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PREM 19/626

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PART 15

Confidential filing

Relations with Argentina

Position of the Falkland Islands

ARGENTINAPt 1: Sept 1979Pt 15: May 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
10.5.82							
PREM 19/626							

PART 15 ends:-

10 - 5 - 82

PART 16 begins:-

11 - 5 - 82.



Argentina

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Hugh Thomas has confirmed that the Prime Minister of Peru will call at 5.50 p.m. on Tuesday.

Alcoa has been in touch with both Perez de Cuellar and the Argentines who know that he is coming.

2. Hugh Thomas will bring him along but agrees with me that he should not sit in on the talks since this will be an official meeting between 2 Prime Ministers. Hugh will give him dinner tomorrow evening.

A.S.C. $\frac{10}{5}$.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION):

0730Z, 10 MAY

US Television Interview with Sr Costa Mendez, 9 May

1. On sovereignty Costa Mendez seemed to say that while Argentina was not insisting that the UK should recognise Argentina sovereignty at the beginning of the negotiations, Argentina insisted that negotiations must conclude with confirmation of Argentine sovereignty.

UN

(a) UK Attitude to Negotiations: Discussion with Secretary-General

2. Sir A Parsons spoke as instructed in paragraphs 2-5 of FCO tel No 371 to UKMIS New York. The following were the main points which emerged in discussion. Verification of naval withdrawal: The Secretary-General said that he would be grateful for London's views on this problem. Venue of the negotiations: The Secretary-General seemed to accept that negotiations would be difficult in New York and said he himself had thought of Ottawa as a possible venue. Terms of reference for negotiations: Sir A Parsons said he was seriously disturbed by Costa Mendez's television interview (see paragraph 1 above). He asked the Secretary-General formally to seek clarification urgently from the Argentines: the Secretary-General agreed to do this. Dependencies: It is clear that our position was not understood fully by the Secretary-General's team: Ahmed argued that this had not been our position in earlier negotiations in 1977. Sir A Parsons countered this, but he believes we may encounter further difficulties. Future action: Sir A Parsons suggested that the time might be ripe for the Secretary-General to produce a somewhat fuller document. The Secretary-General said this was exactly what he intended to do.

(b) Argentine Attitude to Negotiations: Discussion with Secretary-General

3. The Secretary-General has reported to Sir A Parsons on the Argentine attitude. The main points were as follows. Dependencies: Insistence that dependencies must be included. Military withdrawal: Task Force must withdraw from circles of 150 mile radius from the Falklands, South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands. Lifting of economic zones and economic sanctions to be effective as to time 'T'. Venue: New York. Interim administration. Strong objections to any role for the Islanders. Terms of reference: The kind of language they have in mind 'negotiations would have to solve the disputes between the parties taking into account relevant General Assembly resolutions'.

A
(Washington
tel No 1682)

B
(FCO tel No
371 to UKMIS
New York)

C
(UKMIS New
York tel
No 691)

D
(UKMIS New
York tel
No 694)

*Role of
Island
councils.*

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Sir A Parsons Assessment

E
(UKMis New
York 695)

3. For tactical as well as substantive reasons Sir A Parsons has sought to pin down the Argentines on the question of sovereignty and he has given the Secretary-General wording (in UKMis New York telno 694, Flag D) which the Secretary-General has agreed to try out on the Argentines. Against the possibility of Argentine acceptance Sir A Parsons suggests that we might have to consider a trade off between keeping our military forces on S. Georgia and participation by the Falkland Islanders in the interim administration. Sir A Parsons has asked for comments on the question of military withdrawal but has not asked for further detailed instructions so long as London is content with the line he is taking particularly on sovereignty.

(d) Military Engagements


F
(UKMis New
York 692)

4. This caused a stir in the UN; Argentina has complained to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council. The Argentines are making out that in Security Council informal consultations 5/6 May, tacit agreement had been reached that there should be no hostilities while the Secretary-General pursued his initiative. Sir A Parsons has reminded the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council of the true position and has warned that if the Argentines continue their misrepresentations he would be forced to deny publicly the Argentine claim, citing the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in his support.

Comment

5 It is already becoming clear where the main sticking points will be: inclusion of the Dependencies, the place of the local Councils in an Interim Administration, and the terms of reference and time limit for the negotiating period.

6. Sir A Parsons does not require further instructions at this stage; and Sr Ros' own tightly circumscribed brief will slow things down. We will however have to consider whether we are prepared to make concessions on the Dependencies and on the interim administration if we are to secure acceptable terms of reference for negotiations and to retain support in the UN. The Argentines will be making all possible play with military developments in the South Atlantic in order to cast us in the aggressor's role.
7. Other points requiring consideration are:
 - a. Can we accept a ceremonial opening of negotiations at Time T?
 - b. Means of verification of a withdrawal of naval forces.
 - c. Venue for negotiations: in New York State?
 - d. Formulations on sovereignty in an interim agreement (para 9 of UKMIS New York tel No 694).



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

10 May 1982

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 091825Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1682 OF 9 MAY 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: US TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH COSTA-MENDEZ

1. COSTA-MENDEZ WAS INTERVIEWED FROM BUENOS AIRES BY CBS TELEVISION THIS MORNING. COSTA MENDEZ SAID THAT BRITISH ATTACKS ON THE FALKLANDS, NOW UNDER WAY, WERE CHARACTERISTIC OF BRITISH BEHAVIOUR WHICH HAD BEEN TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK WHENEVER "SOUND TALKS" DESIGNED TO LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WERE IN PROGRESS.

2. ASKED ABOUT ARGENTINE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT, COSTA MENDEZ SAID ARGENTINA WAS READY TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS IF BRITAIN WAS WILLING TO WITHDRAW ITS FLEET. THE AUTHORITY OF THE UN COULD BE ESTABLISHED AND, AS PART OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, DISCUSSIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY COULD BE UNDERTAKEN. BUT ALL THIS MUST LEAD TO RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY, EVEN IF THE BRITISH DID NOT ACCEPT THAT SOVEREIGNTY AT THE VERY BEGINNING.

3. WHEN ONE OF THE INTERVIEWERS COMMENTED THAT COSTA MENDEZ SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT HE WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE SO LONG AS THE OUTCOME WAS KNOWN IN ADVANCE, COSTA MENDEZ SAID THIS WAS NOT CORRECT. ARGENTINA WAS NOT SAYING THAT BRITAIN MUST ACCEPT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AT THE BEGINNING. SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT BEING PUT AS PRECONDITION FOR TALKS THOUGH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ARRIVE AT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY.

4. ASKED AGAIN WHETHER HE WAS SAYING THAT ARGENTINA NO LONGER HAD TO BE GUARANTEED SOVEREIGNTY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, COSTA MENDEZ APPEARED TO AGREE. THERE WAS NO DOUBT OF THE GOAL: RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY, BUT ARGENTINA DID NOT DEMAND THAT BRITAIN SIT AT THE TABLE AND SAY THAT THEY RECOGNISED ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AT THE BEGINNING. THERE WAS NO OTHER GOAL THAN SOVEREIGNTY. EVERYTHING ELSE COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH BRITAIN.

~~5. OTHER POINTS MADE DURING THE INTERVIEW INCLUDED:~~

A) THE ISLANDERS WOULD BE GRANTED EVERY RIGHT - RELIGION, LANGUAGE, EDUCATION, OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY. EVEN NATIONAL MINORITY STATUS FOR THE ISLANDERS WAS UNDER

OVER

5 OTHER POINTS MADE DURING THE INTERVIEW INCLUDED:

- A) THE ISLANDERS WOULD BE GRANTED EVERY RIGHT - RELIGION, LANGUAGE, EDUCATION, OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY. EVEN NATIONAL MINORITY STATUS FOR THE ISLANDERS WAS UNDER STUDY.
- B) THERE WOULD BE FAIR COMPENSATION FOR THOSE ISLANDERS WHO WISHED TO LEAVE. THOSE WHO WERE NOT LANDOWNERS WOULD BE GIVEN ACCESS TO LAND EITHER ON THE ISLANDS OR IN ARGENTINA AND SOFT LOAN TERMS WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. ARGENTINA WOULD EVEN HELP THOSE WHO MIGHT WANT TO LEAVE EG FOR AUSTRALIA OR NEW ZEALAND.
- C) THE FALKLANDS WAS A CLASSIC CASE OF COLONIALISM WITH 46% OF THE LAND AND 90% OF THE BUSINESS IN THE HANDS OF ONE COMPANY. MANY ISLANDERS HAD NO ACCESS TO PROPERTY.
- D) ARGENTINA HAD NOT ASKED THE SOVIET UNION FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD EXCELLENT TRADING RELATIONS. ARGENTINA'S FAVOURABLE TRADE BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ENABLED HER TO PAY FOR THE IMBALANCE IN HER TRADE WITH THE US.
- E) THE US HAD GONE TOO FAR BY ABANDONING NEUTRALITY IN THE DISPUTE AND WAS PUTTING AT RISK ITS INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

HENDERSON

NNKH


ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK

ZZ WASHINGTON

GRS 1405

CONFIDENTIAL

-9 MAY



FM FCO 091600Z MAY 82
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 371 OF 9 MAY
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 679, 685 AND 686: FALKLANDS

1. WE AGREE THAT BRITAIN SHOULD DEMONSTRATE FULL WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS. WE THEREFORE WISH TO REPLY QUICKLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE POINTS MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN YOUR MEETINGS YESTERDAY. WE SHOULD IN PARTICULAR DEAL TODAY WITH THE FIVE POINTS IDENTIFIED AT THE END OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 679 BUT SHOULD ALSO STATE FIRMLY OUR POSITION ON THE HIGHLY DIFFICULT AND DELICATE PROBLEM OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

2. YOU SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING BRITISH POSITION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE FIVE POINTS:

(A) DATE OF TIME 'T'. WE CAN AGREE THAT TIME 'T' SHOULD BE SET AS SOON AFTER SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT AS BOTH PARTIES CAN GUARANTEE COMPLIANCE BY THEIR FORCES WITH A CEASEFIRE. FOR US, 24 HOURS AFTER SIGNATURE IS ACCEPTABLE, PROVIDED ARGENTINA CAN GUARANTEE TO ABIDE BY IT AND ASSUMING THAT WE SHOULD HAVE REASONABLE NOTICE (AT LEAST 24 HOURS) OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT.

(B) THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL. WE CAN ACCEPT A PERIOD OF NO LONGER THAN 14 DAYS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE ISLANDS, HALF OF THEM SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN WITHIN 7 DAYS.

(C) THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TASK FORCE. THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL MUST BE EQUAL AND PARALLEL WITH THOSE FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, THUS INVOLVING NO

DISADVANTAGE TO BRITAIN. WE CAN AGREE TO WITHDRAW ALL OUR NAVAL FORCES WITHIN 14 DAYS, AND HALF OF THEM WITHIN 7 DAYS, TO OUTSIDE A ZONE OF 200 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

(D) **TERMINAL DATE FOR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.** IT IS UNREAL TO SET AN ABSOLUTE TERMINAL DATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHEN EVERYONE KNOWS THAT THE PARTIES, WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD, MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WITHIN A SPECIFIED PERIOD. FOR THIS REASON, WE HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL RETURN TO THE EXPRESSION 'TARGET DATE' WHICH APPEARED IN HIS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS OF 3 MAY. ON THAT BASIS WE COULD ACCEPT THAT THE NAMED DATE BE 31 DECEMBER 1982. IN ORDER HOWEVER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF REALITY, WITHOUT STATING DIRECTLY THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT GO ON BEYOND THE TARGET DATE, THE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL AN AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS IS IMPLEMENTED AND WE SHOULD WANT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE TARGET DATE ABOUT THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NEXT STEPS. (NEXT STEPS COULD OF COURSE BE EITHER IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT OR CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS)..

(E) **THE FORMAT AND VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.** WE HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL AGREE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNDER HIS AUSPICES AND AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN HIS PRESENCE. WHEN HE CANNOT BE PRESENT, WE HOPE THAT HIS PLACE WILL BE TAKEN BY A REPRESENTATIVE. BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES IN NEW YORK, WE SHOULD LIKE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE ELSEWHERE, PERHAPS GENEVA OR OTTAWA.

3. **IN AMPLIFICATION OF POINTS (B) AND (C) ABOVE,** PLEASE SUGGEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT HE MIGHT BUILD ON THE KEY POINT OF HIS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS - THAT A NUMBER OF THINGS SHOULD ALL BEGIN HAPPENING AT TIME 'T' - IN THE FOLLOWING WAY. WITH EFFECT FROM TIME 'T' THE PARTIES MIGHT UNDERTAKE NOT ONLY TO CEASE FIRE AND TO BEGIN WITHDRAWING FROM THE ZONE OF 200 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, BUT

ALSO NOT TO INTRODUCE ANY FURTHER MILITARY FORCES INTO THAT ZONE (EXCEPT FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, AND THEN UNDER UN SUPERVISION), TO SUSPEND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ZONES NOW IN OPERATION AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND TO TAKE STEPS TO TERMINATE ECONOMIC MEASURES. THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION WOULD BEGIN ARRIVING IN THE FALKLANDS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER TIME 'D' AND WOULD VERIFY WITHDRAWAL BY BOTH PARTIES. WE HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD REPORT VERY FREQUENTLY, PERHAPS DAILY, ON THE PROCESS AND COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL. BY DAY 14, WHEN WITHDRAWAL BY BOTH PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETE, THE EXCLUSION ZONES WOULD BE FINALLY TERMINATED, THE ECONOMIC MEASURES WOULD END AND THE INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE COMPLETELY ESTABLISHED. NEITHER SIDE COULD INTRODUCE MILITARY FORCES INTO THE 200 NAUTICAL MILE ZONE THROUGHOUT THE INTERIM PERIOD.

4. WE SHARE YOUR SUSPICION THAT ARGENTINA MAY HOPE TO TAKE OVER THE ISLANDS WHEN THE INTERIM PERIOD ENDS. THE POINTS SUGGESTED UNDER (D) ABOVE ARE OF COURSE DESIGNED TO HELP IN COUNTERING THIS. BUT WE MUST ALSO INSIST MOST FIRMLY THAT THE NEW ARGENTINE SUGGESTIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ABOUT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION ARE UNACCEPTABLE. WE CAN ACCEPT UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN THE SENSE OF A UN ADMINISTRATOR AS THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT IN RELATION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS WOULD DISCHARGE THEIR TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS, THE UN ADMINISTRATOR CARRYING OUT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR.

5. ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY SUGGEST LANGUAGE ABOUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS TENDING TO FAVOUR THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY (PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELNO 685). (THIS KIND OF PLOY PRODUCED, IN HAIG'S FIRST SHUTTLE, A COMPLEX AND CONTRADICTIONARY PARAGRAPH ABOUT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.) YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT TO EMBARK ON THIS KIND OF THING WOULD PROBABLY PRODUCE AN

ENDLESS WRANGLE ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE REFERRED TO. WE WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON REFERENCES TO SELF-DETERMINATION OR AT LEAST TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER. WE THEREFORE HOPE VERY MUCH THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CAN KEEP THE LANGUAGE ABOUT THE SUBJECT FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS VERY CLEAR AND SIMPLE. WHY NOT RETURN TO THE WORDS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PAPER OF 3 MAY WHICH OF COURSE ECHOED RESOLUTION 302) ABOUT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SEEKING 'A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES'? ALTERNATIVELY, A COMPLETELY NEUTRAL FORMULA ABOUT THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. WE NOTE ROS'S STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELNO 685 ABOUT NOT PREJUDGING SOVEREIGNTY. IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET THIS CLEARLY ON THE RECORD, IF WE ARE NOT SUBSEQUENTLY TO BE ACCUSED OF HAVING ALLOWED OUR POSITION TO BE ERODED BY NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ANY FIRM EVIDENCE THAT THE ARGENTINE JUNTA ACCEPT THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS A NEGOTIABLE ISSUE.

6. OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS IN MINISTERS' MINDS ARE:

(A) IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT APPARENT ARGENTINE ADHERENCE TO ANY AGREEMENT IN NEW YORK IS FULLY BACKED BY THE JUNTA IN BUENOS AIRES.

(B) ANY AGREEMENT MUST BE ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS - ISLAS MALVINAS. SINCE THERE MAY BE A MEASURE OF UNCERTAINTY IN SOME MINDS YOU SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE INTENTION IS TO EXCLUDE THE DEPENDENCIES.

(C) THE ESSENTIAL NEED FOR A SECURITY GUARANTEE, NOT NECESSARILY AS PART OF THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH IS SEEN AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WHICH YOU POSE IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELNO 686.

7. MEANWHILE WE ARE ENSURING THAT YOU HAVE RECEIVED OR WILL RECEIVE THE TEXTS OF THE PREVIOUS DRAFT AGREEMENTS WITH WHICH WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LIVE: I.E. THE DOCUMENT HAIG TOOK BACK FROM LONDON AFTER EASTER, THE BA VERSION AS AMENDED BY US FOR MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 22 APRIL, AND THE FINAL US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS AS MODIFIED BY US. FURTHERMORE DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARIES WHICH YOU DO NOT ALREADY HAVE WILL BE SENT BY BAG. YOU WILL REALISE THAT THESE - PARTICULARLY

THE TWO FORMER DRAFTS - CONTAIN MANY ELEMENTS WHICH WE WOULD NOT (NOT) WISH TO REVIVE. IN COMPLYING THEREFORE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST TO BE TOLD AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF OUR PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING STANCE YOU SHOULD RESTRICT YOURSELF AS FAR AS YOU CAN TO SUPPLYING DETAILS OF THE US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS. **ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH HE IS ALREADY BRIEFED. WE WISH TO PREJUDGE THAT THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU CAN HOLD BACK WILL BE** CONDITIONED BY HOW MUCH THE ARGENTINES ARE VOLUNTEERING, OR DISTORTING, OUR EARLIER POSITIONS. AT ALL EVENTS, YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT ANY AGREEMENT WHICH IS TO BE CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY BY US MUST (A) INCLUDE THE CONCEPT OF CEASEFIRE BEING UNAMBIGUOUSLY LINKED TO AN IMMEDIATE START OF ARGENTINE TROOP WITHDRAWAL, (B) NOT PREJUDGE IN ANY WAY A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO ARGENTINA, AND (C) AVOID A DE FACTO SITUATION BY WHICH ARGENTINA GAINED THE ISLANDS IN DEFAULT OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT BY A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

PYM

GRS 1200

110 MAY 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 092220Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 691 OF 9 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL NO 371: FALKLANDS.

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AT 1930Z TODAY (9 MAY). WE ARE TO MEET AGAIN AT ABOUT 2300Z, BY WHICH TIME HE WILL HAVE SEEN ROS (ARGENTINA).

2. ON THE DATE OF TIME 'T', THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL AND THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TASK FORCE, I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 2(A) TO (C) AND PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND GAVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR COPIES OF MY SPEAKING NOTES. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR HIS STAFF RAISED THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THIS PART OF MY PRESENTATION:

(A) DID WE ACCEPT THAT THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN AT TIME 'T', SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS MENTIONED IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE? I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY DIFFICULTY ABOUT HAVING A CEREMONIAL OPENING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THAT STAGE, THOUGH IN PRACTICE IT WOULD TAKE TIME FOR BOTH SIDES TO ASSEMBLE AND PREPARE THEIR NEGOTIATING TEAMS.

(B) THE ARGENTINES MIGHT ARGUE THAT 200 NAUTICAL MILES WAS TOO SHORT A RADIUS FOR THE ZONE FROM WHICH THE BRITISH TASK FORCE WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. HAD THIS BEEN AN ISSUE IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS? I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW.

(C) HOW WOULD THE WITHDRAWAL OF NAVAL FORCES, AND ESPECIALLY SUBMARINES, OF BOTH SIDES BE VERIFIED? THE UN HAD NO EXPERIENCE OF SUCH AN OPERATION. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY IDEAS YOU HAVE ON THIS POINT. (ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO MAKE A DECLARATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE SHIPS THEY HAD IN THE ZONE AT TIME 'T' AND NOTIFY HIM AS EACH VESSEL WITHDREW; IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE UN COULD MOUNT ANY PHYSICAL VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL).

I NEXT SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 2(D) OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE ON THE TERMINAL DATE FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS, EMPHASISING THAT WE SIMPLY COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY POSSIBILITY OF THERE BEING A VACUUM ON 31 DECEMBER 1982 WITH NEITHER AN AGREEMENT NOR INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN FORCE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S TEAM ACCEPTED THE POINT BUT CLEARLY THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD BRIDLE AT THE INCLUSION IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ITSELF OF A PROVISION THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL A FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS WAS IMPLEMENTED. AHMED WONDERED WHETHER THIS POINT MIGHT BE MADE IN THE ANNEX DESCRIBING THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. I SAID THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BUT THAT WE WOULD NEED TO SEE LANGUAGE AND THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE.

4. I THEN MADE THE POINTS ABOUT THE FORMAT AND VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARA 2(E) OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, ADDING THAT THE CRITICAL MOMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD COME DURING THE 37TH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THIS WOULD REALLY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD THE TALKS IN NEW YORK. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS AND SAID THAT HE HIMSELF HAD THOUGHT OF OTTAWA AS A POSSIBLE VENUE.

5. I NEXT RAISED THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. I SAID THAT THIS BROUGHT ME ON TO THE ALL-IMPORTANT QUESTION OF ARGENTINE ACCEPTANCE THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY. I HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY DISTURBED BY COSTA MENDEZ'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW TODAY (WASHINGTON TEL NO 1682). HE SEEMED TO ME TO HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT ARGENTINA WAS NOT INSISTING THAT THE UK SHOULD ACTUALLY CEDE SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED BUT THAT SHE INSISTED THAT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS MUST CONCLUDE WITH CONFIRMATION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT THEY WOULD THEREFORE BE CONCERNED NOT WITH SOVEREIGNTY ITSELF BUT WITH HOW THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS MIGHT BE PROTECTED UNDER ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY. IF MY READING OF COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS WAS RIGHT, THERE HAD BEEN A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD DESCRIBED IT TO BE YESTERDAY. IN THAT CASE WE WOULD BE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. I HOPED THAT I WAS WRONG. BUT I MUST FORMALLY ASK PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO ASK ROS FOR URGENT CLARIFICATION OF ARGENTINA'S POSITION. ON HIS ANSWER WOULD DEPEND WHETHER PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS IN BUSINESS OR WHETHER HE WAS ENGAGED IN ANOTHER FUTILE EXERCISE. COSTA MENDEZ WAS THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HE WAS SPEAKING ON THE RECORD. ROS MUST BE ASKED TO ESTABLISH ABSOLUTELY CLEARLY WHAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR LOOKED UNHAPPY BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD DO AS I ASKED.

6. I NEXT STATED THAT I WISHED IT TO BE QUITE CLEAR THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ALONE, NOT ABOUT THE DEPENDENCIES.

I NEXT STATED THAT I WISHED IT TO BE QUITE CLEAR THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ALONE, NOT ABOUT THE DEPENDENCIES. OUR TITLE TO THE LATTER WAS DIFFERENT FROM OUR TITLE TO THE FALKLANDS: AND THEY HAD NO PERMANENT POPULATION. IT HAD BEEN ONLY A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE THAT THEY HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED FROM PORT STANLEY. IT TURNED OUT TO BE AS WELL THAT I MENTIONED THIS. AHMED AT LEAST HAD CLEARLY BEEN ASSUMING THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD COVER THE DEPENDENCIES AS WELL AND THAT WHEN THE ARGENTINES WITHDREW FROM THE FALKLANDS WE WOULD ALSO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH GEORGIA. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE DEPENDENCIES HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN OUR EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES AND QUOTED THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE 1977 ROUND OF TALKS (A/32/111). I INSISTED THAT WE WERE ONLY CONCERNED AT THIS STAGE WITH THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD IN THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS. WE WOULD HAVE ONLY SIX MONTHS TO REACH A FINAL AGREEMENT, AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CONCENTRATE ON THE MAIN PROBLEM, VIZ THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES. I THINK THAT WE MAY HAVE FURTHER TROUBLE ON THIS, WITH AHMED TIRE- SOMELY BRINGING UP THE EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS. I RECOMMEND THAT OUR LINE SHOULD BE THAT THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE ISLANDS (IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION, INCIDENTALLY, OF OPERATIVE PARA 4 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 31/49) HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION AND THAT THE PRECEDENT OF THE EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS IS NO LONGER RELEVANT.

7. FINALLY, I MADE THE POINTS ABOUT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN PARA 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, STRESSING HOW IMPORTANT THEY WERE FOR US. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOOK NOTE.

8. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, I SUGGESTED THAT THE TIME MIGHT HAVE COME FOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO PRODUCE A SOMEWHAT FULLER DOCUMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH ROS AND ME. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE INTENDED TO DO. HE WOULD SEE ROS IMMEDIATELY, IN PARTICULAR TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME A SECOND TIME LATER THIS EVENING, PROBABLY AT 2300Z. I WILL REPORT FURTHER AFTER THAT MEETING.

9. ON THE WHOLE THIS WAS A GOOD MEETING. I EMPHASISED HOW CONSTRUCTIVE, URGENT AND FLEXIBLE WE WERE SHOWING OURSELVES TO BE. NO ONE CONTESTED THIS AND THE ATMOSPHERE WAS SERIOUS BUT FRIENDLY.

PARSONS

NNNN

NYFC 002/10

OO CC (DESKBY 100700Z)

GRS 2000

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 100700Z

FM UKHIS NEW YORK 100300Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 694 OF 9 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 691: FALKLANDS.

1. I HAD ANOTHER HOUR WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AT 2330Z TODAY (9 MAY).
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD ROS (ARGENTINA) THAT WE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE DEPENDENCIES WERE INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT EXERCISE. ROS HAD OBJECTED STRONGLY, SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR PUBLIC OPINION THAT ARGENTINA WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLANDS BUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO BRITISH MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD PURSUED THE QUESTION WITH ROS AT A PRIVATE MEETING. BUT ROS HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT OUR POSITION: THE DEPENDENCIES WERE INCLUDED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS AND IN THE 1977 COMMUNIQUE; THE ARGENTINES WOULD INSIST THAT ALL THE ISLANDS BE INCLUDED. ROS WAS AS USUAL SPEAKING TO A PREPARED BRIEF - THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF AVOIDING THIS ISSUE.
3. ON WITHDRAWAL ETC, THE ARGENTINES WANTED THE BRITISH TASK FORCE TO WITHDRAW OUTSIDE THREE CIRCLES OF 150 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE CO-ORDINATES IN PARA 2 OF THE DRAFT PROPOSALS OF 12 APRIL (YOUR TELNO 369), IE FROM THE CENTRES OF THE FALKLANDS, SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS. THEY WANTED A PROVISION THAT WITHDRAWAL COULD BE EXTENDED FOR A BIT BEYOND 14 DAYS IF BAD WEATHER OR OTHER FACTORS CAUSED DELAYS. AND THEY WANTED THE LIFTING OF THE EXCLUSION ZONES AND OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS QUOTE TO BE EFFECTIVE AS OF TIME 'T' UNQUOTE; OTHERWISE THE IMPRESSION MIGHT BE GIVEN THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL WAS TAKING PLACE UNDER PRESSURE.
4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ROS HAD NOT GIVEN A CLEAR ANSWER ON WHETHER THE ARGENTINES ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL THAT 31 DECEMBER 1982 SHOULD BE DESCRIBED AS THE QUOTE TARGET DATE UNQUOTE FOR COMPLETION OF THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. INSTEAD, HE HAD ASKED HOW LONG AN EXTENSION WE ENVISAGED IF AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED.

BY 31 DECEMBER. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE REDICULOUS FOR THE AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE TWO TARGET DATES, ONE AFTER THE OTHER: IN OUR VIEW IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT, SAY IN MID-DECEMBER, ON HOW MUCH MORE TIME IN HIS JUDGEMENT WAS NEEDED, IF AGREEMENT WAS NOT IN SIGHT BY THEN.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE FIRM IN THEIR WISH FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK, ESPECIALLY IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS TO PARTICIPATE PERSONALLY. ROS DID NOT THINK THAT OTTAWA WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS WONDERING WHETHER SOMEWHERE IN NEW YORK STATE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE: IT HAD BECOME A CONVENTION THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL DID NOT LEAVE NEW YORK DURING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

6. ON THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES CONTINUED TO OBJECT STRONGLY TO ANY ROLE FOR THE ISLANDERS, EVEN OF AN ADVISORY CHARACTER, BECAUSE THIS WOULD PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. YOU HAD TALKED FIRMLY ABOUT HMG'S INSISTENCE ON THE RESTORATION OF THE TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATION. ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD REQUIRE LEGISLATION: WE OUTLINED THE PARLIAMENTARY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS.

7. I WENT ON TO RAISE A FRESH POINT. HAVING HEARD COSTA MENDEZ TODAY, I WAS CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT, IF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AND THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, THE ARGENTINES WOULD AT THAT STAGE INSIST THAT THEY WERE ONLY PREPARED TO TALK ON THE BASIS THAT THEY OBTAINED SOVEREIGNTY IN THE END. THIS WOULD PROVOKE AN IMMEDIATE DEADLOCK. WOULD THE WHOLE INTERIM AGREEMENT THEN COLLAPSE, PRODUCING A VACUUM? TO GUARD AGAINST THIS RISK, I THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A QUOTE NO-BREAK UNQUOTE CLAUSE IN THE AGREEMENT, EG QUOTE THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON SIGNATURE AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES HAS BEEN REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE PARTIES UNQUOTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOOK NOTE OF THIS. DE SOTO COMMENTED (RIGHTLY) THAT IT WOULD MAKE AGREEMENT MORE DIFFICULT ON OUR POINT ABOUT THE TARGET DATE.

8. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A VERY DIFFICULT DISCUSSION WITH ROS ABOUT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LINKED QUESTION OF COSTA MENDEZ'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW TODAY. THE KIND OF LANGUAGE THE ARGENTINES HAD IN MIND FOR THE TERMS OF REFERENCE WAS: QUOTE THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO SOLVE THE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT RELEVANT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT DO. COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS TODAY HAD BEEN VERY CLOSE TO ARGENTINE STATEMENTS WHICH HAD CAUSED THE COLLAPSE OF PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WE MUST HAVE PROPER CLARIFICATION. EVEN IF ROS WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM

DISCUSSION WITH ROS ABOUT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LINKED QUESTION OF COSTA MENDEZ'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW TODAY. THE KIND OF LANGUAGE THE ARGENTINES HAD IN MIND FOR THE TERMS OF REFERENCE WAS: QUOTE THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO SOLVE THE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT RELEVANT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT DO. COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS TODAY HAD BEEN VERY CLOSE TO ARGENTINE STATEMENTS WHICH HAD CAUSED THE COLLAPSE OF PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WE MUST HAVE PROPER CLARIFICATION. EVEN IF ROS WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE ARGENTINE POSITION WAS AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD DESCRIBED IT TO ME YESTERDAY, WE WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON CERTAIN FORMULATIONS BEING INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT, IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT. WE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO INSIST THAT ALL THREE MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA SIGNED THE AGREEMENT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ADMITTED THAT HIS CONVERSATION ON THIS POINT WITH ROS HAD NOT BEEN SATISFACTORY AND SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY AGAIN.

9. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION HE INVITED ME TO GIVE HIM LANGUAGE WHICH, OSTENSIBLY AS HIS OWN INITIATIVE, HE WOULD PRESENT TO THE ARGENTINES IN ORDER TO SMOKE OUT THEIR POSITION AND, HE HOPED, CONFIRM THAT THEY REALLY DID ACCEPT THAT THE FINAL OUTCOME COULD NOT BE PREJUDGED. MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I WAS ACTING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, I HAVE GIVEN HIM THE FOLLOWING FORMULATIONS:

(A) AS A FIRST ARTICLE IN THE AGREEMENT:

QUOTE

(1) NO PROVISION OF THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHALL IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY IN THE ULTIMATE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS).

(2) NO ACTS OR ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WHILST THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT IS IN FORCE SHALL CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR ASSERTING, SUPPORTING OR DENYING A CLAIM TO TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) OR GREAT ANY RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THEM UNQUOTE.

(B) AS AN ARTICLE PROVIDING FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS:

QUOTE THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES AND SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN SOME FORMULA ABOUT THE TARGET DATE CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS. THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY AND WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME. UNQUOTE.

THESE HAVE BEEN TAKEN FROM ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER, FROM THE ISRAEL/JORDAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT (BASED ON ARTICLE 40) AND FROM ARTICLE IV (2) OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY.

10. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY OUT THIS KIND OF LANGUAGE ON ROS, WHO WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO REFER TO BUENOS AIRES. IF THE ARGENTINES WOULD ACCEPT SUCH LANGUAGE, WOULD WE DROP OUR INSISTENCE ON A ROLE FOR THE ISLANDERS IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION? DE SOTO SAID THAT THIS LOOKED LIKE THE MAKINGS OF A TRADE-OFF. I SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A TRADE-OFF AT ALL: DE SOTO WAS NOT COMPARING LIKE WITH LIKE: CONSIDER IT THE OTHER WAY ROUND: IF THE ARGENTINES ACCEPTED A ROLE FOR THE ISLANDERS, WE CERTAINLY COULD NOT GIVE UP OUR INSISTENCE THAT THE FINAL OUTCOME NOT BE PREJUDGED. THIS WAS AN ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL POINT FOR US. IT NEEDED TO BE CLEARED UP FIRST SO THAT WE COULD ALL KNOW WHETHER IT WAS WORTH PROCEEDING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGREED AND SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT ASK ME TO SEE HIM AGAIN UNTIL HE HAD HAD AN ARGENTINE REPLY ON THIS POINT.

11. PLEASE SEE MIFT FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

PARSONS

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PP

NYFO 03/10

OO FCO (DESKBY 100700Z)

GRS 650

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 100700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 100301Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 695 OF 9 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLANDS.

1. MY TACTICS TODAY HAVE BEEN TO MAKE AS MUCH GENUINE PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE WHILE AVOIDING BEING CORNERED ON THE POSSIBILITY OUTLINED IN THE SECOND HALF OF PARA 3 OF MY TEL NO 686, IE HAVING TO RISK A BREAK ON A PROPOSITION - EXCLUSIVE UN ADMINISTRATION ON THE ISLAND - WHICH WOULD COMMAND TOTAL SUPPORT IN THE UN AND LEAVE US ISOLATED.
2. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT, APART FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, I INSISTED THAT THE ARGENTINES MUST COME CLEAN ON THE QUESTION OF PREJUDGMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE WE MOVED ON TO ANYTHING ELSE OF A CONTENTIOUS NATURE.
3. SO FAR, SO GOOD, THIS BALL IS NOW FIRMLY IN THE ARGENTINE COURT AND BUESNOS AIRES WILL HAVE TO GIVE ROS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION BEFORE WE COME UNDER FURTHER PRESSURE. IF THEY COME UP WITH THE WRONG ANSWER, IE AN ANSWER UNSATISFACTORY TO US, THE STAGE WILL BE SET EITHER FOR A BREAK DOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OR FOR A FINAL DRAMATIC EFFORT BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO PERSUADE THE JUNTA TO THINK AGAIN.
4. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF THEIR ACCEPTING THE FORMULATION ON NEGOTIATIONS SET OUT IN PARA 9 OF MIPT, THE PRESSURE WILL THEN BE ON US. IT WILL COME ON THE TWO PRINCIPAL POINTS OUTSTANDING, NAMELY ACCEPTANCE OF UN ADMINISTRATION OF THE FALKLANDS WITH THE LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES IN ABEYANCE, AND WITHDRAWAL OF OUR MILITARY FORCES (NOT SCIENTISTS) FROM SOUTH GEORGIA IN PARALLEL WITH ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS.
5. I REALISE THAT BOTH THESE ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT POINTS FOR YOU, TO SAY THE LEAST. WE MAY WELL NOT REACH THIS STAGE IF THE ARGENTINES FAIL TO DELIVER ON THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION. AND I DO NOT NEED

ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS.

5. I REALISE THAT BOTH THESE ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT POINTS FOR YOU, TO THE LEAST. WE MAY WELL NOT REACH THIS STAGE IF THE ARGENTINES FAIL TO DELIVER ON THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION. AND I DO NOT NEED INSTRUCTIONS TOMORROW (10 MAY). HOWEVER, MY GUESS IS THAT THE WHOLE NEGOTIATION WILL HAVE TO MAKE OR BREAK BY 11 MAY OR 12 MAY AT THE LATEST.

6. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT IF WE WERE SEEN TO HAVE BROKEN OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON EITHER THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OR THE QUESTION OF MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA OR BOTH, WE WOULD BE IN AN EXTREMELY ISOLATED POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS. FROM A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION I HAVE HAD WITH SIR N HENDERSON, I GATHER THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE A GENUINE EFFORT TO DRIVE THE ARGENTINES OFF INSISTING ON THE SOUTH GEORGIA POINT, WHICH HAS NOT SURFACED IN THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, I VERY MUCH DOUBT IF THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE TO CONCEDE BOTH, IE THAT OUR MILITARY FORCES REMAIN ON SOUTH GEORGIA, AND THAT THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS SHOULD REMAIN IN BEING THROUGHOUT THE INTERIM PERIOD. I AM NOT MAKING A RECOMMENDATION BUT WE MIGHT HAVE TO CONSIDER A TRADE OFF.

7. MEANWHILE, I DO NOT THINK THAT I NEED FURTHER DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE POINTS IN PARAS 4, 5 AND 7 OF MIPT PROVIDED THAT YOU ARE CONTENT WITH THE LINES I AM TAKING (I THINK THAT WE SHOULD SETTLE FOR A VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE, PROVIDED THAT IT IS NOT IN NEW YORK CITY) AND THAT YOU ARE CONTENT WITH THE PROPOSITIONS I HAVE ADVANCED ON THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN PARAS 8 AND 9. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE USEFUL TO HAVE ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY WISH TO PROPOSE ON THE DETAILED POINTS IN PARA 3.

PARSONS

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NYFO 10/89

OO FCO (DESKBY 100700Z)

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 100700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 092300Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 692 OF 9 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS ON 9 MAY.

1. TODAY'S MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS HAVE PREDICTABLY FLUTTERED THE DOVECOTES HERE. ROCA (ARGENTINA) COMPLAINED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAS SENT TWO LETTERS TO THE LATTER. THE ARGENTINES ARE PUTTING IT ABOUT THAT AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 5 AND 6 MAY TACIT AGREEMENT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO HOSTILITIES WHILE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUED HIS INITIATIVE. AS SOON AS I LEARNT THIS, I TELEPHONED BOTH PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND LING QING TO REMIND THEM THAT I HAD MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR SUSPENDING MILITARY OPERATIONS. IF THE ARGENTINES WENT ON CLAIMING THAT I HAD AGREED TO DO SO, I WOULD HAVE TO DENY THIS IN PUBLIC AND CITE THE PRESIDENT AND THE S.G. IN MY SUPPORT. I REPEATED THESE POINTS TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AT THE FIRST OF OUR MEETINGS THIS EVENING (AT WHICH A REUTERS REPORT WAS BROUGHT IN ABOUT THE ALLEGED SHOOTING DOWN OF AN ARGENTINE PUMA HELICOPTER TODAY).
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR UNDERSTANDS OUR POSITION BUT IS UNDERSTANDABLY WORRIED THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS BY EITHER SIDE WILL LEAD DORR OR LING QING TO RECONVENE THE COUNCIL, THEREBY THREATENING THE PROSPECTS FOR HIS INITIATIVE.
3. AS THE EMERGENCY UNIT WILL KNOW, I ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO SEND A LETTER TODAY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER ARTICLE 51 GIVING OUR ACCOUNT OF THE DAY'S ENGAGEMENTS. BUT AS UNCERTAINTY REMAINS ABOUT WHAT EXACTLY HAPPENED I HAVE DECIDED TO DEFER MY LETTER UNTIL AN AUTHORITATIVE AND COMPLETE ACCOUNT IS AVAILABLE. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I SHOULD GET MY LETTER IN NOT LATER THAN 1700Z ON 10 MAY.

PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

11



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 May 1982

Dear John,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Prime Minister
Of Peru: 11 May 1982

I understand that the Prime Minister of Peru, Dr Manuel Ulloa, may be calling on the Prime Minister at 1700 on 11 May to discuss the Falklands dispute. I enclose a brief.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'John Holmes'.

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF PERU
AT 1700 ON 11 MAY 1982

POINTS TO MAKE

Peruvian initiative

1. Appreciate statesmanship of President Belaunde in putting forward his proposals. We worked hard on these. Argentine rejection extremely disappointing.

2. Entirely reject the suggestion that our military action responsible for the failure of the Peruvian initiative. Regret all casualties, but military developments are a result of Argentina's original aggression and her continued offensives against our forces. Failure of Peruvian plan and Haig talks because of Argentine intransigence.

UN talks

3. We are now engaged in difficult but serious negotiations in New York. We have displayed considerable flexibility and some progress made. However Argentine position unclear and little evidence as yet that they intend to match our serious and constructive approach.

4. Essential that a ceasefire should be linked to withdrawal of Argentine forces. We want to work for a negotiated settlement to the dispute, But Argentine insistence on pre-determined outcome a serious obstacle.

5. Hope Peruvians will use their influence in Buenos Aires to press for Argentine flexibility. This may be the last chance.

Military pressure

6. Should be clear that we have no intention of allowing our hands to be tied while Argentines procrastinate in negotiations. Military action, which we have clear right to take in self defence, will continue as necessary. Must not lose sight of plain fact that Argentina is the aggressor. Whatever the view taken on the sovereignty issue, the Argentine occupation is contrary to the rules of international law.

7. Peaceful solution still our highest priority. Confident Peru shares this aim.

UK-Peru relations

8. No reason why British and European relations with the democracies of Latin America should fall victim to this dispute. Pleasant memories of your successful visit here last year and the potential it reflected in UK-Peru relations in all fields. Britain also confident in potential of EC/Andean Pact links. But all this would be put at risk by any moves to give direct military support to Argentina.



ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Peruvian opinion is among the most strongly pro-Argentine in Latin America, and Peru has long accepted Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falklands. There is an historical affinity between Peru and Argentina, especially their armed forces. The two countries share a traditional antipathy to Chile, and both have territorial claims against her.

2. However, since the return to civilian rule in 1980 Peru has been a moderate democracy, carefully cultivating her relations with Western Europe to counter the pro-Soviet leanings of the previous regime, and the natural weight of US-Peruvian links. Peruvian-British relations - cool under the military government - had improved markedly and were excellent. Prime Minister Ulloa made successful official visit to London in March/April 1981 during which he had talks with the Prime Minister. President Belaunde aspires to the status of international statesman, and his government has attempted to preserve a restrained approach to the Falklands dispute. Peru made early attempts at mediation on a truce and put a seven point plan to us on 3 May.

3. However the government are under increasing pressure from public opinion and the strongly pro-Argentine military. President Belaunde must be uneasy about the potential threat to democracy in Peru over this issue. There has been a recent considerable toughening in the Peruvian line. The Peruvians did not take up our positive response on 6 May to their plan on the grounds that

(Argentina

Argentina had now resorted to the UN. It has been reported that the Peruvian government blamed British military action, particularly the sinking of the Belgrano, for the eventual failure of their initiative. They protested at the sinking in a note of 4 May. The extension of the TEZ on 7 May was condemned in a Peruvian MFA statement the same day, and the press on 8 May quoted strong criticism from President Belaunde.

4. The Peruvian Army Commander made a statement early in the crisis offering military help to Argentina, but the civilians back-pedalled on this strongly, and the government deny that any military assistance is being given. Rumours of such assistance abound, but we have no conclusive evidence. Peru's own defence requirements, in the light of her territorial disputes with Ecuador and Chile, may deter her from transferring military resources to Argentina. However we need to insure against the particular threat of Peru supplying Exocet missiles from her own stocks and the British Embassy in Lima raised the matter on instructions on 8 May. The Peruvians gave only a holding reply.

F 5. A profile of Dr Ulloa is attached.

91

ZZ F C O

GRS 500A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 030103Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 3 MAY

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS: MY TEL NO 134

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS EVENING. DR ARIAS BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE MUCH HOPED WE WOULD HAVE GOOD NEWS SHORTLY. HE SAID THAT AFTER THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TUR HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WHO HAD DECIDED TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK AND BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. DR ARIAS SAID THAT ON PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD TELEPHONED COSTA MENDEZ TO PRESS UPON HIM A FORMULA WHICH MIGHT OFFER THE BEST CHANCE OF AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION. DR ARIAS REPEATED THAT A WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO CLIMB DOWN WITHOUT TOO MUCH LOSS OF FACE. THEY HAD THEREFORE CONSIDERED WHETHER A TEXT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A TOKEN REFERENCE TO THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY IN THE (FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED) INTRODUCTORY PART MIGHT SUFFICE TO BRING ABOUT A WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE TROOPS. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD ALSO TELEPHONED PRESIDENT REAGAN (BUT HAD FAILED TO GET THROUGH) IN ORDER TO INSTILL A SENSE OF URGENCY AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF MR PYM IN WASHINGTON. MR HAIG HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE.

2. DR ARIAS SAID THAT SOME PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES HAD ARISEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE VARIOUS TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WHICH RELATED TO THE INCLUSION OF THE UNITED STATES AND/OR PERU AS MEMBERS OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. DR ARIAS TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD NO OBJECTION TO PERU BEING

~~MEMBERS OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. DR ARIAS TOLD ME IN
CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD NO OBJECTION TO PERU BEING
EXCLUDED IF BY SO DOING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE OBTAINED.
BUT MR HAIG HAD INTIMATED THAT THE US WOULD NOT WISH TO BE EXCLUDED
FROM THE ADMINISTERING GROUP SINCE THIS WOULD OTHERWISE NOT BE
ACCEPTABLE TO THE UK.~~

3. IN THE EVENT AND IN ORDER TO SIMPLIFY MATTERS, A 7-POINT FORMULA HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. TEXT IS IN MIFT. THERE IS A SPANISH TEXT AND AN ENGLISH TEXT WHICH DR ARIAS SAID HAD VIRTUALLY BEEN DICTATED OVER THE TELEPHONE BY MR HAIG.

4. IN REPLY TO MY SPECIFIC QUESTION DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE 7-POINT FORMULA HAD THE APPROVAL OF COSTA MENDEZ SEMICOLON THAT GENERAL GALTIERI HAD TOLD PRESIDENT BELAUNDE THAT HE WAS QUOTE WELL DISPOSED UNQUOTE TOWARDS IT BUT THAT HE HAD HIS QUOTE SENATE UNQUOTE (IE THE MILITARY JUNTA) TO CONSULT AND CONVINCED. DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE MILITARY JUNTA WAS MEETING EVEN AT THIS MOMENT TO CONSIDER THE TERMS AND THAT A REPLY WAS EXPECTED HOURLY. DR ARIAS SAID THAT HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MR HAIG'S PROPOSALS HAD BEEN CONVEYED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OR AT LEAST THE CONSENT OF MR PYM. DR ARIAS EMPHASISED THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WAS ANXIOUS NOT TO LOSE THE MOMENTUM AND THAT IT HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON THAT IF THE FORMULA WAS ACCEPTABLE, THE SIGNATURE OF AN INTERIM DOCUMENT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN LIMA. DR ARIAS WARNED ME TO EXPECT INSTRUCTIONS TONIGHT AND ADDED THAT THEY WERE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO STAGE A GRAND SIGNATURE CEREMONY IN LIMA.

WALLACE

F C O PLEASE PASS

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
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TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 138 OF 3 MAY
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

2-MAY 1982



MIPT

1. IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.
2. MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES.
3. INTRODUCTION OF THIRD PARTIES TO ADMINISTER THE ISLANDS TEMPORARILY.
4. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO THE ISLANDS.
5. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS IN THE FINAL SOLUTION.
6. THE THIRD PARTIES OR CONTACT GROUP WOULD BE COMPOSED OF BRAZIL, PERU, WEST GERMANY AND THE US (BUT SEE PARA 2 OF MIPT). ALTERNATIVE (SPANISH) TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS: THE THIRD PARTIES OR CONTACT GROUP WHICH WOULD INTERVENE IMMEDIATELY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE COMPOSED OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO BE DESIGNATED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT.
7. THE FINAL SOLUTION WILL BE REACHED NO LATER THAN 30 APRIL 1983 UNDER THE GUARANTEE OF THE CONTACT GROUP.

WALLACE

FCO PSE PASS

NNNN

S E C R E T

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GRS 350

SECRET

FM FCO 061030Z MAY 82

TO FLASH LIMA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 100 OF 6 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
FALKLANDS



6 MAY 1982

1. PLEASE SEEK THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE AUDIENCE WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE TODAY ON THE GROUNDS THAT YOU HAVE AN URGENT AND IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION FROM HMG ABOUT THE PERUVIAN PEACE PROPOSALS. IF FOR ANY REASON THE PRESIDENT CANNOT RECEIVE YOU THIS MORNING, YOU SHOULD SEE THE PRIME MINISTER OR FOREIGN MINISTER.
2. YOU SHOULD TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT HMG ARE IMMENSELY GRATEFUL FOR HIS CONSTRUCTIVE INTERVENTION. IN OUR VIEW, IT CONSTITUTES THE BEST PROSPECT OF SECURING AN EARLY CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL, BEFORE MORE LIVES ARE TRAGICALLY LOST. THE BRITISH CABINET HAS CONSEQUENTLY LOOKED HARD AND URGENTLY AT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS AND, ALTHOUGH THEY INCLUDE ELEMENTS WHICH AFTER ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED ARE VERY DIFFICULT FOR BRITAIN TO ACCEPT, YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO HAND OVER THE TEXT IN MIFT, WHICH CONSTITUTES A VERSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS WHICH BRITAIN WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT AS A BASIS FOR PROCEEDING.
3. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT, IF LATER TODAY IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THIS TEXT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA, WE MAY FEEL OBLIGED BY THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION TO DISCLOSE THE LINES OF THE PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE TO WORLD OPINION THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE EFFORTS THAT ARE BEING MADE TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
4. YOU MAY SAY THAT HMG HAVE NOTED THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND INDEED ARE REPLYING TO HIM. BUT THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS ARE NOT ONLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS BUT ALSO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL CLARITY AND PRECISION IN AN IMAGINATIVE AND POSITIVE WAY.
5. YOU SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT ANY ABANDONMENT OF THE PERUVIAN PLAN

S E C R E T

WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE A RETROGRADE STEP INEVITABLY MAKING PROLONGED HOSTILITIES MORE LIKELY. WE HOPE THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WILL DO HIS BEST TO OBTAIN ARGENTINE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS, AS HE HAS OBTAINED THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE US AND BRITAIN. TO DO SO WOULD BE A FEAT OF STATESMANSHIP WHICH WOULD LEAVE NOT ONLY THOSE CONCERNED DIRECTLY IN THE CRISIS BUT ALSO THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE GREATLY IN HIS DEBT.

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SECRET

FM FCO 061045Z MAY 82

TO FLASH LIMA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 6 MAY

- INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT : FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT FOR HANDING TO PERUVIANS :

BEGINS

DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS

1. AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, CONCURRENT WITH:
2. MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND NON-REINTRODUCTION OF ALL FORCES, ACCORDING TO A SCHEDULE TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE CONTACT GROUP.
3. THE IMMEDIATE INTRODUCTION OF A CONTACT GROUP COMPOSED OF BRAZIL, PERU, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES INTO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ON A TEMPORARY BASIS PENDING AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT. THE CONTACT GROUP WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR :
 - A) VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL:
 - B) ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS AND ENSURING THAT NO ACTIONS ARE TAKEN IN THE ISLANDS WHICH WOULD CONTRAVENE THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT: AND
 - C) ENSURING THAT ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE RESPECTED.
4. BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERING AND CONFLICTING VIEWS REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
5. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS.
6. THE CONTACT GROUP WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REACH A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT PRIOR TO APRIL 30, 1983.

ENDS

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 042150Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 146 OF 4 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU HAS RECEIVED WITH PROFOUND CONSTERNATION THE NEWS OF THE SINKING OF THE CRUISER OF THE ARGENTINE NAVY QUOTE GENERAL BELGRANO UNQUOTE FOLLOWING THE ATTACK BY A SUBMARINE OF THE BRITISH FLEET.

2. IN FULFILLING THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, I AM PRESENTING TO YOU THE SENTIMENTS OF PROTEST AND CONDEMNATION WHICH, BECAUSE OF THE INVIOLEABLE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITY AND OF LAW, THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT HOLDS WITH REGARD TO THIS ACTION, WHOSE CONSEQUENCES INVOLVES THE SACRIFICE OF NUMEROUS HUMAN LIVES. THIS ACT OF WAR, AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT OF NOT BEING EXPRESSLY DECLARED, IS DOUBLY BLAMEWORTHY FOR HAVING OCCURRED OUTSIDE THE AREA OF THE 200 MILES FIXED BY THE FORCE PERPETRATING THE DISASTER.

WALLACE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }
SIR K COUZENS }
MR LITTLE }
MR HAWTHIN }
MR PERETZ }
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

GPS 250
UNCLASSIFIED
FM LIMA 061620Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 102 OF 06 MAY
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: 12 MILE EXCLUSION ZONE

1. THE MFA ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE YESTERDAY:
FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION BEGINS QUOTE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
HAS ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT ANY ARGENTINE SHIP OR AIRCRAFT WHICH
IS FOUND BEYOND 12 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE ARGENTINE COAST WILL
BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE AND SUBJECT TO BE TREATED AS SUCH.

THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OF THE UTMOST GRAVITY THIS
EXTENSION OF THE AREA OF CONFLICT AS FAR AS THE WATERS WHICH,
ACCORDING TO ARGENTINE LEGISLATION, CORRESPOND TO ITS
SOVEREIGNTY AND THEREFORE TO THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL CONTINENT.

FACED WITH THIS NEW ANNOUNCEMENT OF BELLIGERENT ACTION ON THE
PART OF THE BRITISH FORCES, AFTER THE UNJUSTIFIED SINKING OF THE
CRUISER 'GENERAL BELGRANO', THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT REPEATS ITS
FIRM PROTEST AND ITS REQUEST FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
TO MAKE WAY FOR THE PEACE-MAKING MEASURES FORESEEN IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW.

PERU SUPPORTS CLEARLY THE MEASURES WHICH THE UN SECRETARY-
GENERAL IS TAKING AND CALLS ON THE PARTIES IN THE CONFLICT TO
AGREE WITHOUT DELAY TO THE TRUCE WHICH IS THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID
A GREATER CONFLAGRATION.

PERU HAS ADOPTED IMMEDIATELY MEASURES WHICH IN THE INTERNATIONAL
FIELD CORRESPOND TO THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AND TO THIS END HAS SENT NECESSARY
INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS DELEGATION AT THE 20TH CONSULTATIVE MEETING
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS (AT THE OAS). UNQUOTE. ENDS.

2. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

WALLACE

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

GPS 270
UNCLASSIFIED
FM LIMA 061230Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 08 MAY
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. THIS MORNINGS PRESS GIVES PROMINENCE TO THE 12 MILE MEASURES AND OTHER RELATED DEVELOPMENTS.
2. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE UK'S MOVES ARE QUOTE AN INSANITY UNQUOTE. THE WORLD COULD NOT TOLERATE THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH FORCES OFF THE SOUTH AMERICAN COAST SMCLN IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE THAT A COUNTRY WHOSE MATURITY WAS NOT IN DOUBT WISHED TO BRING WAR TO SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND DESERVED WORLDWIDE CONDEMNATION. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE REPEATED THE NEED FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL TRUCE, AS PRECONDITIONS WERE HINDERING THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
3. IN STATEMENTS REPORTED BY PRESS AND RADIO THE PRIME MINISTER IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT PERU HAD NO INTENTION OF SENDING MILITARY AID TO ARGENTINA AND THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW THE TWO ARGENTINE EMISSARIES HAD NOT RAISED THE MATTER. THE COMMANDERS OF THE THREE ARMED FORCES ARE ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING THAT PERU IS NOT LENDING ANY KIND OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA SMCLN THEY SPECIFICALLY DENY SENDING EITHER AIRCRAFT OR MISSILES. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE BOYCOTT OF BRITISH SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT IN PERU, DR ULLOA IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT ANY STEPS TAKEN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED QUOTE WITH GREAT CARE AND CONSIDERATION UNQUOTE, OTHERWISE THE EFFECT WOULD BE TO WEAKEN PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY AND THE ECONOMY, WHICH MIGHT IN TURN REDUCE PERUVIAN HELP AND SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA.
4. THE PERUVIAN SEVEN POINT PLAN HAS NOW BEEN RELEASED TO THE PRESS THE ORIGINAL TEXT IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE TEXT OF POINTS 4, 5 AND 6 AMENDED AT THE BEHEST OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

WALLACE

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL

ULLOA ELIAS, DR MANUEL

Appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Finance and Commerce from 28 July 1980. Also holds title of President of Council of Ministers, although President Belaúnde chairs the Cabinet.

Born in 1922.

His father was a senator and international jurist of standing. A successful self-made man, he has substantial business and newspaper interests, including mining and other companies. Forced into exile following the coup d'etat in 1968, he was permitted to return in 1976. During his time abroad he became a Wall Street banker and financier of international repute. Is now a wealthy and well-connected businessman who is highly regarded by private enterprise, with a pragmatic approach to economic problems.

Minister of Finance from June-October 1968 under President Belaúnde, he then introduced a number of very necessary and overdue measures to reform the Government finances. Is bringing a very professional approach to the problem of Peru's economic planning and development. Is also responsible for the appointment to key posts of experienced international technocrats like the Minister of Mines and Energy.

Married three times. A tall, impressive figure with a handsome head and a shrewd, sharp mind. He is a convincing and articulate speaker. His position makes him the most powerful and articulate speaker. His position makes him the most powerful and influential man in the country after President Belaúnde (qv). If successful, he will undoubtedly be in the running for Presidential candidate when President Belaúnde steps down.

He speaks excellent idiomatic English.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 May 1982

Prime Minister

Agree message?

Yes not

A.F.C. 10/5

Dear John,

President Figueiredo of Brazil has sent a message to the Prime Minister expressing sympathy for the casualties resulting from the attack on HMS Sheffield. We know that President Figueiredo has also sent a message to the Argentine Government following the sinking of the Belgrano. But it will nonetheless be helpful to send a fairly full reply to President Figueiredo, which would provide an opportunity to set out the positive efforts which we are making to secure a peaceful solution to the present crisis. Although the position of the Brazilian Government inevitably tilts towards Argentina, it has sought throughout the crisis to maintain a reasonable balance and Brazil's influence on Argentina could yet be valuable. We therefore need to ensure that our relations with the Brazilian Government are kept in as good order as possible.

I enclose a draft telegram to our Embassy in Brasilia which contains a message from the Prime Minister to President Figueiredo.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
RESTRICTED

Precedence/Deskby
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	RESTRICTED
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 091830Z MAY 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	REPEATED FOR INFO TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
	10	MY TELNO 100: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO
	11	PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
	12	PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO. <i>Begin</i>
	13	<i>1.</i> I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your thoughtful
	14	message of sympathy on the casualties resulting from the attack
	15	on HMS Sheffield.
	16	<i>2.</i> The tragic loss of life which has occurred on both sides
	17	makes it all the more urgent to find a basis for ending the
	18	present conflict in the South Atlantic. This has throughout
	19	been our objective; and it has therefore been extremely
	20	disheartening that the Argentine Government have rejected both <i>the</i>
	21	proposals put forward earlier by Mr Haig and the subsequent
///	22	proposals for an interim agreement based on the helpful initia-
//	23	tive of the President of Peru. We are now actively pursuing with
/	24	the Secretary-General of the United Nations the constructive
	25	suggestions which he has made. The British Government's

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword positive
File number	Dept	Distribution <i>Falklands General</i>
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
RESTRICTED

Page
2

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1 <<<<
 2 positive response reflects our wish to see an early ceasefire
 3 linked to the prompt withdrawal of Argentine forces as called for
 4 in Security Council Resolution Number 502. It is our hope that
 5 the Argentine Government will respond equally positively to the
 6 Secretary-General, so that conflict can end, forces can be
 7 withdrawn, and genuine negotiations to resolve the Falklands
 8 issue can get under way. *But if they do not so respond, they*
 9 *should be in no doubt of our resolve.*
 10 3. Your Excellency may be assured that we for our part will
 11 spare no effort to achieve a peaceful negotiated solution to the
 12 present dispute.
 13 With the assurances of my highest consideration
 14 Margaret Thatcher
 15 Ends.
 16 4. If you have not already done so, please hand over the text
 17 of my statement to the House on 7 May (my telno 362) when
 18 delivering the Prime Minister's reply.

19 PYM
 20 NNNN

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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PRIME MINISTER

You should be aware of Mr. Benn's attached letter, asking whether HMS Sheffield was carrying nuclear weapons. The subject could be raised at Question Time, where you will no doubt wish to follow the standard policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons in any given location at any particular time.

We will let you have a draft letter in reply.

ms. MP

10 May 1982



10. 5. 82

Dear Prime Minister:
 I am writing
 to ask you whether
 there were any
 nuclear weapons
 on board H.M.S.
 Sheffield when she
 was attacked,
 yours sincerely
 Tony Benn

RESTRICTED



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~836 7000~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

10th May 1982

Dear John,

Prime Minister
For information
A.S.C. 10/5
C. de Hysam.

FALKLAND ISLANDS - THE MEDIA

Following this morning's meeting of OD(SA) the Defence Secretary has asked me to circulate for your information the attached record of the latest meeting between Sir Frank Cooper and the Editors of the British press.

I am copying this note and attachment to Private Secretaries to members of OD(SA) and Sir Michael Palliser GCMG and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John
DBO

(D B OMAND)

A J Coles Esq

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SW/82/666

9/31/F

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

THIRD MEETING WITH EDITORS ON FALKLANDS EMERGENCY

1. PUS held a third meeting with Editors on 6 May to discuss media coverage of the Falklands Emergency. A list of those who attended is at Annex A.
2. PUS said that since the last meeting the pace of events in the South Atlantic had quickened and, as suggested, MOD had opened up a full press facility in the Concourse Hall. He was conscious that news was sometimes slower to be released than was desirable. This was due partly to the distances involved and partly to the need to be sure of the facts before making statements. As an additional service to the media, MOD would begin to give specialised background briefings for groups of correspondents.
3. Continuing, he said that there were a number of points causing MOD concern. These included:
 - a. Reporting of assistance from third countries (which could put this in jeopardy).
 - b. Speculation about future operational plans and interception of Argentine communications.
 - c. Harassment of families of Service casualties.
4. In response, Editors expressed concern about the paucity of information being provided by MOD. They appreciated the difficulties caused by long distances and limited communications capacity, but there was a risk of the UK starting to lose public and international sympathy through appearing to be holding back on news when the Argentines had no hesitation about deluging the media with misleading and inaccurate information. Particular points mentioned were:
 - a. Delays in announcing that operations had taken place (eg sinking of General Belgrano).
 - b. Inability of MOD to confirm or deny stories originating from overseas (eg the previous day US sources had been reporting - erroneously - a naval battle in the South Atlantic; MOD did not repudiate this but merely said it "had no information").
 - c. The return of photographs and film from the Task Force and South Georgia was non-existent.

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5. PUS undertook to see what could be done to improve the service in these areas.
6. A number of Editors asked what lay behind recent Ministerial criticism of UK press coverage.
7. Another problem raised was that certain organisations had correspondents with forward elements of Task Force near the Falklands and had good access to news, while others had correspondents only in Canberra off Ascension who were producing very little. It was suggested that reports might be pooled for all UK media. [This did not meet with an immediate response from those Editors with well-placed correspondents, but after the briefing the BBC and ITN offered to make their reports available to press through PA]. A plea was made for greater access for major regional newspapers.
7. It was suggested that any harassment of families could be avoided by MOD providing pictures of the Servicemen concerned. This had solved a similar problem for the Army in Northern Ireland.
8. It was agreed to hold a further meeting in about one week's time.

Comment

While exchanges at the meeting were good-natured, there was clearly a good deal of disquiet on the part of Editors and criticism of the speed and quantity of news provided by MOD. There was a clear feeling that the press was being criticised by Government but inadequately provided with information.

S Webb

S WEBB
PS/PUS

7 May 1982

ISSUE: HR 27 MOD MB

ANNEX

DATE: May 6, 1982

TIME: 1750 for 1800

Newspaper, Agency, etc	Reporters	Photography	Other details
BBC External Services	Ken Brazier		
BBC TV	Allan Protheroe	A/DG	
BBC Radio	John Wilson		
	Larry Hodgson		
Daily Telegraph	Wm Deedes		
Financial Times	G. D. Owen		
Guardian	Peter Preston		
IRN	Peter Thornton		
Daily Mail	David Tytler	Deputy Editor	
PA	David Chipp		
Daily Express	Chris Ward		
ITN	David Nicholas		
Sunday Express	Mike Toner	Political Editor.	
Sunday Telegraph	John Thompson		
Sunday Times	Frank Giles		
Daily Mirror	Peter Thompson	Deputy Editor	
Economist	Andrew Knight		
Star	Brian Hitchens		
News of the World	Derek Jameson		
Sunday People	Nick Lloyd or Barrington	Associate Editor.	
Mail on Sunday	Anthony Shrivley	Associate Editor.	
Reuters	Stewart	Chief Correspondent	
OBSERVER	* IAN LINDSEY-SMITH	EXECUTIVE EDITOR.	
NEWSPAPER CONFERENCE	Mr McDonald	CHAIRMAN	
TIMES	FRED EMERY	EXECUTIVE EDITOR	
BBC	PETER WOON	NEWS EDITOR.	

GPS 120
UNCLASSIFIED
FM LIMA 101750Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 166 OF 10 MAY
INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS

FALKLANDS

1. DURING HIS CUSTOMARY PRESS CONFERENCE ON 9 MAY, PRESIDENT RELAUNDE ANNOUNCED THAT PRIME MINISTER AND ECONOMICS MINISTER WAS VISITING EUROPE TO LOBBY FOR THE LIFTING OF THE COMMUNITY'S ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA.
2. ULLOA LEFT ON 8 MAY TO ATTEND THE WORLD BANK MEETING IN HELSINKI, AND ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS WILL VISIT BRUSSELS FOR TALKS AFTERWARDS.
3. ALTHOUGH ULLOA'S VISIT WAS PRESENTED BY THE LOCAL PRESS AS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN SUPPORT OF ARGENTINA, ULLOA HIMSELF IS QUOTED AS SAYING BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE THAT IF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS DEEPENS, TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKS BETWEEN EUROPE AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING PERU MIGHT BE AFFECTED.

WALLACE

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL
FCO
S AM D
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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CB BONN FCO 007/ 10-

PP FCO

PP MODUK

10 MAY 1982

[Handwritten mark]

PP CINCFLEET

RR TRAFFIC RELAY



126

GRS 470

SECRET

FM BONN 101655Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 426 OF 10 MAY
INFO PRIORITY MODUK CINCFLEET
INFO SAVING OSLO

YOUR TEL 204: FALKLAND ISLANDS : ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA.

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH MFA, AS WITH PREVIOUS CASES (MY TEL 352 TO FCO) HENZE, HEAD OF RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT, STATED THAT THE INFORMATION WOULD BE PASSED TO THE LOCAL CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES WHO WILL WATCH OUT FOR ANY EXPORT LICENCE APPLICATIONS FROM BLAETTNER AND SIEFERT RICH (WHICH WOULD OF COURSE BE REFUSED) OR ATTEMPTS BY THESE COMPANIES TO EXPORT PROHIBITED GOODS WITHOUT LICENCES. APART FROM THE FACT THAT WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO TRACE SIEFERT RICH AND CO WHO ARE NOT LISTED IN ANY OF THE COMMERCIAL DIRECTORIES WE HOLD (IS SPELLING CORRECT QUESTION MARK), HENZE POINTED OUT THAT THE ABILITY OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ACTION WILL DEPEND ON THE TYPE OF MACHINERY BEING OFFERED. IF THE COMPANY WERE OFFERING SIMPLE DYE STAMPING PRESSES OF GENERAL PURPOSE APPLICATION THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE ANY POWER TO FORBID EXPORT.

2. HENZE SAID THAT HE WISHED US TO BE AWARE THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR POLICY OF ALLOWING GERMAN MANUFACTURERS TO CONTINUE WITH THE EXECUTION OF CONTRACTS WITH ARGENTINA UP TO THE POINT OF DELIVERY, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROPOSE TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO BAN OR OTHERWISE DELAY THE CONTRACTORS' SEA TRIALS OF THE FIRST OF THE FOUR FRIGATES WHICH BLOHM AND VOSS ARE BUILDING FOR THE ARGENTINE NAVY. THESE ARE DUE TO BEGIN IN EARLY JUNE BUT MAY BE DELAYED DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS FOR THE ENGINE CONTROLS, EXPORT OF WHICH FROM THE UK HAD BEEN BLOKED (PERRY'S LETTER OF 23 APRIL TO D SALES 2 MOD REFERS). IT IS USUAL PRACTICE FOR GERMAN SHIP BUILDERS TO USE CERTAIN FACILITIES IN NORWEGIAN WATERS FOR THESE TRIALS AND FOR THIS THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT SEEK DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE. SO FAR BLOHM AND VOSS HAVE NOT MADE FORMAL APPLICATION FOR THIS AND MFA PRESUME THIS IS BECAUSE THEY ARE UNABLE TO FORECAST A FIRM DATE AT PRESENT. HENZE ALSO ADDED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF ARGENTINE NAVAL PERSONNEL, WHO WERE DUE TO ARRIVE IN HAMBURG TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE TRIALS AS OBSERVERS/TRAINEES WITH A VIEW TO TAKING OVER THE SHIP FOR THE SECOND STAGE (USER) SEA TRIALS, HAVE FAILED TO ARRIVE. THE GERMANS HAD NOT PUT ANY OBSTACLE IN THEIR WAY.

3. HENZE MENTIONED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EMBARGO. THE ARGENTINES WERE NOW WITH HOLDING PAYMENT FOR ITEMS WHICH GERMAN FIRMS WERE NOT PERMITTED TO DELIVER. THE GERMANS HAD NOT SO FAR GIVEN ANY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO A LONGER TERM POLICY ON SUPPLIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA AFTER THE TERMINATION OF PRESENT HOSTILITIES BUT WERE CONCERNED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN ALIGNMENT OF POLICY BY ALL EC GOVERNMENTS AND ASSUMED THAT IN DUE COURSE WE WOULD RAISE THIS QUESTION IN BRUSSELS.

4. INCIDENTALLY, COUNSELLOR (DEFENCE SUPPLY) RECENTLY SAW EVIDENCE THAT THE EMBARGO WAS IN OPERATION AT THE FIRM OF RENK IN AUGSBURG, WHERE A CONSIGNMENT OF TAM TANK GEAR BOXES WAS BEING HELD BACK FROM SHIPMENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING OSLO.

TAYLOR

NNNN

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD (2)
 HD/S AM D
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 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

W ILETT

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR V COUZENS) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)
 Mr Solvin)
 Mr Hatfield)
 Mr Goodenough)

~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK
 Mr Hanay
 Mr Young ECD(E)

ms

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKREP BRUSSELS 101755Z MAY 1982
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1860 OF 10 MAY 1982
 INFO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN ROME PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK
 INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS THE HAGUE DUBLIN BONN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS
 WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

COREPER (AMBASSADORS) 10 MAY : FALKLANDS

SUMMARY

1. MEETING CALLED AT MY REQUEST TO CONSIDER MODALITIES FOR TAKING DECISIONS ON RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS BEFORE THEIR EXPIRY ON 17 MAY. PRESIDENCY PROPOSED, AND AMBASSADORS AGREED, THAT:
 - A) POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD BE CONVOKED FOR 1600 HOURS ON 15 MAY (IN BRUSSELS).
 - B) COREPER SHOULD MEET AT 1900 HOURS THE SAME DAY, WITH POSSIBILITY OF RECONVENING ON 17 MAY.
 - C) PRESIDENCY SHOULD DECIDE IN THE LIGHT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY TO CALL A MINISTERIAL MEETING. IF DIRECTORS FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD CONVOKE THIS FOR AFTERNOON OF 16 MAY (IN BRUSSELS).

MEETING. IF DIRECTORS FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD CONVOKE THIS FOR AFTERNOON OF 16 MAY (IN BRUSSELS).

D) THE FORMAL DECISION TO RENEW WOULD PROBABLY BE TAKEN IN THE ECOFIN COUNCIL MEETING OF 17 MAY.

DETAIL

2. NOTERDAEME (PRESIDENCY) CONFIRMED ON LEGAL ADVICE THAT ON SANCTIONS REMAINED VALID UNTIL MIDNIGHT ON 17 MAY.

HE EXPLAINED THAT AT VILLERS-LE-TEMPLE MINISTERS HAD REACHED TWO DECISIONS: TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING MEASURES AND TO TAKE A DECISION ON WHETHER TO RENEW THEM BEFORE THEY EXPIRED. IT HAD NOT BEEN DECIDED HOW THIS WOULD BE TAKEN, BUT IT WAS "DANS L'ESPRIT" OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE COURSE OF NEXT WEEKEND.

3. NO ONE RAISED ANY SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE PRESIDENCY'S PROPOSED PROGRAMME, BUT RUGGIERO (ITALY) SAID THAT COLOMBO MIGHT HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE TIMING WHILE LEPRETTE WARNED THAT CHEYSSON WAS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO SPEND THE AFTERNOON OF 16 MAY IN PARIS BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE ANGLO-FRENCH SUMMIT IN LONDON THE FOLLOWING DAY. RIBERHOLT (DENMARK) STRESSED THAT A PRIOR DECISION IN POLITICAL COOPERATION WAS A PRECONDITION FOR COMMUNITY AGREEMENT.

4. EMPHASISING THAT I WAS NOT (NOT) COMMENTING ON THE LIKLIHOOD I SAID THAT IN THE EVENT OF AGREEMENT IN NEW YORK THE COMMUNITY WOULD NEED TO REPEAL SANCTIONS BEFORE THEIR EXPIRY DATE. I ASSUMED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN CALLING A SPECIAL MEETING OF COREPER AND SECURING THE NECESSARY AGREEMENTS WITHIN A FEW HOURS. NO ONE DEMURED.

5. A NUMBER OF MY COLLEAGUES REPORTED APPROACHES BY THE MEXICAN AMBASSADOR. NOTREDAEME CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD REPLIED ORALLY TO THE MEXICAN DEMARCHE ALONG THE LINES AGREED IN COREPER LAST WEEK (PARA 5 OF MY TEL NO 1811).

6. AS REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT (TELECON GORDON/YOUNG) WE ARE TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE WITH THE PRESS: COREPER HAVE MET TO REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR TAKING A DECISION ON RENEWING SANCTIONS BEFORE THEIR EXPIRY ON 17 MAY. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENCY SHOULD CALL MEETINGS OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, COREPER ON 15 MAY. IF ASKED, WE ARE CONFIRMING THAT CONTINGENCY PLANS EXIST FOR MINISTERS TO MEET OVER THE WEEKEND SHOULD THIS BE NECESSARY.

NECESSARY.

FC ADVANCE TO:-

FCO - PS BULLARD GIFFORD URE HANNAY CROWE MS YOUNG EMERGENCY UNIT
CAB - WADE-GERY COLVIN FULLER HATFILED GOODENOUGH

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (32)

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DESKBY 110700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 110142Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 705 OF 10 MAY
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY 2 IPTS: FALKLANDS.

1. AFTER THE EXPERIECES OF THE PAST WEEKS, I DO NOT THINK THAT ANY OF US RATED VERY HIGH THE CHANCES THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR ANY MORE THAN THEY DID WITH HAIG AND THE PERUVIANS. TODAY'S EXPERIENCE BRINGS ME VERY CLOSE TO BELIEVING THAT THEY ARE STILL NOT INTERESTED IN REACHING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ON TERMS WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US, AND THAT IT IS RAPIDLY BECOMING A QUESTION OF WHO WRONG-FOOTS WHOM WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN.
2. QUITE APART FROM THEIR TOTALLY UNCHANGED AND UNSATISFACTORY RESPONSE ON THE QUESTION OF PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, I AM FORTIFIED IN THIS BELIEF

RESPONSE ON THE QUESTION OF PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, I AM FORTIFIED IN THIS BELIEF BY THEIR RENEWED INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING SOUTH GEORGIA, BY THEIR REINJECTION OF THE NOTION OF FREEDOM OF IMMIGRATION AND PURCHASE OF PROPERTY, AND BY THE FRIVOLITY OF THEIR INSISTENCE ON OUR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO A POINT 2,000 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE ISLANDS IN PARALLEL WITH THEIR PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF 150 MILES. ON THIS POINT, THEY KNOW PERFECTLY WELL THAT THE 2,000 MILE CONCEPT WAS INTRODUCED AT A TIME WHEN THE TASK FORCE WAS AT LEAST THAT FAR FROM THE FALKLANDS.

3. THEIR EMPHASIS ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND EXCLUSIVE UN ADMINISTRATION LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE AIMING TO WRONG-FOOT US BY PRESENTING US AS HAVING DESTROYED CHANCES OF AGREEMENT ON GROUNDS WHERE THEY COULD COUNT ON MAJORITY SUPPORT IN THE UN.

4. I DID NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO HAVE A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR THIS EVENING, BUT HIS WHOLE MANNER DURING THE MEETING INDICATED THAT HE HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION WITH A GENUINE CHANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. HE WAS IN A SOMBRE MOOD.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I PROPOSE THAT MY TACTICS TOMORROW SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS. THEY WOULD COMBINE GIVING THE ARGENTINES A LAST CHANCE TO DEMONSTRATE A GENUINE CHANGE OF HEART AND, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO FAIL, LEAVING US ON THE RIGHT FOOT. I SHOULD CONFIRM TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR, AS I EFFECTIVELY DID THIS EVENING, THAT WE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS OF AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT UNTIL WE WERE SURE THAT WE WERE DISCUSSING A GENUINE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT AND NOT SIMPLY A BRIEFLY DELAYED TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION TO ARGENTINA. I SHOULD CONFIRM TO HIM, AGAIN AS I SUGGESTED THIS EVENING, THAT IT WOULD NOT BE WORTH MY PRODUCING FRESH LANGUAGE ON THE DETAILED POINTS IN THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT UNTIL HE HAD EXTRACTED A SPECIFIC FORMULATION FROM ROS ON THE QUESTION OF THE NON PREJUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I WOULD STUDY THIS FORMULATION AND REFER IT TO YOU FOR COMMENTS IN ORDER TO SEE WHETHER THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIC POINT. IF THERE WAS, WE COULD THEN GO ON TO NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT. IF THERE WASNOT, WE WOULD HAVE TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AND DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS WORTH CONTINUING WITH THE PRESENT EXERCISE.

6. AS REPORTED IN MY FIRST IPT, I EXPLAINED REPEATEDLY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT THE PHRASE QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES' WAS NOT ENOUGH IN ITSELF. ARGENTINA DID NOT REGARD ITSELF AS QUOTE CLAIMING UNQUOTE SOVEREIGNTY. THEY REGARDED ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AS AN ACTUALITY WHICH ONLY LACKED RECOGNITION BY US. HENCE, WE HAD TO INSIST ON THE ADDITIONAL PHRASE QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE. I ALSO EXPLAINED THAT COSTA MENDEZ'S

ADDITIONAL PHRASE QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE. I ALSO EXPLAINED THAT COSTA MENDEZ'S
APPARENTLY POSITIVE REMARKS IN PUBLIC ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY NOT BEING A
PRE-CONDITION REFERRED IN FACT TO THE IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION BY THE
UK OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. WE
WERE NOT DECEIVED BY THIS PHRASE: HENCE OUR INSISTENCE ON THE
LANGUAGE I HAD PROPOSED. IF THE ARGENTINES WERE GENUINE, WHY
DID THEY OBJECT TO THE INSERTION OF THIS LANGUAGE? NO ONE ON THE
OTHER SIDE OF THE TABLE COULD PRODUCE AN ADEQUATE ANSWER TO THIS.

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
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 110141Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 704 OF 10 MAY.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

11 MAY 1982



MIPT: FALKLANDS.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE SECRETARIAT'S TRANSLATION OF THE ARGENTINE PAPER WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR GAVE ME THIS EVENING (10 MAY):

BEGINS

1. THIS AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) AND THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
2. THE AGREEMENT TO WHICH THE PARTIES COMMIT THEMSELVES SHALL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES.
3. THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL COMPRISE THE THREE ARCHIPELAGOS CONSIDERED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.
4. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION SHALL BE THE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE OBSERVERS OF THE PARTIES MAY FLY THEIR RESPECTIVE FLAGS.
5. THERE SHALL BE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT AND RESIDENCE FOR CITIZENS OF THE PARTIES, WHO SHALL ENJOY THE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE AND DISPOSE OF REAL ESTATE.
6. THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES SHALL BE EFFECTED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
7. THE PARTIES COMMIT THEMSELVES TO UNDERTAKE IN GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH A VIEW TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE AND, WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, TO COMPLETE THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY 31 DECEMBER 1982.

ENDS

PARSONS

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (32)

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PS/MR HURD

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HD/SAMD

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HD/PLANNING STAFF

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PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

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PS/SIR M PALLISER)

MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER)

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MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

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DESKBY 110700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 110140Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 703 OF 10 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL NO 377: FALKLANDS.

1. I HAD NEARLY TWO HOURS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS TEAM THIS EVENING (10 MAY). IT WAS A VERY DISCOURAGING MEETING.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, AS PROMISED, HE HAD LAST NIGHT PUT TO ROS OUR NEED FOR LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WAS NOT BEING PREJUDGED. THIS AFTERNOON ROS HAD GIVEN HIM A PAPER SETTING OUT THE ARGENTINES' IDEAS, OF WHICH THE SECRETARIAT'S TRANSLATION IS IN MIFT. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH ROS HAD CONTACTED BUENOS AIRES OVERNIGHT, THE PAPER HAD NOT ORIGINATED IN BUENOS AIRES BUT HAD BEEN DRAFTED IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE. IT WAS THEREFORE QUOTE NEGOTIABLE UNQUOTE. ROS HAD

CONTACTED BUENOS AIRES OVERNIGHT, THE PAPER HAD NOT ORIGINATED IN BUENOS AIRES BUT HAD BEEN DRAFTED IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE. IT WAS THEREFORE QUOTE NEGOTIABLE UNQUOTE. ROS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE ARGENTINES SAW THE PAPER AS A QUOTE PACKAGE UNQUOTE AND THOUGHT IT BETTER TO DISCUSS ALL THESE POINTS AT THE SAME TIME. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD SAID THAT THE PAPER WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US BUT THAT HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO ME.

3. I SAID THAT I WAS PUZZLED AND DISAPPOINTED BY ROS'S PAPER: IT WAS OUT OF PHASE WITH THE TALKS I HAD BEEN HAVING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL: IT WAS ANALAGOUS TO THE MESSAGE YOU HAD SENT PEREZ DE CUELLAR FOUR DAYS AGO: IT WENT BACK TO GENERAL HEADINGS (AND, IN ITS PARAGRAPH 5, ADDED A MAJOR NEW POINT), WITHOUT THE DETAIL ON WHICH I THOUGHT PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND I HAD BEEN MAKING PROGRESS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID HE THOUGHT THAT PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE ARGENTINE PAPER SHOULD MEET OUR CONCERN ABOUT NOT PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS: IN HIS VIEW IT COVERED THE WHOLE EXERCISE, INCLUDING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. ROS HAD NOT LIKED OUR LANGUAGE BECAUSE IT IMPLIED THAT THE ARGENTINES MIGHT CHEAT. I REJECTED THIS: THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD SAID SO OFTEN THAT SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE THAT WE HAD TO HAVE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR EVIDENCE IN THE AGREEMENT THAT THIS WAS NO LONGER THEIR POSITION. WE HAD TO KNOW WHETHER WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A GENUINE INTERIM AGREEMENT OR MERELY ABOUT A PROCEDURE FOR THE DELAYED TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO ARGENTINA AT THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD. I HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO STAND FIRM ON THE LANGUAGE I HAD PUT FORWARD YESTERDAY. ANYTHING I SAID ON THE OTHER ASPECTS WAS CONTINGENT ON OUR BEING SATISFIED ON THIS CENTRAL POINT. WHAT WORRIED ME WAS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD NOT ADMITTED THAT THEY QUOTE CLAIM UNQUOTE SOVEREIGNTY: THEY SAY THAT THEY HAVE IT AND THAT IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THEIRS. THE ARTICLE 40 LANGUAGE IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S AIDE MEMOIRE AND IN POINT 2 OF THE ARGENTINE PAPER WAS NOT THEREFORE ENOUGH TO PROTECT US AGAINST ARGENTINE REFUSAL TO INCLUDE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAD TO HAVE UNEQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE OUTCOME OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED.

4. I MADE THESE POINTS AGAIN AND AGAIN TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR. HE AND HIS STAFF TRIED TO ARGUE, WITH CONSPICUOUS LACK OF CONVICTION ON HIS PART, THAT THE ARGENTINE LANGUAGE MET OUR REQUIREMENTS. DE SOTO PRODUCED LANGUAGE ON THE LINES OF: QUOTE ALL ASPECTS OF THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT PPEJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES UNQUOTE, BUT I SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT DO. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD AGAIN CONVEY TO ROS WHAT I HAD SAID AND TRY TO QUOTE CLARIFY UNQUOTE HIS POSITION ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME.

5. THIS ARGUMENT TOOK UP ABOUT HALF THE MEETING. I ALSO MADE TO

OUTCOME.

5. THIS ARGUMENT TOOK UP ABOUT HALF THE MEETING. I ALSO MADE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 7 - 15 OF YOUR TUR, WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS:

(A) DEPENDENCIES

AT THE END OF THE MEETING DE SOTO SAID THAT AS THE DEPENDENCIES HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN OUR EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES THEY COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE NEXT ROUND. DID HE UNDERSTAND THAT I WANTED TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS? SURELY, WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA, WHERE WE HAD FEW TROOPS, WOULD BE A "PAINLESS GESTURE". I DENIED THIS FIRMLY. I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID BUT AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED, THE AGREEMENT UNDER DISCUSSION RELATED TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ALONE.

(B) INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

I LAID PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF DENYING THE ISLANDERS ANY MEANS OF EXPRESSING THEIR VIEWS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD AND ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE UN DISMANTLING REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED UNDER ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WONDERED WHETHER NEW ELECTIONS OR A PLEBISCITE MIGHT BE THE ANSWER. DE SOTO, RIGHTLY CALCULATING THAT THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINES, SUGGESTED THAT MY POINT COULD BE MET IF THE COUNCILS, OR AT LEAST THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, WERE RETAINED IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY.

I POINTED OUT THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD REJECTED THIS YESTERDAY (PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TELNO 694) BUT SAID THAT I WOULD PUT THE SUGGESTION TO YOU. BUT I THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER FOR BOTH COUNCILS TO REMAIN IN BEING, WITH THE ARGENTINES' WORRIES ABOUT PREJUDICE BEING COVERED BY THE KIND OF LANGUAGE WE HAD PUT FORWARD YESTERDAY (PARAGRAPH 9 OF MY TELNO 694).

(C) VERIFICATION

PEREZ DE CUELLAR RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE IDEA OF THE UN USING SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY SOME NEUTRAL STATE.

(D) SIZE OF ZONES FOR WITHDRAWAL

A MAJOR NEW PROBLEM AROSE HERE. AHMED SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD SAID TODAY THAT THE PROPOSALS DISCUSSED WITH HAIG HAD BEEN BASED ON THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE TO ITS BASES IN THE UK. HE THEN READ OUT WHAT SEEMED TO BE THE SECRETARIAT'S TRANSLATION OF A SPANISH TEXT OF THE PROPOSALS IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELNO 765 TO WASHINGTON EXCEPT THAT THE UK FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN TO A DISTANCE OF AT LEAST 2,000 NAUTICAL MILES (NOT 1,750) BY DAY 7. I SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL HAD NEVER BEEN AGREED BY HM GOVERNMENT. IN ANY CASE, I THOUGHT THAT IT HAD BEEN PUT TOGETHER WHEN THE TASK FORCE WAS STILL THOUSANDS OF MILES FROM THE FALKLANDS, ABOUT A MONTH AGO. SINCE THEN, THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED ENORMOUSLY AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR ACCEPTING SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. IT WAS TOTALLY IRRELEVANT TO THE REAL SITUATION.

THE FALKLANDS, ABOUT A MONTH AGO. SINCE THEN, THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED ENORMOUSLY AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR ACCEPTING SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. IT WAS TOTALLY IRRELEVANT TO THE REAL SITUATION. THE ARGENTINES SEEMED TO HAVE CREATED A VERY WIDE NEW GAP.

(E) TARGET DATE FOR CONCLUSION OF FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED THAT ROS HAD REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE NEGOTIATIONS PERHAPS NEEDING TO CONTINUE UNTIL FEBRUARY 1983. I SAID THAT I WAS GLAD THAT ROS WAS NOT INSISTING ON AN ABSOLUTE DEADLINE. FOR US IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD HAVE DISCRETION TO RECOMMEND WHAT FURTHER STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN IF NO AGREEMENT WAS IN SIGHT TOWARDS THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD.

6. I SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE PAPER RAISED TWO NEW POINTS - PARAGRAPH 5, AND THE REFERENCE IN PARAGRAPH 4 TO THE UK AND ARGENTINE OBSERVERS FLYING THEIR FLAGS. WE WERE PUZZLED TO FIND PARAGRAPH 5 IN THE CONTEXT OF A SHORT INTERIM AGREEMENT. IT SEEMED TO OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ARGENTINES TRYING TO CREATE NEW DEMOGRAPHIC FACTS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON THE PURCHASE OF LAND AND ON ACCESS TO THE ISLANDS.

7. SUMMING UP, I SAID THAT WE STILL HOPED TO REACH THE STAGE WHEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR COULD PRODUCE PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE AND THE ARGENTINES HAD TOLD HIM. MEANWHILE, THE QUESTION OF NON-PRE-JUDGEMENT WAS FOR US THE KEY TO EVERYTHING. IN ADDITION, THERE WAS STILL MUCH GROUND TO COVER ON THE DEPENDENCIES, THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, THE SIZE OF THE ZONES OF WITHDRAWAL AND DISCRETION FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO RECOMMEND FURTHER STEPS IF AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED BY THE TARGET DATE.

8. PLEASE SEE MY SECOND IFT FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

PARSONS

CCN... PARA 2 LAST LINE WA WOULD - CONVEY IT TO ME ETC

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GR 150
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 100125Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 701 OF 10 MAY

MY TEL NO 693: FALKLANDS : TRUSTEESHIP

1. AT THE BEGINNING OF MY MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS EVENING (10 MAY), PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ROS HAD COMPLAINED TO HIM ABOUT A STATEMENT YOU HAD ALLEGEDLY MADE TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT 1630Z TODAY IN WHICH YOU CLEARLY MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF TRUSTEESHIP. THIS WAS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE ARGENTINES BECAUSE IT SEEMED TO MEAN THAT BRITAIN WAS INTENDING TO KILL THE CURRENT EXERCISE BY PROPOSING TRUSTEESHIP.

2. I SAID THAT I COULD GIVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR AN ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE THAT WE WERE NOT CONTEMPLATING INJECTING TRUSTEESHIP INTO THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THERE HAD BEEN MUCH INTEREST IN TRUSTEESHIP IN THE HOUSE AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE PART OF DR OWEN AND MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE, WHO HAD BEEN IN NEW YORK AT THE LAST GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

PARSONS

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 102142Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 700 OF 10 MAY

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN
THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON.

FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. I HAVE BEEN GIVING PERIODICAL BRIEFINGS TO THE TEN AND SEPARATELY TO MY OLD COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES. THESE WERE NOT TOO DIFFICULT IN THE EARLIER STAGES. EVERYONE'S CURIOSITY HAS NOW BECOME INSATIABLE.
2. AT TODAY'S BRIEFINGS, I GAVE A GENERAL IDEA OF THE STAGE WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD REACHED. I SAID THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POINTS OF CONVERGENCE AND A FEW CONTENTIOUS ITEMS (WITHOUT SPECIFICATION). I ADMITTED THAT WE WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF PHASED PARALLELISM FOR WITHDRAWAL/CEASEFIRE, THAT WE HAD A TARGET DATE IN MIND FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD BUT THAT THERE MUST BE A MECHANISM FOR IT TO BE EXTENDED IF AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED BY THAT DATE; THAT THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE INSUPERABLE PROBLEMS ABOUT LINKAGE BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL, CEASEFIRE, SUSPENSION AND LIFTING OF ZONES AND ECONOMIC MEASURES. I CONCEDED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ENVISAGE UN ADMINISTRATION FOR THE ISLANDS IF THE TERMS (UNSPECIFIED) WERE RIGHT. I SHOT DOWN A SUGGESTION BY DORR (IRELAND) THAT WE WERE CONSIDERING UN TRUSTEESHIP IN THE IMMEDIATE SHORT TERM. SO FAR, NO-ONE HAS MENTIONED SOUTH GEORGIA. WITH BOTH GROUPS I CONCENTRATED ON THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK, NAMELY THE NEED TO BLOCK ARGENTINE ATTEMPTS TO PRE-JUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I DISCOURAGED ATTEMPTS BY UN PUNDITS IN BOTH GROUPS TO PROPOSE FUZZY FORMULAS AND INSISTED THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION WHICH MUST BE FACED SQUARELY. IT COULD NOT BE FINESSED. I TOLD BOTH GROUPS THAT WE WERE AT PRESENT (AFTERNOON OF 10 MAY) WAITING FOR THE ARGENTINES TO COME UP WITH FRESH INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT.
3. I ASKED BOTH GROUPS TO ENSURE THAT THEIR REPORTING TELEGRAMS WERE GIVEN VERY LIMITED DISTRIBUTION IN THEIR CAPITALS AND LAID GREAT EMPHASIS ON NOT BREAKING THE CONFIDENTIALITY WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS SO FAR MAINTAINED.

GREAT EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS SO FAR MAINTAINED.

4. MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO TELL ME THAT, IF AT ANY TIME WE WANTED TO CALL ON CANADIAN ASSISTANCE ON ANY SPECIFIC QUESTION, WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO ASK.

5. I ASKED MY OLD COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES, WHO HAVE HAD MORE TIME THAN I HAVE RECENTLY TO CIRCULATE AMONGST UN DELEGATIONS, WHETHER THEY FELT THAT THE OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS US WAS CHANGING FOR THE WORSE. THEY SAID THAT IT WAS NOT. THERE WAS STILL MUCH SYMPATHY FOR OUR POSITION.

6. I EXTRACTED FROM DORR THAT NO ONE WAS THINKING OF CALLING FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE PROCEEDING AT THEIR PRESENT INTENSITY.

PARSONS

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... TO GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED
... FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD BUT THAT THERE WOULD BE A
PHASED SUBSTITUTION FOR AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT THAT WE HAD A LIMITED
SPECIFICATION) I ADMITTED THAT WE WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF
BOUNDS OF CONVERGENCE AND A FEW CONTEMPORARY ITEMS (ALTHOUGH
THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD REACHED) I SAID THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF
... AT THE PRESENT TIME I HAVE A GENERAL IDEA OF THE SITUATION WHICH
BECOME INVOLVED

DIFFICULTY IN THE EARLIER STAGES. ELEMENTS OF STABILITY HAS NOT
SERVING TO MY OLD COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES. THESE WERE NOT TOO
I HAVE BEEN GIVING PERIODICAL BRIEFINGS TO THE ICA AND

LAWYERS AND ISLANDS

168

RR MONTEVIDEO

RR BERNE

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 102346Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1692 OF 10 MAY

INFO MODUK (DSB (AIR)) TEL AVIV MONTEVIDEO BERNE

MY TELNO 1618 AND YOUR TELNO 155 TO TEL AVIV: ARMS FOR ARGENTINA

1. OUR U.S. SOURCE HAS NOW PROVIDED FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE AIR CHARTER FROM TEL AVIV TO MONTEVIDEO:

(A) THE FREIGHT COMPANY BARING INC HAVE NOW TOLD HIM THAT THE CARGO IS CLASSIFIED AS WAR MATERIAL (NOT NECESSARILY AMMUNITION):

(B) ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION, THE INTENSE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AT THE U N QUOTE MIGHT OVERTAKE THE NEED FOR THE SHIPMENT OF THE CARGO. UNQUOTE

(C) BIDS FOR THE CONTRACT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED BY THE GLOBAL COMPANY (OPERATING OUT OF KANSAS CITY, OWNED BY IRANIANS OF RECENT U.S. CITIZENSHIP).

AND THE ARROW COMPANY, OPERATING FROM MIAMI.

2. WE HAVE PROVIDED THE STATE DEPARTMENT WITH THESE ADDITIONAL DETAILS. IN VIEW OF THE INFORMATION IN PARA 1 ABOVE, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ASSURANCES FROM TEL AVIV, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER RAISING THIS MATTER WITH THE ISRAELIS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

167
GRS 280

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 102340Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1690 OF 10 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONALS FOR AMBASSADOR)

YOUR TELNO 950: FALKLANDS

1. I RAISED THE SUBJECT OF A GUARANTEE WITH HAIG TODAY, BUT THIS WAS BEFORE I RECEIVED YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. HIS IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WAS TO SAY THAT THE U N COULD NOT GUARANTEE ANYTHING AND THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE COUNTRY THAT COULD DO SO. HE DID NOT VOLUNTEER READINESS ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS TO UNDERTAKE A GUARANTEE AND, ON THE BASIS OF OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT, I RATHER DOUBT WHETHER HE WOULD BE WILLING TO FOLLOW DOWN THIS LINE. THE TROUBLE AS YOU KNOW IS THAT A GUARANTEE OF THIS KIND WOULD REQUIRE THE SPECIFIC AUTHORISATION OF CONGRESS WHICH MIGHT NOT BE PLAIN-SAILING IN THE POST VIETNAM CLIMATE.

2. AS YOU KNOW THE WAY THE AMERICANS DEALT WITH THE GUARANTEE PROBLEM AT THE TIME OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE U.S./PERUVIAN PLAN WAS TO FINESSE IT BY TWO MEANS. THE FIRST WAS THE STIPULATION IN THE AGREEMENT THAT TROOPS SHOULD NOT ONLY BE WITHDRAWN BUT NOT REINTRODUCED. THE SECOND WAS THE COMMITMENT THAT THE CONTACT GROUP, OF WHICH THE U.S. WOULD BE MEMBERS, WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT NO ACTIONS WERE TAKEN WHICH CONTRAVENED THE AGREEMENT AND THAT ALL PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WERE RESPECTED.

3. IT IS A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT MATTER NOW IF WE ARE NOW THINKING OF GETTING THE U.S. TO MAKE SOME GUARANTEE RELATING TO A U N PLAN AND A U N FORCE.

4. ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE U N MUST CONTINUE AND MAY LEAD TO SOMETHING WORTHWHILE, THE PROSPECT OF A U.S. GUARANTEE IN MY VIEW CONTINUES TO DEPEND ON SOME MEASURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANY INTERIM SETTLEMENT.

HENDERSON

NNNN

PS

●/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD (2)
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK

MR ILETT

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)~~

Argentina

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
~~SIR K COUZENS~~) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY
(FCO)

HD/SED

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY

SIC

CYPHER CAT A

FROM GIBRALTAR 100935Z MAY 82
 TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO PERSONAL 63 OF 10 MAY
 AND PRIORITY MADRID

mt

GIBRALTAR/FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY

1. LOCAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE CONSIDER PRESENCE OF ARGENTINE NATIONALS IN SPAIN (PARTICULARLY ANDALUSIA) POSES RISK OF POTENTIAL REPRISAL ADVENTURES AGAINST GIBRALTAR MILITARY AND/OR CIVIL TARGETS. APPROPRIATE COUNTER MEASURES BEING TAKEN DISCREETLY.

2. RECOGNISING INHERENT DIFFICULTIES GRATEFUL FOR ANY ASSESSMENT OF NUMBER, NATURE AND MOOD OF ARGENTINE COMMUNITY IN AREA AND EXTENT TO WHICH THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE BY SPANISH AUTHORITIES.

FCO PLEASE PASS

JACKSON

BT

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL x34

[TYPISTS]

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
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 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR K COUZENS) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TRIPOLI 101050Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 136 OF 10 MAY

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 110: LIBYA AND ARGENTINA

1. I CALLED ON AMERICAN DEPARTMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S BUREAU FOR FOREIGN LIAISON (PBFL) THIS MORNING (10 MAY) OSTENSIBLY TO DRAW THEIR ATTENTION TO A RECENT DEPARTURE IN LIBYAN NEWS AGENCY REPORTING FROM ITS EARLIER EVEN-HANDED POSITION. IN THIS CONTEXT I WAS ALSO ABLE TO MAKE REFERENCE TO REPORTS WE HAD HEARD IN WASHINGTON AND CARRIED ON AFP OF ARGENTINE ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN MISSILES FROM LIBYA.

2. ABU ARQOUB STRESSED THAT THE OFFICIAL LIBYAN POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED SINCE ITS ORIGINAL STATEMENT OF 10 APRIL (OUR TELNO

CHANGED SINCE ITS ORIGINAL STATEMENT OF 10 APRIL (OUR TELNO 105). HE FLATLY DENIED THE WASHINGTON RUMOUR AND UNDER FURTHER QUESTIONING CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE OF ANY KIND. UBAYDI'S ASSURANCE TO US ON 8 APRIL (OUR TELNO 102) THAT NO MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WOULD BE GIVEN TO ARGENTINA REMAINED TRUE.

3. ABU ARQOUB ADDED THAT RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA HAD NOT BEEN GOOD SINCE PERON. ARGENTINA HAD NOT RATIFIED CERTAIN AGREEMENTS, AND HAD A BAD HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. LIBYA NORMALLY CONDUCTED RELATIONS ON A PEOPLE TO PEOPLE BASIS AND COULD NOT BE CLOSE TO A REGIME WHICH HAD IMPOSED ITSELF ON THE PEOPLE AND MAINTAINED THIS POSITION BY FORCE (SIC).
4. THE FRENCH (FROM WHOM WE LEARNT THAT THE RUMOUR HAD APPEARED ON AFP) HAVE CONFIRMED THAT LIBYA HAS NO REPEAT NO EXOCET MISSILES.

BURTON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

X34

TYPISTS

PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
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 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR K COUZENS) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 100855Z MAY 82
 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 192 OF 10 MAY
 INFO UKMIS NEWYORK

FALKLANDS CRISIS

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF 9 MAY HE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING HIS DEEP REGRET OVER THE ATTACK ON HMS SHEFFIELD AND HIS SYMPATHY FOR THE FAMILIES OF MEMBERS OF THE CREW AND OF THE HARRIER PILOTS WHO HAD LOST THEIR LIVES.
2. I AM KEEPING THE ROYAL PALACE AS WELL AS THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FULLY INFORMED ON THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, SENDING THEM COPIES OF ALL MAJOR STATEMENTS, AND I THINK WE CAN COUNT ON THE KING'S CONTINUING UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION (EVEN THOUGH JORDAN'S VOTE IN FAVOUR OF SC RESOLUTION 502 HAS NOT ESCAPED CRITICISM HERE). THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION, ALMOST CERTAINLY ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PALACE, HAS ALSO BEEN KEEPING THE JORDANIAN PRESS MORE OR LESS IN LINE.
3. IN A LONG INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THE EGYPTIAN NEWSPAPER AL AHAM ON 6 MAY, THE KING DREW A PARALLEL BETWEEN THE CONFUSION WHICH HAD ARISEN OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLES IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AND SAID: "..... THE

RESOLUTION 242 AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AND SAID: ".....THE WHOLE WORLD IS ABOUT TO BECOME A JUNGLE. THIS IS BECAUSE WE ARE ABANDONING PRINCIPLES AND DO NOT APPLY WHAT SHOULD BE APPLIED. THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLANDS PROBLEM CONTAINS TWO PRINCIPLES. THE FIRST IS THE INADMISSIBILITY OF OCCUPYING TERRITORY BY FORCE. THE SECOND IS THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THESE ARE THE SAME PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN RESOLUTION 242 ON THE MIDDLE EAST.....BUT WE FIND THAT THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN IGNORED AS FAR AS THE MIDDLE EAST IS CONCERNED, WHILE ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON IMPLEMENTING THEM IN THE FALKLANDS BY FORCE." I THINK WE ARE LIKELY TO HEAR A LOT MORE OF THIS IN THE FUTURE.

URWICK

NNNN

TO DIRECTOR GENERAL

05 EGO

FOR REVIEW

ADVICE TO DIRECTOR

B



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 May 1982

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 6/5.

Dear John,

MT

At their session on 29 April, the Gibraltar House of Assembly passed the following unanimous resolution.

'This House expresses, on behalf of the people of Gibraltar, its full solidarity with the people of the Falkland Islands in their present difficulties, notes the British Government's resolute and determined defence of their wishes and interests, and prays for the success of the Task Force in their mission and for their safe return.'

The Chief Minister asked that the text be transmitted to the Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State for Defence.

The Governor has been asked to tell Sir J Hassan that the text of the resolution has been brought to the attention of Ministers as requested and also to give him a short message of thanks from my Secretary of State.

I am copying this letter to David Omand at the Ministry of Defence.

Yours over,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY

cc Mr Whitmore ✓

Argentina

✓

10.v.

THE FALKLANDS: MEDIA

You will have seen that the Ministry of Defence has progressively been getting a worse press for its handling of the crisis. There were more critical articles in the Sundays (notably the Mail and Observer) and another today by Simon Jenkins, in the Times.

Press Association, ITN and the BBC tried to involve me on Saturday in a meeting with MoD over relations on board the Hermes. Apparently their correspondents had sent signals asking to be brought back because they felt they were not being allowed to do a proper job. (I refused to attend on the grounds that it was in the first instance for the MoD to cope with these problems). Then the attached telegram from Alan Protheroe, BBC, was awaiting me on my arrival in the office yesterday.

David Chipp, Editor in Chief, PA, rang me on Saturday evening to report some progress at his meeting, along with the BBC and ITN, with Ian McDonald (MoD) earlier in the day. It is possible that things will improve, but we cannot be sure.

I raise all this with you for two reasons:

1. MoD, with the support of the co-ordinating committee I chair each morning (comprising also FCO, COI and Cabinet Office), have asked me to try to secure an improvement; and
2. you have been given special responsibility for presentation by OD(SA).

Background

Before turning to the problem, it might be helpful if I outlined some of the background:

- MoD have had considerable difficulty from the outset in securing an adequate voice for public relations;
- I had to intervene very early in the crisis when I became the target for representations by editors who had not secured a place in the Task Force; the fact that I had some success then has made me a focus for media complaints;

- I have great sympathy with MoD public relations who are having to fight every inch of the way to keep up with, let alone ahead of, the public relations battle; they now want me to translate my sympathy into concrete action which secures results;
- as two illustrations of the way in which I am increasingly being forced to step in:
 - last week I had to get on to Mr Nott's private office to force the pace on an announcement over the loss of two Harriers - to ensure, among other things, that the Argentines were not able to claim that they had been responsible for the loss; and
 - yesterday, in some desperation to get public clarification of what was happening around the Falklands, I resorted to the tactic of relaying through MoD PR what I proposed to say at 5.00pm Lobby in the absence of any further guidance from MoD; we eventually got an MoD statement, but after the end of the 6.00pm news some 18 hours after the initial incident.

Diagnosis

The overall problem, which is not confined to MoD, is that the role of public relations in this crisis - as an arm in the Government's total weaponry - has been, and is being, neglected. Perhaps a more accurate diagnosis is that Ministers, while acutely conscious of the need to win the battle for public opinion at home and abroad, have not so far seen fit to forge a direct two-way link between OD(SA) and those at the sharp end of media relations.

The particular MoD problem is in part a reflection of this overall omission and a disinclination within the Department to take the PR function seriously.

Difficulties

The Government's prime objective must be to secure its aims with ^{minimum} maximum loss of life. It must also be accurate and have due regard for the families and particularly for the next of kin. All this is recognised and I have never found difficulty in arguing this case with journalists. But I find it impossible to sustain these arguments over a long period.

Take yesterday, for example. We awoke to reports from the Argentine that an invasion of the Falklands was under way. We are of course used to distortion and downright lies from that quarter and Buenos Aires is now thoroughly discredited. But there is seldom an Argentinian fire without some smoke and so it proved with an MoD statement - but not in any detail until after 6.00pm. I first heard Brian Hanrahan's front line account from the Hermes on the 9.00pm BBC news.


All the evidence is that Official and Service MoD, as distinct from MoD PR, are operating on an altogether too slow and possibly bureaucratic basis.

We ought to speed up our response to events if only in the interests of families back home. Yesterday they had to wait the whole of the day for an authoritative account of what was going on as distinct from a carefully-worded statement mid-morning which begged more questions than it answered.

Conclusion

We need urgently to secure an improvement in the liaison between official and operational MoD and MoD PR, and in the Department's speed of response to PR requirements. Unless we do we shall continue to do ourselves much less than justice. And the media's complaints will intensify. This will do no-one any good and least of all the Task Force and the families of the men out in the South Atlantic.

You may care to discuss.



B. INGHAM

10 May 1982

For dialling instructions
1
Telegram
for enquiries dial the number
shown in your dialling instructions

British
TELECOM
for enquiries
shown in



0
889113 PO SW G
299992 PO TS G
G90 LONDON TLX 116 111 08 1325

MR BERNARD INGHAM
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

THERE EXISTS IN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE A MACHINE CALLED ARMY
NAVY AND AIRFORCE PUBLIC RELATIONS WHICH, OVER THE PAST TWENTY
YEARS, HAS BEEN HONED AND REPEATEDLY EXERCISED TO COPE WITH JUST
THE SORT OF CIRCUMSTANCES WE ARE NOW FACING. FOR SOME INEXPLICABLE
REASON IT IS NOT BEING USED. IT IS AS FAR AS I CAN UNDERSTAND
BEING DELIBERATELY ~~EXCLUDED~~ EXCLUDED FROM MAKING ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO EASING AND ASSISTING THE FLOW OF INFORMATION
TO THE MEDIA. I PLEAD FOR YOUR PERSONAL INTERVENTION TO TRY
AND GET MILITARY AND CIVIL PR EXPERTS IN DEFENCE MINISTRY
MUCH MORE CLOSELY INVOLVED WARMEST REGARDS

ALAN PROTHEROE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL BEC

COL 10

299992 PO TS G
889113 PO SW G

File No.

Department Planning

Drafted by C L G Mallaby
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification <u>CONF</u>
Precedence FLASH
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date)	POSTBY
	(Time)ZZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) (Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK Tel. No. of

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AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) FLASH WASHINGTON

SAVING TO (for info)

MW

Prime Minister

*Approved by Mr. Pym and
deputed.*

A.S.C. 10/5

Distribution:-

Falklands Policy

Headg ECD(E)

Copies to: *JH 10/5*

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNOS 691, 694 and 695: FALKLANDS

1. Thank you for these full reports and for your sterling efforts with the Secretary-General. I endorse in particular your insistence on smoking the Argentines out on the question of sovereignty and the terms of reference for negotiations about the future of the Islands.

2. If the Secretary-General's efforts were to collapse because Argentina insisted on a transfer of sovereignty or would not agree to a sensible provision about what would happen if negotiations had not succeeded by a target date, Argentina would clearly have been unreasonable and we think that we could defend our position satisfactorily in Parliament and internationally. You should/

should continue firmly to represent our position on
bo matters. The questions of the Dependencies

and of the traditional administration may, ^{as you say,} however
be the ones where the crunch will come, ^{but they present very grave difficulties indeed.} and Ministers
They will have to be considered
will wish at that point to consider them in relation

to the position reached on all other elements in
a possible agreement, ^{and meanwhile you should give no (no)}
^{indication that there can be any change of position.}

3. Meanwhile, the following comments on points
raised in your telegrams are provided as ^{general} guidance
for your meetings with the Secretary-General today.

Dependencies

4 In advocating our position, you should argue that
the status quo ~~has not changed~~ in the Dependencies and
that our purpose in the present negotiations is to
deal with the new situation created by the ^{continued unlawful} occupation ^{by the Argentinians}
of the Falkland Islands. ^{themselves} (This line of argument
is easier to sustain in relation to an interim
agreement than in relation to long-term negotiations.

is as it
was before
the unlawful
occupation

If unexpectedly the Secretary-General or the
Argentines were to suggest that the Dependencies
be covered in the negotiations about the future but
not in the other provisions of the interim agreement,
you ^{would no doubt} ~~should~~ undertake entirely without commitment to
^{but} report the suggestion.)

Sovereignty

5 You should continue to insist on two major points of
substance: (a) that the text of the interim agreement
must not prejudice the outcome of negotiations about
the future, and (b) that the Argentines must state
clearly to the Secretary-General that they accept this and
~~will desist from declaring~~ ^{position}
~~not continue to declare~~ the opposite in public.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

6. The language for an interim agreement suggested in para 9 of your telno 694 would be ^{very satisfactory from our point of view} ideal ~~for~~ us and you should stand on it today. (Later, if Argentina will not ~~contemplate~~ ^{be able to} consider it, ~~we might settle~~ ^{we may have to consider,} in the context of an agreement satisfactory on other matters, ~~for~~ ^{different} a ~~watered down~~ version of that language: or ~~for~~ a completely neutral formula, such as that the long term negotiations would be about the future of the Islands, coupled with an Argentine statement on the lines of 5(b) above).

Interim Administration

7. In continuing to insist that the Councils must remain in operation, you should contest the unsupported and erroneous Argentine assertion that the involvement of the islanders in the interim administration would prejudge the outcome of negotiations about the future. You should also make what play you can with the thoughts that to exclude a people from the administration of their own affairs is hardly consistent with the spirit of the UN: and that we have developed ^{the Councils} ~~these institutions~~ in accordance with UN Charter obligations (Article 73(B)) and that it would be contrary to the spirit of the Charter to dismantle them in the absence of alternative arrangements for the expression of the views of the Islanders.

Withdrawal Period.

8. We continue to believe that 14 days should be long enough for total Argentine withdrawal. In any case, we could not accept ^{any} treacherously elastic phrase allowing delays beyond the limit because of 'bad weather or other factors'.

Verification of Withdrawal.

9. This is difficult. Please tell the Secretary-General that a declaration by each side at time 't' of ships and (repeat and) forces in the zone, and daily declarations of what had been withdrawn, would help. But given Argentina's invasion, it is a lot to ask us to accept that she should verify her own withdrawal. You should ask the Secretary-General whether he thinks that the UN could use surveillance aircraft provided by a Member State ^{You will see that} (this possibility, which may depend on whether adequate surveillance aircraft can be borrowed from an acceptable country like Sweden, is also raised in a separate telegram I am sending to Washington).

Size of Zones for Withdrawal.

10. We are content with the Argentine suggestion of 150 nautical miles radius. You have discretion to accept 200 nautical miles ^{for} a zone round the Falkland Islands, if that is ^{raised again} suggested. (Indeed, we perhaps could accept a larger zone round the Falkland Islands, subject to further consideration here.)

Lifting of Zones.

11. You may say that the possibility of their being lifted at time 't' is under positive consideration here.

Lifting of Economic Measures.

12. You may say that we think that the UK and the other EC members could agree to lift economic measures at time 't', ~~and that we are enquiring whether other countries which have introduced economic measures could lift them at such short notice.~~

Target Date for Conclusion of Future Negotiations

13. We see no reason why an interim arrangement should not say that:

- a) negotiations will start immediately, to produce an agreement by 'the target date of 31 December 1982';
- b) the interim arrangements will remain in force until implementation of a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands;
- c) the Secretary-General should report just before the target date about next steps.

14. The idea for starting long term negotiations notionally at time 't' ^w should be presentationally difficult for us and you should maintain a reserve on it.

Venue for Negotiations.

15. We can accept New York State other than New York City itself.

Involvement of Junta in Argentine Adherence to an Agreement.

16. You were right to argue that all three members of the Junta should sign the agreement. But if that later proved to be a sticking point, we could revert to the suggestion in paragraph 6a of my telno 371, that Argentine adherence to any agreement must clearly be fully backed by the Junta. *This could imply a public statement by all 3 members.*

AF 10/7

8

SECRET

4327 - 1

ZZ WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 349

SECRET

FM FCO 101420Z MAY 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 950 OF 10 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 1678: FALKLANDS

1. WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD KEEP HAIG PERSONALLY IN THE PICTURE ON HOW MATTERS ARE DEVELOPING AT THE UN, DRAWING AS NECESSARY ON MY TELNO 371 AND UKMIS NEW YORK REPORTING TELEGRAMS. ALTHOUGH ACTION IS NOW FIRMLY CONCENTRATED IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CONSULTATIONS, THERE CAN BE NO GREAT OPTIMISM ON THEIR OUTCOME AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE ANY IMPRESSION OF LEAVING HAIG IN THE COLD (SEE MIFT). THERE ARE ALSO CONTINUING AND IMPORTANT ASPECTS ON WHICH WE SHALL NEED US INVOLVEMENT.
2. WHEN YOU SEE HAIG, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD TAKE UP FOLLOWING POINTS WITH HIM:
 - A. I LAST RAISED THE QUESTION OF A US GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS IN MY MESSAGE TO HAIG IN MY TELNO 917. IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CONSULTATIONS WERE TO LEAD TO A POSSIBLE INTERIM AGREEMENT UNDER UN AUSPICES, IT WILL BE CRUCIAL FOR US THAT IT SHOULD BE UNDERPINNED BY A CLEAR US GUARANTEE AGAINST THE NON-INTRODUCTION OF ARGENTINE FORCES INTO THE ISLANDS PENDING A DEFINITE SETTLEMENT. SUCH AN ASSURANCE WOULD NEED TO BE CONVEYED TO US AND NOTIFIED TO THE ARGENTINES IN WRITING BEFORE ANY AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO FORCE. AN ASSURANCE BY HAIG ON THIS WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL AT THIS STAGE IN ALLOWING US TO GAUGE THE SCOPE FOR ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE:
 - B. PARAGRAPH 2(C) OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 691 RAISES THE PROBLEM OF UN VERIFICATION OF A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. THE

SECRET

4327 - 1

IDEA OF A SIMPLE DECLARATION AND NOTIFICATION BY BOTH SIDES IS OBVIOUSLY FULL OF HOLES: AND FOR VERIFICATION TO BE EFFECTIVE IT WOULD NEED TO BE DONE PHYSICALLY BY AIRCRAFT. WHILE THE US COULD FULFIL THIS ROLE, A DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF US AIRCRAFT AS SUCH WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. THEREFORE, IF THE NEED ARISES, WOULD THE US BE ABLE TO LOAN SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT TO THE UN TO OPERATE IN UN COLOURS? OR DOES HAIG SEE ANY OTHER WAY ROUND THIS DIFFICULTY, SUCH AS AIRCRAFT FROM A NEUTRAL COUNTRY LIKE SWEDEN?

HYM

FAIKLANDS SELECTIVE

LIMITED
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF DEPT
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
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MR URE

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IMMEDIATE

DEDIP

FM WASHINGTON 101620Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1686 OF 10 MAY
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

FALKLANDS

1. WHEN I SAW HAIG TODAY I GAVE HIM A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF HOW PARSONS WAS GETTING ON IN NEW YORK. HE WAS NOT SURPRISED TO HEAR ABOUT THE DIFFICULT ISSUES EXCEPT THAT OF SOUTH GEORGIA. IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN UNDERSTOOD IN THE LATER PROPOSALS THAT SOUTH GEORGIA WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN ANY SETTLEMENT.

2. I ASKED HAIG TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO GET THE ARGENTINIANS TO GO BACK TO SQUARE ONE ON THAT POINT. PERHAPS HE COULD INSTRUCT GENERAL WALTERS TO TALK ACCORDINGLY ON HIS VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES. HAIG SAID THAT WALTERS WAS GOING DOWN THERE TONIGHT AND HE WOULD CERTAINLY DO WHAT HE COULD ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA.

3. HAIG ASKED ME IF I KNEW THAT THE SO-CALLED CIVILIANS WHO HAD OSTENSIBLY GONE TO SOUTH GEORGIA ON SCRAP METAL BUSINESS WERE IN FACT ARGENTINE NAVAL PERSONNEL DELIBERATELY SENT THERE AS PART OF THE INVASION PLAN. THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION HAD BEEN MASTERMINDED

THE INVASION PLAN, THE SOUTH GEORGIA OPERATION HAD BEEN MASTERMINDED BY COSTA MENDEZ. HAIG COUNSELLED ME SEVERAL TIMES TO BE BEWARE OF THE EXCEPTIONAL MALEVOLENCE AND DECEIT OF COSTA MENDEZ.

4. HAIG ELABORATED A BIT ON HIS VIEWS ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN BUENOS AIRES. HE SPOKE OF CONSIDERABLE INTERNAL DISSENT. GALTIERI HAD SENT HIM A MESSAGE THROUGH A THIRD PARTY THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BECOME MORE DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT THE US AND THE UK SHOULD REALLY BE ARGENTINA'S BEST FRIENDS. HAIG ALSO SPOKE OF ANOTHER CONTACT REPRESENTING THE ARGENTINE ARMY AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE, WITH LINKS TO VIOLA. THEY CLAIMED TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE MODERATES WHO INCLUDED MANY CORPS COMMANDERS AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY. THEIR VIEW WAS THAT ^{HERE WAS} A DANGER OF THE NAVY AND THE PERONISTAS GETTING TOGETHER AND TAKING OVER, VEERING HEAVILY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.

5. HAIG THEN LOWERED HIS VOICE, THOUGH THERE WAS NO-ONE ELSE IN THE ROOM, TO TELL ME OF THE EXTENT OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD INDICATIONS LEADING HIM TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE DECISION TO INVADE THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE PLAN IN WHICH SOTA M

PLAN IN WHICH COSTA MENDEZ HAD PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART, HAD BEEN A TWO-PRONGED ONE TO INVADE THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THE BEAGLE CHANNEL ISLANDS. THE ARGENTINIANS HAD EXPECTED THE SOVIETS TO VETO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND HAD BEEN SURPRISED WHEN THEY HAD NOT DONE SO. THE ARGENTINIANS HAD ALSO BEEN SURPRISED BY THE UK REACTION AND THE USA DECISION TO COME DOWN ON THE BRITISH SIDE.

6. ACCORDING TO HAIG, THE SOVIETS HAD SWUNG LAST WEEK FROM EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA TO INDICATING BACKING FOR THE ARGENTINIAN PEOPLE. ACCORDING TO AMERICAN INFORMATION, THE SOVIETS WERE NOW WORKING ACTIVELY WITH THE PERONISTAS, BELIEVING THAT THEIR FUTURE BEST LAY WITH THEM.

7. THIS LED HAIG TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE AMERICANS MUST DO ANYTHING THEY CAN TO ENCOURAGE A SETTLEMENT BY SOME OF THE MILITARY LEADERS. THIS WILL PROBABLY MEAN THAT GALTIERI WILL HAVE TO GO. THE AMERICAN HOPE IS THAT THERE CAN BE SOME MILITARY LEADERSHIP THAT WILL AVOID THE PERONISTAS TAKING OVER.

8. HAIG SUGGESTED THAT THE US DECISION OF 30 APRIL TO COME DOWN ON THE BRITISH SIDE HAD BEEN A MAJOR EXERCISE OF PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA AND HAD DONE A LOT TO STIMULATE THE PRESENT OUTBREAK OF SPLITTING

9. HAIG SAID THAT IN THIS ATMOSPHERE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE BRITISH MAINTAIN MAXIMUM MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE TALKLAND ISLANDS. HE DID NOT WANT TO INTERFERE WITH OR GIVE US ADVICE ABOUT MILITARY OPERATIONS BUT OBVIOUSLY IF WE COULD AVOID ATTACKS ON THE MAINLAND THAT MIGHT INVOLVE CIVILIAN TARGETS, THAT WOULD AVOID A POSSIBLE SETBACK TO THE PROSPECTS FOR THE MODERATE FORCES.

10. HAIG'S CONVICTION WAS THAT THE ARGENTINIAN GARRISON ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD VERY SOON HAVE SEVERE SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES. THIS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO MAKE THEM YIELD, BUT IF THEY ALSO SUFFERED CASUALTIES HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT WELL BE PREPARED TO SURRENDER.

11. I ASKED HAIG WHAT WALTERS'S INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE FOR HIS MISSION TONIGHT. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GOING LARGELY TO PROBE THE POSSIBILITIES HE HAD MENTIONED OF AN ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT AND HE WOULD TRY TO BRING HOME TO THE PRESENT RULERS THE URGENCY OF THEM REACHING AN AGREEMENT. HE WOULD IMPRESS UPON GALTIERI THAT IF THE SOVIETS SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING ARGENTINA THIS WOULD POSE A THREAT TO THE WHOLE AMERICAN ATMOSPHERE. HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUES UNDER NEGOTIATION. HAIG SAID THAT HE WOULD BE TELLING THE ARGENTINIANS THAT IF THEY WERE PREPARED TO COME TO A REASONABLE AGREEMENT, THE US ATTITUDE WOULD CHANGE COMPLETELY AND THEY WOULD BE READY TO HELP ON A MAJOR SCALE ECONOMICALLY WITH ARGENTINA'S DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.

12. HAIG SPOKE OF HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE ATTITUDE IN LATIN AMERICA GENERALLY. HE THOUGHT A MORE SOBER ATMOSPHERE WAS BEGINNING TO PREVAIL. HE GAVE THIS AS AN EXPLANATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S 'DISTATEFUL' LETTER OF 2 MAY. HE SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN IT IN DRAFT BUT WAS NEVERTHELESS RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS DEPLORABLE.

13. I ASKED HAIG WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT THE CURRENT TALKS BETWEEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND ROS. WAS IT A MERE CHARADE TO WIN TIME FOR THE ARGENTINIANS AND CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATION WHILE AVOIDING ANY COMMITMENTS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY ETC QUERY. RATHER TO MY SURPRISE HAIG SAID HE WAS NOT SO SURE. HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOMETHING MORE TO IT, A REFLECTION I THINK OF HIS CONVICTION THAT THERE IS A GROWING BELIEF IN BUENOS AIRES AMONG A LARGE BODY OF MILITARY LEADERS THAT THEIR INTERESTS WILL NOT BE SERVED BY PURSUING A COURSE THAT WILL GET THEM INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT UPON THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT THERE IS A WAY OUT THAT COULD AVOID DISHONOUR.

ZZ WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 195

SECRET

FM FCO 101420Z MAY 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 951 OF 10 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. HAIG'S COMMENTS IN YOUR TELNO 1678 ARE PUZZLING TO SAY THE LEAST (AS WAS HIS EARLIER REFERENCE IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TELNO 1651 TO GROWING ARGENTINE CONCERN ABOUT 'THEIR PLACE IN HISTORY'). THE SCENARIO OF ARGENTINE MODERATES ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING BRITISH PUNITIVE MILITARY ACTION SEEMS, AS YOU SUGGEST, HIGHLY IMPROBABLE. IF YOU GET AN OPPORTUNITY, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PROBE FURTHER ON WHO EXACTLY THESE MODERATES MIGHT BE, WHAT FORCES THEY REPRESENT (INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE ARMED FORCES) AND WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JUNTA'S POSITION AND FOR THE ARGENTINE NEGOTIATING STANCE. IF THERE ARE SERIOUS CRACKS IN THE ARGENTINE STRUCTURE IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT; BUT IT IS HARD TO DRAW ANY SERIOUS CONCLUSIONS FROM SUCH THROW-AWAY COMMENTS.
2. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO KNOW MORE ABOUT GENERAL WALTER'S CLOAK-AND-DAGGER ACTIVITIES. WE APPRECIATE HAIG'S INTEREST IN KEEPING IN ON THE ACT. BUT WE WONDER ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF BEHIND-THE-SCENES ACTIVITY AT THIS MOMENT WHICH COULD CUT ACROSS THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS.

PYM

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE

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*With the Compliments of the
Assistant Legal Secretary*

H. STEEL

*Attorney General's Chambers,
Law Officers' Department,
Royal Courts of Justice,
Strand. W.C.2A 2LL*

01 405 7641 Extn. 3229

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3229

01-405 7641 Ext. ~~XXXX~~

Communications on this subject should
be addressed to

THE LEGAL SECRETARY
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS,
LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

Our Ref: 14/12/4

10 May, 1982

A.J.C. 4/5
h-a.

Dear Sir,

DEATH OF PRISONER OF WAR ON SOUTH GEORGIA

I have shown the Attorney-General my copy, which I have received today, of Brian Fall's letter to you of 7 May. He has commented that this case is so important, in the international sense, that we must be extra-careful and he therefore supports the view of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that it is highly desirable that his (the Attorney-General's) advice should be sought before the Commanding Officer is in turn given advice on whether or not to institute court martial proceedings.

It has been suggested that I should attend a meeting which is to be held tomorrow afternoon by Ponting (DS 15) and I hope to do so unless other Falkland commitments prevent me. The purpose of my attendance will be primarily to register again this interest which the Attorney-General has in the case and his desire to be consulted before any decisions on it are taken, but I also hope that the meeting will provide an opportunity for me to learn a little more about the facts of the case (on which I have so far seen no more than the ordinary press reports) so as to help me brief the Attorney-General when the time comes.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall and to John Coles at No.10.

*Yours ans,
Henry Steel*

H. STEEL

David Omand Esq
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
London, SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT.



FILE

R.M.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 May, 1982

✓. Master set

Dear John,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE GOVERNOR
OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Mr Rex Hunt, accompanied by Mr Cheek and Mr Luxton, who as you know are prominent Falkland Islanders, called on the Prime Minister on Friday, 7 May at Mrs Thatcher's request.

I am not recording the conversation in detail because it was largely devoted to a discussion of the nature of life on the Falkland Islands and the likely impact on the Islanders of recent events.

But you should be aware of the following points:-

(a) The Governor, supported by Mr Cheek and Mr Luxton, expressed the firm conviction that the Islanders would wish even more strongly than before the invasion to remain British.

(b) Mr Hunt conveyed to the Prime Minister information which was new to her but may not be to you, namely that two weeks before the invasion a group of 17 Argentines had arrived on the Falkland Islands to build a ramp for a gas company; in retrospect Mr Hunt had no doubt that they were preparing some aspect of the invasion.

(c) Mr Cheek asked whether Falkland Islanders who had reached this country would qualify for treatment under the National Health Service. The Prime Minister gave her personal assurance that they would have no difficulty in obtaining treatment under the same terms as United Kingdom citizens.

(d) The Governor suggested that the Prime Minister might broadcast a message to the Islanders. In discussion, it was agreed that the desirability and timing of any broadcast would need very careful consideration. (I should be grateful if you could let me have advice in due course).

BF (1)

/During

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BK(2) During the course of the conversation Mr Hunt said that he had just completed a despatch on the future of the Falkland Islands. I should be grateful if you could arrange for me to receive a copy in due course, together with any comments which the Department may wish to offer.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Clark (Department of Health and Social Security).

Yours ever

John Cole.

John Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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RESTRICTED

PA

SAPU(82) 18

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached for information are the transcripts of the interviews given by Mr Nott (Weekend World) and Mr Parkinson (World This Weekend) on Sunday 9 May 1982.

Cabinet Office

10 May 1982

RESTRICTED

CECIL PARKINSON (TORY PARTY CHAIRMAN)

Transcript from BBC Radio 4, The World This Weekend. 9 May 1982.

PRESENTER: GORDON CLOUGH. Well the inner Cabinet is to meet again at 2.30 this afternoon; it will meet, presumably, without the Foreign Secretary, Mr Francis Pym, who is in Belgium trying to persuade our seemingly slightly reluctant EEC partners to renew their economic sanctions against Argentina. Mr Knott will be there, Mr Whitelaw and Mr Cecil Parkinson, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Chairman of the Conservative Party. Mr Parkinson had hoped, this morning, to be running in the London Marathon, instead, he came into our studio where I asked him, first, if the inner Cabinet had any real hopes that the UN negotiations we've just been hearing about from Sir Anthony, could lead to a successful and peaceful outcome.

PARKINSON: We are going into the talks very, very seriously indeed. Nobody can doubt the Government's determination to try to find a peaceful settlement and nobody should doubt that it is the Argentinians who've consistently blocked progress. There was an offer to them on Thursday which would have resulted in a cease fire on Friday, had they accepted it, which contained almost all the elements of the UN offer. So we're going into these talks very seriously but against the background that the people we're trying to negotiate with for the last 5 weeks, have blocked diplomatic initiatives wherever they came from.

CLOUGH: But what about the British Government's attitude to the UN offer? Are you taking that hook, line and sinker?

PARKINSON: We have said - Francis Pym has made it quite clear - that we back the UN initiative and that we wish to talk with the Secretary General and to make his ideas - we see in those ideas the framework of a negotiable settlement - and that's what we're working with him to

do - just as we worked with the Americans and the Peruvians - in very good faith to try to find an answer.

CLOUGH: Well Mr Haig - if he, indeed, is that senior official who has been quoted so extensively today, and there seems to be very little doubt that he is - appears to think that the road of negotiation is virtually at its end; that he fears there is going to be terrible fighting. Now, although today's reports of an invasion are not true, doesn't there come a time when negotiation cannot go on any longer - we can't keep the task force bobbing around waiting

PARKINSON: The plain fact is that it suits the Argentinians to string negotiations along and if they could get a cease fire without withdrawal that would be perfect for them. Their troops could consolidate their position, they know that their reserves are only 400 miles away so it suits them to string negotiations along and that is, of course, impossible for us. So there is a time limit but I don't believe we've reached it yet. No exact moment has been fixed but there is a moment and we are approaching it. But time is running out and the Argentinians had better understand that, at the moment, there is the prospect of an honourable, negotiable settlement. If they don't take it, then they will have to face the consequences and we are very serious - and we have been all along - that the military option is the final option. Not the one we prefer but if it is the one we have to take, we will take it.

CLOUGH: In a poll that's been published today by commercial television, there appears to be quite remarkable overwhelming support for the Government's policy of negotiation backed by force and also a feeling that lives should be sacrificed if need be. If it came to the point, do you think that the country is prepared to see a lot of people killed - both British and Argentine?

PARKINSON: I think the country realises that, all along, the

Government has told them the absolute truth and I believe that the Government is reflecting the attitude of the country. The whole country wants the negotiated settlement that the Government wants but, equally, the country is telling the Government that, if there is a price to be paid, the country will pay that price. We don't want war; we don't want to see lives lost; that's the very last thing that any of us want. But, equally, we are determined that the Argentinians will not be allowed to take British territory by force and keep it against the wishes of the British people and the British people on those islands.

CLOUGH: Well let us say, Mr Parkinson, that, in due course, there may have to be an attack - an invasion or reinvasion of the Falkland Islands - people may get killed, the Argentines may get driven off. When that's happened and Britain has regained administration over the islands, can we preserve it?

PARKINSON: I believe we will. I don't think the public would understand if we paid the price for retaking those islands and then handed them over and that is not an option in my view: certainly not handing them over to the Argentinians.

CLOUGH: Well what about the UN trusteeship option, then, that's come to the front this last week?

PARKINSON: Francis Pym has made it quite clear that the Government would be prepared to consider that as a very serious option indeed.

CLOUGH: What he didn't make very clear, in answering reporters' questions the other day, was where the islanders themselves stood. When he was pressed on whether their views would be paramount, he tended to fudge and hedge a bit and I think the Falkland Islanders themselves feel this. John Cheke has been saying today that he hopes that their wishes will be paramount and he believes there's been fudging. He says if the Government's thinking is changing,

then would the Government please stand up and say what it actually means about the islanders' wishes?

PARKINSON: No, the Government's thinking isn't changing.

CLOUGH: So the islanders' wishes remain paramount?

PARKINSON: The islanders' wishes, built into the Peruvian agreement, was a clause which covered that point.

CLOUGH: Now then, if the islanders' - after the islands have been retaken - the islanders are polled, a referendum is held or whatever means it might be. If they then say, yes, we want to return to the status quo ante; we want to remain a British Dependency; we want to have no truck with any UN trusteeship arrangements; we want to have no truck with condominium; no truck with lease-back: how does the Government then set about defending these 8,000 miles away islands?

PARKINSON: What the Government has said - and I'm not going to pre-judge now, the outcome of the negotiations which is what you're trying to tempt me to do - what we have said all along

CLOUGH: Not at all, I'm sorry

PARKINSON: No, let me just make the Government's position clear. The Government's position is that we must get the Argentinians off the islands, they must withdraw. Arrangements must be made to keep the Argentinians off the islands. The wishes and the interests of the islanders must be very firmly taken into account: they must be satisfied with the eventual outcome of any negotiations. But, within those parameters, we are prepared to negotiate and I think it would be quite wrong of me to say any more. If you read the agreement with the Peruvians, if you read clause 5, that sets out the Government's position very clearly indeed.

CLOUGH: Forgive me, but you have actually, very carefully, avoided using the word paramount - the word that was used repeatedly at the beginning of this dispute - it was said repeatedly inside and outside

the Houses of Parliament that the islanders' wishes would be paramount. Now are they still going to be paramount?

PARKINSON: I would say that the wishes of the islanders will be of overwhelming importance to us when we come to discuss the longterm future of the Falklands but at the moment, what we're talking about is retaking British territory, removing Argentinian troops from that territory, keeping them off that territory, and then sitting down with the United Nations - this is precisely why we're there and precisely why I don't want to pre-judge the negotiations - sitting down with the United Nations and working out a formula which will give those islands peace and security in the future. May I just make one final point because I think this is a very important one. We, as a country, have a record second to none of bringing countries to independence. This idea that we are a power trying to hang on to a colony, that we have this great urge to have colonies all over the world, simply belies our record. What we are not prepared to do is to bring a colony to independence and then see it handed over to someone else who wishes to turn it into a colony of their own. We have no wish to see the Falklands as a colony of Argentina.

WEEKEND WORLD - SUNDAY, 9TH MAY 1982

INVADING THE FALKLANDS.
MOMENT OF DECISION

STUDIO INTERVIEW WITH MR. JOHN NOTT MP
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE.

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LONDON WEEKEND TELEVISION WHO MUST
BE CREDITED IF USED.

BRIAN WALDEN

Hello and good morning. All the indications are that a British invasion of the Falkland Islands may well be imminent. Indeed there've been reports this morning from Argentina that it may already have begun. Our Ministry of Defence has denied the reports, but clearly the Falklands crisis is coming to a head. At the United Nations in New York today last-ditch diplomatic efforts are still continuing to try to find a peaceful solution to the dispute between Britain and Argentina. Few people however, now believe that these efforts will succeed, and if they fail and if the British government still wants to get the Argentinians off the Falklands, then it would appear to have little choice but to order that the islands be re-captured by force. In those circumstances, all-out bloody conflict seems inevitable. So will the government launch a re-invasion of the islands? Well, to help answer this question this morning, we'll be assessing whether the Argentinian government will back down, with the first full British television interview with the Argentinian Minister of Defence, Senor Amadeo Frugoli. We'll also be reporting on the findings of a Weekend World survey of British public opinion which bears a powerful message for our own government. And most important, John Nott, Britain's Secretary of State for Defence, who's with us in the studio, will be answering our questions. First though, let's hear the latest news headlines from ITN and Sandy Gall (ITN NEWS)

If there is all-out conflict in the South Atlantic, it won't be because Britain has been inflexible. Of course, the British government still wants the Argentinians off the Falklands. But since the Falklands peace drive started nearly five weeks ago, the position of Mrs. Thatcher and her Ministers on what should happen after a withdrawal has undergone a major shift. Once the government insisted on the return of the Falklands to British administration. Now it's agreed that they should be administered by a small group of unidentified countries whilst negotiations

BRIAN WALDEN CONTD.....

to settle the islands' long-term status continue. Once, the government demanded that in any settlement the views of the Falklands Islanders should be paramount. Now it no longer talks in such terms. But on one principle it has so far stood firm. The sovereignty of the Falkland Islands can only be changed by negotiation, with the Falkland Islanders still having a say. The question of sovereignty, the government has insisted, can't be pre-judged.

PATRICK KEATLEY - DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT "THE GUARDIAN"

British Ministers simply cannot accept recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the islands as a precondition for negotiations. They just won't have it. They want the Islanders themselves, 1800 people, to have a say in their own future, to vote on whatever formula emerges, and as Mr. Pym has said, that would make nonsense of negotiations if you in advance hand sovereignty to Argentina or admit that they have it. It's something that's to be negotiated about.

BRIAN WALDEN

But for all Britain's insistence on this point, the Argentinian government has always taken a very different view. The military junta under President Leopoldo Galtieri has asserted right from the start of the crisis that the sovereignty of the Falklands, which it claims is Argentinian, is non-negotiable. It's always held this view with great firmness.

JOHN CARLIN - REPORTER "BUENOS AIRES HERALD"

During the whole of the Haig mediation and right up until this moment Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez has insisted again and again that everything is negotiable except sovereignty. In this he is articulating absolutely

JOHN CARLIN CONTD...

the view of the Argentine military leadership. They would be quite willing to withdraw troops from the Falkland Islands. They would be quite willing to offer Britain exploiting rights to the great mineral wealth there is in and around the Falkland Islands. They would be prepared to give the Falkland Islanders themselves red carpet treatment, but they will not back down on their demand of sovereignty.

BRIAN WALDEN

Only if Argentinian sovereignty is guaranteed, the military regime has said, will they be willing to withdraw their troops. It's this position which the British government's been trying to get Argentina to change since the start of the crisis. Hitherto, in attempting to do this the government's always stood firm by its policy of giving priority to diplomacy, employing the threat of the use of force only as a lever to help back its diplomatic efforts. It was in pursuit of this policy that the task force was despatched, and was ordered to establish a blockade round the Falklands. And it seems to have been to further the aims of the policy that the blockade zone round the Falklands was extended on Friday. Previously the zone covered an area within 200 miles of the Falkland Islands, but on Friday it was extended to within 12 miles of the Argentinian coast. The government didn't say that any Argentinian warships or military aircraft found within this zone would be attacked, but it implied they would. Faced with this threat it might have been hoped that the Argentinians would show some signs of compromise in any diplomatic activity which followed. It's the United Nations in New York which is now the only channel left for such diplomatic negotiations. The United Nations Secretary-General Senor Javier Perez de Cuellar is the man at the centre of these negotiations. He's put forward a six-point peace plan. This calls for an immediate ceasefire as the first step. Then it proposes the withdrawal of

BRIAN WALDEN CONTD...

Argentinian troops from the islands. At the same time the British naval task force would pull back. That would be followed by the start of direct negotiations between the two governments on the long-term future of the islands. The economic sanctions now being implemented against Argentina by Britain and a number of our allies would then be ended. And meanwhile, for an interim period the United Nations would administer the islands, possibly under a form of trusteeship. Clearly, this is a very skeletal package which might accommodate a multitude of different viewpoints. In the talks about the plan, no particular difficulties appear to have cropped up so far. But as soon as more detailed discussions take place, an obvious problem could arise. The Argentinian government may well continue to insist that sovereignty is non-negotiable, despite the threat implied by the extension of Britain's blockade on Friday. Of course, the British government might then back its diplomacy with more threats. It might threaten to invade the islands, or bomb the Argentinian mainland. Indeed a number of reports in today's British newspapers hint that such threats might have already been issued. Of course, the Argentinians might compromise in the face of such threats, but if they were to remain inflexible it's hard to see how a diplomatic solution could be arrived at. The British government's present position simply wouldn't allow it to accept the Argentinian demands without a major climbdown. Well, Weekend World has tried to find out just what the Argentinian reaction is likely to be. Yesterday, in Buenos Aires, Weekend World researcher Cresta Norris conducted the first full interview for British television with the Argentinian Defence Minister, Senor Amadeo Frugoli. She asked him first about the Argentinian government's current willingness to accept a ceasefire and the withdrawal of its troops from the islands, which the Argentinians call the Malvinas.

CRESTA NORRIS

How does the Argentine government react to a ceasefire proposal?

AMADEO FRUGOLI - ARGENTINIAN DEFENCE MINISTER (Translation)

The Argentine government responded affirmatively to the U.N. Secretary-General's proposal to initiate friendly discussions in order to try to find a peaceful solution to the dispute existing with Great Britain. It was pointed out that for these negotiations to take place there would have to be a ceasefire.

CRESTA NORRIS

Would you withdraw your troops immediately a ceasefire was announced?

AMADEO FRUGOLI

The ceasefire means specifically that no military operation should be carried out, but it does not imply a withdrawal of the troops.

CRESTA NORRIS

The British have always insisted during negotiations that the Islanders should be able to choose for themselves which country has sovereignty over them. How do you react to that?

AMADEO FRUGOLI

Argentina has never accepted the argument of self-determination for the inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands because that argument has no justification, since what is involved is a population which was transported there by a colonial power, in this case Great Britain, which took over the Malvinas Islands by force in 1833.

CRESTA NORRIS

How much consultation would you allow the islanders?

AMADEO FRUGOLI

I repeat that the argument of self-determination does not apply in the case of the Malvinas because it is not a population which has always been settled there. It was, I repeat, taken there by the colonial power - Great Britain - when they took the Malvinas by force in 1833.

CRESTA NORRIS

Turning now to the United Nations peace proposal, the main stumbling block from the British government's point of view seems to be the insistence so far of the Argentine government that Argentine sovereignty over the islands be guaranteed before any negotiations. Is there any chance under the circumstances that the Argentine government might change its position on this?

AMADEO FRUGOLI

It is quite clear that the acknowledgement of the unquestionable rights to sovereignty of the government and the people of Argentina to the Malvinas Islands can in no way be disregarded by Great Britain. This is an essential point which marks a limit in the negotiations.

CRESTA NORRIS

Would you accept the United Nations plan if it left the question of sovereignty of the islands to be decided when the trusteeship was concluded?

AMADEO FRUGOLI

This depends on the circumstances. What I want to make perfectly clear is that the Republic of Argentina will

AMADEO FRUGOLI CONTD.

never relinquish its rights of sovereignty to the Malvinas Islands. That during the diplomatic negotiations we can establish a particular sequence to deal with the problems is a different matter, which will depend on how the diplomatic talks develop. But the principle of the recognition of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands is unchangeable. But this does not mean that we do not take into account the interests of the Malvinas inhabitants, and we are prepared to acknowledge their rights to own property, to compensation or other arrangements of an economic nature which may result from the possession of the islands by the Argentine government. Moreover, the Argentine government has stressed on numerous occasions that it does not intend to adopt any measures which would involve an abrupt change in the life-style of the Islanders. And those who wish to leave the islands because they do not feel happy have every opportunity to do so, and this has applied from the very beginning.

CRESTA NORRIS

Has the sinking of the General Belgrano and the loss of lives made the government more or less flexible ?

AMADEO FRUGOLI

The sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano by the British submarine Conqueror outside the exclusion zone established by the government of Great Britain has meant the loss of human lives. This painful event has only strengthened the spirit of the Argentine people, who are now more determined than ever to defend their legitimate rights

CRESTA NORRIS

And any military action taken by Britain will not make the government here more prepared to discuss the issue?

AMADEO FRUGOLI

I repeat that the Republic of Argentina will never under any circumstances relinquish its legitimate rights of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands.

CRESTA NORRIS:

If the British continue with an air and naval blockade around the islands, would you breach it?

AMADEO FRUGOLI:

The Argentine government did not heed the blockade originally established in the 200 mile area around the Malvinas. The British government has now extended the blockade up to 12 miles from the coast of the Argentine mainland. This act undoubtedly constitutes a further aggression and a positive threat to intensify and extend the scope of military operations, and this happens at a time when Britain claims to be fully prepared to start diplomatic negotiations. Really it is impossible to understand how on the one hand they can state their desire to seek a diplomatic settlement, while on the other hand they extend the exclusion zone to the limits which I have just stated.

CRESTA NORRIS:

If the British were to bomb people and places on the Argentine mainland how would the Argentine government and people react?

AMADEO FRUGOLI:

The reaction will be to respond to the attack with all our operational capabilities.

CRESTA NORRIS:

What would be your response to an invasion of the islands by Britain?

AMADEO FRUGOLI:

My response is the response which will undoubtedly be given by the Argentine forces deployed on the Malvinas Islands, who will use their full operational capabilities to defend our legitimate rights.

CRESTA NORRIS:

So do you think that the fighting will get more intense or that a settlement will be reached?

AMADEO FRUGOLI:

Argentina has from the very outset been ready to seek a peaceful settlement to this dispute, and in this she only continues a long and honourable tradition of respect for international relations and peaceful solutions of disputes between countries. But she certainly cannot accept willy-nilly, without defending herself from the aggression to which Great Britain has subjected her for so many years. The government of Great Britain has not shown willingness to negotiate and find a solution to the problem. For a hundred and forty-nine years she has maintained an illegitimate hold over the islands despite the repeated and permanent claims which have been made since then by all Argentine governments, and for the past seventeen years we have negotiated within the framework of the U.N. based on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, but no specific results have been obtained.

BRIAN WALDEN:

The Argentinian government then, still seems most unwilling to compromise. One might take some of what the Defence Minister had to say with a pinch of salt. Bluff and bluster might have had a lot to do with it. But one thing Senor Frugoli made crystal clear. Argentina is still not prepared to put aside its claim to the sovereignty of the Falklands. In these circumstances it's hard to see diplomacy at the United Nations, or indeed anywhere else, delivering what the British government's seeking. So what will Mrs. Thatcher and her Ministers decide to do now? We'll be back in a moment.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Hello again. If diplomacy fails Mrs. Thatcher and her Ministers could be left with very few choices. They could hope to rely on the economic sanctions implemented by our major allies in Western Europe and America. The Argentinian economy is already very weak and it might be hoped that sanctions could bring it to its knees. But sanctions are notoriously slow-acting. And most experts agree that there's little chance of them having a decisive effect in Argentina for months. Alternatively, the government could order the task force to sit out a prolonged blockade. It might be hoped that such seige tactics would eventually drive the Argentinian forces on the Falklands to surrender. But such a strategy would bear great risks. Simply enforcing the enlarged blockade zone for long would face the task force with considerable problems. The weather will worsen as the southern winter approaches. The risk of accidents will increase. The fitness and morale of the men aboard our ships might begin to deteriorate. They could well continue to be vulnerable to air strikes like the one which destroyed H.M.S. Sheffield. The task force might so lose its potency that it might cease to be a threat. Britain might never get the islands back. Faced with that possibility, Mrs. Thatcher and her Ministers would have only one course to take if they wished to avoid a climb-down. They'd have to give priority to the use of military force to re-take the islands. Diplomacy would have to take a back seat. But storming the islands to recapture them would be no easy task. Military commanders have traditionally calculated that for an invasion of that sort to succeed the invading forces should outnumber defenders by three or four to one. Travelling with the task force, or earmarked for it, are estimated to be at least 5,000 British troops. But some of them haven't even left Britain yet. On the Falklands, by contrast, there are believed to be at least 5,000 and perhaps as many as 9,000 Argentinian defenders. Most of these are conscripts, and they might be little match for Britain's marines and paratroopers. Even so, Britain's troops would be vulnerable to air attack.

Brig. KENNETH HUNT:
Writer on Military Affairs

I think we have to accept that once we get troops on shore and they're established we're liable to be attacked from the air. Their position will be known, the attack will be rather easier for example than attacking the fleet where it's difficult to find the ship. The aircraft can come in low, they come in from the west. We clearly would have to take surface to air missile defences on board with us. Now in addition any re-supply is also itself vulnerable. Ships, for example, however small, could be attacked and so could any transport aircraft which were coming in either to drop or to land if the airstrip is made available again. Yes, I'm afraid we would be vulnerable. Now, there would be some air cover, but it might not be complete and permanent.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Only British superiority in the air above the islands could balance the odds. But gaining air superiority would be a very difficult matter. Additional Harrier fighters are currently being rushed to the task force, giving the task force commander, according to publicly available information, perhaps 40 in total. But the Argentinian air force has more than a hundred fighter aircraft. Some, like this Mirage Three, are relatively up-to-date. Others are less so. But even if allowance is made for the age of some of the Argentinian 'planes and also the Argentinian pilots' relative lack of skill and experience, they could defeat our warplanes in the air by sheer weight of numbers. So the only certain way to guarantee air superiority for Britain during landing would be to prevent the Argentinian fighters from ever taking off. Their bases on the Argentinian mainland would have to be bombed.

Brig. KENNETH HUNT:

There are certainly military arguments for bombing the Argentinian air bases, though obviously it would be a very big political step and taken with some reluctance. The argument would be that if you were suffering casualties from

KENNETH HUNT....Cont'd:

aircraft which were coming away from unmolested bases and you weren't able to stop those casualties, then you would have to go to the bases from which the aircraft came. There would be a very strong case for that.

BRIAN WALDEN:

But such a strategy would be fraught with risk. There are only six airfields capable of handling jet fighters in Argentina. The main ones are at Puerto Belgrano, Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Ushuaia. The Royal Air Force does have the means of putting them out of action. Ten Vulcan bombers, which normally carry nuclear weapons, are reported to have been converted so that each can deliver up to twenty-one thousand-pound high explosive bombs. These are capable of cratering runways and rendering them unusable. Nonetheless, the Argentinians might quickly fill in the holes. To keep the runways closed whilst an assault force established itself on the Falklands might require the Vulcans to return repeatedly. Such raids might though ensure that an invasion of the islands took place with minimal risk of air attack. Doubtless there'd be some bloodshed. But the invasion might succeed. The costs, however, could be great. Some Vulcans might be shot down with loss of British lives. As well as that, there'd always be the danger that some of the bombs might miss their targets and kill civilians.

MICHAEL GETHING:

Editor - 'Defence'

In executing a bombing raid on mainland Argentinian air-bases have to assume that there is a possibility that the intruding aircraft will be engaged by either ground-based missiles or interceptor aircraft. Now while the low-level raids are usually quite accurate, if the aircraft bombing had to make any self-preservation moves early or late in the bombing run, then there is a possibility that some of the first or the last bombs of the stick might not go exactly where they were supposed to go, and depended on the nearness of civilian locations to the air base these could go astray.

BRIAN WALDEN:

The use of military force to re-take the Falklands then could well be a bloody business. The lives of British and Argentinian servicemen could well be lost in the landing and in the bombing of the mainland. Civilian lives might also be jeopardised. It might be expected that these costs could be too great for the government to contemplate this option. And it's true that the international repercussions could be serious. Our allies might be deeply alarmed. However, here at home there's evidence that a very different picture of opinion might emerge. And that would be much more important to the government. There is of course a significant body of British public opinion that opposed the sending of the task force and would be bitterly hostile to the naked use of force now. - But most people have supported the government's policy from the start. It's possible that if additional force were used to take the Falklands people might decide that it was necessary to settle the issue once and for all. But it's also possible that they might feel that it was out of all proportion to the problem. Hitherto many surveys of public opinion have tended to suggest that the latter might be the case. But since most of these surveys were carried out, the fighting has started. To get an up-to-date picture of the state of people's attitudes we asked the polling organisation Opinion Research to question a sample of over a 1,000 people throughout the country. The survey was carried out last Friday. It revealed a remarkable shift in opinion. The sample were asked whether recovery of the Falklands was worth the loss of more British servicemen's lives, if that should prove necessary. Those who said it was amounted to fifty-five per cent. Those who said it wasn't amounted to thirty-eight per cent. Those who didn't know amounted to seven per cent. So a clear majority of people appear to believe that the recovery of the islands is worth the loss of more servicemen's lives. Previous polls have tended to show that the majority were against the loss of any servicemen's lives. So these answers represent a distinct hardening of attitudes.

BRIAN WALDEN.....Cont'd:

The sample were also asked whether, if the Argentinian government refused to compromise and a long-term blockade seemed too risky, the British government should launch an invasion of the islands. Those who said it should amounted to seventy per cent. Those who said it shouldn't amounted to just eighteen per cent. And those who didn't know amounted to twelve per cent. Once again a strikingly tough attitude on the part of the majority of the British public was revealed. This tough attitude was shown by other questions in the survey as well. More than half of the sample said they believed the casualties incurred so far in the conflict were a price worth paying. And three-quarters said that they thought that if Argentina refused to withdraw, Britain should refuse to accept ^a a ceasefire. Overall then, the poll shows the British public is in a remarkably hawkish mood.

JOHN HANVEY:

Chairman - Opinion Research

The broad overall message of this poll seems to be that the attitudes of the British public are toughening very considerably. They are prepared, if it proves necessary, to see more loss of life amongst British servicemen. They are reconciled to the idea, and indeed would support it, that if necessary the government can authorise an invasion of the Falkland Islands in order to recover them. Finally it is quite clear that they do not want to see any weakening of resolve when it comes to a ceasefire before any question of Argentinian withdrawal. They do not want this to happen. So what they seem to be telling the government is please take as tough a measures as you think are necessary and please do not weaken in your resolve in trying to get the Argentinians off the Falkland Islands.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Well, it seems that, for the time being at least, the message from the British public is that they're prepared to back a hard line. Mrs. Thatcher and her Ministers have always pledged in the past that they would take a hard line if it became necessary. But just how far they're ready to go to do this remains to be seen. John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence, is with us this morning to discuss the government's intentions.

First of all Mr. Nott, as you know, there have been a series of reports that we have been getting all morning, and all the other news agencies, from Buenos Aires that we have invaded the Falkland Islands. Now our Ministry of Defence, your Ministry of Defence, has officially denied this. Can you confirm that denial?

JOHN NOTT M.P. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE.

Yes, we have not invaded the Falkland Islands, although we are of course continuing to enforce the total exclusion zone around the islands.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Is anything going on down there that could give any sort of credence to these Argentinian reports?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

Well, we have not launched a full-scale invasion, the activity down there is normally reported to us rather later in the day, but we are certainly ensuring that no supplies of any kind can get into the islands, that has been successful so far, and that is our present policy-to totally isolate the occupying forces on the Falkland Islands.

BRIAN WALDEN:

I notice you used the word that we haven't launched a full-scale invasion. Obviously I'm going to be very careful, almost as careful as you will be in answering me, not to probe into operational matters. But does not launching a full-scale invasion mean that we might have some people on the island who in fact are not launching a full-scale invasion but are

JOHN NOTT M.P.

You are free to speculate as much as you want, Mr. Walden.

BRIAN WALDEN:

And I take it that the speculation would not be entirely frivolous if in fact I did assume that we were taking some preliminary steps to prepare for a possible invasion?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

I can't comment on that.

BRIAN WALDEN:

I understand. Let's ask about this possible invasion. Let me first of all draw your attention to a report that appeared in the Observer newspaper this morning, which suggested that in fact Britain had given Argentina an ultimatum. Namely twenty four hours to get out. if you don't get out we'll throw you out. Is that true? Has the British Government given such an ultimatum?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

No, we've given no such ultimatum. We did originally enforce the maritime exclusion zone successfully, no ships got through, we are now enforcing a total blockade, and that so far has been successful. Two days ago, as you know, we announced a different policy so far as the twelve mile from the shore was concerned, and that is to protect our reinforcement shipping and the very large number of ships which are coming, protected of course by the Royal Navy, to join the task force. The, we, I think the British public understand that it is possible to move from the Argentinian shore into a threatening position against our task force and our reinforcement shipping in bad weather very quickly, and this is something we must protect our fleet against, and we will not hold back in anything at all in the protection of our own ships and men pursuing their task in the South Atlantic.

BRIAN WALDEN:

I want to come back to your statement that we will not hold back from anything at all to protect the ships in the task force. Can I however ask you, because you will well remember the last time you talked to me and indeed things that you have said subsequently. Can I take it that of course there is every likelihood of an invasion of the Falkland Islands to recapture them for our sovereignty if the Argentinian Government maintains its present position?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

Well I see my task, and the task of the Chiefs of Staff, to provide to the Cabinet a range of military options at every stage. It is our job to so place our fleet and their supporting troops in a position that they are able to take a range of options. The Cabinet, under the Prime Minister, will then decide what we do. So that is our policy in the Ministry of Defence, to provide a wide range of options, a wide range of choices of a military nature, should they be required.

BRIAN WALDEN:

So if I were the Prime Minister, and I summoned presumably first the War Cabinet, subsequently the full Cabinet, and talked to the Chiefs of Staff, and decided tomorrow that further diplomatic efforts were quite hopeless - advised by Mr. Pym perhaps that we weren't going to get anywhere and that the Argentinians were simply doing this deliberately to weaken the strength of our task force - and she then turned to you and said 'Well, I think I want to go for an invasion! You have given her the means to do that, have you?'

JOHN NOTT M.P.

We are quietly confident that if we have no other choice, that we will be able at the appropriate time to repossess the Falkland Islands by military means.

BRIAN WALDEN:

All right. Now I must ask you about some of the worries that have been expressed about that. Again, of course one doesn't want to know any operational details, I'm talking about the general strategy. Some people say that we haven't got enough men there, and we never will get enough men there to be able to overcome the Argentinian defenders. Now do you accept that?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

Well I think you ought to look first at the quality of our men and their equipment. As I said to you when I was last on this programme, the Royal Marines for instance are an all-volunteer body of professional soldiers, who spend much of their time training in Arctic warfare, they have all the equipment for it. It is quite different from the troops, the Argentinian troops on the island, they are not properly equipped, they are not used to fighting in these conditions, they are isolated from their friends, from supply, and the morale of the troops on the island is going to be a very different, in a very different state from that of our own professional soldiers, who can't be having a very pleasant time tossing around in the South Atlantic, but they are warm and they are properly equipped. It is the quality of our men and equipment which I think will be the key issue, if the time comes.

BRIAN WALDEN:

How do you know that the Argentinian troops in the Falklands are not properly equipped?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

Well, from every report that we receive, it is clear that the morale of those troops, young conscripts, is already low.

BRIAN WALDEN:

I noticed you said, 'If the time comes'. Is that time likely to come sooner or later?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

No, I said that my task is to provide to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet a range of options. Of course what we would like is Resolution 502 of the United Nations to be accepted by the Argentinians. I saw the very hard-line and intransigent interview by the Argentine Minister of Defence, he talked about a peaceful solution, but the United Nations has already declared a mandatory resolution requiring the Argentine occupying forces to withdraw, and that he did not refer to.

BRIAN WALDEN:

I think I must ask you at this point. I want to ask you in a moment about air cover for a possible invasion of the Falklands by our boys - but I think I must ask at this point, because you've said it yourself and I think everybody would agree with you, we'd all like to have a negotiated settlement so that no more blood must be spilled.

But you saw what their Minister of Defence said. Does that mean, if that in any sense represents the view of the Argentinian Government, and it must to a considerable extent, does that mean that diplomatically it's now quite hopeless?

JOHN NOTT.M.P.

Well I think we have always expected that the junta might seek to play for time. We always expected that if they could they would take this into the United Nations with the idea of playing it along diplomatically. And I can say quite emphatically that given that that was a possibility and that they were not serious about giving up their spoils, giving up their aggression, being in possession of the islands they were not going to give them up, we have always throughout this thing continued to move forward remorselessly, so if we are forced and have no other choice but to repossess the islands, that will be open to us. And we have not up to now in these past few weeks taken, held back in any way at all, in placing ourselves in the position to make that ultimate choice should it become necessary.

BRIAN WALDEN:

I wonder if I could ask you further on that point, it isn't a matter here of military strategy, but you are a very important member of the War Cabinet. The Argentinian junta doesn't appear to have moved one inch. Is there really any substantial diplomatic hope left at all?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

Yes, I believe there is. I think that the proposals, the outline proposals which have been put forward by the Secretary-General, do not differ in a very major way from the proposals put forward by the Peruvian President and which we accepted last week. You mentioned them at the beginning of your programme, and no-one could suggest that we have been intransigent, there have now been seven or eight different forms of peace proposal. Where we have not, we have been reasonably flexible, we have always said that a precondition is that they obey the mandatory resolution of the United Nations and withdraw. But once they have withdrawn we are prepared to sit down and discuss the long-term future of the islands. But, you're quite right. Every single attempt by us or by the Americans, and latterly the Peruvians, to get them to withdraw has been rejected, and so we could conceivably be faced with the military option in due course.

BRIAN WALDEN:

How long is in due course?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

We that is to some extent constrained by the problems of operating at very long distances from the United Kingdom, and of course the incoming winter. I must say that the incoming winter is going to cause horrendous problems for the Argentine occupying forces on the islands, and our troops and our men are relatively well-looked after and provisioned in ships. I'm not saying there is any pleasure about being in a ship in those waters, clearly not.

JOHN NOTT M.P. (CON'TD)

We also now have a reasonably sheltered anchorage, if we need it, in South Georgia not far away, outside the range of their land-based air cover. So we do have a range of options, and we could extend the blockade for far longer, if we wished to, than the amount of supplies that they have available to their forces on the island.

BRIAN WALDEN:

That's also interesting, I see what you mean now by a range of options available. Coming back to the possibility of the invasion option, which the British people plainly would now support, and a lot of today's newspapers are suggesting is very much on the agenda, and switching to the Argentinian air force, which most military strategists seem to think is the real problem, as you saw in our programme. One way you could cope with that of course would be by bombing the Argentinian air fields. Now there are reports in one of today's papers that the Cabinet considered this but ruled it out. Has the Cabinet ruled out an attack on the Argentinian airfields?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

Well, can I say for myself that I do not rule out any option, but there are no plans at present to attack mainland Argentina. There are no such plans at present. What we have been seeking to do from the outset of this affair is to move forward step by step, using no more force than is necessary, in our tremendous efforts to get a peaceful solution to the problem. No, there are no plans at present to bomb the Argentinian mainland, but I'm not ruling out any option in the last resort.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Well that raises certain problems. If we are not going to bomb the Argentinian mainland, and one could quite understand why we wouldn't, because I imagine our own allies wouldn't take that too well. Nevertheless it does raise the whole problem of our air support over the Falklands itself, and it also raises a difficulty with regard to a statement that you made to me earlier in this interview.

BRIAN WALDEN: (CONT'D)

You said we would take all possible measures to defend our task force. Now it may be of course that all possible measures to defend our task force would involve bombing Argentinian air fields. Isn't that so?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

Well, I think that some of the experts rather exaggerate the value, the strength of the Argentinian air force. I don't wish to minimise its dangers. The Argentinian forces are some of the largest and most modern in South America and by no means do I wish to suggest that this will not be a tough fight, if it comes to that. But they only have five Super Etendards, which were the aircraft that attacked the Sheffield, they have other Mirage aircraft, but they really are a decade behind the Harrier, they are ten years behind the Harrier, and beyond that their other aircraft are not particularly modern, some of them are very old, and the Harrier is a very effective aircraft, and now that we can inflight refuel the Harrier we can get down to the South Atlantic as many Harriers as we are likely to need. So that I think we must not exaggerate their air situation, it is certainly significant and we must watch it, but we must not exaggerate it.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Well all right, I must however put this to you, because I think you would want me to put it to you. Some people could misunderstand you to have said, as a result of this interview, well their troops on the Falklands, they're no good, their air force, well that's wildly out of date, that's no good, there's hardly a problem. Now, it isn't that simple is it Mr. Nott?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

No, no, no, I'm saying, which is always I think what I said on this interview three or four weeks ago, in terms of quality of equipment, and certainly quality of training and professionalism, our forces really do not compare. We are undoubtedly superior to them. But in war, if that's what it has to become, things go wrong, and there's not a single person in my department, not a single service officer, who does not understand that if we get into

JOHN NOTT M.P. (CON'T)

a conflict of this kind some ships, some aircraft, some men, may not be lost. That is the way that it happens, and it's deeply grievous if it does, but in spite of our superiority we cannot expect to emerge from this thing without losses, we will have losses.

BRIAN WALDEN:

All right. Can I draw out what I think I've learned from what you've had to tell me. Namely that the position is that you as Defence Secretary have on Mrs. Thatcher's desk a range of options from which she could choose. She could take the diplomatic option, though you're not very hopeful about it, but if there was a chance of a diplomatic settlement that could be done, we have done nothing yet to stop it. That she could take the invasion option, you have got in fact the capacity for that one, she could take the prolonged blockade option if she wanted to do that. Let me ask you this question though, which the minority, and one must admit they are a minority, the minority of the British people who don't support you on this are asking all the time. Namely the question of proportion. All right, all of these things, invasion, prolonged blockade, might be able to be done, but how many casualties are proportionate to the righting of this particular wrong? Is there any line that you would draw that you wouldn't go beyond?

JOHN NOTT M.P.

Yes, well, this is British territory and these are British people, and British sovereignty is a fact, it cannot be removed by aggression, but if they withdraw we are prepared to discuss the long term future of the islands, that is a British question. But there is an international question at stake, and that is that if we the British have to be a country which in support of democracy and freedom stands up against this kind of abuse, then so be it, and history will remember that it was the British people that stood firm against aggression. And that has much wider implications for the world than our little problem on the Falkland Islands, and I don't doubt that some support internationally could conceivably fall away from us if the going gets rough. But historians will look back and say, 'Well, they, the British, they stood out against aggression and there

JOHN NOTT M.P. (CONT'D)

are hundreds of border disputes all over the world. The Russians have marched into Afghanistan, and let us remember that if we falter here because people shrink from taking action, then this will happen repeatedly all around the world and the threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies will grow.

BRIAN WALDEN:

That's a very controversial statement, of course that doesn't mean that it's right and it doesn't mean that it's wrong, but it is very controversial and I want to press you on it. You seem to be saying that the principles involved here are so important that even if we were to lose some international support by pursuing what you take to be the right course, you would bear that loss, and even if we did have to sustain a considerable number of casualties, more than many people would wish, you would bear that loss too because the issue is so crucial.

JOHN NOTT M.P.

Well, let me say that we clearly are bending everything to place ourselves in a position that if that final conflict comes we have the minimum number of casualties, and that is why some of the intermediate steps that we are taking are taken in the knowledge that we may be forced in a few weeks or a few months time to take further military action. We mustn't shrink for a day now in moving forward, because if we do that might mean more casualties later in the process. Although I hope that this weekend we will solve the thing. But yes, there is a general principle at stake, and some people may fall away from us, but in ten years' time, and in twenty years' time the historians will look back and say, the British stood up against aggression, they showed the way, they showed that Western democratic principles must be supported.

BRIAN WALDEN:

Well it will be very cheering to have the historians on our side in the future, but I wonder if I could ask you about the practical difficulties of the present. Surely if we do go ahead in this particular way we could

JOHN NOTT M.P.

I think, I wouldn't say that. I was in with NATO last week, and there was strong support for us among the NATO countries.

BRIAN WALDEN:

All right, I must stop you there Mr. Nott, thank you very much indeed for a most revealing interview, thank you.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 May 1982

Dear John

A.J.C. 10/3
f-a.

UN Trusteeship for the Falkland Islands

~~attached~~
Thank you for your letter of 6th May. You will now have seen the OD(SA) paper we have prepared on UN Trusteeship and UN Administration, which I think covers the questions you raised.

I am copying this letter to David Wright.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



10 DOWNING STREET

MR COLES

Here are some American newspaper cuttings. They come from Gordon Reece who used to be Head of Publicity in Central Office.

el.

10 May 1982

The New York Times

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Why Britain Raised the Stakes

It's no longer a jolly little war. First an Argentine cruiser was sunk, and now a British destroyer has been attacked and set afire, carrying with them the first grim casualties in a wretched conflict. But however poignant the death of hundreds of Argentine sailors, their chiefs in Buenos Aires should not be allowed to pose as victimized pacifists.

For days they trumpeted the claim that Argentine fliers had mauled the H.M.S. *Hermes* and sunk the H.M.S. *Exeter*. Those claims turned out to be false, but the loss of the H.M.S. *Sheffield* yesterday was real enough. It was a matter of chance, not inferior morality, that led Britain to strike the first truly violent blow.

War is war, declared or not, and those ships and planes aren't carrying popguns. By invading these islands, and then spurning every call for compromise and withdrawal, Argentina has been the author of its own misfortunes. Not British bloody-mindedness but Argentine recklessness accounts for a widening conflict.

Still, the torpedoing of the General *Belgrano* Sunday was for Britain a military victory with a heavy political cost — precisely because it blurred Argentina's culpability. For example, it offers a flimsy and outrageous, if predictable, basis for the Soviet Union now to leap to Argentina's defense, decrying "colonial brigandage." This while the satellite regime in Warsaw turns water cannon on a workers' demonstration. Was Britain right to raise the stakes?

Britain sent its fleet half a world away in de-

fense of international law. A 200-mile "war zone" was drawn around the invaded Falklands. How, then, could Prime Minister Thatcher justify the deliberate sinking — and it had to be intentional — of an aging cruiser 30 miles outside the war zone? Her answer yesterday in Parliament is compelling: "If we had left it any later it might have been too late."

The very logic of Britain's military situation dictated emphatic action. The first obligation of any government at war is to protect the lives of its own troops, and to mobilize for a decisive strike at the adversary. The advent of winter seas rules out an indefinite war of attrition.

If an invasion of the islands is to be attempted, the General *Belgrano*'s guns and missiles probably had to be eliminated. Argentina was, in any case, warned in an April 28 note that its ships and planes would be targets whether inside or outside the blockade zone.

There was also a parallel diplomatic rationale for emphatic action. Despite Secretary of State Haig's determined efforts, the junta remained capriciously and adamantly unwilling to come to the negotiating table. It could be argued that Argentina had to be shocked into negotiations.

If that were the whole of the British justification for escalation, it might not be compelling. But it is not. The destruction of the H.M.S. *Sheffield* cruelly underscores the military arguments. Both sides have drawn blood and the sinking of this destroyer is cold evidence of Argentina's ability to strike at the Royal Navy. Sadly, the bargaining table recedes.

DAVE ANDERSON | Sports of The Times

Run, Rickey, Run

ALMOST anybody else would have coasted into second with a stand-up double, but Rickey Henderson kept churning and dived head-first into third for a triple. Almost anybody else would have been out on a routine three-hop grounder to short, but Rickey Henderson beat the throw for an infield single. Almost anybody else would have been picked off first base, but Rickey Henderson took off and stole second. And on all three plays Monday night, the Yankees did not mishandle the ball. Rickey Henderson simply outran it.

That's speed, sheer speed. And that's Rickey Henderson of the Oakland A's, who had 24 stolen bases in 25 games this season before last night's game at Yankee Stadium.

"If I don't get hurt, yes, I'll break Lou Brock's record of 118 stolen bases — if not this year, then next year or the year after," Rickey Henderson was saying firmly but not boastfully. "And eventually I'll also break Brock's career record of 938 stolen bases. Those are my goals."

Equally important, one of Billy Martin's goals this season is to see Rickey Henderson surpass Lou Brock's 118 total.

"I'm going to make it a point for Rickey to break it," the A's manager said. "I've never seen anybody with his acceleration in stealing bases. In two strides, he's at full speed."

After only 10 strides, Rickey Henderson usually has second base stolen. After only seven strides, he has third stolen.

"You can get a bigger lead off second, that's why," he explained. "Third is easier to steal. In Cleveland last weekend, I had third stolen three times. But the first time the pitch was fouled off, the next time Cliff Johnson was called out on strikes for the third out, and the third time Dwayne Murphy fouled out. That's the way it goes."

For all his speed, 23-year-old Rickey Henderson does not run on his own.

"I get the sign either from Billy or from our third-base coach, Clete Boyer, after Billy gives it to him," he said. "I'm lucky to be playing for Billy. He likes the running game, and he believes in me. The aggressiveness I have goes with the aggressiveness Billy has. I'm told that Billy played like I do, but he didn't have my speed. Between his style and my speed, we can make things happen."

What happens is the essence of Billy Ball — the manager as the trigger, Rickey Henderson as the bullet.

As a rookie in 1979, when Billy Martin was still the Yankees' manager, Rickey Henderson had 33 stolen bases. When Billy Martin took command of the A's in 1980, he turned Rickey Henderson loose — 100 stolen bases that year for an American League record, 56 more in the strike-interrupted season last year, when he batted .319 and led the American League in hits (135), runs (89) and stolen bases (56) before the A's

were swept by the Yankees in the championship series.

Rickey Henderson resented finishing second in last season's most-valuable-player balloting to Rollie Fingers of the Milwaukee Brewers. "No way a relief pitcher is more valuable than an everyday player," he said. "I should have won it."

On the 28 ballots, cast by two writers in each league city, Fingers had 319 points, Henderson 308. Fingers had 15 first-place votes, Henderson 12. The other first-place vote was for Tony Armas, the A's rightfielder.

"I figured the guys I had to beat were Carney Lansford and Dwight Evans of the Red Sox, and Tony," he said. "And I did beat all of them, but Fingers sneaked in on me."

Rickey Henderson also resented being left off the American League squad for last year's All-Star Game by Jim Frey, then the Kansas City Royals' manager. But if Billy Martin is the American League manager this year, the A's left fielder is sure to be in Montreal for the July 13 game. Bob Lemon had been scheduled to be the American League manager, but his recent dismissal by the Yankees has created some sentiment for Martin to be appointed instead. Three years ago Lemon returned to the All-Star Game as manager about a month after he had been discharged by George Steinbrenner for the first time. To bring back Lemon again, some American League officials think, might be more of an embarrassment for him than an honor.

"The guy I want to see at the All-Star Game is Tim Lincecum," said Rickey Henderson, referring to the Montreal Expos' second-year outfielder. "We could put on a good show together."

As a rookie last year, Tim Lincecum stole 71 bases despite playing in only 88 games because of the strike and an arm injury. But he has only seven steals so far this year.

"He's having the same problem I had last year, after I stole 100 bases the year before," Rickey Henderson said. "Once you have a big year, most of the pitchers change their pickoff move, and it takes time for you to adjust to their new move. But after a runner adjusts, the pitchers can't adjust again. That's one reason I'm stealing so many bases this year. I've adjusted to the pitchers' adjustment. And there isn't much they can do now."

The 5-foot-10-inch onetime high school running back at Oakland (Calif.) Tech, a sturdy 198 pounds, sprints with strength as well as speed, and also with insight.

"The pitchers with the best moves in this league are Scott McGregor and Mike Flanagan of the Orioles," he said. "They've got a balk move, but they've done it for so long the umpires let it go. You can't tell me that if a pitcher leans to the plate, he can come to first base without using a balk move. But those two get away with it, and so do a few others."

N. B. A. Playoffs

Los Angeles Times

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A Ship for a Ship

Suddenly, in 48 hours, several hundred men, British and Argentine, have gone down with their ships in the battle over the Falkland Islands. This may well be a "limited war" but there is no limit to the death toll. It will continue to rise, and rise sharply, unless both sides come to their senses.

A ship has been exchanged for a ship, the Argentine cruiser, the General Belgrano, for the British destroyer, the Sheffield. At this rate, the number of casualties may soon surpass the number of islanders, the 1,800 other people whose future is at stake in the conflict. A tragic waste of lives.

By all standards of logic and reason, both sides should be reaching out for all possible ways to end the dispute and begin negotiations. But logic and reason are scarce commodities in war, whether declared or undeclared, and this is no exception. The United States and all well-meaning nations should intensify attempts to bring about a cease-fire and talks despite signs that the sinkings may well have fed the desire for revenge rather than for compromise.

The new question raised in the past two days is whether the British, who enjoyed widespread support in world public opinion, made a mistake that led to escalation of the fighting. Was Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government justified in sinking the cruiser on Sunday outside the 200-mile war zone imposed by London around the Falklands? Why impose the zone and then torpedo a ship outside it?

Perhaps the British war command had information suggesting that the cruiser was about to put British ships in some jeopardy. If so, that case had not yet been made. Certainly, the British justification for sinking the cruiser would have been stronger if they had tracked it until it crossed into

the war zone. As one Londoner said in a call on Tuesday, "Many of us feel it was unsportsmanlike" to attack outside the zone.

A spokesman in London said that action outside the zone depends on whether the Argentines put themselves "in a menacing or challenging position." Was the cruiser in that kind of position? Again, the explanation has not added up to a justification. Thatcher told the House of Commons—before the British destroyer was sunk—that if the British waited to attack, "it might have been too late. I might have had to come to the House with the news that some of our own vessels had been sunk."

Did Argentina decide to attack the destroyer because of the sinking of the General Belgrano? The junta might have done so anyway. But certainly, until Sunday, both sides had seemed to want to pursue the conflict without daring exploits that endangered lives. The Argentine fleet, for example, had remained outside the war zone.

Although the British action Sunday does raise questions, it should not be forgotten that the primary blame for the crisis still rests with Argentina's military rulers who seized the islands on April 2 and then rejected every reasonable proposal to withdraw and seek a diplomatic solution. The military rulers there are now described as more inflexible than ever.

The loss of hundreds of men in two days should destroy any illusions in London and in Buenos Aires that a "limited war" can be fought at a relatively small cost. The illusions should be replaced by a reality—that now is the time to stop all this before another ship is exchanged for another ship, another plane for another plane, and another few hundred men for another few hundred men.

emetry—bitterly regretting that I failed to send her flowers while she was living. I should have appreciated her more, written her more about her grandchildren, whom she loved so much, and most of all I should have let her know how much I had grown to love her.

I hope others will not make the same mistake I made, because next year may be too late.

TEARS ON MY PILLOW

Getting married? Whether you want a formal church wedding or a simple, "do-your-own thing" ceremony, get Abby's new booklet. Send \$1 plus a long, self-addressed, stamped (37 cents) envelope to: Abby, Wedding Booklet, P.O. Box 38923, Hollywood, Calif. 90038.

Iran Executes 15 in Drug Cases

BEIRUT (AP)—Tehran radio Tuesday reported the execution of 15 people it said were convicted of drug-smuggling charges by a special Islamic revolutionary court in Iran.

The broadcast monitored here gave no date of the executions but said they took place in Tehran, the capital.

In another development, the Paris office of Iran's most powerful opposition group, the leftist Moujaheden, said that more than 17 Revolutionary Guards were killed Monday in Tehran in clashes with Moujahedeen guerrillas.



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
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The New York Times

Weather: New York, sunny and warm. Midwest, partly cloudy with some scattered showers and thunder-showers. South, partly cloudy. West and Southwest, partly sunny, some showers in the south. Details, page 6.

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NEW YORK, TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1982

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50 CENTS

TORPEDOED ARGENTINE CRUISER CARRYING 800 IS REPORTED SUNK; NAVY SAYS IT SPOTS 20 LIFEBOATS



The General Belgrano, reported to have been sunk, refueling early last week in Ushuaia in southern Argentina.

Contact Press Images

2D SHIP SAID TO SINK

Britain Reports Attack — Queen Elizabeth 2 to Be Used for Troops

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, May 3 — British military sources said tonight that they believed the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano had sunk in the South Atlantic after it was hit on Sunday by two torpedoes fired by a British submarine.

In Buenos Aires, the Argentine high command said in a communiqué that the ship, which carried a crew of 800 men, "is presumed to have sunk." The Government said that more than 20 lifeboats had been sighted but that there were probably "many lost" on the ship, the second largest in the Argentine navy.

The British gave no word of survivors, although both countries reported that several Argentine frigates had moved to the General Belgrano's aid after the attack. These might have been able to take off crewmen despite icy weather and high seas.

A senior British officer said that no reconnaissance pictures of the vessel's sinking were available, but he and other officials said they considered it highly unlikely that the 43-year-old American-built ship, which survived the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, could have withstood two direct hits below her waterline.

New Clash Is Reported

Several hours after the cruiser was hit, the Ministry of Defense reported that missile-firing British helicopters had sunk an Argentine patrol vessel and damaged another ship early this morning in a clash off the Falkland Islands.

The ministry said that two Lynx helicopters had struck after the patrol craft opened fired with machine guns on a British Sea King helicopter inside the 200-mile blockade zone in the South Atlantic. There was no word on whether survivors had been picked up, but the British said that they had dropped life-saving gear into the sea.

But it was the presumed sinking of the 13,645-ton General Belgrano, possibly with a considerable loss of life, that brought the dispute over the remote, windswept Falklands to a critical intensity.

Officially, the Ministry of Defense said only that the cruiser had been "severely damaged." Dispatches from the flagship of the British task force, H.M.S. Hermes, said the nuclear hunter-killer submarine Conqueror had torpedoed the General Belgrano as she maneuvered along the fringes of the British blockade zone.

At a news conference tonight, John Nott, the Defense Minister, defended the attack on the cruiser even though it was outside the forbidden area. He told reporters, "our first duty is to protect our men, the General Belgrano was a

Continued on Page 9, Column 5

Crisis in the Falklands: A Contest of Helicopters and Missiles

British Fault Their Foe On Handling of Missiles

By DREW MIDDLETON

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, May 3 — With Britain again making successful use of the helicopter as a weapon against Argentine naval vessels, British naval sources say the Argentines have shown a significant lack of understanding of the power and accuracy of air-launched missiles.

Military Analysis One British source said that the Argentines "have the weapons" but that they had clearly "not done enough training under simulated combat conditions."

These comments came today after British Lynx helicopters had fired air-to-surface Sea Skua missiles at two Argentine patrol boats operating, according to the British Ministry of Defense, about 90 miles inside the 200-mile blockade zone around the Falkland Islands. One patrol boat was sunk, the ministry reported, and the other was damaged.

The attack came after the patrol vessels had opened fire with machine guns at a British Sea King helicopter that was patrolling ahead of the main British fleet. The aircraft is based on the British flagship, the carrier Hermes.

Eight days ago, other British helicopters, firing missiles and machine guns, attacked the Argentine submarine Santa Fe, which had surfaced off the island of South Georgia. The submarine was disabled and driven ashore.

Weapon Against Surface Ships

Military analysts here said the emergence of the helicopter as a successful weapon against vessels on the surface constituted the first tactical surprise of the fighting in the South Atlantic.

The air-sea war thus far has been heavily in Britain's favor. Argentina's only cruiser, the 13,645-ton General Belgrano, was struck on Sunday by two torpedoes from a British submarine and apparently sunk. The cruiser seems to have taken what one naval source called only "rudimentary" anti-submarine precautions.

The attack on the General Belgrano is seen here as an orthodox operation reflecting the established ability of submarines to pick off enemy ships when they are unprotected by escorts. The successes registered by British helicopters, however, represent a new dimension of naval warfare, in the opinion of analysts here.

The United States and British navies have invested heavily in helicopters for antisubmarine operations. But, military analysts here said, the helicopter's usefulness in attacking surface targets had been in doubt until now.

Built in West Germany

The Argentine vessel that was reportedly sunk today was believed to have been the Rio Iguazu, one of the 20 Z-28-type patrol boats built for the Argentine Navy by Blohm and Voss in West Germany. The boats have a speed of 22 knots, a displacement of 81 tons and carry a crew of 15. Other sources said the vessel could have been a patrol tugboat of more than 1,000 tons.

In assessing Argentine naval tactics, a British naval source said he was sure

the Argentines would "try to get one of our big ships with one of their submarines." But he said he thought they would have to "learn to be a bit more sensible about approaching a fleet at the ready."

According to reports from the Hermes, the submarine that damaged the Argentine cruiser, a former United States ship named the Phoenix that fought in World War II, was the Conquerer, a nuclear-powered 4,500-ton hunter-killer boat of the Valiant class with a speed of 26 knots underwater. There are believed to be at least two other British nuclear-powered submarines operating in the South Atlantic.

Criticism of Argentine Tactics

The British criticism of Argentine tactics is echoed by Harrier pilots and air command officers with the fleet. They say that, in general, Argentine pilots tend to fire their missiles too soon and do not appear to have adequate knowledge of the Harrier's qualities. When the Argentines fire at long range, Royal Navy pilots point out, the agile Harriers are able to take evasive action and then close and attack the Argentine jets with Sidewinder missiles.

British sources report that the Argentine aircraft are apparently being refueled in flight because in the operations Sunday they maintained their attacks for many minutes. This would not have been possible had they been operating without refueling.

Argentine pilots, analysts said, also appear to have little knowledge of the range and lethality of the Sea Cat and Sea Slug surface-to-air missiles carried by many of the British surface ships.

Size of Landing Force

According to military sources, the task force is accompanied by 3,000 to 4,500 Marines and airborne troops. This force, they said, is adequate for widely scattered landings intended to mop up isolated units of the Argentine garrison but inadequate for a major operation against the main Argentine positions around Stanley, the Falklands' capital.

The informants said that the British Government probably decided today to requisition the luxury liner Queen Elizabeth 2 because of the realization that more troops might be needed for that sort of attack.

The ship can carry a 3,000-strong brigade of infantry and the additional artillery, engineer and command elements that would be required to establish superiority on the ground against elements of an Argentine garrison that is variously estimated at between 6,000 and 10,000 troops.

Originally the brigade was described as an occupation force to be installed after the Argentine forces departed.

If the present sea and air blockade fails to bring about Argentine evacuation, it is likely, the military sources said, that there will be major landings, most probably among the many inlets north and south of Stanley.



Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher arriving at 10 Downing Street.

United Press International

Britain Says Attack by Sub Probably Sank Enemy Ship

Continued From Page 1

threat to our men and therefore it was quite correct that it was attacked." He did not specify exactly what threat the vessel posed.

Asked whether the intention had been to sink the cruiser, a ministry spokesman replied, "My understanding is that if a shot is fired the shot is fired to sink."

The Government also announced that it had requisitioned the 66,000-ton luxury liner Queen Elizabeth 2. The big flagship of the Cunard Line is to carry to the combat zone a 3,000-man infantry brigade that has been training in Wales.

Three other vessels were commandeered — the container ship Atlantic Causeway and two ferries.

British officials said they could not rule out the possibility of an early invasion of the Falklands, which had been expected this weekend. But it was not clear whether this meant an attack was actually imminent or whether the statement represented part of the continuing campaign of psychological warfare.

Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary, returned tonight from the United States, where he said that Argentina "started this war" and that Britain intended to succeed — "if possible by a negotiated settlement, but if not, by force" — in forcing the Argentines to remove their troops from the Falk-

lands, which they seized April 2. Mr. Pym will brief Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher tomorrow morning on the status of diplomatic efforts.

Government sources said that Mrs. Thatcher believes that only a maintenance tight naval blockade around the islands offered any hope of changing the minds of the Argentine junta. But Mr. Nott reaffirmed at his news conference that Britain would continue to seek a peaceful settlement. He said that military pressure was not an end in itself and pledged that force would be applied with maximum possible restraint.

Legal Status of Conflict

Mr. Nott agreed with a questioner that most laymen would say that Britain and Argentina were now at war. The two countries were indeed "engaged in hostilities," he added, but because London was acting in self-defense under the United Nations Charter the conflict was "not in legal terms a war."

Meanwhile, Denis Healey, the foreign policy spokesman for the opposition Labor Party, issued a new appeal for United Nations mediation, which the Government is unlikely to request. And Michael Foot, the party's leader, said he had turned down Mrs. Thatcher's offer of private consultations because he thought discussions of Government policy should take place in public before the entire House of Commons.

The General Belgrano, which was commissioned as the American cruiser Phoenix in 1939, was well outside the blockade zone when attacked, the Defense Ministry conceded. Armed with 15 six-inch guns, she had been operating along the southern edge of the zone for several days, reports from the scene said, and was near the Isla de Los Estados, 250 miles southwest of the Falklands, when the Tigerfish long-range homing torpedoes found their target at 3 P.M. New York time.

Attack by Helicopter

It was almost 10 hours later, on the north side of the zone, that one of the Argentine patrol craft opened fire on a Sea King from the Hermes, the ministry said. A Royal Navy Lynx helicopter moved in and holed the craft with a radar-guided Sea Skua missile — a new weapon with a high-explosive warhead issued only this year.

The vessel sank quickly, the ministry reported, while a second Lynx attacked a second craft. It was also hit but remained afloat.

There was some confusion about the identity of the targets of the attack.

At first they were thought to be 81-ton German-made patrol boats. Then it was suggested that they were American-made 1,235-ton ships of the Cherokee class, commissioned as tugs in 1945 and later redesignated patrol vessels. Late tonight, Peter Archer of the Press Association, Britain's national news agency, reported that one may have been a much larger warship, possibly a corvette armed with four-inch guns.

Capital Jury Picked in Hinckley Trial

By STUART TAYLOR Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 3 — A jury of seven women and five men was chosen today to try John W. Hinckley Jr. for shooting President Reagan and three other men.

In another development, prosecutors announced today that the President would not appear in person as a witness at the trial and "is not now expected" to testify by videotaped deposition.

Opening statements by prosecution and defense lawyers were set for Tuesday morning. The central issue for the jurors will be whether Mr. Hinckley was insane, and thus not criminally responsible, when he pulled the trigger on March 30, 1981.

Eleven of the jurors are black. The only white is a young woman with a master's degree in educational psychology who said she had studied "abnormal psychology, problems of socially maladjusted persons."

She also said in testimony last Tuesday that she had worked in "facilities for disturbed adolescents" and is now a research assistant at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, at Walter Reed Hospital. She said her father was a surgeon in Milwaukee.

Occupations of Jurors

The other jurors were identified by court officials as a "banquet houseman," a food service technician, a custodian, two secretaries, a supply specialist, a shop mechanic, an information control clerk, a garage attendant, a retired industrial specialist and a person listed as "retired."

The average age of the jurors is about 40. Six alternates, five black women



Associated Press

John W. Hinckley Jr.

and a black man, were chosen as alternates.

The trial is expected to take four to six weeks.

The jury selection was completed in a burst of speed this afternoon, after five days in which Federal District Judge Barrington D. Parker and lawyers questioned individual jurors one by one

and tie with gray slacks, watched attentively from the defense table as the men and women who will decide his fate climbed into the jury box. Five of the 13 crimes with which he is charged, including attempted assassination of the President, carry a maximum penalty of life in prison. None are punishable by death.

He has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.


The names of the jurors and alternates were kept secret, on Judge Parker's order, as were the questions and answers in the individual sessions with potential jurors in the judge's chambers last week and this morning.

One question Mr. Hinckley's attorneys had proposed for the jury selection process was whether potential jurors would be influenced by evidence that the defendant "in the past may have harbored negative attitudes towards Jews, blacks and other minorities."

Trial lawyers here said that they did not think the predominantly black composition of the jury would be of any particular advantage either to the prosecution or to the defense. The population of Washington is 70 percent black.

In the public questioning that began the process of screening a pool of 90 potential jurors last Tuesday morning, one of the women chosen today said she was a "clinical secretary" at George Washington University Hospital, where President Reagan was treated after Mr. Hinckley shot him, and knew some of the doctors named as potential witnesses in the case. Another said her husband was a retired policeman.

One of those chosen as an alternate today had identified herself as a docket clerk at the District of Columbia Superior Court.



The New York Times / D. Gorton

Walker Percy autographing one of his novels on the steps of F. E. Bass High School in Greenville, Miss.

Tribes to Accept \$16 Million In Suit on Land Management

KLAMATH FALLS, Ore., May 3 (AP) — Members of three Indian tribes, by a vote of 262 to 250, accepted the Government's offer of \$16.5 million to settle claims charging mismanagement of tribal timberland.

The Klamath and Modoc Tribes and the Yahooskin band of the Snake Tribe discussed the issue for 10 hours Saturday before voting. Elnathan Davis, chairman of the Klamath Tribal Executive Committee for Claims, said many of those who opposed the settlement said it was not enough.

He said those in favor argued that if they did not accept, there might be a long legal battle and they would end up with less money. The Indians had originally asked for \$91 million.

The assets of the tribes were divided in 1954, and the Federal Government paid \$40 million for the land, now the Klamath National Forest.

Before and after the sale, the Federal Government managed the timberland.

GIVE TO THE FRESH AIR FUND

atives to Greenville, Miss.



The New York Times / May 4, 1982

Greenville is regarded as an unusually liberal Mississippi city.

ways tolerated in these parts. But steeped in libations and stirred by the sounds of James (Son) Thomas's gui-

native thought here. Mr. Reed said he never found any comfort in Carter family editorials but never cared, either. It was the front page he used to like, he said.

Asked at the floating picnic if there was any truth to the complaints from both sides, Erik Grunder, the paper's young editor, said, "I don't know. It's a different emphasis, a different viewpoint, a different way of looking at the same thing."

Changes in the Schools

Other things have changed, too. When Walker Percy, Shelby Foote and Charles G. Bell were in school here, and later, when Beverley Lowry and Angela Jackson were here, there were only public schools. Also, the schools were segregated.

Today, they found to their dismay, the schools are both integrated and segregated. When desegregation prevailed in the late 1960's, it did not achieve a further meshing of cultures in an area that had an unusual mix of Jews, Italians, Lebanese, blacks and Chinese. Most whites go to private, segregated academies now, and the public schools are more than 80 percent black.

The private academies were outraged because their schools were shunned by the festival. Miss Lowry was outraged that the evening audi-

"All the News
That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times

Weather: New York, sunny and warm. Midwest, partly cloudy with some showers and thundershowers. South, sunny. West and Southwest, partly sunny with some thunderstorms in the south. Details, page 46.

VOL. CXXXI No. 45,304

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NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 1982

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50 CENTS

BRITISH DESTROYER SET AFLAME BY MISSILE; DEATHS PUT NEAR 30; ARGENTINES DOWN JET

SEARCH TURN OF FORTUNES

Pilot Is Lost in New Raid on the Main Air Strip in Falkland Islands

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, May 4 — A British destroyer, the Sheffield, was lost this afternoon after having been hit and set afire by an Argentine missile, the Ministry of Defense announced tonight.

The ship was later reliably reported to have sunk, but there was no official confirmation. Defense Minister John Nott said that, of the normal complement of 299, the number of deaths might be as high as 30.

"Nearly all ship's company and captain are accounted for," he told the House of Commons, adding that they had been picked up by ships near the Sheffield at the time of the attack. "The task force is continuing with its operations as planned."

Mr. Nott said the Government would make a further statement Wednesday.

Flier Lost in Falklands Raid

The Defense Ministry also reported that a Sea Harrier fighter-bomber had been shot down during a raid on the airport at Stanley, the main Falklands settlement. The pilot was killed, a spokesman said.

Other Harriers in the raid, a follow-up to strikes on Saturday, returned safely to their aircraft carriers, the Hermes and the Invincible. Long-range Vulcan bombers based in Ascension Island also took part in today's attack.

The loss of the destroyer and of the Harrier represented a startling turn of fortune for the British, who have had almost unbroken success in their naval campaign to regain the Falklands since they were seized by Argentine forces on April 2.

There were prospects of partisan criticism of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's policies. Michael Foot, leader of the opposition Labor Party, described the attack on the Sheffield as "grave and tragic."

Missile Fired by French-Made Jet

According to Iain McDonald, the Defense Ministry spokesman, the 4,100-ton Sheffield was hit by a missile and burst into flames.

"When there was no longer any hope of saving the ship, the ship's company abandoned the ship," he said at a press briefing.

He said all who left the Sheffield have been picked up, but a number of crew members were apparently unable to get clear and are presumed to have been lost.

The Sheffield, which was commissioned in 1975, cost almost \$50 million to

Continued on Page 8, Column 1

Crisis in the Falklands: Tumult in Britain, Anger in Hemisphere

Mrs. Thatcher Attacked At Home Over Cruiser

By STEVEN RATTNER Special to The New York Times

LONDON, May 4—The torpedoing of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, coming as the first major loss of life in the Falkland Islands crisis, provoked sharp debate here today over the propriety of sinking a ship outside the 200-mile maritime exclusion zone imposed around the islands by Britain.

have been 200 miles or less from the General Belgrano and its two accompanying destroyers, which would most likely be capable of steaming at nearly 30 knots, about 35 statute miles an hour. In addition, the French-made Exocet missiles carried by the destroyers have a range of 30 miles.

Detailed Information Lacking In large part, the criticism of the Government has arisen because of lack of detailed information about the circumstances under which the attack was ordered and occurred.

"War Makes Its Own Rules" "No task force commander could risk seeing a hostile force that close to any of his ships," one expert here said.

Their function would be to track on radar any Argentine warplanes launched from the mainland, the source of any air attacks now that the two Falklands airstrips have been destroyed, and warn the bulk of the task force, believed to be about 100 miles northeast of Stanley.

Another question raised here today was why the British submarine Conqueror, which experts said was probably on duty guarding the small British force, chose to attack the General Belgrano rather than the destroyers, which posed the more serious threat.

The position of ships to the west of the islands is particularly sensitive because, as destroyers or frigates, they would almost certainly lack any significant air protection. In addition, they could be within 300 miles of the mainland, well within reach of Argentine air strikes.

In response, British military experts said that the cruiser was the leader of the group and standard military practice is to take out the leader. The loss of the leader, they note, would almost certainly halt a task force while the loss of one accompanying ship might not.

At the same time, the ships could build, and was fitted with the most modern weapons and electronic systems. Military sources said an Argentine Super Etendard jet had fired two missiles at the Sheffield within the 200-mile British blockade zone around the Falklands.

As to why the ship was sunk rather than crippled, experts said that even today's sophisticated torpedo technology was unable to make such fine distinctions, particularly in the difficult weather conditions that usually prevail in the South Atlantic.

Britain's reversals came a few hours after the disclosure of a second series of raids on Falkland airfields and in the wake of attempts by the Prime Minister to defend her decision to sink the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, which has aroused widespread dismay.

Prime Minister Thatcher said Britain regretted the loss of life. At the time she spoke, it appeared that no more than 500 of the 1,042 crew members of the cruiser had survived.

But she said the ship had represented "a very obvious threat" to the British fleet. "There was clearly aggressive intent on the part of the Argentine fleet and Government," she said.

Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary, who returned last night from the United States, said the British Government was "working actively on various ideas" for a diplomatic settlement, including suggestions put forward by Peru. But he told the House that he was not optimistic and that Britain would veto any United Nations call for a cease-fire that was not preceded by an Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands and an agreement by the Argentine junta that subsequent negotiations would include the question of sovereignty.

He disclosed that on Sunday the task force attacked what was believed to have been an Argentine submarine

Discussing the attack on the General Belgrano, Mr. Nott seemed rattled by hostile questions. He said the task force commander, Rear Adm. John F. Woodward, could have ignored the threat represented by the cruiser "only at his own peril."

He said that the cruiser was "closing on elements of the task force, which was only hours away," that the accompanying destroyers should have been able to pick up the Belgrano's crew members and that these escort ships would not have been attacked with British torpedoes had they done so.

Communications Problems Hinted At another point, he seemed to suggest that the British Government had difficulty in exerting full control from 8,000 miles away. In some situations, he said, "communications with submarines are not received instantly."

He and the Prime Minister won support from Tory backbenchers such as Michael Mates, who said that Britain, having dispatched the task force, "cannot now flinch from the consequences that occur, however serious."

But there were harsh words for the Government both in the Commons and in the Lords, where Lord Jenkins of Putney, a former Labor minister, accused Mrs. Thatcher of committing "mass murder on the high seas." He said the sinking of the General Belgrano "has caused a massive swing of world opinion toward the Argentines."

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quor have fired the torpedoes in such a way as to cripple the General Belgrano rather than sink her?

After the Falklands crisis began, British military spokesmen first belittled the combat capacity of the General Belgrano. Two weeks ago, an admiral said she was "held together by baling wire." But today, the ministry spokesman called attention to her 15 six-inch guns, which had a range of less than 15 miles, and her relatively old-fashioned Sea Cat missiles.

In an effort to hold together what remains of multiparty support for her strategy, Mrs. Thatcher gave a private briefing to David Steel, the Liberal party leader, and Dr. David Owen, the parliamentary spokesman of the Social Democratic Party. Mr. Foot, the Labor leader, had declined an invitation to take part.

The Prime Minister also met for 90 minutes with her inner Cabinet and later with the full Cabinet for a general review.

Britain Sets Conditions on Truce

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Disputed U.S. Tactic

Latins Expected Support for Britain But View Curbs on Argentina as Harsh

By WARREN HOGGE Special to The New York Times

BRASILIA, May 4—The economic and military sanctions imposed by the United States against Argentina have provoked South American governments far more than the accompanying American declaration of support for Britain in the Falkland Islands crisis.

Nicanor Costa Méndez, told a diplomatic gathering in Brasilia only two months ago that Argentina did not consider itself a "third world nation," as the rest of the countries of the region do. That attitude has now given way to the thinking expressed in statements by the President of the junta, Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri, that the war is one between "colonialism" and "the Americas."

Officials based here, including American and British representatives, question why the sanctions and the pledge of military assistance were included in the policy. "At the very least, the United States could have timed them on a staggered basis to extract some diplomatic leverage," said a Latin American foreign service officer.

The Reagan Administration had been making efforts to restore lapsed relationships between the American military and various Latin American armed forces, but since the sanctions against Argentina were announced, various generals have been quoted as questioning American "dependability."

The measures are a good deal less severe than those imposed by the Common Market countries, but the Americans are being criticized more heatedly than the Europeans. Among the steps ordered by President Reagan in the policy shift last Friday were the suspension of all arms shipments to Argentina, the blocking of new Export-Import Bank credits and a promise to respond positively to British requests for military aid.

The inter-American relationship, a Latin American diplomat said, "was really more useful to the United States and the Latins didn't like that very much." "Now the process of questioning its value will increase."

A Brazilian official said he believed it was General Galtieri's belief in Argentina's new special relationship with Washington that in part emboldened him to invade the Falklands. He said there was also a widespread "perception" among Latin American diplomats that the British undertook more aggressive military actions only after they were assured of American backing Friday.

Another Latin American official said nations in the area would be more skeptical over the "special relationships" they think they have with the United States. "This has been a clear demonstration that although a 'special relationship' is viable in itself, it is not viable in global terms," he said.

A Persuasive Argument The sanctions have had little negative effect on the Argentines. They have provided them instead with substance to their appeals for solidarity among their neighbors based on the argument that rich and powerful nations of the North are unfairly castigating poor, developing countries of the South.

One Western diplomat said he held out the hope that perennial differences between the individual nations of the area would undercut any eventual organized effort to line up against the United States. "The third worldists and anti-Americanists are out in force now, but when the time comes for decision, each country is going to look to its hole card," he said.

Discussions with submarines are not received instantly. It is known that boats of the Conqueror type must surface to transmit radio messages.

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Iain McDonald, a British Defense Ministry spokesman, using a map of the South Atlantic at a news conference in London yesterday.

The submarine was there to stop it and the fact that she sank was probably not the most desired result," said Capt. John E. Moore, a former submarine commander and now editor of "Jane's Fighting Ships." "Sinking the ship was less satisfactory than leaving it on the surface disabled."

Britain Destroyer Set Aflame By Missile

Continued From Page 1

build, and was fitted with the most modern weapons and electronic systems. Military sources said an Argentine Super Etendard jet had fired two missiles at the Sheffield within the 200-mile British blockade zone around the Falklands.

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One of the missiles missed, the sources said, but the other scored a direct hit on the destroyer's command center amidships. The missiles appeared to have been fired from 20 miles away.

After the Falklands crisis began, British military spokesmen first belittled the combat capacity of the General Belgrano. Two weeks ago, an admiral said she was "held together by baling wire." But today, the ministry spokesman called attention to her 15 six-inch guns, which had a range of less than 15 miles, and her relatively old-fashioned Sea Cat missiles.

Britain's reversals came a few hours after the disclosure of a second series of raids on Falkland airfields and in the wake of attempts by the Prime Minister to defend her decision to sink the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, which has aroused widespread dismay.

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The Prime Minister also met for 90 minutes with her inner Cabinet and later with the full Cabinet for a general review.

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Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary, who returned last night from the United States, said the British Government was "working actively on various ideas" for a diplomatic settlement, including suggestions put forward by Peru. But he told the House that he was not optimistic and that Britain would veto any United Nations call for a cease-fire that was not preceded by an Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands and an agreement by the Argentine junta that subsequent negotiations would include the question of sovereignty.

"A further sortie was made today," he said, "to render the air strip unusable to light supply, communications and ground attack aircraft operating from the Falkland Islands themselves."

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New Speculation About a Landing The latest raid revived speculation that a landing, probably with a relatively small force in a remote area, was imminent. Military analysts suggested that the interdiction of the airfields was a necessary prelude to such a landing.

Without success, Denis Healey, the Labor spokesman on foreign policy, pressed for an answer to a third question: Could the nuclear-powered Con-

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British destroyer was sunk somewhere inside the blockade zone. The main British task force is reported to be northeast of the Falklands (1 on map above), with two or three ships deployed to the west (2). Survivors of sunken Argentine cruiser were hunted south of the zone (3). British planes struck at airfields at Stanley (A on map below) and Goose Green (B).



Sheffield AT A GLANCE

History

The Sheffield, which was sunk yesterday by a missile fired by an Argentine Super Etendard fighter-bomber, was the first of 14 Sheffield-class destroyers built for the Royal Navy. One of its most modern warships, she was commissioned on Feb. 16, 1975 at a cost of \$47.3 million.

Skua air-to-surface torpedoes. The Sheffield was fitted with several types of radar and a sonar system.

Crew

The Sheffield was carrying a complement of 299 men when she was sunk, according to the British Defense Ministry.

Performance

The Sheffield-class destroyer was designed to provide air defense for a task force. Her maximum speed was 29 knots and she had a cruising range of 4,000 miles at 18 knots.

Statistics

Fully loaded, the Sheffield displaced 4,100 tons and was 412 feet long overall with a 47-foot beam. She was armed with 22 Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles, a single 4.5-inch gun and two 20-millimeter anti-aircraft guns. The destroyer carried one Lynx Mark 2 helicopter armed with Sea

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
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Crisis in the Falklands: Harsh Words From Britain's Allies

Rising Casualties Arousing Dismay in Europe

Continued From Page 1

the economic sanctions that it and the other Common Market countries had imposed against the Argentines last month were "no longer appropriate." It seemed that Britain might have difficulty in getting the sanctions renewed when they expire on May 17.

Ireland also called for an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council to propose a resolution calling

for "immediate cessation of hostilities by both British and Argentine forces" and a negotiated settlement.

Defense Minister Patrick Power of Ireland said:

"We felt that Argentina was the first aggressor and originally backed Britain. But obviously the British themselves are very much the aggressors now, and we are taking a neutral stance."

The shift of emphasis from clear support of Britain to an even-handed atti-

tude was seen in other capitals as well.

In Rome, an Italian Government official expressed the hope that the "terrifying" events of the last 24 hours "might shock both sides into willingness to compromise." In Stockholm, a Swedish official said, "This violent British action is out of all proportion to the situation."

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany and Prime Minister Francisco Pinto Balsemão of Portugal, meeting in Bonn, discussed the hostili-

ties around the Falklands. Afterward, Mr. Schmidt said, "The latest reports from the South Atlantic have very much dismayed us both."

Bonn Calls for a Cease-Fire

The West German Government, in a formal statement, called for a cease-fire "in the interests of both parties to the conflict." The French Government issued a statement expressing "consternation" over the loss of Argentine lives. And in Ottawa, External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan said the British should "use the minimum reasonable amount of force" in asserting their claim to the Falklands.

Representatives of the 10 Common Market countries discussed the crisis at

a meeting in Brussels. Britain made a report, but there was no public comment afterward. Officials said the matter of the market sanctions against Argentina would be taken up at a meeting of foreign ministers soon.

The Common Market sanctions, a total ban on imports from Argentina coupled with a cutoff of arms sales, constituted the sternest collective punitive action taken by the community in its 25-year history. Its achievement on April 10 was a major diplomatic gain for Britain. But, as some opposition members of Parliament pointed out in a tumultuous debate today, the gain could be undone by what happens militarily in the South Atlantic.

No Photos Being Sent From the British Fleet

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, May 4—For the last four days, British journalists traveling with the naval task force have been unable to provide photographs.

Although two photographers are with the fleet — one from the Press Association and one from The Daily Express — neither has been able to send pictures of the recent fighting.

British officials have blamed logistical problems but picture editors blame Government restrictions.



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FM FCO 101515Z
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 367 OF 10 MAY.

YOUR TEL 692: FALKLANDS MILITARY ACTION ON 9 MAY

1. WE ARE STILL LACKING FULL DETAILS OF THE ACTION ON 9 MAY. THE FOLLOWING, A SVNTHESIS OF MOD STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY AND INFORMATION THEY HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED CAN BE RELEASED, MAY FORM THE BASIS FOR YOUR LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

BEGINS:

1. THERE WERE SEVERAL REPORTS ON 9 MAY OF MILITARY ACTION THAT DAY IN THE AREA OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THESE SOMETIMES CONFLICTING REPORTS, I WISH TO PLACE ON RECORD THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF EVENTS. THESE MILITARY ACTIONS WERE TAKEN IN SUPPORT OF OUR DECLARATION ON 28 APRIL OF A TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
2. IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY, THE BRITISH TASK FORCE ATTACKED MILITARY TARGETS IN THE VICINITY OF PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD. CERTAIN ARGENTINE MILITARY AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, BUT TURNED AWAY IN THE FACE OF ACTION BY THE TASK FORCE. AN ARGENTINE PUMA HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN OVER THE ISLANDS LATER IN THE DAY.
3. AT 1130 GMT TWO OF OUR AIRCRAFT ON PATROL WELL WITHIN THE TEZ SIGHTED AN ARGENTINE FISHING VESSEL. THE VESSEL, NAMED NARWAL, HAD BEEN SHADOWING THE TASK FORCE FOR SOME DAYS. WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE SHE WAS ENGAGED IN SURVEILLANCE. IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF THIS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND ON BOARD IN DOCUMENTS CONTAINING THE VESSEL'S OPERATIONAL ORDERS. IN OUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TEZ ON 28 APRIL, WE STATED THAT ANY SHIP, MILITARY OR CIVIL, FOUND WITHIN THE ZONE WITHOUT DUE AUTHORITY FROM THE MOD IN LONDON WOULD BE REGARDED AS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION, WOULD BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE, AND WOULD BE LIABLE TO ATTACK BY BRITISH FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, ON 7 MAY,

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HMG MADE CLEAR IN A STATEMENT THAT ALL ARGENTINE VESSELS INCLUDING MERCHANT VESSELS OR FISHING VESSELS APPARENTLY ENGAGED IN SURVEILLANCE OR INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES AGAINST BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, WOULD ALSO BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE AND WERE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY. OUR AIRCRAFT THEREFORE DROPPED A SMALL BOMB ALONGSIDE THE VESSEL. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A SHORT BURST OF GUN FIRE FROM OUR AIRCRAFT. THE CREW THE SURRENDERED AND TOOK TO THEIR LIFEBOAT. THOSE WHO ABANDONED SHIP HAVE BEEN RECOVERED BY ROYAL NAVY HELICOPTERS AND ARE NOW ON ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S SHIPS. THE NAMES OF THE CREW HAVE BEEN PASSED TO THE ARGENTINES VIA DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TODAY (10 MAY), AND ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR THEIR REPATRIATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE NARWAL IS NOW IN THE CUSTODY OF THE ROYAL NAVY. OF THE 25 PEOPLE ON BOARD THE NARWAL, THERE WERE 14 CASUALTIES - ONE DEAD, ONE SERIOUSLY INJURED, AND 12 WITH MINOR INJURIES. THE INJURED ARE RECEIVING MEDICAL ATTENTION.

4. REPORTS FROM ARGENTINE SOURCES HAVE STATED THAT ONE OF OUR AIRCRAFT STRAFED LIFEBOATS FROM THE FISHING BOAT NARWAL AFTER THE INITIAL ATTACK. THERE IS NO TRUTH WHATSOEVER IN THIS CLAIM. HMG DEPLORE THESE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS.

ENDS.


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11 MAY 1982

(38)



FALKLAND ISLANDS

Following is a summary record of the Secretary of State's appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on 10 May.

Paragraphs marked with a star record that part of the discussion which was conducted in closed session (f.e. without the press present).

British Strategy

**

The Diplomatic effort is being pursued with unabated intensity at the United Nations. The military deployment continued in exercise of our right of self defence with the minimum use of force. HMG would not shrink from any decisions which might be necessary. Economic pressures had increased the difficulties of the Argentine economy. Mr Pym was encouraged by the excellent discussion he had had with his Community Partners at the weekend. He had not sought decisions on extending sanctions, but the Community was very supportive. Events were entering a critical phase. He could not predict the outcome, but pledged to persist in the search for a negotiated settlement so long as there was the remotest chance of success.

Community Measures

In response to questions, Mr Pym stressed his appreciation of Community support and solidarity. Some had expressed reservations but in general there was very strong support and decisions would be taken by the end of the week. He agreed that the Council of Europe was also important and denied that any Community Partner was seeking to blackmail Britain by linking sanctions with farm prices. He was confident in the light of the weekend discussion that sanctions would be renewed.

** Taxed with the critical public statements of Ireland, France and the Federal Republic, Mr Pym repeated that the weekend meeting had been encouraging. Commonwealth support was also important. He did not believe that international support was falling away, although every criticism received exaggerated publicity. It was widely understood that if we succeeded, the world would be a more peaceful place. The Security Council was unlikely to give formal endorsement to our military action for obvious reasons, but the Argentine invasion was widely seen as a challenge to democratic institutions. There was perhaps more support for our position among governments than in public opinion, and our firmness of purpose was widely respected.

** The United States had not closed their minds to further measures. What they had already done was designed for maximum impact in the short term. We had not asked for military support and respected the United States' decision that they did not wish to become militarily involved.

The Use of Force

Asked whether his credibility as a peacemaker had not been eroded by the re-capture of South Georgia or the bombing of Port Stanley airport, Mr Pym replied: 'Emphatically not - quite the contrary'. Military pressure was an indispensable element in the search for a peaceful solution and we were well within our rights in using force in self defence to re-take British territory and protect the Task Force.

Asked whether the bombing of Argentine bases on the mainland or an opposed landing on the Falklands would not alienate Latin American opinion, Mr Pym replied that the question underlined the importance of implementing SCR 502. He did not want to escalate or spread hostilities, but could not exclude any possible military action. Although there was widespread support in Latin America for the Argentine claim to the Falklands, there was also much disapproval of Argentine use of force. The OAS meeting had withheld practical help from Argentina.

Diplomatic Options at the United Nations

**

Asked how the United Nations could help an interim or long term solution, Mr Pym replied that this was a practical question. He had an open mind to a range of options. After Argentine withdrawal the gap could be filled by a group of nations or perhaps by the United Nations itself.

Asked about the long term objectives of HMG, Mr Pym replied that the Falkland Islands were British sovereign territory inhabited by British people. We had to bear in mind their wishes. But we had never taken the view that the Islands were under British sovereignty by definition 'for ever and a day'. Other forms of governance to secure their future were not excluded. There were many options, including independence, associate status, condominium, UN trusteeship, and others. The Islanders would take time after Argentine withdrawal to review their life and to contemplate the future. He contrasted the Argentine attitude that sovereignty was not negotiable. When they spoke of de-colonisation, they meant colonisation by force. He was determined that the range of possibilities should not be prejudged in negotiation.

Mr Pym confirmed that there was no question of a ceasefire without Argentine withdrawal, and machinery to supervise it. Withdrawal should take place over a fixed number of days - the shortest practicable period. We would judge proposals by that yardstick.

He acknowledged the relevance to the negotiation of long term considerations of garrison, supply, etc., if the Islands had to be taken by force. Hence the importance of an interim authority and of time for the Islanders to consider their own future.

Asked why HMG did not seek a sanctions resolution in the Security Council, he replied that the first priority was to enforce Resolution 502. He did not exclude the other, although it might be vetoed. He thought the most effective way was to pursue economic measures through the Community, the Commonwealth and bilaterally.

Argentina

** Were the Argentines serious about a peaceful settlement? Mr Pym was sceptical. It remained to be seen. But the pressures were building up and the Americans were now on our side.

** Asked about the power of the Junta and the Argentine decision-making process, Mr Pym said it was not an exact science. Galtieri was the Chairman ad referendum to Admirals and Generals. The Foreign Minister and the UN Representative contradicted each other. The regime changes their minds over night. They had whipped up popular support for intervention, and confused public opinion with a mass of misinformation, which made it difficult for them to negotiate.

Asked to assess the situation inside Argentina, Mr Pym referred to mounting economic problems, the fanatical popular support for the regime, balanced against dislike of war. The military leadership had embarked on this adventure without thinking through the implications. They were surprised by the speed, scale and resolution of the reaction from Britain, the Community, the Commonwealth and the United States.

Propaganda

Mr Pym was aware of widespread criticism of the BBC, for appearing to be even-handed between HMG and the Junta. The Government were concerned. Constituents who complained to Ministers should complain direct to the BBC.

He was aware of the delays over getting television pictures back from the Fleet; but it was technically difficult to transmit them from an operational Fleet.

Dependencies

Mr Pym agreed that the Dependencies were distinct from the Falkland Islands themselves, although they had been administered from Port Stanley as a matter of convenience.

What happened to them in the end would have to take account of the outcome of the Falkland Islands. He could envisage different solutions.

N M Fenn
News Department
10 May 1982

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10 May 1982

ANGLO-ARGENTINE CONFLICT

AN INTERVIEW WITH M. CLAUDE CHEYSSON, MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS, ON BBC 4
(10 MAY 1982)

Q. - In exchange for French support over the Falklands, will the French demand that Britain gives up its opposition to the current European budget ?

THE MINISTER - I find it almost indecent to think there could be a link between the two. In one case - talking to an Englishman, I'm sorry to use strong words - it's an accounting exercise of a very limited size. In the other case, the former one, it's a question of principle. There was an aggression by the Argentinians, there was a decision by the Security Council, Britain defends that decision, Britain defends international law, we support it. It's nothing to do, nothing to do, with accounting exercises or disputes we may have elsewhere.

Q. - If there's no settlement of the Falklands crisis by the time the existing agreement on sanctions runs out, will France be prepared to support the continuation of sanctions ?

THE MINISTER - I will not consider the hypothesis that there be no settlement. All the efforts of your Government - they have been stated and we see the facts - mean that there should be a settlement before. Anyway there will be new developments before. Suppose there is no settlement, and I hate this idea, you can't imagine that things will have stood where they are. So we shall see at the end of the week. But our solidarity has been clear, abruptly stated from the very first minute. We had to speak first because we were on the Security Council, we think we have some authority out there, and we used it, as you know, from the very first moment, even before the Community could consider it.

Q. - Did it surprise you that the fighting has escalated to the level it has ?

THE MINISTER - Not so much. It's a difficult answer to give, because it will not surprise me if it did escalate again. I wonder whether the members of the Junta are in a position now to make any decision.

Q. - You mean that they're locked into what they have started doing and there is no means, no mechanism for them to retreat ?

THE MINISTER - Totalitarian régimes have their... logics.

.../.

Q. - Is there a limit to the escalation beyond which France would not find it possible to continue supporting Britain ?

THE MINISTER - I cannot answer that question. I think that as long as resolution 502 has not been implemented, we are behind Britain, we are behind those who support that resolution. If tomorrow Britain, in a fit of I can't imagine what, contrary to its history, to its tradition, were going into extraordinary other ventures, then of course we would not support it. But I can't imagine that.

Q. - Have you made a review of policy, and I'm thinking that it was a French missile and a French plane... Now it could very well have been English material, because many countries have sold arms to the Argentines. But has it made you think again about the wisdom of supplying arms to dictatorial régimes ?

THE MINISTER - Yes, It could have been, as you said, an English manufactured missile or an English trained crew. I read in the press that an Argentinian destroyer had been on training in Britain not long ago. So the question is not directly related to the Falklands but to armaments policy. As long as there is no disarmament, we feel we shall be present on this market. If we had not provided this missile to Argentina, someone else would have provided it. Now you may say the French equipment is better than others! But still the missile would have been provided by someone.

Q. - So you're looking at it really from purely commercial considerations : that there's a market there, and that French manufacturers should be in it?

THE MINISTER - There is that, there is the problem of employment at home, and finally the problem of our independence in military terms. Independence means that we must keep abreast with the most powerful in terms of modernization of our production. And this we cannot do on the sole basis of our market.

Q. - President Mitterrand said last week that France reserved the position to bring its influence to bear when the time was right, hinting, it seemed to me, at a possible European initiative. Is the time approaching when something like that might be done ?

THE MINISTER - Ask London. We stand with London, it's London that will say when and how friends, brothers, can be helpful.

Q. - But France is not considering doing anything off its own bat, without previous consultation with London ?

THE MINISTER - We're no masters of peace, of telling people how they should behave./.

PRESS STATEMENT 6.00 9 MAY

"The Task ^{Force} Group have today attacked military targets in the vicinity of Port Stanley airfield.

We have a report that an Argentine aircraft approached Port Stanley but turned away in the face of action by the Task Group."

PRESS STATEMENT 6.00PM 9 MAY

MS

At 1230 London Time this morning two Sea Harriers on patrol well within the Total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands sighted an Argentine fishing vessel. The vessel was named NARWAL and had been shadowing the Task Force for some days. We had reason to believe she was engaged in surveillance.

In the announcement of the Total Exclusion Zone on 28 April we had stated that any ship, military or civil found within the Zone without due authority from the MOD in London would be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation, would be regarded as hostile and would be liable to attack by the British Forces. Additionally on the 7 May Her Majesty's Government made clear in a statement that all Argentinian vessels including merchant vessels or fishing vessels ^{apparently} operationally engaging in surveillance or intelligence gathering activities against British Forces in the South Atlantic would also be regarded as hostile and were liable to be dealt with accordingly.

The Sea Harriers therefore opened fire. Indications are that the Argentine fishing vessel surrendered and is now awaiting a RN boarding party. We do not at present know whether the vessel was damaged or if there are any Argentine casualties.

The two Harriers were undamaged and have now returned to their patrol duties.

PS (6)

PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
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 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
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GRS 130

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 100302Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 696 OF 9 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 684; FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPOKESMAN ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT THIS EVENING (9 MAY).

BEGINS

THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PARTIES CONTINUED TODAY AND HE MET TWICE ON SEPARATE OCCASIONS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS ALSO INFORMED THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF HIS TALKS.

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON SEVERAL POINTS BUT CLARIFICATIONS ARE STILL NEEDED ON SOME OTHERS. THE TALKS WILL CONTINUE TOMORROW.

ENDS

2. I HAVE TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE MYSELF WITH THE PRESS.

PARSONS

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (32)

PS (6)
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PU\$
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
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DESKBY 100700Z
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 100301Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 695 OF 9 MAY
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MW 0344

MIPT: FALKLANDS.

1. MY TACTICS TODAY HAVE BEEN TO MAKE AS MUCH GENUINE PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE WHILE AVOIDING BEING CORNERED ON THE POSSIBILITY OUTLINED IN THE SECOND HALF OF PARA 3 OF MY TEL NO 686, IE HAVING TO RISK A BREAK ON A PROPOSITION - EXCLUSIVE UN ADMINISTRATION ON THE ISLAND - WHICH WOULD COMMAND TOTAL SUPPORT IN THE UN AND LEAVE US ISOLATED.
2. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT, APART FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, I INSISTED THAT THE ARGENTINES MUST COME CLEAN ON THE QUESTION OF PREJUDGMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE WE MOVED ON TO ANYTHING ELSE OF A CONTENTIOUS NATURE.
3. SO FAR, SO GOOD, THIS BALL IS NOW FIRMLY IN THE ARGENTINE COURT AND BUESNOS AIRES WILL HAVE TO GIVE ROS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION BEFORE WE COME UNDER FURTHER PRESSURE. IF THEY COME

2. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT, AT THE TIME OF SUBSTANCE, I INSISTED THAT THE ARGENTINES MUST COME CLEAN ON THE QUESTION OF PREJUDGMENT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE WE MOVED ON TO ANYTHING ELSE OF A CONTENTIOUS NATURE.

3. SO FAR, SO GOOD, THIS BALL IS NOW FIRMLY IN THE ARGENTINE COURT AND BUESNOS AIRES WILL HAVE TO GIVE ROS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION BEFORE WE COME UNDER FURTHER PRESSURE. IF THEY COME UP WITH THE WRONG ANSWER, IE AN ANSWER UNSATISFACTORY TO US, THE STAGE WILL BE SET EITHER FOR A BREAK DOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OR FOR A FINAL DRAMATIC EFFORT BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO PERSUADE THE JUNTA TO THINK AGAIN.

4. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF THEIR ACCEPTING THE FORMULATION ON NEGOTIATIONS SET OUT IN PARA 9 OF MIPT, THE PRESSURE WILL THEN BE ON US. IT WILL COME ON THE TWO PRINCIPAL POINTS OUTSTANDING, NAMELY ACCEPTANCE OF UN ADMINISTRATION OF THE FALKLANDS WITH THE LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES IN ABEYANCE, AND WITHDRAWAL OF OUR MILITARY FORCES (NOT SCIENTISTS) FROM SOUTH GEORGIA IN PARALLEL WITH ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS.

5. I REALISE THAT BOTH THESE ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT POINTS FOR YOU, TO SAY THE LEAST. WE MAY WELL NOT REACH THIS STAGE IF THE ARGENTINES FAIL TO DELIVER ON THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION. AND I DO NOT NEED INSTRUCTIONS TOMORROW (10 MAY). HOWEVER, MY GUESS IS THAT THE WHOLE NEGOTIATION WILL HAVE TO MAKE OR BREAK BY 11 MAY OR 12 MAY AT THE LATEST.

6. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT IF WE WERE SEEN TO HAVE BROKEN OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON EITHER THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OR THE QUESTION OF MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA OR BOTH, WE WOULD BE IN AN EXTREMELY ISOLATED POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS. FROM A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION I HAVE HAD WITH SIR N HENDERSON, I GATHER THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE A GENUINE EFFORT TO DRIVE THE ARGENTINES OFF INSISTING ON THE SOUTH GEORGIA POINT, WHICH HAS NOT SURFACED IN THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, I VERY MUCH DOUBT IF THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE TO CONCEDE BOTH, IE THAT OUR MILITARY FORCES REMAIN ON SOUTH GEORGIA, AND THAT THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS SHOULD REMAIN IN BEING THROUGHOUT THE INTERIM PERIOD. I AM NOT MAKING A RECOMMENDATION BUT WE MIGHT HAVE TO CONSIDER A TRADE OFF.

7. MEANWHILE, I DO NOT THINK THAT I NEED FURTHER DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE POINTS IN PARAS 4, 5 AND 7 OF MIPT PROVIDED THAT YOU ARE CONTENT WITH THE LINES I AM TAKING (I THINK THAT WE SHOULD SETTLE FOR A VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE, PROVIDED THAT IT IS NOT IN NEW YORK CITY) AND THAT YOU ARE CONTENT WITH THE PROPOSITIONS I HAVE ADVANCED ON THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN PARAS 8 AND 9. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE USEFUL TO HAVE ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY WISH TO PROPOSE ON THE DETAILED POINTS IN PARA 3.

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (32) 38

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SIR I SINCLAIR
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DESKBY 100700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 100300Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 694 OF 9 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 691: FALKLANDS.

1. I HAD ANOTHER HOUR WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AT 2330Z TODAY (9 MAY).

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD ROS (ARGENTINA) THAT WE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE DEPENDENCIES WERE INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT EXERCISE. ROS HAD OBJECTED STRONGLY, SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR PUBLIC OPINION THAT ARGENTINA WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLANDS BUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO BRITISH MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD PURSUED THE QUESTION WITH ROS AT A PRIVATE MEETING. BUT ROS HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT OUR POSITION: THE DEPENDENCIES WERE INCLUDED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS AND IN THE 1977 COMMUNIQUE; THE ARGENTINES WOULD INSIST THAT ALL THE ISLANDS BE INCLUDED. ROS WAS AS USUAL SPEAKING TO A PREPARED BRIEF - THERE WAS

MEETING. BUT ROS HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT OUR POSITION: THE DEPENDENCIES WERE INCLUDED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS AND IN THE 1977 COMMUNIQUE: THE ARGENTINES WOULD INSIST THAT ALL THE ISLANDS BE INCLUDED. ROS WAS AS USUAL SPEAKING TO A PREPARED BRIEF - THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF AVOIDING THIS ISSUE.

3. ON WITHDRAWAL ETC, THE ARGENTINES WANTED THE BRITISH TASK FORCE TO WITHDRAW OUTSIDE THREE CIRCLES OF 150 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE CO-ORDINATES IN PARA 2 OF THE DRAFT PROPOSALS OF 12 APRIL (YOUR TELNO 369), IE FROM THE CENTRES OF THE FALKLANDS, SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS. THEY WANTED A PROVISION THAT WITHDRAWAL COULD BE EXTENDED FOR A BIT BEYOND 14 DAYS IF BAD WEATHER OR OTHER FACTORS CAUSED DELAYS. AND THEY WANTED THE LIFTING OF THE EXCLUSION ZONES AND OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS QUOTE TO BE EFFECTIVE AS OF TIME 'T' UNQUOTE; OTHERWISE THE IMPRESSION MIGHT BE GIVEN THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL WAS TAKING PLACE UNDER PRESSURE.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ROS HAD NOT GIVEN A CLEAR ANSWER ON WHETHER THE ARGENTINES ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL THAT 31 DECEMBER 1982 SHOULD BE DESCRIBED AS THE QUOTE TARGET DATE UNQUOTE FOR COMPLETION OF THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. INSTEAD, HE HAD ASKED HOW LONG AN EXTENSION WE ENVISAGED IF AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED BY 31 DECEMBER. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE REDICULOUS FOR THE AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE TWO TARGET DATES, ONE AFTER THE OTHER: IN OUR VIEW IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT, SAY IN MID-DECEMBER, ON HOW MUCH MORE TIME IN HIS JUDGEMENT WAS NEEDED, IF AGREEMENT WAS NOT IN SIGHT BY THEN.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE FIRM IN THEIR WISH FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK, ESPECIALLY IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS TO PARTICIPATE PERSONALLY. ROS DID NOT THINK THAT OTTAWA WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS WONDERING WHETHER SOMEWHERE IN NEW YORK STATE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE: IT HAD BECOME A CONVENTION THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL DID NOT LEAVE NEW YORK DURING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

6. ON THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES CONTINUED TO OBJECT STRONGLY TO ANY ROLE FOR THE ISLANDERS, EVEN OF AN ADVISORY CHARACTER, BECAUSE THIS WOULD PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. YOU HAD TALKED FIRMLY ABOUT HMG'S INSISTENCE ON THE RESTORATION OF THE TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATION. ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD REQUIRE LEGISLATION; WE OUTLINED THE PARLIAMENTARY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS.

7. I WENT ON TO RAISE A FRESH POINT. HAVING HEARD COSTA MENDEZ TODAY, I WAS CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT, IF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AND THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, THE ARGENTINES WOULD AT THAT STAGE INSIST THAT THEY WERE ONLY PREPARED TO TALK ON THE BASIS THAT THEY OBTAINED SOVEREIGNTY IN THE END. THIS WOULD

WOULD AT THAT STAGE INSIST THAT THEY WERE ONLY PREPARED TO TALK ON THE BASIS THAT THEY OBTAINED SOVEREIGNTY IN THE END. THIS WOULD PROVOKE AN IMMEDIATE DEADLOCK. WOULD THE WHOLE INTERIM AGREEMENT THEN COLLAPSE, PRODUCING A VACUUM? TO GUARD AGAINST THIS RISK, I THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A QUOTE NO-BREAK UNQUOTE CLAUSE IN THE AGREEMENT, EG QUOTE THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON SIGNATURE AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES HAS BEEN REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE PARTIES UNQUOTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOOK NOTE OF THIS. DE SOTO COMMENTED (RIGHTLY) THAT IT WOULD MAKE AGREEMENT MORE DIFFICULT ON OUR POINT ABOUT THE TARGET DATE.

8. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A VERY DIFFICULT DISCUSSION WITH ROS ABOUT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LINKED QUESTION OF COSTA MENDEZ'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW TODAY. THE KIND OF LANGUAGE THE ARGENTINES HAD IN MIND FOR THE TERMS OF REFERENCE WAS: QUOTE THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO SOLVE THE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT RELEVANT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT DO. COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS TODAY HAD BEEN VERY CLOSE TO ARGENTINE STATEMENTS WHICH HAD CAUSED THE COLLAPSE OF PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WE MUST HAVE PROPER CLARIFICATION. EVEN IF ROS WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE ARGENTINE POSITION WAS AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD DESCRIBED IT TO ME YESTERDAY, WE WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON CERTAIN FORMULATIONS BEING INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT, IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT. WE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO INSIST THAT ALL THREE MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA SIGNED THE AGREEMENT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ADMITTED THAT HIS CONVERSATION ON THIS POINT WITH ROS HAD NOT BEEN SATISFACTORY AND SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY AGAIN.

9. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION HE INVITED ME TO GIVE HIM LANGUAGE WHICH, OSTENSIBLY AS HIS OWN INITIATIVE, HE WOULD PRESENT TO THE ARGENTINES IN ORDER TO SMOKE OUT THEIR POSITION AND, HE HOPED, CONFIRM THAT THEY REALLY DID ACCEPT THAT THE FINAL OUTCOME COULD NOT BE PREJUDGED. MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I WAS ACTING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, I HAVE GIVEN HIM THE FOLLOWING FORMULATIONS:

(A) AS A FIRST ARTICLE IN THE AGREEMENT:

QUOTE

(1) NO PROVISION OF THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHALL IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY IN THE ULTIMATE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS).

(2) NO ACTS OR ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WHILST THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT IS IN FORCE SHALL CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR ASSERTING, SUPPORTING OR DENYING A CLAIM TO TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) OR CREAT ANY RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THEM UNQUOTE.

(B) AS AN ARTICLE PROVIDING FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS:

IS IN FORCE SHALL CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR ASSERTING, SUPPORTING OR DENYING A CLAIM TO TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) OR CREAT ANY RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THEM UNQUOTE.

(B) AS AN ARTICLE PROVIDING FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS: QUOTE THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES AND SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN SOME FORMULA ABOUT THE TARGET DATE CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS. THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY AND WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME. UNQUOTE.

THESE HAVE BEEN TAKEN FROM ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER, FROM THE ISRAEL/JORDAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT (BASED ON ARTICLE 40) AND FROM ARTICLE IV (2) OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY.

20. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY OUT THIS KIND OF LANGUAGE ON ROS, WHO WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO REFER TO BUENOS AIRES. IF THE ARGENTINES WOULD ACCEPT SUCH LANGUAGE, WOULD WE DROP OUR INSISTENCE ON A ROLE FOR THE ISLANDERS IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION? DE SOTO SAID THAT THIS LOOKED LIKE THE MAKINGS OF A TRADE-OFF. I SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A TRADE-OFF AT ALL: DE SOTO WAS NOT COMPARING LIKE WITH LIKE: CONSIDER IT THE OTHER WAY ROUND: IF THE ARGENTINES ACCEPTED A ROLE FOR THE ISLANDERS, WE CERTAINLY COULD NOT GIVE UP OUR INSISTENCE THAT THE FINAL OUTCOME NOT BE PREJUDGED. THIS WAS AN ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL POINT FOR US. IT NEEDED TO BE CLEARED UP FIRST SO THAT WE COULD ALL KNOW WHETHER IT WAS WORTH PROCEEDING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGREED AND SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT ASK ME TO SEE HIM AGAIN UNTIL HE HAD HAD AN ARGENTINE REPLY ON THIS POINT.

11. PLEASE SEE MIFT FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

PARSONS

NNNM

TYPISTS

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (32) 38

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 PS/HOME SECRETARY
 PS/HOME SECRETARY(C/O No.10 D St)
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 PS/SIR M PALLISER)
 MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER)
 D I O)
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 092320Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 693 OF 9 MAY

Handwritten mark

YOUR TEL NO 366: FALKLANDS: TRUSTEESHIP.

1. FRANKLY, I REGARD TRUSTEESHIP MORE AS A PLOY TO BE USED AS NECESSARY AS A MEANS OF SECURING DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGE OVER THE ARGENTINES OR PERHAPS AS A WAY OF OPENING UP A FRESH OPTION IF WE LOOK AS THOUGH WE ARE HEADING TOWARDS SOMETHING TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.
2. OBVIOUSLY ARTICLE 76(B) OF THE CHARTER WOULD BE VERY DISAGREEABLE TO ARGENTINA, IE QUOTE TO PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INHABITANTS AND THEIR PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS SELF-GOVERNMENT OR INDEPENDENCE UNQUOTE ETC. BUT THEY WOULD REALISE THAT A CLASSICAL APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER SUCH AS TRUSTEESHIP WOULD HAVE GREAT ATTRACTIONS FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF UN MEMBERS. WE COULD FOX THEM IN DEBATE BY DRAWING THEIR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT TRUSTEESHIP DID NOT INEVITABLY LEAD TO INDEPENDENCE, QUOTING THE EXAMPLES OF BRITISH TOGOLAND (WHICH UNITED WITH THE GOLD COAST/ GHANA) AND BRITISH CAMEROONS (WHICH UNITED WITH NIGERIA AND CAMEROUN RESPECTIVELY). THIS WOULD PUT THE ARGENTINES IN SOME

THAT TRUSTEESHIP DID NOT INEVITABLY LEAD TO INDEPENDENCE, QUOTING THE EXAMPLES OF BRITISH TOGOLAND (WHICH UNITED WITH THE GOLD COAST/ GHANA) AND BRITISH CAMEROONS (WHICH UNITED WITH NIGERIA AND CAMEROUN RESPECTIVELY). THIS WOULD PUT THE ARGENTINES IN SOME DIFFICULTY, ALHTOUGH I TAKE YOUR POINT ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF ARTICLE 76(D) FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. THE QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNQUOTE FORMULA AT THE END OF (D) MAY HELP.

3. I WOULD CERTAINLY NOT SEE THIS PLOY AS BEING USABLE IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO MAKE OR BREAK OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS. BUT WE MIGHT BEAR IT IN MIND FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IF WE EVER GET THAT FAR. IF THINGS LOOK AS THOUGH THEY ARE RUNNING AGAINST US IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT MIGHT BE A USEFUL DIVERSIONARY TACTIC.

4. FOR THE MOMENT, I THINK THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IT IN MIND BUT SAY AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ABOUT IT IN PUBLIC.

PARSONS

NNNN

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (32) 38

PS (6)
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 HD/SAMD
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/UND
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/ERD
 HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~ *Sent*
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET (2 Copies)

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PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY(C/O No.10 D St)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)

PS/SIR M PALLISER)

MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER)

D I O)

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

IMMEDIATE

00 FCO (DESKBY 100700Z)

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 100700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 092300Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 692 OF 9 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS ON 9 MAY.

1. TODAY'S MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS HAVE PREDICTABLY FLUTTERED THE DOVECOTES HERE. ROCA (ARGENTINA) COMPLAINED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAS SENT TWO LETTERS TO THE LATTER. THE ARGENTINES ARE PUTTING IT ABOUT THAT AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON 5 AND 6 MAY TACIT AGREEMENT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO HOSTILITIES WHILE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUED HIS INITIATIVE. AS SOON AS I LEARNT THIS, I TELEPHONED BOTH PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND LING QING TO REMIND THEM THAT I HAD MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR SUSPENDING MILITARY OPERATIONS. IF THE ARGENTINES WENT ON CLAIMING THAT I

CONSULTATIONS THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR SUSPENDING MILITARY OPERATIONS. IF THE ARGENTINES WENT ON CLAIMING THAT I HAD AGREED TO DO SO, I WOULD HAVE TO DENY THIS IN PUBLIC AND CITE THE PRESIDENT AND THE S.G. IN MY SUPPORT. I REPEATED THESE POINTS TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AT THE FIRST OF OUR MEETINGS THIS EVENING (AT WHICH A REUTERS REPORT WAS BROUGHT IN ABOUT THE ALLEGED SHOOTING DOWN OF AN ARGENTINE PUMA HELICOPTER TODAY).

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR UNDERSTANDS OUR POSITION BUT IS UNDERSTANDABLY WORRIED THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS BY EITHER SIDE WILL LEAD DORR OR LING QING TO RECONVENE THE COUNCIL, THEREBY THREATENING THE PROSPECTS FOR HIS INITIATIVE.

3. AS THE EMERGENCY UNIT WILL KNOW, I ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO SEND A LETTER TODAY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER ARTICLE 51 GIVING OUR ACCOUNT OF THE DAY'S ENGAGEMENTS. BUT AS UNCERTAINTY REMAINS ABOUT WHAT EXACTLY HAPPENED I HAVE DECIDED TO DEFER MY LETTER UNTIL AN AUTHORITATIVE AND COMPLETE ACCOUNT IS AVAILABLE. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I SHOULD GET MY LETTER IN NOT LATER THAN 1700Z ON 10 MAY.

PARSONS

NNNN

PS (6)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
HD/SAMD
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~ *seen*
RESIDENT CLERK

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MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER)
D I O)
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 092220Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 691 OF 9 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL NO 371: FALKLANDS.

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AT 1930Z TODAY (9 MAY).
WE ARE TO MEET AGAIN AT ABOUT 2300Z, BY WHICH TIME HE WILL HAVE SEEN
ROS (ARGENTINA).

2. ON THE DATE OF TIME 'T', THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL
AND THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TASK FORCE, I SPOKE AS
INSTRUCTED IN PARA 2(A) TO (C) AND PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER
REFERENCE AND GAVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR COPIES OF MY SPEAKING NOTES.
LATER IN THE CONVERSATION THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR HIS STAFF RAISED
THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THIS PART OF MY PRESENTATION:

(A) DID WE ACCEPT THAT THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN AT
TIME 'T', SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS MENTIONED IN PARA 3
OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE? I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK THAT
THERE WOULD BE ANY DIFFICULTY ABOUT HAVING A CEREMONIAL OPENING OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THAT STAGE, THOUGH IN PRACTICE IT WOULD TAKE TIME
FOR BOTH SIDES TO ASSEMBLE AND PREPARE THEIR NEGOTIATING TEAMS.

THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THAT STAGE, THOUGH IN PRACTICE IT WOULD BE THE
FOR BOTH SIDES TO ASSEMBLE AND PREPARE THEIR NEGOTIATING TEAMS.
(B) THE ARGENTINES MIGHT ARGUE THAT 200 NAUTICAL MILES WAS TOO SHORT
A RADIUS FOR THE ZONE FROM WHICH THE BRITISH TASK FORCE WOULD BE
WITHDRAWN. HAD THIS BEEN AN ISSUE IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS? I SAID
THAT I DID NOT KNOW.

(C) HOW WOULD THE WITHDRAWAL OF NAVAL FORCES, AND ESPECIALLY
SUBMARINES, OF BOTH SIDES BE VERIFIED? THE UN HAD NO EXPERIENCE OF
SUCH AN OPERATION. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY
IDEAS YOU HAVE ON THIS POINT. (ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR BOTH
SIDES TO MAKE A DECLARATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE SHIPS
THEY HAD IN THE ZONE AT TIME 'T' AND NOTIFY HIM AS EACH VESSEL
WITHDREW: IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE UN COULD MOUNT ANY
PHYSICAL VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL).

3. I NEXT SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 2(D) OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER
REFERENCE ON THE TERMINAL DATE FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS,
EMPHASISING THAT WE SIMPLY COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY POSSIBILITY OF THERE
BEING A VACUUM ON 31 DECEMBER 1982 WITH NEITHER AN AGREEMENT NOR
INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN FORCE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S TEAM ACCEPTED THE
POINT BUT CLEARLY THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD BRIDLE AT THE
INCLUSION IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ITSELF OF A PROVISION THAT THE
INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL A FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE
FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS WAS IMPLEMENTED. AHMED WONDERED WHETHER THIS
POINT MIGHT BE MADE IN THE ANNEX DESCRIBING THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS.
I SAID THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BUT THAT WE WOULD NEED TO SEE
LANGUAGE AND THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE.

4. I THEN MADE THE POINTS ABOUT THE FORMAT AND VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS
IN PARA 2(E) OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, ADDING THAT
THE CRITICAL MOMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD COME DURING THE 37TH
REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THIS WOULD REALLY MAKE IT
IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD THE TALKS IN NEW YORK. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SEEMED
TO ACCEPT THIS AND SAID THAT HE HIMSELF HAD THOUGHT OF OTTAWA AS A
POSSIBLE VENUE.

5. I NEXT RAISED THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS
INSTRUCTED IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. I SAID THAT
THIS BROUGHT ME ON TO THE ALL-IMPORTANT QUESTION OF ARGENTINE
ACCEPTANCE THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY. I HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY DISTURBED BY
COSTA MENDEZ'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW TODAY (WASHINGTON TEL NO 1682).
HE SEEMED TO ME TO HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT ARGENTINA WAS NOT INSISTING
THAT THE UK SHOULD ACTUALLY CEDE SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS
STARTED BUT THAT SHE INSISTED THAT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS MUST CONCLUDE
WITH CONFIRMATION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT THEY WOULD
THEREFORE BE CONCERNED NOT WITH SOVEREIGNTY ITSELF BUT WITH HOW THE
INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS MIGHT BE PROTECTED UNDER ARGENTINE SOVER-
EIGNTY. IF MY READING OF COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS WAS RIGHT, THERE HAD
BEEN A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR

WITH CONFIRMATION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT THEY WOULD THEREFORE BE CONCERNED NOT WITH SOVEREIGNTY ITSELF BUT WITH HOW THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS MIGHT BE PROTECTED UNDER ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY. IF MY READING OF COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS WAS RIGHT, THERE HAD BEEN A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD DESCRIBED IT TO BE YESTERDAY. IN THAT CASE WE WOULD BE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. I HOPED THAT I WAS WRONG. BUT I MUST FORMALLY ASK PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO ASK ROS FOR URGENT CLARIFICATION OF ARGENTINA'S POSITION. ON HIS ANSWER WOULD DEPEND WHETHER PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS IN BUSINESS OR WHETHER HE WAS ENGAGED IN ANOTHER FUTILE EXERCISE. COSTA MENDEZ WAS THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HE WAS SPEAKING ON THE RECORD. ROS MUST BE ASKED TO ESTABLISH ABSOLUTELY CLEARLY WHAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR LOOKED UNHAPPY BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD DO AS I ASKED.

6. I NEXT STATED THAT I WISHED IT TO BE QUITE CLEAR THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ALONE, NOT ABOUT THE DEPENDENCIES. OUR TITLE TO THE LATTER WAS DIFFERENT FROM OUR TITLE TO THE FALKLANDS: AND THEY HAD NO PERMANENT POPULATION. IT HAD BEEN ONLY A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE THAT THEY HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED FROM PORT STANLEY. IT TURNED OUT TO BE AS WELL THAT I MENTIONED THIS. AHMED AT LEAST HAD CLEARLY BEEN ASSUMING THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD COVER THE DEPENDENCIES AS WELL AND THAT WHEN THE ARGENTINES WITHDREW FROM THE FALKLANDS WE WOULD ALSO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH GEORGIA. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE DEPENDENCIES HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN OUR EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES AND QUOTED THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE 1977 ROUND OF TALKS (A/32/111). I INSISTED THAT WE WERE ONLY CONCERNED AT THIS STAGE WITH THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD IN THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS. WE WOULD HAVE ONLY SIX MONTHS TO REACH A FINAL AGREEMENT, AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CONCENTRATE ON THE MAIN PROBLEM, VIZ THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES. I THINK THAT WE MAY HAVE FURTHER TROUBLE ON THIS, WITH AHMED TIRE-SOMELY BRINGING UP THE EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS. I RECOMMEND THAT OUR LINE SHOULD BE THAT THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE ISLANDS (IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION, INCIDENTALLY, OF OPERATIVE PARA 4 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 31/49) HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION AND THAT THE PRECEDENT OF THE EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS IS NO LONGER RELEVANT.

7. FINALLY, I MADE THE POINTS ABOUT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN PARA 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, STRESSING HOW IMPORTANT THEY WERE FOR US. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOOK NOTE.

8. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, I SUGGESTED THAT THE TIME MIGHT HAVE COME FOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO PRODUCE A SOMEWHAT FULLER DOCUMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH ROS AND ME. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE INTENDED TO DO. HE WOULD SEE ROS IMMEDIATELY, IN PARTICULAR TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME A SECOND TIME LATER THIS EVENING, PROBABLY AT 2300Z. I WILL REPORT FURTHER AFTER THAT MEETING.

9. ON THE WHOLE THIS WAS A GOOD MEETING. I EMPHASISED HOW CONSTRUCTIVE

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REMARKS, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME A SECOND TIME LATER THIS EVENING,
~~PROBABLY AT 2300Z. I WILL REPORT FURTHER AFTER THAT MEETING.~~

9. ON THE WHOLE THIS WAS A GOOD MEETING. I EMPHASISED HOW CONSTRUCT-
IVE, URGENT AND FLEXIBLE WE WERE SHOWING OURSELVES TO BE. NO ONE
CONTESTED THIS AND THE ATMOSPHERE WAS SERIOUS BUT FRIENDLY.

PARSONS

NNNN

PS (6)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILMORE
MR URE
HD/SAMD
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~ 2001
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

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MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER)
D I O)
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

MS

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 091825Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 1682 OF 9 MAY 1982,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: US TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH COSTA-MENDEZ

1. COSTA-MENDEZ WAS INTERVIEWED FROM BUENOS AIRES BY CBS TELEVISION THIS MORNING. COSTA MENDEZ SAID THAT BRITISH ATTACKS ON THE FALKLANDS, NOW UNDER WAY, WERE CHARACTERISTIC OF BRITISH BEHAVIOUR WHICH HAD BEEN TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK WHENEVER "SOUND TALKS" DESIGNED TO LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WERE IN PROGRESS.

2. ASKED ABOUT ARGENTINE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT, COSTA MENDEZ SAID ARGENTINA WAS READY TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS IF BRITAIN WAS WILLING TO WITHDRAW ITS FLEET. THE AUTHORITY OF THE UN COULD BE ESTABLISHED AND, AS PART OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, DISCUSSIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY COULD BE UNDERTAKEN. BUT ALL THIS MUST LEAD TO RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY, EVEN IF THE BRITISH DID NOT ACCEPT THAT SOVEREIGNTY AT THE VERY BEGINNING.

ESTABLISHED AND, AS PART OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, DISCUSSIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY COULD BE UNDERTAKEN. BUT ALL THIS MUST LEAD TO RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY, EVEN IF THE BRITISH DID NOT ACCEPT THAT SOVEREIGNTY AT THE VERY BEGINNING.

3. WHEN ONE OF THE INTERVIEWERS COMMENTED THAT COSTA MENDEZ SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT HE WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE SO LONG AS THE OUTCOME WAS KNOWN IN ADVANCE, COSTA MENDEZ SAID THIS WAS NOT CORRECT. ARGENTINA WAS NOT SAYING THAT BRITAIN MUST ACCEPT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AT THE BEGINNING. SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT BEING PUT AS PRECONDITION FOR TALKS THOUGH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ARRIVE AT ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY.

4. ASKED AGAIN WHETHER HE WAS SAYING THAT ARGENTINA NO LONGER HAD TO BE GUARANTEED SOVEREIGNTY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, COSTA MENDEZ APPEARED TO AGREE. THERE WAS NO DOUBT OF THE GOAL: RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY, BUT ARGENTINA DID NOT DEMAND THAT BRITAIN SIT AT THE TABLE AND SAY THAT THEY RECOGNISED ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY AT THE BEGINNING. THERE WAS NO OTHER GOAL THAN SOVEREIGNTY. EVERYTHING ELSE COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH BRITAIN.

5 OTHER POINTS MADE DURING THE INTERVIEW INCLUDED:


- A) THE ISLANDERS WOULD BE GRANTED EVERY RIGHT - RELIGION, LANGUAGE, EDUCATION, OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY. EVEN NATIONAL MINORITY STATUS FOR THE ISLANDERS WAS UNDER STUDY.
- B) THERE WOULD BE FAIR COMPENSATION FOR THOSE ISLANDERS WHO WISHED TO LEAVE. THOSE WHO WERE NOT LANDOWNERS WOULD BE GIVEN ACCESS TO LAND EITHER ON THE ISLANDS OR IN ARGENTINA AND SOFT LOAN TERMS WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. ARGENTINA WOULD EVEN HELP THOSE WHO MIGHT WANT TO LEAVE EG FOR AUSTRALIA OR NEW ZEALAND.
- C) THE FALKLANDS WAS A CLASSIC CASE OF COLONIALISM WITH 46% OF THE LAND AND 90% OF THE BUSINESS IN THE HANDS OF ONE COMPANY. MANY ISLANDERS HAD NO ACCESS TO PROPERTY.
- D) ARGENTINA HAD NOT ASKED THE SOVIET UNION FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD EXCELLENT TRADING RELATIONS. ARGENTINA'S FAVOURABLE TRADE BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ENABLED HER TO PAY FOR THE IMBALANCE IN HER TRADE WITH THE US.
- E) THE US HAD GONE TOO FAR BY ABANDONING NEUTRALITY IN THE DISPUTE AND WAS PUTTING AT RISK ITS INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

(6)

PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~ seen
 RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR K COUZENS) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)



UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERNE 0921:5Z

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 114 OF 09 MAY

V

1. THE SWISS MFA HAVE REQUESTED US TO PASS TO YOU THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE (OUR TRANSLATION FROM FRENCH) FROM THEIR AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES.

BEGINS

THE ARGENTINE MFA INFORM ME URGENTLY THAT THE "YERUIN", A LARGE CIVIL AND UNARMED TUG, LEFT PORT STANLEY 3 HOURS AGO TO

THE ARGENTINE MFA INFORM ME URGENTLY THAT THE "YEHUIN", A
LARGE CIVIL AND UNARMED TUG, LEFT PORT STANLEY 3 HOURS AGO TO
RESCUE TO THE CONTINENT THE SURVIVORS OF THE CIVIL FISHING VESSEL
"NARVAL", SUNK THIS MORNING BY BRITISH NAVAL HELICOPTERS.
THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES, APPARENTLY DUE TO THE INABILITY TO
PASS THIS THROUGH THE BRAZILIANS, URGENTLY REQUEST THE BRITISH
AUTHORITIES TO GRANT FREE PASSAGE TO THE "YEHUIN".

ENDS

2. ORIGINAL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

LEE

NNN

SENT AT RECD AT 092130Z LR/

CD

THATS IT FROM US K

BERFO 002/9

00 FCO

PP MONTEVIDEO (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

PP WASHINGTON

GRS 130

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BERNE 090955Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 113 OF 09 MAY

INFO PRIORITY MONTEVIDEO (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 112: THREAT OF ASSASSINATION OF STAFF/UK CITIZENS
IN THIRD COUNTRIES

1. THE SWISS FDFA HAVE INFORMED US THAT THE SWISS AMBASSADOR
IN BUENOS AIRES TOOK ACTION AT 1745 HRS (LOCAL) ON 8 MAY
WITH KELLER SARMIENTO, WHO WAS THE HIGHEST OFFICIAL THEN
AVAILABLE IN THE ARGENTINE MFA.

2. ACCORDING TO THE FDFA KELLER SARMIENTO UNDERTOOK TO BRING
THE MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO THE NOTICE OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

HIS OWN IMMEDIATE REACTION HAD BEEN THAT "THERE WAS NO NEED
FOR CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF BRITISH NATIONALS".

3. IN REPORTING THIS TO BERNE THE SWISS AMBASSADOR COMMENTED
THAT AS FAR AS BUENOS AIRES WAS CONCERNED THE BRITISH
CHANCERY AND RESIDENCE WERE WELL PROTECTED BY ARMED MOBILE
GUARDS.

LEE

8 MAY 1982



28

Emergency Room

C O N F I D E N T I A L

4257 - 1

OO MEXICO CITY DESKBY 091500Z
PP WASHINGTON
PP UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 139
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 091500Z
FM FCO 090020Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 364 OF 9 MAY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 369

5-8 MAY

(1)



1. MEXICAN AMBASSADOR (OLLOQUI) HAS BEEN TELEPHONED BY PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO FROM SONORA AND ASKED WHEN HE IS LIKELY TO RECEIVE A FULL RESPONSE TO HIS OFFER OF HELP. THE PRESIDENT HAS REPEATED HIS CLAIM THAT GALTIERI IS READY FOR A MEETING IN MEXICO EG. AT CANCUN.

2. WE HAVE GIVEN OLLOQUI THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU CONVEYED TO THE PRESIDENT ON 7 MAY. DRAWING ON SIR A PARSONS' PRESS CONFERENCE TEXT (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO.681 NOT TO YOU) WE ALSO DESCRIBED THE RECENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK AND EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE NOW BOUND TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS. OLLOQUI EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING AND HAS PROMISED TO EXPLAIN THIS TO THE PRESIDENT.

PYM

MESSAGE FROM FCO OPS ROOM -

Telephone conversation with Sir A. Parsons

1. Argentines are going on to propaganda attack in New York citing British attacks on Port Stanley and Port Darwin and sinking of Argentine fishing boat this morning.
2. Ros is taking line with press in New York that he has not talked to Secretary General because he is awaiting instructions from Buenos Aires in view of latest developments - he's giving impression we've been naughty.
3. Argentines through Ros have put note to Security Council complaining that British have made attacks today - it's the first time they've been first in war of words.
4. Costa Mendes in TV show in USA "Face the Nation" is saying that recognition of sovereignty is not a pre-condition - but this is hearsay.

FD

9/5/82

MS FROM DUTY CLERK

The following information has just been received from David Omand, MOD.

At 1130Z (1230 London) a fishing support vessel called the Narwhal believed to have been engaged in surveillance activities for Argentine inside the TEZ was caused to surrender by sea Harrier gunfire. A British naval party has gone aboard. There are no reports of casualties. No press announcement is being made as yet. Further information will follow as it becomes available.


9/5/82

ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK

ZZ WASHINGTON

GRS 1405
CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 MAY -

FM FCO 091600Z MAY 82
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 371 OF 9 MAY

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 679, 685 AND 686: FALKLANDS

1. WE AGREE THAT BRITAIN SHOULD DEMONSTRATE FULL WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS. WE THEREFORE WISH TO REPLY QUICKLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE POINTS MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN YOUR MEETINGS YESTERDAY. WE SHOULD IN PARTICULAR DEAL TODAY WITH THE FIVE POINTS IDENTIFIED AT THE END OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 679 BUT SHOULD ALSO STATE FIRMLY OUR POSITION ON THE HIGHLY DIFFICULT AND DELICATE PROBLEM OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

2. YOU SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING BRITISH POSITION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE FIVE POINTS:

(A) DATE OF TIME 'T'. WE CAN AGREE THAT TIME 'T' SHOULD BE SET AS SOON AFTER SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT AS BOTH PARTIES CAN GUARANTEE COMPLIANCE BY THEIR FORCES WITH A CEASEFIRE. FOR US, 24 HOURS AFTER SIGNATURE IS ACCEPTABLE, PROVIDED ARGENTINA CAN GUARANTEE TO ABIDE BY IT AND ASSUMING THAT WE SHOULD HAVE REASONABLE NOTICE (AT LEAST 24 HOURS) OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT.

(B) THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL. WE CAN ACCEPT A PERIOD OF NO LONGER THAN 14 DAYS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE ISLANDS, HALF OF THEM SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN WITHIN 7 DAYS.

(C) THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TASK FORCE. THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL MUST BE EQUAL AND PARALLEL WITH THOSE FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, THUS INVOLVING NO

DISADVANTAGE TO BRITAIN. WE CAN AGREE TO WITHDRAW ALL OUR NAVAL FORCES WITHIN 14 DAYS, AND HALF OF THEM WITHIN 7 DAYS, TO OUTSIDE A ZONE OF 200 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

(D) TERMINAL DATE FOR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS UNREAL TO SET AN ABSOLUTE TERMINAL DATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHEN EVERYONE KNOWS THAT THE PARTIES, WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD, MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WITHIN A SPECIFIED PERIOD. FOR THIS REASON, WE HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL RETURN TO THE EXPRESSION 'TARGET DATE' WHICH APPEARED IN HIS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS OF 3 MAY. ON THAT BASIS WE COULD ACCEPT THAT THE NAMED DATE BE 31 DECEMBER 1982. IN ORDER HOWEVER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF REALITY, WITHOUT STATING DIRECTLY THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT GO ON BEYOND THE TARGET DATE, THE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL AN AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS IS IMPLEMENTED AND WE SHOULD WANT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE TARGET DATE ABOUT THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NEXT STEPS. (NEXT STEPS COULD OF COURSE BE EITHER IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT OR CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS)..

(E) THE FORMAT AND VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL AGREE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNDER HIS AUSPICES AND AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN HIS PRESENCE. WHEN HE CANNOT BE PRESENT, WE HOPE THAT HIS PLACE WILL BE TAKEN BY A REPRESENTATIVE. BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES IN NEW YORK, WE SHOULD LIKE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE ELSEWHERE, PERHAPS GENEVA OR OTTAWA.

3. IN AMPLIFICATION OF POINTS (B) AND (C) ABOVE, PLEASE SUGGEST TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT HE MIGHT BUILD ON THE KEY POINT OF HIS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS - THAT A NUMBER OF THINGS SHOULD ALL BEGIN HAPPENING AT TIME 'T' - IN THE FOLLOWING WAY. WITH EFFECT FROM TIME 'T' THE PARTIES MIGHT UNDERTAKE NOT ONLY TO CEASE FIRE AND TO BEGIN WITHDRAWING FROM THE ZONE OF 200 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, BUT

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ALSO NOT TO INTRODUCE ANY FURTHER MILITARY FORCES INTO THAT ZONE (EXCEPT FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, AND THEN UNDER UN SUPERVISION), TO SUSPEND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ZONES NOW IN OPERATION AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND TO TAKE STEPS TO TERMINATE ECONOMIC MEASURES. THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION WOULD BEGIN ARRIVING IN THE FALKLANDS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER TIME 'M' AND WOULD VERIFY WITHDRAWAL BY BOTH PARTIES. WE HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD REPORT VERY FREQUENTLY, PERHAPS DAILY, ON THE PROCESS AND COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL. BY DAY 14, WHEN WITHDRAWAL BY BOTH PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETE, THE EXCLUSION ZONES WOULD BE FINALLY TERMINATED, THE ECONOMIC MEASURES WOULD END AND THE INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE COMPLETELY ESTABLISHED. NEITHER SIDE COULD INTRODUCE MILITARY FORCES INTO THE 200 NAUTICAL MILE ZONE THROUGHOUT THE INTERIM PERIOD.

4. WE SHARE YOUR SUSPICION THAT ARGENTINA MAY HOPE TO TAKE OVER THE ISLANDS WHEN THE INTERIM PERIOD ENDS. THE POINTS SUGGESTED UNDER (D) ABOVE ARE OF COURSE DESIGNED TO HELP IN COUNTERING THIS. BUT WE MUST ALSO INSIST MOST FIRMLY THAT THE NEW ARGENTINE SUGGESTIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ABOUT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION ARE UNACCEPTABLE. WE CAN ACCEPT UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN THE SENSE OF A UN ADMINISTRATOR AS THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT IN RELATION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS WOULD DISCHARGE THEIR TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS, THE UN ADMINISTRATOR CARRYING OUT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR.

5. ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY SUGGEST LANGUAGE ABOUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS TENDING TO FAVOUR THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY (PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELNO 685). (THIS KIND OF PLOY PRODUCED, IN HAIG'S FIRST SHUTTLE, A COMPLEX AND CONTRADICTORY PARAGRAPH ABOUT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.) YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT TO EMBARK ON THIS KIND OF THING WOULD PROBABLY PRODUCE AN

ENDLESS WRANGLE ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE REFERRED TO. WE WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON REFERENCES TO SELF-DETERMINATION OR AT LEAST TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER. WE THEREFORE HOPE VERY MUCH THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CAN KEEP THE LANGUAGE ABOUT THE SUBJECT FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS VERY CLEAR AND SIMPLE. WHY NOT STICK TO THE WORDS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PAPER OF 3 MAY (WHICH OF COURSE ECHOED RESOLUTION 302) ABOUT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SEEKING 'A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES'? ALTERNATIVELY, A COMPLETELY NEUTRAL FORMULA ABOUT THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. WE NOTE ROS'S STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELNO 685 ABOUT NOT PREJUDGING SOVEREIGNTY. IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET THIS CLEARLY ON THE RECORD, IF WE ARE NOT SUBSEQUENTLY TO BE ACCUSED OF HAVING ALLOWED OUR POSITION TO BE ERODED BY NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ANY FIRM EVIDENCE THAT THE ARGENTINE JUNTA ACCEPT THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS A NEGOTIABLE ISSUE.

6. OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS IN MINISTERS' MINDS ARE:

(A) IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT APPARENT ARGENTINE ADHERENCE TO ANY AGREEMENT IN NEW YORK IS FULLY BACKED BY THE JUNTA IN BUENOS AIRES.

(B) ANY AGREEMENT MUST BE ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS - ISLAS MALVINAS. SINCE THERE MAY BE A MEASURE OF UNCERTAINTY IN SOME MINDS YOU SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE INTENTION IS TO EXCLUDE THE DEPENDENCIES.

(C) THE ESSENTIAL NEED FOR A SECURITY GUARANTEE, NOT NECESSARILY AS PART OF THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH IS SEEN AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WHICH YOU POSE IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELNO 686.

7. MEANWHILE WE ARE ENSURING THAT YOU HAVE RECEIVED OR WILL RECEIVE THE TEXTS OF THE PREVIOUS DRAFT AGREEMENTS WITH WHICH WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LIVE: I.E. THE DOCUMENT HAIG TOOK BACK FROM LONDON AFTER EASTER, THE BA VERSION AS AMENDED BY US FOR MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 22 APRIL, AND THE FINAL US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS AS MODIFIED BY US. FURTHERMORE DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARIES WHICH YOU DO NOT ALREADY HAVE WILL BE SENT BY BAG. YOU WILL REALISE THAT THESE - PARTICULARLY

THE TWO FORMER DRAFTS - CONTAIN MANY ELEMENTS WHICH WE WOULD NOT (NOT) WISH TO REVIVE. IN COMPLYING THEREFORE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REQUEST TO BE TOLD AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF OUR PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING STANCE YOU SHOULD RESTRICT YOURSELF AS FAR AS YOU CAN TO SUPPLYING DETAILS OF THE US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS, ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH HE IS ALREADY BRIEFED. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU CAN HOLD BACK WILL BE CONDITIONED BY HOW MUCH THE ARGENTINES ARE VOLUNTEERING, OR DISTORTING, OUR EARLIER POSITIONS. AT ALL EVENTS, YOU ALREADY KNOW THAT ANY AGREEMENT WHICH IS TO BE CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY BY US MUST (A) INCLUDE THE CONCEPT OF CEASEFIRE BEING UNAMBIGUOUSLY LINKED TO AN IMMEDIATE START OF ARGENTINE TROOP WITHDRAWAL, (B) NOT PREJUDGE IN ANY WAY A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO ARGENTINA, AND (C) AVOID A DE FACTO SITUATION BY WHICH ARGENTINA GAINED THE ISLANDS IN DEFAULT OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT BY A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

PYM

File No.

OUTWARD

Department

TELEGRAM

Drafted by
(Block Capitals) C. L. G. MALLABY

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
FLASH
DESKBY Z

Tel. Extn.

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)

(Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat/
Privacy Marking)

(Codeword)

(Deskby) Z

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) Flash Washington

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 679, 685 AND 686: FALKLANDS

1. We agree that Britain should demonstrate full willingness to cooperate in the Secretary-General's negotiations. We therefore wish to reply quickly and constructively to the points made by the Secretary-General in your meetings yesterday. We should in particular deal today with the five points identified at the end of your telegram no 679 but should also state firmly ^{one position} on the highly difficult and delicate problem of the interim administration.

2. You should convey the following British position to the Secretary-General on the five points:

(a) Date of time 'T'. We can agree that time 'T' should be set as soon after signature of an agreement as

Copies to:-

both parties can guarantee compliance by their forces with a ceasefire. For us, 24 hours after signature is acceptable, provided Argentina can guarantee to abide by it and assuming that we should have reasonable notice of the conclusion of the agreement.

(at least 24 hours)

(b) The length of the period of withdrawal. We can accept a period of 14 days for withdrawal of all Argentine military personnel from the Islands; half of them should be ~~them being~~ withdrawn within 7 days.

(c) The phasing of the withdrawal of the Task Force. The arrangements for ^{British} withdrawal must be equal and parallel with those for Argentine withdrawal, thus involving no disadvantage to Britain. We can agree to withdraw all our naval forces within 14 days, and half of them within 7 days, to a ^{outside a zone} distance of 200 nautical miles ^{radius} from the Falkland Islands.

(d) Terminal date for diplomatic negotiations. It is unreal to set an absolute terminal date for negotiations ^{when} ~~which~~ everyone knows ^{that} the parties, with the best will in the world, may not be able to conclude ^{an agreement} ~~successfully~~ within a specified period. For this reason, we hope that the Secretary-General will return to the expression "target date" which appeared in his original proposals of 3 May. On that basis we could accept that the ^{named} date be 31 December 1982. In order however to take account of reality, without stating directly that negotiations might go on beyond the target date, we ~~should want~~ ^{would have} the agreement to say that the interim arrangements will continue until an agreement/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

agreement on the future of the Islands is implemented and we ^{we} could want the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council ^(shortly before) the target date about next steps ^{not} concerning the future status of the Falkland Islands.

(Next steps could of course be either implementation of an agreement or continuation of negotiations)

(e) The format and venue for the negotiations. We hope that the Secretary-General will agree that the negotiations should take place under his auspices and as far as possible in his presence. When he cannot be present, we hope that his place will be taken by ^a representative. Because of the particular diplomatic pressures in New York, we should like the negotiations to take place elsewhere, perhaps Geneva, Ottawa ^{or} ~~Mexico City~~.

3. In amplification of points (b) and (c) above, ^(please suggest) to the Secretary General that he might build on the

key point of his original proposals - that a number of things should all begin happening at time 'T' - in the following way. With effect from time 'T' the parties, might undertake ^{not only} to cease fire ^{and} to begin withdrawing from the Zone of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands, ^{but also} not to introduce any further military forces into that Zone (except for the purposes of Argentine withdrawal, and then under UN supervision), to suspend the enforcement of the various zones now in operation ^{around the Falkland Islands} and to take steps to

162.

terminate economic measures. The United Nations administration would begin arriving ^{in the Falkland as soon as possible after} time 'T' and would verify withdrawal by both parties. We hope that the Secretary-General would report very frequently, perhaps daily, on the process and completion of withdrawal. By day 14, when withdrawal by both parties would have to be complete, the exclusion zones would be finally terminated, the

economic/

economic measures would end and the interim UN administration would be completely established. Neither side could introduce military forces into the 200 nautical mile zone throughout the interim period.

4 We ^{share} your ^{suspicion} that Argentina may hope to take over the Islands when the interim period ends. The points suggested under (d) above are of course designed to help in countering this. But we must also insist most firmly that the new Argentine suggestions to the Secretary-General about the interim administration are unacceptable.

(You should tell the Secretary-General that Argentina in earlier negotiations was willing to accept the continuation of the Executive and Legislative Councils (although with two Argentine nominees on the Executive Council and one representative of the Argentine population of the Islands in each Council).)

What Argentina is now suggesting is unprecedented and unreasonable. We can accept UN ^a interim administration, but on the clear understanding that the Executive and Legislative Councils continue to function.

~~In effect, the UN would have the role envisaged in the US/Peruvian proposals for a Contact Group. If pressed~~

You may say that

the most we could accept by way of Argentine involvement ^{in interim administration} would be that a very few Argentine and British nationals could be included in the UN presence.

which was ^{unacceptable}
do ^{about}

No. -
= different

→

45. On the framework for future negotiations, we are concerned that the Argentines may suggest language about General Assembly resolutions tending to favour the Argentine case on sovereignty (Paragraph 4 of your telno 685). (This kind of ploy produced, in Haig's first shuttle, a complex and contradictory paragraph about the terms of reference for the negotiations.) You should make clear to the Secretary General that to embark on this kind of thing would probably produce an endless ^{wrangle} language ~~about individual words~~. ^{what should be referred to} We would have to insist on references to self-determination or at least to the purposes ^{and} of principles of the charter. We therefore hope very much that the Secretary-General can keep the language about the subject for future negotiations very clear and simple. Why not stick to the words of the Secretary-General's paper of

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3 May (which of course echoed resolution 502) about the two Governments seeking 'a diplomatic resolution to their differences'? Alternatively, a completely neutral formula about the future status of the Islands would be acceptable.

56. Other important points in Ministers' minds are:

(a) the Argentine Junta or Galtieri personally should be identified with Argentine adherence to any agreement;

(b) any agreement must be about 'the Falkland Islands - Islas Malvinas', thus keeping the dependencies out of it.

WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

7.8 Meanwhile we are ensuring that you have received or will receive the texts of the previous draft agreements with which we might have been able to live: i.e. the document Haig took back from London after Easter, the BA version as amended by us for my visit to Washington on 22 April, and the final US/Peruvian proposals as modified by us. Furthermore documents and commentaries which you do not already have will be sent by bag. You will realise that these - particularly the two former drafts - contain many elements which we would not (not) wish to revive. In complying therefore with the Secretary General's ^{request} ~~report~~ to be told as much as possible of our previous negotiating stance you should restrict yourself as far as you can to supplying details of the US/Peruvian proposals, on the substance which he is already briefed. We recognise that the extent to which you can hold back will be conditioned by how much the Argentines are volunteering, or distorting, our earlier positions. At all events, you already know that any agreement which is to be considered seriously by us must (a) include the concept of ceasefire being unambiguously linked to an immediate start of Argentine troop withdrawal, (b) not prejudice in any way ^a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, (c) be compatible with a security guarantee e.g. by the U.S., and (d) avoid ^a de facto situation by which Argentina gained the Islands in default of a final settlement by a terminal date for the conclusion of negotiations.

(11)

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 091530Z

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DESKBY 091530Z

FM FCO 091401Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 369 OF 9 MAY

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT PROPOSALS OF L2 APRIL:
BEGINS.

1. ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502, AND NOTING RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING STEPS, WHICH FORM AN INTEGRATED WHOLE:

2. ALL MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES OTHER THAN LOCAL POLICE SHALL BE WITHDRAWN WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, BUT NOT LATER THAN TWO WEEKS FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, FROM THREE AREAS DEFINED BY CIRCLES OF 150 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE FOLLOWING CO-ORDINATE POINTS:

(A) LAT. 51 DEG. 40' SOUTH
LONG. 59 DEG. 30' WEST
(FALKLANDS)

(B) LAT. 54 DEG. 20' SOUTH
LONG. 36 DEG. 40' WEST
(SOUTH GEORGIA)

(C) LAT. 57 DEG. 40' SOUTH
LONG. 26 DEG. 30' WEST
(SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS)

3. AFTER THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT AND PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, NO MILITARY OR SECURITY FORCE SHALL BE INTRODUCED INTO THE AREAS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE. ON COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ALL FORCES THAT HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY SHALL BE

REDEPLOYED TO NORMAL DUTIES.

4. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA SHALL EACH APPOINT, AND THE UNITED STATES AGREES TO APPOINT, A REPRESENTATIVE TO CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL (INTERIM) COMMISSION WHICH SHALL PROVIDE OBSERVERS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS. EACH COMMISSIONER MAY BE SUPPORTED BY A STAFF OF NOT MORE THAN TEN PERSONS.

5. ON AN INTERIM BASIS, ALL DECISIONS, LAWS AND REGULATIONS HEREAFTER ADOPTED BY THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ON THE ISLANDS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO AND EXPEDITIOUSLY RATIFIED BY THE SPECIAL (INTERIM) COMMISSION, EXCEPT IN THE EVENT THAT THE SPECIAL (INTERIM) COMMISSION DEEMS SUCH DECISIONS, LAWS OR REGULATIONS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL ADMINISTRATION SHALL CONTINUE, INCLUDING THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS, WHICH WOULD BE ENLARGED TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARGENTINE POPULATION WHOSE PERIOD OF RESIDENCE ON THE ISLANDS IS EQUAL TO THAT REQUIRED OF OTHERS ENTITLED TO REPRESENTATION, SUCH REPRESENTATIVES TO BE IN PROPORTION TO THAT POPULATION SUBJECT TO THERE BEING AT LEAST ONE SUCH REPRESENTATIVE ON EACH COUNCIL. THE SPECIAL (INTERIM) COMMISSION SHALL FLY THE FLAG OF EACH OF ITS CONSTITUENT MEMBERS AT THE COMMISSION'S HEADQUARTERS.

6. THE SPECIAL (INTERIM) COMMISSION SHALL MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OR TO THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS, TO FACILITATE AND PROMOTE TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND TRADE BETWEEN THE MAINLAND AND THE ISLANDS.

7. WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, BUT NOT LATER THAN TWO WEEKS FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, STEPS SHALL BE TAKEN TO TERMINATE THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY, INCLUDING RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSFERS OF FUNDS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. LIKEWISE THE UNITED KINGDOM SHALL REQUEST THIRD COUNTRIES THAT HAVE ADOPTED SIMILAR MEASURES TO TERMINATE THEM BY THAT DATE.

8. DECEMBER 31, 1982, WILL CONCLUDE THE INTERIM PERIOD, AND DURING THIS PERIOD THE CONDITIONS OF THE DEFINITIVE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS SHALL BE NEGOTIATED CONSISTENTLY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

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FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 HOURS, 9 MAY

UN

1. Sir Anthony Parsons had two meetings with the Secretary-General at which the Secretary-General requested clarification on details of the UK position. Sir A Parsons has asked for instructions before a further meeting later today. Sr Ros, Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, has also had meetings with the Secretary-General.

Mexico

2. The Mexican Ambassador in London asked when a reply could be given to President Lopez Portillo's proposal, but accepted that this would have to wait until the outcome of the UN Secretary-General's current initiative is known.

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) : 0730 HOURS,
9 MAY

UN

(a) Discussions with the Secretary-General

(UKMIS New
York telno.
679)

1. On 8 May Sir A Parsons discussed with the Secretary-General the position reached by both sides on the points in the Aide Mémoire given to the Secretary of State on 2 May (attached for reference). Perez de Cuellar requested clarification from both sides on several points, on five of which Sir A Parsons has requested guidance:-

- (a) the date of 'Time T';
- (b) the length of the period of withdrawal;
- (c) the phasing of the withdrawal of the Task Force;
- (d) the terminal date for diplomatic negotiations;
- (e) the format and venue for those negotiations.

(UKMIS New
York telno.
685)

2. Later on 8 May Sir A Parsons again met the Secretary-General who had heard further from Ros, particularly on the nature of the UN interim administration envisaged by the Argentines. The Secretary-General thought that the Argentine position on interim administration appeared unchanged from that of previous rounds of negotiations, but the Argentines are now making no mention of the continuance of the Islands Councils which had been proposed in the Haig negotiations. Sir A Parsons has already pointed this out. The Secretary-General has as a result asked for details of previous Argentine proposals. The Secretary-General reported Ros as saying that the Argentines were not prejudging the issue of sovereignty. A member of the Secretary-General's staff has commented that this would depend on agreement on appropriate terms of reference for the negotiations.

(UKMIS New
York telno.
686)

3. Sir A Parsons now sees three possibilities:-

- (a) the Argentines have decided to negotiate in good faith (he and the Secretary-General have doubts on this);
- (b) they seek to make us break off negotiations eg. by proposing unacceptable interim administration arrangements in order themselves to dodge blame for an unreasonable stand on sovereignty;
- (c) they have decided that they cannot get what they want now and are preparing the ground to enable them to take over the administration after the interim period ends without a negotiated solution to the dispute.

- 2 -

Sir A Parsons needs instructions before a further meeting with the Secretary-General at 3.30 local time, today, 9 May. He identifies the most difficult point for consideration as HMG's attitude towards the proposed interim administration.

(b) Attitude of the Secretary-General

4. Sir A Parsons believes that the Secretary-General is working well, has suspicions as to Argentine motives but is frank and open in his comments to us.

MEXICO

(FCO telno. 564 to Mexico City)

5. The Mexican Ambassador made several telephone calls on 8 May. President López Portillo is pressing for the promised full UK response to his offer of a meeting between Galtieri and the Prime Minister. The Ambassador has accepted that the UN Secretary-General's efforts must claim our prior attention and will so report to the President.

Comment

6. The well-briefed activity of Ros in New York has all the appearance of a determined Argentine attempt to engineer a UK break from the Secretary-General's current efforts under circumstances which would leave us facing maximum international criticism. We cannot be seen to be dragging our feet. Instructions are needed in New York by 1830 London time on:-

- (i) the Secretary-General's five points;
- (ii) interim administration;
- (iii) any additional points essential to our position, eg. consultation of the Islanders.

7. The PUS's 10.30 meeting will need to consider whether Ministers should meet to authorise instructions to UKMIS New York. Mr Goulding has indicated by telephone that at today's meeting with the Secretary-General, we shall be expected to put forward positions which we could not easily modify.

(UKMIS New York telno. 679)

8. The Prime Minister's disinclination last night for an OD(SA) meeting was conveyed after she had seen only the report of Sir A Parsons' first meeting with the Secretary-General. She will expect FCO advice on whether an OD(SA) meeting, which could take place at Chequers at about 15.15 today, is necessary. The Secretary of State is expected to leave Liège at around 14.00 local time today.

A J Payne

A J Payne
Emergency Unit

9 May 1982

NY 027/83

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GRS 650

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 030700Z

FROM UKMIS K EWYOR K 030543Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 632 DATED 3 MAY 82

INFO WASHINGTON

3 - MAY 1982

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MIPT: YOUR VISIT TO NEW YORK: FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL GAVE YOU ON THE EVENING OF 2 MAY:

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE GRAVE SITUATION THAT HAS DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THE FAILURE THUS FAR TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND THAT WOULD AVERT FURTHER ARMED CONFLICT AND OPEN THE WAY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THEIR DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS).

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BELIEVES THAT, IN THIS SITUATION, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS A MOST SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHARTER URGENTLY TO RESTORE PEACE AND TO PROMOTE A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

TO THIS END, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY. ACCORDINGLY, THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO TAKE SIMULTANEOUSLY THE STEPS SET OUT BELOW, WHICH ARE CONCEIVED AS PROVISIONAL MEASURES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES.

IT IS PROPOSED THAT, AS FROM SPECIFIED TIME T:

(A) THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT BEGIN WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM THE FALKLANDS ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) AND THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT REDEPLOY ITS NAVAL FORCES AND BEGIN THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS), BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWALS BY AN AGREED DATE:

(B) BOTH GOVERNMENTS COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES BY AN AGREED TARGET DATE:

(C) BOTH GOVERNMENTS RESCIND THEIR RESPECTIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF BLOCKADES AND EXCLUSION ZONES, AND CEASE ALL HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST EACH OTHER:

(D) BOTH GOVERNMENTS TERMINATE ALL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:

(E) TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BEGIN TO COME INTO EFFECT TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE STEPS AND TO MEET INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WISHES TO REITERATE HIS READINESS TO DO ALL HE CAN TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, AND TO RECALL IN THIS CONNEXION HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES ON 19 APRIL 1982 IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE INDICATED WAYS IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS MIGHT BE OF HELP. PRATICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANY UNITED NATIONS ROLE CAN BE COMPLETED EXPEDITIOUSLY, SUBJECT TO THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND TO THE DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EXPRESSES THE EARNEST HOPE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL SPEEDILY SIGNIFY THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT THE APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE. IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS REGARD WERE RECEIVED IN TIME TO PERMIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON 5 MAY 1982. IN THAT CASE, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD PROPOSE THAT TIME T BE SET FOR 11.00 HOURS EDT ON 6 MAY 1982.

PARSONS

Emergency Room


C O N F I D E N T I A L

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OO MEXICO CITY DESKBY 091500Z
PP WASHINGTON
PP UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 139
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 091500Z
FM FCO 090020Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 364 OF 9 MAY
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 369

7-8 MAY

①



1. MEXICAN AMBASSADOR (OLLOQUI) HAS BEEN TELEPHONED BY PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO FROM SONORA AND ASKED WHEN HE IS LIKELY TO RECEIVE A FULL RESPONSE TO HIS OFFER OF HELP. THE PRESIDENT HAS REPEATED HIS CLAIM THAT GALTIERI IS READY FOR A MEETING IN MEXICO EG. AT CANCUN.
2. WE HAVE GIVEN OLLOQUI THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU CONVEYED TO THE PRESIDENT ON 7 MAY. DRAWING ON SIR A PARSONS' PRESS CONFERENCE TEXT (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO.681 NOT TO YOU) WE ALSO DESCRIBED THE RECENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK AND EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE NOW BOUND TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS. OLLOQUI EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING AND HAS PROMISED TO EXPLAIN THIS TO THE PRESIDENT.

PYM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

GRS 1400

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 081832Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 679 OF 8 MAY

AND TO FLASH BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



95

MY TEL NO 674: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR AN HOUR AT 1530Z. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY RAFAE AHMED AND ALVARO DE SOTO, PERUVIAN CAREER DIPLOMAT, WHO HAS RECENTLY BEEN ACTING AS THE G77 SPOKESMAN ON DEEP SEA MINING AT UNLOSC BUT WHO JOINED THE SECRETARIAT ON 1 MAY AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT AND IS A WELCOME ADDITION TO HIS FALKLANDS TEAM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WENT THROUGH EACH OF THE POINTS IN HIS AIDE MEMOIRE OF 2 MAY, DESCRIBING THE POSITION AS HE NOW SAW IT IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR MESSAGE OF 6 MAY AND HIS TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH ROS, THE ARGENTINE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER.

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED WITH THE CONCEPT THAT HIS PROPOSALS WERE QUOTE PROVISIONAL MEASURES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES UNQUOTE. I CONFIRMED THAT WE AGREED WITH THIS. BUT I SAID THAT WE MUST HAVE 100 PERCENT PRECISION FROM THE ARGENTINES ON THE POINT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ROS HAD INDICATED THAT THE ARGENTINES ENVISAGED A WRITTEN AGREEMENT; THEIR SIGNATURE WOULD GIVE US THE PRECISION WE NEEDED. I SAID THAT IT WOULD DEPEND WHOSE SIGNATURE WAS ON THE AGREEMENT. ALL PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAD FOUNDERED AT THE LAST MINUTE ON ARGENTINE INSISTENCE THAT THEIR CLAIM ON SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. I HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY PRESS REPORTS THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD SAID THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST LEAD IRREVERSIBLY TO ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY. IF WE WERE TO REACH AGREEMENT AND THEN COSTA MENDEZ WERE TO SAY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IN THE ARGENTINE VIEW THE AGREEMENT MEANT THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED, I WOULD HAVE TO DENY THIS AND THE AGREEMENT WOULD FALL APART. DE SOTO SUGGESTED THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD CONTAIN A PROVISION THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD CLAIM THAT THE AGREEMENT MEANT THAT THAT SIDE'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED. THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA. I THINK THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS HOISTED ON BOARD HOW CRUCIAL THIS POINT IS FOR US AND THE DANGER THAT THE GENERALS IN BUENOS AIRES WILL RENEGE ON IT AT THE LAST MOMENT.

3. AS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEITY (IE THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS AT SUB-PARAS (A) TO (E) OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S AIDE MEMOIRE WOULD BEGIN AT THE SAME TIME), PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ARGENTINA ACCEPTED IT IN TOTO. THE UK ACCEPTED IT IN RESPECT OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT WE DID NOT EXCLUDE IT IN RESPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. BUT HE JUDGED FROM PARA 7 OF YOUR MESSAGE THAT WE WOULD PREFER SUSPENSION OF THE EXCLUSION ZONES AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS TO COME AFTER (REPEAT AFTER) WITHDRAWAL HAD TAKEN PLACE. I SAID THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEITY NEEDED MORE EXACT DEFINITION. WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE SOME TIME AND THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME KIND OF PHASING. I COULD NOT BE PRECISE ABOUT WHEN IN THE WITHDRAWAL AND REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS THE EXCLUSION ZONES WOULD BE LIFTED. BUT I SUGGESTED THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF SIMULTANEITY COULD BE MET IF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S NEGOTIATIONS LED TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH A DETAILED SCHEDULE OR TIMETABLE OF WHEN THE VARIOUS STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT (WITHDRAWAL, REDEPLOYMENT LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES AND SANCTIONS, INTRODUCTION OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, BEGINNING OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, ETC). PEREZ DE CUELLAR SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS: AHMED SEEMED LESS SURE.

4. THE NEXT POINT WAS THE DATE OF QUOTE TIME T UNQUOTE, IE THE POINT AT WHICH SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE AGREEMENT WOULD BEGIN. THE ARGENTINES SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD BE 24 HOURS AFTER SIGNATURE. I SAID THAT THIS SOUNDED REASONABLE BUT THAT I WOULD OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS.

5. ON THE DATE FOR THE COMPLETION OF ARGENTINE AND UK WITHDRAWAL, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE. I SAID THAT I WOULD NEED INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT TOO, BUT THAT I BELIEVED THAT IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS 14 DAYS HAD BEEN MENTIONED AS THE PERIOD FOR COMPLETION OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THERE WOULD BE COMPLICATED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON WHAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US IN THIS RESPECTS.

6. ON THE TERMINAL DATE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, ARGENTINA HAD PROPOSED 31 DECEMBER 1982 AND YOU HAD SUGGESTED QUOTE PERHAPS ONE YEAR UNQUOTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD VALUE YOUR REACTION TO THE ARGENTINE PROPOSALS.

7. ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AND BOTH AGREED THAT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE NEITHER ARGENTINE NOR BRITISH. I INTERRUPTED TO QUESTION THIS LAST POINT: IT

77 BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S PARTY).

18 MAY 82

NOR BRITISH. I INTERRUPTED TO QUESTION THIS LAST POINT: IT DEPENDS ON HOW ONE DEFINED QUOTE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WENT ON TO SAY THAT ARGENTINA FAVOURED QUOTE AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE UNQUOTE, WHEREAS YOU HAD PROPOSED A CONTACT GROUP OF STATES ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. I REPEATED THAT WE NEEDED TO DEFINE WHAT WE MEANT BY QUOTE ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE. I DESCRIBED THE THREE LAYERS OF GOVERNMENT THE ISLANDERS HAD ENJOYED BEFORE THE INVASION (IE THE GOVERNOR, THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL). WHAT DID QUOTE AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE UNQUOTE MEAN IN RELATION TO THEM? COULD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PLEASE OBTAIN CLARIFICATION FROM THE ARGENTINES? I COULD ASK YOU WHETHER YOU WERE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO ACCEPT AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE BUT FOR US THIS WOULD BE A CRUCIAL QUESTION AND I DID NOT THINK THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WOULD FEEL ABLE TO ANSWER IT WITHOUT GREATER PRECISION ABOUT WHAT WAS INTENDED. A PROBLEM IN EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN ARGENTINE INSISTENCE ON DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS. DID THEY NOW INTEND THAT A UN ROLE WOULD EXCLUDE THE COUNCILS? OR WERE THEY FOR INSTANCE THINKING THAT UN NOMINEES SHOULD REPLACE THE PREVIOUS NOMINATED MEMBERS AND THE GOVERNOR (WHICH SEEMS TO BE THE IDEA THAT AHMED FAVOURS)? PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND OUT MORE.

8. ON THE FORMAT AND THE VENUE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WANTED THEM TO BE CONDUCTED BY EITHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR A REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED BY HIM AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE HELD IN NEW YORK. YOU, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD SUGGESTED THE CONTACT GROUP. I SAID THAT I WOULD SEEK YOUR VIEWS. MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT NEW YORK SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE AVOIDED BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE GENERATED HERE ON THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING ROS AGAIN AT 1930Z AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME AT 2130Z TODAY. HE HOPED THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN SOME REACTIONS FROM YOU BY THEN. I EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD RAISED QUESTIONS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO H.M. GOVERNMENT, THAT YOU WERE OUTSIDE BRUSSELS AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT CHEQUERS, AND THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN ANY RESPONSE OF SUBSTANCE BY 2130Z. BUT I WOULD REPORT TO YOU EVERYTHING HE HAD SAID.

10. I SHALL SEND MY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS LATER TODAY, AFTER MY SECOND MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR. I REALISE THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FOCUS ON THESE QUESTIONS IN TIME FOR THAT MEETING. BUT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN THE IMPRESSION OF A POSITIVE APPROACH TO HIS EFFORTS AND I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE THAT YOU OR OFFICIALS CAN LET ME HAVE BY 2130Z ON THE

QUESTIONS ON WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR OUR REACTION VIZ:

- (A) THE DATE OF QUOTE TIME T UNQUOTE;
- (B) THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL;
- (C) THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TASK FORCE;
- (D) THE TERMINAL DATE FOR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS;
- (E) THE FORMAT AND VENUE FOR THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

PARSONS

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INT QSL ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

RE W/ALFOCORG ADDITION TO HIS EVENTS ON 15TH BEING DE. ONERTS
RECORDED ON 1 MAY 68 10 10 AM

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ZZ BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S PARTY).

E Room
-8 MAY 68

ZZ FCO

OO BRUSSELS (DESKBY 090500Z)

GRS 1000

8 MAY 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 090500Z (BRUSSELS)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090106Z MAY 82


TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 685 OF 8 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

3



MY TEL NO 679: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AGAIN AT 2130Z TODAY (8 MAY).

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED ROS (ARGENTINA) FOR AN INITIAL REACTION TO MY REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT THE ARGENTINES MEANT BY QUOTE AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE UNQUOTE IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. ROS HAD REPLIED THAT ARGENTINA FELT THAT SINCE THE INTERIM PERIOD WAS LIKELY TO BE FAIRLY SHORT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ADOPT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH, WHILE NOT AFFECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, SHOULD NECESSARILY COME FULLY UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATOR, IE THE UN. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES SEEMED PREPARED TO RESPECT THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK EXISTING UP TO 31 MARCH 1982 QUOTE REGARDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNQUOTE BUT THEY INSISTED THAT, IF THE ULTIMATE REGIME OF THE ISLANDS WAS NOT TO BE PREJUDGED, THEN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES SHOULD ALSO BE KEPT IN ABEYANCE THROUGH-OUT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. ARGENTINA DID NOT ACCEPT ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN NOMINATED AND ELECTED OFFICERS. SHE FELT STRONGLY THAT, IN ORDER TO AVOID CONFUSION AND SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WAS TRULY TRANSITIONAL, IT SHOULD BE UNDER CLEAR-CUT UN ADMINISTRATION, WITH A PRESENCE FROM BOTH THE INTERESTED PARTIES.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR COMMENTED THAT THIS SEEMED TO BE A REPETITION OF THE POSITION THE ARGENTINES HAD MAINTAINED ALL ALONG ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. I QUESTIONED THIS: AT ONE STAGE IN HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS THE ARGENTINES HAD SEEMED TO ENVISAGE THAT THE

~~LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE COUNCILS WOULD REMAIN~~

LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE COUNCILS WOULD REMAIN IN BEING. THOUGH WITH SUBSTANTIAL ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION. THEIR NEW POSITION WAS VERY DIFFERENT. THEIR REFERENCE TO QUOTE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNQUOTE PRESUMABLY MEANT EXISTING LAW ON PROPERTY, FAMILY MATTERS, ETC. WHAT IN EFFECT THEY WERE PROPOSING WAS DIRECT UN ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT ANY LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES. THIS WAS A VERY DIFFERENT CONCEPT FROM OURS AND I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO OU: IT WOULD AMOUNT TO DENYING THE ISLANDERS THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LET HIM HAVE DETAILS OF THE POSITION THE ARGENTINES HAD TAKEN ON THIS - AND INDEED ON OTHER POINTS - IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS: IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO POINT OUT, AS NECESSARY, WHEN THEY WERE BEING LESS FLEXIBLE THAN THEY HAD BEFORE. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT PRIVY TO ALL OF HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS BUT I WOULD ASK WHETHER YOU COULD LET THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAVE THE INFORMATION HE REQUESTED.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ROS HAD REPEATED VERY CLEARLY THIS AFTERNOON THAT IT WAS NOT THE PURPOSE OF ARGENTINA TO PREJUDGE THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, THOUGH DE SOTO ADDED THAT FOR THE ARGENTINES THIS DEPENDED ON AGREEMENT ON APPROPRIATE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. IN CONVERSATION AFTER THE MEETING, AHMED GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY BE THINKING OF INSERTING INTO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE LANGUAGE ABOUT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS WHICH TEND TO FAVOUR THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY. WE SHALL HAVE TO WATCH THIS CAREFULLY.

5. AHMED SAID THAT ROS HAD TALKED ABOUT 15 TO 20 DAYS AS THE PERIOD FOR WITHDRAWAL. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED ROS FOR DETAILS OF WHAT HAD BEEN PROPOSED IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE DURATION AND PHASING OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS. HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WE TOO COULD LET HIM HAVE THIS INFORMATION. I SAID THAT I WOULD PASS ON HIS REQUEST.

6. MY NEXT MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR WILL BE AT 1930Z TOMORROW (9 MAY).

7. PLEASE SEE MIFT FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.


PARSONS

- 8 MAY 1982

0905 1870

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 090500Z (BRUSSELS)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090107Z MAY 82



TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 686 OF 8 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. AFTER TODAY'S ROUNDS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE ORGANISED THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION VERY THOROUGHLY. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT ROS HAS A PREPARED BRIEF ON EVERY TOPIC FROM WHICH HE READS VERBATIM AS APPROPRIATE. INTERESTINGLY EACH PAGE OF HIS BRIEF IS INITIALLED, BUT PEREZ DE CUELLAR CANNOT SEE BY WHOM EXCLAM.

2. I THINK THAT THERE ARE THREE POSSIBILITIES. THE FIRST, AND LEAST LIKELY, IS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE DECIDED TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH AND TO PLAY IT STRAIGHT, INCLUDING ENTERING A NEGOTIATION WITH ALL OPTIONS OPEN FOLLOWING LINKED WITHDRAWAL/CEASEFIRE ETC. AGAIN, IN STRICT PRIVACY, PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS AS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THIS AS I AM. I HOPE WE ARE WRONG.

3. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE REALISED THAT IF THE SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION FINALLY FAILS BECAUSE OF THEIR INSISTENCE ON PREJUDGING THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION, IT WILL BE DIPLOMATIC GAME, SET AND MATCH TO US. THIS WOULD BE TRUE THROUGHOUT THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN WHATEVER THEIR PRECONCEPTIONS MAY BE ON THE MERITS OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE. HENCE, THE ARGENTINES ARE LOOKING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO OBLIGE US TO BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS ON GROUNDS WHICH WOULD AWARD GAME, SET AND MATCH TO THEM DIPLOMATICALLY. THIS COULD EXPLAIN THEIR CURRENT INSISTENCE THAT THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE UNITED NATIONS THROUGH THE INTERIM PERIOD. THIS PROPOSITION WOULD COMMAND MAXIMUM SUPPORT HERE AND, IF WE TURNED IT DOWN, THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE ABLE TO GO HOME AND CLAIM THAT THE BRITISH HAD REFUSED SOMETHING WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY REASONABLE TO THE WHOLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND WERE CLEARLY DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE MILITARY OPTION ONLY. THEY WOULD THUS NOT HAVE TO EXPOSE IN THE UN THEIR ACHILLES HEEL ON THE PREJUDGMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND WOULD FIND IT EASIER TO WRONG-FOOT US IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON AN UNCONDITIONAL CALL FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES COMBINED WITH A

4. THE THIRD POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY CANNOT GET WHAT THEY WANT NOW, AND THAT THEY SHOULD PREPARE THE GROUND TO GET IT THE DAY AFTER THE INTERIM PERIOD EXPIRES. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THEY WOULD GENUINELY NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH US NOW, THUS BRINGING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE, MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL ETC PLUS AN INTERIM PERIOD UNDER UN ADMINISTRATION TO TERMINATE ON A FIXED DATE. BUT THEY WOULD REFUSE TO ACCEPT ANYTHING IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH ENVISAGED PROLONGATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. THERE WOULD THEN BE NO WAY IN WHICH WE COULD PERSUADE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT WORDING OUTSIDE THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PROLONG THE INTERIM PERIOD IF AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED BY THE TERMINAL DATE. THE ARGENTINES WOULD GET THE SOVIET UNION TO VETO ANY SUCH PROPOSITION ON THE GROUND THAT THE BRITISH WERE DEMONSTRATING EVEN BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD THAT THEY WERE PLANNING TO DRAG THEIR FEET, AS WE HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF DOING OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS. ALL THE ARGENTINES WOULD THEN HAVE TO DO WOULD BE TO INSIST THAT NO AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF BRITISH RECOGNITION OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION (OBVIOUSLY ACCOMPANIED BY A LOT OF PROMISES REGARDING THE WELFARE, ETC OF THE ISLANDERS). AT THE TERMINAL DATE, THE UN WOULD WITHDRAW BECAUSE IT WOULD NO LONGER HAVE A MANDATE TO REMAIN, AND THEY WOULD WALK IN. IN THE MEANTIME, THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN ENGINEERING A BIG MAJORITY FOR A RESOLUTION AT THE FORTHCOMING REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, EG IN NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER, AFFIRMING THAT THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE DECOLONISED AND PASS TO THEIR SOVEREIGNTY WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS.

5. I SHOULD SAY AT THIS POINT THAT, ALTHOUGH UN ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE IN ITSELF OF ARGENTINE GOOD BEHAVIOUR DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, I STRONGLY DOUBT WHETHER THEY WOULD ACTUALLY INVADE AND THROW OUT THE UN (AS NASSER DID WITH UNEF IN 1967) WHILE THEY WERE NEGOTIATING UNDER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AUSPICES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH THEY HAD SIGNED AND WHICH HAD BEEN ENDORSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. TO DO THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE TOO CATASTROPHIC EVEN FOR THEIR REPUTATION. BUT, AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, THEY WOULD NOT BE SLOW TO FILL THE VACUUM WHICH WOULD RESULT THE DAY AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED.

6. WHAT SHOULD OUR TACTICS BE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS? FIRST, WE MUST CONTINUE TO SHOW A POSITIVE, SINCERE AND URGENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NEGOTIATIONS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS IN MY VIEW BEHAVING EXTREMELY WELL, AND HE IS AS SUSPICIOUS OF THE ARGENTINES AS I AM. OUR TETE-A-TETE SESSIONS ARE INVALUABLE.

7. SPECIFICALLY, I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD RETURN CONCRETE REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS IN PARA 10 OF MY TEL NO 679 INCLUDING A DRAFT SCHEDULE FOR QUOTE SIMULTANEOUS UNQUOTE WITHDRAWAL CEASEFIRE LIST

AS I AM. OUR TELE-A-TELE SESSIONS ARE INVOLVED.

7. SPECIFICALLY, I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD RETURN CONCRETE REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS IN PARA 12 OF MY TEL NO 679 INCLUDING A DRAFT SCHEDULE FOR QUOTE SIMULTANEOUS UNQUOTE WITHDRAWAL, CEASEFIRE, LIFT-OF EXCLUSION ZONES, ECONOMIC MEASURES, ETC. FOR THE MOMENT, WE CAN POCKET WHAT ROS HAS SAID ABOUT ACCEPTING THAT THE PROVISIONAL MEASURES ARE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES. I HAVE MADE CLEAR TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND HIS STAFF THAT OUR ULTIMATE ACCEPTANCE OF ARGENTINE GOOD FAITH ON THIS POINT WILL DEPEND ON THE VALIDITY OF THEIR FINAL RESPONSE, IE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANYTHING ON THE SAY SO OF CIVILIAN OFFICIALS.

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8. THE TRICKY POINT AT THIS MOMENT, AS I HAVE SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, IS OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. I UNDERSTAND FROM WASHINGTON TEL NO 1597 THAT OUR REASON FOR PREFERING THE CONTACT GROUP IS THAT IT WOULD BE THE BEST GUARANTEE THAT WE COULD GET NOT ONLY IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BUT TO FILL THE VACUUM IF WE FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT BY THE TERMINAL DATE. BUT I BELIEVE THAT IF WE STAND FAST ON THE CONTACT GROUP, THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL TRY TO MAKE THIS A BREAKING POINT AND TO SCORE HEAVILY AS I HAVE INDICATED. MY SUGGESTION IS THAT I MIGHT TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE TOMORROW (9 MAY). WE ARE PREPARED TO LOOK MORE CLOSELY AT THE POSSIBILITY OF UN ADMINISTRATION, BUT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE ISLANDERS, AS PROPOSED IN THE LATEST ARGENTINE FORMULATION: THIS IS A GREAT DEAL MORE RIGID THAN THE IDEAS THEY DISCUSSED WITH HAIG WHERE THE PROBLEM WAS THE DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF ARGENTINES WHICH THEY REQUIRED ON THE TWO COUNCILS. WE WOULD WANT THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD TO BE CARRIED OUT QUOTE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS UNQUOTE (THE UK VERSION OF THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS). (IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD SPELL THIS OUT IN MORE DETAIL, IE WOULD THERE BE A COUNCIL WITH FORMAL RULES OF PROCEDURE ETC AND AN ORGANIC LEGAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ADMINISTRATOR, OR WOULD HE ACT FOLLOWING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES?) I COULD TAKE THIS LINE AS AN EXPLORATORY MOVE WITHOUT CONCEDED OUR POSITION ON THE CONTACT GROUP FOR THE TIME BEING.

9. LOOKING A LITTLE FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, IF WE WERE TO ACCEPT UN ADMINISTRATION ON CONDITIONS WITH WHICH WE COULD LIVE, WE WOULD HAVE MADE A CONCESSION BY GIVING UP THE CONTACT GROUP. WE SHOULD EXTRACT A COUNTER CONCESSION FOR THIS. MY INCLINATION WOULD BE TO CLEAN UP THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS (WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN) AND ELIMINATE ANY PREJUDICIAL LANGUAGE SUCH AS REFERENCES TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS.

10. IF YOU COULD GIVE ME INSTRUCTIONS ON ALL THE ABOVE, THIS WOULD CARRY ME THROUGH TOMORROW'S NEGOTIATIONS. I REALISE THAT I HAVE NOT TACKLED THE ANSWER TO THE THIRD AND PERHAPS MOST SINISTER POSSIBILITY OUTLINED IN PARA 4 ABOVE. IT IS EXTREMELY HARD TO SEE A WAY OUR OF THIS DILEMMA. I SHALL EXPLORE IT AGAIN WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR STRICTLY TETE-A-TETE AND SEE IF HE HAS ANY IDEAS. IF WE SEEMED TO BE GETTING CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT, HE MIGHT JUDGE IT POSSIBLE TO INSERT SOMETHING WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR A CONTINUING PROCESS WITH UN INVOLVEMENT IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. I WILL REVERT TO THIS IN A FURTHER TELEGRAM, PROBABLY TOMORROW (9 MAY).

11. WE MUST NOT IN ALL THIS FORGET ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE OTHER DEPENDENCIES. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THE TIME HAS YET COME TO INJECT THEM INTO THE DISCUSSION

INJECT THEM INTO THE DISCUSSION.

12. I HAVE MORE IDEAS ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT DEPLOY A TRUSTEESHIP PROPOSAL. I WILL LET YOU HAVE THESE SHORTLY. FOR THE MOMENT I THINK WE SHOULD KEEP IT CLOSE TO OUR CHESTS (AND CERTAINLY NOT DISCUSS IT WITH THE RUSSIANS - MOSCOW TEL NO 260).

PARSONS

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

TYPISTS

Handwritten to Cheque 7/10

3 (6)
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/US
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 H/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR K COUZENS) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

GRS 320

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 090900Z

FM UKMIS GENEVA 090730Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 226 OF 9 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BERNE, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON, MODUK (DS 8 AND DS11).

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 156: REPATRIATION OF POWS : TELECONS HART/HOOD.

1. ICRC HAVE CONTACTED MARTINAIR WHO HAVE CONFIRMED AVAILABILITY OF A DC 10 . ICRC HAVE THEREFORE PROVISIONALLY RESERVED THE DC 10 (REGISTRATION P H M B P) TO LEAVE AMSTERDAM ON 11 MAY AT 0200 LOCAL TIME AND TO ARRIVE ASCENSION ISLAND AT 0900 LOCAL TIME. (ICRC HAVE NOW ADDED THAT ITS PROPOSED DEPARTURE TIME FROM ASCENSION WOULD BE 1100 ON 11 MAY). IT WOULD FLY UNDER THE ICRC FLAG.

2. AS YOU KNOW, THE ICRC NEEDED INFORMATION ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) CONFIRMATION THAT FACILITIES EXIST ON ASCENSION TO RECEIVE AND REFUEL A DC 10 (WE UNDERSTAND THE DC 10 WILL REQUIRE 75 TONS OF FUEL).,

(B) WAS TIMETABLE ACCEPTABLE.,

(A) CONFIRMATION THAT PROTECTED AIRCRAFT
RECEIVE AND REFUEL A DC 10 (WE UNDERSTAND THE DC 10 WILL REQUIRE
75 TONS OF FUEL).

(B) WAS TIMETABLE ACCEPTABLE.

(C) WOULD HMG AGREE TO THE DC 10 CONTINUING DIRECT TO
BUENOS AIRES (ETA WOULD THEN BE 1520 LOCAL TIME)?
THE BACKGROUND TO (C) IS THAT THIS IS USUAL ICRC PRACTICE
WITH RECENT PRECEDENTS IN ISRAEL/ARAB COUNTRIES AND
ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA. ICRC HAVE MADE A SIMILAR REQUEST TO THE
ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES.

3. ON INSTRUCTIONS WE HAVE GIVEN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS ON
(A) (B) AND (C) AND ICRC UNDERTOOK TO PUT MARTINAIR IN
DIRECT CONTACT WITH MODUK (DS8) TO CONFIRM DETAILS. ICRC EXPRESSED
GRATITUDE FOR OUR PROMPT RESPONSE.

4. ICRC ISSUED THE FOLLOWING SHORT PRESS COMMUNIQUE THIS
EVENING (8 MAY):
BEGINS

" FALKLAND ISLANDS/ MALVINAS: ICRC TO VISIT ARGENTINIAN
PRISONERS.

THREE ICRC DELEGATES INCLUDING ONE MEDICAL DOCTOR LEFT GENEVA TODAY
IN ORDER TO REACH ASCENSION ISLAND. THEY ARE DUE TO VISIT,
PRIOR TO REPATRIATION, 150 MILITARY AND 39 CIVILIAN ARGENTINIAN
PRISONERS CAPTURED BY BRITISH ARMED FORCES IN SOUTH GEORGIA.
VISIT WILL BE CARRIED OUT ACCORDING TO USUAL ICRC CRITERIA."
ENDS

5. THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE AFTER ICRC INFORMED THE ARGENTINE
AUTHORITIES OFFICIALLY THROUGH THEIR DELEGATE IN BUENOS AIRES
AND THE ARGENTINE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN GENEVA.

MARSHALL

NNNN

4

S E C R E T

GRS 200

D E D I P

SECRET

DESKBY 090700Z

DESKBY 090500Z (BRUSSELS).

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090130Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 688 OF 9 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON TEL NO 1678: FALKLANDS.

1. I AM NOT SUGGESTING FOR A MOMENT THAT WE SHOULD SUSPEND OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 51. BUT IF WE WERE TO FOLLOW HAIG'S ADVICE AND BE SEEN TO BE GRATUITOUSLY CLOBBERING THE ARGENTINES AT THIS PRECISE MOMENT IT WOULD SPELL THE IMMEDIATE END OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S NEGOTIATIONS AND AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
2. THE FORTUITOUS LULL OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS HAS BEEN A GREAT HELP HERE IN ENABLING PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO GET ON WITH HIS EFFORT, WITHOUT THE COUNCIL BARKING AT HIS HEELS.

PARSONS

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE

- LIMITED
- HD/S AM D
- HD/DEF DEPT
- HD/PLANNING STAFF
- HD/UND
- HD/NEWS DEPT
- HD/ERD
- HD/PUSD
- PS
- PS/MR HURD
- PS/MR ONSLOW
- PS/PUS
- MR BULLARD
- SIR I SINCLAIR
- MR GIFFARD
- MR WRIGHT
- MR GILLMORE
- MR URE

COPIES TO:

- PS/HOME SECRETARY
 - PS/S OF S DEFENCE
 - PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
 - PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
 - PS/SIR M PALLISER
 - MR WADE GERY
 - MR FULLER SPPU/DIO
 - DIO
 - MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 - SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
- } CAB OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

S E C R E T

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 8 MAY

UN

(a) 12-mile blockade

1. Sir A Parsons has assured Sr Perez de Cuellar that the MOD statement should not be seen as a dramatic escalation of the conflict but rather as a clarification of earlier announcements. Sr Perez de Cuellar will speak to the President of the Security Council to ensure that he does not panic. So far the Argentines have not asked for a meeting of the Security Council.

2. Sr Perez de Cuellar accepted the assurances he was given about the UK taking his initiative seriously.

(b) Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister in New York

3. Sr Ros, the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister yesterday called on Sr Perez de Cuellar to offer "amplification" of the Argentine reply to the Secretary-General's initiative. Sr Perez de Cuellar asked him to call again today. He has further invited Sir A Parsons to call after Sr Ros has left.

(c) Argentina complains to the Security Council over 12-mile blockade

4. The Argentine Ambassador has written to the President of the Security Council (UKMIS New York telno 675) saying that this act endangers the security of the Argentine Republic. They therefore reserve the right to adopt defensive measures in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Argentine Note to the ICRC

5. UKMIS Geneva has reported (telno 224 and 225) that on 7 May the ICRC received an Argentine Note which alleged that in a number of instances the UK had neglected its international obligations. UKMIS Geneva commented on an informal basis on the points raised in the Note. The ICRC accepted the comments and gave no sign that they expected to hear further from us.




8 May 1982

D T Healy
Emergency Unit

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby FLASH
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 072030Z MAY 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO FLASH MEXICO CITY
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
	10	YOUR TELS NOS 366 and 367: FALKLANDS
	11	1. We hope to let you have a considered response to Lopez
	12	Portillo's suggestion on 10 May.
	13	2. Meanwhile you may inform Lopez Portillo that we are most
	14	grateful for his <u>constructive and helpful initiative</u> . We will
	15	wish to consider his <u>proposal carefully</u> and a full response will
	16	be sent shortly. We are naturally disappointed by Argentine re
	17	jection of the <u>US/Peruvian proposals</u> . But we are now working
	18	through the <u>UN</u> Secretary-General and hope this may provide a
	19	prospect of progress.
	20	
	21	PYM
117	22	NNNN
11	23	
1	24	
	25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept Emergency Unit	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) MT Fearn		FALKLANDS POLICY
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch 		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

ER

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 080900Z MAY 82
FM LIMA 050100Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 08 MAY

ms

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. WHEN I CALLED ON THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS EVENING HE ASKED ME HOW WE COULD RECONCILE OUR AVOWED DESIRE TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH OUR LATEST MOVE IN IMPOSING A 12 MILE EXCLUSION ZONE OFF THE COAST OF ARGENTINA. I SAID THAT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN OUR DECLARED INTENTION TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA AS A MEANS OF OBTAINING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502 AND THAT IT WAS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO OUR INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES TO ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO SPIN OUT NEGOTIATIONS AT THE U.N. HENCE THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY PRESSURE.

2. DR ARIAS SAID HE WONDERED IF WE WERE RIGHT TO DO THIS. IN ALL THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM THE PERUVIANS HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE ADVICE OF THE MINISTRY'S LEGAL EXPERTS WHOSE JURIDICAL OPINION WAS THAT ARGENTINA WAS THE AGGRESSOR. BUT HE THOUGHT THE POSITION HAD NOW CHANGED. ARGENTINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE ON A 200-MILE TERRITORIAL ZONE (SHARED BY PERU) WAS WELL KNOWN AND THE BRITISH THREAT TO CARRY HOSTILITIES INTO THIS AREA WOULD CONVERT US INTO THE AGGRESSOR IN JURIDICAL TERMS.

WALLACE

GNNN

NYFO 003/08

ER 8

OO F C O DESKBY 080800Z

F-8 MAY 82

GRS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 080800Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 072357Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 674 DATED 7 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

11 12 1
10 1 2
9 3
8 4
7 6 5

mt

MY TELNO 672: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. ROS, THE ARGENTINE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, ARRIVED IN NEW YORK TODAY (7 MAY) AND SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT 2100Z. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS TO SEE HIM AGAIN AT 1330Z TOMORROW AND HAS ASKED ME TO CALL AT 1530Z. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT ROS HAD GIVEN HIM "AMPLIFICATIONS" OF THE ARGENTINE REPLY WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS STUDYING.
2. THE MOD STATEMENT IN YOUR TELNO 91 TO BERNE HAS ALREADY CAUSED A STIR HERE. IT HAS PROVOKED A LETTER FROM ROCA (ARGENTINA) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM), HAS WORRIED PEREZ DE CUELLAR, AND IS BEING PRESENTED DRAMATICALLY IN THE NEW YORK MEDIA (THE NEW YORK POST HEADLINE READS: "MAINLAND BLOCKADE: BRITAIN EXPANDS WAR AS INVASION LOOKS"). I HAD A DIFFICULT INTERVIEW THIS EVENING WITH CBC RADIO BUT WAS ABLE TO USE THE GUIDANCE IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR TELNO 91 TO BERNE. I SHALL WRITE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN SIMILAR TERMS TOMORROW. FOLLOWING MY TELECON WITH THE PUS, I HAVE REASSURED PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT THE MOD STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A DRAMATIC ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT BUT RATHER AS A CLARIFICATION OF EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENTS. THE ARGENTINES HAVE NOT ASKED FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE IS A RISK HOWEVER THAT EITHER THE PRESIDENT OR DORR (IRELAND) MAY OVER-REACT AND DO SO. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS GOING TO SPEAK TO THE PRESIDENT TO STOP HIM PANICKING AND I WILL TRY TO TAKE CARE OF DORR.

3. URQUHART (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS TOLD US THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS DESPONDENT AND WORRIED. THIS IS MAINLY BECAUSE OF WHAT HE SEES AS HAIG'S ATTEMPTS TO BLOCK HIS INITIATIVE. MRS KIRKPATRICK TELEPHONED HIM TODAY, AT HAIG'S REQUEST (SHE SAID), TO TELL HIM THAT OTHER EFFORTS (UNSPECIFIED) WERE UNDER WAY AND THAT IT WOULD BE A PITY IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WERE TO CUT ACROSS THEM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR REPLIED VERY FIRMLY THAT HE HAD STAYED OUT OF THE GAME FOR THREE WEEKS TO GIVE HAIG HIS CHANCE, THAT HE HAD ONLY COME INTO IT NOW VERY RELUCTANTLY, BUT THAT, ONCE IN, HE WAS GOING TO PERSEVERE AND NOT ALLOW ANYONE TO CUT ACROSS HIM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS ALSO DETERMINED NOT TO BE USED BY THE ARGENTINES OR OTHERS. URQUHART HAS CONFIRMED, THAT HE ABSOLUTELY ACCEPTS WHAT I SAID THIS MORNING (MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) ABOUT THE RISK THAT ANYTHING AGREED WITH ROS WILL SUBSEQUENTLY BE DISOWNED BY THE JUNTA; HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE ARGENTINES. HE WILL PRESS ROS HARD AND, IF ROS FAILS TO CONFIRM THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION OPEN DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD, HE WILL SAY THAT IN THAT CASE HIS EFFORT IS AT AN END. FINALLY, HE IS WORRIED BY THE RISK OF ANOTHER MAJOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. BUT HE FULLY ACCEPTS THE ASSURANCES I GAVE HIM THIS MORNING ABOUT OUR GOOD FAITH.

PARSONS

NNNN

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(8)

GR 35F

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 080700Z

FM WASHINGTON 072320Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1668 OF 7 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, BERNE, UKMIS GENEVA, MODUK
(DS11).

MYTELNO 1648: REPATRIATION OF POWS

OUR REQUEST FOR A US CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AT HIGH LEVEL IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND IN CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON.

IT IS CLEAR FROM A NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONS WHICH WE HAVE HAD WITH STATE DEPARTMENT THAT, DESPITE THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES TO THEM OF HELPING TO REPATRIATE THE POWS (MENDING FENCES IN LATIN AMERICA ETC) THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO GET INVOLVED IN HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR AND CLEARLY FEAR THAT TO DO SO COULD BE MISUNDERSTOOD IN LATIN AMERICA AS AN UNHELPFUL US INTERVENTION.

2. THE AMERICANS DO NOT WANT TO GIVE US AN OUTRIGHT 'NO' AND, WERE WE TO SAY THAT WE ATTACHED THE UTMOST POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THEIR SUPPLYING AN AIRCRAFT, THEY MIGHT, RELUCTANTLY, AGREE TO DO SO. BUT, SINCE WE HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE, WE DOUBT IF IT IS IN THE U.K. INTEREST TO PRESS THE AMERICANS ON THIS ISSUE. THERE HAVE BEEN AND NO DOUBT WILL BE, MANY OTHER INSTANCES WHERE THEIR HELP IS ESSENTIAL AND IT IS BETTER TO AVOID USING UP CREDIT UNLESS WE HAVE TO.

3 WE HAVE JUST SEEN YOUR TELNO 153 TO UKMIS GENEVA. WHILE IT IS CLEARLY PRIMARILY AN ISSUE FOR US, THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTIES ABOUT ACCESS TO ASCENSION BY A DUTCH CHARTER AIRCRAFT.

4. IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT SEEMS BEST ONLY TO REVERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AMERICAN HELP IF OTHER OPTIONS PROVE UNFEASIBLE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

EK

FOO/WTCM 942

OO WASHINGTON

- 8 MAY 1982

GRS 151

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FOO 071430Z MAY 1982
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 942 OF 7 MAY 1982
INFO PRIORITY PANAMA CITY



PANAMA TELNO 76: REAGAN'S LETTER ABOUT THE FALKLANDS

1. WE EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE TO THE US EMBASSY HERE ABOUT THE QUOTED PASSAGE IN REAGAN'S LETTER AND ASKED THEM IF THEY COULD LET US HAVE A FULL TEXT.
2. THE EMBASSY SAID, AFTER CHECKING WITH STATE DEPARTMENT, THAT A TEXT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO CRABBIE.
3. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS BEFORE WE CONSIDER WHETHER ANY FURTHER EXPRESSIONS OF SURPRISE ARE REQUIRED.
4. MCCORMACK, POLITICAL COUNSELLOR AT US EMBASSY (PLEASE PROTECT), COMMENTED THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT 'THIS TEXT CAME DOWN FROM ON HIGH AND HE WOULD BE ILL-ADVISED TO COMMENT CRITICALLY ON IT IN HIS OWN NAME'. MCCORMACK ADDED THAT IF WE HAD ANY COMMENTS, THE EMBASSY WOULD, OF COURSE, IN NO WAY FEEL INHIBITED ABOUT PASSING THESE ON.

PYM

NNNN

PP PANAMA CITY

GRS 638

28 MAY 1982


CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 072234Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1667 OF 7 MAY 1982

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA, LIMA, CARACAS, BOGOTA, PANAMA CITY.



18

PANAMA CITY TELNO 74: FALKLANDS.

1. WE HAVE LET THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNOW, AND I WILL PROTEST TO HAIG PERSONALLY, ABOUT THE VERY UNSATISFACTORY TONE AND CONTENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF 2 MAY. THE TEXT WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO PRESIDENT ROYO AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS, INCLUDING THOSE OF BRAZIL, PERU, VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA, IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE CRISIS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OUR SISTER REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA RAISES SUCH FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMUNITY THAT I MUST SHARE MY CONCERNS DIRECTLY WITH YOU AND OTHER AMERICAN CHIEFS OF STATE.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THE MEASURES I ORDERED FRIDAY ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF THAT FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE, DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL THOUGH THEY ARE FOR US, WERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. THESE MEASURES WILL NOT, IN THEMSELVES, PREVENT THE LOSS OF LIVES AND HONOR, A GOAL WHICH CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY THE DECISIONS OF THE TWO SOVEREIGN STATES DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

THE ISSUE ENGAGES ME AND MY FELLOW COUNTRYMEN SO DEEPLY BECAUSE ONE OF THE STATES INVOLVED IS AN AMERICAN STATE, A STATE WITH WHICH WE SHARE A COMMON HERITAGE AND STRONG LEGAL, MORAL AND CULTURAL LINKS. FROM COLONIALIZATION TO NATIONHOOD, THE PEOPLES OF THE AMERICAS HAVE BEEN UNITED BY THE DANGERS AND DREAMS OF BUILDING A NEW WORLD. "THE HISTORIC MISSION OF AMERICA", STATES THE PREAMBLE TO THE OAS CHARTER, THE FUNDAMENTAL INSTRUMENT OF OUR COOPERATION, "IS TO OFFER TO MAN A LAND OF LIBERTY, AND A FAVOURABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS PERSONALITY AND THE REALIZATION OF HIS WELFARE."

CLEARLY, ONE OF ARGENTINA'S ASPIRATIONS HAS LONG BEEN THE CONFIRMATION OF ITS HISTORIC CLAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS KNOWN AS THE MALVINAS. JUST AS CLEARLY, NO AMERICAN BELIEVES THAT COLONIZATION BY ANY EUROPEAN POWER IS TO BE ACCEPTED IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

THE CONTRADICTION — THE REASON MY FELLOW CITIZENS HERE IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS IN THE AMERICAS HAVE NOT RALLIED AS ONE BEHIND THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY ARGENTINA EARLY LAST MONTH — IS THAT ARGENTINA USED FORCE IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUT AN END TO ITS HISTORIC DISPUTE WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM.

MY GOVERNMENT FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE DEEP NATIONAL COMMITMENT OF ARGENTINA TO RECUPERATE THE ISLANDS, AND ITS FRUSTRATION OF LONG YEARS OF FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS. MY ADMINISTRATION BEGAN, HOWEVER, AFTER A DECADE OF INCREASING VIOLENCE — IN THE WORLD, AND IN THIS HEMISPHERE — MUCH OF IT COVERTLY SPONSORED BY OUR COMMON ENEMIES. FROM THE OUTSET, THEREFORE, OUR CENTRAL GOAL HAS BEEN TO EMPHASIZE THE REQUIREMENT FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW AND NOT THE RULE OF FORCE. IT IS GRATIFYING THAT THIS GOAL IS SO WIDELY SHARED BY YOU AND OTHERS IN THE HEMISPHERE. OUR RENEWED COLLECTIVE FIRMNESS IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM, THE RULE OF LAW, AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES HAS BEGUN TO SHOW DEFINITE SIGNS OF SUCCESS.

YET TODAY, JUST AS THE HISTORIC MISSION OF THE AMERICAS IS BEING REAFFIRMED IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THIS NEW CRISIS HAS DEVELOPED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IN THE DAYS AHEAD, THE UNITED STATES WILL DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO BRING ABOUT THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS CRISIS IN WAYS THAT STRENGTHEN SOLIDARITY IN THIS NEW WORLD. WE WOULD PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS AND HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSULT CLOSELY IN THE DIFFICULT DAYS WHICH LIE AHEAD.

HENDERSON

NNNN

RTTC 152700
00 FCC (DESKBY 080800Z)

ER (9)
-3 MAY 82

GRS 278

CONFIDENTIAL


DESKBY 080800Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 072359Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 675 OF 7 MAY,

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM ROCA (ARGENTINA) TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

BEGINS

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST YOU TO INFORM THE SECURITY COUNCIL
THAT ACCORDING TO INFORMATION FROM LONDON, THE UNITED KINGDOM
GOVERNMENT DECIDED TODAY, 7 MAY 1982, TO IMPOSE A BLOCKADE ON
EVERY ARGENTINE WARSHIP OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH DEPARTS MORE
THAN 12 SEA MILES FROM THE CONTINENTAL AND ISLAND TERRITORY OF
ARGENTINA.

THIS UNLAWFUL MEASURE CONSTITUTES A FURTHER ACT OF AGGRESSION
UNDER THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX) ARTICLE 3 PARAGRAPH (C)
WHICH ENDANGERS THE SECURITY OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. IT SHOULD BE
POINTED OUT THAT THE IRRESPONSIBLE DECISION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
GOVERNMENT IS BEING TAKEN AT A TIME WHEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED NATIONS IS ENDEAVOURING TO FACILITATE A PEACEFUL SETTLE-
MENT OF THE QUESTION. BY THIS MEASURE THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT
IS AGAIN DEMONSTRATING ITS INSISTENCE ON A MILITARY SOLUTION AND
ITS WISH TO OBSTRUCT THE PRESENT DIPLOMATIC OPTION AT PRESENT UNDER
CONSIDERATION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HOLDS THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS MEASURE AND THE
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC EXPRESSLY RESERVES ITS RIGHT TO ADOPT WHATEVER
DEFENSIVE MEASURES IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS (CHARTERS).

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIB GENEVA 071735Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 224 OF 7 MAY

INFO PRIORITY BERNE, ROUTINE MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON

FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC

1. WE HEARD UNOFFICIALLY LATE ON 6 MAY THAT THE ARGENTINE MISSION WERE SENDING A LETTER OF COMPLAINT TO ICRC. WE TELEPHONED THE ICRC TO ENQUIRE ABOUT IT ON 7 MAY AND ADAMS WAS INVITED TO CALL TO RECEIVE A COPY OF THE NOTE, DELIVERED THAT MORNING. TEXT IS IN MIFT.

2. ON BEING HANDED THE TEXT, ADAMS WENT THROUGH IT WITH HOCHE OF THE ICRC AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS (REFERENCES ARE TO THE NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS OF THE NOTE).

3. ON 3 AND 4, ADAMS POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD GIVEN ICRC INFORMATION WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE CAPTURE OF THOSE CONCERNED. THIS CONTRASTED FAVOURABLY WITH ARGENTINE BEHAVIOUR OVER OUR PEOPLE WHOM THEY CAPTURED ON SOUTH GEORGIA ON 4 APRIL.

4. ON 5, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ENQUIRY INTO THE DEATH WAS STILL UNDER WAY. ON THE BURIAL HE CONSENTED THAT WE HAD NO INFORMATION, AND UNDERTOOK TO MAKE ENQUIRIES. THE ICRC WERE SURPRISED AT THE REFERENCE IN THE ARGENTINE NOTE TO BURIAL HAVING TAKEN PLACE, A FACT OF WHICH THEY WERE UNAWARE.

5. ON 7, ADAMS COMMENTED THAT THOUGH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS FORBADE THE RE-EMPLOYMENT IN MILITARY ACTION OF FREED PRISONERS OF WAR, THOSE CONCERNED HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN CONSIDERED AS POWS. WE HAD IN ANY CASE NO CONFIRMATION OF THE VERACITY OF THIS ASSERTION.

6. ON 8, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE GENERAL BELGRANO THOUGH OUTSIDE THE TEZ WAS WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE OF BRITISH SHIPS

7 MAY 1982

RR MONTEVIDEO

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 262.


CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 271740Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELNO 225 OF 7 MAY

INFO PRIORITY BERNE, ROUTINE MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON



157

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF ARGENTINE NOTE TO ICRC DATED 5 MAY

1. (USUAL BEGINNING)..... HAS THE DUTY TO STATE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN CARRYING OUT ITS ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE REGION, HAS CARRIED OUT CONTINUOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE MOST ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW.

2. FOR EXAMPLE THERE MAY BE MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING ACTS WHICH SHOW THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NEGLECT OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

3. LACK OF INFORMATION ON THE FATE OF THE CIVILIANS CAPTURED IN SOUTH GEORGIA.

4. LACK OF INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL CAPTURED IN SOUTH GEORGIA.

5. LACK OF INFORMATION ON THE CAUSE OF THE DEATH AFTER HIS CAPTURE OF CORPORAL FELIX ARTUSO AND OF HIS BURIAL WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE.

6. IN ADDITION THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS CARRIED OUT ACTS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSCIENCES OF CIVILED PEOPLES SUCH AS

7. THE INCORPORATION IN THE ROYAL NAVY TASK FORCE OF BRITISH MILITARY PERSONNEL CAPTURED BY ARGENTINE FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA AND THEN REPATRIATED TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

6. IN ADDITION THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS CARRIED OUT ACTS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSCIENCES OF CIVILED PEOPLES SUCH AS

7. THE INCORPORATION IN THE ROYAL NAVY TASK FORCE OF BRITISH MILITARY PERSONNEL CAPTURED BY ARGENTINE FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA AND THEN REPATRIATED TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

8. SINKING BY SUBMARINE ATTACK OF THE CRUISER GENERAL DELGRANO, SAILING OUTSIDE THE ZONE DEFINED BY THE UK AS THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE AND NOT ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES AT THE MOMENT OF SINKING.

9. ATTACKS ON SIMILAR VESSELS GOING TO PICK UP PEOPLE SHIPWRECKED IN ANOTHER INCIDENT, THE ATTACK ON ARA SOBRAL, ONE SUCH VESSEL, WAS EVEN MORE BLAMEWORTHY SINCE IT WAS UNARMED.

10. ASKING THE ICRC TO CONSIDER WELL THE CONDITIONS OF THE PRESENT NOTE (USUAL ENDING).

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT/REVD AT 07/1825Z 1M///ABD

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RESTRICTED

58 MAY 1982

(19)

FM LA PAZ 072305Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 65 OF 7 MAY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

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MY TELNO 64 (NOT TO ALL): CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER

[Handwritten signature]

1. THE PURPOSE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SUMMONS WAS TO HAND ME A LETTER OF PROTEST (TRANSLATION IN MIFT) ABOUT THE SINKING OF THE ARGENTINE CRUISER QUOTE GENERAL BELGRANO UNQUOTE. I WAS PREPARED TO RAISE THE SUBJECT OF THE SINKING WITH DR ROMERO EVEN IF HE HIMSELF HAD NOT DONE SO AS MESSAGES OF SYMPATHY SENT BY PRESIDENT TORRELLO AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THEIR ARGENTINE OPPOSITE NUMBERS EARLIER IN THE WEEK HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS.
2. I SAID THAT I WOULD CONVEY THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO MY GOVERNMENT AND LET HIM HAVE A REPLY IN DUE COURSE. MEANWHILE I WISHED TO MAKE A NUMBER OF POINTS BY WAY OF EXPLAINING THE SINKING. FIRSTLY I REMINDED THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT ARGENTINA HAD STARTED THE FIGHTING AND THAT IT WAS NOT OF BRITISH CHOOSING. I THEN GAVE HIM THE FULL TEXT IN TRANSLATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE'S STATEMENT OF 23 APRIL RESERVING OUR RIGHT TO TAKE WHATEVER MEASURES MIGHT BE NECESSARY IN SELF-DEFENCE AND EXPLAINED THAT THIS STATEMENT HAD BEEN PASSED TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND CIRCULATED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS IN PURSUANCE OF THIS RIGHT THAT WE HAD ATTACKED THE ARGENTINE SUBMARINE OFF SOUTH GEORGIA ON 25 APRIL. I THEN EXPLAINED, ON THE BASIS OF MOD STATEMENT OF 4 MAY, WHY WE CONSIDERED THAT THE CRUISER PLUS ITS ESCORTING DESTROYERS CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS THREAT TO OUR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT. I SAID THAT THE SUBMARINE COULD VERY EASILY HAVE SUNK THE CRUISER. AS IT HAPPENED IT APPEARED TO HAVE STAYED AFLOAT FOR POSSIBLY 24 HOURS. I ASSUMED THAT THE CAPTAIN HAD ATTEMPTED TO MAKE PORT AND DID NOT USE THIS TIME TO EVACUATE THE SHIP TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF HIS CREW. I ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF THE CREW HAD BEEN RESCUED SO THAT THE LOSS OF LIFE WAS NOT NEARLY AS GREAT AS FIRST FEARED.

3. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFER TO THE ATTACK ON HMS SHEFFIELD AND THE CASUALTIES THE CREW HAD SUFFERED. I SAID THAT I FELT AN AFFECTION FOR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OVER THE LOSS OF LIFE IN THE ATTACK BELGRAND HAD BEEN SAID TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE CASUALTIES IN ONE OF OUR DESTROYERS. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE ATTACK ON HMS SHEFFIELD WAS CARRIED OUT BY AIRCRAFT BASED ON THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND. ARGENTINA COULD NOT THEREFORE ARGUE THAT THE WAR AREA SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE. DR ROMERO COMMENTED RATHER CRYPTICALLY THAT THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND ENJOYED A 200 MILE PROTECTION ZONE (PRESUMABLY HE WAS REFERRING TO RIO TREATY REGION). HE SAID THAT HIS MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT THE ATTACK ON THE GENERAL BELGRAND OUTSIDE THE TEZ REPRESENTED A WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT. THE REAL ANSWER HE SAID WAS TO ESTABLISH A CEASE-FIRE TO PREVENT FURTHER LOSSES BY EITHER SIDE. I GAVE THE FOREIGN MINISTER MY SPEAKING NOTES CONTAINING THE VARIOUS POINTS I HAD MADE.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE AS TO THE REPLY I SHOULD SEND TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE SINKING OF THE GENERAL BELGRAND AND THE REPORTED CASUALTIES HAVE HAD A PROFOUND EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN BOLIVIA WHICH HAS TURNED FURTHER AGAINST US.

5. I THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT AND GAVE THE FOREIGN MINISTER A LETTER BASED ON YOUR TELNO 37 ENCLOSED A TRANSLATION OF YOUR STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 7 MAY. IN DISCUSSING THE ARGENTINE POSITION I SAID THAT I HAD READ IN THE PRESS THAT THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT HAD YESTERDAY ADDRESSED A NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS SUPPORTING WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS THE QUOTE POSITIVE ATTITUDE UNQUOTE OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN ACCEPTING HIS PROPOSALS FOR VAYEUCE NEGOTIATIONS. I ASKED WHAT WAS THE BASIS FOR SAYING THAT THE ARGENTINE POSITION WAS POSITIVE SINCE WE WERE VERY SCEPTICAL ABOUT WHETHER THEY REALLY ACCEPTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FRAMEWORK FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH COULD IN ANY EVENT DEPART LITTLE FROM THE US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS WHICH ARGENTINA HAD REJECTED. DR ROMERO SAID THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE ANXIOUS TO NEGOTIATE BUT WERE NOT PREPARED TO REVEAL THEIR CARDS AT THIS STAGE. READING BETWEEN THE LINES, DR ROMERO THOUGHT HE DETECTED THAT THEY WERE READY TO AGREE TO A WITHDRAWAL AND A UN ADMINISTRATION (BUT NOT A UN PEACE FORCE). HE SAID THAT THE FIRST STEP WAS TO OBTAIN A CEASE-FIRE AND IN REPLY I DREW ATTENTION TO THE POINT I HAD MADE IN MY LETTER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

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- 7 MAY

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM UYIS NEW YORK 071745Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 672 OF 7 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



YOUR TELNO 362: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. I CALLED ON PEREZ DE CUELLAR FIRST THING THIS MORNING (7 MAY). I GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE (I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE CHANGES THAT WERE MADE TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT: THE FINAL VERSION MEETS ALL MY POINTS).

2. I HAD DELIBERATELY ASKED TO SEE PEREZ DE CUELLAR ALONE IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK FRANKLY WITHOUT RAFAE AHMED'S MALIGNANT PRESENCE. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO EXPLAIN EXACTLY WHY THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAD COLLAPSED. ESSENTIALLY THIS WAS BECAUSE THE ARGENTINES HAD INSISTED THAT THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT MUST BE PRE-JUDGED AT THE OUTSET BY ACCEPTANCE OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. THIS HAD IN TURN BECOME A PRECONDITION FOR WITHDRAWAL. AN ASSOCIATED PROBLEM WAS THAT HAIG AND OTHERS HAD FROM TIME TO TIME BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CIVILIAN NEGOTIATORS, ONLY TO FIND THAT THEY WERE REPUDIATED BY THE MILITARY AT THE LAST MOMENT. I THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT ENRIQUE ROS (WHO IS COMING TODAY TO NEW YORK TO IMPLIFY THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND WHOM BOTH HE AND I KNOW WELL) WOULD PRESENT A REASONABLE FRONT ON THIS VITAL QUESTION. BUT WE WOULD NOT BE IMPRESSED BY ANYTHING WHICH DID NOT HAVE GALTIERI'S SIGNATURE ON IT.

3. I SUGGESTED THEREFORE THAT, IF HE WAS GOING TO MAKE PROGRESS AND NOT SIMPLY RAISE FALSE HOPES, PEREZ DE CUELLAR MUST CONCENTRATE AT THE OUTSET ON ACHIEVING CAST-IRON AGREEMENT (IE SIGNED BY GALTIERI IN WRITING) ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. THESE MUST INCLUDE A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. THE DETAILS COULD THEN BE FILLED IN EG THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS, THE QUESTION OF A CONTACT GROUP, A UN UMBRELLA, DURATION, VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE FINAL SETTLEMENT, AUTHORITY AND COMPOSITION OF LOCALLY ELECTED AND APPOINTED BODIES AND SO ON. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO...

STRAIGHT TO QUESTIONS OF WITHDRAWAL/CEASEFIRE UNTIL HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DOUBT THAT THE ARGENTINE PRE-CONDITION OF SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT GOING TO SCUPPER HIS EXERCISE AS IT HAD SCUPPERED THE PREVIOUS ONES. I ADDED THAT THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY OTHER DIFFICULTIES, BUT THIS WAS THE CENTRAL OBSTACLE.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOOK NOTES AND SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION. HE WAS ALIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARGENTINES MIGHT SIMPLY BE USING HIM IN ORDER TO GET EITHER A CEASEFIRE AND ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL, OR A BRITISH VETO OF A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE COMBINED WITH NEGOTIATIONS, THIS PUTTING THEM IN A BETTER DIPLOMATIC POSITION. I SAID THAT HE MIGHT HAVE HEARD RUMOURS THAT WE TOO WERE USING HIM, SIMPLY IN ORDER TO BUY TIME. I COULD GIVE HIM MY WORD OF HONOUR THAT WE WERE TAKING HIS INITIATIVE SERIOUSLY AND THAT WE WERE NEGOTIATING WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY AND IN TOTAL GOOD FAITH. HE ACCEPTED THIS.

5. AT THE END, I SAID THAT I HAD ASKED TO SEE HIM ALONE BECAUSE I FOUND RAFAEL AHMED'S UNHELPFUL INTERVENTIONS DISTRACTING AND TIRESOME. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, AFTER OUR MEETING ON 6 MAY, HE HAD TOLD AHMED THAT, IF HE CONTINUED TO BEHAVE LIKE THAT, HIS USEFULNESS WOULD BE AT AN END. AHMED HAD EXCUSED HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT WALDHEIM HAD TRAINED HIM TO GIVE AN APPEARANCE OF TOUGHNESS AT MEETINGS SO THAT HE, WALDHEIM, COULD THEN DISPLAY FLEXIBILITY. I SAID THAT THIS WAS INFANTILE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AGREED AND PROMISED ME THAT I WOULD HAVE NO MORE TROUBLE WITH AHMED WHO HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY CHASTISED. WE SHALL SEE. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT AHMED WAS LUCKY THAT I WAS AN EVEN TEMPERED MAN.

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

071705Z

FM BRASILIA 071705Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 162 OF 7 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK

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FALKLANDS: PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT

1. I CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT NOON TODAY AND HANDED HIM A COPY OF YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE THIS MORNING.

2. GUERREIRO READ THE TEXT IN SILENCE. HE THEN SAID THAT HE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS OFFERED THE BEST ROUTE TO A SOLUTION, THOUGH IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE A VERY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT BUSINESS. HE HAD PERSONALLY URGED ON THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER (WITH WHOM HE KEEPS IN SPORADIC CONTACT BY TELEPHONE) THE NEED TO ADOPT A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION UNDER UN AUSPICES. HE HAD GATHERED FROM COSTA MENDEZ THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT WELCOME A FURTHER FORMAL SESSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SINCE THEY ASSUMED THERE WOULD BE AN AUTOMATIC BRITISH VETO ON ANY DRAFT RESOLUTION UNFAVOURABLE TO OUR INTERESTS. BUT THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE QUITE WILLING TO PURSUE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, THOUGH THEY SEEMED IN NO MOOD YET TO ABANDON THEIR PREREQUISITE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. THE BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UN HAD ALSO RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION FROM HIS SOVIET COLLEAGUE THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE ALSO IN FAVOUR OF AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND WISHED TO AVOID FORMAL DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NO DOUBT THIS ATTITUDE HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE CHINESE PRESIDENCY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS MONTH.

3. I SAID THAT, THOUGH I WAS NOT PRIY TO MY GOVERNMENT'S INNERMOST THOUGHTS ON THE QUESTION, IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT WISH TO IMPOSE ANY PRIOR CONDITIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT, SO LONG AS NO SUCH CONDITIONS (EG ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY) WERE IMPOSED ON US AND NO ARGENTINE TROOPS WERE LEFT ON THE ISLANDS. EVERYTHING ELSE COULD BE DISCUSSED, THOUGH OF COURSE WE WOULD MAINTAIN OUR CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY AND TO BRITISH ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS AND OUR FIRM DETERMINATION TO GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS. ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS, AS I SAW IT, WAS THAT, WHEREAS YOU WERE ALWAYS ABLE TO SPEAK WITH THE FULL AUTHORITY

WHEREAS YOU WERE ALWAYS ABLE TO SPEAK WITH THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH CABINET, COSTA MENDEZ DID NOT SEEM TO BE ENTIRELY TRUSTED BY THE JUNTA AND COULD NOT ALWAYS BE RELIED UPON TO REFLECT THEIR VIEWS ACCURATELY - IF INDEED THEY COULD BE SAID TO HAVE COHERENT VIEWS AT ALL. GUERREIRO DID NOT DEMUR, THOUGH HE HAD NOTED IN THE COURSE OF THE OAS MEETINGS ON THE FALKLANDS QUESTION THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD BEEN IN VERY FREQUENT TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH BUENOS AIRES. THIS SEEMED TO ME TO PROVE MY POINT RATHER THAN OTHERWISE.

COMMENT.

4. GUERREIRO SEEMED TO TAKE A MORE PESSIMISTIC VIEW THAN BEFORE OF THE PROSPECTS OF AN EARLY AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION. I NOTED THAT HE MADE NO ATTEMPT WHATSOEVER TO OFFER ADVICE OR EXHORTATION AS TO HOW WE SHOULD PLAY OUR HAND. I WOULD JUDGE THAT HIS FEELING OF IMPOTENCE IN THE FACE OF A DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE VERY DAMAGING TO BRAZILIAN INTERESTS IS SHARED BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE. PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO, HOWEVER, WHO IS OF A MORE EMOTIONAL DISPOSITION, MAY WELL GIVE VENT TO HIS FRUSTRATION WHEN HE SEES PRESIDENT REAGAN NEXT WEEK. SIR N HENDERSON MAY THUS BE ABLE TO GLEAN SOMETHING OF INTEREST FROM EITHER HAIG OR GUERREIRO AFTER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT AT 071737Z ED

RECD AT 071740Z DP

SUBJECT

TELEPHONE CALL BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND SIR ANTHONY PARSONS
ON SATURDAY 8 MAY 1982

PM: . . . oblivious of background, but if the worst comes to the worst and we have to go in and do something with force then its their young men against our young men and that's terrible. And there was a third thing that I wanted to ask your advice about. It is that I feel a little bit remote but I would really like to see him myself.- the Secretary-General - this is what I wanted to ask your advice about. I think perhaps, as events happened we did not make the best impression last weekend. With the Zimbabwe connection I feel great trust and integrity. I also feel myself a little bit remote from these, which I regard as absolutely the crucial negotiations and time is short. I therefore wanted to ask you, I cannot leave London at the present, I can't leave the United Kingdom at the present which you would understand, you can't in a crisis,

Sir Anthony: No of course not.

PM: Is it therefore possible, which is what I wanted to ask your advice about, would it be possible to ask him quite privately if he could consider coming to London. I realise he would also have to go to Buenos Aires. But in the back of my mind is that he is probably the only person who could finally sort something out between us. Are you with me?

Sir Anthony: Prime Minister when I talked to him yesterday I said to him that you know the only thing that would really do for us on this question of not having sovereignty prejudged before the outset was to have something with Galtieri's signature on it. That what was said by officials and that kind of thing here really didn't mean much to us. And he said if I feel that I am getting anywhere, he said if they are absolutely hopeless, I mean he understands the point as well as I do, that if I feel I'm getting anywhere I shall fly to Buenos Aires. And of course if he did he would obviously have to go on to London too. So I think today when I see him in a couple of hours I will get a much clearer idea of how he thinks he is getting on. He will have had a couple of rounds with the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister by then, one

last night and one this morning and I will be able to get a clearer idea of whether he thinks that there is any hope at all. If so I would expect him, if he makes say one more rung of progress in the next 24 hours then to start moving off on his travels. And in which case of course if he went to Buenos Aires he would obviously come on to London.

PM: All I want him to know is that he would be a very welcome visitor in London.

Sir Anthony: Well I'll tell him that. I think quite honestly he will be very very pleased indeed to have a personal message, to know that you have spoken to me this morning.

PM: Well I heard that you were seeing him and therefore I did want to say that we do feel, have a particular reason to feel his tremendous integrity.

Sir Anthony: Well I will certainly pass that on and I know he will be delighted. It will have a great effect and you know I'm very very glad you rang.

PM: Yes. And I also listened and took the message because it was along the lines, I have been feeling for a long long time that we're not a colonial power at all. Colonisation is only temporary with us as a means of bringing people to independence. And that is still possible. But I don't know whether the ultimate question is that Argentina wants to be the new imperialist or whether she wants us out.

Sir Anthony: Well I know perfectly well that when I spoke to the Argentine negotiator who is up here now who is a very old personal friend of mine I came away feeling they wanted an agreement and you know we are very close and all the rest of it. And I discussed precisely that point and he's an old friend of his too. But we both know that you know that what is said by people like that who are the kind of people like us and what is said by the gentlemen in uniform down there is something quite different.

PM: Yes I know. And that's the difficulty. And in the end you know we might have to go in. I say in the end - time is short but
/ I just

I just feel deeply, well I feel deeply about many things, first that our people there were living in self-determination and freedom before this started and one can't hand them over to anything less. But secondly that it is going to be the most awful waste of young life if we really have to go and take those islands.

Sir Anthony: Well I quite agree Prime Minister.

PM: We have more respect for young life than they do. But the resolve will still be there but I just feel that absolutely everything should be done to make it absolutely clear that in the end it is they who have no respect for young life and . . .

Sir Anthony: Exactly. Well I think that however the votes fell here if we had to come into the Security Council or anything like that, because people vote for the wrong reasons on many occasions here, that our case is very very well understood throughout the membership here.

PM: Good.

Sir Anthony: I mean even those who have reasoned with Solidarity or I don't know what, we might not do as well as we did last time. People jolly well understand what our principles are and what our position is and are going to respect it.

PM: . . and they have to matter. And in the end they'll fight for ideals.

Sir Anthony: Well I entirely agree. As far as I am concerned I don't want to sound sentimental but I mean I will always carry out my Government's policy as well as I can but by God I personally believe in it 100%.

PM: Well I personally believe in it 101%, if it were possible, more than 100%.

Sir Anthony: Well we're with you all the way. And I can tell you Prime Minister the whole of the British Mission to the United Nations is absolutely 100% behind you.

/ PM:

PM: What I am firm on now is that I will do everything before the final decision has to be taken to see if we can upholding the rule of international law and the liberty and justice in which I believe passionately for our people to see if we can stop a final battle. A very personal mesage to him.

Sir Anthony: I'll express these thoughts to him as coming directly from you and I think they are extremely important.

PM: And he will be a very welcome visitor in London the moment he says that he feels that it would help to come and we will put down everything to meet him.

Sir Anthony: OK and if he does come back to London on his travels can I come back to be there with him?

PM: Oh please. Yes please, whether we'll ever let you go again or not I don't know, but still.

Sir Anthony: Thank you Prime Minister. Thank you very much for ringing. I think that's very important and valuable to me. It really is.

PM: So long as you don't mind me just coming in like this when I happen to feel particularly strongly.

Sir Anthony: Prime Minister, any time you want to ring me, 24 hours a day I'm here.

PM: All right. Thank you. And lots of kind thoughts to Lady Parsons. Goodbye.

Sir Anthony: Thank you very much. Goodbye.

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

6

PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD (2)
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR K COUZENS) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

IMMEDIATE

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UNCLASSIFIED
 FM LIMA 081620Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 162 OF 08 MAY
 INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: 12 MILE EXCLUSION ZONE

1. THE MFA ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE YESTERDAY:
 FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION BEGINS QUOTE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
 HAS ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT ANY ARGENTINE SHIP OR AIRCRAFT WHICH
 IS FOUND BEYOND 12 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE ARGENTINE COAST WILL
 BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE AND SUBJECT TO BE TREATED AS SUCH.

THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OF THE UTMOST GRAVITY THIS
 EXTENSION OF THE AREA OF CONFLICT AS FAR AS THE WATERS WHICH,
 ACCORDING TO ARGENTINE LEGISLATION, CORRESPOND TO ITS
 SOVEREIGNTY AND THEREFORE TO THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL CONTINENT.

FACED WITH THIS NEW ANNOUNCEMENT OF BELLIGERENT ACTION ON THE
 PART OF THE BRITISH FORCES, AFTER THE UNJUSTIFIED SINKING OF THE
 CRUISER 'GENERAL BELGRANO', THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT REPEATS ITS
 FIRM PROTEST AND ITS REQUEST FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
 TO MAKE WAY FOR THE PEACE-MAKING MEASURES FORESEEN IN INTER-
 NATIONAL LAW.

PERU SUPPORTS CLEARLY THE MEASURES WHICH THE UN SECRETARY-
 GENERAL IS TAKING AND CALLS ON THE PARTIES IN THE CONFLICT TO
 AGREE WITHOUT DELAY TO THE TRUCE WHICH IS THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID
 A GREATER CONFLAGRATION.

PERU HAS ADOPTED IMMEDIATELY MEASURES WHICH IN THE INTERNATIONAL

AGREE WITHOUT DELAY TO THE TRUCE WHICH IS THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID
A GREATER CONFLAGRATION.

PERU HAS ADOPTED IMMEDIATELY MEASURES WHICH IN THE INTERNATIONAL
FIELD CORRESPOND TO THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AND TO THIS END HAS SENT NECESSARY
INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS DELEGATION AT THE 20TH CONSULTATIVE MEETING
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS (AT THE OAS). UNQUOTE. ENDS.

2. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

WALLACE

NNNN

SENT AT 08/1657Z DS

919307 PRDRME G
25230PE PRODROME

V
919307 PRDRME G

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102

DEDIP

Emergency Room
SECRET As Requested.

4275 - 1

OO BERNE DESKBY 081330Z

GRS 270

DEDIP

SECRET

DESKBY 081330Z MAY 82

FM FCO 081200Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 93 OF 8 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR), WASHINGTON
THREAT OF ASSASSINATION OF STAFF/UK CITIZENS IN THIRD COUNTRIES

1. PLEASE ASK THE SWISS TO SPEAK TO THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN
MINISTRY IN BUENOS AIRES AT THE HIGHEST AVAILABLE LEVEL AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE, TO PASS ON THE FOLLOWING.

2. SOME BRITISH EMBASSIES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THOSE
NEIGHBOURING ARGENTINA, HAVE RECEIVED THREATS FROM ORGANISA-
TIONS CLAIMING TO SUPPORT THE ARGENTINE POSITION. THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT DO NOT KNOW WHO IS BEHIND THESE GROUPS, BUT BELIEVES
THAT IT HAS TO TAKE THE THREATS SERIOUSLY. THE BRITISH BELIEVE
THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SHOULD KNOW OF THIS AT A HIGH
LEVEL: THEY WILL UNDERSTAND THAT IF ANY ATTACKS WERE MADE ON
BRITISH OFFICIALS OR CITIZENS IT WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE A MOST
DAMAGING EFFECT ON BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION AND ON WORLD OPINION.
THAT COULD MAKE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE
CURRENT DISPUTE VERY MUCH HARDER.

3. *Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).
Wayland, 17 April 2012*

IF THE
SWISS ARE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ACTION AS REQUESTED WE ARE UNLIKELY TO
BE ABLE TO GIVE THEM ANY FURTHER DETAILS. WE BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT
THE SWISS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PASS ON A MESSAGE OF THIS SORT
ON OUR BEHALF, WITHOUT ASSOCIATING THEMSELVES WITH ITS CONTENT.
IF PRESSED ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE THREATS YOU CAN REFER TO
THE STORIES CARRIED IN THE EVENING STANDARD ON 23 APRIL AND
TIMES OF 24 APRIL.

PYM

DEDIP

SECRET

PS (6)
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 HD/SAMD
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/UND
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/ERD
 HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~ *200A*

IMMEDIATE

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET (2 Copies)
 PS/S of S DEFENCE
 PS/HOME SECRETARY
 PS/HOME SECRETARY(C/O No.10 D St)
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 PS/SIR M PALLISER)
 MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE
 MR FULLER)
 D I O)
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

DEDIP
 SECRET
 FM WASHINGTON 090010Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1678 OF 8 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK BRUSSELS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME AGAIN FROM WEST VIRGINIA WHERE HE IS SPENDING THE WEEKEND. HE HAS SAID THAT HE WILL WANT TO SPEAK TO ME AGAIN TOMORROW EVENING OR MONDAY MORNING WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON.
2. ON THE OPEN LINE HE WAS EVEN MORE CRYPTIC THAN USUAL BUT I UNDERSTOOD HIM TO MEAN THAT HE HAS PRETTY CLEAR EVIDENCE OF MODERATE ELEMENTS IN BUENOS AIRES BIDDING FOR THE ASCENDANCY THERE BUT HOPING THAT BRITAIN CAN DELIVER A FEW MORE MILITARY BLOWS SO AS TO ENSURE THE DOWNFALL OF THE EXTREMISTS. I ASKED HAIG IF I HAD UNDERSTOOD HIM CORRECTLY. DID HE MEAN THAT THEY REALLY WANTED US TO DELIVER A FEW MORE BLOWS AGAINST THEM? YES HE SAID QUITE CATEGORICALLY, THE MODERATES SAW THEIR CHANCE AS DEPENDING ON MORE MILITARY SUCCESSES BY THE BRITISH. HAIG SAID

THAT HE WOULD BE SENDING AMBASSADOR WALTERS TO BUENOS AIRES ON A VERY SECRET MISSION ON MONDAY IN RESPONSE, SO I UNDERSTOOD IT, TO SOME FEELERS HE HAS HAD FROM THERE. HAIG EMPHASISED HOW EXTREMELY CONFIDENTIAL THIS WAS. HE HOPED THAT WALTERS WOULD BE ABLE TO GET IN AND OUT OF BUENOS AIRES UNOBSERVED.

3. HAIG REPEATED THAT WHAT THE MODERATES WERE HOPING FOR WAS QUOTE A COMPROMISE BASED ON PUNISHMENT UNQUOTE. THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE CONSIDERABLE CHANGES IN THE TOP RANKS.

4. I TOLD HAIG THAT I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE HIM MUCH INFORMATION ABOUT HOW THINGS WERE GOING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN NEW YORK. INDEED HIS TALKS WERE STILL CONTINUING SEPARATELY WITH SIR A PARSONS AND ROSI. BUT ON THE FACE OF IT PEREZ DE CUELLAR SEEMED TO BE INDICATING THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE NOT AS INTRACTABLE AS THEY HAD BEEN, THOUGH OF COURSE THERE WAS NO DEFINITE EVIDENCE THAT ROSI COULD DELIVER.

5. HAIG SAID THAT THAT WAS AS WELL AND THAT IT WAS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SORT OF INFORMATION HE WAS RECEIVING AND THAT HE HINTED AT TO ME.

6. HAIG WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HOPED THAT QUOTE FAINT HEARTS UNQUOTE IN THE UK WERE NOT WINNING GROUND. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THIS WAS THE MOMENT FOR JUST THE SORT OF FIRMNESS BY BRITAIN THAT WE WERE SHOWING. OBVIOUSLY HE WAS A LITTLE PUT OUT BY THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S LATEST REMARKS BUT I TOLD HIM THAT HE SHOULD NOT TAKE THEM TOO LITERALLY AND WE HAD AN EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES ABOUT SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL AFFAIRS. AS YOU KNOW, HE IS A DEVOUT CATHOLIC.

7. I ASKED HAIG WHETHER I COULD CONTINUE TO ASSURE LONDON THAT EVERYBODY WHO MATTERED IN WASHINGTON WAS SOUND IN SUPPORT OF US. HE TOLD ME THAT WE COULD BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THERE WAS NO WORRY ABOUT THIS. THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE ONE OR TWO JOURNALISTS WHO WOULD SHOOT THEIR MOUTHS OFF AND SUGGEST THAT EVERYBODY SHOULD RUN FOR COVER AT THE SLIGHTEST RISK. BUT WHAT MATTERED WAS HIS OWN ABSOLUTE SUPPORT BEHIND US. I ASKED ABOUT THE WHITE HOUSE AND HE ASSURED ME THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO WORRY ABOUT THAT EITHER.

8. I WOULD LIKE TO KEEP HAIG INFORMED AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN NEW YORK: HE SHOULD NOT GET THE STORY FROM THE INEFFABLE KIRKPATRICK.

HENDERSON

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (41)

Handwritten signature

PS (6)
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
~~SIR T STANLEY~~ MR FREEMAN
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR K COUZENS) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

MR THOMAS PCD.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

GRS 400
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FM WASHINGTON 081531Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1674 OF 8 MAY
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

Prime Minister
this is the follow up to Washington
Tel 1664 which I sent to you
earlier today.

Mr Logan
Duty Clerk
7/4

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT BE TOO UPSET BY THE PRESIDENT'S UNPREPARED COMMENT ON OUR DECISION ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY TO BLOCKADE ARGENTINIAN FORCES UP TO TWELVE MILES FROM THE COASTLINE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN FOREWARNED OF OUR ANNOUNCEMENT. BUT HAIG COULD ASSURE ME THAT THERE IS NO INTENTION TO CRITICISE US EVEN BY IMPLICATION. HAIG SAID THAT HE HIMSELF HAD UNDERSTOOD ENTIRELY WHAT WE HAD BEEN DOING. I EXPLAINED THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING. HAIG WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN TALKING TO CHEYSSON WHO, AS I WOULD KNOW, WAS IN CLOSE COHORTS WITH GENSCHER, BUT WHO WAS A DIFFERENT MAN. HAIG HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A UNITED FRONT. THERE MUST BE NO WEAKENING AT THIS STAGE. CHEYSSON TALKED ABOUT THE PROBLEM FOR THE ITALIANS BUT APPEARED TO HAIG TO BE PERFECTLY SOUND HIMSELF. HAIG HAD EMPHASISED TO HIM AS HE HAD

TALKED ABOUT THE PROBLEM FOR THE ITALIANS BUT APPEARED TO HAIG TO BE PERFECTLY SOUND HIMSELF. HAIG HAD EMPHASISED TO HIM AS HE HAD DONE TO OTHERS THE IMPORTANCE OF SEPARATING CEASEFIRE FROM WITHDRAWAL.

3. HAIG GAVE AN EXCELLENT BRIEFING YESTERDAY TO U.S. PRESS AND TELEVISION WHICH IS WELL REFLECTED IN TODAY'S PRESS.

4. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF DEPLORING TO HAIG THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF 2 MAY TO FELLOW AMERICAN PRESIDENTS. IN PARTICULAR I SINGLED OUT THE REFERENCE TO THE U S A 'S QUOTE MORAL LINKS UNQUOTE WITH ARGENTINA, THE CONDEMNATION OF EUROPEAN COLONISATION IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE, AND THE UNDERSTANDING EXPRESSED FOR ARGENTINA'S COMMITMENT TO THE ISLANDS AND THEIR FRUSTRATIONS QUOTE OVER FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE. THERE WAS NOT A WORD CONDEMNING ARGENTINA'S USE OF FORCE OR DISREGARD OF SELF DETERMINATION. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT HAIG COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE SEEN THE MESSAGE IN DRAFT. FROM HIS RESPONSE I THINK THAT HE MAY WELL HAVE BEEN AWARE OF IT BUT WAS NOT ABLE TO TAKE THE WHITE HOUSE ON JUST AT THAT MOMENT BECAUSE OF THEIR ANXIETY TO SHOW QUOTE BALANCE UNQUOTE AFTER LAST WEEK'S DECISION BY THE U S A TO COME DOWN ON THE BRITISH SIDE. AS YOU KNOW, SOME REGIONS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE WHITE HOUSE NOURISH A FOND BELIEF IN THE REALITY AND BENEFITS OF HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY, AND THEY HAVE DIFFICULTY IN RECOGNISING THE UNFAILING PROPENSITY OF LATINOS TO CRITICISE THE U S A WHATEVER WASHINGTON DOES.

HENDERSON

NNNN

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (36)

36

*Referred to Chyuan
10.20 pm 8/5
No. 10 Rec'd 9.30 pm 8/5*

PS (6)

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

SIR I SINCLAIR

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/SAMD

HD/DEF D

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/UND

HD/NEWS D

HD/ERD

HD/PUSD

~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~

RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET (2 Copies)

PS/S of S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY(C/O No.10 D St)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)

PS/SIR M PALLISER)

MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER)

D I O)

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 081832Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 679 OF 8 MAY

AND TO FLASH BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 674: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR AN HOUR AT 1530Z. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY RAFEE AHMED AND ALVARO DE SOTO, PERUVIAN CAREER DIPLOMAT, WHO HAS RECENTLY BEEN ACTING AS THE G77 SPOKESMAN ON DEEP SEA MINING AT UNLOSC BUT WHO JOINED THE SECRETARIAT ON 1 MAY AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT AND IS A WELCOME ADDITION TO HIS FALKLANDS TEAM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WENT THROUGH EACH OF THE POINTS IN HIS AIDE MEMOIRE OF 2 MAY, DESCRIBING THE POSITION AS HE NOW SAW IT IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR MESSAGE OF 6 MAY AND HIS TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH ROS, THE ARGENTINE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED WITH THE CONCEPT THAT HIS PROPOSALS WERE QUOTE PROVISIONAL MEASURES, WITHOUT

FOREIGN MINISTER.

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED WITH THE CONCEPT THAT HIS PROPOSALS WERE QUOTE PROVISIONAL MEASURES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES UNQUOTE. I CONFIRMED THAT WE AGREED WITH THIS. BUT I SAID THAT WE MUST HAVE 100 PERCENT PRECISION FROM THE ARGENTINES ON THE POINT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ROS HAD INDICATED THAT THE ARGENTINES ENVISAGED A WRITTEN AGREEMENT; THEIR SIGNATURE WOULD GIVE US THE PRECISION WE NEEDED. I SAID THAT IT WOULD DEPEND WHOSE SIGNATURE WAS ON THE AGREEMENT. ALL PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAD FOUNDERED AT THE LAST MINUTE ON ARGENTINE INSISTENCE THAT THEIR CLAIM ON SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. I HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY PRESS REPORTS THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD SAID THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST LEAD IRREVERSIBLY TO ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY. IF WE WERE TO REACH AGREEMENT AND THEN COSTA MENDEZ WERE TO SAY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IN THE ARGENTINE VIEW THE AGREEMENT MEANT THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED, I WOULD HAVE TO DENY THIS AND THE AGREEMENT WOULD FALL APART. DE SOTO SUGGESTED THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD CONTAIN A PROVISION THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD CLAIM THAT THE AGREEMENT MEANT THAT THAT SIDE'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY HAD BEEN ACCEPTED. THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA. I THINK THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS HOISTED ON BOARD HOW CRUCIAL THIS POINT IS FOR US AND THE DANGER THAT THE GENERALS IN BUENOS AIRES WILL RENEGE ON IT AT THE LAST MOMENT.

3. AS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEITY (IE THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS AT SUB-PARAS (A) TO (E) OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S AIDE MEMOIRE WOULD BEGIN AT THE SAME TIME), PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ARGENTINA ACCEPTED IT IN TOTO. THE UK ACCEPTED IT IN RESPECT OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT WE DID NOT EXCLUDE IT IN RESPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. BUT HE JUDGED FROM PARA 7 OF YOUR MESSAGE THAT WE WOULD PREFER SUSPENSION OF THE EXCLUSION ZONES AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS TO COE AFTER (REPEAT AFTER) WITHDRAWAL HAD TAKEN PLACE. I SAID THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEITY NEEDED MORE EXACT DEFINITION. WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE SOME TIME AND THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME KIND OF PHASING. I COULD NOT BE PRECISE ABOUT WHEN IN THE WITHDRAWAL AND REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS THE EXCLUSION ZONES WOULD BE LIFTED. BUT I SUGGESTED THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF SIMULTANEITY COULD BE MET IF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S NEGOTIATIONS LED TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH A DETAILED SCHEDULE OR TIMETABLE OF WHEN THE VARIOUS STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT (WITHDRAWAL, REDEPLOYMENT LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES AND SANCTIONS, INTRODUCTION OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, BEGINNING OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, ETC). PEREZ DE CUELLAR SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS; AHMED SEEMED LESS SURE.

4. THE NEXT POINT WAS THE DATE OF QUOTE TIME T UNQUOTE, IE THE POINT AT WHICH SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE AGREEMENT WOULD BEGIN. THE ARGENTINES SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD

TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, BEGINNING OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, ETC). PEREZ DE CUELLAR SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS: AHMED SEEMED LESS SURE.

4. THE NEXT POINT WAS THE DATE OF QUOTE TIME T UNQUOTE, IE THE POINT AT WHICH SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE AGREEMENT WOULD BEGIN. THE ARGENTINES SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD BE 24 HOURS AFTER SIGNATURE. I SAID THAT THIS SOUNDED REASONABLE BUT THAT I WOULD OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS.

5. ON THE DATE FOR THE COMPLETION OF ARGENTINE AND UK WITHDRAWAL, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE. I SAID THAT I WOULD NEED INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT TOO, BUT THAT I BELIEVED THAT IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS 14 DAYS HAD BEEN MENTIONED AS THE PERIOD FOR COMPLETION OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THERE WOULD BE COMPLICATED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON WHAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US IN THIS RESPECTS.

6. ON THE TERMINAL DATE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, ARGENTINA HAD PROPOSED 31 DECEMBER 1982 AND YOU HAD SUGGESTED QUOTE PERHAPS ONE YEAR UNQUOTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD VALUE YOUR REACTION TO THE ARGENTINE PROPOSALS.

7. ON TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AND BOTH AGREED THAT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE NEITHER ARGENTINE NOR BRITISH. I INTERRUPTED TO QUESTION THIS LAST POINT: IT DEPENDED ON HOW ONE DEFINED QUOTE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WENT ON TO SAY THAT ARGENTINA FAVOURED QUOTE AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE UNQUOTE, WHEREAS YOU HAD PROPOSED A CONTACT GROUP OF STATES ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. I REPEATED THAT WE NEEDED TO DEFINE WHAT WE MEANT BY QUOTE ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE. I DESCRIBED THE THREE LAYERS OF GOVERNMENT THE ISLANDERS HAD ENJOYED BEFORE THE INVASION (IE THE GOVERNOR, THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL). WHAT DID QUOTE AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE UNQUOTE MEAN IN RELATION TO THEM? COULD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PLEASE OBTAIN CLARIFICATION FROM THE ARGENTINES? I COULD ASK YOU WHETHER YOU WERE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO ACCEPT AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE BUT FOR US THIS WOULD BE A CRUCIAL QUESTION AND I DID NOT THINK THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WOULD FEEL ABLE TO ANSWER IT WITHOUT GREATER PRECISION ABOUT WHAT WAS INTENDED. A PROBLEM IN EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN ARGENTINE INSISTENCE ON DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS. DID THEY NOW INTEND THAT A UN ROLE WOULD EXCLUDE THE COUNCILS? OR WERE THEY FOR INSTANCE THINKING THAT UN NOMINEES SHOULD REPLACE THE PREVIOUS NOMINATED MEMBERS AND THE GOVERNOR (WHICH SEEMS TO BE THE IDEA THAT AHMED FAVOURS)? PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND OUT MORE.

8. ON THE FORMAT AND THE VENUE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WANTED THEM TO BE

BY EITHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR A REPRESENTATIVE

THAT UN NOMINEES SHOULD REPLACE THE PREVIOUS NOMINATED MEMBERS AND THE GOVERNOR (WHICH SEEMS TO BE THE IDEA THAT AHMED FAVOURS)? PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND OUT MORE.

8. ON THE FORMAT AND THE VENUE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WANTED THEM TO BE CONDUCTED BY EITHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR A REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED BY HIM AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE HELD IN NEW YORK. YOU, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD SUGGESTED THE CONTACT GROUP. I SAID THAT I WOULD SEEK YOUR VIEWS. MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT NEW YORK SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE AVOIDED BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE GENERATED HERE ON THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING ROS AGAIN AT 1930Z AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME AT 2130Z TODAY. HE HOPED THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN SOME REACTIONS FROM YOU BY THEN. I EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD RAISED QUESTIONS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO H.M. GOVERNMENT, THAT YOU WERE OUTSIDE BRUSSELS AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT CHEQUERS, AND THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN ANY RESPONSE OF SUBSTANCE BY 2130Z. BUT I WOULD REPORT TO YOU EVERYTHING HE HAD SAID.

10. I SHALL SEND MY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS LATER TODAY, AFTER MY SECOND MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR. I REALISE THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FOCUS ON THESE QUESTIONS IN TIME FOR THAT MEETING. BUT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN THE IMPRESSION OF A POSITIVE APPROACH TO HIS EFFORTS AND I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE THAT YOU OR OFFICIALS CAN LET ME HAVE BY 2130Z ON THE QUESTIONS ON WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR OUR REACTION VIZ:

- (A) THE DATE OF QUOTE TIME T UNQUOTE:
- (B) THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL:
- (C) THE PHASING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TASK FORCE:
- (D) THE TERMINAL DATE FOR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS:
- (E) THE FORMAT AND VENUE FOR THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

PARSONS

NNNN

INT QSL ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0730 HOURS,

8 MAY

UN

(a) Discussions with the Secretary-General

A
(UKMIS NY
telno 672)

1. On 7 May Sir A Parsons outlined to the Secretary-General the difficulties inherent in negotiations with the Argentines. He suggested that if the Secretary-General were to achieve progress he must concentrate at the outset on securing an agreement signed by President Galtieri on the transitional arrangements and the framework for the diplomatic negotiations; it was essential to establish clearly that the Argentine pre-condition of sovereignty was not going to scupper the Secretary-General's efforts as it had scuppered the previous ones. The Secretary-General said that he fully understood the position and was well aware that the Argentines might seek to use him for their own ends. Sir A Parsons also told the Secretary-General that we were negotiating with a sense of urgency and in total good faith; the Secretary-General accepted this.

B
(UKMIS NY
telno 674)

2. Later the Secretary-General told Sir A Parsons that in his meeting with the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister (Ros) on 7 May he had been given "amplifications" of the Argentine reply and that he was studying these. The Secretary-General has arranged to see Ros and Sir A Parsons on 8 May.

(b) Reactions to MOD Statement of 7 May

C
(UKMIS NY
telno 675)

3. The statement has caused a stir in the UN. Sir A Parsons has reassured the Secretary-General that the statement should not be seen as a dramatic escalation of the conflict but rather as a clarification of earlier announcements. The Argentines have written to the President of the Security Council alleging that this constitutes a further act of aggression. Sir A Parsons will counter these allegations by writing to the President of the Security Council on 8 May. The Argentines have not asked for a Security Council meeting and both the Secretary-General and Sir A Parsons will attempt to head off the possibility of others suggesting such a meeting.

(c) Personal Views of the Secretary-General

(UKMIS
NY telno
674
at B)

4. Speaking in confidence Mr Urquhart reported that the Secretary-General is despondent and worried largely because of what he sees as Mr Haig's attempts to block his initiative. On 8 May the Secretary-General was told by Mrs Kirkpatrick that other efforts (unspecified) were under way and that it would be a pity if the Secretary-General were to cut across them. Nevertheless the Secretary-General is determined to persevere. Mr Urquhart also confirmed that the Secretary-General had taken on board the points made to him by Sir A Parsons earlier in the day (see (a) above).

/US

US

(a) President Reagan's Message to Latin American Heads of State,
2 May

5. We have now obtained the full text of this message. Our Embassy has let the State Department know, and Sir N Henderson will protest to Mr Haig personally, about the unsatisfactory tone and content of this message.

(b) Repatriation of Prisoners

6. Sir N Henderson reports that the Americans are reluctant to accede to our request for a US civilian aircraft. Sir N Henderson judges that if we applied significant pressure the Americans would give way; but he counsels that we should avoid using up our credit with the Americans unless we have to and that it seems best to revert to this request only if other options are not feasible.

ICRC

7. On 7 May the ICRC received a letter from Argentina alleging British neglect of its international obligations. Specifically the Argentines charge that the UK has provided inadequate information on those captured in South Georgia and that repatriated military personnel have been incorporated in the Task Force. The Argentines also complain about the sinking of the "General Belgrano" and allege that British forces have attacked Argentine vessels engaged in rescue operations. Our mission has responded to these charges and the ICRC have given us no indication that they expect us to comment further.

Mexico

8. The suggestion of a meeting between President Galtieri and the Prime Minister is known to Governor Rossell de la Lama and our Ambassador has learnt that in Rossell de la Lama's view President Lopez Portillo wishes to put his full weight behind this proposed meeting.

Brazil

9. The Brazilian Foreign Minister told our Ambassador on 7 May that he had personally urged on Sr Costa Mendez the necessity of adopting a flexible approach to a negotiated solution under UN auspices. He understood from Costa Mendez that the Argentines did not favour a further formal session of the Security Council (because of a possible UK veto) and that the Argentines would be willing to pursue discussions with the Secretary-General. There was no sign as yet that the Argentines would abandon their prerequisite of claiming sovereignty.

Comment


10. Sir A Parsons' further interview with the Secretary-General has usefully established that Perez de Cuellar is well aware of the dangers of Argentine manipulation. At his meeting at 1530 today, 8 May, with the Secretary-General, Sir A Parsons will presumably be given further details of the Argentine 'amplifications' presented by Ros on 7 May. It is for consideration whether additional guidance on last night's MOD statement might help Sir A Parsons to allay the Secretary-General's evident fears that this move has made his task more difficult.

11. It is to be expected that the Argentines would seek to make the most of the MOD statement, and clearly right that the allegations made in writing by Roca to the Secretary-General should be countered today by Sir A Parsons' proposed letter. The Secretary of State will have an opportunity today at Villers-le-Temple to gauge EC reactions to this move and it might be helpful for Sir A Parsons to have an early report on EC reactions.

12. Now that we are fully committed to the UN route, it seems gratuitously unhelpful for Mrs Kirkpatrick to continue earlier US efforts to keep the Secretary-General out of the action. We have as yet seen no comment from Washington. Mr Haig is known to be distrustful of Perez de Cuellar, but even so, there seems a good chance that Mrs Kirkpatrick was acting on her own initiative.

13. The Reagan message is extraordinary. Sir N. Henderson's protest is the least we can do, but it is probably unwise to take the matter further at this point, when we are seeking practical help from the US. It will undoubtedly give comfort to the Argentine and make Perez de Cuellar's task more difficult. Sir N Henderson's recommendation not to press for US transport for POWs seems right provided that other options are available. We must explore these urgently. The Argentines are trying to wrong foot us on this issue.

14. A short interim reply went last night to Mexico City on Lopez Portillo's initiative. The involvement of Rossell de la Lama and Rowland seems to have nothing to offer, but Lopez Portillo might be in a position to offer some help at a later stage. We must first await the outcome of Perez de Cuellar's efforts. If the Brazilian reports are correct, it is a bonus that Costa Mendez is not seeking a formal meeting of the Security Council.



A J Payne
Emergency Unit

8 May 1982

020
ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE,
WESTMINSTER, LONDON, SW1P 1QJ

8 May, 1982

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

We have hesitated before writing to you since we realise the appalling strain you have endured since the Falklands crisis began. Our anxieties, however since hostilities commenced, have now reached such a point that we feel we must express them to you. We do so as we both set out for Rome at the Holy Father's request. We do not know the precise reason.

You may perhaps be aware that after the sending of the Task Force a statement was published in the Catholic press giving some ideas about the moral issues underlying the crisis. Under the principles of the just war the United Kingdom has an unmistakable claim to take the necessary steps to overturn the Argentine aggression even if this involves, as a last resort, the use of force. X However, even then, the point was made that traditional Christian morality insisted on other conditions to ensure that our conduct of hostilities remained morally justified, namely that there should be due proportion between the end to be achieved and the means used, and that there should not be an escalation of hostilities. We seriously question whether this is the case at the present time. X

Events since then have taken a serious turn for the worse and we are far from being alone among Christian churchmen in feeling grave anxiety about what has happened recently and what, to judge by reports, appears to be the accepted position of yourself and Her Majesty's Government.

The recent serious loss of life, the extension of the exclusion zone, the refusal to disavow the possibility of action against the Argentine mainland, all these sit uneasily with the declared intention to seek peace and a negotiated settlement.

cont./.

In our considered view, the Christian conscience of our people, while affirming our right to self defence, will not accept a use of force disproportionate to the original issues at stake; it will not approve a major escalation in armed hostilities and the extension of the war to the mainland of Argentina. Recent suggestions of the cease fire and plans for U.N. Trusteeship for the Islands would by contrast appear to be very positive and helpful.

It would be seriously unjust if anyone were to criticize Christian opinion in these matters as hostile to national interests. We too love our country passionately and are enormously sensitive about her conduct in the world and her position and prestige. We fear lest the true interests of our people could be damaged by such a use of force as might do violence to humanity, world peace and to mutual tolerance and good will among peoples.

At this moment of decision we offer our prayers and those of our Roman Catholic communities for peace and a just solution to the crisis without further bloodshed and suffering.

We have sent a telegram to our episcopal brothers in Argentina urging them to join us in a similar approach to their Government.

Yours sincerely,

Basil Hume
Archbishop of Westminster

Gordon J. Gray
Archbishop of St. Andrews
and Edinburgh

The Rt. Hon. M. Thatcher

Subject to check 7/5
TYPISTS

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (32)

38

PS (6)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUŞ
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
HD/SAMD
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET (2 Copies)
PS/S of S DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY(C/O No.10 D St)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
PS/SIR M PALLISER)
MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER)
D I O)
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 090500Z (BRUSSELS)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090106Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 685 OF 8 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 679: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AGAIN AT 2130Z TODAY (8 MAY).
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED ROS (ARGENTINA) FOR AN INITIAL REACTION TO MY REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT THE ARGENTINES MEANT BY QUOTE AN EXCLUSIVE UN ROLE UNQUOTE IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. ROS HAD REPLIED THAT ARGENTINA FELT THAT SINCE THE INTERIM PERIOD WAS LIKELY TO BE FAIRLY SHORT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ADOPT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH, WHILE NOT AFFECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, SHOULD NECESSARILY COME FULLY UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATOR, IE THE UN. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES SEEMED PREPARED TO RESPECT THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK EXISTING UP TO 31 MARCH 1982 QUOTE REGARDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNQUOTE

INTERIM ADMINISTRATOR, IE THE UN. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES SEEMED PREPARED TO RESPECT THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK EXISTING UP TO 31 MARCH 1982 QUOTE REGARDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNQUOTE BUT THEY INSISTED THAT, IF THE ULTIMATE REGIME OF THE ISLANDS WAS NOT TO BE PREJUDGED, THEN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES SHOULD ALSO BE KEPT IN ABEYANCE THROUGH-OUT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. ARGENTINA DID NOT ACCEPT ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN NOMINATED AND ELECTED OFFICERS. SHE FELT STRONGLY THAT, IN ORDER TO AVOID CONFUSION AND SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WAS TRULY TRANSITIONAL, IT SHOULD BE UNDER CLEAR-CUT UN ADMINISTRATION, WITH A PRESENCE FROM BOTH THE INTERESTED PARTIES.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR COMMENTED THAT THIS SEEMED TO BE A REPETITION OF THE POSITION THE ARGENTINES HAD MAINTAINED ALL ALONG ON THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. I QUESTIONED THIS: AT ONE STAGE IN HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS THE ARGENTINES HAD SEEMED TO ENVISAGE THAT THE ~~LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE COUNCILS WOULD REMAIN IN-~~

~~LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE COUNCILS WOULD REMAIN IN~~

LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE COUNCILS WOULD REMAIN IN BEING. THOUGH WITH SUBSTANTIAL ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION. THEIR NEW POSITION WAS VERY DIFFERENT. THEIR REFERENCE TO QUOTE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNQUOTE PRESUMABLY MEANT EXISTING LAW ON PROPERTY, FAMILY MATTERS, ETC. WHAT IN EFFECT THEY WERE PROPOSING WAS DIRECT UN ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT ANY LOCAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES. THIS WAS A VERY DIFFERENT CONCEPT FROM OURS AND I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO OU: IT WOULD AMOUNT TO DENYING THE ISLANDERS THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LET HIM HAVE DETAILS OF THE POSITION THE ARGENTINES HAD TAKEN ON THIS - AND INDEED ON OTHER POINTS - IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS: IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO POINT OUT, AS NECESSARY, WHEN THEY WERE BEING LESS FLEXIBLE THAN THEY HAD BEFORE. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT PRIVY TO ALL OF HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS BUT I WOULD ASK WHETHER YOU COULD LET THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAVE THE INFORMATION HE REQUESTED.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ROS HAD REPEATED VERY CLEARLY THIS AFTERNOON THAT IT WAS NOT THE PURPOSE OF ARGENTINA TO PREJUDGE THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, THOUGH DE SOTO ADDED THAT FOR THE ARGENTINES THIS DEPENDED ON AGREEMENT ON APPROPRIATE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. IN CONVERSATION AFTER THE MEETING, AHMED GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY BE THINKING OF INSERTING INTO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE LANGUAGE ABOUT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS WHICH TEND TO FAVOUR THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY. WE SHALL HAVE TO WATCH THIS CAREFULLY.

5. AHMED SAID THAT ROS HAD TALKED ABOUT AS TO BE BING AS THE DECISION

THE ARGENTINES MAY BE THINKING OF INSERTING INTO THE TERMS
REFERENCE LANGUAGE ABOUT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
WHICH TEND TO FAVOUR THE ARGENTINE CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY. WE SHALL
HAVE TO WATCH THIS CAREFULLY.

5. AHMED SAID THAT ROS HAD TALKED ABOUT 15 TO 20 DAYS AS THE PERIOD
FOR WITHDRAWAL. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED ROS FOR
DETAILS OF WHAT HAD BEEN PROPOSED IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS
FOR THE DURATION AND PHASING OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS. HE WOULD BE
GRATEFUL IF WE TOO COULD LET HIM HAVE THIS INFORMATION. I SAID THAT
I WOULD PASS ON HIS REQUEST.

6. MY NEXT MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR WILL BE AT 1930Z TOMORROW
(9 MAY).

7. PLEASE SEE MIFT FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

PARSONS

NNNN



BUCKINGHAM PALACE

8th May, 1982

A.J.C. - 11
6-a.

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 7th May. As you know, The Queen's message to the Falkland Islands went out last night by the means proposed by the FCO.

Yours sincerely
Robert Fehar.

A.J. Coles, Esq.

referred to telegram 9/15

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38) 38

PS (6)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
HD/SAMD
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH

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PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
PS/SIR M PALLISER)
MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER)
D I O)

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF (MOD)

GRS 1800

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 090500Z (BRUSSELS)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 090107Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 686 OF 8 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS.

1. AFTER TODAY'S ROUNDS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE ORGANISED THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION VERY THOROUGHLY. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT ROS HAS A PREPARED BRIEF ON EVERY TOPIC FROM WHICH HE READS VERBATIM AS APPROPRIATE. INTERESTINGLY EACH PAGE OF HIS BRIEF IS INITIALLED, BUT PEREZ DE CUELLAR CANNOT SEE BY WHOM EXCLAM.
2. I THINK THAT THERE ARE THREE POSSIBILITIES. THE FIRST, AND LEAST LIKELY, IS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE DECIDED TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH AND TO PLAY IT STRAIGHT, INCLUDING ENTERING A NEGOTIATION WITH ALL OPTIONS OPEN FOLLOWING LINKED WITHDRAWAL/CEASEFIRE ETC.

2. I THINK THAT THERE ARE THREE POSSIBILITIES. THE FIRST, AND LEAST LIKELY, IS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE DECIDED TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH AND TO PLAY IT STRAIGHT, INCLUDING ENTERING A NEGOTIATION WITH ALL OPTIONS OPEN FOLLOWING LINKED WITHDRAWAL/CEASEFIRE ETC. AGAIN, IN STRICT PRIVACY, PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS AS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THIS AS I AM. I HOPE WE ARE WRONG.

3. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE REALISED THAT IF THE SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION FINALLY FAILS BECAUSE OF THEIR INSISTENCE ON PREJUDGING THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION, IT WILL BE DIPLOMATIC GAME, SET AND MATCH TO US. THIS WOULD BE TRUE THROUGHOUT THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN WHATEVER THEIR PRECONCEPTIONS MAY BE ON THE MERITS OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE. HENCE, THE ARGENTINES ARE LOOKING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO OBLIGE US TO BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS ON GROUNDS WHICH WOULD AWARD GAME, SET AND MATCH TO THEM DIPLOMATICALLY. THIS COULD EXPLAIN THEIR CURRENT INSISTENCE THAT THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE UNITED NATIONS THROUGH THE INTERIM PERIOD. THIS PROPOSITION WOULD COMMAND MAXIMUM SUPPORT HERE AND, IF WE TURNED IT DOWN, THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE ABLE TO GO HOME AND CLAIM THAT THE BRITISH HAD REFUSED SOMETHING WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY REASONABLE TO THE WHOLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND WERE CLEARLY DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE MILITARY OPTION ONLY. THEY WOULD THUS NOT HAVE TO EXPOSE IN THE UN THEIR ACHILLES HEEL ON THE PREJUDGMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND WOULD FIND IT EASIER TO WRONG-FOOT US IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON AN UNCONDITIONAL CALL FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES COMBINED WITH A CALL FOR SOME FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE THIRD POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY CANNOT GET WHAT THEY WANT NOW, AND THAT THEY SHOULD PREPARE THE GROUND TO GET IT THE DAY AFTER THE INTERIM PERIOD EXPIRES. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THEY WOULD GENUINELY NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH US NOW, THUS BRINGING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE, MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL ETC PLUS AN INTERIM PERIOD UNDER UN ADMINISTRATION TO TERMINATE ON A FIXED DATE. BUT THEY WOULD REFUSE TO ACCEPT ANYTHING IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH ENVISAGED PROLONGATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. THERE WOULD THEN BE NO WAY IN WHICH WE COULD PERSUADE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT WORDING OUTSIDE THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PROLONG THE INTERIM PERIOD IF AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED BY THE TERMINAL DATE. THE ARGENTINES WOULD GET THE SOVIET UNION TO VETO ANY SUCH PROPOSITION ON THE GROUND THAT THE BRITISH WERE DEMONSTRATING EVEN BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD THAT THEY WERE PLANNING TO DRAG THEIR FEET, AS WE HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF DOING OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS. ALL THE ARGENTINES WOULD THEN HAVE TO DO WOULD BE TO INSIST THAT NO AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF BRITISH RECOGNITION OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION (OBVIOUSLY ACCOMPANIED BY A LOT OF PROMISES REGARDING THE WELFARE, ETC OF THE ISLANDERS). AT THE TERMINAL DATE, THE UN WOULD WITHDRAW BECAUSE IT WOULD NO LONGER

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD THAT THEY WERE PLANNING TO DRAG THEIR FEET, AS WE HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF DOING OVER THE PAST 15 YEARS. ALL THE ARGENTINES WOULD THEN HAVE TO DO WOULD BE TO INSIST THAT NO AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF BRITISH RECOGNITION OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION (OBVIOUSLY ACCOMPANIED BY A LOT OF PROMISES REGARDING THE WELFARE, ETC OF THE ISLANDERS). AT THE TERMINAL DATE, THE UN WOULD WITHDRAW BECAUSE IT WOULD NO LONGER HAVE A MANDATE TO REMAIN, AND THEY WOULD WALK IN. IN THE MEANTIME, THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN ENGINEERING A BIG MAJORITY FOR A RESOLUTION AT THE FORTHCOMING REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, EG IN NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER, AFFIRMING THAT THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE DECOLONISED AND PASS TO THEIR SOVEREIGNTY WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS.

5. I SHOULD SAY AT THIS POINT THAT, ALTHOUGH UN ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE IN ITSELF OF ARGENTINE GOOD BEHAVIOUR DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, I STRONGLY DOUBT WHETHER THEY WOULD ACTUALLY INVADE AND THROW OUT THE UN (AS NASSER DID WITH UNEF IN 1967) WHILE THEY WERE NEGOTIATING UNDER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AUSPICES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH THEY HAD SIGNED AND WHICH HAD BEEN ENDORSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. TO DO THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE TOO CATASTROPHIC EVEN FOR THEIR REPUTATION. BUT, AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, THEY WOULD NOT BE SLOW TO FILL THE VACUUM WHICH WOULD RESULT THE DAY AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE INTERIM PERIOD IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED.

6. WHAT SHOULD OUR TACTICS BE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS? FIRST, WE MUST CONTINUE TO SHOW A POSITIVE, SINCERE AND URGENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NEGOTIATIONS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS IN MY VIEW BEHAVING EXTREMELY WELL, AND HE IS AS SUSPICIOUS OF THE ARGENTINES AS I AM. OUR TETE-A-TETE SESSIONS ARE INVALUABLE.

7. SPECIFICALLY, I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD RETURN CONCRETE REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS IN PARA 10 OF MY TEL NO 679 INCLUDING A DRAFT SCHEDULE FOR QUOTE SIMULTANEOUS UNQUOTE WITHDRAWAL, CEASEFIRE, LIFTING OF EXCLUSION ZONES, ECONOMIC MEASURES, ETC. FOR THE MOMENT, WE CAN POCKET WHAT ROS HAS SAID ABOUT ACCEPTING THAT THE PROVISIONAL MEASURES ARE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES. I HAVE MADE CLEAR TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND HIS STAFF THAT OUR ULTIMATE ACCEPTANCE OF ARGENTINE GOOD FAITH ON THIS POINT WILL DEPEND ON THE VALIDITY OF THEIR FINAL RESPONSE, IE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANYTHING ON THE SAY SO OF CIVILIAN OFFICIALS.

8. THE TRICKY POINT AT THIS MOMENT, AS I HAVE SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, IS OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. I UNDERSTAND FROM WASHINGTON TEL NO 1597 THAT OUR REASON FOR PREFERING THE CONTACT GROUP IS THAT IT WOULD BE THE BEST GUARANTEE THAT WE COULD GET NOT ONLY IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BUT TO FILL THE VACUUM IF WE FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT BY THE TERMINAL DATE. BUT I BELIEVE THAT IF WE STAND FAST ON THE CONTACT GROUP, THERE IS A

8. THE TRICKY POINT AT THIS MOMENT, AS I HAVE SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, IS OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. I UNDERSTAND FROM WASHINGTON TEL NO 1597 THAT OUR REASON FOR PREFERING THE CONTACT GROUP IS THAT IT WOULD BE THE BEST GUARANTEE THAT WE COULD GET NOT ONLY IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BUT TO FILL THE VACUUM IF WE FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT BY THE TERMINAL DATE. BUT I BELIEVE THAT IF WE STAND FAST ON THE CONTACT GROUP, THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL TRY TO MAKE THIS A BREAKING POINT AND TO SCORE HEAVILY AS I HAVE INDICATED. MY SUGGESTION IS THAT I MIGHT TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE TOMORROW (9 MAY). WE ARE PREPARED TO LOOK MORE CLOSELY AT THE POSSIBILITY OF UN ADMINISTRATION. BUT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE ISLANDERS, AS PROPOSED IN THE LATEST ARGENTINE FORMULATION; THIS IS A GREAT DEAL MORE RIGID THAN THE IDEAS THEY DISCUSSED WITH HAIG WHERE THE PROBLEM WAS THE DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF ARGENTINES WHICH THEY REQUIRED ON THE TWO COUNCILS. WE WOULD WANT THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD TO BE CARRIED OUT QUOTE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS UNQUOTE (THE UK VERSION OF THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS). (IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD SPELL THIS OUT IN MORE DETAIL, IE WOULD THERE BE A COUNCIL WITH FORMAL RULES OF PROCEDURE ETC AND AN ORGANIC LEGAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ADMINISTRATOR, OR WOULD HE ACT FOLLOWING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES?) I COULD TAKE THIS LINE AS AN EXPLORATORY MOVE WITHOUT CONCEDED OUR POSITION ON THE CONTACT GROUP FOR THE TIME BEING.

9. LOOKING A LITTLE FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, IF WE WERE TO ACCEPT UN ADMINISTRATION ON CONDITIONS WITH WHICH WE COULD LIVE, WE WOULD HAVE MADE A CONCESSION BY GIVING UP THE CONTACT GROUP. WE SHOULD EXTRACT A COUNTER CONCESSION FOR THIS. MY INCLINATION WOULD BE TO CLEAN UP THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS (WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN) AND ELIMINATE ANY PREJUDICIAL LANGUAGE SUCH AS REFERENCES TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS.

10. IF YOU COULD GIVE ME INSTRUCTIONS ON ALL THE ABOVE, THIS WOULD CARRY ME THROUGH TOMORROW'S NEGOTIATIONS. I REALISE THAT I HAVE NOT TACKLED THE ANSWER TO THE THIRD AND PERHAPS MOST SINISTER POSSIBILITY OUTLINED IN PARA 4 ABOVE. IT IS EXTREMELY HARD TO SEE A WAY OUR OF THIS DILEMMA. I SHALL EXPLORE IT AGAIN WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR STRICTLY TETE-A-TETE AND SEE IF HE HAS ANY IDEAS. IF WE SEEMED TO BE GETTING CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT, HE MIGHT JUDGE IT POSSIBLE TO INSERT SOMETHING WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR A CONTINUING PROCESS WITH UN INVOLVEMENT IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. I WILL REVERT TO THIS IN A FURTHER TELEGRAM, PROBABLY TOMORROW (9 MAY).

11. WE MUST NOT IN ALL THIS FORGET ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE OTHER DEPENDENCIES. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THE TIME HAS YET COME TO INJECT THEM INTO THE DISCUSSION.

PERIOD. I WILL REVERT TO THIS IN A FURTHER TELEGRAM, PROBABLY TOMORROW (9 MAY).

11. WE MUST NOT IN ALL THIS FORGET ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE OTHER DEPENDENCIES. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THE TIME HAS YET COME TO INJECT THEM INTO THE DISCUSSION.

12. I HAVE MORE IDEAS ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT DEPLOY A TRUSTEESHIP PROPOSAL. I WILL LET YOU HAVE THESE SHORTLY. FOR THE MOMENT I THINK WE SHOULD KEEP IT CLOSE TO OUR CHESTS (AND CERTAINLY NOT DISCUSS IT WITH THE RUSSIANS - MOSCOW TEL NO 260).

PARSONS

NNNN

1 YPIOL

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS

(30X3)

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
MR URE
MR GILMORE

ED/S AM D (FCO DIST + A/D F/I)
ED/DE D
ED/NEWS D
ED/UD
ED/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR REFERENCE
PS/CHANCELLOR)
SIR K COUZENS)
MR LITTLER)
MR HAWDEN)
MR PERETZ) TREASURY
MR ILETT)
MR McINTYRE)

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SAFT/DIO " "

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
SIR R ARMSTRONG " "

~~RESIDENT SECRET~~

(Copy passed to Emergency Staff)

P R 062320Z MAY 82
FM BDS WASHINGTON
TO RBDWC/MODUK
INFO RBDWCAB/CABINET OFFICE
RBDWDFA/FCO
BT

8/5 ?

C O N F I D E N T I A L
SIC UAO
CABINET OFFICE FOR ASSESSMENTS STAFF
UK CLASSIFIED

DIC FOR FALKLAND ISLANDS TEAM FROM BDILS(W).

1. A MEMBER OF THE BRITISH NAVAL STAFF HERE WAS TOLD BY RICHARD HALLORAN OF THE NEW YORK TIMES THIS AFTERNOON THAT A SOURCE HAD REPORTED THAT ARGENTINA IS ATTEMPTING TO PROCURE EXOCET MISSILES FROM LIBYA.

2. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO VALIDATE THIS REPORT BUT YOU MAY WISH TO FOLLOW IT UP.

BT

PART 14 ends:-

7 May 1982

PART 15 begins:-

8 May 1982

