

S  
806

PREM 19/623

PART 12Confidential File

9.22 9/10  
 Relations with Argentina  
 Position of the Falkland Islands

ARGENTINAPt 1: Sept 1979Pt 12: April 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>30.4.82</del>							
<del>3.5.82</del>							
2.5.82							
— ends —							
PREM 19/623							



PART 12 ends:-

2 May 1982

PART 13 begins:-

3 May 1982

## CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Emsley

## DEFENCE MATTERS

1. Today was remarkably quiet. I have marked some of the topmost papers on the attached files (containing action papers, papers on POWs, political and military subjects respectively) for you to read. Action may be required during the day on the following points:

(a) Gurkhas

The MOD will be making an announcement on 3 May about preparations for the despatch of 5 Infantry Brigade, which includes Gurkhas, to the South Atlantic. The draft announcement has still to be cleared with Mr Nott and will be typed to us. The attached action file includes a draft telegram to Katmandu instructing our Embassy to inform the Nepalese. You might like to include the MOD statement in the telegram. The telegram should be sent off some time tomorrow, in consultation with the MOD;

(b) Lt Cdr Astiz

There are papers about this contained on the inside cover of the action file; the latest papers record a call by the Swedish Embassy and my subsequent conversation with Legal Advisers and the MOD. I have also done a draft telegram to the Commander of the Antrim, the reason for which is explained in the papers. We should probably try to get this off on 3 May. Legal Advisers, MOD (who will have to send the telegram) and Mr Gillmore, who has taken an interest in this subject, or Mr Weston should be consulted;

(c) UK Cooperation with Chile

\* ~~~~~ \* We have as yet heard nothing from Mr Peters about a form of words for a telegram to Santiago. Please check with him on this;

(d) The Santa Fé

See my minute to Mr Fearn covering a telegram from CINCFLEET. It is possible that the MOD may come back to you on this;

(e) Venezuela

I have also minuted on this subject, copy on the action file. This is another point on which the MOD may return to you during the day;

\*~\* Passage  
deleted and closed,  
60 years under  
FOI Exemption.

Wayland

CODE 18.77

13 April 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

/(f) Action



CONFIDENTIAL

(f) Action in NATO

Sir J Graham is considering the possibility of calling a meeting of the NAC on 3 May to brief his colleagues. He will be calling in at UKDEL NATO at 0730Z to read the papers and decide in the light of developments whether to go ahead with this. I have asked the Night Shift to ensure that he receives a Sitrep covering the military situation and any telegrams reporting the Secretary of State's talks in Washington by 0730Z;

(g) Chiefs of Staff Meeting

You may wish to bear in mind so that you can make the necessary preparations and pass the point on to whoever takes over from you that Mr Wright would welcome papers being suitably prepared for him before he comes in on 4 May for the Chiefs of Staff Meeting - e.g. ensure that we have papers to be taken at the meeting, the Agenda etc.



2 May, 1982

H J S Pearce  
Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Murray

## SECRETARY OF STATE'S RETURN

1. You might like to note, for passing on to whoever takes over from you, two points in this connection:

- (a) the PUS will need to be told at some stage tomorrow what the Secretary of State will be expecting of Sir A Acland on his return from New York (I think tomorrow evening); e.g. will Mr Pym wish Sir A Acland to meet him at the airport and accompany him home?
- (b) work will have to be put in hand on possible Parliamentary statements for use on Tuesday, 4 May, with separate statements on ~~the~~ diplomatic and military situations, possibly to be made by Mr Pym and Mr Nott. But drafting can probably not be put in hand until after Mr Pym's return to the UK.



2 May, 1982

H J S Pearce  
Emergency Unit

\* ie Monday 3 May.




CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Murray

## POSSIBLE MEETING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 3 MAY

1. UKDEL NATO telephoned today to say that Sir J Graham was contemplating the possibility of calling a meeting of the NAC on 3 May to brief his colleagues on developments. He would be looking in on the Delegation at 0730Z tomorrow to check the state of play before making a final decision. Could you please ensure that a suitable Sitrep reaches UKDEL NATO by then, including a Line to Take in the Council if appropriate. You will in particular wish to ensure that UKDEL NATO are informed of any military developments and have copies of any telegrams from Washington or New York reporting on the Secretary of State's talks.



2 May, 1982

H J S Pearce  
Emergency Unit*cc. Mr. Wilson, Defence Dept.*

CONFIDENTIAL




SECRET

Mr Wright  
DS.11  
DSC,MOD

## MILITARY OPTIONS FOR REPOSSESSION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Here are the promised comments on the paper on this subject which was taken by the Chiefs of Staff this morning:
  - (a) first, a general point. Some of the comments under the pros and cons columns, particularly on the political side, struck me as somewhat indiscriminate, e.g. some of the options were described as likely to lose us international support while others which might equally be so described were not so characterised. Perhaps you might look at the paper to check that we are being consistent in this regard;
  - (b) Option 2: Repossession of South Sandwich: The pro column includes the statement that this would be relevant to the UK stake in Antarctica. In our view this point should not be over-emphasised, since legally it is open to question. Perhaps the point might be slightly softened by saying 'might have some relevance ....';
  - (c) Option 9: Mining/Blockading Mainland Argentine Ports: This is one case where we might have included the point about losing international support in the cons column;
  - (d) Option 10: Attack Argentine mainland targets: While the fourth point of the political pros might be a comment worth making, is it really a pro? The third point of the political cons might be made more strongly; the action proposed could well gravely damage international support for HMG;
  - (e) Option 11: Landing in Southern Argentina: Again, the second political con should be expressed more strongly - this too could gravely damage our international support.



H J S Pearce  
Emergency Unit

2 May, 1982

cc. Mr. Amdrey.

SECRET




## CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Emsley

Lt Cdr Alfredo Astiz

1. I spoke to Mr Darwin (Legal Advisers) in the light of the call by Mr Nilsson of the Swedish Embassy on 2 May. He advised that the most we could do within the law to meet the Swedish request would be to inform Lt Cdr Astiz of the Swedes' wish to speak to him and ask him whether he would be willing to meet a Swedish representative. He suggested that a telegram might be sent to the Commander of the Antrim, the ship on which Astiz is being held and which left South Georgia for Ascension today. I attach a draft which will need to be cleared inter alia by Legal Advisers.
2. Meanwhile, I have discussed possible ways of getting a Swedish representative to Ascension with the MOD. They confirm that there are no regular commercial flights to Ascension and suggest that the Swedish representative might reach Ascension most easily by flying commercially to Dakar. The RAF would be able to fly him on from there, but they would need three days' notice. I have not yet passed this on to Mr Nillson, and I suggest you delay doing so until we have decided whether to send the telegram. In these circumstances Mr Nillson might be informed of both points. We would need to tell him that there would be no point in the Swedes sending anybody to Ascension until we had heard from Astiz that he was prepared to talk to a Swedish representative.
3. On Mr Nillson's other question, about designation by Argentina of a Protecting Power, we have as yet heard no more.
4. There is one further point which I failed to record in my earlier minute to Mr Collins about Astiz which I made to Mr Nillson. This is that when the Argentine prisoners of war arrive in Ascension they may well be flown out again almost immediately. This would mean that the Swedes would have very little time to talk to him, even if he were willing to see them. Mr Nillson took this point, but commented that the Swedes could learn what they wanted to know very quickly - an hour or two's conversation would be sufficient.



H J S Pearce  
Emergency Unit

2 May, 1982

cc. Mr. Winton, Defence Dept.  
Mr. Kearn, Staff.  
Mr. Huber, Def. Dept.  
Mr. Gladstone, WED.  
Mr. Aust, Legal Advisers,  
News Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL



File No. ....  
Department EMERGENCY UNIT  
Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) H. J. S. PEARCE.  
Tel. Extn. ....

CONFIDENTIAL

XY 42

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/  
Privacy marking) .....  
(Codeword) ..... (Deskby) .....Z

TO IMMEDIATE - HMS ANTRIM (precedence) (post) Tel. No. ....of.....

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....

INFO SAVING.....

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Lt Col Alfredo Astiz

1. You should know that the Swedish Government have asked whether they could have the opportunity to speak to Astiz in connection with an incident involving Miss Dagmar Hagelin in Buenos Aires in 1977. Miss Hagelin is reported to have been shot at by Argentine Navy personnel and then driven to the Navy ~~Medical~~ <sup>Neurological</sup> School. In 1979 a witness ~~in Madrid~~ claimed to have been in the same prison as Miss Hagelin and it is likely that she had been wounded in the leg and ~~murdered~~ <sup>tortured. It has been established</sup> ~~The witness names~~ <sup>original</sup> Alfredo Astiz <sup>w</sup> as involved in the incident. Swedish representations to the Argentine Government have so far met no response. Swedes would therefore like to send a

Copies to:-

by and personally  
donor that

and subsequently  
talked to Miss  
Hagelin during her  
imprisonment.

CONFIDENTIAL

/representative



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representative to Ascension Island to speak to Astiz on his arrival with the aim of gaining information about Miss Hagelin's fate.

2. While we sympathise with the Swedish request our primary objective must be to comply with the Geneva Conventions. These rule out for example the extradition of Astiz to Sweden, but this has not in any case been requested.

3. We should be grateful if you could inform Astiz of the Swedish wish to send a representative to interview him about Miss Hagelin's fate. You should ask him whether he has any comments on this matter and whether he is willing to see a Swedish representative. You should not put pressure on him to answer affirmatively.

4. Grateful for early reply, since we need to give the Swedes time to send somebody to Ascension in the event of Astiz' agreement to this request.

PYM

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL



Argentina  
Pt 12

~~TAKE 1 OF 2 -- ARGENTINE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO NATION~~

PY826348

BUENOS AIRES DOMESTIC SERVICE IN SPANISH 0246 3MT 2 MAY 82

((SPEECH DELIVERED ON 1 MAY 1982 BY ARGENTINE PRESIDENT  
LEOPOLDO FORTUNATO GALTIERI FROM THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE  
WHITE ROOM -- RECORDED))

((TEXT)) FELLOW ARGENTINES! TODAY, THE ARMS OF THE ARGENTINE  
NATION HAVE ANSWERED A NEW ACT OF AGGRESSION PERPETRATED BY THE  
UNITED KINGDOM IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC; THEY HAVE AND ARE STILL  
ATTACKING US, BUT, WE HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO REPELL THEM, AND  
THIS WILL ALWAYS BE OUR ANSWER IF THE ENEMY INTENDS TO AGAIN  
ESTABLISH A COLONY ON ARGENTINE LAND.

PRIOR TO THIS ATTACK, DURING LONG DAYS AND ENTIRE WEEKS,  
UNCONCEIVABLE PRESSURES HAVE BEEN EXERTED ON OUR SOVEREIGN WILL;  
THEY HAVE DEPICTED US AS CLODDY AGGRESSORS; BUT IT IS WELL-KNOWN  
THAT UPON RECOVERING THE UNREDEEMED TERRITORY THAT WE CHOSE TO DIE  
INSTEAD OF KILLING, ~~AND BECAUSE OF THIS DURING AN UNPRECEDENTED~~  
MILITARY OPERATION NEITHER THE ADVERSARY NOR THE POPULATION OF  
THE MALVINAS EXPERIENCED A SINGLE CASUALTY.

WE HAVE BEEN WRONGED WITH SANCTIONS THAT THE GREAT POWERS  
AVOID ENFORCING AGAINST THOSE THEY CONSIDER TO BE THEIR WORSE  
ENEMIES AS IF OUR CONDITION AS A YOUNG COUNTRY WOULD MAKE US AN  
EASY PREY.



WE HAVE BEEN SLANDERED AND INSULTED, MOREOVER, WE HAVE BEEN  
INTIMIDATED, THREATENED, INTRIGUED AGAINST AND WE HAVE BEEN THE  
VICTIM OF ALL SORT OF UNIMAGINABLE MANEUVERS TO DISCREDIT US,

WE HAVE STATED OUR REASONS, WE HAVE SAID THAT FOR ALMOST ONE  
AND A HALF CENTURY WE EITHER OBTAINED AN INTENSIFIED NEGATIVE OR  
THE MOST CYNICAL SILENCE TO OUR PERSISTENT CLAIM TO OUR PROVEN  
RIGHTS,

WE HAVE PROVEN THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM DECIDED TO SEND WARSHIPS  
IN ANSWER TO THE PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PRESENCE OF ARGENTINE  
WORKERS ON THE GEORGIA ISLANDS,

SINCE WE WERE CERTAIN THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER PATH TO RECOVER  
OUR IRREVOCABLE SOVEREIGNTY, WE ACTED AS WE HAVE, AND THUS WE HAVE  
SHOWN THE WORLD,

THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE AMERICAS HAVE ANSWERED  
US IN A CLEAR AND FRANK MANNER, A SOLIDARY AND FRATERNAL ATTITUDE  
WAS UPHELD BY THOSE WHO, WITHOUT HAVING ULTERIOR MOTIVES, TRULY  
BELIEVED THAT THIS CONTINENT HAS A FUTURE AND A DESTINY AND THAT  
ITS COLONIAL PAST WAS DEAD AND BURIED AND A PART OF HISTORY,

WE ALSO COUNT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING AND THE SUPPORT OF THOSE  
NONALIGNED COUNTRIES THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED WITH THEIR OWN FLESH  
AND BLOOD THE RIGORS OF THE ANTI-COLONIAL WARS AND THAT UNDERSTAND  
THE COURAGE AND DEMANDS INVOLVED IN ACHIEVING A VICTORY IN THIS  
STRUGGLE,

(MORE) HQA/HANDS/MCN 020352 MAY

BT

27244



REF PYZ2734F BUENDAS AIRES DOMESTIC SERVICE 020240//IN 7-15 STRUGGLE;

TAKE 2 OF 2 -- ARGENTINE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO NATION

PYB20412

((TEXT)) THEREFORE, OUR CAUSE IS NO LONGER AN ARGENTINE PROBLEM, IT HAS NOW BECOME A CAUSE OF THE AMERICAS AND THE WORLD WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE COLONIALISM AS A SITUATION WHICH CAN BE ENDURED THIS CENTURY, THE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOW BEEN ADDED TO EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID, AN ATTITUDE WHICH NOT ONLY DISREGARDS THE DECISION MADE WITHIN THE OAS -- DENYING IN THIS MANNER PRINCIPLES WHICH IT HAD, FORMALLY ADHERE TO MORE THAN 35 YEARS AGO -- BUT SUPPORTS IN FACT THE COLONIAL PRETENSIONS IN THE AMERICAS OF AN EUROPEAN POWER BY IMPOSING ON US ILLEGITIMATE AND UNJUST MATERIAL AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS;

THEREFORE, THIS GOES AGAINST THE EXPRESSED FEELINGS OF PRACTICALLY ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE AMERICAS OF WHICH IT IS AN INFLUENTIAL PART,

THE BRITISH EMPIRE, ENCOURAGED BY THE ALLEGED RESULTS OF ITS CAMPAIGN OF PRESSURE, IS RESORTING TO THE DIRECT AND NAKED USE OF FORCE, THEREFORE WE HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE THAN TO RESPOND TO SUCH VIOLENCE WITH MILITARY ACTION, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BREAKING PEACE IN THE AMERICAS AND ENDANGERING WORLD SECURITY WILL FALL ON THE SHOULDERS OF THOSE WHO ATTACK US,

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HAVING JEOPARDIZED INTERNATIONAL HARMONY WILL FALL ON THE SHOULDER OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND OF THOSE SUPPORTING IT,

WE HAVE TRIED ALL MEANS TO ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION AND



FACE THE UNTHINKABLE ATTACK WE HAVE SUFFERED WILL NOT  
DIMINISH THIS DEDICATION TO PEACE WHICH HAS ALWAYS INSPIRED US,

LET US PRAY TO GOD, OUR LORD TO GIVE US SERENITY AND  
STRENGTH FOR THIS NATIONAL ENTERPRISE WE BEGAN ON 2 APRIL, AND  
ENTERPRISE WE WILL PERSIST UNITED TO VICTORY,

WE ALSO PRAY THAT HE WILL ILLUMINATE THE INTELLIGENCE OF THOSE  
WHO PLACE THEIR OWN POLITICAL POSITIONS BEFORE THE INTERESTS OF  
PEACE AND JUSTICE THAT ARE SOUGHT BY ALL NATIONS,

TODAY, 1 MAY, ON LABOR DAY, ARGENTINE MEN AND WOMEN  
ARE AT THEIR WORK PLACE READY TO MAKE GREAT SACRIFICES WHILE IN THE  
SOUTH, A PART OF ARGENTINE TERRITORY, MEN OF ALL AGES ARE IN THE  
TRENCHES COURAGEOUSLY AND FIRMLY DEFENDING THE HONOR AND PATRIOTRY  
OF OUR NATION,

THIS HAS AND WILL SURELY COST US MANY LIVES AND MATERIAL LOSSES,  
BUT THE PRICE THAT THE UNSPEAKABLE BOLDNESS OF THE INVADER  
WHICH HAS DISREGARDED ALL REASONING AND HAS COMMITTED THE  
UNPARDONABLE POLITICAL MISTAKE OF CONFUSING PRUDENCE WITH WEAKNESS,  
WILL BE EVEN HIGHER,

AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME, I ASK THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC,  
MY PEOPLE, FOR FAITH, COURAGE AND DETERMINATION TO DEFEND THE  
ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR FOREFATHERS, WHAT JUSTLY BELONGS TO ALL  
ARGENTINE GENERATIONS OF YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW; GOOD  
EVENING,

ENDALL) 620240 RCA/RML/RANDS/NL/MCN #20417 PAY

BT

7548



*SUBJECT*  
*ce Pallis*As. from: Cabinet Office,  
London,  
SW1

2 May 1982

*Dear David,*Falklands : Military Decisions

The PM held an ad hoc meeting at Chequers at 1245 today. Those present were the Home Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Attorney General, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Force Commander and the Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

In the light of the latest intelligence about the movements and intentions of the Argentine fleet, and of the new situation created by the military events of 1 May, it was agreed that British forces should forthwith be authorised to attack any Argentine naval vessel (but not naval auxiliaries) on the same basis as had been approved by OD(SA) on 29 April in the case of the Argentine aircraft-carrier (OD(SA)(82) 22nd meeting, conclusion 1). The Attorney General made the point that any such attack would be harder to justify if it took place a long way away from the Total Exclusion Zone; Admiral Fieldhouse said that the patrol areas of the British units involved made that very unlikely to happen.

A meeting of OD(SA) was held subsequently at 1430 today, also at Chequers. It was attended by those listed above plus the CNS, the CGS, the CAS, Frank Cooper, Jim Eyre, Michael Palliser and Robert Armstrong. Formal minutes will be issued on 4 May. Because of the intervening Bank Holiday, it may be convenient if I set out in this letter an advance record of the military decisions taken:-

- (1) OD(SA)(82)39 and 40 were approved.
- (2) The Defence Secretary was authorised at his discretion to bring Argentine naval auxiliaries within the scope of the decision recorded in paragraph 2 above.

OD(SA) also

- (3) took note of OD(SA)(82)41;

/(4) invited



- (4) invited the FCO to investigate what more needed to be done to step up the quality and quantity of vernacular and English language broadcasts audible by listeners both in Argentina and in the Falkland Islands (the cost of this was to be regarded as legitimate additional expenditure in the context of our current military operations, and it was suggested that American technical help might be sought if needed);
- (5) invited the FCO, in consultation with the MOD, to consider, e.g. with the ICRC, what arrangements should be made for the removal of Argentine prisoners who might be captured as a result of our military operations;
- (6) agreed to meet again at 0900 on 4 May.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD(SA) and the Attorney General; and to the CDS, Antony Acland and Robert Armstrong.

*For over*  
*Robert*

R.L. WADE-GERY

D.B. Omand, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

TOP SECRET



Unfaxed  
3/5  
ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(36) + 7 CAB

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I),  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST ✓  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR MCINTYRE )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 022300Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1569 OF 2 MAY

INFO F L A S H UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE AND AMBASSADOR).

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 1566: FALKLANDS, YOUR TALK WITH HAIG

1. AS YOU HAD TO CATCH THE PLANE TO NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY AFTER HAIG TELEPHONED YOU THIS AFTERNOON FOLLOWING TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS YOU ASKED ME TO RING HIM AND CLARIFY TWO POINTS.

2. THIS I HAVE DONE, EXPLAINING THAT THERE WERE A GREAT MANY POINTS THAT NEEDED CLARIFYING IN THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS AND THAT YOU WOULD NOT WANT TO BE SUDDENLY FACED WITH A COMMUNICATION FROM HIM, HAIG, SAYING THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD AGREED AND THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO US TO SAY THAT WE DID LIKEWISE.

3. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS VERY MUCH AWARE OF THIS. HE WOULD AVOID ANYTHING LIKE THAT HAPPENING. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROPOSALS OFFERED UP A GREAT DEAL. PERHAPS THE ONLY AREA WHERE IT WAS LESS THAN IDEAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THE INVOLVEMENT OF THIRD PARTIES IN THE TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS.



WAS LESS THAN IDEAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THE INVOLVEMENT OF THIRD PARTIES IN THE TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS. ACCORDING TO HIS LATEST INFORMATION ARGENTINA WERE SAYING THAT THEY WOULD WANT THE CONTACT GROUP, WHICH WOULD CARRY OUT THIS TASK, TO BE COMPOSED OF VENEZUELA AND CANADA, AS WELL AS BRAZIL, PERU, THE FRG AND THE USA. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT WOULD MEAN THERE WOULD BE THREE LATIN AMERICANS IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. IF DECISIONS HAD TO BE TAKEN BY A MAJORITY THEY COULD BLOCK IT. VENEZUELA WAS PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE GIVEN THEIR KNOWN CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH ARGENTINA IN THE RECENT CRISIS. HAIG SAID THAT TO HAVE AS MANY AS SIX WAS OF COURSE ABSURD BUT HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR ENGAGING VENEZUELA IN THE PROCESS. HE ASKED ME WHETHER THERE WAS ANY OTHER COUNTRY OF THE AREA THAT WE WOULD PREFER. I SAID TRINIDAD WOULD BE MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE.

4. I SAID THAT IT WAS TOO SUDDEN FOR US TO BE NEGOTIATING NEW PROPOSALS. YOU DID NOT WANT TO BE RUSHED. YOU HAD NOT CONSULTED LONDON ABOUT THEM. MOREOVER THERE WAS ANOTHER AREA OF DOUBT IN YOUR MIND. WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN IN PRACTICAL TERMS IF THE PARTIES AGREED? HOW COULD WE BE SURE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE GOING TO STICK BY THE SCHEME. HAIG SAID THAT IF IT CAME TO THE POINT HE WOULD GIVE THE ARGENTINIANS A SHORT SPACE OF TIME, SAY 24 HOURS, IN WHICH TO SEND THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER TO A GIVEN PLACE WITH FULL AUTHORITY FROM THE JUNTA TO SIGN UP. HAIG ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS MIGHT SAY THAT THEY COULD ONLY COMPLY WITH THIS TIMETABLE IF THERE WAS NO FURTHER BRITISH MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE ISLANDS IN THE MEANTIME; AND THEY WOULD GIVE AN UNDERTAKING THAT THEY WOULD NOT ENTER THE TEZ. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT DO ANYTHING THAT INHIBITED US FROM MAINTAINING THE MILITARY PRESSURE.

5. HAIG SAID THAT HE WOULD GET INTO TOUCH WITH ME AS SOON AS HE HEARD AGAIN FROM THE ARGENTINIANS.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS  
PS/KE BURD  
PS/ER OSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILBORE

ADVANCE COPY  
06/0305-02  
**IMMEDIATE**

ED/S AX D (FCO DIST + A/D F/1)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS #60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTHIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR MCINTYRE )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR VADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

*Press conference*

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 030500Z

FM WASHINGTON 022200Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1568 OF 2 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIORITY BOGOTA BRASILIA BRIDGETOWN RIO DE JANEIRO GUATEMALA CITY  
LA PAZ LIMA QUITO MONTEVIDEO PANAMA CITY PORT AU PRINCE PORT OF SPAIN  
CARACAS SAN JOSE SANTIAGO MEXICO CITY ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS BOHN  
COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG DUBLIN PARIS ROME REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE  
UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS MOSCOW CANBERRA OTTAWA (FOR DUTY OFFICER)  
WELLINGTON OSLO UKMIS GENEVA  
ROUTINE PRAGUE BUDAPEST BUCHAREST EAST BERLIN BELGRADE SOFIA WARSAW  
PEKING HELSINKI HOLYSEE BOSTON CLEVELAND DETROIT LOS ANGELES SEATTLE  
ATLANTA CHICAGO DALLAS HOUSTON SAN FRANCISCO

FALKLANDS: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE IN WASHINGTON

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S PRESS CONFERENCE  
THIS AFTERNOON AT THIS EMBASSY



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GOOD AFTERNOON.

THERE IS I KNOW A VERY GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, BUT I HAVE NO FURTHER NEWS TO REPORT TO YOU OF ANY EVENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE TODAY, AND I WOULD LIKE TO SAY HERE THAT YOU CAN COUNT UPON THE TRUTH AND VALIDITY OF ANY COMMUNIQUE THAT WE ISSUE FROM THE DEFENCE MINISTRY IN LONDON. YOU WILL KNOW THAT AFTER THE RETAKING OF SOUTH GEORGIA THERE WAS A VERY GREAT DEAL OF MISINFORMATION THAT CAME OUT OF BUENOS AIRES ABOUT THAT EVENT WHICH WASN'T TRUE, AND THE SAME OCCURRED YESTERDAY SO I JUST WISH TO GIVE YOU CONFIDENCE AT THE OUTSET THAT WE WILL TELL YOU THE TRUTH OF WHAT HAPPENED.

LAST WEEK I CAME HERE TO SEE MR. HAIG IN HIS ROLE AS A MEDIATOR. TODAY I HAVE COME BACK TO CONSULT HIM AS AN ALLY. THE BRITISH PEOPLE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO THE UNITED STATES FOR COMING DOWN IN THEIR SUPPORT. WE NEVER HAD ANY DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD COME DOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE VICTIM AND AGAINST THE AGGRESSOR. AFTER ALL, OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHARE THE SAME DEMOCRATIC IDEALS.

MR. HAIG AND I HAVE BEEN TAKING STOCK OF THE SITUATION TODAY AND HOW WE CAN SECURE THE CARRYING OUT OF RESOLUTION 502 AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLAND WHICH OF COURSE IS A PRECONDITION OF EVERYTHING. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE MILITARY SITUATION, WE HAVE LOOKED AT THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES WHICH ARE BEING APPLIED TO ARGENTINA AND WE HAVE BEEN EXPLORING WHAT FURTHER DIPLOMATIC STEPS MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATED. I WOULD SAY THAT THE LONG PHASE OF MR. HAIG'S MISSION ENDED WITH THE REJECTION OF THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS BY THE ARGENTINES A FEW DAYS AGO. BUT THAT DOES NOT END THE SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. THE PRESSURES THAT WE HAVE BEEN APPLYING ON THE ARGENTINES FROM THE OUTSET, - ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY - GO HAND IN HAND WITH THE CONTINUING SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT. SO WHILE THOSE PRESSURES BUILD UP THE DOOR REMAINS OPEN.

NOW I WOULD JUST LIKE TO BRING YOUR MINDS TO THE FACTS ABOUT WHAT THIS ISSUE IS ALL ABOUT. AS I WAS SAYING EARLIER, THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN SHARE THE SAME IDEALS, IT'S ABOUT THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF PEOPLE, ITS ABOUT DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO CHOOSE FOR THEMSELVES THE KIND OF GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WANT. THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN HAVE A LONG HISTORY IN DEFENCE OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO CHOOSE BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS. AS WE KNOW, THERE IS A DIFFERENT-SYSTEM IN ARGENTINA. THEY HAVE TRIED TO IMPOSE - **INDEED**



DIFFERENT-SYSTEM IN ARGENTINA. THEY HAVE TRIED TO IMPOSE - INDEED THEY HAVE FOR THE MOMENT IMPOSED - BY FORCE A RULE IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THAT DENIES THE PEOPLE THEIR CHOICE FOR WHAT THEY WANT, AND THAT IS WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT. WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN MANY MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN HISTORY, AS HAS THE UNITED STATES, IN DEFENCE OF THAT FREEDOM. IT'S A WORLD PROBLEM, NOT JUST A BRITISH PROBLEM, IT'S VITAL THAT WE PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, THE RIGHTS OF PARLIAMENTS TO RUN THEIR COUNTRIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE. AND THAT IS WHY THIS ISSUE IS NOT JUST A MINOR MATTER AFFECTING A FEW THOUSAND PEOPLE DOWN ON AN ISLAND IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, IT'S AN ISSUE THAT AFFECTS COUNTRIES IN EVERY CONTINENT ALL OVER THE WORLD. FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS NOW THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT OF RUNNING THEIR COUNTRY AS THEY WANT; THERE ARE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TROOPS OVER-RUNNING THAT COUNTRY, THERE ARE PLENTY OF OTHER EXAMPLES. AND IF WE WERE TO ALLOW THIS ISSUE NOT TO BE CORRECTED, THIS WRONG, THIS INVASION, THIS AGGRESSIVE ACTION NOT TO BE CORRECTED, THEN THERE ARE A LOT OF OTHER COUNTRIES ALL ROUND THE WORLD WHO WOULD FEEL EVEN MORE FEARFUL THAN THEY DO TODAY. AND THIS IS WHY THE ISSUE IN FACT IS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE WAY WE RUN OUR AFFAIRS. EVERYBODY WANTED THIS TO BE DONE PEACEFULLY, I AM SURE IT IS THOSE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, THAT BASIC PHILOSOPHY AND THOSE COMMON IDEALS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THAT DECIDED THE UNITED STATES TO COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE. AND THAT IS WHAT I WANTED TO SAY BY WAY OF AN OPENING STATEMENT.

#### NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE IT LIKELY THAT THERE COULD BE ANY WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS AND RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS AS LONG AS THE PRESENT JUNTA REMAINS IN ARGENTINA?

A. YES OF COURSE, THEY BEGAN THE AGGRESSIVE ACTION, THEY INVADED THE ISLANDS, AND DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS WHEN THEY WERE UNDER A MANDATORY RESOLUTION TO WITHDRAW THOSE FORCES THEY HAVE REINFORCED THEM. THEY HAVE NOW GOT SOME THOUSANDS ON THAT ISLAND, THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO BE THERE AND THEY WILL HAVE TO GO FROM THERE. THEY STARTED THIS INVASION AND OF COURSE WE WANT THEM TO GO BACK, AS A RESULT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IF WE CAN, AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE CAN. BUT IF NOT, THEN I AM AFRAID THEY WILL HAVE TO GO BACK BY FORCE. BUT WE MUST HOPE THAT SENSE WILL PREVAIL.

#### SHOPPING LIST?

Q. BALTICORE SUN,

COULD YOU TELL US WHAT YOU HAVE ASKED FROM THE UNITED STATES IN THE



## WY OF MATERIEL SUPPORT

A. I HAVE NOT COME HERE WITH A SHOPPING LIST. THEY MADE CLEAR IN THEIR STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD GIVE US MATERIEL SUPPORT AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RESPECTS THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAVE COME DOWN TO HELP US. BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WAYS, LOGISTIC WAYS, OTHER WAYS IN WHICH THEY ARE ABLE TO HELP US. I AM GOING TO SEE MR. WEINBERGER LATER ON THIS AFTERNOON BUT I HAVE NOT COME WITH ANY LIST, I WISH TO MAKE THAT QUITE CLEAR, I HAVE COME TO REVIEW THE SITUATION WHICH IS QUITE DIFFERENT TO WHAT IT WAS LAST WEEK BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS COME DOWN IN SUPPORT OF BRITAIN.

Q. HAVE YOU MADE ANY REQUEST AT ALL FROM THE UNITED STATES SO FAR?

A. I HAVE NOT MADE ANY SPECIFIC REQUESTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING THEIR STATEMENT BUT WHAT I HAVE DONE IS TO DISCUSS IN VERY GENERAL TERMS WITH MR. HAIG THIS MORNING WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES MIGHT BE AND I AM GOING TO HAVE A FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH MR. WEINBERGER THIS AFTERNOON. BUT I AM NOT GOING TO MAKE ANY SPECIFIC REQUEST.

A NEW MEDIATOR?

Q. WITH THE UNITED STATES FIRMLY ATTACHED TO THE BRITISH SIDE NOW SIR, WHO DO YOU THINK WILL BE IN A POSITION TO MEDIATE?

A. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER WE CAN FIND, WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND, A MEDIATOR OR MEDIATORS, THAT IS SOMETHING THAT I WILL EXPLORE FURTHER THIS EVENING WHEN I GO TO NEW YORK, BUT THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS HAVE GOT TO BE FULFILLED ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE TO START WITH, THEY HAVE GOT TO GO. AND THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY HAS GOT TO REMAIN IN A SITUATION THAT DOES NOT PREJUDGE IT. AND THAT IS A BIG CHANGE FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. WHETHER WE CAN FIND SUCH A MEDIATOR REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT I CAN IMAGINE QUITE A LOT OF DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES.

FURTHER MILITARY ACTION?

Q. CAN YOU TELL US IF THE FIGHTING HAS STOPPED AT THIS POINT OR IF THERE MAY STILL BE MILITARY ACTION?

A. THERE IS NO MILITARY ACTION AT THE PRESENT MOMENT. BUT THE POSITION IS THAT WE ANNOUNCED SOME DAYS AGO THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND THE ACTION WE TOOK YESTERDAY WAS IN DEFENCE OF THAT TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE OVER WHICH WE ARE GOING TO MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF ACTION. NOW IT MAY BE THAT TODAY IT HAS NOT BEEN CHALLENGED BY THE ARGENTINES. THAT MAY BE THE POSITION, BUT AT



5 CHALLENGED BY THE ARGENTINES, THAT MAY BE THE POSITION; BUT AT ANYRATE THERE HAVE BEEN NO INCIDENTS WHICH SUGGEST THAT THAT MIGHT BE SO, BUT IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE FIGHTING STOPPING, IT PROBABLY IS THAT NOBODY HAS COME INTO THE TEZ AND THEREFORE NO ACTION HAS TAKEN PLACE, BUT THAT IS ONLY A GUESS.

#### TIMESCALE

Q. ITH

WE KNOW THAT THE WEATHER IS GETTING VERY BAD DOWN IN THE FALKLANDS, TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR MILITARY ACTION, HOW LONG DO YOU GIVE NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED BEFORE WE GO IN AND FINISH IT OFF MILITARILY?

A. WELL I DON'T KNOW THAT THE WEATHER IS GOING TO HAVE ANY GREAT EFFECT. WHAT WE HAVE DONE SO FAR IN MILITARY ACTION IS TO SECURE THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND THAT WE SHALL GO ON DOING, AND WE SHALL GO ON DOING IT IN ALL WEATHERS. THERE IS NO OTHER MILITARY ACTION ENVISAGED AT THE MOMENT OTHER THAN MAKING THAT ZONE SECURE. NOT ONLY IS THERE NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THAT AND SEEKING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, THEY DO IN FACT GO HAND IN HAND, BECAUSE UNLESS WE ARE THERE BUILDING UP THE MILITARY PRESSURE TOGETHER WITH ALL THE OTHER PRESSURES THEN IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION AND THAT IS WHAT THE TASK FORCE IS THERE TO DO, TO PACK UP THE NEGOTIATIONS.

#### WHEN DOES DIPLOMACY RUN OUT?

Q. YOU SAY ARGENTINA MUST LEAVE THE ISLAND, WHEN DOES THE POINT ARISE WHEN DIPLOMACY WILL NOT ACHIEVE THAT END?

A. THEY ARE UNDER A MANDATORY RESOLUTION FROM THE UNITED NATIONS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ISLANDS. HOW THAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED IS ANOTHER MATTER, THAT I SHALL BE DISCUSSING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOMORROW.

#### CONTINUING US ROLE?

INDEPENDENT NEWS,

Q. DO YOU SEE THE US CONTINUING ANY PARTICULAR ROLE?

A. THEY HAVE JUST AS GREAT AN INTEREST AS WE AND ALL THE REST OF US IN TRYING TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IF POSSIBLE, SO I CERTAINLY DO NOT REGARD THEIR ROLE IN THAT AS OVER - CERTAINLY NOT. THE WAY TO ACHIEVE IT IS NOT BY ANY MEANS CLEAR, NOT ONLY TO US OR THE UNITED STATES, IT ISN'T VERY CLEAR TO ANYBODY, BUT LET'S NOT CLOSE ANY DOORS.

#### US ECONOMIC ACTION?



Q. JOHN DICKIE, DAILY MAIL: HAVE YOU ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE SOME ACTION AS YOUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS HAVE DONE IN TERMS OF AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE?

A. THE ANNOUNCEMENT THE UNITED STATES MADE A FEW DAYS AGO COMING IN SUPPORT OF BRITAIN, THERE WAS AN ECONOMIC PART OF IT AND I THINK YOU WILL FIND PROBABLY IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THERE WILL BE FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT PRECISE ACTION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD THEY HAVE TAKEN. BUT CERTAINLY THEIR INITIAL STATEMENT DOES INCLUDE ECONOMIC MEASURES..... THAT WAS AN INITIAL STATEMENT AND WE DISCUSSED IT THIS MORNING AND IT MAY VERY WELL BE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES. MR HAIG HAS SAID THAT HE WILL CONSIDER THAT BUT IT IS UP TO THE UNITED STATES TO DECIDE THAT.

Q. WOULD YOU LIKE TO GET IT ON THE SAME LEVEL AS YOUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS?

A. OH NATURALLY, I WANT TO SEE THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF PRESSURE APPLIED AND THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES CAME BEHIND BRITAIN IS THE MOST DRAMATIC SINGLE INCREASE IN THE PRESSURE AGAINST THE ARGENTINES THAT ANYBODY COULD POSSIBLY IMAGINE.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO?

Q. OTHER ANALYSTS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT NATO SHOULD BE RECONSTRUCTED TO FIGHT COLONIALIST WARS IN THE THIRD WORLD, DO YOU AGREE?

A. THERE'S NO CONNECTION BETWEEN ANY OF THOSE THINGS AND WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW AT ALL, NOR DO I THINK THERE WILL BE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OR ANY NEED FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SO FAR AS NATO IS CONCERNED - ITS RESPONSIBILITIES ARE ENTIRELY CLEAR.

WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IS THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE RIGHT OF SELFDETERMINATION, THE RIGHT FOR PEOPLE TO CHOOSE HOW THEY ARE GOING TO GOVERN THEIR COUNTRY FOR THEMSELVES AND NOT HAVE SOME OTHER REGIME IMPOSED UPON THEM AND THAT IS ALL THAT IS IMPLIED HERE AND THE STEPS WE ARE TAKING MILITARILY IS IN ORDER TO ASSIST AND TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE.

NEED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHERS?

Q. DO YOU SEE OR REQUIRE ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM ALLIES CLOSER IE AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH AFRICA AND IF SO WHAT SORT OF ASSISTANCE?

A. WE HAVE NOT ASKED FOR ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND NOBODY AT THE MOMENT HAS OFFERED ANY. IT WOULD BE NO DOUBT WELCOME WERE IT TO BE OFFERED BUT WE UNDERSTAND THE BASIS OF THE SUPPORT THAT WE ARE



MOMENT HAS OFFERED ANY. IT WOULD BE NO DOUBT WELCOME WERE IT TO BE OFFERED, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THE BASIS OF THE SUPPORT THAT WE ARE RECEIVING AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR IT AND WE ARE NOT AT THE MOMENT THINKING OF ASKING FOR MORE OR FURTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

Q. WHAT ABOUT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FROM THESE COUNTRIES?

A. WELL, ANY INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE LIKE THAT THAT THEY CAN GIVE WE OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE WELCOME.

SHOPPING LIST?

Q. HEC. YOU SAY YOU HAVE COME HERE WITH NO SHOPPING LIST; THEN MIGHT WE EXPECT SPECIFIC REQUESTS FROM BRITAIN?

A. THERE WILL BE A LOT OF CONTACT AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL, AT MILITARY LEVEL, AND AS THE NEEDS BECOME MORE APPARENT THEN SPECIFIC REQUESTS WILL BE MADE, BUT IT'S COVERED I THINK VERY CLEARLY BY THE STATEMENT MADE BY MR HAIG ORIGINALLY IN THE MANNER OF PROVIDING US WITH MATERIEL SUPPORT THAT ARE ASKED FOR.

Q. MIGHT THAT COME AT THE NATO MEETING NEXT WEEK?

A. NO, QUITE SEPARATELY AND DIRECTLY BILATERALLY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

FURTHER MILITARY ACTION?

Q. AP. ARE YOU IN FACT SUGGESTING THERE MIGHT NOT BE ANY MORE FIGHTING IF ARGENTINA STAYS OUT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE?

A. IF THEY STAY OUT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE THEN THERE MAY NOT BE THE CLASHES SUCH AS WE HAD YESTERDAY. BUT OF COURSE THEY STILL HAVE THOUSANDS OF TROOPS ON THE ISLAND AND THEY HAVE STILL GOT TO BE REMOVED BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER SO I CERTAINLY DO NOT IN ANY SENSE INTEND TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WILL NOT BE FURTHER FIGHTING. THAT WOULD BE TOTALLY WRONG.

EROSION OF SUPPORT?

Q. ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT IF THERE IS ESCALATION SOME OF THE SUPPORT YOU HAVE GOT ON SANCTIONS AND THE ENTHUSIASM MAY DRIFT AWAY?

A. NO, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE SUPPORT THAT WE HAVE WILL CONTINUE. IF IT DRAGS ON A LONG TIME, WHICH OF COURSE WE HOPE IT DOESN'T, IT MAY HAPPEN THAT ONE OR TWO CHANGES MIGHT BE SOUGHT FOR ALL I KNOW, BUT THE WHOLE WEIGHT SO FAR HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN PRESSURE. I HAVE NO INDICATION OF ANY KIND TO SUGGEST THAT THAT WILL NOT CONTINUE.



MAY HAPPEN THAT ONE OR TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT BE SUGGESTED FOR ALL THAT, BUT THE WHOLE WEIGHT SO FAR HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN PRESSURE. I HAVE NO INDICATION OF ANY KIND TO SUGGEST THAT THAT WILL NOT CONTINUE. AFTERALL, EVERY COUNTRY, NOT ONLY THOSE WHO ARE SUPPORTING US BUT A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHO HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO SUPPORT US, EXCEPT BY THEIR EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL AND SUPPORT, WILL HAVE A DIRECT INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE, WHICH IS TO RESTORE THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE ON THESE ISLANDS TO CHOOSE THE KIND OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT. SO I HAVE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE AT THE MOMENT, NO INDICATION OF ANY KIND THAT THAT SUPPORT IS IN ANY WAY WEAKENING. RATHER THE REVERSE.

Q. THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT IF THERE IS CONSIDERABLE BLOODSHED IRELAND MAY BE FORCED TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION.

A. WELL, EVERY GOVERNMENT IS ENTITLED TO EXPRESS ANY VIEW THAT THEY WISH. AND OF COURSE WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO CONCLUDE THIS WITHOUT SHEDDING BLOOD, OF COURSE. WE AREN'T FIGHTING THROUGH CHOICE, BRITAIN DOESN'T WANT TO BE PUT IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO FIGHT. BUT WE KNOW WHAT IS AT STAKE, IT'S SOMETHING THAT REALLY MATTERS. IT ACTUALLY IS AT STAKE TO HAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE LIKE THIS - I'VE GOT A PARLIAMENT TO ANSWER TO BACK HOME. ALL DEMOCRATIC POLITICIANS ARE IN THAT SITUATION. THAT DOESN'T APPLY TO EVERY COUNTRY AND WHEN A COUNTRY HAS THAT RIGHT, AND IT'S REMOVED FROM THEM BY FORCE, IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF EVERYBODY TO MAKE SURE THAT THAT IS PUT RIGHT AND THAT'S WHAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN DOING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

MILITARY STRENGTH SUFFICIENT?

Q. FINANCIAL TIMES. YOU SAY YOU HAVE NOT ASKED FOR ANY SPECIFIC SUPPORT FROM THE US - DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU ARE CONFIDENT THAT BRITAIN HAS THE MILITARY STRENGTH TO RECLAIM THE ISLANDS BY FORCE IF NECESSARY?

A. OBVIOUSLY THE UNITED STATES WANT TO GIVE US SUPPORT, SHORT OF A DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. AND WE WANT IT AND WE NEED IT, LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND OTHER KINDS OF SUPPORT. I HAVEN'T COME HERE TO SPECIFICALLY TO ASK FOR THIS THAT OR THE OTHER, BUT I AM SURE THAT WE SHALL GET DOWN TO THE DETAILS BOTH AT THE MILITARY LEVEL AND AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.

Q. FINANCIAL TIMES. YOU SAID WE NEED IT, OR CAN WE DO IT BY OURSELVES?

A. YES, WELL IT'S A VERY GREAT HELP.



A. YES, WELL IT'S A VERY GREAT HELP.

SOVIET UNION AND CUBA?

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION OR DO YOU KNOW WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA ARE GIVING ANY ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA AND DO YOU THINK THIS WILL BREAK DOWN AS AN EAST/WEST ISSUE?

A. I THINK THE LAST IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. I'VE GOT VIRTUALLY NO INFORMATION ON THE FORMER - THERE IS OF COURSE CONTACT, NATURALLY; THE ARGENTINES ARE HAVING THEIR TRADE AFFECTED BY WHAT THE COMMUNITY HAS DONE AND NO DOUBT NOW BY WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOING, AND ARMS SUPPLIES ARE ALL CUT OFF FROM THEM. IN LATIN AMERICA ITSELF, WHEREAS THERE IS IN SOME QUARTERS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FOR THEM AND A SYMPATHY WITH THEIR POINT OF VIEW, - THERE IS ALSO A DESIRE THAT THE MILITARY SIDE OF IT SHOULD NOT ESCALATE. BUT ON YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTION, I HAVE VERY LITTLE INFORMATION, WHICH SUGGESTS TO ME THAT THERE PROBABLY ISN'T MORE THAN A FAIRLY SMALL AMOUNT OF CONTACT.

NEXT STEP IN NEGOTIATION?

Q. WHAT EXACTLY IS THE NEXT STEP TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING AGAIN?

A. I AM TRYING TO FIND ANY MEANS THAT WOULD PRODUCE A SUCCESSFUL RESULT. BUT I THINK THE REAL POINT IS A CHANGE OF HEART BY THE ARGENTINES. THEY MUST NOT REMAIN WITH THEIR CLAIM FOR ASSERTING SOVEREIGNTY. THEY HAVE HAD A CLAIM THEY SAY FOR A LONG TIME. OK, THERE ARE WAYS IN WHICH THAT CAN BE SETTLED AND IN FACT ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WERE ACTUALLY ROUND THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH THEM - UNTIL THEY TOOK THIS AGGRESSIVE ACTION, AND ALSO THEY HAVE GOT TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES, SO THOSE ARE TWO OF THE CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE MET AND I AM HERE TO SEARCH FOR WHATEVER WAYS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT.

HMG'S ATTITUDE TO HAIG PROPOSALS?

Q. CAN YOU STATE UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT IF ARGENTINA HAD ACCEPTED MR HAIG'S LAST SET OF PROPOSALS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE DONE THE SAME?

A. NO, I CANNOT SAY THAT UNAMBIGUOUSLY BECAUSE AS I HAD PERFECTLY CLEAR, AND SO DID MY PRIME MINISTER, IT HAD REAL DIFFICULTIES FOR US. BUT WHAT HE SAID IN HIS STATEMENT WAS THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD CONSIDER PROPOSALS ON THESE LINES; AND THE ANSWER IS THAT WE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING PROPOSALS ON THESE LINES. HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DID HAVE DIFFICULTIES FOR US; AND OF COURSE IT WAS RIGHT FOR THE



10  
ARGENTINES TO RESPOND FIRST, BUT AS THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DO THE BASIC ESSENTIALS, WHICH I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED, THEN THERE WAS NO POINT IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT GOING ANY FURTHER, THAT IS THE POSITION THERE.

UN SECRETARY-GENERAL?

Q. ARE YOU GOING TO NEW YORK TO SEEK HELP FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL, OR TO SEE WHAT HELP THEY MIGHT GIVE YOU?

A. I AM GOING TO EXPLORE WHATEVER POSSIBILITIES MAY EXIST - I HAVEN'T YET HAD THE CHANCE OF MEETING THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND I WANT TO DISCOVER WHAT IDEAS HE ~~MAY~~ HAVE, I WILL SHARE SOME VIEWS I MAY HAVE, AND I WILL SEE WHAT ~~PROGRESS~~ WE CAN MAKE.

ESCALATION IN LATIN AMERICA?

Q. DO YOU FEAR THAT THIS MIGHT JEOPARDISE RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND THAT IT WILL EXCALATE THE CONFLICT WITH PARTICIPATION OF OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES?

A. I AM AFRAID I DON'T THINK THAT; BUT EVEN IF THERE MIGHT BE AN ELEMENT OF TRUTH IN IT WE STILL HAVE TO DO WHAT WE ARE DOING BECAUSE THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT PUTTING THIS WRONG RIGHT ARE VERY SERIOUS INDEED, FOR MANY COUNTRIES IN ALL CONTINENTS, SO THERE MAY BE SOME RISK THERE, BUT I THINK THERE MIGHT BE EVEN GREATER RISK IF WE ALLOWED INTERNATIONAL DISORDER UNDER A THREAT - NOT A THREAT OF FORCE, THE ACTUAL USE OF FORCE - TO GO UNCHALLENGED.

MILITARY STRATEGY?

Q. IS YOUR STRATEGY SIMPLY TO CUT OFF THE FORCE ON THE ISLANDS AND STARVE THEM OUT? IS THAT THE BOTTOM LINE OF YOUR STRATEGY?

A. THERE IS NO BOTTOM LINE OF STRATEGY OF THAT KIND. WE ARE FIRST OF ALL THERE TO SECURE THE ZONE, AS I SAID. IT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY HAVE THAT RESULT, AND THAT MIGHT BE ENOUGH PERHAPS FOR THE ARGENTINES TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS - I RATHER DOUBT IT. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE GOT IS WHO ARE YOU DEALING WITH DOWN THERE? THERE ARE SO MANY VIEWS, THEY CHANGE THEIR MINDS. THE JUNTA THINKS ONE THING AND THE GENERALS AND THE ADMIRALS THINK SOMETHING ELSE, AND THEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAYS SOMETHING ELSE; IT'S VERY DIFFICULT IN THIS AREA TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THEY ARE THINKING. IF THAT SITUATION WERE TO ARISE, IT MAY BE FOR ALL I KNOW THAT THEY WOULD TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW; BUT WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CHANGE?



Q. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT **PART OF BRITAIN'S STRATEGY IS TO TRY TO GET A CHANGE OF ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT**. WOULD BRITAIN HAVE A BETTER CHANCE WITH A CHANGE IN THE JUNTA?

A. I HAVE 'NT THE SLIGHTEST IDEA AND I **AM** NOT SURE THAT I MIND VERY MUCH. IF THEY DECIDE TO CHANGE THEIR LEADERS - WELL, THAT IS A MATTER FOR THEM. IT IS QUITE CLEAR AND ON THE TABLE WHAT WE WANT, AND WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS REQUIRES THEM TO DO, AND IF THAT REQUIRES THEM TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT ONCE OR TWICE, SO BE IT.

UN PEACEKEEPING ROLE?

Q. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BRITAIN BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOME KIND OF UN PEACE KEEPING ROLE?

A. WELL THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. OF COURSE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDITIONS FULFILLED. WHETHER THAT IS THE BEST WAY OF DOING IT I DON'T KNOW. YOU SEE THERE DUGHTN'T REALLY TO BE THE NEED FOR A PEACE KEEPING ROLE, THEY DUGHT TO GO FROM THE ISLAND AND THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY DUGHT TO BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATIONS AS THE POSITION WAS BEFORE. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY OF SETTLING IT, IT CERTAINLY CAN'T BE SETTLED BY FORCE. THEY HAVE TRIED TO SETTLE IT BY FORCE, THEY HAVE INVADDED THE ISLAND AND THEY SHOW EVERY SIGN OF TRYING TO STAY THERE. SORRY, THAT CANNOT BE ALLOWED.

CHANCES OF AVOIDING FULL SCALE HOSTILITIES

Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE CHANCES ARE THAT THE SITUATION CAN BE DEFUSED WITHOUT COMING TO FULL-SCALE HOSTILITIES?

A. I CERTAINLY WOULDN'T GIVE UP HOPE OF THAT. SOME OF YOU IN THIS ROOM WOULD BE MUCH MORE EXPERIENCED THAN ME IN READING THE ARGENTINES' MIND AND HOW THEY WOULD BE THINKING ABOUT IT AND HOW THEY WOULD BE LOOKING AT IT. BUT I THINK THE VENTS OF YESTERDAY AND SOUTH GEORGIA HAVE CERTAINLY HAD THEIR EFFECT. I HAVEN'T ANY DOUBT OF IT. WHEN AIRCRAFT GET SHOT DOWN, AND WHEN THEY FIND WHEN THEY ARE CHALLENGED THEY LOSE, THAT WILL CONCENTRATE THEIR MINDS **VERY** SHARPLY; AND IT IS IN THIS SENSE AND IN THIS WAY THAT THE BUILD-UP OF MILITARY PRESSURE, ALONG WITH ALL THE OTHERS, HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON THE ATTAINMENT, WHICH IS OUR OBJECTIVE, OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

ARGENTINE RESOLVE?

Q. DO YOU DETECT ANY SOFTENING OF ARGENTINE RESOLVE?



A. I REASON THERE ARE A LOT OF WORRIED PEOPLE RUNNING AROUND BUENOS AIRES.

US MILITARY AID

Q. DO YOU THINK THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUPPLY THE UK WITH SOME DIRECT MEANS OF MILITARY AID?

A. WE RESPECT THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED US AND WE ARE QUITE SATISFIED WITH IT. AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT THAT THEY ARE GOING TO GIVE US IN THE GENERAL FIELD OF MATERIEL. SO WE ARE QUITE HAPPY ABOUT THAT, AND ARE VERY GRATEFUL FOR IT; AND I THINK THE IMPACT OF THEIR SUPPORT AND THE EFFECT IT WILL HAVE ON THE REST OF THE WORLD, THAT WE ARE ALL IN THIS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SELF DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, FOR THE CONTINUATION OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, FOR THE RIGHT TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE LIKE THIS.

HAIG ON MATERIEL SUPPORT

Q. DID HAIG TELL YOU WHAT IS OR IS NOT INCLUDED IN MATERIEL SUPPORT - FOR INSTANCE, AMERICAN SUPPLY PLANES TO FERRY SUPPLIES TO ASCENSION ISLAND?

A. NO I CAN'T GIVE YOU A SPECIFIC ANSWER ON THAT, BECAUSE WE JUST DISCUSSED AND EXPLORED THE GENERAL AREAS OF POSSIBLE SUPPORT, AND I AM GOING TO HAVE A FURTHER DISCUSSION THIS AFTERNOON WITH MR. WEINBERGER. BUT AGAIN IN MY CASE I AM NOT GOING TO GET DOWN TO THE DETAILS. IT'S THE EXPLORATION PERHAPS A LITTLE MORE CLOSELY, OF THE AREAS WHERE THEY THINK THEY CAN GIVE SUPPORT, AND WHERE THEY ARE ABLE TO, AND WOULD LIKE TO, AND IT WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED AND OF COURSE IT WILL ASSIST US.

NO BRITISH LANDING?

Q. DID YOU EARLIER ANSWERS SEEM TO RULE OUT BRITISH LANDING ON THE FALKLANDS IN FAVOUR OF SECURING THE 200 MILE ZONE?

A. I WOULDN'T COMMENT ON ANY SPECULATION ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF BRITISH FORCES, NOR WOULD I WISH IN ANY WAY TO SPECULATE ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE MILITARY ACTIONS. THERE ARE A LOT OF OPTIONS BUT WE ARE NOT TAKING ANY DECISIONS ABOUT THOSE AT THE MOMENT, THE POSITION IS EXACTLY AS I DESCRIBED IT: THE BUILD UP OF PRESSURE WHICH I HOPE WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF CAUSING THE JUNTA AND THOSE IN THE ARGENTINE TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND COME TO THEIR SENSES AND TAKE THEIR ARMY AWAY AND GET BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN A CIVILISED WAY.







LITERALLY A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE EFFECT THAT US MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE UK WOULD BE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS. THIS WAS SIMPLY NOT SO; THE AMERICANS WERE NOW THAT OUR MILITARY EFFORTS SHOULD SUCCEED AND THEY WERE THEREFORE READY TO GIVE MORE EXTENSIVE SUPPORT THAN THAT COVERED BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS. HAIG OFFERED TO SPEAK TO WEINBERGER IF THIS WOULD HELP, ALTHOUGH HE WAS SURE THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WOULD GIVE US EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WELCOMED THIS. HE EXPLAINED OUR THINKING IN GENERAL TERMS AND IT WAS LEFT THAT THE DETAILS WOULD BE FOLLOWED UP BY OFFICIALS THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS.

S E C R E T

/5. THE

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MENTIONED OUR CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE VENEZUELAN ACTIONS AGAINST THE FLEET. HAIG REPLIED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THIS QUESTION TO DISCOURAGE THE VENEZUELAN; HE THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT THERE WAS STILL PLENTY OF TIME TO DECIDE WHAT ACTION TO TAKE.

6 SECRETARY OS STATE REMINDED HAIG THAT IF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE PROLONGED, THE PROBLEM OF AIR COVER WOULD INCREASE. HE SUGGESTED TO HAIG (WITHOUT MAKING ANY SPECIFIC MENTION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS) THAT HE MIGHT GIVE SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHT TO THE QUESTION.

#### ECONOMIC

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO THE AMERICANS TAKING ACTION AGAINST IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA, AS OUR EC PARTNERS HAD DONE. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS THINKING OF WRITING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THANK HIM FOR HIS SUPPORT AND TO MAKE THE SAME POINT. HAIG MADE NO COMMITMENT ON SUBSTANCE, BUT VOLUNTEERED TO TAKE ACTION IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS (AND PARTICULARLY ROME) IF THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN GETTING THE EMBARGO EXTENDED; HE WOULD EMPHASISE THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT THE AMERICANS HAD OFFERED TO DO BY WAY OF SUPPORT IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

#### DIPLOMATIC

8. HAIG MADE IT CLEAR THAT, WHILE HE DID NOT WANT TO CUT ACROSS OUR MILITARY ACTIONS (WHICH HE AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED TO HAVE AN ESSENTIAL PART IN THE BUILDING UP OF PRESSURE), HE REMAINED CONCERNED THAT THE US SHOULD HAVE A CENTRAL ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT. THE PRESIDENT ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THIS BECAUSE OF THE US POSITION IN LATIN AMERICA. (IT WAS CLEAR ALSO FROM WHAT I WAS TOLD IN CONFIDENCE BY EAGLEBURGER THAT HAIG



CONCERNED THAT THE US SHOULD HAVE A CENTRAL ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT. THE PRESIDENT ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THIS BECAUSE OF THE US POSITION IN LATIN AMERICA. (IT WAS CLEAR ALSO FROM WHAT I WAS TOLD IN CONFIDENCE BY EAGLEBURGER THAT HAIG ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO HIS PERSONAL ROLE).

9. HAIG THEN EXPLAINED THE OUTLINE OF A POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, WHICH HAD ORIGINATED IN A PERUVIAN INITIATIVE, BUT HAD BEEN MODIFIED BY THE AMERICANS IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF OUR POSITION.

THE BASIC ELEMENTS WOULD COMPRISE:

(I) AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE

(II) A MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES:

(III) THE INVOLVEMENT OF THIRD PARTIES ON A TEMPORARY BASIS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS:

(IV) ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH PARTIES OF THE FACT THAT A DISPUTE OVER SOVEREIGNTY EXISTS:

(V) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE VIEWS AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN REACHING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT:

(VI) A CONTACT GROUP OF BRAZIL, PERU, THE FRG AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE FORMED: AND

(VII) A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED BY 30 APRIL 1983, FOR WHICH THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE.

10. HAIG ARGUED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THESE BROAD LINES WOULD AMOUNT TO A HUMILIATION FOR ARGENTINA, BUT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE JUNTA AS OUR MILITARY PRESSURE INCREASED. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD DISCUSSED THESE IDEAS WITH GALTIERI LAST NIGHT (THE US AMBASSADOR AT LIMA HAD BEEN IN THE ROOM AT THE TIME) AND THE AMERICANS HAD HEARD THIS MORNING VIA COSTA MENDEZ THAT ARGENTINA MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT SOMETHING LIKE THEM.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT AT THE DRAFTING STAGE, BUT IT MIGHT WELL BE THAT SOMETHING ON THESE LINES COULD PROVE USEFUL AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. FURTHER PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE THEY WERE LIKELY TO AGREE TO OUR BASIC REQUIREMENTS. HAIG AGREED THAT THIS WAS ESSENTIAL - WE NEEDED ANOTHER DAY LIKE YESTERDAY. MR PYM ADDED THAT IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE ESSENTIAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THAT THE US SHOULD BE A MEMBER OF THE CONTACT GROUP (THE ARGENTINES HAVE APPARENTLY OBJECTED AND PROPOSED CANADA INSTEAD) AND THAT THEY SHOULD GUARANTEE THE SETTLEMENT. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY THAT PARLIAMENT WOULD ACCEPT ANY CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO OVER SOUTH GEORGIA AFTER ITS SUCCESSFUL RECAPTURE, AND THAT ANY SUCH AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SEEN AS APPLYING TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ONLY.



BE A MEMBER OF THE CONTACT GROUP (THE ARGENTINES HAVE APPARENTLY OBJECTED AND PROPOSED CANADA INSTEAD) AND THAT THEY SHOULD GUARANTEE THE SETTLEMENT. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY THAT PARLIAMENT WOULD ACCEPT ANY CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO OVER SOUTH GEORGIA AFTER ITS SUCCESSFUL RECAPTURE, AND THAT ANY SUCH AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SEEN AS APPLYING TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ONLY.

12. HAIG TOOK NOTE, AND AGREED THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO BRING ANY GREATER PRECISION TO THE DISCUSSIONS. MEANWHILE HE HOPED (AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED) THAT WE WOULD NOT GET EMBROILED IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE P.M. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON RETURN.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(36) + 7 CAB

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

HD/S AM D (PCO DIST + A/D P/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEES D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLE )  
MR HAVIN )  
MR PBRETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

*mf*

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 022300Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1562 OF 2 MAY

INFO FLA SH UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE  
AND AMBASSADOR).

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 15661 FALKLANDS, YOUR TALK WITH HAIG

1. AS YOU HAD TO CATCH THE PLANE TO NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY AFTER  
HAIG TELEPHONED YOU THIS AFTERNOON FOLLOWING TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS  
YOU ASKED ME TO RING HIM AND CLARIFY TWO POINTS.

2. THIS I HAVE DONE, EXPLAINING THAT THERE WERE A GREAT MANY POINTS  
THAT NEEDED CLARIFYING IN THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS AND THAT YOU  
WOULD NOT WANT TO BE SUDDENLY FACED WITH A COMMUNICATION FROM HIM,  
HAIG, SAYING THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD AGREED AND THAT IT WAS NOW  
UP TO US TO SAY THAT WE DID LIKEWISE.

3. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS VERY MUCH AWARE OF THIS. HE WOULD AVOID  
ANYTHING LIKE THAT HAPPENING. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE  
PROPOSALS OFFERED UP A GREAT DEAL. PERHAPS THE ONLY AREA WHERE IT  
WAS LESS THAN IDEAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THE INVOLVEMENT OF



WAS LESS THAN IDEAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THE INVOLVEMENT OF THIRD PARTIES IN THE TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS. ACCORDING TO HIS LATEST INFORMATION ARGENTINA WERE SAYING THAT THEY WOULD WANT THE CONTACT GROUP, WHICH WOULD CARRY OUT THIS TASK, TO BE COMPOSED OF VENEZUELA AND CANADA, AS WELL AS BRAZIL, PERU, THE FRG AND THE USA. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT WOULD MEAN THERE WOULD BE THREE LATIN AMERICANS IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. IF DECISIONS HAD TO BE TAKEN BY A MAJORITY THEY COULD BLOCK IT. VENEZUELA WAS PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE GIVEN THEIR KNOWN CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH ARGENTINA IN THE RECENT CRISIS. HAIG SAID THAT TO HAVE AS MANY AS SIX WAS OF COURSE ABSURD BUT HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR ENGAGING VENEZUELA IN THE PROCESS. HE ASKED ME WHETHER THERE WAS ANY OTHER COUNTRY OF THE AREA THAT HE WOULD PREFER. I SAID TRINIDAD WOULD BE MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE.

4. I SAID THAT IT WAS TOO SUDDEN FOR US TO BE NEGOTIATING NEW PROPOSALS. YOU DID NOT WANT TO BE RUSHED. YOU HAD NOT CONSULTED LONDON ABOUT THEM. MOREOVER THERE WAS ANOTHER AREA OF DOUBT IN YOUR MIND. WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN IN PRACTICAL TERMS IF THE PARTIES AGREED? HOW COULD WE BE SURE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE GOING TO STICK BY THE SCHEME. HAIG SAID THAT IF IT CAME TO THE POINT HE WOULD GIVE THE ARGENTINIANS A SHORT SPACE OF TIME, SAY 24 HOURS, IN WHICH TO SEND THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER TO A GIVEN PLACE WITH FULL AUTHORITY FROM THE JUNTA TO SIGN UP. HAIG ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS MIGHT SAY THAT THEY COULD ONLY COMPLY WITH THIS TIMETABLE IF THERE WAS NO FURTHER BRITISH MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE ISLANDS IN THE MEANTIME; AND THEY WOULD GIVE AN UNDERTAKING THAT THEY WOULD NOT ENTER THE TEZ. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT DO ANYTHING THAT INHIBITED US FROM MAINTAINING THE MILITARY PRESSURE.

5. HAIG SAID THAT HE WOULD GET INTO TOUCH WITH ME AS SOON AS HE HEARD AGAIN FROM THE ARGENTINIANS.

HENDERSON

NNNN



FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 HRS, 2 MAY

Port Stanley Airport

1. Vulcan aircraft attacked the airfield during the night of 30 April. At dawn on 1 May, Sea Harriers made further attacks. The operations were successful.
2. Following Argentine attacks in the TEZ on the British Task Force, an Argentine Mirage and a Canberra bomber were shot down. HM Ships involved sustained minor splinter damage. There was no loss of British aircraft or any serious British casualties.
3. Reports indicate that the Argentines may have shot down one of their own Mirage aircraft.
4. A naval bombardment of the airfield at Port Stanley also took place during the day. Relevant MOD press statements attached.

President Galtieri's Speech

5. General Galtieri finally addressed the Argentine people on national radio and television at 0249 GMT. The speech had originally been announced for 0100 hrs GMT). He said intimidation and threats had been used against Argentina which had the understanding of the Non-Aligned countries. There was no other way of replying to the British use of force than replying with force. Argentina had tried to get conciliation and peace by every means possible.

Total Exclusion Zone

6. There are reports that some Eastern European fishing vessels were still in the TEZ on 1 May. Telegrams have been sent to our Embassies in the countries involved.

United States

7. The Secretary of State and Sir Nicholas Henderson are seeing Mr Haig at about 14.30 (BST) today. Mr Reagan said that the attack on Port Stanley airfield came as a surprise to the United States.

Canada

8. Mr MacQuigan at an interview in his constituency also said the attack had been a complete surprise and that he only learned of 'these things' from the newspapers.


Cuba

9. Rumours are circulating in Havana of a further Cuban aircraft encountering difficulties with Brazil to transit to Buenos Aires.



Japan

10. The international press reported that the Japanese Government had imposed economic sanctions against Argentina. The Japanese Embassy in Buenos Aires said this was unfounded and false.



2 May 1982

T H Steggle  
Emergency Unit



BOMBING OF PORT STANLEY AIRPORT

The MOD have issued the following press statement am.  
1 May:

'We have been enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone since Noon London time on Friday, 30 April in exercise of the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The notice issued on 28 April made it clear that after 48 hours' warning the airport would be closed and that any aircraft on the ground would be liable to attack. Early this morning British aircraft took action to enforce the Total Exclusion Zone and to deny the Argentines the use of the airstrip at Port Stanley. We are not yet able to give details but will do so as soon as we have authoritative information.'

The Ministry of Defence have issued the following further statement (pm. 1 May):-

'Vulcan aircraft refuelled by Victor Tankers attacked the Port Stanley air field during the night. Subsequently at dawn Sea Harriers carried out further attacks. Both operations were successful. All aircraft and personnel involved have now returned. There are no casualties. Further details of the operations will be given when available.'

STATEMENT ISSUED BY MOD AT 2145Z ON SATURDAY, 1 MAY 1982

'Further information about the air engagement is coming in. British aircraft have engaged a number of Argentine bombers, believed to be Canberras, and have shot at least one down and damaged another.'

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE STATEMENT ISSUED 10.15 PM, SATURDAY  
1 MAY 1982

'A report has been received from the Task Force that an air engagement took place this evening within the TEZ between British Sea Harriers and Argentine Mirages. One Mirage was shot down. There are no reports of damage to British aircraft.'

TEXT OF MINISTRY OF DEFENCE PRESS STATEMENT MADE AT 00.15 HOURS  
ON 2 MAY 1982

'Throughout the later part of the day elements of the British Task Force off the Falkland Islands and within the Total Exclusion Zone have been subject to attacks by Argentine fighter and bomber aircraft. The Task Force Commander took the necessary defensive measures and RN Sea Harriers engaged Argentine Mirage and Canberra aircraft off the Falklands. We can confirm that one

/Argentine



Argentine Mirage fighter and one Argentine Canberra bomber have been shot down. A number of Argentine aircraft also sustained serious damage. Reports indicate that the Argentines may have shot down one of their own Mirage aircraft. There have been no losses of British aircraft.

A naval bombardment of the airfield at Port Stanley also took place during the day.

We can categorically deny reports that a British ship has been seriously damaged. HM ships involved only sustained minor splinter damage. There have been no reports of serious casualties among British Servicemen.'





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 May 1982

*Likelihood are changing  
day by day - I  
should prefer to  
wait. before sending  
a message.  
not*

*Fairly*

Prime Minister

*Content to send message?*

*HR 2/5*

Mrs Gandhi: Falklands

In my letter of 27 April I reported Sir John Thomson's advice that we should hold in reserve for the time being a Prime Ministerial message to Mrs Gandhi on the Falklands and drew attention to his proposal to call on Mrs Gandhi on her return from Saudi Arabia.

Sir John Thomson saw Mrs Gandhi on 28 April, with the somewhat disappointing outcome reported in his enclosed telegram no 431. Now might be an appropriate moment for the Prime Minister to send a personal message. Although such a message is unlikely to persuade the Indian Government to reconsider their support for the position recently adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement, it can equally do no harm to our cause. A draft telegram to Delhi is enclosed.

*Gandhi*

*PP* (J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



11- MAY 1982





# OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

Precedence/Deskby  
**IMMEDIATE**

S  
 EATS  
 BY  
 CO  
 ADD  
 NO

1 ZCZC  
 2 GRS  
 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 4  
 5  
 6 FM FCO           Z MAY 82  
 7 TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI  
 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 YOUR TELNO 431: FALKLAND ISLANDS

10 1. In view of Mrs Gandhi's private criticism of our actions,  
 11 but subject to your views on timing, the Prime Minister wishes  
 12 to take the opportunity offered by Mrs Gandhi's letter to send  
 13 the following personal message:

14 Begins. Dear Prime Minister. It was kind of you to write  
 15 in such warm terms about your recent visit. I was delighted to  
 16 have you in London and hope very much that our talks will  
 17 produce the results expected of them. It is, I believe, a cause  
 18 for mutual satisfaction that our agreement on IDA is already  
 19 starting to bear fruit.

20 You will know from Sir John Thomson that I share your  
 21 concern about developments in the South Atlantic. I can assure  
 22 you that we are doing everything in our power to find a peaceful  
 23 solution. We have taken every possible step that has a  
 24 reasonable prospect of helping to achieve our objectives - the  
 25 withdrawal of Argentine forces and the end of their illegal

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword occupation
File number	Dept S/S OFFICE	Distribution SAmD Cabinet Office Additional Dist. Falkland Islands  cc: PS/Chancellor) Sir K Couzens) Mr Littler    ) Mr Hawtin    ) Treasury Mr Peretz     ) Mr Ilett      ) Sir M Palliser, Cabinet Office
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcenreference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats	Page
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1 <<<<  
2 occupation of the Islands, the restoration of British  
3 administration, and a long-term solution acceptable to the  
4 inhabitants of the Falkland Islands, as well as to the British  
5 and Argentine Governments. It is my earnest hope that these  
6 objectives can be achieved by negotiation.  
7 Our action throughout has been based on a mandatory Sec-  
8 urity Council Resolution which calls for Argentine withdrawal  
9 and a negotiated solution to the dispute. This is a stand  
10 which has received the widest support from the international  
11 community, particularly from our Commonwealth colleagues. For  
12 their part, the Argentine Government have made no move to  
13 comply with their international obligations and responsibilities  
14 by ensuring that a peaceful solution is reached in accordance  
15 with the demands of the Security Council. In these circumstan-  
16 ces, we have had no choice but to exercise our unquestionable  
17 right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations  
18 Charter.  
19 Of course, if Argentine forces are withdrawn from the  
20 Islands we shall immediately cease hostilities and stand ready to  
21 enter into negotiation with a view to resolving the underlying  
22 dispute. What is needed now is for all the democratic peoples of  
23 the world to urge the Argentine Government to take the  
24 necessary steps to make such a solution possible. This sort of  
25 pressure is important if we are to reach a peaceful conclusion.  
26 Ends.  
27  
28 PYM  
29 NNNN  
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34

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/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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A. (111)  
Fse 020/8. R. & P.H.  
C. 29/12

GRS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DELHI 290700Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 431 OF 29 APRIL

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 420: <sup>(96)</sup> FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL

T.F.K

1. I PUT OUR CASE TO MRS GANDHI YESTERDAY EVENING. I SAID WE WERE NOT ASKING HER FOR ANY SPECIFIC ACTION INTERNATIONALLY BUT I FELT I SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THE STRENGTH OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE.

2. MRS GANDHI WAS MOST AFFABLE BUT SAID SHE DID NOT APPROVE EITHER OF WHAT THE ARGENTINES HAD DONE OR OF WHAT WE WERE DOING. SOMEWHAT VAGUELY SHE INDICATED THAT SHE HAD TO FOLLOW THE LINE TAKEN BY THE NON-ALIGNED. I SAID THAT VIRTUALLY EVERY GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE THAT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW THE DECISIONS OF THE UN, IN THIS CASE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, TOOK PRECEDENCE OVER THE COMMUNIQUE OF ANY GROUP OF COUNTRIES. MRS GANDHI SMILED AND DID NOT REPLY. I CONTINUED THAT I HOPED THAT SHE ACTUALLY DISAPPROVED OF WHAT THE ARGENTINES HAD DONE. SHE ASSURED ME THAT SHE DID. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE ACTING SCRUPULOUSLY UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER AND WERE USING FORCE ONLY TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE.

3. MRS GANDHI SAID THE ARGENTINES WERE CLAIMING THAT THE REASON WHY THE POPULATION OF THE FALKLANDS WAS NOW OVERWHELMINGLY BRITISH WAS THAT WE HAD FORCEABLY REMOVED THE FORMER ARGENTINIAN INHABITANTS. MY EXPLANATION OF THE REMOVAL OF THE PENAL COLONY IN 1833 MADE HER SMILE AGAIN. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT A COLONIAL DISPUTE.

4. I MADE SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE NATURE OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS AND ABOUT THE DEPLORABLE EXAMPLE WHICH THE JUNTA IN ARGENTINA WAS SETTING FOR OTHER DISPUTES ELSEWHERE, WHETHER ISLANDS OR FRONTIERS. MRS GANDHI PLAINLY GOT THE POINT. I SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT DECENT CONVENTIONS SHOULD BE UPHELD IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE AND THAT I HOPED THAT WHEN THE ANSWER TO A FORTHCOMING PQ WAS FRAMED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WOULD MAKE IT PLAIN THAT THEY THOUGHT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN ALL ITS PARTS. MRS GANDHI SAID SHE WAS UNAWARE OF THE PQ AND INSTRUCTED HER NOTETAKER TO LOOK INTO IT.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

5. THIS CONVERSATION WAS UNSATISFACTORY IN THAT IT DID NOT PRODUCE ANY EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION, BUT IT WAS INTERESTING THAT MRS GANDHI DID NOT ASK THAT WE SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE VIEWS OF THE NON-ALIGNED OR MAKE ANY SUGGESTION AS TO WHAT OUR POLICY SHOULD BE. I AM REASONABLY SATISFIED THAT SHE UNDERSTANDS THE MAIN POINTS IN OUR CASE AND SEES THEIR STRENGTH. NEVERTHELESS I THINK THAT IN PUBLIC THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WILL PROBABLY TRY TO MAINTAIN SOME SORT OF BALANCE.

THOMSON

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FAKLAND ISLANDS

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MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

2  
CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 May 1982

Prime Minister

No longer of immediate relevance -  
but you may still wish to see.

A.F.C. 4/5

Den John

Falkland Islands: Implementing  
Legislation

In your letter of 28 April you asked whether the draft protocol on the Special Interim Authority would require to be implemented by an Order in Council and whether such an Order would need to be laid before Parliament.

The Haig proposals of 23 April consist of three documents: a Memorandum of Agreement, the Protocol on the Special Interim Authority and a letter from the US Government accepting the verification function. All three would require implementing legislation. Our Legal Advisers have been considering the nature and content of such legislation and have been preparing, on a contingency basis, drafts of the instruments which they think would be necessary; and in so doing they have kept in close touch with the Law Officers' Department. Their view is that an Act of Parliament would not be required, but that amendments would be needed to the existing Falkland Islands constitutional instruments. An Order in Council conferring privileges and immunities on the Special Interim Authority and persons connected with it, and on US observers, would also be necessary.

The existing constitutional instruments consist of Letters Patent, Royal Instructions and the Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) Orders 1948 to 1977. Unless the settlement excluded the Dependencies, we do not think the Letters Patent would have to be amended. The other two instruments would however need amendment to provide for Argentine members in the Executive and Legislative Councils and for decisions and laws to be approved by the Special Interim Authority. The amendments to the Royal Instructions are not subject to any Parliamentary procedure but the Order amending the Legislative Council Orders would have to be laid before Parliament after it had been made. The amending Order would not, however, be subject to any negative resolution procedure.

The Protocol and the US letter accepting the verification function require privileges and immunities to be

/accorded





accorded to the Special Interim Authority, to persons connected with it and to the US observers. Although it would be possible to do this by a local ordinance once British administration has been restored it would in the circumstances probably be preferable to do it by an Order in Council made under the British Settlements Acts 1887 and 1945 (the legislation under which the Legislative Council Orders would be amended). This Order would also have to be laid before Parliament after it had been made but, unlike Orders made under the International Organisations Act 1968 conferring privileges and immunities on international organisations, would not be subject to any affirmative (or negative) resolution procedure. Although the scale of privileges and immunities would be higher than would normally be justifiable, in the very special circumstances of this case we would not expect the Order to provoke much, if any, criticism in Parliament.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (MOD), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and Henry Steel (Law Officers Dept).

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



Mufaxed

Mufaxed to Chayen  
and amendments passed to  
FCO 1/5



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

R

1 May 1982

Overlate

Dear John

MR 4/5

US Measures against Argentina

Nicko Henderson has recommended from Washington that the best way to persuade the Americans to impose an import ban would be for the Secretary of State to take to Washington a personal request from the Prime Minister to the President on this matter.

/

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agrees. I attach the draft for such a message. Mr Pym hopes that the Prime Minister will be able to consider this before he leaves for Washington at 6.00 pm today.

*John Fall*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



**DRAFT:** minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

**FROM:**

Reference

Prime Minister  
**DEPARTMENT:**

**TEL. NO:**

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

**TO:**

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

President Reagan

Copies to:

**PRIVACY MARKING**

**SUBJECT:**

.....In Confidence

**CAVEAT**.....

I am tremendously heartened by the way you and Al Haig have come out in our support over the Falkland Islands. This will make it unmistakably clear to the Argentines that they cannot profit from aggression.

The measures you have announced, suspending supplies of military equipment and denying new export credit guarantees, will show the Argentines that you are in earnest. I hope that the measures on military supplies will enable your people to prevent the export of any equipment which might be used for military purposes, such as engines for the Sky-hawk aircraft.

*I wonder if I could ask you*  
 Can I however ~~ask you~~ to consider going ~~even~~ further and to impose a complete ban on imports to the United States from Argentine? I believe this would be <sup>the best</sup> the most effective single measure which you could take to bring this crisis to a solution by peaceful means. <sup>and so that we must make every effort to do that.</sup> It would match the action which our European and Commonwealth partners have taken.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

It would encourage the Community to maintain their own ban, imposed initially for one month, should this prove necessary. It would induce other countries, like Japan, to do the same. The political impact on the  
 /Argentine



Argentine junta would be extremely powerful ~~from the outset~~. They would face the prospect of 40% of their overseas markets being closed to them. The economic impact would be slower to take effect. But if it brings the Argentine junta to their senses quickly, it could be reversed without lasting damage.

I know that this will affect your economic interests, which are greater in the area than ours are. But the same is true of several of our European partners, especially Italy and Germany. They have been ready to take these radical measures, despite political and legal problems, because they see the very dangerous threat to the security of us all if Argentine aggression is not reversed. I hope most sincerely that you can do the same.

So many young lives are at risk - British & Argentines - that I feel we must make a supreme effort to prevent a major military clash. Reason, humanity, common sense has so far failed. With all my heart, I <sup>hope</sup> ~~trust~~ that the measures I propose will succeed.

Warm Regards



PRIME MINISTER

Sitrep on this morning's action

The origin of this sitrep is a verbal report by C-in-C Fleet.

All the aircraft are OK. One Sea Harrier was holed by a shell but returned to the Carrier. The Vulcan cratered the middle of the run-way and the Harriers cratered either end of it. The Goose Green planes and dummies were destroyed. Argentine Mirage jets were airborne but were never in a position to attack (presumably shortage of fuel).

*ms.*

*Bausford*

*PP* Duty Clerk

1 May 1982



A.P.C.

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 HOURS, 1 MAY 1982

Secretary of State's Movements

1. The Secretary of State leaves for Washington at 6.00 pm on 1 May. He proposes to travel to New York on Sunday evening, 2 May, and return to London on Monday evening, 3 May.

UN

2. Sr Costa Mendez has reaffirmed to the President of the Security Council Argentina's wish to continue negotiations. But there is no sign of any change in the Argentine position on sovereignty. Sr Costa Mendez has told the Secretary-General that Argentina saw 'no inconvenience' in action by the United Nations. Argentina did not see the Haig negotiations as dead.

3. Sr Costa Mendez is reported to have left New York for Buenos Aires.

4. Brazil has sent a message to the Secretary-General expressing the view that the UN 'should activate' its peace-keeping mechanisms and reminding him of the UN's responsibility for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 'in all its aspects'.


5. But at close of play in New York on 30 April, Sir Anthony Parsons had seen no sign of anyone seeking an early move to the Security Council.

World Press Reactions

6. Sr Costa Mendez' statements in New York appear to have had some success with the world press. There have been reports in various countries that Argentina has accepted Security Council Resolution 502.

United States

7. At a meeting with TV correspondents on 30 April, President Reagan said that 'he was sure that the United States would honour any requests for aid because he knew that they [the British] would not make any request which we [the United States] could not honour'. He also said that 'we stand ready - and both sides know it - to help if needs be to achieve a peaceful settlement'.



E J Sharland  
Emergency Unit

1 May 1982



PRIME MINISTER

Falklands - Sunday Times Opinion Poll

The Sunday Times will publish tomorrow the following results of a poll taken on Friday:-

1. How many British Servicemen's lives would you be prepared to see lost? - 60% said none
2. How many Falkland Islanders' lives would you be prepared to see lost? - 66% said none
3. What should determine the British Government's long-term policy on the Falkland Islands?:-
  - a) the wishes of the Falkland Islanders alone - 24%
  - b) the interests of Britain as a whole taking the Falkland Islanders' views into account - 72%
4. If there were a General Election tomorrow how would you vote?

Conservative	43%
Labour	30%
Alliance	25%
5. 62% believed the British Government's position on willingness to use force was about right.

The Sunday Times will of course stress that the poll was conducted on Friday, i.e. before this morning's action at Port Stanley airfield.

Ian Kydd

1 May 1982



RESTRICTED

SAPU(82)12

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT

The attached paper issued at 1730 hours on Saturday 1 May 1982 contains suggested lines to take on the following:

1. Raid on Port Stanley airport
2. Mr Pym's Visit to Washington
3. Mr Pym's Visit to New York
4. Role of the UN
5. Costa Mendez

Cabinet Office

1 May 1982

RESTRICTED



## Raid on Port Stanley Airport

1. The following announcement was issued by the MOD at 1550 hours:

"Vulcan aircraft refuelled by Victor tankers attacked the Port Stanley airfield during the night. Subsequently at dawn Sea Harriers carried out further attacks. Both operations were successful. All aircraft and personnel involved have now returned. There are no [British] casualties."

Further details of the operations will be released later.

## Line to take

Should not have been a surprise to anyone. As Mr Pym said yesterday evening we have to take whatever steps we judge necessary to secure and hold the Total Exclusion Zone. We gave over two days warning of our intentions. We stated specifically that we would close Port Stanley airport and that aircraft on the ground would be liable to attack. Shows we mean business.

- Argentine reports of Harriers shot down?

Nonsense.

- Does this mean we have abandoned search for peaceful solution?

No. The enforcement of the TEZ which will isolate the occupying forces is the next turn of the screw in our policy of applying military and economic pressure to secure Argentine withdrawal which remains a prerequisite for negotiations on long-term solution.

- Responsibility for escalation?

Responsibility for the whole situation lies with Argentines. They committed the aggression when they invaded the Falklands. They have refused to comply with the Security/Council Resolution which calls on them to withdraw and have turned down Mr Haig's proposals. They have been using this time to reinforce their troops on the Falklands. We have been left with no alternative but to step up military measures in right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.



### Mr Pym's Visit to Washington

2. Mr Pym is going to Washington for consultation with Mr Haig in the new circumstances created by the US decision to come down on the side of Britain. We are grateful to Haig for his remarkable efforts, and delighted by new US support. Right in the circumstances to 'take stock together' and to consider how best to carry forward our efforts to secure Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands. Quite different from the last visit. Not a negotiating session. A consultation between friends and allies.

#### - US sanctions?

Delighted with the measures already announced. Political impact in Argentina certain to be significant. Withholding of military exports and credit and willingness to supply 'materiel support for British forces' amount to unambiguous and full-hearted support. Will no doubt be discussing this - and other measures which the Americans might consider in due course - during visit.

#### - Have you asked for military help?

No. President Reagan and Mr Haig have made it quite clear that there will be no direct US military intervention but that they are willing to respond positively to requests for supplies, equipment, etc. Cannot discuss publicly any details.

### Visit to New York

3. Mr Pym is taking the opportunity of visit to Washington to meet UN Secretary-General in New York. His first meeting with Mr Perez de Cuellar. He will put the British position to him and consult him on the possibilities and constraints of the UN in this context, but has no specific requests or proposals to make.

### Role of the UN

4. We went to the UN as our first act. Argentine invasion was in defiance of appeal of President of Security Council. The Council has spoken and the first priority is to implement Security Council Resolution 502 which determines that Argentine aggression was a breach of international peace and security. (which leaves the UK the right of self-defence under Article 51) and demands the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands. Further UN roles not excluded but must be realistic about the difficulties.



- Replace Mr Haig by UN mediation, good offices etc?

Difficult to see how any conceivable alternative could have as much chance of success as Mr Haig with his great authority and particular relationship with both parties.

UN mediation likely to be encumbered with constraints and on past form likely to be slow. And time is short.

- New Security Council Resolution, eg on sanctions?

The Council has spoken. Must implement Resolution 502. Sanctions would be very slow to bite, and in any event it is likely that Russians will block any measures against Argentina.

- UN presence on the Islands in the interim period?

Unfortunately we have not yet got to that stage.

- Why not go to the ICJ?

Here again we are not yet at the stage when this would become an option. But Argentina does not recognise compulsory jurisdiction of the court and has refused when we have tried in the past to submit on sovereignty over the Dependencies. Moreover, she refused to accept the result of arbitration of the Beagle Channel when the ruling went against her. The precedents are therefore not encouraging.

In summary, we cannot accept procedures which would leave the aggressor holding sway in the Islands while long drawn out negotiations proceed. Immediate Argentine withdrawal the indispensable first priority. British strategy remains unchanged: the mobilisation of pressures - political, economic and military - to induce Argentina to withdraw with minimum use of force; while keeping open the channel for diplomatic communication. Meanwhile we tighten the screw (eg Stanley airport). We must go on hoping that the Junta will realise they have to obey SCR 502 and that we will not abandon our rights.

Costa Mendez (Reports of remarks yesterday in New York)

5. Always difficult to be sure how much weight to attach to Argentine statements. Complex decision making process in Buenos Aires, contradictory signals and frequent changes of mind. It is no use the Argentine Foreign Minister pretending that the government is willing to implement Security Council



Resolution 502 in its entirety if at the same time he reaffirms that sovereignty is not negotiable. The Argentine position has been throughout that, whatever arrangements are made, they must lead ineluctably to Argentine sovereignty regardless of the wishes of the people. That is intolerable. Argentine statements should be judged by that criterion.



deared by PM

CONFIDENTIAL

T92A/82

Modified to  
Chapman  
12:30



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 May 1982

Den John

PM agreed without  
amendments. FCO informed  
13:30 pm  
① 115

Falklands: Rio Treaty Meeting

In his telegram of 28 April, the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, as President of the Meeting of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, conveyed to the Prime Minister the message contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Resolution passed at the meeting, appealing for Britain to cease hostilities and for a truce to be called.

I recommend that the Prime Minister should reply, and attach a suggested draft telegram for this purpose.

G. J. P. Fall  
[Signature]

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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ZCZC  
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1 ZCZC  
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7 IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
8 TELEGRAM NO  
9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN  
10 ASUNCION, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRIDGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, KINGSTON,  
11 LAPAZ, LIMA, QUITO, MONTEVIDEO, PANAMA CITY, MEXICO CITY,  
12 PORT AU PRINCE (VIA KINGSTON) PORT OF SPAIN, CARACAS, SAN JOSE,  
13 SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, ST DOMINGO, UKDEL NATO  
14 YOUR TELNO 1491: FALKLANDS: RIO TREATY RESOLUTION  
15 1. In accordance with paragraph 7 of the resolution passed on  
16 26 April, Valdes Otero, as Chairman of the Consultation Meeting,  
17 has transmitted to the Prime Minister a message dated 28 April  
18 conveying the appeals in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Resolution.  
19 2. Please deliver to the OAS in Washington the following reply  
20 from the Prime Minister to Valdes Otero.  
21 Begins. 'To His Excellency Estanislao Valdes Otero President of  
22 the 20th Meeting of Consultation Of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.  
23 Thank you for your letter of 28 April drawing to my attention  
24 paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Resolution which was adopted by the  
25 Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at its

///  
//  
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword second
File number	Dept Sofs	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) B J P Fall		
Telephone number 233 5791		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
2

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1 <<<<

2 second plenary session on 26 April, and enclosing a copy of the  
3 Resolution.

4 I note with regret that the resolution takes no account of the  
5 fact that it is Argentina which bears the responsibility for  
6 initiating hostilities by its unlawful invasion of the Falkland  
7 Islands and the Dependencies on 2 and 3 April; and for  
8 continuing them by building up its presence on the islands in  
9 defiance of a mandatory resolution of the Security Council of  
10 the United Nations, which unequivocally demands the immediate  
11 withdrawal of all Argentine forces. The British Government,  
12 for its part, <sup>continues to make every effort to achieve a negotiated</sup> wishes a peaceful solution to the present  
13 situation, ~~and has for over three weeks been seeking to achieve~~  
14 ~~this~~ in accordance with Security Council resolution 502 of the  
15 UN Security Council, <sup>But in</sup> ~~which calls for the withdrawal of all~~  
16 ~~Argentine forces.~~ <sup>must</sup> In view of Argentina's failure to comply  
17 with this resolution, Britain <sup>must</sup> reserves the right to exercise its  
18 inherent right of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of  
19 the UN Charter of the United Nations. Margaret Thatcher, Prime  
20 Minister' ends.

22 PYM

23 NNNN

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NNNN ends  
telegram

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Catchword



ANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(4) + 7 CAB

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PS/MR ONSLOW  
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MR WRIGHT  
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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
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MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWKIN )  
MR PEREPE ) TREASURY  
MR JETT )  
MR MCINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GR 800  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM WASHINGTON 011658Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1558 OF 1 MAY  
INFO UKM:IS NEW YORK AND BIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS - US PRESS

FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF EDITORIALS:-

(A) WASHINGTON POST

BACKING THE BRITS

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S HESITATION TO COME TO OPEN SUPPORT OF BRITAIN IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WAS PRINCIPLED, SINCE IT PROVIDED A BASIS TO ATTEMPT MEDIATION. WHEN ARGENTINA STOOD FIRM ON ITS ABSURD DEMAND TO HAVE ITS AGGRESSION RATIFIED, HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO COME TO THE EQUALLY PRINCIPLED DECISION IT ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY: TO BACK THE BRITS.

THE MOVE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN EASY FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN, GIVEN HIS EARLIER EFFORTS TO COME CLOSER TO AN AUTHORITARIAN ARGENTINE REGIME



FOR PURPOSES OF FIGHTING COMMUNISM IN THE HEMISPHERE. NOR WILL THE  
THE PURPOSE OF FIGHTING COMMUNISM IN THE HEMISPHERE, NOR WILL THE

EXPECTED ENHANCEMENT OF AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH EUROPE ALTOGETHER COMPENSATE FOR THE COMPLICATIONS LIKELY TO COME IN LATIN AMERICA. MR. REAGAN, HOWEVER, HAS SERVED THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF WORLD ORDER. HE HAS SHOWN, AS SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG PUT IT, THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT CONDONE THE USE OF UNLAWFUL FORCE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES BETWEEN NATIONS -- EVEN WHEN FORCE IS USED BY A FRIENDLY STATE.

THE STEPS THE ADMINISTRATION NOW CONTEMPLATES TO HELP BRITAIN ENTAIL NOT DIRECT MILITARY PARTICIPATION BUT SUPPLIES, PLUS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE CAREFULLY LEFT OPEN A POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. THE BRITISH PRESUMABLY WILL NOT BE BLIND TO THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THESE LATEST EVENTS ON NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS; CERTAINLY THE REQUIREMENT FOR BRITISH FLEXIBILITY HAS NOT EVAPORATED.

SENSIBLE ELEMENTS REMAINING IN BUENOS AIRES SHOULD SEE THAT AMERICAN MEDIATION CONTINUES TO OFFER ARGENTINA ITS BEST EXIT FROM THE CRISIS. IN PARTICULAR THEY SHOULD NOTE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION STILL HOLDS ITSELF READY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT QUOTE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES UNQUOTE AND THAT THE AMERICANS REMAIN WELL SHORT OF ENDORSING THE EARLIER BRITISH INSISTENCE THAT THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS, MOST OF WHOM ARE THOROUGHLY SET IN THEIR BRITISH WAYS, MUST BE QUOTE PARAMOUNT UNQUOTE.

THE PROSPECTS OF HEAVY MILITARY ACTION ARE NOW VERY STRONG. THE BRITISH MAY APPLY MAXIMUM PRESSURE WHILE ARGENTINA IS REELING UNDER WASHINGTON'S POLITICAL BLOW, AND THEY WILL ALSO WANT TO BEAT THE WEATHER. THE ARGENTINE GENERALS, LOOKING FOR A SHARP NATIONALISTIC DISTRACTION, HAVE PUT THEIR NATION INTO THE GREATEST CRISIS IN ITS HISTORY. AS PAINED AND CONFUSED AS ARGENTINES MUST FEEL, HOWEVER, SURELY THEY HAVE AMONG THEM RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE WHO PERCEIVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN MODERATION AND PEACE.

#### (B) THE NEW YORK TIMES

##### SHOCK THERAPY FOR ARGENTINA

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISIVE TILT TO BRITAIN CAME JUST IN TIME. WITH LUCK AND MORE RESOURCEFUL DIPLOMACY, IT MAY AVERT A TRAGIC AND POINTLESS WAR OVER THE FALKLANDS.

THOUGH PROBABLY FOREWARNED, ARGENTINE OFFICIALS SAY THEY WERE QUOTE STUPEFIED UNQUOTE BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AMERICAN SANCTIONS AGAINST THEIR GOVERNMENT. ADVERTISED OR NOT, THE SHOCK THERAPY WAS PLAINLY NECESSARY TO SHAKE THE JUNTA FROM ITS TRANCE. IT SEEMED CONVINCED THROUGHOUT THIS MONTH THAT ITS GRAB FOR THE ISLANDS WOULD BE APPLAUDED BY OTHER HEMISPHERE NATIONS -- AND OVERLOOKED BY THE UNITED STATES IN GRATITUDE FOR MARGINAL HELP IN EL SALVADOR. BY NOW OPENLY SIDING WITH BRITAIN AND PROMISING HELP IN CASE OF



BY NOW OPENLY SIDING WITH BRITAIN AND PROMISING HELP IN CASE OF CONFLICT, MR REAGAN IS RELATEDLY CATCHING UP WITH AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. EVEN AS HE DECLARED AGAINST ARGENTINA, CONGRESS WAS MOVING QUICKLY TO URGE THAT COURSE.

THERE IS A CLEAR NATIONAL CONSENSUS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S ASSERTION THAT ARGENTINA'S ARMED AGGRESSION QUOTE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUCCEED UNQUOTE. ARGENTINA HAS ONLY ITSELF TO BLAME FOR THE LOSS OF MR REAGAN AS AN HONEST, OUTWARDLY NEUTRAL BROKER IN THE LONG ATTEMPT TO SAVE FACE ALL AROUND.

FOR THREE DISTRACTING WEEKS, SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG GAVE THE ROYAL NAVY REASON TO PROCEED SOUTHWARD AT A MOST DELIBERATE SPEED. TO NO AVAIL, ARGENTINA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AND ACCEPT AN INTERIM REGIME IN THE FALKLANDS UNLESS ITS AGGRESSION WAS REWARDED WITH A PROMISE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY.

THE ARGENTINES SAID THEIR LEGAL CASE WAS IRREFUTABLE, YET IT COULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO BINDING ARBITRATION. DESPITE THE RIO PACT'S REJECTION OF FORCE AS A DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT, THEY TRIED TO EMBARRASS THE UNITED STATES BY INVOKING IT AND LATIN PRIDE. THE TRANSPARENCY OF THEIR GAME WAS OBVIOUS TO MOST: EVEN THE RIO NATIONS GAVE ONLY RITUAL SUPPORT.

STILL, MR HAIG'S EFFORT HELPED TO DEFINE WHAT THE ARGUMENT WAS REALLY ABOUT AND PROVED WASHINGTON'S WILLINGNESS TO RISK ITS PRESTIGE FOR PEACE. EVEN IN FINALLY SIDING WITH BRITAIN, THE ADMINISTRATION APPARENTLY BOUGHT ANOTHER FEW DAYS' TIME FOR DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE BRITISH ESCALATE ANOTHER NOTCH.

WITH THE PRETENSE OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY ABANDONED, IT IS THE UNITED NATIONS' TURN TO ASSUME THE TASKS OF MEDIATION. WITHIN HOURS OF THE INVASION, THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD DEMANDED THAT ARGENTINA WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLANDS. LET THE COUNCIL NOW AUTHORIZE SECRETARY GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, A PERUVIAN, TO HELP ARGENTINA WITHDRAW UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT GUARANTEE CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS BUT NOT THE RESULT.

THE TIME FOR SAVING FACE HAS PASSED. THE TASK NOW IS TO SAVE ARGENTINE AND BRITISH LIVES FROM A CONTROVERSY THAT SHOULD NEVER HAVE THREATENED ANY.

HENDERSON

MMMM



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS/MR HUED  
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MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
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MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAVTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR MCINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/ES  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADSWORTH GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GRS 490

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ *Reclassified*

FM WASHINGTON 011655Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE P50

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1557 OF 1 APRIL MAY

INFO UKHIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK

FALKLAND ISLANDS: U S PRESS

1. THE ONE BIG STORY, DOMINATING THE WASHINGTON POST AND THE NEW YORK TIMES, IS SUMMARIZED IN THE TIMES HEADLINE: U S SIDES WITH BRITAIN IN FALKLAND CRISIS AND IN STORIES HEADED QUOTE BRITAIN HAILS U S SUPPORT UNQUOTE, REPORTING YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE AND YOUR VISIT HERE THIS WEEKEND. THERE ARE GOOD EDITORIALS (TEXTS IN MIFT).

2. BOTH PAPERS CARRY THE STATEMENTS MADE YESTERDAY BY THE PRESIDENT AND BY HAIG AND REPORT A SUBSEQUENT PRESS BRIEFING BY HAIG, ATTRIBUTED AS USUAL TO A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL.

3. THE QUOTE OFFICIAL UNQUOTE IS SAID TO HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE STEPS ORDERED BY REAGAN WILL HAVE LIMITED PRACTICAL IMPACT ON ARGENTINA'S MILITARY OR ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE SHORT TERM BUT WERE INTENDED AS AN ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL SIGNAL THAT MIGHT JOLT ARGENTINA'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT INTO TAKING A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE THAT WOULD PROMOTE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

*M*



4. IN THE UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING HAIG TOOK EXCEPTION TO COSTA MENDEZ CLAIM THAT ARGENTINA HAD NOT REJECTED THE U S PEACE PROPOSALS, COMMENTING THAT ARGENTINA'S WRITTEN REPLY HAD CONSTITUTED A VERY CLEAR REJECTION. HAIG WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE STICKING POINTS IN NEGOTIATIONS AS BRITAIN'S INSISTENCE THAT THE WISHES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS BE GIVEN HIGH PRECEDENCE AND ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER ANY OUTCOME THAT DID NOT ENTAIL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY. HAIG DESCRIBED A REPEATED PATTERN OF ARRIVING IN BUENOS AIRES BEARING WHAT HE THOUGHT HAD BEEN AN AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATION ONLY TO FIND THE ARGENTINES REITERATING THAT THEY DID NOT CONSIDER SOVEREIGNTY NEGOTIABLE. HAIG TOLD REPORTERS THAT, WITH HINDSIGHT, A FAIR ASSESSMENT MUST SAY THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD BEEN REASONABLE AND FORTHCOMING THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS AND THAT ARGENTINA HAD BEEN LESS SO. WHILE THE U S HAD NOT BROKEN WITH ARGENTINA, THE TIME HAD ARRIVED WHEN IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE U S PUBLIC AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW WHERE THE U S STOOD AND WHY. HAIG WAS STILL HOPEFUL THAT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION COULD BE FOUND AND THOUGHT THAT MILITARY ACTION MIGHT CONSTITUTE A BENCHMARK FOR RECONSIDERATION IN BOTH CAPITALS.

5. ON THE SUBJECT OF U S ASSISTANCE TO THE BRITISH, HAIG DECLINED TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS BUT SAID THAT ANY U S HELP WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF HISTORIC, ON-GOING RELATIONSHIPS WITH BRITAIN AND SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS.

6. THE NEW YORK TIMES QUOTES PENTAGON OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT COMMUNICATION CHANNELS, INCLUDING SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO BRITAIN. THE PENTAGON THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH MIGHT WISH TO BUY MILITARY SPARE PARTS OR NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE U S AND PAY TO HAVE IT FLOWN BY C5 OR C141 TRANSPORTS TO ASCENSION ISLAND. OFFICIALS ALSO SAID THAT, SO FAR, TWO AMERICAN TANKERS HAD FILLED UP THE FUEL TANKS ON ASCENSION, AND THAT U S FLEET OILERS AND CARGO SHIPS MIGHT BE ASKED TO HELP RE-SUPPLY BRITISH SHIPS.

HENDERSON

PSE AMEND DATE IN PREAMBLE TO READ 3 MAY

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS +6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR OXSLOW  
PS/FUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS 760  
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAVTIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR MCINTYRE )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EX  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER, CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

UNCLASSIFIED  
FROM UKR IS NEW YORK 011736Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 627 DATED 1 MAY 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

NIPT: FALKLANPS: SECURITY COUNCIL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

QUOTE

I HAVE THE HONOUR, WITH REFERENCE TO MY LETTER OF 20 APRIL 1982 (S/15006), TO INFORM YOU OF THE FOLLOWING.

ON 2 APRIL 1982, ARGENTINA USED ARMED FORCE TO INVADE THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CALL ON ARGENTINA NOT TO USE FORCE OF 1 APRIL 1982 (S/24944). SINCE 3 APRIL 1982, ARGENTINA HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMAND IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THAT DAY. IN MY LETTER OF 20 APRIL 1982 (S/15006) CONCERNING THE



TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE, I SET OUT THE TEXT OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE EFFECT THAT FROM 1100 GMT ON 30 APRIL 1982

"PORT STANLEY AIRPORT WILL BE CLOSED, AND ANY AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WILL BE REGARDED AS PRESENT IN SUPPORT OF THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION AND, ACCORDINGLY, IS LIABLE TO ATTACK."

ON 1 MAY 1982, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"WE HAVE BEEN ENFORCING THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE SINCE NOON LONDON TIME ON FRIDAY 30 APRIL IN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THE NOTICE ISSUED ON 28 APRIL MADE IT CLEAR THAT AFTER 48 HOURS' WARNING THE AIRPORT WOULD BE CLOSED AND THAT ANY AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND WOULD BE LIABLE TO ATTACK. EARLY THIS MORNING BRITISH AIRCRAFT TOOK ACTION TO ENFORCE THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND TO DENY THE ARGENTINES THE USE OF THE AIRSTRIP AT PORT STANLEY. WE ARE NOT YET ABLE TO GIVE DETAILS BUT WILL DO SO AS SOON AS WE HAVE AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION."

THIS ACTION HAS BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY THE REFUSAL OF ARGENTINA TO COMPLY WITH PARAGRAPH 2 OF RESOLUTION 502 FOLLOWING ITS INVASION OF BRITISH TERRITORY. THE ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN IN EXERCISE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ARRANGE FOR THIS LETTER TO BE CIRCULATED AS A DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

UNQUOTE

PARSONS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(3) + 7 CAB.

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PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR UKE  
MR GILLMORE

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ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAVTIN ) TREASURY  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EX  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADZ-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

RESTRICTED

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 011733Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 626 DATED 1 MAY 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 71 TO ABIDJAN; FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IN RESPONSE TO AN URGENT REQUEST FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (CHINA) FOR INFORMATION, I HAVE DESPATCHED A LETTER TO HIM QUOTING THE MOD'S STATEMENT IN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. FULL TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 30 APRIL ROCA (ARGENTINA) SUBMITTED TWO LETTERS TO THE PRESIDENT, THE FIRST CONTAINING THE TEXT OF THE JUNTA'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN EXCLUSION ZONE AND THE SECOND REPLYING TO MY LETTER OF 26 APRIL ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA. I WILL TELEGRAPH A DRAFT REPLY ON 3 MAY WHEN WE HAVE THE UN'S ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS.



IMMEDIATE

(37)

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CMB

PS ~~MR~~ (6)  
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 DIO CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

ADVANCE COPY

SECRET

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 010900Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 302 OF 1 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKNIS NEW YORK PRETORIA AND NODUK CINCFLEET

MY TELNO 301: FALKLANDS: ARMS SALES

1. THE CAPE TIMES THIS MORNING (1 MAY) CARRIES A REPORT FROM NEW YORK THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAVE PROMISED ARGENTINA ALL THE HELP IT NEEDS, AND THAT A DELEGATION OF SOVIET OFFICIALS YESTERDAY HAD A MEETING WITH THE JUNTA IN BUENOS AIRES. THE REPORT ALSO SAYS THAT THE CUBANS HAVE OFFERED MILITARY AND TECHNICAL AID, AN OFFER WHICH THE JUNTA HAVE NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED.

2. THE MOST EFFECTIVE ARGUMENT WE HAVE TO DISSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS FROM SUPPLYING THE ARGENTINIANS WITH AMMUNITION OR OTHER DEFENCE EQUIPMENT WOULD BE THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA ARE ALSO DOING



SO, I AM DUE TO MAKE MY INITIAL CALL ON PIK BOTHA ON MONDAY (3 MAY) AND COULD MAKE GOOD USE OF THIS PRESS REPORT. IT WOULD BE ALL THE MORE TELLING IF I COULD SAY THAT WE WERE ABLE TO CONFIRM IT OR, BETTER STILL, ADD TO IT. IF THIS IS POSSIBLE, GRATEFUL FOR TELEGRAM DESKBY 031000Z (SEE ALSO MY TELNO 300).

3. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL ALSO NO DOUBT BE INFLUENCED BY THE AMERICAN DECISION TO CUT OFF ALL MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ARGENTINA. THIS IS NOT AN ARGUMENT WHICH IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO USE WITH PIK BOTHA. BUT, IF THE AMERICANS ARE AWARE OF, OR COULD BE MADE AWARE OF, OUR SECRET INFORMATION, THEY MIGHT PERHAPS BE PREPARED TO SPEAK TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THEMSELVES.

FCO PSE PASS EXCEPT PRETORIA.

FERGUSSON



[TYPISTS]

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(38) + 7 CAB.

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PS/ER ONSLOW

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MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

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ED/PLANNING STAFF

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS }

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MR ILETT }

MR McINTYRE }

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EX

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

Handwritten initials

GRS 138

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MADRID 011438Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 234 OF 1 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKNIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF SPANISH GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON PORT STANLEY AIRPORT.



1. THE BRITISH AIR ATTACK ON PORT STANLEY CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS ESCALATION IN THE CONFLICT.
2. THE POSSIBLE OUTBREAK OF A MORE GENERALISED AND MASSIVE BRITISH ACTION IN THE ARCHIPELAGO WOULD MEAN A TRAGIC LOSS OF HUMAN LIVES AND WOULD SIGNIFY GREAT RESPONSIBILITY AND A HISTORIC ERROR.
3. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT HAS LET ITS POSITION BE CLEARLY KNOWN: IT IS ABSOLUTELY CONTRARY TO THE USE OF FORCE, A POSITION WHICH IT NOW REAFFIRMS; ON THE OTHER HAND IT DEPLORES THE FACT THAT INSPITE OF ITS EFFORTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORA AND IN BILATERAL CONTACTS NO ACCOUNT HAS BEEN TAKEN OF THE FUNDAMENTAL COLONIAL PROBLEM WHICH IS THE ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT AND ON WHICH SPAIN HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED ARGENTINA'S TRADITIONAL POSITION, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE DOCTRINE OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
4. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAS STATED TO THE ARGENTINE AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AND ALSO TO THE UNITED NATIONS THE NECESSITY OF THE FULL USE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MECHANISMS TO AVOID ANY FURTHER NEW BELICOSE ACTION.

PARSONS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 01/1449Z PJ/LRD



[Return to K131 - file copy]

38  
(43) + 7 CAB

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-BERRY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TOKYO 211300Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 213 OF 21/5/82

AND REPEATED IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY UKVIS NEW YORK,

AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

AND SAYING TO ALL EC POSTS.



1. IN VIEW OF THE SHIFT IN THE AMERICAN POSITION MINISTER THIS MORNING CONTACTED KATO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU IN THE MFA, AND CLARK, MINISTER AT THE US EMBASSY. WITH KATO WHITEHEAD TOOK THE LINE THAT HE HOPED THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADOPT MEASURES WHICH WOULD BRING THEM INTO LINE WITH THE POSITION OF THE EC, UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES AND WITH CLARK THAT WE HOPED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOW LEAN ON THE JAPANESE TO THIS END. CLARK SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT A MESSAGE FROM HAIG HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO SAKURAIUCHI IN TOKYO AT MIDDAY OUR TIME, THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THE PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE BY THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE YESTERDAY (WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 1533). THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WHEN THE MESSAGE WAS PASSED ON( SEE PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW).

2. KATO SUMMONED MINISTER THIS EVENING AFTER ALL DAY DISCUSSIONS IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST BRIEFED THE JAPANESE PRESS ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE MEASURES WHICH THEY HAD TAKEN. IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS READING OF THE NOTES FOR THAT BRIEFING THAT HE HAD MADE A STRONG POLITICAL PITCH IN DENOUNCING ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL BUT THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY AS REGARDS ECONOMIC MEASURES TALLIED ALMOST WORD FOR WORD WITH THE POINTS CONTAINED IN MR SUZUKI'S SECOND MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER (F O O TELEGRAM NO 161). THERE IS NO OFFICIAL TEXT OF KATO'S PRELIMINARY REMARKS TO THE PRESS AND THE LIST OF MEASURES WHICH WERE HANDED OUT TO THE PRESS ARE IN SUBSTANCE IDENTICAL WITH THOSE CONTAINED IN MY TELEGRAM NO 199.

3. WHITEHEAD SAID THAT, WHILE WE WELCOMED THIS PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, HE THOUGHT THERE WAS BOUND TO BE CONTINUING DISAPPOINTMENT ON THE PART OF HMG AT THE COMPLETE LACK OF FURTHER MOVEMENT ON ECONOMIC MEASURES. THE PROSPECT OF A MILITARY CLASH WAS NOW IMMINENT AND THIS WAS A TIME WHEN WE MUST EARNESTLY LOOK



AND THIS WAS A TYPICAL REACTION TO LIKE-MINDED AND FRIENDLY COUNTRIES FOR SUPPORT AND ABOVE ALL FOR STRONG PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW HER TROOPS. IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE ( F O O TELEGRAM NO 162 ) THAT THE MEASURES SO FAR TAKEN BY JAPAN DID NOT YET MATCH UP TO WHAT WE FELT WE COULD EXPECT AND WE WERE THEREFORE DISAPPOINTED.

4. KATO REPLIED THAT HE RECOGNISED THIS BUT THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION YET AGAIN OVER IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA (HIS LINE ON THIS VACILLATED DURING THE DISCUSSION FROM STATEMENTS THAT "WE CANNOT COMPLY WITH YOUR REQUEST TO RESTRICT IMPORTS: ON SUBSTANCE WE CANNOT GO BEYOND WHAT WE HAVE DONE ALREADY" TO A REMARK THAT "I WOULD NOT SAY IT IS OUT OF THE QUESTION BUT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT"). THE BRIEFING APPEARS TO HAVE CONFUSED THE ISSUE AS FAR AS SOME OF THE PRESS ARE CONCERNED SINCE THE PUBLIC TELEVISION STATION, NHK, IS TAKING THE LINE THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT POSITION ON ECONOMIC MEASURES IS BROADLY IN LINE WITH THAT OF OTHER INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES.

5. THIS WAS NOT A HELPFUL MEETING. IT WAS CLEAR THAT KATO HAD BEEN GIVEN NO LEeway TO MAKE ANY MOVE ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT WHICH SUGGESTS THAT HIS SENIORS IN THE MFA ARE NOT PREPARED TO DO BATTLE WITH ENTRENCHED ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND SUPPORTING LEGALISTIC QUIBBLES FROM OTHER MINISTRIES. KATO TOOK THE POINT THAT WITH POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES IMMINENT THIS WAS A TIME FOR POLITICAL WILL BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT SO FAR THIS WILL DOES NOT EXIST IN THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT ONE FINAL EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE TO TRY TO SHIFT THE JAPANESE FURTHER. IF THIS IS TO BE EFFECTIVE IT WILL HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF SPECIFIC FRESH INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON SINCE THE US EMBASSY HERE APPEAR TO BE STICKING VERY MUCH TO THE BOOK AND HAVE NOT YET STARTED TO PUT ANY PRESSURE ON THE JAPANESE. THE DIFFICULTY OVER SUCH A COURSE IS THAT, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT THE AMERICANS LIKE THE JAPANESE ARE



... THE AMERICANS, LIKE THE JAPANESE, ARE  
TAKING NO ACTION ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA. FAILING  
ON PRESSURE, HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THE  
PROSPECTS OF MOVING THE JAPANESE FURTHER ARE NOW SLIM.

DO PLEASE PASS ~~SAYING~~ TO ALL E C POSTS.

*Copy to RL*

187221



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GRS 170

CONFIDENTIAL

DES BY 3102007

FM CANBERRA 010101Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 185 OF 1 MAY

FALKLAND ISLANDS

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

1. THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER SPOKE TO ME AT 0100 YOUR TIME TODAY 1 MAY TO ASK WHETHER I COULD CONFIRM THE REPORTS IN TODAY'S AUSTRALIAN NEWSPAPERS (IN THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD UNDER THE HEADLINE QUOTE ARGENTINA BACKS DOWN UNQUOTE) THAT ARGENTINA HAD ACCEPTED SCR 502. HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THE REPORT WAS TRUE AND THAT WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY DEVELOPMENTS. I TOLD MR FRASER THAT I COULD ADD NOTHING TO THIS REPORT AND TO THE BBC WORLD SERVICE REPORT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD IMPOSED SANCTIONS.

2. MR FRASER TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SPOKEN VERY STRONGLY TO VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH, WITH WHOM HE HAD DISCUSSIONS IN CANBERRA YESTERDAY, ABOUT THE URGENT NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES OPENLY TO SUPPORT US



PRESIDENT BUSH, WITH WHOM HE HAD DISCUSSIONS IN CANBERRA YESTERDAY,  
ABOUT THE URGENT NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES OPENLY TO SUPPORT US.  
I THANKED HIM.

3. AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT WOULD BE COURTEOUS AND INSTRUCTIVE IF YOU  
WERE ABLE TO AUTHORISE ME TO PASS TO MR FRASER SOME ITEMS OF  
INFORMATION ABOUT THE SITUATION WHICH HE WILL NOT HAVE READ IN THE  
AUSTRALIAN PRESS (OR BEFORE HE READS IT IN THE AUSTRALIAN PRESS).  
THIS WOULD CONFIRM TO HIM HOW MUCH WE VALUE HIS EFFORTS ON OUR  
BEHALF.

4. GRATEFUL REPLY IMMEDIATE DESKBY 010400Z.

MASON

NNNN





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>623</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Santiago telegram 011730Z dated 1 May</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>13 April 2012</i> <i>Wayland</i>
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PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>49</i> ..... (ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

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## Security Council

Distr.  
GENERALS/15021  
30 April 1982  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: SPANISHLETTER DATED 30 APRIL 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF  
ARGENTINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the note from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 26 April and to inform you of the following:

For the reasons which I already had occasion to state to you in my note dated 28 April 1982 (S/15009), the United Kingdom has no legal grounds whatsoever for invoking the right of self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter in justification of the military aggression it is carrying out in the South Georgia Islands.

The fact that three weeks elapsed between Argentina's recovery of those islands for its national patrimony and the British attack which began on 25 April, and the fact that the islands are 8,000 miles from the territory of the United Kingdom, clearly show how inappropriate it is to invoke Article 51 of the Charter as justification for this manifestly illegitimate use of force.

In contrast to the recovery of the islands by Argentina without any loss of British life, the British aggression of 25 April resulted in Argentine casualties, some of them in circumstances that have not been made clear by the invading Power.

The Argentine forces, on the other hand, certainly exercising the right of self-defence in order to repel a grave and imminent danger, have continued their resistance in the South Georgia Islands, thus giving the lie to the United Kingdom's statements that its authority has been restored in those territories.

With regard to the United Kingdom's allegation that my country has violated Council resolution 502 (1982), I must point out that the Argentine Republic on several occasions reiterated before the Council its intention to comply with that resolution and welcomed the steps taken by third States to avoid armed conflict and arrive at an agreement through negotiation. However, the continuation of the British Government's punitive actions compels my country to exercise its right of self-defence, which, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, allows it to repel any armed attack endangering its territorial integrity and its existence as a State.



3 - MAY 1982

Facsimile Transmission Leader.

11 12 1  
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135

Message Input Number ... 1/3 ...

Date - 3 May 1982

This transmission consists of 3 pages (1) PLUS leader.

FROM D H Anderson Esq, UKMis New York

TO Emergency Unit, FCO

P J Roberts Esq, UND, FCO

F D Berman Esq, Legal Advisers, FCO

1. Herewith two Argentine letters dated 30 April (S/15021 and 1 May (S.15026).
2. Draft reply will be telegraphed.

*DH Anderson*  
3/4



2

S/15021  
English  
Page 2

The United Kingdom's armed invasion confirms what I stated in my note of 16 April concerning the unreasonableness of the United Kingdom's presuming to gain its ends by force, thus placing my country in a completely defenceless position.

There are no grounds whatsoever for such a presumption. Neither international law nor the Charter of the United Nations nor Council-resolution 502 (1982) admit of an interpretation that would empower the United Kingdom to arrogate to itself a police power which no one has conferred on it.

With respect to the United Kingdom's comment concerning submission of the question of the South Georgia Islands to the International Court of Justice for settlement, it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is voluntary, in accordance with Article 36 of its Statute, and that no doubts as to the legitimacy of the rights of my country or of any other State can be inferred from its decision not to accept that jurisdiction.

Argentina preferred to seek a peaceful solution to the question through direct negotiation within the framework of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX). It must be pointed out in that connexion that it was the United Kingdom itself which included the South Georgia Islands as a colonial administrative dependency of the Malvinas Islands and agreed to their being considered as such by the United Nations.

I would request that this letter should be circulated urgently as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Eduardo A. ROCA  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative



UNITED  
NATIONS



Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/15026  
1 May 1982  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 1 MAY 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA TO  
THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter, I have the honour to inform you, as a follow-up to my note of today, that the successive attacks by the British Air Force against Puerto Argentino in the Malvinas Islands were repulsed by my country in exercise of its right of self-defence. In the anti-aircraft action, two Harrier aircraft were shot down; a third was hit, but its fate is unknown because radar contact was lost.

In perpetrating this bloody aggression against my country, the United Kingdom is persisting in violating Security Council resolution 502 (1982). In the light of these facts, not even the most distorted interpretation of that resolution (which was adopted in the interest of peace) can be used by the United Kingdom in an attempt to legitimise its irresponsible conduct.

The increasing aggression by the United Kingdom against my country is today threatening to unleash an armed conflict of unknown dimensions and unforeseeable implications for international peace and security; the United Kingdom Government will be solely responsible for the breach of such peace and security.

Through these actions, the United Kingdom is seeking to arrogate to itself powers which, under Article 24 of the Charter, were granted by the States Members of the United Nations to the Security Council for the discharge of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Kingdom is thus thwarting effective implementation of a Council resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom itself. It is now declaring the resolution to be ineffective and is cynically invoking the right of self-defence in seeking to justify an open and brazen act of aggression.

I request that this note be urgently circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Eduardo A. ROCA  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative



*Prime Minister*

*APR 30/82*

STATEMENT BY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY: 30 APRIL  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

---

Mr Haig has told us that Argentina has rejected his proposals for a negotiated settlement, and he has just announced this in Washington.

This is a major change in the situation. In deciding not to cooperate in negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the Argentines have confirmed their commitment to aggression in defiance of the UN.

The British people are deeply grateful to the US, and especially to Mr Haig for his remarkable efforts. America and Britain have done everything possible from the start to produce a negotiated settlement.

We now have a new situation and I am extremely glad that the United States has come down decisively on the side of Britain.



To have the world's most powerful state on our side must make Argentina see that aggression cannot pay.

Mr Haig has not published his proposals, so I shall not describe them now.

But yesterday I outlined in the House of Commons the three major elements of a possible agreement: the Argentine withdrawal; an interim administration in the Islands; and the framework for negotiations about the future of the Islands which must of course respect the wishes of the Islanders.

I also spoke in Parliament on the need for Britain to increase its military pressure and to take military measures if necessary, in the exercise of our right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.



I am going to Washington tomorrow or on Sunday to review the new situation with Mr Haig and to discuss the next steps. Then I shall go on to New York to see the Secretary-General of the United Nations. These meetings are ~~essential~~ <sup>timely</sup> now and will be very much in accord with the wishes of the House of Commons expressed in yesterday's debate.

We shall not abandon our efforts for a peaceful settlement. But Argentina must withdraw, as the Security Council Resolution demanded four weeks ago tomorrow.

Then we shall be entirely ready to move on to the negotiations foreseen in the third point of the same Resolution. A conference or any other kind of negotiation can be considered.



It has been our strategy all along to build up the pressure on Argentina - economic pressure, diplomatic pressure and military pressure.

Now, with US backing, I am more confident than ever that justice will prevail against Argentina's totally illegal aggression.



SECRET

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 30 APRIL, 1982

ARGENTINA

1. On 29 April, the Argentine Government announced that with immediate effect Argentina would enforce a 200 mile exclusion zone against British shipping and aircraft. The zone is to extend from the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the Sandwich Islands and the Argentine mainland.

UNITED STATES

2. There have been a number of communications between Mr Haig and London. Sr Costa Mendez has informed Mr Haig that the US proposals fall short of Argentine demands and are unsatisfactory. Mr Haig's announcement of the failure of his mediation is expected at 1200 hours Washington time today.

3. A consignment of US arms for Argentina has been held up by the Customs at San Francisco.

UN

4. Sir A Parsons reports that on 29 April there was no sign that members of the Security Council were contemplating calling the Council into session; but this might well change when Mr Haig announces the failure of his Mission on 30 April.

5. Argentina has circulated a letter to the Security Council about our TEZ which asserts that HMG cannot invoke the right of defence under Article 51.

6. At the UN Decolonisation Committee Meeting on 29 April, Soviet and Czech. delegates referred to British attempts to perpetuate colonialism in the South Atlantic; our Mission replied in strong terms. Surprisingly neither Cuba nor Venezuela followed up an Argentine attack on us in this Committee.

ICRC

7. The ICRC have made some progress in their discussions with the Argentines and they hope that an ICRC visit to the Falklands will be possible soon.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE MINISTERIAL MEETING

8. The communique issued on 29 April included a reference to the urgent need for the implementation of UNSCR.502.

*E. J. Hughes*  
E J Hughes  
Emergency Unit

30 April, 1982

SECRET



PRIME MINISTER

I have spoken to Sir Tom McCaffrey (from Mr. Foot's office), Mr. David Steel and Dr. David Owen about your readiness to see them on Tuesday.

McCaffrey said that he would not be able to talk to Michael Foot until later this evening. He thought it very likely that Michael Foot would want to consult one or two of his colleagues about your invitation. So we might not have an answer until tomorrow.

David Steel and David Owen accepted at once.

I told them that we would not let it be known publicly that you were seeing them until they had all decided to accept or decline your invitation.

Clive Whitmore

30 April 1982





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 April 1982

Dear John,

I now enclose the original of the Greek Prime Minister's reply to Mrs Thatcher's personal message of 6 April to EC Heads of State/Government concerning economic measures against Argentina. An advance text of Mr Papandreou's letter was sent to us on 15 April in Athens telno 136, which was copied to you at the time.

/  
Filed on  
Pt 7

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



30 APR 1962





ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 010900Z

FM WASHINGTON 302356Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1555 OF 30 APRIL 1982

INFO PRIORITY MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

TELNOS 1553 AND 1554 US MILITARY EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA

1. MINISTER HAS DRAWN THESE POTENTIAL LOOPHOLES TO THE ATTENTION OF EAGLEBURGER. THOMAS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE MUNITIONS CONTROL PEOPLE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THEY HAD ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE THAT ALL APPLICATIONS FOR LICENCES FOR EXPORT TO MILITARY END-USERS IN ARGENTINA MUST BE PASSED TO STATE DEPARTMENT BEFORE APPROVAL. HE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S INTENTION WAS TO HOLD UP ALL DUAL USE EQUIPMENT THAT HAD A SERIOUS MILITARY APPLICATION, SUCH AS AERO-ENGINES. BUT THE POSITION SEEMED LESS CLEAR ABOUT APPARENTLY MORE INNOCENT-LOOKING ITEMS, SUCH AS GENERAL PURPOSE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT.

2. THOMAS TOLD EAGLEBURGER THAT IF ANYTHING WAS ALLOWED TO GO TO MILITARY END-USERS IN ARGENTINA IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS



2. THOMAS TOLD EAGLEBURGER THAT IF ANYTHING WAS ALLOWED TO GO TO MILITARY END-USERS IN ARGENTINA IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS WOULD BE REGARDED BY US AS A STAB IN THE BACK. EAGLEBURGER FULLY UNDERSTOOD. EAGLEBURGER HAS NOW GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT ALL SUCH CASES SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO HIM PERSONALLY.

3. WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE ON THE AMERICANS THAT THEY SHOULD FIND A MORE SATISFACTORY WAY OF DEALING WITH SUCH EXPORTS. AS SUGGESTED IN MY TELEGRAM NO 1538 THIS IS SOMETHING YOU MAY LIKE TO RAISE WITH HAIG WHEN YOU ARE HERE.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
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ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS )  
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SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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DESKBY 010900Z

FM WASHINGTON 302354Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 1554 OF 30 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY MODUK

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM : U.S. MILITARY EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA.

1. FOLLOWING ARE KNOWN LICENCE APPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY END-USERS IN ARGENTINA.

(I) 2 APPLICATIONS FOR EXPORT OF J65 ENGINES

20 J-65 - 16

12 J-65 - 5

(II) 1 APPLICATION FOR EXPORT OF 20 ENGINE NACELLES AND ACCESSORIES FOR TURBO-PROP ENGINES FOR 1A 66 PUCARA.

(III) ONE APPLICATION FOR EXPORT OF 53 ELECTRON TUBES FOR NAVAL MISSILE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS

(IV) 9 APPLICATIONS FOR EXPORT OF MISCELLEANEOUS GENERAL PURPOSE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (EG AIRCRAFT NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT, SPECTRON ANALYSER ETC).

HENDERSON



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB

PS + 6  
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PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GR 370

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DESKBY 010900Z

FM WASHINGTON 302352Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1553 OF 30 APRIL 1982

INFO PRIORITY MODUK

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 876: US MILITARY EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA

1. THE POSITION IS THAT THE SUSPENSION OF ALL MILITARY EXPORTS AND THE WITHHOLDING OF CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINE ELIGIBILITY FOR MILITARY SALES ANNOUNCED TODAY BY HAIG APPLIES STRICTLY ONLY TO ITEMS ON THE MUNITIONS LIST. IT DOES NOT, REPEAT NOT, APPLY TO ITEMS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TO WHICH ORDINARY EXPORT LICENCING ARRANGEMENTS STILL APPLY.

2. NEITHER THE J65 ENGINES FOR SKYHAWKS AND CANBERRAS, NOR THE ENGINES FOR THE PUCARA ARE ANY LONGER ON THE MUNITIONS LIST. WE HAVE URGED STATE DEPARTMENT IN THE LIGHT OF HAIG'S STATEMENT THIS MORNING, TO PUT THEM BACK ON. BUT FOR REASONS THAT ARE NOT ALTOGETHER CLEAR, THEY SEE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN THIS. IT IS A MATTER FOR EXECUTIVE DISCRETION (IE DOES NOT HAVE TO GO THROUGH CONGRESS) BUT THERE IS LEGISLATION IN EXISTENCE WHICH REQUIRES THE EXECUTIVE



EXECUTIVE DISCRETION (IE DOES NOT HAVE TO GO THROUGH CONGRESS) BUT THERE IS LEGISLATION IN EXISTENCE WHICH REQUIRES THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO TRY TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF ITEMS ON THE MUNITIONS LIST (CLASSIFIED AS PREDOMINANTLY OR EXCLUSIVELY FOR MILITARY USE) RATHER THAN TO INCREASE THEM. THE UNDERLYING REASON HOWEVER IS THE SAME AS THE CASE OF THE IMPORT BAN (MY TELEGRAM NO 1537): THEY DO NOT SEE THAT THE POLITICAL OR SECURITY SITUATION YET JUSTIFIES DEPARTURE FROM NORMAL PRACTICE.

3. NEVERTHELESS, THEY FULLY RECOGNISE THE NEED NOT TO LET SUCH ITEMS AS THE J65 ENGINES GO AND ARE PREPARED TO USE THEIR POWERS UNDER THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT TO DELAY ANY APPLICATION FOR A LICENCE FOR EXPORT TO A MILITARY END USER. THEY DO NOT INTEND TO ANNOUNCE THIS, SINCE THE ITEMS CONCERNED ARE NOT UNDER FORMAL CONTROL. BUT IT MEANS IN PRACTICE THAT THEY CAN DELAY ANY APPLICATION FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO SIX MONTHS, AND COULD IF NECESSARY, FIND WAYS OF DELAYING BEYOND THAT.

4. THIS IS FAR FROM SATISFACTORY AND WE HAVE MADE OUR VIEWS ABOUT IT KNOWN AT VARIOUS LEVELS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. MIFT CONTAINS A LIST OF ALL THE PRESENT APPLICATIONS FOR LICENCES FOR EXPORT TO MILITARY END-USERS IN ARGENTINA OF WHICH THEY ARE AWARE. AS WE KNOW (MY TELNO 1514) THEY HAVE STOPPED THE EXPORT OF THE J65 ENGINES AND ARE NOT PLANNING TO ISSUE LICENCES FOR EITHER THE TUBES FOR THE MISSILE CONTROL SYSTEM OR THE PUCARA ENGINES. THERE SEEMED SOME DOUBT IN THEIR MINDS ABOUT THE MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT BUT WE HAVE UNDERLINED VERY STRONGLY TO THEM THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GO.  
PLEASE SEE MIFT.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

32  
(30) + 7 CAB

PS + 6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GR 450  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON 302351Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1552 OF 30 APRIL 1982  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: US ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1. THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA ANNOUNCED TODAY (MY TEL NO 1525) FOCUS ON THE SUSPENSION OF NEW EX-IM BANK CREDITS AND GUARANTEES AND ON THE SUSPENSION OF COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION GUARANTEES.

2. EX-IM BANK. THE ARGENTINA LOAN OFFICER AT EX-IM BANK HAS GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS. THE CURRENT EX-IM BANK EXPOSURE IS:

A. COMMITTED AND DISBURSED - DLRS 550 MILLION.

THESE FUNDS ARE UNAFFECTED BY THE MEASURES INTRODUCED TODAY.

B. COMMITTED BUT NOT YET DISBURSED - DLRS 700 MILLION, SOME DLRS 550 MILLION OF WHICH RELATES TO THE YACYRETA HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECT. A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF PLANNING WORK STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE ON THIS PROJECT. THE DLRS 150 MILLION OF REMAINING COMMITTED BUT UNDISBURSED FUNDS RELATES TO VARIOUS PROJECTS SOME OF WHICH MAY BE TOO FAR



PROJECT. THE DLRS 150 MILLION OF REMAINING COMMITTED BUT UNDISBURSED FUNDS RELATES TO VARIOUS PROJECTS, SOME OF WHICH MAY BE TOO FAR DOWN THE TRACK TO STOP. THE EX-IM BANK MAY ARGUE THAT ALL COMMITMENTS NOT YET DISBURSED SHOULD GO AHEAD.

C. THERE ARE ABOUT SIX OFFER LETTERS OUTSTANDING FOR EX-IM BANK FUNDS WITH A VALUE OF ABOUT DLRS 230 MILLION. THESE PRELIMINARY COMMITMENTS INDICATE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH EX-IM BANK WOULD BE PREPARED TO LEND; THEY ARE NORMALLY VALID FOR SIX MONTHS. IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT DISBURSEMENT OF THESE FUNDS WOULD BE RULED OUT NOW, TOGETHER WITH THE OFFER OF ANY NEW CREDITS, GUARANTEES, OR POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE.

### 3. COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION GUARANTEES (CCC)

CCC IS ADMINISTRED BY THE US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. A DLRS 2 MILLION LINE OF CREDIT GUARANTEES HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO ARGENTINA FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR; THIS SUM IS EARMARKED FOR THE GUARANTEE OF SOFTWOOD LUMBER EXPORTS, ALTHOUGH ARGENTINA HAS NOT USED THE CREDIT SO FAR. SUSPENSION OF CCC CREDIT GUARANTEES WILL THEREFORE MEAN THAT THE DLRS 2 MILLION WILL NOT NOW BE AVAILABLE.

### 4. CONCLUSION

THE SUMS INVOLVED IN THE ECONOMIC MEASURES ANNOUNCED TODAY WILL THEREFORE DEPEND ON HOW THE DETAILED IMPLICATIONS OF HAIG'S ANNOUNCEMENT ARE WORKED OUT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE VALUE OF THE COMITMENTS SUSPENDED IN THE SHORT TERM WILL BE VERY SUBSTANTIAL. HAIG HIMSELF SAID IN BACKGROUND BRIEFING THAT THE SHORT TERM EFFECT WILL BE PRIMARILY POLITICAL. OVER TIME HOWEVER, THE EFFECT OF THE SUSPENSION OF NEW GOVERNMENT CREDIT GUARANTEES ON US BUSINESSES WISHING TO DEAL WITH ARGENTINA IS LIKELY TO BECOME PRONOUNCED, PARTICULARLY SINCE BUSINESS CONFIDENCE IN ARGENTINA IS ALREADY DWINDLING.

5. HAIG, AS PROMISED TO US ALSO SAID IN BACKGROUND BRIEFING THAT THERE WERE ADDITONAL STEPS WHICH THE US COULD TAKE AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE IF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
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 MR GILLMORE  
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 ED/PLANNING STAFF  
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
 RESIDENT CLERK

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 SIR K COUZENS )  
 MR LITTLER )  
 MR HAWTIN )  
 MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
 MR ILETT )  
 MR McINTYRE )  
 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
 DIO CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

00 FCO DESKBY 010800Z

00 UKMIS NEW YORK

GR 230

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 010800Z

FM WASHINGTON 302350Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1551 OF 30 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1547:

FALKLANDS: YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.

1. I SHALL MEET YOU FROM THE SHUTTLE AT NATIONAL AIRPORT AT 1900 TOMORROW. I HAVE KEPT THE EVENING CLEAR OF ANY ARRANGEMENTS.

2. THE OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR SUNDAY IS AS FOLLOWS:

1000 - 1200 TALKS WITH HAIG AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

1315 MR AND MRS HAIG HAVE ACCEPTED MY INVITATION TO LUNCH. I HAVE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

*[Handwritten signatures]*



2. THE OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR SUNDAY IS AS FOLLOWS:

1000 - 1200 TALKS WITH HAIG AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

1315 MR AND MRS HAIG HAVE ACCEPTED MY INVITATION TO LUNCH. I HAVE ALSO INVITED THE EAGLEBURGERS, TOM ENDERS AND THE HOLMES (HOLMES IS ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS).

3. LUNCH SHOULD END AROUND 1500. I UNDERSTAND YOU WOULD LIKE TO CATCH THE 1700 SHUTTLE TO NEW YORK WHICH MEANS LEAVING FOR THE AIRPORT NOT LATER THAN 1615. YOU WOULD HAVE TIME FOR ONLY ONE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN LUNCH AND DEPARTURE. I THINK IT WOULD BE AWKWARD FOR YOU NOT TO SEE THE PRESS IN WASHINGTON AND RECOMMEND THAT THIS SHOULD BE THE PRIORITY. THIS WOULD RULE OUT A MEETING WITH WEINBERGER BUT I THINK HE WOULD QUITE UNDERSTAND. YOU COULD INVITE WEINBERGER TO BREAKFAST ON SUNDAY MORNING BUT GIVEN HAIG'S SENSITIVITY, AND AFTER OUR EXPERIENCE WITH CLARK WHEN YOU WERE HERE LAST WEEK, I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA PARTICULARLY WHEN YOU WOULD NOT BY THEN HAVE SEEN HAIG.

4. ACCOMMODATION: BRIAN FALL, JANE PEAREY AND YOUR DETECTIVE WILL BE STAYING WITH ME. NICK FENN AND HIS TEAM ARE BOOKED IN AT THE WELLINGTON HOTEL.

HENDERSON

NNNN



TYPIST

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

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HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

Handwritten: Hd/NE →

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
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SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GR 180  
RESTRICTED  
FM WASHINGTON 302322Z APR 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1550 OF 30 APRIL 1982

ADVANCE COPY

Handwritten signature

FALKLANDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. ON THE NATIONAL TELEVISION PROGRAMME QUOTE GOOD MORNING AMERICA UNQUOTE THE INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST JACK ANDERSON ALLEGED TODAY THAT THE BRITISH TASK FORCE HEADING FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS ARMED WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT THE COMMANDER HAD AUTHORITY TO USE THEM.

2. ANDERSON CLAIMED THAT, IN ANSWER TO AN URGENT US INQUIRY, THE BRITISH HAD SENT A QUOTE TOP SECRET COMMUNICATION UNQUOTE TO WASHINGTON ACKNOWLEDGING THE PRESENCE IN THE TASK FORCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE AUTHORITY PROVIDED TO ADMIRAL WOODWARD TO USE THE WEAPONS QUOTE UNDER GRAVE CIRCUMSTANCES UNQUOTE.

3. ANDERSON ALSO QUOTED A BRITISH SPOKESMAN AS ISSUING THE ASSURANCE THAT THE BRITISH WOULD NEVER USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE



3. ANDERSON ALSO QUOTED A BRITISH SPOKESMAN AS ISSUING THE ASSURANCE THAT THE BRITISH WOULD NEVER USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FALKLANDS.

4. ANDERSON IS WELL KNOWN AS A CHANNEL BOTH FOR LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND AS THE PURVEYOR OF FANCIFUL INACCURACIES. IN ANSWER TO A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FALKLANDS, WE HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO OUR RESPECT FOR OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TILATELOCO TREATY, AND, MOST RECENTLY, TO LORD TRENCHARD'S ANSWER IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON 27 APRIL.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB

IMMEDIATE

PS + 6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
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SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GR 220

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 302318Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1549 OF 30 APRIL 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 333: FALKLANDS

1. THIS LOOKS TO ME LIKE STANDARD COSTA MENDEZ TACTICS WHICH ARE TO PRETEND THAT THE ARGENTINIANS ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES AND THEREBY COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, WHILE THEY ARE IN FACT ONLY PREPARED TO DO SO IF THEY RETAIN A LARGE MEASURE OF DE FACTO CONTROL OVER THE ISLANDS AND THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IS PRE-JUDGED IN THEIR FAVOUR.

2. THERE IS A NEED TO EXPOSE THESE TACTICS, AND THE FACT THAT COSTA MENDEZ REALLY COUNTS FOR NOTHING IN THIS AFFAIR, THE DECISIONS ARE MADE BY THE JUNTA AND THEY ARE TAKING A DIFFERENT LINE.

3. IN THE COURSE OF BACKGROUND BRIEFING TODAY, HAIG WAS ASKED ABOUT THESE STATEMENTS AND TOOK A SIMILAR VIEW. I UNDERSTAND FROM UKMIS THAT IN ANY CASE KAMANDA APPEARS TO HAVE MISINTERPRETED THE EXTENT TO WHICH COSTA MENDEZ WAS SAYING ANYTHING NEW



THESE STATEMENTS AND TOOK A SIMILAR VIEW. I UNDERSTAND  
UKMIS THAT IN ANY CASE KAMANDA APPEARS TO HAVE MISINTERPRETED THE  
EXTENT TO WHICH COSTA MENDEZ WAS SAYING ANYTHING NEW.

4. THERE IS ONE FURTHER POINT WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND. HAIG IS VERY  
ANXIOUS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS HAVE DECLARED THEMSELVES FIRMLY  
ON OUR SIDE, WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAS GIVEN UP  
COMPLETELY AND WE ARE SWITCHING TO SOME OTHER NEGOTIATOR. HIS HOPE  
IS THAT AS A RESULT OF OUR FURTHER MILITARY PRESSURE, THE MOMENT  
WILL COME WHEN IT MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO PLAY A ROLE IN  
BRINGING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT WHICH COULD AVOID A FIGHT TO THE FINISH.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
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 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
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 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

UNCLASSIFIED  
 FM WASHINGTON 302318Z APR 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NO 1548 OF 30 APRIL

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

MY TELEGRAM NO 1539: FALKLANDS

1. LATER ON AT HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH TV CORRESPONDENTS FROM THE MID-WEST PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS ASKED WHAT KIND OF MATERIEL SUPPORT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE BY THE UNITED STATES FOR BRITISH FORCES. HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS SURE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HONOUR ANY REQUESTS FOR AID BECAUSE HE KNEW THAT THEY (THE BRITISH) WOULD NOT MAKE ANY REQUEST WHICH WE (THE UNITED STATES) COULD NOT HONOUR. AT THIS MOMENT THE UNITED STATES HAD HAD NO REQUEST FOR SUCH HELP.

2. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT QUOTE WE STAND READY - AND BOTH SIDES KNOW IT - TO HELP IF NEEDS BE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNQUOTE.

HENDERSON



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB

PS +6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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GR 220  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM WASHINGTON 302144Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1543 OF 30 APRIL 1982  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: US PRESS

1. IN AN EDITORIAL ENTITLED QUOTE AN UNNECESSARY WAR UNQUOTE THE POST SAYS THAT THE PRIME AMERICAN POLITICAL AND MORAL REQUIREMENT INDISPUTABLY IS TO STAND WITH THE BRITISH AGAINST ARGENTINE AGREESION. ARGENTINA MUST YIELD ON ITS DEMAND THAT SOVEREIGNTY BE GRANTED EVEN BEFORE SOVEREIGNTY NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. BUT THE POST CONTENDS THAT WHILE THE BRITISH MUST DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS, THEY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED AN EFFECTIVE VETO OVER NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR WONDERS WHETHER THE TIME HAS COME TO ENLIST THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HELP IN A FINAL EFFORT TO AVERT A WORSENING OF THE CONFLICT.

2. THE POST AND TIMES REPORT PROMINENTLY YESTERDAY'S SENATE RESOLUTION SUPPORTING OUR POSITION, WITH THE PROVISIO THAT THE RESOLUTION DID NOT COME UNDER THE WAR POWERS ACT AND DID NOT



2. THE FOOT AND MOUTH REPORT PROMPTLY YESTERDAY'S SENATE  
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING OUR POSITION, WITH THE PROVISIO THAT THE  
RESOLUTION DID NOT COME UNDER THE WAR POWERS ACT AND DID NOT  
AUTHORISE THE PRESIDENT TO GIVE DIRECT MILITARY ASSISTANCE.  
THE POST ADDS THAT SOME SENATORS WISHED TO GO FURTHER. SENATOR  
TOWER (CHAIRMAN, ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE) SAID: QUOTE OUR SUPPORT  
SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, SHARED INTELLIGENCE,  
LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND CONSIDERATION OF ANY REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE  
OR SUPPORT THE BRITISH MAY SUBMIT TO US UNQUOTE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

TTTTTTTTTTTTTV



TYPIST

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS  
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 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
 RESIDENT CLERK

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 MR McINTYRE )  
 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
 DIO CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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Bank of England

SECRET

DESKBY 030900Z  
 FM WASHINGTON 301900Z APR 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NO 1540 OF 30 APRIL  
 INFO CARACAS

MS

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

MY TELNO 1532: ARGENTINE DEBT

1. ECONOMIC MINISTER HAS COMPARED NOTES WITH AMMERMAN (US TREASURY) ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE LIGHT OF THE IMPRESSIONS RECORDED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. AMMERMAN SAID THAT HIS IMPRESSION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS BROADLY SIMILAR, ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THE INFORMATION IS NECESSARILY ANECDOTAL. HE ADDED THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

(A) AMMERMAN HAD HAD NO (NO) REPORTS OF NON-PAYMENT BY THE ARGENTINE TO OTHER EC COUNTRIES, IN SPITE OF THEIR HAVING TAKEN PART IN THE IMPORT BAN.

(B) ON ROLLING OVER SHORT-TERM ARGENTINE DEBT, AMMERMAN HAD DETECTED VARIATIONS IN THE ATTITUDE OF BANKS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES RANGING FROM THE US BANKS, WHICH WERE THE MOST AMENABLE TO ROLLING OVER THE JAPANESE LEAST, WITH THE EUROPEANS SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN.

... SEEN ... YESTERDAY IN CARACAS THAT A



ROLLING OVER THE JAPANESE LEAD, WITH THE  
BETWEEN.

(C) THERE HAD BEEN A RUMOUR YESTERDAY IN CARACAS THAT A DOLLARS 2 BILLION JUMBO LOAN WAS BEING DISCUSSED IN THE FINANCE MINISTRY ON THE BASIS THAT THE UK BANKS WOULD BE EXCLUDED. THE US BANKS HAD BEEN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS AND WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH QUOTE BLACK-BALLING UNQUOTE. A LATER STORY TODAY INDICATED THAT NATWEST WOULD AT LEAST BE INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THE TALKS.

(D) BUENOS AIRES HAD BEEN RIFE WITH RUMOURS THIS WEEK, E.G. THAT THE US WERE ABOUT TO PUT A FREEZE ON ASSETS, OR THAT THE ARGENTINE CENTRAL BANK HAD STOPPED MAKING ALL HARD CURRENCY PAYMENTS. SENTIMENT THERE HAD ALSO CLEARLY BEEN DISTURBED BY THE US SENATE RESOLUTION RECORDED IN MY TELNO 1528.

(E) THE ARGENTINE CENTRAL BANK HAD RETAINED AS AN ADVISER A FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE US TREASURY (DAVIS), WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE IRANIAN FREEZE. DAVIS IS QUOTED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AS SAYING THAT THE ROLE OF HIS LAW FIRM WILL BE TO REASSURE AMERICAN BANKS WITH OUTSTANDING LOANS TO ARGENTINA.

2. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO TREASURY AND BANK OF ENGLAND.

HENDERSON

NNNN



PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
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ADVANCE COPY

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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 301808Z APR 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1539 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, OAS POSTS, ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, DUBLIN, PARIS, ROME, REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, MOSCOW, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, OSLO, UKMIS GENEVA, ROUTINE WARSAW PACT POSTS, PEKING, HELSINKI, HOLY SEE, BOSTON, CLEVELAND, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, ATLANTA, CHICAGO, DALLAS, HOUSTON AND SAN FRANCISCO

FALKLANDS : PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT (BROADCAST BY NBC TV) OF REMARKS MADE IN THE LAST HOUR BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN THE WHITE HOUSE TO TV CORRESPONDENTS FROM THE MID-WEST.

BEGINS

WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE AGGRESSION WAS ON THE PART OF ARGENTINA, IN THIS DISPUTE OVER THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THAT LITTLE ICE-COLD BUNCH OF LAND DOWN THERE; AND THEY FINALLY RESORTED TO ARMED AGGRESSION, AND THERE WAS BLOODSHED. AND I THINK THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL OF US MUST ABIDE BY IS THAT ARMED AGGRESSION OF THAT KIND MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUCCEED.

ENDS



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

[TYPISTS]

36 + 7 CAB. OFFICE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 301738Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1538 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKREP BRUSSELS

M.I.P.T. : ARGENTINA : US MEASURES

1. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT IS I THINK CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A US DECISION TO IMPOSE AN EMBARGO ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA THROUGH FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH US OFFICIALS. IT IS A QUESTION OF A POLITICAL DECISION WHICH CAN ONLY BE TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

2. I SUGGEST THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE FOR YOU TO BRING WITH YOU A PERSONAL REQUEST FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE US SHOULD IMPOSE SUCH AN EMBARGO IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THIS SHOULD STRESS THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF SUCH ACTION AND THAT, IF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT TAKE ACTION, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE EMBARGO THEY HAVE IMPOSED (AND WHICH FALLS TO BE RENEWED IN MID MAY); AND IMPOSSIBLE TO PERSUADE OTHERS LIKE JAPAN TO TAKE ACTION THEMSELVES. IT SHOULD ALSO REFER



OTHERS LIKE JAPAN TO TAKE ACTION THEMSELVES. IT SHOULD ALSO REFER TO OUR CONCERN THAT THE U.S. SHOULD EMBARGO THE EXPORT TO ARGENTINA OF MILITARILY APPLICABLE EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THE SKYHAWK AIRCRAFT ENGINES.

3. I THINK WE SHOULD BE WARY OF BEING DRAWN INTO OFFICIAL OR TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS. THESE COULD ALL TOO EASILY STRAY INTO AREAS EG CREDITS FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE PUTTING REQUESTS TO US TO WHICH WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO RESPOND.

HENDERSON

NNNN



FLASH

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS +6  
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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

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SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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FM WASHINGTON 301737Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1537 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS.

ARGENTINA: U.S. MEASURES.

1 THE AMERICANS ARE STILL BAULKING AT IMPOSING AN IMPORT BAN AT THIS STAGE ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS. THEY ARE PLEADING LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS, BUT THE REAL DIFFICULTIES ARE CLEARLY POLITICAL.

2. THE MAIN ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN IMPORT BAN WHICH HAVE BEEN USED WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ARE:

- (I) GENERAL. THE UNITED STATES HAS ONLY EVER USED SUCH A BAN IN VERY LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES, CUBA, VIETNAM, KOREA, LIBYA. EVEN IN THE CASE OF POLAND THEY DID NOT DO SO.
- (II) LEGAL. THERE ARE ONLY TWO POWERS WHICH COULD BE USED. THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC EMERGENCY POWERS ACT IS AVAILABLE IN



INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC EMERGENCY POWERS ACT IS AVAILABLE IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES BUT IT HAS ONLY EVER BEEN USED TWICE - MOST RECENTLY FOR THE FREEZING OF IRANIAN ASSETS. TO USE THIS ACT THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE TO DECLARE A NATIONAL EMERGENCY. AN ALTERNATIVE IS THE NATIONAL SECURITY CLAUSE OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT. THIS WAS USED FOR THE EMBARGO ON LIBYAN OIL. BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT LAWYERS ARGUE THAT IT WOULD BE HARD TO PLEAD THAT ANY IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA REPRESENT A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

(III) ECONOMIC. THERE IS CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS OF U.S. ACTION AGAINST ARGENTINIAN IMPORTS. THIS WOULD ARISE PARTICULARLY IF THE SAME POWERS WERE USED AS IN THE CASE OF THE FREEZING OF IRANIAN ASSETS. THE ARGUMENT IS THAT THE FINANCIAL MARKETS WOULD FORESEE A CLEAR RISK THAT ARGENTINIAN ASSETS WOULD BE FROZEN AT SOME STAGE. A FURTHER ECONOMIC ARGUMENT BEING USED IS THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S IMPORT BAN IS NOT IN FACT BITING SINCE IT DOES NOT APPLY TO EXISTING CONTRACTS.

3. THE ABOVE IS NOT DOUBT NO MORE THAN A PARTIAL SUMMARY. BUT IT REVEALS AN UNDERLYING JUDGEMENT THAT NEITHER THE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES NOR THE THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE YET REACHED A POINT WHERE THE POWERS THAT BE CONSIDER THAT AN IMPORT BAN IS JUSTIFIED. THE LATIN AMERICAN LOBBY HERE HAS ARGUED THAT THE COST TO THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF THE REACTION TO SUCH A BAN IN LATIN AMERICA AS A WHOLE, WOULD BE MORE THAN THE ECONOMIC EFFECT ON ARGENTINA WOULD JUSTIFY. THIS OF COURSE MISSES THE POINT ENTIRELY, AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT. SOME IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE PREPARED TO CONCEDE THAT THE IMPORTANT THING AT THE MOMENT IS NOT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS IN ECONOMIC TERMS BUT THE POLITICAL PRESSURE WHICH THEY GENERATE. BUT THIS POINT DOES NOT PREVAIL POLITICALLY AT THE MOMENT.

4. SEE M I F T.

HENDERSON

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 301657Z APR 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1536 OF 30 APRIL

AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

FALKLANDS

1. IN RESPONSE TO LAST-MINUTE ATTEMPTS TO AMEND HIS STATEMENT, HAIG SAID THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN ALTOGETHER PLAIN-SAILING TO GET IT THROUGH THE NSC. THERE HAD BEEN SOME WHO HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE SUCH AN ANTI-ARGENTINIAN STAND. I ASKED HIM WHERE THE TROUBLE HAD COME FROM. HE SAID HE COULD NOT SAY BUT WENT ON TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT JEANE KIRKPATRICK WAS CERTAINLY AMONG THEM.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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TYPISTS

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RESIDENT CLERK

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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 301537Z APR 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NO 1534 OF 30 APRIL

YOUR TELNO 875: FALKLANDS

1. HAIG IS HAPPY THAT YOU SHOULD COME HERE THIS WEEKEND. IT IS VERY URGENT TO DISCUSS THE NEW SITUATION AND IN PARTICULAR THE BEST WAY TO FILL THE DIPLOMATIC VACUUM. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD COME HERE FIRST, RATHER THAN TO THE UN (I SAID THAT THIS WAS YOUR INTENTION). BECAUSE THE MOST URGENT MATTER WAS TO DISCUSS HOW TO HANDLE WHAT IS BREWING IN NEW YORK.

2. ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION THE ARGENTINIANS WERE GETTING TOGETHER WITH THE CUBANS AND THE SOVIETS AND A PROPOSAL WOULD BE MADE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DESIGNATE THE AGA KHAN AS A MEDIATOR.

3. HAIG SAID THAT IF WE ACCEPT MEDIATION WE WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY. IT WOULD BE VERY AWKWARD FOR THE AMERICANS, IF HMG HAVING REJECTED A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY IN TALKS WITH THEM, WERE THEN TO ACCEPT IT FROM A UN MEDIATOR. I SAID THAT WE COULD REST ASSURED THAT WE WOULD NEVER



SOVEREIGNTY IN TALKS WITH THEM, WERE THEN TO ACCEPT IT FROM A UN  
MEDIATOR. I SAID THAT HE COULD REST ASSURED THAT WE WOULD NEVER  
GO ALONG WITH AN UNDERTAKING TO ACCEPT THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY  
WITHOUT REGARD TO THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS.

HENDERSON

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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36 + 7 Cab. Office

(6) PS/MR HURD ADVANCE COPY

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 301605Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1533 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, OAS POSTS, ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS,  
BONN, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, DUBLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS,  
OTTAWA, OSLO, PARIS, ROME, REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE, UKDEL NATO,  
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, TOKYO, MOSCOW, UKMIS GENEVA: ROUTINE  
WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, EAST BERLIN, SOFIA, PEKING,  
HOLY SEE, HELSINKI.

FALKLANDS: HAIG'S STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT AS MADE BY HAIG TODAY AT 1530 GMT.

BEGINS

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS IS ABOUT TO ENTER A NEW AND DANGEROUS  
PHASE, IN WHICH LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION IS LIKELY. I WOULD LIKE  
TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON WHAT WE HAVE DONE, AND WHY, AND WHAT  
WE MUST DO NOW.



WE MUST DO NOW.

WE HAVE MADE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF U N SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. THAT RESOLUTION CALLS FOR:

- AN END TO HOSTILITIES;
- THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS; AND
- A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DISPUTE.

THE UNITED STATES MADE THIS EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT BECAUSE THE STAKES IN HUMAN LIVES AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER REQUIRE IT. FROM THE OUTSET, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN GUIDED BY THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THE COLLAPSE OF THAT PRINCIPLE COULD ONLY BRING CHAOS AND SUFFERING.

WE ALSO MADE THIS EFFORT BECAUSE THE CRISIS RAISED THE VITAL ISSUES OF HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY AT A TIME WHEN THE COMMUNIST ADVERSARIES SEEK POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE ON THE MAINLAND OF THE AMERICAS AND LATENT TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN MUCH OF THE HEMISPHERE CALL FOR UNITY AND THE RESOLUTE DEFENSE OF PRINCIPLE.

WE ACTED AS WELL BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PARTIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM IS OUR CLOSEST ALLY, AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT LOOKED TO US TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WE HAVE ALSO RECENTLY DEVELOPED A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA, AS PART OF OUR SUCCESS IN REVITALIZING THE COMMUNITY OF AMERICAN STATES. PRESIDENT GALTIERI ALSO REQUESTED OUR INVOLVEMENT.

UNDER THE DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, I PARTICIPATED IN MANY DAYS OF INTENSE DISCUSSION WITH THE PARTIES IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING U N SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. OUR INITIAL AIM WAS TO CLARIFY THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES AND TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THOSE POSITIONS MIGHT BE RECONCILED. WE TOOK NO POSITION ON THE MERITS OF EITHER THE BRITISH OR ARGENTINE CLAIMS TO THE ISLANDS.

AS THE PROSPECTS FOR MORE INTENSE HOSTILITIES AROSE, WE PUT FORTH AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL. IT REPRESENTED OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE TWO PARTIES COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT, AND



WHAT THE TWO PARTIES COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT, AND WAS BASED SQUARELY ON OUR OWN PRINCIPLES AND CONCERN FOR THE RULE OF LAW.

WE REGARD THIS AS A FAIR AND A SOUND PROPOSAL. IT INVOLVES: A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES; WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH ARGENTINE AND BRITISH FORCES; TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS; ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED STATES/UNITED KINGDOM/ARGENTINE INTERIM AUTHORITY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT; CONTINUATION OF THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL ADMINISTRATION WITH ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION; PROCEDURES FOR ENCOURAGING COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISLANDS; AND A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON FINAL SETTLEMENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS.

WE HAD REASON TO HOPE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD CONSIDER A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSAL, BUT ARGENTINA INFORMED US YESTERDAY THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. ARGENTINA'S POSITION REMAINS THAT IT MUST RECEIVE AN ASSURANCE NOW OF EVENTUAL SOVEREIGNTY, OR AN IMMEDIATE DE FACTO ROLE IN GOVERNING THE ISLANDS, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO SOVEREIGNTY. FOR ITS PART, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS CONTINUED TO AFFIRM THE NEED TO RESPECT THE VIEWS OF THE INHABITANTS IN ANY SETTLEMENT.

THE UNITED STATES HAS THUS FAR REFRAINED FROM ADOPTING MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THE SEIZURE OF THE ISLANDS THAT COULD HAVE INTERFERED WITH OUR ABILITY TO WORK WITH BOTH SIDES IN SEARCH FOR PEACE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING FOR THIS POSITION. NOW, HOWEVER, IN THE LIGHT OF ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE, WE MUST TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO UNDERSCORE THAT THE U.S. CANNOT AND WILL NOT CONDONE THE USE OF UNLAWFUL FORCE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES. THE PRESIDENT HAS THEREFORE ORDERED:

- THE SUSPENSION OF ALL MILITARY EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA;
- THE WITHOLDING OF CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINE ELIGIBILITY FOR MILITARY SALES;
- THE SUSPENSION OF NEW EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CREDITS AND GUARANTEES; AND
- THE SUSPENSION OF COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION GUARANTEES.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO DIRECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO REQUESTS FOR MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES. THERE WILL OF COURSE BE NO DIRECT U.S. MKD 018((0(:8.0/3.5



FORCES. THERE WILL, OF COURSE, BE NO DIRECT U.S. MILITARY FORCES ((0:8,0/3,5

AMERICAN POLICY WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY OUR CONCERNS FOR THE RULE OF LAW AND OUR DESIRE TO FACILITATE AN EARLY AND FAIR SETTLEMENT. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS READY TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN FINDING THAT SETTLEMENT. A STRICTLY MILITARY OUTCOME CANNOT ENDURE OVER TIME. IN THE END, THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERESTED PARTIES. OTHERWISE, WE WILL ALL FACE UNENDING HOSTILITY AND INSECURITY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

ENDS

HENDERSON

NNNN



PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR ADAMS

MR URE

MR GILLMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

ED/DEF D

ED/NEWS D

HD/UND

ED/PLANNING STAFF

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

RESIDENT CLERK

HD/ERD

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR )

SIR K COUZENS )

MR LITTLER )

MR HAWTIN )

MR PERETZ )

MR ILETT )

MR MCINTYRE )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

Mr LOEHNIS BANK OF ENGLAND

SECRET

DESKBY 301600Z

FM WASHINGTON 301459Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1532 OF 30 APRIL

MY TELNO 1464: ARGENTINE DEBT

1. WHEN ECONOMIC MINISTER VISITED NEW YORK YESTERDAY, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BROADLY CONFIRMED THE GENERAL PICTURE GIVEN BY US TREASURY IN MY TUR. FRBNY WERE UNAWARE OF THE WELLS FARGO CASE MENTIONED IN YOUR TELNO 851.

2. COMMERCIAL BANK CONTACTS INDICATED HOWEVER THAT THE SITUATION HAD BEEN CHANGING DURING THE WEEK. MAJOR US BANKS WERE SEEKING TO LIMIT USE OF ARGENTINE SHORT-TERM CREDIT LINES TO THE LEVELS ACTUALLY REACHED BEFORE THE CRISIS. SMALLER BANKS WITH A HIGH EXPOSURE IN LATIN AMERICA WERE PULLING OUT AS SOON AS CREDITS MATURED, AND BUILDING UP THEIR LIQUIDITY AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPOSITS BEING SHIFTED AWAY FROM THEM. ONE OF THESE BANKS FELT THAT EVEN IF THERE WAS AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THERE WAS NO WAY THAT ARGENTINA COULD AVOID GOING BROKE WITHIN 2 MONTHS OR SO, AND A NUMBER OF FIRMS DOING BUSINESS THERE MIGHT ALSO COLLAPSE. ONE OF THE LARGER BANKS DID NOT FEEL THIS WAS INEVITABLE



COLLAPSE. ONE OF THE LARGER BANKS DID NOT FEEL THIS WAS INEVITABLE IF THERE WERE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SOON, BUT AGREED THAT THE POSITION WAS DETERIORATING, AND CITED A MAJOR CANADIAN BANK HAVING REFUSED TO ROLL OVER A CREDIT TO ARGENTINA, AND FAILURE THIS WEEK BY THE PARIS BRANCH OF BANCO DE LA NACION TO REPAY MONEY MARKET LOAN FROM AN AMERICAN BANK, EVEN THOUGH THE AMERICAN BANK HAD OFFERED TO ACCEPT PAYMENT IN THE US IF THIS WOULD BE EASIER THAN PARIS.

3. SOME OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WERE SAID TO BE ALSO SUFFERING BY ASSOCIATION. IN THE SHORT RUN, THIS TENDENCY WOULD BE SOMEWHAT INDISCRIMINATE, BUT IT WAS FELT THAT BRAZIL, WHICH HAD ALREADY TAKEN SOME MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ITS ECONOMY, MIGHT NOT BE TOO SERIOUSLY AFFECTED, NOR WOULD MEXICO ALTHOUGH IT ALREADY HAD ITS OWN PROBLEMS. ON THE OTHER HAND, VENEZUELA HAD COME UNDER PRESSURE BECAUSE OF THE BELLICOSE LINE IT HAD TAKEN SO FAR IN THE CRISIS, AND ITS FINANCIAL ADVISERS WERE BELIEVED TO BE COUNSELLING A LOWER PROFILE. THE VENEZUELAN EXCHANGE RATE MIGHT WELL COME UNDER PRESSURE, AND ONE OF THE BRITISH BANKS WHICH HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN A SYNDICATED LOAN TO VENEZUELA HAD BACKED OUT AT THE SIGNATURE CEREMONY ITSELF. (THIS WAS CLEARLY A REFERENCE TO THE LOAN MENTIONED IN YOUR TELNO 77 TO CARACAS.) PERU WAS ALSO FELT TO BE SHAKY. A SYNDICATED LOAN, WHICH HAD BEEN HELD UP FOR FOUR MONTHS BY ADMINISTRATIVE DELAYS IN THE PERUVIAN ADMINISTRATION, COULD PROBABLY STILL BE KEPT INTACT, BUT ONLY JUST. CHILE MIGHT ALSO BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY FEARS THAT A CONFLICT MIGHT BREAK OUT OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL.

4. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO LITTLER (TREASURY) AND LOEHNIS (BANK).

HENDERSON.

NNNN



[TYPISTS]

D B300600z

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(32)

PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE  
 HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY  
 PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 SIR K COUZENS )  
 MR LITTLER )  
 MR HAWTIN )  
 MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
 MR ILETT )  
 MR McINTYRE )  
 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
 DIO CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GR 350

UNCLASSIFIED  
 DESKBY 300600Z [sic]  
 FM WASHINGTON 300600Z APR 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1529 OF 30 APRIL  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK, CGS USA  
 ROUTINE ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, UKREP  
 BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE.  
 OAS POSTS.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL): FOLLOWING IS TEXT  
 OF SENATE RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ADOPTED BY 79 VOTES  
 TO 1 ON 29 APRIL.

BEGINS

RESOLUTION

UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

(INSERT TITLE OF RESOLUTION HERE)

WHEREAS THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE OF  
 1947 SPECIFICALLY ENVISIONS THAT THE AMERICAN STATES WILL SEEK



WHEREAS THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE OF 1947 SPECIFICALLY ENVISIONS THAT THE AMERICAN STATES WILL SEEK QUOTE THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES UNQUOTE: AND WHEREAS ON APRIL 2, 1982, ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA SEIZED AND OCCUPIED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, A CROWN COLONY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: AND

WHEREAS THE UNITED NATIONS, THROUGH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (OF APRIL 3, 1982), HAS DEMANDED QUOTE AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS UNQUOTE AND CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM QUOTE TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES UNQUOTE: AND WHEREAS SUCH RESOLUTION, ARISING FROM A BREACH OF THE PEACE, IS BINDING UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: AND

WHEREAS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS PROVIDED GOOD OFFICES TO THE SEARCH FOR THE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION REQUIRED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502: AND CALLED FOR BY THE OAS, BUT

WHEREAS NO TREATY OBLIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, REQUIRES OR IMPLIES UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF, OR NEUTRALITY TOWARD, ANY ACT OF INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: AND

WHEREAS UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD INDEED BE GUIDED BY THE IMPERATIVES OF OPPOSING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: AND

WHEREAS, IN THE CURRENT DISPUTE, SUCH IMPERATIVES ARE INTENSIFIED BY LONG-STANDING BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLEGIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT STAND NEUTRAL WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 AND RECOGNISING THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ALL OTHER NATIONS TO SELF DEFENCE UNDER THE UN CHARTER, SHOULD THEREFORE PREPARE, THROUGH CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS, TO FURTHER ALL EFFORTS, PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, TO ACHIEVE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINIAN FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

ENDS.

HENDERSON

NNNN



TXPIST

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS (30)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I).  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

*MD*

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

*HD/NAD*

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GR 550  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 300600Z  
FM WASHINGTON 300545Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O

*DESKBY*

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1528 OF 30 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK  
INFO ROUTINE ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN UKREP BRUSSELS  
LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME THE HAGUE AND OAS POSTS.

MYTELNO 1487: FALKLANDS/CONGRESS

LATE ON 29 APRIL THE UNITED STATES SENATE VOTED BY 79 VOTES TO  
1 (HELMS) ON A RESOLUTION WHICH RESOLVES THAT THE UNITED STATES  
CANNOT STAND NEUTRAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTION 502, RECOGNISES THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO  
SELF-DEFENCE UNDER THE UN CHARTER AND CALLS FOR PREPARATIONS  
TO FURTHER ALL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINIAN  
FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. FULL TEXT IN M I F T.

2. THE RESOLUTION, PROPOSED BY SENATORS BIDEN AND MOYINHAN  
AND COSPONSORED BY SENATOR PERCY (CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN  
RELATIONS COMMITTEE) AND OTHERS IS, AS BIDEN DESCRIBED IT ON THE  
FLOOR OF THE SENATE, A FIRM STATEMENT THAT THE SENATE STANDS FOR  
BRITAIN AND AGAINST ARGENTINA, THAT BRITAIN IS RIGHT AND  
ARGENTINA IS WRONG.  
... MEASURES (AND BIDEN STIPULATED)



ARGENTINA IS WRONG.

WHILE IT DOES NOT CALL FOR SPECIFIC MEASURES (AND BIDEN STIPULATED THAT MILITARY ACTION WAS DEFINITELY NOT ENVISAGED) IT IS AN OVERWHELMING EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION, REFLECTING REALISATION THAT THE ARGENTINA POSITION REMAINS INFLEXIBLE.

3. ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION FOLLOWED A DAY OF FILIBUSTING BY HELMS TO TRY TO PREVENT A VOTE. PERCY AND OTHERS SPENT SEVERAL HOURS DURING THE EVENING NEGOTIATING WITH HELMS WHO EVENTUALLY ABANDONED HIS FILIBUSTER IN EXCHANGE FOR SOME TEXTURAL CHANGES.

PERCY TELEPHONED ME SEVERAL TIMES, AT ONE STAGE CONTEMPLATING DELAY UNTIL NEXT WEEK. I URGED HIM TO PRESS FOR A VOTE.

YOU MAY WISH TO SEND HIM A MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION. I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK BIDEN ON YOUR BEHALF.

IT WAS HIS RESOLUTION, DRAFTED AS A RESULT OF YOUR MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE LAST WEEK.

4. EARLIER IN THE DAY, THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ADOPTED BY VOICE VOTE THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY SOLARZ (PARA 1 OF T U R). THE RESOLUTION DESCRIBES BRITAIN AS A LOYAL ALLY THAT HAS STOOD BY THE UNITED STATES AND CALLS FOR FULL DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR GREAT BRITAIN IN ITS EFFORTS TO UPHOLD THE RULE OF LAW. THE SENATE AND HOUSE STAFFS WERE IN TOUCH WITH US THROUGHOUT ABOUT THE DRAFTING OF THEIR RESOLUTIONS.

HENDERSON

NNNN



WONFO015/30  
WONNY010/30

ZZ F C O

OO UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 301230Z

GR 300

SECRET

DESKBY 301230Z (NEW YORK)

FM WASHINGTON 300418Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1527 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

FALKLANDS.

1. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT THIS PUTS THE AMERICANS SQUARELY ON OUR SIDE. WE CAN DISCUSS IMPORTS LATER.

2. THE WAY THE BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS IS PRESENTED IS CLEAR-CUT AND SATISFACTORY FROM OUR STANDPOINT.

3. I AM SURE THAT IT WOULD SERVE OUR INTERESTS HERE IF WE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR HAIG'S EFFORTS AND WELCOME FOR THIS CATEGORICAL EXPRESSION OF AMERICAN SUPPORT.

4. I SEE NO PROSPECT OF A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME WHILE GALTIERI REMAINS IN POWER AND UNTIL OUR MILITARY PRESSURE BRINGS ABOUT A CHANGE IN B A. ONE POINT WE SHALL HAVE TO WATCH, HOWEVER, IS THAT FROM THE TIME OF THE U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT THERE WILL BE A DIPLOMATIC VACUUM WITH THE PROSPECT OR ACTUALITY OF MILITARY OPERATIONS INCREASING TENSION. I CAN SEE THAT THERE IS NO ADVANTAGE IN OUR TAKING THE INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL (SIR A PARSONS TELNO. 606 REFERS) WE SHALL, HOWEVER, NEED TO GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO PREVENT OTHERS FROM SEEKING TO FILL THE GAP IN A MANNER DETRIMENTAL TO OUR INTERESTS. I THINK THAT WE SHOULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS THIS PRIVATELY WITH THE AMERICANS HERE, ONCE THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

ER


3

29 APR 1982

Handwritten squiggle

Handwritten clock face





ZZ F C O

OO UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 301232Z

GR 902

SECRET

DESKBY 301230Z (NEW YORK)

FM WASHINGTON 300415Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1524 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

## FALKLANDS.

EAGLEBURGER GAVE HEAD OF CHANCERY LATE THIS EVENING THE TEXTS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS OF

- A) A DRAFT STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY HAIG AT NOON TODAY (30 APRIL)
- B) A MESSAGE FROM HAIG TO YOU.

2. EAGLEBURGER CONFIRMED THAT THE N.S.C. WOULD BE MEETING TO APPROVE THE DRAFT STATEMENT AT 10 A.M. TODAY THE PRECISE STEPS THE U.S. WOULD TAKE, AS INDICATED IN THE DRAFT STATEMENT AND IN HAIG'S MESSAGE, WERE OF COURSE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE FULL NSC.

3 RENWICK RAISED THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE STATEMENT.

- A) THE PHRASE QUOTE AS HOSTILITIES BECAME IMMINENT UNQUOTE WAS INACCURATE. HOSTILITIES HAD BEGUN WHEN ARGENTINA INVADED THE FALKLANDS ON 2 APRIL. EAGLEBURGER UNDERTOOK TO GET THIS CHANGED.
- B) THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO AN EMBARGO ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA. THIS WAS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR ITS ECONOMIC BUT ALSO FOR ITS POLITICAL EFFECT AND BECAUSE OTHERS E.G. JAPAN WOULD USE THE ABSENCE OF A U.S. EMBARGO AS AN EXCUSE FOR FAILING TO IMPOSE ONE THEMSELVES. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT AN IMPORT EMBARGO WAS NOT EXCLUDED OR A SUBSEQUENT STEP. AS AN IMMEDIATE MEASURE, IT RAISED LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES. THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A FINDING THAT AN IMPORT BAN WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IN ADDITION TO THE ARMS EMBARGO THE AMERICANS WOULD BE USING ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES TO HOLD UP SENSITIVE EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA, AS THEY WERE ALREADY DOING OVER AIRCRAFT ENGINES ETC.



4. RENWICK SAID THAT WE WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF AN EMBARGO ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA. THE STATEMENT, HOWEVER, THAT QUOTE THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO REQUESTS FOR MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES UNQUOTE WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED IN LONDON. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THIS UNDERTAKING SHOULD NOT BE DILUTED IN THE NSC MEETING. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE. RENWICK SAID THAT YOU WOULD ALSO BE GRATEFUL FOR THE CLEAR UNDERTAKING IN HAIG'S MESSAGE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD VETO ANY RESOLUTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH DEPARTED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM RESOLUTION 522. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS SENSE HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT TO MRS. KIRKPATRICK.

5. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HAIG HAD SOUGHT TO PRESENT THE BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS AS HELPFULLY AS POSSIBLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT, DESPITE OUR RESERVATIONS, WE SHOULD NOT CONTRADICT THE STATEMENT QUOTE WE HAD REASON TO HOPE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD CONSIDER A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSAL UNQUOTE, SO THAT THE ONUS COULD BE PUT SQUARELY ON THE ARGENTINIANS.

6. EAGLEBURGER ENDED WITH A PLEA THAT WE SHOULD NOT COME BACK TO HAIG BEFORE THE NSC MEETING WITH A REQUEST FOR MAJOR CHANGES OR FURTHER STEPS. IF WE WISHED TO PURSUE THE QUESTION OF AN IMPORT EMBARGO, WE SHOULD DO SO SUBSEQUENTLY. THIS PACKAGE REPRESENTED WHAT THEY WERE CONFIDENT OF GETTING THROUGH THE NSC TOMORROW MORNING, INCLUDING THE REFERENCE TO SUPPORT FOR OUR FORCES. THIS WOULD PUT THE UNITED STATES SQUARELY ON OUR SIDE. WE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE STEPS THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOW BE TAKING.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ALLENANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB.

PS +6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN ) TREASURY  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010133Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 623 DATED 30 APRIL 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON TELNO 1534: FALKLANDS

1. I WILL RESERVE FURTHER COMMENT ON UN TACTICS UNTIL I CAN TALK TO YOU PERSONALLY BETWEEN KENNEDY AND LA GUARDIA AIRPORTS TOMORROW (SATURDAY) AFTERNOON. MEANWHILE, AT CLOSE OF PLAY HERE TODAY (30 APRIL), THERE IS STILL NO SIGN OF ANYONE SEEKING AN EARLY MOVE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AT HIS FINAL SESSION OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AS PRESIDENT THIS AFTERNOON, KAMANDA RATHER INCAUTIOUSLY SAID THAT, WERE HAIG'S GOOD OFFICES TO FAIL, THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD THINK ABOUT HOW TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502, IF THE PARTIES SO WISHED. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD A ROLE AND MIGHT ADOPT MEASURES TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION. THE SITUATION WAS CRITICAL BUT NOT ALARMING, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL DID NOT NEED TO TAKE ACTION AT PRESENT.



RESOLUTION. THE SITUATION WAS CRITICAL BUT NOT ALARMING,  
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL DID NOT NEED TO TAKE ACTION AT PRESENT.  
THERE WAS NO COMMENT AND ALL DELEGATIONS SEEMED ONLY TOO ANXIOUS  
TO DISPERSE FOR THE WEEKEND.

2. I HAVE DEALT WITH HAIG'S EXTRAORDINARY RUMOUR ABOUT THE  
CUBANS AND RUSSIANS IN PARAGRAPHS 4 TO 6 OF MY TELNO 613. HOWEVER,  
SINCE A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN THE TALKS IS LIKELY TO BE THE  
EVOLVING SITUATION IN NEW YORK, SIR N. HENDERSON AND I THINK  
THAT IT WOULD BE VALUABLE IF GOULDING, MY HEAD OF CHANCERY, WERE  
TO JOIN YOUR DELEGATION. (MY OR WHYTE'S PRESENCE WOULD BE TOO  
CONSPICUOUS, BOTH IN TERMS OF REACTIONS HERE, AND THE POSSIBILITY  
THAT JEANE KIRKPATRICK MIGHT DEMAND TO BE PRESENT TOO). HE  
KNOWS THE SUBJECT BACKWARDS. UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION I PROPOSE  
THAT HE SHOULD ACCOMPANY YOUR PARTY ON THE SHUTTLE.

PARSONS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB

PS + 6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN ) TREASURY  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010131Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 622 DATED 30 APRIL 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

UN SPOKESMAN ON FALKLANDS

1. THE REUTER DAYLEAD FROM THE UN SAYS THAT A U N SPOKESMAN HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD CONFER WITH YOU "ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MEDIATING IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS."
2. IN THE BRIEFING TO WHICH THIS REFERS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN SAID THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD CONVEYED TO ME AND TO COSTA MENDEZ HIS WILLINGNESS TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO BOTH PARTIES IN THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THEIR CONFLICT. THE SPOKESMAN WAS ASKED HOW WE HAD RESPONDED. HE REPLIED THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD EXPRESSED ARGENTINE WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT UN ASSISTANCE. WITH REGARD TO THE UK, THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING MR. PYM. AT NO STAGE DID THE SPOKESMAN USE THE TERM MEDIATION.
3. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION AT LUNCHTIME ON 30 APRIL, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS NOT (RPT NOT) THINKING OF MEDIATION. - PERHAPS MORE OF GOOD OFFICES.
4. WE HAVE DRAWN THE SPOKESMAN'S ATTENTION TO THE INACCURACY



3. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION AT LUNCHTIME ON 30 APRIL, PENELOPE DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WAS NOT (RPT NOT) THINKING OF MEDIATION - PERHAPS MORE OF GOOD OFFICES.

4. WE HAVE DRAWN THE SPOKESMAN'S ATTENTION TO THE INACCURACY (NOT THE FIRST THIS WEEK) IN REUTER'S REPORT. WE HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED TO REUTER THAT THEY SHOULD RECHECK THE PIECE AND CONSIDER FILING A CORRECTION.

5. IF ASKED, WE SHALL DENY THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OFFERED TO MEDIATE; OR THAT WE HAVE REQUESTED MEDIATION.

PARSONS

NNNNN

1/0235



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN ) TREASURY  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

DESKBY 010800Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010009Z MAY  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 620 DATED 30 APRIL 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

ADVANCE COPY  
IMMEDIATE

MIPT: YOUR VISIT TO NEW YORK

1. PRESS AND TELEVISION INTEREST IN YOUR VISIT WILL BE INTENSE AND THE UN CORRESPONDENTS WILL LIE IN WAIT FOR YOU THROUGHOUT. RICHARD HOTTELET OF CBS HAS ASKED IF HE COULD INTERVIEW YOU FOR THE CBS EARLY MORNING SHOW BETWEEN 8 AND 8.30 AM ON MONDAY. HE MAY RING FENN DIRECT ABOUT THIS.
2. MY MAIN CONCERN, FROM THE UN POINT OF VIEW, IS THAT YOUR VISIT HERE SHOULD ADD AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE TO THE RISKS OF OUR BEING DRAWN PREMATURELY BACK INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (SEE MY TELNO 611). I AM THEREFORE PRESENTING IT AS A NATURAL ADJUNCT TO YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON BUT NOT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF YOUR VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. FOR THESE REASONS, MY LOCAL RECOMMENDATION IS THAT YOU SHOULD NOT ACCEPT HOTTELET'S INVITATION. HE IS A UN CORRESPONDENT OF LONGSTANDING AND WIDS EXPERIENCE. IN INTERVIEWING YOU HE WOULD BE BOUND TO CONCENTRATE ON THE UN ASPECTS. HIS VIEWERS



OF LONGSTANDING AND WIDE EXPERIENCE. IN INTERVIEWING YOU HE WOULD BE BOUND TO CONCENTRATE ON THE UN ASPECTS. HIS VIEWERS INCLUDE MANY OF MY COLLEAGUES AND THE SECRETARIAT HERE AND THERE WOULD BE A RISK THAT HE WOULD CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE CLOSER TO INVOLVING THE UN AGAIN THAN IS IN FACT THE CASE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, AND BEARING THE UK REQUIREMENT IN MIND, I DO NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR YOU TO EVADE THE PRESS ALTOGETHER, EVEN IF THIS WERE POSSIBLE. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD GIVE A HALF-HOUR PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE UN AT 9.30 AM ON MONDAY, AFTER YOU HAVE SEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS WOULD GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRAIGHTEN OUT SOME OF THE CONFUSION WHICH COSTA MENDEZ HAS SPREAD TODAY (REPORTED SEPARATELY) AND TO ENSURE THAT OUR POSITION IS PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD BOTH BY SPECIALIST UN CORRESPONDENTS AND BY A WIDER U S AUDIENCE.

4. IT WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE TO RESTRICT ENTRY TO A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE UN, AND ARGENTINE AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS WILL PRESUMABLY BE PRESENT. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, WE COULD ARRANGE A RESTRICTED MEETING WITH BRITISH (AND PERHAPS ALSO AMERICAN) CORRESPONDENTS ON HIS PREMISES AT 845 THIRD AVENUE. BUT THIS WOULD LIMIT YOUR AUDIENCE, AND COULD APPEAR TOO DEFENSIVE. IT WOULD ALSO MAKE THE DEPARTURE TIMETABLE VERY TIGHT. MY PREFERENCE WOULD THEREFORE BE FOR THE PROPOSAL IN PARA 3.

PARSONS

NNNN



TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS (30)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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RESTRICTED

DESKBY 010800Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010007Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 619 DATED 30 APRIL 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

YOUR VISIT TO NEW YORK

1. AS ALREADY REPORTED BY TELEPHONE, I HAVE ARRANGED THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMME FOR YOUR VISIT:

SUNDAY 2 MAY  
(TIME TO BE DETERMINED)  
ARRIVE LA GUARDIA AIRPORT BY EASTERN SHUTTLE FROM WASHINGTON

8.30 PM WORKING DINNER WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT MY RESIDENCE  
(YOURSELF, FALL, FENN, SECRETARY GENERAL, RAFAE AHMED)

MONDAY 3 MAY  
8.00 AM (POSSIBLY, BUT SEE MIFT) INTERVIEW WITH CBS'S RICHARD HOTTELET  
9.00 AM CALL ON AMBASSADOR LING QING (CHINA), PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL; IN HIS OFFICE AT THE UNITED



HOTTELET  
9.00 AM CALL ON AMBASSADOR LING QING (CHINA), PRESIDENT OF  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN HIS OFFICE AT THE UNITED  
NATIONS  
9.30 AM PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS (ASSUMING YOU  
ACCEPT THE RECOMMENDATION IN MIFT)  
10.00 AM DEPART FOR JFK AIRPORT TO CATCH BA 194

2. YOU, FALL AND PATON WILL STAY WITH ME AND THE OTHER MEMBERS  
OF YOUR PARTY AT THE BEEKMAN TOWER HOTEL, WHICH IS TWO MINUTES'  
WALK FROM MY HOUSE.

3. I WILL BE AT THE AIRPORT TO ACCOMPANY YOU FROM JFK TO  
LA GUARDIA WHEN YOU PASS THROUGH TOMORROW (1 MAY).

PARSONS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB.

PS +6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010010Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 617 DATED 30 APRIL 82

INFO EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, UKDEL NATO, OSLO, TOKYO,  
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

YOUR TELNO 332: POSSIBILITY OF UN SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA

1. I TAKE YOUR POINT BUT FEAR THAT I DID A RADIO BROADCAST FOR BBC THIS AFTERNOON (30 APRIL) IN WHICH I TOOK THE LINE IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF MY TELNO 589, IE THAT UN MANDATORY SANCTIONS WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE EXCEPT OVER A LONG PERIOD. I APOLOGISE AND WILL NOT DO SO AGAIN. ON REFLECTION I THINK IT WOULD BE BEST SIMPLY TO CONCENTRATE ON THE AVOIDANCE OF A VETO. TO TALK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NOT ATTRACTING THE REQUISITE VOTES WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE SUPPORT WE SECURED FOR SCR 502 HAD BEGUN TO ERODE.

PARSONS



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
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PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 010700Z MAY  
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010014Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 616 DATED 30 APRIL 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

ADVANCE COPY

MY TWO IPTS AND YOUR TELNO 333: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I AGREE THAT COSTA MENDEZ'S VARIOUS STATEMENTS HERE TODAY AMOUNT TO A SMART PR MOVE. WE KNOW THAT HE HAD A LONG SESSION WITH HIS MISSION HERE LAST NIGHT, BY WHICH TIME HE MUST HAVE HAD AN INKING THAT ARGENTINE REJECTION OF HAIG'S PROPOSALS WAS LIABLE TO LEAD TO NEW MOVES BY THE US. MY GUESS IS THAT HIS PURPOSE HAS BEEN TO PRESENT THE ARGENTINE POSITION IN THE MOST FAVOURABLE LIGHT PARTICULARLY IN UN EYES AND TO TRY TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM US AND UK RESPONSES TO THE FAILURE OF HAIG'S MISSION. HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN CREATING THE IMPRESSION OF A CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION AND HAS BEEN ASSISTED IN THIS BY MISCOMPREHENSION ON THE PART OF KAMANDA, BY INACCURATE REPORTING BY REUTERS, AND, I SUSPECT, BY RAFAE AHMED WHO IS ALTOGETHER



BY MISCOMPREHENSION ON THE PART OF KAMANDA, BY INACCURATE REPORTING BY REUTERS, AND, I SUSPECT, BY RAFEE AHMED WHO IS ALTOGETHER TOO SYMPATHETIC TO THE ARGENTINE CASE.

2. I ALSO AGREE WITH PARA 2 OF YOUR TELNO 333. I DO NOT THINK HOWEVER THAT WE NEED TO TAKE COSTA MENDEZ'S PR'S SUCCESS TOO TRAGICALLY. HIS STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN SMALL BEER BY COMPARISON WITH THOSE OF HAIG AND YOURSELF; AND THEY WILL SOON BE OVERTAKEN BY A PRESUMABLY LESS DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE FROM THE GENERALS IN BUENOS AIRES. WE SHOULD TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION WITH KAMANDA. IF ONE ASSUMES, AS I DO, THAT THE AUTHORITATIVE VERSION OF WHAT COSTA MENDEZ SAID IS THAT GIVEN TO ME BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR, IT IS CLEAR THAT KAMANDA GOT HOLD OF THE WRONG END OF THE STICK PROBABLY FOR LINGUISTIC REASONS. IN ANY CASE KAMANDA CEASES TO BE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT MIDNIGHT TONIGHT (30 APRIL) AND WILL NOT HAVE BRIEFED HIS SUCCESSOR (LING QING, CHINA).

3. I AGREE WITH THE PRESS LINE IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TELNO 333 EXCEPT THAT, HAVING HAD PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S ACCOUNT, I THINK THAT WE CAN SAY QUITE FIRMLY THAT COSTA MENDEZ'S POINTS FALL SHORT OF OUR ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS.

4. CONTRARY TO WHAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOLD ME (PARA 5 OF MY FIRST IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM) COSTA MENDEZ HAS LEFT NEW YORK AND IS APPARENTLY AT THE AIRPORT ENROUTE FOR BUENOS AIRES.

PARSONS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB.

**IMMEDIATE**

PS +6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
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SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

OO FCO DESKBY 010700Z

GR 310

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 010700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 302253Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 615 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE UN PRESS SERVICES SUMMARY OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER SHORTLY AFTER MID-DAY ON 30 APRIL, FOLLOWING HIS CALL ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. (SOME AGENCY REPORTS HAVE APPARENTLY GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD OFFERED UNCONDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502, WHEREAS HE RESTATED ARGENTINE INSISTENCE ON SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS AS THE ATTACHED ACCOUNT MAKES CLEAR.)

REG INC



ISLANDS AS THE ATTACHED ACCOUNT MAKES CLEAR.)

BEGINS

NICANOR COSTA MENDEZ, FOREIGN MINISTER OF ARGENTINA, SAID AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON THAT HE HAD MET THIS MORNING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IN THOSE MEETINGS HE HAD PUT FORTH THE POSITION THAT ARGENTINA WAS ALWAYS READY TO COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502.

HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA WOULD ACCEPT THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ANY OF ITS ORGANS, OR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. HE ADDED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONALITY WOULD IN NO WAY INTERFERE WITH HIS ABILITY TO WORK FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION.

HE STRESSED ARGENTINA'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE: "ARGENTINA WILL NOT STOP NEGOTIATING. ARGENTINA WANTS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT..." THE PRINCIPLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, HE SAID, WAS ARGENTINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. ARGENTINA WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE EVERY OTHER ASPECT OF THE SITUATION.

HE SAID ALSO THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOT REJECTED THE PLAN PUT FORTH BY THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. ARGENTINA HAD NO PROBLEM WITH MR. HAIG AND THE UNITED STATES CONTINUING TO WORK TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

MR. COSTA MENDEZ HAD NO COMMENT WHEN ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS OFFERING MATERIAL AID TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. HE GAVE NO ANSWER WHEN ASKED REPEATEDLY WHEN AND HOW NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE.

ENDS

2. SEE MIFT.

PARSONS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB.

PS +6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST  
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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 010700Z MAY  
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 302251Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 614 DATED 30 APRIL 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 613: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I SAW PEREZ DE CUELLAR FOR 40 MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 30 APRIL.

2. HE READ RAPIDLY FROM THE RECORD OF HIS MEETING WITH THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER EARLIER IN THE DAY. COSTA MENDEZ HAD SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS OPEN TO ALL ALTERNATIVES FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. ARGENTINA WAS READY TO ACCEPT DIRECT ACTION BY THE UN. HAIG'S MEDIATION HAD NOT SUCCEEDED BECAUSE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION, WHICH WAS OF CAPITAL IMPORTANCE TO ARGENTINA AND ON WHICH THEY HAD THE STRONG SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE NON-ALIGNED.



3. COSTA MENDEZ HAD SAID THAT ARGENTINA WAS READY TO ABIDE BY SCR 502. THERE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE A PHASING OUT PERIOD FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS: AND A TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION UNTIL THE FULL EXERCISE OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY BECAME POSSIBLE. RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINA'S RIGHT TO SOVEREIGNTY WAS A BASIC CONDITION. APART FROM THAT, ARGENTINA WAS READY TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WIDEST POSSIBLE BASIS. SHE WAS READY TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE "INTERESTS" OF THE ISLANDERS BUT NOT THEIR "WISHES" WHICH HAD BEEN IMPOSED BY THE ADMINISTERING POWER. BUT SHE COULD ACCEPT A FORM OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION WHICH RETAINED A BRITISH FLAVOUR: AND IN THEIR TREATMENT OF THE ISLANDERS, ARGENTINE GENEROSITY WOULD KNOW NO LIMITS. ARGENTINA WAS THEREFORE OPEN TO ALL POSSIBILITIES, EXCEPT ON SOVEREIGNTY.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD THEN EXPLAINED THE POSSIBLE FORMS WHICH SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION MIGHT TAKE, AND WAYS IN WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD EXERCISE HIS GOOD OFFICES. HE HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WHILE HAIG'S MISSION WAS ALIVE. AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION A RESUME OF HAIG'S PRESS CONFERENCE (TAKING PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY) HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN. (THE SECRETARY GENERAL NOTED IN PASSING THAT HAIG HAD NOT ANNOUNCED OFFICIALLY THAT HIS MISSION WAS OVER. THIS COMPLICATED PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S POSITION). COSTA MENDEZ STATED THAT ARGENTINA WANTED TO AVOID WAR, AND SAW "NO INCONVENIENCE" IN ACTION BY THE UN. HE THOUGHT THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF HAIG'S STATEMENT, THE CONTINUATION OF HAIG'S MISSION APPEARED IMPOSSIBLE.

5. COSTA MENDEZ HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD BE STAYING IN NEW YORK UNTIL SATURDAY AND WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF REQUIRED. HE HAD THEN LEFT TO MEET THE PRESS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR NOTED THAT, IN HIS REMARKS TO THEM (SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM) COSTA MENDEZ HAD NOT SAID THAT HAIG'S MISSION WAS OVER.

6. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD ALSO RECEIVED A LETTER FROM MR HAIG (WHICH HE WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHING). THIS COVERED THE SAME GROUND AS HAIG'S PRESS STATEMENT, BUT ENDED BY SAYING THAT REAGAN WAS READY FOR HAIG TO RESUME HIS EFFORTS EVEN IF MILITARY ACTION TOOK PLACE.

7. IN REPLY, I GAVE THE SECRETARY GENERAL THE TEXT OF YOUR PRESS STATEMENT AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF SOME OF YOUR REPLIES TO QUESTIONS. I DREW HIS ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO YOUR REMARKS ABOUT THE THREE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT: AND ABOUT THE



I DREW HIS ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO YOUR REMARKS ABOUT THE THREE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT: AND ABOUT THE PURPOSES OF YOUR VISITS TO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.

8. REFERRING TO COSTA MENDEZ'S STATEMENTS ABOUT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY, I SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CONCEDE ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY IN ADVANCE, OR TO ACCEPT CONDITIONS IMPLYING THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO CONCEDE SOVEREIGNTY. I THOUGHT THAT WHEN COSTA MENDEZ SAID THAT ARGENTINA WAS READY TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502 IN ITS ENTIRETY, HE WAS IMPLYING THAT HE WOULD START AT THE BOTTOM END OF THE RESOLUTION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD TOLD HIM THAT ARGENTINA WISHED TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTATION WITH NEGOTIATIONS. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS CONFIRMED THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE NOT PREPARED TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT SECURING RECOGNITION OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IN ADVANCE.

9. RAFAEUDDIN AHMED SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD EXPLORE FURTHER COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION. I WARNED HIM FIRMLY THAT WE WERE GOING ROUND IN CIRCLES. BRITAIN COULD NOT ACCEPT A PROCESS OF MEDIATION OR NEGOTIATION WHILE THE ARGENTINES DUG THEMSELVES IN. WE COULD NOT HAVE A GUNNAR JARRING TYPE OF NEGOTIATION DRAGGING ON FOR YEARS WHILE NOTHING CHANGED ON THE GROUND. THIS WOULD BE A PROBLEM FOR ANY POTENTIAL MEDIATOR, FROM THE UN OR ELSEWHERE.

10. WE AGREED TO TAKE MATTERS NO FURTHER BEFORE YOUR VISIT. BUT PEREZ DE CUELLAR THEN SAID THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY CLASHES DURING THE NEXT TWO DAYS. AHMED INTERJECTED THAT THIS COULD PUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD CONSTANTLY MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS AVAILABLE TO ASSIST THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION; BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO DO SOMETHING, IF THERE WAS A SERIOUS CLASH. I SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLIC CONTROVERSY BETWEEN HIM AND ME. I WOULD CONTACT HIM IMMEDIATELY IF ANYTHING HAPPENED.

11. FINALLY, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, IF ARGENTINA STATED OFFICIALLY THAT HAIG'S MISSION WAS DEAD, A VOID WOULD EXIST WHICH HE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE EXPECTED TO FILL. HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER ILLUECA (PANAMA), WHO WAS ABOUT TO SEE HIM, MIGHT TRY TO CONVENE THE COUNCIL. I SAID FIRMLY THAT, IF SOMEONE CALLED THE COUNCIL AND IT BECAME EMBROILED IN UNTIDY PROCEEDINGS, I WOULD HAVE TO ADVISE YOU NOT TO COME TO NEW YORK.



PROCEEDINGS, I WOULD HAVE TO ADVISE YOU NOT TO COME TO NEW YORK.

12. BY AGREEMENT WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR, I TOLD THE PRESS ONLY THAT I HAD INFORMED HIM OF MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS, OF YOUR LATEST STATEMENT, AND OF YOUR FORTHCOMING VISIT TO NEW YORK. HE HAD INFORMED ME OF HIS HIS MEETING WITH COSTA MENDEZ. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, I SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD NOT ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO MEDIATE.

PARSONS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

[T7P1575]  
36 + 7 CAB. OFFICE

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

FLASH

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
HD/DEF D  
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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 301730Z APR 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 613 OF 30 APRIL 1982  
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 612: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. COSTA MRU

UUFx

1. COSTA MENDEZ SAID <sup>NOCH</sup> LVA THE SAME THING TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHOM HE SAW AT 1530Z. WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED THE GIST OF HIS SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE BY TELEPHONE TO WESTBROOK. IT IS BEING ANNOUNCED THAT COSTA MENDEZ WILL RETURN TO BUENOS AIRES THIS EVENING (THOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE MAY CHANGE HIS MIND WHEN HE LEARNS OF YOUR IMPENDING VISIT). THERE IS STILL NO SIGN OF ANYONE CALLING THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY.

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CAME UNDER VERY STRONG PRESSURE FROM HIS STAFF TO MAKE A STATEMENT IMMEDIATE AFTER HE HAD SEEN COSTA MENDEZ. HE RESISTED THIS ON THE GROUND THAT HE HAD NOT SPOKEN TO ME. HE HAS SUMMONED ME AT 1900Z THIS AFTERNOON.

IN TOUCH WITH US THROUGHOUT THE MORNING



TO ME. HE HAS SUMMONED ME AT 1900Z THIS AFTERNOON.

3. I HAVE KEPT IN TOUCH WITH URQUHART THROUGHOUT THE MORNING. HE SAID THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NOTHING HE CAN DO WITHOUT A MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXCEPT TO OFFER HIS GOOD OFFICES, IF THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. EVEN THIS, IN URQUHART'S AND MY VIEW, MIGHT LEAD TO THE SOVIET UNION CHALLENGING THE PROPRIETY OF WHAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS DOING WITHOUT SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORISATION.

4. I HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATING THE RUMOUR THAT EITHER PEREZ DE CUELLAR (AS HAIG, I UNDERSTAND, TOLD YOU) OR THE ARGENTINIANS/CUBANS/RUSSIANS (AS HE TOLD SIR N HENDERSON) HAVE BEEN THINKING OF APPOINTING SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN AS A MEDIATOR. THE US MISSION HERE KNOW NOTHING OF THIS AND THE ARGENTINIANS/CUBANS/RUSSIANS RUMOUR MUST BE NONSENSE. IT WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO MEET IN ORDER TO NOMINATE AN INDIVIDUAL AS A MEDIATOR. ALL THE COUNCIL COULD DO WOULD BE TO CALL UPON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

5. HOWEVER WHEN I TOLD URQUHART OF THE RUMOUR, HE SAID THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOLD HIM THIS MORNING THAT, IF HE BECAME INVOLVED IN ANY GOOD OFFICES OR OTHER EXERCISE, HE WOULD NOT WISH TO DO IT HIMSELF BECAUSE OF HIS NATIONALITY. HE WOULD APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HE HAD SADRUDDIN IN MIND. URQUHART DID NOT THINK THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOLD ANYONE ELSE.

6. I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD GET TOO APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE ABOVE. APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, AND PROBABLY A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD CERTAINLY NOT SPRING ANYTHING LIKE THIS ON US AS A PUBLIC BOMBSHELL. IF HE OR ANYONE ELSE WERE TO START THIS BALL ROLLING, IT WOULD PRESENT US WITH THE KIND OF SCENARIO I HAVE BEEN DESCRIBING FOR WEEKS (E.G. IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 606).

PARSONS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB

PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE  
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 ED/PLANNING STAFF  
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
 RESIDENT CLERK

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 MR McINTYRE )  
 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
 DIO CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 301610Z APR 82  
 TO FLASH F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 612 OF 30 APRIL 1982  
 INFO FLASH WASHINGTON.

FLASH  
 ADVANCE COPY  


FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. COSTA MENDEZ SAW THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT 1430Z TODAY. (30 APRIL). KAMANDA SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED TO TELL ME THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD NOT ASKED FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL BUT HAD MADE SIX POINTS TO HIM, AS FOLLOWS:
  - (A) HE REAFFIRMED ARGENTINA'S WISH TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT:
  - (B) ARGENTINA WAS READY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 'AS A PACKAGE':
  - (C) ARGENTINA HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CONFRONTATION. THE UK WAS USING DISPROPORTIONATE FORCE AND AN ARMED ENCOUNTER COULD HAVE UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES:
  - (D) ARGENTINA WAS READY TO ACCEPT A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IN WHICH ALL ASPECTS OF THE DISPUTE COULD BE RESOLVED:
  - (E) THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY WAS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO ARGENTINA: ARGENTINA WAS DISPOSED TO ACCEPT A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE FORMULA ON SOVEREIGNTY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.



AGREEABLE FORMULA ON SOVEREIGNTY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD:

(F) SO FAR AS ARGENTINA WAS CONCERNED, HAIG WAS STILL IN ACTION BUT HIS LATEST PROPOSALS ON SOVEREIGNTY HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA.

KAMANDA / SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD TELEPHONED HIM TO ADD A SEVENTH POINT, WHICH HE HAD FORGOTTEN TO MENTION, VIZ

(G) ARGENTINA WOULD ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF A UN FORCE IN THE ISLANDS IN ORDER TO ENABLE ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW AND TO BEGIN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

PARSONS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB.

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 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
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 MR LITTLER )  
 MR HAWTIN )  
 MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
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 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
 DIO CABINET OFFICE  
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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GR 955

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ROME 301500Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 221 OF 30 APR 82

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS  
 SAVING FOR INFO OTHER EC POSTS, BIS BUENOS AIRES, UKDEL NATO

MY TELEGRAM NO. 197: ITALIAN POLITICAL REACTIONS

1. THE LONGER THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE GOES ON, THE MORE DIFFICULT

IT BECOMES FOR ITALY TO GIVE SOLID SUPPORT TO BRITAIN. WE  
 ARE REMINDED BY ALL OUR CONTACTS OF THE TIES OF BLOOD AND THE  
 TRADITIONAL LINKS BETWEEN ITALY AND ARGENTINA. THE MILLION OR SO  
 ITALIAN NATIONALS IN ARGENTINA ARE AN EFFECTIVE LOBBY: ALTHOUGH  
 THEY THEMSELVES CAN ONLY VOTE IN ITALIAN ELECTIONS BY COMING BACK  
 TO DO SO, THE VOTES OF THEIR FAMILIES AND ASSOCIATES HERE COUNT.  
 PRESSURE FROM BUSINESS INTERESTS ON ALL THE PARTIES MOUNTS AS EC  
 SANCTIONS AND THE ARGENTINE COUNTER-MEASURES BEGIN TO BITE.

2. THE PROSPECT OF SERIOUS HOSTILITIES ALARMS THE ITALIANS: CRITI-  
 CISM WAS MODERATE AFTER THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION LARGELY BE-

IMMEDIATE  
 ADVANCE COPY



CISM WAS MODERATE AFTER THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION LARGELY BECAUSE IT WAS BLOODLESS. ITALY'S INSTINCT IN OUR SITUATION WOULD BE TO COMPROMISE, AND PEOPLE FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT BRITAIN WILL PAY SUCH A HIGH PRICE FOR PRINCIPLES. FEAR OF THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A MAJOR BATTLE, AND ESPECIALLY OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AFTERWARDS, IS ANOTHER FACTOR. THERE IS SOME SYMPATHY FOR THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY, ON WHICH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO STATE A VIEW. ON THE OTHER HAND, ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND FAILURE TO HEED SCR 502, AND THE NATURE OF THE ARGENTINE REGIME, ARE ALL TELLING POINTS IN OUR FAVOUR HERE. BUT THE GENERAL FEELING IS THAT IT IS NOT WORTH A WAR.

3. THESE VARIOUS PRESSURES WITHIN ITALY ARE REFLECTED IN A FURTHER PALAZZO CHIGI COMMUNIQUE OF 26 APRIL (SEE MIFT) AND A MFA STATEMENT TODAY (SEE MY SECOND IFT). WHEN I TACKLED BERLINGUER, SPADOLINI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER, ABOUT ITS EVENHANDED APPROACH, HE SAID CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE WAS NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN ITALY'S POSITION AND THAT HER SOLIDARITY WITH THE EC LINE WAS CONFIRMED: SPADOLINI WAS APPEASING THOSE POLITICIANS WHO WERE UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ITALIAN COMMUNITY IN ARGENTINA OR FOR OTHER REASONS OPPOSED THE GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT OF BRITAIN. THE MFA HAVE ALSO ADVISED US NOT TO BE TOO CONCERNED ABOUT THE COMMUNIQUE. NEVERTHELESS THERE IS A DISQUEETING TENDENCY TO URGE MODERATION ON BOTH SIDES.

4. THE PSI REMAIN THE MAIN PROBLEM. IN UNHELPFUL PRESS ARTICLES (MY TELEGRAM NO. 207, NOT TO BUENOS AIRES) THEY HAVE OPPOSED SANCTIONS, CRITICISED BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IN EQUAL TERMS, AND IMPLIED THAT FURTHER USE OF FORCE WOULD BE UNJUSTIFIABLE. I CALLED ON CRAXI (PSI LEADER) WHO CLAIMED DISINGENUOUSLY THAT HIS ATTITUDE DID NOT REFLECT PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, THE ITALIAN COMMUNITY IN ARGENTINA, OR ITALIAN INDUSTRIALISTS. HE INSISTED THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND. I ARGUED THAT WE HAD TO USE EVERY MEANS OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON GALTIERI'S REGIME AND THAT EXPRESSIONS OF DOUBT FROM EUROPE, AND ESPECIALLY FROM ITALY BECAUSE OF HER CLOSE LINKS WITH ARGENTINA, COULD ONLY MAKE GALTIERI MORE DETERMINED. WE HAVE ALSO LOBBIED OTHER LEADING SOCIALISTS, INCLUDING BENVENUTO (SOCIALIST UNION LEADER) WHO HAS PUBLICLY CALLED FOR ITALIAN MEDIATION IN THE DISPUTE. CRAXI HIMSELF SEEMS TO BE CALLING THE TUNE.

5. THREE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HAVE TABLED A PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION TO COLOMBO CALLING ON ITALY TO ADOPT A NEUTRAL STANCE, BUT WE ARE TOLD THIS DOES NOT REFLECT SERIOUS DISSENT IN THE DC FROM THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT LINE. THE PARLIAMENTARY TIMETABLE IS ANYWAY SO CROWDED THAT A DEBATE ON THE FALKLANDS IS VERY UNLIKELY IN THE NEXT TEN DAYS, AND ANY MEETING OF COALITION PARTY LEADERS MUST AWAIT THE END OF THE DC CONGRESS ON 07 MAY. I SPOKE TO BOTH FANFANI AND PICCOLI, AND WE REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEM AS WELL



FANFANI AND PICCOLI, AND WE REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEM AS WELL AS THE DC FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERTS, BUT ALL ARE IMMERSSED IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE DC CONGRESS. THE POINT THEY ALL MAKE IS THAT SERIOUS BLOODSHED WOULD PUT ITALY IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION, WORSE IF - AS IS LIKELY - ITALO-ARGENTINES WERE KILLED.

6. IN THE OTHER PARTIES, ZANONE (PLI) HAS EXPRESSED ANXIETY AND TOLD US THAT HUNDREDS OF LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS ARE REACHING HIM FROM ITALIANS IN ARGENTINA (WHO TEND TO BE RIGHTWING). THE PCI ACCEPT OUR ARGUEMENTS ABOUT AGGRESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION, BUT ARE DOUBTFUL ABOUT SANTIIONS AND WANT A GREATER ROLE FOR THE UN: THE NATURE OF THE ARGENTINE REGIME IS A STRONG POINT IN OUR FAVOUR, AND SO FAR THE PCI HAS BEEN LESS TROUBLE THAN THE PSI. THE SMALL PSDI ACCEPT SANCTIONS AND ENDORSE BRITAIN'S PRESENT STRATEGY. AS FOR THE PRI, THEIR PARTY LEADER IN THE ASSEMBLY, BATTAGLIA, CONSIDERS THAT, WHILE IT MAY ACKNOWLEDGE THE JUSTICE OF OUR CASE, ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION IS EMOTIONALLY ON THE SIDE OF ARGENTINA: HE ARGUES THERE MUST BE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND BELIEVES THAT SPADOLINI THINKS SO TOO. (CF. THE CHIGI COMMUNIQUE).

7. I GAVE A WELL-ATTENDED PRESS CONFERENCE ON 28 APRIL TO CORRECT SOME INCREASINGLY WIDESPREAD MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF BRITAIN'S POLICY. PRESS AND TV COVERAGE OF IT WAS GOOD, DESPITE A PARTIAL NEWSPAPER STRIKE.

8. SO FAR WE HAVE MANAGED TO RETAIN ITALIAN SUPPORT, BUT WE SHOULD NOT TAKE IT FOR GRANTED. IF SERIOUS HOSTILITIES BEGIN, WE SHALL NEED TO DEMONSTRATE QUICKLY THAT BRITAIN HAD NO OTHER OPTION BUT TO USE FORCE. AT THAT STAGE, PERSONAL MESSAGES TO COLOMBO AND SPADOLINI, WOULD, BE, VERY HELPFUL: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

IM SO FAR

8. SO FAR WE HAVE MANAGED TO RETAIN ITALIAN SUPPORT, BUT WE SHOULD NOT TAKE IT FOR GRANTED. IF SERIOUS HOSTILITIES BEGIN, WE SHALL NEED TO DEMONSTRATE QUICKLY THAT BRITAIN HAD NO OTHER OPTION BUT TO USE FORCE. AT THAT STAGE, PERSONAL MESSAGES TO COLOMBO AND SPADOLINI WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL: THE ATTENTION YOU PAID COLOMBO AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL (YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 356 TO UKREP BRUSSELS NOT TO ...)



ELS, NOT TO ALL) WAS APPRECIATED HERE. PERTINI TOO SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN: HE CAN ON OCCASION PROVE EFFECTIVE IN RESTRAINING THE PSI, AND THOUGH HE HAS PACIFIST LEANINGS IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE ARGUMENT THAT AGGRESSION AND DICTATORS MUST BE RESISTED.

9. FCO PLSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

ARCULUS

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB

PS + 6

PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

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MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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ADVANCE COPY  
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SECRET

FM SANTIAGO 351742Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 OF 30 APRIL  
AND TO MODUK  
INFO IMMEDIATE LIMA

FALKLANDS: PERUVIAN/ARGENTINE MILITARY COOPERATION

1. MFA CONTACT (SAME AS SOURCE MENTIONED IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 182 - PLEASE PROTECT) STATES THAT CHILEAN AMBASSADOR IN MANILA WAS TOLD BY HIS ARGENTINE COUNTERPART ON 27 APRIL THAT ARGENTINA WAS RECEIVING QUOTE NON-SOVIET AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE ON LOAN FROM PERU. THE CHILEAN AMBASSADOR HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD BY THE PERUVIAN CHARGE ON 29 APRIL THAT THE PERUVIAN AIR FORCE HAD LENT THE ARGENTINES MIRAGE AIRCRAFT WITH PERUVIAN PILOTS DRESSED IN ARGENTINE UNIFORMS.
2. THIS MAY BE DELIBERATE DISINFORMATION OF A KIND WHICH SEEMS TO BE BEING SPREAD BY OTHER ARGENTINE DIPLOMATS/DEFENCE ATTACHES E.G. IN TOKYO. BUT I SUPPOSE WE HAVE TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY ESPECIALLY IF IT FITS OTHER INFORMATION. PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR HERE INCIDENTALLY DENIED SOME DAYS AGO THAT PERU WOULD BE GIVING MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF ANY



TOKYO. BUT I SUPPOSE WE HAVE TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY ESPECIALLY IF IT  
FITS OTHER INFORMATION. PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR HERE INCIDENTALLY DENIED  
SOME DAYS AGO THAT PERU WOULD BE GIVING MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF ANY  
KIND TO ARGENTINE.

HEATH

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 30/1830Z HD/JB



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB.

IMMEDIATE

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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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DESKBY 302200Z

DESKBY 302200Z

FM BRASILIA 302230Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 145 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLANDS: UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TEXT OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL COMMUNICATED BY TELEPHONE TO THE BRAZILIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK AT 302000Z.

BEGINS. GIVEN THE CONTINUING WORSENING OF THE CRISIS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND THAT THE TOUBREAK OF AN ARMED CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS IMMINENT, THE GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL BELIEVES IT IS IMPERATIVE TO IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATE THE MECHANISMS ESTABLISHED BY THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE



GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL BELIEVES IT IS IMPERATIVE TO IMMEDIATELY  
ACTIVATE THE MECHANISMS ESTABLISHED BY THE CHARTER OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE  
AND SECURITY. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
TO TAKE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING THOSE OF A  
PREVENTIVE NATURE, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY  
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), IN ALL ITS ASPECTS.

HIGHEST CONSIDERATION, RAMIRAO SARAIVA GUERREIRO,  
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC  
OF BRAZIL. ENDS.

HARDING

PARA 1 LINE SEVEN SHD READ QUOTE AND THAT THE OUTBREAK OF UNQUOTE

NNNN

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SENT/RECD AT 30:2311Z AD/JW



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB.

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PS/MR HURD  
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RESIDENT CLERK

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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GRS 670

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 302200Z

FM BRASILIA 30:2220Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

REPEATED INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 4 OF 30 APRIL

FALKLANDS: UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 5.30 PM (302030Z) AND HANDED TO ME COPIES IN ENGLISH AND PORTUGUESE OF AN URGENT MESSAGE WHICH HE HAD JUST SENT TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL IN NEW YORK (TEXT IN MIFT).

2. GUERREIRO EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE, WHICH PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED, WAS TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE, NOW THAT THE HAIG MEDIATION WAS EFFECTIVELY AT AN END. GUERREIRO SAID THAT HE HAD CONTEMPLATED ADDRESSING A SUITABLY PHRASED MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS THE ORGAN RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTION NO 502. BUT HE HAD OPTED IN FAVOUR OF SENDING ONE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL (WHO I GATHER HAD COLLECTED MESSAGES OF



RESOLUTION NO 502. BUT HE HAD OPTED IN FAVOUR OF SENDING ONE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL (WHO I GATHER HAD SOLICITED MESSAGES OF THIS KIND), ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE WAS BEST PLACED TO DECIDE HOW TO PLAY THE UN HAND AND THAT IT MIGHT ANYWAY BE PREFERABLE TO HOLD INFORMAL TALKS WITH THE TWO PARTIES BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS CONVENED.

3. I ASKED THE MINISTER WHETHER HE HAD ANY CLEAR IDEA AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE THE MOST SATISFACTORY WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK. HE SAID THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD ME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, BRAZIL WOULD BE READY TO PUT FORWARD EVEN THE MOST CRACKPOT IDEAS IF THEY SEEMED TO OFFER ANY WAY OUT. ONE SUCH IDEA, WHICH WAS NOT HIS OWN, WAS THAT BOTH PARTIES SHOULD RENOUNCE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IN FAVOUR OF SOME KIND OF UN BODY SPECIALLY CREATED FOR THE PURPOSE. THIS GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY OF REPEATING THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR OWN POSITION AND EMPHASISING THAT THE MINDS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE NOT CLOSED TO ANY SOLUTION SO LONG AS (A) IT WAS SEEN NOT TO REWARD THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION: (B) IT WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ISLANDERS' OWN WISHES: AND (C) IT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.

4. IN PASSING, I ASKED GUERREIRO HOW HE VIEWED MR HAIG'S STRONG STATEMENT TODAY IN FAVOUR OF THE BRITISH POSITION. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CREATE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHICH WERE MOST EMOTIONALLY COMMITTED TO THE ARGENTINE SIDE. BUT HE IMPLIED THAT, THOUGH IT WOULD NOT EXACTLY HELP, IT WOULD CAUSE NO DIFFICULTY IN BRAZIL'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

#### COMMENT

5. THIS MESSAGE, WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RECEIVE WIDE PUBLICITY HERE, SEEMS TO BE A CAUTIOUS, IF MISGUIDED, EFFORT BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO BE SEEN TO BE MAKING A CONSTRUCTIVE MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF A SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, WITHOUT ACTUALLY STICKING THEIR NECKS OUT. I WOULD GUESS THAT THE MESSAGE OWES MORE TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO THAN TO GUERREIRO, WHO TOLD ME ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO THAT HE THOUGHT RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD OFFER LITTLE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION IN THE SHORT TERM. THIS INTERPRETATION WOULD ACCORD BOTH WITH THE INDICATIONS FIGUEIREDO GAVE TO THE AMERICAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE EARLIER THIS WEEK (MY UNNUMBERED TEL DATED 272045Z PARAGRAPH 4, REFERS) AND WITH HIS PUBLIC REMARKS TO JOURNALISTS DURING A VISIT TO PORTO ALEGRE ON 28 APRIL, WHEN HE CAREFULLY PROFESSED EQUALLY FRIENDLY FEELINGS FOR BOTH THE ARGENTINE AND BRITISH PEOPLES AND EXPRESSED THE PIOUS HOPE THAT THE LATTER WOULD USE THEIR WELL-KNOWN GOOD SENSE TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS - IMPLYING THAT THE ARGENTINES COULD HARDLY



WELL KNOWN GOOD SENSE TO FIND A WAY OUT  
OF THE PRESENT CRISIS - IMPLYING THAT THE ARGENTINES COULD HARDLY  
BE EXPECTED TO HAVE ANY.

6. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE MESSAGE CALLS FOR ANY DIRECT COMMENT  
FROM US AT THIS STAGE. BUT I GAINED A CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT  
GUERREIRO WOULD LIKE TO KEEP A BILATERAL DIALOGUE GOING WITH US  
ON THIS QUESTION, AS I BELIEVE HE DOES WITH THE ARGENTINES.  
INDEED, I THINK HE SHARES PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S VIEW THAT WE ARE  
MORE LIKELY TO COME UP WITH A SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO THE  
SOVEREIGNTY CONUNDRUM THAN ARE OUR OPPONENTS. GIVEN THE FACT  
THAT HE SAW A GOOD DEAL OF THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER AT THIS  
WEEK'S OAS MEETING, YOU MAY THINK THE TIME IS RIPE FOR YOU  
YOURSELF TO SEND HIM A MESSAGE OUTLINING YOUR VIEWS. EVEN IF  
THIS DOES NO MORE THAN REPEAT WHAT YOU HAVE SAID IN PARLIAMENT,  
I THINK THAT THE EFFECT OF THE GESTURE BOTH ON GUERREIRO AND ON  
FIGUEIREDO WOULD BE POSITIVE. IT MAY HELP WHEN WE NEED THEIR  
SUPPORT, AS WE SURELY WILL EVENTUALLY.

7. SEE MIFT.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 30:2305Z AD/JW



cc to PM  
1/5

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BERFO 014/30

OO FCO

OO WASHINGTON

OO MONTEVIDEO

OO SANTIAGO

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UNCLASSIFIED

(FM BERNE <sup>302135</sup> EPWQETZ)

30 APR 1982

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X23

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 61 OF 30 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO

PRESS SUMMARY

1. TOP NEWS THIS MORNING IS THE BLOCKADE DECLARED BY ARGENTINA IN RESPONSE TO THE BRITISH TEZ. WHILST THE POPULAR DAILIES DECLARE QUOTE ZERO HOUR IS HERE UNQUOTE IGLESIAS ROUCO IN "LA PRENSA" WRITES ABOUT QUOTE AN IMPOSED WAR UNQUOTE AND ALL PAPERS RECORD THE END OF HAIG'S PEACE ATTEMPT WITH THE NEWS THAT THE US SENATE IS BACKING THE UK. SUBSIDIARY HEADLINES IN SOME PAPERS ANNOUCE COSTA MENDEZ'S APPROACH TO THE UN. THE SERIOUS PRESS CARRY THE TEXT OF THE MILITARY JUNTA DECREE IMPOSING GENERAL CENSORSHIP FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY (TEXT FOLLOWS IN MIFT).

2. ON THE INTERNAL POLITICAL FRONT LEADERS IN "LA PRENSA" AND "LA NACION" DENOUNCE OPPORTUNISTIC MOVES BY LEFTWING POLITICIANS, PARTICULARLY THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY PARTY TO



302135  
(FM BERNE ETWGETZ)

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 61 OF 30 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO

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JOY 32.4.

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SENT AT RECD A 302142Z TWPM



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) + 7 CAB.

PS +6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

**IMMEDIATE**

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RESIDENT CLERK

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MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

UNCLASSIFIED

FM QUITO 302107Z APR 1982

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 061 OF 30 APR

REPEAT TO (FOR INFO) WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS: US SANCTION

1. THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION WAS MADE AT 13:30 HOURS LOCAL BY THE ECUADOREAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

BEGINS:

" I HAVE JUST LEARNT WITH PROFOUND CONCERN OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND IN SUPPORTING GREAT BRITAIN. I MUST POINT OUT THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE 20TH CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ADOPTED BY 17 VOTES IN FAVOUR, NONE AGAINST AND 4 ABSTENTIONS, IS OBLIGATORY FOR ALL THE STATES MEMBERS OF THE TREATY OF INTER-AMERICAN RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE. THE TREATY SO RULES EXPRESSLY WHEN IT STATES THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE TREATY ARE OBLIGATORY FOR ALL MEMBERS ONCE THEY HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY. THE DRAFT (SIC) RESOLUTION RECALLS THE DECLARATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMITTEE IN THE SENSE THAT " THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC HAS AN UNIMPEACHABLE RIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLAS MALVINAS". THIS IS A LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATION WHICH THE MEMBERS OF THE TREATY HAVE ASSUMED BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE SUPPORT WHICH HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED AND DECLARED BY THE UNITED STATES FOR GREAT BRITAIN AND THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC



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DATED 30 APRIL 1982.

ENDS.

FCO PLS PASS ✓

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*Passed E/R*

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ANNOUNCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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(FM BERNE EPWQEFZ)

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 61 OF 30 APRIL

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

(FM BERNE 301755Z)

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 60 OF 30 APRIL

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO BRASILIA

APRES GALTIERI LE DELUGE?

1. GALTIERI'S FOUR MONTH PRESIDENCY HAS EXHIBITED MANY OF THE TRADITIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A SOUTH AMERICAN RIGHTWING MILITARY DICTATORSHIP: TOUGH LAW AND ORDER POLICIES, SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PIOUS CATHOLIC STANCE, WITH EVEN A FEW RELUCTANT LIBERALISING TENDENCIES AND A FLURRY OF FLAMBOYANT POPULIST MOVES CULMINATING IN THE BOLD MALVINAS INVASION WHICH HAS BRIEFLY BROUGHT NATIONAL JUBILATION AND UNITY.

2. BUT WHAT IF THE ISLANDS ARE LOST AGAIN? THE NAVY COMMANDER, ANAYA, IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE COMMANDERS



ANAYA, IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE COMMANDERS: QUOTE WE TOOK THEM, NOW WE KEEP THEM UNQUOTE. FEW HERE BELIEVE GALTIERI WOULD SURVIVE SUCH A REVERSE. NO ONE CAN SAY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN, BUT THE POSSIBILITIES INCLUDE:

(1) A NEW ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT, PROBABLY TOUGHER AND EVEN LESS COMPROMISING THAN GALTIERI. (UNIDENTIFIED AS YET, BUT AS LIKELY AS NOT EAGER TO FIGHT TO THE DEATH).

(2) A NEW PRESIDENT, DRAWN, AGAINST TRADITION FROM THE NAVY, THOUGH WITH SOME POPULAR SUPPORT. (?ADMIRAL MASSERA, PAST JUNTA MEMBER AND NAVY COMMANDER, WHO HAS FLIRTED OPENLY WITH THE PERONIST RIGHT AND RECENTLY FORMED HIS OWN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY).

(3) AN INTERIM ARMY PRESIDENT, WITH CIVILIAN POLITICAL SUPPORT, APPOINTED TO PRESIDE OVER DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS WHICH THE PERONISTS WOULD EVENTUALLY WIN. THE QUOTE MULTIPARTIDARIA UNQUOTE 5-PARTY COALITION, IS NOT YET READY FOR THEM.

(4) AN INTERIM CIVILIAN PRESIDENT, RECALLED FROM RETIREMENT TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS AS IN (3) (? ONGANIA).

(5) A PERIOD OF NEAR-ANARCHY, WITH VARIOUS ARMY COMMANDERS COMPETING FOR THE PRESIDENCY AGAINST NAVY AND CIVILIAN CLAIMANTS, THE POSSIBILITY OF A QUOTE CORDOBAZO UNQUOTE (JUNIOR ARMY COMMANDERS' COUP) AND AN INEXORABLE SLIDE TOWARDS CHAOS.

3. OTHER SCENARIOS COULD BE DRAWN, BUT NONE GIVE MUCH CONFIDENCE THAT ARGENTINA WILL BE ANY EASIER TO DEAL WITH AFTER GALTIERI THAN NOW. THE FALKLANDS WILL BE OURS, BUT FOR WHAT PURPOSE, AT WHAT NATIONAL COST, AND FOR HOW LONG? THE HEALING TIME FOR THE WOUNDS ON BOTH SIDES WILL DEPEND ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE LOSSES INCURRED: IF THE BATTLE CAN BE WON AS CLEANLY AND SURGICALLY AS THAT IN SOUTH GEORGIA, TROOPS WITHDRAWN, AND THE ISLANDS THEREAFTER HANDED PROMPTLY OVER TO UN OR US OR JOINT ADMINISTRATION IN A MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE OF VICTORY, IT WILL HAVE BEEN WORTH MAKING OUR POINTS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE AND FOR DEMOCRACY. BUT IF IT IS TO BE A QUOTE LONG AND BLOODY UNQUOTE AFFAIR (WOODWARD), WE RUN THE RISK OF STALEMATE, OR AT BEST, OF A PYRRHIC VICTORY, BRINGING CHAOS IN THIS COUNTRY AND IRREPARABLE LONG TERM DAMAGE TO OUR INTEREST ON THIS CONTINENT, IF NOT WIDER AFIELD.

JOY 32.4.

UNQUOTE

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR GILLKORE

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HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

*Emergency Unit*

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MR ILETT  
MR MCINTYRE

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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FM STRASBOURG 301120Z APRIL  
TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 44 OF 30 APRIL

RFI ANKARA, MADRID  
INFO SAYING TO EC POSTS, OSLO STOCKHOLM REYKJAVIK VIENNA BERNE  
LISBON VALLETTA NICOSIA UKDEL NATO UKNIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

COUNCIL OF EUROPE ASSEMBLY AND MINISTERIAL MEETINGS - 28/29 APRIL.

**SUMMARY**

1. THESE WENT REASONABLY WELL. BOTH THE PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THE OTHER MINISTERS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU COULD NOT LEAVE LONDON AT THIS TIME AND WELCOMED MR HURD AS YOUR REPLACEMENT. OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS ON FALKLANDS SATISFACTORY AND ON TURKEY REASONABLY SO. DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADOPTED.

**FALKLANDS**

2. MR HURD'S SPEECH TO THE ASSEMBLY AND THEN CROWDED PRESS CONFERENCE ON 28 APRIL PREPARED THE WAY FOR THE VERY SATISFACTORY OUTCOME OF THE ASSEMBLY'S DEBATE ON 29TH APRIL (MY TELNO 42). HIS BRIEFING OF THE OTHER MINISTERS DURING THE INFORMAL MEETING ON 28TH (RECORD BEING DISTRIBUTED BY HIS OFFICE) HELPED COUNTER-BALANCE THE INITIAL NERVOUS REACTIONS OF SOME MINISTERS TO OUR DECLARATION OF THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE, BUT DESPITE SPANISH



DECLARATION OF THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE. BUT DESPITE SPANISH DESIRE TO AVOID AN OPEN DISAGREEMENT WITH US, BACK SEAT DRIVING BY THEIR MINISTER FROM MADRID LED TO LONG AND COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE WORDING OF THE COMMUNIQUE (TEXT IN MY TELNO 43). HOWEVER WHEN AT THE LAST MINUTE CYPRIOT MINISTER INSISTED ON A REFERENCE TO UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS SPANIARDS HONOURED THEIR COMPROMISE WITH US AND REFRAINED FROM ALIGNING THEMSELVES WITH HIM.

#### TURKEY

3. A TOUGH TWO HOUR DISCUSSION ON THIS DOMINATED THE FORMAL MEETING. TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER LED OFF WITH A DETAILED DEFENCE OF THE TURKISH RECORD AND BITTER CRITICISM OF THOSE WHO FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL POLITICS WERE CONTINUING UNFAIR ATTACKS ON TURKEY. SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER REPLIED IN MEASURED TERMS EMPHASISING DESIRE TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH TURKEY IN THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS AS DID ITALIAN, PORTUGUESE AND IRISH MINISTERS. BUT NORWEGIAN, DUTCH AND AUSTRIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND ESPECIALLY CHANDERNAGOR (FRANCE) AND PAPOULIS (GREECE) WERE MORE VICIOUS IN THEIR CRITICISM. CYPRIOT COMPLAINED OF COUNCIL'S PAST FAILURE TO CONDEMN TURKISH INVASION OF CYPRUS CONTRASTING THIS WITH EUROPEAN REACTION OVER THE FALKLANDS. TINDMANS REPORTED ON HIS RECENT VISIT. DANISH REPRESENTATIVE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST TO HAVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS EXAMINED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

4. AFTER TURKMEN HAD REPLIED IN FIRM BUT CONCILIATORY TERMS, AND MR HURD HAD DEPARTED AFTER LUNCH, THERE WAS A WRANGLE OVER THE COMMUNIQUE FROM WHICH AUSTRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE CHAIR CONCLUDED THAT WE COULD SAY NO MORE THAT THAT QUOTE THE SITUATION IN TURKEY WAS DISCUSSED AND VARIOUS VIEWS EXPRESSED UNQUOTE. GREEK MINISTER THEN DEPARTED LEAVING INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIS UNFORTUNATE AMBASSADOR TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES OVER REMAINDER OF THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD BE UNBALANCED TO CONDEMN EG POLISH MILITARY WITHOUT CONDEMNING THE TURKS. THIS IN TURN PROVOKED NORWEGIANS AND SWEDES TO STATE THEY SAW NO PARALLEL BETWEEN TURKEY AND POLAND.

#### EAST/WEST

5. DURING THE INFORMAL MEETING PAHR (AUSTRIA) CRITICISED THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE CSCE CONFERENCE AND IT WAS AGREED THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF TACTICS IN THE AUTUMN NOT ONLY BETWEEN CSCE EXPERTS, BUT ALSO BETWEEN MINISTERS EITHER DURING THE REGULAR MINISTERIAL MEETING IN NOVEMBER OR AT AN ADDITIONAL EXTRAORDINARY



MEETING IN OCTOBER. DURING THE FORMAL MEETING AFTER LONG DELAY CAUSED BY THE GREEK INSTRUCTIONS, LANGUAGE WAS AGREED FOR THE COMMUNIQUE SIMILAR TO THAT USED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON POLAND, AFGHANISTAN AND CSCE WITH A FOOTNOTE RECORDING RESERVATIONS (UNSPECIFIED) BY GREECE, WITH WHICH CYPRUS AND MALTA THEN CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES.

OTHER

6. AFTER 6.00PM AFTER ALL THE 15 MINISTERS ORIGINALLY PRESENT HAD DEPARTED EXCEPT OR PAHR. IN THE CHAIR THE COMMITTEE ADOPTED THE DRAFT DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION WHICH RESULTED FROM A UK INITIATIVE. THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVE HAVING FAILED TO SECURE ANY SUPPORT FOR HIS REQUEST FOR A FURTHER SIX MONTHS DELAY. THE COMMITTEE ALSO AGREED TO ENTRUST PAHR, AS CHAIRMAN, WITH A MISSION TO EXPLORE WHAT ROLE THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE COULD PLAY QUOTE IN THE PROCESS OF GIVING NEW IMPETUS TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION UNQUOTE, AND ACCEPTED IN A WATERED DOWN FORM A GERMAN PROPOSAL TO ACCELERATE STUDY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING ON A LEGAL INSTRUMENT RELATING TO DIRECT BROADCAST BY SATELLITE.

7. COMMUNIQUE AND FULL RECORDS BY DAG.

FCO PSE PASS ALL

CAPE

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SAPU(82)11

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached for information is a transcript of Mr Pym's press conference  
this evening.

Cabinet Office

30 ~~May~~ 1982

*April*



STATEMENT BY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY: 30 APRIL  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

---

Mr Haig has told us that Argentina has rejected his proposals for a negotiated settlement, and he has just announced this in Washington.

This is a major change in the situation. In deciding not to cooperate in negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the Argentines have confirmed their commitment to aggression in defiance of the UN.

The British people are deeply grateful to the US, and especially to Mr Haig for his remarkable efforts. America and Britain have done everything possible from the start to produce a negotiated settlement.

We now have a new situation and I am extremely glad that the United States has come down decisively on the side of Britain.



To have the world's most powerful state on our side must make Argentina see that aggression cannot pay.

Mr Haig has not published his proposals, so I shall not describe them now.

But yesterday I outlined in the House of Commons the three major elements of a possible agreement: the Argentine withdrawal; an interim administration in the Islands; and the framework for negotiations about the future of the Islands which must of course respect the wishes of the Islanders.

I also spoke in Parliament on the need for Britain to increase its military pressure and to take military measures if necessary, in the exercise of our right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.



I am going to Washington tomorrow or on Sunday to review the new situation with Mr Haig and to discuss the next steps. Then I shall go on to New York to see the Secretary-General of the United Nations. These meetings are timely now and will be very much in accord with the wishes of the House of Commons expressed in yesterday's debate.

We shall not abandon our efforts for a peaceful settlement. But Argentina must withdraw, as the Security Council Resolution demanded four weeks ago tomorrow.

Then we shall be entirely ready to move on to the negotiations foreseen in the third point of the same Resolution. A conference or any other kind of negotiation can be considered.



It has been our strategy all along to build up the pressure on Argentina - economic pressure, diplomatic pressure and military pressure.

Now, with US backing, I am more confident than ever that justice will prevail against Argentina's totally illegal aggression.



1. FENW: THANK YOU SECRETARY OF STATE. KEITH GRAVES.

KEITH GRAVES: DO YOU RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE TASKFORCE WHILE THIS NEGOTIATING CONTINUES?

MR. PYM: NO, I WOULD NOT RULE OUT ANYTHING, THE WHOLE TIME THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN GOING ON THE ARGENTINES HAVE BEEN REINFORCING THE ISLAND, THEY'VE NOW GOT THOUSANDS OF MEN THERE, THEY'VE TAKEN A NUMBER OF MILITARY MEASURES AND OF COURSE I DO NOT RULE IT OUT. AT THE SAME TIME THAT DOESN'T PREVENT US SEEKING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BY ALL POSSIBLE MEANS.

1. FENW: COULD I JUST SAY - I'M SORRY - COPIES OF THE STATEMENT WILL BE AVAILABLE AS YOU LEAVE, I FORGOT TO SAY THAT BEFORE. WILL QUESTIONERS PLEASE WAIT FOR THE MICROPHONE. JOHN DICKIE

JOHN DICKIE 'DAILY MAIL': SECRETARY OF STATE, ARE YOU PREPARED TO HAVE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINIANS NOW OR DO YOU INSIST THAT THERE MUST BE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BEFORE YOU HAVE ANY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS?

MR. PYM: I DOUBT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE FRUITFUL BECAUSE THERE IS A VERY FUNDAMENTAL DIVISION THEY HAVE CLAIMED SOVEREIGNTY FOR THEMSELVES AND THIS IS UNDOUBTEDLY A MAJOR STICKING POINT, I DOUBT THAT COULD BE FRUITFUL.

1. FENW: SATTEN CBS.

MR. SATTEN: MR. PYM, MAY I ASK MR. GRAVES' QUESTION IN A DIFFERENT WAY? DOES THIS NOT CLEAR THE DECKS FOR DIRECT MILITARY ACTION TO FORCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINES-

MRZ PYM: WE ARE MAINTAINING OUR MILITARY PRESSURE AND WE ARE BUILDING UP OUR MILITARY PRESSURE, AS EVERYBODY KNOWS. OUR TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE COMES INTO FORCE TOMORROW AND THAT IS THE NEXT STEP AND WE WILL INCREASE THE PRESSURE - I BEG YOUR PARDON IT CAME INTO FORCE TODAY, THIS VERY MORNING, I BEG YOUR PARDON - AND WE WILL GO ON TAKING WHATEVER STEPS ARE NECESSARY AND THAT UNDOUBTEDLY I THINK IS HAVING AN EFFECT ON THE ARGENTINES.



DAVE WALKER 17N: THE AMERICANS, I UNDERSTAND, ARE OFFERING MATERIAL SUPPORT, ARE WE GOING TO ASK FOR MATERIAL SUPPORT AND IF SO IN WHAT FORM?

MR. PYM: THE MAJOR EVENT TODAY IS THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE, WE HAVEN'T GOT DOWN TO ANY DETAILS YET BUT IN MR. HAIG'S STATEMENT HE HAS LISTED SOME OF THE THINGS THAT HE INTENDS TO DO.

PETER ALLEN 17N: WE'VE JUST HEARD SOME COMMENTS FROM MR. COSTA MENDEZ, INDICATING HE'S PREPARED TO COMPLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS INSTRUCTION TO LEAVE THE ISLAND, HAVE YOU HEARD OF THOSE, HAVE YOU ANY COMMENT ON THIS?

MR. PYM: HE'S SHOWN NO SIGN OF DOING THAT AT THE MOMENT, THAT OF COURSE .... THE CARRYING OUT OF 502 IS A BASIC CONSIDERATION. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IS THAT IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO ONE IS DEALING WITH IN THE ARGENTINES. THERE'S NO DOUBT THAT MR. HAIG FOUND THAT, THERE IS THE JUNTA, THERE IS PRESIDENT GALTIERI, THERE'S COSTA MENDEZ, THERE ARE THE GENERALS AND THE AMIRALS, IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHO YOU ARE DEALING WITH, BUT CERTAINLY SO FAR THEY'VE SHOWN NO SIGN WHATSOEVER OF WISHING TO WITHDRAW, ON THE CONTRARY THEY'VE SPENT THE LAST THREE OR FOUR WEEKS BUILDING UP THEIR FORCES ON THE ISLAND.

IN FENN: MICHAEL EVANS.

MICHAEL EVANS: MICHAEL EVANS 'DAILY EXPRESS'. IS THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY STILL TO USE THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF FORCE?

MR. PYM: OUR STRATEGY REMAINS EXACTLY AS IT HAS BEEN BEEN BEFORE, THAT IS TO SAY THE SUSTAINED BUILD-UP OF ALL THE PRESSURES THAT I HAVE JUST MENTIONED AND CERTAINLY WE HAVE CONDUCTED OURSELVES SO FAR ON THE BASIS OF MINIMUM FORCE AND CERTAINLY WE STILL INTEND TO STRIVE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IF THAT CAN BE DEVISED AND WE'VE GOT TO REALISE THAT OUR TASKFORCE IS APPROACHING .... APPROACHING AND IT WILL NOW BE AT THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND THEY'VE GOT TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NECESSARY TO PROTECT IT AND IF IT IS CHALLENGED, THEN OF COURSE FORCE IS GOING TO BE USED AND THAT IS THE POSITION WE'RE IN AT THE MOMENT. IT IS STILL UP TO THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW IF THEY WOULD AS THE RESOLUTION ..... AS THE RESOLUTION REQUIRES.



N. FE: ROSEMARY WRIGHT ... CAN YOU WAIT FOR THE MIKE?

ROSEMARY: SORRY. ROSEMARY WRIGHT 'SUNDAY TIMES'. FOLLOWING UP AN EARLIER QUESTION TO YOU, ABOUT FORTY MINUTES AGO, FIFTY MINUTES AGO, THERE WAS A NEWSFLASH FROM REUTERS FROM NEW YORK WHICH SAID THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD ANNOUNCED THAT ARGENTINA WOULD UNDERTAKE TO IMPLEMENT 502 IN ITS ENTIRETY. I BELIEVE THAT HE ADDED THAT SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE, BUT HIS FIRST SENTENCE WAS 'WILL IMPLEMENT IN ITS ENTIRETY'. WHAT WEIGHT WOULD YOU ATTACH TO THAT?

MR. PYM: WELL ..... FOR THE REASONS I'VE GIVEN JUST NOW IT'S DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT WEIGHT TO ATTACH TO IT BECAUSE THEY'VE SHOWN NO SIGNS OF DOING SO SO FAR AND WE WILL HAVE TO HEAR FURTHER SIGNALS AS TO WHAT THE PRECISE MEANING OF THAT IS, BUT AS I SAY UP TO NOW THEY'VE BEEN TOTALLY RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW, ON THE CONTRARY THEY'VE BEEN REINFORCING ALL THE TIME.

JOURNALIST: FOREIGN SECRETARY, WILL THE TASKFORCE NOW BE EXPECTED TO CARRY OUT ITS ORDERS ABOUT THE VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE? SUPPOSING, FOR INSTANCE, A SOVIET SHIP WERE TO PASS THROUGH?

MR. PYM: WE ARE ACTING UNDER ARTICLE 51 IN SELF DEFENCE, WE'VE HAD TERRITORY ANNEXED BY THE ARGENTINES, WE HAVE A RIGHT TO DEFEND THAT ISLAND AND WE HAVE ANNOUNCED VERY PUBLICLY AND GIVEN NOTICE OF ALL THE STEPS THAT WE HAVE TAKEN SO FAR AND WE WILL SECURE THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE IN THE WAY THAT I'VE DESCRIBED. IF THAT MEANS USING FORCE THEN FORCE WILL BE USED.

N. FE: THE GENTLEMAN OVER THERE . MIKE ..WAIT PLEASE, SORRY.  
(QUESTION INAUDIBLE)

MR. PYM: I HAVEN'T GOT IT IN MIND TO PUT A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL TO HIM. I CERTAINLY WANT TO EXPRESS THE VIEW ..... THE VIEWS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, IT'S THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY I'VE HAD TO MEET HIM AND I WANT TO HEAR WHAT HE HAS TO SAY ABOUT IT AND THERE'S NO DOUBT THAT I SHALL CERTAINLY BE REFERRING TO RESOLUTION 502.

*Handwritten note:*  
MIKE



(QUESTION INAUDIBLE)

MR. PYM: I'M NOT CLOSING ANY OPTION AT THE MOMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

MR. FENN: NOEL DOWNING.

NOEL DOWNING: 'THE WASHINGTON POST'. DO TODAY'S EVENTS MEAN ANY CHANGE OR ACCELERATION IN THE BUILD-UP OF MILITARY PRESSURE THAT YOU'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT?

MR. PYM: I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT A VERY SIGNIFICANT ACCELERATION IN THAT BUILD-UP. I CANNOT IMAGINE ANY GREATER DEGREE OF BUILDING UP OF PRESSURE THAN THE UNITED STATES COMING DOWN ON THE SIDE OF BRITAIN, THAT BY ITSELF IS A VERY POWERFUL INCREASE IN PRESSURE SO I THINK THAT IS THE CHANGE.

MR. FENN: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS? THERE MAY BE QUESTIONERS THAT I CAN'T SEE BEHIND THE MIKE? GENTLEMAN OVER THERE.

ADAM RAPHAEL: 'OBSERVER'. WOULD THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAY IF HE'LL URGE THE US SECRETARY OF STATE TO PUBLISH HIS PEACE PROPOSALS?

MR. PYM: WELL, THEY ARE HIS PROPOSALS AND WHETHER HE WILL PUBLISH THEM OR NOT IS A MATTER FOR HIM. I HAD THOUGHT IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO PUBLISH BUT QUITE FRANKLY I DON'T KNOW. THAT IS A MATTER FOR HIM.

JAMES WALKER ITN: HOW LONG WOULD YOU EXPECT IT TO TAKE FOR AMERICAN SANCTIONS TO BITE ON ARGENTINA?

MR. PYM: SANCTIONS NORMALLY TAKE QUITE A LONG TIME TO HAVE THEIR EFFECT, THAT IS NORMAL WITH THE APPLICATIONS OF THAT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BUT I THINK THE WEIGHT OF AMERICAN OPINION, THE FACT THAT THEY'VE COME DOWN ON THIS SIDE BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THAT WE'RE RIGHT, THEY'RE SUPPORTING THEIR OLDEST ALLIES, THEY BELIEVE THE ARGENTINES HAVE BEEN QUITE UNREASONABLE. THE FACT THAT THEY'VE TAKEN THAT DECISION I THINK IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE DEVELOPING SITUATION.

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MR. FENN: GENTLEMAN AT THE BACK.



NORMAN KIRK 'SUNDAY TELEGRAPH': WOULD THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAY WHETHER THE PROSPECTS FOR A MILITARY CONFLICT ARE NOW HIGHER THAN THEY WERE BEFORE MR. HAIG'S ANNOUNCEMENT, OR LESS LIKELY?

MR. PYM: I THINK IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THAT, ON THE ATTITUDE SO FAR SHOWN BY THE ARGENTINES I COULD NOT SAY, I THINK THAT IT LESS LIKELY BUT IT MAY BE THAT THE PRESSURE OF THE AMERICAN DECISION TO COME BEHIND BRITAIN WILL CAUSE A CHANGE IN THEIR ATTITUDE, THAT COULD MAKE IT LESS LIKELY, BUT I COULDN'T BE MORE CERTAIN THAN THAT.

N. FENN: JOHN DICKIE

JOHN DICKIE 'DAILY MAIL': SIR, WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND SECONDLY WHAT ARE YOU HOPING TO DO IN NEW YORK APART FROM EXPLAIN BRITAIN'S CASE?

MR. PYM: I'M GOING TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS WITH MR. HAIG THE RESULT OF THE AMERICAN DECISION AND THE NEW SITUATION THAT WE HAVE NOW REACHED, IT IS A VERY MAJOR CHANGE AND THEY ARE NOW ON OUR SIDE AND THEY ARE SUPPORTING US IN VARIOUS AND VERY IMPORTANT WAYS AND IT'S RIGHT FOR US TO TAKE STOCK TOGETHER AND TO SHARE THE DIPLOMATIC SCENE, INDEED THE WHOLE SCENE AND HOW DO WE GO TOGETHER FROM HERE?

MR. DICKIE: AID IN NEW YORK?

MR. PYM: AND IN NEW YORK - WELL, AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IT'S THE FIRST MEETING, I WANT TO HEAR WHAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS TO SAY, I WANT TO PUT THE BRITISH POSITION TO THEM AND I WANT TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND SEE WHAT POSSIBILITIES MAY EXIST.

N. FENN: MICHAEL EVANS.

MICHAEL EVANS: DO YOU SEE ANY OCCASION WHEN YOU MIGHT THINK IT RIGHT TO ASK THE AMERICANS FOR MILITARY AID AND WHAT THREAT DO YOU THINK IS THERE OF THE ARGENTINES TURNING TO THE RUSSIANS FOR HELP?

MR. PYM: I THINK THAT MR. HAIG IN HIS STATEMENT HAS MADE IT PRETTY CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT INTEND TO GIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND THAT I RESPECT. AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION - WELL, THEY MUST SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, THEY DO INCLINE, ON THE WHOLE, TO TRY AND DABBLE IN MUDDY WATER, SHALL I PUT IT THAT WAY, BUT WHAT ACTION THEY WILL HAVE OF COURSE I DON'T YET KNOW.



N.FENN: DAVID ADAMS.

DAVID ADAMS 'DAILY TELEGRAPH'. MR. HAIG SAID IN HIS STATEMENT THAT HE BELIEVED THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED HIS PROPOSALS - DO THOSE PROPOSALS STILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA?

MR. PYM: WELL, I THINK WHAT HE SAID WAS THAT HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER THEM OR HE HAD REASON TO HOPE. THEY DID - AS MRS. THATCHER HAS EXPLAINED AND I HAVE NEVER DISGUISED FROM ANYBODY - HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR US BUT ON THE OTHER HAND THEY DID ALL COVER THE AREA THAT I DESCRIBED EARLIER, THE WITHDRAWAL AND THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND THEN THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE ULTIMATE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT IS THE AREA THAT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED ALL THE TIME, BUT WHEN THE ARGENTINES SAID, WELL, THEY WEREN'T PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH IT, THEY WEREN'T PREPARED TO MAKE ANY CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY AND VARIOUS OTHER MATTERS, WELL, THEN OBVIOUSLY THERE WAS NO POINT IN PURSUING THEM.

N.FENN: ROSEMARY WRIGHT.

ROSEMARY WRIGHT: SO IT'S NOT TRUE, AS HAD BEEN REPORTED EARLIER TODAY, THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD IN FACT SIGNALLED ITS ACCEPTANCE .....?

MR. PYM: NO, NO, NO, NO, NO ..... THE ARGENTINES WERE GOING TO ANSWER FIRST AND MR. HAIG WELL KNEW THE PROBLEM FROM THE BRITISH POINTS OF VIEW, JUST AS HE KNEW IT FROM THE ARGENTINE POINT OF VIEW BUT HE THOUGHT THAT WE HAD RESERVED, AND WE THOUGHT WE HAD RESERVED, A REASONABLE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION BUT HE ... WE HAVE CERTAINLY NOT ACCEPTED THEM. WHAT HE SAID WAS - . . ., 974371150 COULD N G HE SAID WAS - AND I THINK IT WAS FAIR - THAT HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER THEM.

MR. PHILLIPS CBC: DOES YOUR PROMISE TO ENFORCE THE TOTAL BLOCKADE INVOLVE ANY ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT WHICH MIGHT ALREADY BE ON THE GROUND IN THE FALKLANDS OR ARE YOU MERELY REFERRING TO ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THE BLOCKADE?



MR. PYM: WELL, OF COURSE WE DON'T KNOW WHAT AIRCRAFT THEY'VE GOT ON THE GROUND, THAT AIRFIELD IS NOT VERY BIG, I JUST DON'T KNOW WHETHER THEY'VE GOT ANY AIRCRAFT THERE OR NOT BUT WHAT I DO KNOW IS THAT OF COURSE THAT AIRFIELD IS WITHIN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND THAT'S A FACTOR THAT HAS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BUT IF THEY CHALLENGE THE ZONE BY FLYING IN THE AIR SPACE WITHIN THE ZONE THEN OF COURSE THEY WILL BE CHALLENGED BY BRITISH AIRCRAFT.

MC FENN: GENTLEMAN IN THE CENTRE.

FENELLA PETRE+ - FROM BRAZILIAN TELEVISION. DO YOU BELIEVE, MR. PYM, THAT IF THE UNITED STATES HAD ASSUMED THE POSITION THEY ASSUMED TODAY BEFORE, THE SITUATION TODAY WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT?

MR. PYM: NOT MUCH DIFFERENT, NO. I THINK IT WAS QUITE RIGHT FOR THEM TO USE EVERY ENDEAVOUR, TO GO ON RIGHT TO THE END BEFORE DECIDING THAT THIS INITIATIVE WAS NOT GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL. AND IT WAS THE ARGENTINES WHO REJECTED IT IN THE END AND IN OUR VIEW IT WAS QUITE RIGHT THAT THE ARGENTINES SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASKED FIRST BECAUSE THEY ARE AFTER ALL THE INVADER, THEY'VE BEEN REINFORCING AND THEY ARE IN BREACH OF 502, BUT I DON'T THINK IT WOULD HAVE MADE A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFERENCE. I THOUGHT IT WAS.... THE MOMENT HAD TO COME SOMETIME WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WHEN MR. HAIG WOULD HAVE TO BRING HIS ATTEMPTS TO A CONCLUSION AND I THINK IT SEEMS TO ME TO BE ABOUT RIGHT.

JOURNALIST: DO YOU EXPECT TO SEE PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON?

MR. PYM: I DON'T EXPECT TO, NO. I THINK IF HE WANTED TO SEE ME, OBVIOUSLY THAT'S ANOTHER MATTER BUT I'VE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT I'LL HAVE A MEETING WITH HIM.

JOHN O'CALLAGHAN: 'IRISH BROADCASTING'. COULD I JUST GET IT PLAIN FROM YOU, MR. PYM, THE STATUS OF THIS NEWS THAT WE HAVE HAD FROM NEW YORK THAT MR. COSTA MENDEZ HAS SAID THAT 502 WILL BE COMPLIED WITH, ARE YOU SAYING THAT YOU DON'T ACTUALLY THINK HIM ANY LONGER TO BE A REPRESENTATIVE FIGURE OR THAT YOU HAVEN'T HEARD IT, WITH THE SAME SOURCE THAT WE HAD, OR THAT YOU HADN'T HEARD IT AT ALL? IT'S NOT TO CAST DOUBTS ON YOURSELF



MR. M: OH NO, I'D HEARD IT ALL RIGHT AND I CAN ONLY TELL YOU THAT DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS, OR HOWEVER LONG IT IS, THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN GOING ON, THERE HAVE BEEN A WHOLE SERIES OF CHANGES OF MIND FROM BUENOS AIRES AND SOMETIMES TWICE IN A NIGHT, SO YOU NEVER QUITE KNOW WHAT THE LATEST POSITION IS, SO I DON'T QUITE KNOW WHAT VALIDITY TO PUT ON THAT BUT BY ... JUDGING BY THEIR BEHAVIOUR SO FAR AND THEIR REJECTION OF THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS, IT SEEMS TO ME, TO SAY THE LEAST OF IT, THAT THE STATEMENT THAT I'VE SEEN AND THAT YOU'VE MENTIONED HERE WOULD WANT QUITE A GOOD DEAL OF FURTHER VERIFICATION BEFORE IT COULD HAVE ANY VALIDITY.

JOHN O'CALLAGHAN: CAN I JUST ASK WHAT TESTS YOU WOULD FURTHER APPLY?

MR. PYM: WELL, I DON'T THINK I WOULD BE SPECIFIC ON THAT BUT OBVIOUSLY MORE WILL DEVELOP IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY.

N. FEIN: THE GENTLEMAN AT THE BACK.

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ALAN COPELAND:

'DAILY EXPRESS'. DOESN'T THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS GOING TO AMERICA THIS WEEKEND TO SEE THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDE THE USE OF FORCE BY BRITAIN, EXCEPT IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF SELF DEFENCE AGAINST AN ATTACK BY THE ARGENTINES?

MR. PYM: NO, BECAUSE WE'RE FACING FORCE NOW, AS I HAVE DESCRIBED, THEY'VE GOT A FLEET AT SEA, THEY'VE GOT THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS ON THE ISLANDS, THEY'RE OCCUPYING TERRITORY WHICH THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO OCCUPY. NO, WE ARE GOING TO MAINTAIN OUR TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE, THAT IS THE POSITION AND IF THEY CHALLENGE IT, THEN OF COURSE THERE WILL BE MILITARY ACTION AND THAT'S HOW IT IS AND IT DOESN'T IN ANY WAY ALTER THE FACT THAT .... ANY WAY ALTER THE FACT THAT I AM GOING ON THIS MISSION TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH MR. HAIG, TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE WILL TAKE WHATEVER MILITARY ACTION IS NECESSARY IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT WE HAVE DESCRIBED.



N. FENN: THE GENTLEMAN THERE.

BRIAN HANCOCK: 'NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE'. AS A FOLLOW UP TO THAT QUESTION, DOES MR. COSTA MENDEZ' STATEMENT TO NEW YORK TODAY IN EFFECT BUY ARGENTINA SOME EXTRA TIME?

MR. PYM: NOT SO FAR AS I'M CONCERNED, WE'D HAVE TO HAVE MANY MORE DECISIONS THAN THAT FROM THEM BEFORE WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS. THEY'VE GOT TO WITHDRAW, WE'VE GOT TO HAVE AN ARRANGEMENT FOR WITHDRAWAL AND WITH SOME DETAIL AND THERE'S NO INKLING OF WHAT THOSE MIGHT BE AND AS I SAY, AFTER ALL THE TIME AND TROUBLE TAKEN IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS TO TRY AND ESTABLISH THEM IT'S A RATHER SURPRISING REMARK TO COME OUT JUST BLANDLY LIKE THAT FROM NEW YORK, SO I THINK WE OUGHT NOT TO PERHAPS PAY TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO IT TILL WE KNOW A GREAT DEAL MORE ABOUT IT.

N. FENN: TIME FOR PERHAPS TWO OR THREE MORE QUESTIONS. KEITH GRAVES

KEITH GRAVES: MR. PYM, YOU SAID THERE IF THEY CHALLENGE IT, MEANING THE EXCLUSION ZONE, THERE WILL BE MILITARY ACTION: DID I UNDERSTAND YOU CORRECTLY, YOU SAID THERE 'WILL' BE, NOT THERE 'MAY' BE.

MR. PYM: WELL, IF THEY CHALLENGE THE ZONE, YES, THERE WOULD.... BECAUSE THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE HAS NOW BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR A COUPEE OF WEEKS OR MORE AND BASICALLY THAT HAS BEEN RESPECTED, THAT OS THE POSITION. SO THERE WOULD BE NO .. BUT IF THEY WERE TO FLY INTO THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE NOW, OR FLY .. OR TRY AND FLY OFF THE ISLAND THEN OF COURSE THEIR AEROPLANES WOULD BE ATTACKED OR IF THEY TRIED TO DO SOMETHING ELSE WITH THEIR SHIPS THEY WOULD BE ATTACKED.

KEITH GRAVES: BUT YOU'RE NOT SAYING THEY MAY BE, YOU'RE SAYING THEY WILL BE ATTACKED?

MR. PYM: BUT THAT'S BEEN THE POSITION ALL ALONG, FOR THE LAST FORTNIGHT, IF THEY HAD CHALLENGED OUR MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE BY SENDING IN A WARSHIP OR AN AUXILIARY, THEN THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN ATTACKED. THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE POSITION.



KEITH GRAVES: BUT THERE ARE AIRCRAFT ON THE RUNWAY STILL AND THEY'VE NOT BEEN...

MR. PYM: WE DON'T KNOW THAT, THERE MAY BE, BUT WE DON'T KNOW THAT.

KEITH GRAVES: BUT IF THERE ARE YOU WILL ATTACK THEM? IS THAT CORRECT?

MR. PYM: YES.

JOURNALIST 'DAILY POST': DO YOU EXPECT A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BE CALLED DURING YOUR STAY AND IF IT WAS CALLED WOULD YOU ATTEND?

MR. PYM: I'VE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT IT WILL BE.

PATRICK KEATLEY: SECRETARY OF STATE, COULD YOU TELL US ON THE POINT OF BLOODSHED, WHICH OBVIOUSLY CONCERNS THE PUBLIC VERY MUCH, WOULD YOU CLARIFY FOR US WHAT THE PROSPECT IS OF BLOODSHED IN THE SENSE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER I THINK REFERRED TO IT IN THE HOUSE? IN OTHER WORDS IF BLOODSHED COMES, IT WOULD BE NOT BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY BUT ARGENTINIAN. WOULD YOU DEVELOP THAT?

MR. PYM: YES, WELL, BASICALLY THAT'S TRUE BECAUSE THEY ARE THE INVADERS, THEY STARTED MILITARY ACTION, THEY TOOK THE AGGRESSIVE ACTION, NOT BRITAIN. WE ARE ENGAGED IN A MILITARY BUILD-UP AT THE MOMENT, ~~Y/A/AK~~ UNDER THE ARTICLE 51, WITH OUR RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE, IN ORDER TO RE-ESTABLISH THE POSITION AS IT WAS AND WE HAVE USED THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY THUS FAR, AS EVERYBODY VERY WELL KNOWS AND OF COURSE WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO DO THAT BUT AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS, WE DON'T KNOW IN WHAT WAY WE WILL BE CHALLENGED OR THE ARGENTINIANS MAY DECIDE TO CHALLENGE US. AS THAT DEVELOPS THEN CLEARLY THE LOSS OF LIFE COULD BUILD UP, IT'S SOMETHING EVERYBODY WANTS TO AVOID BUT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT MUST LIE QUITE CLEARLY WITH THE ARGENTINES WHO TOOK THE ORIGINAL DECISION TO INVADE.



N. FEIN: YES, SIR?

JOURNALIST: MR. FOREIGN SECRETARY, FROM YOUR REMARKS SO FAR, IT APPEARS THAT WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS THAT AT LEAST FOR THIS WEEKEND, AT LEAST DURING YOUR TRIP, THE MILITARY ACTIONS BY YOUR FORCES WILL BE REACTIVE TO THE ARGENTINIANS, RATHER THAN INITIATING SOME KIND OF ACTION, FOR EXAMPLE, SUCH AS THE RETAKING OF SOUTH GEORGIA.

MR. PYM: WE WILL TAKE WHATEVER STEPS WE JUDGE TO BE NECESSARY TO SECURE AND HOLD A TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE, THAT IS THE POSITION AND WE'VE GIVEN PLENTY OF NOTICE OF IT. I UNDERSTAND, WELL WE KNOW, THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE NOW IMPOSED AN EXCLUSION ZONE OF THEIR OWN, FOR WHICH THEY GAVE NO NOTICE AT ALL BUT WE SAID WHAT WE WOULD DO AND WE WILL FULFIL THAT OBLIGATION WHATEVER IS REQUIRED TO DO IT.

JOURNALIST: DOES THAT PRECLUDE AN AGGRESSIVE ACTION TO ACTUALLY RETAKE THE FALLANDS THIS WEEKEND?

MR. PYM: OUR ACTION IS NOT AGGRESSIVE, ALL OUR ACTION IS DESIGNED TO SECURE BACK FOR US WHAT SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY FORCE IN THE FIRST PLACE. IF WE CAN DO IT BY PEACEFUL MEANS WE'LL DO IT THAT WAY, IF WE CAN'T DO IT BY THAT WAY, HOWEVER REGRETFULLY AND HOWEVER UNWELCOME, WE WOULD HAVE TO USE FORCE.

JOURNALIST: THEN, SIR, RATHER THAN USING THE WORD AGGRESSIVE, LET ME USE THE WORD INITIATIVE, THAT YOU WOULD START THE ACTION?

MR. PYM: WELL, I'M AFRAID I'VE LOST TOUCH WITH THE ORIGINAL QUESTION BUT I THINK I'VE DESCRIBED IT. WE WILL DO WHAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DO TO SECURE THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE.

N. FEIN: GENTLEMAN FROM BRAZILIAN TELEVISION.

JOURNALIST: ..... THE PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA, WILL BRITAIN ASK ACTIVELY FOR SUPPORT OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, NAMELY .....

MR. PYM: WE'VE ASKED FOR SUPPORT FROM OUR FRIENDS ALL ROUND THE WORLD AND WE HAVE SUPPORT, AS YOU KNOW, FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, WE HAVE SUPPORT FROM COUNTRIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH WE NOW HAVE THE BACKING OF THE UNITED STATES. WELL, THAT'S A PRETTY GOOD START.



JOURNALIST: (-QUESTION INAUDIBLE)

MR. PYN: NO, NO ... NOT PARTICULARLY IN MIND AT THE MOMENT BUT ANYBODY WHO WOULD LIKE TO COME AND HELP US, STAND UP FOR FREEDOM, STAND UP FOR DEMOCRACY, THAT'S WHAT IT'S ALL ABOUT. THE PEOPLE OVER IN THE ARGENTINE, OF BUENOS AIRES, THEY AREN'T ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE, THEY HAVEN'T GOT A PARLIAMENT TO GO AND ANSWER TO. I'VE GOT A PARLIAMENT TO ANSWER TO, WE ALL HAVE AND ALL THE COUNTRIES WHO ARE SUPPORTING US HAVE PARLIAMENTS ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE, AND THIS IS WHAT THIS WHOLE ARGUMENT IS ALL ABOUT AND IF WE DO NOT RE-ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL ORDER, IF WE DO NOT SEE THAT WRONG IS RIGHTED, THEN THERE IS A WEAKNESS IN INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THAT IS AN INTEREST THAT EVERY COUNTRY HAS, IN EVERY CONTINENT, ALL ROUND THE WORLD, AND BRITAIN HAS GOT A PARTICULAR FEELING ABOUT THIS AND IT HAPPENS TO HAVE OCCURRED IN ONE OF OUR TERRITORIES AND THAT IS WHY WE ARE RESPONDING SO STRONGLY AND WHAT WE ARE SO GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT WE'RE GETTING ALL ROUND THE WORLD AND WHY WE HOPE, AND HAVE EVERY REASON TO HOPE, THAT THAT SUPPORT WILL CONTINUE JUST BECAUSE PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND THE FREEDOM OF PEOPLE AND THE RIGHT TO HOLD A MEETING LIKE THIS CAN TAKE PLACE. IF WE DON'T ALL STAND TOGETHER AND PUT THIS WRONG RIGHT THEN THERE MUST BE A QUESTIONMARK OVER THE FUTURE RIGHTS OF THE LIBERTIES OF PEOPLES. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

H. FEIN: I THINK, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT'S THE POINT TO END. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.



FALKLAND ISLANDS: CONSTITUTIONAL POSITIONNote by the FCO Legal Adviser

The "traditional local administration" of the Falkland Islands has to be viewed within the framework of the three basic constitutional instruments providing for the government of the colony.

2. The Letters Patent of 1948 (modified in minor respects in 1954 and again in 1962) provided for the appointment of a Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Colony [i.e. the Falkland Islands themselves] and the Dependencies. The term "Governor" in the Letters Patent is defined as including "the Officer for the time being administering the Government". Under the Letters Patent, the Governor has very wide-ranging powers, including:-

- (a) the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Dependencies;
- (b) the power to appoint judges and other officers;
- (c) the power, for cause shewn to his satisfaction, to dismiss or suspend from the exercise of his office and person holding public office in the Colony;
- (d) the right of pardon;
- (e) subject to any law for the time being in force in the Colony, the power to make and execute grants and dispositions of/land within the Colony or the Dependencies.

/Crown

3. The Letters Patent also constitute an Executive Council consisting of "such persons, appointed in such manner as We shall direct by Instructions" (these are known as Royal Instructions - see paragraph 4 below). Finally, they reserve to the Secretary of State a power of disallowance of laws made by the Governor for the Dependencies.

4. The Royal Instructions of 1949 (as amended in 1951, 1955, 1964, 1973 and 1977) provide for the constitution of the Executive Council which consists of:

- (a) two ex-officio Members, namely the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary;
- (b) two Unofficial Members appointed by the Governor from among persons who do not hold offices of emolument under the Crown in the Colony;
- (c) two Elected Members, elected by the Elected Members of the Legislative Council from those Elected Members.

/The



The Royal Instructions also provide that if inter alia an ex-officio Member of the Executive Council is administering the Government, the Governor may appoint a person to be a temporary Member for the period of the vacancy. The Executive Council is not to be summoned except by the authority of the Governor; and the Governor is, so far as it is practicable, to attend and preside at all meetings of the Executive Council (provision being made that, in his absence, he may appoint another Member, or, if no such Member is appointed, the Senior Member of the Council actually present shall preside). The Royal Instructions then go on to provide that, in the exercise of his powers and the performance of his duties, the Governor shall consult the Executive Council, except in cases:-

- (a) which are of such nature that, in his judgment, material prejudice would be sustained by consulting the Executive Council;
- (b) in which the matters to be decided are, in his judgment, too unimportant to require their advice; or
- (c) in which the matters to be decided are, in his judgment, too urgent to admit of their advice being given in time.

The Governor may act in opposition to the advice given to him by the Members of the Executive Council; but is then required to report to the Secretary of State at the first convenient opportunity. Certain specified categories of laws cannot be made by the Governor without the approval of the Secretary of State (exception being made for cases of urgency when the Governor must report to the Secretary of State with the text of the law, giving his reasons for assenting to it).

5. The third basic constitutional instrument is the Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) Orders, 1948 to 1977, made in pursuance of powers conferred by the British Settlement Acts, 1887 and 1945. The Legislative Council consists of:

- (1) the Governor, as President;
- (2) two Ex-officio Members;
- (3) six Elected Members.

The Ex-officio Members are the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary. Under the Orders, no person is qualified to be elected as an Elected Member or, having been so elected, to sit or vote in the Council who is "by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign Power of State" (this would not exclude a nominated Member). Broadly similar provisions apply in the case of vacancies on the Legislative Council as apply in the case of vacancies on the Executive Council.



6. The Dependencies are legally distinct from the Falkland Islands but are, as already indicated, administered from the Falkland Islands. The Executive Council is common to both the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies. On non-legislative matters relating to the Dependencies, the Governor must consult the Executive Council (subject to the exceptions indicated in paragraph 4 above).

7. The question of who exercises the functions of Governor, whether with respect to the Falkland Islands or with respect to the Dependencies, when the Governor is absent is governed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Letters Patent of 1948. In the present circumstances, the relevant provision is Article 7(1) which reads as follows:-

"(1) Whenever the Office of Governor is vacant, or the Governor is absent from the Colony or is from any cause prevented from, or incapable of, acting in the duties of his Office, then such other person as We may appoint under Our Sign Manual and Signet, or if there is no such person in the Colony so appointed and capable of discharging the duties of the administration, the Senior Member of the Executive Council then in the Colony and so capable, shall, during Our pleasure, administer the Government of the Colony".

In normal circumstances, the Chief Secretary would act as Officer administering the Government and would be able to exercise all the powers of the Governor. If the Chief Secretary were absent from the Falkland Islands (as, it is understood, he is at present) the next Senior Member of the Executive Council would be the Financial Secretary. If the Financial Secretary were also absent, then the next most Senior Member of the Executive Council would be the most Senior of the Unofficial (i.e. appointed) Members of the Council or, alternatively, it would of course be open to Her Majesty to appoint a person to perform the functions of the Governor under Article 7(1).





IS THERE ANY TRUTH IN AMERICAN REPORTS THAT A US OFFICIAL HAS STATED THAT (A) HAIG ASKED THE BRITISH TO DELAY MILITARY ACTION IN THE FALKLANDS AND (B) INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN PASSED TO THE UK AS A RESULT OF AMERICAN OVERFLIGHTS OF THE FALKLANDS?

The report about Mr Haig is quite untrue and we understand that the American Administration is denying it. We do not comment on intelligence matters, but we also note that the Americans are denying this part of what the official is alleged to have said.



South Georgia Rept. *Return to No 10 plc. under Mr R. to UN*

I have the honour, with reference to the letters dated 24 and 25 April from the Permanent Representative of Argentina (S/14998 and S/14999) to state the following.

On 3 April 1982, notwithstanding current action in the Security Council and the adoption of SCR 502, Argentina carried out an armed invasion of the island of South Georgia. The small British garrison resisted but was eventually captured. On 25 April, in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, British forces re-established British authority on South Georgia. The Commander of the Argentine forces which had been there for just over three weeks surrendered. The only casualty so far as my Government is aware was an Argentine seaman who suffered leg injuries.

There is thus no question of the United Kingdom Government having acted aggressively, having in any way breached the terms of SCR 502 (implementation of para. 2 of which by Argentina is still awaited by the international community) or of having caused a breach of international peace and security. The original breach of the peace determined by the Security Council in the third preambular paragraph of SCR 502 will not be brought to an end before Argentina can be seen to have complied with operative para. 2 of that Resolution. No amount of selective quotation from statements by British Ministers can obscure the fact that it was Argentina which first used armed force in defiance of the Security Council's urgent call on 1 April (S/14944).

South Georgia is a remote mountainous island in the South Atlantic (800 miles from the Falkland Islands and 1600 miles south east of Buenos Aires). It was discovered by a British national and has been under British sovereignty since 1908 before which it was terra nullius. The United Kingdom has occupied and administered the island openly continuously and peacefully. For many years Argentina accepted British sovereignty. Argentina appears to have first made claim to South Georgia in 1927. In the 1940s and 1950s the United Kingdom offered to refer the sovereignty dispute over South Georgia to the International Court of Justice. In May 1955, the United Kingdom submitted this dispute to the Court by delivering an application to the Registrar (full text in "ICJ Pleadings, Antarctica Cases (UK v Argentina)").

/ Having seen



Having seen the strength of the British title to South Georgia, Argentina declined to accept the Court's jurisdiction. In recent years, the main use of the island has been as a logistic station supporting the British Antarctic Survey, i.e. peaceful scientific research.



Mr Haig has told us that Argentina has rejected his proposals for a negotiated settlement, and he has just announced this in Washington.

This is a major change in the situation. In deciding not to cooperate in negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the Argentines have confirmed their commitment to aggression in defiance of the UN <sup>and</sup> their insistence on taking the sovereignty of the Islands which is a British possession.

The British people are deeply grateful to the US, and especially to Mr Haig for his remarkable efforts. America and Britain have done everything possible from the start to produce a negotiated settlement.

We now have a new situation and I am extremely glad that the United States has come down decisively on the side of Britain. To have the world's most powerful state on our side must make Argentina see that aggression cannot pay.

Mr Haig has not published his proposals, so I shall not describe them now. But yesterday I outlined in the House of Commons the three major elements of a possible agreement: the Argentine withdrawal; an interim administration in the Islands <sup>under</sup> ~~British administration~~ and the framework for negotiations about the future of the Islands which must of course <sup>reflect the wishes</sup> ~~include the right~~ <sup>of my Island</sup> of self-determination. I also spoke in Parliament on the need for Britain to increase its military pressure and to take military measures if necessary, in the exercise of our right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

I am going to Washington tomorrow or on Sunday to review the new situation with Mr Haig and to discuss the next steps. Then I shall go on to New York to <sup>see</sup> meet the Secretary-General of the United Nations. These meetings are essential now and will be very much in accord with the wishes of the House of Commons expressed in yesterday's debate.



as the SC requested by us 100 hours

We shall not abandon our efforts for a peaceful settlement. Argentina must withdraw first and British administration restored and then we shall be entirely ready to resume talks about the future of the Falkland Islands. A conference or any other kind of negotiation can be considered.

None or to neg.


It has been our strategy all along to build up the pressure on Argentina - economic pressure, diplomatic pressure, and military pressure. Now with the US backing <sup>in confidence</sup> we shall prevail against Argentina's totally unjustified and illegal aggression.

than over  
than the other conditions that justice  
will prevail



30 APR 1982

Dr Heap, SAmD, K 303



39

AJC

## ANTARCTIC TREATY: EFFECT OF A STATE OF WAR WITH ARGENTINA

1. The rules of customary international law regarding the effect of a formal state of war upon multilateral treaties are not settled or clear. Nevertheless, assuming that the UK and Argentina were in a state of war and the other parties to the Antarctic Treaty stayed out of the war the legal considerations tend to the following conclusions:

- a. As between each of the belligerents and the other (neutral) parties to the Antarctic Treaty the Treaty would not be terminated and would remain in force;
- b. As between the United Kingdom and Argentina, the Antarctic Treaty would similarly not be terminated and would in principle remain in force, but the application and operation of certain of its provisions would probably have to be regarded as suspended. This suspension would almost certainly apply to bilateral relations between the UK and Argentina under the Treaty which were inconsistent with the existence of a state of war between them (eg the sending of observers); it might apply to the Treaty as a whole, although this is perhaps unlikely and there would be strong arguments available to suggest that at least those parts of the Treaty which carry with them elements of a special and quasi-permanent status or regime for the Antarctic (eg peaceful use, sovereignty freeze) would continue to apply even between the belligerent States;
- c. In giving effect to the Antarctic Treaty the other parties, in their dealings under the Treaty with the United Kingdom and Argentina, would have to take account of their obligations as neutrals so far as those duties might be relevant.

2. Applying these broad conclusions, especially that in (b), to particular activities will depend on the circumstances of each case.

3. I think that the general legal approach should start from the proposition that as a result of a state of war BAT, being British Territory, is affected by the various consequences of a state of war: eg. Argentina and BAT become, as regards each other, enemy territory. (I leave aside the anomalous situation created by the Argentine claim to Antarctic Territory, which we do not accept, but which is wholly comprised in the area we regard as BAT); trading with the enemy laws apply; and rules relating to the status of enemy aliens apply. In any particular case we shall need to consider, on the

/basis



basis of the particular circumstances, what the "state of war" consequences would be, and then whether those consequences are affected by a still-operative provision of the Antarctic Treaty. The considerations in paragraph 1 (b) above would give us considerable latitude in assessing whether particular treaty provisions are still operative, and would probably give us quite a lot of room in which to take a generous view of the matter if, as I expect, that is what we would wish to do.

4. Even if there is room for argument about the continued application between the UK and Argentina of such basic provisions of the Antarctic Treaty as Article 1, prohibiting measures of a military nature, these provisions would still be binding in relations with the neutral parties to the Treaty, so that Argentina would still be in breach of legal obligations under the Antarctic Treaty to those States if Argentina were to take military action in the Treaty area.

5. If Argentina chooses to go to extreme lengths, Argentina might try to terminate its participation in the Antarctic Treaty. This would require separate legal consideration, depending on the arguments advanced by Argentina to justify such action. There is no provision in the Antarctic Treaty allowing for unilateral termination of participation in present circumstances.

6. Assuming that it is our desired policy that the Antarctic Treaty should remain in force to the greatest extent possible, the general legal position is perhaps too uncertain for us safely to rely on it. Accordingly, a surer way of establishing the result we want would be to take specific action to that end. A Note to the US Government, as the Depositary Government, in the terms of the draft attached to your minute would be appropriate. I would just add that I am not aware of any precedent for taking such action: usually these matters seem to be left on one side, and then tidied up at the end of the war. But this does not constitute a compelling legal reason for not taking the proposed action now.

7. The draft Note says nothing about any possible suspension of some of the Treaty's provisions so far as concerns practical dealings at the bilateral UK - Argentina level. Our options are left open. However, the general impression created by saying that the Treaty "continues in force" will probably be that we intend it to be operational in practice as well as just technically in force. This is presumably the impression we wish to give. It would put the onus on Argentina for any disruption of the Antarctic Treaty system.


8. A state of war would, of course, have effects on other multilateral treaties to which the UK and Argentina are parties. We would not wish action taken in relation to the Antarctic Treaty

/to be



to be regarded as necessarily applying also to all other treaty relations. To enable us to go ahead with action on the Antarctic Treaty without waiting for decisions to be taken about other treaties, the "without prejudice" clause in the draft Note seems to me necessary. The reason for dealing straight away with the Antarctic Treaty, but not others, is of course that the relationship between the Antarctic Treaty and the area of hostilities is exceedingly close, and the position needs to be clarified without delay.

9. While, as you suggest, a Note to the US Government would be called for (as procedurally simpler than bilateral Notes from us to each of the other parties), there would be nothing to stop us also sending bilateral Notes if that was thought desirable, perhaps in the interests of speed of communication. In legal terms, however, a Note for circulation as a UN document would be an optional extra, dictated primarily by political and presentational reasons.



A D Watts  
Deputy Legal Adviser

30 April 1982

cc:

Mr Fearn, SAmD, W 117  
Mr Weston, Defence Dept, W 117  
Mr Mallaby, Planning Staff, W 11





JL

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 April 1982

FALKLANDS: MESSAGE FROM MR. PYM TO MR. HAIG

Thank you for your letter of 29 April. As I told you on the telephone yesterday, the Prime Minister was content with the draft which you enclosed.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A. J. COLES

S

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 April 1982

FALKLANDS: JAPANESE POSITION

Thank you for your letter of 27 April.  
As I told you earlier, the Prime Minister has  
approved the reply from herself to Mr. Suzuki.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 April 1982

Thank you for your letter of 28 April about the handling of Washington telegram No. 1472. As I informed you orally, the Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter, for which she was most grateful.

**A. J. COLES**

S  
Sir Antony Acland, KCVO, CMG,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



VR  
JGWPCP

[TYPISTS]

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

WONFO 17/30

WONNYK 12/30

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PS  
PS/Mr Head  
PS/Mr Enlow  
PS/PLS

Mr Juffard  
Mr Wright

PS/~~No 10~~

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SECRET

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 300830 LOCAL

FM WASHINGTON 300423Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1525 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

(10)

M I P T: FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY HAIG:

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS IS ABOUT TO ENTER A NEW AND DANGEROUS PHASE, IN WHICH LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION IS LIKELY. I WOULD LIKE TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON WHAT WE HAVE DONE, AND WHY, AND WHAT WE MUST NOW DO.

FROM THE OUTSET OF THE CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN GUIDED BY THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW. WE HAVE MADE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF U N SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. THAT RESOLUTION CALLS FOR:

- AN END TO HOSTILITIES:
- THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS: AND
- A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DISPUTE.

THE UNITED STATES MADE THIS EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT BECAUSE THE STAKES IN HUMAN LIVES AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER REQUIRED IT. A



THE UNITED STATES MADE THIS EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT BECAUSE THE STAKES IN HUMAN LIVES AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER REQUIRED IT. A FUNDAMENTAL TENET OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IS THAT CHANGES IN THE WORLD MUST NOT RESULT FROM THE USE OF FORCE. THE COLLAPSE OF THAT PRINCIPLE COULD ONLY BRING CHAOS AND SUFFERING.

WE ALSO MADE THIS EFFORT BECAUSE THE CRISIS RAISED VITAL ISSUES OF HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY AT A TIME WHEN COMMUNIST ADVERSARIES SEEK POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE ON THE MAINLAND OF THE AMERICAS AND LATENT TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN MUCH OF THE HEMISPHERE CALL FOR UNITY AND THE RESOLUTE DEFENSE OF PRINCIPLE.

WE ACTED AS WELL BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PARTIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM IS OUR CLOSEST ALLY, AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT LOOKED TO US TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WE HAVE ALSO RECENTLY DEVELOPED A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA, AS PART OF OUR SUCCESS IN REVITALIZING THE COMMUNITY OF AMERICAN STATES. PRESIDENT GALTIERI ALSO REQUESTED OUR INVOLVEMENT.

UNDER THE DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, I PARTICIPATED IN MANY DAYS OF INTENSE DISCUSSION WITH THE PARTIES -- IN LONDON, IN BUENOS AIRES, AND HERE IN WASHINGTON -- IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING U N SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. OUR INITIAL AIM WAS TO CLARIFY THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES AND TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THOSE POSITIONS MIGHT BE RECONCILED. WE TOOK NO POSITION ON THE MERITS OF EITHER THE BRITISH OR ARGENTINE CLAIMS TO THE ISLANDS.

SQUARE BRACKETS COMMENCE AS HOSTILITIES BECAME IMMINENT, SQUARE BRACKETS END WE PUT FORTH AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL. IT REPRESENTED OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE TWO PARTIES COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT, AND WAS BASED SQUARELY ON OUR OWN PRINCIPLES AND CONCERN FOR THE RULE OF LAW.

WE REGARD THIS AS A FAIR AND SOUND PROPOSAL. IT INVOLVES: A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES; WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH ARGENTINE AND BRITISH FORCES; TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS; RESTORATION OF INTERIM LOCAL ADMINISTRATION; PROCEDURES FOR ENCOURAGING COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISLANDS; AND A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A FINAL SETTLEMENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS.

WE HAD REASON TO HOPE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD CONSIDER



WE HAD REASON TO HOPE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD CONSIDER A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSAL, BUT ARGENTINA INFORMED YESTERDAY THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. ARGENTINA'S POSITION REMAINS THAT IT MUST RECEIVE AN ASSURANCE NOW OF EVENTUAL SOVEREIGNTY, OR AN EXPANDING DE FACTO ROLE IN GOVERNING THE ISLANDS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS THUS FAR REFRAINED FROM ADOPTING MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THE SEIZURE OF THE ISLANDS THAT COULD HAVE INTERFERED WITH OUR ABILITY TO WORK WITH BOTH SIDES IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING FOR THIS POSITION. NOW, HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE, WE MUST TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO UNDERScore THAT THE U.S. CANNOT AND WILL NOT CONDONE THE USE OF FORCE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES. THE PRESIDENT HAS THEREFORE ORDERED:

- THE SUSPENSION OF ALL MILITARY EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA;
- THE WITHOLDING OF CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINE ELIGIBILITY FOR MILITARY SALES;
- THE SUSPENSION OF NEW EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CREDITS AND GUARANTEES; AND
- THE SUSPENSION OF COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION LOANS.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO DIRECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO REQUESTS FOR MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES. THERE WILL, OF COURSE, BE NO DIRECT U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.

AMERICAN POLICY WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY OUR CONCERNS FOR THE RULE OF LAW AND OUR DESIRE TO FACILITATE AN EARLY AND FAIR SETTLEMENT. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS READY TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN FINDING THAT SETTLEMENT. A STRICTLY MILITARY OUTCOME CANNOT ENDURE OVER TIME. IN THE END, THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERESTED PARTIES. OTHERWISE, WE WILL ALL FACE UNENDING HOSTILITY AND INSECURITY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 300426Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1526 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

M I P T: FALKLANDS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF HAIG'S MESSAGE TO YOU:

DEAR FRANCIS:

I REFER TO YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 29 WHICH NICKO DELIVERED TO ME.

I NOW ALSO HAVE A LETTER FROM NICANOR COSTA MENDEZ. HE STATES THE U.S. PROPOSAL DOES NOT MEET ARGENTINA'S MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ON THE ISSUES OF ULTIMATE RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AND PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS.

I AM WRITING COSTA MENDEZ THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT ARGENTINA HAS REJECTED THE U.S. PROPOSAL.

WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF YOUR STATEMENT THAT THE BRITISH CABINET HAS FUNDAMENTAL RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE U.S. PROPOSAL. AT THE SAME TIME WE BELIEVE YOUR DECISION NOT TO REJECT IT REFLECTS THE GOOD FAITH WHICH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE SHOWN SINCE WE BEGAN OUR EFFORTS.

NICKO HAS ALREADY INFORMED YOU THAT BECAUSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION THIS EVENING, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO

[TYPISTS] ADVANCE COPY

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PS/MHumb  
PS/MCoulter  
PS/PUS  
Mr Jeffard  
Mr Knight  
AS/No 10 AS  
RC

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NICKO HAS ALREADY INFORMED YOU THAT BECAUSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION THIS EVENING, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION BEFORE FRIDAY. MEANWHILE, THERE ARE CERTAIN ACTIONS WE MUST TAKE WITHIN OUR OWN GOVERNMENT BEFORE THAT TIME. BECAUSE OF THIS REQUIREMENT, IT WOULD GRAVELY JEOPARDIZE OUR EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IF THERE SHOULD BE ANY PREMATURE DISCLOSURES OF THIS INTENTION. THEREFORE, I KNOW WE CAN COUNT ON YOU TO ORDER AN ABSOLUTE LID IN LONDON ON ANY COMMENTS.

THE THRUST OF OUR STATEMENT WILL BE THAT ARGENTINA DECLINED A FAIR AMERICAN PEACE PROPOSAL AND CONTINUES TO MAKE DEMANDS THAT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED. WE DO NOT INTEND TO RELEASE THE TEXT OF OUR PROPOSAL BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY THAT MIGHT CAUSE YOU. BUT, WE WILL DESCRIBE IT IN GENERAL TERMS AND STATE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH THROUGHOUT OUR EFFORT.

HIS EXCELLENCY

FRANCIS PYM,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT,  
LONDON.

WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOU IN THE O A S AND IN THE U N AND WILL BE PREPARED TO VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR VOTE AGAINST IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ANY RESOLUTIONS WHICH IN OUR JUDGMENT DEPART FROM SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502.

WE ALSO PLAN TO ANNOUNCE THE FOLLOWING STEPS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM:

- SUSPENSION OF ALL MILITARY EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA:
- WITHOLDING OF CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINE ELIGIBILITY FOR MILITARY SALES:
- SUSPENSION OF NEW EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CREDITS AND GUARANTEES:
- SUSPENSION OF COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION LOANS.

FINALLY, WE WILL ANNOUNCE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO REQUESTS FOR MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES.

WE HAVE SHARED ALL ALONG THE PROFOUND HOPE THAT WE COULD FIND A BASIS FOR PEACE, CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW



WE HAVE SHARED ALL ALONG THE PROFOUND HOPE THAT WE COULD FIND A BASIS FOR PEACE, CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER FOR WHICH OUR TWO NATIONS STAND. I KNOW YOU ARE AS DISAPPOINTED AS WE, AND THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WE STAND READY TO ASSIST IN WHATEVER WAY WE CAN.

SINCERELY,

AL

HENDERSON

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SECRET

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 30 APRIL, 1982

ARGENTINA

1. On 29 April, the Argentine Government announced that with immediate effect Argentina would enforce a 200 mile exclusion zone against British shipping and aircraft. The zone is to extend from the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the Sandwich Islands and the Argentine mainland.

UNITED STATES

2. There have been a number of communications between Mr Haig and London. Sr Costa Mendez has informed Mr Haig that the US proposals fall short of Argentine demands and are unsatisfactory. Mr Haig's announcement of the failure of his mediation is expected at 1200 hours Washington time today.

3. A consignment of US arms for Argentina has been held up by the Customs at San Francisco.

UN

4. Sir A Parsons reports that on 29 April there was no sign that members of the Security Council were contemplating calling the Council into session; but this might well change when Mr Haig announces the failure of his Mission on 30 April.

5. Argentina has circulated a letter to the Security Council about our TEZ which asserts that HMG cannot invoke the right of defence under Article 51.

6. At the UN Decolonisation Committee Meeting on 29 April, Soviet and Czech. delegates referred to British attempts to perpetuate colonialism in the South Atlantic; our Mission replied in strong terms. Surprisingly neither Cuba nor Venezuela followed up an Argentine attack on us in this Committee.

ICRC

7. The ICRC have made some progress in their discussions with the Argentines and they hope that an ICRC visit to the Falklands will be possible soon.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE MINISTERIAL MEETING

8. The communique issued on 29 April included a reference to the urgent need for the implementation of UNSCR.502.

30 April, 1982

SECRET

E. J. Hughes  
E J Hughes  
Emergency Unit



## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: OD (82)35 (including Annexes A & B)

Date: 30 April 1982

Signed Wayland Date 13 April 2012

**PREM Records Team**



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COMMONWEALTH

REACTIONS.

EMERGENCY UNIT



*With the compliments of*

RESEARCH DEPARTMENT  
American Section

MISS S. ROCYN - JONES

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London, SW1A 2AH



COMMONWEALTH

Secretary-General Ramphal. Forthright Condemnation

ANTIGUA AND  
BARBUDA

Statement by Prime Minister strongly condemned Argentina, called for withdrawal. Full support also to U N initiative. Forceful statement 23 April rejected Argentine initiative under Rio Treaty.

AUSTRALIA

Strong statement of support. Positive response to Ramphal's letter. Statement to U N Security Council. All imports banned w e f 8 April, except those under existing contracts. No new export credit guarantees to be given. Withdrew Ambassador but considering his return.

BAHAMAS

Strong statement by Foreign Minister reported Note to Argentina rejecting use of force, commitment to self-determination, unconditional support for SCR 502. Press support for U K.

BANGLADESH

Statement condemned use of force in settling disputes. Privately, Foreign Minister expressed strong support. Likely to act in support of U N Charter, principles of NAM and Commonwealth solidarity.

BARBADOS

"Full and complete support to any Commonwealth protest and initiative." Prime Minister delivered statement during televised budget debate ensuring maximum coverage. Condemned breach of international practice, liberties of inhabitants stand to be extinguished.



BELIZE

Telegram to U N Secretary-General protesting Argentine action, urging action for Argentine withdrawal, supports self-determination. As Chairman of CARICOM requested Caribbean supporting protests.

BOTSWANA

Official statement condemned invasion, violation of U N Charter and Commonwealth principles. Called for withdrawal and peaceful settlement. April 21 parliamentary statement referred to mandatory SCR 502, condemned Argentina again.

CANADA

Strong support. Prime Minister endorsed separately statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs. Withdrew Ambassador but decided to return. Banned military shipments. Cancelled military visit. Ban on imports 12 April influenced by EC. No export credit for new transactions.

CYPRUS

No public statement until NAM consulted.

DOMINICA

P M Charles condemned Argentina in TV interview. Letters sent to P M Thatcher and U N Secretary-General and Government issued press release objecting to Argentina's disregard of SCR 502. In letter to P M U K referred to precedent, self-determination.

FIJI

Official statement condemned invasion. Fiji supported territorial integrity, self-determination, urged withdrawal and settlement through normal rules before escalation to armed confrontation.



THE GAMBIA

Statement supporting SCR 502, calls for Argentine withdrawal, talks, settlement in accordance with U N Charter.

GHANA

GRENADA

Foreign Minister's statement 15 April called for peaceful settlement. Grenada joined other non-aligned countries, OAS and Socialist International in supporting Argentina's claim to FI. Suggested joint Argentina-U K Commission to work out time-table for hand-over. (No evidence of S I support for Argentine claim.) Rejects use of force in support of claim or to regain FI.

GUYANA

Voted for SCR 502. Official statement. Grave concern, violation of U N Charter including peaceful settlement, territorial integrity, self-determination. Complete solidarity with U K or Commonwealth initiatives. Strong reply to Commonwealth SG's initiative and P M's letter.

INDIA

Official statement expresses regret at state of U K/Argentine relations due to Argentine military actions. Notes Indian support for NAM backing for speeding up Argentine/U K negotiations. Urges peaceful solution. Press notes interests of islanders. Mrs Gandhi's message to P M expresses concern to reduce tension and avoid confrontation. Hopes for peaceful solution.

/JAMAICA



JAMAICA

MFA press release deplored invasion, contrary to U N Charter, called for withdrawal, urged restraint on both governments, diplomatic solution in accordance with SCR 502, taking self-determination into account.

KENYA

Statement said armed occupation unacceptable, called for withdrawal, peaceful settlement. Chairman of OAU.

KIRIBATI

Message to Argentina condemned invasion, called for withdrawal, restoration to U K. Urged Argentina to negotiate to avoid bloodshed.

LESOTHO

Message to Secretary-General of Commonwealth. Concern, support for U N and other efforts to find peaceful solution in conformity with Charter, justice and international law.

MALAWI

Official statement condemned invasion, called for withdrawal. Referred to self-determination. Private support for force as last resort, but editorial 14 April says negotiated solution should be found with blessing of U N. April 22 reports MFA and Finance Minister expectation of negotiated solution.

MALAYSIA

MFA privately said Malaysia supported peaceful resolution of disputes and condemned Argentine action. But would be difficult totally to support U K unless prepared to negotiate sovereignty, even with Argentina in possession. New Straits Times generally supports Argentine claim, cautions against escalation. Official statement expresses concern, force inconsistent with principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. Hopes for peaceful settlement.



MALTA Neutral. Dissociated from Council of Europe vote (i e no objection). Government press ambivalent, opposition press parochial, "no sides", independent press pro-British.

MAURITIUS Press statement condemned invasion, supported self-determination. Called on Argentina to withdraw and negotiate. Strong reply to Commonwealth Secretary-General. Telegram to U N Security Council condemned Argentina.

NAURU

NEW ZEALAND Strong support. Broke diplomatic relations with Argentina. Statement to U N Security Council. Cancelled Argentine flight schedules 5 April. Ban on imports and exports (including arms sales) on 13 April. No export credit for new transactions. Signs that not whole of public opinion entirely behind government actions.

NIGERIA Statement supported SCR 502, negotiated settlement, importance of U N resolutions. Appeals to Argentina to withdraw, U K and Argentina to resolve all dimensions of dispute including interests of islanders and right to determine their future. Press comment mixed. Reference to double standard over sanctions against South Africa. Reply to P M. Senate President has said privately Nigeria would continue support and influence other Africans if shooting started.

/PAPUA NEW GUINEA



PAPUA  
NEW GUINEA

Official statement deplores Argentine take-over. Falkland Islands integral part of U K. Will make views known through international bodies.

ST LUCIA

Official statement denounced invasion, supports self-determination, territorial integrity. Appeals for withdrawal.

ST VINCENT

Condemns invasion, urges withdrawal, dialogue with U K. Supports self-determination. Full support for HMG.

SEYCHELLES

Published message to P M. Deplored Argentine use of force. Convinced U K will restore climate for talks, hopes for peaceful settlement.

SIERRA LEONE

Official statement. Argentine action threat to peace, denies islanders self-determination. Strongly recommends withdrawal to facilitate peaceful settlement.

SINGAPORE

Official statement deplored invasion as contravention of U N Charter with respect to non-intervention, self-determination and territorial integrity. Urges Argentina to accede to SCR 502, appeals to parties to exercise restraint and find diplomatic settlement. More outspoken than other ASEANS.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Message to Commonwealth Secretary-General condemns Argentina. Message to Secretary-General of UNGA condemns Argentina, appeals



for just and peaceful solution. Pledged support in international bodies in message to P M.

SRI LANKA

Message to P M rejects Argentine use of force as contrary to U N and NAM principles. MFA said privately Argentine withdrawal is a priority. In NAM is seeking compromise stance between Commonwealth and NAM.

SWAZILAND

MFA statement condemned use of force, supported SCR 502 calling for withdrawal and talks. Notes right to self-determination. Swazi public opinion strongly pro-British.

TANZANIA

Statement regretted Argentine military action. Press factual, balanced, reflecting official guidance.

TONGA

Private message condemns Argentina and expresses support for any U K action to reassert sovereignty.

TRINIDAD  
AND TOBAGO

Statement supports territorial integrity and historic boundaries in accordance with U N Charter and UNGA resolution 2734 of 16 December 1970. Abhors use of force, supports self-determination especially UNGA resolution 2065 of 16 December 1970 on F I. Therefore supports efforts towards peaceful solution. Press and public pro-U K.

/TUVALU



TUVALU

Message to Secretary of State condemns Argentina in accordance with Commonwealth principles of self-determination, territorial integrity and negation of use of force.

UGANDA

Voted for SCR 502. Statement condemned Argentina, violation of U N Charter. Party message via MFA on 20 April understands U K action in sending troops but reiterated hope for diplomatic solution.

VANUATU

Government statement condemned Argentina, urged withdrawal. Urged U K to reconsider planned military retaliation and both parties to find peaceful solution.

W SAMOA

ZAMBIA

Statement deplored unilateral action by Argentina. Self-determination paramount. Press comments on importance of U N resolutions, self-determination, strengthening U N power. Privately MFA supported reinstatement of U K administration, prior to testing wishes of population again. Interested in African and OAS attitudes. Helpful over NAM.

ZIMBABWE

Foreign Minister's statement 8 April appealed to U K and Argentina to abide by SCR 502, not to use force, resolve dispute by negotiation or arbitration in accordance with international law.



SECRET

30 APR 1982

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*FR*

ZZ WASHINGTON  
OO UKMIS NEW YORK  
GRS 257  
SECRET  
FM FCO 301100Z APR 82

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(51)

TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 874 OF 30 APRIL  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR  
YOUR TELS NOS 1525 AND 1527

L. PLEASE TELL HAIG THAT I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR HIS EFFORTS AND HIS INTENDED EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN. WE SHALL SHORTLY TELEGRAPH PROPOSALS ABOUT NEXT STEPS AND A STATEMENT I SHALL MAKE HERE THIS EVENING.

2. ON THE TEXT OF HAIG'S PROPOSED STATEMENT IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1525, WE ACCEPT THE REASONS FOR NOT CONTESTING THE REMARK THAT THE US HAD REASON TO HOPE THAT THE UK WOULD CONSIDER A SETTLEMENT ON THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSAL ALTHOUGH AS YOU REALISE IT WILL CREATE DIFFICULTIES HERE AND WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL HANDLING.

BUT THERE ARE TWO POINTS WHICH YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PUT TO HAIG  
A) THE FIRST CONCERNS THE PASSAGE 'ARGENTINA'S POSITION REMAINS THAT IT MUST RECEIVE AN ASSURANCE NOW OF EVENTUAL SOVEREIGNTY, OR AN EXPANDING DE FACTO ROLE IN GOVERNING THE ISLANDS'. WE REALISE THAT THIS IS BASED ON COSTA MENDEZ'S LETTER TO HAIG IN YOUR TELNO 1517. BUT IT COULD GIVE THE WHOLLY FALSE IMPRESSION THAT ARGENTINA WAS WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN RETURN FOR A SHARE IN ADMINISTRATION. THAT IS NOT THE CASE, AS COSTA MENDEZ'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAVE MADE CLEAR. I HOPE THAT HAIG MIGHT BE WILLING TO REFER TO THOSE STATEMENTS RATHER THAN REFLECTING THE WAY COSTA MENDEZ PUT IT IN HIS LETTER.

B) THE REFERENCE A FEW SENTENCES LATER TO CONCRETE US STEPS TO SHOW THAT THE US WILL NOT CONDONE THE USE OF FORCE IS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT MIGHT BE SEEN AS APPLYING TO ANY USE OF FORCE BY BRITAIN. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT HAIG WILL INSERT 'UNLAWFUL' BEFORE 'USE OF FORCE' OR MAKE SOME EQUIVALENT AMENDMENT.



PYM

NNNN

DIST

LIMITED

PLANNING

HD SAMD

DEF DEPT

UND

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

LEGAL ADVISERS

COPIES TO

10 DOWNING STREET

PS/HOME SEC

PS/CHANCELLOR

PS/DEFENCE SEC

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/ SIR M PALLISER



Argentine  
Handling



## CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of  
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO  
*Secretary of the Cabinet*

C. A. Whitmore, Esq

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS  
Telephone: 01-233 8319





IA

Prime Minister

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

ku  
30.4

Ref: A08295

30th April 1982

MS

My dear Frank,

The French Ambassador came to see me this evening, following a telephone conversation with Michael Palliser, who was also present.

He said that someone - he was not prepared to say who, but he did say that it was not anybody in Government - had recently spoken to him in terms which made it clear that he was aware of the recent contacts with the French military authorities about the performance of the French aircraft operated by the Argentine Air Force. He hoped that as a result of what he had said the person concerned would now be aware of the extreme sensitivity of this information, and of the very great damage that could result from these contacts becoming known. The person concerned might well report this conversation back to his own source. The source was believed to be in the Ministry of Defence.

The President of the French Republic has, as you know, been extremely supportive and co-operative in relation to the Falkland Islands crisis, not only in this but also in other ways. It would be a serious matter if indiscretion on these contacts were to cause him political embarrassment and put his co-operation and good will at risk.

No doubt you will take whatever steps are open to you to ensure that the strictest secrecy is observed in these matters.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Antony Acland.

Yours ever  
Robert

Sir Frank Cooper, GCB, CMG



PART 11 ends:-


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PART 12 begins:-

30.4.82



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