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PREM 19/621

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PART 10

Confidential filing

Relations with Argentina

ARGENTINA

Position of the Falkland Islands

Part 1: Sept 1979

Part 10: April 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>25.4.82</del>							
<del>26.4.82</del>							
<del>28.4.82</del>							
26.4.82							
- ends -							
<p>PREM 19/621</p>							

PART 10 ends:-

26.4.82

PART 11 begins:-

27.4.82



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 26 April 1982, columns 609-617

Signed AWayland Date 13 April 2012

**PREM Records Team**

RESTRICTED

Prime Minister

A.J.C.  $\frac{26}{4}$



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Handwritten mark resembling a stylized 'M' or 'W' with a downward arrow.*

*h.a.*  
*AM 29/4*

26 April 1982

*Dear Idun,*

Financial Assistance to Falkland Islanders wishing to return to this country

You spoke to Ken Slatcher on 24 April about the financial assistance we are offering to Falkland Islanders wishing to return to this country and asked for a report from him on how this was at present being done. You mentioned to him the Prime Minister's view that we should pay for the return to this country of all Falkland Islanders who manage to get away. You also mentioned that Mr Needham, Chairman of the Falkland Islands Company, had been in touch with you.

As you know, we issued the following statement on 22 April, after the text had been agreed:

'In view of reports that some Falkland Islanders would appreciate guidance on the matter, the Government wish to make it clear that if there are any who would prefer to leave the Islands temporarily until the immediate crisis has passed, the Government will give sympathetic help to ensure that they are not prevented from doing so by lack of means.'

This was carried by the BBC World Service who agreed to broadcast it this weekend on their world service as well as on the special programme for the Falkland Islands. We also spoke to Mr Needham giving him the message and he has conveyed the sense of it to the Falkland Islands Company representative in Port Stanley. As a result of this, according to Mr Needham, more Islanders are saying they would wish to leave.

At present, the Falkland Islands Company in Port Stanley issues tickets valid either to Montevideo or to this country. In the case of tickets to Montevideo only, our Embassy there then issues to the Islanders tickets to this country but asks them to sign an undertaking to repay.

/We have

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We have so far told those Islanders who have been deported by the Argentines that we do not propose that they should be asked to honour the undertakings to repay that they have signed. We would propose to extend this to all those Islanders who arrive in this country and they will all be informed that we shall not ask them to honour the undertakings they have signed. This arrangement will help to ensure that control is maintained over costs in London and that the system is in a form identifiable to Exchequer and Audit. In the case of the Islanders who purchased their tickets in Port Stanley we shall arrange for them to recover the cost of the tickets. We shall need to agree with Mr Needham an arrangement for payment to him so that the extent of the concession can be identified by Exchequer and Audit.

The matter of the return to the Islands of the Islanders will be considered separately later. In a paper we prepared for ODO(SA) on 21 April on the modalities of evacuation, we estimated that the maximum cost of evacuating the Islanders and returning them would be about £2 million.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

W/O  
RESTRICTED

SAFU (82) 8

*W. M. A. P.*  
Prime Minister

*A. J. C. 25/4*

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAFU)

The attached paper issued at 1900 hours on 26 April 1982 contains suggested lines to take in the following:

1. The landing at South Georgia
2. Legal position
3. What happens next
4. British Antarctic Survey Team

Cabinet Office  
26 April 1982

RESTRICTED

1. The landing on South Georgia

Successful operation. Achieved objective of recovering South Georgia with minimum force. No British casualties and only one Argentine casualty (a submariner has lost a leg).

Troops landed on South Georgia by helicopter on Sunday at about 4.00 pm London time. Argentine forces at Grytviken offered only limited resistance and surrendered after two hours. British troops have subsequently taken the Argentine outpost at Leith. Some 150 - 200 prisoners were taken. These will be returned to Argentina as soon as possible. Commander of the local Argentinian forces has expressed gratitude for the humanity shown to the prisoners.

During the first phase of the operation the Argentine submarine Santa Fe was engaged off South Georgia by our helicopters. The submarine was not simply carrying stores and medical supplies as claimed by the Argentines. It was carrying at least 50 troops as reinforcements for the occupying force.

Was Mr Haig told?

- No-one can have been in any doubt from the Prime Minister's statements in London and Mr Pym's in Washington of our determination to use force if necessary. Sure Mr Haig understood this very well and could hardly have been surprised.

British title to South Georgia?

- As Prime Minister explained to House last week, South Georgia is not part of Falklands but a separate British dependency. In recent years South Georgia has been administered from Port Stanley purely as a matter of convenience. There is no doubt about our legal position, and the Argentine claim has no foundation whatever.

2. Legal Position

Not at war; a start of war would involve a declaration of war by either side or major armed conflict. Nor are we aggressor. Argentines fired first by invading Falklands and South Georgia. Their invasion of South Georgia took place after UN had adopted SCR 502 condemning Argentina as aggressor and calling

on her to withdraw. We attacked the submarine after giving Argentina clear warning last Friday that we would take action against warships threatening to interfere with our forces. Warning specifically mentioned submarines. Argentines chose to ignore warning and must accept consequences.

Sr Costa Mendez's claim that we are "technically at war"?

- Appears to have been off the cuff remark. No formal communication from Argentina.

Are we in breach of Security Council Resolution 502?

- No. The measures determined by the Resolution were explicitly related to Argentine aggression; they required their forces to be withdrawn and demanded an end to hostilities. What was the Argentine reaction? Since the Resolution they have doubled the size of the garrison and they invaded South Georgia. It is three weeks since the Resolution was adopted. In these circumstances there is no doubt whatever of our right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter (which is in no sense modified by SCR 502)

3. What happens next?

Remain determined to do all we can to settle this issue by negotiation. First objective to secure Argentine withdrawal - if possible without use of force. So far met with Argentine intransigence but hope that display of our resolve and ability to take military action if necessary will produce more constructive attitude. Meanwhile the Task Force is approaching the Falklands. The choice between negotiation and further force is up to Argentina.

Mr Haig's initiative finished?

- Not at all. Hope that Argentines will now be more flexible and that Mr Haig will be able to make progress. He now intends to pursue his efforts further with the Argentines, although the Argentines are currently reported to be unwilling to continue negotiations. Trust they will reconsider; time is short.

4. British Antarctic Survey Team and two girl film makers?

Reported safe on Sunday afternoon. Arrangements in hand to evacuate them if they so choose.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 April 1982

Prime Minister

*Some useful developments,  
especially overleaf.*

A. J. C. 27.4

Dear John,

Falkland Islanders

Following discussion at Chequers yesterday, officials have once again reviewed the position of the Falkland Islanders and the related questions of what might be done to sustain their morale and to provide assistance for those of them who wish to leave the Islands temporarily.

Numbers of Falkland Islanders wishing to leave

Accurate figures are impossible to obtain. We have made the best estimate we can, after consulting the Governor, his Chief Secretary and Councillors as well as some of the Islanders who left most recently. We have also consulted the Chairman of the Falkland Islands Company who is in touch daily with his representative in Port Stanley.

Our best estimate, albeit very rough, is that about 300 Falkland Islanders may still remain in Port Stanley. Everyone else has gone to 'the Camp', with which communications are very difficult. The main feeling of those we have consulted is that the great majority of those in 'the Camp' voted with their feet in going and would wish to stick it out. There is also the practical problem that movement back from 'the Camp' to Port Stanley is difficult and would take time.

Of those in Port Stanley, between one and two hundred wish to leave temporarily.

For the time being those who wish to leave temporarily will continue to use the Argentine aircraft. We have no indication that the Argentines are forbidding anyone from leaving.

Help for those who wish to leave temporarily

The BBC have carried a message over the weekend saying that the Government will offer sympathetic help to those who wish to leave temporarily but who are prevented by lack of means from doing so. This message has also been passed by Mr Needham, Chairman of the Falkland Islands Company, to his Company representative in Port Stanley. The Prime Minister made it clear today in the House that the Government would not be found to lack generosity to those wishing to leave temporarily. The BBC

/are



are relaying the Prime Minister's statement today in their special programme for the Falkland Islands.

We have also considered the possibility of special arrangements for the departure of those Falkland Islanders who at present want to leave. Our view is that their numbers do not at present warrant any special arrangements by a third party to evacuate them by air or sea. But we shall need to keep the situation under constant review and reconsider when the Task Force is in position, when the present Argentine flights to the mainland may cease.

#### Islanders' Morale

We have arranged with the BBC's External Services that their special programme for the Falkland Islands - now transmitted thrice weekly - should be broadcast daily. We have also arranged with the Governor that he and his colleagues will appear on these programmes on a regular basis, in order to give a better personal touch to them and to relay as appropriate any Government statement which particularly concerns the Islanders.

I am copying this to the Private Secretaries of the other members of ODSA, Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Michael Palliser.

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

*John Holmes*

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

27 APR 1964



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS  
~~PS/MR HURD~~  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR PERKINS~~  
 PS/PUS  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
 SIR K COUZENS  
 MR LITTLER  
 MR HAWTIN  
 MR PERETZ  
 MR ILETT  
 MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
 DIO CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFF

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 261500Z APR 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 187 OF 26 APRIL  
 INFO WASHINGTON, BERNE, MONTEVIDEO

YOUR TELNO 95: FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC

1. ACTION TAKEN ON PARAGRAPH 1 WITH THE DEPUTY HEAD OF OPERATIONS, ICRC ON 25 APRIL. CONVERS SAID THAT THIS PARAGRAPH FULLY REFLECTED ICRC'S OWN PRIORITIES. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE ICRC HAD LAST WEEK MADE THEIR FRESH APPROACH TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE 4TH CONVENTION (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELNO 176), BUT SO FAR WITHOUT RESULT.

2. CONVERS NOTED THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTERS REMARK ON 25 APRIL THAT THE LANDINGS IN SOUTH GEORGIA MEANT THAT ARGENTINA WAS NOW AT WAR. HEAD OF CHANCERY SAID OUR VIEW WAS THAT THIS WAS AN INITIAL AND PERHAPS PERSONAL REACTION AND THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR A MORE AUTHORITYATIVE VIEW FROM BUENOS AIRES. HE CONFIRMED THAT HMG DID NOT(NOT) CONSIDER THEMSELVES TO BE AT WAR WITH ARGENTINA AT PRESENT. CONVERS SAID THAT THE ICRC HAD REPORTS FROM THEIR OWN PEOPLE IN BUENOS AIRES THAT REACTIONS THERE WERE MORE NUANCE THAN THAT GIVEN BY COSTA MENDEZ. HE ADDED THAT EVEN IF STATES CONDUCTING HOSTILITIES DID NOT CONSIDER THEMSELVES TO BE AT WAR THERE WAS STILL A ROLE FOR ICRC IN LOOKING AFTER VICTIMS, WHETHER BROTHERS, WOUNDED, OR CIVILIANS WHO MIGHT NEED HELP AND PROTECTION.

THERE WAS STILL A ROLE FOR ICRC IN LOOKING AFTER VICTIMS, WHETHER PRISONERS, WOUNDED, OR CIVILIANS WHO MIGHT NEED HELP AND PROTECTION.

3. THIS LED INTO THE QUESTION OF SOUTH GEORGIA. CONVERS ASKED US TO PROVIDE ICRC WITH INFORMATION, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE IDENTITY AND HEALTH OF ANY MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINIAN FORCES STILL ON THE ISLAND AND OUR INTENTIONS TOWARDS THEM. THE DETAILS SHOULD BE IF POSSIBLE ON THE LINES OF THE PRO FORMA IN THE 3RD GENEVA CONVENTION. FULL NAMES, NUMBERS, RANKS AND DATES OF BIRTH WERE THE FIRST PRIORITY. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF NEXT OF KIN WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL WHEN COMMUNICATIONS ALLOWED. HE NOTED THE BRITISH PRESS REPORTS THAT THE DAMAGED SUBMARINE WAS STILL AT GRYTVIKEN. IT WAS FOR US TO DECIDE ABOUT OUR INTENDED HANDLING OF ANY ARGENTINIAN PRISONERS, WHETHER TO DELIVER THEM TO ARGENTINA OR NEUTRAL TERRITORY, OR KEEP THEM IN OUR OWN CUSTODY. IN THE LIGHT OF OUR DECISION ON THESE MATTERS THE ICRC WOULD DECIDE ON THEIR OWN POLICY IN CARRYING OUT THEIR FUNCTION OF PROTECTION. HE NOTED THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD RELEASED THE 22 MARINES AND 13 SCIENTISTS FROM SOUTH GEORGIA ON THE DAY WHICH ICRC HAD SET THEMSELVES AS THE LATEST POSSIBLE DATE, AFTER WHICH THOSE CONCERNED WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED PRISONERS OF WAR. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE ICRC HAD NO INTENTION TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH COULD HAVE NEGATIVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, SUBJECT TO THE OVER-RIDING NEED TO RESPECT THE INTERESTS OF ANY VICTIMS OF THE CONFLICT. HE NOTED THAT WE WERE STILL IN A SITUATION SHORT OF WAR IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING.

4. WITH REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF TUR, ICRC HAVE THREE OFFICES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND A FURTHER ONE IN BOGOTA WHICH IS AT PRESENT VACANT. THEIR ONLY OTHER LATIN AMERICAN REPRESENTATION IS AT BUENOS AIRES WHERE THERE ARE FIVE EX-PATRIATE STAFF COVERING ARGENTINA, CHILE, PERU, PARAGUAY, URUGUAY, AND BRAZIL.

5. LONG ASKED WHETHER ICRC HAD DEVELOPED ANY PLANS ABOUT HOW TO ORGANISE SECURE ZONES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ( PARA 4 OF MY TELNO 176). CONVERS SAID THEY WERE IN TOUCH ON THIS SUBJECT WITH MRS HUNT THROUGH THE BRITISH RED CROSS. SHE HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE VILLAGE OF FITZROY 15 MILES FROM PORT STANLEY MIGHT BE A SUITABLE CENTRE. CONVERS ADDED THAT THE ICRC WOULD VERY MUCH VALUE ANY UP TO DATE MAPS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SUPPLY FOR ICRC USE.

MARSHALL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 April 1982

Dear John,

na M.A. 27/11

I have asked for a clear letter. A.S.C. 26/4.

The Prime Minister said in the House this afternoon that the prisoners captured in South Georgia are not prisoners of war. Unfortunately, this is not an accurate statement of the legal position. It is important that the position be clarified. h.a. 27/4

The Prime Minister could draw on the following, in the House or possibly in her Panorama interview this evening, to set the position straight:

'I wish to clear up a misunderstanding which may have arisen over the answer which I gave in the House earlier today to a question from Sir Bernard Braine. In it I was at pains to emphasize that a state of war does not exist between ourselves and Argentina. But in saying this I may have given the impression that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the members of the Argentine forces captured on South Georgia and that they are not therefore prisoners of war. This is not so. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (to which both Argentina and Britain are parties) apply not only when a state of war exists but also when any other armed conflict arises between two or more parties to the Conventions. They also apply in all cases of partial or total occupation of territory. Thus, the Conventions have been applicable since 2nd April when Argentina used armed force against British forces and occupied the Falkland Islands and, later, South Georgia. They will remain applicable until all hostilities, and the occupation, have ceased and all prisoners have been repatriated.'

Yours ever

J. E. Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

TYPISTS

ATTN COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
*ps/m Hurd*  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RIPPIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

**FLASH**

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
} H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE  
*DIO*

RESIDENT CLERK

*SIR M. PARRISER CABINET OFFICE*  
*SIR R. ARMSTRONG DIO. CABINET OFFICE*

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GR 270

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 262242Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1465 OF 26 APRIL 1982

AND TO FLASH LUXEMBOURG (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1451: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. HAIG HAS TELEPHONED ME FOLLOWING HIS SPEECH AT THE OAS WHICH HE SAID WENT DOWN LIKE A LEAD BALLOON. NOBODY THERE WAS LIKELY AGAIN TO CALL HIM EVEN-HANDED.

2. HE HAD SPOKEN TO COSTA MENDEZ AND TOLD HIM THAT TIME HAD RUN OUT. THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID AN IMMEDIATE CONFLICT WOULD BE FOR HIM TO MEET WITHOUT DELAY WITH THE JUNTA. HE THEREFORE ASKED COSTA MENDEZ TO GET INTO TOUCH WITH BA AND LET HIM KNOW WITHIN AN HOUR WHETHER THE JUNTA COULD RECEIVE HIM. IF NOTHING CAME OF THAT HE WOULD GET PRESIDENT REAGAN TO RING GALTIERI. IT MIGHT BE THAT COSTA MENDEZ WOULD NEED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INTERVENTION.

... HE WOULD BE PRESENTING HIS PROPOSALS TO THE

WOULD GET PRESIDENT REAGAN TO RING GALLERTY. IT MIGHT BE THAT  
COSTA MENDEZ WOULD NEED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INTERVENTION.

3. HAIG SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PRESENTING HIS PROPOSALS TO THE ARGENTINIANS ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS. THEY WOULD HAVE 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO ANSWER YES OR NO. HE WOULD EMPHASISE THE QUOTE TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES UNQUOTE THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD SUFFER IF THEY DID NOT RESPOND FAVOURABLY.

4. HAIG SAID HE WAS NOT SURE HOW THE JUNTA WOULD REACT. EMOTIONS WERE RUNNING VERY HIGH, WHIPPED UP BY THE OAS MEETING, BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE US TO MAKE ITS POSITION COMPLETELY CLEAR. IF A BREAK HAD TO COME IT MUST BE SHOWN BEYOND DOUBT THAT IT HAD BEEN CAUSED BY ARGENTINIAN IRRESPONSIBILITY.

5. HAIG ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT AND I SAID THAT IT SEEMED REASONABLE.

HENDERSON

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

**FLASH**

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RICHARD  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/INSD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

ZZ FCO

GR 580

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 261445Z APR 82

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 565 OF 26 APRIL.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 301

SOUTH GEORGIA: NOTIFICATION TO SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I AM MOST ANXIOUS TO SUBMIT MY LETTER IN TIME FOR IT TO BE CIRCULATED BEFORE THE RESULTS ARE KNOWN OF TODAY'S MEETINGS OF THE OAS AND THE NON-ALIGNED IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK RESPECTIVELY. I PROPOSE TO REPLY TO ROCA'S LETTERS OF 24 APRIL (MY TELNO 562) AND 25 APRIL (TEXT IN MIFT).
2. FOLLOWING IS MY DRAFT REPLY:

BEGINS.

I HAVE THE HONOUR WITH REFERENCE TO THE LETTERS DATED 24 AND 25

~~**FLASH**~~  
~~ADVANCE COPY~~

Prime Minister

*A good statement on South*

*Georgia*

*WOL 26/4*

BEGINS

I HAVE THE HONOUR, WITH REFERENCE TO THE LETTERS DATED 24 AND 25 APRIL FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA (S/14998 AND S/14999) TO STATE THE FOLLOWING.

ON 3 APRIL 1982, NOTWITHSTANDING CURRENT ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ADOPTION OF SCR 502, ARGENTINA CARRIED OUT AN ARMED INVASION OF THE ISLAND OF SOUTH GEORGIA. THE SMALL BRITISH GARRISON RESISTED BUT WAS EVENTUALLY CAPTURED. ON 25 APRIL, IN EXERCISE OF THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BRITISH FORCES RE-ESTABLISHED BRITISH AUTHORITY ON SOUTH GEORGIA. THE COMMANDER OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN THERE FOR JUST OVER THREE WEEKS SURRENDERED. THE ONLY CASUALTY SO FAR AS MY GOVERNMENT IS AWARE WAS AN ARGENTINE SEAMAN WHO SUFFERED LEG INJURIES.

THERE IS THUS NO QUESTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT HAVING ACTED AGGRESSIVELY, HAVING IN ANY WAY BREACHED THE TERMS OF SCR 502 (IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 2 OF WHICH BY ARGENTINA IS STILL AWAITED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY) OR OF HAVING CAUSED A BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THE ORIGINAL BREACH OF THE PEACE DETERMINED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE THIRD PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH OF SCR 502 WILL NOT BE <sup>BRINGING TO AN END</sup> HEALED BEFORE ARGENTINA CAN BE SEEN TO HAVE COMPLIED WITH OPERATIVE PARA 2 OF THAT RESOLUTION. NO AMOUNT OF SELECTIVE QUOTATION FROM STATEMENTS BY BRITISH MINISTERS CAN OBSCURE THE FACT THAT IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH FIRST USED ARMED FORCE IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S URGENT CALL ON 1 APRIL (S/14944).

SOUTH GEORGIA IS A REMOTE MOUNTAINOUS ISLAND IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC (800 MILES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND 1600 MILES SOUTH EAST OF BUENOS AIRES). IT WAS DISCOVERED BY A BRITISH NATIONAL AND HAS BEEN UNDER BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY UNINTERRUPTEDLY SINCE 1775-1908 BEFORE WHICH IT WAS TERRA NULLIUS. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS OCCUPIED AND ADMINISTERED THE ISLAND OPENLY CONTINUOUSLY AND PEACEFULLY. FOR MANY YEARS ARGENTINA ACCEPTED BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY. ARGENTINA APPEARS TO HAVE FIRST MADE CLAIM TO SOUTH GEORGIA IN 1927.

IN THE 1940S AND 1950S THE UNITED KINGDOM OFFERED TO REFER THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE OVER SOUTH GEORGIA TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. IN MAY 1955, THE UNITED KINGDOM SUBMITTED THIS DISPUTE TO THE COURT BY DELIVERING AN APPLICATION TO THE REGISTRAR (FULL TEXT IN "ICJ PLEADINGS, ANTARCTICA CASES (UK V ARGENTINA)"). HAVING SEEN THE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH TITLE TO SOUTH GEORGIA, ARGENTINA DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE COURT'S JURISDICTION. IN RECENT YEARS, THE MAIN USE OF THE ISLAND HAS BEEN AS A LOGISITIC

ARGENTINA DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE COURT'S JURISDICTION. IN RECENT YEARS, THE MAIN USE OF THE ISLAND HAS BEEN AS A LOGISITIC STATION SUPPORTING THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY, I.E. PEACEFUL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

ENDS

3. THE HISTORY HAS BEEN TAKEN FROM THE ICJ APPLICATION.

4. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS BY 1700Z.

PARSONS

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RICHMOND  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

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SIR K COUZENS  
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MR ILETT  
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HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
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SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFF

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 261959Z APR 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1452 OF 26 APRIL 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

ADVANCE COPY  
FLASH

FALKLANDS AND THE OAS.

1. WHEN I SAW HAIG TODAY HE WAS JUST OFF TO MAKE A SHORT SPEECH TO THE OAS MEETING. HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK THAT MANY PEOPLE HAD THE STOMACH FOR A VERY TOUGH RESOLUTION. I SAID, BASING MYSELF ON A WARNING TONY PARSONS HAD GIVEN ME LAST NIGHT, THAT A SOFT RESOLUTION CALLING UPON EVERYBODY TO AVOID THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE COULD BE DAMAGING IF THE U.S. VOTED FOR IT. WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE THAT PANAMA WOULD INTRODUCE IT INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A RESOLUTION SUPERCEDING 502. THIS WOULD TIE OUR HANDS FROM CONTINUING TO EXERT MILITARY PRESSURE UPON THE ARGENTINIANS TO WITHDRAW. HAIG SAID HE WAS FULLY COGNISANT OF ALL THESE DANGERS - I AM NOT ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT HE WAS - AND WOULD ABSTAIN RATHER THAN VOTE FOR ANYTHING THAT WOULD CAUSE US DIFFICULTY.

HENDERSON

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
~~PS/MR HURD~~  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RICHARD~~  
 PS/PUS  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE

~~PS~~ No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
 SIR K COUZENS  
 MR LITTLER  
 MR HAWTIN  
 MR PERETZ  
 MR ILETT  
 MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR M. PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFF

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 261535Z APR 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 188 OF 26 APRIL  
 INFO WASHINGTON, MONTEVIDEO, BERNE

R

MY TEL NO 187 : FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC

1. WE HAVE JUST HEARD FROM THE ICRC THAT THE ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENT GAVE A WRITTEN NOTE TO THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE IN BUENOS AIRES A FEW HOURS AGO. THE NOTE CONFIRMS ACCEPTANCE OF THE ICRC OFFER MADE ON 8 APRIL TO PROVIDE HELP AND PROTECTION TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. ICRC SAY THAT THE TEXT OF THE ARGENTINIAN NOTE IS VAGUE AND DOES NOT (NOT) SPECIFICALLY CONFIRM THAT THE ICRC MAY NOW VISIT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THEY ARE HOWEVER NATURALLY THEMSELVES INTERPRETING IT IN THIS SENSE AND WILL SEEK TO ORGANISE AN EARLY VISIT.

2. OUR ICRC CONTACT COMMENTED (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT THIS MOVE MAY BE PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO PUT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN A GOOD LIGHT AFTER THE EVENTS OF THE WEEKEND. BUT THEY MEAN TO

GOOD LIGHT AFTER THE EVENTS OF THE WEEKEND. BUT THEY MEAN TO  
EXPLOIT IT. THEY WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US. I AM TO SEE THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE ICRC MYSELF TOMORROW MORNING.

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT/RECD. AT 26/1645Z IM/JJV<sup>2</sup>.

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
PS/Mr Hurd  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RICHARD~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 ~~DOWNING~~ ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/UND~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

SIR M. PALMER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR. R. ARMSTRONG, DIO, CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

UNCLASSIFIED

ADVANCE COPY

FM WASHINGTON 270050Z APR 82

IMMEDIATE

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1469 OF 26 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE ASUNCION, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRIDGETOWN, NASSAU,  
LA PAZ, SANTIAGO, SAN JOSE, QUITO, KINGSTON, SANTO DOMINGO,  
TEGUCIGALPA, PANAMA CITY, LIMA, PORT OF SPAIN, MONTEVIDEO,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY BONN, PARIS AND UKDEL NATO.

MIPT: FALKLANDS/OAS.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF HAIG'S SPEECH:

AS WE MEET HERE IN THE HALL OF THE AMERICAS, WE ARE REMINDED  
OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE'S TRADITION OF DEMOCRACY, ITS RECORD  
OF ACHIEVEMENT AND ITS DEVOTION TO PEACE. THE ORGANIZATION  
OF AMERICAN STATES IS THE LIVING TESTIMONY THAT OUR COOPERATION  
CAN BE A FORCE FOR INTERNATIONAL PROGRESS. CLEARLY, A VIGOROUS  
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO THE FUTURE  
OF THE HEMISPHERE.

THESE FACTS MUST BE UPPERMOST IN OUR MINDS AS WE CONSIDER

THESE FACTS MUST BE UPPERMOST IN OUR MINDS AS WE CONSIDER HOW BEST TO ADVANCE TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CONTROVERSY. ALL OF US KNOW THAT WE ARE DEALING TODAY WITH AN ENORMOUSLY DIFFICULT AND SENSITIVE PROBLEM. BOTH THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ASSERT THAT THEIR RIGHTS TO THE ISLANDS HAVE BEEN DENIED. ARGENTINA IS MOTIVATED BY A DEEP NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO ESTABLISH POSSESSION OF THE ISLANDS: IT IS FRUSTRATED BY YEARS OF WHAT IT CONSIDERS TO BE FRUITLESS NEGOTIATION. BRITAIN EMPHASIZES ITS LONGSTANDING POSSESSION OF THE ISLANDS AND ASSERTS THAT THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS MUST BE RESPECTED IN ANY LASTING SETTLEMENT.

TO UNDERSTAND THESE COMPETING CLAIMS AND THE EMOTIONS ON BOTH SIDES DOES NOT MEAN TO PASS JUDGMENT ON THEIR VALIDITY. BUT THIS ORGANIZATION -- AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY -- LONG AGO MADE THE JUDGMENT THAT FORCE SHOULD NOT BE USED TO SOLVE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. WE SHALL ALL SUFFER IF THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND HEMISPHERIC ORDER, WHICH THE RIO TREATY WAS DESIGNED TO PROTECT, IS IGNORED. I THINK ALL OF US ARE WELL AWARE OF HOW MANY MEMBERS OF THE OAS ARE INVOLVED IN A DISPUTE OVER TERRITORY WITH ONE OR MORE NEIGHBORS.

IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT, THE SUREST GUIDE TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS TO BE FOUND IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. IT REQUIRES AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES ON THE ISLANDS, AND THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM BE SOUGHT THROUGH DIPLOMACY. THESE THREE POINTS FORM THE INDISPENSABLE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION: THEY FORM AN INTEGRATED WHOLE. THEY HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES, OR AT LEAST NOT REJECTED BY EITHER OF THEM.

IN SUPPORT OF RESOLUTION 502, THE UNITED STATES HAS OFFERED ITS ASSISTANCE TO BOTH BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. WE HAVE ACTED IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WITH BOTH COUNTRIES. HEARTENED BY THE CONFIDENCE OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS, FOR THE PAST THREE WEEKS, I HAVE PURSUED THE POSSIBILITIES OF AVERTING WIDER CONFLICT AND A FRAMEWORK FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, HERE, IN BUENOS AIRES AND IN LONDON. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN LONG AND DIFFICULT. THEY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS ANGUISHING CONTROVERSY, PRESIDENT REAGAN BELIEVES THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS A PERHAPS UNIQUE ABILITY TO ASSIST THE PARTIES. UNDER HIS DIRECTION, I HAVE MADE MYSELF AVAILABLE TO BOTH, ACCEPTING THEIR INVITATIONS TO SOUND OUT THEIR VIEWS AND SUGGESTING AVENUES TO APPROACH A FRAMEWORK OF PEACE.

AVENUES TO APPROACH A FRAMEWORK OF PEACE.

THROUGHOUT THIS ARDUOUS PERIOD, WE HAVE BEEN AWARE THAT THE STAKES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE AMERICAS AND THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE VERY GREAT. CONTINUED MILITARY ACTION WILL EXACT A HEAVY PRICE. THE ENEMIES OF THE WEST COULD FIND FRESH OPPORTUNITIES TO SEEK THAT POSITION OF INFLUENCE ON THE MAINLAND OF THE AMERICAS THEY HAVE SO LONG SOUGHT.

IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE CRISIS HAS REACHED A CRITICAL POINT. NEW MILITARY ACTION HAS TAKEN PLACE. UNLESS A SETTLEMENT CAN BE FOUND IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, MORE INTENSIVE FIGHTING IS LIKELY TO OCCUR.

THE CONFLICT OVER THE ISLANDS AFFECTS US ALL. AS WE CONSIDER WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP THE SITUATION, LET US RECALL THESE POINTS:

FIRST, THERE HAS BEEN A USE OF FORCE BY AN AMERICAN STATE, FOLLOWED BY A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH CLEARLY SETS FORTH THE BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WHILE WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES AVAILABLE TO US IN THIS FORUM, IT WOULD BE NEITHER APPROPRIATE NOR EFFECTIVE TO TREAT THIS DISPUTE WITHIN THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK IMPLIED BY THE RIO TREATY.

SECOND, ANY RESOLUTION CONSIDERED FOR ADOPTION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD BE EXAMINED AGAINST THE CRITERIA OF WHETHER IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE PEACE PROCESS: WHETHER IT IMPAIRS THE PEACE EFFORTS ALREADY ENDORSED BY THE OAS: AND WHETHER IT STRENGTHENS THE ABILITY OF THIS ORGANIZATION TO CONTRIBUTE IN THE FUTURE TO EASING THIS CRISIS.

OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM PLEDGES US TO STRENGTHEN THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE. IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION THAT BOTH PARTIES CAN ACCEPT WITH HONOR AND RESPONSIBILITY, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE PARTIES. AT THIS CRITICAL HOUR, WE ARE REDOUBLING OUR PEACE EFFORTS. WITH YOUR HELP, WE MAY SUCCEED.

HENDERSON

FROM THE CHAIRMAN



Coalite Group Limited

STRICTLY PERSONAL

26th April, 1982

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW1.

*Prime Minister*

*I have replied*

*APR 27/82*

*Dear Prime Minister*

Thank you for your letter of 22nd April. It was my pleasure to call on 15th April and I greatly appreciated your time and sympathetic hearing for what I had to say.

I fully understand the indication that messages conveyed to the Islanders, whether referring to our own employees or not, have to rest on private initiative. I have to hope that, as intended, they will prove helpful and be supported if the need arises.

As you say, most of the Stanley population have moved out to Camp, apparently leaving less than one hundred and fifty in Stanley. Recent television interviews have suggested that the whole population is pushing to get out. That has not been the impression I have been receiving and I therefore pursued the subject again in a telex conversation yesterday (Sunday). I am attaching copy of the telex exchange, from which you will see that our (English) Manager in Stanley and his (local born) Secretary expressed the view that "most who are left will stick it out", and that our (English) Manager in Darwin also still holds that opinion. Of course their views might change with circumstances and, as you say, there are no means of getting a wholly free and collective view on this and other issues under present conditions.

I agree that there must be doubts about permission for a general evacuation but the spontaneous replies from Stanley as late as yesterday were still indicating that flights are still available to those who wish to leave and it is to be hoped that door will remain ajar. I was notified on Friday that there would be another flight out on Tuesday.

I was delighted to see and hear the messages on your behalf that anyone wishing to leave should not be deterred by financial considerations. From a public relations point of view, even appreciating reservations about precedents creating problems elsewhere, I would like to suggest that the Foreign

/Office could be

Office could be a little more forthcoming regarding the help they are prepared to give to the people coming out through Montivideo. I feel quite sure that the financial interests of the Islanders will be taken care of in the long run but their short-term anxieties regarding money are illustrated in the attached copy of a telex exchange on Saturday, 24th April, which followed several previous indications given that money considerations should not stand in the way of Islanders wanting to leave temporarily.

With due deference, I would question the advice you have received that most of those who have left have been deported but I mention that only in the interests of factual correctness.

Most of the people who have come out were not indigenous and have homes and close relatives here, so there have probably been no problems of accommodation. Any real exodus would evidently be a different matter. We would certainly wish to play our part in providing and raising help towards their needs and I have no doubt that your indication of full and sympathetic assistance will mean just that if and when the need arises. As indicated earlier, the present signs are that it is unlikely in the immediate future at least.

As far as general conditions on the Islands are concerned, there have been no indications so far regarding any shortage of provisions but internal communications are limited. Supplies to the West Island are now dependent on the Argentines but a message received 23rd April indicated that they had agreed to get supplies to any settlement in need.

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to convey to you direct what information we are receiving on the views of the remaining Islanders and the conditions there. Your determination to stand by them is fully understood and greatly appreciated, not only here but also on the Islands. We have every confidence you will get it right.

I must apologise for writing at length when time available is so limited.

Yours Sincerely  
Fred Sedman

P.S. Since dictating the above, I have been able to have a further exchange with the Islands today, which was a great relief. So that you have the flavour of their comments, I am attaching copy of the whole exchange.

F.S.

PS  
PS/M ~~Hurd~~  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RISKIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/UKSD~~

RESIDENT CLERK

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

~~DIO~~  
SIR M. PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG, DIO, CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

*MS*

GR 900

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 270046Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1468 OF 26 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, NASSAU, BRIDGETOWN, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, QUITO, KINGSTON, SANTO DOMINGO, TEGUCIGALPA, MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, PORT OF SPAIN, MONTEVIDEO, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO.

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

FALKLAND ISLANDS/RIO TREATY

1. SUMMARY. CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE RIO TREATY BEGAN IN WASHINGTON TODAY (26 APRIL). MOST RIO TREATY SIGNATORIES WERE REPRESENTED BY THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA. COSTA MENDEZ'S VIOLENT SPEECH WAS FOLLOWED BY WARM APPLAUSE. A FIRM STATEMENT BY HAIG THAT FORCE HAD BEEN USED BY AN AMERICAN STATE AND SECURITY RESOLUTION NO 502 LAID DOWN THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT WAS GREETED WITH TOTAL SILENCE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF VENEZUELA AND PANAMA, THE OTHER SPEAKERS MADE MODERATE SPEECHES. THE IMPRESSION IN THE CORRIDORS IS THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT FOR A PERUVIAN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, POSSIBLY UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL. AN ARGENTINE  
... WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES FROM

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL. AN ARGENTINE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES FROM THE TREATY AREA AND THE SUSPENSION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA AT PRESENT HAS THE SUPPORT OF ABOUT TEN DELEGATIONS.

#### DETAIL

2. COSTA MENDEZ CLAIMED THAT THE CONVOCAION OF THE RIO TREATY MEETING WAS A SYMBOL OF HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY WITH ARGENTINA. BRITISH AGGRESSION THREATENED NOT ONLY ARGENTINA BUT THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE WHOLE LATIN AMERICAN REGION. THE BRITISH ATTACK ON SOUTH GEORGIA DEMONSTRATED HOW THE UK DISREGARDED THE COURSE OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION. THE UK HAD ANSWERED ARGENTINA'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS (SIC) WITH QUOTE AN ACT OF WAR UNQUOTE.

3. COSTA MENDEZ CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINA HAD TAKEN NO-ONE'S TERRITORY OTHER THAN ITS OWN, AND FURTHERMORE IT HAD NOT HURT A SINGLE SOLDIER OF THE OCCUPYING POWER IN DOING SO. THE HISTORY OF BRITISH COLONIALISM, HE ASSERTED SHOWED THE UK'S CONTINUING QUOTE IMPERIALIST PASSION UNQUOTE.

4. THE BRITISH ATTACK ON SOUTH GEROGIA WAS PERFIDIOUS SINCE THE UK WAS AT THE SAME TIME SWEARING THAT IT SUPPORTED PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT FAITH COULD NOW BE ATTACHED TO BRITISH STATEMENTS SUPPORTING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES CONTAINED IN UNSCR 502? IF BRITAIN'S ATTACK ON SOUTH GEORGIA WAS DESIGNED TO PRESSURE ARGENTINA, IT WOULD HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT. ARGENTINA WOULD DEFEND ITSELF TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT: THE ARGENTINE FLAG WOULD NOT BE LOWERED UNTIL THE LAST DROP OF BLOOD HAD BEEN EXPENDED BY THE ARGENTINE SOLDIERS THERE TO PROTECT THEIR NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS.

5. ARGENTINA DEMANDED (A) THAT UK FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY AREA DEFINED IN CHAPTER 4 OF THE RIO TREATY: (B) THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND OTHERS SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IMMEDIATELY, SINCE THEY VIOLATED THE RULES OF THE UN CHARTER.

6 IN A LONG AND INTEMPERATE SPEECH, THE VENEZUELAN FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S DEEP INDIGNATION AT UK MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ARGENTINA: AGGRESSION AGAINST ARGENTINA WAS AGGRESSION AGAINST THE WHOLE OF LATIN AMERICA. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WAS IMPOTENT AND INELIGIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE BIASED VOTING SYSTEM IN THAT BODY WHICH WORKED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE GREAT POWERS. THUS THE MATTER HAD TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OAS AND THE RIO TREATY. VENEZUELA WOULD SUPPORT ALL MEASURES NECESSARY TO DEFEND ARGENTINA

WITH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OAS AND THE RIO TREATY. VENEZUELA WOULD SUPPORT ALL PROVISIONS NECESSARY TO DEFEND ARGENTINA.

7. TEXT OF HAIG'S SPEECH IN MIFT. THE MAIN FEATURE OF THIS SPEECH WAS THAT HAIG STATED THAT ARGENTINA HAD ACTED AGGRESSIVELY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE AND THAT THE UN AND NOT THE OAS WAS THE PROPER BODY TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE.

8. THE PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ASSERTED THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT AND THAT URGENT MEASURES WERE NEEDED. PERU WOULD TABLE IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE TRUCE, LEADING TO NEGOTIATIONS, POSSIBLY UNDER UN AUSPICES. HE CALLED ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS ALLIES TO SUSPEND THEIR SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA.

9. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SUPPORTED THE PERUVIAN PROPOSAL AND SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE TREATY SIGNATORIES TO HELP FOSTER A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. BRAZIL HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO THE MALVINAS, AND UNGA RESOLUTIONS ON THEIR DECOLONISATION. HOWEVER, BRAZIL ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AND WOULD JOIN PERU IN URGING THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO IMPLEMENT ALL THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF UNSCR 502.

10. THE HONDURAN FOREIGN MINISTER MADE A SIMILARLY MILD STATEMENT EMPHASISING THAT THE RIO SIGNATORIES MUST FIND AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION FOR BOTH PARTIES WHICH MAINTAINED THE PRIMACY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACE ENshrined IN THE OAS CHARTER.

11. THE PANAMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SPOKE AT LENGTH WITHOUT MAKING ANY SERIOUS POINTS, BUT GENERALLY SUPPORTING ARGENTINA.

12. THE MEETING ADJOURNED THIS EVENING WITH SEVEN OUT OF THE SEVENTEEN SPEAKERS HAVING MADE THEIR STATEMENTS. THE MEETING WILL RECONVENE TOMORROW AND WEDNESDAY, WHEN IT IS AIMED TO COMPLETE THE CONSULTATIONS PROCESS.

#### CONCLUSIONS

13. ALTHOUGH HAIG'S SPEECH WAS ICILY RECEIVED, THE MAJORITY OF THE SIGNATORIES APPEAR RELUCTANT TO GET DRAGGED INTO SANCTIONS AGAINST BRITAIN: ARGENTINA APPEARS TO HAVE RECOGNISED THIS BY AVOIDING CALLING FOR SUCH SANCTIONS AT THE MOMENT. BRAZIL INDICATED SUPPORT FOR PERU'S MORE MODERATE RESOLUTION (THE TEXT OF WHICH HAS YET TO BE CIRCULATED). THERE WERE SEVERAL REFERENCES TO THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLUTION 502.

This is a copy. Original  
damaged by Sellotape

R Ponner  
27 Oct 11 3140  
Sue  
24/4/8  
(Gene)

DEAR TED,

REFERENCE FCO HELP IN MONTEVIDEO. DO FCO PAY PASSAGES TO LONDON WHEN REQUIRED FOR ORDINARY PEOPLE AS GIFT OR LOAN. I THINK AS LOAN BUT PLEASE CHECK. WE HAVE HAD ONE OR TWO ENQUIRIES ALL FROM PEOPLE WITH CASH. BOTH HERE AND IN UK.

TKS FOR YR MSG AND THATS ABOUT ALL FOR NOW

REGARDS HARRY,

DEAR HARRY,

YOUR QUESTION. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, PEOPLE COMING FROM MONTEVIDEO HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SIGN A PIECE OF PAPER SAYING THAT THEY WILL REPAY THE MONEY FOR FARE FROM MONTEVIDEO BUT THAT HAS BEEN CANCELLED ON ARRIVAL HERE. THAT MEANS THAT FCO OR TREASURY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT COSTS AS I UNDERSTAND IT. IT CERTAINLY APPLIED TO BILL LUXTON FOR EXAMPLE.

DOES THAT ANSWER YOR POINT?

,95

NOT REALLY, BILL LUXTON WAS DEPORTED BY THE ARG. AUTHORITIES. THE PEOPLE I AM TALKING ABOUT ARE THOSE WHO ARE LEAVING VOLUNTARILY. AND IF THEY HAVE TO REPAY THEY WOULD SOONER BUY THERE TICKETS HERE WITH ONEY AVAILABLE LOCALLY AND NOT HAVE TO US THEIR FUNDS IN UK.

REG - CAN YOU FIND THE ANSWER TO THIS ONE PLS.

REGARDS HARRY,

DEAR HARRY,

WITH TIME ROLLING ON AS IT IS I THINK I MUST GIVE YOU A POSITIVE ANSWER TO THIS ONE OFF MY OWN BAT WITHOUT WAITING FOR OFFICIAL INDICATIONS.

I WOULD ADVISE THAT TICKETS ARE TAKEN OUT LOCALLY AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. AS FAR AS PAYMENT IS CONCERNED, AS I HAVE SAID PREVIOUSLY, THE MONEY WILL BE FOUND ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. I WOULD EXPECT OFFICIAL SOURCES TO STAND BEHIND IT BUT, IF THEY WERE NOT TO DO SO, WE WOULD RAISE IT SOME OTHER WAY. IF ANYBODY IS INCLINED TO LEAVE, I WOULD CERTAINLY SUGGEST THAT MONEY CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD NOT STAND IN THEIR WAY.

IS THAT SATISFACTORY?

DEAR TED,

YES THATS MORE THAN SATISFACTORY AND VERY GENEROUS TO SAY THE LEAST. TKS ALOT

REGARDS HARRY.

DEAR HARRY,

WELL THATS FINE. NOW DO STEADY UP AND HOW ABOUT HAVING A TROT ROUND THAT GOLF COURSE - PREFERABLY WITH GOLF CLUBS. TOO COLD?

CHEERIO HARRY

BI FOR NOW ROSEMARIE FROM BETTY

WELL BIBI C FROM HERE - ITS ABOUT 16 DEG C OUT AGAIN TODAY AND THE GOLF HOLES ARE FAR TOO BIG NOW WE'D NEVER FIND THE BALL???

REGARDS ALL.

CAN UNDERSTAND THAT LOOKFORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU TOMORROW UNLESS ANY URGENT MESSAGES MANTIME.

TED

54250 COALTE G  
218 FALKISCO FK

*Fi Time.*  
~~24.04~~ 24.4.82

*ie 3:04pm*

54250 COALTE G  
18 FALKISCO FK

This is a copy. Original  
damaged by sellotape

R. Porwan  
27 Oct 11

25 APRIL 1982

DEAR TED,

WELL NOTHING TO REPORT TODAY EXCEPT THAT IS EXTREMELY COLD OUT.

HOPE YOU'RE ALL FIT AND WELL.

REGARDS HARRY

Rec'd 2.30 pm  
Sunday 25-4-82.

HELLO BETTY,

HELLO ROSEMARY ITS JANET TODAY INSTEAD

DEAR HARRY,

ASSUME YOU ARE KEEPING ABREAST OF NEWS.

GOOD MORNING - I FORGOT THAT BIT. SEE WEATHER COLD BUT HOPE  
STILL REASONABLY BRIGHT

SENT BROOK'S MESSAGE BY PHONE TO SOUTHAMPTON - THEY SEND THEIR  
GOOD WISHES.

SAW BURGESS INTERVIEWED ON TELEVISION LAST NIGHT. HE WAS  
SAYING VERY LOUDLY THAT ISLANDERS ARE ALL WANTING TO COME OUT,  
WHICH IS NOT ~~XXX~~ THE IMPRESSION I HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FROM  
YOU. CAN ONLY HOPE THAT ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES WILL CONTINUE  
TO MAKE TRANSPORT AVAILABLE FOR ANYBODY WHO DOES WISH TO LEAVE.

NOT MUCH MORE I CAN THINK OF. ANY PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AT YOUR  
END.

BEST WISHES TED

DEAR TED,

THANKS ALOT.

AS FOR THE FEELINGS OF THE ISLANDERS. OFCOURSE OPINIONS VARY  
VERY MUCH - OBVIOUSLY ITS A BIT HAIRY BUT THE PLANE IS THERE  
IF YOU WANT OUT. MAJORITY OF PEOPLE ARE IN CAMP AND REALLY WE'VE  
HEARD NO COMMENTS ~~AS~~ AS TO THEIR FEELINGS. JIM BURGESS WANTED  
OUT SO GUESS HES ENTITLED TO SAY WHAT HE THINKS. I THINK MOST  
WHO ARE LEFT WILL STICK IT OUT. HARRY SAYS THIS IS MY OPINION  
NOT HIS (??). THO' HE AGREES.

NO PROBLEMS -  
THATS ABOUT IT SOREGARDS AND TKS  
FROM HARRY + ROSEMARIE.

DEAR HARRY AND ROSEMARIE

YOUR REPLY IS MUCH AS I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED IN VIEW OF WHAT YOU HAVE SAID BEFORE. NICE TO SEE ROSEMARIE CHIPPING IN - OBVIOUSLY WHERE SHE KNOWS HARRY IN AGREEMENT ANYWAY.

ALL OUR VERY BEST WISHES AND WILL BE WITH YOU AND IN TOUCH AGAIN

REGARDS  
TED + JANET

DEAR TED,

I AM STANDING BY THE SIDE OF THE ~~ACHINE AD~~ .. MACHINE AND I WANTED YOU TO GET HER REACTIONS AS A LOCAL PERSON. MINE WERE MUCH STRONGER BUT WHE WOULD NOT LET ME PASS THEM TO YOU. TOO MANY FOUR LETTER WORDS INVOLVED???

REGARDS HARRY.

DEAR HARRY

WE  
L\_U

WELL UNDERSTOOD. RESTRAINT ON LANGUAGE ALWAYS A PROBLM.

AS FAR AS THE FEELINGS IN CAMP ARE CONCERNED, IT MUST BE VERY DIFFICULT TO KEEP IN TOUCH AT ALL BUT YOU ARE OBVIOUSLY IN A BETTER POSITION THAN ANYBODY ELSE. MARVELLOUS THAT WE CAN KEEP IN TOUCH IN THIS WAY.

REGARDS TED

HAVE RECEIVED NO CHANGE OF OPINION IN CAMP FROM BROOK WHEN WE  
SPEEK TO HIM EACH DAY.

WELL THATS ABOUT IT.  
REGARDS ALSO TO JANET.

(Hardenstone in Darwin)

REGARDS AND GOD WISHES HARRY,

DEAR HARRY,

OK THANKS ALL OUR BEST WISHES, OFF TO CHURCH NOW AND BEST WISHES  
TO THE MONSIGNOR

TED

DEAR TED,

MONSIGNOR LUNCHING WITH US TODAY AND I WILL PASS HIM YOUR GOOD  
WISHES,

BIBI FOR NOW  
HARRY AND ROSEMARIE

DEAR HARRY AND ROSEMARIE,

FINE. THANKS. PLEASE PASS KATH'S REGARDS ALSO AND TELL HIM  
SHE IS WEARING A RING CONSTANTLY THAT SHE HAD MADE UP WITH  
ONE OF THE STONES FROM THE ISLANDS GIVEN TO HER BY FATHER  
MONAHAN.

BEST WISHES TED

MARVELLOUS NEWS AND ~~WILL PASS~~ WILL PASS ON TO HIM. BEST WISHES  
HARRY.

BL NOW JANET TO ROSEMARIE ~~BBB, 597:2~~

28

28-136

54250 COALTE G  
210 PALM VISOOR EK

MOM  
LDN SWBD P68

Sent 3.10 pm  
Mon. 26/4/82

54250 COALTE G

COULD YOU PLEASE CONNECT ME TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS  
COMPANY PORT STANLEY NO 218

NOT MUCH CHANCE BUT WOULD TRY

218 FALKISCO FK  
54250 COALTE G

This is a copy,  
original damaged  
by sellotape.

R For man  
27 Oct 11

MR HARRY MILNE 26:4 82

DEAR HARRY,

GOOD MORNING AND BEST WISHES TO YOU ALL.

I DO HOPE THAT WE ARE STILL TO BE ALLOWED TO KEEP IN TOUCH  
ON A PERSONAL BASIS.

DO YOU STILL HAVE A FULL FLIGHT FOR TOMORROW?

ANYTHING I CAN DO?

REGARDS, TED.

DEAR ROSEMARIE,

I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MRS  
DAPHNE HOLMWOOD FOR MRS. BRENDA WHITNEY PO BOX 153  
PORT STANLEY.

DEAR BRENDA,

MANY THANKS FOR MESSAGE OF APRIL 21ST, WAS SO PLEASED  
TO HEAR FROM YOU.

I WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR THAT KURT AND ROBERT HAVE BEEN  
ABLE TO GET AWAY FROM STANLEY ALONG WITH THE OTHER  
CHILDREN. I SHALL SEND A COPY OF YOUR MESSAGE TO ADA.  
AS MAIL HAS A CHANCE OF REACHING YOU, I WILL WRITE AGAIN  
THIS WEEKEND.

GOD BLESS AND KEEP YOU ALL SAFE, YOU ARE FOREVER IN OUR  
THOUGHTS AND PRAYERS.  
LOVE TO YOU ALL FROM  
DAPHNE AND FAMILY.

END OF MESSAGE - BETTY

ANY TO SEND OUT?

---

TKS E BETTY.

YES I HAVE ONE TO SEND OUT BUT FIRSTLY ONE TO MR NEEDHAM.

26 APRIL 1982

DEAR TED,

GOOD MORNING - ALL WELL - WEATHER TODAY AS GOOD AS EVER -  
YESTERDAY WE HAD GALES AND RAIN. WINDS UP TO 62 KNOTS.

5E3 %3,:3' - 49

THE FENCES AROUND THE BUTCHERY PADDOCKS HAVE BEEN BADLY  
DAMAGED SO WE ARE KILLING AND FREEZING THE MUTTON TO AVOID  
LOSSES. NO DOUBT WE WILL GET SOME COMPLAINTS BUT IT IS A  
CASE OF FROZEN OR NOTHING.

THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE - AT PRESENT NOT SURE ON THE FLIGHT  
PASSENGERS FOR TOMORROW BUT SHALL FIND OUT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER  
TODAY.

KINDEST REGARDS HARRY,

---

BETTY GOOD MORNING - I HAVE ONE MESSAGE FOR ISOBEL AND DAVID  
OK TO GA PLS

---

YES OK ROSEMARIE

THAME 3011

MRS CHRIMES  
43 NORTH STREET  
THAME  
OXON

DEAR MUM + DAD,

SORRY MUM + DAD, YOUR CABLE CAME TOO LATE, WE WILL STAY AS WE ARE  
PART OF THE COMMUNITY AND MUST STICK TOGETHER.

SO PLEASE DON'T WORRY WE ARE WELL, AND DAVID IS INVOLVED AS  
ARP SO JUST I PRAY THAT ALL WILL BE WELL. LETTER ON WAY. WE  
HOPE. GOD BLESS AND KEEP YOU BOTH SAFE. LOVE TO THE FAMILY.

BEL + DAVID

TKS ALOT BETTY.

OK FINE

DEAR HARRY,

DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT. MOST APPRECIATIVE STILL ABLE  
TO BE IN TOUCH. GLAD TO SEE FINE WEATHER RETURN.

REGARDING FENCES .- OBVIOUSLY A MATTER OF A BIRD IN THE HAND.  
DECISION OBVIOUSLY RIGHT . HOPE ALL GOES WELL OTHERWISE.  
LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU LATER REGARDING FLIGHTS OR  
ANY OTHER MATTERS. IF NOTHING MORE NOW, ALL OUR BEST WISHES  
TO YOU ALL.

TED

TTKS ALOT FOR YOUR MSG MR MILNE IS NOT WITH ME AT PRESENT.  
NO DOUBT WE SHALL CALL AGAIN LATER HOPEFULLY WITH DETAILS  
OF THE FLIGHT. REGARDS TO YOU ALL AND TKX FOR KEEPING  
IN TOUCH. ROSEMARIE.

THANKS.. BI BI FOR NOW BETTY

MPLS BETTY WOULD YOU PLS DO US A FAVOUR

DAVID COLVILLE LEFT THE ISLANDS ON THURSDAY ALONE AND WE  
HAVENT HEARD FROM HIM - WOULD YOU MIND PHONING HIS HOME  
AT 124 KATHLEEN ROAD - SHIRLEY - SOUTHAMPTON JUST  
TO CHECK HE MADE IT OK AS HE STAYED WITH US WHILST IN THE  
ISLANDS. TKS ROSEMARIE.

HE HAS ARRIVED SAFELY. WE HAVE SEEN HIM ON TELEVISION  
AND READ REPORTS IN THE NEWSPAPER.

WILL SEND MESSAGE FOR YOU AS WELL

TKS ALOT MOST RELEIVED.

BIBI

CHEERIO

54250 COALTE G  
21B FALKISCO FK \_\_\_\_ 3 20 PM

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS No.10 ~~DOWNING ST.~~

PS/Mr *Hard*  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RISKIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
} H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/HQCB~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

*DIO*  
SIR M. PALMER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG, DIO, CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

FM MEXICO CITY 262315Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 322 OF 26 APRIL 82

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 318: POSSIBLE MEXICAN INITIATIVE: FALKLANDS

1. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR WESTERN EUROPE IN THE MEXICAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD NO MORE NEWS TODAY OF WHAT, IF ANYTHING, PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO HAD AUTHORISED ROSSEL DE LA LAMA TO SAY IN LONDON. BUT SHE TOLD ME THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER CATEGORICALLY TO DENY THE EXISTENCE OF ANY MEXICAN PEACE INITIATIVE IN THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE. FUENTES WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH ME AS SOON AS SHE HAS MORE INFORMATION. IN THE MEANTIME IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW IF ROSSELL DE LA LAMA WAS RECEIVED IN LONDON AND WHAT HE HAD TO SAY.
2. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

TICKELL

NNNN

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29) 30

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS  
PS/Mr Huld  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RIPPIND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
DIO

RESIDENT CLERK

SIR M. PARRISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG DIO. CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 270800Z

**IMMEDIATE**

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 262312Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 569 OF 26 APRIL  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

**ADVANCE COPY**

MIPT: FALKLANDS; NAM COMMUNIQUE.  
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE:

A MEETING OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HELD ON APRIL 26TH, 1982, WAS CONVENED AT THE REQUEST OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA.

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE BUREAU THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE REGION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS, INCREASING THE TENSION EXISTING IN THE AREA, THUS GRAVELY ENDANGERING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE COORDINATING BUREAU EXPRESSED ITS GRAVE CONCERN OVER THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS AND REQUESTED THE INTERESTED PARTIES TO ACTIVELY SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THEIR DISPUTE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MAY ENDANGER PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION.

THE COORDINATING BUREAU REAFFIRMED THE VIEW THAT THE USE OF FORCE OR THE THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES

AND SECURITY IN THE REGION.

THE COORDINATING BUREAU REAFFIRMED THE VIEW THAT THE USE OF FORCE OR THE THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES ARE ACTS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

IN CONFORMITY WITH THE TRADITIONAL SUPPORT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT FOR THE PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION, THE COORDINATING BUREAU RECALLED PARAGRAPH 87 OF THE DECLARATION OF THE CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HELD IN LIMA, PERU, IN AUGUST 1975, WHICH STATED:

"THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RATIFYING THE VALIDITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE FOR OTHER TERRITORIES STRONGLY SUPPORT IN THE SPECIAL AND PARTICULAR CASE OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS THE JUST CLAIM OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND URGE THE UNITED KINGDOM TO ACTIVELY CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE SAID TERRITORY TO ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AND THUS PUT AN END TO THAT ILLEGAL SITUATION WHICH STILL PERSISTS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT."

THE SUPPORT OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES FOR ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS ISLANDS HAS BEEN REAFFIRMED AT SUBSEQUENT SUMMIT AND MINISTERIAL MEETINGS OF THE MOVEMENT INCLUDING THE MINISTERIAL MEETING HELD IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER 1981.

IN THIS CONTEXT, THE BUREAU EXPRESSED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS AT OBTAINING A JUST, DURABLE AND PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICATION OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE PRINCIPLES AND DECISIONS OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

PARSONS

NNNN

TYPISTS

DESKBY 261500Z

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RICHARD  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

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SIR K COUZENS  
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HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/REGD

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

LDW NR 473/26

00 FCO DESKBY 261500Z

00 UKMIS NEW YORK

00 UKREP BRUSSELS

00 WASHINGTON

GR 810

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 261500Z

FM TOKYO 261315Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 199 OF 26 APRIL

RFI IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS AND WASHINGTON

SAVING ALL EC POSTS

MY TELNO 198: FALKLAND ISLANDS: JAPANESE POSITION

1. WHEN I SAW KATO, THIS EVENING HE READ ME THE TEXT OF A SECOND

*MJ*

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

Prime Minister

The Japanese go some way  
towards or point to economic  
sanctions but not for export.  
APR 26  
/4

1. WHEN I SAW KATO, THIS EVENING HE READ ME THE TEXT OF A SECOND PERSONAL LETTER FROM MR SUZUKI TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE HANDED OVER BY MR HIRAHARA LATER TODAY. AFTER REITERATING THE JAPANESE POSITION AND REGRETTING THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA THE LETTER SAID THAT THE JAPANESE WERE MEETING OUR REQUESTS BY:-

(A) WARNING JAPANESE BUSINESS NOT TO UNDERMINE THE ECONOMIC MEASURES TAKEN BY THE EC AGAINST ARGENTINA

AND (B) REAFFIRMING THAT NO APPLICATIONS FOR THE PROVISION OF NEW EXPORT CREDITS TO ARGENTINA WERE EXPECTED IN VIEW OF THE TENSE SITUATION.

2. I SAID THAT WE WERE GLAD TO RECEIVE THIS NEW LETTER BUT THOUGH WELCOME, DID NOT "MEET OUR REQUESTS" IN FULL AS THE LETTER SUGGESTED. WE STILL HOPED THAT JAPAN WOULD STOP IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA AND PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE REGIME TO WITHDRAW.

3. KATO SAID THAT THEY HAD ALREADY SENT INSTRUCTION TO LONDON TO SAY THAT THEY COULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE WORDING FOR YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON EXPORT CREDITS. THEY WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE USE OF THE PHRASE "GROWING CONSENSUS" SINCE THIS IMPLIED PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD NOT IN FACT TAKEN PLACE. I SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF SEMANTICS.

4. KATO THEN WENT ON TO STRESS THE MEASURES WHICH JAPAN HAD SO FAR TAKEN. HE LISTED THESE AS:-

(A) JAPAN'S VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 3 APRIL:

(B) NISHIBORI'S SPEECH AT THE UN:

(C) THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SUMMONING OF THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR ON 12 APRIL AND THE REPRESENTATIONS THEN MADE:

(D) SUZUKI'S LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF 12 APRIL:

(E) JAPAN'S RECONFIRMATION IN THAT LETTER THAT SHE STRICTLY OBSERVED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-EXPORT OF ARMS TO ARGENTINA:

(E) JAPAN'S RECONFIRMATION IN THAT LETTER THAT SHE STRICTLY OBSERVED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-EXPORT OF ARMS TO ARGENTINA:

(F) THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S ORAL STATEMENT AT THAT TIME THAT NEW EXPORT CREDITS WERE UNLIKELY TO BE EXTENDED

(G) SAKURAUCHI'S STATEMENT IN THE DIET ON 19 APRIL:

(H) SUZUKI'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI OF 24 APRIL STRONGLY URGED THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502

(I) SAKURAUCHI'S FURTHER STATEMENT ON 26 APRIL (MY TEL NO 197):

(J) THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S NEW STATEMENT ON EXPORT CREDITS (SEE ABOVE)

(K) SUZUKI'S SECOND PERSONAL LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

5. I TOOK UP WITH KATO THE REFERENCE IN SAKURAUCHI'S STATEMENT (MY TELNO 197) TO "THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES". I SAID THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 WAS THE FIRST REQUIREMENT. KATO REPLIED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT SAW THE UN RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE AND HE STRONGLY EMPHASISED THE MFA VIEW THAT THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY ARGENTINA WHO HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO USE FORCE. THE MFA COULD BE QUOTED ON THIS.

6. I THEN SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF A PRESS REPORT WHICH SUGGESTED THAT SUZUKI HAD EXPRESSED REGRET THAT BRITAIN SHOULD HAVE RETAKEN SOUTH GEORGIA BY FORCE WHILE THE HAIG MISSION WAS STILL IN PROGRESS. THE MFA SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN MISQUOTED AND THAT ALL HE HAD SAID WAS THAT "A MILITARY CLASH IS REGRETTABLE". KATO ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE UK'S ACTION OVER SOUTH GEORGIA.

7. KATO SAID THAT JAPAN WOULD SUPPORT A PROPOSAL TO RECONVENE THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ASKED

(A) WHY THE UK HAD NOT GONE BACK TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

(B) WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE REPORTING TO THE U N

(B) WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE REPORTING TO THE U N  
THE MEASURES IT WAS TAKING UNDER ARTICLE 51:

ON (A) I EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE VALUE OF THIS IN VIEW OF THE  
SOVIET AND CHINESE ATTITUDES. KATO SUGGESTED THAT WE  
SHOULD CHALLENGE THE SOVIETS TO VETO.

ON (B) I SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD COMPLY WITH  
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN CHARTER.

B. COMMENT. THE JAPANESE HAVE NOT YET GONE AS FAR AS WE  
WOULD LIKE AND THE JAPANESE PRESS CONTINUE TO PUT THE EMPHASIS  
ON THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT BY BOTH SIDES. BUT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
HAVE NOW GIVEN US SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT NOT ONLY OVER CREDITS BUT  
IN PUTTING DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA AND OUR FRIENDS  
ESPECIALLY IN THE MFA ARE TRYING TO BE HELPFUL. WHILE WE SHOULD  
NOT LET THE JAPANESE THINK THAT WE ARE YET FULLY SATISFIED  
I HOPE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL FEEL ABLE TO SEND A  
RELATIVELY WARM REPLY TO MR SUZUKI.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO EC POSTS

CORTAZZI

NNNN

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
PS/MR HVED  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR BIRKEND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/INCD~~

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitten and CinC Fleet)

Prince Harald

Norwegians remain

with us post South Georgia

ARy  
24

CONFIDENTIAL

FM OSLO 261137Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 81 OF 26 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA.

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, BRUSSELS.

INFO SAVING COPENHAGEN, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NO 106 TO ATHENS AND 296 TO UKMIS NEW YORK:  
FALKLANDS: MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. I MADE INITIAL CONTACT WITH EIVINN BERG, STATE SECRETARY AT MFA, ON EVENING OF 25 APRIL. WE AGREED THAT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WAS BETTER LEFT UNTIL MORE INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE AND MEANWHILE HE WOULD REFRAIN FROM PUBLIC COMMENT. I THEREFORE SAW BERG AT 0715Z TODAY. WE WERE NOTIFIED DURING OUR CONVERSATION OF ARRIVAL OF MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 100 TO ANKARA, WHICH IN THE ABSENCE OF STRAY HIMSELF I WAS ABLE TO READ TO BERG AND WAS MOST TIMELY.

2. I GAVE BERG BOUT DE PAPIER DRAWING ON MOST OF THE POINTS

2. I GAVE BERG BOUT DE PAPIER DRAWING ON MOST OF THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR TO ATHENS (BUT NOT REPEAT NOT PARAS 7 OR 10). TEXTS OF MOD STATEMENT IN YOUR TUR TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE'S SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT OUTSIDE NO 10 YESTERDAY WERE ATTACHED. I EMPHASISED OUR CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.

3. BERG'S INITIAL COMMENT WAS THAT RE-CAPTURE OF SOUTH GEORGIA HAD NOT COME AS A SURPRISE. HE COULD APPRECIATE STRATEGIC, TACTICAL AND LOGISTICAL REASONS FOR OUR ACTION. BUT HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT IT HAD TAKEN PLACE WHILE AMERICAN ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE WERE STILL UNDER WAY. APART FROM STRESSING IN THE BOUT DE PAPIER THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD SHOWN NO SIGNS OF COMPLYING WITH RESOLUTION 502 AFTER THREE WEEKS, I POINTED OUT THAT YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON WAS ONE OF NUMEROUS CONFIRMATIONS OF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO SEARCH FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, BUT YOU HAD COME AWAY PESSIMISTIC. I HOPED THAT SOUTH GEORGIA ACTION WOULD HELP INDUCE A GREATER SENSE OF REALISM IN ARGENTINA.

4. AFTER REFLECTION, BERG'S REACTION BECAME MORE SOLID. HE SAID THAT SOUTH GEORGIA ACTION DID NOT ALTER NORWEGIAN VIEW THAT ARGENTINE INVASION OF FALKLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES WAS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR. HE MUCH WELCOMED REASSURANCE THAT WE REMAIN DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT WE HAD CARRIED OUT A SUCCESSFUL ACTION WITH MINIMUM USE OF FORCE AND WITHOUT FATAL CASUALTIES. YOUR MESSAGE TO STRAY, WHICH ARRIVED JUST AS BERG WAS MAKING THIS POINT, HE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE MOST HELPFUL UNQUOTE. HE HOPED THAT QUOTE THE ONE EVENT IN SOUTH GEORGIA WOULD HAVE A SOBERING EFFECT ON THE ARGENTINE LEADERS UNQUOTE AND THUS MAKE VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS YOU MENTIONED IN THE MESSAGE.

5. BERG STRESSED THAT NORWEGIAN DECISION TO BAN IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA WAS SEEN BY GOVERNMENT PRIMARILY AS CONTRIBUTION TO PRESSURE FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF GOING BACK ON IT, ALTHOUGH HE ENVISAGED POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES BEING RAISED IN STARTING NOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN A MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. OUR USE OF MINIMAL FORCE WOULD CERTAINLY HELP GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH THIS. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK ACTIVELY TO CLEAR PARLIAMENTARY FORMALITIES REQUIRED BEFORE IMPORT BAN FINALLY BECOMES LAW. BERG ESTIMATED THIS WOULD TAKE A FURTHER 2-3 WEEKS.

PARLIAMENTARY FORMALITIES REQUIRED BEFORE IMPORT BAN FINALLY BECOMES LAW. BERG ESTIMATED THIS WOULD TAKE A FURTHER 2-3 WEEKS.

BERG SAID NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT RUSH INTO A STATEMENT OF THEIR REACTIONS, BUT WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND TO ENQUIRIES TODAY. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT PUBLIC LINE WOULD REFLECT MUCH OF HIS OWN THINKING, INCLUDING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT BRITIAN REMAINS COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION IF POSSIBLE.

7. STATE SECRETARY ALSO REFERRED TO STRONG NORWEGIAN HISTORICAL INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH GEORGIA WHALING STATIONS AND IN ANTARCTIC, WHICH GAVE EXTRA DIMENSION TO NORWEGIAN PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE CRISIS.

8. WE THUS RETAIN THE SUPPORT OF NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT AND I BELIEVE THAT, IF WE CAN CONTINUE TO PRESENT OUR CASE ON PRESENT BASIS WITH MINIMUM USE OF FORCE AND EMPHASIS ON OUR COMMITMENT TO DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS, WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO KEEP THEM WITH US.

9. MEDIA COVERAGE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE BUT SO FAR EXCLUSIVELY FACTUAL. SOME PAPERS CARRY COMMENT BY BRITISH OPPOSITION POLITICIANS AS WELL AS THOSE OF OUR OWN MINISTERS.

FCO PLEASE PASS INFO SAVING TO COPENHAGEN, STOCKHOLM AND HELSINKI

BROWN

NNNN

SENT AT 261406Z WEJP

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
~~PS/MR HURD~~  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RICHARD~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
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MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

~~RESIDENT STAFF~~

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitten and CinC Fleet)

Prime Minister

Denmark related about

South Georgia but uncertain about  
an attack on the Falklands.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM COPENHAGEN 261230Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 96 OF 26 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
WASHINGTON.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 106 TO ATHENS, 296 TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND 100  
TO ANKARA: SOUTH GEORGIA.

1. I SPOKE TO PERMANENT SECRETARY ON RECEIPT YESTERDAY OF YOUR SECOND TUR AND FOLLOWED UP (BEFORE NEWS OF REOCCUPATION OF SOUTH GEORGIA) WITH A NOTE OF POINTS IN FIRST TWO TURS. JOERGENSEN ASSURED ME THAT MFA WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO BE HELPFUL.
2. THIS MORNING I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE (THIRD TUR) TO MR KJELD OLESEN. AS I WAS SEEING HIM FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE MY RETURN FROM LEAVE, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE THANKS FOR THE SUPPORT DENMARK HAS GIVEN US SO FAR, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE CONTINUED IN THE NEW PHASE. IN THE LIGHT OF MR OLESEN'S STATEMENT LAST NIGHT (MIFT NOT TO ALL) WHICH HAD EMPHASISED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF BOTH PARTIES TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS AND NOT TO USE FORCE, I POINTED OUT THAT YOU HAD AGAIN RENEWED YOUR COMMITMENT TO SEEKING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. I WENT ON TO EMPHASISE THE ADVANTAGE TO THE AGGRESSOR OF A SITUATION IN WHICH

EMPHASISE THE ADVANTAGE TO THE AGGRESSOR OF A SITUATION IN WHICH CONTINUED FOOT DRAGGING SIMPLY LEFT HIM IN OCCUPATION AND IN SELF-DEFENCE. I ARGUED, IN PARTICULAR, THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE SUPPORT GIVEN US SO FAR IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO HEED THE WARNING GIVEN BY THE REOCCUPATION OF SOUTH GEORGIA. I HOPED MR OLESEN MIGHT AT LEAST FEEL ABLE TO SPEAK TO THIS LAST POINT.

3. MR OLESEN REAFFIRMED THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION RESTED ON SCR 502 WHICH, INTER ALIA, CALLED ON BOTH PARTIES TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE. HE REHEARSED THE LINE HE HAD TAKEN IN PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES IN SECURING AGREEMENT TO THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 113 INCLUDING THE ARGUMENT THAT ECONOMIC PRESSURE WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE. HE WAS, HE SAID, RELAXED ABOUT THE SOUTH GEORGIA ACTION. IF WE WERE TO GO FURTHER, FOR EXAMPLE BY ATTACKING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES, AND THIS WERE TO LEAD TO REAL WAR, HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT THE DANISH ATTITUDE WOULD THEN BE. THE US POSITION, AS IT EVOLVES IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. MR OLESEN ENVISAGED A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE MEASURES BUT INSISTED THAT ALL MEANS SHOULD BE USED TO AVOID OPEN CONFLICT.

4. AT THE END OF OUR TALK MR OLESEN SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE DANISH GOVT. HAD SUPPORTED BRITAIN AND STILL DID SO. THEY SAW IT, HOWEVER, AS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO MOBILISE ALL POLITICAL WISDOM TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. HE DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WOULD WEAKEN DANISH SUPPORT, BUT NOR COULD HE DEPART FROM THE BASIS OF DANISH POLICY AS EXPLAINED IN PARLIAMENT.

WARBURTON

NNNN

SENT AT 26/1312Z JK

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

IMMEDIATE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS  
~~PS/MR HURD~~  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR BIRKEND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

} H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, ~~MOD Siteen and CinC Fleet~~)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 261000Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEWYORK  
U/N TEL OF 26 APR

*Prime Minister*

*Hussein says that we can  
count on his continuing  
support.*

FOLLOWING TEL NOW REPEATED IMMEDIATE TO YOU

*MT* *MR 4/4*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 260725Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 26 APR

YOUR TELNO 296 TO UKMIS NEWYORK: FALKLANDS: MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN LAST NIGHT ON RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR BUT BEFORE NEWS OF THE BRITISH LANDING ON SOUTH GEORGIA HAD BEEN RECEIVED HERE. AFTER AGAIN THANKING THE KING FOR THE SUPPORT HE HAD ALREADY GIVEXDUS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I MADE THE POINTS IN PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR AND ALSO DREW ON YOUR TELNO 99 TO ANKARA. I ALSO REFERRED TO OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND TO THE FACT THAT I HAD BRIEFED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FULLY ON THESE EARLIER IN THE DAY (MY TELNO 163).

KING HUSSEIN SAID WE COULD COUNT ON JORDAN'S CONTINUING SUPPORT

AND TO THE FACT THAT I HAD BRIEFED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS  
THESE EARLIER IN THE DAY (MY TELNO 163).

2. KING HUSSEIN SAID WE COULD COUNT ON JORDAN'S CONTINUING SUPPORT  
AND THAT HE WOULD ENSURE APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT TO THE  
JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. WHILE WAITING TO SEE THE KING, I WAS ABLE TO TAKE THE MINISTER  
OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ARGUMENTS IN YOUR TELNO 99 TO  
ANKARA.

URWICK

NNNN

TYPIST

*[Handwritten scribbles]*  
*[Circled 'x16']*

RRRRR

ERE FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

WONFO 015/27

ZZ FCO

OO LUXEMBOURG

GR 45

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 270100Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1470 OF 26 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG (FOR S OF S)

FALKLANDS.

HAIG HAS JUST SPOKEN TO ME AGAIN. REAGAN HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GALTIERI. THEY STILL DO NOT KNOW WHETHER HAIG WILL BE RECEIVED IN BUENOS AIRES. IF NOT HE WILL SEND THE U.S. PROPOSALS TO THE U.S. AMBASSADOR FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY WITH THE SAME 24 HOUR DEADLINE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

*PS - B M'Orslow*  
*PS/Pus*  
*M Giffard*  
*M Wright*  
*M Gilmore*  
*M Lane*

*[Handwritten blue scribble]*

*Ad/SAand*  
*Ad/DefD*  
*Ad/PusD (2)*  
*PS/No 10 DS*  
*Sir M Palliser*  
*Gen R Armstrong*  
*M Wade - Cont*  
*TR*

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 April 1982

Dear John,

Yes MB

Prime Minister  
Content of attached message  
should issue?  
AR 26/4

Message from the Prime Minister to the President of Nigeria

I enclose a draft telegram to Lagos containing the text of a message which we propose the Prime Minister should send to President Shagari.

The Nigerian response to the Falkland crisis has been generally helpful. They have issued a statement (of which I enclose a copy) including a call for Argentine withdrawal. It would therefore be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send the President a personal message of thanks.

Moreover, this is an excellent opportunity to put the record straight over a problem which is threatening to damage the good relations we have built up with Nigeria over the last few years. Sections of the Nigerian press have been presenting BNO's recent decision to reduce the price of UKCS crude oil to \$31 per barrel as part of a Western plot to undermine not only OPEC in general, but the Nigerian economy in particular. Leading Nigerians, including the President, have tended to give credence to this line in recent public statements. Even if they do not believe the story themselves, they may be using it as a means of deflecting criticism away from their own economic management. This could become very dangerous for British exports to Nigeria (which last year amounted to £1.5 billion, more than our exports to the whole of Latin America). We have therefore agreed with the Department of Energy a form of words on this point, which is included in the draft letter.

Nigeria's insistence on sticking to the agreed OPEC price for her oil has led to a severe drop in sales and consequent balance of payments problems. The government's response has been to impose a number of restrictions on imports, which could have serious repercussions for our exporters, even if there is no actual discrimination against the UK. The draft message therefore includes a reference to the new measures taken by the Nigerian Government.

/In view

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In view of the importance to us of this market, we hope that the Nigerian Government will be able to bring their economy back under control by these means.

*Yours ever,*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Francis Richards'.

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



file KB  
aRo

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 April 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your recent telegram.

We are aware of the improvement in the United States' relations with Argentina over the last year and the more frequent exchanges of high level visits between Washington and Buenos Aires. These contacts were part of the efforts of the current United States administration to cultivate closer relations with Latin America. But we have absolutely no evidence to support the allegations of collusion in the newspaper article to which you refer. Nor do we believe them.

The United States have supported Security Council Resolution 502 condemning the Argentine aggression and calling upon them to withdraw their forces. Mr. Haig's negotiating efforts, as he has repeatedly made clear, have been undertaken in the context of that Resolution. The Government accepts that while Mr. Haig is engaged in delicate negotiations it is not practicable for him to align himself with either party. The British Government believe there is clear and sympathetic understanding in Washington of our intentions in our search for a solution to the crisis and of the central principles which we wish to maintain.

A. J. COLES

Dr. M. F. Perutz, C.H., F.R.S.

AB

A J Coles Esq



CABINET OFFICE

A.J.C. 26/1a

h.a.

With the compliments of  
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO  
*Secretary of the Cabinet*

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS  
Telephone: 01-233 8319

SECRET



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

*From the Secretary of the Cabinet:* Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO

Ref. A08224

26th April 1982

OD(SA) this morning agreed the general lines of a message for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to send immediately to Mr Haig.

I now enclose a copy of the draft message as it was approved by the Prime Minister at 1.45 pm.

I am sending copies of this letter and the enclosure to John Coles, John Halliday, David Omand and Keith Long.

B J P Fall Esq

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY TO  
MR HAIG

Our repossession of South Georgia has radically changed the situation. In particular, it enables us to deal with the Falkland Islands in isolation. Equally it should bring home to Argentina her interest in negotiating seriously for a settlement. But time is desperately short. Our Task Force is approaching the Maritime Exclusion Zone round the Falkland Islands, and the next phase of operations will have to start very soon.

We might now be able to turn the OAS meeting this afternoon to our advantage. But this requires a simpler approach. There is now no time to negotiate in detail.

What we have in mind is as follows. If the Argentinians withdraw their forces from the Falkland Islands, we will stop our Task Force, and turn it back once Argentinian withdrawal is complete, provided that from that time onwards the United States will militarily guarantee the security of the Falkland Islands. This would secure the withdrawal of Argentinian forces in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 502, and clear the way for immediate negotiations in a conference to resolve the dispute. In the meantime the traditional administration would be restored to the Falkland Islands, but for the time being we should be prepared not to send back the Governor, and to appoint instead an officer to administer the government. We

should be ready during that time to have an Argentinian Resident at Port Stanley to look after the interest of the Argentinians living on the Falkland Islands.

If this proposal commends itself to you, we need to decide how it should be launched. It would of course need your own whole-hearted agreement and backing, but it might be advantageous to get someone else to take the initiative. We have had some indications that President Lopez Portillo would like to be helpful. Thus the Mexicans could be invited to put the proposal, with your and our agreement, to the meeting of the OAS later today. The Mexicans might even be prepared to provide the venue for the conference.



## 10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 April, 1982.

Falkland Islands: Call on the Prime Minister by  
Senor Rossell de la Lama

Thank you for your letter of 23 April. Mr. Edward Du Cann brought Senor Rossell de la Lama (the Governor of Hidalgo Province in Mexico) to call on the Prime Minister this morning.

After a short discussion on the Cancun Conference, Mr. Du Cann explained that the Governor, whose English was not perfect, had asked him to speak on his behalf. They wished to regard the meeting as an informal one between friends, though, said Mr. Du Cann, Senor de la Lama was in London with the knowledge and full approval of the President. The President of Mexico wanted to offer his help in the Falklands dispute. But he did not wish to cut across Mr. Haig's efforts, nor was he offering himself as a mediator. His purpose was rather to offer a venue in Mexico for discussion if this seemed appropriate at any time. Mexico understood Argentina's emotional commitment to the Falkland Islands, but they had more understanding for the UK's legal case on the islands and the position we had adopted at the UN.

The Prime Minister said that she was glad to know that a venue for discussion could be provided in Mexico if this were needed. The fact was that if Argentina withdrew its forces in conformity with UN Security Council Resolution 502 and then, following British withdrawal, there was a demilitarised zone, perhaps guaranteed by the United States, we could consider negotiations.

Senor de la Lama undertook to report the Prime Minister's comments to the President of Mexico.

Although there was some discussion of other aspects of the situation, the above records the only substantial part of the conversation.

I should be grateful if the contents of this letter could be carefully protected because Senor de la Lama was most anxious that knowledge of his visit here should be restricted.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ I am

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

I am sending copies of this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office), Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Pleased to receive emissary of President Lopez Portillo (important to give both names). Recall interesting visit to Mexico 21-25 October 1981 for Cancun Conference and signature of Memorandum of Understanding for the Sicartsa project (see page 2 of Background for Sicartsa project).
2. Grateful for message from President Lopez Portillo received by the Mexican Embassy in London on 20 April 1982. Note that Mexican Government has condemned use of force as a means of solving international controversies and subscribes to the United Nations Security Council Resolution no. 502.
3. We are heartened by the strong international support for the UK's position. Particularly appreciate Mexico's helpful attitude. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Mexican Foreign Ministry.
4. We regard implementation of SCR 502 as the key to the solution of the problem. Mr Pym's visit to Washington an attempt to pursue to the limit our efforts to settle the crisis by diplomatic means.
5. We are aware of course that certain Latin American countries thinking of their own claims against neighbouring countries have been influenced in their attitudes to the Falklands crisis.
6. We shall continue to count on the valuable support of our friends in Latin America particularly Mexico and shall study the results of any vote at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS being held on Monday, 26 April 1982.
7. What way forward does Mexico see?

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

MEXICAN ATTITUDE TO FALKLANDS DISPUTE

1. Mexico has issued a statement supporting the territorial claim of the Argentinians over the Falklands but condemns the latter's use of force and stress that the United Nations Security Council Resolution must be respected. The statement draws attention to the bad precedents for American territorial disputes of the Argentine action. (Not to be quoted.) The Mexican Foreign Minister told the French Ambassador that there would be no change in his Government's position if the UK had to resort to force and that Mexico would not join a call for sanctions against Britain.
2. On 22 April the Mexican press reported that Alejandro Sobarzo, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, said that Mexico would oppose the application of the Rio Treaty in the event of an attack by Britain since this would go against a resolution of the United Nations. HM Ambassador at Mexico City has inferred from a conversation with the Mexican Deputy Foreign Minister that Mexico would not impose sanctions on Britain even if a two-thirds majority at the OAS were to vote for such sanctions.
3. At the time of the signature of the Rio Treaty the Mexican delegation made the following special declaration:

'The Delegation of Mexico continues to believe that, except in the case of legitimate defence, the collective measures referred to in Article 8 cannot be applied in an obligatory form, given their coercive nature, without the authorisation of the Security Council of the United Nations'.
4. The press are generally sympathetic to the UK although there is a public lack of awareness of the legalities of the UK position.

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-2-

SICARTSA

5. The Sicartsa II project was won by Davy Loewy against the opposition of three major competitors with an attractive British financial package. It is for a steel plate mill worth £330 m. to be situated on the pacific coast. It represents a major new project for Sidermex, the Mexican State Steel Corporation. Its success has already had beneficial effects on the attitude of the Mexican official arrangement towards Britain and has conferred a new position in Mexico on which the UK may build.

CONFIDENTIAL

ROSSELL DE LA LAMA, ARQ. GUILLERMO

Governor of Hidalgo 1981-7.

Born Pachuca 1925. Graduated in Architecture from UNAM and thereafter lectured at the National School of Architecture and the School of Municipal Engineering. Ministry of Public Works, 1952-57. Director of Council of Economic and Social Planning in López Mateos' presidential campaign (López Portillo was a member of the Council), 1957. Adviser to President of PRI National Executive Committee, 1957-63. Head of Administration and then Deputy Minister, Ministry of National Resources (again with López Portillo), 1958-64. Founder member of IEPES. Member of IEPES council which worked on López Portillo's political programme, 1975-76. Senator for State of Hidalgo, 1976. Appointed Minister of Tourism in December 1976. Resigned in August 1980 to stand for the Governorship of Hidalgo, and was replaced as Minister of Tourism by Rosa Luz Alegria (qv).

His premature nomination as PRI candidate for Hidalgo is said to have arisen from President López Portillo's desire to remove him from the Cabinet, either because he was dissatisfied with his performance or to create a vacancy for his mistress, Rosa Luz Alegria, or both.

Has designed many buildings in Mexico and abroad. His links with the President go back to the fifties. Of Spanish (Catalan) parentage.

Pachuca, Sr Rossell de la lama's birthplace, is the capital of Hidalgo State of which he is Governor. It has an ancient history of silver mining, the Aztecs having mined there before the advent of the Spaniards and the State now accounts for 10% of Mexico's silver production. Some Cornish miners settled in the State in the 19th century. Pachuca is only 27 kilometers from Mexico City.

26. 4. 82

MESSAGE TO FALKLAND ISLANDERS ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

"Over the weekend the BBC have carried messages saying that if there are any who would prefer to leave the Islands temporarily, the Government will give them sympathetic help to ensure that they are not prevented from doing so by lack of means. The British Government recognises that many Islanders will not wish to leave their homeland, even temporarily. But the Government's position is that any Islander who does wish to leave for the time being and is able to get to either Buenos Aires or Montevideo, will be assisted to return to Britain. He should contact either the British Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy (in the British Embassy premises) or the British Embassy in Montevideo. Those British citizens who do not have current British passports will have them issued to them in either Buenos Aires or Montevideo.

Once in Britain, the case of every returned Islander will be considered with the greatest sympathy, and the Government will not be found lacking in generosity."

For use if pressed

"The present regulations demand that British subjects seeking assistance from posts overseas should sign undertakings to repay. But in the particularly difficult circumstances which apply, the Government will treat every case with the greatest sympathy.

"There are obvious practical difficulties in our helping to finance <sup>in advance</sup> the cost of fares from Port Stanley to either Buenos Aires or Montevideo."

26.4.82 ✓

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Mr Haig

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

The repossession of South Georgia of course alters the situation regarding the tremendous efforts you are making to produce a negotiated settlement of the present crisis. ON THE ONE HAND, there is the important change that the Falkland Islands Dependencies are no longer occupied by Argentina. On the other hand, the successful British military action should bring home to Argentina her interest in negotiating seriously for a settlement.

The first Argentine reaction may be to play for time, as Costa Mendez did with you yesterday. Yet time, as you have often said, is running out. Our Task Force is ~~coming very near to~~ <sup>approaching</sup> the maritime exclusion zone and the next phase of operations may have to start very soon.

1

I wonder therefore whether the key elements discussed so far in your negotiations could be simplified and put to the Argentines in a rather different form. A change of this kind might make them more likely to make concessions which they have declined to make when discussing the existing texts. The new suggestion <sup>54</sup> could be linked

Enclosures—flag(s).....

closely/

closely to the elements in Security Council Resolution No 502.

The Argentines might be asked to agree to the immediate starting of negotiations to carry out point 3 in the Resolution, which called on Argentina and Britain to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences. To give Argentina hope of speedier progress than in the past, the United States might offer to chair the negotiations. The subject for negotiation might be described neutrally as the future of the Falkland Islands.

The condition for starting these negotiations would be implementation of the first two points in the Security Council Resolution, namely immediate cessation of hostilities and immediate Argentine withdrawal. In return for Argentine withdrawal the British forces would withdraw a certain distance or stand back from the area of the Falkland Islands. British administration would be restored pending the outcome of the negotiations, but with an Argentine resident in Port Stanley, whose task might be to look after the interests of the Argentine population. I hope that the United States would give a security guarantee for the Islands, during that same period.

You will wish to consider these suggestions urgently and to decide whether to try them out on Costa Mendez during his present visit to Washington. They might conceivably be used to defuse proposals unwelcome to the US and to Britain at the present meeting of the OAS. One idea that occurs tentatively to me is that Mexico or possibly Colombia could be asked to float these ideas in

in the OAS.

The virtue I see in this suggestion is that simplicity can *be maintained* as tension mounts, and that a change of form in your negotiations may make it more likely that Argentina will be reasonable. If you think these ideas worth consideration, we shall gladly send you a more detailed note of them.

*achieve  
speedier  
progress*

*M. Cotes*

*010*



CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of

*Mr. Wade-Gery*

*r.a.*  
*MR 26.*  
*4*

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS

Telephone 01 233

SECRET

8



CABINET OFFICE  
70 WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AS

CI-~~XXXXXXXX~~ 233 8378

Ref: B06477

26th April 1982

Dear David,

Falkland Islands: Military Decisions

As a footnote to your Top Secret and Personal letter of 24th April to Clive Whitmore, I should record (since I have deliberately not put it in the minutes) that during the 15th Meeting of OD(SA), on 24th April, the Defence Secretary mentioned the decision you described in your second paragraph. The other members of the Sub-Committee took note, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary specifically confirmed that he was content.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Coles (No.10), Brian Fall (FCO) and David Wright.

*John Coles*  
*Brian Fall*  
*David Wright*

R L WADE-GERY

D B Omand Esq.  
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

~~Prime Minister~~

A.S.C. 26/4

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 26 APRIL:  
OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

South Georgia

- ... 1. I attach summaries of reports by Heads of posts of reactions to the successful attack on the Argentine submarine and/or the recapture of Grytviken.
2. The Ministry of Defence have confirmed that in the above actions there were no British casualties and only one serious Argentine casualty, a seaman who suffered leg injuries as a result of the attack on the submarine.
3. The Argentine forces at Leith have surrendered. No casualties have so far been reported.
4. The British Antarctic Survey reported that at 1300Z on 25 April all their personnel on South Georgia were safe and well. The British forces are now seeking to contact all civilians on the island.

Argentine Reactions

5. The Foreign Minister, Mr Costa Mendez, has said in New York that Argentina and the United Kingdom are now 'technically' at war.
6. The BBC has reported anit-British demonstrations in Buenos Aires.

Washington

7. Sunday's meeting between Mr Haig and Sr Costa Mendez in Washington has been postponed by the Argentine side. Mr Haig was 'chortling over our action' which he thought would be beneficial in the long run though the immediate impact might cause difficulties. He believes that Costa Mendez will meet him later today and the negotiation get on course again.

*E J Sharland*

E J Sharland  
Emergency Unit

26 April 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO BRITISH ATTACK ON  
ARGENTINE SUBMARINE AND RECAPTURE OF SOUTH GEORGIA

Yugoslavia

Message delivered to Head of Western European Department for transmission to Foreign Secretary. No formal comment yet.

Netherlands

Message delivered to PS/Foreign Minister. No immediate comment.

Saudi Arabia

Message delivered to Head of Western Department. Not yet delivered to Foreign Secretaries.

Brazil

Message delivered to Ricupero. He agreed that task force must defend itself and expressed doubt about basis of Argentine claim to South Georgia.

Ireland

Message delivered to MFA Duty Officer. No official comments.

Sweden

Message delivered to Permanent Under-Secretary. Sweden would 'naturally regret military activity'.

FRG

Political Director 'entirely sympathetic' and passing on our representations. On hearing news of South Georgia landing, Director suggested situation would become much more difficult.

USSR

Message delivered to Semenov, Deputy Head of Second European Department. He said Soviet position already clear. He would report conversation as soon as possible on Monday and arrange call for HMA or Ryzhov or another Deputy Foreign Minister also on Monday.

Belgium

Message delivered to Cahen, Political Director. He took note and said he would be happy to call a meeting of the Political Committee as soon as we wish.

/ Chile

Chile

Message delivered to Errazuriz. Acting Director General of Foreign Policy at MFA. He received the news calmly. In reply to a question, he said that Chile may now maintain an 'eloquent silence' at the OAS meeting on Monday (rather than use it as a forum to list Chilean grievances against Argentina).

Canada

Head of Western European Division expected that any statement would regret military conflict. Mr MacQuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, subsequently made helpful statement saying recovery of South Georgia under-lined the need for a renewed attempt to implement Resolution 502 and secure Argentine withdrawal and for a peaceful solution. UK was acting in self-defence and securing recovery of the status quo before the Argentine seizure.

Ecuador

Message delivered to Valdes, Under-Secretary General of MFA. He said it gave rise to anxiety: Ecuador's overriding objective was peace. Our military action might harden attitudes in OAS.

Belize

Message delivered to Prime Minister. He said we can count on his continued support.

Solomon Islands

Message passed to Alebu, MFA Minister and Bugotu, Permanent Secretary. Both wholly sympathetic to British cause.

Guyana

Resident dock not informed  
of P's approval 26/4/52

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, FLEET

I have just reported to Parliament the successful completion of the operation to recapture the British dependency of South Georgia.

All the major political parties represented in Parliament join with me in congratulating the men in the Armed Forces under your command on the successful outcome of this operation. That this should have been achieved without injury to our own men and with so little to the opposing forces was quite remarkable.

I undertook in the House to convey to you and those who played their part in recapturing the island, the feelings of Parliament. This I gladly do. With this message come my own congratulations and that of Her Majesty's Government for a job well done in the best traditions of our Armed Forces.

L. S. Mountbatten

M. S. M.

This has been approved by the Secretary of State for Defence.

WITH PERMISSION, MR. SPEAKER, I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE A  
STATEMENT ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION  
TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS,

IN OUR CONTINUING PURSUIT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT,  
MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND THE FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY VISITED WASHINGTON ON  
22 AND 23 APRIL.

HE HAD MANY HOURS OF INTENSIVE DETAILED  
DISCUSSION WITH MR. HAIG.

THEIR TALKS PROVED CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL,  
BUT THERE ARE STILL CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES.

MR. HAIG NOW INTENDS TO PURSUE HIS EFFORTS  
FURTHER WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

153 - 12 + 20  
20.  
/ HOWEVER,

HOWEVER, THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER IS REPORTED TO  
BE UNWILLING TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS AT PRESENT,

I HOPE HE WILL RECONSIDER THIS.

AS THE BRITISH TASK FORCE APPROACHES CLOSER  
TO THE FALKLANDS, THE URGENT NEED IS TO SPEED  
UP THE NEGOTIATIONS, NOT SLOW THEM DOWN.

WE REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MR. HAIG.

I NOW TURN TO EVENTS ON SOUTH GEORGIA YESTERDAY.

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE OPERATION TO REPOSSESS  
THE ISLAND BEGAN AT FIRST LIGHT WHEN THE  
THE ARGENTINE SUBMARINE SANTE FE WAS DETECTED  
CLOSE TO BRITISH WARSHIPS PREPARING TO LAND  
FORCES ON SOUTH GEORGIA.

/ THE UNITED KINGDOM

THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR TO ARGENTINA  
THAT ANY APPROACH ON THE PART OF ARGENTINE  
WARSHIPS INCLUDING SUBMARINES, OR MILITARY  
AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO A THREAT TO  
INTERFERE WITH THE MISSION OF BRITISH FORCES  
WOULD ENCOUNTER THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.

THE SANTA FE POSED A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE  
SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION AND TO  
BRITISH WARSHIPS AND FORCES LAUNCHING THE  
LANDING.

HELICOPTERS THEREFORE ENGAGED AND DISABLED THE  
ARGENTINE SUBMARINE.

/ JUST AFTER

JUST AFTER 4 P.M. LONDON TIME YESTERDAY BRITISH TROOPS  
LANDED ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND ADVANCED TOWARDS  
GRYTVIKEN.

AT ABOUT 6 P.M. THE COMMANDER OF THE ARGENTINE  
FORCES IN GRYTVIKEN SURRENDERED, HAVING OFFERED  
ONLY LIMITED RESISTANCE.

BRITISH FORCES CONTINUED TO ADVANCE DURING THE  
NIGHT AND ARE NOW IN CONTROL OF LEITH, THE OTHER  
MAIN SETTLEMENT ON SOUTH GEORGIA.

AT 10 O'CLOCK THIS MORNING THE OFFICER COMMANDING  
THE ARGENTINE FORCES ON SOUTH GEORGIA FORMALLY  
SURRENDERED .

/BRITISH FORCES

BRITISH FORCES THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION USED THE MINIMUM  
FORCE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.  
NO BRITISH CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND IT  
IS REPORTED THAT ONLY ONE ARGENTINE SUSTAINED  
SERIOUS INJURIES.

ABOUT <sup>180</sup>~~200~~ PRISONERS WERE TAKEN, INCLUDING <sup>some</sup>~~70~~  
<sup>had been</sup> REINFORCEMENTS WHO ~~WERE~~ ON THE ARGENTINIAN  
SUBMARINE.

THE PRISONERS WILL BE RETURNED TO ARGENTINA.

BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY PERSONNEL ON THE ISLAND <sup>were</sup>~~ARE~~

REPORTED TO BE SAFE. <sup>when we last heard early</sup>  
<sup>y' day afternoon. Our forces are making contact with them, &</sup>  
ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN HAND TO EVACUATE THEM, IF  
THEY SO WISH.

/ I AM SURE

I AM SURE THE HOUSE WILL JOIN ME IN CONGRATULATING  
OUR FORCES ON CARRYING OUT THIS OPERATION  
SUCCESSFULLY, AND RECAPTURING THE ISLAND.  
THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN IS FULLY IN ACCORD  
WITH OUR INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER  
ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER.

MR. SPEAKER, MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIENDS AND I WILL  
CONTINUE TO KEEP THE HOUSE FULLY INFORMED ON THE  
SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPS.

I SHOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE THAT THE REPOSSESSION OF  
SOUTH GEORGIA INCLUDING THE ATTACK ON THE  
ARGENTINE SUBMARINE IN NO WAY ALTERS THE GOVERN-  
MENT'S DETERMINATION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO  
ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS.  
WE SEEK THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTION, AND WE SEEK IT BY PEACEFUL MEANS IF  
POSSIBLE.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 April 1982

Dear Mike,

Prime Minister's Statement on the Falklands:  
26 April

I enclose some draft paragraphs on the diplomatic side for inclusion in the Prime Minister's statement this afternoon, and a few supplementaries. There has not been time to clear these with Mr Pym but you may wish to pass him a copy in OD(SA).

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq  
10 Downing Street

FALKLANDS: FOREIGN OFFICE PARAGRAPHS FOR INCLUSION IN THE  
PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 26 APRIL

I should like to emphasise that the re-possession of South Georgia (and the attendant attack on an Argentine submarine) in no way alters the Government's determination to do everything possible to achieve a negotiated solution of the present crisis. <sup>Our objective remains unequivocally</sup> ~~We want~~ the implementation of the Security Council Resolution, and we want <sup>to achieve our objective</sup> it by peaceful means if possible.

It was in pursuit of a negotiated settlement that my Right Honourable Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary visited Washington on 22 and 23 April. He had many hours of intensive detailed discussion with Mr Haig. He had taken with him to Washington various new ideas concerning the contents of an agreement. <sup>the</sup> Discussion <sup>was</sup> proved constructive and helpful. but I would be misleading the House if I did not <sup>say frankly</sup> admit that there are still considerable difficulties. Mr Haig now intends to pursue his efforts further with the Argentine Government.

The Argentine Foreign Minister is ~~now~~ reported not to be prepared to continue the negotiating process for the moment. I hope he will reconsider this. But

/He

he should be under no misapprehension that by dragging his feet at the negotiating table he will persuade us to drag ours as the British Task Force approaches ever closer to the Falklands. We are in earnest, and if the Argentines ever doubted this I trust that yesterday's events at Grytviken will have disillusioned them.

( When my Right Honourable Friend was in Washington he found, in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and elsewhere, a lively understanding of our position and a willingness to support us when the time for overt support arrives. He also took the opportunity to talk to Commonwealth representatives and representatives of the European Community as well as the press in Washington, )

I should (also) bring the House up-to-date on the situation regarding the various groups of British people who have been affected by this crisis. ~~The House will be aware that~~ We have sent a message to the Falkland Islanders, through the BBC and by other means, making clear that those who wish to leave but do not have the financial means can expect support from the Government. So far I believe that about 100 people have left the Islands. Many others have left Port Stanley for the hinterland. If others wish temporarily to leave <sup>the Islands,</sup> they can rely on the full cooperation of the <sup>British</sup> Government.

The last news received of the British scientists in South Georgia was at 1300 GMT yesterday. They were in good heart.

/We

We are hoping soon to have direct news of them through the British forces who have re-possessed South Georgia.

(Honourable Members may also know that) the Government sent  
(On 23 April) a further message advising British citizens in  
Argentina to leave that country. (We have pointed out that, as  
the risks of conflict grow, those British citizens who have  
not yet departed should carefully reconsider their position.)  
We are also keeping in touch with the position of the three  
British journalists held in Southern Argentina through the  
British Interests Section in the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires.  
There are conflicting reports on whether they are to stand  
trial.

My Right Honourable Friends and I shall continue to keep  
the House fully informed on all aspects of the crisis as it  
develops.

REFERENCES

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

ARE WE AT WAR WITH ARGENTINA?

The operations we are conducting in the South Atlantic are based on our inherent right of self-defence of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies following the Argentine invasions. They are being conducted within that framework. Sr Costa Mendez's remark (that we are 'technically at war') appears to have been made off the cuff; we have had no formal communication from the Argentine Government.

WHY USE FORCE JUST BEFORE THE OAS MEETING?

Our military decisions in this crisis must be taken in the light of practical considerations in a wild and stormy part of the world, not in the light of schedules of meetings of regional organisations. There may be numerous meetings of the OAS over the next days and weeks: we cannot have our hands tied. Open minded members of the OAS will recognise that we are acting in self-defence; those with closed minds cannot be allowed to deflect us from our purpose.

WHY DID MR PYM NOT SEE PRESIDENT REAGAN?

My Right Honourable Friend's visit to Washington was specifically undertaken for further exchanges with Mr Haig who has been made personally responsible by the President for United States attempts to resolve the Falklands crisis. [I am] We are in touch with President Reagan as necessary.

WAS NOT OUR ACTION IN SOUTH GEORGIA IN BREACH OF SCR 502?

No. The recapture of British territory following armed aggression is an extension of our right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

DID HAIG KNOW ABOUT THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION IN ADVANCE?

Mr Haig has always recognised that military pressure was not inconsistent with the diplomatic endeavours on which we have been engaged with him. In the light of that he can hardly have been surprised at what happened.

---

210  
SAmD

Falkland Islands

The Secretary of State telephoned Mr Haig at 1.15 pm on 26 April to let him know that a message was on its way to him. The Secretary of State explained that the events of 25 April had changed the scene quite considerably. Moreover time was slipping away. We now had in mind a simpler approach which might include a pause by the Task Force as well as Argentine withdrawal. We had it in mind to try to turn the OAS meeting in Washington to advantage if at all possible. We thought that Mexico might be prepared to play a helpful role in this context. We were thinking of offering a conference and were also thinking of treating the Falkland Islands proper on their own, without the Dependencies. We hoped that the essentials of our proposals might be accepted quickly and that a halt in the Task Force's progress might have a helpful effect.

Mr Haig said that he had spoken to Mr Costa Mendez by telephone on the evening of 25 April and was expecting to speak to him again in 30 minutes' time. He looked forward to receiving Mr Pym's message as soon as possible. The Secretary of State commented that he doubted whether the message would arrive in time for Mr Haig's next conversation with Mr Costa Mendez.

*J. E. Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)

26 April 1982

cc: PS  
PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/PUS  
Mr Bullard  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Wright  
Mr Gillmore  
Mr Ure  
MCAD  
Defence Department  
Planning Staff  
Sir I Sinclair  
Mr Coles, No 10 ✓

30 APR 1982



Nr (des)

26 April 1982

MR INGHAM


cc Mr Howe  
Mr Wolfson  
Mr Vereker

PANORAMA INTERVIEW: FALKLANDS

Our own view of the Falklands situation was (I would guess like most people's) that it was analogous to a hijack. Tony Jay rang me this morning to say that a lot of the people he talked to, while generally sympathetic to the Government, nevertheless had the nagging question in their minds "Why are we doing this for these unnecessary islands so far away, possibly risking getting troops killed - for what?"

Tony suggested that the correct answer to this was the hijack model. Most people would agree that the tough line on hijacking ("Once you've landed, you'll never take off again") has been the right one. If the Prime Minister reminded the audience of the similarities (of course there are other factors as well; the analogy is not total) to a hijack, the lesson learnt in hijacking (that you have to face down the very first hijack; that if you don't, there will be another one) and the potential for other Falkland-type aggressions in South America and elsewhere in the world, people may come to see that there is much more at stake than saving face, or 1,800 Falklanders, or 30,000 sheep or a bit of rocky territory 8,000 miles away. There is not simply principle, but the greatly increased risk of similar and perhaps much more dangerous aggression elsewhere, if this one is not absolutely (and <sup>if necessary</sup> ruthlessly) nipped in the bud. This is, of course, why it is rather unwise to talk about the islanders' wishes being paramount. That could be the wrong word to use either way. It could commit Britain to taking tougher military action than it otherwise would; or alternatively making territorial concessions (because the Falklanders are naturally enough not keen to get involved in a shooting war themselves) which would encourage territorial aggression elsewhere.

Our tone of voice should, of course, be consistent with the hijack analogy. If we talk about it as a combination of Stalingrad and Alamein, we risk looking absurd. This is not a battle for our homeland and civilisation. It is the very quiet, very calm, very firm imposition of international law and order. "Ring out the bells" brings us to the edge of black farce for the South Georgia operation.



JOHJ HOSKYNS



*File No*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

26 April 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 26 April enclosing a message from the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

A. J. COLES

His Excellency  
The Honourable L. W. Gandar.

*Q*

010

*SUBJECT*



*cc Ohs  
Masters*

*T 82/82*

NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION

NEW ZEALAND HOUSE · HAYMARKET · LONDON SW1Y 4TQ

Telephone: 01-930 8422 Telex: 24368

From the High Commissioner  
H.E. The Hon L.W. Gandar

26th April, 1982.

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON.  
SW1

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I have this morning received by telex the following message from my Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. R.D. Muldoon:-

"THE NEW ZEALAND CABINET AT ITS MEETING TODAY HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU ITS SATISFACTION AT THE RECOVERY OF SOUTH GEORGIA. IN ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES AND CLIMATE THIS HAS BEEN A SPLENDID FEAT OF BRITISH ARMS. YOU HAVE OUR FULLEST SUPPORT.

ROB MULDOON"

The news of this magnificent achievement was received by me shortly before I attended one of the ANZAC Day commemorative services held in and around London yesterday, and it certainly charged the atmosphere with the linkage of that other great landing which took place over sixty years ago.

*Yours sincerely*

*Hester Gandar*

Substituted

cc Hault  
off

TMP



cc FCO.

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T84/82  
26 April 1982

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mr. President,

As I said in my message of 13 April, I am most grateful to you for the part you played in helping to secure common action by the Ten against Argentina following its illegal and unprovoked aggression against the Falkland Islands.

I have since received your letter, delivered by Monsieur de Marjerie on 16 April, in which you agreed to take the matter up with the Japanese during your visit to Tokyo. I understand that despite repeated efforts by yourself and Claude Cheysson, the Japanese have up to now not been persuaded to take effective action. But I am most grateful for your and Claude's personal intervention and close interest. As you know, we are in the closest touch with the Americans and continue to hope that strong pressure from the international Community will have its effect on Argentina. The pressure will certainly need to be maintained.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Monsieur Francois Mitterrand

He



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 April 1982

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26 April

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It was in pursuit of a negotiated settlement that my Right Honourable Friend the Foreign and Co-monwealth Secretary visited Washington on 22 and 23 April. He had many hours of intensive detailed discussion with Mr Haig. He had taken with him to Washington various new ideas concerning the contents of an agreement. Discussion proved constructive and helpful but I would be misleading the House if I did not admit that there are still considerable difficulties. Mr Haig now intends to pursue his efforts further with the Argentine Government.

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he should be under no misapprehension that by dragging his feet at the negotiating table he will persuade us to drag ours as the British Task Force approaches ever closer to the Falklands. We are in earnest, and if the Argentines ever doubted this I trust that yesterday's events at Grytviken will have disillusioned them.

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The last news received of the British scientists in South Georgia was at 1300 GMT yesterday. They were in good heart.

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We are hoping soon to have direct news of them through the British forces who have re-possessed South Georgia.

Honourable Members may also know that the Government sent on 23 April a further message advising British citizens in Argentina to leave that country. We have pointed out that, as the risks of conflict grow, those British citizens who have not yet departed should carefully reconsider their position. We are also keeping in touch with the position of the three British journalists held in Southern Argentina through the British Interests Section in the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires. There are conflicting reports on whether they are to stand trial.

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DID HAIG KNOW ABOUT THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION IN ADVANCE?

Mr Haig has always recognised that military pressure was not inconsistent with the diplomatic endeavours on which we have been engaged with him. In the light of that he can hardly have been surprised at what happened.

---

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement about recent events in the British Dependency of South Georgia—  
*and our continuing efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Falkland Islands dispute.*

≡ Just after 4 pm London time yesterday British troops landed on South Georgia and advanced towards Grytviken. A British warship took up position in Cumberland Bay shortly afterwards and at about 6 pm the Commander of the Argentine forces in Grytviken, having offered only limited resistance to the British troops, surrendered. British forces continued to advance during the night and are now in control of Leith, the other main settlement on South Georgia. At 10 am this morning the officer commanding the Argentine marines on South Georgia formally surrendered to the British Forces.

The first phase of the operation to retake South Georgia began at first light when an Argentine submarine SANTA FE was detected close to British warships preparing to land forces on South Georgia.

The United Kingdom had made it very clear to Argentina that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces would encounter the appropriate response. The SANTA FE posed a significant threat to the successful completion of the operation and *to our men and* to British warships launching the landing. Helicopters from the British warships,

● About 200<sup>(?)</sup> prisoners have been taken - including around 70<sup>(?)</sup> Argentinian military reinforcements<sup>for S. Georgia</sup> of which were on board the Santa Fé. The prisoners will be taken to Ascension ~~before~~ for onward return to Argentina.

therefore, engaged and damaged the Argentine submarine and drove it towards Grytviken harbour.

Throughout the operation British forces used the minimum force necessary to achieve a successful outcome. No British casualties have been notified and it is reported that only one Argentine sustained serious injuries. *I should also report that* British Antarctic Survey personnel on the island are reported to be safe, and arrangements are in hand to evacuate them as soon as possible.

~~The Commander of the operation sent the following message, "Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Jack in South Georgia. God save the Queen."~~

I am sure the House will join me in congratulating our Forces on a job well done. It is, however, already a matter of intense regret that a member of Her Majesty's Armed Forces, ( ) lost his life when his helicopter crashed at sea ( ) days ago. The House will wish to join me in extending sympathy to his family.

Mr Speaker, the action we have taken is fully in accord with our inherent right of self defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Her Majesty's Government remains committed to the continuing and intensive search for a solution by negotiation to the crisis provoked by Argentine aggression.

(FCO to continue)

Permanent Under-Secretary

NEW BASIS FOR MR HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS

- / 1. The attached draft message takes account of your telephone call to me. I remain convinced that:
- a) we need to present our ideas as a variation on Mr Haig's, so as to protect ourselves against future accusations of having ditched the present basis for negotiations;
  - b) it would be far better to propose a 'Conference' than mere negotiations, since otherwise there is no new look that could attract Argentina in our suggestions.

*C L G Mallaby*

26 April 1982

C L G Mallaby  
Planning Staff

DS 1 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Mr Haig

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

The repossession of South Georgia of course alters the situation regarding the tremendous efforts you are making to produce a negotiated settlement of the present crisis. ON THE ONE HAND, there is the important change that the Falkland Islands Dependencies are no longer occupied by Argentina. On the other hand, the successful British military action should bring home to Argentina her interest in negotiating seriously for a settlement.

The first Argentine reaction may be to play for time, as Costa Mendez did with you yesterday. Yet time, as you have often said, is running out. Our Task Force is ~~coming very near to~~ <sup>approaching</sup> the maritime exclusion zone and the next phase of operations may have to start very soon.

I wonder therefore whether the key elements discussed so far in your negotiations could be simplified and put to the Argentines in a rather different form. A change of this kind might make them more likely to make concessions which they have declined to make when discussing the existing texts. The new suggestion <sup>54</sup> could be linked

Enclosures—flag(s).....

closely/

closely to the elements in Security Council Resolution No 502.

The Argentines might be asked to agree to the immediate starting of negotiations to carry out point 3 in the Resolution, which called on Argentina and Britain to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences. To give Argentina hope of speedier progress than in the past, the United States might offer to chair the negotiations. The subject for negotiation might be described neutrally as the future of the Falkland Islands.

The condition for starting these negotiations would be implementation of the first two points in the Security Council Resolution, namely immediate cessation of hostilities and immediate Argentine withdrawal. In return for Argentine withdrawal the British forces would withdraw a certain distance or stand back from the area of the Falkland Islands. British administration would be restored pending the outcome of the negotiations, but with an Argentine resident in Port Stanley, whose task might be to look after the interests of the Argentine population. I hope that the United States would give a security guarantee for the Islands, during that same period.

You will wish to consider these suggestions urgently and to decide whether to try them out on Costa Mendez during his present visit to Washington. They might conceivably be used to defuse proposals unwelcome to the US and to Britain at the present meeting of the OAS. One idea that occurs tentatively to me is that Mexico or possibly Colombia could be asked to float these ideas in

in the OAS.

The virtue I see in this suggestion is that simplicity can *achieve speedier progress* as tension mounts, and that a change of form in your negotiations may make it more likely that Argentina will be reasonable. If you think these ideas worth consideration, we shall gladly send you a more detailed note of them.

Argentina  
P.A.  
ML 26/4

CONSULAR SITREP: 0730 26 APRIL

A. Medical Repatriation of Mrs Thompson and family from Buenos Aires

1. No further developments took place on this case.

B. Possible Release of Arrested British Journalists

2. Mr Baxter of News Department telephoned to see if we had informed the next of kin of the arrested British journalists of their possible release. I said that as we only had an unconfirmed newspaper report no action would be taken until official confirmation of the report was received.

C. Possible anti-British feeling in Venezuela

3. Mr David Slack, British Caledonian duty manager, rang to say that Tony George, his colleague in Caracas, had telephoned him following reports of the British attack on South Georgia. Mr George had said that there was additional anti-British feeling in Venezuela and shipping workers were boycotting British ships. He feared that air traffic controllers might halt the British Caledonian flight due to land at Caracas that evening en route from Quito. After liaison with the political section of Emergency Unit, Mr Slack was advised that Mr George should liaise closely with the Embassy. This he said Mr George had said he would do. Mr Slack said he would keep us advised of any further messages he received from Mr George.

D. Security of British Persons in Argentina

4. A news agency report stating that the Interior Minister, ~~GEN~~ Alfredo Saint Jean, had given instructions to all provincial governments to take all possible measures to guarantee the security of persons, assets and institutions related to Britain and any other country involved in the present conflict was received. A telegram was sent to BISBA seeking confirmation of this report.

E. Assistance to the Islanders

5. A telegram was received from Montevideo in response to our request for an opinion on whether the Uruguayans would be prepared to provide a ship or aircraft for Islanders wishing to leave the Islands temporarily. The telegram stated that as the Uruguayans had been helpful it would be worthwhile to ask them.

6. A telegram was received from Montevideo estimating the number of Islanders who may wish to leave the Islands temporarily. The telegram said that as reports said the majority of Islanders had left Port Stanley for the interior, they estimated that perhaps less than half of the remaining Islanders would wish to leave. Mr Burgess, one of the latest Islanders to pass through Montevideo, thought that the number wishing to leave could be as low as 'several hundred'. Mr Selwood, another Islander recently in transit, estimated half would wish to leave but many were anxious as they did not have current British passports and were worried at the possibility of travelling on Argentine documents. The telegram estimated that about 1700 Islanders were on the Islands at present.


F. Enquiry as to whether the British Hospital in Montevideo had been alerted

7. Mr Brian Baxter, News Department Duty Officer, rang to say the BBC had received an Argentinian news agency report that the British Embassy in Montevideo had advised the British Hospital there to expect casualties. I said that no notification of this had been received but that we did have a case of mexical repatriation via the British hospital in Montevideo and this may have somehow been picked up. After consultation with the political section of Emergency Unit no action was taken on this rumour.

G. Situation of BAS Personnel and camera women on South Georgia

8. Whilst preparing prospective answers to possible supplementary questions for answer in the House of Commons today, I contacted the MOD who advised that the British forces are now in the process of contacting the BAS personnel and camera women in South Georgia.

26 April 1982



R. J. Austen

Consular Emergency Unit

SUBJECT

T85A/82

cc MARG  
9ms

EMBASSY OF JAPAN  
UNITED KINGDOM

London, 26th April 1982

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I am asked by Prime Minister  
Zenko Suzuki to forward the text of his  
letter to you.

I have pleasure in enclosing  
it herewith.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Tsuyoshi Hirahara*

Tsuyoshi Hirahara  
Ambassador

The Right Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister and First Lord of  
The Treasury,  
10, Downing Street,  
London.

**SUBJECT**  
(PH10)

T 85A/82

T E X T

cc Haru  
Ons.

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I have been following with serious concern - as I mentioned in my letter of April 12th - the developments in and around the Falkland Islands and earnestly hoping for an early and peaceful solution of the dispute, ever since the Argentine military action.

In pursuance of its national policy of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, Japan deeply regrets the Argentine use of force and considers that their forces should withdraw promptly in accordance with Resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council. In line with this position, my Government has continued to make approaches to the Argentine side. Our actions, as mentioned in my previous letter and repeatedly expressed as our official views, are based on the consideration, inter alia, that they should be compatible with our existing international obligations - including those under the United Nations' Charter - while ensuring the long-term interests of the Free World with due attention to unity and cooperation with the Western industrialised countries.

From this point of view, my Government intends to guide the business circles to pay due attention not to unduly take advantage of the measures to ban imports from Argentina taken by the EC members and other countries for the benefit of economic interests of Japan. I believe that it not only conforms to Japan's basic position, but also meets your requests.

With respect to the supply of official credit, I should like to state that no application for new commitment to export credit to Argentina is expected for the time being, in view of the tense situation now prevailing.

/ Japan ...

Japan has placed strong hopes in the good offices of Secretary of State Haig since April 6th and highly appreciates your country's positive response to his efforts. During the recent visit to Japan of Vice-President Bush of the United States, my Minister for Foreign Affairs explained our position and urgently requested that the United States should continue to exert its utmost efforts to secure a peaceful solution of this dispute.

I am deeply concerned that the position brought about by Argentina's use of force should not escalate into a large-scale military clash, bringing with it incalculable loss for all Western nations. May I therefore reiterate my earnest hope that the United Kingdom will find itself able to cope with this most difficult situation through peaceful settlement, in the overall interests of the Free World and to meet the desires of people everywhere. I am confident that the way to a peaceful solution will be opened by your wisdom and resolute decision.

In view of Japan's position as a member of the Security Council, my Government intends for its part to continue its own efforts - both inside and outside the United Nations - to prevent the escalation of the dispute and work for a peaceful settlement.

Please understand, my dear Prime Minister, that I am trying to convey to you the thoughts in my mind at this anxious time, with best wishes for your success in discharging your important duties in fulfilment of the British people's trust.

Yours sincerely,

ZENKO SUZUKI  
Prime Minister  
of Japan

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

36 +7  
(22)

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD (3)  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR ~~REWARD~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PS No.10 DOWNING ST. —

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
MR COLVIN, CAB OFF DIO  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
MR FACER, CAB OFF  
SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFF  
DEFENCE SECRETARIAT

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

SECRET

FM LIMA 251852Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELGRAM NUMBER 118 OF 25 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, SANTIAGO

FALKLANDS

1. IN SOME OF MY RECENT TELEGRAMS ( NOS 88 OF 13 APRIL AND NO 111 OF 22 APRIL) I HAVE REFERRED TO THE PRESSURES BEING APPLIED BY THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES FOR A CLEARER PRO-ARGENTINE DEFINITION OF THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE INCLUDING THE PROSPECT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT.

2. SOURCES CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE WAS DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION. IT WAS ALSO SUGGESTED TO ME THAT THERE MIGHT BE IN EXISTENCE A SECRET UNDERTAKING BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE AND PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES DATING FROM THE TIME OF THE VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES IN 1979 OF THE THEN PRESIDENT OF THE PERUVIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE

DATING FROM THE TIME OF THE VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES IN 1979 OF  
TH THEN PRESIDENT OF THE PERUVIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE  
AFTERMATH OF THE ARGENTINE/CHILEAN BEAGLE CHANNEL CONFRONTATION  
THE PREVIOUS YEAR. THE TERMS OF THE UNDERTAKING WOULD COMMIT  
THE ARMED FORCES OF EACH COUNTRY TO THE DEFENCE OF THE OTHER  
IN CASE OF AGGRESSION BY A THIRD, CLEARLY WITH CHILE UPPERMOST IN  
MIND. THE EXISTENCE OF THIS UNDERTAKING MAY HAVE HITHERTO BEEN  
CONCEALED FROM THE PRESENT PERUVIAN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.

IT HAS CERTAINLY NOT BEEN APPROVED OR RATIFIED BY THE CONGRESS  
AND IS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

3. IF TRUE, THIS WOULD EXPLAIN THE REPEATED PERUVIAN ATTEMPTS  
TO ASSUME DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL INITIATIVES WITH WHICH TO  
COUNTER THE PRESSURES FOR THE MILITARY COMMITMENT FOR WHICH THE  
ARGENTINE-BORN PERUVIAN MINISTER OF WAR IS THE MOST VOCIFEROUS  
PROPOONENT. THE NAVY ARE SAID TO BE LESS ENTHUSIASTIC. IT  
COULD ALSO EXPLAIN THE REPEATED BUT UNCONFIRMED RUMOURS OF  
THE MOVEMENT OF PERUVIAN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF ARGENTINA.  
BUT THE COMBINATION OF PUBLIC EMOTION, PRESS AND POPULAR OPINION  
AND MILITARY PRESSURE MAY WEAKEN THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION  
TO MAINTAIN A CONCILIATORY AND CIRCUMSPECT INTERNATIONAL  
ATTITUDE, PARTICULARLY IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES.

4. MY US COLLEAGUE TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT HE HAD CARRIED OUT  
THE INSTRUCTIONS REFERRED TO IN WASHINGTON TEL TO FCO NO 1439  
WITH SOME DIFFICULTY HAVING INITIALLY SAILED TO REACH THE FOREIGN  
MINISTER WHO HAD SPENT THREE AND A HALF HOURS ATTENDING A MEETING  
AS THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON.

5. IN ANY RESPONSE TO THE LATEST PERUVIAN INITIATIVE ( MY TEL NO  
115) AND TO ANY FURTHER PROPOSALS THEY MAY MAKE EITHER HERE OR IN  
THE OAS MEETING, YOU MAY WISH TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE GROWING  
PRESSURES WHICH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE PROBABLY NOW REGARDS AS A  
THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND TO THE CONTINUING  
EXISTENCE OF A DEMOCRATIC REGIME IN PERU.

WALLACE

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS  
~~PS/MR HVED~~  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RICHMOND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
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MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
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*Mr Faint*  
*Mr Colvin* } Cabinet Office  
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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE  
DIO  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

*Difene Secretariat*

FM WASHINGTON 251815Z  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELNO 1447 OF 25 APRIL 1982,  
INFO SAVING BIS NEW YORK.

FALKLANDS: MEDIA COVERAGE

1. I WAS INTERVIEWED TODAY ON THE ABC SUNDAY NEWSMAKER PROGRAMME "THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY". SENATOR TOWER, WHO FOLLOWED ME, SAID THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE FAILED, THE US SHOULD PROVIDE BRITAIN WITH LOGISTICS AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN ANY MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. TOWER ADDED THAT BRITAIN HAD NOT ASKED FOR SUCH SUPPORT. WHEN PRESSED ABOUT POSSIBLE US MILITARY AND NAVAL INVOLVEMENT TOWER SAID HE THOUGHT THAT US NAVY SHOULD ADOPT A ROLE OF "PASSIVE" RATHER THAN ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

HENDERSON

STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Mrs Thatcher 14 April 1982
2. Mrs Thatcher 3 April 1982
3. Lord Trefgarne 30 June 1981
4. Mr Ridley 18 December 1980
5. Mrs Thatcher 11 December 1980
6. Mr Ridley 2 December 1980
7. Mr Owen 1 March 1977
8. Mr Crosland 2 February 1977
9. Mr Callaghan 14 January 1976
10. Mr Stewart 26 March 1968

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher):

Our objective, endorsed by all sides of the House in recent debates, is that the people of the Falkland Islands shall be free to determine their own way of life and their own future. The wishes of the islanders must be paramount. But they cannot be freely expressed, let alone implemented, while the present illegal Argentine occupation continues.

We made clear to Mr. Haig that withdrawal of the invaders' troops must come first; that the sovereignty of the islands is not affected by the act of invasion; and that when it comes to future negotiations what matters most is what the Falkland Islanders themselves wish.

That solution must safeguard the principle that the wishes of the islanders shall remain paramount. There is no reason to believe that they would prefer any alternative to the resumption of the administration which they enjoyed before Argentina committed aggression. It may be that their recent experiences will have caused their views on the future to change, but until they have had the chance freely to express their views, the British Government will not assume that the islanders' wishes are different from what they were before.

*Falkland Islands*

3 APRIL 1982

*Falkland Islands*

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher):

We have always made it clear that their wishes were paramount and that there would be no change in sovereignty without their consent and without the approval of the House.

Rejecting it, however, sadly does not mean that it has gone away or will go away. The dispute has long overshadowed the Islanders' daily lives. It hinders the proper development and diversification of the Islands' one-commodity economy. It prevents the exploitation of natural resources in the surrounding ocean; most of all, perhaps, its unsettling effect has led to a continuing decline in an already tiny population.

If we accept, as we must, that the dispute is the direct cause of all this, then our prime aim must be to resolve it. Successive British Governments—and the Islanders themselves—have acknowledged this and have sought to establish, through negotiations with the Argentinians, whether a solution can be found which is acceptable to all parties. This Government have held two rounds of talks at ministerial level with the Argentinians and we hope to hold more. For the first time ever, representatives of the Island Council participated in both rounds as members of the British delegation.

What are these talks about? The dispute affects so many aspects of Islanders' lives that it would be very difficult to detail all the subjects that need to be discussed. We are particularly interested in discussing areas of potential co-operation to benefit the Islanders' economy and development; but it is no secret that the Argentinians are principally interested in the question of sovereignty. Other issues are subsidiary for them. All attempts to secure Argentine agreement to proceed with economic co-operation, while leaving the sovereignty issue on one side, have come to nothing.

The choice for us is clear: whether or not to be prepared to discuss sovereignty. And we have to accept that if we are not willing or not able to sit down with the Argentinians and the Islanders and discuss sovereignty, then the Argentinians may see no point in continuing talks. If the Argentinians felt that we were no longer prepared even to discuss the issues with them, then it could not be ruled out that they would look for other means of obtaining what they want. As I have said, the dispute already makes Islanders' lives difficult, but none of us should be in any doubt that the difficulties could be much greater. We are, of course, pledged to support and defend the Islands to the best of our ability. I repeat that pledge now. But there are limits to our capability in this respect which cannot be ignored.

The Government therefore took the view, after the talks held in April 1980, that we should be prepared to discuss sovereignty with the Argentinians. But it was not enough for the Government to decide that. An important premise of our policy is that nothing will be undertaken which is not acceptable to the Islanders. Accordingly, we sought the Islanders' views. My honourable friend the Minister of State (Mr. Ridley) visited the Islands for a week last November and discussed with councillors and other Islanders how best to make progress. He explained Her Majesty's Government's thinking, described the various options we had identified—about which I shall say more in a moment—and invited them to let us have their views.

Your Lordships will know the outcome. The Island councillors voted in favour of a continuation of discussions and gave Her Majesty's Government a mandate to try to negotiate a so-called freeze of the

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Trade (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, this is very much an issue which arouses deep emotions and rightly and understandably so. I am sure that when Islanders read the record of what has been said today they will be gratified by the support they have been given. It is important that this dispute and the Islanders' situation should be understood as widely as possible to ensure that their interests are safeguarded and their wishes respected. This is at the root of the Government's policy.

Let me outline our position. First of all, Her Majesty's Government are in no doubt whatsoever about the legitimacy of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. They have been settled continuously for nearly 150 years by people of British stock—the Government, legal system and way of life are all unmistakably British. We, and all previous British Governments, have rejected the Argentine claim absolutely and without reserve.

[LORD TREFGARNE.]

dispute; that is, a mutual agreement to put the sovereignty issue on one side for an agreed period of time, during which both sides could co-operate to develop the Islands' resources. Talks were duly held in New York in February this year; but the Argentines made it plain that a freeze was unacceptable. This was a great disappointment; but we have to live with it.

Our position now is that we continue to believe that a negotiated settlement to the dispute should be sought and that further discussions should be held. But those discussions will have to cover the sovereignty issue and we have to decide how we should approach this. One idea which, as your Lordships know, was discussed with Islanders last November is that of leaseback: the granting to Argentina of the title of sovereignty, coupled with the simultaneous leasing back to Her Majesty's Government of all territories and maritime zones for a substantial period of time. There may be other possibilities worth exploring. But the main point is that before we propose anything we need to have the Islanders' agreement to negotiate and to obtain a new mandate from them. We are waiting to hear from them. No deadlines have been set—in any case, the impending elections to the Falkland Islands Legislative Council make it difficult for decisions to be taken which would, one way or the other, affect fundamentally the lives of all Islanders. But once the elections are over, we hope the Islanders will be able to agree to a new round of talks.

I have heard it asked why we pay so much attention to the wishes of the Islanders. The dispute is, after all, directly between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The answer is simple. It is the Islanders' future which is at stake. We have consistently supported at the United Nations the Islanders' right to self-determination, in the face of virtually unanimous opposition, and we shall continue to do so.

It has been further suggested that it is enough to continue to hold discussions: that it is not necessary ever actually to solve the dispute. I believe that that is wrong, for two reasons. First, it is not possible to go on discussing even the most complicated of subjects *ad infinitum*. We cannot hope to bore the Argentines into giving up their claim. Nor can we expect that, if we simply tell the Argentines that there is nothing more to talk about, there will be no consequences. Whatever our view on the merits of their claim, we have to recognise that the issue is one which gives rise to deep and long-standing emotions in Argentina. In considering a refusal to talk further, we have also to consider the possible implications for the Islanders.

Second, this suggestion—that it is not necessary to solve the dispute—implies that the *status quo* is acceptable. But it is not. So long as the dispute and the present climate of uncertainty continue, it will be extremely difficult to attract new development and investment and impossible fully to exploit the maritime resources of the Falklands—notably the fish in the waters around the Islands and any oil which may exist on the continental shelf. We cannot move to declare a 200-mile fishery zone for the Falklands or their dependencies and establish a licensing régime if neither we nor the Falkland Islands Government can enforce it. Similarly, the presence of oil on the Islands' continental shelf can only be determined by exploration. And only

3 cont.  
the ending of the dispute will establish the conditions of confidence necessary for commercial companies to investigate and exploit the possibilities. In short, the *status quo* seems to offer few benefits and many disadvantages. It will lead to a continuing decline in the Islands and a drift away of the already small population.

[Mr. Ridley.]

The options are either to seek to negotiate a total solution or to decline to do so. At some stage, we must decide which we are to do. But the consequences of a decision in the matter are absolutely vital to the interests of the islanders. This is the most important thing that can happen in their lives. Therefore, those options are more important to them by a long chalk than they are to us. It must be right to seek their views first, and that is what I did.

I consulted them without duress or pressure. I said that the Government would accept whatever decision they came to—either way—and that we would support them. I am sure that the House will do the same. I was particularly glad to hear my hon. Friend say that, much though he disliked the concept of lease-back, if at any stage that turned out to be the solution to the dispute, he would have to support them in choosing that.

I do not want to anticipate what the islanders will decide, nor do I want to put any pressure upon them. I spoke to about half the inhabitants at the end of November, and I simply await their reply. No date has been given about the time by which they must give me a reply.

If they ask us to proceed, it is only the beginning of a long road. We would then

have to seek to negotiate with the Argentines. Who knows whether that would be successful, particularly as the conditions which the islanders and the Government would attach to any negotiation are still indeed. The consent of the islanders would then be sought—either in a referendum or a general election—to any possible negotiated settlement that was achieved. That final package would then have to come to this House for approval. I am sure that my hon. Friend will feel that there are adequate safeguards there to make sure that the wishes of the islanders are respected, as well as to ensure that this House would always have the final say.

If the islanders do not wish the Government to proceed to negotiate, I am equally certain that the House will support them in that decision. I am sure that we will do whatever is necessary, within our power, to help them in that course of action. I am sure that my hon. Friend agrees with me that, whatever they decide to do, it would be right for this House not to overrule their wishes.

The Prime Minister : The constitutional links between the United Kingdom and the Falkland Islands remain unchanged. My hon. Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, made the Government's position clear in his statement to the House on 2 December. It is now for the Islanders to decide between the various options for the future. We will of course accept their decision.

**FALKLAND ISLANDS**

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Nicholas Ridley): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement on the Falkland Islands.

We have no doubt about our sovereignty over the islands. The Argentinians, however, continue to press their claim. The dispute is causing continuing uncertainty, emigration and economic stagnation in the islands. Following my exploratory talks with the Argentinians in April, the Government have been considering possible ways of achieving a solution which would be acceptable to all the parties. In this the essential is that we should be guided by the wishes of the islanders themselves.

I therefore visited the islands between 22 and 29 November in order to consult

2 L 17

island councillors and subsequently, at their express request, all islanders, on how we should proceed. Various possible bases for seeking a negotiated settlement were discussed. These included both a way of freezing the dispute for a period or exchanging the title of sovereignty against a long lease of the islands back to Her Majesty's Government.

The essential elements of any solution would be that it should preserve British administration, law and way of life for the islanders while releasing the potential of the islands' economy and of their maritime resources, at present blighted by the dispute.

It is for the islanders to advise on which, if any, option should be explored in negotiations with the Argentinians. I have asked them to let me have their views in due course. Any eventual settlement would have to be endorsed by the islanders, and by this House.

**Dr. Owen:** I have tried to make myself available to all sides. I visited Cyprus myself and spoke to Turkish Cypriot leaders and Greek Cypriot leaders. I have spoken to individual Greeks, Turks and Greek and Turkish Cypriots coming through London. What I have always felt in this complex situation is that one needs information about how people feel on the island. My door has been open to many different sides and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that there is no discrimination.

It is a concern for the rights of the individual that govern our policies towards our few remaining dependent territories. We cannot avoid responding to changing circumstances but we must consider at all times the wishes and interests of the people who are dependent upon us. My hon. Friend, the Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands) has just returned from a gruelling and very hard-working visit to the Falkland Islands. He will give the House an account of his consultations and conversations there and in Buenos Aires when he speaks at the end of this debate but I should like to remind the House of the purpose of that visit.

The Government believe that a framework of greater political and economic co-operation in the region of the South-West Atlantic is necessary if we are to have any prospect of achieving a prosperous and durable future for the Islands. The Government therefore decided that the time had come to consider both with the Islanders and with the Argentine Government whether a climate existed for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South-West Atlantic.

As my predecessor indicated, any such discussions would inevitably raise fundamental questions in the relationship between the Islands, Britain and Argentina. However, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders whose interest and well-being are our main concern. In conse-

quence there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their backs.

I now reaffirm these pledges. My hon. Friend had very full discussions with all sections of islander opinion and made it clear that the issue of sovereignty is bound to be raised in any negotiations which might take place with the Argentines. He also assured them, however, that such negotiations would take place under the sovereignty umbrella, that is, Her Majesty's Government would wholly reserve their position on the issue of sovereignty which would in no way be prejudiced. It was on the basis of this assurance, and on the understanding that there would be full consultation at every stage, that the Joint Legislative and Executive Council of the Islands gave their approval for the Minister of State to hold talks in Buenos Aires to try to establish a basis for negotiation with the Government of Argentina. These talks have not yet been concluded but I can assure the House that there has been and there will be no sell-out. That would be to betray the very principles which I believe guide our British foreign policy.

**Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion):** The right hon. Gentleman said there would be the fullest consultations. As with the analogous position of Gibraltar, it has been the position of successive British Governments that there would be no question of handing over sovereignty without the consent of the population. Can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that consultation also involves consent in this case?

**Dr. Owen:** One assurance I can give is that any change in the sovereignty would have to come before this House. I am confident that this House would not pass any legislation involving a sovereignty of the Islanders if it was not satisfied that this was in their best interests. The fact that their interests will be looked after not just by the Government but by this House is the best safeguard for the Islanders.

**Mr. Douglas Jay (Battersea, North):** In spite of that why can my right hon. Friend not give a plain assurance that there will be no transfer of sovereignty without the consent of the Islanders, as has been done in other cases?

Mr. John Davies (Kautsford):

The Foreign Secretary spoke last of all about the Falkland Islands. As he will know, there is a widespread feeling of anxiety on both sides of the House about the sovereignty issue and the position of the islanders. We are not unaware of the dilemma which the right hon. Gentleman faces. We know that although he is faced by proposals that might be made for the improvement of the islanders' economic prospects, they involve very heavy capital expenditure at a time when obviously that is unwelcome. The right hon. Gentleman will have in mind the extremely interesting Adjournment debate initiated by my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce) some time ago when these issues were carefully and sensibly rehearsed.

However, in the light of what the right hon. Gentleman said, we do not feel completely satisfied and assured about this problem of the absolute sovereignty and the islanders' wishes in this respect. "Consultation" is a word that has all sorts of overtones. Too often it implies an endeavour to bring people into line with an existing state of decision. This is a kind of consultation that is totally inappropriate to the circumstances of this issue.

It was a disappointment to the House that the Foreign Secretary could not in clean terms say in response to my right

hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) that he could assure the House that there would be no transfer unless there was consent. I hope that the Minister of State will feel able to go somewhat further than the right hon. Gentleman did just now.

## FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Anthony Crosland):

The Government have therefore decided that the time has come to consider both with the Islanders and with the Argentine Government whether a climate exists for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands, and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South-West Atlantic.

I must make certain things absolutely clear. First, any such discussion, which would inevitably raise fundamental questions in the relationship between the Islands, Britain and Argentina, would

take place under the sovereignty umbrella; that is, Her Majesty's Government would wholly reserve their position on the issue of sovereignty, which would in no way be prejudiced. Secondly, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders, whose interests and well-being remain our prime concern. In consequence, thirdly, there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their backs.

To fulfil this pledge, I am sending my hon. Friend the Minister of State to the Falkland Islands in mid-February to hear from the Islanders at first hand how they view their future. He will also visit Buenos Aires. His object will be, in effect, to see whether terms of reference can be agreed for further more formal talks between the parties concerned.

My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said this to the House last January:

"Given good will on both sides, Britain and Argentina should be able to transform the area of dispute concerning the sovereignty over the Islands into a factor making for co-operation between the two countries which would be consonant with the wishes and interests of the Falkland Islanders."—[*Official Report*, 14th January 1976; Vol. 903, c. 392.]

To day, as 12 months ago, the situation in the South-West Atlantic is a source of potential confrontation, of which there have been recent examples. It is co-operation, not confrontation, both in the Islands and in the Dependencies, which we seek to achieve.

Mr. John Davies: First, may I thank the Secretary of State for making that statement? I join him, naturally, in paying tribute to the work of Lord Shackleton in putting before us the very valuable report that we have had to work on. Moreover, may I say that I welcome the tone of the right hon. Gentleman's statement, and particularly the reassurance that he is giving the House regarding the absolute need for the Islanders' acceptance of any arrangements which may be entered into on their behalf?

We welcome the announcement that there are to be discussions about co-operation with the Argentine, but we are anxious lest the case be presented to the Islanders in a form which in some sense looks like some degree of coercion upon them to accept what might otherwise be unwelcome arrangements in order to

secure their economic future. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to reassure us on that subject. With that caveat, we welcome greatly the visit by the Minister of State and wish him well in his work.

Mr. Crosland: I am well aware of that complication, which I considered

most anxiously, but I still think that at the end of the day we have to proceed in this matter. Nobody is being handed over to anybody. All that my hon. Friend will do is to see whether the Islanders agree that there is a basis for discussion. There will be full consultation at every stage, and nothing will be done that does not meet the wishes of the Islanders. Therefore, while I strongly take the point made by my hon. Friend, I must tell him that the conditions that I have laid down provide a sufficient safeguard.

ARGENTINA

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. James Callaghan):

Our traditional friendship with Argentina is marred only by issues arising from the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, whose inhabitants wish to remain British. Successive British Governments have undertaken to respect their wishes. At the same time they have recognised that the long-term interests of the Islanders must lie in practical forms of association with the Argentine mainland.

It remains my conviction that, given good will on both sides, Britain and Argentina should be able to transform the area of dispute concerning sovereignty over the Islands into a factor making for co-operation between the two countries which would be consonant with the wishes and interests of the Falkland Islanders.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart):

I begin with the question about why there are talks between the Argentine and ourselves on this issue. There is more than one reason. The first is the Resolution passed in the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1965. I cannot accept—but I do not think that this is a major point—the proposition that that Resolution was in some ways *ultra vires*. If Paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter were interpreted in the way that it was sought to be interpreted here, the range of questions left that the United Nations could discuss would be extremely limited.

There are plenty of instances of arguments about sovereignty, or about possible transfers of territory, being regarded as proper to be discussed in the United Nations. But proper to be discussed is one thing. Agreeing with what has been said in the discussions is another. The United Kingdom did not vote for the Resolution, but it has always been the policy of the Government, and I think rightly, that even when we have not been able to agree with the United Nations we should not treat Resolutions passed in the General Assembly simply with silence, still less with contempt. In the kind of world in which we live it is of great importance to maintain this principle, because, if it can be done, the building up of the authority of the United Nations is of enormous importance both to us and to mankind.

That was one reason, but there was a further reason, and I want to stress this one particularly having in mind the interesting and helpful speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Chorley (Mr. Kenyon). It is concerned with the position of the islanders themselves. There is only one point on which I think I disagree with my hon. Friend, in that he seemed to trace the uncertainty or the uneasiness in the islands solely to the events of the last two years, but I think he will know that for some considerable time Argentina has advanced her claim, and there has been repeated argument in many different forms about this.

Further, more recently communication between the islands and the mainland has been cut off. This is a source, to say the least, of vexation and inconvenience to the islanders. Some of them have children in this country for various reasons. From time to time they want to make visits to this country, and the cutting off of direct communication between them and the nearest mainland available to them is, to say the least, a vexation and an inconvenience.

I want the House to notice this further point. In the kind of world in which we live, in which the physical possibilities of travel are always improving, in which, particularly to the younger generation, the possibility of taking part in a wider world is always there, for a small community like this to be seriously at variance with a large continental neighbour could be an increasing source of vexation and uncertainty to the islands.

It would therefore be wrong to behave as though this aspect of the matter was

of no importance, and one reason for being willing to enter into talks with Argentina was that it was not desirable to have a situation in which there was already this degree of inconvenience and vexation imposed, and to leave simply to fester a situation in which the smaller community was at variance with its nearest mainland neighbour, and a neighbour which, as we all know, is a country of great and growing importance in the world.

It is the normal practice for talks like this to be confidential, but there are some things which it would be appropriate to say about them now. Our object in conducting these talks is to secure a lasting and satisfactory *modus vivendi* between these islands and Argentina, because we believe this to be a necessary long-term aim of policy. In this way, we are carrying out what Lord Caradon said in the United Nations:

"There are two basic principles we cannot betray; the principle that the interest of the people must be paramount and, second, that the people have the right freely to express their own wishes as to their future."

To answer other questions that have been asked, I endorse and confirm what Lord Caradon said on that occasion. And since we are speaking of the interests of the people, I would like whole heartedly to join in the many tributes that have been paid to this small and valiant community—these valiant, hard-working, law-abiding good friends of this country and good members of the whole human community. Our object in these talks has been to secure that there is a satisfactory arrangement between them and Argentina.

We have thought it right, in pursuance of this objective, that the question of sovereignty should be discussed in these talks. Since there has been a good deal of stress placed on this aspect, I will explain why we have taken this view. The hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) particularly stressed the desirability of good relations with Argentina. I fully accept the proposition that one cannot buy good relations by giving away things that one should not give away. However, it is also true that if one is genuine in saying that one wants good relations, one cannot refuse to discuss a subject even if one's views and the views of the other party are completely at variance and even if one cannot see, at the beginning of the talks, how those differences are to be reconciled.

The House will accept that there was here a genuine problem to be resolved; our undoubted duties and obligations to our fellow subjects in the islands and our duty also—again, in their interest—to get a satisfactory agreement, if it could be obtained, and the fact that it would not have been prudent, farsighted and in the interest of the islanders for us to preclude any possibility of discussion by saying that we would not even discuss this question of sovereignty.

As has been pointed out, Governments of both complexions in this country have been prepared to put this question to the International Court. I do not believe, therefore, that there is any valid ground for criticism of what the Government have done, simply on the ground—and I make no secret of this—that this question has formed part of the talks.

[MR. STEWART.]

We have no doubt whatever that the sovereignty is now legally ours. I need not go over all the legal and historical arguments that have been advanced. Since it is in our sovereignty, we have a clear duty, as we have towards any other place in our sovereignty, to defend it. I need not say more on this aspect, except to make it quite clear that while some of the detailed questions on defence that have been put to me in the debate are perhaps more matters for my right hon. Friend, we have no doubt that these Islands are in our sovereignty and that we therefore have, as we have for other places in our sovereignty, a duty to provide for their defence.

Having said that, I turn to something which I must say and of which I hope to persuade the House, even if, at first sight, hon. Members may find it a little difficult. If we mean what we say about desiring good relations with the Argentinians, we must at least be prepared to admit that while we are firmly convinced of our legal sovereignty over these islands they are equally firmly convinced of their claim. You get nowhere at all if you start by assuming that the person with whom you are discussing is not even sincere. We have to recognise, therefore, that here there is a problem between two nations who desire to be friendly, who take different views as to what their rights are. It is in the interests of both of them and of the Islands that if possible that dispute shall be resolved. Can it be done? I hope it can. I think it is of great importance for the islanders. If possible it should be done. The House will see from the way I have defined the problem that it will not be easy to do it. Let me at once dispel any fears which I think the hon. Member expressed. Apart from anything else I say, the idea that at any moment there is going to be a transfer of sovereignty has no relation to the facts at all. There is no justification for that in the Islands or as a hope or expectation in Argentina.

I come to what I think the House will regard as really the heart of the matter. At what possible time, or in what possible event or circumstances, could a transfer of sovereignty be made? If we take the view that in order to get a proper *modus vivendi* this country must at any rate be prepared to discuss time

and circumstances in which, if certain conditions were fulfilled, it would agree to cession of sovereignty, the vital question is, in what time, in what circumstances, under what conditions? I think the House will agree that this is really the heart of the matter, and it is to that I now want to address myself. I hope that the House will not feel that I have detained it for too long in describing the matters which have led up to this, because it is extremely important.

We do not want to be at odds with a friendly nation. We do not want to betray people who have a claim on us. This is not a matter which can be quickly dismissed or quickly resolved. I say, in what event or in what time could a transfer of sovereignty be considered? To that my answer would be, first, only as part of an agreement which would secure a permanently satisfactory relationship between the islands and Argentina, in which there would be no harassing, no vexation, no inconveniences, and an arrangement also in which if there were a transfer of sovereignty there would be the fullest safeguards for the special rights of the islanders, the fact of their descent, their language and so on.

That is one condition, that the cession of sovereignty could be considered only as part of an agreement of that nature, but further—notice this—the right to agree to such a cession lies with Her Majesty's Government here. That, of course, is a simple point of law, that the actual power to decide over a transfer of sovereignty lies with Her Majesty's Government here. But I say this quite clearly, Her Majesty's Government would agree to such a cession only, first on the condition I have mentioned that it must be part of an agreement fully satisfactory in other respects, and secondly, only if it were clear to us, to the Government in the United Kingdom, that the islanders themselves regarded such an agreement as satisfactory to their interests. That, I think, is the matter to which the House has attached the greatest importance, and I hope that what I have said will be carefully noted and weighed.

Spore  
copy

faxed to  
Chevrons 25/4

PRIME MINISTER

As foreshadowed in the earlier telephone call from the CDS, the Ministry of Defence will be making the following statement at 12 noon:-

"In pursuance of our inherent right of self defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter; British helicopters today attacked a hostile Argentine submarine in the vicinity of South Georgia."

There is no further information as yet.

Willie Rickett

25 April, 1982

Government Statement Released by MOD and No.10 at 1705 hours,  
25 April 1982

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A British task group engaged in operations off South Georgia detected an Argentine submarine close off the coast near the harbour at Grytviken at first light this morning. Helicopters were sent to engage it in order to safeguard our ships and the men aboard. The submarine which has been damaged, is believed to be the Santa Fe.

Unattributably we added that the submarine was on the surface but of course was ~~well~~ in a position to fire torpedos. We understood that no torpedos were fired but one doesn't wait for the button to be pushed before taking appropriate action if under threat.

Statement Released by MOD at 1800 hours, 25 April 1982

<sup>British</sup>  
~~Their~~ forces are now ashore in South Georgia.

Statement Released by MOD at 2000 hours, 25 April 1982

Our latest reports are that the Santa Fe, the Argentine submarine attacked by RN helicopters, is now alongside King Edward Point, Grytviken. The full extent of the damage is not known. But it is still smoking, leaking oil and listing to port. It may be aground. We assess that the internal damage is severe.

E.R.

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR ALEXANDER HAIG

Thank you for your message giving your comments on your long discussions with Francis Pym. I and some of my colleagues ] have now had a full report from him. We remain most grateful to you for your continuing efforts.

You asked me to send you a reaction this evening. This whole business started with an Argentine aggression. Since then our purpose together has been to ensure the early withdrawal by the Argentine in accordance with the Security Council Resolution. <sup>Do</sup> I think therefore that <sup>the</sup> ~~your~~ <sup>new</sup> ~~first~~ step should be <sup>to you</sup> to put your latest ideas to them. I hope that you will seek the Argentine Government's view <sup>of them</sup> ~~of the proposals~~ tomorrow and establish <sup>urgently</sup> whether they can accept them. Knowledge of their attitude will be important to the British Cabinet's consideration of your ideas.

MESSAGE FROM ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister

I have just received your message and am grateful for your quick response. In light of your reply I shall tomorrow float my ideas to Foreign Minister Costa Mendez in precisely the form given to Francis. I will tell the Foreign Minister that HMG received the same ideas and is now considering them but I do not know whether they prove acceptable to the British Cabinet. I will add that from a US point of view, what we have presented to both parties is a delicately balanced and reasonable proposal which we see no reason further to amend. We will await the Argentine reply. As soon as it is received we will be in touch with Francis. Depending on the Argentine reply and the ultimate decision of HMG on the ideas they have presented we here in Washington will then examine what appropriate next steps we might take. Once again I very much appreciate your prompt reaction. Let us all hope that the Argentine Government will react positively to this final effort to avoid bloodshed.

With warm regards

ALEXANDER HAIG

\*\*\*\*\*

Haig plans to meet Costa Mendez in Washington at about 1500 hours (1900Z) 25 April.

28.4.82

AOL 26  
4  
h-c

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 25 APRIL :  
OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

Argentina

1. Sir Anthony Parsons has informed the Security Council of our communication to the Argentine Government about the approach of Argentine naval vessels and military aircraft. The MOD issued a press release on this subject at 0100, the time that the information was expected to become public in New York. The Argentine news agency, Noticias Argentinas, has reported that the Argentine Government has handed a note to the Security Council saying it will repulse any British attack and claiming that in doing so Argentina would be exercising the right of legitimate defence.

The United States

2. There has been a further exchange of messages between the Prime Minister and Mr Haig. Mr Haig will now put to the Argentine Foreign Minister the same proposal as that put to the Government here, saying that HMG is now considering it but that he does not know whether it is acceptable to them. He will be in touch with us again as soon as a reply is received from Argentina.

3. Mr Denis Healey has had talks in Washington with Mr Eagleburger and Mr Haig. Our Embassy in Washington received the impression from Mr Healey that he was reassured about US intentions to ensure that British interests were safeguarded. He had noted that the US had throughout spoken of the rights of the Falkland Islanders and wondered whether the language of Article 73 of the UN Charter (about the paramountcy of the interests of the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories) could be usefully adopted in the negotiations.

4. Speaking to the press, Mr Healey said that negotiations were very delicately poised and that the rôle of the United States was essential and offered the best hope of a settlement. If the present negotiations failed, the United Nations would have to be brought in. This would allow the United States to align itself more closely with Britain.

5. Sir Nicholas Henderson is to do a network television show at 1130 Washington local time. He will telephone the Emergency Unit at 1400 hours GMT to bring himself up to date with latest developments.

OAS

6. News Agency reports from Caracas say that the Venezuelan Air Force has been put on alert with a view to supporting Argentina.

/General

General

7. Arrangements are being made to repatriate the Captain of HMS Uganda, who is ill, by an RAF medical flight from Freetown where 'Uganda' was due to arrive at 0700 hours.

25 April 1982

*E J Sharland*

E J Sharland  
Emergency Unit

/Distribution:

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PA

1978 - 1

**FLASH**  
**ADVANCE COPY**

*Ps/no.10, Downing St.,  
DIO, Cabinet office,  
Sir R. Armstrong, Cabinet Office,  
Sir M. Fallick, " "  
R.c., (ux).*

ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK  
ZZ WASHINGTON  
GRS 275  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 251230Z APR 82.  
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 296 OF 25 APRIL  
AND FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND OTHER POSTS.

MY TELNOS 99 TO ANKARA, 106 TO ATHENS AND 43 TO BUCHAREST  
(ONLY ONE OF WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN REPEATED TO EACH POST):

FALKLANDS: MILITARY OPERATIONS.

1. THE MOD ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT 11.00 GMT TODAY:  
BEGINS

IN PURSUANCE OF OUR INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE UNDER  
ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER BRITISH HELICOPTERS  
TODAY ATTACKED A HOSTILE ARGENTINIAN SUBMARINE IN THE VICINITY  
OF SOUTH GEORGIA. THERE IS NO FURTHER INFORMATION AS YET.  
ENDS.

2. FOLLOWING THIS INCIDENT YOU SHOULD DO WHATEVER YOU CAN AS  
APPROPRIATE TO ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT OR AGENCY TO WHICH YOU  
ARE ACCREDITED TO SUPPORT OUR POSITION, AND TO  
MINIMISE ANY ADVERSE OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC REACTION. IN ADDITION  
TO DRAWING THE TELEGRAM YOU WILL HAVE BEEN SENT YESTERDAY,  
YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT WE ARE EXERCISING OUR INHERENT  
RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
CHARTER, AND THAT WE GAVE ARGENTINA DUE WARNING IN A MESSAGE  
PASSED TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ON 23 APRIL THAT  
QUOTE ANY APPROACH ON THE PART OF ARGENTINE WARSHIPS  
INCLUDING SUBMARINES, NAVAL AUXILIARIES OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT  
WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO A THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE MISSION  
OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WILL ENCOUNTER THE  
APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. UNQUOTE. THIS WARNING WAS ALSO  
COMMUNICATED ON 24 APRIL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL FOR CIRCULATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND YESTERDAY'S

CONFIDENTIAL

1978 - 1

PUBLIC REACTION TO THE WARNING BY THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES  
DEMONSTRATES CLEARLY THAT THE WARNING HAD BEEN RECEIVED AND  
DULY NOTED.

PYM

GRS 50  
CONFIDENTIAL

R 982

FM FCO 250630Z APRIL 82  
TO FLASH MADRID  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 25 APRIL 1982.



*Infaxed  
to  
Cheyney  
25/4*

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM PUS.  
YOUR TELNO. 218: SUAREZ INITIATIVE

1. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE AND LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS.
2. IF YOU YOURSELF ARE ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE MATTER THROUGH AZA WITHOUT CAUSING OFFENCE THAT WOULD BE FINE.

PYM

NNNN

X

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MR BULLARD

HEAD/SED

MR GIFFARD

PS

MR URE

PS/PUS

*HM Ambassador Madrid to range at 1200 to advise that No. 10 should ring Aza back and say that although the PM was unfortunately not available, the British Ambassador was in Madrid and would be happy to see him. This message passed to Duty Clerk, No. 10, who*

CONFIDENTIAL


*will liaise with Mr Whitmore & the PUS  
25/4 FCO Emergency Unit*

MADFO 021/25

25 APR 1982

E.R.

ZZ FCO



10

GRS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MADRID 250020Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 218 OF 25 APRIL

0042

*Infaxed  
to Chequers*

25/4

PERSONAL FOR PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY  
YOUR TEL NO. 129 : SUAREZ INITIATIVE.

1. I EXPLAINED THE PROBLEM VERY EARLY THIS MORNING TO PEREZ LLORCA. HE WAS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL. HAVING TELEPHONED THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER, HE RANG BACK TO SPEAK AS FOLLOWS. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT KNEW THAT SUAREZ WANTED TO SET HIMSELF UP AS A MEDIATOR AND ATTRACT PUBLIC ATTENTION BY SO DOING. THEY ALSO KNEW THAT HE HAD MADE A SIMILAR OFFER TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN SPITE OF DISCOURAGEMENT FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HERE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, CALVO SOTELO WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE ABLE TO SEE SUAREZ THIS EVENING.
2. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD IN LONDON, BUT THERE MIGHT BE SOME TACTICAL DISADVANTAGE FOR US IF WE WERE TO REFUSE TO RECEIVE INFORMATION FROM SO IMPORTANT A SOURCE AT SUCH A CRITICAL MOMENT. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR US TO OFFER TO RECEIVE THE INFORMATION THROUGH AZA. THIS WOULD HELP CALL SUAREZ'S BLUFF IF MEDIATION WAS HIS REAL AIM. PEREZ LLORCA AGREED THAT THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD SOLUTION; BUT THERE COULD STILL BE HEADLINES HERE IF AZA LET IT BE KNOWN WHY HE HAD FLOWN TO LONDON. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE BETTER TO OFFER TO RECEIVE THE INFORMATION QUIETLY THROUGH ME IN MADRID.
3. BUT PEREZ LLORCA ADDED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE FURTHER SOUNDINGS LATER THIS MORNING ABOUT THE INFORMATION. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WOULD THEREFORE BE MOST GRATEFUL IF WE WOULD SEND NO (REPEAT NO) REPLY AT ALL TO THIS INITIATIVE UNTIL PEREZ LLORCA HAD CONTACTED ME AGAIN. THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE MORNING. OUR COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE HAD BEEN MUCH APPRECIATED.

4. NEEDLESS TO SAY, BOTH CALVO SOTELO AND PEREZ LLORCA WERE MOST ANXIOUS THAT THEIR INTERVENTION IN THIS MATTER SHOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED TO SUAREZ.

PARSONS

NNNN

*I spoke to N° 10 duty office to ensure that no reply would be made direct from N° 10.*

*Bus. informed at 0710  
Tel. sent in reply at his request.*

SENT/RECD AT 25/0042Z RSP/RE

file

Injured to  
Chequers 25/4

PRIME MINISTER

As foreshadowed in the earlier telephone call from the CDS, the Ministry of Defence will be making the following statement at 12 noon:-

"In pursuance of our inherent right of self defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, British helicopters today attacked a hostile Argentine submarine in the vicinity of South Georgia."

There is no further information as yet.

Willie Rickett  
25 April, 1982

MESSAGE FROM ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister

I have just received your message and am grateful for your quick response. In light of your reply I shall tomorrow float my ideas to Foreign Minister Costa Mendez in precisely the form given to Francis. I will tell the Foreign Minister that HMG received the same ideas and is now considering them but I do not know whether they prove acceptable to the British Cabinet. I will add that from a US point of view, what we have presented to both parties is a delicately balanced and reasonable proposal which we see no reason further to amend. We will await the Argentine reply. As soon as it is received we will be in touch with Francis. Depending on the Argentine reply and the ultimate decision of HMG on the ideas they have presented we here in Washington will then examine what appropriate next steps we might take. Once again I very much appreciate your prompt reaction. Let us all hope that the Argentine Government will react positively to this final effort to avoid bloodshed.

With warm regards

ALEXANDER HAIG

\*\*\*\*\*

Haig plans to meet Costa Mendez in Washington at about 1500 hours (1900Z) 25 April.

The Rt. Hon. Sir Derek Walker-Smith QC., MP.

②



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

gc. Mrs Gow

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 23/4

24th April 1982.

Dear Private Secretary,

I am enclosing for the information of the Prime Minister, a copy of a letter Sir Derek has sent to The Times and which he hopes will be published.

Yours sincerely,

*Sheila Kapula (Mrs)*

Private Secretary

The Private Secretary to:  
The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
The Prime Minister  
Downing Street  
SW1



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

22nd April 1982.

Sir,

In your powerful Leader (21/4) you say: "Perhaps Britain should suggest to Argentina that it (the issue of sovereignty) be now taken to the Hague, where it belongs more than in the operations rooms of opposing navies." I respectfully support that view.

One of the several mysteries in the Falkland Islands imbroglio is the position of the parties regarding a reference to the International Court of the question of sovereignty. On Monday the Foreign Secretary told the Commons that he had no reason to think that the Argentines had changed their objection to allowing the matter to go to the International Court, what time his colleague Lord Belstead, while confirming that the Argentines had never shown any interest in referring the sovereignty question to the International Court, made it clear that the British Government, had not proposed such a reference and has never suggested to any Argentine Government that the Falkland Islands dispute should be referred to the International Court.

Against the background of the Charter this is an odd situation. The position under the Charter is clear. Article 33 of the UN Charter imposes an obligation on parties (i.e. States) in dispute to seek first of all a solution by one or more peaceful means, which specifically includes arbitration. Such arbitration is entrusted to the International Court of Justice, which, by Article 92, is constituted "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations" whose Statute is annexed to the Charter and forms "an integral part" of it. By Article 36 of the Statute "the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it." Clearly therefore the dispute as to sovereignty, in its essence a matter of law, is appropriate for reference to the Court.

Why then has neither party suggested a reference? There appears to be no logical reason. The Court exists for the resolution of such disputes and has the necessary expertise. We believe we have a good case in law. Why then hesitate? To view the possession of a good case as a disincentive to going to Court is a novel concept to me. Or is each party waiting for the other like the Earl of Chatham, and Sir Richard Strachan at the battle of Walcheren? And is the Junta giving us a reason for its inaction the alleged indifference of the British just as Foreign Office Ministers are ascribing their inaction to the indifference of the Argentines?

There are in effect four methods of resolving an international dispute. There is negotiation, with or without an honest Broker; there is arbitration; there is what Continental Lawyers call an "amiable compositeur", such as is provided for, if the parties so wish, in commercial disputes by Article 13 of the Rules of the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce; and finally, there is war.

The first method has been tried with the help of the praiseworthy and pertinacious efforts of Secretary Haig. But of course his role was confined to that of honest broker, in effect a go between pedalling the propositions of the parties to each other. He was never entrusted with the superior role of "amiable compositeur" with the power to prescribe his own solution. No doubt the parties did not want to give him such a role. Nor was it indeed necessary in view of the machinery of arbitration, readily available under the auspices of the United Nations.

No further time should in my view therefore be lost in putting the suggestion to the Argentines and arranging a reference to the Court, subject only to prior withdrawal of Argentine troops in compliance with UN Resolution 502. This need not involve any interruption of simultaneous negotiation. Indeed it may well help and expedite it. This pattern, a commonplace in commercial arbitrations, may well be reflected in this arbitration between states. There will thus be two mechanisms operating simultaneously to prevent the evil of the fourth method, resolution by conflict, and to give effect to the principle enunciated by Sir Winston in one of his less grandiloquent but nevertheless relevant aphorisms "jaw-jaw is better than war-war" - the formal method of arbitration and the less formal negotiating talks that would accompany it.

These are the advantages of resort to arbitration. There may be countervailing disadvantages; but if so, nobody has yet spelt them out. Unless some hitherto unknown obstacle is identified, I think we should let the prescribed procedures have their chance before perhaps sadly it is too late.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

*Nerek Walker-Smith*

Letter Page Editor  
The Times  
New Printing House Square  
Grays Inn Road  
WC1

[Passed E.M.U.]  
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SECRET

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FM WASHINGTON 242150Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1441 OF 24 APRIL

MY TELEGRAM NO 1428: FALKLANDS:

ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR SATELLITE COVERAGE OF S. GEORGIA,

TRIPSTS

HD/SAMD

HD/DefD

HD/PUSD

PS (w)

PS/PUS

Mr Griffith

Mr Waight

Mr Ure

Mr Gillmore

DIO Cab. Office

Sir M. Palliser

Mr Wade Gery

NO 10 D.S.

RC

XX  
COLL 6

EAGLEBURGER TELEPHONED MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT YOU HAD SAID YESTERDAY TO HAIG, A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN NOT TO PROVIDE THE FIRST TWO DAYS SATELLITE COVERAGE OF S. GEORGIA REQUESTED BY ARGENTINA. SEPARATE DECISIONS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR EACH OF THE SUCCEEDING DAYS. SO FAR, THE EXPLANATION WAS QUOTE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS UNQUOTE.

2. THOMAS SAID THAT HE KNEW YOU WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME THIS.

3. EAGLEBURGER MADE TWO FURTHER POINTS. FIRST, IT WAS VITAL THAT THIS SHOULD NOT LEAK. SECOND, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE LONGER THE QUOTE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS UNQUOTE CONTINUED THE MORE CLEAR IT WOULD BECOME TO THE ARGENTINIANS WHAT WAS HAPPENING. THE SECOND TWO DAYS COVERAGE WOULD BE OF THE OPEN SEA TO THE WEST OF S. GEORGIA. IT WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP TO HIM IN TAKING THE FURTHER DECISIONS NEEDED FOR 26 AND 27 APRIL TO KNOW WHETHER OUR OWN EXPERTS SERIOUSLY BELIEVED THAT THIS COULD BE OF SOME MILITARY VALUE TO THE ARGENTINIANS.

HENDERSON

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS (6)  
~~PS/MR HURD~~ (3)  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR BIRNHEAD~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST. —

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFX

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GRS 380

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SANTIAGO 240220Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 160 OF 24 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO.

YOUR TELNO 81 TO BRASILIA: FALKLANDS/OAS

1. I SAW FOREIGN MINISTER ROJAS THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS LIKELY CHILEAN POSITION AT OAS MEETING ON 26 APRIL AND MAKE NECESSARY POINTS REFERRED TO IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.
2. HE IS CONVINCED ARGENTINA IS NOT GOING TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION INVOKING ARTICLE 8 OF TIAR WHICH WOULD CALL FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, LET ALONE MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE THINKS ARGENTINES HAVE REALISED BY NOW WAVERING NATURE OF SUPPORT THEY ARE LIKELY TO GET FROM OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND WILL INSTEAD OPT FOR A RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER FALKLANDS WHICH CAN THEN BE REPRESENTED AS A DIPLOMATIC TRIUMPH BY IMPLICITLY CONDONING USE OF FORCE.
3. ROJAS SAID THAT IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD CHILE VOTE IN FAVOUR OF ANY SUCH RESOLUTION UNLESS IT SPECIFICALLY CONDEMNED SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS BY OTHER THAN PEACEFUL MEANS. IF IT DID NOT, CHILE WOULD

ANY SUCH RESOLUTION UNLESS IT SPECIFICALLY CONDEMNED SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS BY OTHER THAN PEACEFUL MEANS. IF IT DID NOT, CHILE WOULD ABSTAIN.

4. ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, CHILEAN POSITION IS MUCH THE SAME AS THE MEXICAN, REGARDING ARTICLE 53 OF UN CHARTER AS OVERRIDING ANY RESOLUTIONS BY REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS THE OAS. HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR COPY OF RESOLUTION 502 WOULD SOON BE PASSED TO OAS SO AS TO STOP ARGENTINES CLAIMING OAS NONCOGNISANCE, AS HE HIMSELF HAD SPOTTED THE DANGER. HE ACCEPTS OUR ARGUMENTS (YOUR GUIDANCE NO 55) ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 9 OF THE TIAR AGAINST ARGENTINA.

5. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER BY ANY CHANCE ARGENTINA MIGHT TRY, UNDER PAPAL PRESSURE TO ACCEPT MEDIATION, TO HORSETRADE THE DISPUTED BEAGLE ISLANDS FOR CHILEAN SUPPORT AT THE OAS, HE COMMENTED THAT WHILE SUCH A PROPOSAL WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE CHILE WOULD NEVER AGREE TO IT. FOR ONE THING AS WEAKER COUNTRY CHILE WOULD ALWAYS INSIST ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS AND NEVER CONDONE THE USE OF FORCE. FOR ANOTHER THEY KNEW FAR TOO MUCH ABOUT TRYING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ARGENTINES EVER TO TRUST THEM TO MAKE SUCH A DEAL STICK.

6. ROJAS PRESSED ME HARD IN ASKING WHEN WE INTENDED TO ATTACK. I REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOT IN HABIT OF DOING SO WHILE DIRECT OR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL GOING ON. I DID NOT GET IMPRESSION THAT CHILE'S ATTITUDE WOULD CHANGE IF FOR INSTANCE OUR ATTACK SHOULD BEGIN DURING OAS DEBATES.

7. ROJAS IS NOT PROPOSING TO GO TO OAS MEETING IN WASHINGTON BUT IS LEAVING REPRESENTATION TO DAZA, THEIR AMBASSADOR TO THE UN WHO QUOTE KNOWS ALL ABOUT ARGENTINE TACTICS UNQUOTE.

8. US AMBASSADOR TELLS ME INCIDENTALLY THAT HE HAS NOT DONE ANY LOBBYING HERE ON THIS ISSUE, AND SEEMS SINGULARLY SWITCHED OFF.

HEATH

NNNN

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IMMEDIATE

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PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD (3)

PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR ~~REARD~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
MR BULLARD

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SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/ECDC (E)  
HD/WED  
RESIDENT CLERK

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
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UNCLASSIFIED

FROM ROME 241100Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 196 OF 24 APR 82

INFO ROUTINE ATHENS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, PARIS,  
BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, UKREP BRUSSELS  
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, OTTAWA, CANBERRA  
WELLINGTON, TOKYO

[sic - ? MIPT]

MIPT: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF COMMUNIQUE:

AFTER HEARING A FULL ACCOUNT FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON. EMILIO COLOMBO, OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONTROVERSY OVER SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/MALVINAS, THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR PROFOUND CONCERN OVER THE MOUNTING TENSION AND PROLONGATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, AND ISSUED A PRESSING APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA TO GIVE PROOF OF THEIR SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO FACILITATE THE DIFFICULT

ms

AND ARGENTINA TO GIVE PROOF OF THEIR SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO FACILITATE THE DIFFICULT WORK OF MEDIATION WHICH THE US SECRETARY OF STATE IS DOING.

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH SEES ITSELF AS PARTICIPATING IN THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE TEN, RENEWS ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR CURRENT AMERICAN ACTION AND HOPES THAT THIS WILL BE CROWNED WITH SUCCESS, LEADING THE INTERESTED PARTIES TO CONTINUE TO THE END OF THE ROAD OF DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. IT REMAINS THE FIRM CONVICTION OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY, EXACERBATED AFTER MANY YEARS OF INCONCLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, WILL BE POSSIBLE ONLY AS A RESULT OF PEACEFUL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES ON THE BASIS OF ALL THE FACTS WHICH FOR YEARS HAVE BEEN THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR A RELAXATION OF CURRENT TENSION AND THIS THE REVOCATION OF THE COMMERCIAL MEASURES TAKEN BY THE EC AGAINST ARGENTINA.

IN REITERATION OF ACTION ALREADY TAKEN ON ALL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AVAILABLE AND MULTILATERALLY IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EC, INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE SENT TO ITALIAN AMBASSADORS IN LONDON BUENOS AIRES TO CONVEY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED.

ARCULUS

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)36+7 = 43

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PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR BIRCHARD~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
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FM GIBRALTAR

TO RBDW DFA/FCO LONDON

RBDW DFA/MADRID

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CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

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CYPHER CAT A

FROM GIBRALTAR 240810Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO PERSONAL 59 OF 24 APRIL

AND IMMEDIATE MADRID

SPANISH REACTION TO FALKLAND ISLANDS INVASION

1. AT MY REGULAR WEEKLY MEETING (23 APRIL) WITH HASSAN HE WAS IN A SOMBRE AND DEEPLY ANXIOUS MOOD. THE WELL-SUPPORTED SPANISH RIGHT WING DEMONSTRATION IN MADRID AND THE WIDE SPREAD (AND SEEMINGLY INCREASING) SUPPORT IN THE SPANISH MEDIA FOR ARGENTINA IS CAUSING

Handwritten signature and date: 1720/24

Handwritten initials: MS

IN A SOBERE AND DEEPLY ANXIOUS MOOD. THE WELL-SUPPORTED SPANISH RIGHT WING DEMONSTRATION IN MADRID AND THE WIDE SPREAD (AND SEEMINGLY INCREASING) SUPPORT IN THE SPANISH MEDIA FOR ARGENTINA IS CAUSING CONSIDERABLE NERVOUSNESS IN POLITICAL CIRCLES HERE, IN ADDITION TO THE INEVITABLE PUBLIC APPREHENSION. HASSAN FEELS STRONGLY THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT MUST SOON MAKE A FORTHRIGHT PUBLIC STATEMENT, AS PSOE HAVE DONE, CONDEMNING SUGGESTIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST GIBRALTAR AND MAKING CLEAR THAT IT WILL TAKE STEPS TO PREVENT SUCH AN ACT. IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT DO SO, HE FEARS THEY WILL FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO RESIST SUCH DEMANDS. IT MIGHT LEAD TO UNPLEASANT AND POSSIBLY VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS, EG IN SPAIN WITH BRITISH TOURISTS AND IN GIBRALTAR WHEN THE FRONTIER OPENS, AT WORST WOULD ENCOURAGE THE MILITARY QUOTE MADMAN UNQUOTE.

2. SEEN FROM HERE, THERE IS MUCH VALUE IN TRYING TO GET THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT AND I SUPPORT HASSANS SUGGESTION

3. HASSAN ALSO STRONGLY URGED THE FCO TO RESTORE THE BBC SPANISH SERVICE. HE IS UNHAPPY THAT THE BRITISH CASE IS GOING BADLY BY DEFAULT IN SPAIN BECAUSE SPANISH PUBLIC OPINION IS EXPOSED ONLY TO BIASED VIEWS FROM OTHER HISPANIC SOURCES. I AM SURE MR PARSONS WOULD SUPPORT HASSANS VIEW, FURTHER DETAILS OF WHICH ARE IN A LETTER TO ME (COPY BY BAG)

FCO PLEASE PASS

JACKSON

BT

FILE

SECRET

GRS210

S E C R E T

FM FCO 242115Z APR 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 833 OF 24 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

HAIG NEGOTIATIONS

1. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO HAIG.

TEXT BEGINS

''DEAR AL,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE GIVING YOUR COMMENTS ON YOUR LONG DISCUSSIONS WITH FRANCIS PYM. MY COLLEAGUES MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED AND I HAVE NOW HAD A FULL REPORT FROM HIM. WE REMAIN MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR CONTINUING EFFORTS.

YOU ASKED ME TO SEND YOU A REACTION THIS EVENING. THIS WHOLE BUSINESS STARTED WITH AN ARGENTINE AGGRESSION. SINCE THEN OUR PURPOSE TOGETHER HAS BEEN TO ENSURE THE EARLY WITHDRAWAL BY THE ARGENTINES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. WE THINK THEREFORE THAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE FOR YOU TO PUT YOUR LATEST IDEAS TO THEM. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEEK THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW OF THEM TOMORROW AND ESTABLISH URGENTLY WHETHER THEY CAN ACCEPT THEM. KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR ATTITUDE WILL BE IMPORTANT TO THE BRITISH CABINET'S CONSIDERATION OF YOUR IDEAS.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

YOUR EVER

MARGARET THATCHER''

TEXT ENDS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

PYM

LIMITED

HD/S AM D

HD/DEF D

HD/PLANNING STZFF

PS

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

COPIES TO:-

SIR I SINCLAIR

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SEC

PS/CHIEF DEFENCE STAFF

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

BS/SIR M PALLISER

MR WADE-GERY

} CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

SUBJECT

81A/82

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Master  
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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 81A/82

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 241055Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE DAKAR  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 56 OF 24 APR

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME  
MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DIOUF.

BEGINS:

DEAR PRESIDENT DIOUF

I SHOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY VERY SINCERE GRATITUDE FOR ALL THE  
HELP YOU ARE PROVIDING TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DURING THESE  
DIFFICULT TIMES. THE ASSISTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR  
GOVERNMENT ARE GIVING IN ALLOWING RAF AIRCRAFT TO USE YOFF AIR-  
PORT IS MOST DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

I AM ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE MEASURE OF SUPPORT WHICH YOUR  
GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN IN CONDEMNING THE ACT OF AGGRESSION BY  
THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS SO CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION NO 502. YOUR GOVERNMENT'S  
ACTIONS IN THIS MATTER ARE A POSITIVE EXPRESSION OF THE WELL-  
KNOWN PRINCIPLES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, ITS ADHERENCE TO  
THE UN CHARTER, ITS STAND ON THE NON-ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES  
BY FORCE AND ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, AND THE  
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF ALL PEOPLES.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

2. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHEN MESSAGE HAS BEEN PASSED.

PYM

FCO  
WAD  
S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(29)

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*Wifaxed to  
Cheques  
25/4*

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 250125Z APR 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1443 OF 24 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 833: HAIG NEGOTIATIONS.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM HAIG TO THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER IN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE:

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER, I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE AND AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR QUICK RESPONSE.

IN LIGHT OF YOUR REPLY I SHALL, TOMORROW, PRESENT MY IDEAS TO FOREIGN MINISTER COSTA MENDEZ IN PRECISELY THE FORM GIVEN TO FRANCIS. I WILL TELL THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT HMG RECEIVED THE SAME IDEAS AND IS NOW CONSIDERING THEM, BUT THAT I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY WILL PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH CABINET. I WILL ADD THAT, FROM A US POINT OF VIEW, WHAT WE HAVE PRESENTED TO BOTH PARTIES IS A DELICATELY BALANCED AND REASONABLE PROPOSAL WHICH WE SEE NO REASON FURTHER TO

BALANCED AND REASONABLE PROPOSAL WHICH WE SEE NO REASON FURTHER TO AMEND.

WE WILL AWAIT THE ARGENTINE REPLY: AS SOON AS IT IS RECEIVED I WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH FRANCIS.

DEPENDING ON THE ARGENTINE REPLY AND THE ULTIMATE DECISION OF HMG ON THE IDEAS I HAVE PRESENTED, WE HERE IN WASHINGTON WILL THEN EXAMINE WHAT APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE.

ONCE AGAIN, I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PROMPT REACTION. LET US ALL HOPE THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WILL REACT POSITIVELY TO THIS FINAL EFFORT TO AVOID BLOODSHED.

WITH WARM REGARDS, SINCERELY, ALEXANDER HAIG. ENDS.

2. HAIG PLANS TO MEET COSTA MENDEZ IN WASHINGTON AT ABOUT 1500 (1900Z) TOMORROW (25 APRIL).

HENDERSON

NNNN

AJC  
seen

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730, 24 APRIL : OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

Secretary of State's Visit to Washington

1. The Secretary of State is due back from Washington at 9.30 am today.

Argentina

2. President Galtieri has returned to Buenos Aires following his much-publicised visit to the Falkland Islands and Southern Argentina (during which, significantly, he did not meet any of the Islanders). He announced at a press conference that there could be no compromise on sovereignty but transitional arrangements could be considered to protect the Islanders' interests.

3. The State Department have confirmed that NASA have complied with the Argentine request for Landsat coverage of the Falkland Islands. The satellite took the required pictures over the period 21-23 April. The quality is likely to be poor because of cloud cover.

4. The Swiss have confirmed delivery to the Argentine Government of our communication about the approach of Argentine naval vessels and military aircraft. Sir A Parsons recommends that the text be conveyed to the President of the Security Council for circulation.

5. The BBC carried the further message to the British community in Argentina recommending that, in the light of a possible increase in tension with the approach of the Task Force, they should consider again whether they should leave Argentina. A British national (Mr Gordon-Davis), who went missing on 20 April, had in fact been held for questioning by the Argentine Police and has now been released. The Argentine News Agency has reported that the 3 British journalists are to be held in custody although the judge is quoted as saying that they may be released as early as Monday.

6. Washington quote a Reuters report indicating that Argentina's largest finance company has been put into liquidation.

OAS

7. Although a majority of Latin American states may support Argentina at the OAS Foreign Ministers' meeting on 26 April, there does not seem to be overwhelming support for strong retaliatory measures, but this may well depend on military developments. Moderating voices may well be Uruguay (whose Foreign Minister is likely to be in the Chair), Mexico (who

/will

- 2 -

will oppose sanctions), Brazil (who in the last resort are likely to toe the common line), Bolivia and Chile. Even Venezuela is hoping that political rhetoric will suffice. The Nicaraguan Foreign Minister has publicly reiterated his country's strong support for the Argentine position.

8. The Brazilian Foreign Minister has confirmed that Brazil is ready to supply military equipment to Argentina but not troops.

#### UN

9. Mr Denis Healey called on the UN Secretary-General and found general agreement that it would be wrong to take any additional initiative whilst Mr Haig's negotiations were continuing. The UN Secretariat were nevertheless working hard on contingency planning, in case the UN was asked to intervene. Mr Healey also urged the American Government to end its neutral posture and put maximum pressure on Argentina.


10. The Kenyan Representative at the UN spoke strongly and helpfully in support of our position on the Falklands during the Emergency Special Session on Palestine.

11. The Non-Aligned Movement's Drafting Group met but agreed no changes to the existing text which will now be referred to the NAM Coordinating Bureau next week. Sir A Parsons recommends further lobbying of friendly countries.

12. The Opanal Secretariat have confirmed that, despite an Argentine approach, no decision has yet been taken on whether to summon a full meeting of Opanal signatories under the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

#### Enquiry

13. Mr Luce has called for an early enquiry into the history of the Falkland Islands negotiations. He has been supported in this by Mr David Steel.



24 April 1982

A E Huckle  
Emergency Unit

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Mr Coles

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10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

THIS EVENING'S TALKS

I have briefed the Press with Nick Fenn at 2pm and stood them down until this evening.

I shall of course be under very heavy pressure after this evening's talks and I would appreciate two kinds of help:

- if possible, a short on the record quote agreed by Ministers; Mr Pym particularly will be pressed on leaving; and
- your personal guidance immediately after the meeting and before I brief the press again; we are coming to the crunch and I now need to take your mind on the major questions that can be anticipated.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'B. Ingham'.

B Ingham  
24.4.82

MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM SECRETARY HAIG  
AT OPENING OF BUSINESS, SATURDAY 24 APRIL ON  
FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS

"Dear Madame Prime Minister

- Francis Pym and I have just concluded our discussions, which were characterised throughout by the clear sense of common interests that we have had since the very outset of this crisis. He will be bringing back to London a text which I put forward as a basis for a peaceful settlement. Francis made it very clear that some of what I suggested presented problems, and that he could not make any promises on whether you could accept the text as presented.
- As you know, we have been guided all along by the same aims and principles as you, both because the United Kingdom is our closest friend and because we have a common view of what is at stake.
- What follows are our views on the text Francis is carrying. I by no means intend to pre-empt his report to you but simply want you to know how we in Washington see it.
- The text I have asked Francis to bring to London is, I believe, sensitive to your need to be faithful to your pledge to Parliament. Moreover, if it were accepted by both parties, it would most certainly not leave the aggressor in occupation.
- The text provides all the safeguards needed to block, if need be, the sort of Argentine saturation of the Islands that you, quite rightly, consider unacceptable. It lays open the possibility of relinquishment of British sovereignty at the end of negotiations, while neither prejudging this outcome nor setting aside the wishes of the Islanders. It provides for substantial restoration of the previous administration.

- Whether the text we have suggested would be accepted in Buenos Aires I cannot say. It would certainly require the Argentines to move well beyond their positions at the end of my latest visit there. I am sure, however, that any text more unfavourable to the Argentines than what we have suggested would stand no chance of acceptance. We are at the point now where we have only the finest tolerance between a peaceful solution and tragedy.

- We have known all along that at some point the United States would need to offer a view on the substance of an agreement. Consistent with our common aims, as well as our assessment of what is required to avert further hostilities, we believe that an agreement based on the text we have offered would be fair, just, and responsible. We are prepared to send it to the Argentines as a US proposal, to press them to accept it, and to defend it in public come what may. Indeed, we would tell them that there is no possibility of further movement on the UK side and absolutely no inclination on the part of the US to seek further movement. The choice would then be theirs.

- Clearly our actions must be able to withstand public scrutiny. This means that positions we take can be defended as fair and just. In our view, this text meets that test. But we must also be able to show that we went as far as we humanly could, without abandoning our principles or historic responsibilities, in order to avoid loss of life. If we can show this, and also that our two countries held a common position, we will have done all that could be asked of us.

- I am sure you will want to give the text careful study. I would like to be in a position to present it to the Argentine Foreign Minister on Sunday morning.

- We would simultaneously present it formally to the UK, telling you, as we would the Argentines, that we consider this a fair proposal that we think both sides should be able to accept.

- Therefore, we would be grateful for a reaction from you by Saturday evening.

- This crisis, and the way we have worked together during it, have made even clearer to me the great strength of our friendship and the identity of our values.

With warm regards

AL HAIG

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 TAGS: ARAFAK  
 SUBJECT: FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS -- MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

*Copy  
 PS  
 PS/No 10  
 PS/PS  
 Bullant  
 Wright  
 Gifford  
 Malley  
 Peam  
 Gilmore*

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PM FROM SECRETARY HAIG AT OPENING OF BUSINESS, SATURDAY, APRIL 24.
3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER:

- FRANCIS PYM AND I HAVE JUST CONCLUDED OUR DISCUSSIONS, WHICH WERE CHARACTERIZED THROUGHOUT BY THE CLEAR SENSE OF COMMON INTERESTS THAT WE HAVE HAD SINCE THE VERY OUTSET OF THIS CRISIS. HE WILL BE BRINGING BACK TO LONDON A TEXT WHICH I PUT FORWARD AS A BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. FRANCIS MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT SOME OF WHAT I SUGGESTED PRESENTED PROBLEMS, AND THAT HE COULD NOT MAKE ANY PROMISES ON WHETHER YOU COULD ACCEPT THE TEXT AS PRESENTED.

- AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN GUIDED ALL ALONG BY THE SAME AIMS AND PRINCIPLES AS YOU, BOTH BECAUSE THE UNITED KINGDOM IS OUR CLOSEST FRIEND AND BECAUSE WE HAVE A COMMON VIEW OF WHAT IS AT STAKE.

- WHAT FOLLOWS ARE OUR VIEWS ON THE TEXT FRANCIS IS CARRYING. I BY NO MEANS INTEND TO PREEMPT HIS REPORT TO YOU BUT SIMPLY WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW WE IN WASHINGTON SEE IT.

- THE TEXT I HAVE ASKED FRANCIS TO BRING TO LONDON IS, I BELIEVE, SENSITIVE TO YOUR NEED TO BE FAITHFUL TO YOUR PLEDGE TO PARLIAMENT. MOREOVER, IF IT WERE ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES, IT WOULD MOST CERTAINLY NOT LEAVE THE AGGRESSOR IN OCCUPATION.

*No.*

- THE TEXT PROVIDES ALL THE SAFEGUARDS NEEDED TO BLOCK, IF NEED BE, THE SORT OF ARGENTINE SATURATION OF THE ISLANDS THAT YOU, QUITE RIGHTLY, CONSIDER UNACCEPTABLE. IT LAYS OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF RELINQUISHMENT OF BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY AT THE END OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE NEITHER PREJUDGING THIS OUTCOME NOR SETTING ASIDE THE WISHES OF THE

LANE. IT PROVIDES FOR SUBSTANTIAL RESTORATION OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.

-- WHETHER THE TEXT WE HAVE SUGGESTED WOULD BE ACCEPTED IN BUENOS AIRES I CANNOT SAY. IT WOULD CERTAINLY REQUIRE THE ARGENTINES TO MOVE WELL BEYOND THEIR POSITIONS AT THE END OF MY LATEST VISIT THERE. I AM SURE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY TEXT MORE UNFAVORABLE TO THE ARGENTINES THAN WHAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED WOULD STAND NO CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE. WE ARE AT THE POINT NOW WHERE WE HAVE ONLY THE FINEST TOLERANCE BETWEEN A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND TRAGEDY.

-- WE HAVE KNOWN ALL ALONG THAT AT SOME POINT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NEED TO OFFER A VIEW ON THE SUBSTANCE OF AN AGREEMENT. CONSISTENT WITH OUR COMMON AIMS, AS WELL AS OUR ASSESSMENT OF WHAT IS REQUIRED TO AVERT FURTHER HOSTILITIES, WE BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE TEXT WE HAVE OFFERED WOULD BE FAIR, JUST, AND RESPONSIBLE. WE ARE PREPARED TO SEND IT TO THE ARGENTINES AS A US PROPOSAL, TO PRESS THEM TO ACCEPT IT, AND TO DEFEND IT IN PUBLIC COME WHAT MAY. INDEED, WE WOULD TELL THEM THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER MOVEMENT ON THE UK SIDE AND ABSOLUTELY NO INCLINATION ON THE PART OF THE US TO SEEK FURTHER MOVEMENT. THE CHOICE WOULD THEN BE THEIRS.

-- CLEARLY OUR ACTIONS MUST BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND PUBLIC SCRUTINY. THIS MEANS THAT POSITIONS WE TAKE CAN BE DEFENDED AS FAIR AND JUST. IN OUR VIEW, THIS TEXT MEETS THAT TEST. BUT WE MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO SHOW THAT WE WENT AS FAR AS WE HUMANLY COULD, WITHOUT ABANDONING OUR PRINCIPLES OR HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES, IN ORDER TO AVOID LOSS OF LIFE. IF WE CAN SHOW THIS, AND ALSO THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES HELD A COMMON POSITION, WE WILL HAVE DONE ALL THAT COULD BE ASKED OF US.

-- I AM SURE YOU WILL WANT TO GIVE THE TEXT CAREFUL STUDY. I WOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION TO PRESENT IT TO THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER ON SUNDAY MORNING.

-- WE WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY PRESENT IT FORMALLY TO THE UK, TELLING YOU, AS WE WOULD THE ARGENTINES, THAT WE CONSIDER THIS A FAIR PROPOSAL THAT WE THINK BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT.

-- THEREFORE, WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A REACTION FROM YOU BY SATURDAY EVENING.

~~S E C R E T~~//NODIS

STATE 110698

THIS CRISIS, AND THE WAY WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER DURING  
HAVE MADE EVEN CLEARER TO ME THE GREAT STRENGTH OF  
R FRIENDSHIP AND THE IDENTITY OF OUR VALUES.-

WITH WARM REGARDS,

AL HAIG END TEXT HAIG

2/2

S E C R E T//NODIS

STATE 110698

ROGER HARRISON  
CALLED AT 0624L



CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 April 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: The Constitutional Position

/ As requested by the Prime Minister, I enclose a detailed note on the constitutional position in the Falkland Islands, prepared by the FCO Legal Adviser.

Yours over,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

f.a.  
 ADL 24.  
 F

FALKLAND ISLANDS: CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION

Note by the FCO Legal Adviser

The "traditional local administration" of the Falkland Islands has to be viewed within the framework of the three basic constitutional instruments providing for the government of the colony.

2. The Letters Patent of 1948 (modified in minor respects in 1954 and again in 1962) provided for the appointment of a Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Colony [i.e. the Falkland Islands themselves] and the Dependencies. The term "Governor" in the Letters Patent is defined as including "the Officer for the time being administering the Government". Under the Letters Patent, the Governor has very wide-ranging powers, including:-

- (a) the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Dependencies;
- (b) the power to appoint judges and other officers;
- (c) the power, for cause shewn to his satisfaction, to dismiss or suspend from the exercise of his office and person holding public office in the Colony;
- (d) the right of pardon;
- (e) subject to any law for the time being in force in the Colony, the power to make and execute grants and dispositions of land within the Colony or the Dependencies.

/Crown

3. The Letters Patent also constitute an Executive Council consisting of "such persons, appointed in such manner as We shall direct by Instructions" (these are known as Royal Instructions - see paragraph 4 below). Finally, they reserve to the Secretary of State a power of disallowance of laws made by the Governor for the Dependencies.

4. The Royal Instructions of 1949 (as amended in 1951, 1955, 1964, 1973 and 1977) provide for the constitution of the Executive Council which consists of:

- (a) two ex-officio Members, namely the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary;
- (b) two Unofficial Members appointed by the Governor from among persons who do not hold offices of emolument under the Crown in the Colony;
- (c) two Elected Members, elected by the Elected Members of the Legislative Council from those Elected Members.

/The



The Royal Instructions also provide that if inter alia an ex-officio Member of the Executive Council is administering the Government, the Governor may appoint a person to be a temporary Member for the period of the vacancy. The Executive Council is not to be summoned except by the authority of the Governor; and the Governor is, so far as it is practicable, to attend and preside at all meetings of the Executive Council (provision being made that, in his absence, he may appoint another Member, or, if no such Member is appointed, the Senior Member of the Council actually present shall preside). The Royal Instructions then go on to provide that, in the exercise of his powers and the performance of his duties, the Governor shall consult the Executive Council, except in cases:-

- (a) which are of such nature that, in his judgment, material prejudice would be sustained by consulting the Executive Council;
- (b) in which the matters to be decided are, in his judgment, too unimportant to require their advice; or
- (c) in which the matters to be decided are, in his judgment, too urgent to admit of their advice being given in time.

The Governor may act in opposition to the advice given to him by the Members of the Executive Council; but is then required to report to the Secretary of State at the first convenient opportunity. Certain specified categories of laws cannot be made by the Governor without the approval of the Secretary of State (exception being made for cases of urgency when the Governor must report to the Secretary of State with the text of the law, giving his reasons for assenting to it).

5. The third basic constitutional instrument is the Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) Orders, 1948 to 1977, made in pursuance of powers conferred by the British Settlement Acts, 1887 and 1945. The Legislative Council consists of:

- (1) the Governor, as President;
- (2) two Ex-officio Members;
- (3) six Elected Members.

The Ex-officio Members are the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary. Under the Orders, no person is qualified to be elected as an Elected Member or, having been so elected, to sit or vote in the Council who is "by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign Power of State" (this would not exclude a nominated Member). Broadly similar provisions apply in the case of vacancies on the Legislative Council as apply in the case of vacancies on the Executive Council.



6. The Dependencies are legally distinct from the Falkland Islands but are, as already indicated, administered from the Falkland Islands. The Executive Council is common to both the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies. On non-legislative matters relating to the Dependencies, the Governor must consult the Executive Council (subject to the exceptions indicated in paragraph 4 above).

7. The question of who exercises the functions of Governor, whether with respect to the Falkland Islands or with respect to the Dependencies, when the Governor is absent is governed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Letters Patent of 1948. In the present circumstances, the relevant provision is Article 7(1) which reads as follows:-

"(1) Whenever the Office of Governor is vacant, or the Governor is absent from the Colony or is from any cause prevented from, or incapable of, acting in the duties of his Office, then such other person as We may appoint under Our Sign Manual and Signet, or if there is no such person in the Colony so appointed and capable of discharging the duties of the administration, the Senior Member of the Executive Council then in the Colony and so capable, shall, during Our pleasure, administer the Government of the Colony".

In normal circumstances, the Chief Secretary would act as Officer administering the Government and would be able to exercise all the powers of the Governor. If the Chief Secretary were absent from the Falkland Islands (as, it is understood, he is at present) the next Senior Member of the Executive Council would be the Financial Secretary. If the Financial Secretary were also absent, then the next most Senior Member of the Executive Council would be the most Senior of the Unofficial (i.e. appointed) Members of the Council or, alternatively, it would of course be open to Her Majesty to appoint a person to perform the functions of the Governor under Article 7(1).



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 April, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

I have written to you separately about a telephone call which I received from Mr Needham this afternoon and which related to the reimbursement of passages for Falkland Islanders who wished to leave.

I should record that he also told me that he had received information to the effect that the Argentines on the Falkland Islands had yesterday invited ten of the inhabitants to meet "representatives of the new administration". They had then been asked to join a new local council. Two had declined to do so but the others had agreed.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

RM

FILE  
CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 April, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THOSE  
WHO WISH TO LEAVE

As I told John Slatcher on the telephone this afternoon, Mr Needham of the Falkland Islands Company rang today to state that, on the basis of messages he had received from the Falkland Islands, there was confusion as to whether the Government would pay for the passages of those who wished to leave or simply lend them the necessary money. He had taken it upon himself to inform the Islanders through his representative that if HMG did not reimburse the passages, he would arrange for the expenses to be met in one way or another.

I told Mr Needham that I would arrange for an FCO official to explain the details of our arrangements to him and John Slatcher kindly undertook to do this.

It is the Prime Minister's view that the Government should reimburse passages to Falkland Islanders who wish to leave the Islands temporarily. I understood from Mr Slatcher that this was in effect the intention but it would be helpful if I could have a note on that point to place before the Prime Minister.

B/F  
A. J. COLES  
John Holmes, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

24 April, 1982

FALKLANDS: NORWEGIAN BAN ON ARGENTINEIMPORTS

Thank you for your letter of 23 April. The Prime Minister agrees that the message to the Norwegian Foreign Minister may issue though she would like the word "courageous" to be deleted.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

RM



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 April, 1982

THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE

Thank you for your letter of 23 April.

The Prime Minister considers that she should send personal letters to the Prime Ministers of Guyana and Barbados and I should be grateful if you could let me have drafts.

The Prime Minister also asked whether she should not send personal letters to Australia, New Zealand and Canada. But, as we discussed on the telephone, she has already sent such letters and further ones might be rather excessive.

As regards the other Governments to which you refer, the Prime Minister agrees that the general circular telegram may issue.

John Holmes, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

lu

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

2111/3

Telephone 01-218 ..... (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5/21

24th April 1982

*The NSD agree that no  
action is necessary on this  
letter. A.J.C. 26/4.*

*Dear John,*

FALKLAND ISLAND POPULATION

Sir Robert Armstrong sent a copy of his minute of 22nd April about the Falkland Island population to the Defence Secretary. There is one gloss we should like to suggest on the arrangements proposed. This is, should we not make provision expressly for the islanders to return to their own homes once the present emergency is over, whatever arrangements might or might not be made with the Argentines?

*Yours,*

*Jane Ridley*  
(J E RIDLEY)(MISS)

A J Coles Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

R M

24 April, 1982

ASSISTANCE FROM CERTAIN WEST AFRICAN  
GOVERNMENTS OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS  
DISPUTE

Thank you for your letter of 23 April.  
The Prime Minister agrees that the messages to  
Presidents Diouf and Stevens may issue.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Ed

*Mufaxed to  
Cheques 25/4*

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby FLASH
ZCZC	1 ZCZC	
GRS	2 GRS	
CLASS	3 CONFIDENTIAL	<i>24.4.82</i>
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6 FM FCO 242100Z APRIL 82	
PRE/ADD	7 TO FLASH MADRID	
TEL NO	8 TELEGRAM NUMBER 129.	
	9 From Permanent Under-Secretary.	
	10 1. Alberto Aza, Chef de Cabinet of Adolfo Suarez, has tele-	
	11 phoned Number 10 to ask if the Prime Minister could see Suarez	
	12 urgently tomorrow night (25 April) regarding some confidential	
	13 information about the Falklands. Suarez would be making a	
	14 special trip only to see the Prime Minister and would then return	
	15 to Spain.	
	16 2. This all sounds rather odd and it is not clear what is	
	17 behind it. We have advised the Prime Minister that she should	
	18 not <sup>(nor)</sup> see Suarez. The visit could well leak out and unless	
	19 cleared previously with Calvo Sotelo the latter could be put out.	
	20 The press here might tend to make undesirable speculation about	
	21 Gibraltar. The Prime Minister has accepted this <sup>advice</sup> and in fact her	
///	22 programme is such that she genuinely could not fit Suarez in.	
//	23 3. I knew Suarez pretty well and Aza very well. The alter-	
/	24 native therefore would be for me to offer to see him and pass on	
	25 any information to Ministers. I imagine that it would be	

NNNN ends  
telegram

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Catchword  
difficult

File number

Dept

Distribution

LIMITED

Drafted by (Block capitals)

Permanent Under-Secretary

H/SED

PS.

PS/PUS

Telephone number

Mr. BULLARD

MR. GIFFARD

MR. URE

Authorised for despatch

*[Signature]*

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
2

<<<<

1 <<<< *for you*  
 2 difficult to consult anyone but before replying to Aza I would  
 3 like to be sure that you see no difficulty over this. I am  
 4 not clear how active Suarez is these days or what his relations  
 5 are with Calvo Sotelo and his colleagues.  
 6 4. I have to be at meetings at Chequers tomorrow afternoon  
 7 so Sunday evening may be difficult but I can work out arrange-  
 8 ments with Aza if you see no objection to the idea.  
 9  
 10 PYM  
 11 NNN  
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NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

TYPISTS

36+7  
(29)

DSY 250800Z

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS (6)  
~~PS/MR HURD~~ (3)  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR REDWOOD~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY  
IMMEDIATE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST. —

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/INOD~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFF.

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

MT

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 250800Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242350Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 559 OF 24 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TELNOS 520 AND 542: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THESE HELPFUL INDICATIONS FROM THIRD WORLD MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH ARE VALUABLE TO US HERE IN THE DEVELOPING CAMPAIGN OVER THE TWO QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE, NAMELY ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE AND WHETHER OR NOT SELF-DETERMINATION IS APPLICABLE TO THE ISLANDERS. THERE WILL BE PLENTY OF OCCASIONS IN THE DAYS TO COME FOR US TO DEPLOY OUR CASE ON BOTH ASPECTS MORE FULLY.

2. HOWEVER, NONE OF THIS ALTERS MY VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. RECENT CONVERSATIONS WHICH I HAVE HAD CONFIRM THAT THE LONGER WE CAN KEEP OUT THE COUNCIL THE BETTER. THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ARE ALREADY FEELING SLIGHTLY UNEASY THAT A COMBINATION OF OUR TACTICS AND PANAMANIAN/ ARGENTINE CLUMSINESS LED THEM TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION WHICH CONTAINED NOTHING ABOUT THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY. I HAVE ALSO HAD RELIABLE CONFIRMATION THAT, IF WE USE FORCE, AND PARTICULARLY IF WE INFLICT CASUALTIES, THERE WILL BE AN IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL  
I HAVE ALSO HAD RELIABLE CONFIRMATION THAT, IF WE USE FORCE, AND PARTICULARLY IF WE INFLICT CASUALTIES, THERE WILL BE AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE COUNCIL, PROBABLY AT THE INSTIGATION OF THE PRESIDENT IF THE LATIN AMERICANS DO NOT ACT FIRST, AND THAT WE WILL BE SERIOUSLY ISOLATED. THIS WILL COME AS NO SURPRISE TO YOU. I HAVE HAD FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT, IF THE HAIG MISSION COLLAPSES, SOMEONE IS BOUND TO CALL THE COUNCIL FAIRLY SOON AND THERE WILL BE PRECISELY THOSE CALLS ON US WHICH WE WISH TO AVOID, EG THE SUSPENSION OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS COMBINED WITH SOME TIME-CONSUMING AND INEFFECTIVE MECHANISM SUCH AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES.

3. ALL THE ABOVE REINFORCES MY CONVICTION THAT WE SHOULD FOR THE MOMENT CONTINUE TO SOLDIER ON HERE FOR AS LONG AS WE CAN, KEEPING THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE AND AVOIDING RECOURSE TO THE COUNCIL, UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO PUT FORWARD IN THE COUNCIL A PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH (A) WOULD BE FULLY AND PUBLICLY ACCEPTABLE TO US AND (B) WOULD HAVE A CHANCE OF GETTING THROUGH THE COUNCIL, IN ORDER AT BEST TO GET RESULTS OR AT LEAST TO WRONGFOOT THE ARGENTINES IN THE DIPLOMATIC VACUUM WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THE FAILURE OF THE HAIG MISSION.

4. THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR MAKING A "BOMBSHELL" STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS OUTLINED IN MY TELNO 505. HOWEVER, THE MEMBERSHIP ARE ALREADY CONDITIONED TO THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HOSTILITIES WILL BREAK OUT PIECEMEAL, BOTH BY CURRENT PUBLICITY ABOUT A POSSIBLE ASSAULT ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND BECAUSE MANY OF THEM HAD WORKED OUT IN THEIR OWN MINDS THAT THIS WAS THE COURSE WE WERE MOST LIKELY TO TAKE. THESE EXPECTATIONS WILL BE REINFORCED WHEN THEY RECEIVE THEIR COPIES OF YOUR NOTIFICATION TO THE ARGENTINES OF YESTERDAY (YOUR TELNO 64 TO BERNE).

IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE QUOTE BOMBSHELL UNQUOTE WOULD TURN INTO A TRANSPARENT PLOY AND WOULD NOT HELP US TO CLAIM THAT WE HAD MAINTAINED THE DIPLOMATIC PROPRIETIES TO THE END.

PARSONS

NNNN

[passed EM.U] LIMITED ADVANCE COPY

DBY 250700Z

XIP

IMMEDIATE

WONFO 002/25

OO FCO DESKBY 250700

GR 200

SECRET

DESKBY 250700Z

FM WASHINGTON 242150Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1441 OF 24 APRIL

MY TELEGRAM NO 1428: FALKLANDS:

ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR SATELLITE COVERAGE OF S. GEORGIA.

TRASTS

HD/SAMD

HD/DefD

HD/PUSD

PS (6)

PS/PUS

Mr Griffith

Mr Wright

Mr Ure

Mr Gillmore

DIO Cab. Office

Sir M. Palliser

Mr Wade Gely

Nº 10 D.S. -

RC

XX  
0046

faxed  
to  
Cheves  
25/4

EAGLEBURGER TELEPHONED MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT YOU HAD SAID YESTERDAY TO HAIG, A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN NOT TO PROVIDE THE FIRST TWO DAYS SATELLITE COVERAGE OF S. GEORGIA REQUESTED BY ARGENTINA. SEPARATE DECISIONS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR EACH OF THE SUCCEEDING DAYS. SO FAR, THE EXPLANATION WAS QUOTE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS UNQUOTE.

2. THOMAS SAID THAT HE KNEW YOU WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME THIS.

3. EAGLEBURGER MADE TWO FURTHER POINTS. FIRST, IT WAS VITAL THAT THIS SHOULD NOT LEAK. SECOND, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE LONGER THE QUOTE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS UNQUOTE CONTINUED THE MORE CLEAR IT WOULD BECOME TO THE ARGENTINIANS WHAT WAS HAPPENING. THE SECOND TWO DAYS COVERAGE WOULD BE OF THE OPEN SEA TO THE WEST OF S. GEORGIA. IT WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP TO HIM IN TAKING THE FURTHER DECISIONS NEEDED FOR 26 AND 27 APRIL TO KNOW WHETHER OUR OWN EXPERTS SERIOUSLY BELIEVED THAT THIS COULD BE OF SOME MILITARY VALUE TO THE ARGENTINIANS.

HENDERSON

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

36+7  
(25)

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD (3)  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR BIRKENDALE~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

PS No.10 DOWNING ST. —

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M. PALLISER, <sup>DIO</sup> CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 242153Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1442 OF 24 APRIL  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLAND ISLANDS: VISIT OF RT HON DENIS HEALEY, MP

MR HEALEY SPENT OVER AN HOUR WITH EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING AND  
SUBSEQUENTLY SAW HAIG FOR 15 MINUTES.

2. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS AS HE LEFT THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MR HEALEY SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE VERY DELICATELY POISED WITH POSITIONS STILL VERY FAR APART. THE ROLE OF THE US WAS ESSENTIAL AND OFFERED THE FIRST AND BEST HOPE OF A SETTLEMENT. WE WERE APPROACHING THE MOMENT WHEN A DECISION ON THE FUTURE OF THE HAIG MISSION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE. IF THE MOMENT CAME WHEN THERE WAS NO LONGER A ROLE FOR AN HONEST BROKER, THE UN WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN. AT THAT POINT THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO ALIGN ITSELF MORE CLOSELY WITH BRITAIN. AS HE DID IN NEW YORK (PARA 2E OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO.543), MR HEALEY ADVISED THE US TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR NOW ON ARGENTINA RATHER THAN TO WAIT UNTIL THE SITUATION HAD DETERIORATED, WHEN ECONOMIC AND OTHER PRESSURES WOULD BE MORE COSTLY AND LESS EFFECTIVE.

PRESSURES WOULD BE MORE COSTLY AND LESS EFFECTIVE.

3. MR HEALEY HAS TOLD US HE WAS IMPRESSED BY HAIG AND WAS CLEARLY REASSURED ABOUT US INTENTIONS. HE SAID THAT EAGLEBURGER HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT HAD BEEN HIS CONCERN THROUGHOUT TO ENSURE THAT BRITISH INTERESTS WERE SAFEGUARDED. MR HEALEY THOUGHT THAT HAIG ALSO TOOK THIS VIEW.

4. MR HEALEY DID NOT DISCUSS HIS IDEAS FOR POSSIBLE UN INVOLVEMENT WITH HAIG BUT DID DO SO WITH EAGLEBURGER AND THOUGHT THAT THE US HAD GIVEN SOME CONSIDERATION ALREADY TO A POTENTIAL UN ROLE. MR HEALEY NOTED THAT THE US HAD THROUGHOUT SPOKEN OF THE RIGHTS (RATHER THAN THE WISHES) OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS AND WONDERED WHETHER THE LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER (THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE INHABITANTS OF NON-SELF GOVERNING TERRITORIES SHOULD BE PARAMOUNT) COULD BE USEFULLY ADOPTED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. MR HEALEY RAISED WITH EAGLEBURGER THE QUESTION OF US CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY AND SAID THAT, WHILE THE EUROPEAN LEFTS LOVE AFFAIR WITH THE SANDINISTAS WAS OVER, THE PRESENT NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT WAS AT LEAST PREFERABLE TO THE SOMOZA GOVERNMENT AND THE US SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO DEAL WITH IT. EAGLEBURGER CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOW TRYING TO ESTABLISH A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT AND DID NOT BELIEVE THE MEXICANS COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE AS INTERMEDIARIES.

HENDERSON

NNNN

25 SUN	26	27	28	29	30	1	2 SUN	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 SUN	10	11	12	13	14	15	16 SUN	17	18	19	20	21	22	23 SUN	24	25	26	27	28	29	30 SUN	31	1	2	3
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CARRIER BATTLE GROUP (TG 317-8)

④  
⑤  
⑥

TEZ

Estimated end of maximum Intensive Flying period

AMPHIBIOUS GROUP (TG 317-0)

①

Earliest Sail ASI

Earliest Arr FI

Preferred Landing Date

Latest Landing Date based on

INTREPID

UK

FI see Note

Note: These dates are the earliest prudent planning dates and may vary depending upon operational requirements, other developments and weather.


ATLANTIC CONVEYOR NORLAND (2 PARA) EUROPIC FERRY

UK

FI see Note

VULCANS

③




LEGEND

① Circled numbers refer to decision sheet.

CANBERRA PR

②





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 April, 1982

ARGENTINE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER THE BRITISH  
TASK FORCE

Thank you for your letter of 24 April.

As I have already told John Weston on the telephone, the Prime Minister agrees that we should circulate the text of our warning in the UN. She doubts, however, whether it is necessary to make any announcement in London.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

LM



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 April 1982

AJC  
seen*Dear John,*Argentine Reconnaissance Flights over the British Task Force

As you know, following two overflights of the main Task Force by Argentine military 707 reconnaissance aircraft, we asked the Swiss to warn the Argentine Government that any approach by its warships, submarines, naval auxiliaries or aircraft which amounted to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British Forces would encounter the appropriate response and that all Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft, engaging in surveillance of these British Forces would be regarded as hostile and were liable to be dealt with accordingly. This warning was delivered in Buenos Aires at 1720 (local) yesterday evening.

Sir Anthony Parsons has now recommended that we should circulate the text of our warning in the United Nations. He fears that, if we do not do so, the Argentine Government will circulate the text themselves as "evidence" of our aggressive intentions.

The Secretary of State considers that we should proceed as Sir Anthony Parsons proposes and at the same time announce in London the fact of the warning given yesterday. If before we can do this, an incident occurs (eg over South Georgia, where the Force Commander already has discretion to shoot down Argentine reconnaissance aircraft) Mr Pym would be in favour of publishing the terms of the warning immediately, adding that it was conveyed formally to the Argentines before the incident in question took place.

On the separate question of whether we should now change the Rules of Engagement for the main Task Force in order to permit the shooting down of Argentine reconnaissance aircraft if warning shots failed to deter, Mr Pym's view is that we should wait to see whether yesterday's warning to the Argentines is sufficient to deter further surveillance flights. If this turns out not to be the case, Mr Pym hopes that Ministers can consider urgently whether to change the Rules of Engagement accordingly.

/I am

SECRET



I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Francis Richards*

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

SECRET

SUBJECT

T 81A/82

cc Niall  
Ops

CONFIDENTIAL

1255 . 1

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 241055Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE DAKAR  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 56 OF 24 APR

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME  
MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DIOUF.

BEGINS:

DEAR PRESIDENT DIOUF

I SHOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY VERY SINCERE GRATITUDE FOR ALL THE  
HELP YOU ARE PROVIDING TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DURING THESE  
DIFFICULT TIMES. THE ASSISTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR  
GOVERNMENT ARE GIVING IN ALLOWING RAF AIRCRAFT TO USE YOFF AIR-  
PORT IS MOST DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

I AM ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE MEASURE OF SUPPORT WHICH YOUR  
GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN IN <sup>DEPLORING</sup> CONDEMNING THE ACT OF AGGRESSION BY  
THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS SO CLEARLY <sup>CONDEMNED</sup> EXPRESSED IN THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION NO 502. YOUR GOVERNMENT'S  
ACTIONS IN THIS MATTER ARE A POSITIVE EXPRESSION OF THE WELL-  
KNOWN PRINCIPLES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. ITS ADHERENCE TO  
THE UN CHARTER. ITS STAND ON THE NON-ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES  
BY FORCE AND ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. AND THE  
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF ALL PEOPLES.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

2. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHEN MESSAGE HAS BEEN PASSED.

PYM

FCO  
WAD  
S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

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SIP K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER } TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR HLETT } . . .

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL

**SUBJECT**

CONFIDENTIAL

T 81c/82

cc MARK

1955

One.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 241035Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FREETOWN  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 44 OF 24 APR

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT STEVENS.

BEGINS:

DEAR PRESIDENT STEVENS

I SHOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY VERY SINCERE GRATITUDE FOR ALL THE HELP YOU ARE PROVIDING TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DURING THESE DIFFICULT TIMES. THE ASSISTANCE WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE GIVEN IN ALLOWING SOME BRITISH VESSELS ATTACHED TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TASK FORCE TO REFUEL AT FREETOWN IS DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

I AM ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN IN CONDEMNING THE ACT OF AGGRESSION BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS SO CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION NO 502. YOUR SUPPORT, AND THAT OF OUR OTHER COMMONWEALTH FRIENDS, HAS BEEN VERY ENCOURAGING TO ME AND MY COLLEAGUES. IT IS A POSITIVE EXPRESSION OF THE COMMONWEALTH'S PRINCIPLES OF THE RIGHT SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS STAND ON THE NON-ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY FORCE AND ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

I CARRY VERY PLEASANT MEMORIES OF YOUR VISIT HERE IN NOVEMBER 1980.

YOURS SINCERELY.

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

2. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHEN MESSAGE HAS BEEN PASSED.

PYM

FCO  
WAD  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR HAWKIN }  
MR PEREZ }  
MR LLETT }

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A08205

MR COLES

I drew the Prime Minister's attention yesterday evening to a paragraph in Dr Johnson's Thoughts On The Late Transactions Respecting Falkland's Islands about the naval preparations that were made when the Spaniards occupied the Falkland Islands in 1770.

2. I thought that she might like to glance through  
--- the attached copy of the complete treatise.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

23 April 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

1773 - 1

GRS 250  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 231445Z APR 82  
TO FLASH BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 64 OF 23 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)  
UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN,  
DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, OTHER  
NATO POSTS, MODUK, PARIS, ROME AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

1. PLEASE ASK THE SWISS TO CONVEY URGENTLY TO THE ARGENTINE  
GOVERNMENT THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION FROM HMG:-  
BEGINS

IN ANNOUNCING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE  
AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, HMG MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS MEASURE  
WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF THE UK TO TAKE WHATEVER  
ADDITIONAL MEASURES MAY BE NEEDED IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS RIGHT  
OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.  
IN THIS CONNECTION, HMG NOW WISHES TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ANY  
APPROACH ON THE PART OF ARGENTINE WARSHIPS, INCLUDING SUBMARINES,  
NAVAL AUXILIARIES, OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO A  
THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE MISSION OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE  
SOUTH ATLANTIC WILL ENCOUNTER THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.  
ALL ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT INCLUDING CIVIL AIRCRAFT ENGAGING IN  
SURVEILLANCE OF THESE BRITISH FORCES WILL BE REGARDED AS  
HOSTILE AND ARE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY.  
ENDS

2. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT HMG REGARD THE TERMS OF THIS  
COMMUNICATION AS HAVING IMMEDIATE EFFECT. PLEASE REPORT  
WHEN THE SWISS HAVE DELIVERED THE COMMUNICATION TO THE  
ARGENTINES. WE SHALL THEREAFTER CONSIDER WHETHER TO ANNOUNCE  
IT PUBLICLY AND TO DELIVER IT MORE WIDELY VIA THE DIPLOMATIC  
CHANNEL.

PYM

FCO  
DEFENCED  
S AM D  
  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER ) TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )

MR FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

WONFO 018/24

MEXWASH 015/23

24 APR 1982

00 FCO - DESKBY 240830Z

GRS320


CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 240830Z

FROM MEXICO CITY 232315Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 316 OF 23 APRIL 82



(22)

E.R.

MY TELNO 310: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. ROWLAND (LONRHO) SPOKE BY TELEPHONE THIS AFTERNOON TO MY MINISTER/COUNSELLOR. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SENT HIS PRIVATE JET TO MEXICO TO BRING HIS FRIEND GOVERNOR ROSSELL DE LA LAMA TO LONDON FOR A PRIVATE VISIT DURING WHICH ROSSELL HAD INTENDED TO DELIVER A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HOWEVER OUR ENQUIRIES ABOUT THE VISIT THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD LED ROSSELL TO POSTPONE HIS JOURNEY.
2. HE HAD JUST SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO ROSSELL WHO HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT TODAY. ROSSELL WOULD NOW TRAVEL TO LONDON ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT TAKING A PERSONAL MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. AS SOON AS ROSSELL HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER HE WAS TO CONTACT THE PRESIDENT BY TELEPHONE. ROWLAND SAID THAT HE ASSUMED THAT PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO SAW SOME SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS, PROBABLY FOLLOWING A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GALTIERI, AND WISHED TO HAVE IT BROUGHT URGENTLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTENTION.
3. ROWLAND ASKED MORRIS TO CONFIRM TO YOU IMMEDIATELY THAT THE VISIT WAS NOW OFFICIAL. BUT HE ASKED THAT WE SHOULD NOT CONTACT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AGAIN AS THEY WERE NOT INVOLVED AND IT WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE MATTERS. THE PRESIDENCY COULD OF COURSE CONFIRM ROSSELL'S ROLE.
4. ROWLAND SAID THAT HIS JET WAS IN SAVANNAH, GEORGIA AND WOULD BE TAKING OFF FOR MEXICO CITY WITHIN HALF AN HOUR (232300Z) TO PICK UP ROSSELL AND FLY HIM TO LONDON.
5. MINISTER/COUNSELLOR SPOKE TO THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECRETARY WHO SAID HE KNEW NOTHING OF SUCH A VISIT.
6. CASILLAS IS VERY CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT AND IT SEEMS

IMPROBABLE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SEND ROSSELL AS AN OFFICIAL  
MISSARY TO LONDON WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY  
OR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ROSSELL, WHO IS  
A PERSONAL FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT MAY HAVE MENTIONED TO THE  
PRESIDENT THAT HE PLANNED TO VISIT LONDON AND HAVE OFFERED TO  
CONVEY AN INFORMAL MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PRESIDENT  
MAY HAVE AGREED TO THIS.

TCKELL

NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1982

*Please type letter.*

*AL 24/4.*

*Dear John,*

Falkland Islands

Thank you for your letter of 19 April enclosing a telegram to the Prime Minister from Dr M F Perutz about the United States' role in the Falkland crisis.

We know of two visits by General Galtieri to Washington last year. In March we understand he was included in the entourage of President Viola, who met President Reagan, Mr Haig and the Secretary for Defence. In August Galtieri paid a further visit as the guest of General E C Meyer, Chief of Staff, Army in the Department of Defence. These and other visits between the United States and Argentina under Mr Reagan's Presidency produced few tangible results, but were cordial and hailed at the time as successful confirmation of a new relationship after Argentina's strained relations with President Carter's administration. Their tone may have had some effect on Argentine calculations about the Falklands, but we have no evidence to support the allegation of collusion made in the letter quoted by Dr Perutz.

I enclose a draft reply from you to Dr Perutz.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

DSR 1 (revised)

DRAFT: ~~minutes/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~  
~~XXXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

A J Coles

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Dr M F Perutz CH FRS  
42 Sedley Taylor Road  
CAMBRIDGE

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

*The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your recent telegram*  
~~Thank you for your telegram to the Prime Minister.~~

CAVEAT.....

~~I have been asked to reply.~~

We are aware of the improvements in the United States' relations with Argentina over the last year and the more frequent exchanges of high level visits between Washington and Buenos Aires. These contacts were part of the efforts of the current United States administration to cultivate closer relations with Latin America. *but we have* We know ~~of no evidence to support the suggestion of collusion in your telegram.~~ *absolutely* ~~any allegation of collusion, which we do not believe.~~

The United States have supported Security Council Resolution 502 condemning the Argentine aggression and calling upon them to withdraw their forces. Mr Haig's negotiating efforts, as he has repeatedly made clear, have been undertaken in the context of that resolution. The Government accepts that while Mr Haig is engaged in delicate negotiations *it is not possible for him* ~~the Government considers it~~ *himself* ~~unhelpful~~ to align itself with either party. The

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/British

British Government believe there is clear and sympathetic understanding in Washington of our intentions in our search for a solution to the crisis and of the central principles which we wish to maintain.

*M 24*

1E

ds

SECRET - UK EYES B



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 April 1982

*Dear Sir,*

Maritime Rules of Engagement

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Nott's minute of 22 April. Subject to the views of colleagues in OD(SA) she is content that the Rule which authorises our forces to presume that any conventional submarine encountered would be Argentinian may be promulgated.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Halliday (Home Office), Keith Long (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Sir Michael Palliser.

*John Cole*

David Omand, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET - UK EYES B



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~930 7922~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

Prime Minister 23rd April 1982

I suggest that you discuss this  
with the Prime Minister tomorrow morning.

the  
23rd

MT  
Gen Chie,

OPERATION CORPORATE: VULCAN SUPPORT

As I indicated to you this afternoon, following the Prime Minister's visit to Northwood and the briefing she received there, the Chief of Defence Staff is seeking a decision, by tomorrow evening, to allow the deployment of two Vulcan aircraft to Ascension. I attach a copy of the submission which he has now sent the Defence Secretary, and which reflects the outcome of discussion by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

I have consulted Mr Nott on the outline of what is proposed. He would strongly support early deployment to Ascension of the two Vulcan aircraft both in order to provide the earliest possible option for neutralising the Port Stanley airfield and also for its general deterrent effect. He recognises however that since the deployment would become known its effect on the diplomatic scene needs to be taken into account, particularly if Mr Haig were to return to Buenos Aires.

The Defence Secretary has asked me to emphasise that authority to mount a sortie against Port Stanley airstrip is an entirely separate decision, which Mr Nott would wish to have discussed fully in OD(SA). This subject may well come up at Chequers on Sunday, and a detailed briefing on the Vulcan capability can be provided for Ministers should they wish it at Northwood later that afternoon.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to the members of OD(SA) and Sir Robert Armstrong. Copies also go direct to Sir Michael Palliser, and Sir Ian Sinclair (FCO).

Yours ever,  
David Omand

(D B OMAND)

C A Whitmore Esq

2038/1

CNS  
CGS  
CAS  
PUS  
SECCOSSECRETARY OF STATEDEPLOYMENT OF VULCANS TO ASCENSION ISLAND

1. As you know the RAF have been working up a capability to attack Port Stanley airfield with conventional bombs from Vulcan aircraft launched from Ascension Island.
2. The Vulcan with air refuelling has a radius of action and bomb carrying capability to reach the Falkland Islands from Ascension Island which is 3,350 miles away. A force of 10 Victor tankers would be required to support a single Vulcan round trip from Ascension Island. There is enough fuel at Ascension to support this operation. The US Administration has today confirmed that there would be no objection to our deploying Vulcan aircraft to Ascension.
3. If a Vulcan aircraft attacked the Port Stanley runway with 21 1,000 lb bombs at low level there would be a 90% probability of causing one runway crater and a 75% probability of causing 2 runway craters. There would be considerable damage to the parking area, and any parked aircraft. The direction of attack would ensure that neither Port Stanley town nor its outskirts were within the predicted impact area. Vulcan aircraft have been modified for this operation, and crews have been training in air to air refuelling and conventional bombing in conditions similar to those they would encounter in the Falkland Islands.
4. So far as we know there are no Argentine Air Defence aircraft deployed to the Falkland Islands, and the distance from mainland bases should preclude interception by air defence aircraft, particularly at night. There are air defences around Port Stanley including anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles, and air defence radars but there is as yet no firm intelligence that these systems have an all weather and night time capability.
5. There is no doubt that an enforcement by our carrier task group of a total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands would be easier to achieve if Port Stanley airfield were rendered inoperable. This can be done by bombing attacks by Vulcans or by Sea Harriers operated from the task group. The Chiefs-of-Staff believe that the sooner it is done the better. The

advantage of using Vulcans is that the attack can be mounted before the task group arrives and the reinforcement of the Argentine garrison would be inhibited two or three days earlier. Furthermore the Sea Harriers would be conserved for the air operations necessary to enforce the Exclusion Zone and protect our ships. The Chiefs-of-Staff are confident that such an operation is militarily feasible and stands a good chance of success.

6. The Vulcans are now ready to be deployed. The earliest time at which one of the aircraft could attack Port Stanley airfield depends on the timing of a decision to deploy aircraft forward to Ascension Island as follows:

Decision to be Deployed	Aircraft on Ascension Island	Attack on Port Stanley Airfield
Sat 24 Apr	Sun 25 Apr	Mon 26 Apr
Sun 25 Apr	Mon 26 Apr	Tue 27 Apr

The decision to deploy the Vulcans forward could be delayed beyond Sun 25 April with corresponding delay to the attack but it should be noted that a delay in the Vulcan operations beyond 28/29 April could lead to a clash of priorities with the requirement to fly reinforcement Harriers out to Ascension Island early in May.

7. We are clear on the military advantages of early use of Vulcans to put Port Stanley airfield out of action. This option will be available sooner if we have an early decision to deploy the two Vulcan aircraft to Ascension. I should stress that a decision in this sense will not commit you to authorise attacks by the Vulcans on Port Stanley airfield which you could decide upon separately. The deployment of the Vulcans to Ascension Island would itself have a deterrent value.

Approved by CDS  
and Signed in his Absence

23rd April 1982

Ref: B06475

*You are already aware of**etc.*MR COLES*Who represents  
the P.M?  
ms.**A.S.C. 23/4**P.A.**MR 4/5*Falklands: Military Decisions

7  
1

Sir Robert Armstrong, who has now left for Paris until tomorrow, has asked me to report two urgent decisions on military matters which were authorised at his meeting this morning with Sir Antony Acland, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Michael Palliser and (in the Chief of the Defence Staff's temporary absence) the Chief of Naval Staff.

2. SSN Conqueror. This submarine has been deployed off South Georgia in the context of Operation Paraquet. The Ministry of Defence consider that she is no longer required there and that, in order not to waste a valuable asset, she should be immediately redeployed in direct support of the main Carrier Battle Group, which as you know is now south of latitude 35° South and will arrive at the Falklands MEZ on 29th April. But if she is to leave the South Georgia area, where she is covered by the Paraquet Rules of Engagement (ROE), she will need to be given new ROE. Apart from the Paraquet area, our submarines have at present ROE only for the Falklands MEZ. But our surface ships south of latitude 35° South have ROE which allow them to take necessary action to achieve their military task (transit) and to attack any submarine (or ship or aircraft) that demonstrates hostile intent; in these contexts they are allowed to presume that any conventional submarines detected are Argentinian. The equivalent ROE for an SSN reads

"Any submarine detected not classified nuclear may be presumed to be Argentinian and may be attacked".

The Ministry of Defence consider it essential that, if Conqueror is redeployed as they suggest, she be given this ROE (you are aware of the reasons why our submarines cannot afford to wait for a conventional submarine encountered to demonstrate hostile intent). Sir Robert's meeting concluded that this was unexceptional from Ministers' point of view; and therefore authorised both the proposed deployment and the proposed ROE. Sir Antony Acland did not consider that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary need be consulted or informed in Washington. The chances of an encounter between Conqueror and an Argentinian submarine are not in fact very high.

3. Argentine 707s. Boeing transport aircraft, with Argentine military markings, have been overflying the British Task Force. If this reconnaissance activity continues it could involve military danger, not least from submarines. Sir Robert's meeting therefore agreed -

(a) that the Task Force's Harriers should be authorised by the Ministry of Defence to "warn off" any further 707s which attempt such surveillance, using internationally recognised signals;

(b) that the Argentines should be confidentially warned, through the Swiss, that with immediate effect any Argentine aircraft engaging in such surveillance will be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be dealt with accordingly;

(c) that, once (b) had been done, the Ministry of Defence should authorise our Harriers to fire warning shots across the path of any 707 which ignores the signals at (a);

(d) that as soon as further urgent work on the legal position is complete a separate submission should be made to Ministers on whether any 707 which ignores the warning shots at (c) should be shot down.

If the steps at (a) or (c) succeed, (d) will of course not arise. The Defence Secretary is content with (a) and (c); Sir Antony Acland is informing the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in Washington and is confident that he too would not object. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office will prepare a public statement which could be made if, as a result of warning shots as at (c), the Argentines publicly complain that their aircraft have been attacked.

!! 4. Since the above was written I have, as you know, mentioned these points to the Prime Minister and she has indicated that she is content with both.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries of the other members of OD(SA); and to the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Antony Acland, Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Michael Palliser.

RLW

23rd April 1982

PRIME MINISTER

Chequers: Sunday, 25 April

Attached is the list of guests  
attending meeting and lunch on Sunday.

59

23 April 1982

c.c. Mr. Whitmore  
Mr. Coles  
Duty Clerk  
Miss Thomas (Chequers)

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING MEETING AND LUNCH ON SUNDAY, 25 APRIL 1982

The Prime Minister

Rt. Hon. William Whitelaw, MP

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP

Rt. Hon. John Nott, MP

Rt. Hon. Cecil Parkinson, MP

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin

Sir Antony Acland

Sir Michael Palliser

Sir Robert Armstrong

Mr. Robert Wade-Gery

Mr. R.L.L. Facer

Brigadier J.A.C. Eyre

Admiral Sir Henry Leach

General Sir Edwin Bramall

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham

Sir Frank Cooper

Mr. Patrick Wright

Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse

Major General Jeremy Moore

Lt.-General Glover

Mr. Julian Bullard

Mr. David Omand

Sir Ian Sinclair

Mr. Clive Whitmore

Mr. John Coles

P S ✓ 10 DOWNING

UNCLASSIFIED COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

As per attached distribution list

COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS' REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

1. Attached is a list of Commonwealth Governments' reactions to the Falklands crisis as at 23 April.

23 April 1982

COMMONWEALTH COORDINATION DEPT

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## COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

CONFIDENTIAL

Country

- \* Antigua and Barbuda Robust statement by PM. Full support also to UN initiative. Copy of statement to Commonwealth Secretary-General.
- \* Australia Recalled Ambassador but now considering reinstating him; ban on imports; ban on credit. Robust statements/messages of support. Statement at Security Council. PM has written to President Reagan.
- \*+ Bahamas Robust reply to PM's letter, to be referred to in Government statement. Note to Argentinian Government urging compliance with SCR 502. Robust statement.
- Bangladesh Statement condemning 'use of force in settling disputes'. Robust statement privately to Ambassador from Permanent Secretary Foreign Affairs. Helpful within NAM.
- \*+ Barbados 'Full and complete support to any Commonwealth protest and initiative'. Prime Minister delivered statement during televised budget debate ensuring maximum coverage. Support in OAS.
- \*+ Belize Reply to PM. Telegram to UNSG. Robust statement.
- \* Botswana Statement 'strongly condemns' Argentine action. No specific mention of support for UK. Replied to SG's letter.
- \* Canada Robust and helpful line. PM endorsed separately statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs. Recalled Ambassador. Reinstated 21 April. Message Trudeau/Galtieri urging compliance with SCR 502. Banned military shipments. Cancelled Defence College visit Ban on imports and export credit.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL



Cyprus

- \*+ Dominica Robust letter to Prime Minister. Robust message to UNSG.
- \*+ Fiji Robust statement by PM.
- \* The Gambia Robust Government statement
- Ghana [No response expected.]
- Grenada Unhelpful statement supporting Argentine's territorial claim but disapproving of use of force.
- \*+ Guyana Strong statement by Guyana Government. Voted for SCR 502. Robust reply to Ramphal's letter. Robust reply PM letter.
- India Lukewarm; appealing to 'all parties' to seek a 'peaceful resolution'.
- \*+ Jamaica Robust statement.
- \* Kenya Robust statement

- \* **Tiribati** Robust statement. Message to Argentine Government condemning invasion.
- Lesotho Response to SG expressing 'deep concern'.
- \*+ **Malawi** President's robust reply to PM: moral backing for use of force if necessary. Robust statement.
- Malaysia Weak statement although 'deeply disturbed'.
- Malta No statement yet. Avoided participation in Council of Europe vote; but in conversation with BHC Foreign Minister said Malta 'committed in support'
- \*+ **Mauritius** Robust reply to Ramphal quoting Security Council instructions. Robust statement.
- Nauru
- \* **New Zealand** Robust statements/messages of support. Broken diplomatic relations. Support at UN. Cancelled Argentine flight schedule. Ban on trade, supply of arms/military material, export credits.
- \*+ **Nigeria** Message to PM. Helpful statement.

- \* Papua New Guinea Robust statement by PM PNG. To make feelings known through international bodies. Responded to SG quoting statement. Told Argentine Government that unless complies with SCR 502 PNG will break off diplomatic relations.
- \*+ Saint Lucia Strong statement. Helpful statement in OAS,
- \*+ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Robust statement. Copy sent to SG.
- \* Seychelles Response to PM letter, deploring aggression: made public.
- \*+ Sierra Leone Statement views developments 'with great concern'. Ambassador UN instructed to 'condemn Argentine Action in strong terms'. SLG agree to provide facilities for refuelling etc.
- \*+ Singapore Fairly robust statement although no specific mention of support for UK. Robust reply from PM to PM's message.
- \*+ Solomon Islands Robust statement. Government has also sent message to SG of UN and to SG of Commonwealth. 'Assurance' of support to Prime Minister. Robust reply to PM letter.
- Sri Lanka Message to Prime Minister 'condemns use of force' but no specific support for UK.

- \*+ Swaziland Statement expressing 'great concern' at invasion and supporting SCR 502. Instructions on similar lines sent to New York.
- Tanzania Statement. regrets Argentine military action. but no specific mention of support for UK. Letter to PM from President expressing 'sympathy' over Falklands problem.
- \* Tonga Robust reply to PM letter: would support 'any action' by us to reassert sovereignty. Robust public statement. Argentine citizens banned from Tonga.
- + Trinidad and Tobago 'Feeble' statement. Helpful in OAS. Abstained in vote to invoke Rio Treaty.
- \*+ Tuvalu Robust reply to SG and Secretary of State.
- \* Uganda Voted for SCR 502. Helpful with Non-Aligned. Replied to PM letter: 'great concern'. Statement condemning aggression.
- \* Vanuatu Statement 'strongly condemns' invasion, but also calls upon UK to "reconsider" military retaliation Copied to SG, PM, Argentine Government, UN.
- Western Samoa
- \*+ Zambia Statement by Acting President deploring invasion

Zimbabwe

Inadequate statement but urging UK and Argentina to abide by SCR 502.

Notes:

- \* Countries which have explicitly (or implicitly through support for SCR 502) in public or in private condemned Argentina's invasion and/or called for withdrawal of Argentine forces.
- + Countries which have expressed support for the principles of self determination in relation to the Falklands.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1982

Prime Minister.

AR 24/4.

Dear John,

Call by Emissary of President Lopez Portillo  
Upon the Prime Minister

/ I enclose briefing material for the  
Prime Minister's use in case a call by  
Senor de la Lama is arranged. A personality  
/ note is included.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1982

Prime Minister

A.J.C.  $\frac{24}{4}$

mb

Dear John,

I understand that the Prime Minister has expressed concern that the party which arrived in Montevideo from the Falkland Islands on 20 April included a number of teachers. The Prime Minister wished to know the circumstances under which the teachers left the Islands.

All teachers in the Falklands were employed by the Falkland Islands Government, the majority of secondary school-teachers being recruited on the Government's behalf by the ODA under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme (OSAS). Of the total of 17 OSAS teachers, 12 have now left. According to one of the teachers, all have left of their own free will. No formal education is going on at present since most children have dispersed from Port Stanley to the settlements and the schools have been closed. The teachers were asked to work for the new Argentine authorities, who evidently offered to pay them local salaries. The Argentines had put in their own superintendent of education for the Islands and had said on the radio that they were intending to send anglophone teachers to the Islands. This added to the OSAS teachers' determination not to continue to work and co-operate with the Argentine occupation authorities.

Five OSAS teachers and 6 local secondary teachers remain, together with the previous Superintendent of Education, Mr John Fowler.

I am copying this to Mike Power (ODA).

Yours ever  
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

then to TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

22  
(29)

DBY 231500

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MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

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SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

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HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M. PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

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GR 475  
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DESKBY 231500Z  
FM ANKARA 231340Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1160F 23 APRIL  
VINFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO , UKREP BRUSSELS

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I WAS CALLED IN AT SHORT NOTICE THIS MORNING BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL IN THE TURKISH MFA RESPONSIBLE FOR LATIN AMERICA, IN ORDER TO ACQUAINT ME WITH A TELEGRAM JUST RECEIVED FROM THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES. THIS REPORTED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY THE ARGENTINE HEAD OF DEPARTMENT CONCERNED TO BE TOLD THAT THE PRESENCE OF A BRITISH FLEET OF 60 (SIC) WARSHIPS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC MIGHT LEAD TO AN ATTACK ON ARGENTINE FORCES. SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD HAVE GRAVE EFFECTS ON THE EAST/WEST AND NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTH AMERICA. THE ARGENTINES WISHED TO PREVENT THIS. THEY HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY BUT THE BRITISH HAD NOT. THE LATTER WERE INSISTING ON THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF A POPULATION 80 PER CENT OF WHOM WERE ALLEGED TO BE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR MEMBERS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY. THE ARGENTINE WAS ASKING TURKEY

~~WHOM WERE ALLEGED TO BE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR MEMBERS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY.~~ THE ARGENTINE WAS ASKING TURKEY AS A FRIEND OF THE UK TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO AVOID BLOODSHED. THERE WAS A HINT THAT ARGENTINA WISHED TO BE ENABLED TO COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 502. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR WAS TOLD THAT SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS WERE BEING MADE TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

2. COMMENTING, GUVENER SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WERE CLEARLY BEGINNING TO REALISE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. THE PRESENCE OF A BRITISH FLEET HAD HAD A SALUTARY EFFECT. IT SEEMED TO HAVE INCREASED THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.

3. REFERRING TO THE ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR TURKISH GOOD OFFICES, I SAID THAT THE MOST HELPFUL THING THAT THE TURKS COULD DO WOULD BE TO TELL THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PLAINLY THAT THE QUICKEST WAY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS ACTUALLY TO COMPLY WITH IT. ARGENTINA HAD COMMITTED AGGRESSION. THE ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP WAS TO UNDO THIS BY WITHDRAWING THE ARGENTINE FORCES. THEN THERE WOULD BE NO RISK OF BLOODSHED. IF THE ARGENTINIANS THOUGHT THAT THE UK WAS INFLEXIBLE ABOUT WITHDRAWAL THEY WERE DEAD RIGHT. IF THEY PRETENDED THAT THE UK WAS INFLEXIBLE ON NEGOTIATIONS THEY WERE DEAD WRONG.

4. GUVENER SAID THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD PUBLICLY STATED ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES. THEY HAD ALSO REPRESENTED THEIR VIEWS TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT THIS WAS AN OCCASION FOR THEM TO DO IT AGAIN. THE MORE COUNTRIES THAT BROUGHT HOME THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THE QUICKER A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WOULD BE REACHED.

LAURENCE

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ms

Prime Minister

A. J. C. 23/4

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY INTERVIEWED BY KEITH GRAVES  
FOR BBC RADIO 4, 6.00 P.M. NEWS LIVE FROM WASHINGTON: 23 APRIL

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Mr. Graves: . . . can you tell us if any progress is being made?

Mr. Pym: Yes I think progress has been made. I had a very valuable first meeting with Mr. Haig yesterday and others and our officials worked all yesterday afternoon and evening and I have had a meeting this morning with Judge Clark from the White House and Mr. Haig and I have had an hour or two together this morning and continue this afternoon. I must tell you that serious difficulties remain. Given the position taken by the Argentines that their aggression should be rewarded it is hardly surprising that it will be difficult to reconcile British and Argentine views. But we remain determined to work for a peaceful solution if it is humanely obtainable and I shall spare no effort and we know Mr. Haig is sparing no effort. But we shall not shrink from the use of force if that is necessary. It would be no service to the cause of peace for us to pretend otherwise. So the position here is, in the middle of the work that I have come to do, and we will continue it this afternoon.

Mr. Graves: You, last night, used the word "useful" at your first talks, are you now in fact using the word "progress" or did I put that into your mouth?

Mr. Pym: I think you suggested it but it is useful and obviously we shall be discussing together how we can improve the proposals and how we can make them more mutually acceptable, that must be helpful. Because as I say I don't disguise the problems in the way.

Mr. Graves: Are you still going home tonight, in a few hours time?

Mr. Pym: My plans are to go home tonight. That is my present intention.

Mr. Graves: Have you given the Americans any assurances over the use of violence. I mean have you said we would use it when necessary or we will not use it until a certain point is reached?

Mr. Pym: No I have given no assurances of that kind and nor have

/ they

they been sought . What we have been spending our time doing is to try and find a way to a peaceful settlement and as I say we shall make every endeavour to achieve this.

Mr. Graves: So what progress will you have made by the time you leave? You arrived here yesterday not feeling very optimistic. When you leave will you just have put over the Americans our case or will you have actually made any progress?

Mr. Pym: Well I hope we will have made progress. I hope we will have worked towards a more mutually acceptable arrangement, that remains to be seen.

Mr. Graves: The OAS is meeting here on Monday. Have the Americans discussed it all with you because its quite a vital meeting obviously.

Mr. Pym: Yes I have discussed it. Mr. Halp has referred to it and the meeting he is going to have on Monday. But that is not directly relevant to the achievements that we are trying to obtain.

Mr. Graves: It is relevant, presumably though, in that the Americans would be very unhappy if there was any violence because it is going to embarrass them with the OAS so to them it is relevant.

Mr. Pym: Yes. But all our work and incidentally that Treaty, but our work is based on the United Nations Charter and the Security Council Resolution which requires the Argentines to withdraw that is the starting point for everything and this is what we have got to work to achieve and that <sup>really is absolutely vital.</sup> We can't allow a country that annexes another <sup>country by invasion</sup> to simply go on enjoying the fruits of what it has achieved. We must arrange things on a more rational and a more orderly basis in the world by basing things on the United Nations and that Resolution and that is what ~~are our~~ work is dedicated towards.

Mr. Graves: The fleet is now virtually in position - are you saying now as you have been saying all along that military confrontation is now all that much closer. Are you likely to resort to that over the weekend?

/ Mr. Pym

Mr. Pym: Our strategy has been clear from the outset, to apply maximum pressure on the Argentines, by diplomatic means, by economic measures and by the build-up of military forces and we remain in exactly the same position today and I hope very much that they will realise that they must behave in an orderly way and they are ~~suffering from the~~ <sup>subject to a</sup> Mandatory Resolution and our strategy is to apply pressure too. We have got friends helping us all round the world, the European Community, the Commonwealth and others.

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RESTRICTED

②

Prime Minister

ms

A.S.C. 23/4

SAPU(82) 7

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper was issued at 1745 hours on 23 April 1982 and contains suggested lines to take on the following:

- Mr Pym's talks in Washington
- Status of South Georgia
- Task Force plans as it approaches Falklands

Cabinet Office

23 April 1982

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1. Mr Pym's Visit to Washington

Mr Pym is on a short working visit. No time yet fixed for his return. He has no plans to meet the Argentine Foreign Minister who is also in Washington; and no plans to go on to New York.

Mr Pym has taken with him counter proposals to the proposals given to Mr Haig by the Argentines. As Mr Pym has stressed there is no disguising the difficulty of these exchanges, or the difference between the two positions. In the House of Commons on Wednesday he outlined three major areas of difficulty: the arrangements for Argentine withdrawal, the nature of any interim administration of the Islands, and the framework for the negotiations on the long term solution to the dispute. The aim remains a diplomatic solution in accordance with the terms of Security Council Resolution 502. Can give no details of the counter proposals which Mr Pym is discussing with Mr Haig.

2. Status of South Georgia

As the PM said in the House yesterday the title to South Georgia is different from that to the Falklands. It is a separate dependency, although it has been administered as a matter of convenience through the Governor of the Falklands. The Argentine claim to South Georgia dates only from 1927, whereas Captain Cook landed and took possession in 1777 and the British Government formerly annexed the Island in 1908. Argentina has consistently declined to submit to the International Court of Justice on the issue, although we have offered to do so.

### 3. Task Force Plans

Will Britain fire first?

- Argentina fired first when she invaded the Falklands. All our actions, including the establishment of the Maritime Exclusion Zone, have been in exercise of our right of self-defence. We have the capability to enforce the zone and Mr Nott has stated that we are prepared to fire first in order to do so.

Admiral Woodward said the opposite?

- The Admiral was not talking about the MEZ. He was speaking after the first contact with Argentine reconnaissance planes and about the possibility of further contact with Argentine aircraft or ships while still on passage to the Falklands.

What happens if the Task Force meets the Argentine fleet?

- Admiral Woodward has clear orders for such eventualities (cannot say what they are).

Fleet seeks, and gets, assurances from PM about air cover? (Times front page)

- No such exchange has taken place. Well aware of importance of air cover to Task Force. Government already sending extra Harriers.

Admiral Woodward's reported plans for an 'air blockade'?

- Cannot discuss operational plans but it is an obvious military option and the announcement of the MEZ clearly reserved our right to take additional measures.

Operational plans (eg landing on South Georgia)?

- Would be irresponsible to speculate about any operational plans.

0/0  
C.A. Whitmore, Esq.



CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of  
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO  
*Secretary of the Cabinet*

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS  
Telephone: 01-233 8319

SECRET



GM to Mr Ingham...

18

Prime Minister

To see

HW  
23/4

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO

Ref. A08199

23rd April, 1982

Handwritten scribble

The Sunday Times published on 18th April three articles about the intelligence cover available in support of the operations of the naval Task Force in the South Atlantic. These articles contained statements some of which were remarkably accurate. They related both to the substance of intelligence reporting and to the methods by which intelligence is collected.

These articles could not have been put together solely by intelligent journalists speculating on the situation. The authors must at the least have had the opportunity to put searching questions to officials and have received replies which were more forthcoming than they should have been.

The damage caused by articles such as these is well known to all of us. In so far as substance is concerned, they enable the Argentines to speculate knowledgably about our intentions and possibly to take deceptive measures themselves. In so far as methods are concerned the damage to our capabilities, though possibly not immediate, is likely to be widespread and long-lasting.

I should be grateful if all those to whom I am sending copies of this letter would ensure that those dealing with the press throughout their organisations - including people who were in the Falkland Islands at the time of the invasion - are most firmly instructed to deal with all questions on intelligence matters in the only approved manner: that is, by refusing to comment.

I am sending copies of this letter to Frank Cooper, Terry Lewin, Nicko Henderson, Clive Whitmore and Robert Wade-Gery, and also, for information, to Michael Palliser, Patrick Wright and Tony Duff.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Sir Antony Acland, KCVO, CMG

SECRET

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(3) 36 + 7

PS (6)  
 PS/MR HURD (3)  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR BIRKEND~~  
 PS/PUS  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/NEWS~~

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 MR LITTLER  
 MR HAWTIN  
 MR PERETZ  
 MR ILETT  
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H.M.TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

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 SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD, Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

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FROM MONTEVIDEO 232010Z APR 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE MODUK  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 232010Z APRIL 1982.

SIC U2J/19F

FROM BRITDEFAT MONTEVIDEO.

FALKLAND CRISIS PRESS 23 APRIL -

1. UPI BUENOS AIRES QUOTES MILITARY SOURCES AS STATING THE SOUTH GEORGIA GARRISON CONSISTS OF 140 VOLUNTEERS. OTHER PRESS ARTICLES WHO DO NOT QUOTE SOURCES SAY FIGURE IS BETWEEN 300 AND 500.
2. ARGENTINE DAILY CLARIN CLAIMS STANLEY AIRPORT IS ACCEPTING 800 LANDINGS PER WEEK.
3. PRESIDENT GALTIERI VISITED THE ISLANDS 22 APRIL ACCOMPANIED BY : ACOS LOG - BRIG GEN ESPOSITO 21C FABRICACIONES MILITARES - BRIG GEN MARQUE CHIEF ENGINEER - BRIG GEN CASTELLI SUB SECRETARY OF ARMY BRIG GEN GUTIERREZ

MILITARES - BRIG GEN MARQUE CHIEF ENGINEER - BRIG GEN CASTELLI  
SUB SECRETARY OF ARMY BRIG GEN GUTIERREZ

ALL OF ARMY HQ. AND ACOS (OPS) OF JOINT HQ BRIG GEN SAA.

4. ALL PAPERS CARRY REPORTS THAT THE URUGUAYAN NAVY SAILED  
YESTERDAY AND RELATE THE SAILING TO THE TENSE SITUATION  
IN FACT TWO DESTROYERS MODE 18 DE FOLIO AND EL URUGUAY ,  
2 MINESWEEPERS AND 3 PATROL BOATS.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT/RCVD AT 23/2045Z TWV/

CCN PARA 4 WA SITUATION . IN FACT TWO

SENT/RCVD AT 23/2045Z TWV/VAH

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36 + 7  
(28)

PS (6)  
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PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR RICHMOND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
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SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER } H.M.TSY  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }  
MR McINTYRE }

HD/SAmD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/PHOD~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
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RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 232045Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 23 APRIL  
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK

MY TELNO 108

FALKLANDS: BRAZILIAN ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA

1. AT THE END OF MY MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER I ASKED HIM STRAIGHT OUT ABOUT BRAZIL'S POLICY ON GIVING MILITARY SUPPORT TO ARGENTINA.
2. GUERREIRO SAID THAT BRAZIL WOULD NOT OF COURSE HELP BY SENDING TROOPS BUT WAS READY TO SUPPLY EQUIPMENT. THE BRAZILIANS WERE MOTIVATED BY THE VIEW THAT IF THEY DID NOT HELP THEY MIGHT CREATE RESENTMENT IN ARGENTINA AGAINST BRAZIL, WHICH COULD LAST GENERATIONS. WHEN I PRESSED HIM FURTHER, HE ADMITTED THAT EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE NON-LETHAL BUT IT WOULD NOT BE QUOTE DECISIVE UNQUOTE EITHER.
3. MY NAVAL ATTACHE HAS REPORTED SEPARATELY (NOT TO ALL) REGARDING THE POSSIBLE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE SUPPLIED.

HARDING

(29) 36 + 7 = 43

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD (3)  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR BIRNIE~~

IMMEDIATE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
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HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/ CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY WASHINGTON 232200Z APR 82  
FM BRASILIA 231945Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 108 OF 23 APRIL 82  
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 81: FALKLANDS/OAS

1. I CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT 1 PM AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TUR.
2. COMMENTING ON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF TUR, GUERREIRO SAID:

(A) THE BRAZILIANS DID NOT SEE THAT THE TIAR MEETING SHOULD HAVE ANY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS, PROVIDED TAT A RESOLUTION CLEARLY WITHIN THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 6, AND NOT STRAYING INTO ARTICLE 8, WAS ADOPTED. SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE TO THE LIKING OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, SINCE IT WOULD HAVE TO ENDORSE THE CLAIM OF ARGENTINA TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS - A POINT ON WHICH ALL THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES WERE AGREED. HE HOPED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE

ENDORSE THE DEATH OF THE  
FALKLANDS - A POINT ON WHICH ALL THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES WERE AGREED. HE HOPED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE IN IT A POSITIVE REFERENCE TO MR HAIG'S NEGOTIATING EFFORTS.

- (B) BRAZIL, IN COMMON WITH OTHER OAS MEMBERS INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, TOOK THE VIEW THAT ARTICLE 53(1) OF THE UN CHARTER REFERRED ONLY TO MILITARY MEASURES OF COERCION. THOUGH HE WOULD NOT SAY SO PUBLICLY, BRAZIL CONSIDERED THAT BOTH SIDES IN THE DISPUTE HAD ACTED ILLEGALLY, ARGENTINA BY HER INITIAL ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ISLANDS AND BRITAIN BY SEEKING TO USE FORCE IN TURN UNDER THE CLOAK OF RESOLUTION 502. IF BRITAIN WISHED TO USE MEASURES OF HER OWN TO CONTEST THE ARGENTINE POSITION, SHE SHOULD FIRST SEEK SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT HE DID NOT AT THIS STAGE SEE ANY FUTURE IN AN ATTEMPT TO DO SO: INDEED, IT MIGHT MAKE MATTERS WORSE.
- (C) ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, BRAZIL CONSIDERED THAT THE EC MEASURES WERE PURELY UNILATERAL AND WERE NOT AUTHORISED EITHER UNDER THE TERMS OF THE UN CHARTER OR OF GATT. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD ALREADY POLARISED OPINION BETWEEN EUROPE ON ONE SIDE AND LATIN AMERICA ON THE OTHER AND THAT THEY SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT.
- (D) HE AGREED WARMLY WITH WHAT I SAID ABOUT THE VALUE ATTACHING TO RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND BRAZIL AND UNDERLINED THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN US WHATSOEVER. I SAID THAT I WAS CONFIDENT THAT YOU WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE THE CAREFUL WORK PUT INTO BUILDING UP OUR RELATIONS IN THE PAST YEAR OR TWO UNDONE: ON THE CONTRARY, WE WISHED TO IMPROVE THEM STILL FURTHER AND, AS THE MINISTER KNEW, HAD SPECIFIC IDEAS IN THIS RESPECT. GUERREIRO AGREED WITH THIS POINT TOO. ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN RELATIONS (VIZ IF REQUIRED UNDER A TIAR RESOLUTION), GUERREIRO SAID JOKINGLY THAT THEY MIGHT INDEED CONTEMPLATE WITHDRAWING AMBASSADOR ROBERTO CAMPOS FROM LONDON FOR POLITICAL REASONS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW HIM TO PURSUE HIS CANDIDATURE FOR THE SENATE IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS.

3. MORE GENERALLY, GUERREIRO SAID THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE WAY THE SITUATION WAS DEVELOPING. THOUGH

3. MORE GENERALLY, GUERREIRO SAID THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE WAY THE SITUATION WAS DEVELOPING. THOUGH THEY WERE NOT INFORMED OF THE DETAIL OF THE HAIG NEGOTIATIONS, THEY COULD SEE THAT THE POSITIONS ADOPTED BY THE TWO SIDES WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE. THEY GREATLY FEARED THE ERUPTION OF THE DISPUTE INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT, WHICH WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR ALL CONCERNED AND COULD HAVE UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES,, THOUGH HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THESE WOULD STOP SHORT OF AN INTER-CONTINENTAL CONFLICT.

4. SPECIFICALLY ON THE CONDUCT OF THE TIAR MEETING, GUERREIRO SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED THAT ONE OF THE MORE HOT-HEADED LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATIONS MIGHT TRY TO OUT-ARGENTINE THE ARGENTINES AND GO FOR A RESOLUTION UNDER ARTICLE 8. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS WOULD PUT THE BRAZILIANS IN A VERY DIFFICULT SPOT AND THAT THEY WOULD DO WHAT THEY COULD TO PREVENT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. BUT IN THE LAST RESORT, THEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO ISOLATE THEMSELVES FROM THE OTHER TREATY MEMBERS.

5. GUERREIRO IS LEAVING ON SATURDAY EVENING FOR WASHINGTON. HE EXPECTS TO MEET A NUMBER OF LA FOREIGN MINISTERS FOR DILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON SUNDAY. HE HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO DINE WITH COSTA MENDES ON THAT DAY.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT AT 23:2035 Z ED //DW

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

37  
(23)

TYPING

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD (3)  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR BIRKEND~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

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HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/NEWS~~

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/CABINET OFFICE  
DIO  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAS. OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GRS 100

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

ADVANCE COPY

(FM BERNE 231805Z)

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
FROM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION BUENOS AIRES (BISBA)  
TELNO 41 OF 23 APRIL

ms.

YOUR TELNO 163: ARGENTINE WAR ZONE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY RODOLFO BALTIERREZ, PUBLIC INFORMATION SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY, PUBLISHED BY 'LA NACION' OF THURSDAY, 8 APRIL:

QUOTE

THE CREATION OF THE 'SOUTH ATLANTIC OPERATIONS THEATRE' IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE DEFENCE OF OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE LARGE AREA IT COVERS: 200 MARITIME MILES FORM THE CONTINENTAL COAST AND AROUND THE RECONQUERED ISLANDS OF MALVINAS, GEORGIAS AND SOUTH SANDWICH.

ONCE THE 'THEATRE' HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE MAY ORDER ACTIONS OF SELF-DEFENCE IN SITUATIONS THAT COULD ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY.

VICE-ADMIRAL JUAN JOSE LOMBARDO, COMMANDER OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,

VICE-ADMIRAL JUAN JOSE LOMBARDO, COMMANDER OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
HAS BEEN APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC OPERATIONS  
THEATRE.

UNQUOTE

2. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NO FURTHER DETAILS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED.

JOY 23.4.

UNQUOTE

LEE

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SENT/RECD AT 231844Z JMM/IA

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR HAWTIN  
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MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
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DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAFU CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFF

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RESIDENT CLERK

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GRS 120

UNCLASSIFIED

(FM BERNE 241000Z)

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

FROM BRITISH INTEREST SECTION BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 44 OF 23 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO

PRESS SUMMARY

1. TODAY'S PRESS CARRIES HEADLINE REPORTS OF GALTIERI'S VISIT TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND HIS EXHORTATIONS TO THE TROOPS DUG IN THERE. OTHER HEADLINES REPORT YOUR INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG IN WASHINGTON WITH HINTS OF POSSIBLE PROGRESS. 'LA PRENSA' HEADLINES THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON EXHAUSTING PEACEFUL MEANS BUT NOT RULING OUT THE USE OF FORCE. INGLESIAS ROUCO, HARDLINE COLUMNIST IN THE SAME PAPER WRITES THAT THIS IS THE TIME FOR ARMS AND WAR IS NOW INEVITABLE. THE ARGENTINES SHOULD REVERT TO THEIR POSITION AT THE FIRST OF APRIL AS THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER SUGGESTS, THAT IS THEY SHOULD PREPARE FOR BATTLE, WITHDRAWING SUBSEQUENT QUOTE CONCESSIONS UNQUOTE.

2. SUBSIDIARY REPORTS SUGGEST THAT BRITAIN WILL ATTEMPT TO

2. SUBSIDIARY REPORTS SUGGEST THAT BRITAIN WILL ATEMPT TO OCCUPY THE GEORGIAS RATHER THAN UNDERTAKE THE DIRECT ASSAULT ON THE FALKLANDS.

JOY 23.4.

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CO MONTREAL

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CO ECO

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TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS No.10 DOWNING ST. —

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
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SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

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RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GRS 180

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 240900Z

FM MEXICO CITY 232040Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 315 OF 23 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (FOR S OF S'S PARTY), UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 299: FALKLANDS/OAS

1. MINISTER/COUNSELLOR SPOKE TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY ABOUT THE OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 26 APRIL. TELLO SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE MEXICAN POSITION SINCE MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON 21 APRIL (NY TUR). DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO THEIR AMBASSADOR AT THE OAS WHICH SHOULD ALLOW HIM TO REACT TO ANY POSSIBLE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION.
2. THE MEXICANS REMAINED COMMITTED TO VOTE AGAINST ANY RESOLUTION CALLING FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED KINGDOM. THEIR AIM WAS TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED RESOLUTION. THEY WOULD, FOR INSTANCE, SUPPORT THE INCLUSION OF A PARAGRAPH CALLING ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO LIFT ITS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA,

THEIR AIM WAS TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED RESOLUTION. THEY WOULD, FOR INSTANCE, SUPPORT THE INCLUSION OF A PARAGRAPH CALLING ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO LIFT ITS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA, BUT ONLY IF THE RESOLUTION ALSO CALLED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502.

3. TELLO CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS NO PRESENT PLAN FOR A MEXICAN MINISTER TO ATTEND THE MEETING. HOWEVER IF MATTERS BECAME COMPLICATED DURING THE MEETING, THE FOREIGN MINISTER MIGHT DECIDE TO ATTEND OR HE HIMSELF WOULD GO TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK WHERE HE WOULD BE TAKING PART IN THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE NEXT WEEK.

TICKELL

NNNN



*With the compliments of*

*John Holmes*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

IMMEDIATE

(LIMITED)

(X7)

WONFO 013/23

MEXWASH 004/23

OO FCO DESKBY 230830Z

GRS 110

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 230830Z

FM MEXICO CITY 230057Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 310 OF 23 APRIL

ADVANCE COPY

DESKBY 230830Z

MCAD

SAMD

PS -

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

RC

0117

cc Mr Coles (No 10)

YOUR TELNO 322: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. MR DU CANN MAY BE REFERRING TO ROSSELL DE LA LAMA, WHO IS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF HIDALGO AND WAS MINISTER OF TOURISM (SEE LPR) UNTIL 1980. ROSSELL HAS HAD BUSINESS LINKS WITH LONHRO.
2. HE IS QUITE CLOSE TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO AND MIGHT APPROPRIATELY BE RECEIVED BY THE PRIME MINISTER. BUT WE HAVE HEARD FROM HIS OFFICE, VIA THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, THAT HE HAS NO PLANS TO VISIT BRITAIN.
3. YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH TO ASK MR DU CANN TO CONFIRM THAT HE IS REFERRING TO ROSSELL DE LA LAMA HIMSELF AND NOT FOR INSTANCE TO ONE OF HIS SONS AND TO CLARIFY THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT.

TICKELL

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

cc. Mr. Gow

*mg*

Mr. Edward Du Cann

The above will now not be coming to see you this weekend.

I spoke to him this evening, referred to a conversation he had had with Ian Gow earlier in the day, and said that now that your arrangements were clearer, you would be glad to see him with his Mexican visitor at 9.30 tomorrow morning.

He said that he was grateful for the offer but because there had been difficulty about making the appointment, his Mexican contact had now decided not to come. He also complained that our Embassy in Mexico City had made enquiries in the Foreign Ministry about the visit and therefore revealed what was supposed to have been a secret mission. I said that the Embassy could not be blamed. As we always did in cases where the Prime Minister was receiving a foreign visitor, we has sought a briefing on the person concerned (the Embassy's telegram in reply is attached).

I told Mr. Du Cann that if, at any point, he wished to resurrect the idea of the visit, he could take it that you would be glad to give him an appointment.

*A.J.C.*

23 April, 1982

IMMEDIATE

(LIMITED)

(X7)

WONFO 013/23

MEXWASH 004/23

OO FCO DESKBY 230830Z

GRS 110

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 230830Z

FM MEXICO CITY 230057Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 310 OF 23 APRIL

ADVANCE COPY

DESKBY 230830Z

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TICKELL

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DESKBY 240800Z  
FM WASHINGTON 240025Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1428 OF 23 APRIL

MY TELEGRAM NO 1416: FALKLANDS : SATELLITE COVERAGE

mt

1. HAIG RAISED THIS WITH SECRETARY OF STATE THIS AFTERNOON THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED BY NASA OF THE ARGENTINIAN REQUEST SHORTLY AFTER WE HAD DRAWN IT TO THEIR ATTENTION. OUR EARLIER INFORMATION WAS SLIGHTLY INACCURATE. THE ARGENTINES HAD ASKED FOR COVERAGE OF SOUTH GEORGIA ITSELF ON 24 AND 25 APRIL AND OF THE OPEN OCEAN TO THE WEST OF THE ISLAND ON 25 AND 26 APRIL. THE REQUEST HAD BEEN RECEIVED LATE LAST NIGHT. NASA HEADQUARTERS HAD BEEN INFORMED AT 0830 THIS MORNING.

2. HAIG SAID THAT THIS REQUEST PLACED THE US IN A QUANDARY. IT WAS ENTIRELY WITHIN THE NORMAL CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND NASA. NORMALLY THE US WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO HONOUR IT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THIS SATELLITE WERE NOT CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ANY INTELLIGENCE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. HE SOUGHT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEWS ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE DONE.

3. AFTER A SHORT BREAK FOR CONSULTATION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THIS HAD TO BE A US DECISION. BUT HE HOPED VERY STRONGLY THAT BY SOME MEANS OR ANOTHER IT COULD BE ARRANGED THAT THIS MATERIAL WAS NOT PASSED TO ARGENTINA. HE DID NOT FEEL COMPETENT HIMSELF TO JUDGE THE POSSIBLE MILITARY VALUE OR SUCH PICTURES BUT IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INFINITELY BETTER IF THEY WERE NOT PROVIDED.

4. HAIG SAID HE WOULD HAVE BEEN SURPRISED IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S REACTION HAD BEEN ANY DIFFERENT. HE NOW FACED A DIFFICULT DECISION, ON WHICH HE WOULD NEED TO CONSULT THE PRESIDENT. BUT HE WANTED MR PYM TO KNOW THAT WHATEVER THE DECISION WAS IT HAD TO BE MEASURED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF WHAT THE US WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE. HE REPEATED THAT NO EXPERT ON THE US SIDE BELIEVED THAT THE SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY CONCERNED HAD ANY MILITARY VALUE, GIVEN ITS VERY LOW RESOLUTION.

HENDERSON  
LIMITED  
HD/SAM  
HD/DEFENCE  
HD/PUS  
RS  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARI

MR WRIGHT  
MR URE  
MR GILMORE

COPIES TO:  
D.I.O. CABINET OFFICE  
SIR M. PALLISER, } CABINET  
MR. WADE-BERY, } OFFICE.

COPY SENT TO NO10  
DOWNING ST. ALSO SENT TO  
MODUK, CINC FLEET AND  
TFG RHY

SECRET

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS (6)  
~~PS/MR HURD~~ (3)  
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 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
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PS/CHANCELLOR  
 SIR K COUZENS  
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 MR HAWTIN  
 MR PERETZ  
 MR ILETT  
 MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG, DIO. CAB. OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK sent

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 232000Z FCO AND WASHINGTON  
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 232005Z APR 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 543 OF 23 APRIL 1982  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

VISIT OF DEPUTY LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION.

1. FOLLOWING CALLS ON THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND BRIAN URQUHART, MR DENNIS HEALEY GAVE INTERVIEWS TO BBC AND ITN AND SPOKE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE.

2. MR HEALEY'S MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) HIS TALK WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD BEEN HELPFUL. THE UN SECRETARIAT WERE WORKING HARD ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING SHOULD A REQUEST BE MADE FOR THE UN TO TAKE A ROLE, WHETHER THROUGH PROVIDING A TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION FOR THE ISLANDS, A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, OR A NEW MEDIATOR IF HAIG FAILED;
- (B) HAIG'S EFFORTS OFFERED THE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HELP HIM. HE HOPED THAT HAIG WOULD INCLUDE IN HIS PROPOSALS A SUGGESTION THAT THE UN SHOULD ASSIST IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS FOLLOWING AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. A PROPOSAL FOR A UN ROLE IN THE

- THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS FOLLOWING AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. A PROPOSAL FOR A UN ROLE IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION COULD BREAK THE PRESENT DEADLOCK:
- (C) AT THE UN, MR HEALEY HAD FOUND GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO TAKE ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES WHILE HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED. HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERED IT VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT, IF HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN, BRITAIN SHOULD ASK THE UNITED NATIONS TO PROVIDE A NEW MEDIATOR. IF WE DID NOT DO THIS, SOMEONE ELSE WOULD:
- (D) A UN ADMINISTRATION WOULD PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE WAY OF CONSULTING THE ISLANDERS ON THEIR VIEWS:
- (E) MR HEALEY WARNED THE UNITED STATES AGAINST MAKING THE SAME MISTAKE IN THEIR DIPLOMATIC APPROACH THAT THE BRITISH HAD MADE IN THEIR EARLIER HANDLING OF THE CRISIS. JUST AS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE FOR THE UK TO SEND A SMALLER NUMBER OF VESSELS AT AN EARLIER STAGE, IT WOULD BE LESS COSTLY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO APPLY MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO THE ARGENTINES NOW THAN TO HAVE TO COPE WITH THEM IF A WAR BROKE OUT. PRESSURE SHOULD INCLUDE MEASURES ON THE LINES OF THOSE TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.
- (F) IF FIGHTING BROKE OUT, THE LABOUR PARTY'S CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT WOULD DEPEND ON THE WAY HOSTILITIES HAD COME ABOUT. THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN RIGHT TO SEND A TASK FORCE. BUT FORCE SHOULD ONLY BE USED WITH GREAT CARE AND AS THE VERY LAST RESORT IF NEGOTIATIONS FAILED. IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO USE FORCE ON ANY SCALE SO LONG AS A GENUINE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS CONTINUING:
- (G) THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT REJECTED HIS SUGGESTIONS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT, BUT HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING THEM SERIOUSLY. MR HEALEY DENIED THAT HE WAS UNDER-CUTTING THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS IN HIS MISSION TO NEW YORK. THE LABOUR PARTY HAD GIVEN CLEAR SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERED IT VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE UN IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY AS SCR 502 HAD BEEN A GREAT SOURCE OF STRENGTH:
- (H) A MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENTARY LABOUR PARTY ON 22 APRIL HAD GIVEN UNANIMOUS BACKING TO HIS MISSION. HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS A "TINY MINORITY" IN THE LABOUR PARTY WHICH DID NOT SUPPORT THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT, BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS ALSO A SIMILARLY TINY MINORITY IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY (MENTIONING SIR ANTHONY MEYER'S OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF FORCE).

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 April 1982

Threat to British Citizens from the Argentine  
Security Services

---

Thank you for your letter of 22 April.

The Prime Minister is content with the  
action you propose.

I am copying this letter to David Omand  
(Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home  
Office) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

X 18 psc.

ec PS  
 PS / Mr. Hunt  
 PS / Mr. Onslow  
 PS / PUS  
 Mr. Giffard  
 E/R Mr. Wright  
 Mr. Gillmore  
 Mr. Weston  
 Mr. Rann  
 Mr. Mallicky  
 Emergency Unit  
 PS / No 10 ←  
 PS / Mr. Watt  
 PS / Mr. Howe  
 PS / Chancellor of Duchy  
 of Lancaster  
 Sir R. Armstrong  
 Sir M. Palliser

24 APR 1982

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FM WASHINGTON 240210Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NO 1435 OF 23 APRIL

YOUR TELNO 803: FALKLAND ISLANDS: US SECURITY ASSURANCES.

AT HIS FINAL MEETING WITH HAIG, JUST BEFORE DEPARTURE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE HANDED OVER THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF POINTS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN A LETTER WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN COULD SEND TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT.

2. HAIG SAID THAT, IN PRINCIPLE, WHAT WE WERE PROPOSING WAS SOMETHING THAT "GOES WITH THE GAME". HE WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE PRESIDENT BEFORE RESPONDING AND HAVE IT STUDIED BY THE LAWYERS, NOT LEAST TO ENSURE THAT LANGUAGE OF THIS KIND DID NOT EXCEED THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT.

3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

POINTS FOR INCLUSION IN A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE  
PRIME MINISTER

- I. GLAD THAT IT LOOKS AS IF WE SHALL BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT.
- II. UNDERSTAND IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD REQUIRE SOME ASSURANCE THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WILL RESPECT ITS OBLIGATIONS IN GOOD FAITH AND, IN PARTICULAR, REFRAIN FROM ANY FURTHER USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ISLANDS.
- III. HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE US PRESENCE ON THE ISLANDS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD WILL SERVE AS AN EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND AGAINST ANY USE OF FORCE TO FRUSTRATE IT. WE SHALL LEAVE THE ARGENTINIANS IN NO DOUBT THAT ANY CHALLENGE BY THEM TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATING TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND THEIR NON-REINTRODUCTION, WILL BE SEEN AS A CHALLENGE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND RESPONDED TO ACCORDINGLY.
- IV. ONCE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED AND THE DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE ONLY SUCH RESPONSIBILITIES IN RESPECT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT AS IT SHALL HAVE SPECIFICALLY ACCEPTED IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUESTS OF THE TWO SIGNATORIES. IT WILL, HOWEVER, BE PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO ANY SUCH REQUESTS SEMICOLON AND, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE, IT WILL CONTINUE TO REGARD ANY USE OF FORCE TO FRUSTRATE OR OVERTURN THE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT AS A CHALLENGE TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO BE RESPONDED TO ACCORDINGLY.

ENDS

HENDERSON

NNNN



CC HO  
MOD  
COL  
CO

HU

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 April 1982

Falkland Islands population

Would you please refer to Robert Armstrong's minute of 22 April? There was some discussion of its contents at a meeting on other matters here this afternoon, at which Sir Antony Acland was present.

The Prime Minister agreed that a statement should be issued on the lines of paragraph 2C of the minute under reference but was concerned that we should not give any impression that we were taking the initiative to encourage the islanders to leave. It might therefore be best if the statement read as follows:

"In view of reports that some Falkland islanders would appreciate guidance on the matter, the Government wish to make it clear that if there are any islanders who would prefer to leave the islands temporarily until the immediate crisis is past, we will give sympathetic help to ensure that they are not prevented from doing so by lack of means."

The Prime Minister also considers that it is desirable to make arrangements for the islanders to receive regular guidance on the general situation. She wondered whether the Governor should make a daily broadcast. Care would have to be taken about the wording of any broadcast but the morale of the islanders could benefit considerably from such an arrangement and the Government might well be criticised if it did nothing in this respect. The Prime Minister would be grateful if this matter could be looked at urgently.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

5

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Chequers: Sunday, 25 April

Attached is the list of guests  
attending meeting and lunch on Sunday.

59

23 April 1982

c.c. Mr. Whitmore  
~~Mr. Coles~~  
Duty Clerk  
Miss Thomas (Chequers)

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING MEETING AND LUNCH ON SUNDAY, 25 APRIL 1982

The Prime Minister

Rt. Hon. William Whitelaw, MP

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP

Rt. Hon. John Nott, MP

Rt. Hon. Cecil Parkinson, MP

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin

Sir Antony Acland

Sir Michael Palliser

Sir Robert Armstrong

Mr. Robert Wade-Gery

Mr. R.L.L. Facer

Brigadier J.A.C. Eyre

Admiral Sir Henry Leach

General Sir Edwin Bramall

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham

Sir Frank Cooper

Mr. Patrick Wright

Fleet Admiral Fieldhouse

Major General Jeremy Moore

Lt.-General Glover

Mr. Julian Bullard

Mr. David Omand

Sir Ian Sinclair

Mr. Clive Whitmore

Mr. John Coles



From the Secretary of State

Prime Minister

X seems to me an odd view.

You may wish to await Mr.

Lynn's view

A.J.C. 23/4

ML 24/4

23 April 1982

L.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
London, SW1A 2AL

mf

Dear Francis,

On 4 April my predecessor took action to ban the export of aircraft, arms, spares and other strategic goods to Argentina under the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1981. Subsequent measures taken by our EC partners to ban the export of arms and military equipment and spares has reinforced the effect of this measure.

Nevertheless as the paper on the Effectiveness of Trade Sanctions against Argentina (OD(20)82) makes clear, the Control does not embrace all items which could have an eventual military application. Officials in my Department have learnt that several companies have sub-contract orders to supply equipment not covered by the existing ban for incorporation in ships or aircraft to be exported to the Argentine. In these cases, the firms agreed not to supply the equipment to the main contractors without further consultation.

Apart from goods with strategic significance there is a wide range of items that could quite legally be supplied from the United Kingdom which could make a contribution to the Argentine war effort. The only certain way of seeking to prevent the supply of such items (eg mobile generators, cranes etc) would be to make a new Export Control Order making a wide range of goods subject to licence (see ... attachment). In the absence of such a Control there is a risk that the export of non-strategic items may cause the embarrassment.

X Nevertheless, I would not think it right in the present delicate state of negotiations to initiate a new round of economic measures. I would be glad to know whether colleagues share this view.

CONFIDENTIAL



*From the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

Separately, there is at present no ban on the provision of services to Argentina. This gap, which would have been closed by the emergency legislation which we have decided to shelve, can equally cause embarrassment as Lloyds' potential involvement in a re-insurance contract for Aerolineas Argentinas illustrated. The great majority of British companies will continue to act in a responsible and prudent way and even if they are not inclined to do so the risks of adverse publicity must be a powerful deterrent to them. Thus the Committee of Lloyds has now told its Members not to undertake direct insurance or identified reinsurance with Argentina.

While therefore I do not propose that action should be taken by Order (still less by primary legislation) to widen the scope of the ban on exports of goods or to introduce a ban on services, I think that it is important that a strong line should be taken by all Departments on the question of undertaking new business with Argentina. In discouraging exporters or equipment or services from undertaking new commitments, my officials are pointing out the inevitable commercial risks involved in dealing with a country in an increasingly precarious economic position, the absence of ECGD cover for new contracts, the selective Argentine import ban and rule that no payments are to be made to British entities, and the wider national interest in refraining from assisting the Argentine economy. Exporters are also being advised to contact the ECGD before shipping orders fulfilled under existing insured contracts. As regards contractual commitments, it would be wrong to suggest to exporters that they should refrain from meeting legal obligations, but we will not of course be encouraging enquirers to go out of their way to help their Argentine customers if they can refrain from doing so without incurring liabilities.

I am sending copies of this letter to Members of OD, Secretaries of State for Industry and Energy and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*J. W. S.*  
*Arthur.*

LORD COCKFIELD

CONFIDENTIAL



GOODS WHICH MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO LICENSING CONTROL IN ANY NEW ORDER

- 1 Machinery and equipment for any purpose which is powered by electricity, battery, steam or oil or its derivatives; and parts for such machinery and equipment.
- 2 Hydrocarbon oils, crude or refined.
- 3 Ships of any description; marine equipment; and parts for ships and marine equipment.
- 4 Powered vehicles of any description; and parts for such vehicles.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1982

Prime MinisterContent that message  
should issue?

A.F.C. 23/4

Dear John,

Falklands: Norwegian Ban on Argentine Imports

As reported in Oslo telegram No 74, the Norwegian Government have now obtained overwhelming support in their Parliamentary Committee for their decision to ban imports from Argentina.

Although the legislation will not take effect until 23 April, there is every reason to believe that the legislative process will go smoothly. The Ambassador in Oslo has suggested that, in order not to lose the momentum in Oslo, it would be desirable for a message of thanks to Mr Willoch, the Norwegian Prime Minister, to be sent as soon as possible. A message has already been sent in the name of the Foreign Secretary.

/ I enclose a draft message for the Prime Minister's approval.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private SecretaryA J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

Precedence/Deskby


CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1	ZCZC
2	GRS
3	CONFIDENTIAL
4	
5	
6	FM FCO 231430Z APRIL 82
7	TO IMMEDIATE OSLO
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	FALKLANDS CRISIS: MESSAGE OF THANKS
10	1. Please pass following personal message from the Prime
11	Minister to the Norwegian Foreign Minister.
12	BEGINS: I should like to tell you how deeply grateful I am
13	to you for the decision of your Government to introduce
14	legislation to implement a ban on imports from Argentina. I
15	know how difficult a step this was. But I also know that your
16	<del>courageous</del> action will have an important further impact on
17	Argentina and bring home to them the profound distaste which is
18	felt by the democratic peoples of the world at their aggression
19	against the Falkland Islands. ENDS
20	
21	PYM
22	NNNN
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NNNN ends telegram		BLANK		Catchword	
File number		Dept		Distribution  Falklands	
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY					
Telephone number 233 4641					
Authorised for despatch					
Comcen reference		Time of despatch			



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1982

*Personal letters  
to Australia, New Zealand  
(I think both have been done)  
Guyana (Foster is intent)  
who has been very helpful and  
cancel Barbados  
no*

Prime Minister

*Agree that your thanks  
may be conveyed in the  
way?  
A.S.C. 23/4.*

The Commonwealth and the Falkland Islands Dispute

The reaction of Commonwealth Governments to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and the response of individual Commonwealth leaders to the Prime Minister's message have for the most part been strong and very gratifying. I enclose a schedule summarising the action they have taken in the last 2½ weeks. You will see that all but nine of the other 45 members of the Commonwealth have declared themselves, in public or private, in some way against the Argentine action. We have been considering what responses might be made to them.

As the schedule shows, the strength and warmth of the reactions of individual Commonwealth governments vary widely. It would scarcely be practicable to send an individually tailored letter of thanks in reply to each message or statement: quite apart from other considerations, this would only inundate you with paper. Although there are grounds for individually tailored messages from the Prime Minister in a small number of cases - and we have been, or shall be in touch with you separately about these - it would be administratively far simpler if High Commissioners could be instructed to convey to their host Heads of Government the Prime Minister's personal thanks, with greater or lesser warmth as each individual case requires. This could be effected by a general circular telegram to posts and I enclose a possible draft.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Country

Argentina and Barbuda Robust statement by PM. Full support also to UN initiative. Copy of statement to Commonwealth Secretary-General.

Australia Ambassador recalled; ban on imports; ban on credit. Robust statements/messages of support. Statement at Security Council. PM has written to President Reagan.

Bahamas Robust reply to PM's letter, to be referred to in Government statement. Note to Argentinian Government urging compliance with SCR 502. Robust statement.

Bangladesh Statement condemning 'use of force in settling disputes'. Robust statement privately to Ambassador from Permanent Secretary Foreign Affairs.

Barbados 'Full and complete support to any Commonwealth protest and initiative'. Prime Minister delivered statement during televised budget debate ensuring maximum coverage. Support in OAS.

Belize Reply to PM. Telegram to UNSG. Robust statement.

Botswana Statement 'strongly condemns' Argentine action. No specific mention of support for UK. Replied to SG's letter.

Canada Robust and helpful line. PM endorsed separately statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs. Recalled Ambassador but reinstated 21/4. Banned military shipments. Cancelled Defence College visit. Ban on imports and export credit.

Cyprus

Dominica Robust letter to Prime Minister. Robust message to UNSG.

Fiji Robust statement by PM.

The Gambia Robust Government statement.

Ghana No response expected.

Grenada Unhelpful statement supporting Argentina's territorial claim but disapproving of use of force.

Guyana Strong statement by Guyana Government. Voted for SCR 502. Robust reply to Ramphal's letter. Robust reply PM letter.

India Lukewarm; appealing to 'all parties' to seek a 'peaceful resolution'.

Jamaica Robust statement.

Kenya Robust statement.

Kiribati Robust statement. Message to Argentine Government condemning invasion.

CONFIDENTIAL

Lesotho Response to SG expressing 'deep concern'.

Malawi President's robust reply to PM: moral backing for use of force if necessary. Robust statement.

Malaysia Weak statement although 'deeply disturbed'.

Malta No statement yet. High Commission does 'not expect Malta to support' UK.

Mauritius Robust reply to Ramphal quoting Security Council instructions. Robust statement.

Nauru

New Zealand Robust statements/messages of support. Broken diplomatic relations. Support at UN. Cancelled Argentine flight schedule. Ban on trade, supply of arms/military material, export credits.

Nigeria Message to PM. Helpful statement.

Papua New Guinea Robust statement by PM PNG. To make feelings known through international bodies. Responded to SG quoting statement. Told Argentine Government that unless complies with SCR 502 PNG will break off diplomatic relations.

Saint Lucia Strong statement. Helpful statement in OAS.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Robust statement. Copy sent to SG.

Seychelles Response to PM letter, deploring aggression: made public.

Sierra Leone Statement views developments 'with great concern'. Ambassador UN instructed to 'condemn Argentine action in strong terms'. SLG agree to provide facilities for refuelling etc.

Singapore Fairly robust statement although no specific mention of support for UK. Robust reply from PM to PM's message.

Solomon Islands Robust statement. Government has also sent message to SG of UN and to SG of Commonwealth. 'Assurance' of support to Prime Minister. Robust reply to PM letter via BHC.

Sri Lanka Message to Prime Minister 'condemns use of force' but no specific support for UK.

Swaziland Statement expressing 'great concern' at invasion and supporting SCR 502.

Tanzania Statement regrets Argentine military action but no specific mention of support for UK. Expression of sympathy in letter to PM from President Nyerere.

Tonga Robust reply to PM letter: would support 'any action' by us to reassert sovereignty. Robust public

statement. Government to refuse entry and visa extensions to Argentine passport holders, and to require them to leave Tonga 'forthwith'.

Trinidad & Tobago	'Feeble' statement. Abstained in OAS vote to invoke Rio Treaty.
Tuvalu	Robust reply to SG and Secretary of State.
Uganda	Voted for SCR 502. Helpful with Non-Aligned. Replied to PM letter: 'great concern'. Statement condemning aggression.
Vanuatu	Statement 'strongly condemns' invasion but also calls upon UK to 'reconsider' military retaliation. Copied to SG, PM, Argentine Government, UN.
Western Samoa	
Zambia	Statement by Acting President deploring invasion
Zimbabwe	Inadequate statement but supporting SCR 502.

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE BANJUL
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN, BRIDGETOWN, COLOMBO, DACCA, DAR ES
	10	SALAAM, GABORONE, GEORGETOWN, HONIARA, KAMAPLA, KINGSTON,
	11	LUSAKA, MASERU, MBABANE, NAIROBI, NASSAU, NUKU'ALOFA, PORT LOUIS,
	12	PORT MORESBY, SINGAPORE, SALISBURY, SUVA, TARAWA, VICTORIA, VILA,
	13	CASTRIES (ST LUCIA), KINGSTOWN (ST VINCENT), ST JOHN'S (ANTIGUA)
	14	REPEATED FOR INFO TO: ROUTINE CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OTTAWA,
	15	LAGOS, LILONGWE, FREETOWN, ACCRA, KUALA LUMPUR, NEW DELHI,
	16	NICOSIA, PORT OF SPAIN, VALLETTA
	17	SAVING TO (FOR INFO) ST GEORGES (GRENADA)
	18	FCO TELNO 99 TO CANBERRA: COMMONWEALTH AND FALKLAND ISLANDS
	19	1. The Prime Minister has been much impressed by the strong,
	20	speedy and heartening response of our Commonwealth partners to
	21	her message in TUR. The great majority of Commonwealth
///	22	countries (paragraph 4 lists the exceptions) have now made
//	23	clear their support for our position. This has been most helpful.
/	24	2. Action addressees should seek an early opportunity to convey
	25	at a suitably high level the Prime Minister's warm personal

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword t h a n k s
File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY		FCO CCD + FALKLAND ISLANDS ADDITIONAL
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Page 2
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<<<<

1 <<<<  
 2 thanks for response to her message and/or her grateful  
 3 appreciation of whatever action host governments may have taken  
 4 following Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. You  
 5 should say that it is at difficult times like these that the  
 6 friendship that sustains the Commonwealth is particularly visible  
 7 and the support accorded by Commonwealth friends most welcome.  
 8 You should add that both Prime Minister and I have expressed  
 9 warm appreciation of this support in Parliament.  
 10 3. You should in your approach take account of the particular  
 11 reaction /response of your host government(s) making specific  
 12 reference (where appropriate) to any message or statement that  
 13 they may have issued. Where reactions/statements of host  
 14 government(s) have been less than adequate posts should modify  
 15 messages appropriately and need not deliver at high level. It  
 16 is important that the message be delivered within the next  
 17 few days and thus in advance of any outbreak of hostilities  
 18 which could follow any breakdown in the negotiations.  
 19 4. For information addressees: individually tailored personal  
 20 messages have already gone or are in hand in respect of  
 21 Presidents Banda, Stevens and Shagari and Messrs Fraser,  
 22 Muldoon and Trudeau. No repeat no message need be sent to  
 23 those governments (viz Cyprus, Ghana, Malta, Nauru and Western  
 24 Samoa) who have not responded to the Prime Minister's message  
 25 (the last two of which may not yet have received it), nor to  
 26 the governments of Grenada, India, Malaysia and Trinidad whose  
 27 responses have been disappointing.  
 28  
 29 PYM  
 30 NNNN  
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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Hd/E.R.

FLASH

An advance copy of ..... Washington .....  
telegram No. 1416 of ..... 23/4 ..... is  
attached.

Please advise on the distribution of this telegram  
by telephone to 233-8102.

Suggested distribution:

Limited

Hd/SAMD

Hd/DefD

~~Hd/NAD~~

~~Hd/ESSA~~

Hd/PUSD

PS

~~PS/IG Hard~~

~~PS/IG Onslow~~

PS/PUS

IG Giffard

IG Wright

IG Gillmore

~~IG [unclear]~~

Please reply as soon as possible:

distribution is being held up pending your decision.

Copies to :-

- PS/IO Dg St
- DIO Cab Off
- Head DS II MOD
- DMSI, Dis, MOD.

p.a.  
22/5/4

COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS  
DEPARTMENT

Date ..... 23/4 .....

WONFO 029/23

ZZ F C O

GRS 500

D E D I P

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 231728Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1416 OF 23 APRIL 1982.

FLASH

Hd/E.R. (Referred re.  
distbn.)  
R/C

MY TELEGRAM NO 1329: FALKLANDS: SATELLITE COVERAGE.

1. BRITISH DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE LIAISON STAFF ARE REPORTING TO MOD THAT WE HAVE LEARNED THIS MORNING, OF AN ARGENTINIAN REQUEST TO NASA TO PROGRAMME LANDSAT TO MAKE A PASS OVER SOUTH GEORGIA TODAY. WE HAVE LEARNED ADDITIONALLY, THAT THEIR REQUEST FOR COVERAGE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON 21, 22 AND 23 APRIL WAS FOR A "BLOCK OF NINE FRAMES", NOT SIMPLY THREE AS WE HAD EARLIER UNDERSTOOD. THIS PHOTOGRAPHY, ALTHOUGH ONLY MULTISPECTRAL, WILL HAVE COVERED A VERY SUBSTANTIAL AREA OF SEA (ESTIMATED AT 350 MILES SQ). WE HAVE NO DETAILS OF THE AREA TO BE COVERED OVER SOUTH GEORGIA.

2. WE UNDERSTAND FROM OUR SOURCE (U.K. LIAISON OFFICER AT U.S. DEFENCE MAPPING AGENCY) THAT TODAY'S PASS OVER SOUTH GEORGIA WOULD ALREADY HAVE TAKEN PLACE BY THE TIME WE LEARNED OF IT. THE ARGENTINIANS WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET THIS ON THEIR DOWN LINK.

3. MINISTER HAS TRIED TO SPEAK AT ONCE TO EAGLEBURGER OR BURT, NEITHER OF WHOM WAS AVAILABLE. HE HAS THEREFORE TOLD EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE THAT WE ARE VERY DISTURBED TO LEARN OF THIS REPORT, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE VARIATIONS FROM WHAT WE HAD EARLIER BEEN TOLD ABOUT THE PASSES OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND MORE PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT S. GEORGIA. MOREOVER, IF OUR EARLIER UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT THAT IT NEEDED A WEEK'S ADVANCE NOTICE TO PROGRAMME LANDSAT TO TAKE PICTURES OF A PARTICULAR TARGET AREA, IT SEEMED POSSIBLE THAT THE ARGENTINIAN REQUEST FOR COVERAGE OF SOUTH GEORGIA HAD BEEN RECEIVED LATE. IN EITHER CASE, GIVEN THE DELICACY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, WE WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS COULD HAVE BEEN FOUND TO DEFLECT THE REQUEST. MINISTER ASKED EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE TO LOOK URGENTLY INTO THE QUESTION AND LET US KNOW URGENTLY WHERE THINGS NOW STAND. HE WILL TAKE IT UP WITH BURT OR EAGLEBURGER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. IT WILL NOT HELP US TO GET BETTER HANDLING OF THIS PROBLEM FROM THE AMERICANS IF THIS LEAKS: HENCE THE CLASSIFICATION OF THIS TELEGRAM.

HENDERSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April 1982

*Prime Minister*

Dear John,

*Amend  
ms*

*Agree that there 2  
messages may be despatched?*

*A.S.C. 23/4.*

Assistance from certain West African Governments  
over the Falkland Islands dispute

I am writing to you separately enclosing a circular telegram to most of our High Commissioners suggesting that they be instructed to convey orally to their host governments at the highest possible level the Prime Minister's thanks for their support over the Falkland Islands dispute. There are two governments in West Africa, namely Senegal and Sierra Leone, to whom we feel individual and personal messages should be sent, in view of the particular assistance which these governments have been giving. We are also considering a separate message to President Shagari, but this may take some little time to prepare for reasons I will not go into here.

The Senegalese Government have given us invaluable assistance by providing facilities at Dakar Airport for the staging of our aircraft en route to Ascension Island. On 9 April we advised our Ambassador in Dakar that we attached great importance to Senegalese cooperation but were not at that time contemplating a high-level message. However, in the two-week period to 18 April, no less than 160 RAF aircraft staged through Dakar and the moment seems right to express our gratitude. It is difficult to envisage how this operation could have been mounted so quickly and effectively without Senegalese support. We must not take it for granted. It is all the more gratifying that this assistance should have come from a non-Commonwealth country with whom we have a friendly but not very substantial relationship.

The Sierra Leonean Government recently provided bunkering services to the 'Canberra' and 'Elk' and may be asked to help over the staging of Victor and Harrier aircraft, and with hospital ships. This cooperation comes at a time when Sierra Leone is in poor shape economically and facing difficult elections (albeit one-party ones) in a few days' time. President Stevens' assistance therefore is all the more appreciated. A message to him could not

/be

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

be exploited in the election campaign; his own position as Head of State is not constitutionally affected by the elections.

// I therefore enclose draft telegrams to Dakar and Freetown conveying messages to Presidents Diouf and Stevens respectively.

*Yours ever*


*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

# OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	↓	CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE
ZCZC	1	ZCZC	
GRS	2	GRS	
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL	
CAVEATS	4		
DESKBY	5		
FM FCO	6	FM FCO	
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE DAKAR	
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9		
	10	FALKLAND ISLANDS	
	11	1. Please pass following personal message from the Prime	
	12	Minister to President Diouf.	
	13	Begins:	
	14	Dear President Diouf	
	15	I should like to express my very sincere gratitude for all the	
	16	help you are providing to the British Government during these	
	17	difficult times. The assistance which you and your	
	18	government are giving in allowing RAF aircraft to use Yoff air-	
	19	port is most deeply appreciated.	
	20	I am also grateful for the <del>measure of</del> support which your	
	21	government has given in condemning the act of aggression by	
///	22	the Argentine Government, which was so clearly expressed in the	
//	23	Security Council's Resolution No 502. Your Government's	
/	24	actions in this matter are a positive expression of the well-	
	25	known principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, its adherence to	
NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword the UN
File number		Dept WAD	Distribution FCO: WAD, SAmD Cabinet Office Additional Distribution: Falkland Islands  cc PS/No 10
Drafted by (Block capitals) A C D S MACRAE			
Telephone number 233 4576			
Authorised for despatch 			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

2

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1 <<<<

2 the UN charter, its stand on the non-acquisition of territories  
3 by force and on the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the  
4 exercise of the right to self-determination of all peoples.

5 Yours sincerely,

6 Margaret Thatcher

7 Ends

8 2. Please let us know when message has been passed.

9 PYM

10 NNNN

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*Amud*  
*ms*

NNNN ends  
telegram

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Catchword

# OUT TELEGRAM

	↓	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1	ZCZC
2	GRS
3	CONFIDENTIAL
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6	FM FCO
7	TO IMMEDIATE FREETOWN
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
9	
10	FALKLAND ISLANDS
11	1. Please pass following personal message from the Prime
12	Minister to President Stevens.
13	Begins:
14	Dear President Stevens
15	I should like to express my very sincere gratitude for all the
16	help you are providing to the British Government during these
17	difficult times. The assistance which you and your
18	government have given in allowing some British vessels attached
19	to the Falkland Islands Task Force to refuel at Freetown is
20	deeply appreciated.
21	I am also grateful for the <del>expression of</del> support which your
22	government has given in condemning the act of aggression by
23	the Argentine Government, which was so clearly expressed in
24	the Security Council's Resolution No 502. Your support, and
25	that of our other Commonwealth friends, has been very

*ms*

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/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword encouraging
File number	Dept WAD	Distribution FCO: WAD, SAmD Cabinet Office Additional distribution: Falkland Islands  cc PS/No 10
Drafted by (Block capitals) A C D S MacRae		
Telephone number 233 4576		
Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature]</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Page 2
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<<<<

1	<<<<
2	encouraging to me and my colleagues. It is a positive
3	expression of the Commonwealth's principles of the right of
4	self-determination and its stand on the non-acquisition of
5	territories by force and on the peaceful settlement of
6	disputes.
7	I carry very pleasant memories of your visit here in November
8	1980.
9	Yours sincerely,
10	Margaret Thatcher
11	Ends
12	2. Please let us know when message has been passed.
13	
14	PYM
15	NNNN
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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UNCLASSIFIED

050/1



BRITISH EMBASSY

VIENNA

X 22.

23 April 1982

Information Department  
F C O

APR 25 / 4

h.c.

Dear Department

FALKLANDS CRISIS : AUSTRIAN MEDIA COMMENT

.....  
1. FCO Telno 49 of 7 April expressed interest in favourable quotations from the local press about the Falklands crisis. I attach a copy of a commentary published in the Salzburger Nachrichten, one of the more reputable and serious of the Austrian newspapers, on 10 April. The author comments that "so absurd is Galtieri's ... battle-cry, so easily does he allow himself to be used as a pattern for any aggression". He adds that the UN can go into recess at least until 2020 "if conquering - demonstrated by the example of the Falkland Islands - remains unnoticed and the right to self-determination melts away like the last snow". The author has little time for those who value "quantity compared to political morality" for "the foundations of international law ... should not be reduced in value by either population numbers or square kilometres".

.....  
2. An article in the same newspaper on 13 April by its London correspondent, Clemens Hutter, leaves no doubt where the blame for the crisis lies:

"Firstly, Argentina exacerbated the deepening dispute by an act of military aggression which has rightly moved the World Security Council to demand an unconditional Argentine withdrawal.

"Secondly, Argentina has made use with its aggression of the much-loved trick of diverting attention with a foreign policy adventure from serious internal political and economic problems. In this, the Junta Generals have had success in temporarily whipping up Argentinians' national enthusiasm. They thus put remaining in power at risk if the country's "national honour" is betrayed and a unilateral withdrawal, however refined, is necessary.

"Thirdly, England had no choice in view of this unprovoked military attack. Mrs Thatcher cannot call off the relief expedition of the British armada without compromising every State's inalienable right, anchored in the UN Charter, to sovereignty."



- 2 -

.... 3. The Salzburger Nachrichten pursues this idea further in its 17/18 April edition, commenting:

"if authoritarian governments continue to be allowed to pursue at their own discretion national interests with cynical canon-boat policies, the only alternative remaining open to all governments in the near future will be one of bloody conflict along the road into the jungle".

Yours ever

D G Blunt  
Chancery

cc: WED, FCO  
Falklands Emergency Unit, FCO

Alexander Haig übertrifft als Außenminister der USA alle Maßstäbe, die er sich als Oberkommandierender der NATO jahrelang in Brüssel gesetzt hat. Seine schonungslose Aktivität als Vermittler im britisch-argentinischen Streit um die Falkland-Inseln zwingt freilich auch zu der Überlegung, wann sich die transkontinentale Pendel-Diplomatie in sterile Hektik verwandelt. So sehr Haigs Bemühungen einen Erfolg verdienen, so notwendig ist eine leidenschaftslose Beurteilung der Lage im südlichen Atlantik.

Über die innenpolitischen Gründe für die Invasion argentinischer Truppen auf den Falkland-Inseln wurde viel geschrieben. Alle Erklärungen reichen für eine Entschuldigung der Entscheidung General Galtieris jedoch ebenso wenig aus, wie es genügt, sich mit der Verurteilung Argentiniens durch den Welt-sicherheitsrat zufriedenzugeben.

Im Kern geht es nun um die Frage, ob Demokratien noch fähig sind, sich gegen die Gewaltpolitik eines autoritären Regimes zu wehren. Während der letzten Jahrzehnte hat sich im Westen — offen oder versteckt, erkannt oder unerkannt — die Auffassung festgehakt, Demokratien dürften niemals den Frieden gefährden. Ein demokratischer Staat kämpfe nicht. Er verhandle.

Diese politische Leitlinie ist sinnvoll, wenn Verhandeln an erster Stelle aller Bemühungen steht. Sie führt jedoch zum Verlust der Freiheit und zur Entwertung aller demokratischen Werte, wenn die Behauptung, notfalls eine militärische Auseinandersetzung in Kauf zu nehmen, von Anfang an als undenkbar oder lediglich als diplomatischer Einschüchterungsversuch eingestuft wird.

Es wäre kurzichtig, die mehrheitliche Bereitschaft der Briten zu übersehen, militärisch zu handeln, falls Argentinien seine militärische Aggression nicht korrigiert. Dabei geht es den meisten britischen Bürgern nicht um den heute und morgen zu beanspruchenden Besitz der Falkland-Inseln. Die Überschrift der Londoner „Times“, „Wir sind alle Falkländer“, weist darauf hin, daß nicht marginale Interessen zu verteidigen sind. Die Behauptung, Großbritannien weigere sich, Reste seines Kolonialreiches freizugeben, ist deshalb töricht. Wenn es autoritären Regierungen erlaubt bleibt, nach eigenem Gutdünken nationale Interessen mit zynischer Kanonenboot-Politik zu verfolgen, bleibt für alle Staaten in naher Zukunft nur noch der Weg in den Dschungel blutiger Auseinandersetzungen offen.

Die elementare politische Bedeutung des Falkland-Konflikts hat die amerikanische Regierung nie geleugnet. Sie stellte sich deshalb auch vorbehaltlos hinter die Verurteilung Argentiniens im Sicherheitsrat. Den Überlegungen Washingtons, so schnell und sichtbar wie möglich die Rolle des Vermittlers zu übernehmen, entspringt gewiß auch die Überzeugung, daß nur die Weltmacht Amerika in dieser Region befähigt ist, eine Entschärfung des Krisenherdes herbeizuführen.

Das Dilemma Washingtons entsteht jedoch aus seiner doppelten Partnerschaft und aus zweifachen freundschaftlichen Bindungen. Die USA sind die anerkannte Führungsmacht im Nordatlantischen Verteidigungsbündnis. Gleichzeitig hält Washington das Gewicht des Vertrags von Rio in Händen. Darin haben sich die lateinamerikanischen Staaten 1947 verpflichtet, gemeinsam jeder Intervention entgegenzutreten,

die außerhalb der amerikanischen Hemisphäre beheimatet ist.

Die Freundschaft führender amerikanischer Politiker und Abgeordneter zu Großbritannien hat historische Wurzeln. Sie bewährte sich in schwierigsten Zeiten. Die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zu Argentinien entstanden aus der Hoffnung, dieser Staat werde in dem von Revolutionen immer wieder geschüttelten Lateinamerika stabilisierenden Einfluß ausüben und gleichzeitig für die wirtschaftlichen Interessen Amerikas aufgeschlossen bleiben.

An der Nahtstelle unterschiedlicher Bindungen wird die Vermittlungspolitik Washingtons ambivalent. So sehr Reagan und seine Regierung in Lateinamerika signalisieren müssen, daß der große Bruder im Norden nach wie vor Einfluß besitzt, so sehr würde auch die NATO ins Wanken geraten, wenn die Amerikaner in Europa nur noch als Gutwetterpartner eingestuft würden. Die harsche Kritik der amerikanischen Präsidenten Carter und Reagan an der weichen Haltung europäischer Demokratien gegenüber sowjetischen Aktionen in Afghanistan und Polen verleihe jede Glaubwürdigkeit, würde eine gleichartig einzustufende Politik der argentinischen Militärjunta in Washington nur flüsternd gescholten und öffentlich als „Realpolitik“ hingenommen.

Die Briten wurden nachdenklich. Sie warten, ungeachtet ihrer Anerkennung für den von Kontinent zu Kontinent eilenden Haig, auf unmißverständliche Erklärungen Washingtons zugunsten Londons. Und sie waren erstaunt, daß nur die Partnerstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft mit wirtschaftlichen Maßnahmen gegen Argentinien zur Stelle waren und eine politische Solidarität demonstrierten, die heute längst nicht mehr alltäglich ist.

So verbreitert sich still der Riß zwischen Amerika und Europa. Das Zusammenrücken der westlichen Demokratien scheint dort am meisten gefährdet, wo es am dringlichsten ist: bei der Verteidigung einer internationalen Rechts- und Friedensordnung.

Theo M. Loch kommentiert:

## Falkland ist keine „Lappalie“

Recht und politische Moral sind nicht Frage von Einwohnerzahlen und Quadratkilometern

Während die Flotte ihrer britischen Majestät die Wogen des Atlantiks in Richtung Falkland-Inseln durchpflügt, argentinische Reservisten zu den Waffen gerufen werden und die englische Regierung einen militärischen Sperrkreis auf der südlichen Hälfte unseres Globus einzeichnet, bleibt uns aufgeschreckten Europäern noch eine kurze Zeit zum Nachdenken. Zum Beispiel: Welche Folgen hat das Argument des argentinischen Präsidenten Galtieri und seiner ihm von einem Tag zum anderen frenetisch jubelnden Landsleute, Großbritannien habe 1833 Argentinien die Malvinas, (Falkland-Inseln) gewaltsam entrisen? Also habe Argentinien nunmehr das Recht, sich die Inseln zurückzuholen.

Nach dieser aus der Geschichte herausgeklauten völkerrechtlichen Logik könnte die Regierung in Wien zwischen Ostern und Pfingsten Triest und Trient besetzen. Auch in Krakau ließe sich — 150 Jahre danach — Österreichs Nationalflagge hissen. Die niederländische Königin täte gut daran, ihre Soldaten auf den Einmarsch in das Großherzogtum Luxemburg vorzubereiten. In Kopenhagen würde es Zeit, dänische Truppen gegen Schleswig-Holstein in Marsch zu setzen, damit dort bis zur Grenze von Hamburg-Altona dänische Rechte zurückgewonnen werden könnten.

Ob die DDR/oder die Bundesrepublik Posen in Polen und Königsberg in der Sowjetunion zurückholen sollte, bliebe zunächst eine Frage des innerdeutschen Gedankenaustausches. Überlegungen, die bundesdeutsche Marine Kurs auf den Bismarck-Archipel im Pazifik steuern zu lassen, erschienen ein wenig verfrüht. Sie wären jedoch nicht von der Hand zu weisen. Außerhalb der Landkarte Europas müßten auch nahezu alle Grenzen auf den anderen Kontinenten — der argentinischen Devise folgend — verändert werden. Offen bleibt, wie weit indianische Völker Lateinamerikas mit ihrem 150 Jahre zurückreichenden Rechtsanspruch den Einmarsch in Buenos Aires androhen könnten.

So absurd der Schlachtruf Gal-

teris und seiner Offiziere auch ist, so leicht läßt er sich als Etikett für jede Aggression benützen. Die Brisanz für die Weltpolitik wird hierbei ebenso deutlich sichtbar wie die Gefährdung des Friedens. Dieser sollte nach der Katastrophe des Zweiten Weltkriegs und ungeachtet aller Enttäuschungen in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren, in einer internationalen Rechtsordnung verankert werden — überwacht von der Organisation der Vereinten Nationen. Die UNO kann sich mindestens bis zum Jahr 2020 vertagen, wenn Eroberungen — wie am Beispiel der Falkland-Inseln demonstriert — ungeachtet bleiben und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht dahinschmilzt wie der letzte Schnee.

Erstaunlich ist die Wertung der Quantität gegenüber politisch-moralischer Qualität zum Nachteil betroffener Bürger. Warum — so ist mancherorts zu hören — all die Aufregung und die militärischen Muskelspielereien, wenn es doch „nur“ darum geht, ob 1800 Bewohner der Falkland-Inseln britisch bleiben wollen oder argentinisch werden sollen.

Grundsätze des Völkerrechts, die in der Gegenwart von den Regierungen unterzeichnet und besiegelt wurden, dürfen weder durch Bevölkerungs-zahlen noch von Quadratkilometern entwertet werden. Der Alltag in unserer Welt ist leider anders. Die „Lappalie Falkland-Inseln“ zeigt wie in einem Vergrößerungsglas den über Jahrhunderte lebendig gebliebenen Zynismus der Macht und die Irrationalität nationalistischer Begeisterung, ohne Rücksicht auf die UNO-Charta oder zahlreiche andere feierlich beschworene Urkunden.

Eiskalt exekutierte Eroberungs- oder auch Rückeroberungspolitik wird mit patriotischen Appellen verschleiert. Hierauf kann sich keine Regierung einlassen, die Friedenssicherung ernst nimmt. Präsident Galtieri, von dem behauptet wird, seine militanten Admirale hätten ihn mit ihrem Handstreich gegen die Falklands überspielt, hat letztlich auch die sowjetische Invasion Afghanistans neutralisiert, falls die argentinische Regierung ihren eigenen Rechtsbruch nicht korrigiert.

Die Schwierigkeiten der US-Politik sind offenkundig. Außenminister Haigs Vermittlerdienste werden gebraucht. Die Gefahr, daß im Streit um die Falklands auch die Entrüstung der US-Regierung über sowjetische Aggressionen verwässert und gleichzeitig die Partnerschaft mit Großbritannien den Hudson hinabschwimmt, ist groß.

Die westeuropäischen Regierungen haben richtig gehandelt, als sie ihre Waffenlieferungen nach Argentinien einstellten und — so der französische Außenminister Cheysson — „schlicht und einfach einen unprovokierten Angriff verurteilten“. Die Partnerschaft mit Großbritannien muß für die westeuropäischen Staaten außer Zweifel stehen, es sei denn, die Risikose im westlichen Verteidigungsbündnis dürften sich zu Abgründen erweitern.

Diese Überlegung nährt freilich auch unsere Sorgen. Noch ist die Stunde der Diplomatie und Vernunft nicht endgültig abgelaufen. Doch die Zeit für das Wirken der Vernunft in Buenos Aires ist kurz bemessen.

SN-Korrespondent Jan Friese berichtet a

## Blutbad im Name

Der Krieg in Afghanistan wird hä

Der Frühjahrsanfang war der Beginn des neuen afghanischen Jahres. Alle Anzeichen deuten darauf hin, daß das kommende Jahr noch blutiger werden wird als die beiden vergangenen seit Beginn der sowjetischen Invasion.

Die vielbesungenen Reformen, um die es bei der „glorreichen April-Revolution“ in Afghanistan ursprünglich ging, scheinen jetzt auch auf dem Papier hinter dem „Kriegsziel“ der Vernichtung des Widerstandes zurückzutreten. Die Sowjets, die lange Zeit den Kampf gegen die Mudschahedin mit gewisser Zurückhaltung führten, sind seit einiger Zeit dazu übergegangen, zunehmend härter zuzuschlagen. Dabei schrecken sie auch von der Einbebnung ganzer Dörfer und Siedlungsgebiete durch Luftbombardements und Artillerie nicht mehr zurück. Die Verluste auf

beiden Seiten die Freiheitskri die Zivilbevöl Blutzoll zahlte

Über die Ge des grausamer Schätzungen. 35.000 Ziviltote afghanischen zungen für die bewegen sich zirka 15.000 V der gefallenen man in Zehntausen.

Der unget Flüchtlinge, gesamten Ostg Pakistan hine tiert die afgl bestürzende V nen Afghanen, tel der Gesa bis jetzt ihre

ARGE Einem brasilian der die Kapitu

CLEMENS M. HUTTER:

## Der Falkland-Wahnsinn

Noch macht es den Anschein, als bestünde in der Falkland-Krise die Chance zu einer nichtmilitärischen Lösung. Solange US-Außenminister Haig zwischen Buenos Aires und London Pendel-Diplomatie betreibt, wollen die Argentinier den ersten Schuß nicht abgeben. Zudem beorderten sie alle ihre Kriegsschiffe aus der von England um die Inselgruppe gezogenen Sperrzone, damit die Gegenseite nicht zum ersten Schuß provoziert werde. Und die britische

Armada braucht noch eine Woche, ehe sie das Krisengebiet erreicht.

Auf den ersten Blick nimmt sich das beruhigend aus, aber dieser Schein trügt. Denn folgende Fakten sind nicht mehr aus der Welt zu schaffen:

Erstens heizte Argentinien den schwelenden Streit durch einen Akt militärischer Aggression an, der den Weltsicherheitsrat zu Recht bewog, Argentinien zum bedingungslosen Rückzug aufzufordern.

Zweitens bediente sich Argentinien mit seiner Aggression des beliebten Tricks, von ernsten innenpolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Problemen durch ein außenpolitisches Abenteuer abzulenken. Damit hatte die Generals-Junta Erfolg, indem sie kurzfristig die nationale Begeisterung aller Argentinier aufpeitschte. Sie riskiert also ihren Bestand, wenn sie die „nationale Ehre“ des Landes verriete und einseitig den taktisch noch so raffinierten Rückzug anträte.

Drittens hatte England keine Wahl angesichts dieses unprovokierten militärischen Angriffs. Frau Thatcher kann das Einsatz-Unternehmen der britischen Armada nicht abblasen, ohne das in der UNO-Charta verankerte Recht eines jeden Staates auf unantastbare Souveränität preiszugeben.

So weit, so ungut. Mittlerweile steht nämlich fest, daß weder England noch Argentinien auf den Falkland-Inseln etwas zu gewinnen haben. Ganz abgesehen von der Unmöglichkeit für beide Seiten, einen Sieg zu erfechten, der dem Verlierer alle Kosten dieses Wahnwitzes aufbürdet, betrifft diese Krise zwei wirtschaftlich übel zugerichtete Länder. Argentinien ist nach Einschätzung von Fachleuten wirtschaftlich so gut wie bankrott. Für die Briten werden die Kosten so oder so von 8 Mrd. S aufwärts veranschlagt, weshalb man in London bereits erwägt, eine „Kriegssteuer“ einzuheben.

Selbst wenn es Haig gelingen sollte, die Konfliktparteien aus der fatalen Eigengesetzlichkeit einer Konfrontation ohne unzumutbaren Gesichtsverlust und ohne einen Schuß zu befreien, böte die Falkland-Krise der Welt erschütterndes Anschauungsmaterial über den Irrsinn militärischer Auseinandersetzungen.

Keiner Seite ist nämlich der Vorwurf zu ersparen, beizelten mit Vernunft, Beharrlichkeit und Kompromißbereitschaft eine Lösung angestrebt zu haben, die auf ehrenhafte Weise das archaische System des britischen Kronkolonialismus und den Zündstein des blindwütigen argentinischen Nationalismus aus der Welt schafft. Zwei Länder mit zehn und mehr Prozent Arbeitslosigkeit hätten wahrlich zwingende Gründe, ihre Mittel menschenwürdiger einzusetzen.

Doch wie man sieht, Geschichte bleibt weiterhin jenes Fach, das man für Prüfungen lernt, doch nicht für das Wohl der Menschen beherzigt.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP 0700 HOURS,  
23 APRIL 1982

h.m.  
M 23/4

Secretary of State's Visit to Washington

1. The only report so far received on the Secretary of State's visit to Washington is of his meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Although the Committee were concerned that armed confrontation should be avoided if possible, there was overwhelming support for the British position.

OAS

2. The balance of reporting seems to suggest that the Argentine Resolution may attract the necessary two-thirds majority, despite some earlier indications to the contrary. There have been robust statements, for example from Mexico about opposing application of the Rio Treaty and refusing to impose sanctions on Britain even if there were a two-thirds vote in favour. But Santiago reports a distinct weakening of Chilean resolve and the desire to avoid giving unnecessary offence to powerful neighbours. Hardening of attitudes are reported from Panama and Caracas with the Venezuelans 'working to principles of regional solidarity against what they see as an extra continental aggression'. Much could however depend on the tone and nature of the Argentine Resolution and any military developments.

Non-Aligned Movement

3. UKM's New York have sent the latest draft of the communique to be issued by the NAM coordinating bureau.

While this is a considerable improvement on the earlier draft, it still leaves a lot to be desired and further instructions have been sent, as suggested, to posts in Commonwealth countries members of the drafting group.

Cuba

4. HM Ambassador has reported Cuban views expressed in interviews with the Vice President and Deputy Foreign Minister that it was a fact of life that the majority of the NAM membership took their cue from the regional group concerned. A strong anti-British reaction by the Latin American group would inevitably be reflected by the NAM. If that happened, we should not blame the Cuban Presidency!

China

5. The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister has avoided giving any assurance that the Peoples Daily commentary, (condoning Argentine military action and failing to call for implementation of SCR 502),

CONFIDENTIAL

did not represent the Chinese Government's position, but has expressed his Government's hope that the crisis could be settled by a peaceful negotiation. HM Ambassador concludes that 'the best we can hope is that China remains neutral'.

The Commonwealth

6. Sir A Parsons gave a resumé of our policy to a meeting of the Commonwealth Group at the UN called, with his encouragement, by the Australian representative. This elicited a realistic and not unfavourable response, with none of those present arguing against the principle that we might need to use force.

Other Third Countries

7. A report from Bridgetown suggests that Argentina is making veiled threats to third countries who are supporting us. The Barbados Government, at least, did not apparently take kindly to suggestions that they only acted on a matter of principle because they were under pressure.


US Press

8. The New York Times has suggested that Argentina has invoked the wrong Treaty at the wrong time, choosing the semblance of diplomacy over the real thing. 'One good way to give diplomacy a further chance will be for the US to rebutt this Argentine challenge with a more pronounced tilt towards Britain'. In another report headed 'In Buenos Aires the euphoria is over', the New York Times refers to the terrible state of the Argentine Stock Exchange, deep divisions in the regime and ideas for a Government of national unity. Reports from other sources also refer to a marked deterioration in the situation in Buenos Aires.

Counsellor Cheek

9. Mr and Mrs Cheek seem to have gone down well in New York with well attended press conferences and impressive meetings and interviews.

23 April 1982

  
J. Tillman  
Emergency Unit

SECRET

1A

American Araft. 23 April.

Master copy

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Preamble:

On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 502,  
and the will of the Argentine Republic and of the United  
Kingdom to resolve the controversy which has arisen between  
*Invasion?* them, renouncing the use of force, both Governments agree  
on the following steps, which form an integrated whole:

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

1. Effective on the signature of this agreement by both Governments, there shall be an immediate cessation of hostilities.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PARAGRAPH 2

2. Beginning at 0000 hours local time of the day after the day on which this agreement is signed and pending a definitive settlement, the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom shall not introduce or deploy forces into the zones (hereinafter, "zones"), defined by circles of 150 nautical miles radius from the following coordinate points (hereinafter, "coordinate points"):

- A) LAT. 51 DEG 40' S  
LONG, 59 DEG 30' W
- B) LAT. 54 DEG 20' S  
LONG, 36 DEG 40' W
- C) LAT. 57 DEG 40' S  
LONG, 26 DEG 30' W

2.1. Within 24 hours of the date of this agreement, the United Kingdom will suspend enforcement of its zone of exclusion and Argentina will suspend operations in the same area.

*- Refer zone in S. Georgia?*

2.2. Within 24 hours of the date of this agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom will commence the withdrawal of their forces in accordance with the following details.

2.2.1. Within seven days from the date of this agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom shall have withdrawn one-half of their military and security

SECRET/SENSITIVE

1/2 subs.

forces present in the zones on the  
date of this agreement, including related  
equipment and armaments. Within the  
same time period, the United Kingdom  
naval task force will stand off at  
a distance equivalent to (7) days'  
sailing time (at 12 knots) from any  
of the coordinate points, and Argentine  
forces that have been withdrawn shall  
be placed in a condition such that  
they could not be reinserted with their  
equipment and armament in less than  
(7) days.

Whole force  
away in 7 days  
to 7 days

Have to  
stand to  
stand at  
beg. of  
period

But how?  
Half the force still  
there.

2,016

2.2.2. Within 15 days from the date  
of this agreement, Argentina shall  
remove all of its remaining forces  
and redeploy them to their usual operating  
areas or normal duties. Within the  
same period the United Kingdom naval  
task force and submarines shall redeploy  
to their usual operating areas or normal  
duties.

i.e. to what they  
were doing before  
w/c. ready to  
insert.

Normal  
duties  
change.

means dispersed  
task force

2.3. The United States, depending on its acceptance,  
shall verify compliance with provisions 2 through  
2.2.2.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Paragraph 3: dropped (essence incorporated in 2)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PARAGRAPH 4

*reinstated*  
→

From the date of this agreement, the two governments will initiate the necessary procedures to terminate simultaneously, and without delay, the economic and financial measures adopted in connection with the current controversy, including restrictions relating to travel, transportation, communications, and transfers of funds between the two countries. The United Kingdom at the same time shall request the European Community and third countries that have adopted similar measures to terminate them.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PARAGRAPH 5

The United Kingdom and Argentina shall each appoint, and the United States has indicated its agreement to appoint, a representative to constitute a Special Interim Authority which shall provide observers to verify compliance with the obligations in this agreement. Each representative may be supported by a staff of not more than 10 persons on the islands.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

205

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Paragraph 6

6.1

Pending a definitive settlement, all decisions, laws and regulations hereafter adopted by the local administration on the islands shall be submitted to and expeditiously ratified by the Special Interim Authority, except in the event that the Special Interim Authority deems such decisions, laws or regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this Agreement or its implementation. The traditional local administration shall continue, except that the Executive and Legislative Councils shall be enlarged to include: (a) two representatives appointed by the Argentine Government to serve in the Executive Council; and (b) representatives in each Council of the Argentine population whose period of residence on the islands is equal to that required of others entitled to representation, in proportion to their population, subject to there being at least one such representative in each Council. Such representatives of the resident Argentine population shall be nominated by the

Unanimity  
or Majority

~~~~~

Representation?

Governor  
Council?

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Special Interim Authority. The flags of each of the constituent members of the Special Interim Authority shall be flown at its headquarters.

6.2

Pending a definitive settlement, neither Government shall take any action that would be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this agreement or its implementation.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PARAGRAPH 7

7.1 Pending a definitive settlement, travel, transportation, movement of persons and, as may be related thereto, residence and ownership and disposition of property, communications and commerce between the mainland and the islands shall, on an equal basis, be promoted and facilitated. The Special Interim Authority shall propose to the two signatories for adoption appropriate measures on such matters. Such proposals shall simultaneously be transmitted to the Executive and Legislative Councils for their views. The two signatories undertake to respond promptly to such proposals. The Special Interim Authority shall monitor the implementation of all such proposals adopted.

*Ind- admit?  
How adopted?*

7.2 The provisions of paragraph 7.1 shall in no way prejudice the rights and guarantees which have heretofore been enjoyed by the inhabitants on the islands, in particular rights relating to freedom of opinion, religion, expression, teaching, movement, property, employment, family, customs, and cultural ties with countries of origin.

SECRET/SENSITIVE



8. December 31, 1982 will conclude the interim period during which the signatories shall complete negotiations on removal of the islands from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and in light of the relevant Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. The negotiations hereabove referred to shall begin within fifteen days of the signature of the present agreement.

② "due regard" - rights of the inhabitants on the islands.

① Reyer with Argentina U.K.

Have signed and any all possibility of staying up with us.

Independence —  
Milit. Structures .

~~Leahurst~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PARAGRAPH 9


9. In order to assist them in bringing their negotiations to a mutually satisfactory settlement by the date stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the Authority shall after consultation with the Executive Council make specific proposals and recommendations as early as practicable to the two signatories, including proposals and recommendations on:

9.1 The manner of taking into account the wishes and interests of the islanders, insofar as islands with a settled population are concerned, based on the results of a sounding of the opinion of the inhabitants, with respect to such issues relating to the negotiations, and conducted in such manner, as the Authority may determine;

9.2 Issues relating to the development of the resources of the islands, including opportunities for joint cooperation and the role of the Falkland Islands Company; and

9.3 Such other matters as the two signatories may request including possible arrangements for compensation of Islanders or matters on which the Authority may wish to comment in light of its experience in discharging its responsibilities under this Agreement.

*Sounding ?*



SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

9.4 The signatories have agreed on the procedure in sub-paragraph 9.1 without prejudice to their respective positions on the legal weight to be accorded such opinion in reaching a definitive settlement.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PARAGRAPH 10

10. Should the signatories nonetheless be unable to conclude the negotiations by December 31, 1982, the United States has indicated that, on the request of both signatories, it would be prepared at such time to seek to resolve the dispute within six months of the date of the request by making specific proposals for a settlement and by directly conducting negotiations between the signatories on the basis of procedures that it shall formulate. The two signatories agree to respond within one month to any formal proposals or recommendations submitted to them by the United States.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PARAGRAPH 11

11. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

POINTS FOR INCLUSION IN A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO  
THE PRIME MINISTER

(Draft given by Mr Pym to M. Harg, 23 April)

- i. Glad that it looks as if we shall be able to reach agreement.
- ii. Understand in the light of recent events that the British Government should require some assurance that the Argentine Government will respect its obligations in good faith and, in particular, refrain from any further use of force against the Islands.
- iii. Have no doubt that the US presence on the Islands during the interim period will serve as an effective guarantee of the implementation of the agreement and against any use of force to frustrate it. We shall leave the Argentinians in no doubt that any challenge by them to the provisions of the agreement, particularly those relating to the withdrawal of Argentine forces and their non-reintroduction, will be seen as a challenge to the Government of the United States and responded to accordingly.
- iv. Once negotiations between the parties have been concluded and the definitive settlement has been achieved, the United States will have only such responsibilities in respect of the implementation of that definitive settlement as it shall have specifically accepted in response to the requests of the two signatories. It will, however, be prepared to respond positively to any such requests; and, notwithstanding the above, it will continue to regard any use of force to frustrate or overturn the provisions of the definitive settlement as a challenge to the United States government to be responded to accordingly.

- even to defend the Argentinians

SECRET

if they were to run the  
kind of regime on the  
Falklands that they run in Argentina?

PART 9 ends:-

22.4.82

PART 10 begins:-

23.4.82

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