

PART 3

M5

Confidential Filing

Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong etc
Possibility of Resettlement in the UK.

VIETNAM

Part 1: May 1979

Part 3 July 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
20.7.79		30.5.80		10.2.81			
24.7.79		13.6.80		16.2.81			
26.7.79		23.6.80		28.2.81			
15.8.79		26.6.80		4.3.81			
24.8.79		30.6.80		<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 100%; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>PREM 19/80</p> <p>4</p> </div> </div>			
31.8.79		9.7.80					
3.9.79		18.7.80					
5.9.79		31.7.80					
13.9.79		16.8.80					
25.9.79		18.8.80					
6.10.79		14.8.80					
17.10.79		29.9.80					
29.10.79		30.9.80					
14.11.79		1.10.80					
5.12.79		21.11.80					
7.12.79		26.11.80					
24.12.79		2.2.81					
3.1.80		5.2.81					
7.1.80							
7.2.80							
5.3.80							
26.4.80							

● PART 3 ends:-

Home Sec : 10 PM of 28/2/87.

PART 4 begins:-

D. Wright to MODRA (A04371) of 3/3/87

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC (79) 10 th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	19.7.79
CC (79) 12 th Conclusions, Minute 2 (extract)	26.7.79

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Signed *AWayland*

Date *11 August 2011*

PREM Records Team



Vietnam

PRIME MINISTER

We are now in sight of fulfilling the commitment we made to the special programme for Vietnamese refugees at the Geneva Conference in July 1979 called by Dr Waldheim on your initiative. I have sent a small team to Hong Kong to select the final batch from the camps there.

@flupont 21

When the Cabinet agreed on 12 July 1979 that we should take a further 10,000 refugees it was recorded that our help should be concentrated on Hong Kong but that the figure was to include any picked up at sea by our ships. We could not in the nature of the case estimate how many rescues at sea there might be: it has turned out to be about 700.

The presentation of our commitment at the Geneva Conference and since has laid emphasis on the figure of 10,000 and the fact that they will be accepted from Hong Kong. It would hardly be practicable in international circles to keep a running total of deductions for rescues at sea. So Hong Kong, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other countries, notably the U.S. who have regularly and closely watched our performance, are expecting the full 10,000 to come from Hong Kong.

I am anxious to draw a line under our Geneva undertaking. (Rescues at sea will continue to present a problem.) It may be easier to do this if we can avoid a haggle with Hong Kong about the exact numbers we are to take. It may not amount to the full 10,000 anyway because the numbers remaining who would like to come to the U.K. are probably now small and some of those selected are dropping out. If we are prepared not to insist on deducting the boat rescues there would be advantage in my sending instructions to the selection team which will enable them to bring the total up to 10,000 if in fact sufficient candidates come forward. We can then concentrate on running down the reception camps in this country.

DS/E // The matter ought I think to be raised in Cabinet, but you might like to have a word first with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and me.

I am sending a copy of this minute to him and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

hollis

28

February 1981



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 February 1981

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Ebalina

I am writing to confirm that, as I have already told you on the telephone, instructions may be sent to the High Commission in Singapore to authorise the guarantee of resettlement for the 35 Vietnamese refugees aboard the MV Ebalina.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Sd



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 February 1981

Dear Michael,

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Ebalina

The British-registered oil tanker 'MV Ebalina' (Shell Tankers UK Limited), is due to arrive at Singapore tomorrow morning, 17 February, with 35 Vietnamese refugees on board.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of refugees by British-registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without a guarantee of eventual resettlement in the UK. However, experience has shown that the Singapore authorities consistently refuse to allow this, and insist on a guarantee that any who are not settled elsewhere within 90 days of arrival in Singapore will be resettled in the United Kingdom. In the circumstances, we recommend that the High Commission in Singapore be authorised to give the necessary guarantee. It is likely that some of the refugees covered by the guarantee will be found resettlement elsewhere: any refugees brought to the United Kingdom as a result could, of course, be counted against our 10,000 quota.

If possible, we would like to issue instructions over-night, so that action can be taken in Singapore tomorrow their time.

I understand that the Home Secretary agrees with the action proposed.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Dept of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department).

yours etc

Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 February 1981

Bonnie Austin

Aut

mt

kg Aut 19/2

Dear Michael,

When we spoke about the Vietnamese refugees on the 'Texaco Bombay', you asked for the current position on the Hong Kong quota.

As we understand the position, in round figures some 8,400 Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong have now arrived in Britain under the 10,000 quota announced in July 1979. Over the same period, some 600 have arrived as a result of rescues by British-registered shipping, and there are guarantees outstanding for about another 150.

Although we are, therefore, approaching exhaustion of the quota, there are still at least two to three months of further movements from Hong Kong to go before we shall have done so.

Lord Carrington intends to review the position in Hong Kong (where there are still over 20,000 Vietnamese refugees), during his visit at the end of March. On his return he will give his colleagues an assessment of the situation.

I am copying this to Stephen Boys-Smith in the Home Secretary's Office, and to Stuart Hampson in the Department of Trade.

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St


9 February 1981

Visit by Major Kim Cuong and Mrs. Yvette Vuong Vo

We spoke about the above this morning and I am enclosing a copy of correspondence we have received from the Save the Children Fund.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

Chris Jebb, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Save the Children

REGISTERED OFFICE
THE SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND
JEBB HOUSE
157 CLAPHAM ROAD
LONDON SW9 0PT
TELEPHONE 01-582 1414

Visit to Downing Street by Major and Mrs. Yvette
Vuong Vo on Wednesday, February 11th at 4.15 p.m.

Major and Mrs. Vo are visiting the Prime Minister to present her with a framed Vietnamese picture. The following background information may be useful:-

Mrs. Vo was employed for several years in Saigon by the British Embassy in a secretarial capacity and recently received a substantial sum in back-pay from the Foreign Office. The Vo's flew directly from Vietnam to the U.K on the 3rd October 1980, using their own financial resources, and are not "Boat People". They have a very different background from most of the refugees who have entered the country via Hong Kong. A number of other refugees of similar backgrounds were allowed into this country by arrangements made by the British Council for Aid to Refugees; the other families are all accommodated in Hythe, Kent but no vacancies existed at Hythe at the time that the Vo's arrived, and they went to Watton in Norfolk. They have subsequently refused suggestions that they should transfer to Hythe to enable them to be re-settled in the London area where they have relatives and friends.

The arrangements now are for them to be rehoused in Ely very soon in response to their request for housing in a "quiet English town, away from other refugees, where they would have good access to religious and educational facilities for their children".

It has been difficult for the Vo's to settle happily into the Watton Reception Centre. Their background is quite different from the other refugees there, and these differences have created considerable problems and ill feelings. Major Vo for example constantly refers to the other refugees as "riff raff" with whom he doesn't wish to be associated. Understandably they have also found difficulties in relating to staff at the Centre.

It is inevitable that refugees from the educational and occupational background of the Vo's will have problems in coming to terms with the different place they have during their beginnings in this country. This leads to feelings such as depression and anxiety, and Major and Mrs. Vo have not been here long enough as yet to have adjusted happily.



Vietnam

10 DOWNING STREET

NOTE FOR THE FILE

Mrs. Tinh will be seeing the Prime Minister at 1615 on Wednesday 11 February. She will be accompanied by her husband and a representative from Save the Children Fund.

Michael Alexander has agreed that no FCO official should be present and that no further briefing is required. The Foreign Office have been told verbally.

5 February 1981



file Bb
(Vietnam)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 February 1981

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Texaco Bombay

As I have already told you on the telephone, there would be no objection to your sending a telegram to Singapore offering guarantee of re-settlement to the 38 Vietnamese refugees on board the MV Texaco Bombay.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Jim Nursaw (Law Officers' Department) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CS



Hearestill 600 or so
below the quota. I have
therefore agreed that the tel
may issue.

Dear Michael,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 February 1981

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Texaco Bombay

The British-registered oil tanker 'MV Texaco Bombay' is due to arrive at Singapore tomorrow morning, 3 February, with 38 Vietnamese refugees on board.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of refugees by British-registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without a guarantee of eventual resettlement in the UK. However, experience has shown that the Singapore authorities consistently refuse to allow this, and insist on a guarantee that any who are not settled elsewhere will be resettled in the United Kingdom within 90 days of arrival in Singapore. In the circumstances, we recommend that the High Commission in Singapore be authorised to give the necessary guarantee. It is likely that some of the refugees covered by the guarantee will be found resettlement elsewhere: any refugees brought to the United Kingdom as a result could, of course, be counted against our 10,000 quota.

The Resident Clerk will be holding a draft telegram of instruction to Singapore. If possible, we would like to issue instructions over-night, so that action can be taken in Singapore tomorrow their time.

I understand that the Home Secretary agrees with the action proposed.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Dept of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department).

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

2 February 1981

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 30 January about Mrs Yvette Tinh. The Prime Minister would like to meet Mrs Tinh and accept her gift. Perhaps Mr. Jebb could get in touch with Miss Stephens to fix a time.

MODBA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



11

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 January 1981

Prime Minister
Who you like to receive
Mrs Tinh or would you
rather a Foreign Office Minister
do so?

Andy

I should like to
see her
ms.

Dear Michael,

Mrs Yvette Tinh, who for many years worked as interpreter in our Saigon Embassy but is now living in Norfolk as a refugee, has asked if she might call on Mrs Thatcher on behalf of her family and other refugees from South Vietnam, to present an old Vietnamese lacquer picture 'which symbolises the former freedom and liberty of Vietnam'. I enclose her letter, which was conveyed via our former Ambassador in Hanoi.

While such an occasion, if publicised, could possibly attract a hostile reaction from the Vietnamese Government, we do not think that this should outweigh any wish the Prime Minister might have to meet Mrs Tinh and accept her gift. As far as we know she has no claim formally to 'represent' any other refugees.

As an alternative, we could arrange for the gift to be received on the Prime Minister's behalf.

Yours ever
Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

Yvette Vuong Thi Tinh
c/o SCF Refugee Centre
18 Cranwell Road
RAF Watton
Thetford - Norfolk

December 11, 1980.

To : The Prime Minister Mrs. M. Thatcher
(c/o H.E. J.W.D. Margetson, Esq.)

The Prime Minister,


I was a locally-engaged member staff at the British Embassy, Saigon, South Vietnam from 1960 to 1979. Now I am a Vietnamese refugee in the SCF Refugee Centre, 18 Cranwell Road, Watton - Norfolk.

When, I lived in South Vietnam, my colleagues and I listened in secretly to Radio Program from the BBC. We were struck with admiration and touched by your speech at the International Conference about Vietnamese Refugees.

With the help of the British Embassy in Vietnam and the British Government, we arrived in this country on 3rd October. My husband and I would like to have the honour of meeting you, on behalf of ourselves and the South Vietnamese people. We want to express to you our profound gratitude and respect. By way of a simple token of our feelings for you and the British people we also want to offer you an older lacqueware picture which symbolizes the former freedom and liberty of Vietnam.

On this occasion, may we take this opportunity to re-affirm, the assurance of our highest consideration for Great Britain and her most distinguished representative.

Yours respectfully,



Yvette Tinh (Mm.)

Vietnam

37

TOP COPY

RESTRICTED

GRS 50
RESTRICTED
FM BANGKOK 260620Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 548 OF 26NOV80
AND TO ROUTINE SINGAPORE
INFO UKMIS GENEVA AND HONGKONG

[386?] (35)

YOUR TELEGRAM 368 I LOGOS

1. GUARANTEE LETTER ISSUED ON 24NOV. IT HAS NOW BEEN PROCESSED BY THAI MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION IS TO BE SUBMITTED FOR MINISTER'S SIGNATURE AT 15.00 HRS LOCAL TIME TODAY.
2. UNHCR ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO DISEMBARK REFUGEES ON MORNING 27NOV. LOGOS WILL SAIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

TRIPP

LIMITED

SEAD
UND
MAED
NEWS D
INFORMATION D
HK & GD
WIAD
PS/MR BLAKER
SIR E YOUDE
MR DONALD

FA 243/81		
NOV 26 1980		
DESK OFFICER		
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35

TOP COPY

C O N F I D E N T I A L

4427 - 2

GRS 165
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 220230Z

FM FCO 211300Z NOV 80
TO IMMEDIATE BANGKOK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 386 OF 21 NOVEMBER,
AND TO ROUTINE SINGAPORE,
INFO UKMIS GENEVA, HONG KONG
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 541: MV LOGOS

32

1. PLEASE ISSUE GUARANTEE IN STANDARD TERMS AND DO YOUR BEST TO ENSURE THAT THE LOGOS CAN DEPART QUICKLY. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT OUR DECISION IS BASED ON HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS AND IS NOT TO BE TAKEN AS A PRECEDENT. IT DOES NOT AFFECT OUR VIEWS ON THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF FLAG STATES. YOU SHOULD POINT OUT, AS NECESSARY, THAT TALK OF 'PROCRASTINATION' IS TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE: THE PROBLEM ALL ALONG HAS BEEN THE REFUSAL OF THE SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES TO ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

2. (SINGAPORE). WE SHALL BE HANDING TO THE SINGAPORE HIGH COMMISSIONER A THIRD PERSON NOTE TO PLACE ON RECORD HMG'S DISAPPOINTMENT AND REGRET AT THEIR ATTITUDE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

LIMITED

SEAD

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OLD

HKGD

WIAD

PS/MR BLAKER

SIR E.YOUDE

MR DONALD

FA 243/81	
RECEIVED IN REG.	
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1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Vietnam

File

ds



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 November 1980

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Logos

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 20 November and has agreed that, exceptionally, a guarantee should be issued for the refugees on the MV Logos even though the ship is registered in Singapore.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Jim Nursaw (Law Officers' Department).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GC.

Morris has

seen



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 0AT

21 November 1980

Dear Rodie,

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV LOGOS

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 20 November to Michael Alexander about the Vietnamese refugees aboard the MV Logos. We have since spoken about your letter.

I can confirm that the Home Secretary agrees that a guarantee should be offered in the terms you set out, subject to the time limit being the usual three months and not less.

When we spoke I mentioned my disquiet about the way this case had been handled. I learned at 11.30 this morning, which was not long after I was able to act upon your letter, that the telegram had been despatched issuing the guarantee. This was well before we were able to seek the views of the Home Secretary in the light of the advice of the two interested parts of the Home Office, the Immigration Department and the Community Programmes Department. It was also before the deadline implied in your letter. Indeed, the Government's decision was on the tapes before I was able to speak to the Home Secretary about this matter. The Home Secretary has asked me to say that he wishes he had been consulted before the telegram was despatched.

As in the past, for our part we will do our very best to expedite decisions on these cases. And I realise, of course, that it is no wish of yours to pre-empt the Home Secretary's decision. But I think it is important to ensure that the concurrence of a Home Office Minister has first been obtained before a telegram is despatched, and not to assume from contact at official level that it will be forthcoming.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

*Yours ever,
S W*

(S W BOYS SMITH)

R M J Lyne Esq



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

(2)

Bidding on for 7,500
have been taken so far.

We shall have filled the
quota by about March 1981.

Urgent consideration is
being given to where we
go from there. You will
of course be consulted.

mg

Paul

010

(1)

Lg Amt



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree with Foreign Secretary's
recommendation that, exceptionally,
the guarantee should be given even
though the ship is Singapore registered?

How many on
10,000

20 November 1980

Agreed
mg

are we?

Dear Michael,

Amt - 20/11

mg

Vietnamese Refugees: M V Logos

The British owned vessel MV Logos arrived in Songkla, Thailand on 7 October after picking up 93 Vietnamese refugees in the South China Sea. She reached Bangkok on 23 October and is still there. She was due to sail for Sibu (East Malaysia) on 17 November. The Master was not prepared to do so until the refugees had been disembarked; but the Thai Government have now said that they will oblige the vessel to leave by 25 November.

The Logos is a missionary training ship-cum-floating book exhibition, whose owners are Educational Book Exhibits Limited of Bromley. The vessel is registered in Singapore. A representative of the owners has told us that a regional flag was consciously chosen in order to give the operation a more acceptable local profile.

The Thai Authorities, in accordance with their invariable practice, have refused to allow the refugees to be disembarked without a resettlement guarantee. It is well established international practice that in such cases the flag state should accept responsibility for the issue of any guarantee. Representations have therefore been made to the Singapore Government, both through official channels (most recently by our High Commissioner to the Minister for Law in the absence of the Foreign Minister), and by the owners themselves. The Singaporeans have adamantly refused to accept any responsibility.

In these circumstances, we face a choice between maintaining our principles in these matters intact, which will mean continuing to argue, with the owners and others, that the matter is not one for HMG to resolve, and that by doing our best with the Singapore Authorities, we have done all that is possible; and deciding to deem the

/Logos

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1



Logos to be an altogether exceptional case in which we should be justified in giving a guarantee.

The arguments in favour of the former course are clear enough; this would be the first time that we had given a guarantee in respect of a non-British registered vessel, and the precedent could be awkward. Indeed, we might face criticism from Bermuda, where a similar case was resolved by their eventually agreeing to accept responsibility. Refugees accepted in this way would, moreover, further reduce the numbers who could be accepted from Hong Kong, where the situation remains serious.

On the other hand, there is no other government willing to accept responsibility, and the fact that the vessel's owners and operators are British places some responsibility on us for putting an end to the human suffering and dislocation involved. The Archbishop of Canterbury is concerned with the enterprise, and his support may be sought by the owners, who have already mobilised a degree of Parliamentary support. The owners point out that as a charity, one of whose objects is 'the direct relief of sickness or poverty by assisting any sick or necessitous persons', they are a unique case and that a decision to help them need not therefore be taken as a precedent. Moreover, a group known as 'Project Vietnam Orphans' has offered to accommodate any of the Logos refugees for up to a year if they are permitted to come here; this would reduce the burden on the normal reception facilities.

The best estimate we have of the likely resettlement breakdown of the refugees is that some 30 may qualify for resettlement in the United States or elsewhere, leaving about 60 who might have to come to Britain. However, if Britain were to issue a guarantee, they could be temporarily accepted into one of the UNHCR-sponsored transit centres in South East Asia if it proved difficult to accept them here immediately.

For the reasons outlined above, provided the Home Secretary concurs, Lord Carrington recommends that the necessary guarantee should be given as a matter of urgency. The question of accepting the refugees or transferring them to a transit centre could be explored once they have been disembarked. Our disappointment with the attitude of the Singapore Government should be

/placed on



placed on record in a formal note, which would also make it clear that our decision should not in any way be taken as a precedent. I shall be grateful to know as soon as possible whether the Prime Minister agrees; because of the Thai deadline, we should like our answer to reach Bangkok by 22 November.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Becket, Law Offices Department.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary



Vietnam
MADBA
5/11

~~Mr Parisson~~ ←

Your Ref

← MA
2/11

with compliments

Treasury Chambers
Parliament Street
London SW1P 3AG
Tel: Direct Line 01-233
Switchboard 01-233-3000

Peter Chambers

8454 5/11

262405 TRSY G
896706 EBE G

REF 768 5/11/80

IS FORWARD :-

DATE : WEDNESDAY 5TH NOV 1980

ADDRESS :-
RIGHT HON MARGARET THATCHER M.P.
PRIME MINISTER
10 DOWNING STREET
WHITEHALL, LONDON,
ENGLAND.

COPIES TO :-
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY
THE HOME SECRETARY
E.B.E. LIMITED, BROMLEY

TEXT :-

FROM MASTER, M.V. LOGOS, INTERNATIONAL BOOK EXHIBITION AND
CHRISTIAN TRAINING SHIP, OWNED BY EDUCATIONAL BOOKS LIMITED,
BROMLEY.

1. MOST GRATEFUL YOUR KIND CONSIDERATION URGENT SITUATION 93 VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEES CONFINED ON BOARD SHIP 4 1/2 WEEKS AWAITING GUARANTEE RESETTLEMENT.
2. CONCERNED DELAY PROVIDING GUARANTE TO THAI AUTHORITIES.
3. SHIP MUST SAIL LATEST MORNING 17TH NOVEMBER TO MEET COMMITMENT INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMME OFFICIAL RECEPTION BOOK EXHIBITION EAST MALAYSIA. IMPOSSIBLE SAIL WITH REFUGEES ABOARD.
4. INCREASING PROBLEMS CRAMPED CONDITIONS AND FEEDING.
5. INCREASING LOCAL SECURITY RISK DUE REFUGEES WORRIED PRESENT UNCERTAINTY.
6. UNDERSTAND HOME OFFICE AWARE OFFER RESETTLEMENT UK BY PROJECT VIETNAM ORPHANS.
7. WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION ENABLE EARLY ARRANGEMENTS DISEMBARK REFUGEES.
8. MOST GRATEFUL YOUR HELP IN THIS MATTER.
9. SIGNED CAPTAIN DENYS WYNNE SYLVESTER COLLINS, (FAREHAM) AND FOLLOWING BRITISH MEMBERS OF STAFF ONBOARD:-

LOIS ASH
NEIL BAIRD
KEN BOULLIER
W LINDSAY FLINTOFF
MARJORIE MURPHY
SUSAN OWST
MARK SWEENEY
SUSAN SWEENEY
RAYMOND TRAINOR
A FREDERICK WILLIAMS
TIMOTHY WILSON

GODALMING
CARDIFF
CHORLEYWOOD
BOLTON
LIVERPOOL
HULL
WIGAN
WIGAN
LEEDS
LONDON
WORTHING

REGARDS

262405 TRSY G
896706 EBE GM

M.V. LOGOS
Vietnamese Refugees
Spoken to F.CO. : 12/12
please chase in 1 week if no
advise received -
7/5
Print 5/11
Kingling back 12/12
Again 22/12

REF 768 5/11/80

S FORWARD :-

DATE : WEDNESDAY 5TH NOV 1980

ADDRESS :-

RIGHT HON MARGARET THATCHER M.P.
 PRIME MINISTER
 10 DOWNING STREET
 WHITEHALL, LONDON,
 ENGLAND.

COPIES TO :-

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY
 THE HOME SECRETARY
 E.B.E. LIMITED, BROMLEY

TEXT :-

FROM MASTER, M.V. LOGOS, INTERNATIONAL BOOK EXHIBITION AND
 CHRISTIAN TRAINING SHIP, OWNED BY EDUCATIONAL BOOKS LIMITED,
 BROMLEY.

1. MOST GRATEFUL YOUR KIND CONSIDERATION URGENT SITUATION 93
 VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEES CONFINED ON BOARD SHIP 4 1/2 WEEKS
 AWAITING GUARANTEE RESETTLEMENT.
2. CONCERNED DELAY PROVIDING GUARANTE TO THAI AUTHORITIES.
3. SHIP MUST SAIL LATEST MORNING 17TH NOVEMBER TO MEET COMMITMENT
 INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMME OFFICIAL RECEPTION BOOK EXHIBITION
 EAST MALAYSIA. IMPOSSIBLE SAIL WITH REFUGEES ABOARD.
4. INCREASING PROBLEMS CRAMPED CONDITIONS AND FEEDING.
5. INCREASING LOCAL SECURITY RISK DUE REFUGEES WORRIED PRESENT
 UNCERTAINTY.
6. UNDERSTAND HOME OFFICE AWARE OFFER RESETTLEMENT UK BY PROJECT
 VIETNAM ORPHANS.
7. WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION ENABLE EARLY
 ARRANGEMENTS DISEMBARK REFUGEES.
8. MOST GRATEFUL YOUR HELP IN THIS MATTER.
9. SIGNED CAPTAIN DENYS WYNNE SYLVESTER COLLINS, (FAREHAM) AND
 FOLLOWING BRITISH MEMBERS OF STAFF ONBOARD:-

LOIS ASH
 NEIL BAIRD
 KEN BOULLIER
 W LINDSAY FLINTOFF
 MARJORIE MURPHY
 SUSAN OWST
 MARK SWEENEY
 SUSAN SWEENEY
 RAYMOND TRAINOR
 A FREDERICK WILLIAMS
 TIMOTHY WILSON

GODALMING
 CARDIFF
 CHORLEYWOOD
 BOLTON
 LIVERPOOL
 HULL
 WIGAN
 WIGAN
 LEEDS
 LONDON
 WORTHING

REGARDS

262405 TRSY G
 896706 EBE GM



cc HO
D/T
LOD Vietnam
CO

MS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 October 1980

Vietnamese Refugees: MV 'Ebalina'

As I told you on the telephone, it has been agreed here that a resettlement guarantee should be given to the 22 Vietnamese refugees on board the MV 'Ebalina'.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

88

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

1 October 1980

Dear Rodier,

K. Smith

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV "EBALINA"

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 30 September to Michael Alexander about the Vietnamese refugees rescued by the MV "Ebalina". As I mentioned on the telephone yesterday evening, the Home Secretary concurs with the proposals for offering the necessary guarantee in the terms you outlined.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander (No. 10), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Jim Nursaw (Law Officers' Department).

Sam.
S W Smith

(S W BOYS SMITH)

R M J Lyne Esq



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 September 1980

Dear Michael,

*hs
RML*

Vietnamese Refugees: MV 'Ebalina'

The UK-owned and registered (Shell) tanker MV 'Ebalina' is due in Singapore late tomorrow local time (around noon GMT) having rescued 22 Vietnamese refugees on passage from Bangkok.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British-registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed on the first port of call without a guarantee of resettlement in the United Kingdom. The Singapore Government has however taken a consistent policy of requiring a guarantee from the flag state in respect of any refugees for whom resettlement in a third country has not been arranged within three months. There is no prospect that the Singaporean Government will allow the refugees to be landed without such a guarantee.

Provided the Home Secretary concurs, we recommend that the Government should give the necessary guarantee. It is likely that some of the refugees covered by the guarantee will be found resettlement elsewhere: any refugees brought to the United Kingdom as a result could of course be counted against our 10,000 quota. As I told you yesterday, there are still places available within the existing quota.

The Resident Clerk will be holding for despatch overnight a telegram authorizing our High Commission in Singapore to give the necessary guarantee.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Becket (Law Officers' Department).

*yours ever
R M J Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

Vietnam



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

30 September 1980

Dear Rodier,

ke
MWS

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: "MV OVERSEAS ADVENTURER"

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 29 September to Michael Alexander.

I am glad to be able to confirm the Home Secretary's agreement to your giving the necessary guarantee, in the terms you outlined, which I mentioned on the telephone yesterday evening. X

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander at No. 10, Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Jim Nursaw (Law Officers' Department).

Yours,

X to the Resident (Camb.)

(S W BOYS SMITH)

R M J Lyne Esq



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 September, 1980.

Vietnamese Refugees: 'My Overseas
Adventurer

It is agreed that H.M. Ambassador at Bangkok may give the Thai Authorities a guarantee of resettlement in the United Kingdom for the 82 Vietnamese refugees on the oil tanker 'My Overseas Adventure'.
(Your letter to me of 29 September refers.)

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office), and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

[Handwritten signature]



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 September 1980

Dear Michael,

Vietnamese Refugees: 'My Overseas Adventurer'

The British-registered oil tanker 'My Overseas Adventurer' is due to arrive at Bangkok on Wednesday 1 October with 82 Vietnamese refugees picked up on passage from Indonesia.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British registered vessels is as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without a guarantee of resettlement in the UK. However the Thai Government has made it clear that it will not allow refugees to be landed without such a guarantee, and in the case of the MV Staffordshire (correspondence resting with Nick Sanders' letter of 19 August to Paul Lever) it required intervention with the Thai Foreign Minister to secure a period of 45 days in Thai camps to allow initial processing. It is clear, therefore, that there is no prospect that the Thai Government will allow these refugees to land without a guarantee. Provided the Home Secretary concurs, we recommend that HM Ambassador at Bangkok should be authorised to give the necessary guarantee. It is likely that some of the refugees covered by the guarantee will be found resettlement elsewhere: any refugees brought to the United Kingdom as a result could of course be counted against our 10,000 quota.

We should be grateful for clearance during the course of the day so that instructions can be sent to our Embassy in Bangkok overnight.

/I



I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Becket (Law Officers' Department).

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Prime Minister
Vietnam
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CONFIDENTIAL

GR 180

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HONG KONG 190937Z AUG

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1037 OF 19 AUGUST, 1980

INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: RESETTLEMENT TO U.K.

1. WE HAVE JUST BEEN TOLD BY JCRV THAT THE OFFTAKE TO U.K. FOR AUGUST, ORIGINALLY FORECAST AT 650, WILL BE REDUCED TO ABOUT 420. SO FAR THIS MONTH, 188 REFUGEES HAVE DEPARTED FOR U.K.

2. THE REASON FOR THIS REDUCTION IS THE CLOSURE OF MATLOCK RECEPTION CENTRE. THIS COMES AS A SURPRISE, SINCE YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 464 INDICATED THAT 300 EXTRA RECEPTION CENTRE PLACES WERE BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO OFFSET ANY SLOWDOWN IN JULY AND AUGUST.

3. THE OVERALL POSITION DOES NOT APPEAR OPTIMISTIC. SO FAR, 7,193 OF THE 2 U.K. QUOTAS FOR 11,000 PLACES HAVE BEEN TAKEN UP. 3,807 PLACES STILL REMAIN, AND IF THESE ARE ALL TO BE TAKEN UP THE END OF 1980, THE MONTHLY DEPARTURE RATE WILL HAVE TO BE ABOUT 850. IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DEPARTURE FIGURES (MONTHLY AVERAGE MAY TO JULY - 565), IS THERE ANY PROSPECT THAT THIS RATE CAN BE ACHIEVED?

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FM FCO 191730Z AUGUST 1980
TO IMMEDIATE BANGKOK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 307 OF 19 AUGUST
YOUR TEL NO 416: MV 'STAFFORDSHIRE'

1. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO ISSUE A GUARANTEE THAT REFUGEES FOR WHOM RESETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES HAVE NOT BEEN FOUND ELSEWHERE WITHIN 45 DAYS OF LANDING WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.
2. WE ARE HOWEVER CONCERNED AT THE TIME LIMIT ENVISAGED WHICH IS HALF THAT APPLIED BY OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS SINGAPORE WHICH REQUIRE SIMILAR GUARANTEES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT 45 DAYS IS AN ADEQUATE PERIOD FOR UNHCR TO EXHAUST ITS SEARCH FOR RESETTLEMENT POSSIBILITIES, AND CERTAINLY NOT LONG ENOUGH FOR MOST RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES TO COMPLETE THEIR PROCEDURES. FURTHERMORE, THE ARRIVAL AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE OF A SIZEABLE GROUP OF REFUGEES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM COULD HAVE DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS ON OUR PROGRAMME OF RESETTLEMENT FROM HONG KONG. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE SEEK AGREEMENT TO A LONGER TIME PERIOD FOR THE GUARANTEE, PREFERABLY AT LEAST 90 DAYS: IF THAT IS NOT AVAILABLE, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO UNHCR AND TO THE THAI AUTHORITIES THAT WE DO NOT EXPECT TO BE ASKED TO ACCEPT WITHIN THAT PERIOD REFUGEES WHO HAVE PENDING APPLICATIONS WITH OTHER RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES, AND THAT WE WOULD IN ANY CASE EXPECT THE TIME PERIOD TO BE APPLIED SYMPATHETICALLY.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A ACLAND
MR DONALD

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 August, 1980.

Vietnamese Refugees: MV 'Staffordshire'

We have consulted the Prime Minister about the 'Staffordshire'. She is content that we should proceed as suggested in your letter to Mike Pattison of 18 August.

I am copying this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

N. J. SANDERS

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

9B

Vietnam

✓ ~~NA~~

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

19 August 1980

Dear Paul,

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: M.V.
"STAFFORDSHIRE"

TPM

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 18 August to Mike Pattison. I am glad to be able to confirm Ministerial agreement to the line you propose in the third paragraph.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours
S. W. Smith

S. W. BOYS SMITH

Paul Lever, Esq.

PM consulted by phone in Switzerland: agreed.

MA 19/8



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 August 1980

Dear Mike,

Vietnamese Refugees: MV 'Staffordshire'

The British owned and registered liquefied natural gas carrier, MV 'Staffordshire', arrived this morning in a Thai port with some 205 Vietnamese refugees on board. This is the largest number of refugees in a single rescue since last May: the average over the last 15 months has been 53.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British-registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without guarantee of resettlement in the United Kingdom. Our Embassy in Bangkok have ascertained over the weekend that the refugees will not be allowed to land unless UNHCR can give a guarantee of resettlement in third countries within 45 days. This amounts to a request to the flag state for a guarantee that refugees for whom settlement elsewhere has not been arranged within a given period will be accepted by the flag state. It is more normal for the time period to be 90 days than 45 but in practice the effect of this shortening of timescale on numbers eventually resettled here may not be that great, since we would not expect any refugees elsewhere to be required to leave Thailand before decisions had been taken by other possible resettlement countries, irrespective of the formal time limit. It is likely that a significant proportion of the refugees covered by the guarantee will be found resettlement elsewhere: any refugee brought to the United Kingdom as a result could of course be counted against our 10,000 quota. Their arrival at short notice will result in the postponement of some arrivals from Hong Kong.

Provided the Home Secretary concurs, we recommend that our Embassy in Bangkok should be authorised to give the appropriate guarantee. We would also, however, instruct them to make clear that we consider that 45 days is too short to allow a serious exploration of resettlement opportunities in third countries: that we would not expect to be required to move refugees within the 45 day period who were still candidates for resettlement elsewhere, and that in general we would expect the time limit to be applied in a reasonable way. The Resident Clerk will be holding a telegram for despatch this evening.

You mentioned in your letter of 11 August about the refugees on the MV "Ben Dearg" that we seemed to be fast approaching the limit of the 10,000 quota. While I am not sure how close we actually are to filling the quota (our understanding is that some 6,060 refugees have so far arrived in the United Kingdom from Hong Kong under the quota: in recent months the average seems to have been about 600 a month), we agree

/that



that the question of what happens thereafter does need to be prepared for Ministerial consideration well before the end of the year. You may like to know that there are still almost 38,000 refugees awaiting settlement in Hong Kong, and that the figure is now falling very slowly, if at all, for a variety of reasons.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Dept of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Becket (Law Officers' Dept).

Yours own

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

Mike Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

*File
MAP*

*ra
MAP*

GR 100

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 180900Z

FM BANGKOK 180430Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 416 OF 18 AUGUST

YOUR 303: M.V. STAFFORDSHIRE

1. VESSEL HAS NOW DOCKED AT SRI RACHA AND IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN FOR TWO TO THREE WEEKS.
2. REFUGEES HAVE BEEN DETAINED ON BOARD. THEY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO ENTER A REFUGEE CAMP UNLESS AN ASSURANCE IS GIVEN BY UNHCR THAT THEY WILL ALL BE RESETTLED IN THIRD COUNTRIES WITHIN FORTY FIVE DAYS. UNHCR ARE UNABLE TO GIVE SUCH AN ASSURANCE UNLESS BRITISH GOVT GUARANTEE TO ACCEPT ALL REFUGEES NOT RESETTLED ELSEWHERE. SHOULD SUCH A GUARANTEE BE FORTHCOMING PROCEDURES FOR TRANSFERRING REFUGEES TO CAMPS WILL TAKE THREE OR FOUR DAYS.

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(MR RUSHFORD)
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PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
MR ADAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

BOAT PEOPLE

Vietnam

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Mr. Pattison MP
To note

SOP
18.8.

GRS 120A

DESKBY 170230Z

RESTRICTED
FM FCO 161716Z AUG 80
TO IMMEDIATE BANGKOK
TELEGRAM NO. 303 OF 16 AUGUST.

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES - M V STAFFORDSHIRE.

WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE BRITISH FLAG LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS CARRIER 'M V STAFFORDSHIRE', WHICH IS DUE AT KOHSICHANG, BANGKOK, EARLY MONDAY MORNING 18TH AUGUST, HAS RESCUED 205 REFUGEES. HER AGENT'S W A L L E M BANGKOK HAVE ALSO BEEN CONTACTED AND BEEN ASKED TO INFORM YOU.

PLEASE SEEK AGREEMENT OF THAI AUTHORITIES TO HAVE REFUGEES LANDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE VESSEL IS DUE TO TRANSFER GAS SHIP-TO-SHIP ON MONDAY.

IF THAI AUTHORITIES REQUEST A GUARANTEE OF SETTLEMENT IN UK FOR THOSE NOT SETTLED ELSEWHERE IN A GIVEN PERIOD, PLEASE INFORM US BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM.

CARRINGTON

BOAT PEOPLE LIMITED

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PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
LORD N G LENNOX
MR DONALD

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 August 1980

Thank you for your letter of 11 August about the Vietnamese refugees on MV "Ben Dearg".

I confirm that the Prime Minister is content that the Government should give the necessary guarantee, subject to the Home Secretary's concurrence.

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, we now seem to be fast approaching the limit of our 10,000 quota. I should be grateful if you could ensure that some thought is given to the implications of this before we run up against the limit.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

98



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 August 1980

Dear Mike,

Vietnamese refugees: MV 'Ben Dearg'

The British-owned and -registered general cargo vessel, MV 'Ben Dearg' (16,000 tonnes) is arriving in Singapore today with 77 Vietnamese refugees on board which it picked up on passage from Hong Kong.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British-registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed on the first port of call without a guarantee of resettlement in the United Kingdom. The Singapore Government has however taken a consistent policy of requiring a guarantee from the flag state in respect of any refugees for whom resettlement in a third country has not been arranged within three months. There is no prospect that the Singaporean Government will allow the refugees to be landed without such a guarantee.

Provided the Home Secretary concurs, we recommend that the Government should give the necessary guarantee. It is likely that a significant proportion of the refugees covered by the guarantee will be found resettlement elsewhere: any refugees brought to the United Kingdom as a result could of course be counted against our 10,000 quota.

I should be grateful for clearance in the course of the day so that instructions can be sent to our High Commission in Singapore overnight.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Becket (Law Officers' Department).

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R. M. J. Lyne)
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street
London

ADVANCES BOAT PEOPLE - 12 25

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/FUS
~~SIR A ACLAND~~
SIR E YOUDE
~~MR DONALD~~
LORD N G LENNOX
HD/UND
HD/HK & GD
HD/NEWS D
HD/SEAD
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR WADE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
RM 754 Q.A.G.

IMMEDIATE

RR HONG KONG (CBF)

RR UKMIS GENEVA

GRS 86

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRUNEI 050810Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 99 OF 5 AUG

AND INFO ROUTINE KUALA LUMPUR, HONG KONG (FOR CBF),
UKMIS GENEVA, TOKYO AND HANOI

Prime Minister

MAD 5/8

MS

IMMEDIATE

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. SHELL HAVE CONFIRMED REPORT THAT BRITISH REGISTERED LIQUID NATURAL GAS CARRIER GASTRANA ON PASSAGE TO BRUNEI HAS PICKED UP 29 VIETNAMESE REFUGEES FROM SMALL BOAT IN SOUTH CHINA SEA. GASTRANA IS DUE AT LUMUT BRUNEI (0900Z) TOMORROW 6 AUGUST.

2. DETAILS OF REFUGEES ARE GIVEN AS :

PORT OF ORIGIN - QUINHON

ADULTS - 16 MALE, 8 FEMALE (2 PREGNANT 6 AND 8 MONTHS)

CHILDREN - 3 MALE 2 FEMALE

PHYSICAL CONDITION - GOOD APART FROM GENERAL DEBILITATION

2. DETAILS OF REFUGEES ARE GIVEN AS :

PORT OF ORIGIN - QUINHON

ADULTS - 16 MALE, 8 FEMALE (2 PREGNANT 6 AND 8 MONTHS)

CHILDREN - 3 MALE 2 FEMALE

PHYSICAL CONDITION - GOOD APART FROM GENERAL DEBILITATION

3. SEE MIFT.

WATSON

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IMMEDIATE

TEX 243V02

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ADVANCES BOAT PEOPLE - 45

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HD/HK & GD
HD/NEWS D
HD/SEAD
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR WADE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
RM 754 Q.A.G.

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

FM BRUNEI 050930Z AUG 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 100 OF 5 AUGUST

INFO ROUTINE KUALA LUMPUR HONG KONG (FOR CBF) UKMIS GENEVA,

TOKYO

INFO SAVING HANOI

IMMEDIATE

MIPT

1. BRUNEI AUTHORITIES MAY BE EXPECTED TO REFUSE ALL RESPONSIBILITY AND AS IN CASE OF GADINIA REFUGEES (YOUR TELNO 110 OF 25 JULY 1978) ONLY ALLOW THEM TO BE LANDED INTO CARE OF BRITISH GURKHA BATTALION AGAINST PROMISE OF RESETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE. SHELL ARE NATURALLY ANXIOUS THAT SHIP'S SAILING SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED BY ARGUMENTS OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEES.
 2. I ASSUME THAT FACT OF RESCUE BY BRITISH REGISTERED SHIP MAKES THIS UNSUITABLE OCCASION FOR ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE BRUNEIS TO ACCEPT PRINCIPLE OF FIRST ASYLUM, I CAN THEREFORE SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO GURKHA BATTALION (WHOM I HAVE ALERTED) TAKING UP BURDEN ONCE MORE (THEY HAD LAST PARTY FOR UP TO 15 MONTHS). I HAVE HOWEVER TOLD SHELL (AND WILL TELL BRUNEIS IF THEY ASK ME) THAT NEITHER I NOR GURKHAS CAN ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY UNTIL I RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOU.
 3. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS. IF GADINIA PRECEDENT IS TO BE FOLLOWED I SHOULD WRITE TO SULTAN ASKING HIM TO ALLOW GASTRANA TO LAND REFUGEES INTO CUSTODY OF GURKHA BATTALION AGAINST OUR GUARANTEE TO RESETTLE THEM ELSEWHERE.
- FCC PSE PASS TO HONG KONG (FOR CBF), UKMIS GENEVA, TOKYO AND SAVING HANOI

Vietnam



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

31 July 1980

Dear Michael

K.A. Jackson

TIMES ARTICLE ON VIETNAM REFUGEES IN MALAYSIA

You asked for briefing on yesterday's Times article.

The article appears to have been stimulated by a local officer of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. It is based upon the false premise that the United Kingdom contribution to accepting boat people from Vietnam is to be judged by the numbers we take from Malaysia. We have always made it clear that we would take the bulk of our refugees from Hong Kong. This policy is well understood by UNHCR. Our processing arrangements have already led to the acceptance of around 9,000 Vietnamese refugees in all, and are expected to get us near to completing the 10,000 quota by the end of this year. This hardly justifies a statement that "Britain's performance has become an open joke among the other resettlement countries".

The commitment made by the previous government to take 250 refugees from camps in Malaysia has already been more than met.

The article is wrong in suggesting that the United Kingdom took the initiative in inviting UNHCR to submit details of ten cases of handicapped people. UNHCR asked locally that the cases be considered and our representative there agreed without commitment. Our policy is to include handicapped people among the refugees we accept but, as the bulk of our acceptances are from Hong Kong, so too do the handicapped people come from Hong Kong. It might have been better to have rejected the proposal immediately or to have reached a decision more quickly, but reluctance to reject a proposal out of hand hardly merits the kind of criticism levelled in the article.

We are taking this up with UNHCR.

Yours sincerely
A.P. Jackson

(A P JACKSON)

Michael Alexander Esq

OVERSEAS

Britain is accused of playing with lives of Vietnam refugees

From David Watts
Kuala Lumpur, July 29

United Nations officials have accused the British Government of "playing with the lives" of Vietnamese refugees after the withdrawal of an offer to resettle 10 handicapped people in Britain.

The Kuala Lumpur office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is particularly bitter at the refusal of the Home Office to allow the refugees to enter Britain as the original offer was seen here as an attempt to compensate for what the United Nations sees as a derisory effort by Britain to help to ease the plight of displaced Indo-Chinese in Malaysia.

Amid much publicity a year ago, Mr Thatcher and Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, took the lead internationally in setting up the Geneva conference on displaced people from Indo-China. But in the succeeding months that beginning has not been followed up with a commensurate practical effort and United Nations officials in Malaysia are now apt to consider it a purely political gesture.

The complaints about the 10 refugees are particularly vehement not solely because of the reversal of the offer but because it took the British bureaucracy six months to make up its mind on the matter.

A spokesman at the British High Commission said that there had never been any commitment to take the handicapped refugees.

To which a spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees rejoined: "We were asked early this year to submit 10 special cases for consideration. Handicapped cases take a lot of processing and obviously you do not go to all that trouble unless there has been a clear indication that they will be taken. The implication

was clear—they would be specially and favourably considered outside any other quotas."

The official reason for the rejection of the displaced people by the Home Office was Britain's commitment to take refugees from HongKong. United Nations officials, however, point out that that commitment was well known before the offer was made to the handicapped Vietnamese.

A United Nations official said: "They should not waste our time, their own time and play with the lives of these handicapped families". The official noted that Britain had fallen far short of its pledges given at the time of the conference in Geneva a year ago.

"It is better not to make any offer at all. Other European countries have equally pressing commitments but they still take their share and applications are processed in half the time that it takes in Britain. Britain's performance has become an open joke among the other resettlement countries."

Britain, however, prepares homes for many refugees before they arrive, unlike some other resettlement countries.

At the time of the July conference, according to the United Nations, Britain said that it would take 250 displaced Indo Chinese from camps in Malaysia. Since then, 174 refugees have gone from Malaysia to Britain.

Since the beginning of the big outflow of refugees and displaced people from Indo China in 1975, Britain has taken 328 refugees from camps in Malaysia while France and West Germany have taken 10 times that number.

It is likely that the 10, who were not seriously handicapped, will find homes in Sweden and Switzerland, which have an exemplary record in taking handicapped refugees.

Critical three months



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 July 1980

Dear Michael,

Vietnamese Refugees: MV 'Wayfarer'

The British-registered bulk carrier MV 'Wayfarer', on passage with a cargo of coal to Kaohsiung (Taiwan) where it was due to arrive on Sunday 20 July, has rescued 40 refugees off the Philippines. The rescue took place close to Manila. The owners have sought our assistance in arranging for disembarkation of the refugees there.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British-registered vessels is to make every possible effort so that they can be landed at the first scheduled Port of Call without a guarantee of re-settlement being issued in the United Kingdom. If the 'Wayfarer' were to proceed to Taiwan, there is no possibility that the refugees would be allowed to land without a guarantee, and every likelihood that the only solution might be for the refugees to be flown directly to the United Kingdom, without any possibility of any of them being found re-settlement places elsewhere. The arrangements involved in this would of course be complicated by the absence of government to government relations with Taiwan.

The simplest and most satisfactory solution would be for the refugees to be disembarked in the Philippines. Philippines' practice is to seek a guarantee, even in cases in which the Filipino Port is clearly the first subsequent scheduled Port of Call. Although this is not the case here, it is our view that there is still a reasonable possibility that they will agree to allow the refugees to be landed if a guarantee is offered.

I have discussed this case with you and with Stephen Boys-Smith, who told me that Home Office Ministers agreed to the issue of a guarantee. We are despatching a telegram this evening so that Manila can take action tomorrow morning local time. Any refugees brought to the UK as a result could, of course, be counted against our 10,000 quota.

/I am

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers Department).

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 July 1980

kg. Phu Vietnam

These figures are not very large when considered against the total quota of 10,000. Would you be content for me to give the necessary guarantees for the time being without troubling you other than in exceptional cases. I would of course

Dear Michael, keep you informed about the general hand.

Unless a very large group applies.
Yes no

Vietnamese Refugees Rescued by British Ships

Phu - 18/7

You asked to see some figures on Vietnamese refugees coming to the United Kingdom as a result of 'guarantees of resettlement'. The numbers derive from statistics held by the Joint Council for Refugees for Vietnam and are approximate only.

Up to the end of June 189 refugees have arrived here following guarantees given under the case-by-case ruling introduced in May 1979. These represent 37% of 504 refugees in eight rescues. Guarantees are outstanding for a further 258 refugees from five more recent rescues for whom resettlement is still being sought at their port of disembarkation: if earlier trends hold we might expect about 100 of these to end up here. 79 refugees were disembarked without the need for a guarantee.

yours ever
Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



Vietnam

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 June 1980

Dear Michael,

to
R. M. J. Lyne
30/6

Vietnamese Refugees : MV 'Embalina'

I am writing to confirm the details of the rescue of 18 Vietnamese refugees by the MV 'Embalina', which arose over the weekend, and for which we were authorised orally to issue a guarantee in standard terms after contacts between Malcolm Adams, your Duty Clerk and the Resident Clerk.

The British-registered oil tanker MV 'Embalina' rescued 18 refugees off Vietnam on 28 June while on passage in ballast from Hong Kong to Singapore, where it was due to arrive at noon local time (early morning our time) today. Six of the 18 refugees are children and were reported to be in very poor physical condition. Any refugees eventually settled in the United Kingdom as a result of this guarantee can of course be counted against our 10,000 quota.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department).

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Vietnam

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

30 June 1980

Dear Roden,

For
RMS

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV "ETREMA"

Thank you for sending us a copy of your letter of 27 June to Michael Alexander. I write to confirm my telephone message of Friday afternoon that the Home Secretary is glad to give his concurrence to offering the Singapore authorities the usual guarantee in this case.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander, Stuart Hampson, David Wright and Bill Beckett.

Yours,
Steph

(S W BOYS SMITH)

R M J Lyne Esq



Prime Minister

(2)

Vietnam

In view of the time factor,

I have agreed that the guarantee

should be given on the usual basis.

I have asked for a note of where we stand on the quota - we must still well inside it.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 June 1980

Dear Michael,

Hand 27/6

Handwritten initials and signatures

Vietnamese Refugees: MV "Etrema"

The British-registered oil tanker MV "Etrema" (19,000 tonnes) has rescued 40 refugees off Vietnam on passage in ballast from Hong Kong to Singapore, where it is due at noon local time (early morning GMT) tomorrow, 28 June.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British-registered vessels is to make every possible effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without a guarantee of re-settlement in the United Kingdom. However, although the Singaporean authorities are in general prepared to allow such refugees to be landed speedily on arrival, if Singapore is their first port of call, in all such cases they ask for a guarantee of resettlement in respect of any for whom resettlement places have not be found elsewhere within 90 days of landing. It is likely that a significant proportion of refugees covered by such a guarantee will, as in previous cases, be found re-settlement places elsewhere.

We recommend that a guarantee be given in this case: if possible we should like to despatch a telegram at the latest this evening, so that Singapore can take action tomorrow morning local time. The FCO Resident Clerk will hold an appropriate telegram of instructions, pending your approval.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department).

Yours ever
Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O' D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

Vietnam



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

23 June 1980

Mr. Rous

Dear Roderic,

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV 'GLEN PARK'

You sent John Chilcot a copy of your letter of 20 June to Michael Alexander about the Vietnamese refugees now on board the MV 'Glen Park'. This letter is to confirm the message I gave your resident clerk on Saturday morning, namely that in the Home Secretary's absence Mr Raison concurs with the proposal that a guarantee should be given to the Australians in the way proposed.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander, Stuart Hampson, David Wright and Bill Becket.

*Tom
Styler*

(S W BOYS SMITH)

R M J Lyne Esq



Resident Clerk informed
1.30 pm 24/6. Duty Clerk.

Vietnam

Prime Minister

①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Agree, on the usual basis?

20 June 1980

Dear Michael,

Print - 28/6

Yes not

Vietnamese Refugees: MV 'Glen Park'

The British-owned and registered bulk carrier MV 'Glen Park' (16,000 tonnes) has rescued 51 refugees off South Vietnam on passage from Taiwan to Port Pirie, South Australia, where it is due on Thursday 3 July.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without a guarantee of resettlement in the United Kingdom. We have already approached the Australian authorities asking them to allow the refugees to land on arrival, without a guarantee. However they have indicated firmly that (as in the case of the 'Entalina' last December) they will insist on a guarantee to resettle all those not resettled elsewhere.

Provided the Home Secretary concurs, we recommend that the Government should give a guarantee as requested by the Australians. It is likely that a significant proportion of the refugees covered by this guarantee will be found resettlement places elsewhere: only 24 of the 149 in respect of whom we gave a guarantee in the 'Entalina' case eventually came to the United Kingdom. We shall make it clear that this is without prejudice to our general position on the subject, on which we continue to differ with the Australians. Any refugees brought to the United Kingdom as a result could of course be counted against our 10,000 quota.

The FCO Resident Clerk will hold an appropriate telegram of instructions, pending your approval.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Becket (Law Officers' Dept).

Yours ever
Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London



Vietnam

10 DOWNING STREET

MR. ALEXANDER

We have been told that a British registered boat carrying 123 Vietnamese refugees is en route for Singapore. We need to give the usual resettlement guarantees in the course of the day. Are you content for No.10 to do this?

Agreed
mb.

Duty Clerk

13 June 1980

Prime Minister

As usual this is rather urgent. Agree?

Paul
- 13/6

MR ALEXANDER - to see



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 June 1980

Thank you for your letter of today's date about the Vietnamese refugees on board MV Bolnes.

As I told you on the telephone earlier, we have consulted the Prime Minister in Venice and she has agreed that the necessary guarantee may be given to the Singapore authorities.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Boys-Smith (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

MAP

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 June 1980

Dear Mike,

Vietnamese Refugees: MV Bolnes

The British owned and registered bulk carrier MV Bolnes (20,000 tonnes) has picked up 123 refugees in the South China Sea on passage from Vancouver to Madras via Singapore where it is due on Saturday morning our time, 14 June, for bunkering.

The Government's policy in cases involving rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British-registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without any guarantee of resettlement in the UK. In this case there is no prospect of being able to land the refugees without a guarantee at Singapore; in previous cases the Singapore authorities have sought, and we have given, a guarantee that any refugees for whom resettlement places have not been found within 90 days would be accepted in the UK. A significant proportion of the refugees covered by such guarantees have in fact been resettled elsewhere. Although owned by a British company and managed from the UK, the Bolnes's beneficial owners are Norwegian. We have therefore asked the Norwegian authorities to assist in the resettlement of the residue of these refugees. As Norwegian policy is to accept all refugees rescued by their shipping, they may be prepared to do so, and this would further reduce the numbers eventually settled here. But in view of the timing, it will not be possible to await the Norwegian response before issuing the guarantee.

We therefore recommend that, provided the Home Secretary concurs, we should give a guarantee to allow the refugees to land at Singapore. The guarantee should if possible be given to the Singapore authorities tomorrow (14 June) at the latest in view of the ship's imminent arrival. Any refugees brought to the UK as a result could, of course, be counted against our 10,000 quota.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Dept of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers Dept).

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

Mike Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

PS TO PM

GR 200
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 130900Z
FM SINGAPORE 130800Z JUN 80
TO IMMEDIATE FCC
TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 13 JUN
INFO JAKARTA

No. 10 DOWNING ST.

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. LOCAL AGENTS OF JEBSENS UK LTD HAVE INFORMED US THAT THEIR VESSEL 'BOLNES' REGISTERED LONDON HAS PICKED UP 123 VIETNAMESE REFUGEES AT SEA ENROUTE TO SINGAPORE. VESSEL IS DUE HERE FOR BUNKERING ABOUT 6 P.M. ON 14 JUNE.
2. GRATEFUL THEREFORE FOR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE USUAL RESETTLEMENT GUARANTEE TO SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT. THIS SHOULD REACH HERE, IF POSSIBLE, DESKBY 0130Z 14 JUNE SO THAT ACTION CAN BE TAKEN IN TIME TO ARRANGE DISEMBARKATION OVER THE WEEK-END.
3. AS BACKGROUND YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES ARE EXERCISED ABOUT THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES NOW IN THE CAMP (APPROXIMATELY 2500) AND EARLIER THIS WEEK REFUSED TO ALLOW THE GERMAN MERCY SHIP 'CAP ANAMUR', WHICH HAS BROUGHT SOME 1700 REFUGEES TO SINGAPORE SINCE FEBRUARY, TO DISEMBARK A FURTHER GROUP OF 310. UNHCR HAVE SINCE TOLD US THAT FRG GOVERNMENT HAVE NEGOTIATED AN AGREEMENT WITH INDONESIA TO MOVE SOME OF THEIR REFUGEES FROM SINGAPORE TO GALANG. THIS, TOGETHER WITH SCHEDULED DEPARTURES, SHOULD REDUCE THE CAMP POPULATION BY ABOUT 1,000 IN THE NEXT WEEK. BUT THE SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES MAY STILL PROVE STICKY. WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO SEE THAT THE 'BOLNES' IS DELAYED AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE, BUT HAVE WARNED THE LOCAL AGENT OF THE RISK.

HENNINGS

FILES
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PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND

MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR RUSHFORD (LEGAL ADV.)

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

Vietnam

La. Smith

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

30 May 1980

Dear George,

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV 'BARON WEMYSS'

We spoke on the telephone about your letter of 28 May to Michael Alexander. This is to confirm that in the Home Secretary's absence from the country Mr Raison has agreed to the proposed course of action, namely that the refugees should be landed at Singapore and that the usual guarantee of ultimate resettlement should be given.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander (No. 10), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers Department).

*Yours,
Stephen Boys Smith*

(S W BOYS SMITH)

G G H Walden Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

30 May 1980

I am writing to confirm for the record that the Prime Minister accepted the Secretary of State's recommendation about guarantees for the Vietnamese refugees on board MV 'Baron Wemyss', as set out in your letter of 26 May.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot, (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department).

MAP

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TR

910



HO confirmed by telephone that Mr. Kaison had agreed this proposal. MAP told the FCO that the PM was content. 29/5 vls.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PRIME MINISTER

28 May 1980

Answer telephoned to MAP from Chequers 29/5. vls.

Agree to give necessary guarantees to enable these refugees to land at Singapore - subject to Home Sec's concurrence?

Yes no

Dear Michael

Vietnamese Refugees: MV 'Baron Wemyss'

MAP 29/5

The British-owned and registered bulk carrier, MV 'Baron Wemyss' has picked up 26 refugees in the South China Sea on passage in ballast from Hong Kong to Christmas Island (an Australian dependency). The owners have sought our advice on whether to attempt to disembark the refugees at Singapore or to keep them on board.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees of British-registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without any guarantee of resettlement in the UK. In this case, there is no prospect of being allowed to land the refugees without a guarantee, either at Christmas Island or on the Australian mainland: Christmas Island has no facilities to receive refugees, and in a previous case (that of the MV 'Entalina') the Australian Government insisted on a guarantee. Although Singapore is not a scheduled port of call there would be benefit both to HMG and to the owners if the refugees could disembark there. This would involve a guarantee that any refugees for whom resettlement places have not been found within 90 days would be accepted in the UK. In previous cases, a significant portion of the refugees covered by such guarantees have in fact been resettled elsewhere. As it is not possible to argue in this case that Singapore is the first port of call, we cannot claim that the authorities there are under any obligation to help us in this way. But we have sought confirmation that, as in earlier cases, they would be prepared to do so and it would obviously benefit the ship-owners to have the refugees disembarked as soon as possible.

We therefore recommend that, provided the Home Secretary concurs, we should give the necessary guarantee to allow the refugees to land at Singapore. The guarantee should if possible be given to the Singapore authorities tomorrow or on Friday (29 or 30 May) since the ship would arrive there at 0200 on 31 May. Any refugees brought to the UK as a result could, of course, be counted against our 10,000 quota.

/I am



I am copying this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office),
Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet
Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers Department).

Yours ever
GGH

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



RO VS
Vietnam

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 April 1980

Dear Robene

Vietnamese Refugees: M V "Alva Sea"

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 25 April about the 28 refugees picked up by the M V "Alva Sea" yesterday. The Prime Minister has agreed that a guarantee should be given to enable the refugees to land at Singapore. I have instructed the Resident Clerk to despatch the telegram referred to in your letter.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

VS

010



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Prime Minister
Agree A?*

Print 26/4

25 April 1980

Dear Michael,

Vietnamese Refugees: M V "Alva Sea"

The British-owned and registered ore/oil carrier MV ALVA SEA has picked up 28 refugees this morning in the South China Sea on passage in ballast from Japan to the Gulf. It is due off Singapore on Monday morning our time, 28 April. The owners have sought our advice on whether to attempt to disembark the refugees at Singapore or to keep them on board until arrival at a currently unknown destination in the Gulf around 10 May.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British-registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without any guarantee of resettlement in the UK. In this case there is no prospect of being able to land the refugees without a guarantee at any Gulf port. Although Singapore is not a scheduled port of call, there would be benefit both to HMG and to the owners if the refugees could disembark there. This would involve a guarantee that any refugees for whom resettlement places have not been found within 90 days would be accepted in the UK. In previous cases a significant proportion of the refugees covered by such guarantees have in fact been resettled elsewhere. As it is not possible to argue in this case that Singapore is the first port of call, we cannot claim that they are under any obligation to help us in this way. But there is reason to believe that they are prepared to do so, and it would obviously benefit the ship-owners to have the refugees disembarked as soon as possible. Moreover, it is most unlikely that we would be able to negotiate with any Gulf State the 90 days respite which disembarkation at Singapore offers, and which enables appropriate arrangements to be made for reception of those eventually coming to the UK to enter resettlement centres here.

A

We therefore recommend that, provided the Home Secretary concurs, we should give a guarantee to allow the refugees to land at Singapore. The guarantee should if possible be given to the Singapore authorities tomorrow (26 April) at the latest in view of the ship's imminent arrival. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Resident Clerk will hold ready for despatch a telegram to give appropriate instructions to our High Commission there. Any refugees brought to the UK as a result could, of course, be counted against our 10,000 quota.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Dept of Trade), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers Dept).

*Yours ever
Roderic Lyne*
(R M J Lyne)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street



AD
TRADE
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SO

2/11
Vietnam

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 March 1980

Vietnamese Refugees: MV 'E Hornsby Masson'

Roderic Lyne wrote to me on 4 March about 33 Vietnamese refugees who had been picked up by the oil tanker E Hornsby Masson. The Prime Minister is content that a guarantee of resettlement within 90 days should be given to the Singaporean authorities in regard to these refugees. Any refugees brought to the United Kingdom as a result would be counted against our 10,000 quota.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Francis
Van Agt.
MacNamara

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 March 1980

Dear Michael,

Vietnamese Refugees: MV 'E Hornsby Masson'

The British-owned and registered oil tanker 'E Hornsby Masson' on passage in ballast from South Korea to the Gulf, has rescued 33 Vietnamese refugees. The tanker will be stopping briefly at Singapore on 5/6 March.

The Government's policy in cases involving the rescue of Vietnamese refugees by British registered vessels is, as you know, to make every effort to ensure that they can be landed at the first port of call without any guarantee of resettlement in the United Kingdom. In this case, this will not be possible, given the Singaporean Government's attitude (see paragraph 3 below). It is no more likely, unfortunately, that one of the Gulf States would permit disembarkation without guarantee, especially as this would not be the first port of call. We understand moreover that the owners are seriously concerned about the safety risks created by the presence of a number of extraneous people on board an empty tanker, which is not scheduled to arrive at a Gulf port until about 20 March.

In these circumstances, we have little alternative but to attempt to arrange for the refugees to land in Singapore. This will, however, not be possible without an immediate guarantee of resettlement within 90 days, such as has been given in the handful of similar cases which have arisen over the past six months. The Singaporean Prime Minister has repeatedly made it clear that for his Government there is no flexibility on this question.

Lord Carrington recommends therefore that, provided the Home Secretary concurs, we should give a guarantee to allow the refugees to land at Singapore. Any refugees brought to the United Kingdom would of course be counted against our 10,000 quota, but as on previous occasions we can expect UNHCR to settle at least some of them in other countries willing to take them for specific reasons.

/An early



An early resolution in this case would have the additional advantage of dispelling the anxiety of the British shipping industry over the cost to British ship-owners of carrying out their responsibility for rescue at sea. The President of the General Council of British Shipping has recently written again to the Secretary of State for Trade about this.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot in the Home Office, Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Martin Vile (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department).

*yours
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

13
ADVANCES: BOAT PEOPLE X - 14

Vietnam

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
LORD N G LENNOX
HD/UHD
ED/HK & GD
ED/NEWS D
ED/SEAD
~~RESIDENT OFFICE~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET
MR WADE, PS/HOME SECRETARY
RM 754 Q.A.G.

PP OTTAWA

GRS 180

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HONG KONG 070425Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE HANOI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 7 OF 7 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY F C O, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA.

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: THE MORATORIUM.

1. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD IN CONFIDENCE BY THE CANADIANS THAT AT CANADIAN IMMIGRATION TEAM WHICH VISITED VIETNAM IN JANUARY WAS TOLD BY WU HOANG OF THE MFA THAT VIETNAM WAS READY TO EXPORT A FURTHER 600,000 REFUGEES BY BOAT UNLESS RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES EXPANDED THEIR DIRECT PROGRAMMES TO COVER INDEPENDENT APPLICANTS AS WELL AS FAMILY REUNION (ORR'S LETTER OF 4 FEBRUARY TO STITT, SEAD - NOW COPIED TO YOU BY BAG).

2. GRATEFUL FOR ANY INDICATIONS OF CURRENT VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE MORATORIUM, AS WELL AS ANY EVIDENCE YOU MAY HAVE OF FUNDS REACHING POTENTIAL REFUGEES FROM OVERSEAS.

3. ANYTHING WE COULD USE WITH PALMEIRI, THE US REFUGEE CO-ORDINATOR, WHOM WE ARE MEETING ON THE MORNING OF 9 FEBRUARY WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL. PLEASE INDICATE ANY MATERIAL WHICH SHOULD NOT BE SO USED.

MACLEHOSE



Vietnam

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

*F.S.
Rush - 10/1*

PRIME MINISTER

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

1. I have seen a copy of the Home Secretary's minute of 28th December suggesting we increase the admission rate on Vietnamese refugees and I have seen your approval to it subject to colleagues' views in your Private Secretary's letter of 3rd January.

2. I can well appreciate the concern shown for these unfortunate people and the problems which Hong Kong has to face. The humanitarian arguments are compelling, and I am therefore content for the Home Secretary to proceed as he suggests.

3. I am copying this Minute to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'G.H.'.

(G.H.)

10 January, 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 January 1980

Dear John,

to Whitelaw 8/1

Vietnamese Refugees

Lord Carrington has seen the Home Secretary's minute of 28 December proposing an accelerated programme for the admission of Vietnamese refugees, and Michael Alexander's letter of 3 January recording the Prime Minister's concurrence.

Lord Carrington fully supports Mr Whitelaw's proposal, and welcomes the news that the initial stage of this operation has gone so smoothly. A decision on the lines proposed will naturally be most welcome to the Government of Hong Kong.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Alexander at No 10, Tony Battishill at the Treasury and to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

J A Chilcot Esq
Home Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

*See memo
file 16*



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 January 1980

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

The Prime Minister has seen the Home Secretary's minute to her of 28 December on this subject. She agrees, subject to the views of the other recipients of the Home Secretary's minute, with the accelerated programme of admissions proposed by Mr. Whitelaw.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Tony Battishill (H.M. Treasury) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

J. A. Chilcot, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

GB

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

*Agree, subject to views of
other recipients?*

PRIME MINISTER

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

Yes per

3/11

When we agreed in July to accept an additional 10,000 Vietnamese refugees I suggested that we might take them at the rate of about 3,000 a year. It is probably that 3,000 will have arrived by mid-February 1980. We need to decide now what our target should be after that.

My object has been to make the process of taking the refugees as smooth and unobtrusive as possible and at the same time to be as helpful as we can to the Governor of Hong Kong whose problems were vividly described to us by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary after he had seen the conditions there. So far we have been more successful than I had hoped. The voluntary bodies who are responsible for reception are working together harmoniously and local authorities are coming forward quietly with housing offers. Sir Arthur Peterson, whom I have appointed as Chairman of a co-ordinating committee, is smoothing out any local problems which arise.

I am now confident that we can and ought to proceed more rapidly than I felt able to propose before we had the measure of the problem. Not to do so would cause severe problems for Hong Kong because the Governor can only keep the countries with greater potentiality for helping - notably Canada and the USA - up to the mark by showing that we are doing as much as we can. From our domestic point of view, there are powerful arguments in addition to humanitarian considerations for getting the refugees out of the Hong Kong camps as soon as we can. They are inevitably exposed to the attention of the criminal syndicates there - the Triads - with their involvement

CONFIDENTIAL

in the drug traffic. We have no evidence that it is a serious problem now, but it could become so.

With our existing camp accommodation in this country and making reasonable projections of housing offers, I think we could complete our obligations to the UN by the end of 1980 or March 1981 at the latest. This means financial provision of £6.2M for 1980/81. If we stick to 3,000 refugees for the next financial year the cost would still be well over £4M as far as I can judge and, of course, something like the same sum for 1981/82. By deliberately going slow we would also stir up hostility in all kinds of quarters - the USA and Canada, the UNHCR and Hong Kong, the voluntary organisations here and some of our supporters, as well as the Opposition.

I propose that we should agree to aim to admit the remainder of the 10,000 Vietnamese refugees by March 1981.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

hsw

28

December 1979

GRS 550

CONFIDENTIAL

P S TO P M No10 DOWNING ST

FM HONG KONG 240830Z DEC 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1798 OF 24 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA.

INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON, OTTAWA,
UKMIS NEW YORK, MANILA, KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, BANGKOK,
JAKARTA, HANOI (BANGKOK PLEASE PASS).

MY TELNO 1756 (NOT TO ALL): VIETNAMESE REFUGEE MORATORIUM.

1. THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF DISTURBING SIGNS RECENTLY THAT VIETNAM'S MORATORIUM ON "DISORDERLY DEPARTURES" MAY NOT LAST MUCH LONGER.
2. FIRSTLY, THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE OF ACCEPTANCE OF BRIBES BY VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS TO TURN A BLIND EYE TO CLANDESTINE DEPARTURES. RECENT CASES HAVE ALL CONCERNED BOATLOADS OF ETHNIC VIETNAMESE. TWO SMALL BOATS WHICH LEFT DANANG ON 9 DECEMBER HAD PAID 5 TAEELS OF GOLD TO LOCAL PSB OFFICIALS AND 40 TAEELS WERE PAID ON DEPARTURE BY THE 122 REFUGEES WHO LEFT VUNG TAU ON 15 DECEMBER AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RESCUED BY THE DANISH SHIP "SIMBA". FOR THE PRECEDING 2 MONTHS NONE OF THE SMALL NUMBER OF REFUGEES ARRIVING FROM SOUTHERN OR CENTRAL VIETNAM HAVE REPORTED PAYING BRIBES.
3. SECONDLY, MONEY AGENTS IN HONG KONG (WHO TRANSMIT FUNDS ON BEHALF OF RELATIVES ELSEWHERE TO MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILY IN VIETNAM) WERE VIRTUALLY INACTIVE FOLLOWING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. ABOUT MID-SEPTEMBER THEIR BUSINESS STARTED TO PICK UP. THEIR ACTIVITIES HAVE RECENTLY INCREASED CONSIDERABLY, ALTHOUGH NOT YET TO THE LEVEL OF JUNE AND EARLY JULY. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT THE AMOUNTS WHICH WILL BE NEEDED TO PAY FOR TRANSPORT OUT OF VIETNAM ARE 3 TAEELS OF GOLD PER ADULT AND HALF THAT FOR CHILDREN (THIS IS ABOUT ONE THIRD TO ONE QUARTER OF THE RATE DURING THE OFFICIALLY ORGANIZED EXODUS EARLIER THIS YEAR).

CONFIDENTIAL

4. THIRDLY, WE HAVE HAD RELIABLE RECENT REPORTS OF AT LEAST ONE SYNDICATE WITH ACTIVE PLANS TO SEND A LARGE BOAT TO VIETNAM TO PICK UP REFUGEES. THERE HAVE BEEN FURTHER REPORTS THAT A NUMBER OF OTHER SYNDICATES ARE MAKING CONTINGENCY PLANS SHOULD THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES INDICATE THAT LARGE BOATS WOULD AGAIN BECOME AN ACCEPTABLE METHOD OF TRANSPORT.

5. ALL OF THE FOREGOING EVIDENCE CONCERNS PLANS FOR DEPARTURE BY PEOPLE WISHING TO LEAVE, MIDDLEMEN IN VIETNAM AND OUTSIDE SYNDICATES. APART FROM THE EVIDENCE OF LOW LEVEL CORRUPTION, NONE BEARS DIRECTLY ON THE INTENTIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF REPORTS BASED ON REFUGEE DEBRIEFINGS HERE AND ELSEWHERE HAVE INDEPENDENTLY SPOKEN OF ENCOURAGEMENT BEING GIVEN TO THE ETHNIC CHINESE COMMUNITY IN VIETNAM BY VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY MIGHT SOON BE ABLE TO LEAVE BY BOAT. A CONSISTENT FEATURE IN SUCH REPORTS IS THAT THIS TIME CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO DISGUISE THE ELEMENT OF OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT EG BY LIMITING BOATS TO NOT MORE THAN 50 OR 100 PASSENGERS SO THAT THEY COULD BE EXPLAINED AS PURELY CLANDESTINE DEPARTURES. THE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND PAYMENT OF (REDUCED) FEES WOULD BE MORE DISCREET. ONE OF THE REFUGEES RESCUED BY THE "SIMBA", QUOTING A SECOND-HAND CONTACT WITH A PSB OFFICIAL, SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN PLANS FOR ORGANIZED SMALL BOAT DEPARTURES TO BE RESUMED ON 1 NOVEMBER; THAT THIS WAS SET BACK TO 1 DECEMBER AND HAS NOW BEEN SET FOR 1 JANUARY.

6. WE ARE MAKING USE OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION DISCREETLY WITH THE LOCAL PRESS. MEANWHILE WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO PARAS 2 TO 5 BEING PASSED TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND TO THE UNHCR.

CATER

FILES
SEAD
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PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
MR CORTAZZI
MR STRATTON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR. MURRAY

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
BOAT PEOPLE

Vietnam


7 December 1979

Vietnamese Refugees

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 4 December on this subject. She has made no comment.

M O'D B A

Don Brereton, Esq.,
Department of Health and Social Security.



CONFIDENTIAL

OSG

FUE

VIETNAM.

5 December 1979

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has given contingent authority for the required assurance to the Australian Government about the re-settlement of the Vietnamese refugees on the MV Entalina.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CB

PRIME MINISTER

You will remember that when you invited Peter Thorneycroft to meet Cabinet colleagues after Cabinet on 4 October, one of the points he raised as causing difficulty in the Party was the impression fostered by a few highly-coloured reports in the Press, that the Vietnamese refugees are reluctant to accept employment. It occurs to me that you might like to have a note.

Although there may be a few individual examples of refugees being reluctant to take work, I have had no indications from my Departmental officers or from the Home Office, that this is a general problem. The refugees are housed initially in reception hostels. It is the Home Office's policy to move them out of the hostels into private accommodation as quickly as possible, and so far good progress has been made on this. Of the 5,000 refugees that have gone into the hostels since the end of the last year, 2,000 have already moved out into the community, and the great majority of those remaining are those who have arrived most recently. During the period - typically, three months - that the refugees remain in the reception hostels the Supplementary Benefit that they receive will usually be divided between them and the charities running the hostels. The refugees will be paid only their pocket-money allowance - £9.70 a week for married couples and £5.95 for single people; the remainder of their benefit - the allowance for accommodation, etc - is paid direct to the charity. Whatever earnings the refugees had in Vietnam, Supplementary Benefit does not provide them with more than a modest standard of living by reference to British earning levels, and the opportunities for higher living standards through taking employment must be very apparent to the refugees once they have obtained a Council house and found their feet.

Not only are there considerable incentives for refugees to take work, but there are also steps we can take in those, very rare, cases where refugees prove unwilling to do so. When a refugee has acquired an adequate grasp of English, he has to register for work. If he refused suitable jobs unreasonably, or if he refused to lower his expectations when his preferred job failed to materialise, my

Only 1500
or so of these
went against
the 10,000
quota.



Prime Minister

(2)

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials]

010

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister (2)

Print

You will remember that when you invited Peter Thorneycroft to meet Cabinet colleagues after Cabinet on 4 October, one of the points he raised as causing difficulty in the Party was the impression fostered by a few highly-coloured reports in the Press, that the Vietnamese refugees are reluctant to accept employment. It occurs to me that you might like to have a note.

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Department would apply the normal procedures used where people are reluctant to take available work. These include having the case examined by an unemployment review officer.

All previous experience has shown that members of refugee groups soon settle down in the community and become self-supporting. In this the Vietnamese have proved no exception, very many having already found employment or places on appropriate training courses. Indeed, considering the great difficulties that the Vietnamese refugees have had to face, including language problems and the absence of a sizeable Vietnamese community in this country, they are settling in remarkably well.

I am copying this to Cabinet colleagues and also to Peter Thorneycroft.

PT

4 December 1979



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 December 1979

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister
Apex A? Yes
1979

Vietnamese Refugees

The MV Entalina, a British owned and registered Shell tanker, rescued 149 Vietnamese refugees on 29 November en route from Singapore to Darwin. The vessel was due to arrive in Darwin on 4 December for a stay of about four days.

The Australian Immigration Minister has refused to allow the refugees to land unless the British Government give an assurance that they accept "responsibility for their resettlement". I enclose a draft telegram recording the Australian High Commission's response to our request for reconsideration of the Australian position.

Lord Carrington considers that we should now give the Australians the assurance which they have requested, and should do so soon in order to avoid embarrassing publicity. The assurance would imply a guarantee of ultimate resettlement for those refugees not accepted for resettlement elsewhere. As in previous cases, those refugees who were eventually resettled in the UK would have to be counted against the existing quota of 10,000. We would make it clear to the Australians that we regarded the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as responsible for processing and placing the refugees.

I should be grateful if the Prime Minister could give contingent authority for the proposed assurance to the Australian Government.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Martin Vile (Cabinet Office), Bill Beckett (Law Officers Department) and Stuart Hampson (DOT).

Yours
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O' D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

At present we have used up rather over 1/10 of the quota.

A J

File No.....

Department

Drafted by

(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification confidential
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) (Time)Z	POSTBYZ
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA (precedence) (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) Priority to Hong Kong and UKMIS Geneva

SAVING TO (for info) Jakarta, Singapore, Manila, Bangkok, Hanoi, UKMIS New York

Distribution:--
 Files
 SEAD
 SAD
 HKGD
 UND
 FED
 EID
 PUSD
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 IPD
 News D
 PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/Mr Blaker
 PS/PUS
 Sir A Duff
 Mr Cortazzi
 Mr Murray
 Mr Stratton
 Lord N Gordon Lennox
 Additional Distrib:
 Boat People

[TEXT]
 Your telegram No 662: INTALINA REFUGEES
 1. Australian High Commission gave Murray this afternoon their Government's response to his request for reconsideration of the Australian position. The Australians noted that at the Executive Committee meeting of the High Commission for Refugees in October, Mr Raison had stated that refugees should be landed at the first port of call "if necessary after receiving guarantees of resettlement". The Australian Government was acting in accordance with a principle for which there was wide acceptance and would ~~accept~~ ^{expect} this principle ~~should~~ ^{to} be maintained. It was not able to accept refugees brought to Australia without prior authority: such occurrences could well jeopardise
 /Australia's

Australia's ongoing programme of commitments from the countries of first asylum including Hong Kong. The Australians added that they would not want a repeat of the situation forced on them by the Greek Government's refusal to guarantee resettlement of the Dimitros stowaways.

2. Murray express disappointment at this reply, particularly the scanty reference to Hong Kong. We would now report to Ministers.

3. For the present you should take no further action.

D. J. S.
3/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Original on

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam

Indonesia June 79,
Visit by Pres. Soeharto.

Excerpt

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA, PRESIDENT SOEHARTO, AT 10 DOWNING STREET
ON WEDNESDAY 14 NOVEMBER AT 1120 HOURS

Present:

The Prime Minister

President Soeharto

Mr. Michael Alexander

Mr. Joop Ave

* * * * *

President Soeharto referred to the concept of "national resilience", This involved an attempt to increase Indonesia's economic, political, military and cultural strength. Of these various areas, the economic was the one which gave rise to most concern. It was imperative that this should be got right. The Prime Minister agreed and said that unless a nation was prosperous, it was impossible for it to defend itself.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Soeharto thought that the Vietnamese had deliberately created the refugee problem in order to destabilise the area. President Soeharto said that when Pham van Dong had toured the area he had said that the Vietnamese Government wished to establish healthy relations with its neighbours and intended to act on the basis of a policy of non-interference. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea had therefore bewildered the people of South East Asia. It had led the Indonesian Government to wonder whether the purpose of the Vietnamese Government was not in fact to destabilise the area. The Prime Minister would be familiar with the Communist doctrine of trying to exploit existing or potential trouble spots in such a way that it looked as though the deterioration in the situation was inevitable. The expulsion of the Chinese and the consequent creation of the refugee problem had a dual purpose from the point of view of the Vietnamese Government. On the one hand the departure of the Chinese reduced the number of people who had to be fed in Vietnam and brought a good deal of money to the Government. On the other hand, the arrival of the Chinese in neighbouring countries tended to destabilise the region. The problem was particularly acute for Malaysia.

The country hardest hit by the crisis in Kampuchea was Thailand. The influx of refugees was putting a terrible strain on Thailand. It was still unclear what would happen in Kampuchea but the outcome would be determined by developments during the coming dry season. The Vietnamese army was being reinforced and hoped to crush Pol Pot. However, Pol Pot remained strong and intended to fight to the end. The Prime Minister said that the British Government found itself in a difficult position over the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

situation in Kampuchea. Pol Pot might be able to hold out but the Government were under constant pressure to withdraw recognition from him. Many of his actions in the past had been intolerable. Heng Samrin was a puppet of the Vietnamese and it would be impossible to recognise him. Because of the difficulties we wished to keep in close touch with our friends in ASEAN. President Soeharto said that his views and those of the Prime Minister were very close. ASEAN agreed that Heng Samrin could not be recognised. They also agreed that Pol Pot's actions could not be condoned. ASEAN's guiding principle was that foreign intervention could not be tolerated. Their longer term objective was to work for a situation where Kampuchea was given an opportunity for self-determination. This would of course be very difficult. The first requirement would be to find a leader strong enough to rally the Khmers. The alternatives so far suggested included Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann. However, it would only be possible to evaluate the position thoroughly once the dry season campaign was finished in 5 or 6 months' time. The Prime Minister and President Soeharto agreed that whatever the ultimate outcome, it was clear that a terrible time was in prospect for the people of Kampuchea.

The discussion ended at 1200 hours.

PhnA
-

14 November 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Extrad from

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject filed on ^{Vietnam} China
Visit of Hua May 79

NFR PM / Premier Hua 29.10.79

SOUTH EAST ASIA

The Prime Minister suggested that they take South East Asia to start the discussions. This was both because of the tragedy taking place there and because she had raised the subject with Premier Kosygin on her way to the Tokyo Summit. She had told him of how concerned we were about events in Vietnam. She had called on him to use his influence with the Vietnamese authorities to dissuade them from turning so many people out. Regrettably his reply had hardly been worth the time it took to deliver. He had claimed that all those leaving were drug addicts, criminals or spies. The Prime Minister had told him that this was impossible since over half a million refugees had left. Premier Hua said that those arriving in China alone numbered 260,000. The Prime Minister said that she had told Kosygin that those arriving in Hong Kong and in the UK were hard-working individuals. Their expulsion was deliberately designed to hurt the refugees themselves, to hurt those countries which received them and to cause instability in South East Asia. Premier Hua commented that quite apart from the huge numbers of refugees recorded there were innumerable who had been lost at sea. The Prime Minister said that she had got nowhere with Mr. Kosygin. Finally she had told him that Vietnamese policy was not a good advertisement for the Russian brand of Communism. She asked Premier Hua whether he agreed that Vietnamese policy was an attempt to destabilize the whole of South East Asia.

Premier Hua said that he agreed and thought highly of Mrs. Thatcher's analysis. He wished to say a few words, starting with South East Asia. Following the war Vietnam had needed a period of peace to heal its wounds. Had they set on that course they would have received widespread support from the whole world. Chinese aid to Vietnam would have been no problem and many other countries would have willingly helped Vietnam to recover from the wounds of war. But Le Duan and other Vietnamese leaders were determined to take the other course - building an Indochina Federation. So instead of reducing their army after the war, they expanded it. They now had an

/army of

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- 4 -

army of one million, which was disproportionate to the size of the country. But the Vietnamese had the backing of the Soviet Union in pursuing their aim of regional hegemony. It was part of what Mrs. Thatcher had rightly described as the grand design of the Soviet Union. It served Soviet purposes to help Vietnam with their expansionism. The Soviets would gain the use of Cam Ranh bay. This would push them forward from their Vladivostock base by 4,500 kms. From Indochina the Soviets could further threaten and endanger Thailand and Malaysia and win control of the Malacca Straits. Control of the Malacca Straits meant control of the sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian Ocean.

Premier Hua said that without Soviet backing the Vietnamese would not have dared to do what they had. They had signed a so-called Treaty of Peace and Friendship; in fact Article 6 made it a military pact. The Vietnamese had launched their invasion of Cambodia at the end of December 1978 and then they had whipped up a massive anti-China campaign. They had decided to drive out all ethnic Chinese and even some national minorities from Vietnam. They had carried on armed provocation to an increasing degree along the Sino-Vietnamese border. In the past this border had not been defended on the Chinese side. But the repeated Vietnamese incursions made it impossible for Chinese inhabitants to carry on their peaceful activities. Before the Chinese had undertaken their "counter-attack in self defence" they had suffered about 400 casualties.

APPOINTMENTS IN CONFIDENCE



VIETNAM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 October 1979

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 15 October, regarding the Home Secretary's proposal to invite Sir Arthur Peterson to Chair the Joint Committee for Refugees from Vietnam. She is content with the nomination.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Laughrin (Civil Service Department).

M. A. PATTISON

J.A. Chilcot, Esq.,
Home Office.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'J.A. Chilcot', located in the bottom right corner of the page.



HOME OFFICE
 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

MAP
 154
 X

APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

15 October 1979

Drawn out.

Dear Mike,

The Home Secretary has, as you know, decided, in consultation with the relevant voluntary agencies, to nominate a Chairman to a Joint Committee for Refugees from Vietnam. The creation of the Committee stems from the Home Secretary's concern that the capacity of the voluntary organisations must be considerably strengthened, particularly on the resettlement side. They agree.

The Home Secretary had it in mind to invite Frank Marshall, but the latter's Vice-Chairmanship of the Conservative Party has ruled that out.

Accordingly, the Home Secretary proposes to invite Sir Arthur Peterson, formerly Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office and Director-General of the Greater London Council (and now Chairman of the Merseyside Docks and Water Board).

Apart from giving much greater administrative strength and direction to the voluntary agencies, the Chairman of the Committee will need to establish rapidly good relations with local authorities and Sir Arthur's experience in both central and local government administration will be of particular value. The appointment will be for a limited period - three years (though there is clearly a strong possibility that the Committee's work will be over before that) and will not be a paid appointment, though it will carry out of pocket expenses.

The Home Secretary would like to announce the appointment as soon as possible and will be glad to know that the Prime Minister is content.

*Yours,
 John*

J. A. CHILCOT

M. J. Pattison, Esq.

FILE

Original in G/R.

VIETNAM
cc: FCO



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 October 1979

Dear Mr. Raymond,

Thank you for your letter of 17 September about Vietnam, a copy of which you sent to Lord Carrington.

The main reason for the exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam has been pressures on them by the Vietnamese Government. I need hardly point out that the Vietnamese Government's actions have caused widespread revulsion abroad.

You suggested that the Government should provide aid for Vietnam. The Vietnamese have not helped their case by their invasion of Cambodia, and their reluctance to open the way to a massive international relief effort for Cambodia by the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations agencies. This aid is urgently needed if thousands of people there are to survive the famine. Thus there is unlikely to be a widespread response at the present time for appeals to help the Vietnamese Government. We must concentrate on trying to provide help to those who have suffered as a result of the Vietnamese Government's policies, and

/ especially

especially to the refugees in Hong Kong and elsewhere in South East Asia. As a Vice President of the Britain-Vietnam Association, you may have seen a copy of Peter Blaker's letter of 6 September addressed to the Association's Hon. Secretary, Miss Joan Yuillé, where he outlined in some detail the measures that we and our colleagues in the European Community had taken to support the operations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. I enclose a copy of this letter, for ease of reference.

I am also enclosing your letter's enclosure.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Miss Joan Maynard, M.P.

PRIME MINISTER

As usual when I am on duty, there is a refugee issue this weekend.

I understand that a British merchant vessel has picked up 52 boat people, reportedly from a burning wreck. A number of refugees are said to require urgent hospital treatment. The British vessel is about 150 miles from Singapore. We have been asked to give a guarantee that these refugees would ultimately be accepted in the UK, so that the Singapore authorities will be prepared to take them ashore urgently for hospital treatment.

Presumably the 52 would count against the agreed UK quota for refugees. This will mean that this action is at the expense of the same number of refugees from Hong Kong. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is aware of this, but sees no other solution, given agreed UK policy. I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary have been in touch, and have jointly recommended that you should agree that the British Government should offer the required guarantee. I attach a note from the FCO setting out the background.

Do you agree that Lord Carrington should provide the requested guarantee?

*Yes - at once
pit*

Mike Pattison

6 October 1979

*Informed FCO duty clerk 10pm 6 October
FCO to cable Singapore.*

Mr Alexander to see

Phms

MP 8/x

Sent by Telex
to P.M. at chequers.

Prime Minister
Agree X

CONFIDENTIAL

6/10

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 October 1979



present
Duty
clerk
6/10

The Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
No 10 Downing Street

Dear Private Secretary

1. Reports were received this morning that the MV Balder London registered in the United Kingdom and owned by the British company, Lloyds Industrial Leasing, had picked up 52 Vietnamese refugees from a burning and sinking boat, some 150 miles north-east of Singapore. Many of the refugees are in urgent need of hospital treatment. The Balder London was due to arrive in Singapore at 6 pm (UK time) this evening.
2. The Singapore authorities have made it clear in the past that they will not let refugees disembark without a guarantee from the Flag State that it will accept for resettlement any refugees for whom the UNHCR has not made other arrangements within 90 days.
3. In view of the urgency of the case, and the attention which humanitarian aspects of the Indo-China problem are attracting at present, Lord Carrington hopes the Prime Minister will agree that the British High Commission in Singapore should be authorised to give the necessary guarantee at once. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs has been consulted and agrees with the action proposed. Subject to the Prime Minister's views the refugees could be counted against our quota of 10,000 announced at Geneva.
4. If the Prime Minister is content that the guarantee should be given we shall arrange for appropriate instructions to be sent to the High Commission in Singapore immediately.
5. I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Trade.

Yours sincerely, Peter Dun

P J Dun
Resident Clerk

CONFIDENTIAL

Reports were received this morning that the NV Balderlondon, registered in the United Kingdom and owned by the British company, Lloyds Industrial Leasing, had picked up 52 Vietnamese refugees from a burning and sinking boat, some 150 miles North West of Singapore. Many of the refugees are in urgent need of hospital treatment. The Balderlondon was due to arrive in Singapore at 1800 (UK time) this evening.

The Singapore authorities have made it clear in the past that they will not let refugees disembark without a guarantee from the Flag State that it will accept for resettlement any refugees for whom the UNHCR has not made other arrangements within 90 days.

In view of the urgency of this case, and the attention which humanitarian aspects of the Indo-China problem are attracting at present, Lord Carrington hopes the Prime Minister will agree that the British High Commission in Singapore should be authorised to give the necessary guarantee at once. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs has been consulted and agrees with the action proposed. Subject to the Prime Minister's views the refugees may be counted against our quota of 10,000 announced at Geneva.

If the Prime Minister is content that the guarantee should be given we shall arrange for prompt instructions to be sent to the High Commission in Singapore immediately.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Trade.



Original
in G/R. c.f. CLO
Vietnam

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 September 1979

Dear Patricia,

Thank you for the letter of 9 September which Mr. Albert Roberts and Mrs de Roland-Peel sent me on your behalf as Chairman of the British Committee for Free Vietnam, and for your support for the steps the Government has taken to ensure that concerted international efforts are made to resolve the refugee problem.

As you know, the Government believes that the root causes of the refugee problem lie in the inhumane policies of the Vietnamese Government towards their own people. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed this at the Geneva meeting and called for the reversal of these policies. I am sure you also know that at the meeting the Vietnamese Government undertook to make every effort to stop 'illegal' departures and, in the meantime, to co-operate with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to bring departures into orderly and safe channels.

You will have seen the Government's statement about the Geneva meeting, which Lord Trefgarne made in the House of Lords on 24 July: I enclose a copy for ease of reference. The next step is for the United Nations Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on progress in implementing his action plan for dealing with the situation. We shall pay close attention to what Dr. Waldheim says and to the discussions in the United Nations; but it would be premature to consider the further measures against Vietnam which you suggest in your letter. In particular the British Ambassador in Hanoi has a part to play in making our views known to the Vietnamese Government.

Yours sincerely

Raymond

Further Home Office
advise coming. M.A. 11/x.



Prime Minister

Agree the

Home Secretary's
proposal?

HOME OFFICE

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

14 September 1979

Dear Mike

He is a
vice-chairman of the
1879 Party is doing a lot
of work
with
land
for. I hope that
they
could
co-ordinate
me.

The Home Secretary has been giving urgent consideration to ways of strengthening the ability of the voluntary refugee organisations to co-ordinate the reception and resettlement of the Vietnamese refugees whom we have agreed to accept into this country.

As a first step, the Home Secretary has agreed that Home Office officials should be loaned to the British Council for Aid to Refugees to form the basis of a co-ordinating Secretariat. He has also proposed to the voluntary organisations that a small Executive Committee should be set up which would bring the voluntary agencies together and could take the necessary operational decisions quickly and efficiently.

In the Home Secretary's view, these arrangements would be greatly strengthened if the Chairman of the Executive Committee were appointed from outside the voluntary refugee organisations. He sees considerable advantage in having a Chairman who has achieved a reputation in a wider field of public administration and who has sufficient force of character to ensure that the reception and resettlement exercise goes smoothly.

The Home Secretary has it in mind to offer this appointment to Sir Frank Marshall. By way of background I attach a copy of the Public Appointments Unit's record of Sir Frank's previous experience. There would be a number of advantages in this particular appointment. Sir Frank served on the Uganda Resettlement Board for 1971-74 and therefore already has some idea of the problems likely to be faced in the reception and subsequent resettlement of a large number of refugees. That apart, Sir Frank's local authority background ought to be of considerable help in any negotiations with local authorities and others on the provision and opportunities for permanent resettlement.

The Home Secretary thought that the Prime Minister ought to be made aware of this proposed appointment. He is anxious to make quick progress on this, and I should be grateful if you could let me know as soon as possible if the Prime Minister has any objection to what is proposed.

Sir Ian Bancroft has been consulted and is content.

Yours,
JAC

J. A. CHILCOT

PICTURE (Continued)

approach. Perhaps not quite as full of bright ideas as some, a he prefers to get his results by concentrating on essentials rather than by pouring out a torrent of energy in all directions. Eminently suited for jobs such as chairmanship of a new town corporation, has private means but prefers (and may even need) to keep a foothold in his professional practise - Mr Wedd, Regional Controller, Yorkshire & Humberside Region, DOE.

A POLITICAL ANIMAL. HAS JOINED STUDY FOR GLL INTO RELATIONS WITH LONDON BOROUGH COUNCILS LEEDS MEETING 1978

GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS HELD (Continued)

DATE	APPOINTMENT	POSITION	COMMENTS

GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS CONSIDERED FOR (Continued)

DATE	APPOINTMENT	POSITION	COMMENTS

OTHER NOTES

1. Chairman: Sir Frank Marshall

Details in Who's Who and otherwise on your files. I could not have asked for a better chairman: He is very sensible and a shrewd politician. He has a strong sense of responsibility and is always ready to give his time when it is wanted. He liked to keep in touch without intervening unnecessarily and would back me whenever I wanted it. We met, or spoke by telephone at least every other day. I could discuss any type of problem with him and would always get help even if it was only moral support. He has a very easy manner with people - on first name terms immediately - and is very considerate. Staff like him and he ran his board very smoothly and efficiently. He is not however, just the cheerful extrovert he might appear - he is quite introspective and sensitive. He fully understands, and maintains, the standards of conduct required in the public service. As the leading Conservative local government figure he has innumerable contacts in the Party but he has many friends in the Labour Party also and, indeed his circle of friends and acquaintances is very wide and stretches well beyond the political field. It will be a great pity if his considerable abilities are not soon again suitably employed in the public service. (Maplin Development Authority 1974)

Vietnam



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

13 September 1979

*K.S.
RMS
14/5*

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES.

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Stephen Gomersall of 3 September regarding Vietnamese refugees, about which we spoke on the telephone recently.

The Home Secretary is generally content with the terms of the letter which your Secretary of State proposes to send to the President of the General Council of British Shipping. But perhaps I could make a few minor points.

On the final sentence of the draft, while it is true that when refugees are rescued by British ships the implications will be considered urgently, in the sense of giving the matter priority and avoiding accidental bureaucratic delays, it is also true that the policy we have to adopt can involve deliberate delay in reaching a decision in order to bring pressure to bear on other countries whom we think should take the refugees. You will want to consider whether the Council of Shipping are likely to interpret the assurance of "the greatest possible urgency" as meaning that we will give quick decisions, and quote it against us if in a future case we wish to move slowly.

As to the penultimate sentence, it may not always be true that "If the country of first port of call refused to take the refugees the Government.....will have to decide whether to accept them in the U.K.": although the Ruddbank refugees were not disembarked at their first port of call in China we are still hoping that Japan will take them as the second port of call. Perhaps "may have to decide" would be more accurate than "will have to decide".

Finally, the Ruddbank episode suggests that the responsibility of owners and masters to disembark any refugees they rescue at the first port of call (even though they would prefer to stay aboard in the hope of being taken to a country more to their liking) is worth emphasising. We suspect that the Ruddbank refugees might have been disembarked in China if they had been told that that was to happen, rather than asked for their views. There was, of course, no obligation on the master to do more than take rescued refugees to the first port convenient to him willing to receive them. You may like to consider inserting after the second sentence of the final paragraph, "It is important that owners and masters should do all they can to ensure that this principle is applied in practice".

Copies of this letter go to Michael Alexander (No.10)
and Stephen Gomersall (Lord Privy Seal's Office).

J. A. CHILCOT

T. G. Harris, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PEKING 100728Z SEP 79
TO PRIORITY FCO

(2)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 786 OF 10 SEPT 79

INFO CANBERRA, HONG KONG, VIENTIANE, BANGKOK, WASHINGTON,
TOKYO, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO.
INFO SAVING TO HANOI

Prime Minister
aro

Sub - 10/9

SINO - VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

1. IN A LONG TALK WITH MR HEATH ON 7 SEPTEMBER, FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS ON VIETNAM.
2. HE COULD CONFIDE TO MR HEATH AS AN OLD FRIEND THAT CHINA FOUGHT THE RECENT "MINOR WAR" NOT OUT OF A NARROW VIEW OF HER OWN INTERESTS OR BORDER SECURITY BUT BECAUSE OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC REGION.
3. ASKED WHETHER THE DISPUTE MIGHT NOT BOG CHINA DOWN IN VIETNAM, DRAINING HER STRENGTH AND THEREBY SUITING THE RUSSIANS, HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE DISPUTE WOULD CONTINUE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. HE EXPECTED NO RESULT FROM THE SINO-VIETNAMESE TALKS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. UNLESS VIETNAM GAVE UP "REGIONAL HEGEMONY" CHINA WOULD NOT SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON BORDER DISENGAGEMENT. TO DO SO WOULD GIVE THE VIETNAMESE AND RUSSIANS A FREE HAND TO PURSUE THEIR DESIGNS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA.
4. THERE WAS THEREFORE NEED FOR HIGH SUSTAINED PRESSURE, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ON VIETNAM. SUPPLIES TO THE CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE WERE CURRENTLY VERY DIFFICULT BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE. IF GUERRILLA WAR COULD BE SUSTAINED FOR 3 TO 5 YEARS IT WOULD PRODUCE CHANGES IN THE VIETNAMESE INTERNAL SCENE. HE WAS REMINDING ASEAN COUNTRIES THAT SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CAMBODIAN FORCES WAS SUPPORT FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY. DURING HIS RECENT VISIT MR MONDALE HAD ASSURED THE CHINESE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NO INTENTION TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES WITH JAPAN FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA BEHIND CHINA'S BACK. THOUGH THE AMERICANS LEANED TOWARDS THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION, THEY AGREED THE TIME WAS NOT YET RIPE. MONDALE HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH VIETNAM FOR US DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD TRY TO PERSUADE OTHER COUNTRIES TO STOP ECONOMIC AID TO VIETNAM.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. CHINA DID NOT ENTIRELY OPPOSE A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA BUT AT PRESENT THE IDEA WAS NOT REALISTIC. SIHANOUK WANTED TO NEGOTIATE AND STRIKE A COMPROMISE WITH VIETNAM IN PURSUIT OF AT LEAST A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS. THIS WOULD BE AN UNACCEPTABLE GAMBLE. SIHANOUK WAS AN OLD FRIEND AND PATRIOT AND DESPITE DIVERGENCES, THE CHINESE RESPECTED HIM AND FAVOURED HIS NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT TO OPPOSE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION. BUT THE IDEA OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH VIETNAM WAS A DIFFERENT MATTER. SIHANOUK HAD NO REAL FORCES AT HOME AND IF AN ELECTION WERE HELD AS HE SUGGESTED UNDER U.N. AUSPICES, THE RESULT WOULD BE VIETNAMESE CONTROL.

6. CHINA HAD RESERVED THE RIGHT TO REPEAT THE MILITARY LESSON OF FEBRUARY AGAINST VIETNAM. SHE ALWAYS HAD IN MIND POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTION IN THE NORTH IN SUCH AN EVENT AND WOULD ALWAYS ACT PRUDENTLY. BUT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE FACED WITH A PROBLEM. IF THEY CHOSE MINOR BORDER CONFLICTS THE CHINESE COULD HANDLE THEM. EVEN A MEDIUM-SIZE INTERVENTION, INVOLVING, SAY 2 ARMY CORPS, WOULD NOT BRING RESULTS. A MASSIVE ACTION WOULD INVOLVE A SWITCH IN SOVIET STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT FROM EUROPE TO THE FAR EAST. THE RUSSIANS WOULD NEED 1 - 2 MILLION MEN TO COPE WITH CHINA.

7. ON REFUGEES, HUANG HUA ADMITTED PROBLEMS IN SETTLING THE 250,000 WHO HAD ALREADY CROSSED THE LAND BORDER INTO CHINA. BUT THE CHINESE WERE PREPARED TO RECEIVE A MAXIMUM OF 10,000 MORE PRESENTLY IN THAI CAMPS INTO CHINA.

8. RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

9. BANGKOK PLEASE PASS SAVING TO HANOI
CRADOCK

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PM/Lynch Meeting
Wed 5 September
at No 10

CONFIDENTIAL

Original on
Ireland (Lynch)
Vietnam May 79 -

- 2 -

would make life difficult for both the US and Egyptian Governments. Mr. O'Kennedy commented that Camp David no longer looked like a step towards the solution of the Middle East problem. He agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that the Nine might be able to establish a common position on the problem in Southern Lebanon but that a common position on self-determination for the Palestinians was not at present feasible.

The Lomé Agreement

Mr. O'Rourke said that the Lomé Agreement might give rise to problems at the next Foreign Affairs Council. The Presidency had just received a letter from (Mr. O'Rourke thought) Mr. Adams of Barbados asking that some of the agreed texts should be re-opened. Mr. O'Kennedy said that his position was that there was no scope for further negotiation with the ACP countries. The most he would be prepared to envisage would be, perhaps, some discussion of the interpretation of the texts. Unfortunately, the Caribbean members of the ACP, who had now inherited the Presidency of the Group, had much less interest than the Africans in seeing the fund become operative. Mr. Franklin said that it would be wrong to show flexibility and that to do so would not lessen the strains emerging among the ACP countries.

Portugal

Mr. O'Kennedy said that one of the issues the Irish Presidency hoped to resolve at the Foreign Affairs Council on 18 September was the outstanding negotiation with Portugal over imports of automobiles. The political situation in Portugal was very delicate and further delay would not be helpful.

Vietnamese Refugees

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he understood that the Danish and Dutch Governments wanted to re-open the discussions about food aid for Vietnamese refugees. He was opposed to this until Waldheim's report on the refugees was available. Mr. O'Kennedy agreed and said that this was the position of the Community.

CONFIDENTIAL /On a different

On a different aspect of the Vietnamese refugee problem, Mr. O'Kennedy referred to the fact that his Government had recently offered to accept a batch of refugees from Hong Kong but only about half of the agreed number had arrived. The remainder had refused to come, evidently preferring to go to the United States. If it became apparent that this incident was part of a trend, the whole problem of refugee resettlement might become more complex. It would be difficult for countries like Ireland to play a role if the refugees insisted on going elsewhere.

Cambodia

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the situation in Cambodia was much worse than that in Vietnam. Mr. O'Kennedy agreed and regretted the absence of a position of the Nine. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that as he understood it the Red Cross were now distributing food in Cambodia: this appeared to create the possibility that the Nine could be more generous.

Mr. O'Kennedy said that he was aware of nothing that need inhibit the Nine from doing so. In fact he believed that M. Cheysson had succeeded in maintaining a food aid programme to Cambodia despite the absence of a Ministerial decision on the subject. The Nine would be free to increase the programme if they chose to do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he thought it would be much better to do it in Cambodia than in Vietnam.

South African Rugby Tour

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. O'Kennedy agreed that the decision reached by the various Rugby Union Federations to invite the South Africans to tour the British Isles next month was very regrettable. After the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had explained the difficulties facing HMG, Mr. O'Kennedy said that, if necessary, his Government would probably step in to prevent the tour taking place. But he expected the Irish Rugby Union Federation would in fact accept the view of the Irish Government and withdraw the invitation.

/Rhodesia and Namibia



Prime Minister

Ans 6/5

(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Fh. Ans

5th September 1979

Dear Michael,

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES: MV BRITISH RESOLUTION AND MV RUDD BANK

You asked on 3 September to be brought up to date on developments since the Prime Minister agreed to the proposals in Stephen Gomersall's letters of 31 August to Bryan Cartledge.

On the MV British Resolution, our High Commission have informed us that they have given the guarantee requested by the Singapore authorities. The refugees are expected to be allowed to land today.

On the MV Rudd Bank, the Japanese have not so far requested a guarantee, and it remains our Embassy's assessment that they will allow the refugees to land temporarily without one. The Japanese authorities are now reported by our Embassy to be seeking temporary accommodation for the refugees. As Stephen Gomersall noted in his letter of 31 August, their reception facilities are already almost full.

The undertaking given by Mr Sonoda in Geneva committed Japan to allowing refugees to land temporarily without a guarantee from the flag state. It now looks as though this undertaking may be honoured without the need for further representations by the Embassy, in spite of the unusual circumstances of the Rudd Bank refugees' arrival. The Japanese may still press us to accept some of the refugees at a later stage, perhaps after it becomes clear how many of the 119 can be accepted elsewhere.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Martin Vile (Cabinet Office), Bill Beckett (Law Officer's Department) and Tom Harris (Department of Trade).

Yours sincerely,
M A Wickstead

M A Wickstead
Assistant Private Secretary
to the Lord Privy Seal
(Sir Ian Gilmour)

M A Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1



From the Secretary of State

Vietnam
to Pmt 4/6

S J Gomersall Esq
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

3 September 1979

Dear Stephen,

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

not copied here

Thank you for your letter of 10 August.

My Secretary of State has decided that in light of the correspondence between our offices it would be appropriate to reply to the President of the General Council of British Shipping along the lines of the enclosed draft. In view of the delay in replying to date I would be grateful for your urgent comments.

You will see that in responding to the General Council's point on operational delays suffered by the shipowner we have said that decisions arising from future incidents will be considered with the greatest possible urgency. Bearing in mind that we are not pressing for acceptance of the principle of "automatic inclusion" at this stage - although we still consider that the need for the UK to take such a decision in line with all other Western nations cannot be sidestepped forever - we would like your assurance that submiss-



ions calling for resettlements will be presented with the utmost expedition when each case arises.

I am copying this letter to Brian Cartledge and John Chilcot.

Yours Sincerely,
Tom Harris

T G HARRIS
Private Secretary



DRAFT LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE

TO: D Ropner Esq
President
General Council of British
Shipping
30 - 32 St Mary Axe
LONDON
EC3A 8ET

Rmt
4/6

September 1979

Thank you for your letter of 16 July. I am sorry it has taken some time to give a considered reply.

I am sure you will have gathered from the Foreign Secretary's statement in the House following the Geneva Conference in July that the Government's first concern is to alleviate the appalling burden that the problem of the boat people places on the resources of Hong Kong. That concern was reflected in our decision to accept a further 10,000 refusees from Indo-China for settlement in the United Kingdom. We hope that this, and decisions announced at Geneva by other governments, will alleviate not only the situation in Hong Kong but also the difficulties facing other littoral states in the South China sea region.

Naturally the Government also recognises the difficulties which you quite rightly say are faced by the owners and masters of British flag ships in the region. However I believe that decisions taken at Geneva will result in less difficulty, particularly in relation to the so-called "first port of call" principle, and thus delay in disembarking refugees. Nevertheless, if the country of first port of call



4 SEP 1979

refuses to take the refugees the Government recognises that, as in the past, it will have to decide whether to accept the refugees in the United Kingdom. I can assure you that such cases will be considered with the greatest possible urgency as they arise.

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam
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Jup



B/F 10-9-79

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 September 1979

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

You sent Bryan Cartledge two letters dated 31 August about Vietnamese refugees on two British registered vessels the MV British Resolution and MV Rudd Bank.

As you already know, the Prime Minister agreed over the weekend to the proposals in both letters. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that the Rudd Bank decision could be delayed as long as possible.

I should be grateful to know in due course whether in the event it was necessary to issue a guarantee of eventual resettlement in both cases.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Martin Vile (Cabinet Office), Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and Tom Harris (Department of Trade).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

S.J. Gomersall, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

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FM F.C.O. 011510Z SEP 79

TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 462 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

INFO PEKING, WASHINGTON, UKMIS GENEVA, HONG KONG, OTTAWA,
PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

FROM RESIDENT CLERK

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 477

REFUGEES: MV RUDD BANK

1. IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT YOU MAY, IS SO PRESSED BY THE JAPANESE
AUTHORITIES, GIVE A GUARANTEE THAT WE SHALL ACCEPT IN THE
UK THOSE REFUGEES WHO CANNOT BE SETTLED ELSEWHERE. YOU SHOULD
NOT OF COURSE VOLUNTEER THIS INFORMATION AS IT IS STILL OUR
EXPECTATION THAT THE JAPANESE WILL STANDBY SONADA'S UNDERTAKING.
WE NEVERTHELESS HOPE THERE WILL BE NO PUBLICITY ABOUT SUCH A
GUARANTEE IF IT HAS TO BE GIVEN. MEANWHILE, PLEASE CONTINUE
TO PRESS THE JAPANESE TO HELP RE-SETTLE THE REFUGEES.

CARRINGTON

FILES

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PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF

MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
MR FRETWELL

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TO IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 205 OF 1 SEPTEMBER

h.c. Am 3/9

FROM RESIDENT CLERK

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 296

REFUGEES: M .V. BRITISH RESOLUTION

1. IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT YOU MAY GIVE THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT THE GUARANTEE THEY REQUIRE. PLEASE TRY TO MINIMISE ANY PUBLICITY WHICH COULD COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS ELSEWHERE.

CARRINGTON

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MR FERGUSSON
MR PRETWELL

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Original in GR
C. HO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

31 August 1979

My dear Bishop.

Thank you for your letter of 30 July about Vietnamese refugees.

There can be no doubt that it is the callous and inhuman policies of the Vietnamese government which are the root cause of the problem and it is imperative that they change their policies. Meanwhile, the burden which the flood of refugees is imposing on others in the region can be relieved only by a major and genuinely international effort.

I am keenly aware of the terrible conditions in which many of the refugees survive, and of the dangers they run to escape from the Communist tyrannies in Indo-China. That was why I first proposed that the international community should consult together, with a view to agreeing on practical measures for the refugees' welfare. We played a full part in the conference which Dr. Waldheim called in Geneva on 20/21 July.

The Government has given very careful consideration to the extent of the humanitarian problems and in particular to the appalling burden which is being placed on the resources of the government of Hong Kong. As you know, before the Geneva conference started we announced that the United Kingdom is prepared to accept a further 10,000 Vietnamese boat refugees for resettlement here. Because of our direct concern for the situation

/in Hong Kong

TMP

in Hong Kong these extra refugees will be taken; over a period, from the 66,000 who are presently awaiting resettlement in Hong Kong.

Despite our continuing immigration commitments we have continued to honour the special quota of 1,500 Indo-Chinese refugees set by the previous government. More recently we have taken some 1,300 refugees saved by the British ships Sibonga and Roachbank.

The Government has also decided to make a further contribution of £5 million to the funds of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees specifically earmarked for use in his South East Asian operations over the next 12 months and we shall, of course, keep the situation under review and continue to respond appropriately.

May I conclude by saying how pleased I was to see from your letter of 9 August to my Private Secretary that your Diocese is able to contribute towards the efforts that are being made on behalf of those refugees who have been accepted here.

Yours sincerely
Roger Fisher

His Lordship the Bishop of Leeds

Letter sent

Ms. Rumb 3/9

Vietnam
①

PRIME MINISTER

Vietnamese Refugees

I attach letters describing two cases involving Vietnamese refugees and giving rise to the question of whether or not the Government should give a guarantee of eventual resettlement in the United Kingdom. As you will see from the letters, it has only become apparent in the course of the day that a decision will be required in one case and may be required in the other over the weekend.

In the first case, that concerning the BP super-tanker the "British Resolution", our decision ought to be communicated to the Singaporean authorities in the course of tomorrow. The Lord Privy Seal believes that "we have no option" but to give the requested guarantee.

✓
dis

The second case, that of the "Rudd Bank", is slightly less clear-cut. Nonetheless it looks very much as though we shall be asked to give a resettlement guarantee. The Lord Privy Seal believes that, if so asked, we should agree promptly.

✓
but hope
can be
delayed
my

It would be helpful if your decisions could be given to the Duty Private Secretary for onward transmission to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as soon as possible.

Agreed with - but

Rumb

hope that Rudd Bank decision
can be delayed as long as possible.

31 August 1979

z

dis



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree X on the understanding
at Y ?

31 August 1979

Dear Bryan,

RHS 21/8

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES : MV BRITISH RESOLUTION

The "British Resolution", a ^{B.P.} Super Tanker, rescued 36 Vietnamese refugees on 29 August while en route from Panama to Singapore to enter dry-dock. It is due at Singapore early on Friday, 31 August.

X
Y

Our High Commissioner in Singapore has already asked the Singapore authorities to accept the refugees without a guarantee of eventual resettlement in the United Kingdom although we knew such a guarantee to be Singapore's standard requirement. The Singaporeans have now told us that they will not do so. We therefore have to take an early decision on whether to give such a guarantee. You will recall that in the case of the MV "Ashford", which also went to Singapore, the Prime Minister agreed that a guarantee should be given. The Lord Privy Seal believes that, in this case also, we have no option but to give the requested guarantee. These refugees would have to be counted against the quota of 10,000 which we have agreed to take.

In this case there are particular considerations which call for a very early decision. Before entering dry dock, the "British Resolution" will have to carry out tank cleaning and de-gassing operations at sea. These have had to be suspended due to the presence of refugees on board. She will therefore have to make a further cruise after disembarkation of the refugees to complete the necessary work, estimated to take five days. However if the vessel is not ready to enter dry dock by 8 September, her dry dock booking

/will

B G Cartledge Esq
Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1



will lapse, causing eight weeks' idleness. Unless the refugees can be disembarked by Sunday therefore, BP will incur significant cost penalties. Delay in carrying out these operations would also, I understand, constitute a possible danger to the ship and crew, as well as to the refugees.

The timing of any announcement about a guarantee will however need to be judged in the light of developments concerning the MV "Rudd Bank", about which I am writing separately. It would of course be preferable if the Japanese could agree to land the "Rudd Bank" refugees without a guarantee before they learned that we had given a guarantee to Singapore.

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot, Home Office, Martin Vile, Cabinet Office, Bill Beckett, Law Officers Department, and Tom Harris, Department of Trade.

Yours sincerely,

Myles A. Wickstead,

ff S J Gomersall



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister: It is not

yet certain that a guarantee of
 resettlement will be required in this case. But it is very likely. Would you

31 August 1979

Dear Bryan

be prepared to give the Lord Privy Seal authority to issue
 the guarantee - again on the basis that the 119 would want
 against the quota.

Rudd 31/8

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES : MV RUDD BANK

You will be aware, in general terms, of the progress of our efforts to secure the disembarcation of the 119 refugees rescued in the South China Sea on 4 August by the Bank Line vessel, MV Rudd Bank at the earliest opportunity and with minimal damage to the owners' interests. The latest situation is briefly as follows.

The Rudd Bank has almost completed its business in Chinese waters, and is now expected to leave today. In spite of the Chinese Government's offer of temporary or permanent asylum to the 119 refugees still on board, they have refused to disembark. It is therefore almost certain that when the Rudd Bank reaches Moji (Southern Japan) around midday tomorrow (our time) to start a new time charter, she will still have 119 Vietnamese on board. Both the Chinese authorities and our Embassy in Peking have done what they could to convince the refugees (mainly ex-officers of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces and their dependants) that they would not be damaging their longer-term interests in disembarking in China, and that they would be able to apply for resettlement elsewhere and be processed in the normal way if they did so. But they have presumably decided that to disembark in China presents them with risks comparable to those they left Vietnam to avoid.

On 20 July we informed the Japanese authorities, in Tokyo and in London, of the probability that when the Rudd Bank reached Japan there would still be refugees on board. We asked that, in accordance

/with

B G Cartledge Esq
 Private Secretary
 No 10 Downing Street
 London SW1



with Mr Sonoda's undertaking at the Geneva meeting on refugees (see sidelined passage in copy attached) the Japanese Government should then allow them to land into temporary asylum without a guarantee of resettlement and even though Japan is not the first port of call. The Japanese response has been equivocal and although our Chargé d'Affaires believes that the Japanese authorities might eventually allow the refugees to land, it is clear that they will not give any undertaking to this effect until all efforts to land them in China have been exhausted : in effect this means that we cannot expect a positive Japanese response until after the Rudd Bank has left Chinese waters. In the light of the Chargé d'Affaires' advice, there is no advantage in taking this up at ministerial level.

The case is a unique one, further complicated by the vessel's detour to Hong Kong (without entering Hong Kong waters) to seek medical treatment for two refugees who were taken into hospital and subsequently transferred to a refugee camp in Hong Kong. It falls outside the typical case which the Japanese had foreseen, and comes at a time when their reception facilities are already almost full. The Japanese authorities may wish to attach conditions to the landing of the refugees, even though Mr Sonoda's undertaking in Geneva was categorical and unqualified. We may therefore again have to consider at short notice over the weekend the question of whether the British Government should give a guarantee of eventual resettlement of the refugees on the Rudd Bank if they have not been accepted for resettlement elsewhere within a certain period after arrival in Japan.

If the Japanese insist on a guarantee of eventual resettlement, the Lord Privy Seal thinks that the Government should agree to give it promptly. The Bank Line who as you know have written to the Prime Minister about earlier cases have been extremely cooperative throughout, and have been in almost daily contact with us. They have not yet incurred any significant financial penalties in respect of the Rudd Bank, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has agreed to meet care and maintenance costs relating to the rescue.

/The vessel



The vessel is, however, due to go on a further time charter out of Japan, which only becomes operational when the refugees have been landed. The boat will therefore be idle at their expense until the refugees have been landed.

We would prefer not to give any publicity to this guarantee, if given, because of the implications for Hong Kong of deducting a significant number from their quota. Many of the refugees appear to have good cases for resettlement in the USA, Canada and France, and the residual obligation may therefore be quite small.

This letter is by way of background for the moment. We will be in touch again when we know the final attitude of the Japanese authorities.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Chilcot (Home Office), Tom Harris (Department of Trade), Martin Vile (Cabinet Office) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers Department).

Yours sincerely,

Miles A. Wickstead

pp S J Gomersall

Statement by H.E. Mr. Sunao Sonoda
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan
at the Meeting on Refugees and
Displaced Persons in South-east Asia

Geneva, July 20, 1979

Mr. Chairman,

I sincerely welcome the convening of this international conference to discuss the most important and perhaps the most difficult problem at present facing the international community -- the problem of Indochinese refugees. It is a great honour for me to be given the opportunity to speak first at this important Conference. To begin with, I should like to express my heartiest respect to both His Excellency Mr. Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and His Excellency Mr. Hartling, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and indeed to all those who have made great efforts to help convene this Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

This problem of Indochinese refugees has now become a challenge to the international community as a whole. As a representative of the host country of the recent Tokyo Summit which was held on June 28 and 29, I would like to report to you that this problem was an issue of grave concern for the participating Heads of State and Government, and as such a Special Statement on Indochinese Refugees was issued. This problem was also taken up as a major issue at the Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Bali, Indonesia from June 28 to 30 and also at the joint meetings of Foreign Ministers of ASEAN and Australia, New Zealand, the United States, EC and Japan which immediately followed the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. At these meetings, the participating countries agreed that effective measures to resolve the problem should be taken as promptly as possible.

Mr. Chairman,

I should like to stress here the need for us to understand the seriousness of the plight facing the ASEAN countries which are bearing the direct impacts of the exodus of Indochinese refugees, and we should give a sympathetic ear to their opinions.

.....

Mr. Chairman,

This problem is no longer a matter of simple humanitarian concern but has become a serious political problem affecting the peace and stability of the region. However, we cannot afford at this conference to indulge ourselves in discussions of a purely political nature on the past history and origin of this problem, still less in mere exchanges of critical abuse. We must, by all available means, achieve concrete and constructive results at this conference. First important point is to restrain the disorderly outflow of refugees in order to solve this problem. Also, sufficient facilities must be provided in the countries of first asylum, resettlement must be facilitated, and financial cooperation must also be expanded.

Mr. Chairman,

Having made some general observations, let me now explain Japan's positions and views on some specific issues.

First, on the question of restraining the further outflow of refugees. A Seven Point Agreement was recently reached between Vietnam and the UNHCR on the orderly emmigration of the Vietnamese. We value this agreement as a step forward towards the solution of this problem. However, the key to the issue is for those source countries in Indochina, particularly Vietnam, to take concrete measures which will be truly effective in preventing the massive and disorderly exodus of refugees which is still on the increase.

Vietnam should implement such measures and make efforts to obtain the understanding of neighbouring countries.

Here, I wish to pay my profound respects for the efforts made by Mr. Waldheim and Mr. Hartling to realize the orderly departure of Vietnamese refugees and may I express my strong hope that you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Hartling will play even more active roles to this end.

I would also like to draw your attention to the question of refugees from Kampuchea. As a result of the ravages of war and famine in Kampuchea, there is a continuing outflow of refugees from Kampuchea to Thailand. This has imposed a very serious burden on Thailand. The lasting solution of this problem essentially requires the restoration of peace in Kampuchea, in addition to emergency measures in such fields as food and medicine. I believe that we should start promoting

.../...

vigorously the international efforts aiming at achieving a political solution to the conflict in Kampuchea and furthermore to the whole problem of Indochina. It is in this spirit that I put forward, in Bali, the idea of convening a conference of the countries concerned.

Second, on the problem of relief measures for refugees. In order to enable these refugees to find a place of settlement and to live in peace, I believe that every country should cooperate to the fullest extent possible. This cooperation could take the form of promoting resettlement in their countries and increasing their financial contributions, depending on their circumstances. I highly appreciate the measures taken so far by many countries for the relief of refugees.

I sincerely hope that this meeting will provide incentives and impetus for those countries which have not yet participated in this international effort to do so if circumstances permit.

Being fully aware of the seriousness of the situation, in response to the needs of the international community and in parallel with the recent decision by the United States to double its monthly quota for resettlement, the Government of Japan has recently decided to raise its share of the contribution this year to the UNHCR Assistance Programme for Indochinese Refugees from its previous share of approximately 25% to 50% at a stroke. In other words, Japan is now prepared to bear, by itself, half of the funds required for this programme. This decision was taken at the highest political level to meet the serious and extraordinary situation where the caseload in neighbouring countries has reached 300,000. I would like to emphasize again that, all the countries concerned should make their utmost efforts to see to it that the number of refugees in the countries of first asylum shall in no circumstances increase in future.

Mr. Hartling has just mentioned that UNHCR funds are running out. However, the UNHCR relief activities for Indochinese refugees must not be hampered or retarded by lack of funds, so I promise here and now that the Government of Japan will consider a prompt disbursement of some part of its committed share of contribution in order to mitigate UNHCR's financial difficulties, in consultation with UNHCR.

Moreover, Japan supports the idea, which has been proposed for some time by the ASEAN countries, of establishing refugee processing centres. With regard to the plan of constructing

.../...

a processing centre on Galang Island in Indonesia which is now being implemented, we have decided to provide half the necessary funds, as a special financial contribution to the UNHCR.

Despite serious domestic difficulties and constraints, Japan is also taking part in the international efforts to promote the resettlement of refugees. This year we have set up a target figure for resettlement, and we are doing our best for the promotion of resettlement through such measures as relaxing conditions for resettlement and through the streamlining of domestic machinery. Taking into account the actual progress in resettlement in Japan, we intend to raise our target figure.

Third, on the problems of rescue at sea and the temporary landing of refugees. Temporary landings should be permitted on humanitarian ground. I would like to stress, however, that to this end it is important that conditions should be created whereby countries would feel no apprehension when granting temporary asylum. As for Japan, we have recently decided to permit refugees to land temporarily in Japan without seeking a guarantee of acceptance from the government of the flag country, and regardless of whether or not the Japanese port was the first port of call. Rescue at sea is another important matter. Japan took renewed steps to ensure the full implementation of domestic legal provisions concerning rescue at sea and has been making its utmost efforts to see to it that all Japanese vessels abide by these provisions.

Furthermore, we intend to study the possibility of extending to the major first asylum countries bilateral assistance, including appropriate measures needed for the relief of Kampuchean refugees in Thailand.

Mr. Chairman,

I have presented the views of the Japanese Government on this serious problem facing us and the measures the Japanese Government is taking.

May I finally say that just holding a conference is not enough. We should faithfully put into practice what we say at this conference and this meeting should become a new starting point of international cooperation for solving the Indochinese refugee problem and eventually for the early realization of peace and stability in South-east Asia. I believe that the concerted action of the international community is the only way to solve this most difficult and pressing problem.

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 August 1979

Dear John,

ALM 20/8

Thank you for your letter of 10 August. With all respect I do not see a great difference between the line suggested at the end of paragraph 4 of my letter of 2 August and that proposed by Tom Harris in his letter to Bryan Cartledge of 17 July.

I am sure there is no disagreement between us on the essential elements in this question, namely that British vessels have a legal duty to rescue refugees at sea, and that within our limitations we should do everything possible to relieve the problems of both the Hong Kong government and the shipowners.

However, it does seem to us that if we gave the unconditional guarantee that Mr Nott wishes to give, that the problems in paragraph 2 of my letter of 2 August would arise, with the consequences either of depriving the Hong Kong Government of the relief which HMG has promised, or, irrespective of Hong Kong's interests, of stretching the quota currently agreed - if, for example, a large scale exodus were resumed. Before such a guarantee were given, OD or Cabinet might wish to be consulted. But it seems that the present guidelines operated on a case by case basis offer Ministers adequate flexibility in present circumstances.

We believe that while efforts are being made as a result of the Geneva meeting to strengthen the application of the principles of first asylum and first port of call in the region, it would be unfortunate to take a decision whose effect would be to relieve the pressure, and we doubt whether Cabinet would wish to reconsider the matter in the absence yet of any major new developments.

/We

J M D Symes Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Trade
Department of Trade
1 Victoria Street
London SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

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We remain therefore in favour of proceeding for the time being on the lines suggested in paragraph 4 of my letter of 2 August, which take cognisance of the shipping industry's concern, on the understanding that Cabinet may naturally wish to reconsider the situation again if need be, in the light of circumstances as they actually develop.

*Yours ever,
Stephen Gomersall.*

S J Gomersall
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal
(Sir Ian Gilmour)

P.S. Copies of this letter go to the recipients of yours.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT.



Vietnam

VLB

cc FCO (with BGC letter)

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET

SERIAL No. T 79 B/79 T

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 August 1979

Thank you for the generous offer, made in your letter of 6 July, to take a limited number of Vietnamese refugees. I am particularly glad to see that your intention is to take them from Hong Kong where, as you will know, the overcrowding in the camps has now reached serious proportions.

As you may be aware, an international fund for refugee resettlement was proposed by Vice President Mondale of the USA at the recent Geneva meeting on refugees in South East Asia. We welcome that proposal. At the moment the details of the fund have not been worked out fully but I can assure you that Belize's interests will be pursued by us when the fund comes into being. Meanwhile, I note that your offer is conditional on financial assistance being provided.

We shall be passing your offer formally to the UNHCR in Geneva, pointing out Belize's need for financial assistance.

Thank you again for making this generous offer.

(signed) M.T.

His Excellency Premier G. C. Price

259



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 August 1979

BELIZE

Thank you for sending me, with your letter of 14 August, the draft of a reply for the Prime Minister to send to Premier Price of Belize in response to his offer to accept a limited number of Vietnamese refugees.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter and approved the draft which you proposed. I now enclose the signed original of her reply to Premier Price and would be grateful if you would arrange for this to be forwarded to Belmopan for delivery.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GB



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 August 1979

✓ MS
Dear Mr Pattison

You wrote to Michael Richardson on 20 July enclosing a letter of 17 July to the Prime Minister from the Private Secretary of Terence Higgins MP and asking for the Lord Privy Seal to reply on Mrs Thatcher's behalf.

The Lord Privy Seal is abroad at present, and Mr Luce has therefore answered Mr Higgins' letter. I enclose a copy of his reply for your records.

Yours sincerely
Olive Walker

Miss O R Walker
Assistant Private Secretary to the
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
(Richard Luce)

M Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 August 1979

From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
Richard Luce MP

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for the letter of 17 July enclosing a petition forwarded to you on 5 July by your constituent, the Rev J H Money of Heene Rectory, 4 Lansdowne Road, Worthing, on behalf of St Botolph's Church, Heene. I am replying on Mrs Thatcher's behalf.

Lord Carrington told the international meeting held under UN auspices at Geneva on 20-21 July that Britain had agreed to accept for resettlement, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had requested, a further 10,000 refugees, to be taken from Hong Kong, in addition to the 4,600 we had already agreed to accept; and that we proposed to make an additional £5 million available to help deal with the refugee problem over the next 12 months.

I am glad to say that, in all, the Geneva meeting resulted in a massive increase in offers of resettlement places, from 125,000 to 260,000, and in new pledges of additional financial support for the use of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees amounting to US\$190 million. This demonstrated the extent of the international community's determination to tackle the problem.

At Geneva the United Nations Secretary-General announced that the Vietnamese had authorised him to say that for a reasonable period of time they would make every effort to stop

/"illegal"

T Higgins Esq MP
House of Commons
London SW1



"illegal" departures, and that in the meantime they would cooperate with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees so as to bring departures into orderly and safe channels. This is the first time the Vietnamese Government have acknowledged even implicitly that they control the refugee traffic. Much now depends on how they honour their pledge.

We shall be keeping a close eye on this, and shall do what we can to help maintain international pressure on the Vietnamese to improve their treatment of their population. This may have some effect, as the Vietnamese have some sensitivity towards international opinion; their attitude at Geneva revealed this.

I enclose a copy of Lord Trefgarne's statement in the House of Lords on 24 July, which summarises our views on the meeting.

I return the Rev Money's letter.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 August 1979

Dear Byron,

PM has seen
the letter
14.8.79

f-a

BELIZE AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

Thank you for your letter of 27 July with which you enclosed a letter to the Prime Minister from Premier Price of Belize.

I attach a draft of the reply which the Prime Minister may wish to send. I should add that Mr Price has indicated informally to the Governor that provided appropriate financial assistance is provided, the "limited number" of which he is thinking is in the region of 1,000. Belize's population density is only 15 to the square mile, but with their small and racially mixed population (137,000) this is probably the maximum which could be settled amicably even in the light of Belize's excellent record of non-discrimination. We are asking the Governor to confirm this indication.

Yours ever,
Stephen

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

Registry
No.

DRAFT LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.To:- Mr G C Price
Premier of Belize
BELMOPAN
Belize

From

PM
Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you for the generous offer, made in your letter of 6 July, to take a limited number of Vietnamese refugees. I am particularly glad to see that your intention is [redacted] to take them from Hong Kong, where, as you will know, the overcrowding in the camps has now reached serious proportions.

As you may be aware an international fund for refugee resettlement was proposed by Vice President Mondale of the USA at the recent Geneva meeting on refugees in South East Asia. We welcome that proposal. At the moment the details of the fund have not been worked out fully but I can assure you that Belize's interests will be pursued by us when the fund comes into being. Meanwhile I note that your offer is conditional on financial assistance being provided.

We shall be passing your offer formally to the UNHCR in Geneva, pointing out Belize's need for financial assistance.

Thank you again for making this generous offer.

A Speed



File 116

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 August 1979

UK REPRESENTATION ON THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE UNHCR

Thank you for your letter of 13 August about the proposal that Mr. Timothy Raison should represent the UK on the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Prime Minister agrees with the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that Mr. Raison should take on this responsibility.

I am sending a copy of this letter to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

A. J. Butler, Esq.,
Home Office.

57A



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON W8 4QB
Telephone: 01-937 8050

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

Handwritten notes in Hebrew:
מסמך
10/8
P.A.

14th August, 1979

Dear Mr. Cartledge,

I have been requested by the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem to confirm receipt of Mrs. Thatcher's letter of reply to Mr. Begin, concerning the Vietnamese refugees.

I have also been asked to express Mr. Begin's thanks to Mrs. Thatcher, and I would be grateful if you would convey this to the Prime Minister.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Y. Biran

Yoav Biran
Minister and
Charge d'Affaires a. i.

Mr. Bryan Cartledge,
Private Secretary,
10 Downing Street,
London, S. W. 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

CR 550

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DESKBY FCO 141100Z

FM PEKING 141040Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FC O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 720 OF 14 AUGUST 79

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, ROUTINE HONG KONG, WASHINGTON
TOKYO, PARIS, OTTAWA

Info ma
6/1
14/18

YOUR TELNO 457: MV RUDD BANK

1. FIRST SECRETARY SPOKE ON 14 AUGUST TO ZHENG YAOWEN OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPT. MFA AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 1 OF TUR. ZHENG AGREED TO PASS ON OUR REQUEST THAT THE SHANGHAI AUTHORITIES TRY ONCE AGAIN TO PERSUADE THE REFUGEES TO DISEMBARK, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS WAS A TEMPORARY MEASURE, AND THAT ALL COULD APPLY FOR EVENTUAL RESETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE. HE DID NOT KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE OFFER ALREADY MADE BY THE SHANGHAI AUTHORITIES. BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD NOT REPEAT NOT OFFERED PERMANENT SETTLEMENT. HE AGREED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF UNHCR COULD BE INVOLVED IN PERSUADING THE REFUGEES. THE CHINESE WOULD DO THEIR BEST TO COMPLY WITH OUR REQUEST, BOTH BECAUSE THEY WISHED TO FULFIL THEIR PROMISES AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, AND BECAUSE THE SHIP HAD BEEN CHARTERED BY CHINA, BUT THEY COULD NOT FORCE THE REFUGEES TO COME ASHORE AGAINST THEIR WILL. SULLIVAN ASSURED HIM WE WERE NOT PRESSING FOR THIS, BUT WE HOPED SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO PERSUADE THE REFUGEES TO AGREE.

2. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO DAVEY (MASTER OF THE RUDD BANK) TODAY, WHO SAYS THAT HIS SHIP, WHICH SUFFERED SOME DAMAGE IN PORT, WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LEAVE SHANGHAI BEFORE 20 AUGUST AT THE EARLIEST. HE DOES NOT EXPECT RUDD BANK TO LEAVE CHINESE WATERS BEFORE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER, AND HAS NO INSTRUCTIONS TO SAIL TO JAPAN (OR ANYWHERE ELSE) AS YET. HE FEELS THE REFUGEES MAY HAVE BEEN CONFUSED TALKING TO THE CHINESE ON 11 AUGUST, AND TOOK THE SAFEST LINE IN REFUSING TO LAND. HE THOUGHT THAT IN VIEW OF THE EXCELLENT TREATMENT THEY HAD RECEIVED FROM THE CHINESE RED CROSS ON BOARD, THEY MIGHT WELL NOW AGREE TO LAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

/IF

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IF CONVINCED THIS WAS ONLY FOR A TEMPORARY STAY IN CHINA.
(SULLIVAN PASSED THIS ON TO ZHENG YAOWEN).

3. WE HAVE NOT YET CONTACTED CASELLA , WHO PRESUMABLY WILL ARRIVE IN THE EVENING OF 14 AUGUST LOCAL TIME (UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 401). IF HE WAS WILLING AND ABLE TO TRAVEL TO SHANGHAI WE SHOULD BE HAPPY TO SEND SOMEONE WITH HIM, BUT DOUBT THE VALUE OF THIS UNLESS WE CAN GUARANTEE TO TAKE THOSE REFUGEES UNABLE TO BE SETTLED ELSEWHERE. HIS REQUEST FOR SOMEONE TO GO WITH HIM WAS PRESUMABLY ON THE ASSUMPTION OF SUCH AN OFFER. IF WE CANNOT OFFER IT THE POSITION OF WHOEVER ACCOMPANIES CASELLA WILL BE RATHER ODD.

4. WE STILL FEEL IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IN TERMS OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE CHINESE TO TRY HARDER, IF THE MASTER OF THE RUDD BANK COULD BE ASKED TO BACK UP OUR REQUESTS THAT THE REFUGEES SHOULD BE LANDED QUICKLY (OUR TELNO 715). AT THE MOMENT OUR PLEAS THAT THE REFUGEES LAND 'TO ENABLE THE RUDD BANK'S CREW TO GO ABOUT THEIR NORMAL BUSINESS UNHINDERED' (PARA 1 OF TUR) DO NOT FIT WELL WITH HIS APPARENT LACK OF CONCERN AT THE SITUATION.

GEORGE

FILES

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PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR FERGUSSON
MR FRESWELL

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HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

13 August 1979

Prime Minister

Agree that Mr. Raison
should take this on?

Yes
14/8

Yes not

Dear Bryan

UK REPRESENTATION ON THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)

...

I enclose a copy of the correspondence between the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about UK representation on the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

You will see that both the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary think it would be sensible for Mr Raison to take on this job, and I am writing to ask if you would be good enough to let me know if the Prime Minister is content with this proposal.

I am sending a copy of this letter to George Walden.

Yours sincerely

Tony Butler

(A J BUTLER)

Bryan Cartledge Esq



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 August 1979


Dear Sir,

UK Representation on the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Thank you for your letter of 27 June about our representation on the UNHCR's Executive Committee. I agree we should not choose a back-bencher again and that it would be right to send a Minister. This would mark the importance we attach to the UNHCR's work worldwide - not just Indo-China - and be very welcome to Hartling.

As to who might do it, normally I would want an FCO Minister to take care of the foreign affairs aspects. But I should be more than happy for Tim Raison to go: no-one could have stronger credentials in this company. He would not, I imagine, wish to spend more than a couple of days or so in Geneva near the beginning of the session, particularly if he also needed to fit in the Party Conference. Our permanent representative in Geneva would stand ready to take over for the remainder of the session.

If this arrangement suits you, our Mission in Geneva will notify Tim's appointment to the UNHCR's office.



(CARRINGTON)

Mr Pittard
Mr Woodfield
Mr Halsey
Mr Angell

The Rt Hon William Whitelaw CH MC MP



QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

27 June 1979

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has an Executive Committee, at present comprising 31 representative States who are party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and, in most cases, the 1967 Protocol to the Convention; the United Kingdom has always been represented on it. The function of the Executive Committee, as I understand it, is both to act as a sounding-board for regional groupings of States in the refugee field and to provide an example to other States by the adoption of procedures and the discussion of subjects usually put on the agenda by UNHCR's officials in Geneva. It usually meets once a year, in October, with a preceding meeting of experts who produce considered views on specialist subjects.

Under the last Administration, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office chose the United Kingdom representative. The choice usually fell on a Government back-bencher, and Bryan Gould acted in this capacity until the Election. It does not seem appropriate for a back-bencher to represent the United Kingdom on a committee of this kind. I think a Minister should go. Tim Raison, who has responsibility for immigration and refugee policy as well as for resettlement, would be ready to take on the job if it would be difficult for an FCO Minister to do it.

WW

c.c. Mr. Flesher
Mr. Woodfield
Mr. Hilary
Mr. Angel

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Carrington, K.C.M.G., M.C.

GR 300

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM F C O 131859Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING

TELEGRAM NUMBER 457 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO UKMIS GENEVA, HONG KONG, WASHINGTON, TOKYO, PARIS, OTTAWA

*Enter via
621
14/8*

YOUR TELNOS 712, 713 AND 715 AND UKMIS GENEVA'S TELNO 403 (NOT TO ALL): M V RUDD BANK

1. PLEASE CONVEY OUR APPRECIATION TO THE MFA FOR THEIR DECISION TO ALLOW THE REFUGEES TO LAND FOR TEMPORARY ASYLUM AND OUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE INFORMATION IN YOUR FIRST TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. ASSUMING THAT CASELLA'S VISIT TO PEKING ENABLES UNHCR TO ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY PROCESSING FACILITIES FOR THE PRESENT REFUGEES, WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND AGREE TO DISEMBARK AT LEAST TEMPORARILY AT SHANGHAI. OUR AIM REMAINS TO LAND THE REFUGEES AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, IF POSSIBLE AT SHANGHAI, TO ENABLE THE RUDD BANK'S CREW TO GO ABOUT THEIR NORMAL BUSINESS UNHINDERED.

2. THE RUDD BANK WILL BE IN SHANGHAI AT LEAST UNTIL 18 AUGUST. WE DO NOT YET KNOW THE TERMS OF THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE SHANGHAI AUTHORITIES AND THE REFUGEES, WHICH LED TO THE REFUGEES' REFUSAL TO DISEMBARK. WE SEE ADVANTAGE IN A VISIT TO SHANGHAI BY CASELLA AND A MEMBER OF YOUR STAFF, DESIGNED TO REASSURE THE REFUGEES THAT UNHCR WILL BE ABLE TO PROCESS AND REGISTER THEM IN CHINA, IF THIS IS IN FACT THE CASE, AND THAT THEY WILL ONLY STAY TEMPORARILY IN CHINA. THIS WOULD ALSO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION WITH THE MASTER. CASELLA WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THIS IDEA WITH YOU (HE MAY CONTACT SULLIVAN) AND TO SEE IF IT CAN FIT WITH HIS OTHER COMMITMENTS.

13.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. YOUR FIRST TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE PARA 3(1). WE SEE LITTLE MERIT IN A GUARANTEE THAT THE UK WILL AGREE TO ACCEPT ANY OF THE REFUGEES WHO ARE NOT ACCEPTED ELSEWHERE, GIVEN THAT SO MANY OF THEM WISH TO GO TO THE US, CANADA AND FRANCE (YOUR SECOND TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). THIS WOULD IN ANY CASE GIVE US CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY AND CANNOT BE OFFERED TO CASELLA. WE ALSO WISH TO RETAIN THE OPTION OF GETTING THE JAPANESE TO ACCEPT THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH MR SONODA'S UNDERTAKING AT GENEVA. IT WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ANY OF THE REFUGEES HOPING TO SETTLE IN THE USA, IF A BRITISH OFFER WERE MADE TO THEM: IF THEY FELL IN A LOWER US CATEGORY, THEY WOULD THEN BE DISQUALIFIED BY HAVING AN OFFER FROM ELSEWHERE.

GARRINGTON

FILES

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MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BULLARD
MR FERGISSON
MR FRETWELL

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Prime Minister

RESTRICTED
DESKBY FCO 111300Z

Z Mr. G. 13/8

FM PEKING 11115Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 712 OF 11 AUGUST 79.
INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG, WASHINGTON, TOKYO AND UKMIS GENEVA
OUR TELNO 711: MV RUDD BANK

ant

1. JIANG ENZHU OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPT. TELEPHONED FIRST SECRETARY AT 111030Z TO SAY THAT THE 120 REFUGEES ABOARD MV RUDD BANK REFUSED TO GO ASHORE IN CHINA. THE SHANGHAI AUTHORITIES WOULD RESPECT THEIR WISHES. THE MASTER OF THE SHIP HAD REQUESTED FOOD AND CLOTHING FOR THE REFUGEES WHICH HAD BEEN PROVIDED.
2. JIANG WAS UNABLE TO SAY WHETHER THE REFUGEES HAD BEEN OFFERED PERMANENT SETTLEMENT IN CHINA OR TEMPORARY REFUGE WITH THE PROSPECT OF SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE.
3. TWO POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO US ARE:
 - (I) TO PRESS THE CHINESE TO PERSUADE THE REFUGEES TO LAND AGAINST AN ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD BE RESETTLED ELSEWHERE. THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY REQUIRE A GUARANTEE FROM HMG THAT THOSE NOT SETTLED ELSEWHERE WITHIN A CERTAIN PERIOD WOULD BE ACCEPTED IN BRITAIN (AND A VISIT TO SHANGHAI BY A MEMBER OF THE EMBASSY).
 - (II) TO ACCEPT THE REFUSAL AND WORK TOWARDS A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION WHEN THE SHIP REACHES JAPAN.

/ 4.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

4. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE MASTER OF THE RUDD BANK FOR HIS ASSESSMENT BUT WILL KEEP TRYING AND LET YOU KNOW IF WE SUCCEED.

5. GRATEFUL INSTRUCTIONS.

GEORGE

FILES

SEAD

HK & GD

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From the Secretary of State

S J Gomersall Esq
 Private Secretary to the
 Lord Privy Seal
 Foreign & Commonwealth Office
 Whitehall
 SW1

10 August 1979

*I have advised the
 FCW to extricate
 the LPS from an
 unenviable position.*

NOBOM int.

GM

11/8

Dear Stephen

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

In Tom Harris' absence I am replying to your letter of 2 August about Mr Ropner's letter of 16 July to the Secretary of State. Following Tom's letter of 17 July to Bryan Cartledge you will not be surprised to know that the Secretary of State does not consider that a reply along the lines you suggest will go any way to alleviating the shipping industry's concerns, which are underlined by the latest case of the RUDDBANK.

The measures to which you refer in paragraph 3 are essentially hypothetical. It is true that at the Geneva Conference Vietnam authorised Dr Waldheim to say that for "a reasonable period" every effort would be made to stop illegal departures but it is not clear how long the moratorium will last or how effective the efforts will be. It is true that Dr Waldheim stressed the importance of re-establishing the principle of first asylum but it remains to be seen whether certain littoral states will now adhere to this without requiring, as hitherto, firm guarantees of resettlement from the flag state. There is indeed to be a meeting of experts to concert arrangements for "active" rescue at sea but as you know we have considerable reservations about this (which UNHCR staff privately share) since we think it can only encourage illegal emigration by sea and thus possibly lead to more deaths than it saves. No similar meeting is yet arranged to discuss "passive" rescue but it is in any case not easy to see what help such a meeting can be to British shipping beyond serving as a further reminder to other flag states of their masters' obligations, of which most of them are aware as a result inter alia of the Conference itself. It is true that Dr Waldheim referred in his closing remarks to the establishment of temporary holding centres but even these could cause problems for shipowners in connection with the contractual law of deviation from normal routes, as our brief for the Conference indicated.

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From the Secretary of State

In any case, the fact remains that OD agreed on 10 July to the Foreign Secretary's proposal that we should include in the total of 10,000 any refugees who arrived here after being picked up at sea by British ships and this was endorsed by Cabinet. It is simply not good enough to say that because of administrative difficulties which have now been thought of this decision cannot be honoured. I therefore hope you will agree that, for the sake of the Government's credibility with the shipping industry, the Secretary of State should reply to Mr Ropner saying that there will now be no difficulty in including any Indo-Chinese refugees picked up at sea by British ships within the quota we have agreed to take.

Finally my Secretary of State has particularly asked me to say that he was concerned at the tone of your letter. The priority facing Ship-Masters is to save drowning men and women, and it should not be beyond our wit to sort out the administrative problems which arise humanely and consistently without our public commitments. Mr Nott was especially concerned at the implication that persons saved from drowning could be designated "queue-jumpers" and furthermore might have to be abandoned if "the quota has been exhausted".

I am sending copies of this letter to No 10 and to the Private Secretary to the Home Secretary.

Yours sincerely

John Symes

J M D SYMES
Private Secretary

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DESKBY FCO 101100Z

FM PEKING 100918Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 711 OF 10 AUGUST 1979

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS GENEVA,
TOKYOPrime Minister6/1
13/8

MY TELNO 451: MV RUDD BANK

1. IN ANSWER TO AN ENQUIRY BY TELEPHONE, QI XIAOSHANG OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT INFORMED US ON 10 AUGUST THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT THE REFUGEES ABOARD THE MV RUDD BANK WOULD BE PERMITTED TO LAND. THE AUTHORITIES IN SHANGHAI HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ACT ACCORDINGLY. FIRST SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD PASS THIS INFORMATION ON TO HMG WHO WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME THIS HELPFUL DECISION, WHICH SHOULD DO A GREAT DEAL TO STRENGTHEN THE PRINCIPLES OF FIRST ASYLUM AND THE FIRST SCHEDULED PORT OF CALL.

2. THE CHINESE HAVE NOT SO FAR RAISED THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES TO TAKE THOSE NOT SETTLED ELSEWHERE, NOR HAVE WE. WE NOTE THAT NCNA ON 9 AUGUST REPORTED THE TAKING UP OF THE REFUGEES BY THE RUDD BANK, DESCRIBED AS A FREIGHTER "OF THE BRITISH BANK LINE CHARTERED BY CHINA". THE REFERENCE CAME AS A TAILPIECE TO A REPORT THAT A CHINESE VESSEL RESCUED 70 REFUGEES ON 31 JULY AND BROUGHT THEM TO CHINA. THE DECISION TO ACCEPT THE REFUGEES MAY THEREFORE REFLECT A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY CONNECTED WITH THE CHARTERING OF THE SHIP AND A DESIRE TO PROVE THE GENUINE NATURE OF ZHANG WENJIN'S PLEDGES AT GENEVA.

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FM HONG KONG 090607Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELNO.1131 OF 9 AUGUST,
INFO PRIORITY: BONN,

ROUTINE : CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WASHINGTON, ADELAIDE, BRISBANE,
MELBOURNE, PERTH, SYDNEY, EDMONTON, HALIFAX, MONTREAL, QUEBEC,
TORONTO, VANCOUVER, DUSSELDORF, FRANKFURT, HAMBURG, HANOVER,
MUNICH, STUTTGART, BERLIN, BMG BERLIN, ATLANTA, BOSTON,
CHICAGO, CLEVELAND, DETROIT, HOUSTON, LOS ANGELES, C.G NEW YORK,
BIS NEW YORK, PHILADELPHIA, ST LOUIS, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE,
HONG KONG GOVT OFFICE LONDON.

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES FROM HONG KONG :
REGIONAL ASPECTS OF MAJOR RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMMES.

1. WE HAVE RECENTLY DISCUSSED WITH THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, SERVICE ORGANISATIONS AND CHURCHES HERE HOW THEY CAN SUPPLEMENT OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO PUT ACROSS INTERNATIONALLY HONG KONG'S CASE FOR A MORE EQUITABLE ALLOCATION OF RESETTLEMENT PLACES.
2. SOME OF THESE BODIES, E.G ROTARY INTERNATIONAL AND THE ROUND TABLE, WILL PROBABLY PLACE ARTICLES IN THEIR INTERNATIONALLY CIRCULATED PERIODICALS, OR UNDERTAKE DIRECT LOBBYING OF GOVERNMENT, BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL, THROUGH THEIR BRANCHES IN OTHER COUNTRIES. SOME MAY ALSO UNDERTAKE VISITS: FOR EXAMPLE THE DIRECTOR OF HONG KONG CHRISTIAN SERVICE IS PLANNING TO VISIT THE F.R.G (BONN TELNO.4 TO HONG KONG, NOT TO ALL) TO PUT HONG KONG'S CASE DIRECT TO THE LAND GOVERNMENTS AND A NUMBER OF THE CITIES.

/ 3. GIVEN THE

3. GIVEN THE LIKELY IMPORTANCE IN ALL MAJOR RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES OF PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP, POSSIBLY UNDER LOCAL SCHEMES, IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF H.M CONSULATES IN THE USA, CANADA, THE F.R.G AND AUSTRALIA COULD KEEP THEIR EARS TO THE GROUND AND GIVE ANY LOCAL HELP THEY CAN. WE SHALL LET YOU KNOW OF ANY PLANNED VISITS OR MAJOR LOBBYING EFFORTS. IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION WE WILL ALSO REPEAT TO THESE POSTS THE BACKGROUND INFORMATION REQUESTED IN BONN TEL UNDER REF, AND ADD THEM TO ADDRESSEES OF OUR (UNCLASSIFIED) MONTHLY STATISTICAL TELEGRAMS ON HONG KONG'S REFUGEE STATE.

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FM HONG KONG 081015Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1129 OF 8 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS GENEVA, TOKYO

INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

MY TELNO 1121: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES ON MV RUDDBANK.

1. THE RUDDBANK SAILED FOR SHANGAI AT 1745 HOURS LOCAL TODAY WITH THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES STILL ON BOARD.

2. THE TWO CASUALTIES HAD BEEN TREATED IN HOSPITAL AND DISCHARGED BUT WERE UNABLE TO RE-BOARD THE VESSEL DUE TO ROUGH SEAS AND DESPITE THE AGENT'S AND MASTER'S BEST EFFORTS. THESE TWO WILL NOW BE LANDED TEMPORARILY IN HONG KONG AND PROCESSED FOR OVERSEAS RESETTLEMENT.

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TO IMMEDIATE PEKING

TELEGRAM NUMBER 451 OF 8 AUGUST 1979.

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, WASHINGTON, UKMIS GENEVA AND TOKYO.

HONG KONG TELNO 1121 (NOW REPEATED) AND 1129 :
VIETNAMESE REFUGEES ON MV RUDD BANK.

1. THE RUDD BANK IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE OFF SHANGHAI AT 1500 LOCAL ON 10 AUGUST, WITH 120 REFUGEES STILL ON BOARD. AFTER UNLOADING SOME CARGO IT WILL THEN GO TO QINGDAO SPENDING ABOUT A MONTH IN CHINESE WATERS.

2. WE NEED TO MAKE A STRONG EFFORT TO GET THE REFUGEES LANDED IN CHINA. WE RECOGNISE THAT THE CHANCES OF A FAVOURABLE CHINESE RESPONSE ARE NOT GOOD (THE NORSE VIKING CASE IS NOT AN ENCOURAGING PRECEDENT - YOUR TELNO 529). NONETHELESS WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO APPROACH THE MFA AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

(I) WE HOPE THAT CHINA WILL FULFIL THE OBLIGATION OF A STATE OF FIRST SCHEDULED PORT OF CALL AFTER RESCUE, AND ALLOW THE 120 REFUGEES ON THE RUDD BANK TO DISEMBARK AT SHANGHAI AND TO AWAIT FINAL RESETTLEMENT.

(II) THE GENEROUS OFFERS OF RESETTLEMENT PLACES FOR REFUGEES AND OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR THE UNHCR'S FUNDS ANNOUNCED BY ZHANG WENJIN IN GENEVA MADE A NOTABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE MEETING'S OUTCOME. HE CALLED THERE FOR SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS TO RESCUE REFUGEES AT SEA. A NECESSARY COROLLARY OF THIS IS THAT REFUGEES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DISEMBARK AT THE FIRST SCHEDULED PORT OF CALL SO THAT THE SHIPS' OWNERS ARE NOT PENALISED FOR ACTING HUMANELY.

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/(111) THE RUDD

- (III) THE RUDD BANK DIVERTED BRIEFLY TO HONG KONG TO SEEK URGENT MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR TWO SERIOUSLY ILL REFUGEES (SUFFERING, RESPECTIVELY, FROM A FRACTURED LEG AND A DUODENAL ULCER) WHO WERE TAKEN INTO HOSPITAL THERE (SEE PARA 2 OF MY 2ND TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE FOR LATEST INFORMATION) AND TO PICK UP EMERGENCY SUPPLIES OF BABY FOOD, VITAMINS, ETC. THE VESSEL NEVER ENTERED HONG KONG WATERS, AND RESUMED HER JOURNEY TO SHANGHAI, HER DECLARED DESTINATION, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.
- (IV) IN HIS CONCLUDING REMARKS IN GENEVA, THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL CALLED FOR A REASSERTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FIRST ASYLUM. CHINA CAN HELP RESTORE THE PRIMACY OF THIS PRINCIPLE BY ALLOWING REFUGEES ON THE RUDD BANK TO LAND TEMPORARILY.
- (V) IF ASKED WHETHER HMG WILL ACCEPT ANY OF THE REFUGEES FOR SETTLEMENT, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE WILL OF COURSE ACCEPT ANY WHO HAVE A CLAIM ON THE UK BY VIRTUE OF FAMILY OR OTHER CLOSE TIES.
- (VI) IF ASKED WHETHER WE SHALL AGREE TO ACCEPT ANY REFUGEES FROM THE RUDD BANK WHO HAVE NOT BEEN ACCEPTED FOR SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE WITHIN A CERTAIN TIME, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT YOU CANNOT GIVE SUCH AN UNDERTAKING BUT ARE WILLING TO SEEK FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
- (VII) IF ASKED WHY THE REFUGEES DID NOT DISEMBARK IN HONG KONG, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE MASTER DID NOT REQUEST THIS, AND THAT HE WISHED TO CONTINUE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE TO HIS SCHEDULED DESTINATION IN CHINA.

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3. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE HOPE THE CHINESE WILL REFRAIN OR BE STEERED AWAY FROM ANY REQUEST FOR A UK GUARANTEE TO ACCEPT ANY OF THE REFUGEES NOT RESETTLED ELSEWHERE. IN THE FIRST PLACE THIS WEAKENS THE FIRST ASYLUM PRINCIPLE IN WHICH IS SUBSUMED THE FIRST PORT OF CALL CONCEPT. SECONDLY AND MORE IMPORTANT ANY ACCEPTANCE OF THE RUDD BANK REFUGEES MIGHT CUT INTO OUR QUOTA OF 10,000 FOR HONG KONG. BUT IF THE CHINESE WOULD NOT OTHERWISE AGREE TO ALLOW DISEMBARKATION AT A CHINESE PORT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SUCH A REQUEST.

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TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1118 OF 7 AUGUST, 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON, UKMIS GENEVA,
WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO ROUTINE PEKING, HANOI, MANILA, JAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR,
SINGAPORE AND BANGKOK.

MY TELNO 1086: VIETNAMESE REFUGEES:

1. REFUGEES IN HONG KONG ON 7TH AUGUST, 1979:-

A. UNDER UNHCR CARE:	33,527
B. AWAITING ACCEPTANCE BY UNHCR	33,161
C. TOTAL:	66,688.

2. 67,790 REFUGEES HAVE ARRIVED SINCE 1 JANUARY, THE INCREASE OF
479 SINCE 31 JULY IS DUE TO THE ARRIVAL OF 5 SMALL BOATS.

3. UNHCR HAS SENT 6,749 (INCLUDING 924 EX - ''SIBONGA'')
REFUGEES TO THIRD COUNTRIES SINCE 1 JANUARY, 1979.

4. THESE FIGURES DO NOT (NOT) INCLUDE THE 122 ON BOARD
THE ''RUDD BANK'' WHICH ARRIVED OFF HONG KONG ON 7.8.79.

5. WELLINGTON FOR SSIR J. CATER.

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FM UK MIS GENEVA 061100Z AUG 1979

PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 306 OF 06 AUGUST 1979

P S TO P M No10 DOWNING ST

INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON

UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 391: INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES: RESCUE
AT SEA

1. THE OFFICIAL INVITATION TO THE MEETING ON 14 AUGUST HAS NOW ARRIVED (COPIES BY BAG) . THE MEETING WILL BEGIN AT 9.39 AM IN CONFERENCE ROOM XXVII AT THE PALAIS DES NATIONS, AND WILL BE ENTITLED QUOTE MEETING OF EXPERTS ON RESCUE OPERATIONS FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN DISTRESS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA UNQUOTE. THE PROPOSED AGENDA IS AS FOLLOWS:-

1. REVIEW BY REPRESENTATIVES OF RESCUE EFFORTS BEING MADE OR UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES (COMPRISING BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTION);
2. ASSIGNMENT TO THE AREA OF UNITS DEDICATED TO SEARCH AND RESCUE: THEIR EFFECTIVE UTILISATION, PARTICULARLY THROUGH CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS;
3. PARTICIPATION IN RESCUE OPERATIONS BY OTHER SHIPPING IN THE AREA;
4. LANDING AND RESETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THOSE RESCUED AT SEA:
 - (A) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FLAG STATES:
ADMISSION OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING QUOTAS;
 - (B) POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT PROCESSING FOR ADMISSION TO FLAG STATES;
 - (C) POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFER TO HOLDING CENTRES PENDING RESETTLEMENT;
 - (D) CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFER TO HOLDING CENTRES:-
PROVISION OF FIRM GUARANTEES OF EVENTUAL RESETTLEMENT;
AVOIDANCE OF QUOTE QUEUE-JUMPING UNQUOTE

/s.

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5. MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN TO BROADEN SUPPORT FOR RESCUE OPERATIONS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING A FURTHER MEETING OF EXPERTS WITH WIDER PARTICIPATION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE:

6. OTHER MATTERS

2. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHO WILL BE REPRESENTING THE UK.

FCO: PLEASE PASS COPIES TO MORRIS, SHIPPING POLICY DIVISION,
DEPT OF TRADE AND MOD.

MURRAY

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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1113 OF 6 AUGUST 1979

INFO PRIORITY PEKING, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON AND HONG KONG

GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

"RUDDBANK"

1. WE HAVE ONLY TODAY RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM BANK LINE VESSEL, "RUNDDBANK" - ON PASSAGE FROM BILBAO TO SHANGHAI STATING THAT SHE HAS RESCUED AT 4.3 DEGREES NORTH 109.4 DEGREES EAST 124 VIETNAMESE REFUGEES CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN AT RISK FOR 11 DAYS. THE RESCUE IS SAID TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON 4 AUGUST AT 09.20 AT POSITION 400 MILES OFF SINGAPORE, WITHIN 200 MILES OF KUCHING AND OVER 1,400 MILES FROM HONG KONG. TWO REFUGEE CHILDREN HAVE SINCE DIED ON BOARD.

2. HONG KONG IS NEITHER FIRST PORT OF CALL NOR NEAREST PORT OF REFUGE. THE SHIP HAS NEVERTHELESS REQUESTED PERMISSION TO ENTER HONG KONG PRESUMABLY FOR ITS OWN CONVENIENCE.

3. PERMISSION TO ENTER HAS BEEN DENIED AND RUDDBANK HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO ANCHOR 2 MILES SOUTH OF PO TOI ISLAND, JUST OUTSIDE HONG KONG WATERS. E.T.A. IS 0800 LOCAL TIME 7 AUGUST. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN REQUESTED AND WILL BE PROVIDED ON ARRIVAL WHEN SHIP WILL ALSO BE BOARDED BY POLICE, MARINE AND IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES.

4. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THIS VESSELL POSES A PROBLEM AND APPEARS TO BE ENDEAVOURING TO STRETCH THE PORT OF REFUGE PRINCIPLE. IN OUR ALREADY CROWDED CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH WE SHALL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO SEEK TO RESIST.

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FM FCO 061820Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 625 OF 6 AUGUST

AND TO IMMEDIATE PEKING, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON AND TOKYO.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1113. VIETNAMESE REFUGEES:
M.V. RUDDBANK.

1. WE AGREE THAT THE RUDDBANK CASE POSES CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THERE MUST BE SOME DOUBT ABOUT WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE MASTER TO DIVERT TO HONG KONG RATHER THAN SOME OTHER PORT IN THE REGION.
2. NEVERTHELESS IN OUR PAPER ON RESCUE AT SEA PREPARED FOR THE PRE-GENEVA MEETINGS WE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A LIBERAL APPLICATION OF THE FIRST PORT OF CALL PRINCIPLE, INCLUDING PORTS OF REFUGE AND PORTS TO WHICH IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE MASTER TO DIVERT. THE BANK LINE, WHICH WAS PUT TO CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE AND TROUBLE OVER THE ROACHBANK AND SIBONGA, HAVE THROUGHOUT HELD TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES. LORD INVERFORTH WAS CRITICAL OF OUR HANDLING OF THE PREVIOUS CASES AND IS LIKELY TO PRESS FOR A SPEEDY RESOLUTION OF THIS CASE. MOREOVER WE THINK THAT AN UNFORTHCOMING ATTITUDE IN THIS CASE MAY AFFECT AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO TAKE INCREASING NUMBERS OF REFUGEES FROM HONG KONG. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE THINK WE SHOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE AND AS A MINIMUM WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL TO OFFER, IN ADDITION TO FULL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, IMMEDIATE LANDING OF ANY SICK (INCLUDING RELATIVES I.E. FAMILY GROUPS SHOULD NOT BE SPLIT).
3. THE BANK LINE HAVE TOLD US THAT MOST OF THE REFUGEES ON BOARD ARE MEMBERS OR DEPENDENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, AND SO GOOD CANDIDATES FOR RESETTLEMENT IN THE USA. IT WOULD ACCORDINGLY BE HELPFUL IF REPRESENTATIVE OF UNHCR AND POSSIBLY US CONSULATE GENERAL COULD BOARD THE SHIP IN HONG KONG AND CONFIRM THE ORIGINS OF THE REFUGEES AND LIKELY ELIGIBILITY FOR SETTLEMENT IN THE USA.
4. THE BANK LINE HAVE ADDED THAT IF THE REFUGEES CANNOT BE LANDED IN HONG KONG THE SHIP WILL PROCEED TO SHANGHAI AFTER ABOUT 48 HOURS, AND AFTER FURTHER CALLS IN CHINA PROBABLY TO JAPAN. WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT THE CHINESE WILL BE PREPARED TO ALLOW ANY OF THESE REFUGEES TO LAND IN CHINA AND THAT WE MAY ULTIMATELY HAVE TO GIVE A GUARANTEE TO ACCEPT ALL REFUGEES UNSETTLED ELSEWHERE.

15. IF THE

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5. IF THE SHIP CONTINUES TO SHANGHAI AND ULTIMATELY TO A JAPANESE PORT WITH THE REFUGEES STILL ON BOARD WE MAY HAVE TO ASK THE JAPANESE TO HOLD TO THEIR GENEVA ASSURANCE THAT THEY WILL ALLOW REFUGEES RESCUED AT SEA BY ANY VESSEL TO DISEMBARK AT A JAPANESE PORT WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS THE FIRST PORT OF CALL. HOWEVER TOKYO SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION WITH THE JAPANESE AT PRESENT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE RUDDBANK WILL REACH A JAPANESE PORT UNTIL NEXT MONTH.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

BF

3 August 1979

G.C. 12/11

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

From your comment this afternoon I have noticed an error in my letter to you of 2 August. The penultimate sentence of paragraph 2 should read "There is also the objection that to grant priority resettlement to refugees picked up at sea while others remain in camps would amount to queue jumping."

I am sending copies of this letter to No 10 and the Private Secretary to the Home Secretary.

S J Gomersall
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal

T G Harris Esq
Private Secretary to
the Rt Hon John Nott MP
Department of Trade
1 Victoria Street
London SW1

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13/8

2 August 1979

*N. H. M. yml.
13/8*

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

The Lord Privy Seal has seen a copy of Mr Ropner's letter of 16 July to Mr Nott, copied to Lord Carrington, in which he asks for an assurance that refugees picked up by British ships should automatically be included in the British quota. Lord Campbell made a similar suggestion in the House of Lords on 18 July. The GCBS have also made representations to Mr Hurd.

Cabinet on 12 July agreed that refugees picked up by our ships should be included in the quota of 10,000. There are difficulties in administering this provision. In the first place Hong Kong needs all the quota for herself and another case of the magnitude of the Sibonga would make serious inroads into the quota. Secondly, there is the administrative problem of arranging reception of ship cases at short notice, assuming that the Hong Kong refugees are accepted at the fastest possible rate. There is also the objection that refugees picked up at sea while others remain in camps would amount to queue jumping. Finally, ship cases may occur after the quota has been exhausted.

As you know, the Vietnamese Government said at the Geneva conference that they would halt the outflow of refugees "for a reasonable period". Dr Waldheim stressed the importance of re-establishing the principle of first asylum, and the

/UNHCR

T G Harris Esq
Department of Trade
1 Victoria Street
London SW1

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- 2 -

UNHCR said that his officials would be in touch with IMCO about the safety at sea aspect of the refugee problem. In these circumstances we hope that the difficulties which have faced British and other shipowners in recent months will be much less acute in future, and that IMCO may come up with some measure of international agreement which may help to spread the load. One possibility which has been discussed is that refugees picked up at sea could be disembarked at the international processing centres to whose establishment the conference gave some impetus.

The Government's objectives must remain to save life wherever possible, to relieve the shipowners' dilemma in which they are placed by the problem of the boat people, to provide the maximum help for Hong Kong, and to avoid taking any more refugees into this country than we have already agreed to accept. In practice, should any more ships cases arise, we may well find ourselves with no alternative to giving the now customary guarantee that we will take the refugees as a last resort. But we doubt whether we should go as far as to give an undertaking to do so automatically, at least until it becomes clear how the situation will develop. We hope therefore that Mr Nott will feel able to write to Mr Ropner on the lines that his point is well taken and that, in practice, we accept the possibility that we may have to take speedy decisions to receive at short notice refugees picked up by a British flag vessel.

We would hope that this would go some way to alleviating the shipping industry's concerns and reduce the pressure for a more positive public commitment.

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I am sending copies of this letter to No 10 and the
Private Secretary to the Home Secretary.

S J Gomersall
Private Secretary to the
Lord Privy Seal

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FM UKMIS GENEVA 011121Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 389 OF 01 AUG 1979

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE.

MIPT: FOLLOWING IS DRAFT NOTE TO UNHCR
BEGINS:

THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND PRESENT THEIR COMPLIMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AND HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST CONFIRMATION THAT THE OFFICE WILL CONTINUE TO ENSURE THAT IN THE ALLOCATION OF RESETTLEMENT PLACES FOR BOAT REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM A FAIR SHARE WILL BE GIVEN TO HONG KONG.

SO FAR IN 1979 HONG KONG HAS RECEIVED 35 PER CENT OF THE REGIONAL INFLOW OF BOAT REFUGEES BUT ONLY 13 PER CENT OF THE RESETTLEMENT PLACES. HONG KONG HAS NOT PRACTISED REFOULEMENT. ITS HUMANITARIAN POLICIES HAVE RESULTED IN MORE REFUGEES GOING TO THE TERRITORY. IT IS ONLY JUST THAT THIS GOOD RECORD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE ALLOCATION OF RESETTLEMENT PLACES.

THE PERMANENT MISSION ARE CONCERNED TO LEARN THAT CERTAIN RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CHOSEN TO BE GUIDED BY THE ADVICE OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THEIR CURRENT OFFERS MIGHT BE ENTIRELY DEVOTED TO RESETTLEMENT FROM AREAS OTHER THAN HONG KONG. FOR EXAMPLE ONE COUNTRY WAS ADVISED TO DEVOTE A NEW QUOTA OF 1500 PLACES TO REFUGEES FROM MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA, AND ANOTHER WAS ADVISED THAT ITS NEW QUOTA OF 1,000 REFUGEES COULD ALL COME FROM MALAYSIA.

THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE ASSURANCES THAT IN FUTURE WHEN RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES SEEK ADVICE FROM UNHCR CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO RECOMMENDING THAT A REASONABLE PROPORTION BE TAKEN FROM HONG KONG.

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THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW
TO THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES THE ASSURANCES OF THEIR HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

ENDS

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FED	PS/MR BLAKER
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SAD	SIR A PARSONS
MAED	MR CORTAZZI
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FM UKMIS GENEVA 011110Z AUG 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 388 OF 01 AUG 1979

INFO HONG KONG, STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE.

STOCKHOLM TELNO 107 AND THE HAGUE TELNO 204: RESETTLEMENT OF VIETNAMESE REFUGEES FROM HONG KONG

1. AS YOU KNOW WE HAVE MADE THE POINT AT SEVERAL LEVELS IN THE UNHCR HIERARCHY THAT CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS APPEAR TO BE RECEIVING ADVICE FROM UNHCR TO TAKE ALL THEIR CURRENT QUOTAS FROM PLACES OTHER THAN HONG KONG. AT A SENIOR LEVEL SUPRISE IS EXPRESSED THAT THIS IS THE CASE AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF QUOTE FAIR SHARES UNQUOTE IS ACCEPTED. WHEN WE TALK TO THE OFFICERS MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED IN THE RESETTLEMENT SECTION (WITH WHOM WE HAVE EXCELLENT RELATIONS) THEY POINT TO THEIR VARIOUS EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE REFUGEES FROM HONG KONG (SEE FOR EXAMPLE PARA 7 OF MY TELNO 363). BUT THEY ALSO MAKE THE POINT THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS ARE SOVEREIGN AND DO NOT HAVE TO ACCEPT UNHCR ADVICE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS SHELTER BEHIND THE EXCUSE OF UNHCR ADVICE TO AVOID EXPLAINING EQUALLY IMPORTANT REASONS FOR THEIR DECISIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DUTCH MISSION HERE TOLD US THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE OF TAKING ALL REFUGEES FROM ONE PLACE WAS A DECISIVE FACTOR.

2. UNHCR HAVE ALSO MADE THE POINT (AGAIN PLEASE SEE PARA 7 OF MY TELNO 363) THAT IN PROFERRING ADVICE THEY ARE INFLUENCED BY THE LENGTH OF TIME REFUGEES HAVE BEEN IN CAMPS. AS OFFICIALS OF A HUMANITARIAN RATHER THAN A POLITICAL ORGANISATION THEY ARE ALSO NO DOUBT INFLUENCED BY THE FACT THAT EACH REFUGEE TAKEN FROM A COUNTRY PRACTISING REFOULEMENT MAY MEAN A LIFE SAVED.

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/ 3. HOWEVER, THE

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3. HOWEVER, THE TIME HAS PERHAPS COME TO PUT ON RECORD OUR POSITION REGARDING QUOTE FAIR SHARES UNQUOTE FROM HONG KONG. SO FAR ALL OUR LOBBYING HAS BEEN ORAL. I THEREFORE PROPOSE THAT WE SHOULD DELIVER A FORMAL NOTE TO A SENIOR MEMBER OF UNHCR ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT IN MIFT. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

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MR STRATTON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 362 OF 30 JULY 1979

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE HANOI, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA AND OTTAWA.

INFO SAVING PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 172: VIETNAM - UNHCR EXCHANGES ON REFUGEES

1. I CALLED TODAY ON DE HAAN, DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER. HARTLING DEPARTED ON LEAVE SHORTLY AFTER THE CONFERENCE AND IS NOT EXPECTED BACK UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER.

2. DE HAAN SAID HE WAS NOT FULLY AWARE OF WHAT TRANSPIRED WHEN PHAN HEIN CALLED ON HARTLING ON 23 JULY SINCE AT THE TIME HE WAS CHAIRING THE MEETING ON RESETTLEMENT REPORTED IN MY TELNO 363. BUT HE CLAIMED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE NOT SAYING ANYTHING REALLY NEW. THEY HAD ALREADY REFERRED PUBLICLY FOR EXAMPLE AT THE JAKARTA MEETING IN MAY TO A FIGURE OF 10,000 A MONTH AS AN IDEAL FOR THE 7 POINT PROGRAMME. HE WASM
VHRZN

SHRURE THAT NO MATHEMATICAL FORMULA HAD BEEN USED AT THE 23 JULY MEETING. THERE WAS CLEARLY A LINK BETWEEN THE CONCEPT OF STOPPING ILLEGAL DEPARTURES AND EXPANDING THE 7 POINT PROGRAMME (THE CONCEPTS ARE JUXTAPOSED IN WALDHEIM'S SUMMING UP OF 21 JULY). IT WAS NO SECRET THAT THE MORE THE 7 POINT PROGRAMME COULD BE EXPANDED THE LESS WOULD BE THE PRESSURE TO TAKE TO THE BOATS.

3. I SUGGESTED TO DE HAAN (PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR) THAT IF HE THOUGHT THE VIETNAMESE WERE MAKING A NEGOTIATING CONNECTION BETWEEN THE RATE OF OUTFLOW AND THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE SCHEME HE SHOULD DRAW THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE MAJOR DONOR COUNTRIES. DE HAAN FELT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A CONNECTION SHOULD BE FAIRLY OBVIOUS TO THEM. THE VIETNAMESE MIGHT WELL HAVE THE WESTERN /COUNTRIES

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COUNTRIES QUOTE OVER A BARREL UNQUOTE BY IMPLYING THIS. BUT THERE WERE MANY OTHER THINGS WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE VIETNAMESE EXCUSES NOT TO FULFIL THE QUOTE MORATORIUM UNQUOTE. THESE INCLUDED POSSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISMS AND THE ALLEGED MAGNET EFFECT OF MERCY SHIPS. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT NOT TO DRAMATIZE MATTERS BUT TO WORK STEADILY TO EXPAND THE 7 POINT PROGRAMME. AT PRESENT ABOUT ONE FLIGHT PER WEEK OF SOME 120 PERSONS IS LEAVING BUT HE HOPED THIS COULD SOON BE DOUBLED. THE PRINCIPLE ENTRY CERTIFICATE COUNTRY WAS FRANCE WHICH UNFORTUNATELY WAS INCLUDING ALL VIETNAMESE WITHIN ITS ANNOUNCED RESETTLEMENT QUOTA. THE OTHER LEADING COUNTRIES IN THIS SCHEME, GERMANY, BELGIUM, USA AND CANADA WERE, HE UNDERSTOOD, COUNTING THOSE UNDER THE 7 POINT PROGRAMME AS BEING IN ADDITION TO ANNOUNCED QUOTAS. HE FULLY AGREED THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY MUST BE TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON EXISTING CAMPS.

4. DE HAAN CONCLUDED BY SAYING IT WAS EARLY DAYS FOR ASSESSING VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES. BUT HE UNDERTOOK TO KEEP IN TOUCH IF HE DETECTED ANY DANGER SIGNALS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO PARIS.

MACINNES

[REPETITION TO HANOI REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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ADDITIONAL DISTN
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MR BULLARD

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Original to GJK JS

cc FCO
I. Gow
FCS

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

Dear Mr. Nardand.

Thank you for your letter of 12 July about merchant ships for Vietnam. I have noted your views and sympathise with the feelings behind them; but in fact the Government has already considered this difficult matter very carefully.

While in Opposition, we strongly criticised the giving of aid to Vietnam for the purchase of British-built ships. Therefore, on taking office, we looked promptly to see whether we could cancel this aid; but the commitment was firm, cancellation could well have been more expensive than completion, and cancellation would also have been damaging to British Shipbuilders and its employees.

If we completed the construction of the ships and then did not deliver them to the Vietnamese, the firm would have to try to sell the ships to somebody else but would be in a weak position because shipowners would know that the ships were surplus and this would be likely to result in a low price. The firm's losses would be increased; and its action would arouse hostility through being regarded as the dumping of ships on an unwilling market. That exercise could also cost the British Government a lot of money, even allowing for the re-sale of the ships and the recovery of most of the money earmarked under the Aid/Trade Contingency Provision grant.

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For these reasons, we regretfully decided not to cancel this grant. On the other hand, as I have already announced, we decided as well to give no new aid to Vietnam while present circumstances continue.

The aid instalments for the ships are being paid, at various stages of construction, through the Crown Agents straight to the shipbuilders in Britain and thus are not being handled by the Vietnamese.

Yours sincerely,

Raymond White

Paul Marland, Esq., MP.

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Original in C&F

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

Dear Lord Shawcross,

Thank you for your letter of 16 July, which you copied to Peter Carrington.

I am glad to say the Geneva meeting was a success. It demonstrated the strength of international concern about all aspects of the refugee problem, including the plight of Cambodia, and secured undertakings from Vietnam to suspend for a time the export of boat people, and to discuss measures for the safe and orderly departure of those of its citizens who wish to leave.


The world now looks to Vietnam to fulfil its responsibilities.

The meeting also resulted in an increase in offers of resettlement places, from 125,000 to 260,000 and in new pledges of additional financial support for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' activities amounting to \$US190 million.

Yours sincerely
Raymond Delisle

The Rt. Hon. Lord Shawcross, G.B.E., Q.C.

HL



cc FCO

Original in file

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

My dear Lord Bishop,

Thank you for your letter of 18 July and for your support for the initiative the Government took in calling for the international meeting which was held at Geneva last weekend to discuss the problem of Indo-Chinese refugees.

You may be interested to see the enclosed copy of the speech which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made at the international meeting at Geneva on 20 July. This includes an announcement of the additional places which Britain has agreed to make available for resettlement and of the extra funds we propose to provide over the next 12 months.

I am glad to say that the Geneva meeting resulted in a massive increase in offers of resettlement places, from 125,000 to 260,000, and in new pledges of additional financial support for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees amounting to U.S. \$190 million.

It also demonstrated the strength of international concern about all aspects of the refugee problem, including the plight of Cambodia, and secured undertakings from Vietnam to suspend for a time the export of boat people, and to discuss measures for the safe and orderly departure of those of its citizens who wish to leave.

/ The world

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The world now looks to Vietnam to fulfil its responsibilities as a member of the community of nations.

I hope that these developments have given the international community at least a breathing space while it sets about the urgent task of clearing the refugee camps in Hong Kong and the countries of first asylum, and bringing the situation under control.

Yours sincerely
Raymond Delisle

The Right Reverend The Lord Bishop of Winchester.



CCFCO

Original in G/R

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

My dear Bishop.

Thank you for your letter of 12 July in which you suggest that Britain should accept at least 15,000 refugees from Indo-China.

As I expect you know, the Government has now announced that it has agreed to accept, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has requested, an additional 10,000 refugees for resettlement in Britain, in addition to the 4,600 which we had already agreed to accept. The Government also proposes to make an additional £5 million available to help deal with the refugee problem over the next 12 months.

Lord Carrington repeated these pledges at the meeting which the U.N. Secretary-General called at Geneva on 20-21 July to discuss the whole problem. You may be interested to see the enclosed copy of his speech.

I am glad to say that the Geneva meeting resulted in a massive increase in offers of resettlement places, from 125,000 to 260,000, and in new pledges of additional financial support for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees amounting to U.S. \$190 million. It also demonstrated the strength of international concern about all aspects of the refugee problem, including the plight of Cambodia, and secured undertakings from Vietnam to suspend for a time the export of boat people, and to discuss measures for the safe and orderly departure of those of its citizens who wish to leave.

/ The world

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I hope that these developments have given the international community at least a breathing space while it sets about the urgent task of clearing the refugee camps in Hong Kong and the countries of first asylum, and bringing the situation under control.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

The Right Reverend the Bishop of Tinisa



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Original in C/PK

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

30 July 1979

My dear Lord Bishop,

Thank you for your letter of 13 July and for your support for the steps the Government has taken to ensure that concerted international efforts are made to resettle those refugees who have already been expelled from Indo-China, and to tackle the refugee problem at its roots by pressing Vietnam to reverse its inhumane policies.

You may be interested to see the enclosed copy of the speech which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made at the international meeting at Geneva on 20 July. This includes an announcement of the additional places which Britain has agreed to make available for resettlement and of the extra funds we propose to provide over the next 12 months.

I am glad to say that the Geneva meeting resulted in a massive increase in offers of resettlement places, from 125,000 to 260,000, and in new pledges of additional financial support for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees amounting to U.S. \$190 million.

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/ The world

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I hope that these developments have given the international community at least a breathing space while it sets about the urgent task of clearing the refugee camps in Hong Kong and the countries of first asylum, and bringing the situation under control.

Yours sincerely
Raymond Thelma

The Right Reverend The Lord Bishop of Guildford

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cc HO LPSO
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1979

Geneva Conference on Refugees from Indo-China

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM/79/70) of 24 July about the Geneva Conference on Refugees from Indo-China.

The Prime Minister was grateful for this report and agrees that, from the U.K.'s point of view, the outcome of the meeting is very satisfactory.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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GB



PM/79/70

PRIME MINISTERPrime MinisterFor the UK, this has
all come out very well.Agreed
20/7Geneva Conference on Refugees in Indo-China

1. The results of the Geneva Conference on Refugees, which took place at the end of last week, have more than vindicated your decision to call for a meeting.
2. The preparations for the meeting focussed attention in a way that has led countries like Sweden and Yugoslavia, who would have preferred to remain neutral, to come into the open before the Conference and criticise Vietnam. These pressures led Vietnam, at Geneva, to take steps to curb what they call illegal emigration "for a reasonable time". This could mean everything or nothing: but since the Vietnamese hold that all the current emigrants leave Vietnam illegally, it offers some hope.
3. Although the Conference was primarily humanitarian, I thought it was vital to make it clear in my speech (enclosed) where the responsibility lay. Although many of the other speakers avoided direct criticism of Vietnam, the Americans, Canadians, Australians and Chinese all spoke forcibly. I believe that our political case was strengthened by our decision to take an additional number of refugees. As a result, the Vietnamese delegation did not succeed in their attempt to portray themselves as the hapless victims of a problem beyond their control. They had to make concessions not only because of the political pressures but also because they are in economic difficulties and are feeling the pinch as a result of the cut-off in aid. I think we can now afford to lower our profile on the whole issue of Vietnamese refugees, leaving it as far as possible to others to maintain the pressure on Vietnam.
4. One way would be, as I suggested in my speech, through an international commission composed of genuinely non-aligned and neutral countries from the region, which would supervise the orderly exodus of the refugees: another could be through a move to the Security Council, even if we were faced there with a Soviet



veto. Western members of the Council and ASEAN countries will need to concert about the next steps, which were summarised by Dr Waldheim in a four point plan of action:-

- (1) To reduce the backlog, both of boat and land people:
- (2) To expand the UNHCR/Vietnamese understanding of orderly departure, but not at the expense of those already in camps:
- (3) The idea of holding centres should be built on:
- (4) Rescue at sea was important and the UN would seek to co-ordinate the activities of special rescue ships.

5. The Geneva Conference has evoked a pledge of resettlement places totalling 260 thousand - double what was available two months ago. The Philippines have offered a transit centre for 50 thousand refugees which should ease the position on Hong Kong. The funds at the disposal of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees were increased by US\$190 million. Vietnam's responsibility for the refugee exodus has been fully exposed and she has lost the sympathy that she once enjoyed.

6. I am copying this minute to the other members of OD and to Sir John Hunt.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

24 July 1979

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, THE RT HON THE LORD CARRINGTON, AT GENEVA ON FRIDAY 20 JULY 1979

I SHOULD LIKE FIRST TO EXPRESS MY GOVERNMENT'S GRATITUDE TO YOU, MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, FOR INVITING US HERE TODAY FOLLOWING MY PRIME MINISTER'S APPEAL ON 30 (THIRTY) MAY. I PAY TRIBUTE AS WELL TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, WHOSE WORK HAS HELPED US TO FOCUS ON THE STARK REALITIES OF THIS UNPRECEDENTED CRISIS.

NOT IN THIS GENERATION HAVE SUCH VAST NUMBERS OF PEOPLE RISKED DEATH AND DESTITUTION TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY IN THE HOPE OF FINDING REFUGE ABROAD. YOU HAVE SEEN THE MISERY OF THOSE WHO ARE WAITING IN THAILAND AFTER CROSSING THE FRONTIERS OF LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA IN THEIR TENS OF THOUSANDS. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM HONG KONG, WHERE OVER SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND PEOPLE HAVE FOUND TEMPORARY SANCTUARY IN THAT TINY AND OVER-CROWDED TERRITORY AFTER PERILOUS JOURNEYS IN THEIR UNSEAWORTHY CRAFT.

WE CAN HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE SCALE OF HUMAN SUFFERING INVOLVED. I HAVE SEEN IT FOR MYSELF. OUR AIMS AT THIS CONFERENCE MUST BE TO FIND WAYS TO ALLEVIATE THAT SUFFERING. FIRSTLY BY GETTING THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO EXERCISE A HUMANE POLICY IN RESPECT OF ITS OWN PEOPLE AND SECONDLY BY FINDING WAYS OF SHARING THROUGHOUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THE UNFAIR BURDEN WHICH IS NOW BEING BORNE BY HONG KONG AND THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THIS PURPOSE CAN BE SERVED BY RAKING OVER PAST HISTORY.

/ IT HAS, HOWEVER,

IT HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN ALLEGED THAT THE REFUGEES ARE BOURGEOIS DROPOUTS WHO CANNOT ADJUST TO THE NEW VIETNAMESE REALITY: THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE TO LEAVE: THAT THEY LEFT ILLEGALLY: THAT IT IS ALL THE CONSEQUENCE OF COLONIALISM OR A PLOT OF THE WESTERN CAPITALISTS AND THE CHINESE.

MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, THESE ARGUMENTS ARE HEARTLESS. MOREOVER, THEY ARE IRRELEVANT. IT IS NOT THE PRACTICE OF BRITISH MINISTERS TO COMMENT ON THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. BUT I AM BOUND TO WONDER WHAT LIES BEHIND THIS EXODUS, AND WHY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN - PERHAPS AS MANY AS THE WHOLE POPULATION OF GENEVA - HAVE DIED IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT, OR WOULD NOT, CONTINUE LIVING IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THEY HAVE BEEN DRIVEN OUT BY NO NATURAL DISASTER. ONE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THEY HAVE LEFT BECAUSE THE POLICIES OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO REMAIN. AND THEIR FATE, CAUSED BY THE POLICIES OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, IS NOW THE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OF US ALL.

THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS NOW PROPOSING THAT ITS EXTREMELY LIMITED SEVEN-POINT UNDERSTANDING WITH THE UNHCR, TOTALLY INADEQUATE IN SCALE, SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED WHICH I TAKE TO MEAN FAMILY REUNION SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO PROVIDE FOR ORDERLY DEPARTURE OF ALL THOSE WHO WISH TO LEAVE VIETNAM. THIS IS A SUGGESTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NEED TO STUDY WITH GREAT ATTENTION AND I HAVE AS OF NOW ONLY TWO COMMENTS. FIRST, VIETNAM MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NO COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO FORCE ON OTHER COUNTRIES A SECTOR OF ITS OWN POPULATION WHICH IT NO LONGER WANTS WITHIN ITS BORDERS. ANY LONG-TERM PROGRAMME FOR THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE OF PEOPLE WHO WISH TO LEAVE VIETNAM MUST BE SEEN TO BE JUST AND FAIR. IT MUST BE TRULY VOLUNTARY, WITH NO ELEMENT OF OPEN OR HIDDEN COMPULSION. THOSE WHO WISH TO LEAVE MUST BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE THEIR NORMAL LIVES IN VIETNAM WHILE THEY AWAIT DEPARTURE. THERE SHOULD BE NO NEED FOR CAMPS IN VIETNAM. IF THEY LEAVE THERE MUST BE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO SO IN NUMBERS AND AT TIMES WHICH THE REST OF THE WORLD CAN ABSORB.

SECONDLY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHICH IS TRYING TO LIFT THE BURDEN OF REFUGEES IN THE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES OF FIRST ASYLUM MUST NOW EXPECT VIETNAM TO CEASE THE PRESSURES ON THOSE PEOPLE

WHO ARE BEING FORCED TO FLEE SO THAT THEY STOP THEIR FLIGHT. THE WORLD NEEDS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THOSE REFUGEES ALREADY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND HONG KONG TO BE RESETTLED. THIS IS AN URGENT REQUIREMENT. VIETNAM MUST RESPOND TO IT AND THEREBY SHOW THAT THE WORLD CAN RELY ON ITS ASSURANCES.

MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE CANNOT HOPE TO RESOLVE ALL THE ASPECTS OF THIS TRAGEDY BEFORE WE LEAVE THIS CONFERENCE. BUT WE LOOK TO YOU TO GIVE US A CLEAR DIRECTION FOR THE FOLLOWING MONTHS. I SUGGEST THAT WE NEED FIRST TO ENSURE THAT EXISTING PRESSURES ARE EASED. FOR THIS TIME WE NEED COMMITMENTS FROM COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE AREA TO RECEIVE REFUGEES FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT AND TO CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY TO THE EVER-ESCALATING COSTS. SECONDLY, WE NEED TO LOOK AT PROPOSALS TO BRING ORDER INTO THE FLOW OF REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM SO THAT THE PRESENT APPALLING LOSS OF LIFE IS ARRESTED. THIRDLY, WE NEED TO REASSERT THE PRINCIPLES OF FIRST ASYLUM AND THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA WHICH HAVE COME UNDER SUCH STRAIN AS THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS GROWN.

IN THE RESETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS THERE MUST BE NO JUMPING OF THE ALREADY OVERLONG QUEUE OF PEOPLE AWAITING RESETTLEMENT IN HONG KONG AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA. INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ANY SCHEME.

IF OTHERS AGREE, SUCH PARTICIPATION COULD BEST BE CONDUCTED THROUGH A COMMISSION DRAWN FROM A SMALL NUMBER OF NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. THIS COMMISSION WOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AND THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO SET UP AND MANAGE ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HANDLING PEOPLE WHO WISH TO LEAVE VIETNAM.

THE SAME COMMISSION, OR ONE LIKE IT, SHOULD ALSO TACKLE THE PLIGHT OF THOSE WHO WISH TO LEAVE LAOS AND CAMBODIA. THE PRESSURE ON THAILAND IS ALREADY ACUTE. IT COULD BECOME INTOLERABLE IF FIGHTING CONTINUES IN CAMBODIA AND IF THERE IS A SERIOUS FAMINE THERE. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST DO WHAT IT CAN IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE FOOD FOR THE STARVING UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE FIGHTING. A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THIS MISERABLE AND WAR-RAVAGED COUNTRY MUST BE FOUND.

IN THE CONTEXT OF ORDERLY DEPARTURE, MY GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH LARGE TRANSIT CENTRES TO PROVIDE TEMPORARY HOMES MEANWHILE, AND WE SHALL COOPERATE WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

BUT THESE TEMPORARY HOMES MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME PERMANENT. IT IS TOO EASY TO FAIL TO FOLLOW THROUGH, TO LEAVE MASSES OF PEOPLE TO GROW DEMORALISED IN CAMPS AS THE MONTHS GROW INTO YEARS. WE SHOULD TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO REUNITE THOSE FAMILIES WHICH HAVE BEEN SEPARATED.

THE WORLD MUST DO ITS UTMOST TO GIVE PERMANENT HOMES AND A LIVELIHOOD TO THE REFUGEES, AND TO FINANCE THE COSTS. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FRANCE, AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAVE ALREADY DONE A GREAT DEAL. MANY OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE ALSO MADE NOTABLE CONTRIBUTIONS.

MY OWN COUNTRY IS IN A UNIQUE POSITION. WE HAVE A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR HONG KONG, WHICH HAS TAKEN ALL THE REFUGEES WHO HAVE REACHED ITS SHORES. NONE HAS BEEN TURNED AWAY. I HAVE SEEN FOR MYSELF HOW GOOD THE ARRANGEMENTS ARE. WE INTEND TO ACCEPT OUR SHARE OF REFUGEES FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT. WE SHALL TAKE INTO BRITAIN OVER THE COMING MONTHS A FURTHER TEN THOUSAND REFUGEES, AS THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES HAS REQUESTED. SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT, WE SHALL ALSO MAKE AVAILABLE A FURTHER FIVE MILLION POUNDS OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS FOR DEALING WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. BECAUSE HONG KONG'S RESOURCES ARE ALREADY STRETCHED TO THE LIMIT, AND THE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES THERE HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE, WE SHALL ALLOCATE ALL OUR PLACES TO HONG KONG. I HOPE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL ALSO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO DOING MORE FOR HONG KONG, WHICH NOW HAS NEARLY ONE THIRD OF ALL BOAT REFUGEES IN CAMPS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA.

WE SHOULD WORK OUT EFFECTIVE PROGRAMMES FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN DEVELOPING AS WELL AS MORE OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. MANY OF THE REFUGEES COULD MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROSPERITY OF THESE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BUT WE RECOGNISE THAT THESE COUNTRIES WILL REQUIRE FINANCIAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE IN RESETTLEMENT.

WE MUST REASSERT THE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR GOVERNING TEMPORARY ASYLUM FOR PEOPLE WHOSE LIVES ARE IN DANGER, AND THE OBLIGATION TO SAVE LIFE AT SEA. THESE PRINCIPLES WERE NOT DESIGNED TO COPE WITH A MAN-MADE DISASTER OF THE SIZE WE ARE NOW WITNESSING. IT IS NOT SURPRISING IF THEY HAVE BROKEN DOWN HERE AND THERE UNDER THE PRESSURE OF WHAT SEEMS TO BE AN ENDLESS INFLUX OF REFUGEES. BUT WE MUST UPHOLD AND REASSERT THEM AS BEST WE CAN IF WE ARE TO PRESERVE THE FABRIC OF CIVILISED INTERNATIONAL LIFE. THE RESPONSIBILITY FALLS NOT ONLY ON THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, AND THE CAPTAINS OF VESSELS IN THE SEAS AROUND VIETNAM. IT FALLS ALSO ON POTENTIAL HOST COUNTRIES BECAUSE THESE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE HARD TO FULFILL UNLESS RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMMES ARE ADEQUATE.

MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN COMMON WITH MOST OF THOSE IN THIS ROOM I AM ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE EXPECTATIONS WHICH THIS CONFERENCE HAS AROUSED - AMONG THE PEOPLE OF CHINA, SOUTH-EAST ASIA, AND HONG KONG; AMONG THE REFUGEES; AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH NOW SUPPORT THEM. WE OWE THESE PEOPLE A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT RELIEF IS ON THE WAY. I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHALL DISPERSE WITHOUT SUCH A SIGNAL.

PRESS OFFICE

~~Duty Clerk / Confidential~~

Vietnamese Refugees

You will remember the thankyou letter to the Prime Minister which was delivered to No.10 by a group of Vietnamese refugee children (who turn out all to belong to the same family). I attach it below, with its enclosure.

The Prime Minister has agreed to send a personal reply to the Nguyen family. I attach a copy. The Prime Minister has not dissented from the suggestion that her reply may be released to the Press, if you think this would be a good thing to do. (The Vietnamese letter was given quite a lot of publicity, you will remember.)

It seems to me that publication of the Prime Minister's reply might be quite useful, image-wise.

BM

28 July, 1979.

message released to Press Sunday 29 July
AW.

Message passed to Andy Wood.
Duty Clerk 28/7.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

28 July, 1979.

Dear Family Nguyen,

Thank you for writing to me about the future of the people of your country and your own family. I fully understand your longing to be reunited with your parents.

I know what terrible sufferings have been endured by refugees from your country. That was why I first proposed that the United Nations Secretary General should call a conference to work out practical measures to help them. We are taking a full part in this international effort and have decided to accept another 10,000 refugees into this country.

I know that in the case of your own parents the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is making every effort to bring them out of Vietnam and we, for our part, have already authorised their entry to this country.

Like you, I hope it will not be long before you are a united family again.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD) MT

The Nguyen Family

Dear Prime Minister

Please help our people to have freedom
and a country they have lost

please help our parents to come over here,
help our family to be united again.

please don't let us grow up without our
parents' love.

Nguyen thi Thu Hong.

Nguyen Anh Quan.

Nguyen Van Vinh

Nguyen Thanh Huet.

Nguyen thi Anh Hong.

Nguyen Thanh Phong

Nguyen thi Thu Diem

OCKENDER VENTURE
Keyfolds Bunch Lane
Haslemere, Surrey

cc/ Mr Ennals
cc/ Press Office

PLEASE
HELP OUR
PARENTS
TO COME

OVER HERE,
HELP OUR
FAMILY TO BE
UNITED AGAIN

Please
don't let us
grow up
without our
parents'
love

• Please
help those
who leave
Viet Nam
to find
freedom

WE BEG THE
BRITISH GOV'T
TO HELP THE
VIETNAMESE
REFUGEES &
ASK IT NOT TO
ALLOW THEM
TO BECOME
VICTIMS
OF THE SEA.

We beg the British
Government

We beg the
British Govt
to help the

• Please
do not let
the Sth China
Sea become
the tomb
of the Vietnamese
refugees

•

• Please
help
to reunite
our
families

THE VIETNAMESE
REFUGEES
ALREADY IN
ENGLAND
WILL BE FOREVER
GRATEFUL
TO THE BRITISH
PEOPLE FOR
THEIR KINDNESS
AND HELP .

Premier of BELIZE

file

28



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 July 1979

Belize and Vietnamese Refugees

I enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Prime Minister by the Premier of Belize, offering on behalf of his Government to accept a limited number of refugees from Hong Kong.

I should be grateful for advice on a reply which the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Price. It would be helpful if a draft could reach me not later than 10 August.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Chase pls.

Ringin out 13.8
coming tomorrow
13/8

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PRIME MINISTER

FM F C O 271824Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 172 OF 27 JULY

INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, UKMIS NEWYORK,

ROUTINE HANOI, WASHINGTON, CANBERRA, OTTAWA.

MAP/viii

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES : VIETNAM-UNHCR EXCHANGES.

1. WE HAVE LEARNT FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT PHAN HIEN, LEADER OF THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION AT THE GENEVA MEETING, CALLED ON HARTLING ON MONDAY 23 JULY AND SAID THAT VIETNAMESE CONTROL OVER THE BOAT REFUGEE FLOW DEPENDED ON AN IMMEDIATE INCREASE IN DEPARTURES UNDER THE 7-POINT PROGRAMME TO APPROXIMATELY 10,000 PER MONTH (AS COMPARED WITH THE PRESENT ONE FLIGHT A WEEK.

2. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE VIETNAMESE MAY ALREADY BE BUILDING UP A CASE TO JUSTIFY ABANDONING THE UNDERTAKING WHICH THEY GAVE TO DR. WALDHEIM OR AT LEAST INCREASING THEIR PRESSURE ON RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES AS A COUNTER TO PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THEM IN THE WEST. PLEASE MAKE DISCREET ENQUIRIES OF UNHCR TO CLARIFY THE TERMS OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN HARTLING AND PHAN HIEN, MAKING THE POINT THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON EXISTING CAMPS, RATHER THAN TO ESTABLISH A SIGNIFICANT FLOW DIRECTLY FROM VIETNAM. WE WOULD NATURALLY LIKE IN THE LONG RUN TO HELP THOSE SUFFERING AS A RESULT OF VIETNAMESE POLICIES BUT THERE IS A REAL LIMIT TO THE SCALE AND PACE OF RESETTLEMENT.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS NOT UNHCR'S INTENTION TO INFORM RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES OF THIS VIETNAMESE DEMARCHE, LEST IT PUNCTURE THE MOOD OF OPTIMISM LEFT BY THE GENEVA MEETING.

IF UNHCR CONFIRM THE VIETNAMESE APPROACH, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT IT THROWS IMPORTANT LIGHT ON VIETNAM'S INTENTIONS, AND THAT YOU BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE DRAWN TO THE ATTENTION OF THE MAJOR DONOR COUNTRIES.

CARRINGTON

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PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON
MR FRETWELL

ADDITIONAL DISTN
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PRIME MINISTER

FM HANOI 270340Z JUL 79
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 223 OF 27TH JULY

MAP 21/vn

GENEVA CONFERENCE: VIETNAMESE REACTIONS

1. THE PARTY NEWSPAPER NHAN DAN, THE OFFICIAL VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY (VNA), AND HANOI RADIO HAVE HAILED THE CONFERENCE AS A SUCCESS. EXTRACTS FROM PHAN HIEN'S SPEECH WERE CARRIED IN NHAN DAN AND VNA. COMMENTARIES CLAIM THAT VIETNAM'S STAND AT THE CONFERENCE AND ITS SPIRIT OF COOPERATION WERE WELCOMED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS (MALAYSIA AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO). 'THE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY THE VIETNAMESE HAS STIMULATED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, AND ADVANCED THE CONFERENCE' CLAIMS NHAN DAN. THUS 'ALL THE PERFIDIOUS ATTEMPTS TO MAKE THIS CONFERENCE ANTI-VIETNAM ROSTRUM MET WITH TOTAL FAILURE'. 'JUSTICE AND GOODWILL HAVE WON.'

2. THE COMMENTARIES INCLUDE SELECTED QUOTATIONS FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT THE LATTER'S CLOSING STATEMENT HAS NOT BEEN CARRIED. THE COMMENTARIES CONTAIN NO REFERENCE TO THE VIETNAMESE COMMITMENTS TO DR WALDHEIM TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT FOR A REASONABLE PERIOD TO PREVENT 'ILLEGAL' DEPARTURES AND TO COOPERATE WITH UNHCR IN BROADENING THE 7-POINT PROGRAMME. (WE ARE NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE LATTER IS SUPPOSED TO BE A WIDER COMMITMENT THAN THE COMMITMENT IN PHAN HEIN'S SPEECH TO DISCUSSIONS WITH UNHCR ABOUT A PROCESSING CENTRE.) NO MENTION IS MADE OF PLEDGES BY WESTERN COUNTRIES OF ADDITIONAL RESETTLEMENT PLACES OR MONEY.

3. TWO NHAN DAN ARTICLES, SUMMARISED IN VNA, HAVE COMMENTED ON THE UK POSITION AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) 24 JULY: 'AT THE CONFERENCE THERE WERE DISCORDANT VOICES OF A MINORITY OF DELEGATES FROM SUCH COUNTRIES AS CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN AND AUSTRALIA WHICH HAD INVADED, OR TAKEN PART IN, THE AGGRESSION AGAINST VIETNAM.'

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(B) 25 JULY: "THE FACTOR OF SUCCESS WAS THE CORRECT STAND AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE OF THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WHICH ... ISOLATED THE DISCORDANT VOICES OF THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES ... AND HELPED DESTROY THE BRITISH, AUSTRALIAN, CANADIAN AND SINGAPOREAN DELEGATES SLANDERS."

4. IN ANSWER TO AN ENQUIRY FROM OUR INTERPRETER ABOUT THE 24 JULY REFERENCE, NHAN DAN HAVE SAID THAT THE REFERENCE WAS TO 1945 WHEN BRITISH TROOPS CAME OSTENSIBLY TO DISARM THE JAPANESE BUT IN PRACTICE TO ASSIST FRENCH RE-OCCUPATION OF VIETNAM.

5. IT WAS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED THAT VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA AFTER THE CONFERENCE WOULD INCLUDE CRITICISM OF THE UK POSITION . WE SEE LITTLE PURPOSE ON REACTING TO THE NHAN DAN ALLEGATIONS BY TELLING NHAN DAN THAT WE REJECT THEM OR RAISING THE MATTER FORMALLY WITH THE MFA. IF HOWEVER VIETNAMESE CRITICISMS OF THE UK BECOME MORE STRIDENT WE SHALL CONSULT YOU ABOUT WHAT ACTION WE MIGHT TAKE.

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SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON

MR FERGUSSON
MR FRETWELL

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MR BULLARD 2

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Vietnam

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FM FCO 241820Z JUL 79
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO 365 OF 24 JULY 1979
INFO UKMIS GENEVA

Enter via

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GENEVA CONFERENCE ON REFUGEES

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL:

BEGINS

"DEAR SECRETARY-GENERAL,
THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ARE MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE SPEEDY AND
EFFECTIVE WAY IN WHICH YOU RESPONDED TO OUR PROPOSAL THAT A
U N CONFERENCE SHOULD BE HELD TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF
VIETNAMESE REFUGEES. I RECOGNISE HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO TURN
AN INITIATIVE OF THIS KIND INTO PRACTICAL ACTION AND I HOPE
YOU WILL NOT MIND MY SAYING HOW MUCH WE ADMIRERD THE WAY IN
WHICH YOU BROUGHT OUR IDEA TO REALITY. I HAVE HEARD WITH MUCH
APPRECIATION OF THE EFFECTIVE WAY IN WHICH YOU CHAIRED THE
MEETING AND SUMMED UP ITS CONCLUSIONS. I SHOULD LIKE TO THANK,
THROUGH YOU, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES FOR ALL THE
VALUABLE PREPARATORY WORK WHICH HE DID.

WE SHALL BE WATCHING CAREFULLY VIETNAM'S BEHAVIOUR IN THE
LIGHT OF THE CONFERENCE, AND WE SHALL JUDGE THEM BY THE WAY
IN WHICH THEY COMPLY WITH THEIR UNDERTAKING. I AM GLAD THAT
YOU WILL BE REPORTING TO THE U N GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE
AUTUMN ON THE POSITION. I RECOGNISE THE NEED FOR CONTINUING
AND EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-UP AND YOU CAN RELY ON OUR CO-OPERATION
IN THIS.

I REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND
IN PARTICULAR THE CONTINUED FIGHTING AND FAMINE IN CAMBODIA.
THESE POSE A PARTICULAR THREAT TO THAILAND. I WOULD LIKE TO

/KEEP IN CLOSE

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KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT THIS SITUATION AND WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THE ROLE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS MIGHT PLAY IN FINDING A LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT TO THE PROBLEMS OF CAMBODIA.

I WAS VERY GLAD TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF TALKING TO YOU IN LONDON ON 12 JULY AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER.

YOURS SINCERELY
PETER CARRINGTON''

ENDS

CARRINGTON

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PLANNING STAFF

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PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR BLAKER

SIR A PARSONS

LORD NG LENNOX

MR CORTAZZI

MR MURRAY

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FM FCO 201738Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NO 165 OF 20 JULY 1979

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND GOVERNOR HONG KONG
PRIORITY ALL EEC POSTS, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, KUALA LUMPUR, BANGKOK
SINGAPORE, MANILA, JAKARTA, TOKYO,
INFO SAVING HANOI.

Prime Minister

Shi 23/7

me

MEETING WITH VICE-PRESIDENT MONDALE: INDO-CHINA REFUGEES

1. I HAD A TALK WITH VICE-PRESIDENT MONDALE IN GENEVA. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HOLBROOKE AND AARON.
2. MONDALE SHARED MY ASSESSMENT THAT THE VIETNAMESE, APART FROM "OFFERING TO HAVE THE WEST DO MORE" WERE SHOWING APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO CO-OPERATE IN ORDER TO DEFLECT CRITICISM, PARTICULARLY ON THE PART OF ASEAN COUNTRIES.
3. MONDALE SAID THAT IN HIS OWN SPEECH TO THE CONFERENCE HE WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ASSIGNING 4 SHIPS AND HALF AN AIRCRAFT SQUADRON TO INDO-CHINA FOR REFUGEE RELIEF WORK. HE WOULD ALSO ANNOUNCE INCREASED U S FUNDS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO HELP THEM COPE WITH REFUGEES: HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PHILLIPINES' OFFER OF A TRANSIT CENTRE FOR 50,000. MONDALE SAID HE WOULD ALSO HAVE A TOUGH SECTION ON VIETNAM TO PUT THEM BACK ON THE DEFENSIVE. HE WAS THINKING OF INCLUDING A REQUEST FOR A MORATORIUM ON REFUGEE EXODUS FROM VIETNAM. HE WAS UNAWARE, UNTIL I TOLD HIM, THAT THE FRENCH HAD ALREADY MADE THIS SUGGESTION.
4. I POINTED OUT THE DANGERS OF PUTTING RESCUE SHIPS IN THE AREA, IE CREATION OF AN ADDITIONAL FLOW OF REFUGEES WITH THE ATTENDANT RISK OF EVEN MORE PERISHING AT SEA. MONDALE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE ANXIOUS THAT THE SHIPS SHOULD NOT BE A MAGNET FOR REFUGEES. THEY WERE NOT PROVIDING A SAFETY NET. THE PRIMARY TASK OF THE SHIPS WOULD BE TO TAKE REFUGEES FROM COUNTRIES OF FIRST ASYLUM TO TRANSIT CENTRES. HOWEVER, IF THE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT SPOTTED BOATS IN TROUBLE THEN THE SHIPS

/WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

WOULD HELP OUT, THE LARGE NUMBERS DROWNING HAD BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR FOR THEM.

5. WE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF FOLLOW-UP TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. WE BOTH THOUGHT WE NEED NOT BE DETERRED BY A SOVIET VETO, BUT WE WOULD NEED TO HAVE SOME ASEAN SUPPORT AND ALSO TO WORK ON THE FRENCH. WE SHALL BE FOLLOWING THIS UP WITH THE AMERICANS WHO WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN WE ARE THAT ASEAN AND NON ALIGNED SUPPORT CAN BE OBTAINED FOR AN APPROACH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

6. HOLBROOKE SAID THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO PEKING, FOLLOWING THE ANZUS MEETING, HE HAD PRESSED THE CHINESE TO TAKE UP TO 10,000 REFUGEES A MONTH AND ACCEPT A PROCESSING CENTRE ON CHINESE SOIL. BUT THEY HAD REACTED SHARPLY TO AMERICAN SUGGESTIONS ON THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA. HUANG HUA HAD TOLD HOLBROOKE THAT CHINA OUGHT TO KEEP FIGHTING, AS SHOULD THE UNITED STATES. IT WAS CLEAR THAT CHINA WISHED TO ESTABLISH AN ANTI-VIETNAM FRONT AMONG ASEAN COUNTRIES, STARTING WITH THAILAND. HOLBROOKE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE FATAL FOR THAILAND TO GET DRAWN IN BUT FORTUNATELY THE THAIS THOUGHT SO TOO. THE AMERICANS WERE THINKING ABOUT CALLING SOME KIND OF NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE BUT FELT THAT THE MOMENT WAS NOT RIGHT. FOR THE TIME BEING THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. CY VANCE SAW THIS AS THE WAY TO STABILITY IN THE REGION BUT THE CHINESE ATTITUDE MEANT THAT THERE WAS NOW A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS, THOUGH UNPUBLICISED, DIFFERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN THEM AND THE UNITED STATES.

7. I URGED ON MONDALE THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE MORE REFUGEES FROM HONG KONG. HOLBROOKE ADMITTED THAT HONG KONG HAD SUFFERED BECAUSE, IN CONTRAST TO MALAYSIA AND THAILAND, THE REFUGEES WERE WELL TREATED THERE. MOREOVER THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN HONG KONG WAS MORE RECENT THAN THAT IN THAILAND. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT HONG KONG WOULD INEVITABLY BENEFIT FROM THE INCREASED U S INTAKE OF REFUGEES IF THE PHILIPPINES TRANSIT CENTRE WERE ESTABLISHED THE U S MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE

/THOUSANDS

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THOUSANDS MORE FROM HONG KONG. MONDALE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO LOOK AT THE FIGURES AND TO ASSESS THE CRITERIA ON WHICH ADMISSIONS TO THE U S WERE DECIDED.

CARRINGTON

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MR MURRAY

MR STRATTON

LORD N G LENNOX

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

MR FRETWELL

ADDITIONAL DISTN

BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, THE RT. HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON, AT GENEVA ON FRIDAY, 20 JULY 1979.

Mr. Secretary-General, High Commissioner, Excellencies:

I should like first to express my Government's gratitude to you, Mr. Secretary-General, for inviting us here today following my Prime Minister's appeal on 30 May. I pay tribute as well to the High Commissioner for Refugees, whose work has helped us to focus on the stark realities of this unprecedented crisis.

Not in this generation have such vast numbers of people risked death and destitution to leave their country in the hope of finding refuge abroad. You have seen the misery of those who are waiting in Thailand after crossing the frontiers of Laos and Kampuchea in their tens of thousands. I have just returned from Hong Kong, where over sixty-six thousand people have found temporary sanctuary in that tiny and over-crowded territory after perilous journeys in their unseaworthy craft.

We can have no doubt about the scale of human suffering involved. I have seen it for myself. Our aims at this Conference must be to find ways to alleviate that suffering: firstly by getting the Government of Vietnam to exercise a humane policy in respect of its own people and secondly by finding ways of sharing throughout the international community the unfair burden which is now being borne by Hong Kong and the countries of South East Asia. We do not think that this purpose can be served by raking over past history.

It has, however, been alleged that the refugees are bourgeois dropouts who cannot adjust to the new Vietnamese reality: that they did not have to leave: that they left illegally: that it is all the consequence of colonialism or a plot of the Western capitalists and the Chinese.

/Mr. Secretary-General,

Mr. Secretary-General, these arguments are heartless. Moreover, they are irrelevant. It is not the practice of British Ministers to comment on the internal affairs of other countries. But I am bound to wonder what lies behind this exodus, and why tens of thousands of men, women and children - perhaps as many as the whole population of Geneva - have died in the South China Sea because they could not, or would not, continue living in their own country. They have been driven out by no natural disaster. One can only conclude that they have left because the policies of the Vietnamese Government made it impossible for them to remain. And their fate, caused by the policies of the Vietnamese Government, is now the international concern of us all.

The Vietnamese Government is now proposing that its extremely limited seven-point understanding with the UNHCR for family reunion should be expanded to provide for orderly departure of all those who wish to leave Vietnam. This is a suggestion that the international community will need to study with great attention and at present I have only two comments. First, Vietnam must acknowledge that no country has the right to force on other countries a sector of its own population which it no longer wants within its borders. Any long-term programme for the orderly departure of people who wish to leave Vietnam must be seen to be just and fair. It must be truly voluntary, with no element of open or hidden compulsion. Those who wish to leave must be allowed to continue their normal lives in Vietnam while they await departure. If they leave there must be arrangements to ensure that they do so in numbers and at times which the rest of the world can absorb.

Secondly, the international community which is trying to lift the burden of refugees in the countries and territories of first asylum must now expect Vietnam to cease the pressures on those people who are being forced to flee. The world needs sufficient time for those refugees already in South East Asia and Hong Kong to be resettled. This is an urgent requirement. Vietnam must respond to it and thereby show that the world can rely on its assurances.

/Mr. Secretary-General, we cannot

Mr. Secretary-General, we cannot hope to resolve all the aspects of this tragedy before we leave this Conference. But we look to you to give us a clear direction for the following months. I suggest that we need first to ensure that existing pressures are eased. For this we need commitments from countries outside the area to receive refugees for final settlement and to contribute generously to the ever-escalating costs. Secondly, we need to look at proposals to bring order into the flow of refugees from Vietnam so that the present appalling loss of life is arrested. Thirdly, we need to reassert the principles of first asylum and the safety of life at sea which have come under such strain as the present crisis has grown.

In the resettlement arrangements there must be no jumping of the already overlong queue of people awaiting resettlement in Hong Kong and South East Asia. International supervision is an essential part of any scheme.

If others agree, such supervision could best be exercised by a Commission drawn from a small number of neutral and non-aligned countries. This Commission would work closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Vietnamese Government to set up and manage acceptable arrangements for handling people who wish to leave Vietnam.

The same Commission, or one like it, should also tackle the plight of those who wish to leave Laos and Cambodia. The pressure on Thailand is already acute. It could become intolerable if fighting continues in Cambodia and if there is a serious famine there. The international community must do what it can immediately to provide food for the starving under effective international supervision. There must be an end to the fighting. A political solution to the problems of this miserable and war-ravaged country must be found.

In the context of orderly departure, my Government supports the proposal to establish large transit centres to provide temporary homes meanwhile, and we shall co-operate with the High Commissioner and the Governments directly involved.

/But these temporary

But these temporary homes must not be allowed to become permanent. It is too easy to fail to follow through, to leave masses of people to grow demoralised in camps as the months grow into years. We should take further steps to reunite those families which have been separated.

The world must do their utmost to give permanent homes and a livelihood to the refugees, and to finance the ever-increasing costs. The United States of America, France, and the People's Republic of China have already done a great deal. Many other countries have also made notable contributions.

My own country is in a unique position. We have a particular responsibility for Hong Kong, which has taken all the refugees who have reached its shores. We intend to accept our share of refugees for final settlement. We shall take into Britain over the coming months a further ten thousand refugees, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has requested. Subject to the approval of the United Kingdom Parliament, we shall also make available a further five million pounds over the next twelve months for dealing with the refugee problem. Because Hong Kong's resources are already stretched to the limit, and the numbers of refugees there has continued to increase, we shall allocate all our places to Hong Kong. I hope that other countries will also commit themselves to doing more for Hong Kong, which now has nearly one third of all boat refugees in camps in South East Asia.

We should work out effective programmes for the resettlement of refugees in developing as well as more of the developed countries. Many of the refugees could make a valuable contribution to the prosperity of developing countries but we recognise that these countries will require financial and other assistance in resettlement.

We must reassert the accepted principles of international behaviour covering temporary asylum for people whose lives are in danger, and the obligation to save life at sea. These principles were not designed to cope with a man-made disaster of the size we are now witnessing. It is not surprising if they have broken down here and there under the pressure of what
/seems to be

seems to be an endless influx of refugees. But we must uphold and reassert them as best we can if we are to preserve the fabric of civilised international life. The responsibility falls not only on the countries of the area, and the captains of vessels in the seas around Vietnam. It falls also on potential host countries because these responsibilities are hard to fulfil unless resettlement programmes are adequate.

Mr. Secretary-General, I am acutely conscious of the expectations which this Conference has aroused - among the people of China, South East Asia, and Hong Kong: among the refugees, among the Governments which now support them. We owe these people a clear signal that relief is on the way. I cannot believe that we shall disperse without such a signal.

c/h to note pl.
Top Copy in G.R.



file RB

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 July 1979.

Dear Greville,

I was very glad to learn, from your letter of 13 July, of your election to be President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and I send you my warm congratulations.

I certainly look forward to maintaining the tradition of close and friendly relations between the Government and the Board of Deputies and I shall, as you are good enough to suggest, feel free to call on you and your colleagues for your views on matters of concern to the Jewish community in the United Kingdom.

I have taken note of the Board of Deputies' statement on the Vietnamese boat people. You will by now have seen Peter Carrington's statement, which Ian Gilmour repeated in the House of Commons yesterday, about the Government's approach to the meeting in Geneva on 20 and 21 July which the United Nations Secretary General has convened in response to my original request and I hope that you and your colleagues have found this reassuring.

With best wishes for your term of office as President of the Board.

Yours ever

Margaret

The Honourable Greville Janner, Q.C., M.P.

LPO

Terence Higgins MP
(Vietnamese Boat People)

DS. 23/8



Printed Reminder?

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 July 1979

Ysp
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7/8

I attach a letter the Prime Minister has received from Terence Higgins, M.P., together with one from some of his constituents about the Vietnamese boat people.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if Sir Ian Gilmour would reply on her behalf, with a copy for our records here.

N. J. SANDERS

Michael Richardson, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office.

GPS 1600A
UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKRIS GENEVA 281233Z JULY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 343 OF 28 JULY 1979

FOLLOWING FOR RIDGEON, OJD

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
AFFAIRS, THE RT HON THE LORD CARRINGTON, AT GENEVA ON FRIDAY
28 JULY, 1979

2

ant

Prime Minister

ant
20/7

MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, HIGH COMMISSIONER, EXCELLENCIES:

I SHOULD LIKE FIRST TO EXPRESS MY GOVERNMENT'S GRATITUDE TO YOU, MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, FOR INVITING US HERE TODAY FOLLOWING MY PRIME MINSITER'S APPEAL ON 30 MAY. I PAY TRIBUTE AS WELL TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, WHOSE WORK HAS HELPED US TO FOCUS ON THE STARK REALITIES OF THIS UNPRECEDENTED CRISIS.

NOT IN THIS GENERATION HAVE SUCH VAST NUMBERS OF PEOPLE RISKED DEATH AND DESTITUTION TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY IN THE HOPE OF FINDING REFUGE ABROAD. YOU HAVE SEEN THE MISERY OF THOSE WHO ARE WAITING IN THAILAND AFTER CROSSING THE FRONTIERS OF LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA IN THEIR TENS OF THOUSANDS. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM HONG KONG, WHERE OVER SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND PEOPLE HAVE FOUND TEMPORARY SANCTUARY IN THAT TINY AND OVER-CROWDED TERRITORY AFTER PERILOUS JOURNEYS IN THEIR UNSEAWORTHY CRAFT.

WE CAN HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE SCALE OF HUMAN SUFFERING INVOLVED. I HAVE SEEN IT FOR MYSELF. OUR AIMS AT THIS CONFERENCE MUST BE TO FIND WAYS TO ALLEVIATE THAT SUFFERING: FISTLY BY GETTING THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO EXERCISE A HUMANE POLICY IN RESPECT OF ITS OWN PEOPLE AND SECONDLY BY FINDING WAYS OF SHARING THROUGHOUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THE UNFAIR BURDEN WHICH IS NOW BEING BORNE BY HONG KONG AND THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THIS PURPOSE CAN BE SERVED BY RAKING OVER PAST HISTORY.

IT HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN ALLEGED THAT THE REFUGEES ARE BOURGEOIS DROPOUTS WHO CANNOT ADJUST TO THE NEW VIETNAMESE REALITY: THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE TO LEAVE: THAT THE LEFT ILLEGALLY THAT IT IS ALL THE CONSEQUENCE OF COLONIALISM OR A PLOT OF THE WESTERN CAPITALISTS AND THE CHINESE.

/MR SECRETARY-GENERAL,

MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, THESE ARGUMENTS ARE HEARTLESS. MOREOVER, THEY ARE IRRELEVANT. IT IS NOT THE PRACTICE OF BRITISH MINISTERS TO COMMENT ON THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. BUT I AM BOUND TO WONDER WHAT LIES BEHIND THIS EXODUS, AND WHY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN - PERHAPS AS MANY AS THE WHOLE POPULATION OF GENEVA - HAVE DIED IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT, OR WOULD NOT, CONTINUE LIVING IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THEY HAVE BEEN DRIVEN OUT BY NO NATURAL DISASTER. ONE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THEY HAVE LEFT BECAUSE THE POLICIES OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO REMAIN. AND THEIR FATE, CAUSED BY THE POLICIES OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, IS NOW THE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OF US ALL.

THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS NOW PROPOSING THAT ITS EXTREMELY LIMITED SEVEN-POINT UNDERSTANDING WITH THE THE UNHCR FOR FAMILY REUNION SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO PROVIDE FOR ORDERLY DEPARTURE OF ALL THOSE WHO WISH TO LEAVE VIETNAM. THIS IS A SUGGESTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NEED TO STUDY WITH GREAT ATTENTION AND AT PRESENT I HAVE ONLY TWO COMMENTS. FIRST, VIETNAM MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NO~~E~~ COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO FORCE ON OTHER COUNTRIES A SECTOR OF ITS OWN POPULATION WHICH IT NO LONGER WANTS WITHIN ITS BORDERS. ANY LONG-TERM PROGRAMME FOR THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE OF PEOPLE WHO WISH TO LEAVE VIETNAM MUST BE SEEN TO BE JUST AND FAIR. IT MUST BE TRULY VOLUNTARY, WITH NO ELEMENT OF OPEN OR HIDDEN COMPULSION. THOSE WHO WISH TO LEAVE MUST BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE THEIR NORMAL LIVES IN VIETNAM WHILE THEY AWAIT DEPARTURE. IF THEY LEAVE THERE MUST BE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO SO IN NUMBERS AND AT TIMES WHICH THE REST OF THE WORLD CAN ABSORB.

SECONDLY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHICH IS TRYING TO LIFT THE BURDEN OF REFUGEES IN THE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES OF FIRST ASYLUM MUST NOW EXPECT VIETNAM TO CEASE THE PRESSURES ON THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE BEING FORCED TO FLEE. THE WORLD NEEDS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THOSE REFUGEES ALREADY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND HONG KONG TO BE RESETTLED. THIS IS AN URGENT REQUIREMENT. VIETNAM MUST RESPOND TO IT AND THEREBY SHOW THAT THE WORLD CAN RELY ON ITS ASSURANCES.

MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE CANNOT HOPE TO RESOLVE ALL THE ASPECTS OF THIS TRAGEDY BEFORE WE LEAVE THIS CONFERENCE. BUT WE LOOK TO YOU TO GIVE US A CLEAR DIRECTION FOR THE FOLLOWING MONTHS.. I SUGGEST THAT WE NEED FIRST TO ENSURE THAT EXISTING PRESSURES ARE EASED. FOR THIS WE NEED COMMITMENTS FROM COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE AREA TO RECEIVE REFUGEES FOR₂ FINAL SETTLEMENT AND TO /CONTRIBUTE

CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY TO THE EVER-ESCALATING COSTS. SECONDLY, WE NEED TO LOOK AT PROPOSALS TO BRING ORDER INTO THE FLOW OF REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM SO THAT THE PRESENT APPALLING LOSS OF LIFE IS ARRESTED. THIRDLY, WE NEED TO REASSERT THE PRINCIPLES OF FIRST ASYLUM AND THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA WHICH HAVE COME UNDER SUCH STRAIN AS THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS GROWN.

IN THE RESETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS THERE MUST BE NO JUMPING OF THE ALREADY OVERLONG QUEUE OF PEOPLE AWAITING RESETTLEMENT IN HONG KONG AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA. INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ANY SCHEME.

IF OTHERS AGREE, SUCH SUPERVISION COULD BEST BE EXERCISED BY A COMMISSION DRAWN FROM A SMALL NUMBER OF NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. THIS COMMISSION WOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AND THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO SET UP AND MANAGE ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HANDLING PEOPLE WHO WISH TO LEAVE VIETNAM.

THE SAME COMMISSION, OR ONE LIKE IT, SHOULD ALSO TACKLE THE PLIGHT OF THOSE WHO SWISH TO LEAVE LAOS AND COMBODIA. THE PRESSURE ON THAILAND IS ALREADY ACUTE. IT COULD BECOME INTOLERABLE IF FIGHTING CONTINUES IN CAMBODIA AND IF THERE IS A SERIOUS FAMINE THERE. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST DO WHAT IT CAN IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE FOOD FOR THE STARVING UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE FIGHTING. A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THIS MISERABLE AND WAR-RAVAGED COUNTRY MUST BE FOUND.

IN THE CONTEXT OF ORDERLY DEPARTURE, MY GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH LARGE TRANSIT CENTRES TO PROVIDE TEMPORARY HOMES MEANWHILE, AND WE SHALL COOPERATE WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND THE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

BUT THESE TEMPORARY HOMES MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME PERMANENT. IT IS TOO EASY TO FAIL TO FOLLOW THROUGH, TO LEAVE MASSES OF PEOPLE TO GROW DEMORALISED IN CAMPS AS THE MONTHS GROW INTO YEARS. WE SHOULD TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO REUNITE THOSE FAMILIES WHICH HAVE BEEN SEPARATED.

THE WORLD MUST DO THEIR UTMOST TO GIVE PERMANENT HOMES AND A LIVELIHOOD TO THE REFUGEES, AND TO FINANCE THE EVER-INCREASING COSTS. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FRANCE, AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAVE ALREADY DONE A GREAT DEAL. MANY OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE ALSO MADE NOTABLE CONTRIBUTIONS.

/MY. OWN

MY OWN COUNTRY IS IN A UNIQUE POSITION. WE HAVE A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR HONG KONG, WHICH HAS TAKEN ALL THE REFUGEES WHO HAVE REACHED ITS SHORES. WE INTEND TO ACCEPT OUR SHARE OF REFUGEES FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT. WE SHALL TAKE INTO BRITAIN OVER THE COMING MONTHS A FURTHER TEN THOUSAND REFUGEES, AS THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES HAS REQUESTED. SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT, WE SHALL ALSO MAKE AVAILABLE A FURTHER FIVE MILLION POUNDS OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS FOR DEALING WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. BECAUSE HONG KONG'S RESOURCES ARE ALREADY STRETCHED TO THE LIMIT, AND THE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES THERE HAS CONTINUED TO INCREASE, WE SHALL ALLOCATE ALL OUR PLACES TO HONG KONG. I HOPE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL ALSO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO DOING MORE FOR HONG KONG, WHICH NOW HAS NEARLY ONE THIRD OF ALL BOAT REFUGEES IN CAMPS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA.

WE SHOULD WORK OUT EFFECTIVE PROGRAMMES FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN DEVELOPING AS WELL AS MORE OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. MANY OF THE REFUGEES COULD MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROSPERITY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BUT WE RECOGNISE THAT THESE COUNTRIES WILL REQUIRE FINANCIAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE IN RESETTLEMENT.

WE MUST REASSERT THE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR GOVERNING TEMPORARY ASYLUM FOR PEOPLE WHOSE LIVES ARE IN DANGER, AND THE OBLIGATION TO SAVE LIFE AT SEA. THESE PRINCIPLES WERE NOT DESIGNED TO COPE WITH A MAN-MADE DISASTER OF THE SIZE WE ARE NOW WITNESSING. IT IS NOT SURPRISING IF THEY HAVE BROKEN DOWN HERE AND THERE UNDER THE PRESSURE OF WHAT SEEMS TO BE AN ENDLESS INFLUX OF REFUGEES. BUT WE MUST UPHOLD AND REASSERT THEM AS BEST WE CAN IF WE ARE TO PRESERVE THE FABRIC OF CIVILISED INTERNATIONAL LIFE. THE RESPONSIBILITY FALLS NOT ONLY ON THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, AND THE CAPTAINS OF VESSELS IN THE SEAS AROUND VIETNAM. IT FALLS ALSO ON POTENTIAL HOST COUNTRIES BECAUSE THESE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE HARD TO FULFILL UNLESS RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMMES ARE ADEQUATE.

MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, I AM ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE EXPECTATIONS WHICH THIS CONFERENCE HAS AROUSED - AMONG THE PEOPLE OF CHINA, SOUTH-EAST ASIA, AND HONG KONG; AMONG THE REFUGEES; AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH NOW SUPPORT THEM. WE OWE THESE PEOPLE A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT RELIEF IS ON THE WAY. I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHALL DISPERSE WITHOUT SUCH A SIGNAL.

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE COPY TO RIDGEON - OJD, FCO
MACINNES [ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
OJD



DS.
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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 July 1979

Dear Terence,

Thank you for your letter with which you enclosed one from the Rector and other parishioners of St. Botolph's Church, Heene, about Vietnamese refugees. I have asked Ian Gilmour to reply direct to you on my behalf.

Yours ever,

Margaret

The Rt. Hon. Terence Higgins, M.P.

LPO

B.R.
PA
PRIME MINISTER

R.C on NHS
and S.S Social.
Services statistics

Copied to National Health:
Report of the Royal Commission
on the Int Health Service.

2

Statements in the House

Sir Ian Gilmour's statement on Indo-Chinese Refugees (Flag A) met with generally warm support in the House. There was support from all sides for the announcement that an extra 10,000 refugees would be admitted.

Mr. Shore welcomed the statement as far as it went. He asked about the food problems in Cambodia and suggested that we ought to give food aid to that country. The Lord Privy Seal said that we had responded to a request from the UNHCR to admit more refugees. It would be unreasonable to make any further undertaking at this time. The Cambodia problem would be dealt with at Geneva and we had already raised the food need with our EEC partners.

There was an extraordinary outburst from Mr. Enoch Powell, who asked what moral, political, historical, or ethical grounds there were for the admission of large numbers of persons from Indo China, a country with which we had no historical connections. There was widespread condemnation from both sides of the House, and the Lord Privy Seal said that Mr. Powell was ignoring the appalling tragedy which was now taking place in South East Asia. He said that we were all part of the human race. Sir Paul Bryan, Mr. Grimond, Mr. Ennals, Hugh Fraser, Peter Bottomley, Jack Ashley and Michael Latham all supported the Government's decision. Ronald Bell, however, said that every immigration episode in the past had been justified at the time on the grounds of hardship. He thought there was a real danger of self-indulgence in matters of this kind and that we all needed to be thinking in terms of no more major immigration initiatives. The Lord Privy Seal said that he disagreed, and that it was possible to be self-indulgent in an inhumanitarian way.

Mr. Frank Allaun (who has a Parliamentary Question down for you tomorrow) aroused the anger of the House by asking what the Conservative Party attitude had been when the American Government was bombing Vietnam and suggesting that we should be

/giving

giving relief to the political prisoners in Latin America who were being tortured at the present time. The Lord Privy Seal accused Mr. Allaun of having double standards. He said that the Vietnamese Government had a callous and calculated policy to expel one million people merely because they were of Chinese stock and Mr. Allaun was demeaning himself.

The balance of opinion in the House was clearly with the Lord Privy Seal and what he said, but there were some notes of reservation from the Government side. There was, however, almost total opposition to Mr. Powell and Mr. Allaun.

*Copied to,
Nat. Health: Report of
the Royal Commission
on the Nat. Health Service*

Royal Commission on the National Health Service

Mr. Jenkin's Statement (Flag B) was received quietly. The main pressure from the Labour side was on the issues of insurance financing of the Health Service, pay beds and private medicine, prescription charges and current financing of the Health Service.

Mr. Jenkin said that the Government did not necessarily share the view of the Royal Commission that 100% financing of the Health Service from taxation was necessarily the right answer. He said that we needed to examine alternatives which would give greater autonomy and greater patient choice. On pay beds he referred back several times to the consultative letter issued in June. On prescription charges and financing more generally, he said that he had been faced with a choice between raising charges and cutting services. He has chosen to maintain the level of services by raising charges. There was no dodging these alternatives.

He said that the main thrust of the report on the structure of the Health Service had support on all sides of the house. It meant ensuring that decisions were taken at the lowest possible

/level

level, eliminating a tier of the management structure and distinguishing properly between strategy and operational management. He emphasised that the Government did not envisage "big bang" changes but would bring them about gradually in line with the Royal Commission's recommendations.

A number of more detailed points were raised, but Mr. Jenkin dealt with them all effectively, with no hostages to fortune.

We will ensure that you will get some briefing for tomorrow's Questions on the main issues, but the only ones which are arousing real concern on the basis of this afternoon's discussion are likely to be private medicine and the present financial situation in the Health Service.

MS

18 July 1979

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 18 July 1979, columns 1779-1789
"Vietnamese Refugees"

Signed Wayland Date 11 August 2011

PREM Records Team

STATEMENT ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES TO BE
MADE BY THE RIGHT HON SIR IAN GILMOUR,
LORD PRIVY SEAL, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
ON WEDNESDAY 18 JULY 1979

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement which has been made by my right hon and noble Friend in another place on the Indo-China refugee problem. Honourable Members will be aware of the deep concern with which the Government have viewed the rapid deterioration of the refugee situation in South-East Asia over recent weeks. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr Waldheim, has now convened a special international meeting in Geneva on the 20th and 21st of July to deal with the problem. The Government welcome this move, which was originally proposed by my Right Hon Friend the Prime Minister.

There can be no doubt that it is the callous and inhuman policies of the Vietnamese Government which are the root cause of the problem and it is imperative that the Vietnamese Government change those policies. Meanwhile, the burden which the flood of refugees is imposing on others in the region can be relieved only by a major and genuinely international effort.

The Government have given very careful consideration to the extent of the humanitarian problems, and in particular to the appalling burden which is being placed on the

resources of the Government of Hong Kong. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has asked us to accept a further 10,000 refugees from Indo-China for settlement here. We have agreed. Because of our direct concern for the situation in Hong Kong, these extra refugees will be taken, over a period to be agreed with the Governor, from Hong Kong where there are already over 66,000 awaiting resettlement. My Right Hon Friend the Home Secretary is getting in touch with the voluntary agencies who have played such a commendable role in helping with the resettlement of the refugees who have already arrived in the United Kingdom. I would like to take this opportunity of recording again the Government's gratitude to the voluntary agencies for the splendid work which they are doing in this field.

The Government also propose, subject to Parliamentary approval, to make a further £5 million available from the overseas aid programme for dealing with the refugee problem in South-East Asia over the next 12 months.

My right hon and noble Friend will himself attend the opening session of the Secretary-General's meeting in Geneva on the 20th of July. I can assure honourable Members that we shall play a full and constructive role in Geneva.

*Copied to. Nat. Health; Report
of the Royal Commission
on the Nat. Health.*

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOCIAL SERVICES
(THE RT HON PATRICK JENKIN MP) ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL HEALTH
SERVICE - WEDNESDAY 13 JULY

With permission Mr Speaker I should like to make a statement
on the Report of the Royal Commission on the National Health
Service.

The Royal Commission, set up by the right honourable,
Gentleman the Member for Huyton in 1975 have presented their
Report to my right honourable Friend the Prime Minister.

It has been published today. Copies of the full report, are
available in the Vote Office.

The Government are grateful to the Chairman,
Sir Alec Merrison, and the other members for the time and
trouble they have devoted to this important task.

The Commission's Report is long and detailed. It merits
careful study. Today I can make no more than a preliminary
reference to a few of the issues with which it deals.

The Commission recommend that the administration of the Health Service should be simplified by eliminating, in most cases, one tier of management; and they recognise that management decisions should be taken at the lowest effective level.

A number of the Commission's recommendations will be costly as they themselves recognise. They state, and I quote, "it would be unrealistic to suppose that the fortunes of the NHS can be insulated from those of the nation".

On the question of private practice, the Commission see no objection to a significant expansion of the private sector, providing that the interests of the NHS are adequately safeguarded. Nor do they consider the presence or absence of pay beds in NHS hospitals to be significant at present from the point of view of the efficient functioning of the Health Service. It is, of course, the Government's policy to welcome the contribution that independent medicine can make to the health care of the nation, and we published our proposals in a consultative letter last month.

I would like to tell the House how we propose to handle the Report. This Report has been made to the Government, and it is now up to the Government to respond with our own proposals. On the major issues of structure and management we shall put forward proposals in a document in the Autumn, and will invite early comments on that document from the interests affected. Subject to this consultation, it is our view that early progress is essential to simplify the structure of the Health Service and to devolve management authority to the lowest effective level.

A number of the Commission's more detailed recommendations will be studied by the Health Departments through the ordinary machinery.

Finally, Mr Speaker, this Statement deals with general matters relating to the United Kingdom. My Right Honourable Friends the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will be making separate arrangements for dealing with those recommendations which relate to their separate interests.

FILE

28



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 July 1979

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for sending us a letter from your constituents of St. Botolph's Church, Heene, about Vietnamese refugees. I will place that letter before the Prime Minister and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

N. J. SANDERS

The Rt. Hon. Terence Higgins, M.P.

TMP



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

This letter from Terence Higgins encloses one from some constituents about Vietnamese refugees, arguing for a larger quota to be admitted.

Do you want to reply yourself, or for the Lord Privy Seal to send the substantive reply?

*Usual formula
MS*

18 July 1979



CONFIDENTIAL

From the Secretary of State

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
Whitehall
SW1

Mr. Sanders PA to me.
Disputed with FCO.
Subject to the
deletion of 'X' by
Mr. Wall. I have
17 July 1979 said we are
Gov. Sec 197

Dear Bryan,

INDO CHINA REFUGEES

Stephen Wall has sent me a copy of his letter to you of 17 July enclosing the draft of a statement which the Foreign Secretary is proposing to make on 18 July.

The statement itself makes no reference to refugees rescued by British vessels and Lord Carrington is proposing to deal with this by way of a supplementary. We are doubtful about the wisdom of relegating this matter to a supplementary and we are not happy about the present drafting of the supplementary.

Shipowners have been placed in the most difficult situation as a result of the present situation. I understand, for example, that the cost to Lord Inverforth's company of the ROACHBANK being out of service while waiting to unload refugees at Taiwan amounted to around £7,000 per day - over £200,000 in all. This was in addition to the out-goings for maintaining the refugees. There is also a possibility of claims against the shipping company from the charterers of the vessel for losses they may have incurred due to late delivery of cargo. You may be aware that Mr Patrick Wall has put down a question for written answer on 19 July about compensation to shipping companies where ships are held up for considerable periods.

contd/.....



The GCBS have been telling us that charterers are reluctant to use British ships in the area which could, of course, be extremely damaging to our valuable cross-trading interests and we have just received a letter from the President of the GCBS strongly urging that refugees picked up by British ships should automatically be included within the 10,000 so as to avoid the delays resulting from the present "case by case" procedure.

We would, therefore, like to say either in the statement or in the supplementary that we recognise these problems. However, we understand that the Foreign Secretary does not wish to publicise last week's Cabinet decision that the 10,000 should include those picked up by our ships. We would not therefore press for a reference to them in the statement itself but would like to see the relevant supplementary amended along the following lines:

X
"Masters of British vessels are well aware of their obligations towards persons in distress at sea. We recognise that compliance with these obligations presents problems to Masters and to shipowners. It is therefore our view that the so-called "first port of call" principle should apply and we hope that one of the results of the Geneva meeting will be to give further weight to this principle. [If in any particular case the country of first call refuses to receive the refugees, we shall be prepared to consider accepting them in the UK"]

If pressed - In this event, they may have to be counted against our new quota.



It may be desirable to add a further supplementary on shipowners' costs. This might be as follows:

"The costs falling to shipowners is one of the problems arising. We hope the Geneva meeting will help in this area".

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Wall and the other recipients of his letter.

Yours Sincerely,

Tom Harris

T G HARRIS
Private Secretary

From: The Rt. Hon. Terence Higgins MP



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

July 17th, 1979

Go I Gov

Dear Private Secretary,

Mr. Higgins has been sent the attached letter from a number of his constituents who are anxious that Mrs. Thatcher should know their views on the Vietnamese boat people.

Yours sincerely,

Anne Say

Private Secretary

Private Secretary to
The Rt. Hon. Mrs. M. Thatcher MP

✓ Mr Cartledge

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER 1



Here is the FCO statement for
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

tomorrow. Contact?

MS

17/7

17 July 1979

PA

MS

Dear Bryan,

Indo China Refugees

Further to my letter of 12 June, arrangements have been made for the statement on refugees to be made by Lord Carrington on Wednesday 18 July, repeated in the House of Commons by Sir I Gilmour. I enclose a text of the statement and notes for supplementaries. Supplementary No 10 (British Rescue Vessel) is still being considered by ourselves and the Home Office.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Lord President of the Council, the Secretary of State for Trade and Sir John Hunt.

Yours ever,
Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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DRAFT STATEMENT ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES TO BE MADE BY THE
RT HON THE LORD CARRINGTON, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON THURSDAY
12 JULY

With the leave of the House, I will make a statement on the Indo-China refugee problem. Noble Lords will be aware of the deep concern with which the Government has viewed the rapid deterioration of the refugee situation in South-East Asia over recent weeks. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr Waldheim, has now convened a special international meeting in Geneva on 20 and 21 July to deal with the problem. The Government welcome this move, which was originally proposed by my Rt Hon Friend the Prime Minister.

There can be no doubt that it is the callous and inhuman policies of the Vietnamese Government which are the root cause of the problem and it is imperative that the Vietnamese Government change those policies. Meanwhile, the burden which the flood of refugees is imposing on others in the region can be relieved only by a major and genuinely international effort.

The Government have given very careful consideration to the extent of the humanitarian problems, and in particular to the appalling burden which is being placed on the resources of the Government of Hong Kong. The United Kingdom is prepared to accept a further 10,000 refugees from Indo-China for settlement here. Because of our direct concern for the situation in Hong Kong, these extra refugees will be taken over a period to be agreed with the Governor from Hong Kong where there are already over 65,000 awaiting resettlement. My Rt Hon Friend the Home Secretary is getting in touch with the voluntary agencies who have played such a commendable role in helping with the resettlement of the refugees who have already arrived in the United Kingdom. I would like to take this opportunity of recording again the Government's gratitude to the voluntary agencies for the splendid work which they are doing in this field.

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The Government also propose, subject to Parliamentary approval, to make a further £5 million available for dealing with the refugee problem in South-East Asia over the next 12 months.

I shall myself attend the opening session of the Secretary-General's meeting in Geneva on 20 July. I can assure Noble Lords that we shall play a full and constructive role in Geneva.

REFERENCES

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

TOO MANY

1. Britain really must play its part in a solution and the new figure takes into account our capacity to accept refugees.

TOO FEW

2. This country has an excellent record for accepting refugees and other immigrants but there are constraints on our ability to take large numbers in a short time.

COST

3. The £5 million will be set aside to help the UNHCR and other refugee operations in South-East Asia. The cost of absorbing the refugees in this country will also be substantial. But it is right that we should bear it in the face of such great humanitarian needs.

SOCIAL IMPACT

4. Care is taken by the voluntary agencies, who look after the refugees on arrival, to distribute them to areas where they can most readily be assimilated.

HOUSING

5. Largely a question for the individual local authorities.

/TIMESCALE

TIMESCALE

6. I cannot say at this stage how rapidly the commitment which I have just announced is likely to be taken up. We shall try to take as many as possible as quickly as possible but the precise rate will depend on how many we can assimilate.

BALANCE OF PREVIOUS QUOTA

7. The commitment which I have just announced is in addition to those undertakings already made by the Government and the previous Government.

POSITIONS OF OTHER STATES

8. A number of other States which will be attending the Geneva meeting have already announced that they will accept additional numbers of refugees as make further financial contributions. Others are still considering whether they will be able to do so, in order to be able to make appropriate announcements in Geneva.

REFUGEES RESCUED BY BRITISH VESSELS

9. We shall continue to remind the Masters of British vessels of their obligations towards persons in distress at sea, and to consider on a case-by-case basis whether to accept for settlement in the United Kingdom refugees rescued at sea by British vessels. But as Noble Lords [hon Members] will be aware, it is our view that the so-called "first port of call" principle should apply in these cases. We hope that one of the results of the Geneva meeting will be to give further weight to this principle.

[If pressed: Any refugees rescued at sea may have to be counted against our new quota.

BRITISH RESCUE VESSEL

10. We are studying urgently the proposal to charter a British vessel for rescue operations in the South China sea. The Geneva meeting has been called to consider all types of international action to help deal with the problem and we must wait until we know what results the meeting will achieve before taking a view on this proposal.

PART 3 begins:-

Pro to BGC 17/7/79

PART 2 ends:-

Note by Malay Min Home Affair 14/7/79