1949. VELIOTES MENTIONED JEWISH REFUGEES WHO ALSO REQUIRE COMPENSATION.
(V) (UN TRUSTEESHIP IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FOR A TRANSITION PERIOD) THE US CERTAINLY FAVOURS A TRANSITION PERIOD BUT CAMP DAVID DOES NOT ENVISAGE UN INVOLVEMENT.
(VI) (PALESTINIAN STATE WITH EAST JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL) ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK HAS TO BE DETERMINED IN NEGOTIATIONS - IN CAMP DAVID, AFTER THE FIVE YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE US IS NOT IN FAVOUR OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. (VELIOTES TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT THE US WOULD PREFER A SOLUTION BASED ON A RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN)
(VII) (ALL STATES IN THE REGION SHOULD LIVE IN PEACE) VELIOTES DESCRIBED THIS AS A PARAPHRASE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND NOTED THAT ISRAEL WAS MENTIONED TWICE BY NAME IN THE EIGHT POINTS HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE SAUDIS WERE PREPARED TO INCLUDE ISRAEL AS A STATE ENTITLED TO LIVE IN PEACE IN THE REGION.
(VIII) (GUARANTEES BY UN OR UN MEMBER STATES) VELIOTES SAID THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATE IN GUARANTEEING A PEACE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND SAID THAT HE ASSUMED THE PARTIES WOULD WISH AS MANY OTHER COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT THIS.

FCO PASS SAVING TO: ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS, ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, DOHA, DUBAI, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANA'A, TRIPOLI AND TUNIS.

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[TEXT]

~~My tel no. [illegible]~~ Sinai Force.

1. Please speak urgently to the Foreign Ministry on the lines of paras 2 to 8 below.

2. It seems to us that we should not join the mood of over-excitement in Washington, which may have something to do with Mr Haig's present state of mind and his domestic position. We also need an independent assessment of the situation in Israel (Tel Aviv please act), taking account of (among other things) of Shamir's reported statement yesterday that Governments refusing to commit themselves to the Camp David process as a whole are not acceptable as contributors to the MFO.

3. We therefore suggest that the four Ambassadors in Washington should be instructed to go back to the

Americans individually today, not speaking from a single text but following a concerted line as follows. The four Governments made it clear long ago that they would have to state their own position if they were to give their consent to particpation. We are surprised that the Americans believe that the results of doing so will be so explosive. But since this is their judgement, it is clear that the basis for participation in the MFO by the Four does not at present exist. We shall have to consult among ourselves to see whether ~~or not~~ a new basis for participation can be constructed, and whether there is the will to attempt to do this. ~~This will take a little time~~. We shall be in touch with the United States, but probably not until after the weekend. Meanwhile we appreciate Mr Haig's offer (now repeated in a message to me, and presumably to the other three Foreign Ministers) to ~~make~~ fly urgently to Europe for consultations, but we see no need to put him to this trouble at the present time.

4. As the three Foreign Ministries are being told this morning by telephone, we should like to hold a meeting of the Four in London starting at 1000 hours GMT tomorrow 6 November. Our representative will be Sir J Graham and/or Mr Bullard. As we see it, the task of this meeting ~~will~~ should be to consider whether to tell the Americans that we will participate in the MFO on the terms which we have explained to them, or not at all: or whether to envisage the possibility of amending the text of one or both statements and/or the proposed procedure for making them public.

5. As Presidency we are taking it upon ourselves to send a brief COREU to all of the Ten, for the information of the other six, explaining that there has been a last-minute hitch, that the four will be holding immediate consultations and that

we shall be in touch with them again later.

6. We are sending urgent instructions to HM Ambassadors in Cairo, Tel Aviv and certain other Middle East posts to give minimal explanations of the delay to the Governments concerned.

7. The line we are taking with the press, if asked, repeat if asked, is as follows: quote

> Consultations with our partners in the Ten have been going on and when we are ready we will make an announcement and Lord Carrington has already told you that this will be soon. Unquote.

In reply to questions about consultations with the Americans: we are saying quote

> The original request to participate in the MFO came from the US Government. It is perfectly natural that we should now be in touch with them about our reply. Unquote.

8. We should be grateful for the urgent comments of the French/Dutch/Italians.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
TEL. 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

בברכות מאת

With the Compliments of

The Ambassador of Israel

שגריר ישראל

M.A. For Information.

Seen
by MoDBA
6/11/81

THE PLO HAS THE 'LEGITIMATE RIGHT' TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF:

On the murder of President Sadat:

"We are happy over the assassination of the master traitor. Europeans like Kreisky, Mitterrand and Giscar D'estaing are free to be sad as they want, but we are happy and we make no secret of it."

(Abu Iyad, PLO Security Chief, in a speech in Beirut, A.P., Beirut, 14 October 1981)

We shake the hand that fired those bullets!

(Abu Iyad, Reuter, Beirut, 6 October 1981)

"This is the best news we have had in many years! It is the Egyptian people that has got rid of Sadat. The Egyptian people has also rid itself of the shame and the dishonour that Sadat had imposed upon the grand history of Egypt."

(Farouk Kaddoumi, Head of the PLO Political Department, Agence Presse Francaise, Havana(Cuba), 6 October 1981)

On "co-existence" with Israel:

Arafat, in an interview transmitted by the Emirates News Agency, denied statements attributed to him in Japan to the effect that he had accepted co-existence with the 'Israeli enemy'. Arafat stated that the Palestinian people believed in co-existence with the 'Jewish sect' in Palestine within the framework of an independent democratic Palestinian state comprising Christians, Muslims and Jews, (i.e. the destruction of the State of Israel) which is in accordance with the programme of the Palestine National Council. Arafat added that his statements on the issue had been distorted and misinterpreted by one of the Japanese politicians.

("Voice of Palestine", 17 October 1981)

"There is one thing that should be clear to Western public opinion: We shall never recognize Israel."

(Ibrahim Souss, PLO representative in Paris, in an interview to ACP, Paris, 23 August 1981)

On relations with the Soviet Union:

"If we had the capability to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union, we would have signed a thousand treaties, and if we controlled land we would have allowed the Soviets a thousand bases because we are dealing with a foe stronger than Israel, the United States."

(Abu Iyad, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai Al-Aam, as quoted by A.P., Kuwait, 17 August 1981)

"The decision of the Soviet Union to recognize our office in Moscow as an embassy signifies recognition of the State of Palestine before its birth... will this initiative be met by another initiative, in that some Arab states, in which to this moment the Soviet Union does not have an embassy, take the initiative of announcing the opening of Soviet embassies? I believe it is time."

(Abu Iyad, in an interview with "Voice of Palestine", 21st October 1981)

POLICY BACKGROUND

SAUDI ARABIA AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

30 October 1981

Information Department, Embassy of Israel, London

SAUDI ARABIA AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

On 7 August 1981, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Fahd Bin Abd al-Aziz granted an interview to the Saudi News Agency in which he proposed eight "guidelines towards a just settlement" in the Middle East (see Appendix).

Upon examination, the Fahd "plan" is nothing more than a one-sided series of demands on Israel, advocating an imposed settlement with no negotiations. International problems cannot be solved by means of declarations made at press conferences or at world forums. No international conflict has ever been resolved without negotiation between the parties in dispute. The Arab-Israel conflict continued unabated for more than thirty years until Egypt agreed to sit and negotiate peace with Israel. After lengthy negotiations, the Camp David accords evolved and are the only basis in existence today for a viable peace in the Middle East. Israel is still waiting for the other Arab countries, and particularly its immediate neighbours, to join the framework of the Camp David accords.

Prime Minister Begin has repeatedly stated, as have previous Israeli prime ministers, that - notwithstanding the gap that obviously still separates the two sides - Israel is willing and eager to meet, at any time and place, with any Arab leader who truly seeks peace and is prepared to negotiate peace, without setting pre-conditions. This offer still stands and it includes, of course, the leaders of Saudi Arabia.

THE NATURE OF THE FAHD PLAN

1. Contrary to initial assessments in many quarters, the Fahd plan reflects no departure whatsoever from Saudi Arabia's traditional negative and hostile policy towards Israel but, rather, conforms to principles formulated at various Arab summit conferences and, as Fahd himself pointed out in his interview, "were confirmed and reiterated on several occasions in recent years by the United Nations." It is common knowledge that the UN itself has in recent years turned into a rubber stamp for the openly anti-Israel Arab-Communist-Third World automatic majority. The real thrust of the Fahd plan is to derail the Camp David peace process.

The late President Sadat of Egypt commented on the Fahd plan as follows in "Meet the Press" (NBC-TV) 9 August 1981:

> *"Unfortunately, Fahd didn't add anything new. And my observation is this. It is the most easy thing for me, for instance, to sit in Cairo and say, well the United States has to do so and so, Premier Begin has to do so and so, and sit still in Cairo, without making any contribution to this. I should like to see Prince Fahd make a contribution. If he is to ask the United States to do a certain pressure towards the peace process, well, I should like to have him share and contribute, rather than adopting the old ways which I don't agree to at all and I reject."*

2. This is not the first time that Saudi spokesmen - including the King, the Crown Prince and the foreign minister - have attempted to veil their relentlessly hostile political positions with sophisticated phrases by which they present themselves as seekers of peace while portraying Israel's policy as a roadblock to that goal.

3. Prince Fahd himself revealed his real purpose in his introductory remarks and in answer to questions during the interview. His comments included some major points that are integral parts of Saudi Arabia's basic political credo:

* "I do not understand how successive US Administrations continue to expose their relations ... with the Arab nations to danger through supporting Israel ... The US should halt this support ..."

* "... What increases our sorrow is that the US continues to adhere to the Camp David accords ... we continue to hope that the Reagan Administration will accept the uselessness of the Camp David agreements as the framework for a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East ..."

* "The press of international quarters was unanimous and the Western press, especially the American ... in the opinion that the US Government should recognize the PLO because it is a fact ... and the time has come for the US Government to be ... more equitable to the Arabs." *(BBC Translation)*

4. Those who view the plan as reflecting a new Saudi approach to the conflict cite its "implied recognition of Israel". Unfortunately, this interpretation is not borne out by the facts. There is no recognition of Israel - implied or otherwise - in the eight points of the plan:

a. The phrase "the countries of the region" (Point 7) - without mentioning Israel - allows the Saudis to exclude Israel from among the countries of the region, because it does not recognize Israel as a country.

b. There is no mention or hint in the "guidelines" of the need for negotiations or agreement or the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.

c. There is no mention of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 (the only resolutions accepted by the two sides of the dispute) which, in calling for - among other things - Arab-Israel peace negotiations, might have implied recognition of Israel. Furthermore, these resolutions have been repeatedly rejected as a basis for a settlement by the rejectionist "Baghdad Front" - and most recently at the Arab summit in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (January 1981).

d. Fahd's call to have the "West Bank" and the Gaza Strip turned over to the UN for a brief transitional period (Point 5), prior to the establishment there of a new "Palestinian State" (Point 6), is no more than a thinly-veiled device to avoid having to address himself to Israel (the administrating power in these areas), which the Saudis do not recognize or wish to recognize, and to enable the PLO to take over these areas without having to deal with Israel.

5. Further evidence of Saudi intentions was provided by the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Shazly al-Kliby, who openly stated that "Prince Fahd's peace initiative does not, as some people believe, imply recognition of Israel's existence" (Interview to the Abu Dhabi daily *Al-Ittihad*, 30 September 1981, as quoted in the Saudi daily *Al-Okaz*, 1 October, 1981).

6. The call for total Israeli withdrawal, the establishment of a new Palestinian state, the dismantlement of Israeli settlements and the return of the Arab refugees to their original homes - in effect constitutes the long-standing Arab programme for the elimination of Israel in stages, an

objective subscribed to by the PLO and spelled out, in the very same terms, at numerous Arab summit conferences. Significantly, Arafat's political adviser, Khaled al-Hassan, in April 1980 proposed a five-point plan whose elements were identical to those now put forward by Fahd. This must be considered together with the fact that the Saudis are also the principal financial and politial supporters of the PLO.

THE TIMING OF THE PLAN'S PUBLICATION

According to available information, the following considerations led Fahd to put forward his plan when he did:

i. The Saudis were alarmed and angered at the Reagan Administration's announced decision to adhere to the Camp David peace process. The Fahd interview took place several days after President Reagan had reaffirmed to the late President Sadat of Egypt that the Camp David accords are the correct course towards a settlement of the Middle East conflict. In his "guidelines", Fahd rejected the Camp David process, and signalled to Sadat that he had no mandate to act as spokesman on the Palestinian issue.

ii. As a result of their involvement in Philip Habib's mission to settle the Syrian-Lebanese crisis, the Saudis felt that many Arabs believed that Saudi Arabia had aligned itself with Washington, and had even been co-opted into the Camp David peace process, above and beyond the Lebanese issue. Thus, at this particular time - during Sadat's visit and on the eve of Prime Minister Begin's visit to America - Saudi Arabia was impelled to define its political positions as being linked with those of the Arab consensus, and to put an end to rumours of US-Saudi political collaboration in the Middle East.

S U M M A R Y

1. The Fahd plan does not deviate from traditional hard-line Saudi policies or from the Arab consensus against the Camp David peace process. It does not reflect Saudi renunciation of the long-standing idea of *Jihad* (Holy War), affirmed once again in the resolutions of the recent Mecca summit conference.

2. The timing of the plan's presentation is clearly aimed at scuttling the Camp David accords by proposing what is made to appear like a feasible alternative and to weaken the support of the Reagan administration for the Camp David peace process. An additional aim is the desire to achieve improvement in Saudi Arabia's public image.

3. There is nothing new in Prince Fahd's eight points. They have all been said before. If acted upon, they will lead to the annihilation of Israel by stages as preached by the PLO, and must therefore be totally rejected by all those who are interested in advancing the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East.

4. If Saudi Arabia should sincerely decide to change its hostile attitude towards Israel - if it really wants to advance the peace process - Israel will gladly welcome Saudi Arabia to the Camp David agreements and peace process, for the benefit of all concerned, not least among them the Palestinian Arabs, whose self-imposed absence from the peace talks, so far, has been the chief impediment to rapid, meaningful progress towards a just and binding settlement.

APPENDIX

THE FAHD PLAN

The following are the eight points of the Fahd plan, as presented at the UN General Assembly by the Saudi Foreign Minister on 5 October 1981:

1. "The withdrawal of Israel from all Arab lands occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem;

2. "The removal of settlements established by Israel in Arab lands after 1967;

3. "Security of the freedom of worship and religious rights for all religions in the Holy Places;

4. "Confirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to return, and compensation for those who opt not to do so;

5. "The West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be subject to a transitional period, under the supervision of the United Nations, for a period not exceeding a few months;

6. "The establishment of an independent Palestinian State, with Jerusalem as its capital;

7. "Confirming the right of the countries of the region to live in peace;

8. "The United Nations or some of its members shall guarantee the implementation of these principles."

Furthermore, "His Royal Highness (Prince Fahd) has stressed that the implementation of these principles depends on three conditions which must be fulfilled. Those conditions are: first, cessation of the unlimited American support for Israel; secondly, an end to Israeli arrogance, a condition which would be automatically fulfilled if the first condition were guaranteed and, thirdly, recognition that the Palestinian question is the main factor in the Middle East equation."

SUBJECT

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1981

cc Master

Sinai MFO

Mr. Hurd came to see the Prime Minister last night at 2020.

He started by showing the Prime Minister Washington telno 1 of 4 November, which set out Mr. Haig's initial reaction to the message from the Ten on the MFO. Mr. Hurd said it was not clear why Mr. Haig had reacted so badly. In response to a question from the Prime Minister he said that he doubted whether the cause of Mr. Haig's alarm was the covering letter from the Prime Minister to President Reagan saying that we retained the right to withdraw from the MFO in the future. It was more likely to be the phrases in the message that distanced European participation in the MFO from the Camp David agreement. Mr. Haig's reaction was hard to understand. The message had been toned down considerably during negotiations in the Ten. It no longer called for acknowledgement by the United States of the conditions on which European countries would participate.

Mr. Hurd went on to say that Mr. Haig would be seeing Sir Nicholas Henderson within a couple of hours, and that Lord Carrington would speak to Sir Nicholas before this. The most obvious demand the Americans could make was that the Ten should either negotiate a more acceptable text, or drop it altogether. Both Lord Carrington and Mr. Hurd felt that further negotiation on the text was out of the question. The statement was almost public knowledge already. Renegotiation would be extremely damaging to the Ten in the Arab world. Mr. Hurd said that he would welcome the Prime Minister's views. President Reagan might wish to speak to her, especially given American concern that Israel might act rashly in the follow-up to the AWACS deal.

After some discussion, the Prime Minister agreed that further negotiation on the text of the message itself was out of the question. The Americans could not dictate the terms on which Europe participated in the MFO. She was surprised that President Reagan had adopted Mr. Carter's Middle East policy so whole-heartedly. She would be glad to speak to the President or to the Secretary of State.

WR

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SINAI FORCE

1. EUROPEAN ADDRESSEES PLEASE SPEAK URGENTLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON THE LINES OF PARAS 2 TO 8 BELOW.

2. IT SEEMS TO US THAT WE SHOULD NOT JOIN THE MOOD OF OVER-EXCITEMENT IN WASHINGTON, WHICH MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH MR HAIG'S PRESENT STATE OF MIND AND HIS DOMESTIC POSITION. WE ALSO NEED AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN ISRAEL (TEL AVIV PLEASE ACT), TAKING ACCOUNT (AMONG OTHER THINGS) OF SHAMIR'S REPORTED STATEMENT YESTERDAY THAT GOVERNMENTS REFUSING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AS A WHOLE ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE AS CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MFO.

3. WE THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT THE FOUR AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO GO BACK TO THE AMERICANS INDIVIDUALLY TODAY, NOT SPEAKING FROM A SINGLE TEXT BUT FOLLOWING A CONCERTED LINE AS FOLLOWS. THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS MADE IT CLEAR LONG AGO THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO STATE THEIR OWN POSITION IF THEY WERE TO GIVE THEIR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATION. WE ARE SURPRISED THAT THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE RESULTS OF DOING SO WILL BE SO EXPLOSIVE. BUT SINCE THIS IS THEIR JUDGEMENT, IT IS CLEAR THAT

THE BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO BY THE FOUR DOES NOT AT PRESENT EXIST. WE SHALL HAVE TO CONSULT AMONG OURSELVES TO SEE WHETHER A NEW BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION CAN BE CONSTRUCTED, AND WHETHER THERE IS THE WILL TO ATTEMPT TO DO THIS. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT PROBABLY NOT UNTIL AFTER THE WEEKEND. MEANWHILE WE APPRECIATE MR HAIG'S OFFER (NOW REPEATED IN A MESSAGE TO ME, AND PRESUMABLY TO THE OTHER THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS) TO FLY URGENTLY TO EUROPE FOR CONSULTATIONS, BUT WE SEE NO NEED TO PUT HIM TO THIS TROUBLE AT THE PRESENT TIME.

4. AS THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTRIES ARE BEING TOLD THIS MORNING BY TELEPHONE, WE SHOULD LIKE TO HOLD A MEETING OF THE FOUR IN LONDON STARTING AT 1030 HOURS GMT TOMORROW 6 NOVEMBER. OUR REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE SIR J GRAHAM AND/OR BULLARD. AS WE SEE IT, THE TASK OF THIS MEETING SHOULD BE TO CONSIDER WHETHER TO TELL THE AMERICANS THAT WE WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO ON THE TERMS WHICH WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO THEM OR NOT AT ALL: OR WHETHER TO ENVISAGE THE POSSIBILITY OF AMENDING THE TEXT OF ONE OR BOTH STATEMENTS AND/OR THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR MAKING THEM PUBLIC.

5. AS PRESIDENCY WE ARE TAKING IT UPON OURSELVES TO SEND A BRIEF COREU TO ALL OF THE TEN, FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE OTHER SIX, EXPLAINING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A LAST-MINUTE HITCH, THAT THE FOUR WILL BE HOLDING IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS AND THAT WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM AGAIN LATER.

6. THE LINE WE ARE TAKING WITH THE PRESS, IF ASKED, REPEAT IF ASKED, IF AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE
CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN HAVE BEEN GOING ON AND WHEN WE ARE READY WE WILL MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT AND LORD CARRINGTON HAS ALREADY TOLD YOU THAT THIS WILL BE SOON. UNQUOTE
IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS ABOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS:
WE ARE SAYING QUOTE:
THE ORIGINAL REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO CAME FROM THE US GOVERNMENT. IT IS PERFECTLY NATURAL THAT WE SHOULD NOW BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM ABOUT OUR REPLY. UNQUOTE.

7. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE URGENT COMMENTS OF THE FRENCH/DUTCH/ITALIANS.

CARRINGTON

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1666 OF 5 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK EC POSTS TEL AVIV CAIRO JEDDA AMMAN BEIRUT DAMASCUS
YOUR TELNO 2 TO RIYADH: SINAI MFO

1. IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU, HAIG REFERRED TO THE BRITISH PART IN EVENTS IN TERMS WHICH DO NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT THE POSITION. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THIS TELEGRAM TO PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT WITH HAIG OR VELIOTES AT THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY.

2. WE HAVE ADHERED TO OUR ASSURANCE TO THE US EMBASSY HERE THAT NO CONDITIONS WOULD BE ATTACHED TO OUR PARTICIPATION. (PARA 3 OF TUR). OUR PROPOSED STATEMENT MAKES NO REQUEST FOR AMERICAN OR ISRAELI ENDORSEMENT OF OUR VIEWS, NOR EVEN FOR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION. MR HURD GAVE VELIOTES, AT THEIR MEETING ON 29 OCTOBER, A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE TEXT OF OUR STATEMENT WOULD SET OUT THE BASIS FOR OUR PARTICIPATION AND SHOW FIDELITY TO THE VENICE PRINCIPLES. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT IT WOULD POINT OUT THAT IN THE VIEW OF THE FOUR, PARTICIPATION WOULD NOT INVOLVE US IN OTHER ASPECTS OF CAMP DAVID. IN ADDING THAT THERE WOULD INEVITABLY BE PARTS THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT HAVE DRAFTED THEMSELVES, MR HURD MADE IT CLEAR TO VELIOTES THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD CONTAIN FIRM LANGUAGE. VELIOTES SAID IN RESPONSE THAT THE AMERICANS UNDERSTOOD THE EUROPEANS' POSITION: THE US COULD NOT ENDORSE VENICE, BUT NEITHER COULD THE EUROPEANS ABANDON IT.

3. THE PROPOSED STATEMENT CANNOT IN ANY CASE HAVE BEEN A QUOTE BOMBSHELL UNQUOTE TO THE AMERICANS. WE KNOW THAT THEY HAD SEEN SOME DAYS AGO AN EARLIER VERSION, PASSED TO THEM BY THE ISRAELIS, WHICH STILL CONTAINED THE REFERENCE TO AN

/INDEPENDENT

INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. WE TOLD THEM WHEN THEY ASKED THAT THIS REFERENCE, TOGETHER WITH A REQUEST FOR US ENDORSEMENT OF OUR POSITION, HAD BEEN DROPPED, BUT DID NOT IN ANY WAY SUGGEST THAT THE STATEMENT HAD BEEN CHANGED IN OTHER RESPECTS.

4. THE EUROPEAN STATEMENT IS NOT AN 'ELABORATION' ON VENICE (LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR PARA 3). IT IS MERELY A RE-AFFIRMATION IN TERMS THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE SURPRISED THE AMERICANS. FOR SEVERAL WEEKS WE HAVE BEEN INDICATING IN UNMISTAKEABLE TERMS TO THE EMBASSY HERE THAT PARTICIPATION WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE ON AN EXPLICIT VENICE BASIS AND WE WERE INFORMED BY THE EMBASSY ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION THAT IT WOULD NOT MATTER WHAT WE SAID, SO LONG AS NO ENDORSEMENT WAS REQUESTED: AND THE AMERICANS WOULD BE VERY CO-OPERATIVE ABOUT THIS. THE EUROPEANS HAD CONSIDERED LANGUAGE THAT WAS AN ADVANCE ON VENICE, BUT HAD REJECTED IT, IN THE INTERESTS OF PROVIDING A BASIS THAT CONFORMED WITH THE GENERAL GUIDELINES WE WERE BEING GIVEN BY THE AMERICANS.

5. IT IS UNTRUE THAT ONLY SYRIA HAS ENTERED RESERVATIONS ABOUT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION (PARA 4 OF TUR). WE HAVE RECEIVED REPRESENTATIONS IN UNMISTAKEABLE LANGUAGE FROM SYRIA, LIBYA, LEBANON, IRAQ, ALGERIA AND THE PLO THAT PARTICIPATION WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE EUROPEAN POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD. AMERICANS WHO KNOW THE ARABS SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THEIR OWN QUESIONS HAVE ILLICITED DIFFERENT ANSWERS . IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIAN MINISTERS THIS WEEK, THEY HAVE REPEATED TO ME THAT, WHILE THEY PRIVATELY UNDERSTAND OUR MOTIVES AND REASONS FOR PARTICIPATING ON THE PROPOSED BASIS, THEY FORECAST DAMAGE TO EUROPEAN-ARAB RELATIONS. PRINCE SAUD HAS COME OUT IN PUBLIC TODAY SAYING THAT ANY EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE WOULD QUOTE CONTRADICT ITS POSITION WITH THE ARAB WORLD AND WOULD MEAN THAT THE EEC HAD JOINED CAMP DAVID UNQUOTE.

6. HAIG'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO BRITISH ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES NOT TO PARTICIPATE ARE WIDE OF THE MARK. OUR POSITION HAS NEVER BEEN THAT OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE, AND WE HAVE TOLD THE AMERICANS THIS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. ON THE CONTRARY, WE ARE THE ONLY ALLIED COUNTRY TO HAVE TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT WE WERE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE

/WITHOUT

WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES. YOU MAY CONFIRM TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE LINE YOU TOOK IN PARA 10 OF TUR, THAT WE WOULD NOT OBJECT IF OTHERS WERE READY TO PARTICIPATE ON ANOTHER BASIS, IS INDEED MY POSITION.

7. IN PUTTING THESE AND OTHER POINTS TO THE AMERICANS, YOU SHOULD NOT LAY EMPHASIS ON EUROPEAN APPREHENSIONS ABOUT DAMAGE TO THEIR COMMERCIAL RELATIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE PRIMARY QUESTION IS ONE OF PRINCIPLE. WE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM WHICH TAKES FULL ACCOUNT OF THE NEED FOR A JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIANS PROBLEM AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE OUR DIPLOMACY ALONG VENICE LINES. IT WOULD RISK GRAVE DAMAGE TO WESTERN INTERESTS GENERALLY IF THE ARAB WORLD FELT THAT THERE WAS NO WESTERN POSITION PROVIDING A REALISTIC BASIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION, THUS ALLOWING INCREASED OPPORTUNITIES TO THE SOVIET UNION TO CHAMPION THE ARAB CAUSE.

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JEDDA TELNO 494 AND FCO TELNO 1665: SINAI.

1. HAIG IS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, SO I HAVE JUST PASSED ON THESE POINTS TO EAGLEBURGER (WHO SEEMS TO BE HOLDING MOST OF THE SINAI THREADS WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT). HE READILY TOOK THE POINT WHEN I SAID THAT, GRATEFUL THOUGH YOU WERE FOR HAIG'S OFFER, YOU DOUBTED THE NECESSITY FOR HIM TO TRAVEL TO LONDON.

2. I ASKED EAGLEBURGER (WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT AT MY MEETING WITH HAIG YESTERDAY) WHETHER I HAD BEEN RIGHT TO UNDERSTAND THAT HAIG HAD BEEN OPEN TO THE IDEA THAT THE MORE DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR MIGHT BE REMOVED FROM THAT STATEMENT, BUT INSTEAD DEPLOYED BY THE INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS IN THEIR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, OR IN BRIEFING ELSEWHERE. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THIS WAS INDEED HIS IMPRESSION OF HAIG'S ATTITUDE: HE WOULD CHECK WITH HAIG AS SOON AS HE WAS BACK, AND CONFIRM IT TO ME. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS THE ADDITIONAL PROVISO IN HAIG'S MIND THAT ANY

THOUGHT THERE WAS THE ADDITIONAL PROVISO IN HAIG'S MIND THAT ANY SUCH INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE MADE IMMEDIATELY, BU RATHER SOME DAYS AFTER THE INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION HAD BEEN MADE (AND THE DUST HAD SETTLED A BIT). I QUERIED THIS: SURELY HAIG'S CONCERN ABOUT AN INTERVAL OF A FEW DAYS HAD RELATED TO THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN, NOT TO POSSIBLE STATEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS? EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HAIG MIGHT NOT HAVE MADE HIMSELF ENTIRELY CLEAR TO ME (HE HAD AFTER ALL HAD FOUR SIMILAR INTERVIEWS YESTERDAY): BUT HE WAS CERTAIN THAT IN HAIG'S MIND THE NEED FOR AN INTERVAL TO ELAPSE APPLIED BOTH TO THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN AND TO ANY INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL STATEMENTS.

HENDERSON

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DESKBY 051130Z

FM JEDDA 051105Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 735 OF 05 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, THE HAGUE, ROME.

MIPT: SINAI

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MR HAIG TO SECRETARY OF STATE DELIVERED IN RIYADH ON 5 NOVEMBER.

BEGINS:

DEAR PETER: I KNOW THAT AMBASSADOR HENDERSON HAS REPORTED IN DETAIL OUR DISCUSSION TODAY, BUT I DO WISH TO MAKE A FEW ADDITIONAL PERSONAL COMMENTS. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IT WAS NOT EASY FOR ME TO URGENTLY REQUEST THAT YOU HALT ACTION ON YOUR PLANNED SCHEDULE OF ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FOUR IN THE SINAI PEACEKEEPING FORCE. I ALSO WISH TO REITERATE THAT I AM WELL-AWARE OF AND APPRECIATE THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE FACED YOU AND YOUR PARTNERS AS YOU WORKED TO FIND AN APPROPRIATE FORMULA FOR ANNOUNCING YOUR PARTICIPATION. FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, THE LAST 48 HOURS HAVE SEEN A DEEPENING OF THE TENSIONS IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH ISRAEL, AND WE NOW HAVE A FULL BLOWN CRISIS ON OUR HANDS. THIS IS DUE TO A VARIETY OF FACTORS WHICH I DESCRIBED TO AMBASSADOR HENDERSON SEMICOLON THE MOST RECENT INGREDIENT IS THE ISRAELI NEGATIVE REACTION TO WHAT THEY HAD LEARNED WOULD PROBABLY BE THE NATURE OF YOUR STATEMENT OF PARTICIPATION.

AS A RESULT, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT YOUR PROCEEDING AS PLANNED WITH THE STATEMENTS WOULD RESULT IN A CATEGORIC ISRAELI REJECTION. IT WAS TO FORESTALL THIS CERTAIN ISRAELI REACTION, WITH ALL THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS THIS WOULD ENTAIL, AS I DESCRIBED TO HENDERSON, THAT I MADE MY URGENT REQUEST TO YOU AND YOUR THREE EC COLLEAGUES.

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR DECISION TO PUT THE ISSUE ON HOLD. I LOOK FORWARD TO EARLY DISCUSSIONS IN ORDER TO FIND A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE CONSISTENT BOTH WITH THE POLICY IMPERATIVES OF YOU AND YOUR EC PARTNERS AS WELL AS THE REALITIES OF THE ISRAELI SITUATION.

IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, I AM PREPARED TO COME TO LONDON IMMEDIATELY FOR MEETINGS WITH YOU AND YOUR DUTCH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES.

(Offer declined)

ENDS.

CRAIG

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DESKBY FCO 051830Z

FM TEL AVIV 051545Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE (DESKBY 051830Z) FCO

TELNO 441 OF 5 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CAIRO AND JEDDA.

YOUR TELNO 484 AND MY TELNO 440: SINAI

1. IN TAKING THEIR PRESENT LINE WITH WASHINGTON, THE ISRAELIS ARE REFLECTING A HARDENING PUBLIC MOOD HERE, COMBINING DEEP SUSPICION OF AMERICAN MOTIVES (CF PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TUR), INTENSIFIED DISLIKE OF THE EUROPEAN, AND PARTICULARLY OUR OWN, APPROACH TO THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE, AND A GENERALISED CONVICTION THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD IS NOW DETERMINED TO GANG UP ON LITTLE ISRAEL.

2. THE VOTE IN THE KNESSET AGAINST VENICE AND THE FAHD PLAN (MY TELNO 436) WITH ITS CLEAR REJECTION OF ANY APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE GOING BEYOND CAMP DAVID, EXPRESS THIS MOOD WELL. IT ALSO SYMBOLISES THE CLASSIC ISRAELI REACTION IN A SITUATION OF THIS KIND: TO HIT OUT HARD AT BOTH FRIENDS AND ENEMIES. THIS ACCORDS WITH BEGIN'S PERSONAL INSTINCT

FRIENDS AND ENEMIES. THIS ACCORDS WITH BEGIN'S PERSONAL INSTINCT AND HIS UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IT LIEKLY TO APPEAL TO THE ISRAELI ELECTORATE AND PARTICULARLY TO HIS OWN SUPPORTERS. HIS DISOBLIGING REMARQCS ABOUT OUR POLICIES IN THE KNESSET ON 2 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 434) REFLECT BOTH FACTORS: AND HE HAS PROBABLY ONLY BEEN RESTRAINED FROM A PUBLIC ATTACK ON REAGAN FOR MOVING TOWARDS JEDDA AT THE EXPENSE OF CAMP DAVID, BY HIS AWARNESS OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH ISRAEL IS SO IMMENSELY DEPENDENT ON CONTINUED US SUPPORT IN WHAT HE SEES AS A RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION.

3. GIVEN THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S JUDGEMENT THAT IT CAN RELY ON FIRM PUBLIC BACKING FOR ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST VENICE AND U S OR EUROPEAN ATTEMPTS TO MAKE MORE OF THE FAHD PLAN, WE CAN EXPECT THIS TO BE INTENSIFIED, WITH THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN JEWISH COMMUNITIES MOBILISED ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF. THE ISRAELIS HAVE INVESTED SO MUCH IN CAMP DAVID THAT THEY REACT PASSIONATELY TO ANY APPARENT MOVE BY OTHERS TO UNDERMINE OR SIDETRACK IT. HOWEVER, SHAMIR'S STATEMENT IN THE KNESSET YESTERDAY (PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR AND MY TELNO 439) MAY REFLECT THE INITIAL ISRAELI BARGAINING POSITION RATHER THAN WHAT THEY MIGHT RELUCTANTLY, AND UNDER AMERICAN PRESSURE, BE FINALLY PERSUADED TO ACCEPT OVER THE SINAI FORCE. WHILE, AS I HAVE SAID, WE MUST EXPECT THEM TO REJECT THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR AS NOW DRAFTED, THEY COULD PROBABLY LIVE WITH A SHORTER STATEMENT ON THE LINES PROPOSED BY HAIG AS A BASIS FOR EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. BUT NATIONAL STATEMENTS COULD STILL RUN THE SAME RISK OF LEADING TO POSSIBLE ISRAELI REJECTION OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS.

4. IT MUST BE TEMPTING FOR US TO CRY A PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES AND TO GIVE UP THE EFFORT TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR JOINING THE SINAI FORCE. FROM THE OUTSET MY VIEW HAS BEEN THAT PARTICIPATION COULD HELP TO REVERSE THE GROWING ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE ISRAELIS WHICH HAS THREATENED TO REACH A POINT WHERE THERE IS NO DIALOGUE BETWEEN US ON THE WIDER PROBLEMS OF THIS AREA. HAVING COME THIS FAR, WITH ALL THE PUBLICITY ABOUT EXPECTED EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION, I HOPE WE SHALL BE WILLING TO GRIT OUR TEETH AND GO THROUGH WITH IT. TO HAVE COME SO CLOSE AND THEN BACK OFF AT THE LAST MINUTE WOULD LEAVE US HERE WITH THE WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS.

MOBERLY

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From: TEL AVIV
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 440 OF 5 NOVEMBER 81

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CAIRO AND JEDDA.

WASHINGTON TELNO 2 ADDRESSED RIYADH: SINAI

1. IT IS TRUE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY REJECT THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR AS DRAFTED. THEIR POSITION HAS NOTICEABLY HARDENED IN THE PAST FEW DAYS AND THEY ARE IN A VERY EDGY MOOD. THEY WOULD PARTICULARLY OBJECT TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 1 AND THE IMPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING SENTENCE WOULD BE SCARCELY LESS UNWELCOME. ALTHOUGH THE SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH SENTENCES OF PARA 2 COVER FAMILIAR GROUND, REPEATED REFERENCES TO PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE PLO ALSO TOUCH ON EXTRA SENSITIVE ISRAELI NERVES JUST NOW JUDGING BY THEIR LATEST STATEMENTS.

2. THE EVIDENCE STILL IS THAT BEGIN REMAINS COMMITTED TO WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. BUT I AGREE (PARA 5 OF TUR) THAT, HAVING REJECTED PARTICIPATION ON THE EUROPEAN TERMS, THE ISRAELIS MIGHT NOW OR LATER USE THE COLLAPSE OF PLANS FOR A GENUINELY MULTINATIONAL FORCE AS AN EXCUSE FOR REFUSING TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO INDICATION THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD LINK REFUSAL WITH A DECISION TO MOUNT AN OPERATION INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON. WHILE PRESSURE CONTINUES WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HERE TO OCCUPY UP TO THE LITANI, I DOUBT IF THE ISRAELIS ARE YET NEAR

TO OCCUPY UP TO THE LITANI, I DOUBT IF THE ISRAELIS ARE YET NEAR TO ACTING: FOR ALL HIS BELLIGERENCE, BEGIN WELL UNDERSTANDS THE INTOLERABLE STRAIN THAT SUCH A MOVE, ESPECIALLY A STAY-PUT OPERATION, WOULD HAVE ON U S/ISRAELI RELATIONS.

3. HAIG'S ADMISSION OF A CRISIS IN US/ISRAELI RELATIONS IS REVEALING AND SUGGESTS EVEN GREATER STRAINS THAN HAVE BEEN APPARENT ON THE SURFACE. THE REAL ISRAELI NIGHTMARE IS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOW DETERMINED TO MAKE SAUDI ARABIA AN ACTIVE PARTNER IN THE FORMULATION OF AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST POLICY, LEADING POSSIBLY TO JOINT US/EUROPEAN ADOPTION OF SOME VERSION OF THE FAHD PLAN AND TO COMBINED PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, POST-APRIL 1982, TO WITHDRAW TO HER PRE-1967 FRONTIERS. THE ISRAELIS CLEARLY SEE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT ON THEIR BEHALF IN THE SINAI MFO CONTEXT AS A TOUCHSTONE WITHIN THIS WIDER PICCURE. THEY MUST ALSO CALCULATE THAT THEIR PATH TO THE EUROPEANS ON THIS ISSUE LIES THROUGH WASHINGTON (IE THE CONVERSE OF THE EUROPEAN VIEW OF HOW BEST TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL). HENCE THE INTENSITY OF THE PRESSURE THEY ARE NOW APPLYING ON HAIG.

4. IF CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO A SHORT STATEMENT BY THE FOUR TO BE SUPPLEMENTED IN CAPITALS (WASHINGTON TELNO 3302, PARA 2) I HOPE WE CAN CONTRIVE NOT TO GET TOO FAR OUT IN FRONT OF THE OTHERS IN ANY NATIONAL STATEMENT. ISRAELI COMMENT HAS ALREADY PORTRAYED BRITAIN AS BEING THE MOST RELUCTANT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORCE AT ALL AND AS DRIVING THE HARDEST BARGAIN FROM ISRAEL'S POINT OF VIEW.

5. YOUR TELNO 484 TO PARIS JUST RECEIVED. FURTHER COMMENT FOLLOWS.

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FROM TEL AVIV 050830Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 439 OF 5 NOVEMBER 81

INFO IMMEDIATE JEDDA, CAIRO AND WASHINGTON.

SINAI MFO

1. SPEAKING IN THE KNESSET YESTERDAY, SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NOTIFIED ALL THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE SINAI MFO THAT ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OR STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING THEIR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE WHICH CONTAINED ANYTHING CONTRADICTORY TO THE TERMS OF THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI/US AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FORCE WOULD DISQUALIFY THE COUNTRY IN QUESTION FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE FORCE. SOURCES HERE ARE QUOTED IN TODAY'S PRESS AS SAYING THAT THE ISRAELI WARNING HAD GONE TO ALL EEC CAPITALS, VIA WASHINGTON, EARLY THIS WEEK.

2. THE ISRAELI PRESS ALSO QUOTES:

(A) THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN AS SAYING, IN THE CONTEXT OF REPORTS THAT YOU HAD TOLD ARAB JOURNALISTS IN LONDON ON 2 NOVEMBER THAT BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO WOULD BE PURELY ON THE BASIS THAT THIS WAS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH CAMP DAVID, THAT HE WOULD NOT REACT TO SUCH REPORTS. ISRAEL WOULD EXAMINE

1. SPEAKING IN THE KNESSET YESTERDAY, SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NOTIFIED ALL THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE SINAI MFO THAT ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OR STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING THEIR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE WHICH CONTAINED ANYTHING CONTRADICTORY TO THE TERMS OF THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI/US AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FORCE WOULD DISQUALIFY THE COUNTRY IN QUESTION FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE FORCE. SOURCES HERE ARE QUOTED IN TODAY'S PRESS AS SAYING THAT THE ISRAELI WARNING HAD GONE TO ALL EEC CAPITALS, VIA WASHINGTON, EARLY THIS WEEK.

2. THE ISRAELI PRESS ALSO QUOTES:

(A) THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN AS SAYING, IN THE CONTEXT OF REPORTS THAT YOU HAD TOLD ARAB JOURNALISTS IN LONDON ON 2 NOVEMBER THAT BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO WOULD BE PURELY ON THE BASIS THAT THIS WAS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH CAMP DAVID, THAT HE WOULD NOT REACT TO SUCH REPORTS. ISRAEL WOULD EXAMINE A BRITISH ANNOUNCEMENT (OF WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE) AND WOULD DETERMINE HER POSITION:

(B) OBSERVERS HERE AS SAYING THAT IF YOU REPEATED YOUR STATEMENT OF 2 NOVEMBER - OR IF ANY OTHER FOREIGN STATESMAN MADE SUCH STATEMENTS - IN OR AFTER OUR OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE WERE PARTICIPATING IN THE FORCE, ISRAEL WOULD VETO OUR OR OTHERS' PARTICIPATION. THE OBSERVERS ARE SAID TO HAVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT YOU WOULD AVOID STATEMENTS IN FUTURE ''OR ELSE WE WON'T LET THE BRITISH IN''.

MOBERLY

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GRPS 521
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FM RABAT 041530Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 495 OF 4 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROUTINE ALGIERS, DAKAR, PARIS.

W. SAHARA

1. I HAD MY FIRST CHANCE OF A WORD WITH THE NEW US AMBASSADOR LAST NIGHT. HE WAS VERY GUARDED BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF HIGH-LEVEL US-MOROCCAN ACTIVITY GOING ON AND THAT THIS RELATES TO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE W. SAHARA.

2. HIS STAFF TELL US (IN STRICT CONFIDENCE) THAT SIX MOROCCAN AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN LOST, INCLUDING TWO HELICOPTERS, SINCE THE POLISARIO ATTACK ON GUELTA ZEMMOUR ON 13 OCTOBER. THEY SAY THAT THE MOROCCANS HAVE NO ANSWER TO THE SAM MISSILES AND THEIR AVIATION IS EFFECTIVELY GROUNDED. THIS MAKES THEM VERY VULNERABLE TO ATTACK AND UNABLE TO STRIKE BACK. THE EMBASSY BELIEVE THAT THERE IS GROWING CRITICISM IN THE ARMY OF THE WAY THE SITUATION IS BEING HANDLED AND FEAR THAT THE SETBACK IS BEGINNING TO CAUSE SOME ALARM AMONG INFORMED OPINION (SUCH AS IT IS) AND MAY WEAKEN THE KING'S POSITION POLITICALLY INSIDE AND OUTSIDE MOROCCO.

3. I DEDUCE (BUT HAVE NO CONFIRMATION) THAT THE KING IS NOW PUTTING HEAVY PRESSURE ON THE US ADMINISTRATION TO GIVE (THERE IS NO MONEY) HIS FORCES THE EQUIPMENT TO RESTORE THE SITUATION. GENERAL WALTERS HAS BEEN COMING AND GOING OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS BUT THE AMERICANS ARE SAYING NOTHING ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISITS. MR WEST, ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEFENSE, IS HERE NOW WITH A LARGE MISSION. I HOPE THE AMERICANS ARE NOT BEING TAKEN FOR A RIDE.

4. WE DO NOT KNOW IF THE FRENCH HAVE ALSO BEEN APPROACHED, BUT THE KING OBVIOUSLY NOW REGARDS THE US AS HIS CHIEF SUPPORTER AND SUPPLIER.

5. THERE ARE NO OUTWARD SIGNS OF ALARM HERE BUT FOR THE PAST 2 - 3 WEEKS THE KING HAS BEEN CLOSETED AT IFRANE AND GOVERNMENT HAS VIRTUALLY GROUND TO A STANDSTILL.(MINISTERIAL AND OTHER CHANGES ARE EXPECTED DAILY BUT NOTHING HAS EMERGED SO FAR). IT IS OF COURSE GALLING FOR THE KING THAT HE SHOULD BE FACED WITH THESE MILITARY REVERSES WHEN HE SEEMED TO HAVE GOT THE SAHARA DISPUTE IN HAND , AND IN THE RUN-UP TO THE FEZ SUMMIT.

DAWBARN

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]
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SUBJECT.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T153 AA/81.

PM message to Reagan Page 2+3.

CONFIDENTIAL

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OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 041400Z
GRS 705
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DESKBY 041400Z
FM FCO 041310Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1652 OF 4 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, EC POSTS, RIYADH (FOR SOFS'S PARTY) SAVING TO ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, DOHA, DUBAI, JEDDA, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANA'A, TRIPOLI AND TUNIS.
SINAI

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO HAIG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE TEXT IS ALSO BEING PASSED TO THE US EMBASSY HERE. THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR, WHICH SHOULD BE HANDED OVER WITH THE MESSAGE, IS IN MIFT. IN HANDING IT OVER YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE TEXT IS AS FINALLY AGREED WITHIN THE TEN. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO VELIOTES THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO AMEND IT FURTHER WOULD RISK UNRAVELLING THE WHOLE PACKAGE. BUT WE THOUGHT IT RIGHT AS WELL AS COURTEOUS TO GIVE THE AMERICANS SOME NOTICE, IN PARTICULAR TO ENABLE THEM TO CONTROL ANY ISRAELI REACTION (I SHALL SHORTLY BE SENDING MESSAGES ALSO TO SHAMIR AND KAMAL HASSAN ALI). THE ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE IN PARLIAMENT AT 1100 GMT ON 6 NOVEMBER AND YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE ORALLY THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING LEAKS BEFORE THEN. THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN WILL BE RELEASED AT THE SAME TIME. THIS TEXT IS ALSO IN M.I.F.T. YOU SHOULD PASS IT TO THE AMERICANS BUT EXPLAIN THAT YOU ARE DOING SO IN CONFIDENCE BECAUSE THE TEN HAVE NOT FORMALLY AGREED TO IT BEING PASSED TO OTHERS IN ADVANCE OF PUBLICATION.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE MESSAGE. BEGINS: THANK YOU FOR YOUR LAST MESSAGE PASSED TO ME BY YOUR EMBASSY IN LONDON ON 26 OCTOBER.

I AM PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO TELL YOU THAT WE, TOGETHER WITH THE FRENCH, ITALIANS AND DUTCH, HAVE DECIDED TO AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI MFO. OUR DECISION HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY THE REST OF THE TEN. AS YOU KNOW, THIS WAS NOT AN EASY DECISION FOR US

TO TAKE, BUT WE FELT THAT CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEMANDED THAT WE SHOULD SHOW IN A PRACTICAL WAY OUR SUPPORT FOR THE RETURN OF ARAB LAND BY ISRAEL AS A STEP TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT AND OUR DESIRE TC HELP EGYPT MAINTAIN STABILITY AND CONTINUITY OF POLICY. THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS WILL PUBLISH ON 6 NOVEMBER THE ATTACHED STATEMENT OF THEIR POSITION, WHICH IS IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THEIR KNOWN POLICY AND SPECIFICALLY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. IT WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF THIS STATEMENT THAT WE SHALL MAKE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MFO AND THAT WE AND OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN SHALL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THOSE PRINCIPLES AS THE BASIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION.

THERE ARE OF COURSE A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL ISSUES CONNECTED WITH OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORCE ON WHICH WE WILL HAVE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH YOU AND THE MFO. OFFICIALS HERE HAVE MADE A START DURING NICK VELIOTES'S VISIT TO LONDON. I HOPE THIS CAN BE FOLLOWED UP QUICKLY. ENDSS

3. PLEASE PASS AT THE SAME TIME THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. BEGINS: YOU WILL RECALL OUR TALK ON THE TELEPHONE ABOUT THE SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE, ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE SINCE HAD INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS. I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH THE DECISION HAS POSED CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR US, PETER CARRINGTON HAS BEEN ABLE TO WORK OUT WITH THEM A BASIS FOR FOR RESPONDING TO YOUR REQUEST, AND IS NOW SENDING A MESSAGE TO AL HAIG CONVEYING OUR AGREEMENT.

WITH THIS MESSAGE, PETER CARRINGTON IS ENCLOSING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT WHICH WE AND OUR PARTNERS WILL BE ISSUING TO ANNOUNCE OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, ONE POINT WHICH IS QUITE DELIBERATELY NOT COVERED IN THE STATEMENT, AND ON WHICH I SHALL NOT BE VOLUNTEERING PUBLICITY - THE MODALITIES OF CONTROL AND THE DURATION OF OUR COMMITMENT. IT IS, HOWEVER, QUITE LIKELY THAT I SHALL BE PRESSED FOR EXPLANATIONS IN PARLIAMENT. IF I AM ASKED, I SHALL SAY THAT OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE IS A MATTER FOR NATIONAL

DECISION, ARRIVED AT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES AND HAVING REGARD TO THE PURPOSES OF THE FORCE. ANY DECISION TO EXTEND OR CUT SHORT BRITISH PARTICIPATION WOULD SIMILARLY BE A MATTER FOR NATIONAL DECISION.
I THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO LET YOU KNOW NOW THAT THIS WILL BE MY RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS AND THAT THIS IS THE BASIS ON WHICH OUR CONTRIBUTION WILL BE MADE. ENDS.

CARRINGTON

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OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 041400Z
OO UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 744
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DESKBY 041400Z
FROM FCO 041145Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1653 OF 4 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, RIYADH (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).
MIPT (NOT TO ALL, AND SAVING TO SOME): SINAI

1. TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE FOUR, ALSO FOR USE BY OTHER ADDRESSEE POSTS (WHO ARE BEING SENT SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS) IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, AFTER CONSULTING THEIR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, HAVE DECIDED, SUBJECT TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND TO AGREEMENT ON THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN SINAI, AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. THE DECISION IS A SYMBOL OF THEIR DETERMINATION. TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH WOULD BRING JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES AND SECURITY FOR ALL THE STATES OF THE AREA. THEY WELCOMED THE ACHIEVEMENT OFPEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THAT GOAL. SIMILARLY THEY WELCOME THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF THE CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH SPECIFICALLY DECLARED INADMISSIBLE THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR, AND THEY BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A DUTY TO PLAY ITS PART, AS NECESSARY AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, IN PEACE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE ALSO IN SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IN THE OTHER TERRITORIES CURRENTLY OCCUPIED IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY REGARD THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS QUITE DISTINCT FROM AND INDEPENDENT OF THE REST OF THE

CAMP DAVID PROCESS.
IN ADDITION, THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS EXPRESS THEIR FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE AND THEIR BELIEF IN THE NEED FOR STABILITY AND CONTINUITY IN EGYPT. THE DECISION OF THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO FOLLOWS FROM THE POLICY, AS STATED IN THE DECLARATION ISSUED AT VENICE IN JUNE 1980 AND IN SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS. THIS POLICY, WHILE INSISTING ON GUARANTEES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, PLACES EQUAL EMPHASIS ON JUSTICE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. IT ALSO HOLDS THAT THE PLO MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS LEADG TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.
THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS STATE THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT:

(I) THE FORCE EXISTS SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING PEACE IN SINAI FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THUS FACILITATING THAT WITHDRAWAL. IT HAS NO OTHER ROLE.

(II) THE FORCE IS BEING ESTABLISHED IN ITS PRESENT FORM IN THE ABSENCE OF A UN DECISION ON AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND ITS POSITION WILL BE REVIEWED SHOULD SUCH A DECISION BECOME POSSIBLE: AND

(III) PARTICIPATION BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS IN THE FORCE WILL NOT BE TAKEN EITHER AS COMMITTING THEM TO OR EXCLUDING THEM FROM PARTICIPATING IN SUCH OTHER INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING ARRANGEMENTS AS HAVE BEEN OR MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN THE REGION.

THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS PLEDGE THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT THE MFO. THEY HAVE INFORMED THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES THAT THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORCE IS MADE ON THE BASIS DESCRIBED ABOVE. FOR THEIR PART THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS, WITH THEIR PARTNERS IN THE TEN, WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN ALL WAYS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THEY HOLD.
2. TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE TEN IS AS FOLLOWS:
THE TEN CONSIDER THAT THE DECISION OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN SINAI MEETS THE WISH FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED BY

THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO FACILITATE ANY PROGRESS IN THE DIRECTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION, NAMELY THE MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO EXISTENCE AND SECURITY OF ALL THE STATES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING ISRAEL, AND THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES, WHICH IMPLIES RECOGNITION OF THE LEGITMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THEY BELIEVE AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI ARE DISINCT FROM AND INDEPENDENT OF THE REST OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.

CARRINGTON

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

GRS 748
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 041500Z
FM FCO 041330Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 317 OF 4 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS,
BONN, ROME, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS,
COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG, RIYADH (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
SINAI PEACEKEEPING

1. ALL ADDRESSEES EXCEPT CAIRO, TEL AVIV, JEDDA AND JERUSALEM SHOULD NOW TAKE ACTION TO DELIVER AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON THURSDAY 5 NOVEMBER THE FOLLOWING BASIC MESSAGE FROM ME TO THE APPROPRIATE RECIPIENT HOST GOVERNMENTS. MIFT CONTAINS SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TAILORING OF THE MESSAGE TO INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS AND RECIPIENTS. THE FINAL TEXT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS IS BEING TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY AND IS TO BE HANDED OVER AT THE SAME TIME AS THE MESSAGE. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE IN LONDON AT 1100 GMT ON 6 NOVEMBER. THE TEXT OF A SHORT STATEMENT BY THE TEN SAYING THAT THE DECISION OF THE FOUR MEETS THE WISH OF THE TEN TO CONTRIBUTE TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE VENICE PRINCIPLES WILL BE RELEASED AT THE SAME TIME, BUT WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO GIVE THIS TO THE ARABS IN ADVANCE. IN HANDING OVER THE MESSAGE YOU SHOULD STRESS ORALLY THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING LEAKS BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE OF BOTH STATEMENTS ON 6 NOVEMBER.

BEGINS: AS YOU WILL KNOW, WE IN EUROPE HAVE EEN ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. I AM WRITING TO LET YOU KNOW, BEFORE OUR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, THAT THE UK GOVERNMENT, TOGETHER WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS HAVE DECIDED TO CONTRIBUTE: AND I SHOULD LIKE TO SET OUT OUR REASONS. I AM SENDING SIMILAR MESSAGES TO ALL OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

THE REQUEST HAS POSED OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR US. WE ARE

DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH OUR SEARCH FOR A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WORKING ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. OUR IMMEDIATE TASK IS TO TRY TO BUILD A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE PARTIES WITH ONE BUTTRESS IN AMERICAN AND THE OTHER IN THE PLO. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE STRONG FEELINGS IN THE ARAB WORLD ABOUT CAMP DAVID AND OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT OUR PARTICIPATION IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE LINKED TO IT MIGHT RAISE OBJECTIONS. WE ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF OUR HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF OUR INDEPENDENT ROLE, IF THE PARTIES CONCERNED WISH US TO BE INVOLVED. WHEN THE AMERICANS RAISED THE SUBJECT SOME WEEKS AGO WE TOLD THEM THAT WE WOULD TAKE NO STEP THAT WOULD DAMAGE THE PRESENT EUROPEAN POLICY, THE PURSUIT OF WHICH IS OUR FIRST PRIORITY.

WITH ALL THESE FACTORS IN MIND WE HAVE NEVERTHELESS DECIDED TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORCE BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE SMOOTH IMPLEMENTATION OF ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED SINAI. OUR DECISION IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 242 AND WITH THE VENICE DECLARATION. THE STATEMENT WHICH THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS WILL SHORTLY MAKE, WHICH I AM SENDING TO YOU WITH THIS MESSAGE, SETS OUT VERY CLEARLY THE BASIS ON WHICH WE ARE ACTING. YOU WILL NOTE THAT WE SPECIFY OUR DISSOCIATION FROM OTHER ASPECTS OF CAMP DAVID AND EMPHASISE OUR CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCPLES OF VENICE. IN AGREEING TO PARTICIPATE, WE ARE SETTING A PRECEDENT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND ARE DEMONSTRATING TO THE AMERICANS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE SAME POLICY TO ENCOMPASS THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE AND THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE TERRITORIES FROM WHICH ISRAEL IS REQUIRED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 TO WITHDRAW. I SHALL BE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT, IN THE BRITISH VIEW THIS INCLUDES THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO AN INDEPENDENT STATE, IF THAT IS THEIR CHOSEN COURSE.

WE HAVE ALSO BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE NEED TO HELP EGYPT TO MAINTAIN HER STRENGTH AND STABILITY. WE BELIEVE THE TIME WILL COME WHEN THE ARAB WORLD AS A WHOLE WILL AGAIN BENEFIT FROM THE PARTNERSHIP OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE. THAT IS AN ADDED REASON WHY

THE EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE IS WORTH PRESERVING.
MY PURPOSE IN WRITING TO YOU IS TO ASK YOU TO ACCEPT THAT OUR ACTION IS A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS ENSURING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY: AND TO RECOGNISE FROM OUR CONTINUING ACTIVITY ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION THAT THIS DECISION HAS NOT AFFECTED OUR DETERMINATION TO PURSUE THE POLICY TO WHICH WE ARE COMMITTED. WE SHALL USE THIS DECISION TO HELP US TO PRESS THE AMERICANS TO MOVE TOWARDS THE POLICY WE ARE CONVINCED THEY MUST FOLLOW IF A JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION IS TO BE FOUND. ENDS

CARRINGTON

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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OO TEL AVIV DESKBY 041500Z
OO CAIRO
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GRS 389
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 041500Z
FM FCO 041335Z OCT 81
TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 171 OF 4 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CAIRO,RIYADH (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)
UKREP BRUSSELS PARIS BONN ROME ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN
LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE DUBLIN UKMIS NEW YORK
SAVING OTHER ME POSTS
SINAI

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO SHAMIR AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON 5 NOVEMBER. THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR IS BEING TELEGRAPHED TO YOU SEPARATELY.

2. BEGINS: I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE AGREED TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO) IN SINAI. WE WERE MOVED TO DO SO BY OUR DESIRE TO MAKE A PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA, AND BECAUSE OF OUR SUPPORT FOR THE OBJECTIVES EXPLAINED IN THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THE FRENCH, ITALIAN AND DUTCH GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE THE SAME DECISION AND IT HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY THE TEN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AS A WHOLE. IN DECIDING TO ACCEDE TO THE US REQUEST THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS THINK IT RIGHT TO PUBLISH THE ATTACHED STATEMENT OF THEIR POSITION, WHICH IS IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THEIR KNOWN POLICY AND SPECIFICALLY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VENICE DECLARATION. IT WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF THIS STATEMENT THAT WE SHALL MAKE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MFO AND THAT WE AND OUR PARTNERS IN THE TEN SHALL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THESE PRINCIPLES AS THE BASIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION. DESPITE OUR DIFFERENCES ON

THE PATH TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT OUR OBJECTIVE, PEACE, AND OUR METHOD, PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS, ARE THE SAME. I HOPE THAT WE CAN ESTABLISH AN INCREASINGLY FRUITFUL DIALOGUE ON THE VERY DIFFICULT ISSUES WHICH THE NEED FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT RAISES. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO VISITING ISRAEL IN THE NEW YEAR AND WILL BE IN TOUCH AGAIN THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE DATES YOU HAVE SUGGESTED. ENDS.

2. THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN IS ALSO BEING TELEGRAPHED TO YOU. YOU MAY PASS THIS TO THE ISRAELI'S BUT SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT THIS MUST BE IN CONFIDENCE SINCE WE DO NOT FORMALLY HAVE THE PERMISSION OF THE TEN TO DO SO. BOTH STATEMENTS WILL BE MADE PUBLIC AT 1100 GMT ON FRIDAY 6 NOVEMBER. YOU SHOULD STRESS TO THE ISRAELIS THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THEN.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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OO BONN DESKBY 041430Z

GRS 242
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 041430Z BONN PARIS THE HAGUE DUBLIN COPENHAGEN LUXEMBOURG UKREP BRUSSELS ROME ATHENS.
FM FCO 041320Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 479 OF 4 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG AND UKREP BRUSSELS:
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON ALL MIDDLE EAST POSTS, RIYADH (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).
OUR TELEGRAM NO 477 TO PARIS: SINAI

1. PLEASE INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT ALL TEN HAVE NOW AGREED AND THAT WE THEREFORE REGARD THE TEXTS IN TUR AS DEFINITIVE. PLEASE EXPRESS OUR THANKS TO ALL CONCERNED FOR THEIR CO-OPERATION. BOTH STATEMENTS WILL BE RELEASED IN LONDON AT 1100 GMT ON FRIDAY, 6 NOVEMBER. WE ASSUME THAT THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN WILL BE RELEASED IN OTHER CAPITALS OF THE TEN AT THE SAME TIME (BUT NOT BEFORE) AND THAT THE FRENCH, ITALIANS AND DUTCH WILL ALSO THEN RELEASE THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR.

2. FOR PARIS, ROME AND THE HAGUE. PLEASE CONFIRM TO HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT WE ARE NOW SENDING OFF MY MESSAGE TO HAIG AND ARRANGING FOR MESSAGES TO SHAMIR, KAMAL HASSAN ALI AND OTHER ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS TO BE DELIVERED ON THE MORNING OF THURSDAY 5 NOVEMBER. WE ASSUME THEY WILL NOW ACT SIMILARLY. WE ARE GIVING THE US, ISRAEL AND EGYPT THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN AS WELL AS THAT BY THE FOUR, BUT ARE STRESSING THAT THIS IS IN CONFIDENCE SINCE WE DO NOT FORMALLY HAVE THE PERMISSION OF THE TEN TO GIVE IT TO THEM IN ADVANCE.

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FM FCO 041730 NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NUMBER 268 OF 4 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, RIYADH (SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
PRIORITY PARIS, THE HAGUE, ROME.
ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, ATHENS, BONN.
SINAI MFO: PLO ATTITUDE

1. RAMLAWI, PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON, CALLED ON NENAD TODAY ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM QADDOUMI TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT PROBABLE BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO. HE DELIVERED A NOTE URGING HMG TO RECONSIDER AND STATING THAT THE TWO PARTS OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS SEPARATE FROM EACH OTHER. THE NOTE ASSERTS THAT QUOTE THE REPORTED DECISION CREATES SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO OUR MUTUAL DESIRE TO IMPROVE AND STRENGHTEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE ARAB NATION UNQUOTE. RAMLAWI ADDED THAT IT WAS THE PLO'S VIEW THAT THE SEPARATE ROLE OF THE EUROPEANS HAD ITS OWN VALUE WHICH WAS RESPECTED BY THE ARAB WORLD. SUCH A DECISION WOULD LEAVE THE PLO DEEPLY UNSATISFIED.

2. WE EXPLAINED THAT THE DECISION WAS PROVING DIFFICULT FOR US. WE WERE FIRMLY DETERMINED TO CONTINUE ALONG VENICE LINES AND WE OURSELVES HAD STRONGLY ARGUED AGAINST ANY DECISION WHICH WOULD DAMAGE EUROPEAN CREDIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND PARTICULARLY ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IF A DECISION TO PARTICIPATE WAS MADE, THE PLO WOULD DO WELL TO RECOGNISE ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS, WHICH WOULD BE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED TO THE PLO LEADERSHIP IN A MESSAGE. THEY SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO BUILD A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND ESPECIALLY BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE PLO, MADE IT ESSENTIAL THAT US/EUROPEAN LINKS REMAINED STRONG. A POSITIVE DECISION

WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE SAME POLICY TO EMBRACE BOTH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AND A DETERMINED SEARCH FOR JUSTICE FOR THE PALESTINIANS.

3. RAMLAWI APPEARED TO TAKE THESE POINTS AND THE TONE WAS FRIENDLY. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY QADDOUMI TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION TO LORD CARRINGTON FOR HIS SPEECH TO THE CONSERVATIVE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL ON 2 NOVEMBER. IT HAD BEEN NOTED AS A POSITIVE STATEMENT.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

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DESKBY Ø4183ØZ FCO AND RIYADH
FM WASHINGTON Ø418ØØZ NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3285 OF 4 NOVEMBER
AND TO RIYADH (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE), JEDDA
INFO IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV, EC POSTS
INFO SAVING OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS.

file

YOUR TELNO 1652: SINAI

1. AS HAIG WAS TESTIFYING TO A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO VELIOTES THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED.

2. VELIOTES EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE ADVANCE NOTICE AND SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY TO DAMP DOWN ISRAELI REACTIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY CURRENTLY HAD SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE ISRAELIS. HE UNDERTOOK TO SPEAK TO HAIG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND EXPECTED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD COME BACK TO US IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY.

3. VELIOTES REINFORCED THE POINTS IN HAIG'S MESSAGE TO YOU YESTERDAY THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN ISRAEL IS EXPLOSIVE, THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTENT THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD REJECT FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS, THAT THERE IS STILL A DANGER OF AN ISRAELI MOVE INTO THE LEBANON, AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING THEIR UTMOST TO CALM THEM DOWN. HE WAS ALSO WORRIED AT THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THE ISRAELIS OF PRESS REPORTS OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS OF FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS. VELIOTES EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE PLO IN THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR WOULD GIVE THE ISRAELIS GREAT DIFFICULTY. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF CHANGING THE TEXTS OF THE STATEMENTS AT THIS LATE STAGE. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT NEITHER THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR NOR OF THE TEN REFERRED TO FAHD'S EIGHT POINTS, A REFERENCE AGAINST WHICH HAIG HAD MADE A SPECIFIC WARNING IN HIS LATEST MESSAGE TO YOU.

FCO PASS SAVING ABU DHABI, ADEN, ALGIERS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, DOHA, DUBAI, JERUSALEM, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, RABAT, SANA'A, TRIPOLI AND TUNIS.

HENDERSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

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DESKBY FCO 050900Z
DESKBY RIYADH 050600Z
FM WASHINGTON 050045Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3302 OF 4 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH JEDDA TEL AVIV CAIRO EC POSTS

SINAI FORCE

1. WE HAD A MEETING OF THE AMBASSADORS OF THE FOUR THIS EVENING AFTER ALL OF US HAD BEEN CANED BY HAIG.
THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED.

(I) ALL OUR FOUR GOVERNMENTS HAD ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE PROGRAMME SHOULD BE HELD UP PENDING FURTHER DECISIONS.

(II) THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN GIVEN BY HAIG THE SAME REPORT AS I HAD ABOUT THE READINESS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES TO ACQUIESCE IN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE.

(III) AS REGARDS PROCEDURE, WE ALL THOUGHT THAT A HECTIC VISIT BY HAIG TO EUROPE WOULD BE INADVISABLE. IT WOULD ATTRACT A LOT OF PUBLICITY. IT WOULD LOOK AS THOUGH HAIG WAS PRESSURISING THE EUROPEANS, WHICH WOULD NOT DO US GOOD IN ARAB COUNTRIES. IF THE OUTCOME WAS SOME MODIFIED STATEMENT, THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY BE LEAKED IN SOME WAY AS AN INDICATION OF AMERICAN SUCCESS AND EUROPEAN CONCESSIONS. IF IT WAS A QUESTION OF AGREEING ON HOW TO ANNOUNCE PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE, SURELY THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT COULD BE DONE WITHOUT A FIVE-POWER MINISTERIAL MEETING. THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT YOU SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE. IF IT WAS A QUESTION OF DISCUSSING THE TERMS OF A STATEMENT, THIS COULD BE DONE EVENTUALLY IN LONDON OR WASHINGTON.

2. THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE MIGHT BE TO KEEP THE COMMUNITY STATEMENT OF THE FOUR RATHER SHORT, MORE OR LESS ON THE LINES OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS, BUT THEN FOR THIS TO BE FILLED IN BY STATEMENTS OR BRIEFING BY EACH OF THE GOVERNMENTS, WHETHER IN PARLIAMENT OR ELSEWHERE. THE ITALIAN MENTIONED THAT HAIG HAD EXPRESSED TO HIM, AS HE HAD TO ME, NO OBJECTION TO STATEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT ALONG THE LINES OF OUR ORIGINAL TEXT. WE AGREED THAT WHAT HAIG HAD OBJECTED TO WAS THE IDEA OF COMMUNITY ACTION THAT WOULD PUT THE AMERICANS ON THE SPOT.

3. AS REGARDS THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN, HAIG HAD SUGGESTED, A POINT I OMITTED TO REPORT EARLIER, THAT HE WOULD BE CONTENT IF THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN WAS MADE, PROVIDED THAT THIS OCCURRED IN, SAY, TEN DAYS' TIME. NEITHER THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR NOR I COULD UNDERSTAND WHY THIS TIME LAPSE WOULD MAKE THE STATEMENT ACCEPTABLE. BUT I THINK WE ALL AGREED THAT THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN POSES A SUBORDINATE PROBLEM TO THAT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR. HAIG HAD TOLD ME THAT HE DID NOT THINK IT NECESSARY AT ALL.

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4. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10, PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/LPS, PS/MR HURD, BULLARD AND GREENSTOCK.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

GPS 481
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FM RIYAHD 042000Z NOV 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 10 OF 4 NOVEMBER
AND TO MODUK (SALES), DS11, DS8
INFO WASHINGTON, JEDDA.

AWACS/NIMROD

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED TO KING KHALED OUR POSITION ON NIMROD: WE HAD BEEN READY TO SUPPLY NIMROD BUT HAD THOUGHT IT BETTER, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THAT THE U S SHOULD BE FORCED TO FACE UP TO SELLING AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA. NEVERTHELESS THE SAUDIS WOULD BE GETTING A WORSE AIRCRAFT. IF THEY WANTED TO FILL THE GAPS THAT AWACS COULD NOT COVER THEY SHOULD BUY NIMROD. THE KING SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD INSISTED ON MODIFICATIONS TO SUIT THEIR NEEDS, AS WITH THE F15S. ISRAEL, IRAN AND LIBYA WOULD NOT BE CONTENT BUT MUST BE DISREGARDED. PERHAPS THE SAUDIS WOULD BUY NIMRODS WHEN THE AWACS WERE WORN OUT. FOLLOWING THE U S DECISION THEY DID NOT NEED NIMRODS NOW: BUT THEY DID NEED POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM BRITAIN.

2. LATER, PRINCE SULTAN TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE (BANDAR WAS ALSO PRESENT) THAT NIMRODS WERE NOT RULED OUT. SABRI HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED DURING HIS VISIT TO STUDY THE MOST ADVANCED FORM OF NIMROD. FIVE AWACS MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH. THE SAUDIS WERE LOOKING AT ALTERNATIVES. THE NIMROD HAD EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE USEFUL FOR SAUDI NEEDS. THE SAUDIS' STUDY OF THEIR REQUIREMENTS WAS BASED ON THEIR NEEDS, NOT ON SHOW.

3. I RAISED THE FH 70 WITH SULTAN AND THE NEED FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE SADAP AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED SOON. (SULTAN SAID THIS WAS QUOTE BEING PURSUED UNQUOTE). I ALSO SAID THAT A REVISED AMG OFFER FOR THE HOSPITAL CONTRACT WAS ON ITS WAY AND THAT DR VAUGHAN WOULD BE SENDING A MESSAGE SOON.

4 SULTAN SAID THAT THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL SUMMIT ON 10 NOVEMBER WOULD CONSIDER THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GULF CHIEFS OF STAFF. IF THERE WAS ANY WAY IN WHICH BRITAIN COULD HELP OVER THESE, HE WOULD CONTACT US.

5. FINALLY SULTAN SAID HE MIGHT VISIT BRITAIN IN MAY OR JUNE IN THE COURSE OF VISITS TO EUROPE AND AFRICA.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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SR 421

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FM RIYADH 042040Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 9 OF 4 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, KUWAIT, DOHA, JEDDA, BAGHDAD. WASHINGTON, MODUK (DS11 DS5 DS8 D SALES 1).

INFO SAVING SANAA, ADEN.

OMAN/US/UK DISCUSSIONS

1. IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH PRINCES SAUD AND SULTAN ON 4 NOVEMBER HE MENTIONED THAT THE OMANIS HAD ASKED US AND THE AMERICANS FOR TRILATERAL TALKS. THERE WAS NOT QUESTION OF A PACT. WE WOULD MERELY HELP THE OMANIS ASSESS THE THREAT AND THEIR DEFENCE NEEDS. THE DATE HAD BEEN PUT OFF UNTIL FEBRUARY. WE WISHED TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE. THE AMERICANS, WE THOUGHT, WERE INCLINED TO ADOPT TOO HIGH A PROFILE. WE WOULD SUGGEST TO THEM THAT IT WAS NOT HELPFUL TO THE OMANIS FOR THE AMERICANS TO BE SO VISIBLE IN OMAN AND TO BE TALKING SO MUCH ABOUT THEIR RELATIONS WITH OMAN.

2. SAUD COMMENTED THAT EVERY TIME QAIS ZAWAWI SAID THERE WERE NO U S BASES IN OMAN THE AMERICANS CONTRADICTED HIM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THEY WERE KEEN TO ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RDF. SAUD SAID HE DOUBTED IF THE RUSSIANS COULD BE TRICKED INTO BELIEVING IT MORE CREDIBLE THAN IT WAS.

3. SULTAN SAID THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO ARMS AND MILITARY HELP FOR OMAN SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO MILITARY PACT OR BASES. THE VISIBLE PRESENCE OF THE U S IN OMAN, AND PUBLICITY FOR THIS, WAS NOT IN OMAN'S INTERESTS. THEIR NEED WAS FOR HELP TO TAKE ON THEIR OWN DEFENCE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WANTED THE OMANIS TO TAKE OVER THEMSELVES THE ROLE PLAYED BY OUR MILITARY IN OMAN AS SOON AS PRACTIBLE. SULTAN SAID THIS SHOULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH GIVING TRAINING AND EXPERTISE TO THE OMANIS.

FCO PASS ALL AND SAVING TO SANAA, ADEN.

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FROM RIYADH 041910Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 OF 4 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, JEDDA, PARIS. BONN. PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO RIYADH: SINAI FORCE

1. IN DISCUSSION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS, PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT IF THE EGYPTIANS WERE FORCED BY THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT AN INADEQUATE AUTONOMY AGREEMENT, THIS WOULD PRECLUDE ANY RECONCILIATION WITH THE ARABS. THIS WAS PRECISELY WHY THE ISRAELIS WERE TRYING TO LINK AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT WITH A SINAI WITHDRAWAL. SIR J GRAHAM SAID THAT SOME IN THE US ADMINISTRATION TENDED TO ACCEPT THAT ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY EXTENDED TO THE WEST BANK. THERE WAS A RISK THAT THEY WOULD MAKE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT THE END OBJECTIVE OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, RATHER THAN MERELY A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT ON THE WAY TO INDEPENDANCE, AND WOULD GIVE IT PRIORITY OVER SECURING WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.

2. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WAS GOOD THING IN ITSELF, PROVIDED THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS STOPPED THERE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THIS WAS WHY WE HAD DECIDED TO ACCEDE TO THE AMERICAN REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE. IT WAS A REQUEST WHICH, FRANKLY, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE. BUT GREAT PRESSURE HAD BEEN APPLIED TO US, AND WE FEARED THAT IF WE DID NOT CONTRIBUTE THE AMERICANS WOULD HOLD US RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ISRAELI FAILURE TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI. THE TEN HAD AGREED THAT THEY COULD ONLY SUPPORT PARTICIPATION ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PURPOSE WAS TO ENSURE THAT ARAB LAND WAS HANDED BACK TO AN ARAB COUNTRY, AND THAT PARTICIPATION WAS EXPLICITLY DISSOCIATED FROM THE REST OF CAMP DAVID. HE EXPLAINED HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE, AND SAID THAT IT WAS INTENDED TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON 6 NOVEMBER. IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT ISRAEL WOULD REJECT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION ON THE BASIS OF THIS STATEMENT.

3. PRINCE SAUD ASKED WHY FRANCE AND BRITAIN, AS SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, FELT IT RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THAT AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND CANADA HAD FOUND IT CONVENIENT TO HIDE BEHIND BRITAIN, AND THAT THIS HAD CONCENTRATED ENORMOUS U S PRESSURE ON US. THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAD ALSO

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MADE THEIR PARTICIPATION CONDITIONAL ON OURS, THERE WERE PRECEDENTS (UNFICYP, UNIFIL) FOR PARTICIPATION IN UN FORCES BY SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS: UNTAG WOULD BE A FURTHER EXAMPLE, IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT ON NAMIBIA. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAD NO WISH TO DO ANYTHING TO PREVENT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. BUT, THE POSITION THE ARABS HAD ADOPTED AT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT WAS THAT THEY WOULD NOT DEAL WITH CAMP DAVID OR WITH ANYTHING EMERGING FROM IT. EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION WOULD CREATE TENSION BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS AND THE ARABS, WHICH COULD BE ALLEVIATED BY A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE EUROPEAN POSITION REMAINED DISTINCT FROM CAMP DAVID, AND THAT PARTICIPATION INVOLVED NO MOVE TOWARDS IT. THE AMERICANS' PURPOSE WAS TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST WAS UNITED BEHIND CAMP DAVID: IF THE EUROPEANS COULD SHOW THAT BY PARTICIPATING THEY INCREASED THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE U S, THIS TOO WOULD HELP. LORD CARRINGTON POINTED OUT THAT THE BREAKDOWN OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD PUT PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S PERSONAL POSITION AT RISK.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO EXPLAINED THE EUROPEAN DECISION TO PRINCE FAHD ON THE LINES OF PARA 2. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PLEASE EVERYBODY, AND THE STATEMENT SEEMED TO HIM A VERY REASONABLE IDEA. THOSE WHO OBJECTED WOULD HAVE DONE SO IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ACCESSIBLE TO REASON. THE STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED BEYOND 6 NOVEMBER: HE FEARED THAT THE TEN WOULD COME UNDER PRESSURE TO ALTER IT.

FCO PASS ALL.

MUIR (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

Repetition to SANA'A referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts.

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FROM RIYADH 041920Z NOV 81
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 OF 4 NOVEMBER.
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, JEDDA, PARIS, BONN, PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND OTHER EEC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO RIYADH : ARAB ISRAEL :FAHD PROPOSALS

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD TWO HOURS OF TALKS WITH PRINCE SAUD THIS MORNING, FOLLOWED BY A SHORT CALL ON THE KING AND TALKS WITH PRINCE FAHD (AT BOTH OF WHICH PRINCE SAUD WAS PRESENT). THE SAUDI PROPOSALS WERE THE MAIN TOPIC OF THE TALKS WITH SAUD AND FAHD : DISCUSSION OF OTHER SUBJECTS (INCLUDING THE SINAI FORCE) IS RECORDED SEPARATELY.

2. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SAUDI PROPOSALS WAS NOT IN ANY NOVELTY IN THEIR COMMENTS BUT IN THEIR CONSOLIDATION INTO A SINGLE PACKAGE TO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IF ENDORSED AT THE FEZ SUMMIT, THEY WOULD REACH A NEW LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE. ARAFAT HAD GIVEN THEM CONSTANT SUPPORT UP TO AND DURING HIS VISIT TO RIYADH WHICH ENDED ON 3 NOVEMBER. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN A CONSTANT MEASURE OF OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSALS WITHIN THE PLO, GENERALLY REFLECTING OUTSIDE INTERESTS, NOT LEAST THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW, ARAFAT HAD FOUND THE RUSSIANS FORTHCOMING ON SOME NON-SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE PLO, BUT OPPOSED TO THE 8 POINTS, SA'UD THOUGHT THAT THE PLO WOULD SUPPORT THE 8 POINTS AT THE SUMMIT. THE LIBYANS WOULD BE OPPOSED, AS (THOUGH WITH LESS DETERMINATION) WOULD THE SYRIANS (PRINCE ABDULLAH LATER TOLD ME HE BELIEVED THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT OPPOSE). THERE WAS NOW A PROSPECT OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS ON THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ACHIEVED SINCE CAMP DAVID. IN ANSWER TO MY QUERY, HE SAID THAT UNANIMOUS ENDORSEMENT AT FEZ WOULD NOT BE ESSENTIAL, PROVIDED THAT A LARGE MAJORITY INCLUDING THE PLO WERE IN FAVOUR. HE HOPED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THIS CONSENSUS TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY US REACTIONS, WHICH HE HOPED REFLECTED A TURNABOUT IN US OPINION.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ONE COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT ANYTHING TO HAPPEN UNTIL NEXT APRIL: THE EGYPTIANS COULD NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE OF COURSE UNTIL THEY HAD SINAI BACK. OBVIOUSLY THE NEXT STEP MUST BE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THOSE MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED, WHO WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE THE PLO. IF THE PLO ACCEPTED A STATEMENT AT FEZ WHICH SIGNALLED THAT SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LEAD TO RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE EUROPEANS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS. US ATTITUDES DID INDEED

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SEEM TO BE EVOLVING AWAY FROM THEIR EARLIER EXCLUSIVE PREOCCUPATION WITH SOVIET DOMINATION TO MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS (AS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW). THIS EXPLAINED THE SHARP ISRAELI REACTION TO THE 8 POINTS. THEY FEARED THAT THEY WERE SO OBVIOUSLY REASONABLE THAT THE WEST WOULD ENDORSE THEM. THE AMERICANS MUST BE PERSUADED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE LINES REPRESENTED THE ONLY WAY FORWARD: HE HOPED THAT THE COMBINED EFFORTS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT AND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (WHERE ONE MIGHT CONSIDER WHETHER A HELPFUL STATEMENT COULD BE MADE) MIGHT DO SOMETHING TO ACHIEVE THIS.

4. PRINCE SA'UD RAISED THE QUESTION OF CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY THE PLO. HE HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT FALL INTO THE VICIOUS CIRCLE IN WHICH THE US HAD BECOME CAUGHT BY PLACING CONDITIONS ON ITS WILLINGNESS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALOESTINIANS. THE PROSPECT OF A DIALOGUE MIGHT BE ONE ELEMENT WHICH WOULD HELP MOVE THE PALESTINIANS, BUT THE CART MUST NOT BE PUT BEFORE THE HORSE. PALESTINIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE 8 POINTS WOULD GIVE 80 PER CENT OF CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION, AND THIS QUESTION SHOULD NOT THEREAFTER REMAIN AN OBSTACLE TO DIALOGUE. HE AGREED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ATTACK ANY SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE TO CAMP DAVID. HE WAS, HOWEVER, CONCERNED THAT THE US APPEARED TO WANT THE 8 POINTS TO REMAIN AS GENERAL PRINCIPLES WHICH THE ARABS WOULD KEEP IN MIND IN THEIR APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, RATHER THAN A FIRM NEGOTIATING POSITION. HE WAS REMINDED OF THE FLEXIBILITY AND COMPROMISE WHICH THEY HAD SOUGHT FROM SADAT AT THE OUTSET OF THE CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS. NOTHING WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH DID NOT HAVE A CLEAR-CUT BASIS. THE US ARGUMENT SEEMED BASED ON THE FALSE PREMISE THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT SECURE ENOUGH TO COMPROMISE: WOULD ISRAEL EVER EXPRESS MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WHICH FELL SHORT OF GUARANTEED MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF THE ARAB STATES? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT VELIOTES HAD BEEN WORRIED THAT THE 8 POINTS WOULD BECOME A BOTTOM LINE PRESENTING A RIGID ARAB POSITION: PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PERHAPS BEEN MORE EXPLICIT IN SPEAKING TO THE SAUDIS. THE ARABS NEEDED A COMMON POSITION TO RECONCILE THE INTERESTS OF THE VARIOUS ARAB PARTICIPANTS: ACCEPTING THE 8 POINTS COULD NOT POSSIBLY MAKE THEIR POSITION MORE RIGID THAN IT ALREADY WAS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BRITAIN ALREADY HAD CONTACTS WITH THE PLO. BUT IF THE EC PRESIDENCY COULD EXACT A PRICE FROM ARAFAT FOR A MEETING, THIS WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON US THINKING WHICH AN UNCONDITIONAL MEETING COULD NOT HAVE.

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IF, AFTER FEZ, ARAFAT WOULD CONFIRM HIS CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE AMERICANS THAT THE PLO WAS NO LONGER THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION DEDICATED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL THAT ISRAEL CLAIMED IT WAS, WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO DIRECT AMERICAN CONTACT WITH THE PLO AND PLACE THEM UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO MOVE THE ISRAELIS TOWARDS NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO. PRINCE SA'UD REPEATED THAT HE HOPED THAT LORD CARRINGTON COULD MEET ARAFAT WITHOUT FURTHER CONDITIONS ONCE THE PLO HAD ACCEPTED THE 8 POINTS. THE PLO EXISTED TO LIBERATE OCCUPIED PALESTINE, AND COULD NOT ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION AT THIS STAGE WITHOUT DESTROYING IS OWN CREDIBILITY. TO PUSH ARAFAT TO GO FURTHER THAN HE COULD WOULD DO THE PEACE PROCESS A DISSERVICE. THE PLO COULD ONLY COME CLOSER TO CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION THAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE 8 POINTS AS PART OF THE OUTCOME OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS HARD TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO NEGOTIATE WHILE PLO SPOKESMEN (EG QADDOUMI LAST SUMMER) CONTINUED TO SAY THAT THEY COULD NEVER LIVE AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL. EVEN AN OBLIQUE INDICATION THAT THE PLO WOULD LIVE AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL AFTER SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE US AND ISRAEL TO TALK TO THE PLO. PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT WE SHOULD IGNORE EXTREMIST RHETORIC. HOWEVER SADAT'S FATE WOULD WARN ARAFAT AGAINST GETTING OUT ON A LIMB. IT WAS TO THE US THAT PRESSURE NOW NEEDED TO BE APPLIED.

6. SIR J GRAHAM SAID THAT THE QUESTION WAS ONE OF CLARITY. WE HAD TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT WE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT THE RIGHT OF STATES IN THE AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE INCLUDED ISRAEL. EXTREMIST RHETORIC MADE PROGRESS DIFFICULT. PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT CLARITY MIGHT NOT IMPROVE THINGS. EVERYBODY KNEW THAT THE RIGHT OF STATES TO LIVE IN PEACE INCLUDED ISRAEL. BUT ONLY MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE US COULD FRUSTRATE THE AIM OF EXTREMIST RHETORIC, WHICH WAS TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS IMPOSSIBLE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT BE UNWILLING TO MAKE ANY CONTENTIOUS MOVES ON THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE SCARS OF THE AWACS DEBATE FRESH ON HIM.

7. IN TALKS WITH PRINCE FAHD, THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGAIN ARGUED THAT ENDORSEMENT OF THE 8 POINTS AT FEZ AND SUBSEQUENT MORE EXPLICIT CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLO OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE COULD OPEN THE WAY FIRST TO A EUROPEAN AND THEN AN AMERICAN DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT THAT TO BE FIRST WITH HIS ENDORSEMENT OF THE 8 POINTS WOULD HELP THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. DESPITE SOME OPPOSITION IN THE PLO, THE ARAFAT FACTION SEEMED TO BE IN A POSITION TO DELIVER THIS SUPPORT. IF, AFTER FEZ, EUROPE AND THE US COULD ACCEPT THE 8 POINTS, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ADDRESS THEM.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS USED ARAB NON-RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS AN EXSCUSE FOR REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE. THEY WOULD CLAIM THAT PRINCE FAHD'S 7TH POINT DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR RIGHT TO EXIST, BECAUSE THE ARABS DID NOT RECOGNISE THAT ISRAEL WAS A STATE. IF, FOLLOWING HIS TALKS WITH PRINCE FAHD AND PRINCE SA'UD, HE WERE TO SAY IN RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTIONS, THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT IN THE SAUDI VIEW THE SEVENTH POINT INCLUDED ISRAEL, WOULD FAHD FEEL OBLIGED TO CONTRADICT HIM? PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS, AS A COUNTRY IN THE REGION, NATURALLY INCLUDED. BUT WHY DID ISRAEL NOT FIRST ACCEPT THE 8 POINTS, AND OFFER CONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL PROVIDED THAT THE ARABS RECOGNISED THE ISRAELIS' RIGHT TO EXIST? INSTEAD, THEY REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE STATUS OF THE GAZA STRIP OR THE WEST BANK: THEY WANTED TO RECEIVE AND TO GIVE NOTHING. THE MAIN SUBJECT OF THE EIGHT POINTS WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE: THE 7TH POINT DEALT WITH ONE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS.

9. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE SAUDI PROPOSALS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO SEE A WAY AHEAD. HE HOPED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL COULD SAY SOMETHING HELPFUL ABOUT THEM. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE TEN TO ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT BEFORE THE FEZ SUMMIT MEETING ENDED ON 28 NOVEMEBER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THIS WOULD STIMULATE AN UNHELPFUL REACTION FROM THE MORE EXTREME ARAB GOVERNMENTS. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT IT WOULD, ON THE CONTRARY, PUT THEM UNDER PRESSURE TO BE MORE

FORTHCOMING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, BUT COULD MAKE NO PROMISES. NOR WOULD HE BE ABLE TO OFFER MORE THAN A GENERAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT: THE TEN WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ENDORSE EACH INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPLE. PRINCE SA'UD SAID THAT THE SAUDIS NEEDED FIRST A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE TEN BEFORE THE FEZ SUMMIT DEBATED THE 8 POINTS, AND SECOND A REACTION FROM THE TEN IF A STATEMENT BASED ON THEM WAS MADE AT FEZ. PRINCE FAHD ADDED THAT IF THIS OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST, IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE WHEN THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER.

10. FOR DISCUSSION OF THE SINAI FORCE AT THESE TWO MEETINGS, SEE MIFT.

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TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 4 NOVEMBER

AND TO F C O

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND JEDDA.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE: SINAI FORCE

1. WHEN I SAW HAIG AT 2030Z TODAY HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD JUST SEEN THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER TO WHOM HE HAD EXPRESSED HIS PROFOUND CONCERN IF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT WAS DELIVERED TO EGYPT OR ISRAEL. HAIG ADDED THAT THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOT AT ALL AU COURANT.

2. KNOWING THAT I HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU FOLLOWING HIS FIRST REACTION THIS MORNING HE ASKED ME ABOUT YOUR RESPONSE AND I SPOKE AS YOU HAD ADVISED ME: IT WAS A EUROPEAN TEXT: IT HAD BEEN DIFFICULT TO PUT TOGETHER: IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ALTER: THE ARABS WERE ANGRY ENOUGH AS IT WAS: THIS WAS THE MINIMUM WE COULD DO: WE HAD NOT ASKED THE USA TO ENDORSE THE STATEMENT: YOU FELT YOU HAD GONE OUT OF YOUR WAY TO HELP AND COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE EUROPEANS COULD BE EXPECTED TO JOIN A FORCE AGINST THE WISHES OF THE ARABS WITHOUT SETTING OUT THE BASIS UPON WHICH THEY DID SO.

3. HAIG GAVE A LONG ACCOUNT OF HOW THIS REQUEST FOR BRITISH PARTICIPATION HAD COME ABOUT. HE KNEW THAT YOU HAD ALWAYS BEEN RELUCTANT BUT THE AMERICANS WERE FACED WITH THE INTERLOCKING VETO: OTHER COUNTRIES NECESSARY FOR THE FORCE WOULD NOT TAKE PART UNLESS THE BRITISH DID. HE ALSO KNEW THAT WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE SUBJECT THE LATTER'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN NEGATIVE, THOUGH NOT COMPLETELY CLOSED. HAIG REFERRED TO HIS TALKS WITH YOU AND GENSCHER IN CAIRO IN A TENT AND TO THE DICUSSION AT CANCUN. HE MENTIONED SPECIFIC ASSURANCES THAT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM LONDON THAT BRITAIN WOULD BE READY TO JOIN WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS AT ALL. WHEN VELIOTES HAD DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH DOUGLAS HURD LAST WEEK HE HAD BEEN GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE STATEMENT ABOUT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SIMPLE DECLARATION THAT WOULD CONFIRM SUPPORT FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ISRAELI/ARAB PEACE TREATY AND CONTAIN A BRIEF RE-STATEMENT OF ADHERENCE TO VENICE. VELIOTES WHO WAS PRESENT INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN NO INKLING THAT WE WERE GOING TO QUOTE ELABORATE UNQUOTE ON VENICE IN OUR STATEMENT.

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4. HAIG SAID THAT AT CANCUN YOU HAD MENTIONED THE DEMARCHE YOU HAD HAD FROM ARAB COUNTRIES THREATENING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. HE HAD THEREUPON CARRIED OUT A CHECK IN ALL CAPITALS AND FOUND THAT NO COUNTRY EXCEPT SYRIA HAD ENTERED ANY RESERVATION ABOUT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE.

5. HAIG SAID THAT THE WORDING OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE FOUR WOULD INFURIATE THE ISRAELIS AND WOULD CERTAINLY LEAD THEM TO REJECT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION ON THOSE TERMS. THEY WOULD USE IT AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT RETURNING SINAI: IT MIGHT WELL TRIGGER AN ATTACK ON THE LEBANON. IF THE EGYPTIANS EXPRESSED THEIR APPROVAL OF THE STATEMENT, WHICH THEY WOULD CERTAINLY DO, THIS WOULD IMPAIR RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND ISRAEL.

6. HAIG SPOKE ABOUT THE QUOTE PARANOIA UNQUOTE IN ISRAEL. THERE WAS A CRISIS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES (HE TOLD ME FOR MY EARS ALONE THAT THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE HAS RESIGNED). TO MY QUESTION OF WHAT HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR BOUT OF PARANOIA HE SAID IT WAS DUE TO THE LEBANON, THE U S REACTION TO THE IRAQI REACTOR RAID, THE DEATH OF SADAT, AND OF COURSE AWACS. HAIG WENT ON TO SPECULATE ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE INSISTED ON MAKING OUR STATEMENT. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO PUT TOGETHER A FORCE WITHOUT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. THIS WOULD LEAD TO A CRISIS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, NOT LEAST WITH BRITAIN. HE SAID THAT IN PRACTICE HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PUT TOGETHER SUCH A FORCE AND THAT THIS WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROCESS.

7. REVERTING TO THE LEBANON DANGER HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE CERTAINLY PREPARED TO MOVE AND TO TAKE OVER ALL THE PLO AREA SOUTH OF THE LITANI, WHICH THEY WOULD NOT WITHDRAW FROM. THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO BATTLE WITH SYRIANS WITH THE OBVIOUS DANGERS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SPECULATION.

8. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS SO WORRIED THAT, IF IT WOULD HELP, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO FLY TO LONDON TOMORROW AND HAVE A MEETING WITH THE FOUR PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS. HE THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT IN ANY CASE HAVE TO GO TO ISRAEL TO TRY TO QUETEN THEM DOWN.

9. I SAID THAT IF BEGIN HAD NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING FROM SINAI THEY WOULD MAKE ANYTHING AN EXCUSE FOR NOT DOING SO. THE REASON THEY WERE REACTING IN THIS EXCITABLE WAY WAS LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE AWACS DEAL AND THEIR FEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT BE SHOWING INCREASED INTEREST IN SAUDI ARABIA. BUT NONE OF THIS WAS A REASON WHY THE EUROPEAN POWERS, IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST THAT DID NOT MEET THEIR INTERESTS SHOULD JEOPARDISE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A PERSONAL ASSURANCE FROM BEGIN THAT HE WOULD WITHDRAW FROM SINAI AS AGREED EVEN IF THIS MEANT HIS RESIGNATION.

10. HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE FRENCH WERE EAGER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORCE. (INCIDENTALLY FROM THE WAY HE SPOKE IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT IT WAS CHEYSSON WHO HAD ENCOURAGED HIM TO THINK PREVIOUSLY THAT WE HAD LOBBIED THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS AGAINST PARTICIPATION.) HAIG ALSO THOUGHT THE ITALIANS WOULD LIKE TO TAKE PART. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT YOU WOULD THINK BUT ON THE FACE OF IT I DID NOT THINK WE WOULD OBJECT IF THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS WERE READY TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT ANY STATEMENT OF THE KIND PROPOSED. BUT I DID NOT THINK THAT AS FAR AS THE FRENCH WERE CONCERNED THEY WOULD WANT TO DO SO WITHOUT A STATEMENT ABOUT THEIR BASIS OF PARTICIPATION.

11. AT THIS POINT IN OUR CONVERSATION HAIG RECEIVED A MESSAGE THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT WELL BE GOING AHEAD ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AND COMMUNICATING THE TEXT TO THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS. HAIG GAVE ORDERS THAT THEY SHOULD BE ASKED TO REFRAIN FROM DOING THIS. I SAID THAT YOU HAD EMPHASISED HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS GOING TO BE AT THIS STAGE TO START TINKERING WITH A TEXT THAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO WITH SUCH DIFFICULTY. BUT SO THAT I COULD EXPLAIN TO YOU WHEREIN LAY HAIG'S PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY COULD HE TELL ME HOW IDEALLY HE WOULD LIKE OUR TEXT REVISED.

12. HE SAID THAT THE WORDING OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR WAS EXTREMELY OFFENSIVE TO ISRAEL. HE THOUGHT THAT ALL THE WORDING FROM QUOTE SIMILARLY THEY WELCOME THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL... UNQUOTE IN PARA ONE DOWN TO QUOTE... A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE UNQUOTE AT THE END OF PARA TWO SHOULD BE ELIMINATED (THIS IS HALF THE MESSAGE). IN PLACE OF THE WORDS QUOTE THAT WITHDRAWAL UNQUOTE AT THE END OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF (I), WORDS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE INSERTED, QUOTE FULFILLMENT OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL UNQUOTE.

13. AS REGARDS THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN, THIS ALSO WAS OBJECTIONABLE. INDEED HE DID NOT SEE WHY THE TEN HAD TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT AT ALL RELATING TO ACTION BY THE FOUR. I INDICATED THE COMMUNITY OF INTEREST OF THE COMMUNITY. I ASKED HAIG, EMPHASISING THAT IT WAS A PURELY PERSONAL QUESTION, WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER IF, INSTEAD OF A STATEMENT ISSUED COLLECTIVELY BY THE FOUR OR BY THE TEN, THE SAME LANGUAGE WERE USED BUT BY EACH GOVERNMENT IN ITS SEPARATE PARLIAMENT. HIS ANSWER TO THIS WAS TO SAY THAT AMERICA COULD NOT OBJECT TO ANYTHING ANY GOVERNMENT SAID IN ITS OWN PARLIAMENT.

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/14.

14. OUR TALK WAS CONCLUDED BY HAIG IMPLORING THAT WE HOLD THINGS UP UNTIL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE HEARD OF HIS GRAVE REACTION. I UNDERTOOK TO INFORM YOU AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE ABOUT OUR TALK. ALTHOUGH AS YOU WILL SEE HAIG WAS IN AN EXTREMELY AGITATED FRAME OF MIND I WOULD NOT WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS AT ALL ABRASIVE.

15. I HOPE THAT POSTS TO WHOM I AM REPEATING THIS TELEGRAM WILL TREAT IT AS FOR PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLY FOR THE MOMENT.

16. COD, F C O, PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO. 10, PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/LPS, PS/MR HURD, BULLARD AND GREENSTOCK.

HENDERSON

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 665 OF 04/11/81
FOR INFO PRIORITY: RIYADH (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), CAIRO, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, AMMAN AND TUNIS
SAVING TO: ROME, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS

MY TEL NO 664, NOT TO ALL: SINAI FORCE.

1. DURING MY CALL ON OTHER MATTERS ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 3 OCTOBER, HAMMADI SAID, ALMOST IN AN ASIDE, THAT HE HAD SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT THE UK AND SOME OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE CONSIDERING PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MULTILATERAL FORCE. IF SO, AND WHATEVER OUR MOTIVES, THE BRITISH ACTION WOULD BE SEEN BY MOST ARAB COUNTRIES AS ADDING STRENGTH TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS.
UNTIL EUROPE HAD APPARENTLY COME INTO LINE, THE US HAD BEEN REDUCED TO FINDING SINAI CONTINGENTS FROM COUNTRIES LIKE FIJI AND ECUADOR. IT WAS NONSENSE TO SAY THAT THE FINAL STAGE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE MADE MORE CERTAIN IF THE MLO FORCE CONTAINED MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT MEMBERS. THE WHOLE SUBJECT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE RABAT SUMMIT AT THE END OF NOVEMBER, AND THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD DO WELL TO DEFER A FINAL DECISION ON PARTICIPATION UNTIL THEREAFTER.

2. I SAID I BELIEVED THAT FOUR OF THE EUROPEAN TEN, INCLUDING THE UK, HAD DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORCE, THOUGH THE TEXT OF THE TEN'S STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THIS MOST CAREFULLY CONSIDERED DECISION WAS AWAITING LORD CARRINGTON'S FINAL APPROVAL ON RETURN FROM SAUDI ARABIA. I ASKED HAMMADI NOT (NOT) TO PREJUDGE THE UK'S POSITION UNTIL HE HAD STUDIED THE PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD CARRINGTON WHICH I EXPECTED TO DELIVER SHORTLY. I THEN DREW FROM THE OTHER FOUR POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TEL NO 299 TO ABU DHABI, STRESSING THAT WE SHARED SOME OF IRAQ'S RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. ONCE FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI HAD TAKEN PLACE, AND ARAB SOIL RETURNED TO ARAB POSSESSION, THE CAMP DAVID PHASE MIGHT WELL BE SEEN TO HAVE RUN ITS COURSE. OUR COMMITMENT TO VENICE REMAINED AS FIRM AS EVER. FURTHERMORE, EUROPE COULD ADVOCATE THE CASE FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION MORE CONVINCINGLY IF IT COOPERATED WITH ASPECTS OF US POLICY COMPATIBLE WITH VENICE.

3. HAMMADI AGREED TO AWAIT YOUR LETTER BUT REPEATED THAT, SPEAKING AS A FRIEND, HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD LOOK AT THE EFFECTS OF OUR ACTION IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE, RATHER THAN ELABORATELY JUSTIFYING OUR MOTIVES. IF WE AND OTHER EC COUNTRIES WENT AHEAD AS PLANNED, IT WOULD MEAN THAT US AND WESTERN INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE ARAB WORLD WOULD BE REDUCED, TO THE BENEFIT OF THE RUSSIANS. AS DURING THE CRUSADES, THE ARABS COULD WAIT FOR AS LONG AS WAS NEEDED FOR US TO LEARN THAT OUR DECISION TO TAKE PART IN THE SINAI FORCE WAS WRONG.

4. COMMENT. HAMMADI SPOKE MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER, BUT FIRMLY. IT MAY BE THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN READING SAHHAF'S RECORD OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S DETAILED EXPLANATIONS, MADE ON CHEYSSON'S INSTRUCTIONS ON 2 NOVEMBER, OF THE FRENCH DECISION TO PARTICIPATE (ROCALVE HAS REFUSED TO TELL ME WHICH ARGUMENTS HE CONCENTRATED UPON). NEITHER THE ITALIAN NOR THE NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR HAVE YET VOLUNTEERED EXPLANATIONS, OR BEEN CALLED IN TO GIVE THEM.

5. THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION ON 2 NOVEMBER WAS CELEBRATED HERE WITH UNFRIENDLY TV AND PRESS COVERAGE.

FCO PLEASE ONPASS SAVING TO: ROME, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS.

EGERTON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

STANDARD

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RID
MAED
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ERD
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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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GRS 320
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FM FCO 042335Z NOV 81
TO FLASH PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 483 OF 4 NOVEMBER
AND TO FLASH THE HAGUE ROME
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON RIYADH (FOR PS/S OF S) EEC POSTS TEL AVIV

SINAI: FROM BULLARD.

1. PLEASE CONTACT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH THE UTMOST URGENCY AND SPEAK AS FOLLOWS.

2. MR HAIG HAS RAEACTED VERY STRONGLY AND VERY NEGATIVELY AGAINST THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE FOUR. HE HAS SAID THAT FOR US TO GO AHEAD ON THIS BASIS WOULD PRODUCE A CRISES OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS IN ISRAEL (POSSIBLY INCLUDING AN ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON) AND THAT THERE WOULD THEN BE NO MULTINATIONAL FORCE. HE HAS ASKED US TO DROP FROM OUR STATEMENT THE ENTIRE PASSAGE FROM THE SECOND SENTANCE OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH TO THE END OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH: AND ALSO TO CHANGE QUOTE FACILITATING THAT WITHDRAWAL UNQUOTE IN SUB PARA (I) OF THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH TO QUOTE FACILITATING THE PEACE PROCESS UNQUOTE.

3. LORD CARRINGTON'S FIRST REACTION IS THAT IT IS OUT OF THE QUESTION TO AMEND OUR STATEMENT, AND THAT EITHER WE PARTICIPATE ON THE BASIS WE HAVE SPELT OUT OR WE DO NOT PARTICIPATE AT ALL.

4. THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT IS TO STOP OUR AMBASSADORS TAKING ACTION IN ARAB POSTS AS THEY HAD BEEN INTENDING TO DO TOMORROW 5 NOVEMBER. WE HAVE SENT APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS AND SUGGEST THAT THE FRENCH/DUTCH/ITALIANS SHOULD DO THE SAME WITHOUT DELAY.

5. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH OUR PARTNERS AGAIN EARLY TOMORROW.

6. FOR THE HAGUE: I HAVE SPOKEN BY TELEPHONE TO NORBART AT HIS HOME, BUT YOU SHOULD CHECK WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN SENT.

7. FOR ROME: THE FOREGOING CONFIRMS AND AMPLIFIES TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BULLARD/CULSHAW.

8. FOR PARIS: I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO REACH ANDREAN, BUT I HAVE SPOKEN TO A DUTY OFFICER AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY WHO MAY HAVE TAKEN THE NECESSARY ACTION, BUT YOU SHOULD CHECK.

9. WASHINGTON ARE TELEGRAPHING A FULL ACCOUNT OF HAIG'S CONVERSATION WITH SIR N HENDERSON AND THIS WILL BE REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION.

CARRINGTON

STANDARD

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FM WASHINGTON 041830Z NOV 81
TO FLASH RIYADH
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 4 NOVEMBER
INFO FLASH FCO.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

SINAI FORCE.

1. HAIG HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME DESCRIBING YOUR MESSAGE AND ENCLOSURES AS QUOTE A BOMBSHELL UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT EXAGGERATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD FLOW FROM THEM. HE COULD ONLY COMPARE IT TO 1956. HE ASKED ME TO COME DOWN AND SEE HIM IN TWO HOURS TIME, WHICH I WILL DO. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF TELEPHONING YOU TO IMPLORE YOU TO DO NOTHING UNTIL YOU HAD HEARD HIS VIEWS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF I COMMUNICATED WITH YOU, WHICH IS WHY I AM SENDING THIS FLASH TELEGRAM.

HENDERSON

NNNN

PART 7 ends:-

3.11.87

PART 8 begins:-

4.11.87