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PREM 19/6/6

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PART 5

Confidential filing


Relations with Argentina.

The position of the Falkland Islands.

ARGENTINA.

Page 4: April 1982

Page 5: April 1982.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
11-4-82							
ENDS							
 <p style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">PREM 19/616</p>							

PART 5 ends:-

Washington tel : 1234 of 11.4.82

PART 6 begins:-

From internal minute of 12/4/82

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Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

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FM WASHINGTON 111835Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1234 OF 11 APRIL
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK

M

MY TELNO. 1193

FALKLANDS: MRS. KIRKPATRICK

1. THE US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN, JEANE KIRKPATRICK, WAS INTERVIEWED ON NATIONAL TELEVISION THIS MORNING. SHE SAID THAT THE MAIN US INTEREST IN THE PRESENT CRISIS WAS TO SEE IT RESOLVED PEACEFULLY. SHE DID NOT SEE A NEED FOR THE US TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. THE ONLY APPROPRIATE ACTION FOR THE US WAS TO TRY AND HELP THE TWO COUNTRIES TO AVOID WAR.

2. ASKED ABOUT HER PRESENCE AT A DINNER GIVEN IN HER HONOUR BY THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR ON 2 APRIL, IE AFTER THE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS, MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT SHE HAD CONSULTED OTHERS IN THE US GOVERNMENT BEFORE ATTENDING. THE US GOVERNMENT VIEW WAS THAT THEY HAD MADE THEIR POSITION CLEAR EG IN VOTING FOR UN SECURITY COUNCIL

FALKLANDS, MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT SHE HAD CONSULTED OTHERS IN THE US GOVERNMENT BEFORE ATTENDING. THE US GOVERNMENT VIEW WAS THAT THEY HAD MADE THEIR POSITION CLEAR EG IN VOTING FOR UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (SHE OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT ADOPTED UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY) AND THAT, IF THE US WAS TO PLAY ANY USEFUL ROLE IT HAD TO KEEP OPEN ITS COMMUNICATIONS TO BOTH SIDES.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT THE US HAD NEVER TAKEN A POSITION ON THE OWNERSHIP OF THE FALKLANDS AND THAT THE ANALOGY BETWEEN ARGENTINIAN ACTION AND THE TAKING OF US HOSTAGES IN IRAN WAS A FALSE ONE. IF OWNERSHIP OF THE ISLANDS WERE CLEAR, THEN THE ARGENTINIAN MILITARY ACTION WOULD CLEARLY CONSTITUTE ARMED AGRESSION. BUT IF THE ARGENTINIANS OWNED THE FALKLANDS THEN MOVING IN TROOPS DID NOT CONSTITUTE ARMED AGRESSION, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE THE US DISAPPROVED OF IT.

4 MRS KIRKPATRICK WAS GIVEN QUITE A HARD TIME BY THE INTERVIEWER, WHO LIKENED THE PRETEXT FOR ARGENTINIAN ACTION TO GERMAN OCCUPATION OF THE SUDETENLAND. ASKED WHETHER SHE HAD ANY DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING NEUTRALITY BETWEEN AMERICA'S CLOSEST ALLY AND A COUNTRY WHICH HAD GIVEN SUPPORT TO THE NAZIS, MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT SHE FELT PROFOUNDLY CLOSE TO THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY BRITAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY, BUT THAT SHE HAD TO SEPARATE HER PRIVATE FEELINGS FROM HER OFFICIAL DUTIES. THERE WERE OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE US AND THE UK VOTED IN DIFFERENT WAYS EG ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT THAT DID NOT THREATEN THE BASIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

5. COMMENT. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAS LONG BEEN NOTED FOR HER PRO-ARGENTINE SYMPATHIES. HER FIRST MAJOR BOOK WAS ABOUT THE PERONIST MOVEMENT THERE. ARGENTINA WAS THE MODEL FOR HER DISTINCTION BETWEEN TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES. MRS KIRKPATRICK, LIKE ENDERS, LIKES TO MAKE MUCH OF THE ARGUMENT THAT, IF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY REGIME THERE WILL BE A RETURN TO PERONISM AND ARGENTINA WILL TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION.

6. I RAISED THIS MATTER WITH HAIG ON 6 APRIL (MY TELEGRAM NO. 1169). MINISTER ALSO TOLD EAGLEBURGER THAT WE HAD BEEN SHOCKED TO HEAR ABOUT MRS KIRKPATRICK'S ATTENDANCE AT THE DINNER. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE TOO HAD BEEN VERY DISMAYED TO LEARN OF IT AND WOULD HAVE BEEN SURPRISED IF WE HAD NOT RAISED IT WITH HIM. HE DESCRIBED THE AFFAIR AS QUOTE DESPICABLE UNQUOTE AND INTENDED TO TAKE IT UP WITH STOESSEL.

7. WE UNDERSTAND THAT IN HER SPEECH AT THE DINNER IN HER HONOUR, MRS KIRKPATRICK PUT UP A CHARACTERISTIC PERFORMANCE. HAVING SUNG THE PRAISES OF ARGENTINA - THE COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE - SHE SAID THAT THE ONLY THING THEY WERE INCAPABLE OF DOING WAS GOVERNING THEMSELVES, THEREBY MANAGING TO OFFEND THE ARGENTINIANS.

7. WE UNDERSTAND THAT IN HER SPEECH AT THE DINNER IN HER HONOUR, MRS KIRKPATRICK PUT UP A CHARACTERISTIC PERFORMANCE. HAVING SUNG THE PRAISES OF ARGENTINA - THE COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE - SHE SAID THAT THE ONLY THING THEY WERE INCAPABLE OF DOING WAS GOVERNING THEMSELVES, THEREBY MANAGING TO OFFEND THE ARGENTINIANS NEARLY AS MUCH AS SHE HAD ANNOYED US.

8. MRS KIRKPATRICK'S ATTITUDE AND ATTENDANCE AT THE ARGENTINE GALA DINNER HAVE BEEN DENOUNCED BY ANTHONY LEWIS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND MARY MCGRORY IN THE WASHINGTON POST AND IS CRITICISED AGAIN TODAY IN THE NEW YORK TIMES. HER PERFORMANCE ON TELEVISION TODAY WAS LESS AGRESSIVE THAN USUAL.

HENDERSON

(Sub on)

NNNN

Faint, mostly illegible text at the bottom of the page, possibly bleed-through or a second page's content.

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PS/LPS (3)
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Then to
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ZZ F C O

GRS 300A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 111800Z APRIL 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 OF 11 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS: MY TELS 77 AND 78

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT HE AND HIS STAFF HAVE BEEN ANALYSING THE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THE BASIS OF MR HAIG'S TALKS IN BUENOS AIRES AND IMMINENT RETURN TO LONDON AND THAT IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO ADDRESS A MESSAGE TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF TEXT:

QUOTE THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU, PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED BY THE EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN THE "MALVINAS ISLANDS" AND BY THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IMMINENT COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, PROPOSES FORMALLY TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT, IN KEEPING WITH THE FIRST (SIC) PARAGRAPH OF THE RECENT RESOLUTION 502 OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, THEY ESTABLISH A TRUCE OF 72 HOURS WHILE THERE ARE TAKING PLACE THE GOOD OFFICES

Handwritten signature

THAT, IN KEEPING WITH THE FIRST (SIC) PARAGRAPH OF THE RECENT RESOLUTION 502 OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, THEY ESTABLISH A TRUCE OF 72 HOURS WHILE THERE ARE TAKING PLACE THE GOOD OFFICES PROCEDURES ACCEPTED BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS CONDUCTING, IN ORDER TO AVOID AN ARMED CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE TO INCREASING THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION WITH A SERIOUS THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. UNQUOTE

2. DR ARIAS ASKED ME TO LET HIM KNOW AS SOON AS I RECEIVED ANY COMMENT OR RESPONSE.

WALLACE

FLASH

NNNN

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Mr Fuller, SAPU, Cabinet-Office

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FM MONTEVIDEO 111644Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 95 OF 11 APRIL
AND TO MODUK

ROYAL MARINES
YOURTEL 83

1. SWISS CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES IN MONTEVIDEO TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM THE SWISS AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES THAT ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE MARINES WERE "AT SEA" AND THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN THEY WOULD BE DISSEMBARKED.

2. TODAY'S URUGUAYAN PRESS ALSO STATES THAT ON THE EVENING OF 10 APRIL "22 MARINES AND 3 CIVILIANS CAPTURED IN SOUTH GEORGIA WERE BEING MOVED AT THIS TIME BY SEA".

3. NO DESTINATION NOR OTHER DETAIL AVAILABLE HERE. THE URUGUAYAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONFIRMED AGAIN LAST NIGHT THAT THEY HAD NO NEWS AT ALL.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 11/2042Z TWW

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR ADAMS
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MR GILLMORE

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DESKBY 120800Z

FROM MONTEVIDEO 111940Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 96 OF 11 APRIL 1982

MT

INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: ARGENTINIAN PROPAGANDA.

THERE ARE URUGUAYAN PRESS REPORTS OF WHICH I HAVE INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION, THAT ARGENTINIANS ARE SENDING TRADE UNIONISTS AND POLITICIANS ABROAD INCLUDING EUROPE TO TRY TO SELL THE ARGENTINIAN CASE TO THEIR OPPOSITE NUMBERS. THE I.C.F.T.U. IN BRUSSELS IS AMONGST THOSE LIKELY TO BE LOBBIED.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

1245

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T.M.I.S

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DESKBY 120900Z
FROM MONTEVIDEO 111643Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 94 OF 11 APRIL 1982

BRITISH INTERESTS' SECTION IN BUENOS AIRES.

I HAVE RECEIVED BY SAFE HAND A LETTER FROM DAVID JOY IN BUENOS AIRES MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) ANY MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH INTEREST SECTION WHO COME TO MONTEVIDEO WILL NOT BE ALLOWED BACK INTO ARGENTINA. HARDY AND HILL THEREFORE WENT TO THE FRONTIER WITH A LORRY CARRYING EQUIPMENT FEPGHV QOS

~~But no further, etc.~~ (THE LORRY WAS FIELDDED ON THE URUGUAYAN SIDE BY MY SECOND SECRETARY AND A UK-BASED SECURITY OFFICER.

(B) THE TOUGHER THE STANCE IN LONDON RE THE ARGENTINIANS THERE, THE TOUGHER THE SITUATION IN BUENOS AIRES. THE ARGENTINIANS ARE INSISTING ON "RECIPROCITY"

(C) APPARENTLY THE ARGENTINIANS ARE NEW TO "INTERESTS SECTIONS", AND THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINE MOVES SLOWLY. COULD YOU ALL

INSISTING ON "RECIPROCITY"

(C) APPARENTLY THE ARGENTINIANS ARE NEW TO "INTERESTS SECTIONS" AND THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINE MOVES SLOWLY. COULD YOU ALL YOUR END PLEASE BEAR THIS IN MIND.

(D) THE FREEZING OF INDIVIDUAL ARGENTINE ACCOUNTS IN THE UK THREATENED FOR NEXT TUESDAY WILL INEVITABLY ENTAIL RECIPROCITY IN ARGENTINA. WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THIS COULD RESULT IN THOUSANDS OF STRANDED BRITISH PEOPLE ARRIVING AT THE INTERESTS SECTION ON THE SWISS EMBASSY SEEKING ASSISTANCE.

(E) PERSONAL SAFETY POSITION OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION MEMBERS IS AT PRESENT GOOD, FURTHERMORE AT PRESENT THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES ARE TRYING TO PROTECT EVERYTHING BRITISH. THIS POLICY HOWEVER COULD CHANGE RAPIDLY ONCE THE BRITISH FLEET IS IN THE AREA.

(F) DIRECT TELEPHONE CALLS, FROM ABROAD TO DAVID JOY AND HIS COLLEAGUES SHOULD BE AVOIDED AS THE ARGENTINIANS HAVE BEEN OBJECTING AND IT EMBARRASSES THE SWISS.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 11/2030Z TWV

OK STILL

TIC

SUB PARA (A) LINE BEGINNING - EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT BUT NO FURTHER. (THE LORRY WAS FIELEDED ON THE URUGUAYAN SIDE BY MY ETC

RGR TKS QSL GA

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Mr. Wade-Gery, Cabinet Office
Mr Fuller, SAPU, Cabinet Office

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FROM MONTEVIDEO 111735Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 111735Z OF 11 APRIL 1982

FROM BRITDEFAT MONTEVIDEO.

SIC U2J

FOR DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE CENTRE.

POINTS NOT YET COVERED RAISED BY YOUR VARIOUS SIGNALS.

1. HEAVY ARMY EQUIPMENT.

ARGENTINE PRESS 10 APRIL CARRIES MENTION FOR FRIST TIME OF QUOTE ARTILLERY PIECES UNQUOTE AND QUOTE VARIOUS TANKS UNQUOTE. AM SEEKING COLLATERAL BUT WHATEVER IS IN STANLEY ADDITIONAL TO INITIAL ASSAULT EQUIPMENT MUST HAVE BEEN TRANSPORTED BY C130. MY GUESS IS THAT IF IT FITS(?) THE PANZERJAEGER WILL HAVE HAD FIRST PRIORITY FOLLOWED BY TAM AND 105MM FIELD GUN.

2. SEA MINES.

ALL I KNOW I PASSED ON TO NA. I.E. ARGENTINE FIRM KEMFIS MANAGED BY ENGLISHMAN TOLD ME THEY HAD MANUFACTURED SOME

2. SEA MINES.

L I KNOW I PASSED ON TO NA. I.E. ARGENTINE FIRM KEMFIS MANAGED BY ENGLISHMAN TOLD ME THEY HAD MANUFACTURED SOME QUOTE MAGNETIC MINES UNQUOTE WHICH THEY HAD SOLD TO ARA. I WILL TRY AND GET MORE BUT CANNOT OF COURSE GET BACK TO MY ORIGINAL SOURCE. ARGENTINE PRESS 11 APRIL STATES THAT ARGENTINA HAS ANNOUNCED THE QUOTE SEA THAT THE FOUR (UK) SUBMARINES WILL HAVE TO PASS THROUGH IS MINED UNQUOTE.

3. RELIEF OF MARINES BY ARMY.

I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE STILL SOME MARINES IN THE ISLANDS BUT TRAVELLERS REPORT THAT LVTP 7'S HAVE LEFT STANLEY BY SHIP. THE MAIN DEFENCE OF STANLEY IS HOWEVER DEFINITELY IN THE HANDS OF 9 BDE (ARMY).

4. RECOILLESS ANTI TANK.

I CAN MAKE NO RPT NO ESTIMATE OF NUMBERS BUT OF COURSE THEY ARE STANDARD INF BN WEAPON. (105 MM CZEKALSKI AND PAMPERO : 127 MM SAPBA : 75MM NOMENCLATURE NK AND 90MM EX USA). 106 MM RCL IS MARINE WEAPON.

5. HELICOPTERS.

INFORMATION IS AS AT 6APRIL WHEN ONE SEA KING WAS REPORTED ON STANLEY STRIP.

6. AIRCRAFT.

BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL ARE REPORTED BY PRESS AS BEING CARRIED ON C130 AIRLIFT TO STANLEY.

7. PUCARA AND MS760.

TRAVELLER SAID HE SAW PUCARA AND MS 760 AS REPORTED AND FROM QUESTIONING I AM SATISFIED HE GOT IT RIGHT.

8. FLY PAST WAS OFF CARRIER AS STATED AND THEREFORE PRESUMABLY BY A4Q AIRCRAFT.

9. SOURCES.

I HAVE NO MORE TRAVELLERS HERE YET BUT OF COURSE HAVE LAID TRAPS FOR ANY WHO ARRIVE. UNTIL THEN I WILL CONTINUE TO REPORT RELEVANT PRESS AND PURSUE OTHER MEANS TO GET INFO ON SITUATION IN SOUTH AND IN ISLANDS.

HUTCHINSON

P.M. H.M.,
Argentina 8

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 111805Z APR 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1231 OF 11 APRIL.

YOUR TELNO. 694: MESSAGE TO HAIG

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN ACCORDINGLY TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO HAVE TOLD US THAT THE MESSAGE HAS NOW BEEN PASSED TO HAIG ON HIS AIRPLANE.

HENDERSON

NNNN



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>616</i> (one piece/item number)	
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TC

LON SWED P70

54250 COALTE G

COULD YOU PLEASE CONNECT ME TO THE FALKLAND ISLAND
COMPANY PORT STANLEY NG 21B

MOM

21B FALKISCO FK

54250 COALTE G

54250 COALTE G

Sent 7.0pm

11-1-82

11TH APRIL 1982 SUNDAY

MR HARRY MILNE

DEAR HARRY,

HAVE BEEN HOPING TO HEAR FROM YOU.

HOPE ALL STILL SAFE AND WELL.

SINCE A.E.S. WAS CARRYING SOME PROVISIONS FOR MARINES,
HAS HAD TO BE DIVERTED FOR TIME BEING. STILL HOPEFUL
IT WILL GET THERE AFTER SENSITIVE PROVISIONS OFF-LOADED.

GRAT PITY OUR COMMUNICATION HAS TO BE SO LIMITED BUT
NEVERTHELESS THANKFUL IF WE CAN REMAIN IN TOUCH.
ANXIOUS TO HELP IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. KATH SENDS LOVE
TO MABEL INCL.

HOPE YOU ARE STILL ABLE TO REPLY.

VERY BEST WISHES.

LLO NE DHAM

54250 COALTE G

21B FALKISCO FK 19 00 HOURS GEN/BS

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Tell D. Wright
OK

c Mr Wade-Gery

Mr Onslow is not now ~~hosting~~ this lunch and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have asked if you would be prepared to do so. I have said that I am sure that you would be so prepared.

2. The guests are -

United Kingdom - Yourself, Robert Wade-Gery, Sidney Giffard (FCO, DUS), Sir Ian Sinclair (FCO Legal Adviser), Antony Williams (HM Ambassador, Buenos Aires), John Ure (FCO, AUS), Christopher Mallaby (Head of FCO Planning Staff), Nick Fenn (Head of FCO News Department), Nicholas Bayne (Head of FCO Economic Relations Department).

United States - Ambassador Louis, Mr Streater, Robert Funseth (AMS equivalent), Dean Fisher (Head of News Dept equivalent), Mr Goldberg, Mr Clauson, Mr Scott Gudgeon, (Legal Adviser), Mr Wrentschler, Mr Service (Head of Latin American Dept.)

(Sir A Acland and the CDS are going to the PM's lunch.)

3. If you do not wish to ~~host~~ the lunch, could you please let me know; otherwise I will assume you and Robert Wade-Gery will make your way to No 11 when the Americans arrive which is likely to be shortly after 12 Noon.

D.J.W.

INTERVIEW WITH MR PYM, SECRETARY OF STATE, by
MR GORDON CLOUGH, BBC RADIO 'WORLD THIS WEEKEND'
SUNDAY, 11 APRIL

Q. Foreign Secretary, Alexander Haig is due back here sometime tomorrow bringing with him his specific ideas for further discussion; now it looks as if he is going to arrive well after the expiry of the MEZ deadline, so would it be in your mind to order British ships not to do anything until such time as you have had a chance to discuss those specific ideas?

A. You know that is really a decision for the Argentinians. They invaded this island, they made this aggressive act, this invasion, so they took that aggressive action. We said on Wednesday, giving four days notice, that this zone would come into effect and if there is going to be some arrangement whereby we can achieve by diplomatic means an end to this dispute, then I would not expect there to be any targets within that zone. As a matter of fact I would not have expected there to be any targets within that zone, anyway I certainly hope there wouldn't. But in view of the fact that Mr Haig is making these efforts which we totally support to try and find a solution, I think it would be very surprising indeed if there were targets there, at any rate I hope very much that the Argentinians do not present a target.

Q. Have you had any indication at all that the potential targets are leaving the area?

A. No, but I think the bulk of the Argentinian Navy is near their ports in the mainland, somewhere in the ports in the mainland, we do not know exactly what is there but the evidence we have suggests that the bulk of it is near their own mainland.

Q. So there may in fact by 5 o'clock tomorrow morning be nothing for the submarines to attack.

A. That is quite possible and I certainly hope that is so

/and if

this negotiation
 and if you can call it that to find a diplomatic solution in accordance with the United Nations Charter is to be real, then I think it would be really extraordinary if the Argentinians did not clear out of the zone.

Q. Mr Pym, when Mr Haig went to Argentina as a friend and ally, not as a negotiator, he took with him apparently a message from the Government to say that there could be no peace until the 9,000 or however many thousand Argentine troops there are in the Falklands had withdrawn and British administration was restored. Do you still stand by that position?

A. That's right, because as I say they are the invading party; the United Nations passed a resolution demanding the end of hostilities, demanding an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces and, of course, the Argentine is legally required to fulfil that requirement and it has not yet done so. And obviously that is a first step to be taken by them before there can be anything remotely like negotiations for a long term solution of the whole problem. So naturally it is vital that that happens and it isn't just a matter between the Argentine and us because I think the whole world has an interest in seeing that this act of aggression is not allowed to stand and therefore of course withdrawal is a first condition.

Q It does not sound from what President Galtieri was saying yesterday as if he was prepared now to withdraw. He said indeed he was calling on us for restraint. He was saying that if they come we will do battle. He also talked about peace with honour. Now can there be any peace with honour for us that does not involve total withdrawal?

A. There must be total withdrawal. No I don't think there can be and that is a United Nations Resolution to which Argentine is of course committed to the Charter just as we are, and they passed that Resolution so they are required to withdraw. I

think one mustn't perhaps necessarily take at absolute face value what a President such as Mr Galtieri may say at a moment of this kind, but the point is that Mr Haig is coming back to London. He arrives sometime tomorrow: we don't know yet when and of course he is going to engage himself in talks with the Prime Minister and myself and we will see what he has to say. But that would suggest that there is ^{at any rate} ~~generally~~ some scope for the finding of a diplomatic solution and as I said to the House last week, the House of Commons, we are very desirous indeed of ending this by peaceful means as I believe everybody is.

Q. What about a longer term peace with honour? There have been talks of course with the Argentine about the possibility of lease-back. The possibility of condominium has been mentioned. In the long term do you think that those options are still open? Do you think that the Falklands Islands can accept a lease-back or a condominium?

A. Whereas I would not exactly exclude them, I can tell you that until and unless there is a withdrawal and unless the conditions of the United Nations Resolution ^{are} ~~is~~ fulfilled there is no question of any further talks or any further negotiations. It does not arise. We have been invaded: British territory has been annexed and that has got to be put right before any further talks can take place.

Q. While we are waiting for what might be a ^{NAVAL} ~~noble~~ battle, what about the position of the Falkland Islanders themselves. There has been this letter from the 15 civic leaders which has been dismissed as not representative, but is it not a letter which should be paid attention to? It may express the wishes of more islanders than are given credit for?

A. I do not think we ought to talk in terms of a naval battle because as I have had indicated I expect that there will be no targets and I very much hope that there won't be within the zone and I would like to make that quite clear, and the bulk of the Argentinian Navy from the evidence we have is near the mainland. In the meantime it is pretty clear that the Falkland Islanders are having a very rough time. I am so glad the

Governor broadcast a message to them today. I am sure they are having a rough time and obviously they will hope that their territory can be returned to British administration and of course thereafter we can ascertain yet again what their wishes are likely to be. We have always paid close attention to their wishes and we must find out again what they will be and the only way we can do that is after there has been a withdrawal. As for the letter, I have not seen a copy. I haven't seen any of the signatories to it and until we have seen a copy and know more about it it is a bit difficult to assess it exactly. But I should be very surprised after all that has happened if the Falkland Islanders were not even more British than they were before, if that is possible.

Q. Is there any further prospect do you think of the United Nations being able to help us in any way? The use of the UN has been urged by various voices, Tony Benn among them, the Peruvian Ambassador among others.

A. We have used the United Nations. It passed a Resolution and it ought to be carried out, and the members of the United Nations ought to see that it is carried out, ~~and~~ I would remind you that even the Soviet Union did not oppose it and they are equally responsible for seeing that it is implemented, ^{just} To take one example, and as an interest for the whole world to see that it is implemented and that's the use of the United Nations - that is what it is for and I very much hope that its members will see that that is carried out.

Q. You said in the House of Commons in the debate that Britain would not appease dictators. Now a very short time to go before that MEZ comes into operation there is a possibility that some ships may still be left in it. Are you prepared to appease in any way?

A. No. The whole world wants the Argentine to withdraw. ~~because~~ **I** It was an aggressive act as everybody very well knows and everybody wants the problem resolved without going to war. And it is up to them to them to withdraw and the whole world wants that. Look at the support ^{we've} ~~it's~~ had in the Community.

A unanimous resolution passed yesterday banning export on arms but also banning Argentinian imports. Look at the response we have had from the Commonwealth. It is splendid. All our friends around the world, all freedom loving people realise what has happened, what an offence has been committed and they want it put right by Argentine without war.

Q. Foreign Secretary I must press you again on this last and what many people think to be the crucial point. Mr Nott has said that if ships are about they will be sunk. If there are ships about tomorrow at 5 o'clock, will they be sunk?

A. That is the position. But as I say I do not expect that there will be. But that is the position.



4

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

11 April 1982

C A Whitmore Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Clive

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: MR HAIG'S VISIT OF 12 APRIL

1. You asked us to give thought to what Mr Haig might propose tomorrow. This letter provides material as a basis for the meeting of Ministers this evening.
2. When Mr Haig was here last week, such ideas as he then had for a settlement of the present crisis were not explained clearly. But he seemed to be thinking of a process in three stages. The first stage would be Argentine withdrawal under international supervision. The second would be the restoration of local administration, apparently under some kind of international umbrella. The third stage would be negotiations on self-determination and sovereignty, apparently with some international involvement. The international element which Mr Haig seemed to be envisaging in all three stages would involve the United States and Canada and perhaps two Latin American states acceptable to Britain and Argentina.
3. The main problem with these ideas is that the restoration of British administration is not explicitly provided for. Thus, if negotiations under stage 3 were to last indefinitely or to be inconclusive, the temporary international administration foreseen in stage 2 might continue and British administration never be resumed. At one point, Mr Haig mentioned the possibility of Argentine involvement in the administration in stage 2, which would be even more unacceptable to Britain. A further weakness of Mr Haig's ideas is that they do not explicitly provide that the wishes of the Islanders should be respected. If, for instance, negotiations were to produce an outcome not approved in the past by the Islanders, it might well be necessary to arrange a referendum.
4. Mr Haig may urge the UK to suspend the Maritime Exclusion Zone, to give more time for negotiations. To do would of course leave Argentina free to continue to strengthen and to supply the occupation force in the Falkland Islands. If Mr Haig does urge that the UK should not enforce the zone because of a prospect of a peaceful settlement, the Prime Minister may wish to counter with a proposal involving important concessions by Argentina. A possible arrangement might be for Argentina to undertake, if the UK conditionally suspends the Exclusion Zone,

/that

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that her naval vessels will immediately leave the area of the Zone and none will enter it; that she will not supply her forces in the Falklands by air; and that her merchant vessels will not enter the area of the Zone. Merchant vessels of other nations would be allowed to go to the Falkland Islands with food and other essential supplies, under some kind of US verification of cargoes.

... 5. I enclose a note of other theoretically possible diplomatic arrangements which Mr Haig might suggest. This may be useful as a source of comment to make about Mr Haig's proposals at the beginning of the second session of talks tomorrow morning. But the Prime Minister may also wish to have at hand ideas for ... positive use. My second enclosure, therefore, is a note of an arrangement which may be acceptable to the UK but also offers minimal presentational advantages to Argentina. These elements are for: a stand-off by the British task force while Argentina withdraws; non-British, probably US, administration of the islands for a finite period, probably confined to the time needed for Argentine withdrawal; American chairmanship of future negotiations about the Falklands; and an international method of ascertaining the future wishes of the Islanders after the re-establishment of British administration.

6. We shall also provide very shortly a note about the economic measures towards Argentina which we would like the United States to take. This might be given to the Americans at the end of the first session tomorrow morning so that they can consider it during the recess.

7. I am sending copies of this letter with the enclosures to the Private Secretaries of the Defence Secretary ~~and~~ the Home Secretary *and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.*

Yours ever,



B J P Fall

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ENCLOSURE 1

Other Theoretically Possible Outcomes Which Mr Haig Might Suggest
(not in order of desirability)

1. Argentine withdrawal; re-establishment of British administration; reference to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion about sovereignty

The Security Council would need to direct the request to the International Court for an advisory (ie not binding) opinion. The Law Officers have advised in the past that the strength in law of the British case was probably sufficient to justify reference to the Court, although they could not altogether exclude the possibility that the Court might find against the UK, particularly over the South Sandwich Islands. Since that advice was given, the composition of the court has become more unfavourable to the UK. This arrangement would therefore be risky for the UK (although the wishes of the Islanders could still be ascertained at the time if the advisory opinion was against the UK).

2. Argentine withdrawal; re-establishment of British administration; reference to the International Court of Justice for a binding decision

In the case of a binding decision, the UK and Argentina would need jointly to refer the question of sovereignty to the International Court. But this course would be even more risky for Britain; a binding ruling against us would virtually remove the Islanders' freedom of choice in the future.

3. Argentine withdrawal; re-establishment of British administration; joint reference by the UK and Argentina to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal

Although the UK would have to agree to the composition of the tribunal, this course presents the same risks as the second one above because the decision would be binding. Argentina, too, might not agree to it. She repudiated the award in the Beagle Channel arbitration tribunal, despite having agreed in advance to accept the findings.

4. Argentine withdrawal; temporary administration by a neutral authority, eg the US, during arbitration or negotiations

If there was a ruling by the International Court or a tribunal against Britain, or if negotiations were inconclusive, the UK would not be in possession of the Falklands and British administration might never be re-established.

5. Argentine withdrawal; cession of Sovereignty over some or all of the Falkland Islands Dependencies; re-establishment of British administration and continued British Sovereignty in the Falklands themselves

This would meet the main British requirements in theory, since the Dependencies are without population. The question is whether Ministers would wish to cede even uninhabited territory.

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6. Repatriation of the Falklanders to the UK or evacuation elsewhere; Argentine military withdrawal; continued Argentine administration.

The Islanders have never wanted evacuation and it is impossible in present circumstances to ascertain whether they have changed their minds. Continued Argentine administration anyway goes against one of the main British requirements.

7. Argentine withdrawal; transfer of Sovereignty from the Falkland Islands and Dependencies to Argentina; lease-back of all the territory to the UK for British administration.

The obvious problem with this is that the Islanders in the past have opposed cession of Sovereignty and lease-back. So any arrangements of this kind, unlike previous versions of the idea, would need to provide for the Islanders to be consulted in the future. One possible arrangement might be a transfer of Sovereignty with indefinite lease-back, the question of termination of the lease being left for the future but requiring a referendum in any case. Another version would be lease-back for 50 years with a referendum near the end of that period. If the Islanders voted against expiry of the lease, it would be extended for another, say, 10 years. There would be another referendum near the end of the extended period ... and so on. Under either version, limits on Argentine immigration would be needed.

8. Extension of the Antarctic Treaty to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

This is still being considered and is mentioned tentatively. The idea would be for the UK, the US and Argentina jointly to propose to the other Parties the extension of this successful and well-regarded Treaty to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. Since Sovereignty is frozen under the Treaty, British retention of Sovereignty and the Argentine claim would both stand. It is relevant that the UK and Argentina already have overlapping Sovereignty claims in the Antarctic, which have not lead to friction since the establishment of the Treaty in 1959. Participating countries administer their own settlements in Antarctica. The UK could thus continue to administer all the existing settlements on the Falklands and the Dependencies. But Argentine settlements would also be allowed on the Islands, which could be under Argentine administration. It is questionable whether Argentina would agree that this part of the Treaty should not be applied. A further problem is that the Treaty insists on the demilitarisation of the area. This would provide legal reason for Argentine withdrawal and for Argentina not invading again; but it would also prevent the UK from keeping warships or marines in the Falklands. The association of a number of major world powers, including the US and the USSR, as Parties to the Treaty might provide some political deterrent to Argentine intervention in future. The Treaty is due for review in 1991 - an appropriate test period. The Governor of the Falklands is also Commissioner for the British Antarctic Territories; he would therefore be able to return to Port Stanley and exercise his full new functions.

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ENCLOSURE 2

A Possibly Acceptable Arrangement

1. No compromise is possible on Argentine withdrawal. But a limited stand-off by the British Task Force might be presented as a quid pro quo. If the exclusion zone was still in force when the arrangement was announced, its suspension could also be presented in this way.
2. Argentine withdrawal may take several weeks to complete. There would be no disadvantage to us in having some international observation to ensure the completion of withdrawal. Those doing this supervision might also exercise temporary administration during the withdrawal. But the duration of the temporary administration must be finite, so as to give us the guarantee that British administration would later be re-established. It would be possible, on this basis, for HMG, in announcing these arrangements, to state the date when British administration would resume. The supervision of withdrawal and the temporary administration might be undertaken by the United States.
3. Negotiations about the Falklands problem could resume at the same time as British administration was re-established. Negotiations could possibly begin even during the period of temporary administration. To give a new look to the negotiations, the US might chair them, with the UK and Argentina and Falklands representatives participating. The wishes of the Islanders about their future would be ascertained by a referendum or an international commission some time after British administration had resumed.
4. The above arrangements would give Argentina four nominal concessions: the stand-off by the British Task Force, non-British administration of the islands for the period of Argentine withdrawal, American chairmanship of future negotiations and an international method of ascertaining the future wishes of the Falkland Islanders. If Argentina is desperate, she might conceivably use these as a way out. If not, we could consider whether to negotiate about a longer, but still finite, period of non-British administration and about some international element, eg a small advisory committee of nationals of other countries than Britain and Argentina, being added to the re-established British administration to give it a slight tinge of an international appearance.

Footnote: If these ideas were put to the Americans, the essential elements might be extracted in a short note for the purpose.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

11 April, 1982.

I attach a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has had from Mr. J.E. Cheek, an elected member of the Falkland Islands Legislative Council.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Cheek.

B/P

C. A. WHITMORE

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

to



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

11 April, 1982.

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 11 April about the future of the people of the Falkland Islands.

The Prime Minister will reply to you as soon as possible.

G. A. WHITMORE

J.E. Cheek, Esq.

Prime Minister.

To me.

I have acknowledged and
I have asked the FCO for a draft
reply.

John
11.4.82.

2 Greycoat Place,
Westminster,
London SW1P 1SDZ

Tel: 01-222 1781
01-222 0028

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

11th April, 1982

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for the support and sympathy which your Government is showing for the people of the Falkland Islands in the terrible situation in which they now find themselves.

The Falkland Islands have a democratically elected government of which I am the only member at present able to speak freely. I am enclosing a proposal for the future of the Islands which I believe the people of the Falkland Islands may be prepared to consider, with the guarantees for their future territorial integrity which are suggested in the proposal.

I am sure you know that it was the expressed wish of the Islanders given effect at the last elections in 1981 that they should remain under British sovereignty and continue to enjoy the freedom to manage their own affairs through their own elected Council. We were unwilling to accede to the proposal that sovereignty of our country should be ceded to Argentina with any lease-back arrangement or that the Islands should be jointly administered by Britain and Argentina in any form of condominium, and I believe these views will have hardened following the Argentine invasion.

After what has happened in the last fourteen days I feel sure that no Falkland Islander would wish his country to become an Argentine colony which is what the lease-back proposal would involve in fact; or that the Government of Argentina should take any part in the administration of our country.

I am deeply conscious as I am sure all other Falkland Islanders are of the very serious world crisis in which we are now involved. I am sure that if they are given the opportunity to express themselves freely the Falkland Islanders will be prepared to look not only to Britain but also to the Community of Nations to find a peaceful solution.

Continued/...

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher.

11th April, 1982

2/...

I personally believe, and it can in the circumstances only be a personal belief, that the kind of arrangement which has given peace and prosperity to Andorra and to other small communities may be a possible solution.

The discussion of this proposal and any other possible solution can of course only start after the withdrawal of the Argentine forces and civilians from the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

May I thank you on behalf of all Falkland Islanders whose homes are in the Islands and nowhere else, as is mine, for your support.

I am writing similarly to Mr. Francis Pym.

Yours sincerely,

J.E. Cheek

J.E. Cheek
Elected Member Falkland Islands
Legislative Council (Stanley West)

A possible future for the Falkland Islands after the withdrawal of Argentine forces

1. There are precedents for the independence and self-government of small communities under the provisions of treaties involving several other States. Examples are Andorra, Liechtenstein and San Marino in Europe. Some very small Pacific island communities, previously European protectorates, are now full members of the United Nations.
2. By analogy with Andorra, the self-governing status of which was confirmed in the Treaty of Vienna in 1816, it is suggested that the Falkland Islanders are perfectly capable of governing themselves if their territorial integrity can be guaranteed and they can retain control over their own resources. They are a highly intelligent and well educated people with an elected Council, fully capable of managing their own affairs and obtaining any specialised outside help they may need.
3. Andorra is under the suzerainty (not the sovereignty) of France in the person of President Mitterand and Spain in the person of the Palatine Bishop of Burgos as successor to an earlier governing bishop. Neither France nor Spain interferes with the internal affairs of Andorra.
4. If the Islands are to survive economically and to prosper it is essential that they have the right to their 200 mile limits and the right to exploit the potential oil resources and the licensing of sea-fisheries around the Falkland Islands and the two dependencies of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.
5. The territorial integrity of the Falkland Islands could be guaranteed by Britain and the other permanent members of the Security Council and by Argentina as signatories to a treaty. Other parties to the treaty might be Brazil and the two traditional friends and supporters of the Falkland Islands, Chile and Uruguay, from both of which countries the Falkland Islands were separated by the Anglo-Argentine Communications Agreement of 1971. Both are directly concerned.
6. A solution on the lines of Andorra would not necessarily require Argentina to give up Argentine claims to historic sovereignty. It would require both Britain and Argentina to accept the right of the Islanders to determine their own future for themselves within the framework of the United Nations Charter, supported

/...

by the international community. Britain has given up her sovereignty over many colonies and dependent territories. There is no disgrace in Argentina following Britain's example and abandoning her claim to govern the Islands. Any Argentine solution, including lease-back, is no more than the transfer of a colony against the will of its inhabitants.

Mugarel 11 30 am
11/4/82

SECRET //NODIS//

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P.O. NOTIFIED

E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 04-11-12 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
HAIG

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER ASAP:

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER,

I HAVE HAD LENGTHY AND INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS HERE, AND I
NOW EXPECT TO ARRIVE IN LONDON ABOUT 0630 A.M. MONDAY
APRIL 12.

I WILL BE PREPARED TO TALK TO YOU WHENEVER YOU WISH ABOUT
A DRAFT PROPOSAL AND SOME ADDITIONAL IDEAS THAT HAVE COME
OUT OF OUR 12 HOURS OF MEETINGS HERE.

IN THE MEANTIME, I AM SURE YOU WOULD AGREE THAT ANY
MILITARY CONFRONTATION MUST BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS UNTIL
YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONSIDER THIS DRAFT PROPOSAL.

ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN; SOME
PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. WITH WARM REGARDS, AL HAIG.
END TEXT.
HAIG

SECRET //NODIS//

SECTO 5041

*for S/S MOD
FO*

MR. WHITMORE from Mr. Pattison

c.c. Duty Clerk

Papers

You will certainly need to see:-

- 10/4 ✓
- ✓ (i) The CDS paper prepared for yesterday's Chequers meeting (to be returned from Chequers by hand of Janice);
 - ✓ (ii) The text of Haig's message;
 - ✓ (iii) The Santiago telegram which we discussed yesterday.

Today's arrangements

The Prime Minister leaves Chequers at 1 o'clock to return for the 2.30 meeting. The Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and CDS will attend. ODSA has been summoned for 7 p.m. Defence and FCO have been informed of this. The Home Secretary has also been informed, as has Cecil Parkinson, and both are making arrangements to return to London. David Wright is informing Sir Robert Armstrong and the Secretariat. The Cabinet Office people have been advised to telephone the Duty Clerk in the late afternoon for final confirmation that the meeting is taking place, but the Home Secretary and the Paymaster General have been told to assume that it will happen.

Press

Brian Mower has confirmed that the Prime Minister is returning to London, and will be seeing colleagues in the course of the afternoon in preparation for a further meeting with Haig tomorrow. At present, Brian does not intend to come into the office today, but is expected to come early tomorrow to handle press enquiries arising out of Haig's visit.

Tomorrow's programme

Haig has said that he intends to arrive in London at 6.30 a.m. There are still some conflicting reports direct from Argentina

/ suggesting

suggesting that he may be having a further round of meetings before his departure. All those likely to be involved in discussions know of his planned arrival time, and of the slight question mark over it. The FCO have been primed to make contingency plans to provide a working lunch for Haig, hosted either by the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary. That apart, no other arrangements have been made for tomorrow, but I have suggested to FCO/MOD/Cabinet Office that there will be a need for an ODSA meeting at some point in the day to take the items originally scheduled for the lunchtime meeting at Chequers. I have suggested that this meeting is now most likely to take place in Downing Street late in the afternoon, after the talks with Mr. Haig are concluded.

Parliament

I told you yesterday that there had been contacts through the usual channels about the possible recall of Parliament. I also consulted the Prime Minister about Dame Judith Hart's approach, and she agreed that some formal response to Dame Judith was necessary. I therefore gave the Duty Clerk a message to telephone back to Dame Judith, which he duly did. The Opposition front bench had in mind the desirability of Parliament meeting on Tuesday or Wednesday, primarily for the purpose of allowing someone - presumably the Prime Minister - to make a statement, although the meeting would technically have to take place on an Adjournment Motion. I also told you that the Prime Minister had it in mind to hold out for a meeting on Thursday. (This was partly dictated by her belief that Mr. Foot still intended to go to Canada towards the end of the week.) In view of the news that Mr. Haig will be in London tomorrow, it seems to me that the Opposition will press that much harder for a meeting early in the week, almost certainly Tuesday. Although the Government will not be in a position to take a firm decision until the talks with Haig have taken place, I think it would be helpful to raise this with the Prime Minister and senior colleagues this afternoon with a view to deciding whether the Government still intend to hold off a meeting for as long as possible, or whether Ministers are now more or less resigned to a Tuesday or Wednesday meeting. If you can get a steer on this, I would like to know the outcome so that I can talk to Murdo Maclean about it.

11 April, 1982.

CONFIDENTIAL

D E D I P

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 111540Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1230 OF 11 APRIL

YOUR TEL 690: FALKLANDS: SOVIET-ARGENTINIAN COLLUSION.

1. I AM AWARE OF THE ARGUMENTS THAT WE MUST AVOID DRIVING THE ARGENTINIANS INTO THE ARMS OF THE RUSSIANS AND THAT THE AMERICANS, AWARE OF THIS DANGER, SHOULD NOT OUTWARDLY TILT TOO MUCH TOWARDS US.

2. IT IS AN ARGUMENT FOSTERED BY THE ARGENTINIANS. IT IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS ARE ALREADY IN A BEAR HUG. THE ARGENTINIANS ARE CURRYING FAVOUR WITH WASHINGTON BY SHOWING READINESS TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH THEM IN RESISTING COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA: WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIETS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IS THERE NOT A CASE FOR EXPOSING INTERNATIONAL CYNICISM OF SUCH A HIGH ORDER?

3. THE ISSUE THAT AROUSES AMERICANS MORE THAN ANY OTHER IS THAT OF ANTI-COMMUNISM. BUT IT NEEDS SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE US GOVT BECAUSE THEY ARE HOOKED ON NOT TAKING SIDES, TO DRAW AMERICAN ATTENTION TO THE DANGER THAT COMMUNISM WILL ADVANCE IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE IF GALTIERI, AIDED AND ABETTED BY THE SOVIETS, HAS HIS WAY.

4. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH WEINBERGER WHO DOES NOT AT ALL GO ALONG WITH THE KIRKPATRICK-ENDERS SCHOOL OF NOT BEING BEASTLY TO THE ARGENTINIANS FOR FEAR OF DRIVING THEM INTO THE SOVIET CAMP. HE REFERS TO FOUR SOVIET/ARGENTINIAN AGREEMENTS JUST SIGNED IN B.A.. MORE IMPORTANT, HE TELLS ME THAT HE KNOWS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PASSING TO B.A. INTELLIGENCE ABOUT THE MOVEMENTS OF OUR FLEET, WHICH THEY ARE FOLLOWING VERY CLOSELY BY VARIOUS MEANS. THIS COULD BE VERY SERIOUS WHEN THE FLEET GETS WITHIN RANGE OF THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE. WE WILL NOT BY EXPOSING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT DO ANYTHING TO MAKE B.A. MORE DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIETS. BUT WE WILL AWAKEN A USEFUL RESPONSE HERE WHERE VIGIL IS NEEDED CONSTANTLY TO KEEP THE AMERICANS ON TRACK.

5. WHAT THEREFORE I WOULD LIKE TO SAY PUBLICLY VERY SOON IS MORE OR LESS AS FOLLOWS.

BEGINS:

NOONE IN THE USA SHOULD OVERLOOK A SINISTER INCREASE IN COMMUNIST INFLUENCE THAT HAS BEEN OCCURRING IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE WHILE ATTENTION HAS BEEN FOCUSSING ON CENTRAL AMERICA. MENTION SOVIET GRAIN DEPENDENCE ON B.A. AS A SAFETY-VALVE AGAINST RISK US GRAIN STOPPAGE (ALREADY 80 PERCENT ARGENTINE GRAIN EXPORTS GO TO USSR) MENTION 5-YEAR MEAT AGREEMENTS. MENTION RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT FORMATION JOINT FISHING COMPANIES OFF FALKLANDS. MENTION REPORTS OF DEALS FOR SOVIETS TO PROVIDE ENRICHED URANIUM TO ARGENTINE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/FINALLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FINALLY I THINK MENTION COULD BE MADE OF THE KNOWN SOVIET SURVEILLANCE CAPACITY IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH ATLANTIC: THE KNOWN PRESENCE (PUBLISHED BY BOTH WASHINGTON POST AND NEW YORK TIMES) OF BEAR AIRCRAFT WITH 8000 MILES RANGE, AND THEIR ACCESS TO BASES IN CUBA AND ANGOLA.

SO MUCH FOR NOT TAKING SIDES AND DRAWING A LINE RIGHT DOWN THE MIDDLE.
ENDS.

HENDERSON

LIMITED
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/EESD
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/NEWS D
HD/INFORMATION D
HD/PUSD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/CHANCELLOR

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

SIR Y. COUZENS

PS/PUS

MR LITTLER

H.M. Tsy

MR GIFFARD

MR HAWTIN

MR WRIGHT

MR PERETZ

MR ADAMS

MR ILETT

MR URE

MR MCINTYRE

MR GILLMORE

Miss DICKSON (BIP DIV) D/En

HD/SAED (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

DIO CABINET OFFICE

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HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF ~~ADVANCE COPIES~~

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

HD/HRGD

M. Fuller SAPU Cabs. Office

RESIDENT CLERK

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LDW NR 258/11

06-7

PP FCO

GR 160

RESTRICTED

FM TOKYO 112330Z

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 180 OF 11 APRIL

YOUR TEL NO 692 TO WASHINGTON

ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA.

1 SPOKE TO KATO TODAY AND FORMALLY DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE DECISIONS BY THE COMMUNITY, REITERATING OUR REQUEST FOR SIMILAR EARLY ACTION BY THE JAPANESE. I WAS CONCERNED BY THE LIKELY EFFECT ON ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IF THE JAPANESE DID NOT TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES SOON. THE JAPANESE PRESS CONTINUED TO TAKE A GENERALLY UNHELPFUL LINE GIVING PROMINENCE TO ARGENTINE VIEWS. I SAID THAT A CLEAR STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT OF OFFICIAL SUPPORT FOR THE UK POSITION WAS OVERDUE.

2. KATO SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER TOMORROW. PERHAPS MR SUZUKI COULD SAY SOMETHING TO THE PRESS. I SAID THAT ANYTHING SAID SHOULD EMPHASISE POSITIVE SUPPORT.

TOMORROW. PERHAPS MR SUZUKI COULD SAY SOMETHING TO THE PRESS. I SAID THAT ANYTHING SAID SHOULD EMPHASISE POSITIVE SUPPORT.

3. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR ON INSTRUCTIONS IS ALSO CONVEYING THE TEXT OFFICIALLY TO THE JAPANESE ON 12 APRIL.

CORTAZZI

NNNN

RESTRICTED

Mr White/ndre.

SAPU(82)2

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached is the second paper in this series. This was approved by the Prime Minister at 2100 hours on 11 April.

The paper contains suggested lines for Ministers to take in public on:

- the exclusion zone deadline;
- possible diplomatic compromises;
- the Haig mission;
- British Task Force and Argentine military activities.

It draws on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's remarks today on BBC radio's "World This Weekend" and ITV's "Weekend World".

Cabinet Office

11 April 1982

RESTRICTED

LINE TO TAKE

(1) The Exclusion Zone Deadline

Does Mr Nott's statement that ships will be sunk after the deadline still hold?

- That is the position; but we certainly hope there will be no Argentine vessels in the exclusion zone tomorrow morning. Most Argentine ships are now in mainland ports.

(2) Mr Haig's discussions with the Argentinians

- We have no details of these but Mr Haig is expected back in London tomorrow for further discussions with the Prime Minister.

(3) Possible diplomatic compromises

- Our position continues to conform to the terms of the mandatory Security Council resolution; viz that there must be:

- (1) a cessation of hostilities;
- (2) a withdrawal of all Argentine forces;
- (3) a search for a diplomatic solution.

There can be no negotiation about the future status of the Falkland Islands until the Argentine forces have withdrawn. Then in any subsequent negotiations with Britain the wishes of the Falklanders will remain paramount.

Specific Questions

Would you agree to an Argentinian civilian administration remaining on the Islands after military withdrawal?

- No. We mean that all Argentinians, officials and military, must withdraw.

Longer term solutions: Condominium? Lease back? Temporary UN administration?

- One step at a time. No longer term solutions can be considered before Argentinians have withdrawn. After that a range of possibilities can be discussed. The wishes of the islanders will remain paramount in any decision on future status. Cannot predict the islanders' wishes once British administration has been restored. Their attitudes may or may not have changed.

(4) Task Force Activities

Can only say that it is on course and on time and has not encountered any difficulties.

Russian spy ship?

- Can confirm that a Soviet intelligence-gathering ship is shadowing Canberra. The Russians always take an interest in our naval movements and we would expect Russian surveillance of an operation of this sort.

Where is HMS Endurance? (allegations that it has been sunk)

- Cannot give details of whereabouts but can confirm that we are and have been in contact throughout.

(5) Argentine Military Activity

Details of remaining Argentine warships; naval auxiliaries / is there anything in the 200 mile zone?

- We are keeping a close watch but cannot give details.

Argentinian strength on the Falklands? (Reports of massive build up)

- Cannot give you details of our assessment but stories from Argentine sources may need a pinch of salt.

News film of Argentine patrol boats off the Falklands?

- Believed to be old film shot off the mainland. Unlikely that Argentinian patrol boats could operate in Falklands' waters in present weather conditions.

Transcript by
JAMES LEE of:

INTERVIEW ON "WEEKEND WORLD" (ITV)
BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR. FRANCIS PYM,
ON SUNDAY, 11 APRIL 1982

QUESTION (first few words not recorded)

.....that Britain does not want to use force if, in fact, this dispute can be solved satisfactorily by peaceful means; but you also made it quite clear that a precondition for negotiations is that the Argentinians should withdraw from the Islands. Now, some problems are starting to come up about this word "withdraw", and what exactly it implies. Some people have suggested that the Argentinians might take their military forces out, but they might leave some administrators in. Now, would you find that form of withdrawal acceptable?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

The British Government has no complication about withdrawal. Withdrawal is withdrawal. They have illegally and wrongfully aggressed and invaded the Falkland Islands and the condition for us is that they withdraw first before anything else can happen.

QUESTION

All of them? Bag and baggage - the lot - military men and civilians?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

All of them!

QUESTION

None of this business of they might leave somebody behind to run up the Argentinian flag every Thursday; you do not want that?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

No! Withdrawal is withdrawal, and that is backed by the Resolution of the Security Council, which had an overwhelming majority, and I think everybody all round the world wants to see it carried out, because if it is not so, then other countries, the weaker countries, may feel themselves threatened by larger countries; so withdrawal is withdrawal.

QUESTION

I understand. Another idea that has been suggested by those who are looking for some sort of compromise now is that the Argentinians may suggest that they are prepared to withdraw - to take everybody out - if our naval task force turns back. Now, is that something that the Government would consider?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

No! Withdrawal must happen first, before anything else is done. There has been no suggestion about any effect

on the task force or anything else and, as I say, it is not just Britain who is asking for that, it is the United Nations who are asking for that.

QUESTION

Well, I will just get that again, Mr. Pym, because I think it is very important. You know yourself that a lot of strange ideas are stirring in the undergrowth. There is no warrant whatsoever for anybody saying, I take it, that the British Government is prepared to allow any Argentinians to remain there as Argentinian representatives, nor that we will turn the task force back - until they withdraw completely from the Islands?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Well, of course, if they withdraw from the Islands, then the task force will not be required to be used in any way and its future, of course, must be determined at that time and an undertaking to withdraw makes a very major transformation in the entire scene, so of course that would have to be considered at that time, but withdrawal is the first thing.

QUESTION

Let me now bring up something else which is causing a great deal of discussion and on which you could perform a most valuable service of clarification, and that is the

question of British administration. It has been said that Britain has never so far said that after an Argentinian withdrawal, it expects immediately to resume its own administration of the Islands, and some people see this as a possible way of getting a compromise which would save the Argentinians' faces. So let me ask you: are you prepared, if the Argentinians withdraw, to see a United Nations peace-keeping force put in there for an interim period?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

We have not considered that possibility because there has so far been no suggestion of withdrawal. The objective that we have had, made clear by the Prime Minister, and repeated by myself - as came up earlier in the programme - was the restoration of British administration. It is true that there was no actual time scale there, but we visualized, of course, that withdrawal would be followed by the return of a British administration, which is what the Islanders have always had and what they have indicated, so far, they have always wanted.

QUESTION

And yet, I see in that answer - all your original answers have been quite unequivocal, and indeed that answer was unequivocal - but you did say that it is an issue that the British Government had not considered - possibly not considered at any length, because the position has not arisen yet -

and I notice that you have not excluded the possibility that if the Argentinians withdrew, Britain might be prepared to see a United Nations peace-keeping force there for a brief period before we resumed our administration.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Let me remind you what the Security Council Resolution said:

Cessation of hostilities; withdrawal of Argentinian forces; all of them; and a search for a diplomatic solution and it is very necessary that we use every effort - which we are using - to try to secure that peaceful solution, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, is heavily engaged in that now and he is coming back to London tomorrow, with what plans or proposals I have no idea at the moment, no indication what they may be. But he is trying to make a contribution - a big one - to the possibility of a diplomatic solution which every one wants. So those are the three things. We are following the United Nations Resolution: cessation of hostilities, withdrawal and the search for a diplomatic solution.

QUESTION

Now, obviously, cessation of hostilities and withdrawal is just what we want. We want the Argentinians out of the Falkland Islands, but you are very rightly stressing that the United Nations would also like to see maximum diplomatic activity and so, I presume, would most British people, and certainly so

would the British Government, so I put it to you again, clearly as a more direct question this time: if we could them out, if we could get hostilities not likely to proceed any further, would we be prepared to pay, as a price for that, a United Nations peace-keeping force there, at least for a brief period?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

One step at a time! There is no sign yet, no indication whatever, following Mr. Haig's visit to Buenos Aires, that there is going to be any withdrawal, but that is the first condition and that has to be fulfilled first of all and it may be that if that withdrawal does come, no doubt there would be diplomatic discussion, but the point is we must stick to the position that they have aggressed against us, they have invaded the Falkland Islands, they have taken them over. They have got to withdraw from that first. We want British administration to go back and then, in the longer term, ^{of course,} there could - after that - be discussions. Now, in the course of the withdrawal and so forth, it may be that that diplomatic initiative could conceivably contain other elements in it, but we are not there yet! One step at a time!

QUESTION

Then I wonder if I may, so sum up this point - because you know yourself how very important all of these things are - put back to you what I take your attitude to be: that

certainly, there can be no question of our doing anything until the Argentinians have withdrawn from the Falkland Islands.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

That is correct.

QUESTION

That is absolutely clear, but that though we want British administration restored, in the diplomatic discussions that might follow such a withdrawal, the British Government does not close its mind by any means, as a gesture towards the United Nations desire and our own desire that there should be no bloodshed if we could avoid it, the British Government does not close its mind to the possibility of a United Nations peace-keeping force for a period.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Let us not close minds to that or any other possibilities, but let me say again that our objective is to restore British administration, because that is what the Islanders have always wanted and what they have always had - at any rate for 150 years.

QUESTION

Let me now move on! Let us suppose, and we all profound hope it - at least we all do in this country - that

the Argentinians do withdraw, that British administration is restored and that, therefore, the immediate crisis is settled. Very obviously, there will then be - maybe after a certain interim period, a cooling-off period as it were - but eventually we will have to get round the negotiating table and start negotiating. Now, I want to put to you - and I stress this is long term; you have made it quite clear there can be no negotiations of this kind until the Argentinians have withdrawn - but long-term, let us look at some of the ideas that have been suggested.

For instance, are you in any way attracted by the suggestion of a condominium.

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Let me remind you that negotiations with the Argentine have been going on for 15 years, perhaps a bit longer than that, trying to resolve this problem. They have always regarded it as a problem, and we have had to take account of that and we have been talking with them, and only a few months ago we were negotiating with them, and on that occasion, there were representatives of the Falkland Islands Council present at those talks, because we have always said that their right to have determination about their future was a very important element in this and, of course, that is a democratic right of all countries. It is what we went to war in the last War about. So that has got to be taken into

account, but it is not a question of ending this thing now and starting negotiations; they have been going on for 15 years and, actually, there are more ideas afloat now, I think, as to the possibilities for the future, that no doubt could be considered because in negotiations in the past nothing has been excluded except that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders have got to be taken fully into account and that must remain like that. But now, what is going to happen after withdrawal, restoration of British administration? What are the views of the Falkland Islanders going to be? We do not know. One would imagine that after this experience they have said: "Good Heavens! We were virtually 100% British before and wanted to remain British - even more so now!" but we do not know that until the whole issue is over. They are in a very difficult position. They have been invaded; they must be at risk and in danger; they must be acutely aware of that, extremely uncomfortable and obviously not having anything like the happy life that they want, so what effect that will have we do not know. We would have to find that out, but in the context of what they would then think, of course we can negotiate and discuss, but we must have the three elements in it: our responsibility for the islands, the attitude of the Argentine Government which must come into it, and the wishes of the people.

QUESTION

Let me take that very last point up, in the context for the moment of condominium - there are other things I want to come back to. Do I take it that you are saying that if

the Falklanders made it quite clear that they did not want a condominium, they did not want a sharing of sovereignty and administration between Britain and the Argentine, we would then have to rule that argument right out?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I do not think one can be definite about a situation so far into the future. When you think what has got to happen before we can arrive at a position - which everybody wants - where we are sitting round the table saying "Now what are we going to do?" An awful lot has got to happen and it is impossible to prejudge at this range what the attitude of the Falkland Islanders would be about condominium or whether they perhaps do not like it and perhaps a certain proportion of them think it is a less undesirable form for the future than other forms. I think they will want to stay British, but we really cannot judge that at this stage.

QUESTION

I accept that. What I am keen to get at is if they did not like the idea of a condominium, what would our attitude be? Would we accept: "Ah well! That is their view and there is nothing we can do to change that!" or would we say "Well now, come on chaps! Condominium may be the way out of this!"?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

I would visualise at that stage - a lot is going to happen before that - a range of possibilities which would have to be discussed with the people of the Falkland Islands and the advantages and disadvantages of each would have to be thought about by them and it may be that they had, you know, a more open mind in a change in one direction rather than another. I cannot anticipate what that would be, but I certainly would not dream of giving a positive view about one particular solution - condominium - nor ought it to be looked at like that. I think it would be a range of possibilities. As I say, I would anticipate myself that they would still want to be very British but I think ^{we} they/would all have to think about it very carefully, granted that we had arrived at a position where, with good sense and with good will all round, we can actually talk sensibly about the long-term future.

QUESTION

I see that, and I want to put you, by the way, certain other possibilities besides condominium, but before I do, you seem to be saying - and I just want to be sure that this is right - you seem to be saying that the Falklanders' wishes, their desire for self-determination, will be the dominant factor here and that if they say: "No, we are very sorry, we do not want any condominium, we want British administration",

as far as this Government is concerned, that would be the decisive factor?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Yes, I think it must be the dominant factor. After all, they are the people who live there and what they will feel like after this awful experience, who can tell? As I say, I would have thought they would be very much more pro-British. I mean, for all I know, some of them may want to perhaps change their way of living and move somewhere else, for all we know. I think it is very difficult to say that, but the idea of imposing on them something, you know, which most of them did not really want, does not seem a very happy future for them, so you have got to take it into account.

QUESTION

Let me point out what may be or at least some people may think it is, a consequence of this, which is not a question of our imposing anything on them - rather the reverse. That once they are told: "All right, the British Government in fact will give you what you want in this situation" from what we know of them at least in the past, most Falklanders will say: "Right! That's it then! What we want is British sovereignty and British administration and end of the matter!" Is that not slightly worrying to you?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

They have, of course, so far had what they wanted. We are now thinking about a context which no doubt is a little way into the future - I hope not too long - but after a terrible experience, with what effect upon their outlook and attitude I cannot predict. I have never been there. I have never been anywhere near the Falkland Islands. I have got no personal knowledge of it and I think, if I may say so, that at this stage it is a mistake to go too far in this direction, but the idea, as I say, of imposing something on them does not seem a very happy future for them, but attitudes may have changed for all I know, and at that point we shall be in a mood of great relief to everybody when that situation arises, that is to say when we can talk meaningfully round a negotiating table, it may be that attitudes will have changed; I do not know.

QUESTION

Let me put another idea to you on which the attitude of the Falklanders in the past has always been clear. If you anticipating some possibility of change now, it will be interesting to have your view on this one, and it is an idea that has always appealed to the F.O. which you are now running, and that is the idea of lease-back; namely that we grant the Argentinians what one might call "nominal sovereignty" but they lease the Falkland Islands back to us and we continue to

administer them for a long period, or perhaps for ever. Now, when it was put to the Falkland Islanders in the past, they did not like it. However, is it still an option on the table as far as you are concerned in the future negotiations?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Well, do you think the Falkland Islanders might think it was a workable option after this experience? I think that is the first question one has to ask. It is not a new idea that. It has been thought about for quite some time, but the Falkland Islanders did not want it and there the matter left, so I do not think one can exclude any of these possible solutions because everybody wants to resolve the problem long-term in the best way we can, taking all the interests into account.

QUESTION

You see, I think one of the difficulties is going to be, one can quite understand why we place such great emphasis - rightly - on the self-determination of the Falklanders - but it could well be that when the Secretary of State gets off his plane here and nips round to see you tomorrow, he will take a very different view of this and will say: "Well now, look! The trouble is Mr. Pym, if you are going to let it all rest on the self-determination of the Falklanders, most of the ideas that can produce a settlement are going to be ruled out by the Falklanders, so you have got to give a bit on this. You must not, in fact, completely shut off possibilities of another

kind of settlement that might be slightly less welcome to the Falkland Islanders!" Now, what will you say to Mr. Haig if he says that?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

The British Government adheres to the Security Council Resolution - cessation, withdrawal and a diplomatic solution - and the vital thing is to get those conditions fulfilled and a British administration returning to the Islands and then, after that, I think longer term, we could consider, but we have made it clear that the wishes of the Islanders are the dominant - was the word you used - consideration, and that must be so, and that is what democracy is all about. That is what freedom is all about. That is what we have been to war in this country through the centuries to preserve and the whole free world has an interest in it. Look at the support we have got for our line! The 10 countries of the European Community have taken a solid line with us; the Commonwealth; all our friends round the world! They understand, as^{well as} you and I do, that freedom under the law is the only civilised kind of life to lead and if invaders and dictators and aggressors annex territory, strong countries overrunning weak countries, that is the way to anarchy throughout the world and nobody want it, so the first thing we have got to do is to make sure that law and order is restored there and after that I say, of course, the interests of the people must be dominant, of course that is so, but let us then at that point - and there will be a sense of great relief at that stage after this tension - let us

sit down at that stage and then let us talk with everybody and see what we can achieve.

QUESTION

Well that is a very clear statement of national aspiration which I would imagine overwhelmingly the British people agree with. However, it does tend to make one thing very clear doesn't it? That if Mr. Haig is coming back here with the idea that he can cobble together some very quick settlement on terms that Argentina has suggested to him, which President Galtieri himself does not seem to have much confidence in, let us face it, though no doubt you will listen to him with very great courtesy, Mr. Haig has not got much of a chance, has he, of cobbling up a quick deal on the basis of what we know so far?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

We have no idea what happened in the conversations in Buenos Aires, nor should we have. We have no idea what proposals he is going to come with. You suggest he may be coming with some long-term condominium proposal. Well, I have no idea whether that is so. Even if he is, withdrawal and all the other things we talked about have got to happen first. We just do not know. My goodness me! Of course, we will listen to him. Any area of diplomatic action that we can take, any effort we can make we shall make to try and end this by peaceful means but we must not let a free country be overrun.

QUESTION

Quite! Well now, if vital principles are involved and we cannot accommodate it may well be - and the Government has foreseen this sad possibility all along - that hostilities will have to commence. In a way, I regret having to put this question to you, but it has been a long time since we have done any serious fighting. Let me ask you straight out, do you think the British have got the stomach for the sacrifices and casualties that might be involved if the worst comes to the worst?

FOREIGN SECRETARY

Provided they are confident and convinced that the way in which we have used it, the manner in which we have exercised that power, in the very unhappy event of it becoming necessary, I think they will. I think they must be convinced that it has not been rashly done or ill-advisedly done or unnecessarily done. If they have confidence in us and in the way we have managed it, I think they will, but they look very carefully and very properly at how these things are carried out, and so on that basis, I think they would.

INTERVIEWER

Mr. Pym, thank you very much indeed!



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

Mr. Fuller

South Atlantic Presentation Unit

The Prime Minister has discussed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and other Ministerial colleagues the draft of the second in the series of notes for Ministers to use in public on the Falkland Islands which you submitted with your minute of today's date.

They agreed on the following changes to the draft:-

(i) Possible diplomatic compromises

The last two sentences to read:-

"There can be no negotiation about the future status of the Falkland Islands until the Argentine forces have withdrawn. Then in any subsequent negotiations with Britain the wishes of the Falklanders will remain paramount."

(ii) Specific Questions

Amend the response to questions about condominium, lease back, and a temporary UN administration to read:-

"One step at a time. No longer term solutions can be considered before Argentinians have withdrawn. After that a range of possibilities can be discussed. The wishes of the islanders will remain paramount in any decision on future status. Cannot predict"

(iii) Task Force Activities

Amend first sentence to read:-

"Can only say that it is on course and on time and has not encountered any difficulties."

11 April, 1982.

JAW.



Prime Minister

Content, subject to the
small changes I have suggested?

DUTY CLERK (No 10)

AKL
llw

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

As discussed I send to you a draft of the second in the series of notes for Ministers to use in public on Falkland Islands questions. This has been agreed at official level in the FCO and the MoD.

If you agree we propose to issue this this evening.

S W J FULLER
Room 322
Cabinet Office
x4991

Cabinet Office
11 April 1982

RESTRICTED

SAPU(82)2

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

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Cabinet Office

11 April 1982

RESTRICTED

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- We have no details of these but Mr Haig is expected back in London tomorrow for further discussions with the Prime Minister.

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- Our position continues to conform to the terms of the mandatory Security Council resolution; viz that there must be:

- (1) a cessation of hostilities;
- (2) a withdrawal of all Argentine forces;
- (3) a search for a diplomatic solution.

There can be no negotiation about the future status of the Falkland Islands until the Argentine forces have withdrawn ~~and British~~ *Then*

~~administration has been restored.~~ *with* In any subsequent negotiations

Britain the wishes of the Islanders will remain ~~dominant.~~ *paramount?*

I have checked
** If the US says they know of it.*
But I thought he sticks to the U.N. resolution
- hence the amendment.

Specific Questions

Would you agree to an Argentinian civilian administration remaining on the Islands after military withdrawal?

- No. We mean that all Argentinians, officials and military must withdraw.

Longer term solutions: Condominium? Lease back? Temporary UN administration?

- One step at a time. No longer term solutions can be considered before Argentinians have withdrawn (and British administration has been restored). After that a range of possibilities can be discussed. The wishes of the Islanders will remain ^{? determine} ~~dominant~~ in any decision on future status. Cannot predict the Islanders' wishes once British administration has been restored. Their attitudes may or may not have changed.

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Can only say that it is on course and on time and has not encountered any [serious] difficulties.

It's not for me to question - I suggest it is relevant.

Open - details - not

Russian spy ship?

- Can confirm that a Soviet intelligence-gathering ship is shadowing Canberra. The Russians always take an interest in our naval movements and we would expect Russian surveillance of an operation of this sort.

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Argentinian strength on the Falklands? (Reports of massive build up)

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News film of Argentine patrol boats off the Falklands?

- Believed to be old film shot off the mainland. Unlikely that Argentinian patrol boats could operate in Falklands' waters in present weather conditions.



*John Holmes memo n 1540
La Belgique
KJ
11w.*

DRAFT SUGGESTED MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO HER EC
COUNTERPARTS

Text:

'I should like to thank you very warmly for your help
in securing common action by the Ten in response to
Argentina's seizure of the Falkland Islands. The speed
with which this action was taken during a holiday period
was an impressive example of community cooperation'.

For Italy, add further sentence:

'I know too how serious a decision this involved for your
Government'.

For Belgium, add following words at end of message

(after 'crisis'): 'and I am especially grateful for the
role played in this by the Belgian Presidency.'

mt.

SECRET

6
Approved by the Prime
Minister. John Haig was
invited (1940).
R
P.W.P.

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR HAIG

Dear Al,

Thank you for your message this morning about your talks in Argentina. I look forward to seeing you in London again tomorrow and shall be glad to hold further discussions.

I should certainly prefer to avoid military confrontation. But Argentina is the aggressor, and is still trying to build up the occupying force in the Falklands. The right way to prevent naval incidents is therefore for Argentina to remove all her naval vessels from the maritime exclusion zone. The Argentine Government has had plenty of warning. I am sure that you will have impressed this point upon the Argentine leaders. But if there is any doubt in your mind as to their intentions, you may wish to consider sending them a further immediate message.

Yours Margaret

SECRET

M. Savod to Chequers 11/4/82.

SUBJECT.

The Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

*Italian Embassy,
4, Grosvenor Square,
London, W.1.*

London, 10th April 1982.

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No.**


*T 10/4/82
68A/82*

Dear Prime Minister,

*g. Foster rec
of.*

I have pleasure in enclosing, herewith, a message addressed to you by the Italian President of the Council of Ministers. A rough translation is also provided.

Very sincerely yours


Andrea Cagiati.

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON S.W.1.

encls.: 2

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUGH TRANSLATION

Dear Prime Minister,

I have received your message of April the 6th, in which you asked the support of the Italian Government with the view to the adoption of common measures towards the Argentinian Government, following the Argentinian military occupation of the Falkland Islands.

Your message has met my complete understanding and first of all I wish to express to you the full solidarity of the Italian Government and my own in this difficult moment faced by your Country following an act in violation of the general principles of International Law.

In full coherence with the fundamental principles of the Italian foreign policy, I have immediately expressed my Government's condemnation of the act of strength decided by the Argentinian Authorities, urging them at the same time to comply with the requested immediate withdrawal of their armed Forces and the resumption of negotiations with your Government. The Italian Government is in fact convinced that only a negotiated settlement, as stressed by the United Nations Security Council, can resolve the dispute.

In keeping with this line, my Government has today decided a total embargo on armaments exports toward Argentina.

In view of the present situation in the South Atlantic, we felt that an embargo on armaments was the most urgent measure. It will be my Government's care to see that this decision - which implies, as you can understand, sensitive problems deriving from the rights acquired by bona fide contracts signed in the past - will be scrupulously implemented.

CONFIDENTIAL

continued

The further measures urged by Her Majesty's Government have to be assessed taking into account their implications towards the Common Market and the legal and economic problems they present for its members.

I see from your message that Her Majesty's Government has not failed to note that an adequate international legal basis would greatly facilitate our task. But, lacking such basis, I agree with you that an examination of the British requests have to be rapidly fostered both in the European context, as far as the European Community is concerned, and in the national ones. Meanwhile, it is unquestionable that the line which has been publicly taken discourages the banking system from committing itself in Argentina.

I wish anyway to assure you that it will be my Government's care to confirm in a tangible manner Italy's full solidarity and its intention to support in this difficult moment Her Majesty's Government.

I take this opportunity to convey to you the expression of my very sincere friendship.

GIOVANNI SPADOLINI

London, 10th April 1982.

Gentile Primo Ministro,

ho ricevuto il Suo messaggio del 6 aprile scorso, con il quale ha chiesto l'appoggio anche del Governo italiano all'adozione coordinata di misure nei confronti del Governo dell'Argentina, a seguito dell'occupazione militare delle Isole Falkland decisa dalle Autorita' di quel Paese.

Desidero assicurarLa che il Suo messaggio ha trovato la mia completa comprensione e sento innanzitutto di esprimerLe la piena solidarieta' del Governo italiano e mia personale in questo difficile momento che il Suo Paese attraversa, a causa di un atto compiuto in violazione dei principi generali del diritto internazionale.

In stretta coerenza con i principi fondamentali della politica estera italiana, ho espresso immediatamente la condanna del Governo per l'atto di forza deciso dalle Autorita' di Buenos Aires, esortandole al tempo stesso ad aderire agli appelli lanciati per il ritiro immediato delle proprie forze militari e per la ripresa di trattative con il Suo Governo. E' infatti convinzione del Governo italiano che soltanto una soluzione negoziata, così come auspicato dal Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, possa porre termine alla controversia.

In stretta aderenza a questa impostazione, il Governo, nella sua odierna riunione, ha deliberato un embargo totale sulle esportazioni di armamenti nei riguardi dell'Argentina.

Data la situazione venutasi a determinare nell'Oceano Atlantico meridionale, l'embargo sulle esportazioni degli armamenti ci e' sembrato il provvedimento piu' urgente. Sara' cura del Governo seguire scrupolosamente l'applicazione di tale decisione che comporta, come Ella puo' immaginare, delicati problemi per i diritti acquisiti attraverso contratti debitamente conclusi nel passato con buona fede delle parti.

E' stato inoltre convenuto che gli altri provvedimenti sollecitati dal Governo di Sua Maesta' devono esser valutati per le loro implicazioni nei confronti del Mercato Comune e per gli aspetti giuridici ed economici che essi presentano all'interno di ciascuno dei nostri Paesi. Noto dal Suo messaggio che al Governo di Sua Maesta' non e' sfuggito che una appropriata base giuridica internazionale faciliterebbe grandemente il nostro compito. Ma, in mancanza di essa, convengo con Lei che l'esame delle richieste inglesi deve essere attivato rapidamente sia in sede europea, per la parte che riguarda la Comunita', sia, per il resto, in sede nazionale. Intanto e' indiscutibile che l'orientamento che abbiamo preso pubblicamente scoraggia di per se' il sistema bancario dall'impegnarsi in Argentina.

Desidero comunque assicurarLa che sara' cura del Governo italiano confermare in maniera tangibile la piena solidarieta' dell'Italia ed adoperarsi per sostenere in questo difficile momento il Governo di Sua Maesta'.

Colgo l'occasione per inviarLe i saluti piu' amichevoli.

GIOVANNI SPADOLINI

Mufaxed to Unquere 11/4

SUBJECT

HAUT-COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA,
DIVISION DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES
ET ECONOMIQUES,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.



CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DIVISION,
MACDONALD HOUSE,
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE,
LONDON, W1X 0AB.

Telephone: 01-629 9492 Ext.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 67/82

Dear Duty Officer,

The telegram attached contains the text of a letter dated April 8 from Prime Minister Trudeau in reply to Prime Minister Thatcher's recent letter to Mr. Trudeau on the crisis in the Falkland Islands. I should be grateful if you could ensure that it is delivered to the Prime Minister's Office as soon as convenient.

cc. Master set
ops

We shall send the original of Mr. Trudeau's letter as soon as it is received.

Yours sincerely,

Steuart Beattie,
Minister-Counsellor

The Duty Officer,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
King Charles Street,
LONDON S.W.1.

DISTR	OP
A14	
T1	224

APR 10 07:59

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT GEB1288 08APR82

TO LDN DELIVER BY 100900

INFO BAIRS WSHDC TOKYO CNBRA WLGTN BONN HAGUE BRU PARIS DUBLN COPEN
 ROME BNATO BREEC OSLO WDOAS MXICO SJOSE LIMA BRSLA BGOTA CRCAS LSBON
 ATHNS ANKRA HAVAN PSPAN MDRID KNGTN GRGTM BDGTN MOSCO FINOTT/IPD/IER
 NDHQOTT/DGIS/DDI/DIPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON PEKIN/SECSTATE/
 REGAN

DISTR SSEA MDE MRL DMT DMF PFC PFG GSP GSL GSC GNG GEA GEP ECD ECO
 ECP SPF TSP DLP DLL CMO CMC MAOH

REF OURTEL GEB1268 07APR

---FALKLAND ISLANDS:RESPONSE TO THATCHER MSG

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LET FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PM THATCHER DATED 02APR.

DEAR MARGARET,

I FULLY SHARE THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED IN YOUR
 MESSAGES TO ME ON THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE
 FALKLAND ISLANDS.AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
 COUNCIL MEETING OF APRIL 2,AS WELL AS DIRECTLY TO THE
 ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS,THE
 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA HAS EXPRESSED ITS SHOCK AND DEEP
 CONCERN OVER THIS USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES.WE
 HAVE ASKED ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW ALL MILITARY FORCES
 FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND HAVE HAD OUR AMBASSADOR
 IN BUENOS AIRES RETURN TO CANADA FOR CONSULTALTIONS.WE

...2



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

April 7, 1982

Original of letter rec'd. earlier

Mr 20/9

h.a.

Jean Margaret

I fully share the concerns expressed in your messages to me on the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. At the United Nations Security Council meeting of April 2, as well as directly to the Argentine authorities through diplomatic channels, the Government of Canada has expressed its shock and deep concern over this use of force to settle disputes. We have asked Argentina to withdraw all military forces from the occupied territory and have had our Ambassador in Buenos Aires return to Canada for consultations. We have also placed an embargo on shipments of military equipment to Argentina.

I agree that we must convince the Argentines that they must begin to search realistically for a peaceful settlement. To that end, the Canadian Government is giving intensive and immediate consideration to the proposed measures that your High Commissioner conveyed to me today. I fully recognize the urgency and importance of undertaking any such measures in a coordinated manner in consultation with other like-minded countries.

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
London

- 2 -

It is our fervent hope that this dispute can be resolved in a peaceful and equitable manner. We will make every attempt to further the realization of these objectives. Therefore Canada also stands ready to assist in any other efforts which could lead to an acceptable and peaceful resolution of this crisis.

Yours sincerely, *and*

*with personal regards on
this difficult occasion*

Diems

Wolland
Purchasing
FING COITENTI ENYAPA

20 APR 1982



PRIME MINISTER

I told you earlier today that we would tonight get the draft of the first series of speaking notes for Ministers on the Falkland Islands.

These have now been received at Downing Street and I have arranged for them to be mufaxed straight to Chequers. Mr. Pym's office will be receiving them simultaneously.

The intention is to circulate them to all Ministers first thing tomorrow. Can you please let me have your clearance, or any amendments you wish to suggest, as early as possible, and preferably in the course of this evening.

May we make your clearance subject to any further points which Mr. Pym suggests?

MAP

10 April 1982

Speed - net.

RESTRICTED



Mike,

Told Mr Fuller 9pm 10/4/82
that I'm content with
note to be circulated to
Ministers.

Steve

MR PATTISON - No 10

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT

We spoke on the telephone this afternoon. I attach draft notes for Ministers to use in public on Falkland Islands' questions. These are agreed by the Ministry of Defence and are currently with Mr Pym's Private Secretary.

If you agree I would propose to send these to Ministers as soon as possible on 11 April. We will submit further recommendations as soon as necessary.

S W J FULLER
Rm 323
Cabinet Office
x6170

4991



10 April 1982

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

10/4

D R A F T

SAPU(82)1

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached is the first of a series of papers suggesting lines for Ministers to take in public on Falkland Islands questions. A particular objective is to provide material for counteracting false or damaging stories in the media about military or diplomatic developments.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Ministry of Defence have been consulted about the attached suggestions.

The suggested lines on military questions reflect a decision by the Ministry of Defence to decline, for operational reasons, to comment in detail on the composition, capabilities and objectives of the military units concerned.

This series is being sent to Private Secretaries to all Members of the Cabinet, to the Press Office in No 10, the News Department in the FCO, and Defence Public Relations. Private Secretaries will wish to consider further distribution within Departments including Ministers and Parliamentary Private Secretaries.

RESTRICTED

LINE TO TAKE

(1) THE TASK FORCE

Cannot add to the official statement already made about composition, capabilities, and objectives of the Task Force - these are highly sensitive operational matters and lives are at stake.

Specific Questions

Nuclear depth charges?

- We never comment on such matters.

Numbers/dispositions of submarines?

- You will understand that I cannot comment on that.

Minesweepers in the Task Force?

- We are well prepared for the problems we expect to encounter.

Capability in winter conditions?

- Our forces will be capable of operating in the conditions likely to be encountered.

Ability to resupply?

- The same applies to resupply.

Technical difficulties?

- Bound to be minor problems, but Task Force has a self-maintenance capability.

Reinforcement?

- We are, of course, considering the question of relieving and sustaining the Task Force but I cannot go into detail.

(2) EC EMBARGO ON IMPORTS INTO COMMUNITY FROM ARGENTINA AND ARMS EXPORTS

Greatly welcome these decisions. Discussion in political committee in Brussels on 10 April marked by unusually strong and encouraging expression of European solidarity. No attempt by anyone to quibble about details. Many representatives quoted from statements of condemnation of Argentinian aggression already made by their Governments.

(3) LETTER FROM FALKLAND ISLAND'S PUBLIC SERVANTS REQUESTING EVACUATION OF POPULATION

We have not yet seen the original of this letter and cannot therefore be certain that it is genuine although the Governor thinks that it may well be so. The signators are expatriate administrators and not elected representatives. The Governor yesterday stated his belief that 90 per cent of the Islanders would rather stay despite the risks.

(4) CARLISLE'S ALLEGATION THAT THE MAJORITY OF FALKLANDERS DO NOT WANT BRITAIN TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION

We have only seen press reports of Mr Edmund Carlisle's statement

(made in Argentina). Mr Carlisle has not tried to get in touch with us direct and we do not know whether he intends to do so.

(5) THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE (ALLEGED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MINISTERS)

There are no differences between Ministers. We are in no doubt of Britain's sovereign rights. These remain unaltered although the British Administration in the Falkland Islands has temporarily been overthrown. The Government's firm objective is to see that the Falkland Islands are freed from occupation and returned to British Administration at the earliest possible moment. There can be no negotiations with the Argentinians about the future of the Falklands before their troops are withdrawn. In such negotiations as may follow the withdrawal of Argentinian troops it will remain the fundamental and unalterable position of the British Government that the wishes of the Islanders are paramount in any discussion of their future status. It is their right to decide their own future and their own way of life. It is precisely those rights that have been removed by the unwarranted military action, and it is those rights which we shall restore.

[(6) UK MILITARY

(6) UK MILITARY CAPABILITY: ALLEGED WEAKNESS DUE TO GOVERNMENT CUTS

The review of defence expenditure has not weakened the Royal Navy. Best proof of this is the task force now steaming towards the South Atlantic. Expenditure on the conventional navy has increased by £¹/₂ billion in real terms since 1979 and is also greater as a proportion of the Defence budget. We will continue to spend more on the conventional navy even when the Trident programme reaches its peak and there will be more major ships and submarines in 1985 than today.

Specific allegations

HMS Invincible to be sold to Australia immediately?

- HMS Invincible will not be handed over until late 1983, after HMS Illustrious has entered service.

HMS Invincible's avionics removed?

- Quite untrue, HMS Invincible remains fully operational.

Carriers to be scrapped?

- HMS Invincible is to be handed over to Australia in late 1983 when HMS Illustrious enters service and HMS Hermes will be run on until HMS Ark Royal enters service. Two carriers will be kept in service continuously.

Reduced ship numbers?

- By 1985 there will be an increase in the total number of major warships and submarines.

RESTRICTED

SAPU(82)1

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Attached is the first of a series of papers suggesting lines for Ministers to take in public on Falkland Islands questions. A particular objective is to provide material for counteracting false or damaging stories in the media about military or diplomatic developments.

The Prime Minister approved the attached notes on the evening of 10 April.

The suggested lines on military questions reflect a decision by the Ministry of Defence to decline, for operational reasons, to comment in detail on the composition, capabilities and objectives of the military units concerned.

This series is being sent to Private Secretaries to all Members of the Cabinet, to the Press Office in No 10, the News Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Defence Public Relations. Private Secretaries will wish to consider further distribution within Departments including Ministers and Parliamentary Private Secretaries.

Cabinet Office

11 April 1982

RESTRICTED

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PP FCO

GRS 666

19, 884

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SANTIAGO 101815Z APR 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 12 APRIL

10 APR 1982

148

10 11 12 1
9 8 7 6 5 4
3 2

RECEIVED IN UNIT

FALKLANDS/ARGENTINA/CHILE

1. THOUGH SITUATION COULD WELL CHANGE AGAIN QUICKLY CHILEAN MILITARY NOW SEEM MORE RELAXED THOUGH STILL VERY VIGILANT. NAVAL SQUADRON IS BELIEVED OFF CHILOE ISLAND READY FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION IN CASE OF DIVERSIONARY ATTACK BY ARGENTINES ON A BEAGLE ISLAND. SOME RESERVISTS ARE BEING CALLED UP AND MILITARY DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS MADE IN NORTH AND SOUTH. BUT NO ONE SEEMS SERIOUSLY TO THINK THAT EITHER BOLIVIA OR PERU WILL BE TEMPTED INTO ACTION AGAINST THEM.
2. MEANWHILE INFORMED CIVILIANS HERE ARE PRAYING FOR QUICK AND EFFECTIVE BRITISH ACTION TO BE PURSUED AGAINST THE ARGENTINE NAVY AND AIR FORCE IN THE BLOCKADE, AND HOPING ESPECIALLY THAT A FEW ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT MAY BE SHOT DOWN AT A VERY EARLY STAGE. THEY FEAR THAT ARGENTINES WILL, AS A DELAYING TACTIC, SHORTLY GIVE FALSE ASSURANCES OF WITHDRAWAL WHICH MAY MAKE US STAY OUR HAND AND AMERICAN SUPPORT FALTER. THERE IS GREAT ADMIRATION FOR OUR DETERMINATION SO FAR AND WE ARE NOT NOW EXPECTED TO FALL FOR FURTHER ARGENTINE TRICKERY.
3. THOUGH IT IS NOT STRICTLY MY BUSINESS TO COMMENT ON ARGENTINE ATTITUDES, INFORMED CIVILIAN VIEW HERE IS THAT EVERYTHING HAS TO BE SEEN AGAINST BACKGROUND THAT AS A TRADITIONALLY PEACETIME FORCE, EACH OF ARMED SERVICES HAS REGARDED THE OTHERS AS RIVALS FOR SLICE OF ANNUAL BUDGETARY CAKE IN ORDER TO KEEP UP AMOUNT OF NEW EQUIPMENT AND THUS SHARE OF INFLUENCE IN BALANCE OF MILITARY/POLITICAL POWER PLAY. EACH SERVICE IS THUS DESPERATE TO AVOID LOSSES OF EQUIPMENT IN CURRENT CONFLICT KNOWING HOW DIFFICULT IT MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE TO REGAIN FORMER POSITION OF INFLUENCE FOR LACK OF BUDGETARY ABILITY TO RESUPPLY. AND EACH IS READY TO LAUNCH ACCUSATIONS AT ANY MOMENT OF BEING FORCED TO LOSE EG AIRCRAFT OR SHIPS SO AS TO BENEFIT THE OTHER.

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28) Valid 8/4)

PS
PS/LPS
PS/
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade - Geny Cab Office
Mr Fuller SAPU

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/HKGD

EC/IEI

74 P/1/1/1

FED

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

RESTRICTED

FM HONG KONG 100225Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 330 OF 10 APRIL
INFO UKREP BRUSSELS, PEKING

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 236: INVASION OF FALKLAND ISLANDS

SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF EXCO, WHO WILL BE CONSULTED IN PRINCIPLE ON 13 APRIL, WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION NEXT WEEK. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER AS SOON AS THE TIMING IS CLEAR.

2. YOUR PARAGRAPH 4. THE PROBLEM OVER RE-EXPORTS TO CHINA IS UNLIKELY TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES.

MACLEHOSE

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28) 736

Valid 8/4)

PS
PS/LPS
PS/
PS/LORD TREGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAYTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M. Tsy

HD/SA&D (PCO DIST + A/D P/1)
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/EKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

Mr Fuller SAPO

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

45

ZZ FCO

GRS250

[TYPISTS]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 101720Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1227 OF 10 APRIL.

YOUR TELNO 689: FALKLANDS, POSSIBLE VISIT BY US OFFICIAL.

1. MINISTER HAS SPOKEN THIS MORNING TO EAGLEBURGER TO REINFORCE THE POINTS WE MADE YESTERDAY AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT. HE POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT ANY TRAVEL TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AT PRESENT WOULD BE DANGEROUS BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THAT IF A US OFFICIAL WERE TO TRAVEL TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITH ARGENTINE PERMISSION AND IN AN ARGENTINE MILITARY AIRCRAFT THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE EXPLOITED BY THE ARGENTINIAN JUNTA TO CLAIM US ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR AGGRESSION AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI. THOMAS SAID THAT YOU WOULD GREATLY PREFER THE AMERICANS TO PUT THEIR WEIGHT BEHIND EFFORTS TO SECURE AN ICRC PRESENCE IN THE FALKLANDS. HE ASKED THAT YOUR VIEWS SHOULD BE CONVEYED URGENTLY TO HAIG BEFORE HE LEFT BUENOS AIRES.

AN ICRC PRESENCE IN THE FALKLANDS. HE ASKED THAT YOUR VIEWS SHOULD BE CONVEYED URGENTLY TO HAIG BEFORE HE LEFT BUENOS AIRES.

2. EAGLEBURGER HAD BEEN AWARE OF THIS PROBLEM BUT DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE RECOGNISED THE ANGLE WE WERE RAISING WITH HIM. HE UNDERTOOK TO GET A MESSAGE TO HAIG IMMEDIATELY. BUT HE SAID THAT WE WERE IN EFFECT ASKING THE US TO FOREGO THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING THE WELFARE AND WHEREABOUTS OF US CITIZENS. THIS COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THEM. THOMAS SAID THAT IN CASES OF ARMED CONFLICT IT WAS OFTEN NECESSARY TO RELY ON THE ICRC FOR SUCH INFORMATION. WE WOULD GREATLY PREFER THAT THIS COURSE BE PURSUED IN THE PRESENT CASE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

Unfaxed 11/14

(28) 36

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

Valid 8/4)

PS
PS/LPS (6/3)
PS/
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE
H.M.Tsy

ADVANCE COPY
DSY 101745Z

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En
DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office
Mr Fuller SAPU

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GPS 250

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 0101745Z

[TALISTS]

FM MONTEVIDEO 010/1725Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 93 OF 010 APRIL 1982

MY TELNO 91 OF 9 APRIL : FALKLANDS LETTER

1. ALTHOUGH THE SIGNATORIES OF THE LETTER ARE, FOR THE MOST PART, EXPATRIATE CIVIL SERVANTS, AND ARE NOT AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISLANDERS, AS GOVERNOR HUNT EMPHASISED TO THE BBC ON 9 APRIL, THE LETTER MAY NOT BE AS UNHELPFUL AS IT AT FIRST SEEMS.
2. THE KEY WORDS IN THE LETTER SEEM TO BE QUOTE TEMPORARY EVACUATION UNQUOTE, THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT THE SIGNATORIES WISH TO HAVE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION REMOVED WHILE THERE ARE HOSTILITIES GOING ON, AND RETURNED TO THE ISLANDS ONCE THE LATTER ARE BACK IN BRITISH HANDS. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT THE SIGNATORIES REQUEST THAT THE EVACUATION BE CARRIED OUT BY SOMEONE

LATTER ARE BACK IN BRITISH HANDS. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT THE SIGNATORIES REQUEST THAT THE EVACUATION BE CARRIED OUT BY SOMEONE ELSE THAN THE ARGENTINES.

3. THERE IS A DANGER THAT ARGENTINE COMPLIANCE WITH THE EVACUATION REQUEST COULD ENDALE ARGENTINA TO CLAIM THAT THE MOTIVE FOR OUR EJECTING THE ARGENTINE FORCES (IE THE ISLANDERS AND THEIR WISHES) IS REMOVED WITH THE ISLANDERS. A REFUSAL BY THE ARGENTINES TO ALLOW ANY IMMEDIATE EVACUATION COULD BE PORTRAYED, HOWEVER, AS THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES, WHICH WOULD EARN ARGENTINA RATHER LESS SYMPATHY THAN SHE IS AT PRESENT RECEIVING INTERNATIONALLY.

HUTCHINSON

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FM DAKAR 101045Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 080 OF 10 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY ASCENSION (PERSONAL FOR ADMINISTRATOR).

YOUR TELNO.43:FLIGHTS TO ASCENSION

1. I AM HOPEFUL THE SENEGALESE WOULD RAISE NO OBJECTION TO BASING SLIP CREWS HERE PROVIDING IT IS DONE DISCREETLY (EG. PLAIN UNIFORMS ON DUTY, CIVILIAN CLOTHES OFF DUTY) IT SHOULD NOT INCREASE THE POLITICAL RISKS ALREADY ACCEPTED. A GRADUAL BUILD-UP WOULD BE DESIRABLE, AND CREWS SHOULD BE FUNDED PREFERABLY IN FRENCH FRANCS.
2. I WOULD NOT PROPOSE TO SEEK FORMAL PERMISSION, BUT INSTEAD KEEP THE SENEGALESE INFORMED ORALLY TO SHOW OUR GOOD FAITH.
3. I SHOULD PREFER NOT TO GO INTO DETAILS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL OVER CARGO CARRIED. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAVE NEVER RAISED THE MATTER WITH US AND MUST ASSUME OUR FLIGHTS ARE CARRYING GUNS ASWELL AS BUTTER. I SHOULD HOWEVER LIKE DISCRETION TO KEEP THE CIVIL AIRPORT AUTHORITIES INFORMED AT TECHNICAL LEVEL WHERE

CIVIL AIRPORT AUTHORITIES INFORMED AT TECHNICAL LEVEL WHERE
DANGEROUS CARGOES COULD GIVE RISE TO SAFETY PROBLEMS.

4. PLEASE BEAR IN MIND THAT THE AIRCRAFT ARE ROUTINELY VISITED BY
SENEGALESE GENDARMERIE AND IMMIGRATION, SO THERE IS NO QUESTION
CONCEALING THE GENERAL NATURE OF WHAT IS BEING TRANSPORTED.

F C O PLEASE PASS.

SQUIRE

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M. faxed 11/4

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GRS 225

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FM BRASILIA 102330Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 110100Z
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 087 OF 10 APRIL 82
FROM FLYNN

FALKLANDS

TELECON: FLYNN-SEGAR EMERGENCY UNIT.

1 FOREIGN MINISTER GUERREIRO'S ADVISER SARDENBERG
TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO WAS MAKING A
PERSONAL APPEAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE ARGENTINE
PRESIDENT AND THAT THE MESSAGE, TRANSMITTED TO THE BRAZILIAN
EMBASSY AT APPROXIMATELY 102130Z, WOULD BE RELEASED TO THE
PRESS TONIGHT.

2 FOLLOWING IS FREE TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF MESSAGE AS READ
OVER THE PHONE BY SARDENBERG:

BEGINS: WITH DEEP ANXIETY AT THE SERIOUS RISKS FOR PEACE I

PRESS TONIGHT.

2. FOLLOWING IS FREE TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF MESSAGE AS READ OVER THE PHONE BY SARDENBERG:

BEGINS: WITH DEEP ANXIETY AT THE SERIOUS RISKS FOR PEACE I RENEW THE VIGOROUS APPEAL MADE BY BRAZIL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA TO FIND IN THE PRESENT CRISIS A SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND BOTH COUNTRIES. I AM SENDING IN THIS SAME SENSE A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI IN WHICH I REAFFIRM THE READINESS OF BRAZIL TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CURRENT DIFFERENCES. IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESENT EFFORTS AND THE READINESS WHICH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED TO DO ALL WITHIN ITS POWER IN THE SEARCH FOR A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION I WOULD STRESS THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE OF THE EFFECTIVE MODERATION OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO ENSURE SUFFICIENT TIME IN WHICH TO EXPLORE THE PATHS OF CONCILIATION.

HARDING

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RECD AT 102345Z RK

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FM BRASILIA 101300Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO. 085 OF 10 APRIL 82
FROM LONGRIGG

FALKLANDS: FURTHER PRESS COMMENT

1. THE JORNAL DO BRASIL OF 9 APRIL CARRIES ANOTHER EDITORIAL STRONGLY CRITICAL OF ARGENTINE ACTIONS. FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS:

"..... EVERYTHING HAS THEREFORE COME TO DEPEND ON THE REMARCHES OF SECRETARY HAIG - WHICH SHOULD BE SUPPORTED UNCONDITIONALLY PROSPECTS ARE THUS GLOOMY: WE ARE ON THE EDGE OF A CONFRONTATION. THE FACT THAT A POWERFUL FLEET WAS READY TO SAIL AFTER ONLY 5 DAYS PREPARATION WHEN THE NORMAL TIME FOR AN OPERATION OF SUCH SCOPE IS USUALLY MUCH GREATER IS A CLEAR INDICATION OF ENGLISH INTENTIONS.

TIME FOR AN OPERATION OF SUCH SCOPE IS USUALLY MUCH GREATER IS
A CLEAR INDICATION OF ENGLISH INTENTIONS.

"IN COMMITTING AN ACT WHICH GOES CONTRARY TO ALL THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, WHICH TOOK POWER SO RECENTLY, REVEALS ITS UNDISGUISED WISH TO DROWN INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN A GREAT WAVE OF PATRIOTISM. BUT IT HAS NOT PAID SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND IS FACING SERIOUS INTERNAL PROBLEMS AS WELL, AND THAT THE SIMPLE GOADING OF AN IMPLACABLE OPPOSITION DOES NOT LEAVE MRS THATCHER A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS. IT IS A QUESTION OF TWO GOVERNMENTS PLAYING FOR THEIR SURVIVAL - AN EXTREME CONTINGENCY PROVOKED BY ARGENTINE AGGRESSION.

....."IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THERE TOOK PLACE A VIOLENT ACTION - AND THAT ANY POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS DEPENDS ON THE FACT THAT ACCEPTABLE SATISFACTION IS GIVEN TO THE COUNTRY THAT SUFFERED THE ACTION - IN THIS CASE ENGLAND.

"THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF ARGENTINA DEMONSTRATES THAT IN MORE THAN ONE SENSE THIS FACT IS ALREADY RECOGNISED. IF ARGENTINA HAD ANY RIGHT TO JUSTIFY ITS ACT OF FORCE, IT WOULD NOT NOW BE ISOLATED AS IT IS. THE POSSIBILITY THAT ARGENTINA COULD INVOKE IN ITS DEFENCE THE RIO TREATY IS FADING AWAY: AND THIS MEANS SIMPLY THAT ARGENTINA CANNOT MAKE USE OF THE NATURAL INSTRUMENT FOR THE DEFENCE OF COUNTRIES OF THE CONTINENT. AND IT CANNOT, BECAUSE IT WAS, IN THIS CASE, THE AGGRESSOR.

"THE FALKLANDS QUESTION, HOWEVER, DOES NOT ONLY INTEREST ARGENTINA AND ENGLAND. BRAZIL MUST BE PARTICULARLY ATTENTIVE TO THE DEFENCE OF ITS INTERESTS AND TO PROTECT THESE INTERESTS SHE CANNOT CULTIVATE THE ILLUSION THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO PLEASE EVERYONE BY MEANS OF A REAL OR FICTICIOUS OMISSION. THERE

ARE PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST BE DEFENDED AT ALL COST. SUCH AS THAT THE SOLUTION OF REGIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS SHOULD NOT BRING ABOUT A RECOURSE TO FORCE.'"S

"SECRETARY HAIG IS MAKING A WORTHWHILE ATTEMPT AT NEGOTIATIONS. BUT TIME IS VERY SHORT: AND FOR HAIG TO HAVE ANY POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS IT MUST BE LEFT CLEAR THAT ON THE FALKLANDS QUESTION ARGENTINA HAS ACTED AS THE AGGRESSOR COUNTRY, WHICH GIVES ENGLAND THE MORAL RIGHT TO DEMAND REPARATION."

HARDING

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 102325Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 440 OF 10 APRIL 1982

INFO PRIORITY BERNE.

MIPT

FOLLOWING WOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE PARAS OF OUR REPLY:

1. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION (CONTAINED IN RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX)) RECALLS THAT IT IS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 39 OF THE CHARTER, TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF ANY THREAT TO THE PEACE, BREACH OF PEACE OR ACT OF AGGRESSION. ARTICLE 2 OF THE DEFINITION STATES THAT:

"THE FIRST USE OF ARMED FORCE BY A STATE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE CHARTER SHALL CONSTITUTE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF AN ACT OF AGGRESSION . . ."

RESOLUTION 502 (1982) ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 3 APRIL 1982 REFERRED TO "AN INVASION ON 2 APRIL 1982 BY ARMED FORCES

AGGRESSION"

RESOLUTION 502 (1982) ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 3 APRIL 1982 REFERRED TO "AN INVASION ON 2 APRIL 1982 BY ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA" (EMPHASIS ADDED) AND WENT ON TO DETERMINE THAT A BREACH OF THE PEACE EXISTED IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. ARTICLE 3(A) OF THE DEFINITION STATES THAT

"THE INVASION . . . BY THE ARMED FORCES OF A STATE OF THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE" (EMPHASIS ADDED) QUALIFIES AS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION. ACCORDINGLY, A TRUE READING OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION TOGETHER WITH RESOLUTION 502 (1982) LEADS INEXORABLY TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS ARGENTINA WHICH IS COMMITTING AGGRESSION BY ITS INVASION AND FIRST USE OF FORCE IN DEFIANCE OF THE APPEAL MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL ON 1 APRIL 1982 (S/14944). MOREOVER, RESOLUTION 502 (1982) LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT IT IS ARGENTINA WHICH BEARS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CURRENT BREACH OF THE PEACE IN THE REGION.

2. THE DECLARATION OF A MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE (WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF MY LETTER TO YE OF 9 APRIL 1982) FALLS SHORT OF WHAT WOULD NORMALLY BE HELD TO CONSTITUTE A "BLOCKADE" UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. AT THE SAME TIME AS THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION ITSELF MAKES CLEAR, THIS MEASURE IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TAKE WHATEVER ADDITIONAL MEASURES MAY BE NEEDED IN EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. ARTICLE 3(C) OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION LISTS "THE BLOCKADE OF THE . . . COASTS OF A STATE BY THE ARMED FORCES OF ANOTHER STATE" (EMPHASIS ADDED) AS AN EXAMPLE OF AGGRESSION. IN RELATION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THE UK IS NOT "ANOTHER STATE" BECAUSE THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE SURROUNDS BRITISH TERRITORY INHABITED BY FALKLAND ISLANDERS WHO RETAIN BRITISH NATIONALITY. IN THIS CONNEXION, IT IS RECALLED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS BEEN ACCEPTED SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER AND THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS ALWAYS FULLY DISCHARGED ITS DUTIES BOTH TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THE UNITED NATIONS IN THAT REGARD.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 102320Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 439 OF 10 APRIL 1982

INFO PRIORITY BERNE.

YOUR TELNO 243: FALKLANDS AT THE UN - "DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION".

1. UNLESS WE HEAR TO THE CONTRARY BY 112000Z, WE WILL AT THAT TIME DELIVER TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL A NOTE OR LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT IN THE TERMS OF THE DRAFT IN MIFT, BEFORE THE MEZ COMES INTO BEING. WE WOULD THUS HOPE TO HAVE OUR LETTER CIRCULATED TO MISSIONS ON 12 APRIL, I.E. AT THE SAME TIME AS YESTERDAY'S ARGENTINE NOTE. THIS TIMING SHOULD NOT INCREASE THE EXISTING RISK OF EARLY RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE ARGENTINES OR THE DO-GOODERS.

2. AS YOU WILL SEE, WE SUGGEST INCLUSION OF ALL POINTS IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. WE HAVE DRAFTED THE WORDING ABOUT THE BRITISH NATIONALITY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS IN PARA 2 BECAUSE MANY DELEGATIONS HERE SAY THEY DO NOT RECOGNISE BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. THE UK WAS ACCEPTED AS THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY OF RHODESIA DURING THE REBELLION AND SO WE COULD TRY TO DERIVE SOME ADVANTAGE FROM THAT STATUS VIS A VIS UN MEMBERS IN THE PRESENT CASE BY MEANS OF THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 2.

WHYTE

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PS/PUS
MR J C MOBERLY

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 102305Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 438 OF 10 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, JERUSALEM.

WASHINGTON TELNO 1205: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. THE LEBANESE PR HAS TODAY (10 APRIL) WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO THE ISRAELI MILITARY BUILD UP IN NORTHERN ISRAEL AND TO REPORTS OF AN IMMINENT INVASION. TUENI DOES NOT ASK FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT RESERVES HIS RIGHT TO DO SO IF THE "ESCALATION" CONTINUES.

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FM BERNE 100930Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 42 OF 10 APRIL

FALKLAND ISLANDS

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A TELEX MESSAGE WHICH WE RECEIVED
ON 09 APRIL. I HAVE INFORMED MR KELLER THAT HIS MESSAGE IS BEING
FORWARDED TO LONDON.

BEGINS

THE AMBASSADOR

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

AT THE REQUEST OF DRES. GILBERT BAECHTOLD, GILBERT DUBOULE AND

AT THE REQUEST OF DRES. GILBERT BAECHTOLD, GILBERT DUBOULE AND EDGAR OEHLER, MEMBERS OF THE SWISS PARLIAMENT, I AM HONORED TO SUBMIT TO YOUR CONSIDERATION THE FOLLOWING DRAFT PROPOSAL WHICH IS INTENDED TO SERVE AS A CATALYST FOR A PEACEFUL, PROMPT AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION OF THE SIMMERING CONFLICT OVER THE CONTESTED SOUTH ATLANTIC ISLANDS.

THE ALABAMA CLAIMS -- WHICH WERE SUCCESSFULLY ARBITED IN GENEVA IN 1872 UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SWISS GOVERNMENT -- MIGHT NOW BE RECALLED WITH MUTUAL BENEFIT. SHOULD YOUR GOVERNMENT FIND IT POSSIBLE AND INDICATED TO FOLLOW UP ON THE IDEAS THUS PRESENTED, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SWISS GOVERNMENT, TOO -- AND AGAIN -- WOULD BE READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO ANY SUCH REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE.

NATURALLY, WE WOULD SUPPORT ANY SUCH ASSISTANCE AND BE GLAD TO AVAIL OUR GOOD OFFICES TO SAID ENDS IN ANY OTHER WAY DEEMED INDICATED AND DESIRED.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

H. ANTON KELLER, PARLIAMENTARY ADVISER
WENKENHOF

4125 RIEHEN SWITZERLAND

061/496848

TELEX: 63113 TXKAB CH (ATTN KELLER 496848)

PROPOSED AGREEMENT TOWARDS RESOLVING OUTSTANDING ISSUES CONCERNING THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

1. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE A NEGOTIATED PROMPT AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKES TO CONFINE ITS MILITARY TROOPS TO WITHIN ITS MUTUALLY UNDISPUTED BORDERS OF SOVEREIGNTY.
2. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE A NEGOTIATED PROMPT AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKES TO CONFINE ITS MILITARY TROOPS TO WITHIN ITS MUTUALLY UNDISPUTED BORDERS OF SOVEREIGNTY.
3. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HEREBY JOINTLY INVITE THE ... GOVERNMENT(S)
A) TO DISPATCH TO THE AREA OF DISPUTE A TEAM OF MILITARY

3 THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HEREBY
JOINTLY INVITE THE ... GOVERNMENT(S)

- A) TO DISPATCH TO THE AREA OF DISPUTE A TEAM OF MILITARY
OBSERVERS WHOSE TASK SHALL BE THE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION
OF THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ABOVE UNDERTAKINGS,
AND, UPON COMPLETION OF SAID TROOP CONFINEMENT,
- B) TO APPOINT A MEDIATOR WHOSE TASK SHALL BE THE PROMOTION OF
A PROMPT AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT IN THIS COURSE EITHER PARTY
MAY SEEK A FINAL AND MUTUALLY BINDING DECISION TO BE RENDERED
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE.

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INFORMATION - THE PRESIDING COMMISSIONER

INVESTIGATION OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HEREBY JOINTLY INVITE THE ... GOVERNMENT(S) TO DISPATCH TO THE AREA OF DISPUTE A TEAM OF MILITARY OBSERVERS WHOSE TASK SHALL BE THE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ABOVE UNDERTAKINGS, AND, UPON COMPLETION OF SAID TROOP CONFINEMENT, TO APPOINT A MEDIATOR WHOSE TASK SHALL BE THE PROMOTION OF A PROMPT AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT IN THIS COURSE EITHER PARTY MAY SEEK A FINAL AND MUTUALLY BINDING DECISION TO BE RENDERED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE.

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FM BERNE 101450Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 44 OF 10 APRIL

FROZEN ARGENTINE ACCOUNTS IN THE UK

THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF A MESSAGE RECEIVED BY THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES AND SENT TO US IN GERMAN BY THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN A NOTE DATED 10 APRIL (COPIES BY BAG).

BEGINS:

QUOTE

ON THE OCCASION OF A DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR KELLER SARMIENTO WITH REGARD TO THE EXPORT OF BRITISH TELEX MATERIAL, THE OFFICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING:

1. HE HAD LEARNED VIA THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD FREED THE PRIVATE (BANK) ACCOUNTS OF THE ARGENTINE

WITH REGARD TO THE EXPORT OF BRITISH TELEX MATERIAL, THE OFFICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING:

1. HE HAD LEARNED VIA THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD FREED THE PRIVATE (BANK) ACCOUNTS OF THE ARGENTINE DIPLOMATS. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO FREE THE PRIVATE ACCOUNTS OF THE BRITISH DIPLOMATS NEXT MONDAY (12 APRIL).
2. AS THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY STILL REMAIN FROZEN, THE SAME MEASURE WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN IN FORCE FOR THE ACCOUNTS OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY.

3. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS THOUGHT TO HAVE FROZEN THE PRIVATE ACCOUNTS OF ARGENTINE CITIZENS. THIS HITS -KELLER SARMIENTO ADDED SLIGHTLY SENTIMENTALLY- ABOVE ALL STUDENTS AND SMALL BUSINESS MEN. IN THE CASE THAT LONDON DOES NOT FREE THESE ACCOUNTS NEXT TUESDAY (13APR), THEN BUENOS AIRES WILL TAKE COUNTER MEASURES. UNQUOTE.

WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE IMMEDIATE COMMENTS OF THE FCO, IN PARTICULAR ON PARA 3. WE WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THOUSANDS OF BRITONS LIVE HERE.

ENDS.

LEE

NNNN

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FM BERNE 091815Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 38 OF10 APRIL

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDING TELEGRAM.

BRITISH INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA

FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF THE FIRST SWISS NOTE. BEGINS:

QUOTE THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS THE HONOUR TO SUBMIT TO HEM EMBASSY A SERIES OF QUESTIONS PUT BY THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES ABOUT ADMINISTRATION AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS.

1. ACCOUNTS

1.1. TAKE-OVER OF BANK ACCOUNTS: THE BALANCE OF THE PESO ACCOUNT OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY WILL BE TRANSFERRED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO A NEW ACCOUNT IN THE NAME OF THE SWISS EMBASSY FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION SUBJECT TO THIS BALANCE HAVING BEEN UNFROZEN BY THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THE STERLING ACCOUNT OF THE FORMER BRITISH EMBASSY? IF UNBLOCKED, SHOULD THE BALANCE BE TAKEN OVER BY THE SWISS EMBASSY AND USED FOR RUNNING EXPENSES OR SHOULD EFFORTS BE MADE TO REPATRIATE THESE FUNDS?

1.2. PAYMENTS WITH REGARD TO EXPENSES PRIOR TO THE TAKE-OVER.

Ltd Bridges
Hd Ed
Hd
Hd Finance
Hd 10
Hd Ps

MB

EFFORTS BE MADE TO REPATRIATE THESE FUNDS?

1.2. PAYMENTS WITH REGARD TO EXPENSES PRIOR TO THE TAKE-OVER. DOES THE FCO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS WITH REGARDS TO THE PAYMENT OF ALL KINDS OF CLAIMS IN SUSPENSE SINCE THE BREAK-OFF OF RELATIONS?

ARE THE REMAINING BRITISH DIPLOMATS COMPETENT TO AUTHORISE OR REFUSE THE PAYMENT OF CERTAIN DEBTS CHARGEABLE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT? DO THEIR DECISIONS IN SUCH MATTERS COMMIT THE FCO WITH REGARD TO THE PROTECTING POWER?

1.3. BRITISH COUNCIL

A. SEPARATE ACCOUNTS WILL HAVE TO BE SET UP WITHIN THE ACCOUNTS OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION.

B. WHAT IS TO HAPPEN WITH RESPECT TO QUESTIONS UNDER POINT 1.2 AS REGARDS THE BRITISH COUNCIL?

1.4. ADVANCE OF FUNDS TO THE BRITISH DIPLOMATS WHO REMAIN. IN VIEW OF THE BLOCKAGE OF FUNDS AND THE DELICATE SITUATION OF THE BRITISH STAFF, ARE WE AUTHORISED TO ADVANCE MONEY TO THEM FOR PRIVATE PURPOSES FROM FOREIGN INTEREST SECTION FUNDS?

2. BRITISH DIPLOMATS FORMING PART OF THE FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION - PLEASE DEFINE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE THEIR PRECISE FUNCTIONS IN THE FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION AND THEIR COMPETENCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN EACH FIELD.

3. CONSULAR ACTIVITIES

IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSULAR ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED OUT ON BEHALF OF GREAT BRITAIN, WE WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE A PRECISE AND COMPLETE LIST OF DUTIES, ALSO DEFINING THE COMPETENCE OF THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL REMAINING IN POST.

4. BRITISH COMMUNITY

FOLLOWING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL TO BRITISH SUBJECTS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, THERE IS A WAVE OF ANXIETY IN THE COMMUNITY. WHAT ASSISTANCE IN EVACUATION CAN WE GIVE IF THE NEED ARISES?

5. WHAT ARE THE ENTRY REQUIREMENTS - IE THE ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES TOWARDS ARGENTINES? AND OUR COMPETENCE IN THE MATTER (VISA)?

THE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE OBLIGED IF THE EMBASSY COULD LET IT KNOW AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES' REPLIES TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS UNQUOTE.

ENDS

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(FM BERNE 101545Z)

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 03 OF 10 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND MONTEVIDEO

FOR FALKLANDS UNIT FROM JOY

1. PLEASE LET ME KNOW BY RETURN
 - (1) HOW LONG THESE MESSAGES TAKE TO REACH YOU,
 - (2) WHETHER ATMOSPHERIC REPORTS AND OTHER BACKGROUND IMPRESSIONS ARE OF VALUE TO YOU AND OTHERS INVOLVED, VIZ. WASHINGTON AND MONTEVIDEO.
2. I WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO COMPETE WITH NEWS AGENCIES. ALL WELL REPRESENTED HERE FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, BUT SHOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE KIND OF POLITICAL REPORTING YOU WOULD

2. I WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO COMPETE WITH NEWS AGENCIES. ALL WELL REPRESENTED HERE FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE, BUT SHOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE KIND OF POLITICAL REPORTING YOU WOULD VALUE, WITHOUT COMPROMISING OUR SWISS COLLEAGUES WHO ARE DOING AN EXCELLENT JOB WITH THE ARGENTINES FOR US.

3. WE ARE TO DESPATCH COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, ETC. BY ROAD TO MONTEVIDEO. LEAVING HERE AT 1300Z. HARDY AND HILL WITH ONE MFA OFFICIAL WILL ACCOMPANY TO FRONTIER AND HAND OVER AT ABOUT 1700Z TO TWO BRITISH SECURITY OFFICERS TO ESCORT TO DESTINATION.

4. BUENOS AIRES IS BEING GEARED UP FOR A MASSIVE PATRIOTIC RALLY IN THE PLAZA DE MAYO TODAY AS HAIG'S TALKS GET UNDER WAY. OTHERWISE LIFE IS NORMAL. NO HARASSMENT OF BRITISH PERSONS OR PROPERTY SO FAR REPORTED, THOUGH THERE IS UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN AMONGST THE BRITISH COMMUNITY ABOUT HMG'S INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF THE FLEET TO ENFORCE THE BLOCKADE, AND POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS THEREAFTER.

JOY

LEE

NNNN

SENT AT REC 101554Z

*Advanced E.R.
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Mullik
CmC Fleet*

* FOR Typink - Xerox

PLUS FCO

FCO

P.S.
PS/LORD PRIVY SEAL
Ps/Mr Luce
MR BULLARD
MR HANNAY
LORD BRIDGES
Mr. GIFFARD
Mr. EVANS
Mr. J.A. DEW, FCO (E)
Mr GIFFARD
Mr Luce
Mr Hayes

Mr. EMERGENCY UNIT

Mr. ERB
Mr. ESID
Mr. WEA
Mr. SEA
Mr. UNA

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FRAME EXTERNAL

FROM ROME 100950Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 159 OF 10 APR 82

INFO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, PARIS
BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO
UKREP BRUSSELS TELNO 1460: COREPER E.C. / ARGENTINA

AND TELECON ORLEBAR / BAYNE

1. FOLLOWING OUR REPRESENTATIONS OVERNIGHT TO THE FARNESINA AND THE CHIGI, I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT SPADOLINI (WHO REPLIED YESTERDAY TO THE P.M.'S LETTER) AND COLOMBO HAVE AGREED THAT ITALY CAN GO ALONG WITH A BAN ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA, IN A SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY AND IN THE HOPE THAT THE CONFRONTATION WILL END IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
2. WE HAVE TOLD UKREP BRUSSELS BY TELEPHONE.
3. FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER IF REQUIRED.
ARCULUS

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FM PARIS 101000Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 334 OF 10 APRIL 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FRENCH PRESS

1. LE MONDE, LE MATIN AND LE FIGARO HAVE OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS PUBLISHED LETTERS OR EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS FROM THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR IN PARIS. I HAVE WRITTEN TO THE THREE PAPERS. THERE HAS NOT YET BEEN TIME FOR MY LETTERS TO BE PUBLISHED.

2. LE MATIN OF 10 APRIL CARRIES A SHORT PIECE UNDER THE HEADING "LES ESPION DE SA MAJESTE", CLAIMING THAT THERE WERE A LARGE NUMBER OF BRITISH AGENTS IN ARGENTINA AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THAT THEIR REPORTS HAD REACHED THE FOREIGN OFFICE BUT THAT THE LATTER HAD TAKEN NO NOTICE. LE MATIN GOES ON TO CLAIM THAT IT CAN NAME SOME OF THE AGENTS OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IT SAYS THAT IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES, THE ENGLISH HAD ONE OF THEIR BEST AGENTS, AIR COMMODORE BRIAN FROW WHO HELD THE POST OF DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE ISLANDS AT THE SIDE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. ADMIRAL HILL NORTON, MILITARY ATTACHE IN BUENOS AIRES, HELPED

COMMODORE BRIAN FROW WHO HELD THE POST OF DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE ISLANDS AT THE SIDE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. ADMIRAL HILL NORTON, MILITARY ATTACHE IN BUENOS AIRES, HELPED HIM IN HIS TASK. THE ARTICLE ENDS BY SAYING " THE ARGENTINES HAVE ATTACKED ANOTHER LOCAL MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE , CAPTAIN J MITCHELL, WHO HAS HAD HIS HOUSE BURNT. THIS AGENT WAS HELPED BY COLONEL LOVE AS WELL AS BY A CIVILIAN, MARK HEATHCOTE."

3. IN MY LETTER TO LE MATIN, I REFERRED TO THIS PIECE, SAYING THAT IT WAS NOT THE PRACTICE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO COMMENT ON ACCUSATIONS OF THIS KIND ALTHOUGH SINCE THEY COULD ONLY HAVE COME FROM THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES IT WAS CLEAR WHAT WEIGHT TO ATTACH TO THEM.

FRETWELL

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SENT PARIS 10/1035Z PJC

NO 00 FOR ME CAN WE DO FINALS KK

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FM MOSCOW 100845Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 188 OF 10TH APRIL

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 185: FALKLAND ISLANDS; SOVIET ATTITUDE.

1. IN THE LAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS THE SOVIET PRESS HAS TAKEN A CLEAR ANTI-BRITISH LINE AND HAS EXPLICITLY ASSOCIATED THE U.S. WITH THE U.K. POSITION IN THE DISPUTE WITH ARGENTINA.

2. IN PARTICULAR, PRAVDA THIS MORNING, REPORTING TASS FROM NEW YORK, PICKS UP AN INTERVIEW GIVEN BY MR NOTT TO ABC TELEVISION, FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE. "NEWS AGENCIES STATE THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE DEFENCE SECRETARY INCREASED TENSION IN ANGLO-ARGENTINE CONFLICT STILL MORE."

MR NOTT'S STATEMENTS ABOUT THE UK'S WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE ANY ARGENTINE VESSEL, MILITARY OR CIVIL, WITHIN THE ZONE "SMACKS OF OLD COLONIALISM.... THE TIMES WHEN DISPUTES COULD BE SETTLED BY GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY ARE ONE...THE ATTEMPTS NOW MADE BY THE TORY GOVERNMENT TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM IN A MILITARY WAY CONTRADICT THE U.N. DECISION ON THE DECOLONIZATION OF THE FALKLANDS (MALVINAS).... AND REPRESENT A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY....IT IS CLEAR THAT BRITAIN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS RECKLESS POLICY, FOR IT IS PRECISELY BRITAIN THAT OVER MANY YEARS STUBBORNLY REFUSED TO CARRY OUT U.N. DECISIONS ON DECOLONIALISATION.....AND WAS AVOIDING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE....THE AGGRESSIVE COURSE TAKEN BY THE TORIES....

YEARS STUBBORNLY REFUSED TO CARRY OUT U.N. DECISIONS ON DECOLONIALISATION.....AND WAS AVOIDING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE....THE AGGRESSIVE COURSE TAKEN BY THE TORIES.... MEETS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT OF THE U.S. THOUGHT IT IS PREFERRED IN WASHINGTON NOT TO SAY THIS ALOUD." PRAVDA GOES ON TO SAY THAT THE U.S. HAS GIVEN THE R.A.F. PERMISSION TO USE THE AIR BASE ON ASCENSION ISLAND WHICH THE BRITISH NAVAL FORCE WILL USE AS A REAR BASE IN OPERATIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA.

3. OTHER MAIN POINTS OF MEDIA COMMENT HERE:

(I) COMMENT HOSTILE TO THE UK BY TASS "POLITICAL NEWS ANALYST" KORNILOV ON 9 APRIL (NOT YET PICKED UP BY THE SOVIET PRESS) ATTRIBUTED BRITAIN'S "OLD IMPERIAL AMBITIONS" TO THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE ARCHIPELAGO, INCLUDING REPORTS OF HUGE OIL RESERVES.

(II) LONDON TASS CORRESPONDENT CHUKSEYEV ON 9 APRIL SPECULATED ON THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR STERLING AND THE UK ECONOMY OF THE COST OF THE NAVAL TASK FORCE AND ANY HOSTILITIES. (AGAIN NOT YET CARRIED IN THE PRESS).

(III) SEVERAL SMALLER EC GOVERNMENTS ARE CONCERNED BY UK POLICY AND DO NOT SUPPORT THE CALL FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. PRAVDA THIS MORNING QUOTES IRISH TIMES REPORTS OF IRISH HOSTILITY TO SANCTIONS.

(IV) PRAVDA ON 9 APRIL ALLEGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S REPUTATION WAS CONTINUING TO FALL AND QUOTED MR CALLAGHAN AS SAYING IN THE HOUSE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD FORFEITED THE RIGHT TO SUPPORT FROM THE OPPOSITION.

BROOKE TURNER

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Cabinet Office Duty Officer

The enclosed note has been prepared by me in great haste following the request received this afternoon. It has not been cleared with the Attorney-General. It is designed simply to afford the very general guidance requested. It is, in my view, essential that, if we are to move onto a war footing, with all the international and domestic legal consequences which flow therefrom, we should have the benefit of the advice of the Attorney-General and indeed of the legal advisers to the major Whitehall Departments which would be principally affected.

Sir I Sinclair

Sir I Sinclair

9 April 1982

cc: Falkland Islands Distribution
Mr Freeland, Legal Advisers
Mr Steel (Law Officer's Department)

Home Office (Duty Officer)

MOD (Defence Secretary's Duty Officer)

D/Trade (Duty Officer) CONFIDENTIAL

D/Transport (Duty Officer)



FORMAL CONSEQUENCES OF A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA

Note by the FCO Legal Adviser

1. This note is based on the assumption that Argentina might formally declare war on the UK on 11 April, or make a statement on that date, possibly following a successful attack on an Argentine naval vessel in the maritime exclusion zone, indicating that a state of war now existed between the two countries.

Question 1. Do we need to respond by formally declaring war on Argentina?

No.

Question 2. Would we nonetheless be at war with Argentina following such a declaration or statement?

Yes. War may begin, first, by a declaration of war. Second, it may begin after the commission of an act of force against another State which that State elects to regard as creating a state of war. We did not so elect following the invasion of the Falkland Islands but are relying instead on our inherent right of self-defence. Argentina may elect to regard an attack upon one of her naval vessels in the maritime exclusion zone as giving rise to a state of war between the two countries. See also paragraphs 2 and 3 of my minute to Mr Fearn of 2 April (copy attached).

Question 3. What formal action would be required in the UK following such a declaration or statement?

In the UK, the power to declare war (and peace) rests with the Crown. The formal method of declaring war is by proclamation, passed under /the



the Great Seal, coupled with a simultaneous delivery to the enemy state of the formal declaration. In the circumstances envisaged, this would not be necessary. There would however have to be a Government statement declaring or acknowledging that a state of war exists between the UK and Argentina. This would have to be cleared with the Palace.

Question 4. What is the essential distinction between a conflict which neither party regards as giving rise to a state of war, and the state of war itself?

The most noticeable distinction between a conflict not amounting to war and war itself is that the former is essentially limited, while the latter is not. Belligerents in a war may apply any amount and any kind of force, save only those means or methods forbidden by international law.

Question 5. What are the legal consequences that flow from a declaration of war or acknowledgement that a state of war exists?

- (1) Rupture of diplomatic relations (this has already occurred);
- (2) Suspension of most, but not necessarily all, bilateral treaties to which the belligerents are parties (most multilateral treaties will continue to be operative);
- (3) Nationals of belligerents on enemy territory are liable to be interned;

/(4)



- (4) Trading with the enemy legislation becomes activated;
- (5) Contracts between nationals of the belligerents will, as a general rule, be abrogated: new contracts with enemies (in the sense of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939) become unlawful;
- (6) Enemy merchant vessels in harbour or on the high seas are liable to capture and condemnation as prize (Prize Courts will have to be set up);
- (7) Third countries uninvolved in the dispute become neutrals. They acquire certain rights and duties as such (see Question 6 below);
- (8) The four Red Cross Conventions of 1949 come into operation (in our view, the Fourth Convention at least is already operative).

See also paragraph 4 of my minute to Mr Fearn of 2 April. It should be stressed that these are by no means exhaustive lists of the legal consequences flowing from the existence of a state of war.

Question 6. Would a third (neutral) state be legally required to prevent use of its ports for supply of the UK task force?

A neutral state must prevent belligerent warships admitted to its ports from taking in /such



such a quantity of provisions as would enable them to continue their naval operations. As to the quantity of provisions which a belligerent warship may be allowed to take in, the UK has in the past (1904) supported the position that no more may be permitted than is necessary to bring them safely to the nearest port of their own country. The UK also stated (later in 1904) that even this rule should not be understood as applying to the case of a 'belligerent fleet proceeding ... to the seat of war; and such fleets were not to be permitted to make use of any British ports, roadsteads or waters for coaling either direct from shore or from colliers accompanying such fleets ...'. (This was in the context of the Russo/Japanese War of 1904.)

The principle that neutral ports and waters must not be allowed to be made the basis of naval operations and preparations applies to warships and to naval auxiliaries, but not to merchant vessels: the neutral state is not forbidden to permit the fuelling of merchant vessels even when they are suspected of unneutral supply to belligerent warships. The possibility cannot, however, be excluded that particular third states would invoke duties of neutrality as a justification for refusing to permit supply to any vessel involved in the UK task force.

Question 7. Would the existence of a state of war between the UK and Argentina affect the right of UK vessels (whether warships or merchant vessels) to transit the Panama Canal?

/No.

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No. Article II and III(e) of the Treaty of 1977 provide for the neutrality of the canal 'both in time of peace and in time of war' and for vessels of war and auxiliary vessels to be entitled 'at all times' to transit the canal.

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Mr Fearn

FALKLAND ISLANDS: IMPLICATIONS OF A DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ARGENTINA

1. I understand that the Secretary of State would like a brief note about the implications of our declaring war on Argentina in the context of an invasion of the Falkland Islands.

2. Traditional international law maintains a strict and clear-cut dichotomy between a State being at peace with another State or at war with it. According to McNair and Watts (Legal Effects of War):-

"Being "at war", however, is a technical concept referring to a state or condition of affairs, not mere acts of force. It is a state to which international law attaches far reaching consequences, and it confers upon States who might be affected by it a distinct legal status: this applies not only to the States party to the war, but also to third States, since where a state of war exists it gives rise to the collateral state of neutrality for non participants in the contest with all its attendant rights and duties."

A state of war may perfectly well exist even if no armed force is being employed by the opposing parties and no actual hostilities between them are occurring. Conversely, force may be used by one State against another without any state of war arising. In this latter instance, the parties will, as a matter of law, still be at peace although their relations will be strained to a greater or lesser extent.

3. The existence of a state of war depends essentially upon the determination of the parties to the conflict and can arise where only one of the parties to the conflict asserts the existence of a state of war, even if the other denies it or keeps silence. For a state of war to exist one at least of the contenders must so assert. This has enabled conflicts, even if militarily extensive as between the parties, to stay essentially limited rather than to entail the overall dislocation which would accompany the escalation of those conflicts into a state of war.

4. Where a state of war is declared or held to exist, the following consequences would ensue:-

- (1) All those resident or carrying on business in territory owned or occupied by the enemy State become "alien enemies" for procedural purposes of English law;

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- (2) Enemy nationals in British territory who have complied with any requirements and restrictions imposed upon them as a matter of general policy (e.g. internment) are deemed to become enemies "in protection";
- (3) Alien enemies in the territorial sense (i.e. those resident or carrying on business in territory owned or occupied by the enemy State) have no right of access to the English courts;
- (4) Generally speaking (and subject to certain exceptions) any contract made before the outbreak of war insofar as not completely performed is regarded as having become abrogated as from the outbreak of war where one of the parties is in this country and the other becomes an alien enemy in the territorial sense. The effect of abrogation is to destroy the contractual relationship and to preclude and prohibit any further performance of the contract. Abrogation does not necessarily destroy any accrued right of either party;
- (5) Trading with the enemy legislation would have to be activated. Trading with the enemy becomes a criminal offence, a cause of illegality and nullity in a contract or other transaction, and a ground of condemnation by a Prize Court. Trading with the enemy covers, as well as trading in the sense of ordinary commercial transactions, intercourse which may have nothing commercial about it. Under the Trading with the Enemy Act 1939, the definition of "enemy" is very wide. Enemy character attaches not only to alien enemies in the territorial sense but also to any UK company or company carrying on business in any place, if and so long as the company is controlled by a person who is defined as an enemy;
- (6) Another normal consequence of the outbreak of war is that enemy merchant ships in UK ports can be seized and requisitioned;
- (7) Finally, it is the general rule that bilateral treaties between belligerents become suspended on the outbreak of war between them. The position as regards multilateral treaties is more controversial; some are clearly designed to operate in time of war, such as the Protocols on International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (although they equally operate in the case of armed conflict falling short of war in the technical sense).

/These

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These are a few illustrations of the immediate consequences of a declaration of a state of war or acknowledgement of the existence of a state of war. It will be seen that the consequences are very far reaching. For this reason, recent State practice has been in the direction of eschewing acknowledgement of the existence of a state of war in the technical sense even where fairly extensive hostilities have occurred or are in the process of occurring. For example, in the case of the Suez operation in 1959, there was no formal declaration of war, nor indeed did either party acknowledge the existence of a state of war in the technical sense.

5. Of course, many actions can be taken by a State which is the victim of an armed attack even without acknowledgement that this armed attack has given rise to a formal state of war between the belligerents. Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter any State which is the victim of an armed attack has the "inherent right of individual or collective self defence" until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. This right of self defence clearly comprehends any military or naval action which might be necessary to repel or expel any invading force. As the right is an inherent one, it need not be accompanied by a formal declaration of war. Other measures, such as the breaking off of diplomatic relations, the suspension of air services or the taking of certain economic measures against the other party, would also be permissible to a State involved in resisting an armed attack against its territory by another State. The temporary freezing or sequestration of assets is, for example, the kind of measure which has been taken in the past in circumstances of armed hostilities falling short of war. Whether it would be advisable to envisage measures of this kind in the present circumstances is of course a matter of policy and not strictly one of law.

2 April 1982

Ian Sinclair
Ian Sinclair
Legal Adviser

cc PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Sir A Acland
Mr Wright
Mr Giffard
Mr Freeland
Mr Ure
Defence Department
South America Department

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at 1950 Valid 8/4) 9/4

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/LOPD TREGARNE
PS/PJS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M. Tsy

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Mr. Wade - Geny, Cabinet Office
Mr Fuller, SAPU, Cabinet Office

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SECRET

FM BRITNAVAT BRASILIA 9:1545Z APRIL 82

TO FLASH MODUK NAVY

SECRET

SIC 19F

REPEATED FLASH CINCFLEET

REPEATED IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO: 084

FOR CGRM AND CINCFLEET FROM BRITNAVAT.

OP CORPORATE. SUBJECT VESSEL AES.

REF MY 19F 082210Z APR 82.

1. BRAZILIAN ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF (INFORMATION)

TELEPHONED BRITNAVAT AT 091330Z TO SAY BRAZILIAN NAVY DID NOT WISH TO RECEIVE THE WRITTEN APPLICATION THEY HAD EARLIER SAID WOULD BE NECESSARY. PARA 2. OF REFERENCE REFERS.

2. REAR ADMIRAL CORDEIRO EXPLAINED THAT FOREIGN AND NAVY MINISTERS HAD DISCUSSED THIS CASE AND FELT IT FELL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE GUIDANCE PREVIOUSLY GIVEN BY THEM ON SEPARATE OCCASIONS TO HM AMBASSADOR. BRASILIA TELEGRAMS 068 OF 5 APR AND 079 OF 7 APR (NOTAL) REFER.

3 IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS THAT, AS HMA HAS ALREADY REPORTED, THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO THE FALKLANDS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ANY WAY, HOWEVER INDIRECT. THIS MEANS THAT ANY SHIP, WHETHER MILITARY OR MERCHANT, RELATED TO THE TASK FORCE WILL NOT BE WELCOME IN BRAZILIAN PORTS, OTHER THAN IN STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCES.

HARDING

BT

NNNN

SENT AT: 09/1600Z BRL K

RECD AT 091600Z RW



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>616</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Santiago telegram no. 89 to FCO dated 9 April 1982</i>	
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Typhoid
(Had WAD)
(H. G. S.)

Mr Wade-Gery *Cab Office*
Mr Fuller, SAPP

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FM DAKAR 092020Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 1000Z FCO

TLEGRAM NUMBER 78 OF 9 APRIL 82

AND TO INFO WASHINGTON

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MR HAIG'S TECHNICAL STOP IN DAKAR

1. ON HIS WAY FROM LONDON TO BUENOS AIRES MR HAIG HAD ONE HOUR'S TALK AT THE AIRPORT WITH THE SENEGALESE FOREIGN MINISTER ON APRIL 9.

2. MY US COLLEAGUE TOLD ME MR HAIG HAD NOT SOUNDED VERY OPTIMISTIC ON THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF HIS IMMEDIATE MISSION. CONCERN HAD BEEN EXPRESSED THAT IF ARGENTINA WAS BACKED INTO A CORNER, IT WOULD BE FORCED TO GO TO THE SOVIET UNION AS ITS ONLY LOGICAL SOURCE OF RE-SUPPLY: THIS WOULD SPREAD SOVIET INFLUENCE IN A REGION WHERE NO ONE WANTED IT. I SAID PRESIDENT GALTIERI SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT OF THAT LAST WEEK.

3. MR HAIG'S PLANE WAS PARKED NEXT TO TWO RAF C130'S STAGING TO ASCENSION, WHICH LED TO SOME HASTY RE-ARRANGEMENT BY THE AMERICANS OF THE BACK DROP FOR THE OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS.

FCO PLEASE PASS

SQUIRE

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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FM LIMA 091650Z APRIL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 75 OF 9 APRIL

FALKLANDS: MY TELNO 74.

1. LAST NIGHT'S LOCAL TV NEWS REPORTED THAT PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SUGGESTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE ON THE FALKLANDS AND THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS IDEA WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES CONCERNED, WHO HAD UNDERTAKEN TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

WALLACE

NNNN

SENT AT 09/1840Z NSC
RECD AT 09/1840Z MW

PS
PS/LPS
PS/
PS/L TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
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MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
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MR MCINTYRE

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*Had WIAJ
the NAG
YUKITS.*

*Mr Wade-Gery Cab Officer
Mr Fuller SAPO*

RESIDENT CLERK

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GRS 100

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRIDGETOWN 092030Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 103 OF 9 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND ROUTINE PORT OF SPAIN KINGSTON

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEETING WITH EASTERN CARIBBEAN LEADERS:
THE FALKLANDS

I AM TOLD THAT IN THEIR PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN LEADERS SPOKE OUT STRONGLY IN CONDEMNING THE ARGENTINIAN ACTION AND CALLING FOR AN ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO HAVE LIMITED HIMSELF TO THE LINE IN HIS MONDAY NEWS CONFERENCE, THAT THE US WOULD ACT AS 'HONEST BROKERS' AND HOPED THAT SECRETARY HAIG WOULD BE ABLE TO HELP AVOID PHYSICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

ARTHUR

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 April 1982

dmu *draft*
mb

Dear Sir,

Argentina

Thank you for your letter of 8 April asking for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to the Chairman of the British Community Council in Buenos Aires.

I enclose a draft, in the form of a telegram to the British Interests Section in Buenos Aires. We have no other way of communicating with Mr Murchison, who did not give an address.

The reply has been drafted on the assumption that it will be made public. Perhaps you could let me know whether, and if so how, you propose that we should publicize it ourselves.

Yours ever

J E Holmes
(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London W1A 7AH



1-7 JB2



File No.

Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification ENCLAIP
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....
 (Security Class.) UNCLASSIFIED (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....
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TO... IMMEDIATE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION Tel. No. of
 (precedence) (post) BUENOS AIRES

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

1. Please deliver the following message from the Prime Minister to Mr Murchison, Chairman of the British Community Council in the Argentine Republic in reply to his telex (text in MIFT).

Begins:

Dear Mr Murchison, Thank you for your telegram about the British Community in Argentina.

Copies to:-

I recognise the consideration which ~~the~~ Argentine governments ^{have} has shown to the British community in Argentina, who have - I know - contributed much to the prosperity and development of that country. We have ^{long} always valued our relations with Argentina.

You will understand, however, that there can be no question of our failing to respond to the unprovoked

/aggression

aggression by the Argentine Government in its invasion of the Falkland Islands and their dependencies, and its attempt to settle by force the long-standing dispute between us.

The Argentine action has been condemned by the UN Security Council, which has passed by an overwhelming majority a mandatory resolution calling on Argentina to withdraw, as well as by very many other governments around the world. It is our earnest hope that the Argentine Government will heed this call and withdraw its forces.

The British Government ^{sacks} ~~wishes for~~ a peaceful solution, and will pursue all possible means of securing one. But there must be no doubt of our determination to re-assert British administration over the Falkland Islands.

I realise with deep regret that this situation may cause anxieties for British people living in Argentina. That is why we have been advising people to consider leaving the country by normal commercial means. It is of course for individuals to decide how to respond to this advice.

I earnestly believe that only firmness and resolution ~~in this~~ will be a ^{contribute to the maintenance of} contribution to maintaining the rule of law and ^{the preservation of} thus preserve peace ~~more generally~~ in the world: ^{both in the South Atlantic and in the wider world.}

With best wishes, Margaret Thatcher.

Ends.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 April 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Australian Economic Measures

The Australian Prime Minister has informed our High Commissioner that the Australian Cabinet has decided to accede, where applicable, to all of our suggestions on economic sanctions against Argentina.

/ Sir J Mason recommends that the Prime Minister should
/ send a particularly warm acknowledgement to the attached letter
/ from Mr Fraser to Mrs Thatcher. I enclose a draft reply.

When Sir J Mason saw Mr Fraser yesterday he made an informal expression of Mrs Thatcher's pleasure at the confirmation of Mr Fraser's leadership. Mr Fraser has now asked that his appreciation should be informally returned.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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GRS 250

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FM CANBERRA 080830Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 148 OF 8 APRIL

MY TELNO 145: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 8 APRIL TO PRIME MINISTER FROM AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER.

QUOTE MY DEAR MARGARET
SIR JOHN MASON YESTERDAY HANDED ME YOUR LETTER SEEKING OUR HELP IN BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

YOU MENTIONED VARIOUS POSSIBLE MEASURES- A BAN ON THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND OTHER MILITARY MATERIAL, AN EMBARGO ON ALL OR SOME IMPORTS OF GOODS FROM ARGENTINA, THE ENDING OF EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR NEW COMMITMENTS TO ARGENTINA, AND DISCOURAGEMENT OF FURTHER INTERNATIONAL LENDING TO ARGENTINA.

NOT ALL OF THESE ARE APPLICABLE TO US: WE ARE NEITHER AN ARMS SUPPLIER NOR A LENDER TO ARGENTINA. NEVERTHELESS, I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT THE AUSTRALIAN CABINET THIS MORNING DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR OPPOSITION TO ARGENTINA'S AGGRESSIVE ACT IN SEIZING THE ISLANDS, AND OUR SOLIDARITY WITH YOU AT THIS CRITICAL TIME.

ACCORDINGLY, THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TONY STREET, HAS ANNOUNCED A BAN WITH EFFECT FROM TODAY AN ALL IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA OTHER THAN THOSE ON THE WATER OR SUBJECT TO EXISTING CONTRACTS. AND THAT NO EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES WILL BE EXTENDED TO ARGENTINA.

CONFIDENTIAL

/IN

CONFIDENTIAL

IN YOUR LETTER YOU EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SUCH MEASURES, TAKEN RAPIDLY , WOULD SHOW ARGENTINA THAT FORCE DOES NOT PAY AND BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. I AM HAPPY THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TAKE THIS ACTION TO SHOW IN A PRACTICAL WAY OUR SUPPORT FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT.

I HOPE THAT THIS IN TURN WILL CONTRIBUTE TO BRINGING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THIS MOST TRYING AND DANGEROUS SITUATION.

MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS

MALCOM FRASER

UNQUOTE

MASON

FCO
S AM D
SPD
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FAIKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR)

SIR K COUZENS)

MR LITTLER)

MR HAWTIN)

MR PERETZ)

MR ILETT)

TREASURY

-2- MISS DICKSON EIP DIV D/ENERGY

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File No.
Department SOUTH PACIFIC OUTWARD
Drafted by J W FORBES-MEYLER TELEGRAM
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CONFIDENTIAL ^{Security Classification}
IMMEDIATE ^{Precedence}
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TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA Tel. No. of.
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AND TO SAVING.....
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, TOKYO, WASHINGTON
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.....
INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-
SPD
SAMD
Cabinet Office
Additional Distribution:
Falkland Islands

Copies to:-
PS/Chancellor)
Sir K Couzens)
Mr Littler)Treas-
Mr Hatwin)ury
Mr Peretz)
Mr Ilett)

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 145: FALKLAND ISLANDS: ECONOMIC MEASURES

1. Please pass following message from the Prime Minister to Mr Fraser.

BEGINS

Dear Malcolm,

Thank you for your letter of 8 April.

I am deeply grateful to you for your

decision to ban all imports from Argentina and to

withold export credits. *This is exactly the kind of support we need. Your decision gave a great boost to the*

Your ~~most~~ timely action will be an *morale* y

important factor in bringing pressure to bear on all those who *whine* in the *free* world, Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands and thus avoiding the need for the use of force.

CONFIDENTIAL

/With *free* world

With My Warmest Regards

Margaret Thatcher

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

TYPIST

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(28)

Valid 8/4)

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PS/
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PJS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
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DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

MR S. FULLER SA/O
Cabinet Office

RESIDENT CLERK

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FM PORT OF SPAIN 091430Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

IMMEDIATE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 59 OF 9 APRIL
AND TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN DESKBY 091700Z
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO KINGSTON, GEORGETOWN

ADVANCE COPY

MY TEL NO 58: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THIS A FEEBLE STATEMENT, AND NOT WHAT RAMPHAL AND I WERE LED TO EXPECT. HAVING OBTAINED THE EMBARGOED TEXT FROM A PRESS CONTACT, I INTERCEPTED THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AS HE ARRIVED AT THE TELEVISION STUDIO TO BROADCAST THE STATEMENT. IN THE TWO OR THREE MINUTES AVAILABLE BEFORE HE WENT ON I SAID THAT, WHILE YOU WOULD BE GLAD TO NOTE THAT TRINIDAD SUPPORTED THE RIGHT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TO SELF DETERMINATION, YOU WOULD BE VERY DISTURBED AT THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONDEMNATION OF THE AGGRESSION OR CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INVADERS. I URGED INCE AT LEAST TO ADD A REFERENCE TO SCR 502, WHICH WAS RECEIVING WORLD-WIDE SUPPORT, HAD MANDATORY FORCE, AND BY ITS DEMAND FOR AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL SHOWED THE ONLY PEACEFUL WAY FORWARD. INCE SAID THAT HIS TEXT HAD BEEN LAID DOWN IN CABINET AND HE COULD NOT CHANGE IT

SUPPORT, HAD MANDATORY FORCE, AND BY ITS DEMAND FOR AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL SHOWED THE ONLY PEACEFUL WAY FORWARD. INCE SAID THAT HIS TEXT HAD BEEN LAID DOWN IN CABINET AND HE COULD NOT CHANGE IT. NOR DID HE.

2. WHEN WE RESUMED DISCUSSION AFTER HIS BROADCAST, I SAID I WAS DISTURBED BY THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES UNQUOTE, WHICH I THOUGHT IN THE FALKLANDS CONTEXT THE ARGENTINES WOULD CHOOSE TO INTERPRET AS A CALL FOR THE ABSORPTION OF THE ISLANDS IN ARGENTINA. INCE SEEMED SURPRISED AT THIS AND SAID IT WAS INTENDED TO SUPPORT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, A BRITISH COLONY. HE REFERRED TO POSSIBLE VENEZUELAN CLAIMS AGAINST TRINIDAD AND I SAID I THOUGHT THE LANGUAGE WOULD BE WELCOME TO SOME IRRIDENTISTS. I ASKED WHY THE STATEMENT MADE NO REFERENCE TO SCR 502. HE SAID THAT THE QUESTION HAD NOT REALLY COME UP: HE HAD MADE AN INPUT IN CABINET BUT OTHERS HAD MADE INPUTS TOO.

3. I SAID THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING HMG, WOULD BE SURPRISED THAT, WITH COUNTRIES SUCH AS (ACCORDING TO THE BBC) MEXICO AND (ACCORDING TO INCE) BRAZIL, AS WELL AS LOTS OF CARIBBEAN AND AFRICAN STATES, CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES, THE TRINIDAD GOVERNMENT HAD NOT FELT ABLE TO DO SO. ON TUESDAY I HAD ASKED WHETHER THE ARGENTINE CHARGE WOULD BE SUMMONED: NOW, I HAD TO SAY, I HOPED HE WOULD NOT BE. I URGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAKE A FURTHER STATEMENT AT LEAST ENDORSING RESOLUTION 502. INCE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE WOULD TALK TO HIS PRIME MINISTER. I ALSO URGED THAT THE TRINIDAD REPRESENTATIVE TO THE OAS SHOULD BE TOLD TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION. INCE SAID, QUOTE WE COULD CERTAINLY DO THAT UNQUOTE. I WONDER.

4. WITH NEARLY ALL WILLIAMS' MINISTERS STILL IN THE CABINET, I SUSPECT THAT THE TRINIDAD STATEMENT REFLECTS THEIR FEELING THAT A LOW INTERNATIONAL PROFILE CONTINUES TO SERVE TRINIDAD'S INTERESTS: WHAT RAMPHAL DESCRIBED TO ME AS THE FETISH OF NON-INVOLVEMENT. I HAVE SENT HIM A MESSAGE VIA BHC BRIDGETOWN TELLING HIM OF THIS OUTCOME AND SAYING THAT A FURTHER INTERVENTION BY HIM COULD BE HELPFUL IN TRYING TO SECURE A SUPPLEMENTARY TRINIDAD STATEMENT.

LANE

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM LISBON 091415 APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 59 OF 9 APRIL 1982

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 56: FALKLANDS

1. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER LEONARDO MATHIAS TOOK OPPORTUNITY OF FURTHER TALK WITH ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR HERE ON 7 APRIL TO TELL LATTER OF PORTUGUESE CONVICTION THAT BRITISH MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND INTENTIONS WERE IN EARNEST HE ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO PORTUGUESE STATEMENT SUPPORTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (MY TELNO 57). MATHIAS TOLD ME YESTERDAY HE WAS HOPEFUL AMBASSADOR HAD REPORTED TO BUENOS AIRES

BYATT

NNNN

[TYPISTS]

28
(27)

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FM PARIS 091438Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 331 OF 9 APRIL 1982

FALKLANDS: FRENCH PRESS COMMENT, 9 APRIL

1. THE FRENCH PRESS CONTINUES TO GIVE WIDE COVERAGE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. MOST PAPERS DETECT A SOFTENING IN THE ARGENTINIAN POSITION WHILE BRITAIN'S REACTIONS CONTINUE TO BE SEEN AS FIRM. THE HAIG MISSION IS GIVEN CONSIDERABLE SPACE: SEVERAL PAPERS UNDERLINE MRS THATCHER'S REMARKS THAT HAIG COMES AS AN ALLY AND A FRIEND, NOT AS A MEDIATOR.

2. LE MATIN (SOCIALIST) CLAIMS THAT THE BRITISH DECLARATION OF A "WAR ZONE" AND MR NOTT'S STATEMENT THAT BRITAIN WOULD FIRE FIRST HAD RAISED THE TENSION AND THE DECLARATION OF THE 200 MILE ZONE HAD SUPRISED OBSERVERS (CF. ISNARD IN LE MONDE - MY TELNO 330). LE MATIN ALSO REFERS TO FRANCE'S INTERESTS IN PRESERVING HER OWN OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS. AN ARTICLE BY ONE OF LE MATIN'S EDITORS ARGUES THAT IT WAS WRONG TO SPEAK OF THE

MY TELNO 330). LE MATIN ALSO REFERS TO FRANCE'S INTERESTS IN PRESERVING HER OWN OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS. AN ARTICLE BY ONE OF LE MATIN'S EDITORS ARGUES THAT IT WAS WRONG TO SPEAK OF THE FALKLANDERS AS OPPRESSED PEOPLE OR OF THE CRISIS AS "A COLONIAL OR FRONTIER CONFLICT: WE ARE TALKING ABOUT TWO DIFFERENT WAYS OF BEHAVIOUR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS." THE ARTICLE COMPARES GALTIERI WITH IDI AMIN AND KADHAFI, AND CONCLUDES THAT "BRITISH DEMOCRACY IS MORE VALUABLE IN OUR (FRENCH) EYES THAN AN OPPRESSIVE ANTIPODEAN DICTATORSHIP WHICH TREATS OUR VALUES WITH CONTEMPT." LA CROIS (CATHOLIC CENTRIST) CRITICISES THE SOVIET POSITION AND CONCLUDES THAT IT WAS HARDLY SURPRISING IF THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTED ARGENTINA AS LEFT WING AND RIGHT WING DICTATORSHIPS BOTH HAD THE SAME CONTEMPT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. CLAIRE TREAN, WRITING IN LE MONDE DATED 10 APRIL, CLAIMS THAT THE TEMPERATURE IN BRITAIN HAD FALLEN AND THAT THE FALKLANDS WERE BEING FORGOTTEN AS THE BRITISH WENT OFF FOR THEIR EASTER WEEKEND. SHE REPORTS THAT "REASON HAS RETURNED" AND THAT A PART OF PUBLIC OPINION WAS ASKING ITSELF ABOUT THE COSTS AND LIKELY RESULT OF THE NAVAL EXPEDITION. SHE SAYS NEVERTHELESS THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE BRITISH AGREE WITH THE DESPATCH OF THE FORCE.

FRETWELL.

NNNN

SENT/RECD 441 AND 442 AT 09/1600Z PJC/

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

9 36
(28)

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PS/LPS
PS/
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

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FM KATHMANDU 090500Z APRIL 82

IMMEDIATE

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 49 OF 9 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE MOD (FOR CGS), CBF HONG KONG

INFO PRIORITY DELHI

MT.

MY TELEGRAM NO 45: GURKHAS: TASK FORCE

1. I HAVE RECEIVED A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE CBF HONG KONG RELAYING THE CGS'S ANXIETY NOT REPEAT NOT TO EXCLUDE 1/7 GURKHAS FROM POSSIBLE FOLLOW UP FORCE IN THE FALKLANDS. CGS APPARENTLY RATES CHANCE OF THEIR USE IN COMBAT LOW.

2. THE ASSESSMENT IN MY TUR AND IN TELEGRAM NO 47 STANDS. IF HOWEVER FOR OVERRIDING MILITARY REASONS IT IS NECESSARY TO INCLUDE THE GURKHAS THE RISK MUST BE TAKEN. IF IT IS SO DECIDED, PUBLICITY SHOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM AND NEPALESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE INFORMED ONLY IF IT BECOMES LIKELY THAT GURKHAS WILL BE USED IN COMBAT. SO FAR I HAVE HAD NO REACTION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 50 TO ABIDJAN. IN CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY ON 7 APRIL, HE DID NOT MAKE ANY REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF GURKHAS.

DENSON

BT

*Referenced to Chequer
at 2235 9/4*

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(28)

Valid 8/4)

PS
PS/LPS
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PS/LORD TREGARNE
PS/PUS
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FM MONTEVIDEO 09/0210Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

19

TELEGRAM NUMBER 090210ZAPR 82

090210Z

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRITDEFAT MONTEVIDEO

TO MODUK

SIC U2J

FOR D14

MILITARY SITREP

1. FALKLANDS

(A) FROM DEBRIEFING OF TRAVELLERS RECENTLY RETURNED FROM PORT STANLEY AYE NOW HAVE FAIR INDICATION OF DEFENSIVE POSITION IN THIS AREA. THIS DETAIL AYE CAN SEND AT ANY TIME BUT IT IS A CONSTANTLY

CHANGING SCENE AND AS I HAVE ONLY QUARTER MILLION SCALE MAP

CHANGING SCENE AND AS I HAVE ONLY QUARTER MILLION SCALE MAP COVERAGE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE IT IN PROSE RATHER THAN GR. PLEASE SAY IF YOU WANT PIECEMEAL OR DATE BY.

(B) FROM THE SAME SOURCES AND FROM ARGENTINE MEDIA WHICH AYE AM SCREENING DAILY IT APPEARS THAT IN SUM THE RELIEF OF MARINE FORCES BY ARMY IS NEARLY COMPLETE. AMPHIBIANS HAVE ALL DEPARTED (WE BELIEVE BACK TO RIO GRANDE) AND THE C130 AIRLIFT IS NOW BUILDING UP ARMY NUMBERS DAILY.

(C) ALTHOUGH AYE CAN GET NO POSITIVE EVIDENCE THAT UNITS OTHER THAN 25 INF REGT ARE IN STANLEY I SHOULD EXPECT THAT UNITS COUNTRY WIDE ARE BEING MILKED OF REGULAR CADRES WHICH WILL GO TO STIFFEN THE GARISON AND BRING IT UP TO BRIGADE STRENGTH. THIS WILL BE ESPECIALLY NECESSARY AT THIS TIME OF YEAR WHEN THE MAJORITY OF CONSCRIPTS ARE RAW.

(D) SPECIFICALLY THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN REPORTED:

4 X 40MM AAA

20 FT (APPROX) OVAL AERIAL RADAR

MAINLY 106 MM RECOILLESS AND 81 MM MOR ANTI-TANK MINE-FIELDS IN TWO AREAS.

(E) AIR. ON THE STRIP 7 APR WERE 4 X PUCANA AND 2 MS 760 IN ADDITION TO C 130 AIRLIFT AC. A 4'S FROM CARRIER MAKE A FLY PAST DAILY AT NOON.

(F) TRAVELLERS SPEAK OF LOW MORALE AMONGST SOLDIERS DUE TO COLD AND WET AND LACK OF ADMIN SUPPORT BUT WE MUST EXPECT THIS TO IMPRVE AS THE BUILD UP CONTINUES. LOCAL POPULATION ARE NOT CO-OPERATING BUT NO DIRECT HARRASSMENT HAS BEEN REPORTED.

2. ARGENTINA

ALL ARGENTINE PRESS INDICATES MOVEMENT OF TROOPS SOUTH AND ESPECIALLY TALKS OF BUILD UP IN COMODORO RIVADAVIA AND RIO GALLEGOS. WE KNOW OF ONWARD MOVEMENT BY AIR FROM THE FORMER AND BELIEVE THEY ARE ALSO USING THE LATTER. TO DATE I KNOW OF NO UNIT MOVES. RESERVISTS IN CERTAIN SPECIALIST CATEGORIES ARE BEING RECALLED. I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO IMPROVE MY SOURCES AND ESPECIALLY AS IMMIGRATION FROM BA CONTINUES (AS IS EXPECTED) AYE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO BETTER IN DAYS TO COME.

BT

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FM MONTEVIDEO 092030Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 92 OF 09 APRIL

MY TELNOS 78 AND 81 : ROYAL MARINES

1. POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT WE COULD FIND SUFFICIENT SEATS ON COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS INSTEAD OF SPECIAL VC 10. SHOULD WE INVESTIGATE?
2. IF VC 10 IS USED WE WILL REQUIRE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DETAILS FOR SEEKING DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE.
3. STILL NO NEWS HERE OF MARINES.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 09/760Z JL/JWL

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS
PS/LPS
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PS/LOPD TREFGARNE
PS/PJS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR UPE
MR GILLMORE

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ED/NEWS D
ED/UKD
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* For Typists - Xerox

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MR HAWTIN
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MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

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FM MONTEVIDEO 092035Z APRIL 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 90 OF 09 APRIL

INFO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK

MY TELNO 82 : URUGUAYAN OFFER OF FACILITIES FOR MEDIATION

1. I HAVE LEARNT FROM THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR THAT THE URUGUAYAN FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD HIM YESTERDAY EVENING THAT IF REQUESTED, THE URUGUAYANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACT AS MEDIATORS IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING FACILITIES IN URUGUAY FOR THE MEDIATION PROCESS.

2. THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT THE INITIAL REACTION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS MILDLY FAVOURABLE TOWARDS URUGUAY BECOMING A (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) LOCALE FOR MEDIATION.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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Valid 8/4)

PS
PS/LPS
PS/
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

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FM MONTEVIDEO 091255Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 85 OF 09 APRIL

MY TELNO 82 : COMMUNIQUE BY URUGUAYAN COUNCIL OF NATIONAL SECURITY

1. PLEASE MAKE THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT CORRECTIONS TO THE TUR:
PARA 2 LINE 4: TO READ QUOTE FURTHERMORE, WITH ARGENTINA URUGUAY
HAD CERTAIN SPECIAL LINKS UNQUOTE (NOT LIMITS).

PARA 4 : INSERT QUOTATION MARKS AROUND EQUIDISTANT TO READ AS
FOLLOWS:

4. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALSO SAID THAT THE URUGUAYAN
GOVERNMENT WAS ANXIOUS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO REMAIN QUOTE
EQUIDISTANT UNQUOTE AS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ETC

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

Dis 090500Z

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(28)

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/FUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR UPE
MR GILLMORE

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FM MONTEVIDEO 090140Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

MF

TELEGRAM NUMBER 82 OF 09 APRIL 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK

MY TELNO 79: COMMUNIQUE BY URUGUAYAN COUNCIL OF NATIONAL SECURITY

1. THIS EVENING THE FOREIGN MINISTER HANDED ME A COPY OF THE COMMUNIQUE UNDER COVER OF A NOTE VERBALE, THE MAIN POINTS OF WHICH ARE:

A. THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY FERVENTLY HOPED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD GO FORWARD WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE DISPUTE TO BE SETTLED IN A SATISFACTORY FORM AND

B. EMPHASIS ON THE URUGUAYAN OFFER TO PROVIDE FACILITIES THAT MIGHT HELP ALONG THE MEDIATION PROCESS.

2. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THEN SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT

2. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THEN SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WHILE URUGUAY HAD LONG STANDING AND MUCH APPRECIATED TIES OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, SHE ALSO HAD SIMILAR TIES WITH ARGENTINA. FURTHERMORE, WITH ARGENTINA URUGUAY HAD CERTAIN SPECIAL LIMITS. HE THEREFORE HOPED FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THAT WE WOULD NOT PUT FORWARD REQUESTS TO WHICH IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT TO ACCEDE. (HE WAS OF COURSE REFERRING TO POTENTIAL REQUESTS FOR REFUELLING ETC).

3. IN RESPONSE TO MY ENQUIRY AS TO WHETHER THIS WAS THE POINT OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SECURITY COMMUNIQUE, HE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, BUT STRESSED THAT ARTICLE 3 REFERRED TO ARGENTINA AS WELL AS THE UK. ARTICLE 3 PREVENTED ANY URUGUAYAN OR URUGUAYAN ORGANISATION DOING ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT HELP THE QUOTE BELLICOSE PREPARATIONS UNQUOTE OF EITHER ONE COUNTRY OR THE OTHER.

4. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALSO SAID THAT THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT WAS ANXIOUS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO REMAIN EQUIDISTANT AS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT WISHED TO OFFER THEIR GOOD OFFICES IN ANY WAY THAT MIGHT BE OF ASSISTANCE, EITHER BY PROVIDING FACILITIES FOR MEETINGS IN URUGUAY OR IN SOME OTHER MANNER. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE ON HUMANITARIAN MATTERS SUCH AS FACILITATING THE TRANSIT OF FURTHER MARINES FROM THE FALKLANDS AND WITH REGARD TO MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN ARGENTINA WHO CAME OVER TO URUGUAY. HE EXPRESSED MUCH APPRECIATION OF THE MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 69.

5. WE AGREED TO MAINTAIN RETICENCE VIS A VIS THE MEDIA ABOUT OUR CONVERSATION.

6. THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR WAS SUMMONED AN HOUR EARLIER WHILE THE US AMBASSADOR WAS SEEING THE MINISTER IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY VISIT.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

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(28)

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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FM MONTEVIDEO 090130ZAPR 82

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 81 OF

09 APRIL 1982

YOUR TELNO 77 AND MY TELNO 78: ROYAL MARINES

1. THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT A FURTHER VC10 FLIGHT; HOWEVER
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID THAT THE URUGUAYANS STILL HAD NOT

RECEIVED ANY NEWS ABOUT A FURTHER PARTY OF ROYAL MARINES.

HUTCHINSON

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PS (6)
PS/LPS (3)
PS/ *McLuice*
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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FM TOKYO 090300Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 178 OF 09/4/82

AND REPEATED IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

M I P T: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

MS

1. I ALSO BRIEFED KATO ABOUT ACTIONS TAKEN BY OTHER COUNTRIES (SEE GUIDANCE TEL NOS 51 AND 52). I SAID THAT I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE ONLY ACTION SO FAR TAKEN BY JAPAN WAS TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE JAPANESE PRESS CONTINUED TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WERE TAKING A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE. I WAS MOST DISAPPOINTED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT EVEN SEEN THEIR WAY TO ISSUING A FORMAL STATEMENT CONDEMNING ARGENTINE ACTION AND REITERATING THE DEMAND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THE POSITIVE BRIEFING OF THE PRESS OF WHICH WE HAD BEEN TOLD YESTERDAY SEEMED TO HAVE HAD LITTLE OR NO EFFECT. KATO THEN COMPLAINED THAT THE BRITISH PRESS WERE SAYING THAT THE JAPANESE WERE BEING UNHELPFUL. THIS WAS NOT TRUE. THE JAPANESE WERE BEING COOPERATIVE AND WERE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING WHAT ACTION THEY COULD TAKE. I SAID THAT THE SOONER THEY MADE UP THEIR MINDS TO DO SOMETHING EFFECTIVE THE BETTER THE REACTION IN BRITAIN WOULD BE .

2. I CALLED ON INAYAMA, THE PRESIDENT OF KEIDANREN THIS MORNING AND SOUGHT THE SUPPORT OF JAPANESE ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS LEADERS FOR EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC ACTION AGAINST ARGENTINA. HE WAS SYMPATHETIC BUT NON-COMMITTAL.

CORTAZZI

NNNN

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(6)
PS/LPS (3)
PS/ *W. H. H. H. H.*
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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FM TOKYO 090250Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 9/4/82

AND REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 176:

1. I HAVE BRIEFED KATO DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU. HE HAD NOT HEARD OF KOHAPI'S SUGGESTION AND AGREED WITH ME THAT A JAPANESE OFFER TO MEDIATE WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY TO BE WELCOMED IN LONDON. THE JAPANESE SEEM TO BE PINNING THEIR HOPES ON SECRETARY HAIG'S MISSION. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY GUIDANCE ON THIS.

CORTAZZI

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

9
(28) Valid 8/4)

PS
PS/LPS
PS/
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
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FH TOKYO 090008Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O DESK BY 091000Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 176 OF 09/4/82

ANMPREPEATED IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 175: FALKLANDS.

SIR JULIAN RIDSDALE HAS BEEN APPROACHED BY KOHARA AIDE TO MR
ESAKI. KOHARA IS PEDDLING THE IDEA OF ESAKI BEING SENT
TO BUENOS AIRES, PERHAPS WITH SECRETARY HAIG, TO HELP IN MEDIATION.
I HAVE ASKED SIR JULIAN TO DISCOURAGE THIS IDEA. I HAVE WARNED
THE MINISTER IN THE U.S. EMBASSY THAT ANY SUCH SUGGESTION
WOULD IN MY VIEW BE ILL RECEIVED IN LONDON WHERE IT WOULD
BE SEEN AS PROVIDING AN EXCUSE FOR THE JATANESE TO CONTINUE TO
SIT ON THE FENCE.

CORTAZZI

IMMEDIATE

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PS/ Mr Luce
PS/LOPD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR UPE
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

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FM BANGKOK 090641Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 209 OF 9 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, MANILA, JAKARTA.


MY I.P.T.: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. ASA SARASIN, DIRECTOR-GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT MFA, GAVE ME BRIEF ADVANCE NOTICE BY TELEPHONE OF THE TERMS OF THIS STATEMENT. I TOLD HIM THAT, WHILE THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE STATEMENT WITH WHICH WE DISAGREED, WE HAD GREATLY HOPED THAT ALL OUR FRIENDS WOULD ISSUE A CLEAR CONDEMNATION OF THE ARGENTINE INVASION: I REFERRED HIM TO THE EXAMPLE OF SINGAPORE (SINGAPORE TEL NO 81, WHICH WE HAD DRAWN TO THE MFA'S ATTENTION ON 7 APRIL). I THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME DISAPPOINTMENT IN LONDON WITH THE TERMS OF THE THAI STATEMENT BUT THAT, SPEAKING FOR MYSELF, IT WAS CERTAINLY PREFERABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW FOR THE THAI GOVERNMENT TO ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT RATHER THAN NONE AT ALL.

... WAS CERTAINLY PREFERABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW FOR THE THAI GOVERNMENT TO ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT RATHER THAN NONE AT ALL.

- 2. ASA REPLIED THAT IN THE MFA THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF OUR FEELINGS FROM MY CALL ON THE MINISTER. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE HAD NOT FELT ABLE TO GO BEYOND THE TEXT HE HAD READ ME. THEY FELT THAT THE SITUATION WAS STILL FLUID, WITH THE PROSPECT OF A U.S. INITIATIVE, AND THEY HAD INDEED DECIDED TO ISSUE A STATEMENT AT ALL ONLY BECAUSE OF OUR LONG-STANDING FRIENDSHIP. AS FOR THE SINGAPORE EXAMPLE, THERE WAS THE COMMONWEALTH CONNEXION, WHICH DID NOT APPLY HERE, AND HE NOTED ALSO THAT SO FAR MALAYSIA AND THE OTHER ASEANS HAD ISSUED NOTHING.
- 3. I SAID THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT REMAINED THAT THE ARGENTINE INVASION WAS CONTRARY TO ALL RECOGNISED INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND DESERVED TO BE STRONGLY CONDEMNED. WE HAD HOPED FOR SUCH CONDEMNATION FROM OUR FRIENDS.

STAPLES



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS (38) (2)

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PJS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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DESKBY 090900Z

FM BANGKOK 090640Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 208 OF 9 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, MANILA, JAKARTA.

MY TELNO 206: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

THE THAI FOREIGN MINISTRY ISSUED A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS AT 1000 AM BRIEFING THIS MORNING. FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TEXT:

QUOTE

1. GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA ARE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THAILAND HAS LONG ENJOYED FRIENDLY RELATIONS.
2. THE THAI GOVERNMENT STRONGLY DEPLORES AND DISAPPROVES THE USE OF FORCE IN DISPUTES BETWEEN NATIONS, INCLUDING THE DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
3. THAILAND CALLS ON THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO MAKE ALL EFFORTS TO SEEK A SOLUTION BY A PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE, CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

UNQUOTE.

4. SEE ALSO MIFT.

STAPLES



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DESKBY 091130Z

FM SALISBURY 091020Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 204 OF 9 APRIL.

MY TELNO 201 : FALKLANDS.

1. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT
LAST NIGHT :

THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE APPEALS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA TO ABIDE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

IT URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO DESIST FROM THE USE OR
THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE AND ASKS THEM TO RESOLVE THE
CONFLICT PEACEFULLY BY NEGOTIATION OR THROUGH ARBITRATION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

BYATT

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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FM BONN 090845Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 313 OF 9 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK(SITCEN)BMG BERLIN EMBASSY BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS

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ADVANCE COPY

FALKANDS

1. HERR GENSCHER, WHO RETURNED FROM BRAZIL ON 7 APRIL, WAS BRIEFED BY HIS STAFF YESTERDAY ON THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. LIMMER (AUS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND HEAD OF THE FALKLANDS EMERGENCY UNIT) TOLD HEAD OF CHANCERY AFTERWARDS THAT GENSCHER WOULD BE RESTING OVER THE WEEK-END, BUT WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME AT 1130 ON 13 APRIL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SITUATION. ASKED IF GENSCHER HAD ANY ASPECTS PARTICULARLY IN MIND, LIMMER SAID HE THOUGHT GENSCHER WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ANYTHING I COULD TELL HIM ABOUT OUR THINKING AND OUR POLITICAL STRATEGY (SEE NEXT PARA). HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW IF THERE WAS ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE HIM TO SAY TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR WHEN HE SAW HIM LATER IN

HIM TO SAY TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR WHEN HE SAW HIM LATER IN THE WEEK. (THE AMBASSADOR, ROBERTO GUYER, FORMER SENIOR UN OFFICIAL IS AT PRESENT IN NEW YORK BUT EXPECTED BACK HERE NEXT WEEK).

2. HUNTER EXPRESSED OUR APPRECIATION OF THE FEDERAL CABINET'S STATEMENT OF 7 APRIL, AND THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN, LIMMER SAID IT HAD BEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S INSTINCTIVE REACTION TO SUPPORT A MAJOR PARTNER AND ALLY WHICH WAS ALSO A PROTECTING POWER IN BERLIN. BUT IT WOULD QUOTE ENLARGE THE BASIS FOR SOLIDARITY UNQUOTE IF WE WERE ABLE TO TAKE THEM MORE INTO OUR CONFIDENCE ABOUT HOW WE INTENDED TO PLAY OUR HAND.

3. LIMMER FULLY AGREED THAT FAILURE TO REACT FIRMLY TO THE ARGENTINE INVASION WOULD MERELY HAVE ENCOURAGED OTHER SIMILAR ACTS OF AGGRESSION ELSEWHERE. BUT THE GERMANS WERE CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT COME TO A SHOOTING MATCH, AMONG OTHER THINGS BECAUSE THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT ONCE THE SHOOTING BEGAN WE SHOULD LOSE MUCH OF OUR PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY IN THE THIRD WORLD BUT ALSO ELSEWHERE.

4. THE GERMANS HAD DECIDED NOT (NOT) TO WITHDRAW THEIR AMBASSADOR FROM BUENOS AIRES FOLLOWING, CLAIMED LIMMER, THE EXAMPLES OF FRANCE, ITALY AND THE NETHERLANDS. UNLIKE THE OTHER MEASURES WE HAD SUGGESTED, WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE REMOVED A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITHOUT AFFECTING ARGENTINA'S WAR CAPABILITY.

5. GRATEFUL TO KNOW BY 130700Z WHAT YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO SAY TO GENSCHER. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTY IN INFORMING EVEN OUR ALLIES OF OUR INTENTIONS, AND THAT AS FAR AS THE MILITARY SITUATION IS CONCERNED YOU MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PERMIT ME TO SAY MORE THAN WHAT IS CONTAINED IN YOUR TEL 115 TO UKDEL NATO. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MORE WE CAN TAKE GENSCHER INTO OUR CONFIDENCE, THE BETTER THE CHANCES OF KEEPING THE GERMANS ON BOARD.

TAYLOR

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 100026Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 436 DATED 9 APRIL 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS GENEVA, UKDEL NATO, DUBLIN,
PARIS, BONN, MODUK SITCEN

FALKLAND ISLANDS AT THE UN

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET MORNING AND AFTERNOON TODAY (9 APRIL) TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION ON THE THREE ANC CONVICTS (REPORTED SEPARATELY). JUST BEFORE THE AFTERNOON MEETING, ROCA (ARGENTINA) DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT A LETTER (TEXT BY FACSIMILE TO EMERGENCY UNIT AND WILLIAMS (UND)) CONTAINING THE TEXTS OF OUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE AND OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES TO THE EFFECT THAT OUR "BLOCKADE" IS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 3(C) OF GAR 3314 (XXIX) (THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION). ROCA MERELY ASKED FOR HIS LETTER TO BE CIRCULATED AND MADE NO MENTION OF A MEETING.

2. ROCA'S LETTER PROMPTED THE PRESIDENT (KAMANDA, ZAIRE) TO CONVENE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AFTER THE PROCEEDINGS ON SOUTH AFRICA WERE CONCLUDED. BEFORE THESE

2. ROCA'S LETTER PROMPTED THE PRESIDENT TO CONVENE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AFTER THE PROCEEDINGS ON SOUTH AFRICA WERE CONCLUDED. BEFORE THESE CONSULTATIONS, I GAVE HIM OUR LETTER ABOUT THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE (YOUR TELNO 240, AS AMENDED IN TELECONS ANDERSON/WILLIAMS). IT WILL BE CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT.

3. BEFORE THE CONSULTATIONS BEGAN, DORR (IRELAND) WAS SPREADING THE VIEW THAT HAIG'S MISSION TO LONDON AND BA WAS UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED, THAT HOSTILITIES MIGHT BEGIN AS SOON AS MONDAY AND THAT THERE COULD THEREFORE BE A VERY BRIEF INTERVAL IN WHICH IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACT. DORR FOUND A READY AUDIENCE IN DE PINIES (SPAIN), NISIBORI (JAPAN) AND AHMED (SECRETARIAT). URQUHART AND I ARGUED STRONGLY THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACT. URQUHART HAD EARLIER TOLD US THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AFTER SIR A PARSONS HAD DONE SO (YOUR TELNO 241). PEREZ DE CUELLAR REMAINED PERSUADED THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR HIM TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AT THIS STAGE, BUT HAD MORE OR LESS MADE UP HIS MIND TO RETURN TO NEW YORK ON 13 APRIL, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE IMMINENT THREAT OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON.

4. AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, KAMANDA SAID THAT HE WAS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE TWO PARTIES. HE HAD RECEIVED LETTERS FROM THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF. THESE WOULD BE TRANSLATED AND DISTRIBUTED. HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE "GOOD OFFICES" OF SECRETARY HAIG, TO WHOM HE WISHED EVERY SUCCESS. IF THERE WERE ANY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE WEEKEND HE WOULD CONTACT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. OVINIKOV (USSR), WHO WAS STILL SMARTING FROM A BRISK EXCHANGE WITH LICHENSTEIN (US) IN THE OPEN COUNCIL, SAID THAT A FEW DAYS EARLIER THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD ADOPTED A RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY THE UK WHOSE FIRST OPERATIVE PARA DEMANDED THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. WHAT WERE THE UK'S INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THIS PARAGRAPH? I SAID THAT THE UK'S POSITION WAS VERY SIMPLE. THE COUNCIL HAD ADOPTED A MANDATORY RESOLUTION WITH THREE OPERATIVE PARAS. THE UK WAS AWAITING IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THREE OF THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IF THE SECOND WAS IMPLEMENTED, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT THE OTHER TWO. THE PROCEEDINGS WERE THEN CLOSED BY KAMANDA WITH AN APPEAL FOR MAXIMUM RESTRAINT.

5. WE HAVE REPORTED THE ABOVE BY TELEPHONE TO SIR A PARSONS AND AGREED WITH HIM THAT, UNLESS THERE ARE UNTOWARD DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE WEEKEND, HE WILL NOT RETURN TO NEW YORK UNTIL THE 10.30 AM CONCORDE ON 12 APRIL. WE HAVE ALSO AGREED WITH HIM THAT COUNCILLOR CHEEK AND HIS COMPANION (TELECONS GOULDING/WILLIAMS) SHOULD NOT COME TO NEW YORK UNTIL THERE IS A DEFINITE

10.30 AM CONCORDE ON 12 APRIL. WE HAVE ALSO AGREED WITH
THAT COUNCILLOR CHEEK AND HIS COMPANION (TELECONS GOULDING/
WILLIAMS) SHOULD NOT COME TO NEW YORK UNTIL THERE IS A DEFINITE
DATE FOR A FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

6. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS WILL BE UNAVOIDABLE
NEXT WEEK, I THINK THAT THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE LIES IN OUR
GETTING IN AN EARLY REBUTTAL OF THE ARGENTINE CHARGE OF
AGGRESSION. IF YOU PLAN TO REPLY TO THEM VIA THE SWISS IN BA,
WE COULD HAVE YOUR REPLY CIRCULATED AS A DOCUMENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. ALTERNATIVELY, I COULD WRITE TO THE PRESIDENT
MAKING THE POINTS THAT:

- A) ARTICLE 3 (C) OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION REFERS TO THE
BLOCKADE OF THE COAST OF STATE A BY THE ARMED FORCES OF STATE
B WHEREAS OUR ZONE SURROUNDS BRITISH TERRITORY:
- B) RESOLUTION 502 CHARACTERISES THE ARGENTINE ATTACK AS AN
INVASION WHICH ARTICLE 3(A) DEFINES AS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION.

THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE DRAWN THAT ONLY ARGENTINA HAD COMMITTED
AN ACT OF AGGRESSION.

WHYTE

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PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/PUS
 MR DAY *Sir J Lealy*
 MR WRIGHT
 SIR L ALLINSON
 MR ADAMS
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/S AF D
 HD/C AF D
 HD/UND
 HD/DEFENCE D
 MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
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FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 092322Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 435 OF 9 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN ROUTINE WASHINGTON PARIS

INFO SAVING MOSCOW.

MIPT: CONDEMNED ANC MEMBERS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF S C RESOLUTION 503/1982

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING RESOLUTION 473 (1980) AND ITS STATEMENT OF 5 FEBRUARY 1981 (S/14361) REGARDING THE DEATH SENTENCES PASSED BY THE TRANSVAAL DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN PRETORIA ON NEIMBITI JOHNSON LUBISI, PETRUS TSEPO MASHIGO AND NAPHTALI MANANA, THREE MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICA,

GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER THE CONFIRMATION OF THE DEATH SENTENCES BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL ON 7 APRIL 1982,

DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE CARRYING OUT OF THE DEATH SENTENCES WOULD FURTHER AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA,

1. CALLS UPON THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES TO COMMUTE THE DEATH SENTENCES:

2. URGES ALL STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE AND TO TAKE URGENT MEASURES IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO SAVE THE LIVES OF THESE THREE MEN.

FCO PASS SAVING MOSCOW

WHYTE

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

~~MR DAY~~ *SM J Leahy*

MR WRIGHT

SIR L ALLINSON

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

HD/S AF D

HD/C AF D

HD/UND

HD/DEFENCE D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

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FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 100010Z APRIL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 434 OF 9 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN ROUTINE WASHINGTON PARIS

INFO SAVING MOSCOW.

YOUR TELNO 239: CONDEMNED ANC MEMBERS.

SUMMARY.

1. THE TEXT IN MIFT WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY ON 9 APRIL AS SCR 503. PROCEEDINGS WERE PROLONGED BY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE AFRICAN GROUP AND THE AMERICANS AND THE LATTER'S NEED TO REFER TO WASHINGTON. THERE WAS ALSO A BRIEF EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR, POLAND AND ELSEWHERE. BUT THERE WAS LESS HEAT THAN ON THE LAST TWO SIMILAR OCCASIONS. WE WERE ABLE TO REMAIN IN CLOSE ACCORD WITH THE AFRICANS.

DETAIL.

2. IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE MORNING OF 9 APRIL OTUNNU (UGANDA) INTRODUCED A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON BEHALF OF THE AFRICAN GROUP. HE SAID THAT THE AFRICAN GROUP WANTED SWIFT, NARROWLY FOCUSED HUMANITARIAN ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL; THE DRAFT CONTAINED NO POLITICAL OR CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENTS. AS THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THIS CASE IN FEBRUARY 1981, A RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE A GREATER IMPACT NOW THAT THE JUDICIAL PROCESSES IN SOUTH AFRICA HAD COME TO AN END.

3. ALL DELEGATIONS EXCEPT THE US EXPRESSED BROAD SUPPORT FOR
AND FOR HAVING A RESOLUTION.

CONTAINED NO POLITICAL OR CONTROVERSIAL ELEMENTS. AS THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THIS CASE IN FEBRUARY 1981, A RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE A GREATER IMPACT NOW THAT THE JUDICIAL PROCESSES IN SOUTH AFRICA HAD COME TO AN END.

3. ALL DELEGATIONS EXCEPT THE US EXPRESSED BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE AFRICAN GROUP'S OBJECTIVE, AND FOR HAVING A RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, IT WAS AGREED THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE DRAFT SHOULD BE DROPPED IN ORDER TO SECURE RAPID ACCEPTANCE BY THE COUNCIL, AND TO AVOID DAMAGING THE RESOLUTION'S CHANCE OF INFLUENCING THE SOUTH AFRICANS. THE CHANGES INCLUDED THE DELETION OF A CALL FOR THE RELEASE OF THE THREE ANC MEMBERS, AND OF A REFERENCE TO THEM AS "PATRIOTS".

4. THE PRESIDENT (KAMANDA, ZAIRE) THEN PROPOSED AN IMMEDIATE FORMAL MEETING TO ADOPT THE AMENDED DRAFT. THE US INSISTED (TO THE EXPRESS ANNOYANCE OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS) ON A THREE HOUR SUSPENSION TO OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS. FOLLOWING THE SUSPENSION, THEY SUBMITTED AN AMENDED FORM OF OPERATIVE PARA 2 INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS WAS OPPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND AFTER FURTHER NEGOTIATION, THE FINAL TEXT EVOLVED.

5. DURING THE FORMAL PROCEEDINGS, ONLY UGANDA (BRIEFLY INTRODUCING THE RESOLUTION) SPOKE BEFORE THE VOTE. KAMANDA (ZAIRE) SPOKE BRIEFLY AFTER THE VOTE AND WAS ABOUT TO CLOSE THE MEETING WHEN LICHENSTEIN (USA) ASKED FOR THE FLOOR. HE SAID THAT THE US WAS CONTINUOUSLY CONCERNED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA, AS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. FOUR PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE NOW ON HUNGER STRIKE IN MOSCOW; THE PEOPLES OF POLAND, AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA HAD BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS. IT WAS THE US UNDERSTANDING THAT THE "OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS" TO WHICH THE RESOLUTION REFERRED INCLUDED THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

6. THIS PROVOKED A RIPOSTE FROM OVINNIKOV (USSR), WHO CLAIMED THAT IN FEBRUARY 1981 THE US HAD ASKED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE JURIDICAL SYSTEM OF APARTHEID. OVINNIKOV DENOUNCED THE AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO SET THE PRESENT RESOLUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS RATHER THAN OF THE LEGITIMATE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID; THE US WAS GROWING PROGRESSIVELY CLOSER TO THE APARTHEID REGIME. AFTER A FURTHER BRIEF INTERJECTION OF LICHENSTEIN, WYZNER (POLAND) REJECTED AS UNFOUNDED THE US REFERENCE TO THE SITUATION IN HIS COUNTRY.

FCO PASS SAVING MOSCOW.

WHYTE

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(Crown F. Isles, dist. authority E.R.)

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FM BERNE 092030Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 41 OF 09 APRIL

FOR FALKLANDS ISLANDS EMERGENCY UNIT (DEFENCE)

HEAD OF FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION OF SWISS MFA HAS INFORMED US THAT A PRESS REPORT EXISTS WHICH STATES THAT 22 ROYAL MARINES ARE AT PRESENT ON BOARD THE ARGENTINE SHIP QUOTE BAHIA PARAISO UNQUOTE.

LEE

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/LOPD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

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MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

Ltd Bridges
H. C. G. *H. O. G.*

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I) *H. Finance*

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Mo. Corcoran 10/4

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 39 OF 09 APRIL

MY TELNO 37

BRITISH INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA

FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF THE SECOND SWISS NOTE.
BEGINS QUOTE.

THE FDFA HAS THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT TO HBM EMBASSY THE FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS PUT BY THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE SWISS EMBASSY
IN BUENOS AIRES.

1. PROPERTIES HIRED BY BRITISH DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. A) SHOULD THE
LEASES BE BROKEN SEMI COLON (B) IF YES, SHOULD THE FORCE MAJEURE
CLAUSE BE INVOKED OR THE DIPLOMATIC CLAUSE OF ONE MONTH
CONTAINED IN EACH LEASE?

ACCORDING TO OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUES ALL LEASES HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED
SUBJECT TO KEY MONEY OF AT LEAST TWO MONTHS RENT. WE SUGGEST
INVOKING THE DIPLOMATIC CLAUSE.

2. PROPERTIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE ASK YOUR AGREEMENT
THAT THE FLATS AND ONE RESIDENCE WHICH ARE UNOCCUPIED SHOULD
BE OCCUPIED FOR REASONS OF SECURITY BY SWISS OR BRITISH OFFICIALS.

mo

THAT THE FLATS AND ONE RESIDENCE WHICH ARE UNOCCUPIED SHOULD BE OCCUPIED FOR REASONS OF SECURITY BY SWISS OR BRITISH OFFICIALS. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR WILL BE OCCUPIED FROM THE END OF THE WEEK BY DAVID JOY. THE SECOND RESIDENCE IS UNDER REPAIR AND ACCORDING TO OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUES IS NOT HABITABLE.

3. PRIVATE CARS OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY STAFF. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK THE FCO FOR THE AGREEMENT OF ITS OFFICERS FOR THE SALE OF THEIR CARS OR ANY OTHER INSTRUCTIONS, SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE ARGENTINE MFA WHICH WE WOULD SEEK.

THE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE EMBASSY WOULD LET IT KNOW THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REPLY TO THESE QUESTIONS.

UNQUOTE

ENDS.

LEE

RNNN

SENT AT RECD AT 092023Z TWPM

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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Valid 8/4)

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MR GIFFARD
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MR URE
MR GILLMORE

*Labridges
HAE*

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office
Mr Fuller SAPU

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RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

No Counter 10/4

RESTRICTED

FM BERNE 091800Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 37 OF 9 APRIL

BRITISH INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA

MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS CONTAIN OUR TRANSLATIONS OF TWO NOTES DATED 9 APRIL HANDED TO ME BY GHISLER, HEAD OF FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION IN THE SWISS FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. COPIES OF THE NOTES FOLLOW BY BAG.

2. GHISLER SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE PARTIAL INFORMATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE RATHER THAN WAITING UNTIL WE WERE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE COMPLETE REPLIES.

LEE

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[TYPISTS]

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
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MR MCINTYRE
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Kiss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

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Mr. Wade-Gery, Cabinet Office
Mr Fuller - SAPU, Cabinet Office

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IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

MF

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERNE 091340Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 35 OF 09 APRIL

FCO TELNO 50 TO ABIDJAN

MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE

PARA 3 OF TUR

SWISS CONFIRM ARGENTINIAN MFA INFORMED AT 1400 HRS ARGENTINE
TIME ON 08 APRIL.

LEE

LEE

SENT AT RECD AT 09.358Z TWPM

NOTE FOR COMMS THE ABOVE HAS ALREADY BEEN PASSED OVER PHONE

TO RESIDENT CLERK

THIS IS CONFIRMING TELEX TANKS

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PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
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Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En
DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade - Geny Cab. Office
Mr Fuller SAPU

RESIDENT CLERK

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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 100055Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 1225 OF 9 APRIL
INFO ASCENSION (FOR ADMINISTRATOR)

MY TELNO 1204: USE OF US FACILITIES ON ASCENSION ISLAND

EAGLEBURGER TOLD MINISTER THIS EVENING THAT THE US WANTED TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE OVER OUR REQUESTS. BUT, EVEN WITH DETAILS BEING HANDLED ON THE SPOT, IT WOULD HELP STATE DEPARTMENT TO HAVE AS CLEAR AN IDEA AS POSSIBLE OF WHAT WE WANTED FROM THEM AND TO DISTINGUISH CLEARLY BETWEEN STEPS BEING TAKEN BY US (OF WHICH WE WERE SIMPLY INFORMING THEM) AND REQUESTS FOR THEIR HELP AND FACILITIES. FOR EXAMPLE DID WE WANT 24 HOUR AIR CONTROL FACILITIES STRAIGHT AWAY AND DID WE REQUIRE THE US TO PROVIDE ALL THE ADDITIONAL AIR CONTROLLERS MENTIONED IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TELNO 680 ? WHEN WE TALKED OF LOCATING VARIOUS COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES ON THE ISLAND AND A MET FACILITY, DID WE NEED ANYTHING FROM THE US EXCEPT THEIR AGREEMENT ?

2. WE ARE SORRY TO MAKE HEAVY WEATHER OF THIS BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT FAIRLY DETAILED DECISIONS ARE BEING TAKEN IN WASHINGTON AND IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO HELP STATE DEPARTMENT, WHO WANT TO BE COOPERATIVE.

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

9/28) SR x Valid 8/4)
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PS
PS/LPS
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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PJS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

* for typists
18-10X

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

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HD/HKGD

Kiss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

Mrs. Fuller S.A.D.
Cabinet Office

RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 092325Z APR 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1220 OF 9 APRIL

MY TELNO 1176 : FALKLAND ISLANDS : POSSIBLE VISIT BY U S OFFICIAL TO PORT STANLEY

1. A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL HAS TOLD US THAT THE DEPARTMENT ARE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM CONGRESS AND FROM FAMILIES TO SEND A CONSULAR OFFICIAL TO PORT STANLEY TO INVESTIGATE THE WELL BEING OF U S CITIZENS THERE, WHO APPARENTLY NUMBER 40 OR MORE. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT SOME HAVE NOT BEEN FREE TO LEAVE THE FALKLANDS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE ARGENTINE DOCUMENTATION.
2. IN ORDER TO GET TO PORT STANLEY IN THE NEAR FUTURE THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO SEND SOMEONE FROM THEIR EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES AND HE WOULD HAVE TO TRAVEL BY ARGENTINE MILITARY AIRCRAFT. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE SAME STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT THE U S EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES FOR PERMISSION TO GO. THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT RESPONDED.
3. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE HINTED THAT, IF THE ARGENTINIANS GIVE PERMISSION FOR AN OFFICIAL TO BE SENT, THEY WILL PROBABLY GO AHEAD. WE SUGGESTED TO THEM THAT A PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO SEEK THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE ICRC BUT STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT CONGRESS WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED UNLESS AN ATTEMPT HAD BEEN MADE TO SEND A

3. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE HINTED THAT, IF THE ARGENTINIANS GIVE PERMISSION FOR AN OFFICIAL TO BE SENT, THEY WILL PROBABLY GO AHEAD. WE SUGGESTED TO THEM THAT A PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO SEE THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE ICRC BUT STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT CONGRESS WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED UNLESS AN ATTEMPT HAD BEEN MADE TO SEND A CONSULAR OFFICER. WE DREW STATE DEPARTMENTS ATTENTION TO OUR ADVICE AGAINST ANY TRAVEL TO THE FALKLANDS AT PRESENT AND TO THE RISK THAT THEIR PROPOSED ACTION COULD BE EXPLOITED BY ARGENTINA AND EXPRESSED THE STRONG HOPE THAT THEY WOULD REFLECT FURTHER ABOUT THIS.

HENDERSON

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(28) 36x Valid 8/4)

PS
PS/LPS
PS/
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PJS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

** for typists
- 1820X*

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

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HD/HKGD

Kiss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

*Mrs Fuller SA/0
Cabinet Office*

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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FM WASHINGTON 092320Z APR 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1219 OF 9 APRIL
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK AND BIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1192: FALKLANDS

1. PARA 4. WE SPOKE TO THE PENTAGON THIS MORNING ABOUT THE REPORT BY ONE WASHINGTON POST CORRESPONDENT QUOTING UNIDENTIFIED U S SOURCES AS SUGGESTING THAT WE MIGHT NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO SUSTAIN A NAVAL BLOCKADE. WE POINTED OUT THE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS IMPRESSION THIS COULD GIVE THE ARGENTINIANS. THE PENTAGON SAID THAT THIS CAME FROM NO OFFICIAL SOURCE AND HAD THEMSELVES ALREADY BEEN TAKING ACTION TO CORRECT ANY SUCH IMPRESSION. THIS HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN SUBSEQUENT AGENCY REPORTS QUOTING U S NAVAL SOURCES AS SUGGESTING THAT AN EFFECTIVE BLOCKADE CERTAINLY CAN BE IMPOSED AND DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE FULL RANGE OF OUR NAVAL CAPABILITIES.

2. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO KAY GRAHAM ABOUT THIS REPORT.

HENDERSON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(2) (2x) (x42) Valid 8/4
PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS
PS/LPS
PS/*Mr. Luce*
PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
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RESIDENT CLERK

* For Typists - 12erox

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE
H.M.Tsy

Kiss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

Mrs. Fuller SAPO
Cabinet Office

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FM WASHINGTON 092109Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1218 OF 9 APRIL

INFO BIS NEW YORK

TRAVEL TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. WE LEARNED TODAY THAT AN ABC TV TEAM WAS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE HAVE STRONGLY ADVISED ABC AGAINST TRAVEL TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BUT THEY WILL PROBABLY GO ANYWAY. THE MINISTER HAS SPOKEN TO HOLMES (STATE DEPARTMENT). THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT, IF ASKED, THEY WILL ADVISE JOURNALISTS AGAINST TRAVEL TO THE FALKLANDS.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TODAY PUBLICLY ADVISED U S CITIZENS TO KEEP AWAY FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS UNLESS THEY HAVE VERY COMPELLING REASONS TO BE THERE. THEY HAVE ALSO ISSUED A WARNING TO U S SHIPPING TO KEEP OUT OF THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE.

HENDERSON

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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Valid 8/4)

PS
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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

~~Mr Giffard~~
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PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En
DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery
Mr Fuller SAPU
Cable Office

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FM WASHINGTON 091855Z APR 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1216 OF 9 APRIL

FALKLANDS: CALL BY ARGENTINE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER

1. ADOLFO PEREZ ESQUIVEL, WINNER OF THE 1980 NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING AT HIS REQUEST. HE EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS CALLING ON ME AS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IN NO SENSE REPRESENTED THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. ESQUIVEL, WHO HAD ALREADY SENT TELEGRAMS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE QUEEN CALLING FOR NON-USE OF FORCE AND FOR NEGOTIATIONS, SAID THAT HE SUPPORTED ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BUT WAS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE BY THE JUNTA TO IMPLEMENT IT. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOW AVOID THE USE OF FORCE AND START NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE FURTHER BLOOD WAS SHED, WITH INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES TO BOTH COUNTRIES AND FOR THE REGION.

2. I SAID THAT WE HAD NEGOTIATED SERIOUSLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND WERE STILL PREPARED TO DO SO. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT, HOWEVER, WAS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MANDATORY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES. THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLANDS HAD LIVED THERE IN PEACE FOR OVER 150 YEARS. THEY HAD EVERY RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE AND COULD NOT BE FORCED AGAINST THEIR WILL TO SUBMIT TO THE ARGENTINE DICTATORSHIP.

3. ESQUIVEL SAID THAT HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO BUENOS AIRES ON MONDAY 12 APRIL, AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH POLITICAL LEADERS AND OTHERS. IF HE WISHED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN, HE WOULD DO SO THROUGH THE SWISS EMBASSY.

3. ESQUIVEL SAID THAT HE WOULD BE RETURNING TO BUENOS AIRES ON MONDAY 12 APRIL, AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH POLITICAL LEADERS AND OTHERS. IF HE WISHED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN, HE WOULD DO SO THROUGH THE SWISS EMBASSY.

4. ESQUIVEL IS OF COURSE NO FRIEND OF THE JUNTA AND WILL CARRY NO WEIGHT WITH THEM. I HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT HE WILL AT LEAST TAKE BACK TO ARGENTINA A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE FIRMNESS OF OUR POSITION.

HENDERSON

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

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HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/HKGD

Handwritten initials: XMAS, HANAY

Handwritten notes: Mr Wade Gery Cab Office, Mr Fuller SHPU

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff. MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WASHINGTON 091850Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1215 OF 9 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA

Handwritten initials: MS.

FALKLANDS: ARGENTINE APPROACH TO CANADIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON.

1. MINISTER AT THE CANADIAN EMBASSY TELEPHONED THOMAS LAST NIGHT TO REPORT THAT THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAD CALLED YESTERDAY ON GOTLIEB (CANADIAN AMBASSADOR HERE) ON INSTRUCTIONS. THE OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE WAS TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSIONS EARLIER IN THE WEEK BETWEEN COSTA MENDEZ AND HAIG. BUT THERE SEEMED TO BE MORE TO IT THAN THAT. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SAW THEIR POSITION IN THE BEST LIGHT THEY COULD MANAGE, AND LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY LOOKED ON CANADA AS A POSSIBLE PARTICIPANT IN SOME EVENTUAL SOLUTION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROBLEM.

2. THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR APPARENTLY TOOK A STUDIEDLY MODERATE LINE, EMPHASIZING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT RECOGNISED THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE UK AND THAT EVERYTHING WAS NEGOTIABLE EXCEPT THE SOVEREIGNTY ITSELF. HE CLAIMED THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD DISCUSSED WITH HAIG HOW TO QUOTE FINESSE UNQUOTE THE ARGENTINE FORMULA ON SOVEREIGNTY. THE MAIN POINT OF INTEREST WHICH SEEMED TO EMERGE WAS THAT ACCORDING TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR (FOR WHAT THAT MAY BE WORTH) ALTHOUGH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ADMIT THAT SOVEREIGNTY WAS NEGOTIABLE, IT NEED NOT BE IMMEDIATE QUOTE IN ITS CONCRETE EXERCISE UNQUOTE.

QUOTE IN ITS CONCRETE EXERCISE UNQUOTE.

3. HE EVIDENTLY WENT OVER A NUMBER OF IDEAS FOR INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN THE ISLANDS (EG A HEMISPHERIC TEAM CONSISTING OF TWO HISPANICS, A CANADIAN, AND AN AMERICAN; OR A JOINT UK/ARGENTINE TEAM).

4. IN AMONG A GOOD DEAL OF FLANNEL, THE ARGENTINIAN ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE SAID THAT ONE THING HIS GOVERNMENT WAS THINKING OF WAS THAT WHILE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS WERE TAKING PLACE, SOME KIND OF HOLDING ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE INVOLVING WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS WHILE THE BRITISH FLEET STOOD OFF THE ISLANDS.

5. GOTLIEB APPEARS TO HAVE GIVEN A FIRM ACCOUNT OF THE CANADIAN POSITION, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO LOOK AT ANY IDEAS FOR MEDIATION UNTIL THE BRITISH WERE READY AND THAT THIS WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE UNTIL THE ARGENTINE TROOPS HAD WITHDRAWN. GOTLIEB WAS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE UNDERLINED HIS ABSOLUTE BELIEF IN THE BRITISH RESOLVE TO CARRY THE THING THROUGH.

HENDERSON

NNNN



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR DEREK RAYNER

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you very warmly for your minute of 7 April.

She was very grateful to have the encouragement of you and your staff at this difficult time.

KWW.

8 April 1982

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SUBJECT.



file 2

✓. Master act.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

8 April, 1982.

Dear Brian,

Falkland Islands

I attach a copy of the record of the discussion during the dinner which the Prime Minister gave for Secretary Haig and his party at 1930 this evening.

The British side briefly reviewed the discussion at dinner after the Americans had left, and the Prime Minister invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to set in hand work on the way in which we would want an Argentinian withdrawal from the islands to be organised and supervised, if such a withdrawal could be secured.

I am sending copies of this letter and of the record to David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

+ Wade-Gary (cc)

Yours ever,

Alvi Whitmore.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A DISCUSSION OVER DINNER ON THURSDAY, 8 APRIL, 1982, AT
10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister	The Hon. Alexander M. Haig
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	The Hon. Edward J. Streator
Secretary of State for Defence	General Vernon Walters
Chief of Defence Staff	The Hon. Thomas O. Enders
Sir Antony Acland	Mr. James Rentschler
Mr. Clive Whitmore	Mr. David Gompert

Mr. Haig said that one of the Argentinian motives for their invasion of the Falkland Islands was to divert public attention from Argentina's present internal problems.

Mr. Enders added that in terms of resources relative to population, Argentina was one of the most favourably placed countries in the world. Yet, there was no growth and no dynamism in their economy. Their foreign borrowing was very heavy. But they could feed themselves, and somehow the economy got by.

Sir Antony Acland said that the Argentines did seem to be beginning to understand how strong was the public and Parliamentary reaction in Britain against the invasion. Our Ambassador to the Argentine who had just returned from Buenos Aires, had previously taken the view that the Argentines might resort to military aggression later this year. He had not anticipated an invasion now.

The Prime Minister added that the last round of talks between Britain and the Argentine on the Falklands had been described as "cordial and positive" in the communique which had been agreed by the two sides. But the communique had never been issued because it had been disowned in Buenos Aires.

/ Mr. Enders

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Mr. Enders said that Mr. Luce had telephoned him to say that he had been concerned about the way things had been developing after the talks in New York. General Walters added that the fact that the communique had not been published by the Argentinians should have been a warning sign. But we all have to concentrate our intelligence efforts on the areas vital to us, and we had to decide where our priorities lay. No western country, not even the United States, had the resources, especially the human resources, to cover all the danger areas. Britain and America had not devoted many human or technical resources to Southern Argentina.

Mr. Haig said that Sir Nicholas Henderson had given him a compendium of British intelligence on the Falklands, and this was much better than anything which the United States had compiled. The American analysis had said that they already had all the different pieces of intelligence which Sir Nicholas Henderson had provided, but they had not put it together to make the whole picture. Detailed planning for the invasion must have been going on for at least 3 weeks before Sir Nicholas Henderson's digest had been assembled.

The Chief of the Defence Staff said that Argentinian contingency planning for the invasion of the Falkland Islands had been in existence for years, and had been regularly exercised in the past.

General Walters said that in most situations the intelligence was there: what was critical was whether the analysis was applied to it, and whether that analysis was of the right quality.

Turning to the future, the Prime Minister said that British Sovereignty over the Falkland Islands continued in being. It had not been lost because of the Argentinian invasion. The sequence of steps towards a solution which we could accept began with the withdrawal of all Argentinian forces from the Falkland Islands. Thereafter British Administration had to be restored. And only after that could we negotiate. The result of any negotiations about

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- 3 -

the future of the islands had to be acceptable to the islanders. Their wishes had to be paramount, as they always had been in the past. If the British Government tried to introduce a solution which was unacceptable to the islanders, it would fall.

Mr. Haig said that it was fundamental to the American approach to the problem that the British Government should not fall. That was why he was here in London. The Americans believed, however, that there had to be a change in the approach to the problem, though without any change of principle. Neither side could hope to secure the totality of what it wanted. A solution had to be devised which recognised that fact, but equally it had to be a solution which did not depart from fundamental principles. The Americans envisaged a three part process. First, the Argentinian forces would withdraw from the Falkland Islands. Then, the local administration of the islands would be returned as nearly as possible to the status quo ante. Finally, there would have to be a negotiating process between Britain and the Argentine. This negotiation would have to be consistent with the right of the islanders to self-determination. The Americans believed that if this three part process was to have any hope of acceptance by the Argentine, it would be necessary for a group of third party countries, such as the United States, Canada and one or two other Latin American countries, to be involved in it. "They would provide a bona fide of internationally recognised objectivity that could help the negotiating framework."

The Prime Minister said that if British Administration was not restored following the pledges which the Government had given in the House of Commons over the last few days, Ministers would face a Motion of Censure. A fundamental principle for us was that the Argentine should not obtain by force what it could not obtain without use of force. The British Government had not sent the naval task force in order to give up that principle.

The Defence Secretary said that the British position was strong. We did not need to keep many naval units off the Falkland Islands to make life intolerable for the Argentines. They would have to

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sustain through the coming winter an authority in the islands which had no food, little water and poor accommodation. He did not believe that an unstable dictatorship could survive that kind of pressure. It was Argentina who had changed the status quo in the Falkland Islands, and perhaps, for that reason, it should be they who first came forward with proposals for solving the problem which they had created.

The Prime Minister reiterated that British Administration had to be restored. We could then negotiate in the light of the islanders' wishes. She acknowledged ^{that} ~~after~~ what had happened over the last few days the course of any negotiations might be different from those which had been held in the past. Following the invasion, the islanders were bound to think much more carefully about what the longer term future might hold for them, even if the Argentinian force withdrew. Many of them might now believe that they would do better to leave the islands and make their lives elsewhere.

Mr. Haig said that he was prepared to go to Buenos Aires and convince the Argentinians that the British Government meant business and that in the long run the Argentine Government would not survive the pressure which Britain would bring to bear. He was ready to tell the Argentinians that they had to give him proposals which he could take back to London. He was convinced that a solution had to be found, for otherwise where would we be if it came to a war.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he did not believe that what Mr. Haig was proposing included the restoration of British Administration to which the Government was pledged. He understood Mr. Haig's solution to fall into three stages. First, the Argentinian forces would withdraw. Second, British Administration returned, but there would be, in addition, an international body which would be an indication to the Argentines that negotiations of the kind previously held would be resumed. Third, the right of the islanders to determine their own future would be upheld and given practical expression. These three points were all ones to which the Government had committed itself in the House of Commons. He doubted whether the Argentine would accept an attempt by Britain to

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restore the situation to precisely what it had been before the invasion.

The Prime Minister said that she did not understand the nature of the second stage of the American proposal. The restoration of British Administration must mean the return of British law, British courts, and so on. She did not see what part an international group could play in this situation.

The Defence Secretary said that he shared the Prime Minister's doubts. British sovereignty already existed. It was a fact, and for the purpose of finding a solution it could be left on one side. We would all agree on the necessity of an Argentinian withdrawal, the restoration of British Administration, and the right of the islanders to self-determination. What he could not understand was what the proposed international group would do.

Mr. Haig said that the United States had no detailed formula worked out. Senor Costa Mendes had shown in conversations in Washington a willingness to let an autonomous Government remain in the hands of the islanders. This provided ground for possible solutions which would have to contain a face-saving device for Argentina. There was a need to get back into negotiations on the perennial issues which had been discussed by both Argentina and Britain. This would not preclude the islanders from self-determination. The group from third party countries would provide an internationally recognised umbrella, which would prevent a war, safeguard the islanders, ensure the preservation of their traditions and their laws, and give international credibility to the agreed solution.

The Prime Minister said that she still did not understand what Mr. Haig was proposing. Once the Argentinian forces had gone, she saw no other way of providing for settled Administration and the rule of law except by the British Government carrying out these functions. Were the Americans saying that we would have to convince international opinion that any test of the islanders' wishes for the future had been properly carried out. That she could accept, but she still did not understand what the status and function of the international group would be.

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Mr. Haig said that he was seeking an arrangement which had "certain constructive ambiguities", but provided no real departure from the standards of administration which would essentially be what they had always been. The laws and rules of the islands would be administered on a day to day basis as they always had been. Negotiations on sovereignty and self-determination were for the future. What we were trying to do immediately was to stop a war. This meant that the question of withdrawal and administration had to be sorted out first. The Argentine had made a dreadful mistake in invading the islands, and he thought that they now knew it. If we can stop the conflict, he believed the problem would go away for 30 years.

The Prime Minister said that as she understood what Mr. Haig was proposing, she did not believe that she could take such a scheme to the House of Commons. But she would like to try again to be absolutely clear what he had in mind. She understood him to be proposing first, that all Argentinian forces would withdraw. Second, British Administration would return to the islands. Then, at a later date, an international group would supervise a test of opinion among the islanders about their future. They could choose to remain British, or become Argentinian, or become independent.

Mr. Haig said that this was not precisely what he was proposing. He did not believe that what the Prime Minister had set out would be acceptable to the Argentine. He thought that he could sell to them a solution on the following lines. First, there would be a withdrawal of Argentinian forces. Then, as regards the Administration, status quo ante would be restored in the islands. This process would need to be guaranteed because in due course it would lead to negotiations. So an international group would be needed. Its first task would be to supervise the Argentinian withdrawal.

The Prime Minister said that this proposal did not ensure the return of British Administration to which the British Government was pledged. Once that had been done, we could see what the islanders' wishes were: indeed, the British Government was pledged to regard their wishes as paramount. We would honour whatever decision the islanders made about their future.

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Mr. Haig said no. As he had explained already, the international group would supervise the withdrawal of Argentinian forces. Then it would provide a vehicle to get the local administration back, as nearly as possible, to the status quo ante. Finally, there would be a framework for negotiations between Britain and Argentina within which the issues which had been the subject of previous negotiations could be discussed.

The Prime Minister said that if, following the restoration of British Administration, the islanders were allowed to exercise their right of self-determination, negotiations would not be needed. The islanders would make it clear that they wished to stay British, and such an outcome would be unacceptable to the Argentine.

The Defence Secretary said that in order to avoid another conflict, it was possible that the islanders would choose a future status which was in some way more favourable to Argentina than the kind of thing they would have chosen before the invasion.

The Prime Minister said that the involvement of the international group would be acceptable to Britain if their function was to supervise the Argentinian withdrawal, the restoration of British Administration, and the test of self-determination for the islanders. But she did not believe that the Argentine would accept a scheme on those lines. Mr. Haig agreed.

Sir Antony Acland said that the Americans seemed to be suggesting the involvement of an internationally acceptable presence in addition to the restoration of British Administration. Such a group would give an international guarantee of the rights of the islanders in addition to their British guarantee. But he did not see that this really added very much to what Britain could already do.

Mr. Nott pointed out that the issues they had been discussing could apply only to the Falkland Islands themselves, and not to the dependencies. It was not for the islanders to determine what happened to the dependencies.

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The Prime Minister said that if the islanders decided to stay British, Argentina would not accept it. So the implication was that the Falkland Islands would have to accept something they did not want. The choice for them would be some form of Argentinian yoke, or departure from the islands. Mr. Haig said that he did not disagree with this assessment. But he was trying to find a way of stopping further conflict. He did not want a situation to arise where the United States could be accused of having failed to seize an opportunity to resolve the problem. The very fact that the United States were ready to volunteer to be a member of the proposed international group showed how important they thought this issue. The scheme would engage the United States in the Falkland Islands in a way in which they had not been engaged before. They would be sharing the burden with the United Kingdom. He would like to go over again the American concept. The international group would supervise the Argentinian withdrawal. British Administration would be restored for an interim period. There would be an agreement between Britain and the Argentine to resume prompt negotiations on the future status of the islands. This agreement would contain language referring to the provisions of the United Nations Charter on self-determination. It was quite possible that the third stage would go on without ever reaching a conclusion, and if this happened, the second stage - the resumption of British Administration - would continue indefinitely in parallel. Such an arrangement would give Britain virtually what existed before the invasion. It might make it saleable to the Argentine if they had an observer in the international group, but he was not optimistic about persuading the Argentine to accept anything.

The Prime Minister said that she could not accept the suggestion that the Argentine should be represented with an observer in any international group. Nor could there be equality of treatment between the Argentine and Britain, since the Argentine was the aggressor.

/ Mr. Enders

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Mr. Enders said that there would need to be some form of liaison between Argentine and the international group, if only because the group would be supervising Argentinian withdrawal.

Mr. Haig said that the British and Americans were agreed on the first stage - withdrawal - and the third stage - the resumption of negotiations between Britain and Argentina where they had left off. What they had not settled upon was what happened between these two stages - the restoration of British Administration and the part to be played in that stage by the international group.

The Prime Minister said that she hoped that Mr. Haig would now go to Buenos Aires to assess the Argentinian position. In dealing with the Press both sides should say that they were fully agreed that UN Resolution 502 should be implemented as quickly as possible. They had discussed how the United States could help in the process. Mr. Haig had heard the British view of the situation in the Falkland Islands, and he now knew how strongly the British felt about the matter. He should not give any impression that the British position had changed in any way or that the British were showing any flexibility. If asked about a possible return to London after his visit to Buenos Aires, he should say that it was too early to say. Mr. Haig agreed to deal with the Press along the lines proposed by the Prime Minister.

The dinner ended at 2300.

CW

8 April, 1982.

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c.c. J. Bullard, FCO.

R. Wade-Gery, CO.



Handwritten initials 'AL' and a red vertical line.

SUBJECT.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 April 1982

ck. master set.

Dear Francis,

FALKLAND ISLANDS: VISIT OF US SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Haig called on the Prime Minister at 7.00 p.m. today. I enclose a record of the conversation. This should not be copied beyond Private Offices and senior officials with an operational need to know.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours
Francis

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AT 7.00 P.M.
THURSDAY 8 APRIL 1982

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Haig for his visit to London. She described the background to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. The intelligence which we had received last Wednesday of an imminent invasion had, she believed, been as much a surprise to the United States as to us. Mr. Haig said that the Americans had been even more surprised than we. The Prime Minister expressed gratitude for the quick action taken by President Reagan. We had thought that his representations to the Argentine/^{Government}would succeed and were surprised when he was rebuffed.

The Prime Minister said that she wished to explain clearly the mood in Britain. We were deeply wounded that our sovereign territory had been invaded. The only desire of the Falkland Islanders was to be British. There was great anguish that we had been unable to defend them. The House of Commons' debate last Saturday had been the most difficult Parliamentary session she had seen. The charge had been made that the Government had betrayed and humiliated the Falkland Islanders and the nation. Calm could not be expected in these circumstances. If the Government had not been able to announce in that debate that the fleet was to sail, the position could probably not have been held. Feelings ran the more strongly because of the nature of the Argentine regime. A further debate yesterday had been more sombre but there was full support for the action the Government were now taking. We wanted a diplomatic solution. We did not wish to use the fleet. But there was total determination that a dictator should not be appeased. If strength was the only language the Argentine regime understood, it would have to be exercised.

We had been careful, for example in our announcement of an exclusion zone, to observe international law scrupulously.

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We had been greatly heartened by the support received from others. President Mitterrand and Chancellor Schmidt had expressed full understanding. The German Chancellor agreed with us that unless this act of unprovoked aggression was reversed, the consequences could be most dangerous for other areas of tension. It was essential that somebody said "enough". Our Community partners were taking practical action. Firm support had been received from Commonwealth countries. It was impossible to be neutral as between unprovoked aggression and a people who just wished to live their lives in their own way. Mr. Haig agreed that neutrality was an impossible position.

The Prime Minister said that we should now have to make our decisions day by day. We hoped for a diplomatic solution. There was no question of negotiation until Argentina withdrew its forces. Their act of aggression did not change the status of the Falkland Islands which remained British Sovereign territory under law. We could not negotiate under duress. We had been rather disturbed by President Reagan's reference to friendship with both the United Kingdom and Argentina, though we understood that this was an "off the cuff" remark. We had always tried to support the United States. We were grateful for the co-operation they were giving over the use of Ascension Island and on intelligence matters.

Mr. Haig said that the Prime Minister would well know where the President really stood. The United States was not impartial. But it had to be cautious about its profile, though not with respect to the violation of international law nor with respect to UN Security Council Resolution 502. On arrival at the airport he had said that he was working for the implementation of that Resolution which required Argentine withdrawal and a diplomatic solution. Wherever international law was violated by an aggressor, whether in Afghanistan, Poland or the Falkland Islands, the principle was the same. The Reagan Administration had had fifteen months' experience

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of Britain's support and the personal backing of the Prime Minister. Whenever the Americans had sought our understanding, we had backed them, sometimes at political risk for ourselves. We now faced a critical, common problem. The United States wished to do everything possible to strengthen the British Government in this hour of trial.

They had analysed the situation carefully. They had had no better intelligence than we had about the invasion. They had been following the South Georgia incident but not with unusual concern. When the invasion was imminent, the United States Ambassador in Buenos Aires had sought an urgent appointment but the Argentines had delayed him until 2 p.m. in the afternoon. His representations having been ineffective, President Reagan had decided to telephone Galtieri. For two-and-a-half hours the latter would not take the call. He had then said that he would be available in fifteen minutes. Later the Argentine Foreign Minister had claimed that the reason for the delay was that it had taken President Galtieri two-and-a-half hours to find out whether it was possible to reverse the military operation. Mr. Haig said that this explanation was "hogwash".

The Americans were watching the situation in Argentina carefully. The Argentines had at first been convinced that the use of force would go unchallenged. Now they had been shocked by the British reaction. Despite their claims to the contrary, they had sought a Soviet veto in the Security Council but failed to get one. We needed to be careful about the Soviet posture. It was clear that doubts were growing in Buenos Aires and that Galtieri's position was in jeopardy. If he fell, his successor would be more intransigent. The Argentine Foreign Minister had recently said that he was prepared to negotiate about everything except sovereignty. Mr. Haig had replied that negotiations were not possible in circumstances where by force the Argentines had brought about a situation which they had been unable to obtain by negotiation.

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He was not prepared to go to Buenos Aires if this kind of language would be used when he arrived. After consultation with his capital, the Argentine Foreign Minister had said that his Government wished Haig to come. Mr. Haig had made it plain that America would only become involved if it was fully understood that they could not accept a change in the status quo brought about by force.

The Argentine character had to be understood. They were less than rational but their greatest subjective fear was that they would appear cowardly. The "macho" instinct would soon develop. For the moment there was a window for negotiation. Now was the optimum time to hold rational discussions with Galtieri. But the agreed American assessment was that when our fleet reached the fiftieth parallel, this would change. The OAS would adopt an anti-colonial stance, whatever the real feelings of the states concerned. This would develop with every passing hour.

The Argentine Foreign Minister had recently said that he saw two options, resort either to the OAS or the Soviet Union. He claimed that they would accept Soviet assistance. Mr. Haig did not wish to overdramatise this point, but neither of us could be comfortable about the prospect. Once the danger of conflict became imminent, the moment for negotiation would have passed. In the United Kingdom, the greater the expenditure of resources, the more difficult the situation would become. He judged that the next 72 hours were the optimum time for negotiation as far as the Argentine was concerned.

He wanted to visit Britain first because we were America's closest friend and ally. He did not wish to go to Buenos Aires without a fundamental understanding of the limits of our possibilities for negotiation, and he wished to be able to portray accurately the vigour of the British approach. It was

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in the American interest that the British Government should succeed in its policies and become stronger. The Reagan Administration agreed with the Government's philosophy. The Prime Minister said that the issue went wider than the United Kingdom. It mattered to Germany because of Berlin, to France because of some of its colonial possessions, to the Caribbean because of the Guyana/Venezuelan dispute. We had experienced before the danger of appeasing dictators. With regard to Mr. Haig's reference to the Soviet Union, she suspected that the Russians feared American involvement as much as the Americans feared the reverse. The West might be stretched, but so were the Soviet Union. She would be surprised if they intervened actively, though they would doubtless fishⁱⁿ/troubled waters.

Mr. Haig said that he believed we could succeed in military terms, at least for a limited period. The Argentines had told him that their fleet would go into port and stay there. The Prime Minister said that we believed that the Argentines had used the negotiations earlier this year simply as a cover for their military preparations. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it appeared that the Galtieri regime had been carried away by emotion.

The Prime Minister asked what pressure the Americans could bring upon Galtieri. The reputation of the Western world was at stake. We wished to solve the matter by diplomatic means, but we would not negotiate under duress - withdrawal was a prior condition. Mr. Haig said that he knew Galtieri well. He was very religious and went to Mass every day. He also drank, perhaps too often and too early. He was tough and saw himself as a man of principle and strength. He was also a poker player who doubled when he lost. He would up the ante if he decided force was inevitable. The United Kingdom could damage the Argentine fleet severely and could blockade the Islands fairly easily. But a landing on the Falklands would be very costly and would put the population in jeopardy. It would be very difficult at this time of the year and in high seas. The problems and burden would grow. Questions and

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doubts would appear in the United Kingdom. American opinion was now much in favour of our principled stance. But he was not sure this would last long - he remembered Vietnam.

He thought it necessary to consider some device which reinforced our position, and would strengthen us in our aims. The Prime Minister said that withdrawal must come first. Mr. Haig suggested that the question was how to obtain withdrawal. Some device was necessary so that the Argentines could claim that they had not lost face totally. Something which looked like less than a total victory for us was desirable. There were three issues - withdrawal, administration and future status, but the sovereignty issue was not America's business. The Prime Minister commented that Britain was sovereign in the Falkland Islands. They were British by law and were free a week ago. Mr. Haig said that it was important to avoid a priori judgements about sovereignty. We might envisage a different character of regime. The Prime Minister said that this was very dangerous ground with British public opinion. The Islanders were British by choice and by allegiance. We had negotiated for fifteen years, but had always said that the wishes of the Islanders must be paramount - surely that principle appealed to American opinion. British public opinion would not accept what Mr. Haig was suggesting. Withdrawal must come first. Later it might be possible to resume earlier talks. Mr. Haig commented that this solution would require force. The Prime Minister replied that force had already been used. Further force would be a great tragedy. Our soldiers would be vulnerable. But so would theirs. The Argentines had forced dictatorship on a people who would not be subjugated. Mr. Haig hinted again at a different form of administration. The Prime Minister stated that we were pledged to restore British administration. Mr. Haig suggested that some kind of American or perhaps Canadian presence might be possible while negotiations continued. The Prime Minister reiterated that we were pledged to the House of Commons to restore British administration. What he was suggesting violated the principle that the Argentines

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could not be allowed to achieve by force what they had not been able to achieve without force. Mr. Haig said that he was merely suggesting that some kind of temporary arrangement should be applied. The Prime Minister said that this would mean that the Argentines had gained from the use of force. Mr. Haig said that he saw things differently. They would be asked to withdraw and agree to a new arrangement involving longer negotiations and ^{an} administration which should guarantee the freedom and sovereignty of the Falkland Islanders while those negotiations continued. The longer-term future of the islands would depend on the resumption of the earlier negotiations. The Prime Minister said that we had to be guided by the wishes of the Islanders. Earlier schemes had foundered because the Islanders turned them down. Only when the Argentine force had withdrawn and British administration had returned, could we reopen negotiations. These might conceivably take a different course than previously. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether Mr. Haig envisaged the preservation of the rights of the Islanders. Mr. Haig said that he did. But if we insisted on withdrawal and the return to the status quo ante, conflict was inevitable. The Prime Minister said that the implication of this was that the Russians could move into Berlin and other countries could take similar action. What kind of signal was this to give to the Soviet Union? Mr. Haig said that he accepted that point. But if our principles were preserved and an interim arrangement was made for an authority on the Islands in which the United Kingdom participated, progress could be made. The Prime Minister said that she could not go back to the House of Commons with such a solution. We were pledged to restore British administration. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked whether the conclusion of the process which Mr. Haig had in mind would be the return of British administration. Mr. Haig said that he believed that the ultimate solution would depend on resuming the earlier negotiations. Leasing had been mentioned at an earlier stage. He believed that that was now unacceptable in the wake of the use of force.

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He said that we must consider where we were going if we did not find a solution and conflict developed. The Prime Minister said that conflict had occurred. It had started with the Argentine invasion. She did not want force to be used, but we had to insist on withdrawal and the restoration of British administration. Mr. Streeter asked whether, if British administration were restored, it could be combined with some kind of international presence, for example from the United States or another country. This would serve as an earnest of our intention to continue negotiations. He did not think this would be an invidious device. The Prime Minister reiterated that British Sovereignty must continue and our administration be restored. Then there could be negotiations in order to make certain that the wishes of the Islanders were paramount. If they wished to continue under British Sovereignty, that was surely unexceptionable.

The discussion ended at 1920 hours, but continued over dinner.

A. J. C.

8 April 1982

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PART 4 ends:-

Sue Goodchild to AJC + act of 8/4/82.

PART 5 begins:-

AJC to FEO + act of 8/4/82.

