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Confidential filing

~~Visit~~ visit of Romanian Prime Minister
Verdel

ROMANIA

April 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
21-7-80							
19-6-80							
20-8-80							
26-8-80							
22-10-80							
3-12-80							
12-1-81							
12-2-81							
4-3-81							
23-3-81							
4-4-81							
16-4-81							

PREM 19/580



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April 1981

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I enclose the record of the Prime Minister's conversation with the Prime Minister of Romania over tea on 14 April.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



file

cc: Trade
Ind.
Energy
CO

BK

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 April 1981

Michael Alexander has already sent you a record of the tête-à-tête conversation between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Romania which took place here on 13 April.

I now enclose the record of the plenary discussion which started simultaneously and was later joined by the Prime Minister and Mr. Verdet.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to John Rhodes (Department of Trade), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry), Julian West (Department of Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATISON

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA, MR. ILIE VERDET, OVER TEA IN THE PRIME
MINISTER'S ROOM IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON TUESDAY 14 APRIL AT
1530 HOURS

Present:

Prime Minister	Mr. I. Verdet
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	Mr. A. Gheorghiu
Mr. B.J.P. Fall	Mr. N. Bujor

* * * * *

Middle East

After courtesies during which Mr. Verdet expressed himself to be well satisfied with his visit, the Prime Minister raised the question of the Middle East. Before we could make steps forward we would have to wait to get a better idea of what the United States would do and for the results of the Israeli elections. She had met Secretary Haig on his return from his Middle East trip last week. It was very much a fact-finding mission and it was clear that Mr. Haig had not made up his mind on what should be done next. The Prime Minister thought that he realised the importance of the Palestinian question to the Arab countries and to the Gulf area as a whole. It was also encouraging that President Reagan and King Hussein got on well together - a great advance on the relations between Hussein and President Carter. Meanwhile, relations between Syria and Jordan were bad and it was important to find some solution to the problem of Lebanon.

Mr. Verdet emphasised Romanian interest in knowing about new initiatives from any quarter. Romania had been active in the search for a settlement and would continue to want to contribute. They did not condemn everything which had been done until now, but neither did they press it too much. Camp David had had a positive result in that Egypt had got back territory in Sinai but one should be careful not to over-estimate its contribution. The process would no doubt run its course whatever the result of the Israeli election, but it did not offer a general settlement,

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to which the Palestinian problem was the key. The Camp David framework was not appropriate to that. What was needed now was to look to the future and provide a new framework of negotiation, an international conference involving all the interested parties including the regional states, Israel, the PLO, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister said that it was generally recognised that Egypt and Israel would not be able to solve the Palestinian problem between them; but Sadat had been concerned not to give the impression that he was interested only in the return of Egyptian territory. One would have to get a greater degree of agreement among the states in the region before considering an international conference. A lot more work had to be done to discover what would be acceptable to Israel, to Jordan and to the Palestinian people, including the Palestinians living outside Palestine. Beyond that there was the question of access to the Holy Places of Jerusalem. It would take all our time to get this sorted out within the next two or three years. We and our European partners had been talking to the states concerned about the practical details, not about generalities and it was clear that a steady and continuous effort was required. The key was Israel, the West Bank and Jordan.

Mr. Verdet agreed. It was clearly hard to foresee a solution without the participation of the United States but another great power, the Soviet Union, also wanted to participate. We should work for a rapprochement of the countries in the region and use our influence in favour of peaceful settlement. Romania did not question the role of the great powers, but the problem should not be left to them alone. Romania had much to contribute and urged a peaceful solution in all her talks with the Arabs and with Israel. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Verdet said that Romanian relations with Israel were normal although this did not mean that their views always coincided; and that Romanian relations with Egypt were also good. The Romanians did not condemn everything which Egypt had done in

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negotiation with Israel: they had used peaceful means and the results were not detrimental to other countries. But this process would not lead to an overall settlement. The Prime Minister said that it should be looked at as the first stage of Israeli withdrawal from territories acquired in 1967 and those in the implementation of Resolution 242. Mr. Verdet agreed but said that other parties should also be involved.

The Prime Minister said that we would have to wait until the Israeli elections which were not far off. Mr. Verdet agreed but said there might not be too much change in substance. The Prime Minister said that this might be right, but the Israelis knew that they would have to take some steps towards solving the problem. They could not go on doing nothing and the Camp David process had really stopped some time ago. All must now realise the urgency of taking some action. Mr. Verdet agreed and said it was important also to do nothing to aggravate the situation. Both parties and especially Israel should refrain from the use of force. The Prime Minister said that this was important for the PLO too and Mr. Verdet agreed.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Mr. Verdet said that he looked forward to seeing the Prime Minister in Bucharest and the Prime Minister confirmed that she looked forward to visiting Bucharest again at the appropriate time.

16 April 1981

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SUBJECT

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA, MR. ILIE VERDET, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON MONDAY, 13 APRIL 1981 AT 1645 HOURS

Present

Prime Minister	Mr. Ilie Verdet, Prime Minister
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs	Mr. A. Duma
Mr. P. A. R. Blaker, Minister of State, FCO	Mr. A. Margaritescu
Mr. J. L. Bullard	Mr. G. Boldur
Mr. P. C. H. Holmer	Mr. V. Gliga
Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander	Mr. C. Pirvutoiu
Mr. J. H. Pownall	Mr. A. Gheorghiu
Mr. B. J. P. Fall	Mr. Bujor
Mr. C. A. Galia)	
Mr. D. Galbinksi)	interpreters

* * * * *

[The Prime Minister and Mr. Verdet had a half-hour conversation tete-a-tete, during which Lord Carrington took the Chair in the Plenary Session.]

Poland

Lord Carrington asked Mr. Duma for his views on the situation in Poland. Mr. Duma said that the Romanian position was well known: the Poles should be allowed to solve their own problems without intervention from either side. No encouragement should be given to those in the West who were trying to hot things up and complicate matters. Everything should be done so that the Poles could solve their own problems. It was at present the Romanian opinion that the Soviet Union did not wish to intervene.

Lord Carrington asked whether a solution could be found, given the Gdansk Agreements and the attitude of the Party. Mr. Duma said he thought it could. But the Gdansk Agreement was very complex and

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there were many tendencies in Solidarity, some of which wanted to go beyond union affairs. Polish economic problems were very pressing. There were no instant solutions to complex problems, but a way had to be found to activate the economy. Reforms might be needed. At present the Government spent all its time putting out small fires and had no time to tackle problems in depth. There was a need for a new strategy and tactics, adapted to the realities of the problem. Lord Carrington agreed about the economic problem and said that we had given food aid and were discussing debt relief with other Western creditors. Politically, the problem was that one faction of Solidarity wanted to go further and change the whole system, while one faction of the Government wanted to claw back what had been agreed at Gdansk. If either faction gained control, there would be trouble. Third parties should keep clear and do only what they could to contribute to stability and calm. Mr. Duma said that the solution would have to be found within the existing system. Lord Carrington asked whether this was the general view of the Warsaw Pact countries. Mr. Duma said that as far as he knew it was. It was necessary to find a solution within the current system and from within Poland.

Mr. Bullard asked whether the immediate neighbours of Poland might feel more threatened by what was happening in Poland than did the Soviet Union. The GDR and the Czechoslovak Press had been very strict and severe about Poland. Were there differences between their attitude and that of Romania? Mr. Duma emphasised that they were immediate neighbours. It was one thing if a neighbour's house was burning down and another thing if one lived a bit further down the road and could wait for the fire engine.

Mr. Bullard wondered whether there could be an economic system liberal enough to persuade the Poles to work and conservative enough to be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Mr. Duma replied that the economic problem was a matter for the Poles. They had been consuming more than they produced and no system, socialist or capitalist, could allow that. Mr. Bullard mentioned that the Western creditors' discussions on debt relief had almost reached agreement and asked whether the CMEA countries were taking similar action. Mr. Duma claimed that the problem did not really arise as trade within the CMEA was on the basis of exchanges of goods rather than the granting

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/ of credits.

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of credits. He indicated his assent when Mr. Bullard asked whether this meant that Romania was not lending money to Poland. Mr. Bullard mentioned that the Poles found it difficult to pay for food even at special prices and with a large proportion of credit, and suggested that it might be easier if Poland were a member of the IMF. Mr. Duma said that Romania had experience of the IMF: there was no way of getting credit without being charged high rates of interest and it was better to borrow as little as possible. Lord Carrington said that it was hard to see how Poland would be able to get out of its economic difficulties without credit.

Mr. Blaker said that it was hard to see a solution. The demands put forward by some elements of Solidarity went very far, but it would cause trouble if they were surrendered. The only hope was for moderate elements on both sides to work together. Lord Carrington said that the economic problems made the political problems more difficult and vice versa. Mr. Duma said that the same was true of the social problems. It was necessary to re-establish calm and increase production and productivity. The Romanians knew very well that if they wanted to reduce working hours they would have to increase their productivity.

Romanian Economy

Lord Carrington asked about the position of the Romanian economy. Mr. Duma said that the situation was reasonably good. The results of the last Five-Year Plan had been good and the next was in preparation. It would also be dynamic, but industrial output was expected to grow at 8-9 per cent rather than at 10-11 per cent as provided in the 1979-80 plan. The priorities on investment would be to complete projects already started, to back projects which did not use too much energy, to ensure the raw materials base for the economy and to place increasing emphasis on agriculture - where large possibilities of development remained to be exploited. Romania would continue to have export surpluses in certain fields, including steel. Lord Carrington asked about energy conservation. Mr. Duma recalled the importance attached to this subject by President Ceausescu and mentioned measures to take out of circulation cars with high petrol consumption, to make more use of diesel fuel, to

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make better use of freight transport and to seek savings in industry where there was a need for new technology and methods of production. [The Prime Minister and Mr. Verdet joined the talks at 5.15 p.m.]

Poland/Afghanistan

The Prime Minister said that she and Mr. Verdet had discussed Poland and had fully agreed that Poland must be allowed to solve her own problems in her own way. They had also discussed Afghanistan, but here there had been a little disagreement. Mr. Verdet had said that there should be talks between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, but she had said that there was no point in talking to a puppet government. The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Verdet would want to speak of his recent visit to China, which was very friendly with Pakistan while the Soviet Union was friendly with India. The Russians, and also the Chinese, saw themselves as surrounded by people whose politics were different. We did not see ourselves in this way and it was hard for us to appreciate this psychology, which appeared nevertheless to be important. Oil, which was tied up with the Middle East, was another subject which Mr. Verdet might wish to discuss.

Bilateral Relations

Mr. Verdet indicated that he would like to talk about bilateral relations. He expressed satisfaction at what had been achieved, more particularly since the visit of President Ceausescu in 1978, and said that Romania was ready to encourage their future development not only as between governments but also between political and mass organisations. Romania also wanted to encourage further co-operation in the diplomatic field. This had been very successful in the past. Trade had increased threefold over the last 10 years, which was a good result. But there was room for further improvement. The Romanian and British economies were complementary. Romania was a developing country. But he had to emphasise the problem that Romania's deficit in bilateral trade amounted to £34 million in 1980, the highest deficit in recent years. Moreover, Romania's imports of industrial equipment from the United Kingdom accounted for 70 per cent while her exports of similar goods for only 5 per cent of trade.

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Joint efforts were needed to normalise this situation. We each knew the other's system and the problem did not lie there: the two systems could co-exist and the two governments should do more to encourage trade. There were two ways to solve the problem: either to reduce trade or to balance it and increase it. The Romanians favoured the latter approach and had the potential to succeed if British firms took the same approach and if the British Government would help.

Mr. Verdet went on to mention a number of points of particular interest to Romania, including co-production and joint ventures; and counter trade, which was necessary if Romania was to earn what it needed to continue to buy. He also asked for a further liberalisation of quantitative restrictions, especially in the fields of radio, textiles and fruit and vegetables; and for British support for an extension of the offer to Romania under the Community's GSP. The Romanian interest was political as well as economic: Romania, 21 per cent of whose trade was already with EC countries, wanted further to diversify her economic links. He noted that the British Presidency would come soon, and hoped that HMG would use their influence on behalf of Romania.

The Prime Minister asked whether the main interest was in agricultural and horticultural products or in the field of manufactures. Mr. Verdet said that the latter was the more important. Mr. Pownall explained that the trade imbalance had been discussed in detail with Mr. Margaritescu at the meeting of the Joint Commission last month. The pattern of trade had changed recently and Britain had started exporting coke, coal, and cereals. This accounted for the increase in the imbalance in 1980. The Prime Minister asked whether the problem on manufactures was one of tariffs or one of quotas. Mr. Verdet said that it was one of quotas, and asked that the political considerations be taken fully into account. Mr. Pownall pointed out that the problem was concentrated on items such as textiles, televisions, and footwear, which were difficult areas for domestic industry.

/ Mr. Verdet

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Mr. Verdet quoted as a good example of industrial co-operation Romania's experience with BAC and with Rolls Royce. What they needed for the future was:

- (i) help from the British Government on sales of technology for the production of metal parts for aircraft and aircraft engines;
- (ii) support from the Government for the Romanian position on the sales of those aircraft in third countries; and
- (iii) a greater effort to implement the provisions of counter trade in Anglo/Romanian joint documents.

Mr. Pownall explained that the last two were essentially commercial problems; but that the Department of Trade were in touch with the firm.

Mr. Verdet said that he hoped matters could be speeded up and that the Government would intervene if there was difficulty. He also pointed to the prospects of co-operation in oil and coal, where British industry had technology to offer, and emphasised the importance to Romania of co-operation in third countries, in which context he cited the examples of a refinery in Jordan, a recent contract in Pakistan with Lummus and discussions over a steel plant in Madagascar. The Prime Minister pointed out that the chairmen of a number of companies particularly active in co-operation with Romania would be at her dinner for Mr. Verdet that evening.

Mr. Verdet said that cultural relations were developing normally and that the Romanians looked forward to the negotiation of the new two year programme in May. They would support these negotiations and implement the agreed programme. The Prime Minister remarked that she had launched British/Romanian exchanges in the field of education when she had visited Romania as Secretary of State for Education: an annual seminar had been set up which had met first in Bucharest and then in Cambridge.

/CSCE

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CSCE

The Prime Minister said that she had received and answered a letter from President Ceausescu. The meeting had now adjourned until 5 May. It would be easier to have a successful conference if the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. While the occupation of an independent and neutral country continued our bilateral relations could not be restored to normality as we would wish. If the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, and assuming that Poland remained sovereign and independent, there could once again be more discussion of detente. We were in any case always ready to discuss reductions in the large burden of armaments. We would like to spend less provided we could be certain that any agreement was monitored and the arrangements properly verifiable. We supported the French CDE proposal at Madrid. The whole of Western Europe was covered by CBMs and the equivalent area in the East went up to the Urals. But President Brezhnev had said that if CBMs extended to the Urals we should go further on the Western side: it was difficult to see what was meant as the Western side was already fully covered. Lord Carrington's proposals on Afghanistan had been intended to take into account the security interests of neighbouring countries, and unless there was some movement it would not augur well for future progress at Madrid. Lord Carrington agreed that progress on Afghanistan would transform the atmosphere at Madrid, but useful progress might still be made if only on a smaller scale. We had made proposals on human rights and information which we hoped the Soviet Union would accept. On CBMs, if we could overcome the problem of geographical area there would be a real incentive to negotiate genuine and verifiable CBMs. We would be ready to go along with such a result, but the whole atmosphere would be very different if there was some move on Afghanistan.

Mr. Verdet said that it was important that the conference was taking place at all. The results were harder to predict. The spirit of President Ceausescu's message was that the break should be used to intensify contacts in the hope of reaching positive results. It was important to ensure the continuation of the Final Act and of the Helsinki spirit, to increase confidence, to have a conference on CBMs and disarmament, and to continue the dialogue. Each state

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must implement the Final Act as a whole and not merely emphasise particular parts of it such as human rights. It was important to have dialogue, not confrontation. It was in this spirit that Romania approached the Madrid Conference and also the problem of new missiles. Romania was by no means against a balance in such weapons, but it had to be reached by reducing a total which was already too large. When Romania spoke about the need for reductions in the deployment of new missiles, they did not mean only Western missiles: the total of Soviet arms was too great. The Romanian ideas had been put forward as of benefit to all the people of Europe. The Prime Minister hoped there would be some progress when the Madrid meeting resumed, if only on some of the smaller points.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Mr. Verdet extended to the Prime Minister an invitation from President Ceausescu and himself to pay an official visit to Romania. The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Verdet. It would not be possible for her to come this year, but she would like to visit Romania again and looked forward to doing so.

The meeting ended at 1805 hours.



15 April 1981

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1981

Dear Mike,

/ I attach a draft record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and Mr Verdet over tea in the Prime Minister's room in the House of Commons yesterday afternoon. Brian Fall agreed with Michael Alexander that he would send it across for you to have typed in the normal way.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards
(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq
10 Downing St

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

DRAFT RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA, MR ILIE VERDET, OVER TEA IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S ROOM IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON TUESDAY 14 APRIL AT 1530 HOURS

CAVEAT.....

Present:

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------|
| Prime Minister | Mr I Verdet |
| Mr M O'D B Alexander | Mr A Gheorghiu |
| Mr B J P Fall | Mr N Bujor |

MIDDLE EAST

1. After courtesies during which Mr Verdet expressed himself to be well satisfied with his visit, the Prime Minister raised the question of the Middle East. Before we could make steps forward we would have to wait to get a better idea of what the United States would do and for the results of the Israeli elections. She had met Secretary Haig on his return from his Middle East trip last week. It was very much a fact-finding mission and it was clear that Mr Haig had not made up his mind on what should be done next. The Prime Minister thought that he realised the importance of the Palestinian question to the Arab countries and to the Gulf area as a whole. It was also encouraging that President Reagan and King Hussein got on well together - a great advance on the relations

Enclosures—flag(s).....

between Hussein and President Carter. Meanwhile, relations between Syria and Jordan were bad and it was important to find some solution to the problem of Lebanon.

2. Mr Verdet emphasised Romanian interest in knowing about new initiatives from any quarter. Romania had been active in the search for a settlement and would continue to want to contribute. They did not condemn everything which had been done ~~up till~~ ^{until} now, but neither did they press it too much. Camp David had had a positive result in that Egypt had got back territory in Sinai but one should be careful not to over ~~appreciate the~~ ^{estimate its} contribution ~~of Camp David~~. The process would no doubt run its course whatever the result of the Israeli election, but it did not offer a ~~solution to the question of an overall~~ ^{general} settlement, to which the Palestinian problem was the key. The Camp David framework ~~of negotiation~~ was not appropriate to that. What was needed now was to look to the future and provide a new framework of negotiation/involving all the interested parties including the regional states, Israel, the PLO, the United States and the Soviet Union.

3. The Prime Minister said that it was generally recognised that Egypt and Israel would not be able to solve the Palestinian problem between them; but Sadat had been concerned not to give the impression that he was interested only in the return of Egyptian territory. One would have to get a greater degree of agreement among the states in the region before considering an international conference. A lot more work had to be done to discover what would be acceptable to Israel, to Jordan and to the Palestinian people, including the Palestians living outside Palestine.

Beyond that there was the question of access to the Holy Places of Jerusalem. It would take all our time to get this sorted out within the next two or three years. We and our European partners had been talking to the states concerned about the practical details, not about generalities and it was clear that a steady and continuous effort was required. The key was Israel, the West Bank and Jordan.

4. Mr Verdet agreed. It was clearly hard to foresee a solution without the participation of the United States but another great power, the Soviet Union, also wanted to participate. We should work for a rapprochement of the countries in the region and use our influence in favour of peaceful settlement. Romania did not question the role of the great powers, but the problem should not be left to them alone. Romania had much to contribute and urged a peaceful solution in all her talks with the Arabs and with Israel. In response to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr Verdet said that Romanian relations with Israel were normal although this did not mean that their views always coincided; and that Romanian relations with Egypt were also good. The Romanians did not condemn everything which Egypt had done in negotiation with Israel: they had used peaceful means and the results were not detrimental to other countries. But this process would not lead to an overall settlement. The Prime Minister said that it should be looked at as the first stage of Israeli withdrawal from territories acquired in 1967 and those in the implementation of Resolution 242. Mr Verdet agreed but said that other parties should also be involved.

5. The Prime Minister said that we would have to wait until the Israeli elections which were not far off. Mr Verdet agreed but said there might not be too much change in substance. The Prime Minister said that this might be right, but the Israelis knew that they would have to take some steps towards solving the problem. They could not go on doing nothing and the Camp David process had really stopped some time ago. All must now realise the urgency of taking some action. Mr Verdet agreed and said it was important also to do nothing to aggravate the situation. Both parties and especially Israel should refrain from the use of force. The Prime Minister said that this was important for the PLO too and Mr Verdet agreed.

Conclusion

6. In conclusion, Mr Verdet said that he looked forward to seeing the Prime Minister in Bucharest and the Prime Minister confirmed that she looked forward to visiting Bucharest again at the appropriate time.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 April 1981

Dear Mike, *MRP*

Visit of Romanian Prime Minister

I enclose a draft record of the talks on Monday afternoon. The Department have sent a copy separately to Mr Pownall in the Department of Trade who may wish to comment in particular on the points affecting his Department.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA, MR ILIE VERDET, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON MONDAY, 13 APRIL 1981 AT 1645 HOURS

Present:

Prime Minister	Prime Minister, Mr Ilie Verdet
<i>Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs</i> Mr P A R Blaker	Mr A Duma
Mr J L Bullard	Mr A Margaritescu
Mr P C H Holmer	Mr G Boldur
<i>Mr M O'D B Alexander</i> Mr J B Pownall	Mr V Gliga
Mr B J P Fall	Mr C Pirvutoiu
Mr C A Galia)	Mr A Gheorghiu
Mr D Galbinski) interpreters	Mr Bujor

[The Prime Minister and Mr Verdet had a half-hour conversation tete-à-tete, during which Lord Carrington took the Chair in the Plenary Session.]

POLAND

1. Lord Carrington asked Mr Duma for his views on the situation in Poland. Mr Duma said that the Romanian position was well known: the Poles should be allowed to solve their own problems without intervention from either side. No encouragement should be given to those in the West who were trying to hot things up and complicate matters. Everything should be done so that the Poles could solve their own problems. It was at present the Romanian opinion that the Soviet Union did not wish to intervene.
2. Lord Carrington asked whether a solution could be found, given the Gdansk Agreements and the attitude of the Party.

/Mr Duma

Mr Duma said he thought it could. ⁸ But the Gdansk Agreements was very complex and there were many tendencies in Solidarity, some of which wanted to go beyond union affairs. Polish economic problems were very pressing. There were no instant solutions to complex problems, but a way had to be found to activate the economy. Reforms might be needed. At present the Government spent all its time putting out small fires and had no time to tackle problems in depth. There was a need for a new strategy and tactics, adapted to the realities of the problem. Lord Carrington agreed about the economic problem and said that we had given food aid and were discussing debt relief with other Western creditors. Politically, the problem was that one faction of Solidarity wanted to go further and change the whole system, ^{while} ~~and~~ one faction of the Government wanted to claw back what had been agreed at Gdansk. If either faction gained control, there would be trouble. Third parties should keep clear and do only what ^{they} ~~could~~ ^{to} contribute to stability and calm. Mr Duma said that the solution would have to be found within the existing system. Lord Carrington asked whether this was the general view of the Warsaw Pact countries. Mr Duma said that as far as he knew it was. It was necessary to find a solution within the current system and from within Poland.

3. Mr Bullard asked whether the immediate neighbours of Poland might feel more threatened by what was happening in Poland than did the Soviet Union. The GDR and the Czechoslovak ^{press} had been very strict and severe about Poland. Were there differences between their attitude and that of Romania.

Mr Duma emphasised that they were immediate neighbours. It was one thing if a neighbour's house was burning down and another thing if one lived a bit further down the road and

/could

could wait for the fire engine. .

4. Mr Bullard ^{wondered} ~~asked~~ ^{there} whether ~~there~~ could be an economic system liberal enough to persuade the Poles to work and conservative enough to be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Mr Duma replied that the economic problem was a matter for the Poles. They had been consuming more than they produced and no system, socialist or capitalist, could allow that. Mr Bullard mentioned that the Western creditor's discussions on debt relief had almost reached agreement and asked whether the CMEA countries were taking similar action. Mr Duma claimed that the problem did not really arise as trade ~~exchanges~~ ^{was on the basis of exchanges of goods} were very rarely ~~unbalanced~~ within the CMEA. He indicated his assent when Mr Bullard asked whether this meant that Romania was not lending money to Poland. Mr Bullard mentioned that the Poles found it difficult to pay for food even at special prices and with a large proportion of credit, and suggested that it might be easier if Poland were a member of the IMF. Mr Duma said that Romania had experience of the IMF: there was no way of getting credit without being charged high rates of interest and it was better to borrow as little as possible. Lord Carrington said that it was hard to see how Poland would be able to get out of its economic difficulties without credit. 5. Mr Blaker said that it was hard to see a solution. The demands put forward by some elements of Solidarity went very far, but it would cause trouble if ~~there~~ ^{they} were surrendered. The only hope was for moderate elements on both sides to work together. Lord Carrington said that the economic problems made the political problems more difficult and vice versa. Mr Duma ^{said that the same was true of} ~~emphasised also~~ the social problems, ^{it was necessary} and the need to re-establish calm and increase production and productivity. The Romanians knew very well that if they wanted to reduce working hours they would have to increase their productivity.

ROMANIAN ECONOMY

6. Lord Carrington asked about the position of the Romanian economy. Mr Duma said that the situation was reasonably good. The results of the last Five-Year Plan had been good and the next was in ~~proportion~~ ^{proportion.} It would also be dynamic, but industrial output was expected to grow at 8-9% rather than at 10-11% ^{as provided in the 1979-80 Plan}. The priorities on investment would be to complete projects already started, to back projects which did not use too much energy, to ensure the raw materials base for the economy and to place increasing emphasis on agriculture, where large possibilities of development remained to be exploited. Romania would continue to have export surpluses in certain fields, including steel. Lord Carrington asked about energy conservation. Mr Duma recalled the importance attached to this subject by President Ceausescu and mentioned measures to take out of circulation cars with high petrol consumption, to make more use of diesel fuel, to make better use of freight transport and to seek savings in industry where there was a need for new technology and methods of production.

↓ [The Prime Minister and Mr Verdej joined the talks at 5.15pm]

POLAND/AFGHANISTAN

7. The Prime Minister said that she and Mr Verdej had discussed Poland and had fully agreed that Poland must be allowed to solve her own problems in her own way. They had also discussed Afghanistan, but here there had been a little disagreement. Mr Verdej had said that there should be talks between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, but she had said that there was no point in talking to a puppet government. The Prime Minister asked whether Mr Verdej would want to speak of his recent visit to China, which was very friendly with

/Pakistan

Pakistan while the Soviet Union was friendly with India. The Russians, and also the Chinese, saw themselves as surrounded by people whose politics were different. We did not see ourselves in this way and it was hard for us to appreciate this psychology, which appeared nevertheless to be important. Oil, which was tied up with the Middle East was another subject which Mr Verdet might wish to discuss.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

8. Mr Verdet indicated that he would like to talk about bilateral relations. He expressed satisfaction ^{at what had been} ~~at their~~ ^{achieved} development, more particularly ^{since} ~~after~~ the visit of President Ceausescu in 1978, and said that Romania was ready to encourage their future development not only as between governments but also between political and mass organisations. ^{He Romanians also} ~~They also~~ wanted to encourage further cooperation in the diplomatic field. This had been very successful in the past. Trade had increased threefold over the last ten years, which was a good result. ^{But} there was room for further improvement. The Romanian and British economies were complementary, ~~and~~ Romania was a developing country. But ^{he} ~~had~~ had to emphasise the problem that Romania's deficit in bilateral trade amounted to ~~£30~~ ^{£34} million in 1980, the highest deficit in recent years. Moreover, Romania's imports of industrial equipment from the United Kingdom accounted for 70% while her exports of similar goods for only 5% of trade. Joint efforts were needed to normalise this situation. We each knew the others system and the problem did not lie there: the two systems could co-exist and the two governments should do more to encourage trade. There were two ways to solve the problem: either to reduce trade or to balance it and increase it. The Romanians favoured the latter approach and had the potential to succeed if British firms took

/the

the same approach and if the British Government would help.

9. Mr Verdet went on to mention a number of points of particular interest ^{to Romania,} including ~~co-production~~ ^{and} joint ventures; and counter trade, which was necessary if Romania was to earn what it needed to continue to buy. ~~They also wanted a~~ ^{He also asked for a}

further liberalisation of quantitative restrictions, especially in the fields of radio, textiles and fruit and vegetables; ~~and~~

~~They also looked~~ for British support for an extension of the offer to Romanian ^{ly's} under the Community's GSP. The Romanian interest was political as well as economic; ~~as~~ Romania, 21% of

whose trade was already with EC countries wanted further to diversify her economic links. He ~~hoped that~~ ^{noted that} the British

Presidency ~~would prove a help.~~ ^{would come soon and hoped that the UK would use its influence on behalf of Romania.}

10. The Prime Minister asked whether the main interest was

in agricultural and horticultural products or in the field of manufactures. Mr Verdet said that the latter was the more

important. Mr Pownall explained that the trade imbalance had been discussed in detail with Mr Margaritescu at the meeting of the Joint Commission last month. The pattern of trade had

changed recently and Britain had started exporting coke, coal, and cereals. This accounted for the increase in the imbalance

in 1980. The Prime Minister asked whether the problem on

manufactures was one of tariffs or one of quotas. Mr Verdet

said that it was one of quotas, and asked that the political considerations be taken fully into account. Mr Pownall pointed

out that the problem was concentrated on items such as

textiles, ^{television} radios and footwear, which were ~~very sensitive from the~~ ^{difficult areas for} ~~point of view of our~~ ^{domestic} industry.

11. Mr Verdet quoted as a good example of industrial cooperation Romania's experience with BAC and with Rolls Royce.

What they needed for the future was:-

- i. help from the British Government on sales of technology for the production of metal parts for aircraft and aircraft engines;
- ii. support from the Government for the Romanian position on the sales of those aircraft in third countries; and
- iii. a greater effort to implement the provisions of counter trade in Anglo/Romanian joint documents.

Mr Pownall explained that ~~this was mainly a~~ ^{the latter two were essentially} commercial problem, but that the Department of Trade were in touch with the firm.

12. Mr Verdet said that he hoped matters could be speeded up and that the Government would intervene if there was difficulty. He also pointed to the prospects of cooperation in oil and coal, where British industry had technology to offer, and emphasised the importance to Romania of cooperation in third countries, in which context he cited the examples of a refinery in Jordan, a recent contract in Pakistan with Lummus and discussions over a steel plant in Madagascar. The Prime Minister pointed out that the chairmen of a number of companies particularly active in cooperation with Romania would be at her dinner for Mr Verdet that evening.

13. Mr Verdet said that cultural relations were developing normally and that the Romanians looked forward to the negotiation of the new two year programme in May. They would support these negotiations and implement the agreed programme. The Prime Minister remarked that she had launched British/Romanian exchanges in the field of education when she had visited Romania as Secretary of State for Education: an annual seminar had been set up which had met first in Bucharest and then in

Cambridge.

CSCE

14. The Prime Minister said that she had received and answered a letter from President Ceausescu. The meeting had now adjourned until 5 May. It would be easier to have a successful conference if the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. While the occupation of an independent and neutral country continued our bilateral relations could not be restored to normality as we would wish. If the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, and assuming that Poland remained sovereign and independent, there could once again be more discussion of detente. We were in any case always ready to discuss reductions in the large burden of armaments. We would ~~also~~ like to spend less provided we could be certain that any agreement was monitored and the arrangements properly verifiable. We supported the French CDE proposal at Madrid. The whole of Western Europe was covered by CBMs and the equivalent area in the east went up to the Urals. But President Brezhnev had said that if CBMs extended to the Urals we should go further on the Western side: it was difficult to see what was meant as the Western side was already fully covered. Lord Carrington's proposals on Afghanistan had been intended to take into account the security interests of neighbouring countries, and unless there was some movement it would not augur well for future progress at Madrid. Lord Carrington agreed that progress on Afghanistan would transform the atmosphere at Madrid, but useful progress might still be made if only on a smaller scale. We had made proposals on human rights and information which we hoped the Soviet Union would accept. On CBMs, if we could overcome the problem of geographical area there would be a real incentive to negotiate genuine and verifiable CBMs. We would be ready to

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go along with such a result, but the whole atmosphere would be very different if there was some move on Afghanistan.

15. Mr Verdet said that it was important that the conference was taking place at all. The results were harder to predict. The spirit of President Ceausescu's message was that the break should be used to intensify contacts in the hope of reaching positive results. It was important to ensure the continuation of the Final Act and of the Helsinki spirit, to increase confidence, to have a conference on CBMs and disarmament, and to continue ^{the} dialogue. Each state must implement the Final Act as a whole and not merely emphasise particular parts of it such as human rights. It was important to have dialogue, not confrontation. It was in this spirit that Romania approached the Madrid Conference and also the problem of new missiles. Romania was by no means against a balance in such weapons, but it had to be reached by reducing a total which was already too large. When Romania spoke about the need for reductions in the deployment of new missiles, they did not mean only Western missiles; the total of Soviet arms was too great. The Romanian ideas had been put forward as of benefit to all the people of Europe. The Prime Minister hoped there would be some progress when the Madrid meeting resumed, if only on some of the smaller points.

CONCLUSION

16. In conclusion, Mr Verdet extended to the Prime Minister an invitation from President Ceausescu and himself to pay an official visit to Romania. The Prime Minister thanked Mr Verdet. It would not be possible for her to come this year, but she would like to visit Romania again and looked forward to doing so.

17. The meeting ended at 1805 hours.



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 65/87.

14 April 1981

THE PRIME MINISTER

Subject copy filed on: -

Your Excellency,

Romania : Anglo/Romanian relations : Nov 79

Thank you for your message about the CSCE Review Meeting in Madrid which was passed to me by Ambassador Gliga on 1 April.

I fully share your conviction that everything must be done to ensure peace. This must be the overriding priority for all governments. In our view, a sound East/West relationship must be based on a stable balance of forces and on the exercise of restraint by all states in Europe and in the wider world arena. Only against this background will it be possible to create the necessary climate for arms control and reductions in military spending, both of which are of vital importance.

We shall continue to do all we can to work for an improvement in East/West relations, but the obstacles are not of our making. There is a pressing need for a solution to the problem of Afghanistan in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which would provide for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the freedom of the Afghan people to have a government of their own choosing. There can be no doubt that progress on Afghanistan would be of immediate benefit to East/West relations. Another issue which is in the forefront of our concerns is the situation in and around Poland. It is of the utmost importance that the Polish people should be left to solve their problems without any outside

/interference.

interference.

Against this background, I agree with you that there is a requirement to reduce tension in Europe and to build confidence in the field of military security. That is why we have supported the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe, to negotiate militarily significant, binding and verifiable confidence building measures which apply to the whole of Europe. In this connection, I welcome President Brezhnev's acceptance of the principle that CBMs should apply to the whole of the European part of the Soviet Union. I hope that the Soviet Union will also be ready to accept the other equally important criteria in the French proposal, which we believe to be essential if CBMs are to make a genuine contribution to enhancing security in Europe. I see no reason why we should not proceed on this basis to the proposed conference. If that can be agreed, we shall of course be ready to play a full part in whatever preparatory work proves necessary.

You mentioned also President Brezhnev's proposal for a quantitative and qualitative freezing of medium range nuclear missiles in Europe. We and our Allies see this as an attempt to contractualise the serious imbalance in theatre nuclear forces in favour of the Soviet Union which has resulted from the recent and continuing large-scale deployment of SS20 missiles. It is, as such, unacceptable to us. We remain committed to the double decision which we took with our Allies in December 1979. This provides both for the deployment of American theatre nuclear forces in Europe and for negotiations on this vitally important subject. We believe that any agreed limitation on these systems should be consistent with the principle of parity. That is the only basis for long-term stability.

/Turning now

Turning now to the Madrid Meeting itself, I too consider that we should be working for a balanced final document which will register agreement on the wide range of issues contained in the Helsinki Final Act. As you will know, we and our partners and Allies have tabled a balanced package of new proposals to further improve the implementation of the Final Act. These proposals cover areas which are of direct interest to us in the fields of military security, human rights, contacts and information. I hope that it will be possible to reach agreement on them, and on proposals which have been put forward by other participants. If, at the end of the day, it proves impossible to go as far, we must at least ensure the continuity of the CSCE process itself. I am sure that you will agree with me on that.

I am grateful for your Government's offer to host the next Review Meeting in Bucharest. If a consensus to this effect could be reached at Madrid, we should have no difficulty in joining it. There is, however, another candidate in the field and the decision will no doubt have to be taken towards the end of the Madrid Conference. In the meantime, I hope that our delegations will continue to work closely together to bring the Meeting to a successful close.

I am looking forward to my meeting with Mr. Verdet and to the opportunity of pursuing these and other important questions in our talks.

(sgd) M T

His Excellency Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu.

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File 116

Romania.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 April 1981

VISIT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF
ROMANIA

I enclose a record of the tête-à-tête discussion between the Prime Minister and Mr. Verdet which took place here yesterday afternoon.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

F. N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

DS

13 April 1981

VISIT OF THE ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER:
PERSONNEL CASES

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 10 April on this subject and is content that we should follow the course of action proposed in it.

MODBA

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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✓ Sc. Tlustet oet.

SUBJECT.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA, MR. ILIE VERDET, AT 10 DOWNING STREET
ON MONDAY 13 APRIL AT 1645

Present: Prime Minister Mr. Ilie Verdet
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander Mr. Alexandru Gheorghiu
(Deputy Director, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs)

* * * * *

After an exchange of courtesies, in the course of which Mr. Verdet conveyed greetings from President Ceausescu and his wife to The Queen and her family and to the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister suggested that Mr. Verdet might like to talk about the situation in and around Poland. The outcome of events there would be important for the whole world. Poland's economy was in a very grave state. The West were giving food aid and were helping with the re-financing of Poland's debt. But they were standing strictly on the proposition that Poland was a Sovereign state and must be allowed to solve its own problems in its own way.

Mr. Verdet said that the situation in Poland was an internal Polish problem. It had its basis in complex political difficulties, notably that of national pride. Mistakes had been made in Poland in recent years. However the economic crisis should not be allowed to obscure the fact that Poland had made great progress.

The Romanian Government's position was that there should be no external interference from any quarter in Polish affairs. The Romanian Government, at the highest level, had expressed their confidence that "Polish political forces" could cope and that they had at their disposal everything they needed to resolve the situation. Romania had said this openly in discussions with friendly neighbouring states. Their approach had been shared by everyone they had spoken to. Romania's own relations with Poland were good.

/ The Prime Minister

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
- 2 -

The Prime Minister repeated her hope that Poland would be left to solve its problems without interference. She had been concerned about the harshness of Mr. Husak's speech in Prague. The military arrangements were still in place which would allow the Soviet Government to take a different decision from that which seemed to be implied by President Brezhnev's own speech in Prague.

In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Verdet said that he was optimistic about the future for Poland. When the Prime Minister asked whether he agreed that a Soviet interference would be disastrous for relations between the East and West, Mr. Verdet replied that the question should not be posed in this way. Governments should try to encourage interpretations of the developing situation which would discourage interference and increase confidence in Poland. The Poles had the right to decide the way forward.

The Prime Minister said that she hoped the views which Britain and Romania shared on non-interference would prevail. She was very conscious of the Czechoslovak precedent. Moreover Afghanistan was still occupied. Mr. Verdet replied that he was confident that the principle of non-interference would be observed. As regards Afghanistan he said he thought the time had come to seek a meeting between the Pakistanis, Afghans and the Iranians. The Prime Minister asked who would represent Afghanistan. Mr. Verdet said that it should be the present regime. One must start from the existing reality. The Prime Minister said that she would never accept that Afghanistan could be represented by a puppet regime.

The two Heads of Government then joined the Plenary Session in the Cabinet Room. The tête-à-tête ended at 1750.



13 April 1981

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PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH ON
THE OCCASION OF THE DINNER GIVEN IN HONOUR OF THE ROMANIAN
PRIME MINISTER ON MONDAY 13 APRIL 1981

Mr. Prime Minister, etc.

I am delighted to have this opportunity of entertaining you and members of your delegation this evening.

I am confident that your visit here, Mr. Prime Minister, is going to produce lasting benefits for both our countries.

But honesty compels one to admit that for many people in both our countries, the most exciting Anglo/Romanian event in 1981 will be the return World Cup football match between Romania and England which is due to take place in just over two weeks' time.

We are just behind after the game in Bucharest but are determined to take full advantage of the encounter on home territory.

My husband tells me that a team from Romania playing the kind of football in which he is more interested - Rugby - played some excellent games on their recent tour here.

/Footballers generate

Footballers generate excitement in a situation where one side must win and another lose.

We are fortunate that in the field of political and economic relations between the United Kingdom and Romania, this is not so.

We can each of us win in our continuing co-operation.

Bilateral Relations

Our talks this afternoon were, I think you will agree, consistent with the best traditions of dialogue between Britain and Romania.

Although the social and economic systems of our two countries are profoundly different, we agree on certain essentials, notably the importance of maintaining peace, and respect for the sovereign independence of nations; this provides a firm basis for fruitful discussion and for fruitful co-operation in many fields.

/Political

Political

The tradition of contact, co-operation and dialogue between Romania and these islands has a long history.

Successive British Governments have accorded a high priority to maintaining and developing friendly and constructive relations with Romania.

I know that the Romanian Government shares this interest.

The successful State Visit to Britain by your distinguished President in 1978 was a clear demonstration of this, and your own visit is evidence that our bilateral relations have continued to flourish since then.

Commercial

Our commercial relations are healthy.

Britain is proud of its contribution to the development of the Romanian aircraft industry, a particularly good example of co-operation to joint advantage.

But the scope for trade and co-operation between our two countries is far from exhausted.

/It is important

It is important that we should do more.

I know, Mr. Prime Minister, that your own responsibilities in Romania lie predominantly in the economic field, and am confident that your visit will give new impetus to the development of our commercial and economic relations.

We have tried to arrange for you a programme in this country which takes full account of your interests.

Afghanistan

Your visit here is of value too in the wider context of East/West relations.

The British Government is determined to work for peace and stability.

That is why we emphasise the need for all countries to conduct their international relations with restraint and in strict accordance with the principles of international law and of the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violated those principles and left the West, and the developing world, disillusioned and angry that peace and detente should be so recklessly jeopardised.

/The international climate

The international climate will remain strained until Soviet forces are withdrawn.

The principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states is, I know, as important to you Mr. Prime Minister as it is to me.

I think we are agreed on the gravity of the consequences of a breach of that principle anywhere in Europe.

An external intervention in Poland would be a disaster for us all.

Defence and Arms Control

The search for security is the fundamental responsibility of any government.

In today's uncertain world the need for a credible defence effort is clear.

Those who might contemplate aggression or adventure must know that we have the capability and the will to respond.

/But arms control and

But arms control and disarmament is also a part of the search for security, and one to which we attach great importance.

We have shown ourselves ready both to put forward and to respond to ideas which will allow a balance of forces to be struck at a lower level, and we shall continue to play an active role in this field.

At the same time, we make no secret of our preference for concrete and verifiable measures and of our distrust of what I call the declaratory approach to disarmament.

International Economic

This is a time of economic difficulty for virtually every nation.

But we are especially conscious of the economic difficulties facing many developing countries, particularly the poorest among them.

We welcome Romania's close involvement in the international search for solutions to these problems.

/In this she sets a

In this she sets a valuable example to others. We in Britain are continuing our substantial aid programme, which will amount this year to over £1 billion.

And I believe very strongly in the value of private flows, for which Britain is the second largest source in the world.

But, above all, we shall strive for sustained non-inflationary growth here in Britain, so that what remains one of the most open markets in the world will continue to make a major contribution to the export earnings of the developing countries.

Conclusion

Mr. Prime Minister, I have done no more than touch on some of the major international problems which are of concern to both our countries.

Happily, there are no such problems in our bilateral relations.

I am convinced that our already good relations can continue on their present course; and I hope that they will increasingly develop in the directions of

/interest not only to

interest not only to our governments, but to the people in many walks of life whose informal contacts are an important part of the fabric of international relations.

I would like to raise my glass to you, Mr. Prime Minister, to the happiness and prosperity of the Romanian people and to the further co-operation between Romania and Britain.

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Pennie Riniker

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I have not named the detailed cases into to you since I do not think you would wish to cite them by name. Content that Mr Blaker should do so?

Yes

mt

10 April 1981

Dear Michael,

should do so?

Print 11/4

Following my letter to you on 6 April about the personal cases raised by the Secretary of the British/Romanian Association, we have been considering what action we might usefully take during Verdet's visit.

Of the cases raised by Mr Georgescu, those of Mrs Jarca, Mr Vasilescu and Miss Sarpe do not yet seem to us to justify Government intervention. The Jarca and Sarpe cases have been active only since December and March respectively. By Romanian standards this is a very short period and the individuals involved have not yet been through all the Romanian administrative hoops, tiresome though these are. We therefore consider that for the Prime Minister to raise these cases now would be to raise the level of our representations too far too fast. In the Vasilescu case the Romanian authorities have not yet refused permission for Mr Vasilescu to leave Romania, although Mrs Vasilescu fears that they may. In our view it would therefore be premature for the Prime Minister to intervene also in this case.

We do, however, think it would be valuable to make clear to the Romanians our concern over the Domnesteanu case which has now dragged on for nearly four years. The Home Office are content for Mr Domnesteanu to come to this country and a visa authority has been sent to the Embassy in Bucharest. We would not, however, advocate that the Prime Minister should raise this case herself, but that Mr Blaker should do so in the course of his talks on 14 April with Mr Duma, his Romanian opposite number. Mr Duma has specifically asked for a discussion of CSCE matters and this will provide a good opportunity to raise the Domnesteanu case and perhaps to touch on the Vasilescu one.

Mr Blaker's briefing will also include a reference to the case of the Crisans, a Romanian evangelical family who have been subject to severe persecution because of their proselytising activities. We have received a deluge of letters from MPs and the public on this case; and we would propose that in the general context of CSCE Mr Blaker should draw to Mr Duma's attention the widespread public disquiet the case has evoked in this country. The same brief will cover the cases raised in Amnesty International's letter of 6 April to you. We shall in this way be in a

/position

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position to say that we have taken the occasion of Verdet's visit to emphasise to the Romanians the importance we attach to the human rights provisions of the Final Act and to those which concern the handling of personal cases.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards
(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 April 1981

Amel

Dear Michael,

As requested, I am enclosing a single sheet of points for the Prime Minister's tête-à-tête meeting with Mr Verdet on Monday.

Yours ever.

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

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p/w briefs for Romanian visit.

And.

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA

TETE-A-TETE MEETING ON 13 APRIL

POINTS TO MAKE

General

1. Want to maintain momentum in bilateral relations emphasised by President Ceausescu's (pronounced Chowsheskoo) State Visit in 1978. Value Romania's contribution to international affairs; many important questions on which we can work together.

Ministerial Visits

2. Welcome regular exchanges, eg visit to Romania by Lord Carrington in March 1980 and forthcoming visit by Foreign Minister Andrei (pronounced Andray). But need also to develop trade and encourage more contact between the people of our two countries.

Commercial Relations

3. HMG committed to continued expansion of bilateral trade. Many areas where UK industry could assist Romania in achievement of industrial objectives, especially energy, chemicals, electronics and agriculture. BAC 1-11 contract an example of what can be done.

State Visit to Romania [if raised]

4. Queen appreciates President Ceausescu's invitation. But normally lengthy interval before return State Visits: number of Queen's overseas visits severely limited.

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VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA

TETE-A-TETE MEETING ON 13 APRIL

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PRIME MINISTER

Dinner for the Prime Minister of Romania
Monday, 13 April

I attach the list of guests attending the
dinner for the Prime Minister of Romania on Monday
evening together with a draft seating plan.

Do you agree the seating plan please?

Sue Goodchild

—

10 April 1981

c.c. Mr. Denis Thatcher
Miss Carol Thatcher
Mr. Mark Thatcher

6/10

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE DINNER TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF HIS EXCELLENCY MR. ILIE VERDET, PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA ON MONDAY, 13 APRIL 1981 AT 7.45 PM FOR 8.00 PM LOUNGE SUIT

The Prime Minister
and Mr. Denis Thatcher

Mr. Mark Thatcher

Miss Carol Thatcher

Romanian Suite

His Excellency Mr. Ilie Verdet	Prime Minister of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania
His Excellency Mr. Aurel Duma	Minister Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
His Excellency Mr. Alexandru Mărgăritescu	Minister Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation and Romanian Chairman of the Joint Commission for Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation between Romania and Great Britain
Mr. Gheorghe Boldur	Deputy Minister of Industry and Machine Building (in charge of aerospace sector)
His Excellency the Romanian Ambassador and Mrs. Gliga	
Mr. Constantin Pirvutoiu	Director at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation
Mr. Alexandru Gheorghiu	Deputy Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Dumitru Dima	Director at the Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade
Mr. Mihai Mares	Private Secretary
Mr. Ion Erhan	Editor at the Newspaper "Scinteia"
Mr. Petru Theodosie	Counsellor/Commercial, Romanian Embassy
<u>HM Government</u>	
The Rt. Hon. John Biffen, MP and Mrs. Biffen	to reflect the mainly commercial and industrial aspects of the visit
The Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph, MP	" " "
Mr. Peter Blaker, MP	FCO Minister responsible for Eastern Europe
Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Havers, QC, MP and Lady Havers	

Labour Party

The Rt. Hon. Michael Foot, MP
and Mrs. Foot

Mr. James Johnson, MP
and Mrs. Johnson

Chairman, British-Romanian Parliamentary Group

Conservative Party

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, MP

Mr. Amery is a regular visitor to Romania
and friend of President Ceausescu

The Hon. Alan Clark, MP
and Mrs. Clark

House of Lords

The Viscount Eccles

The Lord Renton

Companies with Commercial Interests in Romania

The Lord McFadzean of Kelvinside Chairman, Rolls Royce

Sir Maurice Hodgson
and Lady Hodgson Chairman, ICI

Sir John Buckley Chairman, Davy Corporation

Sir Brian Kellett
and Lady Kellett Chairman, Tube Investments

Mr. R.G.C. Messervy
and Mrs. Messervy Chairman and Chief Executive, Lucas Industries Ltd.

Mr. A.H.C. Greenwood Deputy Chairman, British Aerospace

Mr. R. Scholey
and Mrs. Scholey Deputy Chairman, British Steel Corporation

Trades Unions

Mr. Gavin Laird AUEW
and Mrs. Laird

Cultural and Press Contacts

Lord Walston Chairman, Great Britain-East Europe Centre.
and Lady Walston British Co-Chairman of the British Romanian
Round Table which will meet in Romania in June

Professor J.O. Bayley She is Iris Murdoch, the novelist, many of whose
and Mrs. Bayley books have been published in Romania

Mr. Richard Hauser Director, Institute of Social Studies.
and Miss C. Hauser Visited Romania in 1978.

Mr. Richard Davy Chief foreign leader writer, The Times. Member,
and Mrs. Davy British-Romanian Round Table

Members

Sir Oliver Wright
and Lady Wright

Officials

Mr. P.C.H. Holmer
and Mrs. Holmer

HM Ambassador, Bucharest

Mr. J.L. Bullard
and Mrs. Bullard

FCO

10 Downing Street

Mr. Ian Gow, MP

Mr. N.J. Sanders

Miss Jane Parsons

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to 9

DRAFT SEATING PLAN
DINNER ON MONDAY, 13 APRIL 1981

I: Interpreters

I
PRIME MINISTER

I
HE MR. ILLIE VERDET

HE Mr. Aurel Duma

MR. DENIS THATCHER

The Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph

I
HE Mr. Alexandru Margaritescu

Mr. Gheorghe Boldur

I
Mrs. Biffen

Rt. Hon. John Biffen

HE The Romanian Ambassador

Mr. Peter Blaker

Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Havers

Mrs. Gliga

Lady Havers

Mr. Constantin Pirvutoi

Mr. Alexandru Gheorghiu

The Hon. Viscount Eccles

The Lord Walston

The Rt. Hon. Michael Foot

Mrs. Foot

Lady Hodgson

Mr. Dumitru Dima

Rt. Hon. Julian Amery

Rt. Hon. Lord Renton

Sir John Buckley

The Lord McFadzean of Kelvinside

Mr. Mihai Mares

Mrs. Bayley

Lady Kellett

Mrs. Holmer

Mr. P.C.H. Holmer

Sir Maurice Hodgson

Mr. Gavin Laird

Mr. Ion Erhan

Lady Walston

Mrs. Laird

Mrs. Scholey

Lady Wright

Sir Brian Kellett

Mr. Petru Theodosie

Mr. J.L. Bullard

Mr. A.H.C. Greenwood

Mrs. Johnson

Sir Oliver Wright

Mr. James Johnson

Mrs. Messervy

Mr. R.G.C. Messervy

Miss Carol Thatcher

Mrs. Davy

Mr. Mark Thatcher

Mrs. Bullard

Mr. Richard Hauser

The Hon. Alan Clark

Miss C. Hauser

Mr. R. Scholey

Mr. Richard Davy

Miss Jane Parsons

Professor J.O. Bayley

Mrs. Clark

Mr. Ian Gow

Mr. N.J. Sanders

ENTRANCE

cup

Romania

8 April 1981

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from a member of the Executive Council of the British Section of Amnesty International, about the visit of the Prime Minister of Romania to this country. As you will see, Ms. Kennedy has copied her letter to Ewen Ferguson. I should be grateful if you could ensure that it is reflected in whatever way is appropriate in the Prime Minister's briefing for her talk with Mr. Verdet.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

F. N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

✓/b

Jub

8 April 1981

Thank you for your letter of 6 April about the visit of the Romanian Prime Minister, Mr. Verdet. I shall ensure that your letter is covered in the Prime Minister's briefing.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Ms. Margaret Kennedy



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 April 1981

Dear Michael,

I am writing to propose that, as we discussed on the telephone, the British side at the Prime Minister's plenary talks with the Romanian Prime Minister on Monday, 13 April should be, apart from the Prime Minister and yourself:

Mr Blaker

Mr Bullard

Mr Fall, Eastern European and Soviet Dept, FCO

Mr Pownall, DOT *copy at 1645*

Mr Holmer, HM Ambassador, Budapest

The Romanians have been given an informal indication that this is likely to be the line-up.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

The Romanian will
probably make a rather
substantive speech. It is
their habit!

But
Can we cut it to ^{7.4.87}
5 min and have
him to make the
main speech.
not

DINNER IN HONOUR OF THE ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER: MONDAY, 13 APRIL

Mr Prime Minister, etc.

I am delighted to have this opportunity of entertaining you and members of your delegation this evening.

I am confident that your visit here, Mr Prime Minister, is going to produce lasting benefits for both our countries. But honesty compels one to admit that for many people in both our countries, the most exciting Anglo/Romanian event in 1981 will be the return World Cup football match between Romania and England which is due to take place in just over two weeks' time. We are just behind after the game in Bucharest but are determined to take full advantage of the encounter on home territory. My husband tells me that a team from Romania playing the kind of football in which he is more interested - Rugby - played some excellent games on their recent tour here.

Footballers generate excitement in a situation where one side must win and another lose. We are fortunate that in the field of political and economic relations between the United Kingdom and Romania, this is not so. We can each of us win in our continuing cooperation.

Relative Relations.

Our talks this afternoon were, I think you will agree, consistent with the best traditions of dialogue between Britain and Romania.

~~(I found, as I had expected, that we continue to take a similar view of many of the pressing international problems of the day.)~~

~~There is, of course, no gain saying the fact that the social and economic systems of our two countries are profoundly different,~~

~~But we agree~~

~~But~~ we agree on certain essentials, notably the ^{importance} ~~necessity~~ of maintaining peace, and respect for the sovereign independence of nations; this provides a firm basis for fruitful discussion and for fruitful cooperation in many fields.

Political

The tradition of contact, cooperation and dialogue between Romania and these islands has a long history. Successive British Governments have accorded a high priority to maintaining and developing friendly and constructive relations with Romania. I know that the Romanian Government shares this interest. The successful State Visit to Britain by your distinguished President in 1978 was a clear demonstration of this, and your own visit is evidence that our bilateral relations have continued to flourish since then.

Commercial

Our commercial relations are healthy. Britain is proud of its contribution to the development of the Romanian aircraft industry, a particularly good example of cooperation to joint advantage. But the scope for trade and cooperation between our two countries is far from exhausted, ~~and~~ it is important that we should do more. ~~I know~~ ^{Mr Prime Minister}, that your own responsibilities in Romania lie predominantly in the economic field. ~~We have tried~~ ^{I am confident that your visit will give new impetus} to arrange for you a programme in this country which takes full account of your interests. In earlier times, Britain was closely associated with the development of oil production in Romania. Britain is now in the fortunate position of being a major oil producer herself. I hope that the experience and expertise we have gained in the North Sea may prove relevant to Romania's plans for off-shore exploration and production.

to the development of

/Your visit

Afghanistan

Your visit here is of value too in the wider context of East/West relations. The British government is determined to work for peace, ^{and} stability, ~~and genuine two way detente.~~ That is why we emphasised the need for all countries to conduct their international relations with restraint and in strict accordance with the principles of international law and of the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violated those principles and left the West, and the developing world, disillusioned and angry that peace and detente should be so recklessly jeopardised. The international climate will remain strained until Soviet forces are withdrawn. ^{N.P.} The principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states is, I know, as important to you Mr Prime Minister as it is to me. I think we are agreed on the gravity of the consequences of a breach of that principle anywhere in Europe. An external intervention in Poland would be a disaster for us all.

/The search for security

Defence & Arms Control.

The search for security is the fundamental responsibility of any government. In today's uncertain world the need for a credible defence effort is ~~all too~~ clear. Those who might contemplate aggression or adventure must know that we have the capability and the will to respond.

But arms control and disarmament is also a part of the search for security, and one to which we attach ~~the greatest~~ importance. We have shown ourselves ready both to put forward and to respond to ideas which will allow a balance of forces to be struck at a lower level, and we shall continue to play an active role in this field. At the same time, we make no secret of our preference for concrete and verifiable measures and of our distrust of what I call the declaratory approach to disarmament.

International Economic

~~This is a time of economic difficulty for virtually every nation. (We have our problems, just as you have yours; and it is we ourselves who will show the strength and determination to overcome them. But it is not just a question of each country seeking its own solution. We live in an interdependent world. This is true whatever our social and economic systems - as the major effort by Western countries to find a way of helping Poland in her current payments crisis is showing.)~~

~~But~~ ^{especially} We are ~~all~~ conscious of the economic difficulties facing many developing countries, particularly the poorest among them. We welcome Romania's close involvement in the international search for solutions to these problems. In this she sets a valuable example to others. We in Britain are continuing our

/ substantial

substantial aid programme, which will amount this year to over £1 billion. And I believe very strongly in the value of private flows, for which Britain is the second largest source in the world. But, above all, we shall strive for sustained non-inflationary growth here in Britain, so that what remains one of the most open markets in the world will continue to make a major contribution to the export earnings of the developing countries.

Interdependence is relevant also in the field of energy, where the oil producers have responsibilities both in relation to the developing countries and towards the world economy as a whole. In the long term, we shall all lose if these responsibilities are not acknowledged. Western nations for their part have recognised the need to reduce dependence on oil and to break the link between economic growth and oil consumption. In Britain we are making good progress in conservation and in encouraging the increased use of coal and nuclear power; and our achievement in the North Sea makes a significant contribution to the balance of energy supply and demand.

Conclusion

Mr. Prime Minister, I have done no more than touch on some of the major international problems which are of concern to both our countries. Happily, there are no such problems in our bilateral relations. I am convinced that our already good relations can continue on their present course; and I hope that they will increasingly develop in the directions of interest not only to our governments, but to the people in many walks of life whose informal contacts are an important part of the fabric of international relations.

/ I would like

I would like to raise my glass to you, Mr. Prime Minister, to the happiness and prosperity of the Romanian people and to the further co-operation between Romania and Britain.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 April 1981

Type up

Dear Michael,

/ As agreed, I enclose a draft of the Prime Minister's speech at her dinner for the Romanian Prime Minister on 13 April. It will, of course, need to be looked at - up to the last moment - in the context of the evolving Polish situation.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

~~DRAFT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT THE DINNER IN HONOUR OF THE ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER: MONDAY, 13 APRIL 1981~~

Mr Prime Minister, etc

I am delighted to have this opportunity of entertaining you and members of your delegation this evening.

~~I suspect~~ ^{will be} that for many people in both our countries, the return World Cup football match between Romania and England which is due to take place in just over two weeks' time, ~~will be~~ ^{the most exciting} the most important Anglo/Romanian event of 1981.

~~It certainly promises to be the most exciting one; We are just behind after the game in Bucharest, but we now have the advantage of home territory. My husband, who is keener on the other kind of football - Rugby - tells me that our last visitors from Romania also made a very good name for themselves recently. Their recent tour here.~~ ^{but are determined to take full advantage of encounter on} ^{Had some excellent games on}

~~As fellow Prime Ministers, you and I must recognise where we stand when it comes to competing with football for public attention! But I hope that you will agree that we can leave it to the Footballers to generate the excitement which comes from a situation where one side must win and another lose. We are fortunate that in the field of political and economic relations between the United Kingdom and Romania, this is not so. We can each of us only gain from our continuing cooperation.~~ ^{win in}

Our talks this afternoon were, I think you will agree, consistent with the ~~very~~ best traditions of dialogue between Britain and Romania. I found, as I had expected, that we continue to take a similar view of many of the pressing international problems of the day. There is, of course, no gainsaying the fact that the social and economic systems of our two countries are profoundly different. But we agree on

/certain

(am confident that your visit here, Mr Prime Minister is going to produce lasting benefits for both our countries - not honesty impels me to admit

a team from Romania playing the kind of football in which he is more interested - Rugby -

certain essentials, notably the necessity of maintaining peace, and respect for the sovereign independence of nations; this provides a firm basis for fruitful discussion and for fruitful cooperation in many fields.

/The

The tradition of contact, cooperation and dialogue between Romania and these islands has a long history. Successive British Governments have accorded a high priority to maintaining and developing friendly and constructive relations with Romania. I know that the Romanian Government shares this interest. The successful State Visit to Britain by your distinguished President in 1978 was a clear demonstration of this, and your own visit is evidence that our bilateral relations have continued to flourish since then.

Our commercial relations are healthy. Britain is ~~particularly~~ proud of its contribution to the development of the Romanian aircraft industry, ^{a particularly good} ~~an excellent~~ example of cooperation to joint advantage. But the scope for trade and cooperation between our two countries is far from exhausted and it is important that we should do more. I know, Mr Prime Minister, that your own responsibilities in Romania lie predominantly in the economic field. We have tried to arrange for you a programme in this country which takes full account of your interests. In earlier times, Britain was closely associated with the development of oil production in Romania. Britain is now in the fortunate position of being a major oil producer herself. I hope that the experience and expertise we have gained in the North Sea may prove relevant to Romania's plans for off-shore exploration and production.

Your visit here, ~~which exemplifies the friendly and productive relations that exist between our two countries~~, is of value ^{too} ~~also~~ in the wider context of East/West relations. The British government ~~yields to none in its determination~~ ^{is} ~~to work~~ ^{ed} for peace, stability and ^{two-way} ~~a~~ genuine detente. That is why we emphasised the need for all countries to conduct their international relations with restraint and in strict accordance

/with

with the principles of international law and ^{of} the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violated those principles and left the West, and the developing world, disillusioned and angry that peace and detente were ^{should be} so recklessly jeopardised. The international climate will remain strained until Soviet forces are withdrawn. The principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states is, I know, as important to you Mr Prime Minister as it is to me. ~~I think we are agreed on the gravity of~~ ^{of a breach of that} ~~need not say how grave the consequences would be if that~~ principle were to be flouted anywhere in Europe. [~~Possible passage on Poland?~~] ^{An external intervention in Poland would be a disaster for us all.}

The search for security is the fundamental responsibility of any government. In today's uncertain world the need for a credible defence effort is all too clear. Those who might contemplate aggression or adventure must know that we have the capability and the will to respond. // But arms control and disarmament is also a part of the search for security, and one to which we attach the greatest importance. We have shown ourselves ready both to put forward and to respond to ideas which will allow a balance of forces to be struck at a lower level, and we shall continue to play an active role in this field. At the same time, we make no secret of our preference for concrete and verifiable measures and of our distrust of what I call the declaratory approach to disarmament.

This is a time of economic difficulty for ^{virtually} ~~most if not all~~ ^{every} the nations ~~of the world~~. We have our problems, just as you have yours; and it is we ourselves who will ~~have to~~ show the strength and determination to overcome them. But it is not just a question of each country seeking its own solution. We live in ^{an} ~~a mutually~~ interdependent world. ^{This is true} ~~whatever~~ our social and economic systems - as the major effort by Western countries to find a way of helping Poland in her current payments crisis is showing.

/We

We are all conscious of the economic difficulties facing many developing countries, particularly the poorest among them. ~~For our part,~~ ^{we} welcome Romania's close involvement in the international search for solutions to these problems. In this she sets a valuable example to others. We in Britain are ~~determined to do what we can to help~~ ~~We shall~~ ^{continue} our substantial aid programme, which will amount this year to over £1 billion. And I believe very strongly in the value of private flows, for which Britain is the second largest source in the world. But, above all, we shall strive for sustained non-inflationary growth here in Britain, so that what remains one of the most open markets in the world will continue to make a major contribution to the export earnings of the developing countries.

Interdependence is relevant also in the field of energy, where the oil producers ^{have} ~~must recognise their~~ responsibilities both in relation to the developing countries and towards the world economy as a whole. In the long term, we shall all lose ^{these responsibilities are not acknowledged} if ~~this lesson is not learnt~~. Western nations for their part have recognised the need to reduce dependence on oil and to break the link between economic growth and oil consumption. In Britain we are making good progress in conservation and in encouraging the increased use of coal and nuclear power; and our achievement in the North Sea makes a significant contribution to the balance of energy supply and demand.

Mr Prime Minister, I have done no more than touch on some of the major international problems which are of concern to both our countries. Happily, there are no such problems in our bilateral relations. I am convinced that our already good relations can continue on their present course; and I hope that they will increasingly develop in the directions of interest not only to our governments, but to the people in many walks of

/life

life whose informal contacts are an important part of the fabric of international relations. I would like to raise my glass to you, Mr Prime Minister, to the happiness and prosperity of the Romanian people and to the further cooperation between Romania and Britain.



amnesty
international

Amnesty International
British Section
Director: Cosmas Desmond

Nobel Peace Prize Winners 1977

GROUP:

6 April 1981

Michael Alexander Esq
Foreign Affairs Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

20 Queens Gardens
Ealing
London
W5 1SF

Dear Mr Alexander

Visit of Prime Minister of Romania: Mr Ilie Verdet

I understand that Mr Ilie Verdet, the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Romania, will be a guest of Her Majesty's Government from 13 to 15 April 1981, and that he will meet the Prime Minister during his visit.

As you may know, Amnesty International is concerned about a number of human rights issues in Romania, and I have asked the Romanian Embassy in London whether it will be possible for members of Amnesty International (British Section) to meet Mr Verdet during his visit to this country to discuss these issues with him.

I would be very grateful if you could bring the attached briefing on human rights issues in Romania to the attention of the Prime Minister before her meeting with Mr Verdet. I realise that she has much to read and that I am sending this to you rather late in the day. But I would urge you particularly to ask the Prime Minister to raise the points on Father Calciu's imprisonment and the cause of the Jiu Valley miners with Mr Verdet. For her to do so could be of inestimable benefit to the people concerned.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Kennedy
(Executive Council, British Section, Amnesty International)

mk/dw

Copy sent to Mr E A J Ferguson, Foreign Office



Nobel Peace Prize Winners 1977

GROUP:

BRIEFING FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

POINTS TO RAISE

CASES

1. FATHER GHEORGE CALCIU-DUMITREASA

Concern at reports that Father Gheorge Calciu-Dumitreasa is on a hunger strike in Jilava Prison Hospital in Bucharest, despite poor health, in protest against his continued imprisonment and prison conditions and treatment. Urge that he be immediately released, both on grounds of ill-health and because he has been imprisoned for exercising his fundamental human rights.

2. SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS

Ion Anghel, Petre Anghelus, Viorel Ardelean, Lucian Bistriceanu, Mircea Dragonir were sentenced to imprisonment for refusing to perform military service on Saturdays (their Sabbath). They have been sentenced, by military courts, for insubordination, not as conscientious objectors.

3. CASES OF IMPRISONED WOULD-BE EMIGRANTS

Gerhard Kloos, Dumitru Ciocoi-Pop, Franz Heiberger, Matthias Hui, Anton Kampf, Josef Noll, Constantin Petrisori, Ioan Schira, Wilhelm Schlee, Ion Stefan.

4. THE JIU VALLEY MINERS

Ask whether miners who took part in the Jiu Valley strike of August 1977 are still being held under restrictive regulations. If so, urge that these restrictions be removed.

5. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN ROMANIA

Ask if the following abuses of human rights are taking place in Romania:

- (i) the penalisation of Romanian citizens, in particular the imprisonment of would-be emigrants, Non-Conformist religious activists and human rights activists, who attempt to exercise internationally recognised human rights in a non-violent manner, by means of a) imprisonment, b) confinement in psychiatric institutions, c) forced labour (the last, officially termed 'corrective labour without deprivation of liberty',

...cont'd

- being an alternative to imprisonment);
- (ii) cruel, inhuman and degrading conditions of imprisonment, including maltreatment of political prisoners;
- If so, urge that these practices be stopped forthwith.

BACKGROUND NOTE

FATHER GHEORGE CALCIU-DUMITREASA

1. Amnesty International (AI) understands that Father Gheorge Calciu-Dumitreasa, a prisoner of conscience adopted by AI, is an orthodox priest and was a lecturer at Bucharest Orthodox Seminary until he was dismissed in May 1978 for criticising atheist state philosophy. Father Calciu, now aged 53, was a political prisoner from 1949 to 1964.
2. On 10 March 1979, Father Calciu was arrested. His arrest coincided with that of two of his acquaintances who were spokesmen of members of an unofficial trade union movement which had declared as its aim the protection of human rights, particularly those related to work.
3. After his arrest, Father Calciu was reportedly forced to sign a declaration concerning a meeting he had had with a foreign journalist. On 10 May 1979, he was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment on charges of conspiracy in connection with the transmission of 'information which endangers state security'. Father Calciu is reported to have been on hunger strike since 11 November 1980, the date of the opening of the CSCE conference (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) in Madrid. He has been held in Aiud prison, and is reported to have been held in isolation for long periods, deprived of heating and adequate clothing during winter, and to have had his food ration severely reduced on several occasions. As a result of this treatment, his health is reported to have been severely undermined.
4. The Romanian authorities have accused the unofficial Free Trade Union of Romanian Workers, founded by a group of intellectuals and workers from Bucharest and Turnu Severin in February 1979, of being a fascist organisation. However, the demands of this movement have no connection with fascist ideology, but are demands for the respect of basic human rights, in particular, those associated with work conditions. After the broadcast of the movement's manifesto on a foreign radio station in March 1979, there was widespread arrests of members. The authorities have also claimed

....cont'd

that Father Calciu was a member of the Romanian war-time fascist movement, although they have not attempted to demonstrate a valid link between these alleged activities and his present imprisonment.

NOTE

5. AI has welcomed the release in November of Gheorge Brasoveanu and Dr Ionel Cana, founder members of the unofficial free Trade Union movement and would urge that a similar clemency be shown to Father Calciu-Dumitreasa.

THE JIU VALLEY MINERS

6. AI understands that in August 1977 a strike took place among miners of the Jiu valley in south western Romania. The strike started on 1 August 1977 in the town of Lupeni, some weeks after a new Government pension scheme was introduced. Delegates of the miners submitted a petition to the Communist Party and state officials requesting the cancellation of the new pension scheme, the improvement of working conditions and job security, the replacement of the existing mine managers, free working clothes, the abolition of fines which amounted to a significant portion of the monthly wages for not fulfilling work norms and abolition of unpaid compulsory labour.
7. According to the information received by AI, President Ceausescu visited the area and promised substantial improvements in the miners' conditions. However, it has been reported that the promised reforms did not take place. On the contrary, it has been alleged that up to 4000 miners were later dismissed from their jobs, many of them being transferred to other mines. Those who had played a prominent part in the strike, in particular a twenty-member delegation that went to Bucharest to request an audience with the Communist Party Central Committee, were arrested on their return and sent without trial to work in other districts where they were demoted and put under police surveillance. AI understands that the two leaders of the strike died, one in a car accident and one allegedly in a street shooting, within a short time of the strike. It appears that neither accident was properly investigated by the police. Another source has claimed that many of the miners were diagnosed as mentally ill, pensioned off, and deprived of their rights to work.
8. In September 1978, AI took up the cases of 24 named miners who, according to the information available, had been forcibly resettled.

.....cont'd

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN ROMANIA

9. Romanian authorities have told AI in the past that, although human rights abuses took place during the post-war Stalinist period, the situation has changed under the present leadership. However, AI continues to be concerned about a number of human rights issues in Romania:
- (i) AI believes that decree 153/1970 of Romanian law, which allows people to be imprisoned for up to six months on charges of 'social parasitism' (ie. refusal to take up employment or follow a course of training) is being applied to people who are not voluntarily leading a 'parasitic' life but who have attempted non-violently to exercise their human rights in a manner not approved by the authorities; in particular, would-be emigrants who are involuntarily unemployed through having been dismissed from their jobs as a reprisal for having applied to emigrate, religious dissenters and signatories to appeals drawing attention to violations of human rights in Romania.
 - (ii) AI has stated publicly that a number of dissenters have been confined, in the majority of cases for periods of up to two months, to psychiatric hospitals for their non-violent exercise of their basic human rights rather than for authentic medical reasons and has cited specific cases in this respect. AI further believes that, in other cases, dissenters have been dismissed from their jobs and pensioned off as 'mentally unfit';
 - (iii) The migration laws and the restrictions which may face those who seek to emigrate may also result in convictions for social parasitism when a person loses his post after having filed an application to leave the country. A number of persons have therefore felt constrained to attempt to leave the country illegally and have been imprisoned for this. In this context, AI is concerned about the applicability in Romanian law of the right to leave the country as provided under the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
 - (iv) AI believes that, although in recent years, relatively few cases have been brought to its attention of persons sentenced to imprisonment on explicitly political charges, it is also clear that political and other dissenters have not ceased to be persecuted or prosecuted, but that they increasingly tend to be charged under non-political articles which ostensibly do not relate to their exercise of their human rights, such as
-cont'd

- social parasitism, disturbance of the peace, and homosexuality;
- (v) AI has received, and continues to receive, numerous allegations that, during pre-trial detention and interrogation, the accused has been beaten and threatened by members of the State Security forces. These allegations occur with such regularity and from such a variety of sources that AI is compelled to conclude that police brutality is condoned by State authority;
- (vi) Finally, AI believes that, in some cases, satisfactory legal procedures are not adhered to during pre-trial detention - in particular, access to a defence lawyer of the accused's choice - or during the trial itself - dissenters have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment after a summary trial held in camera.

VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA:
13-16 APRIL 1981

SMV (81)1-9

1. STEERING BRIEF
 - a. Anglo-Romanian Relations
 - b. Romanian Internal Situation
 - c. Romanian Foreign Policy
 - d. Statistical Annex
 - e. Personalities
2. EAST/WEST RELATIONS (INCLUDING CSGE, AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND)
3. CHINA
4. MIDDLE EAST
 - a. Iraq/Iran
 - b. Arab/Israel
5. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS (INCLUDING NORTH/SOUTH)
6. ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION
7.
 - a. EC/Romanian Relations
 - b. EC/CMEA Relations
8. POLITICAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS
9. COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

*This set of briefs
destroyed. Set preserved
in CAB 133.*

*R Porner
16 Nov 10*

CONFIDENTIAL

✓ Romania
MAJ

Cabinet Office,
70 Whitehall,
London SW1

PS(81) 7

23rd March 1981

Dear Private Secretary,

Visit of the Prime Minister of Romania:
13th-16th April 1981

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the visit of the Prime Minister of Romania from 13th to 16th April.

The objectives for the visit, as approved by the Prime Minister, are at Annex A. The list of briefs to be prepared, with an indication of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex B. Instructions on format are at Annexes C and D. Those preparing briefs should note carefully the details on the format of briefs set out in Annex C, particularly (b) on the structure of briefs.

70 copies of each brief should be sent to the Cabinet Office as soon as they are ready, and should in any event arrive no later than 12.00 noon on Friday, 10th April. They should be addressed to Mrs. M. Wagner in Committee Section, who should be consulted (tel. no. 233 7628) about any technical points arising.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Douglas Wass, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Kenneth Clucas, Sir Donald Maitland, Sir Peter Preston, Sir Kenneth Couzens, Sir Antony Duff and Mr. Robin Ibbs, and to Michael Alexander, No. 10

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) D.J. WRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER
13th-16th APRIL 1981

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

1. To demonstrate our continued support for Romania's independent line in foreign policy.
2. To exchange views on East-West relations with particular regard to the situation in and around Poland.
3. To maintain the momentum in bilateral relations generated by President Ceausescu's State Visit to the United Kingdom in 1978 and Lord Carrington's visit to Romania last year, in particular with the aim of improving the prospects for United Kingdom trade including bilateral exchanges on energy matters.

PROBABLE ROMANIAN OBJECTIVES

1. To obtain further support for Romania's independent line and to enhance Romania's international stature.
2. To exchange views on East-West relations and other international problems.
3. To promote bilateral relations and press for further high-level exchanges particularly a return State Visit to Romania by The Queen.
4. To promote a balanced expansion in commercial and economic relations with particular emphasis on counter-trade and joint ventures in third countries.
5. To seek trade concessions especially in relations with the EC.

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR VISIT OF ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER
13th-16th APRIL 1981

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
1.	Steering Brief with Annexes on	FCO	
	(a) Anglo-Romanian Relations		
	(b) Romanian Internal Situation		
	(c) Romanian Foreign Policy		
	(d) Statistical Annex		
	(e) Personalities		
 <u>International Questions</u>			
2.	East-West Relations (including CSCE, Afghanistan and Poland)	FCO	
3.	China	FCO	
4.	Middle East:		
	(a) Iraq/Iran	FCO	Energy
	(b) Arab/Israel	FCO	
5.	International Economic Questions (including North/South)	FCO	Treasury Trade Energy ODA
6.	Arms Control and Non-proliferation	FCO	
7.	(a) EC/Romania Relations	Trade	FCO
	(b) EC/CMEA Relations	FCO	Trade
 <u>Bilateral Questions</u>			
8.	Political and Cultural Relations	FCO	
9.	Commercial Relations	Trade	FCO Energy

INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex D. Those preparing briefs should pay particular attention to ensuring that the following instructions are fully observed:

Content

- (a) Briefs should be concise. Each brief should if possible be no more than four sides long.
- (b) The main body of each brief should comprise two sections, a concise list of Points to Make, followed by a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.
- (c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained with all the information required on that particular subject. Briefs should not be divided into separate self-contained sub-sections.

Layout

- (d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.
- (e) As shown in the specimen at Annex D, the top page only of each brief should contain the following details: the symbol and number of the brief in the top left-hand corner (e.g. SMV (81) 10) with the date of production below; a copy number in red at the top right-hand corner; the visit heading; the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible.
- (f) At the foot of the last page and on the left-hand side, briefs should bear the name of the originating Government Department and the date of origin.

Reproduction

- (g) Briefs should be reproduced throughout on white paper, with each page bearing a security classification at top and bottom (as in Annex D). Care should be taken that the reproduction method employed results in clear readable copies.

- (h) It is important that on arrival at the Cabinet Office, briefs should be complete in all detail - collated, stapled and copy numbered and ready for immediate circulation.

Updating

- (i) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, an addendum should be prepared. It should be set out in the form described at (e) above, with the brief number (e.g. SMV (81) 10 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when an addendum is in preparation. Revised briefs and corrigenda should be similarly treated.
- (j) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex B require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

[CLASSIFICATION]

ANNEX D

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S MV (81) [Serial Number as specified in Annex B] COPY NO. [in red]

[Date]

VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA:
13th-16th APRIL 1981

[Leave 1½"
margin]

[SUBJECT] [Insert subject in capitals]

Brief by [name of originating Department, eg Foreign and
Commonwealth Office]

[At the foot of the last page:-]
[left-hand side]

[Originating Government Department, eg Foreign and Commonwealth Office
or Department of Industry, not a subordinate section or division]

[Date of origin]

[CLASSIFICATION]

File

DS

by
Romania

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
CABINET OFFICE

Visit by the Romanian Prime Minister

The attachments to your minute to me of 17 March on this subject would seem to me to provide an admirable basis on which to prepare briefing for the forthcoming visit of Mr. Verdet.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

18 March 1981

②



Ref. A04482

MR ALEXANDER

Visit by Romanian Prime Minister

The Romanian Prime Minister, Mr Verdet, is to visit Britain from 13-16 April. During his visit, Mr Verdet will have talks with the Prime Minister who will also be giving a dinner in his honour and having a further meeting with him after Question Time on the second day of his visit. The full programme is at Annex A.

2. Mr Verdet's visit will be the first to the United Kingdom by a Romanian Prime Minister. It is not breaking new ground in terms of level, since President Ceausescu paid a State Visit in 1978; but the Romanians attach great importance to it. It follows a successful visit to Romania by Lord Carrington in March 1980; and the Romanians recall with pleasure the visit paid there by Mrs Thatcher.

3. This relatively high frequency of visits reflects the healthy state of British/Romanian relations. Romania is in some ways the most independent-minded member of the Warsaw Pact, and has on occasion followed its own line in foreign policy often in a way which has been both helpful and constructive. British Governments of both parties have wished to give a measure of encouragement to this. The visit will also mark our recognition of Romania's important international position as a country enjoying good relations with both East and West and with the Third World.

4. Mr Verdet's meeting with the Prime Minister will provide an opportunity for a substantial exchange on international political issues such as Afghanistan, Poland and East/West relations generally. The Romanians for their part have made clear that given his predominantly economic pre-occupations Mr Verdet's main interest will lie in discussing bilateral commercial, economic, technical and scientific relations. We welcome this. These points will no doubt arise during the talks which Mr Verdet will also be having with the Secretaries of State for Trade, Industry and Energy.



5. It seems unlikely that any substantial pieces of commercial business will be completed during the visit, but Mr Verdet will have an opportunity to meet British industrialists at a meeting sponsored by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry and by the CBI. The Romanians have discovered some oil in the Black Sea and there may be opportunities for British firms to cooperate in exploiting these. Mr Verdet will therefore visit an oil rig in the North Sea and will be meeting representatives of a number of companies in the energy sector. He will also be paying visits to British Aerospace and Rolls Royce, who in 1978 won a substantial contract for the sale and licensed manufacture of BAC 1/11 airliners.

--- 6. In addition to the programme at Annex A, I also attach a draft list of objectives for the visit at Annex B and a list of briefs at Annex C. I should be grateful if you could confirm that you are content with these, in which case I will arrange for the briefs to be commissioned by the Cabinet Office and to reach you by mid-day on Friday, 10 April.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

17 March 1981

Visit of Romanian Prime Minister: 13-16 AprilDraft Programme

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
Monday 13 April	1030	Arrival at London Heathrow by Private aircraft.
	1200-1230	Lay wreath at Westminster Abbey.
		Lunch with Romanian Ambassador.
	1530	Call by Leader of Opposition.
	1600	Tete-à-tete talks with Prime Minister followed by Plenary talks.
Tuesday 14 April	1945 for 2000	Dinner hosted by Prime Minister.
	0930	Talks with Secretary of State for Trade, Victoria Street.
	1030-1230	Meeting at London Chamber of Commerce with representatives of industry.
	1300	Luncheon at the Mansion House.
	1515	Attend Prime Minister's Question Time followed by tea with Prime Minister.
	Later	Meeting with the Anglo-Romanian Parliamentary Group.
	1630	Talks with Secretary of State for Industry.
	1730	Talks with Secretary of State for Energy.
	Evening	Free.
	Wednesday 15 April	am-lunch
pm		Fly to Aberdeen.
		Dinner with businessmen and oil company representatives.
Thursday 16 April	am	Visit an oil-rig in North Sea.
	pm	Depart for London and Bucharest.

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ANNEX B

VISIT OF ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER
13th-16th APRIL 1981

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

1. To demonstrate our continued support for Romania's independent line in foreign policy.
2. To exchange views on East-West relations with particular regard to the situation in and around Poland.
3. To maintain the momentum in bilateral relations generated by President Ceausescu's State Visit to the United Kingdom in 1978 and Lord Carrington's visit to Romania last year, in particular with the aim of improving the prospects for United Kingdom trade including bilateral exchanges on energy matters.

PROBABLE ROMANIAN OBJECTIVES

1. To obtain further support for Romania's independent line and to enhance Romania's international stature.
2. To exchange views on East-West relations and other international problems.
3. To promote bilateral relations and press for further high-level exchanges particularly a return State Visit to Romania by The Queen.
4. To promote a balanced expansion in commercial and economic relations with particular emphasis on counter-trade and joint ventures in third countries.
5. To seek trade concessions especially in relations with the EC.

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ANNEX C

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR VISIT OF ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER
13th-16th APRIL 1981

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
1.	Steering Brief with Annexes on	FCO	
	(a) Anglo-Romanian Relations		
	(b) Romanian Internal Situation		
	(c) Romanian Foreign Policy		
	(d) Statistical Annex		
	(e) Personalities		
	<u>International Questions</u>		
2.	East-West Relations (including CSCE, Afghanistan and Poland)	FCO	
3.	China	FCO	
4.	Middle East:		
	(a) Iraq/Iran	FCO	Energy
	(b) Arab/Israel	FCO	
5.	International Economic Questions (including North/South)	FCO	Treasury Trade Energy ODA
6.	Arms Control and Non-proliferation	FCO	
7.	(a) EC/Romania Relations	Trade	FCO
	(b) EC/CMEA Relations	FCO	Trade
	<u>Bilateral Questions</u>		
8.	Political and Cultural Relations	FCO	
9.	Commercial Relations	Trade	FCO Energy

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Romania

R H

MR THATCHER

The dinner for the
Prime Minister of Romania on
Monday, 13 April is informal.

CS

4 March, 1981

CAROLINE

Prime Minister
agrees to dinner
being informal?
cf.

Dinner for the Prime Minister of Romania
Monday, 13 April

I am told by the Foreign Office
that the Romanians never wear black tie!
Would the Prime Minister therefore be agreeable
to the dinner being informal?

Due

Yes
no

3 March 1981

B/F 9-4-81

HS

Romania

19 February 1981

Visit of the Romanian Prime Minister: 13-16 April

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 17 February. She has agreed the following timings:-

Monday 13 April

1600-1800 Tete-a-tete meeting followed by plenary talks
1945 for 2000 Dinner

Tuesday 14 April

1535-1550 Tea in the Prime Minister's room at the House of Commons.

The Prime Minister agrees that there should be short (5-10 minutes) formal speeches after dinner. I should be grateful to receive a draft by close of play on Thursday 9 April.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

1



Prime Minister (D)

Re speeches: I fear that it would be beyond the Romanian to deliver an informal speech.

Agree, therefore, to short (5/10 mins) formal speeches?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 February 1981

Ans 18/2 Yes not

Dear Michael,

Visit of Romanian Prime Minister: 13-16 April

As you will have seen from our telegram number 26 the Romanians have accepted the draft outline programme for their Prime Minister's visit in April. We now need to confirm the details of the programme. We understand from earlier discussion that the following timings would be acceptable to the Prime Minister:

Monday 13 April

1600 - 1800 - tete-a-tete meeting followed by
~~1630-1830~~ plenary talks
 1945 for 2000 - dinner

Tuesday 14 April

1535- - tea in the Prime Minister's room in
 1550 the Commons.

A | The Romanians seem to expect there to be formal speeches during the dinner rather than a mere exchange of toasts. But they appear disposed to accept any preference the Prime Minister may have on the subject. One possibility would be to go for short formal speeches, making it clear to the Romanians that given the need for interpretation any speech should be kept down to a maximum of 10 minutes of substance. If the Prime Minister would be content with this we shall put in hand the drafting of her speech.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
 10 Downing Street

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6305

PP BUCHAREST

GRS 126

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 101800Z FEBRUARY 81

TO PRIORITY BUCHAREST

TELEGRAM NUMBER 26 OF 10 FEBRUARY

VERDET: YOUR LETTER OF 3 FEBRUARY TO MONTGOMERY

1. WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING ROMANIAN EMBASSY FOR REACTIONS TO THE DRAFT PROGRAMME AND CHARGE CALLED ON HEAD OF EESD ON 9 FEBRUARY TO STATE ON INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE ROMANIANS ACCEPTED THE DRAFT IN PRINCIPLE. EUJOR THEN RETURNED TO THE CHARGE ON A SECOND SESSION OF TALKS AND ON A JOINT COMMUNIQUE. FALL SAID THAT WE WOULD WISH TO STICK TO OUR PRACTICE WHICH WAS TO HAVE ONE SESSION OF TALKS AND TO DO WITHOUT A COMMUNIQUE. HE ADDED IN THE FORMER CONTEXT THAT HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS TO HAVE A BRIEF MEETING OVER TEA AFTER QUESTION TIME.
2. OTHER DETAILS WILL FOLLOW BY BAG.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

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MR FERGUSSON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1981

*Fg
Richards*

Dear Michael,

Visit of the Romanian Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 12 January. We are most grateful for the Prime Minister's readiness to offer Mr Verdet tea in her room in the House of Commons after Questions on 14 April and have included this in our draft programme for the visit. We believe this should meet the Romanians' wish to increase the Prime Minister's involvement in the programme and we shall now be pressing them for early confirmation that the proposed arrangements are acceptable.

Yours ever,

F N Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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HS

Ranava

12 January 1981

BF

Visit of the Romanian Prime Minister

I have discussed your letter to me of 8 January with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister does not wish to have a "concluding session" of talks with M. Verdet on the morning of 14 April. She would however be happy to offer him a cup of tea in her room in the House of Commons after Questions on that day. Given that the Prime Minister will be departing for India later in the afternoon, I hope it can be made clear, tactfully, to the Romanians that the Prime Minister will have no more than 15 or 20 minutes to spare.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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2/11



Perhaps we can have a word. mb

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

8 January 1981 (1)

In my view it would be wrong to offer the Romanians a second session of talks.

N. Verdet is getting just as much of your time as any other Prime Minister would on a visit of this kind: to offer him a second session would create a most undesirable precedent - as well as being a poor way to use up your last morning before departure for India. A possible compromise would be to offer him a cup of tea for 10 minutes in your room at the House immediately after Questions - which he will be attending. Agree?

Dear Michael,

Visit of Romanian Prime Minister:

13 and 14 April

Ans. 9/1

The Ambassador in Bucharest put to the Romanians on 4 December the proposals for the programme contained in FCO telno 269 to Bucharest, and he took the occasion of a call on the Foreign Ministry on 18 December to chase progress. He was told that Verdet had been very busy, and that a reply was unlikely before the New Year.

We may get something soon, but the activities of the Romanian Embassy here suggest that they - or Bucharest - are concerned about the extent of the Prime Minister's involvement in Verdet's programme and that the reply may have been delayed for that reason. Their precise fears are hard to pin down, as they seem worried both by the fact that the Prime Minister will not be in the UK during the second half of the visit and by the thought that she may be there after all, but otherwise engaged; but a general impression of suspected slight is being conveyed and seems to have survived our efforts to dispel it.

We have given the Romanians no grounds to believe that the extent of the Prime Minister's involvement in the programme is negotiable. It would, however, be very helpful if we were able to offer Verdet a further meeting with Mrs Thatcher on 14 April, which (although it need not be very long) could be presented as a 'concluding session' of the talks which will have started on the 13th. Such a meeting would be still more important if the Prime Minister were to leave the UK before Question Time on the 14th (which features in the programme proposed to Verdet), but we would see advantage in proposing it to the Romanians in any case. The morning of the 14th would seem to be the best time, and I hope that you will be able to agree that we should put this to the Romanians.

No question of this.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St



PRIME MINISTER

Visits and Visitors - 1981

I attach a summary of your programme of outward visits and inward visitors next year as it is at present shaping up. I also attach the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's programme together with a background note.

Subject to your views, your programme seems to me at present to be manageable. However, I hope you will agree that it would be wise to resist proposals to extend it much further. In particular the programme of inward visits ^{*} is already looking rather ambitious: there will inevitably be a considerable number of unforeseen additions.

* The FCs would like to issue an (undated) invitation to Mr Angabe early next week for a visit to London next year. Agree?

Am

12 December 1980

(Can we wait a little. I can not see it would be sufficiently well received by public opinion. not.)

PRIME MINISTER'S VISITS AND VISITORS - 1981

OUTWARD VISITS

Fixed, in hand or highly probable

United States of America	Late February/early March
European Council - Maastricht	23-24 March
India/Gulf	15-23 April
North/South Summit - Mexico	Early June
European Council - Luxembourg	29-30 June
Ottawa Summit	19-21 July
CHGM - Melbourne	30 September - 7 October
Anglo-German Summit - Bonn	? October

Proposals

Portugal - now looks less attractive	1 day
Strasbourg	December - 1 day

INWARD VISITORS

Fixed, in hand or highly probable

Panama President	30 March - 1 April
Ghana President	Early 1981
Romania Prime Minister	13-16 April
Anglo-German Summit	11-12 May
Anglo-Italian Summit	? May or later
Anglo-French Summit	? June
Anglo-Irish Summit	June/July
European Council	26-27 November

/ Proposals

Proposals

Mauritius Prime Minister	Early February
French Prime Minister	Early 1981 - if at all
Zimbabwe Prime Minister	
Jamaican Prime Minister	
Belgian Prime Minister	Late 1981
Cameroon President	
Peruvian Prime Minister	
Dominican Prime Minister	

Notes

- (i) The Prime Minister of Singapore is likely to visit the United Kingdom under his own steam in 1981, to become a Freeman of the City of London.
- (ii) The Sultan of Brunei is coming for 4-6 weeks in the Spring to learn about the arts of government.
- (iii) The Prime Minister of Fiji may also come under his own steam.

MR. ALEXANDER

Prime Minister's Visits Overseas and Visitors 1981

I have checked through Roderick Lyne's letter to you of 1 December and can confirm all the dates he mentions on page 4, both for the outward visits and the inward visitors. I would be grateful, however, if when you write back to him you could ask him to go firm as quickly as possible with any of his "proposals". I think it would also be a good idea to show the Prime Minister the whole programme.

The FCO ask for a specific date for Sir S. Ramgoolam. I can manage a dinner on either Wednesday 11 or Thursday 12 February and talks on either day, though the 12th would be infinitely preferable. Not much alternative around that time.

I really am going to be in great difficulty fitting anything more in.

ES.

5 December 1980

fs
Runt

~~7. Alexander~~
To see
CJ-4/12.
Banana

RESTRICTED

5929 - 1

PP BUCHAREST

GRS 300

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 031000Z DEC 80

TO PRIORITY BUCHAREST

TELEGRAM NUMBER 269 OF 3 DECEMBER 1980

VERDET'S VISIT

1. NO 10 WOULD LIKE TO GET AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE MAIN LINES OF THE PROGRAMME FOR VERDET. IT NOW SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL HERSELF BE GOING ABROAD ON AN EXTENDED TOUR LATE ON 14 APRIL. WE THEREFORE HOPE VERDET WILL ARRIVE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON 13 APRIL SO THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVOLVEMENT IN HIS PROGRAMME CAN AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BE RESTRICTED TO THE FIRST DAY AND A HALF.

2. PROVIDED YOU SEE NO OBJECTION PLEASE PUT THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY DRAFT PROGRAMME TO THE ROMANIANS EMPHASISING THAT IT REPRESENTS INITIAL OFFICIAL THINKING AD REFERENDUM TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

MONDAY 13 APRIL.

ARRIVE LATE MORNING.

AFTERNOON: TETE A TETE WITH PRIME MINISTER.

FORMAL TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER.

EVENING: ATTEND DINNER GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER.

TUESDAY 14 APRIL.

CALLS ON OTHER MINISTERS.

LUNCH (SEE PARA 3 BELOW).

ATTEND PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTION TIME.

EVENING: OPERA AND SUPPER PARTY.

WEDNESDAY 15 APRIL.

ALL DAY VISIT OUTSIDE LONDON.

THURSDAY 16 APRIL.

MORNING: DEPART.

3. PLEASE ALSO EMPHASISE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE ROMANIANS:

(A) WE VERY MUCH HOPE VERDET WILL BE ABLE TO ARRIVE BY MID DAY ON MONDAY 13 APRIL.

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5929 - 1

(B) WE ARE NOT/NOT PROPOSING A RETURN DINNER BY VERDET, AND UNDERSTAND THIS ACCORDS WITH ROMANIAN PRACTICE.

(C) GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON WHAT VERDET WOULD WISH TO SEE OUTSIDE LONDON ON 15 APRIL.

4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY AT THIS STAGE, WE HOPE THE LUNCH ON 14 APRIL WILL BE GIVEN BY THE LORD MAYOR, AND THAT VERDET WILL BE ABLE TO CALL ON MR NOTT AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND RECEIVE A CALL BY THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION.

CARRINGTON

NNNN
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NEWS DEPT
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON

-
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

MODBA O/R.

1 December 1980

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister's Overseas Visits and
Visitors 1981

Lord Carrington has been considering possible programmes of visits and visitors for the Prime Minister and himself in 1981. I enclose a schedule of existing plans at Prime Ministerial level and of Lord Carrington's additional proposals, as well as a schedule of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's own plans. We assume of course that events are likely to necessitate additional visits, outward and inward, which cannot now be foreseen.

The Queen

As background, I should recall the plans for State Visits next year. The recommendations are likely to be that King Khalid of Saudi Arabia be invited in June and President Shagari of Nigeria in November. If there is a recommendation for a State Visit in March, it may be for President Marcos of the Philippines or President Banda of Malawi. The Queen will visit Norway in May, Australia for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM) in September/October, and New Zealand and Sri Lanka later in October. Canada is a possibility in July.


Outward Visits by the Prime Minister

In view of the UK Presidency in the second half of 1981, the Prime Minister may prefer to fit as many of her outward trips as possible into the first half of the year.

Lord Carrington welcomes the idea that the Prime Minister should visit the Gulf in early January or in connection with her Indian visit in April. He suggests that the best countries to visit would be Saudi Arabia, Oman and

/the

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Agreed

the United Arab Emirates. If the Prime Minister agrees, we shall submit draft telegrams to the Posts with instructions and detailed suggestions. (There will not be time to include visits to all six Arab states in the Persian Gulf, but the Prime Minister has met in the relatively recent past the Amir of Qatar, and the Prime Ministers of Bahrain and Kuwait. They will be borne in mind for another Ministerial visit in the not too distant future.)

The proposals in the schedule for visits to the US and to the North/South Summit in Mexico need little explanation. Lord Carrington will make specific suggestions in due course. We shall also make detailed suggestions about a visit to India in April. A visit to Spain would only be appropriate if the Lisbon Agreement on Gibraltar is implemented. If this condition was met, a visit during the UK Presidency would be particularly appropriate. A visit to Portugal (Paul Lever's letter of 7 November) could be extremely brief, but the Portuguese would wish it to be separate from any visit to Spain.

Agreed

The schedule of outward visits does not include an Anglo/Italian Summit in Rome in November. The Prime Minister may feel that the frequency of these meetings could be eased by suggesting in due course to the Italians that the second Summit due in 1981 might be postponed because of the UK Presidency until early 1982.

Inward Visits

Agreed

Sir S Ramgoolam, although Prime Minister of Mauvitius since independence, has never paid an official visit to Britain. Despite his age he is not expected to retire soon. He is firmly pro-Western and his country is among the few which have preserved the Westminster model of Parliamentary democracy. Lord Carrington recommends that Sir S Ramgoolam should be invited here in the second week of February, when the Mauritian parliament (where the government have a slender majority) will be in recess and when The Queen should be able to receive him. Given the short time available, we would be grateful to know the Prime Minister's wishes as soon as possible.

Please try to delay.

An invitation to Mr Mugabe would be an excellent way of keeping up the momentum of our relations with Zimbabwe. One of the regular Anglo/Irish Summits will be due in mid-year and should probably be held after the Northern Ireland

/local



not before
election

local government elections in June. We shall be writing shortly with detailed suggestions about inviting M. Barre. It would be a suitable gesture to invite the Belgian Prime Minister for a brief visit before we hand over the Presidency to Belgium at the end of the year.

shall be here
at 10 am
Wed

An invitation to Mr Seaga would be an excellent goodwill gesture after the change of government in Jamaica.

We have tended to neglect Cameroon, a stable, moderate country which is one third Anglophone. The Cameroon market, with its sound agricultural base and significant oil reserves, is buoyant and attractive. President Ahidjo, in office since independence in 1960, has just started another 5 year term. Lord Carrington recommends an official invitation in 1981.

Peru has recently returned to democratic government. The economy is strong and offers opportunities for investment and exports. Dr Ulloa, the Prime Minister, is also Minister of the Economy and Commerce and the most important person after the President. An official visit could win us a valuable friend.

The new, moderate Dominican Government would welcome an invitation to the Prime Minister, Miss Charles. There is advantage in demonstrating support for governments favouring stability in the volatile Eastern Caribbean.

You will see that Lord Carrington's schedule of inward visits includes the possibility of inviting the Polish Foreign Minister. But, depending on how things go in Poland, we may later wish to sound the Poles about the possibility of a higher level contact instead.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

yours ever
R M J Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S OVERSEAS VISITS AND VISITORS, 1981

OUTWARD VISITS

Fixed or in hand

Morocco/Egypt	3-17 January
Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels	19-20 January
Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels	16-17 February
Political Cooperation Foreign Ministers - The Hague	25 June
Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels	16-17 March
European Council - Maastricht	23-24 March
Foreign Affairs Council - Luxembourg	13-14 April
Hong Kong/China/Japan/Pakistan	?28 March - 9/10 April
State Visit to Norway	May
Foreign Ministers' Informal weekend - Netherlands	9-10 May
Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels	18-19 May
NATO Ministerial Meeting Location not fixed	2 days in May
Foreign Affairs Council - Luxembourg	22-23 June
European Council - Luxembourg	29-30 June
Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels	13-14 July
Ottawa Summit	19-21 July
Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels	14-15 September
CHGM Melbourne	30 September - 7 October
Foreign Affairs Council - Luxembourg	19-20 October
Anglo-German Summit - Bonn	?October
Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels	16-17 November
NATO Ministerial Meeting - Brussels	2 days in December
Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels	7-8 December

Proposals

USA	?February/March
Pakistan en route to Hong Kong	?26 March
FRG	Early 1981
Moscow	Early 1981
Nigeria	February 1981
France for brief Bilateral	
North/South Summit - Mexico	Early June
Netherlands (handover visit to outgoing Presidency)	One day late June
UNGA (speaking engagement in US?)	September
Luxembourg: Churchill Memorial Lecture	One day October
Berlin after the Anglo-German Summit	October
ASEAN two countries en route to or from CHGM	September-October

INWARD VISITORS

Fixed or in hand

Mozambique Foreign Minister	26-29 January
Foreign Ministers' informal weekend	5-6 September
Anglo-German Summit	?May
Anglo-Italian Summit	?May
Anglo-French Summit	?June
Political Cooperation Foreign Ministers	13 October
European Council	26-27 November
Iraqi Foreign Minister (perhaps in 1980)	

Proposals

Foreign Ministers of:

Poland

Venezuela

Yugoslavia

Brazil

India

Sweden

Luxembourg

Finland

Mexico

Botswana

Notes

- (i) The Department may wish later to recommend that the Secretary of State should attend the opening session of the Global Negotiations, which may be in late January.
- (ii) New Australian Foreign Minister likely to come under own steam in 1981.
- (iii) The same applies to the Portuguese Foreign Minister;
- (iv) and to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister.
- (v) The Foreign Minister of Guinea may come in early 1981 as a COI Visitor.



Lee
Romania
DSC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 October 1980

VISIT OF ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER

I am replying to your letter to Mike Pattison of 20 October and I have made a note that the Romanian Prime Minister would like to pay a visit to this country during the week of 13-16 April 1981. I am quite happy to go firm on these dates, but as there will be quite a few commitments for the Prime Minister it would help me if we could go firm on the lunches/dinners as soon as possible because at the moment I am having to keep the whole week free.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DB

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 October 1980

Dear Mike,

Visit of Romanian Prime Minister

You wrote on 26 August proposing either the week beginning Monday 30 March, or the pre-Easter part of the week beginning Monday 13 April for a visit here next year by the Romanian Prime Minister, Mr Verdet. The Romanians have now informed us that Mr Verdet would like to come from 13-16 April. I hope that we can now go firm on these dates.

We will be in touch in due course with ideas about the programme. I can, however, confirm now that we would expect the involvement of the Prime Minister to be very much as suggested in your letter. We will probably want to suggest to the Romanians that Mr Verdet should spend at least one day outside London.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Barry Hilton (Cabinet Office).

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq
No 10 Downing St

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→ Romania
File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 August 1980

Paul Lever wrote to me on 18 August, about the proposal that the Romanian Prime Minister should visit this country.

Paul said that a visit of two to three days would be appropriate. --I assume that for our Prime Minister this would involve a tête-à-tête talk, perhaps followed by a wider session, a lunch or dinner in No.10, a return function hosted by Mr. Verdet, and perhaps a press conference. If this is the extent of the Prime Minister's involvement, it should be possible to fit such a visit into her diary at any time in the week beginning Monday 30 March, or in the pre-Easter part of the week beginning Monday 13 April.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Barry Hilton (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Christopher Jebb Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Romania!

PRIME MINISTER

The Romanians have now said firmly that their Prime Minister would like to visit the UK in the early part of next year.

You were aware that this possibility was being considered. We are now being asked to suggest dates in March or April. The visit would last two or three days. It would presumably involve you in a tete-a-tete talk, perhaps followed by a wider session, a lunch/dinner here, a return function hosted by Mr. Verdet, and perhaps a press conference.

At present, we ought to be able to fit this into your diary at any time in the week beginning Monday 30 March, or in the first part of the week beginning Monday 13 April (which is the week of Good Friday).

Content that we suggest these dates?

MPD Yes not.

20 August 1980



Romanian

10 DOWNING STREET

MR. PATTISON

You asked for dates for a possible visit by the Prime Minister of Romania. Can I please offer you the following:

Week beginning Monday 30 March
Any two days of that week.

Week beginning Monday 13 April
Any two days running up to Maundy Thursday on the 16th.

ES.

19 August 1980



10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

Pl see letter below.

Views on dates?

MA
18/8.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 August 1980

Dear Mike,

Romania: Prime Ministerial Visits

I wrote to Michael Alexander on 17 July about a possible visit by the Romanian Prime Minister, Mr Verdet, saying that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary hoped the Prime Minister would consider the idea favourably if the Romanians proposed dates in 1981 and recalling that Mrs Thatcher had told the then Romanian Ambassador last April that Mr Verdet should let us know when he wished to come. You replied on 21 July saying that the Prime Minister had taken note of this.

The Romanian Ambassador has now told us that Mr Verdet would be very pleased to take up this invitation and has suggested that the Prime Minister should suggest one or two possible dates after 1 January 1981, (ie in the early part of the year) which he would then try to fit in with. For the reasons set out in my letter of 17 July, Lord Carrington considers that a visit by Verdet next year would be valuable. He therefore hopes that the Prime Minister will agree to suggest possible dates which we might put to the Romanians. There are no firm plans as yet for other ministerial exchanges with Romania next year apart from a proposed visit by the President of the Grand National Assembly (parliament) here in January. Our annual joint commission meeting with Romania is however at present planned to take place in London in February and it might therefore be better to avoid that month. The Prime Minister might therefore wish to consider the possibility of inviting Mr Verdet in either March or April. A visit of 2-3 days would be appropriate.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)

M A Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

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jfh

Romana

21 July 1980

Romania: Prime Ministerial Visits

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 17 July on this subject.

MODBA

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

GC



(2) Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Ronnie Ruster

To note.

17 July 1980

Paul - 17/7

MS.

Dear Michael,

Romania: Prime Ministerial Visits

As you know, the Romanians have been pressing for some time for a visit to London by their Prime Minister. The last Romanian Ambassador raised it directly with Mrs Thatcher during his farewell call in April (your letter of 1 April). Mrs Thatcher said that Verdets should let us know when he wished to come. The new Romanian Ambassador has been urging the same proposal and has also asked about the possibility of a visit by Mrs Thatcher to Bucharest, which was mentioned in the Prime Minister's discussion with President Ceausescu in Belgrade on 8 May.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary doubts that a visit by the Prime Minister to Romania this year or next would be justified so soon after his own visit last March and the Prime Minister's meeting with President Ceausescu in Belgrade. Moreover in formal terms it is the turn of the Romanian Prime Minister to come here. Lord Carrington believes that a visit by the latter would be valuable. Verdets is the third most powerful figure in Romania, after the President himself and Madame Ceausescu, and the visit would help to encourage Romania in its independent foreign policy as well as providing another boost to our bilateral relations.

The new Romanian Ambassador raised the question of visits when he called on Lord Carrington on 11 July. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary took the opportunity to steer him towards the idea of a visit here by Mr Verdets prior to any visit by the Prime Minister to Romania. It was left that the Romanians would decide whether to suggest dates in 1981. Lord Carrington hopes that the Prime Minister will consider the matter favourably if the Romanians do propose dates.

Yours WGA

Paul

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Master Set

RESTRICTED

file 110
Romania

1 April 1980

Original on:
Romania: March 1980

FAREWELL CALL BY THE ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR

As you know, the Romanian Ambassador called on the Prime Minister this morning to say goodbye. Dr. Popa gave the Prime Minister an oral message of greetings from President Ceausescu. He said that President Ceausescu hoped to see the Prime Minister in Romania before too long. The Prime Minister asked Dr. Popa to convey her very best wishes to the President. She said that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's visit had clearly gone very well. Relations between the two countries were getting closer. This was in both our interests. As regards the possibility of a visit to Romania, the Prime Minister said that she hoped one day to be able to go to Romania again. She remembered her two previous visits with much pleasure.

Dr. Popa also said that the Romanian Prime Minister, Mr. Verdets, would like to visit London. The Prime Minister said that he should let us know when he wished to come.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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