

S  
806

PREM 19/625

9.24  
4/18

SECRET

MT

PART 14

Confidential Filing

Relations with Argentina

ARGENTINA

Position of the Falkland Islands

PE 1: SEPT 1979

PE 14: MAY 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
6-5-82							
7-5-82							
- ends -							
<p>PREM 19/625</p>							



PART 14 ends:-

7 May 1982

PART 15 begins:-

8 May 1982



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>625</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Coles to Fellowes dated 7 May 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>29 May 2012 Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



Duty Officer  
N° 10 Danny SA.

RESTRICTED

4193 - 1

ZZ BERNE

GRS 533

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 071915Z MAY 1982

TO FLASH BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 7 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO,  
ALL NATO POSTS, DUBLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS, SANTIAGO, OTTAWA,  
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN MOD STATEMENT MADE  
IN LONDON THIS AFTERNOON.

BEGINS

1. THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY MADE CLEAR IN HIS STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THIS MORNING THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S HIGHEST PRIORITY IS TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS: BUT THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA DID NOT SHOW THE SAME READINESS AND DESIRE TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, IT SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WHATEVER MAY BE NECESSARY TO END THE UNLAWFUL ARGENTINE OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
2. IN THIS CONTEXT, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WISHES TO RECALL THAT ON 23 APRIL IT INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA THAT ANY APPROACH ON THE PART OF ARGENTINE WARSHIPS, SUBMARINES, NAVAL AUXILIARIES OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO A THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE MISSION OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WOULD ENCOUNTER THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. IN ADDITION, ALL ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING CIVIL AIRCRAFT, ENGAGING IN SURVEILLANCE OF THESE BRITISH FORCES, WOULD BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE AND WERE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY.
3. IN ADDITION, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT

1

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

4193 - 1

ALL ARGENTINE VESSELS, INCLUDING MERCHANT VESSELS, OR FISHING VESSELS, APPARENTLY ENGAGING IN SURVEILLANCE OF OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES AGAINST BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WOULD ALSO BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE AND WERE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY.

4. FROM 1100 GMT ON 30TH APRIL HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED A TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO ENFORCE THIS EXCLUSION ZONE WHICH APPLIES NOT ONLY TO ARGENTINE WARSHIPS AND ARGENTINE NAVAL AUXILIARIES BUT ALSO TO ANY OTHER SHIPS, INCLUDING MERCHANT AND FISHING VESSELS WHICH ARE OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY ARGENTINE FORCES: AND THIS ALSO APPLIES TO ANY AIRCRAFT, WHETHER MILITARY OR CIVIL, WHICH IS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THAT ILLEGAL OCCUPATION.

5. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY MADE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS THE RIGHT TO TAKE WHATEVER ADDITIONAL MEASURES MAY BE NEEDED IN EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IN THE SELF-DEFENCE OF BRITISH SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AND IN RE-SUPPLYING AND REINFORCING BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY OF ARGENTINE BASES AND THE DISTANCES THAT HOSTILE FORCES CAN COVER UNDETECTED, PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT AND IN BAD WEATHER, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WARNS THAT ANY ARGENTINE WARSHIP OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE FOUND MORE THAN 12 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE ARGENTINE COAST WILL BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE AND ARE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY.

ENDS

PLEASE ASK THE SWISS TO CONVEY THIS URGENTLY TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, ADDING THAT HMG REGARD IT AS HAVING IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

(OTHER INFORMATION RECIPIENTS). PLEASE BRING THE TEXT OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OR AUTHORITIES TO WHOM YOU ARE ACCREDITED. ITS MAIN PURPOSE

2

RESTRICTED



AMBASÁD NA hÉIREANN, LONDAIN.



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

*Copy to E.O. for inf.*

85

ERD

PS

PS/Arthur

PS/As. Ouslan

PS/PUS

Mr Bullard  
Mr Griffiths

Mr Vire  
Mr Hamman  
Mr Goodison

RID

SAND

GCD(E)

*John H. 7/5*

7 May 1982

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MP  
Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London

*My dear Foreign Secretary*

I have been asked by our Foreign Minister, Mr Gerard Collins TD, to convey the following reply to your message of yesterday, Thursday 6 May:

My Dear Foreign Secretary

1. In the view of the Irish Government, the imposition by the Community of sanctions on Argentina was designed to provide an element of economic pressure which, in combination with a balanced application of political and military pressure, would serve the purpose of inducing Argentina to abide by the terms of Security Council Resolution 502 and thus make a peaceful political and diplomatic solution of the Anglo-Argentine dispute possible.

2. The actual use of military force in the aftermath of Mr Haig's mediation efforts had unfortunately upset that balance and increased the risk of a wider conflict. In this situation, the continuation of sanctions by the Community was bound to be represented and perceived as supporting and reinforcing a solution through predominantly military means. It is for this reason that Ireland considered that the continued application of sanctions by the Community would be inappropriate in the prevailing circumstances.



3. You will be aware that in their statement of 4 May the Irish Government also indicated that Ireland intended to seek a meeting of the Security Council. The purpose of seeking to activate the Security Council was to make it clear that every diplomatic means was not only explored but fully exploited. We believe that the approach of the Community and its Member States to the Falklands crisis will be better appreciated if, at the same time, the UN is actively engaged in the search for a diplomatic solution.

4. You will be aware that in informal consultations in the Security Council the Irish delegation made it plain that our efforts are aimed at complementing those of the Secretary General. May I say that we were happy to learn of the positive and constructive response by Argentina and Britain to the UN Secretary General's efforts to create a credible diplomatic framework for negotiations. Against this background I believe it is right that we should review the question of Community sanctions at our informal meeting in Villers-le-Temple tomorrow. I shall be glad to explain more fully the reasons for the Irish position on the continuation of sanctions. In any event, I'm sure you will agree, the Ten as a whole should avail of the opportunity to consider at this stage whether and in what circumstances a Community decision to maintain or to renew the sanctions may or may not be appropriate: You may take it that we will give due weight to the principle of Community solidarity.

Yours very sincerely

Gerard Collins  
Foreign Minister.

*I am, my dear Foreign Secretary  
Yours very sincerely  
Sean Kennedy*



Provisional courtesy translation of a joint declaration of Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his Italian colleague Sig. Spadolini following their talks in Hamburg on May 7, 1982:

---

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Government follow the development of the Falkland Islands-Malvinas conflict with great concern.

Both continue to consider the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 to be indispensable. Both support energetically the efforts of the UN Secretary General for the implementation of this resolution of the Security Council with the aim of achieving a cease fire and a peaceful solution of the conflict.

In order to avoid further loss of human lives they support an immediate agreement on a cease fire accompanied by a simultaneous commencement of the withdrawal of the respective armed forces.

73  
11 MAY 1982

Bundeskanzler Schmidt und der italienische Premierminister Spadolini veröffentlichten nach ihren Gesprächen am 7.5.1982 in Hamburg folgende gemeinsame Erklärung:

---

5  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
2  
3  
4

"Die Regierungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Italiens beobachten die Entwicklung des Konflikts um die Falkland-Malwinen-Inseln mit großer Sorge.

Beide halten unverändert die volle Durchführung der Resolution 502 des VN-Sicherheitsrates für unerlässlich. Beide unterstützen nachdrücklich die Bemühungen des VN-Generalsekretärs hinsichtlich der Durchführung dieser Resolution des Sicherheitsrates zur Herbeiführung eines Waffenstillstandes und einer friedlichen Lösung des Konflikts.

Um zu vermeiden, daß weitere Menschenleben verloren werden, unterstützen sie den sofortigen Abschluß eines Waffenstillstandes, begleitet von dem gleichzeitigen Beginn des Abzugs der beiderseitigen Streitkräfte."



FALKLAND ISLANDS: ARGENTINE PRESS REACTION  
7-8 MAY 1982

Two high-ranking government officials of Peru and Venezuela voiced assurances here today that those two American nations are willing to provide military aid to Argentina, in case a request is extended by the latter within the framework of the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty (TIAR)....

*Noticias Argentinas*, Buenos Aires,  
7 May 1982.

The Press Office of the Military Governor of the Malvinas Georgias and South Sandwich Islands has reported the discovery of an inflatable boat close to Puerto Argentino used by British marines in an abortive attempt to land on the island. The boat has a maximum capacity of 12 and according to its markings apparently belongs to the aircraft carrier *Hermes*. Survival kit found in the boat show that it was abandoned without the objective of the mission being achieved. Military authorities stress the absolute certainty that the British attempt to infiltrate troops onto the island did not succeed....

*Telam*, Argentine News Agency,  
7 May 1982.

Comodoro Rivadavia, 7 May (NA) - Aerolineas Argentinas and Austral Airlines will resume their commercial flights to Comodoro Rivadavia as of 1130 today....

*Noticias Argentinas*, Buenos Aires  
7 May 1982.

In a letter to the *Herald* yesterday, *American Time Magazine* correspondent William McWhirter, writing from the Plaza Hotel, said that a report by the news agencies *Noticias Argentinas* and *Diarios y Noticias* published in yesterday's *Herald* about five foreign reporters in Bahia Blanca being detained on Tuesday night for covering the government imposed evening blackout in that city was "erroneous". He said in the letter that "None of the journalists were arrested, detained or charged with improper activities".... He went on to say that "our materials were not searched or confiscated and we were ordered to leave on the following day's flights", adding, "all this can be confirmed through police and army officials in Bahia Blanca"....

In view of the possibility of British attacks against the mainland - a possibility which was increased today with the extension of the blockade - the Defence Minister, Amadeo Frugoli, stressed that "Argentina will defend itself wherever and whenever the need arises in accordance with whatever aggressive action Britain may take in an escalation which seems to be being extended.

*Noticias Argentinas*, Buenos Aires,  
7 May 1982.



Vice Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, the Chairman of the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), has charged that the British Government has cunningly taken advantage of its nuclear power in attacks against a country (Argentina) that is carrying out a nuclear programme for peaceful objectives....

The Argentine Government had expressed its concern over the fact that the British fleet was probably carrying nuclear military material. He adds that this presumption has now been confirmed with the sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano, which was attacked by a nuclear submarine....

*Telam*, Argentine News Agency,  
7 May 1982.

The Argentine Defence Minister, Amadeo Frugoli, is quoted by the *Noticias Argentinas Agency* tonight as saying that ... along with the patrol boat Sobral another Argentine boat and a Polish fishing boat had been attacked from the air, but he did not say what condition these ships were in.

*Noticias Argentinas*, Buenos Aires,  
7 May 1982.

The Argentine Government has denounced the lack of good faith of the United Kingdom which, despite declaring its interest in holding negotiations and in achieving a peaceful solution, has contradicted its stated intentions with concrete deeds and created situations which seriously undermine the possibilities of holding negotiations....

*Telam*, Argentine News Agency,  
8 May 1982.

Information Department

Distribution:

Mr P R H Wright  
Mr C S R Giffard  
Lord N Gordon Lennox  
Mr J B Ure  
Mr K G MacInnes, Information Department  
Mr P J Weston, Defence Department  
Mr N Fenn, News Department  
Mr P R Fearn, South America Department  
Mr J Doble, Information Department  
Mr J Dew, Emergency Unit  
Mr R A Facey, South America Department  
Mr I S McDonald, Deputy Chief of Public Relations, MOD  
Col T Sneyd, MOD  
Mr J Todd, Cabinet Office Assessment Staff  
Emergency Unit  
Information Department



FALKLAND ISLANDS; ARGENTINE PRESS REACTION  
6-10 MAY 1982

Defense Minister Amadeo Frugoli today stated at the auditorium of the Sheraton Hotel that Argentina is not an aggressor country, that the aggression is being perpetrated by Great Britain and that Argentina will respond to that aggression with every means, at the right place and in due time....

... When asked whether a possible Soviet help would displace Argentina from the Western world he answered that Argentina has not considered the possibility of accepting that kind of military aid, concerning a shifting from the West, stressing that this should be understood in the sense that Argentina has contributed to the nurturing and the defense of the fundamental values of the Western world....

*Telam, Buenos Aires, 6 May 1982.*

Argentine Foreign Minister on UN negotiations: This evening Foreign Minister Necanor Costa Mendez stated that in all this something which really bothers us is the continuing British campaign to misrepresent us, to present us as being reticent and above all transigent when this is really not the case....

*Telam, Buenos Aires, 8 May 1982.*

The joint staff hereby states that the British Government's decision to extend the total exclusion zone to 12 nautical miles within the Argentine coast has once again confirmed the position as aggressor of that government.

In the face of this new event, it is reiterated that the armed forces are able and ready to act to the extent that might be necessary to guarantee fulfillment of the established military objectives in the South Atlantic.

*Buenos Aires Domestic Service,  
9 May 1982.*

It has been learned in military circles that the government is studying the possibility of expropriating British properties and of cancelling contracts with British companies.

This possible measure is under consideration in view of new measures of war escalation adopted by Great Britain....

*Noticias Argentinas, Buenos Aires,  
9 May 1982.*



Comodoro Rivadavia: ... A military source indicated that in the military hospital of the Don Bosco neighbourhood there are 40 soldiers with different illnesses which are not serious but he emphasised that they are not wounded.

It has also been confirmed that about 15 soldiers wounded at the front were transferred to several hospitals in the federal capital. ...

*Noticias Argentinas*, Buenos Aires,  
9 May 1982.

While Venezuelan radio and television were today deploring the British attack against the Argentine fishing boat Narwal near the Malvinas Islands, Miraflores Palace sources, the Venezuelan Government Palace, noted the possibility that Venezuela may sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. ...

... A source close to government circles reported that "in view of the escalation of British aggression against Argentina, Venezuela may decide to sever relations with the United Kingdom in a few hours".

*Saporiti*, Buenos Aires, 10 May 1982.

Argentine Defense Minister, Amadeo Frugoli, reported tonight that British Forces attacked today Puerto Argentino and Puerto Darwing using in the attack against Puerto Argentino, Beluga-type bombs that have an area of action of 40 by 120 meters which have been prohibited by the Geneva Convention. ...

... Frugoli added that after this, the British Forces attacked and sunk the Argentine fishing boat Narwal "which was in the area carrying out specific tasks (tarefas específicas) that did not pose any threat to the British Fleet. The Narwal was sunk by a sea harrier which later did not hesitate to machinegun the rafts that were hurled to the sea by the survivors, and even a raft that was filled with sick and wounded. This is an outrageous attack that violates the most elemental human feelings. This is why I do not hesitate to call it an inhuman deed, a hideous barbarian act that goes against all those values of the free world which the British Government has claimed to defend and uphold". ...

*Telam*, Buenos Aires, 10 May 1982.

Information Department

Distribution:

Mr P H R Wright  
Mr C S R Giffard  
Lord N Gordon Lennox  
Mr J B Ure  
Mr K G MacInnes, Information Department  
Mr P J Weston, Defence Department  
Mr N Fenn, News Department  
Mr P R Fearn, South America Department  
Mr J Doble, Information Department  
Mr J Dew, Emergency Unit  
Mr R/A Facey, South America Department  
Mr I S MacDonald, Deputy Chief of Public Relations, MOD  
Col T Sneyd, MOD  
Mr J Todd, Cabinet Office Assessment Staff  
Emergency Unit  
Information Department



RESTRICTED

A14  
with AJC

SAPU(82) 17

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper was issued at 1900 hours on 7 May 1982. It contains information and suggests the line to take on the following -

1. Mr Pym's Press Conference
2. Sporting links with Argentina
3. Are we at war?

Cabinet Office

7 May 1982

RESTRICTED

## LINE TO TAKE

### 1. Mr Pym's Press Conference

A transcript is attached.

### 2. Sporting links with Argentina (Reports of footballers' doubts about World Cup)

Government are keeping the position under review. Present policy is to discourage all bilateral sporting contact in United Kingdom or in Argentina. No objection at present to teams and individuals competing in international events (including the World Cup) held in other countries where Argentina may be represented. Reports in the press that the Minister of Sport will meet the Football Associations involved (England, Scotland, Northern Ireland) next week to advise on participation in the World Cup are incorrect. (The occasion is a press launch of a guidance leaflet for British football fans planning to travel to Spain.)

### 3. Are we at war?

'War' is a technical term with some complex implications. In the legal sense there is no war unless one or other side declares it or recognizes that a state of war exists. Neither side has done either (Mr Costa Mendez's remarks after the South Georgia operation that we were "technically at war" were evidently off the cuff remarks and have not been confirmed or repeated). Our operations in the South Atlantic are in self defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter (text below). We are enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone which cuts off supplies to the Argentine forces, which are illegally occupying the Falklands in defiance of Security Council Resolution 502. We are not in a state of general war against Argentina.

#### Article 51

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."



NICK FENN: GOOD MORNING EVERYBODY. GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND WELCOME TO THIS PRESS CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY, MR. FRANCIS PYM, MAY I FIRST SAY ONE OR TWO WORDS BY WAY OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTRODUCTION, WE HAVE HAD, I UNDERSTAND, THIS MORNING THE AGE OLD ARGUMENT BETWEEN DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF YOUR PROFESSION WHICH WE SHALL RESOLVE IN THE AGE OLD MANNER OF INVITING THE STILL PHOTOGRAPHERS TO DO THEIR STUFF NOW AND THEY CAN COME FORWARD AND STAND UP AND DO WHAT THEY WANT FOR THE FIRST COUPLE OF MINUTES WHILE I'M TALKING AND THEN WILL THEY PLEASE BE SEATED AND ENABLE THEIR OTHER COLLEAGUES TO DO THEIR JOB. SECONDLY I SHOULD SAY THAT THE NORMAL NEWS DEPARTMENT, 12.30 NEWS CONFERENCE IS CANCELLED BECAUSE IT IS QUITE PLAINLY REDUNDANT BUT ANY OF YOU WHO WISH HOWEVER MAY COLLECT THE USUAL LIST OF MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENTS AND ONE SMALL PRESS RELEASE ON ANOTHER SUBJECT FROM NEWS DEPARTMENT AS YOU LEAVE. AVAILABLE AS YOU LEAVE THIS ROOM WILL BE A COPY OF THE STATEMENT WHICH MR. PYM HAS JUST MADE TO PARLIAMENT. HE WILL BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION TO THIS PRESS CONFERENCE MAKE A STATEMENT WHICH WILL BE CLOSELY MODELLED ON THE PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT ALTHOUGH NOT IN ALL RESPECTS TEXTURALLY IDENTICAL. THE PROCEEDINGS THIS MORNING WILL OF COURSE BE ON THE RECORD THROUGHOUT. I INVITE YOU WHEN YOU WANT TO ASK QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY YOURSELF BY NAME AND PUBLICATION AND AFTER THE BRIEF INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT MR. PYM WILL BE GLAD TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS. JUST GIVE THEM ONE MOMENT MORE, SIR, AND THEN WE COULD PROCEED.

(TALKING IN BACKGROUND)

THE PHOTOGRAPHERS WILL STAY ... THEY'VE GOT A MOMENT OR TWO FIRST AND THEN WE'LL ASK THEM TO RESUME THEIR SEATS.

MR. PYM: BE RUNNING OUT OF FILM SOON. YES, OKAY, THERE WE ARE, RIGHT, RIGHT, OKAY.

N. FENN: OKAY GENTLEMEN, THANK YOU VERY MUCH WE CAN NOW PROCEED - IF THE PHOTOGRAPHERS WOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH TO RESUME THEIR SEATS. MR. PYM.

MR. PYM: I HAVE JUST REPORTED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE HAS ONCE AGAIN FRUSTRATED A CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE. THEY HAVE REJECTED PROPOSALS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION DEVELOPED BY MR. HAIG AND THE PRESIDENT OF PERU. YESTERDAY I SIGNIFIED THAT WE WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT IMMEDIATELY AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PREPARE THE WAY FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED SUBSTANTIAL FLEXIBILITY ON OUR PART. IF IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ARGENTINES THE CEASEFIRE WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN FIRMLY LINKED TO THE BEGINNING OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL COULD HAVE COME INTO EFFECT AS EARLY AS 5 O'CLOCK THIS AFTERNOON. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT UNDER DISCUSSION YESTERDAY INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS. FIRST COMPLETE AND SUPERVISED WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, MATCHED BY CORRESPONDING WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES. SECOND - AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AS SOON AS ARGENTINA ACCEPTED THE AGREEMENT AND AGREED TO WITHDRAW. THIRD - APPOINTMENT OF A SMALL GROUP OF COUNTRIES ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES WHO WOULD SUPERVISE WITHDRAWAL, UNDERTAKE THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ISLANDERS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND PERHAPS HELP IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OUR PRINCIPLES OR TO THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. FOUR - SUSPENSION OF THE EXISTING EXCLUSION ZONES AND THE LIFTING OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.



WAY THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE. AS YOU KNOW THAT IS A STICKING POINT FOR US. PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE TWO SIDES WOULD SIMPLY HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFERENCE THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THEM OVER THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. WE HAVE WORKED AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORK POSITIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. OUR AGREEMENT OF THESE IDEAS MAKES THIS ONCE AGAIN ABUNDANTLY CLEAR. I WISH I COULD SAY THAT THE ARGENTINE JUNTA HAD BEEN WORKING IN A SIMILAR SPIRIT, CLEARLY THEY WERE NOT. THE ARGENTINES HAVE SO FAR INSISTED THAT A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THEM WOULD BE A PRECONDITION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A FINAL SETTLEMENT. THE ARGENTINES TALK MUCH OF THE NEED FOR THE DECOLONISATION OF THE ISLANDS, WHAT THEY APPEAR TO MEAN BY THIS IS COLONISATION BY THEMSELVES. IN ADDITION THE ARGENTINES SEEM NOW TO BE OBSTRUCTING PROGRESS IN ANOTHER BUT EQUALLY FUNDAMENTAL WAY, THEY APPEAR TO BE ASKING FOR A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT ANY CLEAR LINK WITH A WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR INVASION FORCE. TO GRANT THIS WOULD BE TO LEAVE THEM INDEFINITELY IN CONTROL OF PEOPLE AND TERRITORY WHICH THEY HAD ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND TO DENY OURSELVES THE RIGHT OF OUR OWN SELF DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. WE HAVE NOT ALLOWED ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO HALT THE MEASURES WHICH OUR TASK FORCE IS TAKING. WE WILL NOT ALLOW THEIR DIPLOMATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM TO DO SO EITHER, NOR WILL THEY BE ALLOWED TO HALT OUR OWN VIGILANT ENDEAVOURS TO FIND A PEACEFUL WAY OUT OF THE CONFLICT INTO WHICH THEY HAVE LED US. THIS IS WHY I WELCOMED AND CO-OPERATED WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH THE INITIATIVES OF MR. HAIG AND WHY I NOW WELCOME THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND AM WORKING CLOSELY WITH HIM. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS PUT TO BOTH US AND ARGENTINA SOME IDEAS AS A FRAMEWORK AROUND WHICH PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE. WE HAVE ACCEPTED HIS GENERAL APPROACH. YESTERDAY I SENT HIM A POSITIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE REPLY MAKING CLEAR THAT THE ELEMENTS FOR A SOLUTION PUT FORWARD BY HIM WERE CLOSE TO THOSE WHICH HAD BEEN THE BASIS OF OUR EFFORTS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS. I MADE CLEAR AT THE SAME TIME THAT IN OUR VIEW RESOLUTION 502 MUST BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY, THAT AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE COULD NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED BY US AS A STEP TOWARDS THIS AND THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CEASEFIRE MUST BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY LINKED TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND MUST BE COMPLETED WITHIN A FIXED NUMBER OF DAYS. IF ONE PHASE OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END BY ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE ANOTHER PHASE IS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN NEW YORK. THE AIM REMAINS THE SAME, TO SECURE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502. WE ARE WORKING URGENTLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THIS END. I HOPE THE ARGENTINES WILL HENCEFORTH SHOW THAT READINESS AND THAT DESIRE TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN EVIDENT SO FAR ONLY ON OUR SIDE. IF THEY DO NOT, THEN LET THEM BE IN NO DOUBT THAT WE SHALL DO WHATEVER MAY BE NECESSARY TO END THEIR UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION. OUR RESOLVE IS UNDIMINISHED. IT REMAINS THE GOVERNMENT'S HIGHEST PRIORITY TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IF THAT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE.

JOURNALIST: DOES THE COLLAPSE OF THE PERUVIAN PEACE INITIATIVE MEAN THAT INCREASINGLY A MILITARY SOLUTION IS THE ONLY ONE POSSIBLE?

MR. PYM: NO, IT DOES NOT. THE PRESENT TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL BEGAN BEFORE THE UNITED STATES/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS HAD BEEN PUT TO EITHER SIDE, THAT HAS NOW ENDED, THAT PARTICULAR INITIATIVE AND WE'RE NOW WORKING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL, SO IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT MEAN THAT.



KEITH GRAVES: IF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK IS VERY CLOSE TO THE OTHER PLANS AS YOU'VE JUST SAID AND THEY'VE BEEN REJECTED BY THE ARGENTINES, THEN SURELY THERE'S VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK SUCCEEDING?

R. PYM: NOT NECESSARILY. WE HAD ONE SET OF PROPOSALS ORIGINALLY PUT FORWARD BY THE UNITED STATES ON THEIR OWN WHICH WERE REJECTED. THEN THERE WAS ANOTHER SET BY THE UNITED STATES AND PERU AND THEY'VE BEEN REJECTED. NOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS COME INTO IT AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF VARIANTS THAT COULD BE INCORPORATED AND WE MUST SEE WHAT THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE IS, SO CERTAINLY DO NOT SHARE THAT VIEW

KEITH GRAVES: BUT WE STAND BY OUR BASIC DEMANDS, WITHDRAWAL AND OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO PRECONDITIONS?

N. FENN: THAT MUST BE SO.

N. FENN: MICHAEL BRUNSON.

MICHAEL BRUNSON: FOREIGN SECRETARY, IT SEEMS THAT EVERY TIME YOU PUT A PLAN TO THE ARGENTINIANS THEY, IN THE END, ALWAYS REJECT IT, EITHER ON THE GROUNDS OF WITHDRAWAL OR ON THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY. HOW MANY MORE PLANS CAN YOU PUT FOR THEM TO REJECT?

MR. PYM: THAT I DON'T KNOW BUT THEY HAVE OF COURSE GIVEN AN INDICATION IN PUBLIC IMPLYING THAT THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE OUTLINE PUT FORWARD BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. AS I'VE SAID IN THIS STATEMENT AND I SAID IN THE HOUSE, I AM SCEPTICAL ABOUT THAT BUT WE SHALL SEE BUT I THINK IT'S THE RIGHT WAY TO GO... TO GO AHEAD NOW AND WE MUST SEE WHAT COMES OUT OF IT.

M. BRUNSON: AND IF THEY DO NOT SUCCEED IS OCCUPATION, RE-OCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS BY FORCE BY BRITAIN INEVITABLE?

MR. PYM: THAT OF COURSE REMAINS AN OPTION ALL THE TIME BUT IT'S THE ONE THING WE'RE TRYING TO AVOID IF WE

POSSIBLY CAN BECAUSE WE WANT TO GET A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. AS I SAID IN THE HOUSE JUST NOW, I AM NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF CLOSING DOORS, I AM IN THE BUSINESS OF OPENING THEM.

N. FENN: JOHN DICKIE.

JOHN DICKIE: (DAILY MAIL) SECRETARY OF STATE, ARE YOU NOW GOING TO ASK FOR GREATER ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA FROM YOUR PARTNERS AND IN PARTICULAR ARE YOU GOING TO CALL ON THE UNITED NATIONS FOR A TOTAL ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AT THE RISK EVEN OF A SOVIET VETO BLOCKING IT?

MR. PYM: I LEAVE THAT AT THE MOMENT IN THE HANDS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE SHALL OF COURSE BE ASKING FOR OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO CONTINUE THEIR SANCTIONS WHEN THEY RUN OUT IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS MONTH. THE UNITED STATES HAS OF COURSE COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE A WEEK OR MORE AGO AND THEY HAVE TAKEN CERTAIN MEASURES. THEY'VE NOT CLOSED THEIR MINDS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES, THAT IS A MATTER FOR THEM, BUT THE GREATER THE SUPPORT WE GET FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN TAKING OTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES THE BETTER IT WILL BE BECAUSE IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE BUILD UP OF PRESSURE AND I THINK PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO REALISE THAT THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY IS IN A PRETTY POOR SHAPE, THEY'VE HAD A DEVALUATION, THEY'VE GOT A LOT OF PROBLEMS THERE IN BORROWING MONEY AND IT IS BEGINNING TO HAVE ITS EFFECT, SO TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN GET MORE COUNTRIES PLAYING THEIR PART IN THAT THE BETTER IT WILL BE.



ANTHONY BEVANS: (TIMES) IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT YOU TOLD THE HOUSE THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT ARGENTINA COULD ACCEPT THE UNITED NATIONS PROPOSALS, IS THIS PRESS CONFERENCE DESIGNED TO SOFTEN UP WORLD OPINION FOR AN INVASION NEXT WEEK?

MR. PYM: CERTAINLY NOT, IT IS TO DESCRIBE EXACTLY WHAT THE BRITISH POSITION IS AND I DON'T THINK I DID SAY IN THE HOUSE WHAT I THINK I UNDERSTOOD YOU TO SAY BY MY REMARKS, WHAT I SAID WAS I WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THEY HAVE ACCEPTED WHAT THEY HAD IMPLIED THEY HAD ACCEPTED BECAUSE SO FAR THEY'D SHOWN NO SIGN EITHER OF AGREEING TO WITHDRAW OR TO LEAVING THE ULTIMATE MATTER OF SOVEREIGNTY OPEN. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

N. FENN: ROSEMARY WRIGHT. COULD YOU WAIT FOR THE MIKE.  
ROSEMARY.

ROSEMARY WRIGHT: MR. PYM, DO YOU ACTUALLY BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN BE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UN OR WOULD ANY ... WOULD IT JUST BE LIMITED TO DISCUSSIONS?

MR. PYM: THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, I THINK THAT IS THE BASIS UPON WHICH IT IS PROCEEDING AND HE IS OF COURSE BRINGING IN ANYBODY AND ANY PEOPLE TO HELP HIM THAT HE WANTS, THAT'S THE BASIS OF IT AND I FEEL THAT THAT'S A VERY HELPFUL WAY TO PROCEED.

ROSEMARY WRIGHT: WOULD HE HAVE TO HAVE ANY PACKAGE THAT HE CAME UP WITH RATIFIED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL?

MR. PYM: NOT NECESSARILY I WOULD'NT HAVE THOUGHT.

N. FENN: JERRY THOMPSON.



JERRY THOMPSON: (MASON A.P.) MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU SEE A FURTHER  
ROLE FOR MR. HAIG IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS?

MR. PYM: IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE I THINK IT'S DIFFICULT TO SEE  
THAT, BUT HE IS JUST AS ENTHUSIASTIC FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT  
AS I AM AND INDEED EVERYBODY IS AND I KNOW THAT HE HOLDS HIMSELF  
IN READINESS TO PLAY ANY PART IN THAT THAT MAY BE ASKED OF HIM  
OR THAT HE MAY THINK APPROPRIATE IN THE FUTURE.

SEAN KELLY: (IRISH RADIO AND TELEVISION) MR. PYM, O WPDDEEE  
I WONDER IF THERE WILL BE A STAY ON FURTHER MILITARY HOSTILITIES  
WHILE THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PLAN IS CONSIDERED?

MR. PYM: POSITION AT THE MOMENT IS THAT WE ARE SECURING  
AND PROTECTING TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE, IT'S BRITISH TERRITORY,  
THERE ARE BRITISH CITIZENS ON THAT ISLAND AND THAT IS WHAT  
WE ARE DOING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

SEAN KELLY: WILL THERE BE  
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS?

MR. PYM: NOT NECESSARILY, IF <sup>YOU</sup> ON FURTHER BOMBING RAIDS ON  
USING IT AGAIN AND THEN COULD TAKE  
OUR FORCES WE WOULD BOMB IT AGAIN,  
USE ANY MORE MILITARY FORCE THAN IS <sup>NEAR</sup> AIRFIELD OR START  
WISH TO DO THAT BUT WE MUST SECURE AND <sup>WE</sup> OF IT TO ATTACK  
EXCLUSION ZONE. <sup>WE</sup> IS NOT TO

SEAN KELLY: ONE FINAL QUESTION, COULD I ASK YOU DON'T  
PERHAPS YOU'RE ASKING A LITTLE TOO MUCH OF THE AR- THE TOTAL  
GALTIERI, IN POLITICAL TERMS TO RULE OUT THE CONCESS-  
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, THE WITHDRAWAL OF  
ARGENTINE TROOPS, BECAUSE HIS POSITION WOULD GO, THE PRE-  
LOSE HIS POWER AND LOSE HIS POSITION IF HE CONCEDED TO BRIT  
DEMANDS?

MR. PYM: WELL, YOU MAY BE ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE BUT I MUST TELL YOU  
THAT WE CERTAINLY ARE NOT ASKING ANYTHING TOO MUCH OF THE  
ARGENTINES, THEY INVADDED, THEY'RE THE AGGRESSOR, THEY'VE PUT  
THEIR FORCES ON TO THAT ISLAND AND WHEN THE RESOLUTION 502 WAS  
PASSED THEY USED IT TO REINFORCE THAT ISLAND, THOUSANDS OF  
TROOPS THEY POURED INTO IT, THEY MUST BE GETTING RATHER WORRIED  
AT THE PRESENT TIME, SORRY ABOUT THAT, BUT IT CAN'T BE HELPED,  
I CERTAINLY AM NOT ASKING TOO MUCH OF THEM, THE ONLY THING THEY  
OUGHT TO DO IS TO GET OFF THAT ISLAND.

(PSE READ FIRST LINE ABOVE PARA 'SIDE')

SEAN KELLY: DON'T YOU AGREE THAT HE WOULD LOSE POWER IF HE GAVE IN?

MR. PYM: HE'S HAD ENOUGH.

N. FENN: HE'S HAD ENOUGH, YES. THE GENTLEMAN BEHIND.



RECAPTURE OF THE ISLANDS. NOW YOU HAVE  
IT, SLIPPING AWAY AND THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, NOW YOU HAVE  
SAID THAT YOU ARE TRYING TO AVOID A RECAPTURE OF THE ISLANDS,  
THAT'S THE LAST THING YOU WANT TO DO BUT WHAT SORT OF TIME DO WE  
HAVE LEFT?

MR. PYM: WELL, THAT REMAINS TO BE SEEN DOESN'T IT? I HOPE THAT  
THEY'LL GO OFF THE ISLAND WITHOUT ANY ESCALATION OF MILITARY  
ACTIVITY AS I'VE SAID BEFORE AND THAT'S WHAT WE MUST HOPE FOR AND  
I WILL GO ON WORKING FOR THAT AND I THINK THE PRESSURES, BOTH  
ECONOMIC PRESSURES ARE HAVING THEIR EFFECT AND I THINK THE  
MILITARY PRESSURES ARE HAVING THEIR EFFECT AND IT MAY BE, I DON'T  
KNOW, WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS FOR ALL I KNOW, OR THE NEXT WEEK  
OR SO, THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL CHANGE THEIR MIND, WE'LL HAVE  
TO SEE.

M. FENN: MALCOLM RUTHERFORD.

MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, FOREIGN SECRETAR, THE TIMING OF THE .....  
ARGENTINA'S RESPONSE TO THE UN, YOU SAID IN DUE COURSE, COULD  
YOU GIVE SOME INDICATION OF WHAT YOU EXPECT DUE COURSE TO MEAN,  
24 HOURS - 48 - OR....

MR. PYM: THEY INDICATED PUBLICLY YESTERDAY BY WHAT THEY STATED  
THAT THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN ONE BUT I AM RATHER DOUBTFUL WHETHER  
THEY HAVE, IN FACT I DON'T THINK THEY HAVE AND NATURALLY I  
HAVEN'T BEEN .... WE HAVEN'T BEEN INFORMED THAT THEY HAVE BUT I  
THINK THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS AWAITING NOW FOR WHAT THEIR  
COMMENTS ARE ON HIS PROPOSALS, SO WE'LL HAVE TO SEE.

M. FENN: PETER JENKINS.

PETER JENKINS: (GUARDIAN) CAN YOU SAY WHETHER MR. HAIG WAS  
ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE PERUVIAN  
PROPOSALS?

MR. PYM: YES, HE WAS, IT WAS A PERUVIAN PROPOSAL ORIGINALLY,  
THEN THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE MEXICAN AMERICAN INPUT INTO IT AND  
WE PUT SOME PRACTICAL IDEAS INTO IT AND IT THEN WENT TO PERU  
AND THE PERUVIANS WERE HAPPY WITH IT BUT THEN THEY PUT IT TO THE  
ARGENTINES AND THEY REFUSED.

JOHN LEWIS: (BIRMINGHAM POST) SECRETARY OF STATE, CAN YOU HELP  
US TO THE EXTENT OF CLARIFYING WHETHER THE UNITED NATIONS  
FRAMEWORK DOES IN FACT CONCEIVE A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE  
CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL AND WHETHER THERE'S ANY TIMING  
ATTACHED TO IT?

MR. PYM: THERE WILL HAVE TO BE THAT DIRECT LINKAGE, YES, BOTH  
A CEASEFIRE AND A WITHDRAWAL WERE OF COURSE PART OF THE PROPOSITION  
THAT WAS PUT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT AS I MADE CLEAR THE  
TWO THINGS HAVE TO GO SIMULTANEOUSLY.



SECRETARY OF STATE RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .  
OUT, SLIPPING AWAY AND THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, NOW YOU HAVE  
JUST SAID THAT YOU ARE TRYING TO AVOID A RECAPTURE OF THE ISLANDS,  
THAT'S THE LAST THING YOU WANT TO DO BUT WHAT SORT OF TIME DO WE  
HAVE LEFT?

MR. PYM: WELL, THAT REMAINS TO BE SEEN DOESN'T IT? I HOPE THAT  
THEY'LL GO OFF THE ISLAND WITHOUT ANY ESCALATION OF MILITARY  
ACTIVITY AS I'VE SAID BEFORE AND THAT'S WHAT WE MUST HOPE FOR AND  
I WILL GO ON WORKING FOR THAT AND I THINK THE PRESSURES, BOTH  
ECONOMIC PRESSURES ARE HAVING THEIR EFFECT AND I THINK THE  
MILITARY PRESSURES ARE HAVING THEIR EFFECT AND IT MAY BE, I DON'T  
KNOW, WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS FOR ALL I KNOW, OR THE NEXT WEEK  
OR SO, THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL CHANGE THEIR MIND, WE'LL HAVE  
TO SEE.

N. FENN: MALCOLM RUTHERFORD.

MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, FOREIGN SECRETAR, THE TIMING OF THE . . . . .  
ARGENTINA'S RESPONSE TO THE UN, YOU SAID IN DUE COURSE, COULD  
YOU GIVE SOME INDICATION OF WHAT YOU EXPECT DUE COURSE TO MEAN,  
24 HOURS - 48 - OR....

MR. PYM: THEY INDICATED PUBLICLY YESTERDAY BY WHAT THEY STATED  
THAT THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN ONE BUT I AM RATHER DOUBTFUL WHETHER  
THEY HAVE, IN FACT I DON'T THINK THEY HAVE AND NATURALLY I  
HAVEN'T BEEN . . . . WE HAVEN'T BEEN INFORMED THAT THEY HAVE BUT I  
THINK THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS AWAITING NOW FOR WHAT THEIR  
COMMENTS ARE ON HIS PROPOSALS, SO WE'LL HAVE TO SEE.

N. FENN: PETER JENKINS.

PETER JENKINS: (GUARDIAN) CAN YOU SAY WHETHER MR. HAID WAS  
ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE PERUVIAN  
PROPOSALS?

MR. PYM: YES, HE WAS, IT WAS A PERUVIAN PROPOSAL ORIGINALLY,  
THEN THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE MREEE AMERICAN INPUT INTO IT AND  
WE PUT SOME PRACTICAL IDEAS INTO IT AND IT THEN WENT TO PERU  
AND THE PERUVIANS WERE HAPPY WITH IT BUT THEN THEY PUT IT TO THE  
ARGENTINES AND THEY REFUSED.

JOHN LEWIS: (BIRMINGHAM POST) SECRETARY OF STATE, CAN YOU HELP  
US TO THE EXTENT OF CLARIFYING WHETHER THE UNITED NATIONS  
FRAMEWORK DOES IN FACT CONCEIVE A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE  
CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL AND WHETHER THERE'S ANY TIMING  
ATTACHED TO IT?

MR. PYM: THERE WILL HAVE TO BE THAT DIRECT LINKAGE, YES, BOTH  
A CEASEFIRE AND A WITHDRAWAL WERE OF COURSE PART OF THE PROPOSITION  
THAT WAS PUT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT AS I MADE CLEAR THE  
TWO THINGS HAVE TO GO SIMULTANEOUSLY.



N. FENN: PATRICK KEATLEY.

PATRICK KEATLEY: (GUARDIAN) IN ALL THIS SOVEREIGNTY APPEARS TO BE THE REEF ON NEGOTIATIONS ARE STRIKING . . . STICKING. IS IT POSSIBLE THIS ISSUE COULD BE SHIFTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. I KNOW THAT'S AN OLD ONE AND I KNOW ARGENTINA HAS ON OCCASIONS REFUSED TO GO THERE BUT IT NOW BECOMES SO IMPORTANT THAT IT MIGHT SAVE FACE, COULD IT NOT BE PART OF A PACKAGE?

MR. PYM: YES, WE HAVE SAID IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, IN THE DEBATE A WEEK AGO YESTERDAY, THAT THIS IS A POSSIBILITY THAT IS NOT EXCLUDED, WE HAVE NOT SHUT OFF THAT OPTION, OF COURSE IT COULD GO TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BUT WHEN WE'VE TRIED BEFORE, AS YOU KNOW, ARGENTINA WOULD NOT TURN UP OR WOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS BUT LET ME REMIND YOU AGAIN ABOUT THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THIS - THAT THE ARGENTINES SAY IT IS THEIR TERRITORY AND THERE'S NO DOUBT ABOUT IT AND THEY'RE GOING TO STICK TO THAT AND IT'S NOT UP FOR NEGOTIATION WHATSOEVER. THAT'S THE END OF THE MATTER. THE BRITISH POSITION - WE HAVE A CLAIM TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THOSE ISLANDS WHICH WE BELIEVE IS TOTALLY VALID, WE HAVE HAD THE POSSESSION OF THEM FOR 149 YEARS, AND WE'VE ADMINISTERED THEM AND LOOKED AFTER THE PEOPLE THERE ALL THAT TIME BUT WE SAY WE RECOGNISE THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE A CLAIM, WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE INVALID, BUT WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT EXISTS AND WHEN THE NEGOTIATORS SIT DOWN WE SAY, ALL RIGHT, IT'S BRITISH TERRITORY BUT WE'RE QUITE PREPARED TO ALTER THAT STATUS IF THAT IS WHAT THE ISLANDERS PREFER OR IF THERE IS SOME OTHER ORGANISATION OR ARRANGEMENT OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT THAT THE ISLANDERS WOULD ACCEPT OR WOULD PREFER, WE WON'T STAND IN THEIR WAY, SO THAT IS AN OPEN AND AN HONOURABLE AND A REASONABLE POSITION AS COMPARED WITH THE ABSOLUTE HARD LINE ON THE OTHER SIDE. NOW THAT HARD LINE ON THE OTHER SIDE HAS GOT TO ALTER SO THAT A NEGOTIATION FOR THE FUTURE CAN TAKE PLACE ON A SENSIBLE BASIS.

N. FENN: DAVID MCNEIL.

DAVID MCNEIL: FOREIGN SECRETARY, WOULD YOU BE PREPARED TO TALK TO MR. COSTA MENDEZ OR ANY OTHER ARGENTINE LEADER IF THAT WERE SUGGESTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL?



IT'S VERY COMPLICATED, WITH GALTIERI'S POSITION, COSTA MENDEZ POSITION, THE JUNTA'S POSITION AND ALL THE GENERALS AND THE ADMIRALS, IT'S ALL VERY COMPLICATED AND I THINK IT'S MUCH BETTER THAT SOMEBODY ELSE TALKS TO THEM AND ALSO TALKS TO US.

N. FENN: THE PERSISTENT STANDARD.

JOURNALIST: YOU SAID JUST A MOMENT AGO THAT YOU'RE TRYING TO AVOID ANY MILITARY ESCALATION BUT ARE YOU REALLY SAYING THAT BECAUSE POSSIBLY THE LOSS OF THREE SEA HARRIERS AND THE SHFFIELD HAS UNDERMINED THE TASK FORCE MILITARY POSITION AS IT STANDS?

MR. PYM: IT CERTAINLY HAS NOT UNDERMINED ANYTHING AND WE ARE SECURING AND HAVE CONTROL OF THAT TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND I WANT TO TELL YOU BECAUSE I HEARD FROM THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF THIS MORNING WHAT YOU WOULD EXPECT TO BE THE CASE, THAT THE MORALE AND BEARING OF ALL OUR TROOPS IN THE TASK FORCE ARE ABSOLUTELY FIRST CLASS AND AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND I WANT TO GIVE THAT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ASSURANCE.

N. FENN: YES, SIR?

JOURNALIST: MR. PYM, IS THIS A STALEMATE, ARGENTINA INSISTING ON SOVEREIGNTY AS A PRECONDITION, BRITAIN INSISTING ON A WITHDRAWAL, IS THERE ANY IDEA ... HAS ANY IDEA BEEN PUT FORWARD THAT CAN 'BROKE' THIS STALEMATE AT ALL?

MR. PYM: NO, AND IT WOULD BE QUITE UNREASONABLE FOR THE ARGENTINES TO DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM AN ISLAND WHERE THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO BE AND IF THERE IS TO BE A NEGOTIATION WHICH WE'RE COMPLETELY READY FOR, INDEED WE WERE ENGAGED IN BEFORE THIS AGGRESSION TOOK PLACE, THEN THAT NEGOTIATION MUST BE ON THE BASIS THAT THE END RESULT IS OPEN, THAT MUST BE SO, OTHERWISE THERE'S NO POINT IN HAVING A NEGOTIATION, THERE'S NOTHING TO COMPROMISE ON, WHAT'S THE POINT OF HAVING A LONG-TERM NEGOTIATION IF ONE SIDE SAYS THEY'RE NOT PREPARED TO MOVE FROM ONE POSITION? I THINK THAT OUR ATTITUDE AND APPROACH TO IT HAS BEEN AND REMAINS COMPLETELY REASONABLE AND WHOLLY IN KEEPING WITH THE LINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN FOR YEARS AND YEARS, KN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BEEN INDEPENDENT IN CONTINENTS ALL ROUND THE WORLD.

N. FENN: BRIDGET BLOOM.

BRIDGET BLOOM: (FINANCIAL TIMES) MR. PYM, I WONDER IF YOU COULD COMMENT, YOU SAID THAT YOU EXPECTED THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW WITHIN A FIXED NUMBER ....

MR. PYM: .... WHERE IS SHE, I CAN'T SEE YOU ....

BRIDGET BLOOM: HERE ... SORRY .... WITHIN A FIXED NUMBER OF DAYS - YOU SAID YOU WANTED THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW, COULD YOU COMMENT ON THAT AND COULD YOU ALSO COMMENT ON WHO MIGHT SUPERVISE THE WITHDRAWAL .....

MR. PYM: WELL, THERE MUST BE A NUMBER OF DAYS BECAUSE ONE DOESN'T WANT IT TO DRAG ON FOR LONGER THAN IS NECESSARY, IT MIGHT BE DONE IN SEVEN DAYS OR TEN DAYS, I DON'T THINK THE ACTUAL NUMBER MATTERS, BUT THERE OUGHT TO BE A CLEAR PERIOD OF TIME BY WHEN IT'S GOT TO BE EXP COMPLETE AND THEN THAT WITHDRAWAL MUST BE VERIFIED AND THERE ARE A VARIETY OF WAYS IN WHICH THAT COULD BE DONE, ASI'VE SAID IN WHAT I SPOKE TO YOU ABOUT AT THE OUTSET, THE CONCEPT, THE LATEST CONCEPT THAT WAS TURNED DOWN WAS A GROUP OF COUNTRIES ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE THAT ROLE BUT OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE OTHER WAYS OF DOING IT, I DON'T THINK THE MECHANISM OF THAT MATTERS SO MUCH AS MAKING SURE THAT IT IS DONE ON A BASIS THAT'S ACCEPTABLE.



N. FENN: NORMAN KIRKHAM.

NORMAN KIRKHAM: (SUNDAY TELEGRAPH) WOULD THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAY IF THERE IS NOW A GROWING POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK ON ANY ARGENTINE MAINLAND BASE TO PROTECT THE TASK FORCE FROM THE VULNERABILITY TO MISSILES?

MR. PYM: NO, I WOULDN'T SAY THAT . . . AND I WOULD . . . AS I'VE SAID ALREADY, WE DON'T WANT TO SEE ANY ESCALATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY BUT AT THIS POINT I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE ANY POSSIBILITY WHATSOEVER, THAT WOULDN'T BE RIGHT BECAUSE AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES MAY APPLY. NOW I DO NOT WANT YOU TO READ INTO THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT I MUST KEEP THE OPTIONS OPEN, ALL OPTIONS OPEN - BUT LET ME ASSURE YOU AT THE MOMENT WE ARE ONLY CONCERNED WITH PRESERVING THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND THERE'S NO OTHER THOUGHT IN OUR HEADS AND I ONLY REPLY AS I HAVE BECAUSE WE DON'T KNOW WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN THIS WEEKEND, NEXT WEEK, NEXT MONTH, HOW LONG IT WILL GO ON FOR, WHETHER IT'S SUDDENLY GOING TO END AND IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES OF COURSE IT WOULDN'T BE RIGHT FOR ME AT THIS STAGE TO EXCLUDE ANYTHING.

PETER RIDDLE: (FINANCIAL TIMES) FOLLOWING ON FROM THAT QUESTION, IN THE HOUSE YOU WERE ASKED ABOUT THIS POINT AND YOU SAID IN REPLY THAT DIFFICULT DECISIONS MIGHT COME IF THE NEGOTIATIONS FAILED. DOES THAT MEAN THAT WHILE THE NEGOTIATION IS GOING ON OUR SOLE CONCERN IS FOR ENFORCING THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND ANY MILITARY ESCALATION WOULD FOLLOW THAT?

MR. PYM: WELL, BASICALLY THAT IS SO AT THE PRESENT MOMENT BUT, AGAIN, I'M NOT GOING TO SHUT OFF ANY OPTION BECAUSE THAT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT REMEMBERING THAT OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST BE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF OUR OWN FORCES, THAT IS A VERY HIGH PRIORITY INDEED AND WE'VE GOT TO TAKE THAT INTO CONSIDERATION AT ALL TIMES.

N. FENN: THE GENTLEMAN - IN FRONT.

JOURNALIST: YES, SECRETARY, COULD I ASK YOU TO REPEAT SOMETHING THAT YOU SAID SEVERAL TIMES SEVERAL WEEKS AGO BUT HAVE NOT SAID IN RECENT DAYS, WHICH IS THE QUESTION OF THE SELF DETERMINATION OF THE ISLANDERS BEING PARAMOUNT, IS THAT STILL THE BRITISH POSITION?

MR. PYM: YES, IT IS BASICALLY. I SAID IN MY STATEMENT, WHAT I JUST READ OUT TO YOU THAT POSSIBLY THE GROUP OF COUNTRIES MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OUR PRINCIPLES OR THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS AND THEIR POSITION IS CLEARLY SET OUT IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER WHICH HAS GUIDED US ALL THE WAY THROUGH AND OF COURSE WE'VE GOT THEM IN MIND AND WE WANT THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO BE CONSULTED IN ANY INTERIM ARRANGEMENT THAT MAY BE MADE WHILE THE LONG-TERM NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON.



PAUL SPANIER: (IRN) DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION, SIR, ABOUT THE SITUATION OF THE ISLANDERS THEMSELVES?

MR. PYM: NO, WE HAVE VERY, VERY LITTLE, WHAT EMERGES EITHER BY LETTER OR RUMOUR, WE HAVEN'T GOT ANY DIRECT INFORMATION ABOUT IT AND SOME OF THE REPORTS WE GET - WE'RE NOT ABSOLUTELY SURE HOW CORRECT THEY MAY BE, SO THE ANSWER IS I'M AFRAID WE'VE GOT VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON THAT AND ONE IS WORRIED ABOUT THE ISLANDERS, ALL THE TIME ONE REALISES THAT THERE THEY ARE IN THESE VERY UNATTRACTIVE CONDITIONS UNDER THE BOOT OF THE INVADER BUT I'M AFRAID WE HAVEN'T GOT HARD INFORMATION.

W. FENN: EKEITH GRAVES.

(BREAK IN TRANSMISSION FOR TWO MINUTES)

JOURNALIST: IN OTHER WORDS WOULD YOU ACCEPT FOR EXAMPLE UN TRUSTEESHIP WHICH WOULD PUT THE ISSUE OF SOVDREIGNTY BEYOND DISPUTE INITIALLY WHILE YOU HAVE AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION?

MR. PYM: I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THAT.

JOURNALIST: BUT WOULD YOU POSITIVELY SUPPORT IT?

MR. PYM: WELL, I MIGHT EVEN DO THAT, I MEAN IT'S JUST AN OPTION THAT'S OPEN AT THE MOMENT, LET'S SEE HOW WE GET ON, WE WANT A REPLY FIRST OF ALL FROM THE ARGENTINES, WHAT ARE THEY GOING TO DO ABOUT IT? HOW ARE THEY GOING TO RESPOND? WHAT I'M SAYING TO YOU IS THAT I'VE GOT NO HANG UP ABOUT THAT, THAT'S AN OPTION THAT COULD BE PURSUED.



AND THEN CHRISTPHER FORBES-ADAMS.

MR. BEVIN: HOW LONG ARE YOU WILLING TO LET THIS CRISIS DRAG ON FOR?

MR. PYM: THAT'S UP TO THE ARGENTINES ISN'T IT?

MR. BEVIN: WITH THE TASK FORCE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC YOU'RE WILLING TO .....

?

MR. PYM: THAT'S UP TO THE ARGENTINES.

MR. BEVIN: FOR A MONTH, TWO MONTHS?

MR. PYM: WE'VE SAID THAT THEY ARE GOING TO LEAVE THAT ISLAND.

MR. BEVIN: A MONTH - TWO MONTHS?

MR. PYM: I WON'T PUT ANY TIMESCALE ON IT. OUR OBJECTIVE IS QUITE CLEAR.

N. FENN: MR. FORBES-ADAMS ....

MR. FORBES-ADAMS: SECRETARY OF STATE, COULD YOU SAY IF THERE ARE ANY PLANS, YOUR ENVIASAGE OF PERHAPS GOING BACK TO NEW YORK TO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE?

MR. PYM: OH I COULD, NOT IMMEDIATELY, I'M ACTUALLY GOING OFF TO BRUSSELS TOMORROW AND SUNDAY WITH THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, BUT I WOULD IF NECESSARY, IF IT WAS APPROPRIATE, IF IT WAS GOING TO BE HELPFUL, I COULD GO BACK BUT I'VE NO PLANS TO AT THE MOMENT.

N. FENN: ROSEMARY - REUTERS.

ROSEMARY: MR. PYM, YOU SAID EARLIER YOU WERE IN THE BUSINESS OF OPENING DOORS, SPAIN .... THE KING OF SPAIN HAS OFFERED SPANISH MEDIATION, HAVE YOU BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SPAIN TO TAKE UP THAT OFFER?

MR. PYM: I HAVEN'T PERSONALLY BEEN DIRECTLY IN TOUCH WITH THE KING OF SPAIN, OR THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN BUT MESSAGES I HAVE RECEIVED FROM THEM.

N. FENN: ONE LAST QUESTION, THE GENTLEMAN BEHIND.

JOURNALIST: MY QUESTION IS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ONE ASKED BY BRIDGET BLOOM AND THAT IS IN NUMBER 'C' THE SMALL GROUP OF COUNTRIES, DID THE PERUVIAN PROPOSAL CONTAIN ANY DETAILS ABOUT THE MECHANISM FOR THE NEGOTIATION AND PARTICULARLY WAS THERE ANY DEADLINE PUT ON THE TIME FRAME FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAD BEEN REPORTED?

MR. PYM: THERE WAS NO DETAIL ABOUT THE FRAMEWORK OF IT, THAT WAS LEFT FAIRLY OPEN, THERE WAS A CONCEPT OF TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITHIN A LIMITED SPACE OF TIME BUT QUITE A LONG SPACE OF TIME, I WOULDN'T WANT TO BE MORE SPECIFIC THAN THAT, BECAUSE I THINK WHEN THIS TRAUMA IS OVER, FOR THOSE PEOPLE LIVING ON THE ISLAND IT WILL TAKE THEM SOME TIME TO RE-ESTABLISH THEIR LIFE AND SOME TIME TO WEIGH UP WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND TO COME TO ANY KIND OF A CONCLUSION WHAT THEY FEEL ABOUT THE FUTURE, AND I THINK COMING BACK TO KEITH GRAVES POINT, I THINK IT WILL TAKE UP TO SOME MONTHS I WOULD VISUALISE, BEFORE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO FORM A VIEW ABOUT WHAT ACTUALLY THEY WOULD PREFER.

N. FENN: FOREIGN SECRETARY- LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THANKX.

MR. PYM: THANK YOU.

?



020  
CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 May 1982

Prime Minister

To note

A.C.C. 3/5

W.L.G.

f.a.

Dear David,

Death of Prisoner of War on South Georgia

As you will know, the Board of Inquiry into the death of the Argentina Marine who was killed after being captured in South Georgia has been held. Although a summary of its findings has been received, we understand that your lawyers have advised that until the full report and the statements of the witnesses have been considered in London it will not be possible for any decision to be taken on whether or not the evidence justifies a prosecution. The report and statements are too long to be telegraphed and they cannot be forwarded to London until the vessel carrying the POWs has arrived at Ascension Island.

Although we understand that, as a matter of law, the decision whether or not to prosecute before a court martial rests with the Commanding Officer, we also understand that in practice in serious cases such as this he will seek advice from his superior authorities. Given the stringency of the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 regarding the death of POWs and the degree of international interest, not least on the part of the ICRC, which the decision will inevitably attract, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considers it highly desirable that no such advice should be given to the Commanding Officer without the benefit of the opinion of the Attorney General.

I am therefore writing to ask you to seek confirmation from your Secretary of State that the Commanding Officer will be advised not to take any decision regarding a prosecution until he has received considered advice from London and that that advice will be given only after consultation with the Attorney General.

/I am copying

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



I am copying this letter to John Coles at No 10 and to Henry Steel at the Law Officers' Department.

*Yours ever,*  
*[Signature]*

B J P Fall  
(Private Secretary)

David Omand Esq  
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL



17 Nov 1902





From: The Rt. Hon. Donald Stewart, M.P.

CS



7 May 1982

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Meeting room  
place = #7C  
at 2215 on  
Monday 10  
May 1982

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON. S.W.1

*Dear Prime Minister,*

Thank you for your letter of 6 May about meeting with leaders of parties in the House.

I know that David Steel and David Owen had pressed for all-party talks and that you had invited them on Privy Counsellor terms to discuss developments in relation to the Falklands Islands. I am aware also that you have said that you are always available to Members in this respect.

I have also received Ian Gow's later letter which says that you would see me to discuss the Falkland Islands. I would like to take this up for a short interview and will be available in the House at any time in the coming week in which you can fit this in.

*Yours sincerely  
Donald Stewart*

Donald Stewart



FM MONTEVIDEO

11 12 1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9

3RS 335

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 071735Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 224 OF 7 MAY

INFO PRIORITY BERNE, ROUTINE MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON

FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC

1. WE HEARD UNOFFICIALLY LATE ON 6 MAY THAT THE ARGENTINE MISSION WERE SENDING A LETTER OF COMPLAINT TO ICRC. WE TELEPHONED THE ICRC TO ENQUIRE ABOUT IT ON 7 MAY AND ADAMS WAS INVITED TO CALL TO RECEIVE A COPY OF THE NOTE, DELIVERED THAT MORNING. TEXT IS IN MIFT.
2. ON BEING HANDED THE TEXT, ADAMS WENT THROUGH IT WITH HOCKE OF THE ICRC AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS (REFERENCES ARE TO THE NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS OF THE NOTE).
3. ON 3 AND 4, ADAMS POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD GIVEN ICRC INFORMATION WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE CAPTURE OF THOSE CONCERNED. THIS CONTRASTED FAVOURABLY WITH ARGENTINE BEHAVIOUR OVER OUR PEOPLE WHOM THEY CAPTURED ON SOUTH GEORGIA ON 4 APRIL.
4. ON 5, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ENQUIRY INTO THE DEATH WAS STILL UNDER WAY. ON THE BURIAL HE CONSENTED THAT WE HAD NO INFORMATION, AND UNDERTOOK TO MAKE ENQUIRIES. THE ICRC WERE SURPRISED AT THE REFERENCE IN THE ARGENTINE NOTE TO BURIAL HAVING TAKEN PLACE, A FACT OF WHICH THEY WERE UNAWARE.
5. ON 7, ADAMS COMMENTED THAT THOUGH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS FORBODE THE RE-EMPLOYMENT IN MILITARY ACTION OF FREED PRISONERS OF WAR, THOSE CONCERNED HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN CONSIDERED AS POWS. WE HAD IN ANY CASE NO CONFIRMATION OF THE VERACITY OF THIS ASSERTION.
6. ON 8, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE GENERAL BELGRANO THOUGH OUTSIDE THE TEZ WAS WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE OF BRITISH SHIPS IN THE AREA, AND WAS FULLY ARMED AND ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS.



THE TEZ WAS WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE OF BRITISH SHIPS  
IN THE AREA, AND WAS FULLY ARMED AND ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS.

7. ON 9, ADAMS AND THE ICRC AGREED THAT MORE  
INFORMATION WOULD BE REQUIRED.

8. THE ICRC ACCEPTED THESE COMMENTS AND GAVE NO (NO)  
SIGN THAT THEY EXPECTED US TO COMMENT FURTHER, UNLESS WE CHOSE  
TO DO SO. THERE MAY BE MERIT IN SENDING IN OUR COMMENTS IN  
WRITING. ALTERNATIVELY WE MIGHT IGNORE THE ARGENTINE COMMUNICATION,  
TO WHICH THE ICRC WILL IN ANY CASE THEMSELVES BE REPLYING.  
WE MIGHT, ON BALANCE, LEAVE IT TO THEM.

9. SEE MIFT.

MARSHALL

NNNN

THE MESSAGES TO BE SENT TO THE ICRC AND THE ARGENTINE CONSUL IN  
Buenos Aires are to be sent by the next available opportunity  
via the nearest available means of communication to the ICRC  
in Geneva and the Argentine Consulate in Buenos Aires. The  
messages should be sent by the next available opportunity  
between the 10th and 15th.

URGENT MESSAGES SHOULD BE SENT BY THE NEXT AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY  
BY AIR TO THE ICRC AND THE ARGENTINE CONSUL IN BUENOS AIRES  
BY THE NEXT AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY BY AIR TO THE ICRC AND THE  
ARGENTINE CONSUL IN BUENOS AIRES.  
BY AIR TO THE ICRC AND THE ARGENTINE CONSUL IN BUENOS AIRES.  
BY AIR TO THE ICRC AND THE ARGENTINE CONSUL IN BUENOS AIRES.





PE.  
PS/MR HURD  
S/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
~~SIR J BOND~~ MR FREELAND  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
HD/PUSD  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF DEPT  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/EPD  
HD/EOD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
EMERGENCY ROOM  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )  
SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
DIO )

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

[ TYPISTS AA ]

ms 1

CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM UKMIS GENEVA 071740Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 225 OF 7 MAY  
INFO PRIORITY BERNE, ROUTINE MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF ARGENTINE NOTE TO ICRC DATED 5 MAY

1. (USUAL BEGINNING)..... HAS THE DUTY TO STATE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN CARRYING OUT ITS ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE REGION, HAS CARRIED OUT CONTINUOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE MOST ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW.

2. FOR EXAMPLE THERE MAY BE MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING ACTS WHICH



2. FOR EXAMPLE THERE MAY BE MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING ACTS WHICH SHOW THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NEGLECT OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
3. LACK OF INFORMATION ON THE FATE OF THE CIVILIANS CAPTURED IN SOUTH GEORGIA.
4. LACK OF INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL CAPTURED IN SOUTH GEORGIA.
5. LACK OF INFORMATION ON THE CAUSE OF THE DEATH AFTER HIS CAPTURE OF CORPORAL FELIX ARTUSO AND OF HIS BURIAL WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE.
6. IN ADDITION THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS CARRIED OUT ACTS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSCIENCES OF CIVILED PEOPLES SUCH AS
7. THE INCORPORATION IN THE ROYAL NAVY TASK FORCE OF BRITISH MILITARY PERSONNEL CAPTURED BY ARGENTINE FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA AND THEN REPATRIATED TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.
8. SINKING BY SUBMARINE ATTACK OF THE CRUISER GENERAL BELGRANO, SAILING OUTSIDE THE ZONE DEFINED BY THE UK AS THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE AND NOT ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES AT THE MOMENT OF SINKING.
9. ATTACKS ON SIMILAR VESSELS GOING TO PICK UP PEOPLE SHIPWRECKED IN ANOTHER INCIDENT, THE ATTACK ON ARA SOBRAL, ONE SUCH VESSEL, WAS EVEN MORE BLAMEWORTHY SINCE IT WAS UNARMED.
10. ASKING THE ICRC TO CONSIDER WELL THE CONDITIONS OF THE PRESENT NOTE (USUAL ENDING).

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT/REVD AT 07/1825Z 14:///ABD






The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>625</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Santiago telegram no. 214 to FCO dated 7 May 1982.</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>11 September 2012 C. Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



OO TEL AVIV  
GRS 208  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 071800Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 155 OF 7 MAY  
INFO WASHINGTON, MONTEVIDEO, BERNE



MY TELNO. L54: ISRAELI ARMS FOR ARGENTINA

1. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SIR J LEAHY ON 7 MAY. SPEAKING IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE AND ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL, HE SAID THAT NOT A SINGLE MILITARY ITEM HAD BEEN SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA SINCE A DECISION TAKEN BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT EARLY IN THE CRISIS, BEFORE YOUR FIRST DEMARCHE ON THIS SUBJECT AND AT A TIME WHEN THE PROSPECT OF MORE SERIOUS FIGHTING STILL SEEMED REMOTE.

2. ARGOV SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINES TO REVERSE THIS DECISION. THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE EXPOSURE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN ARGENTINA (AND THERE HAD BEEN THREATS). THEY WERE ALSO DETERMINED TO HANG ON TO THEIR LONG-TERM MARKET IN ARGENTINA AND LATIN AMERICA.

3. ARGOV SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD CHECKED THE TWO STORIES IN PARA. 3 OF MY TUR. THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF EITHER OF THEM.

4. SIR JOHN LEAHY SAID THAT THE POINTS ARGOV HAD MADE WERE SATISFACTORY TO US. HE UNDERTOOK TO TRY TO FIND A WAY OF DEALING WITH PARLIAMENTARY AND OTHER ENQUIRIES WHICH WOULD NOT ENDANGER THE LEGITIMATE ISRAELI INTERESTS TO WHICH ARGOV HAD REFERRED.

PYM



SECRET

4201 - 1

SECRET

FM F C O 071730Z MAY 82

IMMEDIATE LIMA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 106 OF 7 MAY

ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA.

1. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF 4 EXOCET AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES TO PERU. FOLLOWING THE SINKING OF HMS SHEFFIELD BY MISSILE THEY ARE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE SUPPLY TO ARGENTINA OF THESE MISSILES WHICH UNDER A COLLABORATIVE PROGRAMME INCORPORATE BRITISH-MADE COMPONENTS. ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION PERU HAS BOTH SHIP LAUNCHED AND AIR TO SURFACE VERSIONS.

2. PLEASE APPROACH THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT TO VOICE OUR CONCERN THAT THESE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ARGENTINA. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT, DESPITE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PERUVIAN INITIATIVE, THERE IS ADMIRATION IN BRITAIN FOR PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S STATEMANSHIP IN THIS DISPUTE AND THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT'S CLEAR CONCERN TO AVOID FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT AND UNNECESSARY BLOODSHED. TO REINFORCE ATTEMPTS TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WE WISH TO SEEK ASSURANCES THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE A RESTRAINED POSITION AND IN PARTICULAR THAT THERE WILL BE NO QUESTION OF PERU SUPPLYING ARGENTINA WITH ANY ARMS, PARTICULARLY MISSILES. SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD BE CENTRAL TO OUR CONTINUED HOPE THAT PERU WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY A RENEWED ROLE IN ACHIEVING THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WE ALL DESIRE. THEY WOULD OF COURSE BE VERY MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF THE LONG TERM FUTURE OF PERUVIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS, IN WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE INVESTED SO MUCH EFFORT OVER RECENT YEARS AND WHICH HOLD CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL.

PYM

FAULKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FAULKLAND ISLANDS

SECRET



PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

SIR I SINCLAIR

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/S AM D

HD/DEF DEPT

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/UND

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/ERD

HD/PUSD

EMERGENCY ROOM R.C.

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY C/O No 10 DSt.

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG )

PS/SIR M PALLISER )

MR WADE GERY )

MR FULLER )

DIO )

CABINET OFFICE

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

ADVANCE COPY

DBY 080800Z

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 080800Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 072359Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 675 OF 7 MAY,

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM ROCA (ARGENTINA) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

BEGINS

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST YOU TO INFORM THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT ACCORDING TO INFORMATION FROM LONDON, THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT DECIDED TODAY, 7 MAY 1982, TO IMPOSE A BLOCKADE ON EVERY ARGENTINE WARSHIP OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH DEPARTS MORE THAN 12 SEA MILES FROM THE CONTINENTAL AND ISLAND TERRITORY OF ARGENTINA.

THIS UNLAWFUL MEASURE CONSTITUTES A FURTHER ACT OF AGGRESSION UNDER THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 2064 (XXIX) ARTICLE 2 PARAGRAPH (C)



ARGENTINA

THIS UNLAWFUL MEASURE CONSTITUTES A FURTHER ACT OF AGGRESSION UNDER THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX) ARTICLE 3 PARAGRAPH (C) WHICH ENDANGERS THE SECURITY OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT THE IRRESPONSIBLE DECISION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT IS BEING TAKEN AT A TIME WHEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS ENDEAVOURING TO FACILITATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION. BY THIS MEASURE THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT IS AGAIN DEMONSTRATING ITS INSISTENCE ON A MILITARY SOLUTION AND ITS WISH TO OBSTRUCT THE PRESENT DIPLOMATIC OPTION AT PRESENT UNDER CONSIDERATION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HOLDS THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MEASURE AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC EXPRESSLY RESERVES ITS RIGHT TO ADOPT WHATEVER DEFENSIVE MEASURES IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS (CHARTERS).

ENDS

PARSONS

NNNN



FALKLANDS POLICY ADVANCES (32)

[TYPISTS]

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF DEPT  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/ERD  
HD/PUSD  
EMERGENCY ROOM /RC

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/HOME SECRETARY C/O No 10 DSt.  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
PS/SIR M PALLISER )  
MR WADE GERY ) CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER )  
DIO )  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

ADVANCE COPY

DBY 080800Z

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 080800Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 072357Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 674 DATED 7 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 672: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. ROS, THE ARGENTINE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, ARRIVED IN NEW YORK TODAY (7 MAY) AND SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT 2100Z. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS TO SEE HIM AGAIN AT 1330Z TOMORROW AND HAS ASKED ME TO CALL AT 1530Z. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT ROS HAD GIVEN HIM "AMPLIFICATIONS" OF THE ARGENTINE REPLY WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS STUDYING.
2. THE MOD STATEMENT IN YOUR TELNO 91 TO BERNE HAS ALREADY CAUSED A STIR HERE. IT HAS PROVOKED A LETTER FROM ROCA (ARGENTINA) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM), HAS WORRIED PEREZ DE CUELLAR, AND IS BEING PRESENTED DRAMATICALLY IN THE NEW YORK MEDIA (THE NEW YORK



TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM), HAS WORRIED PEREZ DE CUELLAR, AND IS BEING PRESENTED DRAMATICALLY IN THE NEW YORK MEDIA (THE NEW YORK POST HEADLINE READS : 'MAINLAND BLOCKADE: BRITAIN EXPANDS WAR AS INVASION LOOMS'). I HAD A DIFFICULT INTERVIEW THIS EVENING WITH CBC RADIO BUT WAS ABLE TO USE THE GUIDANCE IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR TELNO 91 TO BERNE. I SHALL WRITE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN SIMILAR TERMS TOMORROW. FOLLOWING MY TELECON WITH THE PUS, I HAVE REASSURED PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT THE MOD STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A DRAMATIC ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT BUT RATHER AS A CLARIFICATION OF EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENTS. THE ARGENTINES HAVE NOT ASKED FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE IS A RISK HOWEVER THAT EITHER THE PRESIDENT OR DORR (IRELAND) MAY OVER-REACT AND DO SO. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS GOING TO SPEAK TO THE PRESIDENT TO STOP HIM PANICKING AND I WILL TRY TO TAKE CARE OF DORR.

3. URQUHART (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS TOLD US THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS DESPONDENT AND WORRIED. THIS IS MAINLY BECAUSE OF WHAT HE SEES AS HAIG'S ATTEMPTS TO BLOCK HIS INITIATIVE. MRS KIRKPATRICK TELEPHONED HIM TODAY, AT HAIG'S REQUEST (SHE SAID), TO TELL HIM THAT OTHER EFFORTS (UNSPECIFIED) WERE UNDER WAY AND THAT IT WOULD BE A PITY IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WERE TO CUT ACROSS THEM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR REPLIED VERY FIRMLY THAT HE HAD STAYED OUT OF THE GAME FOR THREE WEEKS TO GIVE HAIG HIS CHANCE, THAT HE HAD ONLY COME INTO IT NOW VERY RELUCTANTLY, BUT THAT, ONCE IN, HE WAS GOING TO PERSEVERE AND NOT ALLOW ANYONE TO CUT ACROSS HIM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS ALSO DETERMINED NOT TO BE USED BY THE ARGENTINES OR OTHERS. URQUHART HAS CONFIRMED, THAT HE ABSOLUTELY ACCEPTS WHAT I SAID THIS MORNING (MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) ABOUT THE RISK THAT ANYTHING AGREED WITH ROS WILL SUBSEQUENTLY BE DISOWNED BY THE JUNTA: HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE ARGENTINES. HE WILL PRESS ROS HARD AND, IF ROS FAILS TO CONFIRM THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION OPEN DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD, HE WILL SAY THAT IN THAT CASE HIS EFFORT IS AT AN END. FINALLY, HE IS WORRIED BY THE RISK OF ANOTHER MAJOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. BUT HE FULLY ACCEPTS THE ASSURANCES I GAVE HIM THIS MORNING ABOUT OUR GOOD FAITH.

PARSONS

NNNN



OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
RESTRICTED	FLASH

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 RESTRICTED  
4  
5  
6 FM FCO 071915Z MAY 1982  
7 TO FLASH BERNE  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 <sup>IMMEDIATE</sup> AND TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO,  
10 ALL NATO POSTS, DUBLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS, SANTIAGO, OTTAWA,  
11 CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.  
12 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE MODUK  
13 Following is the text of a <sup>76D</sup> statement made ~~in London~~  
14 in London this afternoon.  
15 BEGINS  
16 1. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made clear in his  
17 statement in the House of Commons this morning that Her  
18 Majesty's Government's highest priority is to achieve an early  
19 negotiated settlement of the current crisis, but that if the  
20 Government of Argentina did not show the same readiness and  
21 desire to reach a peaceful settlement, it should be in no  
22 doubt that Her Majesty's Government would do whatever may be  
23 necessary to end the unlawful Argentine occupation of the  
24 Falkland Islands.  
25 2. In this context, Her Majesty's Government wishes to recall

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword that
File number	Dept DEFENCE	Distribution FALKLANDS
Drafted by (Block capitals) P J Weston		
Telephone number 233 3372		
Authorised for despatch <i>MW 7/5</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

Page

RESTRICTED

FLASH

2

1 <<<<

2 that on 23 April it informed the Government of Argentina  
3 that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, submarines,  
4 naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which could amount to a  
5 threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the  
6 South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response.

7 In addition, all Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft,  
8 engaging in surveillance of these British forces, would  
9 be regarded as hostile and were liable to be dealt with  
10 accordingly.

11 3. In addition, Her Majesty's Government has made clear that  
12 all Argentine vessels, including merchant vessels, or fishing  
13 vessels, apparently engaging in surveillance of or intelligence  
14 gathering activities against British Forces in the South Atlantic  
15 would also be regarded as hostile and were liable to be dealt  
16 with accordingly.

17 4. From 1100 GMT on 30th April Her Majesty's Government  
18 established a Total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands.  
19 Her Majesty's Government will continue to enforce this  
20 Exclusion Zone which applies not only to Argentine warships  
21 and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ships,  
22 including merchant and fishing vessels which are operating in  
23 support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands  
24 by Argentine forces; and this also applies to any aircraft,  
25 whether military or civil, which is operating in support of that  
26 illegal occupation.

27 5. Her Majesty's Government has consistently made clear  
28 that the United Kingdom has the right to take whatever  
29 additional measures may be needed in exercise of its inherent  
30 right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations  
31 Charter. Her Majesty's Government will take all necessary  
32 measures in the South Atlantic in the self-defence of British  
33 ships and aircraft engaged in operations and in re-supplying  
34 and reinforcing British forces in the South Atlantic. Because

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

of



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

RESTRICTED

FLASH

Page

3

1 <<<<

2 of the proximity of Argentine bases and the distances that  
3 hostile forces can cover undetected, particularly at night  
4 and in bad weather, Her Majesty's Government warns that any  
5 Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found more  
6 than 12 nautical miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded  
7 as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.

8 ENDS

9 Please ask the Swiss to convey this urgently to the Argentine  
10 Government, adding that HMG regard it as having immediate  
11 effect.

12 (Other information recipients). Please bring the text  
13 of this announcement to the attention of the Government or  
14 authorities to whom you are accredited. Its main purpose  
15 is of course to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding  
16 about our intentions under Article 51 of the UN Charter;  
17 to ensure that earlier warnings issued to Argentina are  
18 clearly understood to remain in force; and to give further  
19 precision to the circumstances in which Argentine forces  
20 will be regarded as constituting a threat to interfere with  
21 the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic.

22 Further guidance by separate telegram.

24 PYM

26 NNNN

27

28

29

30

/// 31

// 32

/ 33

34

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword



CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 071745Z MAY 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 672 OF 7 MAY 1982  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

-7 MAY

*Mr. Lopez*  
*162*  
*Clark*  
*8/1*

YOUR TELNO 362: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. I CALLED ON PEREZ DE CUELLAR FIRST THING THIS MORNING (7 MAY). I GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE (I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE CHANGES THAT WERE MADE TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT: THE FINAL VERSION MEETS ALL MY POINTS).

2. I HAD DELIBERATELY ASKED TO SEE PEREZ DE CUELLAR ALONE IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK FRANKLY WITHOUT RAFAEL AHMED'S MALIGNANT PRESENCE. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO EXPLAIN EXACTLY WHY THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAD COLLAPSED. ESSENTIALLY THIS WAS BECAUSE THE ARGENTINES HAD INSISTED THAT THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT MUST BE PRE-JUDGED AT THE OUTSET BY ACCEPTANCE OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. THIS HAD IN TURN BECOME A PRECONDITION FOR WITHDRAWAL. AN ASSOCIATED PROBLEM WAS THAT HAIG AND OTHERS HAD, FROM TIME TO TIME BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CIVILIAN NEGOTIATORS, ONLY TO FIND THAT THEY WERE REPUDIATED BY THE MILITARY AT THE LAST MOMENT. I THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT ENRIQUE ROS (WHO IS COMING TODAY TO NEW YORK TO IMPLIFY THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND WHOM BOTH HE AND I KNOW WELL) WOULD PRESENT A REASONABLE FRONT ON THIS VITAL QUESTION. BUT WE WOULD NOT BE IMPRESSED BY ANYTHING WHICH DID NOT HAVE GALTIERI'S SIGNATURE ON IT.

3. I SUGGESTED THEREFORE THAT, IF HE WAS GOING TO MAKE PROGRESS AND NOT SIMPLY RAISE FALSE HOPES, PEREZ DE CUELLAR MUST CONCENTRATE AT THE OUTSET ON ACHIEVING CAST-IRON AGREEMENT (IE SIGNED BY GALTIERI IN WRITING) ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. THESE MUST INCLUDE A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. THE DETAILS COULD THEN BE FILLED IN EG THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS, THE QUESTION OF A CONTACT GROUP, A UN UMBRELLA, DURATION, VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE FINAL SETTLEMENT, AUTHORITY AND COMPOSITION OF LOCALLY ELECTED AND APPOINTED BODIES AND SO ON. IT WOULD BE NO GOOD GOING



STRAIGHT TO QUESTIONS OF WITHDRAWAL/CEASEFIRE UNTIL HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DOUBT THAT THE ARGENTINE PRE-CONDITION OF SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT GOING TO SCUPPER HIS EXERCISE AS IT HAD SCUPPERED THE PREVIOUS ONES. I ADDED THAT THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY OTHER DIFFICULTIES, BUT THIS WAS THE CENTRAL OBSTACLE.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOOK NOTES AND SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION. HE WAS ALIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARGENTINES MIGHT SIMPLY BE USING HIM IN ORDER TO GET EITHER A CEASEFIRE AND ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL, OR A BRITISH VETO OF A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE COMBINED WITH NEGOTIATIONS, THIS PUTTING THEM IN A BETTER DIPLOMATIC POSITION. I SAID THAT HE MIGHT HAVE HEARD RUMOURS THAT WE TOO WERE USING HIM, SIMPLY IN ORDER TO BUY TIME. I COULD GIVE HIM MY WORD OF HONOUR THAT WE WERE TAKING HIS INITIATIVE SERIOUSLY AND THAT WE WERE NEGOTIATING WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY AND IN TOTAL GOOD FAITH. HE ACCEPTED THIS.

5. AT THE END, I SAID THAT I HAD ASKED TO SEE HIM ALONE BECAUSE I FOUND RAFE AHMED'S UNHELPFUL INTERVENTIONS DISTRACTING AND TIRESOME. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, AFTER OUR MEETING ON 6 MAY, HE HAD TOLD AHMED THAT, IF HE CONTINUED TO BEHAVE LIKE THAT, HIS USEFULNESS WOULD BE AT AN END. AHMED HAD EXCUSED HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT WALDHEIM HAD TRAINED HIM TO GIVE AN APPEARANCE OF TOUGHNESS AT MEETINGS SO THAT HE, WALDHEIM, COULD THEN DISPLAY FLEXIBILITY. I SAID THAT THIS WAS INFANTILE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGREED AND PROMISED ME THAT I WOULD HAVE NO MORE TROUBLE WITH AHMED WHO HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY CHASTISED. WE SHALL SEE. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT AHMED WAS LUCKY THAT I WAS AN EVEN TEMPERED MAN.

PARSONS

NNNN



Willie Richett, No 10

---



we spoke!

WITH  
THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE  
PRIVATE SECRETARY

Colin Watter

HOME OFFICE  
50 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE  
LONDON SW1H 9AT



IN CONFIDENCE

cc Miss Collins  
Mr Wright  
Mr Andrew  
Mr Heaton  
Mr Phillips

Mr Walters

FALKLANDS EVENTS IN LONDON ON 9 MAY 1982: THE "FALKLANDS AD HOC COMMITTEE" AND THE NATIONAL FRONT

The "Falklands Ad Hoc Committee"

We understand from the Metropolitan Police that the recently organised "Falklands Ad Hoc Committee" have at short notice organised a march and rally in London on 9 May in protest at the use, and threat of use, of force over the Falklands Islands.

2. The Committee is strongly supported by the Communist Party of Great Britain, Labour Party Left-Wingers and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, with associated lesser groups of pacifist or extreme left-wing persuasion.
3. There is to be a rally in Hyde Park between 3 and 4pm on 9 May, followed by a march via Oxford Street to Portland Place, where a petition will be handed in to the offices of the BBC. The petition will claim that the media have failed adequately to put the pacifist argument about the Falklands crisis, and that the coverage has been "jingoist". According to today's edition of the "Morning Star", the rally may be addressed by Dame Judith Hart and Monsignor Bruce Kent among others.
4. These demonstrations may attract about 3,000 people. The police would not expect the organisers to be bent upon disorder, which would be inconsistent both with the practice of the principal organisers and the claimed purpose of the events. Members of the Socialist Workers Party are likely to participate, but whilst the organisers may welcome their numbers, they are likely to wish to play down their presence.
5. It appears that the Communist and Labour Party members and the CND hope to be able to organise subsequent protest events every Sunday until the Falklands crisis has ended. The CND may regard this as a helpful build-up to the major marches and rally in London which they are planning for Sunday 6 June, which I mentioned in my note of 4 May about President Reagan's visit on 7-9 June.


IN CONFIDENCE



The National Front

6. By contrast, and in what is likely to be on a much more minor scale, the National Front in London are attempting to mount a "Bomb Argentina" campaign taking up the cause of bombing airfields in Argentina. This is likely to involve the distribution of leaflets with that title at the National Front customary leafletting points, especially in Brick Lane and Chapel Market. The Metropolitan Police understand that the National Front organisers hope to muster about 60 people to march to Downing Street, to protest at what they see as a lack of determination and use of force by the Government. There is at present no intelligence that National Front supporters will seek to oppose those supporting the "Falklands Ad Hoc Committee" events, but the police will if necessary take precautions to avoid such a conflict, and to keep these events separate from the policing of the London Marathon.

7. We will report any significant developments in demonstrations and campaigns in respect of the Falklands crisis.



J G PILLING

F4 Division  
7 May 1982



GRS 130A

RESTRICTED

T106/82

RESTRICTED  
DESKBY 101400Z  
FM FCO 071702Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE BRIDGETOWN  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 107 OF 7 MAY

cc Nallis  
Ops

FCO TELNO 64 OF 24 APRIL TO BANJUL: COMMONWEALTH REACTIONS TO THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTER ADAMS QUOTE

I SEND YOU MY WARM PERSONAL THANKS FOR THE STRONG SUPPORT LENT TO BRITAIN BY BARBADOS ON THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE.

THE DANGERS OF ALLOWING ACTS OF AGGRESSION, SUCH AS WE HAVE SEEN IN THE FALKLANDS, ARE CLEAR, NOT LEAST TO THE ISLAND STATES OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN. THE FIRM STAND OF BARBADOS IN SUPPORT OF FREEDOM AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IS A GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT.

RECENT EVENTS HAVE ONCE AGAIN PROVED THE UNDERLYING STRENGTH OF THE FRIENDSHIPS WHICH BIND TOGETHER THE COMMONWEALTH.  
UNQUOTE

PYM

LIMITED  
WIAD  
SAMD  
CCD  
PS  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR URE

RESTRICTED



SUBJECT

cc Harris  
Ons

T105/82

RESTRICTED

GPS 150A  
RESTRICTED  
DESKBY 101400Z  
FM FCO 071702Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE GEORGETOWN DESKBY 101400Z  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 51 OF 7 MAY

FCO TELNO 64 OF 24 APRIL TO BANJUL: COMMONWEALTH REACTIONS TO THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BURNHAM

QUOTE

IT WAS VERY THOUGHTFUL OF YOU TO RING ON 21 APRIL. IN TIMES OF TROUBLE THE LINKS OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH BIND THE COMMONWEALTH ARE PARTICULARLY VISIBLE. THE STAUNCH SUPPORT OF OUR COMMONWEALTH FRIENDS HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY WELCOME IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS. BUT I AM PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR HELP IN SECURING THE ADOPTION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 AS WELL AS FOR YOUR KIND OFFER OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE AS NECESSARY. I KNOW THAT YOU SEE VERY CLEARLY WHY IT IS THAT ARGENTINE AGGRESSION HAS TO BE RESISTED AND IT WAS GOOD TO RECEIVE YOUR ENCOURAGEMENT THE OTHER DAY.

UNQUOTE

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED

WIAD  
S AM D  
CCD  
PS  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR URE

RESTRICTED



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(3073)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HARTIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPS/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

HD/WED

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GRS 145

RESTRICTED

FROM OSLO 070855Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 93 OF 07 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, COPENHAGEN, STOCKHOLM.

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. MIPT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DECLARATION SENT TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL ON 06 MAY.

BEGINS.

QUOTE. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FIVE NORDIC COUNTRIES - DENMARK, FINLAND, ICELAND, NORWAY AND SWEDEN - HAVE FOLLOWED WITH PROFOUND CONCERN THE SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF THE CONFLICT CONCERNING THE FALKLAND/MALVINAS ISLANDS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA.

THEY DEEPLY REGRET THAT THE HOSTILITIES HAVE LEAD TO LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE.

THE NORDIC GOVERNMENTS EXPRESS THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO



THE NORDIC GOVERNMENTS EXPRESS THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO  
RESOLUTION 502 ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL  
ON 3 APRIL 1982 AND STRONGLY APPEAL TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO  
COMPLY WITH ITS PROVISIONS.

THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESS THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY  
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN HIS ENDEAVOURS TO FIND A  
SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF  
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. UNQUOTE.

ENDS.

BROWN

NNNN

SENT OSFO 1 THRU 4 AT 07 0933Z GPW

QSL THRU 004

1  
J4



1 YPI 1212

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(3077) 34

PS  
PS/MR HUF  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
~~RESERVE CLERK~~

HP Wey.

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWTIN } TREASURY  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }  
MR McINTYRE }

MISS DICKSON (EEP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPP/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

IMMEDIATE

GRS 75A  
CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPY

FM COPENHAGEN 071015Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 112 OF 7 MAY  
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
MY TELNO 111 : FALKLAND ISLANDS: ECONOMIC MEASURES.

1. I TOLD DIRECTOR OF MFA THIS MORNING THAT YOUR STATEMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE SHORTLY FOR MR OLESEN TO SEE BEFORE LEAVING. EIGIL JOERGENSEN HAD DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION TWICE WITH THE MINISTER SINCE OUR TALK YESTERDAY. HE SAID MR OLESEN WOULD, AS FORESHADOWED IN MY TUR, ARGUE THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO TAKE A DECISION THIS WEEKEND ON RENEWING ECONOMIC MEASURES. HE CONSIDERED THIS WOULD BE ILL-ADVISED AS IT COULD EVEN MAKE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT. JOERGENSEN GAVE ME NO GROUNDS TO HOPE THIS POSITION WOULD CHANGE.
2. MR OLESEN WILL ALSO EXPLAIN THAT ARTICLE 113 WOULD AGAIN BE A REAL PROBLEM FOR DENMARK IF THERE IS NOT UNANIMITY. EIGIL JOERGENSEN, REFERRING TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT IRELAND (PERHAPS WITH ITALY) WOULD MAINTAIN ITS POSITION, SAID NO FORECAST WAS POSSIBLE NOW.

WARDURTON





CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 071130Z MAY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 07 MAY

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 071400Z UKREP BRUSSELS AND IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, OTHER E C POSTS, AND UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 133: FALKLANDS: IRISH GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE

1. THE TAOISEACH BRIEFED POLITICAL CORRESPONDENTS LAST NIGHT ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS.
2. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, MR HAUGHEY SAID THAT IRELAND'S OPTIONS WERE MORE LIMITED THAN THOSE OF OTHER E C MEMBER STATES BECAUSE OF HER NEUTRALITY. WHILE NEVER VERY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT SUPPORTING E C SANCTIONS, THEY HAD ACCEPTED THE ARGUMENT THAT SANCTIONS COULD BE INSTRUMENTAL IN APPLYING PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION BASED ON RESOLUTION 522. BUT SANCTIONS COMPLEMENTING MILITARY ACTION WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO IRELAND AS A NEUTRAL COUNTRY. IRELAND WOULD TRY TO MAINTAIN COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT IT COULD BE HELPFUL IN RESOLVING DISPUTES AND MAINTAINING WORLD PEACE. THEY HOPED TO PERSUADE E C PARTNERS THAT SANCTIONS NO LONGER REPRESENTED SUPPORT OF THE DIPLOMATIC ACTION WHICH WAS IN PROGRESS WHEN THEY WERE FIRST IMPOSED, BUT WOULD BE VERY AVERSE TO UNILATERAL ACTION.
3. TURNING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, MR HAUGHEY REPORTED THAT IRELAND WAS READY TO PROPOSE A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD EMBRACE THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 522, CALL FOR AN END TO HOSTILITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND URGE THAT, AFTER A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES, A U N PRESENCE BE ESTABLISHED ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
4. MR HAUGHEY WILL MAKE FURTHER STATEMENT ABOUT THE FALKLANDS CRISIS TO THE DAIL ON 11 MAY.
5. AS REPORTED IN TELECON YESTERDAY, ORR/CROW E C D (5) THE



5. AS REPORTED IN TELECON YESTERDAY, ORR/CROW E C D(E), THE D F A CONFIRM THAT MR COLLINS' BRIEF FOR THE D/D MAY MEETING WILL TAKE THE LINE ON RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS REPORTED IN MY T U R. THIS WAS ALSO CONFIRMED TO ME THIS MORNING BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE D F A DID NOT DEMUR WHEN ORR SAID THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, WE MIGHT WISH TO INFORM PARTNERS IN ADVANCE OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE IRISH POSITION.

6. MR HAUGHEY DID NOT TELL ME (DESPITE A REPORT TO THIS EFFECT IN TODAY'S IRISH TIMES) THAT IRELAND WOULD ALSO PROPOSE THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD NOW BE WITHDRAWN. NO DOUBT THE PROPOSAL WILL BE MADE, BUT ONLY FOR THE RECORD.

7. THE IRISH POSITION DOES NOT RULE OUT ACTIVE LOBBYING AGAINST RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS. THIS ASPECT IS PLAYED UP IN PRESS REPORTS HERE AND THE TERMS IN WHICH MR HAUGHEY IS QUOTED - E G "WE WOULD BE VERY AVERSE TO UNILATERAL ACTION" - ARE LESS CATEGORIC THAN THOSE HE USED WITH ME. BUT THIS IS FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION HERE. INTERESTINGLY THE IRISH TIMES' BRUSSELS CORRESPONDENT SAYS TODAY THAT "IRELAND NOW APPEARS WILLING TO RENEW THE TRADE SANCTIONS" AND BASES HIS REPORT ON A LUNCH BRIEFING GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR O'ROURKE TO HIS E C COLLEAGUES YESTERDAY.

8. IN VIEW OF PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE IRISH DEFENCE MINISTER'S (NOW DISOWNED) COMMENTS LAST WEEKEND, IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO RECORD THAT IN THE DAIL ON 4 MAY DR FITZGERALD ASKED WHETHER IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WAS STILL THAT "THE ARGENTINE FORCES WHO WERE THE INITIAL AGGRESSORS MUST WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, IN ADDITION TO WHICH THERE SHOULD A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND NEGOTIATIONS". MR HAUGHEY REPLIED: "THAT WOULD BE A FAIR STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED".

9. DESPITE THE TERMS OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT STATEMENT OF 4 MAY (MY TELNO 124) IN QUESTION-TIME LATER THAT DAY MR HAUGHEY SAID IN REPLY TO MR BARRY (FINE GAEL): "WHATEVER OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS DECIDE ON SATURDAY, NATURALLY WE WILL GO ALONG WITH THAT DECISION. WE WILL MAKE OUR OWN PROPOSITION TO OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS."

FIGG



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30/9)

PS  
PS/AC HURD  
PS/CR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/URD  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS 760

~~RES DEPT OFFER~~

*Hell/SEO*

Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (9)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLE )  
MR HAWTHIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR MCINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPE/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

UNCLASSIFIED

FM ANKARA 070845Z MAY 82

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 132 OF 7 MAY

INFO UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING TO ALL OTHER NATO POSTS

FALKLANDS

1. IN HIS FIRST PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT, THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER IS QUOTED IN 'MILLIYET' OF 7 MAY AS SAYING THAT TURKEY SUPPORTED BRITAIN, AS A NATO ALLY, IN HER DISPUTE WITH ARGENTINA. SHE VIEWED WITH DISMAY THE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. MR HAIG HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BUT HIS PROPOSALS HAD BEEN REJECTED BY ARGENTINA. TURKEY HAD STATED FROM THE OUTSET THAT SHE OPPOSED THE USE OF FORCE TO SOLVE THE DISPUTE. TURKEY ACCEPTED THAT BEING IN NATO MEANT THAT SHE WAS IN FULL SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN.

2. THIS STATEMENT (DESPITE THE POSSIBLE INFERENCE THAT TURKEY'S SUPPORT DERIVES PRINCIPALLY FROM HER NATO MEMBERSHIP RATHER THAN THE MERITS OF THE CASE) SHOULD QUASH RECENT LOCAL PRESS COMMENT THAT TURKEY SEEMED TO BE THE ONLY WESTERN COUNTRY MAINTAINING A NEUTRAL STANCE IN THE DISPUTE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL OTHER NATO POSTS

LAURENCE



FALKLANDS POLICY ADVANCES (36)

PS 6  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF DEPT  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/ERD  
HD/PUSD

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/HOME SECRETARY C/O No 10 DSt.  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
PS/SIR M PALLISER )  
MR WADE GERY ) CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER )  
DIO )  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

HD/MCAD

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 210

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MEXICO CITY 071718Z MAY 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 367 OF 7 MAY  
AND-TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

ADVANCE COPY

FLASH

MY TELNO 366: FALKLANDS

1. PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO'S SUGGESTION FOR A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL GALTIERI AT CANCUN IS ALREADY KNOWN TO GOVERNOR ROSSELL DE LA LAMA, AND FOLLOWS FROM HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 26 APRIL (YOUR TELNO 338).

2. ROSSELL DE LA LAMA RANG ME THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ROWLAND, AND ASKED ME URGENTLY TO SPEAK TO ROWLAND IN LONDON. WHEN I DID SO ROWLAND HAD LITTLE MORE TO SAY THAN THAT AS THE PERUVIAN INITIATIVE HAD COLLAPSED THE NEED FOR SOME OTHER INTERVENTION WAS VERY GREAT: HE HAD HEARD FROM ROSSELL DE LA LAMA THAT PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO NOW WANTED TO PUT HIS FULL WEIGHT BEHIND THE IDEA OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL GALTIERI, THE MORE SO AS GENERAL GALTIERI HAD SATIS-



AND GENERAL GALTIERI, THE MORE SO AS GENERAL GALTIERI HAD SATIS-  
FIED THE PRIME MINISTER'S "CONDITIONS" FOR SUCH A MEETING. WHAT WAS HAPPENING? I TOLD ROWLAND NOT TO WORRY. I WAS IN REGULAR  
AND DIRECT TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO, WHO HAD SPOKEN  
TO ME YESTERDAY. YOU WERE FULLY INFORMED.

3. THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH ME LAST NIGHT  
WAS NECESSARILY BRIEF, AND I DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO  
EXPLORE THE BACKGROUND. I WILL DO SO WHEN, AS I HOPE, I SEE HIM  
TO DELIVER YOUR RESPONSE.

TICKELL

NNNN

Q

13 100

13 100

13 100



TYPING

12

SANFO 008/07

ZZ MODUK

ZZ C IN C FLEET

ZZ CTF 317

ZZ GTG 317-8

ZZ HQSTC

ZZ HQ 18 GP

ZZ FCO

GRS 95

SECRET

FM SANTIAGO 071630Z MAY 82  
TO FLASH MODUK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 071630Z OF 7 MAY  
AND TO FLASH C IN C FLEET, CTF317, CTGEQUAI  
HQSTC, HQ18GP FCO

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

Limited distribution

*M*

SAMD  
DEF

MR PS x6  
PS/M'Onshus  
PS/PUS  
M. Gifford  
M. Wright  
M. Ure  
M. Gillman

NO 10

RC

+16

SIC EAA/19F. FROM EDWARDS  
FOR ACAS(OPS), DS INT, DS8, DS5, DMS1.

1. MR PETER BEGGIN OF BBC NOW IN PUNTA ARENAS TELLS US THAT ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS ARE CONVERSING PLAIN LANGUAGE WITH ARGENTINA FROM FALKLANDS VIA H/F SSB TELEPHONE LINK LEFT BY CABLE AND WIRELESS (FREQUENCY NOT KNOWN). WE HOPE YOU MAY BE ABLE TO INTERCEPT.

2. WE THANKED BEGGIN BUT PLEASE LET HIS MASTERS KNOW HOW MUCH WE APPRECIATE COOPERATION (MR JOHN SNOW OF ITV HAS ALSO BEEN HELPFUL IN ANOTHER DIRECTION).

HEATH



E/R  
CONFIDENTIAL

ZZ OTTAWA


OO WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 624

-7 MAY 1982

141



CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 071700Z MAY 82

TO FLASH OTTAWA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 176 OF 7 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, LIMA, UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLAND ISLANDS: POSSIBLE CANADIAN ROLE  
MIPT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MR MACQUIGAN'S MESSAGE:  
QUOTE

DEAR MR PYM,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE TODAY. AS OUR DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER INDICATED TO YOU THIS MORNING, WE WERE BEING SOUNDED OUT BY THE PERUVIANS ABOUT ASSOCIATING CANADA WITH THEIR PROPOSED PEACE INITIATIVE. THIS AFTERNOON, THE PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR MADE A DIRECT APPROACH TO ME THAT EFFECT. THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED TO US IN TERMS OF THE FOLLOWING SEVEN POINTS:

1. IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES:
2. MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES:
3. PRESENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THOSE INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT TO ADMINISTER THE ISLANDS TEMPORARILY:
4. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERING AND CONFLICTING CLAIMS REGARDING THE SITUATION OF THE ISLANDS:



THE TWO GOVERNMENTS RECOGNISE THAT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE LOCAL INHABITANTS HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE FINAL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM:

6. A CONTACT GROUP THAT WILL INTERVENE ON AN IMMEDIATE BASIS IN NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE COMPOSED OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO BE NOMINATED BY COMMON ACCORD:
7. BEFORE 30 APRIL 83, A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT WILL HAVE BEEN REACHED, UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GROUP OF COUNTRIES MENTIONED ABOVE.

IN ADDITION, THE PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR INFORMED US THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PROPOSING THAT PERU AND CANADA BE TWO OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONTACT GROUP, AS WELL AS IN PROMOTING THE PRESENT INITIATIVE. I AM INFORMING THE PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THAT CANADA WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIST IN FACILITATING ANY INITIATIVES IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CONCERNED FELT WE COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. I WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN YOUR REFERENCE TO THE VALUABLE IMPETUS YOU CONSIDER THE PERUVIAN INITIATIVE TO HAVE GENERATED. I NOTE AS WELL YOUR SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE LINK BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND WITH YOUR FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS MUST BE RESPECTED IN ANY DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT. THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS WILL NEED CLARIFICATION AND AMPLIFICATION. BUT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THE FIRST QUESTION IS WHETHER CANADA'S ASSOCIATING ITSELF WITH THE PERUVIAN PROPOSAL WOULD BE HELPFUL IN PROMOTING AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. I AM OF COURSE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE IMPORTANCE YOU CONTINUE TO ATTACH TO SECRETARY HAIG'S ROLE AND OF YOUR VIEW THAT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SECRETARY GENERAL MAY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THEREFORE WHY I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON PERU'S PROPOSAL TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

I FULLY AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE RECENT TRAGIC DEATHS ON BOTH SIDES COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF ARGENTINA HAD COMPLIED WITH THE



CONFIDENTIAL

TERMS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 AND I HOPE THAT THEY WILL  
YET BE PERSUADED TO DO SO. I HAVE EMPHASIZED IN A NUMBER OF  
PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND AGAIN LAST NIGHT BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS  
STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE THAT WE CONSIDER  
THE BRITISH ACTION IN RESPECT OF THE CRUISER GENERAL BELGRANO TO  
HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF BRITAIN'S INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF  
DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. I KNOW  
THAT YOU APPRECIATE AS WELL AS I THE DANGERS OF DIFFERENT PUBLIC  
PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS TO SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AND I AM CONFIDENT  
THAT FOR THESE AND OTHER REASONS THE BRITISH FORCES WILL MAKE EVERY  
EFFORT TO LIMIT THEIR USE OF FORCE TO THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE.

I ALSO SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE IRISH  
GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO THE COMMUNITY'S ECONOMIC MEASURES AND I HOPE  
THAT IT DOES NOT SET IN TRAIN A PATTERN TO BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER  
MEMBERS. WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO ALTER OUR PRESENT POSITION IN REGARD  
TO SANCTIONS BUT I WILL WANT TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU IN THE  
COMING DAYS AS YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN  
CURRENT COMMUNITY MEASURES WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON OPINION HERE  
WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, THOUGH OUR GOVERNMENT'S  
DISPOSITION WOULD BE TO REMAIN AS SUPPORTIVE AS POSSIBLE.

YOURS SINCERELY,  
MARK MACGUIGAN.  
UNQUOTE

PYM



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 630

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 072234Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1667 OF 7 MAY 1982


INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA, LIMA, CARACAS, BOGOTA,  
PANAMA CITY.

PANAMA CITY TELNO 74: FALKLANDS.

*Prime Minister*

*I am not sure whether you  
saw this over the weekend.*

*A.J.C. 10.  
J*



1. WE HAVE LET THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNOW, AND I WILL PROTEST TO HAIG PERSONALLY, ABOUT THE VERY UNSATISFACTORY TONE AND CONTENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF 2 MAY. THE TEXT WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO PRESIDENT ROYO AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS, INCLUDING THOSE OF BRAZIL, PERU, VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA, IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE CRISIS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OUR SISTER REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA RAISES SUCH FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMUNITY THAT I MUST SHARE MY CONCERNS DIRECTLY WITH YOU AND OTHER AMERICAN CHIEFS OF STATE.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THE MEASURES I ORDERED FRIDAY ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF THAT FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE, DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL THOUGH THEY ARE FOR US, WERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. THESE MEASURES WILL NOT, IN THEMSELVES, PREVENT THE LOSS OF LIVES AND HONOR, A GOAL WHICH CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY THE DECISIONS OF THE TWO SOVEREIGN STATES DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

THE ISSUE ENGAGES ME AND MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN SO DEEPLY BECAUSE ONE OF THE STATES INVOLVED IS AN AMERICAN STATE, A STATE WITH WHICH WE SHARE A COMMON HERITAGE AND STRONG LEGAL, MORAL AND CULTURAL LINKS. FROM COLONIALIZATION TO NATIONHOOD, THE PEOPLES OF THE AMERICAS HAVE BEEN UNITED BY THE DANGERS AND DREAMS OF BUILDING A NEW WORLD. "THE HISTORIC MISSION OF AMERICA", STATES THE PREAMBLE TO THE OAS CHARTER, THE FUNDAMENTAL INSTRUMENT OF OUR COOPERATION, "IS TO OFFER TO MAN A LAND OF LIBERTY, AND A FAVOURABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS PERSONALITY AND THE REALIZATION OF HIS JUST ASPIRATIONS."

CLEARLY, ONE OF ARGENTINA'S ASPIRATIONS HAS LONG BEEN THE CONFIRMATION OF ITS HISTORIC CLAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS KNOWN AS THE MALVINAS. JUST AS CLEARLY, NO AMERICAN BELIEVES THAT COLONIZATION BY ANY EUROPEAN POWER IS TO BE ACCEPTED IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ THE



CONFIDENTIAL

THE CONTRADICTION -- THE REASON MY FELLOW CITIZENS HERE IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS IN THE AMERICAS HAVE NOT RALLIED AS ONE BEHIND THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY ARGENTINA EARLY LAST MONTH -- IS THAT ARGENTINA USED FORCE IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUT AN END TO ITS HISTORIC DISPUTE WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM.

MY GOVERNMENT FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE DEEP NATIONAL COMMITMENT OF ARGENTINA TO RECUPERATE THE ISLANDS, AND ITS FRUSTRATION OF LONG YEARS OF FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS. MY ADMINISTRATION BEGAN, HOWEVER, AFTER A DECADE OF INCREASING VIOLENCE -- IN THE WORLD, AND IN THIS HEMISPHERE -- MUCH OF IT COVERTLY SPONSORED BY OUR COMMON ENEMIES. FROM THE OUTSET, THEREFORE, OUR CENTRAL GOAL HAS BEEN TO EMPHASIZE THE REQUIREMENT FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW AND NOT THE RULE OF FORCE. IT IS GRATIFYING THAT THIS GOAL IS SO WIDELY SHARED BY YOU AND OTHERS IN THE HEMISPHERE. OUR RENEWED COLLECTIVE FIRMNESS IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM, THE RULE OF LAW, AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES HAS BEGUN TO SHOW DEFINITE SIGNS OF SUCCESS.

YET TODAY, JUST AS THE HISTORIC MISSION OF THE AMERICAS IS BEING REAFFIRMED IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THIS NEW CRISIS HAS DEVELOPED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IN THE DAYS AHEAD, THE UNITED STATES WILL DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO BRING ABOUT THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS CRISIS IN WAYS THAT STRENGTHEN SOLIDARITY IN THIS NEW WORLD. WE WOULD PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS AND HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSULT CLOSELY IN THE DIFFICULT DAYS WHICH LIE AHEAD.

HENDERSON

FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL  
PCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FAKLAND ISLANDS

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL




GRS 222

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MONTEVIDEO 071900Z MAY 82  
TO ROUTINE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 265 OF 7 MAY.

27 MAY 1982

*Pres Minister  
to act  
Ala Dept  
City Clerk  
3/5*  
202



ARG.  
ENTINE DEBTS.

1. THE FOLLOWING REPORT APPEARED TODAY IN ONE OF THE MONTEVIDEO MORNING NEWSPAPERS.

BEGINS

ARGENTINA MAY PAY DEBTS TO SOME LONDON BANKS.

BUENOS AIRES (SPECIAL). THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS AUTHORISED THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY TO MAKE SOME EXCEPTIONS TO THE BAN ON PAYMENTS TO GREAT BRITAIN, APPARENTLY TO AVOID THE LONDON BANKS FROM DECLARING THAT ARGENTINA IS IN DEFAULT ON HER DEBTS.

THE NEWS EMERGED YESTERDAY FROM BANKING CIRCLES, WHO INDICATED THAT A DECREE TO THIS EFFECT SIGNED BY PRESIDENT GALTIERI - AND NOT PUBLICISED - GAVE MINISTER ROBERTO ALEMANN THE POWERS TO AUTHORISE EXCEPTIONS, IN VIEW OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND TO AVOID THE DETERIORATION OF ARGENTINA'S CREDIT WORTHINESS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS.

THE BAN ON PAYMENTS WAS IMPOSED AFTER GREAT BRITAIN FROZE ARGENTINE FUNDS AND ASSETS IN LONDON ON 2 APRIL.

AVOID DEFAULT.

SOURCES COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN LOANS ON WHICH ARGENTINA SHOULD MAKE PAYMENTS TO RESIDENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING DECLARED IN DEFAULT.

ARGENTINA HAS AN EXTERNAL DEBT OF 34.00 MILLION DOLLARS AND SOURCES QUOTE THAT THIS MEASURE COULD HELP BUENOS AIRES TO RENEW AND REFINANCE MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM LOANS.

NUMEROUS FOREIGN BANKS HAVE SUSPENDED LOANS TO BUENOS AIRES BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY CAUSED BY THE FALKLANDS CRISIS.





cc:- PRIME MINISTER

RM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 May, 1982

*Handwritten mark*

Prime Minister

*You should be aware of*

X.

*A.J.C. 2/5*

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Mexico City telegram number 366 of 6 May reports the suggestion by the President of Mexico, following his telephone conversation with Galtieri, that the latter should have a face to face meeting with the Prime Minister in Cancun to discuss ways of resolving the Falklands problem.

X  
Mr Edward Du Cann MP, rang me today to say that he had just received a message from Mr Rossell de la Lama who, you will recall, called on the Prime Minister with Mr Du Cann recently. Mr de la Lama stated that President Lopez Portillo had just spoken to Galtieri. The latter had said that in no circumstances would he agree to peace proposals put forward by the United States or associated with the United States. However, the recent Peruvian proposals had been broadly acceptable in principle. He was willing to begin a dialogue through the good offices of Mexico.

I told Mr Du Cann that we had received a similar but not identical message and that he could tell Mr de la Lama that we were grateful to him for passing on this latest version.

You will doubtless be considering what reply should be sent to the Mexicans. I suggest that any reply that is sent is transmitted through our Embassy in Mexico City but I should like to be able to tell Mr Du Cann at about the same time what kind of reply we are sending.

*Handwritten mark*

J Holmes, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MEXICO CITY 070325Z MAY 82

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 366 OF 6 MAY

INFO F L A S H WASHINGTON, F L A S H UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELSNOs 337 AND 338: FALKLANDS

1. PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO RANG ME THIS EVENING . HE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST SPOKEN BY TELEPHONE WITH PRESIDENT GALTIERI ABOUT THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE. GALTIERI WOULD BE READY TO HAVE A FACE TO FACE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN CANCUN TO DISCUSS WAYS OF RESOLVING THE CRISIS. THE MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF COMPLETE SECRECY AND AS SOON AS THE PARTIES SO WISHED.
2. LOPEZ PORTILLO ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY. HE WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO HELP AND SAID HE WOULD BE AT MY DISPOSAL AT ANY TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT TO RECEIVE A RESPONSE.

TICKELL

COPIES SENT TO  
No 10 DOWNING STREET

LIMITED  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE

COPIES TO Ps | ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR (TREASURY)  
PS/CHANCELLOR (DUCY OF LANCASTER)  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
MR WADE-GERY )  
MR FULLER ) CABINET OFFICE  
DIO )

# CONFIDENTIAL



DRAFT

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

TO: COMMUNITY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

As you know we are now moving into a new phase of diplomatic activity in our attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Falkland crisis, now that Argentine intransigence has brought about the collapse of yet another initiative (that devised by the United States and Peru).

As the focus moves to New York I want you to know that we are determined to continue to do everything possible to secure a peaceful settlement. Francis Pym made this clear in Parliament today and will be reaffirming it this weekend at Villers-le-Temple. I know that you and the people of your country share our profound desire to attain this objective. Your support for us so far has been invaluable and enormously appreciated in Britain. The Community's economic action against the Argentines was the clearest signal to them that our friends would not, any more than we would ourselves, allow them to reap the fruits of their illegal aggression. I recognise that, in acting thus, you and my other colleagues were not prejudging in any way the long term solution of this problem. Nor indeed are we. What we were all united in doing was consciously to maintain the strongest pressure, political, economic and military on the Argentine Junta to obey the mandatory injunctions of the Security Council in its Resolution No. 502 and to withdraw from the Falklands so that negotiations on a long term solution to the problem might begin.. We have to recognise that that pressure has not so far been sufficient to move the Argentines. Indeed I think there is now a danger of their gaining the impression that our resolve



is weakening and that, if they maintain their intransigence, their act of aggression will pay off. This may well have been a factor in their decision to turn down the US/Peruvian proposals to which we could have agreed and which would have led to an immediate cessation of hostilities. In making this assumption the Argentines are terribly and dangerously mistaken.

There is therefore one point which I wish to put to you urgently, personally and with all the emphasis at my command. If we are to avoid an escalation of the fighting, with the bloodshed that we all detest, it is essential that the Argentines be made to realise that the democracies of Europe are united in their insistence that the rule of law be maintained and that there is no weakening of support for us in the defence of this principle. This means not simply that the Community must renew the economic embargo on 16 May, vital though this is, but it means that no statement whether put out by the Ten as a whole, or by a member government, and no guidance given to the media by governments should give the Argentines reason to hope or believe that support for Britain in the Community is diminishing. Our solidarity is essential if the Argentines are not to be tempted to follow a course that, through misjudgment of our resolve, will lead to the armed conflict that we so ardently wish, if we can, to avoid.



DRAFT

From Prime Minister

To Community Heads of Government

As you know we are now moving into a new phase of diplomatic activity in our attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Falkland crisis, now that Argentine intransigence has brought about the collapse of yet another initiative (that devised by the United States and Peru).

As the focus moves to New York I want you to know that we will continue to do everything ~~that is~~ possible to secure a peaceful

settlement. I know that you and the people of your country share

deeply ~~desire~~ <sup>our purpose</sup> ~~that we should obtain~~ <sup>to attain</sup> this objective. We have ~~been greatly assisted by your support so far.~~ <sup>Your support for us so far has been invaluable and evermore appreciated in Britain.</sup> The Community's

economic action against <sup>the</sup> Argentina was the clearest signal to

the ~~Argentines~~ that our friends would not, any more than we would

ourselves, allow them to <sup>reap</sup> gain the fruits of their illegal

aggression: ~~When the Community acted in this way it did so with~~

the conscious intention of assisting our policy ~~of maintaining~~

the strongest pressure, political, <sup>economic</sup> ~~diplomatic~~ and military

on the Argentine Junta <sup>Falkland</sup> ~~to withdraw from the Islands~~ so

that negotiations on <sup>a</sup> long term solutions to the problem might

begin.

We have to <sup>recognize</sup> face the fact that ~~so far~~ that pressure has not <sup>so far</sup> been sufficient to move the Argentines. ~~I believe~~ <sup>Indeed I think</sup> there is now

a ~~real~~ <sup>real</sup> danger that ~~they are~~ <sup>of them</sup> gaining the impression that our resolve

Francis  
Bye made  
this clear  
in Parliament  
today and  
will be  
making it  
this weekend  
at Villers-le-  
Rouge.

an attempt to

Your support for

in Britain.

I recognize  
that, in asking  
this, you and  
my other colleagues  
were not  
prejudging in  
any way the  
future of  
this problem.  
Nor indeed  
are we. We  
are all committed  
in doing  
this.

to bring the  
Council in  
its Resolution  
No 502  
and



SECRET

is weakening and that, if they maintain their intransigence, they <sup>are</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>win</sup> the day. <sup>arguer will say</sup> ~~Indeed I believe that this may~~ have been a

factor in their decision to turn down the US/Peruvian proposals to which we could have agreed and which would have led to an immediate cessation of hostilities. In making this assumption

the Argentines are terribly and dangerously ~~mistaken~~. ~~and this miscalculation will lead to more fighting, for which we are prepared though we wish with all our hearts to avoid it.~~

There is <sup>therefore</sup> ~~one~~ point which I wish to put to you urgently, personally and with all the emphasis at my command. If we are to avoid an

escalation of the fighting, with ~~all~~ the bloodshed that we all ~~so~~ <sup>desire</sup> ~~ferverently wish to avoid~~, it is essential that the Argentines be

made to realise that the democracies of Europe are united in their insistence that the rule of law be maintained, <sup>and</sup> that there

is no weakening of support for us, <sup>in the defence of this principle</sup> ~~Simply~~ <sup>only</sup> that

the Community must renew the economic embargo on the 16 May,

vital though <sup>this</sup> ~~it~~ is, but it means that no statement whether put out by the Ten as a whole, or by a member government, and no

guidance given to the media by ~~our~~ governments <sup>should</sup> ~~must~~ give the

Argentines reason to believe that <sup>hope or</sup> ~~our~~ support <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>collapsing</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>diminishing</sup> ~~is~~.

Our solidarity is essential if the Argentines are not to be tempted <sup>to follow</sup> ~~on to~~ a course which <sup>that, through misjudgment of our resolve,</sup> ~~will lead to destruction and~~

~~casualties far exceeding what we have seen already.~~

~~wish, if we can, to avoid.~~

SECRET



RESTRICTED

SAPU(82) 17

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper was issued at 1900 hours on 7 May 1982. It contains information and suggests the line to take on the following -

1. Mr Pym's Press Conference
2. Sporting links with Argentina
3. Are we at war?

Cabinet Office

7 May 1982

RESTRICTED



## LINE TO TAKE

### 1. Mr Pym's Press Conference

A transcript is attached.

### 2. Sporting links with Argentina (Reports of footballers' doubts about World Cup)

Government are keeping the position under review. Present policy is to discourage all bilateral sporting contact in United Kingdom or in Argentina. No objection at present to teams and individuals competing in international events (including the World Cup) held in other countries where Argentina may be represented. Reports in the press that the Minister of Sport will meet the Football Associations involved (England, Scotland, Northern Ireland) next week to advise on participation in the World Cup are incorrect. (The occasion is a press launch of a guidance leaflet for British football fans planning to travel to Spain.)

### 3. Are we at war?

'War' is a technical term with some complex implications. In the legal sense there is no war unless one or other side declares it or recognizes that a state of war exists. Neither side has done either (Mr Costa Mendez's remarks after the South Georgia operation that we were "technically at war" were evidently off the cuff remarks and have not been confirmed or repeated). Our operations in the South Atlantic are in self defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter (text below). We are enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone which cuts off supplies to the Argentine forces, which are illegally occupying the Falklands in defiance of Security Council Resolution 502. We are not in a state of general war against Argentina.

#### Article 51

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."



NICK FENN: GOOD MORNING EVERYBODY, GOOD MORNING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND WELCOME TO THIS PRESS CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY, MR. FRANCIS PYM, MAY I FIRST SAY ONE OR TWO WORDS BY WAY OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTRODUCTION, WE HAVE HAD, I UNDERSTAND, THIS MORNING THE AGE OLD ARGUMENT BETWEEN DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF YOUR PROFESSION WHICH WE SHALL RESOLVE IN THE AGE OLD MANNER OF INVITING THE STILL PHOTOGRAPHERS TO DO THEIR STUFF NOW AND THEY CAN COME FORWARD AND STAND UP AND DO WHAT THEY WANT FOR THE FIRST COUPLE OF MINUTES WHILE I'M TALKING AND THEN WILL THEY PLEASE BE SEATED AND ENABLE THEIR OTHER COLLEAGUES TO DO THEIR JOB, SECONDLY I SHOULD SAY THAT THE NORMAL NEWS DEPARTMENT, 12.30 NEWS CONFERENCE IS CANCELLED BECAUSE IT IS QUITE PLAINLY REDUNDANT BUT ANY OF YOU WHO WISH HOWEVER MAY COLLECT THE USUAL LIST OF MINISTERIAL ENGAGEMENTS AND ONE SMALL PRESS RELEASE ON ANOTHER SUBJECT FROM NEWS DEPARTMENT AS YOU LEAVE, AVAILABLE AS YOU LEAVE THIS ROOM WILL BE A COPY OF THE STATEMENT WHICH MR. PYM HAS JUST MADE TO PARLIAMENT, HE WILL BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION TO THIS PRESS CONFERENCE MAKE A STATEMENT WHICH WILL BE CLOSELY MODELLED ON THE PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT ALTHOUGH NOT IN ALL RESPECTS TEXTURALLY IDENTICAL, THE PROCEEDINGS THIS MORNING WILL OF COURSE BE ON THE RECORD THROUGHOUT, I INVITE YOU WHEN YOU WANT TO ASK QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY YOURSELF BY NAME AND PUBLICATION AND AFTER THE BRIEF INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT MR. PYM WILL BE GLAD TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS, JUST GIVE THEM ONE MOMENT MORE, SIR, AND THEN WE COULD PROCEED.

(TALKING IN BACKGROUND)

THE PHOTOGRAPHERS WILL STAY ... THEY'VE GOT A MOMENT OR TWO FIRST AND THEN WE'LL ASK THEM TO RESUME THEIR SEATS.

MR. PYM: BE RUNNING OUT OF FILM SOON, YES, OKAY, THERE WE ARE, RIGHT, RIGHT, OKAY.

N. FENN: OKAY GENTLEMEN, THANK YOU VERY MUCH WE CAN NOW PROCEED - IF THE PHOTOGRAPHERS WOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH TO RESUME THEIR SEATS. MR. PYM.

MR. PYM: I HAVE JUST REPORTED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE HAS ONCE AGAIN FRUSTRATED A CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE, THEY HAVE REJECTED PROPOSALS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION DEVELOPED BY MR. HAIG AND THE PRESIDENT OF PERU, YESTERDAY I SIGNIFIED THAT WE WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT IMMEDIATELY AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PREPARE THE WAY FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED SUBSTANTIAL FLEXIBILITY ON OUR PART, IF IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ARGENTINES THE CEASEFIRE WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN FIRMLY LINKED TO THE BEGINNING OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL COULD HAVE COME INTO EFFECT AS EARLY AS 5 O'CLOCK THIS AFTERNOON, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT UNDER DISCUSSION YESTERDAY INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS, FIRST COMPLETE AND SUPERVISED WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, MATCHED BY CORRESPONDING WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES, SECOND - AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AS SOON AS ARGENTINA ACCEPTED THE AGREEMENT AND AGREED TO WITHDRAW, THIRD - APPOINTMENT OF A SMALL GROUP OF COUNTRIES ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES WHO WOULD SUPERVISE WITHDRAWAL, UNDERTAKE THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ISLANDERS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND PERHAPS HELP IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OUR PRINCIPLES OR TO THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS, FOUR - SUSPENSION OF THE EXISTING EXCLUSION ZONES AND THE LIFTING OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.



WHY THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE, AS YOU KNOW THAT IS A STICKING POINT FOR US. PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE TWO SIDES WOULD SIMPLY HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFERENCE THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THEM OVER THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. WE HAVE WORKED AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORK POSITIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. OUR AGREEMENT OF THESE IDEAS MAKES THIS ONCE AGAIN ABUNDANTLY CLEAR. I WISH I COULD SAY THAT THE ARGENTINE JUNTA HAD BEEN WORKING IN A SIMILAR SPIRIT. CLEARLY THEY WERE NOT. THE ARGENTINES HAVE SO FAR INSISTED THAT A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THEM WOULD BE A PRECONDITION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A FINAL SETTLEMENT. THE ARGENTINES TALK MUCH OF THE NEED FOR THE DECOLONISATION OF THE ISLANDS, WHAT THEY APPEAR TO MEAN BY THIS IS COLONISATION BY THEMSELVES. IN ADDITION THE ARGENTINES SEEM NOW TO BE OBSTRUCTING PROGRESS IN ANOTHER BUT EQUALLY FUNDAMENTAL WAY. THEY APPEAR TO BE ASKING FOR A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT ANY CLEAR LINK WITH A WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR INVASION FORCE. TO GRANT THIS WOULD BE TO LEAVE THEM INDEFINITELY IN CONTROL OF PEOPLE AND TERRITORY WHICH THEY HAD ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND TO DENY OURSELVES THE RIGHT OF OUR OWN SELF DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. WE HAVE NOT ALLOWED ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO HALT THE MEASURES WHICH OUR TASK FORCE IS TAKING. WE WILL NOT ALLOW THEIR DIPLOMATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM TO DO SO EITHER, NOR WILL THEY BE ALLOWED TO HALT OUR OWN VIGILANT ENDEAVOURS TO FIND A PEACEFUL WAY OUT OF THE CONFLICT INTO WHICH THEY HAVE LED US. THIS IS WHY I WELCOMED AND CO-OPERATED WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH THE INITIATIVES OF MR. HAIG AND WHY I NOW WELCOME THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND AM WORKING CLOSELY WITH HIM. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS PUT TO BOTH US AND ARGENTINA SOME IDEAS AS A FRAMEWORK AROUND WHICH PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE. WE HAVE ACCEPTED HIS GENERAL APPROACH. YESTERDAY I SENT HIM A POSITIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE REPLY MAKING CLEAR THAT THE ELEMENTS FOR A SOLUTION PUT FORWARD BY HIM WERE CLOSE TO THOSE WHICH HAD BEEN THE BASIS OF OUR EFFORTS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS. I MADE CLEAR AT THE SAME TIME THAT IN OUR VIEW RESOLUTION 502 MUST BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY, THAT AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE COULD NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED BY US AS A STEP TOWARDS THIS AND THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CEASEFIRE MUST BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY LINKED TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND MUST BE COMPLETED WITHIN A FIXED NUMBER OF DAYS. IF ONE PHASE OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO AN END BY ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE ANOTHER PHASE IS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN NEW YORK. THE AIM REMAINS THE SAME, TO SECURE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502. WE ARE WORKING URGENTLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THIS END. I HOPE THE ARGENTINES WILL HENCEFORTH SHOW THAT READINESS AND THAT DESIRE TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN EVIDENT SO FAR ONLY ON OUR SIDE. IF THEY DO NOT, THEN LET THEM BE IN NO DOUBT THAT WE SHALL DO WHATEVER MAY BE NECESSARY TO END THEIR UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION. OUR RESOLVE IS UNDIMINISHED. IT REMAINS THE GOVERNMENT'S HIGHEST PRIORITY TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IF THAT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE.

JOURNALIST: DOES THE COLLAPSE OF THE PERUVIAN PEACE INITIATIVE MEAN THAT INCREASINGLY A MILITARY SOLUTION IS THE ONLY ONE POSSIBLE?

MR. PYM: NO, IT DOES NOT. THE PRESENT TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL BEGAN BEFORE THE UNITED STATES/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS HAD BEEN PUT TO EITHER SIDE, THAT HAS NOW ENDED, THAT PARTICULAR INITIATIVE AND WE'RE NOW WORKING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL, SO IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT MEAN THAT.



KEITH GRAVES: IF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK IS VERY CLOSE  
TO THE OTHER PLANS AS YOU'VE JUST SAID AND THEY'VE BEEN REJECTED  
BY THE ARGENTINES, THEN SURELY THERE'S VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF  
THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK SUCCEEDING?

MR. PYM: NOT NECESSARILY. WE HAD ONE SET OF PROPOSALS  
ORIGINALLY PUT FORWARD BY THE UNITED STATES ON THEIR OWN WHICH  
WERE REJECTED. THEN THERE WAS ANOTHER SET BY THE UNITED STATES  
AND PERU AND THEY'VE BEEN REJECTED. NOW THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS  
BROUGHT SOME INTO IT AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF VARIANTS THAT COULD BE  
INCORPORATED AND WE MUST SEE WHAT THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE IS, SO  
CERTAINLY DO NOT SHARE THAT VIEW

KEITH GRAVES: BUT WE STAND BY OUR BASIC DEMANDS, WITHDRAWAL AND  
OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO PRECONDITIONS?

N. FENN: THAT MUST BE SO.

N. FENN: MICHAEL BRUNSON.

MICHAEL BRUNSON: FOREIGN SECRETARY, IT SEEMS THAT EVERY TIME  
YOU PUT A PLAN TO THE ARGENTINIANS THEY, IN THE END, ALWAYS  
REJECT IT, EITHER ON THE GROUNDS OF WITHDRAWAL OR ON THE QUESTION  
OF SOVEREIGNTY. HOW MANY MORE PLANS CAN YOU PUT FOR THEM TO REJECT?

MR. PYM: THAT I DON'T KNOW BUT THEY HAVE OF COURSE GIVEN AN  
INDICATION IN PUBLIC IMPLYING THAT THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THE OUTLINE  
PUT FORWARD BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. AS I'VE SAID IN THIS  
STATEMENT AND I SAID IN THE HOUSE, I AM SCEPTICAL ABOUT THAT BUT WE  
SHALL SEE BUT I THINK IT'S THE RIGHT WAY TO GO... TO GO AHEAD  
NOW AND WE MUST SEE WHAT COMES OUT OF IT.

M. BRUNSON: AND IF THEY DO NOT SUCCEED IS OCCUPATION, RE-  
OCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS BY FORCE BY BRITAIN INEVITABLE?

MR. PYM: THAT OF COURSE REMAINS AN OPTION ALL THE TIME BUT IT'S  
THE ONE THING WE'RE TRYING TO AVOID IF WE

POSSIBLY CAN BECAUSE  
WE WANT TO GET A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. AS I SAID IN THE HOUSE  
JUST NOW, I AM NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF CLOSING DOORS, I AM IN THE  
BUSINESS OF OPENING THEM.

N. FENN: JOHN DICKIE.

JOHN DICKIE: (DAILY MAIL) SECRETARY OF STATE, ARE YOU NOW GOING  
TO ASK FOR GREATER ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA FROM YOUR  
PARTNERS AND IN PARTICULAR ARE YOU GOING TO CALL ON THE UNITED  
NATIONS FOR A TOTAL ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AT THE RISK EVEN OF A  
SOVIET VETO BLOCKING IT?

MR. PYM: I LEAVE THAT AT THE MOMENT IN THE HANDS OF THE SECRETARY  
GENERAL. WE SHALL OF COURSE BE ASKING FOR OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS  
TO CONTINUE THEIR SANCTIONS WHEN THEY RUN OUT IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS  
MONTH. THE UNITED STATES HAS OF COURSE COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE A  
WEEK OR MORE AGO AND THEY HAVE TAKEN CERTAIN MEASURES. THEY'VE  
NOT CLOSED THEIR MINDS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING FURTHER  
ECONOMIC MEASURES. THAT IS A MATTER FOR THEM, BUT THE GREATER THE  
SUPPORT WE GET FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN TAKING OTHER ECONOMIC  
MEASURES THE BETTER IT WILL BE BECAUSE IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE  
BUILD UP OF PRESSURE AND I THINK PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO REALISE THAT  
THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY IS IN A PRETTY POOR SHAPE. THEY'VE HAD A  
DEVALUATION, THEY'VE GOT A LOT OF PROBLEMS THERE IN BORROWING  
MONEY AND IT IS BEGINNING TO HAVE ITS EFFECT, SO TO THE EXTENT  
THAT WE CAN GET MORE COUNTRIES PLAYING THEIR PART IN THAT THE  
BETTER IT WILL BE.



ANTHONY BEVANS: (TIMES) IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT YOU TOLD THE HOUSE THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT ARGENTINA COULD ACCEPT THE UNITED NATIONS PROPOSALS, IS THIS PRESS CONFERENCE DESIGNED TO SOFTEN UP WORLD OPINION FOR AN INVASION NEXT WEEK?

MR. PYM: CERTAINLY NOT, IT IS TO DESCRIBE EXACTLY WHAT THE BRITISH POSITION IS AND I DON'T THINK I DID SAY IN THE HOUSE WHAT I THINK I UNDERSTOOD YOU TO SAY BY MY REMARKS, WHAT I SAID WAS I WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THEY HAVE ACCEPTED WHAT THEY HAD IMPLIED THEY HAD ACCEPTED BECAUSE SO FAR THEY'D SHOWN NO SIGN EITHER OF AGREEING TO WITHDRAW OR TO LEAVING THE ULTIMATE MATTER OF SOVEREIGNTY OPEN. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

N. FENN: ROSEMARY WRIGHT, COULD YOU WAIT FOR THE MIKE, ROSEMARY.

ROSEMARY WRIGHT: MR. PYM, DO YOU ACTUALLY BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN BE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UN OR WOULD ANY ... WOULD IT JUST BE LIMITED TO DISCUSSIONS?

MR. PYM: THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, I THINK THAT IS THE BASIS UPON WHICH IT IS PROCEEDING AND HE IS OF COURSE BRINGING IN ANYBODY AND ANY PEOPLE TO HELP HIM THAT HE WANTS, THAT'S THE BASIS OF IT AND I FEEL THAT THAT'S A VERY HELPFUL WAY TO PROCEED.

ROSEMARY WRIGHT: WOULD HE HAVE TO HAVE ANY PACKAGE THAT HE CAME UP WITH RATIFIED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL?

MR. PYM: NOT NECESSARILY I WOULD'T HAVE THOUGHT.

N. FENN: JERRY THOMPSON.



BERNARD THOMPSON: (MASON A.P.) MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU SEE A FURTHER  
ROLE FOR MR. HAIG IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS?

MR. PYM: IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE I THINK IT'S DIFFICULT TO SEE  
WHAT, BUT HE IS JUST AS ENTHUSIASTIC FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT  
AS I AM AND INDEED EVERYBODY IS AND I KNOW THAT HE HOLDS HIMSELF  
IN READINESS TO PLAY ANY PART IN THAT THAT MAY BE ASKED OF HIM  
OR THAT HE MAY THINK APPROPRIATE IN THE FUTURE.

SEAN KELLY: (IRISH RADIO AND TELEVISION) MR. PYM, O WUDEEE  
I WONDER IF THERE WILL BE A STAY ON FURTHER MILITARY HOSTILITIES  
WHILE THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PLAN IS CONSIDERED?

MR. PYM: POSITION AT THE MOMENT IS THAT WE ARE SECURING  
AND PROTECTING TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE, IT'S BRITISH TERRITORY,  
THERE ARE BRITISH TROOPS ON THAT ISLAND AND THAT IS WHAT  
WE ARE DOING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

SEAN KELLY: WILL THERE BE  
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS?

MR. PYM: NOT NECESSARILY, IF THERE ARE FURTHER BOMBING RAIDS ON  
USING IT AGAIN AND THEN COULD TAKE  
OUR FORCES WE WOULD BOMB IT AGAIN,  
USE ANY MORE MILITARY FORCE THAN IS NOW AIRFIELD OR START  
WISH TO DO THAT BUT WE MUST SECURE AND KEEP IT TO ATTACK  
EXCLUSION ZONE. WE IS NOT TO

SEAN KELLY: ONE FINAL QUESTION, COULD I ASK YOU DON'T  
PERHAPS YOU'RE ASKING A LITTLE TOO MUCH OF THE ARGENTINE  
GALTIERI, IN POLITICAL TERMS TO RULE OUT THE CONCESSION  
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, THE WITHDRAWAL OF  
ARGENTINE TROOPS, BECAUSE HIS POSITION WOULD GO, THE PRESIDENT  
LOSE HIS POWER AND LOSE HIS POSITION IF HE CONCEDED TO BRITISH  
DEMANDS?

MR. PYM: WELL, YOU MAY BE ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE BUT I MUST TELL YOU  
THAT WE CERTAINLY ARE NOT ASKING ANYTHING TOO MUCH OF THE  
ARGENTINES, THEY INVADDED, THEY'RE THE AGGRESSOR, THEY'VE PUT  
THEIR FORCES ON TO THAT ISLAND AND WHEN THE RESOLUTION 502 WAS  
PASSED THEY USED IT TO REINFORCE THAT ISLAND, THOUSANDS OF  
TROOPS THEY POURED INTO IT, THEY MUST BE GETTING RATHER WORRIED  
AT THE PRESENT TIME, SORRY ABOUT THAT, BUT IT CAN'T BE HELPED,  
I CERTAINLY AM NOT ASKING TOO MUCH OF THEM, THE ONLY THING THEY  
OUGHT TO DO IS TO GET OFF THAT ISLAND.

(PLEASE READ FIRST LINE ABOVE PARA 'SIDE')

SEAN KELLY: DON'T YOU AGREE THAT HE WOULD LOSE POWER IF HE GAVE IN?

MR. PYM: HE'S HAD ENOUGH.

N. FENN: HE'S HAD ENOUGH, YES. THE GENTLEMAN BEHIND.



SECRETARY OF STATE: ... SLIPPING AWAY AND THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, NOW YOU HAVE  
JUST SAID THAT YOU ARE TRYING TO AVOID A RECAPTURE OF THE ISLANDS,  
WHAT'S THE LAST THING YOU WANT TO DO BUT WHAT SORT OF TIME DO WE  
HAVE LEFT?

MR. PYM: WELL, THAT REMAINS TO BE SEEN DOESN'T IT? I HOPE THAT  
THEY'LL GO OFF THE ISLAND WITHOUT ANY ESCALATION OF MILITARY  
ACTIVITY AS I'VE SAID BEFORE AND THAT'S WHAT WE MUST HOPE FOR AND  
I WILL GO ON WORKING FOR THAT AND I THINK THE PRESSURES, BOTH  
ECONOMIC PRESSURES ARE HAVING THEIR EFFECT AND I THINK THE  
MILITARY PRESSURES ARE HAVING THEIR EFFECT AND IT MAY BE, I DON'T  
KNOW, WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS FOR ALL I KNOW, OR THE NEXT WEEK  
OR SO, THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL CHANGE THEIR MIND, WE'LL HAVE  
TO SEE.

N. FENN: MALCOLM RUTHERFORD.

MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, FOREIGN SECRETAR, THE TIMING OF THE .....  
ARGENTINA'S RESPONSE TO THE UN, YOU SAID IN DUE COURSE, COULD  
YOU GIVE SOME INDICATION OF WHAT YOU EXPECT DUE COURSE TO MEAN,  
24 HOURS - 48 - OR....

MR. PYM: THEY INDICATED PUBLICLY YESTERDAY BY WHAT THEY STATED  
THAT THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN ONE BUT I AM RATHER DOUBTFUL WHETHER  
THEY HAVE, IN FACT I DON'T THINK THEY HAVE AND NATURALLY I  
HAVEN'T BEEN .... WE HAVEN'T BEEN INFORMED THAT THEY HAVE BUT I  
THINK THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS AWAITING NOW FOR WHAT THEIR  
COMMENTS ARE ON HIS PROPOSALS, SO WE'LL HAVE TO SEE.

N. FENN: PETER JENKINS.

PETER JENKINS: (GUARDIAN) CAN YOU SAY WHETHER MR. HAIG WAS  
ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE PERUVIAN  
PROPOSALS?

MR. PYM: YES, HE WAS, IT WAS A PERUVIAN PROPOSAL ORIGINALLY,  
THEN THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE MEXICAN AMERICAN INPUT INTO IT AND  
WE PUT SOME PRACTICAL IDEAS INTO IT AND IT THEN WENT TO PERU  
AND THE PERUVIANS WERE HAPPY WITH IT BUT THEN THEY PUT IT TO THE  
ARGENTINES AND THEY REFUSED.

JOHN LEWIS: (BIRMINGHAM POST) SECRETARY OF STATE, CAN YOU HELP  
US TO THE EXTENT OF CLARIFYING WHETHER THE UNITED NATIONS  
FRAMEWORK DOES IN FACT CONCEIVE A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE  
CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL AND WHETHER THERE'S ANY TIMING  
ATTACHED TO IT?

MR. PYM: THERE WILL HAVE TO BE THAT DIRECT LINKAGE, YES, BOTH  
A CEASEFIRE AND A WITHDRAWAL WERE OF COURSE PART OF THE PROPOSITION  
THAT WAS PUT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT AS I MADE CLEAR THE  
TWO THINGS HAVE TO GO SIMULTANEOUSLY.



SECRETARY OF STATE: WELL, YOU'RE RIGHT, NOW YOU HAVE  
OUT, SLIPPING AWAY AND THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, NOW YOU HAVE  
JUST SAID THAT YOU ARE TRYING TO AVOID A RECAPTURE OF THE ISLANDS,  
THAT'S THE LAST THING YOU WANT TO DO BUT WHAT SORT OF TIME DO WE  
HAVE LEFT?

MR. PYM: WELL, THAT REMAINS TO BE SEEN DOESN'T IT? I HOPE THAT  
THEY'LL GO OFF THE ISLAND WITHOUT ANY ESCALATION OF MILITARY  
ACTIVITY AS I'VE SAID BEFORE AND THAT'S WHAT WE MUST HOPE FOR AND  
I WILL GO ON WORKING FOR THAT AND I THINK THE PRESSURES, BOTH  
ECONOMIC PRESSURES ARE HAVING THEIR EFFECT AND I THINK THE  
MILITARY PRESSURES ARE HAVING THEIR EFFECT AND IT MAY BE, I DON'T  
KNOW, WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS FOR ALL I KNOW, OR THE NEXT WEEK  
OR SO, THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL CHANGE THEIR MIND, WE'LL HAVE  
TO SEE.

N. FENN: MALCOLM RUTHERFORD.

MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, FOREIGN SECRETAR, THE TIMING OF THE .....  
ARGENTINA'S RESPONSE TO THE UN, YOU SAID IN DUE COURSE, COULD  
YOU GIVE SOME INDICATION OF WHAT YOU EXPECT DUE COURSE TO MEAN,  
24 HOURS - 48 - OR....

MR. PYM: THEY INDICATED PUBLICLY YESTERDAY BY WHAT THEY STATED  
THAT THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN ONE BUT I AM RATHER DOUBTFUL WHETHER  
THEY HAVE, IN FACT I DON'T THINK THEY HAVE AND NATURALLY I  
HAVEN'T BEEN .... WE HAVEN'T BEEN INFORMED THAT THEY HAVE BUT I  
THINK THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS AWAITING NOW FOR WHAT THEIR  
COMMENTS ARE ON HIS PROPOSALS, SO WE'LL HAVE TO SEE.

N. FENN: PETER JENKINS.

PETER JENKINS: (GUARDIAN) CAN YOU SAY WHETHER MR. HAIG WAS  
ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE PERUVIAN  
PROPOSALS?

MR. PYM: YES, HE WAS, IT WAS A PERUVIAN PROPOSAL ORIGINALLY,  
THEN THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE MEXICAN AMERICAN INPUT INTO IT AND  
WE PUT SOME PRACTICAL IDEAS INTO IT AND IT THEN WENT TO PERU  
AND THE PERUVIANS WERE HAPPY WITH IT BUT THEN THEY PUT IT TO THE  
ARGENTINES AND THEY REFUSED.

JOHN LEWIS: (BIRMINGHAM POST) SECRETARY OF STATE, CAN YOU HELP  
US TO THE EXTENT OF CLARIFYING WHETHER THE UNITED NATIONS  
FRAMEWORK DOES IN FACT CONCEIVE A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE  
CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL AND WHETHER THERE'S ANY TIMING  
ATTACHED TO IT?

MR. PYM: THERE WILL HAVE TO BE THAT DIRECT LINKAGE, YES, BOTH  
A CEASEFIRE AND A WITHDRAWAL WERE OF COURSE PART OF THE PROPOSITION  
THAT WAS PUT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT AS I MADE CLEAR THE  
TWO THINGS HAVE TO GO SIMULTANEOUSLY.



FENN: PATRICK KEATLEY.

PATRICK KEATLEY: (GUARDIAN) IN ALL THIS SOVEREIGNTY APPEARS TO BE  
A REEF ON NEGOTIATIONS ARE STRIKING . . . STICKING. IS IT  
POSSIBLE THIS ISSUE COULD BE SHIFTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF  
JUSTICE. I KNOW THAT'S AN OLD ONE AND I KNOW ARGENTINA HAS ON  
OCCASIONS REFUSED TO GO THERE BUT IT NOW BECOMES SO IMPORTANT  
THAT IT MIGHT SAVE FACE, COULD IT NOT BE PART OF A PACKAGE?

MR. PYM: YES, WE HAVE SAID IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, IN THE DEBATE  
A WEEK AGO YESTERDAY, THAT THIS IS A POSSIBILITY THAT IS NOT  
EXCLUDED, WE HAVE NOT SHUT OFF THAT OPTION, OF COURSE IT COULD  
GO TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BUT WHEN WE'VE TRIED  
BEFORE, AS YOU KNOW, ARGENTINA WOULD NOT TURN UP OR WOULD NOT  
TAKE PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS BUT LET ME REMIND YOU AGAIN ABOUT THE  
SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THIS  
- THAT THE ARGENTINES SAY IT IS THEIR TERRITORY AND THERE'S NO  
DOUBT ABOUT IT AND THEY'RE GOING TO STICK TO THAT AND IT'S NOT UP  
FOR NEGOTIATION WHATSOEVER. THAT'S THE END OF THE MATTER. THE  
BRITISH POSITION - WE HAVE A CLAIM TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THOSE  
ISLANDS WHICH WE BELIEVE IS TOTALLY VALID, WE HAVE HAD THE  
POSSESSION OF THEM FOR 149 YEARS, AND WE'VE ADMINISTERED THEM AND  
LOOKED AFTER THE PEOPLE THERE ALL THAT TIME BUT WE SAY WE  
RECOGNISE THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE A CLAIM, WHICH WE BELIEVE  
TO BE INVALID, BUT WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT EXISTS AND WHEN THE  
NEGOTIATORS SIT DOWN WE SAY, ALL RIGHT, IT'S BRITISH TERRITORY  
SOVEREIGN TERRITORY BUT WE'RE QUITE PREPARED TO ALTER THAT  
STATUS IF THAT IS WHAT THE ISLANDERS PREFER OR IF THERE IS SOME  
OTHER ORGANISATION OR ARRANGEMENT OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT THAT THE  
ISLANDERS WOULD ACCEPT OR WOULD PREFER, WE WON'T STAND IN THEIR  
WAY, SO THAT IS AN OPEN AND AN HONOURABLE AND A REASONABLE  
POSITION AS COMPARED WITH THE ABSOLUTE HARD LINE ON THE OTHER SIDE.  
NOW THAT HARD LINE ON THE OTHER SIDE HAS GOT TO ALTER SO THAT A  
NEGOTIATION FOR THE FUTURE CAN TAKE PLACE ON A SENSIBLE BASIS.

N. FENN: DAVID MCNEIL.

DAVID MCNEIL: FOREIGN SECRETARY, WOULD YOU BE PREPARED TO TALK  
TO MR. COSTA MENDEZ OR ANY OTHER ARGENTINE LEADER IF THAT WERE  
SUGGESTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL?



IT'S VERY COMPLICATED, WITH GALTIERI'S POSITION, COSTA MENDEZ POSITION, THE JUNTA'S POSITION AND ALL THE GENERALS AND THE ADMIRALS, IT'S ALL VERY COMPLICATED AND I THINK IT'S MUCH BETTER THAT SOMEBODY ELSE TALKS TO THEM AND ALSO TALKS TO US.

N. FENN: THE PERSISTENT STANDARD.

JOURNALIST: YOU SAID JUST A MOMENT AGO THAT YOU'RE TRYING TO AVOID ANY MILITARY ESCALATION BUT ARE YOU REALLY SAYING THAT BECAUSE POSSIBLY THE LOSS OF THREE SEA HARRIERS AND THE SHFFIELD HAS UNDERMINED THE TASK FORCE MILITARY POSITION AS IT STANDS?

MR. PYM: IT CERTAINLY HAS NOT UNDERMINED ANYTHING AND WE ARE SECURING AND HAVE CONTROL OF THAT TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND I WANT TO TELL YOU BECAUSE I HEARD FROM THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF THIS MORNING WHAT YOU WOULD EXPECT TO BE THE CASE, THAT THE MORALE AND BEARING OF ALL OUR TROOPS IN THE TASK FORCE ARE ABSOLUTELY FIRST CLASS AND AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND I WANT TO GIVE THAT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ASSURANCE.

N. FENN: YES, SIR?

JOURNALIST: MR. PYM, IS THIS A STALEMATE, ARGENTINA INSISTING ON SOVEREIGNTY AS A PRECONDITION, BRITAIN INSISTING ON A WITHDRAWAL, IS THERE ANY IDEA ... HAS ANY IDEA BEEN PUT FORWARD THAT CAN 'BROKE' THIS STALEMATE AT ALL?

MR. PYM: NO, AND IT WOULD BE QUITE UNREASONABLE FOR THE ARGENTINES TO DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN WITHDRAW THEIR FORKES FROM AN ISLAND WHERE THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO BE AND IF THERE IS TO BE A NEGOTIATION WHICH WE'RE COMPLETELY READY FOR, INDEED WE WERE ENGAGED IN BEFORE THIS AGGRESSION TOOK PLACE, THEN THAT NEGOTIATION MUST BE ON THE BASIS THAT THE END RESULT IS OPEN, THAT MUST BE SO, OTHERWISE THERE'S NO POINT IN HAVING A NEGOTIATION, THERE'S NOTHING TO COMPROMISE ON, WHAT'S THE POINT OF HAVING A LONG-TERM NEGOTIATION IF ONE SIDE SAYS THEY'RE NOT PREPARED TO MOVE FROM ONE POSITION? I THINK THAT OUR ATTITUDE AND APPROACH TO IT HAS BEEN AND REMAINS COMPLETELY REASONABLE AND WHOLLY IN KEEPING WITH THE LINE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN FOR YEARS AND YEARS, KN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BEEN INDEPENDENT IN CONTINENTS ALL ROUND THE WORLD.

N. FENN: BRIDGET BLOOM.

BRIDGET BLOOM: (FINANCIAL TIMES) MR. PYM, I WONDER IF YOU COULD COMMENT, YOU SAID THAT YOU EXPECTED THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW WITHIN A FIXED NUMBER ....

MR. PYM: .... WHERE IS SHE, I CAN'T SEE YOU ....

BRIDGET BLOOM: HERE ... SORRY .... WITHIN A FIXED NUMBER OF DAYS - YOU SAID YOU WANTED THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW, COULD YOU COMMENT ON THAT AND COULD YOU ALSO COMMENT ON WHO MIGHT SUPERVISE THE WITHDRAWAL .....

MR. PYM: WELL, THERE MUST BE A NUMBER OF DAYS BECAUSE ONE DOESN'T WANT IT TO DRAG ON FOR LONGER THAN IS NECESSARY, IT MIGHT BE DONE IN SEVEN DAYS OR TEN DAYS, I DON'T THINK THE ACTUAL NUMBER MATTERS, BUT THERE OUGHT TO BE A CLEAR PERIOD OF TIME BY WHEN IT'S GOT TO BE 2XP COMPLETE AND THEN THAT WITHDRAWAL MUST BE VERIFIED AND THERE ARE A VARIETY OF WAYS IN WHICH THAT COULD BE DONE, ASI'VE SAID IN WHAT I SPOKE TO YOU ABOUT AT THE OUTSET, THE CONCEPT, THE LATEST CONCEPT THAT WAS TURNED DOWN WAS A GROUP OF COUNTRIES ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE THAT ROLE BUT OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE OTHER WAYS OF DOING IT, I DON'T THINK THE MECHANISM OF THAT MATTERS SO MUCH AS MAKING SURE THAT IT IS DONE ON A BASIS THAT'S ACCEPTABLE.



N. FENN: NORMAN KIRKHAM.

NORMAN KIRKHAM: (SUNDAY TELEGRAPH) WOULD THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAY IF THERE IS NOW A GROWING POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK ON ANY ARGENTINE MAINLAND BASE TO PROTECT THE TASK FORCE FROM THE VULNERABILITY TO MISSILES?

MR. PYM: NO, I WOULDN'T SAY THAT . . . AND I WOULD . . . AS I'VE SAID ALREADY, WE DON'T WANT TO SEE ANY ESCALATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY BUT AT THIS POINT I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE ANY POSSIBILITY WHATSOEVER, THAT WOULDN'T BE RIGHT BECAUSE AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES MAY APPLY. NOW I DO NOT WANT YOU TO READ INTO THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT I MUST KEEP THE OPTIONS OPEN, ALL OPTIONS OPEN - BUT LET ME ASSURE YOU AT THE MOMENT WE ARE ONLY CONCERNED WITH PRESERVING THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND THERE'S NO OTHER THOUGHT IN OUR HEADS AND I ONLY REPLY AS I HAVE BECAUSE WE DON'T KNOW WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN THIS WEEKEND, NEXT WEEK, NEXT MONTH, HOW LONG IT WILL GO ON FOR, WHETHER IT'S SUDDENLY GOING TO END AND IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES OF COURSE IT WOULDN'T BE RIGHT FOR ME AT THIS STAGE TO EXCLUDE ANYTHING.

PETER RIDDLE: (FINANCIAL TIMES) FOLLOWING ON FROM THAT QUESTION, IN THE HOUSE YOU WERE ASKED ABOUT THIS POINT AND YOU SAID IN REPLY THAT DIFFICULT DECISIONS MIGHT COME IF THE NEGOTIATIONS FAILED. DOES THAT MEAN THAT WHILE THE NEGOTIATION IS GOING ON OUR SOLE CONCERN IS FOR ENFORCING THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AND ANY MILITARY ESCALATION WOULD FOLLOW THAT?

MR. PYM: WELL, BASICALLY THAT IS SO AT THE PRESENT MOMENT BUT, AGAIN, I'M NOT GOING TO SHUT OFF ANY OPTION BECAUSE THAT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT REMEMBERING THAT OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST BE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF OUR OWN FORCES, THAT IS A VERY HIGH PRIORITY INDEED AND WE'VE GOT TO TAKE THAT INTO CONSIDERATION AT ALL TIMES.

N. FENN: THE GENTLEMAN - IN FRONT.

JOURNALIST: YES, SECRETARY, COULD I ASK YOU TO REPEAT SOMETHING THAT YOU SAID SEVERAL TIMES SEVERAL WEEKS AGO BUT HAVE NOT SAID IN RECENT DAYS, WHICH IS THE QUESTION OF THE SELF DETERMINATION OF THE ISLANDERS BEING PARAMOUNT, IS THAT STILL THE BRITISH POSITION?

MR. PYM: YES, IT IS BASICALLY. I SAID IN MY STATEMENT, WHAT I JUST READ OUT TO YOU THAT POSSIBLY THE GROUP OF COUNTRIES MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OUR PRINCIPLES OR THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS AND THEIR POSITION IS CLEARLY SET OUT IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER WHICH HAS GUIDED US ALL THE WAY THROUGH AND OF COURSE WE'VE GOT THEM IN MIND AND WE WANT THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO BE CONSULTED IN ANY INTERIM ARRANGEMENT THAT MAY BE MADE WHILE THE LONG-TERM NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON.



DAVID SPANIER: (IRN) DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION, SIR, ABOUT THE  
SITUATION OF THE ISLANDERS THEMSELVES?

MR. PYM: NO, WE HAVE VERY, VERY LITTLE, WHAT EMERGES EITHER BY  
LETTER OR RUMOUR, WE HAVEN'T GOT ANY DIRECT INFORMATION ABOUT IT  
AND SOME OF THE REPORTS WE GET - WE'RE NOT ABSOLUTELY SURE HOW  
CORRECT THEY MAY BE, SO THE ANSWER IS I'M AFRAID WE'VE GOT VERY  
LITTLE INFORMATION ON THAT AND ONE IS WORRIED ABOUT THE ISLANDERS,  
ALL THE TIME ONE REALISES THAT THERE THEY ARE IN THESE VERY  
UNATTRACTIVE CONDITIONS UNDER THE BOOT OF THE INVADER BUT I'M  
AFRAID WE HAVEN'T GOT HARD INFORMATION.

M. PENN: KEITH GRAVES.

(BREAK IN TRANSMISSION FOR TWO MINUTES)

JOURNALIST: IN OTHER WORDS WOULD YOU ACCEPT FOR EXAMPLE UN  
TRUSTEESHIP WHICH WOULD PUT THE ISSUE OF SOVDREIGNTY BEYOND DISPUTE  
INITIALLY WHILE YOU HAVE AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION?

MR. PYM: I WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THAT.

JOURNALIST: BUT WOULD YOU POSITIVELY SUPPORT IT?

MR. PYM: WELL, I MIGHT EVEN DO THAT, I MEAN IT'S JUST AN OPTION  
THAT'S OPEN AT THE MOMENT, LET'S SEE HOW WE GET ON, WE WANT A  
REPLY FIRST OF ALL FROM THE ARGENTINES, WHAT ARE THEY GOING TO DO  
ABOUT IT? HOW ARE THEY GOING TO RESPOND? WHAT I'M SAYING TO YOU  
IS THAT I'VE GOT NO HANG UP ABOUT THAT, THAT'S AN OPTION THAT  
COULD BE PURSUED.



AND THEN CHRISTOPHER FORBES-ADAMS.

MR. BEVIN: HOW LONG ARE YOU WILLING TO LET THIS CRISIS DRAG ON FOR?

MR. PYM: THAT'S UP TO THE ARGENTINES ISN'T IT?

MR. BEVIN: WITH THE TASK FORCE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC YOU'RE WILLING TO .....

MR. PYM: THAT'S UP TO THE ARGENTINES.

MR. BEVIN: FOR A MONTH, TWO MONTHS?

MR. PYM: WE'VE SAID THAT THEY ARE GOING TO LEAVE THAT ISLAND.

MR. BEVIN: A MONTH - TWO MONTHS?

MR. PYM: I WON'T PUT ANY TIMESCALE ON IT, OUR OBJECTIVE IS QUITE CLEAR.

N. FENN: MR. FORBES-ADAMS ....

MR. FORBES-ADAMS: SECRETARY OF STATE, COULD YOU SAY IF THERE ARE ANY PLANS, YOUR ENVIAGE OF PERHAPS GOING BACK TO NEW YORK TO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE?

MR. PYM: OH I COULD, NOT IMMEDIATELY, I'M ACTUALLY GOING OFF TO BRUSSELS TOMORROW AND SUNDAY WITH THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, BUT I WOULD IF NECESSARY, IF IT WAS APPROPRIATE, IF IT WAS GOING TO BE HELPFUL, I COULD GO BACK BUT I'VE NO PLANS TO AT THE MOMENT.

N. FENN: ROSEMARY - REUTERS.

ROSEMARY: MR. PYM, YOU SAID EARLIER YOU WERE IN THE BUSINESS OF OPENING DOORS, SPAIN .... THE KING OF SPAIN HAS OFFERED SPANISH MEDIATION, HAVE YOU BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SPAIN TO TAKE UP THAT OFFER?

MR. PYM: I HAVEN'T PERSONALLY BEEN DIRECTLY IN TOUCH WITH THE KING OF SPAIN, OR THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN BUT MESSAGES I HAVE RECEIVED FROM THEM.

N. FENN: ONE LAST QUESTION, THE GENTLEMAN BEHIND.

JOURNALIST: MY QUESTION IS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ONE ASKED BY BRIDGET BLOOM AND THAT IS IN NUMBER 'C' THE SMALL GROUP OF COUNTRIES, DID THE PERUVIAN PROPOSAL CONTAIN ANY DETAILS ABOUT THE MECHANISM FOR THE NEGOTIATION AND PARTICULARLY WAS THERE ANY DEADLINE PUT ON THE TIME FRAME FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAD BEEN REPORTED?

MR. PYM: THERE WAS NO DETAIL ABOUT THE FRAMEWORK OF IT, THAT WAS LEFT FAIRLY OPEN, THERE WAS A CONCEPT OF TRYING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITHIN A LIMITED SPACE OF TIME BUT QUITE A LONG SPACE OF TIME, I WOULDN'T WANT TO BE MORE SPECIFIC THAN THAT, BECAUSE I THINK WHEN THIS TRAUMA IS OVER, FOR THOSE PEOPLE LIVING ON THE ISLAND IT WILL TAKE THEM SOME TIME TO RE-ESTABLISH THEIR LIFE AND SOME TIME TO WEIGH UP WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND TO COME TO ANY KIND OF A CONCLUSION WHAT THEY FEEL ABOUT THE FUTURE, AND I THINK COMING BACK TO KEITH GRAVES POINT, I THINK IT WILL TAKE UP TO SOME MONTHS I WOULD VISUALISE, BEFORE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO FORM A VIEW ABOUT WHAT ACTUALLY THEY WOULD PREFER.

N. FENN: FOREIGN SECRETARY- LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THANKX.

MR. PYM: THANK YOU.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 May 1982

~~Prime Minister~~  
Content for this message to  
be sent?

A.P.C. 7/5

O. Webster  
ADZ/5

Dear Sir,

We have been considering what more might be done to impress on our Community partners the reasons for the action we are taking and the importance of their support. Mr Pym suggests that the Prime Minister may wish to consider the possibility of sending a message to Community Heads of State and Government. I enclose a draft.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

B J P Fall  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:  
MESSAGE TO COMMUNITY HEADS OF  
GOVERNMENT

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

The collapse of the US/Peruvian initiative means that the focus of diplomatic activity moves to New York. In approaching this new phase of the crisis there is one point which I should like to put to you urgently, personally and with all the emphasis at my command.

CAVEAT.....

I want you to know that Britain will not acquiesce in the retention of the Falkland Islands by Argentina. The military means to terminate the military occupation are being assembled. They will be used, unless a diplomatic solution can be found.

If events take this course there will be, I fear, the likelihood of destruction and casualties on a scale far exceeding what we have seen already. I am prepared for this and so is my government, and so is my country. You should not be in any doubt about that.

There is one way and one way only to prevent this happening. It is for the Argentines to be brought to accept that what they seek is not available: that the world community is not going to award them sovereignty over the Falkland Islands simply because they seized them by force on 2 April 1982. This is the point on which both the American and the Peruvian initiatives collapsed. Unless the principle of resisting aggression is upheld, every state tempted to resort to force will for decades be encouraged; restraint will decline as a factor in international behaviour, and law and order will be dangerously weakened.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

None of us can afford to see this principle undermined. But, subject to that, we shall be as flexible in the United Nations as we were in our response to Secretary of

/State



State Haig and President Belaunde. We can accept any arrangement, organised by any mediator, reached by negotiations in any framework, which achieves Argentinian withdrawal, respects the wishes of the Islanders and does not prejudge the eventual outcome.

So the two alternatives are clear. Either hostilities continue with mounting severity and losses, or the

/...Argentines



Argentines modify their political demands. I know that your country and you personally are deeply disturbed about the first of these prospects. This means that you and I and all who share the same concern must put our entire weight behind the second. To avoid the escalation of hostilities, the pressure on the Argentine junta must be maintained. This will involve not only renewing the economic embargo on 16 May, though that is vital. It also applies to every statement put out by the Ten as a whole or by member government, and to every piece of guidance given to the media. There is a real danger that the Argentines will gain the impression that resolve is weakening and that if they maintain their intransigence, they will gain the fruits of their unlawful act of aggression.

I have exploited our personal friendship to write to you in these rather stark terms, but I wanted to explain the position in all frankness. We have been greatly encouraged by your support so far, and I do most firmly believe that the only way to achieve the result which we all want - a satisfactory negotiated settlement both in the short and long term - is to maintain both our solidarity and our pressure on the Argentines.



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 7 May 1982,  
columns 394-395 (Foreign Secretary's  
statement)

Signed AWayland Date 17 April 2012

PREM Records Team



FALKLANDS STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY  
ON 7 MAY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

---

The House is aware that while we have mobilised and despatched the Task Force to the South Atlantic, where it has already been involved in active operations, we have also been pursuing a highly active programme of consultation and negotiation in the search for a diplomatic solution to the present crisis.

The House has shown exemplary patience with my inability to explain the nature of the proposals we have been examining. I now have to report to the House that Argentine intransigence has again led them to reject proposals for a diplomatic solution. In these circumstances I think it is right that I should give the House an account of where we stand - and of where we intend to go from here.



2

The fact that we were able to reach a point where a new set of firm proposals could be put to both sides owes much to the tireless efforts of Mr Haig. We are also grateful for the constructive contributions of President Belaunde of Peru. We also put forward practical ideas ourselves which take account of the Argentine position as well as our own.

Yesterday we signified that we were willing to accept and implement immediately an interim agreement which would prepare the way for a definitive settlement. Such an agreement would have demonstrated substantial flexibility on our part. If it had been accepted by the Argentines the ceasefire, which would have been firmly linked to the beginning of Argentine withdrawal, could have come into effect as early as 5.00 pm today.



The interim agreement under discussion yesterday included the following elements:

- (a) Complete and supervised withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands matched by corresponding withdrawal of British forces.
- (b) An immediate ceasefire as soon as Argentina accepted the agreement and agreed to withdraw.
- (c) Appointment of a small group of countries acceptable to both sides who would supervise withdrawal, undertake the interim administration in consultation with the Islanders elected representatives, and perhaps help in negotiations for a definitive agreement on the status of the Islands, without prejudice to our principles or to the wishes of the Islanders.
- (d) Suspension of the existing exclusion zones and the lifting of economic sanctions.



This agreement would not of course have prejudged in any way the outcome of the negotiations about the future. As the House knows that is a sticking point for us. Pending the outcome of the negotiations, the two sides would simply have acknowledged the difference that exists between them over the status of the Islands.

We have worked, and will continue to work positively and constructively for a peaceful solution. Our agreement to these ideas makes this once again abundantly clear.

I wish I could say that the Argentine junta had been working in a similar spirit: clearly, they were not. The Argentines have so far insisted that a transfer of sovereignty to them should be a pre-condition of negotiations on a final settlement. The Argentines talk much of the need for the decolonization of the Islands. What they appear to mean by this is its recolonization by themselves.



In addition to this, the Argentines seem now to be obstructing progress in another but equally fundamental way. They appear to be asking for a ceasefire without any clear link with a withdrawal of their invasion force. To grant this would be to leave them indefinitely in control of people and territory which they had illegally seized, and to deny ourselves the right of pursuing our own self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

We have not allowed Argentine military activities to halt the measures which our Task Force is taking. We will not allow their diplomatic obstructionism to do so either. Nor will they be allowed to halt our own vigorous endeavours to find a peaceful way out of the conflict into which they have led us. This is why I welcomed and cooperated whole-heartedly with the initiatives of Mr Haig, and why I now welcome the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and am working closely with him.



6

As the House knows, the Secretary-General has put to both us and Argentina some ideas as a framework around which progress might be made. The Argentine Government claims to have accepted these ideas. We are bound to be sceptical of this claim. There is no indication that Argentina has accepted either that she must withdraw as Resolution 502 demands or that negotiations cannot, as Argentina insists, be made conditional on the transfer of sovereignty to her. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that Argentina, having rejected ideas devised by Mr Haig and the President of Peru, can now accept the Secretary-General's ideas which <sup>have</sup> such a similar basis.

For our part, we have accepted  
the general approach set out by the Secretary-General. I sent him yesterday a positive and substantive reply, making clear that the elements for a solution put forward by him were close to those which had been the basis of our efforts since the beginning of the crisis.



I made clear at the same time that in our view Resolution 502 must be implemented without delay; that an unconditional ceasefire could not under any circumstances be regarded by us as a step towards this; and that implementation of a ceasefire must be unambiguously linked to the commencement of Argentine withdrawal. I then went on to give details, which it would not be right to reveal to the House now, of what we would be prepared to accept to fill out the framework suggested by him.

Mr Speaker, if one phase of diplomatic effort has been brought to an end by Argentine intransigence, another phase is already under way in New York. The aim remains the same: to secure the early implementation of Resolution 502. We are working urgently and constructively with the Secretary General to this end. I hope the Argentines will henceforth show that readiness and desire to reach a peaceful settlement which has been evident so far only on our side. If they do not, let them be in no doubt that we shall do whatever may be necessary to end their unlawful occupation. Our resolve is undiminished.

It remains the Government's highest priority to achieve an early negotiated settlement if that is humanly possible.



SECRET

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 7 MAY

SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS

1. Sir A Parsons yesterday delivered the Secretary of State's reply to the Secretary General, who was clearly pleased by it. He readily acknowledged that this was more substantive than the response he had received from Argentina; and that while the ideas contained therein might not be acceptable initially either to him or to the Argentines, they gave him a real chance of beginning a genuine negotiation.
2. The Secretary General agreed that in the light of this reply it was essential that there should be no formal meeting of the Council.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL

3. The Secretary General opened yesterday's informal consultations with a brief report to the effect that Sir A Parsons had given him a positive reaction and comments on his ideas. He had informed the Argentine Permanent Representative and had asked him for his Government's comments as soon as possible.

US

(a) Meeting with Mr Haig

4. Sir N Henderson yesterday pointed out to Mr Haig that it would be unreasonable from London's point of view if the US Government made no mention of the US/Peruvian proposals or of the outcome of the exchanges concerning them. If the Secretary of State makes a statement on the proposals, Mr Haig said he would then confirm that the Argentines had slammed the door on progress.
5. Mr Haig's view is that the Argentines have not been and are still not seriously interested in negotiation. He also suspects that they may be behind moves apparently aimed at ensuring the US is excluded from involvement in a peace plan.

(b) Message to NATO Foreign Minister

6. Mr Haig has sent a message to all NATO Foreign Ministers (copy attached). It sets out the background on the US/Peruvian proposal and emphasises the need to uphold the principle that force must not be used to settle territorial disputes.

SECRET

/STATEMENTS




SECRET

- 2 -

STATEMENTS FOR CIRCULATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

7. The five Nordic countries have produced a statement (copy attached) which expresses full support for SCR 502.

8. The Latin American group has also produced a statement (copy attached). Through the efforts of the Caribbeans, the text is innocuous and makes no mention of sovereignty. It mentions SCR 502. However, it also makes an urgent call for the cessation of all hostile acts in the region of the Malvinas Islands.



7 May 1982

D T Healy  
Emergency Unit

SECRET



08 500

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WASHINGTON 070145Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1650 OF 7 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE ALL NATO POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKHIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 164B (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE MESSAGE HAIG HAS NOW SENT TO ALL NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS:

I KNOW YOU FEEL, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I DO, THAT THE TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE IN THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO AND SHEFFIELD AND OTHER MILITARY ACTIONS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE URGENT TO FIND A BASIS FOR PEACE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

OVER THE LAST FIVE DAYS PRESIDENT BELAUNDE OF PERU AND I WORKED OUT A POSSIBLE APPROACH, INVOLVING THESE ELEMENTS:

(1) IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES CONCURRENT WITH

(2) MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND NON-REINTRODUCTION OF FORCES;

(3) INTRODUCTION OF THIRD PARTIES ON TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO VERIFY WITHDRAWAL, ADMINISTER THE ISLANDS, AND MAKE SURE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT WERE IMPLEMENTED;

(4) ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OF DIFFERENCES OVER THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS;

(5) ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS THAT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE INHABITANTS WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT; AND

(6) NEGOTIATION OF A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION BY 30 APRIL 1983, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE THIRD PARTIES.

ON MAY 5, FRANCIS PYM INFORMED ME THAT BRITAIN WAS PREPARED TO GIVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL, PROVIDED ARGENTINA DID SO AS WELL, AND WAS PREPARED TO ORDER A



THESE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT VARIOUS POINTS WITH ARGENTINA, RECEIVING AN ENCOURAGING REACTION, BUT WHEN THEY WERE PRESENTED BY PRESIDENT BELLAUNDE TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI LATE MAY 5, HE REFUSED TO CONSIDER THEM. ARGENTINA, HE SAID, WANTS A UN MEDIATION.

REGRETTABLE AS IT IS THAT A PLAN CAREFULLY DEVELOPED WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF A COUNTRY VERY SUPPORTIVE OF ARGENTINA WAS NOT ADDRESSED SERIOUSLY, THE EFFORT HAS NOT BEEN LOST. FRANCIS FYM INFORMS ME THAT BRITAIN WILL NOT PULL BACK FROM THE POSITION TAKEN, AND WILL MAKE IT THE BASIS OF HIS RESPONSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL'S OFFER OF MEDIATION TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR.

FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THIS CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE THAT FORCE MUST NOT BE USED TO SEIZE WHAT CANNOT BE OBTAINED PEACEFULLY. THE PROMPT ACTIONS OF THE EC TEN REFLECTED AN EQUALLY PRINCIPLED STAND. THE INTEGRITY OF THIS NORM IS OF VITAL PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE. HISTORICALLY, ITS EROSION HAS ONLY LED TO FURTHER DISORDER AND WAR. DISPUTES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD COULD TURN VIOLENT IF THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS UNDERMINED. YOUR INSISTENCE ON AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES AND A SIMULTANEOUS CEASEFIRE IS CRUCIAL IN UPHOLDING THIS PRINCIPLE.

BASED ON OUR COMMON INTEREST IN THE RULE OF LAW AND OUR COMMON DESIRE TO STOP THIS WAR, WE MUST ALL STRIVE TO ASSIST THE PARTIES TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 CONTINUES TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT. MY COUNTRY WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THIS RESOLUTION THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR ANY OTHER MECHANISM.

HENDERSON

NNNN



UNCLASSIFIED


-7 MAY 1982

FM UKM IS NEW YORK 060101Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 669 OF 6 MAY

RFC PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROUTINE BRIDGETOWN AND ANTIGUA



MIPT: FALKLANDS AT THE U.N.

STATEMENT BY THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT:

BEGINS

THE GROUP OF THE LATIN AMERICAN MEMBER COUNTRIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS HELD A MEETING ON MAY 4, 1982 AT THE REQUEST OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA.

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA INFORMED ON ALL ARMED ACTIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE REGION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM SINCE 25 APRIL, 1982, AND WHICH HAVE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION AND IN THE WORLD.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE GROUP OF THE LATIN AMERICAN MEMBER COUNTRIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, IN A SPIRIT OF ASSISTANCE IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, DECLARES:

1. ITS' REGRET AT THE INCREASING LOSS OF LIFE WHICH HAS OCCURED IN THE REGION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS.
2. ITS' URGENT CALL FOR A CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILE ACTS IN THE REGION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS.
3. THAT IT URGES THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A JUST, PEACEFUL, PRACTICAL AND LASTING SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ALL ITS PARTS AND THE PERTINENT RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

ENDS

PARSONS

NNNN




UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKFIS NEW YORK 062233Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 664 OF 6 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN OSLO STOCKHOLM REYKJAVIK HELSINKI UKDEL  
NATO.



5

COPENHAGEN TEL NO 111 (NOT TO ALL); PARAGRAPH 3:  
FALKLAND ISLANDS: NORDIC STATEMENT.

1. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE NORDIC COUNTRIES TODAY (6 MAY) ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT:

BEGINS

QUOTE

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FIVE NORDIC COUNTRIES - DENMARK, FINLAND, ICELAND, NORWAY AND SWEDEN - HAVE FOLLOWED WITH PROFOUND CONCERN THE SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF THE CONFLICT CONCERNING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA.

THEY DEEPLY REGRET THAT THE HOSTILITIES HAVE LEAD TO LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE.

THE NORDIC GOVERNMENTS EXPRESS THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO RESOLUTION 502, ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ON 3 APRIL 1982, AND STRONGLY APPEAL TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO COMPLY WITH ITS PROVISIONS.

THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESS THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN HIS ENDEAVOURS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

UNQUOTE

ENDS

PARSONS



G.T. MURCHISON

17/5

7 May 1982

British Community Council in Argentina

I enclose a copy of a further telegtam which the Prime Minister has received from the Chairman of the above about the Falkland Islands situation. I should be grateful if you would let me have a draft reply for consideration by the Prime Minister.

AJC

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions  
**Telegram**  
British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions  
**Telegram**  
British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

*cio*

889113 PO SW G  
OSEAGRAM LN LFTD

LFT030 CLF8621 AUK521 TX108  
BUENOSAIRES/TLX 249/239 6 1702 PAGE1/51

LT  
BUENOS AIRES, MAY 6TH, 1982  
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGAET THATCHER, M.P.  
PRIME MINISTER NO. 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1



DEAR PRIME MINISTER:  
FOLLOWING THE RECENT ESCALATION OF EVENTS IN THE SOUTH  
ATANTIC, WE ARE ONCE MORE APPROACHING YOU ON BEHALF OF THE  
BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL IN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC IN ORDER

COL LT 6TH, 1982 10

PAGE2/50

TO STRONGLY URGE YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SEEK  
A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BY WHATEVER MEANS BEFORE THIS TRAGIC  
EPISODE TAKES ON EVEN GRAVER PROPORTIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS  
FOR ALL INVOLVED. OUR COUNCIL HAS CONTINUED TO EXPRESS THIS  
SAME OPINION TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES, WHO HAVE SHOWN  
GREAT COMPREHENSION FOR THE POSITION OF THE



British TELECOM

for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram

for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

British TELECOM

PAGE3/50

BRITISH COMMUNITY AND ITS INSTITUTIONS, A STAND WHICH ALSO REFLECTS THE FEELINGS OF THE PUBLIC AS A WHOLE TOWARDS THEM. WE MAY ADD, THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS, ONLY A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF BRITISH RESIDENTS HAVE LEFT ARGENTINA. FOLLOWING THE TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE EXPERIENCED SO FAR. THERE

PAGE4/50

IS A GROWING FEELING OF IDIGNATION IN THIS COUNTRY WHICH IS SERVING TO UNITE ARGENTINA AND PREPARING IT TO FACE THE ALTERNATIVES OF AB E E E OF A BITTER STRUGGLE, WHATEVER ITS OUTCOME. IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO SEEK RECONCILIATION AND WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY THAT BRITAIN, ARGENTINA,

PAGE5/38

THE ISLANDERS AND INDEED THE FREE WORLD MAY HOPE TO PROSPER IN THE FUTURE. PLEASE BE GUIDED BY GOD THE CREATOR OF LIFE IN ALL YOUR E E E ALL YOUR DECISIONS.

G. T. MURCHISON CHAIRMAN BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL IN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

SENT 0230/7 ADA  
OSEAGRAM LN LFTD  
889113 PO SW G



enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

British

TELECOM

for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram

for



*Press Office*

*W.H. G.J.*

News of Argentine rejection of the Peruvian proposals has leaked in Washington, and the FCO News Department are being inundated with inquiries. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has just agreed that the following on the record quotation should be released:-

"I am deeply disappointed that Argentine intransigence has once again frustrated a constructive initiative. Had they genuinely wanted peace, they would have accepted the latest proposals put to them, and we could have had a ceasefire in place by 5 p.m. tomorrow".



EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

London, 6 May 1982

*Dear Mr. Coles*

With reference to my communication of 20 April 1982 addressed to Her Excellency the Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, I would be very grateful if you could kindly hand her over the autograph letter of President José López-Portillo whose contents were translated in the aforementioned communication.

*Yours sincerely*  
*José Juan de Ollóqui*

Dr. José Juan de Ollóqui,  
Ambassador

Mr. J.A. Coles,  
Private Secretary,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, SW1



76 MAY 1982



CONGRUO

EMBRYOLOGY DE MEXICO





PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SUBJECT.

SERIAL No. .... T 80/82

JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO

PRESIDENTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS

Palacio Nacional, a 15 de abril de 1982.

cc. Text at  
of

Estimada señora Primera Ministra:

Agradezco su atenta carta del 8 del presente, en la que usted me conunica los puntos de vista de su Gobierno respecto de la peligrosa situación que se ha presentado en las Islas Malvinas y sus dependencias por efecto de la ocupación que de ellas hicieron las fuerzas armadas argentinas.

Dentro del espíritu de amistad y comprensión a que usted alude, quiero darle respuesta.

Desde el día 2 de abril he seguido con honda preocupación el desarrollo del conflicto y el día 6 mi Gobierno fijó su posición condenando el uso de la fuerza como medio para dirimir las controversias internacionales y apoyando la resolución 502 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.

Al mismo tiempo, mi Gobierno recordó que México ha apoyado invariablemente los esfuerzos que ha hecho la República Argentina ante los foros internacionales para obtener el reconocimiento de sus derechos de soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas.

Sigo con atención

Excelentísima Señora  
Margaret Thatcher,  
Primera Ministra del Reino Unido  
de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte,  
Londres.





JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO

PRESIDENTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS

- 2 -

Sigo con atención los esfuerzos que se hacen para encontrar una solución diplomática al conflicto y prevenir nuevas hostilidades en torno a esas islas. Un enfrentamiento bélico entre la Gran Bretaña y la Argentina podría tener graves consecuencias no sólo para la concordia entre los países del continente sino también para la paz mundial.

Confío en que su Gobierno y el de la República Argentina harán todos los esfuerzos posibles para llegar, por la vía de la negociación, a un arreglo justo y honorable.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para renovar, señora Primera Ministra, el testimonio de mi más alta consideración y de mi personal amistad.



OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>FLASH</b>
--	--	---	-----------------------------------

ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 3RS 2 GRS  
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO 061215Z MAY 82  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
 10 REPEATED IMMEDIATE LIMA  
 11 YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 660: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON  
 12 FALKLANDS  
 13 1. The scene of diplomatic activity may now shift inexorably  
 14 to the UN. I want both to improve our stance in New York and  
 15 to do nothing to undermine such chances as the Peruvian/US  
 16 initiative may still have. I am inclined to instruct you to  
 17 deliver to the Secretary-General later today the reply in MIFT,  
 18 subject to developments concerning the Peruvian/US proposals. *If*  
 19 ~~the~~ those proposals pick up momentum again during the day,  
 20 I may send you a different reply to deliver to the Secretary  
 21 General.  
 22 3. Grateful for your immediate comments. Please would  
 23 Washington inform Haig of these contingency instructions.  
 24  
 25 PYM

**NNNN**

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept PLANNING	Distribution Limited HD/SAmD HD/DEF D HD/PLANNING STAFF HD/UND PS PS/MR HURD PS/MR ONSLOW PS/PUS MR GIFFARD MR WRIGHT MR GILLMORE MR URE
Drafted by (Block capitals) C L G MALLABY		COPIES TO PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL PS/HOME SECRETARY PS/S OF S DEFENCE PS/CHANCELLOR (TREAS SUR
Telephone number 233 4333		PS/CHANCELLOR (DUCHY OF LANCASTER PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG PS/SIR M PALLISER MR WADE-GERY) CABINET MR FULLER ) OFFICE DIO )
Authorised for despatch <i>LM</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby FLASH
--	--	--	----------------------------

CZC  
IRS  
LASS  
AVEATS  
ESKBY  
MFCO  
RE/ADD  
ELNO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
4  
5  
6 FM FCO 061215Z MAY 82  
7 TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON  
10 REPEATED IMMEDIATE LIMA  
11 MIPT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON FALKLANDS  
12 Following is draft reply to Secretary-General:  
13 As you know I have been considering very carefully the ideas  
14 about the Falkland Islands which you put to me in New York  
15 last weekend. I accept the general approach embodied in your  
16 ideas. Indeed the elements for a solution which you mention  
17 are close to those which have been the basis of Britain's  
18 efforts for a negotiated settlement since the present crisis  
19 started in early April.  
20 2. Your ideas were naturally stated briefly and in general  
21 terms. I should like in this reply to explain the British  
22 position and offer comments on the elements needed for a  
23 settlement. I think you will see that our views are fully  
24 compatible with yours.  
25 3. I must first reiterate that the present crisis has arisen

///  
//  
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword because
File number	Dept Planning	Distribution LIMITED HD/SAMD HD/DEF D HD/PLANNING STAFF HD/UND
Drafted by (Block capitals) C L G MALLABY		COPIES TO: PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL PS/HOME SECRETARY PS/S OF S DEFENCE PS/CHANCELLOR (TREASURY)
Telephone number 233 4333		PS/CHANCELLOR(DUCHY OF LANCASTER) PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG PS/SIR M PALLISER
Authorised for despatch		PS/PUS MR GIFFARD MR WRIGHT MR GILLMORE MR URE
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	MR WADE-GERY ) CABINET MR FULLER ) OFFICE DIO )



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
2

<<<<

1 <<<<  
 2 because Argentina illegally used force to prosecute a claim,  
 3 to the Falkland Islands when active negotiations were already  
 4 in progress. The United Nations Security Council, in its  
 5 mandatory Resolution No 502 which my government at once  
 6 accepted, set out more than a month ago the requirements for  
 7 ending the crisis. It remains imperative that this resolution  
 8 be implemented without delay.  
 9 4. In order to bring about this implementation, and to avoid  
 10 further bloodshed, Britain is willing to accept and immediately  
 11 implement an interim agreement which would prepare the way for  
 12 a definitive settlement.  
 13 5. Such an interim agreement could provide for a ceasefire to  
 14 come into effect as soon as possible after Britain and  
 15 Argentina had stated formally in writing that they accepted the  
 16 interim agreement. Instructions for a ceasefire could be  
 17 issued immediately after conclusion of that agreement, to come  
 18 into effect as soon as both parties could guarantee compliance  
 19 by their forces.  
 20 6. But such a ceasefire cannot simply leave Argentina in  
 21 illegal occupation of the Islands, in contravention of  
 22 resolution 502 and with the ability to continue to build up the  
 23 occupation forces. Implementation of the ceasefire must  
 24 therefore be unambiguously linked to the commencement of  
 25 Argentine withdrawal, which as you recognise is the priority  
 26 element in any agreement. Withdrawal would be completed  
 27 within a fixed number of days. The British forces would stand  
 28 off at a reasonable distance from the Falkland Islands, thus  
 29 providing mutual withdrawal of the forces of both sides.  
 30 7. After mutual withdrawal, the two sides would suspend the  
 31 exclusion zones now in force. Steps would be taken to lift the  
 32 economic sanctions introduced in connection with the present  
 33 crisis.  
 34 8. As regards the transitional arrangements, the United

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

Kingdom

XY 48 A



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Page  
3

<<<<

1 <<<<

2 Kingdom would be prepared to accept an interim administration  
3 of the Islands, to be undertaken by a Contact Group of a small  
4 number of states other than Britain and Argentina, which would  
5 act in consultation with the elected representatives of the  
6 population of the Islands. The same Contact Group could verify  
7 the withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and the non-return of  
8 forces pending a definitive settlement.

9 9. Britain would be ready with Argentina to acknowledge the  
10 existence of different and conflicting views regarding the  
11 status of the Falkland Islands. We would be willing to engage  
12 in negotiations, without prejudice, for a definitive agreement  
13 on the status of the Islands and to accept a target date -  
14 perhaps one year later - for conclusion of an agreement which  
15 would accord with the wishes of the Islanders. We should be  
16 willing to accept that the Contact Group mentioned above should  
17 have a role in relation to these negotiations.

18 10. I believe that the views that I have expressed accord fully  
19 with your own ideas. Indeed they have the effect of  
20 amplifying your suggestions. Let me conclude by repeating that  
21 the United Kingdom stands ready to consider all constructive  
22 suggestions for a United Nations role in future arrangements  
23 concerning the Falkland Islands.

24

25 PYM

26 NNNN

27

28

29

30

/// 31

// 32

/ 33

34

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword



file

SSP

6 May 1982

e

Thank you for your letter of  
6 May enclosing the signed version of  
the letter of 15 April from the  
President of Mexico to the Prime  
Minister.

RECEIVED

His Excellency Dr. Jose Juan de Olloqui.



BELIZE/GUATEMALA

ADVANCE COPIES

14

8A

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

DIO CABINET OFFICE

HD/MCAD

HD/S AM D

HD/DEF D

HD/NEWS D

HD/UND

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

FM BELMOPAN 061800Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 173 OF 6 MAY 1982

AND TO WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 110.

~~YOUR~~ BRITISH GARRISON

1. I DELIVERED THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRICE THIS MORNING. I CAUGHT HIM AS HE WAS ABOUT TO DEPART FOR COSTA RICA TO ATTEND THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION AND MY CALL WAS NECESSARILY VERY SHORT. HE WAS CLEARLY GRATIFIED BY OUR AGREEMENT TO AN EXTENSION. HE DID NOT COMMENT ON THE LENGTH OF THIS THOUGH I NOTICED THAT HIS FINGER RESTED ON THE PHRASE QUOTE AT THIS STAGE UNQUOTE. HE ALSO FOCUSED WITH APPROVAL ON THE FINAL SENTENCE.
2. I REMINDED THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION ON ANY MATTER RELATING TO GUATEMALA THAT MIGHT AFFECT BRITISH FORCES IN BELIZE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT WE NOW HAD A GOOD UNDERSTANDING ON THE BASIS OF OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION (MY TELNO 162).
3. I RAISED THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE COMMONWEALTH TRAINING TEAM, SPEAKING AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 103. PRICE SAID THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES BUT WAS SURE THEY WOULD AGREE WITH HIM THAT THE OFFER SHOULD BE TAKEN UP SINCE SUCH



SPEAKING AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 103. PRICE SAID THAT HE  
DISCUSS THIS WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES BUT WAS SURE THEY WOULD  
AGREE WITH HIM THAT THE OFFER SHOULD BE TAKEN UP SINCE SUCH  
COMMONWEALTH ASSISTANCE WOULD BE A VERY VALUABLE ADDITION TO OUR  
OWN EFFORTS AND THE HELP EXPECTED FROM THE AMERICANS. HE SAW ITS  
VALUE AS MUCH IN PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PRESENTATIONAL AS IN MILITARY  
TERMS.

FCO PASS WASHINGTON

TREW

NNNN

SENT/RECD 47E/5. +000

EDP

FIRST LINE YOUR TEL ???? TO BRITISH GARRISON PSE

YOUR TELNO 110: BRITISH



RESTRICTED

3728 - 2

OO BRASILIA DESKBY 061600Z

GRS 110

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 060930Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 100 OF 6 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 156: BRAZILIAN REACTIONS

1. YOUR PARAGRAPH 1. PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HAS ALSO SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TEXT AS FOLLOWS.

QUOTE. DISTRESSED BY THE SACRIFICE OF HUMAN LIVES, WHICH IS PARTICULARLY FELT WHEN IT AFFECTS TWO FRIENDLY PEOPLES. I BEG YOU TO ACCEPT THE EXPRESSION OF MY SYMPATHY FOR THE CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM THE ATTACK ON 'SHEFFIELD' AS WELL AS MY FERVENT WISHES THAT THE PARTIES SHALL SUCCEED IN FINDING A WAY OF HONOURABLY PUTTING AN END TO VIOLENCE. HIGHEST CONSIDERATIONS. UNQUOTE.

PYM

DISTRIBUTION

STANDARD

SAMD

EMERGENCY UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS





258  
8

10 DOWNING STREET

e

*From the Private Secretary*

6 May 1982

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister sent to President Reagan on 5 May about the Falkland Islands problem. I should be grateful if you, and the other recipients of this letter, would not circulate it beyond Private Offices.

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



755 H.  
DESPATCHED AT 052450 LOCAL

SECRET

Message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan

Dear Ron,

My Cabinet colleagues and I spent some four hours earlier today considering Al Haig's latest proposals. Francis Pym has replied on our behalf, but I am writing to you separately because I think you are the only person who will understand the significance of what I am trying to say.

Throughout my administration I have tried to stay loyal to the United States as our great ally, and to the principles of democracy, liberty and justice for which both our countries stand.

In your message you say that your suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect. But the present rulers of the Argentine will not respect those principles, and I fear deeply that if a settlement based on your suggestions is eventually achieved, we shall find that in the process of negotiation democracy and freedom for the Falkland Islanders will have been compromised.

Above all, the present proposals do not provide unambiguously for a right to self-determination, although it is fundamental to democracy and was enjoyed by the Islanders up to the moment of invasion. We asked you earlier that it should be included explicitly.

/ Al Haig's



Al Haig's reply was that it could not, because the Argentines would not accept it and there would therefore be no hope of a settlement. This has given me and my colleagues very great difficulty. This is why I have tried to temper Al Haig's latest proposals a little by suggesting that the interim administration must at least consult with the locally elected representatives. It is not much to ask - and I do not think that you will turn it down.

I too want a peaceful settlement and an end to the mounting loss of life in the South Atlantic. I also believe that the friendship between the United States and Britain matters very much to the future of the free world. That is why, with the changes Francis Pym has suggested to Al Haig, we are ready, with whatever misgivings, to go along with your latest proposals. Assuming that they are accepted by the Argentines, then during the negotiation period that will follow we shall have to fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders who have been so loyal to everything in which you and we believe.

Warm personal regards,

Margaret



[TYPISTS (a.a.)]

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(33) (33)

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/MR. HURD  
PS/MR. ONSLOW  
PS/FUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/JND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS 760  
RESIDENT CLERK  
HD/SED

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWTIN } TREASURY  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }  
MR McINTIRE }

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MADRID 061618Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 252 OF 6 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: ALLEGATIONS ABOUT SPANISH SUPPLY OF ARMS TO ARGENTINA.

1. ONE OF TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS (DIARIO 16) CLAIMS THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT IS STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO ARGENTINA.

2. THE PERMANENT SECRETARY OF THE MFA RANG ME THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT THIS ALLEGATION WAS TOTALLY FALSE AND THAT SPAIN HAD NO (REPEAT NO) INTENTION OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO ARGENTINA.

PARSONS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 06/1622Z PJ/CS



7a

GRS 245

SECRET

SECRET

FM FCO 061045Z MAY 82

TO FLASH LIMA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 6 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT : FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT FOR HANDING TO PERUVIANS :

BEGINS

DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS

1. AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, CONCURRENT WITH:
2. MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND NON-REINTRODUCTION OF ALL FORCES, ACCORDING TO A SCHEDULE TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE CONTACT GROUP.
3. THE IMMEDIATE INTRODUCTION OF A CONTACT GROUP COMPOSED OF BRAZIL, PERU, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES INTO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON A TEMPORARY BASIS PENDING AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT. THE CONTACT GROUP WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR :

- A) VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL:
- B) ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS AND ENSURING THAT NO ACTIONS ARE TAKEN IN THE ISLANDS WHICH WOULD CONTRAVENE THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT: AND
- C) ENSURING THAT ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE RESPECTED.

4. BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERING AND CONFLICTING VIEWS REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

5. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS.

6. THE CONTACT GROUP WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REACH A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT PRIOR TO APRIL 30, 1983.

ENDS

PYM

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR	}	TREASURY
SIR K COUZENS		
MR LITTLER		
MR HAWTIN		
MR PERETZ		
MR ILETT		


SIR M PALMER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

SECRET





FROM THE RT.HON. JULIAN AMERY MP

John Nott

112, ALTON SQUARE

WIMBORNE

TEL. 01235 543  
01-235 7409

R.E.

6th May, 1982.

*Margaret Thatcher*

I was in Gibraltar on Tuesday and Wednesday to address the AGM of the Gibraltar European Movement and had talks on both days with Sir Joshua Hassan, Mr. Isola and a number of their colleagues.

Though they are very concerned over the future of the dockyard and the problems of the Gibraltar economy if the frontier should open, their overriding anxiety was related to the Falkland Islands crisis. They were convinced that if we made any concession to the Argentinians on the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands the chances of getting Spain to accept our long established policy that there would be no change of sovereignty over Gibraltar without the agreement of the inhabitants would be fatally prejudiced.

I am copying this letter to Francis Pym and John Nott.

*Julian Amery*  
Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP



GRS 170

CONFIDENTIAL

FM THE HAGUE #61530Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 107 OF 6 MAY

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS BRUSSELS UKRP BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN ROME  
DUBLIN BONN PARIS WASHINGTON

6 MAY 1982

165

10 11 12 1 2 3  
9 8 7 6

*[Handwritten signature]*

PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 417: FALKLANDS

1. VAN DER STOEL READ YOUR MESSAGE (YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 217 TO PARIS) BEFORE HE ANSWERED QUESTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTARIES ON THE FALKLANDS IN THE SECOND CHAMBER THIS MORNING (6 MAY). HE REBUTTED CRITICISMS OF OUR POLICIES AND MADE THE POINTS IN MIFT. HE FAVOURED CONTINUATION OF THE COMMUNITY'S ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA.

2. WHEN I SAW VAN DER STOEL THIS AFTERNOON AT THE COURT OF ARBITRATION, I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE DOING EXACTLY WHAT HE APPEARED TO BE ADVOCATING IN PARIS, AS REPORTED BY AFP. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT SO FAR THE ARGENTINES HAD FAILED TO RESPOND. THEY HAD NOT TAKEN EVEN A FIRST STEP TO SHOW THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WAYS OF IMPLEMENTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502. VAN DER STOEL REPLIED THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY WORRIED BY DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE WEEKEND, BUT HE HAD DEFENDED THE BRITISH POSITION IN THE SECOND CHAMBER THIS MORNING. AFTER THESE EXCHANGES HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY SEVERAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, WHO HAD ASKED HIM WHY HE HAD BEEN DEFENDING OUR POSITION SO ROBUSTLY.

MANSFIELD

NNNN

PARA 2 LINE 7 SHD TREAD " THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY....."



PS (6)  
 PS/MR HURD  
 MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE  
 HD/PUSD  
 HD/S AM D  
 HD/DEF DEPT  
 HD/NEWS DEPT  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
 EMERGENCY ROOM  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 SIR K COUZENS ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
 MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
 DIO )

GRS 360  
 RESTRICTED  
 FM BRASILIA 071305Z MAY 82  
 TO PRIORITY FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 6 MAY  
 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 156: FALKLANDS: BRAZILIAN POSITION

1. AS FORECAST IN PARA 3 OF TUR, FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY DEFENDED IN THE SENATE THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE FALKLANDS CRISIS.

2. GUERREIRO ENDURED THREE HOURS OF POLITE GRILLING BY THE ASSEMBLED SENATORS, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE MADE THE FOLLOWING SALIENT POINTS:

(A) SINCE 1833, WHEN BRITAIN OCCUPIED THE MALVINAS (SIC)



- (A) SINCE 1833, WHEN BRITAIN OCCUPIED THE MALVINAS (SIC) BY FORCE, EXPELLING THE ARGENTINE GOVERNOR, BRAZIL HAD CONSTANTLY SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE CLAIM. SINCE THAT DATE, THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY ARBITRATION, JUDICIAL SENTENCE OR INTERNATIONAL TREATY WHICH GAVE JURIDICAL VALIDITY TO THE BRITISH OCCUPATION.
- (B) BRAZIL'S PRINCIPAL PREOCCUPATION WAS TO REVERSE THE PRESENT ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE AND TRY TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING IN A SPIRIT OF CONCILIATION AND JUSTICE. SHE HAD NEVER HAD ANY ASPIRATION TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR IN THIS CONFLICT OR TO SEEK TO EXERCISE ANY KIND OF CONTINENTAL LEADERSHIP. SHE WOULD TRY TO MAKE HERSELF USEFUL, BUT NO MORE THAN THAT.
- (C) THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THE UNITED NATIONS THE BEST INSTRUMENT FOR SECURING A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. THE THREE ELEMENTS OF SCR 502 (VIZ CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS) MUST ALL BE FULFILLED IN THEIR ENTIRETY.
- (D) BRAZIL'S POSITION SHOULD BE SEEN IN A LONG TERM CONTEXT AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXCEPTIONAL DEGREE OF DIALOGUE WHICH SHE HAD REACHED WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, BY DINT OF OVERCOMING LONG-STANDING RESENTMENTS. HER POSITION HAD TO BE ONE WHICH REFLECTED HER PREOCCUPATION WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN REGION OF WHICH SHE FORMED A PART, AS WELL AS HER EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS ALSO A FRIENDLY COUNTRY WITH WHOM BRAZIL HAD NOT THE SLIGHTEST POINT OF DIFFERENCE, RATHER THE CONTRARY.
- (E) ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES, IT WAS ITAMARATY'S PRACTICE NOT TO MAKE STATEMENTS ABOUT THEM. BUT HE COULD GUARANTEE THAT THE GUIDELINE ADOPTED BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WAS THAT ANY SALES SHOULD NOT CREATE DISEQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE CONFLICTING PARTIES.
- (F) THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WAS OPPOSED TO THE UNITED STATES' DECISION TO SUPPORT BRITAIN AND ADOPT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. IT HAD UNDOUBTEDLY DAMAGED THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, WHICH COULD NEVER BE QUITE THE SAME AGAIN. THOUGH IT WAS NOT



AND MILITARY SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. IT HAD UNDOUBTEDLY DAMAGED THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, WHICH COULD NEVER BE QUITE THE SAME AGAIN, THOUGH IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE THAT IT WOULD FALL APART.

3. THOUGH SUBJECTED TO SOME FAIRLY TRENCHANT QUESTIONING, PARTICULARLY ON THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S EVIDENT TILT TOWARDS ARGENTINA, GUERREIRO GAVE A GOOD ACCOUNT OF HIMSELF AND BY THE END OF THE SESSION APPEARED TO HAVE WON THE UNDERSTANDING, IF NOT THE SUPPORT, OF MOST SENATORS.

4. THIS WAS A CAUTIOUS VENTURE IN THE DIRECTION OF MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF A KIND WHICH BRAZIL HAS SCARCELY SEEN SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF 1964. INsofar AS IT IS LIKELY TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT MORE SENSITIVE TO PARLIAMENTARY OPINION, WHICH SEEMS MARGINALLY FAVOURABLE TO US IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT, THE OUTCOME WAS SATISFACTORY.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT AT 07:1453Z HM



TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30x20) (32)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

D/B 061700Z  
(rec'd 1655Z)

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D E/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTHIN ) TREASURY  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (HIP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPP/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 061700Z

FM UKMIS GENEVA 061600Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 217 OF 6 MAY 1982

INFO BERNE, MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON, BRASILIA

YOUR TELNO 143: REPATRIATION OF POWS

1. ADAMS CALLED ON ICRC TODAY TO DISCUSS THEIR VISIT TO ASCENSION ISLAND. THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED DETAILS FROM THE BRITISH RED CROSS.

2. HOCKE SAID THAT ICRC GLADLY ACCEPTED THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED. THE TEAM OF TWO DELEGATES PLUS A DOCTOR (NAMES TO BE NOTIFIED TO US ON 7 MAY) WOULD ALL BE EXPERIENCED VISITORS OF POWS AND WOULD ARRIVE IN LONDON IN TIME TO LEAVE FOR ASCENSION ON NIGHT OF 8/9 MAY. ICRC ASKED THAT TWO OF THE TEAM SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE PRISONERS FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE JOURNEY. THEY WOULD PREFER THE THIRD TO GO AS WELL IF POSSIBLE.

3. HOCKE ASKED IF THE INJURED SAILOR AND THE BODY OF THE DEAD ARGENTINIAN WERE ON THE SHIP. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO RETURN THE BODY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.



3. HOCHE ASKED IF THE INJURED SAILOR AND THE BODY OF THE DEAD ARGENTINIAN WERE ON THE SHIP. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO RETURN THE BODY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

4. PASQUIER ASKED IF WE HAD CONSIDERED USING A CHARTERED AIRCRAFT, WITH RED CROSS MARKINGS, TO TAKE THE PRISONERS ON FROM ASCENSION. ICRC WOULD PREFER THIS. THE NEUTRALITY OF SUCH AN AIRCRAFT WOULD BE IN NO DOUBT AND SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD SOLVE ANY DIFFICULTIES OVER THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF THE PLANE. HE THOUGHT HE COULD ARRANGE SUCH AN AIRCRAFT WITHIN 48 HOURS IF WE WISHED. HE MENTIONED THE DUTCH CHARTER COMPANY, MARTINAIR. ADAMS UNDERTOOK TO SEEK YOUR VIEWS.

5. HOCHE WONDERED WHETHER ICRC OR BRITISH RED CROSS WOULD PROVIDE ITEMS SUCH AS FOOD, CLOTHES ETC, TO THE PRISONERS ON ASCENSION. THIS WAS A MATTER OF PRESENTATION. IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL BOTH FOR THE UK AND ICRC IF THE PRISONERS LOOKED WELL CARED FOR WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN A THIRD COUNTRY AND EVEN MORE IMPORTANT WHEN THEY REACHED ARGENTINA.

6. PASQUIER POINTED OUT THAT THE ICRC TEAM'S REPORTS ON THEIR INSPECTION OF THE PRISONERS WOULD ISSUE SOON IN DUPLICATE TO US AND THE ARGENTINIANS. THESE REPORTS WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL AND ICRC WOULD NOT (NOT) WISH THEM TO BE PUBLISHED.

7. HOCHE ASKED WHEN THEY COULD LET THE ARGENTINIANS KNOW OF THE ICRC TRIP TO ASCENSION. THE ARGENTINE MISSION HERE WAS PRESSING THEM HARD AFTER SEEING PRESS REPORTS THAT THE PRISONERS HAD LEFT SOUTH GEORGIA. SO FAR ICRC HAD SAID NOTHING.

8. ICRC ARE STILL ANXIOUS TO PUT A TEAM ON THE FALKLANDS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINIANS ARE CONTINUING. THEY WOULD PREFER TO SAIL FROM AN ARGENTINIAN PORT SO SAVING TIME WHICH WOULD BE LOST NEGOTIATING WITH A THIRD COUNTRY. PASQUIER THOUGHT THAT THE BEST TIME TO TRAVEL WOULD BE DURING AN OFFICIAL CEASE FIRE. THEY ARE AWARE OF MOD'S NEED FOR SAILING DETAILS AND 36 HOUR NOTICE. (YOUR TELNO 110 ). THEY WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE BOAT BEING CHECKED AT SEA.

MARSHALL

NNNN

CCRN PARA 2 LINE 1 SHOULD READ

2. HOCHE SAID THAT ICRC GLADLY ETC ETC ETC





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 May 1982

*This note - contains  
my fears.*

*Prime Minister*

*To be aware.*

*A.C.C. 7/5.*

*H.A. 10/5*

*Dear John,*

Falkland Dependencies

I understand that at ODSA this morning the question was raised whether the three UN General Assembly resolutions which have been passed on the Falklands cover the Dependencies.

We have looked carefully at the resolutions. They refer only to the Falkland Islands and do not explicitly mention the Dependencies. Moreover, the lists of non-self-governing territories compiled by General Assembly Committees in 1946 and subsequently in 1964 referred exclusively to the "Falkland Islands". However, the report on the Falkland Islands by the Special Committee on Decolonisation which was referred to in the 1965 General Assembly resolution did include factual data on both the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies, and references were made in the Special Committee's debate to both. But the "conclusions and recommendations" section of the Committee's report did not refer to the Dependencies explicitly and we argued that they did not relate to the Dependencies in a Note which we sent to Argentina on 1 November 1965.

We are not confident that the majority of Member States would support a narrow reading of the strict words of the Resolutions, since this would imply that the General Assembly, having been seized of information about both the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies, consciously intended to adopt decisions excluding the latter from their general scope, notwithstanding the existence of a UK/Argentine sovereignty dispute over all of them.

We ourselves could however certainly argue that the Resolutions cannot be read as dealing with the Dependencies. And of course it remains the case that we did not support any of these Resolutions when they were adopted, that no General Assembly is binding and that we have consistently

/maintained





maintained that the General Assembly is not entitled to consider territorial disputes or questions of sovereignty.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, Defence Secretary, Paymaster General, Attorney General, Sir Robert Armstrong and to Sir Michael Palliser.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPY

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(32)

(36)

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR UPE  
MR GILLMORE

Mr Bullard  
Mr Hamray

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/ORD  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

~~ASSISTANT CLERK~~

HD(EGD)(E)

Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTHIN )  
MR PERETZ )  
MR ILETT )  
MR MCINTYRE )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (HEP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR MADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPD/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM DUBLIN 061100Z MAY 1982.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 133 OF 06 MAY.

AND TO IMMEDIATE INFO PARIS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, THE HAGUE, UKREP BRUSSELS, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, OSLO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 216 TO PARIS: FALKLANDS: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER.

1. I WAS DUE TO SEE THE TAOISEACH AT HIS REQUEST AT 11 O'CLOCK THIS MORNING AND THOUGHT IT RIGHT THAT I SHOULD DELIVER YOUR MESSAGE AS IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF YOUR TELNO 217 TO PARIS TO HIM PERSONALLY. I LEFT A COPY WITH HIS OFFICE.

2. MR HAUGHEY ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THE IRISH INITIATIVE IN NEW YORK AS ONLY TRYING TO BE HELPFUL. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE NOW HOLDING THEIR HAND IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST. HOWEVER, THEY WERE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IF THEY WERE NOT SIMPLY TO BEHAVE LIKE SHEEP THEY FELT IT RIGHT THAT, WITH SUCH A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE, THEY OUGHT TO TAKE SOME ACTION IN VIEW



A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE, THEY OUGHT TO TAKE SOME ACTION IN VIEW OF THE FAILURE OF SECRETARY HAIG'S EFFORTS. THE FIGHTING HAD ESCALATED AND SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE. I SAID THAT, AS I HAD EXPLAINED TWO DAYS AGO, ACTION IN A FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD INEVITABLY DAMAGE THE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT PRESENT GOING ON ON TWO SEPERATE CHANNELS. MOREOVER, THERE HAD BEEN NO HOSTILITIES OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS. WE WERE DOING ALL WE COULD TO GET SOME NEGOTIATIONS GOING AND WE WOULD BE RESPONDING TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE IN A POSITIVE WAY, PERHAPS TODAY.

3. ON THE IMPORT BAN, HE SAID THAT IT SEEMED THAT THE ECONOMIC MEASURES NOW SEEMED TO BE IN SECOND PLACE TO MILITARY OPERATIONS. THIS DID NOT SQUARE WITH IRELAND'S NEUTRAL POLICY. I SAID THAT IT WAS QUITE WRONG TO LOOK AT THE ECONOMIC MEASURES LIKE THIS AND I QUOTED FROM YOUR MESSAGE. I WENT OVER AGAIN THE SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE GOING ON AND SAID THAT WE HOPED HOSTILITIES WOULD NOT START AGAIN. IN THIS SITUATION IT COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE HELD THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE DOMINANT. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT AT LAST THAT WE WERE IN EARNEST ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS AND ON THE QUESTION OF THE IMPORT BAN HE SAID THAT IRELAND WOULD WHEN IT WAS DUE TO BE RECONSIDERED ON 17 MAY GO ALONG WITH A CONSENSUS. SHE WOULD NOT TAKE ANY UNILATERAL STANCE. I SAID I WAS GLAD TO HEAR IT AND WOULD REPORT IT AT ONCE.

4. MR HAUGHEY DID NOT GO FURTHER AND SAY WHAT THEIR FUTURE POLICY MIGHT BE AT THE UN, BUT AS HE TWICE SAID THAT THEY WERE RESPONDING TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST NOT TO DO ANY MORE, I SHOULD THINK THEY WILL BE QUIET FOR THE TIME BEING.

5. I AM REPORTING SEPERATLY (NOT TO ALL) ON THE REST OF OUR TALK WHICH RANGED WIDELY OVER ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS.

FIGG.

NNNNNM

SENT/RECD AT 061210Z HMT/ ~~SECRET~~CEM



TYPISTS

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

32  
~~(30)~~

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

IMMEDIATE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

ADVANCE COPY

GRPS 350  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM BRUSSELS 061600Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 164 OF 06 MAY  
INFO PRIORITY EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 217: FALKLANDS - RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS:  
MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. IN MR TINDEMANS' ABSENCE IN CAIRO I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO HIM TO ONE OF HIS ASSISTANT CHEFS DE CABINET THIS AFTERNOON. VAN DER ESPT SAID TINDEMANS WAS DUE BACK LATER TODAY (THURSDAY). YOUR MESSAGE WOULD BE HANDED TO HIM AS SOON AS HE ARRIVED.
2. HAVING READ IT, VAN DER ESPT SAID THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT TINDEMANS WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE COMMUNITY UNITY AND THE RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS, AS HIS TELEPHONE CALL TO MR HURD EARLIER THIS WEEK HAD UNDERLINED. HE MENTIONED THE QUOTE STRONG UNQUOTE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED THIS MORNING BY THE EUROGROUP. VAN DER ESPT ALSO REFERRED HOWEVER TO THE APPARENT DOUBTS OF OTHERS, INSTANCING THE IRISH, DANES AND GREEKS.



THE IRISH, DANES AND GREEKS.

3. I QUESTIONED HIS REFERENCE TO THE GREEKS, SAYING THAT OUR OWN INDICATIONS ABOUT THEIR LIKELY ATTITUDE POINTED IN A MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION. I SAID THAT AS REGARDS THE DANES, THE SUGGESTION THAT RENEWAL REQUIRED UNANIMITY SO THAT IRISH OPPOSITION WOULD MEAN THAT THE EMBARGO LAPSED(COPENHAGEN TELNO 108) WAS APPARENTLY MISCONCEIVED. I STRESSED THE PASSAGE IN YOUR MESSAGE THAT COMMUNITY ACTION WAS POSSIBLE EVEN WITH ONE MEMBER STATE OPPOSING, AND SAID THAT WE WERE MAKING THIS POINT TO THE IRISH ALSO. WE HOPED THAT THE IRISH POSITION WOULD SOFTEN.

4. VAN DER ESPT SAID YOUR MESSAGE DID NOT PRESUMABLY REQUIRE AN IMMEDIATE REPLY, SINCE MR TINDEMANS WOULD NO DOUBT BE SEEING YOU IN VILLERS LE TEMPLE.

5. I CONTINUE TO THINK IN THIS CONNEXION THAT IT WOULD BE PROFITABLE FOR YOU TO TRY TO SEE TINDEMANS BILATERALLY BEFORE THE INFORMAL FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING BEGINS ON 8 MAY, FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN MT TELNO 162. ANY TIME YOU CAN MAKE FOR THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE WELL SPENT, NOT LEAST IN ORDER TO REINFORCE THE ASSURANCE IN YOUR EARLIER MESSAGE OF 4 MAY TO TINDEMANS THAT YOU WILL BE PLAYING YOUR PART IN THE SEARCH FOR ANEARLY AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE BUDGET ISSUES.

JACKSON

NNNN

SENT AT 061636Z AGP



[ TYPISTS ]  
(a.a.)

IMMEDIATE  
~~(30/2)~~ ~~(32)~~ ~~(33)~~ (34)

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/IND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS T60  
RESIDENT CLERK  
HD/WED  
HD/ECN(E)

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )  
MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EX  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO " "  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

### ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM PARIS 061715Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 430 OF 06 MAY 1982  
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK, ATJENS, BRUSSELS  
UKREP BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG ROME DUBLIN BONN

MY TELNO 427: FRENCH POLICY ON FALKLANDS  
1. WHEN I CALLED ON MAUROY THIS MORNING MUCH OF THE CONVERSATION WAS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE FALKLANDS. MAUROY TOOK THE SAME LINE AS GUTMANN YESTERDAY (MY TUR) ALTHOUGH IN MORE GENERAL TERMS. HE EMPHASISED THE DESIRABILITY OF A UK INITIATIVE TO HELP BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN. I POINTED OUT THE NEED NOT TO CONDONE OR REWARD THE ARGENTINE AGRESSION. MAUROY SAID HE FULLY ACCEPTED THIS AND REITERATED THAT THE FRENCH POSITION, AS LAID DOWN BY THE PRESIDENT, WAS ONE OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE UK. FRANCE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF PUBLIC OPINION WHICH HAD REACTED STRONGLY TO THE ESCALATION OF FIGHTING BUT THIS DID NOT AFFECT BASIC FRENCH POLICY.  
FRETWELL.



CONFIDENTIAL

3827 - 2

ZZ WASHINGTON

ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 298

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 061545Z MAY 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 925 OF 6 MAY

INFO TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK AND FLASH LIMA

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS

YOUR TELNO 1630: FALKLANDS

1. HAIG RANG ME AT 1330Z. HE WAS AS DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW AS EVER. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO YOU AND THAT YOU WOULD REPORT THE CONVERSATION BUT THAT HE WANTED TO TOUCH BASE PERSONALLY. HE HAD JUST SPOKEN TO BELAUNDE.

AS ANTICIPATED THE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN BY GALTIERI (HE PRESUMABLY MEANT THAT GALTIERI HAD TOLD THE PERUVIANS AS MUCH). THE ARGENTINES WERE NOW MOVING TO THE UN AND THAT WAS THE END OF THAT. THE ARGENTINES WOULD NO DOUBT AIM FOR A SIMPLE CEASE-FIRE. THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE AND HE HAD INSTRUCTED MRS KIRKPATRICK THAT THE US AIM SHOULD BE A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL AND CEASE-FIRE. HE ADDED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT WE SHOULD PAY VERY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THE FIRST POINT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TEXT SINCE IT DID NOT EXACTLY SAY THAT.

HAIG CONTINUED THAT HE WAS SURE WE WOULD NOT BE TOTALLY NEGATIVE AT THE UN. I CONFIRMED THAT WE INTENDED TO GIVE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HAIG SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD TRY FOR A QUOTE QUICK AND DIRTY UNQUOTE. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE US AND BRITAIN WORK TOGETHER AT THE UN. MEANWHILE HE PROPOSED HIMSELF TO QUOTE COOL IT UNQUOTE.

2. I ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD OBJECT IF WE WERE TO PUBLISH THE PROPOSALS. HAIG SAID THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO DO SO HIMSELF BUT WOULD BE HAPPY FOR US TO GO AHEAD, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THAT THE PRESENT PROPOSALS WERE QUOTE NOT AS GOOD

CONFIDENTIAL



AS THE OTHER PROPOSAL UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT WE MIGHT GO  
PUBLIC LATER TODAY.

3. HAIG CONCLUDED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IN THE END THER PROBLEM  
WOULD COME BACK TO WASHINGTON AGAIN BECAUSE THE UN WOULD NOT BE  
ABLE TO RESOLVE THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED.  
WHICH EXISTED.

PYM



TYPISTS

TYPISTS

>

HAIG ADVANCES

PS	PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET	
PS/MR HURD	PS/S of S DEFENCE	
PS/MR ONSLOW		
PS/PUS	PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG	)
MR GIFFARD	PS/SIR M PALLISER	)
MR WRIGHT	MR WADE-GERY	) CABINET OFFICE
MR GILLMORE	MR FULLER	)
MR URE	D I O	)
HD/SAMD		
HD/DEFD		

ADVANCE COPY  
 IMMEDIATE

SECRET  
 FM WASHINGTON 061410Z MAY 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELEGRAM NO 1631 OF 6 MAY  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK

*ms*

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS TELEPHONED ME ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS IN NATO. A HEALTHY CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION. HE HAD HEARD TO HIS HORROR THAT SOME QUOTE CLOWN UNQUOTE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD SENT OUT INSTRUCTIONS CAUTIONING AGAINST TOO TOUGH LANGUAGE FOR FEAR THAT THIS MIGHT INTERFERE WITH THE PEACE PROCESS.

2. AS SOON AS HE HAD HEARD THIS, HAIG HAD COUNTERMANDED THE INSTRUCTION SAYING THAT THE US SHOULD GO ALONG WITH THE FIRMEST LANGUAGE POSSIBLE.

HENDERSON



00 UKMIS NEW YORK

00 LIMA

GPS 200

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 061400Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NO 1630 OF 6 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, LIMA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

OUR TEL NO 1629: FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS TELEPHONED THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THE PERUVIANS HAVE DEFINITELY TURNED DOWN THE PROPOSED US/PERUVIAN PLAN. THEY HAVE GIVEN AS THEIR REASON THE FACT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS ARE NOW GOING TO THE UN. HAIG TOLD ME THAT BELAUNDE HAD SPOKEN OF THE ARROGANCE OF THE MILITARY LEADERS IN BA WHOSE MILITARY CONFIDENCE WAS NOW SOARING AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK ON THE SHEFFIELD. THEIR AIM WOULD NOW BE TO ISOLATE THE UK AND GET A CEASEFIRE AT THE UN WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT ON WITHDRAWAL. HAIG SAID THAT THEY WERE A GANG OF BANDITS DOWN THERE AND HE HOPED THAT WHATEVER PRESS TALK THERE MIGHT BE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THERE WOULD BE NO DOUBT IN LONDON THAT THE USA WERE FOUR-SQUARE BEHIND US. BUT IT WAS GOING TO BE A DIFFICULT TIME, PARTICULARLY THE HANDLING OF THE UN OPERATION.

2. HE WAS INTENDING TO PLAY IT COOL IN WASHINGTON AND AVOID MUCH SIGN OF ACTIVITY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

3. HE THOUGHT THAT OUR BEST TACTICS NOW WERE TO TRY TO SEAL OFF THE ISLANDS. ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION THEY HAD EIGHT DAYS OF RATIONS BUT HE HAD EVIDENCE THAT SUPPLIES OF FOOD WERE GETTING THROUGH IN FREIGHTERS. HE THOUGHT THAT THIS SHOULD BE STOPPED.

HENDERSON

NNNN

=6 MAY



104

6



~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

[ TYPISTS A-A ]

(30/30)

FLASH

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR URE  
MR GILMORE

ADVANCE COPY

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)

ED/DEF D

ED/NEWS D

ED/ORD

ED/PLANNING STAFF

MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST

PS/S OF S FOR REFERENCE

PS/CHANCELLOR )

SIR K COUZENS )

MR LITTLER )

MR HAWKIN )

MR PERETZ )

MR ILETT )

MR MCINTYRE )

TREASURY

MISS DICKSON (HEP DIV) D/EN

DIO CABINET OFFICE

MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER SAFT/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

*me*

1410

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 061430Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 661 OF 6 MAY 1982

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE LIMA.

YOUR TELS NOS 355 AND 356: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON FALKLANDS.

1. SIR N HENDERSON HAS TOLD ME THAT THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS HAVE COLLAPSED. I ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO DELIVER OUR REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IMMEDIATELY. THIS WILL UPSTAGE THE ARGENTINIANS WHOSE REPLY CONSISTED ONLY OF AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DEMARCHE, A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, AND AN EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS DETAILS. I SHOULD ALSO GET OUR REPLY IN BEFORE COSTA MENDEZ ARRIVES HERE (WE HAVE NO IDEA WHETHER OR NOT HE HAS DECIDED TO LEAVE BUENOS AIRES).

2. I ONLY HAVE ONE MAJOR COMMENT ON THE TEXT ON YOUR TELNO 356.



2. I ONLY HAVE ONE MAJOR COMMENT ON THE TEXT ON YOUR TELNO 356. WE MUST PROTECT OURSELVES AGAINST THE MOUNTING PRESSURE ON US TO ACCEPT CALLS FOR UNQUALIFIED CEASE FIRES, CESSATIONS OF HOSTILITIES, MAXIMUM RESTRAINT ETC. THESE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE RENEWED AT THIS AFTERNOON'S SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS AND I INTEND TO STAND AS FIRM AS I DID YESTERDAY. OBVIOUSLY WE CANNOT ACCEPT CALLS FOR A CEASE FIRE, HOWEVER DISGUISED, UNLESS THEY ARE CLEARLY LINKED TO UNEQUIVOCAL ARGENTINIAN AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAWAL. EQUALLY AS I EXPLAINED IN WORDS OF ONE SYLLABLE TO THE COUNCIL YESTERDAY, IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICABLE AND UNREALISTIC TO AGREE TO SIMILARLY UNQUALIFIED APPEALS FOR MAXIMUM RESTRAINT. SUCH APPEALS COULD NOT BE REALISTICALLY TRANSLATED INTO ORDERS TO THE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. MY PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS THE ADDITION OF A FINAL SENTENCE AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH 3:

"YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT, UNTIL IT IS IMPLEMENTED, BRITAIN COULD NOT ACCEPT A CALL FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF INHIBITING ITS RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE AS RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER". A CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 "IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502 AND TO AVOID .....

3. I THINK THAT "MEASURES" WOULD BE BETTER THAN "SANCTIONS" IN PARA 7.

PARSONS

NNNN



1. YALISTS

PH 5

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(32)

PS  
PS/MR HIRD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/FUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
MR UPE  
MR GILLMORE

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (-)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWLIN )  
MR PERETZ ) TREASURY  
MR ILETT )  
MR McINTYRE )

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)  
ED/DEF D  
ED/NEWS D  
ED/ORD  
ED/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
RESIDENT CLERK

MISS DICKSON (EEP DIV) D/EN  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADD-GERY CABINET OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAP/DIO " "  
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

GR 1620

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

FM UKDEL NATO 061502Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 061602Z MAY  
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PRIORITY BONN ROME  
OSLO THE HAGUE

ADVANCE COPY

EURO-GROUP DINNER - THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THE DEFENCE SECRETARY BRIEFED HIS EURO-GROUP COLLEAGUES AT DINNER LAST NIGHT. MR NOTT REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE CRISIS, STARTING FROM THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND EMPHASISING THAT IT WAS ARGENTINA THAT FIRED THE FIRST SHOT. HE SAID THAT WE HAD USED THE TIME WHICH IT TOOK THE TASK FORCE TO SAIL TO THE AREA TO PURSUE ENERGETICALLY A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR US IN SUCH A SETTLEMENT WERE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWALT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 AND TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON WHICH WE WERE OTHERWISE FLEXIBLE AND WHICH WOULD NOT PREJUDGE THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. ONE DIFFICULTY HAD BEEN THE INCOHERENCE OF THE ARGENTINE BECAUSE WE HAD



AND WHICH WOULD NOT PREJUDGE THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. ONE DIFFICULTY HAD BEEN THE INCOHERENCE OF THE ARGENTINE REGIME. WE HAD BEEN DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO THE EC FOR THE ECONOMIC MEASURES TAKEN, WITHOUT WHICH THE ARGENTINES WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE BEEN WILLING EVEN TO TALK.

2. MR. NOTT THEN GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS SINCE 1 MAY, EMPHASISING THAT ARGENTINE ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS OBVIOUSLY CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO OUR SHIPS AND THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO WAIT AND ALLOW THE THREAT TO DEVELOP. IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT AUTHORITY HAD BEEN GIVEN FOR THE ATTACK ON THE ARGENTINE CRUISER. SUMMING UP, HE SAID THAT WE HAD NEVER CEASED TO TRY TO FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. WE KNEW THAT THERE MUST BE COMPROMISE AND THAT WE COULD NOT GO BACK TO THE NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINED STATUS QUO ANTE, BUT THE ARGENTINES MUST WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS. A SIMPLE CEASEFIRE WOULD MEAN THAT THE AGGRESSORS HAD WON WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND FOR THE PRINCIPLE WHICH WE WERE SUPPORTING.

3. THE NORWEGIAN DEFENCE MINISTER ASKED IF THE AIRFIELDS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WERE OUT OF ACTION. MR. NOTT CONFIRMED THIS, ADDING THAT AS A RESULT OF THEIR BEING TOTALLY CUT OFF WE EXPECTED THAT THE MORALE OF THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION FORCE IN THE ISLANDS WOULD SUFFER. WE HAD NOT ACHIEVED COMPLETE AIR SUPERIORITY BUT COULD MAKE OUR AIR BLOCKADE EFFECTIVE.

4. THE NETHERLANDS DEFENCE MINISTER ASKED IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO FORESEE FUTURE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. WOULD OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES JOIN ARGENTINA, AND WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR US AND WEST EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AMERICA. HE WAS AFRAID THAT WE WERE WITNESSING QUOTE A BREAK IN HISTORY UNQUOTE. MR. NOTT SAID THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THAT FEAR. ALTHOUGH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WOULD SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH ARGENTINA, THE EVIDENCE SO FAR SUGGESTED THAT THEY WOULD NOT TRANSLATE THAT INTO ACTION. WHEN WE ACHIEVED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE SOON, HE BELIEVED THAT EUROPEAN AND US RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA WOULD SOON BE BACK TO NORMAL. VAN MIERLO EMPHASISED THAT THE EFFECTS OF FURTHER ESCALATION COULD BE VERY SERIOUS. THERE WAS A LOT AT STAKE FOR THE UNITED STATES. AGREEING, MR. NOTT SAID THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO STOP TOMORROW BUT TO DO SO WOULD MERELY GIVE THE AGGRESSOR HIS SPOILS. WE RECOGNISED THAT THE FALKLANDS HAD NO ECONOMIC VALUE AND THAT IN A WAY THE WHOLE EPISODE MIGHT SEEM VERY MINOR, BUT THERE WAS A PRINCIPLE AND THERE WERE MANY OTHER ISLANDS. THE US WAS IN THE CENTRE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND HE WAS HOPEFUL OF A SETTLEMENT PERHAPS EVEN WITHIN A WEEK, BUT ONLY IF WE MAINTAINED THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE,



NEGOTIATIONS AND HE WAS HOPEFUL OF A SETTLEMENT PERHAPS EVEN WITHIN A WEEK, BUT ONLY IF WE MAINTAINED THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE, BOTH MILITARILY AND THROUGH EC ECONOMIC MEASURES.

5. THE FRG DEFENCE MINISTER SAID THAT HE WISHED TO ANALYSE THE SITUATION. EUROPEANS WERE OBLIGED AND WILLING TO GIVE BRITAIN THEIR SUPPORT. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS RIDICULOUS TO COMPARE THE FALKLANDS AND BERLIN, ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNISED THAT TO BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION THERE WAS SOMETHING OF THE SAME FEELING. IT WAS RIGHT TO SUPPORT AN ALLY, TO SHOW THE WORLD THAT NATO WAS UNITED AND COULD NOT ACCEPT AGGRESSION: SELF-DETERMINATION WAS THE FRG'S GOAL AS WELL AND BRITAIN HAD BEEN RIGHT TO MOUNT THE OPERATION. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD QUESTIONS. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE US? EUROPE KNEW THAT IT COULD NOT DEFEND ITSELF WITHOUT THEM, AND THE AFFAIR COULD WELL DESTROY US INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. IT WAS A EUROPEAN INTEREST THAT THE STANDING OF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT BE TOUCHED. SECONDLY, IT WAS GERMANY'S NATIONAL EXPERIENCE THAT DICTATORSHIP COULD EASILY COME TO TERMS WITH COMMUNISM (E.G. HITLER IN 1939). THUS, IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND LATIN AMERICA TO COME TO TERMS. ALREADY WE HAD NICARAGUA AND CUBA MAKING CONTACT WITH ARGENTINA. THIRDLY, IT WOULD BE TERRIBLE IF BRITAIN FAILED. IT COULD START AN INTERNAL PROCESS WITHIN THE UK WHICH WOULD HAVE TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR EUROPE IN GENERAL, A DISILLUSIONMENT WITH EUROPEAN INTERGRATION, NEUTRALISM, ANTI-EC FEELING AND THE UK AND EUROPE WOULD PAY THE PRICE. HE HAD NO ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS: IF THE WAR CONTINUED AND THE KILLING WENT ON, HE WAS AFRAID THAT WE MIGHT LOSE ON ALL THREE FRONTS. BRITAIN MIGHT FEEL DESERTED BY HER ALLIES, AND DRIVEN INTO AN UNACCEPTABLE MOOD. THE US MIGHT BE ISOLATED AND LATIN AMERICA DRIVEN INTO THE ARMS OF THE SOVIET UNION. ONLY THROUGH A CEASEFIRE COULD WE WIN QUOTE MORALLY UNQUOTE. CONCLUDING, APEL SAID THAT HIS SYMPATHY WAS WITH US BE HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT MIGHT GET OUT OF CONTROL. THEREFORE HE CONCLUDED ONLY A CEASEFIRE COULD HELP.

6. MR NOTT SAID THAT THE WORST OUTCOME FOR NATO, AS FOR US, WOULD BE IF WE FAILED EITHER DIPLOMATICALLY - WE COULD NOT ACHIEVE A SOLUTION - OR MILITARILY. IN FACT, BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION WAS MORE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE EC AS A RESULT OF THE CRISIS AND HAD COOLED TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES EVEN THOUGH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THE LATTER'S POSITION. HE HOPED THAT THE IRISH AND OTHERS WHO WERE INCLINED TO HAVE DOUBTS WOULD REALISE THAT IF WE WAVERED NOW WE WOULD NEVER GET A SETTLEMENT. HE BELIEVED THAT THE ARGENTINE ESTABLISHMENT WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO LINK UP WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THOUGH THEY MIGHT LOOK TO IT FOR SHORT TERM AID. THE REAL DANGER IN



BE VERY RELUCTANT TO LINK UP WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THOSE  
THEY MIGHT LOOK TO IT FOR SHORT TERM AID. THE REAL DANGER IN  
ARGENTINA WAS THE PERONISTS. THE US WERE STILL THE MOST  
IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND MR HAIG  
WAS CENTRAL. HE DOUBTED IF THE UN COULD ACHIEVE MUCH  
AT PRESENT. FINALLY, HE ASKED WHAT VALUE US INFLUENCE WOULD BE  
IF IT WAS USED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENCOURAGE AGGRESSION. IF WE  
WERE ASKED TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE, WITHOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL,  
DEMOCRACY WOULD HAVE SURRENDERED TO AGGRESSION. MOREOVER, A  
CEASEFIRE, WHICH LEFT THE ARGENTINES IN POSSESSION OF THE SPOILS,  
WOULD WORK AGAINST US SINCE WE COULD NOT KEEP MEN INDEFINITELY  
AT SEA IN AN ARCTIC WINTER.

7. VAN MIERLO ASKED IF THAT MEANT WE COULD NOT CONTINUE THROUGH  
THE WINTER. MR NOTT CORRECTED THIS AND POINTED OUT THAT THE  
WEATHER AND SHORTAGES OF FOOD AND WATER COULD BE EXPECTED TO  
AFFECT THE MORALE OF THE ARGENTINE SOLDIERS. THE MILITARY POSITION  
WAS NOT IMPOSSIBLE AND WE WERE CONFIDENT WE COULD REPOSSESS  
THE ISLANDS, WE HOPED WITHOUT TOO MUCH BLOODSHED. BUT THE FACT  
WAS THAT WE COULD NOT HAVE MEN LIVING IN SHIPS IN THE ARCTIC  
GALES. THERE WERE TIME CONSTRAINTS: IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT  
THE EC SHOULD NOT DESERT US.

8. THE ITALIAN DEFENCE MINISTER ASKED ABOUT SOVIET TECHNICAL  
ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA. MR NOTT SAID THAT IT WAS VERY LIMITED  
IN OUR JUDGEMENT AND OF LITTLE BUT PROPAGANDA VALUE.

9. APEL REFERRED TO MR NOTT'S STATEMENT THAT WE HAD BEEN  
FORCED TO ATTACK THE ARGENTINE CRUISER. THE ARGENTINES HAD THEN  
ATTACKED A BRITISH DESTROYER. THERE COULD WELL BE ANOTHER LOSS,  
AND THEREFORE FURTHER ESCALATION, AND IN A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THE  
APPLICATION OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, PERHAPS  
THE ARGENTINE CARRIER. IT WAS NO PROBLEM TO DESTROY WITH  
MODERN WEAPONS BUT HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE LAST CHANCE OF  
A POSSIBLE OUTCOME MIGHT BE LOST AND THEN OUR NEXT ATTACK MIGHT  
BE ON BASES IN ARGENTINA. AND THEN DEVELOPMENTS WOULD  
NO LONGER BE UNDER CONTROL. WAS THERE NO CHANCE TO STOP

THAT ESCALATION? PROBABLY NOT. INDEED HE UNDERSTOOD THE  
POSITION, BUT IF IT WENT ON WE MIGHT RUN INTO GRAVE DIFFICULTIES.

10. MR NOTT EMPHASISED AGAIN THAT THERE WAS A CHANCE OF A  
SETTLEMENT AND WE WERE WORKING FOR IT. NEVERTHELESS, THE  
ARGENTINE CARRIER POSED A THREAT. IF THE ARGENTINES WANTED A  
COMPROMISE - AND WE WERE NOT ASKING FOR SURRENDER ON THE ISSUE  
OF SOVEREIGNTY, MERELY THAT IT SHOULD BE PUT ASIDE - WE  
COULD ACHIEVE ONE, BUT SHORT OF THAT, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE IN  
HIS POSITION TO ALLOW THE ROYAL NAVY TO BE THREATENED WITHOUT TAKING  
MEASURES TO DEFEND ITSELF. WE HAD SHOWN RESTRAINT AS WE  
COULD HAVE ESCALATED THE FIGHTING: NOW IF THERE WAS ANYTHING  
DIRECTLY WITH THE ARGENTINE



COULD HAVE ESCALATED THE FIGHTING: NOW IF THERE WAS ANYTHING THE FRG AND ITALY COULD DO DIRECTLY WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL.

11. TO A NORWEGIAN QUESTION, MR NOTT SAID THAT THE MAIN THREAT TO OUR SHIPS THAT HE SAW NOW WAS THE SURVIVING ARGENTINE SUBMARINES. THE ITALIAN DEFENCE MINISTER SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF BRITISH TROOPS COULD QUICKLY ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN NUMBERS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: THAT MIGHT REPRESENT A MORE ACCEPTABLE SCENARIO FOR A CEASEFIRE. MR NOTT SAID THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN LANDING IN AN ISOLATED AREA FOR THE SAKE OF LANDING: IF WE LANDED, WE WOULD WISH TO GET THE ARGENTINES OUT.

12. THE FALKLANDS PARAGRAPH IN THE EUROGROUP COMMUNIQUE WAS THEN QUICKLY AGREED.

GRAHAM

NNNN

SENT AT 061813Z IAN

OK ERE ANOTHER EVEN LONGRE WHAT IS TEL CONTAINMENT ANYWAY



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

UNPS (154)  
 ex PS  
 PS/Awonslaw  
 PS/PUS  
 Mr Bullard  
 Mr Liffard  
 Mr Ure  
 6 May 1982  
 Mr Williams  
 Planning Staff  
 SA and  
 Mr Freehand  
 JH 6/5

*[Handwritten signature]*

Dear John,

UN Trusteeship for the Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister has recently expressed interest in a UN trusteeship arrangement as one of the possible solutions to the Falkland Islands problem. You will recall that references to this possibility have also been made in Parliament.

This possible solution was briefly described in Sir Michael Palliser's paper circulated as OD (SA) (82) 38 on 30 April.

The Prime Minister told me last night that she would now be grateful for a rather more detailed examination of the idea. In particular, she would like to be informed of any relevant precedents involving UN trustee territories. She also wishes to know what opposition such a proposal would be likely to incur at the United Nations and whether, once a trusteeship arrangement was established, its continuity would depend on approval by UN membership. (Would there be any requirement for a periodic vote to review the arrangement?)

I should be grateful if a paper on these lines could be made available as soon as possible. Please incorporate any other material which you think might be relevant to the Prime Minister's further reflection on this possibility.

I am copying this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever  
John Holmes.*

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL





A.J. Coles Esq.

*With the compliments of*

Brian FOM

6.5.82.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON, SW1A 2AH



OUT TELEGRAM

4

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
		SECRET	FLASH

ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 GRS 2 GRS  
 CLASS 3 SECRET  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO 061045Z MAY 82  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO FLASH LIMA  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
 10 MIPT : FALKLANDS  
 11 ~~THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NEW USA PROPOSALS:~~ **FOR HANDING TO PERUVIANS:**  
 12 **BEGINS** DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS  
 13 1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:  
 14 2. Mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduction of all forces,  
 15 according to a schedule to be established by the Contact Group.  
 16 3. The immediate introduction of a Contact Group composed of  
 17 Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United  
 18 States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending  
 19 agreement on a definitive settlement. The Contact Group will  
 20 assume responsibility for :  
 21 a) verification of the withdrawal;  
 22 b) administering the Government of the Falkland Islands in the  
 23 interim period in consultation with the elected representatives  
 24 of the population of the Islands and ensuring that no actions  
 25 are taken in the Islands which would contravene this interim.

///  
 //  
 /



NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword agreement; and
File number	Dept Planning Staff	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) MRS M BLAKE-PAULEY		AS MIPT
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch OF 95		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	







OUT TELEGRAM


		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
		SECRET	FLASH

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	SECRET
CAVEATS	4	.
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 061030Z MAY 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO FLASH LIMA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
	10	FALKLANDS
	11	1. Please seek the earliest possible audience with President
	12	Belaunde today on the grounds that you have an urgent and
	13	important communication from HMG about the Peruvian peace
	14	proposals. If for any reason the President cannot receive you
	15	this morning, you should see the Prime Minister of Foreign
	16	Minister.
	17	2. You should tell the President that HMG are immensely grateful
	18	for his constructive intervention. In our view, it constitutes
	19	the best prospect of securing an early ceasefire and
	20	withdrawal, before more lives are tragically lost. The British
	21	Cabinet has consequently looked hard and urgently at the
///	22	President's proposals and, although they include elements which
//	23	after all that has happened <del>it is</del> <sup>is</sup> very difficult for Britain
/	24	to accept, you have been instructed to hand over the text in
	25	MIFT, which <del>incorporates</del> <sup>constitutes</sup> a version of the President's proposals

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword which Britain
File number	Dept Planning Staff	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) C L G MALLABY		FCO SAMD Cabinet Office
Telephone number 233 4333		Additional Distribution Falkland Islands
Authorised for despatch	<i>BF 95</i>	
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats <b>SECRET</b>	Page 2
	↓	

<<<<  
 1  
 2  
 3  
 4  
 5  
 6  
 7  
 8  
 9  
 10  
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 15  
 16  
 17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25  
 26  
 27  
 28  
 29  
 30  
 /// 31  
 // 32  
 / 33  
 34

<<<<  
 which Britain would be willing to accept as a basis for proceeding.  
 3. You should add that, if later today it becomes clear that this text is not acceptable to Argentina, we may feel obliged by the urgency of the situation to disclose the lines of the proposals in order to demonstrate to world opinion the seriousness of the efforts that are being made to reach a peaceful solution.  
 4. You may say that HMG have noted the ideas put forward by the UN Secretary-General and indeed are replying to him. But the Peruvian proposals are not only compatible with the Secretary-General's ideas but also provide essential clarity and precision in an imaginative and positive way.  
 5. You should conclude <sup>that</sup> any abandonment of the Peruvian plan would in our view be a retrograde step inevitably making <sup>prolonged</sup> hostilities more likely. We hope <sup>that</sup> the President Belaunde will do his best to obtain Argentine acceptance of the proposals, as he has obtained the acceptance of the US and Britain. To do so would be a feat of statesmanship which would leave not only those concerned directly in the crisis but <sup>also</sup> the world community and the cause of peace greatly in his debt.

PYM  
 NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
--------------------	-------	-----------



~~Pine D...to~~

A.J.C.  $\frac{6}{5}$

MESSAGE FROM THE KING OF SPAIN TO HE JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR,  
UN SECRETARY GENERAL

Unofficial Translation



Palace of Zarzuela, 5 May 1982

Mr Secretary General: In the light of the events facing Great Britain and Argentina at the present time, I can remain silent no longer.

My Government has made clear, in successive official statements, its position on the roots of the problem, but allow me, Mr Secretary General, on the basis of these statements to explain to you the anguish which, as a Spaniard, a soldier and a king, I feel in these moments.

I cannot remain impassive in the face of the confrontation between two peoples, nor can I think of the loss of life that has occurred without being deeply moved.

I think just and honourable solutions to all problems can be found through discussion and peaceful means, and in a spirit of peace, thereby avoiding irreparable consequences.

I would be grateful if you would convey to both parties in the conflict my plea for a ceasefire which would allow a continuation of negotiations, and that you appeal, both to the Governments of Europe, of which for many reasons we are a part, and to the Spanish American community, with whom we have strong links of blood and history, to intercede with all possible actions conducive to avoiding prolonged hostilities.

My Government has placed its good offices at the disposal  
/of



of the contesting countries in the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

For my part, with the greatest impartiality I offer all my good will and assistance to contribute, in whatever manner you consider appropriate, towards the attainment of peace and justice.

Yours sincerley

Juan Carlos




Mr Goodison

FALKLANDS: MESSAGE FROM THE KING OF SPAIN TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN

1. A letter dated 6 May from the Spanish Ambassador to Lord Belstead which enclosed a message, in Spanish, from the King of Spain to the Secretary General of the UN was widely distributed by Emergency Unit last night. I now attach a translation of the King of Spain's message which has been prepared by Research Department.

2. We are submitting a draft reply to Sr Arias Salgado's letter separately.



D C Wilson  
Southern European Department

6 May 1982

cc: SAmD  
✓ Emergency Unit  
Planning Staff  
UND  
Defence Dept  
News Dept  
PUSD  
PS  
PS/Mr Hurd  
PS/Lord Belstead  
PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/PUS  
PS/No 10  
Mr Bullard  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Wright  
Mr Gillmore  
Mr Ure



MESSAGE FROM THE KING OF SPAIN TO HE JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR,  
UN SECRETARY GENERAL

Unofficial Translation

Palace of Zarzuela, 5 May 1982

Mr Secretary General: In the light of the events facing Great Britain and Argentina at the present time, I can remain silent no longer.

My Government has made clear, in successive official statements, its position on the roots of the problem, but allow me, Mr Secretary General, on the basis of these statements to explain to you the anguish which, as a Spaniard, a soldier and a king, I feel in these moments.

I cannot remain impassive in the face of the confrontation between two peoples, nor can I think of the loss of life that has occurred without being deeply moved.

I think just and honourable solutions to all problems can be found through discussion and peaceful means, and in a spirit of peace, thereby avoiding irreparable consequences.

I would be grateful if you would convey to both parties in the conflict my plea for a ceasefire which would allow a continuation of negotiations, and that you appeal, both to the Governments of Europe, of which for many reasons we are a part, and to the Spanish American community, with whom we have strong links of blood and history, to intercede with all possible actions conducive to avoiding prolonged hostilities.

My Government has placed its good offices at the disposal  
/of



of the contesting countries in the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

For my part, with the greatest impartiality I offer all my good will and assistance to contribute, in whatever manner you consider appropriate, towards the attainment of peace and justice.

Yours sincerley

Juan Carlos



CONFIDENTIAL



*file DSS*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6. May 1982

*Dear John,*

CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY DR. RAFAEL CALDERA

Thank you for your letter of 5 May.  
Dr. Caldera duly called on the Prime Minister  
today. I enclose a record of the conversation.

I am copying this letter to John Halliday  
(Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence)  
Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the  
Duchy of Lancaster) and David Wright (Cabinet  
Office).

*Yours ever  
John Col.*

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*LB*

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

ghastly

EMR  
SUBJECT

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND  
DR. RAFAEL CALDERA IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AT 1600 HOURS  
ON THURSDAY, 6 MAY.

Present

Venezuela

Prime Minister

Dr. Caldera

Mr. Coles

Lord Thomas of Swynnerton

\* \* \* \* \*

The Prime Minister said that the British people were deeply wounded by Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands. No European Government had been more friendly towards South America.

Dr. Caldera said that Argentina had probably been closer to Britain than any other South American country. He himself had been abroad for four weeks but it was clear to him that emotions were running very high in Venezuela. There existed what he called a "pluralistic solidarity". Regardless of differences between peoples and Governments, there was a strong common feeling throughout Latin America in favour of Argentina. More than 90% of Latin America sympathised with Argentina's cause. Recent events awakened memories of a previous epoch when colonial Britain held bases in far away countries. At a press conference in India recently he had been asked whether the Argentine action against the Falkland Islands was justifiable. In reply, he had asked whether India's action in the case of Goa was justifiable.

The Prime Minister commented that just as India had got away with the affair of Goa, Galtieri thought he could get away with his invasion of the Falkland Islands. But if he did the implications for other countries would be very serious.

Dr. Caldera said he was speaking only as a private person. He wished to refer to the Venezuela/Guyana problem. When he had been in office, he had taken the responsibility of signing the Port of Spain protocol which had postponed the issue for 12 years. That protocol expired in June. The Geneva Agreement

/had established

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

had established an obligation on the parties to search for a practical solution. But the lesson of the Falkland Islands was that dialogue did not produce results.

The Prime Minister disagreed. The friendly dialogue had been carried on with Argentina up until February of this year. The Junta had then declined to publish a Communique about the latest round of talks. We had a proud record of bringing people to independence. Dr. Caldera said that only 1800 people were involved. He could not consider the Falkland Islands to be a country; they were merely a territory. He urged the Prime Minister to take account of the very strong and growing feelings in Venezuela which, since the United States had sided against Argentina, were partly directed against Washington. People argued that in the case of Suez the United States had ensured that Britain and France did not recapture the Suez Canal. But their attitude over the Falkland Islands was different.

Lord Thomas asked why a democracy like Venezuela should support a military dictatorship like Argentina.

Dr. Caldera again referred to "pluralistic solidarity". He had last visited Argentina in 1973. There were very special problems there. Peronism, despite all its failures, was still a popular movement. He did not approve of the dictatorship but where Argentina was involved in military conflict, especially after the Belgrano tragedy, Latin American solidarity was inevitable.

The Prime Minister said that feelings were very strong here too. We did not want our people to live under the heel of the dictator. Argentina would not give freedom to the Falkland Islanders. They would behave like an imperial power. Dr. Caldera repeated that the Falkland Islands were not a country. There were just a few settlers there. But he wished to emphasise two points. First, he was a moderate Latin American and a good friend of the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister should imagine how, if he held these views about the Falklands, other less moderate Latin Americans felt. Secondly, in June the issue of

CONFIDENTIAL

/Guyana



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Guyana would have to be taken very seriously if a major dispute was to be avoided. Forbes Burnham was trying to foster nationalistic attitudes against Venezuela. The Prime Minister asked whether that meant that Venezuela was going to invade Guyana. Dr. Caldera said he was not saying that but the situation was very difficult. Many Venezuelans felt that Guyana had no serious intention to work for a practical solution. It was the principal duty of statesmen to try <sup>to</sup> and foresee and deal with issues.

Reverting to the Falklands issue, Lord Thomas suggested that, whatever Dr. Caldera thought of the Argentine claim, he could not possibly find acceptable the method Argentina had chosen to pursue that claim. Dr. Caldera said that it was an emotional matter. The Prime Minister commented that if the world were governed by emotions, no boundary would be safe. There were many regions of South America which were threatened by boundary disputes. International law must prevail.

A.J.C.

6 May 1982

CONFIDENTIAL



Reference.....

*Emergency Unit*

ARGENTINIAN INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS:

MERCHANT SHIPPING SITUATION REPORT THURSDAY 6 MAY:

Boycott of British Ships and Aircraft

Following yesterdays 'flood' of information nothing further has been received.

*CPZ*  
*MAED*

*161*

The latest updated positional tables are attached.

E R Stambrey  
Shipping Policy Division  
D/Trade  
PSH/55

233 8833

6 May 1982



## Positions of British ships south of 10° South and in East Pacific and west South Atlantic Oceans

No Change

Name of ship	Owner/Manager	Type of ship	Current position and itinerary
British Spey	British Petroleum	Tanker	Loading Rio de Janeiro 1 May for Durban
Kinburnie Universal	Cayzer Irvine	Refrigerated ship	Sailing Santos for Aqaba Due Port Said 14/5
Browning	Blue Star	General Cargo	Due Rio Grande de Sol 28/4. Itajai 1/5 Paranaguá 4/5 Santos 5/5 Rio de Janeiro 8/5 Liverpool 23 May
Aulica	Shell	Tanker	Due Valparaiso 30 April for Antofagasta 3 May Guayaquil 12 May Transit Panama canal 17 May from West
British Kennet	B P	Tanker	Due Santos 2 May awaiting orders
Kang Da	(Hong Kong)	General Cargo	Anch off Santos 27 April
Halifax Star	Blue Star	Reefer	Due Itajai 2 May heading N Europe
Gladstone Star	Blue Star	General Cargo	Due Santos 10 May eta Rio de Janeiro 14 May
Port Quebec	" "	Bulk Carrier	Rio Grande (Brazil) Ets 26 April



ARGENTINIAN MERCHANT SHIPS IN OR DUE AT OR WHICH HAVE

ANNEX III

JUST LEFT EUROPEAN PORTS

(Source: Lloyds Index and Lloyds List)

NAME OF SHIP	GRT	Type	Current position	Remarks
SHIPS IN OR DUE AT UK PORTS				
Nil				
SHIPS IN, DUE AT OR HAVE JUST LEFT EUROPEAN PORTS				
Gaicho Moreira	18,202	Bulk Carrier	Arr Ferrol 25/12/81 for repairs	
Almirante Storni	9,236	Gen cargo	Sld Havre 3 May	
Rio Corrientes	8,462	Refrigerated ship	Sld Hamburg 23 April for Buenos Aires	Eta 12 May
Rio Calchaqui	7,221	Refrigerated ship	Sld Antwerp 26 April for Buenos Aires	
Patricio Murphy	12,519	?	Arr Rotterdam 4 May for Bremen	
Marfrio	6,089	Gen cargo/container	Sld Havre 13/4/82 for Buenos Aires	Eta 30 April
Marlinda	10,069	Gen cargo	Arr Lisbon 24 April for Buenos Aires	Eta 11 May
Alianza Campana	885	Tug	In Cadiz since 17 May 81	
Antartic	47,917	Bulk Carrier	Pd Skaw 2 May for Rostock	
Rio Negro II	112,762		Arr Antwerp 30 April	
Rio Grande	2,622	Refrigerated ship	Arrived Vigo 20 Mar from Mar del Plata	
Dr Atilio Malvagni	14,930	Reefer	Sld Cadiz 14 April for Buenos Aires	Eta 3 May
General Manuel Belgrano	9,236	Gen cargo	Sld Vigo 13/4 for Buenos Aires	Eta 2 May
Glaciar Viedma	9,013	Refrigerated ship	Sld Bilbao 27 April for Buenos Aires	
Tucuman	9,236	Gen Cargo	Sld Marseilles 3 May for Buenos Aires	
Juma	34,460	Ore carrier	Arr Colombo prev. May 4 (engine trouble)	
Rio Olivia	9,059	?	for Germany	
La Pampa	10,114		Sld Santos 17 April for Ashdod	
Lago Lacar	8,486	Refrigerated ship	Sld Hamburg 27 April for Leningrad	
Almirante Stewart	6,531	Ref/Cargo	Sld Rotterdam 4 May for Hamburg	
Libertador General Jose de San Martin	9,236	?	Sld Ashdod 21 April for Buenos Aires	
Estrella Argentina	22,083	TANK	Arr Venice 30 April for Ravenna	
			Sld Buenos Aires 19 Feb for Gdynia	



## FOREIGN MERCHANT SHIPS WITHIN ARGENTINE/FALKLANDS AREA SOUTH OF RIO PLATA

ANNEX IV 1

NAME OF SHIP	FLAG	TYPE OF SHIP	POSITION/ITINERARY	REMARKS
ARASTASIOS	GREECE	BULK	DURBAN SD 7 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 17 April
ARILAN DIAMOND	LIBERIA	?	CAPE TOWN SD 28 APRIL FOR S. AMERICA	ETA 8 MAY?
ACHILLET	GREECE	TANK	DURBAN SD 17 MARCH for S AMERICA	Eta 27 March
ASIA GOLD	LIBERIA	BULK	PORT ELIZABETH SD 3 APRIL for S AMERICA	Eta 13 April
ALAKMON	GREECE		CEUTA SD 23 APRIL for ARGENTINA	ETA 7 MAY
COMODAL 1	BRAZIL	RO/RO	SANTOS SD 27 APRIL for CALLAO	Eta 17 May via Cape?
C. BADOH SECO	ARGENTINA	TANK	LA PLATA SD 16 MARCH for COMODORO RIVADAVIA	Eta 20 March
CAVARELLA	LIBERIA	BULK	DURBAN SD 25 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 5 May
CASA	GREECE	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 2 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 15 April
C. TAHANIN	TURKEY	BULK	NEW YORK SD 23 APRIL for ARGENTINA	
CHRISMIR	LIBERIA	BULK	HAMPTON ROADS SD 8 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 24 April
EIDANGER	SINGAPORE	?	VALPARAISO SD 27 APRIL for BUENOS AIRES	Eta 7 May? Round Cape?
CHRISTOFFER OLDENDORF	LIBERIA	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 12 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 25 April
CIUDAD DE ENSENADA	ARGENTINA	BULK	TAMPA SD 26 MARCH for NECOCHEA	Eta 12 April
ESTRELLA	LIBERIA	REEFER	GUAYAQUIL SD 22 APRIL for BUENOS AIRES	ETA 13 MAY ? VIA CAPE
FELTRICH OLDENDORFF	LIBERIA	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 24 APRIL for BAHIA BLANCA	Eta 7 May
FERDINAND FREILIGRATH	EAST GERMANY	REEFER	BRUNSBUTTEL SD 1 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 23 April



NAME OF SHIP	FLAG	TYPE OF SHIP	POSITION/ITINERARY	REMARKS
GERHART HAUPTMAN	EAST GERMANY	REEFER	BRUNSBUTTEL PASSED 8 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 30 April
GOLDEAN ENTERPRISE	LIBERIA	BULK	SAN NICOLAS SD. 21 APRIL for BAHIA BLANCA?	ETA 25 APRIL
HELEN HAMPTON LION	LIBERIA LIBERIA	BULK BULK	GIBRALTAR PASSED 27 APRIL for ARGENTINA CEUTA SD 21 APRIL for ARGENTINA	ETA 12 MAY Eta 5 May
HENNING OLDENDORF	LIBERIA	BULK	ROTTERDAM SD 21 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 6 May
INCA YAHUAR HUACA	PERU	?	Santos Arr 23 April	In port
IRENE S LEMOS	GREECE	BULK	GHEENT SD 4 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 25 April
KIROVSK	RUSSIA	?	MONTEVIDEO SD 23 APRIL	? For Puerto Madryn
KULDIGA	RUSSIA	REEFER	MONTEVIDEO SD 26 APRIL	Destination not known
MAR DEL NORTE	ARGENTINA	?	SAN NICOLAS SD 15 MARCH for RIO GALLEGOS	Eta 21 March
MOZART FESTIVAL	LIBERIA	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 17 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 30 April



NAME OF SHIP	FLAG	TYPE OF SHIP	POSITION/ITINERARY	REMARKS
MASTER PETROS	GREECE	BULK	CEUTA SD 21 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 5 May
MARQUISE	GREECE	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 10 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 23 April
OBRONCY POCZTY	POLAND	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 8 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 21 April
OTOL	POLAND	FISH FACTORY	MONTEVIDEO ARR 17 MARCH for ANTARCTICA	Could be in area
PETROMAR SANTA CRUZ	ARGENTINA	TANK	CAMPANA SD 16 MARCH for CALETA CORDOVA	In port?
PANAGIA MYRTIDIOTISSA	GREECE		LAS PALMAS SD 18 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 1 May
PYATIDESYATILETIYE SOVETSKOY GRUZ	RUSSIA	TANK	ST ANNA BAY SD 10 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 5 May from Cuba
REGINA OLDENDORF	LIBERIA	BULK	LISBON ARR 13 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 1 May
SLOMAN NAJADE	W GERMANY	?	DURBAN SD 27 APRIL for BUENOS AIRES	Eta 9 May
STOYKIY	RUSSIA	S/TUG	GRYTVIKEN ARR 25 APRIL	Did you find it?
TERMANCIA	SPAIN	-	MONTIVIDEO SD 28TH APRIL for VALPARAISO	Could be in area
SIBUYAN CAREER	PANAMA	?	POINT NOIR SD 14 APRIL for PUERTO MADRYN	ETA 26 APRIL
TIMUR GIRL	SINGAPORE	REEFER	ROTTERDAM SD 4 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 16 April
THEODOR KORNER	E GERMANY	REEFER	BRUNSBUTTEL PASSED 13 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 2 May
UNIWERSYTET GDANSKI	POLAND	BULK	DIAMANTE SD 28 APRIL for BAHIA BLANCA	
VERA	GREECE	BULK	AUGUSTA SD 1 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 19 April
VITA BULK	GREECE	BULK	RIO DE JANEIRO SD 2 MAY for PUERTO MADRYN	ETA 8 MAY
WAH HING	PANAMA	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 5 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 19 April
OCEAN MARLIN	USA	TUG/SUPPLY	PUNTA QUILLA ARR 26 MARCH	In port?
MONTI ZARAYA	SPAIN	BULK	TENERIFE ARR 6 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 19 April
TURTLE	BAHAMAS	REEFER	BRUNSBUTTEL PASSED 16 APRIL for ARGENTINA	Eta 6 May



NAME OF SHIP	FLAG	TYPE OF SHIP	POSITION/ITINERARY	REMARKS
ADOLF LEONHARDT	LIBERIA	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 6 APRIL for RECALADA	S of BAHIA BLANCA <i>Eta</i> 21 April
AKEONO REEFER	JAPAN	REEFER	HELSINGBORG SD 16 APRIL for PUERTO MADRYN	<i>Eta</i> 6 May
ANASTASIA	GREECE		RIO GRANDE SD 9 APRIL for MAR DEL PLATA	<i>Eta</i> 11 April
ANITA VENTURE	LIBERIA	BULK	HAMBURG SD 8 APRIL for ARGENTINA	<i>Eta</i> 28 April
ANNITA	GREECE	?	RIO DE JANEIRO SD 21 April for PUERTO MADRYN	<i>Eta</i> 26 April
AREMAR	ARGENTINA	REEFER	PUNTA ARENAS PASSED 11 APRIL	Destination not known
ATLANTIC	NETHERLANDS	REEFER	APAPA/LAGOS SD 3 APRIL for MAR DEL PLATA	<i>Eta</i> 14 April
KYRIAKOULA D LEMOS	GREECE	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 11 APRIL for ARGENTINA	<i>Eta</i> 24 April
NIOBE	GREECE	BULK	DURBAN S D 13 APRIL for S AMERICA	<i>Eta</i> 25 April (Argentina)
<i>SALTA</i>	<i>ARGENTINA</i>	<i>REEFER</i>	<i>VALPARAISO SD 26 APRIL FOR BUENOS AIRES</i>	<i>ETA 9 MAY</i>
SAN JUAN	ARGENTINA	?	CAPE TOWN SD 26 APRIL for BUENOS AIRES	<i>Eta</i> 7 May
SOUTH SKY	LIBERIA	BULK	LAS PALMAS SD 13 APRIL for ARGENTINA	<i>Eta</i> 26 April
HENRIETTE THOLSTRUP	DENMARK	LPG	LAS PALMAS SD 16 APRIL for BAHIA BLANCA	<i>Eta</i> 29 April
MISIONES II	ARGENTINA	?	TAMPA SD 1 APRIL for PUNTA QUILLA	<i>Eta</i> 25 April
RIO TEUCO	ARGENTINA	?	MAR DEL PLATA ARR 3 APRIL	In port?
DESIDERA F	ITALY	BULK	PIRAEUS SD 21 APRIL for ARGENTINA	<i>Eta</i> 12 May
STONEPOOL	LIBERIA	BULK	ROTTERDAM SD 16 APRIL FOR S.AMERICA	In port
KNIEFSAND	CYPRUS	REEFER	MAR DEL PLATA ARR 30 MARCH	<i>Eta</i> 27 April
KONITSA	GREECE	BULK	BALTIMORE SD 10 APRIL for ARGENTINA	<i>ETA</i> 15 MAY
<i>V. L.</i>	<i>SWITZERLAND</i>	<i>?</i>	<i>DURBAN SD 2 MAY FOR BUENOS AIRES</i>	



NAME OF SHIP	FLAG	TYPE OF SHIP	POSITION/ITINERARY	REMARKS
BAHIA BUEN SUCESO	ARGENTINA	PASS/CARGO	BUENOS AIRES SD 13 FEB FOR COMODORO RIVADAVIA	
CABO GUARDIAN	ARGENTINA	TANKER	BUENOS AIRES SD 9 MARCH FOR COMODORO RIVADAVIA	
CATAMARCA	ARGENTINA	TANKER	BAHIA BLANCA SD 4 MARCH FOR CALETA OLIVIA	
GENERAL MARTIN GUEMES	ARGENTINA	TANKER	BAHIA BLANCA ARR 1 MARCH	
LAVOISER	ARGENTINA	TANKER	BUENOS AIRES SD 23 FEB FOR BAHIA BLANCA	
SAN LORENZO	ARGENTINA	TANKER	BAHIA BLANCA ARR 22 FEB FOR COMODORO RIVADAVIA	
YAHAM	ARGENTINA	GENERAL CARGO	BUENOS AIRES SD 20 FEB FOR RIO GALLEGOS	
PUERTO ROSALES	ARGENTINA	TANKER	CAMPANA SD 2 MARCH FOR COMODORO RIVADAVIA	
PETROMAR CAMPANA II	ARGENTINA	TANKER	CAMPANA SD 22 FEB FOR BAHIA BLANCA	
PUNTA INDIO	ARGENTINA	?	SAN NICOLAS SD 15 APRIL FOR RIO GALLEGOS	



## BRITISH SHIPS EXPECTED IN PANAMA CANAL AREA

NAME	OWNER MANAGER	TYPE	CURRENT POSITION AND ITINERARY
MANZANARES	FYFFES	REEFER	TRANSIT 6 MAY PACIFIC TO ATLANTIC
MAGDALENA	FYFFES	REEFER	TRANSIT 7 MAY PACIFIC TO ATLANTIC
ANCHO EMPRESS	PANOCEAN	TANK	TRANSIT 8 MAY ATLANTIC TO PACIFIC
ALCOL	SILVER LINE	TANK	TRANSIT 8 MAY ATLANTIC TO PACIFIC



138

CONFIDENTIAL

Private Secretary

FALKLAND ISLANDS DEPENDENCIES:  
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNGA

1. Following this morning's discussion  
in ODSA, I submit a draft letter to  
No. 10.

N C R Williams  
United Nations Dept

6 May 1982

cc: PS/PUS  
Mr Freeland  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Mallaby  
SAmD  
Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL



DSR 1 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

PS / No 10

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PS/Home Secretary  
PS/Defence Secretary  
PS/Paymaster General  
PS/Attorney General  
PS/Sir Robert Armstron  
PS/Sir Michael Pallise

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

FALKLAND DEPENDENCIES

1. I understand that at ODSA this morning the question was raised whether the three UN General Assembly resolutions which have been passed on the Falklands cover the Dependencies.

2. We have undertaken a careful examination of the resolutions in question. They refer only to the Falkland Islands and do not explicitly mention the Dependencies. Moreover, the lists of non-self-governing territories compiled by General Assembly Committees in 1946 and subsequently in 1964 referred exclusively to the 'Falkland Islands'. However, the report on the Falkland Islands by the Special Committee on Decolonisation which was referred to in the 1965 General Assembly resolution included factual data concerning both the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies, and references were made in the Special Committee's debate to both. But the 'conclusions and recommendations' section of the Committee's report did

Enclosures—flag(s).....



not refer to the Dependencies explicitly and we argued that they did not relate to the Dependencies in a Note which we sent to Argentina on 1 November 1965.

3. We are not confident that the majority of Member States would support a narrow reading of the strict words of the Resolutions, since this would imply that the General Assembly, having been seized of information about both the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies, consciously intended to adopt decisions excluding the latter from their general scope, notwithstanding the existence of a UK/Argentine sovereignty dispute over all of them.

4. We ourselves could however certainly argue that the Resolutions cannot be read as dealing with the Dependencies. And of course it remains the case that we did not support any of these Resolutions when they were adopted, that no General Assembly Resolution is binding and that we have constantly maintained that the General Assembly is not entitled to consider territorial disputes or questions of sovereignty.



CONFIDENTIAL

Lord Bridges

cc Falklands Distribution  
WED

FALKLANDS: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EMBARGO: DANISH ATTITUDE

1. The Danish Ambassador telephoned me this afternoon about the report on page 2 of today's Times that the Danish Prime Minister, speaking in Brussels yesterday, 'expressed strong misgivings about any extension of EC economic and military sanctions against Argentina beyond their present mid-May expiration date'.
2. The Ambassador said that after checking with Copenhagen he could tell me that this report was 'a hoax, taken out of the blue air'. It was true that Mr Joergensen had been in Brussels yesterday on Labour Party business, and that he had been asked a question about his attitude to the embargo. But he had declined to answer it.
3. I thanked the Ambassador for his explanation, which I thought would be appreciated.
4. Comment. I imagine that Joergensen did indeed express some such view as the Times reports, but that he did not wish it to become known that he had done so.

6 May 1982

J L Bullard

CONFIDENTIAL



RESTRICTED

*Prime Minister*

*AS 6/5*

SAPU(82) 16

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper issued at 1800 hours on Thursday 6 May 1982 contains suggested lines to take on -

1. International Support for Britain
2. A Change in Military Strategy?

Cabinet Office

6 May 1982

RESTRICTED



1. International Support for Britain

- To judge from recent press reports one might assume that international support for Britain had evaporated. This is far from the case. Many countries have expressed concern about the loss of life in the recent engagements. This is entirely natural and accords exactly with sentiments expressed by British ministers. It is quite clear that there remains very considerable support for Britain on the fundamental issues. The following examples are drawn from statements made this week.

a. Today (Thursday 6 May), Ministers of NATO's "Eurogroup" (current members Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom) issued a communiqué which contained the following: "Ministers condemned Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland Islands and the dependencies as well as the failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 502. Ministers noted the importance of maintaining the principle that aggression or occupation of territory by force should not be allowed to succeed and urged the need to seek a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties concerned on the basis of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 in all its parts."

b. The Commonwealth. Last night the Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr Ramphal, speaking after Commonwealth High Commissioners in London had held talks with Mr Pym, reiterated Commonwealth support for what Britain is doing. Several Commonwealth leaders have made recent public statements. For example the Foreign Minister for Canada said on Tuesday: "We deplore the Argentinian attack on the Falkland Islands and request the removal of Argentinian troops .... at the moment the British are engaged in actions of self defence."

c. United States. The House of Representatives adopted on Tuesday a resolution that "Argentina should withdraw its forces from the Falkland Islands, and if the efforts to resolve the conflict through means fail, the US should provide full diplomatic support to Great Britain in efforts to uphold the rule of law."



d. Sweden. On Sunday the Swedish Foreign Minister, interviewed on radio and television, said "the Swedish Government supports, as it has done all along, the UN Security Council Resolution, which calls for Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Falklands and a political solution to the dispute ..... Sweden supports Britain as long as they stick to the UN Resolution and so far as I can judge that is what they are doing. The Falklands are British territory now. If you are to alter the status of these Islands then it must be done after consulting the wishes of the population and before that the Argentine troops must be withdrawn. That is our attitude which the British still take."

e. The co-ordinating bureau of the non-aligned movement in New York (convened at Argentine request) issued a communiqué yesterday. This, predictably, confirmed non-aligned support for Argentina's claims of sovereignty over the Islands but, significantly reiterated an appeal for a peaceful solution to be found in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502 "in its entirety" (ie including the mandatory demand for Argentine withdrawal.)

## 2. Change in Military Strategy?

- Some press reports suggest that following the loss of the Sheffield there may be a change in our strategy.. "Fleet may pull back to avoid missile attacks" (Guardian). "Nott hints at pause in action" (Times).

Important to realise that despite the loss of the Sheffield we are successfully continuing our strategy of isolating the Argentine occupation forces on the Falklands by enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone. Since the Zone came into operation almost a week ago we have prevented both air and sea resupply of the Falklands. All our military action during the past week has been taken either to enforce the Zone or to protect our Task Force. Thus, as Mr Nott said in the Commons, "If in the next few days they do not challenge our ships ..... and they cease coming into the Total Exclusion Zone no casualties need arise."



Man-to-see Free

DSG

cc: FCO

6 May 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 3 May forwarding a Resolution of the European Parliament on the conflict over the Falkland Islands.

J. C. S.

Mr. P. Dankert.

DSG




AJC seen

Mr Goodison

FALKLANDS: MESSAGE FROM THE KING OF SPAIN TO THE SECRETARY  
GENERAL OF THE UN

1. A letter dated 6 May from the Spanish Ambassador to Lord Belstead which enclosed a message, in Spanish, from the King of Spain to the Secretary General of the UN was widely distributed by Emergency Unit last night. I now attach a translation of the King of Spain's message which has been prepared by Research Department.

2. We are submitting a draft reply to Sr Arias Salgado's letter separately.



D C Wilson

Southern European Department

6 May 1982

cc: SAmD  
Emergency Unit  
Planning Staff  
UND  
Defence Dept  
News Dept  
PUSD  
PS  
PS/Mr Hurd  
PS/Lord Belstead  
PS/Mr Onslow  
PS/PUS  
PS/No 10  
Mr Bullard  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Wright  
Mr Gillmore  
Mr Ure



Argentina

Interviewer: The United Nations Secretary General said early today that Argentina had accepted his proposals aimed at settling the Falkland's crisis. He said, and I quote: "I have got a positive reaction from the Argentine Government. They have expressed to me that they are considering with great interest and a sense of urgency the ideas I have proposed to them. I hope that I may have a positive reaction from the United Kingdom." Well, that response is expected today to what is thought to be a plan involving a phased withdrawal of British and Argentine forces, an interim UN administration over the Islands, and a negotiated settlement. On the 'phone now from New York I have Sir Anthony Parsons, Britain's Ambassador to the United Nations. Sir Anthony, I don't know whether you heard that. If you did, is that a rough outline of the plan?

Sir Anthony Parsons: Well, no. It's not really quite accurate. The plan is both more and less precise as it were. The plan is much more procedural in stages, a number of stages, and it is less precise about who would be aware at interim periods and so on. Would you like me to go on and make a comment immediately about the Argentine response?

Interviewer: I would indeed.

AP: I think there is a certain amount of exaggeration, at least there was last night, and I think it has been corrected in the American media this morning. As I understand it, because I was there at the time - I didn't actually read the Argentine letter but it was pretty short, I mean it was about half a dozen lines - I think what they have done is they have said to the Secretary-General, we need accept your de marche as it were, rather in the sense that, yes, we will do business with you. I don't believe they've accepted all the propositions, all the range of ideas that he's put forward, in fact I'm perfectly sure they have not. In the American media this morning they are saying that the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs is



making remarks like, we have not of course agreed to withdraw and the whole question of sovereignty is not negotiable and there's a great deal more to study. In fact, I think the letter did say that the details would be subject to discussion. So I think to put it in the sense that they have accepted it lock, stock and barrel is really very misleading.

Interviewer: From what you're saying, it would seem that the opposite almost seems to be the case.

AP: Well, no, I wouldn't say that, but I mean I think they've said yes, we'd accept that you have put forward proposals and that we will discuss them with you. I mean that is my understanding of it, the Argentines might correct that. I think that if we do put in a reply today about which of course I was in communication with London yesterday, I would expect ours to be much more substantial as it were actually commenting on the ideas themselves.

Interviewer: Sir Anthony, perhaps you can help us with this matter of the United Nations. Can I take it that some form of United Nations administration or perhaps a United Nations trusteeship council has been mentioned in the points that have been proposed?

AP: No, that is not the case. So far as I can remember, I haven't got the points in front of me and again, when we talk about the points, here again it is becoming a little over-precise, I mean there is a whole, long range of ideas and they are much more procedural ideas than substantive ideas. The whole question of UN trusteeship or anything like that just simply doesn't come into it at this stage. That is absolutely true.

Interviewer: Can you give us any further indication of what you mean by procedural notions or ideas?

AP: Well, the ideas deal with as it were concepts like at what stage certain things should happen, I mean at what stage withdrawal should happen, at what stage negotiations should start to take place, but it doesn't go on to say what the negotiations

/should



should necessarily contain.

Interviewer: So things are at the moment are certainly in a very fluid stage but from your own feelings do you begin to detect a glimmer of light?

AP: I don't think anything has changed particularly here. I mean, I think that this very short and very formal, as it were in the sense that it's not substantive Argentine response, was blown up out of proportion here yesterday evening and it gave an impression which I think is already dying down in the New York Media that you know some enormous breakthrough has taken place. I do not believe that to be the case. I think that Mr. Pym's initial answer, which said that we are studying your proposals, we are considering your proposals, or we are considering your ideas with great interest and urgency clearly was the equivalent of what the Argentine's said last night. We will put in substantive proposals, we will then see if there is a possibility of making progress here but so far we are still as you put it at a very fluid - and as I would put it - at a very preliminary stage.



ATTACK ON HMS SHEFFIELD

WHAT WAS SHIP DOING?

She was providing area air defence for the ships of the Task Group.

SHIP'S ARMAMENT?

Sea Dart and 4.5 inch gun.

FAILURE OF SEA DART TO COPE?

Sea Dart is an anti-aircraft missile and has only a minimal anti-missile capability. In the event, neither the launching aircraft nor the missile were detected until it was too late for either to be engaged. When launched from the air, Exocet has a range of about 30 miles.

RANGE OF EXOCET?

This is frankly unlikely.

COULD SEA DART (THEORETICALLY) COPE WITH EXOCET?

WHY MISSILE NOT DETECTED EARLIER?

Exocet's sea-skimming flight profile makes the missile very difficult to detect.

WERE AIRCRAFT DETECTED?

The aircraft were not detected before they had fired their missiles.

WHY WERE AIRCRAFT NOT DETECTED?

Aircraft flying at low level below the radar horizon are very difficult to detect, particularly if not transmitting on their radar. In addition, a ship's ability to detect aircraft is affected by adverse weather conditions. But I cannot say why these particular aircraft were not detected sooner.



WERE THE ATTACKING AIRCRAFT  
ENGAGED?

I do not have this information to  
hand.

SEA DART'S ROLE?

Sea Dart is optimised to engage  
aircraft but has some anti-missile  
capability.

WHY NO POINT DEFENCE  
ON SHEFFIELD?

The type 42 destroyers are designed  
to operate in the area air defence  
role. They are equipped accordingly.

CAN THE TASK FORCE  
COMMANDER PREVENT A  
REPETITION?

I obviously cannot give the House  
an assurance that there will not be  
a further incident of this kind.  
An operation on this scale and of  
this nature inevitably carries with  
it some element of risk. The  
Government has never pretended  
otherwise. The Argentine armed  
forces pose a variety of threats -  
aerial, surface and submarine. We  
believe that, taken as a whole, the  
varied capabilities possessed by the  
units of the Task Force are superior  
to those of the Argentine armed forces  
and that our forces should be capable  
of achieving their task of enforcing  
the Total Exclusion Zone.



ATTACKING AIRCRAFT LAND-  
BASED OR SEABORNE?

We believe the aircraft to have  
been land-based.

UNDERESTIMATION OF  
ARGENTINE AIR CAPABILITY?

We have always been well aware  
of the aerial threat posed by the  
Argentine air force and seaborne  
aircraft. Overall we believe that  
the Task Force is capable of dealing  
adequately with this threat.

SHOULDN'T WE BOMB  
ARGENTINE AIRFIELDS?

We shall, of course, take all measures  
necessary to ensure the effective  
enforcement of the Total Exclusion  
Zone, commensurate with our rights  
of self-defence under the Security  
Council Resolution 502.

SHEFFIELD TO BE REPLACED  
(EITHER IN TASK FORCE  
OR A NEW TYPE 42)?

We shall obviously be looking at  
this.

SHIP STILL AFLOAT?

Yes.



## INFORMING THE NEXT-OF-KIN

As my Rt Hon Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said yesterday

A casualty organisation has been set up to process all casualty information, and for the Navy there are sub units in Naval bases which receive the information and inform next-of-kin. Next-of-kin are normally informed by selected officers from local establishments, preferably by a home visit but by telephone if essential. This is done as quickly as possible after information about casualties has been received from the Task Force.

[Linked to this system for informing next-of-kin are other cells whose telephone numbers are known to all next-of-kin and they can ring up to enquire.]

[The central casualty organisation includes representatives of all services and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and covers civilians.]

[An incident involving casualties may be known before firm details of casualties are received from the Task Force. It may be essential, in the public interest to announce an incident before casualties are confirmed.]



TYPE 42 ARMAMENT

1. TYPE 42 INADEQUATELY ARMED?
- Type 42s are specialised for area air defence against the Soviet threat. They are equipped with SEA DART missiles, a 4.5 in gun, and a passive defence system (CHAFF). She is also equipped with an anti-submarine helicopter.
2. CAPABILITY OF SEA DART?
- SEA DART is a medium range ship to air missile for defence primarily against aircraft and also a capability against larger missiles attacking from high and medium level. SEA DART is also capable of dealing with surface ships.
3. CAPABILITY OF EXOCET?
- EXOCET is a sea skimming missile launched from ships or aircraft.
4. CAPABILITY OF TYPE 42s TO DEAL WITH EXOCET TYPE MISSILES?
- It is generally recognised that sea skimming missiles are among the most difficult to deal with. We have plans in hand to improve the SEA WOLF short range anti missile system to deal with this threat. No navy in the world has yet successfully developed an effective counter to sea-skimming missiles.
5. SHOULD NOT THE TYPE 42s BE ARMED WITH A SHORT RANGE ANTI MISSILE SYSTEM EG SEA WOLF?
- The Type 42 is not large enough to carry a second missile system together with its electronics. As I have said it is a specialised area air defence ship. The Type 22s are equipped for short range protection (they are equipped with SEA WOLF).
6. WILL YOU NOW FIT SHORT RANGE MISSILES TO OUR DESTROYER FORCE?
- The Secretary of State for Defence has said that he will be considering what lessons are to be learned from this crisis. He said yesterday afternoon that improvements to the SEA WOLF system are a major priority in our programme. He also pointed out that until recently the Soviet Union - our major potential adversary - had not deployed sea skimming missiles.



BACKGROUND NOTE


1. The primary role of the Type 42 Sheffield Class of destroyer is to provide medium range air defence for Naval Task Groups. Other ships in the Group (the Type 22 frigates armed with SEA WOLF) would provide short range air defence, with <sup>(long range)</sup> air cover being provided by land based or carrier based aircraft as necessary. Type 42s are, therefore, equipped with the SEA DART medium range air defence missile system and automatic rapid fire 4.5 in gun. They are also equipped with the Lynx helicopter which in addition to carrying anti submarine weapons will also use the SEA SKUA anti surface ship missile which <sup>is</sup> has just entered <sup>into</sup> service. Further details are attached at Annex A.

2. The Defence Review indicated that we could no longer afford to maintain large numbers of every type of platform at the highest standards which the Soviet Union's developing capability requires. In consequence, it outlined a reduction in the size of the surface Fleet to about 50 destroyers and frigates and indicated that in future a greater emphasis would be placed on submarines. It also stated that no further Type 42s would be ordered and plans for its major mid-life modernisation would be abandoned, as would plans for a successor type. It was also decided in the course of the Defence Review - although not mentioned in the White Paper - that plans for improving SEA DART would not proceed.

3. Attached at Annex C is the text of the Defence Secretary's recent statement on the loss of HMS SHEFFIELD.



Ships and pennant Nos.	When completed	Approximate standard displacement (tons) (tonnes)	Overall dimensions (feet) (metres)	Complement	Principal armament
			length beam		
<b>Sheffield Class</b>					
SHEFFIELD (D20)	1974				
BIRMINGHAM (D86)	1976				
CARDIFF (D108)	1979				
COVENTRY (D118)	1978	3,500	410 48	280	
NEWCASTLE (D87)	1978	3,560	125 14.6		114 mm (4.5-in) gun; Sea Dart missile system; A/S torpedo tubes; Lynx helicopter
GLASGOW (D88)	1979				
EXETER (D89)	1980				
SOUTHAMPTON (D90)	1981				
NOTTINGHAM (D91)	} building	} 3,800	450 50	280	
LIVERPOOL (D92)					
MANCHESTER (D95)					
GLOUCESTER (D96)					
EDINBURGH (D97)					
YORK (D98)		3,880	139 15.2		




HMS Glasgow



PERSONALMr A J Coles  
Number Ten

1. At a meeting earlier this morning the PUS told me that you had asked for information about mandatory resolutions of the Security Council. You no doubt recall Mr Holmes' letter of 28 April to you (copy attached for ease of reference). Those present at this morning's meeting agreed that the examples quoted were the obvious examples of previous mandatory resolutions. The last paragraph of the letter explains why such resolutions are certainly few. To establish for certain that there is no other resolution that the UK would consider mandatory would involve careful study of the texts of hundreds of resolutions. I very much hope that the letter you have already received will meet your purposes, but perhaps you would telephone me if it does not.

N C R Williams  
United Nations Department

6 May 1982



CONFIDENTIAL



UNPO 12 (1)		
30 APR 1982		

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 April 1982

UND  
M. Mans (15)

Dear John,

Mandatory Resolutions

You asked for information about resolutions adopted by the Security Council, other than Resolution 502, which were binding on Member States, and remain unimplemented.

I should explain that most of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council have not been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter and have not been binding. In a number of other cases it is uncertain whether the resolution was mandatory in its effect or not (because the language does not make clear whether they were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter). The number of resolutions which are certainly mandatory is quite small. The following are some key examples.

Korea

Resolution 82 (1950) determined that the North Korean invasion of the South was a breach of the peace, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon the North Korean forces to withdraw. It remained unimplemented, and the Korean war followed as a result. The resolutions below cannot be said to have been unimplemented though they were not universally respected.

Southern Rhodesia

Resolution 221 (1966) determined that the situation arising from oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia through Beira was a threat to the peace, called upon Portugal not to receive or permit the pumping of oil for Southern Rhodesia and authorised the UK to prevent the arrival of vessels believed to be carrying such oil.

Resolution 232 (1966) determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a threat to international peace and security and decided that Member States should prevent the import into their territories of certain Southern Rhodesian products as well as the supply to Southern Rhodesia of arms, aircraft and motor vehicles.

/Resolution

CONFIDENTIAL





Resolution 253 (1966) reaffirmed the above determination and made the import and export embargoes virtually complete. It also established a committee of the Security Council to monitor the implementation of the embargo.

South Africa

Resolution 418 (1977) determined that the acquisition of arms by South Africa was a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and decided that all states should cease forthwith the provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types. (A committee of the Security Council was subsequently established to monitor the implementation of this embargo).

Unimplemented resolutions which you may have had in mind, for example 242, did not involve a Chapter VII determination of a threat to international peace and security and are therefore not mandatory. (In many cases because we and other Western countries took care to discourage Chapter VII language in order to discourage subsequent calls for sanctions.)

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St





24 AH

ccs HO  
MOJ  
CLO  
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

6 May 1982

Dear Brian,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

I attach a copy of a message about the Falkland Islands which the Prime Minister sent to President Reagan yesterday evening.

As you will see, it was very much a personal message, and I should therefore be grateful if you and the copy addressees of this letter could ensure that it is given only the most limited circulation.

I am sending copies of this letter and of the Prime Minister's message to John Halliday (Home Office), David Omand (Ministry of Defence), Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

John Major

Brian Fall Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



FLA 052030Z MAY 82

FM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T

197/82  
PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 95/82  
7

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

DEAR RON,

MY CABINET COLLEAGUES AND I SPENT SOME FOUR HOURS EARLIER TODAY CONSIDERING AL HAIG'S LATEST PROPOSALS. FRANCIS PYM HAS REPLIED ON OUR BEHALF, BUT I AM WRITING TO YOU SEPARATELY BECAUSE I THINK YOU ARE THE ONLY PERSON WHO WILL UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT I AM TRYING TO SAY.

THROUGHOUT MY ADMINISTRATION I HAVE TRIED TO STAY LOYAL TO THE UNITED STATES AS OUR GREAT ALLY, AND TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR WHICH BOTH OUR COUNTRIES STAND.

IN YOUR MESSAGE YOU SAY THAT YOUR SUGGESTIONS ARE FAITHFUL TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WE MUST PROTECT. BUT THE PRESENT RULERS OF THE ARGENTINE WILL NOT RESPECT THOSE PRINCIPLES, AND I FEAR DEEPLY THAT IF A SETTLEMENT BASED ON YOUR SUGGESTIONS IS EVENTUALLY ACHIEVED, WE SHALL FIND THAT IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS WILL HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED.

ABOVE ALL, THE PRESENT PROPOSALS DO NOT PROVIDE UNAMBIGUOUSLY FOR A RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, ALTHOUGH IT IS FUNDAMENTAL TO DEMOCRACY AND WAS ENJOYED BY THE ISLANDERS UP TO THE MOMENT OF INVASION. WE ASKED YOU EARLIER THAT IT SHOULD BE INCLUDED EXPLICITLY.

AL HAIG'S REPLY WAS THAT IT COULD NOT, BECAUSE THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT AND THERE WOULD THEREFORE BE NO HOPE OF A SETTLEMENT. THIS HAS GIVEN ME AND MY COLLEAGUES VERY GREAT DIFFICULTY. THIS IS WHY I HAVE TRIED TO TEMPER AL HAIG'S LATEST PROPOSALS A LITTLE BY SUGGESTING THAT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MUST AT LEAST CONSULT WITH THE LOCALLY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES. IT IS NOT MUCH TO ASK - AND I DO NOT THINK THAT YOU WILL TURN IT DOWN.

I TOO WANT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND AN END TO THE MOUNTING LOSS OF LIFE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN MATTERS VERY MUCH TO THE FUTURE OF THE FREE WORLD. THAT IS WHY, WITH THE CHANGES FRANCIS PYM HAS SUGGESTED TO AL HAIG, WE ARE READY, WITH WHATEVER MISGIVINGS, TO GO ALONG WITH YOUR LATEST PROPOSALS. ASSUMING THAT THEY ARE ACCEPTED BY THE ARGENTINES, THEN DURING THE NEGOTIATION PERIOD THAT WILL FOLLOW WE SHALL HAVE TO FIGHT FIERCELY FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE FALKLANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN SO LOYAL TO EVERYTHING IN WHICH YOU AND WE BELIEVE.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS  
MARGARET.



SECRET

Message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan

Dear Ron,

My Cabinet colleagues and I spent some four hours earlier today considering Al Haig's latest proposals. Francis Pym has replied on our behalf, but I am writing to you separately because I think you are the only person who will understand the significance of what I am trying to say.

Throughout my administration I have tried to stay loyal to the United States as our great ally, and to the principles of democracy, liberty and justice for which both our countries stand.

In your message you say that your suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect. But the present rulers of the Argentine will not respect those principles, and I fear deeply that if a settlement based on your suggestions is eventually achieved, we shall find that in the process of negotiation democracy and freedom for the Falkland Islanders will have been compromised.

Above all, the present proposals do not provide unambiguously for a right to self-determination, although it is fundamental to democracy and was enjoyed by the Islanders up to the moment of invasion. We asked you earlier that it should be included explicitly.

/ Al Haig's



Al Haig's reply was that it could not, because the Argentines would not accept it and there would therefore be no hope of a settlement. This has given me and my colleagues very great difficulty. This is why I have tried to temper Al Haig's latest proposals a little by suggesting that the interim administration must at least consult with the locally elected representatives. It is not much to ask - and I do not think that you will turn it down.

I too want a peaceful settlement and an end to the mounting loss of life in the South Atlantic. I also believe that the friendship between the United States and Britain matters very much to the future of the free world. That is why, with the changes Francis Pym has suggested to Al Haig, we are ready, with whatever misgivings, to go along with your latest proposals. Assuming that they are accepted by the Argentines, then during the negotiation period that will follow we shall have to fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders who have been so loyal to everything in which you and we believe.

Warm personal regards,

Margaret



pa 2

SECRET

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 6 MAY

US/PERUVIAN PEACE PLAN

1. Mr Haig has accepted our three amendments to his revised proposals for a ceasefire and settlement. The Americans are seeking to clear the amended text with the President of Peru. They aim to have it transmitted at mid-day today to the UK/Argentina. The US favours a time limit of 24 hours for replies accepting the proposals.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL

2. The UK was almost entirely isolated during informal Security Council discussions on 5 May. A further informal meeting is to be held today. The text of the Presidential Statement which was issued after the meeting is attached. It makes no mention of SCR.502.

3. The UN Secretary-General said publicly that Argentina had accepted his proposals aimed at settling the Falklands crisis, thus bringing UN activity into sharper focus. Sr Costa Mendez is due to arrive in New York today. He may try to use discussions at the UN to aim for a ceasefire without a commitment for Argentinian withdrawal from the Islands, thereby jeopardising the US/Peruvian Peace Plan.

NAM

4. The coordinating bureau of NAM yesterday adopted a communiqué on the lines of their earlier communiqué of 26 April. It confirms non-aligned support for Argentinian sovereignty over the Islands.

HMS SHEFFIELD

5. Early this morning, MOD informed Emergency Unit of the casualty list for HMS Sheffield. This is as follows:

268 survivors, 1 confirmed dead, 5 presumed dead,  
13 RN personnel missing, 1 Hong Kong laundryman  
missing.

We await a full list of names.

/US

SECRET



SECRET

US PRESS COMMENTARIES ON NAVAL ACTIVITY IN OR NEAR THE TEZ

6. In order to allay fears among naval families arising from these commentaries, MOD took the following defensive line in answer to press enquiries:

'At 2200 hours BST, there had been no enemy activity since the attack on HMS Sheffield.'



6 May, 1982

D T Healy  
Emergency Unit

SECRET



765  
CO PANAMA CITY

GEORGETOWN

CO PEKING

GR 150

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 060630Z FCO

DESKBY 060800Z ACCRA

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060221Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 659 OF 5 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MADRID, DUBLIN, MOSCOW, WARSAW,  
ACCRA, KINSHASA, KAMPALA, AMMAN, TOKYO, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN,  
PEKING.

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AGREED BY THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL ON 5 MAY:

"FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE COUNCIL WAS AUTHORISED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT  
ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL:

THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXPRESS DEEP CONCERN AT THE  
DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND  
ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) AND THE LOSS OF LIVES.

THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALSO EXPRESS STRONG SUPPORT  
FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITH REGARD TO HIS  
CONTACTS WITH THE TWO PARTIES.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE AGREED TO MEET FOR FURTHER  
CONSULTATIONS TOMORROW, THURSDAY 6 MAY 1982."

PARSONS

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

FILE SW



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 May, 1982

UN Trusteeship for the Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister has recently expressed interest in a UN trusteeship arrangement as one of the possible solutions to the Falkland Islands problem. You will recall that references to this possibility have also been made in Parliament.

This possible solution was briefly described in Sir Michael Palliser's paper circulated as OD (SA) (82) 38 on 30 April.

The Prime Minister told me last night that she would now be grateful for a rather more detailed examination of the idea. In particular, she would like to be informed of any relevant precedents involving UN trustee territories. She also wishes to know what opposition such a proposal would be likely to incur at the United Nations and whether, once a trusteeship arrangement was established, its continuity would depend on approval by UN membership. (Would there be any requirement for a periodic vote to review the arrangement?)

I should be grateful if a paper on these lines could be made available as soon as possible. Please incorporate any other material which you think might be relevant to the Prime Minister's further reflection on this possibility.

I am copying this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

R



6 May 1982

Co-operation with Chile

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Nott's minute of 5 May. After speaking to John Holmes, I informed the Prime Minister last night that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had no objection to the proposal contained in it.

As I informed Nick Evans last night, Mrs. Thatcher agrees that the Nimrod R should be deployed as proposed by your Secretary of State.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

JOHN COLES

David Omand Esq  
Ministry of Defence



CONFIDENTIAL

CONSULAR SITREP 0800 HOURS, 6 MAY

Returnees

1. Only two of the returnees, the Loves have been positively identified. Stephen Love was a Defence Attaché in Buenos Aires and the Welfare Section of MOD have been informed of his return. A telegram was sent to Montevideo asking for help in identifying the three other passengers mentioned by British Caledonian and they remain unknown. J&SIW have been informed of this. I suggested that Reg Williams when he contacted them could inform Colonel Redfearn if he felt they had anything of value to communicate.

South American Reactions

2. Two points may be of interest on the consular side. The first of which is a possible break off of telecommunication contact with Peru and the second a possible Latin American boycott of British aircraft. This could not come into effect before the weekend.

Prisoners of War

3. ICRC are aware of our thinking on the return of POWs to Argentina. They have a representative in Ascension. The present plan is for them to be returned by civilian aircraft to Brazil or Uruguay.

4. Otherwise intense activity on the diplomatic side but an extremely quiet night from the Consular point of view.

*Richard Hyde*

R W Hyde  
Emergency Unit

6 May 1982





~~1200 on Tuesday~~

May 6, 1962

AR  $\frac{11}{5}$

f.a.

Dear Mr Coles.

I send you a self explanatory note for the Prime Minister. You may well, I appreciate, have yr. own leads to Señor Ulloa, or the Foreign Office may have: but just in case this cd. be helpful I send it you with all despatch.

I have the impression that Señor Ulloa wd like to come to talk to the Prime Minister; but that he will not come to London at all unless he gets a tip that she wd. probably be able to see him.

Knowing Señor Ulloa, & knowing a little of the part played by Ponsseca Peru recently I had thought it wd. be helpful if the Prime Minister cd. see him; I do not think that he will have turned into a rhetorician since I last saw him in November; but of course I do not know



what he will say.

I was distressed by the change, as it seemed to me to be in Dr Calder's personality since I last saw him. I had always thought that he was what he claimed to be yesterday: a moderate politician. ~~That~~ Yesterday though he seemed to have joined the fanatics. That information may I suppose have value. Great value perhaps. But it was exceptionally sad all the same.

He went away I must tell you shaken by the Prime Minister's determination and impressed by her willingness to argue. The conversation plainly made a great impression on him (He talked to me afterwards a little). But he <sup>did</sup> plainly told the Embassy that the meeting had been "a success". So I was told this morning. I said I was delighted he thought so.

I shall be at home during the weekend Sat. eve or anyone wish to put me Senior Ulloa through me. Yours sincerely  
Hugh Thomas



PART 13 ends:-

5. 5. 82

PART 14 begins:-

6. 5. 82



KODAK Q-60 Color Input Target

C M Y



IT8.7/2-1993  
2007:03

<FTP://FTP.KODAK.COM/GASTDS/Q60DATA>

Q-60R2 Target for  
KODAK  
Professional Papers

