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806

PREM 19/6/17

Relations with Argentina.

ARGENTINA.

The position of the Falkland Islands.

Part 5: April 1982

PART 6

Part 6: April 1982.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
13-4-82.							
<u>ENDS</u>							
PREM 19/6/7							

PART 6 ends:-

MODUR Tel 2022 ¹⁵ ~~14/4~~

PART 7 begins:-

Canberra Tel 155 14/4

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 14 April 1982,
Volume 21, No. 97 (complete)

Signed AWayland Date 23 February 2012

PREM Records Team



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>617</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>MOD INTSUM No. 22 as at 15 April 1982</i>	
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54250 P70

54250 COALTE G

CAN YOU PLEASE CONNECT ME TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY
CENT STANLEY NO 218

TKU ON PLLSE

218 FALKISCO FK
54250 COALTE G

MR HARRY MILNE 14TH APRIL 1982

DEAR HARRY,

1. MANAGED TO HEAR FIRST ONE AND A HALF HOURS OF DEBATE IN
PARLIAMENT. MOST EMPHASIS IS ON:
 - A. THE FREELY EXPRESSED WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS BEING
C/PARAMOUNT.
 - B. EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL CONCLUSION.
2. WILL TRY TO KEEP YOU POSTED.
2. YOUR ANSWERS ON COMMODITIES AND PROPOSED VISIT PARTICULARLY
REASSURING.
3. INFORMATION ON LEAVERS INTERESTING. COMMENTS REGARDING
OUR CONTRACT STAFF MOST HELPFUL. APPRECIATE
COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED BUT IT REALLY IS MOST HELPFUL TO
HAVE SOME INDICATION OF REACTIONS IN STANLEY.
4. GREAT FOR ME ALSO. GREATLY APPRECIATE OUR ABILITY TO
KEEP IN TOUCH.
5. WILL USE WHAT INFLUENCE I HAVE IN RIGHT DIRECTION. FULLY
UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT TENSION DURING WAITING.
HOPES HAVE TO BE PINNED ON RESTRAINT AND AMERICAN EFFORTS
AT PRESENT. COMPLETELY APPRECIATE THE FEELING EXPRESSED
REGARDING OPEN WARFARE. FOR NOW, I RETAIN FAITH IN
COMMON-SENSE. YOUR VIEWS ARE WHAT MATTERS.
6. SAD TO SEE OPERATIONS SO BADLY AFFECTED, APART FROM THE
STORES - AND PRESUMABLY THE SHEEP - BUT THAT IS NOT
IMPORTANT AS LONG AS YOU ALL REMAIN SAFE AND WELL.
7. RELIEVED TO KNOW THAT COM. BLOOMER-REEVE NOW INDICATING
UNLIKELY TO REQUISITION MONSUNEN, WHICH WILL BE AN EVEN
GREATER RELIEF TO CREW.

ANY IMMEDIATE QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS?

BEST WISHES.

TEG.

19446 90
54250 COALTE G

HELLO ONE MO

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PARLIAMENT. MOST EMPHASIS IS ON:

A. THE FREELY EXPRESSED WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS BEING
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BEST WISHES.

END.

'9446 90

24250 COALTE G

HELLO ONE KU

WE WILL REPLY SHORTLY AND CALL BACK BIBI

FINEK MOO //

FINE, MORE BLACK COFFEE

24250 COALTE G

218 PALRISCO FR CEN/BS 6.25 PM

COALITE
CAN YOU PLEASE CONTACT ME TO THE FALKLAND ISLAND
COMPANY FORT STARLEY NO 218

MO
54250 COALTE G
MOWHO ARE YOU PSE
COALITE GROUP PLC MR NEEDHAM

MOMPSE
218 FALKISCO FK
54250 COALTE G

*Seen
1.50 pm
Wed 14/4/82*

MR HARRY MILNE 14TH APRIL 1982

DEAR HARRY,

HEARD ON RADIO THAT ABOUT 35 PEOPLE ON THEIR WAY TO U.K.

1. CAN YOU TELL ME WHO THEY ARE?
2. ANY OF OUR PEOPLE?
3. IS ANYBODY FREE TO LEAVE?

I REGARD MY PRIME RESPONSIBILITY AS BEING TO YOU, OUR
EMPLOYEES AND FAMILIES, AND AM ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT YOU
WOULD ALL WISH ME TO BE DOING IN THE WAY OF INSTRUCTIONS
THERE AND REPRESENTATIONS HERE. WITH LIMITATIONS ON
COMMUNICATION, I CAN ONLY GUESS. PREPARED TO TRAVEL
ANYWHERE AND MEET ANYONE TO FIND OUT. ANY SUGGESTIONS?

HOPE THESE QUESTIONS CAUSE YOU NO UNDUE PROBLEMS.
EMPHASIZE THAT THEY ARE RAISED ON A PURELY PERSONAL
BASIS AND WITHOUT CONSULTING ANYBODY. INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS CANNOT BE MY CONCERN. I SIMPLY WANT TO
HELP IF POSSIBLE TOWARDS A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION SOON
AND WITHOUT BLOODSHED.

LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR REPLY.

BEST WISHES

TED.

P.S. SORRY TO HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT MAURICE WALDRON,
WHO WAS SO WELL LOVED ON THE ISLANDS, DIED SUDDENLY
YESTERDAY.

REGARDS, TED.

GOOD MORNING

WE WILL RESPOND SHORTLY - TKS ALOT BIBI
GOOD MORNING TO YOU GLAD TO KNOW YOU RECEIVED THIS
OK -- WILL LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR REPLY BI BI

THIS IS AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ON SOME POINTS AND WILL
DEAL WITH OTHERS LATER.

DEAR
HARRY
THANKS FOR FULL LIST OF EXITS AND INDICATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES
OF LEAVING. OTHERS WHO HAVE ARRIVED HERE HAVE EXPRESSED
VIEWS ON YOUR BEHALF BUT IN AT LEAST ONE CASE HAS BEEN
DISCREDITED BY H.E. APPRECIATE POINT ON INDIVIDUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THESE PEOPLE AND SINCERELY HOPE IT HAS DONE
NOTHING TO DAMAGE MORALE .

YOUR POINT ABOUT HEROES REINFORCES IMPRESSION GAINED FROM YOUR
PREVIOUS COMMENTS AND FULLY UNDERSTOOD.

BEARING IN MIND THAT P.M. IS PERSONALLY HANDLING POLITICAL
NEGOTIATIONS, I DOUBT WHETHER SHE COULD BE PERSUADED TO
BROADCAST AT THIS STAGE BUT S/ WILL CERTAINLY PASS THAT
REQUEST FORWARD . PERSONALLY, I FEEL THAT YOU SHOULD NOT BE
TOO ANXIOUS AT THIS STAGE BUT WE NEED TO KEEP POSITION UNDER
CONSTANT REVIEW ACCORDING TO POLITICAL NEGOTIATION.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS FROM OTHER FARMS MOST HELPFUL .

GLAD TO SEE ADRIAN MONK , TERRY AND MANY OTHERS, INCLUDING
MNSR SPRAGGON ASCENDING// ARE SENDING THIS MESSAGE AND
THAT YOU HAVE COMMON VIEWS ~~THAT~~ TAKING YOUR NEXT
FOUR POINTS :

1. AGREED AND FULLY UNDERSTOOD. P.M. SAID SHE KNEW THAT IN
HER SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON . APPRECIATE NEED TO ALLOW FOR
EFFECTS OF CURRENT SITUATION . NO DOUBT YOU WISH TO REMAIN
UNDER PROPER CONDITIONS.

2. ONLY TOO DELIGHTED.

3. ALREADY ANSWERED.

4. I AGREE.

5. THIS ABILITY TO EXCHANGE IMMEDIATE VIEWS IS A GREAT COMFORT
AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED AND HOPE THAT IT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

I AM NOT SURE HOW TO DEAL WITH YOUR FINAL QUESTION OFF THE CUFF.
HAVE NO DOUBT YOU ARE NOT CONCERNED WITH THE SMALL TRANSACTIONS
INVOLVED IN STORE TRADING ETC. , SINCE YOU WILL KNOW HOW TO
HANDLE THOSE ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES. I WILL COME BACK ON
THIS QUESTION AFTER OUR PEOPLE HAVE ADVISED ME. PRESUMABLY NO
HURRY TIL TOMORROW.

KINDEST REGARDS TO YOU AND EVERYBODY WITH YOU.

SHALL I STAND BY?

I

THE LAST POINT I'D SAY IS NOT IMMEDIATE - HMM IS NOT HERE
AT PRESENT

ONE LAST IMPORTANT POINT HE SAID

PLS EXPRESS OUR DEEPEST REGRETS TO MRS WALDRON.

ONE C NO PLS

NO HMM SAYS NO NEED TO SA STANDBY.

IF THIS GOES ON MUCH LONGER HMM WILL FIT INTO A SQUASH BOTTLE
I THINK??

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I THINK??

REGARDS ROSEMARIE

THAT I HAVE TO SEE .
WILL RUN OUT OF COFFEE.
MRS WALDRON.

TELL HIM TO TAKE IT EASY OR HE
PLEASE TO SEND CONDOLENCES TO

SC?

THE ...

2151

OH HAVE A GOOD NIGHT

19-253 *

215 PALMISCO FK 7.10 PM GOODNIGHT, BETTY.

4250 COALTE G
4250 COALTE G
21B FALKISCO FK

14 APRIL 1982

DEAR TED,

REF EVACUATION.

IT APPEARS THAT CERTAIN CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE BEEN CREATING TO GET
GENERAL EVACUATION.

TO PUT YOU IN THE PICTURE THE FOLLOWING WERE INVOLVED:-

R LAMB - EX UK CHIEF POLICE OFFICER - NOW EXPELLED
H ROWLANDS - LOCAL - EX FINANCIAL SECRETARY
J FOWLER - EX UK. EX SUPT OF EDUCATION
DR D HAINES - EX UK - SENIOR MEDICAL OFFICER
P G SUMMERS - LOCAL - EX ASST CHIEF SECRETARY
R BROWNING - LOCAL - EX DEPUTY ASST CHIEF SECRETARY
L HALLIDAY - LOCAL - RETIRED BUT RE-EMPLOYED GOVT CLERK
D J SOLLIS - LOCAL - MASTER FORREST
G CHEEK - LOCAL - ACTING DIRECTOR CIVIL AVIATION
ALASTAIR GRIEVES - EX UK - GTU - NOW LEFT COLONY
ANN CHATER - EX UK - CAMP EDUCATION OFFICER
P WATTS - LOCAL - BROADCASTING
W ROBERTS - LOCAL - BROADCASTING

THESE PEOPLE HAD A MEETING AND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO OTHERS, TOOK
IT UPON THEMSELVES TO SPEAK FOR THE POPULATION.

WE HAVE NO TRULY LOCAL VOICE TO GUIDE THE PEOPLE AND MANY PRO-
FOUNDLY DISAGREE WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE ABOVE NAMED WHO ARE
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SMO, VIRTUALLY OUT OF THEIR JOBS.

WHILST MANY WOULD PREFER NOT TO BE HERO IF SHOOTING STARTS THEY
DO NOT WANT TO QUIT FOR GOOD.

PERHAPS YOU COULD USE YOUR GOOD OFFICES TO PERSUADE MRS THATCHER
TO BROADCAST TO THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLANDS, GIVING THEM GOOD
CHEER AND GUIDANCE.

FINALLY GOOSE GREEN, FITZROY, NORTH ARM AND MANY OTHER SECTIONS OF
CARPERBOKWANE TO STAND FIRM BUT THE MANAGER NORTH ARM (A COUNCILLOR)
CAMP ARE KNOWN TO STAND FIRM BUT THE MANAGER NORTH ARM (A COUNCILLOR)
APPERS TO WANT TO GET OUT.

THIS MESSAGE COMES TO YOU FROM ADRIAN MONK, TERRY, MYSELF AND
MANY OTHERS. MGR SPRAGGON JOINS US BUT IS TOO UPSET AND ANGRY
ABOUT THE FIRST NAMED 14 TO WRITE.

MANY THANKS YOUR LATEST.

1/ FREELY EXPRESSED WISHES OF ISLANDERS STATED MANY TIMES PRE-
VIOUSLY. CURRENT TENSION PRODUCES STRANGE REACTIONS.

2/ MAY SEND MESSAGES TO THIRD PARTIES. PLS PASS ON. THEY WILL
EXPLAIN.

3/ MAIN POINTS MRS THATCHERS SPEECH BROADCAST BY B B C WOULD
(WORLD NOT WOULD) SERVICE AT 1.00 PM LOCAL MOST ENCOURAGING.

4/ WE MUST JUST HAVE HOPE AND PATIENCE

BEING ABLE TO TALK TO YOU OVER TELEX IS PROVING GREAT BENEFIT
TO ALL

PETROL RATIONED - 10 LTRS VEHICLES / 2 LTRS MOTOR BIKES

CAN ACCEPT MONEY INTO FIC STANLEY AND YOU PAY CHEQUES INTO
ACCOUNTS IN ENGLAND. I UNDERSTAND THAT FUNDS IN
THE GOVERNMENT SAVINGS BANK ARE GUARANTEED BY THE BANK OF ENGLAND

KINDLY REGARDS HARRY

WED FOR PLS

LIVED ON NGH

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

To note.

ABR 14/4.

~~Mr~~ Cotes (No to Downing Street)

MS

You may wish to have this note. It provides further background on the subject of the note which we sent to you earlier today

Mr Fearn
Emergency Unit

RECOVERY OF BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY MEMBERS (BAS)
FROM SOUTH GEORGIA : SITREP 1030 14 APRIL

FCO Emergency Unit
14/4

1. At the time of the occupation of Grytviken, South Georgia, on 3 April, when 22 Royal Marines were removed by Argentine forces, BAS personnel were dispersed as follows:

13 at Grytviken

and, in separate
field parties

4 at Lyell Glacier Hut in
Cumberland West Bay

4 at Bird Island

2 at Schlieper Bay and

3, together with Misses Buxton and
Price, at St Andrews Bay

2. BAS HQ at Cambridge have regular radio contact via Bransfield with the four field parties and, as of 2200 hours on 12 April, all personnel were reported well and in good health. We have had no further information however on the whereabouts of the 22 marines or the 13 BAS personnel from Grytviken.

3. On 5 April, a telegram was sent to Buenos Aires requesting the Swiss to inform the Argentines of the disposition of all the above BAS personnel, suggesting that with winter closing in, three of the field parties would soon be at risk (although BAS HQ at Cambridge have in fact confirmed that they are quite safe for at least another month or two). They were asked to find out the Argentines' intentions and whether they had plans for taking them off the island and repatriating them. In the absence of any reply, and following the shut-down of communications at the Buenos Aires Embassy, a further telegram was sent

/on

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

7 April to Berne to ask the Swiss to follow up enquiries urgently in Buenos Aires. International Red Cross assistance had also been sought.

4. At 10.15 ^{today} Swiss Government confirmed to us that their Ambassador in Buenos Aires had again asked Argentines about whereabouts of BAS personnel. Argentines had replied that the BAS personnel ^{from Signy Island} (and the Royal Marines) were on board an Argentine warship. Argentines would not disclose her position. It is highly unlikely that the 13 BAS men ^{in the 4 field parties} and Misses Buxton and Price are, in fact, on the Argentine warship.

5. Ministry of Defence had concluded previously that there would be too great a risk in using Endurance for any evacuation operation and the owners of the BAS ship Bransfield (the Natural Environment Research Council) considered that she should not be used for fear of being taken hostage.

6. Communications with the separate field parties is being maintained through the British Antarctic Survey station at Signy Island in the South Orkney Islands and RRS Bransfield. Bransfield is due to make contact with BAS headquarters in Cambridge this evening after maintaining 48 hours of radio silence as she moves eastwards out of the Antarctic Treaty Area en route for the UK.

John Heap

Polar Regions Section
South America Department

14 April 1982

2425B COALTE G
21B FALKISCG FK

Received
about 2:45
14/4/82

14 APRIL 1982

DEAR TED,

MANY THANKS YOUR MESSAGES 13TH + 14TH.

1/ MY EARLIER MESSAGE REGARDING COMMODITIES SHOULD GIVE NO CAUSE FOR CONCERN. RECIPIENT WILL GIVE FULL REASONS.

2/ WE UNDERSTAND THAT BISHOP CUTTS AND A PARTY OF ANGLO-ARGENTINES PROPOSE VISITING ISLANDS TO EXPLAIN HOW PEOPLE CAN LIVE HAPPILY UNDER A MILITARY GOVERNMENT. FROM LOCAL COMMENTS SUCCESS OF THEIR MISSION RATED ZERO MINUS.

3/ REGARDING 35 PEOPLE - CHIEF SECRETARY AND FAMILY, W R LUXTON AND FAMILY, REMAINDER GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL. NONE OF OUR PEOPLE. ANYONE IS FREE TO LEAVE.

FTC CONTRACT STAFF SAY STAY PUT BUT IF OFFICIAL EVACUATION ORGANISED THEN NO POINT IN STAYING. WE CAN ONLY SPEAK FOR STANLEY AT PRESENT AS ONLY COMMUNICATION IS TELEPHONE ON EAST. WEST COMPLETELY CUT OFF AS RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PROHIBITED EXCEPT FOR MEDICAL.

4/ REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS TO US, IT IS GREAT TO BE ABLE TO CONSULT YOU WHEN THE NEED ARISES.

5/ REGARDING OTHER WAYS - SUGGEST CLOSE CONTACT WITH BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND KEEP US ADVISED. THE TENSION DURING THIS WAITING PERIOD IS VERY GREAT AND IS PRODUCING A FEELING THAT PEOPLE WOULD RATHER GET OUT THAN SEE OPEN WARFARE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THIS FEELING COULD OF, COURSE, CHANGE OVERNIGHT DEPENDING UPON THE PROGRESS OF THE TALKS.

COMPANY OPERATIONS EXCEPT FOR THE STORES ARE GRADUALLY GRINDING TO A HALT. THIS APPLIES BOTH TO STANLEY AND CAMP.

PLEASE ASK L O TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ON THEIR TELEPHONE LIST AND INFORM THAT ALL HERE STILL WELL AND SAFE.

HELEN + BOB WORMALD - SOUTHPORT (0704) 67540
FROM BROOK + EILEEN

FRED BETTS - NO. 1 DEVON CLOSE, CHANDLERS FORD EASTLEIGH SOTON
PHONE CHANDLERS FORD 63728
FROM GEORGE AND FAMILY

HOPE FOR BETTER NEWS AFTER PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.

CHINS STILL UP - PROBLEMS WITH BLOOD PRESSURE - BLACK COFFEE CONSUMPTION THROUGH THE ROOF.

REGARDS HARRY

PS

REFERENCE MONSUNEN - INDICATIONS ARE THAT ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES WILL REQUISITION VESSEL AS COMODORO BLOOMER-REEVE HAS JUST BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE MAKING ENQUIRIES AND STATED " WHEN WE REQUISITION " - WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

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REGARDS HARRY

PLS HAVE U RCD WELL

YES. RECEIVED MESSAGE WELL AND WILL PASS TO MR NEEDHAM IMMEDIATELY

BIBI FOR NOW

THS BIBI ROSEMARIE

10250 COALTE G
10 FALRISCO FK

54250 COALTE G
218 FALKISCO FK

14 APRIL 1982

3.30 pm
14/4/82

DEAR TED,

JUST HAD PHONE CALL FROM COM. BLOOMER-REEVE TO SAY THAT THEY DO NOT THINK THEY WILL NEED TO REQUISITION THE 'MONSUNEN' AT THE MOMENT.

KINDEST REGARDS,
HARRY

RCDJOK_PLS

MOMENT PSE

I WAS JUST MAKING A TAPE BUT WILL CME STRAIGHT THROUGHT WITH THE MESSAGE

DEAR HARRY,

HOPE YOU WILL EXCUSE ME FOR NOT GIVING A FULLER REPLY NCW. AM LISTENING TO PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. MEANTIME WILL HAVE MESSAGE PASSED AS REQUESTED AND THEN COME BACK AGAIN LATER.

REGARDS TED

YEA RCD FINE TKS

OK BI BI FOR NOW BETTY

54250 COALTE G
218 FALKISCO FK ___14TH APRIL 3.30 P.M.

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN THE
DEBATE ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

WEDNESDAY 14 APRIL

MR. SPEAKER,

IT IS RIGHT THAT AT THIS TIME OF GRAVE CONCERN OVER THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THEIR PEOPLE, PARLIAMENT SHOULD
BE RECALLED SO THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY REPORT
AND THE HOUSE MAY DISCUSS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

OUR OBJECTIVE, ENDORSED BY ALL SIDES OF THE HOUSE IN
RECENT DEBATES, IS THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS SHALL BE FREE TO DETERMINE THEIR
OWN WAY OF LIFE AND THEIR OWN FUTURE.
THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS MUST BE PARAMOUNT.
BUT THEY CANNOT BE FREELY EXPRESSED, LET ALONE
IMPLEMENTED, WHILE THE PRESENT ILLEGAL ARGENTINE
OCCUPATION CONTINUES.

/ THAT IS WHY

THAT IS WHY OUR IMMEDIATE GOAL IN RECENT DAYS HAS BEEN TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502 OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, AND TO SECURE THE RESTORATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.

OUR STRATEGY HAS BEEN BASED ON A COMBINATION OF DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES AND I WOULD LIKE TO DEAL WITH EACH OF THESE IN TURN.

/DIPLOMATIC

DIPLOMATIC

FIRST OF ALL WE SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS.

THIS TOO IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION.

IN THIS APPROACH WE HAVE BEEN HELPED BY THE WIDESPREAD
DISAPPROVAL OF THE USE OF FORCE WHICH THE ARGENTINE

AGGRESSION HAS AROUSED ACROSS THE WORLD.

AND ALSO BY THE TIRELESS EFFORTS OF SECRETARY
OF STATE HAIG WHO HAS NOW PAID TWO VISITS TO THIS
COUNTRY AND ONE TO BUENOS AIRES.

/ ON HIS FIRST VISIT

ON HIS FIRST VISIT LAST THURSDAY WE IMPRESSED UPON HIM THE GREAT DEPTH OF FEELING ON THIS ISSUE, NOT ONLY OF PARLIAMENT BUT OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE AS A WHOLE.

WE MAY NOT EXPRESS OUR VIEWS IN THE SAME WAY AS THE MASSES GATHERED IN BUENOS AIRES BUT WE FEEL THEM EVERY BIT AS STRONGLY.

INDEED, EVEN MORE PROFOUNDLY - BECAUSE BRITONS ARE INVOLVED. WE MADE CLEAR TO MR. HAIG THAT WITHDRAWAL OF THE INVADERS' TROOPS MUST COME FIRST; THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ISLANDS IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE ACT OF INVASION; AND THAT WHEN IT COMES TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS: WHAT MATTERS MOST IS WHAT THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS THEMSELVES WISH.

/ ON HIS SECOND

ON HIS SECOND VISIT ON EASTER MONDAY AND YESTERDAY, MR. HAIG
PUT FORWARD CERTAIN IDEAS AS A BASIS FOR
DISCUSSION, IDEAS CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL
OF TROOPS AND ITS SUPERVISION, AND AN INTERIM
PERIOD, DURING WHICH NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE
OF THE ISLANDS WOULD BE CONDUCTED.

OUR TALKS WERE LONG AND DETAILED AS THE HOUSE WOULD EXPECT.

SOME THINGS WE COULD NOT CONSIDER BECAUSE THEY
FLOUTED OUR BASIC PRINCIPLES.

OTHERS WE HAD TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY AND SUGGEST
ALTERNATIVES.

THE TALKS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE AND SOME PROGRESS
WAS MADE.

AT THE END OF MONDAY, MR. HAIG WAS PREPARED TO
RETURN TO BUENOS AIRES IN PURSUIT OF A PEACEFUL
/ SOLUTION. LATE THAT NIGHT

LATE THAT NIGHT HOWEVER ARGENTINA PUT FORWARD TO HIM OTHER PROPOSALS WHICH COULD NOT POSSIBLE HAVE ACCEPTED. BUT YESTERDAY, THE POSITION APPEARED TO HAVE EASED. FURTHER IDEAS ARE NOW BEING CONSIDERED AND SECRETARY HAIG HAS RETURNED TO WASHINGTON BEFORE PROCEEDING, HE HOPES SHORTLY, TO BUENOS AIRES. THAT MEETING, IN OUR VIEW, WILL BE CRUCIAL.

THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE COMPLEX, CHANGING AND DIFFICULT.

THE MORE SO BECAUSE THEY ARE TAKING PLACE BETWEEN A MILITARY JUNTA AND A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF A FREE PEOPLE - ONE WHICH IS NOT PREPARED TO COMPROMISE THAT DEMOCRACY AND THAT LIBERTY WHICH THE BRITISH FALKLAND ISLANDERS REGARD AS THEIR BIRTHRIGHT.

/ WE SEEK, AND

WE SEEK, AND SHALL CONTINUE TO SEEK, A
DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, AND THE HOUSE WILL
REALISE THAT IT WOULD JEOPARDISE THAT
AIM WERE I TO GIVE FURTHER DETAILS AT
THIS STAGE.

INDEED, SECRETARY HAIG HAS BEEN SCRUPULOUS
IN HIS ADHERENCE TO CONFIDENTIALITY IN
PURSUIT OF THE LARGER OBJECTIVE.

WE SHALL CONTINUE GENUINELY TO NEGOTIATE,
THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF MR. HAIG,
TO WHOSE SKILL AND PERSEVERANCE I PAY
WARM TRIBUTE.

/ MILITARY

MILITARY

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED IF THEY ARE
BACKED BY MILITARY STRENGTH.

At 5.00 A.M. LONDON TIME ON MONDAY 12 APRIL, THE
EXCLUSION ZONE OF 200 MILES AROUND THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS CAME INTO EFFECT.

FROM THAT TIME ANY ARGENTINE WARSHIPS AND ARGENTINE
NAVAL AUXILIARIES FOUND WITHIN THIS ZONE ARE TREATED
AS HOSTILE AND ARE LIABLE TO BE ATTACKED BY
BRITISH FORCES.

WE SEE THIS MEASURE AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS
ACHIEVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES

IT APPEARS TO HAVE EXERTED INFLUENCE ON
ARGENTINA WHOSE NAVY HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED OUTSIDE
THE ZONE.

/ IF OUR AUTHORITY

IF THE ZONE IS CHALLENGED, WE SHALL TAKE THAT AS
THE CLEAREST EVIDENCE THAT THE SEARCH
FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION HAS BEEN ABANDONED.
WE SHALL THEN TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION.
LET NO-ONE DOUBT THAT.

THE NAVAL TASK FORCE IS PROCEEDING WITH ALL SPEED TOWARDS
THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

IT IS A FORMIDABLE FORCE COMPRISING TWO
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, FIVE GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYERS,
SEVEN FRIGATES, AN ASSAULT SHIP WITH FIVE
LANDING SHIPS, TOGETHER WITH SUPPORTING
VESSELS.

/ THE COMPOSITION

THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH IT WAS ASSEMBLED AND PUT TO SEA CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE OUR DETERMINATION.

I CAN TELL THE HOUSE THAT MORALE ON BOARD THE SHIPS IN THE TASK FORCE IS VERY HIGH.

THE SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ARE CARRYING OUT EXERCISES ON PASSAGE AND BY THE TIME THE FORCE ARRIVES OFF THE FALKLANDS, IT WILL BE AT A VERY HIGH STATE OF FIGHTING EFFICIENCY.

A NUMBER OF CIVILIAN SHIPS HAVE NOW BEEN CHARTERED OR REQUISITIONED.

THESE INCLUDE THE CANBERRA FOR USE AS A TROOP SHIP, AND THE UGANDA WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE AS A HOSPITAL SHIP.

/ RECOURSE TO THE

RECOURSE TO THE MERCHANT MARINE IS TRADITIONAL
IN TIME OF NAVAL EMERGENCY AND THEIR RESPONSE
HAS BEEN WHOLEHEARTED ON THIS OCCASION AS IN
THE PAST.

MEN AND EQUIPMENT CONTINUE TO BE FLOWN OUT TO ASCENSION
ISLAND TO MEET UP WITH THE TASK FORCE.
THESE ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS WILL ENHANCE THE
FIGHTING CAPABILITY OF THE FORCE AND THE
RANGE OF OPERATIONS WHICH CAN BE UNDERTAKEN.
NIMROD MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT ARE NOW
PATROLLING THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IN SUPPORT OF
OUR FLEET.

/ SUSTAINING A MAJOR

SUSTAINING A SUBSTANTIAL FORCE 8000 MILES FROM THE UK
IS A CONSIDERABLE UNDERTAKING.

AS THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ANNOUNCED THIS
MORNING ADDITIONAL MEASURES ARE NOW IN HAND TO
PROVIDE EXTRA CAPABILITY FOR THE FORCE OVER AN
EXTENDED PERIOD.

IN PARTICULAR, THE SECOND ASSAULT SHIP,
HMS INTREPID, IS BEING RECOMMISSIONED FOR
OPERATIONAL SERVICE.

SHE WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ADD TO THE AMPHIBIOUS
CAPABILITY OF THE TASK FORCE NOW ENTERING THE
SOUTH ATLANTIC WHICH ALREADY CONTAINS HER SISTER
SHIP HMS FEARLESS.

ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN HAND TO ADAPT A LARGE CARGO
SHIP FOR THE SEA LIFT OF ADDITIONAL HARRIERS.

/ THIS WILL

THIS WILL NEARLY DOUBLE THE SIZE OF THE HARRIER
FORCE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

ALL THESE AIRCRAFT HAVE A FORMIDABLE AIR COMBAT
AND GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY.

OUR DIPLOMACY IS BACKED BY STRENGTH, AND WE HAVE
THE RESOLVE TO USE THAT STRENGTH IF NECESSARY.

/ ECONOMIC

ECONOMIC

THE THIRD ASPECT OF OUR PRESSURE AGAINST ARGENTINA
HAS BEEN ECONOMIC.

WE HAVE BEEN URGING OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES
TO TAKE ACTION PARALLEL TO OUR OWN.

WE HAVE ACHIEVED A HEARTENING DEGREE OF
SUCCESS.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT MEASURE HAS BEEN THE DECISION
OF OUR NINE PARTNERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
TO JOIN US NOT JUST IN AN ARMS EMBARGO BUT
ALSO IN STOPPING ALL IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA.

/THIS IS

THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT STEP, UNPRECEDENTED
IN ITS SCOPE AND THE RAPIDITY OF THE DECISION.
LAST YEAR ABOUT A-QUARTER OF ALL ARGENTINA'S
EXPORTS WENT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.
THE EFFECT ON ARGENTINA'S ECONOMY OF THIS
MEASURE WILL THEREFORE BE CONSIDERABLE AND
CANNOT BE WITHOUT INFLUENCE ON HER LEADERS
IN THE PRESENT CRISIS.

I SHOULD LIKE WARMLY TO THANK OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS
FOR RALLYING TO OUR SUPPORT.
IT WAS AN EFFECTIVE DEMONSTRATION OF
COMMUNITY-SOLIDARITY.

/THE DECISION

THE DECISION CANNOT HAVE BEEN EASY FOR OUR PARTNERS, GIVEN THE COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AT STAKE.

BUT THEY WERE THE FIRST TO REALISE THAT IF AGGRESSION WERE ALLOWED TO SUCCEED IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, IT WOULD BE ENCOURAGED THE WORLD OVER.

OTHER FRIENDS TOO HAVE BEEN QUICK TO HELP.

I SHOULD LIKE TO THANK AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND CANADA FOR THEIR STURDY AND SWIFT ACTION. THEY HAVE DECIDED TO BAN IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA, TO STOP EXPORT CREDITS AND TO HALT ALL SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

/ NEW ZEALAND

NEW ZEALAND HAS ALSO BANNED EXPORTS TO

ARGENTINA.

WE ARE GRATEFUL ALSO TO

MANY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH WHO

HAVE SUPPORTED US BY CONDEMNING THE ARGENTINE

INVASION.

ISOLATION OF ARGENTINA

WHAT HAVE THE ARGENTINES BEEN ABLE TO PRODUCE TO

BALANCE THIS SOLIDARITY IN SUPPORT OF OUR CAUSE?

COUNTRIES

SOME LATIN AMERICAN / HAVE OF COURSE REPEATED

THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO

SOVEREIGNTY.

WE ALWAYS KNEW THEY WOULD.

/BUT ONLY

BUT ONLY ONE OF THEM HAS SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE
INVASION AND NEARLY ALL HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR DIS-
AND DISAPPROVAL THAT ARGENTINA SHOULD HAVE
RESORTED TO AGGRESSION.

ALMOST THE ONLY COUNTRY WHOSE POSITION HAS BEEN SHIFTING
TOWARDS ARGENTINA IS THE SOVIET UNION.

WE CAN ONLY GUESS AT THE / ^{CYNICAL} CALCULATIONS WHICH
LIE BEHIND THIS MOVE.

BUT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA IS HARDLY
LIKELY TO SHAKE THE WORLD'S CONFIDENCE IN THE
JUSTICE OF OUR CAUSE AND WILL NOT ALTER OUR
DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES.

/ BRITISH SUBJECTS

BRITISH SUBJECTS

ONE OF OUR FIRST CONCERNS HAS BEEN AND REMAINS

THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH SUBJECTS WHO
HAVE BEEN CAUGHT UP IN THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE CRISIS.

THEY INCLUDE (APART FROM THE FALKLAND
ISLANDERS THEMSELVES) THE MARINES AND
THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY SCIENTISTS
ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE BRITISH COMMUNITY
IN ARGENTINA.

/ IN SPITE

IN SPITE OF ALL OUR EFFORTS WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE

TO SECURE RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE

22 MARINES WHO WERE ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE

13 BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY PERSONNEL WHO

ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN EVACUATED FROM "SANTVIKEN"

AT THE SAME TIME.

ACCORDING TO ARGENTINE REPORTS THESE PEOPLE ARE ON

A SHIP HEADING FOR THE MAINLAND.

THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE SIX MARINES AND

THE ONE MEMBER OF THE CREW OF ENDURANCE WHO WERE

CAPTURED ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ARE NOW IN

ARGENTINA.

/ FINALLY, THERE

FINALLY, THERE ARE 13 MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY TEAM AND TWO OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS WHO REMAIN ON SOUTH GEORGIA.

THE SURVEY TEAM'S MOST RECENT CONTACTS, ON 12 APRIL, WITH THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THIS COUNTRY INDICATE THAT THEY ARE SAFE AND WELL.

ON 5 APRIL, WE ASKED THE SWISS GOVERNMENT, AS THE PROTECTING POWER, TO PURSUE ALL THESE CASES URGENTLY WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

WE TRUST THEIR EFFORTS WILL SOON PRODUCE THE INFORMATION WHICH WE AND THEIR FAMILIES ANXIOUSLY SEEK.

/ON THE SAME

ON THE SAME DAY WE ALSO SOUGHT THE ASSISTANCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS WITH REGARD TO THE
POSITION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

SO FAR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RESPONDED
TO THEIR REQUEST TO VISIT THE ISLANDS.

LATE LAST NIGHT, A PARTY OF 35 PEOPLE FROM THE ISLANDS,
INCLUDING THE CHIEF SECRETARY, ARRIVED IN
MONTEVIDEO AND A REPORT FROM THE CHIEF
SECRETARY ON CONDITIONS IN THE ISLANDS IS
EXPECTED AT ANY MOMENT.

/ RECENTLY, THE GOVERNMENT

THE GOVERNMENT
RECENTLY / RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE BRITISH

COMMUNITY COUNCIL IN ARGENTINA URGING A
PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT
AND ASKING THAT DUE CONSIDERATION BE
TO THE STRONG BRITISH PRESENCE IN ARGENTINA
AND THE SIZE OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY

WE HAVE REPLIED, RECOGNISING THE CONTRIBUTION
WHICH THE BRITISH COMMUNITY HAS MADE TO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARGENTINA - BUT MAKING
IT PLAIN THAT WE HAVE A DUTY TO RESPOND
TO THE UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION

AGAINST THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
AND INSISTING THAT ARGENTINA SHOULD COMPLY WITH
THE MANDATORY RESOLUTION OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL CALLING UPON IT
TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS.

/WE ARE

WE ARE ALSO BEING URGED FROM SOME QUARTERS TO AVOID ARMED

CONFRONTATION AT ALL COSTS AND TO SEEK CONCILIATION.

OF COURSE WE TOO WANT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT IT WAS

NOT BRITAIN WHO BROKE THE PEACE.

IF THE ARGUMENT OF NO FORCE AT ANY PRICE WERE

TO BE ADOPTED AT THIS STAGE IT WOULD SERVE ONLY

TO PERPETUATE THE OCCUPATION OF THOSE VERY

TERRITORIES WHICH HAVE THEMSELVES BEEN SEIZED

BY FORCE.

/ CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

MR. SPEAKER,

IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE COMING DAYS WE SHALL BE
GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES,

WE SHALL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON ARGENTINE WITH-

DRAWAL FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES.

WE SHALL REMAIN READY TO EXERCISE OUR RIGHT TO
RESORT TO FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51
OF THE UN CHARTER UNTIL THE OCCUPYING FORCES
LEAVE THE ISLANDS.

OUR NAVAL TASK FORCE SAILS ON TOWARDS ITS
DESTINATION.

WE REMAIN FULLY CONFIDENT OF ITS ABILITY TO
TAKE WHATEVER MEASURES MAY BE NECESSARY.

/ MEANWHILE, ITS VE

MEANWHILE, ITS VERY EXISTENCE AND ITS PROGRESS
TOWARDS THE FALKLAND ISLANDS REINFORCE THE
EFFORTS WE ARE MAKING FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.

THAT SOLUTION MUST SAFEGUARD THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE

OF THE ISLANDERS SHALL REMAIN PARAMOUNT.

THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD
PREFER ANY ALTERNATIVE TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION WHICH THEY ENJOYED BEFORE ARGENTINA
COMMITTED AGGRESSION.

IT MAY BE THAT THEIR RECENT EXPERIENCES WILL
HAVE CAUSED THEIR VIEWS ON THE FUTURE TO CHANGE.

BUT UNTIL THEY HAVE HAD THE CHANCE
FREELY TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
WILL NOT ASSUME THAT THE ISLANDERS WISHES ARE
DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THEY WERE BEFORE.

/ WE HAVE A LONG

WE HAVE A LONG AND PROUD HISTORY OF RECOGNISING THE RIGHT
OF OTHERS TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY.

INDEED IN THAT RESPECT WE HAVE AN EXPERIENCE
UNRIVALLED BY ANY OTHER NATION IN THE WORLD.
BUT THAT RIGHT MUST BE UPHOLD UNIVERSALLY, AND
NOT LEAST WHERE IT IS CHALLENGED BY THOSE WHO
ARE HARDLY CONSPICUOUS FOR THEIR OWN DEVOTION TO
DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY.

THE EYES OF THE WORLD ARE NOW FOCUSED UPON THE FALKLAND
ISLANDS.

OTHERS ARE WATCHING ANXIOUSLY TO SEE WHETHER
BRUTE FORCE OR THE RULE OF LAW WILL TRIUMPH.
WHEREVER NAKED AGGRESSION OCCURS IT MUST BE
OVERCOME.

/ THE COST NOW,

THE COST NOW, HOWEVER HIGH, MUST BE SET
AGAINST THE COST WE WOULD ONE DAY HAVE TO PAY
IF THIS PRINCIPLE WENT BY DEFAULT.

AND THAT IS WHY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND IF
NECESSARY THROUGH MILITARY MEANS, WE SHALL
PERSEVERE UNTIL FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ARE
RESTORED TO THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

no VB.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 April 1982

Falkland Islands: Prime Minister's Speech

I enclose the latest draft of the Prime Minister's speech for today's House of Commons debate. I should be most grateful if it could be carefully checked and any comments sent to me by 1100 hours.

In particular, I should be grateful if both you and the MOD would check carefully for factual accuracy the passage entitled "British subjects". Last night I asked the Emergency Unit to check with BAS headquarters in Cambridge their most recent information about the people on South Georgia (I understand that they are regularly in touch with them).

I am copying this letter and the enclosure to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Speaker,

It is right that at this time of grave concern over the Falkland Islands and their people, we should be recalled so that the Government may report and the House may discuss the latest developments.

Objective

Our objective, endorsed by all sides of the House in recent debates, is that the people of the Falkland Islands shall be free to determine their ^{own} way of life and their ^{own} future. The wishes of the Islanders must be paramount. But they cannot be freely expressed ^{let-alone} and implemented while the present illegal Argentine occupation continues. That is why our immediate goal in recent days has been to secure the removal of all Argentine forces in accordance with Resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council.

Strategy.

Our strategy has been based on a combination of diplomatic, military and economic pressures and I would like to deal with each of these in turn.

/ Diplomatic

661

c) Diplomatic

First of all we seek a peaceful solution by diplomatic effort. In this we have been helped by the widespread disapproval of the use of force which the aggression of the Argentines has aroused across the world. And also by the tireless efforts of Secretary of State Haig who has now paid two visits to this country and one to Buenos Aires.

On his first visit last Thursday we ~~were able~~ ^{ed} ~~to~~ impress upon him the great depth of feeling on this issue, not only of Parliament but of the British people as a whole. We may not express our views in the same way as the masses gathered to hear the speeches of dictators, ~~and thank goodness we don't~~, but we feel them every bit as strongly. Indeed, even more profoundly. We made clear that withdrawal of the invaders' troops must come first; that the sovereignty of the Islands ^{and cannot} is not [^] affected by invasion; and that when it comes to future negotiations what matters most is what the Falkland Islanders themselves wish.

On his second visit on Easter Monday and yesterday, Mr. Haig put forward certain ideas as a basis for discussion. Ideas which spanned the time from the withdrawal of troops and its supervision to the conclusion of negotiations on the future of the Islands.

/ Our talks were

200

Our talks were long and detailed as the House would expect. Some things we could not consider because they flouted our basic principles. Others we had to examine carefully and suggest variations. These talks were constructed ^{ide} and some progress was made. At the end of the day, Mr. Haig was prepared to return to Buenos Aires in pursuit of a peaceful solution.

Late that evening Argentina put forward other proposals which gave rise to real difficulties

~~Yesterday it seemed that the Argentine position was not exactly as had been understood.~~ *however the position eased.* Further ideas are now being considered and Secretary Haig has returned to Washington before proceeding ^{he hopes} shortly to Buenos Aires.

difficult. These discussions are complex, ^{changing} ~~various~~ and ~~changing~~. The more so because they are taking place between a military junta and a democratic government of a free people - one which is not prepared to compromise that democracy and that liberty which the British Falkland Islanders regarded as their birthright. We seek, and continue to seek, a diplomatic solution and the House will realise that it would jeopardise that aim were I to give further details at this stage. Indeed, Secretary Haig has been scrupulous in his adherence to confidentiality in pursuit of the larger objective.

4

MILITARY

if they are backed by military strength
Diplomatic efforts are more likely to succeed

At 5.00 a.m. London time on Monday 12 April, the military exclusion zone of 200 miles around the Falkland Islands came into effect. From that time all Argentine warships and Argentine auxiliaries found within this zone will be treated as hostile and are liable to be attacked by British forces. We see this measure as the first step towards achieving the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the area. It appears to have exerted influence on Argentina whose navy has been concentrated outside the zone. If our authority in the zone is challenged, we shall take that as a sign that the search for a peaceful solution has been abandoned. We shall have to take the necessary action. Let no-one doubt that.

The naval Task Force is proceeding with all speed towards the South Atlantic. It is a formidable Force comprising two aircraft carriers, five guided missile destroyers, seven frigates, an assault ship with five landing ships, together with supporting vessels.

The composition of the Force and the speed with which it was assembled and put to sea clearly demonstrate our determination. I can tell the House that morale on board the ships in the Task Force is extremely high. ~~Ships' companies are being regularly put through their operational paces and the ships are exercising together en route.~~
Ships are carrying out exercises en route and carrying out exercises

By the time the Force arrives off the Falklands, it will be at a very high state of fighting efficiency.

5

A number of civil ^{ian} ships have now been chartered or requisitioned ~~to augment and improve logistic support.~~ These include ~~a number of tankers, roll-on roll-off ferries,~~ the Canberra for use as a troop ship, and the Uganda which will be available as a hospital ship. Recourse to the merchant marine is traditional in time of naval emergency and their response has been ~~as~~ wholehearted on this occasion as in the past.

Men and equipment continue to be flown out to Ascension Island to meet up with the Task Force. These additional elements will enhance the fighting capability of the Task Force and the range of operations which can be undertaken. Nimrod Maritime Patrol Aircraft are now patrolling ^{the} South Atlantic in support of our naval deployments.

Check.

Sustaining a ^{major} ~~substantial~~ Force at 8,000 miles distance from the UK is a considerable undertaking. But as the Ministry of Defence announced this morning additional measures are now in hand to provide extra capability ~~for the Force~~ over an extended period. In particular, the second assault ship, HMS INTREPID, is being made ready for sailing, if necessary. Arrangements are in hand to ~~adapt a large~~ ^{send} ~~container ship for the carriage of~~ additional Sea and Ground attack Harriers ~~(which in the latter case would be flown by the RAF)~~. This will double the size of the Harrier force in the South Atlantic.

Our diplomacy is backed by strength, ^{and we have the} ~~We intend to secure~~ ~~our objectives.~~ ^{resolve to use that strength if necessary} ~~if necessary~~ in order to achieve our objectives

ECONOMIC

The other aspect of our pressure against Argentina has been economic. We have been urging our friends and allies to take action parallel to our own. We have achieved a heartening degree of success.

The most significant measure has been the decision of our Nine partners in the European Community to join us not just in an arms embargo but also in stopping all imports from Argentina. This is a very important step, unprecedented in its scope and the rapidity of the decision. Last year nearly one-third of all Argentina's exports went to the European Community. The effect on Argentina's economy of this measure will therefore be considerable and cannot be without influence on her leaders in the present crisis.

I should like warmly to thank our European partners for rallying to our support. It was an effective demonstration of one of the ^{advantages} ~~values~~ of ^{Community} membership. The decision cannot have been easy for them, given the commercial interests at stake. But our partners were ^{the first-} ~~quick~~ to realise that if aggression were allowed to succeed in the Falkland Islands, it would be encouraged elsewhere.

/ Other friends

150

7

Other friends too have been quick to help. I should like to thank Australia, New Zealand and Canada for their ^{shrewdly} ~~firm~~ and swift action. They have decided to ban imports from Argentina, to stop export credits and to halt all sales of military equipment. New Zealand has also banned exports to Argentina. Many other countries in the Commonwealth have supported us by condemning the Argentine invasion.

ISOLATION OF ARGENTINA

What have the Argentines been able to produce to balance this solidarity in support of our cause? ~~from the United Nations, the EEC and the Commonwealth?~~

Some
~~Most of~~

Their Latin American neighbours have of course repeated their support for the Argentine claim to sovereignty. We always knew they would. But ^{only} ~~not~~ one of them has supported the Argentine invasion and many have made clear their distaste and disapproval that Argentina should have resorted to aggression.

(Panama)

Almost

~~About~~ the only country whose position has been shifting towards Argentina is the Soviet Union. We can only guess ^{at the cold calculations which} ~~what dark and complicated reasoning lies~~ behind this move. But Soviet support for Argentina is hardly likely to shake the world's confidence in the justice of our cause or in our ability to achieve our objectives.

20

8/

BRITISH SUBJECTS

Amman

One of our first concerns has been and ~~is~~ for the safety of the British subjects who through no fault of their own have been caught up in the consequences of the crisis. They include ^(as well as the Falkland Islanders themselves) the Marines and the British Antarctic scientists on South Georgia, the British community in Argentina, ~~and of course the Falkland Islanders themselves.~~

CONFIDENTIAL

9

BRITISH SUBJECTS

One of our first concerns has been and is for the safety of the British subjects who through no fault of their own have been caught up in the consequences of the crisis. They include the marines and the British Antarctic scientists on South Georgia and the British community in Argentina.

In view of all our efforts we have not been able to secure
~~The Government are most concerned at the absence of~~
reliable information about the 22 marines who were on South Georgia and the 13 British Antarctic survey personnel who are believed to have been evacuated by the Argentines at the same time. According to Argentine reports these people are on a ship bound for Montevideo ~~but I cannot confirm that this is so.~~ There are also ~~unsubstantiated~~ reports to the effect that the 6 marines and the one member of the crew of Endurance who were said to have been captured on the Falkland Islands are now in Argentina. Finally, there are other members of the British Antarctic survey team who remain on South Georgia. *and his sister Irish subjects.* Their most recent contacts with their headquarters in this country *indirectly* ~~suggest~~ that they are safe and well.

On ~~The Government have~~ asked the International Red Cross to pursue all these cases with the Argentine Government. We trust ~~that the~~ ^{efforts of the} Red Cross will soon produce the information which we lack. *we are then finishing urgently* ~~The House will understand that given the breach of diplomatic relations with Argentina, and the Argentine occupation of the Falklands, our own ability to obtain direct and reliable information is very limited.~~ Where appropriate, the Swiss Embassy, who are looking after our interests in Buenos Aires will be seeking assurances about the safety of all these British subjects.

/The Government

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2
10

The ~~Government~~ recently received a message from the British Community Council in Argentina urging a peaceful solution to the present conflict and asking that due consideration be given to the strong British presence in Argentina and the size of the British community. We have replied, recognising the contribution which the British community has made to the development of Argentina - but making it plain that we have a duty to respond to the unprovoked aggression by the Argentine Government against the Falkland Islands and insisting that Argentina should respond to the mandatory resolution of the United Nations Security Council calling upon it to withdraw its troops.

Get some "De archedo"
N.I

also.

Mr. Speaker, we are being urged from many sides above all to avoid armed confrontation and to seek conciliation. Of course we want a peaceful solution but it was not Britain who broke the peace. (Force has been used by Argentina and a people subjugated.) If the concept of no force at any price is to be used at this stage it would serve ^{only} to ~~protect and preserve~~ ^{we} an occupation of those very territories which have themselves been seized by force.

→ (B)
 link on
 page 13.

Wherever naked aggression occurs it must be overcome. The cost now, however high, must be set against the cost we would one day have to pay if this principle went by default. (If we forfeit the right of British subjects to determine their own future on the Falklands, there are territories in South and Central America, in Africa, indeed all over the world, that would be in danger of attack.)

We can hardly maintain that aggression must be resisted in Western Europe with all the forces at NATO's command, if it were condoned in the South Atlantic off the coast of Argentina.

Mr. Speaker.

Conclusion

Summary

12

In our negotiations over the coming days we shall be guided by the following principles.

We shall continue to insist on complete Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and dependencies. We shall remain ready to exercise our right to resort to force in self-defence ^{under Article 51} until the occupying forces leave the Islands. Our naval Task Force sails on towards its destination. We remain fully confident of its ability to take whatever measures may be necessary. Meanwhile, its very existence and its progress towards the Falkland Islands reinforce the efforts we are making for a diplomatic solution.

1245
UN
check

In that solution the wishes of the Islanders remain paramount. There is no reason to believe that they would prefer any alternative to the resumption of the ~~type~~ of administration which they enjoyed before Argentine committed aggression. It may be that their recent experiences will have caused their views on the future to change. But unless and until they have had the chance freely to express their view the British Government have no intention of assuming that the Islanders' wishes are different from what they were before.

For 150 years, the Falkland Islands have been British until the Argentine invasion on 2 April, British sovereignty, British administration, and British occupation of the Islands had been undisturbed.

During the past century, the United Kingdom has seeded sovereignty over vast areas of the world; that session of sovereignty has been granted at the express wish of the inhabitants of our former colonies and protectorships. Over and over again, Her Majesty's Government has made it plain that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders are paramount. If they wish to change the sovereignty of their Islands, that is a matter which would have to be decided by this House.

But all the evidence confirms that the Islanders wish to remain British, under British administration.

That wish has been flouted by the Argentine occupation, which was preceded by a military assault upon British territory. That assault was not simply against a small and peaceful community in a distant part of the world; it was, too, a violation of international law; and the continuing alien occupation of the Falklands is in defiance of a Resolution of the Security Council, to which Argentina, like the United Kingdom, owes obedience.

/But there

But there is another factor of equal importance; the right of the Islanders themselves to choose their own allegiance and their own form of government.

Mr. Innes

①

We have a long and proud ^{history} ~~history~~ of recognising the right of others to determine their own destiny. ^{indeed we have an experience unrivalled by any other nation} But that right must be upheld universally, and notably ^(not least) where it is challenged by those who are ~~not~~ ^{hardly} conspicuous for their devotion to democracy and liberty. ^{in the world}

②

Intent B.

The eyes of the world are now focussed upon the Falkland Islands. Others are watching anxiously to see whether the rule of law or whether brute force will triumph. ~~(If brute force should be allowed to triumph in the South Atlantic which other small countries will be in peril?)~~

~~There may be some, even in this House, who believe that we should abandon the Falkland Islanders to military occupation and alien rule. That is not the belief of Her Majesty's Government.~~

And that is why we shall continue, through diplomatic, economic, and if necessary through military means, to secure for the people of the Falkland Islands that same freedom of choice which we have conferred upon others and which we shall continue to uphold for them.



p.a.
AR 11/4

ROYAL MARINES

There is as yet no firm news of the remaining Royal Marines captured in the Falklands and South Georgia. We have asked the Swiss as the protecting power to obtain confirmation of their whereabouts from the Argentine authorities. There are unconfirmed Argentine reports that the 22 Marines from South Georgia are on a ship heading for the Argentine mainland and that the six Marines and one member of the crew of HMS Endurance from the Falklands are at present at Comodoro Rivadavia. The Swiss Ambassador in Buenos Aires was told by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 April that the Marines were "at sea" and that he did not know when they would be disembarked.

BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY PERSONNEL

Four outlying field parties, including 13 BAS personnel and Miss Buxton and Miss Price, were reported well and in place by BAS on 12 April (the next radio contact between BAS and the field parties will be on the evening of 14 April). A further 13 BAS personnel are believed to be with the 22 Marines from South Georgia on their way to the Argentine mainland.

The Swiss in Buenos Aires were asked on 5 April to ask the Argentines about their intentions regarding BAS personnel on South Georgia and whether they planned to take them off the island. Following the closure of communications with Buenos Aires on 7 April, a further request for the same information was put through the Swiss in Berne. There has been no firm information in reply to these requests, although the Argentines have asked for and been provided with details of names and locations.



APR 1992

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FILE SW

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 April, 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 10 April enclosing a letter from the President of the Italian Council of Ministers.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Signor Andrea Cagiati, G.C.V.O.



re

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 April, 1982

Falkland Islands: Position of
Italian Government

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mr. Spadolini. I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft reply for signature by the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



8w

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 April, 1982

Falkland Islands: Letter from
Canadian Prime Minister

I enclose a copy of a telegram containing the text of a letter, dated 8 April, from Mr. Trudeau to the Prime Minister. I should be grateful if you would consider whether a reply is called for and, if so, if you would let me have a draft letter for signature by the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

B/P

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

File
CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 April, 1982

Dear Brian,

FALKLAND ISLANDS: CONVERSATIONS WITH

MR HAIG

The United States Secretary of State rang the Prime Minister at 1930 hrs today. Following their conversation, the Prime Minister discussed its contents briefly with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and at 2000 hrs rang Mr Haig to convey her views on the earlier conversation. A note of the main points in the two calls is enclosed with this letter.

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office), Keith Long (Paymaster General's Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Cole

B Fall, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

NOTE OF TWO TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE ON WEDNESDAY, 14 APRIL, 1982

Mr Haig said that there had been much activity in Washington during the last few hours. Considerable complications had been caused by reports in the American media alleging that the United States was giving unusual support to the United Kingdom in intelligence and operational matters. This had created a difficult situation in Buenos Aires. The Argentines had concluded that they could not proceed with negotiations unless the situation was rectified.

A further complication was that the Argentine Government was not prepared to put forward new ideas for the negotiation until they received confirmation that there was some flexibility in the British attitude or at least that the United States had new proposals. Furthermore they were insisting that unless they received some (unspecified) assurance about "The Fleet" (presumably a reference to the Task Force) they would appeal to the Organisation of American States and invoke the Rio Treaty.

Mr Haig said that he thought it necessary to issue a statement to deal with these matters. This would be on the following lines:-

"The dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom was an exceptionally difficult and dangerous problem. The positions held by both countries were deeply felt and in many respects mutually contradictory. But the leaders of both countries had assured him today that they were prepared to go on working to reach a political solution. That would require flexibility on both sides - not abandonment of principles but responsible and sensible adjustments. As a result of his discussions in London, in addition to telephone contacts today, he (Mr Haig) had developed new ideas which he had described to the Argentine Government. In the light of these new ideas, the Argentines had invited him to return to Buenos Aires. He proposed to do so and would go tomorrow or, if necessary, tonight.

/From

CONFIDENTIAL

From the outset in this crisis the United States had viewed its role as one of assisting the two sides to find a peaceful solution. Its ability to do so was based on its longstanding relationships with both the United Kingdom and Argentina. The United States had been careful to maintain these relationships in order to preserve its influence with both governments. Failure to live up to existing obligations or going beyond them would obviously jeopardise the United States ability to play the role which both countries wished it to perform. Since the outset of the crisis the United States had not acceded to requests that would go beyond the scope of customary patterns of cooperation. That would continue to be its stand while peace efforts were under way. Britain's use of US facilities on Ascension Island had been restricted accordingly."

The Prime Minister said that the latter point was particularly awkward. It was covered by a treaty. She had just come from a House of Commons debate where considerable disappointment had been expressed that the United States appeared to adopt a neutral position as between democracy and dictatorship.

Mr Haig said that he took this point but while peace negotiations continued, the normal patterns of cooperation would also continue. If the peace effort failed restrictions would no longer be maintained. He was therefore not talking about any substantive change. He felt it necessary to issue his statement very soon.

Mr Haig then briefly repeated his description of the situation to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary who was with the Prime Minister. He added that the Argentines felt that they had received no proposals of any kind from the United Kingdom. This pointed to the need for a proposal on the lines of the paper which Mr Haig had left with us yesterday. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that we hoped to let him have a revised formula tomorrow.

CONFIDENTIAL

/After a

After a brief discussion with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Prime Minister rang Mr Haig. She explained that parts of his proposed statement would be liable to cause a very adverse reaction in the United Kingdom. To begin with, the statement that the use of Ascension Island would be restricted contradicted the statement that customary patterns of cooperation would continue. Any suggestion that restrictions were being placed on our use of Ascension Island would evoke a strong reaction. There was already a feeling that the United States was doing less for us than we deserved, given the support which the British Government had given to President Reagan and the help which Argentina seemed to be receiving from the Soviet Union.

Mr Haig said that he understood these points. But as the Prime Minister would know, a great deal was being done to help the United Kingdom. The fact that fuel was being made available at Ascension Island had caused difficulties with the Argentines but he had made it clear that America would respect its treaty obligations. Argentina had denied officially that it was receiving help from the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said that that was only to be expected. But it was very difficult for us if we were placed on an equal footing with the Junta.

Mr Haig said that he recognised our concerns. He would delete the reference to Ascension Island. But the rest of the statement was necessary. In his view there were some 48 - 72 hrs left to obtain a peaceful solution. If the Argentines knew what help the United States was really giving to the United Kingdom, they would not continue with the negotiations. The American aim was to keep the affair away from the Organisation of American States where discussion would be very inflamed.

The Prime Minister said that the important thing was that the United States and Europe should stick together. It would be argued here that America could bring the dispute to an end by applying economic pressure. Mr Haig stated that the American press stories of the previous day had been almost fatal to the peace process. He was afraid that the revised statement would be too weak for the Argentines. But he would resist any attempt by them to re-insert a reference to Ascension Island. He had not yet discussed the statement with the Argentines. It would not mean any change in practical cooperation with us.

A. J. C.

ce Master

SUBJECT

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. HAIG - WEDNESDAY,
14 APRIL, 1982 AT 2000 HOURS

PM: I am coming back to one thing immediately after having a moment to have a look at the notes I made and a quick discussion with Francis. I think that parts of your statement will cause an extremely adverse reaction here and also they are contradictory. I refer to those ^{parts} which said towards the end that from the outset you had not accede to requests that would go beyond the scope of the pattern of co-operation, and then you went on to say that the use of Ascension had been restricted accordingly. First they are mutually contradictory I think - if you have not acceded to requests beyond the scope of the customary pattern you don't need to restrict them. Secondly, there will be a feeling that you are deliberately making it difficult for us, because when the Argentines are apparently getting very considerable help from the Soviets. Thirdly, and I must be quite blunt about it, it's been said in the House - and quite rightly - that I have done everything possible to support President Reagan and the US Government on every single occasion they have asked for help, and the moment we need your help you aren't there, we just don't receive it. And I do therefore feel that this statement will be received very badly here. Can you at least say nothing about the use of Ascension Island?

Haig: Well we can of course because as you know there is a great deal being done. The problem is that this is a serious problem there - the fuel and other things - which I said are totally consistent with our Treaty obligations and I said we simply must do that.

PM: I don't think you have to - because it's our island and that will be the reaction of British people. It's our island and the dispute is about our islands, and I can only tell you that I think this statement as it is drafted will give rise to very considerable criticism to put it very mildly here, for the simple reason that they will say the Prime Minister has stood by the President and look what's happened now. And it would be justified.

/Haig:

Haig: ... we can't pull back because we have normal patterns and we are completing them.

PM: I don't like the phrase "you have not acceded to requests beyond the scope of the customary pattern" because it looks as if we have made them and you have turned them down. Can you not say therefore the operation continues within the scope of the customary pattern of operation?

Haig: The difficulty is that I don't know whether you have seen what these very mischievous press reports have alleged, and they are having a major crisis in Argentina right now. I told them that, if they asked, we would turn them down - if you asked while this negotiation was under way we would have to refrain as well. Now I think, if you read that language. Let me read it again. It implies that we have perhaps approaches from either side.

PM: Well, that really, too, would cause trouble here because we know, we get reports every day in our press and media, although we don't get hysterical about them, that the Soviets are helping the Argentines very considerably.

Haig: But they have denied that vigorously officially.

PM: Of course they will. And what does a Soviet denial mean?

Haig: No, I mean the Argentine have ..

PM: Well, course they have. But they've got, you know, the reports that you've received and you know the reports that we received. And the suggestion, you know, that we really are to be treated in the same way as a military junta, with no record whatsoever of human rights - indeed, a very bad record of human rights - I think will cause problems here. And I think if there's any feeling that you're trying to put the screws on us to make it difficult for us to liberate our Islands from the aggression of a military junta, who's in bed already with the Soviet Union and who's had a terrible record on human rights, would be received extremely badly here and would make it very difficult for us to continue the good relationships that have hitherto existed.

/Haig:

Haig: Well, I certainly understand the concern, and that's why I read this to you so you ...

PM: Well let's get Ascension Island out of it altogether, because it's our island.

Haig: I think that you must understand that we've taken on a terrible obligation here, which is not a comfortable one, but I think a necessary one. And we've even gone to the point where I know it's been very irritating when we've talked about evenhandedness. It is not evenhandedness when we're talking about a different set of relationships all the time.

PM: It can't be evenhandedness. We both stand in NATO and we've both got obligations to one another, etc.

Haig: Well, we have, in my view, Prime Minister, about 48 or 72 hours to get this thing reasonably put together and right now we've got an ultimatum ...

PM: I know. What I'm saying, Al, is for Pete's sake, get that use of Ascension Island out of your statement, because it's our island and we can't exactly invade our island. You know, it's ours.

Haig: Of course not, and I will take that out.

PM: Right. Ascension out, and therefore you say: 'Do not accede to requests that would go beyond the scope of the customary pattern of cooperation' ..

Haig: Which is extremely expensive, as you know.

PM: Oh, indeed. That I think I can stand on.

Haig: I think the problem is if they thought we were doing something like this, I would no longer be welcome in any way. And I'm trying to keep them from going in the OAS, where we will have a total emotional North/South fragmentation on this issue.

/PM:

PM: Yes. All that I accept, but ..

Haig: That's the worst thing we can have happen.

PM: Yes. All that I accept, but I mean the OAS has had her claws in it which condemns totally aggression by any Member State. And if it doesn't condemn this, then they're all liable to have aggression by one State or another on their territory. And it's a beautiful treaty from that viewpoint. I don't know of any clause in the OAS which applauds a State for taking the territory of any other State by force.

Haig: That's absolutely right. But I don't have to tell you about how this thing will drift and it's only a two-thirds vote question, you see. Now, we would never go along with this in the first place. We don't think the OAS or the Rio Pact is even applicable in a case of aggression that has already occurred. So they cannot resort to that legally.

PM: Yes. They don't normally combine together to support aggression contrary to the United Nations Security Mandatory Resolution.

Haig: Well, we think we're on very sound ground there, while in practical terms, it could become very nasty and we could end up of course

PM: Yes. Now, listen, in the long run, the importance is that the United States and Europe, through us, sticks together, sticks together. I beg of you, therefore, do not do anything which raises anti-Americanism in this country just when we need help and understanding. I'm trying to understand your position. And particularly on our island, I'm trying to understand your position but you said you would keep the use of Ascension out of it and stick to this phrase that you've not accede to requests that would go beyond the scope of the customary pattern of cooperation, which between allies, of course, as we know, is very considerable. I'm sure my people will say 'Well, look, the Argentines are getting a lot of help from the Soviets, and yet we're not getting any help from our traditional allies'. Now,
/I'm

trying to hold with the past and say 'Look, they are trying to be of assistance in the negotiated solution and they're the only country which has enormous influence on the Argentine'. Then the next thing I will get is: 'Yes, they could, in fact, bring this dispute to an end perfectly easily if they're prepared to use their economic powers' and that's been said in the House this afternoon.

Haig: Well, that's absolutely right, too. And I think you see here, we say we'll continue our stand while our efforts are underway, and that makes it very clear.

PM: Yes, I agree. But we've not got to^{go} beyond the scope of customary patterns of cooperation which, as we know, are very extensive.

Haig: Well, that's the idea. Incidentally, I'm sure you know there's going to be a lot of charges here at home. I can't apologise for our own press.

PM: No need to apologise for the press.

Haig: I don't mean to be cowardly, but this is going to be challenged as being dishonest by the State Department.

PM: Yes. I don't know how you cope with the press. I'm absolutely firm with them and I do not intend to have my policies and the future of the free world and islands and democracy and liberty, etc. etc. governed by the press. The press couldn't exist without the sort of things which you and I stand for. And I'm very

Haig: The damage done last night by the American press - I mean, the individuals involved in this - is almost fatal to the peace process and that's the great tragedy of this.

PM: Yes.

Haig: And I think we have to be guided by the best collective judgments we can apply. I'm afraid that this will be very weak
/from

from the Argentine point of view, not because they care about the realities but far more because they are faced with an upheaval at home, with which they cannot live. They may not permit me to come to that capital if we have not said something reassuring about this difficult issue.

PM: Yes. Well, I'm agreeing that you keep it beyond the scope of the customary pattern or cooperation. And I will have to look and see what that does to us because, as long as you keep in the words 'From the outset, you have not acceded to requests that would go beyond the scope of the customary pattern of cooperation' so there is no change?

Haig: That's correct.

PM: So there is no change at all. But I beg of you, don't go for Ascension Island. It's ours. I know it's your base, and I know we're governed by an agreement, and we honour that agreement, etc.,...

Haig: Well, I'll take that out then, Prime Minister and I will not let them reassert it. I have not talked to them about this statement.

PM: All right, Al. You got problems, we got problems. But above all, the United States and the UK have to stay together and I don't want things which jeopardise our long term cooperation against the real aggressor.

Haig: Well, you're absolutely right and we cannot permit that and will not.

PM: All right. Message received and understood. I made myself clear, did I?

Haig: Yes.

PM: OK, now. Good luck. Bless you, and thank you. Goodbye.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND MR HAIG, WEDNESDAY,
14 APRIL, 1982

SUBJECT.

see. Market etc.

h.a.
14
4

Haig: There has been a lot of activity here this morning. We had two very difficult complications. The first was the news reporting here in Washington alleging unusual American support for Great Britain in intelligence and operational matters.

PM: We read the reports.

Haig: That has caused quite naturally a major crisis in Buenos Aires. Based on that they have concluded that there is no way we can proceed unless there is some rectification of that situation. And the second problem involves the attitude of that government on new ideas. We of course have some new ideas, based on our discussions in London and the suggestions made by the Argentine Foreign Minister to me on the phone the night before last. But they will not forward them formally until they have confirmation that there has been some British flexibility, or perhaps US proposals as well. The third problem involves their insistence/^{that they have some assurance} on the fleet or they will be forced to go to the OAS and invoke the Rio Treaty. Now what we have done Madam Prime Minister is to put together a statement here in which I would clearly confirm that there were new ideas and that I am prepared to bring them to Buenos Aires.

PM: What, fairly soon

Haig: Well there are new ideas clearly and no-one on either side could contradict that.

PM: Well obviously we would not contradict it. But the thing I am most concerned about of all, of course, as you know because you know the implications is your first point is that in no way could we proceed unless there is some rectification of that situation. That is the thing which concerns me most of all, and for reasons which you will appreciate.

Haig: I think I understand that but I think it is also understandable that they would have a difficult problem in the face of that intelligence information which is really not correct.

PM: But are you going to make that clear.

/Haig:

Haig: Yes, what I would like to say and I could read to you what I propose to say here in about an hour after I have discussed it in Argentina as well.

PM: Well let us then go back to the point that you are making immediately that you are preparing to make a statement there on the new ideas but that there are new ideas and that you are prepared to take them to Buenos Aires. Of course no-one here would contradict that, we should be deeply concerned if you did not go to Buenos Aires.

Haig: Absolutely.

PM: You won't actually give the new ideas because we ^{don't know} know of us know what they quite are.

Haig: Would that be helpful.

PM: It would if you could just indicate, yes please.

Haig: What I would say is that I want to make a statement on the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom. It is exceptionally difficult and an exceptionally dangerous problem. The positions that both countries hold are deeply felt and in many cases mutually contradictory. But the leaders of both countries have assured me again today that they are prepared to go on working with us to reach a political solution. That will require flexibility on both sides not abandonment of principles but responsible and sensible adjustments.

PM:

Yes I think the latter is important

Haig: As a result of my conversations in London plus telephone conversations today, I have developed new ideas which I have described to the Argentine Government. Based on these new ideas the Argentines have invited me to return to Buenos Aires. I propose to do so and it will probably be tomorrow but if it has to be even tonight again. This is the important thing on the intelligence - from the outset of this crisis the United States has viewed its role as that of assisting the two sides in finding a peaceful solution. Our ability to do this is based on our long-standing relationships with both the UK and Argentina. /We

Haig: continued .. we have been careful to maintain the relationships in order to preserve our influence with both governments.

PM: Yes. And I read between the lines and between the letters there can I?

Haig: Yes. And here is the key point. Failure to live up to existing obligations or going beyond them would obviously jeopardise our ability to play the role both countries wish us to perform.

PM: I've got, got it all.

Haig: Since the onset of the crisis the U.S. has not exceeded to requests that would go beyond the scope of our customary patterns of co-operation. That will continue to be our stand while our efforts are under way. British use of US facilities on the United Kingdom Island of Ascension has been restricted accordingly.

PM: Oh, now that's a bit devastating.

Haig: Now we have looked very carefully at our agreement on this and we feel that that statement has been and remains justified.

PM: But we have a treaty on this. I have just come out of the House where we have just concluded our Debate and we had enormous support on this, indeed as much unity as I have ever seen in the House and please don't take this amiss but considerable disappointment at the US position in a way - that the full difference between democracy and dictatorship is not appreciated and that we are both treated the same. And the view we have taken, of course, is that that has to be during these negotiations. But you see why I just need to look back at that Treaty, because it is very important to us.

Haig: Yes, I certainly agree with that. And I have made it clear with Buenos Aires that so long as we are conducting the effort we will attempt to stay within normal patterns. We have done that this far and believe that we can stand by that position. On the other hand we have made it clear to them if this peace effort fails those restrictions can no longer be maintained. Now within normal patterns as you know

/there has been

Haig: continued .. there has been extensive words. So I am not talking about any changes.

PM: That I understand. The important thing is I think at the moment is that you continue the process of negotiation. that you have started, that would be our view. We wish you to go back to Buenos Aires, we would like to have more details of the ideas. I can see that you have gone to considerable lengths to reassure me things about which I am concerned about which you have just spoken.

Haig: Well I think thats fine and I think its important that I get this statement out immediately to clamp down what has become a major internal problem in Argentina.....

PM: The statement is going out within a matter of minutes is it?

Haig: Yes.

I think we have enough to continue this process constructively. I will call Francis.

PM: He's right here:

Haig: Francis I just told the PM this press business in Washington has caused a major crisis in Buenos Aires and I read a statement to her which I hope will assist this. They will never accept us down there until we do so and I can understand their concern. Now another problem which they had was that they feel they have had no submission from Gt Britain and I told them that we did have some ideas, that you have given us, but it would be helpful if you recognised that I also must have, and I can portray it as my own, something along the lines of the paper I left with you.

Francis: Yes, we've been working on that all day. We can send it over to you tomorrow or tonight if you like, but tomorrow might be better.

Haig: I would be pleased to have that. I don't want to extract it from you. But I would like your OK in any event to discuss those ideas ... referendum from my own point of view.

Francis: Yes you must do that. We will send it over to you - will tomorrow be in time?

Haig:

Haig: Yes, that's fine ... and I will make a statement here in about an hour as I told the Prime Minister, designed to quiet this down. They had some difficulties with the combination of the very tough positions you have just espoused in Parliament and otherwise on top of this intelligence I think you can see that we didn't anticipate those mischevious press stories.

Francis: Absolutely, it makes the whole process more difficult and I quite see that....

Haig: It's abosolutely essential that we do that and that we move quickly. Francis I will wait to hear your ideas on that paragraph 8.

Francis: We've been working on them all day.

Haig: Well I know you have had a difficult day and I will keep you full primed.



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>67</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Holmes to Coles dated 13 April 1982.</i>	
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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Desl:by
	SECRET	IMMEDIATE
	DESUBY 141300Z	
ZCZC	1 ZCZC	
GRS	2 GRS	
CLASS	3 SECRET	
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5 141300Z	
FM FCO	6 FM FCO 131935Z of ⁴ 17 April 1982	
PRE/ADD	7 TO IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO	
TEL NO	8 TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9 MILITARY CO-OPERATION WITH CHILE	
	10 1. We have been increasingly concerned that a wide variety	
	11 of issues were under discussion with the Chileans on a number	
	12 of difference ^t , and often unconnected, channels. At a meeting ^{yesterday}	
	13 with the MOD to look at all aspects of our relationship with	
	14 the Chileans today , we established what was in hand and where	
	15 responsibility for further action lay. MIFT contains a summary	
	16 record of this meeting.	

Paragraph 2 deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

Wayland

11 September 2012

24 3. Your new Air Attache, who arrives ~~tomorrow~~^{TODAY}, has been
25 fully briefed on all these issues and will no doubt be of great

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword help
File number	Dept	Distribution Head Defence Dept Mr Gillmore Mr Wright PS/PUS PS/Mr Onslow PS Head SAmDept Mr Giffard Mr Ure
Drafted by (Block capitals) D H Gillmore		
Telephone number 233 4231		
Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature]</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

SECRET

Page

2

<<<<

1 <<<<

2 help to you in your contacts with the Chileans. Please, however,
 3 let us know ^{Quickly} ~~urgently~~ if you would find it useful to have
 4 further assistance from here (eg a senior military officer
 5 who would of course travel in plain clothes).

6

7 PYM

8 NNNN

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NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>617</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>FCO telegram to Santiago dated 13 April 1982 (enclosure to letter from Holmes to Coles, 13 April 1982)</i>	
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1982

*Prime Minister**Dear John,*Falkland Islands*This adds a little to the oral account Mr. Pym gave yesterday.**A.J.C. 14/4*

As you know, Mr Haig was again in touch with the Argentine Foreign Minister earlier today and the Argentines indicated that they would have a new proposal to make: basically, they could accept the formulation in paragraph 5 of the paper which emerged from the discussions between the Americans and ourselves yesterday, in return for language drawing on United Nations texts on the decolonisation of the Falkland Islands. Mr Pym called on Mr Haig at his suggestion this afternoon to discuss the latest developments. Mr Pym and Mr Haig had a few minutes tete-a-tete. In subsequent discussion General Walters, Mr Enders, Mr Gompert, Mr Funseth and Mr Gudgeon were present on the American side; and Sir A Acland, Sir I Sinclair, Mr Ure and myself on ours.

A.J.C. 14/4

The Americans had produced the attached paragraph as an illustration of the ideas they understood the Argentinians to have in mind in a form which would replace paragraph 8 of the present text of the draft agreed memorandum.

The Argentinians are however producing their own written version of their ideas, which the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires expects to receive at 8 o'clock this evening local time. The result is clearly unlikely to be any more palatable to us than the American cockshy.

Mr Haig, while not seeking to sell the precise wording of the American draft, clearly regarded it as a step forward on the Argentine part and seemed to think that it offered the possibility of a solution. He emphasised, as did Enders, that Resolution 1514 contained helpful references to self-determination; and that paragraph 5 /which the Argentinians would be prepared to accept in toto in return for the language on decolonisation, should be regarded as the crucial element from our point of view. He accepted that decolonisation might be regarded as a politically charged word in the United Kingdom, but it was certainly very much better from our point of view than the transfer of sovereignty which was the original Argentine demand.

/of the draft,

These themes were replayed by Haig and Enders in the discussion that followed, and the American Legal Adviser argued from UN precedent (including UN Resolution 1541 and the solution reached in respect of the Cook Islands), that

/'decolonisation'



'decolonisation' was a supple concept. He accepted however that the formulation limited the Islanders' right of self-determination to the extent that it excluded the option of sticking to the status quo. It could be inferred from other points made by Mr Haig that the Argentinians had made some headway with their argument that the self-determination for the Islanders on which we insisted was a somewhat artificial concept, because of restrictions on such matters as immigration and Argentine investment. He did however acknowledge the force in our argument that the Islanders were not deprived of contact with the Argentine and that their views were determined more by a dislike of what they saw there than by any lack of knowledge. Haig concluded however that we must look for an arrangement in which the Argentinians could retain the hope that the situation over the next nine months would develop in such a way as to give them the answer they wanted. In response to a question however he said that the American position at the end of the day would be to 'stick to the right of the individual'.

Mr Pym, in stating our position, made it clear that we had always accepted the possibility of change. But any change should be subject to the wishes of the Islanders. We would not stand in the way of whatever outcome they might choose, but the trouble was that the direction in which the Islanders had determined their future had never been acceptable to Argentina. We were open-minded about their choice but we would not let the Islanders down; neither would Parliament endorse a solution which could be represented as our having deserted them.

Despite some fairly persistent questioning neither Haig nor Enders seemed able to say whether the new Argentine ideas were designed to seek a commitment to a transfer of sovereignty in different language, or whether they represented a lowering of sights and a willingness to continue a negotiating process 'under different rules'.

The Argentine language, when we get it, may provide the answer. Judging from hints given by Haig and Enders, it may also include references to 'minority status' for the Islanders, by implication giving them some sort of local autonomy within a greater Argentine whole. The American side recognised that this would not be acceptable to us and made no attempt to have the matter discussed further.

Mr Pym in conclusion said that we would be prepared to look at wording if it led to a situation where both sides were able to continue working for a satisfactory solution. He

/asked




asked that everything be done to guard against leaks, and Haig took the point - while indicating that he had no very great hopes of preventing them happening in Buenos Aires. He made it clear that he expected to go back there, though not before Saturday; and he emphasised the importance of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion: a number of our 'European friends' had impressed this on him and 'there won't be as much robustness on either side of the Atlantic when we get down to ground zero'.

Two other points made by the Americans are worth recording:

- i. Haig referred once or twice to a referendum as being a possible part of a solution. The implication was clearly that he thought that this might be acceptable to the Argentines, provided that a. it was part of a package containing the references to decolonisation and b. something was done to meet the Argentine concern about what they saw as artificial restrictions (Haig volunteered that he did not see this as requiring a swamping of the Island population by Argentinians).
- ii. Enders indicated that, in order to compensate for what he referred to as the tilt towards the Argentine position represented by a reference to decolonisation, it might be possible to weaken the language providing a fixed end to the interim period.

Finally, we shall be following up here a point made by Costa Mendes to Haig - which seems to have impressed him - to the effect that the United Kingdom had previously accepted the Falkland Islands in a list of territories to be decolonised. This may mean no more than is implied by the history of UN discussion of the subject.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,


(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
 10 Downing Street

December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period and, during this period, the signatories shall negotiate the conditions of the decolonization and definitive status of the islands, consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XX), and the 1964 Report of the Special Committee of the General Assembly on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

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FM WASHINGTON 140128Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NO 1268 OF 13 APRILMY TELEGRAM NO 1252: ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA

1. HORMATS HAS CONFIRMED TODAY THAT ADMINISTRATION POLICY OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE EXIM BANK TO GO VERY SLOW ON ARGENTINIAN BUSINESS. HE SAID THERE WERE AT PRESENT SIX OUTSTANDING PRELIMINARY COMMITMENTS OF WHICH TWO WERE DUE TO COME UP BEFORE THE FULL BOARD FOR APPROVAL LAST WEEK. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD GOT THESE DEFERRED FOR "TECHNICAL REASONS" AND THEY HAVE AGAIN BEEN DEFERRED TODAY. THE LONGER THIS GOES ON, THE MORE OBVIOUS IT WILL BECOME TO THE ARGENTINIANS THAT POLITICAL PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED. WE HAVE SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW THIS CAN ONLY HELP TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THEM TO REMOVE THEIR TROOPS.

2. HORMATS BELIEVES (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT BETWEEN NOW AND NEXT WEEK, THE US ADMINISTRATION MAY MOVE INTO A "DIFFERENT GEAR" AS REGARDS DIRECT PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES. HE SAID THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF SUPPORT ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR FIRMER ACTION AND A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE. HORMATS MENTIONED FINANCE AS WELL AS TRADE AS AREAS WHERE PRESSURE COULD BE EXERTED, THOUGH IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT THE US BANKS WERE ANYWAY AIMING TO DO MUCH TO HELP THE ARGENTINIANS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

HENDERSON

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1266 OF 13 APRIL

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MY TELNO 1251: FALKLANDS/OAS

1. SUMMARY

THE OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL TODAY ADOPTED A RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND CRISIS (FULL TEXT IN MIFT). ALTHOUGH THE RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS, THE MEETING WAS MARKED BY AN ACRIMONIOUS ARGUMENT BETWEEN THE ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEANS (INCLUDING GRENADA) AND THE LATIN AMERICANS.

DETAILS

2. PRIVATE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS THIS MORNING FAILED TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEANS AND THE LATIN AMERICANS. WHEN THE PERMANENT COUNCIL MET THIS AFTERNOON, ST LUCIA PROPOSED ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION CONTAINING AN EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE POSITIONS ALREADY TAKEN IN THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS WAS REJECTED: 7 CARIBBEANS SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION AND THE REST OF THE COUNCIL ABSTAINED.

3. THE COUNCIL THEN ADOPTED THE RESOLUTION IN MIFT. IT IS A REFINEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL COLOMBIAN DRAFT (MY-TELNO 1196 - NOT TO ALL) AND OMITTS ANY REFERENCE TO UNSCR 502. IT IS LESS SPECIFIC THAN THE ORIGINAL COLOMBIAN DRAFT ABOUT A MEDIATION ROLE FOR THE OAS.

4. THE VENEZUELAN REPRESENTATIVE MADE A SPEECH CLAIMING THAT THE OAS MUST DEMAND THE BRITISH FLEET'S WITHDRAWAL AND THAT ARGENTINA HAD A TOTAL RIGHT TO DEFEND ITS SOVEREIGNTY. HE ADDED THAT UNSCR 502 WAS BIASED AGAINST ARGENTINA, WHICH HAD SUFFERED THE THEFT OF ITS TERRITORY BY THE UK AND WHICH WAS QUOTE JUSTLY RESPONDING TO THAT ROBBERY UNQUOTE. VENEZUELA ITSELF HAD SUFFERED SIMILAR INDIGNITIES IN BEING DEPRIVED OF ITS OWN TERRITORY BY COLONIAL POWERS.

5. THE AMERICANS REMAINED VIRTUALLY SILENT (AS THEY HAVE DONE THROUGHOUT THE DEBATE). THEIR ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT THE US COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION SINCE THE RESOLUTIONS BEFORE THE COUNCIL ESSENTIALLY SUPPORTED HAIG'S INITIATIVE AND IT WAS THEREFORE QUOTE UNSEEMLY UNQUOTE FOR THE US TO VOTE ON THEM.

6. WITH STRIKING HYPOCRISY, THE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM WOULD PROVE THE DEFENDER OF PEACE AND JUSTICE IN TERMS OF THE OAS CHARTER. ARGENTINA SUPPORTED THE REVISED COLOMBIAN RESOLUTION SINCE IT LAID EMPHASIS ON A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO WHICH OF COURSE ARGENTINA WAS FULLY COMMITTED. HE ADDED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH NUCLEAR SUBMARINES TO ARGENTINE WATERS WAS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION WHICH SHOULD NOT BE TOLERATED; NOR COULD A CONTINUATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL OCCUPATION OF ARGENTINE TERRITORY.

7. THE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL'S APPROVAL OF THE RESOLUTION DID NOT HAVE ANY BEARING ON ARGENTINA'S RIGHT, SHOULD IT SO WISH, TO INVOKE THE RIO TREATY.

8. THE ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEANS ALL EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE REVISED COLOMBIAN RESOLUTION, EMPHASISING THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-USE OF FORCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION MUST STAND UNCOMPROMISED. ST LUCIA SAID THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS WORTHLESS SINCE IT DID NOT UPHOLD THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF DISPUTES. THE BARBADIAN LAUNCHED A STRONG ATTACK ON ARGENTINA'S QUOTE UNJUSTIFIED AND UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE UNQUOTE: THE PRESENT RESOLUTION WAS INIMICAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE OAS SINCE IT MADE NO MENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE OR OF UNSCR 502. BARBADOS, AND OTHER SMALL COUNTRIES, COULD NOT LONG SURVIVE AS INDEPENDENT NATIONS IF THE RULE OF THE JUNGLE WERE ALLOWED TO PREVAIL IN THIS WAY.

9. ONE OR TWO LATIN AMERICANS, INCLUDING PERU, EL SALVADOR AND CHILE TOOK GENTLE SIDE-SWIPES AT THE ARGENTINE INVASION, ALTHOUGH THESE WERE WRAPPED UP IN GENERAL APPEALS FOR LATIN SOLIDARITY.

10. THE ADOPTED RESOLUTION REFLECTS ARGENTINA'S LOBBYING AGAINST ANY REFERENCE TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 THOUGH IT CONTAINS A REFERENCE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 TO THE NEED TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION QUOTE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNQUOTE. IN OTHER RESPECTS THE RESOLUTION IS UNEXCEPTIONABLE AND REPRESENTS THE MINIMUM THE OAS COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO DO IN RESPONSE TO ARGENTINIAN PRESSURE AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE EARLIER IDEA OF AN ACTIVE OAS MEDIATION CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL COLOMBIAN DRAFT HAS BEEN DILUTED.

... THE REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL'S APPROVAL

11. IN COMMENTING TO THE PRESS, WE CONFINED OURSELVES TO SAYING THAT THE FRAMEWORK FOR A SETTLEMENT WAS ALREADY IN PLACE IN THE TERMS OF UNSCR 502 AND THAT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF, AS ENJOINED IN THE OAS RESOLUTION ITSELF, ARGENTINA IS PERSUADED TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

HENDERSON

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*Advances
E.F.
only*

... AND THE LATIN AMERICANS. WHEN THE PERMANENT COUNCIL

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MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. WHEN I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HE READ IT WITHOUT COMMENT AND SAID THAT HE WOULD PASS IT AT ONCE TO THE PRESIDENCY. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THAT PRESIDENT GALTIERI WOULD REPLY IN RATHER SIMILAR TERMS. WHEN I PRESSED HIM AS TO WHETHER SUCH A REPLY HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED, HE SAID THAT NO FORMAL REPLY HAD YET ARRIVED. WE HAVE DISCOVERED INDEPENDENTLY, HOWEVER, THAT AN IMMENSELY WORDY MESSAGE FROM GENERAL GALTIERI HAS ALREADY BEEN ISSUED BY THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY TO THE PRESS. THIS UNORTHODOX PROCEDURE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ANNOY THE BRAZILIANS CONSIDERABLY.

2. I FOUND SR GUERREIRO IN PESSIMISTIC MOOD, THOUGH HE WAS IF ANYTHING FRIENDLIER THAN EVER. HE SEES WAR APPROACHING AND GREATLY FEARS THAT BRAZIL MIGHT BE DRAWN INTO IT. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT BRAZIL COULD DO MUCH TO HELP, THOUGH THEIR OFFER REMAINED OPEN. I ASKED HIM OUTRIGHT WHETHER HE SAW UK/BRAZIL RELATIONS BEING HARMED BY DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE FALKLANDS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT, IF THE MATTER WERE REFERRED AGAIN TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND POSITIONS

WERE ADOPTED THERE WHICH MIGHT BE CONFLICTING. I ALSO ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD INVOKE THE RIO TREATY. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD HOLD OFF AT LEAST UNTIL MR HAIG'S NEGOTIATION HAD EXHAUSTED ITSELF.

3. IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THIS INTERVIEW I HAD SPENT THREE-QUARTERS OF AN HOUR WITH GENERAL MEDEIROS, THE MINISTER IN CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND RIGHT-HAND MAN OF PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO. MEDEIROS, WHO IS A GOOD DEAL MORE FORTHRIGHT THAN GUERREIRO, SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE ARGENTINE ACTION IN INVADING THE FALKLANDS WAS COMPLETELY CRAZY AND INCOMPREHENSIBLE. HE DID NOT SEE ANY EASY WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE. SO FAR AS THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND WAS CONCERNED, HIS TENTATIVE VIEW WAS THAT IF WE CONFINED OURSELVES TO BLOCKADING THE FALKLANDS AND HELD OFF DIRECT HOSTILITIES WITH THE ARGENTINE FLEET, THE PRESSURE WE HAD MOBILISED AGAINST THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY WOULD BEGIN TO TELL VERY SOON. HE SAID THAT HE WAS KEENLY AWARE OF THE DANGER THAT THE ARGENTINE EXAMPLE MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES WHO WISHED TO SETTLE TERRITORIAL SCORES WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS. HE ALSO SAW THE RISK OF SOVIET ADVANCEMENT OF THEIR INTERESTS, THOUGH HE WAS INCLINED TO DOUBT WHETHER THEY WOULD VENTURE ANY OF THEIR NAVAL FORCES ANYWHERE NEAR THE SCENE OF OPERATIONS. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY OFFER MINIMAL AND INEXPENSIVE HELP TO THE ARGENTINES, WHICH WOULD REAP THEM MAXIMUM ARGENTINE GRATITUDE IN THE FUTURE. I ASKED WHETHER THE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT DISCOVERED ON THE CUBAN AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS FORCED TO LAND AT BRASILIA ON 9 APRIL (MY TELNO 089) HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS JUST THE SORT OF ASSISTANCE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE IN MIND.

4. MEDEIROS MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WISHED TO STEER WELL CLEAR OF ANY INVOLVEMENT IN POSSIBLE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. BRAZIL HAD NO REASON TO GET INVOLVED AND FEW MEANS TO DEFEND HER INTERESTS. NEVER THE LESS, SHE WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP IF THE HAIG MISSION FAILED AND NO OTHER AVENUE WAS ON OFFER. THE GOVERNMENT WERE QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT WISH THE RIO TREATY TO BE INVOKED. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, HE ADMITTED THAT BRAZIL WAS SEEN TO BE LEANING TO THE SIDE OF ARGENTINA: BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT SHE MIGHT STILL HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY AS AN UNCOMMITTED INTERMEDIARY IF IT CAME TO A FIGHT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, HE REPEATED WITH EMPHASIS THAT BRAZIL WANTED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AS WELL AS WITH ARGENTINA: WHAT WAS MORE, THEY NEEDED THEM.



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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1267 OF 13 APRIL

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, NASSAU, BRIDGETOWN, LA PAZ, BRASILIA,
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MIPTS: FALKLANDS/OAS

1. TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY OAS ON 13 APRIL:

WHEREAS:

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN RELATION TO THE

MALVINAS (FALKLAND) ISLANDS IS ENDANGERING THE PEACE OF THE HEMISPHERE.

AMONG THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES ESTABLISHED IN THE CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES THERE ARE THOSE OF STRENGTHENING THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE CONTINENT, PREVENTING POSSIBLE CAUSES OF DIFFICULTIES AND ENSURING THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES,

THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES RESOLVES:

1. TO EXPRESS ITS PROFOUND CONCERN OVER THE SERIOUS SITUATION THAT THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND NOW FACE.
2. TO EXPRESS ITS FERVENT HOPE THAT A RAPID, PEACEFUL SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND TO THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
3. TO OFFER ITS FRIENDLY COOPERATION IN THE PEACE EFFORTS ALREADY UNDER WAY, IN THE HOPE OF CONTRIBUTING IN THIS WAY TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE THAT WILL AVERT ONCE AND FOR ALL THE DANGER OF WAR BETWEEN COUNTRIES THAT DESERVE THE RESPECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

HENDERSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 336 OF 13 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON
UKREP BRUSSELS PEKING

INVASION OF FALKLAND ISLANDS

FURTHER TO MY TELNO 330 OF 10 APRIL, THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL
TODAY HAS MADE REGULATIONS TO BAN ALL IMPORTS OF GOODS FROM
ARGENTINA.

2. THE IMPORT PROHIBITION (ARGENTINA) REGULATIONS 1982 WILL BE
PUBLISHED TOMORROW IN AN EXTRAORDINARY ISSUE OF THE GAZETTE AND
TAKE IMMEDIATE EFFECT. COPY OF REGULATIONS IN MIFT. FROM TODAY
ALL IMPORTATION OF GOODS FROM ARGENTINA WILL BE PROHIBITED UNLESS
THEY WERE FOR TRANSHIPMENT OR RE-EXPORT TO CHINA.

MACLEHOSE

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 13 APRIL 1982
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR DIC)

FALKLAND ISLANDS CIVILIAN POPULATION

1. URUGUAYAN MEDIA ARE RELAYING REPORTS FROM BUENOS AIRES AND PORT STANLEY, STATING THAT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF PORT STANLEY ARE EVACUATING THEMSELVES TO THE COUNTRY DISTRICTS.

HUTCHINSON

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PRIME MINISTER

Cabinet: Falkland Islands

Your colleagues will be expecting reports (a) on Mr Haig's visit and the diplomatic prospects and (b) on the present military situation and the military prospects.

2. You could deal briefly with (a) yourself, and perhaps invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to outline the essential elements of the Haig Plan, even though it may by tomorrow be looking a bit academic. You could then invite the Secretary of State for Defence to speak on (b), supplementing as necessary yourself; points which should be covered are whether any naval action seems likely to occur in the exclusion zone, your refusal to halt the task force while the Argentines are withdrawing (if they do) under the Haig Plan, and your agreement that if withdrawal is completed the task force should be redeployed to normal duties (which would not preclude patrolling in the South Atlantic).

3. A reminder that disclosure of any of these matters could prejudice either the prospects of a diplomatic solution or the chances of military success might not come amiss. In talking to the press or to backbench colleagues, they should rest on the material being put out by the Presentation Unit.

4. Two points of procedure may arise in the ensuing discussion:

- (i) Are there ways in which the usefulness of the material being put out by the Presentation Unit could be increased?
- (ii) Your summing up at the Cabinet meeting on 6 April said that after Easter the Secretary of State for Defence would arrange for them to be given a briefing on the detailed capability of the British task force. Plans for the Chiefs of Staff to do this (eg just before the Cabinet meeting originally planned for 15 April) are at present in abeyance. But your colleagues may want them revived.



- (iii) A draft Emergency Powers Bill will be available tomorrow. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be briefed to tell the Cabinet that most of the Departments concerned would want it introduced and passed (though not brought into operation) quickly, once it was clear that no quick diplomatic settlement was available. This would ensure that, if hostilities broke out or Argentina declared war on us, we should have powers to take the appropriate actions immediately (by order), and would not have to wait for the time it would take to get a Bill passed.

5. Your summing up need do no more than record that OD's special Sub-Committee under your Chairmanship will continue to keep the crisis under close review, and will report as necessary to OD and the Cabinet.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

13 April 1982

condemned

54

3 APR 1982

12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12



RESTRICTED

h-a.
MR $\frac{14}{4}$

SAPU(82) 3

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper, containing lines for use in public by Ministers on the Falkland Islands, was approved by the Prime Minister at _____ hours on 13 April.

Cabinet Office

13 April 1982

RESTRICTED

Line to Take

1. Discussions with Mr Haig

- Mr Haig left for Washington this evening. He said on his departure that he would visit Buenos Aires again shortly. Yesterday, following his previous round of talks in Buenos Aires Mr Haig brought certain ideas to us and we had lengthy and serious discussions on these. Today we have had ~~two~~ further helpful talks. Last night the Argentinians raised still more problems which created a new and even more serious situation. The truth is that the Argentines are being very difficult. We are most grateful for all that Mr Haig is doing. There is no question of our having rejected an American formula for a settlement.

We shall remain in touch with Mr Haig about the new ideas which he referred to on his departure. We hope they may yet provide a way forward but the situation remains difficult and dangerous.

In the meantime the Maritime Exclusion Zone remains in force and the task force continues on course.

Specific Questions

- Can go into no detail about the discussions with Mr Haig. These were confidential and to release details now could jeopardize chances of agreement. Nor can I discuss the new ideas which Mr Haig has received. It is true that discussions with Mr Haig focused on interim arrangements rather than on the substance of a long term settlement of the Falkland Island problem.

- Can only repeat that our intention is to negotiate a settlement that reflects the terms of Security Council Resolution 502, which requires as a first step the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands. Once this has been achieved, and British administration restored, our position will again be that no long term solution is excluded but that the wishes of the Islanders will remain paramount.

(The Press Association have tonight withdrawn a wholly unfounded report quoting British Government spokesmen as saying that the American diplomatic initiative had "collapsed".)

2. Maritime Exclusion Zone

- The maritime exclusion zone is now in force. No Argentine warships/naval auxiliaries are reported in the zone. Thus the navy is denying seaborne resupply to the Argentine forces in the Falklands and the zone is achieving its objective.

Specific Questions

Why have you not sunk ships in the zone?

- We are achieving our objective without the need to do so. So far the Argentinians have heeded our warnings that naval vessels and auxiliaries should stay out of the zone.

Are we holding back for diplomatic reasons (Haig)?

- No. We are not holding back. We established a zone to cut off sea supplies to the Argentine forces in the Falklands. That is what is happening.

Will we fire on Argentinian naval vessels while Haig mission continues?

- Certainly, if they enter the zone but we trust they will not do so.

Merchantmen/neutrals

- Can only say we are watching the position closely.

Are you surprised by the lack of Argentine naval ships?

- No. We expected them to heed our warnings.

Danger to Royal Marines from South Georgia?

- Unconfirmed reports that Argentinians are removing them by sea but we do not expect the ship to enter the exclusion zone. We have also heard reports that some have been landed in the Argentine but cannot confirm this.

Reported Brazilian fleet movements?

- These have been reported as normal naval exercises and we have no reason to believe otherwise.

3. Other military preparations

Is the Task Force still going south?

- Yes. It is on course and on time.

Are all other military preparations going ahead as planned?

- Yes, but obviously cannot give details.

Lengthened runway in Falklands/presence of Mirage fighters?

- Cannot speculate on operational matters, especially on the basis of entirely unconfirmed newspaper stories.

4. International Support

- The Canadians have now decided to ban Argentine imports and to discontinue new export credits. We warmly welcome this, coming as it does in the wake of tough measures by, among others, Australia and New Zealand and, of course, the European Community.

The EC's prompt and decisive action in banning imports from Argentina will have the severest impact on the already sick Argentine economy. Argentine exports to the EC were running at almost \$2½ billion per year, about 30% of their total exports. Even before the EC ban the Argentinians were chronically short of foreign currency.

Our diplomatic offensive - the adoption of the mandatory UN Security Council Resolution and the successful demand for economic measures by friendly countries - has, coupled with the despatch of the task force, subjected Argentina to the most intense and effective pressure.

LDN SWSD FEB

54250 COALTE G

COULD YOU PLEASE CONNECT ME TO THE FALKLAND ISLAND
COMPANY PORT STANLEY NO 21B

MOM PSE

21B FALKISCO FK
54250 COALTE G

MR HARRY MILNE 13TH APRIL 1982

Sent at 8.30 pm
13/4/82

DEAR HARRY,

DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOUR REPLIES, ON MOST OF WHICH I NEED
NOT COMMENT FURTHER NOW. PLEASED TO KNOW THAT, DESPITE
ALL THE MANY PROBLEMS AND ANXIETIES YOU MUST HAVE, YOU
ARE ALL HELPING ONE ANOTHER TO KEEP LIFE AS NORMAL AS IS
POSSIBLE, WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT I WOULD EXPECT FROM YOU
MARVELLOUS CHARACTERS.

GOOD TO KNOW THAT MONEY IS CIRCULATING TO PROVIDE FOR
NEEDS. HOPE PROVISIONS CAN BE MAINTAINED.

PLEASE RETURN VERY BEST WISHES TO MONSIGNOR. LOOK
FORWARD TO SEEING HIS CHEERY FEATURES AGAIN BEFORE LONG.

I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF SOMEBODY DIDN'T MANAGE TO EXTRACT
A BIT OF HUMOUR OUT OF THE SHEPHERDING EXERCISE. WITH
INCREASED POPULATION, HOPE NO PROBLEMS ON THIS AND OTHER
FOOD SUPPLIES. YOR EARLIER MESSAGE ON COMMODITIES
CAUSES SOME CONCERN.

WILL CERTAINLY ASK OUR PEOPLE IN LONDON TO REASSURE STAFF
RELATIVES, JUST AS YOU SUGGEST.

GOOD TO HEAR HOW ALL THE STAFF ARE RALLYING ROUND TO MAKE
THE BEST OF A BAD JOB. A
L THESE HIDDEN TALENTS WILL NO
DOUBT BE ABLE TO BE FULLY UTILISED AGAIN WHEN WE GET BACK
TO NORMAL - OR SOMETHING HOPEFULLY BETTER THAN WHAT WE
USED TO REGARD AS NORMAL.

AGAIN - SO GOOD TO BE INTOUCH. WARMEST REGARDS TO
EVERYBODY. WISH I COULD DO MORE.

TED.

21B FALKISCO FK

ANY MESSAGES

IF NOT WILL SIGN OFF FOR NOW, HAVE A GOOD NIGHT

IT'S GOOD NIGHT FROM ME - BETTY AND
IT'S GOOD NIGHT FROM HIM - TED

54250 COALTE G

54250 COALTE G
54250 COALTE G
54250 COALTE G
218 FALKISCO FK

13 APRIL 1982

DEAR TED,

*Rec'd about
6.30 pm 13/4/82*

THANKS FOR YR PROMPT REPLY.

- 1/ GLAD NO CHANGE MONSUNEN POLICY
- 2/ CAMP HAVE SUFFICIENT STORES FOR PRESENT
- 3/ WE HAVE UNDERWRITTEN NO NEW INSURANCE BUSINESS SINCE INVASION AS WE THOUGHT POLICIES WOULD BE WORTHLESS.
- 4/ STILL TRADING IN POUNDS
- 5/ POSTAGE CONVERTED TO ARGENTINE STAMPS
- 6/ MONEY AND ASSETS UNDER OUR CONTROL EXCEPT WHEN VESSEL IN STANLEY THEN JETTY AND EQUIPMENT TAKEN OVER
- 7/ MONEY AVAILABLE TO ISLANDS TO BUY WHAT THEY NEED
- 8/ BAKER SHOULD BE IN TOUCH WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS
- 9/ MONSIGNOR SENDS HIS VERY BEST WISHES TO YOU ALL AT COALITE

THANKS VERY MUCH FOR YR CONCERN BUT WE ARE TRYING TO KEEP A STIFF UPPER LIP WITH THE WEST STORE, SPARES SECTION AND BUTCHERY STILL IN OPERATION UNDER OUR CONTROL. STAFF REDUCING DUE TO CONTINUED EXIDUS TO CAMP.

RECEIVED 425 SHEEP INTO THE EAST JETTY YARD YESTERDAY AND SO STAFF BECAME SHEPHERDS AND SHEPHERDESSES TO GET INTO THE PADDOCKS BEHIND THE OFFICES.

WITH REGARD TO MESSAGES PLS ASK LO IF THEY CAN DO A QUICK RING ROUND OF STAFF RELATIVES IN ENGLAND TO ASSURE ALL STILL WELL, ALIVE AND KICKING HARD UNDER VERY TRYING CONDITIONS.

DEPARTMENTAL HEADS PROVING TOWERS OF STRENGTH WITH ALL THEIR HADDEN TALENTS COMING TO THE FORE.

REGARDS HARRY,

(PLS DELTE HADDEN AND INSERT . HIDDEN ..)

TKS BIBI
54250 COALTE G
218 FALKISCO FK



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1982

N. S. P. R.

*The P. R. has seen a telegram
version. No reply required.*

*AR 14/4
h-a*

Dear John,

/ I enclose a message to the Prime Minister from the Japanese Prime Minister which was delivered at the Foreign Office on 12 April.

/ I attach, for ease of reference, a copy of Tokyo telegram number 181: Sir H Cortazzi's comments on Mr Suzuki's message are in paragraph 8.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

6 21/21

112 APR 1952

(38)

B.

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REC

LDX NR 472+12

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OO FCO DESKBY 121000Z

PP WASHINGTON

PP CANBERRA

PP OTTAWA

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP BONN

PP THE HAGUE

PP BRUSSELS

PP LUXEMBOURG

PP COPENHAGEN

PP PARIS

PP DUBLIN

PP ROME

PP ATHENS

GR 870

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CO DESKBY 121000Z

FM TOKYO 120915Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 181 OF 12 APRIL

RFI PRIORITY WASHINGTON CANBERRA OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK AND EC POSTS.
SAVING WELLINGTON

MY TEL NO 180

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. KATO HANDED ME THIS AFTERNOON A COPY OF MR SUZUKI'S REPLY TO MRS THATCHER (TEXT IN MIFT). HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE HANDED OVER FORMALLY BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON TODAY. KATO HAD KEPT ME WAITING FOR SOMETIME AS IT WAS APPARENT THAT THERE HAD BEEN LAST MINUTE DRAFTING CHANGES IN THE TEXT. KATO SAID THAT WHILE THE PRESS WOULD BE GIVEN AN OUTLINE OF THE REPLY THE TEXT WOULD NOT BE RELEASED.
2. KATO TOLD ME ON INSTRUCTION THAT THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE VICE MINISTER HAD CALLED IN THE ARGENTINIAN AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING AND HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-
 - A) JAPAN DEEPLY REGRETTED THE ARGENTIAN USE OF FORCE AND DEMANDED AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTIAN FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.
 - B) JAPAN ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND WANTED THE ARGENTINIANS TO PAY DUE ATTENTION TO THIS WARNING SO THAT THEY DID NOT FORCE JAPAN INTO A MORE DIFFICULT POSITION. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PLACED HIGH EXPECTATIONS ON THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES AND HOPED THAT ARGENTINA WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THESE EFFORTS.
 - C) IF THIS CRISIS WERE PROLONGED THE CONFIDENCE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE IN ARGENTINA'S FUTURE MIGHT BE UNDERMINED AND THE SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT BE IMPEDED ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS JAPAN WISHED ARGENTINA TO EXERT ALL EFFORTS TO SEEK AN EARLY SOLUTION.

KATO SAID THAT THE VICE MINISTER HAD MADE THESE POINTS

KATO SAID THAT THE VICE MINISTER HAD MADE THESE POINTS FIRST AND THAT THEY HAD THEN BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHOSE TIME HAD BEEN VERY LIMITED. THE GIST HAD BEEN PASSED TO THE PRESS. AS A RESULT JAPAN DID NOT THINK IT NECESSARY AND HAD NO INTENTION OF MAKING A FORMAL STATEMENT.

3. KATO ADDED THAT THE ARGENTINIAN AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD THE JAPANESE THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE WARNING AND WOULD REPORT IMMEDIATELY. THE AMBASSADOR HAD STRESSED THE PEACEFUL INTENTION OF THE ARGENTINIANS (SIC) AND SAID THAT NO BLOOD HAD SO FAR BEEN SHED. THEY HAD WITHDRAWN THEIR WARSHIPS FROM THE AREA OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND HOPED FOR A SINCERE DIALOGUE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

I POINTED OUT THE CYNICISM OF THESE STATEMENTS.

4. IN COMMENTING ORALLY ON MR SUZUKI'S REPLY TO MRS THATCHER KATO SAID THAT NO APPLICATION FOR NEW COMMITMENT OF EXPORT CREDIT WAS EXPECTED. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT BANK LOANS HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT NEW LOANS WERE UNLIKELY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED THAT JAPAN HAD NOT SEEN ITS WAY TO PLACE A BAN ON ARGENTINIAN IMPORTS. WERE THEY CONSIDERING THIS MATTER FURTHER? KATO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN REPLY:-

A) THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUROPE AND JAPAN IN RELATION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS DIFFERENT. EUROPE WAS INDIRECTLY A PARTY TO THE MATTER BECAUSE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ASSOCIATION WITH THE COMMUNITY UNDER THE TREATY OF ROME;

B) A TOTAL OR PARTIAL BAN ON IMPORTS WAS LEGALLY SPEAKING VERY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE UNDER JAPANESE LAWS;

C) AS STATED IN THE MESSAGE JAPAN LOOKED FOR ACTION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IE IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR SANCTIONS JAPAN WOULD HAVE A LEGAL BASIS ON WHICH TO TAKE ACTION;

D) ARGENTINA WAS A MEMBER OF THE GATT AND JAPAN HAD A BILATERAL TREATY WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH ACTION COULD BE TAKEN UNDER THIS TREATY WAS UNDER ARTICLE 13 WHICH ALLOWED EXCEPTIONS ON SECURITY GROUNDS.

6. I ASKED ON WHAT BASIS JAPAN HAD TAKEN ACTION

D) ARGENTINA WAS A MEMBER OF THE GATT AND JAPAN HAD A BILATERAL TREATY WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH ACTION COULD BE TAKEN UNDER THIS TREATY WAS UNDER ARTICLE 13 WHICH ALLOWED EXCEPTIONS ON SECURITY GROUNDS.

6. I ASKED ON WHAT BASIS JAPAN HAD TAKEN ACTION AGAINST IRAN IN THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES. KATO REPLIED THAT NO ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON IMPORTS FROM IRAN BUT THEY HAD PLACED EXPORTS FROM IRAN UNDER THE APPROVAL SYSTEM. HOWEVER IRAN WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE GATT AND JAPAN HAD NO COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH IRAN. I SAID THAT WE WOULD WISH TO PURSUE FURTHER THE LEGAL ASPECTS.

7. IN CONCLUSION KATO SAID THAT HE HAD TWICE MET THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER TODAY. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED AND HAD MUCH SYMPATHY FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN THE PRESENT CRISIS.

COMMENT

8. THE JAPANESE REPLY IS DISAPPOINTING BECAUSE OF THE JAPANESE FAILURE TO TAKE SPECIFIC AND FIRM ACTION AGAINST THE ARGENTINIANS BUT THEY HAVE AT LEAST NOW COME OUT IN SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION AND I HOPE THAT THIS WILL BECOME CLEAR IN THE PRESS. THE REPLY IS BETTER THAN I HAD FEARED AND SUGGESTS THAT THE VIGOROUS LOBBYING OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAS HAD SOME RESULT.

FCO PSE PASS SAYING WELLINGTON

CORTAZZI

NNNN

[Faint, illegible text at the bottom of the page, possibly bleed-through or a second page's content.]

SUBJECT.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 70/82

EMBASSY OF JAPAN
UNITED KINGDOM

cc. Market set
ops

London: 12th April, 1982

Dear Prime Minister,

I am asked by the Prime Minister
of Japan, Mr. Zenko Suzuki, to forward a
message to you.

It gives me much pleasure to
enclose this message herewith.

Yours sincerely,

Tsuyoshi Hirahara

Tsuyoshi Hirahara

Ambassador

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury,
10, Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

EMBASSY OF JAPAN
UNITED KINGDOM

12th April, 1982

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for your detailed message concerning the Falkland Islands issue, which was delivered to me through your Ambassador, Sir Hugh Cortazzi. I have been following with a sense of grave concern the developments in and around the Falkland Islands since military action was taken by the Argentine armed forces. I have also read your message with great attention. The Government of Japan considers that the use of force by Argentina violates the basic principles of peaceful settlement of conflicts and non-use of force of the United Nations Charter and that such action can never be accepted. We strongly hope that the withdrawal of the Argentine forces will be promptly realized and that this dispute peacefully settled through diplomatic negotiations.

It was from this basic standpoint that Japan immediately supported the resolution tabled by your Government at the Security Council of the United Nations and that, also in Tokyo, the Japanese Government clearly explained our position both domestically and internationally.

This position of Japan has been conveyed to the Argentine side on various occasions, and on the 12th April, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conformity with my wishes, made the following representations to the Argentine Ambassador:

- (i) We deeply regret the use of force by Argentina and urge that its forces withdraw in compliance with the Security Council resolution;

- (ii) The Government of Japan places high expectations on good offices by the United States and hopes that Argentina will respond positively to the efforts of the United States in its good offices and will try to reach a peaceful settlement through diplomatic negotiations.

In this connection I wish to state similarly to you that Japan places, for the present, expectations on the efforts of good offices by the United States.

To your request for co-operation in the concrete measures proposed in your message, I should like to reply as follows:

The basic idea of the Japanese Government is that measures to secure the implementation of the Security Council resolution adopted on April 3 should primarily be sought within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with its Charter. We are certainly prepared to make efforts for the improvement of the situation by diplomatic and other means outside the United Nations, too. Such efforts should be naturally exerted in such a manner as not incompatible with the existing international obligations. It is also natural that we shall exert such efforts on the basis of what we judge for ourselves to be the long term interests of the Free World.

In more concrete terms, Japan pursues the policy of abstaining from exporting arms to foreign countries and is satisfied that it is thus contributing towards the maintenance of international peace and stability. This policy is being applied strictly to Argentina.

Bearing these considerations in mind, we stated to the Argentine side in our representations of April 12 that if the present crisis is prolonged, it is feared that the confidence of the Government and people of Japan in that country's future might be undermined and that the smooth development of relations between the two countries might be impeded, especially in the economic field, and expressed our hope that for these and other reasons the Argentine side will endeavour for an early solution of the current situation.

We shall continue to see that the Argentine side is reminded of it.

As a statesman shouldering the responsibilities of government as you are, I can imagine how seriously you are concerned about this affair. But I have known for a long time your outstanding leadership in a broad range of state affairs. In the firm belief that the United Kingdom will not fail to tide over this difficult situation under your able guidance, I send you my very best wishes for your good health and for every success in the discharge of your important responsibilities.

Yours sincerely,

Zenko Suzuki
Prime Minister of Japan

COALTE G

COULD YOU PLEASE CONNECT ME TO THE FAKLAND ISLAND
COMPANY PORT STANLEY NO 218

54250 COALTE G MOMPL

218 FALKISCO FK
54250-053 0211111111

WAIT FOR CONNECTION

218 FALKISCO FK
54250 COALTE G

L 1982

MR HARRY MILNE

*Sent
4.50 pm
13/4/82*

DEAR HARRY,

NOTE YOUR COMMENTS REGARDING PROPOSED USE OF MONSUNEN.
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN YESTERDAY, I CANNOT DEPART FROM
THE ANSWERS GIVEN THEN. I NOTE YOUR INTENTION REGARDING
FUTURE USE OF MONSUNEN INVIEW OF YOUR LOCAL ASSESSMENT
OF RISK TO VESSEL AND CREW. CAMP PRESUMABLY HAVE
SUFFICIENT PROVISIONS FOR PRESENT.

I SUPPOSE IT IS NOT SURPRISING UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT ROYAL INSURANCE ARE INSTRUCTING THAT WE SHOULD
UNDERTAKE NO NEW INSURANCE ON THE ISLANDS FOR TIME BEING.
SORRY TO HAVE TO BOTHER YOU WITH SUCH A MESSAGE BUT AM
OBLIGED TO DO SO.

HAVE SO FAR AVOIDED QUESTIONS ON MONEY MATTERS TO AVOID
BEING MISUNDERSTOOD. ARE YOU STILL TRADING INPOUNDS,
WITH COMPANY ASSETS AND MONEY UNDER YOUR CONTROL?

THE PURPOSE OF THAT QUESTION IS TO KNOW WHETHER NORMAL
MONEY AVAILABLE TO ISLANDERS TO BUY WHAT THEY NEED.

ANY MESSAGE FROM MONSIGNOR?

TOP CONCERN HERE REMAINS FOR YOUR SAFETY AND WELL-BEING.
WHATEVER OUTCOME, LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN AT
HAB// HAMBLEDON BEFORE LONG.

BEST WISHES,

TED.

ANY MESSAGE?

CAN YOU ADVISE WHEN BAKER LIKELY TO BE IN TOUCH.

54250 COALTE G
218 FALKISCO FK 13TH APRIL 1982 5 P M

54250 COALTE G
54250 COALTE G
54250 COALTE G
218 FALKISCO FK

rec'd about
4:30 pm
Tues. 13/4/82

13 APRIL 1982

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO BAKER UPON HIM CONTACTING YOU.

HEREWITH SCHEDULE OF STORES SUBMITTED TO AUTHORITIES AS INSTRUCTED.
ALL NONE ESSENTIAL AT MOMENT -

CO-CP
=====

20 BAGS SUGAR 50 KILOS

WEST STORE
=====

100 BAGS SUGAR 50 KILOS (WHITE GRANULATED)
100 CASES EACH 24 X 14 OZ TINS PEELED PLUM TOMATOES
75 CASES EACH 24 X 19 OZ TINS GARDEN PEAS
20 CASES EACH 24 X 12 OZ CORNED BEEF

REGARDS MILNE

54250 COALTE G
~~218 FALKISCO FK~~

CF

13 April, 1982

ARGENTINA: BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL

Thank you for your letter of 9 April.
As I told you on the telephone today the Prime Minister agrees that a reply should be sent to the message from the Chairman of the British Community Council in the terms of the text enclosed with this letter.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

/

"Dear Mr Murchison,

Thank you for your telegram about the British Community in Argentina.

I recognise the consideration which Argentine governments have shown to the British community in Argentina, who have - I know - contributed much to the prosperity and development of that country. We have long valued our relations with Argentina.

You will understand, however, that there can be no question of our failing to respond to the unprovoked aggression by the Argentine Government in its invasion of the Falkland Islands and their dependencies, and its attempt to settle by force the long-standing dispute between us.

The Argentine action has been condemned by the UN Security Council, which has passed by an overwhelming majority a mandatory resolution calling on Argentina to withdraw, as well as by very many other governments around the world. It is our earnest hope that the Argentine Government will heed this call and withdraw its forces.

The British Government seeks a peaceful solution and will pursue all possible means of securing one. But there must be no doubt of our determination to re-assert British administration over the Falkland Islands.

I realise with deep regret that this situation may cause anxieties for British people living in Argentina. That is why we have been advising people to consider leaving the country by normal commercial means. It is, of course, for individuals to decide how to respond to this advice.

I earnestly believe that only firmness and resolution will contribute to the maintenance of the rule of law and the preservation of peace both in the South Atlantic and in the wider world.

With best wishes.

Margaret Thatcher."

4250 COALITION
218 FALKISCO FK

12 APRIL 1982

TO MR MELDHAM

Rec'd about 4:00p
131+182

DEAR TED,

AUTHORITIES REQUIRE MONSUNEY TO LAY NAVIGATION BUDY IN PORT
WILLIAM THEN AFTER TO RESUME NORMAL DUTIES. THEY ARE HEDGING THE
QUESTIONS OF REQUISITION AND ISSUING WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS.
WHAT DO YOU WANT ME TO DO?

WE DO NOT INTEND TO SAIL MONSUNEY ON COASTAL VOYAGES UNTIL
SITUATION RESOLVED AS WE CONSIDER RISK TO VESSEL AND CREW TO
BE GREAT.

REGARDS HARDY.

KCD WLF PLS

4250 COALITION
218 FALKISCO FK

2.25p
Tues

HELLO HARRY YOUR COMMENTS RE MONSUNEN NOTED . I HOPE IT
STAYS THAT WAY . SORRY TO SEE STANLEY HOUSE REWQUISITIONED
HOPE IT WILL BE TREATED PROPERLY . ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS OR NEWS
REGARDS TED .

WELL MR MILNE IS NOT E HERE AT PRESENT BUT I'M SURE HE'D
PASS ON HIS TKS TO MR NEEDHAM FOR HIS PROMPT ATTENTION - ITS
NICE TO BE IN SUCH CLOSE CONTACT AT THIS TIME.

REGARS ROSEMARIE

THANKS ALL THE BEST TO YOU ALL

TED

54250 COALTE G

21B FALKISCO FK

54250 COALTE G
54250 COALTE GD
54250 COALTE G
21B FALKISCO FK

Rec'd 2.20 pm
↑
Incl

54250 G

13 APRIL 1982.

DEAR TED,

NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS RE 'MONSUNEN'. STANLEY HOUSE HAS NOW
BEEN TAKEN OVER AND OCCUPIED BY AIR FORCE.

ALL THE BEST,

REGARDS HARRY.

HELLO DID YOU RCE OK PLS

YES THANKYOU

ARE YOU STILL THERE

YES

DO YOU WANT TO HANG ON TO SEE IF THERE IS ANY MESSAGES

OK

JUST GETTING TOUCH WITH MR NEEDHAM

OK

INTERVIEW WITH THE RT HON DENIS HEALEY MP BY GORDON CLOUGH,
BBC RADIO FOUR WORLD THIS WEEKEND, ON 13 APRIL 1982

The Falkland Islands

Interviewer: Well, the main thrust of the Opposition's policy in these dangerous times has been to offer its support to the Government but to stress that support does not come in the form of a blank cheque. In his speech in last Wednesday's debate in the House of Commons, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Denis Healey, warned against the danger of reaching a settlement inconsistent with our responsibilities to the Falkland Islanders and of the danger of an all out assault on the Islands at a time when the Argentine forces would have time to build up their strength and their stores. There have been unconfirmed reports today that the airlift of men and materials to the Islands has been accelerated to the point where it is estimated there could be many thousands of Argentine troops in the Falklands. Or of course we have had those reports today that the naval strength has been run down. Mr Healey has been listening with me to that interview with Francis Pym and to another interview Mr Pym gave to Commercial Television. In the light of what you have heard Mr Healey, do you think that the Opposition can still offer the Government its support, not in blank cheque form.

Mr Healey: I think that if the Government follows the line which Mr Pym appeared to put this morning, yes, they would get our support because his position is very, very close, even in detail, to ours. First of all we want a peaceful solution. He stressed that again and again, although we agree with the Government that we shan't get that unless it is encouraged by the wise and prudent deployment of armed strength. I think two other things emerged from the interview he gave on Commercial Television. The first is that it is possible that the Argentine withdrawal could be succeeded not by a British administration but by some form of United Nations presence. And you may recall I suggested in my speech on Wednesday that an United Nations administrator backed by a peace-keeping force might be what was required to do that trick. The other thing

is the long-term answer to the problem and that does require once the troops are withdrawn negotiation which is bound to cover the question of sovereignty. And Mr Pym made it very, very clear that this is a question he is prepared to discuss providing that the Falkland Islanders will accept a solution. And he indicated many many times, as I did in my speech on Wednesday, that the attitude of the Falkland Islanders to their future is bound to have been influenced by the events of the last few weeks.

Interviewer: Did you get the impression that he felt that the opinion of the Falkland Islanders expressed after a period of time should be paramount though?

Mr Healey: Yes and that is our view too. I stressed that very strongly. I think the important thing is not sovereignty over a bit of soil but the right of British subjects to determine their own future, which is absolutely paramount. If we forfeit that then of course there is the risk of Belize being attacked, Gibraltar perhaps being attacked and so on and so forth all over the world. But as he said, and I said, the attitude of the Falkland Islanders is bound to have been influenced by what has happened in the last few weeks, although so far it is not easy to guess in what direction.

Interviewer: What about the position of President Galtieri now? I mean, if the UN peace-keeping force is accepted as an idea and the Argentine forces have to withdraw as a precondition of that, doesn't that weaken his own position very much?

Mr Healey: Oh it does. But of course diplomatic solution does require compromise by both sides. Mr Pym suggested on Commercial Television that once the Argentines undertook to withdraw, we would consider ordering the taskforce back to Britain and that would be a concession if you like ..

I don't think

Interviewer: Well, /he said there was no need for it to go on. I think he actually said to turn it round.

/Mr Healey:

Mr Healey: Well, he did more or less say that, yes, because that was the question put to him and they can't hang around in the middle of the Atlantic whatever, in any case; they have to go somewhere. I think the important thing really is that the opportunity of a diplomatic settlement has been opened. I think the readiness of Britain to back negotiation by strength has been a major factor. It has certainly been a major factor in persuading the Americans to play a leading role in trying to find a solution. And my own view is that in the end it is going to depend on the Americans recognising that a conflict in the South Atlantic would be disastrous to their foreign policy and that of the West and the only way of avoiding it is a settlement of the Falkland Islands problem which is acceptable to all sides.

Interviewer: So that you personally and speaking for the Shadow Cabinet on the whole would say that the Government is on the whole playing it right?

Mr Healey: On the whole so far, though I have been worried by some of the things that Mr Nott has said. Not in Parliament. What he said there was impeccable, but one or two things he has said on the television later. But I think what Mr Pym said, and this is very important, is absolutely critical. He really, if you like, gave support to the line which the Opposition has taken in saying that if force in the end had to be used Britain would support^{it} only if the British people had confidence in the way in which the Government had managed the situation. And I think the primacy of diplomacy at this moment and if force has to be used, the minimum force used with immense prudence, that is the sort of thing which will get support. But the sort of gung-ho jingoism we saw too much of a week ago I think would not only repel British opinion but would rob us of the support of the bulk of the world, which we now have.

Interviewer: Do you think that the Government position as now stated by Mr Pym is going to be sufficiently moderate to pacify,

if you like, the pacifists in the Labour Party, the ones who have been saying we should turn the fleet round tomorrow?

Mr Healey: Well, the pacifists in the Labour Party like pacifists everywhere are not in favour of the use of force under any circumstances and it's not possible to meet their needs. But the important thing is the position which Michael Foot and I have taken in Parliament has been supported not only by the overwhelming bulk of the Labour Members of Parliament but also by the overwhelming majority, in fact there was no opposition to it, in the International Committee of the National Executive Committee.

Interviewer: But you weren't at all worried then by the speeches that were made by Mr Benn, Mr Powell yesterday warning us of the danger of this spreading to nuclear conflict and so on? You didn't feel there was a danger of a major split in the Party?

Mr Healey: No, I don't. I'm no longer surprised or worried by anything that individuals you mention say.

Interviewer: So when you go back to the House of Commons in due course, you may indeed be recalled, who knows, you feel at the moment the Opposition including not only yourselves but the SDP/Liberal Alliance can give the Government all the support it gets?

Mr Healey: Well, everything will depend on what happens within the next few days. It seems to me that we are probably at the most critical moment in the whole affair. Mr Haig is coming back to London with some ideas, not I gather proposals; Mr Pym's answers to questions today suggest that the concept of an United Nations force would not be rejected. If the Government goes for that and hasn't taken unwise action in the meantime, then they will get our support. But I think what has become clearer and clearer is that the case for Parliament having a progress report on this has become a very very strong one indeed and I think probably we shall need to have a recall next week.



113 APR 1982





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1982

Not in the event used

AD 14/4

b.c.

Dear John,

Falklands: Personal Messages from the
Prime Minister

You asked for one or two paragraphs for the Prime Minister's speech about the messages which the Prime Minister has sent to other Heads of State and of Government since the beginning of the present crisis.

/ I enclose a draft.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: FALKLANDS: PERSONAL MESSAGES FROM THE PRIME
MINISTER: DRAFT PARAGRAPHS FOR THE PRIME
MINISTER'S SPEECH

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I have been in constant personal touch with our main friends and allies to seek their support for our position. Immediately following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands I sent personal messages to all our Commonwealth partners asking them to give the strongest possible condemnation to the invasion. On 6 April I sent personal messages to Heads of State and of Government of our principal partners and allies, including our partners in the European Community, seeking their support in bringing pressure against the Argentinians particularly through economic and financial measures. I have also sent messages to other Heads of State, including in Latin America, seeking their support in impressing on the Argentine Government the seriousness of its action, and the need to fulfil its international legal obligations in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502.

/As the

Enclosures—flag(s).....



As the House knows, the response to these efforts has not only heartwarming but has also made a very important contribution to the ~~the~~ of our efforts to seek a peaceful solution. I have received many personal messages of support and encouragement. I have of course already thanked ^{those} all concerned but I am sure ^{will} the House wish to join me in a further public expression of our appreciation. The value of friendship and cooperation has been truly demonstrated in recent days. I shall of course remain in touch with our friends as the search for a peaceful solution continues.

that

from Heads of State and Government around the world

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APR 11 1962

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h.a.
APR 14/82

COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS' REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

- ...
1. Attached is an up-to-date list of Commonwealth Governments' reactions to the Falklands crisis.

13 April 1982

COMMONWEALTH COORDINATION DEPT

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COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

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Country

Antigua and Barbuda Robust statement by PM. Full support also to UN initiative. Copy of statement to Commonwealth Secretary-General.

Australia Ambassador recalled; ban on imports; ban on credit. Robust statements/messages of support. Statement at Security Council.

Bahamas Robust reply to PM's letter, to be referred to in Government statement. Note to Argentinian Government urging compliance with SCR 502.

Bangladesh Statement condemning 'use of force in settling disputes'. Robust statement privately to Ambassador from Permanent Secretary Foreign Affairs.

Barbados 'Full and complete support to any Commonwealth protest and initiative'. Prime Minister delivered statement during televised budget debate ensuring maximum coverage.

Belize Reply to PM. Telegram to UNSG. Robust statement.

Botswana Statement 'strongly condemns' Argentine action. No specific mention of support for UK. Replied to SG's letter.

Canada Robust and helpful line. PM endorsed separately statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs. Withdrew Ambassador. Banned military shipments. Cancelled Defence College visit. Ban on imports and export credit.

CONFIDENTIAL

.../2

Cyprus

Dominica

Robust reply to Prime Minister's letter.

Fiji

Robust statement by PM.

The Gambia

Ghana

Grenada

Guyana

Strong statement by Guyana Government. Voted for SCR 502. Robust reply to Ramphal's letter. Robust reply PM letter.

India

Lukewarm; appealing to 'all parties' to seek a 'peaceful resolution'.

Jamaica

Robust statement.

Kenya

Robust statement

Kiribati Robust statement.

Lesotho Response to SG expressing 'deep concern'.

Malawi / President's robust reply to PM: moral backing for use of force if necessary. Robust statement.

Malaysia Weak statement although 'deeply disturbed'.

Malta No statement yet. High Commission does 'not expect Malta to support' UK.

Mauritius Robust reply to Ramphal quoting Security Council instructions.

Nauru

New Zealand Robust statements/messages of support. Broken diplomatic relations. Support at UN. Cancelled Argentine flight schedule. Ean on trade, supply of arms/military material, export credits.

Nigeria Message to PM. Helpful statement.

Papua New Guinea

Robust statement by PM PNG. To make feelings known through international bodies. Responded to SG quoting statement.

Saint Lucia

Strong statement.

Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines

Robust statement. Copy sent to SG.

Seychelles

Response to PM letter, deploring aggression: made public.

Sierra Leone

Statement views developments 'with great concern'. Ambassador UN instructed to 'condemn Argentine Action in strong terms'. SLG agree to provide facilities for refuelling etc.

Singapore

Fairly robust statement although no specific mention of support for UK. Robust reply from PM to PM's message.

Solomon Islands

Robust statement. Government has also sent message to SG of UN and to SG of Commonwealth. 'Assurance' of support to Prime Minister.

Sri Lanka

Message to Prime Minister 'condemns use of force' but no specific support for UK.

Swaziland PM privately promised support for UK

Tanzania Statement regrets Argentine military action but no specific mention of support for UK.

Tonga Robust reply to PM letter: would support 'any action' by us to reassert sovereignty.

Trinidad and Tobago 'Feeble' statement.

Tuvalu Robust reply to SG and Secretary of State.

Uganda Voted for SCR 502. Helpful with Non-Aligned. Replied to PM letter: 'great concern'. Statement condemning aggression.

Vanuatu Statement 'strongly condemns' invasion, but also calls upon UK to "reconsider" military retaliation. Copied to SG, PM, Argentine Government, UN.

Western Samoa Statement by Government 'strongly condemns' Argentina, but calls upon UK to seek non-military solution.

Zambia Statement by Acting President deploring invasion

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

Zimbabwe

Inadequate statement but supporting SCR 502.

CONFIDENTIAL

Argentina

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1982

*N. S. P.R.**MR 14/4**ha.**Dear John,*Falkland Islands

I have already sent you the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 on decolonisation and the subsequent 1965, 1973 and 1976 resolutions on the Falkland Islands specifically. I now enclose a copy of the 1964 Report of the Special Committee of the General Assembly on Decolonisation about the Falkland Islands, to which Resolution 2065 of 1965 refers. The new draft language proposed by Mr Haig to Mr Pym at the Churchill Hotel on 13 April (copy enclosed) also refers to this Report.

I also enclose a 1965 supplement to the Special Committee's 1964 Report.

All four of the above Resolutions were passed by the General Assembly with large majorities. However we and the United States abstained on Resolution 1514 and on both the 1965 and 1973 resolutions on the Falkland Islands; we voted against the 1976 resolution on the Falkland Islands while the US again abstained.

*Yours ever**John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period and, during this period, the signatories shall negotiate the conditions of the decolonization and definitive status of the islands, consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XX), and the 1964 Report of the Special Committee of the General Assembly on the situation with regard to the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

CHAPTER XXIII

FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. The Falkland Islands (Malvinas), situated in the South Atlantic, lie some 480 miles north-east of Cape Horn. The numerous islands of which they are composed cover 4,618 square miles (11,961 square kilometres). The Dependencies now consist of only South Georgia, 800 miles east-south-east of the Falklands, the South Sandwich Group, some 470 miles south-east of South Georgia and a number of smaller islands. Those territories south of latitude 60°S which were formerly part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, namely the South Orkney Islands, the South Shetland Islands and Graham Land, together with that sector of the Antarctic Continent lying between longitudes 20°W and 80°W were constituted a separate Colony on 3 March 1962 under the name of the British Antarctic Territory. There are two large islands, East and West Falkland, and numerous smaller islands. The surface everywhere, except in the district of Lafonia on East Falkland, is hilly; the maximum height being that of Mount Osborne in East Falkland, rising to 2,312 feet.

2. At the census taken on 18 March 1962, the population, excluding Dependencies, was 2,172. With few exceptions, all were of European descent and most were of British origin. The population of the Dependencies fluctuates with the whaling season: in the summer whaling season, it is approximately 560, with less than half that number during the winter. Stanley, the capital, with a population of 1,074 at the 1962 census, is the only town. Aside from Stanley, the largest settlement in the group is at Goose Green in East Falkland with a population of about 100.

Status

3. Falkland Islands (Malvinas) is a Colony and has been under British control since 1833. The first settlement in the group was that of a French colony at Port Louis on East Falkland, established in 1764. In 1767, the French settlement was sold by the Government of France to Spain at a reported payment of £24,000. A small British garrison was established at Port Egmont on Saunders Island in 1765; five years later, however, the Spanish took over the control of the garrison. In 1771, the garrison settlement was restored by the Spanish but in 1774 the settlement was abandoned by the British. In 1833, the occupation of the Islands was resumed by the British Government and through 1841 the settlement was in the charge of a serving naval officer. In 1842, a civil Lieutenant-Governor was appointed, and in 1843 an Act of Parliament placed the civil administration on a permanent footing, changing the Lieutenant-Governor's title to Governor. In 1844, the seat of government was removed from Port Louis to Port William, which was renamed Stanley.

4. The Government of Argentina, at successive sessions of the General Assembly, has expressed its reservations with regard to the sovereignty over the Territory of the Malvinas Islands. At the eighteenth session of the General Assembly (1267th meeting), the representative of Argentina, while reiterating his Government's reservations, stated that the Territory was not a colony of any nation, but an integral part of Argentine

national territory. The representative of the United Kingdom has stated in reply to Argentina that Her Majesty's Government has no doubts as to its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

*Political and constitutional development**Constitution*

5. In 1949, a new Constitution was introduced which provided for a Governor, assisted by an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. Both Councils consisted of an equal number of official members (civil servants) and non-official members nominated by the Governor. Provision was also made for elections to fill four of the non-official seats in the Legislative Council. The Constitution was amended in 1951, thereby reducing the number of nominated official members in the Legislative Council from three to two and giving, for the first time, a majority to the non-official members. Elections were held in 1952 and the reconstituted Legislative Council met that year. The Executive Council now also has a majority of non-officials. The main features of the present Constitution are set out below.

6. *Governor.* The Governor, the Queen's representative, is the head of the administration of the Territory. In the exercise of his powers he is advised by the Executive Council. He normally acts in accordance with the advice he receives from the Executive Council and may only act against this advice in certain specific circumstances.

7. *Executive Council.* The Executive Council is composed of five non-official members nominated by the Governor and three *ex officio* (civil servants) members. The Council is the principal executive organ and normally takes decisions on all matters affecting the internal government of the Territory, including the budget. In 1962, all except two of the members of the Council were local inhabitants.

8. *Legislative Council.* The Legislative Council, presided over by the Governor, is composed of eleven members, of whom four are elected, four are nominated (including two non-official and three civil servants). The Council passes laws for the peace, order and good government of the Territory. It must meet at least once a year and usually has several sessions, including a budget session in June or July. The Governor has only a casting vote.

Electoral System

9. The four electoral members of the Legislative Council are chosen by universal adult suffrage.

Judiciary

10. The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court and a Court of Summary Jurisdiction. The Governor sits as Judge of the Supreme Court and the Colonial Secretary as Magistrate in the latter Court. The Court of Summary Jurisdiction can also be presided over by a bench of magistrates composed of two or more justices of the peace. The laws of the Territory are mainly based on English laws and precedents.

Public Service

11. Appointments to the Public Service are made by the Governor at his discretion, assisted, when neces-

sary, by members of the Executive Council. A total of fifty-three persons were in the Public Service in 1962. All junior posts in the Administration and the majority of the senior posts are held by local inhabitants. In 1962, among the senior posts, those of Colonial Treasurer, Superintendent of Posts and Telegraphs and the Registrar of the Supreme Court were held by local inhabitants. Most of the justices of the peace are local inhabitants.

Local government

12. There is a Town Council in Stanley, consisting of six elected members and three members nominated by the Governor. Of the six elected members, three retire every two years and elections are therefore held biennially. The activities of the Council are financed mainly from rates and from grants from the central Government. Its responsibility consists of the normal range of local government services such as the fire brigade, street cleaning and lighting, housing and town planning.

Political parties

13. There are no political parties in the Territory.

Economic conditions

14. The economy of the Islands depends on the wool industry and practically all revenue is derived indirectly from sheep-farming. The internal revenue of the Territory, derived mainly from taxation, customs duties and from sales of postage stamps, has decreased from £289,000 in 1959/1960, to £267,000 in 1960/1961 and to £269,000 in 1961/1962, while current expenditure for the respective years was £283,000, £275,000 and £301,000. These continued deficits have led to measures designed to increase the territorial revenue among which are increases in the rates of personal and company taxation which became effective on 1 January 1962 and the introduction of a new profit tax of 10 per cent, which became effective on 1 January 1963. There is no general customs tariff, import duties being confined to liquor, tobacco and matches. Export duty on wool was discontinued in 1962.

15. All land, with the exception of some 56,500 acres remaining with the Crown, is freehold and divided into sheep farms varying in size from 3,600 to 161,000 acres, carrying up to 40,000 sheep. The Falkland Islands Company, Limited, which owns a number of farms, holds freehold land amounting to some 1.23 million acres, carrying nearly 300,000 sheep. At the end of 1962, there were some 620,000 sheep, 11,000 cattle, 3,500 horses and forty pigs. In 1962 mink farming was organized by the Falkland Islands Company, and has proved to be successful. The company has combined the mink project with the construction of a modern abattoir to meet the greatly increased demand for mutton which is used to feed the mink. There is no agriculture in the Territory other than a very small acreage of oats grown for hay. The only manufactured product is a small quantity of tallow. The principal products, aside from wool, are whale meal, other whale products and seal oil. There are no minerals.

16. The figures for external trade show a continued drop in the value of exports. This can be attributed to the decrease in the value of wool exported which continues to account for over 90 per cent of the total. The value of imports remains well below that

of exports. The main imports are food, beverages, tobacco, manufactured goods and machinery, and transport equipment. External trade figures over the last few years are as follows:

Year	Domestic exports (value in thousand pounds)	Wool exports (value in thousand pounds)	Imports
1960	934	908	385
1961	978	958	468
1962	940	913	413

The United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries absorb over 99 per cent of the Territory's exports and provide 76 per cent of the imports.

17. Work on the rehabilitation and improvement of the Stanley roads was commenced in 1956 and was expected to have been completed by the end of 1963. The estimated cost of the project is £219,415, of which £85,470 has been granted from Colonial Development and Welfare funds. Funds made available for development finance for the fiscal year 1960/1961 were £28,996, compared with £4,250 in 1959/1960 and £18,002 in 1958/1959. Special expenditure, including Colonial Development and Welfare schemes, amounted to £39,360 in 1960/1961, £43,271 in 1959/1960 and £53,060 in 1958/1959.

Social conditions

18. There is a general shortage of labour in the Territory owing to the steady exodus of people. In 1962, 411 persons left and 368 arrived, compared with 326 and 224 respectively in 1961 and 292 and 224 respectively in 1960. Sheep farming, the principal industry, employs approximately 500; the Government, 53 and the Falkland Islands Company, 54. Occupations in Stanley are mostly in the Public Service, trading or shipping. Local labour is organized in the Falkland Islands Labour Federation which has more than 90 per cent of eligible labour in the Territory, or over 500 in its membership.

19. A contributory old-age pension scheme was introduced in 1952. In 1961, it was extended to provide pensions on a non-contributory basis for people too old to join the contributory scheme. In 1962, the weekly rate of pension was increased and other benefits were added.

20. *Public health.* The Territory has one hospital, located in Stanley, with thirty-two beds for the treatment of medical, surgical, obstetric and tuberculosis cases. Antenatal and child welfare clinics are also held weekly at the hospital. Admissions at the hospital average 150 annually. The Government Medical Department employs one senior medical officer, and three medical officers, one of whom is in Stanley, one at Darwin and the third at Fox Bay. The nursing staff of the hospital consists of the matron, three nursing sisters and six nurses. There are three government-employed dentists. Diseases of the circulatory system, mainly associated with old age, are the main causes of death. During 1961/1962, a polio immunization campaign and an ophthalmic survey were undertaken.

21. Expenditure on medical services, including special expenditure, was £36,169 in 1961/1962, compared with £30,933 in 1960/1961 and £28,216 in 1959/1960. The recurrent medical expenditure in 1962 represented 12.68 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure of the Territory.

Educational conditions

22. In 1961/1962, there were 314 children receiving education in the Territory. There is no system of higher education and no advanced secondary education. In Stanley there are two government schools, requiring compulsory attendance for all children between the ages of 5 and 14, though a number of them stay until the age of 16, and, in some subjects, reach General Certificate of Education standard. Outside Stanley, education is carried on either in settlement schools or by itinerant teachers, attendance being compulsory for children between 5 and 14 years of age living within one mile, and for children between 7 and 14 years of age living within two miles of a settlement school.

23. A boarding school at Darwin, opened in 1956, accommodates some forty boarders and caters for as many day pupils as may wish to attend. Another boarding school at Port Howard, opened in 1957, caters for some ten boarders and the children of Port Howard as day pupils. Six itinerant teachers were employed in 1960 and four in 1961. In 1961/1962, there were thirteen certificated (completed secondary school course), five uncertificated (completed secondary school course, but not yet certified), three trained (not completing secondary school course) and six untrained teachers in the Territory.

24. An overseas scholarship examination is held each year, and successful candidates are granted a three-year course at boarding grammar schools in England. Two to three scholarships are awarded annually under this scheme. The Department of Education maintains evening classes each winter from May to October, open to the public; shorthand and book-keeping classes are attended by many adults.

25. The total expenditure on education in 1961/1962 was £41,553, representing 14.24 per cent of the total expenditure of the Territory. By comparison, it was £32,548, or 11.8 per cent of the total expenditure in 1960/1961.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE*Introduction*

26. At its 311th meeting on 13 November 1964, the Special Committee considered the Report of Sub-Committee III on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), which appears as an annex to the present chapter.

27. The representative of Argentina participated in the consideration of the report.

Written petitions

28. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas):

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Richard Victor Goss and three other elected members of the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands	A/AC.109/PET.307
The Deputy Chairman of the Falkland Islands Sheep Owners Association	A/AC.109/PET.308
The General Secretary and the Executive Committee of the Falkland Islands Labour Federation	A/AC.109/PET.309
Mr. Harry E. Slade, former Chairman of the Civil Servants Association	A/AC.109/PET.310

*Petitioner**Document No.*

The Chairman of the Stanley Town Council	A/AC.109/PET.311
Twenty-seven petitions concerning the Falkland Islands	A/AC.109/PET.312
Forty-three petitions concerning the Falkland Islands	A/AC.109/PET.312/Add.1

Statements by delegations

29. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government's position on the question of the Falkland Islands had been set out at length in his delegation's statements to Sub-Committee III, which appeared in full in document A/AC.109/102. His Government considered that the Special Committee was not empowered by its terms of reference to consider territorial claims or disputes over sovereignty, and it would therefore not regard itself as bound by any recommendations of the Committee on those subjects. The United Kingdom had no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

30. Where the future of the islands was concerned, his Government would be guided by what it regarded as the interests of the Falkland Islanders themselves, as required by Article 73 of the Charter. It was always ready to consider any proposals for constitutional change which the Islanders might advance, but it was clear from the petitions submitted to the Committee (A/AC.109/PET.307-311) that they wished to retain and strengthen their link with the United Kingdom and that any constitutional association with a foreign Power would be repugnant to them. His delegation had made it clear in Sub-Committee III that, while the United Kingdom could not agree to participate in discussions of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, it was always willing to discuss with the Argentine Government ways in which the two Governments and the Islanders could avoid damage to the good relations between them as a result of the unfortunate dispute. He wished to make a formal reservation concerning the use of the phrase "otherwise known as the Malvinas Islands" in paragraph 121 of the Sub-Committee's report (see annex), which his Government interpreted as indicating purely the Spanish translation of the name of a Territory, and thus as having no implications with regard to the question of sovereignty over the Territory or to the correct nomenclature to be employed in United Nations documents referring to the Territory.

31. The representative of Argentina said that the term "Malvinas Islands" was not simply a Spanish translation of the name of the Territory, but was generally used in countries where Latin languages were spoken; consequently, it was recognized by Argentina as the true name of the Territory. He would prefer the Committee's documents to indicate that the Falkland Islands were also known as the Malvinas Islands.

32. The historical, geographical, juridical, political and economic background of his Government's just claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands had been expounded at length in Sub-Committee III. The problem had arisen from an act of military force by the United Kingdom in 1833 against a part of the Territory of Argentina, as established upon its accession to independence in 1810, following which the Argentine authorities and inhabitants had been expelled from the islands and later replaced by settlers from the United Kingdom. The resulting colonial situation had endured until the present day, although the United Kingdom could invoke no international instrument

giving it any rights over the Malvinas Islands and although the nations of the Americas had repeatedly asserted the illegality of the occupation of territory in their hemisphere by outside Powers. Argentina had never ceased to press its claim for reparation of the injury done to it, which no lapse of time could validate.

33. One might ask why England had seized by force from a young nation, with which it had signed a treaty of friendship, a group of islands 10,000 miles from its own territory. The answer was that England in the early nineteenth century, had been in the grip of an expansionist fever which had led it to annex territories throughout the world. In search of strategic bases in the South Atlantic, the British had invaded Buenos Aires in 1805 and 1807, but had been repulsed; thus frustrated, they had sought an alternative supply base for their vessels proceeding to Australia and the South Pacific, and had therefore occupied the Malvinas Islands, which offered the additional attraction of rich fishing resources. In the twentieth century, the islands had served as an extremely important base for the Royal Navy during two world wars.

34. The question remained why, in a time of peace and in an age when colonialism was being liquidated and mutual respect among peoples was being consolidated, the United Kingdom persisted in maintaining its hold in the Malvinas Islands to the detriment of its relations with a friendly State. The only reply given by the United Kingdom was that it had no doubt about its sovereignty over the Islands, and its sole justification appeared to be its concern for the right of the people to self-determination. The countries of Latin America had been in the forefront of the struggle for self-determination, first in their own hemisphere, and later in the United Nations from its very inception. It would appear from the insistent statements made by its representative during the debate on the Malvinas Islands that the United Kingdom also supported the right of peoples to self-determination; yet the United Kingdom had abstained from voting on resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, adopted by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, after expressing doubts as to whether the principle of self-determination should be set out in paragraph 2 of that resolution. Further reservations concerning the principle of self-determination had been expressed by the United Kingdom Government in its comments on General Assembly resolution 1966 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, contained in document A/5725/Add.4, which at least had the virtue of recognizing that, in exceptional cases, the principle of self-determination might have to be considered in the light of other principles, such as that of the territorial integrity of States—an argument which applied to the Malvinas Islands.

35. The population of the Malvinas Islands had remained unchanged in numbers since the beginning of the twentieth century, and projections prepared by the United Nations showed that it was the only South American territory in which no future population increase was foreseeable. The United Kingdom representative in Sub-Committee III had painted a rosy picture of the economy of the Islands; but apart from the fact that a single company had a monopoly of commercial activities—in itself an objectionable anachronism—the stagnation of the population figures and the fact that emigration was greater than immigration were significant indicators of the state of the

economy. The truth was that no economic and social progress was possible so long as the Islands were completely cut off, not only from the present Administering Power, but from Argentina, simply because of the dispute provoked by the United Kingdom and the strict control imposed on entry to the Territory. Economic development and true social advancement would not be possible until the natural links were re-established with Argentina, which in the past had assimilated persons of many nationalities, showing respect for fundamental human rights and offering economic and social progress to all.

36. Sub-Committee III had confirmed that the provisions of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples were applicable to the Malvinas Islands, but had emphasized that there were special factors to be borne in mind. In particular, since the Islanders were not the original inhabitants, but had simply replaced those expelled by force, paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) could not be blindly applied, and the terms of paragraph 6 must be taken into account.

37. One of the main arguments of the United Kingdom was that the Special Committee was not competent to deal with questions of sovereignty. The Committee's terms of reference had been established in resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 December 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962 and 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, under which the Committee must make recommendations for the full implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, whatever the form of colonialism involved. The basic flaw in the position of the United Kingdom delegation was that it sought to focus the attention of the Committee on one aspect of the question, instead of on the problem as a whole. The Committee had not been asked to decide upon a question of sovereignty, but to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and in doing so it must bear in mind all the circumstances and apply those provisions of the Declaration which it deemed most appropriate.

38. Sub-Committee III had noted the existence of a dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina concerning sovereignty over the Islands and had recommended that the two Governments should enter into negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem. Argentina, a law-abiding and peace-loving country, had accepted that recommendation; the United Kingdom representative had repeated that his Government was willing to negotiate, but had rendered any negotiations meaningless by insisting on the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands.

39. He hoped that States Members of the international community would urge the two Governments to enter into negotiations and that the United Kingdom would agree without reservations; for the strengthening of relations between the two peoples would surely be of much greater importance to the United Kingdom Government than the maintenance under its exclusive control of a remote outpost which no longer had the same strategic or economic importance as in the past.

40. The representative of Venezuela observed that when, in the absence of any international organization to which to resort, the American peoples had liberated themselves by force of arms, Venezuela had never regarded the right to independence as limited to its own territory and people; it had thought of America

as a continent of free nations, and half its population had been sacrificed for the continent's freedom. At Bolivar's death in 1930, plans had been in the making for an invasion to liberate the rest of the Caribbean; his soldiers had marched all over the continent in order to help the people to secure freedom from colonial rule. The Venezuelan people's attitude towards colonialism had not changed. For Venezuela and the other Latin American nations, the liberation started by Bolivar would not be concluded until colonialism had been eliminated from the continent and the rightful owners had regained all the American territory occupied by others. The resolutions of the Organization of American States reaffirmed that freedom, and independence for the whole of America was the constant aim of the foreign policy of all the nations of the continent. The movement to eliminate colonialism had at last become world-wide and irresistible; General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) applied fully to the occupied colonies and territories in America.

41. The representative of Chile said that his delegation would vote in favour of the report of Sub-Committee III, which recommended that the Special Committee should invite the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem of the Malvinas Islands. The Sub-Committee's recommendations were the outcome of careful study and were unanimous.

42. His delegation's position was also prompted by considerations of American solidarity. The problem of the Malvinas Islands affected the entire continent, first, because it frustrated the continent's desire for unification, and secondly, because it conflicted with the agreements reached at the First Meeting of Consultation of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and at the Ninth and Tenth International Conferences, of American States proclaiming the continent's opposition to colonialism and to the occupation of American territories by extra-continental Powers. A prompt solution of the problem was in the interest of all the American Republics. His delegation was convinced that the spirit of peace, the will to co-operate and the great ideals which now inspired America and the world would prevail at the negotiations, so that a constructive solution might be reached which would reconcile the interests of the parties with those of the international community.

43. The representative of Poland said that his delegation would vote in favour of the recommendations submitted in the Sub-Committee's report because it considered the General Assembly Declaration applicable to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). Colonialism was a source of friction and should be eliminated; it was the Special Committee's task to seek the most suitable ways and means to that end. The negotiations between the Argentine and United Kingdom Governments must serve the purpose of decolonization.

44. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in his general statement on the reports of Sub-Committee III, said that his delegation was inclined to agree with the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations on the majority of the Territories it had examined, including the Falkland Islands, otherwise known as the Malvinas Islands. Although the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee, which had been examining those matters for the first time, were of a rather general nature, he could not express satisfaction that in formulating them the Sub-Committee had been guided

by the principles of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)), which alone laid down the terms of reference of the Committee and its Sub-Committees.

45. The representative of Syria said that his delegation was in full agreement with, and would vote in favour of, the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations. Recommendation (b), to the effect that the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable to the Territory under discussion, should be stressed. The Special Committee's task was to ensure that there would be no more colonies; it was to be hoped that within the next few years that task would be completed. His delegation had been somewhat disappointed to learn that the United Kingdom had reservations about the Committee's competence; in view of the change of Government in that country, it was to be hoped that those reservations would not be maintained. Syria welcomed the Sub-Committee's recommendation (d) and hoped the negotiations would be successful.

46. According to the Argentine representative, the word "Malvinas" was not a Spanish translation of "Falkland Islands" but the original name of the islands; the Syrian delegation considered that both names should appear on all documents.

47. The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation fully endorsed the Sub-Committee's report. He also supported the Syrian representative's proposal that both names for the Territory should appear in all documents; as he saw it, the word "Malvinas", in brackets, should follow the words "Falkland Islands" wherever they appeared, in all the working languages.

48. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation would vote in favour of the Sub-Committee's report. He agreed with the Syrian and Uruguay representatives that the name "Malvinas" should be inserted in brackets after the name "Falkland Islands" in the Committee documents.

49. The representative of the United Kingdom said it was his understanding that, in all cases where there were variations of nomenclature, the Secretariat practice was to use the name used by the administering Power unless a United Nations organ had taken a legal stand on the international status of the Territory concerned. The Special Committee had not taken, and was not competent to take, a stand on the legal status of the Falkland Islands. Accordingly, the Secretariat was bound to follow the nomenclature used by the administering Power. The Committee should consult the Secretariat before taking any decision.

50. The representatives of Chile and the USSR supported the Syrian proposal.

51. The representative of Venezuela also supported the Syrian proposal and added that the decision lay with the Special Committee and not with the Secretariat.

52. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation supported the recommendations and conclusions submitted by the Sub-Committee. With regard to the name of the Territory, the English text of the report used the expression "the Falkland Islands (otherwise known as the Malvinas Islands)"; that was consistent with the Syrian proposal.

53. The representative of the United Kingdom agreed with the Venezuelan representative that the Committee could decide what name to use for a Territory in its own reports. As he understood it, however, the proposal was that the Secretary-General

should be invited to use the expression "Falkland Islands (Malvinas)" in all United Nations documents; such an invitation went beyond the Committee's competence.

54. The representative of Uruguay said that, as he understood it, the Syrian proposal related only to documents of the Special Committee.

55. The Secretary of the Special Committee explained that the use of such words in United Nations documents was based on standing instructions issued by the Secretary-General. The Special Committee was free to decide what its own reports should contain, but the adoption of the same practice in other United Nations documents was a matter for the Secretary-General; any decision the Special Committee might take in the matter would be brought to his attention for such action as he might wish to take.

56. The Chairman then put to the vote the Syrian proposal that the word "Malvinas" should appear in brackets after the words "Falkland Islands" in all documents of the Committee.

The Syrian proposal was adopted by 19 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions.

57. The representative of Australia, in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation did not oppose the honest and conscientious report of the Sub-Committee, but reserved its position in relation to the adoption of that report. His delegation was conscious of the problem of small islands and small populations, which in the case of the Falkland Islands was complicated by a dispute between two friendly Powers; Australia sincerely hoped that they would resolve whatever difficulties lay between them. However, his delegation had tried to make clear, in relation to the subject of Gibraltar, its doubts regarding the Special Committee's competence in sovereignty disputes. It had expressed its diffidence regarding attempts by the Committee to find its way, with justice to all, through the mazes of history; in the course of such attempts basic principles like self-determination might become distorted.

C. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE III

58. At the 311th meeting, on 13 November 1964, the Special Committee adopted without objection the report of Sub-Committee III (see annex) concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) as amended by the addition of the word "Malvinas" in parentheses after the words "Falkland Islands", wherever these appear in the report.

59. The conclusions and recommendations as adopted by the Special Committee are as follows:

(a) The Special Committee examined the situation in the Non-Self-Governing Territory of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and heard the statements of the representative of the administering Power and the representative of Argentina;

(b) The Special Committee confirms that the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples apply to the Territory of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

(c) The Special Committee notes the existence of a dispute between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and

that of Argentina concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

(d) The Special Committee invites the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to this problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the United Nations Charter and of resolution 1514 (XV) (of 14 December 1960), the interests of the population of the islands, and the opinions expressed during the course of the general debate;

(e) The Special Committee invites the two above-mentioned Governments to inform the Special Committee or the General Assembly of the results of their negotiations.

ANNEX

Report of Sub-Committee III on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)*

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

1. The Sub-Committee considered the Territory of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) at its 24th to 30th meetings between 8 and 18 September 1964.

2. The Sub-Committee had before it relevant part of the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/L.98/Add.2, section II incorporated in paras. 1/25 of the present chapter).

3. The representative of the United Kingdom participated in the work of the Sub-Committee. At the request of Argentina, and in accordance with procedures previously adopted, the representative of Argentina was invited to participate in the consideration of the above item.

Statements by delegations

4. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Falkland Islands, which lay about 400 miles north-east of Cape Horn, consisted of two large and about 200 small islands. The population, made up almost entirely of settlers or descendants of settlers from Britain, was 2,172 in 1962, of whom 1,733 were born in the Territory, 338 were born in the United Kingdom and nine in Argentina. All the inhabitants except thirty-six—including fifteen Chileans and three Argentinians—were British citizens. The only town was Stanley, the capital, with a population of about 1,000 and the next largest settlement comprised only about 100 people. The Dependencies of the Falkland Islands (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands) had a population that fluctuated with the whaling season; in the summer it was about 500 and in the winter about half that number.

5. The economy and prosperity of the Falkland Islands depended on wool, the world price of which had declined since the time of the Korean War, although it had risen slightly in recent years. Wool exports had risen to 5,061,000 pounds from 3,618,000 pounds in 1938. The standard of living of the inhabitants was slightly higher than in the United Kingdom; there was hardly any poverty and the number of motor vehicles per head now exceeded that of the United Kingdom. During the last fifteen years the Government of the Territory had undertaken considerable development work, to which the British Government had contributed nearly \$700,000 for the improvement of the Stanley roads, water supplies, sea communications between the islands, a power station, construction of a new town hall in Stanley and hospital improvements. A further \$140,000 which was to be spent mainly on school buildings, had recently been made available for the three years 1963-1966.

6. Under the 1951 Constitution, the Falkland Islands had a Legislative Council presided over by the Governor and consisting of three officials, four members elected by universal

* Previously issued as documents A/AC.109/L.123/Add.3 and Corr.1.

adult suffrage and four members nominated by the Government, two of them non-official members. There was thus a majority of non-official members. The Council met at least once a year and usually held several sessions, including the budget session. The non-official members played an important part in the government of the Territory, particularly in the Standing Finance Committee, which comprised only the elected and non-official members of the Council and which could make a decision on any item of proposed governmental expenditure.

7. The Governor, who was the Queen's representative and Head of the Administration, was advised by an Executive Council, which took decisions on all matters affecting the internal government of the Territory. It consisted of three officials and five other members nominated by the Governor. By a recent arrangement, the six non-official members of the Legislative Council were invited to recommend the appointment of two of the non-official members of the Executive Council. The Governor could act against the advice of the Executive Council only in certain quite exceptional circumstances, such as where the Royal prerogative was involved. There were no political parties, although there was a trade union (The Falkland Islands Labour Federation) and a Sheepowners' Federation.

8. The Town Council of Stanley consisted of six elected members and three members nominated by the Governor. Elections were held biennially, three of the six elected members retiring every two years. Appointments to the public service were made by the Governor, assisted, where necessary, by members of the Executive Council. Of 158 government posts now filled, 108 were occupied by Falkland Islanders. The entire staff of the key departments of the Secretariat and the Treasury, with the exception of the Colonial Secretary, were Falkland Islanders. There were no differences between the conditions of service of expatriates and those of Falkland Islanders; they enjoyed the same rates of pay and similar leave conditions.

9. After the recent General Elections, the members of the Executive and Legislative Councils had discussed constitutional changes with the Governor and had agreed on proposals for changes in the composition of both Councils. The non-elected membership of the Legislative Council was to be reduced by omitting one of the three *ex officio* members and the two nominated members. The Legislative Council would then consist of the Governor, the Colonial Secretary and the Colonial Treasurer, two nominated independent members and four elected members. In the Executive Council, one of the three official members would be omitted and the non-official members would consist of two appointed members and two elected members of the Legislative Council chosen by a ballot of the elected and independent members of that Council. Thus, there would be equal numbers of elected and non-elected members in the Legislative Council and the principle of election would be established for members of the Executive Council. The proposals had been accepted by the United Kingdom Government and would be brought into effect as soon as the necessary constitutional instruments were prepared.

10. It was for the Islanders to determine what their ultimate constitutional status should be and the United Kingdom Government was always ready to consider any proposals for constitutional change that the Islanders might advance. For the present, the Islanders had made it clear that they did not want independence. The representative of the United Kingdom quoted a message which the elected members of the Legislative Council had addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee on 3 August 1964 in order to inform the Committee of the wishes of the people of the Islands. They had stated that they were proud to be citizens of a British Colony and had expressed their desire to retain and strengthen their links with the United Kingdom. They had asserted in the strongest possible terms that any constitutional association with a foreign Power would be repugnant to them. They had added that the unofficial nominated members of both the Executive and the Legislative Councils wished

to be associated to the fullest possible degree with their statement. The elected members had adopted a similar declaration on 2 April 1964, which had been transmitted to the British Government. Thus, there could be no doubt about the aspirations of the people of the Falkland Islands.

11. Consequently, the United Kingdom Government's position with regard to the Falkland Islands was fully consistent with the principle of self-determination. He wished to reaffirm the statement made by his delegation in its letter to the Chairman of the Special Committee and to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee (A/AC.109/81) to the effect that the United Kingdom had no doubt as to its sovereignty over the Territory of the Falkland Islands. In the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation, the request by the Argentine representative to participate in the work of the Sub-Committee constituted an intervention in the affairs of the Territory, in which Argentina was not properly concerned. The claim advanced by the Argentine Government to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was in effect a bid to annex those islands in defiance of the clearly expressed wishes and interests of the people of the Territory. According to the United Nations' Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, those wishes and interests should be paramount. In the view of his Government, the Special Committee and therefore the Sub-Committee were not competent to discuss territorial claims. In any case, the Committee would be ill-advised to deal with the difficult and inevitably time-consuming question of sovereignty, which did not arise out of the resolutions establishing the Special Committee or out of the Declaration. It might be suggested, as it had been suggested in the past, that paragraph 6 of the Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV) constituted a mandate for the Committee to consider questions of sovereignty. But, in his delegation's view, that interpretation was not borne out either by the wording of the paragraph itself, which clearly referred to possible attempts at disruption in the future and not to issues of sovereignty dating back to distant history, or by the remainder of the Declaration, which stated specifically that "all peoples have the right to self-determination". No fair-minded observer could therefore construe paragraph 6 as imposing a limitation on the universal application of the principle of self-determination, which was guaranteed under the Charter itself.

12. While, therefore, the United Kingdom Government could not agree to participate in discussions of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, either in the Sub-Committee or the Special Committee, or indeed in bilateral talks with the Argentine Government, it had always been willing to discuss with the Government of Argentina ways in which the United Kingdom, Argentina and the Falkland Islanders could avoid damage to the good relations existing between them from the dispute which unhappily existed and it had so informed the Government of Argentina.

13. At the 25th meeting of the Sub-Committee the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Sub-Committee that on 8 September 1964 the Buenos Aires radio station *Radio el Mundo* had broadcast messages telling the Falkland Islanders to keep calm during an imminent occupation by the Argentine Navy. At 1.10 p.m. local time, an Argentine aircraft had landed on Stanley race-course in the Falkland Islands. The pilot had planted the Argentine flag and handed a letter to the only bystander. The aircraft had taken off before the pilot and co-pilot could be apprehended.

14. Unfortunate instances of that kind, particularly the violation of sovereignty by an aircraft, were bound to exacerbate the dispute and prejudice good relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina. His Government hoped that the Argentine representative would dissociate his Government from such actions and that the Argentine Government would take steps to ensure that they were not repeated.

15. The representative of Argentina replied that the acts described by the United Kingdom representative were the work of individuals. While they accurately reflected the feelings of the Argentine people, they were quite alien to

Argentine Government, which desired a peaceful solution of the dispute.

16. He further stated that history showed that the Malvinas Islands, which were an integral part of Argentine territory, had been illegally seized by the United Kingdom in 1833 and had been maintained since then under United Kingdom authority in spite of repeated protests by Argentina. The Islands had been originally discovered by the Spaniards in the early sixteenth century and were plainly marked on early Spanish maps. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century the Malvinas had been scarcely heard of in England. It was only in 1718 that a plan had been made to "discover" the Islands; but after consultation with Spain, Great Britain had agreed that it had no right to interfere in the Islands and coasts of South America, a position which reflected the Treaty of Peace of 1604 between Spain and England, the Treaties of Madrid of 1670 and 1713, and the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713.
17. In 1764, the French seaman, de Bougainville, had founded Puerto Luis in Malvinas Oriental in the name of the King of France; but in response to a complaint by Spain, King Louis XV had ordered the return of the port, this act constituting recognition of the inherent right of dominion of Spain. The Spaniards had occupied Puerto Luis and changed the name to Puerto Soledad. Then, in 1766, England had sent a secret expedition which founded Puerto Egmont on Saunders Island. When Puerto Luis was transferred from the French to the Spaniards, the British had made no objection to the transfer, and the English garrison had continued to occupy Puerto Egmont.
18. In 1770, the British garrison had been dislodged by Spanish forces under the command of the Governor of Buenos Aires. But after lengthy diplomatic negotiations, Puerto Egmont had been handed back to the British although it was clear from the documents concerned that England had accepted the sovereignty of Spain over the Islands as a whole.
19. In 1774, the English had voluntarily abandoned Saunders Island. Fifty-nine years had then passed during which the Islands had remained, without any protest from Great Britain, in the power first of the Spaniards and then of the Argentines. Right up to the revolution of 1810, marking the beginning of Argentine independence, Spain had exercised dominion over the Malvinas in all kinds of ways without any objection from Great Britain. Thus, Britain's silence from 1774 to 1829 confirmed its recognition of Spanish rights and its intention not to return to the archipelago. Under the Treaty of Peace of Versailles of 1783 and the Convention of San Lorenzo of 1790, the rights of Spain to the lands and seas of South America had been recognized, and British ships had been forbidden to traffic in those areas. The rights then held by Spain had been succeeded to by the Argentine Republic in 1810. Despite the difficulties attending the process of Argentine emancipation, the Argentine Government had sent the frigate *Heroína* to the Malvinas Islands in 1820 in order to take formal possession of the archipelago. In 1823, the Buenos Aires Government had appointed Pablo Areguati as Governor of the Islands and made grants of land and of grazing and fishing rights. In 1825, a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation had been concluded between England and Argentina, and no reservation whatever concerning the Malvinas had been made on that occasion by England. In 1926, groups of families had gone to the Islands to settle there. In 1829, the Buenos Aires Government had established the Malvinas Islands Political and Military Command with headquarters at Puerto Soledad, and had appointed Luis Vernet as Commander.
20. The strategic and commercial interests of England had culminated in the attempts to invade Buenos Aires in 1806 and 1807, which had been repulsed, and in the occupation of other territories in the South Atlantic. These same interests had impelled Great Britain to lodge a protest in the latter part of 1829 against the establishment of the Malvinas Command by Argentina.
21. In 1831, the United States corvette *Lexington* had attacked Puerto Soledad and destroyed its port installations when the Argentine Government had refused to release a United States vessel which had violated the Argentine fishing regulations. The action by the *Lexington* led to a diplomatic incident which in turn had resulted in a virtual breaking-off of relations between the two countries.
22. Great Britain had sent a new expedition to the Islands in 1833 and had seized Puerto Soledad by force, a settlement which it had never previously occupied. By the following year, Great Britain had taken over the whole archipelago. From that time onwards, force had been the only basis for the British presence on the Malvinas.
23. Such an arbitrary and unilateral act of force, which would never be recognized by the Argentine Republic, could in no way create any rights for Great Britain. Since 1833, Argentina had continually protested against the illegal occupation. The case of the Malvinas was a typical example of colonialism in which a newly independent country was taken advantage of by a great Power. For 131 years Argentina had sought in vain to change the British position. Now, times had changed, and the colonial era was drawing to a close. The British presence on the Islands was an anachronism which must be eliminated. Argentina had always shown a willingness to settle its international disputes, and in facing territorial problems it had always had recourse to peaceful means for achieving a settlement, rather than to violence.
24. In 1945 Argentina had signed the United Nations Charter, not only as an instrument for maintaining international peace and security but as a system for finding just solutions to international problems, especially those deriving from the existence of the colonial system. At the San Francisco Conference, the Argentine delegation had expressly reserved the rights of Argentina in respect of the Malvinas Islands.
25. From the first days of the Organization, Argentina had realized the importance of Article 73 e of the Charter and as soon as Great Britain had begun to transmit information on the Malvinas Islands, the Argentine Republic had drawn the attention of the United Nations, as it had done on many occasions in the past, to its reservation of sovereignty in respect of that Territory. Thus Argentina had specified each year, at the sessions of the General Assembly, that the information transmitted by the United Kingdom regarding the Malvinas Islands in no way affected Argentine sovereignty over that Territory. The United Kingdom was in occupation of the Islands by virtue of an act of force, which had never been accepted by the Argentine Government.
26. The representative also cited the decisions adopted by the Seventh and Tenth Inter-American Conferences which had respectively condemned the acquisition of territories by force and had affirmed the need to eliminate colonialism in America.
27. The adoption in 1960 of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples had speeded up the process of decolonization throughout the world. Argentina, which had attained its independence through a similar process, had supported and would continue to support that Declaration and the complementary General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII) and 1956 (XVIII).
28. The case of the Malvinas differed from the classical colonial model. In 1831 they had belonged *de facto* and *de iure* to the Argentine Republic, had been governed by Argentine authorities and had been occupied by Argentine settlers. Those authorities and settlers had been forcibly evicted and had been replaced by a colonial administration and a population of British origin. Today there were 2,172 inhabitants on the Islands, and the population was to a substantial extent periodically renewed. In 1961, for instance, 411 persons had departed and 308 had arrived. In 1961, the corresponding figures were 326 and 224; in 1960 they were 292 and 224.

The colonial Power could not rely on this situation for the purposes of the principle of self-determination.

29. The Argentine Government had stated at the most recent sessions of the General Assembly that this principle of self-determination of peoples, recognized in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter, should in such exceptional cases be viewed in the light of circumstances. Indiscriminate application of the principle of self-determination to Territories so thinly inhabited by nationals of the colonial Power would place the destiny of such a Territory in the hands of the Power which had installed itself there by force, in violation of the most elementary rules of international law. The fundamental principle of self-determination must not be utilized in order to convert illegal possession into full sovereignty under a mantle of protection to be provided by the United Nations.

30. This correct interpretation of the principle of self-determination was based precisely on resolution 1514 (XV), whose purpose was to put an end to colonialism in all its forms. In the preamble to this resolution it was recognized that the peoples of the world ardently desired the end of colonialism in all its manifestations and that all peoples had an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory. In operative paragraph 6 of the Declaration it was stated that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country was incompatible with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

31. Any future for the Islands in separation from Argentina was inconceivable in terms of logic and realities. They were rooted right on the Argentine continental shelf and were situated near to the coast of Patagonia. Their economic development on a stable basis was bound up with their country, with which, at present, they had no direct communication or trade.

32. Ownership of the land was for all practical purposes in the hands of the Falkland Islands Company, which controlled the entire export and import trade and held a monopoly for wool. The successor to the Company, as owner of the land, was the British Crown.

33. British rule in the Malvinas Islands was not only contrary to the United Nations Charter, but also created a sterile situation in a Territory that could enjoy greater economic prosperity. The Islands' population had declined from 2,295 inhabitants in 1912 to 2,172 in 1962. It was the only American community which, instead of growing, was shrinking.

34. In conclusion, he stated that the attitude of the Argentine Government could be summed up as follows: (1) the Argentine Republic claimed the restoration of its territorial integrity through the restitution to it of the Malvinas, the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, which had been taken by Great Britain by force—such restitution being the sole solution dictated by justice. Argentina would take especial account of the welfare and material interests of the present settlers. (2) The Argentine Republic would not agree to the principle of self-determination being distorted and applied to consolidate situations arising from a colonial anachronism, to the detriment of its lawful rights of sovereignty over the Islands.

35. The Chairman speaking as the representative of Uruguay stated that the competence of the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee was defined in General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII) and 1956 (XVIII), which not only empowered the Committee to formulate recommendations for the complete application of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples but also expressly instructed it to do so.

36. The fact that the Malvinas Islands were the subject of a long-standing claim by the Argentine Republic did not lessen the colonial character of the problem. Furthermore, the Malvinas had been voluntarily included by the Administering Power in the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories,

and that amounted to automatic recognition of the Committee's jurisdiction in the matter.

37. At the same time, while none of the resolutions cited above seemed to empower the Committee to pronounce on the substance of the question of sovereignty or rights over the Malvinas, that possibility should not be ruled out *a priori* since a recommendation connected in one way or another with the substance of the matter would be necessary to permit complete application of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

38. Quite apart from the Committee's mandate in that regard, at the very basis of American public law there were two principles to which the countries of Latin America had always devoted special attention.

39. The first had been proclaimed by the newly independent States of Spanish America and was known as the *uti possidetis* principle of 1810 which had been explicitly formulated for the first time in the fundamental law of Colombia, adopted by the Congress of Angostura in 1819.

40. That principle, the scope of which had been defined by an arbitral award of the Swiss Federal Council on 24 March 1922 concerning the borders between Colombia and Venezuela, affirmed that the frontiers of the Republics recently established in Latin America would be those of the Spanish provinces which they replaced. It laid down the absolute rule that, in the eyes of the law, there had been no ownerless territory in former Spanish America and that land which was not occupied *de facto* would be regarded by common consent as occupied *de jure* by the Republic which had succeeded the province to which the land had been assigned by decision of the King of Spain. It therefore excluded any attempts that might be made by European colonizers to claim territories which otherwise might have been considered *res nullius*. Furthermore, it had later been generally consecrated under the name of the Monroe Doctrine.

41. Hence, any colonization of American territories subsequent to the proclamation of that principle clearly constituted a violation of a principle that was at the very basis of South American public law. In that connexion, it was interesting to note that the Charter of the Organization of African Unity had recently endorsed the same principle.

42. The American countries, for their part, considered that their emancipation was not complete so long as there remained on their continent any peoples or areas subject to colonial rule or territories occupied by non-American countries (resolution XXXIII of the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, 1948).

43. The second principle was that the American States did not recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion (article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States). That principle and the absolute condemnation of aggressive war was one of the features of Latin American political and legal thinking. The American countries had all successively adopted the ancient maxim *ex injuria jus non oritur*, which had received universal consecration in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Charter of the United Nations. That principle had been one of the constants of the history of the independent American countries, as was proved by the First International Conference of American States of 1890, which had eliminated the right of conquest from American public law and reaffirmed the *uti possidetis* doctrine of 1810, the Sixth International Conference of American States at Havana in 1928, which had declared aggressive war to be illegal, and the Declaration of 1932 addressed to Bolivia and Paraguay, the rival claimants to the Gran Chaco, by thirteen American States which made it known that they would not accept any territorial settlement not obtained by peaceful means or any acquisition resulting from occupation or conquest by force of arms.

44. The American countries' attachment to that principle was further illustrated by the Saavedra-Lamas Treaty, signed in 1933 at Rio de Janeiro, and the Convention on the Rights and

Duties of States, signed at Montevideo the same year following the Seventh International Conference of American States. In that connexion, he quoted article 11 of the Convention.

45. Finally, the principle was embodied in article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, which had been signed and ratified by all the American States except Canada.

46. The principle of the renunciation of war had been embodied in the General Treaty of Paris and the Covenant of the League of Nations and in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter.

47. States interested in maintaining the *status quo* claimed, of course, that the principle of the non-recognition of the right of conquest was valid only from the time of its incorporation into written international law, and that would limit its application to a few years of the century. The maintenance of the *status quo* was obviously a fundamental policy objective of the colonial Powers, as had been shown in the 1949 debates of the International Law Commission of the United Nations on the draft declaration on the rights and duties of States. The text which had served as a basis for discussion was a draft submitted by Panama containing, *inter alia*, an article on the obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions obtained by force. That article had been retained thanks to the vigorous support of the Latin American representatives on the Commission, but it had been understood that the principle in question would not be retroactive.

48. As early as the eighteenth century, a very clear distinction had been drawn in the theory of law between occupation by force, which involved no transfer of sovereignty, and annexation, which could result only from a peace treaty or the complete disappearance of one of the States as an entity in international law. Such had been the doctrine generally accepted at the time when the Malvinas Islands had been occupied, and all those precedents had been cited in a decision by the Belgian Court of Cassation of 16 June 1957, which considered that the annexation by one State of the territory of another State that continued to be an entity in international law could not have the legal effects of annexation unless it had taken place with the participation or consent of the State whose territory had been dismembered. A similar opinion had already been expressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice on 5 April 1933 in connexion with the legal status of Eastern Greenland. Those examples showed that the American doctrine of the non-validity of territorial acquisitions obtained by force was a principle which had been embodied in international law for at least three centuries; consequently, irrespective of the value of the other titles which might be invoked, nothing, neither prescription nor history, could legalize a fact which from the outset had been completely null and void.

49. Long before the adoption of the Charter of the Organization of American States, decisions taken with respect to the colonial possessions which still existed in America drew a clear distinction between "colonies" or "possessions belonging to extra-continental countries", on the one hand, and "occupied territories", on the other. That distinction also emerged from the text of resolutions adopted at the first two Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in 1939 and 1940. It had been upheld by the last two conferences of American States, held at Bogota, in 1948 and at Caracas in 1954.

50. Resolution XXXIII of Bogota, after distinguishing between "peoples and regions subject to a colonial régime" and "territories occupied by non-American countries", and after recognizing the existence of controversies between American Republics and European countries, declared that it was the operation of the American Republics that colonialism and the occupation of American territories by extra-continental countries should be brought to an end, and it had decided to set up for that purpose an "American Committee on Dependent Territories". In its report, that Committee had classified Belgium, the Malvinas, the South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia and the American zone of Antarctica as "occupied territories". In another resolution, the Committee had noted claims between American States and Great Britain which

"should be settled peacefully in the interests of the Continent and of the whole international community", and had declared that "every legitimate and just claim presented by any American nation should count upon the solidarity of the other Republics of the Continent".

51. The Tenth Inter-American Conference, held at Caracas in 1954, had endorsed the Committee's recommendations, and had also declared its support for the just claims of the American countries by reiterating its faith in "the methods of pacific settlement set forth in treaties in effect" (resolution XCVI).

52. However, as far as the question before the Committee was concerned, the most important resolution of that Conference was resolution XCVII, which stated, perhaps for the first time, that the principle of the absolute and unconditional exercise of self-determination might in certain cases yield to another not less important principle, the principle of territorial integrity; thus it opened the way for a solution which had been confirmed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and in United Nations practice.

53. When the Committee had considered Gibraltar, the Uruguayan delegation had had occasion to analyse in detail at the 20th meeting the operative part of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), especially paragraph 6. To his delegation, that paragraph seemed to contain great political wisdom, particularly where small or weak countries which had been despoiled, almost invariably by force, of part of their national territory, were concerned; the strict application of the principle of self-determination, which would place the fate of the territories in question in the hands of a small group of settlers brought in by the conquering Power, would in the case of those countries be tantamount to recognizing that might was right, a principle which had been condemned for centuries by international law. Those considerations were particularly true in the case of the Malvinas, which had been originally uninhabited and where the present population came almost entirely from the mother country and fluctuated with the seasons.

54. Paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) had made the American doctrine of "occupied territories" universal by drawing the same distinction as did the doctrine between colonies or possessions, to which the principle of self-determination applied, and *de facto* occupied territories, whose situation should be governed by the procedures of pacific settlement provided for by the Charter and other international instruments. Moreover, the question of West Irian (New Guinea), for example, had been settled in that manner, namely through direct negotiation between the parties, of which the General Assembly had taken note in resolution 1752 (XVII). It should be remembered that the Indonesian position was based on the fact that the maintenance of Netherlands colonialism in West Irian constituted a partial encroachment on the national unity and territorial integrity of Indonesia.

55. The Uruguayan delegation did not believe that the Special Committee's task was particularly difficult or complicated. The Committee was not a tribunal for settling a dispute concerning questions of territorial sovereignty, because such a decision would go far beyond its terms of reference and would obviously give rise to justifiable objections. But the Committee should secure full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) by applying the relevant paragraph of that resolution in every case. In the case under discussion, the guarantees which paragraph 6 gave to small States with respect to their national unity and territorial integrity should clearly be invoked.

56. Lastly, Argentina was not alone in the matter, for the American nations without exception had subscribed to resolution XCVI of the Tenth Conference of American States, had proclaimed their support of the just claims of the peoples of America with respect to territories occupied by extra-continental countries, and had reiterated their faith in the methods of pacific settlement set forth in the treaties in effect.

57. The Uruguayan delegation felt sure that the United Kingdom, which in the past had been one of the first to recognize emancipation movements and which had always shown political wisdom as well as justice, would respond to the appeal made to it.

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58. The representative of Italy said that certain features of the debate on the Falkland Islands merited special attention. First, the Falkland or Malvinas Islands constituted a typical example of a "small territory", characterized by a limited area and a sparse or scattered population, for which it would be difficult to envisage complete economic and political independence. Furthermore, it was generally admitted by Committee members that in the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) it might be necessary to apply special criteria to "small territories". At the same time, the archipelago was a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and was therefore subject *ipso jure* to the resolution on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

59. Secondly, sovereignty over the Non-Self-Governing Territory of the Falkland or Malvinas Islands had been and was still claimed by a Member State other than the Administering Power. As the Chairman had pointed out when speaking on 10 September 1964 as representative of Uruguay, the Committee was not a tribunal appointed to settle a dispute over questions of territorial sovereignty. While stressing that point, his delegation considered that account should be taken of the fact that a Member State—Argentina—had constantly expressed reservations concerning sovereignty over the islands. Another relevant factor was the geographical location of the islands which were obviously a part of the American continent.

60. Thirdly, the question of the Falkland or Malvinas Islands seemed to involve two apparently conflicting concepts: the principle of self-determination and the principle of the preservation of national unity and territorial integrity. Both principles were set forth in the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Furthermore, his delegation felt that the national origin of the islanders and the annual or seasonal fluctuations in the population gave rise to serious doubts as to whether the principle of self-determination could be strictly applied.

61. Although it was as yet too soon to formulate final conclusions about the principles at stake or the practical aspects of the question, his delegation wished to make certain points clear. The Committee could not settle the question of the Falkland Islands solely on the basis of legal considerations. Its task was to apply the spirit and the letter of the General Assembly resolutions or, as was stated in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1810 (XVII), "To continue to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all territories which have not yet attained independence". Consequently, if the Sub-Committee wished to expedite the solution of the problems involved, it must rely on practical and rational methods rather than on legal arguments; instead of delving deep into past history, it should consider the Territory's future. From that point of view and taking into account the new facts of international life and the growing necessity for good relations among the States, it should not be difficult for the parties concerned to examine together, in a spirit of understanding what might lie ahead for the islands.

62. His delegation would therefore appeal to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina to decide to enter into negotiations, bearing in mind the future and not the present or even less the past. If the two countries agreed to such a step the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee would take note of that fact with satisfaction and an easy conscience. Since the debate concerned a colonial territory rather than a colonial people, there was a less immediate need for the United Nations to play its sacred role as protector of the interests of indigenous populations under colonial administration than in all the other conventional cases of decolonization considered by the Special Committee. Undoubtedly, Argentina would take fully into account the legitimate interests and particular circumstances of the communities which had adopted the islands as their new homeland.

63. He realized that acceptance of his proposal by the parties concerned might seem to involve a bigger sacrifice for the United Kingdom than for Argentina. Actually, if reason was to prevail over sentiment and narrow self-interest as was to be expected from two countries of such a high cultural and

political level—neither side would be the loser. Both countries had given the world an example of fruitful and peaceful co-operation on a modern basis. After all, the world situation had completely changed since the distant day in January 1833 when the British warship *Cleo* had dropped anchor in Puerto Soledad. The British presence in the Falkland Islands no longer had the same economic and strategic importance today as it had in the nineteenth century or the first decades of the twentieth. His delegation wished to believe that the peace of the American continent, the honourable liquidation of colonialism in that hemisphere and the strengthening of relations between the British and Argentine peoples would be of far greater importance to the British Government than the maintenance of its exclusive control over a distant outpost in the Atlantic Ocean.

64. The representative of the Ivory Coast observed that the most striking feature of the Falkland Islands was their situation as a colonial territory. The United Kingdom had always maintained that the islands belonged to it and had never doubted its sovereignty over the territory. It was in that setting that the problem should be tackled by the Committee. As a colony, the Falkland Islands were subject to the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples; and as the administering Power, the United Kingdom must take the necessary steps to enable the territory to embark upon the path of decolonization.

65. An examination of the islands' political and administrative set-up revealed, however, that the Legislative Council and the Executive Council with which they were endowed enjoyed no greater powers than those of a municipality. Everything about the Falkland Islands—their size, population and resources—suggested the dimensions of a borough held in trust by the Governor representing the Crown. It was tempting, in view of all the colonialist abuses that had been observed, to seek to apply the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples strictly to the letter. But, in the case of the Falkland Islands, the territory was almost empty of permanent settlers, and the United Kingdom representative had only been talking common sense when he declared that the population rejected any idea of independence.

66. Experience had shown that the institutional history of countries resembled the ebb and flow of the tides, ever oscillating between conflicting trends without being able, in times of revolution or necessary transformation, to strike a happy balance. In the great task of decolonization started by the United Nations, striking such a balance should be the aim. A distinction should be drawn between the spirit of laws and the chances of applying them, between the general and the particular.

67. Argentina, a peaceful country whose inhabitants included an appreciable number of foreign communities enjoying all civic rights, claimed the Falkland Islands, not out of a spirit of domination but because their history and their geographical and geological features designated them as Argentine lands. It was normal to render unto Caesar the things that were Caesar's.

68. However, the character of the population was also a factor which must of necessity be taken into account in the search for a solution. Undoubtedly, the home ties and origin of the Falkland Islanders would make a satisfactory solution difficult unless an agreement between the United Kingdom and Argentina gave the emigrants the necessary guarantees for their self-preservation.

69. The problem of the Falkland Islands concerned the United Nations in so far as they were a colony. But in view of their special situation the United Kingdom, Argentina and the local population should consult each other in a spirit of understanding and friendship before any decision was taken on their future status.

70. The representative of Madagascar said that the terms of reference given to the Special Committee under resolution 1654 (XVI) contained two separate points which, however, formed an indivisible whole: the examination of the situation in the Non-Self-Governing Territories, and the recommendation of measures designed to achieve the aims set forth in the

Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

71. The colonial status of the Falkland Islands seemed to be unanimously recognized by the members of the Sub-Committee. In addition, the United Kingdom had confirmed that general opinion by requesting that those islands be included in the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Seeing that the existence of colonial status had been established, the Sub-Committee's task was to study and recommend the measures to be taken to implement the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

72. Since its creation, the Special Committee had always advocated application of the principle of self-determination, which had been formally accepted by the Members of the Organization. However, in the case of the Falkland Islands the Sub-Committee had, as it were, been cautioned against applying that principle, which—according to considerations expounded at length before the Sub-Committee—might prove injurious to the interests of a Member of the United Nations. Those considerations were in essence based upon the delicate question of "sovereignty", examination of which would—it was said—be far beyond the province of the Special Committee and its subsidiary bodies, since it was a matter involving a confrontation between history and law.

73. Thus the Committee, having been obliged to eliminate from its discussions a number of subjects which did not come directly within its terms of reference, was paralysed in the continuation of its work. The Sub-Committee was torn between two moral obligations: on the one hand, the duty of complying with its terms of reference to the General Assembly; on the other, concern to safeguard the interests of a Member State. It was in a position where it could make no choice, since no recommendation favouring one side could be made without harming the interests of the other. Nevertheless, the Sub-Committee could not evade its responsibilities by leaving the matter as it stood; it must at all costs find a solution to the problem.

74. In that connexion he supported the statement of the representative of Italy, who had emphasized the need to settle the problem of the Falkland Islands by resorting to practical action rather than to legal theory, by facing the future rather than by resuscitating the past. It was true that history could not be totally disregarded, but it must be admitted that certain facts had become deeply embodied in present realities and that to ignore the existence of those facts would be to act blindly.

75. It was not for the Sub-Committee, and still less was it for the Malagasy delegation, to make any recommendations to two sovereign nations such as Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Malagasy delegation nevertheless wished to express its conviction that the question of the Falkland Islands could be settled only by taking into account both the interests of the inhabitants and the harmony which should reign in the international community. The good relations existing between the two countries involved would surely enable them to settle the problem of the Falkland Islands in the way most consonant with their respective interests.

76. The Rapporteur, speaking as the representative of Iran drew attention to certain features of the position of the Falkland Islands. First, the colonial nature of the problem seemed clear. No one disputed the fact that the Falkland Islands were a colony and that the provisions of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples were accordingly applicable to them. There could consequently be no doubt that the Special Committee on decolonization at I, therefore, the Sub-Committee were competent to examine the problem with a view to the speedy and complete implementation of the Declaration.

77. Another feature was that Argentina claimed those islands as an integral part of its territory—a claim which created a dispute, of an essentially juridical nature, between two Members of the United Nations. Admittedly the terms of reference of the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee as defined in resolutions 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII) and 1950 (XVIII), were essentially political and not juridical. On the other hand, the Committee was bound to examine the situation

in each of the territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) applied. Each case required individual study, for although the objective was the same for all colonial territories the means to be employed could not be the same in every case. The Sub-Committee could not ignore the existence of a dispute which was poisoning the relations between two States Members of the United Nations.

78. A third feature was that the islands, with 2,000 inhabitants, constituted a typical example of a small territory. They could have no possible future except in association with another independent State. It so happened that geographically they were close to the country which claimed them.

79. Like the other members of the Sub-Committee, Iran considered that the United Kingdom and Argentina should proceed to direct negotiations with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement of their dispute, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter and with due regard to the interests and aspirations of the islands' population.

80. The representative of Bulgaria, like the previous speakers, considered that the Sub-Committee, as an organ of the Special Committee, was entirely qualified to discuss any question and any aspect of a problem which came within the framework of the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

81. However, the Bulgarian delegation could not subscribe to certain interpretations of the Sub-Committee's task which had been put forward. It was apparent, from the documents supplied to the Sub-Committee and from the statements it had heard, that the United Kingdom's occupation of the Malvinas Islands—better known as the Falkland Islands—had all the characteristic features of colonization as practised by the great Powers in the era of imperialism. That situation, which had lasted for 133 years, could, according to certain statements, be prolonged for an indefinite period; at all events, even today the islands were still under colonial rule. If that had been the only aspect of the question, the Sub-Committee's task would have been easier. But the case of the Malvinas Islands was more complicated: colonialism had placed a heavy burden upon that small territory, which had played an important strategic and economic role for the British Empire. There was a dispute, of 133 years' standing, between Argentina and the United Kingdom: the former had always maintained that the Malvinas Islands were an integral part of Argentine territory, and had year after year recalled, in the General Assembly, its rights in respect of those islands. Because of that burden, the Bulgarian delegation associated itself with the suggestion, made by several representatives, that consultations or negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom seemed advisable.

82. The representative of Argentina had stated that his Government sought a peaceful solution of its dispute with the United Kingdom. That was a very important statement, since it would enable recourse to be had, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to all the possibilities today existing for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

83. As the representative of Uruguay had said, the Special Committee—and it was even more true of the Sub-Committee—was not a tribunal for settling a legal dispute. Nevertheless, its task was to seek all possible ways and means of ensuring the complete implementation of the Declaration in which the United Nations had solemnly proclaimed the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

84. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation found it difficult to accept the argument that the Sub-Committee and by extension, the Special Committee were not competent to discuss questions of sovereignty in Territories subject to colonial rule. Whenever the Special Committee recommended or requested, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), that a given Territory should receive its independence and that the people of that Territory should be allowed to exercise freely their right of self-determination, it was merely requesting that sovereignty should be returned to the people from whom it had been usurped. There was no need to stress the well-known principle of constitutional law that sovereignty was vested in the first instance in the people. From the legal point of view, sovereignty over a colonized

Territory belonged to the people, and it was for them to determine the destiny of the Territory that they occupied and not the administering Power. In the case of an uninhabited territory or one in which the original population had been expelled, sovereignty should be restored to the State which had exercised it and from which it had been taken away by force. From the legal point of view, usurped sovereignty could not be restored to a minority of settlers or to an imported population.

85. Therefore, it could not be denied that the Special Committee, and Sub-Committee III, was fully competent to consider the colonial case of the Malvinas Islands. In fact, the administering Power itself had classified the islands as colonies and had consequently transmitted to the Secretary-General the information required under Article 73 e of the Charter. There was therefore no doubt that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) applied to that Territory.

86. His delegation wished to make a few comments concerning some of the political, legal and moral principles on which international law in the Western Hemisphere was based. It was difficult for Americans to accept the principle of occupation as giving rise to rights which had no justification other than the will of the strongest. In any case, such a principle could not and never would be applied in America. It was known that classical law provided that occupation permitted the acquisition of territorial sovereignty if that occupation was carried out on ownerless territory or *res nullius*. From the standpoint of international law, it could not be claimed that warlike occupation or even peaceful military occupation had ever given the occupier a valid title to a territory. With regard to the rule of *res nullius*, there had been no such territory in America since the discovery and conquest of America. In accordance with the law of nations the practice of that day, all territories discovered or to be discovered were to be shared between the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns. The Papal Bulls *Inter caetera* and *Dudum si quidem*, which had been followed by a series of treaties between the two Crowns, had established the borders of the two empires. Sovereignty over the lands of America had therefore been held by one of those two Crowns. Upon their separation from Spain and Portugal, the new American republics had inherited that sovereignty by virtue of and through the proclamation of the principle of *uti possidetis juris* of 1810.

87. Proclaimed by Bolivar, it was established for the first time in the international sphere of America upon the signature of the Pact of Bogotá of 28 May 1811 between Venezuela and Nueva Granada (today the Republic of Colombia). As applied to the American territories, that principle had had the double aim of maintaining and safeguarding the harmony between the various peoples of the continent by making it possible for them to solve through peaceful means disputes which might arise with respect to the demarcation of their frontiers and of preventing the conquest or usurpation of territories by extracontinental Powers. It originated in Roman law, where it meant a prohibition to retain possession. The Romans said "*uti possidetis, ita possidatis*" i.e., "as you possess, so may you possess". Translated into American law, that was not understood in the sense of a principle of possession but rather as the right to possess in conformity with the territorial demarcation made by the Spanish sovereign, according to the titles obtaining at the beginning of the emancipation. The treaty of "Union, League and Confederation", drawn up by Bolivar and signed in 1822, between Gran Colombia, Peru, Chile, and the United Provinces of Buenos Aires had contained a clause in which it was stated that both parties guaranteed the integrity of their territories and would respect the Spanish colonial boundaries that had existed before the war.

88. Bolivar himself had consecrated that principle in practice by establishing the Republic of Bolivia and fixing as its frontiers those which the colonial entity called Audiencia de Charcas had held in 1810. The specific legal formulation of the principle was contained in article 7 of the Treaty of Confederation, subscribed to by the first American Congress held at Lima in 1847-1848. The principle of *uti possidetis* had received international recognition in the majority opinion of the Permanent Commission of the Council of State of Spain

on 18 January 1909 in the Spanish Crown's arbitration of the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. There had been several subsequent arbitral awards defining the scope of the principle, for example, the arbitral award of the Swiss Federal Council on 24 March 1922 regarding the border dispute between Colombia and Venezuela. That award had stated clearly that from the legal point of view, there had been no ownerless territory in former Spanish America. The principle had not only been accepted and applied by the Latin American States but also by the United States of America, which had invoked it on several occasions, for example, upon signing the Treaty of Ghent in 1814 to demarcate its frontiers with the British dominions, and to establish its titles of territorial dominion in Louisiana and the two Floridas. That same idea had served as a basis for the resolution on non-transference adopted by the United States Congress on 15 January 1811. That resolution had constituted one of the principles enunciated in the message which President Monroe had sent to Congress in 1823, and which had subsequently been misnamed the "Monroe Doctrine". More recently, the same principle had been accepted and invoked by the new States of Africa and Asia. Undoubtedly, therefore, from 1810 onwards there has been no such thing in Latin America as *res nullius*.

89. However, it would not suffice merely to proclaim the principle of *uti possidetis*. It had logically to be followed by a condemnation of any attempt at conquest and by the drawing up of legal instruments designed to ensure the territorial integrity of the American States. From its birth, America had been the continent of law and its first international acts had condemned aggressive war and rejected all advantages obtained through the use of force. The First International Conference of American States held in Washington in 1890 had condemned the right of conquest. From that time onward, Inter-American Conferences had proclaimed the illegality of aggressive war. An example of that had been the statement made at the Sixth International Conference of American States held at Havana in 1928 that aggressive war constituted a crime of aggression against the human race and that any aggression was illegal and therefore prohibited. Subsequently, the principle had been set forth categorically in a series of instruments in which it had been established as a norm of Inter-American public law such as the declaration of 1932 on the Chaco dispute and the declaration of the Council of the League of Nations on the Leticia dispute in 1933. Such instruments included the Saavedra-Lamas Treaty signed at Rio de Janeiro on 10 October 1933, the Pan-American Convention of Montevideo of the same year and the Preamble of the Havana Convention of 30 July 1940 regarding the temporary administration of European possessions in America.

90. Finally, the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogotá in 1948 at the Ninth Inter-American Conference had consecrated the inviolability of the territory of the American States, categorically condemned aggressive war, and stated that victory in war did not confer any rights.

91. American institutional life was based on the desire to replace the law of force by the force of the law. Efforts aimed at establishing that doctrine outside of America were well known to the members of the Sub-Committee. In the days of the League of Nations, attempts had been made to establish the principle of legality in relations between States so that no recognition would be granted to *de facto* situations brought about by means contrary to international law, especially in violation of existing treaties. Mr. Henry Stimson, the United States Secretary of State, had set forth that view in a note which he had sent on 7 January 1937 to two Asian Powers affirming that the United States had no intention of recognizing a situation, treaty or agreement obtained by methods contrary to the terms and obligations of the Pact of Paris of 27 August 1928, the Brand-Kellogg Pact. In March 1932, the Assembly of the League of Nations had adopted a resolution in which it had proclaimed that it was incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris. During World War II, that principle had been applied systematically in Asia, Africa and Europe by the Allies, who

had refused to recognize any situation resulting from aggression or the use of force.

92. The principle of the defence of territorial integrity was so deeply rooted in American legal thought that the representatives of Latin American States at the San Francisco Conference had stressed the need for the Charter of the future Organization to guarantee expressly the territorial integrity of States and to condemn categorically aggression and territorial annexations resulting from such aggression.

93. That feeling had been shared by almost all the Latin American representatives, and not by them alone—the representative of Australia, Mr. Forde, speaking at the second plenary meeting, had also advocated inclusion in the Charter of a provision to secure the political independence and territorial integrity of individual nations. The delegation of Uruguay had also given concrete expression to that feeling by introducing, during the debate in Committee I of Commission I on the principles on which the Organization should be based, an amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks draft that included the maintenance of the political independence and territorial integrity of Members. That amendment had been approved, and, in a changed form, had served as a basis for Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. No other position would have been possible for the American countries, for to pass over that question in silence would have been tantamount to tacit acceptance of the continuation of the rule of force.

94. He went on to examine the way in which the colonial problem was envisaged in America. Resolution XXXIII of the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogotá in March 1948, had clearly established that the historic process of the emancipation of America would not be complete so long as there were on the American continent peoples and areas subject to the colonial system or territories occupied by non-American countries. That resolution merely ratified those previously adopted at the Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics held at Panama, Havana and Rio de Janeiro in 1939, 1940 and 1942, condemning the colonial system in America and setting forth the right of the peoples of the continent to decide their own destinies, before the United Nations Charter did so and twenty years before the General Assembly adopted the historic Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Later, the Tenth Inter-American Conference had in 1954 adopted resolution XCVI against colonialism. After reading out the text of that resolution, he pointed out that it had been adopted by a vote of nineteen of the twenty participating States, with only the United States abstaining. The representative of that country had taken the position that colonial questions were better discussed in the United Nations, whose membership included both the American States and the colonial Powers.

95. It might be observed that both the resolution approved at the Ninth, and that adopted at the Tenth Inter-American Conference had drawn a clear distinction between "colonies" and "occupied territories". There was a very good reason for that, as could be seen from his statement.

96. During the General Assembly's discussion of the draft Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, all the countries of America, in accordance with their clearly established anti-colonial tradition, had given firm support to the draft resolution submitted by forty-three States. But there again they had insisted that the distinction set forth in American instruments should be drawn. The principle of self-determination must not be perverted for the purpose of maintaining *de facto* situations. That would have meant seeking to maintain the law of force and conferring an appearance of lawfulness on acts carried out by violence and contrary to the law.

97. With that in mind, the delegation of Guatemala had submitted an amendment to the original draft Declaration, proposing the addition of a new paragraph expressly stating that the principle of the self-determination of peoples might in no case impair the right of territorial integrity of any State or its right to the recovery of territory. In the course of the

original draft of the Declaration, however, it had been made clear that the sponsors had intended paragraph 6 of the Declaration to cover the points raised in the Guatemalan amendment; the amendment had then been withdrawn. The content and scope of the existing paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples had thus been clearly and unmistakably established. It fully protected the inalienable interests of small States or weaker countries which had in the course of their history been deprived of their lawful rights and of part of their territories with no justification other than the law of force.

98. The Malvinas Islands, had, as was clear from the Argentine representative's statement, belonged to Spain until the emancipation of the Spanish American colonies. In accordance with the principle of *uti possidetis* they should have become an integral part of the territory of the Argentine Republic as the heir to the rights of Spain. The unlawful occupation of those Islands by the United Kingdom had disrupted that orderly process and had created the existing situation. The Argentine Republic had never recognized the *de facto* situation and had continually protested against it while entering the strongest reservations in support of its lawful rights over the territory under discussion. The case of the Malvinas Islands was a colonial case. It was therefore within the competence of the Special Committee, and hence within the competence of Sub-Committee III. In the words of General Assembly resolution 1810 (XVII), paragraph 8 (a), it was a matter of continuing to seek "the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration" to the Malvinas Islands.

99. In the opinion of his delegation, every case required the most appropriate and effective handling and the special case of the Malvinas Islands called for a special approach. The representative of Italy had said at the 27th meeting, that the debate concerned a colonial territory rather than a colonial people, and that made it different from other similar cases which had been cited during the debate. But that was precisely why the American States attributed such supreme importance to the distinction between colonies and occupied territories. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples established that "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations". As he himself had already said in the Special Committee on 17 September 1963, failure to apply paragraph 6 would be tantamount to accepting the rule of force in international relations. It was a principle established in American law that victory conferred no rights but that justice was the same before and after victory. Sub-Committee III would be required to produce a report on the territorial colonies in America, and, at the present stage of the debate on the Malvinas Islands, he would suggest that the report and recommendations of Sub-Committee III to the Special Committee should be based upon the following principles:

- (1) The Malvinas Islands were a colony and therefore the Special Committee was competent to deal with the case. They were by definition one of the Territories to which resolution 1514 (XV) applied.
- (2) The Islands presented a special case. They were a severed and occupied part of the territory of another State, with a small population consisting almost entirely of nationals of the administering Power. The population was for the most part transient and changed continually. It was a case covered by paragraph 6 of the Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV), and it should be studied in the light of that paragraph.
- (3) In view of the diplomatic and political aspects of the question, in addition to the colonial problem, since there was a dispute between the administering Power and the State from whose territory the Islands had been severed, the Committee should recommend methods and procedures in keeping with General Assembly resolution 1810 (XVII) which would make it possible to find a satisfactory and just solution to the problem. Such methods, of course, were specified in the Charter of the United Nations. At the current stage of the problem the Special Committee might request the two parties concerned

to enter into direct negotiations with the purpose of seeking a solution in the interests of both parties, within the framework of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the United Nations Charter.

100. He had no doubt that the United Kingdom, true to its traditional political vision, would take note of such recommendations and willingly co-operate in seeking a just and equitable solution to put an end to an anachronistic situation out of keeping with the international order of modern times.

101. The representative of Argentina thanked the Sub-Committee for having given his country its first opportunity to expound at length its legitimate claim to the Malvinas Islands and to exchange arguments with the United Kingdom on the problem.

102. The case of the Malvinas Islands being a typical example of practices engaged in by the great Powers in a bygone age, his delegation had particularly welcomed the recognition by a number of speakers that the Islands were Argentine territory under British occupation and that they should be returned to their rightful owner, as demanded by Argentina for more than a century. In their statements, members of the Sub-Committee had rightly considered, not only the historical and juridical factors, but also the geographical truth that the islands were part and parcel of the American continent. He fully shared the interpretation which several delegations, and in particular that of Uruguay, had placed on the principle of self-determination, as set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and which regarded that principle as being subject to others recognized elsewhere in that resolution and in the Charter, such as the principle of territorial integrity.

103. Argentina was a peace-loving country, which traditionally settled its disputes by peaceful means. It was prepared to negotiate with the United Kingdom a solution to the problem under discussion, on the understanding that it resolutely demanded the restoration of its territorial integrity through the return of the Malvinas, and the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, which had been taken by force by the United Kingdom, and that it would not agree to a perversion of the principle of self-determination in order to perpetuate a colonial anachronism to the detriment of its legitimate sovereign rights. The future of the local population would be fully safeguarded by Argentine law, under which all communities in Argentina had been integrated into the life of the nation and had found ample opportunities for advancement.

104. The representative of the United Kingdom in reply, said that while his delegation, for reasons explained very fully in his opening statement, could not recognize the competence of the Sub-Committee to consider the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, to which the greater part of the Argentine representative's statement at the 25th meeting had been devoted, he wished to correct a number of misconceptions about conditions in the Islands expressed on that occasion.

105. The Argentine representative had suggested that the status of the Falkland Islands as a British colony was an anachronism; the Sub-Committee might consider whether it was the United Kingdom Government's clearly stated policy of allowing the Falkland Islanders to choose their constitutional future or the Argentine Government's desire to annex a small Territory against the wishes of its inhabitants that was more in keeping with modern thought. The population of the Islands had increased from 2,043 in 1901 to 2,171 in 1962, and the stability of the population figures should not be equated with stagnation, as suggested by the Argentine representative, for the Falkland Islanders were full of energy and had a thriving economy. The small population decline in recent years had been due mainly to the attraction of more varied employment opportunities elsewhere, and the resulting emigration had partially offset the natural population increase. It was most misleading to draw a picture of the Islanders as the only shrinking American community; the birth-rate in Argentina itself had been declining ever since 1956. He was not aware of any evidence that the Islands would enjoy greater prosperity as part of Argentina; a comparison of such social indicators as the infant mortality rate and the average size of dwellings, as shown in United Nations statistical publications, suggested that the standard of living and of social well-being in the

Falkland Islands was already substantially higher than in Argentina.

106. The people of the Islands were not temporary settlers; 80 per cent of the resident population in 1962 had been born in the Islands, and many of them could trace their roots there for more than a century. The Islanders were the only home they knew, and his delegation found nothing in the Charter or in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples to suggest that the principle of self-determination should not be applied to communities of British descent.

107. It was true that the Falkland Islands Company played a most important role in the Islands and, indeed, had done much originally to develop them; but the Islands derived great benefit from taxes, wages and other payments by the Company, and it was quite unrealistic to expect so small a community to support a complex competitive economy. The scale and efficiency of the Company enabled it to contribute more to the territory's economy than many small farms could do. The reason for the lack of direct communications with Argentina was that ships wishing to enter Argentine ports could not do so if their last port of call had been in the Falkland Islands, where there were no Argentine authorities to clear papers. Falkland Islanders could not visit Argentina, because if they did so they were treated as Argentine nationals liable to Argentine taxes and military service. Thus the barriers to closer relations between the Falkland Islands and Argentina were due to Argentine Government policy.

108. The Argentine representative had referred to the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958. It appeared from his remarks that the Argentine Government recognized the Convention as definitive in International Law, but it had not yet been ratified by the Argentine Government which failed to follow its principles in almost every respect in drafting a law relating to the continental shelf. Far from justifying any claim to sovereignty over islands on the continental shelf by coastal States, the Convention made special mention of the fact that islands had their own continental shelf and indicated that coastal States had sovereign rights over the shelf only for the limited purpose of exploring it or exploiting its natural resources. The United Kingdom Government fully reserved its rights over the continental shelf adjacent to the Falkland Islands, and it would, of course, be willing to determine appropriate boundaries on the shelf between Argentina and the Islands, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

109. His delegation could not agree with the interpretation placed upon paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples by the representative of Uruguay, in his statement at the 26th meeting. That paragraph was clearly an injunction to all countries to take no action in the future which would result in splitting existing territories or States or would infringe their sovereignty in a manner inconsistent with the Charter, especially Article 2. There was no justification for regarding the paragraph as a limitation on the principle of self-determination set out in paragraph 2 of the Declaration, which in that case would surely have been worded quite differently. If the principle of self-determination had been so limited by the wording of the paragraph, it might well not have been approved by a majority of the Members of the General Assembly in 1960 or at any other time.

110. He did not wish to discuss in detail events of the distant past, but his Government firmly believed that British activities in earlier days had been sufficient to give it a good title to the Falkland Islands by occupation; moreover, the establishment of British sovereignty by open, continuous, effective and peaceful occupation for nearly a century and a half, gave Britain a clear prescriptive title. Argentina had not continually protested since 1833, as stated by its representative, but had remained silent for periods of up to thirty-five years. The Islanders had no connections with Argentina and desired none but the normal friendly relations between neighbouring countries. This had been made very clear in the messages of the elected members and other Falkland Islanders to the Committee and their wishes could not be set aside. His delegation appreciated the spirit underlying the suggestion by several

speakers that the Sub-Committee should appeal to the United Kingdom and Argentina to hold discussions on the problem and to find a peaceful solution, but his Government was responsible for the security and interests of the Falkland Islands community and for the protection of its rights, and it could not disregard its obligations to the people of the Territory simply in order to respond to well-intentioned appeals to negotiate. That did not mean that there was no room for fruitful discussions between the two Governments, perhaps with the participation of representatives of the Falkland Islanders themselves. He had said in his earlier statement that the United Kingdom Government was always willing to discuss with Argentina ways of avoiding damage to their good relations arising from the dispute, and the British Government had so informed the Argentine Government. It was for the Islanders to determine their own ultimate status, and he reaffirmed that the United Kingdom Government, which had no doubts as to its sovereignty, stood by the principle of self-determination.

111. In his reply the representative of Argentina stated that, as far as the use of the word "annex" in reference to assumed Argentine intentions towards the Islands, he protested its use because the Argentine Republic, within the framework of a political continuity that had never been deviated from, had never annexed a foreign territory. Argentina's territorial conflicts had always been solved by arbitration or through negotiations between the parties concerned; what Argentina requested from the United Kingdom was the restitution of an integral part of its territory, the Malvinas Islands, of which it had been deprived by an act of force, and by which the United Kingdom had also expelled the Argentine population established in the Islands.

112. He reiterated the qualification of stagnant to the population of the Malvinas Islands. The statement that the figures of arrivals and departures from the Islands did not represent emigration and immigration figures was indeed difficult to accept. All figures quoted in his earlier statement had been taken from the Secretariat working paper (see section A above). Nevertheless, it was interesting to refer to the paragraph in which it was stated that there was a shortage of skilled workers due to the continuous "exodus" of inhabitants. The figures showed that there were more departures than arrivals every year. The word "exodus" in any language retained its meaning, from its Greek and Latin roots: departure, emigration, never a holiday or a business trip.

113. He noted that the United Kingdom delegate had maintained that British activities in those early days had been sufficient to give them a good title by occupation. In the eighteenth century, the British had been limited to the possession of Port Egmont—which lasted only eight years—with a protest from and with even an armed expulsion by Spain; at the same time Spain had been established in Puerto Soledad with no protest forthcoming from Great Britain. In the nineteenth century, the British had not protested the Spanish occupation, nor the subsequent one established by Argentina. It was only in 1829 that the British had protested. The truth of the matter was that on 3 January 1833, Argentina was occupying the Territory effectively when a British warship had performed the act of force that ended in the expulsion of the Argentine population. The Argentine delegation did not understand what title the delegate of the United Kingdom claimed for his Government before 1833.

114. He made reference to the prescriptive title mentioned by the delegate of Great Britain, and held that even according to British authors the British prescription could not be of use as a title over the Islands because it had been interrupted by the Argentine Republic, with its protests made in every possible occasion.

115. He further stated that if one were to use the British contention that periods had elapsed without any formal protest, the only beneficiary of this theory would be the Argentine Republic, simply because the British had left Port Egmont in 1774 and had been silent for fifty-five years, accepting in that fashion the legitimate titles of Argentina over the archipelago.

116. He concluded by stating that he wished to reiterate once again, in spite of the statement of the representative of

the United Kingdom, the willingness of the Argentine Republic to find, together with the British Government—and bearing in mind the purposes and principles of resolution 1514 (XV)—through direct negotiation, the solution of the core of the problem of the Malvinas Islands, thus consolidating the friendly relations that should exist between their two countries.

117. The representative of the United Kingdom reaffirmed that it did not consider the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee competent to discuss questions of sovereignty. He further added that his delegation wished to make two comments on the draft conclusions and recommendations submitted to the Sub-Committee.

118. First, the United Kingdom delegation was surprised and sorry that the draft made no reference to the principle of self-determination, or even to the wishes and aspirations of the people of the Falkland Islands. In accordance with all the precedents of the Sub-Committee and of the other organs of the Special Committee, the recommendations should indicate clearly that the future of the Territory must be determined in accordance with the wishes of its inhabitants. If that glaring omission were allowed to stand, it would be a break with the Committee's tradition and a precedent would be created which the Committee might have reason to regret.

119. Secondly, regarding the proposal that the Special Committee should invite the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina to enter into negotiations together, he referred to the reservation expressed in his delegation's statements of 8 and 16 September 1964—that the United Kingdom Government could not contemplate discussions with the Government of Argentina on the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The reasons for this reservation had been fully set out in the United Kingdom delegation's statement of 16 September 1964. The essential point was that self-determination for the people of the Falkland Islands was not negotiable.

120. The United Kingdom Government was as anxious as anyone to maintain and develop peaceful and harmonious relations with the Falkland Islands on the one hand and with Argentina on the other. As he had repeatedly said, the United Kingdom Government was always willing to hold talks with the Government of Argentina to that end.

Conclusions and recommendations concerning the Falkland Islands

121. At the 30th meeting, on 18 September 1964, the Sub-Committee unanimously adopted the following conclusions and recommendations:

(a) The Sub-Committee examined the situation in the Non-Self-Governing Territory of the Falkland Islands (otherwise known as the Malvinas Islands) and heard the statements of the representative of the administering Power and the representative of Argentina;

(b) The Sub-Committee confirms that the provisions of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples apply to the Territory of the Falkland Islands (otherwise known as the Malvinas Islands);

(c) The Sub-Committee notes the existence of a dispute between the Government of the United Kingdom and that of Argentina concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (otherwise known as the Malvinas Islands);

(d) The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should invite the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to this problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the United Nations Charter and of resolution 1514 (XV), the interests of the population of the islands, and the opinions expressed during the course of the general debate;

(e) The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should invite the two above-mentioned Governments to inform the Special Committee or the General Assembly of the results of their negotiations.

The year 1963 was remarkable for the establishment of Chinese University of Hong Kong.

15. Educational expenditures in 1963, including grants and subsidies, totalled \$HK 165,408,602, an increase of more than \$HK 15 million over the previous year.

16. Proposals for the reorganization of primary and secondary education were adopted and placed in operation in September 1963. Under these, the normal age

of entry into government and aided primary schools has been raised from six to seven years, and a new first-year primary course will gradually replace the existing six-year course. As soon as practicable, two years of secondary education will be made available after the primary five-year course in order that pupils may continue their schooling up to the age of fourteen, which is the statutory minimum age for industrial employment. Entry to government and aided secondary schools will continue to be by selective examination.

CHAPTER XXII

FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on the Territory is contained in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIII, paras. 1-25). Information on recent developments is set out below.¹

General

2. On 31 December 1964, the population, excluding that of the Dependencies, was estimated at 2,102, compared with 2,172 at the census in March 1962. With few exceptions, all were of European descent and most were British. The population of the Dependencies (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands) as at 31 December 1964 was 499.

Political and constitutional developments

3. Elections were held in 1964 when two out of the four elected seats were contested.

4. On 15 May 1964, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies of the United Kingdom stated that since the recent elections in the Colony, the Governor of the Colony had held discussions with the Executive and Legislative Councils and had submitted agreed proposals for changes in the composition of both Councils. By those proposals, the Executive Council, which was previously composed of five non-official members nominated by the Governor and three *ex officio* members, would be composed of two members nominated by the Governor, two elected members of the Legislative Council and two *ex officio* members. The two elected members of the Legislative Council would be chosen by a ballot of the elected and non-official members of the Legislative Council.

5. It was also proposed that the membership on the Legislative Council should be reduced from eleven to eight members by omitting one of the three *ex officio* members and the two nominated official members. The Council would then consist of the Governor and eight members, namely, the Colonial Secretary and the Colonial Treasurer, two nominated non-official members and four elected members.

¹ The following information transmitted by the administering Power has been taken into account in the preparation of this chapter: information under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter for the year ending 31 December 1963, transmitted on 23 June 1964, and also for the year ending 31 December 1964, transmitted on 2 July 1965.

6. The proposals were approved and the new constitutional arrangements came into operation on 21 September 1964.²

Economic conditions

7. The economy of the Territory continues to depend almost entirely on the wool industry.

8. The external trade figures over the last few years are as follows:

Year	Domestic exports	Wool exports (in thousand pounds)	Imports
1961	978	908	468
1962	940	913	413
1963	1,078	1,054	503
1964	1,050	1,024	545

9. Public revenue is derived mainly from income tax, custom duties and the sale of postage stamps. The following table gives the revenue and expenditure over the past few years for the Falkland Islands, excluding the Dependencies:

Year	Revenue (in thousand pounds)	Expenditure
1961-1962	258	278
1962-1963	294	302
1963-1964	287	350

10. Assistance to the Territory through Colonial Development and Welfare Fund schemes amounted to £180 in 1963 and £497 in 1964, compared with £11,657 in 1962.

11. The United Kingdom Department for Technical Co-operation has, since the beginning of 1963, filled four appointments in the medical services, nine in education and one in the administration. It is also trying to fill thirteen other posts including one agricultural post.

Social conditions

Labour

12. The supply of labour continued to be adversely affected by the net loss of population through emigration. In 1963, 381 persons left the Territory and 353 arrived, compared with 411 and 368 respectively in 1962.

² See the Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order, 1964, and The Falkland Islands Additional Instructions, 1964.

Public health

13. No significant changes occurred in the field of public health in 1963. Total expenditure in 1963-1964 was £35,590, compared with £34,973 in 1962-1963, and £36,169 in 1961-1962, which included special expenditure. The recurrent medical expenditure in 1964 represented 11.21 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure of the Territory, compared with 12.22 per cent in 1963 and 12.68 per cent in 1962.

Educational conditions

14. In 1963-1964, the number of children receiving education in the Territory was 333, compared with 328 in 1962-1963 and 314 in 1961-1962. In 1962-1963 the number of teachers employed rose from 33 to 35.

15. The Colony awards up to two scholarships annually to boarding grammar schools in the United Kingdom. In 1962-1963, there were eight students from the Territory attending schools in the United Kingdom under this scheme.

16. Recurrent expenditure on education in 1962-1963 was £39,534, representing 13.1 per cent, and in 1963-1964 was £44,204, representing 13.97 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure, compared with £39,552, or 14.24 per cent of the total expenditure in 1961-1962.

B. PETITIONS

17. The Special Committee circulated the following petitions concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas):

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Six petitions concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	A/AC.109/PET.357
Miss Cristina B. Miró	
Miss María Cristina Tenaglia	
Miss Elida Susana Oviedo	
Mr. Roberto Heredia	
Messrs. Constantino Brandaris, Vice-President, and Hugo Jorge Pacheco, Secretary-General, Universidad Nacional de la Plata	
Messrs. Alfredo Placios, Alberto Cantiloti and Leonidas Barletta	

APPENDIX

Letter dated 20 April 1964 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations, addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee*

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency certain comments that my Government wishes to make on document A/AC.109/L.98/Add.2, submitted by the Secretariat to the

*Included as an appendix to this chapter in accordance with the decision of the Special Committee at the 389th meeting on 7 October 1965.

Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

These comments refer to chapter II, on the Malvinas Islands, and in particular to the part intended to inform the Committee on the "status" of this territory (A/AC.109/L.98/Add.2, chap. II, paras. 4-8).

My Government notes that in dealing with the status of the Malvinas Islands the document leaves out certain fundamental historical facts and legal considerations, thus in our opinion, obscuring the right of the Argentine Republic to this Territory. I shall indicate briefly the most important omissions found by my Government:

- (1) There is no mention of the fact that in 1767 Spain formally took possession of the Malvinas Islands and proceeded to occupy them.
- (2) It is not made clear that in 1770 the British were expelled by the Governor of Buenos Aires.
- (3) There is no reference to the important activities of Spain and Argentina in the period after 1774.
- (4) In particular, it should be made clear that effective occupation of the whole Territory lasted until 1810, when full sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and adjacent seas passed from Spain to the Argentine Government.
- (5) From then until 1833, the Islands were in fact under Argentine sovereignty and officials appointed by Argentina carried out their functions in the territory.
- (6) It is not made clear that in 1833 the last Argentine administration in the Malvinas Islands was forcibly expelled by British naval units.
- (7) It should also be stated in the document that the Argentine Government protested to Great Britain in 1833 against this occupation of our territory by force and that this protest has since been repeated on many occasions, reservations having been made not only in the United Nations, but in all international organizations to which my country belongs.

In paragraph 3 of the introduction to document A/AC.109/L.98/Add.2, it is stated that the document was prepared on the basis of official information as well as information available from other published sources.

My Government cannot but note that references to be found in innumerable publications have been left out of the part of the report dealt with in the foregoing paragraphs, which contain a brief account of the historical facts.

In the circumstances, the Argentine Government is obliged to express its concern at finding that, in a case as delicate as that of a disputed territory, there has not been a more thorough treatment of the historical background so as to provide a balanced and complete account that would contribute to the enlightenment of the members of the Committee.

Accordingly, we would respectfully ask Your Excellency to inform the United Nations Secretariat of the Argentine Government's strong desire that appropriate corrections should be made in document A/AC.109/L.98/Add.2, so that it will at least include the information provided in this letter.

The result of this will be that the United Nations will have a more balanced view of the historical aspects of the question, and the information available to the members of the Committee for their consideration of the status of the Malvinas Islands will be more accurate.

CHAPTER XXIII**BERMUDA, BAHAMAS, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS****A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES***Introduction*

1. Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands, all under United King-

dom administration, were jointly considered by the Special Committee at the second of its two sessions in 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIV paras. 1-96).

2. Such information as became available on further developments is set out below.

the Cook Islands¹³ and the information on subsequent developments.¹⁴

Having heard the statements made by the United Nations Representative for the Supervision of the Elections in the Cook Islands and the representative of New Zealand.

Noting that, under the Constitution which came into force on 4 August 1965, the people of the Cook Islands have reserved their right to move to a status of complete independence.

1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Cook Islands;

2. Notes the findings and conclusions of the United Nations Representative for the Supervision of the Elections in the Cook Islands and expresses its high appreciation to the Representative and his staff;

3. Expresses its appreciation of the co-operation extended to the United Nations by the Government of New Zealand in the study of the question of the Cook Islands;

4. Notes that the Constitution of the Cook Islands came into force on 4 August 1965, from which date the people of the Cook Islands have had control of their internal affairs and of their future;

5. Considers that since the Cook Islands have attained full internal self-government, the transmission of information in respect of the Cook Islands under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations is no longer necessary;

6. Reaffirms the responsibility of the United Nations, under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to assist the people of the Cook Islands in the eventual achievement of full independence, if they so wish, at a future date;

7. Expresses the hope that the United Nations Development Programme and the specialized agencies will endeavour to contribute in every way possible to the development and strengthening of the economy of the Cook Islands.

1398th plenary meeting,
16 December 1965.

2065 (XX). Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

The General Assembly.

Having examined the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Taking into account the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),¹⁵ and in particular the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee with reference to that Territory.

Considering that its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 was prompted by the cherished aim of bringing to an end everywhere colonialism in all its

¹³ *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda items 23 and 24, document A/5962.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, document A/5961.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I) (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter XXIII; *ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chapter XXII.

forms, one of which covers the case of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

Noting the existence of a dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the said Islands.

1. Invites the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

2. Requests the two Governments to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session on the results of the negotiation.

1398th plenary meeting,
16 December 1965.

2066 (XX). Question of Mauritius

The General Assembly.

Having considered the question of Mauritius and other islands composing the Territory of Mauritius.

Having examined the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Mauritius,¹⁶

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Regretting that the administering Power has not fully implemented resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to that Territory,

Noting with deep concern that any step taken by the administering Power to detach certain islands from the Territory of Mauritius for the purpose of establishing a military base would be in contravention of the Declaration, and in particular of paragraph 6 thereof.

1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Mauritius, and endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee contained therein;

2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory of Mauritius to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

3. Invites the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take effective measures with a view to the immediate and full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV);

4. Invites the administering Power to take no action which would dismember the Territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity;

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I) (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter XIV; *ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chapter XIII.

should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.³¹

Has considered the application for membership of the Republic of Mali,³²

Decides to admit the Republic of Mali to membership in the United Nations.

876th plenary meeting,
28 September 1960.

1492 (XV). Admission of the Federation of Nigeria to membership in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 7 October 1960 that the Federation of Nigeria should be admitted to membership in the United Nations,³³

Having considered the application for membership of the Federation of Nigeria,³⁴

Decides to admit the Federation of Nigeria to membership in the United Nations.

893rd plenary meeting,
7 October 1960.

1495 (XV). Co-operation of Member States

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned by the increase in world tensions, Considering that the deterioration in international relations constitutes a grave risk to world peace and co-operation,

Conscious that both in the General Assembly and in the world at large it is necessary to arrest this trend in international relations and to contribute towards greater harmony among nations irrespective of the differences in their political and economic systems,

1. Urges that all countries, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions likely to aggravate international tensions;

2. Reaffirms the conviction that the strength of the United Nations rests on the co-operation of its Member States which should be forthcoming in full measure so that the Organization becomes a more effective instrument for the safeguarding of peace and for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples;

3. Urges further that immediate and constructive steps should be adopted in regard to the urgent problems concerning the peace of the world and the advancement of its peoples;

4. Appeals to all Member States to use their utmost endeavours to these ends.

907th plenary meeting,
17 October 1960.

1503 (XV). Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

The General Assembly

Takes note of the report of the International Atomic

³¹ Ibid., document A/4514.

³² Ibid., document A/4512.

³³ Ibid., document A/4533.

³⁴ Ibid., document A/4527.

³⁵ Annual report of the Board of Governors to the General Conference, 1 July 1959-30 June 1960, Vienna, July 1960 (A/4531 and Corr.1 and Add.1).

Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1959-1960.³⁵

943rd plenary meeting,
12 December 1960.

1513 (XV). Report of the Security Council

The General Assembly

Takes note of the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly covering the period from 16 July 1959 to 15 July 1960.³⁶

943rd plenary meeting,
12 December 1960.

1514 (XV). Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence,

Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace,

Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories,

Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations,

Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law,

Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith,

Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trends towards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained independence,

³⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/4494).

Convinced that to complete freedom and the integrity

Solemnly proclaims speedy and unimpeded and manifestati

And to this

Declares that

1. The suzerainty and domination a fundamental principle of the United Nations promotion of

2. All peoples by virtue of their political status and cultural

3. Inadequacy of colonial preparation for delaying

4. All armed forces directed in order to ensure freely their integrity of

5. Immediate Non-Self-Governing territories which transfer all powers without any conditions with their fr

Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,

Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;

And to this end

Declares that:

1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.

5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without

any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.

*947th plenary meeting,
14 December 1960.*

1592 (XV). The situation in the Republic of the Congo

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in the Republic of the Congo",

Noting that the previous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on this subject are still in effect,

Decides to keep this item on the agenda of its resumed fifteenth session.

*958th plenary meeting,
20 December 1960.*

* * *

Note

Appointment of the Peace Observation Commission (item 18)

At its 960th plenary meeting on 20 December 1960, the General Assembly decided to reappoint, for the calendar years 1961 and 1962, the present members of the Peace Observation Commission. The Commission is therefore composed as follows: CHINA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, HONDURAS, INDIA, IRAQ, ISRAEL, NEW ZEALAND, PAKISTAN, SWEDEN, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and URUGUAY.



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peoples, and of
of human rights
hout distinction
for freedom in
role of such peo-
pendence,
resulting from the
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manifestations,
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militates against
peace,
own ends, freely
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UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/3160 (XXVIII)
29 January 1974

1973 G.A. 

116-0-14

Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 23

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the Fourth Committee (A/9417)]

3160 (XXVIII). Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also its resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, in which it invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Gravely concerned at the fact that eight years have elapsed since the adoption of resolution 2065 (XX) without any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations,

Mindful that resolution 2065 (XX) indicates that the way to put an end to this colonial situation is the peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom with regard to the aforementioned islands,

Expressing its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonization and to promote the well-being of the population of the islands,

74-02910

/...

1. Approves the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 1/ and, in particular, the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 21 August 1973 concerning the Territory; 2/
2. Declares the need to accelerate the negotiations between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland called for in General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between them concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);
3. Urges the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, therefore, to proceed without delay with the negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, in order to put an end to the colonial situation,
4. Requests both Governments to report to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly as soon as possible, and not later than at its twenty-ninth session, on the results of the recommended negotiations.

2202nd plenary meeting
14 December 1973

1/ A/9023 (Part II), chap. III; and A/9023/Add.6, chap. XXVII.

2/ See A/9023/Add.6, chap. XXVII, para. 12.

VOTE: 116-0-14

RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 3160 (XXVIII):

YES - ABSTAIN - NO	YES - ABSTAIN - NO	YES - ABSTAIN - NO	YES - ABSTAIN - NO
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ecuador	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kuwait	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Romania
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Albania	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Egypt	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Laos	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rwanda
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Algeria	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> El Salvador	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lebanon	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Saudi Arabia
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Argentina	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Equatorial Guinea	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lesotho	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Senegal
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Australia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ethiopia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Liberia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sierra Leone
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Austria *	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fiji	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Libyan Arab Republic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Singapore
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bahamas	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Finland	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Luxembourg	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Somalia
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bahrain	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> France	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Madagascar	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> South Africa
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Barbados	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gabon	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Malawi	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Spain
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Belgium	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gambia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Malaysia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sri Lanka
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bhutan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> German Dem. Rep.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Maldives	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sudan
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bolivia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Germany, Fed. Rep.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mali	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Swaziland
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Botswana	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ghana	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Malta	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sweden
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Brazil	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Greece	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mauritania	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Syrian Arab Republic
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bulgaria	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Guatemala	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mauritius	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Thailand
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Burma	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Guinea	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mexico	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Togo
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Burundi	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Guyana	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mongolia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Trinidad and Tobago
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Byelorussian SSR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Haiti	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Morocco	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tunisia
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cameroon	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Honduras	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Nepal	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Turkey
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Canada	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Hungary	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Netherlands	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Uganda
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Central African Rep.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iceland	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New Zealand	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ukrainian SSR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chad	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> India	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Nicaragua	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> USSR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chile	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Indonesia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Niger	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> United Arab Emirates
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> China	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iran	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Nigeria	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> United Kingdom
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Colombia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iraq	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Norway	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Un. Rep. of Tanzania
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Congo	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ireland	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Oman	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> United States
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Costa Rica	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Israel	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pakistan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Upper Volta
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cuba	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Italy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Panama	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Uruguay
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cyprus	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ivory Coast	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paraguay	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Venezuela
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Czechoslovakia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jamaica	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Peru	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yemen
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Dahomey	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Japan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Philippines	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yugoslavia
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Democratic Yemen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jordan	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Poland	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Zaire
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Denmark	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kenya	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Portugal	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Zambia
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Dominican Republic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Khmer Republic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Qatar	

3161 (XXVIII). Question of the Comoro Archipelago

Date: 14 December 1973 Meeting: 2202
Vote: 110-0-18 (recorded) Report: A/9417

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the Comoro Archipelago,

Having heard the statement of the administering Power, 59/

Having also heard the statement of the representative of the Mouvement de libération nationale des Comores, 60/

Taking note of the "Joint Declaration on the Accession to Independence of the Comoro Archipelago", containing the text of an agreement reached on 15 June 1973 between the Minister for the Overseas Departments and Territories of the Government of France and the President of the Government Council of the Comoro Archipelago, 61/

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration, contained in General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970,

59/ A/C.4/SR.2064.

60/ A/C.4/SR.2065 and A/C.4/L.1041.

61/ A/9023/Add.4, chap. XI, annex, appendix II.

* Later advised the Secretariat it had intended to abstain.

1976

6. Expresses the view that measures to promote the economic development of Tokelau are an important element in the process of self-determination, and the hope that the administering Power will continue to intensify and expand its programme of budgetary support and development aid to the Territory;
7. Requests the administering Power, in the light of the conclusions and recommendations of the Visiting Mission, to continue to enlist the assistance of the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, as well as other regional and international bodies, in the strengthening and development of the economy of the Territory;
8. Requests the specialized agencies and other organizations to consider the methods and scale of their operations in order to ensure that they are able to respond appropriately to the requirements of such small and isolated Territories as Tokelau;
9. Requests the administering Power to take the necessary measures to intensify programmes of political education, as well as to ensure the preservation of the identity and the cultural heritage of the people of Tokelau;
10. Requests the Special Committee to continue to examine this question at its next session, in the light of the findings of the Visiting Mission, including the possible dispatch, as appropriate and in consultation with the administering Power, of a second visiting mission to Tokelau, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

31/49. Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

Date: 1 December 1976

Vote: 102-1-32 (recorded)

Meeting: 85

Report: A/31/362

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

-Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973,

Bearing in mind the paragraphs related to this question contained in the Political Declaration adopted by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, 26/ and in the Political Declaration adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, 27/

Having regard to the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 28/ and, in particular, the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee concerning the Territory, 29/

1. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and, in particular, the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee concerning the Territory; 30/

26/ A/10217 and Corr.1, annex, para. 87.

27/ A/31/197, annex I, para. 119.

28/ A/31/23/Add.9 (Part III), chap. XXX.

29/ Ibid., para. 8.

30/ Ibid.

2. Expresses its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonization and to promote the well-being of the population of the islands;

3. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to expedite the negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty as requested in General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII);

4. Calls upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended in the above-mentioned resolutions;

5. Requests both Governments to report to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly as soon as possible on the results of the negotiations.

RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 31/49:

YES - ABSTAIN - NO	YES - ABSTAIN - NO	YES - ABSTAIN - NO	YES - ABSTAIN - NO
<input type="radio"/> Afghanistan	<input type="radio"/> Dominican Republic	<input type="radio"/> Kuwait	<input type="radio"/> Romania
<input type="radio"/> Albania	<input type="radio"/> Ecuador	<input type="radio"/> Lao Peoples Dem. Rep.	<input type="radio"/> Rwanda
<input type="radio"/> Algeria	<input type="radio"/> Egypt	<input type="radio"/> Lebanon	<input type="radio"/> Sao Tome and Principe
<input type="radio"/> Angola	<input type="radio"/> El Salvador	<input type="radio"/> Lesotho	<input type="radio"/> Saudi Arabia
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Argentina	<input type="radio"/> Equatorial Guinea	<input type="radio"/> Liberia	<input type="radio"/> Senegal
<input type="radio"/> Australia	<input type="radio"/> Ethiopia	<input type="radio"/> Libyan Arab Republic	<input type="radio"/> Seychelles
<input type="radio"/> Austria	<input type="radio"/> Fiji	<input type="radio"/> Luxembourg	<input type="radio"/> Sierra Leone
<input type="radio"/> Bahamas	<input type="radio"/> Finland	<input type="radio"/> Madagascar	<input type="radio"/> Singapore
<input type="radio"/> Bahrain	<input type="radio"/> France	<input type="radio"/> Malawi	<input type="radio"/> Somalia
<input type="radio"/> Bangladesh	<input type="radio"/> Gabon	<input type="radio"/> Malaysia	<input type="radio"/> South Africa
<input type="radio"/> Barbados	<input type="radio"/> Gambia	<input type="radio"/> Maldives	<input type="radio"/> Spain
<input type="radio"/> Belgium	<input type="radio"/> German Dem. Rep.	<input type="radio"/> Mali	<input type="radio"/> Sri Lanka
<input type="radio"/> Benin	<input type="radio"/> Germany, Fed. Rep.	<input type="radio"/> Malta	<input type="radio"/> Sudan
<input type="radio"/> Bhutan	<input type="radio"/> Ghana	<input type="radio"/> Mauritania	<input type="radio"/> Surinam
<input type="radio"/> Bolivia	<input type="radio"/> Greece	<input type="radio"/> Mauritius	<input type="radio"/> Swaziland
<input type="radio"/> Botswana	<input type="radio"/> Grenada	<input type="radio"/> Mexico	<input type="radio"/> Sweden
<input type="radio"/> Brazil	<input type="radio"/> Guatemala	<input type="radio"/> Mongolia	<input type="radio"/> Syrian Arab Republic
<input type="radio"/> Bulgaria	<input type="radio"/> Guinea	<input type="radio"/> Morocco	<input type="radio"/> Thailand
<input type="radio"/> Burma	<input type="radio"/> Guinea-Bissau	<input type="radio"/> Mozambique	<input type="radio"/> Togo
<input type="radio"/> Burundi	<input type="radio"/> Guyana	<input type="radio"/> Nepal	<input type="radio"/> Trinidad and Tobago
<input type="radio"/> Byelorussian SSR	<input type="radio"/> Haiti	<input type="radio"/> Netherlands	<input type="radio"/> Tunisia
<input type="radio"/> Canada	<input type="radio"/> Honduras	<input type="radio"/> New Zealand	<input type="radio"/> Turkey
<input type="radio"/> Cape Verde	<input type="radio"/> Hungary	<input type="radio"/> Nicaragua	<input type="radio"/> Uganda
<input type="radio"/> Central African Rep.	<input type="radio"/> Iceland	<input type="radio"/> Niger	<input type="radio"/> Ukrainian SSR
<input type="radio"/> Chad	<input type="radio"/> India	<input type="radio"/> Nigeria	<input type="radio"/> USSR
<input type="radio"/> Chile	<input type="radio"/> Indonesia	<input type="radio"/> Norway	<input type="radio"/> United Arab Emirates
<input type="radio"/> China	<input type="radio"/> Iran	<input type="radio"/> Oman	<input type="radio"/> United Kingdom
<input type="radio"/> Colombia	<input type="radio"/> Iraq	<input type="radio"/> Pakistan	<input type="radio"/> Un. Rep. of Cameroon
<input type="radio"/> Comoros	<input type="radio"/> Ireland	<input type="radio"/> Panama	<input type="radio"/> Un. Rep. of Tanzania
<input type="radio"/> Congo	<input type="radio"/> Israel	<input type="radio"/> Papua New Guinea	<input type="radio"/> United States
<input type="radio"/> Costa Rica	<input type="radio"/> Italy	<input type="radio"/> Paraguay	<input type="radio"/> Upper Volta
<input type="radio"/> Cuba	<input type="radio"/> Ivory Coast	<input type="radio"/> Peru	<input type="radio"/> Uruguay
<input type="radio"/> Cyprus	<input type="radio"/> Jamaica	<input type="radio"/> Philippines	<input type="radio"/> Venezuela
<input type="radio"/> Czechoslovakia	<input type="radio"/> Japan	<input type="radio"/> Poland	<input type="radio"/> Yemen
<input type="radio"/> Democratic Kampuchea	<input type="radio"/> Jordan	<input type="radio"/> Portugal	<input type="radio"/> Yugoslavia
<input type="radio"/> Democratic Yemen	<input type="radio"/> Kenya	<input type="radio"/> Qatar	<input type="radio"/> Zaire
<input type="radio"/> Denmark			<input type="radio"/> Zambia

* Later advised the Secretariat it had intended to vote in favour.

SUBJECT.



FILE

EM

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET SERIAL No. T 71/82.

From the Private Secretary

13 April, 1982

see Fraser net
off

FALKLAND ISLANDS: AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC MEASURES

Thank you for your letter of 9 April. The Prime Minister would be grateful if a message could be passed to Mr Fraser in the following terms:-

"Dear Malcolm,

Thank you for your letter of 8 April. I am deeply grateful to you for your decision to ban all imports from Argentina and to withhold export credits. This is exactly the kind of support we need. Your decision gave a great boost to the morale of all those who believe in the free world.

Your timely action will be an important factor in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands and thus in avoiding the need for the use of force.

With my warmest regards.

Margaret Thatcher."

A. J. COLES

J Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SECRET

Mr Gales - Note Downing
St. -
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APR 14 -
4

Mr Fearn - SAmD

Falkland Islands

Mr Haig telephoned the Secretary of State at 1240 on 13 April. He said that he had heard again from the Argentine Foreign Minister, who had come back with a further compromise proposal. The Argentine Government would in effect accept the formulation in paragraph 5 of the Anglo/US paper, but in return insisted on language paralleling the 1964 UN Resolution on decolonisation of the Islands. In that context, they would be willing to give the islanders local self-determination. In response to a question from the Secretary of State, Mr Haig confirmed that the Argentine Government had now dropped the five demands they had put forward earlier in the day and had moved a considerable way from their previous position. Mr Haig said he wanted to be sure that we would not reject this new proposal out of hand. If we could agree to language about decolonisation, subject to the wishes of the islanders, he thought that the Argentine Government would accept the Anglo/US paper, perhaps with one or two small changes to make it more palatable to them.

The Secretary of State said that clearly we would have to look at this carefully and would want to do the necessary research. Mr Haig said that the American side were also doing some homework and hoped to obtain the Argentine proposal in more specific form from the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires. He hoped that until there had been a chance to look at this proposal properly, all further action could be held up. He had told Mr Costa Mendez that he would now almost certainly not go back to Buenos Aires. He also did not wish to stay much longer in London since it would begin to look as if he were acting as our agent. When the Argentine proposal had been firmed up, therefore, he would probably return to Washington.

The Secretary of State said that we would probably wish to discuss this proposal with Mr Haig further. Mr Haig said this might be necessary, but repeated that he could not stay in London much longer. Mr Haig added that our position (presumably over sovereignty) had been eroded over the years in the view of many other governments and he hoped we would not want to be too rigid on this now. In any event the Argentine suggestion was an opportunity to keep the dialogue going.

/We have

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We have subsequently telephoned the US Embassy to check that they are now working on a specific proposal which could be put to us. Mr Streater undertook to let us know the position as soon as possible. He subsequently telephoned to say that the Americans were obtaining the text of the relevant resolution urgently and that Mr Haig would be in touch with the Secretary of State as soon as he could say anything more specific.

J. E. Holmes

(J E Holmes)

13 April 1982

cc: PS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Mr Onslow
PS/PUS
Mr Giffard
Lord Bridges
Mr Wright
Mr Ure
Mr Gillmore
Defence Dept
News Dept

SECRET

How long resident before a vote.

MR INGHAM

h.a.
APL 14/4
h.a.

MR HAIG AT AIRPORT

"Only yesterday I had planned to go on to Buenos Aires, the continuation of our effort to help in this crisis, but difficulties developed to change those plans. We have now received some new ideas. I repeat, we have now received some new ideas and while the parties are considering these ideas it will provide an opportunity for me to return to Washington to report to President Reagan prior to proceeding on to Buenos Aires shortly."

Q. As you disappointed at the outcome?

A. Well, I don't describe myself as disappointed or anything else. As I say, we are considering some new ideas.

Q. Can you give any guidance as to what they are, sir?

A. Not at all.

Q. There are reports that Chile has closed its borders with Argentina and is moving its fleet south. Do you think this represents a potentially explosive situation in this area?

A. I think the whole situation in the region is dangerous and increasingly so therefore there is a great urgency in finding a political solution in conformance with UN resolution 502.

Q. Are you going back?

A. I said I am returning to Washington and then to Buenos Aires.

PB

13 April 1982

Mr Fearn, SAMD

Mr 14/4

h.a.

Falkland Islands

Mr Haig telephoned again at 1410 on 13 April. He said that the US delegation had now produced some ideas which he would like to share with the Secretary of State and perhaps one or two colleagues. He then proposed to leave for the airport to go to Washington. He suggested that the Secretary of State should come to see him in the hotel since this would be the best way of avoiding too high a profile. Mr Haig said that he intended to make a statement at the airport which would say that he remained in touch with both sides, who were considering some further ideas. He was therefore taking the opportunity to return to Washington to consult with President Reagan. Mr Haig thought this was sufficiently up-beat to create the desired impression that a dialogue was continuing. He would not say where the ideas now under consideration had come from or go into details about what the difficulties were.

Mr Haig added that the Argentines were now terrified. The climate was right for progress.

The Secretary of State said that if his presence at the hotel was noticed by the press, he would take the line that he was simply seeing off Mr Haig.

J. E. Holmes

13 April 1982

(J E Holmes)

copies to:

PS
 PS/Mr Hurd
 PS/Mr Onslow
 PS/PUS
 Mr Giffard
 Lord Bridges
 Mr Wright
 Mr Ure
 Mr Gillmore
 Defence Dept
 UND



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1982

L-a.
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Dear John,

Falklands: Commons Debate on 14 April

I enclose a draft speech for the Prime Minister which should take slightly less than twenty minutes to deliver. Mr Pym has not seen the draft. The speech is based on the assumption that the change in the Argentine position conveyed by Mr Costa Mendez to Mr Haig before lunch today will leave open the possibility of a diplomatic solution.

The draft takes account of points made by Mr Healey in the media during the weekend, in particular that the chances of a peaceful solution are increased by wise deployment of armed strength (I enclose a transcript of his interview on the World This Weekend). The draft does not mention Mr Healey's points that Argentine withdrawal might be succeeded by a UN administration and peacekeeping force or that sovereignty over the Islands is less important than the wishes of the Islanders themselves.

I am copying this letter with enclosures to the Private Secretaries to the Defence Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Baroness Young.

Yours ever

John Holmes
 (J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
 10 Downing Street

DRAFT SPEECH

1. In this time of difficulty over the Falkland Islands it was only right that the House should be recalled early to be informed of the latest developments. Honourable Members will expect to hear what action the Government are taking to achieve the objectives which were explained here last week. I hope and believe that the House will then be able to give clear support to this action.

2. ~~As I have explained to this House,~~ our objective["] is to see that the Islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment. The Islanders must be liberated from the domination of an alien military régime, in accordance with their own wishes and with the Security Council Resolution.["]

3. Our strategy has been based on a combination of military, economic and diplomatic pressure. That pressure has had some influence. There have seemed at times to be signs that Argentina's leaders were very concerned at the approach of the British Task Force. And the decision of the European Community and of other countries to ban all imports from Argentina has come as a particularly severe blow to them. So has the almost universal disapproval that their action has aroused across the world.

4. From the very beginning it has been clear that the United States would have a key role to play in the search for a peaceful outcome. The closeness of understanding

between/

Objectives

A

StrategyU.S.

between Britain and America does not need to be described. But America also has good relations with Argentina. This puts her in a unique position to be helpful.

5. The American Secretary of State, Mr Haig, has now paid two visits to this country. He has undertaken a gruelling programme of shuttle diplomacy and we admire and welcome his efforts. His first visit last Thursday provided the opportunity for the Government to make clear their determination to secure Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and dependencies, by whatever means might be required. Mr Haig took this message to Buenos Aires, where he held talks with the leaders of Argentina. ⁶ He was back in London for further talks on Easter Monday and yesterday. ^{On his second visit:} ~~in London for further talks on Easter Monday and yesterday.~~ ^{he brought back certain ideas which involved} The discussions were long and detailed. Mr Haig presented specific ideas which took account of his earlier discussions. The Government saw substantial difficulties in parts of these proposals. Yet they seemed to provide a basis for progress in accordance with Security Council Resolution No 502. We therefore made suggestions for various alterations to the proposals. Our many hours of talks with Mr Haig on Monday were constructive. ^h At the end of the day he was prepared to return to Buenos Aires for further talks in pursuit of peace ^{at 7.15 pm} late that evening. Argentina put forward ^{other proposals which gave rise to} certain suggestions. ^{at one point} it seemed that these might endanger Mr Haig's efforts. But happily Mr Haig learned from Buenos Aires yesterday that ^{understood} the Argentine position was not exactly as had been described. [He has therefore returned to Buenos Aires and we wish him well in his further discussions with the Argentine authorities.] ^{Further ideas are now being considered and similarly those that have now}

returned to Washington with a view
to be made somewhat shortly
to B.A.

~~The House will indicate~~
~~that this process~~ These discussions
are various difficult, various and
changing, ~~and difficult, to make~~.

We ~~have to~~ the more so because
they are being placed between - making
justice or a demand for the people
and one which is not prepared to
compromise that demand that they
~~submit of these statements~~ ~~initial~~ ~~papers~~
but what the initial papers required
in the meantime. We seek a content

to make a definite solution
and the House will ~~expect me~~ to be able to
revert that it would ~~rependue~~ that can
we 1 to five further details at this stage -
which ~~has been~~ ~~has been~~ ~~surrounding~~
his adherence to confidentiality.

At 6

13 April, 1982

The Prime Minister has approved the draft message to the President of Brazil which you enclosed with your letter of 13 April.

A J COLES

J Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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020
①
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1982



Prime Minister

Agree to this reply.

Dear John,

Amend MB

A.T.C. 13/4.

//
You will have seen the messages addressed by the President of Brazil to the Prime Minister and, in markedly warmer terms, to the President of Argentina, copies of which I enclose. I enclose a suggested draft reply, which I have not yet had time to show to Mr Pym. As the Brazilian message was released to the press after delivery, it would seem appropriate for us to do the same.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats RESTRICTED	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
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CAVEATS	4	
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PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
	10	FALKLANDS: YOUR TELNO 87
	11	1. Please deliver following message from Prime Minister to
	12	President Figueiredo, in reply to his message contained in TUR.
	13	Begins. Thank you for your message of 10 April appealing
	14	to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina to find a
	15	peaceful solution to the present crisis. I am grateful for your
	16	offer to help. We want a peaceful solution if at all possible
	17	and are making every effort to pursue this through diplomatic
	18	means.
	19	However it was not Britain who broke the peace, but
	20	Argentina, with its unprovoked aggression against the Falkland
	21	Islands. The first requirement for any solution is that the
///	22	Argentine forces must withdraw from the Falkland Islands and
//	23	their dependencies in accordance with Resolution No 502 of the
/	24	Security Council of the United Nations. I hope you will use
	25	your influence with the Argentine Government to impress on them

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File number	Dept S/S OFFICE	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		
Telephone number 233 4641		
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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the need to fulfil their international legal obligations in
this respect. Ends.

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2. Please telegraph when message has been delivered. We
intend then to release it to the press.

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telegram

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Catchword

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO OF BRAZIL TO
PRESIDENT GALTIERI OF ARGENTINA.

(Translation)

At this moment of serious risk to peace I am directing my thoughts, with emotion, to the sister people of Argentina, to which the Brazilian nation feels forever linked by ties of the deepest and unbreakable friendship. I renew to Your Excellency yet again the solemn commitment of Brazil to do everything to contribute to a solution which preserves the supreme value of peace and the best interests of the peoples of Argentina, the Americas, and the whole world. In this sense I am sending similarly to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher an appeal in favour of conciliation and the search for a negotiated solution. Recalling the great historic moments of Brazilian-Argentine friendship and the pleasant times I spent in your country, in the name of the Brazilian people I wish all Argentines peace, concord, and fraternity.


10 April 1982

Message from His Excellency Senhor João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, to the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Deeply concerned with the grave risks that weigh upon the prospects for peace, I reiterate the warm appeal made by Brazil to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Argentina to find, for the present crisis, a solution in accordance with the interests of peace and of the two countries. With the same purpose, I am sending a message to President Leopoldo Galtieri, in which I renew Brazil's disposition to contribute to a peaceful solution for the present crisis.

Bearing in mind the efforts under way and the will shown by the Brazilian Government to do all within its power to find a satisfactory solution for the present problem I stress that it is particularly important that the parties concerned show effective restraint so that sufficient time is left for conciliatory avenues to be explored.

Brasilia, April 10th, 1982.





10 APR 1982





10 DOWNING STREET

*Be. Minister set**SUBJECT.*

From the Principal Private Secretary

13 April 1982

*Sen Bonini,*FALKLAND ISLANDS

Mr. Haig telephoned the Prime Minister again at 0115 this morning.

He said that he had been in touch again with Senor Costa Mendes, who was dissembling and quibbling. On the one hand he was saying that Argentina must have sovereignty. On the other, he said that he wanted the negotiations to go on. He was plainly under a firm remit from President Galtieri.

Mr. Haig said that he had told Senor Costa Mendes that he could not go to Buenos Aires in present circumstances. He would like to sleep on it, while Senor Costa Mendes went back to President Galtieri.

The position as it had developed since he left Downing Street yesterday evening made things difficult for the United Kingdom: it would look to the press as though it had been his meeting with the Prime Minister which had given rise to the present problem. That would be wholly unfair. He therefore proposed to say to the press that he had been on the telephone to Buenos Aires that night and that complications had developed at that end. The picture was still unclear, and he hoped to have it clarified this morning.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed with the line Mr. Haig was proposing to take with the press.

He added that he thought that the outcome would be "grim". He thought that he and the Prime Minister should meet today to discuss the situation. He would at the same time show her a paper which Senor Costa Mendes had given to him as he was leaving Buenos Aires. At that time Senor Costa Mendes had described it as a paper setting out his own thoughts, but now its proposals had apparently become rigid alternative demands of the Argentine Government. The truth was that President Galtieri had created a problem, and it was now running away with him.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that she was very ready to see Mr. Haig and they agreed that they should meet at 9 a.m. today.

The Prime Minister subsequently had a short telephone conversation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and they agreed to meet at 8.45 a.m. for a preliminary word before Mr. Haig arrived.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Alvin Kitchin.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Pt 6

13 April, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: PERUVIAN PROPOSAL

As I told you on the telephone earlier today, the Prime Minister agrees that a message should be sent to the Peruvian Government in accordance with the draft text enclosed with your letter of 13 April.

J Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

4



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1982

Prime Minister

Agree to this reply?

A.T.C. 13/4.

Dear John,

The Peruvian Government has addressed to the British and Argentine Governments a proposal for a 72-hour truce while the American good offices procedures are taking place, in order to avoid an armed confrontation.

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister, which Mr Pym has not yet had a chance to see.

The President of Peru has revealed the terms of the proposal, but not issued its text. It has been reported from Lima that Argentina - hardly surprisingly - has accepted the Peruvian proposal. This need not affect the terms of our reply. After the reply is delivered in Lima, unless you see objection, we should propose to reveal this to the press and also the terms of the reply, if interest is maintained.

Yours ever

John Holmes
(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
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CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 13 Z APRIL 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE LIMA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NO
	9	AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
	10	YOUR TELNO 79: FALKLAND ISLANDS
	11	1. Please deliver to Dr Arias following message from the
	12	British Government to the Peruvian Government, in reply to their
	13	message of 11 April.
	14	Begins. The British Government thank the Peruvian
	15	Government for their message proposing a truce of 72 hours while
	16	the good offices procedures conducted by the Americans are
	17	taking place, in order to avoid an armed confrontation between
	18	the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands.
	19	The British Government appreciate the interest shown by
	20	the Peruvian Government in supporting efforts for a diplomatic
	21	solution. The British Government are no less keen to see a
///	22	peaceful solution, and are making every effort to pursue this
//	23	without prejudice to their rights under Article 51 of the
/	24	Charter of the United Nations. They note however, that the
	25	armed confrontation was initiated by the Argentine action in

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Drafted by (Block capitals) J E Holmes		
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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seizing the Falkland Islands, and that it was to this point that the first paragraph of Resolution No 502 of the Security Council of the United Nations was directed.

The first requirement for any solution is that the Argentine forces should withdraw from the Falkland Islands and their dependencies, in accordance with the mandatory Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations. The British Government hope that the Government of Peru will impress on the Government of Argentina the need to comply with its obligations under international law.

PYM

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MESSAGE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU TO THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA AND TO THE ORGANISATION
OF AMERICAN STATES

(Translation)

The Government of Peru, profoundly disturbed by the events taking place in the 'Malvinas Islands' and by the possibility of an imminent commencement of hostilities between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Argentina, proposes formally to both Governments that, in keeping with the first paragraph of the recent Resolution 502 of the UN Security Council, they establish a truce of 72 hours while there are taking place the good offices procedures accepted by the parties concerned, which the Government of the United States is conducting, in order to avoid an armed confrontation which would contribute to increasing the gravity of the situation with a serious threat to international peace and security.

11 April 1982

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MR. GOW

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop telephoned from Ayrshire last night (2130) and spoke at some length about his grave concern on the Argentinian crisis. Drawing on his thirty years experience of the country's history, he was anxious to pass on some thoughts to No.10. Briefly these were:

- after 5 years of anonymous political rule now sees the same pattern developing as adopted by Peron; follows that this is the only possible outcome in view of the economic problems.
- recalled that when he visited Brazil as part of the IPU delegation (in 1975/76) the then Argentinian Chairman of the equivalent of our House of Commons expressed fears that his country could become a Russian base.
- he envisaged President Galtiere trying to be democratically elected as President.
- doesn't personally know the President, but his assessment is that he is trying to emulate Peron and will want to form a united civil regime.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop will return to the House on Wednesday but may in the meantime be contacted at Dalry, Ayrshire on 2494.

Peter Ewing
Duty Clerk
13 April 1982



✓ 40
CDL
D Wright
MD
FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 April 1982

see file

Falkland Islands: Talks with Mr. Haig

I enclose a copy of the record of the discussion held here this morning with Mr. Haig and his party.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*John Halliday
David Omand*

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

✓ master set.

SUBJECT.

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY
13 APRIL 1982 AT 0915 HOURS

Present

The Prime Minister	The Hon. Alexander M. Haig
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	The Hon. John J. Louis
Secretary of State for Defence	General Vernon Walters
Chief of Defence Staff	The Hon. Thomas O. Enders
Sir Antony Acland	Mr. David Gompert
Mr. Coles	

* * * *

Mr. Haig said that he wished to take stock. As we knew, he had heard overnight from the Argentine Foreign Minister that his Government needed an outcome to the negotiations which embodied a de facto change in the administration of the Islands and a process leading to ultimate Argentine sovereignty. Mr. Haig handed over the enclosed paper embodying five points which were described as essential for Argentine acceptance of any agreement. Mr. Costa Mendes had implied that the first two points were the most important and that Argentina needed to secure at least one of them at this stage. The Argentine Government saw the arrangements worked out with us yesterday as blocking both points. The proposal for an interim Commission did not represent a sufficient degree of change towards de facto Argentine administration. The provision for negotiations on the definitive status of the Islands was inadequate as a commitment to ultimate Argentine sovereignty.

The Argentine Foreign Minister had implied that there was no point in Mr. Haig returning to Buenos Aires unless he could take assurances on these matters. Mr. Costa Mendes had affirmed that he did not want to break off talks. The practical effect of these tactics was that the Argentines were buying time. This might cause difficulties with British public opinion.

The Prime Minister expressed doubt as to whether there would be severe difficulties in the next couple of days. But she thought

/definite

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definite progress in the negotiations would have to be registered this week. She had been impressed by the amount of time Mr. Haig had devoted to the negotiations in Buenos Aires. But the moment he left the Argentines seemed to have back-tracked on their agreement. Mr. Haig said that he had never in fact obtained Argentine agreement to the points discussed with us yesterday. He had worked out a scheme in Buenos Aires but the Argentines had declined to commit themselves to it and had remained equivocal until the moment he left.

Commenting on the five Argentine points (see enclosed paper), the Prime Minister said that they amounted to a demand for the handing of the Islands to Argentina with no provision for democratic processes. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Argentine demands bore no relation to reality.

Mr. Haig stressed that the Argentine Foreign Minister had implied that if either one of the first two points were accepted, this would be satisfactory. His own analysis was that the only way to keep the negotiating process going was to make another effort at "evolution" of the document agreed with us yesterday. The Prime Minister commented that it was essentially an issue of dictatorship versus democracy. Galtieri wanted to be able to claim victory by force of arms. The question now was whether he could be diverted by language he understood, for example the language of economic sanctions.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that Argentina was moving closer towards the Soviet Union. Mr. Haig said that he had received information yesterday to the effect that there were 34 Soviet fishing vessels in the area, who were providing intelligence. The Chief of the Defence Staff said that we were aware of these vessels as well as some Polish fishing craft but it was our understanding that they had received instructions from their authorities to leave the area.

The Prime Minister said that the Argentines might be indulging in brinkmanship. It remained to be seen whether they were willing to go to the brink. They should be faced with the

/consequences

consequences in world opinion and economic pressure of what they were saying. Mr. Haig said that he had made it abundantly clear to Argentina that if conflict developed the United States would side with the United Kingdom. But the question was whether we wished to bring the negotiations to a terminal point today. He could say publicly that he was suspending his own efforts, making clear that the cause was Argentine intransigence. But if he did so other less helpful people might try to intervene. The UN Secretary General was keen to find a role. The OAS might also try but their efforts would reinforce Argentinian intransigence. Another approach would be to say that some progress had been made but that several substantial difficulties remained and that a pause in the negotiating process was therefore desirable.

Mr. Haig said that he expected to have a further telephone conversation with the Argentine Foreign Minister later this morning. Meanwhile, the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires had yesterday been instructed to take all necessary precautionary measures for the protection of his staff and the American community. This would be known to the Argentines and might disturb them. In addition, a certain amount of planning was going on in Washington.

The Prime Minister said that if negotiations broke down at this point, she felt that the public reaction here might be that we had not tried hard enough. Sir Antony Acland suggested that much turned on the American assessment of the situation in Buenos Aires. Unless Mr. Haig judged that the five Argentine points were the final position of the Junta, a further effort at negotiations would be desirable. But it was most important to impress upon the Argentines the strength of the British position and the dangers to Argentina's relations with the United States if a conflict occurred. Mr. Haig commented that the known attitudes in Britain had had the effect of bringing Galtieri's regime to discuss compromise. But there was also very strong popular hysteria in Argentina. When his party had been in Buenos Aires they had been shown thoroughly misleading Argentinian intelligence reports about the alleged economic motives for the British position.

/Mr. Haig

Mr. Haig asked whether, if his next telephone conversation with Mr. Costa Mendes suggested that a further visit to Buenos Aires was desirable, he could take any further suggestions from us which, while consistent with our principles, would enable negotiations to continue. Sir Antony Acland commented that if the Argentines were looking for a face-saving device, there were many points in the document drawn up in London yesterday which could be of assistance to them. After further discussion, Mr. Haig said that he had reached the conclusion that an immediate visit to Buenos Aires would be a mistake. Subject to his telephone conversation with Mr. Costa Mendes, he would therefore tell the press that difficulties had arisen in Buenos Aires. As a result he was proceeding to Washington. But he remained ready to visit Buenos Aires again when the situation justified it. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary observed that the next visit by Mr. Haig to Argentina would be a very important card. He therefore thought it right that it should not be played immediately. Sir Antony Acland pointed out that the nearer the task force got to Argentina, the more difficult it would be, psychologically, for the Argentines to make concessions. Time was therefore limited.

The Secretary of State for Defence said that there were one or two military points which he wished to raise. Our submarines were now committed to the blockade. We should soon have to consider whether it was right to allow Argentinian naval vessels to leave port. Mr. Haig commented that if Argentinian ships did leave port and nothing happened, British credibility would suffer. He had already received some information suggesting that the Argentinians believed that we did not wish to fight. Mr. Nott also said that we should have to consider further military measures if it became clear that a peaceful solution was unlikely to be obtained. We might need to make it clear very soon that we were increasing the number of aircraft available in the area. Mr. Haig said that he favoured any steps which would strengthen the impression of British determination. He believed this would help the prospects for peace.

The discussion concluded at 1040.

13 April 1982

SOME ASPECTS WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE ARGENTINE ACCEPTANCE OF ANY AGREEMENT.

- 1.- The governor of the islands must be appointed by the Argentine Government .

The argentine flag should continue to be flown on the islands.

- 2.- Assurances should be given to the Argentine Government that at the end of the negotiations there will be a recognition of argentine sovereignty.

Any formulation implying that sovereignty is being negotiated should be avoided.

- 3.- Equal rights shall be recognized for Argentines coming from the mainland as for the inhabitants of the islands.

- 4.- The agreement on demilitarization should be considered as complying with Resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council .

5. The draft agreement should be made compatible with the above mentioned elements.

SOME ASPECTS WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE ARGENTINE ACCEPTANCE OF ANY AGREEMENT.

1.- The governor of the islands must be appointed by the Argentine Government .

The argentine flag should continue to be flown on the islands.

2.- Assurances should be given to the Argentine Government that at the end of the negotiations there will be a recognition of argentine sovereignty.

Any formulation implying that sovereignty is being negotiated should be avoided.

3.- Equal rights shall be recognized for Argentines coming from the mainland as for the inhabitants of the islands.

4.- The agreement on demilitarization should be considered as complying with Resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council .

5. The draft agreement should be made compatible with the above mentioned elements.

cc Martin
Ops.

Classification and Caveats

Precedence/Deskby

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4
5
6 FM FCO
7 TO IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 72c/82**

9 YOUR TELNO 112 OF 13 APRIL: NEW ZEALAND ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST
10 ARGENTINA

11 1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister
12 to Mr Muldoon.

13 BEGINS

14 Dear Rob,

15 I have just heard the announcement of your economic measures
16 against Argentina and I wanted you to know that I am
17 profoundly grateful for your ready and ^{robust} timely support. The
18 measures you have announced, together with similar action
19 taken by others, are of the utmost importance in maintaining
20 pressure on the Argentines to reach a peaceful solution and to
21 withdraw from the Falkland Islands in compliance with Security
22 Council Resolution 502. This remains our firm objective, with
23 US help, but we cannot of course allow the Argentines to get
24 away with what they have done. I hope we can stay in close
25 touch. *Everyone in Britain is thrilled by your
staunch swift support.*

///
//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept	Distribution FCO, SAMD, CABINE OFFICE, ERD. ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION: FALKLAND ISLANDS COPIES: PS/CHANCELLOR, SIR K COUZENS, MR LITTLER, MR HAWTIN, MR PERETZ, MR ILETT
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	↓	Classification and Caveats	Page
		CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE 2.

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1	
2	
3	With sincere good wishes.
4	Yours ever Margaret Thatcher
5	ENDS
6	PYM
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TJH/82

①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 April 1982

Dear John,

Yes - as amended

Prime Minister
Content that message be
despatched?

A.F.C. 14/4

Falkland Islands: New Zealand Economic Measures against Argentina

Mr Muldoon announced further measures against the Argentine government on 13 April. They include a ban on all imports and exports to Argentina, a ban on the supply of arms and other military material and the end of export guarantee facilities. These measures follow the earlier break in diplomatic relations and ban on Argentine airlines.

A message of thanks from the Prime Minister to Mr Muldoon would be appropriate. I enclose a draft in the form of a telegram to Wellington.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



CABINET OFFICE
70 WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AS

01-~~330411~~ 233 8378

Ref: B06465

13th April 1982

AW
14.4.82

Dear Clive,

Mr Haig and the Falklands Crisis

below - As a footnote to your records of yesterday's talks with Mr Haig (your letter of 12th April to Brian Fall), I should report two points of his which came across clearly but were outside the ambit of the formal sessions.

a. Mr Haig claimed to have told the Argentine Government that if they reneged on the proposed agreement the United States would impose economic sanctions on Argentina (it was not clear whether by reneging he meant refusing to accept after all or, more naturally, accepting but then not complying).

b. Mr Haig said that the Argentines were being kept posted by the Russians on the movement of the British Task Group, which the Russians' satellite coverage could pinpoint.

2. I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Fall (FCO), David Omand (FCO) and David Wright.

7.4.82

Robert

R L WADE-GERY

C A Whitmore Esq.
10 Downing Street.

1982 APR 14

14 APR 1982

1982
APR

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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 PS/PUS
 MR GIFFARD */ Mr Bullard*
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE */ Mr Hannay*
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**for typists - 1 copy*

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 MR LITTLER
 MR HAWTIN
 MR PERETZ
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H.M.Tsy

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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FROM MONTEVIDEO 121600Z APR 82
 TO PRIORITY SANTIAGO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 3 OF 12 APRIL 1982.

ms

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. MY COMMON MARKET COLLEAGUES HERE HAVE ASKED WHAT IF ANYTHING THE COMMISSION OFFICE IN SANTIAGO IS DOING ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION. THEY SEEMED TO THINK THAT GIVEN THE ECONOMIC MEASURES TAKEN BY THE COMMUNITY, THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE PROVIDING SOME SUPPORT IN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS FIELD.

2. GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 121847Z DP

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GRS 130

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MANILA 120815Z APRIL 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 114 OF 12 APRIL

ml

MY TELNO 113 OF 6 APRIL: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. YESTERDAYS QUOTE BULLETIN TODAY UNQUOTE REPORTED THAT PHILIPPINE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD THE PREVIOUS DAY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE FALKLAND ISLAND DISPUTE:

BEGINS. FOREIGN MINISTER CARLOS P ROMULO ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE FALKLAND ISLAND DISPUTE. QUOTE THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER THE DISTURBING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND HOPES THAT ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM COUNTRIES WITH WHOM THE PHILIPPINES MAINTAINS FRIENDLY RELATIONS, WILL AVOID THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN SETTLING THEIR DISPUTE AND SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION FULLY RESPECTING THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. UNQUOTE.

2. WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN AN OFFICIAL COPY OF THE STATEMENT BUT DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MFA, HAS CONFIRMED TO ME THAT TEXT IN BULLETIN IS COMPLETE. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT STATEMENT MADE NO REFERENCE TO SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HE CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS IMPLICIT IN THE WORDING WHICH INDEED DREW ON THE WORDING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

MORGAN

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CONFIDENTIAL

FCO DESKBY 121000Z

FM TOKYO 120810Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 182 OF 12 APRIL

AND RFIPRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CANBERRA OTTAWA AND
EC POSTS

SAVING WELLINGTON

MIPT FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MR SUZUKI'S LETTER TO MRS THATCHER:-

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR DETAILED MESSAGE CONCERNING THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE, WHICH WAS DELIEVERED TO ME
THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR, SIR HUGH CORTAZZI. I HAVE BEEN
FOLLOWING WITH A SENSE OF GRAVE CONCERN THE DEVELOPMENTS
IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SINCE MILITARY ACTION
WAS TAKEN BY THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES. I HAVE ALSO READ
YOUR MESSAGE WITH GREAT ATTENTION. THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN
CONSIDERS THAT THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA VIOLATES THE
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS AND
NON-USE OF FORCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THAT SUCH
ACTION CAN NEVER BE ACCEPTED. WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES WILL BE PROMPTLY REALIZED

ACTION CAN NEVER BE ACCEPTED. WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES WILL BE PROMPTLY REALIZED AND THAT THIS DISPUTE PEACEFULLY SETTLED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.

IT WAS FROM THIS BASIC STANDPOINT THAT JAPAN IMMEDIATELY SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION TABLED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THAT, ALSO IN TOKYO, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CLEARLY EXPLAINED OUR POSITION BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.

THIS POSITION OF JAPAN HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO THE ARGENTINE SIDE ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS, AND ON APRIL 12, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN CONFORMITY WITH MY WISHES, MADE THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR:

(I) WE DEEPLY REGRET THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA AND URGE THAT ITS FORCES WITHDRAW IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION:

(II) THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN PLACES HIGH EXPECTATIONS ON GOOD OFFICES BY THE UNITED STATES AND HOPES THAT ARGENTINANS WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS GOOD OFFICES AND WILL TRY TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO STATE SIMILARLY TO YOU THAT JAPAN PLACES, FOR THE PRESENT, EXPECTATIONS ON THE EFFORTS OF GOOD OFFICES BY THE UNITED STATES.

TO YOUR REQUEST FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE CONCRETE MEASURES PROPOSED IN YOUR MESSAGE, I SHOULD LIKE TO REPLY AS FOLLOWS:

THE BASIC IDEA OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS THAT MEASURES TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON APRIL 3 SHOULD PRIMARILY BE SOUGHT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CHARTER. WE ARE CERTAINLY PREPARED TO MAKE EFFORTS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION BY DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER MEANS OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS, TOO. SUCH EFFORTS SHOULD BE NATURALLY EXERTED IN SUCH A MANNER AS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. IT IS ALSO NATURAL THAT WE SHALL EXERT SUCH EFFORTS ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE JUDGE FOR OURSELVES TO BE THE LONG TERM

INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
IT IS ALSO NATURAL THAT WE SHALL EXERT SUCH EFFORTS ON THE
BASIS OF WHAT WE JUDGE FOR OURSELVES TO BE THE LONG TERM
INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD.

IN MORE CONCRETE TERMS, JAPAN PURSUES THE POLICY OF
ABSTAINING FROM EXPORTING ARMS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND
IS SATISFIED THAT IT IS THUS CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS THE
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY. THIS
POLICY IS BEING APPLIED STRICTLY TO ARGENTINA.

BEARING THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, WE STATED TO
THE ARGENTINE SIDE IN OUR REPRESENTATIONS OF APRIL 12
THAT IF THE PRESENT CRISIS IS PROLONGED, IT IS FEARED
THAT THE CONFIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN
IN THAT COUNTRY'S FUTURE MIGHT BE UNDERMINED AND THAT THE
SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
MIGHT BE IMPEDED, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, AND
EXPRESSED OUR HOPE THAT FOR THESE AND OTHER REASONS THE
ARGENTINE SIDE WILL ENDEAVOUR FOR AN EARLY SOLUTION OF
THE CURRENT SITUATION.

WE SHALL CONTINUE TO SEE THAT THE ARGENTINE SIDE IS REMINDED
OF IT.

AS A STATESMAN SHOULDERING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
GOVERNMENT AS YOU ARE, I CAN IMAGINE HOW SERIOUSLY YOU
ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS AFFAIR. BUT I HAVE KNOWN FOR
A LONG TIME YOUR OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP IN A BROAD RANGE
OF STATE AFFAIRS. IN THE FIRM BELIEF THAT THE UNITED
KINGDOM WILL NOT FAIL TO TIME OVER THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION
UNDER YOUR ABLE GUIDANCE, I SEND YOU MY VERY BEST WISHES
FOR YOUR GOOD HEALTH AND FOR EVERY SUCCESS IN THE DISCHARGE
OF YOUR IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES

YOURS SINCERELY,

ZENKO SUZUKI
PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN

FCO PASS SAVING WELLINGTON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(4/3)

Valid 8/4)

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SIR K COUZENS

H.M.Tsy

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MR MCINTYRE

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

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Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

Mr Fuller SAPU Cab. office

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FM BONN 120900Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 318 OF 12 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE DOT MOD(DNOT)

[passed by COS]

FALKLANDS: MERCHANT SHIPPING

mt

1. A LEADING FEDERAL GERMAN SHIPOWNER, WHO HAS BEEN VERY HELPFUL TO US IN THE MATTER OF ARGENTINE SHIPPING MOVEMENTS, HAS ASKED US FOR GUIDANCE ON THE POSITION OF NON-ARGENTINE MERCHANT SHIPPING FOLLOWING THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE MARITIME EXCLUSIVE ZONE. AN ARTICLE BY EX-ADMIRAL MCGEOCH, REPORTED IN THE FRG WEEKLY NEWSPAPER WELT AM SONNTAG ON 11 APRIL, HAS GIVEN HIM THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SAFE PASSAGE OF SUCH SHIPPING IN ARGENTINE COASTAL WATERS COULD BE AFFECTED. DOT ARE PRESUMABLY PROVIDING GUIDANCE FOR THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF BRITISH SHIPPING ON THIS (AND ALSO THE EFFECTS OF THE ARGENTINE-DECLARED ZONE): GRATEFUL IF IT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US URGENTLY FOR USE WITH OUR FRG CONTACTS.

TAYLOR

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(25) 30

Valid 8/4)

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PS/LOPD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.V. Tsy

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Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

Mr Fuller SAPU Cab. office

[All pass typists]

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CONFIDENTIAL

FCO DESKBY 121000Z

FM TOKYO 120915Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 181 OF 12 APRIL

RFI PRIORITY WASHINGTON CANBERRA OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK AND EC POSTS.
SAVING WELLINGTON

MY TEL NO 180

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. KATO HANDED ME THIS AFTERNOON A COPY OF MR SUZUKI'S REPLY TO MRS THATCHER (TEXT IN MIFT). HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE HANDED OVER FORMALLY BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON TODAY. KATO HAD KEPT ME WAITING FOR SOMETIME AS IT WAS APPARENT THAT THERE HAD BEEN LAST MINUTE DRAFTING CHANGES IN THE TEXT. KATO SAID THAT WHILE THE PRESS WOULD BE GIVEN AN OUTLINE OF THE REPLY THE TEXT WOULD NOT BE RELEASED.

2. KATO TOLD ME ON INSTRUCTION THAT THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE VICE MINISTER HAD CALLED IN THE ARGENTINIAN AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING AND HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

A) JAPAN DEEPLY REGRETTED THE ARGENTIAN USE OF FORCE AND DEMANDED AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTIANIAN FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

B) JAPAN ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH

B) JAPAN ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND WANTED THE ARGENTINIANS TO PAY DUE ATTENTION TO THIS WARNING SO THAT THEY DID NOT FORCE JAPAN INTO A MORE DIFFICULT POSITION. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PLACED HIGH EXPECTATIONS ON THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES AND HOPED THAT ARGENTINA WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THESE EFFORTS.

C) IF THIS CRISIS WERE PROLONGED THE CONFIDENCE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE IN ARGENTINA'S FUTURE MIGHT BE UNDERMINED AND THE SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT BE IMPEDED ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS JAPAN WISHED ARGENTINA TO EXERT ALL EFFORTS TO SEEK AN EARLY SOLUTION.

KATO SAID THAT THE VICE MINISTER HAD MADE THESE POINTS FIRST AND THAT THEY HAD THEN BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHOSE TIME HAD BEEN VERY LIMITED. THE GIST HAD BEEN PASSED TO THE PRESS. AS A RESULT JAPAN DID NOT THINK IT NECESSARY AND HAD NO INTENTION OF MAKING A FORMAL STATEMENT.

3. KATO ADDED THAT THE ARGENTINIAN AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD THE JAPANESE THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE WARNING AND WOULD REPORT IMMEDIATELY. THE AMBASSADOR HAD STRESSED THE PEACEFUL INTENTION OF THE ARGENTINIANS (SIC) AND SAID THAT NO BLOOD HAD SO FAR BEEN SHED. THEY HAD WITHDRAWN THEIR WARSHIPS FROM THE AREA OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND HOPED FOR A SINCERE DIALOGUE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

I POINTED OUT THE CYNICISM OF THESE STATEMENTS.

4. IN COMMENTING ORALLY ON MR SUZUKI'S REPLY TO MRS THATCHER KATO SAID THAT NO APPLICATION FOR NEW COMMITMENT OF EXPORT CREDIT WAS EXPECTED. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT BANK LOANS HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT NEW LOANS WERE UNLIKELY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED THAT JAPAN HAD NOT SEEN ITS WAY TO PLACE A BAN ON ARGENTINIAN IMPORTS. WERE THEY CONSIDERING THIS MATTER FURTHER? KATO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN REPLY:-

A) THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUROPE AND JAPAN IN RELATION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS DIFFERENT. EUROPE WAS INDIRECTLY A PARTY TO THE MATTER BECAUSE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ASSOCIATION WITH THE COMMUNITY UNDER THE TREATY OF ROME;

WITH THE COMMUNITY UNDER THE TREATY OF ROME:

B) A TOTAL OR PARTIAL BAN ON IMPORTS WAS LEGALLY SPEAKING VERY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE UNDER JAPANESE LAWS:

C) AS STATED IN THE MESSAGE JAPAN LOOKED FOR ACTION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IE IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR SANCTIONS JAPAN WOULD HAVE A LEGAL BASIS ON WHICH TO TAKE ACTION:

D) ARGENTINA WAS A MEMBER OF THE GAATT AND JAPAN HAD A BILATERAL TREATY WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH ACTION COULD BE TAKEN UNDER THIS TREATY WAS UNDER ARTICLE 13 WHICH ALLOWED EXCEPTIONS ON SECURITY GROUNDS.

6. I ASKED ON WHAT BASIS JAPAN HAD TAKEN ACTION AGAINST IRAN IN THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES. KATO REPLIED THAT NO ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON IMPORTS FROM IRAN BUT THEY HAD PLACED EXPORTS FROM IRAN UNDER THE APPROVAL SYSTEM. HOWEVER IRAN WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE GATT AND JAPAN HAD NO COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH IRAN. I SAID THAT WE WOULD WISH TO PURSUE FURTHER THE LEGAL ASPECTS.

7. IN CONCLUSION KATO SAID THAT HE HAD TWICE MET THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER TODAY. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED AND HAD MUCH SYMPATHY FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN THE PRESENT CRISIS.

COMMENT

8. THE JAPANESE REPLY IS DISAPPOINTING BECAUSE OF THE JAPANESE FAILURE TO TAKE SPECIFIC AND FIRM ACTION AGAINST THE ARGENTINIANS BUT THEY HAVE AT LEAST NOW COME OUT IN SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION AND I HOPE THAT THIS WILL BECOME CLEAR IN THE PRESS. THE REPLY IS BETTER THAN I HAD FEARED AND SUGGESTS THAT THE VIGOROUS LOBBYING OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAS HAD SOME RESULT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING WELLINGTON

CORTAZZI

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

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GPS 130
UNCLASSIFIED
FM LIMA 121450Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 83 OF 12 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

mb

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. TODAY'S PRESS HEADLINES CONCENTRATE ON THE INITIATION OF THE NAVAL BLOCKADE AND PERU'S ATTEMPTS TO ARRANGE A TRUCE.

2. ALSO PUBLISHED ARE THE FULL TEXTS OF THE LETTERS EXCHANGED BY PRESIDENTS BELAUNDE AND GALTIERI (MY TELNO 81). PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S LETTER STATES THAT THE ARGUMENTS WHICH HAVE QUOTE JUSTIFIABLY UNQUOTE PREOCCUPIED ARGENTINA SINCE HER INDEPENDENCE ALSO CAUSE CONCERN TO QUOTE SISTER COUNTRIES TRADITIONALLY LINKED TO HER UNQUOTE, AND IT IMPLORES BOTH COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT A TRUCE TO PERMIT PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS TO CONTINUE. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF DESCRIBES HIS LETTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S COMMUNIQUE AS DOCUMENTS QUOTE WHICH WOULD ADD FUEL TO THE FLAMES UNQUOTE, BUT WERE RATHER IN PERSUIT OF PERU'S DETERMINATION TO SECURE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

3. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

WALLACE

NNNN

SANT AT 121515Z AR
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25230PE PRODROME

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PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

* For Typists - 1Kerox

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM LIMA 121500Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 84 OF 12 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MONTEVIDEO

MIFT (NOT TO MONTEVIDEO)

1. THE INDEPENDENT DAILY QUOTE LA PRENSA UNQUOTE PUBLISHED TODAY A REPORT THAT THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN PUT ON ALERT AS A RESULT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SITUATION. I HAVE JUST SPOKEN TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO CHECK THE ACCURACY OF THIS REPORT WHICH HE EMPHATICALLY DENIED, ADDING THAT THE RESPECTIVE SERVICES MINISTERS WERE AT THAT MOMENT ISSUING OFFICIAL DENIALS.

WALLACE

NNNN

SENT AT 121517Z AR
263563 PRODRME G
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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

Valid 8/4)

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS
PS/LPS
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PS/LORD TREFGARNE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.Tsy

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office
Mr Fuller SAPU Cab. office

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
HD/DEF D
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HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/HKGD

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff. MOD Sitcen and Cinc Fleet)

GR 50

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 121539Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1235 OF 12 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, ROUTINE HAVANA, MOSCOW

BRASILIA TELNO 89: FALKLANDS

1. AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING THE ARGENTINIANS WITH THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS I HOPE THAT THIS STORY CAN BE PUBLICISED QUICKLY.

HENDERSON

NNNN

TRIPPING

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
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DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

M. Fuller SAPU Cab. office

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GPS 30
UNCLASSIFIED
FM LIMA 121715Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 87 OF 12 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

OUR TELNO 83: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PARA 2 LINE 9. BETWEEN QUOTE WOULD UNQUOTE AND QUOTE ADD UNQUOTE
INSERT QUOTE NOT (NOT) UNQUOTE.

2. ERROR REGRETTED.

WALLACE

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PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
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Mr Fuller SAPU Cab. Office

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 026 OF 12/4/82

REPEATED TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CARACAS BRASILIA SANTIAGO

MONTEVIDEO

FALKLANDS

1. IN DISCUSSION WITH ACEVEDO UNDER SECRETARY OF FOREIGN MINISTRY (FORMER AMBASSADOR TO SPAIN) THIS MORNING HE SAID THAT DESPITE STRONG PRESSURES PARAGUAY WOULD NOT TAKE SIDES AND THIS CLEARLY REFLECTS VIEWS OF PRESIDENT STROESSNER WHO FOR SOME TIME AND FOR PURELY NATIONAL REASONS HAS MADE PLAIN HIS DISENCHANTMENT WITH ARGENTINA.
2. ACEVEDO SAID THAT PARAGUAY WOULD PRESS FOR FURTHER POSTPONEMENT

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

Valid 8/4)

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MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
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MR HAWTIN
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MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

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Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

M. Fuller SAPU Cab. office

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Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MONTEVIDEO 121505Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 121505Z APRIL

AT

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FROM BRITDEFAT MONTEVIDEO

SIC U2J/19F

FALKLAND CRISIS. ARGENTINE NAVY.

1. I ASKED MY US NAVY COLLEAGUE HERE TODAY WHAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS OF THE ARA REACTION TO THE BLOCKADE. HE REPLIED THAT THE US BELIEVED ALL ARGENTINE SHIPS WERE BEING KEPT OUT OF THE BLOCKADE AREA AND IN TERRITORIAL WATERS.

2. UPI BUENOS AIRES MEANWHILE REPORT CORVETTE GUERRICO REFUELLED PUERTO BELGRANO BUT NO OTHER SHIPS CURRENTLY IN THAT PORT.

HUTCHINSON

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SENT/RECD A 12/1842Z DP/MD

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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Valid 8/4)

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PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR MCINTYRE

H.M. Tsy

* for typists - 182000

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

Mr Fuller SAPU Cab. office

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

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FM MONTEVIDEO 121445Z APRIL 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 99 OF 12 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

mt

FALKLAND ISLANDS : ARGENTINIAN PROPOGANDA
MY TELNO 96 (NOT REPEATED TO WASHINGTON)

1. TODAY'S URUGUAYAN MEDIA REPORTS THAT ARGENTINIAN TRADE
UNIONISTS WILL ALSO VISIT THE UNITED STATES TO LOBBY THE
AFL/C10.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 12/1840Z DP/MD



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

12 April, 1982.

Dear Brian,

Falkland Islands: Talks with Mr. Haig

I attach copies of the records of 3 separate discussions held earlier today with Mr. Haig and his party.

Although the discussion over lunch was devoted almost entirely to the Falkland Islands, nothing new emerged, and I have therefore not recorded the discussion.

I attach a copy of the final version of the draft agreed memorandum.

As the final meeting came to a conclusion, Mr. Enders handed Sir Antony Acland an American paper on how the Special Commission might work, and it was agreed that we would let the Americans have urgently any comments we had to offer on it.

I am sending copies of this letter and its attachments to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Alvi Whinn.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Agreed Memorandum

1. On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 502, and noting relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, Argentina and the United Kingdom have agreed on the following steps, which form an integrated whole:

CONFIDENTIAL

2. All military and security forces other than local police shall be withdrawn within a short period of time, but not later than two weeks from the date of this agreement, from three areas defined by circles of 150 nautical miles radius from the following coordinate points:

(a) Lat. $51^{\circ} 40'$ South
Long. $59^{\circ} 30'$ West

[Falklands]

(b) Lat. $54^{\circ} 20'$ South
Long. $36^{\circ} 40'$ West

[South Georgia]

(c) Lat. $57^{\circ} 40'$ South
Long $26^{\circ} 30'$ West

[South Sandwich Islands]

CONFIDENTIAL

3. After the date of this agreement and pending a definitive settlement, no military or security force shall be introduced into the areas defined in paragraph 2 above. On completion of the withdrawal specified in paragraph 2, all forces that have been deployed in connection with the current controversy shall be redeployed to normal duties.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. The United Kingdom and Argentina shall each appoint, and the United States agrees to appoint, a representative to constitute a Special /Interim/ Commission which shall provide observers to verify compliance with the obligations in the preceding paragraphs. Each Commissioner may be supported by a staff of not more than ten persons.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. On an interim basis, all decisions, laws and regulations hereafter adopted by the local administration on the islands shall be submitted to and expeditiously ratified by the Special Interim Commission, except in the event that the Special Interim Commission deems such decisions, laws or regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes of this agreement or its implementation. The traditional local administration shall continue, including the Executive and Legislative Councils, which would be enlarged to include representatives of the Argentine population whose period of residence on the islands is equal to that required of others entitled to representation, such representatives to be in proportion to that population subject to there being at least one such representative on each Council. The Special Interim Commission shall fly the flag of each of its constituent members at the Commission's headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. The Special [Interim] Commission shall make specific recommendations to the two governments or to the Executive and Legislative Councils to facilitate and promote travel, transportation, communications and trade between the mainland and the islands.

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CONFIDENTIAL

7. Within a short period of time, but not later than two weeks from the date of this agreement steps shall be taken to terminate the economic and financial measures adopted in connection with the current controversy, including restrictions relating to travel, transportation, communications, and transfers of funds between the two countries. Likewise, the United Kingdom shall request third countries that have adopted similar measures to terminate them by that date.

CONFIDENTIAL

8. December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period, and during this period the conditions of the definitive status of the islands shall be negotiated consistently with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter.

SUBJECT

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON MONDAY 12 APRIL
1982 AT 1210 HOURS

Present:

The Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary

Secretary of State for Defence

Mr. Clive Whitmore

The Hon. Alexander M. Haig

General Vernon Walters

The Hon. Thomas O. Enders

Mr. David Gompert

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that she and her colleagues had now been able to have a general discussion on the proposals which Mr. Haig and his party had outlined earlier in the morning. They were very grateful for the tremendous amount of work which the United States had done. They had a number of questions. First, they wondered what the Americans thought would happen if no final settlement had been reached by 31 December 1982. Our fear was that the Argentinians might re-invade the Falkland Islands, especially if, in the meantime, the runway had been lengthened. A new factor in such a situation would be that the United States would be directly involved, through their membership of the Special Commission, as well as the United Kingdom.

Mr. Haig said that the very fact that the United States would be engaged would be a deterrent to any further aggressive action by the Argentine. Mr. Enders added that if nine months of the new system of government for the Falkland Islands envisaged by the American proposals generated a new spirit, then it would not matter too much if negotiations were still continuing on 31 December 1982 and no agreement had been reached.

The Prime Minister said that in order to get the American proposals through the House of Commons, the British Government would have to lay a great deal of emphasis on the preservation of the principle of self determination for the islanders. We

/should have

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- 2 -

should have to quote Article 1(2) and Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. We recognised, however, that Argentina would be saying different things about the agreement from the British Government.

Mr. Haig said that although it would cause problems, he accepted that the British Government would have to give prominence to self-determination. But he thought that British Ministers would be able to say with complete honesty that the agreement did not in any way prejudice the principle of self-determination. They would be able to claim with complete justice that they were not selling out the Falkland Islanders. The Prime Minister was right, however, when she said that President Galtieri would present the agreement in a completely different light. He would tell the Argentines that it represented a substantial change in the Falkland Islands' ^{status} in favour of the Argentine.

The Prime Minister went on to say that it would be impossible to let the Argentine flag continue to fly, and it certainly could not do so over the Governor's house.

Mr. Haig said that he envisaged that all three Commissioners would fly their own flags at the Commission's headquarters.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that, in that case, the headquarters could not be in Government House. It would have to be somewhere else.

The Prime Minister said that she was not clear what would happen to South Georgia under the American proposals. Britain had an absolute title to this island, and our position would have to be that the British Antarctic Survey would return as the traditional local administration.

Mr. Haig said that he saw no problem about South Georgia.

/The Prime Minister

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- 3 -

The Prime Minister said that although British submarines in the demilitarised zone would leave as the Argentinian forces withdrew, the British Task Force would continue to proceed southwards, though it would not enter the demilitarised zone. This was essential, since the British Government could not afford to let the Argentinians bluff them a second time. One concession she might be prepared to make was that the Task Force could stop at a point as far from the Falkland Islands as Argentina was from the Islands. Anything less would be unacceptable to Parliament. The Secretary of State for Defence added that we would bring back the Task Force only when Argentinian withdrawal was complete.

Mr. Haig said that he hoped that once an agreement had been reached, the Task Force would be held in a stand-off position. Mr. Enders added that what the Prime Minister had said about the Task Force might be difficult for the Argentines to accept. President Galtieri would ^{find} it hard to explain to his public why the British fleet was continuing to sail southwards when Argentinian forces were leaving the Falkland Islands.

At this point British Ministers were joined by Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Antony Acland, Sir Ian Sinclair, Mr. Wade-Gery and Mr. Ure, and the American party by Mr. Scott Gudgeon. The meeting then considered the American draft agreement in detail.

The Prime Minister said that the British side would have to look closely at the reference to UNGA Resolutions in paragraph 1 of the draft agreement. There was a risk that the Argentines would use these to try to reinforce their claim to sovereignty and to pre-judge the final negotiations envisaged in part 7 of the proposed agreement.

As regards paragraph 2, it was agreed that British officials should look at the size and centre points of the demilitarised areas. It was also accepted that there would need to be a reference to local police in this paragraph.

/The Prime Minister

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- 4 -

The Prime Minister said that the wording of paragraph 3 would need to be examined particularly closely by officials since she was not prepared to pull back the Task Force from the date of the agreement. It would have to continue: it was Britain's insurance policy.

The Prime Minister said that paragraph 4 would need to contain a reference to the need for each special Commissioner to be supported by a small team of an agreed size.

Mr. Haig said that paragraph 5 was the most sensitive part of the whole proposal, and the agreement would stand or fall by it. He was not certain that he would be able to get the Argentines to accept it in its present form. The key issue was the Governor. They wanted to keep their Governor, but he had told President Galtieri that the best solution he could conceive of was a three-party arrangement in which the Argentine, British and American Governments were represented equally. But if the British insisted on moving away from this position, he did not believe that President Galtieri would be able to go along with the paragraph. The matter was very finely balanced indeed. Mr. Enders added that in fact the arrangement was not equal in practice because of the dominant part to be played by the executive and legislative councils.

The Prime Minister said that if the present Argentinian Governor was appointed as a Commissioner, the British Government would have to appoint Mr. Hunt as our Commissioner.

Mr. Ure added that the Government office block would probably be the best place for the Commission to have its headquarters.

The Prime Minister asked whether paragraph 8 should make it clear that if the negotiations had not been completed by 31 December 1982, the interim arrangements would continue.

/Mr. Haig

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Mr. Haig said that a provision of that kind would be dynamite for the Argentines, since they would see it as removing any incentive for the United Kingdom to negotiate. What had to be remembered was that if the agreement came into force, the situation would never be the same again since the United States would be directly involved. He believed that the outcome of the negotiations would be either a long-term agreement or another crisis.

The meeting ended at 1345.

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12 April 1982

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SUBJECT

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON MONDAY 12 APRIL
1982 AT 1755 HOURS

Present

The Prime Minister

Home Secretary

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Secretary of State for Defence

Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster

Chief of Defence Staff

Sir Robert Armstrong

Sir Antony Acland

Sir Ian Sinclair

Mr. Wade-Gery

Mr. Ure

Mr. Whitmore

The Hon. Alexander M. Haig

General Vernon Walters

The Hon. Thomas O. Enders

Mr. James Rentschler

Mr. David Gompert

Mr. Scott Gudgeon

* * * * *

The meeting considered the American draft agreement as revised by British officials.

Paragraph 1: This was agreed.

Paragraph 2: The British side agreed to let the Americans know precisely how the co-ordinate points had been calculated.

It was also agreed that the demilitarised areas referred to airspace as well as land and sea space.

Paragraph 3: It was agreed to delete the words "other than local police".

Mr. Haig said that once an agreement had been signed, the Americans wanted the British Task Force to stop and stand off. If after the Argentinians had committed themselves to withdrawing from the Falkland Islands in two weeks, the British

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newspapers continued to report that the Task Force was proceeding southwards, President Galtieri would not survive. The Americans were not asking for the fleet to be turned round: they would not support such a request. But they were asking for it to be halted once agreement had been reached. Without such a provision the draft agreement would have no chance of being accepted in Buenos Aires, and it would be better to call off the whole attempt to achieve a diplomatic solution.

Mr. Enders added that it was not so much a question of the distance between the Task Force and the Falkland Islands, as the direction in which it was travelling.

The Prime Minister said that she would not survive in the House of Commons if the Task Force was stopped before the Argentinian withdrawal had been completed. She was, however, ready to let the troop ships proceed more slowly once an agreement had been signed. But she had to let the rest of the Task Force proceed towards the Falkland Islands. The fact was that it was the Argentines who had gained by their aggression, and she saw no reason to give them the benefit of the doubt any more. Britain needed the Task Force close to the Falkland Islands: we could not rule out Argentine's reversing their withdrawal and putting forces back into the Islands or re-invading the Islands, probably by air. There could not be a basis of trust between Britain and the Argentine after what had happened. We were prepared to halt the Task Force at the same distance from the Falkland Islands as the Argentine was from the Falklands, but we could go no further than that. We could not let ourselves be put in a position where we were worse off than the invaders. Their insurance policy was their bases. Ours was the Task Force.

Mr. Haig said that the United Kingdom's position on the Task Force would not be understood publicly. Once the Argentine had decided to withdraw, the United Kingdom would be

/seen to have

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seen to have won. Nobody would understand if the Task Force went on sailing towards the Falklands. If it was halted, it would make no difference to Britain's military position; but if it did not stop, it would put the whole agreement at risk. Once the withdrawal had started, Britain could announce that it would hold the Task Force in place until the withdrawal had been completed. If the withdrawal was reversed, or even slowed down unreasonably, the Task Force would sail on.

The Prime Minister said that under the proposed agreement the Argentine would gain something from the invasion and occupation of the Islands, whereas we, the wronged party, would be the losers. In this situation it would be impossible for her to persuade Parliament to accept Mr. Haig's proposal with regard to the Task Force.

Mr. Haig said that rather than try to agree on a re-draft of paragraph 3, it would be better to go back to the original wording and for the Americans to try to finesse it with the Argentinians who were bound to raise it. It would help if the paragraph referred to all the forces that had been deployed in connection with the current controversy being re-deployed to normal duties, once the withdrawal had been completed.

Paragraph 4: It was agreed that, although the figure of ten persons for each Commissioner's staff might be too small, the number should remain a low one. These people were separate from the observers.

Mr. Haig said that the use of the word "interim" to describe the Commission might give rise to Argentinian suspicions, however unreasonably. The Prime Minister said that it could be dropped if necessary.

Paragraph 5: Mr. Haig said that the requirement for the Commission to be unanimous in deciding whether the acts of

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the local administration were inconsistent with the purposes of the agreement would destroy any chance of gaining Argentine acceptance of the agreement.

The Prime Minister said that without the word "unanimous" the United States would become the referee on everything, but if the Argentines argued strongly against the word, she would be prepared for it to be dropped.

After a lengthy discussion about the best way of defining the Argentine population for the purposes of representation on the two councils, it was agreed that they should be subject to the same qualifying period of residence as others who were entitled to representation.

Paragraph 6: After it was pointed out that the 1971 Anglo-Argentinian Agreement referred to the Argentine mainland, it was agreed that the words "the mainland and the Islands" should be left in this paragraph.

The British side rejected an American suggestion that there should be a reference in this paragraph to immigration. This was a highly controversial subject, particularly since the position of the Falkland Islanders had recently been changed in the Nationality Act, and any mention of it in this agreement would give rise to a great deal of trouble.

Paragraph 7: After a long discussion on the lifting of economic and financial sanctions, the British side agreed not to insist upon a provision that such sanctions would be lifted only when the Argentinian withdrawal had been completed. It was pointed out that the United Kingdom could decide the timing of the removal of sanctions when they saw how the withdrawal was going.

Paragraph 8: This paragraph was agreed.

The meeting ended at 2030.

12 April, 1982.

JAW
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SUBJECT: RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN 10 DOWNING STREET ON MONDAY 12 APRIL 1982 AT 0930

Present:

The Prime Minister	The Hon. Alexander M. Haig
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	General Vernon Walters
Secretary of State for Defence	The Hon. Thomas O. Enders
Mr. Clive Whitmore	Mr. David Gompert

* * * * *

Mr. Haig said that he thought the Prime Minister and her colleagues would find it helpful if he gave them a detailed account of the twelve hours of talks he had had in Buenos Aires on the Falkland Islands. He had been brutally frank with President Galtieri about his talks in London. He had told him that the United Kingdom was ready militarily and psychologically for war, and that the British people were right behind the British Government. He had said to the Argentinians that war would be inevitable if they did not alter course. President Galtieri had not been as bellicose as he had expected. But he had whipped up the people, and things had almost got out of hand during the demonstrations on Sunday, though the crowds away from the main streets were more pacific than jingoistic.

During his talks in Buenos Aires he had detected clear differences of views between the three Argentinian Services. The Navy were looking for a fight. The Air Force did not want a war. The Army were somewhere in between. His talks with the Argentinians had gone through three phases. They had discussed possibilities for bringing about a solution to the problem and these talks had been going well when the Argentinians had produced counter-proposals which had quite clearly been prepared by the Chiefs of Staff. These had demanded virtually complete capitulation by the United Kingdom and the only concession which they offered was to buy out the Falkland Islanders. He had told the Argentinians that if this was

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the basis on which they proposed to continue the talks, it would be a pointless exercise, and he would break off immediately to return to Washington. This threat had alarmed Senor Costa Mendes, and he had intervened with his Argentinian colleagues. As a result, the atmosphere had improved considerably, and the discussions had resumed on a more constructive note.

In the course of the talks, President Galtieri had given him some surprising information. The Cuban Ambassador had returned to Buenos Aires after a year's absence, together with senior Cuban officials. President Galtieri had claimed that Cuba had offered him everything he needed, and they had represented their offer as having the full support of the Soviet Union. President Galtieri had said that he did not want to breach Argentina's attachment to the West. But if he was isolated he would seek the help of the Soviet Union. He had claimed that the Soviet Union had offered to sink British vessels. He (Mr. Haig) had told President Galtieri that he did not believe this, for if it were true it could well be the cause of world conflict. President Galtieri had added that if he had to remove the Argentine flag from the Falkland Islands, he would be out of office within a week.

Mr. Haig continued that the pressure which Britain had been applying was working in the Argentine. There was now a real fear there that there would be a war. Nobody wanted a conflict, except the Navy. But force alone would not push them off the Falkland Islands. The Royal Navy could be in the South Atlantic for a long time. The Argentines might well try to run any blockade using East European ships. It was very important that Britain did not relax its present tough position while attempts were made to find a diplomatic solution. During his talks in Buenos Aires he had based himself wholly on the British demands for the withdrawal of Argentine forces, the restoration of British administration, and respect for the islanders' right of self-determination.

/ he had

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He had worked out a set of proposals with President Galtieri which the Argentines might be brought eventually to accept, and those proposals were structured around the core of the British position. They would trigger the Argentine withdrawal by giving them an interim official presence on the islands and a commitment to negotiations, though without any indication of what the negotiations would cover. There were 7 elements in the possible agreement.

First, both Britain and Argentina would agree to withdraw from the islands and an agreed surrounding area. The surrounding areas might be circles with a radius of 100 miles or 100 kilometres round the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich. The withdrawal would be accomplished within 2 weeks at the outside.

Second, the vacated zone would be demilitarised until such time as there was a final settlement. Both sides would be committed not to reintroduce military forces. The Argentines had said that they wanted an undertaking from the United Kingdom to keep their task force out of the South Atlantic altogether. He had told them that this was impossible, and he believed that they might be satisfied if the agreement provided for British units to return to normal operating. He did not expect Britain to turn round its task force at the present moment, for to do so would mean giving up leverage with the Argentines. But he anticipated that the United Kingdom would announce unilaterally the return of the task force when the crisis had been defused.

Third, a Commission made up of United States, British and Argentine representatives would be set up to ensure compliance with parts 1 and 2 of the agreement. The Argentines had shown themselves completely opposed to any involvement by the United Nations, the OAS or Canada. They felt that only the United States could meet the needs of the situation.

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Fourth, economic and financial sanctions would be lifted, but there would not necessarily be a restoration of diplomatic relations at this stage. The Argentine had been shaken to the core by the European Community decision to embargo imports from the Argentine.

Fifth, the traditional local administration of the islands would be restored, including the re-establishment of the Executive and Legislative Councils. The administration would submit its acts and regulations to the Special Commission for them to ensure that the administration's activities were consistent with the agreement. This had been the most difficult element in the discussions in Buenos Aires. It was unlikely that the Argentines would accept the agreement unless the two Councils included representatives of the Argentine population in the Falkland Islands. He did not believe that this would be too big a concession for Britain to make, since there were only some 40 long-term Argentinian residents in the islands. The Argentinians were adamantly opposed to the return of the Governor, though they were prepared to see the return of other senior British officials. Under these proposals the internal day-to-day running of the islands would be in the hands of the 2 Councils, and the Special Commission would in effect replace the Governor. The Commission would not have any initiating powers, and its decisions would be taken only in response to requests from the Councils, with the exception of the provisions in the 6th part of the proposals. The Commission would operate by a majority vote.

Sixth, the Commission would recommend to the British and Argentinian Governments ways of promoting and facilitating communications, trade and transportation between the islands and the Argentine, and in this area the British Government would have a veto. This veto would be a protection against the Argentines trying to populate the islands with settlers. Nonetheless the Argentinians attached importance to this part of the proposals, since they maintained that, in the past, it had been virtually impossible for Argentine citizens to get permission to start up businesses in the islands or to own or rent property there.

/ Finally,

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

Finally, negotiations on a final settlement would be pursued, consistently with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The United States had insisted on this mention of the Charter because of the references in it to the right of self-determination. The Argentinians had been prepared to agree to this part of the proposals only if they contained a date for the conclusion of the negotiations, and it was suggested that this should be 31 December, 1982. There would be no pre-conceived outcome of the negotiations, but clearly the Argentinians would pursue their objective of establishing their sovereignty over the islands, just as Britain would adhere to the principle of the right of self-determination for the islanders.

In reply to a question by the Prime Minister, Mr. Haig said that he agreed that the Argentinians were probably trying to seek practical arrangements that would enable them to change the character of the Falkland Islands. But they would not be able to move very far in this direction before the end of the year when the final phase of the agreement - the negotiations for a long-term settlement - were due to be completed. It was important to emphasise that these proposals were not what the Argentinians wanted. Rather, they were what the Americans had driven them to contemplate under threats to break off the talks and go back to Washington.

The Prime Minister said that if the Falkland islanders chose to join the Argentine, the British Government would accept their decision. But equally, the Argentinian Government should be ready to accept an expressed wish of the islanders to remain British.

Mr. Haig emphasised that an agreement on the lines he had sketched out would give Britain Argentinian withdrawal and the re-establishment of the local administration. He had emphasised time and again to the Argentinians that if they did not settle for something like this agreement, the alternative would be war. That would be bad for us all. The Soviet Union had been

/ cautious

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

cautious in their approach to the Falkland Islands dispute initially, but now they were taking a very pro-Argentine position. He did not believe that they would seek a confrontation with the United Kingdom: rather, their objective would be to get a foothold in Argentina and to force that country to become a Soviet outpost. The more desperate Argentina became, the more troubled waters there would be for the Soviet Union to fish in.

Mr. Haig went on to say that he had some language drafted which would serve as the basis for an agreement, and he would like to go through this with the Prime Minister and her colleagues. This language represented the absolute limit of Argentine toleration "and a bit more". If he could reach agreement in London he proposed then to fly back to Buenos Aires the next day. The Argentinians were very tense. His advice was that Britain should continue to be tough, but should not use pejorative language about them unnecessarily. The aim should be to keep them frightened, not angry.

The Prime Minister said that she would now like to discuss with her colleagues the proposals Mr. Haig had put to them.

The meeting ended at 1100.

JWH.

12 April, 1982.

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 April 1982

Dear Aive,

N. B. P. M.

AR 14/4

h.a.

Falkland Islands: Mr Haig's Visit Today

In paragraph 6 of my letter of 11 April I said that we would shortly provide a note about the economic measures towards Argentina which we would like the United States to take, and that the note might be given to the Americans at the end of the first session of today's talks so that the Americans could consider it during the recess.

I now attach a copy of the note. Mr Pym's view is that it might be tactically better not to raise the matter with Mr Haig at this stage: he would very probably argue that it would be counterproductive for the Americans to take action of this kind at a time when they are engaged in negotiations with the Argentinians. The Prime Minister may however wish to be aware of the background, and we shall continue to keep the Americans in the picture through ordinary diplomatic channels.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to the Private Secretaries to the Defence Secretary, Home Secretary and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Yours ever
John

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

C A Whitmore Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

POSSIBLE US ECONOMIC ACTION AGAINST ARGENTINA

1. The Argentine economy is vulnerable to external pressure. Economic measures taken against it may therefore have an important impact on Argentina's behaviour in the present crisis.
2. In recognition of this, and of the need to show clearly the strength of international feeling about Argentina's unlawful and aggressive action in invading the Falkland Islands, the UK and a number of its partners and allies have taken quick and firm economic action against Argentina.
3. The UK has:
 - a) frozen Argentine financial assets in London. These may total about \$1.4 billion, one quarter of their holdings in OECD countries;
 - b) ceased to give export credit cover on new commitments to Argentina;
 - c) banned all imports of goods from Argentina.
4. The European Community has agreed to introduce a total ban on imports from Argentina. All our Community partners except Italy and Belgium (who are still considering the matter) have said that they are ready to cease granting export credit guarantees for new business. We hope there will be agreement among all our Community partners about ^{this} early this week.
5. Australia has decided to impose an embargo on imports and a ban on new credit.
6. These measures will have a serious impact on the Argentine economy. The European Community's action alone will affect up to 30% of Argentina's exports (worth \$2.5 billion in 1980). The measures, plus the shock to confidence

/given

CONFIDENTIAL

given by Argentina's recent actions, will make it much more difficult for Argentina to borrow money.

7. It would increase considerably the pressure on Argentina, and thereby make more likely a settlement of the present dispute in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, if the US were to follow the lead of those other of the UK's allies who have taken economic measures against Argentina. The US share of OECD imports from Argentina in 1980 represented some 9% of total Argentine exports, but less than 1% of US trade. The important role of US banks in Argentina's borrowing programme is demonstrated by the fact that of about \$10 billion of short-term loans maturing this year over one half is owed to the US.

8. We therefore hope that the US Administration will:

- i. ban imports from Argentina;
- ii. cease to give Government backing to export credit for new business;
- iii. discourage banks in the US from undertaking new lending to Argentina.

AND D

*Monday - 10:00 AM, about
Had just started sending
telex when interruption for
to come in. Mine in answer to H
of 11.4.82 then sent.*

54250 COALTE G
HELLO STILL THERE
--YES

GA
12 APRIL 1982

MR C E NEEDHAM

DEAR TED,

ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES WISH TO HIRE MONSUNEN FOR WORK AROUND
STANLEY PORT WILLIAM ETC. I HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO HAND OVER
VESSEL AND THEY STATE THAT IF THEY DO NOT GET A REPLY IN THE
VERY NEAR FUTURE THEY WILL REQUISITION THE VESSEL. INSTRUCT-
IONS PLEASE.

REGARDS MILNE

OKS RCD WELL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

12 April 1982

Dear Sir,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

As I told you earlier this evening, Mr. Haig telephoned the Prime Minister at 2155 to say that he had just had a very worrying call from Senor Costa Mendes in Buenos Aires. Senor Costa Mendes had told him that he saw no reason for him, Mr. Haig, to go to Buenos Aires again unless any agreement about the Falkland Islands provided for the Governor of the islands to be appointed by the Argentine Government and for the Argentine flag to continue to be flown there. If that was not possible, then the Argentine Government must have assurances that at the end of negotiations with Britain there would be a recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

The Prime Minister commented that the Argentines were clearly playing for very high stakes. We could not possibly accept Senor Costa Mendes' demands.

Mr. Haig said that he had told Senor Costa Mendes precisely that. He had added that he and British Ministers had worked all day on the basis of the ideas which he had discussed with the Argentine Government in Buenos Aires and he had told him that it was vital that they should now hear from him how he had got on in London, for if there was no agreement the alternative was war. Senor Costa Mendes had then backpedalled a little and had said that perhaps Mr. Haig should go to Buenos Aires after all.

Mr. Haig went on to say that he had not responded to Senor Costa Mendes but had instead told the American Ambassador in Buenos Aires to see Senor Costa Mendes to let him know that he was reconsidering whether to go to Buenos Aires in the light of the ultimatum with which Senor Costa Mendes had presented him. He was now waiting for the Ambassador to report on his meeting with Senor Costa Mendes.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed entirely that Mr. Haig could not return to Buenos Aires on the conditions set by the Argentines. If it came to that, he should let it be known publicly why the effort to find a diplomatic solution had collapsed.

/Mr. Haig said

Mr. Haig said that he would do that. He would now wait for the Ambassador's telephone call. After that he would speak once more to Senor Costa Mendes. If he was still insisting on a guarantee that Argentine sovereignty would be transferred or, failing that, an arrangement which would ensure that they would dominate the Islands unilaterally, he would make it plain that he would not go to Buenos Aires. He would then let President Reagan know how matters stood, make a full public statement explaining what had happened and go straight back to Washington. He would keep the Prime Minister informed.

The Prime Minister said that she was very sorry about this turn of events, especially after all the efforts Mr. Haig had been making to find a solution. She would let the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary know about the telephone call from Senor Costa Mendes.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Shirley Williams

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

✓ Master set.

SUBJECT

RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY HAIG ON MONDAY 12 APRIL 1982

Secretary Haig: this was his initial statement, unless the Governor of the island would be appointed by the Government of Argentina and if the Argentine flag should continue to be flown. He said now if we can't have that then we must have assurances to the Argentine Government that at the end of the negotiations there would be a recognition of Argentine sovereignty.

Prime Minister: Yes, he's playing for high stakes and he can't have them.

Secretary Haig: Well I told him that this was impossible ...

Prime Minister: absolutely impossible

Secretary Haig: Then he backtracked a little and I said I was rather astonished that we'd worked all day on the basis of the ideas we had exchanged down there and I said I thought it was vitally important that they hear those ideas, that here it was clear that there would be no change in the course that was under way unless there were an agreement. And he backpedalled a little. He said, well maybe you should come.

Prime Minister: He's trying it on.

Secretary Haig: But I said I think it would be a mistake to come under those circumstances. So I've called our Ambassador to tell him, the Foreign Minister, that I'm reconsidering this trip in the light of the ultimative character of his telephone call, that either of those alternatives are not acceptable here, that we will do our best to work in a spirit of compromise to assist in both areas, both with a time certain on negotiations and with a share of management of the situation on the island. Now I think I'll wait until he calls back after he's discussed this with Costa Mendes.

/Prime Minister:

Prime Minister: Is he the man called Ross?

Secretary Haig: No, Slaughterman.

Prime Minister: Oh, he's the Deputy Minister?

Secretary Haig: The Foreign Minister is Costa Mendes, and he's the one I just spoke to.

Prime Minister: You spoke to Costa Mendes?

Secretary Haig: Yes, directly.

Prime Minister: I'm amazed he took that view.

Secretary Haig: Well, it was very, very tough.

Prime Minister: I'm amazed, that's not his views. That's what he's been told to get on to you about.

Secretary Haig: Of course. So I think it would be very foolish under these circumstances to go down there.

Prime Minister: They change, this is the trouble, and they can't adhere to one viewpoint.

Secretary Haig: No, that's clear. It's clear that what they gave us at the end of the evening, Saturday, which is what we've discussed all day, had now become something different and I told you of the paper he gave me at the airport, but he gave it to me in a very slippery way, and as a, you know, sort of a trade off paper these are our keen interests and if you get strong on one you can be weaker on the other on these two trade-offs. So the basic stone wall that we're facing now clearly is a guarantee, publicly or privately, that there will be a transfer of sovereignty.

Prime Minister: which cannot be given

Secretary Haig:

Secretary Haig: cannot, of course. And, secondly, if not that then a unilateral dominance on the island, which we cannot give either. And I told him that. I told him that that would be an endorsement of aggression.

Prime Minister: And it's totally outside the Security Council Resolution. No, I entirely agree, Al. If those are the conditions, you cannot return but it has to be known publicly from your viewpoint that they've set those conditions and that was why you said we cannot have those, we cannot therefore return. But it must be known from your viewpoint publicly.

Secretary Haig: Well, that's right. What I thought I would do, Madam Prime Minister, is wait until I get the call back, make one more call in which we will sit here with the stenographer and hear every word and then I'll call President Reagan and suggest that I I don't want to leave without some explanation of why we're going back to Washington.

Prime Minister: Of course not.

Secretary Haig: And I think I'll just lay it straight out.

Prime Minister: Lay it straight out and tell them you're laying it straight out. I'll understand. I'm here. Well, let me think, President Reagan's five hours behind us so they're about five-to-five. They've still got the evening ahead. But if they're doing this, it must be known to the world that after all your efforts they've flouted it.

Secretary Haig: No question about it. They clearly are now in the hands of the Navy. Well, I'll keep you posted.

Prime Minister: Well, Al, I am sorry. We've had all this busy day and you've been marvellous.

Secretary Haig: Should I call Francis?

Prime Minister:

Prime Minister: No, you don't necessarily have to call Francis, we'll call Francis. All right, Al. Bless you and thank you

COALTE G

YOU PLEASE CONNECT ME TO FALKLAND ISLANDS 218+

MOM PL
218 FALKISCO FK
JZTRWTP COALTE G

12.4.82 7.47

ATTENTION MR HARRY MILNE

DEAR HARRY,
I JUST HAPPENED TO BE IN THE OFFICE AT THE TIME. ANY
FURTHER MESSAGES FOR WHICH I SHOULD WAIT/

SINCERE FEELINGS FOR GEORGE BETTS AND CREW.

BEST WISHES,

TED.

9.3 .9
ONE MO

DEAR TED,

COMODORO BLOOMER-REEVE ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ (ARGENTINE
CHIEF SECRETARY) HAS JUST BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE AND I HAVE PASSED
YR MSG. HE STATES THAT HE UNDERSTANDS YR FEELINGS AND WILL
CONVEY THEM TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL. HE ALSO STATES THAT THEY
WANT OUR CREW TO MAN THE VESSEL. I HAVE EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT
THE CREW ARE VERY RELUCTANT TO OPERATE THE SHIP AND HE HAS AGREED
TO PASS THIS MSG ALSO TO THE GENERAL. I AM STANDING BY AWAITING
INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE ARG. AUTHORITIES. WILL ADVISE YOU OF DEVELOP-
MENTS.

REGARDS HARRY.

OK

DEAR HARRY,

Immediate response.

CONVEY THEM TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL. HE ALSO STATES THAT THEY WANT OUR CREW TO MAN THE VESSEL. I HAVE EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THE CREW ARE VERY RELUCTANT TO OPERATE THE SHIP AND HE HAS AGREED TO PASS THIS MSG ALSO TO THE GENERAL. I AM STANDING BY AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE ARG. AUTHORITIES. WILL ADVISE YOU OF DEVELOPMENTS.

REGARDS HARRY.

OK

DEAR HARRY,

Immediate response

MESSAGE RECEIVED AND WILL STAND BY FOR TIME BEING. MUST PROTEST STRONGLY AGAINST THE EMPLOYMENT OF OUR CREW ON THE SHIP AGAINST THEIR WISHES.

REGARDS,

TED

Immediate

DEAR TED,

MSG RCD AND UNDERSTOOD - WILL PASS YR STRONG PROTEST TO AUTHROTIES.

REGARDS HARRY,

PLS DO NOT STANDBY AS WE HAVE NO INDIATION WHEN AUTHORITES WILL COME A BACK TO US. **

OK

ANYTHING ELSE PLS?.

NOT REPLY. WILL RESPOND TO WHATEVER ARISES IN MEANTIME. IF YOU FEEL INAPPROPRIATE TO STAND BY, WILL COSE FOR TIME BEING. UP, TED.

..B

DEAR HARRY THANKS FOR ALL YR HELP, WILL OPEN TELEX LINK WITH TOMORROW MORNING AND LET YOU KNOW THE OUTCOME.

TNS,
REGARDS HARRY.

OK

WELL WELL.

FALKISCO FR
SAND COALTE G

8.00 *per*

ATTENTION MR HARRY MILNE
AC

LDN SWBD P65

54250 COALTE G

CAN YOU PLEASE CONNECT ME TO FALKLAND ISLANDS 218+

54250 COALTE G
MON PSE

218 FALKISCO FK

3e
54250 COALTE G 12.4.82 7.30

*Monday
7.30*

ATTENTION MR HARRY MILNE

DEAR HARRY,

.... WAS TRYING TO SEND MY TELEX AS YOURS CAME THROUGH.

.... AS I FEEL SURE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES WILL UNDERSTAND, FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY CANNOT BE SEEN TO BE MAKING MONEY FROM HIRING MONSUNEN TO THEM UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. INSURANCE ANGLE MUST ALSO BE COMPLICATION. IF THEY INTEND TO REQUISITION IT ANYWAY, THEN I HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT.

.... I HOPE THAT IT WILL BE AVAILABLE AS NECESSARY TO TAKE PROVISIONS TO FARMS.

.... IF REQUISITIONED, IS IT INTENDED THAT F.I.C. CREW WILL BE INVOLVED? ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS FROM YOUR END?

REGARDS

TED NEEDHAM

H JUST A SEC

*Immediate
reply rec'd*

WE DO NOT KNOW IF CREW WILL BE INVOLVED SHOULD THE VESSEL BE REQUISITIONED BUT ASSUME THE WORST AND THAT THEY WILL BE ORDERED TO MAN THE VESSEL - STANDING BY.

OK

DEAR HARRY,

by immediate reply

MESSAGE RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD. ADVISE IF ANY FURTHER ANSWERS OR INSTRUCTION NEEDED.

REGARDS,
TED

DEAR TED,

Immediate reply

WILL ATTEMPT TO HAND OVER VESSEL AND INSIST UPON IT BEING REQUISITIONED. WILL ADVISE SITUATION OF CREW WHEN KNOWN.

REGARDS HARRY

OK

FALKISCO FK
COALTE G



10 DOWNING STREET

~~Clive,~~ N

You will need to speak to the PM about the attached arrangements.

We need to clear with her about tete-a-tete, taking into account Mr Pym's Office, who feel he should be present at such a meeting.

The PM should also be told that Mr Haig's party intend to stay at No 10 during the 90 minute break.

You will wish to be aware that during the small hours of this morning we arranged for a special telephone link to be placed in Robin Catford's Office. This was at US Embassy; PTO

request so that Mr. Haug can
contact people in his Embassy direct
and also Washington. I cleared
this with Leslie Wright and
also informed Mr Rylands what
was being done.

Steve

12./4/82

MR. WHITMORE

Arrangements for meetings with Mr. Haig:
12 April

0930-1030 approx Talks

1030-1200 Break from talks

Mr. Haig's party will use
the suite of 3 Appointments
Rooms*

Prime Minister's party will
remain in the Cabinet Room

1200 onwards Lunch

1400 approx Possible tete-a-tete

* Typewriting, telephone and photocopying
facilities available.

Steve Feary
Duty Clerk.

11 April, 1982.

ATTENTION MR HARRY MILNE

*judicial investigation
interrupted and
from Island about 10:00
came in.*

DEAR HARRY,

1 AND 2 GREAT TO HEAR FROM YOU AGAIN AND TO KNOW ALL SAFE AND WELL.

3 CAN WELL UNDERSTAND DIFFICULTIES AND STATE OF NERVES. TRY TO KEEP YOUR CHIN UP AND BLOOD PRESSURE DOWN. DO LET OTHERS HELP AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. BROOK HARDCASTLE, TERRY SPRUCE AND OTHERS WITH YOU?

4 COMMENTS ON MONSUNEN NOTIEE NOTED. DO ALL FARMS HAVE SUFFICIENT PROVISIONS?

5 HAD ASSUMED HOSTEL WOULD BE UTILISED. MOST UNEXPECTED WAY TO HAVE IT TRIED OUT AND PROVED.

6 UNDERSTAND SOME OF DIFFICULTIES IN OPERATING SERVICES. WOULD LIKE TO ASK MANY QUESTIONS BUT WISH TO AVOID ANY EMBARRASSMENT OR ADD TO YOUR PROBLEMS. IT WOULD GREATLY HELP PEACE OF MIND TO KNOW WHETHER STORE STILL OPERATING AND PEOPLE GREE GETTING WHAT THEY NEED TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST PHYSICAL WELL BEING.

7 WE MUST BELIEVE IN A PEACEFUL OUTCOME, IN WHICH CASE EVERYBODY HAS AN INTEREST IN MAINTAINING WHAT IS THERE AS BEST WE CAN. I HOPE THAT ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES WILL AGREE WITH THAT.

I HESITATE TO BOTHER YOU WITH ROUTINE MATTERS SINCE OUR CONCERN IS ENTIRELY FOR YOUR PRESENT AND FUTURE WELL BEING. WHATEVER YOU CAN RAISE, HOWEVER, I WILL BE DELIGHTED TO DEAL WITH AS HELPFULLY AS POSSIBLE. I HOPE YOU HAVE YOUR SUPPORT IN STANLEY. GOOD TO SEE ROSEMARIE STILL WITH YOU.

IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE CONTACT WITH OTHER FRIENDS THERE, IN OR OUT OF THE COMPANY. WOULD MY OLD FRIEND THE MONSIGNOR, FOR EXAMPLE, BE ALLOWED TO COMMUNICATE WITH ME?

KINDEST REGARDS AND BEST WISHES TO ALL.

54250 COALTE G

218 FALKISCO FK

WHELLO
HELLO A FEW ANSWERS ON GA

(come back immediately)

- 1/ BROOK H. IS AT DARWIN AS 115 GUESTS(OVERSEAS) THERE.
- 2/ THE STORES ARE OPERATING AS NORMAL
- 3/ REMAINDER TEAM IN STANLEY ASSISTING HMM
- 4/ MONSIGNOR KEEPING CHIN UP - WILL PASS MSG TO HIM.
- 5/ APPRECIATE MSG RE MONSUNEN SOONEST

REGARDS
ROSEMARIE

54250 COALTE G

I AM YOU STILL THERE

YUP.

WILL PASS THIS STRAIGHT TO MR NEEDHAM

THANKS

44 FALKISCO FK

54250 COALTE G G. 43 AL

54250 COALTE G
54250 COALTE GH

54250 COALTE G
218 FALKISCO FK

Monday
Received by phone
mid-afternoon

54250

12 APRIL 1982

FROM MR H MILNE

MR TED NEEDHAM

DEAR TED,

1. THANKS FOR YOURS OF 11TH
2. ALL STILL SAFE AND WELL
3. SITUATION MOST DIFFICULT. STAFF IN STANLEY LIVING ON NERVES.
4. MONSUNEN JUST RETURNED FROM CAMP VOYAGE BUT DUE TO PRESENT SITUATION HAVE SUSPENDED ITINERARY AND PROPOSE PUTTING VESSEL TO ANCHOR IN STANLEY HARBOUR WITH NO WATCHMAN ON BOARD. CREW WILL VISIT VESSEL DAILY.
5. HOSTEL TAKEN OVER DO NOT THINK QUESTION OF STRUCTURE WILL ARISE IN FUTURE DUE TO WEIGHTS APPLIED.
6. TRYING TO OPERATE SERVICES BUT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.
7. WILL TRY AND DEAL WITH ROUTINE MATTERS IF YOU WILL START PASSING THEM

KINDEST REGARDS TO ALL,

54250 COALTE G

PS - HMM IS IN NO STATE TO COPE WITH NO. 7. SO I THINK IT WOULD BE BEST TO LET BE FOR THE TIME - ROSEMARIE

DID YOU RCE OK PLS

54250 COALTE G
218 FALKISCO FK

AMERICAN STAFF COMING TO No. 10.

0830 Tony Lovett and 2 labourers

0930 Mr. Haig, Gen. V. Walters,
Mr. Thomas Ender, Mr. David Gompert

1025- Mr. James Rentschler -
1030 Mr. Alvin Adams
Mr. John Campbell
Mr. Dean Fisher
Mr. Robert Funsetch
Mr. K. Scott Gudgeon
Mr. Michael Klosson
Mr. Robert Service
Mr. Roger Harrison

2 secretaries: Laura Simkiss
Joyce Newsbitt

Courer: Robyn Hynson

Mr Haig
General Walters
Mr Ender
Mr Gompert
Mr Rentschler
~~Mr~~ Louis

} lunch.

Radio Notice to Mariners

For Coastal Traffic NRO 174 (important)

Tierra del Fuego, Malvinas and islands of the South Atlantic Stop. For reasons of security starting on the 10th of this month at 0000 hours for navigation close to Malvinas Islands and access to mooring areas, pilots should be picked up at Malvinas Islands Port for access to Cumberland Bay. For San Pedro (St. Peters?) Island, South Georgia, pick up of pilot should be done at Puerto Grytviken. Pilot rules should be followed.

Transmit until 27-4-82.

This Argentinian notice to
mariners was handed to us today
by the Americans. The CSS took
a copy.

AKL

12W'

COPIA INFORMATIVA

ESTACION DE RADIO
100256

003151

RACEL

DE RAUER PNR 2381
T. RAUZAR T. PRECORIV

BT

RADIOAVISO PARA EL TRAFICO COSTERO NRO. 17A (IMPORTANTE)
TIERRA DEL FUEGO MALVINAS E ISLAS DEL ATLANTICO SUR PUNTO POR
RAZONES SEGURIDAD PARTIR 10 ACTUAL A 00:00 HORAS PARA NAVEGACION
PROXIMIDADES ISLAS MALVINAS Y ACCESO FONDEADEROS TOMAR PRACTICO
EN PUERTO ISLAS MALVINAS PUNTO PARA ACCESO BAHIA CUMBERLAND
ISLA SAN PEDRO GEORGIA DEL SUR TOMA DE PRACTICO EFECTUARASE
EN PUERTO GRITVIKEN PUNTO COMPLIMENTAR REGLAMENTO PRACTICAJE PNA
P.F.P. NRO. 14 - SIN

TRANSMITIR HASTA DIA: 27-4-82

BT

AGCI CARRIERS J. J. 10E 100256

RACEL

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

SECRET

Prime Minister

This arrived this morning

Duty Clerk

12/4/82

Mr Giffard

MR HAIG'S VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES

1. Mr Harrison of the US Embassy came round in the small hours with the attached paragraph from a telegram received by the Embassy, in response to our request for a read out on Secretary of State Haig's visit to Buenos Aires before his arrival later this morning.

H J S Pearce

H J S Pearce
Emergency Unit

12 April 1982

cc: Private Secretary
PS/Mr Onslow
PUS/Mr Wright
Mr Gillmore
Mr Ure
Mr Weston
Mr Hulse
Duty Clerk, No. 10 Downing Street ✓

SECRET

3. YOU MAY SAY IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT OUR CONVERSATIONS HAVE REVEALED TENTATIVE CRACKS IN THE ARGENTINE STONE WALL ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES AND THE RESTORATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. BUT WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO IN VERY LITTLE TIME, AND WILL NEED THE HIGHEST STATESMANSHIP OF BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS. WE ARE MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT AN ANGLO-ARGENTINE WAR WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE WESTERN INTERESTS IN CONTAINING SOVIET EXPANSTIONISM.

PART 5 ends:-

Washington tel : 1234 of 11.4.82

PART 6 begins:-

170 Internal minute of 12/4/82

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[FTP://FTP.KODAK.COM/GASTDS/Q60DATA](ftp://ftp.kodak.com/gastds/q60data)

Q-60R2 Target for
KODAK
Professional Papers

