

PREM 19/624

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SECRET
PART 13

Confidential filing


Relations with Argentina

ARGENTINA

Position of The Falkland Islands

Pt 1 Sept-1979

Pt 13: May 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
5.5.82							
ends-							
 PREM 19/624							

PART 13 ends:-

5. 5. 82

PART 14 begins:-

6. 5. 82

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: CC(82) 23rd conclusions, and Limited
Circulation Annex

Date: 5 May 1982

Signed Wayland Date 13 April 2012

PREM Records Team

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

1. House of Commons Hansard, 4 May 1982, columns 19-39 and 120-124
2. House of Commons Hansard, 5 May 1982, columns 155-169

Signed Wayland Date 13 April 2012

PREM Records Team



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>624</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Dove to Fellowes dated 5 May 1982, with covering Buckingham Palace compliments slip.</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>29 May 2012 W. Jayland.</i>
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RESTRICTED

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FM MONTEVIDEO 211435Z APRIL 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 21 APRIL

MY TELNO 162 :FALKLAND PARTY.

1. MEMBER OF PARTY HANDED CONSUL THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS.

BEGINS :

ON THE OCCASION OF HER MAJESTY'S BIRTHDAY WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF
YOU WOULD CONVEY TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN THE LOYAL AND AFFECTIONATE
GREETINGS OF HER SUBJECTS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WITH HUMBLE DUTY
WE ASK HER MAJESTY TO ACCEPT OUR MOST RESPECTFUL GOOD WISHES.
SIGNED : H T ROWLANDS FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

ENDS.

HUTCHINSON

[NOT PASSED BY C.O.D.]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

LIMITED

P & C D
S AM D
CONSULAR D
NEWS D
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR URE
LORD N G LENNOX

RESTRICTED

Her Majesty the Queen has seen a message brought out from the Falkland Islands on your behalf conveying greetings on the occasion of Her Majesty's birthday. Not all of you, perhaps, know of this message, but I am sure you will be glad to hear that it has been received in London. Her Majesty has asked me to convey to each one of you her warm appreciation of these greetings and her prayers, and those of her family, for your safety and wellbeing.

Caroline D.

Thank you.

A.S.C. 17.
5



10 DOWNING STREET

John

Answer
relative from
my friend.
for information
only.

C.D.

C.F.

Please file
after J.C. has
been.

3 SHEPHERD'S CLOSE,
LONDON, W1Y 3RT.
629 2569.

PRIVATE

5th May, 1982

CMR.

In my note of yesterday I did not report that Fiat's vice-chairman and managing director in Argentina, Mr. Riccardo Zinn, is a close friend of Lami Dozo. Rattazzi had not told me this because he believed Zinn to be a hard liner with whom he had strongly disagreed over the Argentine versions of early casualties.

Zinn asked Rattazzi to go and see him this morning. He said that the Sheffield changed everything, because the early versions didn't matter now. It was a good moment to look for peace. Rattazzi asked if Zinn knew anything about the result of Gaenza's conversation with Costa Mendez. In Rattazzi's presence Zinn rang Dozo, and Rattazzi gave me the following version of the conversation:

Costa Mendez had been in disgrace with his masters, but the Sheffield had put him back on the road; so he probably wouldn't now be so anxious for a private line to London. Dozo and Galtieri were anxious to compromise, although Anaya was not. Dozo personally would favour the following plan: (1) cease fire, (2) withdrawal from Falklands, (3) withdrawal of task force (4) interim period for negotiations with firm understanding that end result of these would be Hong Kong-type solution. (1) and (2) were not acceptable unless (4) was agreed in advance. Sovereignty was still the only essential to them.

Zinn, a friend also of Bush and Walters, is planning to go shortly to New York, and no doubt is passing some similar message via them.

I told Rattazzi that I could not pass on a message of this importance unless it was firmer than a report of an overheard telephone conversation. However, on reflection, I think I should do so, in case it fits with others which may be being received at this time.

M.E.M. Pearson

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) TYPISTS

Argentina

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I).
HD/DEF D
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HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR HAWTIN) TREASURY
MR PERETZ)
MR ILETT)
MR MCINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060132Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 657 OF 5 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLANDS AT THE UN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NON-ALIGNED COMMUNIQUE OF 5 MAY:

A MEETING OF THE CO-ORDINATING BUREAU OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HELD ON MAY 5TH, 1982 WAS CONVENED AT THE REQUEST OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA.

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA INFORMED THE BUREAU OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS SINCE THE BUREAU LAST MET ON APRIL 26TH, GRAVELY INCREASING THE TENSION IN THE AREA AND ENDANGERING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION AND IN THE WORLD.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED ABOVE, THE CO-ORDINATING BUREAU:

1) EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE MOUNTING LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE IN THE MALVINAS ISLANDS CONFLICT.

2) ...

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED ABOVE, THE CO-ORDINATING BUREAU

- 1) EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE MOUNTING LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE IN THE MALVINAS ISLANDS CONFLICT.

- 2) REITERATES IN ALL ITS ASPECTS THE COMMUNIQUE ADOPTED ON APRIL 26TH, 1982.

- 3) REITERATES THE COMMUNIQUE'S REAFFIRMATION THAT THE USE OF FORCE OR THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES ARE ACTS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

- 4) CONFIRMS THE COMMUNIQUE'S SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS ISLANDS AS REAFFIRMED AT ALL SUMMIT AND MINISTERIAL MEETINGS OF THE MOVEMENT SINCE THE DECLARATION OF THE CONFERENCE OF MINSTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HELD IN LIMA, PERU IN AUGUST, 1975.

- 5) APPEALS ONCE AGAIN TO THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT URGENTLY TO FIND A JUST, DURABLE AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE PRINCIPLES AND DECISIONS OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

PARSONS

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 May 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Chronology of Events

As requested, I enclose an up-dated copy of the Chronology of Events on the Falkland Islands. We will send you further up-dates on a regular basis.

attachment
with Asc?

Yours ever

John Holmes


(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

-5 MAY

B3B/FCO 012/05



OO FCO DESKBY 060900Z MAY 82

GRS 310

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 060900Z MAY 82

FM BRASILIA 052005Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 158 OF 5 MAY

193

YOUR TELNO 36 TO ASUNCION: DEFENCE SALES TO SOUTH AMERICA

1. UP TO NOW BRAZILIAN MINISTERS HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO DENY ANY POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT BRAZILIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN HOSTILITIES. HOWEVER, WE ALREADY KNOW OF THE SALE TO ARGENTINA OF AT LEAST TWO MARITIME/ASW BANDEIRANTE AIRCRAFT ALREADY IN SERVICE WITH FAB WITHIN THE LAST TWO WEEKS. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS SUGGEST THAT AN ASSORTMENT OF AMMUNITION, MISSILES AND LIGHT WEAPONS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN SOLD IN THE SAME TIME SPAN.

2. IN OUR VIEW THERE IS NO BRAZILIAN ARMY OR AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT OF BRITISH MANUFACTURE CURRENTLY IN SERVICE WHICH THE ARGENTINES WOULD WANT. THE BRAZILIAN NAVY, HOWEVER, POSSESSES A RANGE OF BRITISH EQUIPMENT ALREADY IN SERVICE WHICH COULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE USE TO THEM. THIS INCLUDES LYNX HELICOPTERS, SPARES BETWEEN COMMON EQUIPMENTS IN NITEROI CLASS FRIGATES AND ARGENTINE TYPE 42 DESTROYERS, SEA CAT AND OTHER COMMON MISSILE SYSTEMS. IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE BRAZILIAN NAVY CLANDESTINELY TO PROVIDE THE SERVICES OF AN OBERON CLASS SUBMARINE, BUT WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE NAVAL COMMAND WOULD RULE OUT THIS OPTION. INDEED, IN VIEW OF THE INTENSIVE AND OFTEN CRITICAL PRESS INTEREST IN THE SALE OF THE BANDEIRANTE AIRCRAFT, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE BRAZILIAN SERVICES WILL MAKE ANY FURTHER DELIVERIES OF MAJOR EQUIPMENTS TO ARGENTINA.

3. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE SALES CHAIN OF ANY OF THE THREE SERVICES THAT WE CAN IDENTIFY WHICH WOULD BE OF USE TO THE ARGENTINES IN THE EXPECTED TIME FRAME OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT. POLITICALLY, IT WOULD MAKE SOUND SENSE FOR BRITISH SUPPLIERS TO CONTINUE BUSINESS WITH BRAZIL AS USUAL. FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD

FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD
TEND TO STRAIN THE EXISTING GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND THE
BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES, WHO WIELD A DECISIVE INFLUENCE ON THE
BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES IN THE PRESENT CRISIS.

HARDING

NWNN

SENT AT 05: 2154Z HM
RECD AT 05:2154Z TC

UNCLASSIFIED BY 60323 NIA/JS
REASON: EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
END JTC

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
 HD/DEF D
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 RESIDENT CLERK
 Hd of MENAD

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 PS/CHANCELLOR)
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 MR HAWTIN)
 MR PERETZ) TREASURY
 MR ILETT)
 MR McINTYRE)
 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
 DIO CABINET OFFICE
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GR 160

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 052218Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1618 OF 5 MAY

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DS8(AIR)), ROUTINE: TEL AVIV, MONTEVIDEO

ISRAELI ARMS SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AMERICA

1. WE WERE CONTACTED YESTERDAY BY A US CITIZEN, MR STEADMAN HINKLEY. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE NEW YORK AIRLINE COMPANY, OVERSEAS NATIONAL AIRWAYS, OF WHICH HE IS CHAIRMAN, HAS BEEN APPROACHED BY A FREIGHT COMPANY OPERATING OUT OF HOUSTON, PAN AIRCRAFT, A SUBSIDIARY OF THE BARING CORPORATION, TO CHARTER TEN FLIGHTS CARRYING AMMUNITION FROM TEL AVIV TO MONTEVIDEO IN ABOUT ONE WEEK'S TIME. HINKLEY, WHO SUSPECTS THAT THESE CONSIGNMENTS ARE INTENDED FOR ARGENTINA, HAS ASSURED US THAT HE WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS BUSINESS. HE HAS INFORMED ENDERS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN THE MATTER UP WITH THE POLITICO-MILITARY BUREAU, WHO HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO LOOK INTO IT URGENTLY. HINKLEY HAS PROMISED TO LET US KNOW ANYTHING FURTHER HE DISCOVERS ABOUT THE CHARTER.

HENDERSON

CONFIDENTIAL

3701 - 1

OO WASHINGTON
GRS 353
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM FCO 051600Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 920 OF 5 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO,
PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, BERNE

E.R.
-5 MAY 1982

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REPATRIATION OF POWS

1. AS YOU KNOW THE 151 POWS TAKEN ON SOUTH GEORGIA, TOGETHER WITH 39 CIVILIANS (THESE INCLUDE TWO CHILEANS, TWO URUGUAYANS AND ONE SPANIARD), ARE NOW ON THEIR WAY BY SHIP TO ASCENSION ISLAND. THEY ARE LIKELY TO ARRIVE AROUND 11 MAY. ONWARD TRAVEL FROM ASCENSION TO ARGENTINA PRESENTS US WITH A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. WE HAVE LOOKED CLOSELY AT THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE BEST ANSWER WOULD BE TO SEEK US ASSISTANCE IN THE SHAPE OF A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT TO TRANSPORT THE PARTY EITHER TO BRAZIL (AS THE PROTECTING POWER) OR URUGUAY. A THIRD POSSIBILITY WOULD BE A DIRECT FLIGHT TO ARGENTINA, BUT WE SEE SOME DIFFICULTIES IN THIS. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO LEAVE IT TO THE AMERICANS TO DECIDE ON THE PRECISE ROUTE. ONE OF THE MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IS THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY ON ASCENSION ISLAND: ACCESS BY AIRCRAFT FROM A THIRD COUNTRY WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE, WHEREAS THE USE OF AN AMERICAN PLANE CAUSES NO DIFFICULTIES. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DISCUSS THIS URGENTLY WITH THE AMERICANS AND LET US HAVE THEIR REACTION. WE HAVE NOT SPOKEN ABOUT THESE POSSIBILITIES EITHER TO THE BRAZILIANS OR THE URUGUAYANS. THE ICRC ARE HOWEVER AWARE OF OUR PLANS AND SEE NO DIFFICULTY FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. (THEY WILL HAVE REPRESENTATIVES AT ASCENSION AND WE MAY INVITE ONE OF THEM TO ACCOMPANY THE GROUP).
2. IF POSSIBLE WE WOULD LIKE ALL PASSENGERS TO BE ACCOMMODATED ON ONE FLIGHT, LEAVING ASCENSION AT NIGHT (FOR SECURITY REASONS) ON 11/12 OR 12/13 MAY.

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3701 - 1

WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ARRANGE REPATRIATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
AND ANY DELAY BEYOND THESE DATES WOULD CAUSE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS.

3. (FOR BRASILIA). IF YOU THINK IT HELPFUL YOU MAY INFORM
THE BRAZILIANS OF THESE PLANS, IN VIEW OF THEIR ROLE AS
PROTECTING POWER.

4. (FOR MONTEVIDEO). THE URUGUAYANS MAY BE ANXIOUS TO HELP.
IF THE US SEE ADVANTAGE IN REPATRIATING THE PARTY THROUGH
MONTEVIDEO, WE ASSUME THAT THEY WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY
ARRANGEMENTS DIRECT WITH THE URUGUAY AUTHORITIES.

PYM

ER

WONFO 22/06


WONNY 08/06

6 MAY 1982

RR F C O

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

RR BIS NEW YORK



GR 350

R E S T R I C T E D

FM WASHINGTON 052030Z MAY 82

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1610 OF 5 MAY

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK AND BIS NEW YORK

MS

FALKLANDS; CONGRESS

⑦

1. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES YESTERDAY ADOPTED BY VOICE VOTE THE RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ (D NEW YORK) WHICH HAD BEEN ADOPTED BY THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE LAST WEEK (MY TELNO 1528). THE RESOLUTION RESOLVED QUOTE THAT ARGENTINA SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE FALKLANDS ISLANDS AND, IF THE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS FAIL, THE US SHOULD PROVIDE FULL DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO GREAT BRITAIN IN ITS EFFORTS TO UPHOLD THE RULE OF THE LAW UNQUOTE.

2. FOLLOWING THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY THE US GOVERNMENT ON 30 APRIL, IT HAD BEEN SOLARZ' INTENTION NOT TO PUT HIS RESOLUTION TO THE VOTE IN THE FULL HOUSE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT HAD BEEN MADE REDUNDANT BY THE US STATEMENT. IN THE END, HOWEVER, SOLARZ AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (ZABLOCKI) DECIDED THAT NOT TO PUSH FOR A VOTE MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS A WEAKENING OF CONGRESSIONAL OPINION ON THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE IN THE DISPUTE.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK ANSWERED QUESTIONS BEFORE AN APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF CONGRESS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. THE SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN (CLARENCE LONG - D MARYLAND), SAID THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION'S TACIT ACQUIESCENCE IN MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ARGENTINA, IN THE ANTI-SEMITIC CAMPAIGNS OF THE JUNTA, AND IN ARGENTINA'S DELIBERATE UNDERMINING OF THE US GRAIN EMBARGO, HAD ENCOURAGED THE GENERALS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD INVADE THE FALKLANDS WITH IMPUNITY. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAD MADE A SERIOUS MISCALCULATION AND THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WAS IN NO WAY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ARGENTINE DECISION TO QUOTE MOVE ITS TROOPS INTO THE FALKLANDS UNQUOTE. THE US GOVERNMENT STOOD FOUR SQUARE BEHIND THE PRINCIPLE OF OPPOSING THE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE CONFLICTS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30)

[Typists]

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST -
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR HAWTIN)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
MR ILETT)
MR McINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 052310Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1622 OF 5 MAY
INFO PRIORITY MODUK

MY TELNO 1553 AND 1559: AIRCRAFT ENGINES FOR ARGENTINA

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US TODAY THAT THE US CUSTOMS HAVE NOW FORMALLY SEIZED IN SAN FRANCISCO THE J65 AERO ENGINES (BELIEVED TO TOTAL 32) DESTINED FOR ARGENTINA.

THE CUSTOMS DID SO ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ENGINES WERE NOT SPARE PARTS AS DESCRIBED IN THE EXPORT DOCUMENTS. THE EXPORTER HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK ANOTHER, CORRECT EXPORT LICENCE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE ASSURED US IN CONFIDENCE THAT CONSIDERATION OF ANY NEW LICENCE WILL BE DELAYED.

2. THE CUSTOMS ACTION IN SEIZING THE ENGINES HAS AROUSED CONSIDERABLE PRESS INTEREST. IN RESPONSE TO ENQUIRIES WE SHALL WELCOME THIS DECISION BY THE US AUTHORITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATIONS STATEMENT OF 30 APRIL ANNOUNCING THE SUSPENSION OF ALL MILITARY EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA. IF ASKED ABOUT OUR INVOLVEMENT, WE SHALL CONFIRM THAT WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE US AUTHORITIES ABOUT THIS MATTER.

HENDERSON

CONFIDENTIAL
-5 MA

3684 - 1

OO MADRID

GRS 295

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 051740Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE MADRID

TELEGRAM NUMBER 142 OF 5 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

1. THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR ASKED TO CALL ON ME THIS MORNING. HE WAS SEEN BY LORD BELSTEAD.

2. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO SAY THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED TO GIVE ANY HELP ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES IN FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. A SIMILAR OFFER HAD BEEN MADE TO ARGENTINA. THEY WERE AT OUR DISPOSAL IF THEY COULD BE OF HELP. THEY WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS FOR SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY.

3. LORD BELSTEAD THANKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS MESSAGE. HMG WERE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO FINDING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. IF THE ARGENTINES ABIDED BY THE TERMS OF SCR 502 IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT DETAILS. BUT SO FAR THEY SHOWED NO SIGNS OF COMPLYING. TWO INITIATIVES WERE AT PRESENT IN PROGRESS (PERU AND THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL). IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD BE HESITANT ABOUT OPENING A NEW CHANNEL. HE WOULD TELL ME WHAT THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR HAD SAID. IT WOULD NOT BE DISREGARDED. BUT, FOR THE PRESENT, IT WOULD BE BEST TO CONCENTRATE ON EXISTING INITIATIVES.

4. LORD BELSTEAD WENT ON TO EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT SEEN THE CRISIS IN THE SAME LIGHT AS HMG. WE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SCR 502 AND TO RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT WE WERE OPERATING UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAD REMAINED SILENT ON THE LATTER POINT. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT THE SPANISH POSITION WAS VERY DIFFICULT. THEY WERE COMING UNDER CONFLICTING PRESSURES. THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT A DEEPENING OF THE CONFLICT WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA.

5. SEE M.I.F.T.

PYM

11 12 1
10
9
8
7 6 5

E. R.

M

(1)

Prime Minister



Acknowledged
on telephone.
Cj.

May 5, 1982
1

Dear Caroline,

I send you another paper, looking ahead,
for the Prime Minister, as promised on the
telephone. I have sent a copy to Michael
Pallesit & told him I was telling you -

Yours ever

Angus

See particularly p. 5 sidelined

A FUTURE SETTLEMENT IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

Before considering what variety of longterm settlement we envisage, we have surely to think very precisely what are our permanent interests in the Falklands. First, have we any strategic interests which still are served by our possession of the islands and dependencies? The first Cabinet, I think, to discuss these islands was that of Chatham in 1766. Anson, after his circumnavigation of the globe, had recommended the colonisation of the islands as a convenient port of call on the Pacific route, via Cape Horn to the Far East. The admiralty resolved to enact this. Commander Byron set up our first post on West Falkland. Chatham confirmed the decision - after some hesitation so his biographer says.

It was because of this strategic service which we believed the Falklands gave to us that we insisted on our claim there, and risked war with Spain, in 1771.* A revival of that strategic preconception led us to raise the question of sovereignty again in 1824, to send HM Clio to the Falklands in 1833, and subsequently to establish the colony. The Australian trade in the XIXth century was assisted by the Falklands base. In the XXth century, the role of the Falklands in both world wars was, of course, considerable.

We have assumed since 1945 and in particular since the 1960s, with the emphasis on European defence - supplemented if at all by the Gulf and the Indian ocean - that the old reason for our being in the Falklands, as enunciated by Anson, has vanished. If that were so, the interests of the Falkland Islanders would indeed be the only reason for any interest in the matter - since we, unlike the Argentinians, have no interest in land per se. (Note: in keeping with Argentinian history and character, their interest in the islands is a matter of physical possession: no real interest in economic development, in oil possibilities, in strategy. But they, of course, bolster their argument for land by reference to the

* In this conflict Chatham was specially outspoken. The first preliminary must be confession of guilt from Madrid by the return of Port Egmont: "will you so shamefully betray the King's honour so to make it a matter of negotiation whether His Majesty's possession shall be restored to him or not?" This remark of 1770 indicates what the feeling was *already* then about our right to the island.

continental shelf in whose future they could become seriously interested).

But is it right to assume this? And if we, as Britain, have no further strategic interest - which may be open to question - have we not as Europe? Or as part of the Alliance which formally or not has many interests outside the North Atlantic? *

Whatever strategic aims we may have thought that we had or did not have in the South Atlantic before April 1982, these are likely to have changed. Can we assume that the attack on the Falklands was an isolated action by the Argentinian navy? It was, after all, followed by an attack on South Georgia. Given the opportunity of the still surviving Argentinian presence in South Thule, it is surely possible that the attack on the Falklands would have been followed, had we done nothing, by the absorption of all our dependencies and that (why not?) either then or in a later internal crisis, by an attack on all the disputed regions in Antarctica - particularly those where they are in dispute with us. There might have been - there still might be - action against Chile, whatever the Pope would have said. Thus we may be really nipping in the bud an aggressive naval power in the South Atlantic. But even if defeated now, that naval power may be revived. People remember defeats more than they do victories.

There is also presumably a possibility that a defeated Argentina could make common cause with the USSR. Stranger friendships have been made even though, in the 1970s, there was a clash, I think, involving some loss of life, between Argentina and the Soviet fishing fleet, in collaboration with the Bulgarians. If Argentina, either under a Peronist revival or an irredentist general, became a Soviet ally, presumably there would be some consequences for the Falklands, affecting the Alliance. There have been some hints that the Argentinians would, had they been allowed to get away with their aggression, have allowed the USSR to use the islands as a major fishing port - and one less innocent even than their major (and worrying) use of the Canaries.

At the back of all this, we recall that the preservation of order at sea is a fundamental interest of all the West and that Britain can still play a major part in securing it. (I suppose even the USSR is also interested in it too - though China less).

*This matter is pursued in a letter to The Times May 5 1982

attached

This brings up the question of the Antarctic. Perhaps I have been talking too much to Lord Shackleton. But at all events as a major trading power if nothing else we have an interest in preserving stability in Antarctica. As a nation experienced in research in that region, we presumably can hope to play a continuing part in Antarctic exploration, and, if there are economic benefits, from krill or oil or anything else, we could hope to benefit from them, at the same time as having a due regard for natural life. (On environmental grounds, we must have a strong case for holding onto South Georgia and the dependencies: the lives of penguins may not be a major concern, but much time and money of high minded persons is spent in other parts of the world on just such causes).

We have to anticipate trouble in Antarctica, however the current issue is resolved. In 1978 Dr Barry Buzan wrote a paper in which he said: "the outbreak of active dispute over Antarctica seems almost inevitable ... there seems to be ground for low level conflict among Argentina, Chile and Britain, in their overlapping areas". There might also be fishing disputes involving Japan and the Soviet Union with the Latin Americans.

As to the Falkland Islanders, we have said that their wishes must be 'paramount'. Francis Pym has said that he would be surprised if their views about their future would not have changed as a result of events since April 2: but it would also be surprising - astonishing - if they had become more enthusiastic about living under Argentinian rule. The change might be that they would realise more sharply than they did before that they needed more defence support if they are to survive there. I imagine that the general sense of Britain (adequately expressed by Peter Shore on television (BBC Newsnight, Saturday May 1) is that the community of Falkland Islanders have a right to live under laws and customs of their own in the place where they and their ancestors have lived.

In the past this general sense was not what it is now. Perhaps it would have been possible for a government to have persuaded Parliament to accept either Nicholas Ridley's or Richard Luce's version of the Foreign Office proposals with a little more commitment and a little helpfulness from the Argentines. The Falklanders, after all, did not get what they wanted under the Nationality Act, unlike the Gibraltarians (though the Falklanders are in blood much more British than the Gibraltarians).

But this now must have changed. I cannot see that it would be easy for us, any more than for the Argentines, to return to the proposals discussed in March.

Furthermore, various remarks by Argentines during the crisis have made it evident that if they were to win, they would seek to alter the Falklanders' way of life. After what has happened, the Argentines too will have changed. If the Argentines were to receive sovereignty with a lease to us - even for example guaranteed by the Pope or the King of Spain - what real safeguard could there be that the community as such would be preserved? One Argentine government could indeed easily repudiate any other unless the events of 1982 do usher in a resumption of that era of ordered progress which characterised Argentine history between 1853 and 1930: that is not a probability, though it may be that that may in the end be a consequence of military defeat: to face the facts for the first time as a nation and realise that vainglory is not glory.

Is therefore the only real settlement an indefinite assumption of British sovereignty, whatever the cost in terms of a full time commitment to defend the islands, whatever the likelihood of Argentine long term resentment, whatever trouble which might be caused in Latin America and whatever opportunity in propaganda in Latin America, politically and economically in Argentina itself, that this might give the Russians, and however unclear the long term strategic benefits? If it is so, the defence needed there could be costed; the possibility that contact with the Falklands directly via Argentina (but not Uruguay perhaps?) would be impossible, would have to be costed too. There would be other perhaps large costs to be taken into account.*

We must presumably think through all the alternatives. If neither the Argentines would accept the British, nor the British the Argentines, is there really a chance, on a long term basis, of a condominium? In the present state of our relations it is hard to see it. Would the situation be improved by a UN or US chairman, or component? Perhaps but would such a thing really guarantee the interests which are mentioned above? The UN would seem unnecessary to British opinion. The US might not wish to incur what might turn out to be odium in the rest of Latin America for what might seem no good purpose. Could other countries be involved? No doubt ad interim but I should

* But on this there are other views. See Times letter attached.

not have thought permanently.

The various alternatives suggested for independence of the islands or trusteeship under the UN should also be considered carefully in the light of British interests and what is possible politically and internationally. UN trusteeship has its points surely provided the strategic interests can be so secured.

It looks though as if for the foreseeable future British sovereignty is the only acceptable British policy. If that is so I wonder whether there are not some concessions which could be made to prevent permanent Argentinian irredentism. Do we need the continental shelf on which the Falklands sit? If not, could we not accept, as the Norwegians have in respect of Spitsbergen, that the Falklands have no continental shelf of their own? We have no long distance fishing fleet: could we therefore waive fishing rights beyond a short distance - our old three miles? Could we not devise an Argentinian economic commissioner on one of the islands on which he could fly the white-and-blue flag?

If we do not by any chance really desire to share in the development of Antarctica could we perhaps make some concession to Argentina there: a lease? a cession of part of our claim - perhaps the section immediately east of latitude 53° (see map attached).

If there really is no practical alternative to our sovereignty, with or without the concessions above suggested, a major information campaign should perhaps be launched as soon as possible to put over the legal case for it. Perhaps this could be done by a visit by you to the UN and a speech by you at that forum, couched in conciliatory terms designed to explain our case to the Spanish world as well as to Argentina. It would seek to deflate the idea of a "continent" having interests in expelling "colonialists", particularly since the Falklands are hundreds of miles away. This will not be easy because of the shared Latin America illusions on this matter, but it should be tried. To it could be added a reminder to all that once accepted frontiers begin to be challenged by force, every country in Latin America could soon be at war - and Africa, come to that. The speech could be in the nature of a policy statement and could


from the
mainland

be immediately printed and distributed widely in several languages. You may think that this suggests that I am too great a believer in the power of the spoken and written word, and that is a criticism, but perhaps the policy has a chance.

Such a speech could also include the following points:

1. We are aware of the strong feelings of the Argentines on the question of the Falklands but we must accept the rules of law, not feelings. We consider that the case for our sovereignty is watertight but we are always willing to put the matter to the ICJ.
2. Our long close friendship and beneficial collaboration with Argentina in the past makes us optimistic we can reach an effective understanding. The existence of an argument over the Falklands in the 1880s did not prevent our investment of vast trade. Are we less tolerant than those of the 1880s?
3. The real colonialist danger in Latin America remains Marxism and its quite irrelevant prescriptions for the modern world. There is the real anachronism, if we are looking for such things.

HUGH THOMAS
5.v.82



Map 8: Antarctic Claims

LETTERS

Falklands: policy considerations

From Professor John Hutchinson more

Sir, Four considerations should dominate Western policy on the Falkland Islands, once British rule has been restored:

1. The Islands are important to Western security, especially since the United States might eventually lose access to the Panama Canal, and other Latin American states turn sharply Left. The Islands should be permanently garrisoned by Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, perhaps joined by Nato as a whole.

"In such circumstances", a leading Islander has told me, "we would vote 80 or 90 per cent or more to stay". It is absurd to argue that the Islands are indefensible except at prohibitive cost. Rockets trained on the mainland will deter.

2. The United Nations might properly mediate if its agent is acceptable, but it must not arbitrate. Its role, to adapt Bagehot on the Monarch, should be to advise but not to ordain, to encourage but not to harangue, to warn but not to proscribe. It might shepherd the Argentine withdrawal and other ceremonies, but must not intrude on British rights. British sovereignty must be inalienable by anyone, domestic or foreign.

3. Her Majesty's Government should pledge itself to the maximum economic development of a grossly neglected principality. Hardly a leg of mutton or a hide leaves the Islands, so poor are storage and refrigeration facilities. We spend 1,000 times as much on aid to sometimes surly foreign countries as we do on Falkland welfare. The priorities will have to change.

4. Argentina should be invited to join in the economic and strategic development of the Falkland Islands and to have an official presence and flag, provided the flag does not fly from Government House. Argentina should also receive aid and counsel from the Western powers in meeting its own accelerating and possibly lethal economic problems.

British sovereignty should remain inalienable, but with the Argentine case on the duty agenda. Long and partnered friendship might make the issue moot.

Faithfully,
JOHN HUTCHINSON,
33 Millbank Court,
24 John Islip Street, SW1
May 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

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OO UK MIS NEW YORK (DESKBY 052000Z)

GRS 59

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 052000Z

FM FCO 051915Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 352 OF 5 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE GEORGETOWN

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING A MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH HIGH COMMISSIONERS ON 5 MAY, RAMPHAL TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HAD A MESSAGE FROM FORBES BURNHAM THAT GUYANA WOULD DO EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO HELP US IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PYM

E.L.
-5.

(170)

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MUSCAT 050928Z MAY 82

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 142 OF 5 MAY

MY TELNO 132: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. WHEN MIERS AND I CALLED ON THE SULTAN YESTERDAY I THANKED HIM FOR THE SUPPORT WHICH THE OMAN GOVERNMENT HAD PROMISED US OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
2. THE SULTAN CONFIRMED THAT OMAN FULLY SUPPORTS BRITAIN. BUT HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY DISTURBED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES. IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE TIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES HE THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE SUPPORTED US RIGHT FROM THE START. THE NEUTRAL POSITION WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD ADOPTED INITIALLY HAD BEEN WORRYING FOR OTHER COUNTRIES WITH TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES, SINCE IT MADE THEM WONDER WHETHER THEY COULD REALLY RELY ON THE AMERICANS IN A CRISIS. THE SULTAN SAID THAT HAD THE AMERICANS NOT COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE HE WOULD HAVE CANCELLED HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AS A MARK OF DISAPPROVAL. THE SULTAN ADDED THAT HE WAS TELLING ME THIS "FOR THE RECORD" AND OBVIOUSLY INTENDED IT TO BE PASSED ON TO YOU.
3. IN VIEW OF THE ROBUST LINE WHICH THE SULTAN HAS TAKEN I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR US IN DUE COURSE TO SEND HIM A MESSAGE OF THANKS, IDEALLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

SLATER

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 May 1982

Handwritten initials and a fraction:
V.R. $\frac{6}{5}$
f.c.

Dear John,

The Prime Minister has asked for advice on a request - channelled, I understand, through Lord Thomas of Swynnerton - that she should receive Dr Rafael Caldera, the former President of Venezuela, to discuss the Falkland Islands.

I enclose a personality note on Dr Caldera. He is a founder of COPEI, the ruling Christian Democrat (centre right) party in Venezuela. He was President between 1969 and 1974 and has retained a leading influence in his party. He will be the COPEI candidate in the next Presidential elections in 1983. Dr Caldera is thus a figure of importance in Venezuelan politics. He has considerable political stature in Latin American with a reputation for moderation and breadth of vision.

The present Venezuelan Government under President Herrera have throughout the Falklands crisis taken a firmly pro-Argentine position, strongly supporting the Argentine sovereignty claim and increasingly hostile to the UK. In this they have been conditioned by their own sovereignty claim against Guyana, on which Venezuelan emotions run high. Although in Venezuela rhetoric often counts more than action, it is conceivable that, if conflict continues to develop, Venezuela may provide military assistance to Argentina and could take action against our own diplomatic and economic relations with them. Against this background it is unlikely that any proposals which Dr Caldera may bring will be constructive from our point of view.

However, Dr Caldera has not so far as we are aware yet taken a public position on the Falklands crisis himself. He may conceivably be thinking of casting himself in a mediatory role with an eye to the forthcoming Presidential elections. We would not want to encourage this. There is however no advantage to us in antagonising the Venezuelans unnecessarily and a refusal to see Dr Caldera would inevitably be seen as a rebuff which might only harden Venezuelan attitudes. Venezuela will remain an important market for us in the region and we have in recent years put a good deal of effort into strengthening our political relations and capitalising on the Venezuelan Government's generally sensible and constructive approach to Central American and Caribbean security.

/Our

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Our recommendation is therefore that the Prime Minister should agree to receive Dr Caldera. It would be sufficient if the Prime Minister were to take note of whatever suggestions Dr Caldera might make and to use the opportunity to set our own views on the Argentine invasion. It would also be helpful for Dr Caldera to be reminded that, despite present difficulties, we wish to preserve our good relations with Venezuela and with the region.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'J E Holmes'.

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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CALDERA, DR RAFAEL

President of Venezuela 1969-74.

Born 1916 in Yaracuy; studied law at the Central University and has been active in politics since the age of eighteen.

Member of Congress 1941-44, helped to found COPEI, in 1946, and was re-elected to Congress 1946-47. After Perez Jimenez came to power (1950) his party disintegrated. Some of the party supported Perez Jimenez; Caldera opposed him and was imprisoned.

COPEI presidential candidate 1958; won just under 20 per cent of the votes. Became Deputy and President of the Chamber of Deputies while COPEI was in coalition with AD. Presidential candidate 1963; this time came second with a slightly increased vote. From 1963-68 COPEI was the chief opposition party and he held no Government post.

Elected President 1968 with 32 per cent of the vote. As President he showed himself the undisputed leader of his party (whose Secretary General he had been since its foundation in 1946), but was greatly limited by lack of majority in Congress and a consequent lack of access to funds. An arrangement between COPEI and the leading opposition party, AD, gave Caldera and the Government a freer hand to push through a number of major items of legislation in 1970. At the end of 1970 this collaboration broke down and the tactics of the opposition thereafter forced Caldera to adopt a strong nationalistic attitude towards economic matters, particularly with regard to the foreign oil companies. Made a state visit to the United States in June 1970, where he made a favourable impression; gave full backing to Calvani (Foreign Minister) over the signing of the Protocol of Port of Spain freezing the Guyana border dispute; renewed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Regarded as a good President but with a poor team.

He remains the most important figure in COPEI. From the 1940s until his election to the Presidency he taught politics at the Central University.

He has a good political pressure, although his opponents question whether there is anything behind it. He also speaks and writes extremely well, but is somewhat prolix. Has a number of books to his credit, including a biography of Simon Bolivar. In June 1974 he led the Venezuelan delegation to the unveiling of the Bolivar statue in London, and later in the same year visited the UK again to inaugurate the Andres Bello chair at Oxford University. Visited the UN early in 1979 and was elected President of the IPU during the IPU Conference held in Caracas in September 1979. Since the election of President Herrera there has been an undercurrent of confrontation between the party's two 'Presidents', which Caldera has increasingly brought into the open. Has already made it clear that he is a Presidential Candidate for 1983, though is attempting to widen his base beyond COPEI.

Married; six children. Speaks English well.

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

To note

A.F.C. $\frac{6}{3}$

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

5 May 1982

B J P Fall Esq.
Principal Private Secretary
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

New Brian,

FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE ARGENTINE

There is one point about our present financial restrictions which you may wish to bear in mind.

As you know, they are mainly aimed at freezing Argentine assets by Directions under the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964. These Directions control all payments by order of Argentine residents, which is as wide as the Act permits. They also apply to some contractual payments, where an order forms part of the arrangements, but this is rather a grey area, and Treasury and Department of Trade Officials have formed the view that payments in respect of insurance claims by residents of the Argentine would not necessarily be caught, unless such payments were into Argentine accounts in the UK - which are of course blocked. This leaves a gap in our control.

The Chancellor has therefore authorised the inclusion in the draft Emergency Powers (Falkland Islands) Bill of a provision to prevent the fulfilment of contracts with the Argentine. If the Bill and Regulations are enacted, this could be used to prevent the payment of all insurance claims and any other contractual obligations. Voluntary payments to Argentina could still be made, but in practice the Chancellor doubts that it would be worth attempting to control voluntary payments.

Copies of this letter go to Michael Scholar at No.10, John Rhodes at the Department of Trade, and David Wright at the Cabinet Office.

J O Kerr

J O KERR
Principal Private Secretary

SECRET

Argentina
12



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

[Handwritten initials]

5 May 1982

Prime Minister

To note

A.Y.L. 5/15

Dear John,

Falklands: Chequers meeting of ODSA on 2 May

In his letter of 2 May to David Omand at the Ministry of Defence, Robert Wade-Gery recorded the decisions taken at this meeting. Among these were invitations to the FCO to investigate what more needed to be done to step up the quality and quantity of broadcasts to Argentina and the Falkland Islands; and to consider with the Ministry of Defence arrangements for the removal of Argentine prisoners. This is an interim reply on both points. We will be taking continuing action to ensure as satisfactory arrangements as possible in relation to both issues.

Since Robert Wade-Gery's letter was written, the Argentines have started jamming the BBC Spanish Service to South America. Reports from our posts have suggested that this Service is providing a growing audience with excellent coverage of the crisis, as is the 24-hour World Service in English. The extent of the jamming, and the means by which it is being done, are still unclear, and are being investigated by the BBC. The World Service in English and the Special Service to the Falkland Islands remain unaffected.

We have asked the BBC to consider urgently the possibilities of circumventing the jamming by any means open to them, and for proposals to increase the hours of their broadcasts to Latin America in Spanish. We have approached the Voice of America (who broadcast in Spanish to Latin America for some five-and-a-half hours a day) to draw their attention to the jamming, and to urge them to use the maximum amount of factual material about the Falkland Islands and our military operations put out by HMG. The US Embassy are supporting us on this. The Falkland Islands Service is now broadcast daily (the Islands are also getting the BBC's World Service) and has included special messages from the Foreign Secretary and Mr Cranley Onslow in the past few days. The Governor and Falkland Islands Councillors are also participating regularly in these programmes, which carry messages to the Islanders from friends and relatives in the UK.

/We

SECRET



We have asked our Embassy in Santiago to approach the Chilean authorities to urge their media to carry more of our material. Finally, we have given as wide publicity as possible to the fact of the Argentine jamming, which provides clear evidence that the Argentine Government do not want their people to have access to the facts.

As to the point about the removal of Argentine prisoners, we are taking up urgently with the MOD the question of the timing of any approach to the International Committee of the Red Cross. We note that the Chiefs of Staff already had this subject under consideration and are currently considering a paper which should issue very shortly.

I am sending copies of this letter to Robert Wade-Gery and the other recipients of his letter under reference.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

J E Holmes

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

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ACTION: DCM 5 +2D/ELP

*Message from Haig
 to foreign ministers
 at the 10, sent 5/5*

NODIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/4/88 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)
 TAGS: AR, UK, FA, PBOR
 SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY

1. SECRET

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER: --

DEAR (NAME): FRANCIS PYM WILL TELL YOU THAT WE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS TO FIND A BASIS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATION OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT. THE LOSS OF LIFE MAKES THE SEARCH ALL THE MORE URGENT. I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD ALL RECONFIRM OUR SUPPORT-NOW AND AVOID ANY MOVE THAT WOULD SUGGEST LESSENNED SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN WHILE WE ARE IN THIS MOST CRITICAL PHASE. THE U.S. DOES NOT PROPCSE TO TAKE IMPORT MEASURES SIMILAR TO YOURS, BUT WE BELIEVE OUR MILITARY MATERIEL PLEDGE MORE THN COM, PENSATES.

SINCERELY, AL HAIG.

HAIG

*S. Am D
 PS
 PS/Monsieur
 PS/PUS
 Mr Bullard
 Lord Bridges
 Mr Giffard
 Mr Ure
 Mr Hannay
 Mr Evans
 ERO
 ECD(F)*

Planning Staff

*PS/No 10
 PS/Defense Sec.*

STATE 121029
PS/Hum Sec.

PS/Chancellor & the Duke

*PS/Sir R. Austin
 Sir M. Palliser*

JMH 5/5

SECRET/NODIS

Prime Minister

*Message from Haig to the
 10 Foreign Ministers.*

A.S.C. 4/5

1 YPIDIS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30X31)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLYMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
ED/DEF D
ED/NEWS D
ED/UND
ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS NO 10 DOWNING ST
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLE)
MR HAWTHIN)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
MR ILETT)
MR MCINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SARG/DIO " "
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

PP THE HAGUE
PP UKREP BRUSSELS
PP UKMIS GENEVA

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

GRPS 350
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBLIN 051100Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 05 MAY 1982
REPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
IMMEDIATE INFO TO PARIS, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, ROME, BONN, ATHENS,
LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNOS 124, 125 AND 128: FALKLANDS: IRISH GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE

1. DESPITE THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENTS OF 2 AND 4 MAY
(MY TELNOS 120 AND 124) THERE HAS NOW BEEN A SLIGHT EASING OF THEIR
POSITION. THE TAOISEACH TOLD THE DAIL YESTERDAY THAT COMMENTS
MADE AT A LOCAL FIANNA FAIL PARTY MEETING BY THE IRISH
DEFENCE MINISTER ON 3 MAY (THAT "BRITAIN WAS NOW THE AGGRESSOR"
IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS) HAD BEEN A SPONTANEOUS REACTION TO
THE SINKING OF THE GENERAL BELGRANO, ASSOCIATED IN MR POWER'S

IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS) HAD BEEN A SPONTANEOUS REACTION TO THE SINKING OF THE GENERAL BELGRANO, ASSOCIATED IN MR POWER'S MIND WITH THE ACCIDENTAL SINKING OF THE IRISH TRAWLER SHARELGA BY A BRITISH SUBMARINE (SEE MY TELNO 126, NOT TO ALL). MR HAUGHEY SAID HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT STATEMENTS FROM MINISTERS THAT WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH GOVERNMENT POLICY.

2. EXPLAINING THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO EC SANCTIONS DURING A TV INTERVIEW LAST NIGHT, THE TAOISEACH SAID: "SANCTIONS DID NOT SUCCEED IN THEIR OBJECTIVE. WITHDRAWING COULD CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE". WHEN HE WAS ASKED WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT TO SINK THE BELGRANO, MR HAUGHEY REPLIED: "I WOULDN'T PASS ANY JUDGEMENT ON THAT IN A WAR SITUATION WHO CAN SAY WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS WRONG."

3. WE CAN TAKE SOME ENCOURAGEMENT FROM MR HAUGHEY'S STEADIER LINE AND THE CHANGE IN DIRECTION WHEN HE SAID THAT IRELAND WOULD NOT UNILATERALLY ABANDON A COMMUNITY LINE ON SANCTIONS BEFORE THEY EXPIRE ON 17 MAY (MY TELNO 128). THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS SHOW THAT HE ALONE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY. THERE WAS EVIDENCE FOR THIS YESTERDAY WHEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER ATTACKED ME IN EMOTIONAL TERMS AT A RECEPTION FOR PRESIDENT REDDY. AS HE REPEATEDLY SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY HIS REMARKS ARE NOT WORTH REPORTING. I HAD THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HE COULD ONLY SPEAK AS HE DID BECAUSE HE HAD NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY MAKING IN THIS MATTER.

FIGG

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 051230Z CB:JW

TYPLS L

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30/39)

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR GERRARD
 MR PRICE
~~MR JONES~~ *Loop N. of Lennox.*
 MR URE
 MR GILMORE
 ED/S AND (FOO DIST + A/D. F/I)
 E/DEF D
 E/NEWS D
 E/ORD
 E/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 ASSISTANT CLERK
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PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
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 SIR K COUZENS)
 MR LITTLER)
 MR HAWLIN) TREASURY
 MR PERETZ)
 MR ILETT)
 MR McINTYRE)
 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) B/EX
 DIO CABINET OFFICE
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPO/DIO " "
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

IMMEDIATE
 ADVANCE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED
 FM CANBERRA 050634Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 200 OF 05 MAY 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS : AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER
 1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF QUESTION AND ANSWER IN FEDERAL PARLIAMENT AT 5 AM YOUR TIME TODAY 5 MAY.
 *MR LIONEL BOWEN (DEPUTY LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION):
 I REFER THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE NEWS OF THE HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE SUSTAINED BY BOTH GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IN THE MILITARY ACTION TAKING PLACE NEAR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I ASK THE HON GENTLEMAN: IN VIEW OF THE FACT THERE HAS BEEN NO STATEMENT TO THIS HOUSE, HAS HE INITIATED ANY MATTER AT ALL BY WAY OF A PERSONAL DISCUSSION OR DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM? DOES HE SUPPORT THE IRISH GOVT'S INITIATIVE, WHICH CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CONVENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, TO CONSIDER A RESOLUTION TO CEASE HOSTILITIES FORTHWITH AND BEGIN TALKS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND FURTHER THE LIFTING OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AS THEY ARE NO LONGER DEEMED TO BE APPROPRIATE?

AGAINST ARGENTINA BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AS THEY ARE NO LONGER DEEMED TO BE APPROPRIATE?

MR MALCOLM FRASER: I THINK ALL HON MEMS OF THE HOUSE WILL BE CONCERNED AT THE LOSS OF LIFE THAT HAS OCCURRED WITH THE LOSS OF A MAJOR SHIP OF THE ARGENTINE NAVY AND A SIGNIFICANT SHIP OF THE BRITISH NAVY. IT WOULD BE THE WISH AND THE HOPE OF ALL HON MEMS THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED BY NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN OUR HOPE THAT THE SITUATION NEVER GOT TO THE POINT OF MILITARY CONFLICT. HAVING SAID THAT, IT IS HARD TO GET AWAY FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCE IN WHICH ARGENTINA CAPTURED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION.

THE TALKS THAT WERE PROCEEDING HAD BROKEN OFF. THE PROBLEM HAS ALWAYS BEEN ABOUT HOW A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF FALKLAND ISLANDERS ARE TO BE ALLOWED TO LEAD OUT THEIR LIVES.

BUT THE FACT THAT THERE ARE ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF THEM DOES NOT DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE TO THEM OF THEIR CAPACITY TO CHOOSE THE KIND OF LIFE THEY WANT AND THE KIND OF GOVT THEY WANT.

DEMOCRACY, WHETHER IT BE FOR ONE PERSON, 10 PEOPLE, 2,000 PEOPLE OR 100 MILLION PEOPLE IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AFFECTED. THE ARGENTINIAN ACTION WAS IN DEFIANCE OF EVERYTHING THAT ALL HON MEMS HERE WOULD BELIEVE IN IN RELATION TO THAT RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 502, HAS CALLED FOR THE MATTER TO BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE WAY. ARGENTINA, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, HAS SAID THAT IT ACCEPTS THAT RESOLUTION BUT AT THE SAME TIME, OR IN THE SAME BREATH, IT SAID THAT ITS SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE RECOGNISED. THAT, OF COURSE, DENIES THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS AND THEREIN LIES THE PROBLEM AROUND THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

WE HAVE BEEN VERY CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVT THROUGHOUT THIS MATTER. WE HAVE BEEN CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HON MEMS WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO KNOW THAT A VERY LARGE PART OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, BOTH IN THE CABINET ROOM WITH A NUMBER OF US AND A SMALLER GROUP WITH VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH, RELATED TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE NOTE THAT THE US STAYED, IN A SENSE, IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS DISPUTE FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME, SEEKING TO NEGOTIATE AND USING ALL ITS INFLUENCE WHICH IS UNDOUBTED WITH THE UK AND ALSO NOT INCONSIDERABLE WITH ARGENTINA, AS A SOUTH AMERICAN STATE IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. WE WOULD ALL BE EQUALLY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE VERY CONSIDERABLE

IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.
I WOULD ALL BE EQUALLY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE VERY CONSIDERABLE
EFFORTS OF MR HAIG - WHICH I THINK DESERVE CONSIDERABLE PRAISE
IN SPITE OF THE FACT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL - TO ACHIEVE
A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT FAILED. ONCE IT WAS PLAIN THAT THE
NEGOTIATIONS FAILED AND THAT HOSTILITIES WOULD BEGIN, IT WOULD
NOT SURPRISE HON MEMS OF THIS HOUSE TO KNOW THAT THE US FELT
AT THAT POINT IT SHOULD MAKE ITS OWN VIEW VERY PLAIN ABOUT WHERE
JUSTICE LIES IN THIS DISPUTE. IT MADE IT PERFECTLY PLAIN TO ARGEN-
TINA AND TO BRITAIN THAT ITS SYMPATHIES AND SUPPORT WERE WITH
THE UK. THIS IS THE POSITION WE ARE IN.

I WOULD HAVE BELIEVED THAT IF THERE WERE A CAPACITY FOR A
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IT COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE GOOD
AUSPICES OF THE UNITED STATES. THAT MAY STILL BE THE WAY IT WILL
GO BECAUSE THE US WOULD HAVE INFLUENCE WITH BOTH PARTIES. IF
SOME USEFUL ACTION CAN BE TAKEN THROUGH THE UN, OBVIOUSLY THE
GOVT WOULD WANT TO EXAMINE THAT VERY CLOSELY INDEED, BUT WE NEED
TO REMEMBER THAT ALREADY THERE IS ONE RESOLUTION FROM THE U. N. .
IT IS THE DEFIANCE OF THAT RESOLUTION BY ARGENTINA WHICH HAS
LED TO THE OPENING OF ACTIVE CONFLICT. I DO NOT THINK ANY HON MEM
OF THIS HOUSE WOULD WANT TO UNDERESTIMATE THE IMPORTANCE OF
THIS OCCASION AND THE TRAGEDY OF LOSS OF LIFE THAT HAS OCCURRED
OVER A MATTER THAT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN CAPABLE OF BEING RESOLVED BY
NEGOTIATION. BUT HAVING SAID ALL OF THAT - I HOPE WITH A
VERY REAL SENSE OF MODERATION SO FAR AS THE GOVT IS CONCERNED -
WE WOULD WANT TO MAINTAIN, AND DO MAINTAIN, SUPPORT FOR THE UK
IN HER EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE JUSTICE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS.
. ENDS

MASON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30/31)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR FRICHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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PRESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS }
MR LITTLE }
MR HAWTIN }
MR PERETE } TREASURY
MR ILETT }
MR McINTYRE }

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPE/DIO " "
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

VZCZCFDG CON

IMM

050835Z MAY 82

GR 110

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEL AVIV 050835Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

TELNO 050835Z MAY 82

AND TO PRIORITY FCO

FROM DA

ISRAELI WEAPONS IN THE FALKLANDS

DIRECTLY FOLLOWING BBC REPORT THAT HMS SHEFFIELD WAS HIT BY AIR LAUNCHED EXOCET MISSILE I RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM MARKETING DIRECTOR ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES APOLOGISING THAT ONE OF HIS PRODUCTS SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SO MUCH DAMAGE. THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT GABRIEL SEA TO SEA MISSILE HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE. HE STATED EMPHATICALLY HE WAS CERTAIN AN IAI PRODUCT WAS RESPONSIBLE BUT WOULD NOT RESPOND TO QUESTIONS ON MARK OR TYPE. IAI PRODUCTS ARE ADVERTISED AND TO OUR BEST KNOWLEDGE GABRIEL CANNOT BE AIR LAUNCHED. NOR DO WE KNOW OF ANY OTHER AIR TO SURFACE WEAPON PRODUCED BY THEM. I REPORT THIS FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH.

MOBERLY

ADVANCE COPY

1 YF1212

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30X31)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
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MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR HAWTHIN) TREASURY
MR PERETZ)
MR ILETT)
MR MCINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPP/DIO " "
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GRS 55
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS GENEVA 05/1505Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TEL NO 214 OF 5 MAY 1982
INFO ROUTINE BERNE, MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON, MODUK(DS11 FOR FRANCIS)

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TEL 140

FALKLANDS ISLANDS / ICRC

1. ICRC HAVE READILY AGREED TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THEY SHOULD VISIT ASCENSION ISLAND TO SEE THE ARGENTINIAN PRISONERS TAKEN ON SOUTH GEORGIA. THEY WELCOME YOUR OFFER OF TRANSPORT AND WOULD LIKE TO KNOW PRECISELY WHAT IS ENVISAGED . THEY HAVE ASKED US TO CALL AT 1230Z ON 6 MAY TO DISCUSS MODALITIES.
2. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

MARSHALL

NNNN

TYPISTS

+17

HAIG ADVANCES

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
HD/SAMD
HD/DEFD

~~PS~~/No 10 DOWNING STREET

PS/S of S DEFENCE

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)

PS/SIR M PALLISER)

MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER)

D I O)

ms

FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 051440Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 147 OF 5 MAY

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

FALKLANDS: YOUR TELNO 909 TO WASHINGTON

1. IT IS NOW BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE TWO ARGENTINE EMISSARIES WHO LEFT LAST NIGHT CAME TO LIMA PRINCIPALLY TO SOOTHE PRESIDENTIAL FEATHERS RUFFLED BY THE TERMS OF THE INITIAL ARGENTINE REJECTION COMMUNIQUE WHICH DISMISSED THE PERUVIAN 7 POINT PLAN AS WARMED-OVER HAIG.

2. THE PERUVIANS HAVE RATHER SURPRISINGLY NOT SO FAR REVEALED THE CONTENTS OF THE 7POINT PROPOSAL. IT WOULD THEREFORE EARN US EVEN GREATER PERUVIAN GOOD-WILL AND HELP US PRESENTATIONALLY IF THE

2. THE PERUVIANS HAVE RATHER SURPRISINGLY NOT SO FAR REVEALED THE CONTENTS OF THE 7POINT PROPOSAL. IT WOULD THEREFORE EARN US EVEN GREATER PERUVIAN GOOD-WILL AND HELP US PRESENTATIONALLY IF THE 6 POINTS PROPOSAL IN YOUR TUR COULD BE CONVERTED INTO A QUOTE 7 POINTS PROPOSAL UNQUOTE AS ANNOUNCED TO THE WORLD AT LARGE BY THE PRESIDENT ON PRESS AND TV ON THE EVENING OF 2 MAY.

3. IN ANY CASE, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT ANY PROPOSALS YOU MAY INSTRUCT ME TO CONVEY TO THE PERUVIANS ARE ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE REVEALED TO THE PRESS SHORTLY AFTER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR NORMAL PRACTICE (AND POSSIBLY IN ORDER TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ARGENTINES).

WALLACE

NNNN

~~TYPESET~~

[TYPISTS AA]

018051930Z

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30/3) (32) (35)

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/MR HURD
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 MR GIFFARD
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 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS 760
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 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAFT/DIO " "
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 051930Z

FM PARIS 051725Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 425 OF 5 MAY 1982

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS

YOUR TELNO 96 TO BRUSSELS: ARGENTINA: IMPORT BAN

1. THE FRENCH POSITION SEEMS TO BE SHIFTING SOMEWHAT IN RESPONSE TO CLASHES AROUND THE FALKLANDS IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER TODAY'S MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND A CONVERSATION ABOUT THE COMMUNIQUE WITH GUTMANN, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE QUAI.

2. IN ESSENCE THE FRENCH ARE MAINTAINING THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE BASIC UK POSITION, BUT ARE PLACING INCREASING EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR A CONVINCING GESTURE BY THE UK WHICH WILL CONFIRM OUR INTENTION TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. THEY CONTINUE TO AFFIRM PRIVATELY THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR THE UK TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION, BUT HAVE EVIDENTLY BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE WEIGHT OF HOSTILE COMMENT

BUT HAVE EVIDENTLY BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE WEIGHT OF HOSTILE COMMENT IMPLICIT IN FRENCH PRESS REPORTS ON RECENT INCIDENTS AND ARE THEREFORE TAKING A PUBLIC POSITION IN FAVOUR OF THE IMMEDIATE ENDING OF HOSTILITIES.

3. LOGICALLY THIS POSITION SHOULD IMPLY FRENCH READINESS TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, SINCE WITHOUT THEM THERE WOULD BE NO REASON FOR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW OR TO SEEK A GENUINE NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. THE LESS THEY CAN PUBLICLY ENDORSE MILITARY ACTION, THE MORE THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ENDORSE THE CONTINUED NEED FOR ECONOMIC ACTION. ANY OTHER COURSE WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE ORIGINAL DECISION OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, WHICH HAS BEEN REGULARLY REAFFIRMED BY MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS HERE, TO GIVE FIRM BACKING TO THE UK. THERE MAY HOWEVER BE A DISPOSITION TO ARGUE THAT ANY RENEWAL OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MORE DEFINITE COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS.

4. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE REQUIRE A FRENCH LEAD IN ORDER TO HELP CONVINCED OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS, IT WOULD BE WORTH CONSIDERING A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO MITTERRAND TO ENLIST HIS SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 26 APRIL THANKING MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON FOR THE ACTION THEY TOOK WITH THE JAPANESE ONLY ARRIVED IN PARIS BY BAG YESTERDAY. IT HAS BEEN IN LARGE PART OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND WOULD NOW BE MORE USEFUL IF IT WERE UPDATED TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION ON SANCTIONS. IT MIGHT ALSO REFER TO THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATION. I WILL HOLD THE LETTER UNTIL I RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 051808Z JC/RR



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>624</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Minute from Nott to Prime Minister dated 5 May 1982, with Annexes A and B. (folio 9)</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>13 April 2012</i> <i>Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
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FCS/82/68

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Prime Minister

AFC-4/5

MS

South Africa

Thank you for your minute of ²⁹28 April about Eldon Griffiths's impression of South African willingness to grant us naval and other support facilities in connection with the Falklands operations.

I agree that it would be right to respond on the lines you suggest.

I take your comment that the South African line seems at variance with the assessment given by our Charge d'Affaires in mid-April. But I think it quite likely that South African attitudes may have evolved as the crisis has developed. Our Embassy have reported some evidence to this effect. If so, it seems likely that increasing evidence of Soviet and Cuban support for Argentina has been a factor in this.

Nonetheless, I do not think that we can take it for granted from Eldon Griffiths's soundings that the South Africans would now be bound to react positively to a request for facilities. Nor if they did so should we assume that they would not expect to extract an unacceptably high price. There would also be a heavy diplomatic penalty to pay as regards support for our Falklands case from Third World countries.

I am copying this minute to the recipients of yours.

(FRANCIS PYM)

5 May 1982

SUBJECT

FLASH. 8

DESPATCHED AT 052150 LOCAL

SECRET

✓ to Master
Ops

Message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T97/82

Dear Ron,

My Cabinet colleagues and I spent some four hours earlier today considering Al Haig's latest proposals. Francis Pym has replied on our behalf, but I am writing to you separately because I think you are the only person who will understand the significance of what I am trying to say.

Throughout my administration I have tried to stay loyal to the United States as our great ally, and to the principles of democracy, liberty and justice for which both our countries stand.

In your message you say that your suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect. But the present rulers of the Argentine will not respect those principles, and I fear deeply that if a settlement based on your suggestions is eventually achieved, we shall find that in the process of negotiation democracy and freedom for the Falkland Islanders will have been compromised.

Above all, the present proposals do not provide unambiguously for a right to self-determination, although it is fundamental to democracy and was enjoyed by the Islanders up to the moment of invasion. We asked you earlier that it should be included explicitly.

/ Al Haig's

SECRET

- 2 -

Al Haig's reply was that it could not, because the Argentines would not accept it and there would therefore be no hope of a settlement. This has given me and my colleagues very great difficulty. This is why I have tried to temper Al Haig's latest proposals a little by suggesting that the interim administration must at least consult with the locally elected representatives. It is not much to ask - and I do not think that you will turn it down.

I too want a peaceful settlement and an end to the mounting loss of life in the South Atlantic. I also believe that the friendship between the United States and Britain matters very much to the future of the free world. That is why, with the changes Francis Pym has suggested to Al Haig, we are ready, with whatever misgivings, to go along with your latest proposals. Assuming that they are accepted by the Argentines, then during the negotiation period that will follow we shall have to fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders who have been so loyal to everything in which you and we believe.

Warm personal regards,

Margaret

CONFIDENTIAL

HL



cc HMT
MOD
HO
CDL
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 May 1982

US Measures Against Argentina

Thank you for your letter of 4 May with which you forwarded a revised draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan about further measures on the economic front.

We agreed on the telephone to amend the draft further in the light of developments in the course of yesterday. I now enclose a copy of the final text of the message which was sent to President Reagan on the hot line last night.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to John Kerr (H.M. Treasury), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office), Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

ds

SUBJECT
ce MANSOR
OPS

T95/82

IMMEDIATE 042036Z MAY 82

FM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

DEAR RON,

FRANCIS PYM HAS TOLD ME ABOUT THE VERY USEFUL TALKS HE HAD WITH AL HAIG ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON SUNDAY. WE ARE ALL TREMENDOUSLY HEARTENED BY THE WAY YOU HAVE COME OUT IN OUR SUPPORT.

AS I SEE IT, THE MAIN LINES OF OUR STRATEGY REMAIN FULLY APPROPRIATE IN THIS NEW STAGE OF THE CRISIS. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BUILD UP THE DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO PUT AN END TO ITS UNLAWFUL MILITARY OCCUPATION AND, THEREAFTER, TO NEGOTIATE WITH US IN GOOD FAITH ABOUT THE LONG TERM FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS.

ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH ACCORDS WITH THE PRINCIPLES WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE DEFENDED FOR SO LONG. WE ARE LOOKING URGENTLY TODAY AT AL HAIG'S LATEST IDEAS.

IN THE MILITARY FIELD, LET ME EMPHASISE HOW MUCH WE APPRECIATE YOUR GENEROUS OFFER OF MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR OUR FORCES. THIS WILL BE OF THE GREATEST VALUE TO US, AND OUR PEOPLE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOURS TO FOLLOW UP IN DETAIL FRANCIS PYM'S MORE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH AL HAIG AND CAP WEINBERGER.

I AM SURE THAT, WITHOUT EFFECTIVE MILITARY PRESSURE, THE ARGENTINE LEADERS WILL NOT BE BROUGHT TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. BUT, WITH SO MANY YOUNG LIVES AT RISK - BRITISH AND ARGENTINE - I FEEL THAT WE MUST MAKE A SUPREME EFFORT TO PREVENT A MAJOR MILITARY CLASH. THAT IS WHY I ATTACH SO MUCH IMPORTANCE ALSO TO THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE WHICH WE AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES ARE BRINGING TO BEAR.

THE MEASURES YOU HAVE ANNOUNCED, SUSPENDING SUPPLIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DENYING NEW EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES, WILL SHOW THE ARGENTINES THAT YOU ARE IN EARNEST. I HOPE THAT THE MEASURES ON MILITARY SUPPLIES WILL ENABLE YOUR PEOPLE TO PREVENT THE EXPORT OF ANY EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. I WOULD LIKE TO URGE YOU ALSO TO GO FURTHER AND TO IMPOSE A COMPLETE BAN ON IMPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES FROM ARGENTINA.

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN THE PRESSURES ON ARGENTINA TO AGREE TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. YOUR OWN ACTION WOULD NOT ONLY BE OF GREAT VALUE IN ITSELF, BUT WOULD ENCOURAGE OUR COMMUNITY AND COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS TO MAINTAIN THEIR OWN BANS AND INDUCE OTHERS - IN PARTICULAR THE JAPANESE - TO FOLLOW SUIT. WHATEVER THE DIFFICULTIES, I FEEL SURE THAT IT IS IN OUR ECONOMIC AS WELL AS OUR POLITICAL INTERESTS TO RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE= AND THE EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S MEASURES AGAINST IMPORTS WILL HAVE MORE IMPACT THAN A MORE GRADUAL BUILDING UP OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE. FRANCIS PYM WILL BE SEEING HIS EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES OVER THIS WEEKEND, AND IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP TO US IF HE COULD TELL THEM THAT THIS IS A STEP WHICH YOU INTEND TO TAKE.

FINALLY, LET ME THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR SPLENDID SUPPORT. IT WILL MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS
MARGARET

NNNN

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CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

HL



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cc Mante

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 May 1982

Telephone call by Australian Prime Minister: Falkland Islands

Mr. Fraser rang the Prime Minister this morning. He expressed sympathy about the loss of the Sheffield, but said that we should take heart because we had many friends. The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Fraser for his message. The loss of the Sheffield was a blow but we were still on top of the situation. Mr. Fraser commented that from a distance it looked as though the operation was going well. Vice President Bush had just left Australia and he was in no doubt where the United States would stand in the crunch.

The Prime Minister said that, at present, there was a further move for negotiations through Mr. Haig and Peru. The problem which remained was that of persuading an invader to withdraw without obtaining half of his aims. Mr. Fraser said that it was important to do this if possible. But the main message he wished to convey to the Prime Minister was that there was much admiration in Australia for her actions at the present time.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

dl

5 May 1982

Mrs. Gandhi: Falklands

Thank you for your letter of 1 May proposing that the Prime Minister should send a personal message to Mrs. Gandhi about the Falkland Islands situation.

The Prime Minister has said that because the situation is changing so rapidly day by day she would prefer to wait before sending a message.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

dl

CONFIDENTIAL

HL

5 May 1982

Argentine Aircraft - Laser Equipment

The Prime Minister has noted the contents
of your letter of 3 May.

JOHN COLES

David Omand, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

dl

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

~~(30X31)~~ 52.

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

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MR HAWTIN)
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MR MCINTYRE)

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ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS 760
RESIDENT CLERK

MISS DICKSON (EEP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

Wes

GPS 450
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN 051640Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 408 OF 05 MAY

FRG ATTITUDE TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

He is now coming.

1. IT IS REGRETABLE THAT GENSCHER'S VISIT TO LONDON TOMORROW HAS BEEN CALLED OFF. SUPPORT FOR THE UK HERE HAS TAKEN A SEVERE KNOCK IN THE LAST 48 HOURS FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF THE BELGRANO AND THE SHEFFIELD. IT APPEARS THAT OFFICIALS ARE TAKING THEIR LEAD DIRECT FROM GENSCHER AND THE CHANCELLOR, WHO ARE TAKING THE VIEW THAT THE LATEST INCIDENTS HAVE BROUGHT THE MILITARY CONFLICT TO A PITCH OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION WHICH OCCASIONED IT; AND THAT THE UK IS PURSUING A MILITARY SOLUTION WITH MORE VIGOUR THAN A DIPLOMATIC ONE, TO THE DETRIMENT OF GERMAN AND ALLIED INTERESTS. AFTER THEIR WEEKLY MEETING THIS MORNING, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE FEDERAL CABINET HAD EXPRESSED DISMAY AT THE ESCALATING CONFLICT AND THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE; AND REPEATED THEIR URGENT APPEAL TO US AND THE ARGENTINES FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-

THEIR URGENT APPEAL TO US AND THE ARGENTINES FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND AN EXHAUSTIVE EXPLORATION OF ALL POSSIBILITIES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

2. I VERY MUCH HOPE THEREFORE THAT AT VILLERS-LE-TEMPLE YOU WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK PRIVATELY TO GENSCHER IN THE MARGINS AND TO IMPRESS ON HIM THE LONG-TERM AS WELL AS THE SHORT-TERM IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING GERMAN SOLIDARITY WITH US NOW THAT THE CRISIS HAS ENTERED ITS MOST DIFFICULT PHASE SO FAR. THE MORE COMPLETELY HE CAN BE TAKEN INTO OUR CONFIDENCE THE BETTER. MORE THAN ONE SENIOR GERMAN OFFICIAL MADE CLEAR TO ME, EVEN BEFORE THE LATEST INCIDENTS, THAT THEY WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN QUOTE GIVING SUPPORT IN A VACUUM UNQUOTE. THE BEST WAY OF FILLING THE VACUUM WOULD BE TO GIVE GENSCHER THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNT OF OUR THINKING AS REGARDS BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY OPTIONS. I UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT DOING THIS BUT BELIEVE IT WOULD PAY SUBSTANTIAL DIVIDENDS.

3. THERE REMAINS THE EVEN GREATER PROBLEM OF THE CHANCELLOR. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF EVIDENCE THAT THE PRESENT WAVERING ON THE PART OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DERIVES FROM THE CHANCELLOR PERSONALLY. INDEED THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES STAFF AT THE FMOD TOLD MY DA AS MUCH IN TERMS LAST NIGHT (PLEASE PROTECT). WITH LAHNSTEIN REMOVED TO THE FINANCE MINISTRY AND GABLENTZ AWAY, WE HAVE AT PRESENT NO REALLY CLOSE CONTACTS AT THE TOP OF THE KANZLERAMT. I AM TRYING TO REACH GRONOW, THE NEW STATE SECRETARY THERE, TO REMIND HIM THAT I AM AT THE CHANCELLOR'S DISPOSAL IF HE WANTS TO TALK TO ME (AND I HAVE ASKED PFEFFER TO DO THE SAME WITH GENSCHER). BUT I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD FIND TIME TO TELEPHONE THE CHANCELLOR PERSONALLY TO GIVE HIM HER ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, TO EMPHASISE THE EFFORT WE ARE PUTTING INTO THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, AND TO STRESS THE VALUE WE ATTACH TO CONTINUED GERMAN SUPPORT. THIS COULD ALSO BE CRUCIAL IN KEEPING THE GERMANS ON BOARD OVER SANCTIONS (MY IFT). IF IT SEEMED APPROPRIATE, SHE MIGHT ALSO SUGGEST THAT IF THE CHANCELLOR WANTS TO TALK OVER HIS CONCERNS IN GREATER DETAIL I AM AT HIS DISPOSAL AT ANY TIME.

TAYLOR

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
SENT AT 051719Z KB

CONFIDENTIAL
5 MAY 1982

E. R.

3625 - 1

00 PARIS
GRS 1330
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 051430Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 217 OF 5 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE OTHER EC POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, CANBERRA, OTTAWA,
WELLINGTON, OSLO
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO.



MIPT

MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS

BEGINS

1. (TO ALL EXCEPT DUBLIN). IN VIEW OF THE VERY VALUABLE SUPPORT WHICH YOUR COUNTRY/THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION HAS BEEN GIVING TO US DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE CRISIS OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (TO ALL) I THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO SEND YOU THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO SUPPLEMENT WHAT YOU WILL HAVE HEARD THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADORS/HIGH COMMISSIONERS IN LONDON AND ELSEWHERE.
2. THE POSITION THIS MORNING IS THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE CERTAIN PROPOSALS. AS I SAID YESTERDAY, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, WE WELCOME THESE IDEAS, WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AUTHORS AND WE EXPECT TO RESPOND SHORTLY. AS THEY STAND, THERE COULD BE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR US IN CONNECTION WITH THE LINK BETWEEN STAGE 1 (CEASEFIRE) AND STAGE 2 (WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES), AND ALSO OVER THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS MUST BE RESPECTED IN ANY DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT. WE ARE CONSIDERING URGENTLY WHETHER A WAY ROUND THESE DIFFICULTIES CAN BE FOUND WITHOUT LOSING THE VALUABLE IMPETUS WHICH THE PERUVIAN INITIATIVE HAS GENERATED.
3. AS REGARDS THE UNITED NATIONS, A NUMBER OF IDEAS ARE IN CIRCULATION BUT NO CONCRETE PROPOSALS OF SUBSTANCE HAVE YET BEEN FORMULATED. WE AGREE OF COURSE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION MAY BE ABLE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE

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SECRETARY-GENERAL PERSONALLY, AS WE HAVE BEEN THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS

4. TURNING TO THE MILITARY SIDE, I NEED NOT SAY HOW BITTERLY I AND MY COLLEAGUES IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REGRET THE LOSS OF LIFE WHICH HAS OCCURRED ON BOTH SIDES IN RECENT DAYS. ALL THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF AT ANY TIME DURING THE LAST MONTH ARGENTINA HAD SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY RESOLUTION NO 502, ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, OR IF SHE HAD KEPT HER SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT WELL AWAY FROM THE BRITISH TASK FORCE. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU WILL RECALL THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN LONDON OF A MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE, SUBSEQUENT CONVERTED INTO A TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE, THE FOLLOWING WARNING WAS PUBLISHED HERE ON 23 APRIL AND COMMUNICATED AT THE SAME TIME TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THROUGH SWITZERLAND, THE PROTECTING POWER. QUOTE: IN ANNOUNCING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, HMG MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS MEASURE WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF THE UK TO TAKE WHATEVER ADDITIONAL MEASURES MAY BE NEEDED IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. IN THIS CONNECTION, HMG NOW WISHES TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ANY APPROACH ON THE PART OF ARGENTINE WARSHIPS, INCLUDING SUBMARINES, NAVAL AUXILIARIES, OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO A THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE MISSION OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WILL ENCOUNTER THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. ALL ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT INCLUDING CIVIL AIRCRAFT ENGAGING IN SURVEILLANCE OF THESE BRITISH FORCES WILL BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE AND ARE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY. UNQUOTE.

5. AS YOU WILL KNOW, OUR NAVAL FORCES CAME UNDER HEAVY AND SUSTAINED ATTACK FROM THE ARGENTINE FORCES ON 1 MAY, AND WERE FORTUNATE TO SUSTAIN ONLY LIGHT DAMAGE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT FURTHER ATTACKS WERE PLANNED. ON 2 MAY THE CRUISER GENERAL BELGRANO AND OTHER ARGENTINE NAVAL UNITS APPROACHED THE SOUTHERN END OF THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE, POSING AN IMMINENT THREAT TO OUR NAVAL UNITS OPERATING NEAR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, AND IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WARNING REFERRED TO ABOVE, THE CRUISER GENERAL BELGRANO WAS ENGAGED AND SEVERELY DAMAGED BY A BRITISH SUBMARINE PROTECTING OUR TASK FORCE. OTHER

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ARGENTINE SHIPS WERE IN A POSITION TO GO TO THE AID OF THE CREW OF THE GENERAL BELGRANO BRITISH SUBMARINE TOOK NO ACTION AGAINST THESE SHIPS.

6. AS I EMPHASISED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 4 MAY, OUR MILITARY ACTIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN SEEN AS AN END IN THEMSELVES. THEIR PURPOSE IS TO HELP CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO USE THE MINIMUM OF FORCE. THE ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN HAVE BEEN IN APPLICATION OF OUR INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, AND HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT ARTICLE. THE SAME WILL BE TRUE OF ANY FURTHER MILITARY ACTION WHICH WE MAY BE OBLIGED TO TAKE IN EXERCISE OF THE SAME RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE AND TO PROTECT OUR OWN SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND MEN. THE ARGENTINE ATTACKS ON 1 MAY AND NOW THE LOSS ON 4 MAY OF HMS SHEFFIELD AND OF A BRITISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT HAS SHOWN THAT THE THREAT TO THEM IS VERY REAL AND THE NEED TO PROTECT THEM OF VITAL IMPORTANCE.

7. I AM MOST GRATEFUL, AS YOU KNOW, FOR THE INVALUABLE SUPPORT WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN GIVING US IN THE MATTER OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA. WITH THE MOOD IN BUENOS AIRES AS IT APPEARS TO BE, IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THIS ECONOMIC PRESSURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. (TO ALL EC COUNTRIES EXCEPT IRELAND). AT OUR MEETING NEXT WEEKEND I SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR AGREEMENT THAT THE COMMUNITY BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS SHOULD BE RENEWED ON 16 MAY FOR A FURTHER MONTH IF THE SITUATION WHICH NECESSITATED THE ORIGINAL BAN CONTINUES UNALTERED, THAT IS TO SAY IF ARGENTINA CONTINUES IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. I AM AWARE OF THE SACRIFICES THE EMBARGO HAS MEANT FOR SOME OF OUR PARTNERS, AS IT HAS FOR US. BUT ITS EXTENSION WILL BE IMPORTANT TO HELP SECURE THE NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH WE, WITH YOUR SUPPORT, HAVE BEEN SEEKING THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS. ONE MEMBER STATE HAS ALREADY SPOKEN PUBLICLY AGAINST THE BAN. COMMUNITY ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION OVER POLAND HAS SHOWN THAT THE COMMUNITY CAN ACT EVEN WITH ONE MEMBER STATE OPPOSING. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT NO MEMBER STATE WOULD PREVENT A COMMUNITY DECISION WHICH MOST MEMBER STATES WANT AND THAT THE

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COMMUNITY WOULD MAINTAIN ITS STRENGTH OF PURPOSE AT THAT CRITICAL JUNCTURE.

8. (DUBLIN ONLY). I WAS DISMAYED TO READ THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ON 4 MAY. IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BOTH BILATERALLY AND WITHIN THE TEN, I SHOULD HAVE EXPECTED SOME CONSULTATION BEFORE YOU ACTED PUBLICLY IN THIS WAY. AS IT IS, THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE SERIOUS. THE ENDING OF THE BAN ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA WOULD GREATLY WEAKEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THAT COUNTRY TO COMPLY WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WOULD ALSO SEND, AS YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF YESTERDAY HAS ALREADY SENT, PRECISELY THE WRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL TO ARGENTINA AT A MOST CRUCIAL TIME. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE GREATLY ENCOURAGED, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR ACCEPTING SOMETHING ON THE LINES OF THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS GREATLY REDUCED. THE COMMUNITY TOOK A GREAT STEP FORWARD IN ITS IMPRESSIVE AND RAPID JOINT DECISION OF PRINCIPLE IN SUPPORT OF ACTION AGAINST ARGENTINE AGGRESSION. IT WOULD BE AN EVEN GREATER SETBACK FOR THE COMMUNITY IF THAT SUCCESS WERE NOW TO BE DEMOLISHED. RECOGNISING THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT HAS DOUBTS ABOUT THE MILITARY PRESSURE WHICH I BELIEVE TO BE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE OVERALL PRESSURE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, I NONETHELESS URGE YOU NOT TO PREVENT A COMMUNITY DECISION TO CONTINUE THE BAN IF THAT IS WHAT OUR PARTNERS ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT, AS GREECE DID OVER ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

9. (TO OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OSLO.) I SHALL BE ASKING MY COLLEAGUES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO AGREE TO RENEW THE COMMUNITY IMPORT BAN, IF NECESSARY, WHEN I SEE THEM ON 8/9 MAY. I HOPE THAT THE NEGATIVE POSITION ANNOUNCED ON 4 MAY BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WILL NOT PREVENT THEM FROM ALLOWING THEMSELVES TO BE OUTVOTED: A COMMUNITY DECISION WOULD THUS STILL BE POSSIBLE, AS IT WAS WHEN GREECE VOTED AGAINST BUT ACQUIESCED IN ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH POLAND. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE LIKewise TO GIVE US ITS SUPPORT. ENDS.

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E.R.
- 5 MAY 1982

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GRS 178

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 051430Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 216 OF 5 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE OTHER EC CAPITALS, UKREP BRUSSELS, CANBERRA,
OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, OSLO

REPEATED TO FOR INFORMATION UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER

1. FOLLOWING THE INCIDENTS IN WHICH THE TASK FORCE HAS BEEN
ENGAGED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, I KNOW OF THE CONCERN AMONGST
SOME OF OUR COLLEAGUES AT THE FIRMNESS OF OUR MILITARY RESPONSES.
IT IS THEREFORE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT I KEEP OUR COLLEAGUES
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE OLD COMMONWEALTH AND NORWAY
INFORMED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS AND ABOUT OUR LATEST THINKING.

2. MIFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME
TO M CHEYSSON, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN OTHER CAPITALS TO WHICH
THIS TELEGRAM IS ADDRESSED AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION,
WHICH I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DELIVER AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

3. IN VIEW OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TODAY ABOUT
REFERRAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OPPOSITION TO EXTENSION
OF EC SANCTIONS, I HAVE ADDED A FURTHER MESSAGE TO DUBLIN ONLY.

4. SEE MIFT.

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
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5 MAY 1982

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FM FCO 051734Z MAY 82
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 5 MAY
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON



MIPT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT MESSAGE FROM ME TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

BEGINS:

I HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERING THE IDEAS THAT CAME UP
IN OUR CONVERSATION IN NEW YORK ON 2 MAY. I WARMLY
APPRECIATE THE CONCERN YOU HAVE SHOWN TO CONTRIBUTE TO A
DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS. I FOR MY
PART AM ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST COOPERATION WITH YOU.

AS YOU KNOW, THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS ARISEN BECAUSE OF THE RESORT
TO FORCE BY ARGENTINA AT A TIME WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN
PROGRESS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, IN A MANDATORY RESOLUTION, DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE
BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO
ENSURE THAT THAT RESOLUTION IS IMPLEMENTED.

THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR ITS PART ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 502
IMMEDIATELY AFTER ITS ADOPTION AND I REITERATE OUR WILLINGNESS
TO ENTER INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION OF THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM CONCERNING
THE STATUS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AS CALLED FOR BY THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, ONCE ARGENTINA HAS WITHDRAWN. I FURTHER REITERATE OUR
WILLINGNESS TO JOIN IN A CEASEFIRE SO LONG AS THAT IS CLEARLY
LINKED TO PROMPT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND DOES NOT LEAVE ARGENTINA
IN OCCUPATION OF TERRITORIES ILLEGALLY SEIZED IN DEFIANCE
OF THE CHARTER.

I AM URGENTLY STUDYING THE IDEAS THAT CAME UP IN MY DISCUSSION
WITH YOU ON 2 MAY AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND AND ALONGSIDE OTHER
IDEAS THAT HAVE REACHED US FROM, FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVERNMENTS
OF PERU AND THE UNITED STATES. THERE ARE MANY POINTS OF
SIMILARITY BETWEEN YOUR THINKING AND THOSE OTHER IDEAS AND

I AM URGENTLY STUDYING THE IDEAS THAT CAME UP IN MY DISCUSSION WITH YOU ON 2 MAY AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND AND ALONGSIDE OTHER IDEAS THAT HAVE REACHED US FROM, FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVERNMENTS OF PERU AND THE UNITED STATES. THERE ARE MANY POINTS OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN YOUR THINKING AND THOSE OTHER IDEAS AND I AM SURE YOUR IDEAS WILL BE REFLECTED IN ANY SOLUTION WHICH WE MAY BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE. I SHALL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH.

ENDS.

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5 MAY 1982

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
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FM FCO 051734Z

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 350 OF 5 MAY 1982

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON



[Handwritten signature]

YOUR TELS 631-2 AND 648 AND MY TELNO 344: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I WOULD SEE MERIT IN YOUR DELIVERING A MORE SUBSTANTIVE, THOUGH STILL TEMPORISING, REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS IN THE FORM OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MYSELF TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR. A TEXT, BASED ON THE STATEMENT I MADE IN THE HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON IS IN MIFT. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS TEXT AND ALSO ON THE TIMING OF ITS DELIVERY. IT HAD BEEN MY INCLINATION, DESPITE THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE QUOTE DEADLINE UNQUOTE OF 5 MAY, TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE WARNING YOU HAVE GIVEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT A REPLY IS UNLIKELY BEFORE 6 MAY AT THE EARLIEST AND TO HOLD IT FOR DELIVERY THEN OR LATER IN THE LIGHT OF THE INFORMAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL STARTING TONIGHT. BUT SUBJECT TO YOUR FURTHER ADVICE, I THINK IT MIGHT NOW BE BEST, IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES IN THE HOUSE, TO DELIVER IT TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR TODAY. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO DO SO IF YOU AGREE WITH THE TEXT AS IT STANDS.

2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM TELEGRAMS TO WASHINGTON THAT I AM GIVING PRIORITY TO THE PERUVIAN/AMERICAN INITIATIVE. WE SHOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO LOOK TO HIS IDEAS RATHER THAN HAIG'S AND THUS AVOID THE NEED TO TAKE DECISIONS ON THE LATTER. FOR VARIOUS REASONS, INCLUDING THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN NEW YORK, WE HAVE NOT SPELLED OUT THE PRIMACY OF THE PERUVIAN/AMERICAN INITIATIVE IN THE DRAFT MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. BUT IN DELIVERING IT I WOULD WISH YOU TO EMPHASISE TO HIM THAT THAT IS HOW WE SEE MATTERS FOR THE PRESENT. I SHOULD ALSO WISH YOU TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I AM NOT IN ANY WAY TURNING DOWN HIS OWN IDEAS. I DO NOT WISH TO FORECLOSE ANY OPTIONS AND THERE COULD WELL BE A PLACE FOR ACTION BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT A LATER STAGE. MEANWHILE WE SHALL NEED HIS HELP IN MAKING IT CLEAR TO SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS THAT DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING, THAT HIS OWN IDEAS ARE STILL UNDER STUDY AND THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD DO NOTHING THAT MIGHT CUT ACROSS THESE EFFORTS.

3. I ASSUME THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS BRIEFED, AT LEAST IN GENERAL TERMS, ON THE PERUVIAN IDEAS AND HOPE HE WILL UNDERSTAND OUR PREFERENCE FOR OPERATING ON THAT BASIS FOR THE TIME BEING NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH ITS UNIQUE INFLUENCE, IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION BY THAT ROUTE.

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PP SANTIAGO


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PP MONTEVIDEO

-5 MAY

PP BRASILIA

GR 150



CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 051745Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1604 OF 5 MAY

INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO AND BRASILIA.

mt

YOUR TELNO 897

JAMMING OF BBC LATIN AMERICAN SERVICE.

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO USICA AT SENIOR LEVEL (JOCK SHIRLEY), WHO HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN APPROACHED BY THE U S EMBASSY IN LONDON. HIS RESPONSE (AND THAT OF STATE DEPARTMENT, TO WHOM WE ALSO SPOKE) WAS POSITIVE. USICA HAVE RECENTLY STRENGTHENED THE VOICE OF AMERICA (VOA) BUREAU IN LONDON, WHICH NOW HAS TWO CORRESPONDENTS. THEY HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO AND REPORT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS IN LONDON, ESPECIALLY FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. SHIRLEY SAID THAT, AS A RESULT, VOA BROADCASTS TO ARGENTINA ARE NOW CARRYING VIRTUALLY ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION COMING OUT OF LONDON.

2. SHIRLEY ADDED THAT VOA RECEPTION IN ARGENTINA WAS NOT VERY GOOD. USICA WERE THEREFORE TRYING TO BUY TIME ON A BRAZILIAN RADIO STATION, IN ORDER TO GET A STRONGER SIGNAL INTO ARGENTINA. SHIRLEY ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROTECTED, SINCE DISCLOSURE COULD PREJUDICE THE DISCUSSIONS.

ENDERSON

NNNN

SECRET

change
Ops

T 9.6/82

SUBJECT

Text of message from President Reagan to the Prime Minister
via Cabinet Office

7

Dear Margaret,

The decisions I made last Friday were aimed at putting you in the strongest possible position to achieve a peaceful settlement in line with the basic principles and values to which we are both committed. I believe there is now a chance to realise that aim, and that we must seize it before more lives are lost.

Al Haig has sent to Francis Pym new formulations which might provide a basis for a peaceful settlement if recent military developments have instilled a greater sense of realism in Buenos Aires. I am sure that the ideas sent to Al by your Foreign Secretary would not provide such a basis. Equally important, you will see that our suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect.

I urge you to agree to have these ideas proposed by us and Peru as soon as possible, recognizing that it will be difficult to get Peruvian agreement to join us in this initiative and more difficult still to gain Argentine acceptance. This, I am convinced, is now our best hope.

Sincerely, Ron.

5.5.82

GRS 58Z

24 MAY 82

SECRET

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 051200Z

DESKBY LIMA 051600Z

FM WASHINGTON 150415Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1600 OF 5 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, LIMA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

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MY FIRST MIPT : FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER HAIG IS SENDING THROUGH U S EMBASSY IN LONDON :

DEAR FRANCIS:

I APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS MADE TO REACT QUICKLY TO THE SUGGESTION WE MADE. BUT I MUST TELL YOU WITH A CANDOR POSSIBLE ONLY BETWEEN CLOSEST ALLIES THAT THE IDEAS YOU HAVE CONVEYED CAN LEAD TO ONLY ONE OUTCOME: ARGENTINE REJECTION AND THEREFORE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES AFTER THE FORTY-EIGHT-HOUR PERIOD, WITH THE PROSPECTS FOR EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT HAVING BEEN DAMAGED IN THE PROCESS. BEYOND THAT, WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH YOUR PROPOSAL. INDEED, OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT EVEN PRESENTING IT TO THEM WOULD DRIVE PERU TO A MORE PRO-ARGENTINE POSTURE.

TRAGIC AS RECENT EVENTS HAVE BEEN, I BELIEVE WE NOW HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR SHARED PRINCIPLES AND IMPOSSIBLE TO CONSTRUE AS A SUCCESS FOR THE AGGRESSOR. YOUR WILLINGNESS TO OFFER A 48-HOUR PAUSE MAKES THAT OPPORTUNITY ALL THE MORE REAL. WE MAY NOT HAVE ANOTHER SUCH CHANCE BEFORE MANY MORE LIVES HAVE BEEN LOST -- IF THEN.

I AM SENDING YOU A REVISED VERSION OF THE SEVEN POINTS WHICH ATTEMPTS TO TAKE MORE OF YOUR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT. AS NICKO WILL EXPLAIN, IT INCLUDES OUR BEST EFFORT TO MEET YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT A SECURITY GUARANTEE. I WILL NOT DENY THAT IT IS CLOSER TO THE IDEAS WE SENT YOU THAN TO THOSE YOU SENT US. THE MOST IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOUR IDEAS AND OURS IS NOT THAT OURS ABANDON PRINCIPLE AND REWARD AGGRESSION, FOR THEY DO NOT, BUT RATHER THAT OURS HAVE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE PROVIDED THE ARGENTINES ARE NOW OF A MIND TO SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY. WHILE I REMAIN DOUBTFUL THAT

A SECURITY GUARANTEE. I WILL NOT DENY THAT IT IS CLOSER TO THE IDEAS WE SENT YOU THAN TO THOSE YOU SENT US. THE MOST IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOUR IDEAS AND OURS IS NOT THAT OURS ABANDON PRINCIPLE AND REWARD AGGRESSION, FOR THEY DO NOT, BUT RATHER THAT OURS HAVE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE PROVIDED THE ARGENTINES ARE NOW OF A MIND TO SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY. WHILE I REMAIN DOUBTFUL THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT OURS, I AM CERTAIN THEY WILL REJECT YOURS.

IN PARTICULAR:

— THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES DO NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PARITY THAT WAS EMBODIED IN THE PLAN WE DISCUSSED WHEN YOU WERE IN WASHINGTON A WEEK OR SO AGO.

— THE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO QUOTE RESTORED ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE IS BOTH UNNECESSARY AND, IN AND OF ITSELF, ENOUGH TO GUARANTEE REJECTION.

— THE FORMULATION ON SELF-DETERMINATION WOULD BE NO LESS DIFFICULT FOR THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT THAN IT WOULD BE FOR YOU — OR US — TO ACCEPT A FLAT ASSURANCE OF EVENTUAL ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY.

— THE COMMITMENT ONLY TO MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO REACH A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT WOULD BE READ IN BUENOS AIRES AS A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE, EVEN THOUGH I DO NOT DOUBT FOR ONE MINUTE THAT HMG WOULD NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH.

I ALSO ATTACH A PROPOSED TIMETABLE FOR MOVING THIS INITIATIVE FORWARD WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH HICKO.

I HARDLY NEED TO SAY THAT WE HAVE LEFT NO DOUBT ABOUT WHERE WE STAND: THE ARGENTINES COMMITTED AGGRESSION: THEY HAVE BEEN INFLEXIBLE IN NEGOTIATIONS; AND THE U S SUPPORTS THE UK, EXPLICITLY AND CONCRETELY. WE HAVE NEVER CONTEMPLATED ASKING YOU TO AGREE TO ANYTHING THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW, WEAKEN OUR RELATIONSHIP, OR BE SEEN AS LESS THAN A SUCCESS FOR YOUR COUNTRY AND YOUR GOVERNMENT. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I MUST TELL YOU THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE REVISED VERSION I AM SENDING TO YOU, BUT COULD NOT ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH YOUR VERSION.

RECOGNIZING THE BURDEN IT PLACES ON YOU, MAY I ASK THAT YOU GIVE ME AN INDICATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AS TO WHETHER YOU WOULD LIKE US TO PROCEED.

00 LIMA

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GRS 250

SECRET

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 051200Z

DESKBY LIMA 051600Z

FM WASHINGTON 050410Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1599 OF 5 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS) UKMIS NEW YORK, LIMA

MY FIRST IPT: FALKLANDS

1. IF HAIG'S NEW POINTS CAN BE FOUND ACCEPTABLE IN LONDON, THE FOLLOWING IS THE PROCEDURE THAT HAIG HOPES CAN BE FOLLOWED:

(I) THAT LONDON SHOULD REPLY TO THIS EFFECT BY NOON WASHINGTON TIME TOMORROW, WEDNESDAY 5 MAY.

(II) THE U S A WOULD THEN TRANSMIT THE TEXT TO LIMA AND REQUEST THEIR ACCEPTANCE BY NOON WASHINGTON TIME THURSDAY 6 MAY (LIMA WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO CONSULT WITH THE ARGENTINIANS BEFORE GIVING THEIR ACCEPTANCE).

(III) THE U S A AND PERUVIAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD THEN, AT NOON ON 6 MAY, TRANSMIT THE TEXTS TO THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENTS REQUIRING APPROVAL OF THEM WITHIN 48 HOURS.

(IV) THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD IMMEDIATELY SAY THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED THESE PROPOSALS, THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING THEM AND THAT THEY IMMEDIATELY EXPRESSED READINESS TO GIVE ORDERS FOR A CEASEFIRE TO COME INTO EFFECT AT NOON ON FRIDAY 7 MAY, PROVIDED THE ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION AND HAD NOTIFIED WASHINGTON AND LIMA IN DUE TIME OF ITS READINESS TO DO SO.

(V) AT NOON ON 7 MAY THE CEASEFIRE WOULD COME INTO EFFECT ON BOTH SIDES.

(VI) BY NOON ON 8 MAY BOTH PARTIES WOULD HAVE REPLIED ACCEPTING THE PROPOSALS. IF EITHER PARTY FAILED TO DO SO, THE OTHER WOULD BE FREE TO REVERT TO EARLIER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

HENDERSON

SECRET

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 051200Z

DESKBY LIMA 051600Z

FM WASHINGTON 050405Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1598 OF 5 MAY


INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, LIMA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

MIPT : FALKLANDS

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NEW U S A PROPOSALS :

1. AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, CONCURRENT WITH:
2. MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND NON-REINTRODUCTION OF FORCES, ACCORDING TO A SCHEDULE TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE CONTACT GROUP.
3. THE IMMEDIATE INTRODUCTION OF A CONTACT GROUP COMPOSED OF BRAZIL, PERU, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES INTO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON A TEMPORARY BASIS PENDING AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT. THE CONTACT GROUP WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR:
 - (A) VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL;
 - (B) ENSURING THAT NO ACTIONS ARE TAKEN IN THE ISLANDS, BY THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, WHICH WOULD CONTRAVENE THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT; AND
 - (C) ENSURING THAT ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE RESPECTED.
4. BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERING AND CONFLICTING VIEWS REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
5. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS.
6. THE CONTACT GROUP WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REACH A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT PRIOR TO APRIL 30, 1983.

HENDERSON



SECRET 18

SECRET

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PS/NO 10
PS/NO 10
PS/NO 10
MR GARDNER
MR WOOD
MR GARDNER
MR USE
ED/CAMB
ED/DEFD
~~SECRET~~

PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET
PS/S of S DEFENCE
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
PS/SIR M PALLISER)
MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER)
D I O)

FLASH

R.C.

GR 1500
SECRET
DESKBY 051200Z UKMIS NEW YORK
DESKBY 051600Z LIMA
FM WASHINGTON 250400Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1597 OF 5 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND LIMA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)
YOUR TELNO 909: FALKLANDS

1. I HAVE JUST HAD A THREE-HOUR SESSION WITH HAIG ABOUT YOUR MESSAGE AND PROPOSALS. HE CANCELLED A MEETING IN NEW YORK FOR THE PURPOSE, AND FROM WHAT HE SAID AND THE WAY HE SAID IT THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT HIS GREAT ANXIETY.

2. UNDERLYING HAIG'S REACTIONS IS HIS BELIEF THAT THE USA AND THE UK WILL DIMINISH THEMSELVES IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD IF THEY LET FIGHTING CONTINUE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WITH FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE. HE REALISES THAT HMG CANNOT GET EVERYTHING THEY WANT, AND THAT

TEARS CAN BE FOSTERED, BUT HAIG'S VIEW IS THAT WE ARE A STRONGER
POWER AND THE ARGENTINIANS ARE NOT, AND THAT THIS IMPOSES CERTAIN
OBLIGATIONS, AND INDEED PROBLEMS, FOR US IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD.

3. HE THINKS IT IS NOW OR NEVER. WE MUST PUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING
AND, AS I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED, HE BELIEVES THAT IF THE FIGHTING
GOES ON WE WILL INCREASINGLY LOSE THE SOLID WORLD SUPPORT THAT WE
HAVE GOT NOW, APART ALTOGETHER FROM THE TRAGEDY OF CASUALTIES.

4. HAIG DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE OF THE
PERUVIANS BEING PREPARED TO AGREE TO OUR POINTS OR OF BEING READY
TO TRANSMIT THEM TO THE ARGENTINIANS. HE COULD NOT PUT THEM TO THE
PERUVIANS; HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS WHY WE WISH, FOR INSTANCE, TO INSERT
A REFERENCE TO THE RESTORATION OF THE FORMER ADMINISTRATION, TO THE
NEED FOR THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS TO BE RESPECTED, AND AN
EXPRESSION OF OUR DOUBTS ABOUT REACHING A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT BY
30 APRIL 1983. BUT HE INSISTS, ON THE BASIS OF HOURS AND HOURS OF
ARGUMENT WITH THE ARGENTINIANS, THAT THERE IS NO CONCEIVABLE CHANCE
OF GETTING AN AGREEMENT IF WE INSIST ON OUR LANGUAGE.

5. HAIG ATTACHES THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO AN EARLY CEASEFIRE. HE
BELIEVES THAT THIS IS THE FIRST AND OVERWHELMING NEED AND HE FULLY
APPRECIATES YOUR READINESS TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE ON THIS SUBJECT.
BUT A CEASEFIRE WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE FOR US UNLESS IT IS LINKED WITH
SOME PROCEDURE THAT ENSURES ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL; AND IT WILL
NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINIANS UNLESS IT IS LINKED IN SOME
WAY TO A LONGER TERM SOLUTION.

6. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I LEFT HAIG IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE STRENGTH
OF THE FEELING IN LONDON AND OUR CONVICTION IN OUR CAUSE. WE HAD
SEEN NO READINESS ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINIANS TO BE FLEXIBLE. IT
DID NOT THEREFORE SEEM REASONABLE FOR US TO HAVE TO START WHITTILING
AWAY WHAT WE THOUGHT NECESSARY JUST BECAUSE THE PERUVIANS HAD COME
FORWARD WITH A TEXT THAT THEY THOUGHT WAS WEARABLE BY THE ARGENTINI-
IANS. (THOUGH THEY HAVE SAID THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT IT UNDER DURESS)
THE PRIME MINISTER, YOU AND OTHER MINISTERS HAD GIVEN GREAT THOUGHT
TO THIS AND HAD MADE A HIGHLY IMPORTANT PROPOSAL FOR A CEASEFIRE
INITIATIVE.

7. HAIG EXPRESSED FULL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTNESS OF OUR CAUSE
AND OUR GOOD FAITH IN COMING FORWARD WITH THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL.
BUT HE REPEATED TIME AND AGAIN THAT OUR LIST OF POINTS WERE COMPLETELY
UNNEGOTIABLE. THEY WOULD SIMPLY HAVE THE EFFECT, IF WE

...WELL UNNEGOTIABLE, THEY WOULD SIMPLY HAVE THE EFFECT, IF WE STUCK TO THEM, OF ENSURING THAT THE FIGHTING WOULD GO ON, WITH ALL THE UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES.

8. I ASKED HIM WHAT, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE THOUGHT COULD BE DONE AND THIS LED ON TO A PROLONGED ANALYSIS OF TEXTS, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH WAS A NEW SET OF POINTS, AS GIVEN IN MIFT, THAT HE HOPED MET SOME OF OUR REQUIREMENTS, WITHOUT INVOLVING LANGUAGE THAT WOULD BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND BOTH BY PERU AND ARGENTINA.

9. AS REGARDS THE IDEA OF A GUARANTEE, HAIG, AFTER REFERRING TO ADVISERS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, SAID THAT WHAT WE WERE ASKING FOR POSED ALL SORTS OF DIFFICULTIES, THAT EVEN IF THEY WERE SURMOUNTABLE WOULD TAKE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TIME. TO MEET OUR NEEDS AND AVOID THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM, HAIG HAS INCORPORATED LANGUAGE IN THE NEW POINTS THAT HE CONSIDERS A GUARANTEE ON THE PART OF THE USA, AND FOR THAT MATTER OF THE OTHER CONTACT GROUP POWERS, OF THE NON-REINTRODUCTION OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND OF THE OTHER TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. HE MAINTAINS THAT THE SUREST GUARANTEE IS THE USA PRESENCE.

10. WE HAD A LONG WRANGLE ON OUR PROPOSED WORDING ABOUT QUOTE THE RESTORED ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE. HAIG SAID THERE WOULD BE NO POINT WHATEVER IN DISCUSSING ANY AGREEMENT THAT CONTAINED A COMMITMENT THAT THE PREVIOUS BRITISH ADMINISTRATION SHOULD RETURN TO THE ISLANDS. I REFERRED TO OUR CONVICTION THAT AS THE ARGENTINIANS HAD TAKE THE ISLANDS BY FORCE AND USURPED THE BRITISH AUTHORITY, WE HAD EVERY RIGHT, IN SEEKING A RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO, TO ENSURE THAT OUR ADMINISTRATION WAS REINSTATED. HAIG SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY IT WAS NOT GOING TO BE POSSIBLE TO GO BACK TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD PREFER TO COMMIT SUICIDE THAN PUT THEIR SIGNATURE TO A DOCUMENT COMMITTING THEM TO ACCEPT A RESTORATION OF THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION AS IT WAS. AS YOU WILL SEE, THE WORDING HAIG HAS COME UP WITH IS A REFERENCE TO QUOTE THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE. HE ADMITS THAT THIS IS IMPRECISE. BUT HE REGARDS IMPRECISION AS A VIRTUE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BOTH IN THIS PASSAGE OF THE TEXT AND IN SOME OTHERS. HE KNOWS THAT THERE WILL BE WRANGLES IN THE CONTACT GROUP ABOUT THE MEANING OF THIS PASSAGE BUT MEANWHILE WE WILL HAVE ACHIEVED OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVES, WHICH IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINIAN FORCES.

11. I WILL NOT RECOUNT THE PROLONGED ARGUMENT WE HAD ABOUT RESPECT


1. I WILL NOT RECOUNT THE PROLONGED ARGUMENT WE HAD ABOUT POINT 5, ESPECIALLY FOR THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS BECAUSE IT ALWAYS CAME UP AGAINST HAIG'S CONVICTION THAT THIS IS ANOTHER ABSOLUTE STICKING POINT FOR THE ARGENTINIANS, JUST AS IT IS FOR US. THE WORDING THAT HAIG HAS COME UP WITH ON THIS SUBJECT READS, AS YOU WILL SEE, THAT QUOTE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS UNQUOTE.

12. HAIG CONSIDERED THAT THE LANGUAGE OF OUR POINT 6, WHICH LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT BY 30 APRIL 1983, WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE. I SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS THERE WAS A POINT OF SUBSTANCE HERE. WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN IF A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN ARRIVED AT BY THAT DATE? WAS THERE NOT A DANGER THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD SAY THAT IF THAT POINT HAD NOT BEEN COMPILED WITH THEN THE REST OF THE AGREEMENT WAS INVALID? HAIG ARGUED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THEY COULD DO THIS. IN PRACTICE THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD CONTINUE THEIR FUNCTIONS. IN THE END HE CAME FORWARD WITH A NEW PASSAGE WHICH AS YOU WILL SEE, STATES THAT QUOTE THE CONTACT GROUP WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REACH A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT PRIOR TO APRIL 30, 1983 UNQUOTE.

13. HAIG IMPLORES YOU TO HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THIS AND SEE WHETHER YOU CANNOT ACCEPT HIS LATEST PROPOSALS, GIVEN EVERYTHING THAT IS AT STAKE. HE DOES NOT REALLY THINK THAT WE CAN GO ON DRAFTING AND COUNTER-DRAFTING. IF THIS NEW TEXT CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LONDON, HAIG IS THINKING OF A PROCEDURE AS SET OUT IN MY SECOND LFT.

14. PERHAPS I COULD CONCLUDE WITH A FINAL WORD ABOUT THE MOOD HERE. HAIG IS FEARFUL OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLONGATION OF THE FIGHTING, PARTICULARLY IF IT CAN BE REPRESENTED, HOWEVER UNFAIRLY, THAT HMG HAS NOT PURSUED EVERY POSSIBLE CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT. HE FORESEES THAT WE MAY INCREASINGLY COME TO THE USA FOR SUPPORT AND THAT, IF OPINION TURNS TO BELIEVING THAT WE HAVE MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY OF PEACE, IT IS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR THE USA TO STAY IN THE SUPPORTIVE POSITION THEY HAVE NOW ADOPTED. EVEN IF HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROSPECTS OF CONTINUED FIGHTING WERE NOT WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE RISKS FOR US, I DO NOT THINK THAT HE WOULD BELIEVE THAT IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE THE BATTLE TO THE BITTER END.

OO UKMIS NEW YORK



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S E C R E T

FM WASHINGTON 052206Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1615 OF 5 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK LIMA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

MY TELNO 1611 FALKLANDS

1. ENDERS HAS SPOKEN ABOUT THE TIMETABLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASEFIRE.
2. AFTER READING CAREFULLY YOUR MESSAGE TO HAIG OF TODAY'S DATE, HE REALISES THAT, THOUGH WE MAY BE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE OUR READINESS FOR A CEASEFIRE AT THE TIME WE RECEIVE THE US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT IT UNTIL THE ARGENTINIANS HAVE GIVEN SIMILAR CEASEFIRE ORDERS AND HAVE ACCEPTED THE US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS. THIS LEADS THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON, I THINK, TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN TELESCOPING THE LENGTH OF TIME ALLOWED BETWEEN THE TRANSMITTING OF THE PROPOSALS TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE NEED FOR A REPLY. AT PRESENT THIS GAP IS SUGGESTED TO BE 48 HOURS. IF IT WAS REDUCED TO 24 HOURS IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY ENABLE THE CEASEFIRE TO COME INTO OPERATION EARLIER. NOR, INCIDENTALLY, SHOULD IT NECESSARILY BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE ARGENTINIANS TO ACCEPT 24 HOURS RATHER THAN 48 HOURS IN THIS PARTICULAR PART OF THE TIMETABLE BECAUSE THEY WILL ALREADY HAVE BEEN SHOWN THE PROPOSALS BY THE PERUVIANS AT AN EARLIER STAGE AND THE LATTER WILL NOT HAVE PUT THEM FORWARD FORMALLY TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS UNLESS THE ARGENTINIANS WILL HAVE ACCEPTED THEM.
3. I PRESUME THAT 24 HOURS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS WOULD NOT POSE PROBLEMS FOR US. IT STILL LEAVES US A FURTHER 24 HOURS BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE WOULD HAVE TO COME INTO EFFECT.

HENDERSON

SECRET

WASHINGTON 052040Z MAY 82

TO FLASHFCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1611 OF 5 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND LIMA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

YOUR TELNO 917: FALKLANDS

1. I HAVE GIVEN HAIG YOUR MESSAGE. HE ACCEPTS ALL THREE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS.

2. THE US GOVERNMENT WILL NOW TRANSMIT THE AMENDED TEXT TO THE PRESIDENT OF PERU AND ASK HIM TO GIVE HIS ACCEPTANCE BY NOON WASHINGTON TIME THURSDAY 6 MAY. THE AMERICANS ARE ASSUMING THAT IN THE INTERVAL BELAUNDE WILL CONSULT WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. PROVIDED THE PERUVIANS AGREE WITH THE TEXT THE US AND PERUVIAN GOVERNMENTS WILL THEN TRANSMIT IT TO THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENTS AT NOON ON THE 6 MAY.

3. WHAT HAIG HOPES IS THAT WHEN WE RECEIVE IT WE WILL IMMEDIATELY DECLARE OUR READINESS TO HAVE A CEASEFIRE MAKING CLEAR THAT THIS CAN ONLY COME INTO EFFECT IF THE ARGENTINIANS AGREE AND AGREE UPON A TIME FOR IMPLEMENTATION. I TOLD HAIG THAT YOU COULD ACCEPT 24 HOURS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

4. HAIG QUITE ACCEPTS THAT THE ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENT MUST EXPRESS THEIR AGREEMENT IN WRITING TO THE PROPOSALS BUT HE BELIEVES THAT IF HMG IS TO GAIN THE ADVANTAGE OF COMING OUT WITH THE IDEA OF A CEASEFIRE THEY SHOULD DO SO IMMEDIATELY THEY GET THE PROPOSALS. THEY DO NOT SEE ANY DANGER IN THIS IF THE ACTUAL COMING INTO EFFECT OF THE CEASEFIRE HAS TO AWAIT ARGENTINIAN ACCEPTANCE.

HENDERSON

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RESTRICTED

SAPU(82) 15

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper issued at 1700 hours on 5 May 1982 contains a suggested line to take on the sinking of the General Belgrano and international reaction to it.

Cabinet Office

5 May 1982

RESTRICTED

Sinking of the General Belgrano

Much has been made in some quarters of the fact that the General Belgrano was sunk just outside the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ). The TEZ is quite irrelevant in this case. As Mr Nott made clear in the Commons yesterday, the cruiser was attacked because the heavily armed group of warships of which it was part was closing on elements of our Task Force and represented a serious threat to our own ships. It was therefore attacked under the terms of our warning conveyed to the Argentines on 23 April that -

"..... any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response."

In his statement yesterday Mr Nott said that "the threat to the Task Force was such that the Task Force commander could ignore it at his peril." The hostile intent of the Argentine forces has been repeatedly demonstrated by their attacks on our ships over the last few days and the potency of their weapons has now been tragically demonstrated by the loss of the Sheffield. It should be noted that it is believed that the destroyers accompanying the General Belgrano carried Exocet missiles similar to the one which hit the Sheffield. By attacking the capital ship, the Belgrano, our submarine destroyed the command and control of the Argentine force and removed the threat posed by the entire group of warships. There was therefore no need to attack the remaining Argentine ships and the submarine withdrew so that they would have been able to go to the assistance of the damaged cruiser.

International Reaction

It is not at all surprising that some of our friends and allies have expressed concern at the loss of life. So have HMG (Mr Pym expressed "deep regret at Argentine casualties" in the House yesterday). There is no doubt that there remains very widespread support (from the EC, the Commonwealth and many other countries) for our objective of obtaining by political, economic and military pressures, the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 502, that is to say an Argentine withdrawal and thereafter a negotiated settlement. The intransigence is in Buenos Aires not in London.

FALKLANDS: STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 5 MAY

Mr Rt Hon Friend the Defence Secretary has just spoken about military aspects of the situation. I must however add my own tribute to the courage of the crew of HMS Sheffield and of the Harrier pilot and my sympathy to the families.

The military losses which have now occurred on both sides in this unhappy conflict emphasise all the more the urgent need to find a diplomatic solution.

The House will wish to know that since my return from the United States on Monday I have remained in the closest possible touch with Mr Haig.

As I reported to the House yesterday, we are working very actively on ideas put to us by Mr Haig, including some advanced by the President of Peru. Yesterday afternoon, after my statement, I sent a constructive contribution of our own to Mr Haig. He is taking this fully into account. I shall be in touch with him again later on today.

I want to tell the House that a vital ingredient of the ideas on which we are working is an early ceasefire and the prompt withdrawal of Argentine forces. I can assure the House that we are sparing no efforts in the search for an acceptable solution in line with the principles which we have stated on several occasions.

The points which were put to me in New York by the Secretary-General of the United Nations are also receiving our very careful attention. I have been in touch with Sr Perez de Cuellar about this since my return from New York and will continue to keep in close contact with him.

There are many points of similarity between the Secretary-General's thinking and the points we are pursuing with Mr Haig. Indeed, Sr Perez de Cuellar's helpful ideas seem certain to be reflected in the basis of any solution which we may be able to achieve.

I can assure the House that any obstructionism there may be will not come from our side. Although it is we who have been the victims of aggression, it is also we who are working tirelessly and constructively for a peaceful solution.

DRAFT STATEMENT - 5th MAY

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a further statement about the Argentine attack on HMS SHEFFIELD.

In the statement I made to the House late last night I provided an outline of the attack on HMS SHEFFIELD and of the loss of one of our Sea Harriers and its pilot. The pilot was Lieutenant Nicholas Taylor. His next-of-kin have been informed - and the whole House will I know wish to join me in expressing sorrow and deepest sympathy with his family.

It is entirely right that the House should now have as full an account of the attack on HMS SHEFFIELD as I am able to give today. The House will understand why it will be necessary for me to repeat some of the details I provided last night.

At about 3.30 London time yesterday afternoon HMS SHEFFIELD was attacked by Argentine Super Etendard aircraft which launched Exocet missiles. HMS SHEFFIELD was some 70 miles off the Falklands enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone, together with other elements of the Task Force. One missile missed the ship; the other hit her amidships. The resulting explosion caused a major fire. Although attempts were made to extinguish the fire for nearly four hours, with the assistance of fire-fighting teams from other ships in the area, it eventually spread out of control. At about 7 pm London time the order was

given to abandon ship. Ships of the Task Force in the area picked up survivors, and the latest information I have is that about 30 men are still missing. A further number sustained injuries, and they are being well cared for under medical supervision. We have no further details of casualties at the present time. The ships are still engaged on operations and I know that the Force Commander will provide further information just as soon as he is able to do so. All the next-of-kin of the ship's company are being informed. The thoughts of the whole House are with them at this sad time.

5.5.82

Argentina

MR WHITMORE

Telegram from Dublin just received reports Taoiseach statement to the Dail. Answers to supplementaries included:-

"Mr Haughey explained that Ireland would seek the withdrawal of sanctions against Argentina when the EC Foreign Ministers meet on Saturday. However, he made it clear that if the other members of the EC were against the withdrawal of sanctions, Ireland would observe Community solidarity and not abandon sanctions before they expired on 17 May."

Asked whether the Government's position remained that Argentina must comply with the paragraph in SCR 502 calling for withdrawal of her troops in addition to calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and negotiation of a diplomatic settlement under the auspices of the UN, Mr. Haughey replied that that was a fair interpretation.

5.5.82

Over the past 4 weeks since the invasion of the Falkland Islands my colleague the Foreign Secretary has rightly taken the leading role in explaining HMG's policies to the International and National Press.

Argentina
PHB

The manner in which

~~The way~~ he has performed this role is evidence that our overriding aim will always remain a peaceful and lasting settlement for the future of the Falkland Islands. Military pressure is not — and must never be, an end in itself. It will remain merely one part of the search for a peaceful solution.

We must never forget that the Islands are British and are settled by people of British descent — *and they have been invaded by an aggressor who must ^{now} withdraw.*

But there is also a wider purpose in our endeavours. It is to ensure that armed aggression does not pay. ~~If it is seen to be successful in this case it further undermines the stability of a world already fraught by many problems.~~ Let our response as a member of the Western Alliance be an example that the Western democracies will respond to defend those principles which they hold dear.

So
It is our solemn purpose to achieve the military objectives to which, reluctantly, we have been compelled, using the minimum of force and with the least loss of life on both sides, commensurate of course with our overriding duty ^{to} ~~of~~ defending our own ships, aircraft and men.

REMARKS 127

Every action taken by our forces will remain under the strictest political direction and control although decisions on the ground must be made by the Commanders on the spot. Each move that we have made in this affair has been determined by the need to bring home to those ^{who} apparently believing in force that force cannot triumph.

Every so often we must remind ourselves how we got here in the first place. We did not fire the first shot. It was only as the result of the skill of the Royal Marines on the Falkland Islands and in South Georgia faced with armed attack that our men did not suffer serious casualties and loss of life.

Let me ^{then} say then a very few words on recent military events. The past week has been a notably successful one for our forces in the South Atlantic. It has already provided evidence of their skill and the quality of their equipment.

Over a week ago we had warned the Argentines that any approach on the part of their warships or aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of our Forces anywhere in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. We also made it clear that all Argentinian aircraft including civil aircraft and all their merchant vessels or fishing vessels engaging in surveyance of our Forces would be regarded as hostile and would be liable to be dealt with accordingly. If ~~these~~ ^{they} Forces ~~are attacked~~ ^{constitute a threat} the Task Force Commander has the authority - and it is right that he should have the authority - to respond in self defence. I would like to reiterate this warning. We cannot accept any interference with our Forces ~~whatever~~ ^{wherever} they may be. The action against the cruiser, General Belgrano, yesterday evening was fully consistent with our duty to defend our ships and men.

The announcement today of the bringing forward of 5 Brigade's notice ~~to move~~ ^{is another demonstration of} demonstrates our resolve. This is not an escalatory move. It is merely prudent when contemplating operations - of whatever kind - so far from this country to have resources available nearer the area of operations.

The Argentine Government knows that there is one quick and simple way to avoid further casualties to their personnel and loss of their ships and aircraft - it is to keep out of the zones declared by us and to cease threatening and attacking our forces in the South Atlantic. Furthermore there is one quick and simple way to stop the fighting and that is for them to take their garrison of the Falklands in compliance with UN Resolution 502. Then negotiations for a peaceful long term solution can be resumed.

The information given to you here by our spokesman, Ian McDonald, will be based on fact, not on propaganda. The distances involved are very large between here and the operational area. Our forces may be engaged in action so that our initial reports may be less full than we would wish. You have already shown that you are not prepared to act merely as a channel for Argentine propaganda. Freedom of reporting as it is here is not available in Buenos Aires, and brings with it the need for balance, that has always been the hallmark of a free press. Closest to our concern must be the anxiety of the families and friends of those in the Task Force.

I do not pretend that our forces face an easy task. Early success is certainly encouraging. We are confident that our mission will be successful but we will never be over-confident nor will we boast of our success.

in conclusion
Perhaps I can quote the most famous of our naval heroes Admiral Nelson who said ^{that} "magnanimity in victory will be the main aim of the British fleet".

DENNIS HEALEY (SHADOW FOREIGN SECRETARY)

Transcript from BBC Radio 4, Today Programme. 5 May 1982.

INTERVIEWER: BRIAN REDHEAD. Will the loss of HMS Sheffield divide the Commons? 70 Labour MPs have already signed a Motion calling for an immediate cease fire before there is any further loss of life. On the line now is the Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, Mr Dennis Healey. Mr Healey, do those 70 Members represent a growing body of opinion on the Opposition Benches?

HEALEY: I think they represent a very strong and widespread feeling throughout the country, but I think the real effect of the events of the last few days - the sinking of the Argentine cruiser and the Sheffield - is to sober the Commons because I think it is now recognised that the Force Commander is right. If we try to get a solution by military force alone, we have a long and bloody war in which more people will be killed than there are inhabitants on the Falkland Islands themselves. We can't rely on air superiority and we may have to leave some decisions of vital political importance to individual servicemen like, for example, the Commander of the submarine which sank the Argentine cruiser: and in that situation, I think, the British Government would lose, very rapidly, support not only outside Britain but also inside. On the other hand, if we are going to get a solution by negotiation, it's very clear that we may have to make some compromises on this issue which will be unwelcome to both sides in the House of Commons. So I think the emotional atmosphere with which this crisis began is giving way to a much calmer and more careful and rational approach to the problem and I welcome that.

REDHEAD: Before we turn to the diplomatic moves, would it be fair to

say that the lesson of the last 2 days is that the scale of the war is now out of all proportion to the size of the problem?

HEALEY: Well I think it's getting out of proportion. As I said last night, I think that if the war continued to escalate as it has since the weekend, then, even by the end of this week, there might be more people killed than there are living on the Falkland Islands and that is quite inconsistent, I think, with Article 51 of the UN Charter and most people would regard it as not making sense from any point of view.

REDHEAD: Well let us now turn to the diplomacy and first to what Mr Haig has said. Mr John Wallick, one of the leading reporters in the White House, said on this programme at 6.30 that he understood that Mr Haig had put forward the idea of a 48 hour hiatus. Do you think there's any hope in that?

HEALEY: Well I think that's a very sensible suggestion but I myself believe, as I have right through, that the best man to bring this conflict into a negotiating channel is the Secretary General of the United Nations. He's put proposals forward, to which the British and Argentine Governments must reply today, which, as I understand it, include not only a cease fire but also a way of tackling the very difficult problem of getting the Argentine troops off the Islands and my own view is that it would be not to Britain's advantage to agree to a cease fire unless we were clear that we had a negotiating process which would get the Argentines off the Islands and produce a long term settlement which would enable those living on the Islands to enjoy permanent security and I think that the key to this whole situation does now lie with the United Nations, I hope very much that the British Government makes a positive reply immediately to the United Nations Secretary General and does not hide behind the difficulties which the Argentine Government has in coming to a

conclusion which, as you know is what we did

(or the Government did) so far as Mr Hig's suggestions were last week.

REDHEAD: One last thought. Mr Tony Benn said, about half an hour ago on the programme, that he thought that we should transfer sovereignty to the United Nations?

HEALEY: Well that's a possibility which can be considered and I suggested it myself. If you recall, I suggested that the transitional administration between the withdrawal of Argentine troops and a long term settlement, should be given to the United Nations Secretary General - I think even the British Government is now moving in that direction - and that a long term solution might be sought through United Nations trusteeship which is, of course, transferring sovereignty to the United Nations. But, of course, negotiating that and deciding on the details is a matter which would take some time and I believe it's very important that the military cease fire, which I suspect will come by the end of the week, should be associated with a firm programme for a diplomatic settlement. Otherwise, of course, the Argentines will get game and set.

REDHEAD: Mr Healey, thank you very much.

HEALEY: Thank you.

SECRET

~~Home Secretary~~
6

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 5 MAY

US/PERUVIAN PEACE PLAN

1. Revised proposals by Mr Haig for a ceasefire and settlement together with a timetable for implementation and a personal message to the Secretary of State were received at 0630 hours. Haig feared that our expanded version of his proposals of 3 May which were telegraphed to Washington last night would be rejected outright by Argentina and drive Peru into a more pro-Argentine posture. However he thinks his revised proposals stand a reasonable chance of acceptance. If acceptable to us Haig would like a reply by noon Washington time today, ie 5 pm London time.

SECURITY COUNCIL

2. The British Embassy in Dublin rang the FCO last night to say that Mr Haughey had stated in a radio interview that the Irish Government was respecting a request from the UN Secretary General not to press for a Security Council meeting until there was a response to the Secretary General's proposals. (This consisted of ideas put to Mr Pym and to the Argentine Permanent Representative to the UN last weekend).

3. Sir Anthony Parsons is using the need to await a reply to these "ideas" as a pretext for delaying a formal meeting of the Security Council, at which it might be necessary for the UK to veto a seemingly mild resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities. He has told the Secretary General that Mr Pym's reply to his ideas was not likely to reach him before 6 May. This will gain time for the US/Peruvian peace plan to mature.

4. Nevertheless the President of the Security Council has felt it necessary as a result of the earlier Irish request for a formal meeting of the Council to convene informal consultations of the whole Council at 8 pm GMT today. Sir Anthony will try to keep them at this level for the moment.

OAS

5. President Turbay of Colombia is reported to have called for an emergency meeting of the OAS in view of the latest developments.

SINKING OF HMS SHEFFIELD AND THE LOSS OF A SEA HARRIER

/ 6. Attached is the text of a statement made in the House by Mr Nott last night.

SINKING OF THE GENERAL BELGRANO


7. A Chilean vessel and Soviet fishing vessels near to the Falklands have been sent to help with rescue operations. Fresh reports say that some 680 survivors have been picked up so far.

/8.

SECRET

SECRET

8. The MOD have confirmed with us that the Task Force ships will not interfere with rescue operations. (This is not for public consumption).



T H Steggle
Emergency Unit

5 May 1982

SECRET

Emergency Room - This is what we believe Mr Nett to have said this evening. It is not authoritative until confirmed by Hansard.

Speaker
218-747

Speaker,
(a point order Mr Speaker - I would like to make a statement:

In my statement earlier today I said that we must expect further Argentine attacks on our forces. Mr Speaker, I deeply regret now to have to inform the House of such attacks.

In the course of its duties within the Total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands, HMS SHEFFIELD, a Type 42 destroyer, was attacked and hit late this afternoon by an Argentine missile. The ship caught fire, which spread out of control. The order was then given to abandon ship.

There were accompanying vessels in the immediate area which picked up those who abandoned ship nearly all the ships company and the Captain are accounted for. However, I regret to say that initial indications are that 12 men are missing, and there are likely to be other casualties.

Communications with the operational area are difficult at present and this information must be treated as provisional until further reports are received.

Next of kin will of course be informed first, as soon as full details are received.

Further air operations were also conducted over the Falkland Islands today. In the course of Sea Harrier attacks, one of our aircraft was shot down. The pilot has been killed. His name will be announced after we have confirmation that his next of kin have been informed. All the other Sea Harriers returned safely.

The Task Force is continuing with its operations as planned



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone ~~xxxxxxx~~ 233 8224

NEWAD
 HD/Emergency Unit for aft rpdypse
 a HD/MENAD Em Unit
 HD/Defence Dept
 Sir J. Leahy
 PS/POS

(119)

88
6/5

Sir Antony Acland, KCVO, CMG,
 Permanent Under-Secretary of State,
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

4 May 1982.

Dear Antony,

ISRAEL AND FALKLANDS

1. Lord Sieff spoke to me about this at the weekend. He said that his Israeli contacts had told him that there was much concern in Jerusalem about allegations here, and particularly in the British press, that Israel was continuing to supply military equipment to Argentina. He understood that the official Israeli position as conveyed to us was that existing contracts would be fulfilled but that there would be no new supplies of military equipment pending the end of the Falklands crisis. He had also been assured in confidence that, on Mr Begin's instructions, the Israelis were doing all they could by administrative means to hinder supplies of such equipment, even if they were being made in fulfilment of an existing contract. But this was being done in confidence and the Israeli Government were concerned that it should not be publicly known. In short, the message which he had been asked to convey to us was that the Israeli Government were doing and would continue to do everything they could to prevent the supply of military equipment from Israel to the Argentine; and the less that was said about this here in public the easier it would be for them to do it in practice.
2. I thanked him for this information and said that I would ensure that it was passed on to the proper quarter.

Yours as,

Michael Palliser

(Michael Palliser)

Copies: Sir R Armstrong, Cabinet Office.
 Mr Coles, No. 10

3 SHEPHERD'S CLOSE,
LONDON, W1Y 3RT.
629 2569.

Please keep on
one of your
Falklands files.
es. 515

PRIVATE

4th May 1982

cmk

Since the start of the Falklands' crisis I have been in regular touch by telephone with Doctor Cristiano Rattazzi in Buenos Aires. Rattazzi is the son of Signora Susanna Agnelli, an Italian MEP, and is a nephew of Signor Giovanni Agnelli, Chairman of Fiat. His present job is No.2 in Impresit Argentina, Fiat's construction subsidiary. Rattazzi has dual Argentine/Italian nationality, having been born in Argentina, where he has also worked for several years in Fiat, itself an important prop to the Argentine economy. I have known Rattazzi well for 20 years.

He is well-placed socially and politically in Buenos Aires and amongst his friends are:

- Maxi Gaenza Paz, who owns and edits "La Prensa";
- Amalita Forte Bas, widow of an Argentine steel tycoon, who, Susanna Agnelli tells me, is now the mistress of one of the leading Generals.

Rattazzi is aware that I have friends in our Administration, and has on several occasions asked whether I would be prepared to pass on any private message from Buenos Aires. I have always answered that I would be happy to try to pass on anything constructive from them, but that I have nothing to say from this end beyond what I hear on the wireless (which I communicate regularly).

Rattazzi telephoned me at 08.15 hours this morning (Tuesday 4th May) saying that Gaenza saw Costa Mendez "last night" - (possibly the night of 3rd May) - and told him that he might have a private line to London via the Agnelli family, if that was of interest to Costa Mendez. The latter appeared very enthusiastic about the idea saying that he would consult urgently with his masters and come back to Gaenza. As at 08.15 British time today he had not done so.

But I thought I should pass it on.

M.E.M. Pearson

M.E.M. Pearson

~~RESTRICTED~~

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30) (35) (36)

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS EVANS
 MR URE
 MR GILLYCRE
 MR HAYES
 ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
 ED/DEF D
 ED/SETS D
 ED/URD
 ED/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS T60
 RESIDENT CLERK
 HD/ERD
 HD/ESID

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

~~PS NO 10 DOWNING ST~~
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR K COUZENS)
 MR LITTLER)
 MR HAWTHIN)
 MR PERETZ) TREASURY
 MR ILETT)
 MR MCINTYRE)
 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
 DIO CABINET OFFICE
 MR WADD-GERY CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAFT/DIO " "
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

D.O., DOT
BK/England

ADVANCE COPY

RESTRICTED

(FM BERNE 051442Z)

FM BRITISH INTEREST SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELNO 67 OF 4 AMY
 INFO PRIORITY DOT AND BANK OF ENGLAND

ECONOMIC ROUNDUP

1. THE MONTH OF APRIL CLOSED WITH A DRAIN OF US DOLLARS 250 MILLION FROM THE CENTRAL BANK RESERVES AND THE AMOUNT OF PESOS IN CIRCULATION INCREASED BY 16.7 PER CENT OVER THE PREVIOUS WEEK AND 49.2 PER CENT DURING THE LAST 30 DAYS.

2. ON THE LABOUR FRONT VOLKSWAGEN WILL SUSPEND 1,200 WORKERS IN MAY. FROM 9.00 FOR 1-0 DAYS A WEEK. THE GOVERNMENT HAS

IN MAY: FORD, 2,500 FOR TWO DAYS A WEEK. THE GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED THAT NO FURTHER MASS FIRINGS TAKE PLACE DURING THE PRESENT CRISIS. THERE ARE SOME 15,000 UNSOLD VEHICLES IN THE MANUFACTURERS' PARKING AREAS. THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING A 15 PER CENT TAX ON PETROL TO LOWER ITS CONSUMPTION AND INCREASE TAX INTAKE WHICH HAS DROPPED 30 PER CENT DURING THE FIRST 4 MONTHS OF THIS YEAR.

3. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH TALK BUT NO DETAILS OF ECONOMIC MEASURES TO COPE WITH THE WAR SITUATION, BUT SO FAR NO ANNOUNCEMENT OR ACTION HAS RESULTED. BUSTAMANTE, ECONOMIC MINISTRY UNDER SECRETARY HAS ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT 50 PER CENT OF MINISTER ALEMANN'S POLICIES ARE STILL INTACT. PRESSURES FOR SWITCHING TO A DIRIGISTE WAR ECONOMY ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE IF THE CONFLICT LASTS.

JOY 4.5.

LEE

NNNN

SENT AT RECD TA 051531Z TWPM

POINTS PUT TO MR. HAIG ON 4 MAY BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:
2. Mutual withdrawal of forces:
 - (a) Argentine and British forces to begin immediately to withdraw from an area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands and to refrain from introducing any forces into that area.
 - (b) The UK will ensure safe passage for the Argentine garrison to the mainland.
 - (c) All British and Argentine forces to be withdrawn within 7 days from the area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falklands and to remain outside that area.
3. The immediate introduction of a Contact Group composed of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement, the Group's tasks being:
 - (a) to verify the withdrawal;
 - (b) to ensure that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the restored administration or otherwise, which would contravene this interim agreement.
4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.
5. The two governments agree that the views of the Islanders must be determined, and that their interests and wishes must be respected in the definitive settlement of the status of the Islands.
6. The two governments will make every possible effort in good faith to reach a definitive agreement prior to 30 April 1983. The countries represented in the contact group will give every assistance in this.

Mr Coles



CABINET OFFICE

A.J.C. ¹⁰/₅
h.~.

With the compliments of

Sir Michael Palliser
(Room 302, Cabinet Office)

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone 01 233

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

cc Sir Antony Acland.
Mr Coles (No. 10)

THE FALKLANDS: FRENCH ATTITUDE

1. As you know, the Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, M. Francis Guttman, paid a brief visit to London today, at French request, and discussed the Falklands question with Sir A. Acland and myself. He was accompanied by the French Ambassador. The French were at pains to make it clear that this was a semi-private and unofficial visit designed to exchange views without commitment and informally to bring the French up to date on our thinking. We had about three quarters of an hour together in the office and then a further hour and a quarter over lunch before M. Guttman returned to Paris.

2. M. Guttman began with a very firm restatement of the French position. From the outset of the crisis the French Government had expressed their full support for Britain, for two main reasons: first, they thought it right to support a close friend and ally at a time of crisis, irrespective of whatever transient differences there might be between us in other matters; secondly, because they thought that Britain was making a stand on behalf of all democratic countries in defence of certain crucial principles. It was essential for Western democracies to make it clear that they would not tolerate acts of force of the type committed by Argentina and that if necessary acts of this kind would be met with force. M. Guttman said that that remained the position of the French Government and he did not wish us to interpret his visit to London as weakening in the slightest that French commitment. The French would continue to support us.

3. The Secretary General reverted to this position of principle on a number of occasions throughout our discussion. But for the rest he was concerned to put across two main points. First, that it was critical to continuing European support of our policy that we should make it clear that we were not concerned solely with a military solution, but that we remained ready to negotiate a long-term political settlement; and secondly, that public opinion in France and elsewhere was becoming anxious that in order to achieve our legitimate military objectives we might be indulging in a disproportionate use of force. He said several times that this was at present, he believed, an even more difficult

problem for governmental and public opinion in Italy and Germany than in France. But even in France there was a marked difference, for example, in the tone of comment in the French media today (after the sinking of the Argentine cruiser with the reported potential loss of many lives) than it had been yesterday and previously when the balance of the French press was substantially in our favour.

4. M. Guttman said that he and many others in responsible positions in the French Government understood perfectly well that once we had resolved to deploy and, if necessary, use armed force it was not possible to impose excessive constraints upon our forces in respect of the way they used it. But public opinion took a more subjective view. He thought it would understand if military action were seen to be specifically directed at the Falkland Islands, and the enforcement of a blockade of those Islands and, if need be, at their eventual recapture: but would tend to question military action that seemed to be less related to those specific objectives, particularly if that military action entailed substantial loss of life. This did not mean that there was any risk of the French Government ceasing to support Britain. But if the British Government was to continue to carry French opinion (and even more so in eg Germany, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, etc.) it was desirable not only that Britain should be seen to be using the minimum level of force required but also that we should repeat continuously our readiness to accompany military force with a willingness to negotiate. Sir A. Acland and I explained to him at some length the Government's view that the first requirement was for an Argentine withdrawal; and that there could be no question of us accepting before or during negotiation the Argentine view that sovereignty was not a matter for negotiation; with the implication that the right to self-determination was being refused to the Islanders. We said that no one in the British Government wanted to go to war with the Argentine and none would be better pleased than we if the Argentines would agree to withdraw their troops and then seek a discussion with us not subject to pre-conditions over sovereignty. Unfortunately, every effort so far, whether by Mr Haig or eg by the Peruvians, to bring this about had foundered on Argentine refusal to abandon their position over sovereignty.


5. M. Guttman said that he was not contesting any of that. The French supported the deployment of the task force, recognised that we could not keep troops cooped up for weeks in warships in the South Atlantic in winter and accepted that within a short while we might have to try to recapture the Islands.

All of this he thought would be understood in France, where there was much admiration for British resolution. But we should not under-estimate the problems that this presented for a number of our friends, even more than for France, and it was important that Argentine intransigence should not, however unfairly, seem to be matched by an appearance of British bellicosity. There was a tendency for public opinion in France and elsewhere to suggest that the British were not too sorry to be making an example of an inferior military power. It would be tragic if we allowed the support that our conduct hitherto had so deservedly gained for us to be whittled away by giving the impression that our only concern was to evict Argentina from the Falklands, by military force if necessary, and thereafter to stand pat politically. He implied, without ever saying so specifically, that our right to sovereignty was less generally accepted than our right to stand up for the islanders and to resist military attack on them. And he said that one of the arguments used by the Argentines which had a certain impact on world opinion was that they had been trying to negotiate with us for seventeen years and had made no progress whatever. He added that virtually no one regarded this as justifying the Argentine military action against the Falklands. But it was held to underline the need for Britain to express readiness, once the Argentines had withdrawn, to negotiate seriously about the future of the islands.

6. We reminded him of repeated statements by British Ministers to the effect that, as required by Security Council Resolution 502, we were prepared to negotiate a political settlement, once the Argentines had withdrawn; and we said that there was no bellicosity in Britain; only a determination to see that the aggressor did not in any settlement simply reap the fruits of his aggression. M. Guttman said that there was no argument about that in France. But he thought we needed to make it even clearer than we had already that we were prepared in due course for a serious negotiation, without pre-conditions, about the future of the Falklands. He realised that time was getting short; the sooner that we could focus international opinion on our readiness to negotiate as well as on our military resolution, the better.

7. We said that we were confident that Ministers would continue to do this and that we would make sure that he received rapidly the text of the statements and Answers to Questions in Parliament today. We also agreed that it was particularly desirable at this time that there should be no indication whatever

to the Argentines of any weakening in European Community support for our position; and we agreed on the instructions to that effect that we would try to have sent today to the British and French Political Directors' meeting in Brussels. We also agreed on the importance of the meeting of European Community Foreign Ministers this coming weekend and on the desirability of as firm a statement as possible emerging from that in support of British policy. M. Guttman repeated the continuing support of the French Government, but his anxiety lest support in certain other Community countries might be weakening; and expressed the hope that we could continue to keep in touch informally with the French over the next few weeks. He did not press us at any stage hard about possible action by the United Nations and seemed to accept our arguments about the relative difficulty of using the UN at this stage. But he displayed some scepticism about the extent to which Mr Haig was really an effective mediator and about the possibility of continuing to operate through the United States. (But this is perhaps a fairly normal French reaction.) We said that we would, of course, be ready for any fresh contacts that they would like to have in future and that it was desirable for us to work as closely together as we could.



(Michael Palliser)

4 May 1982.

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

To note

A & C. 5/5

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

01-233 3000

ms
4 May 1982

B.J.P. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Newman,

FALKLAND ISLANDS : US MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA

with Arc?

Thank you for your letter earlier today enclosing a copy of a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan. As I have already told Francis Richards, the Chancellor is entirely content with the terms of this draft.

The point which he had in mind, in raising the matter in Cabinet today, relates to pressure for US action in the banking field. He is not convinced that it would be right, for us to urge the United States to take action to freeze Argentine assets, parallel with the action we have taken. It might well be tempting to argue that such action would isolate Argentina completely in the financial world, but she is already pretty severely isolated and the considerable risk might arise that further action of this kind by the United States could do more damage to the international banking community generally than the extra damage to Argentina would be worth. It is against this background that, in implementing our own freeze on Argentine assets here, we have deliberately and carefully tried to minimise the direct damage to banking operations in other countries.

There would not be the same objection against urging the US Administration to prevent new loans being offered to Argentina, but there are other reasons why it seems hardly worth pursuing this at present: banks themselves are in common prudence unwilling to extend their exposure to Argentina, and the US Administration might be expected to take the view that it was unnecessary for them to embark on the awkward process of legislating to control their banking system in this respect.

/I understand

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



I understand that officials of our two Departments are in touch about these issues, and that they are largely in agreement. And your draft message today of course contained nothing relevant to the Chancellor's concern.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Scholar at No.10 and to David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

J. O. Kerr

J. O. KERR

25 MAY 1982



CR (202)

202

M

4 MAY 1982



RESTRICTED

FM BOGOTA 042230Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 102 OF 4 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NEW YORK

FALKLANDS/OAS

1. PRESIDENT TURBAY IS REPORTED TO HAVE CALLED FOR AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE OAS IN VIEW OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. HE IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE SENT A MESSAGE TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL ENCOURAGING HIM TO CONTINUE HIS SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS QUOTE ABSURD CONFLICT UNQUOTE. TURBAY DEPLORED LOSS OF INNOCENT LIVES.

MACDONALD

NNNN

GR 440

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 050730Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050044Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 652 OF 4 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MADRID, DUBLIN, MOSCOW, WARSAW, ACCRA, KINSHASA, KAMPALA, AMMAN, TOKYO, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, PEKING.

MY TELNO 642: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO MOBILISE THE SECURITY COUNCIL (MY TELS NO 645 AND 647, NOT TO ALL) HAS CAUSED SOME CONSTERNATION HERE. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEW I HAVE PUT FORECFULLY AND REPEATEDLY TO DORR (IRELAND) THAT PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL WOULD BE SO ACRIMONIOUS THAT THEY WOULD EFFECTIVELY KILL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE. IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS VIEW, I HAVE STRESSED THAT I AM NOT TRYING TO BLOCK A MEETING BUT RATHER SUGGESTING THAT ITS TIMING SHOULD BE VERY CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT IT WILL NOT CUT ACROSS THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, OR OTHERS. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HIMSELF HOLDS THIS VIEW STRONGLY AND HAS WORKED HARD DURING THE DAY ON DORR AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. EVEN TROYANOVSKY (USSR) TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT THE RUSSIANS FAVOURED A MEETING "PROVIDED IT DOES NOT UNDERMINE YOUR EFFORTS". BUT, AS I FEARED, LING QING HAS FELT OBLIGED TO RESPOND TO THE IRISH REQUEST (WHICH WAS FORMALLY CONVEYED TO HIM IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON) AND HAS CONVENED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AT 2000Z TOMORROW (5 MAY).
2. IN CONVERSATIONS THIS EVENING WITH DORR, OTUNNU (UGANDA) AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL I HAVE SUGGESTED THAT, NOW THAT SECURITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED, THE BEST WAY OF MINIMISING THE DAMAGE WOULD BE FOR THE COUNCIL TO CONTINUE TO MEET INFORMALLY (IE IN PRIVATE), HEARING REPORTS FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ABOUT HOW HIS INITIATIVE IS FARING AND

- 4 MAY 1982

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DISCUSSING IN A GENERAL WAY WHETHER THERE IS ANY USEFUL ACTION THE COUNCIL COULD TAKE. THERE ARE PLENTY OF RECENT PRECEDENTS FOR THIS, EG OVER THE US HOSTAGES IN IRAN, THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR AND, AT VARIOUS TIMES, NAMIBIA. ALL THREE OF MY INTERLOCUTORS THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA. I SHALL TRY TO MUSTER FURTHER SUPPORT FOR IT BEFORE THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TOMORROW. AS LONG AS THE COUNCIL DOES NOT MEET IN PUBLIC AND FORMAL SESSION, THERE CAN BE NO VOTE ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION AND THUS NO UK VETO; NOR CAN THE COUNCIL DO ANYTHING ELSE WHICH WOULD CUT ACROSS OTHER INITIATIVES.

3. MEANWHILE, I HAVE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 344 (NOT TO ALL), TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT YOU ARE CONSIDERING ALL THE IDEAS WHICH YOU AND HE DISCUSSED ON 2 MAY AND THAT YOU HOPE TO GET COMMENTS TO HIM SHORTLY. WHEN HE ASKED HOW HE SHOULD INTERPRET "SHORTLY", I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK THAT YOUR COMMENTS WERE LIKELY TO REACH HIM BEFORE 6 MAY AT THE EARLIEST. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED "ENCOURAGING NOISES" FROM ROCA (ARGENTINA).

4. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

PARSONS

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-4 MAY 1982

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
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 653 OF 4 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

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MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. NOW THAT THE IRISH HAVE REACTIVATED THE SECURITY COUNCIL (I DO NOT THINK, INCIDENTALLY, THAT ANYONE ELSE WOULD HAVE DONE SO IF THEY HAD NOT), MY OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO DELAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE A FORMAL AND PUBLIC MEETING. I THINK THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT I WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP THE COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS FOR A FEW MORE DAYS, UNLESS THERE IS ANOTHER MAJOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. THE PRECEDENT OF THE US HOSTAGES AND THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR IS A VALID ONE AND THERE IS A GENERAL DESIRE NOT TO CUT ACROSS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS. I HAVE BEEN WORKING ON VARIOUS COUNCIL MEMBERS ON THESE LINES THIS AFTERNOON, WITH SEEMINGLY GOOD RESULTS.

2. MY INSISTENCE ON THE LATTER POINT - NOT CUTTING ACROSS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS - WILL OF COURSE BE ONLY A PRETEXT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT: AND GIVEN THE INVOLVEMENT OF RAFAE AHMED, IT IS PROBABLY DESIRABLE TO KEEP THE UNITED NATIONS OUT OF THE GAME, AT THIS STAGE AT ANY RATE. MY REAL PURPOSE IN DELAYING A FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING WILL BE TO GAIN TIME FOR THE HAIG/BELAUNDE PROPOSALS TO MATURE AND, OF COURSE, TO PUT OFF AS LONG AS POSSIBLE A POSSIBLE UK VETO OF A SEEMINGLY MILD RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. SUCH A VETO WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE OUR POSITION HERE AND TRANSFER THE DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGE TO THE ARGENTINES.


3. ONCE IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT FORMAL AND PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS OF THE COUNCIL ARE INEVITABLE, WE SHALL NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO SPIN THINGS OUT (EG BY ASSEMBLING (AND PROVOKING) THE LONGEST POSSIBLE SPEAKERS LIST) OR TO GO FOR A SHORT SHARP DEBATE IN ORDER TO GET OUR VETO OVER WITH AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IF AND WHEN THE TIME COMES, I SHALL RECOMMEND ON THIS IN THE LIGHT OF THE THEN STATE OF HOSTILITIES AND OF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES.

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-4 MAY 1982

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FM LIMA 042100Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 145 OF 4 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME TO CALL AT 1230 WHEN HE COMMUNICATED TO ME A FORMAL NOTE ADDRESSED TO ME ABOUT THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO. TRANSLATION OF TEXT IN MIFT.
2. IN THE ENSUING CONVERSATION DR ARIAS SAID HE WISHED ME TO BE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE PROFOUND SHOCK AND CONSTERNATION FELT BY THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT ON LEARNING OF THE ATTACK ON THE CRUISER AFTER PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD ANNOUNCED HIS PEACE INITIATIVE. DR ARIAS SAID THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD TOLD HIM ON THE TELEPHONE THAT THE 7 POINT PLAN WAS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE MILITARY JUNTA IN BUENOS AIRES WHEN THE NEWS OF THE ATTACK BROUGHT ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION AND THE MEETING TO A CONCLUSION. DR ARIAS WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDED THE SITUATION AS BEING ONE OF THE UTMOST GRAVITY AND THAT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS WOULD HAVE FAR REACHING EFFECTS NOT ONLY ON BRITISH RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA BUT FOR THE OAS AND THE AMERICAS AS A WHOLE. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE IRISH INITIATIVE REPORTED THIS MORNING AND SAID THAT A BRITISH VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES.

3. DR ARIAS SAID THAT PERU WAS DISPOSED TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT BRING HOSTILITIES TO AN END AND HE WAS PREPARED TO QUOTE PUT SUCH PRESSURE AS THEY COULD UNQUOTE ON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN ANY AREAS WHICH WE MIGHT THINK OFFERED THE PROSPECT OF A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. IN THIS CONTEXT, DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE PERUVIANS WOULD WELCOME DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IF WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD HELP. THE PERUVIAN OBJECTIVES WERE TO AVOID RENEWED HOSTILITIES AND LOSS OF LIFE. THEY WERE ALSO ANXIOUS TO AVOID FANNING THE FLAMES IN ANY WAY. TO THIS END DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION IN LONDON HAD ASKED THE PERUVIAN EMBASSY FOR A COPY OF THE PERUVIAN 7 POINT PLAN BUT THAT THE PERUVIAN CHARGE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT REPEAT NOT TO PASS IT ON.

4. DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS REFERRED TO IN MY TELNO 144 HAD LEFT HIM WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE 7 POINT FORMULA COULD STILL FORM THE BASIS OF A SETTLEMENT WHICH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY JUNTA MIGHT ACCEPT. (THIS HAD ALSO BEEN SUGGESTED TO ME BY MY US COLLEAGUE IN MY EARLIER CONVERSATION THIS MORNING).

5. DR ARIAS ALSO TOLD ME THAT A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION IN SUPPORT OF ARGENTINA HAD BEEN ORGANISED BY ALL THE UNITED LEFT PARTIES FOR THE END OF THIS WEEK AND THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE POPULAR MOOD, HE HAD DECIDED, AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GOVERNING ACCION POPULAR PARTY TO RECOMMEND AP REPRESENTATION IN THIS DEMONSTRATION.

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10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T95A/82

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 May, 1982.

Dear Prime Minister,

I send you my warm personal thanks for the strong support lent to Britain by Barbados on the question of the Falkland Islands dispute.

The dangers of allowing acts of aggression, such as we have seen in the Falklands, are clear, not least to the island states of the Eastern Caribbean. The firm stand of Barbados in support of freedom and the right of self-determination is a great encouragement.

Recent events have once again proved the underlying strength of the friendships which bind together the Commonwealth.

Yours sincerely

Raymond DeLia

The Honourable J.M.G.M. Adams, M.P.

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10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 95 B/82

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 May, 1982.

Dear Prime Minister,

It was very thoughtful of you to ring on 21 April.

In times of trouble the links of friendship which bind the Commonwealth are particularly visible. The staunch support of our Commonwealth friends has been especially welcome in the last few weeks.

But I am particularly grateful to you for your help in securing the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 502 as well as for your kind offer of further assistance as necessary. I know that you see very clearly why it is that Argentine aggression has to be resisted and it was good to receive your encouragement the other day.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Commander L.F.S. Burnham, O.E., S.C.

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10 DOWNING STREET

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T95c/82

THE PRIME MINISTER

4 May, 1982.

Your Excellency,

I am deeply grateful for your prompt and helpful response to my recent message seeking Kenya's support for the condemnation of the Argentine Government's invasion of the Falkland Islands; and for the constructive remarks made on this subject by your country's representative during the recent United Nations General Assembly session on Palestine. It is extremely heartening to know that at this difficult time we are able to count on such strong support from an old and staunch friend.

With my best wishes,

Warm personal regards.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency The Honourable Daniel Arap Moi, CGH, EBS, MP.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 96/82

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON
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S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH02767

DEAR MARGARET:

THE DECISIONS I MADE LAST FRIDAY WERE AIMED AT PUTTING YOU IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE POSITION TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN LINE WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND VALUES TO WHICH WE ARE BOTH COMMITTED. I BELIEVE THERE IS NOW A CHANCE TO REALIZE THAT AIM, AND THAT WE MUST SEIZE IT BEFORE MORE LIVES ARE LOST.

AL HAIG HAS SENT TO FRANCIS PYM NEW FORMULATIONS WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IF RECENT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS HAVE INSTILLED A GREATER SENSE OF REALISM IN BUENOS AIRES. I AM SURE THAT THE IDEAS SENT TO AL BY YOUR FOREIGN SECRETARY WOULD NOT PROVIDE SUCH A BASIS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, YOU WILL SEE THAT OUR SUGGESTIONS ARE FAITHFUL TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WE MUST PROTECT.

I URGE YOU TO AGREE TO HAVE THESE IDEAS PROPOSED BY US AND PERU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, RECOGNIZING THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO GET PERUVIAN AGREEMENT TO JOIN US IN THIS INITIATIVE AND MORE DIFFICULT STILL TO GAIN ARGENTINE ACCEPTANCE. THIS, I AM CONVINCED, IS NOW OUR BEST HOPE.

SINCERELY,
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FM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

DEAR RON,

FRANCIS PYM HAS TOLD ME ABOUT THE VERY USEFUL TALKS HE HAD WITH AL HAIG ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON SUNDAY. WE ARE ALL TREMENDOUSLY HEARTENED BY THE WAY YOU HAVE COME OUT IN OUR SUPPORT.

AS I SEE IT, THE MAIN LINES OF OUR STRATEGY REMAIN FULLY APPROPRIATE IN THIS NEW STAGE OF THE CRISIS. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BUILD UP THE DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA TO PUT AN END TO ITS UNLAWFUL MILITARY OCCUPATION AND, THEREAFTER, TO NEGOTIATE WITH US IN GOOD FAITH ABOUT THE LONG TERM FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS.

ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH ACCORDS WITH THE PRINCIPLES WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE DEFENDED FOR SO LONG. WE ARE LOOKING URGENTLY TODAY AT AL HAIG'S LATEST IDEAS.

IN THE MILITARY FIELD, LET ME EMPHASISE HOW MUCH WE APPRECIATE YOUR GENEROUS OFFER OF MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR OUR FORCES. THIS WILL BE OF THE GREATEST VALUE TO US, AND OUR PEOPLE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOURS TO FOLLOW UP IN DETAIL FRANCIS PYM'S MORE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH AL HAIG AND CAP WEINBERGER.

I AM SURE THAT, WITHOUT EFFECTIVE MILITARY PRESSURE, THE ARGENTINE LEADERS WILL NOT BE BROUGHT TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. BUT, WITH SO MANY YOUNG LIVES AT RISK - BRITISH AND ARGENTINE - I FEEL THAT WE MUST MAKE A SUPREME EFFORT TO PREVENT A MAJOR MILITARY CLASH. THAT IS WHY I ATTACH SO MUCH IMPORTANCE ALSO TO THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE WHICH WE AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES ARE BRINGING TO BEAR.

THE MEASURES YOU HAVE ANNOUNCED, SUSPENDING SUPPLIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DENYING NEW EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES, WILL SHOW THE ARGENTINES THAT YOU ARE IN EARNEST. I HOPE THAT THE MEASURES ON MILITARY SUPPLIES WILL ENABLE YOUR PEOPLE TO PREVENT THE EXPORT OF ANY EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. I WOULD LIKE TO URGE YOU ALSO TO GO FURTHER AND TO IMPOSE A COMPLETE BAN ON IMPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES FROM ARGENTINA.

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN THE PRESSURES ON ARGENTINA TO AGREE TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. YOUR OWN ACTION WOULD NOT ONLY BE OF GREAT VALUE IN ITSELF, BUT WOULD ENCOURAGE OUR COMMUNITY AND COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS TO MAINTAIN THEIR OWN BANS AND INDUCE OTHERS - IN PARTICULAR THE JAPANESE - TO FOLLOW SUIT. WHATEVER THE DIFFICULTIES, I FEEL SURE THAT IT IS IN OUR ECONOMIC AS WELL AS OUR POLITICAL INTERESTS TO RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE= AND THE EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S MEASURES AGAINST IMPORTS WILL HAVE MORE IMPACT THAN A MORE GRADUAL BUILDING UP OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE. FRANCIS PYM WILL BE SEEING HIS EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES OVER THIS WEEKEND, AND IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP TO US IF HE COULD TELL THEM THAT THIS IS A STEP WHICH YOU INTEND TO TAKE.

FINALLY, LET ME THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR SPLENDID SUPPORT. IT WILL MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS
MARGARET

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Dispatched at 042201.

4 May 1982

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MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Ron,

Francis Pym has told me about the very useful talks he had with Al Haig about the Falkland Islands during his visit to Washington on Sunday. We are all tremendously heartened by the way you have come out in our support.

As I see it, the main lines of our strategy remain fully appropriate in this new stage of the crisis. We should continue to build up the diplomatic, military and economic pressure on Argentina to put an end to its unlawful military occupation and, thereafter, to negotiate with us in good faith about the long term future of the Islands.

On the diplomatic front, I can assure you that we remain committed to the search for a negotiated solution which accords with the principles which our two countries have defended for so long. We are looking urgently today at Al Haig's latest ideas.

In the military field, let me emphasise how much we appreciate your generous offer of material support for

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our forces. This will be of the greatest value to us, and our people will be in touch with yours to follow up in detail Francis Pym's more general discussions with Al Haig and Cap Weinberger.

I am sure that, without effective military pressure, the Argentine leaders will not be brought to implement Security Council Resolution 502. But, with so many young lives at risk - British and Argentine - I feel that we must make a supreme effort to prevent a major military clash. That is why I attach so much importance also to the economic pressure which we and other friendly countries are bringing to bear.

The measures you have announced, suspending supplies of military equipment and denying new export credit guarantees, will show the Argentines that you are in earnest. I hope that the measures on military supplies will enable your people to prevent the export of any equipment which might be used for military purposes. I would like to urge you also to go further and to impose a complete ban on imports to the United States from Argentina.

I have no doubt that this would greatly strengthen the pressures on Argentina to agree to a peaceful solution. Your own action would not only be of great value in itself, but would encourage our Community and

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Commonwealth partners to maintain their own bans and induce others - in particular the Japanese - to follow suit. Whatever the difficulties, I feel sure that it is in our economic as well as our political interests to resolve this conflict as quickly as possible; and the early announcement of US measures against imports will have more impact than a more gradual building up of economic pressure. Francis Pym will be seeing his European colleagues over this weekend, and it would be a great help to us if he could tell them that this is a step which you intend to take.

Finally, let me thank you once again for your splendid support. It will make all the difference.

With warmest regards

Harriet

ms.

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

4 May 1982

A. J. C. 4/5.
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Dear John,

Mr Pym's Statement in Parliament

I enclose a copy of the statement which Mr Pym proposes to make in the Commons this afternoon. He has seen it and approved its general terms, but it may be amended further before delivery. I am copying this to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY IN

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

4 MAY

Since we debated the Falklands crisis last Thursday, there have been some notable military achievements. My Right Honourable Friend will report on these in a few minutes.

Meanwhile, I wish to pay tribute to the efficiency and courage of our forces. Our relief that British lives have not been lost is inevitably tempered by our deep regret at Argentine casualties. I know the whole House would wish to be associated with these sentiments.

These military achievements have been in support of our overall strategy; they have not been and will not become a substitute for it. As the House knows, we are maintaining the maximum pressure on Argentina in the diplomatic, economic and military fields with the objective of securing Argentine withdrawal at the earliest possible moment in compliance with the mandatory resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

The military pressure we have exercised has been challenged despite our clear warnings and our desire to use the minimum force. Our response in the circumstances was as inevitable as it was right. But I can assure the House that what we are seeking is not the military humiliation of Argentina but a victory for the rule of law in international affairs.

Since the House last met, I have visited Washington and New York to reinforce our diplomatic efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement as soon as possible. I had extensive talks with Secretary Haig. These covered the diplomatic, economic and military dimensions of the crisis.

On the diplomatic side, Mr Haig made it clear that, just as we have not abandoned our diplomatic endeavours following Argentina's rejection of the earlier American proposals, nor has he. We discussed a range of ideas for a settlement. We are continuing our work with all urgency.

As the House will be aware, other governments have also been active in promoting a settlement. We welcome this and are in close touch with them.

We are therefore working actively on various ideas, including those put forward by the President of Peru. I can assure the House that we are losing no time in developing our thoughts about them and communicating our own constructive views to those concerned. The framework for a settlement remains as I have outlined it to the House.

Proposals are needed which cover the essential elements of Resolution 502, withdrawal and negotiations on the future, unprejudiced in any way. They must also address the interim arrangements and guarantees required.

On the economic front, Mr Haig described the measures which the United States have recently announced. They are a tangible sign of American support for our cause. I know that the Americans have not closed their mind to additional steps.

On the military front, Mr Haig and Mr Weinberger confirmed that they are ready to provide material support for our forces. I welcomed this. We shall be following it up through the usual channels.

In New York I discussed diplomatic possibilities with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with the President of the Security Council. I made it clear to them that our immediate concern is the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502; and that we are open to any ideas which would achieve this on a satisfactory basis, namely an Argentine withdrawal followed by negotiations on the longer-term solution without prejudice to basic principles.

We were able to consider together the various possible ways of involving the United Nations. We recognised that a solution will require not only the right ideas but the right timing and the right sequence of events. I know that the Secretary-General is in touch with the Argentine Government. The burden of compliance with what has already been decided of course rests squarely with them.

It must not be forgotten that we remain the victims of a totally unprovoked act of aggression in defiance of the UN Charter.

We are seeking to ensure that Argentina does not profit from aggression and to uphold the rule of law in international affairs. This is an interest which all members of the United Nations must share.

Our resolve should not be doubted. Neither should our readiness to talk and our will for peace.

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Mr Wright

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 PS/PUS
 Sir Ian Sinclair
 Mr Gillmore
 Mr Giffard
 ✓ Mr Fearn

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE : 4 MAY

The following main points of interest arose during this morning's meeting, which you attended.

Intelligence Report

DCDSI noted Argentine claims that the BELGRANO had been sunk after being located with the help of US satellite information. On the military threat from Venezuela he said that the Venezuelan Navy was assessed to be in poor shape with many of its ships undergoing repair; the capability of the airforce was also doubtful. Venezuela, in his opinion, could not challenge our lines of communication effectively.

2. DCDSI said that the Argentine aircraft carrier group was ~~in the~~ in-shore of area Oscar, within 50 fathoms and enjoying close air cover from the mainland. The Argentine commander had apparently questioned his orders to move forward and launch air attacks and had pulled back for reasons of weather and military prudence. The frigate group north of Puerto Deseado had also drawn in closer to the coast. As for the BELGRANO group, there had been no report of destroyer activity since yesterday morning. -

3. DCDSI quoted the Argentine figures that 128 survivors had been picked up from the BELGRANO crew of 1,042, but said that the manning figures for BELGRANO were uncertain and could vary between 700 and 1,200. In answer to questions from Mr Blaker, it was stated that the attack on BELGRANO had occurred at 1856Z (this is even earlier than the hour quoted in my minute to Mr Gillmore of 4 May, and strengthens the point made there about the very rapid communication with the SSN). Search operations had apparently been delayed until five hours later by which time darkness had fallen: no doubt the explanation was that the destroyers had been engaging in ASW operations, given that the BELGRANO had not sunk immediately. The two Argentine 209 submarines were still at large, whereabouts unknown. Neptune maritime patrol aircraft had subsequently carried out ASW flights over the area, armed with torpedoes.

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4. In answer to your question, no-one present could state whether the BELGRANO had in fact entered the TEZ before the attack, but at the time she was hit she was heading West at 280°. CNS said that the fleet commander had given an explicit instruction that the Argentine destroyers accompanying BELGRANO should not be attacked, so as to permit the picking up of survivors.

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Public Relations

5. You reminded the Committee of the need to keep our Allies informed by regular briefings of service attaches, in order to pre-empt grumbling from these quarters. ACDSPol said that a further briefing of NATO defence attaches had been organised for Thursday this week. CDS added that he would be talking to NATO Chiefs of Staff today and tomorrow, and that he had also written at length to his French opposite number. Mr Nott would also be appearing at the DPC.

6. CNS said that in the 'new phase' of hostilities there were likely to be 'slips' by the media reporters on board the Task Force and he therefore proposed that their reports should be channelled via the MOD and not filed direct to editors. Sir Frank Cooper said there were arguments on both sides but he would have this looked at again. He would be meeting newspaper editors later this week and would in any case want to tell them what we were doing on this point.

Paragraph 7 deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

Wayland ?

11 September 2012


Defence of Ascension

8. The adviser team's report had been received last night and the Force Commander there would signal his recommendations today. Subject to these, the proposal was that the RAF regiment should provide the Headquarters wing (10 men) plus a flight (31 men) for quick reaction alert (they could arrive by 5 May); air defence early warning radar could also be procured at 48 hours' notice, there could be increased NIMROD activity after 7 May and until the guardship arrived on 10 May.

There was also a possibility of using reserve Harriers there in an air defence role. In all a total of 60 extra men on the island would probably be needed. CNS urged prompt action because of the risk as he saw it of an 'Entebbe type raid'.

US Assistance

9. ACDS Pol said there was a need to address this as far as possible through normal channels, together with a high level political approach to establish the context. Priority areas were intelligence, supply of equipment and logistic and operational support. CDS said that he would take the matter up in general terms today and tomorrow with General Jones (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs) and Mr Nott would raise it with Weinberger during the DPC. It was accepted that BDS Washington would have a role to play, but probably not for actual procurement. CNS said he was against the lend lease idea for items such as assault ships. In general it was thought too early to enter into the kind of detail invited by the agenda paper.



P J Weston
Defence Department


4 May, 1982

DRAFT WARNING TO BE ISSUED BY MOD PRESS SPOKESMAN

(0100 4th MAY).

~~The~~ British Forces today have suffered heavy attack from Argentine Forces and a serious loss has been sustained.

The British Government has issued repeated warnings to the Argentine about the consequences of interfering with the mission of our forces in the South Atlantic. By its hostile acts the Argentine Government has shown complete disregard for these warnings. ~~Let us~~^{we} repeat that the protection of our ships and men is our overriding concern. The Argentine must now be prepared for the consequences of their actions.



British forces in the South Atlantic
have today suffered serious attack
from the Argentines and major/grave/
serious damage has been sustained

The Argentine Govt. persists
in ignoring the warnings given
by HMG and it must follow
that British forces cannot be
expected to hold back so as
to expose our Fleet to further attack.

In particular, it is
emphasised that unless the Argentine
Carrier "The 25th May" immediately
withdraws to the North of
Parallels it will be liable
to attack.

4.5.82

4.5.82

TEXT OF BROADCAST BY MOD

In the course of its duties within the total exclusion zone, HMS SHEFFIELD was attacked and hit late this afternoon by a missile. A fire started and it became out of control. The Ship's Company abandoned ship and all who managed to abandon ship were picked up. It is feared there are a number of casualties. There are no details yet as next-of-kin will be informed first.

In further action over the Falklands, a Vulcan attack this morning was successful and the aircraft returned safely. Further sea harrier action - one sea harrier was shot down and the pilot was killed. His name will be announced after confirmation that his next-of-kin have been informed. The Task Force continues with its duties as planned. There will be a statement in the House tomorrow when further details are available.

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL 38

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PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD (7)
HD/S AL D
HD/DEF DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK
Hd/NAD

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
~~SIR V COUZENS~~) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)

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ADVANCE COPY

11 MAY 1982

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SAVING TELEGRAM

RESTRICTED

BY BAG

FROM OTTAWA

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO. 7 SAVING

4 MAY 1982

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO. SAVING of 4 MAY 1982

REPEATED SAVING TO CHANCERY, WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK
UKDEL NATO

FALKLAND ISLANDS

In the House of Commons on 28 April, the Prime Minister was asked whether the Canadian Government recognised the UK as having sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The question was answered by Mr MacGuigan, who said:

"Madam Speaker, the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands is not for Canada to decide; it is a matter to be decided either by an international tribunal, whether it be an arbitration tribunal or the International Court of Justice, or by negotiation between the parties.

What is of great concern to Canada and to other peace abiding countries is that Argentina has chosen to try to settle a dispute over territory by recourse to force of arms and that the United Kingdom has had to have recourse to self-defence in order to regain those islands. That is the position that Canada has taken. It is in pursuance of that position that we have banned the export of war material to Argentina and that we have, like the members of the Common Market, imposed similar kinds of restrictions with respect to the entry of Argentinian imports to Canada".

In reply to a supplementary, he said:

"We have taken similar actions to those taken by members of the European Community with respect to Argentina. We are giving the identical kind of support to the United Kingdom that our other friends are giving, and more than some countries in the world are doing".

2. When I saw Mr Taylor, Deputy Under Secretary at the Department for External Affairs on 30 April, I asked him what Canada's position on the sovereignty of the Islands was. He said that the Department were not in doubt about our sovereignty which had,

.../according

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SAVING TELEGRAM

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-2-

according to the Department's Legal Advisers, been implicitly recognised by the Canadian Government's condemnation of the Argentine invasion.

3. I took the opportunity of saying that the House of Commons in London had been remarkably united in their debate on 29 April.

4. I took occasion to thank the Canadians for the helpful remarks made by their Ambassador on his return to Buenos Aires (my telno. 340).

MORAN

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SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 May 1982

Prime Minister

A.S.C. 4/5.

Dear John,

T.A. 4/4.

Falklands: Ideas for a new Diplomatic Move

Following the discussion at OD(SA) this morning, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has been giving further thought to the ways in which we could alter in our own interests the ideas suggested by Mr Haig to Sir N Henderson last night.

Mr Pym suggests that British ideas for a new diplomatic initiative should:

- a) link a ceasefire directly to Argentine withdrawal; ✓
- b) spell out the withdrawal arrangements in a way that satisfies British interests and so that they will not require further discussion after any Argentine acceptance of the new proposal, since such discussion would enable Argentina to delay withdrawal; ✓
- c) ensure that Argentina is not involved in interim arrangements in the Islands and that the involvement of third parties is so limited that it does not impinge on the restoration of British administration; ✓
- d) make clear that there must be a sounding of opinion to ascertain the wishes of the Islanders;
- e) provide that negotiations on the future of the Islands do not exclude or predetermine any possible outcome. ✓

In order to have any hope of interesting Mr Haig in proposals designed to achieve these results, it will be necessary to draft and present our ideas with care. For instance, it is probably unrealistic to state baldly that full British administration will be restored or that a referendum must take place.

The enclosed list of six points and draft covering message from Mr Pym to Mr Haig seek to satisfy the requirements in the second paragraph above while avoiding the pitfalls in the third paragraph. Mr Pym would like to draw attention to several points of

/clarification:



clarification:

- i) the list of points refers only to the Falkland Islands. We must see whether Mr Haig will resist this.
- ii) The second point leaves us free after withdrawal to deploy our military forces wherever we like outside an area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands.
- iii) The third point provides the opportunity to refer in passing to 'restored administration'. It restricts the Contact Group to four countries - West Germany, the US, Brazil and Peru - and gives the Group a very limited role in the interim arrangements in the Islands: to verify withdrawal (for which it might need US aircraft) and to ensure that nothing is done in the Islands in the interim period which would contravene the list of points. In effect, this latter provision means merely that the Contact Group would verify the non-return of forces in the demilitarised area. The draft covering letter to Mr Haig further weakens the role of the Contact Group by requiring that it should operate by consensus and thus could do nothing unless all four members agreed.
- iv) The fifth point about the views and interests of the Islanders makes necessary an effective sounding of the opinions of the Islanders, because this is the only way of ascertaining their views. To make this clear beyond doubt, the point spells out that the views and the interest of the Islanders 'must be determined'.
- v) The point about future negotiations in Mr Haig's draft said that the conclusion of an agreement by 30 April next year would be the responsibility of the members of the Contact Group. But the responsibility for reaching any agreement of course lies with Britain. The sixth point in my enclosure corrects this mistake by downgrading the role of the Contact Group in negotiations about the future of the Islands.
- vi) The enclosed list of points does not specify that the British and Argentine exclusion zones should be lifted or suspended or that economic sanctions should be



lifted. Mr Haig may of course suggest that these points should be added.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggests that the Government should today put a proposal on the lines of the enclosed drafts to Mr Haig and, subject to the latter's reactions, should subsequently communicate British views to the Government of Peru.

I am sending copies of this letter with enclosures to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD(SA) and the Attorney-General and also the Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong and to Sir Michael Palliser.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'B J P Fall', with a stylized flourish at the end.

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

AMENDED VERSION OF US/PERUVIAN IDEAS

1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:
2. Mutual withdrawal of forces:
 - a) Argentine and British forces to begin immediately to withdraw from an area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands and to refrain from introducing any forces into that area.
 - b) The UK will ensure safe passage for the Argentine garrison to the mainland.
 - c) All British and Argentine forces to be withdrawn within 7 days from the area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falklands and to remain outside that area.
3. The immediate introduction of a Contact Group composed of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement, the Group's tasks being:
 - a) to verify the withdrawal;
 - b) to ensure that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the restored administration or otherwise, which would contravene this interim agreement.
4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.
5. The two governments acknowledge that the views and interests of the Islanders must be determined ^{be} [and taken into account] in the definitive settlement of the problem.
6. The two governments will make every possible effort

SECRET

in good faith to reach a definitive agreement prior to
30 April 1983. The countries represented in the contact
group will give every assistance in this.

SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE TO MR HAIG FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I found our discussions in Washington very useful and am grateful for the continuing efforts you are making to promote a peaceful settlement of the Falklands crisis.

I have discussed with the Prime Minister and other colleagues the ideas you put to Nicko Henderson last night. I am conscious, like you, of the value of simplicity in any new diplomatic initiative. If further conflict is to be avoided and our essential aims are to be met, negotiations must not drag on. At the same time, we cannot accept a ceasefire on the basis of an agreement that is too imprecise. Otherwise, Argentina could accept the proposal, and thus escape military pressure, and then play for time in negotiations and prolong the occupation.

I attach a somewhat expanded version of your points, which takes account of this consideration. Because the provisions on withdrawal and the involvement of third parties in the interim period are expressed more fully, we have omitted your sixth point giving a role to the contact group in negotiations to carry out the interim agreement. We have also gone back to a contact group composed only of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, which is the list given by Peru to our Ambassador on 3 May. I take it that the United States and Peru would approach Brazil and the FRG about their participation. In our view the Group should work by consensus and have US or rotating chairmanship. We have also provided a version of the final point which takes account of the plain fact that

SECRET

it might prove impossible to reach agreement on the future of the Falkland Islands by 30 April 1983.

If you and the Peruvian Government were to call upon Argentina and Britain to accept within 48 hours an agreement in the terms I am enclosing, the British Government would immediately announce that our naval forces in the South Atlantic had been given orders not to fire within or outside the TEZ unless directly threatened by Argentine snips or aircraft but that we would revert to earlier rules of engagement if Argentina failed to accept your proposals within 48 hours. We would need from you an advance assurance that Argentina at the same time would announce that the same orders had been issued to her forces and that her ships would not be present in the TEZ in the 48 hour period.

As you know it is essential for the British Government that there should be a United States guarantee of the security of ^{the} Falkland Islands. It would need to last from the 7th day after the signature of an interim agreement until the implementation of a definitive agreement about the future status of the Islands, and perhaps beyond. For this to deter Argentina, the Government in Buenos Aires must be in no doubt of the guarantee. That suggests that it might take the form of a public statement by the US Administration at the time when the interim agreement entered into force.

SECRET

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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(30731)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PJS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
ED/S AM D (FCO DIST - A/D S/I)
ED/CF D
ED/NEWS D
ED/CD
ED/PLAINING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR HATTIN)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
MR ILETT)
MR McINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EX
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADD-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAFT/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

IMMEDIATE

GR 90
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 041000Z (MODUK)
FROM TEL AVIV 040800Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
TELNO 040800Z MAY 1982
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO.
MODUK FOR DIC CRISIS CELL FROM AA

ADVANCE COPY

1. REPORT IN TODAY'S JERUSALEM POST ACKNOWLEDGES FOLLOWING SALES OF ISRAELI ARMS TO ARGENTINA, CONFIRMING, IN PART, PREVIOUS REPORTS:-
- A. 26 X NESHER JET FIGHTERS (INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED AS MIRAGE III)
 - B. SHAFRIR MK 2 AAM
 - C. 4 X DABUR PATROL BOATS
 - D. GABRIEL MK2 SSM.
2. REPORT STATES THAT GABRIEL IS MOUNTED ON 2 X TYPT 148 FAST ATTACK CRAFT (GERMAN BUILT) WHICH MAY RESOLVE UNCERTAINTLY CONCERNING POSSIBLE SALES OF DVORA FAST MISSILE BOATS IN ADDITION TO KNOWN DABUR DELIVERIES.

MOBERLY

BT

1 YP1212

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30X31)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
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ED/NEWS D
ED/UND
ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLE)
MR HATTIN)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
MR ILETT)
MR McINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EX

DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAFE/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GPS 320

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 041735Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 1590 OF 4 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

Handwritten initials

[FCO]

FALKLANDS: HAIG

1. SPEAKING TO A SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE THIS MORNING, HAIG SAID THAT
(A) QUOTE AS OF THIS MOMENT THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY HAS NOT
DEVELOPED IN BUENOS AIRES UNQUOTE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

(B) QUOTE ONE COULD READILY DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE RECENT
TRAGIC LOSS OF LIVES ASSOCIATED WITH THE LOSS OF THEIR CRUISER HAS
CONTRIBUTED TO THEIR CONTINUING INTRANSIGENCE UNQUOTE.

(C) THE CRISIS MUST ULTIMATELY BE RESOLVED THROUGH POLITICAL
NEGOTIATIONS. THE US WAS NOT CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS IN
THE FORMAL SENSE OF THE WORD THOUGH HE HAD CONFERRED WITH PRESIDENT
BELLAUNDI.

(D) SINCE THE US GOVERNMENT STATEMENT OF 30 APRIL, THE BRITISH
HAD MADE NO REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AID. THE US HAD PLAYED NO PART IN

HAD MADE NO REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AID. THE US HAD PLAYED NO PART IN DIRECT MILITARY SUPPORT OPERATIONS OR IN MILITARY ACTIVITY AND DID NOT ANTICIPATE EXPANDING ITS ROLE IN ANY WAY WHICH WOULD BRING THE US INTO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT:

(E) THERE WAS NO HARD EVIDENCE OF CUBAN OR SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA APART FROM THE VOCAL SUPPORT GIVEN SINCE THE START OF THE CRISIS. THE ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENT HAD DENIED THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED ANY INTELLIGENCE OR MATERIEL SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT US EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION HAD BEEN OUTRAGEOUSLY AND CHARACTERISTICALLY WRONG.

2. THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN THIS MORNING COMMENTED ON THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS: QUOTE WE REGRET THE LOSS OF LIFE. IT POINTS OUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AND THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THIS TRAGIC CONFLICT.... WE REMAIN AVAILABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT FURTHER FIGHTING WILL BE AVOIDED UNQUOTE. SPEAKES DENIED ARGENTINIAN CLAIMS THAT THE US HAD TRACKED THE BELGRANO ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE.

HENDERSON

NNMN

FOI 021100

9.

OUT TELEGRAM

PA

		Classification and Caveats SECRET	Precedence/Deskby FLASH
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GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 SECRET
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6 FM FCO 041930 MAY 82
7 TO FLASH WASHINGTON
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 ~~FM~~ ^{RT} TO UKMIS NEW YORK. LIMA *for ambassadors*
10 ~~Personal for Ambassadors.~~
11 Your telegram No 1589: Falklands
12 1. Please deliver the message below and the attached list of
13 points to Haig from me immediately.
14 2. For Lima: Please take no action pending further
15 instructions.
16 Message begins:
17 I found our discussions in Washington very useful and am
18 grateful for the continuing efforts you are making to promote a
19 peaceful settlement of the Falklands crisis.
20 I have discussed with the Prime Minister and other
21 colleagues the ideas you put to Nicko Henderson last night. I
22 am conscious, like you, of the value of simplicity in any new
23 diplomatic initiative. If further conflict is to be avoided
24 and our essential aims are to be met, negotiations must not drag
25 on. At the same time, we cannot accept a ceasefire on the basis
~~of an agreement that is too~~

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword OF
File number	Dept	Distribution Limited HDS/ Am D HD/Defence D HD/Planning Staff HD/UND HD/ERD PS PS/Mr Hurd <i>etc</i>
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	↓	Classification and Caveats SECRET	Page
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of an agreement that is too imprecise. Otherwise, Argentina could accept the proposal, and thus escape military pressure, and then play for time in negotiations and prolong the occupation.

I attach a somewhat expanded version of your points, which takes account of this consideration. Because the provisions on withdrawal and the involvement of third parties in the interim period are expressed more fully, we have omitted your sixth point giving a role to the contact group in negotiations to carry out the interim agreement. We have also gone back to a contact group composition^{ed} only of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, which is the list given by Peru to our Ambassador on 3 May. I take it that the United States and Peru would approach Brazil and the FRG about their participation. In our view the Group should work by consensus and have US or rotating chairmanship. We have also provided a version of the final point which takes account of the plain fact that it might prove impossible to reach agreement on the future of the Falklands Islands by 30 April 1983.

If you and the Peruvian Government were to call upon Argentina and Britain to accept within 48 hours an agreement in the terms I am enclosing, the British Government would immediately announce that our naval forces in the South Atlantic had been given orders not to fire within or outside the TEZ unless directly threatened by Argentine ships or aircraft but that we would revert to earlier rules of engagement if Argentina failed to accept your proposals within 48 hours. We would need from you an advance assurance that Argentina at the same time would announce that the same orders had been issued to her forces and that her ships and aircraft would not be present in the TEZ in the 48 hour period.

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats SECRET	Page
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 2 As you know it is essential for the British Government
 3 that there should be a United States guarantee of the security
 4 of the Falkland Islands. It would need to last from the 7th day
 5 after the signature of an interim agreement until the
 6 implementation of a definitive agreement about the future status
 7 of the Islands, and perhaps beyond. For this to deter
 8 Argentina, the Government in Buenos Aires must be in no doubt
 9 of the guarantee. That suggests that it might take the form of a
 10 public statement by the US Administration at the time when the
 11 interim agreement entered into force.
 12 Subject to your very early comments I would like out of
 13 courtesy to give these ideas direct to the Peruvian President.
 14 Message ends.
 15 Enclosed list of points begins:
 16 1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:
 17 2. Mutual withdrawal of forces:
 18 a) Argentine and British forces to begin immediately to
 19 withdraw from an area of 200 nautical miles radius from
 20 the Falkland Islands and to refrain from introducing any
 21 forces into that area.
 22 b) The UK will ensure safe passage for the Argentine garrison
 23 to the mainland.
 24 c) All British and Argentine forces to be withdrawn within
 25 7 days from the area of 200 nautical miles radius from the
 26 Falklands and to remain outside that area.
 27 3. The immediate introduction of a Contact Group composed of
 28 Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
 29 States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending
 30 agreement on a definitive settlement, the Group's tasks being:
 31 a) to verify the withdrawal;
 32 b) to ensure that no actions are taken in the Islands, by
 33 the restored administration or otherwise, which would
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats SECRET	Page
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1 <<<<
 2 contravene this interim agreement.
 3 4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing
 4 and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland
 5 Islands.
 6 5. The two governments agree that the views of the Islands^{es} must
 7 be determined, and that their interests and wishes must be
 8 respected in the definitive settlement of the status of the
 9 Islands.
 10 6. The two governments will make every possible effort in
 11 good faith to reach a definitive agreement prior to 30 April 1983.
 12 The countries represented in the contact group will give every
 13 assistance in this.
 14 List of points ends.
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 16 PYM
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ANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30/31)

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PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

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ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR HAWTIN)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
MR ILETT)
MR McINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DEO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GPS 520

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 041730Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NO 1589 OF 4 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

74/14
FLASH

ADVANCE COPY
ADVANCE COPY

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG TELLS ME THAT THE REACTION FROM THE PERUVIANS AND ARGENTINIANS DURING THE NIGHT WAS EXTREMELY DISCOURAGING. THE LATTER ARE BEING MORE INTRANSIGENT THAN EVER, SAYING THAT THIS IS INEVITABLE IN THE LIGHT OF OUR MILITARY ACTION. HAIG DOES NOT THINK THAT THIS SHOULD PRECLUDE US FROM CONSIDERING THE SEVEN-POINT PLAN AND IF POSSIBLE GOING ALONG WITH IT. IF THE ARGENTINIANS TURNED IT DOWN THEY WOULD PUT THEMSELVES ONCE AGAIN IN THE WRONG WITH WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

2. HAIG'S MAIN EMPHASIS THIS MORNING IS ON THE REAL URGENCY, IN HIS VIEW AND THAT OF OTHER PROMINENT AMERICANS WITH WHOM HE HAS BEEN SPEAKING, FOR LONDON TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE. WE HAVE THE MILITARY DOMINANCE BUT HE FEARS A QUOTE CONTINUING ATTRITION UNQUOTE IN THE

SPEAKING, FOR LONDON TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE. WE HAVE THE MILITARY DOMINANCE BUT HE FEARS A QUOTE CONTINUING ATTRITION UNQUOTE IN THE SUPPORT WE ARE GOING TO GET. INCIDENTALLY, HE REGARDS THE IRISH DECISION AS QUOTE TOTALLY IRRESPONSIBLE UNQUOTE AND AS QUOTE LIKE TO PROLONG THE WAR UNQUOTE. HE HAD BEEN SPEAKING TODAY WITH VARIOUS CONGRESSMEN ON THE HILL AND HAD BEEN REMINDED OF THE US QUOTE PROCLIVITY TO RALLY ROUND THE UNDERDOG UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE AMERICAN PROCLIVITY WAS TO BELIEVE THAT NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE SUCCESS, TO WHICH HE SAID THAT THIS WAS SO UNLESS THE SUCCESS WAS SO OVERWHELMING AS OURS HAD BEEN IN THE BATTLE.

3. HAIG SAID THAT SENATOR BAKER THE MAJORITY LEADER, WAS PERFECTLY SOUND BUT NEVERTHELESS DID REFLECT CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY AT THE THOUGHT OF CONTINUED SHEDDING OF BLOOD. HAIG SPOKE TO ME OF THE ADVERSE EFFECT THAT THE IRISH DECISION COULD HAVE ON US OPINION. HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD ENCOURAGE THE SPANIARDS TO BE DIFFICULT.

4. SOMEWHAT MYSTERIOUSLY HE ALSO SPOKE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF SOMEONE HE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE A RETIRED PEER CLOSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER UNQUOTE, WHOM I HAVE LATER IDENTIFIED AS HUGH THOMAS, SOMEONE, HE SAID WHO HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PERUVIAN LEADERS AND WILL BE PUTTING VARIOUS IDEAS TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE HELPFUL.

5. HAIG'S DEDUCTION FROM ALL THIS IS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MUST TRY TO PREEMPT ALL THIS ACTIVITY. HE WAS NOT WEDDED TO HIS PARTICULAR SCHEME, BUT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT LONDON MUST COME UP WITH SOMETHING TO TRY TO HEAD OFF THE INEVITABLE EMERGENCE OF OPPOSITION.

6. I REALISE THAT A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN TO THIS SUBJECT IN LONDON AT THIS TIME AND THAT I MAY WELL BE OUT OF KILTER WITH THE PREVAILING MOOD. ON THE FACE OF IT, WHAT WOULD HOLD THE SITUATION WITHOUT DAMAGE TO THE EXCELLENT POSITION WE HAVE GOT OURSELVES INTO WOULD BE A SIMPLE OFFER OF A CEASEFIRE BY A CERTAIN DATE, PROVIDED THE ARGENTINIANS AGREED TO WITHDRAW. AS REGARDS THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS OF THE DETAILS OF WITHDRAWAL, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE FUTURE, WE COULD SIMPLY SAY AT THIS STAGE THAT WE WERE READY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS AND HOPED THAT HAIG WOULD RENEW HIS NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE ON THEM.

HENDERSON

1 YPIDL

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
PRESIDENT CLERK

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WABE-SERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAP/DIO " "
SIR M PALLYSER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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GRS 340

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKHIS NEW YORK 041754Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 648 DATED 4 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY
[FCO]

FALKLANDS: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

1. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PUT SPECIFIC IDEAS TO YOU AND MY ARGENTINE COLLEAGUE OVER THE WEEKEND IS NOW WIDELY KNOWN HERE. THIS IS IN SPITE OF WHAT HE SAID TO THE PRESS ON LEAVING THE WORKING DINNER WITH YOU AND IS, I SUSPECT, LARGELY ACCOUNTABLE TO RAFAE AHMED. IT ALSO RESULTS FROM SPECULATION ARISING OUT OF HIS AND LING QING'S CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL YESTERDAY (3 MAY). AT YESTERDAY'S PRESS BRIEFING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN USED THE TERM 'CONCRETE IDEAS'. THIS LED UPI TO FILE A STORY ABOUT A 'UN PEACE PLAN'. AT TODAY'S BRIEFING (4 MAY) THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT 'PEACE PLAN' WAS NOT A TERM THE UN WAS USING, BUT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD PUT FORWARD 'VARIOUS IDEAS' TO YOU AND THE ARGENTINES OVER THE WEEKEND AND BOTH HAD

IDEAS* TO YOU AND THE ARGENTINES OVER THE WEEKEND AND BOTH HAD
AGREED TO CONSIDER THEM. THE GUARDIAN'S UN CORRESPONDENT
TOLD US THAT SHE IS FILING A STORY FOR TOMORROW'S PAPER ABOUT THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS: IT WAS CLEAR FROM WHAT SHE SAID THAT
SHE KNOWS A GOOD DEAL ABOUT THEIR CONTENTS.

2. THE MORE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE IS USED IN ORDER
TO DRIVE OFF THE IRISH, THE GREATER THE RISK, OF COURSE, THAT
HIS IDEAS WILL BECOME KNOWN.

3. ALL THIS REINFORCES THE NEED AT THIS END FOR US TO RESPOND
FAIRLY QUICKLY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AS SUGGESTED IN MY TELNO 643.
HAVING HEARD THE EXCHANGE BETWEEN YOU AND MR HEALEY IN THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS THIS AFTERNOON ON THE SUBJECT, I SUGGEST THAT I MIGHT
AS A PRELIMINARY STEP INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT "YOU
ARE CONSIDERING ALL THE IDEAS WHICH YOU AND HE DISCUSSED ON 2
MAY AND THAT YOU HOPE TO GET COMMENTS TO HIM SHORTLY". THIS
WOULD HOLD THE LINE HERE AND, IF HE OR HIS STAFF REVEALED
AFTERWARDS WHAT I HAD SAID, WOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT
WE WERE FORMALLY REACTING TO A SPECIFIC PLAN.

PARSONS

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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RESIDENT CLERK

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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAFE/DEO " "

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HD/ECD (E)

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

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FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 041730Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 647 OF 4 MAY
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON AND DUBLIN.

ADVANCE COPY

[FCO]

MY TEL NO 645: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

- IRELAND

1. I ASKED DORR AT 1700Z WHETHER WE WOULD BE IN THE COUNCIL BY EVENING.

2. HE SAID SHAMEFACEDLY THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF HIS CABINET'S ANNOUNCEMENT, HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO GO AHEAD. HE WOULD THEREFORE BE SUBMITTING A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON. BUT IT WOULD SIMPLY ASK FOR A MEETING, NOT AN IMMEDIATE MEETING. IF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ASKED HIM WHEN HE WANTED THE MEETING TO TAKE PLACE, HE WOULD NOT PRESS FOR THIS TO HAPPEN EITHER TODAY OR TOMORROW. HE WOULD THEN EXPECT ROUTINE CONSULTATIONS TO START AND A MEETING TO BE CALLED PERHAPS ON 6 MAY.

START AND A MEETING TO BE CALLED PERHAPS ON 6 MAY.

3. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE BEST HE COULD DO AND THAT HE WOULD NOT ASK ME FOR MY COMMENTS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT I HAD COMMENTED SUFFICIENTLY TO HIM FOR ONE DAY.
4. I HAVE TOLD DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) WHAT I SAID TO DORR THIS MORNING AND HAVE ALSO SIMILARLY BRIEFED MY OLD COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES AND THE US MISSION.
5. MEANWHILE THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL HAS STATED THAT HE WILL BE AVAILABLE IN HIS OFFICE THIS AFTERNOON TO ANY DELEGATIONS WHO WISHED TO SPEAK TO HIM. SO FAR, ZAIRE, PANAMA, AND SPAIN (THE LAST NAMED PRESUMABLY TO INTRODUCE PEREZ LLORCA, AMONGST OTHER THINGS) HAVE RESPONDED. DORR INTENDS TO SEE THE PRESIDENT LATER TO PRESENT HIS LETTER.
5. AT THIS MORNING'S PRESS BRIEFING, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN READ OUT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

BEGINS

THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS DEEPLY SADDENED AND PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED OVER THE MOUNTING LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) CONFLICT. THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 IS ESSENTIAL. THIS IS OF EXTREME URGENCY NOW FOR THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE MANY ADDITIONAL HUMAN LIVES WHICH MAY OTHERWISE BE LOST.

ENDS

PARSONS

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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MR McINTYRE)
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 041507Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 645 OF 4 MAY
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON AND DUBLIN

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

DUBLIN TEL'S NO'S 124 AND 125: FALKLANDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. DORR (IRELAND) TELEPHONED ME FIRST THING THIS MORNING (4 MAY) TO SAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS, FOLLOWING A CABINET MEETING IN DUBLIN, TO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ORDER TO GET A CEASEFIRE. I TOLD HOLMES (PRIVATE OFFICE) OF THIS BY TELEPHONE AND THEN RANG DORR BACK.
2. I DISEMBOWELLED HIM. WHEN I HAD DRAWN BREATH, I SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS: HE COULD TELL HIS GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME THAT
(1) I WAS NOT PLEADING FOR A DELAY. I WAS READY TO MOVE INTO THE COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY. BUT I WAS ALSO READY TO VOTE IMMEDIATELY ON ANY RESOLUTION WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF ENABLING ARGENTINA TO CONTINUE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION IN THE FALKLANDS WHILE LEAVING US WITH

TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION IN THE FALKLANDS WHILE LEAVING US WITH OUR HANDS TIED;

(II) A COUNCIL MEETING AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE POLEMICAL AND DIVISIVE. THIS DID NOT WORRY ME PERSONALLY BUT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY PRECLUDE ANY USEFUL ROLE IN THE FUTURE FOR THE COUNCIL OVER THIS CRISIS;

(III) SUCH A DEBATE AT THIS STAGE WOULD KILL THE CURRENT CONFIDENTIAL INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

3. I ADDED THAT I HAD HEARD THAT ONE OF HIS MINISTERS HAD DESCRIBED BRITAIN IN PUBLIC AS THE AGGRESSOR. I WARNED HIM THAT I MIGHT HAVE TO TOUCH ON THIS IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL.

4. DORR WAS OBVIOUSLY SHAKEN. HE KEPT ON SAYING THAT IT WAS TOO LATE, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD GONE PUBLIC. HOWEVER, HE COULD ASK FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING WITHOUT INSISTING THAT THE MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE DURING THE NEXT DAY OR SO, IE HE COULD GIVE US AND THE ARGENTINES A CHANCE TO RESPOND TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S IDEAS. I SAID THAT HE KNEW AS WELL AS I DID THAT THIS IDEA WOULD NOT FLY. OUR ADVERSARIES, (I.E. PANAMA, THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND) WOULD BE GLEEFUL AT THIS PLAIN EVIDENCE THAT THE WEST HAD SPLIT AND THAT ONE MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAD COME OUT IN OPEN OPPOSITION TO ANOTHER. AS SOON AS HE ASKED FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING THE NASTIES WOULD PRESS THINGS TO A HEAD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I WAS READY FOR THIS. I HOPED THAT HE WAS,

5. URQUHART SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED AND I TOLD HIM WHAT I HAD SAID TO DORR. HE AGREED WITH EVERY WORD AND IS GOING TO PRESS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SPEAK TO DORR ON SIMILAR LINES, IE THAT, IF HE GOES AHEAD, HE WILL DESTROY ANY CHANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PLAYING A USEFUL ROLE IN THE CRISIS.

PARSONS

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR MCINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DTW) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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GRS 21φ
UNCLASSIFIED
FM PARIS 041730Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 417 OF 4 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE TO THE HAGUE
INFO PRIORITY TO ATHENS BRUSSELS UKREP BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN
LUXEMBOURG ROME DUBLIN AND BONN

FALKLANDS

1. AFTER A REGULAR BILATERAL MEETING WITH CHEYSSON TODAY (4 MAY) IN PARIS AT WHICH THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WAS DISCUSSED, THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER IS QUOTED BY AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE AS DESCRIBING THE TORPEDOING OF THE GENERAL BELGRANO AS 'A DREADFUL INCIDENT'. HE IS ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING THAT 'THE WAY MUST BE RE-OPENED TOWARDS SEEKING A POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND THE BRITISH MUST USE A BROADER FORMULA THAN HITHERTO AND TALK NOT JUST ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF THE ARGENTINIANS BUT ALSO ABOUT A FINAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.'

2. AN AUTHORISED FRENCH SOURCE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT BOTH THE

2. AN AUTHORISED FRENCH SOURCE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT BOTH THE FRENCH AND DUTCH MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR EXTREME CONCERN AT THE ESCALATION OF THE HOSTILITIES.

3. THORN, WHO WAS ALSO IN PARIS TODAY, SAID WHEN ADDRESSING DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENTS THAT THE SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN SHOWN BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY WAS A POSITIVE POINT FOR EUROPE. THE COMMUNITY HAD SHOWN THAT IT WAS ABLE TO SPEAK WITH A SINGLE VOICE ABOUT A SERIOUS PROBLEM. HE ADDED THAT THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY QUESTION OF LINKING EUROPE'S SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN WITH THE BUDGET QUESTION. EUROPE'S POSITION WAS BASED SOLELY ON REJECTION OF THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND RESPECT FOR RESOLUTION 502.

FRETWELL

NWNN

SENT/RECD AT 041800Z CDC/ MG

THIS SHUD BE 11 11

TO DIRECTOR

TO SECRETARY

TO DEPUTY SECRETARY

TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY

TO CHIEF OF STAFF

TO DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

TO DIRECTOR GENERAL

TO DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL

TYPISTS (a.g.)

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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DESKBY 050830Z

FM BONN C41620Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 400 OF 04 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO UKREP
BRUSSELS

INFO SAVING DUBLIN ROME LUXEMBOURG COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE BRUSSELS
ATHENS

FALKLANDS

1. I CALLED THIS EVENING ON STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN, A MEETING
ARRANGED BEFORE THE LATEST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FALKLANDS.
VON STADEN HAD JUST COME FROM A VERY LONG MEETING WITH HERR
GENSCHER IN WHICH THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AND THE DISCUSSION ON THIS
SUBJECT AT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING TODAY HAD FIGURED
LARGELY. THE GERMANS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE IRISH POSITION WOULD
UNDERMINE UNITY. THE MINISTER HAD, HOWEVER, ALSO DWELT ON THE DISMAY
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OVER THE SINKING OF THE ARGENTINE CRUISER.

2. VON STADEN SAID THAT THE SINKING OF THE CRUISER WITH QUOTE A
LARGE LOSS OF YOUNG LIVES UNQUOTE COULD CAUSE A PSYCHOLOGICAL COLLAPSE

LARGE LOSS OF YOUNG LIVES UNQUOTE COULD CAUSE A PSYCHOLOGICAL COLLAPSE OF MUCH OF GERMAN OPINION. HITHERTO, DESPITE SOME DOUBTS, GERMAN OPINION AND CERTAINLY THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN PREPARED TO SUPPORT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A QUOTE CONTROLLED REACTION UNQUOTE TO THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION. BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION HOWEVER HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE OPERATIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF SINKING THE CRUISER OUTSIDE THE TWO HUNDRED MILE ZONE WITH SUCH SERIOUS LOSS OF LIFE.

3. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO SEE THE UNITED NATIONS BROUGHT IN TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATION. VON STADEN APPEARED TO HAVE THE IMPRESSION FROM THE BRIEFINGS GIVEN IN NEW YORK THAT IT WAS THE UK WHO CONSIDERED IT TOO EARLY FOR A NEW UN INITIATIVE.

4. I COUNTERED THESE ARGUMENTS REFERRING TO OUR STATEMENT OF 23 APRIL ABOUT HOSTILE ACTIVITIES BY ARGENTINE UNITS AND DREW ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR THE COMMANDER OF THE TASK FORCE TO CONSIDER THE THREAT. I EMPHASISED THAT NOTHING HAD BASICALLY CHANGED SINCE WE DECIDED TO DISPATCH THE TASK FORCE, AND REFERRED TO THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES THAT FOLLOWED FROM TOTAL ARGENTINE REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY REASONABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I ALSO UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING TOGETHER, AND OF ACHIEVING A SOLUTION THAT DID NOT ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES THROUGH AGGRESSION: VON STADEN WOULD KNOW FROM BRIEFINGS GIVEN BY BULLARD THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO GO A VERY LONG WAY INDEED IN NEGOTIATING APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD NO AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION ABOUT LOSS OF LIFE AS A RESULT OF THE SINKING OF THE CRUISER SINCE WE WERE AT PRESENT DEPENDING UPON ARGENTINE REPORTS. I HOPE ALL THIS MAY HAVE A MODIFYING EFFECT ON THE STATEMENT THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE PROPOSING TO PUT OUT THIS EVENING.

CONCLUSION

5. ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS ARE STILL ON BOARD WITH US, THEY ARE CLEARLY EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY REGARD AS A POSSIBLE UNCONTROLLED ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT. THEIR OWN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND MAKES THEM WORRIED ABOUT LARGE SCALE MILITARY ACTION WHICH REINFORCES THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT REACTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD AND POSSIBLE BENEFITS FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION FOR THE SOVIET UNION. IT WOULD HELP STEADY THEIR REACTIONS IF WE WERE SEEN TO BE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION THROUGH THE US, THE UN OR EVEN PERU: THIS WOULD HELP TO OFFSET THE FEELING THAT THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IS

HELP TO OFFSET THE FEELING THAT THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IS
DEVELOPING A MOMENTUM OF ITS OWN. I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY THE
DIFFICULTIES IN ARRANGING A BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN HERR
GENSCHER AND YOURSELF, BUT IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE MORE WE CAN
TAKE THE GERMANS INTO OUR CONFIDENCE BILATERALLY THE GREATER THE
CHANCE OF CONTINUED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION FROM THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

FCO PASS SAVING ABOVE

TAYLOR

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SENT AT 041857Z KB

CB BONN/FCO 011/04

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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HD(WED)

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GPS 380

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN 041645Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 397 OF 04 MAY

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK DUBLIN P

ROME LUXEMBOURG COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE UKREP BRUSSELS EMBASSY BRUSSELS
ATHENS

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

[fco]

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FALKLANDS: GERMAN PUBLIC STATEMENTS

1. THE SINKING OF THE GENERAL BELGRANO HAS PRODUCED A RASH OF STATEMENTS TODAY IN BONN. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, SPEAKING THIS AFTERNOON AT A PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE VISITING PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER, EXPRESSED HIMSELF QUOTE VERY DISMAYED UNQUOTE AT THIS DEVELOPMENT AND SAID THERE WOULD BE A FURTHER STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION THIS EVENING BECAUSE NOT ENOUGH INFORMATION WAS AT PRESENT AVAILABLE.

2. THE FEDERAL SPOKESMAN AT HIS DAILY PRESS CONFERENCE EXPRESSED THE GOVERNMENT'S QUOTE SHOCK AT THE DEATH OF HUNDREDS OF SAILORS UNQUOTE AND ITS CONCERN AT THE BROADENING OF THE CONFLICT AND THE RISK OF FURTHER ESCALATION. THESE SENTIMENTS HAVE BEEN ECHOED

RISK OF FURTHER ESCALATION. THESE SENTIMENTS HAVE BEEN ECHOED BY THE SPOKESMEN OF BOTH SPD AND FDP. THE LATTER CALLED FOR QUOTE EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND AVOID FURTHER DEATHS UNQUOTE AND SUPPORTED QUOTE THE CONCERN OF THE CHANCELLOR AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO INFLUENCE THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFLICT IN THIS SENSE UNQUOTE. EHMKE, CHAIRMAN OF THE SPD PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, SAID IN A DPA INTERVIEW THAT HIS PARTY SUPPORTED THE UK'S POSITION AND THE UN RESOLUTION FOR AN ENDING OF THE CONFLICT: BUT HE WENT ON TO ASK WHETHER THE LOSSES BEING SUFFERED WERE NOT OUT OF PROPORTION WITH THE AIM OF THE CONFLICT. HE ALSO CRITICISED BOTH THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED FOR THE QUOTE IMPRUDENT UNQUOTE TERMS OF THEIR REPORTING WHICH QUOTE BORDERED AT TIMES ON THE CHAUVANISTIC UNQUOTE.

3. IN CONTRAST, A STATEMENT YESTERDAY BY MERTES, THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN OF THE CDU, SAID THAT THE BRITISH ATTACK ON ARGENTINA WAS AN ACT OF SELF DEFENCE. LONDON WAS NOT PURSUING ANY EXPANSIVE GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY BUT WAS DEFENDING A PRINCIPLE OF THE WORLD WIDE SAFEGUARDING OF PEACE. THIS STATEMENT WAS HOWEVER MADE BEFORE IT WAS KNOWN THAT THE GENERAL BELGRANO HAD SUNK.
FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAING ADDRESSEES

TAYLOR

NNNN

SENT AT 041743Z B KB

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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PP UKDEL NATO

PP LIMA

GRS 600

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 041300Z

DESKBY WASHINGTON 041400Z

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 041400Z

FM MADRID 041020Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 242 OF 4 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL), LIMA, UKDEL NATO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 241 : SPANISH POSITION ON THE FALKLANDS^{DS}

WHEN CUENCA (DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN THE
 FOREIGN MINISTRY) CONTACTED ME THIS MORNING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT
 (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM) I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENQUIRE FURTHER
 ON THE WILINGNESS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT TO HELP IN

(SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM) I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENQUIRE FURTHER ABOUT THE ALLEGED WILLINGNESS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT TO HELP IN ANY WAY TOWARDS A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. THIS IS SPLASHED OVER THIS MORNING'S SPANISH PRESS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN DUE TO GO TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK IN ANY CASE FOR BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE US GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE BASES AGREEMENT ON 5 AND 6 MAY. BUT THE PRESS CLAIM THAT HE ACCELERATED HIS DEPARTURE YESTERDAY IN ORDER TO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK TODAY.

2. CUENCA CONFIRMED THE SPANISH POSITION AS SUMMARISED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. SPAIN HAD INDEED MADE NO SPECIFIC OFFER OF MEDIATION, AS PEREZ LLORCA HAD PUBLICLY MADE CLEAR. BUT HE WENT ON TO IMPLY THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS WITHIN THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT (NOT NECESSARILY THE FOREIGN MINISTER HIMSELF) WOULD NOT BE AVERSE TO SPAIN TRYING TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, IF THIS WERE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. PEREZ LLORCA WOULD ASSESS THE POSITION AFTER SEEING THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN AND AFTER HIS FIRST TALK WITH HAIG WHICH MIGHT BE IN WASHINGTON THIS EVENING. SPANISH WILLINGNESS TO JOIN IN AN INITIATIVE WOULD DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF THOSE TALKS. (AT THE TIME I HAD NOT SEEN UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 642 ABOUT A POSSIBLE IMMINENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS MIGHT AFFECT PEREZ LLORCA'S PLANS).

3. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY FRANKLY TO CUENCA, AS THE EUROPEAN EXPERT IN THE MINISTRY, THAT WE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED AND CONCERNED BY RECENT STATEMENTS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. THESE HAD APPEARED TO LINE UP SPAIN MORE CLOSELY WITH ARGENTINA THAN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS. IT WAS SURELY DISTURBING THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT NOW FOUND THEMSELVES OUT OF STEP WITH THE COMMUNITY, NATO AND INDEED THE REST OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. CUENCA SAID THAT THE MINISTRY WERE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THESE POINTS. HE HOPED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH ME SHORTLY TO RESUME OUR DIALOGUE OVER GIBRALTAR. THIS GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE STRONG HOPE THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT COULD REFRAIN FROM, OR AT LEAST LIMIT, ANY FUTURE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THE FALKLANDS. THESE WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OUR DIALOGUE OVER GIBRALTAR.

4. I CANNOT BE HOPEFUL THAT, IN THE PRESENT MOOD OF SPANISH OPINION THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WOULD FEEL ABLE TO PLAY A HELPFUL PART OVER THE FALKLANDS, AS THE MOTHER COUNTRY OF THE HISPANIC WORLD AND THE ONLY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO FAIL TO CONDEMN THE ORIGINAL ARGENTINE AGGRESSION. THE DAMAGE POTENTIAL OF SPAIN COULD BE CONSIDERABLE, GIVEN ALSO THEIR CURRENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AFTER PEREZ-LLORCA'S TALK WITH PEREZ DE QUELLA AND HAIG, SIR A PARSONS AND /OR SIR N HENDERSON

SPAIN COULD BE CONSIDERED...
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AFTER PEREZ-LLORCA'S TALK WITH PEREZ
DE CUJELLA AND HAIG, SIR A PARSONS AND /OR SIR N HENDERSON
MIGHT THINK IT WORTH WHILE TO SPEAK DIRECT TO PEREZ-LLORCA
OR HIS ABLE SECRETARY OF STATE (MANUECO) WHO IS TRAVELLING WITH
HIM. THEY ARE ALREADY WELL AWARE OF THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR
POSITION (MY TELEGRAM NO 239).

5. SINCE POSSIBLY EXAGGERATED ACCOUNTS OF THE ARGENTINE
CASUALTIES ON THE GENERAL BELGRANO ARE ALSO CURRENT HERE
(UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO ABOVE MENTIONED) IT WOULD BE USEFUL
TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT WE CAN SAY ON THIS SCORE.

PARSONS

NNNN

SENT 04/1123Z PJ

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ALANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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
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RESIDENT CLERK

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MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EX
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GRPS 520
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BRUSSELS 041545Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 158 OF 04 APRIL



INFO PRIORITY TO BONN ROME PARIS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE
LUXEMBOURG UKREP BRUSSELS ATHENS UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YOR
INFO ROUTINE TO MOSCOW

FALKLANDS: BELGIAN ATTITUDE

1. BOTH KING BAUDOUIN AND THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WERE POSITIVE IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR BRITISH POLICY WHEN I SAW THEM ON 4 MAY IN CONNECTION WITH MY PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS.
2. AS I HAVE REPORTED BY TELEPHONE, MR TINDEMANS RECEIVED ME EARLY IN THE DAY AT SHORT NOTICE, IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SEE ME DURING A BRIEF 36 HOUR STOP IN BRUSSELS BETWEEN VISITS TO THE MIDDLE EAST. (CURRENT BELGIAN PRACTICE IS FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO SEE AMBASSADORS ONLY AFTER THEY HAVE PRESENTED CREDENTIALS). HIS PRIMARY INTEREST IN RECEIVING ME QUICKLY WAS APPARENTLY RELATED TO THE EC BUDGET QUESTION(SEE MIFT), AND HE INITIALLY COMMENTED ON THE FALKLANDS ONLY IN RELATION TO IT AS SOMETHING

COMMENTED ON THE FALKLANDS ONLY IN RELATION TO IT AS SOMETHING WHICH HAD HELPED TO DISRUPT PROGRESS TOWARDS A COMPROMISE ON THE BUDGET ETC. WHEN I TOOK A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION OF THE COMMUNITY'S RAPID AND VALUABLE SUPPORT FOR BRITISH POLICY UNDER THE BELGIAN PRESIDENCY, HE SAID IMMEDIATELY THAT THE BRITISH COULD OF COURSE ALWAYS COUNT ON BELGIAN SUPPORT, BUT AGREED THAT THE EC UNITY ON THE ISSUE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING. HE SAID HE HAD VARIOUS INDICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SURPRISE THAT THE TEN HAD BEEN ABLE TO AGREE THEIR POSITION SO RAPIDLY. EG FROM THE VENEZUELAN AMBASSADOR HERE AND WHEN HE WAS IN KUWAIT.

3. WHEN I MENTIONED ON INSTRUCTIONS THAT YOU MIGHT BE SENDING A MESSAGE TO YOUR EC COLLEAGUES ON THE SUBJECT SOON, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE LEAVING FOR CAIRO TOMORROW (5 MAY) AT ABOUT 11 AM LOCAL TIME, BUT WOULD, OF COURSE, DELAY HIS DEPARTURE IF THERE WERE ANY URGENT DEVELOPMENTS.

4. AFTER THE PRESENTATION OF MY CREDENTIALS THE KING DEVOTED VIRTUALLY ALL OF A TWENTY MINUTE TETE A TETE TO THE FALKLANDS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE TENSIONS WHICH THE ISSUE WAS CAUSING IN THE WORLD. HE TOO SAID HOW PLEASED HE WAS HOWEVER THAT EUROPE HAD BEEN ABLE TO UNITE SO QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY ON THE ISSUE. IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES WERE AT STAKE, AND HMG HAD CLEARLY DONE THE RIGHT THING, GIVING FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE DIPLOMATIC SKILL THEY HAD DISPLAYED IN RECENT YEARS.

5. THE KING SAID HE HOPED THAT HMG WOULD USE THEIR SUPERIOR MILITARY FORCE CAREFULLY, AND I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WERE STRIVING TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WITH THE MINIMUM USE OF FORCE POSSIBLE. HE ALSO SAID HE FEARED THAT WHICHEVER WAY THE MATTER ENDED, IT WOULD ONLY BE TO SOVIET ADVANTAGE. HE WENT SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT GIVEN THE CLOSE ARGENTINE/SOVIET CONTACTS, THE JUNTA MIGHT HAVE BEEN PRIVATELY ENCOURAGED BY THE SOVIET UNION TO LAUNCH THEIR INVASION.

6. NEITHER THE KING NOR TINDEMANS MADE ANY OTHER REFERENCE TO RECENT BRITISH MILITARY OPERATIONS. TINDEMANS ALSO TOOK THE LINE IN A RADIO INTERVIEW EARLY ON 4 MAY THAT SO FAR AS EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN WAS CONCERNED, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S POSITION WAS ONE OF COMPLETE SOLIDARITY WITH THE UK. HOWEVER THE UNEXPECTED OUTCOME OF TODAY'S EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, WHILE NOT CALLING INTO QUESTION BELGIAN SUPPORT, SUGGESTS THAT TINDEMANS MAY HAVE BEEN OVER SANGUINE. (2 AM. ~~WE ARE~~ SENDING A

7 TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

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(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GROUPS 150

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM DUBL IN 041710Z MAY 1982.

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 OF 04 MAY.

AND TO IMMEDIATE INFO BRUSSELS (FOR BULLARD), WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

AND TO PRIORITY INFO PARIS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKMIS GENEVA.

MY TELNOS 124 AND 125 (NOW COPIED TO UKMIS GENEVA)

FALKLANDS: IRISH GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE.

1. THE TAOISEACH MADE A STATEMENT TO THE DAIL THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. THIS WAS BASED CLOSELY ON THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN MY TELNOS 120 AND 124.

2. IN ANSWERS TO SUPPLEMENTARIES, MR HAUGHEY EXPLAINED THAT IRELAND WOULD SEEK THE WITHDRAWAL OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA WHEN THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET ON SATURDAY. HOWEVER, HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EC WERE AGAINST THE WITHDRAWAL OF SANCTIONS, IRELAND WOULD OBSERVE COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY AND NOT ABANDON SANCTIONS BEFORE THEY EXPIRE ON 17 MAY.

SOLIDARITY AND NOT ABANDON SANCTIONS BEFORE THEY EXPIRE ON 17 MAY.

3. DR FITZGERALD ASKED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION REMAINS THAT ARGENTINA MUST COMPLY WITH THE PARAGRAPH IN SCR 502 CALLING FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF HER TROOPS IN ADDITION TO CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND NEGOTIATION OF A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN. MR HAUGHEY REPLIED THAT THAT WAS A FAIR INTERPRETATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

FIGG.

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SENT/RECD AT 041730Z HMT/DP

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR GILLMORE

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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GRPS 300

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM DUBLIN 041335Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 125 OF 04 MAY 1982

AND REPEATED FOR INFO TO FLASH BRUSSELS (FOR BULLARD), WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

IMMEDIATE TO PARIS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG, ROME THE HAGUE AND UKREP BRUSSEL (ALL INFO)S

M.I.P.T.

FALKLANDS: IRISH GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE

1. THE NEWS OF THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO WITH POSSIBLE LARGE LOSS OF LIFE HAS BEEN VERY CRITICALLY RECEIVED IN THE REPUBLIC. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED A FURTHER STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIPT). EARLIER THIS MORNING I ASKED TO SEE THE TAOISEACH AND WAS ABLE TO HAVE A QUARTER OF A HOUR WITH HIM JUST BEFORE HIS LUNCH FOR PRESIDENT REDDY. HE READ ME THE STATEMENT WHICH HAD JUST BEEN DRAFTED IN A CABINET MEETING. I SAID THAT WHILE I UNDERSTOOD THAT

DRAFTED IN A CABINET MEETING. I SAID THAT WHILE I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO SAY SOMETHING, I MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE BELGRANO HAD BEEN VIEWED AS A THREAT TO OUR FORCES IN THE AREA. ALTHOUGH IT MAY HAVE BEEN OUTSIDE THE EXCLUSION ZONE WE HAD AGAIN MADE IT CLEAR TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ON 23 APRIL THAT EACH MEASURE ANNOUNCED WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF THE UK TO TAKE WHATEVER ADDITIONAL MEASURES MIGHT BE NEEDED IN EXERCISE OF OUR RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE. I ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE AS ANXIOUS AS EVER TO MAKE SOME ADVANCE ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT AND THAT I MUST SAY QUITE FRANKLY THAT EFFORTS BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT TO ACTIVATE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD, AT THIS STAGE, BE MOST UNHELPFUL. IT WOULD DO NO ONE ANY GOOD TO HAVE AN ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE WITH THE COUNCIL FAILING TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION. THAT WOULD NOT BRING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION NEARER (I.E. PARAGRAPH 3 OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 638). I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT THIS POINT WAS QUITE WELL TAKEN BY MR HAUGHEY. HE ASKED ME WHETHER I MEANT IT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL TO OUR INTERESTS OR TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. I REPEATED THAT OUR ANXIETY TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT FURTHER VIOLENCE WAS AS STRONG AS IT HAD EVER BEEN. WHILE ACCEPTING THIS, HE SAID THAT FROM WHAT MR PYM HAD SAID FOLLOWING HIS MEETING IN NEW YORK IT SEEMED THAT WE HAD RATHER GIVEN UP THE DIPLOMATIC METHOD IN THE UN AND WERE NOW CONCENTRATING EXCLUSIVELY ON MILITARY OPERATIONS. I SAID THAT FOLLOWING HIS TALK WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MR PYM HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE ROLE FOR THE U.N. I AGAIN REPEATED OUR ANXIETY TO SEE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE AND I THINK HE NOW ACCEPTS THAT WE DO. HE ASKED ME FORMALLY TO PASS ON TO HMG THE IRISH VIEW THAT THE ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT MEANT THAT WAR WAS NOW A FACT, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT A LEGAL ONE, AND THAT THE BELGRANO SINKING HAD RADICALLY CHANGED THE WHOLE SITUATION. IN EXCHANGE HE REPEATED HIS UNDERTAKING TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY OUR POINT ABOUT NOT HAVING A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE JUST NOW.

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SENT/RECD AT 041420Z CB/MWG



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

4 May 1982

Dear Brian,

Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary met Mr. David Steel and Dr. David Owen this morning in the Prime Minister's room at the House of Commons to discuss the latest developments in the Falkland Islands situation.

Mr. Pym gave Mr. Steel and Dr. Owen an account of his visit over the weekend to Washington and New York. In all his talks with members of the US Administration and with the United Nations Secretary General he had made it clear that to be acceptable to the British Government any diplomatic settlement of the dispute had to provide for Argentinian withdrawal from the Islands and for a negotiation on the long term future of the Islands which made no prejudgment whatever of the final outcome. The British position on the latter of these two key points had always been more flexible than that of the Argentine. If the nature of the ultimate solution could be left open at this stage, there were various ways in which the approach to it could be tackled, though provision for self-determination on the part of the Islanders would have to be a part of the final settlement. In addition to dealing adequately with the questions of withdrawal and the final outcome of the negotiation, any proposals for a diplomatic solution would also have to provide for the administration of the Islands in the intervening period. British administration would have to be restored but we were prepared to contemplate an international presence associated with it which might embrace a number of countries and not just the Americans.

Following his visit to Washington and New York the British Government was now exploring various ideas which were, for the most part, variants of earlier proposals adapted to present circumstances. The Peruvian Government had put forward certain ideas. Some of these had been helpful, but the Americans had recognised that others would not be acceptable. They and the Peruvians had therefore revised the Peruvian proposals, but when they had been put to the Argentine, the Junta had rejected them. We were now working out some positive proposals of our own designed to try to keep the diplomatic approach going. He hoped to be able to put these ideas to Mr. Haig that night.

/He had

He had explained our position very fully to Mr. Perez de Cuellar. He had not ruled out a role for the United Nations, but that organisation was in a difficult position while the Argentine Government persisted in ignoring a Security Council Resolution. The Secretary General had had some ideas about a diplomatic solution but they had been too vague to be of any value in securing a truce. The fact was that the United Nations had no clear view of how it could become usefully involved in the dispute at present. It was significant that Mr. Perez de Cuellar had not revealed publicly that he had put certain ideas forward. Moreover, the President of the Security Council had equally not had any practical suggestions to offer. None-the-less, he had made it clear to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary General that he would be ready to consider any proposals they came forward with subsequently and he would remain in touch with the Secretary General.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Mr. Haig had claimed that the effect of the United States economic measures against the Argentine would be sharper than was publicly anticipated. He had told Mr. Haig that if that was the case, it was important that the US Government got it over at home and abroad. He had also asked Mr. Haig to strengthen sanctions against Argentina, not least because this would help when it came to getting the European Community's measures extended. Mr. Haig said that he would consider what could be done.

Militarily, there were indications that most of the Argentinian fleet might now have withdrawn to coastal waters. This might mean that there would be no major military incidents in the next few days but the situation was plainly not wholly in our control. If the Argentinians threatened our ships and aircraft, our units would have to respond in order to protect themselves.

On the whole he felt that the events of the last few days had hardened the determination of the Argentine Government to stay on the Falkland Islands, rather than the reverse. None-the-less, they had been prepared to talk to the Peruvian Government over the weekend. It was also significant that they had given a clearer response to the ideas put to them than they had done before. The Government remained determined to try to find a diplomatic solution, but he had to say that he was not optimistic at present. The Prime Minister added that a truce was not simply a ceasefire. It had to include a withdrawal as well. Otherwise a truce would leave the Argentinians in possession of the Islands. The problem now was how to secure the Government's short-term objectives of a cessation of hostilities and an Argentinian withdrawal without prejudging the outcome of a negotiation on the long term future of the Islands.

Mr. Steel said that he had seen Mr. Perez de Cuellar a fortnight earlier, and he had made it clear, privately then that he was not keen to get involved. He would like to know whether the Americans were going to publish their original proposals which the Argentines had rejected.

/The Foreign

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the answer was 'no'. He was glad that Mr. Haig had decided against publication because we were now in a new situation and the appearance of the old American proposals would be decidedly unhelpful. On the other hand, it was of course too early to think of the publication of any of the new ideas which were now under consideration.

Dr. Owen said that he was concerned about the military pressures which now must be building up on the Government. If there was no progress in the diplomatic field, there must be a growing risk that the Argentinian airforce would destroy or disable one of our large ships, and this might lead to a suggestion that mainland airfields should be bombed. He also wondered how long the Task Force could be kept in its present state of instant readiness. How much time was there before a decision on a landing had to be taken? He thought it important that the Government explained in much more detail than it had done so far why the General Belgrano posed such a military threat that it had had to be torpedoed. There was a real danger that unless the Government put over its case convincingly, we should lose a lot of international support.

The Prime Minister said that she took Dr. Owen's point about the cruiser and the Defence Secretary would be dealing with this at some length in his statement in the House that afternoon. Ministers were not in any way contemplating attacking mainland airfields: to do so would be to declare a state of war against Argentina. Moreover, a landing was not in the offing. Indeed, we hoped very much that we could avoid one.

Mr. Steel said that he would have difficulty in holding the line in the Liberal Party if there was a bloody land battle. Dr. Owen added that he accepted that the Government could not exclude the landing option, but he was reassured to know that decisions did not have to be taken for some days. He also understood why British forces were taking action outside the TEZ, and he acknowledged that there would be occasions when the Government and British forces had to move fast. But he repeated his earlier point about the need to explain in greater detail why the Argentinian cruiser had had to be attacked.

Dr. Owen went on to say that he thought that Israel could have been handled more skilfully over arms supplies to the Argentine. We had got into a slugging match unnecessarily. If we had approached them more gently, he was sure that they could have slowed down their contracts with the Argentine, even though they could not have renounced them.

He wondered whether it was realistic to suppose that we could escape from the original American proposals so easily. Would they not come back to haunt us? Once proposals of this kind had been put on the table, they would always be around.

The Prime Minister agreed. Even if proposals were rejected, they remained the starting point for the next round of negotiation.

/Mr Pym

P E R S O N A L
and
S E C R E T

-4-

Mr Pym added that the American proposals had been both complicated and vague. This was inevitable, given that they had attempted to encompass the British and Argentinian views on a cease-fire, withdrawal, the interim situation and the long-term outcome.

Dr Owen said that he was very worried that the support of our European Community partners for our position would collapse. It was essential that the Government should do everything to ensure that their support was maintained, and he would be doing what he could in his public statements to strengthen the Government's position on this. More generally, he thought that with lives increasingly at stake, the Government would have to make clear what its bottom line in negotiations would be. The whole world would soon be pressing to know what Britain would settle for.

Mr Steel said that he had found the meeting very helpful and would like to suggest that similar meetings should be held in the future on an occasional basis. He was still very keen to involve Mr Foot, if at all possible.

Dr Owen said that the more Mr Foot could be kept on board the better, and he would have no objection if the Prime Minister had a private and separate meeting with him. He was ready to say this in public. He also proposed to let the press know that he had found today's meeting helpful. He would make it clear that their discussions had covered all aspects of the problem - diplomatic, economic and military.

The Prime Minister said that she and Mr Pym had also found the meeting valuable. She was ready to leave it that either side could suggest a further meeting.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) and David Wright (Cabinet Office)

• Yours ever,

Alvie Whinn.

Brian Fall Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
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MR GILLMORE

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ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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MR LITTLER)
MR HAWTIN)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
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MR McINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
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MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

GRPS 100

UNCLASSIFIED
FM DUBLIN 041330Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 124 OF 4 MAY 1982

REPEATED FOR INFO TO FLASH BRUSSELS (FOR BULLARD) WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE INFO TO PARIS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG,
ROME, THE HAGUE AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

FALKLANDS: IRISH GOVERNMENT STATEMENT.

1. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TODAY:

BEGINS

FALKLANDS DISPUTE

THE GOVERNMENT ARE APPALLED BY THE OUTBREAK OF WHAT AMOUNTS TO
OPEN WAR BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND GREAT BRITAIN IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
AND AT REPORTS THAT HUNDREDS OF LIVES HAVE ALREADY BEEN LOST.
THEY SEE THE PRESENT SITUATION AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

THEY SEE THE PRESENT SITUATION AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO WORLD PE.

THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN THEIR STATEMENT ON SUNDAY HAS NOW UNFORTUNATELY BEEN REALISED. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS BECOME INVOLVED IMMEDIATELY TO SECURE AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT.

ACCORDINGLY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WILL SEEK AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ORDER TO PREPARE A NEW RESOLUTION CALLING FOR :

- (1) AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BY BOTH BRITISH AND ARGENTINIAN FORCES, AND
- (2) THE NEGOTIATION OF A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN.

THE IRISH GOVERNMENT REGARD THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS NO LONGER APPROPRIATE AND WILL THEREFORE BE SEEKING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE SANCTIONS BY THE COMMUNITY.

ENDS

2. FOR COMMENTS SEE M.I.F.T.

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John

*Have you seen this translation
already?
With the Compliments of Alan
2/10*

**LIBRARY AND RECORDS DEPARTMENT
TRANSLATION SECTION**

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
*LONDON, SW1A 2AH**

Chamber of Deputies
Presidency

Lima, 4 May 1982

Of. No. 121

I have the honour of writing to Your Excellency for the purpose of informing the British Parliament of the text of the Agenda Motion approved by the Peruvian Chamber of Deputies, which reads as follows:

"The Chamber of Deputies agrees:- 1. - To condemn British aggression against Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Isles, which has caused grievous loss of life, disturbed the peace in the hemisphere and endangered world peace; - 2. - To proclaim that the strange attitude adopted by the Government of the United States of America in supporting an aggressive extracontinental power violates the principles of hemispheric solidarity and disregards the "Common Defence and Mutual Aid" Agreements binding it; - 3. - To recommend to the Executive Power that it exercises its constitutional powers and complies with the objectives laid down in the Preamble and Article 100 of the Fundamental Charter on Latin-American Integration by summoning the sister republics of Latin America to a meeting to review the present system of alliance and defence in the hemisphere and lay the institutional foundations of the Latin-American Community; - 4. To express its solidarity with the Government in its desire, which reflects the opinion of the Peruvian Nation, to see the immediate establishment of a just peace in the South Atlantic; - 5. - to reaffirm, at this testing time, its brotherly solidarity with the Argentine Nation and its wishes for the total realisation of its patriotic aspirations. - Lima, 4 May 1982".

Having taken the liberty of transcribing for Your Excellency the document approved unanimously by the Chamber of Deputies of which I am President, I am especially pleased to be able to take this opportunity to offer you the assurance of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

God go with you.

(signed)

Luis Pércévich Roca

President of the Peruvian Chamber of Deputies

To Her Excellency the Prime Minister
of the British Parliament
LONDON

MR LUIS PERCONI + ROCA 25/5

MR COLLES

Cámara de Diputados

Presidencia

R 12/5

Tramitación para

AR 3/51

Lima, 4 de Mayo de 1982

Of. Nº 121

Requiere 12/5

R.

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a V.E. con el objeto de poner en conocimiento del Honorable Parlamento Británico, el texto de la Moción de Orden del Día aprobada por la Cámara de Diputados del Perú, cuyo tenor literal es el siguiente:

"La Cámara de Diputados, acuerda:- 1.- Condenar la agresión de la Gran Bretaña en agravio de la soberanía argentina sobre las Islas Malvinas, que ha ocasionado dolorosa pérdida de vidas, ha alterado la paz del Hemisferio y ha puesto en peligro la paz del Mundo;- 2.- Denunciar que la actitud insólita asumida por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, al apoyar a una potencia agresora extracontinental, vulnera los principios de solidaridad hemisférica y desconoce los Acuerdos de "Defensa Común y Ayuda Mútua" que lo obligan;- 3.- Recomendar al Poder Ejecutivo para que, en uso de sus facultades constitucionales y en cumplimiento de los objetivos que la Carta Fundamental señala en su Preámbulo y en su Artículo 100º, sobre Integración Latinoamericana, convoque a las hermanas Repúblicas de América Latina, a una reunión destinada a replantear el actual sistema de vinculación y defensa hemisférica, así como a echar las bases institucionales de la Comunidad Latinoamericana;- 4.- Expresar su solidaridad con el Gobierno, en la voluntad, que interpreta el sentir de la Nación Peruana, de ver establecido de inmediato una Paz justa en el Atlántico Sur;- 5.- Reiterar, en esta hora de prueba, su fraterna solidaridad con la Nación Argentina y sus votos por la total realización de sus patrióticos anhelos.-Lima, 4 de Mayo de 1982".

Al permitirme el honor de trascribir a V.E. el documento aprobado unánimemente por la Cámara de Diputados que presido, es singularmente grato para mí usar de la oportunidad para ofrecerle el testimonio de mis altas y muy distingui

///



Cámara de Diputados

Presidencia

-2-

/// das consideraciones.

Dios guarde a V.E.

Luis Pérovidic Roca
Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados del Perú

Al Excmo. señor Presidente del
Honorable Parlamento Británico
LONDRES

Mc/

RR BRASILIA

RR SANTIAGO

3 - MAY 1982

(136)

RR UKDEL NATO

GR 360

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 032316Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1580 OF 3 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, ROUTINE: MEXICO CITY, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO,

UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING OTHER OAS POSTS

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ARGENTINA: CONTRAVENTIONS OF ARMS SALES AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES

1 FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER SENT ON 30 APRIL BY POWELL MOORE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, TO SENATOR PERCY, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE:

I AM PROVIDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 3(C)(2) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT (OF 1976).

ON APRIL 2 ARGENTINE MILITARY FORCES OCCUPIED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (KNOWN AS THE ISLAS MALVINAS), WHICH HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A LONGSTANDING DISPUTE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA. ARGENTINE FORCES TAKING PART IN THESE OPERATIONS WERE REPORTEDLY EQUIPPED WITH A VARIETY OF DEFENCE ARTICLES THAT HAD BEEN FURNISHED TO ARGENTINA UNDER THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAMME, INCLUDING DESTROYERS, SUBMARINES, AND LANDING CRAFT, AND C-130, A-4, AND S-2 AIRCRAFT. THE USE OF THESE ITEMS BY ARGENTINA IS LIMITED, UNDER THE AGREEMENTS GOVERNING THEIR SALE, TO PURPOSES CONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE. (THE RIO TREATY)

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I MUST REPORT ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT, PURSUANT TO SECTION 3(C)(2), THAT A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION BY ARGENTINA OF THESE AGREEMENTS MAY HAVE OCCURRED.

AS YOU KNOW, US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA REMAINS SUBJECT TO THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN SECTION 725 OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT OF 1981. IN ADDITION, THE DEPARTMENT IS SUSPENDING UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE ALL DELIVERIES TO ARGENTINA OF DEFENCE ARTICLES AND SERVICES FOR WHICH COMMITMENTS WERE MADE PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1 1978.

THE ADMINISTRATION INTENDS TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST IN A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS DISPUTE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

FCO PASS SAVING: ASUNCION, BOGOTA, BRIDGETOWN, BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, GUATEMALA CITY, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, QUITO, MONTEVIDEO, PANAMA CITY, PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, CARACAS, SAN JOSE, SAN SALVADOR, SANTO DOMINGO.

HENDERSON

NNNN

TO: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM: [Illegible]
SUBJECT: [Illegible]
[Illegible text follows]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Illegible circular stamp]
[Illegible text]

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CO F C O


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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 040035Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NO 1581 OF 3 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

3 - MAY 1982

140



MY TELNO 1575: FALKLANDS

1. I HAVE TOLD HAIG THAT YOU WILL BE CONSIDERING THIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT NINE A.M. LONDON TIME TOMORROW.
2. HAIG SAYS THAT HE HAS NOT HEARD AGAIN FROM PERUVIAN PRESIDENT WHICH MAY MEAN HE IS NOT GETTING ANYWHERE WITH IGLESIAS AND MOYA (NOT ANAYA WHO IS IN BUENOS AIRES). HIS PLAN IS THAT IF THE PROPOSALS ARE MORE OR LESS ACCEPTABLE TO US HE WOULD THEN TELL BELAUDE THAT HE WAS COMMUNICATING THEM TO H.M.G. AND THE ARGENTINIAN GOVERNMENT. HE WOULD HOPE AT THAT STAGE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD ANNOUNCE HER READINESS FOR A CEASE-FIRE OF SAY 48 HOURS WHILE H.M.G. WERE REVIEWING CERTAIN IDEAS (WITHOUT SPECIFYING THE SEVEN POINT PLAN).
3. HAIG REFERRED TO THE BACKLASH BUILDING UP AGAINST US IN CERTAIN LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK ANY SUCH FEELING WAS DEVELOPING IN THE U.S.A.

HENDERSON

NNNN

ADVANCES (23)

PS (6)
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMOPE
 MR URE
 HD/SAMD
 HD/DEPD

PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET
 PS/S of S DEFENCE
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 PS/SIR M PALLISER)
 MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER)
 D I O)

Resident Clerk

(Passed to Emergency Unit)

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 032135Z MAY 82
 TO FLASH F C O
 TELEGRAM NO 1575 OF 3 MAY
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MT.

MY TELNO 1574: FALKLANDS

1. SINCE SENDING TUR, HAIG ASKED TO SEE ME. HE HAD JUST BEEN SPEAKING ON THE TELEPHONE TO THE PRESIDENT OF PERU. GENERAL IGLESIAS AND ADMIRAL ANAYA HAD JUST ARRIVED IN LIMA FROM BUENOS AIRES. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE BELIEVED THAT SOMETHING REAL MUST BE DONE TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE. HE BELIEVED THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE SEVEN PROPOSALS. HAIG SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE ADJUSTED TO PROVIDE FOR INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SIMPLY BY THE US AND PERU. THE CONTACT GROUP OF SIX WOULD BE CONCERNED ONLY WITH TRYING TO FIND A LONG-TERM SOLUTION. HAIG WAS MOST EAGER TO KNOW WHETHER WE COULD GO ALONG WITH THESE PROPOSALS OR SOMETHING VERY SIMILAR TO THEM. NO LESS PRESSING, IN HIS MIND, WAS THE NEED TO DO SOMETHING IMMEDIATELY TO TRY TO STOP THE FIGHTING. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NOTHING TO STOP US SINKING THE WHOLE ARGENTINIAN FLEET. THIS WOULD BRING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF ANY AUTHORITY IN BUENOS AIRES AND THE CREATION OF CHAOS. THE LIVES OF ALL FOREIGN SUBJECTS WOULD BE ENDANGERED.

IMMEDIATELY TO THE
TO STOP US SINKING THE WHOLE ARGENTINIAN FLEET. THIS WOULD BRING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF ANY AUTHORITY IN BUENOS AIRES AND THE CREATION OF CHAOS. THE LIVES OF ALL FOREIGN SUBJECTS WOULD BE ENDANGERED. THERE WOULD BE NO-ONE TO DEAL WITH IN ARGENTINA AND THE WHOLE AMERICAN WORLD WOULD BE ALIENATED. I REPEATED THE VIEW THAT I HAVE EXPRESSED TO HIM OFTEN THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS WILL NOT BE ALIENATED BY FORCE BUT THEY WILL DESPISE AND BE ENCOURAGED BY ANY SHOW OF WEAKNESS, PARTICULARLY WHEN WE HAVE THE CARDS IN OUR HANDS.

2. HAIG SAID NEVERTHELESS THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS DESPERATELY URGENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO PROPOSE A CEASEFIRE TO COME INTO EFFECT WITHIN A CERTAIN NUMBER OF HOURS. UNDER THIS PROPOSAL FOR A CEASEFIRE WE WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO SHELL OR ATTACK THE ISLANDS, NOR TO CARRY OUT ANY OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE TEZ. THE ARGENTINES WOULD UNDERTAKE TO WITHDRAW ALL NAVAL VESSELS FROM THE TEZ AND TO UNDERTAKE NO AIR ATTACKS. IF THE ARGENTINIANS REFUSE THIS CEASEFIRE, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD PUT THEMSELVES IN THE WRONG WITH WORLD OPINION AND MRS THATCHER WOULD HAVE SHOWN MAGNANIMITY IN VICTORY.

3. HAIG'S IDEA WAS THAT THIS CEASEFIRE WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEVEN-POINT PLAN. HE EXPECTS TO HEAR AGAIN FROM THE PRESIDENT OF PERU WITHIN A MATTER OF AN HOUR OR TWO AND IS MOST ANXIOUS TO HAVE SOME INKLING FROM LONDON ABOUT HOW HIS IDEAS ARE RECEIVED.

4. I TOLD HIM THAT AFTER WAITING THREE WEEKS WHILE THE ARGENTINIANS REINFORCED THE ISLANDS WE WERE NOT IN A MOOD TO RUSH TO AN ARMISTICE JUST BECAUSE THE ARGENTINIANS WERE LOSING HANDS DOWN. BUT HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT EVERYBODY KNEW NOW WHERE THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY LAY AND HE WAS VERY WORRIED IF WE GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF DRIVING THINGS TOO FAR.

5 I AM SORRY IF ALL THIS SOUNDS A BIT IMPETUOUS BUT I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOME SORT OF REACTION FROM YOU IF ONLY TO GIVE HAIG A STEER IN HIS PRESENT EXTREMELY ACTIVE FRAME OF MIND.

HENDERSON

NNNN

WONNY 101/3

ZZ F C O ~~XXXXXXXX~~


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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 032012Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NO 1574 OF 3 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

3-MAY



FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO ME AT SOME LENGTH THREE TIMES ALREADY TODAY.

2. HE WAS ANXIOUS TO KNOW HOW YOU HAD GOT ON IN NEW YORK AND I TOLD HIM OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S IDEAS AND OF YOUR IMMEDIATE COMMENTS (UKMIS TELNO 631).

3 HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PERUVIAN PRESIDENT AT 1.00 AM TODAY. THE LATTER HAD COMPLAINED BITTERLY THAT BRITISH ACTION HAD TORPEDOED THE CHANCES OF PEACE. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE USA AS WELL AS OF THE UK. THEY WOULD BOTH NOW HAVE TO PAY A HEAVY PRICE. HE HINTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOW BE INCREASINGLY INVOLVED. HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT A GOOD DEAL OF JOINT THINKING WAS NEEDED ON HOW TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING AGAIN. THERE WAS A HEAD OF STEAM BUILDING UP IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. COSTA MENDEZ MIGHT COME BACK TO THE RIO TREATY ORGANISATION CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD GET SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS. THE AMERICANS WOULD OF COURSE VETO IT BUT IT WOULD DIVIDE THE HEMISPHERE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION THE MOOD IN BA WAS GETTING VERY UGLY BOTH AGAINST THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS. IT WAS BEING PUT ABOUT THAT THE CRUISER HAD BEEN HIT AS A RESULT OF INTELLIGENCE PASSED BY US SATELLITES AND WITH THE HELP OF A SPECIAL WEAPON PROVIDED BY THE AMERICANS. THE US AMBASSADOR IN BA WAS MOST ANXIOUS THAT SOME DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE SHOULD BE TAKEN.

4. HAIG THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A SERIOUS DANGER THAT IF FURTHER SUCCESSFUL MILITARY ACTION WAS TAKEN BY US U.S. OPINION, AND FOR THAT MATTER WESTERN OPINION MORE GENERALLY, MIGHT BECOME LESS FAVOURABLE TOWARDS US. PEOPLE MIGHT SAY WE WERE OVER-REACTING.

5. I REMINDED HIM THAT, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION THAT HE WOULD HAVE SEEN, THE ARGENTINIANS HAD ORDERED THREE FRIGATES TO ATTACK THE HERMES AND THE CARRIER HAD BEEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO ATTACK BRITISH SHIPS. IT COULD NOT THEREFORE BE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE BEHAVING PEACEFULLY AND THAT IT WAS ONLY US WHO WERE PREPARED FOR CONTINUED ACTION. IF THE ARGENTINIANS WANTED PEACE THERE WAS NO DIFFICULTY WHATEVER FOR THEM TO SHOW IT.

6. HAIG SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHETHER BANGING THE ARGENTINIANS HARD WAS THE ONLY THING THAT WOULD BRING THEM TO NEGOTIATE OR WHETHER IT MADE THEM MORE INFLEXIBLE. I MADE THE OBVIOUS RETORT THAT WHEN FOR THREE WEEKS WE HAD NOT DONE ANYTHING AGAINST THEM THEY HAD SHOWN NO FLEXIBILITY.

7. HAIG SAID THAT HE DID NOT DISAGREE BUT HE WAS SURE SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WAS NOT NOW THE TURN FOR LONDON TO SHOW AN INITIATIVE IN FAVOUR OF PEACE. HE REPEATED HIS FEAR ABOUT THE WAY THE PRESS IN THE USA MIGHT SWING AGAINST US IF WE APPEARED TOO BELLICOSE. COULD NOT MRS THATCHER COME FORWARD WITH SOME SUCH DECLARATION THAT SHE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DESIST FROM HOSTILITIES IN A CERTAIN SPACE OF TIME, PROVIDED THE ARGENTINIANS EXPRESSED A READINESS TO DO THE SAME AND TO AGREE TO WITHDRAW. I SAID THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD HAD PLENTY OF TIME TO NEGOTIATE AND WHAT WE COULD NOT DO AT THIS STAGE WAS TO LET UP THE MILITARY PRESSURE UNLESS THERE WAS A CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE GOING TO WITHDRAW AND DESIST FROM MILITARY ACTION. HAIG REPEATED HIS CONCERN AGAINST JUST CARRYING ON AS WE ARE. HE DID NOT THINK PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD GET ANYWHERE. HE WAS THINKING OF PUTTING TOGETHER A SEVEN POINT SCHEME THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH YOU YESTERDAY BUT HE WOULD CONSULT WITH US FIRST. HE REPEATED THE VIEW HE HAS PUT TO US ALREADY THAT THE ONLY ADVERSE ASPECT OF IT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THE FACT THAT THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD COMPRISE SIX PARTIES, THREE OF THEM FROM LATIN AMERICA. THE GROUP HE IS NOW THINKING OF FOR AN INTERIM AUTHORITY WOULD INCLUDE THE USA, THE FRG, JAMAICA, VENEZUELA, BRAZIL AND PERU. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS COULD BLOCK ANY ACTION. I ALSO SAID THAT ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION THE ARGENTINIANS HAD REJECTED THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE THE SAME AS THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY COULD NOT NEGOTIATE UNDER DURESS (IE THE TORPEDOING OF THE CRUISER). HAIG SAID HE THOUGHT THAT ALTHOUGH THE ARGENTINIANS WERE BENT ON A SUICIDE COURSE SOME EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REFLOAT SUCH IDEAS. HE WOULD BE PUTTING SOMETHING TO US VERY SHORTLY AND WAS MOST EAGER FOR YOUR REACTIONS. I SAID IN ANSWER TO G'S LAST CALL THAT YOU WERE ON THE FLIGHT HOME SO YOU COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO REACT IMMEDIATELY.

8. I TRIED TO RESTRAIN HAIG FROM BEING TOO PRECIPITOUS. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE WAS NOT BEING PANICKY.

HENDERSON

MMMM

GPS 350A
D E Y O U

S E C R E T

1B
PS/NO 10 Downing Street
(2)

SECRET AND PERSONAL
FM WASHINGTON 031645Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 1572 OF 3 MAY

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

FALKLANDS

1. IN THE FEW MINUTES I HAD WITH WEINBERGER WHILE THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS CALLED AWAY TO TALK TO HAIG HE SPOKE TO ME OF HIS EAGERNESS TO GIVE US MAXIMUM SUPPORT. HE WAS REALLY WAITING TO HEAR WHETHER HE COULD HELP BY SENDING DOWN A CARRIER. IT WOULD TAKE 15 DAYS FOR IT TO GET TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. HE HAD THE EISENHOWER MARKED FOR THE TASK. IT WAS NOW JUST OFF GIBRALTAR. WHAT HE WAS THINKING WAS THAT IT MIGHT SERVE AS A MOBILE RUNWAY FOR US. THIS WOULD NOT MEAN THAT THE US FORCES WERE GOING TO BE ENGAGED AGAINST THE ARGENTINIANS. I SAID THAT I SUPPOSED US RECONNAISSANCE PLANES COULD FLY OFF THE CARRIER AND PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR US. AS REGARDS OUR OWN LANDING REQUIREMENTS I WAS SURE IT COULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HAVE AS IT WERE A MOBILE LANDING STRIP. HOW WOULD HE VIEW THE IDEA OF BUCCANEERS USING THE CARRIER, MANNED OF COURSE BY THE RAF? WEINBERGER SEEMED TO HAVE NO TROUBLE WITH THIS IDEA.

2 I THINK WEINBERGER SPOKE IN SIMILAR SORT OF TERMS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE HAD EXPRESSED HIS EAGERNESS TO PROVIDE SUPPORT. REGARDING THE POSSIBLE TROUBLE WE MIGHT HAVE OVER AIR COVER HE HAD BEEN THINKING WHICH CARRIER MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE. WE WILL HAVE TO THINK VERY CAREFULLY HOW BEST TO FOLLOW THIS UP, IF WE WISH TO DO SO. AS YOU SUGGESTED IT DOES HAVE A BEARING UPON THE IDEA THAT WE SHOULD PRESSURISE THE AMERICANS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO GET THEM TO CUT OFF IMPORTS TO ARGENTINA. FOR THEM TO MAKE A CARRIER AVAILABLE AS A RUNWAY WOULD BE FAR MORE EFFECTIVE THAN ANYTHING THEY COULD DO IN THE REALM OF IMPORTS.

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET] ✓

LIMITED
HD/DEFENCE D
HD/S AM D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
PS
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE

COPIES TO
PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
SIR R ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

S E C R E T

GR 600

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 040630Z

F UKMIS NEW YORK 040135Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 643 OF 3 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

3 - MAY 1982

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MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AT THIS AFTERNOON'S CONSULTATIONS THAT HE HAD PRESENTED YOU AND ROCA (ARGENTINA) WITH CERTAIN IDEAS (WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY) AND ASKED FOR YOUR COMMENTS IN WRITING BY 5 MAY.

2. MY FIRST INSTINCT LAST NIGHT WAS THAT WE SHOULD BE IN NO HURRY TO RESPOND TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S AIDE MEMOIRE AND THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THE LINE, AS YOU DID WITH HIM, THAT IT WAS FOR THE ARGENTINES TO REPLY FIRST. ON REFLECTION, HOWEVER, I THINK THAT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGES IN OUR LETTING HIM HAVE A REPLY, IF NOT BY 5 MAY, AT LEAST BY THE END OF THE WEEK. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF DOING SO ARE:

(A) WE WOULD CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE DIPLOMATIC PROPRIETIES AND MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS THE ARGENTINES AND NOT WE WHO ARE ADOPTING A NEGATIVE APPROACH TO IDEAS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

(B) OUR REPLY, WHICH WOULD BE CERTAIN TO BECOME PUBLIC SOONER OR LATER, WOULD PROVIDE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO GET OUR CASE FIRMLY ON RECORD WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE UN MEMBERSHIP AT LARGE.

(C) WE COULD INVITE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO REFINE HIS IDEAS, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS WE WOULD SET OUT IN OUR REPLY. IF HE TOOK THIS BAIT, HIS INITIATIVE (ALTHOUGH HOPELESS IN REAL TERMS) WOULD REMAIN ALIVE AND DO SOMETHING TO FILL THE DIPLOMATIC VACUUM. I AM CONSCIOUS THAT HAIG WANTS TO KEEP THE UN OUT OF THE ACT; BUT I IMAGINE THAT SIR N HENDERSON COULD PERSUADE HIM THAT IT WAS WORTH CONTINUING TO PLAY BALL WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN ORDER TO FORESTALL MORE DAMAGING INITIATIVES BY OTHERS IN THE UN.

3. IF YOU AGREE WITH THE ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THAT, SINCE OUR RESPONSE WOULD BE BOUND TO BECOME PUBLIC AND THE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS IN ITS DRAFTING ARE THEREFORE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ONES, THE FIRST DRAFT SHOULD BE PREPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT. WE COULD THEN OFFER COMMENTS ON ANY POINTS WHICH MIGHT NOT BE APPROPRIATE IN THE UN CONTEXT. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS MIGHT BE INCLUDED:

(A) A REMINDER THAT THIS CRISIS HAS ARISEN BECAUSE IT WAS THE ARGENTINES WHO ILLEGALLY USED FORCE TO PROSECUTE A CLAIM THAT WAS UNDER NEGOTIATION:

- (B) AGREEMENT THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SCR 502 BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY. THIS MEANS ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. AN ASSURANCE THAT THE UK TASK FORCE WOULD DO NOTHING TO IMPEDE THAT WITHDRAWAL.
- (C) AFTER ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL THE UK WOULD LIFT THE EXCLUSION ZONES, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ETC AND RESUME NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION OF THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE.
- (D) AS REGARDS THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, THE UK TASK FORCE COULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN UNTIL HM GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED INCLUDED ADEQUATE GUARANTEES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RE-INVASION OF THE ISLANDS. THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ALSO HAVE TO COVER RESTORATION OF TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATION TO THE ISLANDS AND PROCEDURES TO ASCERTAIN THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS.
- (E) THE UK IS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS FOR A ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND IN SUPERVISION OF THE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.
- (F) IT IS THE UK UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SG'S IDEAS RELATE ONLY TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROPER AND NOT TO THE DEPENDENCIES.
- (G) THE UK INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REFINE HIS IDEAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE ESSENTIAL POINTS AND WILL BE HAPPY TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS BASIS.

PARSONS

NNNN

TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

~~(30)~~ ~~(31)~~ (37)

IMMEDIATE

PS (6)
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
 ED/DEF D
 ED/NEWS D
 ED/UND
 ED/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 RESIDENT CLERK
 HD/SED

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR K COUZENS)
 MR LITTLER)
 MR HAWTIN)
 MR PERETZ) TREASURY
 MR ILETT)
 MR McINTYRE)
 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
 DIO CABINET OFFICE
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MADRID 031500Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 239 OF 3 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO MODUK(DI3 WEST) UKREP BRUSSELS

THE FALKLANDS: SPANISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

1. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT'S FIRST STATEMENT ON THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, JUST AFTER THE ARGENTINE INVASION, SUPPORTED ARGENTINA ON THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY BUT MADE A GENERAL CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF FORCE (MY TELNO 222). THEIR SECOND STATEMENT ON 2 MAY (MY TELNO 234) REAFFIRMED SPAIN'S POSITION ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE BUT SPECIFICALLY LINKED THE CONDEMNATION OF THE USE OF FORCE WITH THE BRITISH AIR ATTACK ON PORT STANLEY. IT MADE NO REFERENCE TO INITIAL ARGENTINE AGGRESSION OR TO RESOLUTION 502. THE SPANISH PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS (MY TELNO 237), IF REPORTED CORRECTLY, CRITICISED BRITAIN'S PERFORMANCE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND SUGGESTED THAT SPAIN'S OFFER TO MEDIATE HAD BEEN PUT TO ARGENTINA ALONE.

IF REPORTED CORRECTLY, CRITICISED BRITAIN'S PERFORMANCE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND SUGGESTED THAT SPAIN'S OFFER TO MEDIATE HAD BEEN PUT TO ARGENTINA ALONE.

2. PEREZ LLORCA MAY YET ATTEMPT TO PUT A FAVOURABLE GLOSS ON THESE STATEMENTS AND TO ARGUE THAT, IN ITS SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, SPAIN REMAINS NEUTRAL. BUT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES THE SPANIARDS HAVE NOW COME OFF THE FENCE AND RANGED THEMSELVES WITH ARGENTINA. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF THEIR ACTING OUT OF SIMPLE IGNORANCE. THE LOCAL MEDIA, WHILE INCLINED TOWARDS ARGENTINA, HAS REFLECTED MAJOR BRITISH MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS. I HAVE MADE OUR POSITION AMPLY CLEAR TO PEREZ LLORCA ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, AS WELL AS TO OTHER MINISTERS.

3. WHY HAVE THEY APPARENTLY NOW DECIDED TO ABANDON THEIR PREVIOUS NEUTRALITY? WITHOUT DOUBT THE UNDERLYING MOTIVE IS THE GIBRALTAR QUESTION. THIS AUTOMATICALLY PROVIDES COMMON GROUND AGAINST 'BRITISH COLONIALISM'. WITHIN SPAIN THERE IS COMPLETE SOLIDARITY ON THIS. THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO POPULAR FEELING, WITH CAMPAIGNING FOR THE IMPORTANT REGIONAL ELECTIONS IN ANDALUCIA AT THE END OF THIS MONTH NOW IN FULL SWING. EMOTIONAL TIES WITH LATIN AMERICA ALSO REMAIN STRONG. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SIDE OPENLY WITH BRITAIN MUST HAVE INCREASED THE TEMPTATION TO DISPLAY TRADITIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA, PARTICULARLY AS SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA HERE INCREASES. RESENTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES REMAINS CONSIDERABLE, IF LATENT, HERE. NEVERTHELESS, THE LATEST SPANISH STATEMENTS ARE UNHAPPILY TIMED, WITH PEREZ LLORCA DUE TO VISIT WASHINGTON THIS WEEK AND WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON AMERICAN BASES IN SPAIN CONTINUING.

4. PEREZ LLORCA AND OTHER MINISTERS NO DOUBT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE DANGERS OF DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM NATO, FROM THE EC AND FROM THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. BUT PEREZ LLORCA HAD ALREADY WARNED ME OF DIFFERING VIEWS INSIDE HIS OWN MINISTRY, LET ALONE WITHIN THE CABINET (MY TELNO 208). THE FACT REMAINS THAT SPANISH POLICY IS SHIFTING WITH EVENTS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THE BRITISH MEASURES AGAINST PORT STANLEY AND THE ARGENTINE CRUISER HAVE ADDED TO THE PRESSURES ON A WEAK, AND PERHAPS DIVIDED, GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW PUBLIC OPINION AND PLUMP FOR THE ARGENTINES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW FAR THIS APPARENT IDENTIFICATION WITH ARGENTINA IS A COSMETIC AND TEMPORARY DEVICE TO HELP OVERCOME DOMESTIC CRITICISM IN THIS CRITICAL ELECTORAL PERIOD BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIALS OF THE 23 FEBRUARY PLOTTERS. BUT I SHALL LOSE NO OPPORTUNITY OF REMINDING MINISTERS HERE OF THE HAZARDS OF THIS COURSE FOR THEIR EUROPEAN POLICY. MY COMMUNITY AND

ON A WEAK, AND PERHAPS DIVIDED, GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW PUBLIC
UNION AND PLUMP FOR THE ARGENTINES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN
HOW FAR THIS APPARENT IDENTIFICATION WITH ARGENTINA IS A
COSMETIC AND TEMPORARY DEVICE TO HELP OVERCOME DOMESTIC
CRITICISM IN THIS CRITICAL ELECTORAL PERIOD BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF
THE TRIALS OF THE 23 FEBRUARY PLOTTERS. BUT I SHALL LOSE NO
OPPORTUNITY OF REMINDING MINISTERS HERE OF THE HAZARDS OF THIS
COURSE FOR THEIR EUROPEAN POLICY. MY COMMUNITY AND
AMERICAN COLLEAGUES HAVE ALSO BEEN STEADFAST ON THIS POINT.

PARSONS

NNNN

CCN: PARA 2 LINE 6 PLEASE READ "TOWARDS ARGENTINA"

SENT/RECD AT 03/1542Z PJ/

WW

ADVANCE COPY

4 YP1012

1A

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30/36) 47 CAB OFFICE

PS (6)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/FUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

FLASH

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
ED/DEF D
ED/NEWS D
ED/UND
ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR FAWTIN) TREASURY
MR PERETZ)
MR ILETT)
MR McINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

SECRET

FM SANTIAGO 032100Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 203 OF 3 MAY
AND TO FLASH MOD

MT

MOD FOR ACAS(OPS), DS INT, DS8, DS5, DMSI.

FALKLANDS/CHILE/ARGENTINA

1. Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4) Whayland, 11 Sept. 2012 TELLS
ME THAT CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO OAS, CURRENTLY IN MADRID, HAS BEEN
URGENTLY SUMMONED TO GENEVA TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS
FOR NEW OAS SECRETARY GENERAL. PRESENT INCUMBERENT SR. ORFILA IS SAID
TO HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY ARGENTINE JUNTA AND TO HAVE ACCEPTED
THEIR INVITATION TO REPLACE GALTIERI AS " INTERIM PRESIDENT".
CHILEANS EXPECT THIS MOVE TO TAKE PLACE ALMOST AT ONCE AND SAY
GALTIERI IS UNLIKELY TO LAST THE WEEK (THEY EXPECT HIM TO COMMIT
SUICIDE (EXCLAM)) IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) RODRIGUEZ
AIDE ADDED "OUR NEIGHBOURS WILL BE REPLACING A DRUNKARD WITH A
HOMOSEXUAL". ORFILA IS ALLEGED TO HAVE MADE HIS ACCEPTANCE

S. (L. 1964) IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) /
SIDE ADIEL / YOUR NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE REPLACING A DRUNKARD WITH A
HOMOSEXUAL. OFFICIAL IS ALLEGED TO HAVE MADE HIS ACCEPTANCE
CONDITIONAL ON BEING GIVEN A COMPLETELY FREE HAND TO RESOLVE
THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. CHILEANS CONSIDER THAT HIS INTERNATIONAL
RESPECTABILITY SHOULD GREATLY ASSIST ARGENTINA IN THIS TASK.

2. AS THIS REPORT IS AS YET UNSUBSTANTIATED FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE,
IT SHOULD OBVIOUSLY BE TREATED WITH CARE. THE OUTWARDLY SURPRISING
FEATURE OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT (IF TRUE) IS THAT A HARD-LINER
IN THE JUNTA LIKE ADMIRAL ANAYA WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAND OVER
RESPONSIBILITY TO A CIVILIAN. BUT WITH A DEGREE OF PANIC BEGINNING
TO SPREAD, I SUPPOSE ONE WAY OUT OF SUCH A DIFFICULT SITUATION
WOULD BE TO FIX ON A CONVENIENT CIVILIAN SCAPEGOAT WHO CAN LATER
BE DISOWNED WITHOUT UNDULY TARNISHING THE MILITARY IMAGE.

HEATH

NNNN

SN SENT AT/RECD AT 032150Z PLN//TC

1

1

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(36) + 7 *Car*

PS (6)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

FLASH

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D P/I)
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS WCO
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/CHANCELLOR }
SIR K COUZENS }
MR LITTLER }
MR HAYLIN } TREASURY
MR PERETZ }
MR ILETT }
MR McINTYRE }

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIKA 030118Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 13B OF 3 MAY
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

M.

MIPT

1. IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.
2. MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES.
3. INTRODUCTION OF THIRD PARTIES TO ADMINISTER THE ISLANDS TEMPORARILY.
4. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO THE ISLANDS.
5. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS IN THE FINAL SOLUTION.
6. THE THIRD PARTIES OR CONTACT GROUP WOULD BE COMPOSED OF BRAZIL, PERU, WEST GERMANY AND THE US (BUT SEE PARA 2 OF MIPT). ALTERNATIVE (SPANISH) TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS: THE THIRD PARTIES OR CONTACT GROUP WHICH WOULD INTERVENE IMMEDIATELY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE COMPOSED OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO BE DESIGNATED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT.
7. THE FINAL SOLUTION WILL BE REACHED NO LATER THAN 30 APRIL 1983 UNDER THE GUARANTEE OF THE CONTACT GROUP.

Not enough.

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(7/17/74)
(30) + CAB Office

PS (6) ADVANCE COPY

PS/ER HURD
PS/ER ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLORE

FLASH

HD/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST ✓

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR HAVLIN)
MR PERETZ)
MR ILETT)
MR McINTYRE)

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GEEY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 030103Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 3 MAY

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

MS

FALKLANDS: NY TEL 40 134

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS EVENING. DR ARIAS BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE MUCH HOPED HE WOULD HAVE GOOD NEWS SHORTLY. HE SAID THAT AFTER THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN NY TOR HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WHO HAD DECIDED TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK AND BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. DR ARIAS SAID THAT ON PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD TELEPHONED COSTA MENDEZ TO PRESS UPON HIM A FORMULA WHICH MIGHT OFFER THE BEST CHANCE OF AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION. DR ARIAS REPEATED THAT A WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO CLIMB DOWN WITHOUT TOO MUCH LOSS OF FACE. THEY HAD THEREFORE CONSIDERED WHETHER A TEXT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A TOKEN REFERENCE TO THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY IN THE (FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED) INTRODUCTORY PART MIGHT SUFFICE TO BRING ABOUT A WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE TROOPS. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD ALSO TELEPHONED PRESIDENT REAGAN (BUT HAD FAILED TO GET THROUGH) IN ORDER TO INSTILL A SENSE OF URGENCY AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF MR PYM IN WASHINGTON. MR HAIG HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE.

LONDON. MR HAIG HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE BY THE TELEPHONE SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE.

2. DR ARIAS SAID THAT SOME PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES HAD ARISEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE VARIOUS TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WHICH RELATED TO THE INCLUSION OF THE UNITED STATES AND/OR PERU AS MEMBERS OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. DR ARIAS TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD NO OBJECTION TO PERU BEING EXCLUDED IF BY SO DOING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE OBTAINED. BUT MR HAIG HAD INTIMATED THAT THE US WOULD NOT WISH TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE ADMINISTERING GROUP SINCE THIS WOULD OTHERWISE NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UK.

3. IN THE EVENT AND IN ORDER TO SIMPLIFY MATTERS, A 7-POINT FORMULA HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. TEXT IS IN MIFT. THERE IS A SPANISH TEXT AND AN ENGLISH TEXT WHICH DR ARIAS SAID HAD VIRTUALLY BEEN DICTATED OVER THE TELEPHONE BY MR HAIG.

4. IN REPLY TO MY SPECIFIC QUESTION DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE 7-POINT FORMULA HAD THE APPROVAL OF COSTA MENDEZ SEMICOLON THAT GENERAL GALTIERI HAD TOLD PRESIDENT BELAUNDE THAT HE WAS QUOTE WELL DISPOSED UNQUOTE TOWARDS IT BUT THAT HE HAD HIS QUOTE SENATE UNQUOTE (IE THE MILITARY JUNTA) TO CONSULT AND CONVINCED. DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE MILITARY JUNTA WAS MEETING EVEN AT THIS MOMENT TO CONSIDER THE TERMS AND THAT A REPLY WAS EXPECTED HOURLY. DR ARIAS SAID THAT HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MR HAIG'S PROPOSALS HAD BEEN CONVEYED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF AT LEAST THE CONSENT OF MR PYM. DR ARIAS EMPHASISED THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WAS ANXIOUS NOT TO LOSE THE MOMENTUM AND THAT IT HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON THAT IF THE FORMULA WAS ACCEPTABLE, THE SIGNATURE OF AN INTERIM DOCUMENT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN LIMA. DR ARIAS WAVED ME TO EXPECT INSTRUCTIONS TONIGHT AND ADDED THAT THEY WERE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO STAGE A GRAND SIGNATURE CEREMONY IN LIMA.

WALLACE

F C O PLEASE PASS

NNNN

File

JJ

4 May 1982

FALKLANDS: RIO TREATY MEETING

Thank you for your letter of 1 May.
As you were informed on the same day, the
Prime Minister agreed that a reply should
be sent in the terms you suggested to the
message from the Foreign Minister of
Uruguay.

A. J. COLES

S

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



Secretary of State

VULCAN ATTACK

1. We received a call sign at 1050 indicating that the weapon load had been released. The aircraft is now at the top of its climb and we will not receive any more information until after its rendezvous with the Victor tanker at 1200. The Vulcan is due back at Ascension at 1500.
2. Attached is the proposed line which I can would use at the 12 o'clock briefing.

Also attached is a situation report on recent incidents such, in particular, seeks to explain the Belgiano incident. Ian is under great pressure on this and would wish to use it as a briefing. The only question is the extent to which it preempts your statement this afternoon.

Unless we hear to the contrary from you

we shall assume that you are content

for Ian to brief in this way.

3
4/5.

STATEMENT - 4 MAY

Early this morning a further bombing attack was carried out against the airfield at Port Stanley. The previous attacks on 1 May were successful. It was possible however that repairs to the airfield had started to give it a limited capability. We said in the announcement of the Total Exclusion Zone that Port Stanley airport would be closed. A further bombing attack was therefore mounted to ensure this. It is not impossible that further attacks may be necessary from time to time.

I have no further details at present but more information will be made available as soon as possible.

I have very little to add to the statements I have already made both about the engagement of two armed Argentinian patrol craft type naval auxiliary by Lynx helicopters and about the attack on the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano.

We now know that the vessels I described as "Argentinian patrol type naval auxiliaries" were armed ocean going tugs used by the Argentinian Navy as patrol craft. One of these we have provisionally identified as the Al/Ferez Sobral. If this is so, she would according to all the references, be armed with 40mm and 20mm guns. I am not able to say whether it was this vessel or the other one which was sunk. Neither am I able to say whether there are any survivors. As I announced to you subsequently we did drop life saving equipment close to the damaged vessel. But the night was described as inky black with intermittent rain and strong winds.

As for the cruiser Belgrano. She for some time had been in the general area in which she was attacked. She may have been going in and out of the total exclusion zone or perhaps skirting it. She was accompanied by two Argentinian destroyers. The cruiser was armed with fifteen 6inch guns (with a range of 13 miles) and the short range sea cat missile. Both destroyers were fitted with exocet missiles which have a range of over 20 miles. This force because of its position relative to our task force and its weapon capability overall posed a significant threat to us. In accordance with the warning given to the Argentinian Government on 23 April, the cruiser was therefore attacked by an RN vessel. She was hit by 2 conventional high

explosive torpedos. The capital ship of the group was therefore disabled and the RN vessel in accordance with normal practice then withdrew.

We have no further direct information about the cruiser or its two destroyers which incidentally were not attacked. The Argentinian Government has now announced that the cruiser drifted for some time out of radio contact and has now sunk. We have no reason to disbelieve this account. We have no knowledge of Argentinian casualties.

The task force is now continuing its patrols both by air and sea and by night and day to enforce the total exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands.

010

~~Sec. LAD~~

SAPU(82) 14

ADL 4/5

h.a.

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached for information is a transcript of the press conference given by the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr John Nott, on 3 May 1982

Cabinet Office

4 May 1982

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, 3 MAY 1982 at 2030 hrs

Over the past 4 weeks since the invasion of the Falkland Islands my colleague the Foreign Secretary has rightly taken the leading role in explaining HMG's policies to the International and National Press.

The manner in which he has performed this role is evidence that our overriding aim will always remain a peaceful and lasting settlement for the future of the Falkland Islands. Military pressure is not - and must never be, an end in itself. It will remain merely one part of the search for a peaceful solution.

We must never forget that the Islands are British and are settled by people of British descent - and they have been invaded by an aggressor who must now withdraw.

But there is also a wider purpose in our endeavours. It is to ensure that armed aggression does not pay. Let our response as a member of the Western Alliance be an example that the Western democracies will respond to defend those principles which they hold dear.

So it is our solemn purpose to achieve the military objectives to which, reluctantly, we have been compelled, using the minimum of force and with the least loss of life on both sides, commensurate of course with our overriding duty to defend our own ships, aircraft and men.

Every action taken by our forces will remain under the strictest political direction and control, although decisions on the ground must be made by the Commanders on the spot. Each move that we have made in this affair has been determined by the need to bring home to those who apparently believe in force, that force cannot triumph

Every so often we must remind ourselves how we got here in the first place. We did not fire the first shot. It was only as the result of the skill of the Royal Marines on the Falkland Islands and in South Georgia, faced with armed attack, that our men did not suffer serious casualties and loss of life.

Let me then say a very few words on recent military events. The past week has been a notably successful one for our forces in the South Atlantic. It has already provided evidence of their skill and the quality of their equipment.

Over a week ago we had warned the Argentines that any approach on the part of their warships or aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of our Forces anywhere in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. We also made it clear that all Argentinian aircraft including civil aircraft and all their merchant vessels or fishing vessels engaging in surveyance of our Forces would be regarded as hostile and would be liable to be dealt with accordingly. If their Forces constitute a threat the Task Force Commander has the authority - and it is right that he should have the authority - to respond in self defence. I would like to reiterate this warning. We cannot accept any interference with our Forces wherever they may be. The action against the cruiser, General Belgrano, yesterday evening was fully consistent with our duty to defend our ships and men.

The announcement today of the bringing forward of 5 Brigade's notice is another demonstration of our resolve. This is not an escalatory move. It is merely prudent when contemplating operations - of whatever kind - so far from this country to have resources available nearer the area of operations.

The Argentine Government knows that there is one quick and simple way to avoid further casualties to their personnel and loss of their ships and aircraft - it is to keep out of the zones declared by us and to cease threatening and attacking our forces in the South Atlantic. Furthermore there is one quick and simple way to stop the fighting and that is for them to take their garrison off the Falklands in compliance with UN Resolution 502. Then negotiations for a peaceful long term solution can be resumed.

The information given to you here by our spokesman, Ian McDonald, will be based on fact, not on propaganda. The distances involved are very large between here and the operational area. Our forces may be engaged in action

so that our intitial reports may be less full than we would wish. You have already shown that you are not prepared to act merely as a channel for Argentine propoganda. Freedom of reporting, as it is here, is not available in Buenos Aires, and brings with it the need for balance that has always been the hallmark of a free press. Closest to our concern must be the anxiety of the families and friends of those in the Task Force.

I do not pretend that our forces face an easy task. Early success is certainly encouraging. We are confident that our mission will be successful but we will never be over-confident nor will we boast of our success.

Perhaps in conclusion I can quote the most famous of our naval heroes Admiral Nelson who said that: "magnanimity in victory will be the main aim of the British fleet".

MOD PRESS BRIEFING MADE BY MR JOHN NOTT, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE ON
3 MAY 82 AT 2030 HOURS IN CONCOURSE HALL, MAIN BUILDING

Q. You talk about the minimum use of force - was the attack the British made really using the minimum amount of force?

A. If there is a threat to our ships and men we have no possible option but to respond to that threat. Our first duty is to protect our own men and therefore it was quite correct that we attacked in the way we did.

Q. Is Britain engaged in a war with Argentina?

A. Certainly we have hostilities with the Argentines. It is not in legal terms, however, a war, although the ordinary layman would class it as a war. We have the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Q. Does the right to self-defence include the right to invade the Island if necessary?

A. We would operate in self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. These Islands are British.

Q. What would be your description of the way things have gone and the prospects ahead?

A. There does not seem to be a will to settle this matter by peaceful means on the Argentine side. I hope we can settle the matter peacefully.

Q. Do you expect it to be a bloody conflict?

A. I sincerely hope not. There is still time for a peaceful solution.

Q. Have the Americans to date aided any of the missions?

A. We have received no military assistance from the United States. Nor will we seek it. We were naturally delighted at the offer of materiel support but there are further talks going on about that. It has only been talked about in general terms so far. It may be in the form of logistic support.

Q. What is your response to the claims that have been coming from the Argentines?

A. We have made it quite clear that many of the claims coming from Buenos Aires are just inaccurate. We will do our utmost to give you facts.

Q. In the light of your early success what do you think it will take to make the Argentines surrender?

A. I don't wish for a surrender as such. We want a withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and then we are prepared to go into negotiations for the long term future of the Islands. We have always made that quite clear.

Q. Could we have finished the cruiser off completely?

A. I should imagine it would have been possible.

Q. Would it be the policy of the Royal Navy to assist if there are any survivors from an attack?

A. I believe the Royal Navy dropped some rescue equipment for the crew of the patrol craft that was sunk. I would hope where it is possible we can exercise every opportunity of helping in the rescue of any Argentines in that position, including the use of our medical and hospital facilities.

Q. What can you do to slow down the pace of military hostilities so that there is some chance of negotiations?

A. It has been 4 weeks now. Ever since the invasion the Argentines have continued to build up their forces on the Islands. They attacked South Georgia after Resolution 2062 was passed.

Q. The boot now seems on the other foot on the military level - are we going to give them a breathing space?

A. We will maintain the initiative on the military level. We will maintain the form of pressure on the Argentines to change their minds. They must withdraw their troops.

Q. Are you in charge of the Task Force or is Admiral Woodward - who is giving the orders?

A. The Task Force remains quite clearly under overall political supervision and control ultimately, of course, under the direction of the Prime Minister. All the actions they have taken have been based on Rules of Engagement agreed at a political level and that will remain the case. The tactical decisions must be a matter for Admiral Woodward; it cannot be any other way.

Q. What advice can you give to the Falkland Islanders to preserve their own safety in the light of any action the British will take?

A. We are doing our best to keep them informed of what is happening. The majority of the Falkland Islanders are believed to be in the countryside and not in Port Stanley. The safety of the Islanders themselves is paramount in any action we take.

Q. If the use of military force is one of the tools you are using to try to pressurize the Argentines do you feel you have a lot of room left to apply more force?

A. We have a great deal left and will continue to use military means in parallel to our genuine attempt to achieve a diplomatic solution to this problem.



10 DOWNING STREET

~~John~~

I understand from the
Resident Clerk that Mr
Pym did not deliver this
letter to the President
as it would need redrafting
after his discussions in
the United States &
have informed the PM it was
not delivered

John
4/5

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I am tremendously heartened by the way you and Al Haig have come out in our support over the Falkland Islands. This will make it unmistakably clear to the Argentines that they cannot profit from aggression.

The measures you have announced, suspending supplies of military equipment and denying new export credit guarantees, will show the Argentines that you are in earnest. I hope that the measures on military supplies will enable your people to prevent the export of any equipment which might be used for military purposes, such as engines for the Sky-hawk aircraft.

I wonder if I could ask you to consider going further and to impose a complete ban on imports to the United States from Argentine? I believe this would be by far the most effective single measure which you could take to bring this crisis to a solution by peaceful means and I feel we must make every effort to do that. Also it would match the action which our European and Commonwealth partners have taken.

It would encourage the Community to maintain their own ban, imposed initially for one month, should this prove necessary. It would induce other countries, like Japan, to do the same. The political impact on the Argentine junta would be extremely powerful. They would face the prospect of 40% of their overseas markets being closed to them. The economic impact would be slower to take effect. But if it brings the Argentine junta to their senses quickly, it could be reversed without lasting damage.

I know that this will affect your economic interests, which are greater in the area than ours are. But the same is true of several of our European partners, especially Italy and Germany. They have been ready to take these radical measures, despite political and legal problems, because they see the very dangerous threat to the security of us all if Argentine aggression is not reversed. I hope most sincerely that you can do the same.

/So many

So many young lives are at risk - British and Argentinian - that I feel we must make a supreme effort to prevent a major military clash. Reason, humanity, commonsense have so far failed. With all my heart, I hope that the measures I propose will succeed.

Warm regards

SECRET

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 4 MAY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MOVEMENTS

1. On morning of 3 May, Mr Pym called on the President of the Security Council. It was a singularly unproductive meeting. He also gave a press conference at the UN. Mr Pym arrived back in London at 8 p.m. London time. Our Embassy gave a Community briefing to EC Missions in Washington about Mr Pym's visit.

CEASEFIRE PLEA BY MR HAIG

2. Mr Haig told Sir Nicholas Henderson last night that further successful military action by Britain might cause US, and for that matter Western opinion in general, to swing against her. We might be accused of over-reacting and of being too bellicose.

3. Haig had spoken to President Belaunde of Peru, who believed that the Argentines would accept a seven-point peace plan. This would be adjusted to provide for an interim administration by the US and Peru only. Haig thought that it was desperately urgent for the Prime Minister to propose a ceasefire to come into effect within hours to be followed by the implementation of the peace plan.

4. Mr Haig was informed by Sir Nicholas that the Secretary of State would consider this with the Prime Minister and senior colleagues at 9 a.m. London time today.

5. In a subsequent telegram we asked our Ambassador in Washington to make clear to Mr Haig that the Prime Minister would discuss new developments, including the Peruvian proposals. Meanwhile, military developments in the area would continue to be governed by existing rules of engagement but nothing unprecedented was contemplated before coming back to him.

6. Washington telegram number 1584 (received 0630 hours) refers to a document from Haig transmitted in telegram number 1585 (received 0700 hours) expressing his worry today at focus on military action and his belief that it is the moment for us to make a magnanimous diplomatic move when we have given proof to the whole world that, if need be, we can dictate military terms. The document contains a seven-point proposal for peace and a suggested ceasefire statement, to be made by HMG, to come into effect at 1600 GMT on 5 May.

UNITED NATIONS

7. The Secretary-General has told Sir Anthony Parsons that if "escalation continued" and there was another major incident at sea the Security Council would have to meet.

/SINKING

SECRET


SECRET

SINKING OF GENERAL BELGRANO AND AN ARGENTINE PATROL VESSEL

8. In a communiqué reported by Buenos Aires radio, the Argentine Foreign Ministry has announced that the cruiser General Belgrano with 1042 men on board was sunk by a British submarine at 1700 hours (2000 GMT) on 2 May. The attack took place 36 miles outside the Total Exclusion Zone. A joint staff communiqué reported by Buenos Aires radio said that Argentine naval ships have so far picked up 123 survivors from the General Belgrano, and that rescue operations are continuing.

--- 9. The attached MOD press release refers to the sinking of an Argentine patrol vessel.

4 May, 1982


T H Steggle
Emergency Unit

SECRET

ADDITIONAL MOD STATEMENT OF 3 MAY ON ENGAGEMENT WITH
PATROL CRAFT


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CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE FILE

GENERAL BELGRANO: SIR ANTHONY PARSONS

1. Sir Anthony Parsons telephoned at 1100 BST on 3 May asking for information on the fate of the General Belgrano. He said that he was meeting the President of the Security Council within the half-hour and wanted to be able to comment on a rumour being spread by the Argentinian Mission, that 500 Argentinian casualties had resulted from our attack on the General Belgrano.
2. I told him that, as Mr Nott had said in his television press conference that evening, we had no further information on the attack. Neither did we have any information on casualties. I also told him that according to communique no. 16, released by the Joint General Staff, the Argentinians now presumed the ship sunk.
3. UKMIS New York subsequently telephoned at 2.00 BST, Tuesday, 4th May, to ask whether there was any further information on the General Belgrano and whether a reply would be sent to Washington telegrams numbers 1574 and 1575 of 3 May.
4. I replied, on a secure line, that certain sources suggested that the ship had sunk at the coordinates given in the above communique. On the second point, I referred him to FCO telegram number 898 of 4 May to Washington which I expected he would receive in the next few minutes.



4 May, 1982

PW Martyn Warr
Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL

(26)



Mr Fearn

1. Mr Lavers, Brussels, rang on 4 May to say that during the Ambassador's initial call, Mr Tindemanns had offered little or no comment of detail on the Falklands dispute but had concentrated on the mandate. He had assured the Ambassador that Belgium would always be on the British side.
2. Mr Lavers has promised a fuller report by telegram.

A J Payne

A J Payne
Emergency Unit

4 May 1982

cc Mr Ure

(25)


Mr Ure

Mr Giffard

PS/Mr Onslow

GOVERNOR OF THE FALKLANDS:
CONSERVATIVE BACK BENCH COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE

1. Mr Hunt has received an invitation from the Conservative Back Bench Committee on Defence Questions to meet the Committee at 4 pm on Wednesday, 5 May. Mr Hunt assumes that he will be expected to answer questions but recognises that his answers will have to be confined to matters of fact. In particular, he would not offer any comment regarding the genesis of the dispute or any matters which could be regarded as proper to the enquiry which Ministers have promised.
2. Mr Hunt recalls that he has already met members of the Opposition. He would like Ministerial authority before accepting the invitation.
3. Provided that the interview is confined strictly to questions of fact, and that Ministers consider that such a briefing of the Committee would be helpful in a Parliamentary context, I see no objection to Mr Hunt's accepting.

A J Payne
Emergency Unit

4 May 1982

cc PS/PUS
Mr Fearn

SECRET

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 4 MAY

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
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 May 1982

Prime Minister

Content for revised
message to President Reagan
to issue? A.J.C. 4/5.

Dear Sir,

US Measures against Argentina

I wrote to you on 1 May enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan, which was subsequently amended in the light of the Prime Minister's comments. Mr Pym was grateful for the authority to deliver this letter during his visit to Washington; but he concluded, in the light of his talks there, that it would be better to wait until his return and to amend the draft somewhat in order to take account of the course of his discussions with Haig and, in particular, of the very positive indications he received from Haig and Weinberger of the US willingness to help on the military side.

I attach a revised draft which Mr Pym thinks might now usefully be sent to President Reagan even though the indications are that the Americans will find it very difficult to take further measures on the economic front at this stage.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing St

MOD PRESS BRIEFING MADE BY MR JOHN NOTT, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE ON
3 MAY 82 AT 2030 HOURS IN CONCOURSE HALL, MAIN BUILDING

Q. You talk about the minimum use of force - was the attack the British made really using the minimum amount of force?

A. If there is a threat to our ships and men we have no possible option but to respond to that threat. Our first duty is to protect our own men and therefore it was quite correct that we attacked in the way we did.

Q. Is Britain engaged in a war with Argentina?

A. Certainly we have hostilities with the Argentines. It is not in legal terms, however, a war, although the ordinary layman would class it as a war. We have the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Q. Does the right to self-defence include the right to invade the Island if necessary?

A. We would operate in self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. These Islands are British.

Q. What would be your description of the way things have gone and the prospects ahead?

A. There does not seem to be a will to settle this matter by peaceful means on the Argentine side. I hope we can settle the matter peacefully.

Q. Do you expect it to be a bloody conflict?

A. I sincerely hope not. There is still time for a peaceful solution.

Q. Have the Americans to date aided any of the missions?

A. We have received no military assistance from the United States. Nor will we seek it. We were naturally delighted at the offer of materiel support but there are further talks going on about that. It has only been talked about in general terms so far. It may be in the form of logistic support.

Q. What is your response to the claims that have been coming from the Argentines?

A. We have made it quite clear that many of the claims coming from Buenos Aires are just inaccurate. We will do our utmost to give you facts.

Q. In the light of your early success what do you think it will take to make the Argentines surrender?

A. I don't wish for a surrender as such. We want a withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and then we are prepared to go into negotiations for the long term future of the Islands. We have always made that quite clear.

Q. Could we have finished the cruiser off completely?

A. I should imagine it would have been possible.

Q. Would it be the policy of the Royal Navy to assist if there are any survivors from an attack?

A. I believe the Royal Navy dropped some rescue equipment for the crew of the patrol craft that was sunk. I would hope where it is possible we can exercise every opportunity of helping in the rescue of any Argentines in that position, including the use of our medical and hospital facilities.

Q. What can you do to slow down the pace of military hostilities so that there is some chance of negotiations?

A. It has been 4 weeks now. Eversince the invasion the Argentines have continued to build up their forces on the Island. They attacked South Georgia after Resolution 502 was passed.

Q. The boot now seems on the other foot on the military level - are we going to give them a breathing space?

A. We will maintain the initiative on the military level. We will maintain the form of pressure on the Argentines to change their minds. They must withdraw their troops.

Q. Are you in charge of the Task Force or is Admiral Woodward - who is giving the orders?

A. The Task Force remains quite clearly under overall political supervision and control ultimately, of course, under the direction of the Prime Minister. All the actions they have taken have been based on Rules of Engagement agreed at a political level and that will remain the case. The tactical decisions must be a matter for Admiral Woodward; it cannot be any other way.

Q. What advice can you give to the Falkland Islanders to preserve their own safety in the light of any action the British will take?

A. We are doing our best to keep them informed of what is happening. The majority of the Falkland Islanders are believed to be in the countryside and not in Port Stanley. The safety of the Islanders themselves is paramount in any action we take.

Q. If the use of military force is one of the tools you are using to try to pressurize the Argentines do you feel you have a lot of room left to apply more force?

A. We have a great deal left and will continue to use military means in parallel to our genuine attempt to achieve a diplomatic solution to this problem.

M05/21
• 3.5.82

SECRET until released

h

DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT ON DEPLOYMENT OF 5-BRIGADE AND
REQUISITION OF QE2

As part of our current plans 5 Infantry Brigade ~~has now~~^{are} being brought to short notice to move forward to the South Atlantic area. The Brigade is stationed in the United Kingdom and is already earmarked for out of area duties. Authority has also been given to take up the shipping necessary to transport the Brigade and work to prepare the ships for this role is being set in hand.

This action is being taken because it would be imprudent to contemplate operations - of whatever kind - so far from the UK without reserves available nearer the theatre; We also have to prepare for the possible need to maintain a substantial garrison in the Falkland Islands.

Among the ships being requisitioned is the QE2. The Ministry of Defence of course greatly regrets the inconvenience caused to intending passengers, but the QE2's speed, size and facilities make her uniquely suited to carry substantial numbers of troops who may be required to go into action at short notice.

At the same time as the QE2 we are requisitioning two roll-on-roll-off ferries, 'Baltic Ferry' and 'Nordic Ferry' and a container ship, 'Atlantic Causeway' which will be used to transport the helicopters needed for the air support of the brigade.

SECRET

NOTE FOR THE FILE


GENERAL BELGRANO: ARGENTINIAN COMMUNIQUE NO.16

1. The following communique was issued by the Joint General Staff at 2040 BST today:

" The Joint General Staff reports that, as a result of the attack suffered at a point located at 55 degrees 24 minutes south and 61 degrees 32 minutes west by the cruiser Genral Belgrano, reported in Communique No.15, indications exist that it must be presumed to have sunk."



3 May, 1982

 Martyn Warr
Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 3 MAY

ATTACK ON ARGENTINE CRUISER

1. On 2 May at approximately 8 p.m. London time, the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, sailing just outside the TEZ, was hit by torpedoes fired from a British submarine. The cruiser is believed to be severely damaged. MOD press statement attached.

PERUVIAN PEACE PLAN

2. Dr Arias, the Peruvian Foreign Minister, told HM Ambassador in Lima on evening of 2 May that, acting on President Belaunde's instructions, he had telephoned Costa Mendez to press on him a sevenpoint peace formula. Mr Haig had spoken several times to President Belaunde about the formula which had the approval of Costa Mendez. General Galtieri told Belaunde that he was "well disposed" towards the plan but had to convince the Junta which was meeting. President Belaunde hoped to make a statement soon. The Argentine official news agency later reported the rejection of the proposals which, so it claims, are basically the same as those made by Mr Haig on 27 April.


ATTACK ON PORT STANLEY AND GOOSE GREEN AIRFIELDS

3. Attached is the text of a further MOD press statement and a summary of international reactions.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MOVEMENTS

4. Mr Pym met Mr Haig for talks in Washington on 2 May before proceeding to New York where he dined with UN Secretary-General.

3 May, 1982


T H Steggle
Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL

TEXT OF MOD PRESS STATEMENT

"At approximately 8 p.m. London time this evening the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano was hit by torpedoes fired from a British submarine. The cruiser is believed to be severely damaged.

"On Friday, 23 April, HMG warned the Argentine Government that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. The cruiser posed a significant threat to the British Task Force maintaining the TEZ. The action taken was fully in accordance with the instructions given to the Task Force Commander based on the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The British submarine suffered no damage in the engagement and has resumed her patrol. Further details of the engagement will be given as soon as we have them.

[If pressed on whether the engagement took place within the TEZ the Ministry of Defence will reply that it was on the edge of and just outside the TEZ. In doing so however they will draw attention to the warning issued on 23 April, to the fact that the General Belgrano was posing a significant threat to the British task force and that action was taken in self-defence.]


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ER.

ZZ F C O

GRS 160A
CONFIDENTIAL
FM LIMA 030118Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 138 OF 3 MAY
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

2-MAY 1982



MIPT

1. IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.
2. MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES.
3. INTRODUCTION OF THIRD PARTIES TO ADMINISTER THE ISLANDS TEMPORARILY.
4. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO THE ISLANDS.
5. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS IN THE FINAL SOLUTION.
6. THE THIRD PARTIES OR CONTACT GROUP WOULD BE COMPOSED OF BRAZIL, PERU, WEST GERMANY AND THE US (BUT SEE PARA 2 OF MIPT). ALTERNATIVE (SPANISH) TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS: THE THIRD PARTIES OR CONTACT GROUP WHICH WOULD INTERVENE IMMEDIATELY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE COMPOSED OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO BE DESIGNATED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT.
7. THE FINAL SOLUTION WILL BE REACHED NO LATER THAN 30 APRIL 1983 UNDER THE GUARANTEE OF THE CONTACT GROUP.

WALLACE

FCO PSE PASS

[repeated "flash" to UKMis New York
& Desk by 030730Z, UK DEL NATO.]

NNNN

MOD PRESS STATEMENT - 1220 HOURS, 2 MAY

As you know yesterday before dawn VULCAN aircraft attacked Port Stanley airfield. Subsequently there was a follow up attack by a substantial number of Sea Harriers. The result was a severely damaged runway at Port Stanley airfield and considerable damage to ^{military} surrounding installations and stores. Goose Green was also attacked by a number of Sea Harriers. This local air strip was also damaged together with a number of Argentinian military aircraft parked in its vicinity. All our aircraft and crews returned safely. There was only minor damage to one aircraft which did not affect its capability and which has now in any case been repaired. There were no Task Force casualties.

In the late afternoon of the same day elements of the Task Force situated within the Total Exclusion Zone bombarded Port Stanley airfield to reinforce the effects of the bombing and to deter repair work. While this bombardment was taking place Argentinian fighter and bomber aircraft attacked the ships. They were engaged by Sea Harriers which shot down one Mirage aircraft. Another of the Argentinian Mirage aircraft is believed to have been shot down by Argentinian gun fire from around the airport. During the evening the Argentinians mounted a bombing raid on our Task Force. One of their Canberras was shot down by a Sea Harrier. Another was severely damaged. The raid was ineffective. Only one ship was damaged and that was only superficial splinter damage.

The frigate is continuing to perform its operational task.

The only casualty was Able Seaman Ian Britnell from Teignmouth, Devon, who sustained a splinter wound. He is only slightly wounded and able to walk."

We have no report of further engagements to date.

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACKS ON FALKLANDS ISLANDS: INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS AT
AS AT 0730 Hours 3 MAY

BRAZIL

In an official statement, Brazil 'disagrees' with the armed attack which it describes as a violation of SCR 502. It calls upon the Security Council to ensure the fulfilment of SCR 502.

CUBA

Aggressive statement condemning UK, supporting the Argentine cause and calling for full solidarity from all Latin American countries.

SPAIN

Statement describes attacks as a 'serious escalation' in the conflict; more generalised British action would signify a great responsibility and an historic error. Statement reaffirms Spanish opposition to the use of force and deplors the fact the colonial nature of the problem has been overlooked.

USSR

Moscow Radio has condemned Britain in predictable terms for attempting to restore the Falklands' colonial status by force.

MEXICO

The Mexican Foreign Minister regretted that hostilities had broken out.

VENEZUELA

President Herrera condemned this 'British aggression' and called for a review by Latin America of policies of integration and collective security.

CHINA

The MFA deeply regrets this grave development since the resort to military attacks against the 'Malvinas Islands', thus intensifying the conflict of bloodshed, makes a peaceful settlement more difficult.

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

SAPU(82) 13

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper issued at 1700 hours on 3 May 1982 contains information and suggested lines to take on the following -

1. Military Action from 1 May
2. Move of 5 Infantry Brigade
3. False Argentine Military Claims
4. Mr Pym's Visit to Washington

Cabinet Office

3 May 1982

RESTRICTED

Line to Take

1. Military action from 1 May.

1 May (am) Air Raids on Port Stanley and Goose Green Airstrips

- Before dawn Vulcan aircraft attacked Port Stanley airfield to enforce TEZ and deny use of the airstrip. Subsequently there was a follow-up attack by Sea Harriers. The result was severe damage to the runway and surrounding military installations. The local airstrip at Goose Green was also damaged in a raid by Sea Harriers together with a number of Argentine military aircraft parked nearby. All our aircraft and crews returned safely.

1 May (pm) Bombardment of Port Stanley Airfield

- Bombardment carried out by ships of the Task Force to reinforce effects of bombing and deter repair work. During the bombardment the ships were attacked by Argentine fighters and bombers. One Mirage was shot down by a Sea Harrier and another Mirage is believed to have been shot down by Argentine gunfire.

1 May (evening) Attack on Task Force by Argentine aircraft.

- During evening a bombing raid was mounted on the Task Force. One Argentine Canberra was shot down and the raid was ineffective. One British ship suffered superficial damage and one seaman was injured.

2 May (pm) Argentine cruiser torpedoed.

- Argentine cruiser General Belgrano torpedoed by British submarine from outside the TEZ to the south of the Falklands. On 23 April we had announced a defensive zone around the task force and the cruiser, accompanied by two escort vessels, posed a significant threat to our ships. With modern weapons, particularly missiles, we cannot afford to wait until actually fired on and so the cruiser was attacked in accordance with our warning. It was hit by two torpedoes and severely damaged although according to latest reports it has not sunk.

2/3 May (Night) Argentine patrol vessel sunk.

- During a surveillance mission during the night a Sea King helicopter was attacked inside the TEZ by two Argentine armoured patrol craft. These craft were subsequently attacked by Lynx helicopters; one was sunk and the other damaged. Shortly after the attack life saving equipment was dropped by helicopter close to the damaged vessel. All our helicopters have returned safely.

2. Move of the 5th Infantry Brigade

5 Infantry Brigade is being brought to short notice to move to the South Atlantic. The Brigade is stationed in the United Kingdom and is already earmarked for out of area (ie non-NATO) duties. We are requisitioning shipping (including QE2) to transport the Brigade and work to prepare the ships for this role is being put in hand.

Why extra troops?

- Only prudent when contemplating operations - of whatever kind - to have reserves available nearer the theatre.

Why QE2?

- Speed, size, facilitate make her uniquely suited to carry substantial number of troops who must be kept fit and ready for operations, should they be required.

Other ships?

- Two roll-on-roll-off ferries and a container ship to transport equipment and helicopters.

3. False Argentine military claims

The Argentines have been quick to put out false reports of various military encounters, greatly exaggerating the performance of their forces. In order to make sure that our own statements are fully authenticated and as complete as possible we have to check and re-check before giving details (although some details may have to be held back for operational reasons). This takes time when the Task Force is over 8,000 miles away and is engaged in operations. It is worth waiting for the truth. In a Parliamentary democracy it is

is incumbent upon Government spokesmen to produce the truth. In a military dictatorship, and particularly one whose domestic position is so insecure, the position is quite different. The fact that the Argentines are now jamming BBC World Service bulletins in Spanish is clear evidence that they are determined to suppress accurate and well substantiated reporting.

Examples of false Argentine military reports include -

- i. HMS Exeter According to Argentines several days ago HMS Exeter had been "bombed", "mined" and "sunk". In fact, as Ministry of Defence confirmed HMS Exeter had not been involved in any military operation.

- ii. Aircraft losses During Saturday and Sunday, Argentines made a number of wild and varying claims about the number of British aircraft shot down, claiming up to eleven Harriers and a helicopter. In fact, no British aircraft were shot down - one aircraft suffered minimal damage which has already been repaired - and there were no casualties among the air crew. Confirmed by correspondents with the fleet who counted the same number of aircraft flying off and returning.

- iii. Port Stanley airfield Argentina claim only minimal damage during raids - "a small fire caused by an exploding oil barrel". In fact, the runway and surrounding military installations were severely damaged - correspondents have seen the photographs and confirmed that the runway is severely cratered. The local airstrip at Goose Green was also damaged together with a number of Argentine military aircraft parked nearby.

- iv. Damage to Task Force Argentines have claimed to have destroyed 2 helicopters and severely damaged up to four frigates, one aircraft carrier and a destroyer during air raids on the Task Force. One report claims that damage to Hermes is so serious that the Task Force can only count on Invincible. In fact, the only damage sustained by the Task Force is superficial splinter damage to the superstructure of one frigate.

v. British casualties. Argentines have claimed that there are serious British casualties (and one report claims that a shot down pilot has been picked up). In fact, there have been no casualties or losses among British aircrew and the only casualty in the Task Force is one seaman wounded by shrapnel splinters who is 'safe and comfortable'.

4. Mr Pym's visit to Washington

Attached for information is a transcript of his press conference in Washington on Sunday night.

GR 4,500
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 030500Z
FM WASHINGTON 022230Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1569 OF 2 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY BOGOTA BRASILIA BRIDGETOWN RIO DE JANEIRO GUATEMALA CITY
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COPENHAGEN LISBON LUXEMBOURG DUBLIN PARIS ROME REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE
UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS MOSCOW CANBERRA OTTAWA (FOR DUTY OFFICER)
WELLINGTON OSLO UKMIS GENEVA
ROUTINE PRAGUE BUDAPEST BUCHAREST EAST BERLIN BELGRADE SOFIA WARSAW
PEKING HELSINKI HOLYSEE BOSTON CLEVELAND DETROIT LOS ANGELES SEATTLE
ATLANTA CHICAGO DALLAS HOUSTON SAN FRANCISCO
FALKLANDS: PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE IN WASHINGTON

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S PRESS CONFERENCE
THIS AFTERNOON AT THIS EMBASSY.

GOOD AFTERNOON.

THERE IS I KNOW A VERY GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE SOUTH
ATLANTIC. BUT I HAVE NO FURTHER NEWS TO REPORT TO YOU OF ANY EVENTS
THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE TODAY, AND I WOULD LIKE TO SAY HERE THAT YOU
CAN COUNT UPON THE TRUTH AND VALIDITY OF ANY COMMUNIQUE THAT WE ISSUE
FROM THE DEFENCE MINISTRY IN LONDON. YOU WILL KNOW THAT AFTER THE
RETAKING OF SOUTH GEORGIA THERE WAS A VERY GREAT DEAL OF MISINFORMA-
TION THAT CAME OUT OF BUENOS AIRES ABOUT THAT EVENT WHICH WASN'T
TRUE, AND THE SAME OCCURRED YESTERDAY SO I JUST WISH TO GIVE YOU
CONFIDENCE AT THE OUTSET THAT WE WILL TELL YOU THE TRUTH OF WHAT
HAPPENED.

LAST WEEK I CAME HERE TO SEE MR. HAIG IN HIS ROLE AS A MEDIATOR.
TODAY I HAVE COME BACK TO CONSULT HIM AS AN ALLY. THE BRITISH
PEOPLE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO THE UNITED STATES FOR COMING DOWN
IN THEIR SUPPORT. WE NEVER HAD ANY DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD COME DOWN
IN SUPPORT OF THE VICTIM AND AGAINST THE AGGRESSOR. AFTER ALL, OUR
TWO COUNTRIES SHARE THE SAME DEMOCRATIC IDEALS.

MR. HAIG AND I HAVE BEEN TAKING STOCK OF THE SITUATION TODAY AND
HOW WE CAN SECURE THE CARRYING OUT OF RESOLUTION 502 AND THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLAND WHICH OF COURSE IS
A PRECONDITION OF EVERYTHING. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE MILITARY
SITUATION, WE HAVE LOOKED AT THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES WHICH ARE BEING
APPLIED TO ARGENTINA AND WE HAVE BEEN EXPLORING WHAT FURTHER
DIPLOMATIC STEPS MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATED. I WOULD SAY THAT THE LONG
PHASE OF MR. HAIG'S MISSION ENDED WITH THE REJECTION OF THE UNITED
STATES PROPOSALS BY THE ARGENTINES A FEW DAYS AGO. BUT THAT DOES
NOT END THE SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. THE PRESSURES THAT WE
HAVE BEEN APPLYING ON THE ARGENTINES FROM THE OUTSET, - ECONOMIC,
DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY - GO HAND IN HAND WITH THE CONTINUING
SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT. SO WHILE THOSE PRESSURES BUILD UP THE DOOR
REMAINS OPEN.

/NOW I

NOW I WOULD JUST LIKE TO BRING YOUR MINDS TO THE FACTS ABOUT WHAT THIS ISSUE IS ALL ABOUT. AS I WAS SAYING EARLIER, THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN SHARE THE SAME IDEALS, IT'S ABOUT THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF PEOPLE, ITS ABOUT DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO CHOOSE FOR THEMSELVES THE KIND OF GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WANT. THE UNITED STATES AND BRITIAN HAVE A LONG HISTORY IN DEFENCE OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO CHOOSE BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS. AS WE KNOW, THERE IS A DIFFERENT-SYSTEM IN ARGENTINA. THEY HAVE TRIED TO IMPOSE - INDEED THEY HAVE FOR THE MOMENT IMPOSED - BY FORCE A RULE IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THAT DENIES THE PEOPLE THEIR CHOICE FOR WHAT THEY WANT, AND THAT IS WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT. WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN MANY MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN HISTORY, AS HAS THE UNITED STATES, IN DEFENCE OF THAT FREEDOM. ITS A WORLD PROBLEM, NOT JUST A BRITISH PROBLEM, IT'S VITAL THAT WE PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, THE RIGHTS OF PARLIAMENTS TO RUN THEIR COUNTRIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE. AND THAT IS WHY THIS ISSUE IS NOT JUST A MINOR MATTER AFFECTING A FEW THOUSAND PEOPLE DOWN ON AN ISLAND IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, IT'S AN ISSUE THAT AFFECTS COUNTRIES IN EVERY CONTINENT ALL OVER THE WORLD. FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS NOW THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT OF RUNNING THEIR COUNTRY AS THEY WANT: THERE ARE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TROOPS OVER-RUNNING THAT COUNTRY, THERE ARE PLENTY OF OTHER EXAMPLES. AND IF WE WERE TO ALLOW THIS ISSUE NOT TO BE CORRECTED, THIS WRONG, THIS INVASION, THIS AGGRESSIVE ACTION NOT TO BE CORRECTED, THEN THERE ARE A LOT OF OTHER COUNTRIES ALL ROUND THE WORLD WHO WOULD FEEL EVEN MORE FEARFUL THAN THEY DO TODAY. AND THIS IS WHY THE ISSUE IN FACT IS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE WAY WE RUN OUR AFFAIRS. EVERYBODY WANTED THIS TO BE DONE PEACEFULLY, I AM SURE IT IS THOSE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, THAT BASIC PHILOSOPHY AND THOSE COMMON IDEALS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THAT DECIDED THE UNITED STATES TO COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE. AND THAT IS WHAT I WANTED TO SAY BY WAY OF AN OPENING STATEMENT.

NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE IT LIKELY THAT THERE COULD BE ANY WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS AND RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS AS LONG AS THE PRESENT JUNTA REMAINS IN ARGENTINA?

A. YES OF COURSE, THEY BEGAN THE AGGRESSIVE ACTION, THEY INVADED THE ISLANDS, AND DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS WHEN THEY WERE UNDER A MANDATORY RESOLUTION TO WITHDRAW THOSE FORCES THEY HAVE REINFORCED THEM. THEY HAVE NOW GOT SOME THOUSANDS ON THAT ISLAND, THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO BE THERE AND THEY WILL HAVE TO GO FROM THERE. THEY STARTED THIS INVASION AND OF COURSE WE WANT THEM TO GO BACK, AS A RESULT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IF WE CAN, AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE CAN. BUT IF NOT, THEN I AM AFRAID THEY WILL HAVE TO GO BACK BY FORCE. BUT WE MUST HOPE THAT SENSE WILL PREVAIL.

SHOPPING LIST?

Q. BALTIMORE SUN.

COULD YOU TELL US WHAT YOU HAVE ASKED FROM THE UNITED STATES IN THE WAY OF MATERIEL SUPPORT?

A. I HAVE NOT COME HERE WITH A SHOPPING LIST. THEY MADE CLEAR IN THEIR STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD GIVE US MATERIEL SUPPORT AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RESPECTS THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAVE COME DOWN TO HELP US. BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WAYS, LOGISTIC WAYS, OTHER WAYS IN WHICH THEY ARE ABLE TO HELP US. I AM GOING TO SEE MR. WEINBERGER LATER ON THIS AFTERNOON BUT I HAVE NOT COME WITH ANY LIST, I WISH TO MAKE THAT QUITE CLEAR, I HAVE COME TO REVIEW THE SITUATION WHICH IS QUITE DIFFERENT TO WHAT IT WAS LAST WEEK BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS COME DOWN IN SUPPORT OF BRITAIN.

Q. HAVE YOU MADE ANY REQUEST AT ALL FROM THE UNITED STATES SO FAR?

A. I HAVE NOT MADE ANY SPECIFIC REQUESTS OF THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING THEIR STATEMENT BUT WHAT I HAVE DONE IS TO DISCUSS IN VERY GENERAL TERMS WITH MR. HAIG THIS MORNING WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES MIGHT BE AND I AM GOING TO HAVE A FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH MR. WEINBERGER THIS AFTERNOON. BUT I AM NOT GOING TO MAKE ANY SPECIFIC REQUEST.

A NEW MEDIATOR?

Q. WITH THE UNITED STATES FIRMLY ATTACHED TO THE BRITISH SIDE NOW SIR, WHO DO YOU THINK WILL BE IN A POSITION TO MEDIATE?

A. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER WE CAN FIND, WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND, A MEDIATOR OR MEDIATORS. THAT IS SOMETHING THAT I WILL EXPLORE FURTHER THIS EVENING WHEN I GO TO NEW YORK, BUT THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS HAVE GOT TO BE FULFILLED ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE TO START WITH. THEY HAVE GOT TO GO, AND THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY HAS GOT TO REMAIN IN A SITUATION THAT DOES NOT PREJUDGE IT. AND THAT IS A BIG CHANGE FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. WHETHER WE CAN FIND SUCH A MEDIATOR REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT I CAN IMAGINE QUITE A LOT OF DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES.

FURTHER MILITARY ACTION?

Q. CAN YOU TELL US IF THE FIGHTING HAS STOPPED AT THIS POINT OR IF THERE MAY STILL BE MILITARY ACTION?

A. THERE IS NO MILITARY ACTION AT THE PRESENT MOMENT. BUT THE POSITION IS THAT WE ANNOUNCED SOME DAYS AGO THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND THE ACTION WE TOOK YESTERDAY WAS IN DEFENCE OF THAT TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE OVER WHICH WE ARE GOING TO MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF ACTION. NOW IT MAY BE THAT TODAY IT HAS NOT BEEN CHALLENGED BY THE ARGENTINES. THAT MAY BE THE POSITION. BUT AT ANYRATE THERE HAVE BEEN NO INCIDENTS WHICH SUGGEST THAT THAT MIGHT BE SO. BUT IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF THE FIGHTING STOPPING, IT PROBABLY IS THAT NOBODY HAS COME INTO THE TEZ AND THEREFORE NO ACTION HAS TAKEN PLACE. BUT THAT IS ONLY A GUESS.

TIMESCALE

Q. ITN

WE KNOW THAT THE WEATHER IS GETTING VERY BAD DOWN IN THE FALKLANDS, TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR MILITARY ACTION. HOW LONG DO YOU GIVE NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED BEFORE WE GO IN AND FINISH IT OFF MILITARILY?

A. WELL I DON'T KNOW THAT THE WEATHER IS GOING TO HAVE ANY GREAT EFFECT. WHAT WE HAVE DONE SO FAR IN MILITARY ACTION IS TO SECURE THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND THAT WE SHALL GO ON DOING, AND WE SHALL GO ON DOING IT IN ALL WEATHERS. THERE IS NO OTHER MILITARY ACTION ENVISAGED AT THE MOMENT OTHER THAN MAKING THAT ZONE SECURE. NOT ONLY IS THERE NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THAT AND SEEKING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, THEY DO IN FACT GO HAND IN HAND.. BECAUSE UNLESS WE ARE THERE BUILDING UP THE MILITARY PRESSURE TOGETHER WITH ALL THE OTHER PRESSURES THEN IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION AND THAT IS WHAT THE TASK FORCE IS THERE TO DO, TO BACK UP THE NEGOTIATIONS.

WHEN DOES DIPLOMACY RUN OUT?

Q. YOU SAY ARGENTINA MUST LEAVE THE ISLAND, WHEN DOES THE POINT ARISE WHEN DIPLOMACY WILL NOT ACHIEVE THAT END?

A. THEY ARE UNDER A MANDATORY RESOLUTION FROM THE UNITED NATIONS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ISLANDS. HOW THAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED IS ANOTHER MATTER, THAT I SHALL BE DISCUSSING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TONIGHT

CONTINUING US ROLE?

INDEPENDENT NEWS:

Q. DO YOU SEE THE US CONTINUING ANY PARTICULAR ROLE?

A. THEY HAVE JUST AS GREAT AN INTEREST AS WE AND ALL THE REST OF US IN TRYING TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IF POSSIBLE, SO I CERTAINLY DO NOT REGARD THEIR ROLE IN THAT AS OVER - CERTAINLY NOT. THE WAY TO ACHIEVE IT IS NOT BY ANY MEANS CLEAR, NOT ONLY TO US OR THE THE UNITED STATES, IT ISN'T VERY CLEAR TO ANYBODY, BUT LET'S NOT CLOSE ANY DOORS.

US ECONOMIC ACTION?

Q. JOHN DICKIE. DAILY MAIL: HAVE YOU ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE SOME ACTION AS YOUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS HAVE DONE IN TERMS OF AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE?

A. THE ANNOUNCEMENT THE UNITED STATES MADE A FEW DAYS AGO COMING IN SUPPORT OF BRITAIN, THERE WAS AN ECONOMIC PART OF IT AND I THINK YOU WILL FIND PROBABLY IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THERE WILL BE FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT PRECISE ACTION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD THEY HAVE TAKEN. BUT CERTAINLY THEIR INITIAL STATEMENT DOES INCLUDE ECONOMIC MEASURES..... THAT WAS AN INITIAL STATEMENT AND WE DISCUSSED IT THIS MORNING AND IT MAY VERY WELL BE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES. MR HAIG HAS SAID THAT HE WILL CONSIDER THAT BUT IT IS UP TO THE UNITED STATES TO DECIDE THAT.

Q. WOULD YOU LIKE TO GET IT ON THE SAME LEVEL AS YOUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS?

A. OH NATURALLY, I WANT TO SEE THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF PRESSURE APPLIED AND THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES CAME BEHIND BRITAIN IS THE MOST DRAMATIC SINGLE INCREASE IN THE PRESSURE AGAINST THE ARGENTINES THAT ANYBODY COULD POSSIBLY IMAGINE.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO?

Q. OTHER ANALYSTS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT NATO SHOULD BE RECONSTRUCTED TO FIGHT COLONIALIST WARS IN THE THIRD WORLD, DO YOU AGREE?

A. THERE'S NO CONNECTION BETWEEN ANY OF THOSE THINGS AND WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW AT ALL, NOR DO I THINK THERE WILL BE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OR ANY NEED FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SO FAR AS NATO IS CONCERNED - ITS RESPONSIBILITIES ARE ENTIRELY CLEAR. WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IS THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE RIGHT OF SELFDETERMINATION, THE RIGHT FOR PEOPLE TO CHOOSE HOW THEY ARE GOING TO GOVERN THEIR COUNTRY FOR THEMSELVES AND NOT HAVE SOME OTHER REGIME IMPOSED UPON THEM AND THAT IS ALL THAT IS IMPLIED HERE AND THE STEPS WE ARE TAKING MILITARILY IS IN ORDER TO ASSIST AND TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE.

NEED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHERS?

Q. DO YOU SEE OR REQUIRE ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM ALLIES CLOSER IE AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH AFRICA AND IF SO WHAT SORT OF ASSISTANCE?

A. WE HAVE NOT ASKED FOR ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND NOBODY AT THE MOMENT HAS OFFERED ANY. IT WOULD BE NO DOUBT WELCOME WERE IT TO BE OFFERED, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THE BASIS OF THE SUPPORT THAT WE ARE RECEIVING AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR IT AND WE ARE NOT AT THE MOMENT THINKING OF ASKING FOR MORE OR FURTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

Q. WHAT ABOUT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FROM THESE COUNTRIES?

A. WELL, ANY INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE LIKE THAT THAT THEY CAN GIVE US OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE WELCOME.

SHOPPING LIST?

Q. NBC. YOU SAY YOU HAVE COME HERE WITH NO SHOPPING LIST: WHEN MIGHT WE EXPECT SPECIFIC REQUESTS FROM BRITAIN?

A. THERE WILL BE A LOT OF CONTACT AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL, AT MILITARY LEVEL, AND AS THE NEEDS BECOME MORE APPARENT THEN SPECIFIC REQUESTS WILL BE MADE, BUT IT'S COVERED I THINK VERY CLEARLY BY THE STATEMENT MADE BY MR HAIG ORIGINALLY IN THE MANNER OF PROVIDING US WITH MATERIEL SUPPORT THAT ARE ASKED FOR.

Q. MIGHT THAT COME AT THE NATO MEETING NEXT WEEK?

A. NO, QUITE SEPARATELY AND DIRECTLY BILATERALLY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

FURTHER MILITARY ACTION?

Q. AP. ARE YOU IN FACT SUGGESTING THERE MIGHT NOT BE ANY MORE FIGHTING IF ARGENTINA STAYS OUT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE?

A. IF THEY STAY OUT OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE THEN THERE MAY NOT BE THE CLASHES SUCH AS WE HAD YESTERDAY. BUT OF COURSE THEY STILL HAVE THOUSANDS OF TROOPS ON THE ISLAND AND THEY HAVE STILL GOT TO BE REMOVED BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER SO I CERTAINLY DO NOT IN ANY SENSE INTEND TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WILL NOT BE FURTHER FIGHTING. THAT WOULD BE TOTALLY WRONG.

EROSION OF SUPPORT?

Q. ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT IF THERE IS ESCALATION SOME OF THE SUPPORT YOU HAVE GOT ON SANCTIONS AND THE ENTHUSIASM MAY DRIFT AWAY?

A. NO. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE SUPPORT THAT WE HAVE WILL CONTINUE. IF IT DRAGS ON A LONG TIME, WHICH OF COURSE WE HOPE IT DOESN'T, IT MAY HAPPEN THAT ONE OR TWO CHANGES MIGHT BE SOUGHT FOR ALL I KNOW, BUT THE WHOLE WEIGHT SO FAR HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN PRESSURE. I HAVE NO INDICATION OF ANY KIND TO SUGGEST THAT THAT WILL NOT CONTINUE. AFTERALL, EVERY COUNTRY, NOT ONLY THOSE WHO ARE SUPPORTING US BUT A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHO HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO SUPPORT US, EXCEPT BY THEIR EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL AND SUPPORT, WILL HAVE A DIRECT INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE, WHICH IS TO RESTORE THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE ON THESE ISLANDS TO CHOOSE THE KIND OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT. SO I HAVE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE AT THE MOMENT, NO INDICATION OF ANY KIND THAT THAT SUPPORT IS IN ANY WAY WEAKENING. RATHER THE REVERSE.

Q. THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT IF THERE IS CONSIDERABLE BLOODSHED IRELAND MAY BE FORCED TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION.

A. WELL, EVERY GOVERNMENT IS ENTITLED TO EXPRESS ANY VIEW THAT THEY WISH. AND OF COURSE WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO CONCLUDE THIS WITHOUT SHEDDING BLOOD, OF COURSE. WE AREN'T FIGHTING THROUGH CHOICE, BRITAIN DOESN'T WANT TO BE PUT IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO FIGHT. BUT WE KNOW WHAT IS AT STAKE, IT'S SOMETHING THAT REALLY MATTERS. IT ACTUALLY IS AT STAKE TO HAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE LIKE THIS - I'VE GOT A PARLIAMENT TO ANSWER TO BACK HOME. ALL DEMOCRATIC POLITICIANS ARE IN THAT SITUATION. THAT DOESN'T APPLY TO EVERY COUNTRY AND WHEN A COUNTRY HAS THAT RIGHT, AND IT'S REMOVED FROM THEM BY FORCE, IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF EVERYBODY TO MAKE SURE THAT THAT IS PUT RIGHT AND THAT'S WHAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN DOING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

MILITARY STRENGTH SUFFICIENT?

Q. FINANCIAL TIMES. YOU SAY YOU HAVE NOT ASKED FOR ANY SPECIFIC SUPPORT FROM THE US - DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU ARE CONFIDENT THAT BRITAIN HAS THE MILITARY STRENGTH TO RECLAIM THE ISLANDS BY FORCE IF NECESSARY?

A. OBVIOUSLY THE UNITED STATES WANT TO GIVE US SUPPORT, SHORT OF A DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. AND WE WANT IT AND WE NEED IT, LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND OTHER KINDS OF SUPPORT. I HAVEN'T COME HERE TO SPECIFICALLY TO ASK FOR THIS THAT OR THE OTHER, BUT I AM SURE THAT WE SHALL GET DOWN TO THE DETAILS BOTH AT THE MILITARY LEVEL AND AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.

Q. FINANCIAL TIMES. YOU SAID WE NEED IT, OR CAN WE DO IT BY OURSELVES?

A. YES, WELL IT'S A VERY GREAT HELP.

SOVIET UNION AND CUBA?

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION OR DO YOU KNOW WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA ARE GIVING ANY ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA AND DO YOU THINK THIS WILL BREAK DOWN AS AN EAST/WEST ISSUE?

A. I THINK THE LAST IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY. I'VE GOT VIRTUALLY NO INFORMATION ON THE FORMER - THERE IS OF COURSE CONTACT, NATURALLY: THE ARGENTINES ARE HAVING THEIR TRADE AFFECTED BY WHAT THE COMMUNITY HAS DONE AND NO DOUBT NOW BY WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOING, AND ARMS SUPPLIES ARE ALL CUT OFF FROM THEM. IN LATIN AMERICA ITSELF, WHEREAS THERE IS IN SOME QUARTERS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FOR THEM AND A SYMPATHY WITH THEIR POINT OF VIEW, - THERE IS ALSO A DESIRE THAT THE MILITARY SIDE OF IT SHOULD NOT ESCALATE. BUT ON YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTION, I HAVE VERY LITTLE INFORMATION, WHICH SUGGESTS TO ME THAT THERE PROBABLY ISN'T MORE THAN A FAIRLY SMALL AMOUNT OF CONTACT.

NEXT STEP IN NEGOTIATION?

Q. WHAT EXACTLY IS THE NEXT STEP TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING AGAIN?

A. I AM TRYING TO FIND ANY MEANS THAT WOULD PRODUCE A SUCCESSFUL RESULT. BUT I THINK THE REAL POINT IS A CHANGE OF HEART BY THE ARGENTINES. THEY MUST NOT REMAIN WITH THEIR CLAIM FOR ASSERTING SOVEREIGNTY. THEY HAVE HAD A CLAIM THEY SAY FOR A LONG TIME. OK, THERE ARE WAYS IN WHICH THAT CAN BE SETTLED AND IN FACT ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WERE ACTUALLY ROUND THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH THEM - UNTIL THEY TOOK THIS AGGRESSIVE ACTION. AND ALSO THEY HAVE GOT TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES. SO THOSE ARE TWO OF THE CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE MET AND I AM HERE TO SEARCH FOR WHATEVER WAYS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT.

HMG'S ATTITUDE TO HAIG PROPOSALS?

Q. CAN YOU STATE UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT IF ARGENTINA HAD ACCEPTED MR HAIG'S LAST SET OF PROPOSALS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE DONE THE SAME?

A. NO. I CANNOT SAY THAT UNAMBIGUOUSLY BECAUSE AS I MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR, AND SO DID MY PRIME MINISTER, IT HAD REAL DIFFICULTIES FOR US. BUT WHAT HE SAID IN HIS STATEMENT WAS THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD CONSIDER PROPOSALS ON THESE LINES; AND THE ANSWER IS THAT WE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING PROPOSALS ON THESE LINES. HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DID HAVE DIFFICULTIES FOR US; AND OF COURSE IT WAS RIGHT FOR THE ARGENTINES TO RESPOND FIRST. BUT AS THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DO THE BASIC ESSENTIALS, WHICH I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED, THEN THERE WAS NO POINT IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT GOING ANY FURTHER. THAT IS THE POSITION THERE.

UN SECRETARY-GENERAL?

Q. ARE YOU GOING TO NEW YORK TO SEEK HELP FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL, OR TO SEE WHAT HELP THEY MIGHT GIVE YOU?

A. I AM GOING TO EXPLORE WHATEVER POSSIBILITIES MAY EXIST - I HAVEN'T YET HAD THE CHANCE OF MEETING THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND I WANT TO DISCOVER WHAT IDEAS HE MAY HAVE, I WILL SHARE SOME VIEWS I MAY HAVE, AND I WILL SEE WHAT PROGRESS WE CAN MAKE.

ESCALATION IN LATIN AMERICA?

Q. DO YOU FEAR THAT THIS MIGHT JEOPARDISE RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND THAT IT WILL EXCALATE THE CONFLICT WITH PARTICIPATION OF OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES?

A. I AM AFRIAD I DON'T THINK THAT; BUT EVEN IF THERE MIGHT BE AN ELEMENT OF TRUTH IN IT WE STILL HAVE TO DO WHAT WE ARE DOING BECAUSE THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT PUTTING THIS WRONG RIGHT ARE VERY SERIOUS INDEED, FOR MANY COUNTRIES IN ALL CONTINENTS. SO THERE MAY BE SOME RISK THERE, BUT I THINK THERE MIGHT BE EVEN GREATER RISK IF WE ALLOWED INTERNATIONAL DISORDER UNDER A THREAT - NOT A THREAT OF FORCE, THE ACTUAL USE OF FORCE - TO GO UNCHALLENGED.

MILITARY STRATEGY?

Q: IS YOUR STRATEGY SIMPLY TO CUT OFF THE FORCE ON THE ISLANDS AND STARVE THEM OUT? IS THAT THE BOTTOM LINE OF YOUR STRATEGY?

A: THERE IS NO BOTTOM LINE OF STRATEGY OF THAT KIND. WE ARE FIRST OF ALL THERE TO SECURE THE ZONE, AS I SAID. IT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY HAVE THAT RESULT. AND THAT MIGHT BE ENOUGH PERHAPS FOR THE ARGENTINES TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS - I RATHER DOUBT IT. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE GOT IS WHO ARE YOU DEALING WITH DOWN THERE? THERE ARE SO MANY VIEWS, THEY CHANGE THEIR MINDS. THE JUNTA THINKS ONE THING AND THE GENERALS AND THE ADMIRALS THINK SOMETHING ELSE, AND THEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAYS SOMETHING ELSE: IT'S VERY DIFFICULT IN THIS AREA TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THEY ARE THINKING. IF THAT SITUATION WERE TO ARISE, IT MAY BE FOR ALL I KNOW THAT THEY WOULD TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW: BUT WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CHANGE?

Q. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT PART OF BRITAIN'S STRATEGY IS TO TRY TO GET A CHANGE OF ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. WOULD BRITAIN HAVE A BETTER CHANCE WITH A CHANGE IN THE JUNTA?

A. I HAVE 'NT THE SLIGHTEST IDEA AND I AM NOT SURE THAT I MIND VERY MUCH. IF THEY DECIDE TO CHANGE THEIR LEADERS - WELL, THAT IS A MATTER FOR THEM. IT IS QUITE CLEAR AND ON THE TABLE WHAT WE WANT, AND WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS REQUIRES THEM TO DO, AND IF THAT REQUIRES THEM TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT ONCE OR TWICE, SO BE IT.

UN PEACEKEEPING ROLE?

Q. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BRITAIN BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOME KIND OF UN PEACE KEEPING ROLE?

A. WELL THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. OF COURSE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDITIONS FULFILLED. WHETHER THAT IS THE BEST WAY OF DOING IT I DON'T KNOW. YOU SEE THERE OUGHTN'T REALLY TO BE THE NEED FOR A PEACE KEEPING ROLE, THEY OUGHT TO GO FROM THE ISLAND AND THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OUGHT TO BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATIONS AS THE POSITION WAS BEFORE. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY OF SETTLING IT, IT CERTAINLY CAN'T BE SETTLED BY FORCE. THEY HAVE TRIED TO SETTLE IT BY FORCE, THEY HAVE INVADDED THE ISLAND AND THEY SHOW EVERY SIGN OF TRYING TO STAY THERE. SORRY, THAT CANNOT BE ALLOWED.

CHANCES OF AVOIDING FULL SCALE HOSTILITIES

Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE CHANCES ARE THAT THE SITUATION CAN BE DEFUSED WITHOUT COMING TO FULL-SCALE HOSTILITIES?

A. I CERTAINLY WOULDN'T GIVE UP HOPE OF THAT. SOME OF YOU IN THIS ROOM WOULD BE MUCH MORE EXPERIENCED THAN ME IN READING THE ARGENTINES' MIND AND HOW THEY WOULD BE THINKING ABOUT IT AND HOW THEY WOULD BE LOOKING AT IT. BUT I THINK THE VENTS OF YESTERDAY AND SOUTH GEORGIA HAVE CERTAINLY HAD THEIR EFFECT. I HAVEN'T ANY DOUBT OF IT. WHEN AIRCRAFT GET SHOT DOWN, AND WHEN THEY FIND WHEN THEY ARE CHALLENGED THEY LOSE, THAT WILL CONCENTRATE THEIR MINDS VERY SHARPLY; AND IT IS IN THIS SENSE AND IN THIS WAY THAT THE BUILD-UP OF MILITARY PRESSURE, ALONG WITH ALL THE OTHERS, HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON THE ATTAINMENT, WHICH IS OUR OBJECTIVE, OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

ARGENTINE RESOLVE?

Q. DO YOU DETECT ANY SOFTENING OF ARGENTINE RESOLVE?

A. I REAKON THERE ARE A LOT OF WORRIED PEOPLE RUNNING ROUND BUENOS AIRES.

US MILITARY AID

Q. DO YOU THINK THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUPPLY THE UK WITH MORE DIRECT MEANS OF MILITARY AID?

A. WE RESPECT THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED US AND WE ARE QUITE SATISFIED WITH IT. AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT THAT THEY ARE GOING TO GIVE US IN THE GENERAL FIELD OF MATERIEL. SO WE ARE QUITE HAPPY ABOUT THAT, AND ARE VERY GRATEFUL FOR IT: AND I THINK THE IMPACT OF THEIR SUPPORT AND THE EFFECT IT WILL HAVE ON THE REST OF THE WORLD, THAT WE ARE ALL IN THIS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SELF DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, FOR THE CONTINUATION OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, FOR THE RIGHT TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE LIKE THIS.

HAIG ON MATERIEL SUPPORT

Q. DID HAIG TELL YOU WHAT IS OR IS NOT INCLUDED IN MATERIEL SUPPORT - FOR INSTANCE, AMERICAN SUPPLY PLANES TO FERRY SUPPLIES TO ASCENSION ISLAND?

A. NO I CAN'T GIVE YOU A SPECIFIC ANSWER ON THAT, BECAUSE WE JUST DISCUSSED AND EXPLORED THE GENERAL AREAS OF POSSIBLE SUPPORT, AND I AM GOING TO HAVE A FURTHER DISCUSSION THIS AFTERNOON WITH MR. WEINBERGER. BUT AGAIN IN MY CASE I AM NOT GOING TO GET DOWN TO THE DETAILS. IT'S THE EXPLORATION PERHAPS A LITTLE MORE CLOSELY, OF THE AREAS WHERE THEY THINK THEY CAN GIVE SUPPORT, AND WHERE THEY ARE ABLE TO, AND WOULD LIKE TO, AND IT WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED AND OF COURSE IT WILL ASSIST US.

NO BRITISH LANDING?

Q. DID YOU EARLIER ANSWERS SEEM TO RULE OUT BRITIAN LANDING ON THE FALKLANDS IN FAVOUR OF SECURING THE 200 MILE ZONE?

A. I WOULDN'T COMMENT ON ANY SPECULATION ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF BRITISH FORCES, NOR WOULD I WISH IN ANY WAY TO SPECULATE ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE MILITARY ACTIONS. THERE ARE A LOT OF OPTIONS BUT WE ARE NOT TAKING ANY DECISIONS ABOUT THOSE AT THE MOMENT, THE POSITION IS EXACTLY AS I DESCRIBED IT: THE BUILD UP OF PRESSURE WHICH I HOPE WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF CAUSING THE JUNTA AND THOSE IN THE ARGENTINE TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND COME TO THEIR SENSES AND TAKE THEIR ARMY AWAY AND GET BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN A CIVILISED WAY.

FCO PLEASE ONPASS TO COI TELEGRAPH ROOM.

HENDERSON

[REPETITION TO GUATEMALA CITY REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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SIR I COUZENS)
MR LINDBERG)
MR HAWTHIN) TREASURY
MR PERETZ)
MR ILETT)

SIR M PALMER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (SIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

apm

HAIG ADVANCES (2-3)

PS (6)
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PS
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 ED/SAC
 ED/DEPD

PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET
 PS/S of S DEFENCE
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 PS/SIR M PALLISER)
 MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER)
 D I O)

Resident Clerk

(Passed to Emergency Unit)

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 032135Z MAY 82
 TO FLASH F C O
 TELEGRAM NO 1575 OF 3 MAY
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1574: FALKLANDS

1. SINCE SENDING JUR, HAIG ASKED TO SEE ME. HE HAD JUST BEEN SPEAKING ON THE TELEPHONE TO THE PRESIDENT OF PERU. GENERAL IGLESIAS AND ADMIRAL ANAYA HAD JUST ARRIVED IN LIMA FROM BUENOS AIRES. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE BELIEVED THAT SOMETHING REAL MUST BE DONE TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE. HE BELIEVED THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE SEVEN PROPOSALS. HAIG SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE ADJUSTED TO PROVIDE FOR INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SIMPLY BY THE US AND PERU. THE CONTACT GROUP OF SIX WOULD BE CONCERNED ONLY WITH TRYING TO FIND A LONG-TERM SOLUTION. HAIG WAS MOST EAGER TO KNOW WHETHER WE COULD GO ALONG WITH THESE PROPOSALS OR SOMETHING VERY SIMILAR TO THEM. NO LESS PRESSING, IN HIS MIND, WAS THE NEED TO DO SOMETHING IMMEDIATELY TO TRY TO STOP THE FIGHTING. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NOTHING TO STOP US SINKING THE WHOLE ARGENTINIAN FLEET. THIS WOULD BRING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF ANY AUTHORITY IN BUENOS AIRES AND THE CREATION OF CHAOS. THE LIVES OF ALL FOREIGN SUBJECTS WOULD BE ENDANGERED.

IMMEDIATE TELETYPE
TO STOP US SINKING THE WHOLE ARGENTINIAN FLEET. THIS WOULD BRING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF ANY AUTHORITY IN BUENOS AIRES AND THE CREATION OF CHAOS. THE LIVES OF ALL FOREIGN SUBJECTS WOULD BE ENDANGERED, THERE WOULD BE NO-ONE TO DEAL WITH IN ARGENTINA AND THE WHOLE LATIN AMERICAN WORLD WOULD BE ALIENATED. I REPEATED THE VIEW THAT I HAVE EXPRESSED TO HIM OFTEN THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS WILL NOT BE ALIENATED BY FORCE BUT THEY WILL DESPISE AND BE ENCOURAGED BY ANY SHOW OF WEAKNESS, PARTICULARLY WHEN WE HAVE THE CARDS IN OUR HANDS.

2. HAIG SAID NEVERTHELESS THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS DESPERATELY URGENT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO PROPOSE A CEASEFIRE TO COME INTO EFFECT WITHIN A CERTAIN NUMBER OF HOURS. UNDER THIS PROPOSAL FOR A CEASEFIRE WE WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO SHELL OR ATTACK THE ISLANDS, NOR TO CARRY OUT ANY OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE TEZ. THE ARGENTINES WOULD UNDERTAKE TO WITHDRAW ALL NAVAL VESSELS FROM THE TEZ AND TO UNDERTAKE NO AIR ATTACKS. IF THE ARGENTINIANS REFUSE THIS CEASEFIRE, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD PUT THEMSELVES IN THE WRONG WITH WORLD OPINION AND MRS THATCHER WOULD HAVE SHOWN MAGNANIMITY IN VICTORY.

3. HAIG'S IDEA WAS THAT THIS CEASEFIRE WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEVEN-POINT PLAN. HE EXPECTS TO HEAR AGAIN FROM THE PRESIDENT OF PERU WITHIN A MATTER OF AN HOUR OR TWO AND IS MOST ANXIOUS TO HAVE SOME INKLING FROM LONDON ABOUT HOW HIS IDEAS ARE RECEIVED.

4. I TOLD HIM THAT AFTER WAITING THREE WEEKS WHILE THE ARGENTINIANS REINFORCED THE ISLANDS WE WERE NOT IN A MOOD TO RUSH TO AN ARMISTICE JUST BECAUSE THE ARGENTINIANS WERE LOSING HANDS DOWN. BUT HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT EVERYBODY KNEW NOW WHERE THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY LAY AND HE WAS VERY WORRIED IF WE GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF DRIVING THINGS TOO FAR.

5 I AM SORRY IF ALL THIS SOUNDS A BIT IMPETUOUS BUT I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOME SORT OF REACTION FROM YOU IF ONLY TO GIVE HAIG A STEER IN HIS PRESENT EXTREMELY ACTIVE FRAME OF MIND.

HENDERSON

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CONFIDENTIAL

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WASHINGTON TELEGRAM No. 897

JAMMING OF BBC LATIN AMERICAN SERVICE

The BBC 5 hours a day Latin America Spanish Service is being subjected to substantial jamming by transmitters in Argentina. We are exploring with the BBC ways of getting round this and perhaps increasing hours of broadcasting in so far as their demands on BBC transmitters permit.

This is a serious development since we attach maximum importance to ensuring that Argentine military and civilian opinion at all levels is being informed of the true facts. To help achieve this we should be grateful if Washington could speak to the appropriate authorities supervising the Voice of America (VOA) to enlist their support. VOA should be encouraged to give the greatest possible coverage in their news programmes to statements emerging from Argentina. We have spoken to Arnold, the US Embassy Public Affairs Counsellor who says he will immediately contact the USICA and State Department in the same sense. Grateful to learn what the VOA can manage.

HMA Santiago also has discretion to approach the Chilean Broadcasting authorities in the same sense. We recognise it may be more difficult for the Chileans to obtain material from London and they may feel slightly inhibited about giving excessive prominence to British as opposed to Argentine reports. However the London version of developments is carried by the major international press agencies and it would be very useful if Chilean broadcasts audible in Argentina could report the truth as announced in London to the maximum extent possible. We should welcome comments.

We are taking up the points in Santiago tel no 199 to Washington.

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
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 638 OF 3 MAY

INFO PRIORITY EC POSTS, WASHINGTON.

3-MAY 1982

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YOUR VISIT TO NEW YORK: COMMUNITY BRIEFING

1. AT THE PRESIDENCY'S REQUEST, I BRIEFED MY COLLEAGUES OF THE TEN ABOUT YOUR VISIT THIS AFTERNOON AND GAVE THEM THE TRANSCRIPT OF YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE HERE (MY TELNO 634). I SAID THAT YOU EXPECTED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHORTLY AFTER YOUR RETURN TO LONDON (YOUR TELNO 895 TO WASHINGTON NOT TO ALL).
2. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD THAT YOUR TALKS IN WASHINGTON HAD CONFIRMED THAT HAIG WAS STILL IN THE ACT. IN NEW YORK YOU HAD SEEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD NOT TAKE AN INITIATIVE WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. BUT HE WAS THINKING OF USING HIS GOOD OFFICES ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY. IE WITHOUT SEEKING A MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE FELT THAT MEETINGS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE POLEMICAL AND THIS COULD DAMAGE THE COUNCIL'S ABILITY TO HELP IN THE FUTURE. YOU HAD HAD A LONG EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR ABOUT THE STEPS HE MIGHT TAKE TO HELP RESOLVE THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS OR TO ASSIST DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. YOU HAD MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 502 CONSTITUTED AN UNCONDITIONAL DEMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

BUT THE ARGENTINES HAD REFUSED TO WITHDRAW AND HAD REINFORCED THEIR TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS. YOU VERY MUCH WANTED A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION BUT YOU WERE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND (UNDER ARTICLE 51) MILITARY PRESSURES ON THE ARGENTINES IN ORDER TO GET THEM TO CHANGE THEIR PRESENT INSISTENCE THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION MUST BE PREJUDGED BEFORE THEY WOULD WITHDRAW. UNLESS THIS POSITION COULD BE CHANGED IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE EITHER HOW A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT FURTHER USE OF FORCE OR HOW THE UN COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. YOU HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO ALL THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S IDEAS. BUT YOU HAD INSISTED ON OUR DETERMINATION TO DISCHARGE OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS TRUSTEES OF THE ISLANDERS. I THOUGHT THAT YOUR FIRM STATEMENT OF HM GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WOULD HAVE REMOVED ANY DOUBTS IN THE MINDS OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND LING QING.

3. AS REGARDS THE SECURITY COUNCIL, OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT ARGENTINA WAS NOT DISPOSED TO RETURN TO THE COUNCIL FOR THE PRESENT. NOR DID ANY OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS SEEM TO WANT TO DO SO. WE WERE NOT AFRAID OF A FURTHER PUBLIC DEBATE BUT WE WERE WORRIED THAT IF IT WAS ACRIMONIOUS AND IF THE COUNCIL FAILED TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION (IE IF THERE WAS A VETO), THAT WOULD NOT BRING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION NEARER.

4. IN THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED, THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE CONSULTATIONS THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE HOLDING TODAY WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS WILL HAVE REDUCED THE RISK OF ANYONE CALLING THE COUNCIL IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THOUGH WITH A SLIGHT QUESTION MARK OVER SPAIN, WHOSE FOREIGN MINISTER IS TO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOMORROW (4 MAY) EN ROUTE TO COSTA RICA. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT, WHILE PEREZ DE CUELLAR FELT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AS SECRETARY GENERAL, HE WAS PROCEEDING CAUTIOUSLY AND RECOGNISED THE EXTREME DELICACY OF THE PROBLEM. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT SOME MIS-APPREHENSIONS AMONGST MY COLLEAGUES ABOUT LAST NIGHT'S PERUVIAN PROPOSAL.

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FOR NEWS DEPT.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY MR PYM AT THE UNITED NATIONS AT 1330Z ON 3 MAY.

BEGINS

FOLLOWING MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON YESTERDAY AND THE DISCUSSIONS I HAD WITH MR HAIG, BOTH IN THE MORNING AND IN THE AFTERNOON, I CAME HERE AND LAST NIGHT, AS YOU KNOW, HAD TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE EXPLORED VARIOUS IDEAS AS TO HOW THE UNITED NATIONS MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. I HAVE SEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS MORNING AND I HAVE TALKED WITH HIM ON THE SAME ISSUE AND TAKEN HIS MIND ABOUT HOW HE VIEWS THE POSITION AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE SITUATION IS RATHER DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE ARGENTINES HAVE UNLAWFULLY INVADDED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ARE AT THE MOMENT IN POSSESSION OF THEM. THEY ARE IN BREACH OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 AND THE FIRST BRITISH INTEREST, AS I BELIEVE IT IS A UNITED NATIONS INTEREST - IT AFFECTS ALL COUNTRIES ALL ROUND THE WORLD - IS TO SEE THAT THAT WITHDRAWAL THAT IS REQUIRED TAKES PLACE. SO THAT, IN THE LONGER TERM, WE CAN RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. WE HAVE HAD NO DOUBT AND NEVER HAVE HAD ABOUT OUR TITLE; BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT WE ARE ACTING, AS IT WERE, AS TRUSTEES FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND WE HAVE ALWAYS RESPECTED THEIR WISHES ON THE UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THAT HAS NOT BEEN THE ARGENTINE POSITION SINCE THEY INVADDED THE ISLANDS UNLAWFULLY A MONTH AGO. THEY WISH TO PRE-JUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS AND OF COURSE THAT IS A NON-NEGOTIABLE POSITION SO FAR AS THE BRITISH ARE CONCERNED. OUR STRATEGY ALL ALONG HAS BEEN TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES, DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY, AND WE DECLARED SEVERAL DAYS AGO THE TOTAL EXCLUSION

MILITARY, AND WE DECLARED SEVERAL DAYS AGO THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE WHICH WE ARE NOW GOING TO PROTECT. YESTERDAY THERE WAS A VERY REAL THREAT TO THAT ZONE POSED BY A CRUISER. THERE WAS ALSO AN ATTACK ON A HELICOPTER FROM TWO SHIPS WHICH WERE IMMEDIATELY COUNTER-ATTACKED BY BRITISH FORCES. I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE BRITISH ARE NOT UNDERTAKING THESE MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS BY CHOICE. WE ARE THERE TO DEFEND BRITISH SOIL AND BRITISH PEOPLE AND WE WISH TO GO BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AT WHICH WE WERE SITTING VERY PROPERLY WITH ARGENTINA BEFORE ALL THIS BEGAN. I THINK THAT THE PRESSURE, THE BUILD-UP OF MILITARY PRESSURE WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE, MUST HAVE AN EFFECT AND I HOPE THAT VERY SOON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WILL REALISE THAT THE RIGHT THING TO DO IS TO FULFIL THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED UPON THEM MANDATORILY BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITHDRAW, AND GET BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH AN OPEN MIND.

Q: RICHARD HOTTELET, CBS NEWS:

I WONDER IF YOU CAN TELL US SOMETHING MORE ABOUT YOUR EXPLORATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AS TO THE WAYS IN WHICH THE UN MIGHT BE HELPFUL.

A: NOT SPECIFICALLY. I PUT OUR POSITION AND THE ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION THAT ARE NOT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW NEGOTIABLE: THAT IS TO SAY THE ULTIMATE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AS SEEN BY THE ARGENTINES, AND THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL. THE WAY TO BRING PEACE TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS FOR THOSE TWO THINGS TO HAPPEN AND IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THERE IS A UNITED NATIONS INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THAT DOES HAPPEN. BUT VARIOUS IDEAS HAVE BEEN PUT UP BY MR PEREZ DE CUELLAR LAST NIGHT, VARIOUS IDEAS PUT UP BY MR HAIG. AND I TALKED WITH THE PRESIDENT SQUARE BRACKETS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SQUARE BRACKETS THIS MORNING. I CAN'T BE SPECIFIC ABOUT THEM. WE ARE GOING TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH BECAUSE IT MAY BE THAT A SITUATION WILL DEVELOP WHERE THE UNITED NATIONS MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP. AND I WANT TO MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT I'M NOT CLOSING THE DOOR TO ANY DIPLOMATIC OPTION IN MY VISIT HERE. BUT THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT, AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL INDICATED LAST NIGHT AFTER OUR TALKS, THERE ARE NO PARTICULARLY SPECIFIC IDEAS AT THE MOMENT: BUT A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS HE DID PUT FORWARD, WHICH OF COURSE I WILL THINK ABOUT, AND I SHARED WITH HIM SOME OF THE POSSIBILITIES AS I VIEWED THEM. SO THERE'S NOTHING SPECIFIC THAT I CAN TELL YOU ABOUT THAT: BUT THE EXPLORATION VERY THOROUGHLY AND CAREFULLY OF THE POSSIBILITIES WAS A VERY USEFUL DISCUSSION FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW.

Q: TREVOR MCDONALD, ITN, LONDON:

YOU HAVE EXPLAINED BRITISH STRATEGY AS THE SORT OF POLICY WHERE THE DIPLOMATIC EFFECT IS BACKED UP BY THE FORCE OF THE BRITISH NAVAL TASK FORCE. BUT WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE HAPPENED IS THAT EVERY ESCALATION OF THIS ACTION SEEMS TO BE A DIPLOMATIC

NAVAL TASK FORCE. BUT WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE HAPPENED IS THAT EVERY ESCALATION OF THIS ACTION SEEMS TO BE A DIPLOMATIC PARALLEL GOING ON. WHAT HAPPENS IF ARGENTINA DOES NOT RESPOND TO THIS PRESSURE? ISN'T THERE A DANGER THAT THE MAIN INSTRUMENT OF OUR POLICY IS BECOMING A MILITARY OPTION AND NOT THE DIPLOMATIC ONE?

A: I'M CERTAINLY NOT CLOSING THE DOOR TO ANY DIPLOMATIC ACTION. IT'S REALLY UP TO THE ARGENTINES TO FULFIL THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION AND I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THE UNITED NATIONS THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN PARTICULAR, BUT ALL THE UNITED NATIONS - HAS AN INTEREST IN SEEING THAT THEY DO. THEY ALL OCCUPYING THAT LAND UNLAWFULLY AND THEY OUGHT TO GO. THAT'S THE WAY TO BRING PEACE BACK AND I THINK THAT THE MILITARY ACTION (WHICH WE HOPED TO AVOID BECAUSE WE HOPED THAT SENSE WOULD PREVAIL IN BUENOS AIRES) THAT ACTION WILL I HOPE CAUSE THEM TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS. ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT, IN THE CASE OF THE CRUISER YESTERDAY, THAT POSED A SERIOUS THREAT TO OUR FORCES, AND SO THEY TOOK ACTION. WE HAD A HELICOPTER THAT WAS ATTACKED BY TWO SHIPS AND THEY RECEIVED THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. SO I HOPE THAT AS A START AT ANY RATE THE ARGENTINES WILL RESPECT THAT TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE - RESPECT IT, AND WE ARE THERE TO PROTECT WHAT IS BRITISH TERRITORY AND THE CHOICE IS REALLY THEIRS. WE DON'T WANT TO MAKE FURTHER ATTACKS ON THEM OR ANYTHING AT THE MOMENT - WE WANT THEM TO WITHDRAW. WHAT WE ARE DOING AT THE MOMENT, AND THE PURPOSE OF OUR MILITARY EFFORT, IS TO SECURE THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE OF WHICH WE GAVE PROPER NOTICE.

Q: CHARLES WHEELER (BBC)

IS IT YOUR POSITION THAT ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT ARGENTINA MUST NOW MAKE THE FIRST MOVE?

A: BASICALLY YES IT IS. THEY STARTED THIS WAR. THEY INVADED THE ISLANDS UNLAWFULLY AND THEY HAVE GOT TO GO FROM THOSE ISLANDS. THAT IS THE POSITION.

Q: HAVE YOU FOUND SYMPATHY WITH THAT AMONG THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS YOU HAVE BEEN TALKING TO?

A: YES THEY UNDERSTAND THAT, AND I HAVE EXPLAINED TO THEM THE BRITISH VIEW ABOUT THIS. IT ISN'T JUST A LITTLE ARGUMENT DOWN IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC ABOUT A SMALL GROUP OF ISLANDS WITH ONLY A FEW PEOPLE INVOLVED. WE ARE TALKING HERE ABOUT THE RIGHT OF DEMOCRACIES, THE RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THE KIND OF LIFE THEY WANT FOR THEMSELVES. THAT'S WHY THE BRITISH NAVY HAS GONE 8,000 MILES TO THEIR DEFENCE. AND THAT IS AN INTEREST TO LOTS OF COUNTRIES IN EVERY CONTINENT ALL ROUND THE WORLD.

Q: DO THEY AGREE THAT AFTER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 532 ARGENTINA SHOULD MAKE THE NEXT MOVE?

A: THAT IS QUITE CLEARLY WHAT THE RESOLUTION SAYS AND THAT POSITION AND OUR INSISTENCE UPON IT IS UNDERSTOOD.

A: THAT IS QUITE CLEARLY WHAT THE RESOLUTION SAYS AND THAT POSITION AND OUR INSISTENCE UPON IT IS UNDERSTOOD.

Q: BUT DO THE PEOPLE TO WHOM YOU HAVE BEEN TALKING, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AGREE THAT ARGENTINA SHOULD MAKE THE NEXT MOVE?

A: THEY DIDN'T EXPRESS IT IN PRECISELY THOSE TERMS. THEY TOOK NOTE THAT THAT WAS QUITE CLEARLY THE BRITISH VIEW AND THE FACT THAT I COULDN'T SEE ANY ALTERNATIVE BUT THE ARGENTINES MAKING THE FIRST MOVE OF THIS KIND. THAT WASN'T NECESSARILY ACCEPTED EITHER BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE SECRETARY GENERAL, BUT THEY UNDERSTOOD EXACTLY WHAT I WAS SAYING. AND I MADE THE POINT THAT THE INTEREST AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE IS MUCH WIDER THAN JUST THE RESOLUTION ITSELF, AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES.

Q: BERNARD NOSSITER, NEW YORK TIMES:

YOU SAID YOU THOUGHT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS A PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS MATTER. DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE ANOTHER SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AND, IF SO, WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE IT TO PRODUCE IN THE WAY OF A RESOLUTION?

A: MY POSITION IS THAT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE RESOLUTION 502 CARRIED OUT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT NO OTHER RESOLUTION CAN EXACTLY REPLACE THAT AND THE PROBLEM IS TO SEE THAT IT IS DONE. YOU SEE, DURING THE LAST THREE OR FOUR WEEKS, SINCE THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED, SO FAR FROM THE ARGENTINES HAVING ANY THOUGHT OF OBEYING IT, THEY HAVE SPENT THE TIME REINFORCEING THE ISLAND. THERE ARE NOW SOME THOUSANDS OF TROOPS ON THAT ISLAND. NOW THAT'S A FLAGRANT ABUSE AND FLAGRANT DISOBEDIENCE OF THE RESOLUTION. THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS IS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL THAT WAS ASKED FOR FOUR WEEKS AGO ACTUALLY TO TAKE PLACE. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, OBVIOUSLY, THAT THE BRITISH TASK FORCE THERE WOULD FACILITATE THAT AND INDEED PROTECT IT IF NECESSARY, SO THAT IT TAKES PLACE URGENTLY. AND THAT'S THE NEXT MOVE.

Q: THAT MEANS THEN THAT YOU DO NOT WANT TO SEE ANOTHER MEETING ON TOP OF THAT ONE NOW?

A: IT'S NOT FOR ME TO DECIDE THAT OF COURSE. I DON'T QUITE SEE HOW THEY CAN TAKE IT FURTHER UNTIL THAT RESOLUTION IS CARRIED OUT. IF THEY WERE TO MEET NO DOUBT THEY MIGHT DISCUSS JUST HOW THAT WAS GOING TO BE ACHIEVED. ONE COUNTRY IS IN BREACH OF A RESOLUTION WHICH THEY PASSED AND THAT IS QUITE A SERIOUS MATTER. BUT I THINK UNTIL THERE IS A MOVE ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT FURTHER PROGRESS CAN BE MADE.

Q: IN THIS PARTICULAR PROBLEM HOW CAN YOU RECONCILE TWO OBVIOUS DIFFERENT IDEAS ON DETERMINING SOVEREIGNTY. YOU CLAIM THAT YOU HAVE SOVEREIGNTY ON A COLONIAL TERRITORY WHICH IS NOT AN INTEGRAL PART OF GREAT BRITAIN. WHILE ARGENTINA CLAIMS SOVEREIGNTY OF AN INTEGRAL PART OF ITS TERRITORY. IT'S NOT THE SAME THING.

A: IT'S NOT THE SAME THING. FOR 149 YEARS THE BRITISH HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE HAVE ADMINISTERED IT. WE HAVE LOOKED AFTER IT. WE HAVE ALLOWED THE PEOPLE TO GOVERN THEMSELVES AS THEY PREFER IT TO BE GOVERNED. AND WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE A DIFFERENT VIEW ABOUT IT - WE HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THE FACT THAT THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE A CLAIM. ALL RIGHT. LET THAT BE DISCUSSED AND TALKED ABOUT AND NEGOTIATED ABOUT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. WE WERE NEGOTIATING ABOUT IT, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ARGENTINES, ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO. THAT IS THE WAY TO DO IT AND YOU CANNOT ALLOW A POSITION TO ARISE WHERE A BIG COUNTRY ANNEXES A SMALL COUNTRY BY FORCE AND BY INVASION. THAT IS THE WAY TO INTERNATIONAL DISORDER AND THE UNITED NATIONS RIGHT HERE IS AN ORGANISATION CONCERNED WITH INTERNATIONAL ORDER. THAT IS WHY IT'S SO IMPORTANT TO RIGHT THAT WRONG. IF THEY HAVE A CLAIM (AND WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE A CLAIM; WE DO NOT THINK IT'S A VALID CLAIM, BUT WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT EXISTS) LET IT BE ARGUED ABOUT, LET IT BE TALKED ABOUT, LET IT BE ADJUDICATED UPON IN A CIVILISED WAY ROUND THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. NO WAY CAN IT BE CONCLUDED EITHER BY FORCE OR BY THE ARGENTINES SIMPLY SAYING THAT IT BELONGS TO THEM.

Q: BUT YOU HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THIS FOR 17 YEARS AND NOW YOU SAY THAT THEY ANNEXED - HOW CAN YOU ANNEX A TERRITORY THAT YOU CLAIM IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF YOUR OWN TERRITORY?

A: WE HAVE NEVER BEEN IN ANY DOUBT ABOUT OUR TITLE TO IT. WE HAVE HAD IT FOR 149 YEARS AND THAT IS CLEARLY QUITE A LONG TIME. YOU TALK ABOUT IT AS THOUGH IT IS A COLONY. EVERYBODY IN THIS ROOM KNOWS THAT ALMOST INCREDIBLE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE IN CAUSING WHAT WAS ONCE A GREAT EMPIRE TO BECOME A SERIES OF INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES, PROUD IN THEIR OWN RIGHT AND VERY SUCCESSFUL TOO. WHAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE BEEN DOING IS NOT A PROCESS OF DECOLONISATION, IT'S A PROCESS OF RECOLONISATION. THEY HAVE ACTUALLY INVADED A COUNTRY IN ORDER TO TAKE IT OVER FOR THEMSELVES. THERE IS NO WAY THE UNITED NATIONS CAN ALLOW THAT TO STAND. ALTHOUGH IT'S ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE ON A SMALL GROUP OF ISLANDS IT IS OF IMPORTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN EVERY CONTINENT. THAT IS WHY THE BRITISH ARE THERE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO GOVERN THEMSELVES AS THEY PREFER.

Q: KEITH HINDELL, BBC:

IN THE LONG TERM ARE THE WISHES OF THE POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS STILL PARAMOUNT, AS THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SOME WEEKS AGO?

A: THAT'S REALLY WHAT THE ARGUMENT IS ABOUT: THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE TO CHOOSE WHAT GOVERNMENT THEY WANT FOR THEMSELVES. IT IS PECULIARLY DIFFICULT IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THEY ARE A SMALL

... THAT I WOULD REALLY WANT THE ARGUMENT IS ABOUT: THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE TO CHOOSE WHAT GOVERNMENT THEY WANT FOR THEMSELVES. IT IS PECULIARLY DIFFICULT IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THEY ARE A SMALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE AND THEY ARE A LONG WAY AWAY. BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS RESPECTED THEIR WISHES: WE HAVE REGARDED OURSELVES, SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS, AS TRUSTEES FOR THOSE PEOPLE. BECAUSE THEY ARE IN TROUBLE NOW, BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN INVADED, WE ARE GOING TO GO TO THEIR DEFENCE. IT'S THE SAME AS WHAT HAPPENED IN, SAY, AFGHANISTAN, ONLY UNFORTUNATELY WE CANNOT DO MUCH ABOUT THAT. THERE ARE OTHER COUNTRIES: POLAND IS ANOTHER THAT COMES TO MIND. OTHER COUNTRIES ALL ROUND THE WORLD, WHERE THESE RIGHTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION, WHICH ARE BASIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, ARE NOT BEING FULFILLED. HERE IS A CASE WHERE BRITISH TERRITORY IS CONCERNED AND BRITISH SUBJECTS: THE REASON THE TASK FORCE IS DOWN THERE IS TO PROTECT THEM AND WE ARE ENTITLED TO SELF-DEFENCE OF OUR OWN TERRITORY AND OUR OWN PEOPLE UNDER THE CHARTER. AFTER THIS IS ALL OVER AND THE SOONER THE BETTER, WHAT VIEW THE PEOPLE ON THE ISLANDS WILL THEN TAKE ABOUT THEIR FUTURE AND HOW THEY WANT IT ORGANISED IS SOMETHING THAT WILL HAVE TO BE DETERMINED.

Q: IN DEFENDING THESE RIGHTS IN THE VIGOROUS MANNER THAT YOU'RE DOING, ARE YOU NOT IN FACT RISKING A VERY MAJOR CONFLICT BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN WORLD AND LATIN AMERICA?

A: WE INTEND TO SUCCEED, IF POSSIBLE BY A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, BUT, IF NOT, BY FORCE, HOWEVER UNWELCOME. WHEN WE SUCCEED, THE WORLD WILL BE A SAFER PLACE BECAUSE PEOPLE WILL REALISE THAT THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS WHICH THE FREE DEMOCRACIES OF THE WORLD WILL STAND UP TO DEFEND. WE HAVE BEEN DOING IT FOR A LONG TIME IN OUR HISTORY. MANY OTHER COUNTRIES TOO HAVE TAKEN THE SAME VIEW. THEREFORE I BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE ARE DOING IS ACTUALLY OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE LONG TERM STABILITY OF PEOPLE. THAT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR TRADE AND PROSPERITY AND ALL THE NICE THINGS ABOUT LIFE WHICH PEOPLE WANT.

Q: DON SHANNON, LOS ANGELES TIMES:

IF THE RESOLUTION IS NOT BEING CARRIED OUT, THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT THIS IS DONE. IS BRITAIN AS A PERMANENT MEMBER NOT OBLIGED TO RECONVENE THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SEE THAT SOMETHING IS DONE TOWARD RECONVENE THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SEE THAT SOMETHING IS DONE TOWARD ENFORCING THE RESOLUTION? THAT SEEMS ALMOST YOUR RESPONSIBILITY.

A: I'M NOT A UNITED NATIONS EXPERT. MY FIRST REACTION TO THAT IS THAT I PRESUME IT WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY

... WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT IS NOT A PARTICULARLY BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT THE RESOLUTION IS CARRIED OUT: BUT WE ARE VERY ENTHUSIASTIC THAT IT SHOULD BE, AS IT IS A BASIC PRINCIPLE, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT. IT IS A COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM AND I THINK RIGHT NOW IT IS A COLLECTIVE ANXIETY FOR THEM. BUT THE WAY TO BRING PEACE AND TO RESTORE SENSE IS FOR THE ARGENTINES TO CHANGE THEIR MIND AND WITHDRAW - THAT IS QUITE SIMPLE.

1: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP. WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THAT DONE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL SO THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE APPLYING SANCTIONS TO ARGENTINA?

A: ANY ESCALATION OF PRESSURE WOULD BE A GOOD THING. WE HAVE CONDUCTED OUR STRATEGY ON THAT BASIS ALL THE WAY THROUGH, WITH AN INEXORABLE BUILD-UP OF PRESSURE. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE IN THAT RECENTLY WAS OF COURSE THE UNITED STATES COMING DOWN ON OUR SIDE BEHIND BRITAIN, AS WE WERE SURE THAT SHE WOULD BECAUSE SHE WOULD BE ON THE SIDE OF THE VICTIM, THE DEMOCRACY, AGAINST THE AGGRESSOR AND THE INVADER. YOU SEE THERE IS NOBODY IN ARGENTINA WHO IS ELECTED - THE GOVERNMENT THERE IN ALL ITS COMPLEXITY IS NOT ELECTED BY ANYBODY. IT IS ONLY RESPONSIBLE TO ITSELF. THE PRINCIPLE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE IS TO PRESERVE THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH PEOPLE LIVING IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

Q: MUTUAL NEWS:

WOULD YOU GIVE A BRIEF SUMMARY OF YOUR CONTACTS WITH THE UN PERSONNEL ON THIS TRIP?

A: I CAME TO MEET THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND I OUTLINED TO HIM THE BRITISH POSITION. I SAID THAT UNTIL TWO THINGS HAPPENED - THAT IS TO SAY, ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND THEIR ABANDONMENT OF THEIR CLAIM TO RETAIN SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH IS CERTAINLY CHALLENGEABLE - IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT PROGRESS THERE COULD BE. BUT I ASKED HIM IN WHAT WAYS HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP: AND WHAT ROLE THE UNITED NATIONS MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY. HE PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF IDEAS AND I AM OF COURSE GOING TO TAKE THESE BACK WITH ME. I FELT, (AND IT IS FOR HIM TO COMMENT WHAT HIS REACTION IS, HE MIGHT FEEL THIS HIMSELF AS WELL) THAT THE TIME IS NOT RIPE AT THE MOMENT FOR ANY KIND OF DEVELOPMENTS AS FAR AS THE UNITED NATIONS IS CONCERNED. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO SAY THAT FOR HIM BUT THAT WAS AN IMPRESSION THAT I GAINED. SIMILARLY WITH MR HAIG - EXACTLY THE SAME THING - I DON'T MIND WHAT FORMAT IS USED, WHAT MECHANISM MIGHT BE DEvised, WHATEVER IT IS THAT PRODUCES THE DESIRED RESULT, LET'S CONSIDER IT. AND AGAIN THIS MORNING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I REHEARSED OUR POSITION. I ASKED HIM FOR HIS IDEAS.

THERE ARE NO SPECIFIC IDEAS AT THE MOMENT THAT HE WISHED TO PUT TO ME: BUT WE TALKED AROUND VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES WHICH MIGHT COME UP IN THE FUTURE AND WE ARE GOING TO KEEP IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR, AND FOLLOW THE STORY ALONG BUT I THINK WE ARE ALL AGREED, I MADE IT VERY, VERY CLEAR, THAT ON OUR PART THE NEXT STEP DID LAY WITH THE ARGENTINES AND THAT'S REALLY WHAT WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR.

Q: MR SCOTLAND: BLACK AMERICAN:

THE ARGENTINIANS HAVE INSISTED THAT THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT NEGOTIABLE. WHAT OPTIONS ARE LEFT TO THE BRITISH TO RESPOND TO THIS BLIND RIGIDITY?

A: THAT IS TOTALLY NON-NEGOTIABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE TO US. WE HAVE BEEN THERE FOR 149 YEARS, SINCE 1833. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ARGENTINES BELIEVE THEY HAVE A CLAIM. WE DO NOT THINK IT IS A VALID CLAIM OR ONE THAT CAN BE UPHeld, BUT WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY THINK THAT THEY HAVE SUCH A CLAIM. LET IT BE TALKED ABOUT, LET IT BE NEGOTIATED ABOUT, OR AT ANY RATE DISCUSSED, BEARING IN MIND THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED. SO LONG AS THE ARGENTINES STICK TO THEIR VIEW THAT THOSE ISLANDS ARE THEIR ISLANDS AND THEY ARE NOT GOING TO MOVE, THERE IS NO WAY IN WHICH WE CAN ACCEPT THEIR POSITION.

Q: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE:

YESTERDAY YOU INDICATED THAT IN YOUR OPINION THE HAIG EFFORT HAD NOT COME TO A HALT. HOW WOULD YOU LIKE IT TO PROCEED NOW IN VIEW OF THE OBVIOUS OPPOSITE POSITION OF THE PARTIES?

A: WE DISCUSSED AGAIN POSSIBLE IDEAS. WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT AT THE END OF HIS LONG SHUTTLE HE CAME OUT WITH PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN WHICH AS YOU KNOW THE ARGENTINES TURNED DOWN. AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED THAT WAS CONCERNED THAT WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE END OF THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT AND MR HAIG DOESN'T SEE IT LIKE THAT EITHER. WE DISCUSSED YESTERDAY IN THE NEW CONTEXT WHAT OTHER POSSIBILITIES THERE MIGHT BE. THERE WAS A RANGE OF SUGGESTIONS. THERE SEEMS TO BE TALK AND RUMOURS IN THE PRESS ABOUT A SERIES OF PROPOSALS THAT CAME FROM PERU. AS A MATTER OF FACT THERE WERE SOME IDEAS THAT HE TOLD ME HAD ORIGINATED THERE, WHICH WE TALKED ABOUT AND IN FACT SINCE THEN AS YOU KNOW THE ARGENTINES HAVE TURNED THOSE DOWN. THEY WERE NEVER PUT TO US IN ANY SENSE AT ALL, SO I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THEY WERE IN DETAIL. IF ANY OTHER IDEAS COME UP IN ANY CONTACTS THAT HE HAS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ANYWHERE, WHICH PRODUCE A CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION, I'LL LISTEN TO IT. BUT THE ESSENCE OF IT REMAINS THESE TWO POINTS UPON WHICH THE ARGENTINES WILL HAVE TO GIVE WAY.

O: JOHN DICKIE, DAILY MAIL:

DESPITE ALL YOUR EFFORTS IT SEEMS THAT VERY LITTLE PROGRESS

DESPITE ALL YOUR EFFORTS IT SEEMS THAT VERY LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. DO YOU ACCEPT THEREFORE THAT YOUR OWN DIPLOMATIC SHUTTLE IS OVER FOR THE TIME BEING AND THAT UNTIL FURTHER MILITARY ACTION MAKES THE ARGENTINE JUNTA AGREE TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL THERE IS REALLY NOT MUCH YOU CAN DO?

A: I CERTAINLY DON'T REGARD IT AS OVER AND I HAVE NOT BEEN CONDUCTING A SHUTTLE. I HAVE COME OVER IN A NEW SITUATION TO TALK TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, MR HAIG, AND TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO EXPLORE WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES ARE. I WILL KEEP MYSELF AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS ANY POSSIBILITIES WITH ANYBODY. BUT IT DOES NOT LOOK TERRIBLY HOPEFUL AT THE MOMENT. THEY HAVE GOT TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS. WE WILL IN THE MEANTIME SECURE OUR TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE. THAT IS THE SITUATION AS IT IS TODAY AND WE HOPE THAT BETTER COUNSEL WILL PREVAIL IN BUENOS AIRES.

Q: AL AHRAM, CAIRO:

IS THIS A WAR OR WHAT IS IT? NOBODY HAS DECLARED WAR. WHAT HAPPENS TO THE PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER THINGS THAT MIGHT COME UP DURING THE CONFLICT?

A: IT IS AN ILLEGAL INVASION BY A LARGE COUNTRY, WHICH IS NOT BASED ON ANY DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE IN ITS GOVERNANCE, INVADING A VERY SMALL COUNTRY NEXT DOOR TO IT, IN FLAGRANT BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ALSO IN BREACH OF A UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION. WE ARE DOWN THERE WITH OUR TASK FORCE IN ORDER TO DEFEND BRITISH SOIL AND BRITISH PEOPLE. WHAT WE WANT IS THE PRESSURE OF THE OPINION OF THE WORLD, WHICH LONGS FOR A PEACEFUL CONCLUSION, TO BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ARGENTINES SO THAT THEY RETREAT FROM A SITUATION WHICH THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO TAKE UP.

Q: MARK HAINES, WABC TV:

ON THE SUBJECT OF INEXORABLE PRESSURE, AREN'T YOU RUNNING THE ENORMOUS RISK OF APPLYING TOO MUCH PRESSURE AND SO DAMAGING ARGENTINE NATIONAL HONOUR THAT THEY CANNOT RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE?

A: I DON'T THINK SO. WE HAVE GOT TO PROTECT BRITISH TERRITORY AND BRITISH PEOPLE. THE ONLY WAY WE CAN DO THAT, OR THE RIGHT WAY IT SEEMED FOR US TO DO THAT, WAS TO DECLARE THIS EXCLUSION ZONE, ORIGINALLY MARITIME ONLY AND NOW TOTAL, ROUND OUR OWN TERRITORY. IF THAT IS RESPECTED BY THE ARGENTINES, AND THEY ONLY HAVE TO KEEP RIGHT AWAY, THEN THE ACTION THAT WE HEARD ABOUT YESTERDAY AND THE DAY BEFORE WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE. THE PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD WAS OF COURSE AN ADVANTAGE TO THE ARGENTINES WHICH WE DID NOT THINK WE COULD AFFORD TO ALLOW

THEM TO RETAIN, AND THAT IS WHY WE TOOK THAT OUT. WE ARE SECURING THAT ZONE AND IT IS UP TO THEM TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS WHAT THEY ARE GOING TO DO NOW..

Q: IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT YOU DO NOT CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE THAT YOU MIGHT SO DAMAGE THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY FEEL THAT THEY CANNOT GRACEFULLY RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE?

A: I AM AFRAID I DON'T MIND WHAT HAPPENS TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, WHETHER THEY FALL, WHETHER THERE IS ANOTHER ONE, WHETHER THEY CHANGE TWO OR THREE TIMES, I DON'T MIND. THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO BE THERE. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS SO DECLARED. WE DON'T WANT TO GET THEM OUT WITH A FIGHT IF WE CAN AVOID IT. WE WANT TO GET THEM OUT BY COMMON-SENSE AND REASON AND NOBODY HAS BEEN ABLE TO CHALLENGE THE FACT THAT THEY ARE WHEN THEY OUGHT NOT TO BE THERE. NOBODY HAS CHALLENGED THE FACT THAT WE ARE RIGHT IN SAYING THEY MUST WITHDRAW AND THE POSITION FOR THE LONGER TERM, EVERYBODY WOULD SAY, MUST BE NEGOTIATED AND TALKED ABOUT ROUND A TABLE IN A CIVILISED WAY.

Q: CABLE NEWS NETWORK:

THERE IS A PERCEPTION HERE THAT BRITAIN IS NOT REALLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE UN GETTING FURTHER INVOLVED AND THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR CANNOT REALLY MEDIATE UNLESS BOTH SIDES WANT HIM TO AND THAT SINCE BRITAIN HAS RESOLUTION 502 YOU DO NOT REALLY WANT ANY MORE UN ACTION.

A: YOU ARE WRONG IN THAT PERCEPTION. OTHERWISE I WOULD NOT BE HERE. I HAVE COME HERE TO SHARE THE VIEWS AND TO EXPLORE WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES ARE. IT IS THE FIRST CHANCE I'VE HAD OF DOING THAT AND I HAVE EXPRESSED CERTAIN VIEWS ABOUT IT BUT I DO NOT EXCLUDE A UNITED NATIONS ROLE. I THINK THAT THE UNITED NATIONS OUGHT TO SAY THE ARGENTINES MUST WITHDRAW - THEY HAVE SAID THAT. AND THEY HAVE GOT TO THINK TOGETHER AND WORRY TOGETHER ABOUT HOW THEY ARE GOING TO GET THAT ACHIEVED. IF I TOOK THE VIEW THAT YOU SUGGEST I TAKE, I WOULD NOT BE HERE.

Q: YOU SPEAK A LITTLE ABOUT THE PERUVIAN INITIATIVE AND ALSO SPAIN HAS OFFERED TO MEDIATE. ARE YOU TAKING SERIOUSLY THE PERUVIAN INITIATIVE? CAN YOU GIVE US SOME DETAILS? ARE YOU TAKING THE OFFER OF SPAIN?

A: I HAVE NO IDEA HOW SERIOUS IT WAS. I READ ABOUT IT IN THE PRESS AND AS I SAY MR HAIG DID REFER TO IT AS A MATTER OF FACT YESTERDAY. BUT IS HAS NOW BEEN REJECTED, WHATEVER IT WAS, BY THE ARGENTINES SO THAT SEEMS TO BE THE END OF IT.

Q: YOU CLAIM THAT THIS IS A BRITISH TERRITORY AND ARGENTINA CLAIMS THAT IT BELONGS TO THEM. HOW CAN YOU GO TO A NEGOTIATING TABLE?

A. THE ARGENTINES SAY THEY HAVE A CLAIM AND I HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY MAINTAIN THEY HAVE A CLAIM. WE DO NOT THINK THAT CLAIM

THAT IT BELONGS TO THEM. HOW CAN YOU GO TO A NEGOTIATING TABLE?

A: THE ARGENTINES SAY THEY HAVE A CLAIM AND I HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY MAINTAIN THEY HAVE A CLAIM. WE DO NOT THINK THAT CLAIM IS VALID BUT WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ARGENTINES THINK THAT IT IS, WHICH IS A VERY REASONABLE POSITION. THE BRITISH HAVE SAID WE HAVE GOT OPEN MINDS ABOUT ITS STATUS IN THE LONG TERM BUT WE MUST ALWAYS HAVE DUE AND PROPER RESPECT FOR THE VIEWS OF THE PEOPLE ON THE ISLANDS AND THAT IS VERY MUCH IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THE ARGENTINES COME ALONG AND THEN FIRST OF ALL INVADE IT AND ANNEX IT QUITE REGARDLESS OF THE VIEWS OF THE PEOPLE AND ARE TAKING BY FORCE WHAT THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN AND HAVE UPHELD IN ANY COURT OR ANY NEGOTIATING TABLE ANYWHERE AND THAT IS THE ILLEGALITY OF IT. THAT IS WHAT IS WRONG ABOUT IT AND THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO DO IT AND EVERYBODY KNOWS THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO DO IT AND SO THEY MUST CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND THEN LET US SIT DOWN AGAIN AND TALK ABOUT IT.

Q: YOUR DEFENCE MINISTRY THIS MORNING ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS RECRUITING THE QE2 TO CARRY TROOPS THERE. DOES THAT INDICATE THAT YOU ARE SENDING MORE MESSAGES TO THE ARGENTINE ABOUT MILITARY OPTIONS THAN THE DIPLOMATIC?

A: NO. THAT IS A LONG TERM PRECAUTION. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW THESE EVENTS ARE GOING TO UNFOLD. OUR HOPE AT THE ONE END OF THE SCALE IS THAT SENSE AND REASON AND JUSTICE AND LEGALITY WILL PREVAIL IN BUENOS AIRES AND THEY WILL WITHDRAW AND THAT WILL BE THE END OF IT. BUT WE DON'T KNOW THAT THAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN AND WE HAVE TROOPS ON THE TASK FORCE 8,000 MILES AWAY FROM HOME. IF THINGS DID NOT GO WELL, IF THIS DISPUTE AGAINST ALL OUR WISHES AND DESPITE ALL OUR EFFORTS BECAME LONG DRAWN OUT, THEN WE HAVE TO THINK ABOUT HOW WE ARE GOING TO MAKE THE NECESSARY RELEASE OF OUR FORCES. BECAUSE THE DISTANCE IS SO ENORMOUS WE HAVE TO THINK SEVERAL WEEKS AHEAD IN TERMS OF CHANGING TROOPS OVER IF IT COMES TO THIS. IT IS NOT IN ANY WAY A MEASURE PARTICULARLY DESIGNED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE NOW. IT IS A SENSIBLE PRECAUTION FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. IF IT HAS THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THAT PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE, I AM QUITE HAPPY THAT IT SHOULD BE SO. BUT EVERYBODY IN THIS ROOM WITH ANY MILITARY KNOWLEDGE WILL UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE TO THINK A VERY LONG WAY AHEAD WHEN CONTEMPLATING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOMETHING THAT MAY GO ON FOR LONGER THAN ANYBODY HOPES.

Q: THE QE2 - YOU HAVE OTHER SHIPS AVAILABLE HOWEVER. I WONDER WHY THE QE2.

A: THE REASONS IS THAT IT HAPPENS TO BE AVAILABLE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND IT HAPPENS TO BE LARGE ENOUGH TO CARRY THE

FEW DAYS AND IT HAPPENS TO BE LARGE ENOUGH TO CARRY THE NUMBER OF TROOPS THAT IT IS ENVISAGED TO CARRY. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO HAVE TWO OR THREE OTHER SHIPS THAT WOULD DO THE SAME JOB BUT IN FACT I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE NOT TWO OR THREE OTHER SHIPS AVAILABLE IN THE TIME SCALE THAT WAS REQUIRED, AND THAT'S THE ONLY ONE THAT IS AVAILABLE. THAT'S MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION AND THAT'S THE REASON FOR IT.

Q: MICHAEL COLES, BBC TV:

AT THE END OF A WEEKEND OF CONCERTED MILITARY ACTION, APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL FROM BRITAIN'S POINT OF VIEW, AND YOUR CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND HERE, DO YOU HAVE ANY SENSE AT ALL THAT YOU ARE CLOSER TO THE END OF HOSTILITIES OR DO YOU FEEL THAT WE ARE IN FOR A PROTRACTED PERIOD OF WARFARE?

A: I WOULD HOPE THAT WE ARE NEARER, BUT THAT IS UP TO THE ARGENTINES AND WE MUST SEE. I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON YOUR PHRASE "CONCERTED MILITARY ACTIVITY". THAT MILITARY ACTIVITY HAS BEEN ENTIRELY DIRECTED TO SECURING THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE OF WHICH WE GAVE NOTICE. THE ARGENTINES STARTED THE AGGRESSION. THEY INVADED THE ISLAND FIRST. IT IS BRITISH TERRITORY AND THERE ARE BRITISH PEOPLE THERE. WE HAVE GONE TO DEFEND THEM AS WE ARE ENTITLED TO DO UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. WE DECIDED TO DO IT BY DECLARING A CERTAIN ZONE, QUITE CAREFULLY IDENTIFIED, THAT WE WOULD SECURE OVER BRITISH TERRITORY. THE MILITARY ACTION TO WHICH YOU REFER HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO DO THAT. I HOPE THAT WITH THIS BUILD-UP OF ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY PRESSURE, THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL BEGIN TO TAKE MORE NOTICE AND BY MY PRESENCE HERE AND THE TALKS I HAVE HAD WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THAT ALL THE FREEDOM-LOVING PEOPLES OF THE WORLD SEE HOW VITAL IT IS THAT THE RIGHTS OF THESE ISLANDERS ARE UPHELD AND THAT WE ARE DEFENDING THEM. IN MY VIEW, WHEN THIS IS SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED, THE WORLD WILL HEAVE A SIGH OF RELIEF. IT WILL BE A MORE PEACEFUL PLACE AND THERE WILL BE A GREATER DEGREE OF STABILITY AND THAT IS VERY MUCH A BRITISH INTEREST AND AN INTEREST TO ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

Q: A.P.

WHEN WERE THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLANDS LAST CONSULTED WHETHER THEY WANTED TO BE BRITISH OR ARGENTINE, AND WHAT WAS THE FORM OF THE CONSULTATION AND WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME?

A: A BRITISH MINISTER WENT OUT LAST YEAR AND HAD MEETINGS WITH THEM TO DISCUSS WITH THEM POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES. WHEN WE WERE NEGOTIATING SOME MONTHS AGO WITH ARGENTINA WE HAD WITH US

BE A GREATER DEGREE OF STABILITY AND THAT IS VERY MUCH A BRITISH INTEREST AND AN INTEREST TO ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

Q: A.P.

WHEN WERE THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLANDS LAST CONSULTED WHETHER THEY WANTED TO BE BRITISH OR ARGENTINE, AND WHAT WAS THE FORM OF THE CONSULTATION AND WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME?

A: A BRITISH MINISTER WENT OUT LAST YEAR AND HAD MEETINGS WITH THEM TO DISCUSS WITH THEM POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES. WHEN WE WERE NEGOTIATING SOME MONTHS AGO WITH ARGENTINA, WE HAD WITH US (I AM NOT SURE WHETHER THEY WERE IN THE ROOM BUT THEY WERE CERTAINLY PART OF OUR DELEGATION) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. SO THE ANSWER TO THAT IS VERY THOROUGHLY AND VERY CAREFULLY AND VERY RECENTLY. AND WHEN ALL THIS IS OVER, SOME PROCESS WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO BE GONE THROUGH TO ASCERTAIN WHAT THEIR VIEWS WILL BE AFTER THE INVASION BY ARGENTINA.

ENDS

PARSONS

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CO F C O DESKBY 030700Z

GRS 650

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 030700Z

FROM UKMIS N EW YOR K 030543Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 632 DATED 3 MAY 82

INFO WASHINGTON

NIPT: YOUR VISIT TO NEW YORP; FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL GAVE YOU ON THE EVENING OF 2 MAY:

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE GRAVE SITUATION THAT HAS DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THE FAILURE THUS FAR TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND THAT COULD AVERT FURTHER ARMED CONFLICT AND OPEN THE WAY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THEIR DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS).

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BELIEVES THAT, IN THIS SITUATION, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS A MOST SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHARTER URGENTLY TO RESTORE PEACE AND TO PROMOTE A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

TO THIS END, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY. ACCORDINGLY, THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO TAKE SIMULTANEOUSLY THE STEPS SET OUT BELOW, WHICH ARE CONCEIVED AS PROVISIONAL MEASURES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES.

IT IS PROPOSED THAT, AS FROM SPECIFIED TIME T:

(A) THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT BEGIN WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) AND

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

(X12)

As
As/pt Head
As/M'Gowan
As/PUS
As C. Gifford
As W. Gifford
As C. Gifford
As C. Gifford
As C. Gifford
As C. Gifford
RC

As/pt Head
As/pt Head

mt

ITS TROOPS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) AND THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT REDEPLOY ITS NAVAL FORCES AND BEGIN THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS), BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWALS BY AN AGREED DATE:

(B) BOTH GOVERNMENTS COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES BY AN AGREED TARGET DATE:

(C) BOTH GOVERNMENTS RESCIND THEIR RESPECTIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF BLOCKADES AND EXCLUSION ZONES, AND CEASE ALL HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST EACH OTHER:

(D) BOTH GOVERNMENTS TERMINATE ALL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:

(E) TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BEGIN TO COME INTO EFFECT TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE STEPS AND TO MEET INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WISHES TO REITERATE HIS READINESS TO DO ALL HE CAN TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, AND TO RECALL IN THIS CONNEXION HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES ON 19 APRIL 1982 IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE INDICATED WAYS IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS MIGHT BE OF HELP. PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANY UNITED NATIONS ROLE CAN BE COMPLETED EXPEDITIOUSLY, SUBJECT TO THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND TO THE DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EXPRESSES THE EARNEST HOPE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL SPEEDILY SIGNIFY THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT THE APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE. IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS REGARD WERE RECEIVED IN TIME TO PERMIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON 5 MAY 1982. IN THAT CASE, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD PROPOSE THAT TIME BE SET FOR 11.00 HOURS EDT ON 6 MAY 1982.

PARSONS

NNNN

*The President
of the European Parliament*

00387839

Strasbourg,

Rb
-3.-5- 1982

Rt. Hon. Margaret THATCHER, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
Member of the European Council,
10, Downing Street,
LONDON S.W.1

Dear Prime Minister,

At its April 1982 part-session the European Parliament adopted, following a debate by urgent procedure pursuant to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,


a resolution on the conflict over the Falkland Islands

and decided to forward the text to the governments of the Member States.

I enclose an extract from the Minutes of the relevant sitting with Parliament's resolution.

The minutes will be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities pursuant to Rule 89(4) of the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure.

Yours sincerely,


P. DANKERT

Encl.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1982 - 1983 SESSION

EXTRACT

OF THE MINUTES
OF THE MEETING OF

THURSDAY, 22 APRIL 1982

IN THE CHAIR: Nicolas ESTGEN, Vice-President

RESOLUTION

on the conflict over the Falkland Islands

The European Parliament,

- profoundly shocked by the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina and more than ever convinced that territorial disputes should be resolved by peaceful negotiations,
 - aware of the very serious dangers of an internationalization of the conflict and of the danger that other territorial conflicts may break out in the Americas and elsewhere were such unilateral faits accomplis to be accepted,
 - whereas the European Community has a dual responsibility to show solidarity towards her British partner on the one hand and towards the Falkland Islands as an associated territory on the other,
1. Condemns unreservedly the invasion of the Falkland Islands;
 2. Notes and supports Resolution 502 of the Security Council of the United Nations on Argentina which demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities, and an immediate withdrawal of all Argentinian forces from the Falkland Islands and called on the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
 3. Underlines the importance of Community solidarity which has been shown in the actions of the Council of Ministers;
 4. Records its agreement with the embargo on imports from Argentina and the ban on arms exports to Argentina and requires that these be maintained until the Security Council Resolution 502 has been implemented;
 5. Encourages the Commission and the Council to continue to review the possibility of taking further measures;
 6. Insists that in any solution it is necessary to take fully into account the wishes of the Falkland Islanders;

7. Recognizes that Argentinian compliance with Resolution 502 by withdrawing its armed forces would lead to the halting of United Kingdom naval operations and so to the negotiation of a peaceful agreement;
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Governments of the Member States and the Secretary General of the United Nations.'

H.-J. OPITZ
Secretary-General

Lady ELLES
Vice-President

(X12)

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/Ad Hurd
PS/W Cronk
PS/Pas
Mr. Cifford
Mr. Wright
Mr. Gillmore
Mr. Lee
H/S
H/D
PS/10 DES
PS/10 DES

M.

NYFD 006/03

CO F C O DESKBY 030700Z

GRS 850

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 030700Z
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 030533Z MAY 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 631 DATED 3 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR VISIT TO NEW YORK; FALKLANDS

1. YOU DINED AT MY HOUSE ON 2 MAY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL,
WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY RAFAE AHMED AND A NOTE-TAKER.

RE!

X

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THE SUSPENSION OF HAIG'S MISSION, HE FELT IT HIS DUTY TO FILL THE GAP BY SETTING UP SOME NEGOTIATING MECHANISM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SCR 532, IF ONLY TO FORESTALL DRAMATIC AND UNHELPFUL INITIATIVES FROM OTHERS. THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE INCREASINGLY RESTIVE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON. HE SAW THE DANGERS OF A MEETING OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL, PERHAPS THE ANSWER WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT, OR FOR HIM AND THE PRESIDENT JOINTLY, TO BRIEF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL INDIVIDUALLY OR IN GROUPS.

3. YOU SAID THAT NO DOORS WERE CLOSED. YOU HAD DISCUSSED A RANGE OF IDEAS WITH HAIG WHO DID NOT REGARD HIS EFFORT AS BEING AT AN END. BUT MEANWHILE OUR ENFORCEMENT OF THE TEZ MUST CONTINUE. IF THE ARGENTINES CHALLENGED IT, THEY WOULD GET A SHARP ANSWER.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN ROCA (ARGENTINA) EARLIER TODAY AND GIVEN HIM A DOCUMENT, WHICH HE WOULD GIVE YOU TOO, SETTING OUT IDEAS WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH BOTH PARTIES. HE WOULD NOT GIVE THE DOCUMENT TO ANYONE ELSE NOR REVEAL ITS EXISTENCE TO THE PRESS. HE THEN INVITED AHMED TO INTRODUCE THE DOCUMENT, THE TEXT OF WHICH IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. AHMED SAID THAT IT WAS A PROCEDURAL FORMULA WHICH DID NOT GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE AND COULD BE REGARDED AS CONTAINING "PROVISIONAL MEASURES" UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER. IN ORDER TO CIRCUMVENT THE "CHICKEN AND EGG" PROBLEM RESULTING FROM OUR INSISTENCE THAT THE FIRST STEP MUST BE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND ARGENTINE INSISTENCE THAT IT MUST BE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY, THE UN PROPOSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE "SIMULTANEITY" BETWEEN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE UK TASK FORCE, THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE UN ASKED FOR RESPONSES FROM US AND ARGENTINA BY 5 MAY, SO THAT THEIR SCHEME COULD COME INTO EFFECT ON 6 MAY.

5. YOU SAID THAT YOU WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS BUT THAT YOU HAD THE FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE COMMENTS:

- A. THE UN TIMETABLE SEEMED PRECIPITATE;
- B. IT WAS A BASIC CONDITION FOR US THAT THE OUTCOME ON SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED IN ANY WAY. IF, AS AHMED CLAIMED, THE UN SCHEME MET THIS CONDITION, WHAT CHANCE WAS THERE THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD ACCEPT IT? AT THIS POINT PEREZ DE CUELLAR INTERVENED TO SAY THAT, IF WE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO HIS PAPER, HE WOULD FLY PERSONALLY TO BUENOS AIRES AND USE ALL HIS INFLUENCE AS A LATIN AMERICAN TO GET THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT IT TOO. YOU POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PICK THE RIGHT TIME, SO THAT THIS ASSET SHOULD NOT BE WASTED.
- C. THE UK TASK FORCE HAD BEEN SENT TO PRESERVE THE INTERESTS OF

RIGHT TIME, SO THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO...

C. THE UK TASK FORCE HAD BEEN SENT TO PRESERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDS AND TO ENSURE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF A "BALANCED" WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH AND ARGENTINE FORCES. THE ARGENTINES HAD TO GO FIRST. THERE MIGHT BE SOME "OPTICAL" REDEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH FORCES, AND THE PASSAGE OF WITHDRAWING ARGENTINE FORCES, WOULD OF COURSE BE GUARANTEED, BUT EQUALITY OF WITHDRAWAL (FOR EXAMPLE, WITHDRAWING SO MANY ARGENTINIANS AND AN EQUAL NUMBER OF BRITISH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE).

D. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED IN ADVANCE. FOLLOWING ARGENTINE REJECTION OF HAIG'S PROPOSALS, THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION (INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARGENTINE PRESENCE) WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT AFRESH

YOU CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING GRATITUDE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S IDEAS, WHICH YOU WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY. BUT YOU WANTED HIM TO BE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT WHAT WAS POSSIBLE. YOU GAVE NO UNDERTAKING TO RESPOND BY 5 MAY AND MADE THE POINT THAT THE ARGENTINES SHOULD REPLY FIRST.

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR LEFT IT TO AHMED TO INTRODUCE AND DEFEND HIS PAPER. HE SEEMED TO AGREE WITH MANY OF YOUR COMMENTS ON IT. YOUR FIRMPRESS WILL, I THINK, HAVE HAD A SALUTARY AFFECT ON AHMED WHO CAN NO LONGER BE UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS THAT HIS SKETCHY AND ILL-THOUGHT OUT IDEAS HAVE MUCH CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE. NEVERTHELESS, THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS GIVEN YOU AND THE ARGENTINES SOME IDEAS, WHICH WILL CERTAINLY BECOME KNOWN HERE (I SHALL BE SURPRISED IF PEREZ DE CUELLAR FAILS TO ALLUDE TO THEM WHEN HE BRIEFS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL), SHOULD ENABLE US TO GAIN A LITTLE MORE TIME HERE. IT WOULD BE OFF-SIDE FOR ANYONE TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN THE PARTIES WERE CONSIDERING IDEAS PUT TO THEM BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

PARSONS

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30X31)

You will have to read

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
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 ED/DEF D
 ED/NEWS D
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 ED/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 ~~DOWNING ST~~ - *John*
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 PS/CHANCELLOR) *2v.*
 SIR K COUZENS)
 MR LITTLER)
 MR HAWTIN)
 MR PERETZ) TREASURY
 MR ILETT)
 MR McINTYRE)
 MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
 DIO CABINET OFFICE
 MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "
 SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
 SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GRPS 200
 UNCLASSIFIED
 FM DUBLIN 030915Z MAY 1982
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 3 MAY 1982
 AND REPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.
 PRIORITY TO PARIS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, ROME,
 THE HAGUE AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

ADVANCE COPY
 IMMEDIATE

FALKLANDS: IRISH GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

1. THE IRISH GOVERNMENT ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ABOUT THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AFTER A CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY, 2 MAY.

BEGINS

THE GOVERNMENT ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AT THE ESCALATING MILITARY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

FROM THE OUTSET OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, THE POLICY OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT, BOTH AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITHIN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO PREVENTING A WIDER CONFLICT AND PROMPTING A NEGOTIATED, HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT BY

ECURRENT COMMUNITY, HAS BEEN... A WIDEN
CONFLICT AND PROMOTING A NEGOTIATED, HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT BY
DIPLOMATIC MEANS.

AN ADE UATE FRAMEWORK ALREADY EXISTS WITHIN WHICH SUCH A
SETTLEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED IF THE PARTIES DEMONSTRATE THE POLITICAL
WILL TO DO SO.

IT IS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, THAT THE POSSIBILITIES OFFERED BY THE
UNITED NATIONS SHOULD BE FULLY EXPLOITED AND FURTHER MILITARY
ESCALATION WHICH WOULD ONLY MAKE NEGOTIATIONS ALL THE MORE
DIFFICULT AVOIDED. IRELAND IS READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY IT CAN,
THROUGH ITS CURRENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO ADVANCE
A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.

THE GOVERNMENT WISH TO RE-AFFIRM IRELAND'S TRADITIONAL ROLE OF
NEUTRALITY IN RELATION TO ARMED CONFLICTS.

ENDS

FIGG

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 03:0955Z CB/RK

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM No. 237

3 MAY 1982

Today's press reports remarks made by the Spanish Prime Minister on 2 May during an electoral visit to Southern Spain. Calvo Sotelo is reported to have said that Spain had offered herself to Argentina as a mediator in the Falklands crisis although he did not know whether it was not already too late for this offer.

Calvo Sotelo apparently described the situation in the South Atlantic as "very serious" and said that Spain considered herself affected by it. Spain rejected the use of force: but he claimed that Britain had negotiated "little and badly". He added that Spain had a clearer claim to Gibraltar than had Argentina to the Falklands.

It is not clear whether the Spanish Prime Minister's remarks have been accurately reported. We are trying to get the text. Further assessment follows.

Summary of other press coverage on Falklands follows on separate telegram.

PARSONS

Mufaxed
315

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(30) + 7 CAB. OFFICE

PS (6)
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PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY
FLASH

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HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
RESIDENT CLERK

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MR LITTLER)
MR HAWTIN)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
MR ILETT)
MR McINTYRE)
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "
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SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

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FM LIMA 030103Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 3 MAY
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS: MY TEL NO 134

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS EVENING. DR ARIAS BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE MUCH HOPED WE WOULD HAVE GOOD NEWS SHORTLY. HE SAID THAT AFTER THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TUR HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WHO HAD DECIDED TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK AND BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. DR ARIAS SAID THAT ON PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD TELEPHONED COSTA MENDEZ TO PRESS UPON HIM A FORMULA WHICH MIGHT OFFER THE BEST CHANCE OF AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION. DR ARIAS REPEATED THAT A WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO CLIMB DOWN WITHOUT TOO MUCH LOSS OF FACE. THEY HAD THEREFORE CONSIDERED WHETHER A TEXT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A TOKEN REFERENCE TO THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY IN THE (FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED) INTRODUCTORY PART MIGHT SUFFICE TO BRING ABOUT A WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE TROOPS. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD ALSO TELEPHONED PRESED REAGAN (BUT HAD FAILED TO GET THROUGH) IN ORDER TO INSTILL A SENSE OF URGENCY AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF MR PYM IN WASHINGTON. MR HAIG HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE.

... SAID THAT SOME PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES HAD ARISEN

INGTON. MR HAIG HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE.

2. DR ARIAS SAID THAT SOME PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES HAD ARISEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE VARIOUS TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WHICH RELATED TO THE INCLUSION OF THE UNITED STATES AND/OR PERU AS MEMBERS OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. DR ARIAS TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD NO OBJECTION TO PERU BEING EXCLUDED IF BY SO DOING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE OBTAINED. BUT MR HAIG HAD INTIMATED THAT THE US WOULD NOT WISH TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE ADMINISTERING GROUP SINCE THIS WOULD OTHERWISE NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UK.

3. IN THE EVENT AND IN ORDER TO SIMPLIFY MATTERS, A 7-POINT FORMULA HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. TEXT IS IN MIFT. THERE IS A SPANISH TEXT AND AN ENGLISH TEXT WHICH DR ARIAS SAID HAD VIRTUALLY BEEN DICTATED OVER THE TELEPHONE BY MR HAIG.

4. IN REPLY TO MY SPECIFIC QUESTION DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE 7-POINT FORMULA HAD THE APPROVAL OF COSTA MENDEZ SEMICOLON THAT GENERAL GALTIERI HAD TOLD PRESIDENT BELAUNDE THAT HE WAS QUOTE WELL DISPOSED UNQUOTE TOWARDS IT BUT THAT HE HAD HIS QUOTE SENATE UNQUOTE (IE THE MILITARY JUNTA) TO CONSULT AND CONVINCED. DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE MILITARY JUNTA WAS MEETING EVEN AT THIS MOMENT TO CONSIDER THE TERMS AND THAT A REPLY WAS EXPECTED HOURLY. DR ARIAS SAID THAT HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MR HAIG'S PROPOSALS HAD BEEN CONVEYED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OR AT LEAST THE CONSENT OF MR PYM. DR ARIAS EMPHASISED THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WAS ANXIOUS NOT TO LOSE THE MOMENTUM AND THAT IT HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON THAT IF THE FORMULA WAS ACCEPTABLE, THE SIGNATURE OF AN INTERIM DOCUMENT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN LIMA. DR ARIAS WARNED ME TO EXPECT INSTRUCTIONS TONIGHT AND ADDED THAT THEY WERE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO STAGE A GRAND SIGNATURE CEREMONY IN LIMA.

WALLACE

F C O PLEASE PASS

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OO WASHINGTON
GRS 312
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 031015Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 897 OF 3 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO
INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO

mf

JAMMING OF BBC LATIN AMERICAN SERVICE

1. THE BBC 5 HOURS A DAY LATIN AMERICAN SPANISH SERVICE IS NOW BEING SUBJECTED TO SUBSTANTIAL JAMMING BY TRANSMITTERS IN ARGENTINA. WE ARE EXPLORING WITH THE BBC WAYS OF GETTING ROUND THIS AND PERHAPS INCREASING HOURS OF BROADCASTING IN SO FAR AS THEIR DEMANDS ON BBC TRANSMITTERS PERMIT.
2. THIS IS A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT SINCE WE ATTACH MAXIMUM IMPORTANCE TO ENSURING THAT ARGENTINE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OPINION AT ALL LEVELS IS BEING INFORMED OF THE TRUE FACTS. TO HELP ACHIEVE THIS WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WASHINGTON COULD SPEAK TO THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES SUPERVISING THE VOICE OF AMERICA (VOA) TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT. VOA SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO GIVE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE COVERAGE IN THEIR NEWS PROGRAMMES TO STATEMENTS BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND OTHERS IN LONDON. THEY SHOULD BE URGED TO DISCOUNT THE HIGHLY INACCURATE STATEMENTS EMERGING FROM ARGENTINA. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO ARNOLD, THE US EMBASSY PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNSELLOR, WHO SAYS HE WILL IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE USICA AND STATE DEPARTMENT IN THE SAME SENSE. GRATEFUL TO LEARN WHAT THE VOA CAN MANAGE.
3. HMA SANTIAGO ALSO HAS DISCRETION TO APPROACH THE CHILEAN BROADCASTING AUTHORITIES IN THE SAME SENSE. WE RECOGNISE IT MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE CHILEANS TO OBTAIN MATERIAL FROM LONDON AND THEY MAY FEEL SLIGHTLY INHIBITED ABOUT GIVING EXCESSIVE PROMINENCE TO BRITISH AS OPPOSED TO ARGENTINE REPORTS. HOWEVER THE LONDON VERSION OF DEVELOPMENTS IS CARRIED BY THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGENCIES AND IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF CHILEAN BROADCASTS AUDIBLE IN ARGENTINA COULD REPORT THE

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3231 - 1

TRUTH AS ANNOUNCED IN LONDON TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE.
WE SHOULD WELCOME COMMENTS.

4. WE ARE TAKING UP THE POINTS IN SANTIAGO TELNO 199 (NOT TO
WASHINGTON).

PYM

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR)

SIR K COUZENS)

MR LITTLER)

MR HAWTIN)

MR PERETZ)

MR ILETT)

TREASURY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

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1979 01/13

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DESKBY 030700Z

3 - MAY 1982

(5)

FROM DEPT S K EW YOR K 030543Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 632 DATED 3 MAY 82

INFO WASHINGTON

11	12	1
10	4	2
9	3	3
8	4	4
7	5	5

M IPT: YOUR VISIT TO NEW YORK: FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL GAVE YOU ON THE EVENING OF 2 MAY:

THE SECRETARY--GENERAL IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE GRAVE SITUATION THAT HAS DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THE FAILURE THUS FAR TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND THAT WOULD AVERT FURTHER ARMED CONFLICT AND OPEN THE WAY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THEIR DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS).

THE SECRETARY--GENERAL BELIEVES THAT, IN THIS SITUATION, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS A MOST SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHARTER URGENTLY TO RESTORE PEACE AND TO PROMOTE A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

TO THIS END, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY. ACCORDINGLY, THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO TAKE SIMULTANEOUSLY THE STEPS SET OUT BELOW, WHICH ARE CONCEIVED AS PROVISIONAL MEASURES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES.

IT IS PROPOSED THAT AS FROM SPECIFIED TIME T:

(A) THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT BEGIN WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) AND THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT REDEPLOY ITS NAVAL FORCES AND BEGIN THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS), BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWALS BY AN AGREED DATE:

(B) BOTH GOVERNMENTS COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES BY AN AGREED TARGET DATE:

(C) BOTH GOVERNMENTS RESCIND THEIR RESPECTIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF BLOCKADES AND EXCLUSION ZONES, AND CEASE ALL HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST EACH OTHER:

(D) BOTH GOVERNMENTS TERMINATE ALL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:

(E) TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BEGIN TO COME INTO EFFECT TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE STEPS AND TO MEET INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WISHES TO REITERATE HIS READINESS TO DO ALL HE CAN TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, AND TO RECALL IN THIS CONNEXION HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES ON 19 APRIL 1982 IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE INDICATED WAYS IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS MIGHT BE OF HELP. PRATICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANY UNITED NATIONS ROLE CAN BE COMPLETED EXPEDITIOUSLY, SUBJECT TO THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND TO THE DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EXPRESSES THE EARNEST HOPE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL SPEEDILY SIGNIFY THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT THE APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE. IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS REGARD WERE RECEIVED IN TIME TO PERMIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON 5 MAY 1982. IN THAT CASE, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD PROPOSE THAT TIME T BE SET FOR 11.28 HOURS EDT ON 6 MAY 1982.

PARSONS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

Trans
(36) r + Co Dist. C

PS (b)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

ED/S AK D (FCO DIST + A/D P/1)
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ED/NEWS D
ED/UKD
ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS #60
RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLE)
MR HAWTIN)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
MR ILETT)
MR MCINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EX
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM UKNIS NEW YORK #305012 MAY 82
TO FLASH LIMA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 DATED 3 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE F C O, WASHINGTON

M

YOUR TELSNOs 137-139, FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD BY NOW HAVE RECEIVED COPIES OF WASHINGTON
TELEGRAMS NOS 1566 AND 1569 TO FCO, WHICH GIVE THE BACKGROUND.
PLEASE GET IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND/OR
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE TO ENSURE (YOUR TELNO 139) THAT NO ANNOUNCEMENT
IS MADE WHICH IMPLIES THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO THESE PROPOSALS
OR EVEN HAD THEM FORMALLY PRESENTED TO US. THE SECRETARY OF
STATE'S POSITION IS AS DESCRIBED IN WASHINGTON TELS UNDER
REFERENCE.

2. YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION ASSURE YOUR INTERLOCUTORS THAT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS GRATEFUL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH PRESIDENT
BELAUNCE IS MAKING TO SECURE A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS GRATEFUL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE IS MAKING TO SECURE A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE ON A BASIS WHICH RESPECTS THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY ANY IDEAS PRESENTED TO US WHICH SEEM LIKELY TO ENSURE WHAT MUST BE THE FIRST REQUIREMENT: A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS WHICH UNLAWFULLY INVADED AND OCCUPIED THE FALKLANDS. BUT WE MUST BE SATISFIED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WILL BE PROPERLY SUPERVISED, THAT THERE WILL BE EFFECTIVE GUARANTEES THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL IMPLEMENT WHATEVER AGREEMENT MAY BE REACHED, AND THAT ANY INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT ARE NOT SUCH AS TO PREJUDICE THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK HARD FOR A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION, BUT WE CANNOT CUT CORNERS WHEN MATTERS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE ARE AT STAKE. NEITHER CAN WE RENOUNCE THE EXERCISE OF OUR RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE WHILE ARGENTINE TROOPS MAINTAIN THEIR UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLANDS.

PARSONS

WNNN

SECRET

IAA



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~830 7822~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

3rd May 1982

Prime Minister

A-J.C. 5/4

Dear John,

ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT - LASER EQUIPMENT

I understand that Sir Timothy Kitson mentioned to the Prime Minister the possibility that Argentine Mirage aircraft could be fitted with laser equipment.

The Argentines had 14 Mirage III (now down to 12) supplied by France and primarily designed for air defence. These aircraft are not equipped with lasers.

The Argentines also have 23 Mirage IV, bought from Israel, which have a primary role of ground attack. In this role a laser can be used in two ways. It can provide range information to the weapon aiming system which improves accuracy of attack against ground targets. Secondly, a laser can be used for illuminating a target on to which a suitable weapon will then home (the so-called "smart bomb"). However, our intelligence assessment is that no Argentine aircraft have a laser capability.

It is true, however, that both the Mirage III and V can be fitted with types of laser equipment (this is the case with some of the French and Israeli Mirages) and knowledge of this may have caused Sir Timothy Kitson to raise the matter. We suggest that if any reply to Sir Timothy is required it is confined to the general statement that this question had already been investigated and it is not believed to be a problem.

Yours ever,

David Omand

(D B OMAND)

A J Coles Esq

SECRET

PART 12 ends:-

2 May 1982

PART 13 begins:-

3 May 1982