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PREM 19/614

PART 3

TOP SECRET

C

Confidential filing.

MT

Relations with Argentina.

The position of the Falkland Islands.

ARGENTINA.

Part 1: September 1979.

Part 3: April 1982.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>2.4.82</del>							
<del>5.4.82</del>							
6.4.82							
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ends							
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PREM 19/614							

PART 3 ends:-

Post hours tel : 67 of 5/4/82.

PART 4 begins:-

RTA to PM (A08060) of 6/4/82.

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

**Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents**

Reference	Date
CC(82) 13th Conclusions, Item 2	1.4.82
CC(82) 14th Conclusions	2.4.82
CC(82) 15th Conclusions	2.4.82

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed Wayland

Date 26 January 2012

**PREM Records Team**

## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

1. House of Commons Hansard, 2 April 1982, columns 571-577 and 619-622
2. House of Commons Hansard, 3 April 1982, volume 21, No 92 (complete)
3. House of Lords Hansard, 3 April 1982, volume 428, No 68 (complete)
4. House of Commons Hansard, 5 April 1982, columns 688-690

Signed Wayland Date 26 January 2012

**PREM Records Team**



Argentina

LAMBETH PALACE, LONDON, SE1 7JU

5th April 1982

Your Holiness,

The Apostolic Pro-Nuncio has told me of Your Holiness's deep concern about the threat of further hostilities in the South Atlantic following the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland Islands. I have therefore decided to send my special envoy, Mr. Terry Waite, to see Your Holiness's Secretary of State, Cardinal Casaroli, to discuss the crisis.

I have a personal involvement as the Bishop directly responsible for the Islands, two-thirds of the population of which is Anglican; but I am also writing on behalf of all the Christians of the Falkland Islands, Roman Catholic and Presbyterian, as well. It is a very God-fearing community. Your Holiness's great moral authority in Argentina prompts me to appeal to you to urge the present military government in that country to respect international law and the recent and unambiguous resolutions of the Security Council.

My envoy, Mr. Waite, will enlarge on this request and he will also be able to give your Cardinal Secretary an up-to-date briefing on sentiment in Great Britain.

(Cont.)

I look forward to more tranquil topics for  
our eagerly awaited meeting in May.

Your Holiness's Brother in Christ,

*Robert Runcie*

Archbishop of Canterbury

His Holiness Pope John Paul II,  
The Vatican.

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

IMMEDIATE

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DIO CABINET OFFICE  
RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff and MOD SITCEN).

MAUFO 002/05

OO FCO

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PORT LOUIS 050540Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 67 OF 5 APRIL 82

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK

DAURATIUS

MY TEL NO 66 (NOT TO UKMIS)

1. FOLLOWING IS NE TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT FROM PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ON 3 APRIL.

BEGINS:-

THE GOVERNMENT DEPLORES AND CONDEMNS UNRESERVEDLY THE AGGRESSION ON FALKLAND ISLANDS BY ARGENTINA. IT CALLS UPON ALL COUNTRIES TO CONDEMN SUCH A BLATANT AGGRESSION WHICH VIOLATES THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS STOOD FOR THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND PROCLAIMS ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT ARGENTINA WILL WITHDRAW ITS FORCES IMMEDIATELY FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND NEGOTIATE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.



FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

ENDS

ALLAN

NNNN

SENT/ RECD 050544Z PAC/DAB

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(X19)

LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

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RESIDENT CLERK

[Copies passed to Emergency Staff  
and MOD Sitcen]

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 052258Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1119 OF 5 APRIL 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, GOVERNOR ASCENSION ISLAND

FALKLANDS

1. AT AN IMPROMPTU NEWS CONFERENCE IN HIS OFFICE PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA OVER THE FALKLANDS PUT THE UNITED STATES IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION BECAUSE IT WAS FRIENDLY WITH BOTH COUNTRIES. HE BELIEVED THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS WERE WILLING TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO WITH NO FORCEFUL ACTION OR BLOODSHED. QUOTE BOTH SIDES HAVE THREATENED THE USE OF FORCE, AS IS EVIDENCED BY ARGENTINA'S LANDING UNQUOTE. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET AND THE IDEA OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WOULD EMERGE. ASKED WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IF BRITAIN SOUGHT TO RE-TAKE THE FALKLANDS BY FORCE, THE PRESIDENT CALLED THIS A

IT WAS FRIENDLY WITH BOTH COUNTRIES. HE BELIEVED THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS WERE WILLING TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO WITH NO FORCEFUL ACTION OR BLOODSHED. QUOTE BOTH SIDES HAVE THREATENED THE USE OF FORCE AS IS EVIDENCED BY ARGENTINA'S LANDING UNQUOTE. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET AND THE IDEA OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WOULD EMERGE. ASKED WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IF BRITAIN SOUGHT TO RE-TAKE THE FALKLANDS BY FORCE, THE PRESIDENT CALLED THIS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION: QUOTE I JUST DON'T THINK IT IS AN ISSUE THAT SHOULD COME TO THAT POINT UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACT AS AN HONEST BROKER IF HE COULD HELP TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTED TO BE AS HELPFUL AS IT COULD BUT IT WAS PREMATURE TO SPECULATE ABOUT MEDIATION EFFORTS. HE DECLINED TO SAY WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD DO IF HMG ASKED IT TO JOIN IN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA OR IF THE ARGENTINES INVOLVED THE RIO TREATY. HE SAID THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION: THEY DEPLORED THE USE OF FORCE AND CALLED FOR THE END OF HOSTILITIES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS.

3. ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE USE BY BRITISH TASK FORCE AIRCRAFT OF THE US BASE ON ASCENSION ISLAND, THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT BRITAIN HAD A LEGAL RIGHT TO LAND MILITARY PLANES AT THE AIRFIELD AFTER NOTIFYING THE US MILITARY COMMANDER. THIS WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE INVOLVEMENT IN THE DISPUTE. THE SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE WILLING TO USE ITS GOOD OFFICES, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT USING THE TERM IN ANY FORMAL SENSE BUT MERELY TO INDICATE THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS IN CONTACT WITH BOTH PARTIES.

HENDERSON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

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DIO CABINET OFFICE

WIA

RESIDENT CLERK

179  
PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 60A/82

✓ Master sek  
of.

[Copies passed to Emergency Staff  
and MOD Sitcen]

GRS 220

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRIDGETOWN 051656Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 94 OF 5 APRIL

KINGSTON PLEASE RETAIN TRANSMISSION COPY FOR INFO

INFO PORT OF SPAIN

FALKLAND ISLANDS

PRIME MINISTER EUGENIA CHARLES, DOMINICA, HAS ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE DELIVERED TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER

MY GOVERNMENT HAS LEARNED WITH REGRET OF THE ARMED INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY MILITARY FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA.

IT IS OF THE VIEW THAT SUCH UNPROVOKED VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND DECENCY IS TO BE UNRESERVEDLY DEPRECATED NOT ONLY BECAUSE IF NOT CONDEMNED OUTRIGHT, IT CAN BE A DANGEROUS AUGURY FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN SMALL WEAK STATES AND MORE POWERFUL STATES, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS EMBARKED UPON IN DISREGARD OF THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT ALSO AND

RELATIONS BETWEEN SMALL WEAK STATES AND MORE POWERFUL STATES, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS EMBARKED UPON IN DISREGARD OF THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT ALSO AND PARTICULARLY BECAUSE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES OF WHATEVER SIZE AND STATUS EVERY ATTEMPT BE MADE TO SETTLE DIFFERENCES BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND BECAUSE THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES TO SELF DETERMINATION MUST BE RESPECTED.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA IS NOT (NOT) SATISFIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA, IN DECIDING UPON THE COURSE OF INVASION, TOOK ANY COGNISANCE WHATEVER OF THE DEMOCRATIC WISHES OF THE MAJORITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ARGENTINE ACT OF AGGRESSION AND INVASION PLACES INTERNATIONAL PEACE IN JEOPARDY.

MARY EUGENIA CHARLES PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

ARTHUR

NNNN

X

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

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RESIDENT CLERK

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IMMEDIATE

GRS 50

RESTRICTED

FM MONTEVIDEO 051420Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 54 OF 05 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. LOCAL RADIO HAS RELAYED ARGENTINE AGENCY REPORTS THAT

(A) SEVEN MARINES HAVE BEEN CAPTURED IN THE FALKLANDS

AND

(B) THAT THREE THOUSAND ARGENTINE TROOPS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO THE FALKLANDS.

HUTCHINSON

NNNNN

SENT/RECD AT 051500Z SF/KAW

[14P15TS]

IMMEDIATE

D. B 051100Z

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

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MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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ADVANCE COPIES (28)

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DESKBY 051100Z

FM LISBON 051040Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 50 OF 5 APRIL 1982

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 47 - FALKLAND ISLANDS : PORTUGUESE ATTITUDE

1. DR LEONARDO MATHIAS PORTUGUESE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID YESTERDAY ON A RADIO PROGRAMME THAT IF BRITAIN ASKED TO USE THE LAJES AIR BASE IN THE AZORES TO REFUEL ITS AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN FALKLANDS DISPUTE UNDER THE TERMS OF TREATIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE GRANTED. HE WENT ON TO CONDEMN ARGENTINA'S ACTION IN INVADING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

2. I EXPECT TO CALL ON MATHIAS SHORTLY TO CARRY OUT INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 34.

BYATT

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

DBY 051230Z  
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IMMEDIATE

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(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff and MOD SITCEN).

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GRS 130A

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 051230Z

FM COLOMBO 051045Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 84 OF 5 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

[Tylists]

YOUR TELNOS 99 TO CANBERRA AND 63 TO ANKARA

1. I DELIVERED PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT A.M. 3 APRIL AND FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF YOUR TELNO 63 TO ANKARA HAVE CALLED ON THE ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TYRONE FERNANDO.
2. WHILE ACKKNWLEDGING THAT SRI LANKA HAD LITTLE OR NO DEALINGS WITH THE ARGENTINE, I SPOKE ON LINES OF TUR AND GAVE ACTING MINISTER SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE FALKLANDS.
3. IN RESPONSE HE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE CLAIM HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERATION IN THE PAST BOTH WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR THE RESOLUTION AT THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN COLOMBO IN 1975 WHICH IN EFFECT SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE CLAIM. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT SRI LANKA COULD NOT SUPPORT THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AND TOLD ME THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD AGREED A MESSAGE IN RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. THIS MESSAGE IS LIKELY TO BE DELIVERED BY THE SRI LANKAN HIGH COMMISSION IN LONDON. THE TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:  
QUOTE 1. SRI LANKA VIEWS WITH GREAT REGRET THE EVENTS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, INVOLVING A MEMBER OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND A MEMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH. WHAT HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE IS CONTRARY TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, WHICH REJECT THE USE OF FORCE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.  
2. SRI LANKA CONDEMNS THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY



2. SRI LANKA CONDEMNS THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE UNQUOTE.

ABOVE TEXT WILL BE MADE PUBLIC AND SHOULD APPEAR IN LOCAL PRESS TOMORROW.

NICHOLAS

NNNN

SENT:RECD 051108Z RWS:JJ

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE  
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA  
SRI LANKA CONDEMNS THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY  
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE UNQUOTE.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA  
SRI LANKA CONDEMNS THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY  
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE UNQUOTE.

[LAWRENCE]

CC: PKWIS VISA AGEX

CC: SAC DEPTA PRSUSGS

CC: SAC WASH DC

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

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IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MADRID 051040Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 175 OF 5 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL).

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 172 : FALKLAND ISLANDS

THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES IN BAD COMPANY AS THE ONLY NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRY TO ABSTAIN ON THE UK DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDING INTER ALIA THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THIS POINT, WHICH I SHALL CERTAINLY RUB IN HERE, HAS NOT BEEN LOST ON THE MORE LIBERAL SECTIONS OF THE SPANISH PRESS (SEE SEPARATE REPORT). THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA WAS CONSIDERABLE. THEY WERE DRAWN TOWARDS ARGENTINA BY HISPANIC SOLIDARITY AND MUTUAL OPPOSITION TO BRITISH POLICY ON DECOLONISATION, EVEN THOUGH CALVO SOTELO HAS PUBLICLY EMPHASISED THIS WEEK-END THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND GIBRALTAR. NEVERTHELESS THEY WERE PROBABLY AWARE OF THE DANGERS FOR THEIR EUROPEAN POLICY OF REFUSING TO CONDEMN THE USE OF FORCE BY A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP. HENCE PEREZ LLORCA'S CIVIL MESSAGES TO YOU AND THEIR DECISION TO ABSTAIN. I SUSPECT THAT THEY WERE MISLED BY DE PINIES IN NEW YORK. WHEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND CUENCA SPOKE TO ME LATE ON 2 APRIL THEY SAID THAT, ACCORDING TO THEIR ADVICE FROM NEW YORK, THE BRITISH RESOLUTION HAD LITTLE CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE. ONLY HALF AN HOUR LATER THE NEWS OF THE FAVOURABLE VOTE CAME THROUGH ON THE BBC WORLD SERVICE.

2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I EXPECT THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER IS FEELING RATHER RUEFUL, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLY ADVERSE IMPACT ON THEIR PROSPECTS OF EARLY ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY

2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I EXPECT THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER IS FEELING RATHER RUEFUL, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLY ADVERSE IMPACT ON THEIR PROSPECTS OF EARLY ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY AND ALLIANCE OF THEIR FAILURE TO CONDEMN MILITARY AGRESSION BY A DICTATORSHIP. THEY SHOULD BE WATCHING WITH APPREHENSION THE REACTION OF THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT AND THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WHOM CALVO SOTELO IS VISITING NEXT WEEK.

3. I SEE LITTLE PROSPECT OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT TAKING THE SORT OF ACTION OUTLINED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 63 TO ANKARA. BUT, FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REASONS, THEY WILL WANT IF POSSIBLE TO TRY TO SHOW ON APRIL 20/21 THAT ACTIVE MEASURES ARE AFOOT FOR RECOVERING GIBRALTAR BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION. IN PRACTICE THIS MAY PRESENT GRAVE DIFFICULTIES FOR THEM, JUST AS IT DOES FOR US.

4. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL) ABOUT PROPOSED TACTICS.

PARSONS

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66 00016 85722573

66 00017 2010

03 013075 178 (88630000)

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MR GIFFARD  
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to write my ref.  
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(COPIES PASSED TO THE EMERGENCY STAFF AND MOD SITCEN).

GPS 13CA

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MONTEVIDEO 051305Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 53 OF 5 APRIL

FALKLANDS: EVACUATION OF THE GOVERNOR AND THE MARINES.

1. YOU WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT THE URUGUAYANS AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN MAGNIFICENT FROM THE MOMENT I WAS SUMMONNED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER LATE AFTERNOON ON FRIDAY 2 APRIL UNTIL THE TIME OF DEPARTURE OF THE VC 10 YESTERDAY. THEIR UNDERSTANDING, HELPFULNESS, EFFICIENCY AND COOPERATION HAVE BEEN REMARKABLE.

2. I SHOULD ALSO REPORT THAT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS INTERVENED PERSONALLY AND SUCCESSFULLY WHEN THE ARGENTINIANS SAID THAT AFTER ALL THE GOVERNOR AND HIS FAMILY WOULD NOT BE ON THE

1330  
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REPORT THAT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
INTERVENED PERSONALLY AND SUCCESSFULLY WHEN THE ARGENTINIANS  
SAID THAT AFTER ALL THE GOVERNOR AND HIS FAMILY WOULD NOT BE ON THE  
ARGENTINIAN AIRCRAFT WITH THE MARINES.

3. WHILE I AM OFFICALLY EXPRESSING GRATITUDE, A MESSAGE FROM  
THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT YOUR END FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD  
BE HELPFUL.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 051330Z SF/SDMH

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

ADVANCE COPIES ( 18 )

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE *HD/EESD*

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RESIDENT CLERK

(COPIES PASSED TO THE EMERGENCY STAFF AND MOD SITCEN).

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IMMEDIATE

GR 660

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 051530Z

FM MOSCOW 051430Z APR 82

AO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 176 OF 5 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

YOUR TEL NO 188 : FALKLAND ISLANDS : SOVIET ATTITUDE

1. PRESS COVERAGE HERE HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS, BRIEF, AND SELECTIVELY FACTUAL. THE IMPRESSION GIVEN IS THAT THE SOVIET PRESS HAS BEEN CAUGHT ON THE HOP BY THE SWIFT DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS: AND THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY ELABORATING A CLEAR LINE ON WHAT IS FOR THEM AN AWKWARD SITUATION.

2. WHILE THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE YET THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING DOWN ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, ONE OR TWO POINTERS SUGGEST THE BEGINNING OF A DRIFT TOWARDS THE ARGENTINIAN POSITION SINCE THE SEIZURE OF THE ISLANDS. THE INVASION (WHICH HAS BEEN DESCRIBED ONLY AS AN "OCCUPATION") HAS NOT BEEN CONDEMNED IN THE PRESS: AND ALTHOUGH NO OVERT SUPPORT HAS YET BEEN GIVEN FOR ARGENTINIAN ACTIONS, THE PRESS HAS REPORTED EVENTS IN A WAY IN WHICH ARGENTINA IS UNLIKELY TO FIND UNACCEPTABLE. LAST WEEK THE ISLANDS WERE REFERRED TO AS THE FALKLANDS. SINCE THE INVASION

THEY ARE NOW CALLED THE FALKLANDS (FALKLANDS) THE RUSSIANS

WHICH ARGENTINA IS UNLIKELY TO FIND UNACCEPTABLE. LAST WEEK THE ISLANDS WERE REFERRED TO AS THE FALKLANDS. SINCE THE INVASION THEY ARE NOW CALLED THE "FALKLANDS (MALVINAS)". THE PRESS HAS REPORTED THE UNITED STATES' CALL FOR ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW, BUT DID NOT MENTION THE SIMILAR CALL IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, OR THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION ABSTAINED IN THE VOTE. PRAVDA THIS MORNING CONFINED ITSELF TO SAYING THAT THE RESOLUTION CALLED FOR BOTH SIDES TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS (ALTHOUGH IT ALSO REPORTED ARGENTINA'S REJECTION OF THE RESOLUTION).

3. AGAINST THIS, ALTHOUGH AT ONE STAGE LAST WEEK THE UK WAS ACCUSED IN THE PRESS OF RAISING TENSION, THE EMERGENCY DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT AND THE ASSEMBLY OF THE NAVAL TASK FORCE HAVE BEEN REPORTED WITHOUT COMMENT.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND MY PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO THE QUESTION POSED IN YOUR T.U.R. ARE AS FOLLOWS.

5. GENERAL. THE RUSSIANS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO DELAY FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE COMING DOWN FIRMLY ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. THEY WILL NOT TRY TO LEAD INTERNATIONAL OPINION. THEY ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO ASSESS WHERE THE WEIGHT OF THEIR INTEREST LIES. ON THE ONE HAND, DESPITE AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR DECOLONISATION, THEY DO NOT LIKE TO SEE THE STATUS QUO UPSET VIOLENTLY IN SITUATIONS OVER WHICH THEY HAVE NO CONTROL. THEY MUST ALSO FEAR THAT WITH THE ISLANDS UNDER ARGENTINE CONTROL THERE IS A RISK THAT MILITARY FACILITIES WILL BE OFFERED TO THE UNITED STATES (PRAVDA THIS MORNING REPORTED A DENIAL BY THE ARGENTINE MFA THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH MILITARY BASES). ON THE OTHER HAND, DESPITE THE ABOVE AND THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE ARGENTINE REGIME, THERE IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE A NATURAL BIAS IN FAVOUR OF ARGENTINA BECAUSE OF THE LATTER'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ITS ROLE AS A MAJOR SUPPLIER TO THE SOVIET UNION OF GRAIN AND OTHER COMMODITIES. A KEY CONSIDERATION WILL BE NON-ALIGNED AND THIRD WORLD OPINION GENERALLY, THE WEIGHT OF WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WILL ON PAST FORM FOLLOW.

6. HOSTILITIES. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WILL BE LARGELY GOVERNED BY HOW THIRD WORLD OPINION HAS EVOLVED IF AND WHEN HOSTILITIES RESUME. IT WOULD BE UNUSUAL FOR THEM TO SUPPORT THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY ANYONE BUT THEMSELVES AND THEIR ALLIES AND PROXIES. BUT WITH THEIR RESPECT FOR THE DEMANDS OF REALPOLITIK THEY WILL ALSO BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THEIR ASSESSMENT OF WHO WILL WIN THE WAR.

THEY WILL ALSO BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THEIR ASSESSMENT OF WHO WILL WIN THE WAR.

7. SANCTIONS. AGAIN, THIRD WORLD OPINION WILL BE IMPORTANT. BUT, GIVEN THE SCALE OF SOVIET/ARGENTINIAN TRADE, THE URGENT NEED FOR ARGENTINIAN GRAIN (ALL THE MORE PRESSING NOW THAT A FIGURE FOR LAST YEAR'S HARVEST OF ONLY 158 MILLION TONNES IS BEING OPENLY DISCUSSED HERE), AND SOVIET PUBLIC HOSTILITY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN THE AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND CONTEXT, THERE WILL BE A VERY STRONG RELUCTANCE TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS OF ANY KIND.

8. TO SUM UP : I DOUBT THAT WE CAN HOPE AT ANY STAGE FOR OPEN SOVIET SUPPORT. BUT IF ARGENTINA FAILS TO GAIN OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FROM THE THIRD WORLD AND IT LOOKS AS THOUGH SHE WILL BE THE LOSER IN ANY RESUMED HOSTILITIES, THE RUSSIANS MAY WELL TACITLY ACQUIESCE IN WHATEVER ACTION WE TAKE TO REGAIN THE FALKLANDS.

BROOKE TURNER

NNNN



PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

HD/SAmD (Standard Dist.+ A.D. FI.)  
HD/DEFENCE D.  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND

PS/No. 10, DOWNING STREET  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff and MOD SITCEN).

ADVANCE COPIES (16x)

[TYPISTS]

*Handwritten notes:*  
42  
Please write to Hank  
ms

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WELLINGTON 050415Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 05 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

MY TELNO 99 (NOT REPEATED): FALKLANDS.

1. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCED THAT NZG HAD DECIDED TO BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE AND THAT HE HAD SUMMONED THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AND REQUESTED HIM TO LEAVE WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. HE HAD ALSO TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT NO FURTHER APPROVALS WOULD BE GIVEN FOR ARGENTINE AIRLINES TO LAND IN NZ. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION MR MULDOON SAID THAT THIS ACTION HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN AT THE REQUEST OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

STRATTON

NNNN

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/S AM D (STANDARD DIST.+A.D. FI.)

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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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ADVANCE COPY

FLASH

ZZ FCO

OPS 60

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BUENOS AIRES 05/1345Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 162 OF 05 APRIL 1982

STAFF EVACUATION

YOUR TELNO 102

1. WE HAVE NOW ARRANGED FOR MAIN PARTY OF 44 PASSENGERS TO FLY BUENOS AIRES TO RIO DE JANEIRO ON WEDNESDAY 7 APRIL FLIGHT SR 143 ETD 14.45 ETA RIO 19.05.

2. PLEASE CONFIRM 4 FIRST CLASS AND 40 ECONOMY SEATS ON BRITISH CALEDONIAN ETD RIO 21.30,

3. WE WILL TELEGRAM FULL WELFARE NOMINAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WILLIAMS

DESKBY

051300

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/S AM D (STANDARD DIST.+A.D. FI.)

HD/DEFENCE D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/CONS D

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

DIO CABINET OFFICE

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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ADVANCE COPIES ( 18 )

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

GRS 900

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 051300Z

FM MADRID 051149Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 176 OF 5 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL)

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM

FALKLAND ISLANDS AND GIBRALTAR

IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE UNREALISTIC FOR ME TO CARRY ON TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A TEXT FOR SINTRA AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. NEVERTHELESS I WILL TRY TO KEEP CUENCA IN PLAY PENDING YOUR CONSIDERED INSTRUCTIONS.

2. I SUPPOSE THAT IN THE WORST CIRCUMSTANCES APRIL 20 MIGHT BE JUST ABOUT THE TIME WHEN ARMED CONFLICT WAS IMMINENT BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE NAVIES. INFORMED POLITICAL OPINION HERE WOULD RECOGNISE THAT THE ARGENTINE DICTATOR REPRESENTS THE SAME SORT OF OUTMODED MILITARY MENTALITY THAT IS NOW ON TRIAL IN SPAIN FOR ATTEMPTED INSURRECTION. NEVERTHELESS,

~~TRIAL IN SPAIN FOR ATTEMPTED INSURRECTION. NEVERTHELESS,~~  
UNFORTUNATELY THE MAJORITY OF PUBLIC OPINION WOULD PROBABLY BE  
AGAINST US HERE.

3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT PEREZ-  
LLORCA WOULD FEEL ABLE TO MEET YOU AT SINTRA. NOR WOULD THE  
OPENING OF THE GIBRALTAR FRONTIER BE EASY IN TERMS OF SPANISH  
OPINION.

4. THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE GIBRALTAR SITUATION ON OUR SIDE  
MIGHT BE EVEN GL

W F

IVYRXLXC

RG YOUR OWN POSSIBLE UNWILLINGNESS  
TO BE PRESENT AT SINTRA. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE FEELING IN THE HOUSE  
OF COMMONS AND THE DANGER OF YOUR APPEARING TO EMBARK ON A PROCESS  
WHICH COULD END IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE HANDING OVER  
OF GIBRALTAR TO SPAIN. SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNOR,  
THE GIBRALTARIAN PEOPLE MAY NOW ADOPT A MUCH LESS WELCOMING  
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE OPENING OF THE FRONTIER,  
ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE DANGER OF INCIDENTS, EG THROUGH  
GROUPS OF SPANISH VISITORS RAISING THE SPANISH FLAG ON THE  
ROCK AND BEING PELTED FOR THEIR PAINS.

5. I RECOMMEND THAT IF POSSIBLE A SUBSTANTIVE DECISION ON THE  
VIABILITY OF THE APRIL 20 OPERATION SHOULD BE POSTPONED ON  
EITHER SIDE FOR A SHORT TIME TO SEE HOW THE FALKLAND ISLANDS  
SITUATION DEVELOPS.

6. MEANWHILE WE HAVE A TACTICAL PROBLEM. IN THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES  
I SEE EVEN GREATER DIFFICULTY IN MY TRYING TO NEGOTIATE WITH  
CUENCA A DRAFT STATEMENT FOR USE AT SINTRA. ONE POSSIBILITY  
WOULD BE TO ABANDON THE ATTEMPT. IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE  
BEST TO SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER  
ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WHICH I COULD DELIVER ORALLY.

7. I CANNOT CONCEAL MY REGRET, YOU WOULD SAY, THAT YOU FELT  
UNABLE TO GIVE ACTIVE SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO  
A RESOLUTION WHICH DID NO MORE THAN CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE  
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES  
FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE ANGLO-ARGENTINE  
DIFFERENCES THROUGH A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. I HAD HOPED THAT YOU  
WOULD BE ABLE TO GO ALONG WITH THIS COMPROMISE, IN VIEW OF SPAIN'S  
NEW AND VALUABLE IDENTITY AS A DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN NATION  
OPPOSED TO THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR THE SOLUTION OF  
BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS. THE EUROPEAN  
COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE SURELY BASED ON  
THAT ESSENTIAL PROPOSITION. NEVERTHELESS I DO UNDERSTAND YOUR

BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE SURELY BASED ON THAT ESSENTIAL PROPOSITION. NEVERTHELESS I DO UNDERSTAND YOUR DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING YOUR HISTORIC TIES WITH ARGENTINA AND YOUR KNOWN VIEWS ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, WHICH IN OUR OPINION SUBORDINATE TO THE DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS OF HUMAN BEINGS. I APPRECIATE THE MESSAGES YOU HAVE SENT ME AND THE LINE TAKEN IN PUBLIC BY YOUR PRIME MINISTER THAT CONCLUSION ARISING FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE COULD NOT BE REASONABLY BE DRAWN IN THE CASE OF GIBRALTAR.

8. THE MESSAGE WOULD CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS. I SHARE YOUR STRONG WISH TO MAKE A SUCCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LISBON AGREEMENT ON GIBRALTAR SO LONG PLANNED FOR APRIL 20. NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD ONLY BE REALSITIC TO AGREE BETWEEN OURSELVES THAT, WITH PUBLIC FEELING RUNNING VERY HIGH, THE DIFFICULTIES ARE NOW GREATLY INCREASED. I AM NOW BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER IT WILL BE FEASIBLE TO AGREE ON COMMON LANGUAGE FOR A STATEMENT AT SINTRA, AND CERTAINLY IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT YOU AND I SHOULD UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER COMPLETELY AND SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE AN AGREED LINE IN PUBLIC. I SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR OUR JOINT PURPOSES TO MAKE CLEAR THE FOLLOWING RESULT FROM SINTRA :

- (A) WE MET IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LISBON AGREEMENT TO START NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT OVERCOMING ALL THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US, INCLUDING OF COURSE THE CENTRAL POLITICAL ISSUE
- (B) WE SAW THIS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF A NEW ERA ARISING FROM SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE ALLIANCE.
- (C) WE RECOGNISE AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN RESOLVING OUR DIFFERENCES OUR JOINT DEMOCRATIC RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS AND WELL-BEING OF THE GIBRALTAR PEOPLE. I AGREED TO STUDY ANY PROPOSAL YOU MIGHT MAKE FOR THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE TERRITORY, IN THE LIGHT OF OUR OWN ASSURANCES TO THE PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR EXPRESSED IN THE PREAMBLE TO THE GIBRALTAR CONSTITUTION.
- (D) VIEWING THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW STARTED AS A CONTINUING PROCESS, WE DECIDED TO REINFORCE THE NORMAL MACHINERY OF DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS BY SETTING UP WORKING GROUPS UNDER OUR PERSONAL DIRECTION. ONE OF THESE GROUPS (PROBABLY MEETING IN PRACTICE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL) WOULD CONSIDER ANY POLITICAL PROPOSALS YOU MIGHT MAKE, WHILE OTHERS WOULD DEAL WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC LINKS. ANY PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FOLLOWING UPON THE RESTORATION

POLITICAL PROPOSALS YOU MIGHT MAKE, WHILE OTHERS WOULD DEAL WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC LINKS, ANY PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FOLLOWING UPON THE RESTORATION OF DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS, AND DEFENCE COOPERATION.

9. IN DELIVERING THIS MESSAGE I SHOULD HAVE TO MAKE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT YOU WERE NOT COMMITTED TO GOING AHEAD ON APRIL 28 AT ANY PRICE. IN THE LAST INSTANCE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR AND THIS WAS NOW YOUR IMMEDIATE PRIORITY. NEVERTHELESS, IN SPAIN'S OWN INTEREST, IT WOULD BE A GREAT PITY TO LOSE THIS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS AND GET RID OF THE FRONTIER RESTRICTIONS WHICH HAD ACTUALLY MILITATED AGAINST SPAIN'S OWN DESIRE TO GET CLOSER TO THE PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR.

10. THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS APPROACH IS THAT IT WOULD RESCUE US FROM PRESSURE TO AGREE A JOINT STATEMENT AT SINTRA, WHICH COULD PRESENT SEVERE DIFFICULTIES AT HOME, AS WELL AS GREAT PROBLEMS OF TEXTUAL DRAFTING.

11. PLEASE PASS ADVANCE COPY TO GOODISON AND HEAD OF SED.

PARSONS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 05/1247Z PJ/JW

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

[TYPISTS]

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UNCLASSIFIED  
FM MADRID 051017Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 174 OF 5 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

FALKLAND ISLANDS/GIBRALTAR; SPANISH PRESS COMMENT.

1. SPEAKING AT AN IMPROVISED PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE CAMPO DE GIBRALTAR DURING A SCHEDULED ELECTORAL VISIT, CALVO SOTELO TOLD THE SPANISH PRESS ON 3 APRIL THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE MALVINAS (FALKLAND ISLANDS) AND GIBRALTAR WERE DIFFERENT FOR REASONS OF DISTANCE, HISTORY AND POPULATIONS AND THAT CONCLUSIONS COULD NOT BE DRAWN FROM ONE FOR THE OTHER. HE ADDED THAT THE OPENING OF THE BORDER AND BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON GIBRALTAR WERE A ROAD LEADING TO "THE RECOVERY BY SPAIN OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER GIBRALTAR FOR WHICH WE WILL NOT HAVE LONG TO WAIT."

2. THE MAJORITY OF PRESS AND OTHER MEDIA REPORTING LINK THE TWO PROBLEMS; ALL SUPPORT ARGENTINA'S MORAL RIGHT TO THE ISLANDS AS FIRMLY AS SPAIN'S RIGHTS TO GIBRALTAR. THE RIGHT WING PRESS HAVE CRITICISED THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT FOR FAILING TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA AND FOR THEIR 'SHAMEFUL' AGREEMENT TO OPEN THE GIBRALTAR BORDER IN RESPONSE TO BRITISH DEMANDS AT A TIME WHEN ARGENTINA HAS SUCCEEDED IN RECOVERING SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS OCCUPIED TERRITORY. THE MORE LIBERAL PRESS, WHILE SYMPATHISING WITH ARGENTINA'S IMPATIENCE OVER BRITAIN'S ALLEGED REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION, CONDEMNS THE USE OF FORCE AND CRITICISES THE ARGENTINE REGIME'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. ONE EDITORIAL CRITICISES THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT FOR FAILING TO CONDEMN AN ACT OF FORCE BY A PARTICULARLY UNPLEASANT REGIME, THUS DIFFERENTIATING THE SPANISH POSITION FROM THAT OF

REGIME, THUS DIFFERENTIATING THE SPANISH POSITION FROM THAT OF OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

3. OTHER EDITORIALS AND ARTICLES POINT OUT THE HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COLONIES AND THE FACT THAT SPAIN HAS ALWAYS RENOUNCED THE USE OF FORCE WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE BE INCONCEIVABLE AGAINST A FUTURE NATO PARTNER. THE 'EL PAIS' EDITORIAL NOTES THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN BRITAIN WILL NOW BE LESS PREPARED TO GIVE UP SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ROCK BUT ADDS THAT THE UK GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOTE THAT PATIENCE IS NOT INFINITE ON COLONIAL QUESTIONS. THE FORMER MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SPOKESMAN, AN ARMY COLONEL WHO REPRESENTS MODERATE MILITARY OPINION, UNDERLINES THE LATTER POINT IN A SIGNED ARTICLE AND SAYS THAT AFTER 300 YEARS OF HUMILIATING DELAY AN IMMEDIATE DECISION IN PRINCIPLE OVER THE RETURN TO SPAIN OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER GIBRALTAR IS NECESSARY.

PARSONS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 05/1046Z PJ/PA



PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

IMMEDIATE  
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DIO CABINET OFFICE  
RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff and MOD SITCEN).

~~HD/CONSULAR D.~~  
~~HD/PLANNING STAFF~~

GR 233

RESTRICTED

FM SINGAPORE 050920Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 81 OF 5TH APRIL 1982.

INFO ROUTINE KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, BANGKOK, JAKARTA AND  
UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELS NO 99 TO CANBERRA AND 63 TO ANKARA :  
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO THE  
PRESS ON 5 APRIL.

BEGINS

THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT STRONGLY DEPLORES ARGENTINA'S  
MILITARY INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.  
THE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE A LONG STANDING DISPUTE IS IN  
TOTAL CONTRAVENTION OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH  
ENSHRINES THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERVENTION, SELF-DETERMINATION  
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT THEREFORE URGES THE GOVERNMENT  
OF ARGENTINA TO ABIDE BY THE UN CHARTER PRINCIPLES AND  
WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON 3 APRIL 1982.  
THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT FURTHER APPEALS TO THE PARTIES  
CONCERNED TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE  
BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS.

BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS.

ENDS

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS STATEMENT IS LIKELY TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR MR LEE KUAN YEW'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO HIM WHICH I DELIVERED ON 3 APRIL. LEADER IN STRAITS TIMES OF 5 APRIL ALSO DEPLORES ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S USE OF FORCE AND COMMENDS BRITISH RESPONSE AS RESTRAINED AND LEVEL HEADED.

3. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TOMORROW 6 APRIL TO PURSUE SUGGESTIONS IN YOUR SECOND T.U.R.

HENNINGS

NNNN

DWF G 078/5

LDX 847/05

LKN 009/05

NR S 218/05

XX

1108

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(X19)

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/SAMD (Standard Dist +FalklandIs. A/D)

HD/DEFD

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/CONS D

HD/PLANNING STAFF

PS/No. 10 DS ✓

DIO CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

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and MOD Sitcen]

RESIDENT CLERK

(Then to TYPISTS)

GRS 370

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LISBON 051650Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 52 OF 5 APRIL 1982

INFO PRIORITY MADRID

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 63: FALKLANDS.

1. I SAW ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER (LEONARDO MATHIAS) THIS MORNING AND SPOKE ON LINES OF YOUR PARAS 2 - 6.
2. I THANKED MATHIAS FOR HIS CLEAR STATEMENT OF SUPPORT DURING LIVE RADIO INTERVIEW ON 4 APRIL IN WHICH HE CONDEMNED ARGENTINE ACTION AS SOMETHING UNACCEPTABLE TO PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS OPPOSED TO USE OF FORCE IN SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. I ALSO THANKED MATHIAS FOR PROMPT CLEARANCE OF RAF FLIGHTS THROUGH PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC FLIGHT INFORMATION REGION OVER PAST 48 HOURS.
3. MATHIAS CONFIRMED HIS STRONG CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINE ACTION. HE HAD DEFLECTED QUESTION DURING RADIO INTERVIEW ABOUT BRITISH REACTION AT TIME OF INDIAN INVASION OF GOA. (OUR TREATY WITH MALDIVES ISLANDS PREVENTED US FROM AGREEING PORTUGUESE FLIGHTS

HE HAD DEFLECTED QUESTION DURING RADIO INTERVIEW ABOUT BRITISH REACTION AT TIME OF INDIAN INVASION OF GOA. (OUR TREATY WITH MALDIVE ISLANDS PREVENTED US FROM AGREEING PORTUGUESE FLIGHTS THROUGH RAF GAN IN 1961). HE HAD ALSO FIRMLY REJECTED SUGGESTION THAT HMG HAD RECOGNISED INDONESIAN OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR. HE HAD STATED FIRMLY THAT BRITAIN WAS PORTUGAL'S OLDEST ALLY AND TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WOULD COVER REFUELLING AT PORTUGUESE PORTS OR AIRPORTS WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE AGREED IF REQUESTED. (MATHIAS HINTED THAT AIRCRAFT WOULD REQUIRE LESS CONSIDERATION THAN SHIPS).

4. PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WERE GREATLY CONCERNED AT THIS SUDDEN CRISIS AND WANTED TO HELP. PORTUGAL HAD ONLY A CHARGE CURRENTLY AT BUENOS AIRES. MATHIAS SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS WITH HIS PRIME MINISTER POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWAL FOR CONSULTATIONS, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME 50,000 PORTUGUESE NATIONALS IN ARGENTINA. HE ASKED PARTICULARLY TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF ANY MOVES BY OTHER COUNTRIES. POSSIBILITY OF RESTRICTING CREDIT WOULD BE EXAMINED (BUT SCOPE FOR ACTION SEEMS NEGLIGIBLE). MATHIAS KNEW OF NO IMPENDING ARMS DEALS.

5. MATHIAS SAID HE APPRECIATED GREAT IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING UTMOST PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN NEXT TWO WEEKS AND HOPED WE WOULD STAND FIRMLY ON QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE MOBILISING OPINION THROUGH ACTION AT THE UN, THE I.C.J., THROUGH NATO AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

6. MATHIAS QUOTED REPORTS TODAY FROM PORTUGUESE EMBASSY, MADRID, OF PRO-ARGENTINE REACTION AND LINKAGE WITH GIBRALTAR IN SOME PARTS OF SPANISH PRESS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVINGS ADDRESSEES.

BYATT

~~IN~~ [PASSED BY C.O.D.]

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 April 1982

A J Coles Esq  
NUMBER 10

N. S. J. R.

M. S. F.

*Dear Sir,*

## THE FALKLANDS: NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1977

1. We have been researching this subject. There are still papers to study before our conclusions can be definitive. But the work so far has established the important features of the 1977 story.
2. As early as February 1977 there was an intelligence assessment that Argentine military action was possible if talks with Britain went badly. The Minister of State at the FCO (Mr Rowlands) held talks late that month in Buenos Aires about the Falklands. No naval deployments appear to have been undertaken at that time.
3. On 1 November 1977, it was assessed, on the basis of all the evidence available rather than as a result of a particular insight from intelligence sources, that Argentina would still prefer to achieve its sovereignty objectives by peaceful means, but that if negotiations broke down, or the Argentines concluded that they would not make progress, there would be a high risk of their resorting to more forceful measures, including direct military action. It was assessed that invasion of the Falklands could not be discounted but was unlikely. Action against British shipping in disputed waters was considered the most serious risk. The establishment of a presence on one or more of the dependencies or harassment of the British Antarctic Survey base on South Georgia were viewed as possibilities.
4. Mr Rowlands was due to hold further negotiations with the Argentines in New York on 13-15 December 1977. The Government decided in November to send an SSN and two frigates to the South Atlantic. They left in the period 24-26 November. HMS Endurance made a routine visit to Port Stanley from 13 December. But the other ships' movements were secret. The two frigates and the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries stayed 1,000 miles north-east of the Falklands. The nuclear-powered submarine moved into the immediate vicinity of the Islands but remained submerged.



5. The talks in mid-December went well. The government then decided before Christmas that the RN ships should leave the area but that secrecy should be maintained.

6. This naval deployment did not become public and Parliament was not informed. There is no evidence in the more important files, which have already been reviewed, that the Argentines knew of its deployment. It seems unlikely therefore to have influenced their actions in November-December 1977.

7. We shall write again if further research alters or amplifies this story in any significant way.

*Tanqueray,*

*Andrews*

R A Burns  
Private Secretary to the  
Permanent Under Secretary

cc: D J Wright Esq  
CABINET OFFICE

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF MAJOR NOOTT AND MAJOR NORMAN

Major Gareth (Garry) Noott

Born 26 October 1944; joined Royal Marines 27 January 1964; various postings include Officer Commanding Royal Marines on HMS Endurance; married with three daughters; lives in Topsham, Nr. Exeter.

Major Mike Norman

Born 7 October 1943; joined Royal Marines in the ranks 1962; commissioned 1964; various postings also include Officer Commanding Royal Marines on HMS Endurance; married, no children; lives in Poole.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE GOVERNOR OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Mr. Rex Hunt

55 year-old Mr. Hunt has been Governor in Port Stanley since February 1979, where he has been accompanied by his wife Mavis. His teenage son and daughter have been at boarding schools in Britain visiting the Falklands for school holidays.

Following service with the RAF from 1944-48, Mr. Hunt spent the early years of his overseas career in the colonial service, finishing in Uganda in 1963. Subsequently he has spent the greater part of his time in South East Asia on diplomatic postings to Sarawak, Sabah, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam (when he left Saigon when it fell in 1975) and Malaysia.

In the Falkland Islands he commanded the respect of the Islanders for his open approach to the government of the Colony and for his obviously genuine interest in the people's welfare.

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL  
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 629/82

5 April 1982

*Dear Private Secretary,*

The Secretary-General, who is presently in Trinidad, has asked me to convey the following message to the Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP. The Secretary-General would appreciate it if this could be placed before the Prime Minister at the earliest possible opportunity.

*Yours Sincerely,*

*Mark Robinson*

Mark Robinson,  
Assistant Director,  
Secretary-General's Office.

The Private Secretary  
to the Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1.



TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE  
PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP.

5 April 1982

Begins

On Saturday morning I left London for a long scheduled visit to the Caribbean even as the House of Commons was discussing the Falkland Islands' situation. I want to let you know directly how much I share your condemnation of Argentina's reprehensible conduct in this matter. Peter Carrington will have told you that as soon as I heard of the invasion on Friday I sent messages to all Commonwealth Heads of Government, a copy of which I attach, and to their Permanent Representatives in New York calling on them to stand by Britain in this matter and to join in the international condemnation of Argentina. I am particularly anxious that Caribbean Governments, as part of the Latin American Community, should do so and I spoke personally with some of the Prime Ministers on Friday afternoon from London. I am following this up while I am in the region and I stand ready to act in any way that may be considered helpful and desirable.

We have already had in our time too many acts of aggression by those who calculate on getting away with it in a world devoid of any real elements of collective security. Argentina's action requires from the whole international community a stand for the maintenance of law and order world-wide. I am sure this is how your Commonwealth colleagues will see it. I shall certainly do all in my power to so encourage them so that their friendship and support might be a strength to you at this time.

In the days ahead please be mindful of my own readiness to do whatever I can to help.

With deep respect,

Sonny Ramphal

Ends

Text of Secretary-General's Message to Commonwealth  
Heads of Government

BEGINS

You will be aware of the very dangerous situation that has resulted from Argentina's military invasion of the Falkland Islands in pursuit of its sovereignty claim. It is deeply disquieting that, despite a personal appeal for restraint by both the UN Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, Argentina rejected all attempts to persuade it to seek a diplomatic solution to its dispute with Britain. I am sure you will agree that, in the face of such unprovoked aggression, there is need for Commonwealth countries to stand by Britain in this matter, consistent with your support for the principles of territorial integrity, the right of self-determination, and the rejection of the use of force to unsettle long-established boundaries - principles for which the Commonwealth has consistently stood. I hope you will find it possible in whatever way you consider appropriate to make clear your condemnation of this Argentine action and to use all your influence to ensure a de-escalation of the matter.

Shridath Ramphal  
Commonwealth Secretary-General

ENDS

Top papers with the  
Prime Minister

*Date*

John

Has PM

Sent this

message?

No. We await

F./C.O. advice.

RR 5/4

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

~~X19~~ X18 Bf

PS

PS [LPS]

PS [MR LUCE]

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/SAMD (Standard Dist +FalklandIs. A/D)

HD/DEFD

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/CONS ~~D~~ NCAS (Referred re. distbn)

HD/PLANNING STAFF

PS/No. 10 DS

DIO CABINET OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

DLB 060900Z

[Copies passed to Emergency Staff and MOD Sitcen]

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~ ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 060900Z

FM MEXICO CITY 060007Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 247 OF 5 APRIL

TELECON WITH WHITE:FALKLANDS:POSSIBLE MESSAGE FROM MRS THATCHER TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO

1. I HAVE ASKED TO SEE PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER CASTANEDA SAID HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO HELP. IT WOULD, I THINK, MAKE AN EXCELLENT IMPRESSION IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD SEND THE PRESIDENT A PERSONAL MESSAGE. I HAVE THEREFORE, AS YOU SUGGESTED, TRIED MY HAND AT A DRAFT. THE TEXT IS IN MIFT.

TICKELL

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(X19) (X18)

PS

● [LPS]  
PS [MR LUCE]

IMMEDIATE

D/B060900Z

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/SAMD (Standard Dist +FalklandIs. A/D)

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HD/UND

HD/CONS ~~D~~ NCAS (referred re. distbn)

HD/PLANNING STAFF

PS/No. 10 DS

DIO CABINET OFFICE

[Copies passed to Emergency Staff  
and MOD Sitcen]

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 060900Z

FM MEXICO CITY 060025Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 248 OF 65 APRIL

MIPT: POSSIBLE MESSAGE FROM MRS THATCHER TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ  
PORTILLO

BEGINS:

- 1 I WRITE TO YOU AT A DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS MOMENT IN WORLD AFFAIRS. I DO SO CONCIIOUS OF THE FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING WE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN US WHEN I VISITED MEXICO LAST YEAR.
2. THROUGH AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST VIRTUALLY UNDEFENDED ISLANDS HUNDREDS AND IN SOME CASE THOUSANDS OF KMS FROM THEIR OWN SHORES, ARGENTINE FORCES HAVE OUTRAGED THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE INTERNAT-  
-IONAL ORDER IS BASED AND ON WHICH MY COUNTRY, AS YOURS, HAS BUILT ITS FOREIGN POLICY: IN PARTICULAR SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. AS YOU KNOW THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL HAS SINCE PASSED A MANDATORY RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. UNFORTUNATELY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF COMPLYING WITH THIS RESOLUTION.
3. THIS CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND RULE OF LAW

CLEAR THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF COMPLYING WITH THIS RESOLUTION.  
3. THIS CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND RULE OF LAW AFFECTS ALL MEMBERS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, AND I APPEAL FOR YOUR HELP IN BRINGING HOME TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THE SERIOUSNESS OF ITS ACTIONS AND THE GREAT DANGERS WHICH ITS FAILURE SO FAR TO RESPECT THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR WORLD PEACE. THE GREATER THE WEIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF ARGENTINE AGGRESSION, THE MORE LIKELY A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

4. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS DESPATCHED SUBSTANTIAL FORCES TO THE AREA. WE HOPE IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO USE THEM TO RECOVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND LIBERATE THEIR INHABITANTS FROM ALIEN RULE. WE REMAIN DETERMINED TO PURSUE ALL PEACEFUL MEANS OF SETTLING THE DISPUTE. BUT FAILURE TO SETTLE IT BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER WILL MAKE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY POWERFUL COUNTRIES AGAINST WEAKER OR SMALLER NEIGHBOURS.

5. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE, THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS, TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH THROUGH THIS UNHAPPY PERIOD AND TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER.

ENDS

TICKELL

NNNN

91 B Street  
From the High Commissioner



**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE**  
**SERIAL No. T 62 B/82 K6**

High Commission of the Democratic  
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka  
13, Hyde Park Gardens,  
London W2 2LU

5 April 1982

My dear Prime Minister

I have been instructed to convey the following  
Message from my President addressed to you :

" My dear Prime Minister,


I have received your Message regarding the  
occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine.

In this connection my Government has issued  
the following Communique today.

- ' 1 Sri Lanka views with great regret the events  
in the Falkland Islands, involving a Member  
of the Non-Aligned Movement and a Member of  
the Commonwealth. What has already taken  
place is contrary to the United Nations  
Charter and the accepted principles of the  
Non-Aligned Movement, which reject the use  
of force for the settlement of any international  
disputes.
- 2 Sri Lanka condemns the use of force in the  
settlement of any international disputes. '

Yours sincerely,  
J R JAYEWARDENE "

With my highest esteem and warm personal regards.

Yours sincerely,  
  
A T Moorthy

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
No.10 Downing Street,  
London S.W.1



The National Archives

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PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>614</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Digby Dodd to Norman Strauss dated 5 April 1982</i>	
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MR. COLES

Mr. Catford *etc.*

Thank you. I told the

F/C-O.

*MR 6/4*

In the course of conversation with the Prime Minister this evening the Archbishop of Canterbury mentioned that his personal representative - Mr. Terry Waite (of Iranian hostage fame) - was flying to the Vatican tomorrow to see Cardinal Casseroli by appointment.

His mission on the Archbishop's behalf is to urge the Pope to appeal publicly to the Argentinian Government to observe international law regarding the Falkland Islands.

The Archbishop believes the Pope has already done this privately but the Archbishop (whose Province includes the Falklands) believes that a public utterance by the Pope would have an impact on Argentinian opinion as it is a strongly Catholic country.

I understand that Lambeth Palace has not told the FCO but I pass this information on in case you wish to do so.

ROBIN CATFORD

5 April 1982

Measures following the Invasion of the Falkland Islands1. Diplomatic

- a) Immediately after the invasion we obtained the passage of UN Resolution 502 condemning the invasion and calling for a diplomatic solution. This was backed by the United States, France, Ireland, Japan, Zaire, Togo, Uganda, Guyana and Jordan. The Soviet Union, China, Poland and Spain abstained; Panama voted against.
- b) We have broken off diplomatic relations with Argentina.
- c) On 4 April we urged a large number of friendly countries to take measures of their own including:
  - i) recalling all Ambassadors for consultation;
  - ii) embargo on supply of arms and military equipment;
  - iii) denial of export credit;
  - iv) encouragement to their commercial banks to refrain from making fresh loans to Argentina.
- d) We are telling our European Community partners we have decided to impose an embargo on the import of Argentine goods and are asking them to do the same. We are asking them to be ready to take quick action despite the imminent Easter break.

2. Military

- a) We have despatched a naval task force led by HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes, the most powerful force we have ever put to sea.

3. Economic

- a) We have frozen Argentine assets in the UK. These are believed to amount to \$1.4 billion, ie a quarter of all Argentine holding in OECD countries.
- b) We have stopped export credit.
- c) We have banned export of arms to Argentina.
- d) We have decided to impose an embargo on the import of all goods from Argentina from midnight tonight.

International Reaction following the Invasion of the Falkland IslandsFavourable

The UN Resolution has received a wide measure of support both officially from governments and unofficially in the press. In general, the importance of not resorting to force tends to be given greater prominence than the condemnation of the Argentine violation of the principle of self-determination.

The United States have responded helpfully but with a distinct degree of impartiality.. President Reagan described the conflict as one between two friendly nations. The State Department spokesman said that it was not yet time for mediation, but everything had to be done to avoid the use of force.

Our European partners have all expressed a greater or less degree of sympathy. M Mitterrand sent a personal message of support. The Ten have jointly condemned the invasion. Governments have not yet responded to our calls for support in our economic and political measures against Argentina, but they have said they will be considering them sympathetically.

Support is most widespread in the Commonwealth. The Caribbean and African members are almost unanimous in condemning the violation of the principle of self-determination. New Zealand has broken off diplomatic relations. Australia has recalled its Ambassador for consultations; Canada has also recalled its Ambassador and declared an arms embargo. India's response is rather more balanced.

Neutral

Among the countries that have stressed the need not to resort to force are Japan, Austria, Iceland, Finland, Nepal and the East European states such as the GDR, Poland and Yugoslavia. Malaysia has also refused to be drawn.

Unfavourable

Latin American solidarity is almost total. Brazil has refused to issue a statement but has made it clear that its friendship with Argentina is at least as important as its relationship with us. Uruguay has declared muted support for Argentina; Mexico, while privately condemning the use of force, is not prepared to say so, and Venezuela, bearing in mind her own claim to a large part of Guyana, has reacted predictably unhelpfully. Only Chile has condemned Argentina for the use of force.

## PRESENT SITUATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Argentine occupation forces have imposed strict military rule on the Falkland Islands. The Islanders are under house arrest until further notice, and anyone defying this order is threatened with immediate imprisonment. They have been instructed to hang a white flag outside if they need assistance and to await the arrival of a military patrol.

All schools, shops, banks, clubs and pubs have been closed until further notice.

Other penalties have been imposed in the face of growing hostility from the Islanders. These include 30 days in prison for rude gestures against the military, 60 days for irreverence to the Argentinian flag or for disrupting public services, and up to 180 days for disturbing public order. Messages from radio hams, monitored in Britain, say that troops are searching homes and confiscating equipment.

All these measures give rise to concern about the welfare of the Islanders under the Argentine occupation. A commander of the invasion force said that the Islanders would be treated with respect and that the Islanders would be to live 'normal lives'. The behaviour of the Argentinians has not been repressive so far. There has only been one reported incident, on the night of the landing, when an Islander physically assaulted an Argentine. Many people are leaving Port Stanley voluntarily for the interior of the islands rather than submit to the dictates of the Argentine military. /unduly

General Menéndez, the military commander is a hard liner with little respect for human rights. He led an abortive coup against the government of President Videla in 1980 because he considered General Videla was becoming too soft on the opposition.

Sources - Press Reports and ham radio



A-2C-5  
4

h.a.

*With the compliments of*

LORD BRIDGES

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

South America Department

cc. Mr Ure  
Mr Coles, No.10

ARGENTINA

Mr Patrick Shovelton, Director-General of the General Council of British Shipping telephoned me at home on April 4 to report a conversation with Mr Edmund Vestey, Chairman of the GCBS (and also of course a member of the family engaged in economic relations with Argentina via Blue Star Line, Union Corporation, etc.).

2. Mr Vestey had told Mr Shovelton that he had it in mind to write a letter to the Prime Minister offering his services, and those of his family, to make contact with the authorities in Argentina if that were at all useful. Mr Shovelton did not think that Mr Vestey or any of his family knew President Galtieri personally.

3. I thanked Mr Shovelton for this information and said I would pass it on: but I believed events were moving in the opposite direction.

B.

(Bridges)

5 April 1982

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS/LPS *up*

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/SAMD (Standard Dist +FalklandIs. A/D)

HD/DEFD

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/CONS D

HD/PLANNING STAFF

PS/No. 10 DS

DIO CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

PRIME MINISTER  
PERSONAL MESSAGE 62/82  
SERIAL No. ....

*Tylists*

*M. C. J.*

[Copies passed to Emergency Staff  
and MOD Sitcen]

FM BELMOPAN

TO FCO LONDON

BT

R E S T R I C T E D UK COMMS ONLY

SIC

DESKBY 060800Z APR

SIC TELNO 136

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 136 OF 05 APRIL 1982

YOUR TELNO 99 TO CANBERRA: FALKLAND ISLANDU.

1. I PASSED MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER ON SATURDAY MORNING  
AND NOW HAVE HIS REPLY WHICH IS AS FOLLOWS.

2. BEGINS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I AM MAKING STATEMENT  
TO THE NATION, SUPPORTING HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENTS'S ACTION,  
AS WELL AS THE UNITED NATION'S RESOLUTION DEMANDING THE WITH-  
DRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.  
PLEASE ACCEPT ASSURANCES THAT BELIZE STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE  
SETTLEMENT OF



DRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.  
PLEASE ACCEPT ASSURANCES THAT BELIZE STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE  
PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE SETTLEMENT OF  
DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND DEPLORES AND CONDEMNS THE  
ARMED INVASION AND THE USE OF COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF  
POLICY. ENDS.

3. PRICE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE HE COULD DO,  
BEYOND WHAT HE HAD DONE ALREADY (MY TELNO 128). I SUGGESTED  
THAT HE ISSUES A STATEMENT, WHICH HE UNDERTOOK TO DO. TEXT  
IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. IT WILL GO OUT AT  
2200 Z TODAY.

TREW

BT

NNNN

SUBJECT

cc Mahr  
cfs

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 61/82

RESTRICTED

GR 120  
RESTRICTED  
FM KATHMANDU 051200Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 41 OF 5 APRIL  
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 63 TO ANKARA: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PRIME MINISTER OF NEPAL'S FOLLOWING REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE OF 2 APRIL WAS FINALLY DRAFTED AFTER FURTHER APPROACH TO FOREIGN SECRETARY IN LINE WITH YTUR:

"I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF THE SECOND INSTANT DELIVERED TO ME THROUGH HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S EMBASSY IN KATHMANDU. AS YOU ARE AWARE, HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THE STAND THAT ALL OUTSTANDING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS SHOULD BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THE USE OF FORCE BY ANY COUNTRY AGAINST ANOTHER IS FRAUGHT WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE WORLD. NEPAL HAS ALWAYS DEPLORED SUCH ACTIONS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO IN ALL INTERNATIONAL FORA".

2. THE TEXT WILL BE CONVEYED BY NEPALESE AMBASSADOR TO LONDON, TO WHOM FCO MAY WISH TO MAKE FURTHER REPRESENTATIONS. IT IS ALSO BEING SENT TO THE NEPALESE DELEGATION IN NEW YORK.

3. NEPALESE COMMENT ON SIMILAR LINES IS BEING RELEASED TO PRESS. WE ARE PROMPTING AGENCIES TO CARRY IT AND SHALL TELEGRAPH TEXT SEPARATELY.

ROBERTS

STANDARD  
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

RESTRICTED

SECRET

Prime Minister

To be aware by Cabinet.

17

MR 5/4

Ref. A08043

PRIME MINISTER

Implications for Civil Departments of the Situation in the South Atlantic

I held a meeting of Permanent Secretaries this morning to review the action which civil Departments are taking or need to take following the invasion of the Falkland Islands, and to consider what Whitehall machinery is needed to ensure that it is properly carried out.

2. Our principal aim was to ensure that all Departments in Whitehall were filling in the picture over the diplomatic, economic and military measures in hand, and that all the possibilities for, and implications of, further action were being actively pursued. Much of this ground had been covered by officials on Friday 2nd April, but we were able to build on that work and in particular to consider what further action might be needed if the situation were to deteriorate further. It was agreed that a permanent Committee of officials, chaired by Mr. Wade-Gery, should be set up immediately to co-ordinate all further work in this area.

3. Mr. Wade-Gery's group met this afternoon to look at the proposals for economic and financial measures against Argentina contained in Lord Carrington's minute to you of 5th April.


4. It was agreed that the United Kingdom Representative at tomorrow's meeting of COREPER in Brussels should be instructed to inform our partners that, in addition to the measures we have already taken to ban arms exports, freeze all Argentine assets and suspend guaranteed export credit cover, we should shortly be announcing a total ban on all Argentine exports to Britain not already shipped when the invasion took place. He should invite our partners to follow our example in banning arms exports to Argentina and all imports from Argentina and should seek a further meeting of COREPER before Easter, to argue through our proposals. Officials agreed that our partners were unlikely in practice to agree to ban all imports from Argentina; as a fall-back, therefore, we should aim to persuade them at least to take selective measures against

SECRET

SECRET

certain Argentine exports, viz. meat and meat preparations, cereals and vegetable oil, textiles, footwear, clothing and steel. The objective should be to produce decisions by the Community this week.

5. On financial measures, it was agreed to seek to persuade our partners:
  - (a) To withhold guaranteed exports credit to Argentina.
  - (b) To exclude Argentina from the benefits of the Community's generalised preference scheme.
  - (c) Not to encourage their banks to lend further to Argentina.
6. Instructions in this sense are being despatched to UKREP Brussels. As far as the timing of our own total ban on imports is concerned, Mr. Biffen (as the Secretary of State for Trade) agreed that he should make an early announcement after tomorrow's Cabinet.
7. It was also agreed that following tomorrow's COREPER meeting, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will provide draft messages, covering the substance of our trade and financial proposals, for you to send to Community Heads of Government urging their support: these would indicate some willingness to move towards our fall-back position. At the same time messages urging parallel action would be prepared for you to send to the Heads of Government of the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
8. I am copying this minute to all members of the Cabinet and to the Governor of the Bank of England.




ROBERT ARMSTRONG

*(approved by Sir R. Armstrong  
& signed on his behalf)*

5th April, 1982

SECRET

  
CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Falkland Isles

You may like to bring your colleagues up to date with the report which the Governor of the Falkland Isles made to you today; and with domestic political developments and prospects.

2. You could then ask the Secretary of State for Defence to report on the departure of the task force and the military preparations now in hand.

3. You could then ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to report on diplomatic developments, including the passing of a mandatory resolution in the United Nations and the actions that have been or are being taken to build on that, and to gather support for our position and to embarrass and isolate the Argentinians.

4. The Cabinet will have had copies of a note on economic measures, following Lord Carrington's minute of 5th April to you, and in particular on the actions being taken with the European Community and with the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan to seek to persuade them to take corresponding measures in the field of trade. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Trade might be asked to speak to these matters.

5. If you have decided to keep the management of the crisis under the control of a small group of Ministers, you may like to tell the Cabinet that you so propose, making it clear that major decisions will come to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (OD) and to Cabinet as necessary. We shall have to keep up the political and diplomatic pressure through the next three weeks, while the task force is sailing to the South Atlantic. During this period as well as after, decisions may be needed at short notice, and you will want to warn your colleagues that it may be necessary to call unscheduled meetings and meetings at very short notice.



Robert Armstrong

5th April 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Wignall  
✓

Argentin

POINTS TO BE MADE ABOUT TODAY'S RESIGNATIONS

1. The PM did everything possible to dissuade Lord Carrington from resigning.
2. Mr Atkins and Mr Luce felt that once Lord Carrington had decided to go they should in all honour go with him. As the PM's letter makes clear she understands their reasons of honour, respects them immensely for their action and accepts with the greatest of regret.
3. There is no question of the PM sacking or rebuking Lord Carrington.
4. Mr Nott offered to resign as a matter of honour. The PM refused to accept it. As her letter to Mr Nott makes clear the Ministry of Defence is not the Department responsible for policy towards the Falkland Islands. She considers it vital that Mr Nott continues as Secretary of State for Defence as our forces prepare for the possibility of armed action, and she says she has the fullest confidence in his ability to carry out the crucial test that lies ahead.
5. The PM is now working on the reconstruction of her Government. It is not clear when any names will be announced. We shall, of course, communicate the names when appointments have been made.



B. INGHAM  
5 April 1982

Seen MT  
Trade with Argentina

I attach the text of Mr Biffen's reply to Sir Peter Emery's PMQ.

Sir Peter asked whether traders were advised to continue deliveries under existing contracts, and how companies should respond to Argentine efforts to obtain spares - especially military spares - from third countries. Mr Biffen asserted that he was not advising breach of contracts, but the ban on arms and spares as well was intended to be comprehensive.

For the Opposition, John Fraser, saw other sanctions as inevitable. He wanted to know what these would be and what compensation and protection there would be for British firms and workers. He also wanted to know what was expected from our EC partners and other friends. He insisted that the Government, not the firms, should meet losses on ECGD covered business. Mr Biffen said that we were consulting our partners. In this kind of situation, there would inevitably be trading losses. The conventions applied within the lifetime of previous Parliaments would apply now.

Russell Johnston wanted to know the trade figures. Mr Biffen told him that 3% of our exports went to Argentina, and a similar volume of thiers came to us. Eric Deakins asked about our trading relationships with other Latin American states. Mr Biffen replied that nobody could be confident that these would not be frustrated.

M. A. PATTISON

5 April, 1982

## QUESTION

Peter Emery to ask

What advice, instructions, or regulations he is giving or introducing to cover those companies or organisations who are trading with or have contracts with Argentina?

It was announced on 3 April that the Government had frozen all Argentinian financial assets held in this country, that ECGD would not provide new export credit cover for Argentina and that exports of military equipment and arms to Argentina had been prohibited. Other economic measures are being urgently examined, and we are consulting our European Community and other allies. British citizens are advised not to travel to Argentina, and British companies to withdraw their non-essential British staff. British firms must decide what action they should take in relation to existing commitments in the light of the present circumstances, the measures which have so far been announced, and of the terms of their own individual arrangements with Argentinian firms. They are advised not to enter into new commitments.

The Prime Minister told the House on 3 April of the Government's intention to despatch a substantial naval task force to the Falkland Islands. I should like to take this opportunity to announce to the House that Her Majesty assented to an Order in Council enabling the Government to requisition any vessels that may be needed, under the long-standing contingency plans available to meet national emergencies of this kind. The P&O liner Canberra whose Captain is an officer in the Royal Naval Reserves, is being transferred to naval control this afternoon. Other ships will be requisitioned and chartered as necessary.





file  
cc MDD  
BAC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 April 1982

AD 5/4  
h.a.

House of Commons Debate on  
Falkland Islands:  
Wednesday, 7 April

No decision has yet been taken on who should speak for the Government in the above debate. But since the time available is limited it would seem wise to begin work on a speech which can either be used by the Prime Minister or another Minister.

I should be most grateful if a draft speech could reach me by 1 pm on Tuesday, 6 April. I attach an outline of the kind of speech which the Prime Minister might wish to deliver.

A. J. COLLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH: POSSIBLE OUTLINE

The Objective

Return of Falkland Islands to British administration  
Role of Task Force  
Peaceful solution preferred. Otherwise we fight

Events since Speech on Saturday

South Georgia  
Falkland Islands - military build-up  
- Argentine measures against Islanders  
Return of Governor

Action being taken by HMG

Military measures  
Economic measures  
Diplomatic activity

Conclusion

Support for Armed Forces  
Careless talk costs lives  
Message to the people of the Falkland Islands  
Call for national unity

010  
CONFIDENTIAL



PM/82/25

Prime Minister

Falkland Islands: Economic Measures

1. We should now decide what economic and financial measures can be mobilised against Argentina to bring further pressure on them to withdraw from the Falkland Islands.
2. The UK's ability, on our own, to inflict damage on Argentina is limited. Action can only be effective if taken in conjunction with our partners in the Community and beyond including, most importantly, the US, Japan, Canada and Australia.
3. Our partners will be sympathetic but reluctant to take action damaging to their own economic interests. To secure early action we must handle this in a way which makes it as easy for them as possible. With our Community partners, in addition to the arguments about the flagrant violation of international law and the Security Council Resolution, we have the strong argument that the invasion of the Falklands was of a territory specifically covered by Part 4 of the Treaty of Rome as a dependent territory of a Member State.
4. In the commercial field the most effective measure we could take would be a total ban on Argentine exports to Britain not already shipped when the invasion took place. This would make a strong impact on our partners. But if we should ask them to follow suit, they are unlikely to be willing to go that far. They should certainly be ready to impose an arms embargo. It ought to be possible to get them to take limited trade measures, notably by banning selected agricultural imports from Argentina. As far as the Community is concerned, these consist mainly of beef (to Germany and the UK) and cereals. Several of our Community partners might welcome this

/action



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action on CAP grounds. Our partners might also be ready to take action on textiles, footwear, clothing and steel since these are all sensitive products. Beyond that, we could reasonably ask them to withhold guarantees on export credits to Argentina, as we are doing ourselves. To the extent that the Argentine economy is in a fragile condition and that financial confidence will have been shaken by their decision to invade, our partners may be readier to consider action in the field of export credit. These measures would do the most damage to Argentina by restricting foreign exchange earnings, although we should have to accept that the Soviet Union would no doubt buy their grain. In addition, our Community partners might be willing to strike Argentina from the list of beneficiaries under the Community's generalised preference scheme, which gives Argentina, along with other developing countries, preferential access to the Community's market.

5. Seeking wider trade measures, like a complete embargo, would be problematical. The question is whether we should press our partners to go further and risk protracted discussion; or seek a quick decision on some initial measures, while leaving open the possibility of going back for more. In my view, we should do the latter.

6. The same considerations apply to measures in the financial field. We have frozen Argentine assets in the UK. We can ask our partners to do the same; if they agreed, this would be a serious blow to Argentina. But I doubt very much whether any will be prepared to go as far as this. You will recall that no other country was prepared to freeze Iranian assets when the Americans asked us to do so. Furthermore, the amount of claims by international banks against Argentina exceeds the assets they hold by about 4 to 1. Even so, I believe we could still inflict damage upon Argentina if we could persuade our partners to give guidance to their banks to make no new loans to Argentina. This would make it hard for them to finance

/their

CONFIDENTIAL

their external deficit and counter the present outflow of capital; we could also frustrate any application they might make to the International Monetary Fund.

7. A further measure would be the suspension of air services in and out of Argentina, especially on trans-Atlantic routes. This would have considerable demonstrative effect, if it could be achieved. But we may wish to use commercial air services to evacuate British nationals: and in any case this measure could easily be circumvented by flights via other South American capitals.

8. On our approach, we should be in the strongest position to secure active support from our partners if we can inform them both of what we intend to do ourselves, and precisely what we want them to do. This would need to be related to the general context, including events in the Falklands themselves and the UN. We should therefore:-

- a) Explain the political and other action, including action at the United Nations, which we have taken to bring about an Argentine withdrawal; and the need to reinforce this in the economic and financial field.
- b) Inform our partners that we have decided to impose a total ban on exports from Argentina to Britain in addition to the freezing of Argentine assets and the suspension of export credit cover which we have already announced.
- c) Seek supporting action from them (for our Community partners on the basis of Article 224 of the Treaty of Rome as in the case of Iran). Such action to consist of the measures described above.

/d)

- d) Action to be implemented nationally but co-ordinated as to timing and extent. To our Community partners we should say that we have called for an immediate meeting of Permanent Representatives following which we hope there will be early agreement.

9. On tactical handling, the last opportunity for action with our Community partners before the Easter holiday will be the meeting of COREPER on Tuesday, 6 April. Thereafter there will be nobody worthwhile in Brussels, and no doubt in capitals until after the Easter weekend. I therefore invite the concurrence of all concerned (to be expressed at the meeting to be held in the Cabinet Office at 4.00 pm today) that UKRep should speak in COREPER tomorrow in accordance with the above points.

10. We shall warn the Presidency and our partners this afternoon of our intentions in general terms and ask them to seek helpful instructions. We shall also ask the Presidency to follow up immediately after the Easter holiday and recommend a message from the Prime Minister to her Community colleagues in the light of the first COREPER discussion with a view to influencing the decisions of their governments.

11. We must also take parallel action with the US and other friendly countries most concerned.

12. I am copying this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade, the Secretary of State for Industry, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Defence, the Governor of the Bank of England and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CARRINGTON)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 April 1982

Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO  
CABINET OFFICE

*f.a.  
AB 5/4.*

*Dear Robert,*

FALKLAND ISLAND: ECONOMIC MEASURES

In view of the shortage in time, and advice from UKRep Brussels to make use of the last meeting of COREPER before Easter on 6 April, we need to adapt the tactical approach set out in my Secretary of State's minute of this morning to the Prime Minister. I do this in the form of the attached amendment which would imply the deletion of paragraph 9 and the ~~second~~ *third* sentence of paragraph 8.

*Yours,*

*Michael*

Michael Palliser

cc: Sir D Wass GCB, HM TREASURY  
M D M Franklin Esq CB CMG, DOT  
Sir P Carey KCB, DOI  
Sir B Hayes KCB, MAFF  
Sir F Cooper GCB CMG, MOD  
C W MacMahon Esq, Bank of England  
Sir B Cubbon KCB, HOME OFFICE  
A J Coles Esq, NUMBER 10



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PM/82/25

Prime Minister

Falkland Islands: Economic Measures

1. We should now decide what economic and financial measures can be mobilised against Argentina to bring further pressure on them to withdraw from the Falkland Islands.
2. The UK's ability, on our own, to inflict damage on Argentina is limited. Action can only be effective if taken in conjunction with our partners in the Community and beyond including, most importantly, the US, Japan, Canada and Australia.
3. Our partners will be sympathetic but reluctant to take action damaging to their own economic interests. To secure early action we must handle this in a way which makes it as easy for them as possible. With our Community partners, in addition to the arguments about the flagrant violation of international law and the Security Council Resolution, we have the strong argument that the invasion of the Falklands was of a territory specifically covered by Part 4 of the Treaty of Rome as a dependent territory of a Member State.
4. In the commercial field the most effective measure we could take would be a total ban on Argentine exports to Britain not already shipped when the invasion took place. This would make a strong impact on our partners. But if we should ask them to follow suit, they are unlikely to be willing to go that far. They should certainly be ready to impose an arms embargo. It ought to be possible to get them to take limited trade measures, notably by banning selected agricultural imports from Argentina. As far as the Community is concerned, these consist mainly of beef (to Germany and the UK) and cereals. Several of our Community partners might welcome this

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5. Seeking wider trade-measures, like a complete embargo, would be problematical. The question is whether we should press our partners to go further and risk protracted discussion; or seek a quick decision on some initial measures, while leaving open the possibility of going back for more. In my view, we should do the latter.

6. The same considerations apply to measures in the financial field. We have frozen Argentine assets in the UK. We can ask our partners to do the same; if they agreed, this would be a serious blow to Argentina. But I doubt very much whether any will be prepared to go as far as this. You will recall that no other country was prepared to freeze Iranian assets when the Americans asked us to do so. Furthermore, the amount of claims by international banks against Argentina exceeds the assets they hold by about 4 to 1. Even so, I believe we could still inflict damage upon Argentina if we could persuade our partners to give guidance to their banks to make no new loans to Argentina. This would make it hard for them to finance

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their external deficit and counter the present outflow of capital; we could also frustrate any application they might make to the International Monetary Fund.

7. A further measure would be the suspension of air services in and out of Argentina, especially on trans-Atlantic routes. This would have considerable demonstrative effect, if it could be achieved. But we may wish to use commercial air services to evacuate British nationals: and in any case this measure could easily be circumvented by flights via other South American capitals.

8. On our approach, we should be in the strongest position to secure active support from our partners if we can inform them both of what we intend to do ourselves, and precisely what we want them to do. This would need to be related to the general context, including events in the Falklands themselves and the UN. I, therefore, recommend that you should send messages to the Heads of Government of our partners in the Community and the US, Japan, Australia and Canada, which would cover the following ground:

- a) Explain the political and other action, including action at the United Nations, which we have taken to bring about an Argentine withdrawal; and the need to reinforce this in the economic and financial field.
- b) Inform them that we have decided to impose a total ban on exports from Argentina to Britain in addition to the freezing of Argentine assets and the suspension of export credit cover which we have already announced.
- c) Seek supporting action from them (for our Community partners on the basis of Article 224 of the Treaty of Rome as in the case of Iran). Such action to consist of the measures described above.

/d)

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d) Action to be implemented nationally but coordinated as to timing and extent. To our Community partners we should say that we have called for an immediate meeting of Permanent Representatives following which we hope there will be early agreement.

9. I hope my colleagues will agree with the approach I have suggested. If so, we will prepared drafts for the messages. I propose that detailed positions be worked out by the officials concerned under Cabinet Office chairmanship as early as possible.

10. I am copying this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade, the Secretary of State for Industry, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Defence, the Governor of the Bank of England and Sir Robert Armstrong.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

5 April 1982

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*File 116*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 April 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Edmund Vestey offering his help in the present situation. I have replied on behalf of the Prime Minister thanking him for his offer.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and John Rhodes (Department of Trade).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*116*



EL DB

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 April 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 5 April offering your help in the present situation regarding the Falkland Islands. Mrs. Thatcher was most grateful. We shall bear your offer in mind.

A. J. COLES

Edmund Vestey, Esq., D.L.

AV

010  
PRESIDENT: EDMUND VESTEY DL

Telephone 01-283 2922

GENERAL COUNCIL OF BRITISH SHIPPING

30-32 ST. MARY AXE

LONDON, EC3A 8ET

5th April, 1982

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP.,  
Prime Minister,  
10, Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

*Dear Prime Minister.*

If I can be of any help in the present crisis, I am at your disposal. My contacts with the Argentine Government, though not as close with President Galtieri as some of his predecessors, could perhaps be of use in certain circumstances. The FCO already know of this.

As regards the Merchant Navy, you may be sure that, as always in times of emergency, we will play our part to the best of our ability. The GCBS, as you will know, is in close touch with MOD and DOT about the chartering of suitable vessels.

*Yours sincerely  
Edmund Vestey.*





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 April 1982

Falkland Islands

I enclose copies of messages which the Prime Minister has received from the Prime Minister of Australia and the Prime Minister of New Zealand in response to Mrs. Thatcher's letter to Commonwealth Heads of Government.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Rb



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 April 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 3 April enclosing a message from the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency The Honourable L.W. Gandar



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 April 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 5 April enclosing a message from the Prime Minister of Australia.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency The Honourable Sir Victor Garland,  
K.B.E.

ds

VGB

CONFIDENTIAL

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SUBJECT  
cc Mr. ... Ops



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE LONDON

PERSONAL MESSAGE  
T 60/82  
SERIAL No. ....

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

The Hon. Sir Victor Garland, KBE

5 April 1982

*My dear Annie Brewster,*

A telegram from my Prime Minister asks me to convey to you the following reply to your message to him on the Falkland Islands (the text of the reply was informally passed to your office on Saturday 3 April):

Begins -

"Dear Margaret,

Thank you for your message on the Falkland Islands. I agree with you completely as to the gravity of this use of armed force to take possession of a peaceful territory, against the proven wishes of its inhabitants.

On my instructions Australia's Permanent Representative at the U.N. has intervened in the Security Council's debate to condemn Argentina's use of force and call for an immediate withdrawal of Argentinian forces, Michael MacKellar, who is acting as Foreign Minister in Tony Street's absence in the Middle East, has called for a peaceful resolution of the dispute, and I issued a statement on the situation this afternoon.

....

I attach copies of the texts of David Anderson's remarks in the Security Council, and of my statement.

In this difficult time you have Australia's firm and unequivocal support.

Yours sincerely,  
Malcolm Fraser."

Ends.

*Sincerely,*  
*[Signature]*  
R.V. GARLAND

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister,  
No. 10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO  
THE UNITED NATIONS, MR DAVID ANDERSON, TO THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL, NEW YORK - 2 APRIL 1982.

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

MR PRESIDENT,

ON BEHALF OF MY DELEGATION I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR GRANTING US PERMISSION TO SPEAK BEFORE THE COUNCIL. WE HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT UNDER YOUR PRESIDENCY THE COUNCIL WILL HAVE WISE AND JUDICIOUS GUIDANCE IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THE IMPORTANT ISSUES ON ITS AGENDA.

MY GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED PERMISSION TO SPEAK TODAY BECAUSE OF THE VERY SERIOUS SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IT IS NOW ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA HAVE INVADED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT WHICH CAN ONLY AGGRAVATE AN ALREADY HIGHLY TENSE SITUATION AND WHICH CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

WE HAVE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COUNCIL YESTERDAY AND THIS MORNING BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA. NOTHING CONTAINED IN THOSE STATEMENTS COULD JUSTIFY THE ACT OF AGGRESSION WHICH HAS BEEN COMMITTED BY THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2.3 AND ARTICLE 2.4 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS WILL RECALL THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL YESTERDAY ISSUED AN APPEAL FOR MAXIMUM RESTRAINT ON BOTH SIDES AND THAT LAST NIGHT THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MADE A STATEMENT WHICH EXPRESSED THE COUNCIL'S CONCERN ABOUT THE TENSION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION AND CALLED UPON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM "TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AT THIS TIME AND IN PARTICULAR TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IN THE REGION AND TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION".

MR PRESIDENT,

MY GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTS THE CALL FOR RESTRAINT WHICH YOU ISSUED LAST NIGHT ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL. THE FACT REMAINS, HOWEVER, THAT THE OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY ARGENTINE TROOPS HAS ESCALATED THE TENSION IN THE REGION AND WILL MAKE THE TASK OF FINDING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS DISPUTE MORE DIFFICULT. MY GOVERNMENT CONDEMNS THE USE OF FORCE BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND SUPPORTS THE ACTION PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION NOW BEFORE THE COUNCIL. WE URGE THAT THE PATH OF PEACE AND NEGOTIATION BY BOTH SIDES NOT BE ABANDONED. AS A FIRST STEP IN THAT DIRECTION WE CALL UPON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO HEED THE APPEALS MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ACCORDINGLY TO UNDERTAKE AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

NEW YORK  
2 APRIL 1982

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR MALCOLM FRASER,  
ON 3 APRIL 1982

---

FALKLAND ISLANDS

THE PRIME MINISTER, MR MALCOLM FRASER, SAID TODAY (3 APRIL):

"I CONDEMN THE ARGENTINIANS' INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS.

THIS USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST A SMALL AND PEACEFUL TERRITORY IS A GROTESQUE REMINDER OF AN ERA WHICH WE HAD ALL HOPED HAD RECEDED INTO THE PAST.

IT IS AN ACTION WHICH CARES NOTHING FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION, AND IS CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH CONDEMNS COERCION AND THE USE OF FORCE AS A MEANS OF SETTling INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

THE SITUATION IS ALREADY A MOST DANGEROUS ONE, AND I CALL UPON THE ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER MOST CAREFULLY THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS ACTION, AND TO WITHDRAW AT ONCE ITS ARMED FORCES FROM THE TERRITORY THEY HAVE OCCUPIED."

MR FRASER SAID THAT HE FULLY SUPPORTED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN THE SITUATION IN WHICH IT HAD BEEN PLACED.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 April 1982

Dear Sir,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Governor of  
the Falkland Islands

The Governor of the Falkland Islands, accompanied by Major Norman and Major Noott of the Royal Marines, called on the Prime Minister at 1230 this morning.

The Prime Minister congratulated the party on the courage they had shown during the recent Argentine invasion of the Islands. She described in confidence some of the measures which had been adopted in London and, after explaining the shortage of reliable information on Argentinian intentions in London, enquired whether those in Port Stanley in the days preceding the invasion had been any more aware of the likelihood of an invasion. The Governor replied in the negative. He had been inclined to think that the Argentine President was sabre rattling as on previous occasions. Even when it was known that the Argentine Navy was on the move, it was reasonable to think that their objective might have been to position themselves between South Georgia and the Falkland Islands in order to intercept Endurance.

The Governor explained the difficulties which he had had with communications. He had sent a signal about the invasion about 0515 hours Falkland Islands time but Cable and Wireless had been unable to transmit the message.

Major Norman said that Argentinian intelligence had appeared to be rather good. For example, they knew his name and that he had only arrived three days previously. The Governor added that the Argentine invading forces possessed the names of all the marines though these were obtainable from flight lists when the marines had travelled on earlier occasions to Montevideo by civilian airlines. The Admiral in charge of the assault group had been gentlemanly, but the General who had taken over as "Governor" of the Islands was of a different character.

/Major Noott

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Major Noott said that the Argentine forces had not appeared to be particularly skilled or brave. They had, for example, shown reluctance to go outside Port Stanley because they had heard that a section of six marines were still at large in the rest of the Island. The Governor added that they had obviously been shaken by what they had heard of the resistance at Grytviken. They had probably assumed that there were no marines left there and had therefore only put forty of their own ashore. Major Norman described the assault on Port Stanley. The bulk of the Argentine troops had arrive from the landward side. When they reached Government House only the HQ staff were present. Nevertheless, three of the Argentinians were badly wounded and two of them had since died. The British troops had assumed that the Argentinians would regroup at once and return, as our own troops would have done in similar circumstances. But they did not do so. Three Argentinian soldiers had taken refuge in the maids' quarters, had made no attempt to join in the fighting and had then been captured for a time.

Major Norman said there was a conviction among the Argentinian troops on the Falkland Islands that the British Government would not launch an attack to retake the Islands. The Prime Minister said that there were lessons to be drawn here for the psychological effort which would be necessary. The Governor added that he believed the Argentinians were determined to stay. They felt very strongly about the issue. They were pouring men and equipment into the Islands.

*kwartus*

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

*John*  
*John*

John Holmes Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF MAJOR NOOTT AND MAJOR NORMAN

Major Gareth (Garry) Noott

Born 26 October 1944; joined Royal Marines 27 January 1964; various postings include Officer Commanding Royal Marines on HMS Endurance; married with three daughters; lives in Topsham, Nr. Exeter.

Major Mike Norman

Born 7 October 1943; joined Royal Marines in the ranks 1962; commissioned 1964; various postings also include Officer Commanding Royal Marines on HMS Endurance; married, no children; lives in Poole.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE GOVERNOR OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Mr. Rex Hunt

55 year-old Mr. Hunt has been Governor in Port Stanley since February 1979, where he has been accompanied by his wife Mavis. His teenage son and daughter have been at boarding schools in Britain visiting the Falklands for school holidays.

Following service with the RAF from 1944-48, Mr. Hunt spent the early years of his overseas career in the colonial service, finishing in Uganda in 1963. Subsequently he has spent the greater part of his time in South East Asia on diplomatic postings to Sarawak, Sabah, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam (when he left Saigon when it fell in 1975) and Malaysia.

In the Falkland Islands he commanded the respect of the Islanders for his open approach to the government of the Colony and for his obviously genuine interest in the people's welfare.

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GRS 380

SECRET

ECLIPSE

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 051653Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 395 DATED 5 APRIL 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

Cholo DLK  
(al, Hs)  
IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE

MY TELNO 393: SECURITY COUNCIL; FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE FOLLOWING COULD BE CLOSELY PROTECTED.
2. AN ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT REASON FOR KEEPING THE ACTION AWAY FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS JEANE KIRKPATRICK. SHE HAS VERY CLOSE AND SYMPATHETIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP. I HAVE DISCOVERED THAT, WHEN ROCA (ARGENTINE) ARRIVED IN NEW YORK TO TAKE UP HIS POST A LITTLE OVER A WEEK AGO, HE WENT STRAIGHT FROM THE AIRPORT TO HER OFFICE. HE EXPRESSED ANXIETY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE, THE BRITISH, MIGHT CALL THE SECURITY COUNCIL ABOUT THE FALKLANDS. MRS KIRKPATRICK GAVE HIM AN ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE THAT I WOULD NEVER DO ANYTHING OF THE KIND. THIS NEWS MUST HAVE BEEN RECEIVED WITH GRATIFICATION IN BUENOS AIRES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FINAL DECISION TO INVADE. IT ALSO EXPLAINS TO SOME EXTENT HER WILD OUTBURST WHEN I TOLD HER THAT I WAS CALLING THE COUNCIL ON 1 APRIL TO GET A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. ROCA HAD PROBABLY ACCUSED HER OF MISLEADING HIM.
3. I ALSO HAVE SOME EVIDENCE THAT, PROBABLY ON THE SAME OCCASION, SHE GAVE ROCA TO UNDERSTAND THAT, IF ARGENTINA WOULD SUPPORT THE US OVER NICARAGUA, SHE WOULD RETURN THE COMPLIMENT OVER THE FALKLANDS.
4. MRS KIRKPATRICK ABSENTED HERSELF FROM THE WHOLE OF LAST WEEK'S DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL, BUT I KNOW THAT LICHENSTEIN (US) WATERED DOWN THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT IN OUR SUPPORT WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO DELIVER IN THE COUNCIL.
5. GIVEN HER SYMPATHY WITH THE ARGENTINE REGIME, HER ESTIMATION OF HERSELF AS A SUPREME EXPERT ON LATIN AMERICA, AND HER MAVERICK IRRESPONSIBILITY, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, IF AND WHEN WE COME BACK TO THE COUNCIL, SHE WILL NOT BE ACTIVELY HELPFUL TO US WHATEVER HER INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT, BEHIND THE SCENES, SHE MAY WELL WORK AGAINST US.

PARSONS

John



10 DOWNING STREET

We spoke further,  
and you know that  
an MOD paper will  
come, and that you may  
need to arrange with  
the Palace the

CAW

“AJC” processing of an Order in  
Council (about which

Mr Nott raised with PM / know next to  
and colleagues today his  
decision to “charter” a  
Cunard liner. (MOD tell me  
he should have said  
“requisition”.)

nothing) YAF

His decision was  
endorsed. But colleagues  
(not PM) asked him to  
consider possibility of  
sending liner empty to  
Ascension, and airlifting  
the men to join it there.

MAP 5/3



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 April 1982

Dear Richard

It was with great regret that I received your letter of today submitting your resignation from the Government.


I know that you felt that you had to take this course as a matter of honour and I have every respect for your decision. I accordingly accept your resignation, though with great reluctance.

You have given valuable service to the Government and the country in the period of nearly three years you have spent as a Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It was in recognition of your considerable qualities that I appointed you as a Minister of State in September of last year. I am sure that you will have other opportunities in due course to render further service. In the meantime I am very grateful to know that the Government will continue to have your fullest support in the difficult times that lie ahead. *Every good wish*

*Yours ever*

Richard Luce, Esq., MP.

*Raymond*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 April 1982

PERSONAL

My Dear Prime Minister,

I am submitting my resignation from the Government.


The Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands has been a humiliating setback to the people of the Islands and to the United Kingdom.

In these difficult times it is vital that the Government has the full confidence and support of the country. To this end, I believe that it will help you to have a new Minister to take my place, irrespective of whatever judgements will be made by the country of the events of the past.

I remain firmly of the view that Her Majesty's Government has an overwhelming duty to the people of the Falkland Islands. I have the fullest confidence that you will fulfil that duty.

It has been a great privilege to have served in this Government under your leadership. It has been an honour to have worked with Peter Carrington, whom I regard as an outstanding leader and one of our finest Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries.

I need hardly say that I shall continue to give the fullest support to you and the Government in the important days ahead and for the future.



(RICHARD LUCE)

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 April, 1982.

Dear Humphrey,

It is with great regret that I have received your letter of today in which you say that you wish to resign at the same time as Peter.

I understand entirely the reasons of honour which made you write as you did, and I respect you immensely for it.

It is with the greatest of regret that I accept your resignation. You were my Chief Whip for four years, and then you unflinchingly accepted the heavy burden of office of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland when I asked you to take it up in 1979. In that post you stood firm throughout, and especially in the darkest moments of the hunger strikes. Since then you have served the Government and the country with great skill as Lord Privy Seal. You have given your country service of the utmost value, and I have no doubt that you will continue to do so in future.

I am much strengthened by the assurance of your continuing support. It is a great encouragement to me at this time that I can count on it in the weeks and months to come, just as I have always done in the past.

Yours  
Humphrey

The Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins, M.P.

Raymond

PERSONAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

5 April 1982

*Dear Margaret,*

Much of the criticism of the Government's policy on the Falkland Islands, which I do not believe to be sustainable, has been directed at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

While Peter Carrington is the Secretary of State, I as a Member of your Cabinet, share fully with him the responsibility for the conduct of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

That being so, I have no doubt that I should resign at the same time as Peter.

In asking you to accept my resignation, may I say how greatly I have enjoyed the privilege of serving you over the last seven years, as Chief Whip, as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and as Lord Privy Seal. May I also thank you, not only for the confidence you have shown in me over these years but also for many personal kindnesses.

You have my assurance that I will continue to give you and your Government my fullest support in everything you have set out to do.

*Yours ever*

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Monday 5<sup>th</sup> April 1982

Dear Peter,

It was with very great regret that I heard this morning of your unalterable decision to resign your office as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. You explained to me very clearly why you thought that, as the Minister responsible for the Government's policy towards the Falkland Islands, you should, in honour, leave the Government at the present time.

I did my utmost throughout Saturday and Sunday to dissuade you from this course; and so did other friends. I have been unsuccessful, and it is with the greatest reluctance that I accept your decision. The news of your resignation will be received with a heavy heart not only by your colleagues in the Cabinet but also by all those with whom you have worked at home and abroad these last three years.

You have given the nation the most outstanding service as Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Your achievements have been many and great. You have preserved and strengthened our very close links with the United States and you have enabled us to play our full part in the European Community. Perhaps, above all, the greatest single achievement for which you will be remembered will

/ be



be the way in which you brought Rhodesia to independence. The absence of your wisdom and your humanity, your patience and your skill from our counsels will be an immense loss for us all.

I shall find your continuing support in the weeks and months to come an enormous encouragement; and I am strengthened by the conviction that you have great service still to render our country.

Yours ever

Margaret

---

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PERSONAL

5 April 1982

*Dear Margaret*

The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands has led to strong criticism in Parliament and in the press of the Government's policy. In my view, much of the criticism is unfounded. But I have been responsible for the conduct of that policy and I think it right that I should resign. As you know, I have given long and careful thought to this. I warmly appreciate the kindness and support which you showed me when we discussed this matter on Saturday. But the fact remains that the invasion of the Falkland Islands has been a humiliating affront to this country.

We must now, as you said in the House of Commons, do everything we can to uphold the right of the Islanders to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. I am sure that this is the right course, and one which deserves the undivided support of Parliament and of the country. But I have concluded with regret that this support will more easily be maintained if the Foreign Office is entrusted to someone else.

I have been privileged to be a member of this Government and to be associated with its achievements over the past three years. I need hardly say that the Government will continue to have my active support. I am most grateful to you personally for the unfailing confidence you have shown in me.

*Yours  
Peter*

(CARRINGTON)

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP

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GRS 97

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FM FCO 041210Z APRIL 82

TO FLASH BOGOTA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 60 OF 4 APRIL

AND TO FLASH LIMA, MEXICO CITY, OTTAWA, QUITO

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK SITCEN

FALKLAND ISLANDS: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THERE IS ANY LIKELIHOOD THAT LOCAL AUTHORITIES WOULD AGREE TO STAGING AND/OR OVERFLIGHTS BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN CONNECTION WITH THE CURRENT OPERATION. THEY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE APPROACHED.
2. (FOR OTTAWA.) WE ARE INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE USE OF STAGING FACILITIES AT GOOSE BAY OR GANDER. GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF CANADIANS ARE LIKELY TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES OVER SUCH A REQUEST.

CARRINGTON

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MR. PATTISON

*MAJ*

FALKLAND ISLANDS

I have confirmed to the MOD that the Prime Minister wishes Mr. Nott to be one of the speakers in the next debate. No decision has yet been taken on the second speaker from the Government side.

The Prime Minister said today that she thought there would have to be another statement tomorrow on the Falklands. I do not think it can be decided who should do this until tomorrow morning.

*A. J. C.  $\frac{4}{4}$ .*

4 April 1982

P. 3

**CONFIDENTIAL**

GRS 664

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FM BONN 041120Z APRIL 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 4 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

ROUTINE WASHINGTON SANTIAGO UKMIS NEW YORK

*f.a.  
M 5/5*

BONN TELNO 293 AND TELECON ELDON/BRIGHT : FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TOOK THE ACTION FORESHADOWED IN TUR WITH THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SUMMONED TO SEE PRESIDENT GALTIERI AT 2000 BUENOS AIRES TIME. (THE GERMANS UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS WILL ALSO BE CALLED IN BY THE PRESIDENT). THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT HAVE GIVEN US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE LATTER CONVERSATION (ABOUT WHICH WE UNDERSTAND GENSCHER MAY TELEPHONE YOU FROM HIS AIRCRAFT - SEE PARA 6 BELOW). OUR CONTACT ASKED THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF IT SHOULD NOT BE REVEALED OUTSIDE THE FCO AND IN PARTICULAR THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE FRG EMBASSY IN LONDON.

2. GALTIERI, WHO LOOKED NERVOUS, BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE WISHED TO EXPLAIN THE ARGENTINE POSITION TO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WITH THE AIM OF BRINGING ABOUT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE FALKLAND CRISIS. HE REHEARSED THE ARGENTINE POSITION ON FAMILIAR LINES AND ENDED BY SAYING THAT THE QUOTE OCCUPATION UNQUOTE OF THE ISLANDS HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN BECAUSE OF DOUBTS ABOUT BRITAIN'S WILL TO NEGOTIATE IN EARNEST. ARGENTINA WAS PREPARED TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS WITH ALL THE MILITARY MEANS AT HER DISPOSAL: IF HER WESTERN FRIENDS CHOSE NOT TO SUPPORT HER SHE WOULD ACCEPT MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE.

3. AFTER REFERRING TO THE EC STATEMENT ON THE INCIDENT THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER ARGENTINA WAS STILL PREPARED TO HOLD TALKS AIMED AT REACHING AN HONOURABLE SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS AND WHAT THE ELEMENTS OF SUCH A SOLUTION MIGHT BE. GALTIERI REPLIED THAT EVERYTHING WAS NEGOTIABLE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FINAL RECOGNITION OF

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/ ARGENTINE

ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION HE SAID THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE FORCE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE PROVIDED THAT IT DID NOT BRING INTO QUESTION THE RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY. ARGENTINA WAS ALSO WILLING TO TALK ABOUT A TIMETABLE FOR THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY BUT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE FIRMLY AGREED WITH THE TRANSFER TAKING PLACE SOON AND IF POSSIBLE THIS YEAR: ANOTHER 17 YEARS OF NEGOTIATION WERE OUT OF THE QUESTION. ECONOMIC MATTERS AND QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE ISLANDERS COULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED.

4. GALTIERI SAID THAT DURING THE LANDINGS THE ARGENTINE FORCES HAD HAD STRICT ORDERS NOT TO OPEN FIRE AND IF POSSIBLE NOT TO ENGAGE IN ANY SHOOTING WITH THE ISLANDS' DEFENDERS. AS FAR AS HE KNEW FOUR ARGENTINES HAD BEEN KILLED BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO BRITISH CASUALTIES. BUT IF BRITAIN ATTEMPTED TO RETAKE THE ISLANDS THERE WOULD BE MUCH BLOODSHED.

5. GALTIERI ADDED THAT HE HAD NO SPECIAL CONFIDENCE IN US ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE IN THE DISPUTE. HE PREFERRED TO LOOK TO EUROPE TO DO THIS AS HE FELT THAT THERE WAS MORE SYMPATHY THERE FOR THE ARGENTINE POSITION (SIC).

6. WE UNDERSTAND THAT GENSCHER HAS OFFERED OVER THE TELEPHONE TO FEED IN TO THE BRASILIANS ANY IDEAS ON THE DISPUTE THAT YOU FELT WOULD BE USEFUL (HE WILL ACCOMPANY FEDERAL PRESIDENT CARSTENS ON A STATE VISIT TO BRAZIL STARTING TOMORROW). THE PARTY LEFT BONN FOR RECIFE AT 1130Z AND WILL STOP OVER THERE TO ALLOW THEM TO ARRIVE IN BRASILIA AT A REASONABLE HOUR TOMORROW MORNING. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE BEST IF ANY COMMUNICATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT COULD BE SENT BOTH HERE AND TO BRASILIA FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION. THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT THINK THAT THE BRAZILIANS ARE BY NO MEANS SYMPATHETIC TO THE ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTION: AND OUR CONTACT POINTED OUT THAT THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD CAREFULLY AVOIDED TAKING A POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER WHEN HE SPOKE TO THE PRESS IN NEW YORK ON 2 APRIL ON HIS WAY BACK TO BRAZIL FROM A VISIT TO TOKYO.

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FM FCO 041800Z APR 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 634 OF 4 APRIL 1982

INFO ASCENSION (FOR ADMINISTRATOR)

LIKELY UK REQUIREMENTS AT ASCENSION ISLAND

1. PLEASE THANK THE AMERICANS FOR THEIR OFFER RECORDED IN YOUR TELNO 623. ON PRESENT PLANS WE SHALL BE IMPOSING CONSIDERABLE DEMANDS ON US FACILITIES ON THE ISLAND. PLEASE PASS ON THE FOLLOWING DETAILS AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL. THEY ONLY DEAL WITH GENERAL REQUIREMENTS: SOME ADDITIONAL DETAIL HAS ALREADY BEEN PASSED TO THE US ON SERVICE CHANNELS.

2.(A) SHIPS:

RFA FORT AUSTIN IS ARRIVING AT 0800Z 6 APRIL WITH STORES AND PASSENGERS FOR TRANSFER TO HMS ENDURANCE.

(B) AIR:

13 HERCULES FLIGHTS ARE PLANNED FOR 3-6 APRIL TRANSPORTING 3 HELICOPTERS, SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, COMS EQUIPMENT AND A ROYAL MARINE BLOW-PIPE DETACHMENT.

A CHARTERED BELFAST WILL ARRIVE NIGHT OF 5-6 APRIL WITH TWO LYNX HELICOPTERS.

HANGAR SPACE IS NEEDED FOR ALL FIVE HELICOPTERS, 15 TONS OF STORES AND AMMUNITION AND ACCOMMODATION FOR SOME 146 ALL RANKS BETWEEN 4-6 APRIL UNTIL DEPARTURE IN FORT AUSTIN.

(C) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT:

THE ISLAND IS EXPECTED TO BE THE FORWARD OPERATING BASE FOR 3RD COMMANDO BRIGADE WITH 3 PARA UNDER COMMAND - ACCOMMODATION REQUIRED FOR 25 PERSONNEL AND 4,000 SQ METRES OF STORAGE. A SATELLITE COMS TERMINAL OPERATED BY SEVEN MEN IS REQUIRED TO OPERATE THERE FROM 6 APRIL.

IN THE LONGER TERM, THERE COULD BE A REQUIREMENT FOR THE

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RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF CASUALTIES.

LATER EXPANSION OF FORCES COULD REQUIRE RECEPTION AND STAGING FACILITIES FOR 3,500 MEN: A LOGISTIC BASE WOULD REQUIRE 200 MEN FOR THE RECEPTION, STORAGE AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF COMBAT SUPPLIES.

(D) LONGER TERM REQUIREMENTS:

THESE ARE, AT PRESENT, DIFFICULT TO DEFINE AND DETAILED RECONNAISSANCE IS NEEDED TO ESTABLISH THE ISLAND'S CAPACITY TO PROVIDE A FORWARD OPERATING BASE FOR UP TO TWO BRIGADES.

3. SPECIFIC DETAILS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR EG ACCOMMODATION, LIFTING GEAR, LIGHTERAGE AND REFUELLERS, WILL NEED DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON SERVICE CHANNELS. ONE PARTICULAR REQUIREMENT WILL BE FOR ADDITIONAL AIR CONTROLLERS TO ALLOW FOR 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.

CARRINGTON

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FM FCO 041830Z APR 82  
TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 636 OF 4 APRIL 1982.

FALKLANDS

1. WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR TELECON WITH FALL, WE HAVE  
ALREADY SENT TO YOU THE GOVERNOR'S REPORT OF THE ATTACK ON  
PORT STANLEY. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE TERMS IN WHICH MR NOTT  
DESCRIBED THE FALL OF GRYTVIKEN ON TV TODAY:

'OUR INFORMATION IS THAT THE 22 ROYAL MARINES AT THE GRYTVIKEN  
BASE ON SOUTH GEORGIA RESISTED STRONGLY BEFORE THEY WERE  
CAPTURED BY ARGENTINIAN FORCES. AN ARGENTINIAN PUMA HELICOPTER  
WAS SHOT DOWN AND A FRIGATE WAS DAMAGED. SEVERAL ARGENTINIANS  
WERE KILLED, BUT AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES  
AMONG THE ROYAL MARINES.'

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(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff) ~~and MOD SITCEN~~.

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DESKBY 050800Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050045Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER <sup>393</sup> ~~GEOE~~ OF 4 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (SITCEN), WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TEL NO 200: SECURITY COUNCIL : FA  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. TWO IMPORTANT FACTORS MUST BE BORNE IN MIND IN OUR CONSIDERATION OF ANY FUTURE ACTION IN THE UN:-

(I) THE ANTIPATHY OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE IRELAND AND JAPAN) TO THE USE OF FORCE. THIS, COMBINED WITH THE ARGENTINE REJECTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL APPEAL, WAS THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY WE SECURED NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION TABLED BY A WESTERN PERMANENT MEMBER CRITICAL OF A NAM MEMBER STATE.

(II) WE HAVE VIRTUALLY NO SUPPORT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE, IE THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL WOULD APPROVE OF THE OUTCOME IF IT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN ANY OTHER WAY.

2. GALTIERI' OPEN REJECTION OF THE RESOLUTION (AS REPORTED ON THE RADIO) THEORETICALLY STILL LEAVES US WITH THE INITIATIVE IN THE COUNCIL, AND I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WHETHER WE SHOULD TAKE EARLY ADVANTAGE OF THIS, BEARING IN MIND PARA 3 OF YOUR TELNO 200. I HAVE COME TO THE FOLLOWING FIRM CONCLUSIONS.

3. WHATEVER THE RIGHTS OR WRONGS MAY BE, WE WOULD HAVE NO SUPPORT FOR A CALL FOR MEASURES EG SANTIONS UNDER CHAPTER 7. TO TRY THIS ON WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO QUOTE GOING DOWN FIGHTING UNQUOTE.

FOR A CALL FOR MEASURES EG SANCTIONS UNDER CHAPTER 7. TO TRY THIS ON WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO QUOTE GOING DOWN FIGHTING UNQUOTE. IT WOULD INVITE A HUMILIATION. IT WOULD BE REGARDED BY ALL MEMBERS AS A RITUAL PRELIMINARY TO MILITARY ACTION BY US. IT WOULD NOT BE ANALOGOUS TO THE AMERICAN REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS OVER THE IRANIAN HOSTAGES. HAD THE COUNCIL REALISED THAT THIS WAS A PRELIMINARY TO AN AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT THE HOSTAGES BY FORCE, THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE HAD A HUMILIATING RESULT IN TERMS OF VOTES.

4. SHORT OF THIS, WE COULD GO BACK TO THE COUNCIL TO REAFFIRM SCR 502, DEPLORE THE ARGENTINE REJECTION OF IT, STRESS ARGENTINA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLES 25 AND 40 AND REITERATE A CALL FOR IMPLEMENTATION. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD BY ITSELF BE A BIT WET. FURTHERMORE, I HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANY RESOLUTION WHICH DID NOT ALSO CALL ON US TO HALT OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE (BOTH YESTERDAYS' PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS CONVINCED ME OF THIS). EQUALLY, THERE IS ALREADY A TENDENCY IN THE CORRIDORS TO TALK ABOUT THE NEXT STEP BEING SOME UN INVOLVEMENT, EG THE GOOD OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE DESPATCH OF A UN COMMISSION OR UN PEACE-KEEPING OF SOME KIND. IF WE HAD TO REJECT ANY OF THESE PROPOSITIONS, NOTWITHSTANDING OUR LEGAL RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER, WE WOULD BE DANGEROUSLY EXPOSED AND ISOLATED EVEN AMONGST OUR FRIENDS. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON THE FRENCH BUT I WOULD BE DUBIOUS ABOUT THE AMERICANS, AND THERE WOULD BE NO HOPE OF HOLDING THE IRISH OR THE JAPANESE WITH US.

5. I TAKE IT THAT YOU WOULD NOT WISH US TO INITIATE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF IT WERE TO LEAD TO PREMATURE INVOLVEMENT OF UN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT MACHINERY, AND THAT EQUALLY YOU WOULD NOT WISH ME TO HAVE TO VETO SUCH PROPOSITIONS. BY DOING SO WE WOULD LOSE ALL THE GROUND WHICH WE HAVE SECURED IN THE LAST FEW DAYS AND WE MIGHT WELL BE FACED BY AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE LIGHT OF OUR PUBLICLY EXPRESSED DETERMINATION TO RECOVER THE ISLANDS BY FORCE IF NECESSARY. AT THAT STAGE, WE NOT ARGENTINA, WOULD BE IN THE DOCK HERE.

6. I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT WE WOULD BE BEST ADVISED (BUT SEE BELOW) TO KEEP AWAY FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL AND UNLESS WE ARE OURSELVES READY TO DE-ESCALATE THE SITUATION BY INVOKING UN PEACE-MAKING MACHINERY OR THE ICJ. FOR THE MOMENT, OUR BEST COURSE, AS SEEN FROM HERE, WOULD BE TO PURSUE THE DIPLOMATIC OPTION OUTSIDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

~~UN PEACE-MAKING MACHINERY ON THE ICJ. FOR THE MOMENT, OUR BEST COURSE, AS SEEN FROM HERE, WOULD BE TO PURSUE THE DIPLOMATIC OPTION OUTSIDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EXTRACTING FULL VALUE FROM SCR 502, THROUGH THE AGENCY OF INFLUENTIAL THIRD PARTIES SUCH AS THE US OR LEADING MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY. THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE UN AUDIENCE THAT WE WERE PURSUING DIPLOMATIC POSSIBILITIES, AS ENJOINED BY SCR 502, AND MIGHT REDUCE THE FOLLOWING RISK.~~

7. THIS IS THAT BRITISH FLEET MOVEMENTS WILL PRECIPITATE AN EARLY CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FROM PANAMA (AT ARGENTINIAN REQUEST) OR FROM SOME OTHER DELEGATION WITH STRONG VIEWS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. IN THIS CASE, WE WILL FIND OURSELVES IN THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN PARA 4 ABOVE. MY PERSONAL INSTINCT IS THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY HOLD THEIR HANDS FOR A BIT IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF GALTIERI'S REJECTION OF SCR 502 TO BE OVERTAKEN BY THE EFFECT OF THE PUBLICITY WHICH WILL SURROUND THE MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH FLEET. HOWEVER, I UNDERSTAND THAT THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL BE ADDRESSING A MEETING OF THE OAS IN WASHINGTON ON 5 APRIL AND IT IS NOT TO BE EXCLUDED THAT THEY MAY COME STRAIGHT BACK TO THE COUNCIL THEREAFTER.

8. IF YOU DECIDE THAT, FOR DOMESTIC REASONS, IT IS NECESSARY FOR US TO TAKE A FURTHER IMMEDIATE INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES, WE WILL DO OUR BEST, AS WE WILL IF WE ARE DRAGGED INTO THE COUNCIL BY OTHERS. IF YOU THOUGHT IT USEFUL, I COULD FLY HOME TOMORROW (5 APRIL) FOR CONSULTATIONS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE COMPLEX SITUATION AT THE UN. I COULD RETURN TO NEW YORK IN A DAY IF THE COUNCIL WAS CALLED AT SOMEONE ELSE'S INITIATIVE. IF YOU WISH ME TO DO SO I WOULD NEED TO KNOW BY 1400Z ON 5 APRIL TO ENABLE ME TO CATCH THE CONCORDE AT 11.15 LOCAL TIME (1615Z).

PARSONS

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/Ld. TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
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MR WRIGHT  
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FM WASHINGTON 041926Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1111 OF 4 APRIL

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, BIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF EDITORIAL IN THE WASHINGTON POST OF 4 APRIL:  
BEGINS

#### ARGENTINA'S AGGRESSION

SUPERFICIALLY, THERE IS AN ALEC GUINNESS QUALITY TO ARGENTINA'S TAKEOVER OF BRITAIN'S TINY, REMOTE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BUT IT IS A SERIOUS AFFAIR, AND IT COULD HAVE GRIEVOUS CONSEQUENCES-FOR ARGENTINA-IF THE REGIME IN BUENOS AIRES DOES NOT QUICKLY END ITS FOOLISH VENTURE AND RESTORE THE STATUS QUO.

IT IS CLEAR ENOUGH WHY ARGENTINA, HAVING FOR 149 YEARS KEPT WITHIN BOUNDS ITS OUTRAGE OVER BRITAIN'S HOLD ON THE FALKLANDS, INVADED EARLY FRIDAY. IT WAS NO CASE OF A NATION'S BEING FINALLY PROVOKED BEYOND ALL HUMAN TOLERANCE BY SOME NEW INJUSTICE OR HUMILIATION. NOTHING WHATEVER HAD HAPPENED IN THE FALKLANDS, WHOSE 1,800 INHABITANTS HAVE REPEATEDLY OPTED TO STAY WITH BRITAIN. BUT SOMETHING HAD HAPPENED IN ARGENTINA. AS PART OF THE BARGAINING WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES THAT RECENTLY PRODUCED A NEW PRESIDENT, NATIONALISTIC ELEMENTS IN THE OFFICER CORPS GAINED A NEW ASCENDANCY. THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT IS INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR. A DISTRACTION WAS CONSIDERED TIMELY, AND SO THE ARMY MOVED, KNOWING THAT ALL ARGENTINES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR CURRENT

ASCENDANCY. THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT IS INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR. A DISTRACTION WAS CONSIDERED TIMELY, AND SO THE ARMY MOVED, KNOWING THAT ALL ARGENTINES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR CURRENT POLITICAL VIEWS, ARE BROUGHT UP BELIEVING THAT THE FALKLANDS ARE THE MALVINAS.

BRITAIN'S PRIME MINISTER SPOKE THE SIMPLE TRUTH WHEN SHE LABELED THE ARGENTINE ACT "UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION." IT IS MORE THAN LIKELY THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE MADE A SERIOUS MISTAKE BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF BRITAIN'S DISTANCE AND INATTENTION, FOR MRS. THATCHER IS A TOUGH WOMAN, NOT INCLINED TO LET BRITISH SUBJECTS BE RUN OFF A PART OF THE BRITISH RANGE, AND THE BRITISH DO NOT APPEAR TO BE IN A MOOD TO BE PUSHED AROUND.

THE BRITS HAVE NOTHING TO APOLOGIZE FOR IN THE FALKLANDS. MRS. THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT IS TAKING THE CASE TO THE UNITED NATIONS-AND DISPATCHING A 40-SHIP FLEET.

DID THE ARGENTINES THINK THAT, WITH THE ADMINISTRATION DECIDING TO RESUME ARMS SALES AND SEEKING THEIR HAND IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THEY COULD GET THE PRESIDENT TO WINK AT THEIR GRAB OF THE FALKLANDS? WE TRUST MR. REAGAN LEFT NO DOUBT OF THE AMERICAN REJECTION OF THE GRAB WHEN HE TRIED TO TALK PRESIDENT GALTIERI OUT OF IT ON THURSDAY. ARGENTINA COMMITTED AGGRESSION. BY DOING SO IT REMOVES ITSELF FROM CONSIDERATION AS AN AMERICAN PARTNER IN OTHER HEMISPHERIC MATTERS. PERHAPS THE ARGENTINES WILL THINK OF THAT WHEN THEIR COLLECTIVE HEAD CLEARS.

UP AT THE UNITED NATIONS YESTERDAY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL GAVE PRETTY MUCH THE SORT OF SHODDY PERFORMANCE THAT HAS BROUGHT THE WORLD BODY INTO DISREPUTE OVER THE YEARS; ONLY 10 OF ITS MEMBERS COULD BRING THEMSELVES TO DEMAND AN IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE PULLOUT. PANAMA GAVE FULL AID AND COMFORT TO THE AGGRESSOR BY OPPOSING THE RESOLUTION, AND THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, WITH POLAND AND SPAIN, GAVE ALMOST FULL AID AND COMFORT BY ABSTAINING. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW THESE GOVERNMENTS SQUARE THEIR SUPPORT OF ARGENTINA'S ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE WITH, FOR INSTANCE, THEIR DENUNCIATION OF THE ISRAELI POSITION IN THE WEST BANK. PERHAPS THE UNITED NATIONS IS SO FAR GONE AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION THAT IT IS FOOLISH TO TAX IT WITH A DEMAND FOR CONSISTENCY, OR TO POINT OUT THAT ITS CREDIBILITY-ITS REMAINING CREDIBILITY-IS AT STAKE. ENDS.

HENDERSON

NNNN



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\* 7 in typists - 12/10/82  
IMMEDIATE

- 6 PS
- 3 PS/LPS
- PS/MR LUCE
- PS/Ld. TREFGARNE
- PS/PUS
- MR GIFFARD
- MR WRIGHT
- MR ADAMS
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FM CARACAS 041735Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 89 OF 4 APRIL

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS

ms

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS

FACED WITH THE GRAVE EVENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE MALVINAS, IN WHICH TWO NATIONS WITH WHICH WE MAINTAIN CORDIAL RELATIONS ARE INVOLVED, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPRESS, WITH LATIN AMERICAN CONCERN, THEIR POSITION IN FAVOUR OF PEACEFUL AND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT LEGAL INSTRUMENTS.

VENEZUELA, THE OBJECT AND VICTIM OF THE DESPOILMENT OF TERRITORY CARRIED OUT BY COLONIAL POWERS, REITERATES HER SOLIDARITY WITH THE JUST CLAIM OF THE SISTER REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, WHICH HAS SEEN HER SOVEREIGN TERRITORY DIMINISHED BY COLONIALIST POWER. SHE REITERATES ALSO HER CONVICTION THAT THE HISTORICAL REPARATION OF THE INJUSTICE MUST BE CHANNELLED THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS WHICH GUARANTEE A JUST, PRACTICAL AND PERMANENT SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

UNALTERABLY COMMITTED TO A RESOLUTE ANTI-COLONIAL POSITION, ONE OF THE PILLARS WHICH SUSTAIN THEIR FOREIGN POLICY, THE NATIONAL

~~UNALTERABLY COMMITTED TO A RESOLUTE ANTI-COLONIAL POSITION,~~  
~~ONE OF THE PILLARS WHICH SUSTAIN THEIR FOREIGN POLICY,~~ THE NATIONAL  
GOVERNMENT ARE AWARE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN THE CASE OF THE  
MALVINAS, AS IN OTHER CASES IN HISTORY, CANNOT CLAIM ANY TITLE  
OTHER THAN DESPOILMENT AND FORCE IN THE FACE OF ARGENTINA'S JUST  
CLAIM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CONSIDER IT  
NECESSARY TO HAVE RECOURSE TO PEACEFUL MEANS WHICH AVOID THE  
INCREASE OF TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS IN THE CONTINENT AND ENSURE  
THAT LATIN AMERICA IS NOT USED AS A FIELD IN WHICH THE POWERS OF  
ONE OR THE OTHER BLOC, USING OVERWHELMING FORCE, MAY INTERVENE.

PEACE IN THE REGION IS NOT ONLY A NECESSITY, BUT ALSO A VERY  
IMPORTANT CONDITION FOR THE SOLUTION BY THE PARTIES OF TERRITORIAL  
DIFFERENCES, WHICH SHOULD BE DULY RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNITY AND ~~NNN~~ SHOULD ENSURE FOR THE CLAIMANT STATE THE PEACEFUL  
AND UNINTERRUPTED POSSESSION OF THE TERRITORIES WHICH HAVE BEEN  
RECOVERED.

FINALLY, IN THIS SENSE, WE CALL ATTENTION TO THE RESOLUTION  
ADOPTED TODAY BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THAT RESOLUTION CONFINES  
ITSELF TO POINTING OUT ACTION TAKEN BY ARGENTINA WITH NO REFERENCE  
TO THAT OF THE UK, A PARTY DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE SITUATION,  
AND IGNORES THE JUST MOTIVATION OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. THUS IT  
OVERLOOKS THE ORIGINAL CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH IS THE TERRI-  
TORIAL DESPOILMENT CONSUMMATED BY THE OCCUPYING COLONIAL POWER.  
THIS SITUATION IS A SOURCE OF GRAVE CONCERN FOR THOSE OF US WHO  
ARE PLEDGED TO THE PEACEFUL AND PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF TERRITORIAL  
CONTROVERSIES, WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THEIR ENTIRETY AND NOT  
TREATED WITH INDIFFERENCE BY THE GREAT POWERS AND THE COUNTRIES OF  
THE THIRD WORLD, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE ORGANISATION  
IN CASES WHICH CAN LEAD TO SITUATIONS CRITICAL FOR PEACE.

ENDS

SECONDE

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

MR ADAMS

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

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FM LIMA 041441Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 65 OF 04 APRIL

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY PUBLISHED A COMMUNIQUE LAST NIGHT. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF TEXT. BEGINS:

WITH REFERENCE TO THE EVENTS WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND GREAT BRITAIN THE MFA GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(A) PERU HAS EXPRESSED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS AND NOW REITERATES ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RECOVERY BY THE ARGENTINE REPLUBLIC OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS WITHIN THE PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION CONSECRATED BY UN RESOLUTIONS.

(B) PERU MAINTAINS INVARIABLY ITS POSITION OF PRINCIPLE IN THE SENSE THAT INTERNATIONAL 'CONTROVERSIES MUST BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY THROUGH THE CORRESPONDING MECHANISMS FORESEEN IN THE TREATIES IN FORCE.

(C) THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT TRUSTS THAT THE CONFLICT WHICH HAS ARISEN BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE REPLUBLIC AND GREAT BRITAIN WILL BE RESOLVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE FULL RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE FRIENDS OF PERU ENDS.

2. PRESS COMMENT GENERALLY CONTINUES TO SUPPORT ARGENTINE INVASION.

WALLACE

ADVANCE COPIES FALKLAND ISLANDS

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[Tulists]

PS (6)  
 PS/LPS (3)  
 PS/MR LUCE  
 PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
 PS/PUS (2)  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR URE  
 MR ADAMS  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 HD/SAMD (FCO Dist + A/D Falkland Islands)  
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FM PANAMA CITY 041615Z APR 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 050900Z APR  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 29 OF 1 APRIL

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF A DECLARATION UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF JORGE E ILLUECA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHICH APPEARED IN TODAY'S PRESS:

OPEN QUOTES - BEGINS

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA RECOGNISES THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC OVER THE MALVINAS, INCLUDING THE ISLANDS OF SOUTH GEORGIA AND SOUTH SANDWICH AND REAFFIRMS ITS POSITION OF SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE REVINDICATION ALREADY EXPRESSED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, DOCTOR ARISTIDES ROYO, BEFORE THE XXXVI GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT SHARES THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE OF 1976 DECLARING THAT THE ARGENTINE HOLDS SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS AND THAT, IN ITS JUDGEMENT, WHAT REMAINED TO BE RESOLVED WAS THE PROCEDURE ENGLAND (SIC) MUST FOLLOW IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE TERRITORY OF THE SAID ISLANDS TO THE ARGENTINE.

THE UNITED NATIONS' DECLARATION ON DECOLONISATION AND THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE CONFERENCES OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES CONFIRM THE FULL INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND THE SOLID LEGAL AND POLITICAL BASIS FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM.

THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, PANAMA AMONGST THEM, CANNOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO AN ANACHRONISTIC COLONIAL SITUATION THAT HAS NO RIGHT TO PERSIST IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD BECAUSE IT IS DAMAGING TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE ARGENTINE NATION. THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT CHERISHES THE HOPE THAT IN KEEPING WITH RESOLUTION 2065 (XX) OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL REACH NEGOTIATED FORMULAS WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FOR THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF THE MALVINAS.

THE DECISION OF THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT TO GIVE ITS FULL SUPPORT TO THE RESTORATION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMANDER AND GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES.

CLOSE QUOTES - ENDS

2. THE COMMUNIQUE HAS NOT BEEN COMMUNICATED TO ME OFFICIALLY.

STEPHENSON

NNNN

SECRET

File     Inf

14

4 April 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Prime Minister enquired today what scope there might be for increasing internal opposition to the Argentine regime. She would be grateful for the views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the matter. On one particular aspect, she would also be grateful to know for how many hours the BBC External Services broadcast to Argentina and the Falkland Islands, how good reception is and whether any steps need to be taken to improve the services.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

5

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. WHITMORE ✓

KH  
S<sub>2</sub>

You should know that the Prime Minister asked for an analysis to be made of the recent intelligence and JIC assessments on the Falkland Islands situation. I have conveyed this to Sir Robert Armstrong, who has it in hand.

A. J. C.

4 April, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

File JWP



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 April 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Prime Minister expressed some concern today that the prominence given by the media to the views of armchair strategists on the military options available to HMG could prejudice our interests since it was not inconceivable that they might alight on an option which HMG might eventually wish to select.

Mrs. Thatcher spoke to the Home Secretary about her concern and asked whether it would be possible for him to contact the BBC and ITV at a high level to explain the problems which could be caused by such speculation. The point could be made that, when the task force was about to sail, such public comment was liable to be particularly damaging. The Home Secretary undertook to take action on this matter.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

J. F. Halliday, Esq.,  
Home Office.

SECRET

B



CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

SW



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 April, 1982

Falkland Islands

As you know, one of the main criticisms raised against the Government in yesterday's debate in the House of Commons was that an analysis of the Argentine press and public statements by the Government of the Argentine in the period since the present junta took office would have shown, well before the most recent events, that there was an intention to invade the Falkland Islands. The Prime Minister considers it important that this charge should be carefully examined before the next debate in the House of Commons.

I should be grateful if you could let me have, for submission to the Prime Minister on the evening of 5 April, an analysis of this kind with any comment you wish to offer. It would also be helpful if, for comparative purposes, an analysis could be provided of Argentinian Governmental and press comment at earlier periods - it may be possible to show that similar bellicose statements had been made which had not been followed by an invasion.

It was also stated in yesterday's debate that letters from Falkland Island counsellors and other Falkland Islanders in recent months provided further evidence of the likelihood of an Argentine invasion. Perhaps you could take account of this as well.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

*sup*

**B**

4 April 1982

ORDER IN COUNCIL PROVIDING FOR THE  
REQUISITION OF SHIPPING

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The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Nott's minute of 4 April and has approved the course of action proposed, subject, to the views of the other recipients of the minute.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade, the Attorney General and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

D.B. Omand, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

*GC*



12

MO 5/21

PRIME MINISTER

I mentioned to you yesterday afternoon that I had already taken a decision to charter the Canberra, a passenger liner owned by P&O. I explained to you that in spite of the political dimension I judged that we needed additional shipping for troop transport if we were to carry the maximum weapon load on HM Ships and get our men to the other end of the world in good order. The advantage of chartering such a ship is that it also enables us to embark a larger contingent than had already been planned.

2. Unfortunately further investigation during the course of yesterday afternoon has now indicated that we need to lay an order which should be done today with the Queen's approval being required the same day. Obviously this involves an even higher profile than I had wished or anticipated but I still must recommend that in the judgement of all of us in the MOD such steps are now necessary. / A note on the details is attached.

3. We would obviously have to prepare very careful briefing for the press before we laid such an order given that the first criticism will be that we have reduced the Royal Navy to such an insignificant size we cannot even carry our own troops. But since the ship would be flying the blue ensign and would be under the command of a Captain in the Royal Naval Reserves we would attempt to make it appear, as indeed is the case, a straightforward part of our emergency planning to which all Governments have subscribed.

4. Whilst I can see all the problems and disadvantages it might be wise to lay this general order pretty quickly whilst the nation and Parliament is still in a highly bellicose mood. Indeed, the

SECRET



fact of our taking general power to requisition shipping would show the urgency of the Government in meeting its objective.

5. I am copying this to the Foreign Secretary, the Lord President, the Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade and the Attorney General.

*MHR (runs) (private secretary)*

*[ approved by Mr Mott and signed in his absence ]*

Ministry of Defence

4th April 1982

SECRET

1. CINCFLEET has decided that he must obtain the use of several vessels to transport troops and equipment to the Falkland Islands. The most important requirement is for a passenger vessel and a freight carrier. The most immediately available and suitable vessels are the P&O CANBERRA (for passengers) and the P&O NORSEA (for vehicles and equipment).
2. P&O have refused to charter these vessels and it is necessary to seek Cabinet agreement to advise Her Majesty that an Order-in-Council be made exercising the Royal Perogative to requisition the ships.
3. The requirement is to transport 4350 men (including 3 Para Bn, the Spearhead). Service transport can accommodate all but 1700 men, 150 tons of stores and some 60 vehicles. The 1700 men can be accommodated on CANBERRA and the stores and vehicles on NORSEA. On discharging the troops CANBERRA would be able to take on the additional function of a casualty reception station with hospital facilities. Without these ships the Chiefs of Staff assessment is that the military capability of the force would be severely degraded, given the likely threat.
4. The Company are unwilling to agree to charter service. They fear that to do so would make them liable for all consequential third party claims for breach of contract. It is unlikely that P&O will change their view. But, even if they did, charter would have serious drawbacks. Firstly the liability for claims would be transferred to HMG and would involve an open-ended financial commitment. We are unable to quantify this but it would vastly increase the cost of the operations. Secondly we would have to rely on the continuing good will of the company at all future stages.

5. Finally the Company do not wish to be seen to be voluntarily breaking their contractual obligations to passengers whose passages have already been booked. The only way of protecting both the Company and the Crown from claims is therefore to exercise the Royal Perogative to take up the CANBERRA from trade. The chartering cost of £105,000 per day includes victuals, fuel and crew costs. It will be for P&O to refund to passengers the money they have paid for the holidays they cannot now take.

6. There are disadvantages to this course of action. Firstly it is overt and dramatic. It could arouse inevitable comparisons with previous occasions when recourse has had to be made to the Perogative (the two World Wars and Suez). Secondly we should have to continue to rely on the existing crew of the CANBERRA who cannot be subject to naval disciplinary law. It is not possible at this short notice to assess ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> all the implications but we do not expect this to be a problem. The crew will probably demand a supplementary payment. If the operation is prolonged the fleet will require additional oilers - the British Tamar and British Esk (both owned by BP). The Order-in-Council would cover these ships and any others which might be required.

7. Department of Trade officials have obtained legal advice which confirms proposed course of action. A draft Order-in-Council / has been drawn up and a copy is attached. If this is agreed, the Department of Trade will carry out the necessary requisition actions and negotiations with P&O.

AT THE COURT AT  
on the                      day of                      1982

PRESENT

THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY  
IN COUNCIL,

WHEREAS it is expedient in view of the situation now existing in relation to the Falkland Islands that Her Majesty should be enabled to exercise in the most effectual manner the powers at law vested in Her for the defence of the realm including Her Majesty's dependent territories:

NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:-

1. This Order may be cited as the Requisitioning of Ships Order, 1982.

2. A Secretary of State or the Minister of Transport (hereinafter referred to as "the Minister") or the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may requisition for Her Majesty's service any British ship and anything on board such ship wherever the ship may be.

3. A Secretary of State or the Minister of Transport or the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may, to such extent and subject to such conditions and restrictions as he or they think proper, delegate all or any of his or their functions under Article 2 of this Order to any specified persons or class of persons.

4. The owner of any ship or thing requisitioned under this Order shall receive such payment for the use thereof during its employment in Her Majesty's service and such compensation for loss or damage to the ship or thing occasioned by such employment as may be provided by any enactment relating to payment or compensation in respect of the exercise of powers conferred by this Order and, in the absence of such an enactment, such payment or compensation as may be agreed between a Secretary of State or the Minister of Transport or the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty (as the case may be) and the owner or, failing such agreement, as may be determined by arbitration.

5. In this Order:-

"Secretary of State" means any of Her Majesty's

Secretaries of State;

"Requisition" in relation to any ship or thing means take possession of the ship or thing or require the ship or thing to be placed at the disposal of the requisitioning authority;

"British ship" means a ship registered in the United Kingdom or any of the following countries -

- (a) the Isle of Man;
- (b) any of the Channel Islands;
- (c) any colony;
- (d) any country outside Her Majesty's dominions in which Her Majesty has jurisdiction in right of the government of the United Kingdom.

Signed:



File SW

MR. WHITMORE

The First Sea Lord rang today to ask whether he might have a five minutes personal chat with the Prime Minister about H.M.S. Invincible. He said that he did not wish to exploit the present situation but that he had various suggestions to make which might be helpful for the forthcoming debate in the House of Commons.

With the Prime Minister's agreement, I rang back to say that it would be difficult for her to fit this in in current circumstances but perhaps the First Sea Lord might like to have a word with you. If he does, his Private Secretary will probably contact you tomorrow.

A. J. COLES

4 April, 1982

Private Secretary

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SITREP AT 0730, 4 APRIL

~~Prime Minister~~  
Overnight report by F/CO.

A.S.C. 4/4

SECURITY COUNCIL

1. UKMIS New York telegram Nos 389, 391 and 392 confirmed the result of the Security Council vote which had been passed to us earlier by telephone (10 votes for, 1 against [Panama], 4 abstentions [USSR, Poland, China and Spain]. The telegrams underline that almost all speakers in the debate supported Argentinians' case on the substance of sovereignty dispute, while strongly opposed to the use of force. This point needs to be borne in mind for future approaches to the UN, in Sir A Parsons's view.

SOUTH GEORGIA

2. Argentine Military Junta Communiqué No 12 claimed that the takeover of South Georgia was complete with their takeover of Grytviken. This now confirmed in a message from HMS ENDURANCE at 032245Z. ENDURANCE's helicopter carried out a covert reconnaissance during which it discovered the Argentine frigate GUERRICO off Grytviken. They also believed, but did not sight, the PARAISO to be in the Bay. They had no knowledge of the fate of the Royal Marines and the BAS party at Grytviken. The remainder of South Georgia was in British hands. Four British Antarctic survey personnel were at Bird Island, two at Schlieper Bay (Bird Island is at the western extremity of South Georgia and Schlieper Bay lies to the East of Bird Island at the western extremity of main island). They had also discovered Cindy Buxton and Annie Price at St Andrews Bay, together with two BAS scientists who had gone to give them moral support. ENDURANCE's helicopter had dropped a message of good cheer but had not picked them up. The MOD described St Andrews Bay as two days' march from Grytviken. ENDURANCE has now departed South Georgia and spent the night south-west of the island amongst '800 ice-bergs'. ENDURANCE will attempt to carry out another reconnaissance flight on 4 April. (There is a separate Argentine account of the military encounter at Grytviken.)

3. Duty Office No 10, Private Secretary and Mr Luce informed, as well as Lord Buxton and Dr Laws (BAS). Mr Luce was anxious to avoid any repetition of the delay in confirming the seizure of Port Stanley and instructed that News Department should confirm, in response to any press enquiries, that Grytviken had fallen. News Dept were informed accordingly.

UK/CHILE

4. At 0015 hrs the Sunday Express telephoned to ask for confirmation that the Chileans had offered us the use of HMS NORFOLK. We declined to comment.

DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY

5. The Metropolitan Police reported that at 2030 hrs on 2 April two men were arrested outside the Argentine Embassy. They were charged with being drunk and disorderly. During the arrest a small piece of rock was thrown at the Embassy and a window broken.

6. At 1525 on 3 April two men were arrested after throwing tins of corned beef at the Embassy and breaking a window. They will be charged on Wednesday 7 April.

7. At 1930 hrs on 3 April the New National Front began a peaceful, torchlight vigil in Wilton Crescent which lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. The area around the Embassy has now been cordoned off.

8. We were notified at 0315 that a junior barrister and a consultant architect had been arrested for throwing an egg at the Argentine Residence. They claimed to be making 'a protest' on behalf of the man in the street'.

PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S REACTIONS TO BRITISH MOVES

9. At 0500 the BBC Monitoring Service rang to say that they had picked up an Argentine news agency report which covered a meeting which President Galtieri had with journalists shortly after midnight. He apparently wanted to make it clear to the international community that, if attacked, the Argentine will fight. But they are prepared to talk and keep talking. The Monitoring Service will let us have a copy of the report.

P J Weston

Copied to: PS/LPS  
PS/Mr Luce  
PS/PUS  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Ure

Mr Gillmore  
Mr Fearn  
Mr Marshall  
Mr Fenn

*[Handwritten signature]*

EMERGENCY UNIT

0730: 4 APRIL 1982



Just

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 April 1982

B/F for set

FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Prime Minister has agreed that a message of thanks should be sent to President Mitterrand in the following terms:

"Dear Mr. President,

I am most grateful to you for telephoning me yesterday to confirm France's support for us in the crisis created by the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. Your support in the Security Council has been invaluable and the influence you were good enough to exert on our behalf with Zaire and Togo was indispensable to the adoption of our draft Resolution calling for immediate Argentine withdrawal.

I very much appreciated your thoughtfulness and kindness in telephoning me personally. It was such a warm gesture. One does need friends in times like these.

We are urgently considering other ways in which our allies may be able to help us in our efforts to resolve this crisis. Your personal support is a great encouragement.

Yours sincerely,  
Margaret Thatcher."

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

5



Private Secretary

SAM D ① Tel (a) to issue  
② Please pass tel. (b) direct to No. 10, who  
are expecting it.

J  
9/4

FALKLAND: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I submit:
  - (a) a draft telegram to Sir A Parsons; and
  - (b) a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Mitterrand. Mr Luce and the PUS have seen and agreed.
2. The Prime Minister has already sent a message of thanks to King Hussein. Posts in other Security Council capitals which supported us have also been instructed to express appreciation.
3. Sir A Parsons' reporting telegrams are attached.

*N C R Williams*

N C R Williams  
Emergency Unit

4 April 1982

File No. ....

Department **UND** .....

Drafted by **N C R WILLIAMS**  
(Block Capitals) .....

Tel. Extn.....

**OUTWARD**

**TELEGRAM**

Security Classification  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

Precedence  
**IMMEDIATE**

DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) .....

(Time) .....Z

POSTBY.....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) .....**CONFIDENTIAL**.....

(Caveat/  
Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword) .....

(Deskby).....Z

TO **IMMEDIATE**  
(precedence)

**PARIS**  
(post)

Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info)..... **UKMIS NEW YORK** .....

Distribution:-

FCO  
SAMD  
Addl Dist:  
Falkland Islands

Copies to:-

*2-3 very much appreciated for thoughtfulness and kindness in telephoning me personally. It was such a warm gesture. One does need friends in these times like this.*

[TEXT]

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to President Mitterand.

Begins:

Dear Mr President

I am most grateful to you for telephoning me yesterday to confirm France's support for us in the crisis created by the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. Your support in the Security Council has been invaluable and the influence you were good enough to exert on our behalf with Zaire and Togo was indispensable to the adoption of our draft Resolution calling for immediate Argentine withdrawal.

We are urgently considering other ways in which our allies may be able to help us in our efforts to resolve this crisis. ~~by peaceful means and will continue to work in close consultation with your Government.~~ Your personal support is a great encouragement.

Yours sincerely , Margaret Thatcher

Ends

FILE SW

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 April, 1982

As you are aware, President Mitterrand spoke to the Prime Minister on the telephone yesterday afternoon. I enclose a transcript of the conversation based on a tape recording.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

Chastler  
Gps



T 60/82  
First received from  
High Commissioner re  
Subject filed on  
5/4/82  
PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

3 APR 1982

Mr. Leon Ponzet

Thank you for your message on the Falkland Islands. I agree with you completely as to the gravity of this use of armed force to take possession of a peaceful territory, against the proven wishes of its inhabitants.

On my instructions, Australia's Permanent Representative at the U.N. has intervened in the Security Council's debate to condemn Argentina's use of force and call for an immediate withdrawal of Argentinean forces; Michael MacKellar, who is acting as Foreign Minister in Tony Street's absence in the Middle East, has called for a peaceful resolution of the dispute and I issued a statement on the situation this afternoon.

I attach copies of the texts of David Anderson's remarks in the Security Council, and of my statement.

In this most difficult time, you have Australia's firm and unequivocal support.

You sincerely  
Robert Muldoon

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister of Britain,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON



GRS 240

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 031931Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES

TELEGRAM NO 99 OF 3 APR

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK BIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO  
ROUTINE EC POSTS CANBERRA WELLINGTON OTTAWA MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO.

BBC OVERSEAS SERVICE. MESSAGE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS.

1. I HAVE RECORDED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR USE ON THE BBC  
OVERSEAS SERVICE \*\*CALLING THE FALKLANDS\*\* FOR BROADCAST AT 2210 GMT  
ON 4 APRIL.

BEGINS.

I AM TAKING THIS FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO ALL THE BRITISH  
PEOPLE OF THE FALKLANDS, AND TO SEND THEM A MESSAGE OF ENCOURAGEMENT  
FROM US IN BRITAIN.

BOTH HOUSES OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT TODAY UNITED IN CONDEMNING  
THIS UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA.

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ITS DEPENDENCIES REMAIN BRITISH TERRITORY,  
INHABITED BY BRITISH PEOPLE. IT IS OUR FIRM OBJECTIVE TO ENSURE  
THAT THEY ARE FREED FROM ALIEN OCCUPATION.

LET ME READ YOU WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID YESTERDAY TO THE  
HOUSE OF COMMONS

THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, LIKE THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN,  
ARE AN ISLAND RACE. THEY ARE FEW IN NUMBER. BUT EVEN SMALL  
COMMUNITIES, IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE WORLD HAVE THE RIGHT TO  
LIVE IN PEACE, TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN WAY OF LIFE, AND TO DETERMINE  
THEIR OWN ALLEGIANCE.

THE WAY OF LIFE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS IS BRITISH. THEIR  
ALLEGIANCE IS TO THE CROWN.

IT IS THE WISH OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE AND THE DUTY OF HER  
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO UPHOLD THAT  
RIGHT. THAT WILL BE OUR HOPE AND OUR ENDEAVOUR IN THE DAYS  
AHEAD.

ENDS.

CARRINGTON

STANDARD

S AM D  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
UND  
ECD (E)  
ERD

MAED  
ESID  
SED  
CONSULAR D

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

RESTRICTED

1620  
LONDON  
0119

'NITAC'

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. ....  
59A/82

UNCLAS 3 APR 82  
FROM WELLINGTON  
TO LONDON 2232

'IMMEDIATE' 'NITAC'

NITAC FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER  
FROM PRIME MINISTER

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PERSONEL MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO  
MRS THATCHER.

BEGINS.....

'DEAR MARGARET,  
I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE  
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

WE ARE AS CONCERNED AS YOU ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF  
THIS AGGRESSION AND I HAVE CONDEMNED IT IN A STATEMENT  
ISSUED AS SOON AS I LEARNED OF IT.

LET ME SAY THAT WE STAND READY TO HELP IN WHATEVER WAYS  
MAY BE APPROPRIATE. I HAVE ALERTED OUR PEOPLE AT THE  
UNITED NATIONS TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOURS.

YOURS SINCERELY, ROB MULDOON.'

ENDS.....

THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE IS A RESPONSE TO A MESSAGE FROM  
MRS THATCHER RECEIVED THROUGH THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER THIS  
MORNING.

K32442  
03/01197 WLN IHC

COL 2232  
+++

TELETYPE 3 APR 82  
WELLINGTON  
TO LONDON 2230

IMMEDIATE

YORK (PM) 202 OTTAWA 402

IMMEDIATE

CANBERRA 1205 WASHINGTON 1391 SANTIAGO 110 LIMA 128 PRIORITY

PMD  
P/S TO MFA  
P/S TO MIN DEF  
DEFENCE  
SFA (AMRR/UNC)

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

PRIME MINISTER MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT 3 APRIL:

REGINS -

'NEW ZEALAND CONDEMNS THE RESORT TO ARMED FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES OF THIS KIND. IT IS NOT THE WAY TO HANDLE PROBLEMS THESE DAYS.

'THIS IS PRECISELY THE KIND OF ISSUE WHICH OUGHT TO BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLANDS, NOT BY ARMED AGGRESSION. WE HAVE EXPRESSED TO BRITAIN OUR CONCERN AND SUPPORT AND I HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR AMBASSADOR AT THE UN TO MAKE THIS CLEAR DURING THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION. WE SUPPORT THE BRITISH DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINIAN FORCES FROM THE FALKLANDS AND A SEARCH BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.'

FNDS.

2. PLEASE PASS COPY TO FCO AND MINISTERS. SUGGEST YOU ALSO PASS COPY TO COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT.

=

K22413 GLC  
02/2314Z WLN

COL 2230 202 402 1205 1391 110 128

+++



NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION

NEW ZEALAND HOUSE · HAYMARKET · LONDON SW1Y 4TQ

Telephone: 01-930 8422 Telex: 24368

From the High Commissioner  
H.E. The Hon L.W. Gandar

3rd April 1982

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing St.,  
London.

Dear Prime Minister,

I am enclosing an urgent message to you from my Prime Minister, Mr. Muldoon in reply to your message to him about the Falkland Islands. I enclose also the text of a Press statement which Mr. Muldoon has issued and to which he has referred.

May I extend my own good wishes to you and your colleagues in this difficult time.

Yours sincerely  
Leslie Candor

SUBJECT cc m...  
cc m...

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

SATURDAY, 3 APRIL, 1982

Prime Minister:

Hallo, Monsieur President

President Mitterrand:

I am ringing to express my sympathy with you. I wouldn't wish you to think that France, as a very close friend and neighbour, was not absolutely with you in thought and freedom.

Prime Minister:

Monsieur President, I do appreciate your calling. It's very kind and thoughtful of you. We're in an acutely difficult position, and we've had a very difficult morning in Parliament. Thank you very much for your message. Above all, thank you for your support, and both I and the British people will appreciate this.

President Mitterrand:

Mrs. Thatcher, I want you to know that it isn't just I myself, but the French people who would want you to know - and the British people - how close we feel to you in this.

Prime Minister:

Thank you very much. We've been close before and I therefore very very much appreciate what you've said. Parliament is determined that we shall restore the Falkland Islands to British sovereignty, and I know that we'll have your support and the support of the French people in that.

President Mitterrand:

I want you to know that if there's anything we can do to help, we should like to. Of course, I quite realise that Britain is quite big enough to find its own solutions to this problem. But it's important that you should realise that others share your opposition to this kind of aggression.

Prime Minister:

Thank you very much. We all have need of friends at difficult

times and that's when we particularly appreciate them.

President Mitterrand:

Please accept my very best wishes and I hope that we can be in touch again if there's anything that we can usefully do.

Prime Minister:

Thank you very much. I hope that, too. And in any event, I hope that we will soon meet again.

MR COLES

President Mitterrand

President Mitterrand telephoned the Prime Minister at 1800 hours, after indicating much earlier in the day that he was ready to talk to the Prime Minister at any time which suited her. A transcript of the conversation is being typed. Sir Michael Palliser acted as translator.

The President spoke to assure the Prime Minister of his personal support, and of the support of the French people as a whole, for Britain at this time. He went on to say that, if there was anything that France could do to help, she stood ready. France understood that Britain was a powerful nation, capable of handling such problems on her own, but he wanted the Prime Minister and Britain to know that she had friends who shared her opposition to this kind of aggression, and would provide any assistance requested.

I have not dictated any record, nor have I forwarded the transcript to the FCO.

During my conversations with the French Embassy (M. Tremeau), before the President spoke to the Prime Minister, I was told that M. Cheysson had telephoned the French Embassy in London to pass on his own messages of support and to say that France was doing everything possible to rally support for our UN Resolution <sup>from countries</sup> within their sphere, like Togo and Zaire.

*MA*

3 April, 1982

MR. COLES

cc. Mr. Whitmore

Sir Philip Moore asked what further information could be given to The Queen, and whether there was any more sensitive information that the Prime Minister wished to make available.

After consulting the Prime Minister, I reported to Sir Philip at 1915 hours today. I told him that the Prime Minister did not feel that there was any significant new intelligence/covert information to add to what she had been able to report at Windsor on Thursday. I told him briefly of the position in the Security Council, confirmed today's Commons announcements about the preparations for the fleet to begin to sail on Monday and the order to freeze Argentine assets, and informed him of the present estimate that the Governor and marines would arrive back at 0940 on Monday.

I also told him what we knew of events in Grytviken, and confirmed to him that this information had largely been relayed through H.M.S. Endurance, thus confirming that it had not been sunk.

MAP

3 April, 1982



MR. COLES

Grytviken

The messages received during the day from Endurance have been as follows:

1. Received in London 1220 BST:  
Second Argentine vessel - frigate - arrived off Leith.
2. Received 1442 BST; in radio contact with Grytviken  
[i.e. no change in situation].
3. 1520 BST:  
Endurance reported direct her monitoring of conversation between British Antarctic <sup>Survey</sup> ~~surface~~ base and the first Argentine vessel. The Argentine vessel's commander told the shore base that the Port Stanley marines had surrendered and called on those at base to do the same. The commander said that he would not do so. The ship then proposed to send in Argentine marines. The base commander replied that he would treat this as a provocative action. The ship then changed its ~~proposal~~ proposal and said it would send in a helicopter with one man. The commander agreed to allow this to land, but ordered the marines to resist any additional landing.
4. 1637 BST:  
Endurance reported that it had lost communication with Grytviken. There was jamming on the frequency. If communication was not resumed, Endurance proposed to fly a helicopter reconnaissance, remaining as covert as possible.

MA

3 April, 1982

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. ....

T 59/82

CONFIDENTIAL

70 - 1

cc Mad ops

OO AMMAN  
GRS 67  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM F C O 032210Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 OF 3 APRIL  
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK.

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO  
KING HUSSEIN.  
BEGINS  
YOUR MAJESTY,  
I HAVE JUST HEAD<sup>R</sup> THE RESULT OF THE VOTING ON THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS RESOLUTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY  
COUNCIL. I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SUPPORT.  
WITH BEST WISHES,  
MARGARET THATCHER.  
ENDS

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

STANDARD  
S AM D  
NENAD  
EMERGENCY STAFF

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

SUBJECT

mine

A.S.C.  $\frac{4}{4}$   
L.A.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

SATURDAY, 3 APRIL, 1982

Prime Minister:

Good evening, your Majesty. I am so sorry to have to contact you at this time of night. The problem is rather urgent. There is a Motion before the Security Council about the Argentine invasion of the Falklands. The vote upon that Motion is due to be taken shortly and, as we understand at the moment, Jordan intends to abstain unless your Majesty could agree to vote with us on that Motion. It is vital that we get nine votes; otherwise, the Motion falls. The Motion, as you know, demands an immediate cessation of hostility, demands the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falklands and calls on the Argentine and British Governments to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences. At the moment, in addition to ourselves, the United States, France, Ireland, Japan and Uganda are voting for, and Togo is also voting for. And we had hoped that Jordan would help us by voting for the Motion. We believe that Zaire may also vote for it. And I thought the only way to see if we could secure Jordan's co-operation would be to contact you, Sir, directly.

King Hussein:

Prime Minister, I appreciate that very, very much. We are very concerned about all these developments and are very supportive of ...(unclear). So I will be in touch right away and hope I will be in time to make sure that they will vote for ... (unclear).

Prime Minister:

I am most grateful to you. Very very grateful indeed. Your very kind and a wonderful ally. Thank you so much, thank you. Goodnight.

King Hussein:

Thank you. Thank you for calling me.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

MR. COLES

I had a round up with David Omand at about 1900 tonight. It may be helpful to record the following points.

Mr. Nott's plans for Sunday:

0930	Session with <u>Chiefs of Staff</u> , going over <u>operational plans</u> , etc.
Late morning	Weekend World Interview with <u>Brian Walden</u> .
Early p.m.	Fly to <u>Portsmouth</u> to visit <u>HMS Hermes</u> (BBC mute filming arranged).
1700 approx.	Depart <u>Portsmouth</u> , returning to London by 1800 hours.

PM  
knows  
of this

Next steps. I asked David when Mr. Nott expected to be able to put on paper some proposals to allow colleagues to begin to focus on issues beyond the departure of the fleet. He said that work on this was already well in hand with the Chiefs of Staff, but would need to be translated from operational language to political language. He took the point that some initial paper very early next week was needed, particularly after a weekend in which various groups of Ministers will be talking privately and informally without any common starting point.

Arising from what I reported to him of this afternoon's conversations, he made three points.

Paragraph (1) deleted and retained under  
Section 3(4)

CP Wayland

11 September 2012

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- 2 -

(2) It was misleading for colleagues to think in black and white terms about some major engagement some weeks away. Planning needed to envisage a combination of some diplomatic and military incidents which, over the next few days would allow the UK to wrong foot the Argentines militarily. This was what would be considered at Mr. Nott's meeting with Chiefs of Staff tomorrow.

(3) Mr. Nott had got the message from today's discussions about the intentions of colleagues, and the MOD was now effectively on a "war footing". This meant that the operations staff would increasingly be in the lead, but political input would always be available whenever we wanted it. (I think David was trying to hint that we might find the Services attempting to cut out the political offices in dealings with us.) Through tomorrow, the MOD Private Office would be ~~around~~<sup>manned</sup> as if for a normal working day, perhaps with an earlier than usual evening finish. John Nott and the Duty Private Secretary were always available on bleeper, but they would continue to rely primarily on the Resident Clerk through the silent hours.

MA

3 April 1982



10 DOWNING STREET

AJC

Monday

PM confirms she is ready to see Governor whenever he is ready on Monday.

I put in a minute from Bernard about her Monday ITN engagement, which he recommends her to fulfil.

MAJ 3/4

PM Hassan.

na  
MA

PRIME MINISTER

Following last night's discussion in Cabinet, I have explored the freezing of Argentine financial assets in this country. While there is of course some unavoidable risk of damage to London's position as a financial centre, such action will in present circumstances be widely understood.

I am advised that it would be appropriate to lay an Order under the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964 which would have the effect of preventing the movement of gold, securities or other funds held in this country by the Argentine Government or Argentine residents. While it would not in practice be feasible for such funds to move before Monday, I would see advantage in our laying the Order today. I attach a text which requires the signature of two Lords Commissioners: I suggest that you and I should sign it forthwith.

That done, you might wish to include the following passage in your speech in the House this morning:-

"As an appropriate precautionary, and I hope temporary, measure, the Government has taken action to freeze Argentine financial assets held in this country. An Order will be laid before Parliament today, under the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964) blocking the movement of gold, securities, or funds held in the United Kingdom by the Argentine Government or Argentine residents."

Copies of this minute go to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

GH

3 April 1982

John

Chancellor is personally happy with this, but it is not yet fully cleared.

MA

PRIME MINISTER

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Copies of this minute go to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Attorney General and Sir Robert Armstrong.

GH

3 April 1982



PRIME MINISTER

Falkland Islands and the Media

After today, I am strongly of the view that the Government will win no prizes if it is seen to be running away from the media tomorrow and does not take every reasonable opportunity to explain its case. We simply cannot allow it to go by default. In addition, Lord Carrington and Mr. Nott will win no credit with their critics for turning down invitations.

Against this background, I have advised the FCO that Lord Carrington could very usefully do tomorrow's LWT "Weekend World" with Brian Walden. I am also urging the Ministry of Defence to encourage Mr. Nott to explain his case, as suitable opportunities arise. MOD and FCO are considering who should put the Government's case on BBC Radio "World This Weekend". We shall consider who should respond to "Panorama" and Granada's "World In Action" in the light of events tomorrow.

On reflection, I think it would be helpful if you could fulfil your engagement with ITN on Monday afternoon - for the same reasons: the Government needs to induce a greater rationality into the debate and to win understanding of the problems involved in coping with the Falkland Islands.

I have also agreed with the FCO and MOD that the Governor of the Falkland Islands and the leader of the marines should not be exposed to the press before they have reported to you and Lord Carrington on Monday. But we cannot keep them away from the press forever and we have agreed that a press conference should be set up for Monday afternoon.

I hope you are content with all these arrangements and especially my contention that Ministers - and particularly the two most closely concerned - should be seen this week to be fighting back.

3 April, 1982

B. INGHAM

*Mr Nott  
is now  
doing  
"Weekend  
World"  
M.P.*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
 Telephone 01-~~230 7672~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

3rd April 1982

*Handwritten initials:* ~~KL~~  
 S.V.

*Handwritten:* Dear David,

MILITARY NOTETAKER FOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS

We are grateful for your agreement to the presence of a military notetaker at Cabinet or Cabinet Committee meetings on the Falkland Islands situation which may give rise to decisions on operational matters. The notetaker will be the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee or a member of his Secretariat. It is understood that this is subject to prior agreement.

This should provide a useful safeguard that Ministers' decisions are most rapidly translated into operational orders.

In the circumstances there may very well be occasions when meetings are called at short notice under No 10 auspices to discuss particular aspects of the situation. Perhaps I can leave it to John Coles, to whom I am copying this letter, to bear the same requirement in mind for such meetings.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and to Brigadier Eyre (SECCOS).

*Handwritten signature:* Yours ever,  
 David Omand

(D B OMAND)

D J Wright Esq

SECRET

GRS 390

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 031915Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1107 OF 3 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR) UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1077 : FALKLANDS

1. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE CLEAR TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI, AND AS HAIG HAS DONE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING ON THE ASSUMPTION AND SAYING SO, THAT IF THE ARGENTINES INVADED THE FALKLANDS WE WOULD NOT ACQUIESCE AND WOULD DEPLOY A NAVAL FORCE TO THE AREA.
2. AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS ON THURSDAY THE AMERICANS ACCEPT THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL CERTAINLY NOT BE BROUGHT BACK TO A COURSE OF REASON IF THERE IS NO COUNTERVAILING FORCE IN THE AREA.
3. THE LONGISH TIME-SPAN BETWEEN THE DEPARTURE OF OUR NAVAL FORCE AND ITS ARRIVAL IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS PROBABLY GOING TO GIVE RISE TO A SEARCH HERE FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS. OPINION HERE MAY BECOME SOFTER AS THE PROSPECT OF MILITARY ENGAGEMENT COMES NEARER. THERE MAY WELL BE GROWING CONCERN AT THE THOUGHT OF WARFARE IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE BETWEEN A MAJOR EUROPEAN ALLY AND AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE OAS.
- 4 IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE U S ADMINISTRATION WILL BECOME INVOLVED, WHETHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION SO AS TO AVERT CONFLICT. I REALISE THAT IT IS EARLY DAYS FOR YOU TO START THINKING ABOUT THIS BEFORE THE FLEET, WHOSE PROXIMITY WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO BRINGING THE ARGENTINES TO ANY NEGOTIATION, HAS EVEN SET SAIL. BUT THERE COULD BE DANGERS FOR US IN A MOVE BY THE AMERICANS TOWARDS EARLY NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITIES. WE MIGHT THEREFORE BE ADVISED TO BE READY WITH OUR OWN IDEAS OF WHAT COULD BE HELPFUL FROM THE AMERICANS, HOWEVER INAPPROPRIATE IT WILL BE FOR US TO BE PUTTING ANYTHING FORWARD PUBLICLY AT THIS STAGE. WHAT OBVIOUSLY WE WOULD WANT TO AVOID IS GETTING INTO A POSITION IN WHICH WE WERE RESTRAINED FROM TAKING OR THREATENING MILITARY ACTION OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME WITH OUR FORCES HELD IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WHILE THE ARGENTINES BY THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE ON THE ISLANDS INCREASED THEIR DE FACTO CONTROL.

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SECRET

5. IT IS MUCH TOO SOON TO GO INTO ALL THIS AND I MERELY WANTED TO SIGNAL A WAY IT MAY START TO LOOK FROM HERE. THE AMERICANS MAY WELL COME TO THE VIEW THAT THE ESSENCE OF THE DILEMMA WILL BE HOW TO GET A SHORT-TERM SOLUTION THAT AVERTS WAR OR THE THREAT OF WAR AND THAT THEREFORE MUST INVOLVE FOR US ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT HOLDING OUT THE PROSPECT OF A LONG-TERM SOLUTION THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINES.

HENDERSON

FCO D  
SAMD  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL D  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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2

SECRET

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GRS 120  
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FM BUENOS AIRES 03/2134Z APR 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 154 OF 03 APRIL 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO AND WASHINGTON

*h.a.  
102 5/4*

FALKLANDS

IN THE LIGHT OF MR NOTT'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE TODAY (RETRACT 00903) ABOUT DATES FOR OUR NAVAL TASK FORCE, I RECOMMEND THAT, UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION, YOU ASK THE BBC TO PUT OUT ON THEIR WORLD SERVICE, WHICH IS THE BEST WAY OF DISSEMINATING ADVICE NOW AVAILABLE TO US, THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:- QUOTE IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER HOSTILITIES, THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES IS NOW REPLYING TO ENQUIRERS THAT UK CITIZENS WHO HAVE NO PRESSING NEED TO REMAIN IN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC ARE ADVISED TO CONSIDER LEAVING THE COUNTRY BY NORMAL COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT UNQUOTE.

2. WE HAVE CLEARED THIS STATEMENT WITH THE SWISS EMBASSY HERE.

WILLIAMS

[COPY ADVANCED TO EMERGENCY STAFF]

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S AM D  
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FALKLAND ISLANDS

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

*JJ*

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR ~~DEE~~ GIFFARD

MR URE

*Mr. Adams*  
HD/S AM D - (FCO Disc +  
As Falkland Is.)

HD/DEFENCE DEPT

HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

MR WRIGHT

*Mr. Gilmore*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 031255Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 129 OF 03 APR

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEWYORK, TOKYO, MADRID, DUBLIN, GEORGETOWN,  
KINSHASA.

ADVANCE COPIES

IMMEDIATE (4/82)

*PS/Lt. Ziegler,*

*PS/N<sup>o</sup> 10, Downing Street,*

*DIO, Cabinet Office.*

*(Copies passed to the Emergency Staff.)*

YOUR TELNO 130 TO TOKYO AND UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 378.  
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

FROM SINDALL IN AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE FROM AMMAN.

1. THESE TELEGRAMS ARRIVED JUST AS I WAS LEAVING TO SEE QUEEN NUR OFF ON HER TRIP TO LONDON. I WAS THEREFORE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH KING HUSSEIN AT THE AIRPORT. I THANKED HIM FOR EARLIER JORDANIAN HELP (PARA 5 OF UKMIS TELNO 378) AND SAID I VERY MUCH HOPED WE COULD CONTINUE TO COUNT ON JORDANIAN SUPPORT FOR A BRITISH RESOLUTION LATER TODAY, 3 APRIL. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD ENSURE THAT MATTERS WERE FOLLOWED THROUGH WITH CLOSE ATTENTION.
2. I SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS AT THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY TO WALID TASH, THE JORDANIAN ALTERNATE DELEGATE DESIGNATE TO THE UN WHO APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN WHEELED IN ESPECIALLY FOR THE OCCASION (HE HAS NOT BEEN APPEARING AT THE MFA FOR SOME WEEKS NOW). TASH UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY MY REPRESENTATIONS URGENTLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER BUT WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE LIKELY JORDANIAN RESPONSE. I SAID TO TASH THAT THE INHABITANTS OF THE FALKLANDS WERE NOW UNDER ILLEGAL ARMED OCCUPATION AND BEING PREVENTED BY FORCE FROM EXERCISING THEIR RIGHTS TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD ONLY JUST FINISHED DEBATING THE SITUATION IN THE WEST WHERE THE RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS WERE ALSO AT ISSUE. WE

I SAID TO TASH THAT THE INHABITANTS OF THE FALKLANDS WERE NOW UNDER ILLEGAL ARMED OCCUPATION AND BEING PREVENTED BY FORCE FROM EXERCISING THEIR RIGHTS TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD ONLY JUST FINISHED DEBATING THE SITUATION IN THE WEST BANK WHERE THE RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS WERE ALSO AT ISSUE. WE NATURALLY VERY MUCH HOPED JORDAN WOULD MAINTAIN A CONSISTENT POSITION WHEN THE FALKLANDS QUESTION CAME TO A VOTE LATER TODAY.

3. IF ANY FURTHER LOBBYING IS NEEDED IN AMMAN I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO BE SENT THE TEXT OF OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION.

URWICK

CCN PARA 3 LINE 8 WA ~~U~~NDER ILLEGAL ARMED .....

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BUENOS AIRES 03/1853Z APR 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 150 OF 03 APRIL 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE BERNE

*ADL 5/4**h-a.*

## BREAK OF RELATIONS

1. THE SWISS AMBASSADOR AND I MET KELLER SARMIENTO, HEAD OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT MFA, THIS MORNING IN THE SWISS EMBASSY WHEN I WAS HANDED A NOTE IN REPLY TO THE NOTIFICATION GIVEN TO THE ARGENTINE CHARGE IN LONDON YESTERDAY, 2 APRIL. THE NOTE REQUIRES ME AND MY STAFF TO LEAVE ARGENTINA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN MIDDAY ON 9 APRIL. THE NOTE CONFIRMS THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT THE SWISS GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE CHARGE OF OUR DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS IN ARGENTINEA AND INFORMS US THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL ACT FOR THE ARGENTINES IN LONDON. THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO OUR ESTABLISHING A BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF APPROPRIATE SIZE SUPERVISED BY TWO DIPLOMATS FROM THE SWISS EMBASSY HERE.

## 2. KELLER SARMIENTO CLARIFIED THE FOLLOWING FURTHER POINTS:-

(1) THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT OBJECT IF SUBJECT TO RECIPROCITY WIVES OR CHILDREN OF DEPARTING PERSONNEL WISHED TO STAY ON TO SUPERVISE PACKING OF EFFECTS.

(2) THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO OUR RETAINING FOUR SUPPORT STAFF IN ADDITION TO THE FOUR DIPLOMATS.

(3) EXISTING OFFICE PREMISES COULD BE USED (WE ARE ALREADY FLYING THE SWISS FLAG AT THE EMBASSY OFFICES AND RESIDENCE WITH AN APPROPRIATE TEMPORARY DOOR PLATE).

(4) KELLER SARMIENTO PROMISED TO CONFIRM THAT THE THREE PRESENT BRITISH COUNCIL STAFF WITH DIPLOMATIC STATUS COULD REMAIN IN ADDITION TO THE FOUR DIPLOMATS.

3. IN RETURN HE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OF WHICH HE HAD BEEN NOTIFIED FROM LONDON, PARTICULARLY THAT PERSONAL ACCOUNTS HAD BEEN BLOCKED. HE SOUGHT ASSURANCES CONCERNING ARGENTINE BUILDINGS AND PROPERTY IN LONDON ON WHICH I ADVISED HIM TO ASK THE BRAZILIANS. HE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE VIEW WAS THAT THE BREAK OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS DID NOT INVOLVE A BREAK IN CONSULAR RELATIONS AND WISHED TO KEEP OPEN THEIR CONSULAR OFFICE IN LIVERPOOL. HE ALSO WISHED LOCALLY ENGAGED COMMERCIAL SECTION STAFF TO REMAIN IN LONDON. DKELLER SARMIENTO ALSO EXPRESSED A WISH TO RETAIN ARGENTINE STAFF AT THEIR NAVAL OFFICE IN LONDON. I DOUBTED WHETHER THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE BUT SUGGESTED HE TOOK IT UP THROUGH THE BRAZILIANS.

4. THE SWISS AMBASSADOR SOUGHT CLARIFICATION FROM KELLER SARMIENTO ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

CONFIDENTIAL

/(1)



CONFIDENTIAL

(1) THAT COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY DIRECT TO LONDON MIGHT CONTINUE. KELLER SARMIENTO AGREED SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION THAT THESE COULD BE MAINTAINED UNTIL MY DEPARTURE. THEREAFTER ALL COMMUNICATIONS WOULD GO THROUGH THE SWISS EMBASSY.

(2) TRAVEL DOCUMENTS WOULD BE SUPPLIED BY THE ARGENTINES FOR DEPARTING STAFF EITHER BY ROAD TO URUGUAY OR BY AIR, TOGETHER WITH CUSTOMS LAISSEZ PASSER FOR THEIR HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS AND CARS.

(3) DEPARTING MEMBERS OF MY STAFF COULD BE APPOINTED CASUAL SWISS COURIERS TO CONVEY CERTAIN CLASSIFIED ITEMS FROM HERE TO MONTEVIDEO FOR ONWARD DESPATCH TO LONDON. OUR BAGS WOULD BE OVER-POUCHED IN SWISS BAGS.

(4) THERE MIGHT BE A FEW BAS PEOPLE AWAITING COLLECTION BY SHIP FROM THE GEORGIAS AND THE MFA SHOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM.

(5) KELLER SARMIENTO SAW NO REASON FOR ANY IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN THE WHITE CARD TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE ISLANDS AND ARGENTINA.

5. IT WAS CLEAR FROM OUR DISCUSSION THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE TOTALLY INEXPERIENCED IN DEALING WITH A UNILATERAL BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE CONSEQUENT ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERESTS SECTIONS. WE TOO LACK EXPERTISE IN THIS FIELD AS DO OUR SWISS COLLEAGUES. BUT SWISS EXPERTS ARE ON THE WAY, ONE ARRIVING BY MONDAY AND THE MODALITIES MAY THEN BECOME CLEARER. MEANWHILE MY SWISS COLLEAGUE WILL BE TAKING UP THE ABOVE POINTS WITH YOU IN LONDON VIA BERNE AND I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PROTECT THIS NOT AUTHORISED ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE PROBLEMS.

6. OUR DISCUSSION, PARTICULARLY ON COMMUNICATIONS IN WHICH IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SWISS EXPECT ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO PASS THROUGH THEM AFTER MY DEPARTURE PROMPTS ME TO QUESTION WHETHER MY INITIAL SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STAFFING OF OUR INTERESTS SECTION ARE NOW APPROPRIATE. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT CYPHER STAFF WILL NOT BE NEEDED (NOR PRESUMABLY CYPHER EQUIPMENT WHICH SHOULD CLEARLY BE GOT OUT FAST). IT SEEMS RIGHT TO LEAVE A SENIOR MEMBER OF STAFF AND TWO ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF BEHIND AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING BUT YOU WILL WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY WILL NEED A FIRST SECRETARY IN SUPPORT.

WILLIAMS  
FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FAKLAND ISLANDS

MR. COLES

A.S.C. 4/4  
v-a.

Security Council

Whilst Ministers were meeting informally in the Commons late this afternoon, Brian Fall telephoned me with Sir Anthony Parsons' latest report. Sir Anthony Parsons was uncertain whether we could ~~must~~<sup>muster</sup> nine votes for our Resolution, but recommended that we ~~could~~<sup>should</sup> press ahead to a vote today. He saw considerable advantage in voting now on a Resolution which might make some sense to British public opinion. There were, on the other hand, considerable disadvantages in spending more time over negotiation leading to changes in the draft. Ultimately, there would be a risk that we would lose control of the ~~meeting~~<sup>resolution</sup>, perhaps to the extent of finding it necessary to veto in order to preserve our freedom of action.

When I reported this to the FCS, he raised the matter with a group of Ministers then present. The Prime Minister and all present formally endorsed Sir Anthony Parsons' recommendations.

MA

3 April, 1982

A.J.C.  $\frac{4}{4}$   
h-a.South American DeptNote for the File: Marines at Grytviken


Mr Knight-Smith rang me from the Emergency Unit at 0400 hrs this morning to say that the Marine detachment at Grytviken had been given notice by the Argentinian ship 'Bahia Paraiso' that it would have an important message to transmit at 1000Z. This message was assumed by MOD to be a demand for the surrender of the detachment.

Mr Knight-Smith understood from 10 Downing Street that the Prime Minister was inclined to favour surrender, in order to prevent pointless loss of life. Mr Nott, however, favoured resistance. This was confirmed by a subsequent conversation with Mr Evans (APS/Mr Nott), who said that Mr Nott attached considerable importance to this; the orders would be the same as those given to the Marines at Port Stanley - to resist using minimum force.

I undertook to speak to Lord Carrington in the morning, and did so at 0710 hrs; he then spoke to the Prime Minister. He explained the situation at Grytviken and said that he favoured resistance with minimum force, as did Mr Nott. The Prime Minister said that while her initial instinct had been in favour of surrender, she accepted the contrary arguments, and would not wish to go counter to Mr Nott's advice.

I relayed this information to the Emergency Unit and to the Defence Situation Centre, and confirmed to the Defence Situation Centre our agreement to draft orders to this effect at 0850 hrs.

No No. 10 Private Secretary was listening to the Prime Minister's conversation with the Secretary of State, of which this is therefore the sole record.

  
(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

3 April 1982

cc: PS

PS/Mr Luce

Mr Ure  
Defence Dept

→ A J Coles, Esq  
10 Downing Street

PS/S of S

Copy to:

CDS  
 CNS  
 CGS  
 CAS  
 VCNS  
 CGRM  
 ACDS(Ops)  
 SECCOS  
 AUS(DS)  
 AUS(NS)  
 Hd of D55

A.J.C.  $\frac{4}{4}$ 

h-a.

SOUTH GEORGIA

1. A satellite telephone call was received from the Captain of HMS ENDURANCE at 1530. ACNS(O) and DNOT spoke to him between 1530 and 1545. The local times in South Georgia are four hours earlier (ie 1120, 1130, 1145).
2. He reported that the Captain of the BAHIA PARAIISO has informed the BAS Commander that the Falkland Islands had surrendered unconditionally and that he should do the same. The BAS Commander declined and the Captain of the BAHIA PARAIISO intimated that he was considering sending Marines ashore. The BAS Commander replied that this would be a provocative act, and he would prefer to discuss the situation with a representative of the BAHIA PARAIISO if one could come ashore. The Captain of the BAHIA PARAIISO said that his helicopter would bring a representative ashore.
3. The Captain of HMS ENDURANCE has advised the Royal Marines detached in GRITVIKEN not to fire on the helicopter. However in accordance with current ROE it was made clear that the Royal Marines should resist a takeover of the base by force until it became pointless.
4. <sup>CO. ENDURANCE'S</sup> ACNS(O) agreed his proposed movements as follows. He intends to conceal himself in one of the many fjords in South Georgia where he would be less liable to detection than on the open sea. He would be less vulnerable to attack by surface ships. He intends to defend himself by all means including the use of anti-ship missiles from his helicopters.

Whetstone.

A J WHETSTONE  
 Rear-Admiral  
 ACNS(O)

3 April 1982

PS: A rather Gibetian note was lent to this when the Captain of the ENDURANCE told me that the BAHIA PARAIISO had called him and offered to relay messages to his shore party if he had difficulty in communication.

Note by Defence Ops Staff:- Chief of Staff to CINC FLEET agrees para 4 above.

James Long  
 Capt RN

# Threat of action on Falkland Islands

From Jeremy Morgan  
in Buenos Aires

The Argentine Government has warned that it will "put an end" to negotiations with Britain over the disputed sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and feel free to take other action unless a quick solution of the issue is found.

In a strongly-worded statement which reflected exasperation at what is seen as British foot-dragging, the Foreign Ministry said yesterday that unless there was progress, Argentina would consider itself free to choose "a procedure which better suited its interests."

Argentina has negotiated with Britain "with patience, fidelity and in good faith" for more than 15 years under the terms of United Nations resolutions over its claim to the Falkland Islands, the Ministry added.

In diplomatic terms the Ministry warning was forceful, although officials have yet to indicate what sort of action the Government might be contemplating.

The strong phraseology contrasted strongly with the polite tone of a joint statement issued by both countries after the latest round of negotiations, which were held in New York on Friday and Saturday of last week.

This said that the talks had been "cordial and positive" and that both sides had reasserted their decision to find a solution. The two governments would be considering a procedural proposal aimed at bringing about more progress in that direction, the statement added.

The Argentines have revealed that in New York they put forward a plan under which the two sides would meet once a month to discuss an agreed agenda. If adopted, such negotiations would mark a radical departure from the practice of recent years: since 1977, talks have been held about once a year.

The aim of the Argentinian move will be to achieve "substantial results in a time that, at this stage of the talks, will necessarily have to be short," according to a top-level official.

This is not the first indication that the Argentinians may be losing their patience over resolving their claim to the islands, which lie 300 miles from Argentina in the south Atlantic.

Public opinion over the islands, which Argentina calls the Malvinas and have laid claim to ever since British troops occupied the islands in 1833, is also starting to run high.

The suspected presence of oil in considerable quantities in the waters off the islands—conservative estimates put probable reserves at around 2.4 billion barrels—has done little to keep tempers cool.

But despite the optimistic assertions of British officials, who stressed yesterday that their position had not changed, the two sides seem as far apart as ever. Britain maintains that because the talks are taking place it does not necessarily mean that sovereignty will eventually be transferred to Argentina.

But this is exactly how Buenos Aires saw the purpose of holding negotiations in the first place. The indications from the latest statement are that Argentina believes that London has not been listening.

THE GUARDIAN

WEDNESDAY 3 MARCH 1982

U.K. U.S. Fr. Ireland  
f Canada, Japan

Togo  
Zaire  

---

Guyana

Jordan. " Resolution returned

1) President -

1) demands an immediate -

2) <sup>un</sup> withdrawal of all <sup>US</sup> <sup>Thomson</sup> <sup>sub</sup> <sup>missile</sup> forces from Falklands

3) calls on gov to seek diplomatic

role to ~~def~~ their differences

and to respect fully

the purpose & principles of charter



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 April 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: House of Commons Debate

/ I enclose a draft speech for the Prime Minister's  
/ use in opening the Commons Debate tomorrow. Some notes  
for supplementaries are also attached. The draft has  
not been seen by Lord Carrington. I am copying the draft  
to David Omand (MOD) and would be grateful if he could  
pass any comments direct to you, copied to us.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Office

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

John

I think (his) will need more  
about the background to the museum -  
about the Ridley - Lane negotiations since  
1979; and whether more can  
be said about consequential actions.

Should something be said about  
support for Falkland Islanders who  
want to leave?

Robert

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. It became clear during the course of yesterday, after nearly two weeks of rising tensions in our relations with Argentina, that considerable elements of the Argentine Navy had made a landing at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands and had established military control. We do not have full details of the present circumstances in the Islands, but the fact of Argentine occupation is clear. I am sure that the House will join me in totally condemning this unprovoked aggression by the Government of Argentina against British territory. The Argentine action has been in the most flagrant disregard of the appeals made by both the Secretary General of the United Nations and by the President of the Security Council on 1 April that both Britain and Argentina should refrain from the use of force and should resolve present tensions by diplomatic means.

2. I should state to the House that Her Majesty's Government continue to regard the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Island Dependencies as British territory. Our firm objective is to ensure that the Falkland Islands are freed from this Argentine occupation and should return to British administration. Our sovereignty dispute with Argentina is long-standing. But we have no doubt about British sovereignty and we cannot accept that the clear wishes of Falkland Islanders, who are British in stock and wish to remain British in allegiance, should be denied through this act of unprovoked aggression.

3. The incident which has led to the present situation was in no way in proportion to the outcome. It has been seized upon by the Argentine Government in order to impose their claim.

There needs to be some account of the dispute and the negotiations since the Gov<sup>t</sup> took office: it could go in here



4. It is worth recalling the history of the past two weeks. On 19 March an Argentine party, employed on a straightforward commercial contract, landed at Leith harbour in South Georgia from an Argentine naval transport vessel and raised the Argentine flag. They were instructed by the Commander of the British Antarctic Survey base at nearby Grytviken, which is the accepted point of entry into South Georgia, either to leave or to proceed to Grytviken to obtain the necessary clearance. They refused to do so and, although the Argentine ship and most of the party did leave on 22 March, a number of Argentines remained. The Argentine Government, who claimed to have had no prior knowledge of the landing and who assured us that no military personnel were involved, were asked to arrange for the men's <sup>deportation</sup> removal or to ensure that the party sought the necessary authorisation for their presence on British territory. We made clear that while we had no wish to interfere in the operation of a normal commercial contract, we were unable to acquiesce in the illegal and unauthorised presence of foreign nationals on British territory. ~~Faced with a potentially serious situation, HMS Endurance was ordered to the area in order to assist as necessary.~~

*We had no wish to escalate*  
5. ~~We were however resolved to ensure that~~ this superficially minor problem, ~~should not be allowed to escalate~~ and we made it plain to the Argentine Government that our object was to prevent a rise in tension between us, and that we wished to achieve a peaceful resolution of the problem by diplomatic means. To help in this HMS Endurance was ordered ~~not to approach the Argentine party at Leith, and she has at no time made any attempt to interfere with their operations.~~

6. However, it soon became clear that the Argentine Government had little interest in a regularisation of the problem. On 25 March, a further Argentine Navy transport vessel arrived at Leith to deliver supplies to the men. Requests by our Ambassador

(to go to the area to be available as necessary, but

for an early response from the Argentine Government on arrangements for the men's departure were refused. We again made clear that, even at that late stage, the party's presence could be regularised by obtaining the proper authorisation from the British authorities at Grytviken. No immediate reply from the Argentine Government was received and there was meanwhile increasing evidence of the deployment of vessels of the Argentine Navy into the Falklands area. On 26 March, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement announcing that the men on South Georgia would be given all necessary protection. On 28 March, we received an outright refusal from the Argentine Foreign Minister to regularise the men's position. Instead, it re-stated, in discourteous terms, Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Island Dependencies and that in its view the only matter for discussion was a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. At this stage the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary sent a message to the United States Secretary of State asking him to intervene and to urge restraint. Our American friends acted promptly. But their initiative was also flatly rejected by the Argentine Government. On 30 March, my hon Friend the Minister of State (Mr Luce) made a statement to the House, again stressing our wish to defuse the issue and to pursue a diplomatic solution to it. In pursuit of this aim our Ambassador in Buenos Aires proposed to the Argentine Foreign Minister on 31 March that a senior official should visit Buenos Aires in a further attempt to find a peaceful way out of the impasse. The Argentine Foreign Minister replied to this on 1 April. This reply was totally negative and made clear that for him the diplomatic channel was closed.

7. By late on 1 April there was mounting evidence that the Argentine Navy was positioning itself for an attack on the Falkland Islands. In this grave situation we immediately sought the assistance of our friends, both in the United States

/and

and in the European Community, to dissuade Argentina from precipitate action. But their appeals, including a personal intervention by President Reagan to the Argentine President, were turned aside. Following a request by the United Nations Secretary General that both sides should continue their efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution, we sought an Emergency meeting of the Security Council on 1 April. This led to a statement by the President of the Council urging both sides to refrain from the threat or use of force in the area. The British Representative agreed without hesitation. But the Argentine~~s~~ said nothing.

8. It is now all too apparent that the Argentines had from the outset no intentions of heeding the Security Council's recommendations. All the while their preparations for an attack on the Falklands were in progress, and that attack was carried out on 2 April. I do not have words to express my revulsion at this unprovoked and entirely unwarranted attack by massive naval forces on a peaceful and lightly-populated territory. We do not have full details of the situation in the Falkland Islands. But I am sure that this House will join me in confirming that our feelings at this grave moment are with the Governor and the people of the Islands.

9. We are taking appropriate military and diplomatic measures to sustain our rights under international law and in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. We shall also be taking urgent international action, in particular in the United Nations Security Council where we have again sought an Emergency debate, in order to achieve a clear condemnation of this Argentine action leading to an early withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.

2  
This needs to be strengthened, if it is to be said.

A naval task force has been ordered to sail for the area as soon as possible.

The House will understand that I cannot give details of its strength or composition.

Something about freezing assets?  
Anything about trade, or shipping?  
Something about British subjects in Argentina?

SUPPLEMENTARIES FOR A STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER: 3 APRIL

WHAT DETAILS CAN YOU GIVE US ON THE INVASION?

Communications with the Governor in Port Stanley and with our Embassy in Buenos Aires have been very difficult. However, the Americans tell us that they have been officially informed by the Argentine Government that Argentina has occupied the Falkland Islands. Additionally, we have information from a British Antarctic Survey Ship in the region of the Falkland Islands. This vessel, the Bransfield, was monitoring the Falkland Islands radio broadcasts. Argentine news agencies have made broadcasts about invasion and Ham radio operators have also picked up transmissions. The picture we have is of a landing in the early morning of 2 April by a force of 200 troops. The force moved in on several ships; 3 took up station in the outer harbour of Port Stanley. We understand that Government House was surrounded by armed troop carriers. Subsequently we understand the Argentines began to make broadcasts over the Islands broadcasting system, announcing the formation of a military junta.

WAS THERE AN EXCHANGE OF FIRE?

2. Reports vary. Several amateur radio reports state that fire was exchanged for about 3 hours, that 3 Argentines were injured, one seriously, but that there were no British casualties. Other reports suggest that the Marines in Port Stanley did not offer resistance. We await further information.

WHAT WAS HMS ENDURANCE DOING AT THE TIME OF THE INVASION?

3. As we stated earlier, HMS Endurance was in South Georgia, lying off Grytviken in order to render assistance if necessary as the S Georgia situation developed. S Georgia is several hundred miles from Port Stanley.

WHAT IS THE POSITION IN SOUTH GEORGIA?

4. We understand that an Argentine vessel moved into Cumberland Bay, near  
/Grytviken,

Grytviken, on the afternoon of 2 April. We have no reports of any additional activity there.

WHY WAS NO ACTION TAKEN BEFOREHAND?

5. It is self-evident: the Islands are several thousand miles from Britain. I must underline that we have worked intensively since this crisis began to reach a settlement by peaceful diplomatic means. The Argentines have rejected all such proposals and have chosen to launch this unprovoked invasion. But there should be no doubt that the British Government will respond in appropriate fashion now that the Argentines have taken this disgraceful and wholly unjustified action.

WHAT ARE THE MILITARY MEASURES YOU ARE TAKING?

6. You will understand that I cannot go into this. But we cannot accept this occupation of British Territory. I must express with all the force at my command the outrage and indignation of the British Government and the British people at this unprovoked act of aggression against the Islands.

HAVE YOU CONSULTED OUR ALLIES?

7. On the diplomatic front we have sought the assistance of many countries including the Americans and European partners. I much regret that the Argentines proved unwilling to heed these appeals, which included a personal intervention by President Reagan with the Argentine President.

WHAT ACTION ARE YOU TAKING TO PROTECT BRITISH CITIZENS IN ARGENTINA?

8. Contingency plans exist for the protection of British citizens throughout the world should an emergency arise in the country where they happen to be.

/Arrangements

Arrangements are being made accordingly. There are 17,000 British passport-holders in Argentina. According to Argentine radio broadcasts, the Argentine Interior Minister has ordered the police and Government officials throughout Argentina to guarantee the security of and respect for British subjects, their property, institutions, commercial ventures, enterprises and corporations. We expect these instructions to be scrupulously observed.

WILL YOU NOW EXPEL ARGENTINE DIPLOMATS FROM BRITAIN?

9. We shall take every measure in our power to bring home to the Argentines our revulsion at their action. We shall be breaking our diplomatic relations with Argentina.

WHAT INFORMATION IS THERE ON THE WAY IN WHICH THE ISLAND POPULATION IS BEING TREATED?

10. We have little hard information on this. But one report states that the Commander of the Argentine invasion force made a broadcast in Port Stanley on the afternoon of 1 April in which he said that the Islanders would be free to leave or to stay as they chose. They would be offered certain guarantees about their way of life, freedom of worship, cultural and educational continuity, etc. We reject totally the right of the Argentines to make such proposals.

GRS 1000(A)

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 022200Z APR 82

TO FLASH BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 51 OF 2 APRIL

AND TO FLASH SANTIAGO MONTEVIDEO BUENOS AIRES AND WASHINGTON  
AND TO IMMEDIATE LIMA QUITO CARACAS BOGOTA CANBERRA WELLINGTON  
OTTAWA AND ALL EC POSTS.

*h.a.*  
*1005/4*

FALKLANDS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF LORD CARRINGTON'S AND MR NOTT'S OPENING  
STATEMENTS AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE FCO AT 1700Z TODAY.

2. LORD CARRINGTON'S STATEMENT BEGINS:

I HAVE TO CONFIRM THAT AN ARGENTINE MILITARY ATTACK ON PORT  
STANLEY IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAS TAKEN PLACE AND THAT PORT  
STANLEY IS NOW OCCUPIED BY ARGENTINE MILITARY FORCES.  
HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TOTALLY CONDEMNS THIS UNPROVOKED  
AGGRESSION WHICH IS IN FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF THE APPEAL MADE BY  
BOTH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND BY THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY FOR BOTH SIDES TO  
REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE AND TO RESOLVE PRESENT TENSIONS  
BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS.

IT IS WORTH, IF I MAY FOR A MOMENT, LOOKING BACK AT THE HISTORY  
OF THE PAST TWO WEEKS. ON 19 MARCH THE COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH  
ANTARCTIC SURVEY AT GRYPVIKEN ON SOUTH GEORGIA REPORTED THAT  
AN ARGENTINE NAVY TRANSPORT VESSEL WAS ANCHORED AT NEARBY LEITH  
HARBOUR AND A PARTY OF ABOUT 60 ARGENTINIANS  
HAD SET UP CAMP AND HAD RAISED THE ARGENTINE FLAG. THE BASE  
COMMANDER TOLD THEM THAT THEY HAD NO RIGHT TO LAND ON SOUTH  
GEORGIA WITHOUT SEEKING THE REQUIRED PERMISSION FROM THE  
BRITISH AUTHORITIES AT GRYPVIKEN WHICH IS THE ONLY POINT OF ENTRY  
FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES. HE REQUESTED THEM EITHER TO SEEK  
THE NECESSARY CLEARANCE OR TO LEAVE.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT SOUGHT IMMEDIATE CLARIFICATION FROM  
THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE REGARDED THIS  
ILLEGAL PRESENCE AS POTENTIALLY SERIOUS AND ASKING THE ARGENTINES  
TO ARRANGE FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHIP AND THE PARTY. THE  
SHIP AND MOST OF THE PARTY DID LEAVE ON 22 MARCH. BUT A NUMBER OF  
ARGENTINIANS REMAINED. HMS ENDURANCE WAS ORDERED TO THE AREA  
TO ASSIST AS NECESSARY.

| SINCE

SINCE THEN WE HAVE MADE REPEATED REQUESTS TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FOR THEM TO REGULARISE THE POSITION OF THE ARGENTINE PARTY, EITHER BY ARRANGING THEIR DEPARTURE OR BY SEEKING THE CORRECT AUTHORITY. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHILE WE REGARDED THE SALVAGE CONTRACT ON WHICH THE MEN WERE EMPLOYED AS BEING QUITE STRAIGHT-FORWARD, WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THEY SHOULD REMAIN ILLEGALLY IN SOUTH GEORGIA. WE EMPHASISED THROUGHOUT TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THAT WE NONETHELESS WISHED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID THIS INCIDENT DEVELOPING INTO A SERIOUS CONFRONTATION, WE HAVE MADE AND OUR STILL MAKING ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. HOWEVER ALL OUR INITIATIVES WERE REJECTED AND THE ARGENTINE POSITION BECAME INCREASINGLY UNCOMPROMISING. THEY INSISTED THAT SOUTH GEORGIA WAS ARGENTINE TERRITORY AND ASSERTED THAT THE ARGENTINE MEN AT LEITH WOULD BE GIVEN ALL NECESSARY PROTECTION BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

IN A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO AVOID WHAT WAS NOW CLEARLY DEVELOPING INTO A MOST DANGEROUS SITUATION, I SENT A MESSAGE TO THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER PROPOSING THE DESPATCH TO BUENOS AIRES OF A PERSONAL EMISSARY TO WORK OUT SOME MEANS OF SETTLING THIS ISSUE PEACEFULLY. ON 1 APRIL THE FOREIGN MINISTER FLATLY REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL, CLAIMING THAT THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL WAS NOW CLOSED AND THAT ANY FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD BE SIMPLY TO ARRANGE THE MODALITIES OF THE TRANSFER TO ARGENTINA OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THE FALKLAND ISLAND DEPENDENCIES. IN THIS CRITICAL SITUATION, FOLLOWING A PERSONAL APPEAL BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS, WE SOUGHT AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 1 APRIL, WHICH LED TO A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLING ON BOTH SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE. OUR REPRESENTATIVE DID SO AND ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THIS STATEMENT BUT THE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE DID NOT.

IT WAS NOW CLEAR, AND THIS WAS YESTERDAY, THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WERE BENT ON NOTHING LESS THAN THE FORCIBLE OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND TO PREVENT THIS WE SOUGHT THE ASSISTANCE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING A PERSONAL APPEAL FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT WERE REJECTED. AND IT IS NOW CONFIRMED THAT AN ARGENTINE NAVAL FORCE LANDED TROOPS TODAY AT PORT STANLEY AND HAVE SEIZED CONTROL OF THE TOWN. WE DO NOT HAVE FULL DETAILS OF THE SITUATION THERE.

THE ARGENTINE CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES HAS BEEN SUMMONED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO BE INFORMED THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAVE BEEN BROKEN OFF AND THAT ARGENTINIAN DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE ASKED TO LEAVE THE UNITED KINGDOM WITHIN FOUR WORKING DAYS. I HAVE INSTRUCTED SIR ANTHONY PARSONS, UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, TO ASK FOR AN URGENT MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS HE HAS DONE AND IT SHOULD BE MEETING AT THIS MOMENT.

ENDS.



3. MR NOTTS SPEECH BEGINS:

''THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS EXPLAINED THE SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE A SALVAGE PARTY LANDED AT S. GEORGIA 14 DAYS AGO. INTENSIVE EFFORTS WERE MADE TO SETTLE THIS MATTER BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS - THROUGHOUT WE WERE ANXIOUS TO AVOID MILITARY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN MISCONSTRUED OR MISREPRESENTED BY ARGENTINE, AS A THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE. NEVERTHELESS WE DISPATCHED HMS ENDURANCE TO THE AREA OF S. GEORGIA WITH APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS. HMS ENDURANCE REMAINS IN THE AREA BUT I DO NOT WISH TO DISCLOSE HER POSITION.

EARLIER THIS WEEK WE BECAME AWARE OF SUBSTANTIAL ARGENTINE NAVAL EXERCISES, WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY CAME TO INCLUDE AN AMPHIBIOUS GROUP, AND LATER IN THE WEEK WE OBTAINED CLARIFICATION THAT THE EXERCISE LOCATION WAS MOVING TOWARDS THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. ALTHOUGH THE ARGENTINE FLEET WAS STILL ON NAVAL EXERCISES WE DELIBERATELY AVOIDED AN OBVIOUS MILITARY RESPONSE SO AS TO AVOID PRECIPITATING THE VERY INCIDENT WHICH WE WERE SEEKING TO AVOID BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS - AT LEAST UNTIL WE HAD KNOWLEDGE THAT A THREAT TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS CONTEMPLATED.

LAST NIGHT CLEAR EVIDENCE BECAME AVAILABLE FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE ARGENTINE NAVAL FORCE WERE PREPARING FOR THE ASSUALT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE ROYAL NAVY WAS STRAIGHT AWAY PUT ON IMMEDIATE NOTICE FOR OPERATIONS - AND A SUBSTANTIAL TASK FORCE IS BEING PREPARED.

NEVERTHELESS I CAN DISCLOSE THAT WE HAVE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF ROYAL NAVAL SHIPS AT SEA FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME. I CANNOT HOWEVER REVEAL THEIR POSITION. ARRANGEMENTS WERE ALSO MADE SOME TIME AGO FOR REPROVISIONING AND REFUELLING SUPPORT TO MOVE TO THE S. ATLANTIC.

I AM NOT ABLE TO GIVE ANY FURTHER DETAILS OF THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS WHICH WE HAVE MADE - OR ANY OTHER DETAILS OF FORCE MOVEMENTS''.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>614</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Santiago telegram no. 62 to Fco dated 2 April 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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Extract/Item details:  <i>FCO telegram No. 69 to Santiago dated 2 April 1982 -</i>	
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MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

E. R.

INTERVIEW WITH DR. DAVID OWEN, MP, AND JOHN SARGENT ON THE WORLD AT ONE PROGRAMME, FRIDAY 2 APRIL 1982

---

Interviewer: Does it seem to you as if the Government has been withholding information?

Dr. Owen: It looks very like it. I must say it's a very damaging thing to have to say and I hope it's proven not to be the case but as the hours went by it became increasingly obvious that an invasion had taken place and yet the House of Commons was not being given the full information. I hope this is not the case but it certainly looks like it.

Interviewer: But why should the Government do that?

Dr. Owen: Well I've been trying to ask that question myself. I can't see any real reason. I mean they may have hoped to be able to play for time hoping that Naval Forces would get there, who perhaps say two days steaming away but that wouldn't really have justified not letting the House know as soon as they had a flash telegram from the Governor that there had actually been an invasion.

Interviewer: As a former Secretary you had to deal with this problem the last time it occurred. What do you think the Government should now do?

Dr. Owen: I think it's going to be extremely difficult to get this back if they've got forces on the island they will also have air cover they'll have ships in the area. Even if we now make a major demonstration of Naval Forces it's going to be extremely difficult to get these back. The tragic error was not to deploy Naval Forces down there at the end of February and early March when there was ample warning that the situation was flaring up. This is exactly what we did four years ago. We did it in fact in total secrecy. The Argentinians probably never knew that the Force was there and then we were able to negotiate with them, we were negotiating with the knowledge and I had the knowledge that I had Naval Forces behind me. But I do want to warn people against a belief that Britain can now simply re-invade the Islands and

get them back. It's going to be mighty difficult to do it and I think the main emphasis now will have to go on diplomacy, getting the maximum pressure. I suspect only the American administration and President Reagan has any chance of being listened to by the Argentinian junta. I'm not sure they will be, it's a very nasty vicious government with no respect of human rights. They've obviously made a deliberate decision and there's no chance of them giving this up without a very bitter fight.

Interviewer: Is there a danger now of humiliation for the British Government?

Dr. Owen: Yes, I mean if this is true and the Falkland Islands have been invaded, we are faced by the most appalling humiliation. It is terrible and there will have to be a very major inquiry. This is one of the most humiliating defeats for Britain I suppose that we've suffered, well certainly since Suez and in many ways it's more humiliating than that. But the Government should have responded earlier and I think the House of Commons will now want to have a look at the whole way in which this affair has been conducted. I think one can see it ending up in a special Commission such as Parliament set up after the Dardanelles. I mean this is a very major question and there are some serious political and military questions that will have to be asked. And I must say I think it's a very grave situation we face now.

SUBJECT

T 58/82

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. ....

ex Mr. ...  
ops

CONFIDENTIAL

31246 - 3

GRS 206  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 022245Z  
FM FCO 021340Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 99 OF 2 APRIL  
AND TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS (DESKBY)  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. BEGINS:

THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, FOLLOWING THEIR REJECTION OF OUR PROPOSAL FOR CONTINUING DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WILL I FEAR HAVE THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES. I AM SENDING THIS BRIEF MESSAGE TO YOU AND ALL OUR OTHER COLLEAGUES IN THE COMMONWEALTH TO SEEK YOUR SUPPORT IN GIVING THE STRONGEST AND EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONDEMNATION TO ACTIONS WHICH ARE DESTRUCTIVE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE REJECTION OF COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY WHICH WE HAVE ALL SUPPORTED FOR SO MANY YEARS AND TO WHICH COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SUBSCRIBED IN THE DECLARATION OF COMMONWEALTH PRINCIPLES WHEN THEY MET IN SINGAPORE IN JANUARY 1971. ENDS.

2. YOU SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO STIMULATE CONDEMNATION OF THE ARGENTINE ACTION AND STATEMENTS PRESSING FOR THEIR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL, DRAWING ON OUR STATEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT AND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. YOU SHOULD OF COURSE BEAR IN MIND THAT THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE IS APPLICABLE.

CARRINGTON

STANDARD  
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ES & SD  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE SW

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

2 April, 1982

Falkland Islands

Thank you for your letter of 2 April. The Prime Minister accepts Lord Carrington's recommendation that she sends a message to Commonwealth Heads of Government and has approved the text which you enclosed.

A. J. COLES

J. E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SE





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 April 1982

*Agreed  
not*

Prime Minister  
*Agree to send message?*

*A.F.C.  $\frac{2}{4}$*

*Dear John,*

Falkland Islands

Lord Carrington recommends that the Prime Minister send a message to Commonwealth Heads of Government on the lines of the enclosed draft.

Lord Carrington asked Mr Ramphal to call this afternoon to discuss what support the Commonwealth could offer. Mr Ramphal had already been thinking along the same lines and had drafted a message to Heads of Government asking them to stand by Britain. I enclose a copy of his initial draft, which Lord Carrington welcomed. Mr Ramphal will now be sending a revised version, taking account of the latest developments.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

# OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby  
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 021340Z APR 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE HMRR IN ALL COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	FALKLAND ISLANDS
	10	1. Please pass following personal message from the Prime
	11	Minister to the Head of Government to which you are accredited.
	12	Begins:
	13	The Argentine Government's invasion of the Falkland
	14	Islands, following their rejection of our proposal for
	15	continuing diplomatic exchanges will I fear have the gravest
	16	consequences. I am sending this brief message to you and all
	17	our other colleagues in the Commonwealth to seek your support in
	18	giving the strongest and earliest possible condemnation to
	19	actions which are destructive of the principles of self-
	20	determination and the rejection of coercion as an instrument of
	21	policy which we have all supported for so many years and to
///	22	which Commonwealth Heads of Government subscribed in the
//	23	declaration of Commonwealth principles when they met in
/	24	Singapore in January 1971. Ends.
	25	2. You should make every effort to stimulate condemnation of

(C)

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword the
File number	Dept	Distribution  Falkland Islands
Drafted by (Block capitals) C S R GIFFARD		
Telephone number 233 3579		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
2

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the Argentine action and statements pressing for their immediate withdrawal, drawing on our statements in Parliament and in the Security Council.

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3. You should of course bear in mind that the right of self-defence is applicable.

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CARRINGTON

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NNNN ends  
telegram

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Catchword

To all Heads of Government

You will be aware of the dangerous situation that has resulted from Argentina's attempts to assert its claim over the Falkland Islands. I am sure you will agree that over and above all technical arguments, there is need for Commonwealth countries to stand by Britain in this matter, consistent with their support for the principles of territorial integrity, the right of self-determination, and the rejection of the use of force to unsettle long-established boundaries. I hope you will find it possible in whatever way you consider appropriate to so identify and to use all your influence to ensure a de-escalation of the matter.

APR 1942



CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

SW



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

2 April, 1982

Falkland Islands

Thank you for your letter of 2 April suggesting that the Prime Minister should send a message to the Governor and people of the Falkland Islands. The Prime Minister has decided that she would prefer not to send such a message at the present time.

A. J. COLES

B. J. P. Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A J Coles Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

2 April 1982

*Dear John,*

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister send a message to the Governor and people of the Falkland Islands. This would need to be despatched urgently since an Argentine attack would be followed shortly by a loss of communications with Port Stanley. I enclose a draft.

.....

*Yours ever,*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'B J P Fall', written in a cursive style.

B J P Fall

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

In this difficult and dangerous situation, please tell the people of the Falkland Islands that we admire their steadfastness<sup>and</sup> that our thoughts are with them. We are doing everything we can to help ~~and to preserve~~ their security *in these circumstances.*

CONFIDENTIAL





22 APR 1992  
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B 9 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



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T 05780

MR COLES

cc Sir Robert Armstrong

*AD 3/4*  
*La.*

FALKLANDS

Attached for your information is the record of a meeting of officials to discuss possible action by home departments, held in the Cabinet Office at 2.30 pm this afternoon.

R L L FACER

2 April 1982

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SECRET

Ref: U0456

COPY NO 26

IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL DEPARTMENTS OF AN  
ARGENTINIAN INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

MINUTES of a Meeting held in  
Conference Room F, Cabinet Office, on  
FRIDAY 2 APRIL 1982 at 2.30 pm

PRESENT

Mr R L L Facer, Cabinet Office (In the Chair)  
Mr A Howard, Home Office  
Mr C Hulse, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Mr R S Reeve, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Mr R M Hastie-Smith, Ministry of Defence  
Mr N J Beaumont, Ministry of Defence  
Group Captain J L Dillon, Ministry of Defence  
Mrs E M McLoughlin, Ministry of Defence  
Commander A J Bannister, Ministry of Defence  
Mr F H Elders, Department of Transport  
Mr J D Henes, Department of Trade (Shipping)  
Mr A Fortnam, Department of Trade (Civil Aviation)  
Mr R B M Williams, Department of Trade (Civil Aviation)  
Mr S S Holness, Department of Trade (Shipping)  
Mr P Abbott, Central Office of Information  
Mr C H O'D Alexander, Cabinet Office (Secretary)  
Cdr G R G Middleton, Cabinet Office (Secretary)

1. DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SITUATION

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE reported that there had as yet been no confirmation of the report, received via the British Antarctic Survey Office in Cambridge at about 12.45 pm that an Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands had taken place. There had been no reports of a landing in South Georgia although an earlier intelligence report had suggested that an Argentinian warship was due there at 5.00 pm in the afternoon with instructions to round up British civilians. Communications with Port Stanley had not been achieved since 8.00 am in the morning, and had ceased with HMS Endurance at about 1.00 pm.

SECRET

SECRET

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE reported that HMS Endurance was now half way between South Georgia and Port Stanley and that, following discussions between the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary on the evening of 1 April, considerable military preparations were being made on a contingency basis. The 3rd Commando Brigade, comprising three Commando Groups, an Headquarters element and logistic support had been placed on standby and the Army was now involved in outloading the force's war maintenance reserve. A naval Task Force was being formed, partly from ships currently in Gibraltar and partly from those in United Kingdom ports. All these naval and military forces would be at four hours notice to move from the afternoon of Sunday, 4 April. No decisions on their deployment had been taken. Eleven Hercules aircraft had already started to deploy with the aim of delivering three helicopters and a small ground detachment to Ascension Island where they would be embarked in a Royal Fleet Auxiliary en route to the island.

## 2. ACTION BY CIVIL DEPARTMENTS

In discussion the following points were made -

- a. British merchant shipping had been warned through the General Council of British Shipping not to enter Argentinian territorial waters and to keep clear of the Falkland Islands. British ships in Argentinian ports had similarly been advised to leave. British Caledonian, the only British airline operating a scheduled service to Argentina, had cancelled the day's flight and suspended further services.
- b. It was too early to consider what action might be taken in respect of Argentinian citizens in the United Kingdom except that Argentinian Embassy personnel, who could be expected to be trying to gather information on any British military preparations, should be kept under surveillance.
- c. A separate meeting of officials, under Treasury chairmanship, was examining the question of what economic sanctions could be applied to Argentina.

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d. The position on any shipments of military equipment and spares to Argentina needed to be established. Applications for export licences for such items and for high technology equipment which could be of military value were not being processed.

e. One Argentinian merchant ship was in a United Kingdom port, at Newhaven, and was under observation. Two more were due to arrive at Heysham. A flight by an Argentinian aircraft to the United Kingdom scheduled for the previous day had been cancelled for what they had described as technical reasons.

In discussion of the civil support which might be required for any military deployment it was noted that civil aircraft were unlikely to be required: the Royal Air Force transport fleet could be fully committed. If merchant ships were needed, freighters could be chartered but passenger carrying vessels would need to be requisitioned. An Order in Council would be required to enable the Royal Prerogative to be used for requisitioning.

In further discussion it was suggested that an approach should be made to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to invite them to see to the needs of any casualties resulting from an Argentinian invasion. In practice the facilities on the Falkland Islands might already be adequate; this would not necessarily be so on South Georgia. It was difficult to make an immediate judgement on an approach to the ICRC. But besides the humanitarian aspect of such a move, it would provide scope for embarrassing the Argentines on whose facilities the ICRC would be dependent for access to the Falkland Islands and South Georgia.

THE CHAIRMAN said that, as regards the handling of urgent issues over the weekend, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence would each be manning their offices on a 24 hour basis. Such matters as obtaining overflight clearances would be dealt with using the normal channels. It seemed unlikely to be necessary to convene meetings of officials in the Cabinet Office, but arrangements had been made to do so at very short notice if the need arose.

SECRET

SECRET

The Meeting -

1. Invited the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Trade to establish the position on military equipment and spares awaiting shipment to Argentina, and noted that no further processing of export licence applications would take place.
2. Noted that if the Ministry of Defence needed to make use of passenger carrying merchant ships, they would have to be requisitioned and an Order in Council would be required to enable the Royal Prerogative to be used for this purpose.
3. Invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to pursue the question of an approach to the International Committee of the Red Cross in relation to possible casualties on the Falkland Islands or South Georgia.
4. Invited the Cabinet Office to arrange for the Security Service to place members of the Argentinian Embassy in the United Kingdom under surveillance.

Cabinet Office

2 April 1982

Distribution

Those present plus

Mr Coles, Prime Minister's Office  
Sir Robert Armstrong, Cabinet Office  
Mr J P McIntyre, HM Treasury

SECRET

OPENING ANNOUNCEMENT BY ARGENTINA RADIO

"The military junta, as the supreme organ of the state, today informed the people of the Argentina nation that the republic, by means of its armed forces and by means of the successful realisation of a joint operation has recovered the Malvinas islands, Georgia and the South Sandwich for the nation. In this way it has assured the exercise of Argentina's sovereignty over all the territory of the afore-mentioned islands and the maritime and airspace corresponding to them. (It befalls?) all the country to understand the profound and unequivocal national significance of this decision so that collective responsibility and endeavour should accompany this undertaking and permit, with God's help, to turn into a reality a legitimate right of the Argentine people patiently and prudently postponed for almost 150 years. And now, from the White Room of Government House, his Excellency the President of the nation will address a message to the country in the name of the military junta. Lt. Gen. Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri will now speak."

NB Words in brackets were unclearly heard by the BBC.

Lieutenant General Galtieri:

"Compatriots, in the name of the military junta, in my capacity as President of the nation, I speak at this crucial, historic moment to all the inhabitants of our soil, in order to convey to them <sup>(the basis of the resolution taken</sup> ~~the grounds which vouchsafe a resolution)~~ [Sense of this is unclear - BBC Monitoring Service] the responsibility for which has been fully assumed by the Commanders and Officers of the Armed Forces who in this way interpret the profound sentiments of the Argentine people. We have recovered, safeguarding the national honour without resentment, but with firmness demanded by the circumstances, the southern islands which form part of the national heritage by legitimate right.



This decision was dictated by the need to put an end to the interminable succession of evasions and delays which have been used by Great Britain to perpetuate its rule over the islands and their zone of influence. This stance was considered by the national Government in the present circumstances as conclusive proof of its <sup>(i.e. Great Britain's)</sup> lack of good-will towards beginning serious negotiations, <sup>(without delay</sup> ~~and in the short term)~~ on the central object of the dispute and acknowledging, once and for all, that its alleged rights have no other origin than an act of plunder.

The situation which arose concerned the virtual <sup>ultimatum</sup> (~~summons~~) to a group of Argentines to leave the Georgia Islands, where this group were legally carrying out a joint task, and in which their legal situation was protected by agreements established in their time by the two countries. The despatch of a Naval Force and the peremptory conclusion it wished to impose are clear demonstrations that it (note: Britain) is persisting in facing the question with arguments based on force and only sees a solution in the straightforward repudiation of Argentine interests. In the face of this unacceptable claim, the Argentine Government cannot have any other response than the one it has just made, in the realm of deeds.

The Argentine position does not represent any kind of aggression for the present inhabitants of the Islands, whose rights and way of life will be respected with the same generosity as were those of the peoples liberated during our memorable exploits of emancipation. But we cannot yield before the intimidatory deployment of British forces, who, far from having used the peaceful channels of diplomacy, have threatened the indiscriminate use of this force.

Our forces will only act to the extent strictly necessary. They will not disturb in any way the life of the inhabitants of the Islands. On the contrary, they will protect the institutions and persons who co-exist with us, but they will not tolerate any abuse of the territory of the Islands or the mainland.

The important step which we have just taken was done without taking any political calculations into account. It has been taken in the name of each and every Argentine citizen without distinguishing sectors or factions and with our minds set on all the Governments, institutions and persons which in the past without exceptions and for 150 years have struggled for the defence of our rights. I am aware, and we acknowledge it with great emotion, that the entire country is already expressing the joy of a new achievement and is getting ready to defend what belongs to it, heedless of sacrifice, which we will possibly make or with sectional problems which, no matter how understandable they may be, will never be placed before the supreme national interests where the existence or non-existence of the fatherland is at stake.

With Christian faith I pray that those who are today our adversaries may understand in time their error and may deeply reflect before persisting in a position which is rejected by all the free people's in the world and by all those who had their territory mutilated and endured colonialism and exploitation. With Christian faith I pray for our men deployed to the Southern Seas, for your children, husbands, fathers, soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers who make up the front lines of an effort which will not stop until final victory is achieved. Invoking the protection of God and his Holy Mother, let us all commit ourselves to complying with our duty like the generations of the past century <sup>who did</sup> ~~should but~~ not mind harsh weather, long distances, disease or poverty when it came to defending freedom.

By taking part in Belgrano's liberating men to Paraguay, in whose missions to the upper Peru - beyond the mountains - along the Pacific Coast with General San Martin as their leader or to the desert, they did not hesitate in leaving their families and comfort whether they have much or little. Is our generation capable of emulating their example? Or are we not capable of doing so? I believe in you. We must all believe in ourselves and together raise our national banner high as a symbol of freedom so that it can wave sovereignly and definitively over our great fatherland.

This will not prevent us from persisting in our tradition as a peace-loving nation and from respecting all world nations, nor will it prevent us from resuming, through friendly gestures stimulating from our natural generosity, dignifying diplomatic negotiations which may give an institutional basis to the situation which we have achieved, clearly safeguarding those legitimate interests we have always respected. Our arms will always be extended to conclude noble commitments and to forget past offences for the sake of building a peaceful future for the civilised world.

Glory to the great Argentine people. May this be God's will.

The Argentine Government says that its armed forces has invaded the British administered Falkland Islands but as we go on the air there is still some confusion about the situation. Just over an hour ago a British Government Minister told the House of Commons that he was unable to confirm that an Argentine invasion of the Falkland had in fact begun. So for the Argentine version of events here is <sup>our</sup> Latin America correspondent Harold Briley reporting over the line from the capital Buenos Aires.

The advance assault force of marines landed just after midnight from a large fleet of ships in position off the windswept island. They went ashore to capture key targets, the airport, the barracks of about 80 British marines and the tiny capital of Port Stanley, population 800. With beachhead secured more Argentine troops arrived by helicopter, landing craft and transport planes flying from the mainland. Argentina says all objectives were successfully accomplished. The ruling military junta said the Malvenas, Argentina's name for the Falklands and its dependencies of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, had been recovered. The Foreign Minister said Argentina had taken this action because Britain had left it no alternative. There was no word whether the British marines or civilian population of 1800 British people offered resistance. One report says not. Britain's colonial governor, Mr. Rex Hunt, was reported to have requested talks with the occupying forces. The army's operational chief of staff, General Benjamin Memendez, was named as Argentina's military governor. Almost the entire Argentine fleet led by the navy's flagship and aircraft carrier with 1500 troops on board had sailed from the navy's main base of Puerto Belgrano some days ago. The lone British navy vessel in the area, the ice patrol ship HMS ENDURANCE was patrolling off the dependency of South Georgia a thousand miles to the south east, shadowed by Argentine warships. President Galtieri called an emergency Cabinet meeting and promised a nationwide broadcast. Some provincial towns were reported to be festooned with flags as Argentina celebrated its reoccupation of the Islands after nearly 150 years in which it has

claimed sovereignty, inherited the Argentines say, from Spain. In Buenos Aires itself there was not much outward sign of rejoicing though some buildings flew Argentina's blue and white national flag. Newspapers splashed the story with banner headlines. People were interviewed on the streets by radio stations. I found mixed opinions. There was a general welcome for reoccupation of what Argentines regard as their territory. Many people told me they hoped there would be no bloodshed. Some Argentines said the invasion had been launched to divert discontent at home and criticism of the military government unpopular for its economic austerity programme, its prolonged rule and past human rights violations.

That was Harold Briley on the line from Buenos Aires. In London Parliament has heard statements on the situation in the Falklands and is ready to sit tomorrow, Saturday, if there are further developments. But, as our political correspondent Jeff Robertson points out, there is still no confirmation in London that the Falklands has been invaded.

The atmosphere in the House of Commons was very grave as the Deputy Foreign Minister informed MPs that an invasion by Argentine forces was expected very shortly.

"Over the past 24 hours the situation has become increasingly grave. There is now a real expectation that an Argentine attack against the Falkland Islands will take place very soon."

And, after acquainting MPs about the moves in the United Nations Security Council, Mr. Atkins went on:

"We are taking appropriate military and diplomatic measures to sustain our rights under international law and in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The House will not expect me to give details at this stage of the military steps we have taken to respond to the worsening situation."

## DRAFT JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

## FALKLAND ISLANDS

We can now confirm that an Argentine military attack on Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands took place today. HMG totally condemn this unprovoked aggression which is in flagrant disregard of the appeal made by the President of the Security Council last night for both sides to refrain from the use of force and to resolve present tensions by diplomatic means.

We call upon the Argentine Government, even at this late hour, to reconsider its ill-conceived action, to withdraw its forces immediately and to return to the path of diplomatic negotiation.

We cannot at this stage report on the situation in Port Stanley. But our feelings at this grave moment must be with the Governor and the people of the Falkland Islands.

We are taking appropriate military and diplomatic measures to sustain our rights under international law and in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. To this end the Government have decided that it is right to send a task force to the South Atlantic. We shall also be taking urgent international action, in particular through the UN Security Council, in order to achieve an early withdrawal of Argentine armed forces from the Falkland Islands.



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 April 1982

*Overtake. N.S.A.N.*

*MR 4/4*

*h-a.*

*Dear John,*

Falkland Islands

You asked for a short note on the political and long term implications of a military operation to retake the Falkland Islands. I enclose an inevitably hasty paper prepared by officials. In the interests of speed, I am sending this over before Lord Carrington has had a chance to see it himself.

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Private Secretary

c.c. PS/LPS  
 PS/Mr Luce  
 PS/PUS  
 Sir A Acland  
 Mr Giffard  
 Mr Ure  
 Mr Fearn, SAmD

RETAKING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS :  
THE POLITICAL COSTS

1. I understand that Number 10 have asked the MOD for proposals on how to recover the Falklands by military action; and the FCO for observations on the likely political costs involved.
2. We have not seen the MOD proposals, but the assumption must be that they would involve the fleet task group now assembling, No 3 Commando Brigade (about 2,000 men) and the SSN force; that the attempt could not begin in less than three weeks from now at the earliest; and that we would be effectively on our own, except for (conceivably) some use of Chilean airport facilities.
3. Likely political costs in international terms (the domestic dimension is not covered here) would include:-
  - (a) It would be very difficult to reopen hostilities on the major scale required, three weeks after the occupation of the Falklands without a shot fired, without generating a massive backlash in Argentina against the 17,000 British subjects there and associated British property and investments.
  - (b) The likely scale of operation might well tempt the Argentine Government to declare a state of war and to act formally against British subjects, property and investment in Argentina. At present the Argentine Government have declared their intention to guarantee the security of and respect for British subjects and property. Unless the 1,800 islanders were manifestly being subjected to inhumane treatment by Argentine occupying forces, it would be hard to persuade people that the game was worth the candle.
  - (c) We have told the Security Council that we are ready to accept the injunction to refrain from the use or threat of force. If after several weeks we make a massive show of force in the South Atlantic, which to be successful will presumably have to include destruction of at least the greater part of the Argentine Navy, it is unlikely that we shall find much support in the Security Council for the view that we are exercising a legitimate right of self-defence as distinct from exacting retribution.



- (d) We should not in the circumstances be able to rely upon the close support of our European Allies, who have their own subjects and interests to protect in the Argentine. This could prove disruptive both in NATO and European Community terms.
- (e) Nor should we assume that the attitude of the United States, who have so far supported us strongly, would remain unambivalent. They did not support Anglo-French military action in 1956, despite what then appeared to be a much more obvious strategic interest than the Falklands represent.
- (f) We should not exclude the Soviet Union fishing in troubled waters and offering support to the Argentines (an important trading partner) against what they will seek to portray as neo-colonialist out-of-area adventurism by NATO.
- (g) Whatever reservations other countries may have about the means used by Argentina to assert her claim there are few points to be won in the international forum for the colonial power attempting to reassert her own rights by force.
- (h) Even if a military repossession of the Falklands proves successful, the political difficulties of sustaining a viable British position there indefinitely in the face of much compounded Argentine antagonism and without severe prejudice to our interests in that country, are likely to prove formidable. To many of our friends they will also seem disproportionate to the stake involved.

P J Weston  
Defence Department

2 April, 1982

ARGENTINE PRESS SALUTES FALKLAND "RECOVERY"

BUENOS AIRES FRICAY -- ARGENTINE NEWSPAPERS THIS MORNING SPLASHED THEIR FRONT PAGES WITH BANNER HEADLINES STATING THAT ARGENTINA WAS BOUT TO RECOVER THE DISRUPTED FALKLAND (MALVINAS) ISLANDS.

"THE RECOVERY OF THE MALVINAS IS IMMINENT, READ THE HEADLINE THAT TOK UP NEARLY HALF A PAGE OF THE POPULAR DAILY CLARIN.

THE MORE CONSERVATIVE AND PRO-GOVERNMENT LA NACION SAID IN A HEADLINE, "OPERATIONS HAVE BEGUN IN THE SOUTH TO SUPPORT NATIONAL SOVREIGNTY.

LA NACION QUOTED A HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT SOURCE AS SAYING THAT ALL MILITARY MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN FOR ARGENTINA TO EXERCISE ITS LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IN THE ARCHIPELAGO IN THE NEXT HOURS.

EARLIER TODAY THE ARGENTINE NEWS AGENCY, NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS, KNOWN TO HAVE CLOSE CONTACT WITH MILITARY AUTHORITIES, SAID AN ARMED INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS WOULD BEGIN AT DAWN. BUT NEITHER THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WOULD CONFIRM THE INVASION PLAN.

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FM FCO 021830Z APR 82

TO FLASH BUENOS AIRES

TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 2 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE: BERNE, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TEL NO 89

ARGENTINA: SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

1. THE PUS SUMMONED THE ARGENTINE CHARGE THIS EVENING. HE TOLD HIM THAT FOLLOWING HIS GOVERNMENT'S INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HMG WERE BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

2. SIR MICHAEL PALLISER SAID THAT THE SWISS GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN BUENOS AIRES. HE ASKED THE CHARGE TO CONSULT PROTOCOL AND CONFERENCE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THEIR CHOICE OF THIRD COUNTRY TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWER FOR ARGENTINA IN LONDON. IT WAS AGREED THAT A SMALL INTERESTS SECTION MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE IN THE EMBASSIES OF THE PROTECTING POWERS AT EITHER END. SIR M PALLISER ASKED THAT THE REST OF THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY SHOULD DEPART WITHIN 4 WORKING DAYS, IE BY MIDDAY ON THURSDAY 8 APRIL.

CARRINGTON

*Handwritten initials: n. n. 5/4.*

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TO PRIORITY HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 219 OF 2 APRIL

AND TO PRIORITY BERMUDA: GRAND CAYMAN: GIBRALTAR

*ML 5/4*  
*h.a.*

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE ARE ADVISING BRITISH SHIP OWNERS THAT THEIR SHIPS SHOULD AVOID CALLING AT ARGENTINE PORTS AND SHOULD AVOID FALKLAND ISLANDS AREA.
2. YOU MAY CONSIDER PASSING SIMILAR ADVISE TO LOCAL SHIP OWNERS WITH BRITISH FLAG SHIPS.

CARRINGTON

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPY TO:-

MR S FRANKISS SP2B DOT

RESTRICTED

Mr Speaker: With permission I wish to make a statement on the situation in the Falkland Islands. Over the past 24 hours the situation has become increasingly grave. There is now a real expectation that an Argentine attack against the Falkland Islands will take place very soon. It was for this reason that we sought an Emergency meeting of the Security Council yesterday and associated ourselves immediately with a request from the President of the Security Council that both Britain and Argentina should exercise restraint and refrain from the use or threat of force, and continue the search for a Diplomatic solution. There was no Argentine response to this: nor has the Argentine President responded to the many appeals that have been made to him to draw back from the use of force.

We are taking appropriate military and diplomatic measures to sustain our rights under international law and in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. But the House will not expect me to give details at this stage of the military steps we have taken to respond to the worsening situation. In the meantime we continue to hope that the Argentine Government even at this late stage will reconsider its rejection of the Diplomatic channel as a means for settling the differences between our two countries.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 April 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: House of Commons Debate

/ I enclose a draft speech for the Prime Minister's  
/ use in opening the Commons Debate tomorrow. Some notes  
for supplementaries are also attached. The draft has  
not been seen by Lord Carrington. I am copying the draft  
to David Omand (MOD) and would be grateful if he could  
pass any comments direct to you, copied to us.

Yours ever

J E Holmes  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Office

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. It became clear during the course of yesterday, after nearly two weeks of rising tensions in our relations with Argentina, that considerable elements of the Argentine Navy had made a landing at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands and had established military control. We do not have full details of the present circumstances in the Islands, but the fact of Argentine occupation is clear. I am sure that the House will join me in totally condemning this unprovoked aggression by the Government of Argentina against British territory. The Argentine action has been in the most flagrant disregard of the appeals made by both the Secretary General of the United Nations and by the President of the Security Council on 1 April that both Britain and Argentina should refrain from the use of force and should resolve present tensions by diplomatic means.

2. I should state to the House that Her Majesty's Government continue to regard the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Island Dependencies as British territory. Our firm objective is to ensure that the Falkland Islands are freed from this Argentine occupation and should return to British administration. Our sovereignty dispute with Argentina is long-standing. But we have no doubt about British sovereignty and we cannot accept that the clear wishes of Falkland Islanders, who are British in stock and wish to remain British in allegiance, should be denied through this act of unprovoked aggression.

3. The incident which has led to the present situation was in no way in proportion to the outcome. It has been seized upon by the Argentine Government in order to impose their claim.




4. It is worth recalling the history of the past two weeks. On 19 March an Argentine party, employed on a straightforward commercial contract, landed at Leith harbour in South Georgia from an Argentine naval transport vessel and raised the Argentine flag. They were instructed by the Commander of the British Antarctic Survey base at nearby Grytviken, which is the accepted point of entry into South Georgia, either to leave or to proceed to Grytviken to obtain the necessary clearance. They refused to do so and, although the Argentine ship and most of the party did leave on 22 March, a number of Argentines remained. The Argentine Government, who claimed to have had no prior knowledge of the landing and who assured us that no military personnel were involved, were asked to arrange for the men's ~~removal~~<sup>debarment</sup> or to ensure that the party sought the necessary authorisation for their presence on British territory. We made clear that while we had no wish to interfere in the operation of a normal commercial contract, we were unable to acquiesce in the illegal and unauthorised presence of foreign nationals on British territory. Faced with a potentially serious situation, HMS Endurance was ordered to the area in order to assist as necessary.

5. We were however resolved to ensure that this superficially minor problem should not be allowed to escalate and we made it plain to the Argentine Government that our object was to prevent a rise in tension between us, and that we wished to achieve a peaceful resolution of the problem by diplomatic means. To help in this HMS Endurance was ordered not to approach the Argentine party at Leith and she has at no time made any attempt to interfere with their operations.

*but to go to Grytviken*

6. However, it soon became clear that the Argentine Government had little interest in a regularisation of the problem. On 25 March, a further Argentine Navy transport vessel arrived at Leith to deliver supplies to the men. Requests by our Ambassador



for an early response from the Argentine Government on arrangements for the men's departure were refused. We again made clear that, even at that late stage, the party's presence could be regularised by obtaining the proper authorisation from the British authorities at Grytviken. No immediate reply from the Argentine Government was received and there was meanwhile increasing evidence of the deployment of vessels of the Argentine Navy into the Falklands area. On 26 March, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement announcing that the men on South Georgia would be given all necessary protection. On 28 March, we received an outright refusal from the Argentine Foreign Minister to regularise the men's position. Instead, it re-stated, in discourteous terms, Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Island Dependencies and that in its view the only matter for discussion was a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. At this stage the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary sent a message to the United States Secretary of State asking him to intervene and to urge restraint. Our American friends acted promptly. But their initiative was also flatly rejected by the Argentine Government. On 30 March, my hon Friend the Minister of State (Mr Luce) made a statement to the House, again stressing our wish to defuse the issue and to pursue a diplomatic solution to it. In pursuit of this aim our Ambassador in Buenos Aires proposed to the Argentine Foreign Minister on 31 March that a senior official should visit Buenos Aires in a further attempt to find a peaceful way out of the impasse. The Argentine Foreign Minister replied to this on 1 April. This reply was totally negative and made clear that for him the diplomatic channel was closed.

7. By late on 1 April there was mounting evidence that the Argentine Navy was positioning itself for an attack on the Falkland Islands. In this grave situation we immediately sought the assistance of our friends, both in the United States

/and



and in the European Community, to dissuade Argentina from precipitate action. But their appeals, including a personal intervention by President Reagan to the Argentine President, were turned aside. Following a request by the United Nations Secretary General that both sides should continue their efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution, we sought an Emergency meeting of the Security Council on 1 April. This led to a statement by the President of the Council urging both sides to refrain from the threat or use of force in the area. The British Representative agreed without hesitation. But the Argentine said nothing.

8. It is now all too apparent that the Argentines had from the outset no intentions of heeding the Security Council's recommendations. All the while their preparations for an attack on the Falklands were in progress, and that attack was carried out on 2 April. I do not have words to express my revulsion at this unprovoked and entirely unwarranted attack by massive naval forces on a peaceful and lightly-populated territory. We do not have full details of the situation in the Falkland Islands. But I am sure that this House will join me in confirming that our feelings at this grave moment are with the Governor and the people of the Islands.

9. We are taking appropriate military and diplomatic measures to sustain our rights under international law and in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. We shall also be taking urgent international action, in particular in the United Nations Security Council where we have again sought an Emergency debate, in order to achieve a clear condemnation of this Argentine action leading to an early withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.

SUPPLEMENTARIES FOR A STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER: 3 APRIL

WHAT DETAILS CAN YOU GIVE US ON THE INVASION?

Communications with the Governor in Port Stanley and with our Embassy in Buenos Aires have been very difficult. However, the Americans tell us that they have been officially informed by the Argentine Government that Argentina has occupied the Falkland Islands. Additionally, we have information from a British Antarctic Survey Ship in the region of the Falkland Islands. This vessel, the Bransfield, was monitoring the Falkland Islands radio broadcasts. Argentine news agencies have made broadcasts about invasion and Ham radio operators have also picked up transmissions. The picture we have is of a landing in the early morning of 2 April by a force of 200 troops. The force moved in on several ships; 3 took up station in the outer harbour of Port Stanley. We understand that Government House was surrounded by armed troop carriers. Subsequently we understand the Argentines began to make broadcasts over the Islands broadcasting system, announcing the formation of a military junta.

WAS THERE AN EXCHANGE OF FIRE?

2. Reports vary. Several amateur radio reports state that fire was exchanged for about 3 hours, that 3 Argentines were injured, one seriously, but that there were no British casualties. Other reports suggest that the Marines in Port Stanley did not offer resistance. We await further information.

WHAT WAS HMS ENDURANCE DOING AT THE TIME OF THE INVASION?

3. As we stated earlier, HMS Endurance was in South Georgia, lying off Grytviken in order to render assistance if necessary as the S Georgia situation developed. S Georgia is several hundred miles from Port Stanley.

WHAT IS THE POSITION IN SOUTH GEORGIA?

4. We understand that an Argentine vessel moved into Cumberland Bay, near  
/Grytviken,



Grytviken, on the afternoon of 2 April. We have no reports of any additional activity there.

WHY WAS NO ACTION TAKEN BEFOREHAND?

5. It is self-evident: the Islands are several thousand miles from Britain. I must underline that we have worked intensively since this crisis began to reach a settlement by peaceful diplomatic means. The Argentines have rejected all such proposals and have chosen to launch this unprovoked invasion. But there should be no doubt that the British Government will respond in appropriate fashion now that the Argentines have taken this disgraceful and wholly unjustified action.

WHAT ARE THE MILITARY MEASURES YOU ARE TAKING?

6. You will understand that I cannot go into this. But we cannot accept this occupation of British Territory. I must express with all the force at my command the outrage and indignation of the British Government and the British people at this unprovoked act of aggression against the Islands.


HAVE YOU CONSULTED OUR ALLIES?

7. On the diplomatic front we have sought the assistance of many countries including the Americans and European partners. I much regret that the Argentines proved unwilling to heed these appeals, which included a personal intervention by President Reagan with the Argentine President.

WHAT ACTION ARE YOU TAKING TO PROTECT BRITISH CITIZENS IN ARGENTINA?

8. Contingency plans exist for the protection of British citizens throughout the world should an emergency arise in the country where they happen to be.

/Arrangements



Arrangements are being made accordingly. There are 17,000 British passport-holders in Argentina. According to Argentine radio broadcasts, the Argentine Interior Minister has ordered the police and Government officials throughout Argentina to guarantee the security of and respect for British subjects, their property, institutions, commercial ventures, enterprises and corporations. We expect these instructions to be scrupulously observed.

WILL YOU NOW EXPEL ARGENTINE DIPLOMATS FROM BRITAIN?

9. We shall take every measure in our power to bring home to the Argentines our revulsion at their action. We shall be breaking our diplomatic relations with Argentina.

WHAT INFORMATION IS THERE ON THE WAY IN WHICH THE ISLAND POPULATION IS BEING TREATED?

10. We have little hard information on this. But one report states that the Commander of the Argentine invasion force made a broadcast in Port Stanley on the afternoon of 1 April in which he said that the Islanders would be free to leave or to stay as they chose. They would be offered certain guarantees about their way of life, freedom of worship, cultural and educational continuity, etc. We reject totally the right of the Argentines to make such proposals.



The National Archives

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 April 1982

N. D. P. D .

ADL 3/4

p.a.

Dear John,

Falkland Islands:  
Economic Retaliation Against Argentina

I enclose for the Prime Minister a paper setting out the scope for economic retaliatory measures against Argentina. Our general conclusion from this is that the scope for effective action, which will not hurt us as much as it hurts the Argentines or which would not cause us legal problems, is very limited.

Yours over,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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## SCOPE FOR ECONOMIC RETALIATORY MEASURES AGAINST THE ARGENTINES

Bilateral Trade

1. Argentina is our third largest market in Latin America, but only ranks 42nd in our world table. Exports to Argentina in 1980 (full figures for 1981 not available) were worth £173 million including:

Machinery	-	£28 million
Power generating machinery	-	£18 million
Road vehicles	-	£17 million

Imports from Argentina in 1980 were worth £114 million including:

Meat and meat preparations	-	£51 million
Textile fibres	-	£10 million
Oil seeds	-	£9 million
Metal ores	-	£8 million (we do not rely on Argentina for any strategic metals)

Invisible earnings increased the favourable balance in our favour.

2. Argentina would be able to find other suppliers and other markets if we were to cut off trade. We have just over 3% of their market and take 3% of their exports. (We should have to take Community law into account if we were to consider interrupting trade; and legally we would have to honour existing contracts.)

3. ECGD have firm commitments for £290 million worth of business and have made offers on a further £60 million. No immediate prospect of major project business. ECGD are considering applications for:

(a) Methanol plant (Davy)	-	£130 million
(b) PVC project (Davy)	-	£197 million

/EC Trade

EC Trade

4. Any attempt to impose sanctions on this trade would come up against Community controls: and we would undoubtedly have great difficulty in persuading our Community partners to agree to common action against Argentina.

5. The EEC Treaty does allow for particular measures in extreme circumstances by individual member states. It is not, however, entirely clear whether we could prevent Argentinian trade with the UK being carried on via other Community countries, given the provisions on the free circulation of goods within the Community. The UK might be able to do so under Article 224 of the EEC Treaty; otherwise it would rest with the Commission to take any decision to suspend the free circulation provisions. A further complication is Argentina's membership of the GATT, which also imposes obstacles to trade restrictions (this is a major point of contrast with the issue of trade restrictions against the Soviet Union, which is not a GATT member). There are provisions in the GATT for actions to protect national security etc, but these are very rarely invoked, and the traditionally unpoliticised nature of the GATT's operation would make them highly controversial. The Commission usually speak for all member states in GATT.

6. Defence Sales are not restricted by Community or GATT controls. Our defence sales to Argentina are already limited on human rights and Falklands grounds. Sales in 1981 were only £12 million, but a further £50 million of sales are in prospect in 1982. These could be cancelled.

Aid

7. We have no aid programme with Argentina.

/British



### British Financial Involvement with Argentina

8. The UK has about 8% of Argentina's foreign investment. Latest book value of our investments is about £200 million but we believe the actual value may be higher. Investors include ICI, Unilever, Shell, Bank of London and South America (Lloyds), Dunlop, EMI, Black & Decker, Burroughs Wellcome, Coats Paton, Gestettner, Tube Investments, Rank, Pilkington Reckitt & Coleman, GEC, Babcocks, British Caledonian and John Brown Engineering.

9. Argentina's external debt was estimated at \$34 billion in 1981, of which \$21 billion was owed to OECD countries. UK banks have claim to US\$3 billion of this debt. Argentina makes extensive use of the City of London, as she ranks fifth in the league of developing country borrowers on the Euro-dollar market after Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and South Korea. Argentina raised \$3.5 billion on the Euro-dollar market last year.

10. British banks are particularly well represented in Argentina: Lloyds International (Bank of London and South America), Barclays, Midland, all have branches. The Bank of London and South America have a particularly important stake with 24 branches in Buenos Aires itself and 13 provincial branches. They are the third largest foreign-owned bank in Argentina and rank No 13 amongst Argentine banks with deposit totalling the equivalent of US\$315 million.

### Argentine Investment in the UK

11. We are unaware of any Argentine investment in the UK: if it exists it would be very small.

/Air



### Air Links

12. The UK has an air services agreement with Argentina dating from 1966. The designated British airline British Caledonian Airways operates scheduled services twice a week to Buenos Aires and earns almost £9 million a year from these services, compared with Argentine Airlines' £7 million a year from a similar twice-weekly operation. Twelve months' notice would have to be given for the agreement to be denounced, but a quicker way to end air services would be for the Secretary of State for Trade to use his powers under the Air Navigation Order 1980 to suspend temporarily the Argentine Airlines' operating permit with immediate effect. Such action could put us in breach of the Air Services Agreement unless it could be shown that this was justified as a retaliatory measure to an illegal act by Argentina. During the period of the permit's suspension, the airline would not be able to operate commercial flights to or from the UK. In retaliation the Argentine authorities would be bound to withdraw British Caledonian's permit. The commercial effects of this would not just be limited to a direct loss of earnings on services to Buenos Aires but would also have an effect on BCAL's network of services to Chile and Brazil, which are served on the same route as Buenos Aires.

### Shipping

13. Under Argentine Government legislation the shipping of goods between the UK and Argentina is divided on 50/50 basis between the UK carriers (four UK lines) and two Argentine national shipping lines. The earnings would be roughly the same for both parties. Relations are currently good and there are no problems which would justify our taking any discriminatory action under the Merchant Shipping Act. There is at present only one Argentine merchant vessel in a UK port, but two more are due on 4 April.



31 APR 1982



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file SR

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 April 1982

I write on behalf of the Prime Minister to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 1 April enclosing a message from President Reagan.

A. V. COLES

The Honourable Edward J. Streator

PART 2 ends:-

AJC SEETHA 1.4.82

PART 3 begins:-

Seagan to PM 1/4/82

