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PREM 19/627

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PART 16.

Confidential filing.


Relations with Argentina.

Position of the Falkland Islands.

ARGENTINA.

Part 1: Sept 1979

Part 16: May 1982.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
11-6-82							
12-5-82							
14-5-82							
- Pt Ends -							
 <p style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">PREM 19/627</p>							

● PART 16 ends:-



Paris to Fco, tel 486, 14.5.82

PART 17 begins:-

Fco Sitrep (Detailed version) 0730, 15.5.82

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 13 May 1982, columns
952-1034

Signed Wayland Date 19 April 2012

PREM Records Team

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (36)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR ~~BULLARD~~ HANNAY
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
~~MR ADAMS~~
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
EMERGENCY ROOM
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~
HD/WED
~~LEGAL ADVISER~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)
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[Passed to E.R.]

ADVANCE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED
FM PARIS 131735Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 486 OF 14 MAY 1982

MY TEL NO 482: FALKLANDS : ASTIZ

1. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT ASTIZ IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 12 MAY, CHEYSSON SAID THAT AS SOON AS THE CAPTURE OF ASTIZ WAS KNOWN (SIC) THE FRENCH HAD MADE ENQUIRIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THE LATTER HAD CONFIRMED TWO HOURS EARLIER THAT DAY THAT ASTIZ WAS ONE OF THE PRISONERS. THE FRENCH HAD THEN MADE A DEMARCHE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REQUESTING THEM TO DELAY THE RETURN OF ASTIZ TO ARGENTINA. CHEYSSON SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO PROOF, THERE WAS MUCH EVIDENCE POINTING TO ASTIZ'S RESPONSIBILITY NOT ONLY FOR THE HORRIFYING TREATMENT INFLICTED ON HIS OWN COMPATRIOTS BUT ALSO FOR THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO FRENCH NUNS.

2. CHEYSSON CONTINUED: " IN A FIRST REPLY TO THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INDICATED THAT IT WAS COMMITTED TO RETURNING ALL ARGENTINE PRISONERS THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF URUGUAY AND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS IN THE SAME WAY AS THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT RETURNED ON 9 APRIL

OF URUGUAY AND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS
IN THE SAME WAY AS THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT RETURNED ON 2 APRIL
THE BRITISH PRISONERS IT HAD TAKEN ON THE FALKLANDS. WE DO NOT
KNOW WHAT ITS FINAL REPLY WILL BE, BUT GIVEN THE SERIOUSNESS OF
THE MATTER WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER ITS
POSITION.''

3. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS INTEREST IN ASTIZ OVER
THE PAST FEW DAYS.
FRETWELL.

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FM FCO 141720Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 14 MAY

AND TO ALL OTHER EC CAPITALS AND UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

WASHINGTON TELNO 1734: FALKLANDS: EC IMPORT EMBARGO

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE WHICH HAIG HAS SENT TO
COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS:

'AS YOU APPROACH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO RENEW THE IMPORT
EMBARGO ON ARGENTINA, I WANT TO BE SURE YOU HAVE THE AMERICAN
VIEW.

THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS HAS CONFRONTED US WITH AN
UNAMBIGUOUS CHALLENGE TO THE RULE OF LAW. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
EUROPEAN PARTNERS ACTED DECISIVELY IN DEFENSE OF A PRINCIPLE THE
EROSION OF WHICH CAN ONLY FOSTER DISORDER IN AN ALREADY DANGEROUS
DECADE. THIS WAS AND IS A CORRECT STAND. FOR OUR PART, ONCE
THE FUTILITY OF OUR DIRECT ROLE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES BECAME
CLEAR, WE MADE KNOWN IN CERTAIN TERMS THAT WE, TOO, STOOD ON THE
SIDE OF RIGHT AND WERE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO BRITISH
FORCES, IN ADDITION TO ADOPTING CERTAIN MEASURES OF OUR OWN
AGAINST ARGENTINA.

THE SITUATION TODAY IS FUNDAMENTALLY UNCHANGED. UN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED. ARGENTINA CON-
TINUES TO DEMAND A HIGH PRICE FOR THE REMOVAL OF ITS INVASION
FORCE FROM THE DISPUTED TERRITORY. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS NEGO-
TIATED IN THE BEST OF FAITH: BRITISH FORCES HAVE BEEN USED ONLY
BECAUSE ARGENTINA HAS YET TO OPEN UP A PATH TO A FAIR SETTLEMENT.
ANY WEAKENING OF SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM AT THIS JUNCTURE
COULD WELL BRING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A HALT AND THUS
PROLONG THE CONFLICT. I KNOW FROM MY OWN DISCUSSIONS IN BUENOS
AIRES THAT LIFTING OF THIRD COUNTRY SANCTIONS IS AN IMPORTANT
NEGOTIATING POINT FOR THE ARGENTINES. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THIS

/INCENTIVE BE

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INCENTIVE BE PRESERVED. RENEWAL OF THE IMPORT EMBARGO WOULD HELP CONVINCING THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PAY FOR THEIR VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER UNTIL A SETTLEMENT IS REACHED.

NO LESS IMPORTANT IS HOW WE ARE BEHELD BY THE REST OF THE WORLD -- FRIEND AND ADVERSARY ALIKE. TO LOSE OUR RESOLVE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE IS SURE TO DAMAGE OUR INTERESTS AND OUR STANDING. TO LOSE OUR RESOLVE ON A MATTER OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IS TO INVITE AN ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS LOSS OF RESPECT.

THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS TRAGIC FOR ALL OF US -- MOST OF ALL FOR OUR BRITISH PARTNERS. OUR CONTINUED COHESION IS ESSENTIAL IF WE WANT TO SEE THIS TRAGEDY END BEFORE IT WORSENS. I AM WELL AWARE THAT THIS IS A DIFFICULT QUESTION FOR YOU. WHILE EACH COUNTRY MUST OF COURSE DECIDE FOR ITSELF, I FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GIVE YOU OUR VIEW IN THE SPIRIT OF CANDOR WHICH OUR FRIENDSHIP MAKES POSSIBLE.'

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S E C R E T

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FM FCO 141545Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 14 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, BERNE.

FALKLANDS: PRISONERS OF WAR

COSTS OF SOUTH GEORGIA REPATRIATION:

1. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DISCUSS WITH THE ICRC THE SHARING OF THE COSTS OF THIS REPATRIATION WITH ARGENTINA UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION. OUR INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 118 IS THAT ASCENSION ISLAND SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PORT OF EMBARKATION. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD SUGGEST TO THE ICRC THAT MARTINAIR SHOULD SEND THEIR BILL DIRECT TO THE ARGENTINES OR, FAILING THAT THAT THE ICRC SHOULD DO SO WHEN THEY RECEIVE IT. YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT WE OURSELVES BORE THE COSTS FOR OUR MEN FROM MONTEVIDEO AND IT SEEMS REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT THE MAJOR COSTS OF THIS REPATRIATION PROPERLY FALL TO ARGENTINA.
 2. WE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER THE ICRC (AS OPPOSED TO THE PROTECTING POWER) IS THE APPROPRIATE CHANNEL FOR SETTTLING THE COSTS OF REPATRIATION THOUGH WE WOULD IN ANY CASE WELCOME THEIR VIEWS ABOUT WHAT IS THE USUAL PRACTICE IN THIS MATTER.
- CREW OF NAWAL AND FUTURE REPATRIATIONS:
3. FOLLOWING THE TAKING OF A FURTHER 24 ARGENTINE PRISONERS ON 9 MAY, WE ARE NOW LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY, ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS, THAT WE MAY HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR LARGER NUMBERS OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS OF WAR IF OPERATIONS CONTINUE. PLEASE TELL THE ICRC THAT WE ARE GIVING THIS PROBLEM SOME THOUGHT AND THAT WE SHOULD WELCOME ANY ADVICE THEY CAN OFFER.
 4. IT IS DIFFICULT TO FORECAST HOW THE SITUATION COULD DEVELOP. IT IS, HOWEVER, A POSSIBILITY THAT THERE MAY BE LARGER NUMBERS OF POWS WHICH, IN THE LIGHT OF OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION AND OF THE LIMITED DETENTION AND LOGISTIC FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, WE WILL WANT TO

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5439 - 2

REPATRIATE BEFORE THE END OF HOSTILITIES. INITIALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT POWS WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO BE HANDLED IN MUCH THE SAME WAY AS THOSE BEING REPATRIATED FROM SOUTH GEORGIA - OR POSSIBLY BY SOME OTHER AND MORE DIRECT METHOD WHICH WE ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING APROPOS THE NARWAL CREW ABOUT WHOM MOD HAVE MADE A DIRECT APPROACH TO THE ICRC AND A DECISION HAS YET TO BE TAKEN. BUT REPATRIATION VIA ASCENSION CAUSES US PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES, PARTICULARLY OVER ACCOMMODATION AND SECURITY. WE WOULD THEREFORE SEE ADVANTAGE IN REPATRIATING FUTURE GROUPS TO MONTEVIDEO USING OUR HOSPITAL SHIPS, BUT THIS WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION (ESPECIALLY ARTICLES 30, 33 AND 34) UNLESS ARGENTINA WERE TO AGREE. GRATEFUL FOR THE ICRC'S VIEWS. ICRC THOUGHTS ON THE HANDLING OF ANY SUBSEQUENT PRISONERS OF WAR, INCLUDING SICK AND INJURED, AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING MORE GENERAL POINTS WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL, IN PARTICULAR:

- A. NEGOTIATION WITH NEUTRAL STATES REGARDING ASSISTANCE IN THE SHAPE OF SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND RECEPTION FACILITIES.
- B. APPORTIONING OF COSTS UNDER ARTICLE 118.
- C. ICRC ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF BRITISH SERVICEMEN BECOMING POWS.
5. YOU SHOULD, OF COURSE, EMPHASISE THAT THIS APPROACH ON THE MORE GENERAL HANDLING OF POWS IS AT PRESENT INFORMAL AND ENTIRELY CONFIDENTIAL.

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 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK
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 CONFIDENTIAL
 FM MADRID 141321Z MAY 82
 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 273 OF 14 MAY

MY TELNO 272: SPANISH MEDIA COVERAGE OF FALKLANDS

I PAID A "COURTESY CALL" THIS MORNING ON ROBLES PIQUER, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SPANISH RADIO AND TV. HE IS A PERSONAL FRIEND, HAVING BEEN SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. WHILE EXPRESSING UNDERSTANDING FOR THE DIFFICULTY OF TRYING TO COVER IMPARTIALLY A FAST MOVING SITUATION, I SAID EXPLICITLY THAT WE WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE PRESENTATION OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS ON TELEVISION HERE. I GAVE HIM SOME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE OBJECTED BOTH TO THE LACK OF BALANCE IN THE COMMENTARIES AND TO THE MARKED PREFERENCE FOR PRESENTING ARGENTINE, BUT NOT BRITISH, MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS. THIS COULD NOT (NOT) BE EXPLAINED ONLY BY TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES ABOUT VOICE-DUBBING.

2. ROBLESPIQUER TOOK ALL THIS IN GOOD PART, POSSIBLY PERHAPS BECAUSE I WAS AT PAINS TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT I WAS

2. ROBLESPIQUER TOOK ALL THIS IN GOOD PART, POSSIBLY PERHAPS BECAUSE I WAS AT PAINS TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT I WAS MAKING AN OFFICIAL PROTEST AND ALSO BECAUSE I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO OFFER PERSONAL CRITICISM OF THE SPANISH TV CORRESPONDENT IN LONDON (VEYRAT). HE MADE A SPECIAL NOTE WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT UNCRITICAL TRANSMISSION TO THE SPANISH NATION OF ARGENTINE LIES, DESIGNED TO GIVE THE BRITISH FORCES AN APPEARANCE OF INHUMANITY, COULD HAVE A DANGEROUS IMPACT ON PUBLIC ORDER WITHIN SPAIN AND ON THE VALUABLE BRITISH TOURIST TRADE.

3. WE THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL METHODS OF COOPERATION ALONG THE LINES OF MY TELNO UNDER REFERENCE. ROBLES PIQUER UNDERTOOK TO EXPLORE URGENTLY WITH VEYRAT SOME WAYS OF IMPROVING VISUAL COVERAGE OF THE BRITISH POSITION. HE CLAIMED TO BE BY NO MEANS AVERSE TO SHOWING EXTRACTS FROM BRITISH MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS DUBBED INTO SPANISH. THESE WERE AVAILABLE FROM VISNEWS. HE ALSO LIKED THE IDEA OF SPANISH SPEAKING INTERVIEWS WITH PRO-GOVERNMENT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT SUCH AS GAREL-JONES.

4. ALTHOUGH A HARDLINER ON GIBRALTAR, ROBLES PIQUER HAS ENOUGH SENSE TO SEE THE DANGERS OF STIMULATING ANTI-BRITISH FEELING HERE. BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW SUCCESSFUL HE WILL BE IN SWINGING HIS HUGE AND TEMPERAMENTAL TEAM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. I RECOMMEND THAT THIS CONVERSATION SHOULD BE ACTIVELY FOLLOWED UP WITH VEYRAT IN LONDON IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT. IT WILL OBVIOUSLY BE IMPORTANT TO AVOID GIVING HIM THE INCORRECT IMPRESSION THAT I HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT HIM TO ROBLES PIQUER. THIS WOULD DO US NO GOOD WITHIN SPANISH TV.

PARSONS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 14/1358Z PJ/JJJJKZ



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 May 1982

Prime Minister

Agree to message at

Ray F ?

A.J.C. 17.
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Dear John,

Yes ✓

Thank you for your letter of 7 May enclosing a copy of a telegram to the Prime Minister from the Chairman of the British Community Council in Argentina.

//
/ This follows an earlier telegram from Mr Murchison to the Prime Minister, to which the Prime Minister replied on 13 April. I enclose copies of this exchange.

I enclose a further draft reply from the Prime Minister. This, like the earlier reply to Mr Murchison, should be telegraphed to the British Interests Section in Buenos Aires for them to pass on.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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OO BERNE (PSE PASS BIS BUENOS AIRES)

OP COPY

GRS 274

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FM FCO 131500Z APR 1982

TO IMMEDIATE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION, BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 9 OF 13 APRIL

1. MR G T MURCHISON, CHAIRMAN, BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL
IN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM
TO THE PRIME MINISTER:-

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER: ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY
COUNCIL, WHICH CENTRALISES THE CULTURAL, PHILANTHROPIC AND
CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES OF NATIVE BORN BRITONS AND PEOPLES OF
BRITISH DESCENT LIVING IN ARGENTINA, WHO NUMBER IN EXCESS OF
100,000 PEOPLE, WE RESPECTFULLY WISH TO POINT OUT THAT WE DO
NOT FEEL THAT OUR SITUATION HAS BEEN FULLY CONSIDERED OR TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM WHICH HAS ARISEN BETWEEN
ARGENTINA AND GREAT BRITAIN. ARGENTINA HAS ALWAYS SHOWN EVERY
CONSIDERATION TOWARDS THE BRITISH COMMUNITY ALLOWING IT TO RUN
ITS OWN SCHOOLS, CHURCHES, HOSPITALS, OLD PEOPLE'S HOMES ETC.
IN ADDITION MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY HAVE INTERGRATED
THEMSELVES INTO ALL ASPECTS OF ARGENTINE LIFE, PLAYING A
PROMINENT ROLE ESPECIALLY IN BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL CIRCLES.
IN SPITE OF THE DIFFICULT MOMENTS WE ARE LIVING THROUGH, THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC HAS CONTINUED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE
COMMUNITY AND ITS INSTITUTIONS WILL BE SAFEGUARDED AND NO
ANIMOSITY HAS BEEN SHOWN TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY BY THE POPULATION
AS A WHOLE. WE THEREFORE STRONGLY URGE YOU TO SEEK A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION TO THIS SITUATION AND GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE
STRONG BRITISH PRESENCE IN ARGENTINA AND THE SIZE OF THE COM-
MUNITY LIVING HERE. WE PRAY THAT THE LORD WILL GUIDE YOU IN
THESE DIFFICULT TIMES AND BLESS YOU AS A PEACEMAKER.

G T MURCHISON CHAIRMAN BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL IN THE
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.

ENDS

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MR HAWTIN }
MR PERETZ }
MR ILETT }

TREASURY

MR FULLER SAPU CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

Dear Mr Murchison,

Thank you for your telegram about the British Community in Argentina.

I recognise the consideration which Argentine governments have shown to the British community in Argentina, who have - I know - contributed much to the prosperity and development of that country. We have long valued our relations with Argentina.

You will understand, however, that there can be no question of our failing to respond to the unprovoked aggression by the Argentine Government in its invasion of the Falkland Islands and their dependencies, and its attempt to settle by force the long-standing dispute between us.

The Argentine action has been condemned by the UN Security Council, which has passed by an overwhelming majority a mandatory resolution calling on Argentina to withdraw, as well as by very many other governments around the world. It is our earnest hope that the Argentine Government will heed this call and withdraw its forces.

The British Government seeks a peaceful solution and will pursue all possible means of securing one. But there must be no doubt of our determination to re-assert British administration over the Falkland Islands.

I realise with deep regret that this situation may cause anxieties for British people living in Argentina. That is why we have been advising people to consider leaving the country by normal commercial means. It is, of course, for individuals to decide how to respond to this advice.

I earnestly believe that only firmness and resolution will contribute to the maintenance of the rule of law and the preservation of peace both in the South Atlantic and in the wider world.

With best wishes.

Margaret Thatcher."

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/teleletter/despatch/note
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Mr G T Murchison
Chairman
British Community Council
ARGENTINA

Copies to:

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your telegram of 6 May about the
Falkland Islands.

CAVEAT.....

We have worked tirelessly for a satisfactory
peaceful settlement. It remains our objective.

I recognise your concern at the escalation of
events in the South Atlantic in recent days. However,
the basic cause remains Argentina's refusal to withdraw
her forces from the Falkland Islands as she was required
to do by Security Council Resolution No 502. Nor must
we forget who first took to arms.

I am glad that the Argentine authorities and
public are to date behaving correctly towards the
British Community in Argentina. Indeed I should have
been dismayed if that were not the case. ~~Similarly you
can rest assured that~~ Every respect is being shown to the
people of Argentine nationality resident in this country.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/You say

You say that there is a growing feeling of indignation in Argentina. You should however recognise that there is also considerable indignation in Britain that Argentina should persist in defying the resolution of the Security Council, and in attempting to enforce Argentine rule on the Falkland Islanders. This action is in total disregard of the principles of international law and democracy which, as you know, we in Britain regard as vital.

It is in the wider interests of order and justice in the world, and to the benefit of all nations, that Argentina's aggression against the Falkland Islands should not be allowed to succeed.

MAY 1982

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

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LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
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HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
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FM STOCKHOLM 141100Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 086 OF 14 MAY 1982
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, PARIS, UKMIS GENEVA AND ASCENSION

YOUR TELNO 254 TO PARIS : FALKLANDS : ASTIZ

1. WHEN I SAW FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING ABOUT FALKLANDS HE WAS WELL PLEASED AT WHAT WE HAD DONE OVER ASTIZ. I STRESSED THAT HOLDING HIM DID NOT PREJUDGE ACTION AND WAS DESIGNED TO GIVE US TIME FOR REFLECTION. AT THIS STAGE WE HAD NOT AGREED THAT SWEDES COULD QUESTION HIM. POLITICAL DIRECTOR GENERAL, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, ACKNOWLEDGED FIRMLY (TO GET IT FIXED IN ULLSTEN'S MIND, I THINK) THAT THIS WAS POSITION AND THAT TODAY'S LOCAL PRESS HAD GOT IT WRONG IN REPORTING PROMINENTLY THAT SWEDES WERE BEING ALLOWED ACCESS.

2. ULLSTEN SAID CHEYSSON HAD PHONED HIM YESTERDAY ABOUT ASTIZ AND BOTH GOVERNMENTS WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH. RECOGNISING BALL WAS IN OUR COURT, HE WONDERED OUT LOUD WHETHER WE WOULD ALLOW JOINT ACTION WITH FRENCH : ALSO IF WE HAD PREFERENCE FOR SWEDISH DIRECT QUESTIONING OF ASTIZ AS AGAINST BRITISH INTERROGATION ON BASIS OF SWEDISH WRITTEN QUESTIONS. I SAID WE WOULD TAKE THESE QUERIES INTO ACCOUNT. FRENCH AND SWEDISH REQUESTS WOULD OF COURSE BE TREATED

ACCOUNT. FRENCH AND SWEDISH REQUESTS WOULD OF COURSE BE TREATED EQUALLY BUT I THOUGHT FRENCH PREPARATION MIGHT BE LESS ADVANCED THAN SWEDISH ONE. ULLSTEN ADDED THAT FRENCH CASE SEEMED WEAKER TOO.

3. ULSTEN ASKED IF I THOUGHT ASTIZ WOULD ANSWER QUESTIONS. I SAID PERSONALLY I WAS DOUBTFUL. MEANWHILE SWEDES EXPECT TO SEE ICRC INVOLVED (I HAD NOT THEN SEEN UKMIS GENEVA TEL NO 239)? ULLSTEN SAID ICRC HAD NOT BEEN HELPFUL WHEN WE HAD STEERED SWEDES TO THEM ORIGINALLY, BUT HE IMAGINED THAT IF QUESTIONING TOOK PLACE ASTIZ WOULD NEED SOMEONE WATCHING HIS INTERESTS.

MURRAY

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SENT/RECD AT 141150Z KJ/PJ

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 141930Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 752 OF 14 MAY.
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON.

MY TELS NO'S 748 AND 749: FALKLANDS.

1. FOLLOWING MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PUS THIS MORNING (14 MAY) I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I SPOKE WITH CONSIDERABLE VIGOUR AND EMOTION. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD BEEN CALLED BACK FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. I WOULD BE BACK IN NEW YORK ON MONDAY MORNING. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THESE CONSULTATIONS BEING COMPLETED BEFORE THEN I.E. ENABLING ME TO GET BACK ON SUNDAY. I URGED HIM NOT TO PRESENT HIS PAPER UNTIL HE HAD SEEN ME ON MY RETURN. IT WAS VITAL THAT MY MINISTERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WITHOUT FURTHER PREJUDICE FROM ANY SIDE. I URGED HIM TO CONVINCING ROS THAT WE WERE NOT PLAYING GAMES, THAT MY RETURN TO LONDON WAS NOT A PLOY DESIGNED TO BUY TIME, AND THAT IT WAS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST TO SIT TIGHT AND AWAIT MY RETURN.

2. I ADDED THAT I WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON. ATTEMPTS MIGHT BE MADE TO PERSUADE ME TO ACCEPT A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CALLING FOR MILITARY RESTRAINT OR SOMETHING OF THE KIND. AS HE KNEW, I WOULD HAVE TO REFUSE THIS FLATLY. SUCH AN ATTEMPT MIGHT CONCEAL A STRATEGY TO FORCE US IMMEDIATELY INTO OPEN COUNCIL EITHER THIS EVENING (UNLIKELY) OR TOMORROW (SATURDAY). IF THIS HAPPENED, I WOULD NOT RETURN TO LONDON AND MY GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO TURN ITS ATTENTION TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HIS INITIATIVE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY COLLAPSE AND WE WOULD NEVER KNOW IF IT WOULD HAVE SUCCEEDED. HE AND EVERYONE ELSE CONCERNED WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WITH THIS THOUGHT FOR THE REST OF THEIR LIVES.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR RESPONDED ADMIRABLY TO THIS ORATION. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT THINK OF PRODUCING HIS PAPER UNTIL AFTER HE HAD DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH ME ON MY RETURN. HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO HOLD EVERYTHING OVER THE WEEKEND. HE WOULD SEE ROS PRIVATELY AND FELT SURE THAT HE COULD CONVINCING HIM TO DO THE SAME. HE WOULD TALK TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO THE DO-GOODERS AND TROUBLE MAKERS TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THIS AFTERNOON'S DISCUSSION WOULD BE SHORT AND UNCONTENTIOUS. HE FULLY ACCEPTED ALL MY POINTS.

4. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD GIVEN ROS A HARD TIME YESTERDAY ON THE QUESTION OF ISLANDER PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT ANY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY COULD ACCEPT THAT PEOPLE SHOULD BE ROBBED OF THEIR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, AND THAT THERE COULD BE PARITY OF REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF NEARLY 2,000 PEOPLE ON THE ONE HAND AND ABOUT 30 ON THE OTHER. HE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT THE BRITISH MIGHT ACCEPT ONE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR BUSINESS COMMUNITY BEING INCLUDED IN WHATEVER STRUCTURE WAS AGREED. ROS HAD TAKEN THIS WELL. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD THEREAFTER RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A LATIN AMERICAN FRIEND OF HIS WHO WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE ARGENTINE DELEGATION. THIS PERSON OBVIOUSLY KNEW EXACTLY WHAT WAS GOING ON. HE HAD TOLD PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT HE WAS SURE THAT ARGENTINA WOULD SEE REASON ON THIS POINT.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE MIGHT HAVE A MORE DEFINITIVE MESSAGE FOR ME ON THIS QUESTION BEFORE I LEFT FOR THE AIRPORT TONIGHT. IF NOT, HE MIGHT TELEPHONE ME AT MY LONDON HOUSE TOMORROW (SATURDAY) MORNING.

6. SO FAR SO GOOD. I WILL REPORT THE SECURITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LEAVING FOR THE AIRPORT.

PARSONS

NNNN

SENT AT 150348Z

CAB/EDNB 009/15

OO EDINBURGH

GRS 870

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 141600Z
FM MOSCOW 141.40Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 279 OF 14/579
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO: 275 FALKLANDS

1. I CALLED ON SUSLOV, HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, AT HIS REQUEST AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL TODAY. HE MADE AN ORAL STATEMENT, HANDING OVER A TEXT OF WHICH THE FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION:

QUOTES IN CONNEXION WITH THE COMMUNICATION, TRANSMITTED BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ON 12 MAY 1982, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL TO STATE THE FOLLOWING.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO EXTEND THE ZONE OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, ARBITRARILY ANNOUNCING THE CLOSURE OF EXTENSIVE AREAS OF OPEN SEA TO THE MARITIME AND AIR TRAFFIC OF OTHER COUNTRIES. THESE ACTIONS ARE IN CLEAR CONTRAVENTION OF THE 1958 CONVENTION ON THE OPEN SEA AND, ACCORDINGLY, ARE CONSIDERED BY THE SOVIET SIDE TO BE ILLEGAL.

MOREOVER, EXTENDING ITS MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE BRITISH SIDE, EVIDENTLY, BY WAY OF DIPLOMATIC COVER HAVE SEVERAL TIMES COMMUNICATED "WARNINGS" TO US WHICH ARE WHOLLY INAPPROPRIATE AND HAVE THE AIM OF CREATING A FABRICATION ABOUT SOME KIND OF SOVIET "INVOLVEMENT" IN THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE CONFLICT OVER THE FALKLANDS (MALVINAS) ISLANDS. WHEREAS THE FACTS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DOES NOT GIVE THE LEAST PRETEXT FOR SUCH INVENTIONS, AND THIS IS WELL-KNOWN IN LONDON.

IN CONNEXION WITH THIS, I AM INSTRUCTED TO STATE THAT, THE "WARNINGS" AND "REQUESTS" OF THE BRITISH SIDE REFERRED TO ABOVE ARE ENTIRELY UNACCEPTABLE AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BY US OTHER THAN PROVOCATIVE AND NOT PROMOTING THE MAINTENANCE OF A NORMAL CLIMATE IN SOVIET/BRITISH RELATIONS. UNQUOTE S.

2. I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT THIS TO MY AUTHORITIES FROM WHOM ANY SUBSTANTIVE REPLY WOULD COME. MEANWHILE, I WISHED TO MAKE A NUMBER OF COMMENTS ON MY OWN AUTHORITY. SO FAR AS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR CLOSING CERTAIN SEA AREAS WAS CONCERNED, PRECEDENTS EXISTED AS THE SOVIET WIDE KNEW WELL. SEA AREAS HAD IN THE PAST BEEN CLOSED FOR GOOD REASONS. THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ACTIONS. AS TO MY COMMUNICATION OF 12 MAY, THIS HAD NOT NOTIFIED THE CLOSURE OF A SEA AREA. IT HAD BEEN A WARNING THAT IN A DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS SITUATION THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WISHED TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO AVOID AN INCIDENT. IT HAD BEEN MADE IN THIS SPIRIT ALONE. BECAUSE OF THE SURPRISING ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT I CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO RE-STATE THE BASIC FACTS OF THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BRITISH TROOPS ON BRITISH TERRITORY HAD EXPERIENCED AN UNPROVOKED AND ARMED ASSAULT BY ARGENTINE FORCES, BRITISH TERRITORY HAD BEEN UNLAWFULLY OCCUPIED AS A RESULT, AND IN DEFIANCE OF A MANDATORY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ARGENTINA CONTINUED TO OCCUPY THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. BRITISH FORCES WERE NOW EXERCISING THEIR INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE IN RESPONSE TO CONTINUED ARMED ACTIONS AGAINST THEM BY ARGENTINA. WE EARNESTLY WISHED TO SEE AN END TO THESE ACTIONS AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE. BUT, UNTIL THEN, THERE WAS A RISK OF FURTHER ARMED ACTION BY ARGENTINA AGAINST BRITISH FORCES ENGAGED IN LEGAL ACTIVITY. ARGENTINA WAS THEREFORE THE CAUSE OF A DANGEROUS SITUATION TO WHICH THE UK HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTED THIS RESPONSE TO BE CONTAINED AND NOT TO GIVE RISE TO INCIDENTS. THE MESSAGE WHICH I HANDED OVER ON 12 MAY HAD BEEN SENT IN A GENUINELY CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT. IT DEMONSTRATED THAT COMMON SENSE, THE NEED FOR WHICH ON BOTH SIDES SUSLOV HAD HIMSELF UNDERLINED. THE LANGUAGE OF MY MESSAGE HAD CONTAINED NO INSINUATIONS ABOUT SOVIET POLICY. IT WAS WITH SURPRISE AND REGRET THAT I NOTED THE LANGUAGE OF THE SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS.

3. SUSLOV SAID THAT HE HAD NO FURTHER COMMENT TO MAKE.

4. I REMARKED, BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATING A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET REACTION THAT I HAD HEARD OF THE MESSAGE FROM THE COUNSELLOR IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES ON 4 MAY ABOUT SOVIET FISHING VESSELS GOING TO THE RESCUE OF SHIPWRECKED ARGENTINE SOLDIERS. THIS SEEMED AN EXAMPLE OF THE SENSIBLE APPROACH WHICH WOULD HELP TO AVOID INCIDENTS.
KEEBLE

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL 34 141600Z

PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD
HD/S AK D
HE/DEF DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM SENT~~
~~RESIDENT CLARK~~
Hd of SAA

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)

[RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET] ✓

00 FCO (DESKBY 141600Z)

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 150

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 141600Z

FM DELHI 141352Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 468 OF 14 MAY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 427: INDIA AND THE FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING REPORTS IN THE INDIAN PRESS ON 11 MAY OF RAO'S STATEMENT IN KERALA SAMUEL CALLED ON DAULAT SINGH, HEAD OF THE WEST EUROPE DIVISION IN THE MEA ON 12 MAY TO SEEK A CLARIFICATION. SINGH SAID THE REPORTS NO DOUBT DISTORTED WHAT RAO HAD SAID AND THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY CHANGE FROM THE GOI'S POSITION OF 3 APRIL

2. I HAVE NOW ACTED ON TUR WITH RASGOTRA (RAO IS OUT OF DELHI). HE HAD NOT SEEN THE TIMES REPORT, BUT SAID THAT HEADLINES IN THE INDIAN PRESS THAT INDIA SUPPORTED ARGENTINA WERE MISLEADING. HE

HE HAD NOT SEEN THE TIMES REPORT, BUT SAID THAT HEADLINES IN THE INDIAN PRESS THAT INDIA SUPPORTED ARGENTINA WERE MISLEADING. HE ASSURED ME THAT INDIA'S POSITION REMAINED AS IN THE STATEMENT OF 3 APRIL AND THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO CHANGE IT. INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT HAD BEEN ISSUED TO ALL OVERSEAS INDIAN POSTS THIS WEEK.

3. I AM SATISFIED BY RASGOTRA'S ASSURANCE AND SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT LOBBYING BY THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR OR CASTRO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN MOVING THE INDIAN POSITION.

THOMSON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (7)

[7/15/82]

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD 2
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 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
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 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 MR ILETT) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

~~FM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

51

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ROME 141415Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NO. 268 OF 14 MAY 82
 INFO ROUTINE MOD (DS11 AND DS13)
 SAVING FOR INFO UKDEL NATO AND UKREP BRUSSELS

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 241 TO PARIS: ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES

- ON 11 MAY I HAD ALREADY ASKED INDELICATO (THE MFA UNDER SECRETARY WHO CHAIRS THE INTER MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE WHICH AUTHORIZES EXPORT LICENCES FOR ARMS) WHETHER HE HAD NOTICED ANY INCREASE IN APPLICATIONS FOR EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN ARGENTINA. HE SAID HE HAD NOT, ADDING HE HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE SYSTEM OF CONTROL THROUGH END USER CERTIFICATES ON WHICH THE ITALIANS INSISTED.
- ON RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR, I SAW INDELICATO AGAIN AS INSTRUCTED AND LEFT A PIECE OF PAPER. INDELICATO COMMENTED THAT, WHERE CONTRACTS EXISTED AND ITEMS WERE ALREADY PAID FOR, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO HOLD UP DELIVERY.

CONTRACTS EXISTED AND ITEMS WERE ALREADY PAID FOR, IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY DIFFICULT FOR THE ITALIANS TO HOLD UP DELIVERY. ITALY WAS AN IMPORTANT TRADITIONAL SUPPLIER TO BOTH VENEZUELA AND PERU, THOUGH IT HAD LITTLE BUSINESS WITH PANAMA. I SUGGESTED THE ITALIANS CONSIDER REMINDING LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OF THE IMPORTANCE OF END USER CERTIFICATES. HE SHIED AWAY FROM THIS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ACCUSING THEM OF DISHONESTY. HE DID HOWEVER, UNDERTAKE TO SEE THAT HIS COMMITTEE SCRUTINISED APPLICATIONS TO EXPORT TO THESE COUNTRIES WITH EXTRA CARE, PAYING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THEIR LEGAL STATUS AND THE VALIDITY OF THE END USER CERTIFICATES.

3. INDELICATO ASKED WHAT EXACTLY WAS MEANT BY OUR REQUEST NOT TO DIVULGE TECHNICAL INFORMATION RELATING TO EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH THE BRITISH FORCES (YOUR PARA 3, LAST SENTENCE). I SAID I ASSUMED THIS REFERRED TO ANY CASES WHERE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY ITALY TO THE UK WAS ALSO BEING SUPPLIED TO THE LATIN AMERICANS (A FRENCH EXAMPLE WOULD BE EXOCET). HE POINTED OUT THAT ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT WAS LIKELY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY MANUFACTURERES' INSTRUCTIONS.

4. FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

SIMPSON-ORLEBAR

BT

NNNN

V





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

TELEPHONE 01-218 9000
DIRECT DIALLING 01-218-2112

MO5/21

14 May 1982

Dear John,

As you know the Argentines have converted and designated their 10,000 ton survey ship BAHIA PARAISO as a hospital ship. They notified us of this through the Swiss authorities on 8 May.

It was clear from this intelligence that the Argentines are prepared to use the ship for military purposes in contravention of the appropriate Geneva Conventions (I attach at Annex A a note by FCO Legal Advisers prepared in consultation with the Attorney-General's Department, which defines clearly how a hospital ship should be used and treated).

In recent days, the BAHIA PARAISO has called in at the Port of Ushuaia on Tierra del Fuego. We have received some unsubstantiated intelligence that she may have taken on board large quantities of food, and possibly some weapons. This could be significant, in that we have reliable reports that the Argentine garrison on the Falklands is short of food. We suspect that the BAHIA PARAISO has now sailed from Ushuaia, possibly for Santa Cruz, but she could be diverted on passage to make a dash for Port Stanley. The ship could carry some 800 tons of food, which would represent 40 days supply of food for the 10,000 Argentine soldiers on the Falklands.

In consultation with FCO Legal Advisers and the Attorney General's Department officials of our two departments have been considering what action we might take, taking account of the Chiefs of Staff's view that it would be a significant setback for us if supplies of food on this scale got through to Port Stanley. Our 2 departments have agreed that:

- a. The International Red Cross should be invited through the Swiss authorities to dispatch a representative to inspect the BAHIA PARAISO, confirm that she is equipped and configured only for her role as a hospital ship, and remain with her for the duration of the conflict.
- b. The Argentine Government should be informed, again through the Swiss, that we have reason to believe the BAHIA PARAISO is undertaking tasks inconsistent with her status as a hospital ship, and informing them that our forces reserve the right to stop, board and search her to confirm whether or not this is so.

J Holmes Esq

c. The Task Force Commander should be informed of the problem and the action we have taken, and instructed that if the BAHIA PARAIISO is located within the Total Exclusion Zone he should:

1. Order her to stop for inspection.
2. Put an armed search party aboard to look for evidence that the BAHIA PARAIISO is being used for purposes contravening the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention governing hospital ships, e.g. carrying food outside her normal requirements or weapons or military supplies.

Telegrams and signals covering the foregoing actions have been dispatched.

The question which remains is what authority the Task Force Commander should have to attack the BAHIA PARAIISO if she refuses to stop or submit to search. It is clear that if our suspicions are well founded and the ship, because of its refusal to stop, actually got through to the Falkland Islands garrison, the consequences would be of very real military significance. The stock of food alone which the BAHIA PARAIISO could carry would add very greatly to the garrison's endurance. On the other hand, the agreement reached between FCO, MOD and Cabinet Office officials on the rationalisation of ROE (OD(SA)(82) 47) specifically precluded attacks on hospital ships. As the Legal Advisor's note makes clear, political problems surround the use of force especially if an attack resulted in the ship being sunk and with her the evidence that she was not acting as a hospital ship. The military view here is unambiguously that the Force Commander should have as a last resort the discretion to attack the BAHIA PARAIISO accepting the risk that she may be sunk.

If Ministers agree with the military advice it will, of course, be essential to have ready a carefully prepared public line to rebut the obvious allegations which will be made by the Argentine. Instructions on the need to brief embarked press immediately any incident takes place and guidance on the line to be taken would be sent to the Task Force concurrently with the amended ROE. It is clearly imperative that we should avoid being put on the defensive over this.

I shall be seeking the views of the Defence Secretary urgently on this point and should be grateful if you could bring it to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. We shall need to send further instructions to the Task Force Commander as soon as possible.

I am copying this to John Coles (No 10), to the Private Secretaries of other OD(SA) members and of the Attorney General, and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Gene Ridley
MISS JE RIDLEY
(Assistant Private Secretary)

Note on Hospital Ships
and rights in relation to them under the Geneva Convention

1. Under the Second Geneva Convention, hospital ships are "military hospital ships, that is to say, ships built or equipped by the Powers specially and solely with a view to assisting the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to treating them and to transporting them." (Article 22) Converted merchant vessels used as hospital ships may never be put to any other use during hostilities. (Article 33)
2. "A hospital ship may in no circumstances be attacked or captured, but shall at all times be respected and protected." (Article 22)
3. A hospital ship must not be used for any military purpose. (Article 30)
4. The parties to have the right to control and search hospital ships. "They can refuse assistance from these vessels, order them off, make them take a certain course, control the use of their wireless and other means of communication, and even detain them for a period not exceeding seven days from the time of interception, if the gravity of the circumstances so requires." "They may put a commissioner temporarily on board whose sole task shall be to see that orders given in virtue of the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be carried out." (Article 31)
5. "The protection to which hospital ships and sick-bays are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after due warning has been given, naming in all appropriate cases a reasonable time limit, and after such warning has remained unheeded. (Article 34)
6. A hospital ship may not possess or use a secret code for its wireless or other means of communication. (Article 34)
7. A hospital ship may, however, carry arms of the crew for the maintenance of order or for their own defence, and ammunition for this purpose, as well as arms and ammunition taken from the sick and wounded. (Article 35)
8. A hospital ship may carry equipment and personnel intended exclusively for medical duties over and above normal requirements. (Article 35)
9. This is important because it might be claimed that any materials loaded on the ship were of this character.
10. There are also provisions concerning medical transports, but these require that particulars regarding the voyage of the medical transport should be notified to the adverse power and approved by the latter. (Article 38) But this has no application here.
11. Article 31, set out in paragraph 4 above, gives guidance as to what can be done to the hospital ship, if it submits to search and cooperates.

12. The most difficult question is what the intercepting ship can do if the other ship declines to cooperate. It can fire a warning shot across the bows to require the ship to stop and to submit to search. It can send a boarding party, eg by helicopter. But if this is not possible, can the intercepting ship in the last resort fire at the hospital ship?

13. Legally this depends on whether it is or is not in fact a hospital ship being properly used. If in fact it is being properly used, firing at it to inflict damage would be unlawful; and any suspicions deriving from its loading or from its conduct during the interception go only to mitigate the breach of the Convention.

14. On the other hand, if it was carrying ammunition or supplies, even including food, outside its normal requirements and destined for Argentine forces, this would be use for a "military purpose" prohibited by Article 30, and it would be "acts harmful to" the UK which would, after due warning, disentitle it under Article 34 to protection.

15. The warning requiring it to comply with the instructions of the intercepting vessel must be clearly given, with a time limit for compliance if possible, and indicating that the intercepting vessel is exercising its rights under the Convention and that failure to comply will disentitle it to protection as a hospital ship.

16. The intercepting ship must use minimum force. It should aim to cripple and not to sink the hospital ship. If force were used on it, it would be essential to preserve the evidence establishing that there had been an abuse of its status as a hospital ship. A full record of the warnings and other action taken under Article 34 should be kept, on the basis of which it could be argued that the hospital ship had forfeited that status.

17. The above results from discussion with the Attorney-General and in particular he has approved the position set out in paragraphs 12 to 16.

HG Darwin

H G Darwin
Deputy Legal Adviser
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

14 May 1982



Die Aft

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

14 May 1982

Dear Brian,

FALKLAND ISLANDS, PERUVIAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

I attach a copy of a communication addressed to the Prime Minister by the President of the Peruvian Chamber of Deputies.

I see no reason why the Prime Minister should respond to it and I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be dealt with appropriately.

Yours mv,

John White.

Brian Fall Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Aft

Chamber of Deputies
Presidency

Lima, 4 May 1982

Of. No. 121

I have the honour of writing to Your Excellency for the purpose of informing the British Parliament of the text of the Agenda Motion approved by the Peruvian Chamber of Deputies, which reads as follows:

"The Chamber of Deputies agrees:- 1. - To condemn British aggression against Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Isles, which has caused grievous loss of life, disturbed the peace in the hemisphere and endangered world peace; - 2. - To proclaim that the strange attitude adopted by the Government of the United States of America in supporting an aggressive extracontinental power violates the principles of hemispheric solidarity and disregards the "Common Defence and Mutual Aid" Agreements binding it; - 3. - To recommend to the Executive Power that it exercises its constitutional powers and complies with the objectives laid down in the Preamble and Article 100 of the Fundamental Charter on Latin-American Integration by summoning the sister republics of Latin America to a meeting to review the present system of alliance and defence in the hemisphere and lay the institutional foundations of the Latin-American Community; - 4. To express its solidarity with the Government in its desire, which reflects the opinion of the Peruvian Nation, to see the immediate establishment of a just peace in the South Atlantic; - 5. - to reaffirm, at this testing time, its brotherly solidarity with the Argentine Nation and its wishes for the total realisation of its patriotic aspirations. - Lima, 4 May 1982".

Having taken the liberty of transcribing for Your Excellency the document approved unanimously by the Chamber of Deputies of which I am President, I am especially pleased to be able to take this opportunity to offer you the assurance of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

God go with you.

(signed)

Luis Pércovich Roca

President of the Peruvian Chamber of Deputies

To Her Excellency the Prime Minister
of the British Parliament
LONDON

Lima, 4 de Mayo de 1982

Of. N°

121

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a V.E. con el objeto de poner en conocimiento del Honorable Parlamento Británico, el texto de la Moción de Orden del Día aprobada por la Cámara de Diputados del Perú, cuyo tenor literal es el siguiente:

"La Cámara de Diputados, acuerda:- 1.-Condenar la agresión de la Gran Bretaña en agravio de la soberanía argentina sobre las Islas Malvinas, que ha ocasionado dolorosa pérdida de vidas, ha alterado la paz del Hemisferio y ha puesto en peligro la paz del Mundo;- 2.- Denunciar que la actitud insólita asumida por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, al apoyar a una potencia agresora extracontinental, vulnera los principios de solidaridad hemisférica y desconoce los Acuerdos de "Defensa Común y Ayuda Mútua" que lo obligan;- 3.- Recomendar al Poder Ejecutivo para que, en uso de sus facultades constitucionales y en cumplimiento de los objetivos que la Carta Fundamental señala en su Preámbulo y en su Artículo 100º, sobre Integración Latinoamericana, convoque a las hermanas Repúblicas de América Latina, a una reunión destinada a replantear el actual sistema de vinculación y defensa hemisférica, así como a echar las bases institucionales de la Comunidad Latinoamericana;- 4.- Expresar su solidaridad con el Gobierno, en la voluntad, que interpreta el sentir de la Nación Peruana, de ver establecido de inmediato una Paz justa en el Atlántico Sur;- 5.- Reiterar, en esta hora de prueba, su fraternal solidaridad con la Nación Argentina y sus votos por la total realización de sus patrióticos anhelos.-Lima, 4 de Mayo de 1982".

Al permitirme el honor de transcribir a V.E. el documento aprobado unánimemente por la Cámara de Diputados que presido, es singularmente grato para mí usar de la oportunidad para ofrecerle el testimonio de mis altas y muy distingui

///

/// das consideraciones.

Dios guarde a V.E.

Luis Pérez Vique

Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados del Perú

Al Excmo. señor Presidente del
Honorable Parlamento Británico
LONDRES

Mc/

0/0

RESTRICTED

SAPU(82) 20

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper issued at 1715 hours on 14 May 1982 contains suggested lines to take on the following -

1. Are we jeopardising military options by continuing to negotiate?
2. The negotiations in New York
3. Alleged differences within the Government
4. Why was HMS Sheffield not fitted with Sea Wolf?
5. Lt Cdr Astiz

Cabinet Office

14 May 1982

RESTRICTED

1. Are we jeopardising military options by continuing to negotiate?

- There has been comment in the press and elsewhere on the lines that we cannot "continue to work for a peaceful settlement indefinitely without jeopardising our ability to enforce a military settlement should negotiations fail" (Daily Express, 14 May). The Prime Minister said in the Commons on 11 May that "the fact of negotiations does not close off any military option" and Mr Pym repeated this during the debate on 13 May. We have been applying military, economic and diplomatic pressures in parallel to achieve our aims but have constantly restated our resolve to remove Argentines by force if necessary - ie we have continued to negotiate in the hope of reaching a satisfactory peaceful settlement while building up our military strength in the South Atlantic.

First, we established the Maritime Exclusion Zone which cut off supply by sea to the Argentine occupation forces. Second, we recaptured South Georgia - very efficiently and with no loss of life. Then, we stepped up our blockade of the Falklands with the Total Exclusion Zone which has isolated the Argentines on the Falklands. And we have taken effective measures to enforce the blockade - air raids on Port Stanley and Goose Green airstrips, naval bombardments, and most recently the sinking of a supply vessel in the sound between the islands. Our grip is now very tight indeed.

All our military measures not only increase pressure on Argentina to negotiate; they also weaken Argentine military capability. There are good military reasons for not launching a premature invasion. We have to build up to each stage of military action to ensure success and the minimum risk of casualties (cf the methodical preparations for D Day). There is no question of the Government allowing itself to be embroiled in protracted negotiations if there is a chance they might weaken our military capability or do anything to put servicemen at risk.

2. The Negotiations in New York

There is no further news that we can report. Negotiations continue. As Sir Anthony Parsons said last night "we are still in business". There is a wide gap still on some important points, and we cannot predict the outcome.

Argentine flexibility on sovereignty?

- The Argentine position is different every time we hear it. General Galtieri said yesterday to TV Eye that negotiations would be without precondition but then spoke of a pre-established outcome and the need for the Argentine flag to stay flying. On Wednesday Costa Mendez stated that all negotiations must lead to recognition of Argentine sovereignty, etc, etc.

3. Alleged Differences within the Government

The Government is absolutely united behind the policies which it has adopted. It remains our highest priority to achieve an early negotiated settlement if that is possible. If the Argentines' intransigence prevents this they know that we will not flinch from ending the crisis in another way. It is irresponsible to fabricate differences between Ministers by distorting verbal differences. There is no difference of substance on any of the issues we face, including the issue of Argentine withdrawal.

As Mr Pym said in the House "when they demonstrate that readiness to withdraw is a reality we shall feel able and willing to match this - in ways yet to be determined - by standing our own forces off from the area of conflict". Details are under discussion in New York.

4. Why was HMS Sheffield not fitted with Sea Wolf?

- Considered fitting Sea Wolf to Type 42 destroyers (Sheffield class) over ten years ago - and again some five years ago. But it was found to be impracticable to fit both the Sea Wolf anti-missile system and the Sea Dart anti aircraft system on the same Type 42 ship. The Sea Wolf system is deployed with the Task Force on the Type 22 frigates (Broadsword class).

There has been press speculation that Sea Wolf could have been available on Type 42s if the radar for the planned lightweight version had been ordered from Holland rather than from Marconi. This is not so. Whichever radar the Navy had chosen, the new system could still not have been in service for several years and, in any case, it is probable that design problems will still prevent Sea Wolf being fitted to Type 42s even when the lightweight version is available.

5. Lt Cdr Astiz

Following formal representations by Swedish and French governments, Lt Cdr Astiz has not been repatriated with the other prisoners captured on South Georgia. This is to give the Government more time to consider the views of these two friendly countries. Only decision so far taken is not to return him on the same flight as the other prisoners.

We have explained position to International Red Cross in Geneva who accept that decision to repatriate rests with Britain. We shall, of course, fully abide by Geneva Conventions.

Seen by pm

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(43)
(38)

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

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 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 MR BARRETT
 HS/S AM D
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/UND
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
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PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

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PS/SIR M PALLISER,)

PS/SIR A DUFF)

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DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 141935Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 753 OF 14 MAY 1982

YOUR TELNOS 390 AND 395: FALKLANDS: DRAFT AGREEMENT

1. A REVISED VERSION OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT IN MY TELNO 713 HAS BEEN PREPARED MAKING THE CHANGES SPECIFIED IN YOUR TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE (TEXT BY TODAY'S BAG TO FEARN EMERGENCY UNIT AND FREELAND, LEGAL ADVISERS). THERE ARE SOME OUTSTANDING POINTS ON WHICH I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS.

ARTICLE 6(1) AND (2)

2. IT EMERGED FROM SOME REMARKS BY AHMED ON 13 MAY THAT THE SECRETARIAT ENVISAGE TWO RESOLUTIONS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE FIRST AUTHORISING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ADMINISTER THE FALKLANDS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD AND CALLING FOR A REPORT ON HOW HE WOULD PROPOSE TO DO IT, AND THE SECOND SIMPLY APPROVING HIS REPORT. THIS PROCEDURE WOULD DEPART FROM THAT FOLLOWED IN THE CASE OF WEST IRIAN (WHERE THE SG PRODUCED HIS REPORT AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED ONE RESOLUTION IN EFFECT ENDORSING BOTH), BUT WOULD FOLLOW THE

SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED ONE RESOLUTION IN EFFECT ENDORSING BOTH), BUT WOULD FOLLOW THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN MOUNTING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. (EG SCRS 425 AND 426 SETTING UP UNIFIL, BOTH OF WHICH WERE ADOPTED ON THE SAME DAY). I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH ANY PROCEDURE WHICH PRODUCES THE RIGHT RESULT QUICKLY.

ARTICLE 6(4)

3. I SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE SHOULD BE ADDED:
"THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD CONSULT THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THROUGH THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERWISE, ABOUT THEIR INTERESTS, WISHES AND INTENTIONS FOR THE FUTURE".

ARTICLE 6(6)

4. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MAY FEEL THAT YOUR WORDING ABOUT HIS STAFF WOULD IMPINGE UPON HIS AUTHORITY AS THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER OF THE UN. HIS PROPOSALS ON STAFFING WOULD, OF COURSE, BE INCLUDED IN HIS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON IMPLEMENTATION AND SO WE SHOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO INFLUENCE HIM AT THAT STAGE.

ARTICLE 7

5. THE SG'S FORMULA (MY TELNO 728, PARA 2) IS "TO SEEK WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY THE COMPLETION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY 31 DECEMBER 1982", WHICH MAY BE AS GOOD AS, IF NOT ACTUALLY STRONGER THAN, "WITH A VIEW TO REACHING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND COMPLETING THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE TARGET DATE".

ARTICLE 8

6. THIS REMAINS A DIFFICULT ISSUE AND I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR REACTIONS TO WORDING ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:
"THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON SIGNATURE AND MAY BE TERMINATED AT ANY TIME BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THE UN ADMINISTRATION SHALL CONTINUE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MAKES A DETERMINATION THAT ALL EFFORTS AT REACHING A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 7 ABOVE HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED".

PARSONS

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OO EDINBURGH FOR PM'S PARTY

GR 550

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 142310Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 754 OF 14 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, MADRID, DUBLIN, ACCRA, KINSHASA, KAMPALA,
TOKYO, AMMAN, MOSCOW, WARSAW, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, PEKING.

MY TELNO 752: FALKLANDS.

1. THIS AFTERNOON'S (14 MAY) INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL PASSED WITHOUT MISHAP. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS AS GOOD AS HIS WORD AND SAW A NUMBER OF DO-GOODERS AND TROUBLEMAKERS INDIVIDUALLY BEFORE THE MEETING IN ORDER TO MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT HE TOO WANTED THE MEETING TO PASS AS UNEVENTFULLY AS POSSIBLE.

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR GAVE A BRIEF ORAL REPORT. THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REMAINED A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION, NOT ONLY FOR THE UN BUT FOR THE WHOLE WORLD. HE HAD RECEIVED MANY MESSAGES FROM WORLD POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND WAS GETTING A VERY LARGE POST-BAG. THIS SHOWED HOW MUCH HOPE AND FAITH WAS PLACED IN THE UN. ON 2 MAY HE HAD GIVEN YOU AND THE ARGENTINES CERTAIN IDEAS FOR AN AGREEMENT CONSISTENT WITH SCR 502. BOTH PARTIES HAD ACCEPTED HIS IDEAS AS A BASIS, BUT HAD RAISED QUESTIONS WHICH REQUIRED FURTHER CLARIFICATION. SOME OF THESE RELATED TO THE DETAILS OF WITHDRAWAL, THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS ETC. SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. A BROAD FRAMEWORK OF AGREEMENT WAS TAKING SHAPE, COVERING CEASEFIRE, MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL, AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THERE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE UN, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE ATTITUDE OF BOTH PARTIES HAD BEEN SERIOUS, REFLECTING THEIR SHARED INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT. THERE REMAINED, HOWEVER, DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE PROVING DIFFICULT TO BRIDGE. HE WOULD GIVE NO DETAILS. BUT A CRITICAL MOMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. AN ENDLESS EXERCISE WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE: TIME WAS NOT ON THE SIDE OF PEACE. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDITIONAL MOVEMENT QUITE SOON OR WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED WOULD BE IN JEOPARDY. HE WAS IN DAILY TOUCH WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WOULD CONTINUE TO REPORT FURTHER AS DEVELOPMENTS WARRANTED.

3. I SPOKE NEXT, PAYING TRIBUTE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR FOR HIS EFFORTS, CONFIRMING THAT WE WERE NEGOTIATING URGENTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH, AND INFORMING THE COUNCIL OF MY RECALL TO LONDON FOR CONSULTATIONS.

4/3/

4. ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, APART FROM GUYANA AND UGANDA, THEN SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. ALL EMPHASIZED THEIR CONCERN AND THEIR HOPE FOR EARLY RESULTS. DOOR (IRELAND) WAS HIS USUAL SENTENTIOUS SELF BUT THIS TIME HIS CLAPTRAP WAS HARMLESS. THE ONLY UNPLEASANTNESS CAME FROM DE PINIES (SPAIN) WHO ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU THE FEELING IN THE COUNCIL (WHICH IN FACT NOONE ELSE EXPRESSED, EXCEPT THE USSR) THAT A CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED DURING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS. HE DID NOT ASK THE COUNCIL TO TAKE A FORMAL POSITION IN THIS SENSE NOR FOR THE PRESIDENT TO ISSUE A STATEMENT, BUT HE HOPED THAT I WOULD MAKE THE POINT CLEAR TO YOU. I DECIDED NOT TO REPLY TO THIS, IN ORDER NOT TO OPEN UP A DEBATE. TROYANOVSKY (USSR) SAID THAT WHILE SUPPORTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS, HE ASSUMED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD REMAIN SEIZED OF THE QUESTION, THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IT INFORMED, THAT IF HE WAS SUCCESSFUL HIS SOLUTION WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL FOR ITS CONSIDERATION AND THAT IF HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET TO CONSIDER WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN.

5. THANKS TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S EFFORTS, WE HAVE THUS CLEARED ANOTHER HURDLE IN THE COUNCIL. BUT THERE WAS NO MISTAKING THE MEMBERS' NERVOUSNESS ABOUT HOSTILITIES IF AND WHEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS SHOULD FAIL. THE COUNCIL IS ALL SET TO SUPPORT A SIMPLE CEASEFIRE PLUS NEGOTIATIONS RESOLUTION IN THAT EVENT.

PARSONS

NNNN

DBY 150700Z

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MR WIRE
MR PRETT
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HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
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DESKBY 150100Z (CANBERRA WELLINGTON)
DESKBY 161430Z (WASHINGTON)
DESKBY 171430Z (OTTAWA).

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 142315Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 755 OF 14 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE
LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME UKREP BRUSSELS CANBERRA WELLINGTON
OTTAWA AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 740: FALKLANDS: BRIEFING OF COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS.

1. I SAW THE TEN AGAIN AT 1930Z TODAY (14 MAY).
2. MY BELGIAN COLLEAGUE TOLD ME BEFORE THE MEETING THAT SHE HAD BEEN LOBBIED TODAY BY ROCA (ARGENTINA). IT SUBSEQUENTLY TURNED OUT THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY SEEING ALL MEMBERS OF THE TEN HERE. THEIR LINE HAD BEEN:
(A) ARGENTINA WAS NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH:

HERE. THEIR LINE HAD BEEN:

- (A) ARGENTINA WAS NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH:
- (B) SANCTIONS HAD NOT HELPED THE BRITISH: THEIR EFFECT HAD SIMPLY BEEN TO CONSOLIDATE LATIN AMERICAN AND THIRD WORLD SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA: THEIR RENEWAL WOULD EXTEND THE CONFRONTATION AND HEIGHTEN THE NORTH/SOUTH CONFLICT:
- (C) THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION HAD BEEN RESOLVED AS A RESULT OF AN ARGENTINE CONCESSION:
- (D) THERE REMAINED THREE MAIN ISSUES:
- (E) THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE WAS THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, WHERE ARGENTINA WANTED A PURELY UN ADMINISTRATION, BUT THE BRITISH WERE INSISTING ON RETENTION OF QUOTE THE COLONIAL STRUCTURES UNQUOTE.
- (F) THE OTHER TWO WERE WITHDRAWAL, WHERE THE ARGENTINES HAD ACCEPTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS OR PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL, BUT THE BRITISH HAD NOT: AND THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WHERE THE BRITISH WERE REFUSING TO ACCEPT A DEADLINE, EVEN THOUGH ARGENTINA HAD BEEN FLEXIBLE IN EXPRESSING READINESS TO ACCEPT EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE BY A FEW MONTHS IF NECESSARY.

(THIS WAS CLEARLY A COORDINATED DIPLOMATIC EFFORT BY THE ARGENTINES HERE IN ADVANCE OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE'S MEETING, WITH THE OBJECT OF PUTTING US ON THE WRONG FOOT BY PRETENDING THAT WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING UP PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S NEGOTIATIONS).

3. I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN RECALLED TO TAKE PART IN MINISTERIAL MEETINGS OVER THE WEEKEND AT WHICH THE WHOLE SITUATION WOULD BE REVIEWED. I HAD SO INFORMED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS MORNING AND HAD PUT TO HIM THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT NOTHING SHOULD HAPPEN IN NEW YORK UNTIL I GOT BACK. I HAD ASKED HIM TO PERSUADE ROS (ARGENTINA) THAT THE UK WAS NOT PLAYING GAMES AND WAS NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH. HE HAD TAKEN THIS POINT. THE ONLY THING THAT COULD UPSET MY PLANS (LOOKING FIRMLY AT DORR) WAS IF ANYONE WERE TO FORCE A FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SEEK A CALL FOR MILITARY RESTRAINT. MEANWHILE, I HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON THE SUBSTANCE. BUT I DID WANT TO REAFFIRM THAT AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT WE FELT STRONGLY THAT THERE WOULD BE A SEVERELY DAMAGING EFFECT ON THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS IF THE COMMUNITY DID NOT EXTEND ITS SANCTIONS.

4. MOST OF THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION COVERED THE SAME GROUND AS THAT REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. I AGAIN SAID THAT PARTICIPATION OF THE ISLANDERS IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WAS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR US. I DECLINED TO BE DRAWN (BY THE FRG AND GREECE) IN ANY DETAIL ABOUT WHAT THE OTHER REMAINING POINTS OF DIFFICULTY WERE. DORR SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT ANYONE WOULD ROCK THE BOAT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS AT

GREECE) IN ANY DETAIL ABOUT WHAT THE OTHER REMAINING POINTS OF
DIFFICULTY WERE. DORR SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT ANYONE WOULD
ROCK THE BOAT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS AT
● Y RATE.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, WHYTE WAS BRIEFING MY CANADIAN, NEW ZEALAND
AND AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUES IN SIMILAR TERMS.

PARSONS

NNNNN

CAB/SAH 022/15

OO EDINBURHG FOR PM'S PARTY

GRS 420

SECRET

O 141930Z MAY 82
FM MODUK
TO RBDEC/CTF 317
INFO RBDW DFA/FCO LONDON
BT

S E C R E T
SIC 19F

OP CORPORATE-BAHIA PARAISO - STATUS

1. SINCE BAHIA PARAISO WAS DECLARED AN HOSPITAL SHIP BY ARGENTINA

ON 8 MAY, INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED WHICH SUGGESTS THAT HER ACTIVITIES MAY NOT COMPLY WITH ALL ASPECTS OF GENEVA CONVENTION.

IN LAST 24 HOURS THERE HAS BEEN INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT SHE MAY BE LOADING FOOD AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE ARG GARRISON IN FALKLAND IS.

2. APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR THE FOLLOWING ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER THREE ARTICLE 31 GENEVA CONVENTION IF

BAHIA PARAISO IS LOCATED WITHIN THE TEZ.

A. VESSEL IS TO BE ORDERED TO STOP FOR INSPECTION.

PAGE 2 RBDWC 4439 S E C R E T

B. VESSEL IS TO BE BOARDED BY ARMED PARTY WHO ARE TO INSPECT VESSEL WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO CRITERIA BELOW. MEDICAL OFFICER OR SENIOR MEDICAL RATING SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN PARTY.

3. FOLLOWING SPECIFIC ASPECTS SHOULD BE INSPECTED:

A. USE OF CRYPTO MATERIAL FOR COMMUNICATIONS OR EVIDENCE THAT RADIO HAS BEEN USED FOR TRANSMISSION OF MILITARY INFORMATION.

B. CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS OTHER THAN LIMITED PERSONAL WEAPONS FOR CREW SELF DEFENCE.

C. STORES PROVISIONS AND EQUIPMENT NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOR MEDICAL OR CREWS OWN USE.

D. CARRIAGE OF COMBATANT PERSONNEL.

E. RED CROSS MARKINGS ON ALL HELICOPTERS CARRIED AND NUMBER THEREOF.

4. WARNINGS HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO ARG AUTHORITIES THROUGH SWISS THAT IF BAHIA PARAISO IS OBSERVED IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE EQUIPPED, LOADED OR IN OTHER WAYS BEHAVING IN A MANNER CONTRAVENING THE RELEVANT PROVISION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION GOVERNING HOSPITAL SHIPS, WE SHALL NOT REGARD HER AS ENJOYING THE PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THAT CONVENTION.

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5. IF, WHEN CHALLENGED, BAHIA PARAISO DOES NOT STOP, SHE SHOULD BE SHADOWED AND REPORT MADE BY FLASH MESSAGE.

6. BAHIA PARAISO MAY REPORT HM SHIPS IN HER VICINITY TO COMBATANT UNITS. SPECIAL WATCHFULNESS REQUIRED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES

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OO UKMIS GENEVA

GRS 313

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 142130Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 170 OF 14 MAY

INFO BERNE, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK (FOR DS11 AND DS5)

THE ARGENTINE SHIP 'BAHIA PARAISO'

1. PLEASE APPROACH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS ON THE FOLLOWING MATTER.
2. ON 7 MAY WE LEARNED FROM OUR EMBASSY IN BERNE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAD NOTIFIED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) THAT IT INTENDED HENCEFORWARD DURING PRESENT HOSTILITIES TO DESIGNATE THE NAVAL AUXILIARY VESSEL 'BAHIA PARAISO' AS A HOSPITAL SHIP WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION. AS THE ICRC ARE WELL AWARE, THIS CONVENTION LAYS DOWN A NUMBER OF STRICT PROVISIONS WHICH ARE TO BE OBSERVED IF SUCH A SHIP IS TO ENJOY THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE CONVENTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.
3. WE NOW HAVE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT, DESPITE THIS NOTIFICATION AND THE VESSEL'S EXTERNAL MARKINGS AS A HOSPITAL SHIP, THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA MAY BE LOADING THE 'BAHIA PARAISO' AND IN OTHER WAYS EMPLOYING HER IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION.
4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FORMALLY REQUESTS THE ICRC TO APPOINT A REPRESENTATIVE TO INSPECT THIS VESSEL AND TO REPORT WHETHER SHE IS IN ALL RESPECTS COMPLYING WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION. WE ALSO REQUEST THAT AN ICRC REPRESENTATIVE REMAIN ABOARD THE 'BAHIA PARAISO' DURING ANY FUTURE ACTION BY THAT SHIP DURING CURRENT HOSTILITIES.
5. (FOR BERNE). PLEASE ASK THE SWISS TO INFORM THE ARGENTINES THAT WE HAVE MADE THIS COMMUNICATION TO THE ICRC. IN DOING SO, WE SHOULD LIKE THE SWISS TO ADD THAT IF THE 'BAHIA PARAISO' IS FOUND BY BRITISH FORCES WITHIN THE EXCLUSION ZONE ESTABLISHED AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS EQUIPPED, LOADED OR IN OTHER WAYS BEHAVING IN A MANNER CONTRAVENING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE

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GENEVA CONVENTION GOVERNING HOSPITAL SHIPS WE SHALL NOT (NOT)
REGARD THE 'BAHIA PARAISO' AS ENJOYING THE PROTECTION UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AFFORDED BY THAT CONVENTION.

PYM

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FAKLANDS SELECTIVE

LIMITED

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HD/PLANNING STAFF

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→ HD/ERD HD/ELD(E)

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DEP HD/PUSD

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

SIR I SINCLAIR

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

MR BARRETT

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MR WADE-GERY

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MR O'NEILL HD/ASSESSMENTS

DIO STAFF

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q.

CABINET
OFFICE

ON OTHER RELATED SUBJECTS, TAKACS:

- THOUGHT IT A HOPEFUL SIGN THAT NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UN NOW ARE IN THEIR THIRD DAY:
- EXPECTS A CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE WEEKEND:
- SAID HENRY KISSINGER WAS TO MEET PYM TODAY TO URGE THE UK TO YIELD ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE: ?
- REPORTED THE GARCIA BUSTILLOS-HEADED VENEZUELAN DELEGATION IN BUENOS AIRES WILL OFFER MILITARY AID -- BUT NOT TROOPS BECAUSE THE GOA HASN'T ASKED:
- STRESSED THAT ARGENTINA DOESNT WANT TO INTERNAIONALIZE THE WAR, SAYING, QUOTE AS YOU KNOW, WE'VE HAD OFFERS FROM OTHERS WHICH WE HAVE TURNED DOWN UNQUOTE
- SUGGESTED, THAT AS A SIGNAL TO THE LATINS THAT WE WISH TO AVERT THE GROWING BUILDUP OF ANIMUS AGAINST US, THAT THE US SEEK SOMEHOW TO RETURN TO A NEUTRAL POSITION BEFORE AN ACTUAL SETTLEMENT IS COMPLETED-- QUOTE EVEN IF SUCH A RETURN TAKES PLACE ONLY FIVE MINUTES BEFORE ANNOUCEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT UNQUOTE
- EMPHASIZED (AS QUIJANO ALSO HAS DONE) THE NEED TO LOOK BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM TO WAYS TO RE-BUILD HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY.

RETURNING TO THE PRESENT STATE OF HOSTILITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, TAKACS CCLAIMED THE GOA HAS BEEN OBSERVING A CEASE-FIRE FOR SOMETIME-- THAT THE ACTION AGAINST THE SHEFFIELD WAS ONLY IN RETALIATION FOR THE BELGRANO. HE ALSO SAID THAT CONTINUED BRITISH SHEELLING COULD BE A DISASTER, PROVOKING AN ESCALATION IN HOSTILITIES. HE SAID THUS FAR TEN ISLANDERS HAD BEEN KILLED: MANY MORE WERE IN PERIL IF THE BRITISH DO NOT STOP. HE SAID HE WAS VERY SKEPTICAL THAT BY CONTINUOUS SHELLING THE UK IMPROVES CHANCES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ALTHOUGH NO DOUBT THE BRITISH HAVE A DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT. HE SAID THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS GO ON OVER THE NEXT WEEK OR LONGER AND THE BRITISH AT THE SAME TIME SHOW NO SIGNS OF HALTING, HE WOULD HOPE THE US WOULD WEIGH IN AND ASK THE UK TO STOP.

HENDERSON

NNNN

CAB/SAH 025/15

00 EDINBURGH FOR PM'S PARTY

GR 800
SECRET
DESKBY 142000Z
FM WASHINGTON 141817Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NO 1757 OF 14 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

1. I HAD A MEETING THIS MORNING WITH STOESSEL AND EAGLEBURGER. BREMER (HAIG'S ASSISTANT) WAS ALSO THERE. EAGLEBURGER TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT THE CONTENTS OF OUR CONVERSATION WOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE WHO HAD ACTUALLY BEEN PRESENT, BY WHICH HE MEANT THAT ENDERS HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY LEFT OUT.
2. STOESSEL SAID THAT HAIG HAD BEEN IN TOUCH FROM ANKARA BECAUSE HE WAS CONCERNED AT YESTERDAY'S DEVELOPMENTS, IE JEANE KIRKPATRICK'S INTERVENTION LEADING TO THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRIME MINISTER. STOESSEL AND EAGLEBURGER BOTH ASSURED ME THAT THEY HAD WORKED HARD ON THE PRESIDENT AND WERE CONFIDENT THAT BY THE TIME HE PHONED THE PRIME MINISTER, HE WAS IN NO DOUBT THAT IT WAS NOT WE WHO WERE BEING INTRANSIGENT. IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY DOUBTS REMAINING IN THE PRESIDENT'S MIND, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD DEALT WITH THEM.
3. STOESSEL WENT ON TO SAY THAT HAIG HAD ASKED THEM TO LET ME HAVE HIS LATEST THOUGHTS ON THE SITUATION AND ON OUR NEGOTIATING STANCE, WHICH WERE AS FOLLOWS:
 - (I) WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS NOT WE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE, OR HELD RESPONSIBLE, FOR ANY BREAKDOWN IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS IN NEW YORK. I SAID THIS WAS INDEED OUR AIM.
 - (II) WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE BASED ON PARITY OF TIME IN TERMS OF THE ABILITY OF BOTH SIDES TO REINSERT THEIR FORCES. THE US WAS WILLING TO GIVE WHATEVER HELP MIGHT BE REQUIRED IN TERMS OF VERIFICATION.
 - (III) THE FOCUS OF DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND NOT THE DEPENDENCIES. THIS HAD ALSO BEEN THE VIEW OF PRESIDENT FIGUETREDO OF BRAZIL.
 - (IV) THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA SHOULD BE THE CURRENT NEUTRAL FORMULA PUT FORWARD IN NEW YORK ON TUESDAY (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 728).
 - (V) AS REGARDS CONSULTATION WITH THE ISLANDERS, HAIG THOUGHT THAT THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE US/PERUVIAN TEXT: "ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS" WAS A GOOD FORMULATION AND THE BEST WE COULD HOPE TO GET.
 - (VI) AS REGARDS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, THERE SHOULD BE SOME KIND OF NEUTRAL FORMULA ON THE LINES THAT HE HAD FIRST PROPOSED IN LONDON, EG FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WOULD BE ENCOURAGED IN AN ORDERLY WAY, WITH THE CONSENT OF EACH PARTY REQUIRED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC STEPS. THE UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION COULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FORMULATING SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THIS FORMULATION WOULD PUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING SUGGESTIONS IN THE HANDS OF THE UN BUT WOULD GIVE US A VETO SHOULD THE ARGENTINIANS PERSUADE THE UN TO PUT FORWARD IDEAS WHICH WOULD CLEARLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. HAIG'S IDEA SEEMS TO BE THAT THIS LANGUAGE MIGHT BE INCORPORATED IN A SIDE LETTER RATHER THAN IN THE MAIN TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT.

4. I SAID THAT WE HAD NO GUARANTEE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD STICK TO THE FORMULA ON SOVEREIGNTY WORKED OUT IN NEW YORK. INDEED, PUBLIC REMARKS BY GALTIERI AND IGLESIAS ALREADY PUT THIS IN DOUBT. BUT THERE WERE OTHER VITAL ISSUES, INCLUDING, NOT JUST THE KEY ONES OF THE ROLE OF THE ISLANDERS AND THE NEED TO PREVENT THE ARGENTINIANS FROM SIMPLY SWAMPING THE ISLANDS WITH THEIR OWN PEOPLE, BUT HOW WE COULD ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NOT SIMPLY A CUT OFF POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OR SOME THEORETICAL EXTENSION OF THE NEGOTIATING PERIOD WHICH COULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY ARGENTINA. WE NEEDED SOME GUARANTEE THAT ARGENTINA COULD NOT ORDER THE UN OUT AT THE END OF THE YEAR AND REOCCUPY THE ISLANDS. FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW THE US/PERUVIAN PLAN HAD BEEN IDEAL BECAUSE THE PRESENCE OF A CONTACT GROUP, INCLUDING THE US, HAD EFFECTIVELY PROVIDED THE GUARANTEE THAT WE NEEDED. STOESSEL AND EAGLEBURGER STRONGLY AGREED. HOWEVER, EVEN IF WE COULD GET BACK TO THE IDEA THAT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF A CONTACT GROUP OF COUNTRIES, RATHER THAN UN OFFICIALS, THEY DOUBTED WHETHER THE US WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE UNDER A UN PLAN BECAUSE OF ITS SUPER POWER STATUS. EAGLEBURGER MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE KIND OF GUARANTEE THAT WAS IMPLICIT IN THE US PRESENCE AS PART OF A CONTACT GROUP OF COUNTRIES WAS AS FAR AS THEY COULD GO. A SEPARATE, PRIVATE, US MILITARY GUARANTEE WOULD RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES IN CONGRESS.

5. DURING OUR TALKS, HAIG TELEPHONED FROM ANKARA ASKING TO SPEAK TO ME. HE SAID THAT, IF IT WOULD HELP, HE COULD MEET YOU IN LUXEMBOURG EARLIER ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON THAN AT PRESENT PLANNED (I BELIEVE YOU WERE DUE TO MEET AT 1900). HAIG WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO DO THIS AND IF IT CAN BE FITTED IN WITH THE TIMETABLE OF YOUR MEETING WITH EC COLLEAGUES I RECOMMEND THAT YOU RESPOND POSITIVELY. STOESSEL SEPARATELY GAVE ME A COPY OF THE VERY STRONG AND HELPFUL LETTER WHICH HAIG HAS SENT TO COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS URGING THEM TO RENEW THE IMPORT BAN. I UNDERSTAND A COPY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO YOU IN LONDON.

SEE MIFT.

HENDERSON

NNNN

OK ERE SOME MORE

CAB/SAH 026/15

OO EDINBURGH FOR PM'S PARTY

MS

GRS 250

DEDIP
SECRET
DESKBY 142000Z
FM WASHINGTON 141821Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1758 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLANDS

*Paragraph 1 deleted and retained under
Section 3(4).*

*Wayland
17 April 2012*

2. EAGLEBURGER AND STOESSEL WERE AS ANXIOUS AS WE ARE TO AVOID GETTING BACK INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT THOUGHT THAT THE PANAMANIAN, AMONG OTHERS, WOULD MAKE MISCHIEF. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT IF THE WRONG RESOLUTION WERE TO BE PUT FORWARD IN THE COUNCIL BRITAIN WOULD NO DOUBT VETO AND HE ASSUMED THAT THE US WOULD DO LIKewise. HE ASKED WHETHER WE WERE WORKING ON THE FRENCH TO KEEP THEM ON OUR SIDE, WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT IT WOULD HELP THE US TO VETO IF THE FRENCH WERE ALSO ON BOARD.

3. AS REGARDS JEANE KIRKPATRICK, EAGLEBURGER SAID SHE WAS SAFELY OUT OF THE WAY FOR THE MOMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA

HENDERSON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

Seen by PM 11

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 MR BARRETT
 HS/S AM D
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/UND
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE
 PS/HOME SECRETARY
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 PS/SIR M PALLISER,)
 PS/SIR A DUFF) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY)
 MR FULLER) OFFICE
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-)
 MENTS STAFF)
 DIO
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q.

GR 130

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 141825Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1759 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY BRASILIA

MY TELEGRAM NO 1745 (NOT TO BRASILIA): FALKLANDS: US/BRAZIL

1. WHEN I SAW STOESSEL THIS MORNING, HE TOLD ME THAT PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO WAS NO LONGER PLANNING, AS CLARK HAD TOLD ME YESTERDAY, TO SEND HIS CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE AS A SPECIAL EMISSARY TO BUENOS AIRES. STOESSEL HAD SEEN FIGUEIREDO OFF AT THE AIRPORT LAST NIGHT AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT FIGUEIREDO NOW THOUGHT THAT BRAZIL COULD NOT PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE UNLESS AN AGREEMENT WAS IN SIGHT. IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, BRAZIL MIGHT INFLUENCE ARGENTINA TO BE REASONABLE BUT AT PRESENT FIGUEIREDO THOUGHT THAT BOTH SIDES WERE TOO FAR APART.

HENDERSON

Seen by PM

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

47

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 ~~DOWNING ST~~ (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 MR ILETT) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

ERM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 142120Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1761 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS 11, DS 20):
 PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 982: FALKLANDS : US ASSISTANCE

1. BY AGREEMENT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT, WE AND THEY HAVE ANSWERED MANY ENQUIRIES ON THIS BY SIMPLY REFERRING TO MR. HAIG'S STATEMENT THAT THE US WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO REQUESTS FOR MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES
2. THE FORMULA IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE MAKES THE POINT THAT SOME US ASSISTANCE HAS ACTUALLY BEEN GIVEN. AGAINST THAT, THE DETAILS OFFERED SEEM LIKELY TO WHET THE MEDIA'S APPETITE: AND MAY NEED TO BE UPDATED TO REMAIN ACCURATE.
3. WE UNDERSTAND (TELECON HALL/GREGORY HOOD) THAT THE US EMBASSY WERE ALSO UNENTHUSIASTIC, AND HAVE PROPOSED A MORE LIMITED FORMULATION, AND THAT MOD HAVE SUGGESTED A REVISED

3. WE UNDERSTAND (TELECON HALL/GREGORY HOOD) THAT THE US EMBASSY WERE ALSO UNENTHUSIASTIC, AND HAVE PROPOSED A MORE LIMITED FORMULATION, AND THAT MOD HAVE SUGGESTED A REVISED TEXT.

4. AS SEEN FROM HERE, I DOUBT THE WISDOM OF PRESSING THE AMERICANS TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, WHEN THE TERMS OF HAIG'S STATEMENT COVER OUR NEEDS FULLY. WE CAN SURELY INDICATE IN GENERAL TERMS THAT THE US IS STANDING BY ITS COMMITMENT, WITHOUT OPENING PANDORA'S BOX ON DETAILS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

Seen by pm

CAB/SAH 028/15

OO EDINBRGH FOR PM'S PARTY

GRS 250

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 142200Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1762 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

1. JUDGE CLARK TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE HAD HAD AN APPROACH FROM SENATOR STEVENS WHO WAS THINKING OF PUTTING DOWN A RESOLUTION CALLING UPON THE BRITISH NOT TO ATTACK THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND. THE SENATOR HAD ASKED JUDGE CLARK FOR HIS REACTION. CLARK HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE SEEING ME SHORTLY AND WOULD OBTAIN MY VIEW.

2. I TOLD CLARK THAT SENATOR STEVENS SHOULD BE STRONGLY DISCOURAGED. IF SUCH A RESOLUTION WAS DISCUSSED OR EVEN TABLED IN THE SENATE IT COULD ONLY HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT IN THE UK. THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT MIGHT IN RETURN CONSIDER SOME RESOLUTION CALLING UPON THE US SENATE NOT TO INTERFERE IN OUR AFFAIRS, OR TO PUT IT LESS MILDLY, TO MIND THEIR OWN BUSINESS. BUT IN ANY CASE IT COULD DO NO GOOD. JUDGE CLARK UNDERTOOK TO SPEAK TO SENATOR STEVENS ACCORDINGLY.

3. I HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED SENATOR PERCY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS JUST LEAVING THE COUNTRY FOR 3 OR 4 DAYS BUT HE WOULD GIVE INSTRUCTIONS THAT A COMPLETE BLOCK SHOULD BE PUT ON ANY ATTEMPT BY SENATOR STEVENS TO TABLE SUCH A MOTION. HE REALISED IT WOULD ONLY DO HARM. THE MAIN EFFORT FOR EVERYBODY NOWADAYS SHOULD BE TO EXERT THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINIANS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

DUNIT AGEN LAST ONE WAS 29 RPT 29 NOT 28

CAB/SAH 030/15

Seen by pm

00 EDINBURGH FOR PM'S PARTY

GRS 80

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 150001Z
FM WASHINGTON 142232Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1770 OF 14 MAY

MY TELNO 1757 AND TELECON WALL/PRIVATE OFFICE:
FALKLANDS : MEETING WITH HAIG IN LUXEMBOURG

1. WE HAVE TOLD HAIG'S OFFICE THAT YOU COULD MEET HIM A BIT EARLIER THAN PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED ON SUNDAY EVENING IN LUXEMBOURG AND HAVE PROPOSED 1830 HOURS. WE HAVE EXPLAINED THAT YOU WILL BE UNABLE TO LEAVE LONDON BEFORE LUNCHTIME AND THAT YOU MAY BE GOING STRAIGHT INTO A MEETING OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS.
2. WE HAVE LEFT IT THAT, SHOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU AND HAIG TO MEET EARLIER THAN 1830, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE WORKED OUT ON THE SPOT. HAIG HIMSELF IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN LUXEMBOURG AT ABOUT 1400 HOURS LOCAL TIME

HENDERSON

NNNN

CAB/SAH 031/15

ZZ EDINBURGH FOR PM'S PARTY

GRS 900

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 150145Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1773 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: GENERAL WALTERS' VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES

1. GENERT TTM

1. GENERAL WALTERS PHONED ME ON HIS RETURN FROM BUENOS AIRES TO APOLOGIES FOR HIS UNHELPFUL REMARKS ABOUT BRITISH AND ARGENTINE POLICY ON THE FALKLANDS (MY TELNO 1729). HE WAS A GREAT ADMIRER OF THE PRIME MINISTER, AND WAS DEEPLY DISTRESSED THAT HIS REMARKS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED OFFENCE IN LONDON

2. WALTERS WENT ON TO OUTLINE HIS VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES, THE MAIN PURPOSE OF WHICH HE CLAIMED WAS TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE TO AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA WHICH HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY US SUPPORT FOR THE UK. HE HAD FOUND THE ARGENTINE JUNTA THE MOST DIFFICULT PEOPLE HE HAD HAD TO DEAL WITH SINCE HIS ENCOUNTERS MANY YEARS AGO WITH MOSSADE.

3. EAGLEBURGER SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE THE MINISTER AN ACCOUNT OF THE VISIT, BASED ON WALTERS' REPORTING CABLES. WALTERS HAD BEEN EFFUSIVELY GREETED BY GALTIERI, WHO HAD THANKED HIM FOR COMING SO FAR. HE AGREED WITH THE AMERICAN DESIRE FOR AN HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT TO A WAR BETWEEN TWO FRIENDS OF THE US.

4. GALTIERI TOLD WALTERS THAT RECENT US STATEMENTS, PARTICULARLY BY WEINBERGER, HAD RAISED STRONG ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS IN BUENOS AIRES. HE CLAIMED TO UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR US BACKING OF THE UK, BUT HE FELT THAT THE AMERICANS COULD HAVE ADOPTED A LESS PARTIAL COURSE. WALTERS REMINDED HIM THAT HAIG HAD WARNED THE ARGENTINIANS SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE US WOULD HAVE TO SUPPORT BRITAIN IF ARGENTINA REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

5. WALTERS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WHAT HE FELT WERE THE TWO MAIN PROBLEMS IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, IE PREJUDGEMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF THE ISLANDERS IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. GALTIERI HAD ASKED WHAT GUARANTEE THERE WAS THAT ARGENTINA WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS AND THAT THE BRITISH WOULD SIMPLY NOT SPIN OUT NEGOTIATIONS INDEFINITELY: HE HAD TO HAVE SOMETHING TO REASSURE THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC ON THIS. WALTERS HAD REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE COULD GIVE NO PROMISE AS TO THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTACT GROUP OF THIRD PARTIES (SIC) WOULD QUOTE HELP THINGS ALONG UNQUOTE.

6. WITH REGARD TO ARGENTINE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WALTERS CLAIMED THAT THE ONLY WINNER OF WAR BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UK WOULD BE THE USSR. GALTIERI REPLIED THAT IF BRITAIN ASSAULTED THE FALKLANDS, ARGENTINA WOULD SEEK HELP FROM THOSE FRIENDS WHO HAD OFFERED IT, EXCEPT THE SOVIETS. THE ARGENTINIANS HAD ALREADY LOST NEARLY 400 MEN: THEY WERE PREPARED TO LOSE 40,000 IF NECESSARY.

7. ON MILITARY MATTERS, ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA (WHO WALTERS SAW SEPARATELY) ACCUSED THE US OF HAVING PROVIDED THE ROYAL NAVY WITH INTELLIGENCE ON ARGENTINE SHIP POSITIONS. ADMIRAL ANAYA CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINE VESSELS HAD ON FIVE OCCASIONS BEEN LOCATED OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF BRITISH RADAR AND THAT ALL THE EVIDENCE POINTED TOWARDS US ASSISTANCE. WALTERS HAD DENIED THIS. THE BRITISH HAD ADEQUATE DETECTION CAPABILITIES OF THEIR OWN (HE TOLD ME THAT HE REMINDED THE ARGENTINIANS THAT THEY HAD TAKEN ON A GREAT POWER).

8. AT A SECOND MEETING WITH GALTIERI, WALTERS GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE JUNTA (WHICH HE THOUGHT SEEMED COMPLETELY UNITED) WERE FLEXIBLE ON PREDETERMINATION ON SOVEREIGNTY (ALTHOUGH THEY STILL INSISTED ON A FIRM CUT-OFF DATE) AND EVEN ON THE CONTINUATION OF SOME FORM OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. HOWEVER GALTIERI WAS UNYIELDING ON ACCESS TO THE ISLANDS FOR ARGENTINE NATIONALS. WALTERS HAD EMPHASIZED THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE US WOULD HAVE ON THIS POINT. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF THE DEPENDENCIES, BUT WALTERS THOUGHT THE JUNTA WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THAT THEY SHOULD BE HANDLED SEPARATELY.

9. GALTIERI HAD ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE DISPUTE SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY MEANS OF A SUMMIT MEETING HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND COMPRISING HIMSELF, MRS THATCHER AND PRESIDENT REAGAN.

10. WALTERS FINALLY EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF US CITIZENS IN ARGENTINA: HE WAS TOLD THAT ARGENTINA WAS NOT IRAN AND THAT AMERICANS HAD NOTHING TO FEAR (PROVIDED THEY TOOK A LOW PROFILE). GALTIERI REPEATED THAT AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE UK WAS DEEPLY RESENTED, BUT WALTERS WAS ENCOURAGED THAT THE ARGENTINES SEEMED ANXIOUS TO MEND FENCES.

HENDERSON

NNNN

Seen by PM

NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES 1924

PS (67)
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
MR GOODISON
HD/RID
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/INFORMATION DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF
STATE RM 66 A/2 GGS

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

MR WOODFIELD
MR MARSHALL
MR G L ANGEL
MR HARRINGTON

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO

NO 10 DOWNING STREET -

... ..
... ..
RESIDENT CLERK

[passed NIO Belfast
and Dublin]

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 142240Z MAY 62
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1771 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE NIO LONDON NIO BELFAST
ROUTINE BIS NEW YORK DUBLIN

MY TELNO 1753 (NOT TO DUBLIN): NORTHERN IRELAND: VISIT OF
FRIENDS OF IRELAND

1. FOLEY'S OFFICE HAVE ASKED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE FOR LORD GOWRIE'S LUNCH TO BE HELD ON SATURDAY
29 MAY, RATHER THAN ON SUNDAY 30 MAY. THE REASON FOR THIS
SEEMS TO BE THAT DOUGHERTY AND SHANNON HOPE TO BE IN LONDONDERRY
ON THE SUNDAY. DOUGHERTY HAS FAMILY THERE.
SPEAKER O'NEILL HAS ALSO ASKED THAT THE GROUP VISIT HUME ON
HIS HOME GROUND.

2. WE REALISE THAT THIS REQUEST, AND THE REASONS FOR IT,
ARE IRKSOME BUT IF IT IS POSSIBLE FOR LORD GOWRIE TO CHANGE
THE DATE OF HIS LUNCH WITHOUT INCONVENIENCE, WE RECOMMEND

2. WE REALISE THAT THIS REQUEST, AND THE REASONS FOR IT, ARE IRKSOME BUT IF IT IS POSSIBLE FOR LORD GOWRIE TO CHANGE THE DATE OF HIS LUNCH WITHOUT INCONVENIENCE, WE RECOMMEND THAT WE RESPOND TO THE CONGRESSMEN'S REQUEST.

WE GATHER THAT THE US CONSUL GENERAL (MICHAUD) WAS TO HAVE GIVEN A LUNCH ON THE SATURDAY BUT IS HAPPY TO STAND DOWN HIS ARRANGEMENTS. HE WILL ANYWAY BE GIVING A DINNER FOR THE VISITORS THAT EVENING.

3. THE CONGRESSMEN'S PLAN IS NOW TO FLY FROM DUBLIN TO BELFAST EARLY ON SATURDAY, 29 MAY, ARRIVING AT ABOUT 1030. IF CARDINAL O'FLAICH WERE, AFTER ALL, TO BE IN NORTHER IRELAND (THIS DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE POPE'S VISIT TO ENGLAND GOES AHEAD) THE CONGRESSMENT WILL TRY TO SEE HIM EITHER IN BELFAST OR IN ARMAGH. IN THE LATTER CASE THEY WOULD LEAVE DUBLIN BY ROAD AT CRACK OF DAWN. FOLEY'S STAFF ASKED WHETHER BISHOP EAMES MIGHT BE INVITED TO LORD GOWRIE'S LUNCH. WE SAID WE THOUGHT THAT THE LUNCH WAS LIKELY TO BE THE OCCASION FOR A POLITICAL DISCUSSION AND THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO MAKE A SEPARATE ARRANGEMENT TO CALL ON EAMES.

HENDERSON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL 41+7

DB 141730

198515

Seen by pm

PS 6
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD 2
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM SENT~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 MR ILETT) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)
 FRM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

52

GRS 355

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 141730Z

FM BRASILIA 141600Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 163 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN

YOUR TELNO 107 (NOT TO BONN): MESSAGE FROM BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT

1. THIS MESSAGE MUST HAVE BEEN RELAYED TO THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY DIRECT FROM PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S PARTY WHILE THEY WERE IN WASHINGTON. INDEED, I WOULD GUESS THAT IT OWES SOMETHING TO FIGUEIREDO'S DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN WHICH, AS FORESHADOWED IN PAARA 4 OF MY TELNO 162, HE WILL CERTAINLY HAVE SPOKEN VERY PLAINLY OF HIS FEARS OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS GETTING OUT OF HAND.
2. THIS MORNING'S JORNAL DO BRASIL REPORTS UNDER A WASHINGTON DATELINE THAT PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO SENT A LETTER YESTERDAY TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT REQUESTING THAT HE SHOULD INTERCEDE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN ORDER TO INDUCE BRITAIN TO SHOW MODERATION IN THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT. THIS SEEMS AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY

CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT REQUESTING THAT HE SHOULD INTERCEDE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN ORDER TO INDUCE BRITAIN TO SHOW MODERATION IN THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT. THIS SEEMS AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY ROUNDABOUT WAY FOR FIGUEIREDO TO PUT HIS VIEWS TO THE PRIME MINISTER, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE DIRECT MESSAGE IN TUR. THE BRAZILIAN PRESS MAY, AS USUAL, MERELY HAVE GOT HOLD OF THE WRONG END OF THE STICK.

3. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S MESSAGE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE CONCERN IT VOICES IS DIRECTED PRIMARILY TO THE REPERCUSSIONS OF A FULL SCALE, AND PROBABLY BLOODY, BRITISH ONSLAUGHT ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WHICH IS NOW SEEN HERE AS IN IMMINENT PROSPECT. GIVEN THAT THE BRAZILIANS ARE, GIVEN THEIR PORTUGUESE ORIGINS, MUCH LESS PRONE TO BE SUBMERGED BY WAVES OF HISPANO-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY THAN THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA, I SUGGEST THAT PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S VIEW DESERVES TO BE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT. I NOTE FROM WASHINGTON TELNO 1731 THAT MR HAIG'S FRIENDLY WARNING, APPARENTLY ENDORSED BY PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO, REFERRED TO THE REPERCUSSIONS OF AN ATTACK ON THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND AND NOT OF ONE ON THE ISLANDS THEMSELVES. OBVIOUSLY, AN ATTACK ON THE MAINLAND WOULD BE SEEN HERE, AS ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA, AS QUITE DIFFERENT IN KIND, AND MUCH MORE SERIOUS IN IMPORT, THAN AN ATTACK ON THE FALKLANDS.

4. AS TO A REPLY, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER BE ADVISED TO HOLD OFF REPLYING UNTIL NEW DEVELOPMENTS MAKE A FRESH MESSAGE OPPORTUNE.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 141705Z ED//RD

SENT/RECD AT 141700Z ED//RD

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL 42 +7 *Seen by pm* ^{74 PIST}

(6)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
RESIDENT CLERK
HD of SED.

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2) ✓
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)
ARM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

GRS 230
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MADRID 141702Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 274 OF 14 MAY
INFO MOD DI3(WEST) WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR
(PERSONAL)

YOUR TELNO 155: FALKLANDS: SPANISH POSITION

I TOOK ACTION WITH CUENCA TODAY, ACCOMPANIED BY MAUD. I LEFT CUENCA IN NO DOUBT THAT ANY FURTHER STORIES OF SPANISH REPRESENTATIONS TO US ABOUT THE USE OF GIBRALTAR WOULD BE UNHELPFUL FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS. I ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT SPAIN'S FAILURE TO HIGHLIGHT THE ARGENTINE FIRST USE OF FORCE HAD NOT GONE DOWN WELL.

2. CUENCA ASSURED ME THAT THESE POINTS WERE FULLY TAKEN. DESPITE PRESSURE OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR A MORE CLEAR-CUT PRO-ARGENTINE STANCE HIS MINISTER WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY THE ISSUE CAUTIOUSLY AND AVOID MAKING ANY CONNECTION WITH GIBRALTAR, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE LISBON AGREEMENT AND OUR IMPENDING NEGOTIATIONS. CUENCA ADDED THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AGREED WITH US IN HOLDING

CUENCA ADDED THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AGREED WITH US IN HOLDING TO 25 JUNE AS THE NEXT STEP IN THE PROCESS. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAD EVERY INTEREST IN DEMONSTRATING ITS CONFIDENCE IN PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS AS THE MEANS OF RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. ANY FURTHER POSTPONEMENT WOULD LAY THE GOVERNMENT OPEN TO RIGHT-WING CRITICS ADVOCATING THE ARGENTINE METHOD.

3. AS AN EXAMPLE OF SPANISH SENSITIVITY CUENCA MENTIONED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED ON 13 MAY A REQUEST FOR A BRITISH CIVIL OVER-FLIGHT CARRYING 23 TONS OF LAUNDRY EQUIPMENT TO ASCENSION ISLAND. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAD RAISED NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT THIS. BUT HAD THE PRESS GOT HOLD OF IT, THEY COULD HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PLAY WITH WHAT THE PLANE MIGHT ACTUALLY CONTAIN.

4. AS SEEN FROM HERE, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF WE COULD AVOID THE USE OF SPANISH AIRSPACE FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPLIES IN RELATION TO THE TASK FORCE'S OPERATIONS, EVEN OF A CIVILIAN NATURE. THE SPANIARDS ARE HAVING TO TREAD A NARROW COURSE. BUT THEY CLEARLY DO NOT WISH TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES FOR US.

5. WE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACT ALSO ON YOUR TELNO 150 (NOT TO ALL).

PARSONS

[Passed TO ER]

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 14/1722Z PJ/TB

BB WOD DIRECT

bb ECO

WYDLO STCTP

PP SCOTTISH OFFICE FOR P.M.'S OFFICE.

GPS 182

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CARACAS 141500Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 14/5.

VENEZUELA AND FALKLANDS:

1. FOLLOWING A MINISTERIAL MISSION TO BUENOS AIRES THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT ARE SENDING FURTHER MISSION TO SEVERAL EUROPEAN CAPITALS AT GALTIERI'S REQUEST. DATES GIVEN ARE 15-29 MAY. AT PRESENT PLANNED ITINERARY IS SPAIN, VATICAN, WEST GERMANY, BELGIUM, HOLLAND AND FRANCE, POSSIBLY ENDING UP IN USA. MISSION WILL BE LED BY DR GARCIA BUSTILLOS, MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY, AND WILL INCLUDE THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER DR PAEZ PUMAR. THE GOVERNING COPEI PARTY, THE ACCION DEMOCRATICA OPPOSITION AND THE MAIN LEFT-WING PARTY MAS WILL ALSO BE REPRESENTED.
2. PURPOSE OF MISSION IS TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH ARGENTIA. IT WILL UNDEEDLINE APPARENT QUOTE FLEXIBILITY UNQUOTE SHOWN BY GALTIERI IN JOINT ARGENTINE/VENEZUELAN DISCUSSIONS IN BUENOS AIRES, IT WILL SEEK THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, AND IS CLEARLY AIMED AT ISOLATING UK FROM EUROPE. ITS MAIN IMPACT WILL PROBABLY BE ON INTERNAL OPINION HERE AS IT AT LEAST GIVES IMPRESSION THAT VENEZUELAN LEADERSHIP IS DOING SOMETHING POSITIVE.

SECONDE

NNNN

ABOVE SHOULD BE NUMBERED CAB/SAH 038/15

PS 6
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URB
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD 2
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 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
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 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 EMERGENCY ROOM sent
 RESIDENT CLERK
 Hd of WED
 " " WIAD

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 MR ILETT) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)
 RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

53

CONFIDENTIAL

FM THE HAGUE 141515Z MAY 82
 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 124 OF 14 MAY
 INFO ROUTINE CARACAS

FALKLANDS: BUNKERING/ REPAIR FACILITIES AT CURACAO

1. THERE HAVE BEEN PERSISTENT RUMOURS HERE, APPARENTLY STIMULATED BY A NEWSPAPER REPORT FROM CURACAO, THAT REPAIR FACILITIES FOR HERMES HAD BEEN REQUESTED FROM THE DUTCH IN CURACAO. LAST NIGHT WE HEARD REPORTS THAT OFFICIALS IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WERE CONSIDERING SUCH A PROPOSITION.
2. AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE SECOND CHAMBER, SCHAPER (D66) ASKED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEDE TO A REQUEST FOR BUNKERING FACILITIES AT CURACAO FOR THE TASK FORCE. VAN DER STOEL AVOIDED GIVING A DIRECT REPLY, SAYING THAT THIS WAS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.
3. I ASSUME THAT ANY DISCUSSION IN THE MFA IS A CASE OF DUTCH PRECAUTION TO CONSIDER IN ADVANCE WHAT THEIR REACTION WOULD BE TO A REQUEST FROM US FOR FACILITIES FOR THE TASK FORCE.

3. I ASSUME THAT ANY DISCUSSION IN THE MFA IS A CASE OF DUTCH PRECAUTION TO CONSIDER IN ADVANCE WHAT THEIR REACTION WOULD BE TO ANY REQUEST FROM US FOR FACILITIES FOR THE TASK FORCE. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER THERE IS ANY BASIS FOR THESE RUMOURS?

MANSFIELD

NNNN


CCN PARA 3 LINE 2 " WHAT THEIR REACTION SHOULD BE....

SENT/RECD 1532 DAS/DGB

NY CV570V2

BB 100

HVGC 000+TT



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

Seen by PM
x 37

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD
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 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
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 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 MR ILETT) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)
 §RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET§

ADVANCE COPY

52

RESTRICTED
 FROM MONTEVIDEO 141412Z MAY 82
 TO ROUTINE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 306 OF 14 MAY 1982.

ARGENTINA : SANCTIONS.

1. URUGUAYAN PRESS OF 12 MAY REPORTS THAT SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA ARE AFFECTING URUGUAY'S DEVELOPING FISHERIES INDUSTRY. IT STATES FIRST THAT SANCTIONS ARE RESTRICTING SPACE FOR SHIPMENTS TO EUROPE AS THIS IS NORMALLY AVAILABLE ON VESSELS WHOSE MAIN PORT OF CALL IS BUENOS AIRES. IT GOES ON TO SAY THAT, WITH THE LOSS OF EUROPEAN MARKETS, ARGENTINA IS PURSUING THE UNITED STATES MARKET MORE AGGRESSIVELY AND OFFERING PRICES WITH WHICH OTHER FISH EXPORTING COUNTRIES (INCLUDING URUGUAY) CANNOT COMPETE. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY HEARD FROM A LOCAL CONTACT THAT SIMILAR ARGENTINE POLICY WAS AFFECTING URUGUAYAN CORNED BEEF SALES TO UNITED STATES.

HUTCHINSON

42 + 7
ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

Seen By pm
IMMEDIATE [FYPIST]

(6)
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD
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HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)
RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 141650Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 751 OF 14 MAY
INFO KATHMANDU, NEW DELHI

YOUR TELNO 407 : FALKLANDS : GURKHAS

1. DOCUMENT A/AC.207/L.6/ADD.2 OF 1981 DOES NOT SEEM TO US TO BE THE RIGHT DOCUMENT TO QUOTE. IT WAS ONE SECTION OF A DRAFT REPORT, AND WAS SUPERSEDED BY THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/36/43 - SEE PARAGRAPH 35).
NOR DO WE THINK THAT TOO MUCH SHOULD BE MADE OF THIS PARAGRAPH WHICH IS ONLY A SUMMARY OF POINTS MADE IN A GENERAL DEBATE, LARGELY BY CHITURVEDI (INDIAN MFA LEGAL ADVISER) AND NOT QUESTIONED BY OTHER DELEGATIONS. DURING THIS YEAR'S SESSION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE, THE INDIAN SEAT WAS MAINLY EMPTY AND THE QUESTION OF THE RIGHT OF STATES TO RECRUIT NON-NATIONAL PERSONNEL FOR THEIR ARMED FORCES WAS NOT DISCUSSED DIRECTLY.
2. IN OUR VIEW THE IMPORTANT POINT TO MAKE IS THAT THIS YEAR IN THE COMMITTEE THERE WAS WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT THAT THE DEFINITION OF "MERCENARY" CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 47 OF THE FIRST HUMANITARIAN LAW PROTOCOL OF 1977 SHOULD BE ADHERED TO. THIS OF COURSE.

2000 BY 6/11
OF 'MERCENARY' CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 47 OF THE FIRST HUMANITARIAN
LAW PROTOCOL OF 1977 SHOULD BE ADHERED TO. THIS, OF COURSE,
DOES NOT INCLUDE GURKHAS.


PARSONS

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WALD 15/10

CONFIDENTIAL

5298 - 1



OO BRASILIA

GRS 394

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 141400Z

FM FCO 141145Z MAY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 121 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, ASCENSION ISLAND
MODUK (DS5, DS11)

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ (005313)

1. PLEASE SPEAK TO THE BRAZILIANS ON THE FOLLOWING LINES ABOUT THIS CASE.
2. AS THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WAS NOTIFIED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON 13 MAY (TEXT IN MIFT), LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ WAS NOT REPATRIATED TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER ARGENTINE PRISONERS OF WAR WHO LEFT ASCENSION ISLAND ON 13 MAY BY AIR FOR MONTEVIDEO. THIS FOLLOWED CERTAIN FORMAL APPROACHES MADE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT RESPECTIVELY. WE ARE OF COURSE WELL AWARE OF OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION ON PRISONERS OF WAR AND MINISTERS HAVE STATED PUBLICLY IN PARLIAMENT THAT WE SHALL OBSERVE THEM. THE APPROACHES BY THE SWEDISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS HOWEVER HAVE NATURALLY INTRODUCED A COMPLICATION. WE FORESEE A LIKELIHOOD THAT THESE GOVERNMENTS MAY WELL WISH EITHER TO REQUEST ACCESS TO LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERVIEWING HIM OR THAT THEY WILL ASK US AS THE DETAINING POWER TO CONSIDER WHETHER QUESTIONS COULD BE PUT TO LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ ON THEIR BEHALF POSSIBLY BY A PARTY SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS OR BRAZIL AS THE PROTECTING POWER. WE ARE AWARE THAT UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTION WE HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO PERMIT ACCESS TO A PRISONER OF WAR BY SUCH PARTIES.
3. WOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA IN PRINCIPLE BE WILLING FOR LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ TO BE ASKED WHETHER HE CONSENTS TO A MEETING WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN

1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5298 - 1

OR THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE: OR WHETHER HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE A REPRESENTATIVE OF A PARTY SUCH AS BRAZIL (AS PROTECTING POWER) OR THE ICRC ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE OR THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IN THIS MATTER? WE SHOULD APPRECIATE AN EARLY INDICATION OF THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF BRAZIL AS PROTECTING POWER WOULD ACCORDINGLY SEEK A RESPONSE FROM BUENOS AIRES ON THIS MATTER.

4. YOU SHOULD TELL THE BRAZILIANS THAT WE ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY KEEPING THE ICRC INFORMED OF THE INSTRUCTIONS WE HAVE SENT YOU IN THIS TELEGRAM.

5. (FOR UKMIS GENEVA) PLEASE EXPLAIN TO THE ICRC THE ACTION WE ARE TAKING WITH THE BRAZILIANS (AS ABOVE)

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE
LIMITED
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
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PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT

COPIES TO:
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF
LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR O'NEILL HD/ASSESSMENTS
DIO STAFF
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q.

CABINET
OFFICE

2
CONFIDENTIAL

CAB/SAH 032/15

ZZ EDINBURGH

FOR PM'S PARTY

GRS 500

S E C R E T

FM PARIS 141750Z MAY 82

TO F L A S H F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 502 OF 14 MAY 1982

YOUR TELNO 256 : ARMS SALES

1. I CALLED ON DORIN, DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS, ON 13 MAY AND MADE A FORMAL DEMARCHE ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELNO 241. I ASKED FOR FRANCE'S SPECIFIC COOPERATION ON A NUMBER OF CASES, STARTING WITH THE 4 EXOCET MISSILES FOR PERU.

2. I SAID THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN GRATEFUL FOR GUTMANN'S REPLY THAT THE SHIPMENT OF FOUR AM39S WHICH HAD BEEN DUE TO LEAVE CHATEAUROUX BY AIR SOME TIME LAST WEEKEND HAD BEEN STOPPED (MY TELNO 456). THIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN CONFIRMED TO OUR DEFENCE AND NAVAL ATTACHES BY THE DAI ON 12 MAY. WE HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN EXTREMELY CONCERNED THAT BLANC OF THE DAI HAD GIVEN A CLEAR HINT THAT THE CONSIGNMENT MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE SENT BY SEA, IN THE APPARENT BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD TAKE A MONTH TO GET THERE AND THAT BY THAT TIME THE NEED FOR THE EMBARGO ON ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE DISAPPEARED. I SAID I COULD NOT EMPHASISE TOO STRONGLY WHAT AN UNFORTUNATE IMPRESSION IT WOULD CREATE IN THE HIGHEST CIRCLES IN LONDON IF SUCH A SHIPMENT NOW WERE TO TAKE PLACE. IT WOULD APPEAR TO CONTRADICT THE WHOLE TENOR OF FRENCH POLICY IN SUPPORT OF BRITAIN. I ASKED FOR EARLY REASSURANCE ON THIS POINT. DORIN LOOKED SURPRISED AND SLIGHTLY WORRIED AND SAID THAT HE WOULD CHECK THIS CASE IMMEDIATELY.

3. THE DEFENCE ATTACHE SUBSEQUENTLY HEARD FROM A BRITISH CONTACT WORKING WITH SNIAS THAT THE AM39S WERE APPARENTLY ABOUT TO BE LOADED ON TO A FRENCH SHIP IN LE HAVRE BUT THAT BUREAUCRATIC FORMALITIES WERE HOLDING IT UP. WE PASSED THIS INFORMATION TO THE QUAI TODAY. THE HEAD OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN DEPT (FOUQUET) TELEPHONED BACK THIS

EVENING TO FIRST SECRETARY TO SAY THE QUAI ENQUIRIES REVEALED THAT THE SHIPMENT WAS INDEED TO TRAVEL BY SEA. FOUQUET SEEMED TO THINK THAT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE UK AND ADDED CONFIDENTIALLY THAT THE SHIP WOULD BE CALLING AT PIRAEUS.

4. I HAVE ASKED TO SEE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL URGENTLY. I RECOMMEND (AS ALREADY SUGGESTED BY TELEPHONE TO PRIVATE OFFICE) THAT THE MATTER BE RAISED WITH CHEYSSON IN LONDON TONIGHT.

5. SINCE WRITING THE ABOVE I HAVE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A MEMBER OF CHEYSSON'S CABINET (LIONNET). REFERRING TO MY REQUEST TO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND TO MY DEMARCHE YESTERDAY LIONNET SAID HE WISHED TO ASSURE ME THAT :
(A) THE FRENCH GOVT. TOOK OUR REQUEST VERY SERIOUSLY;
(B) THEY WERE URGENTLY EXAMINING FURTHER THE QUESTION OF THE 4 EXOCETS FOR PERU ;
(C) NO DELIVERY EVEN TO A THIRD PARTY WAS PROGRAMMED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. PRESSED TO SAY WHAT HE MEANT BY A " DELIVERY" LIONNET AGREED THAT EXPEDITION FROM FRANCE WOULD CONSTITUTE DELIVERY. FURTHER PRESSED ON WHAT HE MEANT BY THE " IMMEDIATE FUTURE" LIONNET SAID NO REPEAT NO DELIVERY WOULD BE MADE OVER THIS WEEKEND.

6. I SAID I WOULD REPORT THIS VERY LIMITED REASSURANCE, ?75 BUT I EXPECTED THAT I SHOULD RECEIVE FURTHER FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS TO RAISE THE MATTER AGAIN IN THE LIGHT OF WHATEVER MIGHT PASS BETWEEN YOURSELF AND M. CHEYSSON IN LONDON.

PETRIE

NNNN

CAB/EDNBOO3/15

OO EDINBURGH

GRS 394

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 141400Z

FM FCO 141145Z MAY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NKMBER 121 OF 14 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, ASCENSION ISLAND
MODUK (DS5, DS11)

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ (005313)

1. PLEASE SPEAK TO THE BRAZILIANS ON THE FOLLOWING LINES ABOUT THIS CASE.

2. AS THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WAS NOTIFIED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON 13 MAY (TEXT IN MIFT), LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ WAS NOT REPATRIATED TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER ARGENTINE PRISONERS OF WAR WHO LEFT ASCENSION ISLAND ON 13 MAY BY AIR FOR MONTEVIDEO. THIS FOLLOWED CERTAIN FORMAL APPROACHES MADE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT RESPECTIVELY. WE ARE OF COURSE WELL AWARE OF OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION ON PRISONERS OF WAR AND MINISTERS HAVE STATED PUBLICLY IN PARLIAMENT THAT WE SHALL OBSERVE THEM. THE APPROACHES BY THE SWEDISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS HOWEVER HAVE NATURALLY INTRODUCED A COMPLICATION. WE FORESEE A LIKELIHOOD THAT THESE GOVERNMENTS MAY WELL WISH EITHER TO REQUEST ACCESS TO LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERVIEWING HIM OR THAT THEY WILL ASK US AS THE DETAINING POWER TO CONSIDER WHETHER QUESTIONS COULD BE PUT TO LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ ON THEIR BEHALF POSSIBLY BY A PARTY SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS OR BRAZIL AS THE PROTECTING POWER. WE ARE AWARE THAT UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTION WE HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO PERMIT ACCESS TO A PRISONER OF WAR BY SUCH PARTIES.

3. WOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA IN PRINCIPLE BE WILLING FOR LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ TO BE ASKED WHETHER HE CONSENTS TO A MEETING WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN OR THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE: OR WHETHER HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE A REPRESENTATIVE OF A PARTY SUCH AS BRAZIL (AS PROTECTING POWER) OR THE ICRC ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE OR THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IN THIS MATTER? WE SHOULD APPRECIATE AN EARLY INDICATION OF THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF BRAZIL AS PROTECTING POWER WOULD ACCORDINGLY SEEK A RESPONSE FROM BUENOS AIRES ON THIS MATTER.

4. YOU SHOULD TELL THE BRAZILIANS THAT WE ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY KEEPING THE ICRC INFORMED OF THE INSTRUCTIONS WE HAVE SENT YOU IN THIS TELEGRAM.

5. (FOR UKMIS GENEVA) PLEASE EXPLAIN TO THE ICRC THE ACTION WE ARE TAKING WITH THE BRAZILIANS (AS ABOVE)

PYM

NNNN

SENT AT 15/0319

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION)

0700 14 MAY 1982

UN

1. Sir A Parsons' Tactics, 13 May: Sir A Parsons employed delaying tactics successfully. With the Secretary-General he spoke as instructed but did not make the points about South Georgia and the interim administration; he judged they would almost certainly have precipitated a breakdown. Sir A Parsons took the line that because of the emergency debate London had not been able to send definitive instructions on these two points. Both the Secretary-General and the Argentines accepted this.

2. Vacuum at the end of the interim period: Sir A Parsons told the Secretary-General that we could trust him but not the Security Council; might it not be possible to devise a formula under which if the Secretary-General affirmed both sides were negotiating in good faith, then the interim administration would remain in being unless the Security Council decided otherwise? The Secretariat said the Argentines were also concerned about Security Council involvement; the Secretariat draft contained no reference to the Security Council but would allow the Secretary-General to authorise an extension. The Argentines would accept this if only one such extension were allowed (possibly an extra month or two). Sir A Parsons said this condition would not be acceptable. The Secretary-General reported later that Ros, in private, had produced what the Secretary-General described as points which were a 'little more co-operative' on the vacuum and interim administration.

3. Secretary-General's Position: The Secretary-General is very worried and close to the end of his tether. He believes the ball is in our court; it is up to us to make some concession in response to the Argentine position on sovereignty. Also the Secretary-General is considering presenting a paper to both parties on 15 May giving a time limit of 3 days to make or break the negotiations.

4. Sir A Parsons' Assessment: Sir A Parsons judges that there is a very real risk that if we hold to our positions on interim administration and South Georgia and negotiations break down (which is very likely) there would then be no hope of us being able to place the blame for a breakdown on Argentina. Also he could not reasonably repeat his delaying tactics of 13 May.

5. Sir A Parsons proposes a modified tactic under which we would have to decide now to make a concession on South Georgia and accept, at least in principle, the Secretariat concept of a rectangle for withdrawal rather than a circle or circles, leaving only the interim administration as a major stumbling block. The Secretary-General might then be persuaded to bring out his paper leaving a blank space on interim administration and we would succeed in frustrating Argentine attempts to

wrong foot us.

6. Sir A Parsons will meet the Secretary-General today; an informal meeting of the Security Council begins at 2000Z. Sir A Parsons does not need instructions before the Security Council meet and provided he can give an assurance that instructions are on their way it might be possible to avoid serious problems in the meeting.

US

7. President's views: The President is very concerned about the worsening situation. The US has already impaired its relations with Latin American countries; and there would be serious problems in NATO if hostilities were intensified and this led to feelings in the UK that the US were not giving us sufficient support. But the President is completely on our side and the Americans are ready to do anything we want.

6. Background to Conversation with Prime Minister: The President paid heed to the Brazilian President's opinion that a British attack on the Argentine mainland would have far-reaching consequences inflaming the whole Latin American continent; and to Mrs Kirkpatrick's report that Argentina was being forthcoming on sovereignty and that a corresponding concession by the British would pave the way to an agreement. (See Sir A Parsons' report in UKMIS New York Telno 739 (at Flag A) and 74'). Sir N Henderson contested Mrs Kirkpatrick's garbled account of negotiations in New York and he suggests that we might turn her intervention with the White House to advantage by spelling out to the President what we would like him to do at this stage.

EC

7. France: On 13 May M. Cheysson said publicly that it would be dangerous to forecast what would happen on renewal of sanctions. HM Ambassador reports that there will be a meeting of Irish and French Foreign Ministers today. He suggests he should pass an oral message from the Secretary of State to M. Cheysson to say that we hope he will take this opportunity to stiffen Irish resolve on renewing sanctions.

8. FRG: Speaking personally Herr Genscher assured our Ambassador that the FRG would hold to its line that sanctions would have to be continued if no peaceful solution had been agreed by 17 May. HM Ambassador has also heard that the FRG may wish to limit extension to fifteen days.

9. Denmark: The Danes do not wish to prevent renewal of the ban but are holding to use of Article 224. They may accept a 14-day extension to allow national action under Article 224.

10. Ireland: No official decision has been taken on sanctions; this will depend on how the meeting/meetings go. The Prime Minister will decide Irish policy.

Washington
Telno 1746)

Washington
Telno 1745)

UKMIS
New York
Telno 741)

Paris Telno
83)

Paris Telno
83)

Bonn
Telno 440)

Copenhagen
Telno 126)

Dublin
Telno 149)

M (Brussels
Telno 176)

11. Belgium: The Belgian Prime Minister says that they will continue to support us wholeheartedly.

N
(Hague
Telno 120)

12. Netherlands: The Dutch favour extending the EC ban but in the light of other countries' attitudes they favour extension for a short period only.


13. For reference purposes UKMIS New York Telnos 731 and 733 are at Flag O.

Comment

14. Sir A Parsons's view is that the talks are now likely to break down (leaving us on the wrong foot) unless we can today offer some movement on South Georgia or on an interim administration. There has apparently been some Argentine give on the vacuum following the target date: but we do not have details. If progress is blocked, the Secretary General is considering putting forward his own paper on 15 May with a short time limit for response. There is an informal meeting of the Security Council at 2000Z today.

15. Decisions are needed on:

- (a) whether we should now offer further concessions in order to keep the talks going;
- (b) if so, whether this should be on withdrawal from South Georgia (as Sir A Parsons recommends on the basis of para 6(1) of UKMIS New York telno 733); leaving the question of interim administration for later treatment;
- (c) whether to accept Sir A Parsons's proposed tactic that he should not receive his instructions before the informal meeting of the Security Council;
- (d) whether, as suggested to Sir H Henderson by Judge Clark (Washington telnos 1745 and 1746), we should now set out clearly for President Reagan what we want from him, in order to prevent further wobble.


P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

14 May 1982

FALKLANDS DAILY SITREPS: SUBMISSION FOLDERS

There is a serious shortage of submission folders and dividers. Would recipients of the daily Sitrep please return folders and dividers to the Emergency Unit (FCO Downing Street West, Room 117A) as soon as possible after use?

14 May 1982

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AT 1600Z. I DESCRIBED WHAT I HAD HEARD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTIONS TODAY AND THE OPENING SALVOS IN THE EMERGENCY DEBATE. THESE CONFIRMED ALL I HAD SAID TO HIM YESTERDAY BOTH ABOUT THE NEED FOR HIM TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL REALITIES IN BRITAIN AND ABOUT THE EFFECT OF ARGENTINE STATEMENTS WHICHZ APPEARED TO CONTRADICT THEIR ACCEPTANCE HERE THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED. EVERY DAY COSTA MENDEZ OR SOME OTHER ARGENTINE SPOKESMAN REVIVED OUR DOUBTS. THESE KIND OF STATEMENTS MADE IT NONSENSE TO TALK ABOUT OUR ACCEPTING ARGENTINE GOOD FAITH, WHICH WAS ANYWAY DIFFICULT AFTER THE WAY THEY HAD BROKEN OFF NEGOTIATIONS AND INVADED THE ISLANDS.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, BECAUSE OF THE EMERGENCY DEBATE, YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO SEND ME DEFINITIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TWO MAJOR ISSUES WE HAD DISCUSSED YESTERDAY (IE THE DEPENDENCIES AND THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION). (PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE ALWAYS PREFERRED DELAYS TO BAD NEWS). I DID, HOWEVER, HAVE AN ANSWER OF SUBSTANCE ON THE RISK OF A VACUUM AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982 IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY THEN. THIS WAS NOT A PERIPHERAL ISSUE: INDEED IT WAS ALMOST AS ESSENTIAL FOR US AS THE QUESTION OF NON-PREJUDGEMENT. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE COULD BE GENERATED BETWEEN US AND THE ARGENTINES FOR IT TO BE SAFELY LEFT IN THE AIR. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT POINT TO THE UN, THE UK AND ARGENTINA. IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY THE END OF THE YEAR AND THE ARGENTINES THEN REINVADED THE ISLANDS, THE STANDING OF THE UN AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE DEALT A MORTAL BLOW: THE UK WOULD HAVE TO REMOUNT A MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION: AND THE ARGENTINES WOULD STILL BE FRUSTRATED IN THEIR DESIRE TO OBTAIN AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO ASK WHETHER THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD ANY FURTHER IDEAS ON THIS CENTRAL QUESTION.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES WERE PRESSING HIM FOR IDEAS ON IT. THE ARGENTINES WERE PREPARED TO LET HIM ASK FOR AN EXTRA MONTH OR TWO IF NO AGREEMENT WAS IN SIGHT AT THE END OF THE YEAR. BUT THEY WANTED TO GUARD AGAINST THE RISK THAT THE UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WOULD LAST FOR EVER. I SAID THAT WE COULD TRUST THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT NOT THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MIGHT IT BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE SOME FORMULA UNDER WHICH, IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

DECIDED THAT FURTHER TIME WAS NEEDED, BEING SATISFIED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WOULD REMAIN IN BEING UNLESS THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDED OTHERWISE? AHMED AND DE SOTO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES ALSO FELT UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT THE INVOLVING THE SECURITY COUNCIL (BECAUSE OF OUR VETO) AND THAT THE SECRETARIAT WERE WORKING ON LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD CONTAIN NO REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT WOULD PROVIDE THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE "FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH CAN BE EXTENDED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL". THE TROUBLE WAS THAT THIS FORMULA WOULD NOT MEET ARGENTINE CONCERNS, UNLESS IT SPECIFIED THAT ONLY ONE EXTENSION WOULD BE POSSIBLE. I INDICATED THAT THE LATTER CONDITION WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US.

5. I WAS THEN SUBJECTED TO A BURST OF RHETORIC FROM AHMED TO THE EFFECT THAT WE COULD NOT EXPECT THE ARGENTINES TO MAKE ANOTHER CONCESSION. THEY WOULD SEE THAT BY GIVING THIS PROMINENCE TO THE RISK OF A VACUUM, WE WERE "CRAFTILY" TRYING TO GET ANOTHER CONCESSION FROM THEM, WITHOUT OFFERING ANYTHING IN RETURN. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS ALREADY SUSPECTED IN SOME QUARTERS OF "PLAYING FOOTSY WITH THE BRITS". THESE SUSPICIONS WOULD BE CONFIRMED IF HE NOW TOLD THE ARGENTINES THAT WE WERE STALLING ON THE DEPENDENCIES AND THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION BUT ASKING THEM MEANWHILE FOR A CONCESSION ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982.

6. I DEALT VERY FIRMLY WITH THIS. I SAID THAT IF THE UN WAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY SHOW THEMSELVES CAPABLE OF LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM THROUGH LONDON EYES. I THEN REPEATED THE POINTS I HAD MADE YESTERDAY, READING OUT VERBATIM PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 733. AHMED HAD TO REALISE THAT THAT WAS THE LONDON VIEW. THERE WAS ALREADY TALK OF A "SELL-OUT" IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. THE UN WOULD FUEL THESE SUSPICIONS IF IT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS SYMMETRY OF RIGHT AND WRONG BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. PEREZ DE CUELLAR INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. BUT WE HAD TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM THROUGH HIS EYES. WORLD PEACE WAS AT STAKE. THAT WAS WHY HE WAS ASKING US FOR CONCESSIONS - NOT CONCESSIONS TO ARGENTINA, BUT CONCESSIONS TO PEACE. FAILURE OF HIS EFFORTS WOULD MEAN A BLOODBATH, ESPECIALLY IF WE BOMBED THE MAINLAND. HE WOULD NEVER FORGIVE THE ARGENTINES FOR THEIR USE OF FORCE AND HIS PURPOSE WAS TO OBTAIN IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNLESS WE WERE PREPARED TO MAKE THE SACRIFICE OF OFFERING SOME CONCESSION.

7. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD INVITED RCS TO SEE HIM, AT 2000Z TODAY AND WOULD TELL HIM WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT THE RISK OF A VACUUM AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982. I ASKED HIM TO ASSURE RCS THAT I WAS NOT PLAYING GAMES. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS OBVIOUSLY AFRAID THAT RCS WOULD BREAK OFF BECAUSE OF MY FAILURE TO MAKE ANY MOVE ON EITHER THE DEPENDENCIES OR THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. HE SAID THAT HE NOW FELT THAT BY SUNDAY (16 MAY) AT THE LATEST HE WOULD HAVE TO PRESENT SOME UN IDEAS TO BOTH OF US. HE RECOGNISED THAT ONE OR BOTH OF US MIGHT REJECT HIS IDEAS. BUT HE FELT OBLIGED TO TRY. HIS TEAM WERE NOW WORKING ON THE "CONCILIATORY IDEAS" WHICH HE WOULD PRESENT. IF WE HAD ANY NEW POINTS COULD WE PLEASE GIVE THEM TO HIM?

8. IN CONCLUSION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SUDDENLY BECOME VERY CONCERNED. HE WAS PUZZLED BY THIS. SOMETHING SEEMED TO HAVE HAPPENED. HAIG HAD TELEPHONED HIM YESTERDAY (12 MAY) TO ASK HOW HE WAS GETTING ON AND TO OFFER ANY HELP THE AMERICANS COULD PROVIDE. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD TELEPHONED HIS THIS MORNING WITH THE SAME MESSAGE. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME SHE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM FOR DAYS. SHE HAD SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS FOLLOWING THE MATTER CLOSELY.

9. I WENT OVER THIS GROUND ON THE TELEPHONE WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR PRIVATELY AN HOUR LATER AFTER TALKING TO NICKO HENDERSON. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM HAIG ON 12 MAY AND ANOTHER ONE ON THE SAME LINES TODAY (13 MAY) AFTER OUR MEETING. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD ADDED IN HER CONVERSATION WITH HIM THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT GET IN TOUCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE, PEREZ DE CUELLAR, HAD HAD NO CONTACT WITH THE WHITE HOUSE.

10. I HAD HOPED TO BRIEF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER THIS MORNING'S MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR. BUT I MISSED HIM AND SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO CONVENE THE COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 2000Z TOMORROW (14 MAY) TO DISCUSS THE FALKLANDS QUESTION TOGETHER WITH LEBANON AND SEYCHELLES.

11. I WILL TELEGRAPH MY COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS LATER TODAY.

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GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 131100Z MAY 82

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 396 OF 13 MAY

AND REPEATED FLASH TO WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAMS 731-3: FALKLANDS

1. I REALISE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. ALL HERE ARE AGREED THAT OUR IMMEDIATE PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO KEEP THE NEGOTIATIONS GOING, AT LEAST FOR SOME TIME YET. WHILE I UNDERSTAND THE VIEWS IN YOUR THIRD TELEGRAM, I SEE SCOPE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BEFORE MINISTERS ATTEMPT TO TAKE A DECISION ABOUT A PACKAGE COVERING ALL THE IMPORTANT OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, PLEASE PURSUE THE FOLLOWING MATTERS.

(A) YOU SHOULD MAKE FULL PLAY WITH THE CONTINUED STATEMENTS BY COSTA MENDEZ THAT ARGENTINA INSISTS ON HAVING SOVEREIGNTY, IN ORDER TO PRESS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON WHETHER HE REALLY IS CONVINCED THAT THE JUNTA IS BACKING WHAT ROS IS SAYING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE FORMULA ON NON-PRE-JUDGEMENT.

(B) YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE RISK OF A VACUUM AFTER AN INTERIM PERIOD IS FOR US ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTERS, AND THAT MORE CLARITY MUST BE ACHIEVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GIVEN THE BACKGROUND OF ARGENTINE INVASION, IT IS NO GOOD ASKING US TO RELY ON GOOD FAITH IN BUENOS AIRES. AS WELL AS PRESSING THE FORMULA IN ARTICLE 8 IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 713, YOU MAY FLOAT THE POSSIBILITY THAT INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MIGHT CONTINUE UNTIL EITHER A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED OR THE

SECURITY COUNCIL VOTED FOR ITS DISCONTINUATION, WHICHEVER WAS THE SOONER.

(C) IT IS CLEAR (PARA 2 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 1725) THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP IN VERIFYING WITHDRAWAL. HAS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MADE ANY PROGRESS IN CONSIDERING US INVOLVEMENT, PERHAPS WITH OTHER STATES? (SEE PARA 4 OF SAME WASHINGTON TELEGRAM)

2. I REALISE THAT YOU ALSO NEED TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA AND ABOUT INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

I CANNOT AUTHORISE YOU TO TAKE THE LINE IN PARA 6 OF YOUR THIRD TELEGRAM. BUT ON SOUTH

GEORGIA YOU MAY SAY THAT WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO REFER TITLE OVER SOUTH GEORGIA TO THE ICJ. DOES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THINK THAT THIS WOULD HELP?

3. ON INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO COUNCILS, OR AT LEAST THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SHOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. IT SHOULD ALSO BE CLEAR THAT OFFICIALS EXPERT IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN. YOU MAY ASK THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHETHER THE ADDITION OF ONE PERSON FROM AMONG THE ARGENTINES LIVING ON THE ISLANDS TO EACH OF THE TWO COUNCILS, ON THE NOMINATION OF THE UN ADMINISTRATOR, WOULD BE A HELP.

4. IF IT WOULD HELP YOU TO KEEP THE TALKS GOING, YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO RETURN TO OTHER MATTERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, TAKING A LINE CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRESENT POSITION.

5. WE ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE DEPENDENCIES AND ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY.

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
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CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 140300Z

14 MAY 1982

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 140110Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 748 OF 13 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



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MY TEL NO 739: FALKLANDS.

1. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS TOLD ME THAT NOTHING MUCH EMERGED FROM HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (13 MAY) WITH ROS. HE HAD EXPLAINED TO ROS THAT, FOR PRACTICAL REASONS, WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO COME UP TODAY WITH COMMENTS ON THE TWO DIFFICULT ISSUES - INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND SOUTH GEORGIA. INSTEAD, WE HAD CONCENTRATED ON ONE POINT - HOW TO AVOID A VACUUM IF THE TARGET DATE WAS NOT ACHIEVED. ROS HAD ACCEPTED THIS POSITION. IN PRIVATE, HE HAD PRODUCED WHAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR DESCRIBED AS POINTS WHICH WERE QUOTE A LITTLE MORE CO-OPERATIVE UNQUOTE ON THE VACUUM AND THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONCLUDED THAT THE BALL WAS NOW BACK IN MY COURT.

2. THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SCHEDULED FOR 2000Z ON 14 MAY MAY BE DIFFICULT. I HAVE FOUND OUT THAT ROS IS SEEING EACH MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL INDIVIDUALLY. MY GUESS IS THAT HE WILL PROBABLY SUGGEST TO THEM THAT THEY SHOULD PRESS ME TOMORROW AFTERNOON ON MILITARY RESTRAINT WHILE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE (I WILL OF COURSE MAINTAIN ROCK-LIKE FIRMFNESS

ON THIS) AND AT THE SAME TIME PREPARE THE GROUND TO WRONG FOOT US IF THE NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN, IE BY MAKING THE MOST OF QUOTE ARGENTINE MODERATION AND FLEXIBILITY UNQUOTE AND ALLEGING THAT WE WERE BEING SO INFLEXIBLE AS TO MAKE IT OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE NOT SERIOUS ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS. I HAVE INCIDENTALLY BEEN WARNED VERY SECRETLY BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT THE CHINESE PRESIDENT IS TOTALLY BIASED AND DANGEROUS. I HAD ALREADY COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT HIS TALK ABOUT PRESSURE FROM OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR A ROUND OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WAS LIES, AND THAT THE MEETING IS BEING HELD ENTIRELY AT HIS INITIATIVE.

3. URQUHART TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS CLOSE TO THE END OF HIS TETHER BUT THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF HIS MEETING WITH ME THIS MORNING, HE WAS PREPARED TO KEEP ON TRYING FOR A LITTLE LONGER. HE WAS CONTEMPLATING (HE HAD NOT MADE UP HIS MIND) PRESENTING HIS PAPER (SEE PARA 7 OF MY TEL NO 739) TO BOTH OF US ON SATURDAY AND GIVING A TIME LIMIT OF THREE DAYS THEREAFTER TO MAKE OR BREAK.

4. PLEASE SEE MY IFT.

PARSONS

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 140115Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 749 OF 13 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY I P T: FALKLANDS

1. MY THEATRICAL PERFORMANCE THIS MORNING HAS HELPED US TO GET THROUGH ANOTHER DAY. THE PRICE OF COURSE WAS EXPECTATION THAT WE WILL COME UP WITH SOMETHING ON THE DIFFICULT SUBJECTS TOMORROW (14 MAY).

2. I AM WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE ARE ON TWO TRACKS - GENUINE SEARCH FOR AGREEMENT AND, IF NO AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS TO COLLAPSE WITH US IN THE LEAST DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION. I AM ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO BUY AS MUCH TIME AS WE CAN.

3. AS REGARDS THE LATTER TRACK, THERE IS NO HOPE OF OUR BEING ABLE TO CLAIM, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS COLLAPSE, THAT JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING WAS UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE OF ARGENTINE OBEDURACY. EVERYONE HERE KNOWS TOO MUCH. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE VACUUM POINT

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14 MAY 82

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ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND NOBODY WOULD BELIEVE THAT WE COULD NOT HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON SUCH MATTERS AS WITHDRAWAL, CEASEFIRE, ETC: THE ARGENTINES ARE MAKING THE MOST OF THEIR "MAJOR CONCESSION" ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT. HENCE, IT WOULD BE KNOWN THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD FAILED OVER SOUTH GEORGIA OR THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OR BOTH. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, BY FAR THE LESS DISADVANTAGEOUS BREAK-POINT WOULD BE THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WITH ALL ITS CONNOTATIONS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL PROGRESS UNDER ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER, RIGHTS OF PEOPLES ETC. EVEN OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD FAILED BECAUSE OF OUR REFUSAL TO REMOVE A SMALL MILITARY GARRISON FROM SOUTH GEORGIA.

4. IF I RETURNED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOMORROW WITH NO CHANGE IN OUR POSITIONS ON THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND SOUTH GEORGIA, MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY TRANSMIT OUR POSITIONS TO ROS. THERE WOULD THEN BE A SERIOUS RISK THAT ROS WOULD DECIDE THAT THE MOMENT HAD COME TO BREAK AND TO WRONG-FOOT US IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON GROUNDS OF GENERAL OBDURACY, HAVING URGED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (WHO NEED NO SUCH URGING) TO INITIATE MANDATORY CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. HE COULD TRIGGER THIS OFF THROUGH THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TOMORROW AFTERNOON. I REGARD THIS RISK AS VERY REAL, SINCE I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT THE MAIN ARGENTINE TRACK IS NOW TO WRONG-FOOT US IN THIS WAY, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY STILL BE KEEPING OPEN A MINOR TRACK WHICH COULD LEAD TO A GENUINE AGREEMENT IF THEY COULD EXTRACT ENOUGH FROM US. THERE IS THE ACCOMPANYING DANGER THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR, SEEING THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES WERE TOO WIDE TO BRIDGE ON THESE QUESTIONS, WOULD ABANDON HIS IDEA OF PRESENTING A MEDIAN PAPER AND THROW HIS HAND IN, OR AT LEAST NOT MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO PREVENT ROS FROM ACTING AS I HAVE SUGGESTED HE MIGHT.

5. THIS LEADS ME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, HAVING JUST MANAGED TO HOLD THE LINE TODAY BY A THEATRICAL PERFORMANCE ON THE VACUUM (NOT WITHOUT ITS SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT), I COULD NOT REASONABLY HOPE TO DO THE SAME TOMORROW BY STALLING ON BOTH THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS AND TRYING TO GAIN ANOTHER DAY EG BY ADDRESSING THE TECHNICALITIES OF WITHDRAWAL, WHICH IS ABOUT THE ONLY SUBSTANTIVE POINT ON WHICH I MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING NEW TO SAY.

6. I MUST THEREFORE AGAIN FACE YOU WITH A DIFFICULT DECISION. BUT I HAVE A MODIFIED TACTIC TO PROPOSE. PROVIDED THAT WE COULD ENGAGE THE GEARS ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND WITHDRAWAL, THUS LEAVING ONLY INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AS A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK (THE LEAST DISADVANTAGEOUS ONE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IF THE BREAK COMES), I BELIEVE THAT I COULD PERSUADE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO COME FORWARD WITH HIS PAPER, LEAVING THE PARAGRAPH ON INTERIM ADMINISTRATION BLANK ON THE GROUND THAT THIS WAS SUCH A VITAL POINT TO US FROM THE GOVERNMENTAL, PARLIAMENTARY, AND ISLANDER POINTS OF VIEW, THAT WE NEEDED TO SEE THE REST OF THE PACKAGE IN TOTO BEFORE COMING TO A FINAL DECISION ABOUT WHAT WE COULD ACCEPT ON THIS QUESTION. ROS WOULD NOT FIND IT EASY TO DEPLOY THE TACTICS IN PARA 4 ABOVE IF THIS WAS OUR POSITION.

7. TO MAKE THESE TACTICS WORK MEANS THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE NOW TO MAKE A CONCESSION ON SOUTH GEORGIA, PERHAPS ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 6 (1) OF MY TELEGRAM NO 733. IF WE WERE PREPARED TO DO THIS, I IMAGINE THAT THIS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR US TO ACCEPT, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, THE SECRETARIAT CONCEPT OF A RECTANGLE FOR WITHDRAWAL RATHER THAN A CIRCLE OR CIRCLES. IF WE COULD ACCEPT THIS CONCEPT IN PRINCIPLE, WE COULD THEN ARGUE FIERCELY FIRST TO REJECT UNEQUAL WITHDRAWAL AS PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARIAT (MY TELNO 731, PARAGRAPH 6 (B)) AND SECONDLY TO RECONSTRUCT THE RECTANGLE IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO LEAVE US AT A DISADVANTAGE.

8. I MUST HAVE ANOTHER ROUND WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOMORROW, BUT I AM NOT ASKING YOU TO LET ME HAVE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE THE INFORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AT 2000Z. PROVIDED THAT I COULD GIVE AN ASSURANCE THAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE ON THE WAY, THE FACT THAT THEY HAD NOT ARRIVED BY 2000Z MIGHT ENABLE US TO GET THROUGH THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITHOUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD GET AWAY WITH AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE COUNCIL TO MAKE SERIOUS TROUBLE IF IT WAS KNOWN THAT I WAS ON THE POINT OF MAKING AN IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

9. FOR THE MOMENT, THERE IS NO NEED TO PURSUE THE QUESTION OF MY FLYING HOME, WHICH THE PUS AND I DISCUSSED ON THE TELEPHONE. I MAY REVERT TO THIS AS A LAST DITCH PLOY TO BUY MORE TIME.

PERSONS

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FM WASHINGTON 132306Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1746 OF 13 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (DESKBY 132359Z)

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. CLARK TOLD ME HOW VERY CONCERNED PRESIDENT REAGAN IS ABOUT THE WORSENING FALKLAND ISLANDS SITUATION. THE USA HAS ALREADY IMPAIRED ITS RELATIONS WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE ALLIANCE IF HOSTILITIES BECAME INTENSIFIED AND IF THERE WERE FEELINGS IN THE UK THAT THE US WAS NOT BEING SUPPORTIVE ENOUGH.

2. I TOLD CLARK NOT TO BE TOO BOTHERED ABOUT THE CURRENT UNPOPULARITY THAT AMERICA SENSED IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS WAS ALWAYS HAPPENING. IT WAS THE COROLLARY OF POWER. BUT THE LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS NEEDED THE US BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND IN ORDER TO RESIST THE SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. THERE WOULD BE NO LASTING RESENTMENT FOR WHAT WAS HAPPENING NOW.

ER.

14 MAY 1982

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3. CLARK ASKED WHETHER IT WAS TRUE THAT THERE HAD BEEN A LITTLE BIT OF TROUBLE ABOUT SOME REMARKS THE PRESIDENT WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE MADE RECENTLY IN CHICAGO. ASSUMING THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO THE REMARKS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT TO A CHICAGO HIGH SCHOOL ON 10 ((SEE WALL'S LETTER TO BRIGHT OF 12 MAY), I SAID THAT THERE HAD INDEED BEEN ADVERSE COMMENT UPON IT. BUT EVEN WORSE HAD BEEN THE REACTION IN LONDON TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO AMERICAN PRESIDENTS OF 2 MAY. THIS HAD GIVEN A COMPLETELY ONE-SIDED PICTURE OF THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. CLARK SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN DRAFTED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

4. CLARK WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HOPED I UNDERSTOOD HOW COMPLETELY ON OUR SIDE THE PRESIDENT WAS. THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THAT.

5 THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH CLARK SAYING HE WANTED TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON THIS SUBJECT. THERE WAS NO PROBLEM WITH AL HAIG NOW IF HE DID SO. HE REPEATED HOW WORRIED THE PRESIDENT WAS ABOUT IT, AS HE WAS HIMSELF. THEY WERE READY TO DO ANYTHING WE WANTED.

6. THIS INTERVENTION BY THE WHITE HOUSE HAS TAKEN PLACE OF COURSE AS SOON AS AL HAIG IS OUT OF THE COUNTRY. JEANE KIRKPATRICK HAS GOT INTO THE ACT WITH A GARBLED VERSION OF THE NEGOTIATION IN NEW YORK. IT HAS BEEN HAIG'S OBJECTIVE - AND INDEED OURS - TO KEEP HER OUT OF THE SCENE ON THIS SUBJECT. SHE DOES OF COURSE HAVE ACCESS TO THE WHITE HOUSE, WHICH HAIG IS ABLE TO THWART IF HE IS HERE. BUT THERE MAY BE DIFFICULTY WHEN HE IS AWAY. ENDERS WILL HELP HER. HOWEVER, I THINK WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO TURN THIS TO OUR ACCOUNT BY INVOLVING THE PRESIDENT IN WHATEVER WAY WE THINK BEST WHILE MAKING SURE THAT HE HAS THE PICTURE FROM US AND NOT JUST FROM MRS KIRKPATRICK.

7. INCIDENTALLY, I ASKED HAIG RECENTLY WHETHER CLARK WAS COMPLETELY SOUND ON THIS SUBJECT. HIS ANSWER WAS THAT AT THE BEGINNING CLARK HAD BEEN EXTREMELY SUPPORTIVE OF OUR POINT OF VIEW, SO MUCH SO THAT IF HIS ADVICE HAD BEEN FOLLOWED IT MIGHT HAVE JEOPARDISED HAIG'S POSTURE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT RECENTLY HE HAD SWUNG THE OTHER WAY AND HIS MAIN PREOCCUPATION NOW WAS THE TROUBLE THAT THE US WAS CREATING FOR ITSELF IN LATIN AMERICA BY TAKING THE BRITISH SIDE.

8. YOU MAY THINK IT WORTHWHILE SEIZING THIS CHANCE OF SPELLING OUT WHAT IT IS THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE US PRESIDENT TO DO AT THIS STAGE. I AM SURE THAT HE WILL NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THE DETAILED NEGOTIATION, BUT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MOBILISE HIM IN SOME WAY:

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RRRRZZ UKMIS NEW YORK

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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 132304Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1745 OF 13 MAY

INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

1. I SAW JUDGE CLARK AT THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HAIG HAD TELEPHONED ME EARLIER FROM ANKARA ASKING ME TO TRY TO SEE CLARK BEFORE THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BUT THIS HAD NOT PROVED POSSIBLE. HAIG WAS AFRAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN GIVEN A GARBLED ACCOUNT OF WHERE THE TROUBLE LAY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK AND HAD NOT BEEN TOLD THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES NOT JUST ONE RELATING TO SOVEREIGNTY.


2. CLARK TOLD ME THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN PROMPTED TO TELEPHONE THE PRIME MINISTER FOR TWO REASONS. THE FIRST AROSE FROM CONVERSATIONS HE HAD JUST HAD WITH THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT. THE LATTER HAD EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE FALKLANDS ISSUE AND A READINESS TO DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO HELP BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. CLARK REGARDED HIM AS A MODERATE MAN AND BELIEVED THAT HE COULD BE USEFUL. THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO SEND A SPECIAL EMISSARY TO BUENOS AIRES, HIS CHIEF

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12 MAY 1982



THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT IN HIS TALK WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS THE PROSPECT THAT THE BRITISH MIGHT BE ABOUT TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN MAINLAND. CLARK SPOKE OF FIVE AIR BASES WHERE THE ARGENTINIANS MAINTAINED PLANES. CLARK SAID THAT IT WAS THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT'S OPINION, TO WHICH EVIDENTLY PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD PAID HEED, THAT A BRITISH ATTACK ON ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE FAR-REACHING REPERCUSSIONS AND ENGAGE THE WHOLE LATIN AMERICAN CONTINENT.

3. CLARK SAID THAT THE SECOND IMPULSE BEHIND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRIME MINISTER WAS THE REPORT THAT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM MRS KIRKPATRICK ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK. ACCORDING TO THIS ACCOUNT, THE ARGENTINIANS HAD BEEN EXTREMELY FORTHCOMING AND HAD CHANGED THEIR STANCE ON SOVEREIGNTY. AS THIS WAS THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK CLARK GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WHITE HOUSE HAD BEEN LED TO THINK, PRESUMABLY BY MRS KIRKPATRICK, THAT IT SIMPLY REQUIRED A SIMILAR MOVE ON THE PART OF THE BRITISH AND THE WAY WOULD BE OPEN FOR THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT. CLARK SAID THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED A RUN-DOWN OF THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER SO DID NOT KNOW WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED, BUT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE TALK HAD GONE WELL.

4. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT HAD AN ACCOUNT EITHER, BUT I WANTED TO FILL CLARK IN, SO THAT HE COULD INFORM THE PRESIDENT, ABOUT THE VARIOUS DIFFICULT ISSUES INVOLVED. IT WAS NOT A SIMPLE MATTER OF SOVEREIGNTY. PERHAPS THE ARGENTINIANS HAD BEEN PREPARED TO MAKE A MOVE ON SOVEREIGNTY, THOUGH THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS LEFT DOUBT ABOUT THIS. BUT WHAT THEY GAVE AWAY ON SOVEREIGNTY THEY TOOK BACK IN THEIR NEGOTIATING STANCE ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. IF THEY WERE PREPARED NO LONGER TO INSIST ON PRE-JUDGING THE ULTIMATE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE TRYING TO ENSURE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION ON THE ISLAND, COUPLED WITH PROVISIONS FOR THE ENTRY OF ARGENTINE PEOPLE AND THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY, THAT WOULD ENSURE WITHIN A SHORT MATTER OF TIME THAT A MAJORITY OF THOSE ON THE ISLAND, BEHOLDEN AS THEY WOULD BE TO ARGENTINA, WOULD BE IN

INTOLERABLE IF AFTER ALL THE EFFORT AND SACRIFICE INVOLVED IN REDRESSING THE ARGENTINIAN INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WE WERE TO BE FACED WITHIN A MATTER OF MONTHS WITH A DE FACTO REOCCUPATION THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS.

5. BUT APART FROM THIS PROBLEM OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, THERE WERE OTHER DIFFICULTIES, AS I EXPLAINED TO CLARK. THERE WAS THE ISSUE OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF A FINAL AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED BY THE STATED DATE OF 31 DECEMBER 1982. WE COULD NOT GET INTO A POSITION IN WHICH A SOVIET VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD PREVENT THE CONTINUATION OF THE INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH GEORGIA ETC, ABOUT WHICH CLARK INTERJECTED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD NO JUSTIFIABLE CLAIM TO THOSE TERRITORIES.

6. I ASKED CLARK WHAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS OF THE PRESENT MOOD IN BUENOS AIRES. DID HE THINK THAT THE JUNTA WANTED A SETTLEMENT OR DID HE BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE SIMPLY PLAYING FOR TIME IN THE BELIEF THAT SOMETHING WOULD TURN UP AND THAT THE BRITISH WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN INVADING THE ISLANDS ? I EMPHASISED TO CLARK THE EXTREME TIME PRESSURE INVOLVED, OF WHICH THE ARGENTINIANS DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE.

7. CLARK SAID THAT HE DID NOT REALLY KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN BUENOS AIRES. HE DID NOT THINK THAT WALTERS WOULD GET ANYWHERE IN HIS MISSION. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT GALTIERI WANTED A SETTLEMENT BUT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SECURE ONE. ADMIRAL ANAYA WAS THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK. CLARK SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED THE GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEM. HOSTILITIES COULD WELL BE SEVERE AND PROLONGED. THE DEEPER THE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT THE MORE DIFFICULT WOULD IT BE TO BRING IT TO AN END.

8. CLARK SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE READY TO LISTEN TO ANY SUGGESTIONS WE MIGHT MAKE FOR HELP HE COULD GIVE IN BRINGING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. I SAID THAT I WOULD REFER THIS OFFER TO LONDON AND LET HIM KNOW WHAT SUGGESTIONS THEY MIGHT HAVE.

9. PLEASE SEE MIFT

HENDERSON



The National Archives

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PARIS FCO

18/13

13 MAY 1982

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GRS 430

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 131636Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 483 OF 13 MAY 1982

FALKLANDS: FRENCH ATTITUDE

1. ANSWERING QUESTIONS YESTERDAY (12 MAY) IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CHEYSSON MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT THE FALKLANDS:

(1) FRANCE'S SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN STEMMED FROM CONDEMNATION OF THE INVASION OF A TERRITORY BY FORCE. THE INVASION HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE ADOPTION OF SCR 502 WHICH WAS MANDATORY AND WHICH CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. AS LONG AS RESOLUTION 502 WAS NOT APPLIED FRANCE WOULD CONTINUE TO CONDEMN THE ARGENTINE INVASION.



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(II) FRANCE'S SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN DID NOT MEAN FRENCH RECOGNITION OF ANYONE'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED.

(III) NEW CLASHES WERE LIKELY TO ARISE DESPITE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S SOLEMN APPEAL FOR A CEASEFIRE ON 5 MAY.

(IV) BOTH SIDES (SIC) WERE IN FACT PREJUDGING THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OVER SOVEREIGNTY. ARGENTINA HAD MADE CONCESSIONS, BUT BRITAIN WAS INSISTING THAT THE WISHES OF THE FALKLANDS INHABITANTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT; THIS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO PREJUDGING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN SOVEREIGNTY CAME TO BE DISCUSSED. AS THE ARGENTINES WERE REFUSING TO ACCEPT THIS BRITISH DEMAND, THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT REACHED A CONCLUSION.

(V) TOGETHER WITH ITS EC PARTNERS FRANCE STOOD BY RESOLUTION 502 BUT FRANCE WOULD CONSIDER RESOLUTION 502 TO HAVE BEEN APPLIED ONCE THE ARGENTINES STARTED WITHDRAWING THEIR FORCES. AFTER THAT, FRANCE WOULD INSIST MORE ON OTHER ASPECTS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, ORGANISATION OF A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, AND THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

(VI) RENEWAL OF THE EC BAN POSED A SERIOUS PROBLEM GIVEN THAT SOME PEOPLE TENDED TO LINK THIS TOPIC WITH OTHERS OVER WHICH EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY WAS SINGULARLY LACKING. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE DANGEROUS TO FORECAST WHAT WOULD HAPPEN.

2. MINISTER ASKED THE DIRECTOR FOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS IN THE QUAI THIS AFTERNOON FOR SOME CLARIFICATION OF CHEYSSON'S REMARKS, WHICH INTER ALIA DID NOT CORRECTLY DESCRIBE THE BRITISH POSITION AND WHICH APPEARED, ODDLY, TO ENVISAGE A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES BEFORE A CEASEFIRE. DORIN ADMITTED THAT THE REMARKS SUMMARISED IN PARA 1 (IV) AND (V) ABOVE WERE HARD TO INTERPRET

AND SUGGESTED THAT TOO MUCH SHOULD NOT BE READ INTO THEM. THEY WERE NOT PART OF CHEYSSON'S PREPARED WRITTEN STATEMENT. HE MAINTAINED THAT CHEYSSON FIRMLY SUPPORTED BRITAIN AND SAID THAT OVERALL CHEYSSON'S REMARKS HAD BEEN INTERPRETED AS DISAGREEABLE FOR ARGENTINA. (IN FACT, THEY APPEAR TO BE A TYPICAL EFFORT BY CHEYSSON TO APPEAL TO DIFFERENT AUDIENCES AT THE SAME TIME.)

3. MIFT CONTAINS FULL TEXT IN FRENCH OF THE REMARKS SUMMARISED IN PARA 1 (IV), (V) AND (VI) ABOVE.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 132000Z BC/MBI

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD
HD/S AK D
HD/DEF DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)

[RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET]

(177)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 131715Z

FM PARIS 131615Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 485 OF 13 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

FALKLANDS : FRANCE/IRELAND

1. IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED IN PARIS THAT THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER WILL BE MAKING A WORKING VISIT TO PARIS FOR TALKS WITH CHEYSSON TOMORROW, 14 MAY. ACCORDING TO AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, THE TWO MINISTERS WILL DISCUSS COMMUNITY QUESTIONS (AGRICULTURAL PRICES AND THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION) AND THE FALKLANDS.

2. I SUGGEST THAT YOU AUTHORISE ME TO PASS AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM YOU TO CHEYSSON TO SAY THAT YOU HOPE HE WILL TAKE THE CHANCE TO STIFFEN IRISH RESOLVE ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. IF NOTHING ELSE, THIS WOULD SHOW CHEYSSON THAT WE TOOK EXPRESSIONS OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE U K OVER THE FALKLANDS AT THEIR FACE VALUE. THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL TACTIC, SINCE CHEYSSON'S REMARKS TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 483) SUGGEST SOME INCONSISTENCY AND A READINESS TO SHELTER BEHIND OTHERS.
FRETWELL

PP PARIS

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKDEL NATO

RR TFC RELAY

GRS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 131500Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 440 OF 13 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY ROME PARIS WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

FALKLANDS

1. HERR GENSCHER RECEIVED ME THIS MORNING. MY MAIN PURPOSE IN ARRANGING A MEETING HAD BEEN TO MAKE SURE THAT HE WAS ON BOARD, AND I CONCENTRATED ON EMPHASISING THE ENORMOUS EFFORT THAT YOU HAVE BEEN PUTTING IN, EVER SINCE YOU TOOK UP YOUR JOB AND AT AN EVER-INCREASING TEMPO, INTO THE PEACE EFFORT. I REFERRED TO MY DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE IMPLICATIONS IN RECENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS THAT THE GERMANS FELT THAT WE WERE NOT DOING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ON THIS FRONT. HERR GENSCHER ASSURED ME THAT HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF YOUR EFFORTS AND THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS POSITION WAS ABSOLUTELY FIRM. HE REFERRED TO HIS QUOTE ROBUST UNQUOTE INTERVENTION AT VILLERS-LE-TEMPLE, WHERE HE HAD FOUND THE CRITICISMS OF SOME OTHER MINISTERS UNACCEPTABLE. HE SAID THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC SUPPORTED US AS ALLIES AND FRIENDS AND PARTNERS, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO.

2. ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS, HERR GENSCHER SAID THAT THE MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT CABINET BUT THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT FELT THAT IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY BEST FOR THE DECISION TO BE STATED AT THE LAST MINUTE: OTHERWISE THERE WAS A DANGER THAT POLITICAL DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT WOULD ARISE BEFORE THE 17TH OF MAY WHEN THE DECISION HAD TO BE MADE. HE COULD ASSURE ME PERSONALLY AND CONFIDENTIALLY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE THE SAME STANCE.

...WE COULD ASSURE HE PERSONALLY AND CONFIDENTIALLY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE THE SAME STANCE. IE THAT SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONTINUED IF NO PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS HAD BEEN AGREED BY 17 MAY. THE FINAL DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN BY HIMSELF AND SCHMIDT. BUT IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HE CONFIRMED THAT WE COULD COUNT ON A POSITIVE DECISION. (WE DID NOT HOWEVER DISCUSS THE LENGTH OF THE RENEWAL, AND I HAVE SINCE HEARD INDICATIONS THAT THE GERMANS MAY TRY TO LIMIT IT TO 15 DAYS).

3. GENSCHER ADDED HOWEVER THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED OVER THE NEWS FROM ROME ABOUT ITALIAN ATTITUDES FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S DEBATE IN THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT.

4. AT THE END OF MY TALK, AFTER DISCUSSING OTHER MATTERS WHICH I WILL REPORT SEPARATELY, I TOOK HERR GENSCHER THROUGH THE BELGRANO INCIDENT AND THE FACT THAT GERMAN REACTIONS HAD BEEN BASED ON INADEQUATE AND FALSE INFORMATION FROM ARGENTINA. HE CLAIMED TO UNDERSTAND THE POSITION FULLY AND DENIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD FORMED FALSE CONCLUSIONS. I THINK HE NEVERTHELESS TOOK THE MESSAGE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD EXERCISE SOME CAUTION IN REACTING TO NEWS THAT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONFIRMED.

5. I EMPHASISED AS STRONGLY AS I COULD THE IMPORTANCE OF SENDING THE RIGHT SIGNAL TO ARGENTINA AND OF AVOIDING ENCOURAGING THE ARGENTINIANS TO THINK THAT SUPPORT FOR US WAS CRUMBLING.

TAYLOR

OO UKREP BRUSSELS

OO BONN

OO PARIS

OO ROME

OO DUBLIN

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM COPENHAGEN 131530Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 126 OF 13 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, BONN, PARIS, ROME AND DUBLIN

MY TELNO 125: FALKLANDS: EC IMPORT BAN

1. ANOTHER LONG TALK WITH DIRECTOR, MFA, TODAY GAVE LITTLE GROUND TO HOPE THAT THE DANES WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 113 ON SUNDAY, EVEN THOUGH THEY WANT THE BAN CONTINUED.

2. ALTHOUGH THEY SURVIVED BOTH THE FOLKETING DEBATE YESTERDAY AND THE FOREIGN POLICY COMMITTEE TODAY WITH THEIR HANDS UNTIED, THE MINISTERS CONCERNED HAD A VERY ROUGH RIDE INDEED IN THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GROUP. UP TO 15 LEFT-WING MEMBERS OF THE PARTY (25% OF THE TOTAL) THREATEN TO ABSTAIN TOMORROW EVEN ON THE ENDORSEMENT OF MR OLESEN'S STATEMENT YESTERDAY. IN THE HOPE OF BRINGING THEM INTO LINE, MR OLESEN HAS GIVEN A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON, TAKING THE LINE THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT POSITION IS THAT ARTICLE 224 SHOULD BE USED ALSO FOR THE PROLONGATION OF THE ARGENTINE BAN. IN PARALLEL, HE HAS WRITTEN SIMILARLY TO MR TINDEMANS. IT SEEMS THAT MR OLESEN AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE BEEN VERY DEPRESSED AT THE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARLIAMENTARY GROUP IS OUT OF CONTROL. THE DECISION WHETHER TO REMAIN IN OFFICE MAY WELL TURN ON THEIR SUCCESS IN MUSTERING SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE.

3. I AM ASSURED THAT MR OLESEN FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FALKLANDS, WHICH I REITERATED FORCEFULLY TO EIGIL JOERGENSEN,

FOR THE FALKLANDS, WHICH I REITERATED FORCEFULLY TO EIGIL JOERGENSEN, AND DOES NOT (NOT) WANT TO PREVENT THE RENEWAL OF THE BAN. IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT HE WILL SEEK TO USE HIS FLEXIBILITY HELPFULLY, WITHIN LIMITS, E.G. BY ACCEPTING 14 DAY PROLONGATION (THE PREFERRED WORD) TO ALLOW NATIONAL ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 224 (PRESUMABLY WE COULD THEN PROPOSE A MONTH, BUT THIS MIGHT PROVE TOO LONG FOR HIM).

4. IT DOES NOT SEEM THAT ANY FURTHER APPROACH TO DANISH MINISTERS OR OTHER PARLIAMENTARIANS IS LIKELY TO HELP IN WHAT FOR THEM REMAINS FIRST AND FOREMOST A DOMESTIC PROBLEM. NEWS OF PROGRESS IN THE UN WOULD BE THE BEST HELP. I WILL CONSULT JOERGENSEN AGAIN AFTER TOMORROW'S VOTE AND REPORT FURTHER IF THERE IS ANYTHING TO ADD.

WARBURTON

NNNN

SENT AT 13/1606Z JK

LETTER TO WASHINGTON
IN WASHINGTON
BY AIRMAIL
ON 13/1606Z JK

OO WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GROUPS 502

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM DUBLIN 131635Z MAY 1982.

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 149 OF 13 MAY.

AND TO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNOS 142 AND 143: FALKLANDS: IRISH GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES.

1. ACTING HEAD OF CHANCERY WENT OVER THE TAOISEACH'S STATEMENT OF 11 MAY WITH O'TOOLE, DFA, MAKING CLEAR THE MANY POINTS ON WHICH WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ITS INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS OR OF BRITISH POLICY. IN PARTICULAR:
 - (A) TALKS OF "OPEN WAR" WAS A DANGEROUS EXAGGERATION:
 - (B) SIDES HAD BEEN TAKEN. SCR 502 HAD FOUND ARGENTINA'S ACTIONS DEEPLY DISTURBING: HER ARMED INTERVENTION HAD BEEN CONDEMNED IN THE PRESIDENCY STATEMENT OF 2 APRIL, REAFFIRMED BY THE COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 10 APRIL: THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF 10 APRIL HAD ALSO REFERRED TO ARGENTINA'S DIRECT DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
 - (C) CONDEMNATION OF ARGENTINA HAD BEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF BRITAIN'S PREPARATION TO USE AND THEN HER USE OF LIMITED MILITARY MEASURES IN SELF-DEFENCE, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE COMMONS ON 3 APRIL THAT A LARGE TASK FORCE WAS TO BE SENT, THROUGH THE VARIOUS DECLARATIONS SPELLING OUT TO ARGENTINA WHAT ACTIONS ON HER PART WOULD BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE. SCR 502 AND EC ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WERE COMPATIBLE WITH BRITISH MEASURES. TALK OF WHICH MEASURES COMPLIMENTED WHICH COULD BE MISLEADING WHEN TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. BRITAIN'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE STEPS UNDER ARTICLE 51 WAS INDEPENDENT FROM THE COMMUNITY'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ECONOMIC MEASURES TO HELP ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE WITH SCR 522.

COMMUNITY'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ECONOMIC MEASURES TO HELP ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE WITH SCR 502.

(D) LOSS OF LIFE WAS REGRETTABLE BUT WAS THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ANY OF THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF SCR 502 AND HER SUBSEQUENT AGGRESSIVE DEPLOYMENTS AGAINST THE TASK FORCE.

(E) AT NO STAGE HAD IT BEEN TRUE THAT BRITAIN HAD GIVEN UP ON DIPLOMATIC AVENUES FOR PROGRESS, INCLUDING THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

2. O'TOOLE ACCEPTED THE FORCE OF THESE POINTS AND SAID HE WOULD PASS THEM TO MACKERNAN. BOTH WILL ATTEND THE POCO MEETING ON SATURDAY. HIS ONLY REJOINDER WAS TO SAY THAT THERE WAS A BALANCE BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY MEASURES. IF MILITARY MEASURES SEEMED DOMINANT, AS THEY HAD AT TIMES, THIS MADE JUSTIFICATION OF SANCTIONS HARDER FOR HIS GOVERNMENT.

3. O'TOOLE STRESSED THAT NEITHER THE TAOISEACH'S STATEMENT NOR HIS RADIO REMARKS (MY TELNO 145) ABOUT OTHER COMMUNITY DISPUTES HAD BEEN DRAFTED BY THE DFA. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE LATTER, HE AGREED THAT SANCTIONS AND FARM PRICES WERE QUITE DIFFERENT ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD TO EMPHASIS THAT VIRTUALLY ALL CABINET MEETINGS AT WHICH THE FALKLANDS HAD ARISEN RECENTLY HAD ALSO HEARD REPORTS FROM THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ON THE CONTINUING AND COSTLY IMPASSE ON FARM PRICES.

4. O'TOOLE SAID NO FINAL IRISH DECISION ON SANCTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN BECAUSE THIS WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE MEETING/MEETINGS WENT. IN PRACTICE POLICY WILL BE MADE BY THE TAOISEACH AND NOT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. I AGREE THAT OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE IRISH IS EXTREMELY LIMITED (YOUR TELNO 980 TO WASHINGTON). ANY FURTHER DIRECT UK APPROACH TO MR HAUGHEY IS MORE LIKELY TO INCREASE THE DANGER THAT HE WILL TAKE PRIDE IN GOING IT ALONE. I THEREFORE ENDORSE THE SUGGESTION THAT AMERICAN PRESSURE MIGHT HELP. AT THE WEEKEND MEETINGS I HOPE SOME OF OUR PARTNERS - LUXEMBOURG AND FRANCE SEEM TWO OF THE BEST CANDIDATES - COULD BE ASKED TO HELP. IF THE ITALIANS CAN BE BROUGHT ON BOARD EARLIER, THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE IRISH MIGHT ALSO BE BENEFICIAL.

BUFO 008/13

00 FCO

00 BONN

00 ROME

00 PARIS

00 COPENHAGEN

00 DUBLIN

00 THE HAUGE

00 LUXEMBOURG

00 UKREP BRUSSELS

00 ATHENS

00 UKDEL NATO

00 UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 320

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRUSSELS 13/1545Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 176 OF 13 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 122 TO ATHENS : FALKLANDS - RENEWAL OF SANCTIONS

1. THE BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED ME THIS AFTERNOON (13 MAY) SO THAT I COULD BOTH MAKE AN INITIAL CALL AND DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

2. WHEN WE REACHED THE FALKLANDS ISSUE MR MARGENS ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION WHICH SUGGESTED (AS WE

ER

(152)

HAD BEEN TOLD EARLIER BY OFFICIALS THAT HE IS NOT FOLLOWING EVENTS IN GREAT DETAIL AND IS LEAVING THE BELGIAN RUNNING ON THIS LARGELY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. I EXPLAINED HMG'S POLICY AND THE PRESENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL TERMS AS NECESSARY, AND ASSURED HIM IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY HAD THE BROAD SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE, DESPITE THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO SOME DISSENTING VOICES.

3. I THEN HANDED OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. I ACCOMPANIED THIS WITH A REFERENCE TO THE APPRECIATION WHICH WE HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED TO TINDEMANS FOR BELGIUM'S SUPPORT IN BOTH HER NATIONAL AND HER PRESIDENCY CAPACITIES. I ALSO DREW MR MARTENS' ATTENTION TO THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL AND TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S RESOLUTION YESTERDAY FOR CONTINUATION OF SACTIONS. I SAID WE HOPED THIS WOULD HELP TO OVERCOME THE APPARENT DOUBTS FROM THE IRISH AND DANISH SIDE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE COURSE OF YESTERDAY'S DEBATE IN THE FOLKETING (COPENHAGEN TELNO 125), WHICH HE HAD EVIDENTLY NOT YET HEARD OF.

4. MR MARTENS SAID BELGIUM HAD SUPPORTED US WHOLEHEARTEDLY OVER THE FALKLANDS AND WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE TO DO SO . I THANKED HIM.

5. IN DISCUSSING THE MACHINERY NECESSARY FOR RENENWAL MARTENS SAID THAT TINDEMANS WAS OF COURSE AT PRESENT IN LIBREVILLE. TINDEMANS HAD SUGGESTED BEFORE HE LEFT THAT BELGIAN MINISTERS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON SATURDAY NIGHT OR SUNDAY MORNING IF THAT SHOULD PROVE NECESSARY. MARTENS RECALLED THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD MET SPECIALLY IN ORDER TO APPROVE THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS DURING THE EASTER HOLIDAYS.

6. SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM FOR DISCUSSION OF BUDGET/CAP ISSUES - NOT TO ALL.

JACKSON

NNNN

SEMT/RECD 131600Z PD/HK

TT AGENS

GRS 200

RESTRICTED

FM THE HAGUE 131610Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF 13 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS

YOUR TELNO 980 TO WASHINGTON; FALKLANDS; EC IMPORT EMBARGO
1. AT A JOINT SESSION WITH THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE
SECOND CHAMBER THIS MORNING VAN DER STOEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE
SAW NO CONNECTION BETWEEN RENEWAL OF COMMUNITY SANCTIONS AND
THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TO THE 30 MAY MANDATE. IN HIS VIEW A FAILURE
TO EXTEND SANCTIONS AFTER 17 MAY WOULD MERELY ENCOURAGE THE
ARGENTINIANS. HE THUS FAVOURED THEIR EXTENSION, THOUGH HE ADDED
THAT THIS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND
17 MAY. IN THE LIGHT OF OTHER COUNTRIES' ATTITUDES HE WOULD BE
PREPARED TO SEE SANCTIONS EXTENDED FOR A SHORT PERIOD ONLY
RATHER THAN ABRUPTLY TERMINATED.

2. WHEN I SAW VAN DER STOEL THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT THE MANDATE,
I THANKED HIM FOR THESE REMARKS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD OF
THE STRONG OPPOSITION TO RENEWAL IN THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE DANISH HESITATIONS SO THAT THERE COULD BE DIFFICULTY IN
REACHING AGREEMENT, HENCE HIS LAST COMMENT ABOUT SHORT RENEWAL.
I SAID THAT THE ECONOMIC MEASURES HAD HAD A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT
ON THE ARGENTINES SEMI COLON IT WOULD BE MADNESS TO LIFT
THEM WHEN NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK APPEARED TO BE MAKING SOME
PROGRESS.

MANSFIELD

F C O DESKBY 130300Z

33
~~200~~


GRS 1800

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 130300Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 130009Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C OTELEGRAM NUMBER 731 DATED 12 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

13 MAY 1982



YOUR TELSNOs 390 AND 391: FALKLAND ISLANDS

SUMMARY (UNDERLINED)

1. I CARRIED OUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS AFTERNOON (12 MAY). HE AND HIS TEAM WERE STUNNED. HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR AGREEMENT TO YESTERDAY'S FORMULA ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT AND THAT THE BREAKDOWN OF HIS INITIATIVE WOULD BE INEVITABLE. AFTER DISCUSSION, HE DECIDED NOT TO REVEAL ALL THAT I HAD SAID TO ROS, IN THE HOPE THAT ROS WOULD HAVE SOMETHING NEW TO SAY WHICH MIGHT GIVE US SOMETHING MORE TO WORK ON. I AGREED TO THIS. THERE WAS THEN SOME DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS DETAILED POINTS. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, HE FORMALLY ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU HIS VIEW THAT HIS WHOLE INITIATIVE MIGHT COLLAPSE TOMORROW (13 MAY) UNLESS WE COULD MODERATE OUR POSITION.

DETAIL (UNDERLINED)

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AT 2000Z. IT WAS A GRIM MEETING. I TOOK HIM THROUGH THE POINTS I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE IN YOUR TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) NON-PREJUDGEMENT (UNDERLINED): I SAID THAT ARGENTINE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FORMULA ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT WAS AN ADVANCE. I COULD NOT SAY AT PRESENT THAT WE ACCEPTED IT. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT AS PART OF AN EVENTUAL PACKAGE. MEANWHILE I QUOTED COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS TODAY (YOUR TELNO 392) AND ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TRY TO GET THE ARGENTINES

TO STOP MAKING THIS KIND OF STATEMENT IN PUBLIC.

(B) POSITION AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982: (UNDERLINED)

I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO APPROVE CONTINUATION OF THE INTERIM STRUCTURES. I EXPLAINED WHY IN DETAIL. I THEN READ OUT ARTICLE 8 FROM MY TELNO 713, SAYING THAT THIS WOULD MEET OUR POINT IF IT WAS COMBINED WITH ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE ON THE TARGET DATE.

(C) WITHDRAWAL: (UNDERLINED) I GAVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR THE TEXT OF ARTICLE 2 FROM MY TELNO 713. (SEE PARA 6(B) BELOW FOR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION ABOUT AHMED'S BOX IDEA).

(D) VERIFICATION: (UNDERLINED) I ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARIAT HAD HAD FURTHER THOUGHTS. AHMED SAID NO: IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR THE SECRETARIAT TO APPROACH GOVERNMENTS AT THIS STAGE. THEY WERE ALSO BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER GOVERNMENTS WOULD MAKE SUCH SOPHISTICATED DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO THE UN. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN FAVOUR OF US INVOLVEMENT. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SECRETARIAT DOUBT WHETHER THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA AND FEAR THAT IT WOULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL (BUT SEE MY TELNO 734).

(E) INTERIM ADMINISTRATION: (UNDERLINED) I SAID THAT THIS WAS CLEARLY A MAJOR DIFFICULTY. WE ASSUMED THAT THE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD INCLUDE ANY ARGENTINE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION INTRODUCED SINCE THE INVASION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS SO. I THEN DESCRIBED OUR CONCEPT OF THE UN ADMINISTRATOR'S FUNCTIONS AS IN PARA 2(E) OF YOUR TELNO 390 AND DICTATED YOUR REVISED VERSIONS OF ARTICLES 6(3) AND (4) OF THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 713, ADDING THAT WE ALREADY HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE TRYING TO INTRODUCE CHANGES TO THE CHARACTER OF LIFE ON THE ISLANDS.

(F) FREEDOM OF TRANSIT, RESIDENCE ETC: (UNDERLINED) I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED, MAKING WHAT I COULD OF OUR AGREEMENT THAT THE 1971 COMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT COULD CONTINUE TO APPLY AND OUR IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF ARGENTINE OBSERVERS.

(G) DEPENDENCIES: (UNDERLINED) I FIRST MADE THE POINT IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TELNO 391 AND THEN THOSE IN PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4, OTHER THAN THE ONE ABOUT THE ARGENTINES HAVING BEEN READY AT AN EARLIER STAGE TO EXCLUDE THE DEPENDENCIES (I DO NOT THINK THAT IT HELPS US IN THIS NEGOTIATION TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT THE ARGENTINES MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE ACCEPTED AT EARLIER STAGES). I INCLUDED THE POINT ABOUT THE DEPENDENCIES BEING DEPENDENCIES OF THE UK BUT SHALL NOT DO SO AGAIN, AS I HAVE SINCE SEEN THAT ACCORDING TO HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND THEY WERE ESTABLISHED AS DEPENDENCIES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN 1908 BY LETTERS PATENT.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF WERE CLEARLY STUNNED BY WHAT I HAD SAID. HIS FIRST REACTION WAS TO ASK WHAT HE COULD DO. THE ARGENTINES WERE COMING TO SEE HIM TWO HOURS LATER. IF HE TOLD THEM WHAT I HAD SAID, THEY WOULD CERTAINLY WITHDRAW THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF YESTERDAY'S FORMULA ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT. THAT WOULD MEAN THE END OF HIS INITIATIVE. I HAD GIVEN HIM NOTHING TO PASS ON TO THEM IN RETURN FOR WHAT THEY SAW AS YESTERDAY'S MAJOR CONCESSIONS. THEY WOULD BE BITTER AND DISAPPOINTED. HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD BREAK OFF THE TALKS IMMEDIATELY. IF WE WERE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN AVOIDING THE "CARNAGE" WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM FAILURE OF HIS EFFORTS, HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE HAD TO TAKE SUCH A HARD LINE.

4. I SAID THAT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN PREPARED AFTER EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES TODAY. I COULD NOT SAY IF THEY WERE YOUR LAST WORD. BUT I URGED HIM TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM FROM THE LONDON END. IT WAS NOT WE WHO HAD COMMITTED THE AGGRESSION. WE HAD NEVERTHELESS ALREADY MADE A NUMBER OF MAJOR CONCESSIONS FROM THE POSITIONS SET OUT IN YOUR MESSAGE TO HIM OF 6 MAY (SEE MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM). ANY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH APPEARED TO REWARD ARGENTINE AGGRESSION WOULD SIMPLY NOT BE ACCEPTED IN BRITAIN. A SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED IN DEFIANCE OF THE POLITICAL REALITIES IN LONDON.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, ON REFLECTION, HE THOUGHT THAT THE ONLY WAY FOR HIM TO AVOID AN IMMEDIATE BREAKDOWN WAS FOR HIM NOT (NOT) TO DESCRIBE OUR POSITION TO ROS AS "BLUNTLY" AS I HAD PUT IT TO HIM. BEFORE SAYING ANYTHING TO ROS THIS EVENING ABOUT OUR REACTION, HE WOULD SEE WHETHER ROS HAD ANYTHING TO TELL HIM; PERHAPS ROS MIGHT COME UP WITH SOMETHING NEW. ALTERNATIVELY, HE MIGHT SEE ROS PRIVATELY, TELL HIM THAT HE HAD HAD A VERY FIRM REACTION FROM YOU ON A NUMBER OF POINTS, AND DISCUSS WITH HIM WHAT HE (ROS) COULD DO TO HELP. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO GIVE UP AT THIS STAGE. I AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BEST WAY FOR HIM TO PROCEED. IT WAS LEFT THAT HE WOULD SUMMON ME AGAIN THIS EVENING AFTER HE HAD SEEN ROS.

6. WE THEN HAD SOME DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS POINTS IN MY INSTRUCTIONS:

(A) DEPENDENCIES (UNDERLINED)

DE SOTO SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE NECESSARILY THINKING OF A UN PRESENCE IN THE DEPENDENCIES. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THEM WAS THAT BRITISH FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH GEORGIA AND THAT THE TWO DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ADDED THAT THE DEPENDENCIES COULD BE COVERED IN AN AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED

THAT THE DEPENDENCIES COULD BE COVERED IN AN AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED SEPARATELY FROM, BUT IN THE SAME PROCESS AS, THE FINAL SETTLEMENT ON THE FALKLANDS THEMSELVES. AHMED SAID THAT IN THE PROVISIONAL DRAFT AGREEMENT THE UN WERE PREPARING THERE WOULD BE NO GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OTHER THAN THE WITHDRAWAL BOX (SEE PARAGRAPH 6(B) BELOW): THERE WOULD BE NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF EITHER THE FALKLANDS, SOUTH GEORGIA OR THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS: INSTEAD THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE EXPRESSED TO BE ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT OF CURRENT DIFFERENCES. THE UN WOULD RESIST ANY SUGGESTION FROM THE ARGENTINES THAT THE UN ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE ON SOUTH GEORGIA: IN PRACTICE, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD REVERT TO THE STATUS QUO BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION IE BAS: IN ADDITION, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT MIGHT HAVE SOME LANGUAGE ABOUT ACCESS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDING LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR SCIENTISTS, INSPIRED BY ARTICLE 1 (2) OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND ALLOWING FOR HMS ENDURANCE TO RETURN. IN SHORT, AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD NEITHER SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE NOR SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDE THE DEPENDENCIES. WE REPLIED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOUTH GEORGIA WOULD HAVE TO BE SPELT OUT AND COULD NOT BE LEFT TO UNSPOKEN UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE UN AND THE ARGENTINES. FOR US IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO BE CLEAR THAT ADMINISTRATION BY THE BAS SHOULD BE RESTORED, PLUS REGULAR VISITS BY HMS ENDURANCE ETC. NOR DID I HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT YOU WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAWAL OF UK FORCES FROM SOUTH GEORGIA EVEN IF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION WAS RESTORED. DE SOTO REJOINED THAT WE WOULD BENEFIT FROM ARGENTINA'S OBLIGATION NOT TO REINTRODUCE ITS FORCES INTO SOUTH GEORGIA.

(B) WITHDRAWAL (UNDERLINED)

I ASKED AHMED FOR MORE DETAILS OF HIS BOX. HE SAID THAT IN THE UN'S DRAFT IT WAS DESCRIBED AS "A ZONE BOUNDED BY STRAIGHT LINES CONNECTING THE FOLLOWING FOUR COORDINATE POINTS: 48 DEGREES SOUTH 63 DEGREES WEST, 48 DEGREES SOUTH 22 DEGREES WEST, 60 DEGREES SOUTH 22 DEGREES WEST, 60 DEGREES SOUTH 63 DEGREES WEST." (ITS SOUTHERN BOUNDARY IS THUS THE SAME AS THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AREA). AHMED SAID THAT THE UN'S IDEAS FOR WITHDRAWAL WERE THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO PHASES. IN THE FIRST, HALF THE ARGENTINE FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW WEST OF 63 DEGREES WEST AND ALL BRITISH FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW NORTH OF 46 DEGREES SOUTH: IN BOTH CASES THE WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS BEING "EN ROUTE TO THEIR USUAL OPERATING BASES OR AREAS". IN THE SECOND PHASE THE REST OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL NOT PRESENT IN THE ISLANDS ON 31 MARCH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, AND BRITISH FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW NORTH OF 33 DEGREES SOUTH. I SAID

PERSONNEL NOT PRESENT IN THE ISLANDS ON 31 MARCH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN,
AND BRITISH FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW NORTH OF 33 DEGREES SOUTH.
THAT I WOULD REPORT THIS TO YOU BUT THAT YOU DID NOT LIKE THE BOX
IDEA. OUR STRONG PREFERENCE WAS FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT IN
ARTICLE 2 OF OUR TELNO 713.

(C) FREEDOM OF TRANSIT, RESIDENCE ETC (UNDERLINED)

DE SOTO SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO THE IMPRESSION THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL MIGHT HAVE GIVEN YESTERDAY, THE IDEA THAT ARGENTINE RESIDENTS
ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SHOULD HAVE EQUAL REPRESENTATION WITH THE
MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN THE UN ADMINISTRATOR'S
ADVISORY GROUP (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELNO 728) WAS NOT AN
ARGENTINE IDEA BUT ONE WHICH THE UN HAD PUT FORWARD AND WHICH
THE ARGENTINES HAD ACCEPTED, WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM, AS A
POSSIBLE COMPROMISE.

(D) POSITION AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982 (UNDERLINED)

I ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARIAT HAD HAD ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS
ABOUT THIS (SEE PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 714). AHMED SAID NO.
THEIR ONLY THOUGHT WAS THAT THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO TRUST EACH
OTHER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHO COULD BE ASKED TO REPORT
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RECOMMEND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF
AGREEMENT WAS NOT IN SIGHT BY THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD. I
SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS BECAUSE ANY SUGGESTION THAT
THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO EXTEND THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS
AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982 WOULD EXPOSE US TO THE SOVIET VETO, PROBABLY
FOLLOWING A GA RESOLUTION DECIDING THAT SOVEREIGNTY MUST PASS
TO ARGENTINA ON 31 DECEMBER.

7. BRINGING THE MEETING TO A CLOSE, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT
HE FELT OBLIGED TO ASK ME FORMALLY TO TELL YOU THAT IN HIS VIEW
HIS WHOLE EFFORT MIGHT NOW COLLAPSE IF WE COULD NOT MODERATE
OUR POSITION.

8. I WILL REPORT FURTHER AND SEND COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AFTER
MY SECOND MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR LATER TONIGHT.

PARSONS

NNNN

0810/13

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GRS 750

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 130300Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 130227Z MAY 82

13 MAY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 733 DATED 12 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON



MY TWO IPTS: FALKLANDS

1. YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES ARE NOW FACED WITH AN IMMEDIATE STRATEGIC DECISION. IF TOMORROW (13 MAY) I STICK TO THE POSITIONS I SET OUT TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR TODAY AND HE PUTS THEM TO THE ARGENTINES, AS HE WILL FEEL BOUND TO DO, I AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TERMINATE THERE AND THEN. WE CAN ONLY KEEP THE TALKS GOING IF WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND ON OUR MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA (ALL IN THE CONTEXT OF SATISFACTION ON THE WHOLE PACKAGE).

2. PLEASE DO NOT THINK THAT I AM NOT AWARE OF THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. I EXPLAINED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN DETAIL THAT THE BASIC BRITISH VIEW WAS AS FOLLOWS. THE ONLY JUST OUTCOME WAS THAT THE AGGRESSOR SHOULD WITHDRAW, THE STATUS QUO ANTE BE RESTORED AND THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN SO RUDELY BROKEN OFF RESUMED. HE MUST NOT THINK THAT WE WERE BEING INFLEXIBLE. WE HAD SHOWN OURSELVES READY TO ENTERTAIN A STRING OF CONCESSIONS - UNADMINISTRATION, ACCEPTANCE THAT THE OUTCOME DID NOT HAVE TO BE BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY WITH ITS CONCOMITANT OF THE PARAMOUNTCY OF THE ISLANDER'S WISHES, A TARGET DATE FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT ONLY SEVEN MONTHS AWAY ETC.

3. HOWEVER, THE PLAIN IF REGRETTABLE FACT IS THAT EVERYONE HERE SEES THE SITUATION QUITE DIFFERENTLY. THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP SYMPATHISE WITH OUR REACTION TO ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE, BUT THEY BELIEVE (THIS INCLUDES A NUMBER OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS) THAT THE FALKLANDS SHOULD BELONG TO ARGENTINA PROVIDED THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS ARE SAFEGUARDED. AT THIS STAGE, THE DOMINANT VIEW HERE IS THAT THE ARGENTINE POSITION IS BECOMING MORE MODERATE AND THAT WE SHOULD RESPOND IN ORDER TO BRING TO AN END THE HOSTILITIES WHICH ARE CREATING INCREASING CONCERN WORLD-WIDE. RIGHT OR WRONG, THIS IS HOW IT IS.

4. HENCE, IF WE DO NOT MODERATE OUR POSITION AND THE NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN TOMORROW (13 MAY) LEAVING A DIPLOMATIC VACUUM ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY INTENSIFYING MILITARY ACTIVITY, WE WILL BE REGARDED AS THE CULPRITS (THE SECRETARIAT WILL SEE TO THAT). SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION, EVEN FROM OUR ALLIES AND PARTNERS, WILL DRAIN AWAY AS WE CAST VETOES AGAINST CALLS FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, PROBABLY ACCOMPANIED BY THE CLAMOUR OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I STILL HAVE SOME SHOTS IN MY LOCKER TO TRY TO LIMIT THIS DAMAGE BUT, IF THE DIPLOMATIC VACUUM PERSISTS, THEY WILL BECOME DECREASINGLY EFFECTIVE.

5. THE ABOVE IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN HERE IF THE NEGOTIATIONS COLLAPSE TOMORROW AS A RESULT OF OUR STICKING TO OUR PRESENT POSITION. IF YOU NEED TO BUY MORE TIME EITHER IN THE HOPE OF REACHING A SOLUTION THROUGH THE PRESENT UN PROCESS, OR TO AVOID AN IMMEDIATE DIPLOMATIC VACUUM EG IN THE CONTEXT OF PERSUADING OUR PARTNERS TO RENEW SANCTIONS ON 16 MAY, WE SHALL HAVE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS ON THE TWO ISSUES MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE AT MY MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOMORROW. THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS IS TOO DIFFICULT FOR YOU, IS FOR ME TO SET OUT OUR PRESENT POSITION IN FULL TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND OBLIGE THE ARGENTINES TO REJECT IT. AS IT STANDS, THEY WOULD BE LIKELY TO REJECT IT IN TOTO RATHER THAN REFERRING TO SPECIFIC POINTS. THIS WOULD MARGINALLY LIMIT THE DAMAGE THEREAFTER IN THE UN.

IF, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, YOU ARE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE FURTHER CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO KEEP THE TALKS ALIVE, THE FOLLOWING ARE IN MY JUDGEMENT THE MINIMUM:-

- (I) SOUTH GEORGIA: AGREEMENT TO DEMILITARISATION TO ACCOMPANY MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS, LEAVING THE TRADITIONAL BAS ADMINISTRATION INTACT, FREEZING ALL FRESH ECONOMIC AND OTHER NON-SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY (TO DEAL WITH THE DAVIDOFF CONTRACT) AND AGREEING THAT A SEPARATE SOLUTION TO SOUTH GEORGIA/SOUTH SANDWICH BE INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FALKLANDS.
- (II) THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION: AGREEMENT THAT THE UN ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD ACT IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISLANDERS, ACTING AS A CORPORATE BODY (UNSPECIFIED), AS REGARDS THE DAY TO DAY AFFAIRS OF THE ISLANDS AND AS REGARDS THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDERS. WE WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE OPERATION OF THE EXISTING INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE SUSPENDED (NOT ABOLISHED) DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD BUT INSIST THAT THE UN ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD NOT MAKE (OR RETAIN) ANY CHANGES WHICH WOULD NOT BE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS AND PRACTICES PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED BY THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

PARSONS

NNNN



PS/Mr Rifkind

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. You asked for a brief note about the exchanges which took place the other day between the Prime Minister and Mr Foot concerning the need to keep Parliament informed before the Government made any decision on proposals which might emerge from the Secretary-General's current mediatory efforts. The strict legal and constitutional position is that the treaty-making power is vested in the Crown as part of the royal prerogative. If and to the extent that the implementation of a treaty by the United Kingdom would require primary legislation, the constitutional practice of successive administrations has been to ensure that the treaty is signed subject to ratification. The necessary domestic legislation is then enacted between signature and ratification so that the Crown can ratify the treaty in full knowledge that it already has available to it all necessary powers to ensure its effective execution as and when it enters into force.

2. In the particular case of the Falkland Islands, what is being sought is an Interim Agreement for the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces, interim administration of the Islands and a formula permitting negotiations on the future of the Islands. By virtue of its very nature, an Agreement on the cessation of hostilities must enter into force on signature. In the particular circumstances of the Falkland Islands, any necessary adjustments to the constitutional instruments to accommodate an interim administration can be effected by way of modification of subordinate legislation - that is to say, to the extent necessary, the Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) Orders and the Royal Instructions. There would thus be no need for primary legislation to give effect to any Interim Agreement that might be reached along the lines now under consideration.

3. I should perhaps also say a word about the Ponsonby Rule. This is a rule of constitutional practice which has been broadly observed since 1924 and which requires that any treaty subject to ratification should be laid before Parliament for 30 sitting days before the government of the day proceeds to ratification. The object and purpose of the Ponsonby Rule is to ensure that Parliament has an opportunity to debate the terms of any treaty subject to ratification before the Crown actually proceeds to ratification. As will be apparent, the Ponsonby Rule does not apply to treaties expressed to come into force on signature. However, any agreement expressed to come into force on signature must be laid before Parliament as soon as it has been concluded.

4. There have been one or two occasions in the past (notably in the context of the negotiations on Cyprus in 1960) when the text of a treaty has been laid before Parliament in draft - that is to say, before signature. These have, however, been exceptional cases, and there is no legal or constitutional reason why the text of any Interim Agreement on the Falkland Islands should be laid before Parliament before it is signed (this is on the assumption that the

/Agreement



Agreement is expressed to come into force on signature). It is of course a question of policy as to how much of the detail of any Interim Agreement that might be negotiated should be revealed to Parliament by way of Ministerial statement before signature.

Ian Sinclair

Ian Sinclair
Legal Adviser

13 May 1982

Partial T.B. Treaty

Waiver of Primary rules

① What happens when Argentine
wants except minimum conditions.

② Dr/Arg. loops on island.

③ Paroni. Sec. 004. ~~scribble~~

500. W.
3:1

LW. SW. 134ns. AM M.

④ Anti Royal? L. P. D.

⑤ Timely debate.

Reporters. Sov. Admin. Writes
Parsons

Take form - on that basis
for that purpose. Revised letter,
will be written
the people.

⑥ Last Friday - Int. Agreement.

No withdrawal which
corresponds to them.
Not British admission.

Prejudices cannot overcome
- minded for

⑦ Concessions - whatever

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(FM BERNE 141542Z)

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 95 OF 13 MAY

CONVERSATION WITH ADMIRAL MOYA

1. ON THE INITIATIVE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL, BILL, MURCHISON, WHO HAS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH SENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS AND SOME IDEAS FOR A DIRECTLY-NEGOTIATED CONTINGENCY PEACE PLAN IN CASE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS FAIL, MURCHISON AND I HAD AN HOUR'S INTERVIEW YESTERDAY WITH ADMIRAL MOYA, NAVAL HEAD OF THE PRESIDENTIAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WHICH SERVICES THE JUNTA ITSELF.

2. I MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT I WAS ATTENDING IN A PURELY PERSONAL CAPACITY AND HAD NO AUTHORITY OR LOCUS STANDI AS A BRITISH DIPLOMAT TO CONVEY ANY MESSAGE FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, BUT THAT I HAD TOLD MY SWISS COLLEAGUES I PROPOSED TO ACCOMPANY MURCHISON AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS INITIATIVE TO MEET MOYA AND HAVE A DISCUSSION WITH HIM.

3. MURCHISON'S PLAN IS BASED ON A SUGGESTION FOR CESSION OF A PERMANENT ARGENTINE COMBINED SERVICES BASE ON THE ISLANDS IN EXCHANGE FOR A RETURN TO BRITISH ADMINISTRATION AND A BRITISH GOVERNOR, WITH NEGOTIATIONS OVER SOVEREIGNTY CONTINUING UNDER UN AUSPICES AND A DEADLINE FOR ITS TRANSFER TO A DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT BY 1 JANUARY 1990.

4. NONE OF THESE DETAILS WERE GIVEN TO MOYA EXCEPT THE SUGGESTION OF A BASE. NATURALLY, HE SAID HE COULD NOT COMMENT AS THIS WAS NOT EVEN AN INFORMAL PROPOSAL, BUT, SIGNIFICANTLY, HE DID SAY THAT IF NECESSARY, AND IF DESIRED, THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIT DOWN TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES TO AVOID WAR. HE SEEMED PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UN, AND SAID ARGENTINA WOULD FIGHT IF NECESSARY.

5. BEFORE TAKING THIS IDEA FURTHER, HE WANTED CONFIRMATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO PURSUE IT. I REPEATED I HAD NO STANDING IN THIS MATTER, BUT WOULD CONSULT.

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6. AFTER SPEAKING WITH FEARN I ADVISED MURCHISON TO PURSUE THE IDEA THROUGH PRIVATE CHANNELS TO AVOID PREJUDICING THE CURRENT DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK. I SHALL TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION.

JOY 13.5.

FROM BERNE

IN THEIR NOTE FORWARDING TO US THE TEXT OF THIS TELEGRAM THE SWISS FDFA COMMENTED THAT THE CONVERSATION OF JOY AND MURCHISON WITH ADMIRAL MOYA WAS PURELY A PRIVATE INITIATIVE ON THE PART OF JOY AND NOT (NOT) ARRANGED ON EITHER BRITISH OR SWISS INSTRUCTIONS THIS WAS ALSO MADE CLEAR TO THE ARGENTINE INTERLOCUTORS.

LEE

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OO FCO
OO MODUK
OO PARIS
OO STOCKHOLM
OO ASCENSION ISLAND

GRS 220
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS GENEVA 131240Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 239 OF 13 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PARIS, STOCKHOLM, ASCENSION ISLAND
YOUR TEL 60 TO ASCENSION
REPATRIATION OF POWS

1. JOSSERSON (ICRC) CALLED TODAY (13 MAY) CONCERNING OUR DECISION TO RETAIN LT.COMMANDER ASTIZ ON ASCENSION. HE HANDED

DECISION TO RETAIN LT.COMMANDER ASTIZ ON ASCENSION. HE HANDED TO US A NOTE (TEXT IN MIFT TO FCO AND MOD ONLY).

2. JOSSERSON SAID THAT TSCHIFFELE, THE DELEGATE IN CHARGE OF THE ICRC REPATRIATION TEAM, HAD TELEPHONED GENEVA FROM ASCENSION DURING THE NIGHT ABOUT THE DECISION. ICRC WISHED TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO THIS DEVELOPMENT AND WOULD BE HANDING A SIMILAR NOTE TO THE ARGENTINIANS HERE. THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A LOT OF ENQUIRIES FROM THE PRESS AND WOULD BE ANSWERING THEM ON THE LINES OF THE NOTE.

3. JOSSERSON SAID THAT THE DECISION TO HOLD ASTIZ DID NOT (NOT) PRESENT ANY LEGAL DIFFICULTIES. THE UK WAS FULLY ENTITLED TO HOLD POWS UNTIL THE END OF HOSTILITIES. BUT ICRC HAD TO POINT OUT THAT RETAINING HIM WAS OUR SOLE RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT HE WAS STILL ENTITLED TO COMPLETE PROTECTION UNDER THE 3RD GENEVA CONVENTION. THIS INCLUDED ICRC ACCESS TO ASTIZ.

4. SPEAKING UNOFFICIALLY JOSSERSON SAID THAT THE ICRC WOULD NOT OPPOSE ANY FUTURE JUDICIAL PROCESS AGAINST ASTIZ BY THE PROTECTING POWER. BUT IF HE WERE TO BE HANDED OVER TO ANOTHER POWER THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO EXTRADITION. ICRC ARE CURRENTLY CONSULTING THE CONVENTIONS TO DECIDE THEIR STANCE ON SUCH OUR ISSUE IF IT WERE TO ARISE.

5. GRATEFUL FOR DETAILS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE FCO MENTIONED IN THE ICRC NOTE.

6. SEE MIFT.

MARSHALL

NNNN

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GRS 351
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 131500Z MAY 82
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 399 OF 13 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 396: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PARAGRAPH 5 OF MY TUR PROMISED A FURTHER TELEGRAM ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE DEPENDENCIES.
2. IT IS INDEED THE CASE THAT, UNDER OUR CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, THE DEPENDENCIES ARE FORMALLY DEPENDENCIES OF THE COLONY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IN THAT SENSE THE POSITION IS AS DESCRIBED IN HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, TO WHICH YOU REFER IN PARAGRAPH 2(G) OF YOUR TELNO 731. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ROOT OF OUR TITLE TO THE DEPENDENCIES, AND IN PARTICULAR TO SOUTH GEORGIA, IS QUITE DISTINCT FROM THE ROOT OF OUR TITLE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES. AS FAR AS SOUTH GEORGIA IS CONCERNED, WE CLAIM TITLE BY VIRTUE OF DISCOVERY BY CAPTAIN COOK IN 1775 AND THE TAKING OF FORMAL POSSESSION BY HIM THEN, COUPLED WITH THE ACTS OF BRITISH OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION FROM THE EARLY PART OF THE 20TH CENTURY AND PARTICULARLY FROM 1908 ONWARDS WHICH HAVE CONSOLIDATED THAT ORIGINAL ROOT OF TITLE.
3. THE POSITION WAS WELL STATED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM'S APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ICJ IN 1955 (WHEN THE ARGENTINES OF COURSE DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT). THAT APPLICATION INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE:

'IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD THAT ALTHOUGH, FOR REASONS OF CONVENIENCE, THE TERRITORIES TO WHICH THE PRESENT APPLICATION RELATES WERE CONSTITUTED DEPENDENCIES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES, THE BRITISH TITLE TO THEM IS A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT

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ONE, WHICH IN NO WAY DERIVES FROM OR DEPENDS ON THE TITLE TO THE FALKLANDS THEMSELVES'. (FOOTNOTE 2 AT PAGE 9 OF ANTARCTICA CASES: PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS).

4. THIS PASSAGE MAKES CLEAR THE DISTINCTION WHICH WE REGARD AS FUNDAMENTAL - THAT, ALTHOUGH FOR REASONS OF CONVENIENCE THE DEPENDENCIES HAVE BEEN CONSTITUTED DEPENDENCIES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES, THE TITLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THEM IS WHOLLY SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT FROM OUR TITLE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 140047Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 747 OF 13 MAY.

FALKLANDS: NARVAL AND PUMA.

1. ROCA (ARGENTINA) HAS HAD CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT A LETTER TO THE EFFECT THAT QUOTE A PUMA HELICOPTER, WHILE CARRYING OUT SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS IN CONNEXION WITH THE FISHING VESSEL NARVAL, WAS ATTACKED AND SHOT DOWN BY BRITISH AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE. GRATEFUL FOR ANY MATERIAL YOU MAY HAVE TO REBUT THIS FURTHER ATTEMPT TO CHARGE US WITH WAR CRIMES.

PARSONS

NNNN

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X 37 [TYPISTS]

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FM BONN 131500Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 440 OF 13 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY ROME PARIS WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

FALKLANDS

1. HERR GENSCHER RECEIVED ME THIS MORNING. MY MAIN PURPOSE IN ARRANGING A MEETING HAD BEEN TO MAKE SURE THAT HE WAS ON BOARD, AND I CONCENTRATED ON EMPHASISING THE ENORMOUS EFFORT THAT YOU HAVE BEEN PUTTING IN, EVER SINCE YOU TOOK UP YOUR JOB AND AT AN EVER-INCREASING TEMPO, INTO THE PEACE EFFORT. I REFERRED TO MY DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE IMPLICATIONS IN RECENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS THAT THE GERMANS FELT THAT WE WERE NOT DOING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ON THIS FRONT. HERR GENSCHER ASSURED ME THAT HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF YOUR EFFORTS AND THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS POSITION WAS ABSOLUTELY FIRM. HE REFERRED TO HIS QUOTE ROBUST UNQUOTE INTERVENTION AT VILLERS-LE-TEMPLE, WHERE HE HAD FOUND THE CRITICISMS OF SOME OTHER MINISTERS UNACCEPTABLE. HE SAID THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC SUPPORTED US AS ALLIES AND FRIENDS AND PARTNERS,

AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO.

2. ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS, HERR GENSCHER SAID THAT THE MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT CABINET BUT THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT FELT THAT IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY BEST FOR THE DECISION TO BE STATED AT THE LAST MINUTE: OTHERWISE THERE WAS A DANGER THAT POLITICAL DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT WOULD ARISE BEFORE THE 17TH OF MAY WHEN THE DECISION HAD TO BE MADE. HE COULD ASSURE ME PERSONALLY AND CONFIDENTIALLY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE THE SAME STANCE. IE THAT SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONTINUED IF NO PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS HAD BEEN AGREED BY 17 MAY. THE FINAL DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN BY HIMSELF AND SCHMIDT. BUT IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HE CONFIRMED THAT WE COULD COUNT ON A POSITIVE DECISION. (WE DID NOT HOWEVER DISCUSS THE LENGTH OF THE RENEWAL, AND I HAVE SINCE HEARD INDICATIONS THAT THE GERMANS MAY TRY TO LIMIT IT TO 15 DAYS).

3. GENSCHER ADDED HOWEVER THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED OVER THE NEWS FROM ROME ABOUT ITALIAN ATTITUDES FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S DEBATE IN THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT.

4. AT THE END OF MY TALK, AFTER DISCUSSING OTHER MATTERS WHICH I WILL REPORT SEPARATELY, I TOOK HERR GENSCHER THROUGH THE BELGRANO INCIDENT AND THE FACT THAT GERMAN REACTIONS HAD BEEN BASED ON INADEQUATE AND FALSE INFORMATION FROM ARGENTINA. HE CLAIMED TO UNDERSTAND THE POSITION FULLY AND DENIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD FORMED FALSE CONCLUSIONS. I THINK HE NEVERTHELESS TOOK THE MESSAGE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD EXERCISE SOME CAUTION IN REACTING TO NEWS THAT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONFIRMED.

5. I EMPHASISED AS STRONGLY AS I COULD THE IMPORTANCE OF SENDING THE RIGHT SIGNAL TO ARGENTINA AND OF AVOIDING ENCOURAGING THE ARGENTINIANS TO THINK THAT SUPPORT FOR US WAS CRUMBLING.

TAYLOR

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RESTRICTED

FM FCO 131550Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 94 OF 13 MAY

FALKLANDS: LT COMMANDER ASTIZ

1. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WILL SEEK TO MAKE USE IN THEIR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT YET REPATRIATED LT CMDR ASTIZ. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE BEYOND WHICH YOU SHOULD NOT BE DRAWN.

POINTS TO MAKE:

2. THE MAIN BODY OF PRISONERS LEFT ASCENSION ISLAND FOR MONTEVIDEO BY AIR EARLY ON 13 MAY. LT CDR ASTIZ WAS NOT AMONG THEM.

3. FOLLOWING FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS BY THE SWEDISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS, WE DECIDED NOT TO REPATRIATE THE LT CDR WITH THE OTHER PRISONERS IN ORDER TO GIVE HMG MORE TIME TO CONSIDER THE VIEWS OF THESE TWO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. THE ONLY DECISION SO FAR TAKEN IS NOT TO RETURN HIM TO MONTEVIDEO ON THAT FLIGHT.

4. WE HAVE EXPLAINED THE POSITION TO THE ICRC IN GENEVA. THE ICRC ACCEPT THAT THE DECISION WHEN TO REPATRIATE RESTS WITH HMG.

5. WE SHALL, OF COURSE, FULLY ABIDE BY THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS.

6. UNDER THE CONVENTIONS, WE HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO REPATRIATE PRISONERS OF WAR BEFORE THE END OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES. ALL THE OTHER PRISONERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT THAN THE CONVENTIONS REQUIRE.

7. UNDER THE CONVENTIONS THE ONLY INFORMATION WHICH A PRISONER OF WAR IS REQUIRED TO DISCLOSE IS HIS PERSONAL IDENTITY - NAME, RANK AND NUMBER. HE MAY NOT BE PLACED UNDER DURESS IN THE EVENT OF REFUSAL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.

PRISONERS OF WAR:

8. WE ARE NOT AT WAR WITH ARGENTINA. BUT THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS APPLY TO HOSTILITIES FALLING SHORT OF WAR, AND THEREFORE APPLY IN THIS CASE. THEY USE THE TERM 'PRISONERS OF WAR' TO REFER TO PRISONERS TAKEN IN WAR, IN CASES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND IN ALL

CASES OF PARTIAL OR TOTAL OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY. OUR USE OF THE TERM 'PRISONERS OF WAR' THEREFORE DOES NOT MEAN OR IMPLY THAT WE ARE AT WAR.

UNATTRIBUTABLE:

9. BOTH THE SWEDES AND THE FRENCH ARE INVESTIGATING SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST LT CDR ASTIZ IN CONNECTION WITH THE WOUNDING AND DISAPPEARANCE OF A SWEDISH WOMAN IN BUENOS AIRES IN 1977, AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO FRENCH NUNS RESPECTIVELY. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE OWE IT TO THOSE FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO GIVE THEM A FEW DAYS TO EXPLAIN THEIR PREOCCUPATIONS TO US IN GREATER DETAIL.

10. IF THE SWEDES OR THE FRENCH ASK FOR DIRECT ACCESS TO ASTIZ WE SHALL HAVE TO CONSIDER THIS IN THE LIGHT OF OUR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS. SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED OUR DETERMINATION TO ABIDE FULLY BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS.

11. (IF PRESSED): OUR LEGAL OBLIGATIONS WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE US TO REPATRIATE ASTIZ IN DUE COURSE - AT THE END OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES IF NOT BEFORE. WE HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR ANY FUTURE BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR.

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DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8).

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DESKBY 140400Z

FM WASHINGTON 132342Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1751 OF 13 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: U.S. ATTITUDES

1. THE TIMES CORRESPONDENT IN WASHINGTON, ASHFORD, HAS DESCRIBED TO US IN CONFIDENCE A CONVERSATION WITH A WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL ABOUT U.S. POLICY IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. THE OFFICIAL SAID THAT GENERAL WALTERS HAD VISITED BUENOS AIRES TO TRY TO REINSTITUTE AN ACTIVE U.S. ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WALTERS WAS TO INFORM THE ARGENTINES THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO FOLLOW A MORE EVEN-HANDED APPROACH IF THAT WOULD HELP BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. U.S. MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR THE U K WAS NOT OPEN-ENDED; IT COULD BE RESCINDED IF THAT SUPPORT WAS USED FOR PURPOSES INCONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. ASHFORD'S SOURCE REFERRED IN PARTICULAR TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A BRITISH ATTACK ON THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND, CLAIMING THAT THIS WOULD BE RESISTED BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND SAID THAT DECISIONS ON THE FALKLANDS

THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND, CLAIMING THAT THIS WOULD BE RESISTED BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND SAID THAT DECISIONS ON THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WERE NOW BEING TAKEN IN THE WHITE HOUSE RATHER THAN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. ASHFORD INTENDS TO FILE A REPORT SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. MAY BE CLIMBING BACK ONTO THE FENCE.

2. WE HAVE HEARD SEPARATELY FROM LATIN AMERICAN SOURCES HERE THAT PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO ARGUED STRONGLY, AND HE BELIEVED WITH SOME SUCCESS, THAT U.S. RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE U K AND THAT THE ONLY WAY OF RESTORING THE SITUATION WOULD BE FOR THE AMERICANS TO RESUME AN ACTIVE NEGOTIATING ROLE FROM A POSITION OF NEUTRALITY.

3. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT WHILE HAIG IS AWAY, A LOT OF LESSER FIGURES ARE TRYING TO GET BACK INTO THE ACT: AND THAT FIGUEIREDO'S VISIT HAS MADE SOME IMPRESSION HERE. STOESSEL, WITH WHOM I HAD A TALK THIS EVENING HOWEVER, TELLS ME THAT WALTERS DOES NOT SEEM TO BE GETTING ANYWHERE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 May 1982

Dear John,

MS

Prime Minister

To note

AL 12/5

AL 13/5. h.c.

Call on the Prime Minister by the Governor of the Falkland Islands

In your letter of 10 May you recorded points arising from the Prime Minister's conversation with the Governor, and Mr Cheek and Mr Luxton, on 7 May.

On your paragraph 2(b), the background, which we have discussed further with the Governor, is as follows. Gas del Estado (the Argentine National Gas Company) has been the supplier of domestic butane gas to the Islands. There have been problems on where to store the cylinders and in 1981, Gas del Estado asked the Falkland Islands Government (FIG) to make available a site near to the fuel depot, where the gas cylinders could be more suitably stored and loaded more easily on to land rovers for distribution. Permission was given and in due course FIG were informed that the regular STN vessel would be bringing in cement and aggregate for the construction of a ramp. FIG had assumed that the work would be carried out by local contractors and were therefore surprised when 17 Argentines, claiming to be employees of Gas del Estado, arrived on the LADE flight on 23 March.. The STN vessel arrived shortly afterwards but work on the ramp had not begun before the invasion.

This was not reported from Port Stanley at the time; and it is hard at this stage to judge whether the Governor's suspicions are well-founded. It is possible that the Argentines were some form of advance guard. But there is no firm evidence to support this. They were rounded up with other Argentines on the morning of the invasion: no arms or transmitters were found.

We shall be replying separately on the question of a broadcast to Falkland Islanders by the Prime Minister.

We shall also shortly let you have a copy (with our comments) of the Governor's paper on the future of the Falkland Islands.

/I am

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I am sending a copy of this letter to David Omand in the Ministry of Defence.


Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



14 MAY 1966



ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE,
WESTMINSTER, LONDON, SW1P 1QJ

13 May, 1982

R 14/5

PPS

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of the 11th May.

You wrote in that letter "I was surprised that you should question whether our use of force in the South Atlantic was morally justified." I found this slightly puzzling in that you will be able to check that in my letter of May 8th I wrote as follows:

"You may perhaps be aware that after the sending of the Task Force a statement was published in the Catholic press giving some ideas about the moral issues underlying the crisis. Under the principles of the just war the United Kingdom has an unmistakeable claim to take the necessary steps to overturn the Argentine aggression even if this involves, as a last resort, the use of force."

I do not wish to burden you with this but I thought it only right to put the records straight from my point of view. The rest of my letter of May 8th, I would like to think, is clear enough.

Yours sincerely,

David Hume

Archbishop of Westminster

The Rt. Hon. M. Thatcher

Mr Whitke



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Press Secretary

13 May 1982

Mr Neville,

I am sending you the attached correspondence on a personal and confidential basis. You may well have seen Nicholson's report. If not it may help you to move things along.

I have replied as attached to David Nicholas.

Best wishes.

B. Ingham

B. INGHAM

Neville Taylor, Esq.,
Director of Public Relations,
Ministry of Defence.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Press Secretary

13 May 1982

Dear David,

Many thanks for your letter of May 11 enclosing an internal service message from Michael Nicholson with the Task Force.

I am convinced that Neville Taylor, the new Director of Public Relations at the MoD, will do his level best to improve matters. But he needs to be given time, bearing in mind the impossible circumstances he discovered on arrival in the Department soon after the crisis arose.

We were well aware of the film problem of the Argentine prisoners and we have tried to ensure that the UK has the first film. A number of us will be very disappointed and upset if that has not occurred.

As you may know Peter Woon was on to me earlier today over the latest difficulties. I made exactly the same point to him as I have made to you above - namely that you do have a friend in Neville Taylor, but he has to be given time to work. I know your problems and your frustrations, but I am bound to say that I think if you overplay your hand you will be playing into the hands of those who really have no time for any journalist who comes within 8.000 miles of the Fleet.

Yours sincerely
B. Ingham

B. INGHAM

David Nicholas, Esq.,
Editor,
Independent Television News Limited.

FROM THE EDITOR

Mr Bernard Ingham
Press Office
10 Downing Street
London SW1

11 May 1982

Dear Bernard,

Just to illustrate the problems involved in reporting from the Task Force, I thought you would be interested to see an internal service message received at ITN this morning from Michael Nicholson.

I repeat we are receptive to any vetting system at this end to scrutinise sensitive material as long as we can keep a constant flow coming in. I have reminded the Ministry of Defence that Nicholson is a highly experienced war correspondent and has covered fourteen wars these last twenty years: so he knows what it is all about.

On the matter of the Argentine prisoners taken at South Georgia: the latest news is that they arrive in Buenos Aires tomorrow, no doubt to extensive Argentine television coverage. But to the best of my knowledge there will not be a single picture of them in British hands either at the Georgia end or on Ascension. It seems to me a major trump has been lost here.

Thanks for past help these difficult weeks.

Yours ever,

David
David Nicholas

enc.

MEMORANDUM

TO : THE EDITOR, cc FOREIGN DESK

FROM : MICHAEL NICHOLSON ex "Hermes", phoned in on Tuesday 11 May 1982
at 1030 BST

SUBJECT : LATEST INCIDENTS IN THE LONG RUN OF COMPLAINTS.

1. We were told this morning by Admiral staff aboard Hermes that there were no incidents to report overnight -- poor visibility, and there had been no activity in the air. Minutes afterwards, we heard on the BBC World Service the MOD spokesman in London announcing surface engagements off the Falklands, and that the Task Force had fired on a vessel.
2. Having got to this ship to radio-phone on Sunday, we have been stranded here since Sunday with familiar excuses on why we cannot have a helicopter.
3. The MOD in London is mishearing information from our stories and misreporting it back to the Task Force. For example, I was accused by Rear Admiral Woodward of reporting to ITN that there would be a further naval bombardment last night. MOD complaint to Admiral quoted NAO report. I said nothing of the kind. Hanrahan of the BBC was accused of quoting survivors ex-"NAWAL" having been strafed by Harriers. He said no such thing.
4. Bad news stories strictly embargoed from MOD London and released by MOD without telling us. For example, we were not allowed to report the 'Sheffield' attack or the loss of the 3 Sea Harriers.
5. There are frequent attempts by MOD London to direct the activities of the press on board. For example, we were not allowed to interview survivors of 'Sheffield', and we could only interview the Captain of 'Sheffield' after he had been briefed by MOD.
6. We were not allowed to film or photograph 'Sheffield' until 4 days after she had been hit, and we were told on the day of the attack that there was no room in helicopters for operational reasons, even though we witnessed helicopters leaving 'Hermes' with one small fire-pump aboard, and returning empty. Also, we were only allowed to film on condition that both pool film/ENG and P.A.'s negatives be held by the MOD rep aboard for future release. It is not our property.
7. Every story we write is censored at 2 levels -- Admiral staff and MOD-PR aboard.
8. Since the arrival of ITN equipment, I am told by 'Hermes' technical people that Scott satellite transmission is technically possible even

...CONTD/2

ough only black and white. However, MOD have refused permission.

9. A VHF radio transmission between 'Hermes' and this radio/marifat ship is also possible, which would mean we need never leave 'Hermes' but could be patched through, enabling us to talk directly to London ex-'Hermes' and for London to talk directly to us whenever they wished. Enormous advantages, but navy here insists it is not operationally possible, in contradiction to other sources who say that it is. Navy say VHF link not secure line, but whatever we report over that line is due to be broadcast world-wide anyway.

Michael.

ENDS

The Birmingham Post

Tuesday, May 11, 1982





OD(SA)

(FCO)
MOD
HO
CDLO
CO

8A *Feb*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS - US GUARANTEE

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 12 May and the enclosed draft message to President Reagan.

The Prime Minister does not wish to write to President Reagan in these terms at the present time. She does not think it appropriate to indicate to President Reagan that she could accept a settlement which was unsatisfactory in certain aspects. I believe that Mrs. Thatcher may wish to revert to the matter if the current negotiations in New York produce more progress than at the moment seems likely.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other Members of OD(SA).

A. J. COLES

B.J.P. Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

Ac

BK

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 May 1982

Dear John

Falkland Islands

On the evening of 11 May the Prime Minister spoke to Mr Rifkind about the legal aspects of keeping Parliament informed before the Government made any decisions on proposals put forward by the UN Secretary-General. I attach a note prepared by Sir Ian Sinclair covering the points raised by the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely

Marsh

P.P. (J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

PS/Mr Rifkind

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. You asked for a brief note about the exchanges which took place the other day between the Prime Minister and Mr Foot concerning the need to keep Parliament informed before the Government made any decision on proposals which might emerge from the Secretary-General's current mediatory efforts. The strict legal and constitutional position is that the treaty-making power is vested in the Crown as part of the royal prerogative. If and to the extent that the implementation of a treaty by the United Kingdom would require primary legislation, the constitutional practice of successive administrations has been to ensure that the treaty is signed subject to ratification. The necessary domestic legislation is then enacted between signature and ratification so that the Crown can ratify the treaty in full knowledge that it already has available to it all necessary powers to ensure its effective execution as and when it enters into force.
2. In the particular case of the Falkland Islands, what is being sought is an Interim Agreement for the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces, interim administration of the Islands and a formula permitting negotiations on the future of the Islands. By virtue of its very nature, an Agreement on the cessation of hostilities must enter into force on signature. In the particular circumstances of the Falkland Islands, any necessary adjustments to the constitutional instruments to accommodate an interim administration can be effected by way of modification of subordinate legislation - that is to say, to the extent necessary, the Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) Orders and the Royal Instructions. There would thus be no need for primary legislation to give effect to any Interim Agreement that might be reached along the lines now under consideration.
3. I should perhaps also say a word about the Ponsonby Rule. This is a rule of constitutional practice which has been broadly observed since 1924 and which requires that any treaty subject to ratification should be laid before Parliament for 30 sitting days before the government of the day proceeds to ratification. The object and purpose of the Ponsonby Rule is to ensure that Parliament has an opportunity to debate the terms of any treaty subject to ratification before the Crown actually proceeds to ratification. As will be apparent, the Ponsonby Rule does not apply to treaties expressed to come into force on signature. However, any agreement expressed to come into force on signature must be laid before Parliament as soon as it has been concluded.
4. There have been one or two occasions in the past (notably in the context of the negotiations on Cyprus in 1960) when the text of a treaty has been laid before Parliament in draft - that is to say, before signature. These have, however, been exceptional cases, and there is no legal or constitutional reason why the text of any Interim Agreement on the Falkland Islands should be laid before Parliament before it is signed (this is on the assumption that the

/Agreement

Agreement is expressed to come into force on signature). It is of course a question of policy as to how much of the detail of any Interim Agreement that might be negotiated should be revealed to Parliament by way of Ministerial statement before signature.

Ian Sinclair

Ian Sinclair
Legal Adviser

13 May 1982

Subj
cc Master **SECRET** *file* *8*



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1982

Dear Brian,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

President Reagan telephoned the Prime Minister this evening. I enclose a record of their conversation. I should be grateful if you and the other recipients of this letter would ensure that it is circulated only to those with a strict need to know.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office), Jim Nursaw (Attorney General's Office), Keith Long (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Your ever
John Major

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET *K*

SECRET

8

RECORD OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND
THE PRIME MINISTER AT 1840 HOURS ON THURSDAY, 13 MAY, 1982

President Reagan said that he understood that the Prime Minister had been answering Questions in Parliament. He thought she might like to hear a friendly voice. The Prime Minister said that Parliament was rather restless. We were now engaged in our sixth set of negotiations and it had not been possible to reveal the details. Argentina was still insisting on Sovereignty and on unsatisfactory arrangements for administration of the Islands as conditions of withdrawal.

President Reagan said that he had understood that the negotiations conducted by the UN Secretary-General in New York had produced some movement. He believed that the Argentines were willing to enter into negotiations without pre-conditions; or at least their representative in New York said that was the case, though the attitude of the Junta was less clear. No clear signal had emerged from General Walters' talk with Galtieri. But his understanding was that the remaining issues related to the composition of the interim administration, freedom of movement and participation in the administration by the "Island groups". A recent telephone conversation with the Secretary-General had suggested that the two sides were quite close. Was this true?

The Prime Minister said that she regretted that this was not the case. At least two big questions remained. As regards the interim arrangements, Argentina wanted greater Argentine participation than we could accept and there were substantial difficulties about ownership of property and freedom of movement. Secondly, there was the difficulty of South Georgia where our title was completely different and we were in possession. There was the added difficulty that we did not know with whom we were negotiating. The Argentinians were trying to arrange an interim administration which would lead inevitably to Argentine Sovereignty. Finally, there was no guarantee that at a later stage they might not invade the Islands again.

/President Reagan

SECRET

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- 2 -

President Reagan said that he had discussed the issue with the President of Brazil during the latter's current visit to Washington. President Figueiredo's position on Sovereignty was, of course, close to the Argentine position, but he would support the United Kingdom position on the exclusion of South Georgia from the negotiations and on freedom of movement (which ought to be decided, not in the interim agreement, but in the negotiations for a long-term settlement). Figueiredo had told the President that he had just received a report from the Brazilian Ambassador in Buenos Aires. The latter had said that the United Kingdom was preparing an attack on the Argentine mainland and the Argentine military were also on the move. The Ambassador had added that only Figueiredo would have any impact on Galtieri. The suggestion had arisen that President Reagan should talk to the Prime Minister. Both would be asked to delay any further military action. The President asked whether the Prime Minister could hold off military action.

The Prime Minister said in reply that Argentina had attacked our ships yesterday. It was easy for them to delay military action. Our task force had less endurance than their forces on the mainland. Our capacity to take military action would be steadily reduced. We had made it clear that we could not delay military options because of negotiations. The truth was that it was only our military measures which had produced diplomatic results.

President Reagan said that the United States had sided with Britain but at the price of its relations with Latin America. He was worried that the earlier perception of Argentina as the aggressor was disappearing. A David/Goliath image was now being created - and the United Kingdom was Goliath. The Prime Minister said that this could hardly be true at a distance of 8,000 miles. Our people in the Falkland Islands did not wish to live under a military junta or under the Peronistas. The President would not wish his people to live under a similar regime. The Argentines' title to the Falkland Islands was weak. They had always refused to take it to the international court. If they based their claim on geographical proximity, there were many other islands closer to the American mainland, e.g. Trinidad and Tobago.

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/President Reagan

SECRET

- 3 -

President Reagan said that the Argentines had shown no consideration for the people on the Falkland Islands. When he had rung President Galtieri to persuade him to delay his invasion, Galtieri had assured him that the Islanders way of life would continue. But this of course was not true.

The Prime Minister said that some of the families on the Islands had been there far longer than people in Argentina. An Islander who had visited her the other day was of the seventh generation. In other words, his family had begun their life on the Islands at a time when the ancestors of many Argentinians were still in Italy and Spain. There were only 40 Argentines on the Islands and only 20 of those were there permanently. There was another fact which was not generally understood. The Falkland Islands were of strategic importance. If the Panama Canal was closed, it would be important that Port Stanley and South Georgia should be in the hands of a friendly power. This had been significant in the last two World Wars. Argentina was getting very close to the Soviet Union. One day the Junta would fall. The Peronistas would take over and Argentina would get even closer to the Russians. Then we should need to be sure that the Falkland Islands were in loyal hands. The last thing anyone would want is the Russians in both Cuba and the Falkland Islands. South Georgia, as an ice-free port, was important to the future development of Antarctica. Argentina could not be allowed to gain the objectives which had caused her to invade.

President Reagan said that the United States would continue to do what it could to help the negotiations and would remain in touch with the Secretary-General. He had been under the impression that the Argentines had conceded the main points. The Prime Minister said that that was not the case. Argentine rule would really be too much to ask the Islanders to accept. They were a loyal, true and thrifty people who simply wanted to live their own lives. The two greatest democracies must surely protect that wish. This was the kind of thing that the President and she herself had said in their speeches. President Reagan said that he could not quarrel with these arguments.

SECRET

A. J. C.

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 13 MAY 1982

UN

Flag A
(UKMIS NY
telno.731)

(a) Sir A Parsons' negotiations with Secretary General

1. Sir A Parsons spoke as instructed. The Secretary General and his team were stunned. The Secretary General's first reaction was that the Argentines would withdraw from agreement to the 11 May formula on non-prejudgement and that the breakdown of his initiative would be inevitable. After discussion the Secretary General decided not to reveal to the Argentines all that Sir A Parsons had said but he asked Sir A Parsons to report formally to London that in the Secretary General's view his effort might now collapse if we could not moderate our position.

2. There was some discussion of details. Dependencies: The Secretariat do not believe that the Argentines are necessarily thinking of a UN presence there. In the Secretariat's provisional draft Agreement there would be no geographical definition other than the withdrawal box (on which the Secretariat have provided further details). An interim agreement would neither specifically include nor specifically exclude the Dependencies. Freedom of transit residence etc.: The idea of equal representation for Argentine residents is not an Argentine idea, but one which the UN put forward and which the Argentines accepted, without enthusiasm, as a possible compromise. Position after 31 December 1982: The Secretariat have no further thoughts other than the parties would have to trust each other and the Secretary General, who could be asked to report to the Security Council and recommend what should be done if agreement were not in sight by the end of the interim period. Sir A Parsons said we could not accept this.

(b) Secretary General's report on Argentine views

Flag B
UKMIS NY
telno.732

3. The Secretary General reported by telephone to Sir A Parsons on his fairly brief meeting with Ros. Ros, speaking privately, appeals to us to show military restraint while serious negotiations are continuing. The Secretary General suggested to Ros that there should be a moratorium on public statements while negotiations continue. Ros has nothing further to offer on the nature of the interim Administration and has reopened the question of freedom for Argentines to acquire property and their ability to buy shares in the Falkland Islands Company.

(c) Sir A Parsons' assessment

Flag C
UKMIS NY
telno.733

4. Sir A Parsons says that we are now faced with an immediate strategic decision. If we hold to our positions and the Secretary General puts them to the Argentines today, as he will feel bound to do, then Sir A Parsons agrees with the Secretary General's assessment that negotiations will be terminated. Sir A Parsons believes that if we do not moderate our position and the negotiations break down today, leaving a diplomatic vacuum accompanied only by intensifying military activity, we will be cast as the culprits and support for our position, even from allies and partners, will drain away.

5. Sir A Parsons suggests that if we need to buy more time either in the hope of reaching a solution through the present UN process or to avoid an immediate diplomatic vacuum we shall have to make substantial concessions on the nature of the interim administration and on our military withdrawal from South Georgia. Sir A Parsons sets out the minimum concessions he judges necessary to keep the talks alive, details of which are in para. 6 of telegram at Flag C.

US(a) Mr Haig's views on negotiations

Flag D (Washington telno. 1724) 6. Dependencies: We should not give in to Argentine demands. Ambassador Walters will probe the Argentine position on this.

Flag E (Washington telno.1725) Argentine negotiating tactics: The greater the Argentine flexibility on sovereignty the more difficult they will be about the interim authority. Guarantee: There should be no difficulty about supervising troop withdrawal under UN auspices; aircraft could be made available. But if there were no settlement about the future and there were renewed Argentine threats, it would be much easier if the US were involved in the UN regime and this then carried on. Adverse consequences of any British attack on Argentine mainland: While not suggesting we intend to do this Mr Haig nevertheless wishes to tell us that any such action would place Britain in the wrong and would inflame the whole American hemisphere. Negotiating difficulties: If negotiations in New York run into great difficulties on interim arrangements Haig hopes we will not break them off and rush to the Security Council.

Flag F (Washington telno.1731)

(b) Discussion Mr Haig/Secretary General

7. Sir N Henderson reports (Washington telno. 1724 at Flag D) that the Secretary General told Mr Haig that the Argentines had made a considerable concession on sovereignty. The UK should make a comparable concession and the US were best placed to extract this. Sir N Henderson says that Mr Haig fully understands the absurdity of this argument. Sir A Parsons reports that the Secretary General is encouraged by his discussion with Mr Haig which he interpreted as meaning that the US would be helpful on verification.

Flag G (UKMIS NY telno.734)

(c) Ambassador Walters' Mission

Flag H (Washington telno.1727) 8. There are no signs in Buenos Aires that the Argentines believe there has been a break through in negotiations on sovereignty. Sir N Henderson judges that Mr Haig does not expect much from the Walters' mission.

/Comment

Comment

9. Sir A Parsons will need further instructions for his meeting with the UN Secretary General today. His view is that the talks will break down today unless we can modify our position on:


(a) Interim Administration, particularly the role of the Legislative/Executive Councils (para 6(ii) of UKMIS New York telno 733): and any involvement of Argentine residents;

(b) The Dependencies. Demilitarisation (Exclusion from UN Administration: but inclusion in negotiations) (para 6(i) of UKMIS New York telno 733).

10. Other points requiring decisions are:

(a) Withdrawal. The Secretary General is sticking to his 'Box' concept and has defined the coordinates (para 6(B) of UKMIS New York telno 731);

(b) Position after 31 December 1982. Whether we should continue to insist on clear procedures allowing for an extension of UN Administration.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

13 May 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 13 MAY 1982

UN

1. Negotiations continued. Sir A Parsons speaking to the press said that it was too soon to predict a successful outcome and that he was in the thick of negotiations.

MILITARY ACTION

2. The MOD announced that two A4 Sky Hawk aircraft of the Argentine air force had been shot down. In a separate incident a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter ditched within the Total Exclusion Zone. Its crew of four were rescued by other helicopters.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

3. The European Parliament debated the Falklands situation for the second time. A resolution was passed which attributed the loss of life in the conflict to the Argentine failure to comply with SCR 502 and invited the Foreign Ministers to renew the Community embargoes on Argentina if no solution was reached by 16 May 1982.

REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. The Prisoners of War captured on South Georgia together with the party of civilians left Ascension by plane at 0150 GMT en route to Montevideo. Following an approach from the French Government HMG have agreed to detain one of their number, Lt Commander Astiz for a few days.

ABDUCTION OF TV CREW

5. Three members of a Thames Television crew in Buenos Aires were reported to have been abducted as they left the MFA building. Press agency reports from Argentina say that they were later discovered, naked, some 30 km from the capital. The reports add that the Minister of the Interior deplored the incident and has invited the journalists to dinner to describe their experience.

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

6. Following a meeting between the Brazilian Foreign Minister and Mr Haig the Americans have told us that the Brazilians are willing to tell the Argentines that they should drop their insistence on including dependencies; interim administration should include some representation of the local community; and the Argentines should be flexible on the distance to which forces of both sides should be withdrawn.

13 May 1982

Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL



TE *Sub*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1982

CAPTAIN ASTIZ

Thank you for your letter of 12 May.
As I told you last night, the Prime Minister
agreed whole-heartedly with the action which
the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes.

I am copying this letter to David Omand
(Ministry of Defence).

A J COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL *A*

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
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 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 MR ILETT) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

[RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET]

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 131730Z

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

FM PARIS 131608Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 482 OF 13 MAY 1982
 INFO PRIORITY MODUK, STOCKHOLM, ASCENSION ISLAND AND UKMIS GENEVA

FALKLANDS: ASTIZ

1. DIRECTOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AT THE QUAI TOLD MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WERE VERY GRATEFUL FOR BRITISH AGREEMENT TO RETAIN COMMANDER ASTIZ ON ASCENSION. FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION WAS VERY INTERESTED IN THE CASE. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT HE COULD BE HELD LONG ENOUGH FOR THEM TO INITIATE PROCEEDINGS.

2. THE PROCEEDINGS WHICH THE FRENCH APPARENTLY CONTEMPLATE WOULD CONSIST OF:

(A) THE ASSEMBLY, BY THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK, OF A DOSSIER CONTAINING SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ASTIZ'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE TWO FRENCH NUNS TO JUSTIFY A FORMAL PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BY A MAGISTRATE:

(B) THE INVESTIGATION WOULD THEN BE CARRIED OUT (APPARENTLY BY ...)

(B) THE INVESTIGATION WOULD THEN BE CARRIED OUT (APPARENTLY BY
BRITISH PERSONNEL)

(C) DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS, FURTHER LEGAL STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN
TO BRING ASTIZ TO JUSTICE. DORIN ADMITTED THAT THE FRANCO-BRITISH
EXTRADITION TREATY DID NOT PROVIDE FOR EXTRADITION FOR A CRIME
COMMITTED IN A THIRD COUNTRY BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE PREC-
EDENTS FOR HANDING OVER ACCUSED PERSONS IN SUCH CASES.

3. PETRIE OBSERVED THAT THIS SCENARIO MIGHT CONTAIN SOME CONFUSION
BETWEEN FRENCH AND BRITISH LEGAL PRACTICE. NO DOUBT THE FRENCH
EMBASSY IN LONDON WOULD ALREADY BE ADVISING THE QUAI ON THE
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF BRITISH LAW. BUT IN ANY CASE HE SUGGESTED
THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROCEED WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED
SINCE IT WAS NOT AT ALL CLEAR HOW LONG IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO
HOLD ASTIZ.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 131635Z JC/HK

IMMEDIATE

7D

(PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS)

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 MR BARRETT
 HS/S AM D
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/UND
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/ERD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
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 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 PS/SIR M PALLISER,)
 PS/SIR A DUFF) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY)
 MR FULLER) OFFICE
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-)
 MENTS STAFF)
 DIO
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
 DIRECTOR G.C.H:Q. (via Rms 8)

SECRET

FM MEXICO CITY 131839Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 391 OF 13 MAY
 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 375: FALKLANDS

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO THIS MORNING.
2. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS WARM THANKS FOR SUCH A LOGICAL AND REASONABLE STATEMENT. HE DID NOT WANT TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S CURRENT EFFORTS, WHICH HE DEVOUTLY HOPED WOULD SUCCEED. HIS OWN SUGGESTION HAD PRECEDED THE PRESENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATION: IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AGAIN IF AND WHEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S INTERVENTION FAILED.
3. THE PRESIDENT ASKED WHERE THE MAIN POINT OF DIFFICULTY NOW LAY. I REPLIED I UNDERSTOOD IT TO BE ARGENTINE INSISTENCE ON PREDETERMINATION OF THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY. ALTHOUGH WE WERE READY IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS TO DISCUSS SOVEREIGNTY AMONG OTHER MATTERS, WE COULD OBVIOUSLY GIVE NO ADVANCE UNDERTAKINGS. IN PARTICULAR WE HAD TO ENSURE THAT THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS, WHO FORMED

WE COULD OBVIOUSLY GIVE NO ADVANCE UNDERTAKINGS. IN PARTICULAR WE HAD TO ENSURE THAT THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS, WHO FORMED A DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY WITH STRONG VIEWS OF ITS OWN, SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

4. THE PRESIDENT AGREED THAT HIS INITIATIVE AND EXCHANGES WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT GALTIERI SHOULD REMAIN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. AS I LEFT HE UNDERLINED HIS DESIRE TO DO ANYTHING WHICH COULD HELP TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS.

TICKELL

NNNN

GRS 375

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 140300Z
FM WASHINGTON 132350Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1752 OF 13 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK.

PRESIDENT REAGANS PRESS CONFERENCE: FALKLANDS

DURING HIS NATIONALLY TELEVISED PRESS CONFERENCE ON 13 MAY, PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS ASKED ABOUT U.S. RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA SINCE THE U.S. HAD SO FIRMLY COME DOWN ON THE SIDE OF BRITAIN. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED: QUOTE WELL I THINK THERE IS A TENDENCY ON THE PART OF MANY OF THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AMERICA TO FEEL THAT THEIR SYMPATHIES ARE MORE WITH ARGENTINA THAN OURS. I DO NOT THINK THERE HAS BEEN IRREPARABLE DAMAGE DONE THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE TO GO ON. THEY HAVE MOVED TO THE UNITED NATIONS NOW AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL THERE IS VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN THEM. THIS MORNING AND YESTERDAY IN MY TALKS WITH PRESIDENT FIGUEREIDO OF BRAZIL, HE TOO IS INTERESTED AND HAS VOLUNTEERED HIS GOOD OFFICES TO TRY AND HELP. ALL THAT THOSE OF US WHO WANT TO BE BROKERS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT CAN DO IS STAND BY AND TRY TO BE HELPFUL IN THAT. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT SOME OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO HAVE BEEN AGREED UPON. THERE ARE STILL SOME. BASICALLY, IT IS DOWN TO A SITUATION OF WITHDRAWAL, OF WHAT WILL BE THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION ON THE ISLAND ITSELF AND WHAT WILL BE THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS THEN OF WHAT THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT IS SUPPOSED TO BE. UP UNTIL NOW, THE INTRANSIGENCE HAD BEEN ON ONE SIDE AND THAT IS IN WANTING A GUARANTEE OF SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE, WHICH DOES NOT MAKE MUCH SENSE. I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME AGREEMENT NOW ON A WAY TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THAT, SO WE WILL CONTINUE TO HOPE AND PRAY. UNQUOTE

HENDERSON

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(FM BERNE 141309Z)

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 96 OF 13 MAY

ECONOMIC ROUND-UP

1. LOCAL MANUFACTURERS ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AT THE RECENT GOVERNMENT MEASURES IMPOSING A VIRTUAL 45-DAY IMPORT BAN ON NON-ESSENTIAL GOODS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE EXTENSION OF THESE RESTRICTIONS.

2. FOLLOWING THE LOW STOCK SITUATION BEFORE THE PRESENT CRISIS DUE TO EXCEEDINGLY HIGH INTEREST RATES, THESE MEASURES HAVE CREATED A CRITICAL SITUATION. MOST AFFECTED IS THE METALLURGICAL SECTOR WHICH IS SHORT OF COMPONENTS, SPARE PARTS, SPECIAL STEELS FOR TOOL MANUFACTURE, CHROME AND NICKEL. THE FOOD SECTOR IS ALSO HIT BY THE LACK OF COCOA, BICARBONATE OF SODA AND INGREDIENTS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF SWEETS, CHOCOLATES AND BISCUITS, CIGARETTE

FOR TOOL MANUFACTURE, CHROME AND NICKEL. THE FOOD SECTOR IS ALSO
HIT BY THE LACK OF COCOA, BICARBONATE OF SODA AND INGREDIENTS
FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF SWEETS, CHOCOLATES AND BISCUITS. CIGARETTE
MANUFACTURERS ARE SHORT OF CIGARETTE PAPER, FILTERS AND PLASTIC
STRIP PACK OPENERS. CAR MANUFACTURERS ARE PRESSING THE GOVERNMENT
TO SPEED IMPORT CERTIFICATES ON VEHICLE COMPONENTS.

3. GRAIN EXPORTERS FORESEE DIFFICULTIES IN SHIPPING THEIR PRODUCTS
ABROAD DUE TO LLOYD'S CANCELLATION OF SHIPPING COVER AS FROM 24
MAY AND THE SOVIET SLOW-DOWN ON GRAIN IMPORTS. THERE ARE NO
SHIPMENTS PROGRAMMED TO THE USSR FOR THE SECOND HALF OF JUNE.

JOY. 13.5.

LEE

NNNN

SENT AT RECD AT 141320Z TWPM/ PJH

VFO TLM

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 370
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MADRID 131618Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 272 OF 13 MAY
INFO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK



MY TELNO 248:

SPANISH MEDIA COVERAGE OF FALKLANDS

1. SPANISH PRESS REPORTING OF THE DISPUTE HAS BEEN MUCH MORE BALANCED THIS WEEK WITH ADEQUATE REPORTING AND QUOTATIONS FROM BRITISH MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS AND MOD PRESS BRIEFINGS. ALTHOUGH SPAIN'S SYMPATHIES ARE BASICALLY WITH ARGENTINA, THE MORE LIBERAL PRESS HAVE PUBLISHED ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND OF THE JUNTA. THE MORE POPULAR DIARIO 16 HAS GIVEN PROMINENCE TO THE STORY THAT ONE OF THE ARGENTINE'S CAPTURED IN SOUTH GEORGIA IS A LEADING TORTURER IN WHOSE RELEASE BOTH FRANCE AND SWEDEN ARE TAKING AN ACTIVE INTEREST NEVERTHELESS EVEN THE FAVOURABLE ARTICLES SUGGEST THAT THE UK HAS OVER-REACTED AND SHOULD CONSIDER LONGER TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR NORTH SOUTH AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THE RIGHT WING PRESS (ALCAZAR AND YA) CONTINUE THEIR ANTI-BRITISH CAMPAIGN AND THEIR STRONG CRITICISM OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO SUPPORT THEIR LATIN AMERICAN BROTHERS. THE US IS ALSO CRITICISED FOR SUPPORTING THE UK.

2. THE STATE RUN TELEVISION DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS HAS BEEN EXTREMELY BIASED IN FAVOUR OF ARGENTINA, CARRYING THEIR WORST PROPOGANDA WITHOUT QUALIFICATION. IT WAS THIS KIND OF BIAS THAT LEAD TO MY REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY REINSTATEMENT OF THE BBC SPANISH SERVICE (TELNO 151). WHILST I APPRECIATE YOUR REASONS FOR NOT WANTING TO START UP THE SERVICE AGAIN, I HOPE YOU WILL GIVE FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSALS BELOW.

3. I AM CALLING ON ROBLES PIQUER THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RADIO AND TV ON 14 MAY TO REMONSTRATE PRIVATELY. PART OF THE PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF TV FILM MATERIAL FROM LONDON AND THE LANGUAGE BARRIER. I INTEND TO OFFER TV ASSISTANCE IN OVERCOMING THIS PROBLEM. I HAVE IN MIND THAT MR GAREL JONES, THE SPANISH SPEAKING GOVERNMENT WHIP, COULD GIVE INTERVIEWS TO THE SPANISH TV

CONFIDENTIAL

/ CORRESPONDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CORRESPONDENT IN LONDON, TAILORED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SPAIN'S SPECIAL POSITION, WHICH HE KNOWS WELL. THIS WOULD GIVE SPANISH VIEWERS A CHANCE TO HEAR OUR SIDE OF THE ISSUE ALMOST FOR THE FIRST TIME (THE SPANISH TV CORRESPONDENT IN LONDON BEING REALLY TERRIBLE). IT WOULD ALSO COUNTER BALANCE ARGENTINE MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS. A RADIO FEED TO THE STATE RADIO NETWORK WOULD ALSO BE A VALUABLE MEANS OF PUTTING OVER THE BRITISH POSITION IN SPAIN (FCO TEL 228 TO MONTEVIDEO REFERS). I HOPE THAT YOU CAN AGREE THAT SPAIN SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS SERVICE IF WE CAN INTEREST ONE OF THE NETWORKS IN TAKING IT.

4. RADIO REPORTING HAS BEEN MIXED, BUT THE MANY PHONE-IN PROGRAMMES HAVE SHOWN A CLEAR PRO-ARGENTINE AND ANTI-BRITISH BIAS FROM THE PUBLIC.

5. I WILL REPORT FURTHER AFTER MY MEETING WITH ROBLES PIQUER. BUT I BELIEVE THAT SPECIFIC ACTION IS NECESSARY TO COUNTERACT THE IMPACT BEING MADE HERE BY TV. THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS IS BY THE PROVISION OF MORE NEWS FILM FROM LONDON. TV IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN SPAIN WHERE NEWSPAPER READERSHIP IS LOW. BUT RADIO IS ALSO IMPORTANT.

PARSONS

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HD/PUSD
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PP MADRID

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 131230Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY MADRID

TELEGRAM NUMBER 154 OF 13 MAY

INFO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, GIBRALTAR

YOUR TELNO 250: FALKLANDS: MESSAGE FROM KING JUAN CARLOS

1. WE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE MESSAGE LATE ON 5 MAY UNDER COVER OF A LETTER FROM THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO LORD BELSTEAD WITH THE REQUEST THAT IT BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF. SINCE WE DID NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO REJECT THE KING OF SPAIN'S SUGGESTIONS OUT OF HAND, IN REPLYING TO THE LETTER LORD BELSTEAD WELLCOMED THE MESSAGE QUOTE AS A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS TO WHICH WE REMAIN DEDICATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF SCR 502 UNQUOTE.

2. WITH THE PRESS WE ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT WE WELCOME ANY CONSTRUCTIVE ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. WE ARE DECLINING TO COMMENT SPECIFICALLY ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MESSAGE SINCE IT WAS NOT ADDRESSED TO US, BUT, IF PRESSED, WE SHALL POINT TO THE BRITISH REQUIREMENT THAT ANY CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE LINKED TO AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS. SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN MINIMAL PRESS INTEREST HERE.

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

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S E C R E T

SECRET

FM BRUSSELS 131700Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 174 OF 13 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS AND MODUK C IN C FLEET

MIPT:FALKLAND ISLANDS:ARMS SALES

1. WE HAD SPOKEN EARLIER TO BURNY, THE MFA OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR ARMS SALES ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELNOS 241 AND 244 TO PARIS.
2. ON SALES TO SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT PASS EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA, BURNY SAID THAT BELGIAN EXPORTS TO VENEZUELA AND PERU WERE NOT SIGNIFICANT. THE RESPONSE OF HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE LINE TAKEN BY BELGIUM'S COMMUNITY PARTNERS AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES TO WHOM WE MADE SIMILAR DEMARCHES. BURNY RECALLED THAT IN 1977 THE SUSPENSION OF ARMS SALES TO GUATEMALA, UNDERTAKEN AT OUR REQUEST, HAD WORKED SINCE THE MAJOR SUPPLIERS HAD BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON COMMON RESTRAINT.
3. BURNY ATTEMPTED TO ARGUE THAT ANY SALE TO A SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY WOULD IN ANY CASE BE ACCOMPANIED BY END USER CERTIFICATES. WE REPLIED THAT THESE DID NOT AMOUNT TO A SATISFACTORY SAFEGUARD. THE NEED WAS URGENT: IF THE BELGIAN AUTHORITIES LEARNT OF ANY PROSPECTIVE SALES TO SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES WHERE ARGENTINA COULD BE THE FINAL RECIPIENT, WE HOPED THEY WOULD FIND WAYS OF DELAYING THE TRANSACTION.
4. BURNY HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARGENTINES MIGHT BUY AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES FROM PRIVATE DEALERS. WE ASKED HIM IF THEY WERE MONITORING THE ACTIVITIES OF ARMS DEALERS IN BELGIUM AND WHETHER THEY KNEW IF THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY HERE HAD STEPPED UP ITS ACTIVITIES OVER ARMS PURCHASES. BURNY SAID THEY HAD NOT SO FAR COVERED THESE POINTS AND UNDERTOOK TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. WE ARE ALSO TAKING ACTION WITH THIS MINISTRY VIA OTHER CHANNELS.

JACKSON

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

SECRET

GRS 300

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(FM BERNE 140855Z)

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 94 OF 13 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO BRASILIA WASHINGTON UKMIS
NEW YORK

PRESS SUMMARY

1. TODAY'S MAIN NEWS IS A REPORTED ARGENTINE AIR FORCE ATTACK ON THE BRITISH FLEET WHICH SERIOUSLY DAMAGED TWO FRIGATES AND DOWNED A SEA KING HELICOPTER FOR THE LOSS OF TWO ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT. ALL THE PAPERS CARRY THIS IN HEADLINES.
2. COSTA MENDEZ IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE ADVANCING SLOWLY BUT MORE SIGNIFICANT ARE THE REPORTS OF A STATEMENT BY GENERAL IGLESIAS, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY IN NEW YORK TO THE "WASHINGTON POST" THAT ARGENTINA REQUIRES THAT ANY AGREEMENT OVER A PEACEFUL SOLUTION SHOULD BE A CERTAIN AND GUARANTEED MEANS OF OBTAINING COMPLETE ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY QUOTE WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD UNQUOTE. THIS HINT OF CONCESSION WAS ECHOED HERE BY GALTIERI IN COMMENTS TO JOURNALISTS SOON AFTER MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT WHEN, SPEAKING OF SOVEREIGNTY, HE SAID QUOTE WE SHALL NOT GIVE UP THIS OBJECTIVE: WE CAN TALK WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING IT IN A REASONABLE TIME SO LONG AS IT DOES NOT TAKE ANOTHER 149 YEARS UNQUOTE. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE LOCAL PRESS HAS CARRIED COMMENTS OF THIS KIND BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JUNTA ITSELF. IT IS THE MOST CHEERING NEWS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WE HAVE YET HEARD OR SEEN IN THE ARGENTINE MEDIA AND WAS THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION IN BERNARDO NEUSTADT'S "NEW DAY" RADIO PROGRAMME THIS MORNING. SEVERAL OF NEUSTADT'S EMINENT INTERLOCUTORS WERE ECHOING THE PRESIDENTIAL LINE.
3. THE BRIEF KIDNAPING AND RETURN OF ONE AMERICAN AND THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS IS ALSO REPORTED IN DETAIL. THIS HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE INDIGNATION IN PRESS AND GOVERNMENT CIRCLES AND PROVOKED SPECIAL ATTENTION FROM THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF.

JOY 13.5

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FAULKLAND ISLANDS

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS: FALKLANDS DEBATE

13 MAY 1982

Over the past two days, the Opposition has put a number of requests to us. Those which seemed to put in question the responsibility of the Government to govern were firmly answered by my rt hon Friend the Prime Minister in reply to the Leader of the Opposition. This reply was entirely in accordance with our parliamentary practice and procedure, and I have nothing to add on that.

The request for a debate was in a different category; and, although this is the fifth debate on the Falklands crisis since the beginning of April, we have willingly agreed. The Government has throughout this crisis taken every opportunity to keep the House informed of developments; and, although on this occasion there is not very much new that I can report I welcome this further opportunity for debate on the very important issues which are involved.

I would also like to put on record the Government's gratitude, and my own personal thanks both for the support and cooperation we have received from this House, and for the resolute support which the British people have given us. This has been vital to the maintenance of our resolute stand.

The Government's position has remained clear and consistent throughout. Our objectives and our strategy are unchanging. We have of course adapted our tactics in the light of the evolving diplomatic and military situation. We have as you know moved through different stages of negotiations; The first with Mr Haig in London and in Washington; then in reacting to the ideas first launched by the President of Peru and subsequently developed in discussion by him with the United States, and ^{now} in the talks with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Through all these stages we have shown a careful balance of firmness on the essential principles, tempered by the necessary measure of readiness to negotiate on issues where negotiation is possible. But in all this negotiation our determination has never wavered - our determination to end Argentina's illegal occupation and to uphold the rights of the Falkland Islanders.

The House has been most tolerant and understanding about our inability to disclose our detailed position at any stage. But no such inhibitions apply to explaining the broad lines of strategy, and this I would like to do again this afternoon.

From the beginning of this crisis, the Government has been trying, as the House knows, to build up the pressures on Argentina steadily and progressively. Our aim has been to make her withdraw, through a negotiated arrangement if that can be achieved. The pressures we have applied have been of three kinds - diplomatic, economic and military.

The diplomatic pressures bring to bear the moral weight of world opinion upon Argentina and her act of aggression. Just as Security Council Resolution 502 was clear and firm in its condemnation of aggression and its demands for Argentine withdrawal, so have the statements of our friends and allies in the ensuing weeks continued to demonstrate the world's expectation that Argentina will end her occupation of the Islands.

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Last weekend I had full talks in private with the Foreign Ministers of the Ten. I was once again heartened by the expressions of solidarity and support I received. Europe remains on our side. Further evidence of this was provided by the European Parliament yesterday. They passed a resolution recognising that the loss of life in the South Atlantic - which we all regret - is due to the failure of the Argentines to comply with Resolution 502. They also reaffirmed their previous tough resolution in our support and called on the Foreign Ministers to renew the import embargo on 17 May.

We have found no inclination among the leaders of the free world to blur the distinction between legitimacy and illegality, between self-defence and aggression, between right and wrong, and between truth and falsehood. The world knows that the international rule of law would be dangerously undermined if Argentine aggression were allowed to stand. And that it is on that international rule of law that the prospects for stability and prosperity depend.

So international support for us remains firm. We continue to receive messages of support from governments all around the world. The Commonwealth remains steadfast and resolute in its backing of our stand.

The diplomatic pressure remains strong and sustained. So also does the economic pressure. That too has been maintained and increased. The economic measures taken by many of Britain's closest friends are a further demonstration of the international support which we enjoy. I think here in particular of our partners in the European Community, and of those who have done likewise. The suspension of imports, the denial of credit, the bans on arms sales - all these continue to have a real and biting effect on an Argentine economy already in disarray.

It was estimated earlier this year that Argentina would need to raise some 3 billion dollars in net new loans in 1982. World repugnance at her recent actions has meant that - so far as we can tell - not a single new public sector loan has been agreed since 2 April.

The Argentine peso has been under heavy pressure. Besides expectations of increased inflation and general loss of confidence, the markets of the world have indicated clearly what they think of Argentine currency: while the official rate remains at 14,000 pesos to the American dollar, even across the River Plate in Montevideo the free market is demanding 20,000 pesos for the dollar.

Those who have given us economic support should not doubt that the consequence of this support has been to concentrate pressure on Argentina to comply with Resolution 502. It is, in short, an essential part of the pressure that we are applying in order to achieve an early negotiated solution.

The third element of our strategy is military. As the House knows we continue to tighten the military screw. British servicemen are experiencing danger and hardship 8,000 miles away. Their presence and their activity are making it increasingly hard and costly for Argentina to sustain her occupation of the Falkland Islands.

We all grieve over British losses. We take no satisfaction at the losses inflicted on Argentina. Military incidents may occur with increasing frequency, as the net closes round the Islands. That may be inevitable in the circumstances. But we must never forget who is the aggressor, who invaded whom, who embarked on an unlawful and dangerous course, who first took up arms and thus put lives at risk. Argentina knows how to avoid further military conflict. She can begin her withdrawal.

The whole House and the country know our clear and decisive preference for a negotiated settlement. But military pressure is necessary to bring Argentina to negotiate seriously and at the same time to strengthen our own negotiating hand. I do not doubt that it is having this effect. There are signs that the message is beginning to get through.

We have been and remain indefatigable in the search for a negotiated settlement. I will not recall now the long and strenuous efforts we made in cooperation with Mr Haig, ending in failure because of Argentina's intransigence.

It is interesting that, in spite of Argentina's rejection then, the elements of an agreement about which I first spoke to the House as long ago as 21 April have remained as elements in subsequent negotiations. In that statement I told the House that they were the arrangements for the Argentine withdrawal, the nature of any interim administration of the islands and the framework for the negotiation for a long-term solution. That is still the case today.

When I spoke in the House last Friday, I outlined the main elements of an agreement, worked out in cooperation with Peru and the United States, which Britain would have been willing to accept and which would have led to an early ceasefire.

I spoke of complete and supervised withdrawal of Argentine forces, an immediate ceasefire, an interim administration involving a small group of countries acceptable to both sides, and the suspension of the existing exclusion zones and the lifting of economic measures . . . Since these elements continue to be relevant to the negotiations now under way in New York, it would not be right for me to go into greater detail now than I did on 7 May.

Press accounts have been misleading to a greater or lesser degree, but I can assure the House that we have at no stage lost sight of our declared objectives and principles.

The negotiations are now going on under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Sr Perez de Cuellar has shown great determination and diplomatic ability in his lengthy and frequent talks in recent days with the British Representative, Sir Anthony Parsons. On Tuesday, those talks seemed to make a little progress. Yesterday, things went less well. Hopes have been raised before, only to be dashed, and many very serious difficulties remain.

I hope that more progress will be made - and quickly. If it is not, it will not be for lack of effort and readiness on our part to reach a negotiated solution. Nor have our efforts to this end in any way prejudiced or hindered the necessary build-up of military pressure. They have not closed off any military option, or affected our military options in any way.

It is not of course easy to negotiate with the Argentine authorities: while their representative in New York has appeared to be prepared to recognise many of the realities of the situation, there have been -

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even within the last two days - a number of
unhelpful statements by other Argentine public figures.

On different occasions the Foreign Minister,
one of his senior officials, a General and a
junior Minister in another Department have all
referred to the process of negotiation as if
this was designed solely to lead up to a
handover of sovereignty to Argentina.

That attitude is, I repeat, quite unacceptable
to us and we must be absolutely sure that Argentina
does not adhere to it, privately or publicly, if a
negotiated settlement is to be possible.

It would perhaps be helpful if I once again
emphasise those basic requirements in our strategy
which must be understood by Argentines as they
have been understood by reasonable people across
the world. If Argentina now recognises that
there are issues on which we remain justifiably
immoveable, we may be able to make greater
progress in other areas where some flexibility
is possible.

The first absolutely fundamental requirement is the need for the withdrawal of the whole Argentine invasion force. We insist on this and until Argentina is committed to such a withdrawal and is willing to commence it, we cannot commit ourselves to a ceasefire. When they demonstrate that readiness to withdraw is a reality, we shall feel able and willing to match this - in ways yet to be determined - by standing our own forces off from the area of conflict.

The timings and the distances of mutual withdrawal are things which need to be settled and on which we are keen to make progress in negotiation. And the House will understand that we must be absolutely certain about arrangements for verification. After the invasion, we cannot be expected to have faith in Argentine good intentions.

The second fundamental requirement, on which we are absolutely firm, is that the outcome of long-term negotiations about the future of the Islands must not be prejudged in advance in any way.

We accept that negotiations about the future of the Islands can exclude no possible outcome, but equally we insist that they must predetermine none. Nothing excluded, nothing prejudged. That is a reasonable position and one on which we shall not compromise.

Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands, once agreed, should be carried out within a fixed number of days. Negotiations about the long-term future of the Islands will of necessity take a matter of months.

It follows from this - as I said in this House many days ago, on 21 April, and again in more detail on 7 May - that some interim arrangements will be necessary on the Islands.

I have already made clear that we do not debar involvement of third parties in these arrangements. It may or may not be the case that the United Nations will have a role to play. But we could not of course agree to a structure, however temporary, which ignored the past and disregarded the administrative experience of the British inhabitants of the Islands.

They know how to run their own affairs in a democratic way. There are officials and administrators who know their jobs: there are democratically-elected members of the Councils who know the feelings of their fellow Islanders. They must be fitted in to whatever is agreed if the Islands are to be run fairly and efficiently during whatever interim period proves necessary.

If we get an interim agreement, long-term negotiations may begin quite soon. I want to make clear to the House that we have no doubt whatever about the British title to sovereignty. All British governments have taken the same view. However, we did not, before the invasion, rule out discussion of sovereignty in negotiations with Argentina. Again, successive governments have taken the same position. We still remain willing to discuss it as one of the factors in negotiations about the future.

Already we have begun, as I believe we must, to think about the many possible arrangements which might conceivably result from such negotiations.

After the terrible traumas of this crisis, the Islanders will need time to consider their position. Their wishes for the future may or may not then be the same as before.

They will wish to consider, after a period of respite and recuperation, how their prosperity and the economic development of the Islands can best be furthered; how their security can best be protected; and how their links with the outside world can best be organised. These questions at present are some way ahead and the Government retains an open mind. We are thinking about them but we are far from reaching conclusions.

Mr Speaker, present negotiations in New York are at an important point. Our resolve has not wavered. There have been some indications - really the first since this crisis began - of genuine Argentine willingness to negotiate on some of the important points. There will have to be more if we are to succeed.

The Government remains determined to see the implementation of the mandatory resolution of the Security Council. As before, we much prefer to achieve this by negotiation and we are bending our most strenuous efforts to this end. At the same time, our military presence in the South Atlantic continues to become stronger. If, in the end, Argentine intransigence prevents success in negotiation, Argentina will know that the alternative is another kind of ending to the crisis.

We do not want that but we are ready for it. As it has been throughout this crisis, the choice lies with those who rule Argentina.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 13 MAY 1982

UN

1. Negotiations continued. Sir A Parsons speaking to the press said that it was too soon to predict a successful outcome and that he was in the thick of negotiations.

MILITARY ACTION

2. The MOD announced that two A4 Sky Hawk aircraft of the Argentine air force had been shot down. In a separate incident a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter ditched within the Total Exclusion Zone. Its crew of four were rescued by other helicopters.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

3. The European Parliament debated the Falklands situation for the second time. A resolution was passed which attributed the loss of life in the conflict to the Argentine failure to comply with SCR 502 and invited the Foreign Ministers to renew the Community embargoes on Argentina if no solution was reached by 16 May 1982.

REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. The Prisoners of War captured on South Georgia together with the party of civilians left Ascension by plane at 0150 GMT en route to Montevideo. Following an approach from the French Government HMG have agreed to detain one of their number, Lt Commander Astiz for a few days.

ABDUCTION OF TV CREW

5. Three members of a Thames Television crew in Buenos Aires were reported to have been abducted as they left the MFA building. Press agency reports from Argentina say that they were later discovered, naked, some 30 km from the capital. The reports add that the Minister of the Interior deplored the incident and has invited the journalists to dinner to describe their experience.

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

6. Following a meeting between the Brazilian Foreign Minister and Mr Haig the Americans have told us that the Brazilians are willing to tell the Argentines that they should drop their insistence on including dependencies; interim administration should include some representation of the local community; and the Argentines should be flexible on the distance to which forces of both sides should be withdrawn.

Emergency Unit

13 May 1982

FLASH

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS] *Don't Minnie To note plan Lopez duty clerk 1/4/82*

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HS/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
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PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
PS/SIR M PALLISER)
PS/SIR A DUFF) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY)
MR FULLER) OFFICE
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-)
MENTS STAFF)
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (Via Rim 8)

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 131955Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 739 OF 13 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 396: FALKLANDS

SUMMARY

1. I ACTED ON THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS MORNING (13 MAY). I JUDGED THAT TO MAKE THE POINTS ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY PRECIPITATE AN IMMEDIATE BREAKDOWN. I THEREFORE TOOK THE LINE THAT BECAUSE OF THE EMERGENCY DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YOU HAD NOT YET HAD TIME TO SEND ME SUBSTANTIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THESE TWO POINTS BUT THAT MEANWHILE YOU HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO PERSUE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE RISK OF A VACUUM AT THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD. I MADE SOME PROGRESS ON THIS. BUT PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS VERY WORRIED AND FEELS INCREASINGLY EXPOSED. HE SEES THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS CLEARLY ENOUGH BUT FEELS OBLIGED, IN HIS SEARCH FOR PEACE, TO ASK YOU TO OFFER SOME CONCESSION IN RESPONSE TO THAT MADE BY

WRONGS CLEARLY ENOUGH BUT FEELS UNABLE TO ASK YOU TO OFFER SOME CONCESSION IN RESPONSE TO THAT MADE BY ARGENTINA OVER SOVEREIGNTY. HE IS SEEING ROS THIS AFTERNOON. THERE IS A RISK THAT ROS WILL THEN BREAK OFF THE TALKS: IF HE DOES NOT DO SO, WE WILL HAVE GOT THROUGH ANOTHER DAY. MEANWHILE THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CAVED IN AND CONVENED AN INFORMAL MEETING FOR TOMORROW AFTERNOON (14 MAY).

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AT 1600Z. I DESCRIBED WHAT I HAD HEARD OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTIONS TODAY AND THE OPENING SALVOS IN THE EMERGENCY DEBATE. THESE CONFIRMED ALL I HAD SAID TO HIM YESTERDAY BOTH ABOUT THE NEED FOR HIM TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL REALITIES IN BRITAIN AND ABOUT THE EFFECT OF ARGENTINE STATEMENTS WHICHZ APPEARED TO CONTRADICT THEIR ACCEPTANCE HERE THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED. EVERY DAY COSTA MENDEZ OR SOME OTHER ARGENTINE SPOKESMAN REVIVED OUR DOUBTS. THESE KIND OF STATEMENTS MADE IT NONSENSE TO TALK ABOUT OUR ACCEPTING ARGENTINE GOOD FAITH, WHICH WAS ANYWAY DIFFICULT AFTER THE WAY THEY HAD BROKEN OFF NEGOTIATIONS AND INVADED THE ISLANDS.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, BECAUSE OF THE EMERGENCY DEBATE, YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO SEND ME DEFINITIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE TWO MAJOR ISSUES WE HAD DISCUSSED YESTERDAY (IE THE DEPENDENCIES AND THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION). (PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE ALWAYS PREFERRED DELAYS TO BAD NEWS). I DID, HOWEVER, HAVE AN ANSWER OF SUBSTANCE ON THE RISK OF A VACUUM AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982 IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY THEN. THIS WAS NOT A PERIPHERAL ISSUE: INDEED IT WAS ALMOST AS ESSENTIAL FOR US AS THE QUESTION OF NON-PREJUDGEMENT. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE COULD BE GENERATED BETWEEN US AND THE ARGENTINES FOR IT TO BE SAFELY LEFT IN THE AIR. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT POINT TO THE UN, THE UK AND ARGENTINA. IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY THE END OF THE YEAR AND THE ARGENTINES THEN REINVADED THE ISLANDS, THE STANDING OF THE UN AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE DEALT A MORTAL BLOW: THE UK WOULD HAVE TO REMOUNT A MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION: AND THE ARGENTINES WOULD STILL BE FRUSTRATED IN THEIR DESIRE TO OBTAIN AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO ASK WHETHER THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD ANY FURTHER IDEAS ON THIS CENTRAL QUESTION.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES WERE PRESSING HIM FOR IDEAS ON IT. THE ARGENTINES WERE PREPARED TO LET HIM ASK FOR AN EXTRA MONTH OR TWO IF NO AGREEMENT WAS IN SIGHT AT THE END OF THE YEAR.

ON IT. THE ARGENTINES WERE PREPARED TO LET HIM ASK FOR AN EXTRA MONTH OR TWO IF NO AGREEMENT WAS IN SIGHT AT THE END OF THE YEAR. BUT THEY WANTED TO GUARD AGAINST THE RISK THAT THE UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WOULD LAST FOR EVER. I SAID THAT WE COULD TRUST THE SECRETARY GENERAL BUT NOT THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MIGHT IT BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE SOME FORMULA UNDER WHICH, IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL DECIDED THAT FURTHER TIME WAS NEEDED, BEING SATISFIED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WOULD REMAIN IN BEING UNLESS THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDED OTHERWISE? AHMED AND DE SOTO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES ALSO FELT UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT THE INVOLVING THE SECURITY COUNCIL (BECAUSE OF OUR VETO) AND THAT THE SECRETARIAT WERE WORKING ON LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD CONTAIN NO REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT WOULD PROVIDE THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE "FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH CAN BE EXTENDED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL". THE TROUBLE WAS THAT THIS FORMULA WOULD NOT MEET ARGENTINE CONCERNS, UNLESS IT SPECIFIED THAT ONLY ONE EXTENSION WOULD BE POSSIBLE. I INDICATED THAT THE LATTER CONDITION WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US.

5. I WAS THEN SUBJECTED TO A BURST OF RHETORIC FROM AHMED TO THE EFFECT THAT WE COULD NOT EXPECT THE ARGENTINES TO MAKE ANOTHER CONCESSION. THEY WOULD SEE THAT BY GIVING THIS PROMINENCE TO THE RISK OF A VACUUM, WE WERE "CRAFTILY" TRYING TO GET ANOTHER CONCESSION FROM THEM, WITHOUT OFFERING ANYTHING IN RETURN. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS ALREADY SUSPECTED IN SOME QUARTERS OF "PLAYING FOOTSY WITH THE BRITS". THESE SUSPICIONS WOULD BE CONFIRMED IF HE NOW TOLD THE ARGENTINES THAT WE WERE STALLING ON THE DEPENDENCIES AND THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION BUT ASKING THEM MEANWHILE FOR A CONCESSION ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982.

6. I DEALT VERY FIRMLY WITH THIS. I SAID THAT IF THE UN WAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY SHOW THEMSELVES CAPABLE OF LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM THROUGH LONDON EYES. I THEN REPEATED THE POINTS I HAD MADE YESTERDAY, READING OUT VERBATIM PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 733. AHMED HAD TO REALISE THAT THAT WAS THE LONDON VIEW. THERE WAS ALREADY TALK OF A "SELL-OUT" IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. THE UN WOULD FUEL THESE SUSPICIONS IF IT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS SYMMETRY OF RIGHT AND WRONG BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. PEREZ DE CUELLAR INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. BUT WE HAD TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM THROUGH HIS EYES. WORLD PEACE WAS AT STAKE. THAT WAS WHY HE WAS ASKING US FOR CONCESSIONS - NOT CONCESSIONS TO ARGENTINA, BUT CONCESSIONS TO PEACE. FAILURE OF HIS EFFORTS WOULD MEAN A BLOODBATH, ESPECIALLY IF WE BOMBED THE MAINLAND. HE WOULD NEVER FORGIVE THE ARGENTINES FOR THEIR USE OF FORCE AND HIS PURPOSE WAS TO OBTAIN

ESPECIALLY IF WE BOMBED THE MAINLAND. HE WOULD NEVER FORGIVE THE ARGENTINES FOR THEIR USE OF FORCE AND HIS PURPOSE WAS TO OBTAIN IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNLESS WE WERE PREPARED TO MAKE THE SACRIFICE OF OFFERING SOME CONCESSION.

7. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD INVITED ROS TO SEE HIM AT 2000Z TODAY AND WOULD TELL HIM WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT THE RISK OF A VACUUM AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982. I ASKED HIM TO ASSURE ROS THAT I WAS NOT PLAYING GAMES. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS OBVIOUSLY AFRAID THAT ROS WOULD BREAK OFF BECAUSE OF MY FAILURE TO MAKE ANY MOVE ON EITHER THE DEPENDENCIES OR THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. HE SAID THAT HE NOW FELT THAT BY SUNDAY (16 MAY) AT THE LATEST HE WOULD HAVE TO PRESENT SOME UN IDEAS TO BOTH OF US. HE RECOGNISED THAT ONE OR BOTH OF US MIGHT REJECT HIS IDEAS. BUT HE FELT OBLIGED TO TRY. HIS TEAM WERE NOW WORKING ON THE "CONCILIATORY IDEAS" WHICH HE WOULD PRESENT. IF WE HAD ANY NEW POINTS COULD WE PLEASE GIVE THEM TO HIM?

8. IN CONCLUSION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SUDDENLY BECOME VERY CONCERNED. HE WAS PUZZLED BY THIS. SOMETHING SEEMED TO HAVE HAPPENED. HAIG HAD TELEPHONED HIM YESTERDAY (12 MAY) TO ASK HOW HE WAS GETTING ON AND TO OFFER ANY HELP THE AMERICANS COULD PROVIDE. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD TELEPHONED HIS THIS MORNING WITH THE SAME MESSAGE. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME SHE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM FOR DAYS. SHE HAD SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS FOLLOWING THE MATTER CLOSELY.

9. I WENT OVER THIS GROUND ON THE TELEPHONE WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR PRIVATELY AN HOUR LATER AFTER TALKING TO NICKO HENDERSON. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM HAIG ON 12 MAY AND ANOTHER ONE ON THE SAME LINES TODAY (13 MAY) AFTER OUR MEETING. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD ADDED IN HER CONVERSATION WITH HIM THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT GET IN TOUCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE, PEREZ DE CUELLAR, HAD HAD NO CONTACT WITH THE WHITE HOUSE.

10. I HAD HOPED TO BRIEF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER THIS MORNING'S MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR. BUT I MISSED HIM AND SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO CONVENE THE COUNCIL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AT 2000Z TOMORROW (14 MAY) TO DISCUSS THE FALKLANDS QUESTION TOGETHER WITH LEBANON AND SEYCHELLES.

11. I WILL TELEGRAPH MY COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS LATER TODAY.

PARSONS

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HS/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)

PS/SIR M PALLISER,)

PS/SIR A DUFF)

CABINET

MR WADE-GERY)

MR FULLER)

OFFICE

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-)

MENTS STAFF)

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 132222Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 743 OF 13 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ALL CG'S NORTH AMERICA.

FOR NEWS DEPT.

FALKLANDS: PRESS LINE.

1. I MADE ONLY BRIEF REMARKS TO THE PRESS ON MY WAY TO AND FROM MY MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TODAY. I HAVE TURNED DOWN ALL NEW REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS, BUT MET A LONG-STANDING COMMITMENT TO GIVE AN INTERVIEW TO THAMES TELEVISION FOR TV EYE (WHICH YOU WILL HAVE SEEN).

2. IN REPLY TO PRESS ENQUIRIES, WE HAVE ADDED LITTLE TO THE LINE REPORTED IN MY TEL NO 736. WE HAVE SAID THAT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, A WIDE GAP REMAINS TO BE BRIDGED ON A NUMBER OF VERY IMPORTANT ISSUES. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN CONVERGENCE ON ONE IMPORTANT POINT, AND MUCH ARGENTINE TALK IN PUBLIC ABOUT FLEXIBILITY AND THE DROPPING OF PRECONDITIONS, ARGENTINA IS STILL ADHERING TO VERY HARD POSITIONS IN OTHER AREAS. WE ARE REFUSING TO BE DRAWN ON

POINT, AND MUCH ARGENTINE TALK IN PUBLIC ABOUT FLEXIBILITY AND THE DROPPING OF PRECONDITIONS, ARGENTINA IS STILL ADHERING TO VERY HARD POSITIONS IN OTHER AREAS. WE ARE REFUSING TO BE DRAWN ON WHAT THESE POSITIONS ARE; ON THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS; OR ON THE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE.

3. THE ARGENTINE MISSION HAVE TOLD AT LEAST ONE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT THAT THEY ARE PRESSING FOR SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS TO BE INCLUDED IN AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE ARE THEREFORE NOT DENYING THAT THE QUESTION OF THE DEPENDENCIES IS A FACTOR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ARE REMINDING CORRESPONDENTS OF THEIR DISTINCT HISTORICAL, LEGAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATUS.

PARSONS

NNNN

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 MR BARRETT
 HS/S AM D
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
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 HD/ERD
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~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
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CABINET

MR WADE-GERY)

MR FULLER)

OFFICE

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MENTS STAFF)

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 132210Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 740 OF 13 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 398; FALKLANDS: BRIEFING OF COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS.

1. BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I HAD AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM MY BELGIAN COLLEAGUE TO BRIEF THE TEN AT 1830Z TODAY (13 MAY). I AM TO DO SO AGAIN AT 1930Z TOMORROW.

2. I SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHETHER OR WHEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S INITIATIVE WAS GOING TO SUCCEED. I WAS PROCEEDING WITH MAXIMUM URGENCY AND SEEING PEREZ DE CUELLAR TWICE A DAY ON AVERAGE. THERE WAS NO FOOT DRAGGING ON THE BRITISH SIDE, NOR, AS FAR AS I COULD JUDGE, ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE. A HOPEFUL SIGN WAS THAT ROS HAD ACCEPTED A FORMULATION ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION WHICH WE WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF A FULL PACKAGE, PROVIDED THAT IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT ROS WAS ACTING WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE JUNTA. BUT IT WAS DISCOURAGING THAT ARGENTINE SPOKESMEN KEPT ON SAYING THE OPPOSITE IN PUBLIC. EVEN IF THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION WAS SAFELY OUT OF THE WAY, THERE

THAT ARGENTINE SPOKESMEN KEPT ON SAYING THE OPPOSITE. EVEN IF THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION WAS SAFELY OUT OF THE WAY, THERE REMAINED A WHOLE RANGE OF DIFFICULT PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED, ESPECIALLY:

(A) THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION: WE HAD ACCEPTED UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION IN PRINCIPLE BUT HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT THE ISLANDERS' ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES WERE PROPERLY FITTED INTO IT:

(B) THE TARGET DATE FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS: WE HAD TO BE SURE THAT IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY THE TARGET DATE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD CONTINUE IN FORCE: OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE A VACUUM, WITH THE RISK THAT GENERAL MENENDEZ WOULD COME MARCHING BACK: EQUALLY, THE ARGENTINES WERE RELUCTANT TO CONTEMPLATE A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH COULD LAST ANOTHER 17 YEARS.

EACH MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL WENT DEEP INTO THE HEART OF THESE AND OTHER PROBLEMS. I DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS ANY IMMEDIATE RISK OF A BREAKDOWN. BUT THERE WAS MUCH HARD WORK AHEAD AND WE NEEDED A FEW MORE DAYS (NOT WEEKS, THOUGH).

3. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THIS WAS THE FULLEST BRIEFING I HAD GIVEN ANY OF MY COLLEAGUES. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD BEEN UNIQUELY CONSCIENTIOUS IN MAINTAINING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS. I ASKED THEREFORE THAT MY COLLEAGUES SHOULD GIVE A VERY LIMITED DISTRIBUTION TO THEIR REPORTS. I THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S EFFORT WOULD STILL BE UNDER WAY WHEN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MET ON 15 MAY. I NEED NOT SAY HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT OUR PARTNERS SHOULD HELP TO MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES.

4. I ANSWERED SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WHAT WAS OUR POSITION ON THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDERS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD (BELGIUM)?

I SAID THAT IF, IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WERE TO INSIST THAT THE ISLANDERS' WISHES SHOULD BE PARAMOUNT, WE WOULD BE OPEN TO THE CHARGE THAT WE OURSELVES WERE TRYING TO PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME ON SOVEREIGNTY. AT THE SAME TIME WE HAD TO REMEMBER THAT IT WAS THE FUTURE OF PEOPLE WHICH WAS AT ISSUE: THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS WERE OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE AND MUST BE RESPECTED: AND THERE HAD TO BE A MEANS OF ASCERTAINING THEM DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD.

(B) WAS NOT ARGENTINA FOOT DRAGGING BY INSISTING ON UN MEDIATION (BELGIUM)?

I SAID THAT OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE OF THE ARGENTINES NATURALLY MADE US SUSPICIOUS. BUT I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT ROS (ARGENTINA) WAS NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH. THE QUESTION MARK WAS OVER THE GENERALS IN BUENOS AIRES.

WAS NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH. THE QUESTION MARK WAS OVER THE GENERALS IN BUENOS AIRES.

- (C) WOULD NOT THE ONSET OF WINTER DETRACT FROM THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR MILITARY PRESSURE (LUXEMBOURG)?

I SAID THAT, THOUGH NOT A MILITARY EXPERT, I THOUGHT THAT THE WEATHER WAS NOT AS CENTRAL A FACTOR AS SOME COMMENTATORS SUGGESTED. THE ROYAL NAVY'S HOME, AFTER ALL, WAS THE NORTH ATLANTIC: IT WAS NOT A FAIR-WEATHER NAVY.

- (D) WHAT WOULD BE THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION? WOULD THE UN SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES (FRG)?

I SAID THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO INTRODUCE OUTSIDE PARTIES: THAT WAS NOT THE PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISLANDERS WOULD FIT INTO THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. I DESCRIBED THE THREE LEVELS OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE ISLANDS (GOVERNOR; EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL). THE GOVERNOR MIGHT BE REPLACED BY THE UN ADMINISTRATOR: BUT IT WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE TO SUSPEND THE TWO COUNCILS, BOTH BECAUSE THE UN ADMINISTRATOR WOULD NEED THEIR HELP AND EXPERIENCE OVER THE PRACTICAL DETAILS OF ADMINISTRATION AND BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO ASCERTAIN THE ISLANDERS' VIEWS ABOUT THEIR FUTURE. A WIDE DIFFERENCE REMAINED HERE.

- (E) HOW MUCH OF A PROBLEM WAS THE PHASING AND MONITORING OF WITHDRAWAL (IRELAND)?

I SAID THAT AGREEMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN REACHED ON PHASING, THOUGH IT WAS FAR FROM BEING THE MOST DIFFICULT POINT. MONITORING WAS A PROBLEM: WE WERE DISCUSSING IT WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WHO HAD IDEAS: AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE SEEMED THE BEST POSSIBILITY.

- (F) WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOMORROW (FRG)?

I SAID THAT I WAS CONVINCED THAT ANY FORMAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE COUNCIL, WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY INVOLVE A ROW, WOULD KILL THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS. I HOPED THAT TOMORROW'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE AS BRIEF AS POSSIBLE.

- (G) WAS THERE ANY RISK THAT CONTINUING MILITARY ACTIVITY WOULD CAUSE ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER TO BREAK OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS (IRELAND)?

I SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF THIS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOOK THE SAME VIEW AND HAD SO INFORMED THE PRESS (MY TELNO 737).

- (H) WAS THERE A MOMENT BY WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO END THE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE WE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO SUSPEND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" (BELGIUM)?

I SAID NO, THOUGH I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER THE PARTIES OR THE SECRETARY GENERAL WANTED NEGOTIATIONS TO DRAG ON INDEFINITELY.

- 9 March: A British Antarctic Survey field party report that an Argentine Navy cargo vessel is anchored in Leith harbour. A party of about 60 Argentines have set up camp and an Argentine flag has been hoisted.
- 10 March: The BAS field party informs the Argentines that they have landed illegally and that they must leave.
- The Ministry of Defence instruct HMS Endurance to prepare to sail to South Georgia with a detachment of Marines from Port Stanley.
- HM Ambassador Buenos Aires informs the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs that we are treating the infringement of our sovereignty very seriously. The Argentine Charge d'Affaires is called in to the Foreign Office and told the same. The Argentine Government profess ignorance but agree to look into the matter urgently.
- 21 March: HMS Endurance departs for South Georgia.
- Argentine MFA inform us that the ship will leave South Georgia shortly and that no service personnel are involved.
- 22 March: We receive confirmation that the ship has left but there are doubts about whether all the men have gone.
- News Department issue statement on incident.
- In the evening, BAS confirm that about six men and some equipment remain.
- 23 March: HMS Endurance is instructed to sail on for South Georgia and remove the men, if possible without using force.
- Mr Luce makes a statement to the House of Commons.
- Argentine Government later warns that use of HMS Endurance would be gravely provocative. They are told we wish to avoid this if possible: if they can propose an acceptable alternative method of removing the men, we are prepared to let them do so.

24 March: HMS Endurance ordered to anchor in Grytviken harbour, but not to proceed to Leith.

Argentine MFA say they wish to prevent the situation escalating if possible, but need time to consider.

25 March: Argentine naval vessel is sighted at Leith delivering further supplies.

We ask the Argentines for an early response to our request that they remove the men.

Argentine MFA then say that by deploying HMS Endurance we have made it impossible for them to contain their position.

We reply that we wish to do everything possible to avoid confrontation and propose that if the party request the proper authorisation from Grytviken, it will be given.

27 March: No formal reply from the Argentine MFA. But they issue a press statement announcing that the men will be given all necessary protection and the press reports that several Argentine Navy vessels have been ordered into the area.

28 March: Argentine Foreign Minister sends a message to the Secretary of State making it clear that the Argentines have no intention of agreeing to our proposal.

The Secretary of State sends a message to Mr Haig, asking him to intervene and urge restraint on the Argentines.

30 March: Secretary of State makes statement in House of Lords.

Argentines reject US proposal for a solution based on regularising the men's presence.

Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

Wayland

17 April 2012

31 March

British Ambassador, Buenos Aires, meets Argentine Foreign Minister and passes on Secretary of State's offer to send a personal emissary to Buenos Aires. This is later rejected and Costa Mendez says he considers the diplomatic channel is now closed.

US Government urges Argentines to exercise restraint.

* ~~~~~ * indicate that large naval force will be in position * ~~~~~ * on 2 April to mount attack on Falkland Islands.

1 April

UN Secretary General calls in both British and Argentine Representatives and asks them to refrain from threat or use of force. Later we seek Emergency meeting of the Security Council, which results in Presidential statement on similar lines to the Secretary General's appeal.

The Americans attempt, both through their Ambassador in Buenos Aires and later by direct telephone call between Mr Reagan and President Galtieri, to avert the threat. But they are rebuffed.

2 April

1200 London time, first sighting of Argentine attack force. Operation complete by 1900 London time.

Diplomatic relations between the UK and Argentina broken off.

British officials and Marines flown from Falklands to Montevideo.

Message from Commonwealth Secretary General to all Commonwealth Heads of Government urging condemnation of Argentine action.

Messages also from Prime Minister and Secretary of State to wide range of governments.

UK calls immediate meeting of the Security Council.

EC Foreign Ministers issue a statement condemning Argentina and calling for her withdrawal.

3 April

Emergency debate in both Houses.

UN Security Council adopts mandatory resolution calling for Argentines to withdraw their forces.

We announce freezing of Argentine assets in the UK and ending of ECGD cover.

* ~ * Words

deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

Wayland
17 April 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

4 April

British officials and Marines expelled from Falkland Islands leave Montevideo for UK.

We receive confirmation that South Georgia has also been attacked and is now in Argentine hands.

Reports that the Marines defending Grytviken have inflicted considerable damage on the Argentines.

Wide-ranging diplomatic action to secure condemnation by other countries of Argentine action and also to persuade other governments to take economic action similar to our own.

5 April

Governor, staff and Marines arrive back in the UK. Debriefings and press conference.

Task force departs from the UK.

Wide-ranging trade sanctions announced.

New Zealand announces breaking of diplomatic relations with Argentina.

British citizens advised to consider leaving Argentina (BBC World Service broadcast)

Canada announces recall of Ambassador in Buenos Aires.

In an impromptu press conference, President Reagan said that the confrontation put the United States in a difficult position as it was friendly with both countries.

Remaining Marines in Falklands captured.

Lord Carrington, Mr Humphrey Atkins and Mr Luce resign.

Requisitioning of Canberra announced.

6 April

Prime Minister sends message to President Reagan.

Australia announces recall of Ambassador in Buenos Aires.

Mr Haig meets British and Argentine Ambassadors in Washington.

Ban on Argentine imports announced (came into effect at midnight).

7 April

Debate in House of Commons.

MEZ announced.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT

Not for inclusion in

Chronology but useful to know

8 April: Prime Minister

announces that the

enquiry is to be held

into the events leading up

to the Falklands crisis

See Hansard Col 1085

- 8 April: Mr Haig has talks in London with the Secretary of State and Prime Minister.
- Most of British Embassy staff from Buenos Aires return to UK; Argentine Embassy staff leave London.
- Australia announces ban on imports from and export credits to Argentina.
- 9 April: Message from Falkland Islands public servants requesting evacuation reaches Montevideo.
- 10 April: EC countries announce agreement to impose ban on Argentine imports, to take effect from 16 April for one month.
- Mr Haig in Buenos Aires.
- Message to Prime Minister from President Figueiredo of Brazil.
- 11 April: Peruvian proposal for 72-hour truce.
- 12 April: Mr. Haig has talks in London.
- MEZ comes into effect.
- Canada announces ban on imports from and export credits to Argentina.
- 13 April: After staying in London overnight, Mr Haig has further talks at No.10.
- Arrival in Montevideo of Chief Secretary and others from Falkland Islands.
- OAS Resolution adopted by consensus following acrimonious argument between Caribbeans and Latin Americans.
- New Zealand announces ban on imports from and exports to Argentina.
- Argentina bans imports from EC and other countries taking sanctions against her.
- 14 April: Debate in House of Commons.
- 15 April: Chief Secretary and party arrive in London.

- 15 April: Mr Haig arrives in Buenos Aires.
- Soviet Ambassador calls on Mr Hurd. Mr Hurd explains HMG's views and need for solution on basis of SCR 502. Mr Popov maintains that Soviet position was 'principled, not opportunist'.
- Statement on HMG's position by Sir Antony Parsons at Plenary Session of ECOSOC.
- 16 April: Mr Haig begins further talks in Buenos Aires. Argentine Permanent Representative to United Nations sends letter to President of the Security Council setting out Argentina's position in the dispute.
- 17 April: It is learnt that three British journalists have been missing in Argentina since 11 April.
- Argentines notify ICAO that permission will have to be sought for overflights of Argentine territory south of Parallel 36S (which includes the Falklands).
- 18 April: Andean Pact countries (Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia) announce that they will increase their trade with Argentina to compensate for effect of economic measures by European and other countries.
- Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm that the three missing British journalists have been arrested.
- Arrival in Montevideo of 29 Royal Marines and 13 BAS personnel.
- 19 April: Norway bans Argentine imports.
- Mr Haig sends text of draft agreement reached with Argentines and returns to Washington. Statement issued from No.10 Downing Street describes the proposals as 'complex and difficult'.
- Soviets launch Salyut 7 satellite which could monitor naval movements in the South Atlantic.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 April:

The 29 Royal Marines and 13 BAS personnel arrive in UK.

Further party of 30, mostly ODA personnel, arrive in Montevideo from Falklands.

OAS agree to hold Foreign Ministers meeting on 26 April.

Meeting in Brussels, the EC Ministers expressed full support for Britain and backed the UN call for the immediate withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands.

21 April:

Mr Haig reports on utter irrationality and chaotic nature of present Argentine leadership.

US assess that on present indications Argentina will obtain two-thirds majority for action under Rio Treaty. US to lobby before meeting due on 26 April.

European Parliament passes Resolution in support of UK position.

Argentine plane intercepted in airspace over Task Force.

22 April

Secretary of State has talks in Washington with Mr Haig and with Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

President Galtieri visits Falklands

In a Note to the EC Council Latin American Ambassadors accredited to the EC protest against the Community's ban on Argentine imports and ask that the measure be revoked.

23 April

Mr Denis Healey calls on UN Secretary-General.

Message communicated through the Swiss Embassy ~~to~~ the Argentine Government warning that Argentine aircraft approaching Task Force vessels will be treated as hostile.

24 April

S of S returns to UK from Washington.

- 25 April Argentine submarine attacked off Grytviken, South Georgia by 2 British helicopters.
- British forces land in South Georgia and successfully take control of Grytviken.
- Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez says in New York that Argentina and the UK are now 'technically' at war.
- 26 April Argentine contingent at Leith Harbour, South Georgia surrender.
- Argentine prisoner shot dead on South Georgia by Royal Marine
- OAS meeting convened. Argentine representative calls for withdrawal of UK forces and suspension of economic measures against her, but no call for OAS sanctions. Haig makes full speech.
- 27 April Mr Haig passes text of proposals to Argentine government, telling them that he must have an answer, accepting or rejecting them, by midnight Buenos Aires time on 27/28 April.
- 28 April OAS adopt resolution by 17-0-4 which recognizes Argentine sovereignty but insists that SCR 502 must be observed. No call for sanctions.
- Information released about death of Argentine officer on South Georgia.
- Total Exclusion Zone announced (comes into operation on 30 April).
- 29 April Further debate on Falklands in Parliament.
- Details of 151 Argentine military personnel and 39 foreign civilians captured on S. Georgia received and passed to appropriate authorities.
- Letter from Costa Mendez to Haig stating that US proposals fall short of Argentine demands and do not satisfy Argentine aspirations in relation to sovereignty and an interim administration.
- Argentina declares total exclusion zone.

	30 April		The British Total Exclusion-Zone comes into force at 1100 GMT. US Secretary of State Haig publicly announces US Government support for the UK in the form of a ban on arms sales to Argentina and financial restrictions on that country. In addition the US will respond positively to UK request for material support.
7 May:			
	1 May		Airfields on the Islands bombed. Task Force later comes under aerial attack. Argentines lose 3 aircraft. Secretary of State flies to Washington.
8 May			
	2 May		Secretary of State calls on UN Secretary-General.
8/9 May			
	3 May		British submarine torpedoes Argentine cruiser, which later sinks. Argentine patrol vessel fires on British helicopter and is sunk by others. Secretary of State returns from New York.
9 May			
	4 May		Secretary of State and Mr Nott make statement in the House, followed by further statements in the House by Mr Nott. MOD Statement on the loss of HMS Sheffield Sea Harrier.
	5 May	-	Revised version of US/Peruvian proposals for ceasefire and settlement sent to Secretary of State by Mr Haig. UK responds with suggested amendments. Proposals sent to Peruvian Government for transmission to Argentina.
10 May		-	Informal Security Council consultations.
		-	UN Secretary-General announces that Argentina has accepted his 'proposals', i.e. the ideas discussed with Mr Pym on 2 May.
		-	Secretary of State and Mr Nott make statement in the House.
11 May		-	Mr Haig and, later, the Peruvian President HMA Lima, inform HMG that the US/Peruvian proposals have been overtaken by Argentina's approach to UN Secretary-General.
	6 May	-	Sir Anthony Parsons delivers HMG's response to UN Secretary-General's initiative.
		-	MOD release statement concerning the loss of British Sea-Harriers.
		-	Informal Security Council Consultations.
		-	Mr Haig sends message to NATO Foreign Ministers about US/Peruvian proposals rejected by Argentina.

11 May (continued)

Further round of discussions between UN Secretary General and the parties. Sr Perez de Cuellar says he is 'rather encouraged' by latest developments.

12 May

Ministry of Defence issue two statements about Argentine air attacks on task force: 2 Argentine A4 aircraft shot down - no British casualties.

European Parliament adopting resolution reaffirming condemnation of Argentine failure to implement SC resolution 502 and inviting EC Foreign Ministers to renew sanctions.

More discussions in New York between the Secretary General and the parties.

13 May

188 Argentine prisoners captured on South Georgia handed over to ICRC at Ascension Island; flown to Montevideo for return by sea to Argentina. Lieutenant-Commander Astiz detained at Ascension Island.

MOD statement about crash of third Argentine aircraft in sea during attack on Task Force on 12 May.

Debate on Falklands crisis in the House of Commons.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 May 1982

Dear John,

Captain Astiz

Among the Argentine POWs due to be flown out of Ascension Island at 3 am London time tomorrow morning for return to Argentina via Montevideo is a Captain Astiz. There has already been press and parliamentary interest in this man because of the Swedish Government's wish to interview him in connection with the shooting and disappearance of a Swedish girl in Buenos Aires in 1977. When the Swedish Government formally approached us for access to Astiz, or at least that we should ask him whether he would be willing to answer questions about the alleged incident, we replied (after Mr Nott had been consulted) that we would prefer the Swedes to approach the ICRC on the point because of our delicate position in relation to the treatment of Argentine POWs. The ICRC have apparently not been receptive to the Swedish request that they raise this matter with Astiz.

We have today received two formal approaches from the French Government about the same man. M Cheysson's office have told our Embassy in Paris that the French Government wished formally to ask the British Government not to transfer Astiz into ICRC protection as the French wish to consider criminal proceedings against him, apparently in connection with the killing of two French nuns. The French Ambassador raised the same matter with Sir Antony Acland this afternoon. *Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4). @Wayland, 17/4/82* Cheysson's office have added that the French Foreign Minister may have to answer questions about Astiz later today and in that case would say that an approach had been made to the British Government.

/This case



This case obviously requires careful handling presentationally. From the legal angle we are under no obligation to return POWs until the end of hostilities. On the other hand a POW is not under any obligation to answer questions other than about his rank, name and number and must not be subjected to duress. But in the light of the French approach and Ministers' imminent contacts with M Cheysson, M Mauroy and President Mitterrand, Mr Pym thinks there is a strong case for reconsidering the line we have so far taken over Astiz. He therefore proposes that we should instruct our people at Ascension Island not to hand over Astiz with the other POWs at 3 am tomorrow morning when the other POWs become the formal responsibility of the ICRC and are repatriated by air. We should then tell the French and the Swedes (and if necessary take the line publicly) that Astiz's repatriation has been delayed for a few days to consider carefully the implications of the approaches by those two Governments. We should then either permit the French and/or Swedish representative to interview Astiz at Ascension or at the very least we should ask him ourselves whether he would be prepared to answer questions passed to us by the French and the Swedes. If, as seems almost certain, Astiz were to decline on both counts (as strictly speaking he is entitled to do as a POW) we should have to explain this both to the French and Swedes and publicly; and probably then to repatriate him after an interval of a week or two. But at least we should have put ourselves in a better position politically and in terms of public relations. It is even possible that we could turn the matter to good account in terms of the British journalists still detained in Argentina. Mr Pym does not believe that to act as he has suggested would prejudice the current prospects for negotiations in New York. But if we are to act, we must do so quickly.

I am copying this letter to David Omand at the Ministry of Defence.


Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

11 MAY 1962



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7A



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 May 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands - US Guarantee

Nicko Henderson's telegram number 1690 of 10 May shows that the US are still evading all commitment on the question of some form of US guarantee for the Falkland Islands, despite repeated approaches which we have made to them on the subject. This is an important element, and we need to pin the Americans down. We think the best way of doing this might be through a message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan, and I attach a draft.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD(SA).

It is not the kind of letter that would spread to him and not the kind of letter I am prepared to write. It is based on the view that I would be prepared to make for a US than John's agreement. ✓ anything - my view are because I think we should write to lobby our people. No.

John's view

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

Prime Minister

- This has of course been approved by Mr. Pym.
- 2. You may think that the message does not go far enough. but if we ask the U.S. for too binding a commitment that is likely to provoke the reply that it would require legislation which, post-Vietnam, they could not get through Congress.
- 3. Agree that message should be despatched?

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

A.J.C. 12/5

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT REAGAN

We are, as you know, doing all we can to ensure that the UN Secretary-General's peace efforts succeed, as of course we did during the earlier initiatives taken by Al Haig. But a lot of difficulties remain and we cannot be certain whether the Argentines really are looking for a reasonable negotiated settlement. For our part we shall of course go as far as we can in the search for a settlement consistent with our principles. Indeed I shall be willing to accept an agreement which some here might regard as far from perfect. I know you would wish me to do this and I believe it would be right to do so in order to arrive at a peaceful solution.

But I could more readily accept a settlement which was not satisfactory in certain aspects, if I knew that the US was willing to play a part in deterring the Argentines from any further aggression once they had withdrawn from the Islands. I do not have in mind a formal US guarantee, particularly in the event of a settlement with which the United States were not directly involved, for example as a result of the UN Secretary-General's present initiative. But you and I are well aware that the UN, with the best will in the world, would be unable to keep the peace in the area. I do therefore see very great advantage in some written assurance from you which would make it clear that the United States would take a very close interest in the fulfilment by the parties of their obligations under an interim agreement and beyond; that they would take the most serious view of any violation of the obligation to withdraw troops from the Islands and ^{of} any attempt to use force or the threat of force to frustrate or influence the negotiations for a definitive settlement; and that they would respond appropriately to any such challenge to the international rule of law. The fact of such an assurance would of course need to be made known to the Argentines.

/As you

As you know we have raised this thought before, and I should be grateful to receive your personal reaction.

MAY 1982



IMMEDIATE

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HS/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/SIR M PALLISER,

PS/SIR A DUFF

MR WADE-GERY

MR FULLER

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF

)
)
) CABINET

) OFFICE

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q.

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 122248Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1727 OF 12 MAY 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY 3 IPTS: FALKLANDS

1. WHILE I WAS TALKING TO HIM TODAY HAIG RECEIVED HIS FIRST REPORT FROM AMBASSADOR WALTERS WHO HAD SEEN GALTIERI AND LAMI DOZO (THE AIR GENERAL IN THE JUNTA). WALTERS HAD NOT DETECTED ANY SIGNS THAT THE ARGENTINIANS BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN A BREAK-THROUGH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY. HE HAD DETECTED HOW THE ARGENTINIANS EMPHASISED THAT THE LESS THEY GOT IN SOVEREIGNTY THE MORE THEY WOULD HAVE TO STRESS THE NEED FOR EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ARGENTINIANS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THE INTERIM.

2. LAMI DOZO HAD SPOKEN OF THE EQUIPMENT AND ASSISTANCE THE SOVIETS WERE OFFERING AT VERY LOW PRICES: BUT GALTIERI HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED TO ANY ARGENTINE COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

3. LAMI DOZO'S VIEW WAS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UN WERE AT A DEAD END. THE ARGENTINIANS COULD NOT GIVE WAY ON SOVEREIGNTY BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE OF THE PERONISTAS. THIS LED HAIG TO SAY THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE TROUBLE LAY NOT WITH THE JUNTA BUT WITH THE POLITICIANS BEHIND. THE LATTER WERE INSISTING ON OPENING UP THE ISLANDS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, WHICH HAIG REALISED COULD LEAD TO FLOODING BY ARGENTINIANS THAT WAS QUITE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

4. LAMI DOZO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE NEXT STAGE MIGHT BE A CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED CALLED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

5. I ASKED HAIG WHAT GOOD HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD DO AND WHETHER HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ATTEND. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD GO BUT THAT HE WOULD ADVISE AGAINST SUCH A MEETING. THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN HAVING IT UNLESS THE GROUND HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY PREPARED BEFOREHAND.

6. WALTERS ALSO REPORTED ON THE SUGGESTION THAT HAD BEEN MADE THAT GALTIERI AND MRS THATCHER MIGHT MEET IN SOME THIRD COUNTRY.

7. WALTERS'S IMPRESSION FROM LAMI DOZO WAS THAT HE WAS NOT OPERATING UNDER THE SAME SENSE OF URGENCY AS GALTIERI. THE LATTER REALISED THE DANGERS AS WELL AS THE NEED TO RESTORE US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS WHICH IN HIS VIEW WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE MALVINAS.

8. WALTERS WILL NOW SEE ADMIRAL ANAYA IF HE IS PREPARED TO SEE HIM; AND THEN GALTIERI AGAIN.

9. I DO NOT THINK THAT HAIG EXPECTS MUCH FROM THE WALTERS MISSION.

HENDERSON

NNNN

12 MAY 1982

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GVA/FCO 004/12

PP FCO

GRS 90

CONFIDENTIAL

ECLIPSE

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 120945Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 231 OF 12 MAY

THE SITUATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: US REPORTS

1. MOREILLON, THE CHIEF LEGAL ADVISER TO THE ICRC, TOLD ME ON 11 MAY THAT THE 17 US CITIZENS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAD A RADIO LINK WITH THE US AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES AND WERE ABLE TO REPORT ON CONDITIONS THERE. THE LATEST REPORT HE HAD SEEN INDICATED THAT MATTERS WERE "NOT TOO BAD".
2. YOU MAY ALREADY BE AWARE OF THIS LINK. IF HOWEVER THIS IS NOT (NOT) THE CASE, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF MOREILLON'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESPECTED, SINCE HE WAS SPEAKING TO ME PRIVATELY.

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT NOS 3,4 AT 1003Z IM/VVIA

XFO004/13

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E.R.

F C O (DESKBY 130300Z)

GR 120

CONFIDENTIAL

113 MAY 1982


DESKBY 130300Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130016Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 734 OF 12 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



MY TELNO 731; PARAGRAPH 2(D); FALKLANDS - VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL.

1. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ME PRIVATELY AFTER THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING THAT HAIG HAD TELEPHONED HIM BEFORE LEAVING FOR HIS VISITS TO GREECE ETC. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOLD HIM THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BUT THAT THERE WERE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AHEAD. HAIG HAD SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT, IF THE AMERICANS COULD HELP AT ALL IN THE CONTEXT OF WITHDRAWAL, PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD ONLY TO ASK. PEREZ DE CUELLAR REGARDED THIS AS ENCOURAGING IN REGARD TO VERIFICATION, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT WANT TO MAKE THIS KNOWN TO HIS STAFF WHO WERE OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS TO KEEP THE AMERICANS OUT OF THE ACT.

PARSONS

NNNN

010
21-2-83
Covering 12th May



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear John,

Further Message from the President of Brazil to the Prime
Minister

The President of Brazil has sent a further message to the Prime Minister about his fears that military confrontation might demolish the diplomatic efforts of the UN Secretary-General. I enclose the text.

There is no point in prolonging, for the sake of politeness, exchanges of messages between the President and the Prime Minister. But the Prime Minister will know that President Figueiredo spoke on 13 May to President Reagan and has decided to send an emissary to Buenos Aires (Washington telno 1745 to FCO). He is known to be particularly concerned about the possibility of mainland operations against Argentina.

I enclose a telegram containing a draft reply from the Prime Minister which might be delivered, like her previous message, through Brazilia.

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CÓPIA.

SERVICO NO EXTERIOR

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T. 107 AB/82

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATIVE
REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, SENHOR JOÃO BAPTISTA FIGUEIREDO
TO THE RT HON. MRS MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND


"I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your
kind telegram of yesterday's date, May 11th.

It is encouraging to have a reaffirmation of the
endeavour of the British Government to find a negotiated solution
for the question.

Bearing in mind, however, the growing military
activity in the South Atlantic, which increases the risks of an
armed confrontation of serious proportions, I wish to reiterate
to Your Excellency the concern of my country, its Government and
public opinion, that such risks might mar the diplomatic efforts
now being made by the Secretary General of the United Nations,
Mr Perez de Cuellar. Such occurrence, as Your Excellency can
well imagine, could have serious and deep repercussions both in
the American Continental picture as well as in the world.

I trust, therefore, that the parties to the
question, in no moment should fail to adapt a flexible and
constructive attitude within the present negotiations in the
United Nations, and I once again reaffirm the wishes of my
country for a successful end for such efforts in the shortest
possible period of time.

With my highest consideration."



London, May 12th, 1982.

OUT TELEGRAM

↓	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	RESTRICTED	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	RESTRICTED
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 142000Z MAY 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, NEW YORK
	10	INFO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY
	11	1. Please pass following message from the Prime Minister to
	12	President Figueiredo.
	13	<u>BEGINS:</u> I thank Your Excellency for your message of 12 May. I
	14	value your concern and share your hopes that the efforts now
	15	under way in New York will be successful.
	16	But Argentina has so far ignored Mandatory Resolution
	17	No 502 of the Security Council: a full withdrawal of Argentine
	18	forces from the Falklands would transform the prospects for a
	19	settlement. Their presence on the islands is wholly unlawful.
	20	The consequences of failure at New York are much in my
	21	mind as they are in yours. You may be assured that we have no
///	22	wish to prolong military action longer than may be necessary
//	23	and have approached the present negotiations in the United
/	24	Nations with urgency and in a constructive spirit. If a
	25	negotiated settlement does not prove possible, it will not be

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword for
File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) PRIVATE SECRETARY		
Telephone number 233 4641		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

Page

RESTRICTED

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for lack of effort on our part.

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I assure Your Excellency of my highest consideration.

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ENDS

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
13 MAY 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 122316Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1731 OF 12 MAY 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA.

FALKLANDS

1. AT THE END OF MY TALK TODAY WITH HAIG HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE READY TO BE CALLED BACK FROM HIS EUROPEAN TRIP AT ANY TIME. HIS FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO BE OF HELP OVER THE FALKLANDS ISSUE AND WE MUST NOT HESITATE TO LET HIM KNOW IF WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON. HE COULD BE BACK IN 7 HOURS' TIME.

2. HE THEN SAID THAT HE WANTED ME TO CONVEY ONE IMPORTANT MESSAGE. THIS WAS BASED NOT ONLY ON HIS OWN FEELINGS BUT THOSE OF THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT WHO WAS HERE AND WHO, IN HAIG'S VIEW, IS A VERY SOUND MAN, IN NO WAY HOSTILE TO THE BRITISH. THIS WAS THAT THERE WAS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR US OVER RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION. MOST LATIN AMERICANS UNDERSTOOD HOW IMPOSSIBLE THE ARGENTINIANS WERE. THEIR MACHISMO MADE THEM INTOLERABLE TO DEAL WITH. BUT BRITAIN WOULD PUT ITSELF IN THE WRONG, AND AS A RESULT INFLAME THE WHOLE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE, IF IT ATTACKED THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND. HAIG EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT THIS WAS OUR INTENTION, BUT HE JUST WANTED TO REGISTER HIS CONVICTION OF THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES IT WOULD HAVE, THOUGH HE HOPED YOU WOULD NOT THINK THAT HE WAS SEEKING TO INTERFERE IN OUR AFFAIRS.

HENDERSON

ER

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WONNYE94/12

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OO F C O

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

2347

GPS 600

113 MAY 1982

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 122245Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 1724 OF 12 MAY 1982,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

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FALKLANDS

1. WHEN I SAW HAIG TODAY FOR A FAREWELL TALK BEFORE HE GOES OFF ON HIS EUROPEAN TOUR HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TELEPHONED HIM THIS MORNING. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD SPOKEN OF THE CONSIDERABLE CONCESSION THE ARGENTINIANS HAD MADE OVER SOVEREIGNTY. THIS NOW REQUIRED A COMPARABLE CONCESSION FROM THE BRITISH: THE USA WERE BEST ABLE TO EXERCISE PERSUASION ON LONDON.
2. IN DISCUSSION, HAIG SHOWED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE ABSURDITY OF THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT WHEN ARGENTINA UP TO NOW HAS MADE NO MOVEMENT WHATEVER, BUT ON THE CONTRARY HAS STEPPED UP ITS DEMANDS. NOR DOES HE THINK THAT WE SHOULD GIVE WAY ON SOUTH GEORGIA. HE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER WHO HAD CHARACTERISED THE ARGENTINE CLAIM ON SOUTH GEORGIA AS "OUTRAGEOUS". HAIG IMPLIED THAT THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT THOUGHT THAT THE DEPENDENCIES MIGHT BE HANDLED SEPARATELY FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE.
3. I ASKED HAIG WHETHER HE COULD INSTRUCT WALTERS TO PROBE THE ARGENTINIANS ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH GEORGIA AND HE UNDERTOOK TO INSTRUCT HIM IMMEDIATELY.

4. HAIG THEN TURNED TO WHAT HE SAID HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE ARGENTINIAN NEGOTIATING TACTIC. THE MORE FLEXIBLE THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO BE ON SOVEREIGNTY, THE TOUGHER THEY WOULD BE ABOUT THE INTERIM AUTHORITY, PARTICULARLY THE QUESTIONS OF ENTRY, PURCHASE OF PROPERTY, ETC, AND NOT SPECIFYING THAT THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY. IT WAS NOT THEREFORE SURPRISING IF, NOW THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE THINKING OF CONCESSIONS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY, THEY WERE BEING DIFFICULT ON THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. HAIG SAID THAT HE QUOTE UNDERSTOOD OUR POINT OF VIEW. WE COULD NO MORE OVERLOOK WHAT THE INHABITANTS WANTED THAN WE COULD ALLOW THE ISLANDS TO BE SWAMPED AND BOUGHT OUT BY ARGENTINIANS. IT WOULD BE A TRAVESTY IF AFTER ALL THE EFFORT AND AGONY OF THIS FALKLANDS CRISIS THE PLACE WAS SIMPLY TO PASS BY PURCHASE AND OCCUPATION INTO THE HANDS OF THE ARGENTINIANS WITHIN A VERY SHORT SPACE OF TIME.

5. NEVERTHELESS, HE THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COME UP WITH A NEW FORM OF WORDS THAT THE ARGENTINIANS COULD ACCEPT IF THEY WERE SERIOUS ABOUT NEGOTIATION. THE AMERICAN FORMULA INCORPORATED IN THE US/PERUVIAN PLAN HAD SPOKEN OF THE "CONSULTATION WITH THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS". HE DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD DO TO GO BACK TO THAT WORDING BECAUSE THE ARGENTINIANS HAD ALREADY REJECTED IT. BUT, WITH OUR INGENUITY, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND A FORMULA THAT WOULD EMBRACE THE INHABITANTS, THOUGH HE WAS SURE THAT WE WOULD NOT SUCCEED IF WE TRIED TO SECURE WORDING THAT SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE COUNCILS.

6. PLEASE SEE MY 4 IFT'S.

HENDERSON

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13 MAY 1982

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FM WASHINGTON 122246Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 1725 OF 12 MAY 1982,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. I HAD A LENGTHY BUT INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION WITH HAIG ON THE SUBJECT OF THE GUARANTEE.

2. HE DID NOT SEEM TO THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE SUPERVISION OF THE TROOPS' WITHDRAWAL. THIS WOULD BE DONE UNDER UN AUSPICES AND THEY COULD DRAW ON AIR SURVEILLANCE AS THEY WISHED. I MENTIONED THE MFC AS A POSSIBLE PRECEDENT, WHICH HAIG ENTIRELY ACCEPTED. HE WAS SURE THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE.

3. A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT QUESTION AROSE IF THE CUT-OFF DATE HAD ARRIVED AND THERE WAS STILL NO LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT. HAIG HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT ON THIS. HE HAD SEEN NO REASON WHY INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NOT THEN CARRY ON.

4. HAIG NEVERTHELESS SAW A PROBLEM IF THERE WAS NO SETTLEMENT ABOUT THE FUTURE AND IF THE ARGENTINIANS THEN THREATENED TO RETURN. HE SAID IT WOULD BE EASIER IF THE US WERE PART OF THE UN REGIME AND IT CARRIED ON. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS MIGHT INITIALLY PROTEST ABOUT USA PARTICIPATION BUT WOULD IN THE END ACCEPT IT. IN HIS VIEW THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE BEST GUARANTEE. IT HAD TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WERE THINKING OF THE US WOULD BE RESTORING ITS RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND WOULD BE PROVIDING MUCH-NEEDED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT, IN SUCH A SITUATION, WISH TO ANTAGONISE THE USA BY ADOPTING SOME UNACCEPTABLE TACTICS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

5. HAIG AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS THIS MATTER FURTHER, ADDING THAT IT DEPENDED TO SOME EXTENT ON THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT. INDEED IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BE PRECISE ABOUT IT UNTIL WE KNEW WHAT THAT AGREEMENT WAS LIKELY TO BE.

HENDERSON

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 130227Z MAY 82


TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 733 DATED 12 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TWO IPTS: FALKLANDS

13 MAY 1982



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1. YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES ARE NOW FACED WITH AN IMMEDIATE STRATEGIC DECISION. IF TOMORROW (13 MAY) I STICK TO THE POSITIONS I SET OUT TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR TODAY AND HE PUTS THEM TO THE ARGENTINES, AS HE WILL FEEL BOUND TO DO, I AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TERMINATE THERE AND THEN. WE CAN ONLY KEEP THE TALKS GOING IF WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND ON OUR MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA (ALL IN THE CONTEXT OF SATISFACTION ON THE WHOLE PACKAGE).

2. PLEASE DO NOT THINK THAT I AM NOT AWARE OF THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. I EXPLAINED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN DETAIL THAT THE BASIC BRITISH VIEW WAS AS FOLLOWS. THE ONLY JUST OUTCOME WAS THAT THE AGGRESSOR SHOULD WITHDRAW, THE STATUS QUO ANTE BE RESTORED AND THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN SO RUDELY BROKEN OFF RESUMED. HE MUST NOT THINK THAT WE WERE BEING INFLEXIBLE. WE HAD SHOWN OURSELVES READY TO ENTERTAIN A STRING OF CONCESSIONS - UN ADMINISTRATION, ACCEPTANCE THAT THE OUTCOME DID NOT HAVE TO BE BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY WITH ITS CONCOMITANT OF THE PARAMOUNTCY OF THE ISLANDER'S WISHES, A TARGET DATE FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT ONLY SEVEN MONTHS AWAY ETC.

HOWEVER, THE PLAIN IF REGRETTABLE FACT IS THAT EVERYONE HERE SEES THE SITUATION QUITE DIFFERENTLY. THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP SYMPATHISE WITH OUR REACTION TO ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE, BUT THEY BELIEVE (THIS INCLUDES A NUMBER OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS) THAT THE FALKLANDS SHOULD BELONG TO ARGENTINA PROVIDED THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS ARE SAFEGUARDED.

THIS STAGE, THE DOMINANT VIEW HERE IS THAT THE ARGENTINE POSITION IS BECOMING MORE MODERATE AND THAT WE SHOULD RESPOND IN ORDER TO BRING TO AN END THE HOSTILITIES WHICH ARE CREATING INCREASING CONCERN WORLD-WIDE. RIGHT OR WRONG, THIS IS HOW IT IS.

4. HENCE, IF WE DO NOT MODERATE OUR POSITION AND THE NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN TOMORROW (13 MAY) LEAVING A DIPLOMATIC VACUUM ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY INTENSIFYING MILITARY ACTIVITY, WE WILL BE REGARDED AS THE CULPRITS (THE SECRETARIAT WILL SEE TO THAT). SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION, EVEN FROM OUR ALLIES AND PARTNERS, WILL DRAIN AWAY AS WE CAST VETOES AGAINST CALLS FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, PROBABLY ACCOMPANIED BY THE CLAMOUR OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I STILL HAVE SOME SHOTS IN MY LOCKER TO TRY TO LIMIT THIS DAMAGE BUT, IF THE DIPLOMATIC VACUUM PERSISTS, THEY WILL BECOME DECREASINGLY EFFECTIVE.

5. THE ABOVE IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN HERE IF THE NEGOTIATIONS COLLAPSE TOMORROW AS A RESULT OF OUR STICKING TO OUR PRESENT POSITION. IF YOU NEED TO BUY MORE TIME EITHER IN THE HOPE OF REACHING A SOLUTION THROUGH THE PRESENT UN PROCESS, OR TO AVOID AN IMMEDIATE DIPLOMATIC VACUUM EG IN THE CONTEXT OF PERSUADING OUR PARTNERS TO RENEW SANCTIONS ON 16 MAY, WE SHALL HAVE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS ON THE TWO ISSUES MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE AT MY MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOMORROW. THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS IS TOO DIFFICULT FOR YOU, IS FOR ME TO SET OUT OUR PRESENT POSITION IN FULL TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND OBLIGE THE ARGENTINES TO REJECT IT. AS IT STANDS, THEY WOULD BE LIKELY TO REJECT IT IN TOTO RATHER THAN REFERRING TO SPECIFIC POINTS. THIS WOULD MARGINALLY LIMIT THE DAMAGE THEREAFTER IN THE UN.

6. IF, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, YOU ARE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE FURTHER CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO KEEP THE TALKS ALIVE, THE FOLLOWING ARE IN MY JUDGEMENT THE MINIMUM:-

sent to LCJ -

- (I) SOUTH GEORGIA: AGREEMENT TO DEMILITARISATION TO ACCOMPANY MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS, LEAVING THE TRADITIONAL BAS ADMINISTRATION INTACT, FREEZING ALL FRESH ECONOMIC AND OTHER NON-SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY (TO DEAL WITH THE DAVIDOFF CONTRACT) AND AGREEING THAT A SEPARATE SOLUTION TO SOUTH GEORGIA/SOUTH SANDWICH BE INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FALKLANDS.
- (II) THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION: AGREEMENT THAT THE UN ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD ACT IN CONSULTATION WITH THE
} ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISLANDERS, ACTING AS A CORPORATE BODY (UNSPECIFIED), AS REGARDS THE DAY TO DAY AFFAIRS OF THE ISLANDS AND AS REGARDS THE FUTURE
} OF THE ISLANDERS. WE WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE OPERATION OF THE EXISTING INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE SUSPENDED (NOT ABOLISHED) DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD BUT INSIST THAT THE UN ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD NOT MAKE (OR RETAIN) ANY CHANGES WHICH WOULD NOT BE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS AND PRACTICES PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED BY THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

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13 MAY 1982

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
DESKBY 130300Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130011Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 732 OF 12 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. IN THE EVENT PEREZ DE CUELLAR DECIDED NOT TO CALL ME BACK FOR A FURTHER MEETING THIS EVENING. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RELATIVELY LITTLE TO SAY AND MY REAPPEARANCE WOULD ONLY EXCITE FURTHER SPECULATION.

2. HE TOLD ME ON THE TELEPHONE THAT THE FOLLOWING POINTS HAD EMERGED FROM HIS FAIRLY BRIEF MEETING WITH ROS:

- (I) A PRIVATE (PEREZ DE CUELLAR THOUGHT NOT ON INSTRUCTIONS) APPEAL TO US TO BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH ME PERSONALLY FOR MILITARY RESTRAINT WHILE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING.
- (II) PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ROS THAT WE WERE GENERALLY SATISFIED, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT, WITH THE ARGENTINE STATEMENT ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT. HOWEVER WE ALREADY HAD FRESH MISGIVINGS BECAUSE OF COSTA MENDEZ'S STATEMENT TODAY (YOUR TELNO 392). PEREZ DE CULLAR SUGGESTED A MORATORIUM ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED. ROS IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO COMPLAIN ABOUT STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF LONDON.
- (III) ROS HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO OFFER ON THE NATURE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S COMMENT WAS THAT ROS WAS "COMPETING WITH US IN INFLEXIBILITY ON THIS POINTS".
- (IV) ROS RE-OPENED THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM FOR ARGENTINES TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY IN THE FALKLANDS AND THE POINT ABOUT THEIR BEING ABLE TO BUY SHARES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR REITERATED THAT, IF HE EXPOSED OUR PRESENT POSITIONS TO ROS, THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE TERMINATED ON THE SPOT. HE HAD TAKEN CARE NOT TO DO SO, THUS BUYING US ANOTHER DAY. HE HOPED TO HEAR MORE FROM ME ON 13 MAY.

4. SEE MIFT.

PARSONS

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RECEIVED
MAY 13 1964

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

MAY 13 1964

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 130300Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 130009Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 731 DATED 12 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

13 MAY 1982



YOUR TELSNOs 390 AND 391: FALKLAND ISLANDS

SUMMARY (UNDERLINED)

1. I CARRIED OUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS AFTERNOON (12 MAY). HE AND HIS TEAM WERE STUNNED. HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR AGREEMENT TO YESTERDAY'S FORMULA ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT AND THAT THE BREAKDOWN OF HIS INITIATIVE WOULD BE INEVITABLE. AFTER DISCUSSION, HE DECIDED NOT TO REVEAL ALL THAT I HAD SAID TO ROS, IN THE HOPE THAT ROS WOULD HAVE SOMETHING NEW TO SAY WHICH MIGHT GIVE US SOMETHING MORE TO WORK ON. I AGREED TO THIS. THERE WAS THEN SOME DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS DETAILED POINTS. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, HE FORMALLY ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO YOU HIS VIEW THAT HIS WHOLE INITIATIVE MIGHT COLLAPSE TOMORROW (13 MAY) UNLESS WE COULD MODERATE OUR POSITION.

DETAIL (UNDERLINED)

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS TEAM AT 2000Z. IT WAS A GRIM MEETING. I TOOK HIM THROUGH THE POINTS I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE IN YOUR TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) NON-PREJUDGEMENT (UNDERLINED): I SAID THAT ARGENTINE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FORMULA ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT WAS AN ADVANCE. I COULD NOT SAY AT PRESENT THAT WE ACCEPTED IT. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT AS PART OF AN EVENTUAL PACKAGE. MEANWHILE I QUOTED COSTA MENDEZ'S REMARKS TODAY (YOUR TELNO 392) AND ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TRY TO GET THE ARGENTINES TO STOP MAKING THIS KIND OF STATEMENT IN PUBLIC.

TO STOP MAKING THIS KIND OF STATEMENT IN PUBLIC.

(B) POSITION AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982: (UNDERLINED)

~~I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO APPROVE CONTINUATION OF THE INTERIM STRUCTURES.~~ I EXPLAINED WHY IN DETAIL. I THEN READ OUT ARTICLE 8 FROM MY TELNO 713, SAYING THAT THIS WOULD MEET OUR POINT IF IT WAS COMBINED WITH ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE ON THE TARGET DATE.

(C) WITHDRAWAL: (UNDERLINED) I GAVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR THE TEXT OF ARTICLE 2 FROM MY TELNO 713. (SEE PARA 6(B) BELOW FOR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION ABOUT AHMED'S BOX IDEA).

(D) VERIFICATION: (UNDERLINED) I ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARIAT HAD HAD FURTHER THOUGHTS. AHMED SAID NO: IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR THE SECRETARIAT TO APPROACH GOVERNMENTS AT THIS STAGE. THEY WERE ALSO BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER GOVERNMENTS WOULD MAKE SUCH SOPHISTICATED DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO THE UN. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN FAVOUR OF US INVOLVEMENT. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SECRETARIAT DOUBT WHETHER THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA AND FEAR THAT IT WOULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL (BUT SEE MY TELNO 734).

(E) INTERIM ADMINISTRATION: (UNDERLINED) I SAID THAT THIS WAS CLEARLY A MAJOR DIFFICULTY. WE ASSUMED THAT THE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD INCLUDE ANY ARGENTINE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION INTRODUCED SINCE THE INVASION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS SO. I THEN DESCRIBED OUR CONCEPT OF THE UN ADMINISTRATOR'S FUNCTIONS AS IN PARA 2(E) OF YOUR TELNO 390 AND DICTATED YOUR REVISED VERSIONS OF ARTICLES 6(3) AND (4) OF THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 713, ADDING THAT WE ALREADY HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE TRYING TO INTRODUCE CHANGES TO THE CHARACTER OF LIFE ON THE ISLANDS.

(F) FREEDOM OF TRANSIT, RESIDENCE ETC: (UNDERLINED) I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED, MAKING WHAT I COULD OF OUR AGREEMENT THAT THE 1971 COMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT COULD CONTINUE TO APPLY AND OUR IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF ARGENTINE OBSERVERS.

(G) DEPENDENCIES: (UNDERLINED) I FIRST MADE THE POINT IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TELNO 391 AND THEN THOSE IN PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4, OTHER THAN THE ONE ABOUT THE ARGENTINES HAVING BEEN READY AT AN EARLIER STAGE TO EXCLUDE THE DEPENDENCIES (I DO NOT THINK THAT IT HELPS US IN THIS NEGOTIATION TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT THE ARGENTINES MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE ACCEPTED AT EARLIER STAGES). I INCLUDED THE POINT ABOUT THE DEPENDENCIES BEING DEPENDENCIES OF THE UK BUT SHALL NOT DO SO AGAIN, AS I HAVE SINCE SEEN THAT ACCORDING TO HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND THEY WERE ESTABLISHED AS DEPENDENCIES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN 1988 BY LETTERS PATENT.

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF WERE CLEARLY STUNNED BY WHAT

HIS FIRST REACTION WAS TO ASK WHAT HE COULD DO. THE

3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF WERE CLEARLY STUNNED BY WHAT I HAD SAID. HIS FIRST REACTION WAS TO ASK WHAT HE COULD DO. THE ARGENTINES WERE COMING TO SEE HIM TWO HOURS LATER. IF HE TOLD THEM WHAT I HAD SAID, THEY WOULD CERTAINLY WITHDRAW THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF YESTERDAY'S FORMULA ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT. THAT WOULD MEAN THE END OF HIS INITIATIVE. I HAD GIVEN HIM NOTHING TO PASS ON TO THEM IN RETURN FOR WHAT THEY SAW AS YESTERDAY'S MAJOR CONCESSIONS. THEY WOULD BE BITTER AND DISAPPOINTED. HE COULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD BREAK OFF THE TALKS IMMEDIATELY. IF WE WERE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN AVOIDING THE "CARNAGE" WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM FAILURE OF HIS EFFORTS, HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE HAD TO TAKE SUCH A HARD LINE.

4. I SAID THAT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN PREPARED AFTER EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES TODAY. I COULD NOT SAY IF THEY WERE YOUR LAST WORD. BUT I URGED HIM TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM FROM THE LONDON END. IT WAS NOT WE WHO HAD COMMITTED THE AGGRESSION. WE HAD NEVERTHELESS ALREADY MADE A NUMBER OF MAJOR CONCESSIONS FROM THE POSITIONS SET OUT IN YOUR MESSAGE TO HIM OF 6 MAY (SEE MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM). ANY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH APPEARED TO REWARD ARGENTINE AGGRESSION WOULD SIMPLY NOT BE ACCEPTED IN BRITAIN. A SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED IN DEFIANCE OF THE POLITICAL REALITIES IN LONDON.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, ON REFLECTION, HE THOUGHT THAT THE ONLY WAY FOR HIM TO AVOID AN IMMEDIATE BREAKDOWN WAS FOR HIM NOT (NOT) TO DESCRIBE OUR POSITION TO ROS AS "BLUNTLY" AS I HAD PUT IT TO HIM. BEFORE SAYING ANYTHING TO ROS THIS EVENING ABOUT OUR REACTION, HE WOULD SEE WHETHER ROS HAD ANYTHING TO TELL HIM; PERHAPS ROS MIGHT COME UP WITH SOMETHING NEW. ALTERNATIVELY, HE MIGHT SEE ROS PRIVATELY, TELL HIM THAT HE HAD HAD A VERY FIRM REACTION FROM YOU ON A NUMBER OF POINTS, AND DISCUSS WITH HIM WHAT HE (ROS) COULD DO TO HELP. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO GIVE UP AT THIS STAGE. I AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BEST WAY FOR HIM TO PROCEED. IT WAS LEFT THAT HE WOULD SUMMON ME AGAIN THIS EVENING AFTER HE HAD SEEN ROS.

6. WE THEN HAD SOME DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS POINTS IN MY INSTRUCTIONS:

(A) DEPENDENCIES (UNDERLINED)

DE SOTO SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE NECESSARILY THINKING OF A UN PRESENCE IN THE DEPENDENCIES. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THEM WAS THAT BRITISH FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH GEORGIA AND THAT THE TWO DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ADDED

... TAKE IN YOUR TELEPHONE AND HIS TEAM AT ...
(A) NOW ...
WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH GEORGIA AND THAT THE TWC DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ADDED THAT THE DEPENDENCIES COULD BE COVERED IN AN AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED SEPARATELY FROM, BUT IN THE SAME PROCESS AS, THE FINAL SETTLEMENT ON THE FALKLANDS THEMSELVES. AHMED SAID THAT IN THE PROVISIONAL DRAFT AGREEMENT THE UN WERE PREPARING THERE WOULD BE NO GEOGRAPHICAL DEFINITION OTHER THAN THE WITHDRAWAL BOX (SEE PARAGRAPH 6(B) BELOW): THERE WOULD BE NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF EITHER THE FALKLANDS, SOUTH GEORGIA OR THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS; INSTEAD THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE EXPRESSED TO BE ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT OF CURRENT DIFFERENCES. THE UN WOULD RESIST ANY SUGGESTION FROM THE ARGENTINES THAT THE UN ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE ON SOUTH GEORGIA; IN PRACTICE, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD REVERT TO THE STATUS QUO BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION IE BAS; IN ADDITION, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT MIGHT HAVE SOME LANGUAGE ABOUT ACCESS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDING LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR SCIENTISTS, INSPIRED BY ARTICLE 1 (2) OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND ALLOWING FOR HMS ENDURANCE TO RETURN. IN SHORT, AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD NEITHER SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE NOR SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDE THE DEPENDENCIES. WE REPLIED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOUTH GEORGIA WOULD HAVE TO BE SPELT OUT AND COULD NOT BE LEFT TO UNSPOKEN UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE UN AND THE ARGENTINES. FOR US IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO BE CLEAR THAT ADMINISTRATION BY THE BAS SHOULD BE RESTORED, PLUS REGULAR VISITS BY HMS ENDURANCE ETC. NOR DID I HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT YOU WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAWAL OF UK FORCES FROM SOUTH GEORGIA EVEN IF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION WAS RESTORED. DE SOTO REJOINED THAT WE WOULD BENEFIT FROM ARGENTINA'S OBLIGATION NOT TO REINTRODUCE ITS FORCES INTO SOUTH GEORGIA.

(B) WITHDRAWAL (UNDERLINED)

I ASKED AHMED FOR MORE DETAILS OF HIS BOX. HE SAID THAT IN THE UN'S DRAFT IT WAS DESCRIBED AS "A ZONE BOUNDED BY STRAIGHT LINES CONNECTING THE FOLLOWING FOUR COORDINATE POINTS: 48 DEGREES SOUTH 63 DEGREES WEST, 48 DEGREES SOUTH 22 DEGREES WEST, 60 DEGREES SOUTH 22 DEGREES WEST, 60 DEGREES SOUTH 63 DEGREES WEST." (ITS SOUTHERN BOUNDARY IS THUS THE SAME AS THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AREA). AHMED SAID THAT THE UN'S IDEAS FOR WITHDRAWAL WERE THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO PHASES. IN THE FIRST, HALF THE ARGENTINE FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW WEST OF 63 DEGREES WEST AND ALL BRITISH FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW NORTH OF 40 DEGREES SOUTH; IN BOTH CASES THE WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS BEING "EN ROUTE TO THEIR USUAL OPERATING BASES OR AREAS". IN THE SECOND PHASE THE REST OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL NOT PRESENT IN THE ISLANDS ON 21 MARCH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN,

ARGENTINES MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE ACCEPTED AT EARLIER STAGES).
I INCLUDED THE POINT ABOUT THE REPRESENTATION

PERSONNEL NOT PRESENT IN THE ISLANDS ON 31 MARCH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, AND BRITISH FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW NORTH OF 33 DEGREES SOUTH. I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT THIS TO YOU BUT THAT YOU DID NOT LIKE THE BOX IDEA. OUR STRONG PREFERENCE WAS FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT IN ARTICLE 2 OF OUR TELNO 713.

(C) FREEDOM OF TRANSIT, RESIDENCE ETC (UNDERLINED)

DE SOTO SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO THE IMPRESSION THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MIGHT HAVE GIVEN YESTERDAY, THE IDEA THAT ARGENTINE RESIDENTS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SHOULD HAVE EQUAL REPRESENTATION WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN THE UN ADMINISTRATOR'S ADVISORY GROUP (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELNO 728) WAS NOT AN ARGENTINE IDEA BUT ONE WHICH THE UN HAD PUT FORWARD AND WHICH THE ARGENTINES HAD ACCEPTED, WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM, AS A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE.

(D) POSITION AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982 (UNDERLINED)

I ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARIAT HAD HAD ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS ABOUT THIS (SEE PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 714). AHMED SAID NO. THEIR ONLY THOUGHT WAS THAT THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO TRUST EACH OTHER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHO COULD BE ASKED TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RECOMMEND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF AGREEMENT WAS NOT IN SIGHT BY THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS BECAUSE ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO EXTEND THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1982 WOULD EXPOSE US TO THE SOVIET VETO, PROBABLY FOLLOWING A GA RESOLUTION DECIDING THAT SOVEREIGNTY MUST PASS TO ARGENTINA ON 31 DECEMBER.

7. BRINGING THE MEETING TO A CLOSE, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE FELT OBLIGED TO ASK ME FORMALLY TO TELL YOU THAT IN HIS VIEW HIS WHOLE EFFORT MIGHT NOW COLLAPSE IF WE COULD NOT MODERATE OUR POSITION.

8. I WILL REPORT FURTHER AND SEND COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AFTER MY SECOND MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR LATER TONIGHT.

PARSONS

NNNN



Argentine
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 May, 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands

Following ODSA's discussion of the further instructions for Sir A Parsons now required, I enclose two draft telegrams to New York, the first covering the various points raised during yesterday's discussions between Sir A Parsons and the Secretary General and a second covering South Georgia. In the interests of speed, I am sending the first telegram over in rough draft form only. Obviously the need is to get these telegrams off to Sir A Parsons as soon as possible.

The Attorney General has been consulted about the terms of the first telegram and is content.

Yours ever
J E Holmes
(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street

File No.

Department PLANNING STAFF

Drafted by (Block Capitals) H JAY

Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence FLASH
DESKBYZ

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched (Date) (Time)Z POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) (Security Class.) (Caveat) Privacy marking) (Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK (precedence) (post) Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Falklands Selective

YOUR TELNOS 728 AND 729 : FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. The Argentine formula on sovereignty is a considerable improvement, subject to agreement on what happens at the end of the interim period if no definitive solution is reached, and The Argentines have also moved on some other points. But serious problems remain, particularly, as you say, the questions of the Dependencies and of administrative arrangements, during the interim period. We are particularly concerned that the Argentines may, having apparently given way on

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

'non prejudging', ^{mbm} try to engineer changes in conditions on the Islands during the interim period so as considerably to reduce the chances of any outcome unfavourable to them.

2. In further discussions with the Secretary General you should be guided by the following points:

a. "Non prejudging" . (The Argentine text) is much better than earlier ones and we could probably accept it at the end of the day, including the reference to the UNGA resolutions, although you should, in part for tactical reasons, continue to say that we may have reservations about these references. Furthermore although the last sentence of the formula is legally sound it ^{may} might cause us difficulties in presentation. ^(This is) There is for example ~~no~~ no mention of self-determination. You should tell the Secretary General that it would help to remove continuing doubts in our minds about Argentine intentions, in the negotiations, if they were to cease making statements in public which suggest that sovereignty is not negotiable.

b. Position after 31 December 1982, if no definitive solution is agreed by then. This is a key point. We cannot allow a vacuum, which might tempt the Argentines to further adventures. Nor can we accept any arrangement which would require the Security Council to

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approve the continuation of the interim period, since the Russians ^{might} ~~may~~ veto it, thus leading to the vacuum we must avoid. ~~For this reason we should avoid the language in Article 7(3) of your telno 713, even though it might be said to be governed by Article 8. If it is to be included it would need to be amended to read "If no agreement has been reached by ³¹ ~~10~~ December 1982, the Secretary General shall submit a report to the Security Council about the progress achieved in the negotiations, together with any recommendations about their future conduct".~~

It would seem best here to put the actual target date in order to avoid giving an impression that if no agreement were reached before ~~and 31 December~~ 1982, the interim arrangements might fall c. Distance of Withdrawal. At first sight we do not

like Ahmed's ideas, though ~~we cannot make any serious~~ ^{it is not entirely clear} exactly what he means. He appears to be including Smith comment until we have seen them on a map. ↑ You should

argue for the language in Article 2 of your telno 713.

d. Verification of withdrawal and non-introduction of forces. ^{how these ~~are~~ are} A major anxiety is the ~~verification of~~

~~withdrawal and non-reintroduction of forces is to be~~ guaranteed. Our ^{strong} preferences would be for ^a multilateral verification arrangement, ^{with} to include US involvement, ^{but} ~~though we do not think we can stop the Secretary~~

General from pursuing the matter with the Canadians, ^{but} please ask ^{him for a full account of his} the Secretary General ~~precisely how he sees this being done.~~ *Latest intentions and do all you can to influence them towards some kind of US involvement.*

Administrative arrangements on the Islands during

Interim

Article 8 in your telno 713 would do the trick. But

Georgia, which is unacceptable (see separate telegram)

the ~~Interim~~ period. The Argentine proposals are clearly unacceptable. The ^{absolute} minimum we could accept would be the ^{revised version of} ~~formulation in~~ Article 6(4) of your telno ^(suggested below) 713/ though even this, referring as it does only to 'consultation' with the Executive and Legislative Councils, ^{has presentational} ~~would be very~~ difficult ^{is} for us.

We see a real dilemma over the role of the UN Administrator. If we allow him wide terms of reference there is a risk that he would assume powers and responsibilities which would be quite unacceptable to us. But if we try now to negotiate detailed terms of reference it could spin out negotiations and lead to ^{further} major difficulties.

Please tell the Secretary General that we assume that Argentine withdrawal will include withdrawal of any administration, whether military ^{or} ~~of~~ supposedly civil, that may ^{have been} ~~be~~ instituted on the Islands since the invasion. Our view is that the UN Administrator would then assume the role of officer administering the Government in the manner previously conducted by the Governor, ie acting through the administrative ^{personnel} ~~personnel~~ remaining since ~~which~~ before the invasion plus some officers, ~~such as the Chief Secretary,~~ ^{will} who may return.

It would be helpful to have these ideas reflected in the agreement, perhaps ^{by revised versions of paragraphs} ~~on the following lines~~
 3 and 4 of Article 6 of your draft on the following lines:

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(3) A UN Administrator, being a person acceptable to Argentina and the UK, will be appointed by the Secretary-General and will be the officer administering the Government of the Islands.

(4) The United Nations Administrator will have authority under the direction of the Secretary-General to ensure the continuing administration of the Government of the Islands. He shall despatch his functions in consultation with the Executive and Legislative Councils in the Islands and shall act through the competent officials and institutions of the traditional local administration. He shall exercise his powers in accordance with the terms of this Agreement and in conformity with the spirit of the laws and practices previously observed by the traditional local administration. 4

We assume that before the UN Administrator takes up his duties he will need terms of reference more clearly defined than such [^] formulation. We should be grateful if you could ask the Secretary General what his plans are on this, making clear to him that we could not agree to open-ended ^{cont. branches} arrangements for the Administrator, ^{Since} ~~which~~ ^{this} might lead to a significant alteration in the character of life on the Islands during the interim period.

f. Freedom of transit, residence etc. The Argentine requirements set out in paragraph 5 of your telno 704 are unacceptable (for the reasons explained in my para 1 above). We have no wish to revert to the complicated formulae in the Haig drafts. We could however accept wording to the effect that, during the period of interim administration, the provisions of the 1971 Communications Agreement should continue to apply, except as may be otherwise agreed between the parties. The 1971 Agreement does not of course give any general rights to residence or to acquisition of property by

Argentines; our position should be that this aspect should be dealt with in the negotiations for a definitive settlement. The Agreement requires that decisions relating to the Agreement should be taken by a Joint Consultative Committee (of representatives of the Argentine MFA and the British Embassy). Since this Committee no longer exists, special arrangements would have to be made to reconstitute it; might this possibly be done by using the British and Argentine observers? (You should bear in mind Argentine assertions during the South Georgia incident that the Communications Agreement covered the Dependencies: this, however, has no basis.)

g. Dependencies: see separate telegram.

3. Further comments on the draft agreement in your telno 713 follows shortly.

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
	CONFIDENTIAL	FLASH

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 121700Z MAY 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
	10	YOUR TELS NOS 728 AND 729: SOUTH GEORGIA
	11	1. Ministers remain of the view that the inclusion of South
	12	Georgia in the interim arrangements presents us with very
	13	serious difficulties. Quite apart from our title and the fact
	14	that we are in possession, there are practical considerations.
	15	2. First, we may well need to use South Georgia during the
	16	period of withdrawal. Its anchorages will enable us to conduct
	17	this operation much more satisfactorily than if they were not
	18	available. This would clearly be very difficult to provide for in
	19	an interim agreement involving demilitarisation.
	20	3. In the slightly longer term (but probably still during the
	21	period of the interim arrangements), we wish to be able to
///	22	return the British Antarctic Survey Teams, and to administer them.
//	23	This could not effectively be done if
/	24	
	25	

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword South
File number	Dept	Distribution Falklands Selective
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number 233 5791		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	FLASH	Page 2
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1 <<<<
 2 South Georgia's administration ^{were} to be handled by the UN
 3 administrator during the interim period. It would have to be
 4 done from London. We might also have to deal again with the
 5 Davidoff contract or similar requests. ^{And we would not wish to see}
 6 ^{HMS Endurance debarred from supporting the BAS personnel.}
 7 4. All these considerations point most strongly to South
 8 Georgia's exclusion. The Argentines were able at least to
 9 contemplate at an earlier stage the exclusion of the
 10 Dependencies from proposed agreements (para 1 of Washington
 11 telno 1686). ~~You should argue with the Secretary General that~~
 12 ^{Given} ~~this, combined with~~ the very real practical considerations
 13 outlined above, ~~make it~~ inappropriate for the Dependencies to
 14 be dealt with in the interim agreement now under discussion. It
 15 is not realistic to think that satisfactory arrangements can be
 16 negotiated in the time available. They would introduce a new
 17 factor of great complexity. Much the best course is to
 18 concentrate on the Falklands only.
 19 5. You should make it clear to the SYG at the same time that
 20 we are not repeat not necessarily saying that the future of
 21 the Dependencies should be excluded from the definitive
 22 negotiations which will follow the present agreement. As a
 23 last resort we might be able to agree to their inclusion in
 24 the substantive negotiations although for your own information,
 25 we have it in mind that the Dependencies might be treated quite
 26 differently from the Falkland Islands as regards their future.
 27 6. You could put it to the Secretary General that if the
 28 question of South Georgia is not included in his interim
 29 agreement, we may be prepared to overlook for the present
 30 ^{illegal Argentinian presence on} the ~~question of~~ the South Sandwich Islands, although they too
 31 would be included in the subsequent negotiations. For your
 32 own information, if we were ever to come to contemplate withdrawal
 33 from South Georgia in the interim, we should have to insist upon
 34 total Argentine withdrawal from Southern Thule, ~~where their~~
~~presence remains illegal.~~

you should not send para 2 at this stage you should argue with the Secretary General that it would be

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /7.
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	FLASH	Page 3
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<<<<
 7. Please do your best on the above lines.
 PYM
 NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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7

SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5/21

12th May 1982

A.S.C. 12/5
L.A.

Dear John,

NON-COMBAT AIRCRAFT : CONTINGENCY PRESS
RELEASE

At OD(SA) yesterday it was agreed that Lord Cockfield should have the opportunity of commenting on the contingency press release against the possibility of an Argentine non-combat aircraft being shot down. I am attaching a draft which has been cleared at working level in both the DoT and FCO and I should be grateful if you would clear this line with the Trade Secretary.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10), Brian Fall (FCO) and Roger Facer (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Jane Ridley
(J E RIDLEY)

J Rhodes Esq

SECRET

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE FOR ARGENTINE 707/C130 ENGAGEMENT

At [] time [] an Argentine (military) aircraft engaged on surveillance duties against our own forces was shot down by a (missile/aircraft). We have no reports of any survivors.

We warned the Argentine authorities on 23 April and again on 7 May that all Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft, engaging in surveillance of British forces would be regarded as hostile and were liable to be dealt with accordingly.

The aircraft which was a (Boeing 707/C130) was (outside/inside) the TEZ and it was clear from its observed behaviour that it (intended to obtain/was engaged in acquiring) intelligence about our forces.

The intelligence gained from this type of surveillance operation can be used to direct air, surface ship and submarine attacks against our forces, with consequent risk to British lives.

The need for such action in our self-defence can easily be avoided if Argentina heeds our public warnings in future.



The National Archives

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

x 38

5

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 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD(2)
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
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 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

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 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

[RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET]

Hd/eesd

SECRET

FM MOSCOW 121805Z MAY 82
 TO F L A S H FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 275 OF 12/5

YOUR TELNO 278 : FALKLAND ISLAND.

1. NO DEPUTY MINISTER WAS AVAILABLE. I THEREFORE SPOKE TO SUSLOV IN HIS CAPACITY AS MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY COLLEGIUM AT 2130 LOCAL (1730Z) TODAY.
2. I HANDED HIM A SPEAKING NOTE CONTAINING PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR, OMITTING THE FINAL SENTENCE.
3. SUSLOV READ IT CAREFULLY AND REPLIED THAT HIS ANSWER WOULD BE THAT WHICH HE HAD GIVEN ME PREVIOUSLY, NAMELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND DID NOT INTEND TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY. HE UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE TO THOSE CONCERNED AT A HIGH LEVEL.

4. SUSLOV WENT ON TO ASK WHETHER THIS WARNING AND EARLIER ONES MIGHT BE USED LATER TO JUSTIFY A DANGEROUS SITUATION CAUSED BY THE BRITISH SIDE. THE INFERENCE OF OUR MESSAGE WAS THAT WE SO UNDERESTIMATED SOVIET COMMON SENSE THAT WE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE COULD PROVOKE A DANGEROUS SITUATION. THE RISK DID NOT COME ONLY FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. BOTH SIDES NEEDED COMMONSENSE AND HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO AVOID A POSSIBLE INCIDENT. WERE WE SUGGESTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ACTING ILLEGALLY ?

5. IN REPLY I AGREED THAT COMMONSENSE WAS NEEDED ON BOTH SIDES. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE WAS TO ENSURE THAT AN INCIDENT, WHICH COULD BE SERIOUS, DID NOT ARISE. WE WERE NOT ACCUSING THE SOVIET UNION OF ACTING ILLEGALLY NOR DID WE QUESTION THEIR SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. BUT IN A GRAVE SITUATION WE WANTED TO DO EVERYTHING TO AVOID AN INCIDENT.

6. IN FURTHER EXCHANGES THE FOLLOWING POINTS AROSE:

(A) I SAID THAT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE REFERENCE TO 5-60 AND 5-70 DEGREES MEANT "BETWEEN 5 AND 60 DEGREES SOUTH AND 5 AND 70 DEGREES WEST."

(B) I ASSUMED - THOUGH IT WAS ONLY MY PERSONAL ASSUMPTION - THAT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBMARINES AND SURFACE VESSELS REFLECTED THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFICATION.

(C) SUSLOV SAID THAT HE WOULD MUCH REGRET IF AS A RESULT OF THIS AND MY EARLIER EXCHANGE WITH RYZHOV THERE WERE TO BE RECRIMINATIONS IN THE EVENT OF ANY INCIDENT. I REPLIED THAT THE PURPOSE OF MY WARNING WAS TO AVOID AN INCIDENT AND I WAS GIVING IT TO HIM IN WRITING.

(D) SUSLOV REPEATED THAT SPECULATION ABOUT SOVIET INTERFERENCE OR "SPECIAL INTERESTS" IN THE DISPUTE WERE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. ANY SUGGESTION OF IMPROPER SOVIET BEHAVIOUR WAS ALSO WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

7. AS SUSLOV DID NOT SUGGEST THAT WE WERE SEEKING INFORMATION ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS, I DID NOT USE THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF YOUR TUR.

8. IN A FINAL EXCHANGE I SAID THAT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO REPORT HIS REPLY. SUSLOV CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

8. IN A FINAL EXCHANGE I SAID THAT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO REPORT HIS
REPLY. SUSLOV CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

KEEBLE

NNNN

CONSULAR SITREP 1700 HOURS 12 MAY

General

1. Today was rather busier than yesterday after a quiet night.

Journalists

2. While awaiting Mr Ballmer's report of his visit to Ushaia we have received messages from Sir A Parsons in New York for the editor of the 'Observer'. These reported his enquiries on behalf of the newspaper to the UN Secretary General and the reply given to the latter by the Argentine representative, namely that the matter was sub judice and the three men were being treated decently. Separately, UN Department confirmed that the Director General of UNESCO, Mr M'Bow, had also raised the matter, as reported in today's 'Times'.

3. A summary of Mr Ballmer's report is contained in Berne telegram No 105 attached.

4. BISBA reported in their telegram No 81 of 10 May - just seen - that the story of another British journalist's arrest was incorrect. The group of five men (one of them Philip Hayton wrongly identified as John Phillips) are safely back in Buenos Aires.

Missing Persons

5. Mrs Milligan telephoned at 1030 am to say that she had had a message from Mrs Ojeda (our telegram of 10 May to BISBA) that the family were safe and well. The message was delivered by a passenger from Buenos Aires.

Restrictions on UK citizens

6. BISBA have sent an interim reply to our telegram No 63. In their telegram 84 of 10 May they report that the Government are still working on these measures and there is no definitive text yet. There was however a leak which resulted in the TELAM news item on which our enquiry was based.

Mail from the Falklands

7. We have been advised that letters from the Falkland Islands have been delivered during the last few days. Some have been described as 'out of character' by the recipients and one or two people have offered to send us copies. These should be passed to JSIW for assessment, to decide whether there is any evidence that they were written under duress.

ICRC Visit to the Islands

8. According to Geneva telegram No 232 of 12 May there is an impasse in the arrangements for the ICRC team's visit to the Islands. The Argentine authorities have pointed out that a sea voyage would be hazardous but have not offered an alternative. (The

/journey

journey, whether by sea or air, would need the cooperation
of the Royal Navy.)

Naunig

PP


K Goodwin
Emergency Unit

via
En. Room Room 8,
12 MAY 1992

RESTRICTED

FM BERNE 121320Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 117 OF 12 MAY



89

MY TELEGRAM NO 105 AND TELECOM BROOK/FEU ON 11 MAY.

JOURNALISTS

1. THE SWISS FDFA HAVE TODAY PROVIDED WRITTEN CONFIRMATION OF THE INFORMATION GIVEN BY TELEPHONE ON 11 MAY ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SWISS EMBASSY OFFICIAL, BALLMER, TO MATHER, PRIME AND WINCHESTER IN USHUAIA. OUR TRANSLATION FROM THE GERMAN IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS

THE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION OF THE PRISONERS IS GOOD. HERR BALLMER THOUGHT THE JOURNALIST IAN MATHER SEEMED A LITTLE SENSITIVE. (QUOTE ETWAS SENSIBEL UNQUOTE).

THE PRISON ACCOMMODATION IS APPROPRIATE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE CELL IN WHICH THE THREE, BY THEIR OWN WISH, LIVE TOGETHER IS APPROX 2.4 METRES SQUARE. THE CELL DOOR IS ALWAYS LEFT OPEN. BALLMER BOUGHT TABLE TENNIS EQUIPMENT FOR THEM TO PASS THE TIME. THE SANITARY PROVISIONS ARE SATISFACTORY ALTHOUGH NOT ALWAYS CLEAN.

IN RESPECT OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD, BALLMER ARRANGED FOR THE THREE TO HAVE TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THEIR WIVES FROM LONDON EACH TUESDAY, THURSDAY AND SUNDAY BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 2000 AND 2102 LOCAL TIME. THE QUOTE SELF-IMPOSED TIME LIMIT UNQUOTE FOR CALLS : APPROX 16 MINUTES.

MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE GOOD. BALLMER BOUGHT VITAMIN TABLETS FOR THEM. FOOD IS SIMPLE BUT ADEQUATE.

BALLMER WAS WELL RECEIVED BY THE AUTHORITIES AND REACHED ~~USHUAIA~~ ^{UNDERSTANDING} WITH THEM.

AS FAR AS THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL IS CONCERNED, THE SENTENCE IS NOT EXPECTED UNTIL 4 MONTHS' TIME. THE JUDGE HOWEVER IS PREPARED

63
BALLYER WAS WELL RECEIVED BY THE AUTHORITIES AND REACHED UNDERSTANDING
WITH THEM.

AS FAR AS THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL IS CONCERNED, THE SENTENCE IS NOT EXPECTED UNTIL 4 MONTHS' TIME. THE JUDGE HOWEVER IS PREPARED TO EXAMINE FAVOURABLY THE QUESTION OF RELEASE ON BAIL IF GENERAL RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN SHOULD IMPROVE.

ENDS

2. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE FROM THE INFORMATION GIVEN ORALLY IS THAT TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH WIVES ARE PERMITTED THREE TIMES WEEKLY AND NOT DAILY.

3. THE FDFA SAY A MORE DETAILED REPORT WILL FOLLOW. THEY WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF NO INFORMATION IS GIVEN TO THE PRESS UNTIL THIS IS AVAILABLE.

LEE

NNNN

SENT AT PECD AT 121404Z TWPM/

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION):

0730, 12 MAY 1982

UN

(a) State of Negotiations

- A
(UKMIS
New York
telno 728)
1. Late on 11 May the Secretary-General gave Sir A Parsons a text which he had drafted and which had been accepted by the Argentines covering non-prejudgment of negotiations and a target date for completion of these negotiations.
 2. The latest Argentine views are as follows. Target date for negotiations: 31 December should be a target date for completion of negotiations 'taking into account the Charter of the UN and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly'. Prejudgment of negotiations: The parties would negotiate in good faith and 'these negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties and without prejudgment of the outcome'. Interim administration: Acceptance that individual members of the Legislative Council, in their personal capacity, could be used by the administrator for advisory purposes so long as the administrator was also empowered to call on an equal number of individuals from the Argentine population of the Islands for the same purposes. Transit of persons, communications and the acquisition of property: Hope serious consideration could be given to having as few restrictions as possible. Zones of withdrawal: Hope agreement could be reached on Task Force withdrawal which would dispel impression Argentines were withdrawing under pressure because of its proximity.
 3. Sir A Parsons welcomed the developments above and made the following points to the Secretary-General. Text accepted by the Argentines: We would not be entirely happy with reference to relevant GA resolutions and there remained outstanding the question of what would happen if no agreement had been reached by 31 December. Dependencies: The Argentines had said nothing about this. Withdrawal from South Georgia would be extremely difficult. Interim administration: Sir A Parsons did not believe London would be able to accept that 1,800 Islanders should have the same representation as 30 Argentines.
 4. The Secretariat have suggested that problem of withdrawal could be eased if concept of circles were abandoned. Idea is agreement should provide for UK forces to withdraw north of a certain latitude and Argentine forces west of a certain longitude. Sir A Parsons said idea merited examination.

(b) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

- B
(UKMIS
New York
telno 729)
5. Sir A Parsons judges that, for better or worse, our tactics have worked. While it is not easy to assess Argentine motives, Sir A Parsons concludes that on balance they are either sincere or are trying to force us to break negotiations in such a way as to leave us wrong-footed. The Argentine attitude now, at face value, suggests that we should be able to reach agreement on operational questions such as phasing of withdrawal/cease-fire, lifting of military zones, etc. But the Argentines may seek to wrong foot us on withdrawal from South Georgia and/or the nature of the UN Administration.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION):
0730, 12 MAY 1982

UN

(a) State of Negotiations

1. Late on 11 May the Secretary-General gave Sir A Parsons a text which he had drafted and which had been accepted by the Argentines covering non-prejudgment of negotiations and a target date for completion of these negotiations.
2. The latest Argentine views are as follows. Target date for negotiations: 31 December should be a target date for completion of negotiations 'taking into account the Charter of the UN and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly'. Prejudgment of negotiations: The parties would negotiate in good faith and 'these negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties and without prejudgment of the outcome'. Interim administration: Acceptance that individual members of the Legislative Council, in their personal capacity, could be used by the administrator for advisory purposes so long as the administrator was also empowered to call on an equal number of individuals from the Argentine population of the Islands for the same purposes. Transit of persons, communications and the acquisition of property: Hope serious consideration could be given to having as few restrictions as possible. Zones of withdrawal: Hope agreement could be reached on Task Force withdrawal which would dispel impression Argentines were withdrawing under pressure because of its proximity.
3. Sir A Parsons welcomed the developments above and made the following points to the Secretary-General. Text accepted by the Argentines: We would not be entirely happy with reference to relevant GA resolutions and there remained outstanding the question of what would happen if no agreement had been reached by 31 December. Dependencies: The Argentines had said nothing about this. Withdrawal from South Georgia would be extremely difficult. Interim administration: Sir A Parsons did not believe London would be able to accept that 1,800 Islanders should have the same representation as 30 Argentines.
4. The Secretariat have suggested that problem of withdrawal could be eased if concept of circles were abandoned. Idea is agreement should provide for UK forces to withdraw north of a certain latitude and Argentine forces west of a certain longitude. Sir A Parsons said idea merited examination.

(b) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

5. Sir A Parsons judges that, for better or worse, our tactics have worked. While it is not easy to assess Argentine motives, Sir A Parsons concludes that on balance they are either sincere or are trying to force us to break negotiations in such a way as to leave us wrong-footed. The Argentine attitude now, at face value, suggests that we should be able to reach agreement on operational questions such as phasing of withdrawal/cease-fire, lifting of military zones, etc. But the Argentines may seek to wrong foot us on withdrawal from South Georgia and/or the nature of the UN Administration.

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(UKMIS
New York
telno 728)

B
(UKMIS
New York
telno 729)

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6. Sir A Parsons suggests we would be most exposed if negotiations broke down over South Georgia, leaving us isolated in the U N. We would be slightly less exposed on the question of Islander participation, but even here the great majority of U N members would think us obdurate if we failed to reach agreement.

7. Sir A Parsons has told the Secretary-General that he could not reasonably expect a response from us before this afternoon New York time. Sir A Parsons suggests that it is in our interest, from the U N point of view, that our first response should be positive and that we should give the Secretary-General a response today.

(c) Background

8. Events set out above have largely overtaken earlier reporting from our Mission in New York. Points remaining of interest are as follows. Verification: The Secretariat believe Canada may be acceptable to the Argentines. Non-prejudgment of negotiations: The situation has been altered radically now but in his earlier telegram (No 714 at Flag C) Sir A Parsons queried the instructions he had received concerning an accompanying statement or letter on non-prejudgment. British draft agreement prepared by UKMIS New York: This incorporates instructions received from London. Sir A Parsons suggests that he should use this as a quarry deploying individual articles from it in discussion with the Secretary-General over the latter's text. Our own text would not be given to the Secretary-General. Sir A Parsons asks for urgent comments.

U S

9. Landsat photography of the Falklands 7 - 12 May has been obtained by the Argentines.

10. Mr Haig is planning to leave today for a visit to Greece, Turkey and Brussels, 12-18 May. He expects to see Sir N Henderson before leaving. We have full details of Mr Haig's travel plans.

Comment

11. Significant progress has been made. It is now for us to respond. Sir A Parsons will need further instructions (by 1700Z) for his meeting for the Secretary General today). Points requiring consideration are:

(a) On the Secretary General's draft language, whether we can accept:


(i) the reference to General Assembly Resolutions as balanced ~~by~~ reference to UN Charter;

(ii) the language on pre-judgment;

/(b)

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- (b) Distance of withdrawal, taking into account Ahmed's ideas on lines of withdrawal West and North of lines of latitude and longitude;
- (c) The position on interim administration following 31 December 1982;
- (d) The place of the Executive/Legislative Council in the interim administration (responding to the inadequate Argentine proposal for comparable Islander/Argentine representation);
- (e) References to communications, transit and acquisition of property (including Argentine point on acquisition of shares in the Falkland Islands Company). This will need to be looked at in the light of the 1971 Communications Agreement;
- (f) Finally, there is the question of the place of the Dependencies in an agreement. Sir A Parsons considers this critical in retaining UN sympathy. His suggestion of separate agreements on the Islands and on the Dependencies requires a reaction.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

12 May 1982

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 120257Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 728 DATED 11 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 714: FALKLANDS

1. IN THE EVENT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DID ASK ME TO SEE HIM AGAIN THIS EVENING (AT 2315Z) AFTER HIS FURTHER MEETING WITH ROS.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT AT LAST HE HAD GOOD NEWS FOR ME. THE ARGENTINES HAD ACCEPTED THAT 31 DECEMBER SHOULD BE A TARGET DATE AND THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD STATE THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED. HE THEN HANDED ME THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

"THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTE AND TO SEEK, WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, THE COMPLETION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY 31 DECEMBER 1982, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE INITIATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITION OF THE PARTIES AND WITHOUT PREJUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME."

PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD PUT THIS TEXT (WHICH IS A

PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD PUT THIS TEXT (WHICH IS A VARIANT OF THE LANGUAGE I GAVE HIM ON 9 MAY (PARAGRAPH 9(E) OF MY TELNO 694)) TO ROS AS HIS OWN PROPOSAL. ROS HAD TOLD HIM THIS EVENING THAT, "AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH EVERYBODY", COSTA MENDEZ HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO ACCEPT IT.

3. I SAID THAT THIS WAS AN EXTREMELY ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE NEGOTIATIONS TO MOVE FORWARD TO CONSIDERATION OF THE DETAILS OF THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, ALWAYS ASSUMING THAT ROS WAS ACTING WITH FULL AUTHORITY. I SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH THE REFERENCE TO RELEVANT GA RESOLUTIONS, AND THAT THERE STILL REMAINED A QUESTION ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY 31 DECEMBER. THIS QUESTION WAS BOUND TO BE PRESSED BY THE MEDIA AND BY PARLIAMENT IN THE UK. THE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE SOME LANGUAGE ON IT.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD MADE A "TREMENDOUS CONCESSION". THEY HAD ALSO TOLD HIM, ON THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY, COULD BE USED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR ADVISORY PURPOSES, SO LONG AS THE ADMINISTRATOR WAS ALSO EMPOWERED TO CALL ON AN EQUAL MEMBER OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS FROM THE ARGENTINE POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS FOR THE SAME PURPOSES. ON POINT 5 IN THEIR TEXT OF YESTERDAY, THE ARGENTINES HAD SAID THEY HOPED THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO THE NEED TO HAVE AS FEW RESTRICTIONS AS POSSIBLE ON COMMUNICATIONS, THE TRANSIT OF PERSONS AND THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY. THEY WOULD WANT THIS TO BE COVERED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. MORE SPECIFICALLY, BUT NOT TO BE MENTIONED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, THEY HOPED THAT OBSTACLES TO THE ACQUISITION BY ARGENTINES OF SHARES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY COULD BE LIFTED. FINALLY, ON ZONES OF WITHDRAWAL, THE ARGENTINES HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT ON WITHDRAWAL DISTANCES FOR THE TASK FORCE WHICH WOULD DISPEL ANY IMPRESSION THAT ARGENTINES WERE WITHDRAWING UNDER PRESSURE BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY.

5. I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT ALL THIS TO YOU. I NOTICED THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE DEPENDENCIES. AHMED COMMENTED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THIS WAS A KEY POINT FOR THEM, AS WAS THE DISTANCE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TASK FORCE. I SAID THAT, WELCOME THOUGH TONIGHT'S NEWS WAS, THERE WERE STILL MAJOR DIFFICULTIES AHEAD. ONE WAS THE ARGENTINES' PROPOSALS ON REPRESENTATION OF THE ISLANDERS: I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THAT 1800 ISLANDERS SHOULD HAVE THE SAME REPRESENTATION AS 30 ARGENTINES. I ALSO THOUGHT THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. SO WOULD UNEQUAL WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH AND ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLANDS PROPER. ON THE LATTER

THE ARGENTINES HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE DEPENDENCIES. AHMED COMMENTED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THIS WAS A KEY POINT FOR THEM, AS WAS THE DISTANCE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TASK FORCE. I SAID THAT, WELCOME THOUGH TONIGHT'S NEWS WAS, THERE WERE STILL MAJOR DIFFICULTIES AHEAD. ONE WAS THE ARGENTINES' PROPOSALS ON REPRESENTATION OF THE ISLANDERS: I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THAT 1800 ISLANDERS SHOULD HAVE THE SAME REPRESENTATION AS 30 ARGENTINES. I ALSO THOUGHT THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH GEORGIA WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. SO WOULD UNEQUAL WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH AND ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLANDS PROPER. ON THE LATTER POINT, AHMED SUGGESTED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROBLEM COULD BE EASED IF WE ABANDONED THE CONCEPT OF CIRCLES. HIS IDEA IS THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR UK FORCES TO WITHDRAW NORTH OF A CERTAIN LINE OF LATITUDE AND ARGENTINE FORCES WEST OF A CERTAIN LINE OF LONGITUDE. HE FLASHED AT US A CHART OF THE ISLANDS INCLUDING THE DEPENDENCIES AROUND WHICH A RECTANGLE HAD BEEN DRAWN WHICH SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY WAS A LINE OF LATITUDE AT ABOUT 47 DEGREES SOUTH, IE BELOW THE LATITUDE OF COMODORO RIVADAVIA AND THAT THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY WAS ABOUT 59 DEGREES SOUTH. THE WESTERN BOUNDARY WAS ABOUT HALFWAY BETWEEN WEST FALKLAND AND THE MAINLAND. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THIS IDEA MERITED EXAMINATION.

6. IN CONCLUSION IT WAS AGREED THAT I SHOULD PUT ALL THIS TO YOU OVERNIGHT AND SEEK YOUR REACTIONS, WHICH I WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO CONVEY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOMORROW AFTERNOON NEW YORK TIME. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT IN ORDER TO "CONSOLIDATE" THE CONCESSIONS HE HAD GOT OUT OF THE ARGENTINES, HE WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT US WITH HIS PROVISIONAL DRAFT AGREEMENT, LEAVING SOME POINTS IN BRACKETS OR BLANK WHERE AGREEMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN REACHED. I URGED HIM, AND HE AGREED, NOT TO DO ANY FURTHER DRAFTING UNTIL HE HAD HAD YOUR REACTION TO TODAY'S DEVELOPMENTS.

7. PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

PARSONS

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 729 OF 11 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

M.I.P.T. :

FALKLANDS

1. FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE, OUR TACTICS HAVE WORKED. BY INSISTING THAT WE MUST HAVE AN ANSWER ON THE PREJUDGEMENT QUESTION BEFORE DISCUSSING THE DETAIL OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WE HAVE EXTRACTED THE ANSWER WE WANTED. I AM NOT BOTHERED BY THE REFERENCE TO GA RESOLUTIONS. THEY ARE ONLY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 'TAKING INTO ACCOUNT' IS A RELATIVELY MILD INTRODUCTORY PHRASE. THE REFERENCE TO THE CHARTER IS MORE IMPORTANT. AND, MOST IMPORTANT, WE HAVE GOT OUR LANGUAGE ABOUT THE OUTCOME NOT BEING PREJUDGED.
2. FURTHERMORE, THE ARGENTINES HAVE SHOWN SOME FLEXIBILITY ABOUT THE TARGET DATE; THEY HAVE SCALED DOWN THEIR REQUIREMENTS ON RESIDENCE ETC; THEY HAVE SHOWN SOME FLEXIBILITY ABOUT ISLANDER PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, ALTHOUGH THEIR FORMULATION OBVIOUSLY WILL NOT DO AS IT IS; AND THEY SEEM TO HAVE COME OFF THE NONSENSE ABOUT 2000 MILE WITHDRAWAL.
3. WHAT ARE THEY UP TO? I AM INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT THEY ARE ON THE TRACK OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 686 IE BLOCKING AGREEMENT UNTIL 31 DECEMBER LEADING TO THE IMMEDIATE

ON THE TRACK OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 686 IE BLOCKING AGREEMENT UNTIL 31 DECEMBER LEADING TO THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE OF THE UN ADMINISTRATION AND THEIR WALKING IN THE NEXT DAY. AS I EXPLAINED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THIS EVENING, WE STILL NEEDED MORE LANGUAGE ON THIS, AND I SHALL FIGHT HARD FOR LANGUAGE IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE COMPLETELY CLEAR THAT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED IF NECESSARY, AFTER THE TARGET DATE. HOWEVER, EVEN THE LANGUAGE THEY HAVE PROPOSED OFFERS SOME INSURANCE IE 'TO SEEK THE COMPLETION BY 31 DECEMBER 1982.' THIS DOES NOT INSIST THAT 31 DECEMBER IS AN ABSOLUTE CUT OFF DATE. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO TAKE THE POSITION IF NECESSARY, THAT THE WHOLE STRUCTURE MUST CONTINUE AFTER THE TARGET DATE. IF ANYONE TABLED A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE CONTRARY, WE COULD BE CONFIDENT OF THREE VEToes (UK, US, FRANCE), PROVIDED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD REPORT THAT WE WERE STILL NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY.

4. IT IS MORE LIKELY THEREFORE THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE EITHER SINCERE, OR THAT THEY ARE PURSUING THE TRACK OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 686, IE TRYING TO FORCE US TO BREAK THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A POINT OR POINTS WHICH WOULD LEAVE US SQUARELY ON THE WRONG FOOT. THESE POINTS WOULD BE EITHER THE NATURE OF THE UN ADMINISTRATION OR SOUTH GEORGIA OR BOTH.

5. WE WOULD BE MOST EXPOSED ON SOUTH GEORGIA. IF THE NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN BECAUSE WE HAD REFUSED TO WITHDRAW A SMALL MILITARY GARRISON FROM A VIRTUALLY UNINHABITED ISLAND WHERE WE HAD NO GARRISON BEFORE THE PRESENT CRISIS ERUPTED, WE WOULD FIND OURSELVES TOTALLY ABANDONED BY EVERYONE HERE, EVEN OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES SUCH AS THE OLD COMMONWEALTH AND THE TEN. IT WOULD SEEM REASONABLE TO EVERYONE THAT WE SHOULD WITHDRAW OUR GARRISON FROM SOUTH GEORGIA AND BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FALKLANDS NEGOTIATIONS, A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS PERHAPS ON ANTARCTIC TREATY LINES.

6. WE WOULD BE SLIGHTLY LESS EXPOSED IF THE NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN ON THE QUESTION OF ISLANDER PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERIM UN ADMINISTRATION. IF THE ARGENTINES INSISTED ON DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION BY ARGENTINES IN ANY CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENT, THIS WOULD BE SEEN AS UNREASONABLE. EVEN SO, THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP, INCLUDING THE WEST, WOULD THINK US OBDURATE IF WE FAILED TO REACH SOME COMPROMISE ON THIS QUESTION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF A SHORT PERIOD OF INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

7. THESE ARE THE TWO BASIC POINTS. ON THE FACE OF IT, THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARGENTINES THIS EVENING SUGGESTS THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS SUCH AS

CIRCUMSTANCES OF A SHORT PERIOD OF INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

7. THESE ARE THE TWO BASIC POINTS. ON THE FACE OF IT, THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARGENTINES THIS EVENING SUGGESTS THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE PHASING OF WITHDRAWAL/CEASEFIRE, THE LIFTING OF MILITARY ZONES, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND SO ON.

8. I REALISE ONLY TOO WELL THAT THE PRESSURE IS NOW ON US (THIS WAS INEVITABLE IF THE ARGENTINES GAVE WAY ON THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION) AND THAT YOU FACE VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS. IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF THESE DECISIONS THAT I MADE CLEAR TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR (WHO FULLY ACCEPTED THE POINT) THAT HE COULD NOT EXPECT ME TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE TOMORROW AFTERNOON NEW YORK TIME. PRESENTATIONALLY I THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT I SHOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY TO HIM ON 12 MAY, HOWEVER LATE.

9. ON TIMING, I PUT IT TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THIS AFTERNOON (HE DID NOT DEMUR) THAT THIS NEW SITUATION WOULD REQUIRE THE REST OF THE WORKING WEEK IN WHICH TO CLARIFY WHETHER OR NOT AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. WHATEVER ARGENTINE MOTIVES MAY BE, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST, FROM THE UN POINT OF VIEW, THAT OUR FIRST RESPONSE SHOULD APPEAR POSITIVE EVEN THOUGH IT STILL LEAVES ROOM FOR FURTHER HARD NEGOTIATION ON THE IMPORTANT POINTS.

10. FINALLY A POINT ON PUBLIC ATMOSPHERE HERE. BEFORE THIS EVENING'S ROUND, THE ARGENTINES WERE SUCCEEDING IN PRESENTING THEIR POSITION AS HAVING BECOME MORE MODERATE VIZ NEW YORK TIMES HEADLINE "ARGENTINA EASES TERMS FOR PEACE IN THE FALKLANDS". WE HAVE HAD TO REFER TO FINE PRINT IN ORDER TO CORRECT THIS. SIR N. HENDERSON HAS CONFIRMED TO ME THAT THIS IMPRESSION OF ARGENTINE REASONABLENESS IS WIDESPREAD IN THE MEDIA.

PARSONS

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11 MAY 1982

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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO OO Fco. Telno. 714 of 11/5.

(175)

MY TELNO 709: FALKLANDS

1. MY MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS TEAM THIS AFTERNOON WAS FAIRLY BRIEF. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, ON REFLECTION, HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO GIVE ME THE "ROUGH DRAFT" REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TUR UNTIL HE HAD HAD A REPLY FROM ROS ON THE QUESTION OF NON-PREJUDGEMENT.
2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS ONE POINT HE WISHED TO RAISE FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH ROS THIS MORNING. ROS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE ARGENTINES FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A TARGET DATE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS: IF THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND HENCE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IS SUBJECT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THIS COULD LEAD TO INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF THE UN ADMINISTRATION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD FIND OTHER WAYS TO MEET OUR CONCERN ABOUT A VACUUM OCCURRING IF AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED BY 31 DECEMBER. COULD THE AGREEMENT NOT PROVIDE FOR THE UN ADMINISTRATION'S MANDATE TO BE RENEWED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL? I SAID THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET VETO: PRESUMABLY THE ARGENTINES WOULD EQUALLY OBJECT TO A PROVISION THAT THE UN ADMINISTRATION COULD BE DISCONTINUED ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH PARTIES. IT WAS LEFT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TEAM WOULD THINK FURTHER ABOUT THIS.
3. THIS ARGENTINE INSISTENCE REINFORCES THE NEED FOR US TO HOLD FIRM ON THIS POINT (ON WHICH THE SECRETARIAT SYMPATHISED WITH US). WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE DANGER THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY PLAY FOR AUTOMATIC FILLING OF A VACUUM AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (PARA 4 OF MY TEL NO 686). I TOLD PEREZ DE CUELLAR POINT BLANK THAT, IF THE UN HAD TO LEAVE AND GENERAL MEHENDEZ MOVED IN THE NEXT DAY, THIS WOULD BE CASTASTROPHIC FOR THE UN'S REPUTATION QUITE APART FROM OUR REACTION.
4. THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE ALSO TOUCHED ON BRIEFLY.

FOR THE UN'S REPUTATION QUITE APART FROM OUR REACTION.

4. THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE ALSO TOUCHED ON BRIEFLY:

(A) VERIFICATION

I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARAGRAPH 3(D) OF YOUR TELNO 383. AHMED SAID THAT THE UN'S RESEARCHES INDICATED THAT ONLY FIVE COUNTRIES HAD THE KIND OF AIRCRAFT REQUIRED: USSR, USA, UK, FRANCE, CANADA (THEY HAD NOT THOUGHT OF CHILE). HE THOUGHT THAT CANADA MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINES, EVEN THOUGH SHE HAD TAKEN ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA.

(B) OBSERVERS AND FLAGS

PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED WHETHER I HAD HAD ANY REACTION TO POINT 4 IN THE ARGENTINE PAPER (MY TELNO 704). I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARAGRAPH 4(11) OF YOUR TELNO 383.

(C) FREEDOM OF TRANSIT, RESIDENCE, ETC

PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ROS HAD EXPLAINED POINT 5 IN THE ARGENTINE PAPER BY SAYING THAT THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE 1971 COMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE IMPLEMENTED DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT AND THEN SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARAGRAPH 3(F) OF YOUR TELNO 383, RECEIVING HELPFUL SUPPORT FROM AHMED. DE SOTO ASKED FOR COPIES OF THE COMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT 1971/2 AND THE YFF AGREEMENT 1974, WHICH WE ARE SENDING HIM FROM THE UK TREATY SERIES.

5. IT WAS LEFT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD ASK TO SEE ME AGAIN EITHER AFTER HE HAD SEEN ROS AT 2200Z THIS EVENING OR MORE PROBABLY, TOMORROW MORNING (12 MAY).

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD ME THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS FEELING A LITTLE LEFT OUT AND WAS COMING UNDER PRESSURE FROM SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL (PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS NOT SURE WHO BUT THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE TOGO) TO CONVENE AN EARLY INFORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. PEREZ DE CUELLAR DID NOT WANT THIS; HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE ONLY A TWO-SENTENCE REPORT. I SAID THAT MY POSITION WOULD BE THE SAME. ON PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S ADVICE I SUBSEQUENTLY SAW LING QING AND GAVE HIM, IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, A GENERAL BRIEFING ON THE TALKS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS, EMPHASISING THAT FOR US THE KEY POINT WAS THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED. LING QING SHOWED SOME SIGNS OF BEING INCLINED TO CAVE IN TO THOSE WHO WANT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. I URGED HIM NOT TO DO SO: I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SAY ANYTHING AND A DISCUSSION COULD ONLY COMPLICATE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TASK. LING QING TOOK NOTE: I HOPE THAT WE HAVE GAINED ANOTHER DAY OR TWO.

7. YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ABOVE THAT OUR TACTICS TODAY HAVE WORKED AS PLANNED. PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS IN NO DOUBT THAT HIS EFFORTS WILL ONLY SUCCEED IF HE CAN GET THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT

OUR CONCERNS ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT. HE HAS SHOWN NO DISPOSITION TO PRESS ME FURTHER ON THE OTHER POINTS UNTIL HE HAS HAD AN ANSWER ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT FROM ROS. UNLESS THERE ARE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THIS EVENING, IN WHICH CASE I SHALL REPORT, MY PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS WILL SUFFICE FOR TOMORROW.

8. HOWEVER I HAVE ONE COMMENT ON YOUR TELNO 383. I AM GLAD THAT YOU AGREE THAT WE MUST INSIST ON ABSOLUTE CLARITY ON NON-PREJUDGEMENT. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY AN ARGENTINE STATEMENT OR LETTER, SEPARATE FROM THE AGREEMENT ITSELF, AS PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 4(1) OF YOUR TELNO 383.

IF THIS WAS TO SERVE OUR PURPOSES, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PUBLISHED: BUT THE ARGENTINES WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THIS, IF THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE POINT IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. MY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION THEREFORE IS THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE POINT BE COVERED IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT.

PARSONS

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PSE INSERT TELEGRAM NUMBER 714 OF 11 MAY OK
AND TKU

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DESKBY 112359Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 112249Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 713 DATED 11 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

11 MAY 1982

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MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT AGREEMENT REFERRED TO IN MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDING TELEGRAM AS WELL AS A DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO IMPLEMENT IT:

DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT

THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

RESPONDING TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 532 (1982) ADOPTED ON 3 APRIL 1982 UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

HAVING ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS), HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS "THE ISLANDS",

HAVING IN MIND THE INTERESTS AND WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE ISLANDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING:

ARTICLE 1

- (1) NO PROVISION OF THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHALL IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY IN THE ULTIMATE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTE OVER THE ISLANDS.
- (2) NO ACTS OR ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WHILST THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT

IS IN FORCE SHALL CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR ASSERTING, SUPPORTING OR DENYING A CLAIM TO TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS OR CREATE ANY RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THEM.

ARTICLE 2

- (1) WITH EFFECT FROM (A SPECIFIED TIME, APPROXIMATELY 24 HOURS AFTER SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT) (TIME 'T'), EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO CEASE ALL FIRING AND OTHER HOSTILE ACTIONS.
- (2) ARGENTINA UNDERTAKES:
 - (A) TO COMMENCE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS ARMED FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS WITH EFFECT FROM (TIME 'T'),
 - (B) TO WITHDRAW HALF OF ITS ARMED FORCES TO AT LEAST 150 NAUTICAL MILES AWAY FROM ANY POINT IN THE ISLANDS BY (TIME 'T' + 7 DAYS), AND
 - (C) TO COMPLETE ITS WITHDRAWAL TO AT LEAST 150 NAUTICAL MILES AWAY BY (TIME 'T' + 14 DAYS).
- (3) THE UNITED KINGDOM UNDERTAKES:
 - (A) TO COMMENCE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS ARMED FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS WITH EFFECT FROM (TIME 'T'),
 - (B) TO WITHDRAW HALF OF ITS ARMED FORCES TO AT LEAST 150 NAUTICAL MILES AWAY FROM ANY POINT IN THE ISLANDS BY (TIME 'T' + 7 DAYS), AND
 - (C) TO COMPLETE ITS WITHDRAWAL TO AT LEAST 150 NAUTICAL MILES AWAY BY (TIME 'T' + 14 DAYS).

ARTICLE 3

EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO LIFT THE EXCLUSION ZONES, WARNINGS AND SIMILAR MEASURES WHICH IT HAS IMPOSED IN THE REGION.

ARTICLE 4

EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO RESUME HOSTILITIES DURING OR AFTER WITHDRAWAL AND TO REFRAIN FROM REINTRODUCING ANY ARMED FORCES INTO THE ISLANDS OR WITHIN 150 NAUTICAL MILES THEREOF, EXCEPT FOR THE PURPOSES OF (ARGENTINE) WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS.

ARTICLE 5

ARTICLE 5

EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO LIFT WITH EFFECT FROM TIME 'T' THE ECONOMIC MEASURES IT HAS TAKEN AGAINST THE OTHER AND TO SEEK THE LIFTING OF SIMILAR MEASURES TAKEN BY THIRD PARTIES, INCLUDING, IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

ARTICLE 6

- (1) IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL JOINTLY SPONSOR A DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE TERMS OF WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD TAKE NOTE OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, ACKNOWLEDGE THE ROLE CONFERRED UPON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS THEREIN, AND AUTHORISE HIM TO CARRY OUT THE TASKS ENTRUSTED TO HIM THEREIN.
- (2) AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH (1) OF THIS ARTICLE AND WITH EFFECT FROM (TIME 'T', THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS SHALL BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS.
- (3) A UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATOR, ACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, WILL BE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.
- (4) THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATOR WILL HAVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ADMINISTER THE ISLANDS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS IN THE ISLANDS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT. THE UNITED NATIONS FLAG WILL BE FLOWN DURING THE PERIOD OF UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION.
- (5) THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATOR SHALL VERIFY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARMED FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS, AS WELL AS THEIR NON-REINTRODUCTION.
- (6) THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINSTRATOR WILL HAVE SUCH STAFF AS MAY BE REQUIRED.
- (7) EACH PARTY MAY HAVE NOT MORE THAN (3) OBSERVERS IN THE ISLANDS WHO MAY FLY THEIR RESPECTIVE FLAGS.

ARTICLE 7

- (1) THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATELY TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH A VIEW TO REACHING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS AND COMPLETING THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE TARGET DATE OF 31 DECEMBER 1982.

- (2) THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY AND WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE OUTCOME.
- (3) IF NO AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED BY 10 DECEMBER 1982, THE SECRETARY -GENERAL SHALL SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS.

ARTICLE 8

THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON SIGNATURE AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS HAS BEEN REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE PARTIES. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL IMMEDIATELY COMMUNICATE ITS TEXT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND REGISTER IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 102 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

DONE IN IN THE ENGLISH AND SPANISH LANGUAGES, IN A SINGLE COPY.

FOR ARGENTINA
(THE JURTA)

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 522(1982) ADOPTED ON 3 APRIL 1982,
NOTING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT SIGNED ON
BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM,

NOTING WITH APPRECIATION THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
IN EXERCISE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES, TO BRING ABOUT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
NOTING FURTHER THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT (DOCUMENT S/):

1. WELCOMES THE ROLE CONFERRED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN
THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.
2. APPROVES THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (DOCUMENT S/)
AND AUTHORISES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CARRY OUT THE TASKS
ENTRUSTED TO HIM IN THE AGREEMENT.

PARSONS

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OO F C O DESKBY 112359Z

GRS 160

11 MAY 1982 (18)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 112359Z MAY 82
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 112247Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 712 DATED 11 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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FALKLANDS

1. YOU WILL SEE FROM MY TELNO 709 THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WILL SHORTLY BE GIVING ME A PAPER, WHICH I TAKE TO BE A DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT, PREPARED BY HIS STAFF. MY LEGAL COUNSELLOR HAS MEANWHILE PREPARED A DRAFT AGREEMENT INCORPORATING THE INSTRUCTIONS YOU HAVE SENT ME FOR THE LAST FEW DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR (IE YOUR TELS NOS 371, 377 AND 383). ANDERSON'S DRAFT IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR URGENT COMMENTS ON IT. I WOULD LIKE TO USE IT AS A QUARRY DEPLOY INDIVIDUAL ARTICLES FROM IT, AS PART OF THE DISCUSSIONS I WILL NO DOUBT HAVE WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR ABOUT HIS OWN TEXT. I WOULD NOT HAND IT OVER. ALTHOUGH PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS BEEN ADMIRABLE ABOUT MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY THERE IS ALWAYS A RISK OF A SELF-CONTAINED DOCUMENT LEAKING HERE.

PARSONS

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11 MAY 1982

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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 120005Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1709 OF 11 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

MY TELNO 1636 : SATELLITE COVERAGE OF FALKLANDS

1. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOW ADVISED US, WITH SOME EMBARRASSMENT, THAT LANDSAT PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE FALKLANDS AREA HAS TAKEN PLACE DURING THE PERIOD 7 - 12 MAY AND THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE OBTAINED THE PICTURES.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT WILL PROVIDE US WITH COPIES OF THEM AS SOON AS THEY CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE.

HENDERSON

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 111850Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1699 OF 11 MAY 82

INFO, IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

Advised in Civil

1. HAIG HAS TOLD ME THAT HE IS PLANNING TO LEAVE LATE TOMORROW AFTERNOON, THE 12TH, FOR A VISIT TO GREECE, TURKEY AND BRUSSELS. HOWEVER HE WILL BE READY TO RETURN AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE IF NECESSARY. HE SAYS THAT HE WANTS A TALK BEFORE HE SETS OFF. I WILL LET YOU KNOW WHAT TRANSPIRES. THE SUBJECT WILL I THINK BE ANY REPORT HE HAS RECEIVED FROM BA AND WHAT HAPPENS AT THE UN WHEN IT BECOMES OBVIOUS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS HAVE RUN INTO THE SANDS.

2. INCIDENTALLY I AM PLANNING TO SEE PARSONS IN NEW YORK ON THE MORNING OF THURSDAY 13 MAY.

HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 120021Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1712 OF 11 MAY 82


INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK ROUTINE MADRID ANKARA ATHENS

LUXEMBOURG

11 MAY 1982

238

FALKLANDS : HAIG'S TRAVEL PLANS



HAIG LEAVES WASHINGTON TOMORROW EVENING (12 MAY) ON VISITS TO ANKARA, ATHENS AND LUXEMBOURG (FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL). YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING NOTE OF HIS ITINERARY (ALL TIMES ARE LOCAL).

12 MAY 1982

1700 HOURS DEPART ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE

13 MAY 1982

0620 HOURS ARRIVE TORREJON AIR FORCE BASE, SPAIN (REFUEL)

0750 HOURS DEPART TORREJON

1255 HOURS ARRIVE ANKARA

15 MAY 1982

0930 HOURS DEPART ANKARA

1110 HOURS ARRIVE ATHENS

16 MAY 1982

1135 HOURS DEPART ATHENS

1335 HOURS ARRIVE LUXEMBOURG

18 MAY 1982

1400 HOURS DEPART LUXEMBOURG

1555 HOURS ARRIVE MADRID

1720 HOURS DEPART MADRID

1815 HOURS ARRIVE LAJES, AZORES (REFUEL)

1945 HOURS DEPART LAJES

2200 HOURS ARRIVE ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE.

HENDERSON

SECRET

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12 May, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Thank you for your letter of 11 May.

The Prime Minister agrees that the proposed reply from herself to the President of Mexico may be despatched.

I have given Mr Du Cann, on a confidential basis, a very brief summary of Mrs Thatcher's reply.

A. J. COLES

J E Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Could you pl. approve
the message at Filey A

A.J.C. $\frac{11}{5}$

[Handwritten signature]

GVA/FCO 005/12

OO FCO

RR MONTEVIDEO

RR BERNE

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 160

RESTRICTED

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 121005Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 232 OF 12 MAY

INFO MONTEVIDEO, BERNE, WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 162: FALKLANDS AND ICRC

1. WE PUT THESE POINTS TO ICRC TODAY (12 MAY).

2. JOSSERON ACKNOWLEDGED THEM, BUT SAID THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE TAKING THE LINE THAT THE ICRC TEAM SHOULD NOT (NOT) TRAVEL TO THE FALKLANDS BY SEA, ARGUING THAT THE JOURNEY WOULD BE DANGEROUS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT FOGS AND ROUGH SEAS AND THE PRESENCE OF THE TASK FORCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ARGENTINIANS HAD NOT (NOT) OFFERED TO ARRANGE TRAVEL BY AIR.

3. JOSSERON SAID THAT THE ICRC DELEGATES IN BUENOS AIRES TENDED TO AGREE THAT SEA TRAVEL MIGHT BE DANGEROUS. THEY ALSO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VERY TIME CONSUMING.

4. THERE IS AN IMPASSE HERE. WE AND ICRC ARE KEEN TO SEE ICRC DELEGATES ON THE FALKLANDS SOON, BUT THERE SEEMS LITTLE EARLY PROSPECT OF THIS GIVEN THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES OVER TRAVEL. ICRC WOULD BE KEEN TO FLY IN IF AN AIR CORRIDOR COULD BE NEGOTIATED. WITHOUT THIS THE ICRC WOULD HAVE TO KICK THEIR HEELS UNTIL THE ARGENTINES CHANGE THEIR LINE ON SEA TRAVEL.

MARSHALL

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~~XX~~
12 MAY 1982


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12 MAY 1982
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OO WASHINGTON
PP UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 288

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 120854Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 968 OF 12 MAY
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: GENERAL WALTERS' REMARKS

1. REUTERS REPORTED FROM WASHINGTON ON 10 MAY THAT GENERAL WALTERS TOLD A BRIEFING AT THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE THAT THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WAS 'A CONFLICT OF MACHISMOS'... HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE GONE ON TO SAY THAT 'BOTH PARTIES ARE VERY STICKY' AND TO REFER TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AS 'A SILLY WAR AND A CONFLICT OF EGOS'.

2. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD POINT OUT TO HAIG ON THE NEXT SUITABLE OCCASION THAT SUCH STATEMENTS FROM A SENIOR MEMBER OF HIS NEGOTIATING TEAM AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES IS BELIEVED TO HAVE 'COME OFF THE FENCE ON OUR SIDE' CAUSE WIDESPREAD CONFUSION AND IRRITATION HERE. IF IT IS PUT TO YOU THAT WALTERS' REMARKS WERE DESIGNED TO MAKE HIM MORE 'ACCEPTABLE AS AN INTERLOCUTOR IN ARGENTINA, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT SUGGESTING THAT BOTH SIDES

ARE TO BE TREATED AS EQUALLY RECALCITRANT IN THIS CRISIS IS CERTAINLY NOT THE WAY TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY HAVE TO CHANGE THEIR RESPONSES.

3. YOU MIGHT ADD THAT THESE REMARKS FROM WALTERS COME PARTICULARLY STRANGELY AFTER HAIG'S OWN COMMENTS TO YOU AS REPORTED IN YOUR TELNO 1686. SUCH REMARKS WILL HAVE SURELY MITIGATED AGAINST 'THE MAJOR EXERCISE OF PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA' TO WHICH HE REFERS AND ARE HARDLY COMPATIBLE WITH HIS ADVICE TO US TO KEEP UP FIRM MILITARY PRESSURE.

4. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR WHAT YOU SAID TO HAIG ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER OF 2 MAY TO THE LATIN AMERICAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (PARAGRAPH 12 OF YOUR TELNO 1686): IT MIGHT NOW BE TIMELY FOR YOU TO ASK HAIG IF HE COULD NOT HAVE A WORD WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

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VERNON WALTERS AND OTHERS TO AVOID FURTHER EMBARRASSING
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS SORT.

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DIST:

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EMERGENCY UNIT

NAD

NEWS DEPT

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

LD GORDON LENNOX

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

40

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HS/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

LORD N GORDON LENNOX

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HD/PCD

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)

PS/SIR M PALLISER)

PS/SIR A DUFF)

CABINET

MR WADE-GERY)

MR FULLER)

OFFICE

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-

MENTS STAFF)

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM HOLY SEE 121005Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 023 OF 12 MAY 82

INFO ROUTINE ROME

THE POPE'S VISIT

1. DURING CDL HUME'S BRIEF VISIT TO ROME HE GAVE ME AN HOUR YESTERDAY BETWEEN CALLS ON THE POPE. IN COURSE OF HIS FIRST TALK ON 10 MAY HUME HAD ARGUED STRONGLY WHAT A BAD EFFECT CANCELLATION OR POSTPONEMENT WOULD HAVE ON PUBLIC OPINION AND THE CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IN BRITAIN. THE POPE PROPOSED A PAUSE FOR REFLECTION BEFORE A SECOND MEETING WHICH TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY.
2. I GAVE MR GLADSTONE THE GIST OF THE AGREED STATEMENT WHICH EMERGED FROM THE CDL'S SECOND MEETING WITH THE POPE. THE KERNEL OF THIS WAS A SENTENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT IF THE POPE'S PRAYERS AND HOPES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WERE NOT ANSWERED (AN AMELIORMENTO

FLASH
ADVANCE COPY

HOPES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WERE NOT ANSWERED (AN 'AMELIORMENTO NETTO') AND IF ARMED CONFLICT WERE TO CONTINUE THEN THE VISIT WOULD BE 'RECONSIDERED'.

3. IN MY VIEW THE POPE IS AND HAS LONG BEEN VERY KEEN TO COME. BUT HE IS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE LATIN AMERICANS, WHO REPRESENT ABOUT HALF CATHOLIC CHRISTENDOM IN NUMBERS. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS THE VATICAN HAS BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF ESCALATION AND THE POPE HAS MADE A NUMBER OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT. THEY ARE FULLY SIEZED OF OUR CASE THE JUSTICE AND LEGALITY OF WHICH THEY HAVE SHOWN NO DISPOSITION TO CONTEST. BUT LOSS OF LIFE, ON BOTH SIDES, AND THE DANGERS OF WIDER INVOLVEMENT ARE A SOURCE OF CONCERN.

4. CDL HUME TOLD ME THAT THE COST OF THE VISIT WAS SO GREAT THAT THE CHURCH COULD NOT AFFORD ANOTHER. THE BEST THEY COULD HOPE FOR MIGHT BE A ONE DAY VISIT IN, SAY, OCTOBER. THE POPE WILL REFER TO THE FALKLANDS WHEN HE IS AT FATIMA AND AGAIN AT NEXT SUNDAY'S ANGELUS. A DECISION ON WHETHER THE VISIT IS ON OR NOT WILL BE TAKEN BY 19 MAY (THESE THREE POINTS HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN TO THE PRESS).

5. THE CDL IS AWARE OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR UK/VATICAN RELATIONS IF THE POPE DOES DECIDE TO POSTPONE THE VISIT, A POSSIBILITY HE HIMSELF CDL GRAY AND ARCHBISHOP WORLOCK HAVE BEEN RESISTING STRONGLY. I HAVE POINTED THIS ASPECT OUT TO VATICAN OFFICIALS ON A PERSONAL BASIS AND WOULD WELCOME INSTRUCTIONS TO DO SO FORMALLY. HITHERTO I HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO UNDERLINE THE PASTORAL AND NON-OFFICIAL NATURE OF THE VISIT. THERE IS CLEARLY AN ELEMENT OF SQUEEZE IN THE POPE'S LINE BUT I SUSPECT THIS IS MAINLY TO ENABLE THE VATICAN TO ANSWER CRITICISM FROM THE CELAM BISHOPS SHOULD THE VISIT GO AHEAD WITHOUT SOME SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS IN SIGHT.

6. I THINK IT WOULD DO NO HARM TO TELL MGR HEIM THAT A DECISION TO POSTPONE OR CANCEL THE VISIT MIGHT BE TAKEN BY PUBLIC OPINION IN BRITAIN AS A POLITICAL COMMENT ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE AND COULD FAN THAT VERY SUSPICION OF AND HOSTILITY TOWARDS CATHOLICISM THAT HAS TAKEN SO LONG TO SET AT REST.

HEATH

NNNN

172 MAY 1982

DUBFO 201/12

OO F C O

OO E C POSTS

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

OO UKREP BRUSSELS

OO UKMIS GENEVA

OO WASHINGTON

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 121055Z MAY 1982


TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 144 OF 12 MAY

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS, PARIS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, BONN, ATHENS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 142: FALKLANDS

1. MR HAUGHEY'S CONTINUING UNHELPFUL POLICY, WHICH WAS EVIDENT IN HIS SPEECH YESTERDAY, HAS BEEN STRONGLY CRITICISED BY DR FITZGERALD. THE LATTER REFERRED IN HIS SPEECH TO " THE UNNECESSARY BREACH WITH BRITAIN BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN ATTEMPT TO USE THIS ISSUE TO PLAY FOR VOTES AT HOME ". THIS REFERS TO THE FORTHCOMING BY-ELECTION IN WEST DUBLIN TO FILL THE SEAT VACATED BY DICK BURKE THE NEW E E C COMMISSIONER. I THINK DR FITZGERALD IS RIGHT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CONSIDERATIONS PUT FORWARD IN MY TELNO 121, PARAGRAPH TWO, STILL APPLY. FIRST, MR HAUGHEY MUST CONTINUE TO KEEP THE CONFIDENCE OF BLANEY, THE DAIL'S



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MUST CONTINUE TO KEEP THE CONFIDENCE OF BLANEY, THE DAHL'S LEADING ANGLOPHOBE, WHOSE VOTE IS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN THE PRECARIOUS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY. SECONDLY, THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE HAS MADE THE REPUBLICAN WING OF FIANNA FAIL MORE VOCAL AND THEIR ANTI-BRITISH ATTITUDE, WHICH IS NEVER FAR BELOW THE SURFACE, IS REVEALING ITSELF QUITE WIDELY. THERE IS IN FACT A DIVISION IN IRISH FEELING AS REFLECTED BY THE STATEMENTS IN THE DAIL YESTERDAY. I WOULD VENTURE TO SUGGEST THAT THE MAJORITY OF IRISH PEOPLE WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S PERFORMANCE AND, WHILE REGRETTING THE WAY THINGS HAVE DEVELOPED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, PARTICULARLY THE LOSS OF LIFE, UNDERSTAND BRITAIN'S POSITION AND WHY WE ARE DOING WHAT WE ARE DOING.

2. I MUST, HOWEVER, POINT OUT THAT WHILE DR FITZGERALD WAS PRETTY CRITICAL OF RECENT IRISH GOVERNMENT POLICY HE DID SAY IN HIS SPEECH THAT THE PRESENT FALKLANDS DISPUTE " IS BASED ON ISSUES OF PRIDE AND FEAR OF LOSS OF FACE, ISSUES WHICH SHOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO BE THE OCCASION FOR LOSS OF LIFE ". I HAD PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED TO SEE HIM THIS EVENING AND WILL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY AND STRAIGHTEN HIM OUT.

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SENT AT / RECDAT 12/1115Z DH/1A

E.R.

13 MAY 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 122300Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 1729 OF 12 MAY 1982,
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 968 : FALKLANDS, GENERAL WALTERS'S REMARKS

1. I TOOK THIS UP WITH HAIG WHO WAS HORRIFIED ABOUT IT. HE ADMITTED THAT THE FACT THAT THE BRIEFING WAS MEANT TO BE PRIVATE DID NOT EXCUSE IT. THE TROUBLE WAS THAT WALTERS, WHO WAS COMPLETELY PRO-BRITISH, WAS APT TO SPEAK IN FLIPPANT LANGUAGE AND LIKED GETTING LAUGHS. BUT HAIG ADMITTED HOW REGRETTABLE THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT WAS.
2. HE HAS TELEGRAPHED WALTERS ABOUT IT AND IS VERY UPSET.
3. PLEASE SEE MLET FOR EDITORIAL ON THIS SUBJECT IN TODAY'S NEW YORK POST.

HENDERSON

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~~RT UKMIS NEW YORK~~

RR BRASILIA

12 MAY 1982

GPS 250

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 121710Z
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 1716 OF 12 MAY 1982,
INFO BRASILIA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

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FALKLANDS: VISIT OF BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT

1. HAIG HAD A SESSION THIS MORNING WITH THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, GUERREIRO, AND ENDERS HAS GIVEN US A BRIEF READ-OUT. THE BRAZILIAN POSITION ON THE FALKLANDS, WHILE BASICALLY MAINTAINING THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH ARGENTINA, WAS RATHER HELPFUL TO US. GUERREIRO SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO URGE THE ARGENTINIANS TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE THAT THE DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE COVERED IN ANY UN SETTLEMENT. THEY BELIEVED THIS WAS PREJUDICIAL TO ARGENTINA'S CASE.
2. THE BRAZILIANS WOULD ALSO TELL THEM THAT THEY THOUGHT THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SHOULD INCLUDE SOME REPRESENTATION OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY. THIS WAS DESIRABLE ON GROUNDS OF SIMPLE HUMANITY.
3. ON THE DISTANCE TO WHICH THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES SHOULD WITHDRAW, THEY WOULD URGE THE ARGENTINIANS TO BE FLEXIBLE.
4. GUERREIRO WOULD ALSO PUT IT TO THE ARGENTINIANS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT INSIST ON OBTAINING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE ISLANDS FOR ARGENTINIAN CITIZENS AS PART OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE BRAZILIAN VIEW WAS THAT THIS WAS A REASONABLE OBJECTIVE FOR THE FINAL OUTCOME, BUT THE ARGENTINIANS SHOULD NOT TRY TO SECURE IT BEFOREHAND.
5. ENDERS UNDERSTOOD THAT GUERREIRO WOULD TRY TO BE IN TOUCH WITH ROS IN NEW YORK TODAY TO PUT THESE BRAZILIAN VIEWS ACROSS TO HIM.

HENDERSON

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
EMERGENCY ROOM
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)~~
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)
~~[RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET]~~

[Passed to E.R.]

ADVANCE COPY

R 121500Z MAY 82
FM ADMINISTRATOR ASCENSION
TO RBDWDF/FCO LONDON
RBDWC/MODUK

mt

propaganda

BT
R E S T R I C T E D
S I C N I L

THE BBC ATLANTIC RELAY STATION HERE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING TELEX TODAY FROM APIS WHICH, PRESUMABLY, IS AN ARGENTINIAN NEWS AGENCY BEGINS PRINCE ANDREW SPEAKS AND FEARS, BUENOS AIRES, MAY 10 (APIS) ORDINARILY EASY GOING, PRINCE ANDREW OF WINDSOR, SECOND SON OF QUEEN ELIZABETH 11, RECOGNISED IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW FOR AN ARGENTINE WEEKLY MAGAZINE THAT HE FELT EXTREMELY SCARED WHEN HE REALIZED WHICH ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A REAL WAR

ANDREW IS SERVING HIS QUEEN AND COUNTRY AS PILOT OF AN HELICOPTER CARRIED BY THE INVINCIBLE, THE INSIGNIA WARSHIP OF REAR ADMIRAL JOHN WOODWARD. AFTER DESCRIBING THE ARGENTINE ATTACK AGAINST THE SHEFFIELD ANDREW RECOGNISED THE AREA BY AIR AND AFTERWARDS HE

ADMITTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE FEAR HE FELT NOT ABLE TO TAKE THE COMMAND OF THE HELICOPTER. I AM REALLY ASTONISHED BY THE ABILITY

COMMAND OF THE HELICOPTER. I AM REALLY ASTONISHED BY THE ABILITY

PAGE 2 RBDAPW 097 R E S T R I C T E D
OF THE ARGENTINES TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION. THEY PROVED THAT
THINGS ARE NOT TO BE EASY FOR US. THE SINKING OF THE SHEFFIELD
HAS BEEN AN UPSETTING SURPRISE. END
PAUNCEFORT
BT

NNNN

NNNN

(14)

(TYPISTS)

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

[Passed EM.U]

(LTD)

WONFO092/12
WONNY095/12

OO FCO

OO UKMIS NY

OO BIS NY

GPS 160

HD SAND
HD NAD
HD NEWSD
HD Planning Staff
PS
PS / MR ONSTOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR URE
Lord N Gordon Lewis
NO 10 DS (2)
RC

[Handwritten signature]

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 122302Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1730 OF 12 MAY 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK.

MIPT: FALKLANDS, GENERAL WALTERS' REMARKS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AN EDITORIAL WHICH APPEARED IN TODAY'S
NEW YORK POST:

BEGINS:

"SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG'S AMBASSADOR AT LARGE, GENERAL VERNON WALTERS, FORMER DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CIA, SAYS OF THE BRITISH RESORT TO ARMS TO DEAL WITH ARGENTINA'S SEIZURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: 'WHAT YOU REALLY HAVE HERE IS A PROBLEM OF MACHISMOS AND THE MACHISMO OF WOMEN IS EVEN MORE SENSITIVE THAN THE MACHISMO OF MEN'.

IS THAT REALLY WHY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTED TO CONDEMN ARGENTINA'S AGGRESSION AND DEMANDED WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES? IS THAT WHY SECRETARY HAIG TRAVELLED THOUSANDS OF MILES TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION? IS THAT WHY THE OAS REFUSES TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA'S GENERALS? IS THAT WHY WESTERN EUROPE BANS ALL TRADE WITH ARGENTINA?

LATINS MAY BE ROMANTIC AND GRANDILOQUENT BUT, IF WALTERS HAS GOT IT RIGHT, MRS THATCHER MUST BE QUITE A WOMAN". ENDS.

HENDERSON

IMMEDIATE

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

2A

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 MR BARRETT
 HS/S AM D
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/UND
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/ERD
 HD/PUSD
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE
 PS/HOME SECRETARY
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 Dst)
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 PS/SIR M PALLISER)
 PS/SIR A DUFF) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY)
 MR FULLER) OFFICE
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-)
 MENTS STAFF)
 DIO
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q.

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 122050Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1720 OF 12 MAY 1982;

AND TO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE (FOR COORDINATOR AND AS

ASSESSMENTS

STAFF);
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW.

FALKLANDS: USSR/ARGENTINA

1. TESTIFYING ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE THE SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE YESTERDAY (11 MAY) AND IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR INMAN IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT IN THE WAKE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS ARGENTINA MAY BEGIN A SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAMME TO OBTAIN NEW WEAPONS FROM THE USSR THIS POSSIBILITY WOULD BE A MAJOR CAUSE FOR WORRY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. INMAN SUGGESTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROBABLY BE ANXIOUS TO SELL MILITARY EQUIPMENT AT A BARGAIN PRICE TO ARGENTINA NOW THAT WESTERN SUPPLIES HAD BEEN RESTRICTED. SUCH ARMS SALES COULD HELP PAY FOR GRAIN AS WELL AS INCREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN BA.

WESTERN SUPPLIES HAD BEEN RESTRICTED. SUCH ARMS SALES COULD HELP PAY FOR GRAIN AS WELL AS INCREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN BA.

2. AS REPORTED SEPARATELY (OUR JICTEL 206 OF 11 MAY PARA 4) THE CIA ASSESSMENT IS THAT MOSCOW NOW SEES THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AS A MAJOR OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE ITS STANDING IN LATIN AMERICA. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT WHILE MOSCOW WILL SEEK TO CAPITALISE ON THAT OPPORTUNITY AND MAY TRY TO ENCOURAGE SOME HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE US, STRONG ARGENTINE SUSPICION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE LIKELY TO LIMIT ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

3. INMAN'S REMARKS HAVE RECEIVED ONLY PARTIAL AND MINOR PRESS TREATMENT TODAY, BUT THEY COULD BE PICKED UP FURTHER, ESPECIALLY AS CONCERN THAT THE CRISIS WILL INCREASE SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN ARGENTINA DOES CONTINUE TO BE AN ELEMENT, THOUGH BY NO MEANS A MAJOR FACTOR, IN US THINKING.

4. WE HAVE SUGGESTED AT WORKING LEVEL THAT AN INTERNAL CIA BRIEFING UPDATE FOR INMAN TODAY SHOULD INCLUDE A NOTE DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE CIA JUDGEMENT ABOVE, AND TO OUR CONCERN ABOUT ANY REMARKS WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED E.G. IN THE U K AS CONVEYING A HINT OF SOFTENING OF US SUPPORT FOR THE UK. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN AT A HIGHER LEVEL IN THE CIA AND TO INMAN'S OFFICE. INMAN WAS AWAY, BUT SENSITIVITY TO OUR CONCERNS WAS EXPRESSED AND THESE WILL BE DRAWN TO INMAN'S ATTENTION. PRESS COVERAGE IS NOT THOUGHT IN THE CIA LIKELY TO BE REPEATED. WE SHALL REPORT ANY RESPONSE FROM INMAN WHEN HE RETURNS TO HIS OFFICE, BUT THOSE CONCERNED IN INMAN'S VISIT NEXT WEEK WILL WISH TO BEAR THE POINT IN MIND.

HENDERSON

NNNN

R E S T R I C T E D

4936 - 1

OO BRUSSELS

GRS 319

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 121630Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 92 OF 12 MAY.

FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY

1. ARGENTINE PROPAGANDA IS SEEKING TO PORTRAY THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY AS A MONOPOLISTIC ENTERPRISE WHICH HAS DOMINATED AND ATROPHIED POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN THE FALKLANDS. IN COUNTERING SUCH PROPAGANDA, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING:
2. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY HAS PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISLANDS, BUT SO HAVE COMMERCIAL CONCERNS IN MANY BRITISH AND FOREIGN COMMUNITIES. WE REJECT ANY SUGGESTION THAT IT DOMINATES THE ISLANDS. IT EMPLOYS LESS THAN 14 PER CENT OF THE ISLANDS POPULATION. THOUGH IT HAS SUBSTANTIAL HOLDINGS, IT IS ONLY ONE OF ABOUT 40 INDEPENDENT LAND OWNERS ON THE ISLANDS. IT HAS BEEN WORKING ACTIVELY OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS TO SPLIT UP AND SELL OFF SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS TO SMALL FARMERS AND ENCOURAGE INDEPENDENT TENANTS. THE COMPANY HAS ALSO BEEN COOPERATING IN PLANS TO DIVERSIFY THE ISLANDS ECONOMY INTO NEW FIELDS.
3. THE COMPANY'S ROLE IN NO WAY DETRACTS FROM THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS OF THE ISLANDERS, WHICH EXERCISED THROUGH THEIR OWN FREE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS INDEPENDENT OF COMPANY INFLUENCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLANDS IS BASED ON UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, ELECTING COUNCILS WHICH INCLUDE NO EX-OFFICIO COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES. ONLY TWO COMPANY EMPLOYEES SERVE ON THE PRESENT COUNCILS. THEY WERE FREELY ELECTED BY THE POPULATION AND HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE EXTREMELY INDEPENDENT MINDED IN THEIR ATTITUDE TO COMPANY AFFAIRS. THERE ARE FULL UNION RIGHTS IN THE

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

4936 - 1

FALKLANDS, A UNION WITH OVER 500 MEMBERS WORKING FOR NUMEROUS EMPLOYERS, AND LEGISLATION GOVERNING WAGES, WORKING CONDITIONS, COMPENSATION, ETC.

4. AN ALLEGATION HAS SURFACED THAT MR DENIS THATCHER IS A FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY SHAREHOLDER. IF RAISED, YOU CAN SAY THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO TRUTH IN THIS STORY.

PYM

SENT BY TELEGRAPH TO:

BONN	STRASBOURG (UKDEL)	NEW YORK(BIS)	SANTIAGO
BRUSSELS	STOCKHOLM	WASHINGTON	ASUNCION
BRUSSELS (EEC)	NEW YORK(UKMIS)	MONTEVIDEO	OTTAWA
PARIS			

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

COPENHAGEN	CARACAS	RIO DE JANEIRO(IO)	WELLINGTON
THE HAGUE	MEXICO CITY	LIMA	
ROME	BRASILIA	CANBERRA	

[ALL PRIORITY]

ATHENS	MOSCOW	DAKAR	ACCRA
BRUSSELS(NATO)	WARSAW	KINSHASA	BANJUL
LISBON	BOGOTA	YAOUNDE	FREETOWN
LUXEMBOURG	HAVANA	CAPE TOWN	LAGOS
OSLO	LA PAZ	PRETORIA	NAIROBI
BERNE	PANAMA	LUANDA	HARARE
GENEVA(UKMIS)	QUITO	ISLAMABAD	LUSAKA
DUBLIN	SAN JOSE	PEKING	KINGSTON
HELSINKI	AMMAN	TOKYO	PORT OF SPAIN
MADRID	JEDDA	NEW DELHI	GEORGETOWN
VIENNA	KUWAIT	DACCA	BRIDGETOWN
			HONG KONG
			GIBRALTAR(PERSONAL)

[ALL ROUTINE]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL
INFORMATION DEPT
EMERGENCY UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
GUIDANCE

COPIES TO:
MR FULLER CABINET OFFICE
MR TAYLOR PRESS OFFICE MOD

2

R E S T R I C T E D

SECRET

2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 May 1982

Prime Minister

Content that

(a) the attached reply is sent to the President of Mexico?

(b) to tell Mr. du Cann the gist of your reply? A.J.C. 11/5

Dear John,

Falkland Islands

Thank you for your letter of 7 May. We have sent an interim reply to the President of Mexico about his initiative with Galtieri and the proposed face-to-face encounter in Cancun both through our own Ambassador in Mexico City and through the Mexican Ambassador here. (FCO Telnos 363 and 364, attached.)

It is clearly right to continue to devote our full energies to the efforts being made by the Secretary General of the UN in New York. Until such time as these efforts succeed or fail, it would be unwise to switch to another channel.

At the same time, we must not offend President Lopez Portillo whose concern is clear and whose good offices might possibly be of value at some stage in the future. I enclose a draft telegram to Mexico City containing a reply from the Prime Minister.

In addition to Mr du Cann, Mr 'Tiny' Rowland and Lord Duncan-Sandys have also been involved in the President's initiative through Sr Rosell de la Lama. There would of course be no objection to your passing on to Mr du Cann, on a confidential basis, the gist of the Prime Minister's reply.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

ZZ MEXICO CITY
OO WASHINGTON
OO UKMIS NEW YORK
GRS 114

11 12 1
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7 8 5

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 072030Z MAY 82

TO FLASH MEXICO CITY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 363 OF 7 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELS NOS 366 AND 367: FALKLANDS

182

1. WE HOPE TO LET YOU HAVE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO LOPEZ PORTILLO'S SUGGESTION ON 10 MAY.
2. MEANWHILE YOU MAY INFORM LOPEZ PORTILLO THAT WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL FOR HIS CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL INITIATIVE. WE WILL WISH TO CONSIDER HIS ^{PROPOSAL} ~~PROPOSAL~~ CAREFULLY AND A FULL RESPONSE WILL BE SENT SHORTLY. WE ARE NATURALLY DISAPPOINTED BY ARGENTINE REJECTION OF THE US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS. BUT WE ARE NOW WORKING THROUGH THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HOPE THIS MAY PROVIDE A PROSPECT OF PROGRESS.

PYM

Emergency Room


C O N F I D E N T I A L

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OO MEXICO CITY DESKBY 091500Z
 PP WASHINGTON
 PP UKMIS NEW YORK
 GRS 139
 CONFIDENTIAL
 DESKBY 091500Z
 FM FCO 090020Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 364 OF 9 MAY
 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK
 YOUR TELNO 369

7-8 MAY

(1)



1. MEXICAN AMBASSADOR (OLLOQUI) HAS BEEN TELEPHONED BY PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO FROM SONORA AND ASKED WHEN HE IS LIKELY TO RECEIVE A FULL RESPONSE TO HIS OFFER OF HELP. THE PRESIDENT HAS REPEATED HIS CLAIM THAT GALTIERI IS READY FOR A MEETING IN MEXICO EG. AT CANCUN.

2. WE HAVE GIVEN OLLOQUI THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU CONVEYED TO THE PRESIDENT ON 7 MAY. DRAWING ON SIR A PARSONS' PRESS CONFERENCE TEXT (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO.681 NOT TO YOU) WE ALSO DESCRIBED THE RECENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK AND EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE NOW BOUND TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS. OLLOQUI EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING AND HAS PROMISED TO EXPLAIN THIS TO THE PRESIDENT.

PYM

OUT TELEGRAM


Classification and Caveats
SECRET

Precedence/Deskby
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	SECRET
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 111300Z MAY 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
	10	MY TELNOS 363 AND 364: FALKLANDS
	11	1. Please pass as soon as possible following message to
	12	President Lopez Portillo. Begins.
	13	^{Mr.} Dear President: I was most grateful for your recent message
	14	about President Galtieri's willingness to meet me on Mexican
	15	soil to discuss our differences. I am grateful for the evident
	16	concern which lay behind your initiative. We must neglect no
	17	possibility in the urgent search for a solution to a dispute
	18	which has already had such tragic consequences, but, as you know,
	19	we are at this present moment making intense efforts through the
	20	UN Secretary General in New York to work out a basis for an
	21	early ceasefire and a subsequent negotiated settlement. I and my
///	22	colleagues are now giving these matters our undivided attention
//	23	and will continue to do so during the coming days until it is
/	24	clear that the Secretary-General's intervention has either
	25	succeeded or failed. I am sure you would agree that our first

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /priority
File number SIR ANTONY ACLAND'S OFFICE	Dept SIR ANTONY ACLAND'S OFFICE	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) R A BURNS		
Telephone number 233 5142		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats		Page
	SECRET	IMMEDIATE	2

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1 <<<<
 2 priority must be to do all we can to ensure that Sr Perez de
 3 Cuellar's efforts come to a satisfactory conclusion.
 4 In these circumstances, I do not believe that it would be right
 5 to cut across what is happening in New York. I shall not
 6 hesitate to contact you again if some new approach seems
 7 desirable. In the meantime I should be grateful for anything
 8 you can do to impress upon President Galtieri the crucial
 9 importance of reaching early agreement in New York so that
 10 hostilities can cease. These efforts will only succeed if
 11 Argentina can be persuaded to withdraw her forces and refrain
 12 from previous insistence on predetermined Argentine sovereignty
 13 over the Falkland Islands. For our part, we are ready to return
 14 to the negotiating table in good faith once Argentine forces
 15 have been withdrawn.
 16 In view of intense worldwide speculation which has already placed
 17 the UN Secretary General under great pressure, I am sure you
 18 would agree with me that it would be best to make no public
 19 reference to our own exchanges and to your initiative with
 20 President Galtieri.
 21 I send to you my warmest good wishes and personal thanks for your
 22 active interest and help. Ends.
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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file

BK

11 May 1982

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL

Thank you for your letter of 10 May.

The Prime Minister is content that the proposed message to President Figueiredo should be despatched.

A J COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RM



216 AH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

11 May 1982

Dear David,

BBC PANORAMA : 10 MAY

Thank you for your letter of 11 May 1982 about the remarks which Mr Tam Dalyell made about the Chiefs of Staff on last night's BBC Panorama programme on the Falklands.

I have shown the Prime Minister the draft letter which your Secretary of State is being advised to send to Mr Dalyell, and as I told Nick Evans earlier this afternoon on the telephone, she is well content with it.

Yours ever,

Mavis Whitman.

David Omand Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

AH

PERSONAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~938 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

11th May 1982

Dear Sir,

BBC PANORAMA: 10TH MAY

As I told you on the telephone the Chiefs of Staff saw this morning a transcript of last night's BBC Panorama programme, and the remarks of Mr Dalyell. They were naturally extremely concerned at his remarks which they regarded as an irresponsible slur on them. I attach a copy of the draft of the letter which they have in mind that my Secretary of State should send to Mr Dalyell this afternoon.

Yours sincerely
D B Omand

(D B OMAND)

C A Whitmore Esq

PERSONAL

LETTER FROM THE DEFENCE SECRETARY TO MR DALYELL MP

I have seen this morning a transcript of an interview in last night's BBC Panorama programme in which you suggested that some of the Chiefs of Staff (and you name the Chief of the Air Staff in particular) had advised against the dispatch of the Task Force to the Falkland Islands.

As you know, there is an accepted convention - and one which I think it a most undesirable precedent to breach - that neither the Chiefs of Staff nor other senior advisers comment publicly upon the advice that they may have given to the Government of the day. I am nevertheless writing to make clear to you personally that there is no truth whatever in your assertion.

I should therefore be extremely grateful if you would be good enough to make known your withdrawal of your assertion and it would be courteous if you were to give an apology to the Chiefs of Staff.

Interviewer: What concerned Mr Dalyell was the military advice about the Falklands operation the Prime Minister had received from her Chiefs of Staff in the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Mr Dalyell: Quite frankly information came from a source that I have always found impeccable in the past that some of the Chiefs of Staff, the Air Staff, have not been happy. I looked John Nott and Francis Pym straight in the eye and they were both paying attention. Every MP has to take responsibility for his own statements. I am taking responsibility for saying that some of the Chiefs of Staff advised against this whole mission to the Falkland Islands.

Interviewer: You are saying that the Chiefs of Staff, or the Chief of the Air Staff, was unhappy from the first.

Mr Dalyell: From the beginning.

Interviewer: They thought that it would not be effective?

Mr Dalyell: That there was great vulnerability.

Interviewer: You cannot expect the Secretary of State for Defence to reveal the advice from the Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister on a mission like this.

Mr Dalyell: I assume that it would have been denied in the strongest terms.


Film of CAS in uniform.

Interviewer: The Chief of the Air Staff is Air Chief Marshal
Sir Michael Beetham.

One of Mrs Thatcher's former Ministers with excellent
contacts in the Ministry of Defence told me that there
have been reservations from the start by the Chiefs of
Staff.

AVM Hoad: I am not party to the deliberations of the Chiefs of
Staff but of one thing I am quite certain, the British
air staff had no illusions about the toughness of the
task which confronted all three services and the advice
they were giving would have been that air power is the
key to success or failure in this particular enterprise.

11 MAY 1982





May 11, 1982.

A.S.C. $\frac{11}{5}$
h-a.

Dear Mr Coles,

I enclose a self explanatory note for the Prime Minister about Señor Villos.

I have one additional point: I had the impression that Roberto Aleman had in turn left the impression that the economic side of US policies towards Argentina was less harsh than it has purported.

Yours,

Angus Thomas

OUT TELEGRAM

191

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
CONFIDENTIAL	FLASH

ZCZC 1
GRS 2
CLASS 3
CAVEATS 4
DESKBY 5
FM FCO 6
PRE/ADD 7
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ZCZC
GRS
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 112115Z MAY 82
TO FLASH BRASILIA
TELEGRAM NUMBER
WARSHIPS IN SOUTH ATLANTIC
1. Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft has sighted three warships across lines of communication between Ascension Island and Falklands. They are believed to be Brazilian but MOD would be grateful if you could confirm this as quickly as possible with Brazilian authorities and report back by flash telegram.
2. Details as follows:-
(a) 703 ft long warship position 13.56S 20.12W on heading of 116 at 13 knots at 111925Z. We think that this is Brazilian carrier;
(b) 275 ft long warship. Position 30.58S 35.36W heading 355 at 15 knots at 111536Z. Destroyer or frigate;
(c) 375 ft long warship. Position 28.26S 32.41W heading 285 at 20 knots at 111645Z. Destroyer.

PYM
NNNN

mt

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept Emergency Unit	Distribution Falklands Standard
Drafted by (Block capitals) I KNIGHT SMITH		Copy to: MOD DSC
Telephone number 233 4386		
Authorised for despatch <i>[Signature]</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

CONFIDENTIAL

MF

Argentin

4593 - 3

GRS 752

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 111120Z MAY 82

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 383 OF 11 MAY

AND REPEATED TO FLASH WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAMS 703-5: FALKLANDS

11 12 1 2 3 4
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M

E R

176

1. I AGREE THAT YOUR TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL YESTERDAY WERE VERY DISCOURAGING. I ALSO AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED IN FURTHER TALKS TODAY BY PARA 5 OF YOUR TELNO 705.

2. THE ARGENTINE PAPER IN YOUR TELNO 704, HAVING BEEN DRAFTED BY ROS IN NEW YORK, MUST INCORPORATE NEGOTIATING FAT. MOREOVER, IT MIGHT BE DISOWNED BY THE JUNTA AND, FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS, WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO GET INTO THE POSITION OF ACCEPTING IT AS THE BASIS OF FURTHER DISCUSSION. THE COMMENTS BELOW ON THIS TEXT ARE THEREFORE PROVIDED AS GUIDANCE FOR THE TIME WHEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MAY PRODUCE A TEXT OF HIS OWN.

3. WHEN YOU SEE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TODAY, YOU MAY USE THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL ON SPECIFIC POINTS:

(A) DEPENDENCIES. CONTINUE TO INSIST ON THEIR EXCLUSION.

(B) SOVEREIGNTY. THE FORMULA IN TWO PARTS IN PARA 9 OF YOUR TELNO 694 IS CLEAR AND EASILY EXPLAINABLE. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR AS MUCH OF IT AS POSSIBLE.

(C) WITHDRAWAL. FOR THE REASONS YOU GAVE YESTERDAY, THE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD RETIRE 2000 NAUTICAL MILES IS COMPLETELY UNREAL.

(D) VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL: AFTER FURTHER RESEARCH, WE HAVE FOUND THAT SWEDEN DOES NOT HAVE APPROPRIATE LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT FOR VERIFYING NAVAL WITHDRAWAL. INDEED, IT APPEARS THAT ONLY ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND CHILE HAVE SUCH AIRCRAFT. THE STATE WHICH WOULD BE BEST PLACED GEOGRAPHICALLY AND IN TERMS OF EQUIPMENT TO VERIFY NAVAL WITHDRAWAL EFFECTIVELY WOULD BE THE US. PLEASE URGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONSIDER THIS POSSIBILITY. (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE MIGHT OTHERWISE EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SEPARATE ANGLO/US/ARGENTINE AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION OF SEABORNE WITHDRAWAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR HOPE IS THAT US INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A US GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS.)

(E) INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. YOU SHOULD SUGGEST THAT THE UN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE DESCRIBED AS FUNCTIONING 'IN CONSULTATION WITH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS IN THE ISLANDS'. THE WORD 'EXCLUSIVE' IN POINT 4 OF THE ARGENTINE TEXT IN YOUR TELNO 704 IS IN ANY CASE UNACCEPTABLE, AS IS THE THOUGHT BEHIND IT.

(F) POINT 5 IN THE ARGENTINE TEXT ABOUT FREEDOM OF TRANSIT AND RESIDENCE IS OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED BY ARGENTINA TO FLOOD THE ISLANDS AND THUS CHANGE THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR, WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS IN THE LONG TERM NEGOTIATIONS, BUT CHANGES IN THE SITUATION IN THE INTERIM PERIOD ARE WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE.

4. THE FOLLOWING FURTHER POINTS ARE FOR YOUR GENERAL GUIDANCE AT THIS STAGE.

(I) THE LEGAL ADVISER CONSIDERS THAT POINT 2 IN THE ARGENTINE TEXT CAN REASONABLY BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED. BUT THIS IS A POINT ON WHICH CLARITY IS ESSENTIAL AND, TO BRING IT OUT MORE CLEARLY, WE MIGHT LATER PROPOSE EXPANDING POINT 2 AS FOLLOWS:

'THE AGREEMENT TO WHICH THE PARTIES COMMIT THEMSELVES, INCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7 THEREOF, SHALL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE ...'. THIS WOULD NEED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ARGENTINE STATEMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT ARGENTINA UNDERSTOOD THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS NOT BEING PREJUDICED. SINCE POINT 2 OF THE ARGENTINE TEXT, IF PUBLISHED AFTER A BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD NOT LOOK UNREASONABLE, WE MAY WISH, BEFORE ANY BREAKDOWN, TO REACH A SITUATION WHERE WE HAD PROPOSED THE ABOVE AMENDMENT AND ARGENTINA HAD REJECTED IT.

(II) DURING A UN ADMINISTRATION, WE SHOULD OURSELVES WISH TO HAVE OBSERVERS IN STANLEY. SO WE MAY AGREE IN DUE COURSE TO BOTH PARTIES HAVING OBSERVERS AND TO THEIR FLYING NATIONAL

FLAGS, WHICH WOULD BE A PERFECTLY NORMAL PROCEEDING. BUT A STRICT LIMIT OF SAY 3 OR 5 ON THE NUMBER OF ARGENTINE OBSERVER PERSONNEL WOULD BE NECESSARY.

(III) TARGET DATE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. IN POINT 7 OF THE ARGENTINE TEXT, THE PHRASE 'TO COMPLETE THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY 31 DECEMBER 1982' APPEARS TO BE GOVERNED BY THE PHRASE 'THE PARTIES COMMIT THEMSELVES...' IT WOULD MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE IF 'TO COMPLETE' COULD BE GOVERNED BY 'WITH A VIEW TO'. THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED SIMPLY BY SUBSTITUTING 'COMPLETING' FOR 'COMPLETE'.

5. THE TIMING OF ANY BREAK WILL OF COURSE HAVE VARIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR US. BUT FOR YOUR PURPOSES THE ESSENTIAL AIM MUST BE TO ENSURE THAT ARGENTINA IS ON THE WRONG FOOT AT THE TIME OF ANY BREAK.

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S
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
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 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM SENT~~
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MYLETT

IMMEDIATE

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 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
~~SIR K COUZENS)~~ TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

UNCLASSIFIED

(FM BERNE 120741Z)

FM BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION SWISS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELNO 86 OF 11 MAY
 INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO WASHINGTON BRASILIA SANTIAGO
 UKDEL NEW YORK

Y

PRESS SUMMARY

1. THIS MORNING'S HEADLINES ARE A MIXED BAG, REFLECTING UNCERTAINTY AMONGST EDITORS ABOUT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT NEWS. THEY VARY FROM THE MOST POPULAR QUOTE MORE BRITISH ATTACKS ON THE ISLANDS UNQUOTE AND QUOTE UK KEEPS UP HOSTILITIES UNQUOTE TO QUOTE SLOW PROGRESS IN UN NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE AND COSTA MENDEZ'S COMMENT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE MFA THAT THERE WAS QUOTE A MODERATE AND REASONABLE HOPE FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION UNQUOTE.

A MODERATE AND REASONABLE HOPE FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION UNQUOTE.

2. THERE ARE A FEW FAINT INDICATIONS OF GIVE SUCH AS MFA CHIEF OF CABINET'S RADIO COMMENT THAT QUOTE WE WANT TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR MRS THATCHER TO SIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE WITHOUT HAVING TO SAY THAT SOVEREIGNTY BELONGS TO ARGENTINA BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN UNQUOTE.

3. BUT THERE ARE ALSO DOUBTS (''AMBITO FINANCIERO'') WHETHER ARGENTINA CAN POSSIBLY AGREE TO A UN FLAG OVER THE ISLANDS WITH SO MANY ARGENTINE CASUALTIES. (THIS COINCIDES WITH PUBLICATION OF 10 DEAD, 18 WOUNDED AND 4 MISSING IN THE CONFLICT SO FAR).

4. THERE IS CONTINUING CRITICISM IN ''LA PRENSA'', BY IGELESIAS ROUCO HIMSELF, OF THE PAUCITY OF OFFICIAL ARGENTINE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CONFLICT WHICH ONLY RESULTS IN INCREASED RUMOURS, DOUBTS AND GENERAL UNEASE.

5. ON THE HOME FRONT ONLY THE ''B A HERALD'' RECORDS THAT THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS OWN DEADLINE SET TWO MONTHS AGO TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON MISSING PERSONS (LOS DESAPARECIDOS) TO THEIR RELATIVES, POINTING OUT THAT OVER 300 PEOPLE INVITED TO BRIEFINGS YESTERDAY WERE TURNED AWAY EMPTYHANDED.

6. PRELIMINARY GDP FIGURES RELEASED YESTERDAY BY THE CENTRAL BANK INDICATE A DECLINE OF 4.3 PER CENT IN FIRST QUARTER ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: THE BIGGEST FALL FOR JANUARY/MARCH IN THE LAST TEN YEARS WITH MANUFACTURING MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED (9.00 PER CENT FALL) AND ONLY AGRICULTURE RISING. THE CENTRAL BANK RESERVES FOR THE FIRST WEEK OF MAY ROSE BY 117.3 MILLION DOLLARS AFTER EIGHT CONSECUTIVE WEEKS OF DECLINE AND APRIL CAR SALES ROSE BY 30 PER CENT OVER MARCH, ATTRIBUTED TO HIGHER INFLATION FEARS AND EXPECTED HIGHER COSTS DUE TO GOVERNMENT EMERGENCY MEASURES.

JOY 11.5.

UNQUOTE

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[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS] 17

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HS/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
RESIDENT CLERK

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IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)

PS/SIR M PALLISER)

PS/SIR A DUFF)

CABINET

MR WADE-GERY)

MR FULLER)

OFFICE

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-)
MENTS STAFF)

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q.

SECRET

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 120100Z
FM WASHINGTON 112350Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1706 OF 11 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS JUST SPOKEN TO ME AFTER A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL. HE SAYS THE LATTER IS ANXIOUS TO HELP. HE HAD BEEN UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD MADE CONCESSIONS, INCLUDING SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT IT WAS THE BRITISH WHO WERE BEING DIFFICULT. HE HAD DERIVED THIS OF COURSE FROM BA PROPAGANDA.

2. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT BY SAYING THAT ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS HE, HAIG, HAD BEEN AWARE OF CONSIDERABLE CONCESSIONS ON THE PART OF LONDON: THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANYTHING FROM ARGENTINA. HAIG SPOKE OF THE ORIGINAL PLAN THAT HE HAD DRAWN UP WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE ARGENTINIANS A GREAT DEAL.

3. HAIG THEN SAID, RATHER TO MY SURPRISE, THAT HE HOPED WE WERE

3. HAIG THEN SAID, RATHER TO MY SURPRISE, THAT HE HOPED WE WERE NOT GOING TO RUSH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE THOUGHT THAT THE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TALKS, HOWEVER UNPRODUCTIVE, SHOULD BE ABLE TO RUN THEIR COURSE: AND THAT WHEN THEY COULD NO LONGER BE SUSTAINED IT SHOULD BE PEREZ DE CUELLAR WHO SHOULD ANNOUNCE THIS AND EXPLAIN WHERE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE LAY, NAMELY WITH THE ARGENTINE.

4. I ASKED HAIG WHERE HE HAD GOT THE IDEA FROM THAT WE WERE INTENDING TO RUSH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID THAT THIS HAD COME FROM THE ARGENTINIANS WHO WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE INTENDING TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS EARLY AS FRIDAY.

5. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INFORMATION TO THIS EFFECT BUT I WOULD CONSULT LONDON AND GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM AGAIN. BUT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT WE WERE NOT TRYING TO RUSH THINGS.

6. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO LET THINGS RUN THEIR COURSE IN THE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TALKS. QUOTE KEEP ON GOING THERE UNQUOTE WAS HAIG'S PARTICULAR PHRASE. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL TO CONCERT OUR ACTION IF IT DOES COME TO A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. EARLIER IN THE DAY HE HAD TOLD ME CATEGORICALLY THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WOULD CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT WITHDRAWAL.

HENDERSON

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SECRET

DESKBY120800Z MAY82

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 111700Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 327 OF 11 MAY
INFO PRETORIA, MODUK

ms

MIPT : FALKLAND ISLANDS - ARMS SALES

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SOUTH AFRICAN SPEAKING NOTES:

AN INTERNATIONAL ARMS BOYCOTT HAS BEEN IN FORCE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA FOR ALMOST TWO DECADES. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS RIGIDLY ADHERED TO THE ARMS BOYCOTT. SOUTH AFRICA MUST OF NECESSITY PROTECT ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SAFEGUARD ITS VITAL INTEREST. S IN VIEW OF THE GROWING THREAT WHICH SOVIET AGGRESSION POSES FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA AS A WHOLE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT AFFORD TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT WEAKEN ITS ABILITY TO RESIST SOVIET ENCROACHMENT. THE ANTI-SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS BOYCOTT HAS FORCED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT A COURSES OF ACTION WHICH IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE CONTEMPLATED WERE IT NOT FOR THE BOYCOTT. IT IS OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE FOR SOUTH AFRICA IN PRINCIPLE NOT TO AGREE TO ANY BOYCOTT MOVE. INDEED SUCH A STEP COULD IRREVOCABLY AFFECT SOUTH AFRICA'S CHANCES OF SURVIVAL. NEVERTHELESS, TO ENABLE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THIS MATTER THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO LEARN WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE THE SUPPLY OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND OTHER STRATEGIC MATERIAL TO SOUTH AFRICA.

FERGUSSON

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

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TYPISTS 1B

PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
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 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK
 H.A.S.A.D.

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST-(2)
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 SIR K COUZENS) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
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DBY 120800Z

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

DESKBY 120800Z MAY 82
 FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 111720Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 326 OF 11 MAY
 INFO PRETORIA, MODUK

MY TELEGRAM NO 301: FALKLAND ISLANDS - ARMS SALES

1. I WAS SUMMONED AT SHORT NOTICE TO SEE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
 DFAI AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL TIME TODAY (11 MAY). VAN DALSEN REFERRED
 TO A REQUEST APPARENTLY MADE YESTERDAY BY ALLINSON TO THE SOUTH
 AFRICAN EMBASSY IN LONDON REGARDING APPROCHES ALLEGEDLY MADE
 TO SOUTH AFRICAN FIRMS (NIMRO AND ALBRECHT ?) FOR THE SUPPLY
 OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA. ALLINSON HAD ALSO REFERRED
 TO REPORTS ABOUT A URAGUAYAN PLANE LOADING MILITARY EQUIPMENT
 AT A SOUTH AFRICAN AIRPORT, PRESUMABLY JOHANNESBURG. (SEE
 ALSO MY TELEGRAM NO 323). THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD TODAY
 CONSIDERED THIS APPROACH AND HE THEN HANDED ME THE " SPEAKING
 NOTES " IN MIFT. (HE CONFIRMED IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION THAT
 THIS WAS ALSO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANSWER TO REID'S ACTION
 REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).

THIS WAS ALSO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANSWER TO REID'S ACTION REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).

2. VAN DALSEN ADDED THAT HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO TELL ME, AS I WAS NO DOUBT AWARE, THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD ALREADY RESPONDED FAVOURABLY TO A REQUEST FOR CERTAIN EQUIPMENT PUT TO THEM " THROUGH SERVICE CHANNELS ". VAN DALSEN WENT ON TO SAY, IN ANSWER TO A FURTHER QUESTION PUT TO THE EMBASSY IN LONDON BY ALLINSON, THAT WHATEVER THE TERMS OF THE SPEAKING NOTES HE COULD GIVE US A CONFIDENTIAL ASSURANCE THAT EXOCET HAD NOT BEEN SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA (AND BY IMPLICATION WOULD NOT BE). VAN DALSEN SAID THAT A REPLY ON THESE LINES WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FCO THROUGH THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY.

3. I TOLD VAN DALSEN THAT I FEARED THAT THE REACTION TO THE COMMUNICATION CONTAINED IN HIS SPEAKING NOTE WOULD BE TO REINFORCE IMPRESSIONS IN LONDON THAT, WHATEVER THEIR PUBLIC POSITION OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE, THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE INDEED SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA. VAN DALSEN COMMENTED THAT OUR APPROACH HAD TOUCHED THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON A RAW NERVE. SPEAKING FRANKLY THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE, IMPORTANT AS IT WAS TO HMG, DID NOT TOUCH THE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY OF THE UK. THE UN ARMS EMBARGO IN WHICH THE UK FULLY PARTICIPATED THREATENED SOUTH AFRICA'S EXISTENCE. THE TERMS OF OUR REQUEST HAD PROVOKED A WARM REACTION. (IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE EMBASSY'S REPORT WOULD HAVE REACHED CAPE TOWN IN TIME FOR DISCUSSION AT THIS MORNING'S REGULAR CABINET MEETING AND THAT THE TERMS OF THE SPEAKING NOTES REFLECTED THAT DISCUSSION). THE MAJOR PRINCIPLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA WAS THAT THEY WERE AGAINST BOYCOTTS OF ANY KIND, EITHER INWARD OR OUTWARD, AND THAT WAS THE SENSE IN WHICH THEIR RESPONSE SHOULD BE INTERPRETED. I REPEATED THE DISAPPOINTMENT WHICH I KNEW YOU WOULD FEEL. YOU WILL NO DOUBT CONSIDER WHETHER YOU WISH TO REPLY TO THE QUESTION IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE SPEAKING NOTES.

FERGUSSON

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BSB/FCO 001/12

ZZ FCO

GRS 150

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
FM BRASILIA 112350Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 160 OF 11 MAY

WARSHIPS IN SOUTH ATLANTIC

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 110 OF 11 MAY

E.R. *0024*
11 MAY 1982
225
mt


1. I CALLED THIS EVENING WITH MY NAVAL ATTACHE ON THE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF AT HIS HOME. WE SHOWED HIM ON A CHART THE POSITIONS OF THE THREE SHIPS SIGHTED AND ASKED IF THEY WERE BRAZILIAN.

2. ADMIRAL ARATANHA ANSWERED WITHOUT HESITATION THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD ME ON 21 APRIL, NO REPEAT NO BRAZILIAN NAVY SHIPS WERE AT PRESENT OUTSIDE BRAZIL'S 200 MILE LIMIT, NOR WOULD ANY BE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, APART FROM THE TRAINING SHIP CUSTODIO DE MELLO (IN FUNCHAL OR ON PASSAGE FROM THERE FOR BARCELONA). THE EARLIEST MOVEMENT HE FORESAW OUTSIDE THIS ZONE WAS OF ONE FRIGATE IN JULY.

3. CAPTAIN LASLETT REPORTED A POSITIVE SIGHTING OF THE ONLY BRAZILIAN AIRCRAFT CARRIER MINAS GERAIS IN THE RIO DOCKYARD ON 10 MAY IN HIS SIGNAL UAA/19F 111925Z MAY ADDRESSED TO MODUK FOR DMSI.

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SENT/RECD AT 12:0024Z HM/MD

OO SANTIAGO

11 MAY 1982

GRS 217


CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 111030Z MAY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 11 MAY.

YOUR TEL NO 217.



Handwritten signature or initials in blue ink.

79 (circled)

BBC LATIN AMERICAN SERVICE

1. WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR HELP IN ENCOURAGING CHILEAN RADIO STATIONS TO ACCEPT BROADCASTING MATERIAL AND INFORMATION FROM THE BBC EXTERNAL SERVICES. WE WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED TO NOTE THAT RADIO POLAR OF PUNTA ARENAS IS HEARD CLEARLY IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. AT PRESENT WE SEE NO NEED TO ACCEPT THE STATIONS KIND OFFER OF RELAYING MESSAGES TO THE FALKLANDS SINCE THE BBC WORLD SERVICE IN ENGLISH IS BROADCASTING A SPECIAL DAILY PROGRAMME DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THIS. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF RADIO POLAR COULD CARRY AS MUCH NEWS AS POSSIBLE FROM BRITISH SOURCES IN ORDER TO HELP EXPLAIN THE TRUE FACTS TO THE ARGENTINE GARRISON ON THE FALKLANDS AND THUS UNDERMINE THEIR MORALE.

2. PLEASE DO WHAT YOU CAN WITH RADIO POLAR TOWARDS THIS END. WE SHOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH BBC MATERIAL THE STATION IS USING AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT IT. ARE ITS BROADCASTS IN THE MEDIUM WAVE AND ARE THEY SUFFICIENTLY QUOTE POPULAR UNQUOTE TO ENCOURAGE LISTENERSHIP AMONGST THE ARGENTINIAN TROOPS?

3. WE ALSO HOPE THAT PUNTA ARENAS MIGHT TAKE THE PROPOSED COI SPANISH RADIO SERVICE OUTLINED IN OUR TELEGRAM NO 228 TO MONTEVIDEO OF 10 MAY. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS?

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FALKLANDS ISLANDS GENERAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

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4537 -

FCO
INFO DEPT
SAMD
CABINET OFFICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

37

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
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 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/ERD
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 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

Mr Little

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
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 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

MT

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 112342Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 716 OF 11 MAY
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS: ARGENTINE NOTIFICATION OF UK SHIPPING

1. ROCA (ARGENTINA) HAS TODAY (11 MAY) COMMUNICATED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE NUMBER 40 ISSUED TODAY BY THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES, WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE MILITARY JUNTA STATES THAT IN VIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S PERSISTENCE IN ITS AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE, WHICH IS REFLECTED INTER ALIA IN THE RESTRICTIONS IT HAS ATTEMPTED TO IMPOSE ON ARGENTINE MARINE TRAFFIC IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, AND IN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IT HAS DECIDED THAT ANY VESSEL FLYING THE UNITED KINGDOM FLAG WHICH IS NAVIGATING IN THE AFOREMENTIONED ZONE TOWARDS THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND/OR WHICH MAY BE PRESUMED TO CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY SHALL BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE, AND ACTION WILL BE TAKEN ACCORDINGLY."

PARSONS

PP LUXEMBOURG

PP PARIS

PP ROME

PP THE HAGUE

PP DUBLIN

PP BONN

GRS 570

CONFIDENTIAL

FM COPENHAGEN 111730Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 OF A11 MAY


INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS AND PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS.

YOU TELS NOS 122 AND 123: FALKLANDS: EC BAN.

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO MR ANKER JOERGENSEN THIS EVENING. AFTER HE HAD READ IT, I FOLLOWED UP WITH AN ORAL REHEARSAL OF THE PRIORITY WE GIVE TO SEEKING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE MIX OF PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE THIS, THE WISH TO AVOID ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RENEWING THE IMPORT BAN IF THIS WAS TO BE DONE. I ADDED, REFERRING TO THE FOLKETING DEBATE TOMORROW (MY TELNO 118) A BRIEF OUTLINE OF ARGUEMENTS AGAINST NOW SWITCHING FROM ARTICLE 113 TO ARTICLE 224.

2. MR ANKER JOERGENSEN THEN SAID THAT HE SUPPORTED RENEWAL OF THE BAN: THAT ON PROCEDURE THE DANISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET DECIDED ITS POSITION AND IT WOULD THEREFORE BE IMPOSSIBLE AND QUITE WRONG OF HIM TO TELL ME WHAT IT WAS, BUT THAT "WE" (NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS WAS PARTY, GOVERNMENT OR A SMALLER GROUP) DID NOT WANT TO USE THAT ARTICLE AGAIN: WHEN I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE MEANT NOT IN OTHER CASES, MR JOERGENSEN SAID "NOT IN THIS CASE". THE DANISH GOVT. COULD AND WOULD QUICKLY PUT THROUGH LEGISLATION TO RENEW THE BAN: HE WAS UNIMPRESSED BY MY ARGUEMENT THAT NOT ALL PARTNERS WOULD DO SO.

ALL THIS WAS TEMPERED SLIGHTLY BY REPETITION THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS TOMORROW WITH MR OLESEN AND OTHER MINISTERS BEFORE DECIDING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, BUT HE REPEATEDLY STATED HIS DISLIKE OF ARTICLE 113, ALSO MENTIONING OPPOSITION IN THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE.



195

3. I SAID THAT THE DECISION HE ANTICIPATED WOULD BE MOST UNWELCOME TO HMG. I MORE THAN ONCE WENT OVER THE ARGUMENTS FOR STAYING WITH ARTICLE 113, ESPECIALLY THAT BY INSISTING ON SWITCHING NOW THE DANES WOULD EFFECTIVELY END THE BAN AND MAKE RESORT TO FORCE MUCH MORE LIKELY. SURELY IT WOULD BE BETTER TO MAKE USE OF THE GOOD ARGUMENTS FOR SEEING FALKLAND AS A SPECIAL CASE RATHER THAN UNDERMINING THE POLICY THE DANISH GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED? MR JOERGENSEN WAS IMPERVIOUS TO ALL THESE POINTS.

4. TALKING WITH THE PERMANENT SECRETARY, PM'S DEPT. (WHO WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT) AS I LEFT I FOUND HIM SURPRISED THAT THE PM HAD ALREADY REACHED SUCH A FIRM VIEW. LIKE EIGIL JOERGENSEN, HE ATTRIBUTED IT TO THE POLITICAL SITUATION, IN THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND ADDED THAT THE RADICAL PARTY - ONE OF TWO WITH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS NEGOTIATING FOR ITS EXISTENCE - WERE STRONGLY AGAINST USING ARTICLE 113. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT OFFICIALS SAW THE MATTER DIFFERENTLY.

5. WE LEFT IT THAT I WOULD RENEW MY EFFORTS WITH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOMORROW, WHEN WE WILL CONTINUE APPROACHING PRO-COMMUNITY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT TO ALERT THEM TO THE DANGERS. I FEAR THAT IN THEIR PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION, THE DANISH GOVERNMENT WILL FIND IT HARD NOT TO SET THEIR FACES AGAINST ARTICLE 113. BUT A LATE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR JOERGENSEN THROWS A SLIGHTLY BETTER LIGHT ON THINGS. HE HAS THIS EVENING GOT MR OLESEN (JUST RETURNED) TO AGREE THAT IN THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE TOMORROW HE WILL SEEK TO PRESERVE SOME FLEXIBILITY OVER THE APPLICATION OF THE FORMULA (MY TELNO 118, PARA 2) TO PROLONGING ALREADY EXISTING SANCTIONS. THE IMPORT BAN COULD, HE BELIEVES, THEN BE DEALT WITH AS A MONTH AGO. EIGIL JOERGENSEN IS NOT TOO OPTIMISTIC, BUT SEES SOME ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE YET. HE IS APPREHENSIVE THAT IF PUBLIC ATTENTION FOCUSES ON TOMORROW'S DEBATE IT WILL MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT.

6. YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT EIGIL JOERGENSEN HAS BEEN SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY TODAY. I MUCH HOPE HIS CONFIDENCE WILL BE FULLY RESPECTED.

WARBURTON

NNNN

SENT AT 11/2053Z JK



10 DOWNING STREET

Clive

This is the
Falklands solution
for economists!

Ala

Note.

I discussed this with Mr
Walker today. We agree we
are not sure it is a case for the
time being.

File.

19w.

SECRET

1 A⁹

AN ECONOMIC SOLUTION FOR THE FALKLANDS

1. Any ultimate solution to the Falklands issue must have the following properties:
 - a. it must be consistent with our objectives for the constitutional status of the Falkland Islands before Argentine aggression;
 - b. it must be consistent with the wishes of the Falklanders; and
 - c. it must make Argentina pay, and ensure that they do not profit from their aggression.
2. In its essence we must ensure that, after the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Argentine forces, we allow the Argentine Government to attempt to persuade the Falklanders, by a compensation payment for each Falklander, man, woman and child who were on the Islands, let us say two years ago, to receive a specified sum. (I was thinking of a sum of about £50,000 per head, but this is fixed by Argentina.)
3. The Falklanders can then vote on plebiscite whether they wish to take their £50,000 per head and receive Argentinian sovereignty, or whether they reject both the compensation and sovereignty. There would have to be agreement on the majority required, probably two-thirds. (Note that the bigger the required majority the higher the necessary bid.)
4. The important point is that this sum must be paid to each Falklander which ever way he votes and whether he chooses to stay on the Islands or to leave them, or indeed has left over the past two years. This payment would be enforceable through a bond posted with a suitable bank and could be easily policed. The Argentinians would be allowed to make other promises, which it would be difficult to police, but which could be taken into account by the Falklanders, such as improvements in infrastructure, transport services, etc.
5. If the Argentinians really want sovereignty then they will bid high in the compensation stakes. And even at £50,000 per head, this would amount to less than £100 million. I suspect more than two-thirds of the Islanders would be willing to settle at that amount. But I have no basis or knowledge here other than intuition.

/6. What happens

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

6. What happens if the Argentines misjudge the "market" and bid too little? Then sovereignty remains in the UK, but the interim administration would continue for a year. But to avoid producing another incipient Falklands incident and to induce Argentine acceptance, we might negotiate that, six months later, the plebiscite could be tried again. Granted the acquisitive obsession of the Argentines, their second bid would be likely to be raised to heights which the Falklanders could hardly refuse.

7. At this stage of the conflict this all may appear to be "thirty pieces of silver", but appearances are deceptive. It would have the nice quality of satisfying a majority of all parties - and that is worth striving for.

11 May 1982

ALAN WALTERS

SECRET

SECRET

OUTLINE AGREEMENT

Preamble

Mutual desire for a peaceful settlement within the terms of UN Resolution 502. Acknowledgement that any new arrangements must be acceptable to, and in the best interests of, the Falkland Islanders themselves.

Provision 1

All hostilities will cease on a given Date A.

Provision 2

Establishment of a UN peacekeeping force on Date A, based on the Falkland Islands, with following responsibilities:

- i. to supervise the withdrawal of armed forces under Provision 3, and report breaches to the Interim Authority established under Provision 5;
- ii. to ensure no armed forces are reintroduced within the specified area by either party;
- iii. to support the Interim Authority as necessary.

Provision 3

Mutual and simultaneous withdrawal of armed forces by both parties, to outside a specified area, to be completed by a given Date B.

Provision 4

Ending of financial and economic sanctions taken by either party during the dispute; re-establishment of diplomatic relations; lifting of restrictions of any kind on nationals of one party in the territory of the other.

Provision 5

Establishment of an Interim Authority for the administration of the Falkland Islands, comprising equal numbers of:

SECRET

- i. representatives of the Islanders; and
- ii. representatives of the UN peacekeeping force, with specified powers, effective until Date D.

Provision 6

Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands from Date D to be determined in accordance with a plebiscite of all Falkland Islanders, whether currently resident or not, to take place on Date C.

Provision 7

The question to be put in the plebiscite to be:

"Do you wish the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands to be transferred from the United Kingdom to Argentina?"

For the transfer of sovereignty to take place, a two-thirds [negotiable] majority is required.

Provision 8

Conduct of the plebiscite, and adherence by both parties to the outcome, to be the responsibility of the Interim Authority.

Provision 9

Between Date B and Date C, both parties may introduce to the Falkland Islands up to three civilian representatives of their respective Governments empowered to pledge their authorities in the event of their Government being the sovereign power after Date D, to make a specified compensation payment per head to all Falklanders whether they remain in the Falklands or migrate - this payment to be made in US\$ or £ sterling immediately after the plebiscite. (The completed payments being a condition of the transfer of sovereignty.)

Provision 10

Where, under Provision 9, specified sums are pledged, the pledging party to lodge a bond accordingly with the Interim Authority; such bond to be returned in the event of that party not being the sovereign power after Date D.

SECRET

- 3 -

Provision 11


Complete freedom of movement for the Falkland Islanders and their assets into and out of the Islands after Date B.

Provision 12

Both parties undertake that, whatever the sovereignty arrangements after Date D, the normal way of life of the Falkland Islands, as before the hostilities, will be respected, notably as concerns language, education and local laws.

11 May 1982

SECRET



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>627</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Washington telegram no. 1698 dated 11 May 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR <i>40</i> YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>17 April 2012 CW Wayland</i>
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Lettercode, Series and Piece/Item references clearly
e.g.

LETTERCODE/SERIES
.....GRA 168.....
PIECE/ITEM49.....
(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

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HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM

← Mr. Bassett

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET (2 Copies)

PS/S of S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY(C/O No.10 D St)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG)

PS/SIR M PALLISER)

MR WADE-GERY) CABINET OFFICE

MR FULLER)

D I O)

MR J M STEWART AUUSD STAFF (MOD)

Handwritten mark

GPS 100

RESTRICTED

FM STRASBOURG 110912Z MAY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 47 OF 11 MAY.

RFI ROUTINE EC POSTS, UKREP BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

FALKLANDS: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

FROM UKREP


1. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WILL DEBATE THE FALKLANDS ISSUE AGAIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF 12 MAY, STARTING SOON AFTER 3.00PM, WITH A VOTE IN THE EVENING.

2. AS AT THE LAST SESSION SEVERAL RIVAL TEXTS ARE BEING DISCUSSED. THERE IS A GENERAL EXPECTATION THAT THERE WILL BE MORE VOTES THAN LAST TIME AGAINST ANY RESOLUTION WHICH GETS CONSENSUS SUPPORT. THIS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME. THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE OF A TEXT EMERGING WHICH COULD BE SUPPORTED BY MUCH OF THE CENTRE/RIGHT AND SOCIALISTS. BUT MOST OF THE COMMUNISTS SEEM LIKELY TO VOTE AGAINST SUCH A RESOLUTION.

FCO PSE PASS ALL

CAPE

FM LIMA 110200Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 11 MAY



185

ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA
MY TEL NO 160

1. THE PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ME TO SEE HIM AT 1700 TODAY TO GIVE ME THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO THE REQUESTS CONVEYED TO HIM IN MY TUR.
2. DR ARIAS SAID THAT IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT POSSIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION TO GIVE ASSURANCES OF THE SORT REQUESTED (C.F. PARA 2 OF MY TEL 116). HE SAID THAT ANY SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD BE AN INFRINGEMENT OF PERUVIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FREEDOM OF ACTION. THEY WOULD ALSO RUN COUNTER TO PERU'S OBLIGATIONS TO HONOUR HER INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IF INVOKED BY ARGENTINA UNDER THE TERMS OF THE RIO TREATY IN THE EVENT OF E.G. AN ATTACK AGAINST SOUTH AMERICA'S CONTINENTAL MAINLAND.
3. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION DR ARIAS SAID THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES PERU MIGHT BE OBLIGED TO SEND TROOPS, AIRCRAFT OR WHATEVER. HE SAID THAT HE PREFERRED NOT TO CONTEMPLATE THIS PROSPECT WHICH WOULD BE THE RUINATION OF PERU AS WELL AS OF ARGENTINA. BUT HE ASSURED ME AND AUTHORIZED ME EXPLICITLY TO INFORM YOU THAT PERU WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A POSITION OF RESTRAINT WITH A VIEW TO CONTRIBUTING TO AN EARLY AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE. DR ARIAS SAID THAT WHILE IT WAS TRUE THAT PERU SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE POSTURE, PERU ALSO ATTACHED VALUE TO HER FRIENDSHIP WITH THE UK. PERU WAS THEREFORE READY AND ANXIOUS AT ALL TIMES TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO CONTEND WITH VARIOUS INTERNAL PRESSURES FOR A MORE EXTREME POSITION.
4. DR ARIAS CONCLUDED OUR CONVERSATION WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE LATEST REPORTS OFFERED SOME HOPES OF AN EARLY CEASE FIRE, THAT PERU WOULD CONTINUE TO PUT SUCH PRESSURE AS SHE WAS ABLE ON ARGENTINA FOR SOME MEASURE OF FLEXIBILITY AND THAT HE HOPED EVENTS WOULD SHORTLY RENDER OUR CONVERSATION OF ONLY ACADEMIC INTEREST.
5. AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR CONVERSATION I MADE THE POINTS IN YOUR GUIDANCE NO 38 WHICH I ALSO GAVE HIM TO READ.

WALLACE

OO UKMIS GENEVA

GRS 114

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 111215Z MAY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 162 OF 11 MAY

AND INFO MONTEVIDEO, BERNE, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 148: FALKLANDS AND ICRC

Handwritten blue squiggle

F. R.
11 MAY

1415

11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1. IN VIEW OF THE EXTENSION OF THE TEZ AND, FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON HMS SHEFFIELD, THE INCREASED SENSITIVITY OF THE TASK FORCE AIR DEFENCES TO ANY AIRCRAFT ENTERING THE ZONE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT, SHOULD ANY OFFER BE MADE BY THE ARGENTINES TO FLY THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVES NOW IN ARGENTINA TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THAT OFFER SHOULD BE DECLINED.

2. PLEASE ASK THE ICRC TO INSTRUCT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN ARGENTINA ACCORDINGLY AND TO REPEAT TO THEM OUR NEED TO HAVE DETAILS OF ANY TRAVEL BY SHIP AT LEAST 36 HOURS IN ADVANCE.

PYM

Argentina



CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 May 1982

Overlaid

MR 1/5

f-c

Dear John,

Falklands: EC Import Ban

Foreign Ministers of the Ten were not ready at their weekend meeting in Belgium on 9 May to take a political decision to renew the EC's import ban until they saw how events moved this week. The Secretary of State considers that we should seek to influence the consideration which will now be given to this within the governments of our partners and recommends that the Prime Minister should send a message by telegram in the terms of the attached draft to her colleagues. The message should reach them before their Cabinet meetings and before the Franco-German summit meeting later this week, and so should get off, if possible, by lunchtime on 11 May.

The Presidency informed COREPER today that the Political Committee would meet at 4 pm on Saturday 15 May. If agreement to renew were reached, the implementing regulation would be discussed by COREPER at 7 that evening and again if necessary on the morning of Monday 17 May, and finally approved the same day by the ECOFIN Council. Should agreement to renew not be possible at the Political Committee, the Presidency would convene a special meeting of Foreign Ministers at 4 pm on Sunday 16 May.

Yours over,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~xxxx~~ ^{Message} / ~~letter~~ / ~~despatch~~ / ~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
EC Heads of Government

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I welcome the reaffirmation by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten at Villers-le-Temple last weekend of the principles that have consistently guided their response to the Falklands crisis since the Argentine invasion, including condemnation of the Argentine aggression and early implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 502; they also strongly supported the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and stressed the need for a negotiated solution. Our Permanent Representative at the United Nations has for some days been in constant touch with the Secretary General of the United Nations and we are working with maximum energy and flexibility for a diplomatic settlement.

I wish I could say that there was any significant retreat from the intransigent attitude so far taken by the Argentines who have now rejected both the Haig and the Peruvian/US initiatives, and whose response to the UN Secretary-General is so far not encouraging. Events have shown from the beginning of this crisis that the Argentines will not give up their illegal military gains by mere

/pressure

Enclosures—flag(s).....

pressure of international opinion or denunciation at the United Nations. They continue flagrantly to disregard the mandatory resolution of the UN Security Council. I have no doubt that they are calculating that they can spin ~~on~~ ^{out} negotiations over a protracted period, while international pressure declines. Their objective is obviously to get a ceasefire which is not linked to withdrawal of their forces, and to declare that the outcome of any negotiations about the future of the Falkland Islands must be a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. They would thus be left in possession of their spoils. We shall know very soon whether Argentina can be brought to see reason in the Secretary General's negotiations. So long as the Argentines will not negotiate seriously, the only counter is the resolute maintenance of all possible means of pressure until they produce the desired effect. Argentina must be in no doubt about the resolve of the international community, which must be at least equal to that of Argentina both in intensity and duration.

It is this that justifies continued maximum pressure of all sorts - political, economic, diplomatic and military. Any let-up in any of these fields is likely to encourage the Argentines in their belief that if they can only hold out long enough they will attain their end. Reducing the non-military pressures must inevitably throw greater weight on the military ones and thus increase the likelihood of further conflict and further loss of life. The continuation of the EC measures, should events make this necessary, will thus be of vital importance in the weeks ahead. The European solidarity which they have been widely, and rightly, seen to signify

/will

will mark a historical development in the evolution of the European Community.

I hope very much that, should our hopes in New York be disappointed, your government will give the necessary instructions to your representatives at the weekend to renew the Community's import ban.

OUT TELEGRAM

	↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby FLASH
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO 111300Z MAY 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO FLASH ATHENS
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO FLASH OTHER EC POSTS
	10	FALKLANDS: EC BAN
	11	MIPT: Following is text of message.
	12	Francis Pym has told me of the very full and valuable
	13	discussion by Foreign Ministers last weekend. I was most
	14	grateful for the helpful expression of their views reported by
	15	Leo Tindemans subsequently to the press.
	16	You will, I know, already be aware of the reasons why I
	17	and my ^{colleagues} Government think it of the greatest importance that the
	18	Community's embargo on imports from Argentina be renewed when it
	19	expires on 17 May. Anything less than this could only encourage
	20	the Argentines to believe that our resolve is weakening, and that
	21	if they maintain their intransigence their aggression will
///	22	eventually attain its objective. This is the exact opposite of
//	23	the signal which we need to send them when they are considering
/	24	the latest initiative by the Secretary-General of the United
	25	Nations - on which so much may depend. To slacken the pressure

MW

11 May

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword now
File number	Dept	Distribution FRAME ECONOMIC FALKLANDS ECD(E)
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats	Page
↓	CONFIDENTIAL	2

<<<< 1 <<<<
 2 now could not fail to damage the prospects for a peaceful
 3 solution, and conversely to increase the chances of a prolonged
 4 and bitter fight. I ask you to bear these considerations in mind
 5 in approaching the decision on the embargo to be taken next week-
 6 end.
 7 At this delicate stage in the negotiations, it is all the
 8 more important that we should avoid anything in the meantime
 9 which might be interpreted by the Junta as pointing to any
 10 breach in our solidarity and in our resolve to secure
 11 implementation of Security Council Resolution 502.
 12 ENDS
 13
 14 PYM
 15 NNNN
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 31 ///
 32 //
 33 /
 34

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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FRICKLANDS

fr.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 May 1982

Dear Cardinal Home,

Thank you for your letter of 8 May, which was also signed by the Archbishop of St Andrews and Edinburgh.

I was surprised that you should question whether our use of force in the South Atlantic was morally justified. It was Argentina who first used force in this dispute, and we cannot allow them to profit from their invasion; that is an important principle, and one which all nations should support. We cannot allow the Islanders' rights and wishes to be denied by Argentina's territorial ambitions; and we are determined to do whatever is necessary to free them from occupation.

It has always been our wish, and it still is our wish, to settle this dispute by negotiation. Our repossession of South Georgia, and the recent military engagements, in no way alter that. These military actions have been intended to support our overall strategy; they have not been and will not become a substitute for it.

Our immediate concern is to implement the resolution passed by the UN Security Council, which called for the withdrawal of Argentine forces, and negotiations on the future, unprejudiced in any way. We are open to any ideas that would achieve this. But so far the Argentines have been intransigent. They have shown no inclination to implement the resolution, and they have rejected the

/proposals

HL

proposals based on the Peruvian President's ideas. We accepted these proposals, and if they had, then we could have had a ceasefire in place very quickly.

I hope that your appeal to the Argentines will encourage them to reconsider their position; that they will now show the readiness and desire to achieve a peaceful settlement that only we have shown so far; and that progress can be made with the help of the UN Secretary General. Until then, we will continue to exercise our rights of self defence, including the use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter, if this proves necessary.

Yours sincerely
Raymond Baxter

His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster

DS7 (Revised)

DRAFT: MESSAGE
minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

After the very full discussion by Foreign Ministers last weekend you will already be aware of the reasons why I and my Government think it essential that the Community's embargo on imports from Argentina be renewed when it expires on 17 May. Anything less than this could only encourage the Argentines to believe that our resolve is weakening, and that if they maintain their intransigence their aggression will eventually attain its objective. This is the exact opposite of the signal which we need to send them in the week when they are considering the latest initiative by the Secretary-General of the United Nations - on which so much may depend. To slacken the pressure now could not fail to damage the prospects for a peaceful solution, and conversely to increase the chances of a prolonged and bitter fight. I ask you to bear these considerations in mind both in approaching the matter of the embargo and in anything said to the media in your capital, whether officially or otherwise.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

IN CONFIDENCE

42 Sedley Taylor Road,
CAMBRIDGE CP2 2PN

11th May, 1982

A.J. Coles, Esq.,
Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON

A.J.C. $\frac{12}{5}$

Dear Mr Coles,


p.a.

Thank you for your reassuring letter of 26th April which I found on my return from abroad. After I had heard that Mr Haig described the President to an American friend of mine as "an incompetent lunatic" I was prepared to believe anything!

Yours sincerely,

MF Peutz

13 MAY 1982



010

RESTRICTED

SAPU(82) 19

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper issued at 1200 hours on 11 May 1982 contains information and suggested lines to take on the following -

1. Negotiations at the United Nations
2. Informal Meeting with EC Foreign Ministers
3. Paying for the Falklands Operations
4. HMS Britannia
5. Attack on the Narwal
6. Summary of Mr Pym's appearance before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 May

Cabinet Office

11 May 1982

RESTRICTED

LINE TO TAKE

1. Negotiations at the United Nations

Negotiations will continue today in New York. Details are confidential. The going is hard; there is much ground to be covered. We are neither on the verge of breakthrough, nor deadlocked. We are setting no deadlines but it is self evident that the situation is critical. We have accepted the Secretary General's approach and are co-operating actively, fully and urgently in the negotiations. We wish to achieve an early settlement if that is humanly possible.

Do Costa Mendez's remarks on CBS constitute a break-through?

- He is reported as saying "we are not putting sovereignty as a precondition for our talks". But this must be read in conjunction with other remarks by the Argentine Government and with his own subsequent comments, ie Argentine statements are conflicting. It remains our firm position that sovereignty cannot be prejudged in the negotiations on the long-term future of the Islands.

2. Informal Meeting of European Community Foreign Ministers 9 May

This meeting went a good deal better than some press reports would suggest. It was always envisaged that a decision on renewing sanctions against Argentina would not be taken until 16 May. Community solidarity remains, as Mr Tindemans said publicly after the meeting when he stressed that support for Britain had not lessened.

3. Paying for the Falklands Operations

Extra cost will not be sufficient to disrupt economic strategy but decisions on how to finance operations will have to wait until full cost is known. Do not yet know how long operations will last or what form they will have to take. Impossible to assess accurately even cost to date with Task Force over 8,000 miles away, a vast range of supporting activities in the United Kingdom, at Ascension, and elsewhere and new military requirements day by day. Meanwhile operations not being hampered by financial restrictions - although we have not abandoned all financial discipline.

Not all costs will be "extra costs" (eg cost of servicemens' pay, routine deployments and exercises would have been incurred anyway). Although "extra costs" are likely to be substantial in themselves, they will be comparatively small in relation to Government expenditure as a whole (£115 billion this year) or even defence expenditure (£14 billion this year).

4. HMS Britannia (Story in the Sun on 10 May: "Our Shame, by Britannia Men")

Britannia's NATO war role is to ferry casualties from continental ports to the United Kingdom for transfer to British hospitals. This is very different from the situation in the South Atlantic. There are no nearby open ports to which casualties could be regularly ferried - requirement is therefore for a considerably larger vessel able to act, quite literally, as a hospital ship and, perhaps, for prolonged periods. The Uganda's much more extensive accommodation and longer range between refuelling makes her ideally suitable for this particular task. (Additionally the deployment of Britannia in the South Atlantic would probably require a dedicated tanker as she uses a different fuel from the majority of the ships in the Task Force.) However none of these factors would apply in a European war and Britannia remains fully capable of fulfilling her planned NATO role.

5. Attack on Narwal

Argentines have attempted to present this as an attack on an innocent vessel and have even alleged that British aircraft strafed survivors. This is totally false. The Narwal had been shadowing the Task Force for several days and had previously been warned to leave the area. When it was sighted again on Sunday - well within the TEZ - we had every reason to believe that it was spying on the fleet. Irrefutable evidence of this was discovered after we had captured the vessel: an Argentine naval officer, surveillance equipment and detailed military orders for reconnaissance operations were found on board. Information supplied by the Narwal could have been used by the Argentines to guide submarines or aircraft to attack our ships. Our announcement of the TEZ warned the Argentines that all ships found in the zone without our authority would be regarded as hostile. Additionally, on 7 May, two days before the incident, we warned that merchant ships or fishing vessels apparently engaged in surveillance or intelligence activities against our forces in the South Atlantic would be regarded as hostile and were liable to be dealt with accordingly.

6 FALKLAND ISLANDS

Following is a summary record of the Secretary of State's appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on 10 May.

Paragraphs marked with a star record that part of the discussion which was conducted in closed session (i.e. without the press present).

British Strategy

** The Diplomatic effort is being pursued with unabated intensity at the United Nations. The military deployment continued in exercise of our right of self defence with the minimum use of force. HMG would not shrink from any decisions which might be necessary. Economic pressures had increased the difficulties of the Argentine economy. Mr Pym was encouraged by the excellent discussion he had had with his Community Partners at the weekend. He had not sought decisions on extending sanctions, but the Community was very supportive. Events were entering a critical phase. He could not predict the outcome, but pledged to persist in the search for a negotiated settlement so long as there was the remotest chance of success.

Community Measures

In response to questions, Mr Pym stressed his appreciation of Community support and solidarity. Some had expressed reservations but in general there was very strong support and decisions would be taken by the end of the week. He agreed that the Council of Europe was also important and denied that any Community Partner was seeking to blackmail Britain by linking sanctions with farm prices. He was confident in the light of the weekend discussion that sanctions would be renewed.

** Taxed with the critical public statements of Ireland, France and the Federal Republic, Mr Pym repeated that the weekend meeting had been encouraging. Commonwealth support was also important. He did not believe that international support was falling away, although every criticism received exaggerated publicity. It was widely understood that if we succeeded, the world would be a more peaceful place. The Security Council was unlikely to give formal endorsement to our military action for obvious reasons, but the Argentine invasion was widely seen as a challenge to democratic institutions. There was perhaps more support for our position among governments than in public opinion, and our firmness of purpose was widely respected.

** The United States had not closed their minds to further measures. What they had already done was designed for maximum impact in the short term. We had not asked for military support and respected the United States' decision that they did not wish to become militarily involved.

The Use of Force

Asked whether his credibility as a peacemaker had not been eroded by the re-capture of South Georgia or the bombing of Port Stanley airport, Mr Pym replied: 'Emphatically not - quite the contrary'. Military pressure was an indispensable element in the search for a peaceful solution and we were well within our rights in using force in self defence to re-take British territory and protect the Task Force.

Asked whether the bombing of Argentine bases on the mainland or an opposed landing on the Falklands would not alienate Latin American opinion, Mr Pym replied that the question underlined the importance of implementing SCR 502. He did not want to escalate or spread hostilities, but could not exclude any possible military action. Although there was widespread support in Latin America for the Argentine claim to the Falklands, there was also much disapproval of Argentine use of force. The OAS meeting had withheld practical help from Argentina.

Diplomatic Options at the United Nations

**

Asked how the United Nations could help an interim or long term solution, Mr Pym replied that this was a practical question. He had an open mind to a range of options. After Argentine withdrawal the gap could be filled by a group of nations or perhaps by the United Nations itself.

Asked about the long term objectives of HMG, Mr Pym replied that the Falkland Islands were British sovereign territory inhabited by British people. We had to bear in mind their wishes. But we had never taken the view that the Islands were under British sovereignty by definition 'for ever and a day'. Other forms of governance to secure their future were not excluded. There were many options, including independence, associate status, condominium, UN trusteeship, and others. The Islanders would take time after Argentine withdrawal to review their life and to contemplate the future. He contrasted the Argentine attitude that sovereignty was not negotiable. When they spoke of de-colonisation, they meant colonisation by force. He was determined that the range of possibilities should not be prejudged in negotiation.

Mr Pym confirmed that there was no question of a ceasefire without Argentine withdrawal, and machinery to supervise it. Withdrawal should take place over a fixed number of days - the shortest practicable period. We would judge proposals by that yardstick.

He acknowledged the relevance to the negotiation of long term considerations of garrison, supply, etc., if the Islands had to be taken by force. Hence the importance of an interim authority and of time for the Islanders to consider their own future

Asked why HMG did not seek a sanctions resolution in the Security Council, he replied that the first priority was to enforce Resolution 502. He did not exclude the other, although it might be vetoed. He thought the most effective way was to pursue economic measures through the Community, the Commonwealth and bilaterally.

Argentina

** Were the Argentines serious about a peaceful settlement? Mr Pym was sceptical. It remained to be seen. But the pressures were building up and the Americans were now on our side.

** Asked about the power of the Junta and the Argentine decision-making process, Mr Pym said it was not an exact science. Galtieri was the Chairman ad referendum to Admirals and Generals. The Foreign Minister and the UN Representative contradicted each other. The regime changes their minds over night. They had whipped up popular support for intervention, and confused public opinion with a mass of misinformation, which made it difficult for them to negotiate.

Asked to assess the situation inside Argentina, Mr Pym referred to mounting economic problems, the fanatical popular support for the regime, balanced against dislike of war. The military leadership had embarked on this adventure without thinking through the implications. They were surprised by the speed, scale and resolution of the reaction from Britain, the Community, the Commonwealth and the United States.

Propaganda

Mr Pym was aware of widespread criticism of the BBC, for appearing to be even-handed between HMG and the Junta. The Government were concerned. Constituents who complained to Ministers should complain direct to the BBC.

He was aware of the delays over getting television pictures back from the Fleet; but it was technically difficult to transmit them from an operational Fleet.

Dependencies

Mr Pym agreed that the Dependencies were distinct from the Falkland Islands themselves, although they had been administered from Port Stanley as a matter of convenience.

What happened to them in the end would have to take account of the outcome of the Falkland Islands. He could envisage different solutions.

2.



RRL5

[Handwritten signature]

*with the
compliments of*

ANTHONY GRANT, MP.

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

From: Anthony Grant, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

11th. May 1982

John Han

I must add my voice of protest at the way the BBC is presenting the Falklands news. So many constituents were outraged by the Panorama programme that I took the trouble to see the video today. Frankly it was disgraceful. A disproportionate amount of time was given to the Argentine Minister being interviewed by a most obsequious man who could not have been more reverent had he been questioning the Pope ! More acres of space were accorded to eccentric minority opinion on both sides of the House. By no stretch of imagination can Anthony Meyer or David Crouch be described as representing Conservative Parliamentary opinion - on this issue or any other.

The whole impression given was of a pigheaded Prime Minister and Party Chairman flying in the face of opinion on all sides. I can only describe this as preposterous. I do not expect the BBC to be biased in Britain's favour but, in the interests of 'balance' if nothing else, need they be so obviously be on the side of the enemy ?

Anthony Grant

Sir Ian Trethowan
Director General
BBC
Broadcasting House, London W1A 1AA

Thy

PA

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION):0730, 11 MAYUSMr Haig's Views

1. South Georgia: the Argentine wish for its inclusion is surprising US Ambassador Walters (due to travel to Argentina, 10 May) will do what he can. President Galtieri: through a third party Haig had received a message that Galtieri does not wish to become dependent on the Soviet Union; the US and UK should be Argentina's best friends. Internal Dissent: there is considerable unrest, particularly in the Argentine Army and Air Force. Soviet Union: indications that the Soviet Union may have been involved in the decision to invade. The Soviet Union is now working actively with the Peronistas. British Action: we should maintain maximum military pressure while, if possible, avoiding attacks on the mainland which might involve civilian targets. Argentine Garrison on Falklands: severe supply difficulties soon and if combined with casualties they may surrender. Ambassador Walters' Mission to Argentina: objectives are to probe the possibility of an alternative government there; to emphasise to Galtieri the danger of Soviet penetration; and to indicate US economic help would be forthcoming in the event of a UK/Argentine agreement. UN Negotiations: the Argentines may not be engaged in a charade, there may be something more to it.

2. US Guarantee: Haig did not volunteer an American guarantee within the context of a UN plan. HM Ambassador judges that the prospects for a US guarantee depends on some measure of US involvement in any interim settlement.

UN(a) Argentine Position Paper

3. The Secretary-General has given us an Argentine paper which is viewed by them as a 'package'. The Secretary-General told the Argentines it would be unacceptable to the UK.

(b) Further Details which emerged from Discussion with Secretary-General

4. Prejudging the Outcome: Sir A Parsons disagreed with the Secretary-General's assessment that the Argentine language met our concerns. Secretary-General agreed to convey to the Argentines the points made by Sir A Parsons in rebuttal and to try to 'clarify' the Argentine position on non-prejudgement. South Georgia: Sir A Parsons declined the Secretariat suggestion that withdrawal would be a 'painless gesture'. Interim Administration: Argentine proposal was unacceptable. The Secretariat suggested that the UK viewpoint might be met if the Councils, or at least the Legislative Council, were retained in an advisory capacity. Sir A Parsons agreed to

/put

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put this to London. Verification: Secretary-General responded positively to idea of UN using surveillance aircraft of neutral state. Size of Zones for Withdrawal: Argentines are now proposing total withdrawal of UK forces to a point 2,000 nautical miles from the Islands in parallel with their own partial withdrawal of 150 miles. Target Date for Conclusion of Negotiations: Argentines have referred specifically to the negotiations perhaps needing to continue until February 1983.

(c) Conclusions of the Meeting Sir A Parsons/Secretary-General

5. Sir A Parsons said we still hope to reach the stage where the Secretary-General could produce proposals of his own on the basis of the UK and Argentine positions. Meanwhile, the question of non-prejudgement was for us the key to everything. The Argentine formula was not acceptable. We had to insist on the additional phrase 'without prejudicing the outcome of the negotiations'. Sir A Parsons says that the Secretary-General is in a sombre mood and he believes the Secretary-General has concluded that he is not engaged in a serious negotiation with a genuine chance of a successful outcome.

(d) Sir A Parsons' Assessment and Recommendations

6. Sir A Parsons is close to believing that the Argentines are not interested in reaching a negotiated settlement in terms which would be acceptable to us and that it is rapidly becoming a question of who wrong foots whom when the negotiations break down. Sir A Parsons recommends that his tactics should be to give the Argentines a last chance to demonstrate a genuine change of heart and, if the negotiations are to fail, leaving us on the right foot. Specifically he would tell the Secretary-General today:-

- (a) we would only negotiate details of interim arrangement when we were sure we were discussing a genuine interim arrangement;
- (b) there would be no point in his proposing further language on interim arrangements before the Secretary-General extracts a specific Argentine formulation on non-prejudgement of negotiations;
- (c) that the Argentine formulation ((b) above) would be referred to London to see if it offered hope of a satisfactory outcome on this basic point. In the light of our review we would then decide whether it would be worth continuing with the present exercise.

Instructions to Sir A Parsons (FCO Telno.377 of 10 May) are at Flag F.

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Comments


7. Mr Haig's assessment of the situation has, to say the least, odd features: and the actual purpose of General Walters's journey to Buenos Aires today is far from clear. What is apparent is that the American assessment of the situation gives first weight to their own strategic and regional interests: and that Haig is determined to stay in the act.

8. The Argentine position with the Secretary-General has so far provided no evidence for Mr Haig's belief in a genuine Argentine willingness to compromise. The Argentine paper seems entirely tactical and designed to win maximum presentational marks in the UN forum. Sir A Parsons has rightly focussed on the essential need for acceptable language on the terms of reference for negotiations: the risk is that we shall be seen in the UN to be threatening the outcome of the Secretary-General through semantic quibbling.

9. Sir A Parsons's insistence on an improved formulation on non-prejudgment of an outcome to negotiations has for the moment put the ball back in the Secretary-General's court. But we shall be required to react quickly to the package as a whole once the Secretary-General has reported back. Points for immediate consideration are:

- (a) whether in a package we should insist on the exclusion of the Dependencies;
- (b) the Secretary-General's suggestion that the Executive and Legislative Councils should exist in an advisory capacity;
- (c) paragraph 5 of the Argentine paper (freedom of transit and residence);
- (d) paragraph 4 of the Argentine paper which introduces the concept of UK and Argentine 'observers' and flags;
- (e) how far we could go on distance of withdrawal of the task force.

10. We shall need to send Sir A Parsons further instructions today.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

11 May 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 HOURS, 11 MAY

UN

1. Sir A Parsons attended a meeting yesterday evening with Sr Perez de Cuellar at which there were further detailed discussions on the negotiations. Reporting on the latest round of negotiations, UKMIS New York have said in reply to press enquiries (telno. 706) that much ground remains to be covered. The UK has set no deadline for the talks which, together with Sr Perez de Cuellar, we are pursuing with the greatest possible urgency. We are still not assured that the Argentines would forego pre-judging the sovereignty issue in negotiations.
2. Since the Argentine invasion Sir A Parsons has given periodic briefings to the Ten and separately to the Old Commonwealth Colleagues. Yesterday, the Old Commonwealth Colleagues confirmed from their own contacts among UN delegations that there has been no change in attitude towards us. There was still much sympathy for our position.

Naval Incident

3. At approximately 0530 hours this morning MOD issued a press statement announcing that during the night a surface vessel from the Task Force engaged with guns another vessel well inside the TEZ. There was an explosion from the vicinity of the other vessel. Further details are not yet available.

NAM

4. Fidel Castro, as President of NAM, is reported to have sent a message to Heads of States of all NAM Members calling on them to take steps to delay imminent British action against Argentina (Havana telno. 139).

Repatriation of POWs via Montevideo

5. Our Embassy in Montevideo has reported (telno. 283) that it appears that the ICRC has given wrong information to the Uruguayans that the POWs are expected to arrive today rather than on 13 May. Action is being taken to ensure that the Uruguayans are given the correct information.

Military Junta declares British ships in South Atlantic hostile

6. Overnight the Military Junta in Buenos Aires issued Communiqué No. 40 which declared that in view of Britain's great persistence in its aggressive attitude it invoked the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and declared that ships under British flag sailing in the South Atlantic towards the area of operations would be considered hostile and therefore be treated accordingly.

11 May 1982

Emergency Unit



Handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'M'. There is also a dark circular mark on the left side of the document.

*With
the Compliments of
Sir Frank Cooper, G.C.B., C.M.G.
Permanent Under-Secretary of State*


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PART 16 begins:-

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