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PREM 19/622



Relations with Argentina

ARGENTINA

Position of the Falkland Islands

Pt 1: Sept 1979

PART II

Pt 11: April 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
29.4.82							
<del>ends</del>							
<del>PREM 19/6/22</del>							



PART

11

ends:-

29.4.82

PART

12

begins:-

30.4.82



## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: CC(82) 21PV conclusions, Item 2

Date: 29 April 1982

Signed Wayland Date 13 April 2012

**PREM Records Team**



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

1. House of Commons Hansard, 27 April 1982, columns 707-713
2. House of Commons Hansard, 29 April 1982, columns 969-974 and 980-1060

Signed Wayland Date 13 April 2012

**PREM Records Team**





Argentina  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

Dear John,

ICRC and the Geneva Convention

You asked for a note on what the ICRC are doing and on the lawfulness of the new restrictions on the Islanders under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

ICRC

Under the Geneva Conventions the ICRC may seek access to prisoners of war and to the civil population and the right to offer their services to the parties to help in the making of humanitarian arrangements such as the creation of safety zones for the wounded and infirm. The ICRC are also empowered by their own Statute to take an interest in any humanitarian question.

The Argentines view the ICRC with suspicion and have been reluctant to admit that the Geneva Conventions apply. These Conventions apply in a state of war, or when there is another type of armed conflict or when territory is being occupied (Argentina denies that she is in occupation of alien territory). The ICRC accordingly based their initial approach to the Argentines on their broad humanitarian concern. Argentina has now accepted in principle the ICRC offer to help over the civil population but has so far refrained from making arrangements for an ICRC visit to the Islands. The ICRC are continuing to press them to permit this.

The ICRC are now also increasingly basing themselves on the Geneva Conventions. They have asked for details of the prisoners we have taken and will seek to exercise their right of access if they are not repatriated. They also yesterday formally appealed to Argentina and the UK to take all measures necessary to discharge their obligations under the Conventions and offered their services to assist in the necessary arrangements. They called for the creation of hospital and safety zones for the wounded and infirm and if necessary for neutralised zones for the benefit of the civilian population in general.

/If admitted





If admitted to the Islands, the ICRC would be able to act as go-between in the setting up of such zones on the Islands. They would also be able, if the Argentines agreed, to make practical arrangements for the evacuation of civilians from the Islands, though for this they would need to obtain transport from other sources and to get authority to pass through the Total Exclusion Zone. An ICRC presence on the Islands would also act as a general deterrent to any maltreatment of the Islanders by the occupying forces.

#### New Argentine Measures

The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits violence against civilians, degrading treatment, the taking of hostages, and the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without due judicial process. It also prohibits forcible transfer of the population and the detention of civilians in areas particularly exposed to danger. But it also allows for derogation in case of imperative military reason and permits the subjection of the population to provisions which are essential to ensure the security of the occupying forces and administration. On the basis of what we know so far of their content, it therefore seems unlikely that we could argue convincingly that the measures taken by Argentina so far are breaches of this Convention.

*Yours ever*


(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

*J E Holmes*

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



29 APR 1962







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

Dear Sir,

Beagle Channel

/ I enclose as requested a background note on the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)

Private Secretary

*J E Holmes*

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St





## BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE

## BACKGROUND NOTE

1. Argentina and Chile have long been at odds over the application of their nineteenth century boundary treaties to the geographically complex area of small islands and narrow straits off the mainland at the southern tip of South America.
2. In 1971 both parties to the dispute asked the British Government, as the arbiter agreed under a General Treaty of Arbitration signed by both Argentina and Chile in 1902, to act in that capacity. (This 1902 Agreement superseded an earlier treaty of 1896 which had conferred a similar function on the Government of Queen Victoria.) The British Government accepted and, in agreement with the two parties, appointed an independent International Court of Arbitration, consisting of five Judges of the International Court of Justice, to decide on the dispute.
3. In 1977, the International Court of Arbitration awarded to Chile the three islands claimed by both sides at the north-eastern end of the Beagle Channel, south of Tierra del Fuego. The award was denounced by Argentina as null and void. A series of bilateral talks in 1978 failed to establish a basis for agreement. Argentina came close to military action to assert her sovereignty in the disputed area. The danger of hostilities was averted by an initiative by the Vatican, just before Christmas 1978, in sending an envoy, Cardinal Samore, to Chile and Argentina. His mission led to a détente and a formal request from both countries to the Holy See to mediate and help them to find a peaceful solution.
4. The Papal mediation has continued intermittently since the beginning of 1979. In December 1980 the mediator put to both sides a solution virtually identical to that recommended by the International Court of Arbitration. Chile accepted this proposal almost immediately but the Argentines have consistently refused to give a direct answer, preferring instead to drag the process out as long as they can.

/Earlier






Earlier this year the Argentines abrogated a treaty which they had signed with Chile in 1972 which was essentially an agreement by both countries to submit all disputes between them to the International Court of Justice. Argentina clearly feared that the outcome of any reference to the ICJ would be as unacceptable as the award of the International Court of Arbitration. It remains unclear how the Argentines propose to continue to handle the dispute, given their lack of international support; but we know that the Chileans are worried that the Argentines may move to occupy the islands in question, particularly if they lose face over the Falkland Islands and have to look elsewhere for a foreign policy success.



*With the Compliments of  
Sir Frederic Bennett, M.P.*



*House of Commons*  
*London, SW1A 0AA*

*01-219 3403*

*01-219 3000*





~~Prime Minister~~

AR 29.  
4

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Thursday, 29th April:

From: The Leader of the British Parliamentary Delegation to the Council  
of Europe, Sir Frederic Bennett, M.P.

"I would like you to know in regard to to-day's debate on the Falkland Islands, in the House of Commons, that the Council of Europe Assembly, comprising about 150 Members, representing 21 free countries in Europe, passed this afternoon, by an overwhelming majority, a Resolution condemning Argentine's aggression against the Falkland Islands and expressing solidarity with Britain.

There was only one vote against and less than 5 abstentions. The abstentions came from the Spanish Delegation, who explained that their action was due to their family ties with Latin America, but that this did not mean any condonation of the Argentine aggression, nor did it affect their wish to maintain strong and increasing ties of friendship with Great Britain.

The debate was chaired by The Rt. Hon Tom Urwin, M.P. (United Kingdom) and there was complete unanimity between the British delegation comprising Conservative, Socialist, S.D.P. and Liberal Members."





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

*MF*

Prime Minister

A-J-C. 3/4.

Dear John,

Role of the UN Secretary-General

I understand that the Prime Minister has called for a note on the role of the Secretary-General in bringing matters before the Security Council.

Article 99 of the UN Charter says that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The Russians argue that this does not permit him actually to cause a meeting of the Council to be convened, but most others think it does. The Article has been used only rarely in recent years and the new Secretary-General would be likely to tread warily before taking such an initiative.

You will be aware that the Secretary-General has the right to use his 'good offices' to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes. This is not spelt out in the Charter but follows from the Secretary-General's position as one of the organs of the UN working to serve the purpose and principles set out at the beginning of the Charter. There are no formal restrictions on the exercise of these 'good offices' but in practice the Secretary-General would only move in close consultation with the parties to the dispute and, where the Security Council has been recently engaged, may be reluctant to do so without a request from the Council.

Incidentally the Prime Minister also asked which country would assume the Chairmanship of the Security Council in May. The answer is China.

*Yours ever,*

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St





Prime Minister  
Duly checked  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 29/4

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

Dear John,

PM has seen  
na  
MAF

Nuclear Cooperation between Germany and  
Argentina

You asked for a draft PQ and Answer  
to deal with reports in the media that  
Germany has been helping Argentina to  
acquire nuclear weapons.

I attach a draft.

Yours over.

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



Argentina



DRAFT PQ

Will the Government make a statement on the reports of cooperation between Germany and Argentina on nuclear weapons?

DRAFT ANSWER

*of the F.R.*  
~~The German Government made a statement on these matters on April 19. I am happy to confirm that we~~ *We*  
 The Government are entirely satisfied that, <sup>first</sup> ~~as was~~  
~~stated by the German Government on 19 April,~~ there is no  
 truth in suggestions ~~that~~ <sup>of</sup> Germany ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> supporting <sup>for</sup> Argentina  
 in the acquisition of an atomic bomb, <sup>and secondly</sup> that cooperation in  
 the nuclear field between <sup>the two countries</sup> Germany and Argentina is firmly  
 tied into an effective non-proliferation policy, ~~and that~~  
 all the relevant agreements on cooperation for peaceful  
 purposes have been approved by the International Atomic  
 Energy Agency.

*of support from the FRG for A,*

*Open MS.*

*We are entirely satisfied both that there is no truth in suggestion of support from the FRG for A in the ac of an a bomb, and that coop in the n.p. between the two countries is firmly etc*





FCS/82/66

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADEPrime Minister

To: note.

AD 25.  
4

1. Thank you for your letter of 23 April about the export of strategic goods to Argentina.
2. We do not want to be unduly provocative. But it is clear that the situation may change very rapidly and I believe that we ought to be ready to make immediately a new Export Control Order, subjecting a wider range of goods to licence. I think, therefore, that officials should urgently clear the ground and prepare the necessary Instrument.
3. We need to consider whether we should wish to allow goods produced by our EC partners which were covered by a new order to be trans-shipped through the United Kingdom on their way to Argentina. In practice, a problem would probably arise only with Ireland and even then on a very small number of cases. For this reason, and given that we may shortly be seeking our EC partners' agreement to a prolongation of the Community import ban (which will be difficult to achieve anyway), it might be unwise to create an extra irritant to an issue that is of little practical significance.
4. I am in entire agreement with the line your officials are taking on enquiries from companies about undertaking new business with Argentina. We are taking a similar line on these and on cases where companies ask us about restructuring their business with Argentina through third countries.
5. I am sending copies of this letter to members of OD, to the Secretaries of State for Industry and Energy and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
29 April 1982



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS

MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

ED/DEF D

ED/NEWS D

ED/UND

ED/PLANNING STAFF

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR )

SIR K COUZENS )

MR LITTLER )

MR HAWTIN )

MR PERETZ )

MR ILETT )

MR McINTYRE )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MONTEVIDEO 291615 Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 291615 Z OF 29 APRIL 1982

SIC U2J/19F

FROM BRITDEFAT MONTEVIDEO.

PRESS 29 APRIL AND COMMENT

RUSSIAN OFFERS TO ARGENTINA.

1. BUENOS AIRES CORRESPONDENT OF MONTEVIDEO NEWSPAPER MANANA REPORTS QUOTE THE SOVIET UNION OFFERED ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA ACROSS THE BOARD, INCLUDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE (COMMENT I HAVE NO OTHER EVIDENCE ON THIS SUBJECT AS YET).

MILITARY SALES FROM BRAZIL

2. ANSA REPORT FROM RIO DE JANEIRO THE AGREEMENT TO SELL 14 XAVANTE AND 4 BANDELRANTE EMBIII TO ARGENTINA AND STATES THAT ARGENTINE PILOTS ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE FOR BANDEIRANTE PILOT TRAINING WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS ( COMMENT : UNLESS YOU ADVISE TO THE CONTRARY I SHALL NOT REPORT ANY MORE FROM HERE ON THIS



TRAINING WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS ( COMMENT : UNLESS YOU ADVISE TO  
TO THE CONTRARY I SHALL NOT REPORT ANY MORE FROM HERE ON THIS  
SUBJECT . CAN YOU ASK DA BRASILIA TO COPY ANYTHING RELEVANT TO  
ME AS I CAN WATCH AIRPORT AND AIRSPACE HERE).

TROOP MOVEMENT IN ARGENTINA.

3. CONTINUING MOVEMENT TO THE SOUTH IS REPORTED IN ALL PRESS.

AIR BRIDGE.

4. AIR BRIDGE RIO GALLEGOS - STANLEY WAS HALTED BECAUSE OF BAD  
BWEATHER 28 APRIL.

RIO GRANDE.

5. CANBERRA AIRCRAFT ARE REPORTED HERE FOR THE FIRST TIME.

SOUTH GEORGIA.

6. ARGENTINE WEEKLY GENTE PUBLISHED THIS MORNING CARRIES TEXT OF  
DIRECT RADIO CONVERSATION IT CLAIMS IT HAD WITH AN OFFICER MEMBER  
OF A STAY BEHIND PARTY ON SOUTH GEORGIA AT 1930 HOURS (PRESUMABLY  
LOCAL) 27 APRIL. THE OFFICER IS IDENTIFIED AS QUOTE THE SAME  
ONE WHO SAID FROM PORT LEITH THAT HE WAS GOING TO DESTROY THE  
RADIO UNQUOTE. (COMMENT I HAVE NO MEANS OF JUDGING ITS VALIDITY).

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 29/1705Z TWV



RRR

INFO 065/29

ZZ FCO

GR 700

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 292148Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1517 OF 29 APRIL 1982

INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/WT Head  
PS/WT Dinslow  
PS/PUS  
Mr Gifford  
Mr Whight  
Mr Gillman  
Mr Case

Hell/Sim  
J H B  
X 12

RE  
PS/N 610 DS  
MT

1. EAGLEBURGER HAS GIVEN US A COPY OF A LETTER JUST RECEIVED BY HAIG FROM COSTA MENDEZ. AS YOU WILL SEE THIS STATES THAT THE QUOTE DOCUMENT THAT YOU SENT FALLS SHORT OF ARGENTINE DEMANDS AND DOES NOT SATISFY ITS IMMEDIATE ASPIRATIONS UNQUOTE IN RELATION TO THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY. COSTA MENDEZ DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE CHANGES MADE FROM THE PROPOSALS DISCUSSED WITH HAIG IN BUENOS AIRES AND SAYS QUOTE WE CANNOT ACCEPT THESE CHANGES UNQUOTE. THE FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT:

MR SECRETARY:

WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE DOCUMENT THAT YOU TRANSMITTED TO US, COMPARING IT WITH OUR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS AND WITH THE POINTS OF VIEW THAT WE HAVE MAINTAINED IN OUR VARIOUS MEETINGS. THAT ANALYSIS REVEALS SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES. SOME OF WHICH RAISE PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE OVERCOME.

AS MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY INDICATED TO YOU, ARGENTINA'S OBJECTIVE IS THE RECOGNITION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS ISLANDS. THAT CENTRAL ELEMENT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS IS THE ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY MY COUNTRY AND, AS I HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF STATING TO YOU ON MANY OCCASIONS, IS FOR US AN UNRENOUNCEABLE GOAL.

ALONG WITH THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, THE CURRENT CRISIS RAISES THE IMMEDIATE NEED TO ESTABLISH A PROVISIONAL REGIME FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS AS AN ESSENTIAL STEP IN THE PROCESS OF SEPARATING THE TWO MILITARY FORCES AND AS A REASONABLE PAUSE IN VIEW OF THE LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF FORMALLY AGREEING UPON THEIR FINAL DESTINY AT THIS TIME.

THE TALKS THAT WE HAVE HELD HAVE BEEN FUNDAMENTALLY BASED ON THESE TWO QUESTIONS--RECOGNITION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIME OF PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION. THE REMAINING PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED



THESE TWO QUESTIONS—RECOGNITION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIME OF PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION. THE REMAINING PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED MORE READILY IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE TWO POINTS THAT I HAVE JUST MENTIONED.

WHAT IS CERTAIN IS THAT BOTH ARE CLOSELY RELATED. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE RECOGNITION OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY ARE IMPRECISE, WE DEEM NECESSARY, IF WE WISH TO AVOID A RETURN TO THE FRUSTRATING SITUATION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO APRIL 2, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MECHANISMS THAT GIVE US GREATER POWERS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS.

IF, ON THE CONTRARY, IT WERE CLEAR THAT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY WILL ULTIMATELY BE RECOGNIZED, WE WILL BE MORE FLEXIBLE WITH RESPECT TO PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION.

THE DOCUMENT THAT YOU SENT FALLS SHORT OF ARGENTINE DEMANDS AND DOES NOT SATISFY ITS MINIMUM ASPIRATIONS ON EITHER OF THE TWO POINTS. ON THE CONTRARY, UNFAVORABLE CHANGES HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN BOTH. REGARDING ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS, THE NUMBER OF ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVES HAS BEEN REDUCED, AND THERE IS NO LONGER THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING MY COUNTRY'S CONTROL IN THE EVENT THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION DRAG ON WITHOUT A SOLUTION BEING FOUND. WE THUS FACE THE DEFINITE POSSIBILITY THAT A PREDOMINATELY BRITISH ADMINISTRATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED WITH NO FIXED TIME OF EXPIRATION.

AS CONCERNS THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, ALL PRECISION REGARDING THE CONCEPT OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY HAS BEEN ABANDONED, AND A NEW ELEMENT HAS BEEN INTRODUCED, A VIRTUAL REFERENDUM TO DETERMINE THE QUOTE WISHES UNQUOTE OF THE INHABITANTS, IN OPEN OPPOSITION TO UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 2065 AND TO THE POSITION UNWAVERINGLY MAINTAINED BY ARGENTINA.

YOU REALIZE, MR. SECRETARY, THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT THESE CHANGES. IN MY OPINION, OTHER FORMULAS MUST BE FOUND, A TASK FOR WHICH WE WILL ALWAYS REMAIN AT YOUR DISPOSAL. THEY SHOULD REFLECT THE EQUILIBRIUM TO WHICH I REFERRED EARLIER IN ORDER TO BALANCE ADEQUATELY THE DATA REGARDING THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY WITH PROVISIONS FOR THE PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS. THE PROVISIONS SHOULD BE OF FIXED DURATION AND ALLOW FOR PROGRESSIVE ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION OR, FAILING THAT, OF SUCH PRECISION THAT THEY ASSURE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF ARGENTINA WITHIN A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME.

IF THIS ARGENTINE POSITION WERE UNDERSTOOD, AGREEMENT WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY FACILITATED, AND THE FINAL DRAFTING OF THE DOCUMENT WOULD PRESENT NO INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES.

I THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR ARDUOUS EFFORTS, AND ASSURE YOU, MR. SECRETARY, OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. ENDS.



~~EXX~~ PISIS

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IMMEDIATE

WONFO 054/29

ADVANCE COPY

OO FCO

ps  
ps/m'Harol  
ps/m'onslow  
ps/pas  
m' C.ifford  
m' weinght  
Ad/s'Ham D  
Ad/Duff D

GR 250

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 291948Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1511 OF 29 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

RC  
ps/w' 10 82

FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING THE PUS'S CALL I SPOKE TO HAIG AND ASKED HIM WHETHER HE WAS THINKING OF PUBLISHING THE TEXT OF THE US PROPOSALS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT THINKING OF DOING SO BECAUSE HE REALISED THAT IT COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR HMG.

2. I EMHPASISED HOW ANXIOUS WE WERE TO SEE THE WORDING THE US GOVERNMENT WERE THINKING OF USING ABOUT THE BRITISH REACTION TO THEIR PROPOSALS. HAIG SAID HE WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO ENSURE THAT WE SAW THE DRAFT TEXT. HIS PRESENT INTENTION WAS TO HAVE SOME GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE CAUSE OF THE BREAKDOWN, SHOWING THAT IT WAS ARGENTINIAN INTRANSIGENCE ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY THAT HAD CAUSED IT WHEREAS THE BRITISH WERE READY TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE PROVIDED THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS WERE RESPECTED.

3 HAIG SAID HE HAD RUNG ME TO SAY THAT, HAVING SEEN THE FRONT PAGE OF TODAY'S GUARDIAN, HE UNDERSTOOD ENTIRELY, AND SYMPATHISED WITH, THE CONCERN MANIFESTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT TODAY. THE GUARDIAN PUBLISHED AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT DR BAILEY OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF HAD SAID AT A SPERLING BREAKFAST. AS HE HAD TOLD ME EVERYTHING BAILEY HAD SAID HAD BEEN UNTRUE. HE WAS ISSUING THE NECESSARY DENIALS AND ALSO MAKING SURE THAT BAILEY WAS DISMISSED FROM OFFICE. BUT HE SAW THE DAMAGE THAT SUCH A REPORT COULD DO IN LONDON AND WAS OBVIOUSLY APOLOGETIC THOUGH IT WAS A WHITE HOUSE BUNGLE, NOT HIS.

HENDERSON



OO WASHINGTON

GRS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 291200Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 871 OF 29 APR

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY EC POSTS

ARGENTINA: IMPORT BAN

1. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DECIDED ON 10 APRIL TO IMPOSE A BAN ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA. THE BAN CAME INTO EFFECT ON 16 APRIL FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD OF ONE MONTH AND EXPIRES AT MIDNIGHT ON 16 MAY. IT CAN BE RENEWED ON A PROPOSAL BY THE COMMISSION AND WILL IN PRACTICE NEED UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT IN THE COUNCIL. SOME OF OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF WAVERING. IT IS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE BAN SHOULD BE RENEWED FOR ANOTHER MONTH IF THE SITUATION SO REQUIRES. EQUALLY, IT IS IMPORTANT TACTICALLY THAT WE SHOULD GIVE EVERY IMPRESSION OF ASSUMING RENEWAL AND THEREFORE NOT SHOW CONCERN, WHILE DISCREETLY SETTING THINGS UP TO ENSURE RENEWAL.

2. IF THE HAIG MISSION COMES TO AN END AND THE REASON FOR THE AMERICAN EVEN-HANDED STANCE LAPSES, WE AND OUR PARTNERS WILL EXPECT AMERICAN ACTION SIMILAR TO OURS. AN AMERICAN DECISION TO BAN ARGENTINE IMPORTS WOULD HAVE A DECISIVE IMPACT ON THE WILLINGNESS OF OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS TO RENEW THEIR OWN BAN. EQUALLY, AMERICAN UNWILLINGNESS OR PREVARICATION COULD HAVE A DECISIVE INFLUENCE THE OTHER WAY, WITH VERY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA.

3. PLEASE DRAW THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE US ADMINISTRATION AS YOU THINK BEST. IN SPEAKING TO THE AMERICANS YOU SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO USE TERMS WHICH DO NOT IMPLY ANY DOUBT IN OUR MINDS ABOUT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE EC TO RENEW (IN CASE OUR APPROACH COMES TO THE EARS OF OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS). YOU COULD TAKE THE



LINE THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL BE DECIDING ON RENEWAL IN THE WEEK BEFORE 16 MAY, PROBABLY FOLLOWING DISCUSSION AT THE INFORMAL WEEKEND MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 8/9 MAY. THERE WILL BE MUCH PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE RENEWAL AND ARGENTINA WILL PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE COMMUNITY'S INTENTIONS. AN AMERICAN BAN, OR AT LEAST A PUBLICLY DECLARED US DECISION TO IMPOSE SUCH A BAN, BEFORE THE INFORMAL FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING WOULD EXERT EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA. THE COMBINATION OF THE NEW US BAN AND THE RENEWAL OF THE COMMUNITY BAN WOULD DEMONSTRATE A HARDENING OF WORLD OPINION, WITH THE PROSPECT OF EVEN MORE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THEIR ECONOMY UNLESS THEY END THEIR ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WILL SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN AND THE COMMUNITY, IN TIME FOR THE US ACTION TO HAVE THE MAXIMUM IMPACT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COMMUNITY'S ACTION, SHOULD THE SITUATION IN MID-MAY MAKE THIS NECESSARY.

PYM



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

TYPIST

PS

PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN ) TREASURY  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKM IS NEW YORK 300046Z APR 82-  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 606 DATED 29 APRIL 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

FALKLAND ISLANDS AT THE UN

1. I HAVE SPENT MOST OF THE DAY IN THE COMPANY OF ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE IS AN ATMOSPHERE AMONGST THEM OF GREAT TENSION AND EXPECTATION EG OF A DRAMATIC MILITARY MOVE BY US ANY DAY NOW, BUT NO SIGN THAT ANY OF THEM ARE CONTEMPLATING CALLING THE COUNCIL. THIS HESITATION MAY DISAPPEAR IF HAIG ANNOUNCES FAILURE AT 10 AM NEW YORK TIME TOMORROW (30 APRIL), HIS ANNOUNCEMENT COINCIDING WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEZ. COSTA MENDEZ IS NOW IN NEW YORK AND EITHER HE (ACTING DIRECTLY OR THROUGH PANAMA) OR A DO-GOODER MIGHT RUSH TO THE COUNCIL WITH A RESOLUTION CALLING ON US TO HALT ALL MILITARY PREPARATIONS WHILE FRESH NEGOTIATING AVENUES WERE OPENED UP. IN A VERY PRIVATE CONVERSATION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CALL THE COUNCIL, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD BACK THE ARGENTINES ONE HUNDRED PER CENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE LATINS (ARGENTINA OR PANAMA) WERE THE MOST



ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD BACK THE ARGENTINES ONE HUNDRED PER CENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE LATIN (ARGENTINA OR PANAMA) WERE THE MOST LIKELY TO DO SO. TO SUM UP, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUDGE ACCURATELY WHETHER THE NEW SITUATION TOMORROW WILL TRIGGER OFF ACTION BY SOMEONE ELSE IN THE COUNCIL. IF I HAD TO LAY ODDS, I WOULD PUT THEM AT ABOUT SIX TO FOUR AGAINST, UNLESS OF COURSE THERE IS A MAJOR MILITARY INCIDENT (LATEST INFORMATION, AFTER THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED IS THAT THE ARGENTINES DO NOT INTEND TO CALL THE COUNCIL TOMORROW AND THAT COSTA MENDEZ WILL LEAVE NEW YORK TOMORROW EVENING)

2. MY VIEW REMAINS THAT, ONCE WE GET BACK IN THE COUNCIL THERE WILL BE NO WAY OF AVOIDING AN UNACCEPTABLE CALL ON US TO HALT MILITARY PREPARATIONS COMBINED WITH EG GOOD OFFICES ETC. THIS WOULD MEAN A VETO. HENCE, MY STRONG INCLINATION IS FOR US TO CONTINUE TO SWEAT IT OUT AS WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY DONE NOW FOR NEARLY FOUR WEEKS.

3. HAVING SAID THAT, I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THERE WILL BE A DIPLOMATIC VACUUM IF HAIG ANNOUNCES FAILURE TOMORROW, AND I HEARD ENOUGH OF TODAY'S HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE ON A LIVE RELAY IN BIS TO APPRECIATE THAT WE ARE UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO RETAIN THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY IN THE UN (PRECISELY THE PROBLEM OVER WHICH WE HAVE BEEN RACKING OUR BRAINS SO FAR DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS).

4. IF WE ARE TO BE SEEN TO BE MAINTAINING THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE HERE (PURELY WITH PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION IN MIND AND WITH NO EXPECTATION OF PRODUCING RESULTS) THERE ARE ONLY TWO POSSIBILITIES WHICH I CAN SEE.

5. FIRST, I COULD ASK TO BE INSTRUCTED TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (AND LET THIS BE KNOWN) IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF HIS PLAYING A USEFUL ROLE IN TRYING TO SUCCEED WHERE HAIG HAD FAILED. THIS WOULD BUY TIME AND MIGHT DEFUSE THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL DO-GOODERS HERE. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD FALL INTO THE TRAP. HE AND URQUHART HAVE BEEN SEVERELY BRUISED BY THE BRITISH PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY CONTROVERSY OVER HIS APPEAL A FEW DAYS AGO. THEY HAVE BOTH TOLD ME THAT THEY REALISE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN DRAGGED INTO BRITISH DOMESTIC POLITICS. I AM PRETTY SURE THAT BOTH OF THEM WOULD SUSPECT (RIGHTLY) THAT WE WERE CYNICALLY BUYING TIME IN ORDER TO CONTINUE OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS WITHOUT BEING BADGERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL; AND THAT WE WERE USING THEM AS TOOLS.

I THEREFORE RAISE THIS POSSIBILITY ONLY TO REJECT IT.

6. THE SECOND OPTION WOULD BE FOR ME TO ASK, SAY, ON 30 APRIL OR OVER THE WEEKEND FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 3 MAY. THIS WOULD KEEP US THE INITIATIVE FOR THE TIME BEING.

I WOULD OPEN THE DEBATE WITH A STATEMENT DELIBERATELY CALCULATED TO BRING AS MANY SPEAKERS TO THE TABLE AS POSSIBLE. I WOULD NOT



TO BRING AS MANY SPEAKERS TO THE TABLE AS POSSIBLE. I WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH DIFFICULTY IN SMOKING OUT A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICANS, AS WELL AS SOME OF THE NASTIES. I COULD ALSO GET A NUMBER OF OUR SUPPORTERS TO SPEAK. THIS COULD MEAN A DEBATE LASTING SOME DAYS. AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE, I WOULD CIRCULATE A DRAFT RESOLUTION (WITHOUT TRYING TO BULLDOZE IT TO AN IMMEDIATE VOTE) OMITTING ANY CALL ON US TO HALT MILITARY PREPARATIONS, BUT CALLING ON ARGENTINA TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502 BY WITHDRAWING FROM THE ISLANDS, AND PERHAPS CALLING ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HELP TO BRING ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502, PERHAPS WITH A SHORT TIME LIMIT. I COULD FILL THE DRAFT WITH VERBIAGE IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON IT TOOK AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE. IN THE END, I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE WOULD BE DRIVEN INTO THE CORNER OF HAVING TO VETO (PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE), BUT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO BUY A WEEK AND WE WOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN TO HAVE MAINTAINED THE INITIATIVE.

7. BUT THE RISKS OF THIS COURSE WOULD BE APPALLING, AND THE DISADVANTAGES GREAT. I COULD BY NO MEANS GUARANTEE THAT I COULD MAINTAIN CONTROL OF EVENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE ARGENTINES/RUSSIANS/PANAMANIAN HAD ANY SENSE (THIS IS WHAT I WOULD DO IN THEIR PLACE) THEY WOULD SLAP DOWN AN IMMEDIATE RESOLUTION AT THE OUTSET SIMPLY CALLING ON US TO HALT ALL MILITARY PREPARATIONS, THEIR ARGUMENT BEING THAT "THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL STEP TO TAKE WHILE THE COUNCIL GAVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE IMPORTANT PROPOSALS WHICH I HAD ADVANCED" THIS PLOY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY GET MORE THAN NINE VOTES AND WE WOULD HAVE PRECIPITATED OUR OWN VETO. EVEN IF WE SUCCEEDED IN RETAINING CONTROL AND THEREBY GAINED A WEEK, IT WOULD BE CLEAR TO ALL THE UN PUNDITS HERE THAT WE WERE BUYING TIME AND WERE NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN OBTAINING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UN. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD FORFEIT THE ADVANTAGE WE AT PRESENT HAVE OF HAVING BEEN SEEN TO PLAY THINGS CORRECTLY FROM THE BEGINNING. EVEN TODAY MANY DELEGATIONS HAVE TOLD ME THAT OUR RECORD HERE IS STILL PERFECT - THE CONSCIENTIOUS NOTIFICATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 51, THE POLITE BUT FIRM RESPONSES TO THE ARGENTINE LETTERS AND SO ON.

8. FROM MY POINT OF VIEW THEREFORE, I WOULD MUCH PREFER TO CARRY ON AS SUGGESTED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE AND TO FIGHT AS GOOD A DEFENSIVE BATTLE AS I CAN IF AND WHEN I HAVE TO. BUT, IF THE DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE IN YOUR JUDGEMENT OVERRIDING, I THINK THAT PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE IS THE ONLY WAY TO PROCEED.

PARSONS



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
FD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
FD/DEF D  
FD/NEWS D  
FD/UND  
FD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
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SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 291946Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 601 DATED 29 APRIL 82

YOUR TELNO 75 TO BERNE: FURTHER NOTIFICATION TO ARGENTINA

1. ARGENTINA HAS CIRCULATED A LETTER (S/15009, SENT BY FACSIMILE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT) ABOUT THE TEZ WHICH ASSERTS THAT WE CANNOT INVOKE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51. I RECOMMEND THAT, WHEN I CONVEY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE COMMUNICATION IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME REFUTE THE ARGENTINE ARGUMENT, DRAWING UPON YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 81.

2. MY DRAFT REPLY IS AS FOLLOWS:  
BEGINS

FURTHER TO MY LETTER OF 28 APRIL (S/15006) AND ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION WAS DELIVERED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA ON 29 APRIL 1982:

SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN TEXT OF COMMUNICATION SQUARE BRACKETS END



SQUARE  
BOTH TEXT OF COMMUNICATION SQUARE BRACKETS END

THIS COMMUNICATION HAS BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY THE CONTINUED REFUSAL OF ARGENTINA TO COMPLY WITH PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 502. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED KINGDOM RETAINS THE RIGHT TO TAKE MEASURES IN EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.

2. SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN TEXT OF PARA 2 OF GUIDANCE TELNO 81 SQUARE BRACKETS END

3. SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN TEXT OF PARA 3 OF GUIDANCE TELNO 81 SQUARE BRACKETS END

4. ALTHOUGH ARTICLE 51 PRESERVES THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE "UNTIL THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS TAKEN MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY'", THIS CAN ONLY BE TAKEN TO REFER TO MEASURES WHICH ARE ACTUALLY EFFECTIVE TO BRING ABOUT THE STATED OBJECTIVE. CLEARLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISION IN SCR 502 HAS NOT PROVED EFFECTIVE. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE IS THUS UNIMPAIRED.

5. FOR THESE REASONS, THE ARGUMENTS IN THE LETTER DATED 28 APRIL FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA (S/15009) CANNOT BE ACCEPTED. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ARE BRITISH TERRITORY AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND ILLEGAL OCCUPATION REMAINS UNIMPAIRED. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH, BY ITS FIRST USE OF FORCE IN DEFIANCE OF THE CALL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 1 APRIL (S/14944), COMMITTED AN ACT OF AGGRESSION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE "DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION" CONTAINED IN GAR 3314 (XXIX). THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE CLEAR IN MR WHYTE'S LETTER OF 11 APRIL (S/14964). FINALLY, AS REGARDS THE ALLEGATIONS BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA ABOUT THE DISPROPORTIONATE USE OF FORCE AND A "BLOODY ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH GEORGIA", I WOULD DRAW YOUR EXCELLENCY'S ATTENTION TO THE FACTS THAT SOUTH GEORGIA WAS RESTORED TO BRITISH CONTROL BY A FORCE SMALLER THAN THE NUMBER OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS IT TOOK AND THAT ONLY ONE MEMBER OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES WAS INJURED, AND NONE KILLED, BEFORE THE ARGENTINE SURRENDER.

ENDS

3. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS BY 301400Z

PARSONS



GRS 450

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FM DELHI 290700Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 431 OF 29 APRIL

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 420: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I PUT OUR CASE TO MRS GANDHI YESTERDAY EVENING. I SAID WE WERE NOT ASKING HER FOR ANY SPECIFIC ACTION INTERNATIONALLY BUT I FELT I SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THE STRENGTH OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE.
2. MRS GANDHI WAS MOST AFFABLE BUT SAID SHE DID NOT APPROVE EITHER OF WHAT THE ARGENTINES HAD DONE OR OF WHAT WE WERE DOING. SOMEWHAT VAGUELY SHE INDICATED THAT SHE HAD TO FOLLOW THE LINE TAKEN BY THE NON-ALIGNED. I SAID THAT VIRTUALLY EVERY GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE THAT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW THE DECISIONS OF THE UN, IN THIS CASE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, TOOK PRECEDENCE OVER THE COMMUNIQUE OF ANY GROUP OF COUNTRIES. MRS GANDHI SMILED AND DID NOT REPLY. I CONTINUED THAT I HOPED THAT SHE ACTUALLY DISAPPROVED OF WHAT THE ARGENTINES HAD DONE. SHE ASSURED ME THAT SHE DID. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE ACTING SCRUPULOUSLY UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER AND WERE USING FORCE ONLY TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE.
3. MRS GANDHI SAID THE ARGENTINES WERE CLAIMING THAT THE REASON WHY THE POPULATION OF THE FALKLANDS WAS NOW OVERWHELMINGLY BRITISH WAS THAT WE HAD FORCEABLY REMOVED THE FORMER ARGENTINIAN INHABITANTS. MY EXPLANATION OF THE REMOVAL OF THE PENAL COLONY IN 1833 MADE HER SMILE AGAIN. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT A COLONIAL DISPUTE.
4. I MADE SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE NATURE OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS AND ABOUT THE DEPLORABLE EXAMPLE WHICH THE JUNTA IN ARGENTINA WAS SETTING FOR OTHER DISPUTES ELSEWHERE, WHETHER ISLANDS OR FRONTIERS. MRS GANDHI PLAINLY GOT THE POINT. I SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT DECENT CONVENTIONS SHOULD BE UPHELD IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE AND THAT I HOPED THAT WHEN THE ANSWER TO A FORTHCOMING PQ WAS FRAMED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WOULD MAKE IT PLAIN THAT THEY THOUGHT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN ALL ITS PARTS. MRS GANDHI SAID SHE WAS UNAWARE OF THE PQ AND INSTRUCTED HER NOTETAKER TO LOOK INTO IT.

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5. THIS CONVERSATION WAS UNSATISFACTORY IN THAT IT DID NOT PRODUCE ANY EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION, BUT IT WAS INTERESTING THAT MRS GANDHI DID NOT ASK THAT WE SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE VIEWS OF THE NON-ALIGNED OR MAKE ANY SUGGESTION AS TO WHAT OUR POLICY SHOULD BE. I AM REASONABLY SATISFIED THAT SHE UNDERSTANDS THE MAIN POINTS IN OUR CASE AND SEES THEIR STRENGTH. NEVERTHELESS I THINK THAT IN PUBLIC THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WILL PROBABLY TRY TO MAINTAIN SOME SORT OF BALANCE.

THOMSON

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

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MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

2

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PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
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HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
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(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

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DESKBY 300820Z

FM MEXICO CITY 292230Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 337 OF 29 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO. 342: MEETING WITH MEXICAN PRESIDENT

1. I CALLED ON PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO THIS MORNING. WE WERE ALONE.
2. I SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE MESSAGE CONVEYED BTO HER BY ROSSELL DE LA LAMA ON 26 APRIL. LOPEZ PORTILLO SAID THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO HELP IN ANY WAY BUT DID NOT WANT TO CUT ACROSS THE EFFORTS OF OTHERS. HE WOULD BE GLAD TO OFFER A PLACE FOR NEGOTIATIONS IF AND WHEN NEED AROSE. IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS HE WOULD NOT SEEK TO BE A MEDIATOR BUT RATHER A COMMUNICATOR WHO WOULD ENABLE THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO MEET FACE TO FACE. WE HAD ONLY TO LET HIM KNOW AND HE WOULD SET THINGS IN TRAIN IMMEDIATELY. SO FAR HE HAD NOT SENT ANY EMISSARY, OFFICIAL OR OTHERWISE, TO BUENOS AIRES TO SPEAK TO GENERAL GALTIERI. HE HAD NOT THOUGHT IT WORTHWHILE IN THE PRESENT MOOD OF THE ARGENTINES.
3. LOPEZ PORTILLO SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW US SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG WAS GETTING ON BUT IT WAS HARD TO BE OPTIMISTIC. HE REALIZED THAT WE COULD NOT LEAVE THE FLEET BOUNCING UP AND DOWN IN THE TERRIBLE WEATHER OUTSIDE THE FALKLANDS MUCH LONGER. HE ALSO KNEW HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ARGENTINE JUNTA WHICH CONSISTED OF AMBITIOUS INDIVIDUALS. IT WAS OBVIOUS THEY LAUNCHED THEIR INVASION TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM



THAT THEY HAD LAUNCHED THEIR INVASION TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THEIR FAILURES AT HOME, AND TO UNIFY THE ARGENTINES. YET THE PRINCIPAL RESULT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN TO UNIFY THE BRITISH IN DEFENCE OF THE FALKLANDS.

4. I SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN CRITICISED IN MEXICO FOR THE LENGTH OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF 2 APRIL. THESE CRITICISMS WERE UNFAIR. SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAD TRIED TO ESTABLISH A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND HAD SINCE BEEN MUCH CRITICISED FOR DOING SO. BUT THE DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN AND WERE VERY GREAT. WE COULD NOT ABANDON THE ISLANDERS; THEIR VIEWS AND INTERESTS HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO FULL ACCOUNT. THEY WERE A DEMOCRATIC AND STRONG-MINDED PEOPLE WITH DEEP SUSPICIONS OF ARGENTINA. THEIR FEELINGS ON THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN EXPRESSED IN THE ELECTIONS TO THEIR LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL LAST AUTUMN. THESE SUSPICIONS HAD BEEN ONLY TOO JUSTIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. LIKE MEXICO, BRITAIN ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION.


5. I REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE OAS DEBATE ON 27/28 APRIL. WE DID NOT OF COURSE AGREE WITH MEXICO ON THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE ARGENTINE CLAIM, BUT WE HAD APPRECIATED THE MODERATE ATTITUDE OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND ROLE IN WORKING OUT THE FINAL RESOLUTION. LOPEZ PORTILLO SAID THAT MEXICO HAD FOUGHT HARD TO GET A BALANCED RESULT. HE FELT THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS THE BEST THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED. MEXICO WAS PART OF LATIN AMERICA, AND TOOK A CORRESPONDING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARGENTINE CLAIM. BUT NO ONE DEPLORED MORE THAN MEXICO THE METHODS THE ARGENTINES HAD USED TO PURSUE IT. IF OTHER COUNTRIES BEHAVED LIKEWISE WITH THEIR ASSORTED CLAIMS, THEN THE WORLD WOULD GO BACK TO THE JUNGLE.

6. BEFORE LEAVING I SAID THAT MUCH AS WE WANTED A PEACEFUL OUTCOME, THE FIRST REQUIREMENT WAS FOR THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES IN CONFORMITY WITH THE MANDATORY RESOLUTION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. MOREOVER ANY NEW STATUS FOR THE ISLANDS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS AND INTERESTS OF THE INHABITANTS. BUT WE WERE OTHERWISE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION. WHEN HE ASKED ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY, I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO LEAVE QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY ASIDE AS OBVIOUSLY NEITHER COULD AGREE. THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF OTHER MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME. PEOPLE'S MINDS COULD NOT CHANGE OVERNIGHT.

7. LOPEZ PORTILLO SAID THIS WAS A REASONABLE APPROACH. HE WOULD REFLECT ON OUR MEETING AND CONSIDER WHETHER TO SEND A PERSONAL EMISSARY TO TALK TO THE ARGENTINES IN BUENOS AIRES. IF HE DID SO HE WOULD LET ME KNOW. IN ANY EVENT WE SHOULD REMAIN IN TOUCH.

8. PLEASE SEE MIFT.





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>622</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Heseltine to Fall dated 29 April 1982, with enclosure</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>29 May 2012</i> <i>C. W. Dayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
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MR GILLMORE

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

HD/DEF D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

HD/PLANNING STAFF

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/CHANCELLOR )

SIR K COUZENS )

MR LITTLER )

MR HAWTIN )

MR PERETZ ) TREASURY

MR ILETT )

MR McINTYRE )

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SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

FM GIBRALTAR

TO FCO LONDON

BT

UNCLAS ENCLAIR

SIC

UNCLAS ENCLAIR

FROM GIBRALTAR 291430Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 27 OF 29 APRIL 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THE GIBRALTAR HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY AT THEIR OPENING SESSION ON 29 APRIL UNANIMOUSLY CARRIED THE FOLLOWING MOTION:

THIS HOUSE EXPRESSES, ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF GIBRALTAR, ITS FULL SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THEIR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES, NOTES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS RESOLUTE AND DETERMINED DEFENCE OF THEIR WISHES AND INTERESTS,

PAGE 2 RBTJC 049 UNCLAS ENCLAIR

AND PRAYS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE TASK FORCE IN THEIR MISSION AND FOR THEIR SAFE RETURN.


2. THE CHIEF MINISTER HAS ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT THE TEXT TO YOURSELF, AND TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE.

JACKSON

FCO PLEASE PASS TO 10 DOWNING STREET AND MODUK

BT





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>622</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>FCO telegram no. 11 to Holy See dated 29 April 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>29 May 2012</i> <i>A. Jayland</i>
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FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 29 APRIL: OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

Reports from Mr Haig

1. Mr Haig told the Secretary of State that Sr Costa Mendez had made a clear and plaintive request for the continuation of negotiations. Later Mr Haig told Sir N Henderson that he was expecting to see Costa Mendez again (on 28 April); but it was highly unlikely that Costa Mendez would say anything worthwhile. In discussion of the timing of an American announcement that talks had broken down Mr Haig said he thought it would be better to give his explanation publicly on the evening of 29 April.

OAS/UN

2. After receiving formally the text of the OAS Resolution the President of the Security Council made a personal statement to the press. Sir A Parsons has described this publicly as being unacceptable in so far as it equated Britain with Argentina and suggested that we could be failing to implement UNSCR 502. The OAS Resolution will be circulated shortly as a Security Council document. Sir A Parsons recommends that he should write a reply setting out the reasons why we cannot accept the Resolution. The President of the OAS has formally sent a copy of the resolution to the Prime Minister.

TEZ

3. HMG's declaration was delivered to the Argentine Government at 1710 local time, 28 April.

Chile

4. On 28 April, the Chilean Government published an official denial that 'Tidepool' had become Chilean property. HM Ambassador Santiago believes we should also issue a formal denial.

Uruguay

5. The Uruguayans are willing to help with the repatriation of Argentine personnel and are also, in principle, willing to accept hospital ships.

Australia

6. On 28 April the Australians announced the return of their Ambassador to Buenos Aires.



NATO

7. Sir N Henderson suggests that we should consider obtaining a statement from the alliance in support of our position; this could be helpful in providing cover for the US Administration to give us some additional practical support.

US Opinion Poll

8. A poll due to be published on 29 April shows strong support for Britain and an overwhelming belief that the US should remain neutral in any war between Britain and Argentina.

BAS Personnel

9. Contact has been made with all BAS personnel and Misses Price and Buxton. All are well and next-of-kin are being informed.

Falklands Evacuation

10. A party of 16 will arrive at Heathrow this afternoon.

South Georgia

11. Full details have been received of all those captured on South Georgia.

British Aircraft

12. Peruvian airport workers have instituted a boycott of British aircraft and cargoes which will affect British Caledonian flights.

*E. J. Hughes*

29 April 1982

E J Hughes  
Emergency Unit



SUBJECT

RGRGR TKS

at Marle

Sps

TOP WITH  
PM 14  
30/4

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T91/82

WAG026

TOO WTE24

DE WTE 2553 1192235

O 292218Z APR 82

FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

ZEM

SECRET VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH02553

APRIL 29, 1982

DEAR MARGARET

IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS, AS WELL AS YOUR LETTER OF THIS MORNING, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW MY VIEWS ON WHERE MATTERS STAND AND HOW THE UNITED STATES WILL PROCEED.

WE HAVE JUST NOW RECEIVED AN ARGENTINE RESPONSE WHICH IN EFFECT REJECTS OUR PROPOSAL. WE WILL THEREFORE ISSUE A STATEMENT FRIDAY ON OUR VIEW TOWARD THE CRISIS AND ON THE STEPS WE ARE TAKING IN LIGHT OF THE ARGENTINE POSITION.

I AM SURE YOU AGREE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL NOW TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE WORLD THAT EVERY EFFORT WAS MADE TO ACHIEVE A FAIR AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION, AND THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS OFFERED A CHOICE BETWEEN SUCH A SOLUTION AND FURTHER HOSTILITIES. WE WILL THEREFORE MAKE PUBLIC A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE. WHILE WE WILL DESCRIBE THE U.S. PROPOSAL IN BROAD TERMS, WE WILL NOT RELEASE IT BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY THAT MIGHT CAUSE YOU. I RECOGNIZE THAT WHILE YOU SEE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE PROPOSAL, YOU HAVE NOT REJECTED IT. WE WILL LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WORKED WITH US IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS LEFT WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO PROCEED WITH MILITARY ACTION BASED ON THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE.

YOU HAVE MADE CLEAR THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS THAT, WHILE YOU HAVE WANTED ABOVE ALL A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, YOUR GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO USE MILITARY MEANS TO REMOVE ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS. NEITHER YOUR GOOD WILL IN WANTING PEACE NOR YOUR READINESS TO USE FORCE IF NECESSARY WERE EVER IN DOUBT. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE AS SADDENED AS I THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO AVERT HOSTILITIES, AND I AM HEARTENED THAT YOU HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT NO MORE THAN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE WILL BE USED.

IT IS AS IMPORTANT AS EVER THAT WE PRESERVE THE GROUND FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. WHILE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FORCIBLY TO REMOVE ARGENTINE FORCES, THE FUTURE WILL BE FRAUGHT WITH

END OF PAGE 01



INSTABILITY, ANIMOSITY, AND INSECURITY IF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IS NOT ULTIMATELY FOUND. THEREFORE, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TO SECURE A JUST PEACE. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT WE STAND READY TO ASSIST THE PARTIES TOWARD THIS END.

OUR SHARED PRINCIPLES HAVE ASSURED FROM THE OUTSET THAT WE WOULD WORK WITH COMMON PURPOSE. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE REFRAINED FROM TAKING THOSE ACTIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF YOUR POSITION THAT WOULD HAVE MADE OUR DIPLOMATIC MISSION IMPOSSIBLE. YOU HAVE SHOWN CLEAR UNDERSTANDING FOR OUR JUDGMENT ON THIS AND HAVE OFFERED EVERY ENCOURAGEMENT TO OUR EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THIS REFLECTS THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF STATESMANSHIP AND CONFIDENCE ON YOUR PART.

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR FULL SUPPORT FOR YOU AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER YOU ARE DEFENDING. YOU CAN COUNT ON THAT SUPPORT IN WHATEVER FORUM THIS ISSUE IS DEBATED. YOU CAN ALSO COUNT ON OUR SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION OF REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE. WE WILL ALSO ANNOUNCE THAT ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW ITS INVASION FORCE AND TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH HAVE MADE IT NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ADOPT A NEW POSTURE TOWARD BUENOS AIRES. AL HAIG WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH FRANCIS PYM CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC MEASURES WE WILL TAKE.

WE WILL OF COURSE WANT TO STAY IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS AHEAD. I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT OUR COMBINED EFFORTS CAN YIELD A JUST SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL STRENGTHEN THE PRINCIPLES FOR WHICH WE STAND, AND I CAN ONLY HOPE FOR THE LEAST AMOUNT OF BLOODSHED BEFORE THAT GOAL IS REACHED.

SINCERELY,

RON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982


*AJC*

*Dear Sir,*

Falklands: Message from  
Mr Pym to Mr Haig

I enclose a draft as we discussed.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours faithfully,*  


(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



## DRAFT MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO MR HAIG

I should let you know immediately that the British Cabinet has now considered your proposals for a negotiated solution to the Falklands crisis.

As you know, Cabinet meets regularly on Thursday mornings and we had expected that the Argentinians would before then have either accepted your proposals without textual alterations or rejected them, in accordance with the conditions and the deadline which you said you would be putting to Costa Menez when transmitting the text to him. I cannot conceal from you that my colleagues were very surprised to find that the deadline had passed and that the possibility of Argentinian proposals for amendments appeared not to be excluded.

The Cabinet took the view that the combination of Argentinian delay <sup>and</sup> their request for amendments, together with their repeated public insistence that there can be no compromise on the issue of sovereignty, must be construed as an Argentinian rejection of the United States Government's proposals as they stand. It is therefore our very firm expectation, based on all the discussions that we have had together, that you will confirm this publicly tonight and that we shall henceforth be able to rely on the active support of the United States in applying pressure on Argentina to move

/from their



from their present position. I hope that our people can get together very quickly to discuss what your Government could do to this end.

Given the Argentinian rejection of your proposals, there would seem to be no reason for the British Government to pronounce on them in any detail at this stage. But I should make it clear that the Cabinet had fundamental reservations, in particular about those areas which you know from our discussions to be of the greatest concern to us in the light of the principles which we have always regarded as of overriding importance.

Margaret Thatcher will be sending a message to the President to underline the importance she attaches to US support in the situation in which we now find ourselves.





The National Archives

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Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Acland to Armstrong dated 29 April 1982 (folio 12)</i>	
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

Prime Minister.

*MS*

*HR 29/4.*

*Dear John,*

Falkland Islands: Position on Medical Emergencies

The Prime Minister has asked for a note on medical facilities on the Islands and on what might happen if, following imposition of the TEZ, Islanders in the Camp faced a medical emergency.

There is a 35-bed hospital in Port Stanley which, on our latest information, continues to function normally in dealing with Islanders' medical requirements. It remains staffed by two British doctors (including an anaesthetist), one dentist and two nurses (all recruited by the ODA under OSAS terms); one doctor paid by the Falkland Islands Government as a locum; and about nine local nurses. The hospital can undertake routine surgery. Before the Argentine invasion, complicated emergency cases were flown either to Argentina (on normal payment terms) or to the UK. Islanders requiring treatment in the Camp have either been brought to Port Stanley or visited by doctors, using the Islander or two Beaver aircraft operated by the Falkland Islands Government Air Service (FIGAS).

Our present information is that the FIGAS aeroplanes have been taken over by the Argentines and that the Islander is being used under LADE colours to maintain communications with outlying settlements. It is not clear whether the Beavers are yet being used.

In the event of a medical emergency in the Camp, Islanders will therefore be reliant on the Argentines arranging transport to Port Stanley or a visit by a doctor. We have had no reports of emergency cases since the Argentine occupation. Once the TEZ is implemented, we can only speculate on Argentine willingness to use internal air services to deal with medical emergencies. However, provided that the Islander or Beaver aircraft were clearly seen as being used for local internal flights, not

/for purposes

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for purposes of military supply, they should not be at risk under present ROEs. Although LADE is run by the Argentine Air Force, it is distinctively marked. We are informing the MOD of the need to take this aspect into account.

If the Port Stanley runway is out of action, the Islander can land on short grass strips and the Beaver aircraft are seaplanes.


*Yours ever*  
*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



29 APR 1982







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

*Dear John,*

ICRC and the Geneva Convention

You asked for a note on what the ICRC are doing and on the lawfulness of the new restrictions on the Islanders under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

ICRC

Under the Geneva Conventions the ICRC may seek access to prisoners of war and to the civil population and the right to offer their services to the parties to help in the making of humanitarian arrangements such as the creation of safety zones for the wounded and infirm. The ICRC are also empowered by their own Statute to take an interest in any humanitarian question.

The Argentines view the ICRC with suspicion and have been reluctant to admit that the Geneva Conventions apply. These Conventions apply in a state of war, or when there is another type of armed conflict or when territory is being occupied (Argentina denies that she is in occupation of alien territory). The ICRC accordingly based their initial approach to the Argentines on their broad humanitarian concern. Argentina has now accepted in principle the ICRC offer to help over the civil population but has so far refrained from making arrangements for an ICRC visit to the Islands. The ICRC are continuing to press them to permit this.

The ICRC are now also increasingly basing themselves on the Geneva Conventions. They have asked for details of the prisoners we have taken and will seek to exercise their right of access if they are not repatriated. They also yesterday formally appealed to Argentina and the UK to take all measures necessary to discharge their obligations under the Conventions and offered their services to assist in the necessary arrangements. They called for the creation of hospital and safety zones for the wounded and infirm and if necessary for neutralised zones for the benefit of the civilian population in general.

/If admitted





If admitted to the Islands, the ICRC would be able to act as go-between in the setting up of such zones on the Islands. They would also be able, if the Argentines agreed, to make practical arrangements for the evacuation of civilians from the Islands, though for this they would need to obtain transport from other sources and to get authority to pass through the Total Exclusion Zone. An ICRC presence on the Islands would also act as a general deterrent to any maltreatment of the Islanders by the occupying forces.

#### New Argentine Measures

The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits violence against civilians, degrading treatment, the taking of hostages, and the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without due judicial process. It also prohibits forcible transfer of the population and the detention of civilians in areas particularly exposed to danger. But it also allows for derogation in case of imperative military reason and permits the subjection of the population to provisions which are essential to ensure the security of the occupying forces and administration. On the basis of what we know so far of their content, it therefore seems unlikely that we could argue convincingly that the measures taken by Argentina so far are breaches of this Convention.

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

*J E Holmes*

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

*Dear Sir,*Falkland Islanders

In my letter of 26 April I said that officials had reviewed the position of the Falkland Islanders, particularly as regards their morale, and the provision of assistance to those who wanted to leave the Islands temporarily.

Numbers of Falkland Islanders wishing to leave

Our estimates remain the same as in my letter of 26 April. It looks as if a maximum of 300 Falkland Islanders may remain in Port Stanley, but that the great majority are in 'the Camp'. An undetermined number of those in Port Stanley may wish to leave. The large majority of those in 'the Camp' are likely to want to stick it out.

An Argentine aircraft left Port Stanley yesterday for the mainland carrying from 16 to 23 passengers. Most of these will stay overnight in Montevideo and should be flown home to the United Kingdom tomorrow. The usual reception party will be on hand to receive them, de-brief them and look after their welfare. The Chief Secretary of the Falkland Islands will also be at the airport. I shall write to you further about the information we obtain from them.

International Red Cross

The International Red Cross have been trying for some time to persuade the Argentines to give them access to the Islands. We have encouraged them in their efforts, emphasising that we wish them in particular to report on the position of the Islanders, ascertain how many might wish to leave, and consider the ways of enabling them to do so. The ICRC have confirmed that these are among their own highest priorities. After initially turning down the ICRC, the Argentines have now sent them a note indicating that they accepted in principle the ICRC's offer to help over the civilian population, but falling short of agreeing to an early ICRC presence on the Islands. The ICRC are continuing to press for this. We have drawn their attention urgently to the imposition of the Exclusion Zone, indicating that they should re-double their efforts to obtain a presence in the Islands before the zone takes effect.

/We





We shall of course have to refer to the ICRC's efforts publicly. But the ICRC are concerned that we should not give too much publicity to our contact with them, since this might augment Argentine suspicion that they are in some way acting in collusion with us, and thus defeat their objective.

For the present, we believe an ICRC presence on the Islands represents our best hope of seeing to the welfare of the Islanders. But we have to recognise that the ICRC's efforts may not succeed: and indeed we may need to consider the intervention of a third party to make special arrangements to evacuate those who want to leave. We are in the first place asking our Ambassador in Montevideo to consult the Uruguayans on a personal and contingency basis on whether they would be willing to help, if the need should arise. But the problem will remain, particularly if there is no ICRC presence on the Islands, that we will have no clear means of establishing the demand.

#### Help for those who want to leave temporarily

HMG will pay the return fares of Islanders who wish to leave temporarily. Steps have been taken to put this into effect. A message has been sent to the Islanders by the BBC, and confirmed by the Prime Minister in the House on 26 April, that the Government would offer very sympathetic help to all those who want to leave temporarily, but are prevented by the lack of means from doing so. It remains our view (and that of the Governor, the Chief Secretary and other prominent returned Islanders) that to make a public announcement that HMG will pay the return fares of Islanders who manage to leave would create consternation among the remaining Islanders; and might build up more pressures for an evacuation than may exist at present, and which we could not at present satisfy.

#### Morale

The BBC special Service to the Falkland Islands is now operating daily for 35 minutes. The audibility is said to be good, as is the audibility of the BBC's World Service. The Governor spoke on this programme on 26 April, and the Chief Secretary on 27 April. Other prominent returned Islanders will take part on subsequent evenings, the intention being to add a personal and familiar tone to the broadcasts. Any special messages we need to get to the Islanders can best be conveyed to them by this means (as well as the BBC World Service and the telex link which is still operating between the Falkland Islands Company in London and its Manager in the Islands).

/I am





I am sending copies of this letter to Private Secretaries of the other members of OD(SA), to Sir Robert Armstrong and to Sir Michael Palliser.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

2  
(30)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

**IMMEDIATE**

**ADVANCE COPY**

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

HD/WED

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 291430Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 384 OF 29 APRIL

INFO ROUTINE PARIS ROME

YOUR TEL NO 175 TO PARIS: GERMAN REPORTING ON ARGENTINA

1. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS OF GERMAN REPORTING SENT FROM BUENOS AIRES YESTERDAY:

A. WHILE GALTIERI IS SIGNALLING READINESS TO NEGOTIATE THROUGH COSTA MENDES, THE ARMED FORCES ARE TAKING STEPS TO COUNTER A BRITISH INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS, WHICH IS WIDELY BELIEVED IN BUENOS AIRES TO BE ABOUT TO TAKE PLACE VERY SHORTLY. THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT THE FALKLANDS WERE WITHIN THE OPERATING RANGE OF THE ARGENTINE AIRFORCE.

B. THE GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE HAD BEEN TOLD DURING A CALL ON THE ARGENTINE NAVAL HEADQUARTERS THAT THE BRITISH RECOVERY OF SOUTH GEORGIA HAD TAKEN BUENOS AIRES BY SURPRISE: THE NAVY HAD NOT EXPECTED BRITAIN TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION SO SOON. THE MILITARY ATTACHE GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ARGENTINE NAVY WAS BEGINNING TO HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT HAIG'S NEUTRALITY AND THE RELIABILITY OF US MEDIATION.



DOUBTS ABOUT HAIG'S NEUTRALITY AND THE RELIABILITY OF US MEDIATION. THEY SUSPECTED THAT THE US HAD BEEN INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF THE INTENDED RECOVERY OF SOUTH GEORGIA, AND HAD CONDONED IT.

C. NEWSPAPERS IN ARGENTINA REPORTED PROMINENTLY A STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES THAT THE ACTIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN WERE UNACCEPTABLE, AND ALSO THE ENERGETIC CONDEMNATION OF GREAT BRITAIN BY CUBA. THE LOSS OF SOUTH GEORGIA HAD BEEN GIVEN MINIMAL COVERAGE ON THE INSIDE PAGES OF NEWSPAPERS, AND ON 28 APRIL THE ARGENTINE PRESS WAS STILL CLAIMING THAT THERE WAS FIGHTING ON THE ISLAND.

D. THE MASS DEMONSTRATION OF TRADE UNIONISTS IN BUENOS AIRES ON 27 APRIL HAD GIVEN THE JUNTA STRONG BACKING FOR ITS SOVEREIGNTY CLAIM, BUT HAD ALSO HAD A STRONG PERONIST FLAVOUR. A TYPICAL SLOGAN WAS QUOTE THE MALVINAS BELONG TO ARGENTINA. THE PEOPLE BELONG TO PERON UNQUOTE. THE GERMAN EMBASSY BELIEVE THAT THE PERONISTS WILL MAKE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THE CRISIS AND THE SURGE OF NATIONALIST FEELING TO THEIR OWN POLITICAL ADVANTAGE.

TAYLOR

NNNN

SENT AT C291458Z LCD

KZ



TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

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ED/DEF D  
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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

Hd/Consular

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PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

*ms*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 291730Z

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 291610Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 198 OF 29 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE BERNE, MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 192: FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC

1. PASQUIER, DELEGATE-GENERAL FOR SOUTH AMERICA AT THE ICRC, ASKED HEAD OF CHANCERY TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON. HIS FIRST POINT WAS TO ASK FOR DETAILS OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS ON SOUTH GEORGIA. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD MUCH HELP ICRC'S DEALINGS WITH THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES IF WE COULD GIVE THIS INFORMATION QUICKLY. (WE SHORTLY AFTERWARDS RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 76 TO BERNE AND ARE PASSING ON TO THE ICRC THE DETAILS IN YOUR TELNOS 77 AND 78 TO BERNE).

2. THE SECOND POINT WAS THAT ICRC NOW HOPE TO VISIT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SOON. PASQUIER SAID THAT THE ICRC HAD MADE PROGRESS IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES, WHO WERE NOW TALKING OF AN EARLY VISIT BY AN ICRC TEAM TO COMODORO RIVADAVIA



TALKING OF AN EARLY VISIT BY AN ICRC TEAM TO COMODORO RIVADAVIA, PUERTO GALLEGOS AND THEN ON TO THE FALKLANDS. ICRC COULD NOT CONVINCED THE ARGENTINIANS TO REVERSE THIS ORDER OF PRIORITY, WHICH FITTED IN WITH THE ARGENTINE PRECONCEPTIONS DESCRIBED IN PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 190. THE ARGENTINIANS HAD GIVEN THE ICRC TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WOULD PUT AN AIRCRAFT AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

3. PASQUIER SAID THAT IN UNDERTAKING THIS ITINERY THE ICRC AIM WOULD BE TO MAKE CONTACTS WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION AND WITH MEDICAL AND OTHER OFFICIAL PERSONNEL, AND ALSO TO DISCUSS WITH THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITIES ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEUTRAL ZONES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS IN THE EVENT OF FURTHER HOSTILITIES. ONE OF THE TEAM MIGHT STAY FOR A LONGER TIME IN THE FALKLANDS. PLANS WOULD NATURALLY BE SUBJECT TO THE EVOLVING POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION.

4. PASQUIER SAID THAT ONE MAJOR PROBLEM WAS THAT THE VISIT COULD NOT(NOT) BE GOT UNDER WAY BEFORE THE FRIDAY DEADLINE FOR THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE. IT LOOKED AS IF THEY MIGHT MOVE BY SATURDAY, BUT IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO GO TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS UNTIL SUNDAY. THE ICRC THOUGHT THAT THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED WOULD BE TO ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT BUT ON THE STRICTEST UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE WHOLE JOURNEY BE DESIGNATED AS A RED CROSS AIRCRAFT WITH RED CROSS MARKINGS. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE ICRC TEAM, PLUS ONE ARGENTINE LIAISON OFFICER AND IF NECESSARY A CIVILIAN ARGENTINE OFFICIAL. NO WEAPONS OR AMMUNITION OF ANY SORT WOULD BE ALLOWED ON THE AIRCRAFT NOR ANY OTHER SUPPLIES FOR THE ARGENTINIAN FORCES.

5. PASQUIER HOPED THAT ON THIS BASIS HMG MIGHT ALLOW THE AIRCRAFT TO TRAVEL TO THE FALKLANDS. THE ICRC WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A JOURNEY WITHOUT THE EXPLICIT AUTHORITY OF HMG. LONG ASKED WHETHER THE ICRC HAD CONSIDERED SECURING A NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT OR A CHARTER AIRCRAFT. PASQUIER SAID THEY THOUGHT IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET AN ARGENTINIAN CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT OUTSIDE ARGENTINA. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ICRC HOPED THAT WE WOULD CONCUR IN WHAT WAS SUGGESTED, WHICH SEEMED THE MOST PRACTICAL SOLUTION.

6. PASQUIER ASKED, PROVIDED WE WERE READY IN PRINCIPLE TO GIVE AUTHORITY FOR THE FLIGHT, WHAT DETAILS WE WOULD REQUIRE AND IN PARTICULAR HOW MUCH NOTICE WOULD BE NEEDED AND WHAT CHANNEL SHOULD BE USED. HE ASSUMED THAT THESE WOULD BE THE NORMAL DETAILS SUCH AS AIRCRAFT TYPE, NAME OF PILOT, PASSENGERS, FLIGHT PLAN AND PRECISE TIMINGS ENVISAGED. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE WOULD REQUIRE ANY OTHER TECHNICAL DETAILS E.G. FOR RADAR



WE WOULD REQUIRE ANY OTHER TECHNICAL DETAILS E.G. FOR RADAR IDENTIFICATION. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DESIGNATE A PARTICULAR AIR CORRIDOR FOR THE PASSAGE OF THIS AIRCRAFT ON THE OUTWARD AND RETURN JOURNEYS.

7. PASQUIER AGAIN STRESSED THE NEED TO KEEP ALL DETAILS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL . ANY LEAK TO THE PRESS MIGHT KILL OFF THE WHOLE OPERATION.

8. IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF THE MATTER AND THE APPROACH OF THE WEEKEND, GRATEFUL EARLIEST POSSIBLE REPLY.

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT AT 29/1641Z IM/ET



Ps/No 10 Downy St  
(2) 11

SECRET DEHOC

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OO WASHINGTON (DESKBY 291430Z)  
OO UKMIS NEW YORK (DESKBY 291430Z)  
GPS 375  
SECRET  
DEHOC  
DESKBY 291430Z BOTH POSTS.  
FM FCO 291330Z APRIL 82  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NO 868 OF 29 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

FALKLANDS

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE URGENTLY FROM ME TO MR HAIG. BEGINS. I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW IMMEDIATELY THAT THE BRITISH CABINET HAS NOW CONSIDERED YOUR PROPOSALS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS.

AS YOU KNOW, CABINET MEETS REGULARLY ON THURSDAY MORNINGS AND WE HAD EXPECTED THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD BEFORE THEN HAVE EITHER ACCEPTED YOUR PROPOSALS WITHOUT TEXTUAL ALTERATIONS OR REJECTED THEM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS AND THE DEADLINE WHICH YOU SAID YOU WOULD BE PUTTING TO COSTA MENDEZ WHEN TRANSMITTING THE TEXT TO HIM. I CANNOT CONCEAL FROM YOU THAT MY COLLEAGUES WERE VERY SURPRISED TO FIND THAT THE DEADLINE HAD PASSED AND THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ARGENTINIAN PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS APPEARED NOT TO BE EXCLUDED.

THE CABINET TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE COMBINATION OF ARGENTINIAN DELAY AND THEIR REQUEST FOR AMENDMENTS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR REPEATED PUBLIC INSISTENCE THAT THERE CAN BE NO COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY, MUST BE CONSTRUED AS AN ARGENTINIAN REJECTION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS AS THEY STAND. IT IS THEREFORE OUR VERY FIRM EXPECTATION, BASED ON ALL THE DISCUSSIONS THAT WE HAVE HAD TOGETHER, THAT YOU WILL CONFIRM THIS PUBLICLY TONIGHT AND THAT WE SHALL HENCEFORTH BE ABLE TO RELY ON THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES IN APPLYING

/PRESSURE

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SECRET DEHOC



SECRET DEHOC

2746 - 1

PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO MOVE FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITION. I HOPE THAT OUR PEOPLE CAN GET TOGETHER VERY QUICKLY TO DISCUSS WHAT YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD DO TO THIS END.

GIVEN THE ARGENTINIAN REJECTION OF YOUR PROPOSALS, THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE NO REASON FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO PRONOUNCE ON THEM IN ANY DETAIL AT THIS STAGE. BUT I SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE CABINET HAD FUNDAMENTAL RESERVATIONS, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THOSE AREAS WHICH YOU KNOW FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS TO BE OF THE GREATEST CONCERN TO US IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE HAVE ALWAYS REGARDED AS OF OVER-RIDING IMPORTANCE.

MARGARET THATCHER WILL BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE SHE ATTACHES TO US SUPPORT IN THE SITUATION IN WHICH WE NOW FIND OURSELVES. ENDS

PYM

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Mr Wright

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ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK\*\*\*\*\*

GR 230

SECRET

Cal. Office { Sir Michael Palliser  
Sir Robert Armstrong  
Mr Wade Gery  
PS / Def Sec.  
PS / Home Sec.  
PS / Chancellor Duty of Hon.

Sir Sinclair  
Mr Bullard  
Mr Giffard  
Mr UCE

FM WASHINGTON 291647Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1510 OF 29 APRIL

INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

No 10 D.S. ✓

YOUR TELNO 868: FALKLANDS

MA

1. I KNOW THAT THE CABINET HAD FUNDAMENTAL RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE US PROPOSALS. AT THE RISK OF STATING THE OBVIOUS, I SHOULD SAY THAT IT IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE WITH THE AMERICANS FOR THEM TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT IT WAS THE ARGENTINIANS WHO HAD BEEN COMPLETELY INFLEXIBLE AND THAT WE HAD BEEN "FORTHRIGHT", TO USE HAIG'S WORD TO ME YESTERDAY. IT WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE US TO COME DOWN EMPHATICALLY ON OUR SIDE IF THEY CAN LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE BLAME FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS LAY EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE ARGENTINIANS.

2. I HOPE THAT WE WILL HAVE A CHANCE OF SEEING THE US TEXT ON THIS SUBJECT THOUGH, FROM THE WAY THINGS GO HERE, ONE CAN NEVER BE SURE OF THIS. BUT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OUR PUBLIC POSTURE COULD WE NOT TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE IN DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT WE HAD ACCEPTED THE US PROPOSALS: THE US PROPOSALS WERE CONVEYED TO THE ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING DETAILED TALKS BY THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK. SINCE THE ARGENTINIANS WERE THE AGGRESSORS, IT WAS NATURAL THAT THE USA'S PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THEM IN THE FIRST PLACE. MR HAIG WAS IN NO DOUBT ABOUT WHAT WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO HMG AND THE POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF OUR APPROACH AND EAGERNESS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. BUT THERE WAS NO REASON FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO PRONOUNCE ON THE USA PROPOSALS IN ANY DETAIL UNLESS THE ARGENTINIANS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEM, WHICH THEY WERE NOT.

HENDERSON



S E C R E T

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GR 430  
D E D I P  
SECRET  
FM WASHINGTON 291625Z APR 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NO 1509 OF 29 APRIL  
AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK  
FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS SPOKEN TO ME. I HAD NOT BY THEN RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE CONTAINED IN FCO TELNO 868. HAIG MENTIONED THE PM'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT WHICH HE SAID SHOWED NERVOUSNESS THAT WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE. THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE REPLYING.

2. I HAVE NOW CONVEYED YOUR MESSAGE. IN DOING SO I HAVE TOLD HAIG THAT I HAVE INFORMED YOU OF HAIG'S INTENTION TO GO PUBLIC AT 10 AM LOCAL TIME TOMORROW RATHER THAN TONIGHT. HAIG EXPLAINED THAT THIS CHANGE OF TIMETABLE HAD BEEN NECESSITATED BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT WAS GOING TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT TELEVISION BROADCAST ABOUT THE BUDGET AT 8 PM THIS EVENING.

3. HAIG SAID THAT THE STATEMENT TO BE MADE TOMORROW MORNING, WHICH WOULD BE PRECEDED BY A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND CONSULTATIONS ON THE HILL, WOULD CONVEY A TONE MORE OF SORROW THAN OF ANGER. THE FOCUS WOULD BE ON THE NEED TO RESPECT THE RULE OF LAW WHICH THE ARGENTINIANS HAD VIOLATED. THEY HAD ALSO SHOWN A LACK OF FLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATION.

4. THE STATEMENT WOULD ALSO INDICATE THE ACTION THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD HENCEFORTH TAKE. THEY WOULD NOT BE IN A STATE OF WAR WITH ARGENTINA, BUT HE WAS INTENDING TO GO FURTHER THAN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAD RECOMMENDED. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS FULLY ABOARD.

5. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD A WORD FROM COSTA MENDEZ SINCE THEIR MEETING YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, THOUGH HE HAD PROMISED TO GET BACK TO HIM URGENTLY. HE WAS SURE, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN COSTA MENDEZ DID RETURN HE WOULD SAY THAT THE ARGENTINIAN BOTTOM LINE WAS THE PROPOSAL THEY HAD MADE TO HIM WHEN HE LEFT ARGENTINA WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE BOTH TO HIM, HAIG, AND TO HMG. HAIG REFERRED TO MISCHIEF BEING PUT ABOUT IN BA ABOUT THE COLLUSION BETWEEN HMG AND THE US GOVERNMENT. HE WAS SURE THAT THERE WAS AN "INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM IN BA". THEY HOPED THEY COULD MANIPULATE THE US GOVERNMENT WHEREAS THEY WERE JUST STRANGLING THEMSELVES.

S E C R E T

/6. HAIG



S E C R E T

6. HAIG ALSO TOLD ME PERSONALLY OF A CALL HE HAD JUST HAD FROM GENSCHER. THIS PRAISED HIM FOR THE SPEECH HE HAD MADE YESTERDAY ON FOREIGN POLICY AND WENT ON TO DEAL WITH THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THERE HAD BEEN NO UNCERTAINTY IN GENSCHER'S ATTITUDE ON THIS SUBJECT. HAIG HAD TOLD HIM HOW ESSENTIAL IT WAS THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHOULD STAY STRONGLY BEHIND BRITAIN: AND HE HAD TOLD GENSCHER THAT THE US WOULD BE MOVING BEHIND BRITAIN TOO VERY SHORTLY.

7. I HAVE EMPHASISED TO HAIG THE DELICACY OF THE WAY IN WHICH THEY REFER TO THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TO THE US PROPOSALS. I HAVE ASKED HIM TO LET US SEE THE TEXT ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE ANYTHING IS AGREED OR PUBLISHED. PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T. ON THIS SUBJECT.

HENDERSON

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MR WADE-GERY )



Subject

gc Master  
ops

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 90/82



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

29 April 1982

Your Majesty,

I was greatly touched by your letter of 18 April. Your personal best wishes and support mean much to me at this time. I am sure we have to stand against aggression. It is not just a matter of Argentina and the Falkland Islands. There are many countries around the world which could suffer the consequences if aggression was rewarded in this case.

I look back with great pleasure to your visit here and hope we shall be able to meet again in the near future.

My very best wishes,

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

2





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

N. S. P. R.

ARC 29/4

p-a-

Dear John,

Falklands

I enclose a letter dated 8 April to the Prime Minister, which has just been received from Mr Pindling, Prime Minister of the Bahamas.

The text of the letter was contained in Nassau telegram No 36 of 8 April: and an adequate reply has already been sent in FCO telegram No 64 of 24 April to Banjul, (copies attached).

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Siled —/  
pf<sup>n</sup> 4

attached. /



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22 APR 1982		

- 8 APR 1982

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FM NASSAU 081908Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 36 OF 3 APRIL

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MY TELNO 34: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER PINDLING TO THE PM DELIVERED 1830Z 8 APRIL READS:

BEGINS

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR THE PERSONAL MESSAGE CONVEYED TO ME ON 3RD APRIL BY YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER, HERE IN NASSAU.

I AND MY GOVERNMENT LEARNT WITH GREAT ASTONISHMENT AND DEEP REGRET OF ARGENTINA'S MILITARY INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IT IS DEEPLY DISQUIETING THAT DESPITE PERSONAL APPEALS FOR RESTRAINT BY THE UN SECURITY GENERAL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PRESIDENT REAGAN, AND YOUR OWN OFFER TO CONTINUE THE DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE, ARGENTINA REJECTED ALL ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE IT TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE.

MY GOVERNMENT HAS THEREFORE TRANSMITTED A NOTE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, INDICATING ITS CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND REAFFIRMED ITS BELIEF IN THE INVIOALABILITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES AND THE UNAMBIGUOUS REJECTION OF THE USE OF FORCE AS A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES AMONG STATES.

MY GOVERNMENT ALSO RESTATED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO THE RIGHT OF THE FALKLAND ISLAND PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN POLITICAL DESTINY.

AND FINALLY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS URGED THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA TO COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION DEMANDING THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DISPUTE.



PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

ENDS

2. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.
3. UNDERSTAND FROM MEA THAT TEXT IS NOT (NOT) TO BE RELEASED HERE BUT THAT REFERENCE TO THE LETTER WILL BE MADE IN A BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED EITHER TODAY OR ON 10 APRIL.

PAPADOPOULOS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 082221Z MT/MBI

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 241122Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE BANJUL

TELEGRAM NUMBER 64 OF 24 APR

AND TO IMMEDIATE BELMOPAN. COLOMBO. DACCA. DAR ES  
SALAAM. GABORONE. HONIARA. KAMPALA. KINGSTON.  
LUSAKA. MASERU. MEABANE. NAIROBI. NASSAU. NUKU'ALOFA. PORT LOUIS.  
PORT MORESBY. SINGAPORE. SALISBURY. SUVA. TARAWA. VICTORIA. VILA.  
CASTRIES (ST LUCIA). KINGSTOWN (ST VINCENT). ST JOHN'S (ANTIGUA)  
REPEATED FOR INFO TO: ROUTINE GEORGETOWN. CANBERRA.  
WELLINGTON. OTTAWA. BRIDGETOWN. LAGOS. LILONGWE.  
FREETOWN. ACCRA. KUALA LUMPUR. NEW DELHI. NICOSIA.  
PORT OF SPAIN. VALLETTA

SAVING TO (FOR INFO) ST GEORGES (GRENADA)

FCO TELNO 99 TO CANBERRA: COMMONWEALTH AND FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN MUCH IMPRESSED BY THE STRONG, SPEEDY AND HEARTENING RESPONSE OF OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS TO HER MESSAGE IN TUR. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES (PARAGRAPH 4 LISTS THE EXCEPTIONS) HAVE NOW MADE CLEAR THEIR SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION. THIS HAS BEEN MOST HELPFUL.
2. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL THE PRIME MINISTER'S WARM PERSONAL THANKS FOR RESPONSE TO HER MESSAGE AND/OR HER GRATEFUL APPRECIATION OF WHATEVER ACTION HOST GOVERNMENTS MAY HAVE TAKEN FOLLOWING ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT IT IS AT DIFFICULT TIMES LIKE THESE THAT THE FRIENDSHIP THAT SUSTAINS THE COMMONWEALTH IS PARTICULARLY VISIBLE AND THE SUPPORT ACCORDED BY COMMONWEALTH FRIENDS MOST WELCOME. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT BOTH PRIME MINISTER AND I HAVE EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION OF THIS SUPPORT I PARLIAMENT.
5. YOU SHOULD IN YOUR APPROACH TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PARTICULAR REACTION /RESPONSE OF YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT(S) MAKING SPECIFIC

1  
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/REFERENCE



CONFIDENTIAL

1959 - 1

REFERENCE (WHERE APPROPRIATE) TO ANY MESSAGE OR STATEMENT THAT THEY MAY HAVE ISSUED. WHERE REACTIONS/STATEMENTS OF HOST GOVERNMENT(S) HAVE BEEN LESS THAN ADEQUATE POSTS SHOULD MODIFY MESSAGES APPROPRIATELY AND NEED NOT DELIVER AT HIGH LEVEL. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE MESSAGE BE DELIVERED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND THUS IN ADVANCE OF ANY OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WHICH COULD FOLLOW ANY BREAKDOWN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. FOR INFORMATION ADDRESSEES: INDIVIDUALLY TAILORED PERSONAL MESSAGES HAVE ALREADY GONE OR ARE IN HAND IN RESPECT OF PRESIDENTS BANDA, STEVENS, SHAGARI, BURNHAM AND PRIME MINISTER ADAMS AND MESSRS FRASER, MULDOON AND TRUDEAU. NO REPEAT NO MESSAGE NEED BE SENT TO THOSE GOVERNMENTS (VIZ CYPRUS, GHANA, MALTA, NAURU AND WESTERN SAMOA) WHO HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (THE LAST TWO OF WHICH MAY NOT YET HAVE RECEIVED IT), NOR TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GRENADA, INDIA, MALAYSIA AND TRINIDAD WHOSE RESPONSES HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING.

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CABINET OFFICE

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

MISS DICKSON (EMP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE



FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 29 APRIL: OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

Reports from Mr Haig

1. Mr Haig told the Secretary of State that Sr Costa Mendez had made a clear and plaintive request for the continuation of negotiations. Later Mr Haig told Sir N Henderson that he was expecting to see Costa Mendez again (on 28 April); but it was highly unlikely that Costa Mendez would say anything worthwhile. In discussion of the timing of an American announcement that talks had broken down Mr Haig said he thought it would be better to give his explanation publicly on the evening of 29 April.

OAS/UN

2. After receiving formally the text of the OAS Resolution the President of the Security Council made a personal statement to the press. Sir A Parsons has described this publicly as being unacceptable in so far as it equated Britain with Argentina and suggested that we could be failing to implement UNSCR 502. The OAS Resolution will be circulated shortly as a Security Council document. Sir A Parsons recommends that he should write a reply setting out the reasons why we cannot accept the Resolution. The President of the OAS has formally sent a copy of the resolution to the Prime Minister.

TEZ

3. HMG's declaration was delivered to the Argentine Government at 1710 local time, 28 April.

Chile

4. On 28 April, the Chilean Government published an official denial that 'Tidepool' had become Chilean property. HM Ambassador Santiago believes we should also issue a formal denial.

Uruguay

5. The Uruguayans are willing to help with the repatriation of Argentine personnel and are also, in principle, willing to accept hospital ships.

Australia

6. On 28 April the Australians announced the return of their Ambassador to Buenos Aires.



NATO

7. Sir N Henderson suggests that we should consider obtaining a statement from the alliance in support of our position; this could be helpful in providing cover for the US Administration to give us some additional practical support.

US Opinion Poll

8. A poll due to be published on 29 April shows strong support for Britain and an overwhelming belief that the US should remain neutral in any war between Britain and Argentina.

BAS Personnel

9. Contact has been made with all BAS personnel and Misses Price and Buxton. All are well and next-of-kin are being informed.

Falklands Evacuation

10. A party of 16 will arrive at Heathrow this afternoon.

South Georgia

11. Full details have been received of all those captured on South Georgia.

British Aircraft

12. Peruvian airport workers have instituted a boycott of British aircraft and cargoes which will affect British Caledonian flights.

*E. J. Hughes*

29 April 1982

E J Hughes  
Emergency Unit



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

*h.a.  
ABL 29.  
4*

*Dear John,*

We have been considering what we might say in public if it becomes clear that Haig's proposals have failed, and have reached the stage reflected in the attached draft. It has occurred to us that, with very little adaptation, this might replace paragraph 2 of the draft 'recent developments' section of the Prime Minister's speech which we sent across to you yesterday.

*Yours ever,*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: ~~C L G MALLABY~~

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: ~~PS/PUS~~

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

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SUBJECT: PUBLIC STATEMENT IF HAIG'S PROPOSALS FAIL

.....In Confidence

1. On 27 April, Mr Haig put to Argentina draft proposals which resulted from his discussions during his long mission. It represented what he considered reasonable to put formally and with the full authority of the US Government to Argentina. It was right that these proposals should be addressed to Argentina, ~~since the onus is on them to comply with the~~ Security Council resolution 502. The text was also given to us.

2. As Mr Haig knew from his talks with us, the draft contained a number of elements which we were inclined to consider satisfactory, but also, as the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary have made clear, other elements which presented us with real difficulty, particularly as regards the provisions for self determination.

3. We told Mr Haig that we first needed to know Argentina's decision about this draft. If Argentina accepted the draft, and the central requirement of Argentine withdrawal together with adequate arrangements for the security of the Islands and an interim administration was thus agreed, HMG and the House would

CAVEAT.....

*Which initiated the crisis and is still in breach of*

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/want



want to consider the matter extremely carefully.

4. Argentina has however so far made no clear response to Mr Haig in spite of the latter's insistence on a very quick reply.



29 APR 1962







Management and Personnel Office

Whitehall London SW1A 2AZ

Telephone 01-273 } 4400  
GTN 273 }

29 April 82

Mike Pattison, Esq  
10 Downing St

Dear Mike,

Here is the text of  
the Lord Privy Seal's speech -  
as at 1300! Any amendments  
gratefully received.

Tim Buckley.



My Lords I beg to move the motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, from the onset of the Falklands crisis, we have undertaken to keep the House as closely informed as possible about the situation. Although my last report to Your Lordships was only on Monday I know that the House will agree that such is the seriousness of the situation that it merits an emergency debate in your Lordships House this afternoon. [Perhaps I could thank those members - in particular the Noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow - for agreeing to take off the business which we had intended to take today]. This is the third debate since the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands four weeks ago tomorrow.

My Lords, during that period the Government has taken every possible step that has a reasonable prospect of helping us to achieve our objectives - the withdrawal of the Argentine forces and the end of their illegal occupation of the Islands; the restoration of the traditional administration; and a long term solution which is acceptable not only to the House but to the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands.

It is the Government's most earnest hope that we can achieve these objectives by a negotiated settlement. We have done

/everything we can to



everything we can to encourage Mr Haig's attempts to find a solution by diplomatic means, and I shall have something to say about the latest developments in this area in a moment.

#### Military Developments

But as the House knows, the Government has taken military measures as well to strengthen our diplomatic efforts.

Mr Haig's initiative would never have got underway if the British Government had not sent the naval task force to the South Atlantic within four days of Argentina's aggression against the Falkland Islands. [What incentive would there have been for the Argentine junta to give Mr Haig's proposals more than the most cursory glance if Britain had not underpinned its search for a diplomatic settlement with the despatch of the task force? ] Gentle persuasion is not going to make the Argentine Government give up what it has seized by force.

Our military response to the situation has been measured and controlled. On 12 April we declared a Maritime Exclusion Zone. This has been enforced since then against Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries. It has been completely successful, and the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands have been isolated by sea.

Eleven days later we warned the Argentine authorities that any approach by their warships or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British



Forces in the South Atlantic would encounter<sup>n</sup> the appropriate response.

Then on 25 April, as I told the House on Monday, British forces recaptured South Georgia. This operation was conducted in exercise of our right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The minimum of force was used consistent with achieving our objective and no lives - Argentinian or British - were lost in the operation, though, as was announced yesterday, an Argentine prisoner was most unfortunately killed in an incident on 26 April which is now being urgently investigated by a Board of Inquiry.

The latest of our military measures is the imposition of the Total Exclusion Zone round the Falkland Islands of which we gave 48 hours notice yesterday. The new Zone has the same geographical boundaries as the Maritime Exclusion Zone which took effect on 12 April.

It will apply from noon London time tomorrow to all ships and aircraft, whether military or civil, operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands. A complete blockade will be placed on all traffic supporting the occupation forces of Argentina. Maritime and aviation authorities have been informed of the imposition of the Zone, in accordance with our international obligations.

/ It is our present



It is our present understanding that the majority of the Falkland Islanders prefer to stay where they are. This is a remarkable testimony to their attachment to their native Islands. We cannot pretend that the Total Exclusion Zone has no implications for their well-being. But it is something which must be done if we are to achieve the common aim of getting the Argentines out, and I have every confidence that the Islanders - whose fortitude and determination we so much admire - will see why we had to act as we did. It is our hope that the ICRC will be able to establish a presence in the Islands, and that with their help or by other means we may be able to arrange for the evacuation of any Islanders who may still wish to depart.

As my Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister said in the House on 26 April, if some of the Islanders still in the Falkland Islands wish to be evacuated temporarily and have not the means to do so, the Government will ensure that the necessary means are provided. We are doing all that we reasonably can to help those from the Falkland Islands who have arrived in the UK, and others who may arrive in the future. A welfare committee has been established by the Home Office for that purpose.

If the Argentines choose to challenge our authority in the ~~the~~ <sup>Total</sup> Exclusion Zone, the responsibility will be theirs. We shall enforce that ~~Total Exclusion~~ Zone as completely as we have done the Maritime Exclusion Zone. The Argentine occupying forces will then be totally isolated. They will be cut off by sea and air.



All these measures have been designed to support our diplomatic efforts.

### Diplomatic Negotiations

Since I last reported to the House, Mr Haig has put formal American proposals to the Argentine Government and requested an early response.

He saw Mr. Costa Mendez last evening but no conclusion was reached. He judged it right to <sup>ask</sup> ~~put the proposals first to~~ Argentina as the country to whom Security Council Resolution 502 is principally addressed. *to give her decision first.*

Mr Haig has also communicated to us the text of his proposals. They are the result of Mr Haig's talks in London and Buenos Aires and of his discussions in Washington with my Rt Hon Friend last week.

It is difficult both for the House and the Government that we have not been able to say more about them, especially as in our democratic system we need the interplay of opinions and ideas. And we should profit from the views and analysis of Hon Members. But they are Mr Haig's proposals and negotiations are continuing. We understand from Mr Haig that it is his present intention to publish them in full but he of course must judge the appropriate time. The proposals are complex and difficult and inevitably bear the hallmarks of compromise in both their substance and language. We are studying them very carefully indeed in the light of the principles and objectives enunciated in past debates.

It was the Argentine invasion which started this crisis and it is Argentine withdrawal that must put an end to it.



The United Nations

As this situation has developed, and as the British Government has made every effort to find a solution. This House and those in another place have broadly supported both the Government's objectives and its methods. But in the last few days, it have been argued that first that we should not have resorted to the use of force and second that we should seek greater involvement by the United Nations.

My Lords, with regard to the first argument -

It would be totally inconsistent to support the despatch of the Task Force and yet to be opposed to its use. The diplomatic pressure would be undermined. As long as the Argentines refuse to comply with the Security Council Resolution, we must continue to intensify the pressure on them. And we must not abandon our efforts to re-establish our authority over our own territory and to free our own people from the invader.

/ Let me turn now



Let me turn now to the United Nations. The House knows that all our action has been based on a Resolution of the United Nations. <sup>The Argentinian</sup> ~~Before the invasion occurred we went to~~ <sup>was carried out in defiance of</sup> an appeal issued by the President of the Security Council at the Secretary-General and asked him to issue a stern warning ~~our urgent request on 1 April. This solemn appeal was endorsed calling on Argentina to desist from the use of force. As~~ <sup>by the whole of the Security Council. but it was brushed aside.</sup> ~~soon as the invasion had occurred we asked for a meeting of~~ <sup>immediately after</sup> ~~the Security Council.~~ <sup>Lanister</sup> That meeting passed Resolution 502. Since then our efforts, those of Mr. Haig and a large part of the international community have been directed to implementing that mandatory Resolution.

If I may just remind your Lordships, ~~that~~ Resolution 502 calls for ~~three things: - the cessation of hostilities,~~ Argentine withdrawal and a negotiated solution to the dispute. ~~The three things are linked.~~ Without Argentine withdrawal, <sup>have no choice but</sup> there cannot be a cessation of hostilities; we are forced to exercise our right to self-defence. <sup>Of course,</sup> ~~Likewise,~~ if Argentina withdraws it would be out of the question for us to continue hostilities or to refuse to hold negotiations with a view to solving the underlying dispute. We were after all negotiating a few weeks before the invasion. It is quite wrong to suggest

/ that because



that because the invader is not prepared to implement the Resolution, the principles of the United Nations require that we should refrain from limited use of force in self-defence. <sup>It</sup> ~~That~~ <sup>also</sup> would be to condone and encourage aggression.

Such an argument has no validity in international law

The Government have been criticised for their response to the United Nations Secretary-General's Statement of 26 April. We agree with the Secretary-General that Security Council Resolution 502 must be complied with. It is Argentina that has flagrantly failed to do this. The Government have told the Secretary-General that any suggestion that Britain has failed to comply with SCR 502 is unacceptable, and he has taken note. The Secretary-General's appeal has not been communicated to us in any formal way and we do not propose to make a formal reply to it. It is because of that failure that we must be free to exercise our right of self-defence.

What could further recourse to the United Nations ~~now~~ achieve <sup>at the present stage?</sup>  
We need mediation. But we already have the most powerful and the most suitable mediator available; Mr Haig, backed by all the authority and all the influence of the United States. <sup>If</sup> anyone can succeed in mediation, it is Mr Haig. Of course we support the United Nations and we believe that respect for the United Nations should form the basis of international conduct. But the United Nations does not have the power to enforce compliance with its Resolutions.

and working to implement a mandatory resolution of the Security Council.

These simple facts are perfectly well understood in the international community. Let me quote the Swedish

/ Foreign Minister because



Foreign Minister because Sweden is a country second to none in its opposition to the use of force and its respect for the United Nations. The Swedish Foreign Minister said <sup>of the South Georgia operation,</sup> and I quote, "We have no objection to Britain retaking British territory. Time and again one is forced to observe that the United Nations is weak and lacks the authority required to mediate". That I think says it all.

The recapture of South Georgia has not diminished international support. No country that was previously with us has turned against us. On Tuesday, we saw that the support

of the European Community remained robust. The world has shown no inclination to condemn Britain's exercise of the right to self-defence.

~~And even~~ In the Organisation of American States <sup>itself</sup> Argentina <sup>was criticised,</sup> ~~realised that despite the claims of traditional Latin American solidarity, for her use of force it would not be possible to obtain any form of sanctions against Britain, and the only resolution passed clearly referred to SCR 502 and called despite the traditional sympathy of members for her claim to sovereignty on Argentina not to exacerbate the situation.~~

My Lords, We have been involved in constant activity at the United Nations. Our representative in New York has been in daily touch with the Secretary-General since the crisis began. He has discussed with him repeatedly and at length all possible ways in which the United Nations could play a constructive role in assisting Mr Haig's mission and, if Mr Haig fails, in securing implementation of Resolution 502. Sir Anthony Parsons has also discussed with Mr de Cuellar his contingency planning about the part the United Nations might be able to play in the longer term in negotiating and implementing a diplomatic settlement. In the light of these discussions our representative has advised that:-

(a) The Secretary-General is very conscious of the complexity of the problem and of the need for careful preparation of any initiative he might take.

/ b) As the



(b) As the Security Council is already seized of the problem, it would <sup>not</sup> be appropriate for the Secretary-General to act under Article 99 of the Charter.

(c) The Secretary-General would not wish to take any initiative which he had not established in advance would be acceptable to both the parties.

(d) He would also require a clear mandate from the Security Council before taking any action.

Our representative has also reported that the Secretary-General has several times stated in public that he was not prepared to take action while Mr Haig's mission was alive and that he had pointed out that not even the Organisation of American States had asked for him to become involved.

In these circumstances the Government have accepted the advice that the only valid course for the Security Council at the present juncture was to insist on implementation of Resolution 502. The United Nations Secretary-General is aware of this view. Our representative was consequently instructed to ensure that no action was taken in New York which would cut across Mr Haig's efforts. He has reported that he has had the full support of the Secretary-General, and of the President of the Security Council, in carrying out these instructions.



Although we have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich or British Antarctic Territory, some Noble Lords have suggested that we refer the matter to the International Court of Justice.

Since Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the matter cannot be referred <sup>for a binding decision</sup> without her agreement, ~~except by resolution of the Security Council.~~

We have never submitted the Falkland Islands themselves to that Court, but we have raised the question of the dependencies on three separate occasions. In 1947, 1949 and 1951. Each time Argentina withheld her consent.

In 1955, the British Government applied unilaterally to the ICJ against encroachments on British sovereignty in the Dependencies by Argentina. Again, the Court advised that it could not pursue the matter since it could only act if there was agreement between the parties recognising the Court's jurisdiction.

In 1977 Argentina, having accepted the jurisdiction of a Court of Arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results.

It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind.

/There is



There is no reason, given the past history of this question, for Britain, which has sovereignty and is claiming nothing, to make the first move. It is Argentina that is making a claim. If she wanted to refer it to the International Court, we should consider the possibility very seriously. But it would be hard to have confidence that Argentina would respect a judgement she did not like.


My Lords, I have made it clear that our hopes for a peaceful settlement continue to be based on Mr Haig's efforts. What then will happen if Argentina does not accept the results of those efforts? As the Commonwealth Secretary-General said on 27 April:

"In making a firm and unambiguous response to Argentine aggression. Britain is rendering a service to the international community as a whole".

My Lords, I beg to move.



29 APR 1982





Subject

✓ Master

File UB



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 April 1982

see diary

Chancellor Schmidt

The German Chancellor telephoned the Prime Minister at 1825 today. Their conversation covered the Falklands, allegations about German supply of nuclear materials to Argentina, the link between agricultural prices and the Budget discussion, the recent Germany Cabinet changes and the visit to Bonn of Mr. Kadar.

I enclose a record of the conversation.

I am copying this letter to John Kerr (HM Treasury), Robert Lowson (MAFF), David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John Kerr

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
THE GERMAN FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AT 1825 HOURS ON THURSDAY 29 APRIL 1982

Chancellor Schmidt said that he understood that the Falklands situation was creating serious problems. He believed that we and Mr. Haig were working hard for a political solution and he wanted to offer his support for this approach. The Prime Minister said that the problem arose from the fact that Argentina wished to retain the Islands which it had acquired by invasion. The signs were that the Argentines were unlikely to accept a diplomatic solution. Chancellor Schmidt replied that he considered it very important that the United Kingdom retained the political initiative. It was necessary to show other Latin American countries and the Third World more generally that territorial aggression could not be allowed. He hoped the Prime Minister would make clear her support for a political solution. On the other hand, he assured her that German support for the British position was unchanged.

The Prime Minister reiterated that we wanted a political solution. If Mr. Haig's initiative did not succeed, we should have to think of another process quickly.

Chancellor Schmidt said that there had been some criticism in the German press of "military noise" in the United Kingdom. He had in mind recent comments by Admiral Woodward. The Prime Minister said that these comments had caused embarrassment. But they were unlikely to be repeated.

Chancellor Schmidt enquired about the role of the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said that this caused her great concern. Eighty per cent of Argentina's exports went to the Soviet Union, which might export arms to Argentina to correct the imbalance of trade. Argentina also received some help from Soviet intelligence. Chancellor Schmidt said that he worried that the Russians might try to play a strategic role in the South Atlantic. Argentina might become a gate-way to the general area. The Prime Minister pointed out that if the Soviet Union could add the Falkland Islands and South Georgia to its facilities in Cuba, it would acquire a very commanding position. Chancellor Schmidt said that he saw the strategic situation in the same way.

CONFIDENTIAL / Chancellor Schmidt



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Chancellor Schmidt said he wished to raise a small point. There had been reports in the British media of the supply of nuclear materials by Germany to Argentina. These reports had not been true and it would be helpful if they could be corrected. Germany had made strenuous efforts to persuade Argentina to submit its nuclear programmes to IAEA control. The Prime Minister said that we would try to correct the reports by means of a Question and Answer in Parliament. Chancellor Schmidt said he would be most grateful and would ensure that wide publicity was given to the exchange.

Chancellor Schmidt then said that EC Agriculture Ministers were likely to reach a critical point in their discussion of farm prices in Luxembourg this evening. President Mitterrand had just telephoned him. He now wished to appeal to the Prime Minister to break the link between agricultural prices and the Budget. Otherwise, there would be a serious crisis in the Community. The Prime Minister said that she had to disappoint the Chancellor. Cabinet had decided yesterday that the link must be maintained because the inter-action between the two subjects was so great. Chancellor Schmidt warned again that a critical situation could develop later tonight. The Prime Minister reiterated that Cabinet had taken its decision. We still sought parallel progress on the three chapters of the Mandate.

After a brief exchange about the United Kingdom's receipts, Chancellor Schmidt said that it might be helpful if the Prime Minister were able to be in contact with the United Kingdom Representative at the Luxembourg meeting tonight. Germany would argue that the Commission demonstrated that there was no danger of the 1% VAT ceiling being breached. It was also important that agriculture expenditure should grow more slowly than general expenditure. The Prime Minister said that she agreed with these two points.

Referring to his recent Cabinet reshuffle, Chancellor Schmidt said that the only important point for cooperation with the United Kingdom was that Lahnstein had been made Financial Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL / Finally,



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Finally, Chancellor Schmidt referred to the visit to Bonn of Mr. Kadar on 27/28 April. As on previous occasions he had been much impressed by Kadar's personality and political judgement. Hungary was showing great interest in joining the International Monetary Fund. Kadar wanted Germany to help him maintain his freedom of movement in the Communist world. Chancellor Schmidt said that HM Ambassador in Bonn would be given a full account of the visit but he hoped this could be kept confidential. The Prime Minister said she would be most interested to see the report in due course.

*Duty Clerk*  
*Mr A J. Coles*

29 April, 1982.

CONFIDENTIAL



SUBJECT

cc: Maden  
ops

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 789/82

6

IMMEDIATE 291322Z APR 82

FM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T

MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

DEAR RON,

THE CABINET CONSIDERED AL HAIG'S CURRENT PROPOSALS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FOR THE FIRST TIME THIS MORNING. WE WERE ALL VERY GRATEFUL FOR HIS TIRELESS EFFORTS.

I EXPLAINED TO MY COLLEAGUES THAT AL HAD PUT HIS PROPOSALS TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ONLY ON 27 APRIL= THAT, AS HE MADE CLEAR TO FRANCIS PYM, HE HAD GIVEN THEM A DEADLINE FOR ACCEPTING THE PROPOSALS WITHOUT AMENDMENT OR REJECTING THEM= AND THAT THIS DEADLINE HAD PASSED MORE THAN 24 HOURS AGO WITH NO ARGENTINE REPLY.

IN THE CABINET'S VIEW, THE PROPOSALS MUST NOW BE REGARDED AS HAVING BEEN REJECTED BY THE ARGENTINES, WHO HAVE IGNORED THE DEADLINE AND PUBLICLY RESTATED THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO ALTER THEIR POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY.

AL MADE CLEAR TO FRANCIS LAST WEEK THAT, IF ARGENTINA DID REJECT THE PROPOSALS, THE U.S WOULD CONSIDER ITS CURRENT PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS TO HAVE ENDED AND WOULD FROM THEN ON GIVE FULL PUBLIC SUPPORT TO BRITAIN. IN THE CABINET'S VIEW, THIS POINT HAS NOW BEEN REACHED. I CANNOT CONCEAL FROM YOU HOW DEEPLY LET DOWN I AND MY COLLEAGUES WOULD FEEL IF UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE U.S WERE NOT NOW TO GIVE US ITS FULL SUPPORT.

YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT WHEN WE SPOKE ON THE TELEPHONE ON 17 APRIL, ABOUT THE EARLIER PROPOSALS WHICH AL AND WE WORKED OUT IN LONDON ON 12 APRIL, YOU TOLD ME THAT IN YOUR VIEW WE HAD BEEN AS ACCOMMODATING AS WE COULD HAVE BEEN AND IT WOULD NOT BE REASONABLE TO ASK US TO GO FURTHER. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, YOU WILL NOT BE SURPRISED TO KNOW THAT THE CABINET SAW FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTIES FROM BRITAIN'S POINT OF VIEW IN AL'S LATEST PROPOSALS WHICH WE REGARD ARGENTINA AS HAVING NOW REJECTED. THESE DIFFICULTIES LAY IN THE ESSENTIAL AREAS WHERE THE LATEST PROPOSALS DIFFERRED FROM THE 12 APRIL PROPOSALS. IT WAS, OF COURSE, JUST THESE AREAS WHICH FRANCIS DISCUSSED SO THOROUGHLY WITH AL IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK.

ONE STAGE IN THE EFFORT TO SETTLE THIS CRISIS HAS NOW ENDED. IT SEEMS TO ME ESSENTIAL THAT, AS WE ENTER THE NEXT STAGE, THE U.S AND BRITAIN SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE UNEQUIVOCALLY ON THE SAME SIDE, STAUNCHLY UPHOLDING THOSE VALUES ON WHICH THE WESTERN WAY OF LIFE DEPENDS.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,  
MARGARET

NNNN



cc: MOD  
FCO  
CDL  
HO

SECRET

Passed a Hotline  
Time: 29/1341Z  
29 April 1982

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Ron,

The Cabinet considered Al Haig's current proposals on the Falkland Islands for the first time this morning. We were all very grateful for his tireless efforts.

I explained to my colleagues that Al had put his proposals to the Argentine Government only on 27 April; that, as he made clear to Francis Pym, he had given them a deadline for accepting the proposals without amendment or rejecting them; and that this deadline had passed more than 24 hours ago with no Argentine reply.

In the Cabinet's view, the proposals must now be regarded as having been rejected by the Argentines, who have ignored the deadline and publicly restated that they are not prepared to alter their position on sovereignty.

Al made clear to Francis last week that, if Argentina did reject the proposals, the US would consider its current peace-making efforts to have ended and would from then on give full public support to Britain. In the Cabinet's view, this point has now been reached. I cannot conceal from you how deeply let down I and my colleagues would feel if under these circumstances the US were not now to give us its full support.

/You will

SECRET



SECRET

-2-

You will remember that when we spoke on the telephone on 17 April, about the earlier proposals which Al and we worked out in London on 12 April, you told me that in your view we had been as accommodating as we could have been and it would not be reasonable to ask us to go further. Against that background, you will not be surprised to know that the Cabinet saw fundamental difficulties from Britain's point of view in Al's latest proposals which we regard Argentina as having now rejected. These difficulties lay in the essential areas where the latest proposals differed from the 12 April proposals. It was, of course, just these areas which Francis discussed so thoroughly with Al in Washington last week.

One stage in the effort to settle this crisis has now ended. It seems to me essential that, as we enter the next stage, the US and Britain should be seen to be unequivocally on the same side, staunchly upholding those values on which the Western way of life depends.

Warm personal regards,

Margaret

SECRET





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

has seen  
 Prime Minister NA  
 A.F.C. 25/4

Dear John,

Falkland Islanders

In my letter of 26 April I said that officials had reviewed the position of the Falkland Islanders, particularly as regards their morale, and the provision of assistance to those who wanted to leave the Islands temporarily.

Numbers of Falkland Islanders wishing to leave

Our estimates remain the same as in my letter of 26 April. It looks as if a maximum of 300 Falkland Islanders may remain in Port Stanley, but that the great majority are in 'the Camp'. An undetermined number of those in Port Stanley may wish to leave. The large majority of those in 'the Camp' are likely to want to stick it out.

An Argentine aircraft left Port Stanley yesterday for the mainland carrying from 16 to 23 passengers. Most of these will stay overnight in Montevideo and should be flown home to the United Kingdom tomorrow. The usual reception party will be on hand to receive them, de-brief them and look after their welfare. The Chief Secretary of the Falkland Islands will also be at the airport. I shall write to you further about the information we obtain from them.

International Red Cross

The International Red Cross have been trying for some time to persuade the Argentines to give them access to the Islands. We have encouraged them in their efforts, emphasising that we wish them in particular to report on the position of the Islanders, ascertain how many might wish to leave, and consider the ways of enabling them to do so. The ICRC have confirmed that these are among their own highest priorities. After initially turning down the ICRC, the Argentines have now sent them a note indicating that they accepted in principle the ICRC's offer to help over the civilian population, but falling short of agreeing to an early ICRC presence on the Islands. The ICRC are continuing to press for this. We have drawn their attention urgently to the imposition of the Exclusion Zone, indicating that they should re-double their efforts to obtain a presence in the Islands before the zone takes effect.

/We





We shall of course have to refer to the ICRC's efforts publicly. But the ICRC are concerned that we should not give too much publicity to our contact with them, since this might augment Argentine suspicion that they are in some way acting in collusion with us, and thus defeat their objective.

For the present, we believe an ICRC presence on the Islands represents our best hope of seeing to the welfare of the Islanders. But we have to recognise that the ICRC's efforts may not succeed: and indeed we may need to consider the intervention of a third party to make special arrangements to evacuate those who want to leave. We are in the first place asking our Ambassador in Montevideo to consult the Uruguayans on a personal and contingency basis on whether they would be willing to help, if the need should arise. But the problem will remain, particularly if there is no ICRC presence on the Islands, that we will have no clear means of establishing the demand.

#### Help for those who want to leave temporarily

HMG will pay the return fares of Islanders who wish to leave temporarily. Steps have been taken to put this into effect. A message has been sent to the Islanders by the BBC, and confirmed by the Prime Minister in the House on 26 April, that the Government would offer very sympathetic help to all those who want to leave temporarily, but are prevented by the lack of means from doing so. It remains our view (and that of the Governor, the Chief Secretary and other prominent returned Islanders) that to make a public announcement that HMG will pay the return fares of Islanders who manage to leave would create consternation among the remaining Islanders; and might build up more pressures for an evacuation than may exist at present, and which we could not at present satisfy.

#### Morale

The BBC special Service to the Falkland Islands is now operating daily for 35 minutes. The audibility is said to be good, as is the audibility of the BBC's World Service. The Governor spoke on this programme on 26 April, and the Chief Secretary on 27 April. Other prominent returned Islanders will take part on subsequent evenings, the intention being to add a personal and familiar tone to the broadcasts. Any special messages we need to get to the Islanders can best be conveyed to them by this means (as well as the BBC World Service and the telex link which is still operating between the Falkland Islands Company in London and its Manager in the Islands).

/I am



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -



I am sending copies of this letter to Private Secretaries of the other members of OD(SA), to Sir Robert Armstrong and to Sir Michael Palliser.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1982

CA.

HW

29.11

Dear John,

Falkland Islanders: The Total Exclusion  
Zone

Mr Pym thinks it is necessary to say something reassuring to the Falkland Islanders this evening, on the special programme beamed to them, about the Total Exclusion Zone. We are arranging for this to be done by the Governor. I enclose the form of words which he will use.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

J E Holmes

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



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Type 1 +

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:—

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

## PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

TEXT OF POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO BE BROADCAST TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THIS EVENING - POSSIBLY BY THE GOVERNOR

1. I expect you will have heard from the World Service that the Government have today decided to extend the Maritime Exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, which was imposed on 12 April to exclude all ships and aircraft from the area. This will take effect at 0800 hours Falkland Islands (Port Stanley) time on 30 April, and from that time any ship or aircraft which is operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands will be regarded as hostile and liable to attack by British forces. At the same time, the Government have said that any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as illegal and liable to attack.

2. The Government decided that they had no alternative but to impose this zone if they are to achieve their overall aim - which I know is the same as yours - namely to bring about the withdrawal of the Argentines from the Islands, and to re-establish our own Administration there as soon as we can. It does not mean that the Government have abandoned their pursuit of an acceptable settlement achieved by peaceful means. They continue to do all they can to seek one.

/3. May



3. May I say a special word to you about this measure. It will of course cause many of you concern and possible hardship. But you will also appreciate its necessity, if the results we all want are to be achieved. It will unfortunately also close the means of civilian departure from the Islands for the time being.

4. From the beginning, all of us in Britain have watched with admiration the patience and courage you have shown in adversity. We know how isolated you feel and we fully understand the difficulties which this move may cause you, but it has to be done if we are to get the Argies out soon. I think you should also know that no-one here has the slightest doubt in your determination to see this need through.



**SUBJECT**

File No. **ce Maslo**  
Department **Ops**  
Drafted by  
(Block Capitals)  
Tel. Extn.

T 92/82  
~~OUTWARD~~  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification UNCLASSIFIED
Precedence PRIORITY
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY .....Z
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**PREAMBLE**

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 (Security Class.) ..... (Caveat/Privacy marking) .....  
 (Codeword) ..... (Deskby) ..... Z

TO ..... PRIORITY NAIROBI Tel. No. .... of .....  
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) .....  
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AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....  
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SAVING TO (for info) ..... UKMIS NEW YORK .....

Sent 29/4

**Distribution:-**

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- Sir L Allinson
- Mr Giffard
- News Dept

**Copies to:-**

**[TEXT]**

THE FALKLANDS: TELECON JARROLD/DENNIS OF 26 APRIL

1. Please convey the following personal message from the Prime Minister to President Moi (signed original in bag closing here 30 April):
2. 'Your Excellency

I am deeply grateful for your prompt and helpful response to my recent message seeking Kenya's support for the condemnation of the Argentine Government's invasion of the Falkland Islands; and for the constructive remarks made on this subject by your country's representative during the recent

/United



CONFIDENTIAL

Mandatory Resolutions

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

Prime Minister

Dear Sir,

AS 27/24

Mandatory Resolutions

You asked for information about resolutions adopted by the Security Council, other than Resolution 502, which were binding on Member States, and remain unimplemented.

I should explain that most of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council have not been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter and have not been binding. In a number of other cases it is uncertain whether the resolution was mandatory in its effect or not (because the language does not make clear whether they were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter). The number of resolutions which are certainly mandatory is quite small. The following are some key examples.

Korea

Resolution 82 (1950) determined that the North Korean invasion of the South was a breach of the peace, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon the North Korean forces to withdraw. It remained unimplemented, and the Korean war followed as a result. The resolutions below cannot be said to have been unimplemented though they were not universally respected.

Southern Rhodesia

Resolution 221 (1966) determined that the situation arising from oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia through Beira was a threat to the peace, called upon Portugal not to receive or permit the pumping of oil for Southern Rhodesia and authorised the UK to prevent the arrival of vessels believed to be carrying such oil.

Resolution 232 (1966) determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a threat to international peace and security and decided that Member States should prevent the import into their territories of certain Southern Rhodesian products as well as the supply to Southern Rhodesia of arms, aircraft and motor vehicles.

/Resolution

CONFIDENTIAL



United Nations General Assembly session  
on Palestine. It is extremely heartening  
to know that at this difficult time we  
are able to count on such strong support  
from Kenya.

With my best wishes.

Your sincerely


Margaret Thatcher'

Ends.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



28 APR 1982







Resolution 253 (1966) reaffirmed the above determination and made the import and export embargoes virtually complete. It also established a committee of the Security Council to monitor the implementation of the embargo.

South Africa

Resolution 418 (1977) determined that the acquisition of arms by South Africa was a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and decided that all states should cease forthwith the provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types. (A committee of the Security Council was subsequently established to monitor the implementation of this embargo).

Unimplemented resolutions which you may have had in mind, for example 242, did not involve a Chapter VII determination of a threat to international peace and security and are therefore not mandatory. (In many cases because we and other Western countries took care to discourage Chapter VII language in order to discourage subsequent calls for sanctions.)

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



CONFIDENTIAL



MO 5/21

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~3307822~~ 218 2111/3

28th April 1982

*has seen.*

*Prime Minister*

*MA*  
*MA*

*A.J.C. 25/4*

*Dear John,*

DEATH OF AN ARGENTINE PRISONER

Following the discussion at Cabinet this morning, my Secretary of State has asked me to give you further details of the incident in which an Argentine prisoner was shot. Communications with the task group at South Georgia are very difficult and we have only just received a fuller report. This information is, I must emphasize, provisional until the report of the Board of Enquiry is received.

On the day of the shooting the Captain and members of the crew of HMS BRILLIANT inspected the Santa Fe. They found that it was sinking and, as it was moored alongside the only jetty in Grytviken, they decided that it would have to be moved. They asked the Argentine Commander for assistance and he agreed. The Royal Marine Guard party were briefed by British submariners about the dangers of the exercise and the possibility of sabotage.

The submarine was successfully started up but when it had got a few hundred yards from the jetty it suddenly lurched to port. The Argentine Commanding officer shouted to a crew member to pull a lever to blow more air into the submarine to keep it stable. The crew member moved to do this but the Royal Marine Guard, believing that the man was about to pull another lever which is nearby and which floods the submarine, shot him to prevent the boat being scuppered. The submarine was righted and is now on the other side of the bay, half sunk but sealed, with the body of the Argentinian still on board. Although we have no details of this the assumption must be that it was difficult to remove the body in circumstances where those concerned believed that the boat was about to sink.

The Marine concerned is young and was apparently under strain in the wet, dark and dangerous conditions aboard the Sante Fe. He had been specifically told to guard against the possibility of the particular lever being used to scupper the submarine. Those concerned are aware of the political sensitivity of the incident and the need for a full and urgent report. I gather that the Board of Enquiry will be completed very soon. We will, of course, let you have the details as soon as possible. In the meantime the incident will be treated as sub judice.

A J Coles Esq

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



In view of the need for a quick decision my Secretary of State has directed that, when the body can be recovered, it should be buried on shore with full military honours rather than at sea. This is in line with the requirements of the Geneva Convention in these matters. It will also give the Argentinians the opportunity to recover the body to Argentina at some future date, should they wish to do so. To take the body from South Georgia to Ascension for transshipment to Argentina would be logistically difficult and would, of course, carry the risk of keeping the incident in the public eye over the next few days.


*Yours ever*

*Nick Evans*

(N H R EVANS)



28 APR 1982



CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

Dear John.

I have confirmed to the  
F/CO. that the telegram  
may issue. AM 20/4.

Please type letter  
✓ AM 24/4.

Message of Thanks from the Prime Minister  
to President Moi of Kenya

I am writing to recommend that the Prime Minister send a personal message to President Moi of Kenya, thanking him for the robust Kenyan statements of support for the UK over the Falklands crisis.

Kenya issued a prompt statement on 5 April condemning the Argentine aggression. On 23 April, during the UNGA Emergency Special Session on Palestine, the Kenyan representative made an even stronger and more detailed statement, describing the Argentine action as 'entirely contrary to the Charter of the United Nations' and calling on the Argentines to withdraw immediately in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502.

This forthright support is in line with other personal interventions President Moi has recently made to help us, for example by instructing that two major contracts be awarded to British firms.

I therefore attach a draft letter to President Moi for the Prime Minister's signature, together with a draft telegram to Nairobi.

Smart

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: His Excellency Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, CGH, MP  
President of the Republic of Kenya

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Your Excellency

CAVEAT.....

I am deeply grateful for your prompt and helpful response to my recent message seeking Kenya's support for the condemnation of the Argentine Government's invasion of the Falkland Islands; and for the constructive remarks made on this subject by your country's representative during the recent United Nations General Assembly session on Palestine. It is extremely heartening to know that at this difficult time we are able to count on such strong support from an old and staunch friend.

With my best wishes.

*Handwritten signature and date: 29/4*

Enclosures—flag(s).....



10 DOWNING STREET

28th April, 1982

PRIME MINISTER

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It may be worth pointing out (yet again) that :

1. We have always been willing to negotiate with the Argentine about the Falklands. *Wen my. F. L.*
2. Negotiations were, in fact, taking place earlier this year.
3. In the two or three days before their invasion we offered urgently to send a negotiator (I think).
4. Our first action was to turn to the United Nations, who issued a mandatory resolution requiring the withdrawal of their forces so that negotiations could take place.
5. Far from withdrawing their forces, they added to them.

The more this history of negotiations is repeated from the beginning the more naive appear those who believe the Argentines are willing to negotiate, or willing to take note of the Security Council, or the United Nations. I think it adds weight to this argument to begin this history with the earlier negotiations rather than with the Security Council resolution.

David W.

David Wolfson

*I should you with "I respect" advice Granfie has the number where I shall be this evening, but I suspect you already have enough "cooks"!*



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FM FCO 282030Z APR 82  
TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 861 OF 28 APRIL  
INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

*Mr 29  
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*h.*

FALKLANDS: CONVERSATION WITH HAIG

1. I RANG MR HAIG AGAIN AT 1910Z.
2. HAIG SAID THAT COSTA MENDEZ WOULD BE WITH HIM IN 20 MINUTES TIME, AND HAD INDICATED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO STAY IN WASHINGTON ON THURSDAY IF NECESSARY. THEREAFTER HE WOULD BE GOING TO NEW YORK BEFORE RETURNING TO BUENOS AIRES: IN HAIG'S VIEW HE HAD A UN TRICK UP HIS SLEEVE. HAIG INTENDED TO MAKE VERY CLEAR TO HIM WHERE THE US STOOD. I SAID THAT I WAS GLAD OF THIS. AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, THE US PROPOSALS HAD BEEN PUT TO THE ARGENTINIANS ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS, WITH A CLEAR DEADLINE AND HAIG EVIDENTLY MEANT TO KEEP TO THIS. HAIG SAID THAT THIS WAS CORRECT. HE HAD DISCUSSED THE POSITION WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND THEY WERE ALL IN AGREEMENT OVER THIS. IF, HOWEVER, ANYTHING MINOR CAME OUT OF THE MEETING WITH COSTA MENDEZ, HE WOULD LET US KNOW AT ONCE: IN HIS MESSAGE SETTING UP THE FORTHCOMING MEETING, MENDEZ HAD CLAIMED TO HAVE NEW INSTRUCTIONS. COSTA MENDEZ HAD TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE FIRST PHASE - OAS ENDORSEMENT OF ARGENTINIAN SOVEREIGNTY - WAS COMPLETE, AND THAT THEY WERE NOW READY TO PROCEED TO THE SECOND PHASE. I INDICATED THAT I DID NOT FIND THIS ENCOURAGING. THE TIME FACTOR WAS MUCH IN OUR MINDS. THERE WAS ALSO TOMORROW'S COMMONS DEBATE WHICH WAS RELEVANT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MAKING THE US PROPOSALS PUBLIC. HAIG SAID THAT TO GO PUBLIC NOW WOULD BE A MISTAKE. IN HIS BRIEFING TO THE SENATE, HE WOULD GIVE NO DETAILS: AND HE WOULD BE WARNING COSTA MENDEZ OFF DOING SO. THE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC ONLY WHEN THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO HOPE. I SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT WELL BE IN HALF-AN-HOUR'S TIME. IF

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HAIG DID NOT INTEND TO GO PUBLIC BEFORE 1100Z TOMORROW, IT WOULD BE BETTER FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IF THIS WAS NOT DONE UNTIL FRIDAY. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD IN ANY CASE BEEN THINKING IN TERMS OF FRIDAY. THE REVELATION OF DETAILS SHOULD BE TRIGGERED BY A QUOTE MAJOR CHANGE IN THE SITUATION UNQUOTE. ONE HAD TO REMEMBER THAT THE ARGENTINIANS TENDED TO BE 24 HOURS BEHIND REALITY.

4. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION WAS THAT THE US PROPOSALS HAD BEEN PUT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO THE ARGENTINIANS, SINCE IT WAS FOR THEM TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502, HAIG SAID THAT THIS WAS RIGHT: THERE HAD BEEN SIMULTANIETY IN TRANSMISSION: BUT HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT I MEANT. HE UNDERTOOK TO TELEPHONE WHEN HE HAD SEEN COSTA MENDEZ.

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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ADVANCE COPY

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PS/MR ONSLOW

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MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS DS W60.  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
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H.M.TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
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MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

SIR M. PALMER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG, CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

*MR 19/4*  
*f.a.*

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FM WASHINGTON 281850Z APR 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1494 OF 28 APRIL

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS TELEPHONED (1840Z) TO SAY THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAS ASKED TO SEE HIM IN 20 MINUTES TIME WITH QUOTE NEW INSTRUCTIONS UNQUOTE. COSTA MENDEZ SAID THAT HE HAD COMPLETED HIS FIRST PHASE IN THE OAS AND WAS NOW READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS.
2. HAIG IS TREATING THIS WITH APPROPRIATE SCEPTICISM AND PROMISES ME THAT HE QUOTE WILL HANG VERY TOUGH UNQUOTE.
3. HE WILL GET INTO TOUCH WITH ME AS SOON AS THE MEETING IS OVER.

HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 281900Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1495 OF 28 APRIL

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FALKLANDS

1. THIS TELEGRAM PUTS ON RECORD THE MEETING I HAVE JUST HAD WITH HAIG AND MY SUBSEQUENT TALK WITH YOU ON THE SECRET TELEPHONE. HAIG SAID THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD NOT YET ASKED TO SEE HIM AND THERE HAD BEEN NO REPLY IN BUENOS AIRES, THOUGH MANY HOURS HAD PASSED SINCE THE HOUR HE HAD SET FOR A REPLY. HE BELIEVED THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE DELIBERATELY STALLING WHILE THE OAS DEBATE WAS STILL GOING ON. BUT THEY HAD NOT DERIVED MUCH ADVANTAGE FROM THAT.

2. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS PRETTY SURE THAT WHEN COSTA MENDEZ DID SEE HIM HE WOULD COME FORWARD WITH COUNTER-PROPOSALS ON ALL THE THREE MAIN SUBJECTS: HE WOULD SEEK GREATER ARGENTINIAN REPRESENTATION ON THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN THE INTERIM; HE WOULD TRY TO REINSTATE THE REFERENCES TO UN RESOLUTIONS THAT WERE TANTAMOUNT TO A COMMITMENT ON THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY; AND HE WOULD SAY THAT AT THE END OF THE SIX MONTH PERIOD IN WHICH THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY TO FIND A SOLUTION THE ISLANDS WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. HAIG KNEW THAT THE LAST TWO IDEAS WERE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO US. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE MIGHT BE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AS REGARDS THE FIRST. I SAID THAT THE IDEA HAD BEEN THAT THE U S PROPOSALS HAD BEEN SUBMITTED ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS AND A DEADLINE HAD BEEN SET FOR MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT. HAIG QUALIFIED THIS LAST POINT BY SAYING THAT HE HAD NOT EXACTLY SET A DEADLINE; HE HAD TOLD THE ARGENTINIANS THAT UNLESS THEY REPLIED BY MIDNIGHT THE WHOLE SITUATION WOULD CHANGE.

3. I ASKED HAIG WHETHER HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE JUST WASTING TIME. THEY HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH HIM NOW FOR THREE WEEKS AND SURELY HE WOULD AGREE WITH ME THAT THE JUNTA WERE NOT NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY. HE SAID HE AGREED BUT THE AMERICANS MUST GO RIGHT DOWN TO THE END OF THE LINE BEFORE COMING OUT ON OUR SIDE. THERE WERE ALL SORTS OF WAYS THEY COULD HELP, INCLUDING A SERIOUS ECONOMIC SQUEEZE. BUT THERE MUST BE NO DOUBT IN ANYBODY'S MIND THAT THE ULTIMATE EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO TRY TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

4. HAIG WENT ON TO ASK ME ABOUT BRITISH OPINION IN THE LIGHT OF FOOT'S SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY. I SHOULD INTERJECT HERE THAT WEINBERGER TELEPHONED ME EARLY THIS MORNING TO ASK ME WHETHER FOOT'S SPEECH INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A CRACK IN THE BRITISH POSITION, SOMETHING THAT COULD BE VERY SERIOUS. I HAD TOLD WEINBERGER, AS I HAVE NOW TOLD HAIG, THAT TOO MUCH SHOULD NOT BE MADE OF

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/ FOOT'S



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FOOT'S SPEECH. THEY MUST KNOW WHAT HE WAS LIKE. BUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S STAND WAS RESOLUTE AS WAS BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION.

5. HAIG WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS MOST DETERMINED IN HIS WISH TO GIVE THE PRIME MINISTER EVERY SORT OF HELP BUT QUOTE THE AMERICANS COULD NOT BE MORE BRITISH THAN THE BRITISH UNQUOTE AND HAIG WANTED THEREFORE TO BE SURE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE GETTING AHEAD OF US. I LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT ON THIS POINT AND SAID THAT THE MOST USEFUL THING THE AMERICANS COULD DO IF THEY REALLY WANTED TO AFFECT ARGENTINE REACTIONS WAS TO SHOW WHICH SIDE THEY WERE ON.

6. THIS LED ME ON TO TALK ABOUT TWO RESOLUTIONS THAT ARE BEING PUT DOWN IN THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT HE, HAIG, WAS WRONG TO TRY TO DISSUADE SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN FROM VOTING FOR RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE ARGENTINIANS ETC. HAIG DENIED THAT HE WAS DOING THIS AND ADDED THAT AT ANY RATE HE WAS NOW IN FAVOUR OF SUCH RESOLUTIONS. HE WOULD BE HAVING A SECRET MEETING WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THIS AFTERNOON.

7. HAIG SAID HE HAD NOTICED THAT WE HAD POSTPONED BY 24 HOURS THE COMING INTO EFFECT OF THE AIRCRAFT EXCLUSION ZONE. HE REGARDED THIS AS A SIGN OF OUR EXTENDED READINESS TO NEGOTIATE AND WOULD BE TAKING THAT LINE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. I SAID THAT THAT MIGHT BE ALL RIGHT BUT HE SHOULD NOT GIVE THEM ANY GROUNDS FOR THINKING THAT IT WAS A SIGN OF WEAKENING ON OUR PART. THE ZONE WOULD COME INTO EFFECT AS ANNOUNCED. SUBSEQUENTLY, HAVING SPOKE TO BRIAN FALL, I TOLD HAIG THAT THE REASON FOR THE DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION WAS SIMPLY TO GIVE AIRCRAFT AN ADDITIONAL CHANCE TO GET OUT OF THE ZONE.

8. FOLLOWING MY TALK WITH YOU I ALSO SPOKE AGAIN TO HAIG SAYING THAT YOU EXPECTED HIM TO TELL COSTA MENDEZ THAT HE, HAIG, INTERPRETED ANY COUNTER PROPOSALS THE ARGENTINIANS MIGHT MAKE AT THIS STAGE AS A REJECTION OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. THE PROPOSALS WOULD BE DIFFICULT ENOUGH FOR US AS THEY WERE. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF HARDENING THEM AS THE ARGENTINIANS APPARENTLY WERE THINKING OF TRYING TO DO. HAIG ASKED ME WHAT HE SHOULD SAY IF COSTA MENDEZ ASKED WHAT THE



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BRITISH REACTION WAS. I SAID TO HIM THEN AND REPEATED IT AGAIN AFTER CLEARING THE LINE WITH YOU ON A SECURE TELEPHONE THAT HE MUST AVOID LETTING THE ARGENTINIANS SAY THAT WE HAD REJECTED THE PROPOSALS: BUT LIKEWISE HE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ANYTHING THAT COULD LEAD TO SOME PUBLIC, OR FOR THAT MATTER PRIVATE, STATEMENT THAT WE HAD IN FACT ACCEPTED THEM. AS HE KNEW, WE HAVE NOT IN FACT DONE SO. I SUGGESTED THAT IN ANSWERING SUCH A QUESTION FROM COSTA MENDEZ HE COULD ELABORATE BY SAYING THAT THE WHOLE SUBJECT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH YOU AT THE END OF LAST WEEK.

HENDERSON

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FM FCO 281130Z APRIL 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 853 OF 28 APRIL.

INFO IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK - PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR  
PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY OF STATE

1. I KNOW THAT HAIG WILL LET YOU KNOW, AND THAT YOU WILL REPORT TO US IMMEDIATELY, WHEN THERE IS ANY CLEAR RESPONSE FROM GALTIERI AND THE JUNTA. SHOULD THEY ACCEPT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS I DO NOT HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO HANDLE AND WE WILL NEED TIME FOR APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIONS. I HOPE HAIG WILL UNDERSTAND THIS AND WILL NOT (NOT) FORCE OUR HAND OR ADD TO OUR PROBLEMS BY PREMATURE PUBLICATION. THERE NEEDS TO BE THE CLOSEST CONSULTATION ON TIMING AND PRESENTATION.
2. THE PROBLEM WILL BE LESS CRITICAL IN THE EVENT OF ARGENTINIAN REJECTION OR QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE WITH DEMANDS FOR FURTHER MODIFICATION, BUT WE WILL REQUIRE ADVANCE WARNING OF HAIG'S INTENTIONS AS REGARDS PUBLICATION AND TIME TO REACT.
3. IN THE EVENT OF ARGENTINIAN ACCEPTANCE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO GIVE A PRECISE SECURITY GUARANTEE OF THE ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL SO THAT THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF REOCCUPATION BY THE ARGENTINES OR AN ARGENTINIAN CHANGE OF MIND DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS SHOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, GALTIERI BE OUSTED. YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT I RAISED THIS WITH HAIG DURING MY VISIT AND GOT ONLY A QUALIFIED ANSWER.
4. I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO JUDGE WHETHER YOU SHOULD PUT THESE POINTS TO HAIG NOW OR WHETHER YOU MAKE THEM WHEN YOU GET FIRM AND FINAL NEWS OF THE ARGENTINIAN REACTION.
5. CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR GREAT PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT. IT HAS OBVIOUSLY BEEN A HUGE SUCCESS AND HAS CONTRIBUTED CONSIDERABLY TO THE FAVOURABLE CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC MOOD.

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FM FCO 282300Z APRIL 82  
TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 862 OF 28 APR  
INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. HAIG TELEPHONED ME AGAIN AT 2100Z. HE HAD JUST SPENT ONE AND A QUARTER HOURS WITH COSTA MENDEZ WHO HAD MADE A CLEAR AND PLAINTIVE REQUEST FOR THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS TO CONTINUE. COSTA MENDEZ HAD SAID THAT THE ALTERANTIVES WERE FOR ARGENTINA TO BRING IN 'THE OTHERS' (BY WHICH HAIG PRESUMABLY MEANT THE RUSSIANS: HAIG COMMENTED THAT HE DOUBTED THAT THEY WOULD BE INTERESTED) OR GO TO THE UN. HE HAD ASKED HAIG WHETHER HE WOULD FORWARD FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO US. HAIG HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE PROPOSALS AS THEY NOW STOOD OFFERED ARGENTINA MORE THAN SHE COULD REASONABLY HAVE EXPECTED. THERE WAS NO HOPE OF IMPROVING THEM. HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT ACTUALLY REFUSE TO PASS ON ANY ARGENTINE SUGGESTIONS. COSTA MENDEZ HAD FINALLY DEPARTED, LEAVING IT UNCLEAR WHETHER HE INTENDED TO GO TO NEW YORK OR PROPOSE SOME FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO BE FORWARDED TO US. HAIG EXPECTED HIM TO MAKE SOME SUGGESTIONS IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS. ON EMERGING FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT, COSTA MENDEZ HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE HAD NOT REJECTED THE US PROPOSALS AND THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS CONTINUED.

2. I SAID THAT IT WAS INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE STRINGING US ALONG. HAIG DID NOT DISSENT BUT SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE VERY WORRIED BECAUSE THEY HAD NO DOUBT WHICH SIDE THE AMERICANS WOULD FINALLY BE ON. HAIG WENT ON TO TALK OBSCURELY OF 'THE NEXT BIG EVENT' ON FRIDAY MORNING. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO COSTA MENDEZ THAT WHEN THIS HAPPENED THE AMERICANS WOULD MAKE THE 'TOTAL MOVE' (IT WAS NOT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR WHETHER HAIG MEANT BY THIS

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JUMPING IN ON OUR SIDE OR MAKING HIS PROPOSALS PUBLIC), IF THE ARGENTINES DID NOT PROVOKE THIS MOVE BY THEIR OWN ACTIONS OR STATEMENTS BEFORE THEN.

3. I REPEATED MY CONCERN THAT ONE DEADLINE HAD ALREADY PASSED AND THAT NOW HAIG SEEMED TO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF NOTHING DEFINITE HAPPENING UNTIL AT LEAST FRIDAY MORNING. WE HAD TO BE ABLE TO SEE AN END TO THE PROCESS. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO CARRY ON. AN ULTIMATUM NOW WOULD BE A MISTAKE. BUT HE HAD MADE THE US POSITION AND OUR OWN VIEWS VERY CLEAR TO COSTA MENDEZ. WE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE OUR OWN JUDGEMENT AND ACT IF WE HAD TO ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ARGENTINES COULD NOT BRING THEMSELVES TO ACCEPT A REASONABLE FRAMEWORK. HE REPEATED THAT THE NEXT STEP WOULD COME WITH THE NEXT 'EVENT'. HAIG CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS HE HEARD FURTHER FROM COSTA MENDEZ. I MADE CLEAR AGAIN MY CONCERN AT THE UNSATISFACTORY POSITION WE WERE NOW IN.

4. I AM PUZZLED BY HAIG'S SEVERAL REFERENCES TO 'THE EVENT' ON FRIDAY MORNING. HE WAS TALKING ON THE OPEN LINE AND IT IS NOT CLEAR TO ME WHAT HE HAD IN MIND. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD EXPLORE URGENTLY WITH HIM EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD IN MIND, EXPLAINING THAT THE NECESSARILY OBLIQUE NATURE OF OUR CONVERSATION HAD LEFT ME IN SOME DOUBT. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, IT SEEMED FROM THE WAY HAIG REFERRED TO IT, THAT HAIG WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF AN INVASION ON FRIDAY.

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FM WASHINGTON 290105Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1506 OF 28 APRIL 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

*[Handwritten initials]*

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Ps/Asst Secy

Mr Giddara  
Mr Wazui

Ps/No 10 28  
Rc

YOUR TELNO 862: FALKLAND ISLANDS

[SER]

1. I HAVE SEEN HAIG AND ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION ON THREE POINTS:

- I) WHAT HE MEANT WHEN HE SPOKE TO YOU ABOUT QUOTE THE NEXT BIG EVENT UNQUOTE;
- II) WHETHER HE REALLY MEANT THAT HE WAS GOING TO PASS ON TO US ARGENTINE COUNTER PROPOSALS; AND
- III) WHAT HE HAD MEANT BY TALKING ABOUT QUOTE THE TOTAL MOVE UNQUOTE.

2. HAIG SAID THAT HIS REFERENCE TO FRIDAY HAD BEEN TO THE ACTION HE ASSUMED WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE TO IMPLEMENT THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE: HE ASSUMED THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME MILITARY ACTION THAT WOULD INCLUDE LANDINGS OF SOME KIND. HE EMPHASISED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT OUR PLANS WERE. HIS ONLY POINT IN REFERRING TO THIS WAS THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD ALTER THE SCENE AND, TO ANSWER MY THIRD QUESTION, HE THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR AT THAT TIME THE REASONS FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE READINESS OF THE USA TO COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE.

3. AS REGARDS WHAT HE WOULD DO IF COSTA MENDEZ CAME BACK WITH COUNTER PROPOSALS HAIG SPOKE AS FOLLOWS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS EXPECTING COSTA MENDEZ TO COME BACK THIS EVENING. HE DID NOT



COUNTER PROPOSALS HAIG SPOKE AS FOLLOWS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS EXPECTING COSTA MENDEZ TO COME BACK THIS EVENING. HE DID NOT EXPECT HIM TO ACCEPT HIS PROPOSALS OR TO HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT WERE TOLERABLE. BUT HE HAD INDICATED TO COSTA MENDEZ EARLIER TODAY THAT IF THERE WERE SIMPLY MINIMAL CHANGES HE WANTED TO MAKE HE COULD NOT REFUSE TO CONSIDER THEM. HAIG'S OWN VIEW WAS THAT SOVEREIGNTY WAS THE ISSUE THE ARGENTINIANS SOUGHT, AND THAT ANY PROPOSALS THEY MAKE WOULD REFER TO THAT MATTER AND THAT THESE WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE BOTH FOR HIM AND FOR HMG.

4. I SAID THAT IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF COSTA MENDEZ BEING PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE US PROPOSALS WITH MINIMAL CHANGES I HOPED HAIG WOULD AVOID TELLING HIM OR SAYING PUBLICLY THAT THE ARGENTINE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO HMG. THIS WOULD PUT THE SPOTLIGHT ON US AND COULD CAUSE US GREAT DIFFICULTIES. IT WAS IN ANY CASE TOTALLY UNREASONABLE SINCE HE, HAIG, HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED TO PASS OUR PROPOSALS ON TO THE ARGENTINIANS. HAIG ACCEPTED THIS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD SIMPLY TELL COSTA MENDEZ THAT HIS IDEAS WOULD BE EXAMINED. BUT HAIG REPEATED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT COSTA MENDEZ WOULD HAVE ANYTHING WORTHWHILE TO SAY.

5. HAIG HAS OBVIOUSLY REACHED YOUR VIEW, AND INDEED THE VIEW WE HAVE HELD IN LONDON FOR A LONG TIME, THAT THE ARGENTINIANS ARE SIMPLY STRINGING THE AMERICANS ALONG. THEY ARE NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATION. BUT HAIG EMPHASISED HOW EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT IF HE SHOULD HAVE TO ANNOUNCE THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE BEYOND QUESTION THAT HE HAD LEFT NO POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATION OUT OF ACCOUNT.

6. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE TIMING OF AN AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE TALKS HAD BROKEN DOWN ETC. HAIG SAID HE HAD JUST BEEN TO A MEETING OF THE SENATE WHERE THERE HAD BEEN GREAT SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH POSITION, EXCEPT FROM SENATOR HELMS. HAIG WOULD HAVE TO GIVE A FULL EXPLANATION PUBLICLY OF THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND HE WOULD LEAVE NO SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT THE BRITISH HAD SHOWN A READINESS TO NEGOTIATE AND THAT IT WAS THE ARGENTINIANS WHO HAD PREVENTED THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM SUCCEEDING. AS REGARDS WHEN HE WOULD DO THIS HE HAD NOW REVISED THE IDEA THAT HE HAD MENTIONED TO YOU OF DOING THIS ON FRIDAY IN THE SHADOW OF SOME MILITARY ACTION THAT WE MIGHT BE TAKING. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GIVE HIS EXPLANATION PUBLICLY TOMORROW EVENING, 29 APRIL, AFTER THE END OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE. THIS WOULD ENABLE YOU TO STICK TO THE LINE YOU ARE NOW PROPOSING TO TAKE IN THE DEBATE.



YOU TO STICK TO THE LINE YOU ARE NOW PROPOSING TO TAKE IN THE  
DEBATE.

7 HAIG WILL LET ME KNOW IMMEDIATELY HE HAS SEEN COSTA MENDEZ.  
HE EXPECTS HIM TO TELL THE PRESS WHEN HE LEAVES THE STATE DEPT  
THAT HE HAS EVERY HOPE THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROCEED. THIS IS  
PART OF THEIR TACTIC. I SAID THAT IT WAS UP TO HAIG TO EXPOSE THIS.

HENDERSON

NNNN



PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
MR ONSLOW

SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY.

PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS DS Wbo

SIR M. PALMER CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

SIR R. ARMSTRONG, CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GRS 260

SECRET

FM SANTIAGO 282110Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 182 OF 28 APR

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PRIORITY LA PAZ, LIMA, MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS/CHILE/OAS

MY TELEGRAM NO.160 (NOT TO ALL)

1. RELIABLE MEDIUM LEVEL MFA CONTACT HAS REPORTED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) MFA HAD PREPARED A COMPLEX DOSSIER OF VARYING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THEIR DELEGATION TO THE OAS DEPENDING ON THE MODERATION OR INTEMPERANCE OF ANY EVENTUAL ARGENTINE RESOLUTION. HOWEVER AT A MEETING OF THE JUNTA ON 22/23 APRIL, PRESIDENT PINOCHET APPARENTLY OVERRULED THESE DIPLOMATIC NICETIES AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER ROJAS, AND INSTRUCTED THAT CHILE WOULD IN ANY EVENT ABSTAIN.
2. MFA SAY THAT THIS DECISION STEMMED FROM A CONVICTION THAT GALTIERI'S DAYS ARE NOW NUMBERED. IN THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, GALTIERI IS COMING UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOLITS ARE ALREADY DISCERNIBLE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES



AND SPLITS ARE ALREADY DISCERNIBLE WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. CHILEANS ALSO APPEAR CONVINCED THAT HMG IS NOW SO FIRMLY COMMITTED TO RECOVERY OF THE FALKLANDS COME WHAT MAY, THAT GALTIERI WILL FALL AS A RESULT. WITH ARGENTINA THEN PLUNGED INTO A MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS (WITH A TOTTERING ECONOMY) CHILEANS NOW CONSIDER IT UNLIKELY THAT ANY NEW REGIME WHICH EMERGES OF WHATEVER COMPLEXION WOULD CONTEMPLATE ATTACKING CHILE, ESPECIALLY AS THE CONSEQUENCES OF GALTIERI'S MILITARY FOOLHARDINESS WOULD BE STILL SO FRESH IN ARGENTINE MINDS.

3. MFA CONTACT ALSO CONFIRMED THAT ARGENTINA HAD INDEED APPROACHED CHILE WITH AN OFFER OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL (MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) BUT HAD BEEN REBUFFED, PARTLY BECAUSE CHILIEAN GOVERNMENT MISTRUSTED ARGENTINE PROMISES AND PARTLY BECAUSE THEY NO LONGER SAW GALTIERI AS A LEADER WITH A POLITICAL FUTURE.

4. MFA ARE RESIGNED TO ARGENTINA REGARDING THE CHILEAN ABSTENTION AT THE OAS ON 27 APRIL AS AN QUOTE UNFRIENDLY UNQUOTE ACT AND EXPECT REPRISALS OF SOME SORT THOUGH THEY ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO BE SPECIFIC.

HEATH



SECRET

UK EYES ALFA

FM WASHINGTON 281730Z APR 82

OO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER U/N OF 28 APRIL.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PSE PASS FOLLOWING TO MODUK AND CABINET OFFICE.

O 281730Z APR 82

FM BDS WASHINGTON

TO MODUK

INFO CABINET OFFICE  
BT

SECRET UK EYES ALFA  
SIC AAA/UAJ

389

UK CLASSIFIED

FOR DIC ATTN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CELL, FROM BDILS(W). INFO FOR THE ASSESSMENTS STAFF. MY AAA/UAJ 272100Z APR CONNECTS

SUBJ: POSSIBLE COVERT ATTACK ON ASCENSION ISLAND AIRFIELD FACILITIES

1. FURTHER PRESSING OF USAF INT SOURCES ON SUBJECT MATTER HAS REVEALED THAT THE POSSIBLE COVERT ATTACK ON ASCENSION ISLAND FACILITIES REPORTED YESTERDAY IS NOT BASED ON TANGIBLE HARD INTELLIGENCE BUT IS RATHER THE ANALYTICAL JUDGEMENT OF THE ANALYST CONCERNED. HE BASES HIS JUDGEMENT ON A LONG TERM FAMILIARITY WITH ARGENTINE PSYCHOLOGY, THE FANATICISM OF CERTAIN PARTS OF THE ARGENTINIAN FORCES AND THE ASSESSED DESPERATE NEED FOR A QUOTE PROPAGANDA VICTORY UNQUOTE. HIS ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ASCENSION ISLAND FACILITIES OFFERS A SOFT OPTION, EASILY ACHIEVED, BUT ONE WITH CONSIDERABLE PROPAGANDA MILEAGE EVEN IF THE DAMAGE WERE ONLY TOKEN. THE TASK MIGHT BE MADE MORE EASY WITH CURRENT ATTENTION KEENLY FOCUSED ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

2. HD BDILS(W) HAS DISCUSSED THIS WITH DIA WHO CONCUR THAT SOME THREAT MIGHT EXIST BUT HAVE NO HARD INTELLIGENCE TO BACK THIS JUDGEMENT

3. IN SUMMARY, NO HARD INTELLIGENCE IS HELD BY THE U.S. TO SUPPORT THE POSSIBILITY OF COVERT ATTACK ON ASCENSION ISLAND FACILITIES NEVERTHELESS EXPERIENCED ANALYSTS IN SOUTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS ARE AGREED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A COVERT ATTACK SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT. PARA 8 OF JICTEL NO 151 FALKLANDS MIGHT ALSO BE SEEN AS ADDING SOME WEIGHT TO THIS POSSIBILITY

BT

HENDERSON

FOR TYPISTS - IKEROK

Mr. W. J. A. D.

Ps

Ps/Mr. Hurd,

Ps/Mr. ONSLOW,

Ps/Rus,

Mr. GIFFARD,

Mr. Wright,

Mr. Use,

Mr. Gillmore,

R.C. (18X).

Mr. John S. (Repetitions),

Mr. Jeffrey S.,

Mr. Rus,

Sir R. P. A. ARMSTRONG, Cab. Off.

Sir M. PALLISER, Cabinet Office,

Mr. S. Fuller, SAFA, DEO " "

DIO Cabinet Office,

Mr. WADE-GARY, CABINET OFFICE,

Mr. A. Williams, DSW 60,

Ps/No. 10, Downing Street,

[Copies passed to E.R. and MODUK via S.H. Dec 1, Mod]



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2528 - 1

OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 281500Z  
OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS310

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 281500Z

FM FCO 281230Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 854 OF 28 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNOS 1490 AND 1491: FALKLANDS/OAS/SECURITY COUNCIL

1. PLEASE NOW PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO MR HAIG.

BEGINS: NICKO HENDERSON HAS TOLD ME OF THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE OAS EARLIER THIS MORNING. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR ALL YOUR EFFORTS, AS WELL AS THOSE OF OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, TO HEAD OFF A RESULT WHICH WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE THE SITUATION AND COMPLICATE YOUR OWN PEACE EFFORTS, WHICH WE CONTINUE TO REGARD AS VITAL. THE DIFFICULTIES OF YOUR POSITION IN THE OAS ARE FULLY APPRECIATED HERE AND WE ARE THEREFORE DOUBLY APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR FORTHRIGHT INTERVENTION AND YOUR ABSTENTION IN THE VOTE. HOWEVER YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE RESOLUTION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US. WE CANNOT FOREGO OUR UNDOUBTED RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER AS THE RESOLUTION SUGGESTS WE SHOULD.

2. THE OAS RESOLUTION IS TO BE CONVEYED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ARGENTINA MAY ADDITIONALLY SEEK AN EARLY DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL AND THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION ON SIMILAR LINES. WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN KEEPING THE ISSUE OUT OF THE COUNCIL SINCE THE ADOPTION OF SCR 502. THIS HAS IN OUR VIEW BEEN IMPORTANT IN HELPING YOUR EFFORTS AND MAINTAINING MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES. WE THEREFORE CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT THE COUNCIL WILL STAND FAST ON 502. WE WILL BE WORKING HARD TO ACHIEVE THIS, I HOPE WITH YOUR HELP. IF THE COUNCIL NEVERTHELESS MEETS AGAIN, I HOPE I CAN COUNT ON THE UNITED STATES TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US, BOTH IN NEW YORK AND IN SECURITY COUNCIL CAPITALS, TO HEAD OFF SUPPORT FOR ANY

1

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2528 - 1

UNHELPFUL AND UNACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION. IF WE FAILED YOU KNOW  
THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO USE OUR VETO. WE WOULD OF COURSE LOOK  
FOR SUPPORT FROM YOU IN THAT EVENT. ENDS

PYM

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR )

SIR K COUZENS )

MR LITTLER )

MR HAWTIN )

MR PERETZ )

MR ILETT )

TREASURY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR. A. WILLIAMS DSW 66

<sup>2</sup>  
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2648 - 1

OO MONTEVIDEO

GRS220

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 281800Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 186 OF 28 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO BRASILIA, UKMIS GENEVA

FCO TELNO 836 TO WASHINGTON AND MONTEVIDEO TELNO 193 (NOW COPIED TO BRASILIA AND UKMIS GENEVA).

FALKLAND ISLANDS: HELP FOR ISLANDERS

1. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE HAS REINFORCED THE NEED TO THINK ABOUT THE POTENTIAL NEED FOR THIRD PARTY HELP. PLEASE NOW ASK THE URUGUAYANS WHETHER THEY WOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE WILLING TO ASSIST, IF THE NEED SHOULD ARISE IN THE FUTURE, IN ARRANGING FOR E.G. A SHIP TO TAKE OFF ISLANDERS WHO MIGHT WISH TO LEAVE THE ISLANDS TEMPORARILY UNTIL THE PRESENT CRISIS IS OVER. YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT OF COURSE BE CERTAIN THAT THIS NEED WILL IN FACT ARISE, MUCH LESS OF THE NUMBERS OF ISLANDERS WHO MIGHT BE INVOLVED. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT YOUR ENQUIRY IS A PURELY PERSONAL ONE, AND IS BEING MADE ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS.

2. IN VIEW OF THE ICRC'S SENSITIVITY ABOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A PRESENCE ON THE ISLANDS, WE SHOULD PREFER YOU NOT TO MENTION THE POSSIBILITY OF ICRC INVOLVEMENT: ALTHOUGH IF THE ICRC DID MANAGE TO GET ON TO THE ISLANDS THEY WOULD OF COURSE BE CLOSELY INVOLVED IN ANY EFFORT TO EVACUATE ANY PEOPLE WHO WANTED TO LEAVE.

3. GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS FROM WASHINGTON ON FCO TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

PYM

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR )

SIR K COUZENS )

MR LITTLER )

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TREASURY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS

DSW 60

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TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS  
*P. Hurd*  
PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS DS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS No.10 ~~DOWNING~~ ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

*DIO*  
SIR M. PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG, ~~DE~~ CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 290820Z

FM WASHINGTON 282320Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO 1504 OF 28 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, OTTAWA  
PRIORITY ROME

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELEGRAM NO 1486: ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA

1. THE STORY ABOUT THE SALE TO ARGENTINA OF 32 SKYHAWK ENGINES IS STILL RUNNING. IT HAS BEEN FOLLOWED UP BY A CONGRESSIONAL STAFFER WITH STRONG BRITISH SYMPATHIES, WHO HAS GIVEN FURTHER DETAILS TO THE WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT OF SOUTHAMS PRESS (PUBLISHERS INTER ALIA OF THE OTTAWA CITIZEN.)

2. WHAT HE HAS TOLD US IS THAT THE US FIRM INVOLVED IS TURBINE ALLIED OF WASHINGTON NEW JERSEY. THEIR CONTRACT WAS EFFECTIVE FROM 8 APRIL AND SINCE THE ENGINES WERE NO LONGER ON THE MUNITIONS LIST THERE WAS NO BAR TO THEIR EXPORT. SIX PACKAGES HAVE ACCORDINGLY BEEN EXPORTED TO ARGENTINA SINCE 8 APRIL. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER EACH PACKAGE CONTAINED A COMPLETE ENGINE, OR PARTS FOR AN ENGINE. RESULT OF OUR ACTION YESTERDAY WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, A



BEEN EXPORTED TO ARGENTINA SINCE 8 APRIL. IT TO NOT BE A  
EACH PACKAGE CONTAINED A COMPLETE ENGINE, OR PARTS FOR AN ENGINE.  
AS A RESULT OF OUR ACTION YESTERDAY WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, A  
FURTHER CONSIGNMENT OF 12 PACKAGES HAS BEEN HELD UP BY US CUSTOMS  
AT SAN FRANCISCO. ASSUMING EACH PACKAGE REPRESENTS ONE ENGINE, THERE  
IS NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE REMAINING 14.

3. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE ALL THE ABOVE ENGINES ARE J65-16S. A  
FURTHER CONSIGNMENT OF 12 J65-5S (WHICH DO NOT FIT SKYHAWK) ARE DUE  
TO GO TO ARGENTINA UNDER A CONTRACT WITH A SEPARATE FIRM, ALLIED  
TECHNOLOGY.

4. THE US FIRMS ARE APPARENTLY NOW TRYING TO GET THE CONSIGNMENTS  
TREATED AS QUOTE ENGINE PARTS UNQUOTE RATHER THAN QUOTE ENGINES  
UNQUOTE IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THIS WILL GET ROUND THE CONSTRAINTS  
WHICH US CUSTOMS HAVE IMPOSED.

5. MINISTER HAS TAKEN THIS UP WITH EAGLEBURGER IN GENERAL TERMS  
AND GIVEN DETAILS TO BURT WHO HAS UNDERTAKEN TO PURSUE THE MATTER  
AND TO REPORT BACK. IT SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND THE COMBINED SKILLS OF  
THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND US CUSTOMS TO DEVISE ADMINISTRATIVE  
DELAYS EVEN IF THE IMPOSITION OF AN FORMAL BAN IS DIFFICULT.

6. IF WE ARE PRESSED FOR COMMENT, WE PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE THAT  
THE WHOLE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT: THAT  
WE UNDERSTAND THAT THESE ENGINES ARE NO LONGER TECHNICALLY ON THE  
MUNITIONS LIST: BUT THAT WE UNDERSTAND NO FURTHER EXPORTS ARE  
TAKING PLACE FOR THE TIME BEING: AND THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE  
INVESTIGATING URGENTLY.

HENDERSON

NNNN



WONY 059/28

OO FCO

RR BIS NEW YORK

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 190

CONFIDENTIAL

28 APR 1982

FM WASHINGTON 282044Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1499 OF 28 APRIL

INFO BIS NEW YORK AND UKMIS NEW YORK

11 12 1  
10 2  
9 ← 3  
8 4  
7 6 5

CALL ON HAIG: FALKLANDS

1. WHEN I SAW HAIG THIS MORNING HE WAS STILL SEETHING OVER AN INCIDENT WHICH HE DESCRIBED TO ME AS FOLLOWS.
2. ED MEESE HAD BEEN DUE TO BE THE GUEST AT A GODFREY SPERLING BREAKFAST THIS MORNING (THESE ARE ON THE RECORD BREAKFAST MEETINGS OF LEADING WASHINGTON JOURNALISTS). AT THE LAST MOMENT, MEESE HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM GOING AND HAD ASKED CLARK TO FIND SOMEONE TO TAKE HIS PLACE. CLARK HAD SENT AN NSC STAFFER CALLED BAILEY WHO DEALS WITH ECONOMIC PLANNING AND KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT THE FALKLANDS.
3. DURING THE BREAKFAST BAILEY HAD TOLD JOURNALISTS
  - (A) THAT US SR71S HAD BEEN OVERFLYING THE FALKLANDS AND THAT THE U S HAD PASSED TO US ALL THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE FLIGHTS:
  - (B) THAT HAIG HAD ASKED THE BRITISH TO DELAY MILITARY ACTION IN THE FALKLANDS FOR THREE DAYS.
4. HAIG SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD DENY THESE STORIES AS TOTALLY UNTRUE.
5. LUCKILY, WHAT BAILEY SAID WAS COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. BUT HAIG CLEARLY FEARS THAT THE STORY ABOUT THE SR71S WILL PROVOKE SPECULATION AND WILL BE BELIEVED BY THE ARGENTINIANS.
6. IF QUESTIONED BY THE PRESS, WE SHALL DRAW ATTENTION TO THE U S DENIAL.



TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS No. 40 DOWNING ST.

PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

H.M.TSY.

PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS DS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

SIR M. PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG, CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 291350Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 295 OF 28 APRIL

AND TO MODUK (NAVY)

INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, PRETORIA

INFO SAVING MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

1. PIK BOTHA ASKED ME TO CALL THIS MORNING (28 APRIL) TO PASS ON SOME INFORMATION WHICH SAVIMBI HAD GIVEN HIM YESTERDAY (HE IMPLIED THAT THEY HAD MET IN PERSON, BUT HE DID NOT SAY WHERE AND I DID NOT ASK). HE SAID THAT SAVIMBI HAD RELIABLE



WHERE, AND I DID NOT ASK). HE SAID THAT SAVIMBI HAD RELIABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN LUANDA, FROM WHOM HE HAD LEARNED THAT TWO SOVIET LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (BELIEVED TO BE BEARS) HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED IN LUANDA AND WERE OPERATING FROM THERE TO TRACK THE MOVEMENTS OF OUR FLEET IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT SAVIMBI HAD SUGGESTED THAT HE (PIK) SHOULD PASS THIS ON TO US, WHICH HE WAS NOW DOING. PIK BOTHA SAID HE REALISED THAT THE INFORMATION MIGHT NOT BE NEW TO US.

2. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT IN GIVING US THIS INFORMATION, SAVIMBI CLEARLY HOPED TO EARN SOME CREDIT WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR WHOM HE HAD GREAT RESPECT. I DID NOT COMMENT.

3. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, PIK BOTHA SAID THAT HE WOULD TELL SAVIMBI THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO ME, AND WOULD IMPRESS ON HIM THE NEED TO REGARD THE WHOLE MATTER AS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE KNOWN THAT HE HAD PASSED ON THIS INFORMATION TO US. I SAID THAT FOR OUR PART HE COULD RELY ON US TO BE COMPLETELY DISCREET.

4. PIK BOTHA, WHO WAS AT HIS MOST FRIENDLY, SAID HE HOPED WE REALISED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIAL POSITION HAD TO BE ONE OF NEUTRALITY, THERE WAS A FUND OF SYMPATHY, AND GOODWILL IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND IN SOUTH AFRICA GENERALLY FOR THE STAND WE HAD TAKEN ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. I SAID I HAD GUESSED AS MUCH, BUT WAS GLAD TO HEAR IT FROM HIM. HE SAID HE WAS FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE CLOSEST ATTENTION AND HOPED THAT THE MATTER WOULD SOON BE RESOLVED IN A WAY THAT REDOUNDED TO THE CREDIT OF MRS THATCHER OF WHOM HE SPOKE IN THE WARMEST TERMS.

5. I SAID I FELT SURE YOU WOULD WISH ME TO THANK HIM FOR ALL



5. I SAID I FELT SURE YOU WOULD WISH ME TO THANK HIM FOR ALL  
THAT HE HAD SAID.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL EXCEPT PRETORIA

REID

NNNN



TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

*P. M. Hurd*  
PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE

H.M.TSY.

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
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MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS DS W60

SIR M. PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR. R. ARMSTRONG, CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GR 350

IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY

RESTRICTED

FM BIS NEW YORK 281620Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 OF 28 APRIL 1982  
INFO WASHINGTON.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: US PUBLIC OPINION

LOUIS HARRIS ASSOCIATES HAVE GIVEN US IN CONFIDENCE AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE RESULTS OF A NATIONWIDE OPINION POLL WHICH INDICATES STRONG SUPPORT FOR BRITISH POLICY AND AN OVERWHELMING BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REMAIN NEUTRAL IN ANY WAR BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. THE POLL WAS CONDUCTED BY TELEPHONE BETWEEN 16 AND 22 APRIL AND IS DUE TO BE PUBLISHED ON 29 APRIL.

2. 60 PER CENT OF THOSE POLLED SYMPATHISED WITH BRITAIN AGAINST 19 PER CENT WITH ARGENTINA AND 8 PER CENT WITH NEITHER. 46 PER CENT CONSIDERED THAT THE CRISIS WAS A VERY SERIOUS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE. IN THE EVENT OF WAR BREAKING OUT BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN



PEACE. IN THE EVENT OF WAR BREAKING OUT BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN IN  
- AND ASSUMING THAT THE US WOULD NOT ACTUALLY FIGHT IN THE WAR -  
12 PER CENT THOUGHT THE US SHOULD HELP BRITAIN, 1 PER CENT THAT  
THEY SHOULD HELP ARGENTINA AND 83 PER CENT THAT THE US SHOULD  
REMAIN STRICTLY NEUTRAL.

3. OPINIONS ON OTHER STATEMENTS ABOUT THE CONFLICT ARE AS  
FOLLOWS:

A) THE BRITISH ARE RIGHT TO INSIST THAT THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS SHOULD DECIDE THEMSELVES WHICH COUNTRY THEY  
WANT TO BE RULED BY -- BRITAIN OR ARGENTINA.

AGREE	DISAGREE	NOT SURE
84	12	4

B) THE BRITISH ARE JUSTIFIED IN SENDING A BIG FLEET TO RETAKE THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS, BECAUSE THE ISLANDS WERE SEIZED BY FORCE THROUGH  
AN ILLEGAL ACT OF AGGRESSION.

AGREE	DISAGREE	NOT SURE
65	27	8

C) IT'S NOT RIGHT FOR ENGLAND, A COUNTRY IN WESTERN EUROPE, TO  
HAVE A COLONY IN SOUTH AMERICA, 8,000 MILES AWAY.

AGREE	DISAGREE	NOT SURE
33	59	8

D) THE ARGENTINIANS WERE JUSTIFIED IN TAKING OVER THE FALKLAND  
ISLANDS BY FORCE, BECAUSE FOR OVER 100 YEARS THEIR CLAIM THAT  
THE ISLANDS BELONG TO THEM HAS NOT BEEN SETTLED BY NEGOTIATIONS  
WITH THE BRITISH.

AGREE	DISAGREE	NOT SURE
28	62	10

NIXON

NNNN



SECRET

Prime Minister

AR 25/4.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730, 28 APRIL

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

US

1. On 27 April Mr Haig told Sir N Henderson of President Galtieri's great interest in the US proposals; the junta had referred the matter to the corps commanders. Mr Haig said he would keep the Argentines to deadlines and would give up the idea of a further visit to Buenos Aires.
2. Mr Haig telephoned Sir N Henderson in the early hours of 28 April to say that the deadline had passed and that they had not heard a word. Mr Haig added that there were rumours that the Army and Air Force members of the junta were in favour of accepting but the Navy were opposed.
3. Resolutions in support of the UK are likely to be introduced soon in both Houses in the US Congress.

OAS MEETING

4. Argentina had a bad day at the OAS meeting on 27 April. Only Guatemala and Nicaragua endorsed the Argentine invasion and a number of speakers, including Mexico, Trinidad, Costa Rica and Colombia specifically criticised Argentina for abusing fundamental international principles concerning the non-use of force to settle disputes. A drafting group is considering three draft resolutions (of which the only one which does not refer to UNSCR 502 is that submitted by Argentina) and it does not seem likely that the Rio signatories will endorse any specific action against the UK.

FALKLAND EVACUATION

5. A party of 16-23 Islanders is expected to transit Buenos Aires en route to Montevideo on 28 April.

SOUTH GEORGIA

6. Both the ICRC and the Argentines (through the Swiss) have asked for information about the identity and health of Argentine forces on South Georgia and our intentions towards them. The Uruguayans have also asked for information concerning two of their citizens on South Georgia.

BRAZIL

7. On 27 April the Acting Foreign Minister told HMA that the Brazilian Government wished to transmit to HMG its concern over the report that an invasion of the Falklands was imminent and its hope that no move would be made which might impede the negotiating process.

SECRET

/BRITISH



SECRET

BRITISH SHIPPING

8. It seems that port workers in Peru, Venezuela, Colombia and Moscow are boycotting British ships and/or refusing to handle British cargo.

28 April, 1982

*E. J. Hughes*

E J Hughes  
Emergency Unit

SECRET





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

*Dear John,*

Falklands: Debate in Parliament on 29 April

I enclose, as requested, draft material for the Prime Minister's opening speech. Most of this has been drafted on the assumption that Argentina will not before tomorrow afternoon have made known a decision definitely to accept or reject Mr Haig's proposals. The exception is the passage about the contents of the draft agreement and the good and bad elements in it, which have been drafted on the assumption that Argentina has taken a decision and that either the contents of the agreement have been published or Mr Haig has agreed to our revealing them.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Defence Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Sir Robert Armstrong, and to Simon Fuller in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

I should begin by bringing the House up-to-date on events since my last statement on Tuesday.

The United States Government put their formal proposals for a settlement of the present crisis to the Argentine Government on 27 April. They requested a very early response. Mr Haig has also given his proposals to us. We have been studying them carefully. The proposals are the result of Mr Haig's travels to London and Buenos Aires and his discussions with my Rt Hon Friend in Washington last week. The important new development is that these proposals have now, for the first time, been put to Argentina formally and in their entirety and with the full authority of the United States.

Until we know whether Argentina is prepared to accept these proposals, we cannot make their contents public. The key elements remain the same as in earlier versions. They are the arrangements for Argentine withdrawal from the Islands, the nature of the administration of the Islands after the withdrawal and pending a final settlement of the Falklands problem, and the framework for negotiations about the future of the Islands.

We must now see whether Argentina is willing to reach a negotiated settlement involving her withdrawal from the Falklands and the implementation of Security Council Resolution number 502. It is obvious that all the arrangements must hinge on Argentine agreement to withdraw. That is the



key to the whole process. It was the Argentine invasion that started this crisis and it is Argentine withdrawal that must put an end to it. *So long as (we do not) know the decision* in Buenos Aires, we shall continue to maintain maximum pressure so as to make perfectly clear to Argentina that refusal to accept a negotiated settlement can only intensify the crisis and increase the risks.

[Passage on military developments]

It is our understanding that the majority of the Falkland Islanders prefer to stay where they are. This is a remarkable testimony to their attachment to their native Islands. We do not envisage that our imposition of a Total Exclusion Zone should affect their well-being. Transit through the zone can take place with our permission. Under the fourth Geneva Convention, Argentina as the occupying power is forbidden to force people to remain in an area particularly exposed to danger. And now that the International Red Cross has received a response from the Argentine Government to its offer of assistance, we would hope that it would be possible with their help or by another means to arrange the evacuation of any Islanders who might still wish to depart.

Meanwhile, in order to sustain morale on the Islands, the BBC has begun broadcasting daily instead of once a week. Personalities such as the Governor and the



Chief Secretary have taken part in these broadcasts. The Islanders can also receive the World Service of the BBC, and audibility is believed to be good.

After the recapture of South Georgia we were able to reassure ourselves that the 13 British Antarctic Survey personnel and the two wildlife photographers have come to no harm. They are shortly to be evacuated by our forces from the Island, but it is our firm intention that their important scientific work should be able to continue in the future.



## THE US PROPOSALS

DESCRIPTION

The proposals take the form of a draft agreement between Britain and Argentina. There are ten paragraphs. The main elements are as follows.

Argentine and British forces are required to withdraw from three zones of 150 nautical miles radius around the Falkland Islands themselves, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The withdrawal is to start within 24 hours of the date of signature of the agreement.

Half of the forces are to be withdrawn within 7 days, and <sup>within</sup> 15 days ~~all of them~~ must have withdrawn and redeployed to their usual ~~duties~~. The United States is to verify this withdrawal.

operating  
as in  
normal  
duties

British and Argentine economic sanctions would be terminated simultaneously and without delay. The UK would ask her partners in the European Community and the Commonwealth to lift their economic sanctions too.

The local administration in the Islands would be reestablished to a very large degree. Two representatives would be appointed by the Argentine Government <sup>to the Executive Council</sup> and the Argentine population of the Islands would also be represented on the Executive and Legislative Councils in proportion to their numbers.

A Special Interim Authority of one representative each from Britain, the United States and Argentina would be established for the interim period lasting until 31 December 1982. The local administration would refer new decisions, laws and regulations to this Authority, /which



which would ratify them unless it deemed them to be inconsistent with the agreement.

Pending a definitive settlement, travel, transportation, movement of persons and related questions of residence, ownership and disposition of property, communications and commerce between Argentina and the Islands are to be promoted on a non-discriminatory basis and without prejudice <sup>to</sup> the rights and guarantees enjoyed by the Islanders in the past. The Special Interim Authority is to <sup>propose</sup> ~~press~~ measures on these matters to the Governments of Britain and Argentina.

During the interim period until the end of this year, Britain and Argentina <sup>are to</sup> ~~would~~ complete negotiations on the future of the Islands. The Special Interim Authority <sup>is to</sup> ~~would~~ make proposals to the two Governments to assist them in their negotiations, notably on the manner of taking into account ~~the~~ the wishes and interests of the Islanders, based on the results of a sounding of ~~the~~ opinion ~~of the~~.

---

#### THE UNWELCOME FEATURES OF THE PROPOSALS

I shall describe in a moment the better features of these proposals. But I will not hide from the House that there are regrettable features. Britain would be required to withdraw not only ~~her~~ naval forces from the zones around the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, but also ~~the~~ the forces who have just retaken South Georgia. // Another feature that I do not like



is the addition of Argentine members <sup>to</sup> the Executive and Legislative Councils, although they would <sup>probably</sup> be in a minority of 3 out of 9 in the Executive Council and 1 out of 12 in the Legislative Council. Yet another problem is that the <sup>Governor in person</sup> ~~creation of the Special Interim Authority would remove the role of the Governor~~ <sup>would be absent</sup> in the interim period. <sup>An officer to administer his functions would be appointed from London.</sup>

A further problem concerns the way in which the draft describes the subject matter <sup>for the</sup> negotiations about the future of the Islands. The words used seem to exclude one possible outcome, namely a return to the status quo that existed before the invasion.

#### THE BETTER FEATURES OF THE PROPOSALS

First and foremost among the better features is that Argentina would withdraw from the Falkland Islands and her aggression would be ended. Second, the traditional administration in <sup>major</sup> most respects would be restored. Third, <sup>measures to</sup> the facilitation <sup>and contacts</sup> of commerce between the Islands and Argentina would be subject to <sup>the</sup> agreement <sup>of</sup> the British government. As to the very important question of the scope of future negotiations, it is good that the agreement <sup>envisages that</sup> ~~provides for~~ the Islanders <sup>should</sup> be consulted. Moreover, Britain would not be obliged, despite the target date of 31 December for a conclusion of negotiations, to agree to any particular outcome. And <sup>in</sup> negotiating <sup>we</sup> would of course be guided by the wishes of the Islanders. We <sup>have</sup> resisted far worse <sup>descriptions</sup> settlements of the subject matter for future negotiations, so that <sup>a</sup>



transfer of sovereignty, for instance, is not stated as the intended outcome. The essential meaning of this passage in the draft agreement is that any outcome to negotiations is possible, with the single, most regrettable exception of the exact status quo. <sup>a return to</sup>



## INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Some honourable [redacted] Members have shown interest in a possible role for the International Court of Justice in the present dispute. Since Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the matter cannot be referred [redacted] without her agreement. The House is aware that we have four times tried to get Argentina to agree to submit the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands Dependencies to the [redacted] Court. Argentina has always declined.

There is no reason to suppose that Argentina would behave otherwise at present. <sup>And</sup> [redacted] there is no reason, given the past history of this question, for Britain, which has sovereignty and is claiming nothing, to make the first move. It is Argentina that is making a claim. If she wanted to refer it to the International Court, we should consider the possibility very seriously.

*But let us not forget that Argentina, having accepted arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results. It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind.*



Next Stages

I have made it clear that our hopes for a peaceful settlement continue to be based on Mr Haig's efforts. What then will happen if Argentina does not accept the results of those efforts?

If I were the Argentine junta that is exactly the question I would be asking myself anxiously. What would in fact have changed? The most satisfactory and acceptable mediator would have failed with little prospect of any other, whether the UN, a Third World statesman or whoever, having any real chance of succeeding in his place. But all the pressure on Argentina would remain and continue to intensify. The Task Force would still be advancing, gradually tightening the pincers round the Islands. The international pressure would still be on, perhaps supported by new measures from those countries which have hitherto remained even-handed but which would now realise that Argentina <sup>will</sup> ~~would~~ <sup>only to</sup> ~~only~~ respond ~~to further~~ coercion. And Security Council Resolution 502 would still stand as the statutory condemnation of Argentina's action and the mandatory definition of what she must do. It is too well known that other territories would never sleep soundly again. The World Community will not condone Argentina. As the Commonwealth Secretary General said <sup>on 27 April</sup> yesterday: "In




making a firm and unambiguous response to Argentine aggression, Britain is rendering a service to the international community as a whole."

The international community also realises that Argentina was the aggressor. If Mr Haig's efforts fail then it will also be clear that Argentina has compounded aggression by a refusal to accept a peaceful settlement. Right will be doubly on our side. Fortified by that right, our determination to liberate British territory and British people will be all the greater.



2288 APR 1982







MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 <sup>2111/3</sup> (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5/21

28th April 1982

Dear John,

NR 29.  
4

FALKLAND ISLANDS

/ You asked this morning for a passage on military matters for inclusion in the Prime Minister's speech tomorrow. I attach a suggested contribution. It has not been formally cleared with the FCO but our assessment is that they would not dissent from it. A copy goes to John Holmes, David Wright and Jim Buckley.

Yours ever  
Nick Evans

(N H R EVANS)

A J Coles Esq



SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER

I turn now to the military steps which the Government has taken.

Our military response to the unprovoked aggression by Argentina against the Falkland Islands and South Georgia has been both restrained and consistent. We assembled a formidable task force in a short space of time and despatched it to the South Atlantic. The pressure placed on Argentina by this action was, of course, complemented by other measures which we have taken, and encouraged others to take, on the trade, economic and diplomatic fronts.

It is our view that Argentina is unlikely to comply with the Security Council Resolution without the application of military pressure. Our first step was to declare a Maritime Exclusion Zone from 12th April. This has been enforced since that time against Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries. Our second step was to issue a warning to the Argentine authorities on 23rd April that any approach by Argentine warships or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British Forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. On 25th April we exercised our right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter to repossess South Georgia - but with the minimum of force consistent with achieving our objective. I am very glad that no lives were lost in that operation.

Two lives have been lost, however. The first was the Petty Officer killed in one of HMS HERMES helicopters which ditched in the sea on Friday. The second was that of the Argentine killed in an incident on South Georgia on the 26th April, following the surrender of the Argentine forces. I heartily regret both these deaths. The Argentine Government have been informed through intermediaries of the incident on South Georgia and, in accordance with the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention, a Board of Inquiry has been convened to conduct an urgent investigation of the circumstances. It would not be appropriate for me to comment further until the Board has concluded its investigation.



The Total Exclusion Zone, which was announced yesterday, is another step in the gradually increasing pressure which we have been applying. The Total Exclusion Zone has the same geographical boundaries as the Military Exclusion Zone which took effect on 12th April. The new Zone will apply from the 30th April to all ships and aircraft, whether military or civil, operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands. At the same time Port Stanley airport will be closed. A complete embargo will be placed on all traffic supporting the occupation forces of Argentina. International maritime and aviation authorities have been informed, as appropriate, of the imposition of the Zone. Our aim continues to be to bring home to the Argentinians the folly of their actions in invading the Falkland Islands. If they choose to challenge our authority in that Zone the responsibility will be theirs.

Mr Speaker, the rt hon Member the Leader of the Opposition asked on Tuesday that we should not take any further steps in the escalation of military matters. I said then that I stood by the UN Security Council Resolution 502 and the UN Charter. I hold to that statement. It is not we who are escalating this crisis. Its de-escalation can be achieved very simply by Argentina withdrawing its forces from the Falkland Islands. For our part we are making our own decisions and we are not the prisoners of military timetables. But we do not intend to give the Argentine Government any comfort by reducing the pressure we are now applying to achieve our objective: the end of an illegal occupation.



Private Secretary

Mr. Pattison (NO10)

You requested a note  
on this. X is the  
important point.

J. H. H. H.  
29/4

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OPINION

1. You asked what happened when the UN Secretary-General U Thant intervened in the Cuban missile crisis. In the short time available we have not been able to check the facts to our entire satisfaction. But it looks very much as though U Thant's appeal to the major parties (which Mr Healey is now quoting as a precedent for Mr Perez de Cuellar's press release on Monday) was private.
2. The Security Council met from 23 - 25 October 1962 in response to separate requests by the USA, Cuba and the USSR. On 24 October U Thant informed the Council that, at the request of a large number of delegations, he had sent identically worded appeals to President Kennedy and Chairman Krushchev to suspend voluntarily the armed shipments and quarantine measures for a period of two to three weeks and to enter into immediate negotiations for a peaceful solution.\* He had also addressed a separate appeal to Prime Minister Castro.
3. During the course of the Security Council's debate the Secretary-General received favourable replies from President Kennedy and Chairman Krushchev. The Council adjourned on the understanding that future work would be decided in the light of the results of the discussions that were to take place.
4. On 30 - 31 October U Thant talked to the Cubans in Havana. He reported afterwards that he had been reliably informed that the missiles were being dismantled and that 'the United Nations should continue to participate in the peaceful settlement of the problem'.
5. On 7 January 1963 the Secretary-General received a joint letter from the USSR and the United States expressing appreciation of the two Governments for his efforts in helping them to avert the serious threat to the peace.

x  
\* This appeal was, in fact, issued with the agreement of both the USA and the USSR. Its language had been negotiated with them in advance. Both the major parties were in fact looking to the Secretary-General to provide a ladder which they could climb down.

*P. J. Roberts*

P J ROBERTS  
United Nations Department

28 April 1982





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

Dear John,

Type letters please

JH 29.  
4

The Commonwealth and the Falklands Islands

Dispute: Barbados and Guyana

Thank you for your letter of  
24 April.

I enclose draft messages from the  
Prime Minister to Mr Tom Adams, Prime  
Minister of Barbados, and President  
Forbes Burnham of Guyana, the texts of  
which could be telegraphed if the Prime  
Minister agrees.

Yours ever

JH Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:  
The Rt Hon J M G M Adams MP QC  
Office of the Prime Minister  
Bridgetown  
BARBADOS

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

I ~~should like to express to~~ <sup>and</sup> you my warmest personal appreciation <sup>Thanks</sup> for the strong support lent to Britain by Barbados on the question of the Falkland Islands dispute.

CAVEAT.....

Recent events have once again proved the underlying strength of the friendships which bind together the Commonwealth. We are especially grateful for the support of our friends in the Commonwealth and both the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and I have expressed that gratitude in Parliament.

The dangers of allowing acts of aggression, such as we have seen in the Falklands, <sup>are clear, not least</sup> to go unchallenged must be all too obvious to the island states of the Eastern Caribbean. ~~It~~ is particularly <sup>The firm stand of</sup> heartening to find Barbados so prepared <sup>in support of the right of freedom and the right of</sup> to stand firm for the principles of self-determination and freedom.

*is a great encouragement.*

Enclosures—flag(s).....



DRAFT: ~~memo/letter/telex/airmail/tele~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

His Excellency Cde LFS Burnham OE, SC

Secret

President of the Co-operative  
Republic of Guyana

Copies to:

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Georgetown

*Guyana.*

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

*It was very thoughtful of you to ring*

CAVEAT.....

~~When we spoke on the telephone, on 21 April, I expressed my thanks for Guyana's help in the current dispute over the Falkland Islands.~~

~~As in any family, it is in times of trouble that the links of friendship which bind the Commonwealth are particularly visible. The prompt support of our friends in the Commonwealth has been especially welcome. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and I have both already recorded our warm appreciation for this assistance in Parliament.~~

*in the last few weeks*

~~However, I should like to take this further opportunity to express to you my personal gratitude for your help in securing the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 502 as well as for your kind offer of assistance in other international fora as necessary. It is particularly heartening that, even in the midst of its own tribulations, Guyana could find the time to offer a helping hand.~~

*I know that you see very clearly why it*

Enclosures—flag(s).....



∴ that the Argentine aggression has had to  
be resisted and ~~has not~~ ~~encouraged~~ by the  
it is good to receive your encouragement the  
other day.



Prime Minister

AM 15/4

Mr Fearn, SAMD

h-a.

Falklands: Conversation with Mr Haig

Mr Haig rang the Secretary of State at 1355 today.

Mr Haig said that there was still no word from Buenos Aires. There appeared still to be a stalemate, with the Navy in favour of action, and the Airforce and Army preferring negotiation. The only thing that the US side could do was not to look too nervous; the Junta owed them an answer, and they should be prepared to wait for it. The Secretary of State said they could only wait for a while. Mr Haig agreed. If there was still no reply by the morning of 29 April, the United States would go public. Mr Pym said that the timing was important for us, partly for Parliamentary reasons. He suggested that it might be useful for him to speak to Mr Haig again later today. In answer to a question from Mr Pym, Mr Haig confirmed that the Argentinians were in no doubt of the consequences of a negative response on their part.

Mr Pym said that he wanted to be able to reassure the Prime Minister on the issue of security arrangements in the interim period, if the Argentinians decided to accept the American draft. We would need absolute confidence that the Argentinians would not simply go back into the Islands, and this - for understandable reasons - was not covered explicitly in the draft. He knew that this point still caused the Prime Minister concern. Mr Haig said that it went without saying that the United States would be ready to make the necessary provision in the context of a favourable outcome.

*J. E. Jones*

28 April 1982

*fr* (F N Richards)

copies to:

PS  
PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/PUS  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Wright

Mr Ure  
Mr Gillmore  
Planning Staff  
Defence Dept  
Sir I Sinclair

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



RESTRICTED

SAPU(82) 10

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT

The attached paper issued at 1800 hours on 28 April 1982 contains suggested lines to take on the following:

1. Mr Haig's proposals
2. Total Exclusion Zone
3. Death of Argentine prisoner
4. International Opinion
5. Statement by UN Secretary General

Cabinet Office  
28 April 1982

RESTRICTED



LINE TO TAKE

1. Mr Haig's Proposals

The American Government put their formal proposals to the Argentine Government yesterday. They have now given us the text. The proposals are under consideration.

Are the proposals addressed to both sides?

- Both sides have the text and the proposals are under consideration. The crucial decision is whether the Argentine Government will agree to withdraw all its forces from the Falkland Islands in accordance with SCR 502.

What are the proposals?

- They are developed from the ideas which emerged from Mr Haig's "shuttle". The important difference is that they are now, for the first time, put to Buenos Aires with the full authority of the United States.

Is it true that the Americans have given Argentina an ultimatum?

- We understand that Mr Haig has made it clear that he expects an early response from Argentina.

2. Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ)

This will be in force from <sup>1200</sup>1100 Friday London time and will cover the same area as the Maritime Exclusion Zone. All ships and aircraft (including aircraft on the ground in the Falklands) operating in support of the Argentine forces will be liable to attack. It is a natural extension of the Maritime Exclusion Zone intended to cut all supply to Argentine occupying forces. We are continuing to seek a peaceful solution but Argentines have shown no sign of complying with Security Council Resolution after three weeks - so we must further step up pressure.

Will you attack merchant ships/civil aircraft/neutrals?

- Our intention is to deny all support to occupying forces. Therefore all ships and aircraft are liable to be attacked if they enter the zone without our authority.



Will the Islanders now starve?

- Naturally concerned about Islanders who remain our primary consideration. But they are largely self-supporting for basic foods.

### 3. Death of Argentine Prisoner

Incident took place on 26 April on South Georgia. Brazilian government has already been asked to inform the Argentines. Few details available. Board of Inquiry, required by Geneva convention, has been set up already. Will be completed as soon as possible.

### 4. International Opinion

There have been some most encouraging signs of continuing support for Britain in the last 24 hours:

(a) as Mr Pym said after the meeting of the Ten Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg yesterday our partners continue to be most robust despite the problems that unqualified support for Britain can cause them (large numbers of citizens living in Argentina, major commercial interests, etc)

(b) United States public opinion remains fully behind Britain and the reaction to the British Ambassador's regular appearances on US television confirms this. Resolutions are today being introduced in both Houses of Congress urging full US diplomatic support for Britain "in its efforts to uphold the rule of law".

(c) At the OAS meeting in Washington which concluded early this morning the Argentines got nothing like the degree of support they were looking for. It is true that the resolution (on which US, Chile, Colombia and Trinidad abstained) confirmed majority support for Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands, called on Britain to cease hostilities and deplored EC sanctions. All this was to be expected; but significantly it also insisted that all the terms of Security Council Resolution 502 be fulfilled (ie including the demand to Argentina to withdraw from Falklands), and called on Argentina to refrain from taking action that may exacerbate the situation. In explanation of vote several Ministers made telling comments eg. the Colombian complained that the meeting had been "an exercise in futility: in truth Argentina had committed an act of aggression and had abused the inter-American system by seeking to invoke the Rio Treaty".



5. Statement by the Secretary General of the UN (Mr Foot's Remarks in the House)

The Secretary General's statement was a low key statement put out by his press secretary ie. it had no formal status and was in no sense a major statement. But given the interest that it aroused the British Ambassador called on the Secretary General on the evening of 26 April and made it clear that any suggestion in his statement that the British Government had failed to comply with SCR 502 was unacceptable. It was Argentina which was in breach of the resolution. There was no question of Britain having acted aggressively or having in any way breached the terms of the resolution or having caused a breach of international peace and security. The Secretary General took these points.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

Prime Minister

AP 29/4

Dear John,

Mandatory Resolutions

You asked for information about resolutions adopted by the Security Council, other than Resolution 502, which were binding on Member States, and remain unimplemented.

I should explain that most of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council have not been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter and have not been binding. In a number of other cases it is uncertain whether the resolution was mandatory in its effect or not (because the language does not make clear whether they were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter). The number of resolutions which are certainly mandatory is quite small. The following are some key examples.

Korea

Resolution 82 (1950) determined that the North Korean invasion of the South was a breach of the peace, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon the North Korean forces to withdraw. It remained unimplemented, and the Korean war followed as a result. The resolutions below cannot be said to have been unimplemented though they were not universally respected.

Southern Rhodesia

Resolution 221 (1966) determined that the situation arising from oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia through Beira was a threat to the peace, called upon Portugal not to receive or permit the pumping of oil for Southern Rhodesia and authorised the UK to prevent the arrival of vessels believed to be carrying such oil.

Resolution 232 (1966) determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a threat to international peace and security and decided that Member States should prevent the import into their territories of certain Southern Rhodesian products as well as the supply to Southern Rhodesia of arms, aircraft and motor vehicles.

/Resolution





Resolution 253 (1966) reaffirmed the above determination and made the import and export embargoes virtually complete. It also established a committee of the Security Council to monitor the implementation of the embargo.

South Africa

Resolution 418 (1977) determined that the acquisition of arms by South Africa was a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and decided that all states should cease forthwith the provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types. (A committee of the Security Council was subsequently established to monitor the implementation of this embargo).

Unimplemented resolutions which you may have had in mind, for example 242, did not involve a Chapter VII determination of a threat to international peace and security and are therefore not mandatory. (In many cases because we and other Western countries took care to discourage Chapter VII language in order to discourage subsequent calls for sanctions.)

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

A J Coles Esq  
10 DOWNING STREET

*Prime Minister has seen*

*ML 28.  
4*

*Dear John,*

I wanted to write to you immediately about the handling of Washington tel no 1472 about which the Prime Minister quite rightly complained at this morning's meeting of OD(SA). I have looked into what happened and it is clear that the fact that the telegram was not advanced to you was simply due to human error for which I apologize, and for which I must accept ultimate responsibility. It is extremely unfortunate that the error should have happened in relation to this particular telegram.

You will want the facts. All timings are expressed in British Summer Time. The telegram left Washington at 0906 hours yesterday, 27 April. It was received in the FCO signals office at 1109 and a copy sent immediately to our Emergency Unit for immediate action. Advance copies were despatched at 1130. The final 'printed-up' version was ready by 1355 when the wider distribution was made. Most recipients outside the FCO would have received this final version of the telegram by Home Service messenger in the course of the afternoon, though you at Number 10 and other priority addressees should have received your advance copy at about 1130 in the morning.

As I have said, it was simple human error which failed us in this instance. The telegram distributor concerned, who has only just returned from a tour of duty overseas, intended (rightly) to limit distribution of this secret telegram in the first instance to those who had received the telegram to which it referred i.e. Washington tel no 1471. That telegram was advanced to you. He thus erred seriously in omitting to include No 10 among the advance recipients of Washington tel no 1472.





It was not immediately clear from the introductory paragraph of Washington tel no 1472 that the text was being formally presented to us. The State Department were described as having "given us the text of the US proposal" which had been conveyed to the Argentines. It was clearly based on the document which the Foreign Secretary brought back from Washington following his discussions with Mr Haig there. Since however there were a number of significant changes, the Emergency Unit took immediate steps, in agreement with the Cabinet Office, to have this latest version circulated for this morning's meeting as OD(SA)(82)31. I do not think myself that on this point the Prime Minister can be said to have misled the House yesterday.

All this said, however, I greatly regret that such a mistake occurred. I hope you will give my personal apologies to the Prime Minister. I have already made alterations to our present procedures and my office among others will keep a close eye on the telegram distributions in future.

*James Cook*  
*Antony*

Antony Acland





128 APR 1982







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

Prime Minister  
of, I hope, only historical  
interest now.

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Judge Clark's  
Ideas about Trusteeship

AD 30/4

You may have noticed in Mr Pym's memorandum (OD(SA) (82)25) reporting on his discussions with Mr Haig in Washington a reference to the idea of US trusteeship briefly floated by Judge Clark. I enclose a copy of a letter from Nicko Henderson which gives the background. I would add only that, while we were having the breakfast with Clark, it seemed natural to assume that we were being given advance warning of an American proposal which would be put to Mr Pym by President Reagan, and we were given no reason to believe that Mr Haig would be taken by surprise (though Clark did make it clear that he would speak to Haig after our breakfast).

p.a.  
AD 4/5

Yours ever,  
J.P.F.

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

26 April 1982

B J P Fall Esq  
 Private Secretary to the  
 Secretary of State  
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
 London SW1

*Dear Brian*

FALKLANDS: THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S BREAKFAST WITH  
 JUDGE CLARK

1. I promised to let you have an account of the Secretary of State's discussion over breakfast on 23 April with Judge Clark: and of the subsequent developments.
2. Clark took as his starting point the fact that the negotiations were making no progress. He did not in any way suggest that this was our fault, nor did he put forward any ideas for bringing the two parties together in the framework of the present draft. The Secretary of State took the opportunity to argue the need for greater pressure on Argentina; and to explain that, although he recognised the reason for the US position while they were acting as intermediaries in a negotiation, American "even-handedness" was becoming increasingly difficult to explain to British public opinion. He also warned Clark about the time constraints which we were operating under on the military side.
3. Clark replied that there was no doubt about US support for the British case on moral grounds. He recognised that the time might come when the Americans would have to move away from their policy of even-handedness, but that time was not yet. He mentioned in the context of even-handedness the importance which President Reagan attached to the hemisphere.
4. Emphasising that he was talking off the record, Clark then said that the President had been giving much thought to the

/problem





problem and had personally come up with the idea that trusteeship - of which the Americans had some experience - might provide an answer. It transpired that Clark was thinking in terms of Argentinian trusteeship, complete with the Argentinian flag over the Islands. The Secretary of State and I reacted strongly to this extraordinary idea, whereupon Clark indicated that he regarded as worth exploring further the idea of American trusteeship. He envisaged that this would be for a fixed period (five years was mentioned) but he indicated at one stage that this might be subject to extension. He foresaw the trusteeship as ending with the self-determination of the population. We pointed out that this would be likely to be difficult for the Argentinians as it was they, not we, who were opposed to the option of independence. Clark appeared to see no objection to independence as a final solution and did not react adversely to the idea of the United States guaranteeing independence. Indeed he seemed to think that they would be prepared to do this.

5. In further discussion, Clark seemed to accept that if the idea were thought worth pursuing after further study by us and the Americans, the Americans would have to present it to the Argentinians in a form of ultimatum. I put it to Clark that this would have to be backed up by a clear indication that the United States would join our other allies in supporting us if the Argentinians rejected the trusteeship idea. Finally, there was some discussion of the UN aspects. Clark's original conception involved taking an appropriate trusteeship precedent, and by implication presumably a role for the United Nations under the relevant provisions of the Charter. We pointed out how difficult it would be for us to embark on the trusteeship route if what was agreed between the three countries could subsequently be amended by the General Assembly.

6. When the Secretary of State saw Haig privately afterwards, he said that he had been furious to be summoned to the White House to be told that Clark had floated these ideas without consulting him. Haig said that Clark did not know what he was talking about. He had already tried out the idea of American trusteeship on the Argentinians, who would not wear it. He was conducting the negotiations. I have no doubt, therefore, that whatever the attractions of this option from our point of view (in terms of greater American involvement and not pre-judging the outcome) Haig will not be prepared to endorse it or put it again to the Argentinians, least of all as a take it or leave it proposition.

7. One adverse outcome of this somewhat ill-considered entry by Clark into the diplomatic arena was that the Secretary of

/State





State never got to see the President. It had been understood beforehand that this would be arranged. I can only suppose that Haig told the White House to keep off the grass - or, *curf,* to use his own phrase - and they did not have enough experience or self-confidence to get into the act. It was a graphic example to the Secretary of State of the peculiar decision-making process - if the word process can be used - that prevails at the moment in this town.

*Yours*

*Nich*

Nicholas Henderson



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KKKKK(/TIAR)Z

FROM OAS WASHINGTON DC APRIL 28 1982 15:00

EXCELENTISIMA SENORA  
MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIMER MINISTRO DEL REINO UNIDO DE GRAN BRETAGNA  
E IRLANDA DEL NORTE  
LONDRES

MISC 572: LA VIGESIMA REUNION DE CONSULTA DE MINISTROS DE  
RELACIONES EXTERIORES, CONVOCADA DE ACUERDO CON LO DISPUESTO EN  
EL TRATADO INTERAMERICANO DE ASISTENCIA RECIPROCA, EN SU SEGUNDA  
SESION PLENARIA CELEBRADA EL DIA DE HOY APROBO LA RESOLUCION  
I SOBRE "GRAVE SITUACION PLANTEADA EN EL ATLANTICO SUR".

EN MI CALIDAD DE PRESIDENTE DE LA VIGESIMA REUNION DE CONSULTA  
CUMPLI CON EL ENCARGO DE TRASMITIR A VUESTRA EXCELENCIA EL LLAMADO  
DE LOS CANCELLERES DE AMERICA PARA QUE EL GOBIERNO DEL REINO  
UNIDO DE GRAN BRETAGNA E IRLANDA DEL NORTE CESE DE INMEDIATO  
LAS HOSTILIDADES QUE REALIZA EN LA REGION DE SEGURIDAD DEFINIDA  
POR EL ARTICULO 4 DEL TRATADO INTERAMERICANO DE ASISTENCIA  
RECIPROCA, SE ABSTENGA DE CUALQUIER ACTO QUE PUEDA AFECTAR LA  
PAZ Y LA SEGURIDAD INTERAMERICANAS Y ESTABLEZCA DE INMEDIATO  
UNA TREGUA QUE PERMITA LA REANUDACION DEL NORMAL DESENVOLVIMIENTO  
DE LAS GESTIONES CONDUCENTES A LA SOLUCION PACIFICA DEL CONFLICTO,  
TENIENDO EN CUENTA LOS DERECHOS DE SOBERANIA DE LA REPUBLICA  
ARGENTINA SOBRE LAS ISLAS MALVINAS, ASI COMO LOS INTERESES  
DE SUS POBLADORES. LOS CANCELLERES DE AMERICA CONFIAN  
PLENAMENTE EN QUE ESTE LLAMADO SERA ACEPTADO EN BIEN DE LA PAZ  
DE LA REGION Y DEL MUNDO.  
ACEPTE VUESTRA EXCELENCIA LAS EXPRESIONES DE MI MAS ALTA Y  
DISTINGUIDA CONSIDERACION

ESTANISLAO VALDES OTERO  
PRESIDENTE DE LA VIGESIMA REUNION DE  
CONSULTA DE MINISTROS DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES



HERE FOLLOWS THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING MESSAGE AND THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE RIGHT HONORABLE MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT  
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND  
LONDON

THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CONVOKED UNDER THE PROVISION OF THE INTER AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, AT ITS SECOND PLENARY SESSION HELD TODAY, ADOPTED RESOLUTION 1 ON THE "SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC".

AS PRESIDENT OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TRANSMIT THE APPEAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE AMERICAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IMMEDIATELY CEASE THE HOSTILITIES IT IS CARRYING ON WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION DEFINED BY ARTICLE 4 OF THE INTERAMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, AND ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT THAT MAY AFFECT INTER-AMERICAN PEACE AND SECURITY AND IMMEDIATELY TO CALL A TRUCE THAT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RESUME AND PROCEED NORMALLY WITH THE NEGOTIATION AIMED AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA OVER THE MALVINAS (FALKLAND) ISLANDS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE AMERICAS ARE FULLY CONFIDENT THAT THIS APPEAL WILL BE RECEIVED FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE IN THE REGION AND IN THE WORLD.  
ACCEPT YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ASURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION

ESTANISLAO VALDES OTERO  
PRESIDENT OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION  
OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

XX MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF  
MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

APRIL 26 1982  
WASHINGTON D.C.



RESOLUTION I

SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC  
RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION HELD ON APRIL  
28, 1982)

CONSIDERING:

THE PRINCIPLES OF INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION  
AND THE NEED TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO ANY SITUATION THAT  
ENDANGERS THE PEACE OF THE AMERICAS,

THAT A DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION HAS ARISEN BETWEEN THE UNITED  
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE ARGENTINE  
REPUBLIC, WHICH WAS AGGRAVATED TODAY BY THE EVENTS THAT HAVE ARISEN  
FROM THE PRESENCE OF THE BRITISH NAVY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC,  
WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 4 OF THE  
RIO TREATY,

THAT THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL  
ASSISTANCE IS THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE  
HEMISPHERE, WHICH, IN THE CASE THAT ARISEN, REQUIRES ENSURING  
THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE,

THAT TO FACILITATE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE, IT IS  
URGENT THAT HOSTILITIES CEASE, SINCE THEY DISTURB THE PEACE  
OF THE HEMISPHERE AND MAY REACH UNFORESEEABLE PROPORTIONS,

THAT IT IS AN UNCHANGING PRINCIPLE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN  
SYSTEM THAT PEACE BE PRESERVED AND THAT ALL THE AMERICAN STATES  
UNANIMOUSLY REJECT THE INTERVENTION OF EXTRA-CONTINENTAL OR  
CONTINENTAL ARMED FORCES IN ANY OF THE NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE,

THAT ARGENTINA'S RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS  
(FALKLAND) ISLANDS, AS STATED IN SOME IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS  
PASSED BY VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, INCLUDING THE DECLARATION  
OF THE INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE ON JANUARY 6, 1976,  
WHICH STATES: "THAT THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA HAS AN  
UNDENIABLE RIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS ISLANDS,"  
MUST BE BORNE IN MIND, AND

THAT THE PEACE EFFORTS BEING MADE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE  
PARTIES MUST BE EMPHASIZED, AND THAT INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY  
TO THAT OBJETIVE, AND

HAVING SEEN:

RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL,  
ALL OF WHOSE TERMS MUST BE FULLFILLED, RESOLUTION 359 OF APRIL  
13, 1982, ADOPTED BY THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION  
OF AMERICAN STATES, AND THE DECLARATION ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY  
BY MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE  
TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION (DOC.14/82), AND IN  
CONFORMITY WITH THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE,



RESOLVES:

1. TO URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IMMEDIATELY TO CEASE THE HOSTILITIES IT IS CARRYING ON WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION DEFINED BY ARTICLE 4

OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, AND ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT THAT MAY AFFECT INTER-AMERICAN PEACE AND SECURITY.

2. TO URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA LIKEWISE TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING ANY ACTION THAT MAY EXACERBATE THE SITUATION.

3. TO URGE THOSE GOVERNMENTS IMMEDIATELY TO CALL A TRUCE THAT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RESUME AND PROCEED NORMALLY WITH THE NEGOTIATION AIMED AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC ARGENTINA OVER THE MALVINAS (FALKLAND) ISLANDS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS.

4. TO EXPRESS THE WILLINGNESS OF THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION TO LEND SUPPORT THROUGH WHATEVER MEANS IT CONSIDERS ADVISABLE, TO THE NEW INITIATIVES BEING ADVANCED AT THE REGIONAL OR WORLD LEVEL, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES, WHICH ARE DIRECTED TOWARD THE JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

5. TO TAKE NOTE OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED ABOUT THE IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TO EXPRESS ITS WISHES THAT WILL BE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.

6. TO DEPLORE THE ADOPTION BY MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND OTHER STATES OF COERCIVE MEASURES OF AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL NATURE, WHICH ARE PREJUDICIAL TO THE ARGENTINE NATION AND TO URGE THEM LIFT THOSE MEASURES, INDICATING THAT THEY CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS PRECEDENT, INASMUCH AS THEY ARE COVERED BY RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CHARTERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE OAS AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT).

7. TO INSTRUCT THE PRESIDENT OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO TRANSMIT THE APPEAL CONTAINED IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 3 OF THIS RESOLUTION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, AND ALSO TO INFORM THEM, ON BEHALF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE AMERICAS, THAT HE IS FULLY CONFIDENT THAT THIS APPEAL WILL BE RECEIVED FOR SAKE OF PEACE IN THE REGION AND IN THE WORLD.

8. TO INSTRUCT THE PRESIDENT OF THE TWENTITH MEETING OF CONSULTATION IMMEDIATELY TO PRESENT THIS RESOLUTION FORMALLY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, SO THAT HE MAY BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL.

9. TO KEEP THE TWENTITH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OPEN, ESPECIALLY TO OVERSEE FAITHFULL COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION, AND TO TAKE SUCH ADDITIONAL MEASURES AS ARE DEEMED NECESSARY TO RESTORE AND PRESERVE PEACE AND SETTLE THE CONFLICT BY PEACEFUL MEANS.



Facsimile Transmission Leader.

Message Input Number 1/28.....

Date 28/4.....

This transmission consists of 11..... page(s) PLUS leader.

FROM J.H. ANDERSON.....

TO EMERGENCY UNIT.....

Dr. John Heap, Polar Regions S, S. Am Dept  
Sir I. Sinclair Legal Advisers

WKMS Tel No 584 : following is  
to NAM  
draft reply and historical memo. on  
settlement of F. Is.

*M 29/4*  
*f-a.*

*J. Anderson*  
27.4

Transmitted at .....

By .....



I have the honour, with reference to the letter from the Permanent Representative of Cuba dated 26 April 1982 to which was attached a communique by the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries, to state the following.

2. The United Kingdom shares the concern of the Coordinating Bureau over developments in the region of the Falkland Islands. As resolution 502(1982) adopted by the Security Council on 3 April 1982 makes clear, the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in defiance of the Security Council's call on 1 April that force should not be used, <sup>caused</sup> ~~led~~ to the <sup>current</sup> breach of the peace ~~existing~~ in the region. This breach of the peace will not be brought to an end before Argentina can be seen to have complied with operative paragraph 2 of that resolution by withdrawing all its forces from the Falkland Islands. Argentina's use of force was not only contrary to the principles of the Movement of Non-Aligned countries, as the communique notes, but also to paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations - the fundamental principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force.

3. With regard to the <sup>question</sup> ~~reference~~ of self-determination, ~~in the Lima Declaration~~, I wish to draw Your Excellency's attention to the following points. Self-determination is usually referred to these days <sup>in the United Nations</sup> not as a principle, but rather as an inalienable right: in other words, it is a right which cannot be taken away. <sup>This right derives principally from the Charter and the Covenants on Human Rights.</sup> Article 1(2) of the Charter refers to self-determinati:



of peoples and article 73 recognises "that the interests of the (such as the Falkland Islands inhabitants" of territories are paramount. Article 1 of the two International Covenants on Human Rights contains the following provision:

"1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (*Emphasis added*).

Paragraph 3 of the same article establishes that the duty to promote the realisation of this right is imposed upon all states parties and not only upon those administering territories.

- ← The conditions for the exercise of the right are, therefore
- ← (1) that there exists a 'people' within the meaning of the Article;
  - ← (2) that a determination of their political status is made by that people;
  - ← (3) that this determination is made freely; and
  - ← (4) that the people are free to pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

The Falkland Islanders are a people. The United Kingdom ~~has~~ ratified both the <sup>Rights Covenants</sup> Human/ on their behalf. They are a permanent population. Over half of the people can trace back their roots on the Island to 1850. They have no other home. They have made known their wishes regarding their political status in free and fair elections, the last having been held as



recently as October 1981. Their decision was to retain their traditional allegiance and social and cultural life and not to become Argentine. The consistent practice of the United Nations shows that there is no minimum figure for a population to qualify for the right to self-determination: it suffices to cite the case of St. Helena, another South Atlantic island with about 4000 people whose right to self-determination has been consistently upheld. In these circumstances, the United Kingdom fails to see any exception to the right of self-determination under the Charter and the Human Rights Covenants <sup>in the case of the Falkland Islanders.</sup> ~~such as may have been suggested in the Lima Declaration.~~

4. Turning to the question of sovereignty, the United Kingdom, whilst fully maintaining its position, acknowledges that its sovereignty has been disputed by Argentina on the basis of certain events in 1833. Attached to this letter is a memorandum setting out the history of settlement of the Falkland Islands. This shows that France has maintained a colony for about 3 years, Spain for <sup>at most</sup> about 41 years, the United Kingdom 158 years and Buenos Aires about <sup>at most</sup> 6 years. In particular, the present population of the Falkland Islands has been there, generation after generation, for the last 149 years maintaining a viable pastoral economy and distinctive way of life. ~~And whereas the French, Spanish and Buenos Aires colonies were very small,~~

(for 100 people), only significant movement has been that from wind - CIA & the present day saying just over 2000 tons.

5. Whilst no doubt much time and energy could be spent in reviewing the history of the Falkland Islands between the first settlement in 1764 and 1833, and whilst the United Kingdom is confident about the strength of its legal case over that period these factors cannot be allowed to override the inalienable right of self-determination. In 1833, the age of the railway was just opening in Europe and it hardly seems appropriate to decide issues involving the welfare of people alive in the latter part of the 20th century on the basis of <sup>(disputed) events</sup> ~~things done~~ in the early part of the 19th century or even the 18th century. <sup>If</sup> ~~were~~ the international community <sup>were</sup> to discount 149 years of history, ~~this would reopen numerous old territorial disputes.~~ <sup>there would hardly be an international boundary which did not immediately become subject to dispute</sup>



islands for 70 leagues and saw no evidence of anyone being there

June 1766

A second British expedition, led by Captain Macbride completed the settlement at Port Egmont and erected a block house for the defence of the settlement, having discovered the existence of the Bougainville settlement and given the settlers formal notice to leave British territory.

April 1767

France relinquished its claim to the islands to Spain in return for a financial indemnity. Spain re-named Port Louis as Puerto de la Soledad.

November 1769

The Captain of a British frigate ordered a Spanish ship to move away from Port Egmont. The Governor of the Spanish colony called on the British settlers to leave and the British captain warned the Spaniards to leave within 6 months.

4 June 1770

A Spanish frigate entered Port Egmont and was joined two days later by 4 or more Spanish ships to expel the British settlers.

10 June 1770

The British settlers capitulated and set sail for the United Kingdom. *The United Kingdom protested to the Government of Spain.*

22 <sup>January</sup> June 1771

Spain issued a declaration in response to <sup>the</sup> British protest, agreeing to restore to the United Kingdom the possession of Port Egmont. The Spanish declaration stated that the restoration of Port Egmont to British possession "cannot nor ought in any wise to affect the question of the prior right of sovereignty to the Malouines Islands, otherwise called Falkland's Islands". The British accepted this declaration, together with full performance of the Spanish undertakings, as satisfaction for the



injury done to the United Kingdom on 10 June 1770.

September 1771

Port. Egmont was formally restored to the United Kingdom.

May 1774

The British establishment at Port Egmont was closed for reasons of economy. The British commanding officer left the British flag flying and a plaque declaring the Falkland Islands "to be the sole right and property" of King George III.

1777

The buildings at Port Egmont were destroyed by the Spanish. 1778 Spanish colony had 82 inhabitants (including 28 convicts).

June 1806

The Spanish settlement at Soledad was abandoned. Islands uninhabited

9 November 1820

Col. Jewett paid a brief visit and took formal possession of the Falkland Islands on behalf of the newly independent government in Buenos Aires, without establishing a settlement. He found many vessels engaged in sealing including several British and US vessels.

1823

An attempt by Don Jorge Pacheco <sup>of Buenos Aires</sup> to establish a settlement failed

1826

~~A settlement was established at Soledad by Louis Vernet, a~~

Hamburg merchant of French descent,

5 January 1828

The government in Buenos Aires issued a decree establishing a colony at Soledad. Mr Vernet, was given three years to establish a colony and provision was made in case the population should extend to other islands.

30 August 1829

Mr Vernet established the colony, with only 20 men in whom he had confidence, according to his own account.

June 1829

A decree was issued by the Government of Buenos Aires asserting sovereignty, as successor to Spain, over the Falkland Islands.



19 November 1829

The British Charge d'Affaires at Buenos Aires delivered a formal protest against the above decree on the grounds that "an authority has been assumed, incompatible with His Britannic Majesty's rights of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. These rights founded upon the original discovery and subsequent occupation of the said islands, acquired an additional sanction from the restoration by (Spain) of the British settlement in the year 1771...."



25 November 1829

The Minister of Foreign Relations of Buenos Aires acknowledged receipt of the protest.

July 1831

Three US sealing vessels were seized by Mr Vernet.

21 November 1831

The US consul in Buenos Aires took up with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires the arrest of one of the US vessels, the schooner "Harriet".

25 November 1831

The Minister replied that the schooner had been taken as a prize

26 November 1831

The US consul denied that Mr Vernet had any right to capture and detain US vessels engaged in the fisheries at the Falkland Islands and remonstrating against all measures, including the decree of 10 June 1829, asserting a claim to the Falkland Islands. A formal protest was made in respect of the "Harriet" and two other vessels, the "Superior" and the "Breakwater"

3 December 1831

The Minister at Buenos Aires replied that an enquiry was being undertaken, but that the protest could not be admitted because the US consul did not appear to have been specially authorised.

June 1832

The US ship "Lexington" <sup>under Captain Silas Duncan</sup> arrived at the Falkland Islands and destroyed the colony set up by Buenos Aires. The colonists fled. Some were captured and taken by the "Lexington" to Montevideo. Duncan declared the islands free of all government.

20 June 1832

The US Charge d'Affaires in Buenos Aires addressed a Note to the Minister responsible for foreign affairs about the seizure of three US vessels. On instructions, the Charge denied



"the existence of any right in this Republic to interrupt, molest, detain or capture any vessels belonging to citizens of the United States ..." The US government demanded restitution of all captured property and an indemnity, pointing out "that the citizens of the United States have enjoyed the rights of free fishery in these regions unmolested ..."

December 1832 - 3 January 1833

Captain Onslow of HMS Clio occupied Port Egmont. On reaching Soledad, Captain Onslow found a detachment of 50 <sup>Buenos Aires</sup> ~~Argentinian~~ soldiers and their schooner "Sarandi". A mutiny had previously occurred and the mutineers had killed their commander. The ~~Commander~~ of the Argentine schooner had placed the mutineers in irons aboard a British schooner and they were, at his request taken to Buenos Aires. "Most people"

elected to be repatriated; 18 were persuaded to stay behind.

Not a shot was fired on either side. Captain Onslow re-asserted British sovereignty by raising the flag and reorganising the settlement.

22 January 1833.

The Minister at Buenos Aires protested to the British Charge d'Affaires.

May 1833

The United Kingdom rejected the protest and affirmed that the Falkland Islands belonged to the Crown.

1833

Argentina presented claim to US Government in respect of USS Lexington's action. Diplomatic correspondence continued until least 1886 but the US government rejected the claim for compensation on the grounds that it depended on the question of sovereignty.



1841

British Lieutenant Governor appointed and civil administration organised in Port Louis.

1841-2

Further protests about British settlement rejected.

1844

Capital moved to Stanley.

1845

Governor appointed. Legislative Council and Executive Council set up.

1851

Population estimated at 287 (*See below*)

1884-88

Further Argentine protests made and rejected.

1949

Elections to the Legislative Council instituted on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

1977

Voting age lowered to 18.

September/October 1981

General elections held for the Legislative Council.



Since the first census in 1851, the population has increased substantially, reaching a peak in the mid-1930s of some 2,400 inhabitants. Censuses have been taken every ten years and full details are in the annex to this account. The community thus established has set up its own social, economic and cultural structures within a political framework which evolved in accordance with the wishes of the islanders themselves. They have freedom of expression and all of the basic rights guaranteed to them under the United Nations Charter. The United Kingdom, as administering authority, has submitted comprehensive information on the territory annually under Article 73(e) of the Charter and an up to date account based on this information is readily available in the Committee of 24's most recent working paper on the islands (document A/AC109/670 of 5 August 1981).

#### ANNEX

The population in the Census years 1851 - 1980

Year	Population
1851	287
1861	541
1871	811
1881	1,510
1891	1,789
1901	2,043
1911	2,272
1921	2,094
1931	2,392
1946	2,238
1953	2,230
1962	2,172
1972	1,957
1980	1,513 <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Estimated.



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GRS 155  
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TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 138 OF 28 APRIL  
INFO PRIORITY GEORGETOWN, UKHIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

*ms*

FCO TEL NOS 46 AND 47 TO GEORGETOWN AND UKHIS NEW YORK TELNO 577  
TO FCO: VENEZUELA/GUYANA

1. SINCLAIR'S DEMARCHES IN NEW YORK, AS WELL AS THE PRIME MINISTER'S PANORAMA INTERVIEW, DEALING WITH POSSIBLE VENEZUELAN INTENTIONS IN GUYANA WERE REPORTED IN NEWSPAPERS HERE.

2. THIS LED ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER PAEZ PUMAR TO TELL THE PRESS THAT FEARS OF A VENEZUELAN INVASION OF GUYANA WERE UNFOUNDED AND THAT THE ONLY COMMON DENOMINATOR BETWEEN THIS CASE AND THOSE OF THE FALKLANDS AND BELIZE WAS THE LINK WITH BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL PAST. PAEZ PUMAR ADDED THAT QUOTE IT WOULD SEEM AS IF THE BRITISH CONTINUE TO LOOK AT THIS (GUYANA) AS A PROBLEM TO DO WITH THEIR COLONIAL POSSESSIONS, WHICH IS NOT THE CASE UNQUOTE.

3. OUR ASSESSMENT REMAINS THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WILL TRY TO ACHIEVE A PRACTICAL SETTLEMENT USING THE MACHINERY PRESCRIBED BY THE GENEVA AGREEMENT AS FROM 28 JUNE.

4. RUMOURS OF VENEZUELAN INVASION OF GUYANA MAY BE WORTH EXPLOITING IN NEW YORK (PARA 4 OF UKHIS TUR), BUT ARE RATHER UNSETTLING HERE.

SECUNDE

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]  
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LIMITED  
WIAD  
S AM D  
XENS D  
DEFENCE D  
PLANNING STAFF  
PUSD  
PS  
PS/MR CHELSON  
PS/POG  
MR GIFFARD  
MR URE

RESTRICTED



NOTE FOR RECORD

mf

## DETAILS OF DEAD AND INJURED ARGENTINE PRISONERS

1. The Ministry of Defence have given us the following details which have been passed on by telephone to the Brazilian Embassy and UKMIS Geneva (for the ICRC):

Dead soldier (FCO tel 069 to Berne)

No: 2677  
Rank: Sub official Primero (SIMQ)  
Name: Felix Artuso

Injured sailor

No: 355 955  
Rank: Leading seaman  
Name: Alberto Masias

Q

Emergency Unit

28 April 1982



4



covering CONFIDENTIAL  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

~~Prime Minister~~

You wanted to read this.

A.F.C. 30/4.

Dear John,

You asked for a further copy of Sir Reginald Hibbert's valedictory despatch from Paris. This I now attach.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

covering CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

~~Prime Minister~~  
Agree to send message at  
Flag F?

The Prime Minister agreed.  
AR 25/4  
27 April 1982

Dear John,

AR 25/4

Falklands: Japanese Position

The Japanese Prime Minister has sent a further letter to Mrs Thatcher, delivered today to Sir Antony Acland by the Japanese Ambassador. The original is enclosed. The letter is unsatisfactory in a number of ways.

- i) it avoids any Japanese commitment to impose a ban on imports;
- ii) it goes no further on export credits than previous private assurances: 'no application for new commitments ... is expected for the time being'. This assurance has not been made public by the Japanese nor will they allow us to refer to it in Parliament in any clear form. Thus it is not an effective element in the campaign of public pressure on Argentina;
- iii) On trade with Argentina, the letter says only that the Japanese Government will 'guide business circles ... not to unduly take advantage of the measures (taken by the EC and others).' Whatever the word 'unduly' might mean, this falls very far short of our request for an import ban by Japan.

Mr Pym believes it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could reply in rather stiff terms to this letter. The Japanese should be under no illusion about our expectation from them of more full-hearted support than we have had so far. I enclose three draft telegrams, the last of which contains a draft for the Prime Minister's reply, and would be grateful for approval for their despatch.

Yours ever  
J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
4  
5  
6 FM FCO 271800Z APRIL 82  
7 TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
10 YOUR TELNO 199: FALKLANDS: JAPANESE POSITION  
11 1. Japanese Ambassador called today on <sup>PUS</sup>~~Acland~~ to deliver text  
12 (in MIFT) of further letter from Suzuki to Prime Minister.  
13 2. Acland made the following points:  
14 (a) we had been grateful for original Japanese support  
15 (voting for SCR 502, summoning Argentinian Ambassador on  
16 12 April, private assurance, now reaffirmed, of block on  
17 new export credits to Argentina).  
18 (b) but we were disappointed that Japan had not felt able  
19 to follow the lead of EC, Commonwealth and other  
20 industrialised countries in imposing ban on imports from  
21 Argentina. Japan's reluctance to take similar measures  
22 left a big hole. Position of US (as mediators) was  
23 naturally different.  
24 (c) we were grateful for Mr Suzuki's undertaking about  
25 'not taking advantage' but the wording was not satisfactory.

///  
//  
/

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword What
File number		Dept FED	Distribution  FCO FED SAmD  Additional dist: Falkland Islands
Drafted by (Block capitals) M C STARK			
Telephone number 233 3259			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
2

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1 <<<< .  
 2 What was meant by 'unduly'? Public opinion in Europe  
 3 would not understand any (underlined) increase in Japanese  
 4 trade with Argentina resulting from our sanctions.  
 5 (d) we hoped the Japanese would look again at the  
 6 question of an import ban. Arguments that GATT and the  
 7 Argentina/Japan bilateral treaty constituted insuperable  
 8 obstacles seemed to us invalid. EC, Canada, Norway etc  
 9 were also in GATT. The bilateral treaty contained an  
 10 escape clause similar to GATT Article XX1 allowing trade  
 11 restrictions where international security was at stake.  
 12 Japan had found ways of restricting trade with Iran during  
 13 the hostage crisis.  
 14 e) we were frankly disappointed that Japan had not felt  
 15 able to give us more whole-hearted support in this crisis.  
 16 We believed that Argentina was seriously worried by the  
 17 combination of military, diplomatic and economic pressure.  
 18 Now was the time for Japan as a major democracy with  
 19 strong economic links with Argentina to tighten the screws.  
 20 (f) he would pass Mr Suzuki's letter on at once: he  
 21 thought the Prime Minister would probably wish to reply.

23 PYM  
 24 NNNN

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 // 32  
 / 33

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OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 GRS 2 GRS  
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO 271730Z APRIL 82  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
 10 MIPT: FALKLANDS: JAPANESE POSITION  
 11 1. Text of Mr Suzuki's letter:  
 12 BEGINS: Dear Mrs Thatcher,  
 13 I have been following with serious concern - as I mentioned in  
 14 my letter of April 12th - the developments in and around the  
 15 Falkland Islands and earnestly hoping for an early and peaceful  
 16 solution of the dispute, ever since the Argentine military action.  
 17  
 18 In pursuance of its national policy of the peaceful settlement of  
 19 international disputes, Japan deeply regrets the Argentine use  
 20 of force and considers that their forces should withdraw promptly  
 21 in accordance with Resolution 502 of the United Nations Security  
 22 Council. In line with this position, my Government has continued  
 23 to make approaches to the Argentine side. Our actions, as  
 24 mentioned in my previous letter and repeatedly expressed as our  
 25 official views, are based on the consideration, inter alia, that

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File number	Dept FED	Distribution  FCO FED SAmD  Additional dist: Falkland Islands
Drafted by (Block capitals) M C STARK		
Telephone number 233 3259		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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1 <<<<  
 2 they should be compatible with our existing international  
 3 obligations - including those under the United Nations' Charter -  
 4 while ensuring the long-term interests of the Free World with  
 5 due attention to unity and cooperation with the Western  
 6 industrialised countries.  
 7  
 8 From this point of view, my Government intends to guide the  
 9 business circles to pay due attention not to unduly take  
 10 advantage of the measures to ban imports from Argentina taken  
 11 by the EC members and other countries for the benefit of  
 12 economic interests of Japan. I believe that it not only  
 13 conforms to Japan's basic position, but also meets your requests.  
 14  
 15 With respect to the supply of official credit, I should like to  
 16 state that no application for new commitment to export credit to  
 17 Argentina is expected for the time being, in view of the tense  
 18 situation now prevailing.  
 19  
 20 Japan has placed strong hopes in the good offices of Secretary  
 21 of State Haig since April 6th and highly appreciates your  
 22 country's positive response to his efforts. During the recent  
 23 visit to Japan of Vice-President Bush of the United States, my  
 24 Minister for Foreign Affairs explained our position and urgently  
 25 requested that the United States should continue to exert its  
 26 utmost efforts to secure a peaceful solution of this dispute.  
 27  
 28 I am deeply concerned that the position brought about by  
 29 Argentina's use of force should not escalate into a large-scale  
 30 military clash, bringing with it incalculable loss for all  
 31 Western nations. May I therefore reiterate my earnest hope  
 32 that the United Kingdom will find itself able to cope with this  
 33 most difficult situation through peaceful settlement, in the  
 34 overall interests of the Free World and to meet the desires of

///  
 //  
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword <i>the people</i>
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

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3

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1 <<<<  
2 ~~the~~ people everywhere. I am confident that the way to a  
3 peaceful solution will be opened by your wisdom and resolute  
4 decision.  
5  
6 In view of Japan's position as a member of the Security Council,  
7 my Government intends for its part to continue its own efforts -  
8 both inside and outside the United Nations - to prevent the  
9 escalation of the dispute and work for a peaceful settlement.  
10  
11 Please understand, my dear Prime Minister, that I am trying to  
12 convey to you the thoughts in my mind at this anxious time,  
13 with best wishes for your success in discharging your important  
14 duties in fulfilment of the British people's trust.  
15 Yours sincerely,  
16 ZENKO SUZUKI  
17 Prime Minister of Japan ENDS  
18  
19 PYM  
20 NNNN  
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OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

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CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
4  
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6 FM FCO 271700Z APRIL 82  
7 TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

*Agreed MS*

9 AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
10 MIPT:FALKLANDS: JAPANESE POSITION  
11 1. You should deliver at appropriate level following reply  
12 from Prime Minister:

13 BEGINS: Dear Mr Suzuki,  
14 I was grateful for your letter which your Ambassador delivered on  
15 27 April. I am pleased to note that Japan will continue to give  
16 diplomatic and other support to our efforts to secure Argentine  
17 withdrawal from the Falkland Islands.

18  
19 As you know, the European Community were able to agree very  
20 swiftly to ban imports from Argentina, and other industrialised  
21 countries (not all from the Commonwealth) have taken similar  
22 measures. While I am grateful for your assurance that Japanese  
23 business circles will be guided 'not to unduly take advantage'  
24 of these restrictions, I am bound to say that ~~I doubt whether~~  
25 this does not fully meet our request. Public opinion in Europe

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword would
File number	Dept FED	Distribution  FCO FED SAmD  Additional dist: Falkland Islands
Drafted by (Block capitals) M C STARK		
Telephone number 2333259		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
2

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2 would certainly not understand it if any (underlined) increased  
3 trade between Argentina and Japan were to result. I should like  
4 to urge you now to reconsider whether Japan could not impose  
5 actual restrictions on trade with Argentina. *and make public the decision you take, as well*  
6 move by Japan, if undertaken swiftly, could have an important *those you*  
7 effect in showing Argentina the serious economic consequences *have*  
8 of refusal to withdraw her forces in accordance with Security *already*  
9 Council Resolution 502. *taken.*

10 Yours sincerely

11 Margaret Thatcher ENDS

12

13 PYM

14 NNNN

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telegram

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Catchword



GRS 230

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 272304Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1486 OF 27 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO PRIORITY ROME

MA

ARGENTINA: ARMS SUPPLIES.

1. TODAY'S EDITION OF AEROSPACE DAILY REPORTED THAT THE U S DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE SHORTLY AFTER THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS APPROVED THE SALE TO ARGENTINA OF 32 WRIGHT J65 SKYHAWK ENGINES TO BE USED AS REPLACEMENTS FOR THE ARGENTINE A4S. SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS TO ARGENTINA HAVE BEEN UNDER EMBARGO SINCE 1978. BUT J65 ENGINES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO MUNITIONS CONTROL.

2. WE RAISED THIS REPORT IMMEDIATELY THIS MORNING WITH BURT (DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT). BURT HAS NOW TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT LICENCES FOR THE EXPORT OF THE ENGINES WERE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE J65 ENGINES ARE NOT ON THE MUNITIONS LIST AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS NOT AWARE OF THE TRANSACTION. THEY HAD INVESTIGATED URGENTLY, AS REQUESTED BY US. THEY HAD DISCOVERED THAT THE ENGINES WERE AT PRESENT INOPERABLE. THE EXPORT LICENCES HAD BEEN ISSUED FOR THEM TO BE SHIPPED TO FIAT IN ITALY TO BE PUT INTO OPERATING CONDITION. THE SHIPMENT HAD BEEN STOPPED TODAY BY THE U S CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES AND THE SHIP HAD LEFT WITHOUT THE ENGINES. EAGLEBURGER SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THIS TO THE MINISTER.

HENDERSON

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR )

SIR K COUZENS )

MR LITTLER )

MR HAWTIN )

MR PERETZ )

MR ILETT )

TREASURY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A. WILLIAMS RM 60

DOWNING ST WEST

CONFIDENTIAL





5  
Liu

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

27 April 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 26 April. She was grateful for your latest information on the situation in the Falkland Islands.

As regards advice to the islanders on financial assistance, should they wish to leave the Islands temporarily, the Prime Minister made the position clear in Parliament yesterday. She stated:-


"If some of them wish to be evacuated temporarily and have not the means to do so, the Government will ensure that the necessary means are provided."

This statement was broadcast by the BBC on 26 April in their special programme for the Falkland Islands.

A. J. COLES

Ted Needham, Esq.





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>622</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Williams to Fearn dated 27 April 1982, with 3 enclosures.</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>29 May 2012 A Mayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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NUMBER NOT USED	



LIC RR 165/26

CO

GR 195

200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HOLY SEE 261515Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NO. 021 OF 26 APR 82  
INFO ROUTINE ROME

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 099 TO ANKARA AND 296 TO UKHIS NEW YORK,  
FALKLANDS; MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. I DELIVERED A LETTER THIS MORNING TO MGR SILVESTRINI BASED  
LARGELY ON YOUR TWO TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE. I ALSO TOOK  
THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE HIM TWO COPIES OF THE WORLD PRESS COMMENTS  
ON THE AFFAIR RECEIVED TO-DAY.
2. MGR SILVESTRINI NOTED THE ARGUMENTS SET OUT IN MY LETTER  
(COPY BY BAG SA DEPARTMENT) AND ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION, WHICH  
I GAVE, POINTING TO THE RELEVANT SENTENCE, THAT WE CONTINUED TO  
REGARD NEGOTIATION AND THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS AS THE BEST HOPE FOR  
A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE.
3. I DESCRIBED BRIEFLY THE EVENTS IN SOUTH GEORGIA OUTLINED IN  
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 072 TO CARACAS. SILVESTRINI SAID THAT A  
PEACEFUL SOLUTION WAS THEIR AIM AND HOPE. I THINK THAT A REPLY TO  
THE POPE'S RECENT MESSAGE TO THE EFFECT THAT THIS WAS ALSO HMG'S  
AIM AND HOPE WOULD BE A TIMELY CONTRIBUTION (MY TELECON OF 26  
APRIL WITH YOUNG OF WED).

HEATH

WIK



TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS  
PS/M Hurd  
PS/MR ONSLOW

**FLASH**

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS DS W60

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

RESIDENT CLERK

DIO  
SIR M. PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG, ~~SE~~ CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

ZZ F C O

GRS 320

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 271726Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 575 DATED 27 APRIL 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELECONS WITH HOLMES: EXCHANGES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS  
ABOUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S 'APPEAL'

1. THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 570, PARAGRAPH 2) HAS NOT BECOME A STORY HERE. IT WAS A ROUTINE, LOW-KEY COMMENT OF A KIND WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OFTEN MAKES ABOUT DISPUTES AND TENSION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES. SUCH STATEMENTS ARE NOT FORMALLY COMMUNICATED TO THE DELEGATIONS CONCERNED AND DO NOT CALL FOR ANY FORMAL RESPONSE. HOWEVER, AS THE STATEMENT WAS ON THIS OCCASION OPEN TO MISINTERPRETATION, I THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND SPEAK AS IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELNO 570.



HERE. IT WAS A ROUTINE, LOW-KEY COMMENT OF A KIND WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OFTEN MAKES ABOUT DISPUTES AND TENSION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES. SUCH STATEMENTS ARE NOT FORMALLY COMMUNICATED TO THE DELEGATIONS CONCERNED AND DO NOT CALL FOR ANY FORMAL RESPONSE. HOWEVER, AS THE STATEMENT WAS ON THIS OCCASION OPEN TO MISINTERPRETATION, I THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND SPEAK AS IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELNO 570.

2. AS I INDICATED TO HOLMES, I AM RELUCTANT TO ISSUE ANY KIND OF FORMAL STATEMENT FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION HERE. THIS WOULD BE ALMOST UNPRECEDENTED (AS FAR AS I CAN RECALL ONLY THE ISRAELIS AND SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE TAKEN SUCH ACTION IN RECENT YEARS). A FORMAL STATEMENT BY ME WOULD PROVOKE A REJOINDER BY ROCA (ARGENTINA) AND WOULD GENERATE LATIN PRESSURE ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE A FURTHER STATEMENT, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY NOT IMPROVE MATTERS.

3. I HAVE CONCLUDED THEREFORE THAT THE BEST WAY OF DEFUSING THIS EPISODE QUICKLY WOULD BE FOR ME TO GIVE THE STATEMENT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM INFORMALLY TO THE BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS HERE BUT NOT ISSUE IT AS A FULL-BLOWN PRESS RELEASE WHICH WOULD BE CIRCULATED TO DELEGATIONS. I AM PROCEEDING ACCO<sup>R</sup>DINGLY. I SHALL ALSO SPEAK ON SIMILAR LINES WHEN INTERVIEWED SHORTLY FOR THE BBC 2 NEWSNIGHT PROGRAMME AND PERHAPS ALSO FOR BBC RADIO.

4. MR DENIS HEALEY TELEPHONED FROM PHILADELPHIA THIS MORNING TO ASK WHETHER WE REGARDED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S "APPEAL" AS COMPARABLE TO U THANT'S APPEAL TO THE US AND USSR DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, I.E. THE IDEA URQUHART HAD DISCUSSED WITH HIM LAST WEEK (MY TELNO 544). WE SAID THAT WE DID NOT. THIS MAY EXPLAIN THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE "APPEAL" BY MR FOOT IN THE HOUSE TODAY.

PARSONS

NNNN



Facsimile Transmission Leader.

Message Input Number 001.27...

Date 27 April 82

This transmission consists of 2 page(s) PLUS leader.

FROM DH ANDERSON

TO NCR WILLIAMS UNB

Sir I. SINCLAIR  
EMERGENCY UNIT  
JA HEAP SAND

Following is our letter to President  
of Security Council (S/15002), as per  
FCO Tel NO 306 and my telephone call  
with Sir I Sinclair

DH Anderson  
27.4

Transmitted at .....

By .....





## Security Council

Distr.  
GENERALS/L5002  
25 April 1982

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 APRIL 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED  
NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour, with reference to the letters dated 24 and 25 April from the Permanent Representative of Argentina (S/14998 and S/14999), to state the following.

On 3 April 1982, notwithstanding current action in the Security Council and the adoption of Security Council resolution 502 (1982), Argentina carried out an armed invasion of the island of South Georgia. The small British garrison resisted but was eventually captured. On 25 April, in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, British forces re-established British authority on South Georgia. The Commander of the Argentine forces, which had been there for just over three weeks, surrendered. The only casualty, so far as my Government is aware, was an Argentine seaman who suffered leg injuries.

There is thus no question of the United Kingdom Government having acted aggressively, having in any way breached the terms of Security Council resolution 502 (1982) (implementation of paragraph 2 of which by Argentina is still awaited by the international community) or of having caused a breach of international peace and security. The original breach of the peace determined by the Security Council in the third preambular paragraph of Security Council resolution 502 (1982) will not be brought to an end before Argentina can be seen to have complied with paragraph 2 of that resolution. No amount of selective quotation from statements by British Ministers can obscure the fact that it was Argentina which first used armed force in defiance of the Security Council's urgent call on 1 April (S/14944).

South Georgia is a remote mountainous island in the South Atlantic (800 miles from the Falkland Islands and 1,600 miles south-east of Buenos Aires). It was discovered by a British national, and British sovereignty was first proclaimed in 1775, before which it was terra nullius. Since 1908, the United Kingdom has occupied and administered the island openly, continuously and peacefully, maintaining a government station and a resident magistrate, and regulating whaling, fishing and sealing in particular. For many years, Argentina accepted British sovereignty. Argentina appears to have first made claim to South Georgia in 1927.

82-11599 0159v (E)

/...



S/15002  
English  
Page 2

In the 1940s and 1950s, the United Kingdom offered to refer the sovereignty dispute over South Georgia to the International Court of Justice. In May 1955, the United Kingdom submitted this dispute to the Court by delivering an application to the Registrar (full text in "ICJ Pleadings, Antarctica Cases (UK v. Argentina)"). Having seen the strength of the British title to South Georgia, Argentina declined to accept the Court's jurisdiction. In recent years, the main use of the island has been as a logistic station supporting the British Antarctic Survey, i.e., peaceful scientific research.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. D. PARSONS





Mr. ~~Loes~~ (No 10)

We spoke.

J. Holmes  
27/4

Mr Giffard

MR HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES

1. On receipt of Washington tel no 1473 I spoke to Sir N Henderson on the secure line to ask if he could give me some of the background. If Mr Haig were to go down to Buenos Aires again it appeared to be a significant change of tactic. He had intended to put his ideas on a 'take it or leave it' basis against a very short deadline. A delay of what might be 36 hours could present significant difficulties here since Sir N Henderson already knew some important decisions on the next phase of operations would have to be taken very soon.
2. Sir N Henderson said that he was very conscious of all this and he was also sure that Mr Haig understood absolutely that time was running out. He thought that Mr Haig might believe that his presence was essential to get the agreement out of General Galtieri.
3. I said that I would shortly be seeing Sir R Armstrong and others and would therefore let him know whether we wanted Sir N Henderson to advise Mr Haig on our behalf not to go to Buenos Aires.
4. While I was in Sir Robert Armstrong's office, Sir N Henderson telephoned again to say that he had been in touch with Mr Haig. The American proposals had been put to Galtieri, who in turn had put them to the Junta. Galtieri's mood was now very different. He was no longer 'rumbunctious' (Mr Haig's word) and was impressed that what were being put to him were US proposals. His main complaint so far had been that the US had not been able to stop us from recapturing South Georgia. Mr Haig would be seeing Costa Mendes again and stressing the urgency. He did not think that he would go to Buenos Aires and could deal with Galtieri if necessary on the telephone.
5. On a separate point Galtieri had asked Mr Haig whether there had been Argentinian casualties and whether the prisoners would be repatriated to Argentina. Mr Haig thought that confirmation from the British through him on these points would be helpful. After quick discussion with Sir R Armstrong and the others present, Sir N Henderson was authorised to ask Mr Haig to confirm to Galtieri that in the reoccupation of South Georgia there had only been one casualty, who was being treated on a British ship and that the prisoners of war would certainly be returned in due course.
6. Sir N Henderson has promised to send us a round-up of recent developments before tomorrow's ODSA meeting.

27 April 1982

*Antony Acland*  
Antony Acland

/cc:



SECRET



cc: Mr Fearn, SAmD  
Mr Weston, Defence Dept  
Mr Williams  
Mr Mallaby, Planning Staff  
Mr Fenn, News Dept  
Mr Ure  
Mr Gillmore  
Mr Wright  
Lord Bridges  
Mr Bullard  
PS/Mr Onslow  
PS



SECRET



Ref. A08248

PRIME MINISTER

---

Cabinet: Falkland Islands

The substance of the line to be taken at Cabinet tomorrow would depend entirely on the overnight Haig news; and on OD(SA)'s decisions in the light of that news.

2. Procedurally, you could begin by inviting the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence, in that order, to report and yourself filling in any gaps they leave.

3. If Mr Haig has failed, or if the situation remains unclear, your summing up need only invite the Cabinet to take note of the diplomatic and military situations, and of the prospects, including the TEZ announcement (which may be being made while the Cabinet is in session). If Mr Haig has succeeded, you will need to establish at least a preliminary consensus on the acceptability of his proposals from Britain's point of view.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

27 April 1982



The conclusion of this agreement shall in no circumstances justify any delay in the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

ARTICLE 119

Repatriation shall be effected in conditions similar to those laid down in Articles 46 to 48 inclusive of the present Convention for the transfer of prisoners of war, having regard to the provisions of Article 118 and to those of the following paragraphs.

On repatriation, any articles of value impounded from prisoners of war under Article 18, and any foreign currency which has not been converted into the currency of the Detaining Power, shall be restored to them. Articles of value and foreign currency which, for any reason whatever, are not restored to prisoners of war on repatriation, shall be despatched to the Information Bureau set up under Article 122.

Prisoners of war shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects, and any correspondence and parcels which have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be limited, if the conditions of repatriation so require, to what each prisoner can reasonably carry. Each prisoner shall in all cases be authorised to carry at least twenty-five kilograms.

The other personal effects of the repatriated prisoner shall be left in the charge of the Detaining Power which shall have them forwarded to him as soon as it has concluded an agreement to this effect, regulating the conditions of transport and the payment of the costs involved, with the Power on which the prisoner depends.

Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offence.

Parties to the conflict shall communicate to each other the names of any prisoners of war who are detained until the end of proceedings or until punishment has been completed.

By agreement between the Parties to the conflict, commissions shall be established for the purpose of searching for dispersed prisoners of war and of assuring their repatriation with the least possible delay.

SECTION III.—DEATH OF PRISONERS OF WAR

ARTICLE 120

Wills of prisoners of war shall be drawn up so as to satisfy the conditions of validity required by the legislation of their country of origin, which will take steps to inform the Detaining Power of its requirements in this respect. At the request of the prisoner of war and, in all cases, after death, the will shall be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power; a certified copy shall be sent to the Central Agency.



Death certificates, in the form annexed to the present Convention, or lists certified by a responsible officer, of all persons who die as prisoners of war shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau established in accordance with Article 122. The death certificates or certified lists shall show particulars of identity as set out in the third paragraph of Article 17, and also the date and place of death, the cause of death, the date and place of burial and all particulars necessary to identify the graves.

SCIL.

The burial or cremation of a prisoner of war shall be preceded by a medical examination of the body with a view to confirming death and enabling a report to be made and, where necessary, establishing identity.

The detaining authorities shall ensure that prisoners of war who have died in captivity, are honourably buried, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged, and that their graves are respected, suitably maintained and marked so as to be found at any time. Wherever possible, deceased prisoners of war who depended on the same Power shall be interred in the same place.

Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable circumstances require the use of collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his express wish to this effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in the death certificate of the deceased.

In order that graves may always be found, all particulars of burials and graves shall be recorded with a Graves Registration Service established by the Detaining Power. Lists of graves and particulars of the prisoners of war interred in cemeteries and elsewhere shall be transmitted to the Power on which such prisoners of war depended. Responsibility for the care of these graves and for records of any subsequent moves of the bodies shall rest on the Power controlling the territory, if a Party to the present Convention. These provisions shall also apply to the ashes, which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in accordance with the wishes of the home country.

#### ARTICLE 121

Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another prisoner of war, or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.

A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. Statements shall be taken from witnesses, especially from those who are prisoners of war, and a report including such statements shall be forwarded to the Protecting Power.

If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all measures for the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.



TYPISTS

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

WONFO 20/27

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ZZ LUXEMBOURG

GRS 300

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 270455Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1471 OF 27 APRIL

AND TO FLASH LUXEMBOURG

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

~~IMMEDIATE  
ADVANCE COPY~~

X17

PS  
PS/W Orlov  
PS/PLS  
W Gifford  
W Wright  
W Gillmore  
W Ural

PS/NO 10  
Sin M Kallies  
S R Armstrong  
W Wade  
RC  
Ad/STND  
Hd/De (D)  
Hd/PLSD (2)  
Hd/Plan Staff

FALKLANDS

HAIG HAS TELEPHONED ME AGAIN JUST AFTER MIDNIGHT. HE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD COME FORWARD WITH THREE ALTERNATIVES.

THE FIRST WAS THAT HE SHOULD GO TO BUENOS AIRES BUT ONLY AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE O A S DEBATE WHICH WOULD MEAN NOT EARLIER THAN WEDNESDAY 28TH APRIL. THEY COULD NOT HAVE HIM THERE WHILE THE DEBATE WAS PROCEEDING. HAIG HAD REPLIED THAT IN VIEW OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH FLEET THAT WOULD BE TOO LATE.

THE SECOND PROPOSAL WAS THAT HAIG SHOULD ASK H M G TO HALT THE ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH FLEET. HAIG HAD REJECTED THIS AS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE. HE COULD NOT BRING IT ABOUT EVEN IF HE WANTED TO.

THE THIRD IDEA WAS THAT HAIG SHOULD TRANSMIT HIS PROPOSALS IMMEDIATELY THROUGH THE U S A EMBASY IN BUENOS AIRES. HE HAS DECIDED TO DO THIS. HE WILL ALSO TRANSMIT THE TEXT TO COSTA MENDEZ HERE AT SEVEN A.M. TOMORROW MORNING 27TH APRIL. HE HAS SAID THAT HE MUST HAVE AN ANSWER, YES OR NO, BY MIDNIGHT BUENOS AIRES TIME 27/28TH APRIL. THERE CAN BE NO SUGGESTIONS FOR TEXTUAL ALTERATIONS.



27/28TH APRIL. THERE CAN BE NO SUGGESTIONS FOR TEXTUAL ALTERATIONS.

HAIG WILL GIVE US THE TEXT TOMORROW. IT IS THE SAME AS THAT GIVEN US LAST FRIDAY EVENING. IT WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED UNLESS THE ARGENTINES REJECT IT. IF THEY ACCEPT IT THERE WILL BE NO PUBLICATION UNTIL WE HAVE BEEN CONSULTED.

HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A FAIR CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE, THANKS TO OUR ACTION IN SOUTH GEORGIA.

FINALLY, HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT WISH TO BE A LITTLE FLEXIBLE AS REGARDS THE DEAD-LINE. IF, FOR INSTANCE THE ARGENTINIANS SAID THEY WANTED AN ADDITIONAL TEN HOURS, WE MIGHT BE PREPARED FOR HIM TO CONCEDE IT, BUT THERE WAS NO NEED TO DECIDE THAT NOW.

AS YOU WILL SEE HAIG HAS HOISTED IN THAT THERE IS NOT A LOT OF TIME, AND I BELIEVE HE THINKS THAT HE HAS AT LAST PERSUADED THE ARGENTINIANS THAT WE MEAN BUSINESS, OR, TO BE MORE EXACT HE BELIEVES THAT OUR ACTION HAS DONE THIS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

33. 10. 1941

3. 10. 1941

3. 10. 1941

3. 10. 1941

3. 10. 1941

W. M. G. 10/10/41  
W. M. G. 10/10/41  
before  
W. M. G. 10/10/41

10/10/41



GRS 400

SECRET

SECRET

FM F C O 270237Z APR 82

TO FLASH LUXEMBOURG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 27 APRIL.

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

U.S. EMBASSY DELIVERED NFOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MR HAIG AT 270215Z

BEGINS:

DEAR FRANCIS,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF APRIL 26 AND YOUR CONCURRENCE THAT WE SHOULD PUT TO THE ARGENTINES THE PROPOSALS WE WORKED OUT DURING YOUR VISIT HERE.

WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR SUCCESS ON SOUTH GEORGIA MAY NOW GIVE US GREATER REASON TO HOPE THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL REGARD THE PRESENTLY DRAFTED FRAMEWORK AS A PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE TO FURTHER ARMED CONFLICT. IF THIS HOPE IS NOT MISPLACED, WE MAY HAVE AN EXTREMELY CRITICAL OPPORTUNITY — PERHAPS THE LAST — BEFORE AN ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING TAKES PLACE AND THE SCENARIO CHANGES IN A WAY WHICH PLUNGES ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT WHICH — WHATEVER ITS IMMEDIATE OUTCOME — WILL CREATE LONG-TERM INSTABILITY, INSECURITY AND HOSTILITY. AS NICKO HAS NO DOUBT TOLD YOU, WE HAVE PROPOSED TO THE ARGENTINES THAT I

LEAVE FOR BUENOS AIRES AS SOON AS THAT CAN BE ARRANGED — PERHAPS IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS. I WILL, IN LINE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF APRIL 24, AND YOUR SECOND MESSAGE TODAY, PRESENT OUR IDEAS TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND THE JUNTA. I AM NOT GOING TO BUENOS AIRES TO NEGOTIATE; RATHER I WILL BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN OUR IDEAS AND SEEK A PROMPT RESPONSE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I WILL NOT REMAIN IN ARGENTINE AN INORDINATE PERIOD OF TIME.

OBVIOUSLY, ALL OF THE ABOVE IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ARGENTINES AGREE TO RECEIVE ME. IF THEY DO NOT, WE MUST NEVERTHELESS MAKE AN EFFORT TO PRESENT OUR IDEAS, IF ONLY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD A FAIR PROPOSITION BEFORE THEM WHICH THEY CHOSE TO DECLINE. THEREFORE, IF I DO NOT GO TO BUENOS AIRES, I WILL INSTRUCT OUR AMBASSADOR THERE TO DELIVER OUR TEXT AND ASK FOR A PROMPT ARGENTINE REPLY. THUS, WHETHER OR NOT I GO TO BUENOS AIRES, WE SHOULD KNOW WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO WHETHER THERE IS REASONTO HOPE THAT A SETTLEMENT CAN BE REACHED BEFORE NEW, MORE INTENSE HOSTILITIES ERUPT.

SECRET

/I WILL



SECRET

I WILL OF COURSE STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS TO YOU AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER,

AL

ENDS

PYM

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

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MR ILETT )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

-2-

SECRET



SECRET

Prime Directive

Sensitive passages are in square brackets.

AM 6/3

3

t.a.  
AM 27/4

ILLEGAL LANDING ON SOUTH GEORGIA: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

FRIDAY 19 MARCH:

A BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY FIELD PARTY REPORT THAT AN ARGENTINE NAVY CARGO VESSEL IS ANCHORED IN LEITH HARBOUR. A PARTY OF ABOUT 60 ARGENTINES HAVE SET UP CAMP AND AN ARGENTINE FLAG HAS BEEN HOISTED.

SATURDAY 20 MARCH:

THE BAS FIELD PARTY INFORMS THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY HAVE LANDED ILLEGALLY AND THAT THEY MUST LEAVE.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE INSTRUCT HMS ENDURANCE TO PREPARE TO SAIL TO SOUTH GEORGIA WITH A DETACHMENT OF MARINES FROM PORT STANLEY.

HM AMBASSADOR BUENOS AIRES INFORMS THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT WE ARE TREATING THE INFRINGEMENT OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY VERY SERIOUSLY. THE ARGENTINE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IS CALLED IN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND TOLD THE SAME. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PROFESS IGNORANCE BUT AGREE TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER URGENTLY.

SUNDAY 21 MARCH:

HMS ENDURANCE DEPARTS FOR SOUTH GEORGIA.

ARGENTINE MFA INFORM US THAT THE SHIP WILL LEAVE SOUTH GEORGIA SHORTLY AND THAT NO SERVICE PERSONNEL ARE INVOLVED.

MONDAY 22 MARCH:

WE RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE SHIP HAS LEFT BUT THERE ARE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER ALL THE MEN HAVE GONE.

IN THE EVENING, BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY CONFIRM THAT ABOUT SIX MEN AND SOME EQUIPMENT REMAIN.

/ TUESDAY 23 MARCH



SECRET

TUESDAY 23 MARCH:

HMS ENDURANCE IS INSTRUCTED TO SAIL ON FOR SOUTH GEORGIA AND REMOVE THE MEN, IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT USING FORCE.

MR. LUCE MAKES A STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT LATER WARNS THAT USE OF HMS ENDURANCE WOULD BE GRAVELY PROVOCATIVE. THEY ARE TOLD WE WISH TO AVOID THIS IF POSSIBLE: IF THEY CAN PROPOSE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF REMOVING THE MEN, WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THEM DO SO.

WEDNESDAY 24 MARCH:

HMS ENDURANCE ORDERED TO ANCHOR IN GRYTVIKEN HARBOUR, BUT NOT TO PROCEED TO LEITH.

ARGENTINE MFA SAY THEY WISH TO PREVENT THE SITUATION ESCALATING IF POSSIBLE, BUT NEED TIME TO CONSIDER.

THURSDAY 25 MARCH:

ARGENTINE NAVAL VESSEL IS SIGHTED AT LEITH DELIVERING FURTHER SUPPLIES.

WE ASK THE ARGENTINES FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST THAT THEY REMOVE THE MEN.

ARGENTINE MFA THEN SAY THAT BY DEPLOYING HMS ENDURANCE WE HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO CONTAIN THEIR POSITION.

WE REPLY THAT WE WISH TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION AND PROPOSE THAT IF THE PARTY REQUEST THE PROPER AUTHORISATION FROM GRYTVIKEN, IT WILL BE GIVEN.

FRIDAY 26 /  
SATURDAY 27 MARCH:

NO FORMAL REPLY FROM THE ARGENTINE MFA. BUT THEY ISSUE A PRESS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THAT THE MEN WILL BE GIVEN ALL NECESSARY PROTECTION AND THE PRESS REPORTS THAT SEVERAL ARGENTINE NAVY VESSELS HAVE BEEN ORDERED INTO THE AREA.

/ SUNDAY 28 MARCH







SECRET

TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE IN THE AREA.  
THE UK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AGREES; THE  
ARGENTINE SAYS NOTHING.

WE UNDERTAKE INTENSIVE LOBBYING OF US AND EC  
COUNTRIES ASKING THEM TO INTERVENE ON OUR BEHALF.  
THE AMERICANS HAVE TAKEN ACTION AT THE HIGHEST  
LEVEL BUT THE ARGENTINES REMAIN UNRESPONSIVE.

LAST MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM FALKLANDS (2155 HRS.  
OUR TIME).

FRIDAY 2 APRIL:

0833 - TELEGRAM SENT TO FALKLANDS.

0845 - COMMUNICATIONS CEASE.

0945 - CABINET INFORMED THAT ARGENTINE INVASION  
IMMINENT. DECIDE THAT NAVAL AND MILITARY  
PREPARATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE AS PLANNED.

1100 - THE LORD PRIVY SEAL MAKES STATEMENT IN  
THE HOUSE EXPRESSING HMG'S GRAVE CONCERN AT  
SITUATION.

*Passage deleted and retained under  
Section 3(4). @Wayland  
13 April 2012*

FOLLOWING FURTHER REPORTS FROM MEDIA AND OTHERS,  
CABINET DECIDES THAT NAVAL TASK FORCE SHOULD  
SAIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND  
ARGENTINA BROKEN OFF.

BRITISH OFFICIALS AND MARINES FLOWN FROM FALKLANDS  
TO MONTEVIDEO.

MESSAGE FROM COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL TO  
ALL COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT URGING  
CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINE ACTION.

/ MESSAGES



S E C R E T

MESSAGES ALSO FROM PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY TO WIDE RANGE OF GOVERNMENTS.

UK CALLS IMMEDIATE MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL.

SATURDAY 3 APRIL:

DEBATE IN BOTH HOUSES. PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCES THAT TASK FORCE WILL SAIL, ARGENTINE BALANCES IN THE UK HAVE BEEN FROZEN, AND ECGD COVER SUSPENDED.

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TELEPHONES PRIME MINISTER. UN SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS BY 10 VOTES TO 1 WITH 4 ABSTENTIONS FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

SUNDAY 4 APRIL:

BRITISH OFFICIALS AND MARINES EXPELLED FROM FALKLAND ISLANDS LEAVE MONTEVIDEO FOR UK.

WE RECEIVE CONFIRMATION THAT SOUTH GEORGIA HAS ALSO BEEN ATTACKED AND IS NOW IN ARGENTINE HANDS.

REPORTS THAT THE MARINES DEFENDING GRYTVIKEN HAVE INFLICTED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE ON THE ARGENTINES.

WIDE RANGING DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO SECURE CONDEMNATION BY OTHER COUNTRIES OF ARGENTINE ACTION AND ALSO TO DISSUADE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE ECONOMIC ACTION SIMILAR TO OUR OWN.

ORDER IN COUNCIL PROVIDING FOR REQUISITIONING OF SHIPPING.

MONDAY 5 APRIL:

GOVERNOR, STAFF AND MARINES ARRIVE BACK IN THE UK. DEBRIEFINGS AND PRESS CONFERENCE.

TASK FORCE DEPARTS FROM THE UK.

WIDE RANGING TRADE SANCTIONS ANNOUNCED.

BRITISH CITIZENS ADVISED TO CONSIDER LEAVING ARGENTINA (BBC WORLD SERVICE BROADCAST).





N. B. P. R.

M  $\frac{27}{4}$ 

h-a.

PM/82/29PRIME MINISTERMaritime Rules of Engagement

In his minute of 22 April, the Secretary of State for Defence proposed that we could now safely promulgate a rule authorising our forces to presume that ~~an~~<sup>any</sup> unconventional submarine encountered between 10° and 35° South (and West of 20° West) would be Argentinian. I confirm that I am content with this proposal.

I am copying this minute to the members of OD(SA) and to Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Michael Palliser.

(FRANCIS PYM)



[We have this morning notified] [We shall at the earliest opportunity notify] the Brazilian Government, (so that they can inform the Argentine authorities) of a serious incident which took place [yesterday] 26 April in South Georgia and which involved the death of an Argentine prisoner of war. We do not yet have full details. [We have only recently learned the name of the man who died.] Instructions have been given for the convening of a Board Inquiry in South Georgia which will complete its deliberations as soon as possible. Both the notification to the Brazilians and the setting up of the Board of Inquiry are strictly in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention.

If Pressed

Nothing more can be said until the Board's findings are reported to us.

Duty Clerk No 10

We spoke.

Murphy

APS / SPS for Defence

27/4/82.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 April 1982

*Dear John,*

Prisoners captured on South Georgia

Following my letter to you of 26 April, we discussed further the status of the prisoners captured on South Georgia. I now enclose a note by Sir I Sinclair setting out chapter and verse for his view that the prisoners captured on South Georgia are prisoners of war within the meaning of the relevant Geneva Convention of 1949 to which both we and Argentina are parties. The Geneva Convention provides the internationally accepted definition of prisoners of war.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED IN SOUTH GEORGIA

Note by the FCO Legal Adviser

1. The Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (to which both Argentina and the UK are parties) was concluded in August 1949.

2. Article 2 of the Convention provides that:-

"In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them."

Article 2 also provides that the Convention shall:-

"apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance".

3. Article 4 of the same Convention defines prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, as persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy. Six categories are listed, of which the most significant is:-

"members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces".

4. There is also a separate defined category of persons to be treated as prisoners of war under the Convention. These are:-

"(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.

(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on

/their



their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties."

Neither of these two defined categories of persons to be treated as prisoners of war apply to the prisoners captured in South Georgia.

5. In the circumstances, there is, in my view, no doubt whatsoever that the prisoners captured in South Georgia must be regarded as prisoners of war within the meaning of the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.



PRIME MINISTER

cc: Mr. Coles

I attach Mr. Foot's reply to your letter, about which I forewarned you earlier in the evening.

No overnight response seems to me to be required. I have sent a copy of the letter across to the Foreign Office, and I have warned that you may want to consult the Foreign Secretary at OD/SA or Cabinet in the morning about any further response.

MAP

27 April 1982





HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Arg.  
MAP  
Pen Office  
Foreign Office

The Office of the  
Leader of The Opposition

27 April

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter.

I must say at once that, at such a moment of international crisis, I attach the greatest importance to any statement issued by the Secretary General of the United Nations, and I am shocked that the Government does not appear to share that view.

The Government should have responded positively to such an approach even before the matter was raised in the House of Commons to-day. Much the best response would have been for the Government to send a spokesman, preferably the Foreign Secretary, to meet the Secretary General to discuss the matter with him immediately and directly. The better the British case, the stronger the argument for such a mission.

I fully accept that it is Argentina which is in violation of Security Council Resolution 502 and the Government cannot complain of any lack of support on our part, but when, in the light of the latest events, the Secretary General issues a special appeal, the Government must respond in terms very different from the dismissive ones which you have selected.

I still urge, as I did in the House, that the Foreign Secretary should go to New York without further delay to talk with the Secretary General, and that no further major military action should be authorised until this has been done.

I write on behalf of a party which has given the strongest support to the role which the United Nations can play in international disputes, and I urge that all future Government action should be governed by the need to support the United Nations and its Secretary General.





I continue to be amazed that the Government's first response was not to propose a meeting of this nature. Human lives and great issues of peace are involved, and the proper way ~~is~~ for the British Government to be prepared to discuss them <sup>is</sup> with the Secretary General of the United Nations in response to his specific appeal.

I want to see our country retaining the world-wide support which hitherto has been forthcoming for the British case in this dispute. It is our allegiance to the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Organisation and its institutions which has helped us to command that support. If that great asset is destroyed or impaired at this moment, the responsibility will be yours.

W. M. K. Foot

The Prime Minister





file

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 April 1982

Dear Michael,

During Question Time this afternoon, you asked me about the Government's response to an appeal put out by the United Nations Secretary General yesterday.

I should first make it clear that the Secretary General's appeal took the form of a press release put out by his spokesman. It has not been circulated as a document of the Security Council or General Assembly, nor has it been communicated to Her Majesty's Government in any formal way.

It would be most unusual for any formal response to be sent to an appeal issued in this way. The United Kingdom's Permanent Representative nevertheless spoke to the Secretary General on behalf of the Government yesterday. He told Mr De Cuellar that any suggestion that we had failed to comply with Security Council Resolution No. 502 was unacceptable, and that it was Argentina which was in breach of the Resolution.

In view of the importance which you attached to these exchanges this afternoon, I shall of course release this letter to the press.

I am sending copies of this letter to David Steel and David Owen.

Yours sincerely

Robert Thatcher

The Right Honourable Michael Foot, M.P.





*Geneva Convention*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 April 1982

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*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

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10 Downing Street





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(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on

/their





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27 APR 1982

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

27 April 1982

In the light of exchanges at Question Time this afternoon, the Prime Minister may wish to send a letter to Michael Foot this evening on the lines of the attached draft.

I should be grateful for rapid confirmation that the draft is factually correct. It is based on the information you gave John Coles earlier this afternoon.

M. A. PATTISON

John Holmes Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

During Question Time this afternoon, you asked me about the Government's response to an appeal put out by the United Nations Secretary General yesterday.

I should first make it clear that the Secretary General's appeal took the form of a press release put out by his spokesman. It has not been circulated as a document of the Security Council or General Assembly, nor has it been communicated to Her Majesty's Government in any formal way.

It would be most unusual for any formal response to be sent to an appeal issued in this way. The United Kingdom's Permanent Representative nevertheless spoke to the Secretary General on behalf of the Government yesterday. He told Mr De Cuellar that any suggestion that we had failed to comply with Security Council Resolution No. 502 was unacceptable, and that it was Argentina which was in breach of the Resolution.

In view of the importance which you attached to these exchanges this afternoon, I shall of course release this letter to the press.

I am sending copies of this letter to David Steel and David Owen.



MR COLES

Bernard has asked whether we have any intention of setting the record straight with Michael Foot's office. I am still of the view that no harm - and possibly some good would be done by a brief letter from the Prime Minister. It need say no more than the attached draft.

If the Prime Minister is prepared to write I suggest, that, as the draft says, it should be copied to David Steel and made available to other Parties through the Whips Office. We would need to consider to copy it direct to David Owen.

MAP

27 April 1982



DRAFT LETTER TO MR FOOT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

During Question Time this afternoon, you asked me about the Government's response to an appeal put out by the United Nations Secretary General yesterday.

I should first make it clear that the Secretary General's appeal took the form of a press release put out by his spokesman. It has not been circulated as a document of the Security Council or General Assembly, nor has it been <sup>communicated</sup> ~~mentioned~~ to Her Majesty's Government in any formal way.

*in an appeal this way* *it would be most unusual for any formal response to be sent to such* *to be sent an appeal issued*  
The United Kingdom's ~~Permanent Representative~~ <sup>Permanent Representative</sup> at the United Nations nevertheless spoke to the Secretary General on behalf of the Government yesterday. He told Mr De Cuellar that any suggestion that we had failed to comply with Security Council Resolution No 502 was unacceptable, and that it was Argentina which was in breach of the Resolution.

I am sending a <sup>copies</sup> copy of this letter to David Steel ~~and~~ <sup>David</sup> Owen.

*In view of the importance which you attached to these exchanges this afternoon, I shall of course release this letter to the press.*



FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 27 APRIL: OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

Argentine prisoners in South Georgia

1. On 26 April an Argentine prisoner was shot dead by a Royal Marine who thought the prisoner was making a hostile move. The Royal Navy are conducting an enquiry.
2. HM Ambassador, Montevideo, has pointed out that we would gain much credit internationally by announcing without delay that Argentine prisoners will be repatriated as soon as arrangements can be made.

United States

3. On 26 April Mr Haig told Sir N Henderson that in his view the Argentines had been convinced that the UK was bluffing; South Georgia had no doubt disabused them. In Mr Haig's view a bigger operation on the Falklands would not be so easy, but he did not wish to say that we were not right to maintain the pressure.
4. Mr Haig spoke to Sr Costa Mendez on 26 April and told him that time had run out. The only way to avoid an immediate conflict would be for Mr Haig to meet the Junta without delay.
5. In a message to the Secretary of State (attached) Mr Haig reports that he has proposed to the Argentines that he should leave for Buenos Aires as soon as that could be arranged; if this were not acceptable he would instruct the US Ambassador to deliver a text and ask for a swift response.
6. Just after midnight Mr Haig told Sir N Henderson that after discussion with the Argentines it had been agreed that Mr Haig would transmit his proposals (i.e. the text given to us on 23 April) immediately through the US Embassy Buenos Aires. He will also give the text to Sr Costa Mendez on 27 April at 7 am Washington time. Mr Haig has told the Argentines that he must have an answer, yes or no, by midnight Buenos Aires time 27/28 April; there could be no suggestions for textual alterations. Mr Haig told Sir N Henderson that he thought there was a fair chance of acceptance, thanks to our action in South Georgia.

Organisation of American States (OAS)

7. At the OAS meeting on 26 April Secretary Haig said that it would be 'neither appropriate nor effective' to deal with the Falklands under the Rio Treaty. Argentina demanded withdrawal of UK forces and the suspension of economic measures directed against her. With the exception of Venezuela and Panama, other speakers made moderate speeches. Sir N Henderson reports that there seems to be a good deal of support for a Peruvian resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a resumption of negotiations, possibly under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. The majority of participants appear reluctant to support sanctions against Britain and Argentina appears to have recognised this; it has so far avoided calling for sanctions.

/Non-Aligned



Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

8. On 26 April the NAM Coordinating Bureau adopted a communique which endorsed the Argentine position on sovereignty, although it also contained, inter alia, a reference to Security Council Resolution 502.

Italy

9. HM Ambassador, Rome, has reported that Sr Colombo is in two minds about our recapture of South Georgia and is concerned about possible escalation.

Mexico

10. In a television interview on 26 April President Lopez Portillo indicated his support for Argentina's claim to the Falklands but added that Mexico had not become involved in the dispute as very capable people were mediating in an attempt to achieve a peaceful settlement. HM Ambassador believes that there has been a slight tilt towards Argentina in recent statements by leading Mexicans; but he believes that for the moment we should not take this too seriously.

Argentine liquidity position

11. The US Treasury's general conclusion is that the Argentines will have no serious liquidity crisis up to at least the end of June.

E. J. Hughes

E J Hughes  
Emergency Unit



DEAR FRANCIS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF APRIL 26 AND YOUR CONCURRENCE THAT WE SHOULD PUT TO THE ARGENTINES THE PROPOSALS WE WORKED OUT DURING YOUR VISIT HERE.

WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR SUCCESS ON SOUTH GEORGIA MAY NOW GIVE US GREATER REASON TO HOPE THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL REGARD THE PRESENTLY DRAFTED FRAMEWORK AS A PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE TO FURTHER ARMED CONFLICT. IF THIS HOPE IS NOT MISPLACED, WE MAY HAVE AN EXTREMELY CRITICAL OPPORTUNITY — PERHAPS THE LAST — BEFORE AN ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING TAKES PLACE AND THE SCENARIO CHANGES IN A WAY WHICH PLUNGES ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT WHICH — WHATEVER ITS IMMEDIATE OUTCOME — WILL CREATE LONG-TERM INSTABILITY, INSECURITY AND HOSTILITY. AS NICKO HAS NO DOUBT TOLD YOU, WE HAVE PROPOSED TO THE ARGENTINES THAT I LEAVE FOR BUENOS AIRES AS SOON AS THAT CAN BE ARRANGED — PERHAPS IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS. I WILL, IN LINE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF APRIL 24, AND YOUR SECOND MESSAGE TODAY, PRESENT OUR IDEAS TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND THE JUNTA. I AM NOT GOING TO BUENOS AIRES TO NEGOTIATE; RATHER I WILL BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN OUR IDEAS AND SEEK A PROMPT RESPONSE. NEED-LESS TO SAY, I WILL NOT REMAIN IN ARGENTINA AN INORDINATE PERIOD OF TIME.

OBVIOUSLY, ALL OF THE ABOVE IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ARGENTINES AGREE TO RECEIVE ME. IF THEY DO NOT, WE MUST NEVERTHELESS MAKE AN EFFORT TO PRESENT OUR IDEAS, IF ONLY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD A FAIR PROPOSITION BEFORE THEM WHICH THEY

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CHOOSE TO DECLINE. THEREFORE, IF I DO NOT GO TO BUENOS AIRES, I WILL INSTRUCT OUR AMBASSADOR THERE TO DELIVER OUR TEXT AND ASK FOR A PROMPT ARGENTINE REPLY. THUS, WHETHER OR NOT I GO TO BUENOS AIRES, WE SHOULD KNOW WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO WHETHER THERE IS REASON TO HOPE THAT A SETTLEMENT CAN BE REACHED BEFORE NEW, MORE INTENSE HOSTILITIES ERUPT. I WILL OF COURSE STAY IN CLOSEST CONTACT WITH YOU.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS TO YOU AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, AL. END TEXT.



TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(29)

PS No.10 DOWNING ST.

PS  
ps/m Hurd  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
~~PS/MR DICKSON~~  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMED

PS/CHANCELLOR  
SIR K COUZENS  
MR LITTLER  
MR HAWTIN  
MR PERETZ  
MR ILETT  
MR McINTYRE  
H.M.TSY

HD/SAMD (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
~~HD/...~~

RESIDENT CLERK

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE  
DIO

SIR M. PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG DIO CABINET OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and CinC Fleet)

GRS 300

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CANBERRA 270116Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 175 OF 27 APRIL

FALKLAND ISLANDS

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED BY AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER ON 26 APRIL

QUOTE.

ADVICE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF THE OPERATION WHICH WAS MOUNTED BY UK FORCES ON 25 APRIL ON SOUTH GEORGIA ISLAND.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO USE FORCE TO RE-ESTABLISH ITS ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH GEORGIA IS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA BY ARGENTINE FORCES, AND THE FAILURE OF ARGENTINA TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES. ARGENTINA HAS REFUSED TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND HAS IGNORED REPEATED WARNINGS



ARGENTINA HAS REFUSED TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS, AND HAS IGNORED REPEATED WARNINGS FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED THE USE OF FORCE. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO REINFORCE ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE FALKLANDS.

THE BRITISH MILITARY ACTION SHOULD THEREFORE NOT HAVE COME AS A SURPRISE.

ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS I HAVE RECEIVED, THE MILITARY OPERATION WAS RESTRICTED AND MET WITH LIMITED RESISTANCE. ARGENTINE FORCES HAVE SURRENDERED AND IT APPEARS THAT CASUALTIES WERE LIMITED. NEVERTHELESS THE MILITARY ACTION EMPHASISES THE DANGER INHERENT IN THE FALKLANDS SITUATION. IT IS A DANGER TO WHICH I DREW PARTICULAR ATTENTION IN MY STATEMENT ON 3 APRIL WHEN I CALLED UPON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER MOST CAREFULLY POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS ACTION.

THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS HAVE EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR EVEN GREATER EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE AS CALLED FOR IN RESOLUTION 502. I WELCOME IN THAT REGARD PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF SECRETARY HAIG'S MEDIATION EFFORTS. IT IS A MATTER OF GREAT REGRET THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INITIATED MILITARY ACTION IN THIS DISPUTE, AND HAS NOT ALLOWED IT TO BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

UNQUOTE.

MASON

NNNN



SECRET

GRS 100

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 271220Z APR 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1473 OF 27 APRIL

*mf*

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS JUST TOLD ME THAT U.S. AMBASSADOR IS ON WAY TO SEE GALTEIRI. HE HAS DELIVERED PROPOSALS TO COSTA MENDEZ. HE WILL GIVE HIM ONE HOUR TO STUDY THEM.

2 HAIG SAYS HE MAY HAVE TO GO DOWN TO B.A. AGAIN BUT HE WILL BE CAREFUL NOT TO GET STALLED.

3 HE WILL KEEP IN TOUCH.

HENDERSON

LIMITED  
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DEFENCE D  
PUS D  
NA D  
PS  
PS | MR ONSLOW  
PS | PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR LILMORE  
MR URE  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:  
SIR M. PALLISER } CABINET  
SIR R. ARMSTRONG } OFFICE  
MR WADE-LERY }

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

SECRET



ps/N° 10 DS

ZZ LUXEMBOURG.

GRS 400

SECRET

FM F C O 270237Z APR 82

TO FLASH LUXEMBOURG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 31 OF 27 APRIL.

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

U.S. EMBASSY DELIVERED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MR HAIG AT 270215Z

BEGINS:

DEAR FRANCIS,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF APRIL 26 AND YOUR CONCURRENCE THAT WE SHOULD PUT TO THE ARGENTINES THE PROPOSALS WE WORKED OUT DURING YOUR VISIT HERE.

WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR SUCCESS ON SOUTH GEORGIA MAY NOW GIVE US GREATER REASON TO HOPE THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL REGARD THE PRESENTLY DRAFTED FRAMEWORK AS A PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE TO FURTHER ARMED CONFLICT. IF THIS HOPE IS NOT MISPLACED, WE MAY HAVE AN EXTREMELY CRITICAL OPPORTUNITY -- PERHAPS THE LAST -- BEFORE AN ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING TAKES PLACE AND THE SCENARIO CHANGES IN A WAY WHICH PLUNGES ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT WHICH - WHATEVER ITS IMMEDIATE OUTCOME - WILL CREATE LONG-TERM INSTABILITY, INSECURITY AND HOSTILITY. AS NICKO HAS NO DOUBT TOLD YOU, WE HAVE PROPOSED TO THE ARGENTINES THAT I

LEAVE FOR BUENOS AIRES AS SOON AS THAT CAN BE ARRANGED - PERHAPS IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS. I WILL, IN LINE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF APRIL 24, AND YOUR SECOND MESSAGE TODAY, PRESENT OUR IDEAS TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND THE JUNTA. I AM NOT GOING TO BUENOS AIRES TO NEGOTIATE; RATHER I WILL BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN OUR IDEAS AND SEEK A PROMPT RESPONSE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I WILL NOT REMAIN IN ARGENTINE AN INORDINATE PERIOD OF TIME.



OBVIOUSLY, ALL OF THE ABOVE IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ARGENTINES AGREE TO RECEIVE ME. IF THEY DO NOT, WE MUST NEVERTHELESS MAKE AN EFFORT TO PRESENT OUR IDEAS, IF ONLY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD A FAIR PROPOSITION BEFORE THEM WHICH THEY CHOSE TO DECLINE. THEREFORE, IF I DO NOT GO TO BUENOS AIRES, I WILL INSTRUCT OUR AMBASSADOR THERE TO DELIVER OUR TEXT AND ASK FOR A PROMPT ARGENTINE REPLY. THUS, WHETHER OR NOT I GO TO BUENOS AIRES, WE SHOULD KNOW WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO WHETHER THERE IS REASONTO HOPE THAT A SETTLEMENT CAN BE REACHED BEFORE NEW, MORE INTENSE HOSTILITIES ERUPT.

I WILL OF COURSE STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS TO YOU AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER,

AL

ENDS

PYM

NNNN



GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

You asked for very quick legal advice, cleared with the FCO legal adviser, on the incident this morning. This is as follows.

It seems clear that the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war is applicable to the Argentinian prisoners on South Georgia. The Convention is applicable "to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict" (article 2, convention (iii)).

Prisoners of war, other than officers, may be required to do certain kinds of work. These are listed in article 50, convention (iii) as follows:

"Besides work connected with camp administration, installation or maintenance, prisoners of war may be compelled to do only such work as is included in the following classes:

- (a) agriculture,
- (b) industries connected with the production or extraction of raw materials, and manufacturing industries with the exception of metallurgical, machinery or chemical industries; public works and building operations which have no military character or purpose;
- (c) transport and handling of stores which are not military in character or purpose;
- (d) commercial business, and arts and crafts;
- (e) domestic service;
- (f) public utility service having no military character or purpose.

You will see that stress is laid on the non-military character of work permitted. Thus the judgement of whether the orders to

/ the Argentines



the Argentines were covered under the Convention or not depends on what they were actually doing to the SANTE FE. If they were being ordered to disable or even de-stall it for military purposes, the implication is that we were outside the Convention. However all this will need further checking in the light of fuller reports of what happened.

N.E.

27 April 1982



SECRET

FATAL SHOOTING OF AN ARGENTINIAN SAILOR

Last night, shortly before midnight, information was received by phone from CINCFLEET and confirmed by signal some hours later of the fatal shooting of an Argentinian sailor at South Georgia.

The submarine SANTA FE was being disabled under direction of HMS BRILLIANT according to the verbal report (but not yet confirmed) the submarine was being moved. The Argentinian crew were assisting under guard by Royal Marines, one of whom apparently saw what he interpreted as a hostile move by an Argentinian sailor and shot the man dead.

A local Board of Enquiry is being held under the Presidency of CO HMS ENDURANCE, on which ship the Royal Marine is isolated for questioning. The body of the sailor is being transferred to TIDESPING for medical examination and certification. Advice on repatriation or burial at sea has been sought.

SECRET

One Page Only

27.4.82



SUBJECT

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Planis



T87/82

file 116

atro  
High Commissioner  
for N.Z.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 April 1982

Dear Rob,

Thank you so much for your encouraging message of 26 April and for the comments of your Cabinet. Support of the kind you are giving to us is of the greatest possible help.

It was a wonderful message - and so much appreciated by all our people.

Yours sincerely

The Rt. Hon. R. D. Muldoon, C.H., M.P.

*[Handwritten signature]*

116





*File L6*

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

27 April 1982

Dear Admiral Fieldhouse,

Thank you very much indeed for the invaluable briefing you provided last Friday. Do please pass on my warm thanks to all your staff whose efficiency and control of the situation did not surprise but much impressed me.

Would you also please pass on my warm thanks to your wife for the delicious lunch provided at such short notice.

Good luck to you all.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, K.C.B.

LPO



27 April, 1982

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE  
PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA

As I told John Holmes earlier today, the Prime Minister is content that the telegram proposed in your letter of 26 April should be sent.

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

9



Sublet

cc. On's  
Marr's

27/4/82

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby  
IMMEDIATE

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 86/82

- 1 ZCZC
- 2 GRS
- 3 CONFIDENTIAL
- 4
- 5
- 6 FM FCO
- 7 TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS
- 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9

10 YOUR TELNO 265: MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER

11 1. Please seek an early personal interview to deliver

12 following message to President Shagari:

13 "Dear Mr President

14 I was most grateful to receive your reply to my appeal for

15 support over the Falkland Islands issue. It is good, in

16 times like these, to be able to count one's friends. At this

17 moment, we still cannot see how things will go: but you may

18 rest assured that we shall continue to do our utmost to arrive

19 at a negotiated solution consistent with our principles and

20 in particular the wishes of the islanders themselves, the

21 very point which Nigeria's statement on the Falkland Islands

22 issue so correctly stresses.

23 "I should not like you to think that we are aware only of our

24 own problems. We are extremely conscious of the difficulties

25 which the weaknesses in oil prices has caused Nigeria.

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword Indeed
File number	Dept WAD	Distribution Standard WAD SAmD ESSD Cabinet Office  Additional: Falklands Oil
Drafted by (Block capitals) A C D S MacRae		
Telephone number 233 4576		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcenreference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
2

<< 1 <<<<

2 Indeed, we too have suffered a loss of Government revenue  
3 as a result of the weakening of world demand for oil. The  
4 British Government has absolutely no interest in de-stabilisa-  
5 tion of the oil market. As you correctly stated in your  
6 historic statement on the special joint session of the  
7 Nigerian National Assembly on 19 April, 'the nations of the  
8 world, big or small, rich or poor, are all mutually inter-  
9 dependent and our interests are complementary'. We have  
10 noted with interest the economic programme which you announced  
11 on that occasion and I send you my very best wishes for its  
12 success.

13 "Yours sincerely,  
14 Margaret Thatcher."

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17 NNNN  
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NNNN ends  
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Catchword



PS/No.10

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GPS 370

27 APR

162

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 271642Z  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELNO 1474 OF 27 APRIL 1982.

YOUR TELNO 840: FALKLANDS

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING FROM ME PERSONAL TO SECRETARY OF DEFENCE

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 26 APRIL. I HAVE HAD A GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH WEINBERGER, WHO LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BRUSSELS NEXT WEEK.

2. HE IS DELIGHTED BY THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION AND TELLS ME THAT THE PRESIDENT IS ALSO. HE IS SCEPTICAL WHETHER THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING TO GET ANYWHERE, THOUGH THINKS IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT SOMETHING COULD BE ACHIEVED IF GALTIERI GOES. IN ANY EVENT, HE IS HAVING TO LOOK AHEAD AND MAKE CONTINGENCY PLANS. WEINBERGER THINKS THAT WHAT THE US IS DOING AT THE MOMENT GOES ABOUT AS FAR AS THEY CAN MANAGE WITHOUT APPEARING TO TAKE SIDES. BUT IF THE TALKS BREAK DOWN AS A RESULT OF ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE AND THE USA COMES DOWN FIRMLY ON THE BRITISH SIDE, HE THINKS THE US GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER A SERIES OF STEPS THEY CAN TAKE. WEINBERGER SAYS THAT HE IS ALREADY THINKING ABOUT THIS. I AM SURE THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO COMMIT HIMSELF OR TO THINK THAT ANYTHING HE HAD SAID TO ME WOULD BE REPEATED BACK TO HIM OR ANYONE ELSE AS SUGGESTING SOME POSSIBLE UNDERTAKING.



3. I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT WE HAVE TO WAIT TO SEE HOW EVENTS DEVELOP. IF THE DIPLOMATIC PATH GETS BLOCKED THEN BY THE TIME YOU SEE WEINBERGER NEXT WEEK WE MAY BE WELL INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS ABOUT HOW THEY MIGHT EXTEND FURTHER SUPPORT. I BELIEVE THAT THE WILL IS THERE, BUT IT OBVIOUSLY NEEDS VERY TACTFUL HANDLING. THE AMERICANS STILL HAVE A PSYCHOSIS ABOUT GETTING INVOLVED IN ANOTHER VIETNAM. HOWEVER, MUCH PUBLIC, CONGRESSIONAL AND MEDIA OPINION IS REMARKABLY PRO-BRITISH ON THIS ISSUE. WEINBERGER HAD JUST BREAKFASTED WITH TWO CONGRESSMEN WHO WERE WEARING I BACK BRITAIN BADGES.

4. WEINBERGER ASKED WHETHER NATO WOULD BE MAKING ANY DECLARATION ON THE SUBJECT. HE DID NOT THINK THAT NATO WERE UNAFFECTED. WE WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT THOUGH THEY MAY NOT HAVE BEEN OF PARTICULARLY POSITIVE STRATEGIC VALUE TO US, WE WOULD ALL BE VERY CONCERNED IF THE SOVIETS GOT PERMANENT USE OF FACILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. I THINK THAT THIS IS NOT THE LEAST OF THE REASONS WHY CAP IS EAGER TO SUPPORT US.

HENDERSON

NMNN



PS/PM

CONFIDENTIAL No 10 Downing St.

OO GRS 165  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM SANTIAGO 272130Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIAT FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 179 OF 27 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

*ms*

FALKLANDS: PRESS ALLEGATIONS ABOUT CHILEAN/UK MILITARY COOPERATION

1. WE HAVE BEEN APPROACHED TODAY BY A NUMBER OF REPORTERS, INCLUDING THE BBC FROM PUNTA ARENAS, FOR COMMENTS ON A STORY ALLEGEDLY PRINTED IN THE QUOTE DAILY STAR UNQUOTE WHICH TALK OF A SECRET ANGLO/CHILEAN DEAL UNDER WHICH PUNTA ARENAS WOULD BE USED BY RAF VULCANS IN RETURN FOR SALES OF RAF HUNTERS TO THE CHILEAN AIR FORCE. WE HAVE AVOIDED COMMENT AND REFERRED ENQUIRIES TO THE CHILEAN AUTHORITIES.
2. THE QUOTE DAILY STAR UNQUOTE WAS THE SOURCE OF AN EARLIER CANARD ABOUT UK/CHILEAN MILITARY COOPERATION (SEE MY TELNO 78), AND IT OCCURS TO ME THAT THEIR CORRESPONDENT WHOEVER HE IS MAY BE BEING FED WITH ARGENTINE DISINFORMATION FROM TIME TO TIME SO AS TO TARNISH THE CURRENT CHILEAN NEUTRAL STANCE, AND PERHAPS TRY TO STRAIN CURRENT PARLIAMENTARY UNITY ON FALKLANDS ISSUE. NO DOUBT YOU WILL WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER A WORD ON THIS IN THE RIGHT PLACE MIGHT DISCOURAGE SIMILAR TROUBLE MAKING.

HEATH

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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 MR HAWTIN )  
 MR PERETZ )  
 MR ILETT )

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
MR A WILLIAMS  
RM 60 DOWNING ST WEST

CONFIDENTIAL



SAPU(82)9

Pt 10  
with Dlc

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT

Attached for information is a transcript of the Prime Minister's interview  
on Panorama on Monday night.

Cabinet Office

27 April 1982



NOTE:

THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS TYPED FROM A TELEDIPHONE RECORDING AND NOT COPIED FROM AN ORIGINAL SCRIPT. BECAUSE OF THE RISK OF MISHEARING AND THE DIFFICULTY, IN SOME CASES, OF IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS, THE BBC CANNOT VOUCH FOR ITS ACCURACY.

P A N O R A M A

Recorded from transmission on BBC-1 at 2010 — 26th April, 1982

ROBERT KEE:

Good evening from Downing Street. The Falklands crisis is at a new and potentially dangerous turning point. The Government has made it clear that the recapture of South Georgia is designed to strengthen negotiation and not to end it. But time, as the Prime Minister herself stressed in the House of Commons this afternoon, is getting short and President Reagan has said it's running out.

Mrs Thatcher has just come from Number-10 to join Richard Lindley and myself a couple of doors away here at the Whip's office at Number-12. We'll be discussing with her the prospects of peace or war in a moment. But first, for the latest developments in the crisis, over to Philip Tibenham in the Panorama studio.

PHILIP TIBENHAM:

Well, it seems in spite of Argentina's firm announcement that all negotiations were off, they may — just may — still be on. We hear that Mr Costa Mendez, the Argentine Foreign Minister, may still have an extremely private meeting with Mr Alexander Haig later tonight in which, no doubt, he'll be pressed again to negotiate. They're both in Washington for a meeting of the Organisation of American States — this is an alliance of American countries, including the United States. Argentina's called the meeting to demand that member countries should regard an attack on the Argentine as an attack on all of them. The OAS is due to reconvene within the next half hour.

Back home, Mrs Thatcher reported on the South Georgia raid to the House of Commons and received almost unqualified support. But Mr Foot pressed her to negotiate and to reveal the details of the negotiations to the House. Now it's emerged during the day that the raid wasn't quite as simple as we thought last night. The town of Grytviken did fall fairly easily, but there was some fighting during the night at Leith and it wasn't until ten o'clock this morning that surrender was complete: a hundred and eighty prisoners; no British casualties and only one Argentine seriously hurt. The prisoners will be sent home and senior Argentine officers were given a civilised dinner on board the British ship.

Back in Argentina, no such niceties. These crowds were shouting for their soldiers to kill British troops and later tonight the Argentine trade unions plan to hold a huge

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PHILIP TIBENHAM: .... demonstration against Britain. Around the world there was mixed response to the raid. The New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr Muldoon, called the assault a splendid feat of British arms. But European countries were more cautious saying that further escalation should be prevented, while Japan called the use of force "regrettable" so long as negotiations were still going on. In America, President Reagan was still trying to be evenhanded in his help to both Britain and Argentina. He said that time was running out, but he'd do everything possible to find a peaceful solution.

But what about public opinion here? Over the weekend, Panorama commissioned a special poll by MORI by questioning a panel selected for the Economist who'd been monitored since the crisis started. It's been possible to see whether there's been any shift in people's thinking.

Two weeks ago sixty percent were satisfied with the Government's handling of the crisis. Last week sixty-eight percent. This weekend seventy-six percent. And the parties gaining ground in the wake of this approval. People were asked: if there were a general election tomorrow which party would you vote for? Two weeks ago the Tories scored thirty-three percent; last week thirty-six percent and now it's up to thirty-nine percent. But these questions asked on Saturday were about the Government's policy of backing diplomacy with the threat of force. When people were asked about actually using force, it was a rather different story. Worryingly from a Government point of view, more people were against Britain shooting first while negotiations were still taking place. People were asked: - and bearing in mind this was before the South Georgia operation - "Should Britain fire first even if diplomatic talks are still going on?" Forty-three percent thought we should, but fifty-one percent thought not. Mind you given the smoothness of the operation the same question now will probably throw up a rather different answer. Now the Government faces much more difficult problems. "What are we going to do now about the Falklands?" And this is where opinions are less certain. We asked: "Do you think that retaining British sovereignty over the Falklands is important enough to justify the loss of British servicemen's lives?" Over half thought that it was justified. But what about risking islanders' lives? When we asked whether that sort of loss will be justified, there was a straight split: forty-six for and forty-six against. But that's more people in favour than last week. Now one theory is that our next step should be to bomb Argentine air bases to ensure our air superiority. The public seems reluctant to approve this sort of action. "Should we bomb Argentine military bases?" Thirty-three percent were in favour, but fifty-eight percent were against. But there is solid support for Mrs Thatcher's insistence on the islanders determining their own future. "In any settlement should the Falkland islanders have the last say?" A massive eighty-three percent said "yes". On the other hand when we asked: "Is it wrong to go to war even

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PHILIP TIBENHAM: .... if the Government's long-term intention is to give up the islands?" Over half — fifty-seven percent — thought it was wrong. Overall then our poll seems to show that Mrs Thatcher has broad support so far, but the hardest decisions have still to be taken. Now back to Downing Street.

ROBERT KEE: Prime Minister, thank you very much for giving us your time when you must have even less of it to spare than usual. May I come straight to the point and say that while the country is indeed still rejoicing, as you put it, at the remarkable success of the South Georgia operation and I think particularly because there was no loss of life, there is a certain amount of concern about where we go from there. Is there any prospect this evening that our military success has brought a diplomatic solution any closer?

MR. HON. MARGARET THATCHER, MP (The Prime Minister): I think there's bound to be concern and I'm the first to feel concerned because when you know you've got your own forces out at sea and Marines are landed on an island and you're worried about whether the operation could be a success then I know exactly what anxiety and concern are like and for the families, too. I don't believe that diplomatic negotiations will have any chance of success unless they were backed up by the task force and a certainty on the part of the Argentinians that we would use that task force if need be. I've always hoped that we wouldn't have to use it because after all that United Nations resolution was passed just over three weeks ago. It told the Argentinians to withdraw and all they've done is pile on more and more soldiers and more and more equipment into the islands. And in the meantime our people — our British people — are living under that occupation. This is a totally wrong action, totally unprovoked aggression and if actions like this were allowed to stand then there'd be many many territories the world over where people would fear the invader.

KEE: You did say in the House of Commons this afternoon that there was a better chance of a peaceful settlement if you increased military pressure on Argentina. That does rather suggest that perhaps this was a prelude to another military move rather than an immediate diplomatic offensive.

MRS THATCHER: The first thing we did was to send the task force and then I think there was a feeling growing up that we wouldn't use it. Well, it was obvious that we needed to recapture South Georgia. It is, after all, a quite separate British dependency. It's not a Falkland Islands dependency, it's a British dependency and it's very important. Of course we will try to go on getting a peaceful settlement. No one wants it more than I do. It seems to me absurd that Argentina doesn't withdraw her youngmen from those islands under the United Nations' resolution. If she did and we could get, say,  
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MRS THATCHER: .... the United States to guarantee the security of the islands or even, perhaps, a United Nations' force then we could withdraw our task force and then there would be hope of solving it all peacefully. That's my objective and what I shall work for.

RICHARD LINDLEY: Prime Minister, you said this afternoon that the urgent need is now to speed up the negotiations. But has the use of force in South Georgia really done that; has it helped that process? Far from it bringing Argentina closer to a diplomatic deal their Foreign Minister's been saying that for the moment negotiations are at an end. Is there a danger, do you think, that you've stiffened the resistance of Argentina instead of making them more amenable?

MRS THATCHER: I don't think so. Don't forget we didn't use force first. Britain didn't break the peace; Argentina used force; Argentina is the invader; Argentina is the occupier. So it's not for her to complain about other people using force to recapture our own possessions and to see that our people don't live under the invader. After all, in a way Argentina is punishing those British people there because they refused to belong to Argentina. They refused to let us discuss sovereignty with Argentina. Now in the face of what's happened in the last three weeks, in the face of the fact that Argentina hasn't withdrawn at all but has piled on her soldiers and equipment and aircraft onto those islands I don't think the fact that we took South Georgia will increase the Argentinians' resistance to a peaceful settlement. I hope it'll make them realize that we are quietly determined in support of a principle. We don't want to use force; democracies never do.

LEE: There is always then this difficult problem, isn't there, in using force as backing for diplomacy that if you use the force and it's successful, as it was in this case, you do injure Argentinian pride and, perhaps, make them more intransigent rather than more pliable.

MRS THATCHER: Force has been used. It's been used against our territory; against our people. It's been used totally illegally and if this kind of force is allowed to succeed there'll be many many other examples the world over and someone, some country has to care enough about it to say 'stop'. It's like, in a way, those hijackings. Some people take the view...some countries, oh, have the hijacked plane through here as quickly as possible. That's the way to increase hijacking. When we got one coming here I said 'right, they've come down here and understand they're not going to take off again'. That's the way to stop hijacking. Similarly, to see that an invader does not succeed is to stop further invasions and to really stand up for international law against international anarchy.

KEE: And you mean it's not a hijacker's pride that is your first consideration when dealing with him?

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MRS THATCHER: My first consideration is the British people on those islands who for years and years would not let us even discuss sovereignty with the Argentinians because they did not want to go under the Argentine and the Argentine is now punishing them for it and it's our duty to them, our people, our sovereign territory, to stand up for them and to show the whole world we're prepared to.

LINDLEY: If this military action for South Georgia is designed to spur negotiations on, as you say, how long will you give Argentina to respond before you have to take the next military step?

MRS THATCHER: One thing I was trying to explain in the House this afternoon is that you can't just go on indefinitely with negotiations. Some people say that "don't use force while the negotiations are continuing". It's a very easy argument, isn't it? It just enables the Argentinians to carry on negotiations on and on and on — a perfectly easy ploy. And in the meantime it will get more and more difficult for us to use a military option eight thousand miles away from home; with the onset of winter; in very terrible weather; gales; freezing; that will be their ploy. That could not be so. They've had three weeks. Three weeks in which to start to withdraw their forces. Three weeks in which to negotiate through Mr Haig. We had to take South Georgia at the best possible time. I have to keep in mind the interests of our boys who are on those warships and our Marines. I have to watch the safety of their lives, to see that they can succeed in doing whatever it is we decide they have to do at the best possible time and with minimum risk to them.

LINDLEY: So how long will you give Argentina?

MRS THATCHER: Every day is important and has always been important to me. Argentina has had over three weeks. We had to go to recapture South Georgia at the best possible time. Al Haig has been saying time is getting short for some time, it is. But you know the whole situation would change if when he sees Mr Haig tonight he would agree to withdraw his forces from the Falklands if on condition that when he had finished withdrawing his forces our task force would withdraw. Surely that would save their face. Their troops withdrew and then our withdrew but there'd have to be some guarantee of security for those islands and then we could resume negotiations. That's what the United Nations' resolution said. That resolution in theory has the force of international law. But, of course, the United Nations has no means of enforcing it.

LINDLEY: So you can't say at the moment how long you will give Argentina before we move again?



MRS THATCHER: No, of course, I can't. And I shall be very remiss if I were to give any hint because it would put the lives of some of our people at risk and that I would never do.

KEE: Prime Minister, you did say in the House of Commons this afternoon that the military options were, indeed, very limited in these stormy South Atlantic seas and one understands what you mean by that, but does this mean that in fact we can't just go on sitting there keeping our blockade by sea and air of the Falklands because the seas are so stormy and it would not be a practical proposition and we would therefore, perhaps, have to go against the Falkland Islands themselves fairly quickly?

MRS THATCHER: I can't give you any operational decisions. It's obvious that you simply cannot go on sitting there for ever with the very large task force that you've got. We have two aircraft carriers, they're there. We have a large number of ships, they're there. We can replace some of them, not all of them and you have to decide what is the best time for the military option bearing in mind the safety of your own people and their capacity to do whatever they have to do with minimum loss of life. I must say that matters to me a great deal and it matters also to our armed forces that whatever they have to do they do it in the best possible way and, of course, they did on South Georgia and we were all very pleased indeed.

KEE: Of course we have I suppose in a way already slid into the next military option in as much as the blockade must just be about to be complete both by sea and air. Aren't we without even the Falklands air strip really very dangerously exposed to attack by air both from the Falklands themselves and from the Argentina's land bases?

MRS THATCHER: It is a very considerable task force. It has a good Harrier force on board the aircraft carriers and as you know I announced some time ago that we're reinforcing with twenty more Harriers. They're very very effective aircraft.

KEE: Of course they would take some time to get there still?

MRS THATCHER: They would take a little bit more time to get there still. I have the feeling you're trying to probe about operational things. I can't help you and you'll understand why.

LINDLEY: Can we ask you a point of principle then as to how far we might be prepared to go. I don't know whether you can answer this. Do you rule out an attack on Argentine air force bases on the Argentine mainland. Surely that may well be necessary both for a successful blockade of the Falklands even more so if at the end we have to make a landing on them.



MRS THATCHER: You're doing just exactly what I said I cannot do. You're asking me what sort of options we will consider. I am saying that our first duty is towards the British people who are living under the invader and to make it perfectly clear that an invader must not succeed. We will always use minimum force at all times. We're a democracy; that is what we believe in. The democracies love peace and liberty; they stand for self-determination. If the Argentine also would allow self-determination as a major principle things would be very different. We shall always use minimum force to attain our objective.

LINDLEY: Would you rule that option out of bombing their mainland airports?

MRS THATCHER: There's a classic way of asking. You ask directly and the next question, if you don't get a reply, is "will you rule that option out". I am not replying in any way. I want minimum escalation. But please, again, we constantly come back to the same point. Argentina was the invader. The Argentine is occupying British territory with British people under its heel who do not wish to be there and to whom can those people look except to Great Britain?

KEE: Prime Minister, may I ask you what I hope is a political and not a military question and you were asked it up to a point in the House of Commons this afternoon. How much political control is there should there be further action in the South Atlantic? That's to say is the admiral of the fleet or are the officers under him responsible for the action they take or does every action virtually have to be referred to Downing Street?

MRS THATCHER: I think it's reasonably obvious that the main actions have to be referred to Number-10, not just to me. Of course no one person can take these decisions. We have obviously an 'inner Cabinet' to which we often refer and also the Cabinet for the really big things. But then the way in which they're carried out you simply could not run a war in the South Atlantic from Downing Street or from this country, of course not. But the big decisions of course are taken by the government and the way in which they're carried out, naturally the details, the details in which they're carried out is up to the commander in the field.

KEE: Now that the shooting war has up to a point started might it not be time for you take leaders of other political parties into your confidence about what you're doing?

MRS THATCHER: It would be almost impossible on operational things as the thing about those is to keep extremely quiet for very obvious reasons and also I think some of them — I know Michael Foot feels this because he doesn't want it. He's a  
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MRS THATCHER: .... very experienced politician and I think he probably feels as I would feel if I were in his position that he could only be given information on the basis not only he would not use it; not mention it to anyone but he could not use that information to colour what he said in the House of Commons. Now in a way that might deprive him of carrying out effectively his first duty which is constructively to criticise the government of the day. And this I think is the reason why he stood out against it the whole time. You can't have just one, you have to have them all in. I had some experience of this when I was in Opposition when Harold Wilson had the leaders of all the political parties in on one or two occasions about Northern Ireland. We didn't get anywhere because he really couldn't tell us anything which he wouldn't be prepared to tell Parliament. And so I'm very wary of it. I mean my job is twofold. One, to try to secure a peaceful settlement and secondly, in the absence of it, to make certain that an invader does not succeed and that our people come back to being British on an island whose sovereignty has not been changed because it's invaded.

LINDLEY: Prime Minister, can I ask you this: what is the danger do you think that this crisis will escalate to involve other countries, perhaps even involving Russia in some way in support of Argentina?

MRS THATCHER: I don't believe it'll involve the Soviet Union.

LINDLEY: Other countries?

MRS THATCHER: I don't believe it'll involve other countries.

LINDLEY: You think you can contain it?

MRS THATCHER: Yes. You know other countries are obviously very slow to become engaged. This sometimes can help. For example as we helped the United States in a multi-national force in Sinai. Because when that withdrawal was undertaken, and as you know that was good news also this weekend, on the Egyptian-Israel agreement. The United States asked ourselves and a number of other countries to take part not in an United Nations force but in a multi-national force to see that a withdrawal took place and that it was adhered to. Some countries will come and help in those kind of operations, but not get involved in the immediate dispute. But I again stress we'd all cheer everyone loudest of all if we could get a peaceful settlement which is the withdrawal of Argentine troops and then, eventually, self-determination for our people in the Falkland Islands.

LINDLEY: You took action in South Georgia before the Organisation of American States had met as they're doing now. What happens, how will you react if their decision goes against Britain?

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MRS THATCHER: Yes, can I make one thing clear? There are certain international meetings scheduled but you can't, when you're deciding to take action, have those paramount in your mind for the simple reason that supposing you were to say "look we won't take that action now". You're dealing with the most inclement, uncertain weather conditions in an area where gales are the usual order of the day. So you have to decide on practical considerations  
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LINDLEY: Like 'D-Day'?

MRS THATCHER: Like D-Day? You have to decide on practical considerations when to take your military action. We owe that to our own boys and you simply can't say "you must try to stop for a couple of days because of the OAS or another meeting" because you might be putting them in greater danger or not be able to take it. I think the OAS...naturally quite a number of the states in Latin America will feel that they must support Argentina in her claim. I don't think many of them will support her in the use of force. Certainly not from what they've said. And as you know that part of the world, South America and Central America, is littered with territorial disputes and many of them will know if one country succeeds in getting territory by invasion there'll be a lot of invasions on border territories in South America and possibly in Central America, too. I mean we have one. We have a garrison in Belize still. That garrison is kept in Belize, even though Belize is now independent, in case of invasion from Guatemala. There's another one in the British Commonwealth. Forbes Burnham was very much with us in the Security Council — Guyana, she's on the Security Council. Venezuela lays claim to two-thirds of Guyana's territory. All of these people are watching and hoping that we'll succeed.

LINDLEY: Prime Minister, can I get you to clarify what seems from what you've already said to be sticking points. First that the Argentine invasion forces must leave the Falklands. Second, that the islands should return to British administration. On your first condition does that mean that every Argentine must withdraw or would you allow some Argentines to remain behind, perhaps civilians or policemen or something like that?

MRS THATCHER: Oh well, the military forces must withdraw, that's the United Nations resolution. The military forces must withdraw completely.

LINDLEY: Could they remain behind in any way as civilians or policemen or something like that?



MRS THATCHER: There are on the Falkland Islands about forty Argentinians but only about twenty who reside there and the others change over for business reasons, some of them do a spell of duty from Argentine and so there's quite a turnover.

LINDLEY: They could stay?

MRS THATCHER: Look, the Falklands has no Argentine history as far as Argentinians living there are concerned. The people there are of British stock. The enormous majority about eighteen hundred of them and about twenty civilian residents and about twenty others who come from time to time.

LINDLEY: Could we share in any civilian interim administration with Argentina?

MRS THATCHER: Well, you're talking about an interim administration as a means of restoring to the longer term solution. There obviously would have to be an arrangement to supervise the withdrawal from the islands and, of course, such an arrangement was one that is being considered although the details of course are not decided in any way.

KEE: But can I be quite clear with you, Prime Minister, the British government would be prepared to negotiate on the first stage of the Argentine withdrawal; would perhaps be prepared to offer some conditions in return for the immediate Argentine withdrawal. I'm not talking about any later settlement but in the first stage which you emphasized so rightly where we must get the Argentines off we would perhaps be prepared to offer something to induce them to get off?

MRS THATCHER: It's a matter of practicality really. They've got a lot of forces there and they have to get off and someone has to supervise the withdrawal. So you need to have some authority to go on actually to supervise that withdrawal and to see that it was carried out in accordance with any agreement. So that in itself would mean some interim arrangement. In the meantime, of course, the law and administration has to be carried on and the law is British law and the executive and legislative council are the British executive and legislative council and most of the work is done and exercised through them in accordance with the constitution of the Falkland Islands.

KEE: Presumably you'll be thinking of U.N. or possibly U.S. administration to help you in that interim period?

MRS THATCHER: This is one thing that Mr Haig is considering.



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KEE: Well, can we then look at this that this would be a way which would comply with our requirements for the removal of Argentine forces and compliance with the U.N. Security Council resolution. But they're not going, so we do have to offer them something to get off. What could we offer them?

MRS THATCHER: You say they're not going and we have to offer them something. You mean that an invader has to gain from his invasion?

KEE: I don't mean that.

MRS THATCHER: That's not the way the United Nations put it at all. You have to have withdrawal of those forces. Certainly you'll have to have that withdrawal administered and verified. There can be no possibility of negotiating a long-term solution before that withdrawal and one always constantly makes it clear that the sticking point which I think is what you're on. The sticking point for us is the right of self-determination. It is after all in the United Nations charter itself although many people who ascribe to that charter do not allow self-determination to their own people.

KEE: Before we come to that — I wasn't quite on that point yet though it is obviously extremely important for the final solution — I was talking about this early phase when ...you yourself have called 'interim phase' and your Foreign Secretary called the 'interim phase' ... in order to get them to comply it does seem you have to offer them something because they're not going or we'll have to use force. Could we offer any form of joint Argentine administration or could we allow them just to keep their flag there because they've made such a point of their flag staying at all costs?

MRS THATCHER: What do you mean 'keep their flag there'? Not as an indication of sovereignty in any way. After all if an ambassador is in a place he flies his own flag in his own grounds.

KEE: That might be tolerable?

MRS THATCHER: But I mean our ambassador in our grounds all over the world will fly his own flag on his own ground but not a flag as an indication of sovereignty in any way. The sovereignty is British and it's not changed by invasion.

KEE: And the sovereignty, of course, is to be possibly negotiated in the or talked about, shall we say, in the second phase?

MRS THATCHER: We have in a way been discussing sovereignty for quite a long time. This whole thing started to come up again in 1965. It's gone on under successive governments. Now  
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MRS THATCHER: .... whenever we have talked to the Argentines we have always insisted under my government that we consulted with the islanders first to find out what their wishes were and in the months before the invasion whenever we met the Argentines on this problem we had with us two members of the Islands' council and actually we were at last getting on rather well together. That's the tragedy of it...getting on very well together and we had agreed to an Argentinian proposal that there should be a negotiating commission and the islanders were happy with that and it was going to be referred back to the Falkland islanders and referred back to this government. So in that sense we have been talking about it, but if it came even to talking about lease-back the islanders wouldn't contemplate it. I mean their loyalty to Britain is fantastic and that's why we really...another reason why we just have to stick up for them and to stick up for our friends and show the world that someone is prepared to do that. We must stand by them.

LINDLEY: Just before we come to the islanders and we will. Obviously from what you say they remain paramount as far as you're concerned. On that question of sovereignty I think what confuses some people is why we are prepared to fight and apparently die if we have to to sustain our claim to sovereignty of the Falklands while as you say yourself your government along with other governments has been quite ready to try to find a way of negotiating sovereignty away to Argentina?

MRS THATCHER: First there's the point: an unprovoked aggressor, an invader must not succeed in taking by force what the people have rejected by negotiation. Secondly, they wish to stay British. We must stand by them. Thirdly, democratic nations believe in the right of self-determination. Britain has taken more colonial territories to independence than any other nation in the world. We've done it always by saying "now what do the people in that territory want" and we've negotiated with them a constitution. This also must apply to the islanders. Britain does stand up to the things which I've indicated: the liberty, the law, the democratic rights and against an invader succeeding. And we are doing that. But the idea that we're just going to say "all right hand over sovereignty to the Argentine", that's what the Argentine wants. But she will not consult the people at all. The right of self-determination is under the United Nations charter for the people. It is not certainly the only thing because when you come to the dependencies, namely South Georgia and South Sandwich, they have no settled population and again I stress they're not dependencies of the Falklands, they're dependencies of Britain. Now they have no settled population and there is a right of sovereignty. Our title...after all South Georgia was discovered by Captain Cook... their title is different...we own them through a different title from the Falklands or we have sovereignty over them. So you can't, in looking at that territory.....



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LINDLEY: Apply the same test.

MRS THATCHER: Apply the same test.

LINDLEY: Just as far as the Falklands are concerned you've so far avoided giving any commitment to keep the Falklands British in the long term. Would you like to do so now?

MRS THATCHER: You simply cannot say "I believe in the right of self-determination, but I'm going to prejudge the result of that determination". The Falkland islanders wish to stay British. They did before. I should think that living under the Argentine forces for some time I should think their wish will probably be even greater. After all you can't imagine the Channel Islanders after the German occupation wanting to go German can you?

KEE: Prime Minister, doesn't this, though, giving their wishes paramountcy and saying their self-determination is the most important thing. Doesn't this mean that they have a veto over any final negotiation?

MRS THATCHER: It does mean that in a democracy you do say the most important thing is what the people who've lived in those islands for many many years — they're British stock, I can't emphasize that, for generations they've been British stock — that their wishes are the most important thing of all, not the only thing, but the most important thing of all. This is the way we've gone about bringing many many colonial territories to independence, some of them very small, none as small in population as the Falkland Islands. But you know if only there had not been this dispute with Argentina; if only she'd been prepared to be more cooperative about negotiating business contracts then it's possible there might have been a much better future for the Falkland Islands under the existing sovereignty. Because there is a possibility of oil. It's not an assured possibility, there's a possibility of oil and other resources and if those were developed then the Falkland islanders would have, I think, a much better future or a much more varied future than they have at the moment. But please let me emphasize democracy is about the wishes of the people. That's why I'm here because I was elected that way. The system matters. Sometimes you put people in, sometimes out. But it's about the wishes of the people. The people in the Argentine don't have it. So it's not surprising that the Argentine wishes to deny it to other people. But our people have it and it mustn't be said that they just give it up or that we surrender it for them.

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**KEE:** But could you not get a rather odd constitutional position then, sticking as closely as you do to your definition of democracy, if eighteen hundred people who are part of our fifty/sixty million population are determined to have things their way and just conceivably the British public as a whole might, were you to achieve some sort of successful solution to this problem, might say that their wishes should not be totally paramount and they should not have the final veto. Who would be right then, the eighteen hundred or the British democracy?

**MRS THATCHER:** I would be very surprised if Britain with her marvellous record of bringing countries to independence would ever say that. Of course when we're back there and can talk with the people then you can talk in a totally different atmosphere, when you can take everything into account, then you can persuade again. You can persuade, you can put all the arguments before; that's the way we were going before. But that is our way — persuasion. The Argentines' way is force. But then you see you come right up against the difference and the real difference in negotiation. Argentine is a military dictatorship with a junta. We are a democracy. We, therefore, of course take all our strength as government from an exercise of the wishes of the people; they take it by force.

**LINDLEY:** Could I make perhaps in a further comparison between the two countries, one you may reject. One of the problems Mr Haig is facing I think in getting General Galtieri of Argentina to be flexible is that if he gives ground he'll lose his job. Now you've said we have to be true to our objectives. Have you ever warned the Americans that you might not be able to continue as Prime Minister if Britain doesn't gain the objectives you say are .....

**MRS THATCHER:** No I haven't. But I do stand very very firmly for certain things and I'm here because I do and I shall continue to stand for those things and they are things which I believe are valuable to the world over and they are things which I believe must be upheld if we're to live in peace. General Galtieri can quite easily say that it would be an act of statesmanship to withdraw from the Falkland Islands in agreement with the wishes of the United Nations and because many of his neighbouring countries have condemned what he's done. And then naturally he would say that if he withdrew the task force too should withdraw and that of course would be a means of saving face. But is statesmanship totally out under these circumstances? There is another thing. If he withdrew he wouldn't be putting the lives of all of his young people at stake. He can keep all those lives. I do not know what will happen in the Falklands, but they must be having a terrible time on those islands. He withdraws and his young people then have a totally different future for them from the one which they're literally contemplating on the Falkland Islands and nothing would please me more than to be able to withdraw the task force after the withdrawal of the Argentine forces



MRS THATCHER: .... from the Falkland Islands.

KEE: Prime Minister, can I just bring you back for a moment to that principle of self-determination for which you stand so firmly. If we continue to say that those islanders' views are paramount and they do have, as it were, a veto in the final negotiations what can the Argentines think there is to negotiate about?

MRS THATCHER: But you have come up right against the problem. This is the problem of a negotiation between a dictatorship which does not believe in the rights of the people — and you know how many people have disappeared — and a democracy that does. And really you've said it all for me. We're standing up for the rights of democracy, law and liberty and those are very very big things and you know if we didn't have them you couldn't even be questioning me like this here.

KEE: Quite. But of course what you're also saying is that you're standing up for negotiation.

MRS THATCHER: I'm standing up for the right of self-determination, I'm standing up for our territory, I'm standing up for our people, I'm standing up for international law, I'm standing up for all those territories — those small territories and peoples the world over — who if someone doesn't stand up and say to an invader "enough, stop", they — the small countries, the peoples, the territories — all of them would be at risk and that's one reason why we've had so much support the world over and once again other countries are looking to Britain for a lead and we mustn't fail in giving that lead.

LINDLEY: If you don't obtain the objectives you've outlined and stand so strongly for would you feel it right to go to the country?

MRS THATCHER: No. We will do our level best up to the limit of the government's ability and the splendid ability of our armed forces and they're so professional, so honourable, so confident and also our ability to try to negotiate a settlement. If we don't get a peaceful settlement it won't be our fault; it won't be Mr Haig's fault; it will be because the Argentines will not withdraw unless they keep what they invaded for and that cannot be.

LINDLEY: The polls tell us at the moment that you are riding very high in popular esteem; your handling of this crisis is well regarded. Do you think people have already forgotten that the crisis began with what Lord Carrington called "a national humiliation for Britain".

MRS THATCHER: Of course when a country invades your islands it is a humiliation, it is a humiliation, but equally you don't just throw up your hands in horror and say there's nothing we can do about it. You say those people are British. It is British



MRS THATCHER: .... sovereign territory. An invader must not succeed. International law must be upheld. The Security Council is on our side and many other countries in the world. They still leave us to take the requisite action but I can only say that if we do not take that requisite action it'll be a very bad day for international law, for peoples in small countries and in disputed territories everywhere and a very very bad day also for the United Nations and for peace.

KEE: Prime Minister, you've expressed your admiration for Mr Haig's efforts at peace, but I wonder if now you would like America to come down firmly on our side?

MRS THATCHER: If the negotiations don't get anywhere and I think they'll have to come to a head soon then Mr Haig I think has made it abundantly clear that if the negotiations do not succeed the United States — one of the great democracies of the world — would be on the side of Britain.

KEE: You mentioned just now "coming to a head", negotiations coming to a head. Can we still not look a little into what that might mean?

MRS THATCHER: Well, you can't go on for ever and ever with us saying look you must withdraw..... United Nations and if you withdraw..... we of course will withdraw our task force and then we'll go back to negotiations. You can't go on for ever saying that when you've sent a task force there and you'll have to decide precisely what to do with that task force. I cannot tell you precisely what those decisions will be; there are a number of options. You have to take those options not according to the length of the negotiations but according to practical considerations, including the circumstances there, the weather and so on.

LINDLEY: Prime Minister, in this summary of Conservative achievements laying the foundations you published I think ....

MRS THATCHER: Very good, isn't it?

LINDLEY: Yes. Well, I thought it's pretty good, but you laid extreme emphasis, and I quote: "Emphasis was laid on the need to assure the defence of the realm against external enemies". Now how has it felt to be found so vulnerable on ground of your own choosing?

MRS THATCHER: It's not surprising when those islands are eight thousand miles away and our main forces are committed to NATO; we keep some to deploy outside the NATO area; we also have a garrison in Belize, one side of the world in Central America; we also have a garrison in Hong Kong, on the other side of the world and we keep  
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MRS THATCHER: .... a small naval presence in the Caribbean. The interesting thing is that we were able to mount the biggest naval force that has been mounted in peacetime and to mount it in seventy-two hours with the latest equipment, with the right armed forces, with all the back-up going and did you see the speed with which that ship, the UGANDA, was converted from being a cruise ship to children to seeing it sail away fully repainted with its red cross on converted with a helicopter pad. That is a tribute to everything said in there; it's a tribute to the navy.

LINDLEY: I don't think many people realize that your concept of the navy included a school children's cruise ship?

MRS THATCHER: No, of course. But I would have thought most people realized that when you have these operations those who...have only to look at what's happened in the past. You also have to have back-up from the merchant service in order to carry troops and usually to have a sufficiently large hospital ship. The Britannia is the hospital ship that's used within the NATO area... had to have a bigger one. The Suez operation was totally different from this in every way as far as the politics of it are concerned because here we're the wrong party. I only mention it because then when we set the fleet afloat to sail there also merchant ships had to be requisitioned or chartered. It's not unusual you couldn't possibly keep all those numbers in for the amount of equipment and stuff that you've got to send the other side of the world.

LINDLEY: We're coming rather near the end now. May I ask a question a Falkland islander asked us to put to you. If the islanders do vote that the island should remain British will you guarantee to change your defence policy to make sure that in the future you do have enough surface ships to protect the Falklands properly even if that means the nation has to spend rather more on defence.

MRS THATCHER: You'll have to try to get an arrangement to guarantee the security of the islands. We're all very very much aware of that. It would be difficult. It has been difficult to defend it at eight thousand miles distance. We would have to get an arrangement to guarantee a security of those islands. I have not the slightest shadow of doubt that we will be prepared to be a part of it. The ship 'India' is a magnificent ship. On its own it would not be enough. There are other means and other ways of course.

KEE: Prime Minister, we've had a question too from a Falkland islander and we've only got very little time left. I think we should put a question to you that for all the concern over the Falklands crisis very many people in this country are deeply worried about. That is, of course, unemployment.



KEE: .... Now recent figures have shown a very healthy trend in certain aspects of your economic policy: inflation down to .....single figures; productivity per man going up and yet unemployment is still around the three million mark. When can we hope to see an improvement there?

MRS THATCHER: I wish I could give you a quick easy answer. It's a problem in the whole of Europe and also in the United States and the Western world as we've had a combination of this very very big oil price increase and of course the effect of new technology coming together and the first effect of new technology is to lose jobs. The second effect is actually to gain them as all sorts of things become possible which were not possible before and you can look and see that. I cannot give you an answer to precisely when it will come down because we're facing yet another year of a lot of school-leavers because we have a lot of young people aged sixteen this year; we had to face three years. I can only tell you that the prospects will be at their best if we get inflation down and continue to get it down. Germany is still lower than we are and if we take steps to try to stimulate small businesses and new businesses because the really big companies, you know, put in the very big latest technology and it's as much as they can do to keep their labour force by expanding. So we've got to stimulate the small businesses and the new businesses.

KEE: Prime Minister may I say with very great respect we have heard you saying this now for something like three years — well over half your term of office. I think many people and many of your own supporters want to know whether there's anything else other than your own confidence to back you up?

MRS THATCHER: Yes. If you look at some work done in the United States you'll find that a fantastic number of jobs come from newly created small businesses. The worst time to create those small businesses of course is a world recession which we've been having. As you come out of it you get much much more chance to create them and of course as you come out of it the countries that have become competitive — and that is us — are the countries that get most business. So there is quite a bit of actual evidence and research work to back one up.

KEE: I think I have to say that when the Labour Party in the 1979 election used the world recession and oil crisis as an excuse you castigated them in the Conservative manifesto for doing so.

MRS THATCHER: No, we weren't into the full oil crisis then. We had to face the 1973 five fold increase in oil price most of which was over of course before the Labour Party came into power. Then when we came into power at the beginning of the Iran  
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MRS THATCHER: .... problem, you remember, and of course that took out a whole large portion of production from the world suddenly and the oil price increase...I remember when I first went to Tokyo on the economic summit during my first three months in office the price of oil then was about fourteen dollars a barrel, it's now thirty-four dollars a barrel. That, of course, had withdrawn an immense amount of purchasing power from all those countries who have to buy all their oil and so therefore they can't order exports from us. This has affected the whole world. I think that was the main reason for putting it into recession. Now that oil price increase appears to be stopped or reversed a little. That is one very big hope for helping the world to come out of the recession and therefore what we've done in becoming competitive and in helping small business to start and to expand will I hope soon bear fruit.

KEE: Prime Minister, thank you very much indeed for answering all our questions on so many topics.

MRS THATCHER: It's been a pleasure. Thank you very much.

KEE: That's all from Panorama. From Richard Lindley and myself for tonight good night.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 April 1982

M<sup>30</sup>/4

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Dear John,

Death of Argentine Prisoner

I understand that ODSA this morning decided that no publicity should be given to the incident yesterday and that we should take no further action for the time being, pending further details from South Georgia. However, I enclose a copy of a note from one of our Legal Advisers about our obligations under the Third Geneva Convention in the event of the death of a prisoner. The important point is that we are obliged to communicate immediately with the protecting power (in this case Brazil). I also enclose the text of the relevant article, No 121.

ODSA may wish to consider in the light of this, the timing of our notification to the Brazilians of this incident. It is clearly important that we should not be vulnerable to accusations that we have fallen down on our legal obligations under the Geneva Convention. In the view of our Legal Advisers, ignorance of the details of the soldier's name and number would not constitute a valid reason for not notifying the protecting power immediately. We should avoid if at all possible a situation in which news of the incident leaks out before we have notified the Brazilians and in a way which will immediately put us on the defensive about it. Against this, we clearly need to consider the implications for Mr Haig's efforts of publicity about this incident which we must assume would follow immediately any notification to the Brazilians.

ODSA may need to meet again to consider this, but it might be helpful if the group of officials meeting under Sir R Armstrong's chairmanship at 3.30 today could consider it first. Meanwhile, it is possible that the news will leak at any moment and the Prime Minister needs a line to take in the House today, which could also serve as a press line for ourselves and the Ministry of Defence. I enclose a suggested line agreed with the Ministry of Defence and our Legal Advisers. This overtakes any previous advice already offered.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of ODSA, to Sir R Armstrong and to Sir M Palliser. In view of the urgency I am sending this before Mr Pym, who is in Luxembourg, has been consulted. He is aware of the incident.

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

Yours ever  
John Holmes.

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



Mr Wright

#### KILLING OF ARGENTINE PRISONER OF WAR

1. Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention prohibits any "unlawful" act causing the death of a prisoner of war and treats such an act as a "serious breach" of the Convention. Article 42 provides that:

"The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping or attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances".

2. The authoritative Red Cross commentary on this Article makes it clear that shooting a prisoner of war who is threatening a member of the detaining forces is also covered by this provision and shooting to kill must only be used as a last resort.

3. Without knowing the full details, it is impossible to say whether or not an offence has been committed. But it is quite probable that this has happened.

4. Article 121 provides that when a prisoner of war has been killed this must be immediately followed by an official enquiry and a communication sent immediately to the protecting power. It also provides that statements shall be taken from witnesses, especially those who are prisoners of war, and a report including such statements forwarded to the protecting power. If the enquiry indicates guilt, the detaining power shall take all measures for prosecution of the person or persons responsible.

5. We must therefore inform the Brazilian Embassy of the death giving the name, rank and number of the prisoner of war and tell them that an official enquiry has been instigated and that the further information required by Article 121 will be supplied to them as soon as possible. We should also add that if the enquiry would indicate guilt of one or more persons, the facts will be submitted to the appropriate authorities for the purpose of considering a criminal prosecution.

6. In view of the explicit terms of the Convention and the likelihood that the story will inevitably leak soon, it would seem preferable to pass the initial information without delay. Even if there is no leak it would look extremely bad if we waited, say, a week or more before passing on the information.

/The





-The Argentines would no doubt make damaging propaganda out of this.

*A. G. H. H. H.*

pp. A I Aust  
Emergency Unit

27 April 1982

cc PS  
PS/PUS  
Mr Fearn  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Gillmore  
Sir I Sinclair



The detaining authorities shall ensure that prisoners of war who have died in captivity, are honourably buried, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged, and that their graves are respected, suitably maintained and marked so as to be found at any time. Wherever possible, deceased prisoners of war who depended on the same Power shall be interred in the same place.

Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable circumstances require the use of collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his express wish to this effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in the death certificate of the deceased.

In order that graves may always be found, all particulars of burials and graves shall be recorded with a Graves Registration Service established by the Detaining Power. Lists of graves and particulars of the prisoners of war interred in cemeteries and elsewhere shall be transmitted to the Power on which such prisoners of war depended. Responsibility for the care of these graves and for records of any subsequent moves of the bodies shall rest on the Power controlling the territory, if a Party to the present Convention. These provisions shall also apply to the ashes, which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in accordance with the wishes of the home country.

#### ARTICLE 121

Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another prisoner of war, or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.

A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. Statements shall be taken from witnesses, especially from those who are prisoners of war, and a report including such statements shall be forwarded to the Protecting Power.

If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all measures for the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.

#### Part V.—Information Bureaux and Relief Societies for Prisoners of War

#### ARTICLE 122

Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties to the conflict shall institute an official Information Bureau for prisoners of war who are in its power. Neutral or non-belligerent Powers who may have received within their territory persons belonging to one of the categories referred to in Article 4, shall take the same action with respect to such persons. The Power concerned shall ensure that the Prisoners of War Information Bureau is provided with the necessary accommodation, equipment and staff to ensure its efficient working. It shall be at liberty to employ prisoners of war in such a Bureau under the conditions laid down in the Section of the present Convention dealing with work by prisoners of war.

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We have received reports of [such] an incident, but do not yet have the full details. These are being sought as a matter of urgency. As soon as they are available, we shall take any action required of us under the Third Geneva Convention. We shall keep the House informed.



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 April 1982

Dear John,

AR 27/4  
h.a.

Mrs Gandhi: Falklands

Thank you for your letter of 19 April suggesting that the closing words of Mrs Gandhi's letter of thanks to the Prime Minister about her recent visit create an opening for a further attempt to influence the Indian attitude on the Falklands.

Just before we received your letter, we had instructed Sir John Thomson to call on Mrs Gandhi in order to ensure that she personally understands our position. Although we have received a good deal of support from the Indian media for our position on the Falklands the statement issued by the Indian Government was more muted. The Indians are of course conscious of their non-aligned position.

We asked Sir John Thomson whether, if he had not already seen Mrs Gandhi, he would find it helpful to have with him a message from Mrs Thatcher. He has replied that he would prefer to reserve the option of a Prime Ministerial message for use if events take a dramatic turn in the next week or so. He detects a strong current of sympathy for Britain and he will be taking steps to encourage the Indian Government to acknowledge privately and publicly that our case in international law is unanswerable. He hopes to call shortly on Mrs Gandhi, who has just returned from Saudi Arabia.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary


J E Holmes

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

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27 APR 1982



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PART 10 ends:-

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PART 11 begins:-

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