

5  
806

PREM 19/630

relations with Argentina


Position of the Falkland Islands

PART 19.

ARGENTINA

Part 1: Sept 1979

Part 19: May 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
24.5.82							
- ends -							
 <p>PREM 19/630</p>							

PART 19 ends:-

24-5-82

PART 20 begins:-

25-5-82



## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 24 May 1982, columns  
647-652

Signed Wayland Date 19 April 2012

**PREM Records Team**





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 May, 1982

Prime Minister

Agree that message may  
be sent? A.S.C. 24/5

Dear John,

M amended  
M

Falkland Islands: Message to the Prime Minister from President  
Guzman of the Dominican Republic

President Guzman of the Dominican Republic has sent a message to the Prime Minister. I enclose a translation. The message is rhetorical and makes no specific proposals. The Dominican Republic has not so far played any forward role during the crisis and carries little influence in Latin America.

We understand from our Ambassador in Santo Domingo that a similar message has been sent to President Galtieri, with copies to the UN Secretary-General.

I enclose a draft telegram to Santo Domingo containing a proposed reply from the Prime Minister to President Guzman. Mr Pym has not been able to see this draft himself.

Yours ever


John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

210

cc PS/10 Downing St  
PS/FCO  
PS/MOD



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

cc Mr Gillespie  
Mr LP Wright  
Mr Hyde  
Mrs Hitler  
Mr Heahan  
Mr Grant  
Mr Soden

From Rt Hon Dame Judith Hart

24 May, 1982

Dear Willie,

Miss Daniels

A.T.C. 26/5.

Thank you for your letter of 20 May about Senor Esquivel's visit to Britain.

I am afraid your decision to allow him to come is too late. He returned to Argentina from Geneva on 20 May.

I regret your delay in responding to my request of some four weeks ago.

Yours sincerely,

William

Rt Hon William Whitelaw MP



25 MAY 1987

1 2 3 4  
5 6 7 8 9



OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

EN CLAIR

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE DESKBY 231330Z

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 UNCLASSIFIED  
4  
5 DESKBY 231330Z  
6 FM FCO 221100Z MAY 82  
7 TO IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER 21

80

9 MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
10 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  
11 1. You will wish to know that on 22 May No 10 received a  
12 message in Spanish, and through commercial channels, from  
13 the President.  
14 Text of message begins:  
15 Her Excellency Mrs Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great  
16 Britain and Northern Ireland, London, SW1.  
17 The Government of the Dominican Republic, having regard for the  
18 latest statements made by the UN Secretary General, feels it  
19 necessary to express its great concern over the South Atlantic  
20 problem involving two friendly States, the United Kingdom and  
21 the Argentine Republic. The Dominican Republic is very deeply  
22 concerned that the efforts made to date have failed to secure  
23 any formula for the solution of the conflict.  
24 The Government over which I am honoured to preside and the  
25 people of the Dominican Republic will not waver in their moral

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword	and
File number	Dept	Distribution <i>Falklands General</i>	
EMERGENCY	UNIT		
Drafted by (Block capitals) E J HUGHES			
Telephone number 233-4485			
Authorised for despatch <i>E J Hughes</i>			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

EN CLAIR

Page

2

1 <<<<  
 2 and juridical support for a search for a solution. I still  
 3 trust that a formula can be found which will halt the military  
 4 confrontation, thus sparing the world community from catastrophe,  
 5 and that the principles of the United Nations organization can  
 6 be reaffirmed without weakening those established by the inter-  
 7 American regional system. My Government's foreign policy will  
 8 continue to be unswerving in its desire to see the reaffirm-  
 9 ation of those principles which constitute the bonds of peace  
 10 and unity between all States, as well as the re-establishment  
 11 of normality through negotiations.  
 12 I appeal to Your Excellency to make a supreme effort to preserve  
 13 peace and continue negotiations with a view to reaching a just,  
 14 worthy and honourable understanding for both sides.  
 15 Please be assured of my highest and most distinguished regards.  
 16 Antonio Guzman, President of the Dominican Republic.  
 17 Ends.

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 19 PYM  
 20 NNNN  
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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# OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

RESTRICTED

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

1 ZCZC

2 GRS

3 RESTRICTED

4

5

6 FM FCO

7 TO IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO

8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9 INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

10 MY TELNO 21 (NOT TO ALL) AND YOUR TELNO 43: MESSAGE FROM

11 PRESIDENT GUZMAN

12 Please deliver the following reply from the Prime Minister  
13 to President Guzman.

14 2. Begins: I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your  
15 message. I appreciate your deep concern over the situation in  
16 the South Atlantic. It is a concern which I fully share. ~~I~~  
17 ~~also share your hope that a peaceful solution can be found even~~  
18 ~~at this late stage.~~ The tragic conflict which has developed has  
19 not been of the United Kingdom's seeking. Over the seven weeks  
20 since Argentina launched its unprovoked and unlawful aggression  
21 against the small and peaceful population of the Falkland  
22 Islands, the British Government have sought urgently, and with  
23 open-mindedness and flexibility, to reach a peaceful negotiated  
24 settlement, based on the fundamental principles of international  
25 law and of the United Nations Charter - principles to which all

NNNN ends  
telegram

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Catchword

democratic

File number

Dept

Distribution

Private Office

Falklands General

Drafted by (Block capitals)

J E Holmes

Telephone number

233 4641

Authorised for despatch

Comcen reference

Time of despatch



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

RESTRICTED

Page

2.

1 ZCZC

2 democratic nations must attach the greatest importance. The  
 3 road to a peaceful solution has regrettably been blocked by  
 4 Argentina. Argentina has shown no readiness to comply with the  
 5 Security Council's mandatory Resolution 502 and to withdraw  
 6 its forces; instead it has sought only to consolidate its  
 7 aggression and to prevaricate in negotiation. The United  
 8 Kingdom has throughout made clear its determination to bring  
 9 to bear all necessary diplomatic, economic and military  
 10 pressures on Argentina so as to bring to an end its occupation.  
 11 We have at every stage stated our position with clarity; and,  
 12 using our right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United  
 13 Nations Charter, have confined ourselves to using only what  
 14 force proved necessary to achieve an Argentine withdrawal and to  
 15 protect our Task Force.

16 3. It is still open to Argentina to comply with the clearly  
 17 expressed international will and to withdraw its forces in  
 18 accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, bringing to an  
 19 end the present dangerous conflict. I hope that Your  
 20 Excellency can do all in your power to persuade the Argentine  
 21 Government of this. You would be making a major contribution  
 22 to the cause of peace. Ends

23  
 24 PYM

25 NNNN

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NNNN ends  
 telegram

BLANK

Catchword





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 May 1982

Prime Minister  
 Content with this message as  
 amended?

A. J. C.  $\frac{24}{5}$ 

Dear John.

Falkland Islands: Message to the Prime Minister from the  
 President of Colombia

The Colombian Ambassador delivered to the FCO on 22 May a message from President Turbay. The original was sent to you on 22 May, but I enclose a copy for reference. Although delivered on 22 May, the message appears to have been composed before the news broke about the British landings on 21 May.

The Colombian Ambassador called at the FCO again on 23 May, on instructions from his President, to urge that an early reply be sent to the message, particularly since President Galtieri had already replied (the Ambassador could give no details of this reply). The Ambassador relayed President Turbay's fears that the conflict could have not only grave consequences for British and European relations with South America in general but also for inter-American institutions and democracy in the region. Now that Britain was again in strength on the Islands, there might be a new opportunity to begin a new round of talks. The Colombians wished to do all they could to promote negotiations and end the hostilities: Colombia had a profound wish to preserve its friendly relations with both parties.

Since the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, Colombia has maintained a moderate position even when that has meant departing from the ranks of Latin American solidarity, eg in abstaining on the resolution adopted by the Rio Treaty signatories on 28 April. She is proud of her democratic traditions in a region not noted for them.

The President's message, although it contains nothing specific which could usefully be built on in present circumstances, was clearly sent with the best of intentions and it deserves a full reply. With further Rio Treaty action possible this week, it will be important for us that Colombia continues to act as a counterweight to the more extreme Latin American positions.

/I enclose



/ I enclose a suggested draft reply to President Turbay, which we would propose, if the Prime Minister agrees, to transmit to him through our Ambassador in Bogota. It would be helpful if this could be sent today, given the evident Colombian anxiety for an early reply.

Mr Pym has not seen this draft.


*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

*J E Holmes*

A J Coles Esa  
10 Downing Street





EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA

C O P Y  
-----

"BOGOTA, 21 DE MAYO DE 1982

SEÑORA MARGARET THATCHER  
PRIMER MINISTRO DEL REINO UNIDO  
LONDRES.

APRECIADA PRIMER MINISTRO:

CONOCE BIEN VUESTRO GOBIERNO CUAL HA SIDO LA POSICION QUE EL GOBIERNO COLOMBIANO HA ADOPTADO EN EL CONFLICTO ENTRE VUESTRA PATRIA Y LA ARGENTINA ALREDEDOR DE LA SOBERANIA DE LAS ISLAS MALVINAS. NO FUIMOS PARTIDARIOS DE LA CONVOCATORIA DEL ORGANO DE CONSULTA POR CONSIDERAR QUE ANTES QUE INTENTAR APLICAR LAS MEDIDAS PREVISTAS EN EL TIAR RESULTABA ABSOLUTAMENTE INDISPENSABLE AGOTAR TODOS LOS RECURSOS POLITICOS, JURIDICOS Y DIPLOMATICOS PARA EVITAR UNA GUERRA DE IMPREVISIBLES CONSECUENCIAS NO SOLO POR EL NUMERO DE VICTIMAS INOCENTES SACRIFICADAS EN LA CONFRONTACION ARMADA, SINO POR LAS GRAVES TENSIONES QUE SE PRESENTARIAN ENTRE VUESTRO PAIS Y LATINÓAMERICA QUE COMPARTE A ESCALA UNIVERSAL CON EL REINO UNIDO LA DEFENSA DEL SISTEMA DEMOCRATICO.

SE QUE YA SE HAN PRODUCIDO LOS PRIMEROS ENCUENTROS MILITARES ENTRE ARGENTINOS Y BRITANICOS Y CONTEMPLA CON HORROR LA EXTENSION DE LA GUERRA Y SUS FATALES CONSECUENCIAS. PIENSA MI GOBIERNO QUE LAS NACIONES DEMOCRATICAS TIENEN LA OBLIGACION DE FORTALECER EL SISTEMA CONTRA LOS RIESGOS QUE LO AMENAZAN Y DICHA FINALIDAD NO SE LOGRA A NUESTRO JUICIO DEBILITANDONOS EN GUERRAS CRUENTAS Y ESTERILES, SINO REVISTIENDONOS DE LA PACIENCIA NECESARIA PARA DIALOGAR HASTA ENCONTRAR UN PUNTO DE APROXIMACION QUE LE DEVUELVA AL MUNDO LA CONFIANZA EN LA ELIMINACION DE LOS PELIGROS DE UNA NUEVA CONFLAGACION.

SON MUCHAS LAS FORMULAS QUE PODRIAN SERVIR SI NO PARA RESOLVER DESDE EL PRINCIPIO LA TOTALIDAD DEL PROBLEMA, POR LO MENOS PARA AVANZAR EN NUEVOS CONTACTOS DIPLOMATICOS QUE PERMITAN TRABAJAR SOBRE EL CAMINO DE LAS SOLUCIONES PACIFICAS.

ESTOY ENTERADO DE QUE EL PRESIDENTE DEL PERU HA ENVIADO A VUESTRO GOBIERNO Y AL DE LA ARGENTINA UNA PROPUESTA QUE PODRIA DAR PIE A MAS AVANZADAS CONVERSACIONES. ESA FORMULA U OTRA CUALQUIERA QUE HAGA POSIBLE EL ALEJAMIENTO DEL PELIGRO DE LA GUERRA, OBIVIAMENTE ESTIMULA NUESTRO INTERES DE DEMOCRATAS. EL GOBIERNO

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EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA

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
COLOMBIANO QUE HA OBSERVADO UNA POSICION DE RESPETO A SU TRADICION JURIDICA CREE QUE EL VUESTRO ENTENDERA MUY BIEN LA PREOCUPACION QUE A COLOMBIA LE ASISTE PARA ENCONTRAR SOLUCIONES PACIFICAS QUE EVITEN QUE SE AGRAVE EL YA BIEN PELIGROSO CONFLICTO ENTRE EL REINO UNIDO Y LA ARGENTINA.

DESDE AHORA OFRECEMOS LA COADYUVANCIA DEL GOBIERNO DE COLOMBIA PARA LA FORMULA DE PAZ QUE MEJOR SE ACOMODE A LOS INTERESES DE LA GRAN BRETAÑA Y DE LA ARGENTINA, PAISES A LOS CUALES NOS SENTIMOS UNIDOS POR VIEJOS Y FUERTES VINCULOS.

ME SUSCRIBO COMO VUESTRO CORDIAL AMIGO,

JULIO CESAR TURBAY-AYALA  
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA."





EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA

INFORMAL TRANSLATION

Bogotá, 21st May 1982.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister  
London

Dear Prime Minister,

Your Government is well aware of the position that the Colombian Government has adopted in the conflict between your country and Argentina on the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands. We did not agree to the convocation of the Organ of Consultation as we felt that before trying to apply the measures provided for in the TIAR (Interamerican Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance) it was absolutely essential to exhaust every political, juridical and diplomatic resource in order to avoid a war of unforeseeable consequences, not only because of the number of innocent victims that would be sacrificed in an armed confrontation, but also because of the very serious tensions that would arise between your country and Latin America, a continent that shares the defence of the worldwide democratic system with the United Kingdom.

I know that the first military clashes between the Argentines and the British have already taken place, and I regard the escalation of the war and its fatal consequences with horror. My Government believes that democratic nations have the obligation of strengthening the system against the risks threatening it and, in our opinion, this aim is not achieved by weakening ourselves in unproductive wars involving

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EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA

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a lot of bloodshed, but rather through endowing ourselves with the necessary patience to persevere in dialogues until it is possible to find suitable meeting points which would restore the world's confidence in the elimination of the dangers of a new conflagration.

There are many formulas that could be useful, if not to resolve the whole problem from the outset, at least to make progress in new diplomatic contacts which would allow peaceful solutions to be worked towards.

I am aware that the President of Perú has sent your Government and the Argentine one a proposal which could lead to more advanced talks. This proposal or any other which might drive away the danger of war is obviously of interest to us as democrats. The Colombian Government that has always maintained a position of respect to its own juridical tradition believes that your Government will well understand the concern prompting Colombia to find peaceful solutions that would avoid the escalation of the already very dangerous conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina.

From now on we offer the Colombian Government's assistance for the achievement of a peace formula which would be in the best interests of both Great Britain and Argentina, countries to which we feel linked by old and strong ties.

Yours sincerely,

JULIO CESAR TURBAY-AYALA  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA "



OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC 1 ZCZC  
 GRS 2 GRS  
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
 CAVEATS 4  
 DESKBY 5  
 FM FCO 6 FM FCO  
 PRE/ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE **BOGOTA**  
 TEL NO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 RFI UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON  
 10 MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TURBAY  
 11 1. Please deliver, as soon as possible, the following reply  
 12 from the Prime Minister.  
 13 BEGINS:  
 14 Dear Mr President,  
 15 I was most grateful for your thoughtful message of 21 May  
 16 about the Falkland Islands. We have been much aware in recent  
 17 weeks of the constructive approach which you and your  
 18 Government have adopted towards this tragic ~~affair.~~ *situation.* I share  
 19 ~~your sorrow that blood has been shed and your hope that, even~~  
 20 ~~at this late stage, the way to a peaceful solution can be found.~~  
 21 I agree wholeheartedly with you that it should be for  
 22 democratic nations to set the world an example, by the patience  
 23 with which they pursue peaceful negotiations and by their  
 24 reluctance to resort to military force. I am sure you will  
 25 recognise that in the seven weeks of negotiations in which we

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File number	Dept	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

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have engaged in good faith since Argentina invaded British territory, we have shown the greatest patience, as well as the utmost open-mindedness and flexibility consistent with the basic principles of international law and of the United Nations Charter. These are principles which Britain and Colombia, as democratic nations, share.

8

The difficulty throughout has been Argentina's refusal to match our constructive approach. President Galtieri and his colleagues have rejected every proposal which has been put to them which would have led to a ceasefire coupled with a withdrawal of Argentine forces, as required by Security Council Resolution 502. ~~We remain ready to consider any~~

*validity of principle*

14

~~proposal from any quarter which offers a real possibility of~~

15

~~a [satisfactory negotiated] solution of this crisis~~ We looked closely and urgently at President Belaunde's recent proposals, which you mention, and I remain grateful to President Belaunde for his continued concern and active interest.

19

The essential first stage must however be a firm indication that Argentina is ready to comply with Security Council Resolution 502 and withdraw its forces from the Islands. ~~Negotiations could then resume in good faith on a~~

23

~~basis which did not predetermine or prejudge their outcome.~~

24

It is because there has hitherto been no sign that Argentina is willing ~~to take these steps~~ ~~so to negotiate~~ that we have been obliged to

26

increase our military, as well as our diplomatic and economic, pressure on Argentina. We have at every stage in this conflict stated our position with clarity, and have confined ourselves to using the absolute minimum of force necessary to impose pressure on Argentina, and to protect our own forces, ~~in~~ *and to restore the rights of the 11 islands*

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accordance with our rights of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

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I share your own anxieties on the possible effect of this crisis on relations between my country and those of Latin

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NNNN ends telegram

BLANK

Catchword

America



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Page

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1 <<<<  
 2 America. As you know, we attach great importance to our  
 3 relations with the region and our consistent objective has been  
 4 to foster and strengthen them. It is no wish of ours that they  
 5 should be put at risk. But I hope that you can agree that no  
 6 country should be allowed to seek a resolution of territorial  
 7 disputes by force, if democratic freedoms are to be maintained.  
 8 If aggression is not firmly resisted, the consequences  
 9 throughout the world would be grave.

10 The point at issue has been and remains Argentine  
 11 aggression. No-one regrets more than I do that Argentina has  
 12 so far resisted all our efforts to achieve a peaceful  
 13 settlement. We have never wanted to resort to military  
 14 action: but Argentine obduracy has left us no choice. The  
 15 decision to end the present conflict rests squarely with  
 16 Argentina.

17 If you, Mr President, can bring home to the Argentine  
 18 Government not only the extent of our determination to achieve  
 19 a just solution to this crisis, but also the imperative need  
 20 to withdraw their forces from the Falkland Islands in  
 21 accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, you would be  
 22 making a contribution to the peace of South America and of the  
 23 world which it would be hard to exaggerate.  
 24 Yours sincerely, Margaret Thatcher.

25 ENDS

27 PYM

28 NNNN

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NNNN ends  
 telegram

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Catchword

24 MAY 1962

ESTL  
1962  
MAY 24

1962



GRS 440

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM PARIS 241700Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 541 OF 24 MAY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK.

FALKLANDS : FRENCH ATTITUDE

1. SPEAKING ABOUT THE FALKLANDS IN THE COURSE OF A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 24 MAY IN THE IVORY COAST, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IS QUOTED BY LE MONDE AS SAYING THAT " BRITAIN IS OUR ALLY, IT IS A COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE HAVE LIVED OVER THE COURSE OF THIS CENTURY THROUGH THE MOST TRAGIC MOMENTS OF OUR EXISTENCE. WE HAVE LIVED THROUGH A PERIOD OF INTENSE SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN AND BRITAIN WITH US. ALL THESE LINKS BETWEEN US CANNOT BE AT THE MERCY OF EVENTS, HOWEVER REGRETTABLE, SUCH AS THOSE GOING ON AT THE MOMENT". AFTER DESCRIBING LATIN AMERICAN VIEWS THAT BRITAIN'S BEHAVIOUR WAS COLONIALIST AS "RATHER EXCESSIVE", MITTERRAND WENT ON: "FRANCE HAS VERY STRONG STRONG LINKS WITH LATIN AMERICA WHICH GO BEYOND TRADE LINKS, WHICH DERIVE FROM FACTORS OF CIVILISATION. WE THEREFORE WANT THE FRIENDSHIP OF THESE PEOPLES, WE HAVE IT AND WE DON'T WANT TO LOSE IT". MITTERRAND ADDED THAT THE ARGENTINE INITIATIVE HAD OFFENDED "BRITAIN , OUR FRIEND" IN ITS INTERESTS AND ITS PRIDE. HE OBSERVED THAT FROM THE MOMENT WHEN BRITAIN IT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FAIT ACCOMPLI IN THE FALKLANDS, ITS FLEETS COULD NOT RETURN HOME WITHOUT FULFILLING ITS MISSION WHICH COULD NOT BE JUST ONE OF INTIMIDATION. MITTERRAND CONCLUDED : "FRANCE WILL ALWAYS BE A FIRM SUPPORTER OF A RETURN TO A JUST PEACE ("PAIX DANS LE RESPECT DU DROIT"). THIS MEANS THAT EVERYTHING THAT MIGHT BE DONE AND SAID TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END TO THE FIGHTING WHILE RESPECTING THE LAW WILL BE DONE BY FRANCE. HOWEVER WE WILL NOT DO IT OUT OF INDULGENCE TOWARDS ONE PARTY OR THE OTHER, WE WILL DO IT BECAUSE THE RETURN TO A JUST PEACE IS A CONSTANT THEME OF FRENCH DIPLOMACY". IN THIS CONNECTION, MITTERRAND RECALLED FRANCE'S ATTACHMENT TO RESOLUTION 502.

2. SPEAKING IN SIMILAR VEIN AT AIX-EN-PROVENCE ON 23 MAY, THE FRENCH DEFENCE MINISTER SAID " IF WE WANT PEACE THAT MEANS A JUST PEACE ALLOW THE DEFENCE MINISTER TO SAY IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE AGRASSOR IS ARGENTINA, AND THE VICTIM IS BRITAIN, AND THAT BRITAIN IS DEFENDING ITS RIGHTS".

3. HERNU IS ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY OFFICIAL REQUEST FROM MR NOTT OR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE LOAN OF FRENCH PLANES TO BRITAIN. HE WAS COMMENTING ON REPORTS STEMMING APPARENTLY FROM A CLAIM

/MARCEL



RESTRICTED

MARCEL DASSAULT HAD MADE ON THE RADION THAT BRITAIN HAD ASKED FOR THE LOAN OF SUPER-ETANDARDS AND MIRAGES TO STUDY THEIR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.

4. FRENCH PRESS COVERAGE OF THE PANDINGS HAS BEEN REASONABLY FAVOURABLE. LE FIGARO AND LE QUOTIDIEN ( BOTH RIGHT-WING ) HAVE CARRIED STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE EDITORIALS AND EVEN LE MONDE IN ITS EDITORIAL ON 23 MAY ADMITTED THAT WHATEVER ARGENTINA'S RIGHTS MIGHT BE OVER THE FALKLANDS IT HAS BEEN THE AGGRESSOR.  
FRETWELL

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

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CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

2

RESTRICTED



IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR GIFFARD  
MR URE  
HD/PCD  
HD/NAD  
HD/NEWS D DEPT  
HD/SAMD

MR BULLARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR COLLMORE

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG, CABINET OFFICE  
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. [MR COLES]

[passed EM. Jit]



RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 242150Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1879 OF 24 MAY.

FALKLANDS: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. AN ARTICLE IN TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST ARGUES THAT THE FALKLANDS WAR WILL EXPOSE AS SYMBOLISM WITHOUT SUBSTANCE THE ECONOMIC AND NATO SUMMITS TO BE ATTENDED BY THE PRESIDENT AND GOES ON TO SUGGEST THAT, IF THE FALKLANDS BATTLE IS RAGING ON 7 JUNE, THE PRESIDENT MAY DECIDE NOT TO GO TO LONDON, OR AT LEAST TO REDUCE HIS SCHEDULE IN BRITAIN. AN UNNAMED WHITE HOUSE ADVISER IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT EVEN THOUGH CERTAIN COMMITMENTS HAD BEEN MADE THE PRESIDENT'S PRESENCE IN LONDON COULD BE PRETTY UP-SETTING TO AMERICA'S LATIN AMERICAN FRIENDS.

2. DEEVER RANG ME TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN THE WASHINGTON POST STORY BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT ALL CONCLUDE THAT, IF THERE WERE SERIOUS FIGHTING AT THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, SOME OF THE MORE GLITTERING ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAMME MIGHT HAVE TO BE TONED DOWN, BY WHICH HE MEANT THAT THE BANQUET MIGHT NOT BE TELEVISED AND THAT THE PRESIDENT'S RIDE WITH THE QUEEN MIGHT HAVE TO BE CANCELLED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS ENQUIRIES, THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN HAS SAID THERE IS NOTHING TO THE WASHINGTON POST STORY AND THAT NO CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO ALTERING THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE. THE SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT WOULD BE AN ITEM OF CONCERN ON THE AGENDA. BUT THERE WOULD BE OTHER ISSUES AS WELL. THE PRESIDENT HAD AN EXTREMELY BUSY SCHEDULE DURING HIS EUROPEAN JOURNEY. HE WAS LOOKING TO THE NATO SUMMIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE. THE PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN MEETINGS WOULD BE EVEN MORE BENEFICIAL THIS TIME AROUND BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE HEADS OF STATE



CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER.

4. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAS SINCE BEEN ASKED WHETHER HE WAS PLANNING TO CANCEL OR CURTAIL HIS VISIT. HE REPLIED: QUOTE WE HAVEN'T SEEN ANYTHING AS YET THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT. OBVIOUSLY IF SOMETHING UNFORESEEN HAPPENED, WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER TO GO OR NOT. BUT NO, I SEE NO REASON. UNQUOTE

HENDERSON

NNNN



PRIME MINISTER

PM  
Seen

As at 8 o'clock there had been no attacks reported since the MOD issued their last statement.

Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad still had their unexploded bombs aboard. Further reports are awaited - the MOD may put out a further statement for the 10 o'clock news.

In the attacks reported earlier this afternoon:

2 Argentine aircraft were downed by Harriers  
3 by Rapiers  
2 by missiles from HMS Fearless  
1 aircraft was seen departing damaged.

Of the above, 2 were definitely Mirages. Of the remaining 5, the balance between Mirages and Skyhawks is not known because the attacking force was a mixture of both.

A.J.C.

24 May, 1982.



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39) TYPING

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR GNSLOW  
PS/PJS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF DEPT  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/EPD  
ED/ECD(3)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
EMERGENCY ROOM ✓  
RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MR ILETT ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )  
SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
DIO )  
RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

GRS 230

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 241606Z MAY 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 833 DATED 24 MAY 82  
AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN  
MY 2IPTS: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PANAMANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

NOTING WITH GREAT APPRECIATION THE EFFORTS BEING MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

EMPHASIZING THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.



EMPHASIZING THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

1. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO CEASE ALL FIRING AND TERMINATE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY IMMEDIATELY;
2. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO START IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) IN ALL OF ITS PARTS;
3. DECIDES THAT, IMMEDIATELY AND CONCURRENTLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, NEGOTIATIONS SHALL START BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

PARSONS

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

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 PS/ER HURD  
 PS/ER GNSLOW  
 PS/PJS  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
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 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE  
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 HD/ECD(E)  
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 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
 EMERGENCY ROOM ✓  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
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 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MR LETT ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
 MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
 DIO )

RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

*Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY*

*[Passed to E.R.]*  
*[Typists a.a.]*

*W*

GRS 240

**FLASH**

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 241626Z MAY 82  
 TO FLASH F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 835 DATED 24 MAY 82  
 AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, TOKYO, DUBLIN

ADVANCE COPY

*Japanese draft.*

MIPT: FALKLANDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

1. RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 502 (1982) CONCERNING THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ON THE FALKLAND ISLAND (ISLAS MALVINAS),
2. REGRETTING THAT RESOLUTION 502 HAS NOT YET BAEN IMPLEMENTED,
3. GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE STALEMATE OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENCES TO THE PARTIES, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DETERIORATING SITUATION

IN THE AREA



3. GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE STALEMATE OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENCES TO THE PARTIES, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN TH AREA,

4. REAFFIRMING THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN PARTICULAR NON-USE OF FORCE AND SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS,

1. URGES ONCE AGAIN THAT RESOLUTION 502 BE IMPLEMENTED IN ITS ENTIRETY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,

2. SUPPORTS ONCE AGAIN THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND REQUESTS HIM TO RENEW THE USE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES ON THE BASIS OF HIS PREVIOUS EFFORTS AS REPORTED IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE 2360TH MEETING OF THE COUNCIL WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVEING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND REALIZING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE,

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT REGULARLY TO THE COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

PARSONS

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1975  
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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

TYPING

PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR GNSLOW  
 PS/PJS  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE  
 HD/PUSD (Q)  
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 HD/NEWS DEPT  
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 HD/ECD(E)  
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 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
 EMERGENCY ROOM ✓  
 RESIDENT CLERK

FLASH

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MR ILETT ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
 MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
 DIO )

RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERG

NA

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

GR 420

FLASH

UNCLASSIFIED  
 FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 241604Z MAY 82  
 TO FLASH FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 832 OF 24 MAY  
 AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S/S PARTY)  
 INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN.  
 MIPT: FLAKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

ADVANCE COPY

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
 RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 502.  
 NOTING WITH THE DEEPEST CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION  
 OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS HAS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED.  
 HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO  
 THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS  
 WELL AS THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND  
 OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AT  
 THE SAME MEETING.

NOTING FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT THE EXTENT TO  
 WHICH POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD ALREADY BEEN  
 ESTABLISHED THROUGH HIS EFFORTS.



NOTING FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT THE EXTENT TO WHICH POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH HIS EFFORTS.

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION.
2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982.
3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION, AND, AS A FIRST STEP TO AGREE TO A COMPLETE SUSPENSION OF PRESENT HOSTILITIES FOR A PERIOD OF 72 HOURS.
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WITHIN THAT PERIOD, TO ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO THE NEGOTIATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CONTINUING CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE.
5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY THE END OF THE PERIOD INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 3.

PARSONS

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PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR GNSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE  
 HD/PUSD (2)  
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 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
 EMERGENCY ROOM  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
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 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
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 MR LETT ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )  
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 SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
 MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
 DIO )

RE 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERG

[Passed to E.R.]  
 [Typists a.a.]

GR 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 241625Z MAY 78  
 TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 834 OF 24 MAY

AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S/S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, TOKYO, DUBLIN.

MY TELNO 832: FALKLANDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE (WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS AND ON A PERSONAL BASIS) HAS PREPARED A DRAFT (TEXT IN MIFT) IN THE REALISATION THAT WE WOULD VETO THE PANAMANIAN AND IRISH TEXTS.

2. IT IS CERTAINLY PREFERABLE TO THE OTHER TWO TEXTS ALTHOUGH THE PHRASE "ON THE BASIS OF HIS PREVIOUS EFFORTS....." IS NOW OUT OF DATE, AND THE GENERAL MANDATE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BRING US UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO CEASE MILITARY ACTION (BUT THIS PRESSURE ALREADY EXISTS).

3. MEANWHILE OTUNNU (UGANDA) HAS TOLD PANAMA THAT, IF THEY GO AHEAD WITH THE DRAFT WITHOUT GIVING THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL A CHANCE TO MAKE AN INPUT (AS PANAMA DID LAST TIME) THEY WOULD HAVE "TO TAKE THE CONSEQUENCES".

4. IT IS GOING TO BE A DAY WITH RESOLUTIONS EMERGING FROM ALL POINTS IN THE WOODWORK FOLLOWED BY FRANTIC ATTEMPTS TO MARRY THE

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ADVANCE COPY



4. IT IS GOING TO BE A DAY WITH RESOLUTIONS EMERGING FROM ALL POINTS IN THE WOODWORK FOLLOWED BY FRANTIC ATTEMPTS TO MARRY THE VARIOUS TEXTS.

4. I NEED NO INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MOMENT. I WILL TRY TO PULL THE THREADS TOGETHER AT THE END OF THE DAY.

PARSONS

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TO DIRECTOR FBI WASHINGTON DC  
FROM SAC NEW YORK (100-100000)  
RE NEW YORK TELETYPE TO BUREAU  
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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

TYPING

PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR GNSLOW  
 PS/PJS  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE  
 HD/PUSD (2)  
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 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
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PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
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 SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
 MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
 DIO )  
 RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]  
 [Typists a.a.]

GRS 320

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 241602Z MAY 82  
 TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 831 DATED 24 MAY 82  
 AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)  
 INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN

MYTELNO 828: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

1. BEFORE THIS MORNING'S MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WERE HANDED ROUND INFORMALLY BY IRELAND AND PANAMA. THEIR TEXTS ARE IN MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FORMALLY TABLED. THERE IS ALSO TALK OF A UGANDAN DRAFT.

2. I AM CONTINUING TO TAKE THE LINE, WITH COLLEAGUES AND WITH THE PRESS, THAT ANY CEASEFIRE WHICH SIMPLY LEFT THE ARGENTINE FORCES ON THE ISLANDS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO



2. I AM CONTINUING TO TAKE THE LINE, WITH COLLEAGUES AND WITH THE PRESS, THAT ANY CEASEFIRE WHICH SIMPLY LEFT THE ARGENTINE FORCES ON THE ISLANDS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

3. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO CHEYSSON. CHEYSSON HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT ANYTHING TO HAPPEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE COMPLETED.

DE NANTEUIL REALISED THAT IF EITHER THE IRISH OR THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT WAS PUT TO THE VOTE WE WOULD VETO. HE WAS WORRIED THAT SOMETHING WOULD COME TO A VOTE BEFORE WE HAD 'CLEANED UP' THE ARGENTINES.

4. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED I HAVE SPOKEN TO DORR (IRELAND). HIS INTENTION IS:

(A) TO GET THE IRISH POSITION ON THE TABLE:

(B) TO PRE-EMPT PANAMA:

(C) TO OFFER (AS HE PUTS IT) A POSSIBLE WAY OUT IF BOTH PARTIES AT ANY TIME NEEDED IT.

I TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO VETO HIS RESOLUTION AS IT STOOD. HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THIS. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH HE MAY TABLE HIS DRAFT THIS AFTERNOON (24 MAY), FOR A POSSIBLE VOTE ON TUESDAY. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH YOU PERSONALLY.

PARSONS

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SECRET

*1 copy for P.U.S.D.*

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ZZ UKREP BRUSSELS

GRS 564

SECRET

FM FCO 24L330Z MAY 82

TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 456 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM PUS

WASHINGTON TELNO 1869: HAIG'S VIEWS ON THE FALKLANDS

*1 copy to Private Sec*

*Nº 10*

*Sir R Ambrose*

*Sir M Bell*

*Mr Giffard*

*Em Unit.*

*PS/POS*

THIS COPY FOR

1. OD(SA) THIS MORNING THOUGHT THAT SIR N HENDERSON SHOULD SPEAK TO HAIG AGAIN TODAY. I RECOMMEND THAT HE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING.

2. IT IS DISCONCERTING THAT HAIG SHOULD BE SO VOLATILE. AS HENDERSON HAS POINTED OUT, HAIG WAS URGING US ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION. HENDERSON SHOULD DO ALL HE CAN TODAY AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO KEEP HAIG STEADY. HE MAY WISH TO TRY THE TECHNIQUE OF ASKING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS (SOME ARE SUGGESTED BELOW) SO AS TO ENCOURAGE HAIG TO FOCUS ON THE ACTUAL SITUATION RATHER THAN TO INDULGE IN RAPIDLY CHANGING GENERALITIES.

3. HENDERSON SHOULD POINT OUT TO HAIG THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH BRIDGEHEAD IN THE FALKLANDS IS BOUND TO HAVE A MAJOR EFFECT ON OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION. PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION WOULD TOLERATE NOTHING LESS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN THE HOUSE ON 20 MAY THAT OUR DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS WITHDRAWN. WE CANNOT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDER THE IDEA OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. THE PARALLEL WITH OUR REPOSSESSION OF SOUTH GEORGIA, AFTER WHICH HAIG AGREED THAT THE DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT, IS OBVIOUS. HENDERSON SHOULD ADD THAT WE HOPE THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK'S INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE AMENDED (PARA 2 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 1870), IN THE SENSE THAT SHE WOULD VETO ANY RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT ALSO CALLING FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 502, OR ANY RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL.



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4. HENDERSON SHOULD CONTINUE THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO BRING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITH THE FEWEST POSSIBLE CASUALTIES, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT MADE CLEAR IN PARLIAMENT ON 20 MAY THAT WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. THE ESSENTIAL HOWEVER IS THAT ARGENTINA DEMONSTRATE A REAL CHANGE OF POSITION, FOR INSTANCE BY INDICATING A WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW WITHIN A FIXED TIME LIMIT.
5. HENDERSON SHOULD ASK HAIG WHETHER HE SEES ANY SIGN THAT ARGENTINA'S WILL TO CONTINUE FIGHTING MAY FAIL AND WHETHER, IF THIS HAPPENED, ARGENTINA WOULD CHANGE HER POSITION REGARDING SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.  
WHAT IS THE US EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES SAYING ON THESE POINTS?
6. HENDERSON COULD ALSO ASK HAIG ABOUT LIKELY EVENTS IN THE OAS AND WHETHER HAIG WOULD ATTEND ANY MEETING.
7. HENDERSON COULD POINT OUT THAT THE EC'S INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA IS A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN'S POLICIES IN THIS CRISIS. THE ADMINISTRATION TOO CAN GIVE A HELPFUL LEAD TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION, AND INDEED TO DOMESTIC OPINION IN THE US, BY CONTINUING TO REITERATE THAT ARGENTINA BEGAN THIS CRISIS BY COMMITTING AGGRESSION, AND THEN REFUSED FOR SEVEN WEEKS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY: AND THAT BRITAIN IS NOW ENGAGED, AS A LAST RESORT, IN USING MILITARY MEANS TO END THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION AND IS SUFFERING CASUALTIES IN THE PROCESS WHICH SHE WOULD FAR RATHER HAVE AVOIDED.  
OUR MILITARY ACTION IS IN NO WAY A REASON FOR THE US CLIMBING BACK ON THE FENCE. WE GREATLY HOPE THAT HAIG WILL BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS IN THIS SENSE.  
PYM



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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKREP BRUSSELS 241412Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2063 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS  
 BONN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO OSLO  
 OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON TOKYO ROUTINE STRASBOURG LISBON MADRID  
 UKMIS GENEVA

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION:

MEETING OF MINISTERS OF THE TEN, BRUSSELS 24 MAY 1982

FALKLANDS

SUMMARY

1. MINISTERS AGREED TO EXTEND THE IMPORT BAN FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD UNTIL THE SITUATION SHOULD PERMIT ITS REMOVAL; THIS TO BE DONE ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE DECISION AT LUXEMBOURG ON 17 MAY. THE COMMISSION WILL NOW PUT A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO COREPER AND THE DECISION WILL BE TAKEN AS A 'A' POINT IN THE COUNCIL.

2. THE PRESIDENCY IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS WILL CONFIRM THE TEN'S POSITION AS STATED AT LUXEMBOURG, AND IN PARTICULAR THEIR WISH TO SEE SCR 502 IMPLEMENTED AND THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.

DETAIL

3. MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION WAS BRIEF AND THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT. FOR THE UK YOU RECALLED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 21 MAY AND THE DOCUMENT PUBLISHED BY THE UK WHICH DEMONSTRATED HOW FAR THE UK HAD BEEN PREPARED TO GO IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THIS WAS NOT THE END OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. WE WERE READY TO TALK AT ANY TIME. HOWEVER THE ARGENTINE POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED IN ANY IMPORTANT WAY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WITHOUT SOME SIGN OF CHANGE THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT. THE MILITARY POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN. THE UK HAD USED MINIMUM FORCE IN ITS LANDINGS AND HAD SUFFERED LESS DAMAGE THAN EXPECTED.

4. GLESEN (DENMARK) SAID THAT THE DANISH SANCTIONS BILL WAS BEFORE



MINIMUM FORCE IN ITS LANDINGS AND HAD SUFFERED LESS DAMAGE THAN EXPECTED.

4. OLESEN (DENMARK) SAID THAT THE DANISH SANCTIONS BILL WAS BEFORE PARLIAMENT TODAY. IT IMPOSED NO TIME LIMIT. HE SUGGESTED THE COMMUNITY SHOULD DO THE SAME. CHEYSSON (FRANCE) AGREED. IT WOULD BE "SHOCKING" FOR THE COMMUNITY TO SUGGEST THAT IT EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE AS MUCH AS A MONTH TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE INSISTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DECLARATION TODAY BY THE TEN SINCE THIS WOULD EITHER CONSIST OF BANALITIES OR WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A POSITION ON QUESTIONS SUCH AS CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WERE DELICATE AND WERE CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

5. OTHERS WERE CONTENT TO ACCEPT AN EXTENSION OF A MONTH, OR INDEFINITELY, VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS) EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD BUT WITHDREW THIS WITHOUT PROTEST. ONLY COLOMBO (ITALY) WANTED A DECLARATION WHICH HE SAID SHOULD UNDERLINE THE POLITICAL UNITY OF THE TEN. IT WAS THEREFORE AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENCY SHOULD SPEAK BRIEFLY TO THE PRESS ON THE LINE IN PARA 1.

6. IN AN EARLIER MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE BULLARD GAVE A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE SITUATION, INCLUDING THE VARIOUS INITIATIVES FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION AND THE POSITION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE ASKED THAT MORE OF THE TEN SHOULD SPEAK THERE SO AS TO GIVE THE DEBATE A BETTER BALANCE. HE STRESSED THAT THE UK'S LANDING HAD CHANGED THE SITUATION FUNDAMENTALLY AND THOUGH THE UK REMAINED WILLING TO NEGOTIATE THE NEW SITUATION WOULD NEED TO BE REFLECTED IN ANY TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE.

7. OTHERS SAID THAT THEIR VIEWS WERE NOT CHANGED ON SANCTIONS AS WELL AS OTHER ASPECTS. ANDREANI (FRANCE) ASKED IF THE UK THOUGHT THE RESULTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS HAD COMPLETELY DISAPPEARED. HE ASKED HOW THE UK WOULD REACT TO A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS AND CALLING FOR THE PARTIES TO BUILD ON THE RESULTS OF THESE. OTHERS ECHOED THIS QUESTION.

8. BULLARD AND OTHERS SPEAKERS DREW ATTENTION TO THE UNDESIRABLE POLARISATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA WHICH SEEMED TO BE CREEPING INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. (IRELAND) STRESSED THAT THE IRISH APPROACH



8. BULLARD AND OTHERS SPEAKERS DREW ATTENTION TO THE UNDESIRABLE POLARISATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA WHICH SEEMED TO BE CREEPING INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. MACKERNAN (IRELAND) STRESSED THAT THE IRISH APPROACH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS TO TRY TO MOVE TOWARDS A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AS A BASIS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE REAFFIRMATION OF SCR 502 A, DIRECT OR INDIRECT CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, A FORMAL MANDATE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND POSSIBLY TO REPORT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ALREADY ACHIEVED IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS. IN REPLY BULLARD POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS HAD RESULTED IN AGREEMENT ONLY ON A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH COULD SET A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATION. THE MAIN POINTS OF SUBSTANCE WERE STILL FAR FROM SOLUTION WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD ADMITTED FAILURE. THE COST TO THE UK IN EFFORT AND LIVES OF THE MILITARY OPERATION COULD NOT BE IGNORED. IT WAS NOW DIFFICULT FOR EXAMPLE TO EXPECT THE UK TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE ISLANDS LEAVING ONLY A SMALL LIAISON OFFICE AS PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS NOT MEETING AT UK REQUEST AND THE UK WAS NOT CONVINCED ITS ACTIVITIES COULD BE HELPFUL. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND BEEN ABLE HITHERTO TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY WITHOUT A SPECIFIC SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE.

FCO ADVANCE TO:-

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BUTLER

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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39) 40 TYPING

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Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

HD/NAD

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

GRS 530

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 241549Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1873 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND BIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 830: FALKLANDS : U S PRESS EDITORIALS

FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL, TODAY'S WASHINGTON POST ALSO CARRIES AN EDITORIAL ABOUT THE FALKLANDS.

TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS :

BEGINS

WAR AIMS

SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG SUGGESTS THAT BRITAIN'S SUCCESSFUL LANDING ON THE FALKLANDS - PLUS THE SACRIFICES SUSTAINED BY BOTH SIDES - MAY MAKE ENOUGH OF A DIFFERENCE TO PERMIT NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME. SURELY HE IS RIGHT. IN ITS BRIDGEHEAD AND



SUCCESSFUL LANDING ON THE FALKLANDS - PLUS THE SACRIFICES SUSTAINED BY BOTH SIDES - MAY MAKE ENOUGH OF A DIFFERENCE TO PERMIT NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME. SURELY HE IS RIGHT. IN ITS BRIDGEHEAD AND IN ITS EVIDENT CAPACITY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS ASHORE, BRITAIN HAS SOMETHING REAL TO CONVERT INTO POLITICAL COIN. ARGENTINA MAY HOPE TO RAISE THE COST TO THE BRITISH AND LIMIT THEIR MILITARY GAINS, BUT IT CANNOT EXPECT TO BOOT THEM OFF THE ISLANDS AGAIN. THE 40 ISOLATED MARINES IT SWEEPED UP ON APRIL 2 ARE ONE THING: THE 5,000 TROOPS ASHORE, WITH THEIR FLEET PROTECTION, ARE QUITE ANOTHER.

MR HAIG TOLD CBS YESTERDAY THAT WHAT HELP ARGENTINA IS GETTING FROM ITS LATIN FRIENDS DID NOT YET AMOUNT TO MUCH AND THAT HE ACCEPTED AT FACE VALUE ARGENTINA'S WORD THAT IT IS NOT RECEIVING SOVIET ASSISTANCE. IT RUNS COUNTER TO JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING KNOWN ABOUT THE ARGENTINE JUNTA AND ARGENTINE PRIDE, HOWEVER, TO ASSUME THAT BUENOS AIRES WOULD FORGO AVAILABLE OUTSIDE AID IF IT FELT IT WERE FACING HUMILIATION IN ITS QUOTE MALVINAS UNQUOTE CAMPAIGN. PERU, FOR ONE, COULD HELP ON ONE LEVEL, THE SOVIET UNION ON ANOTHER. THAT COULD COMPLICATE THE CURRENT DETERMINATION OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, IN BACKING THE BRITISH, TO AVOID QUOTE ANOTHER SUEZ UNQUOTE. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER UNDERCUT HIS BRITISH AND FRENCH ALLIES WHEN THEY INVADED SUEZ IN 1956.

IN THAT CONNECTION, WE MUST ASK AGAIN: JUST WHAT IS BRITAIN FIGHTING FOR? MRS. THATCHER HAS MADE CLEAR THE PRINCIPLE, OR THE COLLECTION OF PRINCIPLES - DEMOCRACY, SELF DETERMINATION, RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION - BUT NOT THE INTEREST, NOR THE PARTICULAR OUTCOME, IT WISHES TO SEE IN THE FALKLANDS. HER FOREIGN SECRETARY, FRANCIS PYM, COULD HAVE CLARIFIED THIS MATTER YESTERDAY, ON ABC, BUT DID NOT. THE LONG-TERM ARRANGEMENTS TO BE MADE AFTER BRITISH TROOPS QUOTE REPOSSESS UNQUOTE THE ISLANDS, HE SAID, ARE QUOTE UNCERTAIN. UNQUOTE THERE WILL BE A BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SHORT RUN AND, IN THE LONG, QUOTE BROADER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. UNQUOTE LONDON WILL CONSULT WITH THE ISLANDERS AND WILL TALK WITH QUOTE MANY NATIONS UNQUOTE - HE DID NOT CITE ARGENTINA - ABOUT QUOTE SOME PATTERN OF DEFENSE. UNQUOTE MR. PYM APOLOGIZED A BIT FOR NOT BEING SPECIFIC. QUOTE HOW CAN I BE? UNQUOTE HE ASKED.

IN ALL DUE RESPECT TO AN ALLY UNDER DURESS, WE MUST ASK: HOW CAN HE NOT BE? DOES THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT EXPECT TO RETAIN THE SUPPORT IT NOW ENJOYS FOR WAR AIMS IT HAS YET TO DEFINE? DOES IT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY ULTIMATE WAY TO ENSURE THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS WITHOUT CONSULTING THE ARGENTINES DIRECTLY? IT WAS, AFTER ALL, INATTENTION TO THE ARGENTINE INTEREST AND THE ARGENTINE PASSION IN THE FIRST PLACE THAT GOT MRS. THATCHER INTO THE SITUATION SHE IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO REDEEM BY ARMS. SHE HAS RIGHT AND REASON TO OPPOSE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION BUT, NOW THAT SHE IS FIGHTING, SHE CANNOT IGNORE THE CENTRAL POLITICAL REALITY. THERE IS REALLY ONLY ONE OTHER



ATTEMPTING TO REDEEM BY ARMS. SHE HAS RIGHT AND REASON TO OPPOSE  
ARGENTINE AGGRESSION BUT, NOW THAT SHE IS FIGHTING, SHE CANNOT IGNORE  
THE CENTRAL POLITICAL REALITY: THERE IS REALLY ONLY ONE OTHER  
NATION WITH WHICH BRITAIN MUST WORK OUT THE FATE OF THE ISLANDS -  
ARGENTINA. THE SOONER THAT PROCESS CAN RESUME, THE FEWER MEN WILL  
DIE.

ENDS

HENDERSON

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PS/MR HURD  
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GRS 135

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 241552Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1874 OF 24 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)

YOUR TELNO 1034 : FALKLANDS : U S ASSISTANCE

1. AS YOU WILL BE AWARE, WEINBERGER ACTED IMMEDIATELY LAST NIGHT TO APPROVE THE SUPPLY OF THE LARGE AMOUNT OF AM2 AIRFIELD MATTING WE REQUESTED. AT HIS PERSONAL DIRECTION THE PENTAGON HAVE ALSO MOVED RAPIDLY OVER THE SUPPLY OF VULCAN PHALANX FOR OUR NEW CARRIER, THE LARGE AMOUNT OF PRE-FABRICATED ACCOMMODATION REQUIRED ON ASCENSION ISLAND AND THE CONVERSION OF S.S.STENA INSPECTOR AS AN AUXILIARY FOR THE TASK FORCE. THEY ALSO OFFERED ALL THE ASSISTANCE THEY COULD OVER THE WEEKEND WITH ADVICE ON DEFUSING THE UNEXPLODED BOMBS ON OUR FRIGATES. OUR VERY LARGE VOLUME OF REQUESTS FOR MATERIAL ARE BEING DEALT WITH PROMPTLY AND POSITIVELY. I HAVE EXPRESSED MY APPRECIATION TO WEINBERGER FOR ALL HE HAS BEEN DOING TO HELP.

HENDERSON



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

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MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
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1/B 241500Z

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PANAMA CITY 241312Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 241500Z MAY  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 84 OF 24 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 827 TO YOU. FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. I HAVE NOT YET SEEN ILLUECA'S STATEMENTS BUT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED PRESS HERE HAS INCREASINGLY INDULGED IN PERSONAL ATTACKS ON THE PRIME MINISTER. AN EDITORIAL IN CRITICA ON 22 MAY, FOR EXAMPLE, DESCRIBES HER AS A QUOTE HITLER WITH SKIRTS UNQUOTE WHOSE QUOTE INFINITE OBSTINACY UNQUOTE LEFT YOUNG IRISH REBELS TO DIE OF HUNGER.
2. THE TELEGRAM TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ABOUT WHICH, ON INSTRUCTIONS, I PROTESTED ON 14 MAY (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 80) WAS, WHOEVER THE AUTHOR, SIGNED BY ROYO AND ONE MUST ASSUME HE CONCURRED IN ITS LANGUAGE. I SUSPECT THAT HE IS EITHER UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO CURB ILLUECA AND I DOUBT WHETHER REPRESENTATIONS TO HIM WOULD BE ANY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THOSE MADE ON 14 MAY.
3. IF, HOWEVER, YOU DECIDE THAT ILLUECA'S OUTPOURINGS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PASS WITHOUT COMMENT YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER AS



3. IF, HOWEVER, YOU DECIDE THAT ILLUECA'S OUTPOURINGS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PASS WITHOUT COMMENT YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER, AS AN ALTERNATIVE, CALLING IN THE PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON AND DELIVERING A FORMAL PROTEST TO HIM. IF NEWS OF THIS WERE GIVEN TO THE MEDIA - ESPECIALLY THE NEWS AGENCIES - IT WOULD QUICKLY FIND ITS WAY TO PANAMA. WE COULD ALSO PASS THE TEXT OF ANY PROTEST NOTE TO THE PANAMANIAN MEDIA. WHILE THIS WILL NOT ENDEAR US TO ROYO AND ILLUECA OR WEAKEN PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA (OF WHICH THERE IS NO HOPE ANYWAY) IT MAY AT LEAST SERVE TO AROUSE DECENT PANAMANIAN OPINION AND THUS HELP CURB FURTHER EXCESSES.

FCO PLEASE PASS UKMIS NEW YORK

STEPHENSON

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

(38) 42

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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 242058Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1873 OF 24 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 456 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS

1. I SAW HAIG TODAY AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH ATTITUDE WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE: BUT NEVERTHELESS, ALTHOUGH IT WAS PRESUMPTUOUS OF HIM TO DO SO, HE FELT OBLIGED TO POINT OUT THAT THERE WERE LONG TERM ISSUES AT STAKE THAT MIGHT WELL BE JEOPARDISED IF A BREADTH OF VISION WERE NOT SHOWN AT THIS STAGE.

2. HE HIMSELF WAS CONVINCED THAT WE WOULD SUCCEED QUITE QUICKLY IN DEFEATING THE ARGENTINIAN GARRISON ON THE ISLANDS: BUT HE WAS ALSO CERTAIN THAT THIS WOULD NOT END THE PROBLEM. ON THE CONTRARY IT WOULD CREATE ANOTHER ONE THAT COULD GET US INTO



CONTRARY IT WOULD CREATE ANOTHER ONE THAT COULD GET US INTO INCREASING DIFFICULTIES UNLESS AN EFFORT WAS MADE NOW TO FORESTALL IT.

3. HAIG SPOKE OF THE VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS THAT WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE CORRIDORS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ONE OF THESE INVOLVED A CEASEFIRE AND RENEWAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MANDATE WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN VETOING THAT BUT THERE WERE OTHER RESOLUTIONS THAT INCLUDED WITHDRAWAL AS WELL AS A CEASEFIRE AND THAT ALSO PROPOSED, IN ONE RESOLUTION, AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION BY THE UN AND IN ANOTHER RESOLUTION THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTACT GROUP OF FOUR NATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE CHARTER. THESE, HAIG THOUGHT, WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE BUT HAIG SAID HIS MAIN PROBLEM WAS THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE RIO TREATY. THE ARGENTINIANS WERE CALLING THIS FOR NEXT THURSDAY UNLESS BY TOMORROW THERE HAD BEEN A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. HAIG'S CONCERN ABOUT THE RIO TREATY ORGANISATION WAS THAT THE USA MIGHT BECOME COMPLETELY ISOLATED IF IT OPPOSED THE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION THAT HE THOUGHT WOULD BE PUT DOWN. THE ONLY SUPPORT THEY MIGHT GET WOULD BE FROM GUYANA AND TRINIDAD. THIS ACTIVITY IN THE OAS WOULD REFLECT THE MOVEMENT, ABOUT WHICH HAIG SPOKE WITH GREAT CONCERN, OF LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY DEDICATED TO SUPPORTING ARGENTINA IN PREPARING FOR A WAR OF REVENGE AND OPENING THE WAY TO INCREASED SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

5. HAIG SAID THAT COSTA MENDEZ, WHOSE TREACHERY KNEW NO BOUNDS, WAS ADVOCATING THE ADOPTION BY BA OF A POLICY OF REBUILDING ARGENTINE MILITARY CAPABILITY WITH THE HELP OF THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS.

6. HAIG SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT, BY COMING DOWN ON THE BRITISH SIDE, HAD ALREADY GREATLY JEOPARDISED US INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA. WHAT WAS AT STAKE IN THE FUTURE WAS ENORMOUS. IT WAS NOT SIMPLY A QUESTION OF THE ECONOMIC SACRIFICES INVOLVED BUT OF THE ENORMOUS INCREASE IN SOVIET AND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.

7. I INTERJECTED THAT HAIG HAD TOLD ME SEVERAL TIMES THAT GALTIERI HAD ALWAYS PROMISED HIM THAT HE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE SOVIET OPTION. TO WHICH HAIG SAID THAT THINGS HAD MOVED ON FROM THERE. ARGENTINIANS WERE NOW DESPARATE AND WOULD BECOME MORE SO AND WOULD STOP AT NOTHING IN THE PURSUIT OF REVENGE.

8. HAIG'S PROBLEM THEREFORE WAS SOMEHOW TO AVOID A RESOLUTION



8. HAIG'S PROBLEM THEREFORE WAS SOMEHOW TO AVOID A RESOLUTION UNDER THE RIO TREATY LATER THIS WEEK THAT WOULD ISOLATE THE USA STILL FURTHER FROM THE REST OF THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE CLUE LAY IN CLOSE INVOLVEMENT WITH BRAZIL. HE IMPLIED THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE USA TO MAINTAIN A TOUGH STANCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF, BUT ONLY IF, THE USA COULD BE SEEN TO BE ACTIVE IN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE FALKLAND'S ISSUE ELSEWHERE. THE SAME APPLIED IN THE OAS. HAIG DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY GOOD COULD COME OF SOLUTIONS SUGGESTED EITHER BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE OAS, BUT THAT THIS DID NOT PRECLUDE GREAT DAMAGE TO THE USA IN BOTH ORGANISATIONS UNLESS THEY WERE SEEN TO BE PURSUING SOME ACTIVE LINE OF DIPLOMACY. HENCE HIS IDEA OF TRYING TO GET TOGETHER WITH BRAZIL TO FLOAT NEW IDEAS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

9. HAIG THEN SUGGESTED THE SORT OF PLAN WHICH I HAVE ALREADY HINTED TO YOU MIGHT BE IN HIS MIND (WASHINGTON TELNO 1873) CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL, US/BRAZILIAN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT PREJUDICE REGARDING THE FUTURE - IDEAS THAT I TOLD HAIG HAVE GONE DOWN IN LONDON LIKE A LEAD BALLOON.

10. HAIG REPEATED HIS VIEW ABOUT THE NEED TO KEEP THE BRAZILIANS IN PLAY. IF THIS DID NOT HAPPEN THE OAS WOULD GET OUT OF CONTROL AND THIS WOULD SPELL THE END OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR WHICH THE USA WOULD BE BLAMED. AGAIN HE DILATED UPON THE GREAT DANGERS OF INCREASED SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. IT WOULD BE A DISASTER IF THE OUTCOME OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WAS AN INTENSIFICATION OF COMMUNISM AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. HE QUITE REASLISED THE DIFFICULTY FOR US IN CONTEMPLATING WITHDRAWAL AT THIS STAGE. NEVERTHELESS HE BELIEVED THAT WE COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE REMAINING ON THE ISLANDS IN GREAT FORCE INDEFINITELY. IN THE LONG RUN THE ONLY SECURITY FOR THE ISLANDS WAS SOME AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE USA HAD PARTICIPATED. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, HAIG SAID, TO GET A US GUARANTEE FOR A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE.

11. I REMINDED HAIG HOW OFTEN HE HAD ASSURED ME THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ANOTHER SUEZ. IF THE US GOVERNMENT NOW TOOK ACTION WHICH COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF TRYING TO BRING OUR FORCES TO A HALT BEFORE THEIR MISSION WAS ACCOMPLISHED, THE CHARGE OF ANOTHER SUEZ COULD BE RAISED. FURTHERMORE CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICES HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE BY GREAT BRITAIN: THESE MUST NOT BE RENDERED VAIN BY PREMATURE TERMINATION OF THE TASK. I TOLD HAIG THAT WE NATURALLY RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE USA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS LATIN



PREMATURE TERMINATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE USA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBOURS. NEVERTHELESS HE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE POSSIBLE RISK TO RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE UK AND WESTERN EUROPE GENERALLY. I MENTIONED THE COMMUNITY'S EXTENSION OF ECONOMIC MEASURES.

12. HAIG SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED ALL THIS. THAT WAS WHY HE DID NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR BRITAIN: INDEED HE WANTED TO ACT NOW IN CONCERT WITH BRITAIN. HE WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT A JOINT APPEAL BY THE US AND BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENTS TO BOTH SIDES COULD BE DEVISED IN ADVANCE SO AS TO MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE TO BRITAIN. I REPEATED THAT IF HE WAS THINKING OF AN APPEAL FOR WITHDRAWAL BY BOTH SIDES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION THIS WAS JUST NOT ON. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINIANS NOT THE BRITISH. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WERE OUR TERRITORY. HOW WOULD IT BE IF THE CUBANS OCCUPIED PUERTO RICO AND WE THEN SAID THAT AS PART OF ANY SETTLEMENT THE AMERICANS MUST WITHDRAW AS WELL AS THE CUBANS. RESOLUTION 502 WAS THE SHEET-ANCHOR.

13. HAIG ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFICULTIES FOR US BUT INSISTED UPON THE NEED TO HAVE THE LONG-TERM IN MIND IN DECIDING ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HE ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM - BY WHICH I THINK HE MEANT EXERCISING PRESSURE ON US - WOULD HAVE TO BE FACED BY THE USA AT SOME STAGE SO PERHAPS IT WAS BETTER TO DO SO NOW. HE WOULD GIVE THE MATTER FURTHER THOUGHT IN THE LIGHT OF OUR CONVERSATION AND EITHER TRY TO SPEAK TO YOU ON THE SECRET TELEPHONE OR SEND YOU A MESSAGE.

14. I LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF FEELING IN LONDON AND THE CONVICTION THAT WE WERE NOW OPERATING ON A DIFFERENT BASIS FROM THAT OF THE EARLY STAGES OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS. HAIG SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE NOT LIKELY TO GET NOW THE TERMS THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE GOT HAD THEY BEEN MORE FAR-SIGHTED IN EARLY APRIL.

15. TO SUM UP: WHAT REALLY WORRIES HAIG AT THE MOMENT IS THE PROSPECT OF A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN THE US GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CHANCES THIS MAY OFFER THE SOVIETS TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. THIS WOULD BE THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SET AS THEIR FIRST PRIORITY AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION. THE US GOVERNMENT THEREFORE MUST TAKE SOME INITIATIVE NOW WHICH, EVEN IF IT DOES NOT BRING ABOUT A RESOLUTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROBLEM, WILL AT LEAST LIMIT THE DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE TO US INTERESTS BY



BRING ABOUT A RESOLUTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROBLEM, WILL AT  
LEAST LIMIT THE DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE TO US INTERESTS BY  
ACCUSATIONS OF BEING PRO-BRITISH AND NON-UNDERSTANDING OF THE LATIN  
AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW.

HENDERSON

NNNN

RGRG NOTE FCO



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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250110Z MAY 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 844 OF 24 MAY 1982  
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, TOKYO, DUBLIN.

MY TELEGRAMS NOS 842 AND 843: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTIONS.

1. SINCE MY TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE WERE DRAFTED OTUNNU (UGANDA) AND I HAVE HAD TWO TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE NON ALIGNED MEMBERS (EXCLUDING PANAMA) WERE ANNOYED WITH DORR FOR GOING AHEAD AND TABLING A DRAFT WHICH HE AND EVERYONE ELSE KNEW THAT WE WOULD VETO. THE THREE AFRICANS, JORDAN AND GUYANA WERE DESPERATELY ANXIOUS TO AVOID A DEADLOCK IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A MAJOR ROW GENERATED BY THE LATIN AMERICANS IN AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THIS WOULD ONLY POLARISE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REGIONS, BENEFIT THE RADICALS AND DAMAGE ANY PROSPECT THERE MIGHT BE OF A PEACEFUL OUTCOME TO THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERM. THEY HAD CAREFULLY LOOKED OUT THE AMENDMENTS BELOW TO DORR'S DRAFT



OUTCOME TO THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERM. THEY HAD ACCORDINGLY WORKED OUT THE AMENDMENTS BELOW TO DORR'S DRAFT. IF, AS HE WAS AT PRESENT INSISTING, DORR WOULD NOT BE DRIVEN OFF, THEY MIGHT TABLE THESE AS AMENDMENTS IF THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF THEIR BEING ACCEPTABLE TO US.

2. THE AMENDMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

SUBSTITUTE FOR OPERATIVE 3 THE FOLLOWING NEW LANGUAGE:

''URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION WITH A VIEW TO ENDING THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS)''.

AMEND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 TO READ:

''REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DESPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO MAINTAIN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE''.

DORR'S OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD ALSO BE AMENDED TO REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON HIS EFFORTS WITHIN A LIMITED PERIOD, SAY TWO OR THREE DAYS.

3. OTUNNU URGED ME TO PUT THESE AMENDMENTS TO YOU AND I AGREED TO DO SO. I SAID TO HIM, SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY, THAT I THOUGHT HE WAS SETTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK WHICH THE LATTER WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO UNDERTAKE. I HAD TOLD PEREZ DE CUELLAR AS RECENTLY AS THIS MORNING (24 MAY) THAT, FOR US, A CEASEFIRE COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IF COMBINED WITH IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL WAS A NON-STARTER. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THIS POSITION WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA AND WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO CHALK UP A SECOND FAILURE. MEANWHILE, THE CONFLICT WOULD CONTINUE.

4. OTUNNU TOOK MY POINT BUT ARGUED THAT A BRIEF TIME LIMIT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT MIGHT ENCOURAGE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO HAVE ONE MORE GO: A FORMAL MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT GIVE HIM FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT: AND WE WOULD AT LEAST POSTPONE THE HORRORS OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

5. OTUNNU HAS SINCE TELEPHONED ME FOR A THIRD TIME TO SAY THAT PANAMA (RELUCTANTLY) AND THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS (INCLUDING COSTA MENDEZ) WOULD ACCEPT THE IRISH DRAFT WITH THESE AMENDMENTS. I DO NOT REGARD THIS AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH. THE MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY WANT TO GET OUT



MINISTERS (INCLUDING COSTA MENDEZ) WOULD ACCEPT THE IRISH DRAFT WITH THESE AMENDMENTS. I DO NOT REGARD THIS AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH; THE MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY WANT TO GET OUT OF THE UN QUICKLY BECAUSE THEY ARE BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE THE VOTES TO JACK UP AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY FOLLOWING A UK VETO AND/OR THAT THEY WANT THEIR HANDS FREE FOR THE RIO TREATY MEETING DUE TO START ON 27 MAY.

6. HOW SHOULD WE REACT TO THESE CLEVERLY DRAFTED AMENDMENTS WHICH I BELIEVE ARE GENUINELY INTENDED TO GET EVERYONE OUT OF THE PRESENT MESS IN THE COUNCIL WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY LOOMING AHEAD? TO BE THOROUGHLY CYNICAL, THEY WOULD NOT TIE OUR HANDS. IT IS IMPLICIT IN THE NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 THAT THE HOSTILITIES WOULD CONTINUE WHILE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUED HIS MISSION AND, IF HIS MISSION FAILED, THE QUESTION OF UN OBSERVERS WOULD NOT ARISE. ON THE OBVIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION WOULD FAIL, WE WOULD OF COURSE BE BACK IN THE COUNCIL BY THE END OF THE WEEK.

7. IF WE DECIDED TO SUPPORT A DRAFT RESOLUTION SO AMENDED, I WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO MAKE AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE COVERING THE FOLLOWING POINTS. FIRST., I WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE 4TH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AS IN THE IRISH DRAFT (MY TELNO 832) AND WITH THE LAST PHRASE IN OPERATIVE PARA 2, ON THE LINES I PROPOSED FOR DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE DRAFT - PARAGRAPH 7 OF MY TELNO 842 I WOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT, WHILE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUED HIS MISSION, WE WOULD BE IN NO WAY INHIBITED FROM TAKING MILITARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.

8. AS SEEN FROM THIS END, THIS WOULD BE A CLEVER WAY OF GETTING OUT OF THE COUNCIL WITHOUT A VETO, AT LEAST FOR SOME DAYS. HOWEVER, IF YOU WILL FORGIVE ME GOING BEYOND MY BRIEF, YOU MIGHT FEEL THAT OUR SUPPORT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD REVIVE PRESSURE ON US AT HOME TO SUSPEND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A CHANCE (COSTA MENDEZ WOULD BE BOUND TO SAY AFTER THE VOTE THAT ARGENTINA WOULD DO SO. I COULD OF COURSE DEAL WITH THIS EASILY). OBVIOUSLY THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE SINCE IT WOULD ONLY BENEFIT ARGENTINA.

9. TO SUM UP, I NOW NEED THE FOLLOWING LIST OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE A FAIRLY MESSY DAY:

(I) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE IRISH DRAFT AS IT STANDS WITH AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE AS IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TELNO 842.

(II) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN



MY TELNO 842.

(II) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT WITH AN APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION OF VOTE (OTUNNU TELLS ME THAT THE PANAMANIAN - EVEN ILLUECA - HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PURSUE THEIR DRAFT, BUT WE CAN NEVER EXCLUDE SUCH A CONTINGENCY).

(III) INSTRUCTIONS ON THE JAPANESE DRAFT.

(IV) INSTRUCTIONS ON THE IRISH DRAFT, AS AMENDED BY THE NON ALIGNED. IF YOU THINK THAT SUPPORT FOR THIS DRAFT WOULD OFFER AN ACCEPTABLE WAY OUT OF OUR PROBLEMS HERE, AT LEAST FOR A SHORT TIME, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I COULD HAVE INSTRUCTIONS BY 1400Z 25 MAY, SO THAT I CAN MUDDY DORR'S WATERS AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

PARSONS

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Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

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DESKBY 250100Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250010Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 839 OF 24 MAY 1982

AND TO UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SOFS PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BRASILIA.

MY TELS NOS 831 TO 835 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. THE LATEST ADDITION TO THE LIST OF RESOLUTION-DRAFTERS IS BRAZIL. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY (24 MAY) SENT THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL A LONG LETTER (TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH INCLUDES AN EXPANDED VERSION OF THE PIECE OF PAPER MY BRAZILIAN COLLEAGUE SHOWED ME YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 828, PARA 3). YOU WILL SEE THAT THIS CONTAINS THE FAMILIAR INGREDIENTS OF AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL, AND A UN ADMINISTRATION, WITH THE NEW IDEA OF A COMMITTEE APPOINTED UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE CHARTER TO CARRY OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE TOLD THE BRAZILIANS HERE THAT THE TIME FOR SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IS NOW PAST AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF OUR ALLOWING A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES TO BE ADOPTED.



ON THESE LINES TO BE ADOPTED.

2. SEE MIFT.

PARSONS

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Mrs Dickson, D/ENERG

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

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DESKBY 250100Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250011Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 840 OF 24 MAY

AND TO UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BRASILIA.

MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER OF 24 MAY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

BEGINS

EXCELLENCY,

EVER SINCE THE MALVINAS CRISIS BEGAN, BRASIL HAS ACCOMPANIED DEVELOPMENTS WITH PROFOUND INTEREST AND EVER-INCREASING PREOCCUPATION.

THIS CRISIS DEEPLY AFFECTS BRAZIL AND THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, AN AREA WHICH



THIS CRISIS DEEPLY AFFECTS BRAZIL AND THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, AN AREA WHICH IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE FOR BRAZIL, BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT INVOLVES TWO OF OUR TRADITIONAL FRIENDS, BOTH OF THEM COUNTRIES WE CARE DEEPLY ABOUT.

THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE UNTIRING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE TWO PARTIES AND TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THIRD PARTIES, TO SEEK FOR A PEACEFUL, JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT FOR THIS QUESTION. WE MAINTAINED FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTACTS, UP TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL, WITH THE COUNTRIES THAT, IN OUR OPINION, COULD MAKE THE MOST DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO AN UNDERSTANDING. WE DECIDEDLY SUPPORTED THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ONCE THIS INITIATIVE HAD BEEN THWARTED, WE VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTED THE NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AS WELL AS HIS PEACE PROPOSALS.

PRESIDENT JOAO BAPTISTA DE OLIVEIRA FIGUEIREDO MADE A PERSONAL APPEAL TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO REQUESTED THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES TO HELP IN ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE.

EVEN SACRIFICING THE DISCUSSION OF IMPORTANT AND PRESSING BILATERAL QUESTIONS, PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO DEVOTED THE GREATER PART OF THE TIME HE SPENT CONVERSING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THAT COUNTRY, EXPLORING AVENUES FOR THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND THE SOLUTION OF THE MALVINAS QUESTION.

IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF, AS WELL AS IN THE MEETING OF THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, BRAZIL, THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE CRISIS, HAS BEEN A VOICE FOR MODERATION, UNDERSTANDING AND PEACE.

NOW THAT ALL VOLUNTARY EFFORTS SEEM TO HAVE FAILED, NOW THAT HUNDREDS OF LIVES OF YOUNG ARGENTINES AND BRITISH SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN LOST, NOW THAT WE FACE THE PROSPECT OF THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR LATIN AMERICA AND FOR THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BRAZIL BELIEVES THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CAN NO LONGER DELAY TAKING A FIRM AND DECISIVE ACTION TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

IN THE SAME SPIRIT THAT HAS GUIDED BRAZIL THROUGH-OUT THE CRISIS, AND SPEAKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY THAT HAS GIVEN PROOF OF ITS UNCONDITIONAL ADHERENCE TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, I BELIEVE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE A DECISION TO PUT AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO ESTABLISH THE BASES FOR A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD BY THE PARTIES, THE



THE BASES FOR A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD BY THE PARTIES, THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO SUBMIT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH I FIRMLY BELIEVE CAN BE THE BASIS FOR A COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT WILL ENSURE A JUST AND HONOURABLE PEACE, WITHOUT WINNERS OR LOSERS:

1. IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES:
2. SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES TO CONTINENTAL ARGENTINE TERRITORY AND OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE NORTHEAST DIRECTION TO A DISTANCE EQUIVALENT TO THAT BETWEEN ARGENTINE CONTINENTAL TERRITORY AND THE MALVINAS ISLANDS:
  - A) THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE FORCES SHOULD BE INITIATED 48 HOURS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION:
  - B) ALL ARGENTINE AND BRITISH FORCES SHOULD HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA WITHIN 21 DAYS, ONE-THIRD OF THE FORCES OF EACH PARTY BEING WITHDRAWN AT SEVEN-DAY INTERVALS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL:
3. APPOINTMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS OF A PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR THE ISLANDS, WITH EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE, WHICH WILL HOLD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS, TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM:
  - A) THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE AND BRITISH FORCES:
  - B) ALL UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATES WILL GRANT THE SECRETARY GENERAL THE SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.
4. ESTABLISHMENT, UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, OF A COMMITTEE PRESIDED OVER BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND COMPOSED OF THE TWO PARTIES AND OF FOUR OTHER MEMBER STATES, TWO OF WHICH ARE TO BE APPOINTED BY EACH OF THE PARTIES, WITH THE MANDATE OF CONDUCTING URGENT NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION. THE COMMITTEE WILL BEGIN ITS WORK THE DAY FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCES FROM THE AREA AND WILL SUBMIT ITS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOT LATER THAN 31 JANUARY 1983.

BRAZIL IS CONVINCED THAT THESE ELEMENTS, AS A WHOLE, CONSTITUTE AN HONEST, JUST AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR THE CESSATION OF THE SHEDDING OF BLOOD AND TRAGIC LOSS OF LIVES.

THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT FERVENTLY APPEALS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO, PLACING THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND



ARGENTINA AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT  
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO, PLACING THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND  
HUMANITY ABOVE ALL ELSE, DETERMINE TO CEASE HOSTILITIES FORTHWITH  
AND ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT LIKEWISE APPEALS TO ALL STATES MEMBERS  
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SUPPORT, BY THEIR WORDS, BY THEIR ACTIONS  
AND BY THEIR VOTES, A SOLUTION ALONG THE LINES HEREWITH PRESENTED.

LET US RENEW OUR DEDICATION TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF  
THE CHARTER AND DEMONSTRATE IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER THAT OUR WORDS  
WERE NOT EMPTY WORDS WHEN WE ALL PROMISED, AT THE MOMENT THIS  
ORGANIZATION WAS CREATED, THAT:

''WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DETERMINE TO SAVE  
SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR.....''

WITH HIGHEST CONSIDERATION,

RAMIRO SARAIVA GUERREIRO  
MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE  
FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL.

ENDS

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*Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY*

*[Passed to E.R.]*

*[Typists a.a.]*

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DESKBY PANAMA CITY, WASHINGTON, GEORGETOWN 251300Z

DESKBY UKDEL NATO 250800Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242025Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 836 OF 24 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, DUBLIN, MADRID,

KAMPALA, KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW,

AMMAN, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, NAIROBI.

MY TELNO 825: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

SUMMARY

1. THE DEBATE WAS RESUMED AT 1530Z TODAY (24 MAY). IT WAS A

DISCUSSION ON THE SITUATION IN ZAMBIA, KENYA, LAOS, LIBERIA,



1. THE DEBATE WAS RESUMED AT 1530Z TODAY (24 MAY). IT WAS A MAINLY AFRICAN SESSION: UGANDA, ZAIRE, KENYA, LAOS, LIBERIA, GREECE AND CHINA SPOKE. KENYA WAS MAGNIFICENT, EVEN BETTER THAN THE OLD COMMONWEALTH. OTHER AFRICANS WERE EVEN-HANDED, CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND A NEW MANDATE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. CHINA LEANED STRONGLY TOWARDS ARGENTINA BUT WAS NOT TOO BAD. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF GREECE HAD NOT SPOKEN. THE DEBATE WILL BE RESUMED AT 1430Z TOMORROW, WHEN COSTA MENDEZ IS TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT.

#### DETAIL

2. OTUNNU (UGANDA) SAID THAT UGANDA SHARED THE TWO-PRONGED APPROACH OF THE NAM: ON THE SUBSTANCE, IT RECOGNISED THE JUSTICE OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM; ON PROCEDURE, IT FAVOURED NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAD VOTED FOR SCR 502 BECAUSE OF ITS POSITION ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. THE CRISIS HAD SINCE EXPANDED. UGANDA'S PRESENT ATTITUDE WAS: SUPPORT FOR SCR 502; REJECTION OF THE USE OF FORCE OR WAR AS A METHOD OF RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES; A CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS; REGRET THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS HAD BROKEN DOWN; AND A WISH THAT HE SHOULD BE MANDATED TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS, AS THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS.

3. KAMANDA (ZAIRE), WHO FANCIES HIMSELF FOR HIS ELOQUENCE, MADE A LONG AND VAPID STATEMENT ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NON USE OF FORCE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES; ABOUT PEACE AND WAR; ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UN; ABOUT NATIONAL HONOUR AND SO ON. HE CONCLUDED BY URGING THE COUNCIL TO BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502, ON THE BASIS OF THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ALREADY ACHIEVED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WHO SHOULD BE GIVEN A FORMAL MANDATE.

4. MAINA (KENYA) MADE AN ADMIRABLY ROBUST STATEMENT WHICH WAS AN EFFECTIVE ANTIDOTE TO ALL THE LATINS HAVE BEEN SAYING ABOUT A CULTURAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE WEST AND LATIN AMERICA (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELNO 828 - NOT TO ALL). HE SAID THAT THE BREACH OF THE PEACE HAD STARTED WITH ARGENTINA'S AGGRESSION ON 2 APRIL. THAT WAS A SEPARATE QUESTION FROM THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. SOME OF THOSE WHO "FELT OBLIGED" TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA'S CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY HAD TRIED TO TREAT THE TWO PROBLEMS AS ONE. KENYA WAS FRIENDLY TO BOTH SIDES BUT HAD TO SPEAK OUT IN THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THE DECOLONISATION ARGUMENT WAS IRRELEVANT. ALL (UNDERLINED) OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA HAD BEEN COLONISED IN THE 18TH



DECOLONISATION ARGUMENT WAS IRRELEVANT. ALL (UNDERLINED)  
OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA HAD BEEN COLONISED IN THE 18TH  
AND 19TH CENTURIES. THE TWO CONTINENTS HAD BEEN PEOPLED  
AS A RESULT OF COLONIALISM; THAT WAS FACT OF THE WORLD'S  
UNFORTUNATE PAST. THIS WAS NOT A COLONIAL ISSUE: ARGENTINA  
WAS ENGAGED IN THE PURELY TERRITORIAL CLAIM, IN TOTAL  
DISREGARD OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLANDS. THE ARGENTINE  
CLAIM COULD NOT BE SETTLED AT THEIR EXPENSE: THEIR INTERESTS  
WERE PARAMOUNT. IF THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOLONISATION WAS  
DISTORTED IN ORDER TO REDISTRIBUTE PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS  
WOULD BE IN REAL TROUBLE: THERE WOULD BE ENDLESS WAR AND  
DESTRUCTION. ARGENTINA HAD FLOUTED THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL  
SETTLEMENT: YET ONLY EIGHT MONTHS AGO SHE HAD INSISTED ON  
ENTERING RESERVATIONS ON A PASSAGE IN THE NAM COMMUNIQUE OF  
SEPTEMBER 1981 ABOUT SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF NATIONAL  
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. WHATEVER SOME DELEGATIONS MIGHT HAVE SAID,  
THE NAM HAD NEVER SUPPORTED ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE  
THE DISPUTE. THERE HAD BEEN A DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN OF DISTORTION  
IN SOME OF THE INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEBATE. THE FACT WAS THAT  
ARGENTINA HAD IGNORED CALLS FOR RESTRAINT FROM THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT WAS PERVERTED REASONING  
TO SAY THAT AGGRESSION HAD BEGUN WHEN THE UK FORCES MOVED  
TOWARDS THE AREA. ARGENTINA HAD NO RIGHT TO IMPOSE ITS OWN  
FORM OF COLONIALISM ON THE FALKLANDS. THE UN SHOULD NOT CONDONE  
ARGENTINE AGGRESSION: THE MATTER SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE ICJ.  
THE UN'S REACTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS WAS BEING VERY KEENLY  
WATCHED: THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE CONCERTED ACTION TO  
PREVENT ANYONE FROM DRAWING THE CONCLUSION THAT AGGRESSION PAID.

5. LAOS WAS BRIEF AND POISONOUS (TO THE US, AS WELL AS TO THE UK).  
LIBERIA WAS CONFUSED AND EVEN-HANDED. SHE GOT A LAUGH FOR SAYING  
THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS LIKE A MAN WITH TWO WIVES: PRESIDENT  
REAGAN HAD TO DECIDE WHETHER BRITAIN OR ARGENTINA WAS THE HEAD  
WIFE. SHE REGISTERED A COMPLAINT ABOUT THE IMPROPRIETY OF  
ILLUECA'S REMARKS ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY.

6. DOUNTAS (GREECE) SAID THAT GREECE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT  
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE WHICH WAS BEING FLAGRANTLY  
VIOLATED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. ALL FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN  
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND A PROVISIONAL UN ADMINISTRATION INTRODUCED  
IN ORDER TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE. MILITARY INVASION SHOULD  
NEVER BE CONDONED. GREECE TOOK NO POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF  
THE QUESTION AT ISSUE. SCR 502 AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT  
OF 21 MAY PROVIDED A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR  
SHOULD BE GIVEN A NEW MANDATE.



SHOULD BE GIVEN A NEW MANDATE.

7. THE PRESIDENT, LING QING (CHINA), SPEAKING IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, SAID THAT THE FAILURE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS AND THE ARRIVAL OF BRITISH FORCES HAD BROUGHT ABOUT AN ESCALATION WHICH CHINA DEEPLY DEPLORED. IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS HAD HAD TO STOP BECAUSE OF THE GAP BETWEEN TWO PARTIES AND BECAUSE "THE PARTY WITH MILITARY STRENGTH HAD TAKEN A TOUGH STAND". THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM WAS A LEGACY OF COLONIALISM, ON WHICH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE NAM HAD ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS. CHINA ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE STRUGGLE OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO SAFEGUARD THEIR SOVEREIGNTY THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE COUNCIL SHOULD RESPECT THE DECISIONS OF THE NAM AND THE TIAR CONSULTATIVE ORGAN AND SUPPORT ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. BUT THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT WAS A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

PARSONS

NNNN



FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

(5) (42)

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

4

**IMMEDIATE**

PS  
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PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
PS/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
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MR REED PUSD

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DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 242328Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1881 OF 24 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (~~FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY~~)

UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1878 : FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME AGAIN EVIDENTLY IN AN EASIER FRAME OF MIND. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN REFLECTING ON OUR CONVERSATION AND HAD ALSO HAD A CHAT WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE LATTER, HE ASSURED ME, WAS QUOTE VERY SOLID, MORE SO THAN THOSE AROUND HIM. THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH HIM. UNQUOTE HOWEVER HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO BE CAUGHT UNAWARES AT THE KEY MOMENT. HE SAW A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AT THE MOMENT WHICH HE THOUGHT SOMEONE SHOULD FILL BECAUSE OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE A VACUUM TAKEN OVER BY THE FORCES OF EVIL. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR LONDON TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE.



PREFERABLE FOR LONDON TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

2. HE INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD SENT AN EXTREMELY TOUGH MESSAGE TO HAVANA TO WARN THEM OFF FROM ANY QUOTE HANKY PANKY UNQUOTE AND A MORE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE TO THE OTHER PARTY (BY WHICH I PRESUME HE MEANT THE SOVIET UNION).

3. HE WAS NOW PROPOSING TO SEND YOU A PERSONAL MESSAGE THIS EVENING, BUT HE WOULD NOT BE PUTTING ANYTHING FORWARD THAT WOULD BE DISTURBING TO YOU. HIS AIM WAS TO HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT FOR A POSITIVE MOVE AND TO KEEP BRAZIL FROM BEING DISTRACTED TO THE WRONG SIDE.

4. I TOLD HIM THAT MY REPORTS OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM TODAY AND SATURDAY WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN DISTURBING TO LONDON. HE SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN TALKING VERY FRANKLY AND HE WOULD BE MORE SUBTLE IN THE MESSAGE HE SENT YOU.

5. HAVING JUST SEEN ZABLOCKI, CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, I TOLD HAIG THAT HE HAD INDICATED NO SENSE OF DISQUIET ON THE HILL ABOUT BRITISH ACTIVITIES AND THE US GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THEM. ZABLOCKI HAD ADMITTED THAT AMERICA MIGHT NOT DO WELL OUT OF THE WHOLE BUSINESS BUT US OPINION WAS STRONGLY BEHIND BRITAIN. HAD WE NOT TAKEN THE ACTION WE HAVE DONE THIS WOULD HAVE SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FROM WHICH EVERY COUNTRY MIGHT SUFFER. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT THIS HAD BEEN ZABLOCKI'S ATTITUDE. HE DID NOT REPEAT TO ME THE WARNINGS HE HAD GIVEN ME ON SATURDAY ABOUT MURMURINGS ON THE HILL.

HENDERSON

NNNN





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PM  
seen

MOD PRESS STATEMENT 2330 24 May 1982

HMS ANTELOPE HAS SUNK

As the Secretary of State for Defence announced in the House of Commons earlier today, HMS ANTELOPE sustained severe damage after an attack yesterday.

Despite strenuous efforts by the ship's company, fires caused by the attack became uncontrollable. The ship's company were forced to abandon her and were safely transferred to other ships.

There are no further reports of casualties.

It has now been reported that HMS ANTELOPE has sunk.





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
6312

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01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

PQ 5023

24. May 1982

Dear Mike

/ I enclose a copy/~~copies~~ of a Statement to be made in the House this afternoon by Mr John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence.

Yours Sincerely

Harry Kentish

M. A. Pattison Esq.

(H KENTISH)  
Parliamentary Clerk



STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE - 24TH MAY 1982

Mr Speaker,

Seven weeks ago when Argentinian forces invaded the Falkland Islands, my right honourable Friend the Prime Minister stated that the Falkland Islands remained British territory, that no aggression and no invasion could alter that simple fact, and that it was the Government's objective to see that the Islanders were freed from occupation.

On the night of Thursday 20th May Her Majesty's forces re-established a secure base on the Falkland Islands and the Union Flag is today flying over the settlement of San Carlos in East Falkland - where it will remain. The whole House will have been delighted to see the expressions of delight on the faces of the Islanders and their children - published widely yesterday.

The amphibious landing was the culmination of a long period of planning by the Force Commander and of preparation by the Royal Marine Commanders, members of the Parachute Regiment and supporting arms during their six weeks voyage into the South Atlantic. Whilst they sailed south, the Government worked unremittingly to persuade Argentina to withdraw peacefully and honourably from the Falkland Islands. But the government met only with Argentine intransigence.

Last week it became clear that the only possible course left open to us was the re-possession of the Falkland Islands by military means. In this the Government has been encouraged - as I think has the country as a whole - that Her Majesty's Opposition and the other main political parties in the House have supported us.



Certainly I believe that our Servicemen have been greatly encouraged by the support that they have received from rt honourable and honourable Members of this House.

Mr Speaker - I will not go over all the details of the amphibious landing; the approach by the Task Force under the cover of darkness, widespread raids on Argentine military targets, the entry into Falkland Sound and the disembarkment into landing crafts leading to assault in the San Carlos area, but I think I can say that it was an exploit which captured the imagination of our people.

Argentinian forces did not interfere to any significant extent with the landing itself. The amphibious ships involved in the first stages of the operation were able to withdraw without incident to safer waters to the East of the Falkland Islands and I must here pay tribute to the men and women of the merchant marine for their heroism and skill in these dangerous operations; their role is a vital one.



The landing itself was complemented by attacks in other parts of the Falklands including the airfield at Goose Green and bombardment of military installations south of Port Stanley. Carrier based RAF Harriers launched attacks against Argentine defences at Port Stanley airfield. These operations were an essential part of the overall plan. I deeply regret, however, that in the course of these operations 3 Royal Marines were killed when their Gazelle helicopters were shot down and that 1 RAF Harrier pilot is missing. And as we have announced, 21 men were tragically lost when a Royal Navy Sea King ditched in the sea shortly before the operations began.

To protect the landing operation the Royal Navy maintained a gun-line of destroyers and frigates in the Falkland Sound. Other warships provided close protection for our amphibious forces; overhead, Sea Harriers from our Carriers provided continuous combat air patrols. The waves of Argentine air attacks had to run the gauntlet of these air defences. The Sea Harriers shot down 8 of their aircraft and total Argentine losses that day are estimated at 14 Mirages and Sky Hawks, 2 Pucaras and 4 helicopters. These losses represent more than a third of their combat aircraft taking part that day.



During these continuous air attacks the Royal Navy fought with great skill and bravery. Nevertheless those Argentine aircraft which had penetrated our air defence screen inflicted damage on 5 of our ships. Of these, the Type 21 frigate HMS ARDENT was severely damaged but despite the efforts of her crew to control the damage she sank in the course of Friday night. 22 of her crew died and 17 were injured. The injured are now receiving full medical attention in hospital ships of the Fleet.

Since that action the Task Force has been reinforced by the arrival of more, highly capable, warships, more than compensating for those damaged or lost in action so far.



The following day, Saturday, saw a lull in the fighting. Although the weather was good the Argentine airforce launched only one attack by 2 Skyhawks on our ships which was not pressed home. Yesterday the Argentine airforce resumed their attacks on ships of the Task Force in San Carlos Water. The aircraft were engaged by missiles from ships, by shore based Rapier batteries and by the combat air patrols of Sea Harriers. 6 Mirage aircraft and 1 Skyhawk are known to have been shot down - one aircraft more than was first announced - and there have been unconfirmed reports of a further 1 Mirage and 2 Skyhawks also shot down. Yesterday's events involved the loss of two-thirds of the Argentine aircraft taking part.

In the meantime, action to make the blockade effective has continued. Sea Harriers from the Task Force yesterday destroyed 2 Argentine helicopters and caused serious damage to another. Task Force action also resulted in the beaching of a ship used by the Argentines to ferry troops and ammunition around the Islands. With the loss of re-supply ships and 6 helicopters the Argentine Commander has lost all but a very limited capability to supply his forces and move them around the Islands.



Mr Speaker, I regret to confirm that in yesterday's action, the frigate, HMS ANTELOPE, sustained severe damage. Our latest information - and this is based on preliminary reports - is that one of her ships company was killed and 7 others were wounded. I must also inform the House, with great regret, of the loss of one of our Sea Harrier's last night. This aircraft met with an accident shortly after launching from one of our carriers and the pilot was killed. This accident was not as a result of Argentine action and the cause has yet to be established. Next of kin have been informed.

Mr Speaker - the intensive fighting of the last few days has produced tragic loss of life on our side, and the House will join with me in conveying the deep sympathy of the whole nation to the relatives and friends of those killed and injured.

We all feel deeply too for the constant concern and worry of the families and friends of our Servicemen. They are showing great patience and understanding in very difficult circumstances.



Names of casualties will not be released until the next-of-kin have been informed although to counter the false propaganda coming out of Argentina we have had to give some general information on the progress of military action as soon as it is confirmed.

Mr Speaker - Our forces are now established on the Falkland Islands with all the necessary supplies, together with their heavy equipment and air defence missiles. They have mobility with a large number of helicopters at their disposal - and their spirits are high.

But I must emphasise that our men still face formidable problems in difficult terrain with a hostile climate. We must expect fresh attacks upon them, and there can be no question of pressing the Force Commander to move forward prematurely - the judgement about the next tactical moves must be his - and his alone.

But, one thing is certain, the days of the occupying Argentine garrison are numbered and it will not be long before the Falkland Islanders once again have their democratic rights restored.



SUBJECT

Text of Mr's reply to  
Hope - sent 0030 24/1  
Commercial lines.

No 10-22/5.  
BK.  
T112/82

We share <sup>the</sup> anguish which you express at the loss of life in the tragic conflict over the Falkland Islands. I deeply respect the <sup>way</sup> which led you to send me your message and should like to reply in the same spirit of frankness and candour.

The conflict was not of our making. It was the Argentine forces who invaded the Islands and broke the peace. We have striven for seven weeks to secure a negotiated settlement but Argentina has shown no disposition to match our endeavours in good faith. A ceasefire has to be accompanied by withdrawal of Argentine troops. To do otherwise would leave the aggressor in occupation and in possession of the rewards of military adventure.

That our cause is just and that the principles which we uphold are shared and understood by democratic nations, I have not the slightest doubt. Aggression must not be allowed to succeed. International law must be upheld. Sovereignty cannot be achieved by armed invasion. The liberty which the Falkland Islanders previously enjoyed must be restored. The world has seen too often in this century the tragic consequences of failure to defend the principles of justice, civilised values and international law. We seek peace with freedom, not peace at the expense of freedom.

The conflict could be ended immediately if Argentina were to withdraw its forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502. The authority of the United Nations would thereby be reasserted. I <sup>sincerely hope</sup> ~~pray~~ that such counsels may yet prevail in Buenos Aires before more lives are lost.

Sent by



Argentina

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) : 0700 HRS, 24 MAY

UN(a) Security Council Debate

UKMIS New York  
telno.825)

1. The Security Council resumed its debate at 1500Z on 23 May. There were 13 speakers: France, Poland, Honduras, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Equatorial Guinea, Paraguay, Colombia, El Salvador, Belgium, Indonesia, Peru and Panama (again). Sir Anthony Parsons spoke in right of reply to Panama. The statements by New Zealand and Belgium were excellent, but France was awful. Apart from Nicaragua, the Central Americas were strikingly moderate and Paraguay and Colombia were also better than might have been expected. Peru was strongly pro-Argentine, and said that its latest initiative was still alive. The Panamanian Foreign Minister was again intolerably offensive, and Sir Anthony has suggested consideration of an approach to the President of Panama. The Council is to meet again at 1430Z today.

(b) Draft Resolution?

UKMIS New York  
telno. 829)

2. The Irish Ambassador expects the Panamanians to table a draft Resolution today.

(c) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

UKMIS New York  
telno. 828)

3. The elastic of our support, even from our close friends (with the exception of the old Commonwealth), is stretching very thin; not simply because of natural UN pacifism and a desire to see the UN play a part in stopping the fighting and bringing about a peaceful solution, but more seriously a view is developing (exploited by the Argentines) that the crisis is bringing about a kind of cultural confrontation between Latin America and Western Europe/North America. If we have to veto a ceasefire resolution and are thereafter dragged into the General Assembly, we are going to be very isolated indeed.

(d) Securing Speakers Favourable to our Cause

FCO telno. 842 to Bonn)

4. Earlier yesterday we had conducted a lobbying exercise in certain European and Third World capitals to encourage governments to speak in the debate. A similar exercise was conducted in London with many Ambassadors of the Ten.

The Pope's Message

Minute:  
Mr Bullard)

FCO telno. 818 to Holy See)

FCO telno. 853 to UKREP Brussels)

5. The Prime Minister's reply to the Pope's message has been sent by telex to the Vatican and our Ambassador to the Holy See has been instructed to deliver a confirmatory copy. The reply stresses that aggression must not be allowed to succeed and that the conflict could be ended if Argentina complied with SCR 502.. Buenos Aires Radio broadcasted the text of President Galtieri's reply to the Pope: 'We listen with Christian humbleness to Your call for peace, understanding and prudence. Our people and our Government have made all possible efforts to avoid a military confrontation and bloodshed .....'.  
.....'



US Attitude

Washington  
elno.1869)

Washington  
elno.1870)

UKMIS New  
York telno.  
30)

6. Secretary of State Haig saw Sir Nicholas Henderson privately on 22 May. He said that the US Government is increasingly concerned at the consequences for US interests in the continuing battle over the Falkland Islands and that the Americans believe that thought should be given by both Washington and London at a very early date to a way of bringing an end to the conflict that will in some way prevent a hostage to fortune for the future. This possible shift in US attitude is echoed in yesterday's 'New York Times' editorial.

Uruguay

Montevideo  
elno.359)

Montevideo  
elno.360)

7. The Uruguayan Foreign Minister summoned our Ambassador yesterday to deliver a stiff reply to our earlier Note on the 12-mile limit. The Uruguayans are being sensitive over our reference to the River Plate 'estuary' as opposed to 'river'. The Minister said that he would be leaving for Washington, not New York, on Tuesday and that there was likely to be a further meeting with regard to the Rio Treaty on Thursday.


Comment

8. Although a Resolution calling for a ceasefire only still seems unlikely to command sufficient support, pressures are developing for action to halt the conflict through a mutual withdrawal and reversion to the idea of an interim UN or other presence to hold the ring while a negotiated settlement is pursued. As the fighting develops, so the solidity of our support is shifting. A further meeting of Rio Treaty States may take place later this week.

9. The underlying Western concerns, put clearly by Mr Haig (and probably shared by many in Europe), is that a military defeat for Argentina will make the sovereignty issue harder to resolve, will lead to continuing tension in the region, will inflict lasting damage on Western relations with Latin America and will provide openings for the spread of Soviet influence.

10. Action for consideration today, arising from overnight developments, is whether:-

- (a) a message might be sent to Mr Haig to stiffen his resolve;
- (b) a message should be sent to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister (Montevideo telegram No.360);
- (c) whether we should take up with the Panamanian Government the offensive comments of their UN Representative.



P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

24 May 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0700 HOURS, 24 MAY

UN

1. Yesterday's session of the Security Council debate failed to give rise to a draft Resolution. The debate will resume at 1430Z today.

Military Action

2. A frigate was seriously damaged and six Argentine aircraft were shot down in further attacks against Task Force ships in San Carlos waters. In a separate incident, Sea Harriers shot down one Argentine helicopter and forced down another in flames. A third was damaged.

The Pope's Message

3. The Prime Minister has sent a reply to the Pope. It makes clear that a ceasefire must be accompanied by Argentine withdrawal. Argentine Radio has broadcast the text of President Galtieri's reply to the Pope.

24 May 1982

Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL



E.R.

PRIME MINISTER

The Foreign Secretary has now considered the question of a reply to the Pope. He feels strongly that we should not reply too quickly. Like our Ambassador to the Holy See he feels a reply would best go on Monday.

Content?

*Duty Clerk informed -  
is letting Willie  
know.  
BK.  
23/5.*

WILLIE RICKETT  
23 May 1982



2

Covering UK SECRET/US TOP SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)  
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5/21

23rd May 1982

Dear John,

I attach a self-explanatory message from Mr Nott to Secretary Weinberger. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its onward transfer to Washington.

A copy goes to John Coles (No 10) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever  
Nick Evans

(N H R EVANS)

J Holmes Esq

A.J.C. 24/5  
h-a.



MO 5/21

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE NOTT  
TO SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE WEINBERGER

UK OPERATION CORPORATE

I am very grateful for the helpful way in which, following our talks in Brussels earlier this month, your Department has approached the question of material support for UK forces. In particular, my officials have been in touch with yours about the possible release of 150,000 square yards of AM2 Airfield Matting, which I understand the US Marine Corps hold as war reserve. I should be very grateful if you could agree to this release at a very early date, in which case our officials could jointly work out the details.

We would propose that the matting should be transported from the United States in a ship we would charter. We should also look to you for any special training required. As to the financial basis of the release, perhaps this could also be discussed between our officials: since you would need, I understand, to arrange for resupply you may wish to consider an arrangement under which you would supply to us initially on the basis that the matting would be returned if unused. If it were used, then when the Port Stanley airfield was permanently repaired we would recover it to become a useful enhancement of the UK's capability, for use either within NATO or out of area.



MOD statement

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

During the early afternoon in the Falkland Islands the Argentine Air Force launched a number of raids on ships of the Task Force in San Carlos Waters. The aircraft were engaged by missiles from surface vessels, shore-based Rapier and by Sea Harriers. Five Mirage and one Sky Hawk are known to have been shot down; a further one Mirage and two Sky Hawks were probably shot down.

During these attacks one of our frigates sustained some damage. No reports on the extent of the damage have been received, nor have we any indication of casualties. We have had no reports of other damage to British ships or aircraft.

In a separate incident earlier, Sea Harriers from the Task Force on routine patrol saw two Argentine Puma and one Bell helicopters in the Falkland Sound just off the coast of West Falkland. The Harriers attacked and one Puma exploded; the Bell helicopter landed but was seen to be on fire and the second Puma may have been damaged.

We have no reports of further action at present.

Ministry of Defence  
23 May 1982



Note given to PM  
23/5/62

Further news from San Carlos:

There were two further attacks by aircraft. In the first attack there was the possible downing of an A4.

The second wave was of four mirage aircraft. One was shot down by Sea Wolf on HMS Broadsword, one was shot down by 20 mm cannon on either Antelope or Plymouth, and one further possible shot down, but this is not confirmed.

There was a third wave of mirage, two of which were shot down by sea harriers. Therefore the total in the present wave of attacks is as follows:

- 1 A4 definitely shot down.
- 1 possible A4 shot down.
- 4 mirage definitely shot down.
- 1 possible mirage shot down.

+ 3 Helicopters (as previously reported) (Shag Cove)

Our only casualties have been as previously reported, that of the unexploded bomb in HMS Antelope (still no further news about casualties).



Note given to PM  
23/5/82

First incident was reported by Nicholson and Hanrahan:

Two A4 aircraft were sighted at approximately 1745 hours. No bombs were observed. One shot down by HMS Antelope which is a type 21 frigate.

There were also two further reports that have not been broadcast:

The first involves a further A4 attack on the fleet in the San Carlos area where HMS Antelope was hit by an unexploded bomb on the starboard. Casualties are unknown. It is believed that there were four A4 aircraft and these are being pursued by sea harriers.

There was also an engagement by sea harriers from HMS Hermes. They attacked three helicopters in the area of Shag Cove on West Falkland. The sea harriers shot down one Bell helicopter and attacked two Puma helicopters. One crashed and the other has landed - damage not known.



TEXT OF GALTIERI'S MESSAGE TO THE POPE

BBC MONITORING SERVICE REPORT

Buenos Aires Radio at 1530 GMT broadcast a message sent today to Pope John Paul II by President Galtieri of Argentina which said: 'Grieved like Your Holiness over the loss of human lives, we listen with Christian humbleness to Your call for peace, understanding and prudence. Our people and our Government have made all possible efforts to avoid a military confrontation and bloodshed, and we have participated with a spirit of renunciation and flexibility in the negotiations to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. In his peace efforts during the past few days, the UN Secretary-General found understanding and a spirit to negotiate in our country.

The call made by Your Holiness strengthens us in our unwavering desire to support all efforts which may lead to stopping a bloody confrontation we have not sought, and which is the result of an obstinate and intransigent attempt to restore an illegal colonial situation.

The Argentine Nation endorses the desire of Your Holiness and, with responsibility before history, is ready to take part in a cessation of hostilities which would allow the re-establishment of peace, and in this climate, to seek a peaceful, honourable and just agreement.'

(Monitored at 1650Z on 23 May 1982)



FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0715 HOURS 23 MAY

UN

1. The Security Council debate continued but without a draft resolution appearing.

Military Action

2. The MOD issued a statement which reported further consolidation of our bridgehead on E. Falkland. There were no reports of enemy action. Sea Harriers attacked and severely damaged an Argentine patrol boat.

Pope's Message

3. The Prime Minister received a message from the Pope calling for an immediate ceasefire to open the way to a peaceful solution of the dispute.

NATO

4. A meeting of the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed support for the British position.

Latin America

5. The President of Colombia and the President of the Dominican Republic have both sent messages to the Prime Minister. The President of Peru has said that the Argentines have accepted his peace proposals. The Government of Mexico in a public statement appealed for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a renewal of the search for a negotiated settlement.

EMERGENCY UNIT

23 May 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0700 HRS, 23 MAY

[Due to late transmission UN/US material is placed at the end of today's Sitrep]

North Atlantic Council Meeting, 22 May

A UKDel NATO  
tel no 251.  
B UKDel NATO  
tel no 252.  
C Minute  
Penfold-  
Payne.

1. This resulted in a public reaffirmation of alliance support for us and an expression of solidarity with our recent action. The statement was weaker than a draft circulated by our Ambassador which ran into trouble with the French, Italians and Germans although it received US support.

The Pope's message to the Prime Minister

D FCO Tel  
no 16 to  
the Holy See

2. The Pope appeals to the Prime Minister to 'act decisively in order to secure an immediate ceasefire that will open the way to a peaceful solution of the dispute'.

Latin America

(a) Peruvian Initiative

E Lima Tel  
no 192

3. According to President Belaunde the Argentines have accepted, in principle, the latest Peruvian ideas with certain reservations which President Belaunde thinks may not be insuperable. Reportedly the Argentines are receptive to the idea of an "equidistant" withdrawal of forces and are not opposed to a UN administration for one year while negotiations take place. In the event of negotiations failing, the Argentines would return the problem to the UN. The text of the Peruvian proposal is at Flag F .

F Lima Tel  
no 187

(b) Colombian President's message to the Prime Minister

G FCO Tel  
no 107 to  
Bogota

4. The President expresses interest in the Peruvian initiative and also offers Colombian assistance in achieving peace. HM Ambassador Bogota reports that the Colombian and Peruvian Presidents spoke to each other recently and that knowledge of the Colombian President's message to the Prime Minister is public there.

H Bogota  
tel no 122

(c) Dominican President's message to the Prime Minister

I FCO Tel  
no 21 to  
Santo Domingo

5. The President expresses deep concern about the crisis, appealing to the Prime Minister to make a supreme effort to preserve peace through negotiations leading to an honourable understanding for both sides. An identical message has been sent to President Galtieri and a similar message to the UN Secretary-General.

J Santo  
Domingo tel  
no 43

UN

(a) Security Council Debate

K UKMis New  
York tel 821

6. Spain, Uruguay, Venezuela, Soviet Union, Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, Panama, Canada, United States and Guatemala spoke. Sir A Parsons spoke in right of reply and drew a mild rejoinder from Ros (Argentina). Most speakers said the Security Council

L UKMis New  
York tel no  
823



should adopt a resolution providing for an immediate ceasefire and a mandate for the Secretary-General to resume his efforts. Of the Latins the Venezuelan and Panamanian Foreign Ministers were abusive; the others made reasonably moderate statements, notably Guatemala. The Soviet Union was hostile but not abusive. Canada was excellent. The US statement was a little too even-handed (a point which our Embassy, who had been given an advance text, had already made to the State Department). Mrs Kirkpatrick made small but important changes to the advance text.

M Washing-  
ton tel 1864  
N Washing-  
ton tel 1865

(b) Sir A Parsons' assessment

O UKMis New 7. The Council is in a jam. It is clear that a large number of  
Yorktel 822 delegations are anxious to avoid precipitating a British veto but there is an overwhelming desire to bring about an end to the fighting. It seems unlikely that there will be a vote before 24 May at the earliest. Sir A Parsons has been asked to say what sort of language we could live with. He has refused to be drawn into discussion except to say 'Argentine withdrawal'.

P FCO tel no (c) Securing speakers favourable to our cause  
451 to UKMis

New York 8. As suggested by London, Sir A Parsons is seeking to promote  
Q UKMis New helpful speeches. Some of our partners and allies are claiming  
York 817 they need instructions from capitals. Sir A Parsons has asked our  
R UKMis New missions to urge that instructions should be sent today (UKMis New  
York 819 York tel no 822 at flag 'O'), so that they will be able to speak in the  
Council on 24 May providing some balance to Latin American rhetoric.  
Sir A Parsons is in contact with the Commonwealth Secretary-General who is being helpful.

(d) UK Statement on military action

S UKMis New 9. The Argentines have circulated their version of military  
York 824 events as documents of the Security Council. In order to set the record straight Sir A Parsons would be grateful for a self-contained document covering events since 19 May. He asks that this should reach him by 231330Z.

Comment


10. The Pope's message, which we understand has also gone to Galtieri comes amid growing confidence that the visit to UK will take place. It may help the Pope to justify a favourable decision on the visit.

11. Since the stalling of the UN Secretary-General's efforts on 19/20 May it has become open season for Latin American initiatives. The Presidents of Peru, Colombia and the Dominican Republic have sent messages to the Prime Minister. The Presidents of Mexico and Brazil did so earlier. All will have seen advantage in such moves for Latin American solidarity and their own relations with Argentina. So far none of these initiatives contains new elements, or offers more than token help. It will nevertheless be important to maintain good relations with individual Latin American capitals if possible.



CONFIDENTIAL

12. The Security Council debate has so far lived up to Sir A Parsons' expectations. We will do what we can to secure helpful interventions today. Ramphal's help is of value. Talk of resolutions is circulating in corridors but if the tabling of texts can be put off until tomorrow, this would suit us well. We are producing urgently the summary of military events since 19 May for which Sir A Parsons has asked.



A J Payne  
Emergency Unit

23 May 1982

CONFIDENTIAL



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

(3802)

IMMEDIATE

(6)  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PJS  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N:G LENNOX  
 LORD BRIDGES  
~~MR NPE~~  
 MR GILLMORE  
 HD/PUSD (2)  
 HD/S AM D  
 HD/DEF DEPT  
 HD/NEWS DEPT  
 HD/EPD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/USD  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~  
 RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MR ILETT ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
 MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
 DIO )

~~RE 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]

*MW*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 291633Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1867 OF 23 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK AND MODUK

FALKLANDS: US PRESS FOR 23 MAY

AMID CONTINUING MASSIVE COVERAGE OF MILITARY ACTION ON THE FALKLANDS A NUMBER OF ARTICLES REFLECT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISPUTE FOR US INTERESTS.

2. GWERTZMAN, IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, IN TWO ARTICLES REFLECTING ADMINISTRATION BRIEFING, NOTES US FEARS THAT ITS RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY AND ADVERSELY AFFECTED; ARGENTINA'S NOW MORE LIKELY THAN EVER TO DEVELOP AN ATOMIC BOMB AND BRAZIL MAY DO THE SAME; US EFFORTS TO LIMIT CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES IN THE REGION WILL BE FRUITLESS; US LEADERSHIP IN THE REGION HAS BEEN DEALT A SERIOUS BLOW, AFFECTING ATTEMPTS TO CURB CUBAN INFLUENCE; THE SOVIET UNION WILL INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE AS A TRADING PARTNER AND ARMS SUPPLIER IN THE REGION. GWERTZMAN ARGUES THAT, PRIVATELY, HAIG DOES NOT VIEW A BRITISH MILITARY VICTORY AS NECESSARILY THE BEST OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS. HAIG IS SAID TO FEAR AN OUTCOME WHICH



SUPPLIER IN THE REGION. GWERTZMAN ARGUES THAT, PRIVATELY, HAIG DOES NOT VIEW A BRITISH MILITARY VICTORY AS NECESSARILY THE BEST OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS. HAIG IS SAID TO FEAR AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD COMMIT BRITAIN TO MAINTAINING A LARGE MILITARY PRESENCE IN AND AROUND THE ISLANDS INDEFINITELY, WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE REVANCHIST SENTIMENT, A MASSIVE PROGRAMME OF REARMAMENT IN ARGENTINA AND PROVIDE A MASSIVE OPENING FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA. NEXT SATURDAY'S NONALIGNED MEETING IN HAVANA HAD BEEN SEEN BY WASHINGTON AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MEMBERS TO QUESTION SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ADVENTURISM. NOW, THE US GOVERNMENT FEARS THAT THE ONE TOPIC WILL BE THE FALKLANDS AND CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE US ROLE. ACCORDING TO GWERTZMAN ALL THESE FEARS HELP EXPLAIN WHY THE US HAS BEEN WILLING TO HELP BRITAIN PRIVATELY BUT NOT TO CHEER HER ON PUBLICLY.

3. AN EDITORIAL IN THE NEW YORK TIMES SAYS THAT THE PRINCIPLES AT ISSUE JUSTIFIED SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN BY DEMOCRATIC NATIONS BUT NOW THE POINT HAS BEEN MADE, THE AGGRESSOR HAS BEEN PUNISHED AND IF THE CONFLICT EVEN JUSTIFIED THE LOSS OF LIFE, IT NO LONGER DOES.

4. OTHER COMMENTATORS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW. JOHN OAKES WRITES THAT THE VENEMOUS FURY DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY LATIN AMERICA DEMONSTRATES, NOT THAT AMERICA WAS WRONG TO SUPPORT BRITAIN, BUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY HAS BEEN PERVERSELY WRONG.

5. JAMES RESTON REGRETS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NOT MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO ARGENTINA THAT IT WILL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO DELIVER MILITARY SERVICES AND WEAPONS TO THE BRITISH. RESTON REMINDS PRESIDENT REAGAN, ON THE EVE OF HIS VISIT TO EUROPE, THAT IF HE DOES NOT MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US WILL OPPOSE THE USE OF FORCE AND DEFEND HIS CLOSEST ALLY IN BRITAIN, HE WILL SOON BE IN AS MUCH TROUBLE ABROAD AS HE IS WITH HIS ECONOMIC POLICY AT HOME.

6. JACK ANDERSON IN THE WASHINGTON POST WRITES THAT US SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN HAS CAUSED DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA THAT HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS BEYOND THE WILDEST IMAGININGS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. KRAFT ALSO IN THE POST, SAYS THAT DAMAGE TO US RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA WILL NOT BE MATCHED BY IMPROVED TIES WITH BRITAIN. ON THE CONTRARY, AMERICA'S IMPARTIAL STANCE DURING ITS MEDIATION EFFORTS WAS SEEN IN LONDON AS A VIOLATION OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP.

HENDERSON



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (28) 43

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR GNSLOW  
PS/PJS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
HD/PUSD (a)  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF DEPT  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/EPD  
HD/ECD(3)  
HD/UCD  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
EMERGENCY ROOM ✓  
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MR ILETT ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )  
SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
DIO )

~~RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM MONTEVIDEO 231700Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 355 OF 23 MAY  
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (C IN C FLEET AND DS8)  
AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA.

MT

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 277: EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES.

AS MUCH HAS HAPPENED SINCE MY TELEGRAMS NO 222 AND NO 213,  
I DECIDED TO PUT IN A FORMAL NOTE SEEKING PERMISSION FOR CASUALTIES  
TO BE EVACUATED VIA MONTEVIDEO BY ONE OF OUR HOSPITAL SHIPS.  
AFTER ALL AS REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 213,  
ONLY IN PRINCIPLE DID URUGUAY AGREE TO ACCEPT HOSPITAL SHIPS.

2. AFTER SUBMISSION OF MY NOTE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO THEN  
REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT, I HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN AFFIRMATIVE  
REPLY, WITH THE CAVEAT THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE THAT ARRANGE-  
MENTS COULD BE MADE THROUGH THE I C R C. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT  
GIVEN THE TIME SCALE THIS MIGHT NOT BE PRACTICABLE I WAS TOLD  
THAT I C R C INVOLVEMENT WAS NOT (REPEAT NOT) A SINE QUA NON BUT  
WOULD BE PREFERABLE.



3. ON NUTS AND BOLTS I WAS ASKED THE OBVIOUS QUESTION NAMELY

(A) HOW MANY CASUALTIES?

(B) WOULD THEY HAVE TO BE HOSPITALISED IN MONTEVIDEO? -  
WE KNOW THAT THE BRITISH HOSPITAL AND CERTAIN OTHER  
HOSPITALS HAVE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE RECEPTION OF  
CASUALTIES FROM EITHER SIDE.

(C) WHAT WERE OUR PLANS FOR THE REPATRIATION OF CASUALTIES?

4. FROM THE ABOVE IT WILL BE CLEAR THAT WHILE FOR THE PRESENT  
THE URUGUAYANS WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM AN INVALUABLE  
HUMANITARIAN ROLE WE MUST BE SCRUPULOUS IN NOT TAKING THEM  
FOR GRANTED. AS I SUSPECTED, THEY CLEARLY EXPECT TO BE ASKED  
FOR PERMISSION ON EACH OCCASION AND FOR PRACTICAL REASONS TO  
BE GIVEN AS FULL DETAILS AS POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE.

5. WHILE I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS OF C IN .C FLEET AND  
DSS, I HOPE THAT THEY AND YOU UNDERSTAND MY PROBLEMS HERE. IN  
THE WIDER CONTEXT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT AT NO TIME WE GIVE  
THE IMPRESSION OF TRYING TO PUSH THE URUGUAYANS. THEY ARE BEING  
PUSHED BY THE ARGENTINIANS SO MY CREDIT WITH THE M F A IS BASED  
ON SCRUPULOUS ATTENTION TO DIPLOMATIC NICETIES. PROVIDED WE  
CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY THESE WE CAN FOR THE PRESENT STILL OBTAIN  
FAST AND HELPFUL ANSWERS ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. BUT TO REPEAT  
WE MUST NOT TAKE SUCH RESPONSES FOR GRANTED.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 231720Z NCG



SECRET

GRS 233

SECRET

FM FCO 231700Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1034 OF 23 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

*NET*

1A

REQUEST FOR US MATERIAL SUPPORT

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MR NOTT TO MR WEINBERGER:

BEGINS:

I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE HELPFUL WAY IN WHICH, FOLLOWING OUR TALKS IN BRUSSELS EARLIER THIS MONTH, YOUR DEPARTMENT HAS APPROACHED THE QUESTION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR UK FORCES. IN PARTICULAR, MY OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOURS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF 150,000 SQUARE YARDS OF AM2 AIRFIELD MATTING, WHICH I UNDERSTAND THE US MARINE CORPS HOLD AS WAR RESERVE. I SHOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD AGREE TO THIS RELEASE AT A VERY EARLY DATE, IN WHICH CASE OUR OFFICIALS COULD JOINTLY WORK OUT THE DETAILS.

WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE MATTING SHOULD BE TRANSPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES IN A SHIP WE WOULD CHARTER. WE SHOULD ALSO LOOK TO YOU FOR ANY SPECIAL TRAINING REQUIRED. AS TO THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF THE RELEASE, PERHAPS THIS COULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN OUR OFFICIALS: SINCE YOU WOULD NEED, I UNDERSTAND, TO ARRANGE FOR RESUPPLY YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER AN ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH YOU WOULD SUPPLY TO US INITIALLY ON THE BASIS THAT THE MATTING WOULD BE RETURNED IF UNUSED. IF IT WERE USED, THEN WHEN THE PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD WAS PERMANENTLY REPAIRED WE WOULD RECOVER IT TO BECOME A USEFUL ENHANCEMENT OF THE UK'S CAPABILITY, FOR USE EITHER WITHIN NATO OR OUT OF AREA.

ENDS  
PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE

LIMITED  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD (E)  
HD/PUSD  
DEP HD/PUSD  
PS

PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT

COPIES TO  
MR PENNEY RESEARCH D  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR O'NEILL  
HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
MR COLVIN  
DIO  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE  
DIRECTOR G C H Q

CABINET  
OFFICE

SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

*Misfaxed to Chequers  
at 2045, 22/5*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

22 May 1982

Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

*Prime Minister  
You spoke to Mr Rickett  
about the attached preliminary  
draft and agreed that FCO  
should have more time to  
consider your response.*

*Duty Clerk  
22/5/82*

*Dear Private Secretary,*

I submit a draft reply from the Prime Minister in answer from the Pope's telegram received this afternoon.

This draft has been conveyed to the Secretary of State's Private Office by telephone but has not been seen by Mr Pym. Nor has it been seen by the PUS or Supervising DUS, both of whom are in transit to weekend addresses.

Since there is a possibility that the Pope may intend to give wide publicity to the Prime Minister's reply in announcing his decision on the visit to the UK, I am sure that it would be prudent for us to clear the draft here before the Prime Minister's reply is sent. We would also like to consider whether Cardinal Hume needs to be warned of this exchange. There is the further possibility that the Pope may make reference to the Prime Minister's reply in his Sunday address at St Peter's, if it is sent this afternoon.

I will proceed urgently with clearance of the draft here, and will telephone to the Duty Clerk as soon as possible with suggested amendments. I would hope that we could before this evening provide any comments which the Secretary of State or the PUS may have.

*A Payne.*

A J Payne  
Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL



REPLY  
DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teletype/letter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
Prime Minister  
DEPARTMENT:

Reference

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:  
His Holiness John Paul The Second

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Your urgent appeal, and the anguish which you express at the loss of life in the tragic conflict over the Falkland Islands finds immediate echo here in London. We do not seek to continue the conflict. We have striven for 7 weeks to secure in peace a negotiated settlement. That our cause is just, and that the principles which we uphold are shared and understood by democratic nations throughout the world I have not the slightest doubt. I am ready for a ceasefire, so urgently needed for the reasons of compassion and humanity which are uppermost in your mind, but the conditions for this must not leave an aggressor in possession of the rewards of military adventure. The world has seen too often in this century the tragic consequences of failure to defend the principles of justice, civilised values, and international law.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

We have always been ready, and still remain ready to seek to end the conflict through negotiations. But Argentina has shown no disposition to match our endeavours in good faith. Aggression must not be allowed to succeed. International law must be upheld.

/Sovereignty



Sovereignty cannot be achieved by armed invasion. The liberty of the Falkland Islanders must be restored.

We earnestly desire a reasonable, peaceful and honourable settlement. We are ready to do all in our power to achieve it but we cannot succeed alone. The conflict was not of our making. It could be ended immediately if Argentina were to withdraw its forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502 and reassert by so doing the authority of the United Nations. I pray that such counsels may yet prevail in Buenos Aires before more lives are lost.



Teleg  
for enquiries dial the number  
shown in your dialling instructions  
British TELECOM  
for enquiries dial the number  
shown in your dialling instructions  
Telegram  
for enquiries dial the number  
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British TELECOM  
for enquiries dial the number  
shown in your dialling instructions  
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SUBJECT

T 111/82

Prime Minister  
22/5/82

cc <sup>o</sup> Paul's  
+  
Ops



889113 PO SW G  
CSEAGRAM LN LFTC

LFT082 CLF3869 LBE407 ELB7504 ROC043 GRT0642 RCV284 SAB061  
GBXX BY IUVS 235 ITOLB  
SSS CITTAVATICANO 236/226 2 1300 VATGOVT

ETATPRIORITE  
THE RIGHT HON. MARGARET THATCHER PRIME MINISTER 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDONSW1

IN DEEP ANGUISH AT THE NEWS FROM THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, WHERE THE ARMED CONFLICT WITH ARGENTINA IS CAUSING GREIVIOUS LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE AND MAY PROVE ALARMINGLY DETERIORATION CONSEQUENCES FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED AND EVENFOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE IN GENERAL, I URGENTLY APPEAL TO YOU TO ACT DECISIVELY IN ORDER TO SECURE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE THAT WILL OPEN THE WAY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE. MAY THE LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES HEED THE EARNEST DESIRE OF MANKIND AND STRIVE WITH ALL THE MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO AVERT FURTHER SACRIFICES AND BLOODSHED. MAY TRUE LOVE FOR THEIR PEOPLES, A DEEP SENSE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE HISTORY AND THE JUSTIFIED APPREHENSION OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY INSPIRE IN THEM AN ATTITUDE CAPABLE OF LEADING TO A MAGNANIMOUS ACCEPTANCE OF REASONABLE RENUNCIATIONS FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUPREME GOOD OF PEACE, THUS AVOIDING THE LOSSES BROUGHT BY WAR, WHICH ALWAYS FOSTERS HATRED AND ENDANGERS THE VALUES THAT ARE MOST GENUINELY HUMAN. I ASK GOD, THE FATHER OF ALL, TO GRANT THAT SENTIMENTS OF WISDOM AND UNDERSTANDING WILL PREVAIL, IN ORDER THAT THE ARMED CONFLICT MAYBE HALTED BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE AND THAT PEACE MAY BE RESTORED IN A GENERAL SEARCH FOR A RESONABLE, PEACEFUL AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT.

IOANNES PAULUS PP II

COL 10 LONDONSW1


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22 MAY 1982

(24)

Mr Payne



1. Mr Gibson, UK Delegation, NATO, Brussels, telephoned at 1050 to inform us that there will be a NATO Council Meeting at 1600 hours Brussels time (1500 UK time). Sir John Graham proposes to circulate a draft statement for use by the NATO Secretary-General - text is as follows:

'Falkland Islands

Draft Statement for use by Secretary-General of NATO, 22 May 1982

17. The Council met at 1600 hours on Saturday, 22 May 1982 and heard a statement by the British Permanent Representative about the latest situation in the Falkland Islands. The Council noted the Argentine Government's rejection of the British Government's proposal of 7 May for a diplomatic settlement of the issue. The Council noted also that British forces have landed on the Falkland Islands. They expressed their support for the British Government's determination to turn back the Argentine aggression of 2 April, in the exercise - failing compliance by Argentina with Security Council Resolution No 502 - of the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.'

2. Sir John Graham would like clearance or any amendments to the above text. His aim is to circulate it to all members prior to the meeting. He is optimistic that he can get it through.
3. I undertook to inform UKDEL NATO by telephone (Security Desk, extension 3001) as soon as possible.

P A Penfold  
Emergency Unit

22 May 1982



GR 520

CONFIDENTIAL

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FM UKDEL NATO 221615Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 OF 22 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE  
LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA PARIS REYKJAVIK ROME WASHINGTON  
UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKREP BRUSSELS

YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 105: THE FALKLANDS

BY AGREEMENT WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL I CALLED FOR A MEETING  
OF THE NAC AT 1400HRS GMT TODAY, WITH THE OBJECT OF OBTAINING AN  
EXPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY. I CIRCULATED A POSSIBLE TEXT IN  
ADVANCE BUT THIS RAN INTO TROUBLE WITH THE FRENCH, ITALIANS AND  
GERMANS. THE FRENCH OBJECTIONS RELATED TO FORM RATHER THAN  
SUBSTANCE AND THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING INSTRUCTIONS IN TIME.  
THE ITALIANS, WHO CONSULTED COLOMBO BY TELEPHONE, TOLD ME THAT  
THEY COULD NOT GO BEYOND A STATEMENT RECALLING THEIR SOLIDARITY  
FROM THE START, NOTING OUR LANDING ON THE ISLANDS, AND EXPRESSING  
THE HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE GERMANS, ALSO ON INSTRUCTIONS  
SUGGESTED THAT SINCE THE LUXEMBOURG COMMUNIQUE WAS SO RECENT, THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD CONFINE HIMSELF TO REITERATING THE  
THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION AS SET OUT IN PARA 14 OF THAT COMMUNIQUE.  
MEANWHILE THE US RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HAIG TO SUPPORT OUR  
TEXT.

2. LUNS SPOKE TO ME ABOUT THIS JUST BEFORE THE MEETING AND  
STRONGLY ADVISED ME TO DROP MY DRAFT AND TO LEAVE IT TO HIM;  
OTHERWISE WE SHOULD HAVE A WRANGLE. I AGREED AND EXPLAINED MATTERS  
TO THE AMERICANS.

3. IN THE EVENT THINGS WENT AS LUNS HAD FORECAST. I MADE A  
STATEMENT, BASED ON VARIOUS TELEGRAMS ESPECIALLY THE TELEGRAM  
UNDER REFERENCE, AND STRESSING THAT WE HAD NOT TURNED OUR BACK  
ON NEGOTIATIONS. MILREP'S STAFF GAVE A BRIEFING DRAWING ON MR  
NOTT'S STATEMENT AND A FEW OTHER SNIPPETS. (WE ARE ARRANGING THAT  
THE COUNCIL SHALL RECEIVE ON A REGULAR BASIS COPIES OF THE  
SITREPS WHICH MILREP DISTRIBUTES TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE).  
MOST PERMREPS WERE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT NORWAY, CANADA,  
US (ON INSTRUCTIONS) BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY MADE STRONG  
STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE UK. FRG, ITALY, DENMARK AND FRANCE  
WERE MORE RESERVED BUT WERE READY TO SUPPORT A STATEMENT BY  
THE SECRETARY GENERAL REITERATING PARA 14 OF THE LUXEMBOURG  
COMMUNIQUE. LEDOGAR (US) POINTED OUT THAT SINCE 19 MAY THERE HAD  
BEEN DEVELOPMENTS: SINCE NOBODY CONTRADICTED HIM A REITERATION,



THE SECRETARY GENERAL REITERATING PARA 14 OF THE LUXEMBOURG COMMUNIQUE. LEDOGAR (US) POINTED OUT THAT SINCE 13 MAY THERE HAD BEEN DEVELOPMENTS: SINCE NOBODY CONTRADICTED HIM A REITERATION, MADE IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE DEVELOPMENTS AMOUNTS TO A STRONG STATEMENT OF SUPPORT. NEVERTHELESS I BELIEVE THAT YOU MAY FIND THE RESERVATIONS OF THE FRG AND ITALY REFLECTED IN THE ATTITUDES OF GENSCHER AND COLOMBO ON 24 MAY. THE FRENCH AS REPRESENTED HERE ARE MORE UNPREDICTABLE.

4. I WAS ASKED TO SAY WHAT OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVES WERE AND WHAT ACTION WE FORESAW IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I QUOTED FROM MR NOTT'S STATEMENT FOR THE FIRST, THAT OUR TROOPS WOULD ADVANCE TO HARASS THE ARGENTINE TROOPS AND THAT WE WOULD TIGHTEN THE BLOCKADE WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. I ALSO RECALLED THAT YOU HAD SAID IN THE NAC ON 17 MAY THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE THAT WITHDRAWAL, IF POSSIBLE BY PEACEFUL MEANS, BUT IF NOT, BY ARMS. AS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I SAID I HAD NO UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION BUT I POINTED OUT THAT A CEASE-FIRE IN (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) SITU, WHICH LEFT THE ARGENTINES IN OCCUPATION OF ANY PART OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

5. TEXT OF SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT IS IN M I F T.

GRAHAM

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 221656Z JW/VPA



FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO STREP (DETAILED VERSION) : 0700 HRS, 22 MAY

UN

(a) Developments on 21 May

1. In informal consultations of the Security Council it was quickly agreed, on the proposal of Ireland, that the Council should meet formally. But about an hour's wrangling then followed on a US proposal that the formal meeting should be held in private. This proposal fell when the President announced that Argentina was not prepared to participate in a private meeting.
2. At the formal meeting the Secretary-General gave an account, in neutral terms, of his activities since the adoption of SCR.502. He concluded by saying that efforts must continue to restore peace. Ros (Argentina) gave a wordy and repetitive speech seeking to contrast Argentine willingness to negotiate with our alleged rigidity. Sir A Parsons, in a speech which was well received, gave an account of recent events and of the course of negotiations. He also drew attention to the Argentine's violations of the basic principles of the Charter (peaceful settlement, non-use of force) while for our part we were acting within the terms of the Charter, specifically the inherent right of self-defence and the right of self-determination for the people of non-self-governing territories.
3. Dorr (Ireland) was not particularly helpful but he at least condemned Argentina for using force and held to SCR.502. Nisibori (Japan) made a helpful statement asking only for a resumption of negotiations. Correa da Costa (Brazil) made a careful statement calling for full implementation of SCR.502. Albornoz (Ecuador) spoke strongly, but in somewhat confused terms, for Argentina. Street (Australia) gave a superb speech on the theme that Argentina began the crisis and is responsible for the consequences of its own recklessness. Jacob (Antigua and Barbuda) made a brief and helpful statement. The Council will resume at 221900Z.

(b) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

4. The first day has not gone badly. A number of delegations are thinking about Draft Resolutions; the Irish in terms of re-affirming SCR.502 with a ceasefire combined with a fresh mandate for the Secretary-General. The Spanish are floating an idea of a Security Council Commission, possibly including UN observers, which should go to the Falklands immediately to stop the fighting and enable negotiations to start for mutual withdrawal. Sir A Parsons has left the Irish and the Spanish in no doubt as to our views. Sir A Parsons believes it will be hard for anyone to bring a Draft Resolution to a vote today and that with luck Argentine, Venezuelan and Panamanian Foreign Ministers, who are expected in New York today, will produce a sufficiently extreme Resolution for the 9 votes to be in question and for us to secure negative votes from the US and the French.

(c) Message from the Secretary-General

5. The Secretary-General thanks the Secretary of State for his very kind message and expresses the hope that, in spite of the present impasse, it will be possible to resolve the crisis peacefully before too long.

/(d)

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York telno.  
812)

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York telno.  
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York telno.  
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York telno.  
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(d) Press

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 (UKMIS New  
 York telno.  
 815)

6. The Argentine Mission are giving copies of their final paper to journalists (the 'Sunday Times' have a copy). Sir A Parsons suggests we might use this as grounds for giving copies unattributably to our customers and exploiting the openings which it offers.

Peruvian Initiative

H  
 I  
 (Lima telno.  
 189 (sic))

7. HM Ambassador spoke to President Belaunde along the lines of paragraph 1 of FCO telegram No.122 to Lima. In reply Belaunde said that he had studied the documents explaining our position and this confirmed his belief that a ceasefire and a mutual and phased withdrawal of forces should be negotiated, leaving the substance and detail of the dispute for subsequent negotiations. The President said he could not give up his peace efforts and implied that the third sentence of our message to him (paragraph 1 of FCO telegram No.122 to Lima at Flag H) could be used to keep his initiative alive in the event of Argentine acceptance.

J  
 (Lima telno.  
 191)

K

8. The Dutch Ambassador, Lima, has been told by his Argentine colleague that Argentina believes the Peruvian initiative is 'interesting' but that the Argentines understand we have rejected it and that therefore there would be no further point in an Argentine response. But according to an Argentine press report the Argentines have told the Peruvians that they accept the Peruvian proposal although they have also made minor observations on it.

US

L  
 (Washington  
 telno.1854)

M  
 (FCO telno.  
 1013 to  
 Washington)

N  
 (Washington  
 telno.1838)

O  
 (Washington  
 telno.1851)

9. The US Embassy, Buenos Aires, has reported that the Argentines are talking about breaking off relations with the US; one pretext being American materiel support for us and the publicity given to this in the American press. While admitting American responsibility for press leaks, Mr Haig hopes we will continue to avoid making public details of the support we are receiving. On instructions our Embassy had already raised the question of official comments on press leaks with both the State Department and the Pentagon. The US view is that they prefer to hold to present guidelines refusing to discuss specific requests for assistance from the UK or the response to these. The National Security Council issued a statement on 21 May which, inter alia, said 'we will, however, not address reports of specific requests for assistance or how we respond'.

Brazil and Exocet

P  
 (Washington  
 lno.1855)

Q  
 (Brasilia  
 lno.199)

R  
 (Brasilia  
 lno.200)

10. The Secretary-General of the MFA has told our Ambassador that to his knowledge no Exocet missiles of any kind have been supplied from Brazilian official sources to Argentina; nor did he know of any intention to supply them in the future. (The Brazilians claim they have only the surface version of Exocet). The Secretary-General was less certain of the position concerning Exocets being sent through Brazilian intermediaries by a third country supplier, but he said he would see what he could do to check this.



FRG

Bonn tel.  
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
11. Herr Genscher has been unusually forthcoming and has invited our Ambassador to see him at any time concerning any help he might give us. HM Ambassador suggests we should consider whether we would wish to use this opening to pass Falklands or EC messages or attempts to argue our case.

Comment

12. Proceedings in the Security Council have so far gone more or less as predicted and do not in themselves point to a need for new instructions to Sir A Parsons. It is fortunate that the Australian Foreign Minister was on hand to give such strong support.

13. The Argentine position on the latest Peruvian proposals is unclear. But Belaunde is unlikely to leave matters as they now stand, especially if he receives encouragement from Buenos Aires. His ideas of a partial Argentine withdrawal to West Falkland in particular have no attraction. The Colombian Ambassador is to deliver a message from his President this morning; we have no details of its contents. We will need to consider how to respond.

14. Argentine release to the media of their final paper gives us a welcome opportunity to underline their inflexibility. We need to consider early action on this.



A J Payne  
Emergency Unit

22 May 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 221454Z MAY 82

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TO WASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 192 OF 22 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TEL NO 189: FALKLANDS.

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME (AT 0915) TO SAY THAT HE HAD A LONG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT WITH GALTIERI, WHO SAID THE ARGENTINES HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE LATEST PERUVIAN IDEAS WITH CERTAIN RESERVATIONS WHICH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE THOUGHT MIGHT NOT BE INSUPERABLE. IN PARTICULAR, PRESIDENT BELAUNDE SAID THAT GALTIERI HAD SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF AN QUOTE EQUIDISTANT UNQUOTE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. THE ARGENTINES FEEL THAT 150 MILES IS TOO NEAR BECAUSE THEIR OWN BASES ARE FURTHER AWAY. BUT THE PRESIDENT EMPHASISED THAT HIS OWN INSISTENCE ON AN EQUIDISTANT WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN QUOTE WELL RECEIVED UNQUOTE BY GALTIERI.
2. THE PRESIDENT ASLO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE NOT (NOT) OPPOSED TO A UN GROUP GOVERNING THE ISLANDS FOR SIX MONTHS OR EVEN ONE YEAR DURING WHICH NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE. IF AT THE END OF THIS PERIOD THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT, THE ARGENTINES WOULD PROPOSE TO RETURN THE PROBLEM TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SO FAR INFORMED THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN OF THESE DETAILS, BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT COSTA MENDEZ WAS ON HIS WAY TO THE UN, AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD BE INFORMED STRAIGHT AWAY OF THE NATURE OF GALTIERI'S RESPONSE.
4. THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME AGAIN TO KEEP IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH HIM ON ANY ASPECT OF THE SITUATION. HE SAID HE COULD SPEAK ON THE TELEPHONE TO MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AT ANY TIME.

WALLACE

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL



FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0715 HRS, 22 MAY

UN

1. The Security Council met in a formal session at which the Secretary-General gave a detailed account of his activities since the adoption of SCR.502. Statements were then made by Senor Ros (Argentina) and Sir A Parsons. The Australian Foreign Minister made a strong speech in support of the British case and other helpful speeches were made by the Representatives of Japan, Brazil and Antigua and Barbuda. The Council will resume the debate later today.

Military Action

2. The Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Nott, in a statement to the press announced the establishment of a British bridgehead on East Falkland. Our ships had come under heavy attack and two were seriously damaged. The Argentines had lost sixteen aircraft and had suffered casualties.

Argentina

3. The British Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires has reported that there have been no reports of any incidents involving British citizens in Argentina.



[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO  
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

*(98) 46*

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS *Ps/Ld Belstead 1*  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HS/S AM D  
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HD/PLANNING STAFF  
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HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD (E)  
HD/PUSD *(2)*  
EMERGENCY ROOM  
RESIDENT CLERK  
*Hd of NAD*

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET *(2 copies)*

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG )

PS/SIR M PALLISER )

PS/SIR A DUFF )

CABINET

MR WADE-GERY )

MR FULLER )

OFFICE

MR O'NEILL, HD ASSESS-

MENTS STAFF )

*Mr Cowin*  
DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. *(via Room 8)*

GR 550  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON 220046Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1856 OF 22 MAY 1982  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: CONGRESS

1. I MADE SEPARATE CALLS ON SENATORS PERCY AND TOWER TODAY. BOTH CONTINUE TO SUPPORT OUR POSITION THOUGH THEY HOPE THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE OUR MILITARY PURPOSE QUICKLY AND WARNED THAT THERE IS A FEAR AMONG SOME SENATORS THAT OUR MILITARY ACTION COULD SPREAD TO THE MAINLAND OR THAT WE MIGHT, IF WE GOT BOGGED DOWN, ASK THE US GOVERNMENT FOR ASSISTANCE GOING BEYOND MATERIEL SUPPORT. THE STRONG IMPLICATION WAS THAT WE WOULD LOSE SENATE AND INDEED PUBLIC BACKING IN EITHER EVENTUALITY.

2. I HAD A LONG TALK THIS EVENING WITH SENATOR BIDEN, A LEADING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WHO WAS THE AUTHOR OF THE RESOLUTION OF SUPPORT FOR US ADOPTED BY THE SENATE ON 29 APRIL. BIDEN SAID THAT EVEN BACK IN APRIL THERE HAD BEEN SOME RELUCTANCE, ESPECIALLY AMONG REPUBLICANS, TO SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD CUT ACROSS HAIG'S EFFORTS AND INVOLVE THE US ILL ADVISEDLY IN A DISPUTE WHICH COULD DAMAGE US RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. WHEN HAIG HAD GIVEN THE GO-AHEAD TO THE RESOLUTION, SUPPORT HAD RALLIED BUT ONLY AFTER CHANGES TO THE DRAFT HAD BEEN MADE, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE RIGHT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TO SELF-DETERMINATION.



THE RIGHT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

3. BIDEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT SENATE SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION REFLECTS THE CLOSENESS OF ANGLO/US RELATIONS RATHER THAN A FEELING THAT IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES WERE AT STAKE. HAD THE FALKLANDS BELONGED TO BRAZIL, FOR EXAMPLE, NO AMERICAN WOULD HAVE CARED A BIT ABOUT ARGENTINE AGGRESSION, LET ALONE BEEN PREPARED TO SUPPORT ATTEMPTS TO RETAKE THE ISLANDS. WE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE ASSUME THAT THE SENATE WOULD SUPPORT GREATER US INVOLVEMENT - OR EVEN MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR US INDEFINITELY. THE LONGER THE DISPUTE LASTED THE MORE AMERICANS WOULD BECOME CONCERNED ABOUT BEING SUCKED IN MILITAIRLY OR ABOUT THE DETERIORATION IN US RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. HE HAD HAD SOME CRITISISM FROM CONSTITUENTS ON THIS SCORE ALREADY.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, BIDEN SAID WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED THAT SO MANY SENATORS HAD TAKEN THE VIEW THAT THE US COULD NOT AFFORD TO IMPAIR ITS INTERESTS FOR THE RIGHTS OF SELF DETERMINATION OF 1800 SHEEP FARMERS. IF, IN ANY RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS, SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE ISLANDERS WERE TO BECOME THE ONE ISSUE ON OUR SIDE STANDING IN THE WAY OF A SETTLEMENT US SUPPORT FOR US WOULD EVAPORATE.

5. I SAID THAT I WAS ASTONISHED THAT SELF DETERMINATION COULD COUNT FOR SO LITTLE IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAD INVENTED IT. THE LOGIC OF WHAT BIDEN HAD SAID WAS THAT THE ISLANDERS SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THEY MUST EITHER LEAVE OR AGREE TO LIVE UNDER A DICTATORSHIP. BIDEN SAID HE AGREED WITH ME AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE OUR STRONGEST SUPPORTER BUT WE SHOULD NOT DELUDE OURSELVES THAT CONGRESSIONAL OPINION WAS ALTOGETHER SOLID. HE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RATHER TEPID EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR US REFLECTED, NOT JUST REAGAN'S STYLE, BUT A POLITICAL SENSE OF THE MOOD WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY.

6. COMMENT: BIDEN WAS NOT SAYING THAT WE HAD LOST SENATE SUPPORT BUT THAT IF WE GOT INTO DIFFICULTIES MILITAIRLY OR IF WE APPEARED TO BE UNREASONABLE IN NEGOTIATIONS, THEN FEAR OF THE US GETTING INVOLVED OR OF DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS WOULD START TO OUTWEIGH OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

HENDERSON

NNNN



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

(45)

**FLASH**

PS (6)  
 PS/IR FURD  
 PS/IR OSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 MR BILLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 IR GIFFARD  
 IR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LEMFOX  
 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR JUREA  
 MR GILLORE  
 HD/PUSD (2)  
 HD/S K D  
 HD/DEF DEPT  
 HD/HESS DEPT  
 HD/SPD  
 HD/ED (E)  
 HD/ITD  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS 760  
~~MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS~~  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/KO 10 DOCKING ST--(2)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MR ILETT ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 SIR K PALLISER ) CABINET  
 MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO  
 DIO

~~UK 8 FOR MODER IN S FLASH~~

Mr. Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]

**FLASH**

Twists 007

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 2216120Z MAY 82  
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 817 OF 22 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, KINGSTON, PARIS, WASHINGTON,  
PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN.

YOUR TELNO 451 : FALKLANDS

1. MANY THANKS FOR THE FIRST SENTENCE OF YOUR PARA 1.
2. WE HAVE ALREADY GOT CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND ON BOARD. THEY WILL PROBABLY SPEAK TODAY, THUS TO SOME EXTENT OFFSETTING THE TORRENT OF LATIN AMERICAN RHETORIC WHICH IS IN STORE FOR US (NO BAD THING IN A WAY TO GET MOST OF IT OVER IN ONE AFTERNOON - IT WILL BORE THE COUNCIL TO DEATH). WE ARE WORKING ON CARIBBEANS, AFRICANS AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY. UNFORTUNATELY, THE JAMAICAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS AN ANCIENT FOSSIL, APPARENTLY ALMOST INCAPABLE OF HUMAN SPEECH. ABDULAH (TRINIDAD) IS ON OUR SIDE,



PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS AN ANCIENT FOSSIL, APPARENTLY ALMOST INCAPABLE OF HUMAN SPEECH. ABDULAH (TRINIDAD) IS ON OUR SIDE, BUT GUTLESS. I DOUBT IF HE WILL SPEAK UNLESS HE RECEIVES ABSOLUTELY UNEQUIVOCAL INSTRUCTIONS TO DO SO FROM HIS CAPITAL. THE NEW BARBADIAN AMBASSADOR IS A MAN OF STERNER STUFF AND I HAVE SOME HOPES OF HIM. OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS - ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA, KENYA ETC. ARE CHEERING US VIGOROUSLY FROM THE PAVILION BUT ARE RELUCTANT TO GO TO THE WICKET. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO WORK ON NIGVE. A DIRECT INSTRUCTION FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA TO PAUL LUSAKA MIGHT JUST DO THE TRICK WITH ZAMBIA. THE US AND FRANCE ARE BOUND TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENTS AT SOME STAGE BUT, GIVEN THE PERSONAL QUALITIES OF MRS KIRKPATRICK AND DE NANTEUIL, I SUSPECT THAT THE GUYANAN STATEMENT MAY BE MORE HELPFUL THAN THEIRS (I HOPE I AM DOING THEM AN INJUSTICE).

3. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF GETTING OUT THIRD WORLD COMMONWEALTH SPEAKERS, IT MIGHT BE WORTH YOUR SEEING IF RAMPHAL WOULD HELP, BOTH THROUGH HIS CONTACTS IN CAPITALS AND HIS DIRECT CONTACTS WITH PERM. REPS. HERE.

PARSONS

NNNN



GALTIERI.

2. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE NOT (NOT) OPPOSED TO A UN GROUP GOVERNING THE ISLANDS FOR SIX MONTHS OR EVEN ONE YEAR DURING WHICH NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE. IF AT THE END OF THIS PERIOD THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT, THE ARGENTINES WOULD PROPOSE TO RETURN THE PROBLEM TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SO FAR INFORMED THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN OF THESE DETAILS, BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT COSTA MENDEZ WAS ON HIS WAY TO THE UN, AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD BE INFORMED STRAIGHT AWAY OF THE NATURE OF GALTIERI'S RESPONSE.

4. THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME AGAIN TO KEEP IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH HIM ON ANY ASPECT OF THE SITUATION. HE SAID HE COULD SPEAK ON THE TELEPHONE TO MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AT ANY TIME.

WALLACE

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL

NNNN



FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

45

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

PS — 6  
 PS/MR FURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS — Ps/Ld Balstead 1  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR BARRETT  
 ES/S AM D  
 ED/DEF D  
 ED/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/UND  
 ED/NEWS D  
 HD/ERD  
 ED/EDD(E)  
 ED/PUSD (2)

**FLASH**

**ADVANCE COPY**

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)  
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
 PS/SIR E PALLISER  
 PS/SIR A DUFF  
 MR WADE-GERY  
 MR FULLER  
 MR O'NEILL. HD ASSESS-  
 MENTS. STAFF  
 MR C. ...  
 DIO

CABINET  
OFFICE

MR J K STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGT MOD  
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Rosu 8)

CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM LINA 221454Z MAY 82  
 TO FLASH FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 192 OF 22 MAY  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

NY TEL NO 189: FALKLANDS.

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME (AT 0915) TO SAY THAT HE HAD A LONG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT WITH GALTIERI, WHO SAID THE ARGENTINES HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE LATEST PERUVIAN IDEAS WITH CERTAIN RESERVATIONS WHICH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE THOUGHT MIGHT NOT BE INSUPERABLE. IN PARTICULAR, PRESIDENT BELAUNDE SAID THAT GALTIERI HAD SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF AN QUOTE EQUIDISTANT UNQUOTE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. THE ARGENTINES FEEL THAT 150 MILES IS TOO NEAR BECAUSE THEIR OWN BASES ARE FURTHER AWAY. BUT THE PRESIDENT EMPHASISED THAT HIS OWN INSISTENCE ON AN EQUIDISTANT WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN QUOTE WELL RECEIVED UNQUOTE BY GALTIERI.

...THE ARGENTINES ARE NOT (NOT)



PRIME MINISTER

*mf*

FCO's initial reaction is that there is nothing new in the President's comments. However, they will consider a response and submit advice in advance of Monday's OD(SA).

Duty Clerk  
22.5.82



PP THE HAGUE


22 MAY

PP LUXEMBOURG

PP ROME

PP DUBLIN

PP BONN



*MF*

GPS 120

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 221110Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 537 OF 22 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND  
OTHER EC POSTS

MY TELNO 519; FALKLANDS; EC IMPORT BAN

1. MINISTER PURSUED THE QUESTION YESTERDAY EVENING WITH GUTMANN, WHO SAID HE COULD NOT AT THIS STAGE SAY WHAT THE FRENCH POSITION WOULD BE. HOWEVER HE EXPECTED CHEYSSON TO RETURN TO PARIS DURING THE WEEK-END, POSSIBLY ON SATURDAY.

2. MOREL IN THE ELYSÉE COMMENTED THAT, AS MITTERRAND HAD INDICATED AT HIS MEETING ON 17 MAY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, FRENCH SUPPORT WAS UNEQUIVOCAL EVEN IF THE MILITARY SITUATION BECAME MORE ACTIVE. THE FRENCH LINE WOULD BE FINALISED WHEN CHEYSSON RETURNED FROM AFRICA OVER THE WEEK-END.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/REGD 221146Z BC/ABD



[NAMIBIA

ADVANCE COPIES] 17

PS — 6

~~PS/US~~

PS/PUS

~~PS/US~~ Sir J. Leahy

SIR L. ALLINSON

MR R WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET ✓

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

ES/S AF D

ED/C AF D

ED/UND

ED/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 221055Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 353 OF 22 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE URMIS NEW YORK LUANDA GABORONE LUSAKA HARARE MAPUTO

DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS NAIROBI PARIS BONN AND OTTAWA

WASHINGTON TELNO 1853 TO FCO: NAMIBIA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARGUS REPORT OF 21 MAY.

BEGINS

SOUTH AFRICA HAS SURPRISED — AND DELIGHTED — THE WESTERN FIVE NEGOTIATORS BY VIRTUALLY IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTING PHASE TWO OF THE SWA/NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT PLAN WITHOUT ANY FUSS.

EVEN THE ISSUE OF UNITED NATIONS IMPARTIALITY, SOMETHING SOUTH AFRICA HAS SHOWN STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT, SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOLVED SATISFACTORILY.



THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT THE COUNTDOWN TOWARDS AN ELECTION  
COULD BEGIN AS EARLY AS JULY THIS YEAR.

OFFICIALLY, THE SECOND PHASE OF THE WESTERN PLAN HAS NOT YET  
BEEN PRESENTED TO SOUTH AFRICA AND WILL THEN AWAIT A REPLY, BUT  
MOST DIPLOMATS KNOW WHAT THE ANSWER IS GOING TO BE.

MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR THE EASY TRANSITION FOR PHASE TWO  
THROUGH THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIDE COULD BE GIVEN TO DR KENNETH KAUNDA  
OF ZAMBIA, WHO ASKED TO MEET MR P V BOTHA SO AS TO SORT OUT THE  
SWA/NAMIBIA ISSUE.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN WILL GO HAND IN  
HAND WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA, AFTER WHICH  
AMERICA MIGHT GRANT DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO LUANDA.

WHILE SOUTH AFRICA HAS ACCEPTED VIRTUALLY ALL OF PHASE  
TWO, THERE MIGHT STILL BE SOME QUIBBLING ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.

SOUTH AFRICA APPEARS READY TO ACCEPT A FORCE OF 6,000, WHILE THE  
NUMBER BEING SUGGESTED MAY BE 7,000.

ONCE PHASE TWO, WHICH DEALS WITH THE SIZE OF THE UN FORCE, THE  
IMPARTIALITY OF THE UN AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE, HAS  
BEEN ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES. PHASE THREE - IMPLEMENTATION - CAN  
IN THEORY BEGIN.

HOWEVER PHASE ONE HAS NOT BEEN AGREED UPON YET AS SWAPO HAS  
REJECTED BOTH ALTERNATE VOTING PROCEDURES PUT FORWARD BY THE FIVE.

ENDS

FERGUSSON

NNNN



PRIVATE  
OFFICE

MOD PREESE STATEMENT 2115 22 MAY

Yesterday (Friday) we established a bridgehead on the Falkland Islands. During the night we consolidated this position against the possibility that the Argentines might attack it today. In the event we have had no reports of such an attack taking place so that throughout the day we have been able without interruption to continue our consolidation of the position.

There have been no reports of any Argentine action against the task force or disembarked British forces.

The only reported operational incident today involved two Harriers on routine patrol south of Port Stanley. The Harriers attacked and severely damaged an Argentine patrol boat in the Choiseul Sound.

END



22 MAY 1982

ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK  
 ZZ WASHINGTON  
 GRS 606  
 UNCLASSIFIED

37

FM FCO 221400Z MAY 82  
 TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 453 OF 22 MAY 1982  
 AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS, LISBON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE BY MR NOTT AT 1215Z TODAY 22 MAY.  
 BEGINS.
  
2. THIS MORNING THE UNION JACK IS ONCE AGAIN FLYING ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. AND I HOPE THAT YOU HAVE ALL SEEN THIS PHOTOGRAPH - SHOWING THE EVIDENT PLEASURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLAND CHILDREN.
  
3. A MAJOR BRIDGEHEAD HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE AREA OF SAN CARLOS ON EAST FALKLAND. THE MAJOR AMPHIBIOUS LANDING YESTERDAY WAS A COMPLETE SUCCESS. TACTICAL SURPRISE WAS ACHIEVED AND OUR TROOPS LANDED SAFELY WITH ALMOST NO INTERFERENCE FROM ARGENTINE FORCES. WE ARE NOW ASHORE ON BRITISH SOVEREIGN TERRITORY IN CONSIDERABLE FORCE AND HAVE THREE ROYAL MARINE COMMANDOS AND TWO BATTALIONS OF THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT FIRMLY IN PLACE WITH THEIR SUPPORTING ARMS INCLUDING ARTILLERY AND RAPIER AND OTHER AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS. FROM THEIR SECURE BASE OUR FORCES WILL ADVANCE TO PLACE THE OCCUPYING ARGENTINE TROOPS UNDER INCREASING HARASSMENT, WHILST THE ROYAL NAVY MAINTAINS AND TIGHTENS ITS BLOCKADE AROUND THE ISLANDS.
  
4. TO COMPLEMENT THE LANDINGS THERE WERE RAIDS YESTERDAY IN OTHER PARTS OF EAST AND WEST FALKLANDS. IN ONE OF THESE ROYAL MARINES CAPTURED AN ARGENTINE POSITION ON FANNING HEAD OVERLOOKING FALKLAND SOUND. IN ANOTHER THE AIRFIELD AT GOOSE GREEN



AND ARGENTINE POSITIONS CLOSEBY WERE RAIDED BY OUR FORCES. CARRIER BASED RAF HARRIERS LAUNCHED ATTACKS IN THE COURSE OF THE MORNING AGAINST ARGENTINE INSTALLATIONS AT PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD AND THE HELICOPTERS ON THE GROUND NEARBY, AS WELL AS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AT FOX BAY. DURING THESE OPERATIONS WE LOST TWO GAZELLE HELICOPTERS, AND ONE RAF HARRIER IS MISSING.

5. THE ARGENTINE NAVY HAS SO FAR MADE NO ATTEMPT TO INTERVENE. ITS SURFACE SHIPS REMAIN BOYTLED UP IN COASTAL WATERS. THE ARGENTINE AIRFORCE HAS AS EXPECTED LAUNCHED HEAVY RAIDS ON OUR SHIPS. AIR ATTACKS STARTED AT ABOUT 10.30 LOCAL TIME AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT DAYLIGHT. A SUCCESSION OF ATTACKS WERE MADE BY MIRAGE, SKY HAWKS AND PUCARAS. COMBAT AIR PATROLS BY SEA HARRIERS FROM THE TASK FORCE WERE FLOWN CONTINUOUSLY AND WERE SUCCESSFUL IN SHOOTING DOWN A LARGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT. WE BELIEVE THAT TOAL ARGENTINE LOSSES SO FAR ARE 9 MIRAGE, 5 SKY HAWKS, 2 PUCARAS AND 4 HELICOPTERS. THESE LOSSES MUST REPRESENT A VERY SIGNIFICANT BLOW TO THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE.

6. NEVERTHELESS ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT PENETRATED OUR AIR DEFENCE SCREEN AND CARRIED OUT ATTACKS ON OUR SHIPS. THREE WARSHIPS SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE, BUT THIS IS BEING REPAIRED AND THE SHIPS REMAIN OPERATIONAL. ONE WARSHIP HAS BEEN DAMAGED IN THE ENGINE ROOM BY AN UNEXPLODED BOMB BUT ALL HER WEAPONS REMAIN EFFECITVE. A TYPE 21 FRIGATE, HMS ARDENT WAS ALSO HIT BY BOMBS AND ROCKETS, AND AFTER VALIANT EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE DAMAGE SANK IN THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT. WE DO NOT YET HAVE FURTHER DETAILED CASUALTY FIGURES TO ADD TO THOSE ALREADY ANNOUNCED BY THE MINISTRY BUT FIRST REPORTS INDICATE THAT ABOUT 20 MEN ARE MISSING FROM HMS ARDENT, AND ABOUT 30 ARE INJURED.

7. I SHOULD LIKE TO PAY GREAT TRIBUTE TO THE MEN OF OUR TASK FORCE WHOSE ACTIONS YESTERDAY WERE IN THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF HER MAJESTY'S FORCES, AND TO MEN AND WOMEN OF THE MERCHANT NAVY. OVER THE NEXT DAY OR SO OUR FORCES WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SEE ACTION AGAIN, AND WE MUST EXPECT FRESH ATTACKS UPON THEM. BUT THEY



ARE FIGHTING NOW FROM A SECURE BASE, AND THE HAZARDOUS HOURS OF THE INITIAL AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ARE BEHIND THEM. WE ARE BACK ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND BACK IN STRENGTH. WE INTEND TO ENSURE THAT AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY.

PYM



STATEMENT BY MOD 0700 22 MAY 1982

*See 4 MCM.*  
*WV*

1. Further reports on yesterday's operations in the Falklands up-date Argentine aircraft losses as follows:

9 Mirages, 5 Skyhawks, 2 Puccaras and 4 helicopters.

2. We have not received final casualty reports for yesterday's operations. Initial reports indicate British casualties of 27 wounded, 2 missing and 3 dead.

3. The two ships reported yesterday as being seriously damaged were hit by bombs in the series of air attacks launched against our forces. The other three damaged ships remain operational.



E.R.  
MR. WHITMORE

I have decided to stay at home to do housework.

I think the PM has played it beautifully so far.

I agree not the time for photographs inside.


Better if John Nott handles events from PR point of view for the moment.

I think PM should be quiet with media this weekend pending clarification, success and news of casualties.

Tomorrow may be a better time for her to say something; but I am inclined to think we should wait until Monday before she makes herself available for radio or television.

But so far so good.

I shall be around at home all the time except when at the hospital. I will be in the office Sunday afternoon from 1530 (Lobby briefing at 1700 and Americans at 1800).

  
Bernard Ingham

22 May 1982



FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

(43) [PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

PS (6)  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE

ps/Ld Belstead 1

~~MR BARRETT~~  
MR BARRETT  
HS/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/PUSD (2)

ADVANCE COPY

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG )

PS/SIR M PALLISER )

PS/SIR A DUFF )

CABINET

MR WADE-GERY )

MR FULLER )

OFFICE

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS- )

MENTS STAFF )

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H:Q. (via Rosu 8)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 221655Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1861 OF 22 MAY

INFO TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 211900Z

FALKLANDS: ISRAELI EQUIPMENT

1. HAIG HAS TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT HE SPOKE LAST NIGHT TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR, WHO IN TURN SPOKE TO SHARON, BOTH OF WHOM ARE IN NEW YORK. HAIG WAS TOLD THAT NO EQUIPMENT WOULD BE SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA BEYOND THAT ALREADY PROVIDED FOR UNDER EXISTING CONTRACTS, AND EVEN THAT WOULD NOT BE SENT BY AIR. I SAID THAT THAT MEANT THAT THE CONSIDERABLE SUPPLIES OUTSTANDING ON EXISTING CONTRACTS COULD BE SENT TO ARGENTINA AND THAT THEY COULD MAKE NEW SUPPLIES AVAILABLE THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES. HAIG ADMITTED THIS WAS SO BUT SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN VERY FIRMLY TO THE ISRAELIS.

HENDERSON



IMMEDIATE

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO  
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

IAA

PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS Ps/Ld Balstead 1  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR ~~UPB~~  
 MR BARRETT  
 HS/S AM D  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/UND  
 HD/NEWS D  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/PUSD (2)  
 EMERGENCY ROOM  
 RESIDENT CLERK  
 HD/WED

ADVANCE COPY

[Passed to E.R.]

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)  
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 PS/SIR M PALLISER )  
 PS/SIR A DUFF ) CABINET  
 MR WADE-GERY )  
 MR FULLER ) OFFICE  
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS- )  
 MRC. MENTS STAFF )  
 DIO )  
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

O R 241300Z MAY 82  
 FM ADMINISTRATOR ASCENSION  
 TO RBDWDF/FCO [IMMEDIATE]  
 INFO MODUK (DS 11)

BT

SECRET

SIC 19F

MY TEL 221630Z MAY. ASTIZ

1. CBFSU TSCHIFFELI AND I WENT ABOARD DUNBARTON CASTLE TODAY. TSCHIFFELI HAD PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH ASTIZ FOR HALF HOUR. HE EXPRESSED HIMSELF SATISFIED WITH ALL ASPECTS OF ASTIZ'S DETENTION

2. IN MY PRESENCE BUT ABSENCE OF TSCHIFFELI WHO DECLINED TO BE PRESENT, CBFSU PUT QUESTIONS TO ASTIZ AS INSTRUCTED. HE REPLIED QUOTE I DO NOT KNOW WHY THEY ASK THESE QUESTIONS. I REFUSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENEVA CONVENTION UNQUOTE. HE ALSO SAID HE HAS EVERY CONFIDENCE IN THE TREATMENT HE WILL RECEIVE FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR TSCHIFFELI'S VISIT. PAUNCEFORT

BT



**PART** 18 **ends:-**

21 May '82

**PART** 19 **begins:-**

22 May '82



