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806

PREM 19/6/18

9/17

9/11

TOP SECRET

PART 7

Confidential Filings

Relations with Argentina

ARGENTINA

The position of The Falkland Islands

Part 1: Sept 1979

Part 7: April 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>16.4.82</del>							
17.4.82							
<del>Ends</del>							
PREM 19/6/82							

PART

7

ends:-

ASC to FCO

17/4/82

PART

8

begins:-

FCO Emergency Out Sr Rep 14/4





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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Argentina (2)

Prime Minister

17 April 1982

A.F.C. 15/4

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Views of Inhabitants

The Chief Secretary of the Falkland Islands, the Chief of Police, the Registrar, and a member of the Executive Council of the Falkland Islands (Mr Luxton) who had returned to the UK on 15 April, were debriefed today by FCO officials on conditions on the Islands and the mood of the Islanders. The Prime Minister may wish to have a summary of the main conclusions.

Morale

People in Port Stanley, having been at the centre of the military action during the invasion, are apprehensive about the prospects of a further battle. Perhaps 40 per cent of the former population of the town have moved out into the hinterland, where morale is high, particularly amongst the permanent Islander population. There has been no collaboration with the occupying forces. Indeed several Islanders have been openly defiant.

Supplies generally are adequate for two months, and so far the Argentines have not been requisitioning them. However, there could be problems over water supply given the large increase in demand, particularly in Port Stanley, where the distribution system was damaged in the fighting. The Savings Bank was still in operation, under the supervision of the Argentines who were believed to be sending an Anglo-Argentine to help run it. The confiscation of the radio telephone sets, which were owned by all the outlying inhabitants, has had some effect on morale. It has also made it impossible to obtain reliable information about reactions amongst the population as a whole.

Evacuation

Shortly before he left, the Chief Secretary asked government servants, expatriate and Islanders, whether they would like to be evacuated. Almost 100 per cent were interested, amounting to 300 people including dependants. He believes that most of these would probably wish to return after Argentine forces had withdrawn.

The great majority of those people would be residents of Port Stanley, apprehensive like those who had left for the hinterland

/about

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about further military conflict. There is no way of ascertaining how many of those in the hinterland share this view. Mr Luxton was confident that many were determined to stay as long as possible, even if there was fighting. But some might well wish for temporary evacuation, if they thought they would be caught in the firing.

Those wishing to leave are not now doing so for a variety of reasons. They are reluctant to abandon their homes to the occupying forces; the only destination to which they could travel from the Islands is Argentina, and they would be compelled to take out Argentine travel documents; and many of them do not have enough money for the fare to where they would wish to go. Nor is the Argentines' attitude to evacuation clear. They are making those who want to leave pay for their passage; and one Islander who was interested in leaving was told by the Argentines that there was no insurance cover, which seems clearly to be a pretext. It may be that the Argentines would not wish to see a mass exodus.

This is clearly a very difficult issue. We are giving further urgent consideration to how the Government should react to the fact that a considerable number of Islanders are now known to be interested in temporary evacuation. Mr Baker and his colleagues have been urged not to reveal this fact, and to weigh very carefully how they answer questions from the press on the subject.

#### The Future

The Islanders have not yet formulated any firm views about a long-term solution, after Argentine withdrawal. However, they believe that it would not be possible to revert to the former situation, with the gradual development of economic links with Argentina while Britain retained full sovereignty and administration.

Two main possibilities are being considered. One is an almost complete break with Argentina, with Britain providing a substantially enhanced defence capability, as well as all the necessary links for supplies and communications between the

/Falklands

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Falklands and the outside world. Some Islanders would welcome such a solution.

The other main possibility is that more consideration is now being given to some kind of 'lease-back' solution. However, there is no way of telling, under present circumstances, how widely either of these possibilities might be supported, after withdrawal.

*Yours ever.*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Francis Richards', written in a cursive style.

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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SECRET

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He B  
Argentina



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 April 1982

Dear Brian,

Falkland Islands: Telephone call by President Reagan

President Reagan telephoned the Prime Minister at 8.30 pm this evening. He said that he had wanted to give Mrs Thatcher an account of Mr. Haig's progress in Buenos Aires. Earlier in the day he had been discouraged by the reports. Now he did not know what the position was. Mr. Haig was still engaged in discussions with the Argentines. Meanwhile, the President wished to assure the Prime Minister that he well understood what efforts she had made to reach a compromise. He did not think she should be asked to go any further.

The Prime Minister said that when Mr. Haig had left London he had taken with him a fair and workable compromise. He was a good negotiator and we were very grateful to him.

President Reagan said that President Galtieri had adopted a more reasonable approach than hitherto. But when he resumed contact with the junta the Argentine position hardened. The President said that he had asked Mr. Haig to return to Washington if no progress was made on the proposals he had taken to Buenos Aires, because he did not think it would be reasonable to ask the Prime Minister to move further. He expressed sympathy with the British Government in the present difficult situation. He was "deeply interested in keeping this great relationship which we have".

I am copying this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever  
John Cole.

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>618</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Santiago telegram 170245Z dated 17 April 1982</i>	
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(29)

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PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERSTZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
} E.M.TSY

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Location

OO FCO DESKBY 171000Z

ADVANCE COPY

OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 171300Z

IMMEDIATE

GRS 300  
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DESKBY 171000Z  
FM CANBERRA 170800Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 163 OF 17 APRIL  
INFO WASHINGTON DESBY 171300Z

*Handwritten note:*  
H. S. Culler - see  
next page. H.S.

MPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MR FRASER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN NOW BEING TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

QUOTE I AM SURE THE WHOLE WORLD IS GRATEFUL FOR THE ENORMOUS EFFORTS WHICH YOU PERSONALLY, AND THROUGH AL HAIG, HAVE BEEN DEVOTING TO FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS. I RECOGNISE THE ISSUES OF HEMISPHERE RELATIONS WHICH FORM PART OF THE BASIS FOR THESE UNREMITTING EFFORTS. WHILE AT THE TIME OF WRITING I CAN NOT BE SURE OF THEIR OUTCOME I VERY MUCH HOPE FOR YOUR SUCCESS.

SHOULD YOUR BEST EFFORTS FAIL, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO ME OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE THAT EVERY ONE SHOULD BE CLEAR AS TO WHERE THE UNITED STATES STANDS. BRITAIN HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION. IT HAS RECEIVED THE MORAL AND PRACTICAL SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. ITS DEMAND THAT THE ARGENTINIAN FORCES WITHDRAW HAS BEEN SUPPORTED BY A RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. BRITAIN STANDS SUPPORTED BY THE COMMUNITY OF WESTERN NATIONS AS A VICTIM OF AN ACT BY A COUNTRY WHICH HAS OF ITS OWN VOLITION CHOSEN TO FOLLOW THE PATH OF AGGRESSIVE FORCE AND TO SET ASIDE THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

IN THE AFTERMATH OF A FAILURE OF AL HAIG'S EFFORTS MANY COUNTRIES WOULD WATCH TO SEE AND BE GUIDED BY THE STAND THE UNITED STATES TOOK. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD AMOUNT TO A SERIOUS BLOW TO WESTERN VALUES, AND TO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE ITSELF, IF THE UNITED STATES DID NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY SUPPORT BRITAIN. FOR QUITE OTHER REASONS THE ALLIANCE IS ALREADY FACING SERIOUS STRAINS AND IS DUE SHORTLY TO HOLD TWO MOST IMPORTANT MEETINGS. OVER THE YEARS BRITAIN HAS BEEN AMERICA'S CLOSEST ALLY. THE FUTURE COHESION OF OUR WESTERN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS WOULD BE AT STAKE.

I HOPE YOU DO NOT MIND THE BLUNT TERMS OF THIS MESSAGE, I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEND IT BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE TIES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND BRITAIN AND BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES SEMI COLON AND I FEEL THAT THE SITUATION IS FAR TOO SERIOUS FOR ME TO STAY SILENT. UNQUOTE.

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~~PS/MR ONSLOW~~

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

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SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLER

MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

MR McINTYRE

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IMMEDIATE

FM ROME 170935Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 168 OF 17 APR 82

INFO IMMEDIATE MADRID, BRUSSELS, BONN, WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS AND ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO.

SAVING FOR INFO OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, CANBERRA, MONTEVIDEO, BIS BUENOS AIRES, HOLY SEE (ACTIONED).

MY TELEGRAM NO. 167 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLAND ISLANDS

ARGENTINE MISSION

1. THE ARGENTINE DELEGATION VISITING ROME WAS FRANCISCO CERRO (PRESIDENT OF THE ARGENTINE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS), RAFAEL MARTINEZ RAYMONDA (PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS) AND JOSE DEHESA (PERONIST). THEY SAW PICCOLI (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT SECRETARY), RUMOR (PRESIDENT OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT WORLD UNION), THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI) LEADERSHIP, COLOMBO, AND MONS. SILVESTRINI. THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO ASK ITALY TO USE HER INFLUENCE IN THE EC AND HER LINKS WITH BOTH BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IN FAVOUR OF A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SOLUTION: THEY ALSO SET OUT ARGENTINA'S CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY IN STANDARD TERMS.

THEY ALSO SET OUT ARGENTINA'S CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY IN STANDARD TERMS. THEY SAID THAT AFTER THE INVASION THEY HAD TEMPORARILY BURIED THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH THE GALTIERI REGIME, AND HAD COME TO EUROPE ON A PEACE MISSION. THEIR NEXT STOPS ARE SAID TO BE MADRID, BRUSSELS AND BONN.

2. ALL THE ITALIANS THEY MET CONDEMNED ARGENTINA'S ACT OF AGGRESSION, AND STRESSED ITALY'S SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN AND COMMITMENT TO EC DECISIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THIS EXPOSITION OF THE ARGENTINE CASE WAS LISTENED TO WITH ATTENTION, AND THE POINT ABOUT ITALY'S STRONG LINKS WITH ARGENTINA WENT HOME. REPORTS OF DEMONSTRATIONS BY RIGHT-WING RESIDENT ITALIANS IN BUENOS AIRES AGAINST THE ITALIAN EMBASSY HAVE CAUSED CONCERN HERE, ALTHOUGH THE NUMBERS INVOLVED ARE SAID TO BE SMALL.

#### ITALIAN ATTITUDES

3. AFTER THE CALL ON COLOMBO, THE MFA ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT SAYING THAT THE EC'S INVOLVEMENT ON BRITAIN'S SIDE WAS FELT PARTICULARLY IN ITALY BECAUSE OF ITALY'S LINKS WITH ARGENTINA. IT ADDED THAT HAIG HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO ROME ON 14 APRIL, TO WHICH COLOMBO HAD REPLIED CONFIRMING ITALY'S FULL SUPPORT FOR THE U S PEACE INITIATIVE. BARBARANI OF THE MFA TOLD US THAT THIS DID NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE IN ITALY'S BASIC POSITION OF SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN. BUT HE WAS NERVOUS THAT IF SHOOTING STARTED THE PRESENT ALL-PARTY SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION COULD BEGIN TO CRUMBLE. BIG BUSINESS WOULD BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON BOTH THE DC AND PSI, AND THE ENORMOUS ITALIAN COMMUNITY IN ARGENTINA COULD FACE REPRISALS, QUITE APART FROM THE ITALIAN EMBASSY ITSELF. TODAY'S PAPERS REPORT THAT AN ITALIAN CONSORTIUM HAS BEEN STRUCK OFF THE LIST OF TENDERERS FOR A PIPELINE PROJECT.

4. BOTTAI TOLD ME THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD HAD A REAL BATTLE WITH THE PSI ON 15 APRIL OVER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. ITALY'S ASSENT TO THE EC WRITTEN PROCEDURE HAD AS A RESULT BEEN COMMUNICATED TO BRUSSELS A FEW HOURS AFTER THE DEADLINE. ALTHOUGH THE MATTER WAS NOW SETTLED THE GOVERNMENT'S DIFFICULTIES WERE NOT OVER. THE SOCIALISTS WERE OPPOSED TO SANCTIONS IN PRINCIPLE, BELIEVING THEM TO BE INEFFECTIVE. BOTTAI WANTED ME TO KNOW HOW DIFFICULT A CLASH THIS HAD BEEN FOR THE GOVERNMENT.

5. THE ARGENTINE DELEGATION HAS CLEARLY HAD SOME IMPACT ON THE SOCIALISTS. OUR CONTACTS IN THE MFA AND PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ARE NERVOUS ABOUT FUTURE SOCIALIST ATTITUDES, THOUGH SPADOLINI HIMSELF IS SAID TO BE LESS SO. YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING DISCUSSED THE FALKLANDS, AND THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTERWARDS EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REMAIN IN FORCE FOR THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME AND THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION CAN ENABLE THEM TO BE REVOKED. YESTERDAY A SOCIALIST PARTY NOTE ARGUED THAT, WHILE IT WAS RIGHT FOR ITALY TO IMPOSE AN ARMS EMBARGO, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AT





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686 - 1

OO WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 212

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FM FCO 171800Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE LIMA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 71 OF 17 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNOS 90, 91 AND 95: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. WE AGREE THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE PERUVIAN WISH NOT TO COME DOWN TOO SOLIDLY ON THE SIDE OF ARGENTINA. BUT WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL FOR A TRUCE, WHICH AS IT STANDS WOULD SIMPLY HAVE THE EFFECT OF CONFIRMING THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

2. WE HAVE CONSIDERED YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT AGREE TO THE TRUCE PROPOSAL ON CONDITION THAT THE ARGENTINES WITHDREW THEIR TROOPS. HOWEVER, APART FROM THE FACT THAT THE TRUCE SUGGESTION WOULD SCARCELY BE RELEVANT ONCE WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPLETED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SAY NOTHING WHICH WOULD IMPLY THAT THE FLEET WOULD BE HALTED.

3. SINCE THE SECOND PERUVIAN MESSAGE HAS NOW BEEN CIRCULATED IN THE UN (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 476), WE ACCEPT THE NEED FOR A REPLY. THIS IS IN MY FIRST IFT. UKMIS NEW YORK HAVE DISCRETION TO CIRCULATE IT.

4. THE PERSONAL MESSAGE WHICH DR ARIAS HAS NOW SENT ME (YOUR TELNO 95) DOES NOT REFER TO THE TRUCE PROPOSAL. IT WOULD SEEM BEST TO GIVE THIS A RATHER FULLER RESPONSE. PLEASE THEREFORE ALSO DELIVER A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS IN MY SECOND IFT.

PYM

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

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SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
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TREASURY

MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

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679 - 1

OO WASHINGTON  
OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 195  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 171646Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE LIMA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 OF 17 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY FIRST IPT: TEXT OF REPLY TO PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT'S MESSAGE  
BEGINS.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT APPRECIATE AND SHARE THE CONCERN OF THE  
PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE  
SITUATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS HAS BEEN THEIR  
CONSISTENT OBJECTIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS ISSUE WHICH  
HAVE HITHERTO BEEN PURSUED WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OVER  
MANY YEARS. THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE FALKLAND  
ISLANDS HAS SINCE DEMONSTRATED THEIR OWN DISREGARD FOR  
THE PATH OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT IS  
THEREFORE THAT ARGENTINE FORCES MUST WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLAND  
ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATORY  
RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WITH  
ARGENTINA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. ONLY  
WHEN THIS WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES HAS BEEN COMPLETED WILL THE RIGHT  
CONDITIONS EXIST FOR A NEGOTIATED  
SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HOPE THAT THE  
PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO LEND THEIR SUPPORT TO THE  
ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE. ENDS.

PYM

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MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

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OO LIMA

GRS 417

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FM FCO 171700Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE LIMA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 73 OF 17 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY SECOND IPT: TEXT OF MY REPLY TO PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM

PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

BEGINS.

I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EXCELLENCY'S PERSONAL MESSAGE WHICH OUR AMBASSADOR HAS CONVEYED TO ME. I APPRECIATE AND SHARE YOUR CONCERN TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS IS INDEED WHAT WE ARE MAKING ALL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE IN THE PRESENT GRAVE CIRCUMSTANCES: JUST AS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE FALKLANDS ISSUE HAS BEEN OUR CONSISTENT OBJECTIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE HITHERTO BEEN PURSUED WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OVER MANY YEARS.

THE FACT IS HOWEVER THAT THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAS DEMONSTRATED THEIR OWN DISREGARD FOR THE PATH OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION. THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (TO WHICH YOUR EXCELLENCY REFERS) HAS SINCE SIGNALLED THEIR REJECTION OF THE CLEAR AND URGENT WISHES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE FIRST AND ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICT IS THEREFORE THAT ARGENTINE FORCES MUST WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S MANDATORY RESOLUTION AND WITH ARGENTINA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. ONLY WHEN THIS WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES HAS BEEN COMPLETED WILL THE CONDITIONS EXIST FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS AND FOR FOR A NEGOTIATED AND LASTING SETTLEMENT TO THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. THIS MUST BE THE CONTEXT FOR THE URGENT EFFORTS THAT ARE CURRENTLY BEING MADE TO RESOLVE THE PRESENT SITUATION. YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL, I KNOW, SHARE MY CONVICTION THAT UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC WISHES OF A SMALL

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AND PEACEFUL POPULATION CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONDONED WITHOUT  
POSING GRAVE DANGERS FOR THE BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

I WISH TO REITERATE MY SINCERE APPRECIATION OF THE INTEREST AND  
CONCERN SHOWN BY YOU PERSONALLY AND BY YOUR GOVERNMENT. THE  
SUPPORT OF THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE INVALUABLE IN  
SECURING THE OBJECTIVES WHICH I HAVE DESCRIBED. ENDS.

IN HANDING THIS OVER, PLEASE THANK THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT FOR  
THEIR EFFORTS, BUT MAKE CLEAR THE TO ACCEPT A TIME WOULD SIMPLY  
HAVE THE EFFECT OF CONFIRMING THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION OF THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND SAY THAT WE THINK IT RIGHT THAT THE DIPLOMATIC  
EFFORTS IN SEEKING A SOLUTION TO THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM ARE BEST  
CONCENTRATED ON THE GOOD OFFICES CURRENTLY BY MR HAIG.

PYM

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MR FULLER D/c CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

2  
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573  
[Handwritten mark]

OO PARIS DESKBY 180900Z

GRS 235

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DESKBY 180900Z

FM FCO 171700Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 176 OF 17 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY BONN 180900Z. ROME

FALKLANDS: REPORTING ON ARGENTINA

1. SINCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES, WE HAVE BEEN WITHOUT THE USUAL FIRST-HAND REPORTING OF DEVELOPMENTS THERE.
2. PLEASE URGENTLY ASK THE QUAI IF THEY WOULD SHARE WITH US THE INFORMATION THEY ARE RECEIVING FROM THEIR EMBASSY WHICH IS RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE MOOD OF THE JUNTA, THE PUBLIC VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT, THE DEGREE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR GALTIERI, THE REACTIONS TO OUR PRESSURES, DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, AND THE STATE OF THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY FOLLOWING THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UK, FRANCE AND OTHERS.
3. WE ARE AWARE THAT THE QUAI MAY FEEL THAT WE HAVE NOT ADEQUATELY BEEN TAKING THEM INTO OUR OWN CONFIDENCE, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE HAIG DISCUSSIONS. IF THIS IS RAISED, PLEASE SAY THAT WE SHALL TELL THEM ALL WE CAN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. BUT HOPE THEY WILL UNDERSTAND HOW VERY DELICATE THE SITUATION IS REGARDING THE TALKS, AND THAT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PROSPECT OF SECURING A PEACEFUL OUTCOME, WHICH WE WOULD OF COURSE MUCH PREFER, WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY REVEALING AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE NOW ABOUT THE ACTUAL DETAILS OF THE DISCUSSIONS: THIS VIEW IS SHARED BY HAIG.
4. BONN AND ROME PLEASE TAKE SIMILAR ACTION

PYM

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

- PS/CHANCELLOR
- SIR K COUZENS
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MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

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UNCLASSIFIED

672 - 1

OO BIS BUENOS AIRES (VIA BERNE)

GRS 50

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 171400Z

FROM FCO 171205Z 82

TO IMMEDIATE BIS BUENOS AIRES

TELEGRAM NUMBER 21 OF 17 APRIL

FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY MONTEVIDEO

OUR TELNO 19 OF 16 APRIL: MISSING JOURNALISTS

1. SUNDAY TIMES HAVE HEARD JOURNALISTS ARE BEING TRANSFERRED  
TO BUENOS AIRES.

2. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CONFIRM.

PYM

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

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MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

RESTRICTED

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GR 6p  
RESTRICTED  
FM MONTEVIDEO 172348Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE BERNE - FOR BIS BUENOS AIRES  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 001 OF 17 APRIL  
INFO FCO

YOUR TELNO 19 TO BIS BUENOS AIRES: MISSING JOURNALISTS

1. ISOBEL HILTON OF SUNDAY TIMES TOLD MACKENZIE AT 1500Z TODAY THAT JOURNALISTS WERE BEING HELD IN USHUAIA. HILTON CONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS THAT THREE WERE ARRESTED FOR PHOTOGRAPHING SHIPS IN NAVAL DOCK IN USHUAIA. THEY ARE TO APPEAR IN COURT ON 19 APRIL, AND HILTON SAID SHE WAS TRAVELLING TO USHUAIA ON 17/18 APRIL TO REPRESENT SUNDAY TIMES.

2. MACKENZIE ADVISED HER TO CONTACT YOU ON TRANSIT THROUGH BUENOS AIRES.

HUTCHINSON

Repetition to BIS BUENOS AIRES  
referred for departmental decision,  
repeated as requested to other posts.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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ADDITIONAL DIST:  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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DE DIP

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 171705Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1333 OF 17 APRIL

MIPT : FALKLANDS

1. CLARK SAID THAT GALTIERI AND COSTA-MENDEZ HAD BEEN COMPLETELY OVERRULED BY THE JUNTA WHO ARE MAKING QUITE UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS. HE HAD THEREFORE SENT HAIG INSTRUCTIONS AT 2 AM THIS MORNING TO HAVE A MEETING WITH THE JUNTA, LEAVE THEM IN ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THE AMERICANS REALISED WHICH SIDE WAS BEING INTRANSIGENT AND WHICH SIDE THEY WOULD BE ON IF THE TALKS BROKE DOWN. IF THE JUNTA REMAINED ADAMANT, HAIG WAS TO RETURN HOME IMMEDIATELY. IT WOULD BE THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. CLARK DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE TIMETABLE WOULD BE FOR INDICATING TO THE WORLD THE US VIEW ABOUT WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE TALKS; NOR WHEN OR IN WHAT FORM THE AMERICANS WOULD INDICATE THAT HENCEFORTH THEY WERE ENTIRELY ON OUR SIDE.

3 CLARK EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN AT THE STORY ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE NEW YORK TIMES TODAY THAT BRITISH OPINION IS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE AMERICANS FOR THEIR NEUTRAL STANCE. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THIS BECAUSE AMERICA WAS HELPING IN ALL SORTS OF WAYS BUT HAD TO REMAIN NEUTRAL IN PUBLIC WHILE THE TALKS WERE GOING ON.

4. I REPLIED THAT THE NEW YORK TIMES GAVE A FAITHFUL ACCOUNT OF BRITISH OPINION. THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND MANY

AGAINST ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND WERE PREPARED TO TAKE STEPS ACCORDINGLY; IT WAS AGAINST THIS STAUNCH SUPPORT THAT THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE LOOKED HIGHLY DISAPPOINTING.

5. I ADDED THAT THE STATE OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IF THERE IS ANY SUGGESTION OF THE AMERICANS GOING BACK TO LONDON AND URGING US TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I SAID THAT ANYTHING LIKE THIS WOULD BE QUITE OUT OF THE QUESTION. THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE ARGENTINES WAS SUCH THAT THEY WOULD NEVER MOVE UNTIL THE AMERICANS MADE CLEAR WHICH SIDE THEY WERE ON AND THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND WERE READY TO TAKE ALL MANNER OF STEPS AGAINST THE ARGENTINES.
6. CLARK ASSURED ME THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO GET THE PRIME MINISTER TO MAKE ANY FURTHER MOVE. HE WAS FULLY AWARE THAT IT WAS THE ARGENTINES WHO WERE MAKING THE NEGOTIATIONS IMPOSSIBLE.
7. CLARK SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WORRIED THAT ANY ALTERNATIVE ARGENTINE REGIME WOULD BE A COMMUNIST ONE. I SAID THAT IF THE ARGENTINES SUCCEEDED IN THEIR PRESENT ENTERPRISE THE SOVIETS WOULD TAKE CREDIT FOR IT AND HAVE AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POSITION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.
8. CLARK SPOKE ABOUT THE OLD ALLIANCE AND US/UK RELATIONS. I SAID THAT THESE WERE CERTAINLY IMPORTANT BUT WHAT WAS AT ISSUE WAS A MATTER OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE US. IF THE ARGENTINES GOT AWAY WITH VICTORIOUS AGGRESSION THERE WOULD BE ENHANCED INSTABILITY THROUGHOUT THE HEMISPHERE. CLARK SAID HE AGREED AND ADDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE.
9. CLARK EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DAMAGE THAT ARGENTINE AIR POWER MIGHT DO TO OUR FORCES. HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC BUT IS REFLECTING QUITE A WIDESPREAD VIEW IN WASHINGTON THAT THE ARGENTINES CAN BE A SERIOUS THREAT TO US FROM THE AIR.
10. CLARK ALSO SAID IN ANSWER TO MY ENQUIRY THAT THE SOURCE OF THE STORY THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST US IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WAS A PIECE OF CUBAN INTELLIGENCE. ACCORDING TO THIS THE SOVIETS HAD ASSURED THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SINK ONE OF OUR SHIPS IF THEY WANTED. I SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT WELL BE A PIECE OF DISINFORMATION AND THAT ON THE FACE OF IT IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THE RUSSIANS WOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN

OF IT IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THE RUSSIANS WOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN DIRECT ACTION WITH A MEMBER OF NATO IN THE ATLANTIC. CLARK AGREED. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PROVIDING THE ARGENTINES WITH INTELLIGENCE ABOUT OUR FLEET MOVEMENTS.

11. WE NOW WAIT TO SEE THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING GOING ON BETWEEN HAIG AND THE JUNTA. IF THAT FAILS TO MOVE THE ARGENTINES, THE AMERICANS WILL IMMEDIATELY CONSIDER THE WAY IN WHICH THEY DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE COMING DOWN FIRMLY ON OUR SIDE. I SAID TO CLARK THAT WE WOULD EXPECT THEM TO DO NO LESS THAN THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY AND AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. I AM NOT SURE THAT HE TOOK THIS IN COMPLETELY AND IT IS SOMETHING THAT WE MAY HAVE TO TAKE UP WITH HIM AGAIN VERY SHORTLY, DEPENDING UPON DEVELOPMENTS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

*Mufaxed 1840 17/4 24*

PS

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

ADVANCE COPY

PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RIEKIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

**FLASH**

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
*Dio*

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 171635Z APR 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 1332 OF 17 APRIL

FALKLAND ISLANDS

- 1 HAVE SEEN CLARK AT THE WHITE HOUSE WHO HAS BEEN UP ALL NIGHT.
2. HAIG IS HAVING A LAST ROUND WITH THE JUNTA ON THE BASIS OF VERY TOUGH INSTRUCTIONS. IF, AS THE AMERICANS EXPECT, THIS COMES TO NOTHING, HE WILL RETURN HOME IMMEDIATELY.
3. THE AMERICANS WILL THEN STATE QUITE CLEARLY WHICH SIDE THEY ARE ON.
- 4 THE PRESIDENT WILL BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND PERHAPS TELEPHONING HER, THOUGH THE LATTER CANNOT BE SECURE. PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T.

HENDERSON



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>618</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Santiago telegram 170245Z dated 17 April 1982 (folio 23)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>1 March 2012 C. Wayland</i>
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Use the card for one piece/item number only

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FM USDEL BUENOS AIRES

TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6710

BT

SECRET USDEL BUENOS AIRES SECTO 6034

NIACT IMMEDIATE

22

18 APR 82

TOR: 0542

CN 41849

CHRG: STA

Action: DCM 5+2D/ETB

NODIS

*MR. McCormick notified*  
0710 L.

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 (4/17/12 -HAIG, ALEXANDER)

TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER)

SUBJECT: FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISES

1. SECRET -ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCIS:

BASED ON THE UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE WHICH I RECEIVED AND SENT TO YOU LAST NIGHT (FRIDAY), I THREATENED TO BREAK OFF THIS PROCESS. AS A RESULT, I WAS INVITED TO MEET WITH THE JUNTA, AND SPENT TWO HOURS WITH THEM THIS MORNING (SATURDAY). THE CHARACTER OF THE GROUP IS ESSENTIALLY AS I IMAGINED: GALTIERI IS THE LEAST BRIGHT AND GIVEN TO BLUSTER; THE ADMIRAL IS LUTRA HARD-LINE; THE AIR FORCE GENERAL IS BRIGHT. POLITICAL REASONABLE--REALTIVELY SPEAKING--BUT CLEARLY THIRD IN INFLUENCE.

3. I IMPRESSED ON THESE MEN IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT BRITISH RESOLVE WAS BEYOND DOUBT, AND THAT THEY WERE ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH MILITARY HUMILIATION AND ECONOMIC RUIN. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE ADMIRAL

--WHOSE DEFINITION OF GLORY HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY SUCCESS--

--I WOULD SAY THESE MEN ARE WORRIED. THEY ARE FEELING THE PRESSURE OF YOUR FLEET, THOUGH IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR YOU TO ASSUME THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO FIGHT.

4. THE JUNTA URGED ME TO STAY AND TRY TO "SOLVE THE PROBLEM" WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. IN HOPES THAT THEY WOULD IMPART FLEXIBILITY TO THEIR NEGOTIATORS I AGREED TO DO SO. THE TEN-HOUR SESSION THAT ENSUED WAS EXCRUTIATINGLY DIFFICULT. WE SPENT MOST OF THAT TIME ON THE LANGUAGE DEALING WITH THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DEFINITIVE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. YOUR LANGUAGE WAS REJECTED OUT OF HAND. I PRESSED UPON THEM LANGUAGE THAT AVOIDS REJUDGING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WHILE PRESERVING WHAT YOU MUST HAVE WITH REGARD TO THE RIGHTS OF THE ISLANDERS. THE

ARGENTINES ARE NOW DEVELOPING A NEW FORMULATION BUT I EXPECT IT WILL BE PREGNANT WITH THE CONCEPT OF ASSURED ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY.

5. THE ISSUE OF TRAVEL, TRADE, ETC., IN THE INTERIM PERIOD WAS ALSO HOTLY CONTESTED. THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT UNLESS IT INVOLVES A CLEAR PROSPECT OF GENUINE PROMOTION OF VARIOUS FORMS OF INTER ACTION, WITH THE NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER FEARS COULD OCCUR.

6. WE ARE ALSO ENCOUNTERING DIFFICULTY ON THE QUESTION OF INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, THOUGH THE INTEGRITY OF THE IDEA WE DISCUSSED IN LONDON HAS BEEN MAINTAINED.

7. FINALLY, THOUGH WE DID NOT DISCUSS IT AT LENGTH, THERE WAS A DEFINITE FORESHADOWING OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT --I.E. STOPPING THE FLEET AND REMOVING THE SUBMARINES. I THINK THIS MATTER CAN BE SETTLED IN TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE UK. THOUGH NOT WITHOUT MORE FLEXIBILITY THAN I ENCOUNTERED IN LONDON. ALL IN ALL, AS OF NOW THE SITUATION IS GRIM. I WILL RECEIVE A NEW ARGENTINE TEXT DURING THE NIGHT AND THEN DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO BREAK OFF.

8. I WILL ONLY CONSIDER COMING TO LONDON IF THE ARGENTINES GIVE ME A TEXT THAT GOES WELL BEYOND THEIR POSITION TODAY. I DO NOT WANT TO SHIFT THE SPOTLIGHT ONTO YOU IF IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINE PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE. EVEN IF I DO NOT COME TO LONDON, I WILL OF COURSE SEND YOU THE ARGENTINE TEXT.

9. IF I SUSPEND MY MISSION TOMORROW MORNING I WILL LEAVE NO DOUBT WHERE LIES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMPASSE.

WARM REGARDS,  
AL

END TEXT.  
BAIG

SECRET/NODIS

USDEL BA 6034

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29) (35) FLASH

FLASH

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~~PS/IPS~~  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RIFKIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

*referred* 1710  
1714

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

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HD/CONS D

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
*Sir Robert Armstrong, Cab Off.*  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER ~~SAPU~~ CABINET OFFICE  
DIO

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff) ~~MOD Siteen and CinC Fleet.~~

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MONTEVIDEO 171420Z APRIL 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 144 OF 17 APRIL  
AND TO FLASH MODUK AND TO FLASH MOD AIR

1. SWISS EMBASSY HERE INFORMED US AT 1400Z THAT THEY HAD HEARD FROM SWISS AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES THAT QUOTE TWENTY-TWO MARINES AND SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA WOULD BE ARRIVING IN MONTEVIDEO TODAY OR THIS EVENING UNQUOTE.
2. GRATEFUL DETAILS VC 10 FLIGHT FOR CLEARANCE SOONEST.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT /RECD AT 171425Z SF/BTM

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

*My faxed 12 noon*  
~~31~~ 31  
(29)

PS  
~~PS/SPS~~  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
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MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST ✓  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER ) H.M.TSY  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD  
*Hd/SPD*  
RESIDENT CLERK

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
*Sir R. Armstrong Cab Office*  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER ~~SAPU~~ CABINET OFFICE  
*DIO*

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CANBERRA 1700Z

00 FCO DESKBY 171000Z

00 WASHINGTON DESKBY 171300Z

GRS 380  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 171000Z  
FM CANBERRA 170800Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 163 OF 17 APRIL  
INFO WASHINGTON DESBY 171300Z

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MR FRASER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN NOW BEING TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

QUOTE I AM SURE THE WHOLE WORLD IS GRATEFUL FOR THE ENORMOUS EFFORTS WHICH YOU PERSONALLY, AND THROUGH AL HAIG, HAVE BEEN DEVOTING TO FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS I RECOGNISE THE ISSUES OF HEMISPHERE RELATIONS WHICH FORM PART OF THE BASIS FOR THESE UNREMITTING EFFORTS. WHILE AT THE TIME OF WRITING I CAN NOT BE SURE OF THEIR OUTCOME I VERY MUCH HOPE FOR YOUR SUCCESS.

SHOULD YOUR BEST EFFORTS FAIL, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO ME OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE THAT EVERY ONE SHOULD BE CLEAR AS TO WHERE THE UNITED STATES STANDS. BRITAIN HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION. IT HAS RECEIVED THE MORAL AND PRACTICAL SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. ITS DEMAND THAT THE ARGENTINIAN FORCES WITHDRAW HAS BEEN SUPPORTED BY A RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. BRITAIN STANDS SUPPORTED BY THE COMMUNITY OF WESTERN NATIONS AS A VICTIM OF AN ACT BY A COUNTRY WHICH HAS OF ITS OWN VOLITION CHOSEN TO FOLLOW THE PATH OF AGGRESSIVE FORCE AND TO SET ASIDE THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

IN THE AFTERMATH OF A FAILURE OF AL HAIG'S EFFORTS MANY COUNTRIES WOULD WATCH TO SEE AND BE GUIDED BY THE STAND THE UNITED STATES TOOK. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD AMOUNT TO A SERIOUS BLOW TO WESTERN VALUES, AND TO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE ITSELF, IF THE UNITED STATES DID NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY SUPPORT BRITAIN. FOR QUITE OTHER REASONS THE ALLIANCE IS ALREADY FACING SERIOUS STRAINS AND IS DUE SHORTLY TO HOLD TWO MOST IMPORTANT MEETINGS. OVER THE YEARS BRITAIN HAS BEEN AMERICA'S CLOSEST ALLY. THE FUTURE COHESION OF OUR WESTERN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS WOULD BE AT STAKE.

I HOPE YOU DO NOT MIND THE BLUNT TERMS OF THIS MESSAGE, I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEND IT BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE TIES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND BRITAIN AND BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES SEMI COLON AND I FEEL THAT THE SITUATION IS FAR TOO SERIOUS FOR ME TO STAY SILENT. UNQUOTE.

MASON

No 10

Mufard 0015

18/4

(103)

WONFO 33/17

00 F C O

GRS 300

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 171745Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1335 OF 17 APRIL 82.

Action

MY TELNO 1333 : FALKLANDS

THE NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE (PARA 3 OF TUR) IS BY RATTNER. UNDER THE HEADING "US HANDLING OF FALKLAND CRISIS STIRS DEEP RESENTMENT IN BRITAIN", RATTNER SAYS A BROAD CROSS SECTION OF BRITAINS HAVE BEEN OFFENDED BY LACK OF MORE OVERT SUPPORT FROM SENIOR AMERICANS, INCLUDING REAGAN AND HAIG, WITH THE GREATEST OUTRAGE BEING RESERVED FOR JEANE KIRKPATRICK - EVEN BEFORE THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, RATTNER WRITES, THE US STOOD LOW IN BRITISH OPINION AS MEASURED BY THE POLLS AND HE QUOTS A MOI POLL SHOWING THAT 28 PERCENT OF BRITONS HAVE A LOWER OPINION OF REAGAN AS A RESULT OF US HANDLING OF THE FALKLANDS.

2. RATTNER SAYS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO DEFUSE THE RISING BRITISH UNHAPPINESS WITH AMERICAN POLICY BUT NOTES THAT, WHILE ROBUST EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT BY EG SENATOR MOYNIHAN, HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED, HAIGS DESCRIPTION OF BRITAIN AS AMERICA'S CLOSEST ALLY PRODUCED A MIXED REACTION OF BITTERNESS AND IRONY. RATTNER CONCLUDES THAT, TO MANY IN BRITAIN, THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE IS REMINISCENT OF SUEZ, HE QUOTES THE TIMES AS SAYING THAT BRITAIN WILL DRAW UNFAVOURABLE CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FUTURE IF THE US REMAINS UNCOMMITTED AND LINKS THIS TO EXISTING PUBLIC UNHAPPINESS AT US DEFENCE POLICY AND AT THE NUMBER OF US MILITARY BASES IN BRITAIN.

3. A SHORT ARTICLE IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST COVERS SIMILAR GROUND BUT SUGGESTS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THE US TO BEHAVE LIKE AN ALLY IF THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE DETERIARATES.

HENDERSON

TYPISTS

*Mufaxed* 1400  
1714

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS

ADVANCE COPY

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RYKIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD  
HD/CESD  
RESIDENT CLERK

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
*DIO*

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 171146Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 203 OF 17 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, HAVANA, UKDEL NATO,  
PRIORITY PARIS, BONN

WASHINGTON TEL NO 1288 TO FCO : FALKLANDS : SOVIET ATTITUDE

1. SINCE SENDING MY TEL NO 201 (NOT TO ALL) I HAVE SEEN TUR REPORTING AMERICAN FEARS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BECOME MILITARILY INVOLVED IN THE CRISIS SHOULD ANGLO/ARGENTINE HOSTILITIES RESUME.
2. THE ODDS MUST BE STRONGLY AGAINST AMERICAN FEARS BEING REALISED IN ANY OVERT OR DIRECT WAY. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROVIDE, FOR EXAMPLE, OPEN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ARGENTINA, STILL LESS ACTUALLY LINE UP ALONGSIDE THE ARGENTINE NAVY AGAINST OUR TASK FORCE. WERE THEY TO DO SO, IT WOULD BE THE MOST RADICAL DEPARTURE IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE CUBA CRISIS, DELIBERATELY PUTTING THE SOVIET UNION ON A MILITARY COLLISION

CONSIDERABLELY PUTTING THE SOVIET UNION ON A MILITARY COLLISION COURSE WITH A MAJOR EUROPEAN NATO POWER AND THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN RECENT YEARS HAS DESERVED TO BE CALLED ADVENTURIST, THE SOVIET-BACKED INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA AND SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WERE CARRIED OUT ON THE CORRECT CALCULATION THAT THESE WOULD NOT PROVOKE AN OPEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE US. SEEN FROM HERE, NO SUCH CALCULATION COULD SAFELY BE ADVANCED TO JUSTIFY DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION ON ARGENTINA'S SIDE.

3. IF THE ARGENTINIANS COULD SWALLOW IT, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD BECOME MORE UNHOLY THROUGH A MORE ACTIVE CUBAN ROLE ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE, INTENDED TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS AT ONE REMOVE FROM THE ACTION. BUT THIS WOULD BE AN EQUALLY HIGH-RISK POLICY, OPENING THE DOOR TO US/SOVIET CONFRONTATION ALMOST AS FAR AS DIRECT SOVIET INTERVENTION.

To  
4. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT, AS SIR N HENDERSON HAS RIGHTLY POINTED OUT IN TUR, THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT TRY SOME FLESH-CREEPING TO TEST OUR NERVE AND THAT OF THE US. THE FIRST SIGNS OF THIS HAVE BEGUN TO APPEAR IN CHARACTERISTIC FASHION IN THE SOVIET PRESS. LAST NIGHT'S IZVESTIA CARRIED A REPORT OF A STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES WOULD LEAD TO A "GREATER COMPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND POSSIBLY TO NUCLEAR CONFLICT". PRAVDA THIS MORNING CARRIES A MORE ALARMIST VERSION OF THE STATEMENT: "THE CONFLICT CAN QUICKLY BEGIN TO SPREAD, DRAWING IN OTHER PARTICIPANTS AND LEADING TO A GENERAL CONFRONTATION IN WHICH THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NOT EXCLUDED".

5. MIPT, REPORTING MY CALL THIS MORNING ON THE MFA TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TEL NO 460 (NOT TO OTHERS), CONTAINS THE FORMAL DENIAL BY SEMEONOV, DEPUTY HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE HELPING THE ARGENTINES WITH THE PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE ON THE BRITISH FLEET. EVEN IF TRUE, IT MAY NOT BE SO IN THE FUTURE, AND AS THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 4 OF MY TEL NO 201 SUGGESTS, PUBLIC OPINION HERE, SUCH AS IT IS, HAS BEEN TO SOME EXTENT PREPARED FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO PROVIDE SOMETHING MORE THAN PROPAGANDA SUPPORT TO THE ARGENTINIANS TO BALANCE ALLEGED ANGLO/AMERICAN COLLUSION. THIS POSSIBILITY CANNOT THEREFORE BE EXCLUDED, THOUGH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY AT THIS STAGE WHAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DECIDE. THE HIGH POLITICAL RISKS APART, THE SCOPE FOR COVERT OR INDIRECT MILITARY SUPPLIES LOOKS LIMITED BECAUSE OF THE APPARENT INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE SOVIET AND ARGENTINE INVENTORIES. THERE COULD BE SOME KIND OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO HELP DEFRAY THE COSTS OF THE



ARGENTINE INVENTORIES. THERE COULD BE SOME KIND OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO HELP DEFRAY THE COSTS OF ANY WAR AND OF THE EC'S EMBARGO, ALTHOUGH WHAT WE KNOW OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION AT THE PRESENT TIME WOULD MAKE ANYTHING MORE THAN PROVISION OF A TOKEN AMOUNT OF AID AN UNATTRACTIVE OPTION FOR THEM.

6. TO SUM UP: THE RUSSIANS HAVE A STRONG MATERIAL INTEREST IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. (THIS HAS BEEN UNDERLINED BY THE GRATUITOUS APPEARANCE ON TASS YESTERDAY, SOME DAYS AFTER HIS RETURN, OF AN INTERVIEW WITH MANZHULO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE, ON THE RECENT SOVIET/ARGENTINE MIXED COMMISSION IN BUENOS AIRES: THIS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.) FURTHERMORE THE FALKLANDS CRISIS HAS THROWN UP, IN THE SHAPE OF A POSSIBLE OPENING INTO ARGENTINA, AND INTO LATIN AMERICA GENERALLY, A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAVE FOUND TOO TEMPTING TO LET PASS. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY CONSIDER THE PRIZE SO GLITTERING, OR THE THREAT TO THEIR GRAIN SUPPLIES SO GREAT, AS TO JUSTIFY THE RISK OF OPEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH U.S. WHICH, SUBJECT TO SIR N HENDERSON'S VIEWS, WOULD SEEM THE ALMOST INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE. THIS SAID, IF HOSTILITIES WITH ARGENTINA APPEAR IMMINENT, WE SHOULD FASTEN OUR SEAT BELTS TO FACE AN ESCALATION IN THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, WHICH IS VERY LIKELY TO CONTAIN A STRONG NOTE OF MENACE.

BROOKE TURNER

CCN PARA 4 LINE 1 "THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT ....."

CCN PARA 6 LINE 3 " THE GRATUITOUS....."

NNNN

*Manufactured* (420) 17/4 TYPISTS  
ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

34  
(29)  
[Bcd K131  
171155Z]

PS (6)  
~~PS/...~~ Ps/Mr. Hurd  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RIEKIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.  
PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD  
Hd ESS  
RESIDENT CLERK

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER ~~SAPU~~ CABINET OFFICE  
DIO

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

*Then to Typists*  
[D/By 171145Z]

LL0 195/17

00 F C O DESKBY 171145Z

00 WASHINGTON

00 UKMIS NEW YORK

00 UKDEL NATO

PP PARIS

PP BONN

GRS 1040

CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 171145Z APRIL 82  
FM MOSCOW 171000Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 17TH APRIL  
FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS AND BONN

F C O TELNO 460 (NOT TO ALL); FALKLAND ISLANDS: SOVIET ATTITUDE.

1. I CALLED THIS MORNING ON SEMEONOV, DEPUTY HEAD OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT IN THE MFA, TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TUR. INDICATING THAT MY CALL WAS A NATURAL FOLLOW-UP TO MY EARLIER NOTIFICATION OF THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE, I READ, AND GAVE SEMEONOV ON A PERSONAL BASIS, A SPEAKING NOTE CONTAINING THE LANGUAGE IN PARA 2 OF TUR. SEMEONOV UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS IMMEDIATELY TO HIGHER AUTHORITY.

2. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION COVERED THE SUBJECTS BELOW, THE FIRST THREE OF WHICH SEMEONOV RAISED IN RESPONSE TO MY SPEAKING NOTE.  
A. RETURN OF THE ISLANDS TO BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. SEMEONOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THAT THIS INTENTION ACCOUNTED TO AN ATTEMPT TO RETURN THE FALKLANDS TO A COLONIAL STATUS AND THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY READ FROM A MANUSCRIPT NOTE A FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION:

'' WE CONSIDER IMPERMISSIBLE THE ATTEMPTS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM TO RE-ESTABLISH COLONIAL STATUS AND WE OPENLY OPPOSE SUCH ATTEMPTS. WE QUALIFY THEM AS CONTRADICTORY TO THE DECISION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DECOLONISATION OF THESE ISLANDS AND AS CREATING A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY''.

IN REPLY I STRESSED THAT BRITAIN HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH RIGHT UP TO AND BEYOND THE NEW YORK MEETING IN FEBRUARY AND IN SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS. THROUGHOUT WE HAD BEEN GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF DETERMINATION AND THE PARAMOUNTRY OF THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS.

B. UN CHARTER ARTICLE 51.

SEMEONOV DISPUTED THAT BRITAIN HAD FULL RIGHTS TO USE FORCE. IT WOULD CREATE A SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE. SEMEONOV CLAIMED TO FIND AMBIGUITIES IN YOUR SPEECH IN THE COMMONS ON 14 APRIL OVER THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER ARTICLE 51 WAS BEING INVOKED FOR THE DEFENCE OF BRITAIN OR THE DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I SAID I HAD NOTED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENTS ATTITUDE TOWARDS ARTICLE 51. I HAD READ THAT ARTICLE AGAIN AND WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT IT COVERED THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE WITHOUT MAKING DISTINCTIONS ABOUT WHAT PORTION OF TERRITORY HAD BEEN ATTACKED. THE PEOPLE LIVING ON THE FALKLANDS HAD BEEN

HAD BEEN ATTACKED. THE PEOPLE LIVING ON THE FALKLANDS HAD BEEN BRITISH FOR 150 YEARS, AND WISHED TO REMAIN SO. IT WAS FOR THEM THAT WE WOULD EVOKE ARTICLE 51. THE PRINCIPLE THAT FORCE COULD BE USED WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS WAS ONE WHICH BRITAIN AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES DID NOT WANT ACCEPTED. I THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION TOO WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE IT ENDORSED.

#### C. BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY.

SEMEONOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED BRITAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONFLICT BECAUSE ITS PROCRASTINATION OVER 17 YEARS HAD LED TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. I SAID I FOUND HIS COMMENT VERY DISAPPOINTING. I COULD NOT SEE HOW, WHEN THE LAST COMMUNIQUE OF THE ANGLO/ARGENTINE NEGOTIATIONS HAD REFERRED TO THEIR CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE AND WHEN THE FALKLANDS HAD SHORTLY THEREAFTER BEEN SUBJECTED WITHOUT WARNING TO NAKED AGGRESSION, THE SOVIET UNION COULD MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT BRITAIN WAS RESPONSIBLE. I WOULD REPORT MR SEMEONOV'S STATEMENT WITH GREAT REGRET, THE MORE SO AS THE SOVIET UNION CLAIMED TO PURSUE A PRINCIPLED FOREIGN POLICY. WE LOOKED FOR SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTION 502, FOR RESPECT FOR THE INHABITANTS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (A POINT THE SOVIET UNION USUALLY MADE MUCH OF), AND CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF VIOLENCE AS A WAY TO SETTLE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES.

#### D. SOVIET UNION'S PRINCIPLED POSITION.

SEMEONOV CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID HAVE A PRINCIPLED POSITION, ESPECIALLY ON DECOLONISATION AND AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE. THE SOVIET UNION "REGRETTED THAT ARGENTINA HAD USED FORCE" BUT IT WAS BRITAIN WHICH HAD CREATED THE SITUATION BY BRINGING TALKS TO STALEMATE. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS CLEAR. SEMEONOV AGAIN REMINDED ME OF THE PASSAGE IN GROMYKO'S SPEECH IN BELGRADE (MY TELNO 181, PARA 2(1)), CALLING FOR A CONSIDERED APPROACH TO DISPUTES. THE SOVIET UNION STOOD FOR THE FULFILMENT OF UN RESOLUTIONS AND FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. BUT NOW BRITAIN THREATENED FORCE AND HAD ALREADY APPLIED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

TWO WRONGS DID NOT MAKE A RIGHT. I AGAIN STRESSED THE NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 IN ALL ITS PARTS.

#### E. PRESS COMMENT.

I SAID I HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO SEE THAT UNTIL TWO DAYS AGO THERE HAD BEEN NO REFERENCE IN THE SOVIET PRESS TO THE FACT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 WAS MANDATORY AND CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ACCOUNT IN THE SOVIET PRESS OF THE WISHES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS THEMSELVES

THE SOVIET PRESS OF THE WISHES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS THEMSELVES. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF PRESS TREATMENT OF THE CRISIS SEMEONOV COMPLAINED THAT THE BRITISH PRESS DISTORTED THE SOVIET POSITION AND PROPAGATED FLAT UNTRUTHS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS KNOWN THAT THE US WAS SUPPLYING BRITAIN WITH INTELLIGENCE BUT NOW THE PRESS ALLEGED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS DOING LIKEWISE FOR ARGENTINA. THIS WAS SIMPLY AN INVENTION. WHEN I PRESSED HIM ON THIS, SEMEONOV CONFIRMED THAT WE COULD TAKE THIS AS A FORMAL DENIAL.

3. IN CONCLUSION SEMEONOV REPEATED THE HOPE HE HAD EXPRESSED AT MY LAST CALL THAT BRITAIN WOULD USE ITS POLITICAL WISDOM AND EXPERIENCE TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT THREATENING FORCE. HE FEARED THAT GOVERNMENT SPEECHES WERE TOUGH AND BIASED. PASSION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO OVERTAKE COLD REASON. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT MORE POINTS OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION. 25 APRIL WAS ALREADY WORRYINGLY NEAR. SEMEONOV SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL MIGHT USE THE FLALKLANDS CRISIS AS COVER FOR AGGRESSION. I STRESSED HMG'S SERIOUS SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION UPON THE PRE-CONDITION OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS BUT FORMALLY REJECTED THE SUGGESTION THAT BRITAIN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE. I WENT ON TO STRESS THE DEGREE OF UNITY SHOWN IN PARLIAMENT AND THROUGHOUT BRITAIN FOR HMG'S ACTIONS, AND TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE EXTENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED FOR OUR POSITION. (BY READING OUR THE LIST OF CONDEMNATIONS OF ARGENTINA ACTION IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF YOUR GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 51).

BROOKE TURNER

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171112

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D D I P

SECRET

UK EYES ALPHA

No 10

21

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 172027Z APR 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 492 OF 17 APRIL 1982

YOUR TELNO 266: FALKLANDS AT THE UN

1. I WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY CHANGES TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. HAVING SEEN YOUR TELNO 747 TO WASHINGTON, I AGREE ENTIRELY WITH PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM TO ME UNDER REFERENCE.
2. I HAVE TWO POINTS TO MAKE AT THIS STAGE. FIRST, IF I GO INTO ACTION HERE, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE SHOULD CONDUCT SIMULTANEOUS LOBBYING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN ALL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER STATES' CAPITALS. LOBBYING IN MOSCOW, PEKING AND WARSAW (ALTHOUGH THE LAST NAMED IS THE LEAST IMPORTANT) WOULD BE PARTLY FOR FORM'S SAKE AND PARTLY TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET UNION OR THE CHINESE TO PROCRASTINATE IN THE COUNCIL. LOBBYING IN PARIS, WASHINGTON AND GUYANA WOULD BE TO GAIN MAXIMUM POSITIVE SUPPORT FROM THOSE GOVERNMENTS. LOBBYING IN DUBLIN, TOKYO, KAMPALA AND KINSHASA WOULD BE MAINLY DESIGNED TO EXPLAIN WHY WE COULD NOT AFFORD THE TIME TO CONSULT BEFORE TAKING ACTION IN THE COUNCIL, AND TO CONVINCED THEM THAT TO TRY TO CLEAR THE PROPOSAL IN ADVANCE WITH THE ARGENTINES WOULD ONLY LEAD TO FURTHER DELAY AND DANGEROUS DRIFT. THE FRENCH COULD LOOK AFTER TOGO AND THEIR SUPPORT IN KINSHASA WOULD BE VALUABLE. IT WOULD BE AS WELL TO MAKE SURE WITH KING HUSSEIN THAT JORDAN WAS STILL ON BOARD. LOBBYING IN MADRID WOULD HELP TO ENSURE THAT DE PINIES DID NOT DEPLOY HIS WRECKING SKILLS, AND REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA MIGHT PREVENT ILLUECA (NOT NOW IN NEW YORK SO FAR AS I KNOW) FROM RENEWING HIS ATTEMPTS TO THROW SPANNERS INTO THE WORKS.
3. SECONDLY, IN ORDER TO ALLOW LOBBYING IN CAPITALS TO TAKE PLACE WITH MAXIMUM EFFECT, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACT BEFORE MONDAY. HENCE, IF HAIG HAS ALREADY FAILED, WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS NOT TO REVEAL THIS IMMEDIATELY AND TO CONTINUE TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION FOR ANOTHER THIRTY-SIX HOURS THAT HIS MISSION IS STILL ALIVE. IF THIS CANNOT BE DONE, I SHALL HAVE TO GO AHEAD OVER THE WEEKEND AND DO THE BEST

BE DONE, I SHALL HAVE TO GO AHEAD OVER THE WEEKEND AND DO THE BEST  
I CAN (IN ORDER TO PRE-EMPT ANYONE ELSE). BUT THIS COULD BE UNPOPULAR  
WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS WHO HAVE HAD A ROUGH RIDE ON A NUMBER OF  
SUBJECTS OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS, QUITE APART FROM THE LOSS OF  
IMPACT OF LOBBYING IN CAPITALS.

PARSONS

NNNN



file 20 B  
Copy no .5. of 5 copies

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 April 1982

Dear David,

Falkland Islands: Maritime Exclusion Zone

The Prime Minister held an informal meeting of Ministers here tonight. The Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence were present.

During the course of the meeting, which was mainly concerned with other matters, it was decided that authority should be given to the SSNs to attack any Argentine naval warships which entered the Maritime Exclusion Zone.

I am copying this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Major

David Omand, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

TOP SECRET



Myfaxed to 19  
Chequers at  
1100, 17/4

## FALKLAND ISLANDS

SITREP BY FCO, 0730, 17 APRIL : OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

### Haig Initiative

1. Haig is now in Buenos Aires. Press reports indicate that President Galtieri phoned President Reagan before Haig's departure to stress Argentina's desire for a peaceful settlement. Apparently Haig saw President Galtieri on arrival before going into meetings with Costa Méndez.
2. Haig has sent a telegram this morning to the Secretary of State indicating a discouraging initial Argentine response - see attached.

### Argentine Action

3. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): The Argentines have circulated a draft communiqué seeking support for Argentine sovereignty to selected Members of the NAM Coordinating Bureau in the hope that it can be adopted at the meeting of the Bureau, probably on 20 April. UKMIS New York recommend that we should carry out an urgent lobbying exercise to prevent it going through on the nod.
4. Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO): the Argentines have notified ICAO that permission will now have to be sought for aircraft overflights of Argentine territory south of Parallel 368 (which includes the Falklands).
5. Economic Retaliation: HMA, Montevideo, relays Argentine press reports indicating that the Argentine ban on EC imports will be selective - only goods which cannot be bought elsewhere will be affected; firms based in EC countries would be excluded from public sector contracts.

### Latin America

6. HMA, Caracas, has been warned informally by official sources that Venezuela may take action against British commercial and shipping interests. HMA, Montevideo, has reported receipt of letters threatening terrorist action from a pro-Argentine group. The local police have advised that she should hire a personal bodyguard.

### UN

7. Sir A Parsons thinks that he has successfully averted Security Council activity over the weekend but urges a rapid British initiative if the Haig talks fail, to forestall activity by the President and others. The Argentine Permanent Representative (Roca) has addressed a further letter to the President of the Security Council requesting its circulation as a Security Council

- 2 -

document; a reply will have to be formulated early next week. UKMIS New York report a 'New York Times' interview with the UN Secretary-General in which he intimated that he would consider intervening if the Haig initiative failed.

#### Other Countries


8. The Norwegian Foreign Minister has indicated privately that the Government of Norway has decided to ban imports from Argentina; the decision is confidential until it is announced in the Norwegian Parliament on 19 April.
9. The Australian Prime Minister (Mr Fraser) has agreed to send a message to President Reagan on 17 April urging positive American support for the UK if the Haig initiative breaks down.
10. The Chinese People's Daily has come out more strongly in favour of the Argentine position and HMA, Peking, recommends that we should do all that we can to ensure that China continues to abstain in any votes in the UN Security Council.
11. HMA, Bonn, reports that the West German Government may come under greater pressure if there is no quick diplomatic solution to the crisis, and recommends that we should take them as much as possible into our confidence.

#### US

12. Washington report that Eagleburger was upset that the Argentine request for Landsat coverage of the Falklands had got into the press. It would be virtually impossible for him now to prevent NASA from complying.
13. The Anderson tapes of the conversation between Haig and President Reagan received considerable media coverage. Jack Anderson commented in his article that it was obvious from the transcript that the British worried Reagan and Haig more than the Argentines.

#### Missing Journalists

14. Three British journalists - Simon Winchester ('Times') and Ian Mather and Tony Prime ('Observer') - have been missing since 11 April. It is thought that they left Buenos Aires to tour Argentine ports.



17 April 1982

A E Huckle  
Emergency Unit

/Distribution:

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BUENOS AIRES

TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6702

ZNE/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

BT

S E C R E T SECTO 6026

*Unfaxed to Chequers at*  
**FLASH**

1110, 17/4

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TOR: 0417

CN 41662

CHRG STA

ACTION DCM-6-3D CG

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3 4/16/0012

TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER, M., JR.)

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM

1. SECRET. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY  
TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM AT OPENING OF BUSINESS SATURDAY  
APRIL 17.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCIS:

I HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED SINCE 10:00 AM THIS  
MORNING. TONIGHT, FOREIGN MINISTER COSTA MENDEZ AND  
HIS TEAM MET WITH PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND  
HIS ENTIRE JUNTA. AT 10:40 PM LOCAL TIME WE RECEIVED  
A VERY DISCOURAGING RESPONSE WHICH I HAVE ASKED TO  
DISCUSS TOMORROW MORNING WITH THE JUNTA AND THE PRESI-  
DENT. I WILL ADVISE YOU OF THE RESULTS OF THIS MEETING  
BY FLASH MESSAGE.

WARM REGARDS,  
AL HAIG      END TEXT  
HAIG

S E C R E T / NODIS

SECTO 6026



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 April 1982

*Dear John,*

Falkland Islands Company

Willie Rickett wrote to me on 15 April reporting Mr Needham's call on the Prime Minister on 15 April and asking for advice.

Mr Pym is inclined to doubt whether any general evacuation of the sort which Mr Needham appears to have in mind would necessarily be in line with the wishes of the Islanders (their views on this appear very mixed and the telexes provide no convincing evidence either way); or that it would be allowed by the Argentine authorities (who may want to hang on to a substantial proportion of the population as hostages against a military assault). He therefore does not think that any authorisation should be given to Mr Needham to encourage a general evacuation: individuals and companies such as his will have to make their own decision in the light of particular circumstances.

Mr Pym also does not believe that we should give assurances about the Falkland Islands Company (FICo) not losing financially, or the Islanders being in a position to rescue their savings from the Falklands, at this juncture. The question of reparations for losses resulting from the Argentine invasion or subsequent hostilities - whether these losses are incurred by companies or by individuals - will have to be part of a larger long-term settlement. They should not be made the subject of individual undertakings at this stage. However, Mr Pym entirely shares the Prime Minister's 'determination that nothing should stand in the way of those Islanders who wished to return to the UK'. The enclosed draft letter to Mr Needham indicates that arrangements are being made to give the necessary support to any Islanders who have either been deported or made arrangements for their own evacuation from the Islands. The letter is drafted as from the Prime Minister, since past experience shows that Mr Needham will not take anything else, for example a Private Secretary letter, as representing her views.

This is obviously a question of some importance and the Prime Minister may wish to discuss it further, for example in

/ODSA



ODSA, before replying to Mr Needham.

I am copying this letter, with the enclosed draft, to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office)

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Mr Gregory-Hood/Mr Hulse

p.a.  
102  $\frac{23}{4}$

ASCENSION ISLAND: USE OF US AIRFIELD BY CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT

The MOD are proposing to charter UK registered civilian aircraft with all-civilian crews to transport troops to Ascension Island. The aircraft would have to use Wide Awake Airfield which (as its name implies) is part of the US facility established on the Island pursuant to the Agreement of 25 June 1956. Paragraph (a) (i) of the Agreement of 29 August 1962 (Cmnd 1869) provides that the Government of the United Kingdom shall have the right to land "United Kingdom military aircraft" at that airfield, provided 24 hours notice are given of the arrival of a single aircraft and 72 hours notice of the arrival of groups of two or more aircraft. Although the reference to "military aircraft" is pretty explicit, I think a fairly respectable argument can be constructed that the object of that Agreement was to enable us to use the airfield for military purposes. Clearly what it was not intended to do was to enable us to land civilian aircraft for non-military purposes. However, the lease of a civilian aircraft and its crew for the sole purpose of transporting members of HM Armed Forces to be used in connection with the Task Force would seem to be completely consistent with the object of the Agreement.

A I Aust  
Legal Advisers

16 April 1982

CONFIDENTIAL



*[Handwritten signature]*

PRIME MINISTER

I thought it would be helpful if, in advance of our meeting on Monday, I circulated a note on an Emergency Powers (Falkland Islands) Bill: first, what it might contain and, second, when it might be introduced.

A second print of the Bill is being circulated today. It has been prepared on a contingent basis without direction from Ministers. It is expressed in terms of the consequences of the unlawful occupation of the Falklands, and enables Defence Regulations to be made in that connection. The draft of any Order in Council making such Regulations is to be subject to affirmative resolution.

The Bill provides (Clause 1(2)) for the expulsion from the United Kingdom of anyone whose expulsion appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient (an earlier draft excluded British Subjects, but this raised questions about E.C. nationals, and it seemed preferable to leave that detail to the Regulations). There is no provision for Regulations about detention (i.e. internment); this is because there are at present no security grounds for interning any Argentinians; because even a provision for internment might provoke retaliation by Argentina against our nationals there; because of the practical problems of locking up Argentinians here; and because the absence of a provision on the analogy of wartime Regulation 18b should make the Bill more acceptable to Parliament. We need to decide whether the omission of any provision for internment in the Bill is acceptable.

Clause 1(2)(d) would allow Regulations to be made suspending the operation of the Trading with the Enemy Act 1939 which otherwise

/would

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would automatically on the outbreak of war prohibit all transactions with Argentina, instead of most as at present. The Clause would allow suspension to retrospective effect to the outbreak of war. This will increase our room for manoeuvre on the timing of introduction.

As the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum explains, the nub of the Bill would remain in force for three months initially; its financial effects cannot be quantified.

As to when a Bill might be needed, the principal concern must be to avoid upsetting negotiations. Since negotiations are likely to continue until forces are engaged, this seems to rule out introduction before the outbreak of hostilities. The case for early introduction once that stage had been reached will depend on our judgment of what Parliament will expect, as well as what it will accept.

Colleagues may feel that the case for introduction will have to rest on stronger grounds than the need for provisions about the Trading with the Enemy Act. From the Home Office point of view, there are unlikely to be such grounds: there are no Argentinians here whom we particularly want to expel, and such matters as treachery, assisting the enemy and sabotage are not urgent requirements. The case is therefore likely to have to be made on grounds that other powers are urgently required. Requirements identified so far are powers for the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Trade to requisition chattels (including vehicles, ships and aircraft), to take space on United Kingdom ships and aircraft, to take possession of land and to prescribe shipping routes; and perhaps provision for an offence of inducing a breach of discipline, which would go wider than the Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934.

If (as drafted) the Bill is to provide for Defence Regulations to require affirmative resolution, there may be something to be said for having the Bill ready for introduction soon after any

/hostilities

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hostilities which may break out, making it clear that we shall bring forward Regulations for Parliamentary approval only as and when they may be needed.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Defence, Scotland and Transport, the Lord President, the Lord Privy Seal, the Secretary of State for Trade, the Attorney General and the Chief Whip, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

W.L.

16 April 1982

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ADVANCE COPY.

**IMMEDIATE**

WONFO/051/16W RNY/037/16

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

OO FCO DESKBY 161930Z

GRS 150

**DEDIP**  
**SECRET**

**DESKBY 161930Z**

FM WASHINGTON 161832Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1312 OF 16 APRIL

PS  
PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/AUS  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Wright  
Mr Adams  
Mr Ure  
Mr Gillmore  
Hd/SA  
Hd/Defence  
Hd/News  
Hd/UN

1922

(15)

H/Planning St.  
RC  
10 Cabinet Office  
Mr Wade-Gery  
AS/No 10.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

MY TELNO 1310: FALKLANDS (NOT TO ALL)

mb

1. A MEMBER OF THE NSC (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE JACK ANDERSON STORY IS TRUE. THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO HAIG ON AN OPEN LINE AND THIS WAS PICKED UP. HE AND HAIG WERE EXPRESSING QUOTE HALF FORMED UNQUOTE IDEAS AND DISCUSSING IMPRESSIONS AT A PARTICULAR STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS SENT A MESSAGE DIRECT TO NO 10 ABOUT HIS CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT WITH PRESIDENT GALTIERI. GALTIERI TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN MAKING THE CALL. HE STRESSED IN GENERAL TERMS HIS INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND AGREEMENT TO TALK SERIOUSLY TO HAIG WITHOUT GIVING SPECIFIC SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY. PRESIDENT REAGAN TALKED IN SIMILAR GENERAL TERMS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

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2



Prime Minister

A.S.C. 16. 4

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

PRIME MINISTER

FROZEN ARGENTINE ASSETS

When we introduced the freeze on Argentine financial assets in the United Kingdom on 3rd April, we could only estimate the amount likely to be involved on the basis of out of date information. The Bank of England had figures of about \$1½ billion for the end of 1981 and no reason to suppose any large change had taken place.

2. Since the freeze, the Bank have been obtaining details of accounts here, and it has emerged that substantial sums were transferred from London to New York in the first two days of April, and that the total remaining and caught by our freeze is around \$900 million only. This was not a case of transfer from sterling to dollars, which on the scale involved would have been noticed in exchange transactions, but movement in dollar accounts only.

3. The Bank of England also have evidence that the total of U.K. claims on Argentine fell by some \$500 million between the end of 1981 and the close of business on 2nd April, and it is possible that the two movements were connected, indeed may have reflected matching reductions of claims and liabilities.

4. I cannot think that we would have found it right, even if possible, to introduce the freeze earlier, had this information been available to us immediately. Nor would knowledge of the lower figure of Argentine assets here have caused me to



recommend against taking action to freeze them on 3rd April. That action has in any case made an important contribution to the economic and financial pressures we have been able to mobilise.

5. But it is disappointing, an interesting reflection on Argentine behaviour, and potentially embarrassing since the figure of about \$1½ billion, which journalists were able to obtain from official publications, was endorsed by Treasury comment as being the latest available indication of the amount likely to be involved.

6. I thought that you and the Foreign Secretary should have this information straight away, but I do not propose to advertise it more widely, unless and until questions are asked or information comes out from other sources. The Treasury Press Office will deal with any substantive enquiries but we are also ensuring that the No.10, FCO and the Bank of England Press Offices are alerted.

7. Copies go to the Foreign Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Peter Jenkins*

for G.H.

16 April 1982

(Approved by the Chancellor of the Exchequer  
and signed in his absence)

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

36  
(1250)

IMMEDIATE

PS

~~PS/LPS~~

PS/MR ONSLOW

~~PS/MR RIFKIND~~

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/HKGD

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR

SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLER

MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER ~~SAPU~~ CABINET OFFICE

DIO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRASILIA 162008Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 111 OF 16 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

FROM LONGRIGG

FALKLANDS: PRESS COMMENT 13/16 APRIL

1. IN THE PAST FEW DAYS EDITORIALS IN THE MAJOR PAPERS HAVE BEEN LOOKING, WITH INCREASING ANXIETY, AT THE WIDER AND LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS. CONCERN IS BEING EXPRESSED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT, AT THE GROWING EAST/WEST DIMENSION OF THE CRISIS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CLOSER ARGENTINE LINKS WITH THE EASTERN BLOC. IN THIS CONTEXT THE GALTIERI

DIMENSION OF THE CRISIS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CLOSER ARGENTINE LINKS WITH THE EASTERN BLOC. IN THIS CONTEXT THE GALTIERI REGIME IS COMING IN FOR A LOT OF CRITICISM AND THE BRITISH CASE IS GETTING A NOTICEABLY MORE SYMPATHETIC HEARING.

2. THE ESTADO DO SAO PAULO, THE MOST WIDELY RESPECTED BRAZILIAN PAPER, WHICH UNTIL RECENTLY HAS ADOPTED A CAREFULLY NEUTRAL LINE, HAS NOW PUBLISHED AN EDITORIAL HIGHLIGHTING THE HISTORICAL LESSON THAT DICTATORSHIPS, WHETHER OF THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT, ALWAYS END UP BASING THEIR FOREIGN POLICY ON THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE, AND IN THIS CONTEXT COMPARES THE GALTIERI REGIME WITH THOSE OF HITLER, STALIN AND CASTRO. IN ANOTHER EDITORIAL ON 16 APRIL, IT SCATHINGLY ATTACKS THE OPPORTUNISTIC OFFERS OF SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA MADE BY SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WHICH IT SEES AS BASED ON NOTHING MORE THAN A NEED FOR AN ESCAPE ROUTE FROM INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND A POSSIBLE DESIRE TO USE SIMILAR TACTICS TO RESOLVE THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, THE PAPER ARGUES, THESE GESTURES WILL ONLY HAVE THE EFFECT OF SPLITTING THE LATIN AND ANGLOPHONE AND AMERICAN COUNTRIES INTO TWO IRRECONCILEABLE BLOCS. IT ARGUES THAT BRAZIL MUST NOT BE TEMPTED TO FOLLOW SUIT.

3. MEANWHILE, THE JORNAL DO BRASIL CONTINUES ITS VIGOROUS CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARGENTINE POLICIES. ON 14 APRIL, ONE CORRESPONDENT ARGUED THAT THE MAIN POINT AT ISSUE WAS NOT THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, BUT THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER - THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE DUTY OF GOVERNMENTS TO PUT AN END TO COLONIALISM, AND WENT ON TO QUESTION THE RIGHT OF BUENOS AIRES TO REPLACE BRITISH COLONISATION WITH ARGENTINE COLONISATION OF A TERRITORY MORE THAN 600 MILES (SIC) FROM THE MAINLAND WITHOUT ANY INDIGENOUS ARGENTINE POPULATION.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT AT 16:2036Z AD



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 April 1982

Dear David,

Rules of Engagement for SSNs

Avail. not  
 Regs.  
 Apr 19  
 p.a.

Mr Pym has asked me to seek your help in clearing up the following problem.

Yesterday's ad hoc Ministerial meeting is recorded as having decided to make 'an addition to the Rules of Engagement set out in OD(SA)(82)5 to the effect that any submarine found within the Maritime Exclusion Zone should be presumed to be an Argentine submarine and might be attacked'. Until then the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had been under the impression (which he had thought shared by colleagues) that this wording had not been authorised for communication to the Task Force, even as part of a catalogue from which specific Rules could subsequently be activated as and when Ministers instructed. It is clear however to Mr Pym, both from yesterday's signal by the Commander of the Task Force (151101Z) and from MODUK Navy signal 071045Z setting out 'Rules of Engagement authorised for SSNs' (now seen in the FCO for the first time), that this impression was mistaken. The Rule quoted above has evidently been included in the list communicated to the Fleet ever since 7 April. He is somewhat surprised by this. There also seem to be textual variations between the Rules authorised by Ministers in OD(SA)(82)5 and the corresponding Rules in the numbered list held by Naval Commanders.

Mr Pym takes the view that, with events moving so fast and with so much at stake, the utmost care should be taken to ensure that the results of ministerial discussion are accurately reflected in the instructions given. If we are right in thinking that there has been a discrepancy in the crucial text on this occasion he hopes very much that steps can be taken to avoid a repetition.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office) and to John Coles (No. 10).

Yours ever,  
 J.P.F.

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

D B Omand Esq  
 Ministry of Defence



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 April 1982

Dear John.

Message from Mr Haig

I attach a copy of a message from Mr Haig received here at 1545 this afternoon from Buenos Aires.

The note contains no clue as to Mr Haig's future plans. The American Embassy have checked with Washington at our request and received the answer that, despite press reports, Haig was still in Buenos Aires continuing contacts with the Administration.

Yours ever.

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Mufaxed 1745  
17/4

MR 4  
h-a-



2. DEAR FRANCIS:

FURTHER TO MY MESSAGE OF EARLY THIS MORNING -- AND AS I GO INTO MY 10:00 A.M. MEETING WITH THE JUNTA -- I WANT YOU TO HAVE THE THREE KEY PARAGRAPHS WE RECEIVED LAST NIGHT FROM COSTA MENDEZ FOLLOWING HIS MEETING AT CASA ROSADA. AS I TOLD YOU IN MY MESSAGE. WE ARE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED. THE ARGENTINE PARAGRAPHS ARE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. I WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AGAIN FOLLOWING MY MEETING. AL END OF MESSAGE.

3. BEGIN ARGENTINE PARAGRAPHS:

INTERIM ADMINISTRATION:

PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, ALL DECISIONS, LAWS AND REGULATIONS TO BE HEREAFTER IMPLEMENTED ON THE ISLANDS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO AND EXPEDITIOUSLY RATIFIED BY THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY, EXCEPT IN THE EVENT THAT THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY DEEMS SUCH DECISIONS LAWS AND REGULATIONS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL ADMINISTRATION SHALL CONTINUE THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS, WHICH SHALL BE ENLARGED TO INCLUDE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES APPOINTED BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AMONG LOCAL RESIDENTS. THE LOCAL POLICE SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE GENERAL SUPERVISION OF THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY. THE FLAGS OF EACH OF THE CONSTITUENT MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY SHALL BE FLOWN AT ITS HEADQUARTERS.

LINKS BETWEEN MAINLAND AND ISLANDS:

FULL FREEDOM OF TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION, MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RESIDENCE, OWNERSHIP AND DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMERCE BETWEEN THE MAINLAND AND THE ISLANDS SHALL BE RECOGNIZED TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLANDS AND TO THE ARGENTINE NATIONALS COMING FROM THE MAINLAND ON AN EQUAL BASIS.

THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY SHALL MAKE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON THESE MATTERS IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THESE FREEDOMS, INCLUDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMPENSATION OF

ISLANDERS WHO DO NOT WISH TO REMAIN.

NEGOTIATIONS:

DECEMBER 31, 1982, WILL CONCLUDE THE INTERIM PERIOD DURING WHICH THE SIGNATORIES SHALL CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS ON MODALITIES FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE ISLANDS FROM THE LIST OF NON-GOVERNING TERRITORIES UNDER CHAPTER XI OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND ON CONDITIONS FOR THEIR DEFINITIVE STATUS, ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ARGENTINE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND TAKING FULLY INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLANDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX) AND OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

Dear Francis,

Further to my message of early this morning - and as I go into my 1000 a.m. meeting with the Junta - I want you to have the three key paragraphs we received last night from Costa Mendez following his meeting at Casa Rosaia. As I told you in my message, we are deeply disappointed the Argentine paragraphs are totally unacceptable. I will be in touch with you again following my meeting. Al.

End of message

Begin Argentine paragraphs

Interim Administration:

Pending a definitive settlement, all decisions, laws and regulations to be hereafter implemented on the Islands shall be submitted to and expeditiously ratified by the special interim authority. Except in the event that the special interim authority deems such decisions, laws and regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of the agreement or its implementation. The traditional local administration shall continue through the Executive and Legislative Councils, which shall be enlarged to include an equal number of representatives appointed by the Argentine Government among local residents. The local police shall be subject to the general supervision of the special interim authority, the flags of each of the constituent members of the special interim authority shall be flown at its headquarters.

Links between mainland and islands:

Full freedom of travel, transportation, movement of persons, residence, ownership and disposition of property communications and commerce between the mainland and the Islands shall be recognised to the inhabitants of the Islands and to the Argentine nationals coming from the mainland on an equal basis. The special interim authority shall make specific provisions on these matters in order to implement these freedoms, including  
/arrangements

arrangements for compensation of islanders who do not wish to remain.

Negotiations:

December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period during which the signatories shall conclude negotiations on modalities for the removal of the Islands from the list of non-governing territories under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and on conditions for their definitive status, on the basis of the implementation of the principle of Argentine territorial integrity and taking fully into consideration the interests of the inhabitants of the islands in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and Resolutions 1515(XV), 2085 (XX) and other relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

UNCLASSIFIED COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

A.S.C. -  $\frac{19}{4}$   
L.a.

As per attached distribution list

COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS' REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

1. Attached is a list of Commonwealth Governments' reactions to the Falklands crisis as at 16 April.
2. The statement attributed to W. Samoa in the list of 13 April was in error.

16 April 1982

COMMONWEALTH COORDINATION  
DEPARTMENT

UNCLASSIFIED COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Distribution:

Private Secretary

Mr Fuller

Mr Cresswell

PS/PUS

Sir Ian Sinclair

Mr Bullard

Sir J Leahy

Mr Wright

Mr Giffard

Lord Bridges

Mr Ure

Sir L Allinson

Mr Gillmore

Mr Aust

Mr Illman (Emergency Unit) (3 copies)

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Defence Dept

Planning Staff

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SEAD

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SAfD

CAfD

WIAD

- PS/No 10 Downing Street

- Cabinet Office

UKMIS New York

British High Commissions:

Canberra  
Nassau  
Dacca  
Bridgetown  
Belmopan  
Gaborone  
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei  
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Nicosia  
Suva  
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Lilongwe  
Kuala Lumpur  
Valletta  
Port Louis  
Wellington  
Lagos  
Port Moresby  
Victoria

Freetown  
Singapore  
Honiara  
Colombo  
Mbabane  
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Nuku'alofa  
Port of Spain  
Kampala  
Vila  
Lusaka  
Salisbury

Office of British High Commissions:

St Johns  
St George's  
Castries  
Kingstown

COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

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Country

Antigua and Barbuda	Robust statement by PM. Full support also to UN initiative. Copy of statement to Commonwealth Secretary-General.
Australia	Ambassador recalled; ban on imports; ban on credit. Robust statements/messages of support. Statement at Security Council.
Bahamas	Robust reply to PM's letter, to be referred to in Government statement. Note to Argentinian Government urging compliance with SCR 502. Robust statement.
Bangladesh	Statement condemning 'use of force in settling disputes'. Robust statement privately to Ambassador from Permanent Secretary Foreign Affairs.
Barbados	'Full and complete support to any Commonwealth protest and initiative'. Prime Minister delivered statement during televised budget debate ensuring maximum coverage.
Belize	Reply to PM. Telegram to UNSG. Robust statement
Botswana	Statement 'strongly condemns' Argentine action. No specific mention of support for UK. Replied to SG's letter.
Canada	Robust and helpful line. PM endorsed separately statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs. Recalled Ambassador. Banned military shipments. Cancelled Defence College visit. Ban on imports and export credit.

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.../2



Cyprus

Dominica

Robust letter to Prime Minister.

Fiji

Robust statement by PM.

The Gambia

Robust Government statement

Ghana

No response expected.

Grenada

Guyana

Strong statement by Guyana Government. Voted for SCR 502. Robust reply to Ramphal's letter. Robust reply PM letter.

India

Lukewarm; appealing to 'all parties' to seek a 'peaceful resolution'.

Jamaica

Robust statement.

Kenya

Robust statement

Niribati Robust statement.

Lesotho Response to SG expressing ''deep concern''.

Malawi President's robust reply to PM: moral backing for use of force if necessary. Robust statement.

Malaysia Weak statement although ''deeply disturbed''.

Malta No statement yet. High Commission does 'not expect Malta to support' UK.

Mauritius Robust reply to Ramphal quoting Security Council instructions. Robust statement.

Nauru

New Zealand Robust statements/messages of support. Broken diplomatic relations. Support at UN. Cancelled Argentine flight schedule. Ean on trade, supply of arms/military material, export credits.

Nigeria Message to PM. Helpful statement.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Papua New Guinea

Robust statement by PM PNG. To make feelings known through international bodies. Responded to SG quoting statement. Told Argentine Government that unless complies with SCR 502 PNG will break off diplomatic relations.

Saint Lucia

Strong statement.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Robust statement. Copy sent to SG.

Seychelles

Response to PM letter, deploring aggression: made public.

Sierra Leone

Statement views developments 'with great concern'. Ambassador UN instructed to 'condemn Argentine Action in strong terms'. SLG agree to provide facilities for refuelling etc.

Singapore

Fairly robust statement although no specific mention of support for UK. Robust reply from PM to PM's message.

Solomon Islands

Robust statement. Government has also sent message to SG of UN and to SG of Commonwealth. 'Assurance' of support to Prime Minister.

Sri Lanka

Message to Prime Minister 'condemns use of force' but no specific support for UK.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

Swaziland Statement expressing 'great concern' at invasion and supporting SCR 502.

Tanzania Statement regrets Argentine military action but no specific mention of support for UK.

Tonga Robust reply to PM letter: would support 'any action' by us to reassert sovereignty.

Trinidad and Tobago 'Feeble' statement.

Tuvalu Robust reply to SG and Secretary of State.

Uganda Voted for SCR 502. Helpful with Non-Aligned. Replied to PM letter: 'great concern'. Statement condemning aggression.

Vanuatu Statement 'strongly condemns' invasion, but also calls upon UK to "reconsider" military retaliation. Copied to SG, PM, Argentine Government, UN.

Western Samoa

Zambia Statement by Acting President deploring invasion

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

Zimbabwe

Inadequate statement but supporting SCR 502.

CONFIDENTIAL

## FALKLAND ISLANDS

SITREP BY FCO: 0730 16 APRIL: OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

US

1. Mr Haig left slightly earlier than expected for Buenos Aires (2 pm London time on 15 April) and depending on the progress of his talks there, he could arrive back in London on Saturday afternoon.
2. The Americans are increasingly concerned about Soviet involvement and disinformation activity. Eagleburger is to see Dobrynin to 'read him the riot act' about Soviet activities.
3. In this context, Mr Hurd took the opportunity of a call by Soviet Ambassador Popov on 15 April to make clear HMG's views on the Falklands and the need for a solution on the basis of SCR 502. Popov maintained that the Soviet position was 'principled and not opportunist'.

UN

4. Sir A Parsons made a further statement on HMG's position in the plenary of ECOSOC on 15 April.
5. He believes that it will be possible to get through the weekend without further proceedings in the Security Council provided that there is no naval incident. The President of the Security Council (Kamanda: Zaire) believes that the Council cannot remain on the sidelines indefinitely; it is likely that pressure for UN action will grow.
6. Sir A Parsons warned that strong efforts should be made to dissuade Councillor Cheek from going to New York to argue the Falklands case if there was any possibility that he might undermine HMG's position.

EEC

7. The European Parliament is likely to discuss the Falklands during the plenary session in Strasbourg next week.

Latin America

8. As the Task Force gets nearer to the Falklands it is becoming more difficult for some Latin American countries not to give public support to Argentina in response to President Galtieri's letter of 12 April. The Colombian reply, though still attempting to be balanced, leans more towards the Argentine position than before. The reply from Uruguay was partially leaked in Buenos Aires to show greater support for Argentina and HMA Montevideo thinks that it will be difficult for Uruguay to maintain her moderate stance for much longer. Nevertheless, President Alvarez went ahead with his visit to Chile and signed a joint statement on 14 April with President Pinochet emphasising the principle of self-determination. Pinochet's subsequent remarks to the press came as close as Chile has yet come to condemning the Argentine invasion.


SECRET

9. The Bolivians, though supporting the Argentine recovery of the Falklands, have publicly declared themselves opposed to intervening militarily on Argentina's behalf. The Peruvian Foreign Minister has written to the Secretary of State.

Argentina

10. Argentina has reacted to the Community's economic sanctions by banning imports from EC countries (it is not clear whether this ban also applies to Australia, Canada and New Zealand).

11. Media reports indicate that the Argentine Navy has put to sea.



16 April 1982

A E Huckle  
Emergency Unit

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

16 April 1982

Prime Minister

*M*

A.J.C. 19/4

Dear John,

AD 20/4  
h.c.

Falkland Islands: Republic of Ireland

The Counsellor at the Irish Embassy, who is currently in charge, asked to call at the FCO this morning to deliver a message from Mr Haughey to the Prime Minister which I enclose. No immediate reply seems called for.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



16 APR 1982



POSTAGE AND COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE  
LONDON SW1V 5YH

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN, LONDAIN.



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

cc Master  
ops  
PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T75A/82

MESSAGE FROM THE TAOISEACH, MR. CHARLES J. HAUGHEY, T.D., TO  
THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.

I was very glad to receive yesterday your message of thanks for our support in enabling the Community to reach agreement on joint action in relation to the situation in the Falkland Islands. The fact that it was possible, in such a short time, to arrive at agreement is indeed an impressive example of Community co-operation.

You are, I know, already aware of my Government's attitude to the use of force by Argentina, in defiance of the Security Council. We have made our views clear both in the Security Council and in our support for the Joint Statements by the Ten on this issue.

At the same time, however, we have always been doubtful about the effectiveness of economic sanctions, particularly in circumstances where they cannot be universally applied. In addition, I was aware that while our own trade with Argentina was not substantial, the imposition of an embargo would have a serious effect on a number of Irish manufacturers.

Nonetheless, in the present special circumstances, and in the interests of solidarity between Community partners, we felt it important to support Community action and demonstrate this solidarity. I am gratified that we have all been able to do this so rapidly and I believe it augurs well for the Community's capacity to act to resolve its own difficulties in the future.

I hope that the Community's action will contribute directly to efforts to bring about a diplomatic solution. In the meantime, let me assure you of my Government's continuing readiness to help insofar as we can in advancing a resolution of the crisis and the achievement of an honourable and enduring settlement.

16 April, 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 16 April enclosing the original of a letter recently addressed to her by Signor Spadolini.

EX-103

His Excellency Signor Andrea Cagiati GCVO.,

5

*The Italian Ambassador  
to the United Kingdom*

PERSONAL

T 68A/82  
MESSAGE

SERIAL NO. 3426


cc Muller  
& ups

London, 16th April 1982

*Dear Prime Minister,*

Further to my letter of the 10th April,  
I now have pleasure in sending you the original  
letter addressed to you by Signor Spadolini which  
arrived today.

*Very sincerely yours*

  
Andrea Cagiati

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP.



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 682/82

Roma, 8 aprile 1982

Gentile Primo Ministro,

ho ricevuto il Suo messaggio del 6 aprile scorso, con il quale ha chiesto l'appoggio anche del Governo italiano all'adozione coordinata di misure nei confronti del Governo dell'Argentina, a seguito dell'occupazione militare delle isole Falkland decisa dalle Autorità di quel paese.

Desidero assicurarLa che il Suo messaggio ha trovato la mia completa comprensione e sento innanzitutto di esprimerLe la piena solidarietà del Governo italiano e mia personale in questo difficile momento che il Suo paese attraversa, a causa di un atto compiuto in violazione dei principi generali del diritto internazionale.

In stretta coerenza con i principi fondamentali della politica estera italiana, ho espresso immediatamente la condanna del Governo per l'atto di forza deciso dalle Autorità di Buenos Aires, esortandole al tempo stesso ad aderire agli appelli lanciati da numerosi paesi, fra i quali anche quelli comunitari, per il ritiro immediato delle proprie forze militari e per la ripresa di trattative con il Suo Governo. E' infatti convinzione del Governo italiano che soltanto una soluzione negoziata, così come auspicato dal Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, possa porre termine alla controversia.

In stretta aderenza a questa impostazione, il Governo, nella sua odierna riunione, ha deliberato un embargo totale sulle esportazioni di armamenti nei riguardi dell'Argentina.

S.E. la Signora  
Margaret Thatcher  
Primo Ministro di  
Gran Bretagna  
L O N D R A

./.



Data la situazione venutasi a determinare nell'Oceano Atlantico meridionale, l'embargo sulle esportazioni degli armamenti ci è sembrato il provvedimento più urgente. Sarà cura del Governo seguire scrupolosamente l'applicazione di tale decisione che comporta, come Ella può immaginare, delicati problemi per i diritti acquisiti attraverso contratti debitamente conclusi nel passato con buona fede delle parti.

E' stato inoltre convenuto che gli altri provvedimenti sollecitati dal Governo di Sua Maestà devono essere valutati per le loro implicazioni nei confronti del Mercato Comune e per gli aspetti giuridici ed economici che essi presentano all'interno di ciascuno dei nostri paesi. Noto dal Suo messaggio che al Governo di Sua Maestà non è sfuggito che una appropriata base giuridica internazionale faciliterebbe grandemente il nostro compito. Ma, in mancanza di essa, convengo con Lei che l'esame delle richieste inglesi deve essere attivato rapidamente sia in sede europea, per la parte che riguarda la Comunità, sia, per il resto, in sede nazionale. Intanto è indiscutibile che l'orientamento che abbiamo preso pubblicamente scoraggia di per sé il sistema bancario dall'impegnarsi in Argentina.

Desidero comunque assicurarLa che sarà cura del Governo italiano confermare in maniera tangibile la piena solidarietà dell'Italia ed adoperarsi per sostenere in questo difficile momento il Governo di Sua Maestà.

Colgo l'occasione per inviarLe i saluti più amichevoli



The National Archives

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FILE

R M

16 April, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from President Mitterrand in reply to her letter of 6 April. I should be grateful if you could consider whether a reply is desirable and, if so, let me have a draft as soon as possible.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

No reply required

285

16 April, 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 16 April enclosing a message from Monsieur Francois Mitterand, President of the French Republic.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency Monsieur Emmanuel de  
Margerie

RM

T 74/82

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE  
LONDRES

L'AMBASSADEUR

16th April, 1982

Dear Prime Minister,

I have just received the text  
of a message addressed to you by Monsieur  
François Mitterand, President of the French  
Republic.

I enclose it herewith.

Yours sincerely  
E. M. Marjani

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10, Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

②

PRIME MINISTER

I attach a letter to you from President Mitterrand. It reads in translation roughly as follows:-

"Since receiving your letter I ensured that the French Delegation at Brussels had indeed carried out its instructions and supported the proposals of your delegation for measures designed to give to the Argentine Government the necessary proof of the solidarity of our reaction. It is indeed desirable, as you suggest, to supplement the measures taken since 3 April by preventing the despatch of any arms or ammunition.

"The Community has also set an example in rapidly deciding to embargo Argentine imports and suspend the application of the system of generalised preferences in relation to Argentina. It is good that other countries such as Canada and New Zealand have followed suit. As Mr. Pym suggested in his telegram, I have spoken about this matter with the Japanese Prime Minister. One of my Ministers will raise it with M. Sakurachi. It is indeed desirable that no doubt exists in Buenos Aires of the unanimous condemnation of the hostile action undertaken against the Falkland Islands. This will create the best possibilities of a useful negotiation with regard to the decision of the Security Council. I shall not fail to keep you informed and at the same time I reiterate the French wish to remain firmly at your side."

The FCO are considering a reply.

*Reading on  
mt*

*A. J. C. 16.  
4*

16 April 1982

*K.A. AR 14.*

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 74/82

Message de Monsieur François Mitterrand,

Président de la République

cc Myster  
ops

à

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,

Premier Ministre de la Grande-Bretagne

Citation :

"Chère Madame le Premier Ministre,

Dès réception de votre lettre, je me suis assuré que la délégation française à Bruxelles avait bien adopté l'attitude prescrite par ses instructions et appuyait les propositions de votre délégation quant aux mesures destinées à donner au gouvernement argentin la nécessaire preuve de notre réaction solidaire. Il convenait, en effet, comme vous le suggériez, de compléter les mesures déjà prises depuis le 3 avril pour interdire tout envoi d'armes et de munitions.

De même la communauté a donné l'exemple en décidant dans les meilleurs délais de mettre l'embargo sur les importations argentines et en suspendant l'application du système des préférences généralisées à l'Argentine. Il est bon que d'autres pays, tels que le Canada et la Nouvelle-Zélande, aient suivi. Ainsi que M. PYM

.../...

le suggère dans son télégramme, je m'entretiendrai du sujet avec le Premier Ministre japonais et mon ministre saisira M. SAKURAUCHI. Il est souhaitable en effet qu'il n'existe à Buenos-Aires aucun doute sur la condamnation unanime de l'action de force entreprise aux îles Malouines. C'est ainsi qu'existeront les meilleures chances d'une utile négociation dans le respect de la décision du Conseil de Sécurité. Je ne manquerai pas de vous tenir informée en vous réitérant la volonté française de demeurer fermement à vos côtés.

Je vous assure de mes sentiments amicaux et de ma haute considération.

signé : F. Mitterrand"./.

Fin de citation

<sup>hwe</sup>  
SECRET

R M

Argentina

10

16 April, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister received last night from President Reagan. There was some discussion of this message at this morning's meeting of OD(SA), as a result of which the Prime Minister has sent a reply to President Reagan. A copy of that reply is enclosed.

I am copying this letter and its enclosures to David Omand (MOD), John Halliday (Home Office), Keith Long (Paymaster General's Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

B Fall, Esq  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

SECRET

Q

16 April, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE AUSTRALIAN  
PRIME MINISTER

As I told Brian Fall on the telephone today, the Prime Minister agrees that there would be advantage in encouraging Mr Fraser to send a message to President Reagan about the Falkland Islands.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



SECRET.

161220Z. MISC 103

T77/82

~~MMX~~ MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

DEAR RON,

Thank you for your message of 15 April about your conversation with General Galtieri.

15

h.a.  
APR 16/82

I am sure that neither you nor Al Haig, following his most helpful visits here, are in any doubt that it is the strong wish of the British Government, Parliament and people to avoid conflict. We have done our utmost to put Al Haig in a position where he has reasonable proposals to offer the Argentine Government.

I regret that we have seen no corresponding flexibility on the part of the Argentines. I note that General Galtieri has reaffirmed to you his desire to avoid conflict. But it seems to me - and I must state this frankly to you as a friend and ally - that he fails to draw the obvious conclusion. It was not Britain who broke the peace but Argentina. The Mandatory Resolution of the Security Council, to which you and we have subscribed, requires Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Falkland Islands. That is the essential first step which must be taken to avoid conflict. When it has been taken, discussions about the future of the Islands can profitably take place. Any suggestion that conflict can be avoided by a device that leaves the aggressor in occupation is surely gravely misplaced. The implications for other potential areas of tension and for small countries everywhere would be of extreme seriousness. The fundamental principles for which the free world stands would be shattered.

May I ask you to convey my strong feelings on this point urgently to Al Haig in Buenos Aires.

We remain ready at any time to continue discussions with yourself and Al Haig. Our earnest aim is to avoid conflict. But it is essential that America, our closest friend and ally, should share with us a common perception of the fundamental issues of democracy and freedom which are at stake, as I am sure you do.

WARMEST GOOD WISHES

MARGARET.

TOD 18027

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 77/82**

CAB/WH 1/16

FROM: CABINET OFFICE 161220Z APRIL 1982

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE

cc Marks  
ons

**S E C R E T**

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 15 APRIL ABOUT YOUR CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL GALTIERI.

I AM SURE THAT NEITHER YOU NOR AL HAIG, FOLLOWING HIS MOST HELPFUL VISITS HERE, ARE IN ANY DOUBT THAT IT IS THE STRONG WISH OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE TO AVOID CONFLICT. WE HAVE DONE OUR UTMOST TO PUT AL HAIG IN A POSITION WHERE HE HAS REASONABLE PROPOSALS TO OFFER THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

I REGRET THAT WE HAVE SEEN NO CORRESPONDING FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINES. I NOTE THAT GENERAL GALTIERI HAS REAFFIRMED TO YOU HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME - AND I MUST STATE THIS FRANKLY TO YOU AS A FRIEND AND ALLY - THAT HE FAILS TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS CONCLUSION. IT WAS NOT BRITAIN WHO BROKE THE PEACE BUT ARGENTINA. THE MANDATORY RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO WHICH YOU AND WE HAVE SUBSCRIBED, REQUIRES ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THAT IS THE ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP WHICH MUST BE TAKEN TO AVOID CONFLICT. WHEN IT HAS BEEN TAKEN, DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS CAN PROFITABLY TAKE PLACE. ANY SUGGESTION THAT CONFLICT CAN BE AVOIDED BY A DEVICE THAT LEAVES THE AGGRESSOR IN OCCUPATION IS SURELY GRAVELY MISPLACED. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER POTENTIAL AREAS OF TENSION AND FOR SMALL COUNTRIES EVERYWHERE WOULD BE OF EXTREME SERIOUSNESS. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR WHICH THE FREE WORLD STANDS WOULD BE SHATTERED.

MAY I ASK YOU TO CONVEY MY STRONG FEELINGS ON THIS POINT URGENTLY TO AL HAIG IN BUENOS AIRES.

WE REMAIN READY AT ANY TIME TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH YOURSELF AND AL HAIG. OUR EARNEST AIM IS TO AVOID CONFLICT. BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT AMERICA, OUR CLOSEST FRIEND AND ALLY, SHOULD SHARE WITH US A COMMON PERCEPTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM WHICH ARE AT STAKE, AS I AM SURE YOU DO.

WARMEST GOOD WISHES  
MARGARET

ENDS

DATE: TKS

MR Bosley NO 10

JACK ANDERSON (AMERICAN JOURNALIST) - Tapes Of Conversations Between  
President Reagan And Mr Alexander Haig.

Transcript from BBC Radio 4, Today Programme. 16 April 1982.

PRESENTER: Jack Anderson, one of America's best known investigative journalists, has managed to listen to taped conversations between President Reagan and Mr Alexander Haig while Mr Haig was in London for the Falkland negotiations. It's a remarkable revelation of the way the President's mind was working on the problem and what he thought of Mrs Thatcher's attitude. Earlier this morning Jack Anderson gave me the gist of this supposedly private conversation.

ANDERSON: President Reagan was giving instructions to the Secretary of State. In these instructions the President indicated some concern about the state of British emotion; he asked the Secretary whether the emotion that he encountered in his meetings in London extended beyond the officials to the people; he was told that the feelings were strong in Britain. Then he made a rather amazing statement about whether the British would be appeased if their submarine, which is located in the area, should sink an Argentine ship. What he said was (and I'll read to you the direct quote)

'That submarine of their's, do you think it's apt to go ahead with retribution and sink anything within the 200 miles and would that be enough to vindicate them?'

And at another point he urges the Secretary of State to bring pressure upon the Argentine leaders to exercise restraint. Reagan offered to take the blame for putting on the pressure. He used the kind of words that a Western hero in the movies might use; he said (and this is a direct quote)

'In those talks, if it's helpful at all, don't hold back on making me the bad guy and insisting on restraint if that's necessary'.

PRESENTER: Well what was Mr Haig's reply on the question about the submarine and sinking an Argentine ship?

ANDERSON: Basically he was saying that the Argentinians were exercising a little bit more restraint than the British; that the British were implacable.

PRESENTER: Was he saying anything about the sticking point in the negotiations where he couldn't get agreement?

ANDERSON: No, there wasn't too much of that, at least nothing that we don't all know about that hasn't been made in public. He was talking about the multi-national peace force, the problems of establishing it, whether or not the British wanted a skirmish. Reagan suggested that that they would want a skirmish, that they seemed to want to vindicate themselves.

PRESENTER: Did you get the impression from these tapes that he still has hopes of reaching a solution?

ANDERSON: Yes he calls it, in the tapes, a tough problem; he calls it an uphill fight; he wishes the Secretary of State good luck; he still obviously hopes that the Secretary will be successful in averting a naval showdown over the Falkland Islands.

~~Prime Minister~~

A.J.C. 16/4

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(6)

16/4

P.A.

MESSAGE FROM RENWICK, HEAD OF CHANCERY, WASHINGTON,  
RECEIVED 0720 HOURS: 16 APRIL

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY HAIG

He has spoken again to Costa Mendez. He says that the Commander in Chief of the Argentine Navy has assured him that no Argentine submarine is in or is entering the Maritime Exclusion Zone.

*A E Huckle*

16 April 1982

A E Huckle  
Emergency Unit

- cc: PS
- PS/PUS
- Mr Wright
- Mr Giffard
- Mr Gillmore
- No 10 (Mr Coles)
- MOD/Defence Situation Centre
- PS/Mr Nott

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29) 33

PS

~~PS~~ No.10 DOWNING ST.

~~PS/LPS~~

PS/MR ONSLOW

~~PS/MR RICHARD~~

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR

SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLER

MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER ~~SAPU~~ CABINET OFFICE

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IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 161600Z

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 161415Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 170 OF 16 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK SITCEN

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 708 TO WASHINGTON: FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC (RED CROSS)

1. CONVERS, DEPUTY HEAD OF OPERATIONS, ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON. HE HAD NO (NO) NEWS OF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN BUENOS AIRES, BUT WANTED TO EXPLAIN PRECISELY HOW MATTERS NOW STOOD.

2. CONVERS SAID THAT HE HAD JUST BEFOREHAND HAD A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE ICRC MAN IN BUENOS AIRES, CORTESI, WHO HAD AGAIN GONE OVER THE GROUND WITH THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES. THE ARGENTINIANS CONTINUED TO SHOW EXTREME SENSITIVITY AND A LEVEL OF NATIONALISM RARE IN ICRC EXPERIENCE. THEY CLEARLY FELT UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM THE UK AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND ALSO FROM THE WORLD PRESS WHICH THEY SAW AS DEEPLY UNSYMPATHETIC. ALL THIS TENDED TO CONFIRM THE TOUGHER ELEMENTS IN THEIR OB DURACY.

THEY SAW THE ICRC AS A EUROPEAN INSTITUTION AND HENCE THE TOOL OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE UK. THE ICRC WAS ALREADY SUSPECT IN ARGENTINIAN EYES BECAUSE OF ITS EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE EFFECTS OF REPRESSION IN ARGENTINA. THEY SAW THE ICRC'S ACTION AS DICTATED BY EUROPEAN AND UK INTERESTS AND CONSIDERED THAT A CONCESSION TO THE ICRC WOULD BE A CONCESSION TO THE BRITISH. THEY ARGUED FALSELY THAT DURING RECENT TENSION BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE THE ICRC HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST IN THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND WONDERED WHY THE ICRC WERE PUSHING SO HARD NOW.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, CONVERS RECOGNISED THAT BRITISH MINISTERS MIGHT WELL FIND IT DESIRABLE (AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS) TO MENTION ICRC'S ACTIONS IN PUBLIC AND EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THEM. WE WERE ENTIRELY FREE TO TAKE OUR OWN DECISIONS ON HOW TO EXPLAIN THE FACTS AND OUR REACTIONS TO THEM. BUT IN SO FAR AS WE MENTIONED ICRC ACTIVITIES WITH APPROVAL, AND CRITICISED THE LACK OF AN ARGENTINE RESPONSE, THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO THE ICRC IN ATTAINING ITS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE ON THE ISLANDS. THE ICRC WERE PRESSING AS HARD AS THEY COULD FOR THIS OBJECTIVE AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. TO STAND ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS THEY MUST HOWEVER BE SEEN TO BE THE INITIATOR OF THEIR OWN POLICIES, AND NOT THE TOOL OF ANYONE ELSE. CONVERS SAID THAT THE ICRC RECOGNISED THAT WE WANTED TO SEE AN ICRC PRESENCE TO HELP PROTECT "OUR PEOPLE" ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. BUT HE HOPED THAT MINISTERS WOULD SO FAR AS POSSIBLE AVOID SAYING SO PUBLICLY, IN ORDER THAT OUR INTEREST, AND THE ICRC INTEREST, WHICH FULLY COINCIDED,,

SHOULD BE REALISED.

4. I WELCOMED ICRC'S DETERMINATION TO PERSERVERE IN THEIR EFFORTS, AND NOTED THAT IT WAS ALSO IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ARGENTINIANS TO ALLOW THE ICRC IN, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO BEHAVE IN A RESPONSIBLE AND HUMANITARIAN WAY. CONVERS AGREED, BUT SAID THAT THE LONGER THE ARGENTINIANS DELAYED, THE MORE ANY DECISION TO ADMIT THE ICRC WOULD BE SEEN AS POLITICAL RATHER THAN HUMANITARIAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

LONG

*Mufaxed to Cheques at 1015, 1974*  
TYPISTS  
ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(35)

IMMEDIATE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

~~PS/...~~  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RIFKIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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HD/NEWS D  
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Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
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(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM WASHINGTON 161704Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1310 OF 16 APRIL

1910  
XX

FALKLANDS : JACK ANDERSON ARTICLE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARTICLE FROM NEW YORK POST OF 15 APRIL, HEADED HAIG'S POST-SHUTTLE IMPRESSIONS.

BEGINS  
SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG HAS TOLD PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT ARGENTINA MAY BE WILLING TO PULL OUT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE CAN BE SENT INTO THE DISPUTED TERRITORY.

A TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL CONVERSATION BETWEEN HAIG AND THE PRESIDENT CONTAINS SOME SURPRISING LANGUAGE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GENERAL FEELING IN THIS COUNTRY IS THAT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY JUNTA IS THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY IN THE CONFRONTATION. THE RHETORIC OF THE ARGENTINE LEADERS HAS BEEN EVEN MORE INFLAMMATORY THAN THE BELLICOSE STATEMENTS ISSUING FROM NO. 10 DOWNING STREET.

YET AFTER SHUTTLING BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES, HAIG TOLD THE PRESIDENT: THE ARGENTINIANS ARE A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBLE THAN THE BRITISH, IN FACT, AS THE TRANSCRIPT MAKES CLEAR, HAIGS AND REAGANS BIGGEST FEAR IS THAT A MILITARY ACTION WILL OCCUR BEFORE

... AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING



IN FACT, AS THE TRANSCRIPT MAKES CLEAR, HAIGS AND REAGANS BIGGEST FEAR IS THAT A MILITARY ACTION WILL OCCUR BEFORE THE US SPONSORED COMPROMISE - AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE TAKING OVER THE ISLANDS FROM ARGENTINE TROOPS - CAN BE ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES.

AND IT IS OBVIOUS FROM THE TRANSCRIPT THAT ITS THE BRITISH WHO WORRY REAGAN AND HAIG.

THEYLL WANT A SKIRMISH TO SAVE FACE, THE PRESIDENT REMARKED GLOOMILY AT ONE POINT

THEY INTEND TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE ARRIVES, HAIG TOLD REAGAN.

ONE THING EMERGED CLEARLY FROM THEIR CONVERSATION: REAGAN HAS CONFIDENCE IN HAIGS ABILITIES AS A SHUTTLE DIPLOMAT, THOUGH HE APPEARED TO FEEL THAT EVEN HAIGS BEST EFFORTS MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS.

DO WHAT YOU CAN, THE PRESIDENT TOLD HAIG. DONT PUT PRESSURE ON EITHER COUNTRY. THEN HE ADDED: BUT I BELIEVE YOUVE GOT YOUR WORK CUT OUT FOR YOU.

REAGAN EXPRESSED MILD SURPRISE AT THE BELATED BRITISH REACTION TO THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE ISLANDS. HE OBSERVED THAT A BRITISH NUCLEAR SUBMARINE HAD BEEN IN THE AREA FROM THE START, AND SUPPOSEDLY WAS KEEPING TRACK OF ARGENTINE MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

TOWARD THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, REAGAN INSTRUCTED HAIG NOT TO SAY TOO MUCH ABOUT THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO THE PRESS. KEEP THE SPECULATION DOWN TO A MINIMUM, HE TOLD HIS SECRETARY OF STATE.

ENDS

2. AN ARTICLE IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST REPORTS THAT THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE ON THE NIGHT OF 11 APRIL AS HAIG WAS FLYING TO LONDON. IT QUOTES PRESIDENT REAGAN TELLING HAIG QUOTE IN THOSE TALKS (WITH THE BRITISH), IF ITS HELPFUL AT ALL, WHY, DONT HOLD BACK ON MAKING ME THE BAD GUY AND INSISTING ON RESTRAINT IF THATS NECESSARY. UNQUOTE HE IS QUOTED AS ASKING HAIG QUOTE INCIDENTALLY, THAT SUBMARINE OF THEIRS, DO YOU THINK ITS APT TO GO AHEAD WITH RETRIBUTION AND SINK ANYTHING WITHIN 200 MILES, AND WOULD THAT BE ENOUGH TO VINDICATE THEM ? UNQUOTE

HENDERSON

*Mufaxed to Chequers  
at 10.15, 13/4*

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

36  
(28)

**IMMEDIATE**

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS  
~~PS/LPS~~  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RIFKIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
DIO

RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 170730Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 170115Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 487 OF 16 APRIL 1982

MY I.P.T.: FALKLANDS: NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT

i. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT COMMUNIQUE PREPARED BY ARGENTINA:  
BEGINS

THE MEETING OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU OF THE NON-ALIGNED  
MOVEMENT HELD ON APRIL , 1982, WAS CONVENED AT THE REQUEST  
OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA.

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA MADE A STATEMENT  
TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES THE NEW

DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE REGION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS AFTER HIS INTERVENTION OF 6TH. APRIL WHICH HAVE INCREASED THE TENSION EXISTING IN THE ZONE, GRAVELY ENDANGERING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE ABOVE-MENTIONED STATEMENT AND THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY OTHER REPRESENTATIVES, AS WELL AS THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION, THE COORDINATING BUREAU POINTED OUT ITS GRAVE CONCERN OVER THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS AND REQUESTED THE INTERESTED PARTIES TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION OF THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WHICH MAY ALTER PEACE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE REGION.

IN THIS CONTEXT THE COORDINATING BUREAU CONSCIOUS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN THE PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION, RECALLED THE REITERATED SUPPORT OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY RECOGNIZED IN RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

THE COORDINATING BUREAU EXPRESSED ITS SUPPORT TO ALL THE STATEMENTS OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AIMED AT OBTAINING A JUST AND NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTEREST OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLANDS, AND THE PREVIOUS RECOGNITION OF THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC OVER THOSE TERRITORIES.

ENDS

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EYES ALPHA

DESKBY 170730Z

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 162226Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 481 OF 16 APRIL.

PERSONAL FOR MALLABY

MIPT: FALKLANDS AT THE UN.

1. FOLLOWING IS TENTATIVE TEXT OF PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION:  
BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 502 (1982),

DEEPLY DISTURBED ABOUT THE FAILURE SO FAR TO IMPLEMENT THIS  
RESOLUTION AND TO RESTORE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION OF THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS),

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER,

1. CALLS ON ARGENTINA TO COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE  
FORCES AND ADMINISTRATION FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS),  
SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS BY 0400 GREENWICH MEAN  
TIME ON (26 APRIL 1982).

2. TAKES NOTE OF THE READINESS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO WITHDRAW  
ITS ARMED FORCES FROM THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS  
MALVINAS) AND TO SUSPEND IMMEDIATELY ITS DECISION CREATING A  
MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS),  
AS SOON AS CONFIRMATION IS RECEIVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA  
HAS BEGUN IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS RESOLUTION.

3. DECIDES THAT, UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE AND UNITED  
KINGDOM FORCES, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH  
SANDWICH ISLANDS SHALL BE DEMILITARIZED AND USED FOR PEACEFUL  
PURPOSES ONLY BUT WITHOUT PREVENTING THE CONTINUED USE OF THE  
ISLANDS FOR THE PURPOSES OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

4. DECIDES FURTHER, IN THE LIGHT OF THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY, THAT FOR AN  
INTERIM PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING (FIVE) YEARS FROM (26 APRIL 1982)  
THE INHABITANTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SHALL ADMINISTER THEIR OWN  
AFFAIRS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATOR  
WHO SHALL BE APPOINTED IMMEDIATELY FOR THAT PURPOSE AND WHO SHALL  
HAVE THE ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF:

(A) CONFIRMING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE AND UNITED KINGDOM ARMED  
FORCES;

(B) VERIFYING THE DEMILITARIZED STATUS OF THE ISLANDS;

(C) ADMINISTERING SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS.

5. URGES THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO  
SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES DURING THE INTERIM  
PERIOD REFERRED TO ABOVE AND TO RESPECT FULLY THE PURPOSES AND

ACTION

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NARITHE EXCLUSION ZONE AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (1982)  
AS SOON AS CONFIRMATION IS RECEIVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA  
HAS BEGUN IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS RESOLUTION.

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ISLANDS FOR THE PURPOSES OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

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- (A) CONFIRMING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE AND UNITED KINGDOM ARMED  
FORCES;
- (B) VERIFYING THE DEMILITARIZED STATUS OF THE ISLANDS;
- (C) ADMINISTERING SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS.

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5. URGES THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO  
SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES DURING THE INTERIM  
PERIOD REFERRED TO ABOVE AND TO RESPECT FULLY THE PURPOSES AND  
PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SUBMIT TO THE COUNCIL PROPOSALS  
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 4 WITHIN 24 HOURS.

ENDS

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TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

Mufaxed to Chequers  
TYPISTS at 1035, 17/4  
(82) 31

PS (6)  
~~PS/MR HURD~~ PS/MR HURD  
~~PS/MR ONSLOW~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.  
PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
[ HD/NEWS D ]  
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DIO

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[ D/BY 170700Z ]

WONFO 018/17

CO FCO DESKBY 170700Z

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DESKBY 170700Z

FM WASHINGTON 170238Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1329 OF 16 APRIL

MY TELEGRAM NO 1323: FALKLANDS

ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR SATELLITE COVERAGE.

EAGLEBURGER TELEPHONED MINISTER THIS EVENING TO GIVE HIM THE LINE WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD NOW WORKED OUT FOR DEALING WITH THE INTENSE PRESS INTEREST IN THIS STORY, FOLLOWING TONIGHT'S U.S. TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE. EAGLEBURGER STRESSED THAT THIS WAS THE BEST THEY COULD DEVISE TO MINIMISE PUBLIC RELATIONS DAMAGE IN TERMS OF THE U.S. - ARGENTINE RELATIONS.

OF THE U.S./U.K. RELATIONSHIP.

2. THE MAIN QUESTIONS BEING ASKED FOCUS ON WHETHER ARGENTINA HAS ASKED FOR OR OBTAINED PHOTOGRAPHIC SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.
3. ON THE RECORD THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL SAY NO, AND WILL OFFER NO COMMENT ON DEEP BACKGROUND, THEY WILL SAY THAT THIS STORY IS TOTALLY UNTRUE. IF PRESSED (WHICH THEY EXPECT TO BE) THEY WILL SAY THEY NOTE THAT BOTH ARGENTINA AND THE U.K. HAVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH NASA IN CIVIL SATELLITE PROGRAMMES, THAT THESE HAVE NO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE VALUE, AND THAT FURTHER ENQUIRIES SHOULD BE PUT TO NASA.
4. NASA, IF APPROACHED, WILL
  - (A) GIVE FULL TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE LANDSAT PROGRAMME,
  - (B) CONFIRM THE REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AND EXPLAIN THAT IT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH NASA,
  - (C) CONFIRM THAT NASA IS MEETING THE ARGENTINIAN REQUEST.NASA WILL THEMSELVES ALSO EMPHASISE THE ABSENCE OF MILITARY VALUE IN THESE PROGRAMMES. (THEY ARE VERY SCARED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO THE FUTURE OF THESE PROGRAMMES WHICH WERE BUILT ON THE ASSURANCE THAT THEY WERE ENTIRELY BENIGN).
5. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT PUBLICATION OF ALL THIS MATERIAL WAS NO MORE THAN NORMAL PRACTICE. ALL NASA ARRANGEMENTS WITH SECOND PARTY SUBSCRIBERS (E.G. ARGENTINA) WERE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. THIS WAS NOT TRUE OF THIRD PARTY RELATIONSHIPS (E.G. U.K.) NASA WOULD NOT THEREFORE REVEAL THE U.K.'S RECENT REQUEST FOR LANDSAT COVERAGE OF THE ARGENTINIAN COASTLINE (WHICH WE UNDERSTAND HAS BEEN SOUGHT BY HUNTING SURVEYS).
6. EAGLEBURGER ADDED FOR GOOD MEASURE THAT NASA HAD TOLD THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT IN 10 YEARS OF TRYING THEY HAD VERY POOR RESULTS WITH THIS PROGRAMME OVER THE FALKLANDS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT WITH THE ARGENTINIANS FOR THE MOMENT IN OCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS AND FROM WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD OF THE LIKELY MOVEMENTS OF OUR SHIPS, THEIR PRESENT REQUEST WOULD PROVIDE THEM WITH NO USEFUL INTELLIGENCE WHATEVER. THE NEXT PASS WOULD NOT BE FOR EIGHTEEN DAYS. EAGLEBURGER GAVE MINISTER A FIRM UNDERTAKING THAT NASA WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO ACCEDE TO A FUTURE ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR SIMILAR COVERAGE WITHOUT SPECIFIC CLEARANCE.
7. WE SUGGEST THAT WE ALSO STICK TO THE LINE IN PARAGRAPH 3 IN RESPONSE TO ENQUIRIES HERE OR IN LONDON.

7. WE SUGGEST THAT WE ALSO STICK TO THE LINE IN PARAGRAPH 3 IN  
RESPONSE TO ENQUIRIES HERE OR IN LONDON.

PLEASE ADVANCE BY 170700Z TO FALKLANDS EMERGENCY UNIT AND NEWS  
DEPARTMENT.

HENDERSON

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FM FCO 161600Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 60 OF 16 APRIL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: ARGENTINE PROPAGANDA

1. SOME ARGENTINE MISSIONS OVERSEAS ARE CIRCULATING DOCUMENTS TO OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND LOCAL CONTACTS, INCLUDING THE MEDIA, PURPORTING TO EXPLAIN THE BACKGROUND TO RECENT EVENTS AND JUSTIFY THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS. POSTS WILL ALREADY HAVE MATERIAL TO COUNTER THEIR MAIN ARGUMENTS, BUT THE FOLLOWING POINTS MAY ALSO BE HELPFUL AND CAN BE USED FREELY.

SOUTH GEORGIA

2. ARGENTINE PROPAGANDA IS PRESENTING EVENTS IN SOUTH GEORGIA IN MARCH 1982 AS BRITISH 'AGGRESSION' AGAINST ARGENTINE CITIZENS LEGALLY CONDUCTING A COMMERCIAL OPERATION. FOR THE TRUE BACKGROUND, INCLUDING BRITAIN'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS, SEE LORD CARRINGTON'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON 30 MARCH (TEXT IN VS 29/82). ARGENTINE CLAIMS THAT THE GROUP WAS THERE LEGALLY BECAUSE IT HAD DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 1971 ANGLO-ARGENTINE COMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT ARE SPURIOUS: THE 1971 AGREEMENT APPLIES SPECIFICALLY AND EXCLUSIVELY TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, NOT SOUTH GEORGIA. IN ANY CASE, POSSESSION OF SUCH DOCUMENTATION NEVER ABSOLVED EITHER ARGENTINES OR FALKLAND ISLANDERS FROM COMPLYING WITH NORMAL IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES. CLAIMS THAT BRITAIN WAS SEEKING TO 'INVALIDATE' THE 1971 AGREEMENT ARE EQUALLY SPURIOUS FOR THE SAME REASONS.

HISTORICAL BASIS OF SOVEREIGNTY CLAIM

3. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON MATERIAL ALREADY PROVIDED, INCLUDING

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GUIDANCE TELNOS 54, 57 AND 58 TO COUNTER TENDENTIOUS ARGENTINE ARGUMENTS ABOUT EVENTS PRIOR TO 1833, AND ASSERTIONS THAT THESE PROVE THE VALIDITY OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. YOU COULD ADD THAT IF EVERY COUNTRY WHICH HAD UNSATISFIED TERRITORIAL CLAIMS DATING BACK 150 YEARS WERE TO USE FORCE IN AN ATTEMPT TO REDRAW ITS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, A VERY CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WOULD BE AFFECTED AND THE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS.

#### UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

4. ARGENTINE ARGUMENTS THAT UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS CALLED ON ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE ARE PLAINLY SELF-DEFEATING, SINCE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING AT THE TIME OF THE INVASION THE MOST RECENT ROUND HAVING BEEN HELD IN FEBRUARY 1982 IN NEW YORK. MOREOVER, ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT MANDATORY UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 FOLLOWING THE INVASION SHOWS HOW MUCH SHE HERSELF RESPECTS UN RESOLUTIONS.

#### WISHES VS INTERESTS

5. YOU WILL BE FAMILIAR WITH ARGENTINA'S ARGUMENTS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS ON THE BASIS THAT THEY ARE FOREIGN SETTLERS, NOT NATIVES. YOU SHOULD USE THE ARGUMENTS IN GUIDANCE TELNO 57 TO COMBAT THIS. HMG HAVE CONSISTENTLY EMPHASISED THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLANDERS' OWN WISHES. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IS INDEED ENSHRINED IN THE UN CHARTER.

6. ARGENTINE PROPAGANDA HAS BEEN INSISTING THAT ISLANDERS' INTERESTS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN BORNE IN MIND, AND LONG LISTS OF ARGENTINE OFFERS OF MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THEM ARE BEING PARADED. ARGENTINA HAS CERTAINLY PROVIDED USEFUL SERVICES TO THE ISLANDS, NOTABLY A WEEKLY AIR SERVICE TO THE MAINLAND AND SUBSIDISED PETROL: SUCH SERVICES HAVE BEEN APPRECIATED. THE FACT THAT OTHER OFFERS WERE DECLINED MEANS ONLY THAT ISLANDERS CONSIDERED EXISTING FACILITIES ADEQUATE OR, IN SOME CASES, THAT

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HEAVY-HANDED OFFERS OF CHARITY, WHOSE PURPOSE AS AN INDUCEMENT TO ACCEPT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY WAS SOMETIMES OPENLY ADMITTED, WERE INEVITABLY UNWELCOME.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH

TO IMMEDIATE

BONN

ATHENS  
BRUSSELS  
UKREP EC BRUSSELS  
COPENHAGEN  
THE HAGUE  
LUXEMBOURG  
PARIS

ROME  
BERNE  
DUBLIN  
MADRID  
UKMIS NEW YORK  
BIS NEW YORK

WASHINGTON  
OTTAWA  
CANBERRA  
WELLINGTON  
NEW DELHI  
LAGOS

[PRIORITY]

UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS  
LISBON  
OSLO  
UKDEL STRASBOURG  
UKMIS GENEVA  
STOCKHOLM  
MOSCOW  
WARSAW  
CARACAS  
MEXICO CITY  
BRASILIA  
SAO PAULO  
RIO DE JANEIRO  
BOGOTA  
HAVANA  
LIMA

MONTEVIDEO  
SANTIAGO  
ASUNCION  
LA PAZ  
PANAMA CITY  
QUITO  
SAN JOSE  
SANTO DOMINGO  
TEGUCIGALPA  
AMMAN  
KUWAIT  
CAIRO  
DAKAR  
KINSHASA  
CAPE TOWN

PRETORIA  
PEKING  
TOKYO  
DACC  
COLOMBO  
ACCRA  
NAIROBI  
LUSAKA  
KINGSTON  
PORT OF SPAIN  
GEORGETOWN  
BRIDGETOWN  
BELMOPAN  
SUVA  
HONG KONG  
GIBRALTAR

[ROUTINE]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

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501 1

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

RR BIS NEW YORK

RR WASHINGTON

RR MEXICO CITY

RR OTTAWA

GRS 600

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FM FCO 161500Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 59 OF 16 APRIL.

FALKLANDS: ECONOMIC ACTION TAKEN AGAINST ARGENTINA BY EUROPEAN  
COMMUNITY AND OTHERS

1. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE USED AT YOUR DISCRETION EXCEPT WHERE  
OTHERWISE STATED.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

2. ON 2 APRIL (THE DAY OF THE INVASION) FOREIGN MINISTERS  
CONDEMNED THE ARGENTINE ACTION AND CALLED ON ARGENTINA TO  
WITHDRAW ITS FORCES IMMEDIATELY AND TO ADHERE TO THE UN SECURITY  
COUNCIL'S APPEAL TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE (RETRACT NO  
090/05).

3. ON 10 APRIL FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE COMMUNITY REPEATED  
THEIR CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINA AND CALLED FOR THE IMMEDIATE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. THEY ANNOUNCED A COMPLETE EMBARGO OF  
ARMS EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA TO BE CARRIED OUT BY INDIVIDUAL  
GOVERNMENTS. THEY DECIDED 'IN A SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY' TO BAN  
ALL IMPORTS OF ARGENTINE ORIGIN INTO THE COMMUNITY. THEY CALLED  
ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE SIMILAR DECISIONS. TEXT OF THIS  
STATEMENT IS BEING SENT TO SELECTED POSTS IN RETRACT SERIES.

4. THE DETAILS OF THE IMPORT BAN WERE FINALISED ON 14 APRIL.  
THE BAN WILL COME INTO EFFECT FROM 16 APRIL FOR AN INITIAL  
PERIOD (RENEWABLE) OF ONE MONTH. IT WILL AFFECT ALL IMPORTS OF  
ARGENTINE ORIGIN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GOODS IN TRANSIT AND  
THOSE ALREADY LICENSED OR CONTRACTED FOR.

/5. EXPORT

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5. EXPORT CREDITS ARE A MATTER FOR INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS. ALMOST ALL MEMBER STATE GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALSO DECIDED THAT IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARGENTINA THERE WILL NOT IN PRACTICE BE ANY NEW OFFERS OF OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED EXPORT CREDITS. (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT IS STILL PERSUING WITH ITS EXPORT CREDIT BOARD, WHICH IS NOT GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED.)

6. MOST MEMBER STATES HAVE IN ADDITION REPORTED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF CONTACTS WITH BANKS IN THEIR COUNTRIES, THE PROVISION OF NEW LOANS TO ARGENTINE BORROWERS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IS MOST UNLIKELY.

OTHER STATES

7. AS FAR AS THE COMMONWEALTH IS CONCERNED, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND HAVE BANNED IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA AND WILL GRANT NO NEW EXPORT CREDITS. NEW ZEALAND HAS GONE FURTHER AND BANNED EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA AS WELL.

8. THE UNITED STATES HAVE TAKEN NO PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MEASURES, THOUGH THEY ARE AT PRESENT AVOIDING NEW COMMITMENTS ON EXPORT CREDITS. (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE ARE NOT PRESSING THE AMERICANS TO INTRODUCE MEASURES AS LONG AS THE HAIG MISSION CONTINUES.)

9. JAPAN HAS NOT TAKEN ANY MEASURES, THOUGH THEY HAVE WARNED ARGENTINA THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS COULD BE AFFECTED IF THE DISPUTE CONTINUES. (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THE JAPANESE HAVE TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT NO APPLICATION FOR NEW COMMITMENTS FOR EXPORT CREDIT TO ARGENTINA ARE EXPECTED FOR THE TIME BEING. WE ARE NOW PRESSING THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO GO FURTHER, AS THE COMMUNITY AND OLD COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES HAVE DONE.)

10. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE ASKED ALL UK DEPENDENCIES TO IMPOSE A PARALLEL BAN ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA. THESE ARE ONLY SIGNIFICANT

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IN THE CASE OF HONG KONG: HONG KONG HAVE ALREADY TAKEN THE NECESSARY ACTION.

ARGENTINE RETALIATION

11. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS (OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET HAD CONFIRMATION) THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED THAT NO MORE IMPORT LICENCES WILL BE GRANTED FOR SUPPLIES FROM EC COUNTRIES, EXCEPT FOR VITAL GOODS SUCH AS SPARE PARTS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ABOUT ANY SIMILAR ARGENTINE ACTION AGAINST OTHERS WHO HAVE TAKEN ECONOMIC MEASURES.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH

ATHENS  
BONN  
BRUSSELS  
UKREP EC BRUSSELS

COPENHAGEN  
THE HAGUE  
LUXEMBOURG  
PARIS

ROME  
BERNE  
DUBLIN  
LAGOS

[PRIORITY]

UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS  
LISBON  
OSLO  
UKDEL STRASBOURG  
UKMIS GENEVA  
MADRID  
STOCKHOLM  
MOSCOW  
WARSAW  
UKMIS NEW YORK  
BIS NEW YORK  
WASHINGTON  
CARACAS  
MEXICO CITY  
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BOGOTA

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LUSAKA  
KINGSTON  
PORT OF SPAIN  
GEORGETOWN  
BRIDGETOWN  
NASSAU  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 April 1982

*Dear John,*

Falkland Islands Company

Willie Rickett wrote to me on 15 April reporting Mr Needham's call on the Prime Minister on 15 April and asking for advice.

Mr Pym is inclined to doubt whether any general evacuation of the sort which Mr Needham appears to have in mind would necessarily be in line with the wishes of the Islanders (their views on this appear very mixed and the telexes provide no convincing evidence either way); or that it would be allowed by the Argentine authorities (who may want to hang on to a substantial proportion of the population as hostages against a military assault). He therefore does not think that any authorisation should be given to Mr Needham to encourage a general evacuation: individuals and companies such as his will have to make their own decision in the light of particular circumstances.

Mr Pym also does not believe that we should give assurances about the Falkland Islands Company (FICo) not losing financially, or the Islanders being in a position to rescue their savings from the Falklands, at this juncture. The question of reparations for losses resulting from the Argentine invasion or subsequent hostilities - whether these losses are incurred by companies or by individuals - will have to be part of a larger long-term settlement. They should not be made the subject of individual undertakings at this stage. However, Mr Pym entirely shares the Prime Minister's 'determination that nothing should stand in the way of those Islanders who wished to return to the UK'. The enclosed draft letter to Mr Needham indicates that arrangements are being made to give the necessary support to any Islanders who have either been deported or made arrangements for their own evacuation from the Islands. The letter is drafted as from the Prime Minister, since past experience shows that Mr Needham will not take anything else, for example a Private Secretary letter, as representing her views.

This is obviously a question of some importance and the Prime Minister may wish to discuss it further, for example in

/ODSA



ODSA, before replying to Mr Needham.

I am copying this letter, with the enclosed draft, to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office)

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



LETTER

**DRAFT:** minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

**FROM:**

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

**DEPARTMENT:**

**TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

**TO:**

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

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Unclassified

C E Needham Esq  
Chairman of the Falkland Islands  
Company

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**SUBJECT:**

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for calling on 15 April to give me an account of your contacts with the Falkland Islands over the past few days. This was a great help to me in keeping abreast of developments there. I am returning to you the telex messages which you showed me. We are, of course, treating them in strict confidence

You suggested that you might pass messages back to your employees and their dependants on the Islands about evacuation. This must be a matter for you and your company. We have noted that a large number of Islanders who normally live in Port Stanley have been permitted to leave for the countryside ('the camp') where they will presumably be safer in the event of any hostilities. There is conflicting evidence about how many of the Islanders wish to leave now and it seems no general pattern has yet emerged. Indeed, it is

/likely

Enclosures—flag(s).....

likely to remain essentially a personal decision for individuals. There is no machinery through which the Islanders can express their collective views as long as the Islands remain under Argentine occupation. We remain doubtful in any case whether the Argentine authorities would themselves permit any general evacuation of the Islands by the British inhabitants.

However, I do feel strongly that anyone who wishes to leave should not be prevented from doing so by financial circumstances. We have therefore given some thought to this aspect of the problem. At present we understand that most of those who have left have been deported by the Argentine authorities without charge; nor do we anticipate that there would be problems for Islanders if required to pay for their passage to the Argentine mainland since Falklands Islands currency still appears to be valid on the Islands. We recognise however that there are very real problems for those Islanders who reach Montevideo and wish to continue their journey back to the United Kingdom. We have therefore instructed our Embassy at Montevideo to give sympathetic help under our normal rules to any Islanders who are in this position. They may be sure that no-one will be left stranded there for want of funds.

Equally we understand that most Islanders who might return to the UK would have family, friends or employers (such as your own company) to help them in any temporary

settlement problems here. As I told you, the Home Office will adopt a cooperative attitude towards immigration problems for any Falkland Islanders who do not have right of abode in the UK, and the social services would also lend full and sympathetic assistance in meeting the immediate needs of Islanders who arrive here.

I hope you will keep in touch with us about developments on the Islands and anything further you may learn about conditions there and the intentions of the Islanders. I am - as you know - determined to stand by them in the difficulties, dangers and anxieties that are facing them in the days ahead.

TODAY SUMMARY APRIL 16

FALKLANDS

HAIG SHUTTLE

Haig arrives in Buenos Aires and will meet gov leaders later on this morning (our time). At the airport says stakes are now so great as to demand the ultimate effort from both sides to achieve a negotiated settlement. Argentine Pres phones Regan who continues to forcefully urge negotiated settlement.

ARGENTINE FLEET

Reports that ships have left port heading south. Argentine gov warns international shipping to stay out of MEZ

ANDERSON TAPES

Columnist Jack Anderson says he has tapes of conversations between Regan and Haig at time of first Haig trip to UK. Tapes show:

1. Regan asking if emotion shown by gov is shared by public. Regan told emotion running high throughout the country
2. Regan asking if British would be "appeased" if their submarine on station (by implication only one) were to sink an Argentine ship. Would that meet the British need for retribution? Would it be enough to vindicate the gov? Haig says Argentines showing more restraint than UK.
3. Regan indicating he would keep up pressure on Argentines to exercise restraint.
4. Regan offering to take the blame for any unpopular American negotiating stance.... "don't hold back on making me the bad guy"

PYM FALKLAND BROADCAST

Brief extract from conclusion of broadcast.

DEPORTEES

ODA vet interviewed. Stresses worry of islanders about their fate in the event of an invasion.

OTHER NEWS

MID EAST

Intense diplomatic activity to ensure that there is no hold up in Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

RETIREMENT AGE

Help the Aged wants fixed retirement ages ended as this is age discrimination.

WIMBLEDON

Borg will not play this year.

ce Mark  
On.

8

T 73/82

Prime Minister

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. ....**

A.P.C. 16/4

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\*\*\*\*\*ZZ WTE24  
DE WTE 22011 1052329  
Z 152353Z APR 82  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO CABINET OFFICE  
ZEN

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH02011

APRIL 15, 1982

DEAR MARGARET:

AT HIS REQUEST, I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH GENERAL GALTIERI CONCERNING THE FALKLANDS ISLAND CRISIS. I WANTED TO RELAY TO YOU A SUMMARY OF THAT CONVERSATION. IN VIEW OF THE LATE HOUR IN LONDON, I HAVE SENT YOU THIS MESSAGE, BUT WE CAN TALK ON THE TELEPHONE TOMORROW MORNING IF YOU THINK IT NECESSARY.

GENERAL GALTIERI REAFFIRMED TO ME HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH YOUR COUNTRY, AND HIS FEARS THAT CONFLICT WOULD CAUSE DETERIORATION IN RECENTLY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT THE ADVANCE OF YOUR FLEET AND THE BLOCKADE OF THE ISLANDS WERE MAKING HIS SITUATION DIFFICULT. I TOLD HIM THAT I SHARED HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT, AND URGED HIM TO BE FORTHCOMING AND FLEXIBLE IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH SECRETARY HAIG, WHO HAD MY FULL FAITH AND CONFIDENCE. WITHOUT MAKING SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STEPS TO ME, GENERAL GALTIERI PROMISED TO DEAL HONESTLY AND SERIOUSLY WITH SECRETARY HAIG.

I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE HOSPITALITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO AL DURING HIS TWO VISITS. WE ARE ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE RECEPTIVITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A COMMON GROUND BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY, ONE OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES, AND ARGENTINA, WITH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO COOPERATE IN ADVANCING SPECIFIC INTERESTS IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

WARM REGARDS,

RON

0286  
22011

NNNN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SAPU(82) 4

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper was issued at 1745 hours on 16 April 1982. Items 2 - 4 contain advance warning of news stories which may become public over the weekend along with suggested defensive lines to take. It is classified CONFIDENTIAL because we would not wish to draw attention to these issues unless or until they become public.

Cabinet Office

16 April 1982

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. The Haig Mission

Mr Haig may come to London this weekend for further discussions. We shall not be commenting on any aspects of his negotiations until after he has seen the Prime Minister. Meanwhile our objective remains a diplomatic solution.

2. RAF Vulcan Bombers

The Sunday Express is likely to carry a story (by Winston Churchill MP) that the RAF is preparing Vulcan bombers to take part in the Falkland Island operations. These bombers, which have a nuclear capability, are to be replaced by the Tornado and were being withdrawn from service. However training exercises with conventional bombs were already planned for next week and it was not to be expected that these would have escaped public notice.

Defensive Line to Take

Can confirm that Vulcans are planned to take part in bombing exercises this week. I cannot comment on operational plans but in any event there is no suggestion that their nuclear capability has any relevance in the Argentine context.

3. HMS Illustrious

HMS Illustrious the second of the Navy's new anti submarine carriers which is being built by British Shipbuilders on Tyneside was planned to enter service in 1983. She has finished sea trials and is now completing her fitting out. British Shipbuilders have been asked to divert extra effort to Illustrious to speed up her acceptance into service and have agreed to co-operate.

Defensive Line to Take

We are making every effort to speed up HMS Illustrious's entry into service to enhance our military capability but cannot comment on specific plans.

4. 2 Parachute Regiment --

2 Parachute Regiment is being brought to 72 hours notice to move as part of our continuing build up of military focus and this is likely to become public over the weekend. No firm order to move will however be issued until arrangements for suitable shipping have been finalised.

Line to take

Can confirm that this is part of our continuing build up but no move can take place until arrangements for transport have been completed.





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>618</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
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ILLEGAL LANDING ON SOUTH GEORGIA; CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

FRIDAY 19 MARCH:

A BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY FIELD PARTY REPORT THAT AN ARGENTINE NAVY CARGO VESSEL IS ANCHORED IN LEITH HARBOUR. A PART OF ABOUT 60 ARGENTINES HAVE SET UP CAMP AND AN ARGENTINE FLAG HAS BEEN HOISTED.

SATURDAY 20 MARCH:

THE BAS FIELD PARTY INFORMS THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY HAVE LANDED ILLEGALLY AND THAT THEY MUST LEAVE.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE INSTRUCT HMS ENDURANCE TO PREPARE TO SAIL TO SOUTH GEORGIA WITH A DETACHMENT OF MARINES FROM PORT STANLEY.

HM AMBASSADOR BUENOS AIRES INFORMS THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT WE ARE TREATING THE INFRINGEMENT OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY VERY SERIOUSLY. THE ARGENTINE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IS CALLED IN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND TOLD THE SAME. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PROFESS IGNORANCE BUT AGREE TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER URGENTLY.

SUNDAY 21 MARCH:

HMS ENDURANCE DEPARTS FOR SOUTH GEORGIA.

ARGENTINE MFA INFORM US THAT THE SHIP WILL LEAVE SOUTH GEORGIA SHORTLY AND THAT NO SERVICE PERSONNEL ARE INVOLVED.

MONDAY 22 MARCH:

WE RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE SHIP HAS LEFT BUT THERE ARE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER ALL THE MEN HAVE GONE.

IN THE EVENING, BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY CONFIRM THAT ABOUT SIX MEN AND SOME EQUIPMENT REMAIN.

/ TUESDAY 23 MARCH

SECRET AND PERSONAL

TUESDAY 23 MARCH:

HMS ENDURANCE IS INSTRUCTED TO SAIL ON FOR SOUTH GEORGIA AND REMOVE THE MEN, IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT USING FORCE.

MR. LUCE MAKES A STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT LATER WARNS THAT USE OF HMS ENDURANCE WOULD BE GRAVELY PROVOCATIVE. THEY ARE TOLD WE WISH TO AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE: IF THEY CAN PROPOSE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF REMOVING THE MEN, WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THEM DO SO.

WEDNESDAY 24 MARCH:

HMS ENDURANCE ORDERED TO ANCHOR IN GRYTVIKEN HARBOUR, BUT NOT TO PROCEED TO LEITH.

ARGENTINE MFA SAY THEY WISH TO PREVENT THE SITUATION ESCALATING IF POSSIBLE, BUT NEED TIME TO CONSIDER.

THURSDAY 25 MARCH:

ARGENTINE NAVAL VESSEL IS SIGHTED AT LEITH DELIVERING FURTHER SUPPLIES.

WE ASK THE ARGENTINES FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST THAT THEY REMOVE THE MEN.

ARGENTINE MFA THEN SAY THAT BY DEPLOYING HMG ENDURANCE WE HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO CONTAIN THEIR POSITION.

WE REPLY THAT WE WISH TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION AND PROPOSE THAT IF THE PARTY REQUEST THE PROPER AUTHORISATION FROM GRYTVIKEN, IT WILL BE GIVEN.

FRIDAY 26 /  
SATURDAY 27 MARCH:

NO FORMAL REPLY FROM THE ARGENTINE MFA. BUT THEY ISSUE A PRESS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THAT THE MEN WILL BE GIVEN ALL NECESSARY PROTECTION AND THE PRESS REPORTS THAT SEVERAL ARGENTINE NAVY VESSELS HAVE BEEN ORDERED INTO THE AREA.

/ SUNDAY 28 MARCH:

SUNDAY 28 MARCH:

ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER SENDS A MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE NO INTENTION OF AGREEING TO OUR PROPOSAL.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SENDS A MESSAGE TO MR. HAIG, ASKING HIM TO INTERVENE AND URGE RESTRAINT ON THE ARGENTINES.

MONDAY 29 MARCH:

CONVERSATION AT NORTHOLT.

TUESDAY 30 MARCH:

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY MAKES STATEMENT IN HOUSE OF LORDS.

ARGENTINES REJECT US PROPOSAL FOR A SOLUTION BASED ON REGULARISING THE MEN'S PRESENCE.

WEDNESDAY 31 MARCH:

FOREIGN SECRETARY SENDS MESSAGE TO COSTA MENDEZ PROPOSING THE DESPATCH OF AN EMISSARY.

\* ~~~~~ \*

ARGENTINE NAVAL FORCE WILL BE GROUPING FOR PORT STANLEY ON 2 APRIL. MEETING IN PRIME MINISTER'S ROOM IN HOUSE OF COMMONS. PRIME MINISTER SENDS MESSAGE TO MR. REAGAN ASKING HIM TO INTERVENE.

THURSDAY 1 APRIL:

COSTA MENDEZ REJECTS PROPOSAL TO SEND EMISSARY AND SAYS DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL IS NOW CLOSED. ONLY REMAINING POINT OF DISCUSSION WOULD BE THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO ARGENTINA.

PRESIDENT REAGAN REBUFFED BY GALTIERI: SENDS MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER STATING THAT GALTIERI LEFT "THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HE HAS EMBARKED ON A COURSE OF ARMED CONFLICT".

UN SECRETARY GENERAL SUMMONS BRITISH AND ARGENTINE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO APPEAL TO BOTH TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

OD DECIDES THAT ENDURANCE SHOULD REMAIN ON STATION IN SOUTH ATLANTIC FOR TIME BEING.

\* ~ \* Passage deleted  
and retained under  
Section 3(4)

Wayland  
1 March 2012

THURSDAY 1 APRIL (CONTD) BRIEF DISCUSSION IN CABINET.

AFTER RECEIVING FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT AN ARGENTINE ATTACK WAS IMMINENT, WE SEEK AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH RESULTS IN A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CALLING ON BOTH SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE IN THE AREA. THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AGREES; THE ARGENTINE SAYS NOTHING.

WE UNDERTAKE INTENSIVE LOBBYING OF US AND EC COUNTRIES ASKING THEM TO INTERVENE ON OUR BEHALF.

LAST MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM FALKLANDS (2155 HRS. OUT TIME).

FOREIGN SECRETARY RETURNS FROM ISRAEL. MEETING AT 10 DOWNING STREET.

FRIDAY 2 APRIL:

0833 - TELEGRAM SENT TO FALKLANDS

0845 - COMMUNICATIONS CEASE.

0945 - CABINET INFORMED THAT ARGENTINE INVASION IMMINENT AND THAT TASK FORCE HAD BEEN PLACED ON IMMEDIATE ALERT. DECIDE THAT NAVAL AND MILITARY PREPARATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE AS PLANNED.

1100 - THE LORD PRIVY SEAL MAKES STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE EXPRESSING HMG'S GRAVE CONCERN AT THE SITUATION.

1230 - BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY SHIP REPORTED THAT A LOCAL RADIO REPORT STATION HAD SAID THAT LANDING OPERATION HAS BEGUN.

CONFIRMATION BY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE NOT THEN AVAILABLE.

FOLLOWING FURTHER REPORTS FROM MEDIA AND OTHERS, SECOND MEETING OF CABINET DECIDES THAT NAVAL TASK FORCE SHOULD SAIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINE BROKEN OFF.

/ BRITISH OFFICIALS

SECRET AND PERSONAL

FRIDAY 2 APRIL (CONTD)

BRITISH OFFICIALS AND MARINES FLOWN FROM FALKLANDS TO MONTEVIDEO.

MESSAGE FROM COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL TO ALL COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT URGING CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINE ACTION.

MESSAGES ALSO FROM PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY TO WIDE RANGE OF GOVERNMENTS.

UK CALLS IMMEDIATE MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL.

SATURDAY 3 APRIL:

FIRST DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT. PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCES THAT TASK FORCE WILL SAIL ON 5 APRIL, ARGENTINE BALANCES IN THE UK HAVE BEEN FROZEN, AND NEW ECGD COVER SUSPENDED.

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TELEPHONES PRIME MINISTER. PRIME MINISTER TELEPHONES KING HUSSEIN.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS BY 10 VOTES TO 1 WITH 4 ABSTENTIONS FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

SUNDAY 4 APRIL:

BRITISH OFFICIALS AND MARINES EXPELLED FROM FALKLAND ISLANDS LEAVE MONTEVIDEO FOR UK.

MR. NOTT INTERVIEWED ON "WEEKEND WORLD".

WE RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT SOUTH GEORGIA HAS ALSO BEEN ATTACKED AND IS NOW IN ARGENTINE HANDS.

REPORTS THAT THE MARINES DEFENDING GRYTVIKEN HAVE INFLICTED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE ON THE ARGENTINES.

WIDE RANGING DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO SECURE CONDEMNATION BY OTHER COUNTRIES OF ARGENTINE ACTION AND ALSO TO <sup>PERSUADE</sup> ~~DISSUADE~~ OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE ECONOMIC ACTION SIMILAR TO OUR OWN.

PERSUADE ?

ORDER IN COUNCIL PROVIDING FOR REQUISITIONING OF SHIPPING.

/ MONDAY 5 APRIL

MONDAY 5 APRIL:

LORD CARRINGTON, MR. ATKINS AND MR. LUCE RESIGN.  
GOVERNOR, STAFF AND MARINES ARRIVE BACK IN THE  
UK. GOVERNOR AND TWO ROYAL MARINE MAJORS CALL  
ON PRIME MINISTER.

TASK FORCE DEPARTS FROM THE UK.

WIDE RANGING TRADE SANCTIONS ANNOUNCED.

BRITISH CITIZENS ADVISED TO CONSIDER LEAVING  
ARGENTINA (BBC WORLD SERVICE BROADCAST).

PRIME MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON ITN.

IN AN IMPROMPTU PRESS CONFERENCE, PRESIDENT REAGAN  
SAID THAT THE CONFRONTATION PUT THE UNITED STATES  
IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AS IT WAS FRIENDLY WITH  
BOTH COUNTRIES.

REMAINING MARINES IN FALKLANDS CAPTURED.

REQUISITIONING OF CANBERRA ANNOUNCED.

TUESDAY 6 APRIL:

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

MR. HAIG MEETS BRITISH AND ARGENTINE AMBASSADORS  
IN WASHINGTON.

CABINET INFORMED THAT OD(SA) WOULD BE ESTABLISHED.

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO EC COUNTRIES, US,  
CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN ABOUT  
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS ANNOUNCED (CAME INTO  
EFFECT AT MIDNIGHT).

INFORMAL MEETING IN PRIME MINISTER'S ROOM IN  
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON MILITARY OPTIONS.

WEDNESDAY 7 APRIL:

SECOND DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT  
RINGS PRIME MINISTER. OD(SA) MEETS TWICE.  
MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE ANNOUNCED.

THURSDAY 8 APRIL:

MR HAIG'S FIRST VISIT TO LONDON FOR TALKS ON  
FALKLANDS SITUATION WITH PRIME MINISTER.



SECRET

AND PERSONAL

THURSDAY 8 APRIL (CONTD) MOST OF BRITISH EMBASSY STAFF FROM BUENOS AIRES RETURN TO UK; ARGENTINE EMBASSY STAFF LEAVE LONDON.

OD(SA) APPROVES RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR SUBMARINES.

FRIDAY 9 APRIL:

MESSAGE FROM FALKLAND ISLANDS PUBLIC SERVANTS REQUESTING EVACUATION REACHES MONTEVIDEO.

OPERATING RIGHTS OF ARGENTINE AIRLINES SUSPENDED.

SATURDAY 10 APRIL:

EC COUNTRIES ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT TO IMPOSE BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS.

MR. HAIG IN BUENOS AIRES.

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO OF BRAZIL.

SUNDAY 11 APRIL:

PERUVIAN PROPOSAL FOR 72-HOUR TRUCE.

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR. HAIG ("ARGENTINA IS THE AGGRESSOR").

FOREIGN SECRETARY INTERVIEWED ON WEEKEND WORLD.

MONDAY 12 APRIL:

MR. HAIG'S SECOND VISIT TO LONDON.

MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE COMES INTO EFFECT.

TUESDAY 13 APRIL:

AFTER STAYING IN LONDON OVERNIGHT, MR HAIG HAS FURTHER TALKS AT NO. 10.

ARRIVAL IN MONTEVIDEO OF CHIEF SECRETARY AND OTHERS FROM FALKLAND ISLANDS.

OAS RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS FOLLOWING ACRIMONIOUS ARGUMENT BETWEEN CARIBBEANS AND LATIN AMERICANS.

ARGENTINA BANS IMPORTS FROM EC.

WEDNESDAY 14 APRIL:

THIRD DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT.

PRIME MINISTER SPEAKS TO HAIG ABOUT LATTER'S PROPOSED STATEMENT ON "COOPERATION".

/ THURSDAY 15 APRIL:

SECRET

AND PERSONAL

THURSDAY 15 APRIL:

CHIEF SECRETARY AND PARTY ARRIVE IN LONDON.

PRIME MINISTER GOES TO MOD FOR BRIEFING.

TWO MESSAGES SENT TO HAIG, ABOUT (A) CONTENTS OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT (B) ARGENTINE SUBMARINE MOVEMENTS.

FRIDAY 16 APRIL:

PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM REAGAN STRESSES THAT ARGENTINA BROKE THE PEACE AND MUST WITHDRAW.

HAIG IN BUENOS AIRES.

OD(SA) APPROVES RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR TASK FORCE.

16.4.82

SECRET

309 - 1

ZZ WASHINGTON

GRS 150

SECRET

FM FCO 151715Z APR 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 731 OF 15 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE MOD (PS/SOS)

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS

NEW FORMULA FOR PARAGRAPH 8

DECEMBER 31, 1982 WILL CONCLUDE THE INTERIM PERIOD. DURING THIS PERIOD, THE SIGNATORIES SHALL NEGOTIATE WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING THE FUTURE DEFINITIVE STATUS OF EACH OF THE THREE GROUPS OF ISLANDS CONSISTENTLY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 1514(XV) AND 2625(XXV) AND, SO FAR AS ISLANDS WITH A SETTLED POPULATION ARE CONCERNED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR WISHES AND INTERESTS OF THAT POPULATION, WHICH SHALL BE ASCERTAINED BY A SOUNDING OF THEIR OPINION TO BE SUPERVISED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION. IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE THE PROCESSES ENVISAGED IN THIS PARAGRAPH BY DECEMBER 31, 1982, THE INTERIM PERIOD MAY BE EXTENDED FOR (THREE) MONTHS BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

PYM

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MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

LORD BRIDGES

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

SECRET

GRS 230

SECRET

PS/NO 10  
11

DEDIP

SECRET

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 151553Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 472 DATED 15 APRIL 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR SIR N HENDERSON).

WASHINGTON TELNO 1278: HAIG'S STATEMENT

1. CURIOUSLY ENOUGH, HAIG'S STATEMENT WAS HELPFUL TO US HERE IN INFLUENCING DELEGATIONS NOT TO FOLLOW THE LEAD GIVEN BY THE PANAMANIAN FOR A RESUMED ROUND IN THE COUNCIL. IF HIS STATEMENT HAD BEEN LESS EVEN HANDED, IE MORE HEAVILY TILTED TOWARDS US, THIS EFFECT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIMINISHED. SUCH IS THE UN.

2. MEANWHILE MRS KIRKPATRICK HAS BEEN SMOTHERING ME WITH OLIVE BRANCHES. SHE HAS BEEN OSTENTATIOUSLY SEEKING MY ADVICE ON THE JERUSALEM DEBATE. YESTERDAY EVENING, SHE BROUGHT UP HER ATTENDANCE AT THE ARGENTINE DINNER. USING HER BEST CLASS ROOM MANNER, PUNCTUATED BY EXPRESSIONS OF AFFECTION FOR MYSELF AND BRITAIN, SHE EXPLAINED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS BUSY DISMANTLING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM. THE U S HAD TO HOLD THIS SYSTEM TOGETHER AT ALL COSTS. ARGENTINA WAS A KEY ELEMENT IN IT. HENCE, THE SHORT TERM INTERESTS OF THE US WERE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT FROM OURS, ALTHOUGH SUCCESSFUL U S PROTECTION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM WOULD BE IN OUR LONG TERM INTERESTS. AFTER A LOT MORE IN THIS VEIN I SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR POINT IN HOLDING A POST MORTEM OVER HER ATTENDANCE AT THE DINNER. IT WAS NOT MY HABIT TO HARP ON WHAT WAS PAST.

PARSONS

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PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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SECRET



The National Archives

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PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>618</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Washington telegram 1290 dated 15 April 1982 (folio 10)</i>	
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SECRET

Sub  
9



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 April 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Thank you for your letter of today's date enclosing draft telegrams to Washington containing a message to Mr. Haig.

I earlier conveyed to John Holmes on the telephone certain amendments which the Prime Minister proposes should be made. For the record these are:-

- (a) In line 24 on page 1 of the first telegram delete the word "important".
- (b) The first complete sentence on page 2 to read "Having been the victim of one sudden attack, then assuming your present efforts are successful and Argentine troops are withdrawn, we could not risk the same thing again."
- (c) In the second paragraph on page 2 delete all from "we should like this" to "outside the draft memorandum" and substitute "the methods of achieving this can be discussed further".
- (d) The paragraph would then conclude as follows "I must emphasise that an arrangement of this kind is of the utmost importance to the British Government and Parliament. We cannot risk the same thing happening again."
- (e) In line 25 replace "the U.S." by "us".
- (f) Line 31 to read "opinion of our people on the Islands".
- (g) In the second telegram delete "in accordance with their wishes and interests" and substitute "in accordance with the wishes and interests of their population".

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

BJ



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1982

*Please type letter*

*A.J.C. 16/4*

*Dear John,*

Falkland Islands: Letter from Mr Cheek

Clive Whitmore wrote to Brian Fall on 11 April enclosing a copy of a letter addressed to the Prime Minister from Mr Cheek, who is a member of the Falkland Islands Legislative Council, suggesting an Andorra style solution to the Falkland Islands question. This is one of a number of options which we have been looking at but clearly there is not much we can say on the substance to Mr Cheek at this stage.

/ I enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



LETTER  
DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference\*

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Mr J E Cheek  
 Falkland Islands' Office  
 2 Greycoat Place  
 Westminster  
 LONDON SW1P 1SD

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you very much for your letter of 11 April and for your appreciation of ~~our support~~ <sup>the Government's</sup> in response to the terrible situation in which the Falkland Islands now find themselves. I can assure you of the Government's and the British people's whole-hearted determination to bring an end as speedily as possible the Argentine occupation of the Islands. This is our first priority ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> as we have made clear throughout ~~and it is an objective~~ <sup>to</sup> which, as you will have seen, <sup>h</sup> has the full support of the British Parliament.

I was grateful ~~to you~~ <sup>you</sup> for sending me <sup>h</sup> interesting ideas on the kind of long term solution which might be applicable to the Falkland Islands. We shall give these very careful attention, particularly since you are able to present them as an elected representative of the Islanders (although I appreciate that they are only your personal views) .

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/Once we have

Once we have secured the withdrawal from the Islands of the Argentine forces, We shall ~~then~~ be in a position to consult the Islanders once again on their future. We have stressed throughout the importance we attach to their wishes. ~~and,~~ <sup>A</sup> as the Foreign Secretary made clear in this week's debate in the House of Commons, it is not our intention to rush any consultations through before the Islanders have had ample time to discuss the question amongst themselves.

May I assure you, and through you all Falkland Islanders, of our support in the present tragic situation. Our thoughts are with you.

ARL 16.  
4

OLU

(2)

Prime Minister

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES ( )  
LONDON


A.C. 2 <sup>5</sup>/<sub>4</sub>

April 15, 1941

Dear Foreign Secretary:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from Secretary Haig, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,

  
John J. Louis, Jr.  
Ambassador

*MS*  
*ha.*  
*W. J.*

Enclosure:  
CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MC, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, SW1.

CONFIDENTIAL

April 14, 1982

Dear Francis:

On behalf of the President and my colleagues, I want to thank you and the Prime Minister for the extraordinary patience and statesmanship you have displayed over the past twenty-four hours. The extremely unhelpful press stories and public speculation about the talks have been a burden to all of us, but especially to your Government. Hopefully all parties involved in this delicate and dangerous situation will be able to avoid feeding or overreacting to mischievous press stories in the coming days. I am convinced that some of these are encouraged, if not planted, by the Soviets in the hopes of derailing our efforts at a peaceful solution.

I will proceed to Buenos Aires tomorrow with some ideas which I hope can begin to bridge the gaps remaining. I look forward to being in touch with you and the Prime Minister again soon. Please give her my best regards.

Sincerely,

Al

CONFIDENTIAL

15 APR 1982





CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

To note.

A.S.C.  $\frac{16}{4}$

(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1982

A.S.C.  $\frac{19}{4}$

h-a.

*Very relevant - to the talks now going on.*

*mb*

Dear John,

Falkland Islands

I understand that at this morning's meeting of ODSA, the Prime Minister enquired whether the Executive Council and the Legislative Council exercised jurisdiction over the Dependencies (ie South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands) as well as the Falklands themselves.

The position is as follows. Under the Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) Orders, 1948 to 1977, the Legislative Council is constituted 'in and for the Colony', the 'Colony' being defined as the Colony of the Falkland Islands (excluding the Dependencies which are separately defined). Under the same Orders, it is lawful for the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council, to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Colony.

The Executive Council is constituted under Letters Patent, 1948 to 1962, 'in and for the Colony and for the Dependencies'. The same Letters Patent state that it is lawful for the Governor to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Dependencies. Royal Instructions issued simultaneously with the Letters Patent of 1948 provide that (with certain exceptions) the Governor should consult with the Executive Council in the exercise of his powers and the performance of his duties. The exceptions relate to cases:

- a) which are of such nature that, in the judgment of the Governor, material prejudice would be sustained by consulting the Executive Council; or
- b) in which the matters to be decided are, in his judgment, too unimportant to require their advice; or
- c) in which the matters to be decided are, in his judgment, too urgent to attempt of their advice being given by the time within which it may be necessary for him to act.

/The distinction

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



The distinction between laws applying only to the Falkland Islands and those made by the Governor for the Dependencies is acknowledged in the Royal Instructions by a direction that the words of enactment of the former shall be 'Enacted by the Governor of the Colony of the Falkland Islands with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council thereof'; and of the latter 'Enacted by the Governor of the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies thereof'.

I am copying this to the Private Secretaries of the other members of ODSA and to David Wright (Cabinet Office)

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

TYPISTS

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 270

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 151647Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1288 OF 15 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN.

FALKLANDS

1. IN A TALK TODAY WITH EAGLEBURGER AT WHICH BURT AND HOLMES WERE PRESENT ON THE AMERICAN SIDE AND THE MINISTER WITH ME, THE AMERICANS SHOWED REAL CONCERN ABOUT THE DEVELOPING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE U.S. WERE SO WORRIED ABOUT A CONTINUATION OF THE CRISIS AND THE POSSIBLE RESORT TO FORCE BY US IN THE AREA WAS THEIR FEAR THAT THIS WOULD BE BOUND TO LEAD TO INCREASED SOVIET PARTICIPATION. I ASKED WHETHER BY THIS THEY MEANT INCREASED SOVIET MORAL, POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS DISTINCT FROM DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION, TO WHICH THE AMERICANS



ANSWERED THAT THEY WERE NOT AT ALL SURE THAT IT WOULD BE LIMITED IN THIS WAY. THEY IMPLIED THAT THEY FEARED THE SOVIETS MIGHT ACTUALLY BE INVOLVED IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES. I EXPRESSED DOUBT ABOUT THIS, BUT NOT ABOUT THE SOVIET WISH TO SPREAD FEAR OF IT.

2. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE LONG-TERM DANGER TO U.S. AND FOR THAT MATTER WESTERN, INTERESTS GENERALLY IF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COULD BE USED BY THE SOVIETS. THIS WOULD POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO WESTERN SECURITY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED.

3 THE LESSON TO BE DRAWN FROM THIS WAS THAT THE ARGENTINIANS MUST NOT BE ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH WHAT THEY HAD DONE. IF THEY SUCCEEDED IN THEIR PRESENT ENTERPRISE THE SOVIETS WOULD CERTAINLY CLAIM THAT THIS WAS PARTLY DUE TO SOVIET BACKING AND THEY WOULD WORK ON THIS TO ENHANCE THEIR INFLUENCE IN ARGENTINA AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC GENERALLY.

4. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING DOBRYNIN LATER TO-DAY TO READ HIM THE RIOT ACT ABOUT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT.

HENDERSON

NNNN

LB 67818

55 OKTIEF 11/10

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10/10 02/12

NOV 11 02/12

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L150

XXX

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(27)

PS  
~~PS/MS~~  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MS~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

**ADVANCE COPY**

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

**IMMEDIATE**

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON 151643Z  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELNO 1287 OF 15 APRIL 1982.

FALKLANDS

1. IN DISCUSSION TODAY EAGLEBURGER EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT HOW THE HAIG STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY WOULD HAVE GONE DOWN IN THE UK. THIS LEAD ON TO A DISCUSSION ABOUT REACTIONS IN BRITAIN TO AMERICA'S STANCE ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE.
2. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HAIG AND HE WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE CONSIDERABLE DOUBTS, TO PUT IT MILDLY, THAT WERE BEING EXPRESSED IN THE UK ABOUT AMERICA AS AN ALLY AT THIS JUNCTURE. THE TRUTH WAS THAT AMERICA WAS HELPING US A GREAT DEAL, AS WE KNEW, BUT THEY COULD NOT GO FURTHER PUBLICLY IF HAIG WAS GOING TO RETAIN ANY CREDIBILITY AT ALL AS A GO-BETWEEN.
3. I SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT CONCERN IN THE UK AT THE US GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC ATTITUDE, WHICH INCIDENTALLY WAS WELL BEHIND THAT OF CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION, SO FAR AS I COULD JUDGE IT. BUT EVERYTHING WOULD OF COURSE DEPEND UPON THE OUTCOME.

HENDERSON

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS ✓

(29)

PS

~~PS/ETS~~

PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

}  
H.M.TSY  
}

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitten and CinC Fleet)

GRS 340

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 151638Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1286 OF 15 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY BRAZILIA, MEXICO CITY, SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO, LA PAZ,  
LIMA, BOGOTA, ASUNCION, UKMIS NEW YORK, QUITO, UKDEL NATO.

FALKLANDS

1. IN THE COURSE OF THE TALK WITH EAGLEBURGER AND HIS ASSISTANTS TODAY THE SUBJECT CAME UP OF THE NATURE OF THE REGIME THAT AL HAIG WAS DEALING WITH IN BA. EAGLEBURGER ADMITTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY UNSTABLE AND DIFFICULT TO MAKE PREDICTIONS ABOUT. BUT IT WAS THE U.S. VIEW, THAT ANY SUCCESSOR REGIME TO CALTIERI WOULD BE WORSE. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT THIS WAS ALSO KISSINGER'S VIEW AS HE HAD EXPRESSED IT TO HIM AND ME THE OTHER NIGHT.

2. I SAID THAT I DID NOT GO ALONG WITH THIS VIEW. IN PRINCIPLE I KNEW THAT FOREIGN MINISTRIES TENDED TO BELIEVE IN AND PREFER THE STATUS QUO IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO CHANGE. I HAD A STRONG RECOLLECTION OF ARRIVING IN THE USA ON THE DAY STALIN'S DEATH WAS ANNOUNCED WHEN THERE WAS A GENERAL AMERICAN VIEW THAT THIS WAS A TRAGEDY BECAUSE AT ANY RATE THE AMERICANS KNEW WHERE THEY WERE WITH UNCLE JOE. SO FAR AS GALTIERI WAS CONCERNED, IF GALTIERI SURVIVED AND COULD MAKE OUT THAT HE HAD HAD SOME SORT OF SUCCESS, AND HE WOULD NOT SURVIVE UNLESS HE COULD DO THIS, WE WOULD BE CONFRONTED WITH A BAD MAN WHO ALSO HAD AN AURA OF ACHIEVEMENT BY AGGRESSION ON HIS SIDE. IT MIGHT BE THAT IF HE WAS SUCCEEDED IT WOULD BE BY SOME PRETTY UNDESIRABLE LEADER OR JUNTA BUT AT ANY RATE THEY WOULD NOT HAVE THE CROWN OF SUCCESS UPON THEIR HEADS. NO DOUBT THEY WOULD BE BAD BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE MUCH TO BE SAID IN FAVOUR OF GALTIERI.

3. THE AMERICANS SEEM TO THINK THAT GALTIERI'S MAIN PROBLEM WAS GOING TO BE WITH THE NAVAL COMMAND. HAIG HAD SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER SEEN SO BELLICOSE A BUNCH OF PEOPLE AS THE SENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS IN BUENOS AIRES.

HENDERSON

NNNN

KKKKKKKKKKKK

V

QSL FLASH KKK

WONFO 053/15

WONNY 026/15

XX  
1732



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1982

Dear John,

*Please type  
M 17/4.*

Malawi: Response to Argentina's invasion of the Falklands

President Banda of Malawi's response to the Prime Minister's recent message on the Falklands has been outstandingly robust and helpful; and indeed in these respects the best response from an African Commonwealth country. We think it would be right for the Prime Minister to acknowledge this personally. I should therefore be grateful if you could seek the Prime Minister's agreement to the terms of a message on the lines of the attached draft.

*Yours ever,*

*Francis Richards*

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

DSF (Revised)

MESSAGE

DRAFT: minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

President Banda of Malawi

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Your Excellency

I am most grateful for your prompt and helpful response to my recent message seeking Malawi's support for the condemnation of the Argentine Government's invasion of the Falkland Islands. It is heartening to know that at this difficult time we are able to count on strong support and backing from Malawi and our other friends in the Commonwealth.

With my best wishes

Margaret Thatcher

*MT* 16.  
4

Enclosures—flag(s).....

RESTRICTED

GR 130  
RESTRICTED  
FM LILONGWE 070930Z APR 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 7 APRIL

MY TELNO 108: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PRESIDENT BANDA HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO MRS THATCHER IN ANSWER TO HER MESSAGE OF 3 APRIL HIS AND MALAWI'S WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT FOR BRITISH POSITION ON FALKLANDS AND TOTAL CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINE INVASION. I GAVE HIM ACCOUNT OF LEGAL POSITION AND OF EVENTS IN FALKLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA LEADING UP TO DESPATCH OF NAVAL TASK FORCE. HE COMMENTED THAT SELF-DETERMINATION WAS UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF PEOPLES SUCH AS THOSE LIVING IN FALKLANDS. HMG SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH EFFORTS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BUT WOULD HAVE HIS MORAL BACKING IN USE OF FORCE IF OTHER METHODS FAILED.
2. PUBLIC STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT IS POSSIBLE. HE DID NOT RESPOND WHEN I SUGGESTED IT, BUT I AM SURE HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO HIS MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER BEING MADE PUBLIC SHOULD THIS SEEM HELPFUL. HE STRESSED HIS WISH TO BE HELPFUL IN ANY WAY OPEN TO HIM.

PETERS

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

STANDARD

S AM D  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
UND  
ECD (E)  
HSD

MAED  
ESID  
SED  
VAD  
SAFD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO:

SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR HAWTHIN )  
MR ILETT )

)} TREASURY

RESTRICTED

file BK

15 April 1982

The Prime Minister had asked me to thank you for your letter of 14 April transmitting a message from the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

A J COLES

His Excellency The Honourable L.W. Gandar



*Surf*

15 April 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: POSITION OF BRAZIL

I enclose the text of a message to the Prime Minister from the President of Brazil. I should be grateful if you could consider whether a reply is desirable.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*JK*

Manuscript to Chequers  
11/4/82

cc. Mark's  
ONS.

11/4  
T 69/82 ✓

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE**  
**SERIAL No. ....**


LISB EMBASSY

Message from His Excellency Senhor João  
Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, President of the  
Federative Republic of Brazil, to the Right  
Honourable Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Deeply concerned with the grave risks that  
weigh upon the prospects for peace, I reiterate the warm  
appeal made by Brazil to the Governments of the United  
Kingdom and of the Republic of Argentina to find, for the  
present crisis, a solution in accordance with the interests  
of peace and of the two countries. With the same purpose, I  
am sending a message to President Leopoldo Galtieri, in  
which I renew Brazil's disposition to contribute to a peace-  
ful solution for the present crisis.

Bearing in mind the efforts under way and  
the will shown by the Brazilian Government to do all within  
its power to find a satisfactory solution for the present  
problem I stress that it is particularly important that the  
parties concerned show effective restraint so that sufficient  
time is left for conciliatory avenues to be explored.

Brasilia, April 10th, 1982.




Mensagem do Presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, Senhor João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, à Excelentíssima Senhora Margaret Thatcher, Primeiro-Ministro do Reino Unido da Grã-Bretanha e Irlanda do Norte.

Com profunda preocupação pelos graves riscos que pesam sobre a paz, renovo o veemente apelo feito pelo Brasil aos Governos do Reino Unido e da República da Argentina no sentido de que se encontre, para a presente crise, solução de acordo com os interesses da paz e dos dois países. Dirigi, nesse sentido, mensagem ao Presidente Leopoldo Galtieri, na qual reafirmo a disposição do Brasil de contribuir para a resolução pacífica das atuais divergências.

Tendo em vista os esforços ora em curso e a disposição que o Governo brasileiro já manifestou de fazer o que estiver ao seu alcance para a busca de uma solução satisfatória, assinalo ser particularmente importante a efetiva moderação das partes envolvidas a fim de assegurar tempo suficiente a que se explorem os caminhos da conciliação.

Brasília, em 10 de abril de 1982.



Mensagem do Presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, Senhor João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, à Excelentíssima Senhora Margaret Thatcher, Primeiro-Ministro do Reino Unido da Grã-Bretanha e Irlanda do Norte.

Com profunda preocupação pelos graves riscos que pesam sobre a paz, renovo o veemente apelo feito pelo Brasil aos Governos do Reino Unido e da República da Argentina no sentido de que se encontre, para a presente crise, solução de acordo com os interesses da paz e dos dois países. Dirigi, nesse sentido, mensagem ao Presidente Leopoldo Galtieri, na qual reafirmo a disposição do Brasil de contribuir para a resolução pacífica das atuais divergências.

Tendo em vista os esforços ora em curso e a disposição que o Governo brasileiro já manifestou de fazer o que estiver ao seu alcance para a busca de uma solução satisfatória, assinalo ser particularmente importante a efetiva moderação das partes envolvidas a fim de assegurar tempo suficiente a que se explorem os caminhos da conciliação.

Brasília, em 10 de abril de 1982.

Message from His Excellency Senhor João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, to the Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Deeply concerned with the grave risks that weigh upon the prospects for peace, I reiterate the warm appeal made by Brazil to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Argentina to find, for the present crisis, a solution in accordance with the interests of peace and of the two countries. With the same purpose, I am sending a message to President Leopoldo Galtieri, in which I renew Brazil's disposition to contribute to a peaceful solution for the present crisis.

Bearing in mind the efforts under way and the will shown by the Brazilian Government to do all within its power to find a satisfactory solution for the present problem I stress that it is particularly important that the parties concerned show effective restraint so that sufficient time is left for conciliatory avenues to be explored.

Brasilia, April 10th, 1982.



FILE

RM

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

10 DOWNING STREET

SERIAL No. T72A/82

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 April, 1982

cc Mavis  
One.

*Monsieur Chirac,*

see Pt. 4 //

I was most grateful for your kind telegram expressing your solidarity with us in the situation brought about by the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. It is good to know that we may count upon your support.

*Very good wish.*

*Yours sincerely*

*Raymond Thatcher*

Monsieur Jacques Chirac

*cu*

804

15 April 1982

CANADIAN ECONOMIC MEASURES  
AGAINST ARGENTINA

Thank you for your letter of 14 April.  
As I told you on the telephone, the Prime  
Minister has approved the proposed message  
to Mr. Trudeau.

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

804

T 72c/82

15 April 1982

NEW ZEALAND ECONOMIC MEASURES  
AGAINST ARGENTINA

See Pt. 6

Thank you for your letter of 13 April. The Prime Minister agrees that the proposed message should be sent to Mr. Muldoon but with the following amendments:

- (a) delete "timely" and substitute "robust";
- (b) add at the end "everyone in Britain is thrilled by your staunch and swift support".

A. J. COLES

J. E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BR



CONFIDENTIAL

file

BK

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

The Prime Minister has taken note of your minute of 14 April about the retention of Sir Michael Palliser as a Special Adviser in the Cabinet Office during the Falkland Islands crisis.

A J COLES

15 April 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

SR

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

T72D/82

PS  
~~PS/MR ONSLOW~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)



IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 151500Z

FM ATHENS 151355Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO.,

TELNO 136 OF 15 APRIL 1982.,

REPEATED AS PRIORITY INFO TO UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON, AND UKMIS  
NEW YORK.,

SAVING INFO TO ALL EC POSTS, AND UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 71 TO BRUSSELS. FALKLANDS. THE GREEK RESPONSE.

I HAVE TODAY RECEIVED FROM PAPANDEOU THE FOLLOWING REPLY DATED  
14 APRIL TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF 6 APRIL.

THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE OF APRIL 6TH,  
1982, DELIVERED TO ME BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS.

AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY REPLIED  
IN A POSITIVE WAY AND BY VARIOUS MEANS TO THE REQUESTS OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM CONCERNING THE OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS  
BY ARGENTINA.

A) THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC DECLARATION OF SUPPORT THE TEXT OF WHICH HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN ATHENS SEMI-COLON

B) GREECE PARTICIPATED IN THE COMMON DECLARATION ISSUED BY THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE SEMI-COLON

C) GREECE JOINED THE MEMBER STATES OF THE E.E.C. IN ADOPTING ALL OF THE PROPOSED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA INSPITE OF SOME VITAL TRADE INTERESTS AND ALSO THE THOUSANDS OF GREEK ORIGIN PERSONS ESTABLISHED IN ARGENTINA.

IN SO DOING, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WANTED TO UNDERLINE ITS SOLIDARITY WITH A MEMBER STATE OF THE COMMUNITY, NAMELY THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH WHICH GREECE IS ALSO LINKED WITH TRADITIONAL FRIENDLY RELATIONS SEMI-COLON BUT MAINLY TO EMPHASIZE ITS BEING OPPOSED TO THE USE OF FORCE AND TO ANY KIND OF FAIT ACCOMPLI IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IN PARTICULAR TO OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE.

I AM SURE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL FULLY UNDERSTAND OUR ATTACHMENT TO THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES, BEARING IN MIND EVENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURED OR MIGHT OCCURE IN THE VERY SENSITIVE AREA IN WHICH MY COUNTRY IS SITUATED.

I WOULD FINALLY LIKE TO REITERATE THAT WE FULLY SUPPORT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, ADOPTED ON APRIL 3RD, 1982, AND THAT MY GOVERNMENT STRONGLY HOPES AND WISHES THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CASE TO BE SETTLED BY MEANS OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

2. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

3. THE PUBLIC DECLARATION REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 (A) OF PAPANDREOU'S LETTER IS THAT REPORTED IN MY TELNO 129.

4. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL E.C. POSTS, AND UKDEL NATO.

S U T H E R L A N D

SECRET

file B16

7

15 April 1982

Falkland Islands:  
Military cooperation with Chile

Thank you for your letter of 13 April. The Prime Minister has noted its contents without comment. There was a brief reference to this subject during a discussion on other matters at the Ministry of Defence this morning.

Mrs. Thatcher expressed the view that if we could find a suitable emissary it would still be desirable to send someone to Chile but the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explained that he had not been able to identify a person who could add effectively to representations by HM Ambassador in Santiago.

A J COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

SB

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON

April 15, 1982

S.A.D

✓ PS

PS/As Onslow

PS/103

no Gifford  
not right

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Oct. Dept

Following staff

PS/No 10

PS, Sick. Anthony

with 5/4

Prime Director

A.S.C. 16/4

ADL 16/4

h.c.

Dear Foreign Secretary:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from Secretary Haig, which was received at the Embassy this afternoon.

Sincerely,

*Edward J. Lewis for*  
John J. Louis, Jr.  
Ambassador

Enclosure:  
SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MC, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, SW1

SECRET

Dear Francis:

The Argentines have now provided us with their language on decolonization. As promised, we are providing it to HMG.

Begin text:

The British Government shall adopt measures necessary to comply, with respect to the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands, with Resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, completing the decolonization of the same by 31 December 1982, taking into account that, in accordance with Resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII), and 3149 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in this case the principle of Argentine territorial integrity is applicable.

End text.

The problems with this language are all too obvious. Nevertheless, perhaps taking as a starting point the language we left on Tuesday morning, we would appreciate receiving a formulation without delay so that we can try to bring the Argentines to it.

Sincerely,

Al

SECRET

*Sent  
Voluntary.  
ML 1/4.*

16 APR 1982



PP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1982

Dear Idun,

Falkland Islands: The Australian Prime  
Minister

You will have seen Canberra telno-  
155 reporting Mr Fraser's concern about *attached.*  
the US attitude and his offer to weigh  
in with the Americans. Mr Pym thinks  
that there might be advantage in this.  
I enclose a draft reply to Canberra  
which we will despatch if the Prime  
Minister agrees.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

*John Holmes*

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
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ZCZC

GRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER

AND REPEATED FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 155: FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

1. Please tell Mr Fraser that the Prime Minister and I are most grateful for this further offer to help, which we would like to accept. You should say that a prod to Reagan might well be useful, although we have received some encouraging indications both about Haig's own views and about what he has said to the Argentines. <sup>probably</sup> A message from Mr Fraser, to be effective, would have to be fairly blunt (while being careful to avoid appearing to gang up on the Americans). Our main concern is to keep up the pressure on the Argentines, a process <sup>we believe</sup> to which the Americans can <sup>make a major contribution</sup> ~~contribute enormously~~, despite Haig's current mediatory role. You should also of course make clear that we are very appreciative of Haig's efforts so far.

///  
//  
/

PYM  
NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept S/S OFFICE	Distribution Falkland Islands
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

ERS 260

CONFIDENTIAL

*Sole*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 140900Z

FM CANBERRA 140439Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 155 OF 14 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 0500 HOURS YOUR TIME ON 14 APRIL AND SAW ME ALONE. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM WHETHER THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD ASSURED US OR THE ARGENTINIANS THAT, IF IT CAME TO A CHOICE, THEY WOULD SUPPORT US RATHER THAN THE ARGENTINIANS. HE BELIEVED MOST STRONGLY THAT THE AMERICANS IN EFFECT HAD NO CHOICE: THEY MUST IF IT CAME TO THE POINT SUPPORT THEIR STRONGEST AND STAUCHEST EUROPEAN ALLY BY ACTIONS AS WELL AS WORDS, AND THEY SHOULD MAKE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR TO THE ARGENTINIAN JUNTA THAT THIS WAS THEIR POSITION. HOWEVER, MR RUPERT MURDOCH HAD SPOKEN ON THESE LINES AT A HIGH LEVEL IN WASHINGTON YESTERDAY, AND HAD REPORTED TO MR FRASER THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN REASSURED BY THE REPLIES WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM HIS AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS.

2. WITH YOUR TELNO 698 TO WASHINGTON IN MIND, I TOLD MR FRASER THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT, IF ANY, ASSURANCES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT HAVE GIVEN TO US, OR TO THE ARGENTINIANS. I ASKED MR FRASER WHETHER I SHOULD ENQUIRE OF YOU WHETHER WE WOULD FIND IT USEFUL FOR HIM TO EXPRESS TO THE AMERICANS THE VIEWS WHICH HE HAD OUTLINED TO ME. MR FRASER SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DO THIS IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL. HE WOULD DO SO BY MEANS OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, WITH WHOM HE HAD SOME CREDIT AND WITH WHOM HE WAS ON FRIENDLY TERMS.

3. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS. I GAVE MR FRASER NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT ANY REPLY WHICH YOU MAY INSTRUCT ME TO GIVE TO HIM WOULD NECESSARILY ENLIGHTEN HIM ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' POSITION.

MASON

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
 SIR X COUZENS }  
 MR LITTLER }  
 MR HAWTHIN }  
 MR PEREZ }  
 MR ILETT }

TREASURY

MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (BIF DIVN) D/ENERGY

CONFIDENTIAL



MO 5/21

Mr Coles

A.S.C.  $\frac{14}{4}$

I gather that the Prime Minister was anxious to have any further details of Mr Haig's movements. The FCO's best information (from the US embassy) is that he expects to leave Washington for Buenos Aires at midnight our time (7 p.m. Washington time) tonight. His flight will take 10 hours. He expects to stay in Buenos Aires for some 24 hours but, so far as the FCO are aware, no firm times for meetings with Galtieri etc have been fixed. This would take us to mid-morning our time on Saturday so, given a 17 hour flight between Buenos Aires and London, the earliest he could be back with us on these assumptions would be early Sunday morning. The FCO emphasised that the only firm time in all this is his departure later tonight.

*NHR*

15th April 1982

(N H R EVANS)  
APS/S of S

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1982

Dear David,

ADL 16/4  
h.c.m.

Following this afternoon's discussion among Ministers on Rules of Engagement, we have been giving some thought to whether it would be prudent to make an approach in Moscow to warn the Russians to keep their surface vessels and submarines well clear of the South Atlantic area, and of our Maritime Exclusion Zone in particular, to minimise the risk of inadvertent encounters in any naval action that may prove necessary. You discussed this briefly with Brian Fall. I now enclose a draft telegram of instructions to Moscow to show the sort of lines along which we think this might be done. Perhaps we could have a further word about this early tomorrow morning.

I am copying this to John Coles (No 10).

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

D B Ormand Esq  
Ministry of Defence

File No. ....  
Department .....  
Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) .....  
Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification	
CONFIDENTIAL	
Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
DESKBY .....	Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
(Security Class.) ..... CONFIDENTIAL ..... (Caveat) .....  
(Codeword) ..... (Privacy marking) .....  
(Deskby) ..... Z

TO ..... IMMEDIATE ..... MOSCOW ..... Tel. No. .... of .....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-  
PS  
PS/PUS  
Mr Onslow  
Mr Wright  
Mr Gillmore  
Defence Dept

[TEXT]

FALKLANDS

1. Please seek an early opportunity to speak to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at an appropriately senior level on the following matter, making it clear that you do so on instructions. You should present your approach as a natural follow-up to your meeting with Semeonov at the beginning of this week, at which you informed the Russians of our decision to declare a Maritime Exclusion Zone,
2. While HMG stand ready to find a negotiated solution to the problem created by Argentine aggression against the Falklands, as the Prime Minister made clear again in Parliament yesterday, we shall also be firm in implementing the Maritime Exclusion Zone against Argentine warships, submarines and naval auxiliaries and in taking

Copies to:-

whatever additional measures may prove necessary in exercise of our right of self-defence of British sovereign territory under Article 51 of the UN Charter. HMG wish it to be clearly understood by the Soviet Union that British naval deployments in the South Atlantic are strictly limited to supporting the Government's objective, which is to see that the Falkland Islands and their dependencies are freed from occupation and returned to British Administration at the earliest possible moment. We sincerely hope that this will not require the use of force. But the Government have made clear that they are prepared to use force if necessary and British military commanders will have the appropriate instructions should the need arise. At the same time Her Majesty's Government have no wish to involve the vessels of any other country in naval action and it was for this reason among others that we were careful to give ample notice of our declaration of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands and of the fact that additional measures might be needed. Her Majesty's Government express the hope that the Soviet Government will draw the appropriate conclusions for its own shipping <sup>in the South Atlantic area</sup> and will take all necessary precautions to keep well clear, in the interest of avoiding errors, accidents or misunderstandings.

3. (Strictly for your own information.) We are naturally concerned to minimise any risk of encounters between Royal Naval ships and Soviet surface vessels or submarines which might deliberately or inadvertently find themselves in or near waters where engagements with the Argentines may take

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

place. There are particular operational difficulties in regard to submarines. We therefore think it right to make this point as plainly as we can to the Russians now, given the recent signs of Soviet naval activity and interest in the South Atlantic area. But we do not wish to sound as if we are throwing down a challenge. It is more a question of sensible forethought.



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>618</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Prime Minister dated 15 April 1982 (folio 6)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
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SECRET

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5



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1982

*We raised this  
question this  
morning  
not*

Prime Minister

*To note.*

*A.J.C. 15/4*

*Dear John,*

*h-a.  
15/4*

Falkland Islands

*h-a.*

The Prime Minister may wish to have in mind the implications of paragraph 2 of the Draft Agreed Memorandum, as discussed with Mr Haig, for the illegal Argentine station on Southern Thule. If all military forces were to be withdrawn, as envisaged in the Draft Agreed Memorandum, any Argentine military personnel on Southern Thule would also in logic have to be removed. This might be a useful presentational point for the Prime Minister in eventual presentation to Parliament of any agreement.

As far as we know, the Argentine station on Southern Thule is still being maintained on a year-round basis. Our latest report, based on observation from HMS Endurance in February 1981, was that about 50 Argentines were present at the Southern Thule base. This however was during the summer season; in the winter season the complement would be much smaller. For example, in the annual Argentine report of their Antarctic activities for 1978 it was stated that there were 11 Argentine personnel on Southern Thule.

Although we do not have precise information on the proportion of military personnel to civilians at Southern Thule, Argentine Antarctic stations are administered by the military and have military support staff. There is therefore a strong presumption that some Argentine military personnel are there. (This is consistent with the Antarctic Treaty, provided that such military personnel are working in support of scientific investigation.)

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Cole Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>618</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Armstrong to Coles dated 15 April 1982 (folio 4)</i>	
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MR JOHN COLES

*discussed. 15/4.*


NEEDHAM - FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY

We raised the question with Private Office this morning whether we should give any publicity to Mr Needham's visit to see the Prime Minister this afternoon since, as I understand it, he could be very helpful.

We have since telephoned him to find out whether he would object to publicity. He is not keen but told Hugh Colver that he would lend himself to a publicity exercise if we felt it useful.

We have left it on the basis that we shall not draw attention to his visit to see the Prime Minister. However we could arrange for him to be interviewed after his meeting with the Prime Minister - either by a single journalist or by radio and television, depending on how the Prime Minister and Mr Needham feel.

Could I suggest that you raise with him at the beginning of the meeting whether he would like to give an interview to radio or television or, for example, to a PA Press Association reporter and let us know so that we can lay on the journalist or crew for when he leaves?



B INGHAM  
15 April 1982



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>618</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Omand to Coles dated 15 April 1982 (folio 3)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>1 March 2012 Wayland</i>
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FILE

SW

bcc: Mr. Ure (Fro)  
Peter Jenkins  
(HMT)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 April, 1982

Dear John

Mr. C. E. Needham, Chairman of the Falkland Island Company, called on the Prime Minister this afternoon at 1700. Mr. Ure was also present.

Mr. Needham said that his company was in daily telex communication with their offices in the Falklands, and he thought these telexes would give the Prime Minister a useful picture of conditions on the Islands. He handed round the attached telexes, and summarised their contents. All the Company's staff were safe. Many were leaving Port Stanley to live on outlying farms. Freedom of movement on the Islands was good. In the last two days, the Argentine authorities had requisitioned a substantial quantity of groceries from the Company, but this was not a cause for concern; the stores and butchery were still under the Company's control. The Argentines had also sought to requisition one of the Company's ships, the "Monsunen", but they had not carried out this threat in the face of the Company's refusal. None of the 35 people who had left the Islands were staff of the Company; they were all civil servants. The remaining islanders were all intensely loyal to the Crown, and their overriding desire was to get back to the life they had lived before the occupation. There was no enthusiasm for living under Argentine administration. The tension of the crisis was producing a feeling in some people that they would prefer evacuation to open warfare.

Mr. Needham concluded this part of the discussion by asking if we could treat the existence of his telexes as confidential since he did not wish his communication link to be jeopardised.

Mr. Needham then went on to say that he was sure the British public would criticise the Government if hostilities took place while the islanders remained in the Falklands. He recognised, however, that it would be difficult for the Government to be seen to be organising an evacuation. To avoid this problem, he was willing to stage an evacuation through the offices of the Falkland Island Company. He felt his offer should be considered seriously and quickly by the Government. But there were some

/difficulties

CONFIDENTIAL



difficulties. The islanders would have to be flown out by the Argentines who would expect payment. The islanders would also no doubt wish to bring their savings with them to the UK. The Argentines would be most unlikely, however, to allow sterling to be exported from the Islands. The Falkland Island Company could issue its employees with travellers cheques in return for payment in sterling at Port Stanley; but there was no guarantee that the Company would be able to make use of these sterling deposits. Not only that, but the islanders would be worried about how they would be treated on arrival in the UK and whether they would be able to find accommodation. The cost of the evacuation would be at least £2 million (based on an assumed air fare of at least £1,000 for 1,800 inhabitants).

In conclusion, Mr. Needham indicated, though not very specifically, that if he were to proceed with the evacuation, he would need:

- a) an assurance from the Government that the evacuees and his Company would not lose financially. His main concern here seemed to be that his Company should not lose financially from issuing travellers cheques to the islanders in return for sterling, which it might not be able to export. Without a suitable assurance from the Government, he could not authorise his Port Stanley office to issue such cheques;
- b) to be able to assure the islanders that they would be properly looked after on arrival in the UK, and that temporary accommodation would be provided if necessary. He did not accept that it was his Company's responsibility to provide entirely for its employees on arrival in the UK, given that the situation was not of the Company's making. Nor did he seem to be entirely satisfied that the social security system, and local authority help with housing, would be seen as an adequate safety-net by the islanders.

The Prime Minister said that she would consider Mr. Needham's suggestion urgently, and let him have a response within a few days. She was determined that nothing should stand in the way of those islanders who wished to return to the UK, and the Home Secretary had given an assurance that there would be no problems from the point of view of immigration policy. But Mr. Needham's suggestion raised wider issues which would need to be considered very carefully.

In the light of this discussion, the Prime Minister would be grateful for your Secretary of State's advice on Mr. Needham's

/offer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

offer, and a draft letter which we might send to him, as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter, but not the enclosures, to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*Willie Rickett*

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

LETTER

DRAFT: minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

C E Needham Esq  
Chairman of the Falkland Islands  
Company

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for calling on 15 April to give me an account of your contacts with the Falkland Islands over the past few days. This was a great help to me in keeping abreast of developments there. I am returning to you the telex messages which you showed me. We are, of course, treating them in strict confidence.

You suggested that you might pass messages back to your employees and their dependants on the Islands about evacuation. This must be a matter for you and your company. We have noted that a large number of Islanders who normally live in Port Stanley have been permitted to leave for the countryside ('the camp') where they will presumably be safer in the event of any hostilities. There is conflicting evidence about how many of the Islanders wish to leave now and it seems no general pattern has yet emerged. Indeed, it is

/likely

Enclosures—flag(s).....

*Type urgent*  
*please.*  
*Mia*

likely to remain essentially a personal decision for individuals. There is no machinery through which the Islanders can express their collective views as long as the Islands remain under Argentine occupation. We remain doubtful in any case whether the Argentine authorities would themselves permit any general evacuation of the Islands by the British inhabitants.

However, I do feel strongly that anyone who wishes to leave should not be prevented from doing so by financial circumstances. We have therefore given some thought to this aspect of the problem. At present we understand that most of those who have left have been deported by the Argentine authorities without charge; nor do we anticipate that there would be problems for Islanders if required to pay for their passage to the Argentine mainland since Falklands Islands currency still appears to be valid on the Islands. We recognise however that there are very real problems for those Islanders who reach Montevideo and wish to continue their journey back to the United Kingdom. We have therefore instructed our Embassy at Montevideo to give sympathetic help under our normal rules to any Islanders who are in this position. They may be sure that no-one will be left stranded there for want of funds.

Equally we understand that most Islanders who might return to the UK would have family, friends or employers (such as your own company) to help them in any temporary

settlement problems here. As I told you, the Home Office will adopt a cooperative attitude towards immigration problems for any Falkland Islanders who do not have right of abode in the UK, and the social services would also lend full and sympathetic assistance in meeting the immediate needs of Islanders who arrive here.

I hope you will keep in touch with us about developments on the Islands and anything further you may learn about conditions there and the intentions of the Islanders. I am - as you know - determined to stand by them in the difficulties, dangers and anxieties that are facing them in the days ahead.

WJL 1/11/71

010  
**RESTRICTED**

SAPU(82) 3

Prime Minister

This now appears at  
least daily.

VR 15/4

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper, issued at 1500 hours on 15 April 1982, contains  
recommended lines for Ministers to take on the Falkland Islands.

h.a.  
VR 16/4

Cabinet Office

15 April 1982

**RESTRICTED**

15 April 1952

LINE TO TAKE

1. United States attitudes

- Remain very grateful for Mr Haig's intensive efforts to find a just settlement. His role is crucial. In this context it is quite reasonable that the United States should maintain an evenhanded position in public. There is no doubt that the Americans are fully aware of the true principles and interests at stake.

Specific questions

United States giving us intelligence? (Mr Haig's statement of 14 April)

- We never comment on such questions. Mr Haig's reference to 'customary patterns of co-operation' is of course to the customary patterns of co-operation between allies. (Similarly, decline to comment on specific points on co-operation on re-fuelling, communications, weather forecasting etc.)

2. Further United Kingdom military preparations

- Still hoping for a diplomatic solution but must be prepared for military action. This means we must be capable of sustaining our forces for extended periods of time if necessary, at a great distance from base. Measures we are now taking enable us to do that and will extend our range of military options.

Specific questions

Argentines stronger than we thought?

- No. Having despatched our initial task force we are now making the arrangements to sustain and increase its options.

A prolonged blockade rather than a landing?

- Not necessarily. Wrong to comment on the military options. We are giving ourselves the widest range of possibilities. We must think ahead given difficulties of an operation 8,000 miles away.

HMS Intrepid was to be scrapped?

- No. Decision to retain her announced earlier this year.

Why charter minesweepers?

- To enhance the task force capability. These vessels especially suitable for South Atlantic.

Suitability of RAF/RN Harriers at sea?

- Importance of sustaining aircover to the task force. Fully confident of RAF/RN Harriers ability for the job.

Extra troops with Intrepid?

- Cannot comment on such details.

Are you planning further measures? (eg speeding up entry into service of HMS Illustrious)

- Of course we are looking at all ways of increasing effectiveness of our forces in the South Atlantic. Will no doubt be further measures. Cannot go into details.

Is the task force still steaming south?

- Yes. It is on course and on time.

Difficulties with HMS Hermes?

- These have been denied by the First Sea Lord. Hermes is still with the task force which is proceeding on time.

3. Is support hardening for Argentina from other countries in this region?

- A few Latin American countries have indicated support for Argentina, some for transparent reasons of their own. But, on 13 April the Organisation of American States conspicuously failed to endorse the Argentine invasion. It called for a peaceful solution of the problem within the context of international law (of which of course the Argentines are in flagrant breach in all respects including their refusal to conform with mandatory terms of Security Resolution 502). Many countries, particularly in the Caribbean, are emphasising that the principles of the non-use of force and of self determination must not be compromised.



4. Are the Argentines entitled to invoke military support from other American states under the Rio Treaty?

- They may try. But the Treaty provides that assistance be given in the event of 'an armed attack by any state against an American state', and this has not taken place; on the contrary there has been an armed attack on British territory and our sole purpose is to secure the withdrawal of Argentine forces from that territory. The Treaty furthermore states that "invasion affecting a region which is under the effective jurisdiction of another state shall be considered as aggression" there thus being no doubt that the Argentines are defined as aggressors in the terms of the Treaty.

5. Future action at the Security Council

- Not excluded. But the first priority is the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502.

Specific questions

The Argentines' latest position at the UN - that they will withdraw troops as required in Security Council Resolution 502 if we cease 'hostilities' (ie turn the task force round) - is spurious. Security Council Resolution 502 must be read as a whole; the measures mandated were based explicitly on the breach of the peace which resulted from the Argentine invasion. Since then the Argentines have continued to build up forces in the Falklands and invaded South Georgia, in flagrant disregard of the mandatory terms of the Resolution. Britain will continue to take whatever measures may be needed in exercise of its inherent right of self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.

Ref. A08122

MR WHITMORE

I have been giving some thought to the form, composition and terms of reference of the inquiry which the Prime Minister has agreed to set up into the way in which Government Departments discharged their responsibilities in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.

2. It seems to me that we should have the following requirements in mind:
  - (1) if pressures for investigations by Select Committees are to be avoided, there will need to be a political component in the inquiry;
  - (2) as the conduct of Ministers as well as civil servants is at issue, the inquiry should include someone who is neither a politician or a civil servant;
  - (3) those conducting the inquiry should be sensitive to the problems of dealing with the intelligence material and assessments involved.
  
3. These considerations point to a Committee consisting of two senior Privy Counsellors, one Conservative and one Labour, under an independent chairman, who might be a judge or an academic.
  
4. If the Privy Counsellors should come from the House of Commons, there are two former Prime Ministers to bear in mind: Mr Heath and Mr Callaghan. Nobody would suppose that in appointing Mr Heath the Prime Minister would be doing herself a favour. Mr Heath was Prime Minister when the 1971 agreement with Argentina was concluded; Mr Callaghan was involved in the events of November and December 1977. Both men were familiar with intelligence matters.
  
5. If Privy Counsellors in the House of Lords can be chosen, there are suitable candidates in Lord Carr and Lord Shackleton, both of whom have had relevant Ministerial experience. Lord Shackleton has personal links with the Falkland Islands and Antarctica. Other possibilities include Lord Jellicoe and Lord Shepherd; but neither was close to intelligence matters.

6. If the Prime Minister wanted to go for a judge as chairman, it would be necessary to consult the Lord Chancellor. If there were a suitable Lord of Appeal or Lord Justice, he would be a Privy Counsellor, and we should have a Committee of Privy Counsellors. I doubt whether Lord Diplock would want to take it on. Lord Bridge is a possibility; but I suppose that we may have to ask the Security Commission to review the case of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office girl who recently passed secret information to an Egyptian intelligence officer in Tel Aviv, and Lord Bridge would have to chair that review. If the Prime Minister would like me to pursue other possibilities, I will talk to the Lord Chancellor.

7. But I am inclined to think that an academic might be more suitable than a judge for this inquiry, if we could find the right one. Possible names that occur to me here are Lord Dacre of Glanton (alias Hugh Trevor-Roper), now Master of Peterhouse, and Professor Michael Howard, both of whom are familiar with intelligence matters. Either would do a thorough job; Michael Howard would be less liable to be idiosyncratic than Lord Dacre. Michael McCrum, the Master of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, though an ancient historian by discipline, is a man of good judgement and considerable authority. Lord Blake, the Provost of The Queen's College, would do it excellently, but is perhaps too closely associated with the Conservative Party. Other possibilities are Professor Hedley Bull (an Australian by birth), Professor of International Relations at Oxford, who has had experience of working in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Professor S E Finer, Professor of Government and Administration at Oxford; either would do a thorough and sensible job, though Professor Finer has not (so far as I know) any familiarity with intelligence matters.

8. None of these is a Privy Counsellor; but any of them could be appointed a Privy Counsellor, if it were thought desirable that the inquiry should be constituted entirely of Privy Counsellors. Lord Trend is a Privy Counsellor, and head of an Oxford college; but he is now 68, and I doubt whether it would be right to have a former civil servant as the chairman of this inquiry (though as Lord Allen has shown on the Crown Agents Tribunal former poachers can be the fiercest of gamekeepers).

9. As to terms of reference, I do not believe that we are likely to do better than the words which the Prime Minister used in her answer to Mr Grimond:

To inquire into the way in which the Government Departments concerned discharged their responsibilities in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands; and to report.

10. The Prime Minister may like to discuss this with the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence; and (if she has a judge in mind) with the Lord Chancellor.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

15th April 1982

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0  
689113 PO SW G  
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*Prime Minister 2*  
*We will let you have a draft reply.*



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GBXX HV AEBA 300  
BUENOSAIRES 431/415 14 1915 PGE1/50

LT  
THE PRIME MINISTER  
10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON

THE BRITISH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (INC) REPRESENTS MANY AND IMPORTANT BRITISH AND ARGENTINE COMPANIES WITH INDUSTRIAL, TRADING OR FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM STOP WITHIN ARGENTINA ITS MEMBERS EMPLOY OVER 10,000 PERSONS AND ACCOUNT FOR

COL LT 10 10,000

PGE2/52/50

AN AGGREGATE INVESTMENT OF OVER 500 MILLION POUNDS., THEY ARE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR GENERATING A BILATERAL FLOW OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE ORDER OF 1,000 MILLION POUNDS PER YEAR STOP EVER SINCE ITS FOUNDATION IN 1913 THE CHAMBER HAS BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE FURTHERANCE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN

COL 500 1,000 1913

PGE3/52/50

THE TWO COUNTRIES STOP AS SUCH IT HAS WITNESSED THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FRUITFUL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN ARGENTINE AND BRITISH INTERESTS STOP GENERATIONS OF BRITONS HAVE CHOSEN TO WORK AND LIVE IN ARGENTINA AND IN MANY CASES HAVE SETTLED AND INTEGRATED PERMANENTLY INTO THE LOCAL COMMUNITY WHERE THEY FOUND RESPECT AND

COL

PGE4/5250

EVEN ADMIRATION FOR BRITISH VALUES AND WAY OF LIFE AND NEVER AT ANY TIME HAVE REGRETTED THEIR DECISION STOP OUR CHAMBER IS THEREFORE MOST SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BECAUSE THAT LONG HISTORY OF FRIENDSHIP IS NOW AT STAKE TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE MANY INDIVIDUALS AND COMPANIES OF BRITISH ORIGIN OR AFFILIATION

COL

PGE5/51/50

PRESENT IN ARGENTINA PUTTING AT RISK A RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPED OVER MORE THAN A CENTURY WHICH MAY BE DESTROYED IN ONE DAY BUT WOULD REQUIRE DECADES TO REPAIR STOP THIS CONCERN EXTENDS ALSO TO WHAT WE BELIEVE IS A LACK OF AWARENESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH RESPECT TO THE SINCERITY

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PGE6/51/50

AND INTENSITY OF THE FEELINGS OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE TOWARDS THE ISSUE UNDER DISCUSSION EVER SINCE IT AROSE 150 YEARS AGO AND THEIR FRUSTRATION AFTER SEVENTEEN YEARS OF FRUITLESS TALKS STOP THIS CHAMBER IS ANXIOUS THAT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THIS PROBLEM BE RECHED STOP THE HIGHEST SENSE OF MUTUAL

COL 150

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LT  
THE PRIME MINISTER  
10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON

RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION MUST PREVAIL STOP THE UNDENIABLE  
DUTY OF EVERYONE AND PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO WIELD POWER IS TO  
DEMONSTRATE THE MOST SINCERE WILLINGNESS TO CARRY THROUGH TO  
A SPEEDY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE  
ALREADY BEEN INITIATED THE FAILURE OF WHICH NO REASONABLE  
PERSON CAN ACCEPT STOP

COL

PGE8/53/50

WE URGE YOU TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE WHICH AT THIS  
POINT COULD ONLY CAUSE IRREPARABLE HARM TO ALL CONCERNED AND  
INCALCULABLE DAMAGE TO THE WESTERN WORLD AND TO STRIVE TO  
ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING WHICH WILL ALLOW A POSITIVE FUTURE TO  
BE BUILT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF

COL

PGE9/15

ALL INCLUDING THE ISLANDERS STOP  
CHAIRMAN BRITISH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE ARGENTINE  
REPUBLIC INC

COL

889113 PO SW G  
25807 ITGLF G

010  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

15 April 1982

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

AM 1/4  
h.a.

FALKLAND ISLANDS : SITUATION REPORTS

1. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Emergency Unit produce a daily situation report at 0730 each morning, covering overnight developments relevant to the Falkland Islands dispute. At present, the reports are distributed mainly within the FCO; but it has been suggested that rather wider distribution might be useful. We would, therefore, propose to include you (and other recipients of this minute) on the circulation list in future.
2. The reports would be distributed (by tube where appropriate) to reach you by about 9 o'clock each morning.

Head of Emergency Unit

cc:

PS/Mr Whitelaw  
PS/Mr Parkinson  
PS/Sir R Armstrong,  
Cabinet Office  
R L Wade-Gery Esq CMG,  
Cabinet Office  
PS/Mr Nott  
Sir B Tovey  
Secretariat, Box 500  
Secretariat, Box 850  
DCDS(I), MOD  
DGI, MOD  
Sir A Acland

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FALKLAND ISLANDS: SITREP BY FCO: 0730 15 APRIL:  
OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

PARLIAMENT

1. The Prime Minister secured general Parliamentary endorsement over the Falklands during the Debate in the House on 14 April. She welcomed Haig's efforts at mediation but reiterated the UK's insistence on Argentine withdrawal and warned that if the maritime exclusion zone was challenged, it would be taken as evidence that the search for a peaceful solution had ended. Haig's further talks in Buenos Aires would be "crucial". The Prime Minister also emphasised the importance of the various economic measures in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina. It was announced that the Task Force would be reinforced with extra Harriers and the assault ship HMS Intrepid.

USA

2. Haig reported back to President Reagan who, in a subsequent news broadcast, continued to stress USA's impartial rôle as a friend of both countries seeking to achieve a peaceful solution of an "unnecessary disagreement". Haig is due to travel to Buenos Aires today (15 April).

3. There is to be an ODSA meeting at 0930 hours this morning (15 April) to discuss US concern about the Argentine reaction to the disclosure of US intelligence and operational assistance to us. In an attempt to defuse, Haig issued a statement yesterday afternoon (14 April) stressing that the US had "not acceded to requests [for assistance] that would go beyond the scope of customary patterns of cooperation based on existing bilateral agreements".

EC

4. The EC agreed on 14 April the text of a regulation imposing a total embargo on imports for one month (as opposed to fifteen days) with effect from 16 April.

Commonwealth

5. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, has offered to send a personal message to President Reagan urging America to make it clear to Argentina that if it came to the point the USA would support the UK.

Latin America

6. Caracas have reported a further hardening of the Venezuelan position in support of Argentina (and Venezuelan information that the new Guatemalan Government were considering moving against Belize). The Peruvian Government, following our reply to their original proposal for a 72-hour truce (interpreted by the Peruvian media as a British rejection of the idea) have sent a further



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message repeating the proposal. HMA Lima believes that the Peruvian President is coming under increasing pressure from pro-Argentine groups. The Panamanian Ambassador to the UN apparently exceeded his instructions by delivering a long letter to the President of the Security Council supporting the Argentine cause. The *Panamanian* Argentine President subsequently assured our Ambassador that he had been instructed not to press for discussion of the letter until the outcome of the Haig mission had become clear.

Evacuation from the Falklands

7. Most of the 35-strong Falklands party are due to arrive at Gatwick this afternoon (15 April); one woman and her two children, travelling separately, will arrive at Heathrow on 16 April.


8. The Chief Secretary (Mr Baker) reports that, at the time of their departure, essential services were being maintained but there was a clamp-down on internal air services and the RT system. Private telegrams were being closely monitored. The people were sharply divided between hard-liners and those who wanted a negotiated settlement; Mr Baker believed that 80% would be in favour of a temporary evacuation. The Argentinians are increasing their defensive precautions. The morale of Argentinian troops has been low but has improved with the better organisation of supplies. Military conduct towards the Falk-landers is correct.

9. Still no firm information about the whereabouts of the Marines and BAS personnel from Grytviken.

British Community in Argentina

10. Bruce Carlisle, a leading member of the British Community in Argentina, is travelling to the UK to deliver a personal message to the Secretary of State from Costa Mendez.

15 April



A E Huckle  
Emergency Unit

/Falkland Islands

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

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Mr Coles ✓

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Mr Wade-Gery  
JIC Secretariat (6 copies)  
Captain Tod, Assessments Staff  
South Atlantic Presentation Unit (Rm.322)

MOD:

PS/Mr Nott  
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DG.1  
Defence Situation Centre

Other Departments:

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PS/Mr Whitelaw  
Paymaster-General's Office  
PS/Mr Parkinson  
Box 500 - Secretariat)  
Box 850 - Secretariat) -via PUSD, Room E.203  
Sir B Tovey )

APR 1982





BK  
file

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 April 1982

Falkland Islands:  
Government Savings Bank

Thank you for your letter of 14 April. I believe that the Prime Minister's main concern was to establish whether the Islanders' savings were at risk as a result of the Argentine occupation.

Before I show Mrs. Thatcher your letter, are you able to add anything on this point?

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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BK

UPDATED TO 15 APRIL '82

## INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 19 March: A British Antarctic Survey field party report that an Argentine Navy cargo vessel is anchored in Leith harbour. A party of about 60 Argentines have set up camp and an Argentine flag has been hoisted.
- 20 March: The BAS field party informs the Argentines that they have landed illegally and that they must leave. The Ministry of Defence instruct HMS Endurance to prepare to sail to South Georgia with a detachment of Marines from Port Stanley. HM Ambassador Buenos Aires informs the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs that we are treating the infringement of our sovereignty very seriously. The Argentine Charge d'Affaires is called in to the Foreign Office and told the same. The Argentine Government profess ignorance but agree to look into the matter urgently.
- 21 March: HMS Endurance departs for South Georgia. Argentine MFA inform us that the ship will leave South Georgia shortly and that no service personnel are involved.
- 22 March: We receive confirmation that the ship has left but there are doubts about whether all the men have gone. News Department issue statement on incident. In the evening, BAS confirm that about six men and some equipment remain.
- 23 March: HMS Endurance is instructed to sail on for South Georgia and remove the men, if possible without using force. Mr Luce makes a statement to the House of Commons. Argentine Government later warns that use of HMS Endurance would be gravely provocative. They are told we wish to avoid this if possible: if they can propose an acceptable alternative method of removing the men, we are prepared to let them do so.

24 March: HMS Endurance ordered to anchor in Grytviken harbour, but not to proceed to Leith.

Argentine MFA say they wish to prevent the situation escalating if possible, but need time to consider.

25 March: Argentine naval vessel is sighted at Leith delivering further supplies.

We ask the Argentines for an early response to our request that they remove the men.

Argentine MFA then say that by deploying HMS Endurance we have made it impossible for them to contain their position.

We reply that we wish to do everything possible to avoid confrontation and propose that if the party request the proper authorisation from Grytviken, it will be given.

27 March: No formal reply from the Argentine MFA. But they issue a press statement announcing that the men will be given all necessary protection and the press reports that several Argentine Navy vessels have been ordered into the area.

28 March: Argentine Foreign Minister sends a message to the Secretary of State making it clear that the Argentines have no intention of agreeing to our proposal.

The Secretary of State sends a message to Mr Haig, asking him to intervene and urge restraint on the Argentines.

30 March: Secretary of State makes statement in House of Lords.

Argentines reject US proposal for a solution based on regularising the men's presence.

*Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).*

*Wayland*

*1 March 2012*

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your message of 15 April about your conversation with General Galtieri.

I am sure that neither you nor Al Haig, following his most helpful visits here, are in any doubt that it is the strong wish of the British Government, Parliament and people to avoid conflict. We have done our utmost to put Al Haig in a position where he has reasonable proposals to offer the Argentine Government.

I regret that we have seen no corresponding flexibility on the part of the Argentines. I note that General Galtieri has reaffirmed to you his desire to avoid conflict. But it seems to me - and I must state this frankly to you as a friend and ally - that he fails to draw the obvious conclusion. It was not Britain who broke the peace but Argentina. The Mandatory Resolution of the Security Council, to which you and we have subscribed, requires Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Falkland Islands. That is the essential first step which must be taken to avoid conflict. When it has been taken, discussions about the future of the Islands can profitably take place. Any suggestion that conflict can be avoided by a device that leaves the aggressor in occupation is surely gravely misplaced. The implications for other potential areas of tension and for small countries everywhere would be of extreme seriousness. The fundamental principles for which the free world stands would be shattered.

May I ask you to convey my strong feelings on this point urgently to Al Haig in Buenos Aires.

We remain ready at any time to continue discussions with yourself and Al Haig. Our earnest aim is to avoid conflict. But it is essential that America, our closest friend and ally, should share with us a common perception of the fundamental issues of democracy and freedom which are at stake, as I am sure you do.

31 March:

British Ambassador, Buenos Aires, meets Argentine Foreign Minister and passes on Secretary of State's offer to send a personal emissary to Buenos Aires. This is later rejected and Costa Mendez says he considers the diplomatic channel is now closed.

US Government urges Argentines to exercise restraint.

*Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(u)  
Wayland, 1 March 2012*

1 April:

UN Secretary General calls in both British and Argentine Representatives and asks them to refrain from threat or use of force. Later we seek Emergency meeting of the Security Council, which results in Presidential statement on similar lines to the Secretary General's appeal.

The Americans attempt, both through their Ambassador in Buenos Aires and later by direct telephone call between Mr Reagan and President Galtieri, to avert the threat. But they are rebuffed.

2 April:

1200 London time, first sighting of Argentine attack force. Operation complete by 1900 London time.

Diplomatic relations between the UK and Argentina broken off.

British officials and Marines flown from Falklands to Montevideo.

Message from Commonwealth Secretary General to all Commonwealth Heads of Government urging condemnation of Argentine action.

Messages also from Prime Minister and Secretary of State to wide range of governments.

UK calls immediate meeting of the Security Council.

3 April:

Emergency debate in both Houses.

UN Security Council adopts mandatory resolution calling for Argentines to withdraw their forces.

We announce freezing of Argentine assets in the UK and ending of ECGD cover.





A 7.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands Company

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Mr Ted Needham, the Chairman of Coalite and of the Falkland Islands Company (FICo) at 3.30 pm today. I understand that Mr Needham wants to inform the Prime Minister of the views of the FICo employees in the present situation. I enclose a background note on FICo. It is the main land-owner and employer in the Islands (45 per cent of the farmland, 50 per cent of wool-producing capacity, about 250 employees).

Mr Needham has been regularly in touch with the FCO since the Argentine occupation of the Islands. His immediate preoccupation was that the charter vessel used by FICo to remove the wool clip and to provide supplies to the Islands (FICo also operate the main retail outlets) was at sea en route for Port Stanley. Mr Needham was initially reluctant to accept our advice that the vessel should not proceed but should put in at another port to await developments: but he eventually did so after the advice was confirmed to him by Ministers and after the announcement of the maritime exclusion zone. The charter vessel is now on its way to Ascension Island.

Mr Needham has more generally been concerned about the future of his company's operations in the Islands. We have advised him that, in the present uncertain situation, it would seem premature to try to reach any firm view and that the position could only be sensibly judged in the light of political/military developments in the next few weeks. He has not as yet raised the question of liability if the Argentine occupation or subsequent military action damage the company's assets and prospects.

/Mr Needham

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Mr Needham remains in regular contact with the FICo manager in Port Stanley through the Cable and Wireless link. The local FICo manager has confirmed that FICo employees are so far safe and well; that the farms continue to run; and that the company's retail outlets in Port Stanley and the operation of the FICo jetty have not been seriously affected, although short-staffed (through the exodus of people from Port Stanley to the countryside).

Mr Needham is a bluff, rather deliberately abrasive Northcountryman, who has at times given the impression of being somewhat out of his depth in the present situation.

You have agreed that John Ure should also attend Mr Needham's call.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



## FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY

1. The Falkland Islands Company (FICo) is a major landowner and by far the largest of the overseas companies with commercial interests in the Islands. A subsidiary of Coalite Limited, whose Chairman, Mr C E (Ted) Needham, is also the Chairman of the FICo.

2. Coalite's interests are very widespread. They include the production of smokeless fuel; chemical-processing; coal and fuel-oil distribution (including 6% interest in Sovereign Oil and Gas UK); vehicle-building and distribution; building materials; shipping; oil-rig servicing; transport and warehousing. The turnover was of the order of £360 million a year; profit was about £21.5 million. The company was No 46 in the profitability league of the top 200 British companies.

FICo involvement in the Islands

3. FICo has virtual monopoly control in many areas of commercial life, eg:

- (a) ownership of 45% of farmland, 50% of the wool-producing capacity;
- (b) through ties with other externally-owned farming companies, a strong influence on at least half of the remaining farmland;
- (c) effective control of internal and external shipping;
- (d) ownership of the sole commercial jetty and direct employer of the only dock labour force, giving it control over the loading and unloading of all produce and supplies;
- (e) a dominant role in the marketing of the Islands' wool through its conduct of auctions between the two (or occasionally three) UK brokers involved;

/(f)



- (f) most of the insurance, finance and other commercial services for its own and other enterprises;
- (g) the largest buying agent and importer of equipment for its own and other farms and for retail in its own stores and the settlement shops;
- (h) marketing diesel supplies by the MOD.

4. The company's investment record in the Islands has in the past been poor but has improved in recent years. Under Grasslands Trials Unit supervision 500 acres in Lafonia have been re-seeded with encouraging results. The company has also responded to Lord Shackleton's recommendation concerning the establishment of smaller farming units by selling its Green Patch Farm to the Government for sub-division. Nevertheless, local FICO managers are under the strict control of the Head Office in London and find it difficult to obtain money for capital investment projects which do not show quick returns. Lack of investment was one of the major criticisms in the 1976 Shackleton Report.

5. The Argentines regard the company as a major obstacle to their ambitions. In 1978, Argentine interests made a fairly overt bid for ownership of the company, although the Argentine Government at the time maintained that they had played no direct part. The Argentine Government suggested to the previous Government on several occasions that the company be taken over by a joint holding company representing the UK, Argentine and Islander interests.

6. We have frequently considered the merits of a take-over of the company. But there has been no case for doing so on economic grounds. Cost of a possible take-over is estimated to be in the region of £5-10 million.

#### School hostel

7. FICO are involved in the construction of the new school hostel in Stanley. FICO are still in dispute with the Falkland Islands Government and ODA over design faults and conditions of contract.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1982

*Dear John,*

Falkland Islands

//

I attach draft telegrams to Washington containing a message to Haig on the lines discussed at the meeting this morning. You will note that the reference to the provisions of the UN Charter concerning non self governing territories has not been placed in the body of the proposed new paragraph 8, but has been presented to Haig as something that he might put to the Argentinians by way of compromise if they asked for more explicit language on decolonisation. This is no more than a tactical gambit, but Mr Pym thought it one worth trying. He also thought on reflection that it would be better not to insist too much in the text on the question of entitlement to representation. He felt that to do so would make the fundamental idea of sounding out the views of the population much harder to sell to the Argentinians; and that our essential interests would be effectively preserved by our membership of the Special Commission.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosures to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

*for* (B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

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TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Please pass the following message urgently from me to Mr Haig, together with the new draft formulation for paragraph 8 of the draft Agreement Memorandum in MIFT.

Begins. Thank you for your friendly message which I have just received. As I have said to you, and indeed to the British Parliament and people, we in London are most grateful for the efforts which you are making to resolve the Falkland Islands crisis. We realise that the determination and stamina required are very great. We send you our warmest wishes for your crucial meetings in the coming days in Buenos Aires.

Since your most recent visit and our subsequent talks by telephone, we ~~in London~~ have been thinking further about the position reached in your efforts to promote a settlement and about the draft Memorandum which we have been discussing.

There is one important matter which greatly concerns the Prime Minister and myself and our other colleagues. Recent

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Classification and Caveats

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experience has proved that Argentina is willing to resort to aggression. Having been the victim of one sudden attack, we cannot risk the same thing again. We therefore need to ensure that the Islands are protected from further aggression in the future. This is a general requirement, but one particular aspect of it is that Argentina might use the airfield at Port Stanley, only 350 miles from the mainland, to introduce large numbers of troops quickly and conveniently, without our being in a position to prevent this.

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We in London believe that the best way of minimising these risks would be a concrete arrangement involving the United States, which would provide an effective deterrent to Argentine use of force. We should like this to take the form, at least until some permanent settlement takes effect, of a US guarantee of the demilitarisation of the Islands. Such a guarantee could be included in the draft Memorandum or, perhaps more easily, could take the form of a unilateral US statement outside the draft Memorandum. I must emphasise that an arrangement of this kind is of the utmost importance to the British Government.

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Before your departure from London on 13 April, you gave me a revised text of paragraph 8 of the draft Memorandum. Not surprisingly, this text as it stands presents considerable difficulties for <sup>us.</sup> ~~the US~~. The word quote decolonisation unquote would in any case be unacceptable to Parliament, given the importance to this country of the wishes of the Islanders which, as you know, remain paramount for us. I enclose a formula for paragraph 8 on lines which we could accept. For us, the important element is to provide for a sounding of the opinion of <sup>our people on the islands:</sup> ~~the islanders, but this is balanced in our formula~~ ~~by the reference to the provisions of the UN Charter concerning non-self-governing territories~~. If the Argentinians seem reasonably inclined to a solution on the lines envisaged, but

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7	TO FLASH WASHINGTON
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS
10	NEW FORMULA FOR PARAGRAPH 8
11	December 31, 1982 will conclude the interim period.
12	During this period, the signatories shall negotiate with a view
13	to determining the future definitive status of each of the
14	three groups of islands consistently with the purposes and
15	principles of the UN Charter, United Nations General Assembly
16	Resolutions 1514(XV) and 2625(XXV) and, so far as islands with a
17	settled population are concerned, in accordance with their
18	wishes and interests <sup>of that population</sup> which shall be ascertained by a sounding
19	of their opinion to be supervised by the Special Commission.
20	If it is not possible to complete the processes envisaged in
21	this paragraph by December 31, 1982, the interim period may be
22	extended for (three) months by agreement between the parties.
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argue for more explicit account to be taken of the idea of  
decolonisation, I hope that you will impress on them the  
significance of the reference to UNGA Resolution 1514. If,  
however, you felt it essential in order to reach full  
agreement, we would be prepared to consider adding to the text  
after quote these groups of islands unquote the phrase quote  
within the framework of the provisions of the UN Charter  
relating to non-self-governing territories unquote. Ends.

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FALKLANDS: POSSIBLE FUTURE DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS

I Ideas which might be pursued by Mr Haig

a) Interim arrangements

A military stand-off: British Task Force halts at e.g. 50 miles from Port Stanley, exclusion zone is lifted, Argentina stops supplying the garrison by air or merchant ships as well as by naval vessels.

Variations on Mr Haig's present ideas, for instance. US instead of tripartite administration during withdrawal and negotiations.

Variations on the description of the longer term negotiations, e.g. that they should be described as being about sovereignty and self-determination or about a specific option such as lease-back.

b) Longer term arrangements

A treaty about the Falkland Islands and Dependencies similar to the Antarctic Treaty (Note A attached)

Lease-back: Argentine sovereignty, British administration (Note B attached).

Cession of some or all FI Dependencies, status quo ante for Falkland Islands themselves.

One of the above combined with repatriation arrangements for Falkland Islanders.

II Other methods of seeking a settlement

Another respected international figure, for instance the Commonwealth Secretary-General, tries to negotiate a settlement.

A group of states (e.g. US, 1 European and 1 *Latin American*) try the same thing.

UN Secretary-General appoints a Special Representative to try the same thing.

The UN Security Council seeks an advisory opinion about sovereignty from the International Court of Justice.


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Private Secretary

FALKLANDS: POSSIBLE FUTURE DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS

1. As requested I attach a note on this subject. It is divided into two parts:
  - a) Ideas about substance which we might consider putting to Mr Haig if his negotiations on their present basis should run into acute difficulty.
  - b) Other methods of seeking a settlement.



C L G Mallaby  
Planning Staff

15 April 1982

cc: PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/PUS  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Ure  
Mr Fearn ✓

Note A

The Antarctic Treaty

The main provisions of the Antarctic Treaty are that questions of sovereignty are frozen for the duration of the treaty; that parties to the treaty have freedom of scientific investigation anywhere in the area (and may establish scientific stations for the purpose); and that the area is demilitarised. The obvious disadvantage in applying the multilateral treaty to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies is that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries (as well as the US, the UK and Argentina and others) are parties and therefore would have the right to establish scientific stations. A better alternative might be to suggest a new agreement covering the Falklands and dependencies with provisions similar to those in the Antarctic Treaty, to which the UK and Argentina - or these two and the US- would be the only parties. The advantages of involving the United States would include that a US presence in the Islands might provide an element of political deterrence of future Argentine aggression, and that American investment might possibly be attracted to the Islands.

Instead of freedom to establish scientific settlements, which would hardly be relevant to the Falklands, the new agreement would presumably provide for the parties to establish settlements under their own administration. Legislation would be required in the Falkland Islands to allow the purchase of land by Argentine or US interests. It might be possible to encourage Argentine settlements on some of the less utilised smaller islands in the Falklands group and in the Dependencies, since this would give rise to less friction than settlements on the two main islands. Land in the Falkland Islands is broadly divided between that owned by the Falkland Islands Company, that owned by private sheep farmers and other private persons, and a small amount of Crown land. It would be necessary to limit the amount that Argentines and Americans could buy, for otherwise British interests might quickly sell out while the going was good.

Another difficult question would be the area to which the new treaty regime would be applicable. One solution would be the islands and a 3 mile belt of territorial sea around them. This would not provide all that much in the way of security. Another solution would be the islands and a 200 mile belt of waters around them subject, in the case

of/

of the Falkland Islands, to a median line with Argentina, and in the case of the South Sandwich Islands to the outer limit of the Antarctic Treaty area. This would of course provide a great deal more in the way of security but is likely to be unacceptable to Argentina unless accompanied by a separate arrangement for joint exploitation of mineral resources within the belt between 3 and 200 miles.

The advantages of this arrangement for the UK would be that the position on sovereignty would be unchanged, since the UK and Argentine views would simply stand; that British administration would be re-established over all existing settlements; and that the United States could be involved permanently in the question of the Falkland Islands. One difficulty would be that the Falkland Islanders could not be assumed to favour such new arrangements. Their views would probably have to be ascertained by means of a sounding of opinion before the arrangements took effect. Another difficulty might be that Argentina would suggest alterations to the Antarctic model which would be completely unacceptable. The other big question is whether Argentina would buy this idea. It would give her a real gain: her own settlements on the islands with her administration and flag. But she would not get her main goal, which is sovereignty, although she would be able to maintain her claim to it.

Britain and Argentina refer sovereignty to the International Court of Justice for a binding decision.

UK and Argentina jointly refer sovereignty to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal.

UN Security Council appoints a commission to investigate the Falkland Islands problem

Note: The risk *with* the International Court or an ad hoc arbitration tribunal is that they might possibly find against UK. The composition of the International Court is not favourable to us. The risk with any UN arrangement is that third world solidarity on questions of so-called decolonization would be against us.

Note BLease-Back

This would involve immediate transfer of sovereignty to Argentina and lease-back to the UK either indefinitely or for a long finite period, such as 50 years. This possibility has been much mentioned in Parliament and the media and does not seem to have attracted widespread criticism. It might well satisfy Argentina, since sovereignty is what she wants. It would meet the UK criteria of Argentine withdrawal and the return of British administration, but not the criterion about the wishes of the Islanders. Indeed the Islanders in the past have opposed this idea. Any new version of it would therefore need to provide for them to express their views. There might be provision for a referendum before the arrangements were put into effect; or for a referendum before the end of the lease-back period. In the latter case, if a majority opposed the expiry of the lease, it would continue for a further, say, 10 years. There would be another referendum near the end of this second period and a further extension if a majority opposed expiry of the lease. And so on...

Needham 18 April.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 April 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Government Savings Bank

I understand that the Prime Minister would like details on the position of Islanders' deposits in the Falkland Islands Government Savings Bank, including the rate of interest paid.

The interest paid by the Government Savings Bank on private deposits (5 per cent tax-free) has been set at the discretion of the Falkland Islands Government, within whose competence it has been. The FIG have taken the view that a higher rate of interest would reduce their income without attracting compensatory new deposits and might require them to raise additional taxes or to seek further aid. Islanders have been otherwise able to invest their savings overseas, principally in the UK, where they have received the going rate.

During 1981, proposals were carried forward to transform the Government Savings Bank into an institution offering a wider range of normal commercial services. The intention was to complete this process during 1982. While the formation of a commercial bank would not on its own affect the rate of interest paid on private deposits, it would be for the commercial judgement of the Bank's manager whether to make rates more competitive.

Since the Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands, we have had no information on the present position of the Government Savings Bank. We have however seen no reports of Argentine interference with its operations.

Yours ever

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

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# Briefing Note

No. 14  
14.4.82

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS - THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMONS SPEECH, 14.4.82

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Parliament was recalled on 14th April so that the Government might report and the House discuss the latest developments. Opening the debate, the Prime Minister said, "Our objective, endorsed by all sides of the House in recent debates, is that the people of the Falkland Islands shall be free to determine their own way of life and their own future". Their wishes "cannot be freely expressed, let alone implemented, while the present illegal Argentine occupation continues. That is why our immediate goal ... has been to secure the withdrawal of all Argentine forces .... and to secure the restoration of British administration. Our strategy has been based on a combination of diplomatic, military and economic pressures ...".

## Diplomatic Measures

Mrs. Thatcher paid tribute to the "tireless efforts" of the American Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, who had paid two visits to Britain and one to Buenos Aires. "We made clear to Mr. Haig that withdrawal of the invaders' troops must come first, and that the sovereignty of the Islands is not affected by the act of invasion".

She briefly outlined the negotiations so far, adding, "These discussions are complex, changing and difficult, the more so because they are taking place between a military junta and a democratic government of a free people ... We seek, and shall continue to seek, a diplomatic solution, and the House will realise that it would jeopardise that aim were I to give further details at this stage".

## Military Measures

The Prime Minister declared: "Diplomatic efforts are more likely to succeed if they are backed by military strength". She referred to the naval exclusion zone of 200 miles around the Falkland Islands, which came into effect on 12th April. "We see this measure as the first step towards achieving the withdrawal of Argentine forces. It appears to have exerted influence on Argentina whose navy has been concentrated outside the zone ... If the zone is challenged, we shall take that as the clearest evidence that the search for a peaceful solution has been abandoned. We shall then take the necessary action".

The naval task force, which is proceeding with all speed towards the South Atlantic, comprises two aircraft carriers, five guided missile destroyers, seven frigates, an assault ship with five landing ships and supporting vessels. A number of civilian ships has also been chartered or requisitioned, including the Canberra for use as a troop ship, and the Uganda, which will be available as a hospital ship. "Recourse to the merchant marine is traditional in time of naval emergency and their response has been wholehearted on this occasion as in the past".

Mrs. Thatcher described how men and equipment were being flown out to Ascension Island to meet up with the Task Force, and Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft were now patrolling the South Atlantic in support of our fleet.

The Ministry of Defence had announced additional measures to provide extra capability for the force over an extended period, including the recommissioning of a second assault ship, HMS Intrepid, which will

significantly add to the amphibious capability of the Task Force. Arrangements were in hand to adapt a large cargo ship for the sea lift of additional Harriers, which will nearly double the size of the Harrier force in the South Atlantic".

### Economic Measures

The Prime Minister said: "We have been urging our friends and allies to take action parallel to our own. We have achieved a heartening degree of success". The most significant measure was the decision of our nine partners in the European Community to join us in stopping all imports from Argentina, "unprecedented in its scope and the rapidity of the decision ... an effective demonstration of Community solidarity". Last year about a quarter of all Argentina's exports went to the EEC. Our partners "were the first to realise that if aggression were allowed to succeed in the Falkland Islands, it would be encouraged the world over". Australia, New Zealand and Canada have also decided to ban imports from Argentina, to stop export credits and to halt all sales of military equipment. Many other Commonwealth countries had supported us by condemning the Argentine invasion. Compared to this almost the only country whose position has been moving towards Argentina is the Soviet Union. "We can only guess at the cynical calculations which lie behind this move".

### Force not ruled out

The Prime Minister described how the Government had recently received a message from the British Community Council in Argentina urging a peaceful solution to the present conflict. "We have replied, recognising the contribution which the British community has made to the development of Argentina - but making it plain that we have a duty to respond to the unprovoked aggression against the Falkland Islands... Of course we too want a peaceful solution, but it was not Britain who broke the peace. If the argument of no force at any price were to be adopted at this stage it would serve only to perpetuate the occupation of those very territories which have themselves been seized by force".

### Guiding Principles

The Prime Minister concluded: "In any negotiations over the coming days we shall be guided by the following principles. We shall continue to insist on Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and dependencies. We shall remain ready to exercise our right to resort to force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter until the occupying forces leave the Islands. Our naval task force sails on towards its destination...". Any diplomatic solution "must safeguard the principle that the wishes of the Islanders shall remain paramount. There is no reason to believe that they would prefer any alternative to the resumption of the administration which they enjoyed before Argentina committed aggression".

"The eyes of the world are now focussed upon the Falkland Islands. Others are watching anxiously to see whether brute force or the rule of law will triumph. Wherever naked aggression occurs it must be overcome. The cost now, however high, must be set against the cost we would one day have to pay if this principle went by default. And that is why, through diplomatic, economic and if necessary through military means, we shall persevere until freedom and democracy are restored to the people of the Falkland Islands".

DJN/JV

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Ref. A08119

MR. WHITMORE

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It was agreed at a meeting of OD(SA) last week that Sir Michael Palliser, who retired as Permanent Under Secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Thursday 8th April, should be retained as a Special Adviser in the Cabinet Office during the Falkland Islands crisis. It was agreed that he should be based in the Cabinet Office and should attend future meetings of OD(SA).

2. Sir Michael Palliser has taken up his post as Special Adviser today. We have agreed the broad lines of the work which he has to put in hand. He will not be responsible for any day-to-day management or executive functions, which are the business of the Departments concerned, but he will be available for consultation as required on particular political, diplomatic or military aspects of the handling of the crisis. He will be responsible for clearing the output of the South Atlantic Presentation Unit: he will either authorise its release (consulting Departments and me as appropriate) or when he considers it necessary seek the Prime Minister's approval. He will also consider the longer-term alternatives available to the Government both for the current negotiations being conducted by the United States Secretary of State and also for the constitutional status of the Falkland Islands once the Argentine troops have withdrawn and British administration is restored.

3. I see no need for any public announcement of Sir Michael Palliser's appointment. It will become known to the Departments and officials concerned in the course of day-to-day business and as a result of work which is commissioned of him by Ministers. But there is a risk that news of his appointment might leak, and we should provide ourselves in advance with a line to take, should we be asked about the appointment by the press. There is no reason to conceal the appointment, and I suggest that, if there are enquiries, the No. 10 Press Office should confirm that, following his retirement, Sir Michael Palliser has been asked by the Prime Minister to serve as a Special Adviser in the Cabinet Office during the Falklands crisis. His appointment will be for as long as

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Ministers consider necessary, but will clearly be related to the course of events. If asked what tasks he will be fulfilling as a Special Adviser, the Press Office should refuse to be drawn, but could say that he will take on any work which Ministers consider it would be appropriate for him to do.

4. The Prime Minister may like to welcome Sir Michael Palliser at tomorrow morning's meeting of OD(SA), and to tell the Sub-Committee what his remit is, on the lines of paragraph 2 above.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

14th April, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 April 1982

*mt*  
Prime Minister

A.J.C. 1/4

h.a.  
A.J.C.

Dear John,

Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister has asked for details of the qualifying period for the electoral registration of a resident of the Falkland Islands.

According to the Legislative Council (Elections) (Amendment) Ordinance 1977, any person who:

- a) is a British subject who has attained the age of 18 years; and
- b) is not subject to any legal incapacity; and
- c) has continuously resided in the Colony during the qualifying period and is normally resident in the electoral area or the electoral division on the qualifying day;

shall be qualified to be registered as an elector.

According to the Legislative Council (Elections) (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance 1977, the term "qualifying period" means:

- a) in the case of a person born in the Colony, the preceding 12 months ending on qualifying day (this being 15 July of each year);
- b) in the case of a person not born in the Colony, the preceding three years ending on qualifying day.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private SecretaryA J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 April 1982

Opposition to the Argentine Regime

Thank you for your letter of 8 April. The Prime Minister has no objection to the proposals you describe. But she very much agrees with your comment that it is unlikely that much can be done immediately to puncture the present mood of euphoria in the Argentine. She believes that the time to sow doubts is when doubts have already begun to appear and that timing of the proposed action is therefore very important.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

T 728 182



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 April 1982

*Dear John,*

Canadian Economic Measures against Argentina

The Canadian government decided on 13 April to ban imports from Argentina and to deny export credit for new transactions.

The Canadians, who introduced an arms embargo last week, have therefore now put into effect all three of the economic measures requested of them in the Prime Minister's message of 6 April. I enclose a draft message of appreciation for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Trudeau.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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**PRIME MINISTER'S  
 PERSONAL MESSAGE**  
 SERIAL No. T 72 B/82

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YOUR TELNO 199: ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA  
 1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister  
 to Mr Trudeau.  
 BEGINS  
 I have just learned about the decision taken by your Government  
 yesterday to ban all imports from Argentina and to cut off  
 export credit finance. I am deenly grateful for this action.  
 Together with the steps taken by our other friends and allies  
 across the world these measures will certainly contribute  
 to the pressure on the Argentina government to withdraw  
 from the Falkland Islands and to agree to a peaceful  
 settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolution  
 No 502. I am most heartened by your support.  
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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 72/82

NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION

NEW ZEALAND HOUSE · HAYMARKET · LONDON SW1Y 4TQ  
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Telex: 24368

cc Harris  
CHS

From the High Commissioner  
H.E. The Hon L.W. Gandar

14th April, 1982.

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON.  
SW1

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I have been asked to pass on to you the following message  
from Mr. Muldoon:

"Dear Margaret,

You will no doubt have been informed that the  
New Zealand Cabinet agreed yesterday, in response to  
your message of 9 April, on the following economic  
measures against Argentina as a result of the  
invasion of the Falkland Islands.

I should like to confirm that the three measures,  
which I announced yesterday (13 April), are:

- a ban on all trade with Argentina (this would not  
apply to goods in transit or to those covered by  
existing contracts),
- a ban on the supply of arms and other military  
material to Argentina,
- the ending of guarantee commitments by the Export  
Guarantee Office for new business with Argentina.

These further actions against Argentina are a  
reflection of New Zealand's strong condemnation of the  
Falkland invasion. They are also an expression of our  
solidarity with you and the British people at this time.

Rob Muldoon"

Yours sincerely,


L. Gandar  
High Commissioner

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 708 OF 14 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA.



FALKLAND ISLANDS: ICRC

1. AS YOU KNOW, THE ICRC HAVE BEEN TRYING FOR SOME DAYS TO OBTAIN ARGENTINE CONSENT TO THEIR SENDING A GROUP OF THREE ICRC REPRESENTATIVES TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO WATCH OVER THE WELFARE OF THE CIVIL POPULATION. WE ARE MOST ANXIOUS THAT THE ICRC REQUEST SHOULD BE APPROVED AND AN ICRC PRESENCE ESTABLISHED ON THE ISLANDS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. ON 12 APRIL WE ASKED THE AMERICANS THROUGH THE US EMBASSY HERE TO EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE ARGENTINES ON BEHALF OF THE ICRC. A SIMILAR REQUEST WAS MADE BY THE ICRC THEMSELVES TO THE US MISSION IN GENEVA. YOU HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED TO THE AMERICANS THAT THEY SHOULD PUT THEIR MUSCLE BEHIND THE ICRC REQUEST RATHER THAN PROCEED WITH THEIR OWN PROPOSAL TO SEND AN AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICIAL TO THE ISLANDS. WE UNDERSTAND (YOUR TELNO 1260) THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOT NOW PURSUING THEIR PROPOSAL BUT SO FAR AS WE KNOW THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT (NOT) YET TAKEN ANY ACTION WITH THE ARGENTINES ON THE ICRC REQUEST.
3. PLEASE ENSURE THAT HAIG IS PERSONALLY AWARE THAT I AM VERY ANXIOUS TO SEE THE ICRC ESTABLISHED ON THE ISLANDS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND HOPE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL INTERVENE QUICKLY AND FIRMLY WITH THE ARGENTINES. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT THE POPULATION IS BEING MALTREATED BUT GIVEN THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD OF THE ARGENTINE REGIME PUBLIC OPINION

/HERE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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HERE IS RIGHTLY CONCERNED. IT CAN SURELY BE PUT TO THE ARGENTINES THAT IT IS VERY MUCH IN THEIR INTERESTS NOT (NOT) TO BE SEEN TO BE OBSTRUCTING THE WORK OF THIS PURELY HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATION.

4. THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE ICRC HAVE NOT (NOT) BASED THEIR REQUEST ON THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION BECAUSE OF ARGENTINE SENSITIVITIES TO THE TERM QUOTE OCCUPATION UNQUOTE IN ARTICLE 2 BUT ARE ACTING UNDER THEIR GENERAL MANDATE TO MONITOR MATTERS OF HUMANITARIAN CONCERN.

PYM

FCO

S AM D

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2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

D E D I P

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 142358Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1278 OF 14 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR SIR A PARSONS)

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1274: HAIG'S STATEMENT

1. THIS IS A MESS OF THE AMERICANS' OWN MAKING, ENTIRELY BROUGHT ABOUT BY LEAKS FROM WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE EXTENT OF COVERT AMERICAN COOPERATION WITH US WAS DELIBERATELY LEAKED BY SOMEONE WITH AN INTEREST IN STOPPING IT. BUT I THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT THEY HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO THE OPENNESS AND INCOHERENCE OF THEIR SYSTEM. THEY HAVE ALSO LEAKED THE EXTENT OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA, WHICH COULD BE HELPFUL TO US.

2. HAIG'S REACTION WAS PREDICTABLE BUT AGGRAVATED BY JET-LAG. HE AND HIS ADVISERS HAVE HELD THE VIEW FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EXERT ANY INFLUENCE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS UNLESS THEY GAVE A DISPLAY OF PUBLIC IMPARJALITY. I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO HAIG THAT WE DO NOT SHARE THIS JUDGMENT AND THAT IN OUR VIEW A FIRM LINE IN KEEPING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 WOULD BE VERY MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE. THE ARGENTINIANS READINESS TO NEGOTIATE WILL BE RELATED, NOT TO THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE USA, BUT TO THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE LATTER TO DO DAMAGE TO THE ARGENTINIANS IF THEY PERSIST IN INTRANSIGENCE. HAIG HAS EVIDENTLY REVERTED TO HIS INSTINCTIVE VIEW THE MOMENT THE ARGENTINIANS BLEW THEIR TOP, PARTICULARLY SINCE HIS OWN PRESTIGE IS NOW ON THE LINE. HE IS LEAVING FOR BUENOS AIRES AGAIN TOMORROW. ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR THE AMERICANS AT PRESENT IS HOW TO HANDLE THE ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENT. THEIR MAIN ILLUSION IS TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED IF GALTIERI REMAINS IN POWER AND THAT ANY SUCCESSOR REGIME WOULD BE WORSE.

3. WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED BOTH BY EAGLEBURGER AND BY PEOPLE IN THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES THAT HAIG'S STATEMENT TODAY WILL MEAN NO CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS. EAGLEBURGER HAS SAID PRIVATELY THAT THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN CONTINUING AS AT PRESENT, UNLESS WE ARE LOOKING FOR A MAJOR CHANGE IN LEVEL OF SUPPORT FROM THE US. WE WILL KEEP AN EYE ON THIS.

4. NOW THAT THE STATEMENT HAS BEEN MADE, THERE WILL BE SPECULATION EVERYWHERE ABOUT WHAT IT MEANS AS WELL AS CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S STANCE. I RECOGNISE THAT THIS WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR YOU TO HANDLE. I DOUBT IF IT WILL HELP US TO SHOW TOO PUBLICLY OUR ANNOYANCE AT THE WAY THE AMERICANS CHOOSE TO PRESENT THEIR POLICIES IN PUBLIC, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT WE ARE GETTING IN PRIVATE, OR THAT IT WOULD SERVE OUR INTEREST TO GIVE THE



SECRET

IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE MIFFED ON GETTING LESS PRACTICAL SUPPORT THAN WE WOULD LIKE. I EXPECT THAT OUR CAUSE WILL BEST BE SERVED BY INDICATING THAT WE HAVE NO DOUBT OF THE USA'S AWARENESS OF THE PRINCIPLES AND INTERESTS AT STAKE.

HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 142125Z APR 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1274 OF 14 APRIL  
INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

**FLASH**

FALKLANDS: US STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY HAIG RELEASED TODAY  
AT 1600 HOURS:

I WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. IT IS AN EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT -- AND EXCEPTIONALLY DANGEROUS -- PROBLEM. THE POSITIONS THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HOLD ARE DEEPLY FELT, AND IN MANY CASES MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. BUT THE LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE ASSURED ME, AGAIN TODAY, THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO GO ON WORKING WITH US TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THAT WILL REQUIRE FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES -- NOT ABANDONMENT OF PRINCIPLE, BUT RESPONSIBLE AND DEFENSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS. AS A RESULT OF MY CONVERSATIONS IN LONDON, PLUS TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS TODAY, I HAVE DEVELOPED NEW IDEAS WHICH I HAVE DESCRIBED TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. BASED ON THESE NEW IDEAS, THE ARGENTINIANS HAVE INVITED ME TO RETURN TO BUENOS AIRES. I PROPOSE TO DO SO ON THURSDAY 15 APRIL. (DAY DATE UNDERLINED)  
FROM THE OUTSET OF THIS CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES HAS VIEWED ITS ROLE AS THAT OF ASSISTING THE TWO SIDES IN FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. OUR ABILITY TO DO THIS IS BASED ON OUR LONG-STANDING

15 APRIL. (DAY DATE UNDERLINED)  
FROM THE OUTSET OF THIS CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES HAS VIEWED ITS  
ROLE AS THAT OF ASSISTING THE TWO SIDES IN FINDING A PEACEFUL  
SOLUTION. OUR ABILITY TO DO THIS IS BASED ON OUR LONG-STANDING  
RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA. WE HAVE BEEN  
CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN THESE RELATIONSHIPS IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OUR  
INFLUENCE WITH BOTH GOVERNMENTS. FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO EXISTING  
OBLIGATIONS -- OR GOING BEYOND THEM -- WOULD OBVIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE  
OUR ABILITY TO PLAY THE ROLE BOTH COUNTRIES WISH US TO PERFORM.  
SINCE THE ONSET OF THE CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES HAS THEREFORE NOT  
ACCEDED TO REQUESTS THAT WOULD GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF CUSTOMARY  
PATTERNS OF COOPERATION BASED ON EXISTING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.  
THAT WILL CONTINUE TO BE OUR STAND WHILE OUR EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY.  
THE EXCHANGES OF THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS INDICATE THAT EACH GOVERN-  
MENT WELCOMES OUR ROLE AND RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING  
OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE IT.

HENDERSON

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GR 170

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED  
FM WASHINGTON 142311Z APR 82  
TO ROUTINE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1277 OF 14 APRIL  
INFO NIO LONDON AND BELFAST  
INFO SAVING BIS NEW YORK, DUBLIN

YOUR TELNO: 628: NORTHERN IRELAND:  
MESSAGE FROM MR PRIOR TO JUDGE CLARK.

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM JUDGE CLARK TO MR PRIOR'S MESSAGE ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND:

BEGINS:

DEAR JIM,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 2 APRIL OUTLINING YOUR PLANS FOR A FRAMEWORK OF SELF GOVERNMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND. IT IS CLEAR THAT A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT HAS GONE INTO YOUR PROPOSALS. I APPLAUD YOUR DECISION TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO TACKLE THE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND. AS YOU KNOW, OUR POLICY IS THAT A SOLUTION MUST COME FROM THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND THEMSELVES, AND THE FRAMEWORK YOU INTEND TO ESTABLISH OFFERS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THAT PROCESS.

WARM REGARDS,

ENDS.

2. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

FCO PASS SAVING DUBLIN.

HENDERSON

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 PS/PUS  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE

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 MR LITTLER  
 MR HAWTIN  
 MR PERETZ  
 MR ILETT  
 MR McINTYRE

} H.M.TSY

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*M*

FM DUBLIN 141605Z APR 1982

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 104 OF 14 APRIL

FOR EMERGENCY UNIT. MY TELNO 99: IRISH REPUBLIC AND THE FALKLANDS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR GERARD COLLINS ON 10 APRIL.

BEGINS

THE GOVERNMENT HAS ONE OVERRIDING CONCERN IN REGARD TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS: IRELAND SHOULD DO ALL IT CAN TO HELP AVERT A LARGER CONFLICT AND GREATER BLOODSHED. WE WANT TO SEE THIS HISTORIC AND NOW VERY DANGEROUS DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES WHOSE FRIENDSHIP WE VALUE AND WHOSE INTERESTS WE RESPECT RESOLVED PEACEFULLY.

THIS HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE AIM OF ALL OUR WORDS AND ACTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND AS A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. IRELAND HAS CAREFULLY REFRAINED IN THE PRESENT SITUATION

COUNCIL AND AS A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.

IRELAND HAS CAREFULLY REFRAINED IN THE PRESENT SITUATION FROM PRONOUNCING ON THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND GREAT BRITAIN REGARDING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. NONETHELESS IT IS CLEAR THAT ARGENTINA BY ACTING TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY BY FORCE DID SO IN DIRECT DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING THE ARMED INTERVENTION BY ARGENTINA, THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED ON APRIL 3 A RESOLUTION NO. 502 WHICH MADE THREE CLEAR DEMANDS. IT CALLED FOR AN END TO HOSTILITIES, AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES AND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. IRELAND VOTED FOR THAT RESOLUTION BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS TERMS IS THE BEST MEANS BY WHICH FURTHER FIGHTING CAN BE AVOIDED AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RULE OF LAW RATHER THAN THE RULE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UPHELD.

IT IS FOR THIS REASON AND IN DEFENCE OF THAT PRINCIPLE ALSO THAT WE TOGETHER WITH OUR NINE PARTNERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL SOLIDARITY HAVE DECIDED TO UNITE OUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EFFORTS TO PRESS FOR AND TO PROMOTE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TERMS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502.

THIS IS THE SOLE AIM OF THE MEASURES DECIDED ON BY THE TEN IN BRUSSELS EARLIER TODAY.

IT IS OUR ERNEST HOPE THAT THEY WILL HELP TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH ARGENTINA AND GREAT BRITAIN CAN RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY AND HONOURABLY.

FOR ITS PART, IRELAND WILL CONTINUE ITS OWN EFFORTS AND IS READY TO JOIN WITH OTHERS IN THE SEARCH FOR DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS.

THE MOMENT IS FAST APPROACHING WHEN THE PEACE MAKING AND PEACE KEEPING MACHINERY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IF THEY ARE RESORTED TO MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE AS IN THE CASE OF OTHER CONFLICTS A PRACTICAL MEANS BY WHICH TO AVERT A MAJOR CLASH, GREATER BLOODSHED AND FURTHER SUFFERING.

I HAVE INSTRUCTED THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AMBASSADOR NOEL DORR, TO EXPLORE EVERY POSSIBILITY IN THIS REGARD.

ENDS

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/MR ONSLOW  
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PS/PUS  
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MR WRIGHT  
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MR URE  
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FM CARACAS 141400Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 100

OF 14 APRIL 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT ISSUED LONG COMMUNIQUE EVENING 13 APRIL. TRANSLATION AND COMMENT WILL FOLLOW. THE COMMUNIQUE SHOWS A FURTHER HARDENING OF VENEZUELAN POSITION IN FAVOUR OF ARGENTINA.
2. THE COMMUNIQUE VIEWS BRITISH NAVAL MOVES AS AN AGGRAVATION AND A CRITICAL THREAT TO PEACE OF AMERICA. WHILE REPEATING VENEZUELAN BELIEF IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, IT IS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ROLE WHICH VENEZUELA CONSIDERS TO HAVE BEEN ONE SIDED IN NOT TAKING ACCOUNT OF COLONIAL ORIGIANS OF PROBLEM AND VALIDITY OF ARGENTINIAN CLAIMS, AND WHICH IS SILENT IN THE FACE OF POSSIBLE ARMED ATTACK IN THE NAME OF COLONIALISM AGAINST PART OF AMERICAN CONTINENT.

SECONDE

TYPISTS

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FM CARACAS 141900Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 103 OF 14 APRIL

OUR TEL NO 101 : THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. A MEMBER OF CHANCERY HAS MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISORY COMMISSION (CAFE), DR RAFAEL EMILIO MARQUEZ, SINCE THE ARGENTINIAN INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. ON 14 APRIL, FOLLOWING THE MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND PARTY MEETING WHICH ENDORSED COMMUNIQUE REPORTED IN TUR. DR MARQUEZ MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(1) IN CASE OF ARMED CONFLICT

THE VENEZUELAN WOULD TAKE NO DEFINITE ACTION WHILST MEDIATION ATTEMPTS CONTINUED. BUT, IF ARMED CONFLICT TOOK PLACE, THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ADHERE TO THE RIO TREATY OF 1947. MILITARY ASSISTANCE (UNSPECIFIED) WOULD BE SENT TO ARGENTINA, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UK WOULD BE BROKEN AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WOULD BE REVISED.



WOULD BE REVISED.

(II) ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN

THIS WAS HARDENING AND THREE ANTI-BRITISH POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS WERE BEING PLANNED. THE TWO MOST SIGNIFICANT WERE THOSE BEING ORGANISED BY THE YOUTH WING OF THE GOVERNING PARTY COPEI AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCV)

(III) GUATEMALA

THE VENEZUELANAS HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT THE NEW GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS WELL VIEWED BY VENEZUELA, WERE CONSIDERING MOVING AGAINST BELIZE. IF THIS OCCURRED IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES VENEZUELA WOULD BE COMPELLED TO SUPPORT THEM.

(IV) THE GUYANA DISPUTE

DR MARQUEZ CONSIDERED THAT CURRENT POPULAR AND MEDIA CALLS TO OCCUPY THE ESSEQUIBO IMMEDIATELY DID NOT REFLECT THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW. THE GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO AWAITING THE EXPIRY OF THE PORT OF SPAIN PROTOCOL, AT WHICH TIME IT WAS LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD CALL UPON THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO SET UP NEW NEGOTIATING MACHINERY. NEVERTHELESS PUBLIC OPINION WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY WORKED UP AND HE COULD NOT GIVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOT WAVER IN ITS RESOLVE.

(V) CUBA.

A DELEGATION FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY HAD CALLED ON CARE ON 13 APRIL. THEY SAW THE INVOCATION OF THE RIO TREATY AS A MEANS OF BRINGING CUBA BACK INTO THE LATIN AMERICAN FOLD. CUBA NEEDED AN ACCOMMODATION WITH LATIN AMERICA. THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR, AND SEVENTEEN OFFICIALS, HAD RETURNED POSTE HASTE TO BUENOS AIRES. THE RUSSIANS WERE NONETHELESS CONCERNED THAT THE RIO TREATY, IF IT WAS REVIVED BY THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE, COULD BE USED AGAINST THEM AT A LATER DATE.

(VI) HAWK

THE HAWK CONTRACT HAD BEEN JEOPARDISED. THOUGH THE ARMED FORCES STILL WANTED IT, POLITICIANS WERE THINKING NOW IN TERMS OF GOING TO THE US. LACK OF MONEY, THE ESSEQUIBO AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WERE WORKING AGAINST THE HAWK.

2. I AM INCLINED TO TAKE MARQUEZ' VIEWS SERIOUSLY. HE IS A CENTRAL FIGURE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE, AND HE HAS BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH THE CRISIS. WE HAVE FOUND HIM LEVEL-

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SECONDE

NNNN

TYPISTS ✓

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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FM MONTEVIDEO 141320Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 115 OF 14 APRIL

FOLLOWING FROM BAKER. YOUR TELNO 93 OF 14 APRIL.  
FALKLANDS SITREP 13 APRIL 82

PARTY OF 35 WHICH LEFT STANLEY 13 APRIL INCLUDED CHIEF SECRETARY  
CHIEF POLICE OFFICER, REGISTRAR GENERAL AND TWO R.A.F. SECONDED  
TECHNICIANS ALL BEING DEPORTED. IN ADDITION EXCO MEMBER AND LAND  
OWNER BILL LUXTON AND WIFE DEPORTED ON POLITICAL GROUNDS. TWO  
OTHERS, G CHEEK AND S WALLACE (EX LEG CO) WERE WARNED THAT THEY  
WERE POLITICALLY SUSPECT AND MIGHT BE DEPORTED IF THEY DID NOT  
TOE THE LINE.

UNTIL THEN WE HAD SUCCEEDED IN MAINTAINING ESSENTIAL SERVICES  
FOR THE ISLANDS I.E. MEDICAL, WATER, ELECTRICITY, TELEPHONES, CIVIL  
POLICE, SAVINGS BANK AND TREASURY AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PUBLIC

UNTIL THEN WE HAD SUCCEEDED IN MAINTAINING ESSENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE ISLANDS I.E. MEDICAL, WATER, ELECTRICITY, TELEPHONES, CIVIL POLICE, SAVINGS BANK AND TREASURY AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PUBLIC WORKS. HOWEVER INTERNAL AIR SERVICE WAS INTERDICTED AND ARGENTINES HAD RECENTLY CLAMPED DOWN ON R.T. SYSTEM. PRIVATE OVERSEAS TELEGRAMS WERE STILL AVAILABLE BUT CLOSELY MONITORED AND OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS BY C.S. VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

FEAR THAT YESTERDAY'S DEPARTURES MAY LEAD TO REDUCTION IN ESSENTIAL SERVICES, C.S. CIVIL POLICE MAY NOW BE TAKEN OVER BY ARGENTINE MILITARY WITH DEPRESSING EFFECT ON PUBLIC MORALE. HAROLD ROWLANDS, FINANCIAL SECRETARY, HAS ASSUMED FORMAL C.S.'S RESPONSIBILITIES AND WILL ENDEAVOUR TO KEEP GOING WHAT HE CAN FOR BENEFIT OF ISLANDERS.

POPULATION SHARPLY DIVIDED (SINCE BBC PUBLICATION OF "PROTECTING POWER" LETTER AND LONDON RESPONSE) BETWEEN HARD LINERS WHO WANT ARGENTINIANS EXPELLED AT WHATEVER COST AND THE REST WHO WANT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. LATTER INCLUDE SOME WHO SIMPLY DO NOT WANT TO BE CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE (AS THEY SEE IT) AND OTHERS WHO FEEL THAT THEY WOULD RATHER GIVE UP THEIR WAY OF LIFE (AND PERHAPS ALL THEY OWN) THAN SEE THE FALKLANDS PROBLEM CAUSE MAJOR CONFLICT OR PERHAPS EVEN ESCALATE TO WIDER HOSTILITIES. PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT MOST HARD LINERS ARE OLDER AGE GROUPS AND SOME WHO DID NOT ACTUALLY WITNESS THE INVASION. MOST PEOPLE WITH YOUNG FAMILIES AND EVEN SOME PREVIOUSLY WELL KNOWN HARD LINERS ARE NOW SAYING THAT THE SITUATION HAS NOW CHANGED SO MUCH THAT FURTHER FIGHTING IS NOT JUSTIFIED. MY ESTIMATE AS AT TIME OF DEPARTURE IS THAT GIVEN THE CHANCE 80 PERCENT WOULD BE IN FAVOUR OF A TEMPORARY EVACUATION BEING OFFERED. HOWEVER, THIS SEEMS PURELY ACADEMIC TO ME AS IN SPITE OF FREQUENT ASSURANCES THAT THEY INTEND TO AVOID FIGHTING IN THE TOWN ARGENTINIANS ARE PROCEEDING WITH DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS AROUND STANLEY AND I DOUBT VERY MUCH IF THEY WOULD ALLOW ANY "TOTAL" EVACUATION WHILE THE BRITISH TASK FORCE IS STILL A THREAT. NEVERTHELESS THEY HAVE ALLOWED A LARGE NUMBER (LOCAL ESTIMATE IS 40 PERCENT) TO LEAVE FOR THE CAMP WHERE SO FAR THE ONLY KNOWN CONCENTRATIONS OF TROOPS ARE 120 AT GOOSE GREEN AND 150 AT FOX BAY EAST. THUS PEOPLE FEEL, PERHAPS ERRONEOUSLY, THAT THERE MAY BE LITTLE OR NO ACTION IN THE RURAL AREAS.

ARGENTINIANS SAY REASON FOR THE DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS AROUND STANLEY IS DEFENCE OF AIRPORT ONLY AND THEY SEEM TO BE MAKING PREPARATIONS TO BUILD A TEMPORARY STRIP ELSEWHERE AS A RESERVE. SO FAR IMPOSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN WHERE THIS WOULD BE BUT GOOSE GREEN, FOX BAY EAST OR CHARTRES SEEM POSSIBILITIES. THERE HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS AIR TRAFFIC AND SO LONG AS C130S AND OLDER AIRCRAFT SUCH AS LOCKHEED ELECTRAS COME AND GO UNHINDERED I DO NOT SEE THE

INUOUS AIR TRAFFIC AND SO LONG AS C130S AND OLDER AIRCRAFT SUCH AS LOCKHEED ELECTRAS COME AND GO UNHINDERED I DO NOT SEE THE NAVAL BLOCKADE HAVING ANY PRACTICAL EFFECT.

HITHERTO ARGENTINE TROOPS MORAL HAS SEEMED LOW WITH TROOPS, SOME VERY YOUNG, BEGGING FOOD FROM THE LOCAL POPULATION AND SEEMING COMPLETELY BEWILDERED. HOWEVER IMPRESSIONS YESTERDAY WERE THAT SUPPLIES WERE BETTER ORGANISED. FRESH TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT WERE ARRIVING AND DURING HOURS WAIT AT AIRPORT WE NOTICED NEW OFFICERS (MAJOR/COLONEL RANK) BEING WELCOMED AND MORE CHEERFUL ATMOSPHERE AMONG TROOPS.

DETAILED MILITARY INFORMATION BEING PASSED TO COL. LOVE BUT IT WAS OBVIOUS EVEN TO LAYMAN YESTERDAY THAT ARGENTINIANS ARE BEEFING UP THEIR DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS BOTH IN TERMS OF MATERIAL AND MEN.

ISLANDERS CONTINUE GENERALLY CALM AND SEEING OFF PARTY YESTERDAY WERE IN GOOD SPIRITS. APART FROM ISOLATED BREAK-INS AND THEFTS MILITARY CONDUCT CONTINUES TO BE CORRECT BUT I DOUBT IF THIS WOULD LAST LONG IF FOOD SUPPLIES WERE DRASTICALLY REDUCED. I WOULD THEN FORESEE GRAVE PROBLEMS IN MAINTAINING DISCIPLINE AND ENSURING SAFETY OF CIVILIAN POPULATION AND PROPERTY.

HUTCHISON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(28)

Valid 8/L)

PS  
PS/  
PS/  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M. Tsy

Kiss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/En

DIO CABINET OFFICE

Mr Wade-Gery Cabinet Office

*Mr Fuller SAPU Cab. office*

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

*MW*

RESIDENT CLERK

Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

**DESKBY 140730Z**

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM LIMA 140405Z  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
DESK BY 0730Z  
AND IMMEDIATE INFO WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 90 OF 14 APRIL

ADVANCE COPY  
**IMMEDIATE**

FALKLANDS: YOUR TELEGRAM NO 61

1. THE MFA HAVE ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU A MESSAGE IN REPLY TO THE TEXT IN YOUR TUR. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION. BEGINS:-  
"THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU IS GRATEFUL TO HMG FOR THE CAREFUL ATTENTION IT HAS GIVEN TO ITS PROPOSAL FOR A TRUCE, EVEN THOUGH THIS ACCEPTANCE IS CONDITIONED BY THE REQUIREMENTS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC SHOULD FIRST FULFILL.

THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT HAS DULY CONSIDERED THE REASONS EXPRESSED BY HMG AND IS AT THE SAME TIME SENSITIVE TO THE DANGERS WHICH DEEPLY CONCERN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WHICH GROW MORE ALARMING HOUR BY HOUR.

WITH THESE GRAVE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU IS DISPOSED TO PERSIST IN ITS FRIENDLY REQUEST TO HMG ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS AGREEING TO THE PROPOSED TRUCE OF 72 HOURS - A PERIOD IN WHICH THERE SHOULD NOT EXIST ANY RISK OF HOSTILITIES OCCURING - PRECISELY TO CREATE THE OPTIMUM CONDITIONS WHICH MAY PERMIT THE NEGOTIATION OF THE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION WHICH IS BEING SOUGHT TO RECONCILE THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES.

THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU, PROFOUNDLY CONSCIOUS OF THE GRAVITY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, CONSIDERS THAT IT NEITHER CAN NOR SHOULD SPARE ANY EFFORT TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD HAVE INCALCULABLE AND DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES." ENDS.

2. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT IS MUCH CONCERNED BY THE SEEMING LACK OF PROGRESS OF THE HAIG GOOD OFFICES MISSION AS REPORTED BY THE MEDIA. THE PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINES SEEMS TO BE GAINING MOMENTUM AND IT IS OBVIOUSLY GETTING MORE DIFFICULT FOR PRESIDENT BELAUNDE TO MAINTAIN THE CONCILIATORY AND STATESMANLIKE POSTURE HE HAS SO FAR ADOPTED IN ALL HIS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE CRISIS IN WHICH HE HAS MADE REPEATED REFERENCES TO PERU'S FRIENDSHIP WITH BRITAIN. MY TELEGRAM NO. 89 (NOT TO

HAS SO FAR ADOPTED IN ALL HIS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE  
CRISIS IN WHICH HE HAS MADE REPEATED REFERENCES TO PERU'S  
FRIENDSHIP WITH BRITAIN. MY TELEGRAM NO. 88 (NOT TO  
WASHINGTON) ALSO REFERRED TO THE PRESSURES TO WHICH HE IS  
BECOMING INCREASINGLY SUBJECTED BY THE PRO-ARGENTINE PERUVIAN  
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ MILITARY HARDLINERS, WHO STILL REPRESENT A  
SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN THE POLITICAL BALANCE OF THE PRESENT  
DEMOCRATIC REGIME. I BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S TRUCE  
SUGGESTION IS INTENDED TO BE A GENUINELY WELL DISPOSED INITIATIVE  
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN INSPIRED BY THE ARGENTINES.

2- WALLACE

NNNNU

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

~~(29)~~ (30)

**IMMEDIATE**

D/B 141500Z

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.


PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD  
~~HD/NAD~~  
~~HD/EESD~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

ADVANCE COPY 

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 141500Z

FM WASHINGTON 141315Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1270 OF 14 APRIL

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: US ASSISTANCE FOR UK.

1. LAST NIGHT'S TELEVISION NEWS AND TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS CARRIED PROMINENT REPORTS THAT THE US IS PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE BRITISH IN SUPPORT OF THE ROYAL NAVAL TASK FORCE.

2. AMONG THE HELP WHICH THE REPORTS ALLEGE IS BEING PROVIDED IS:

- A) USE OF A CHANNEL ON AN AMERICAN SATELLITE TO HELP COMMUNICATION WITH OUR VESSELS;
- B) INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS OF ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTIVITY, INCLUDING PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE;
- C) SPECIAL EFFORTS TO MAKE JET FUEL AVAILABLE FOR BRITISH AIRCRAFT ON ASCENSION ISLAND;
- D) WEATHER INFORMATION ON THE FALKLANDS REGION.



3. TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST QUOTES SENIOR US OFFICIALS AS CONFIRMING THE ACCURACY OF THESE REPORTS.

4. THE SAME NEWSPAPER ALSO CONTAINS A REPORT THAT SOME PENTAGON OFFICIALS ARE PLAYING DOWN WIDELY-CIRCULATED RUMOURS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BE SUPPLYING ARGENTINA WITH INTELLIGENCE DATA ON BRITISH SHIP MOVEMENTS. THE OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO REACH CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THIS AND THAT IN ANY CASE THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT LAUNCHED A MAJOR INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING EFFORT ON THE FALKLANDS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

NOVA 03017

NOVA 03017

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TYPISTS ✓

DB 141700z

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE

*Handwritten mark*

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GRS 295

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 14:1530Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 141700Z  
REPEATED TO WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 14 APRIL

MY TELS NOS 099 AND 100: FALKLANDS/ TENDENTIOUS BRAZILIAN PRESS COMMENT

1. TODAY'S CORREIO BRASILIENSE (ONE OF TWO DAILY NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN BRASILIA), REFERRING TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO, CARRIES A FRONT-PAGE HEADLINE QUOTE ENGLAND THREATENS BRAZIL: THE IDEA IS TO FORCE US TO PERSUADE GALTIERI UNQUOTE. ON AN INSIDE PAGE AN EXPANDED REPORT IS HEADED QUOTE LONDON HINTS AT THE CUTTING OFF OF NAVAL ASSISTANCE TO BRAZIL UNQUOTE. THE REPORT CLAIMS THAT BRITAIN ACCOMPANIED MRS THATCHER'S QUOTE HARD AND CURT UNQUOTE NOTE WITH A THREAT TO CANCEL BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE LONG-STANDING PLAN FOR THE RENOVATION AND MODERNISATION OF THE BRAZILIAN FLEET. IT SAYS THAT THIS THREAT, WHICH WAS CONFIRMED BY A NAVAL SOURCE

WAS THE CENTRAL THEME OF A MEETING YESTERDAY OF THE NAVY HIGH COMMAND CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER HIMSELF. THE ARTICLE GOES ON REFER TO THE PRESENCE OF BRAZILIAN NAVY OFFICERS UNDERGOING TRAINING AT VOSPER THORNEYCROFTS IN BRITAIN AND TO THE DEVASTATING EFFECT THAT BRITISH SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE AGAINST THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FRIGATE SQUADRON, IN PARTICULAR.

2. WE HAVE PUT OUT A PRESS RELEASE TO REBUT THIS DAMAGING LIE (ENGLISH TEXT IN MIFT). RICUPERO OF THE ITAMARATY HAS ALREADY TOLD ME THAT HE WAS PRESENT AT THE NAVY HIGH COMMAND MEETING IN QUESTION AND THAT THE QUESTION OF BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE FRIGATE AND CORVETTE PROGRAMME WAS NOT EVEN MENTIONED. I SHALL CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS AFTERNOON TO HAND HIM A COPY OF THE PRESS RELEASE. I HAVE ALREADY IMPRESSED ON HIM THROUGH RICUPERO THE NEED FOR THE ITAMARATY AND THE NAVY MINISTRY TO TAKE SWIFT ACTION TO DENY THE TRUTH OF THE ARTICLE.

3. MY OWN SUSPICION IS THAT THIS IS AN EXERCISE IN BLACK PROPAGANDA MOUNTED BY EITHER THE ARGENTINES OR THE RUSSIANS. WE SHALL HAVE TO WATCH OUT FOR FURTHER DIRTY TRICKS OF THIS KIND.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD 14:1540Z MW/KRW

T 720/82

Athens, April 14th, 1982 cc Mabis  
Ons.

Her Excellency  
The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister  
of the United Kingdom

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

This is in response to your personal message of April 6th, 1982, delivered to me by the British Ambassador in Athens.

As you are well aware, my Government has already replied in a positive way and by various means to the requests of the United Kingdom concerning the occupation of the Falkland islands by Argentina.

In particular:

- a) The Greek Government has issued a public declaration of support the text of which has been delivered to the British Embassy in Athens;
- b) Greece participated in the common declaration issued by the Council of Europe;
- c) Greece joined the member States of the E.E.C. in adopting all of the proposed economic sanctions against Argentina inspite of some vital trade interests and also the thousands of Greek origin persons established in Argentina.

In so doing, the Greek Government wanted to underline its solidarity with a member State of the Community, namely the United Kingdom with which Greece is also linked with traditional friendly relations; but mainly to emphasize its being opposed to the use of force and to any kind of fait accompli in international relations and in particular to occupation of territory by force.

I am sure that your Government will fully understand our attachment to the above principles, bearing in mind events which have occurred or might occur in the very sensitive area in which my country is situated.

./..

I would finally like to reiterate that we fully support the Security Council Resolution, adopted on April 3rd, 1982, and that my Government strongly hopes and wishes the Falkland islands case to be settled by means of peaceful negotiations.

Yours sincerely,



Andreas G. Papandreou

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

*If that's what B.A. is not successful a message would help (be very good)*

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/HKGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

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AS 260

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 140900Z

FM CANBERRA 140439Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 155 OF 14 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

*p.a. AR 15/4*

ADVANCE COPY  
D/By 140900Z

IMMEDIATE

FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 0500 HOURS YOUR TIME ON 14 APRIL AND SAW ME ALONE. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM WHETHER THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD ASSURED US OR THE ARGENTINIANS THAT, IF IT CAME TO A CHOICE, THEY WOULD SUPPORT US RATHER THAN THE ARGENTINIANS. HE BELIEVED MOST STRONGLY THAT THE AMERICANS IN EFFECT HAD NO CHOICE: THEY MUST IF IT CAME TO THE POINT SUPPORT THEIR STRONGEST AND STAUNCHEST EUROPEAN ALLY BY ACTIONS AS WELL AS WORDS, AND THEY SHOULD MAKE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR TO THE ARGENTINIAN JUNTA THAT THIS WAS THEIR POSITION. HOWEVER, MR RUPERT MURDOCH HAD SPOKEN ON THESE LINES AT A HIGH LEVEL IN WASHINGTON YESTERDAY, AND HAD REPORTED TO MR FRASER THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN REASSURED BY THE REPLIES WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM HIS AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS.

2. WITH YOUR TELNO 698 TO WASHINGTON IN MIND, I TOLD MR FRASER THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT IF ANY ASSURANCES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

2. WITH YOUR TELNO 698 TO WASHINGTON IN MIND, I TOLD MR FRASER THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT, IF ANY, ASSURANCES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT HAVE GIVEN TO US, OR TO THE ARGENTINIANS. I ASKED MR FRASER WHETHER I SHOULD ENQUIRE OF YOU WHETHER WE WOULD FIND IT USEFUL FOR HIM TO EXPRESS TO THE AMERICANS THE VIEWS WHICH HE HAD OUTLINED TO ME. MR FRASER SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DO THIS IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL. HE WOULD DO SO BY MEANS OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, WITH WHOM HE HAD SOME CREDIT AND WITH WHOM HE WAS ON FRIENDLY TERMS.

3. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS. I GAVE MR FRASER NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT ANY REPLY WHICH YOU MAY INSTRUCT ME TO GIVE TO HIM WOULD NECESSARILY ENLIGHTEN HIM ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' POSITION.

MASON

NNNN

14/0705

PART 6 ends:-

Moduk Tol 22

~~Hansard~~ 14. 4. 82

PART 7 begins:-

Canberra tel 155 07 14/4



