

PREM 19/633

Relations with Argentina

ARGENTINA

Position of the Falkland Islands

Pt. 1: Sept 1979

PART 22.

Pt. 22: June 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
3.6.82							
4.6.82							
5.6.82							
— Ends —							
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PREM 19/6 33							

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed Wayland

Date 23 April 2012

PREM Records Team

PART 22 ends:-

FCO to Versailles tel: 23 5/6/82

its

ate

PART 23 begins:-

FCO Sitrep 0700 6/6/82

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed Wayland

Date 23 April 2012

PREM Records Team

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
Limited Circulation Annex to CC (82) 31 st , Minute 1	3.6.82
OD (82) 50	4.6.82

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed *C. Wayland*

Date 23 April 2012

PREM Records Team

GRS900

SECRET

FM FCO 050335Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 23 OF 5 JUNE
FOR PS/NO.10 AND PRIVATE SECRETARY
FALKLANDS: DIPLOMATIC SITREP
UNITED NATIONS

ms 12

1. A SLIGHTLY AMENDED VERSION OF THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT FAILED TO SECURE ADOPTION YESTERDAY EVENING (4 JUNE) BECAUSE OF VEToes BY THE UK AND US. THE VOTING WAS 9 - 2 (UK US) - 4 (FRANCE GUYANA JORDAN TOGO). THE RESOLUTION SECURED 9 VOTES ONLY BECAUSE OF A LAST MINUTE SWITCH BY JAPAN FROM AN ABSTENTION TO A VOTE IN FAVOUR. AFTER THE VOTE MRS KIRKPATRICK STATED IN THE COUNCIL THAT SHE HAD BEEN ASKED BY HER GOVERNMENT TO SAY THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO CHANGE A VOTE ONCE CAST THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE ITS VOTE FROM A VETO TO AN ABSTENTION. HER DEPUTY TOLD THE PRESS THAT HAIG HAD GIVEN THE ORDERS TO CHANGE TO AN ABSTENTION TOO LATE FOR THE VOTE IN THE COUNCIL.

2. UPON RECEIPT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM VERSAILLES SIR A PARSONS INFORMED DE PINIES (SPAIN) AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (DE NANTEUIL - FRANCE) THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT. BOTH SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO VOTING THAT AFTERNOON (4 JUNE). IN THE DELAY OF ABOUT TWO HOURS BEFORE THE VOTE, MRS KIRKPATRICK MADE SEVERAL EFFORTS TO PERSUADE HAIG IN VERSAILLES TO SWITCH FROM A NO TO AN ABSTENTION. BUT SHE ONLY RECEIVED HER CHANGE OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM VERSAILLES AFTER THE VOTE HAD BEEN TAKEN. EVEN SO, THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD NOT HAVE SECURED THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES HAD NOT THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, TO HIS OBVIOUS CHAGRIN, RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM VERSAILLES AT THE LAST MINUTE TO SWITCH FROM AN ABSTENTION TO A VOTE IN FAVOUR. LAST MINUTE EFFORTS WERE MADE BY OURSELVES (TELECON EMERGENCY UNIT/UKDEL VERSAILLES) AND THE FRENCH TO GET THE JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS CHANGED BACK TO AN ABSTENTION. BUT IT WAS TOO LATE AND THE VOTE COULD NOT BE DELAYED ANY LONGER.

3. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION VOTED ON WAS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THE EARLIER REVISED TEXT WITH THE FIRST AND SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS RUN TOGETHER AND AN UNHELPFUL CHANGE TO THE THIRD OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. SIR A PARSONS SPOKE FIRST IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE BEFORE THE VOTE EMPHASISING THAT THE DRAFT DID NOT MEET UK CRITERIA: THERE WAS NO DIRECT AND INSEPARABLE LINK BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITH A FIXED TIME LIMIT AND THE WORDING WOULD HAVE ENABLED ARGENTINA TO REOPEN THE ENDLESS PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION THUS LEAVING ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES IN ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF PARTS OF THE ISLAND.

// 4.

SIR A PARSONS DESCRIBES MRS KIRKPATRICK'S PERFORMANCE AS 'TRUE GROTESQUE'. SHE MADE FREQUENT AND STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO CHANGE HER INSTRUCTIONS AND CLAIMED INCOMPREHENSIBLY THAT SIR A PARSONS WAS GOING TO DO SO TOO. HER PERFORMANCE HAS THUS EXCITED MUCH MORE MEDIA ATTENTION THAN OUR VETO. SIR A PARSONS HAS REJECTED ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM THE MEDIA THAT WE ARE ISOLATED IN THE UN. THE RESOLUTION NEARLY FAILED FROM LACK OF VOTES IN FAVOUR DESPITE ITS SUPERFICIAL REASONABLENESS. THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE TALK YET ABOUT AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SIR A PARSONS CONSIDERS THAT AT PRESENT THERE WILL BE LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR SUCH A CALL WHICH WOULD NEED EITHER NINE VOTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR A LETTER SIGNED BY A MAJORITY OF THE WHOLE UN MEMBERSHIP.

VULCAN AIRCRAFT

6. THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT DIVERTED TO BRAZIL ON 3 JUNE, IS STILL BEING HELD AT RIO DE JANEIRO MILITARY AIRPORT.
 7. THE MISSILE WAS SUCCESSFULLY DETACHED FROM THE AIRCRAFT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND STORED SEPARATELY BY THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES OUTSIDE THE SUPERVISION OF OUR AIR ATTACHE. NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE BRAZILIANS TO REFUEL THE AIRCRAFT.
 8. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVE RECEIVED A FORMAL NOTE FROM THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR, REQUESTING THEM TO INTERN THE AIRCRAFT. THE FORMER HAVE REPORTED THAT NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN, AND THEY HAVE ADVISED HM AMBASSADOR THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO BRITISH THOUGHTS ON THE ARGENTINE REQUEST.
 9. HM AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK A MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, TO EXPRESS HMG'S SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE DELAY IN ALLOWING THE AIRCRAFT TO DEPART. HMA HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DRAW THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE ALLOWING ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT, TRANSPORTING MILITARY EQUIPMENT, TO USE BRAZILIAN AIRFIELDS.
 10. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR AMBASSADOR TO RAISE THE MATTER AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL WITH THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES.
- #### NON-ALIGNED MEETING HAVANA
11. THE FINAL SCHEDULED DATE OF THE PLENARY SESSION HAS BEEN REACHED WITH ONLY HALF OF THE SPEAKERS HAVING SPOKEN AND IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE LATE INTO THE NIGHT OF 4/5 JUNE. THE REFERENCE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN THE GENERAL STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN AT YUGOSLAV INSISTENCE AND SHOULD THEREFORE ONLY APPEAR IN THE LATIN AMERICAN SECTION. DRAFTING IS CONTINUING. THE CARIBBEANS AND AFRICANS HAVE RESISTED A ONE-SIDED TEXT. CLUMSY REFERENCES TO APARTHEID IN COSTA MENDEZ' SPEECH WERE REPORTEDLY GREETED WITH LAUGHTER BY SOME AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVES WHO RECALLED THAT ARGENTINA HAD NEVER PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. GENERAL FEELING IS THAT THE REFERENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE WILL PROBABLY BE EVEN-HANDED WHILE MAKING REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS NAM SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINE SOVEREIGN CLAIM, BUT THE UK VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY AFFECT THE OUTCOME.

PYM

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SECRET
UK EYES ALPHA
FM FCO 050415Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 5 JUNE.

FOR PS/NO.10 AND PRIVATE SECRETARY
FALKLANDS: DEFENCE SITREP: SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION
SUTTON AS AT 050430A JUNE 82

INTELLIGENCE

1. CURRENT INTSUM PASSED SEPARATELY.

OWN FORCES

2. SEA. LSL SIR GALAHAD IS UNLOADING AT TEAL INLET. ANDROMEDA, PENELOPE, BLUE ROVER AND SIR GERAIN TO SAN CARLOS EARLY 5 JUNE. THE CARRIER BATTLE GROUP REMAINS TO THE EAST OF THE TEZ. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT TONIGHT BY CARDIFF AND ACTIVE ON THE PORT STANLEY AREA. GLASGOW AND ARGONAUT HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM OP CORPORATE DUE TO EXTENSIVE DAMAGE FROM EARLIER ACTIONS. THEY ARE DUE FOR REPAIR IN THEIR HOME PORTS TOWARDS THE END OF JUNE. QE2 50 NM OFF ASCENSION.

3. LAND. 3 PARA REMAIN IN AREA OF NW MOUNT LONGDON. 45 CDO ARE MOVING FROM TEAL INLET TO THE AREA OF SMOKO MOUNTAIN. 2 PARA ARE AT BLUFF COVE WITH 1/7 GURKHA RIFLES MOVING FORWARD FROM GOOSE GREEN TO JOIN. 2 SCOTS GUARDS AND 1 WELSH GUARDS ARE MOVING TO BLUFF COVE AREA BY THE NIGHT OF 5/6 JUNE. IT IS INTENDED THAT A TWO CDO ATTACK WILL BE MADE ON TWO SISTERS MOUNTAIN WITHIN NEXT 48 HOURS.

4. AIR. WEATHER CONDITIONS CONTINUE TO BE POOR: FOG HAS SEVERELY LIMITED ALL AIR OPERATIONS. THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ARGENTINE AIR ACTIVITY. THE DEPLOYMENT ASHORE OF GR3/SEA HARRIER AIRCRAFT IS NOT YET CONFIRMED BUT THE FORWARD OPERATING BASE IS READY FOR THEM.

INCIDENTS

5. A 42 CDO PATROL STRUCK A MINEFIELD DURING THE NIGHT OF 2/3 JUNE: ONE OWN FORCES WOUNDED. IN A SEPARATE INCIDENT AN ARGENTINE PATROL OF 5 WAS ENGAGED AND 3 ENEMY KILLED.

BRITISH CASUALTIES

6. SIXTEEN STRETCHERS AND 35 WALKING CASUALTIES ARE EMBARKED ON HMS HYDRA, EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AT MONTEVIDEO AT 1300Z ON 6 JUNE. SUBJECT TO DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE THEY WILL DEPART FOR UK ON A VC10 FLIGHT AT 1700 HOURS Z THE SAME DAY AND WILL FLY TO BRIZE NORTON A ASCENSION AND DAKAR.

7. A M GIVEL OF THE ICRC IS FLYING ON 6 JUNE FROM BUENOS AIRES TO MONTEVIDEO TO INSPECT THE 17,000 LBS OF MEDICAL STORES WHICH WILL BE ON THE VC10 FOR LEADING ON HMS HYDRA.

ARGENTINE PRISONERS OF WAR

8. MV NORLAND IS EXPECTED TO SAIL FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WITH 1400 PRISONERS OF WAR, ON 6 JUNE, BOUND FOR MONTEVIDEO, WHERE SHE IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE ON 10 JUNE. DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE AND ICRC ARRANGEMENTS STILL TO BE CONFIRMED.

9. SPECIAL CATEGORY PRISONERS INCLUDING SENIOR OFFICERS, MEMBERS OF SPECIAL FORCES AND PRISONERS OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE WILL BE RETAINED IN FALKLAND ISLANDS.

10. BAHIA PARAISO HAS EMBARKED ARGENTINE WOUNDED FROM UGANDA. BAHIA PARAISO IS ENROUTE TO FOX BAY AND HAS REQUESTED PERMISSION TO EMBARK WOUNDED AT PORT HOWARD.

ASTIZ

11. COMMANDER ASTIZ IS DUE TO ARRIVE AT PORTSMOUTH ON THE MV BRITISH AVON AT 0300Z ON SATURDAY 5 JUNE. HE WILL BE DRIVEN UNDER ARMED ESCORT TO THE ROYAL MILITARY POLICE DEPOT AT CHICHESTER, ARRIVING AT ABOUT 0500 HOURS Z.

12. A PROVISIONAL BOOKING HAS BEEN MADE FOR ASTIZ TO RETURN TO BUENOS AIRES ON A DIRECT FLIGHT ON THE NIGHT OF 9 JUNE UNDER A PSEUDONYM.

VULCAN DIVERSION TO BRAZIL

13. FURTHER TO THE 041800Z SITUATION REPORT, THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT YET AGREED TO RELEASE OF THE RAF VULCAN OR ITS SHRIKE MISSILE. THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT IS GIVING CONSIDERATION TO AN URGENT ARGENTINE REQUEST FOR THE INTERNMENT OF THE AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON. FCO ARE TRYING TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES.

PYM

NNNN

US VIEWS ON FALKLAND ISLANDS

Following are some points about the Falkland Islands which United States leaders have made in the recent past.

1. Armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed in the world. If the Argentine invasion were allowed to stand uncontested, this would reduce the security of small states everywhere.
2. We support the principle of self-determination, enshrined in the UN Charter, and believe that the rule of law must be upheld.
3. The fact that we took a different view from Britain on the merits of a text at the United Nations does not diminish our strong support for Britain in this crisis.
4. We are not asking for a military pause. This is a judgement for Britain to make.
5. Like Britain, we hope that this can be resolved with minimum loss of life and we note that the option of honourable withdrawal remains open to the Argentine garrison.

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM UKDEL VERSAILLES 050945Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 001 OF 05 JUNE 1982
INFO PRIORITY F C O

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR SIR A PARSONS FROM PRIME MINISTER.

1. I HAVE THIS MORNING BEEN READING YOUR OVERNIGHT TELEGRAMS AND SHOULD LIKE TO SAY ONCE AGAIN HOW MUCH I HAVE ADMIRER YOUR HANDLING OF THE U N ASPECT OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS DURING THE LAST TWO MONTHS. I KNOW THAT YOU HAD ARGUED FOR DIFFERENT TACTICS YESTERDAY, AND IT COULD BE THAT THESE WOULD HAVE WON US SOME MORE TIME. BUT IN THE WIDER CONTEXT, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL MOOD IN BRITAIN AND ABOVE ALL THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND, I AM SURE IT WAS BETTER TO REACH THE CLEARCUT RESULT IN LAST NIGHT'S RESOLUTION. THE VOTE WAS A DISAPPOINTMENT AND I HAVE THIS MORNING EXPRESSED MY FEELINGS TO THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER IN NO UNCERTAIN MANNER. BUT THE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT HERE LAST NIGHT SHOWED HOW RIGHT YOU ARE TO REBUT THE SUGGESTION THAT BRITAIN IS INTERNATIONALLY ISOLATED. I IMAGINE THE LULL AT THE U N WILL ONLY BE TEMPORARY, SO THAT I HAVE THE PLEASURE OF FURTHER WISE AND ENTERTAINING TELEGRAMS FROM YOUR PEN TO LOOK FORWARD TO. VERY MANY THANKS INDEED.

NNNN

File No. _____
Department _____
Drafted by _____
(Block Capitals) _____
Tel. Extn. _____

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY _____ Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched
(Date) 5/6
(Time) 1120 Z

POSTBY _____ Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) 050945 Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) _____
(Security Class.) Confidential (Caveat/Privacy Marking) _____
(Codeword) _____ (Deskby) _____ Z

TO Immediate UKMIS NEW YORK Tel. No. 1 of 5/6/82
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) _____

AND SAVING TO _____

REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY: FCO

SAVING TO (for info) _____

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Copies to:-

Following Personal for Sir A Parsons from Prime Minister
1. I have this morning been reading your overnight telegrams and should like to say once again how much I have admired your handling of the UN aspect of the Falklands crisis during the last two months. I know that you had argued for different tactics yesterday, and it could be that these would have won us some more time. But in the wider context, including the national mood in Britain and above all the military situation on the ground, I am sure it was better to reach the clear-cut result in last night's resolution. The vote was a disappointment and I have this morning expressed my feelings to the Japanese Prime Minister in no uncertain manner. But the discussion of this subject here last /night

night showed how right you are to rebut the
suggestion that Britain is ^{inter-}nationally isolated.
I imagine the lull at the UN will only be
temporary, so that I have the pleasure of further
wise and entertaining telegrams from your pen to
look forward to. Very many thanks indeed.

MF 5/6

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 June 1982

cc ITO
MOD
CDLO
CO

FALKLANDS

After dining with the other participants in the Versailles Summit on Friday, 4 June, the Prime Minister briefly described that part of the discussion which had concerned the Falklands. Mrs. Thatcher said that she had found strong support for our general position and President Reagan had been particularly robust in his comments. The main new idea which had emerged (originated by President Reagan and then taken up by President Mitterrand) was that those countries which were operating sanctions against Argentina should, when Port Stanley had fallen, tell the Argentines that if they agreed to a total cessation of hostilities, sanctions would be lifted.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD(SA) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John Coles

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION):
0700 HOURS, 5 JUNE 1982

United Nations

- A (UKMis New
York tel no 933)
- B (UKMis New
York tel no 934)
- C (UKMis New
York tel no 935)
- D (UKMis New
York tel no 936)
1. A slightly amended version of the Panamanian/Spanish draft failed to secure adoption yesterday evening (4 June) because of vetoes by the UK and US. The voting was 9 - 2 (UK US) - 4 (France Guyana Jordan Togo). The Resolution secured 9 votes only because of a last minute switch by Japan. After the vote Mrs Kirkpatrick stated in the Council that she had been asked by her Government to say that if it were possible to change a vote once cast the United States would like to change its vote from a veto to an abstention. Her Deputy told the press that Haig had given the orders to change to an abstention too late for the vote in the Council.
 2. Upon receipt of his instructions from Versailles Sir A Parsons informed De Pinies (Spain) and the President of the Council (de Nanteuil - France) that we would not be proposing amendments to the Panamanian/Spanish draft. Both said that in that case there was no alternative to voting that afternoon (4 June). In the delay of about two hours before the vote, Mrs Kirkpatrick made several efforts to persuade Haig in Versailles to switch from a no to abstention. The draft Resolution would not have secured the necessary nine votes had not the Japanese Ambassador, to his obvious chagrin, received instructions from Versailles at the last minute to switch from an abstention to a vote in favour. Last minute efforts were made by ourselves (telecon Emergency Unit/UKDel Versailles) and the French to get the Japanese instructions changed back to an abstention. But it was too late and the vote could not be delayed any longer.
 3. The draft Resolution voted on was essentially the same as the earlier revised text with the first and second operative paragraphs run together and an unhelpful change to the third operative paragraph. Sir A Parsons spoke first in explanation of vote before the vote emphasising that the draft did not meet UK criteria.
 4. Sir A Parsons describes Mrs Kirkpatrick's performance as "truly grotesque". She claimed incomprehensibly to the press that when she had vetoed she had not realised that Sir A Parsons was going to do so too. Her performance has thus excited much more media attention than our veto.
 5. There has been very little talk yet about an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. Sir A Parsons considers that at present there will be little sympathy for such a call which would need either nine votes in the Security Council or a letter signed by a majority of the whole UN membership.

/Vulcan

SECRET

Vulcan Aircraft Diversion

6. The Vulcan aircraft diverted to Brazil on 3 June, is still being held at Rio de Janeiro military airport.

E (Brasilia to
FOO tel no 245)

7. The missile was successfully detached from the aircraft yesterday afternoon and stored separately by the Brazilian authorities outside the supervision of our Air Attache. No action was taken by the Brazilians to refuel the aircraft.

F (Brasilia to
FOO tel no 246)
G (Brasilia to
FOO tel no 247)

8. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry have received a formal Note from the Argentine Ambassador, requesting them to intern the aircraft. The former have reported that no decision has yet been taken, and they have advised HM Ambassador that they are prepared to give consideration to British thoughts on the Argentine request.

H(FOO to Bras-
ilia tel no 166)

9. HM Ambassador has been instructed to seek a meeting with the Foreign Minister, to express HMG's surprise and disappointment at the delay in allowing the aircraft to depart. HMA has also been instructed to draw the Brazilian Government's attention to the fact that they are allowing Argentine aircraft, transporting military equipment, to use Brazilian airfields.

I (Washington
to FOO tel no
2029)

10. The State Department have instructed their Ambassador to raise the matter at the highest possible level with the Brazilian authorities.

Non-Aligned Meeting Havana

J (Havana to
FOO tel no 170)
K (Havana to
FOO tel no 171)

11. The final scheduled date of the Plenary Session has been reached with only half of the speakers having spoken and is expected to continue late into the night of 4/5 June. The reference to the Falkland Islands in the general statement of international problems in the final communique has been withdrawn at Yugoslav insistence and should therefore only appear in the Latin American section. Drafting is continuing. The Caribbeans and Africans have resisted a one-sided text. Clumsy references to apartheid in Costa Mendez' speech were reportedly greeted with laughter by some African representatives who recalled that Argentina had never previously supported their efforts against South Africa. General feeling is that the reference in the communique will probably be even-handed while making reference to previous NAM support for Argentine sovereign claim, but the UK veto in the Security Council may affect the outcome.

COMMENT

12. As Sir A Parsons has commented, it has been a remarkable achievement to avoid having to use a veto until this late stage. Even then it was a tight run thing. There seems to be no immediate likelihood of an Emergency Session of the General Assembly.


13. We need to consider action on the following:

- (a) to take up with the Japanese at the highest level our disappointment at their switch of vote;

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SECRET

- (b) to send messages of thanks to Guyana, Jordan and Togo for their support (any necessary thanks to the US and France can presumably be done best at Versailles);
- (c) the issue of early guidance to posts on the Security Council outcome emphasising the bare majority for the Resolution, the fact that we are not isolated and, as appropriate, that the Secretary-General's good offices can continue. We will need to be careful to take a non-committal line on the odd US behaviour. It will, however, be too late for further lobbying of NAM members.



5 June 1982

P R Fearn

Emergency Unit

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL


NYFO 005/05

ZZ FCO

OO UKDEL VERSAILLES (DESKBY 050500Z)

①
4 JUN 1982

- OO PEKING (DESKBY 050130Z)
- OO TOKYO (DESKBY 050130Z)
- OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 050500Z)
- OO PARIS (DESKBY 050630Z)
- OO KAMPALA (DESKBY 050700Z)
- OO AMMAN (DESKBY 050700Z)



FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050107Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 933 OF 4 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN, MADRID, PARIS, KAMPALA, KINSHASA,
ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN, TOKYO, MOSCOW, PEKING,
HAVANA, UKDEL NATO.

UKDEL VERSAILLES TEL NO 3 TO YOU (NOT TO ALL); FALKLANDS:

SECURITY COUNCIL.

SUMMARY.

1. A SLIGHTLY AMENDED VERSION OF THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT FAILED TO SECURE ADOPTION THIS EVENING (4 JUNE) BECAUSE OF VEToes BY THE UK AND US. THE VOTING WAS 9 - 2 (UK, US) - 4 (FRANCE, GUYANA, JORDAN, TOGO). THE RESOLUTION SECURED NINE VOTES ONLY BECAUSE OF A LAST MINUTE SWITCH BY JAPAN. AFTER THE VOTE, MRS KIRKPATRICK ASTONISHINGLY STATED THAT SHE HAD BEEN ASKED BY HER GOVERNMENT TO SAY THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO CHANGE A VOTE ONCE CAST, THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE ITS VOTE FROM A VETO TO AN ABSTENTION.

DETAIL.

2. UPON RECEIPT OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I INFORMED DE PINIES (SPAIN) AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT OF LAST NIGHT. BOTH SIDES SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO VOTING THIS AFTERNOON (4 JUNE). THERE FOLLOWED A DELAY OF ABOUT 2 HOURS WHILE BOTH SIDES COUNTED HEADS, AND MRS KIRKPATRICK MADE SEVERAL EFFORTS TO PERSUADE HAIG IN VERSAILLES TO SWITCH FROM A NOT TO ABSTENTION. WITH ABSTENTIONS ASSURED FROM GUYANA, JAPAN, JORDAN AND

WHILE BOTH SIDES COUNTED HEADS, AND MRS KIRKPATRICK MADE SEVERAL EFFORTS TO PERSUADE HAIG IN VERSAILLES TO SWITCH FROM A 'NOT TO ABSTENTION. WITH ABSTENTIONS ASSURED FROM GUYANA, JAPAN, JORDAN AND TOGO, AND PROBABLY FROM ZAIRE, IT LOOKED AS THOUGH DE PINIES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET HIS NINE VOTES. BUT, AT THE LAST MINUTE, MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE, TO HIS OBVIOUS CHAGRIN, RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM VERSAILLES TO SWITCH FROM AN ABSTENTION TO A VOTE IN FAVOUR. HE TOOK WITH HIM ZAIRE, AND NEARLY JORDAN AS WELL. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) LEFT THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THIS POINT TO RETURN TO HIS MISSION TO TELEPHONE VERSAILLES IN AN EFFORT TO GER THE JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS CHANGED. BUT IT WAS TOO LATE AND HE COULD NOT DEFER THE VOTE ANY LONGER.

3. THE DRAFT VOTED ON WAS A SLIGHTLY REVISED VERSION OF THE TEXT IN MY TEL NO 926, WITH THE FIRST AND SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS RUN TOGETHER AND WITH AN UNHELPFUL CHANGE TO THE THIRD OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH (REVISED TEXT IN MIFT, TO YOU, VERSAILLES AND WASHINGTON ONLY). I SPOKE FIRST IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE BEFORE THE VOTE (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT, TO YO ND COI ONLY). UGANDA, JAPAN, IRELAND AND ZAIRE ALSO SPOKE BEFORE THE VOTE, DECLARING THEIR INTENTION TO VOTE IN FAVOUR. JAPAN'S STATEMENT WAS BRIEF AND PAINED: JAPAN WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ARGENTINA WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME: SHE WAS DISTRESSED AT THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER BLOODSHED: SHE APPEALED TO ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW, SO THAT ARGENTINA'S TIES OF FRIENDSHIP COULD BE RESTORED AND STRENGTHENED. DORR PRODUCED 15 MINUTES OF HIS USUAL SELF-CONGRATULATORY DRIVEL.

4. THE VOTE WAS AS REPORTED IN PARA 1 ABOVE. GUYANA SPOKE AFTER THE VOTE - AN ADMIRABLY ROBUST STATEMENT. DE PINIES (SPAIN) WAS SURPRISINGLY MILD: VARIOUS AMENDMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO THE DRAFT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF COUNCIL MEMBERS' VIEWS: ALTHOUGH A BALANCED TEXT, IT HAD NOT BEEN ADOPTED: THIS WAS NOT A FAILURE FOR ITS SPONSORS BUT FOR PEACE: THE RESPONSIBILITY LAY WITH THOSE WHO HAD PREVENTED ADOPTION.

5. MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) SPOKE NEXT. IT WAS A TRULY ASTONISHING STATEMENT. SHE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL'S DECISION WAS YET ANOTHER FAILURE TO MEDIATE A 200 YEAR OLD CONFLICT. IT REPRESENTED ONE MORE STEP IN THE PROCESS OF ESCALATION. PHASE ONE HAD ENDED WITH THE ARGENTINE INVASION: PHASE TWO 'MIGHT WELL END' WITH BRITISH REOCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS: WHERE WOULD PHASE THREE END? THE VOTE HAD AFFIRMED THE WISH OF THE MAJORITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE. THE US VETO, TO WHICH SHE WOULD RETURN, HAD AFFIRMED DISAPPROVAL OF THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA. SHE THEN READ OUT A POEM (ABOUT THE HORRORS OF WAR) BY THE ARGENTINE POET BORGES. THE FRIENDS OF ARGENTINA, OF THE AMERICAS AND OF WORLD PEACE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE 'NO SUCH OFFERINGS' FROM THE PRESENT WAR. THEY HOPED THAT COOPERATION COULD BE RESTORED AND...

... TO WHICH SHE WOULD RETURN, HAD AFFIRMED DISAPPROVAL OF THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA. SHE THEN READ OUT A POEM (ABOUT THE HORRORS OF WAR) BY THE ARGENTINE POET BORGES. THE FRIENDS OF ARGENTINA, OF THE AMERICAS AND OF WORLD PEACE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE "NO SUCH OFFERINGS" FROM THE PRESENT WAR. THEY HOPTED THAT COOPERATION COULD BE RESTORED AND FRIENDSHIPS MENDED. THE US GOVERNMENT HAD WORKED HARD TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT. IT HAD BEEN RENT BY A CLASH OF VALUES, LOYALTIES AND FRIENDS. THAT CLASH HAD CONTINUED RIGHT DOWN TO THE PRESENT VOTE. SHE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT A MEMBER COULD NOT CHANGE ITS VOTE ONCE IT HAD BEEN CAST. BUT SHE HAD BEEN ASKED BY HER GOVERNMENT TO STATE THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO CHANGE A VOTE THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE ITS FROM A VETO TO AN ABSTENTION. THIS STATEMENT HAD AN ELECTRIFYING EFFECT, REVIVING MEMORIES OF CARTER'S VOLTE FACE OVER THE US VOTE ON JERUSALEM IN 1980.

6. KAM (PANAMA) RANTED ON FOR A WHILE IN THE STYLE OF HIS MASTER, ILLUECA. HE NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD CORRECTED ITS VETO. SO ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY THE UK ALONE. THE WORLD NOW KNEW WHO STOOD FOR PEACE AND WHO FOR WAR. NINE COUNTRIES HAD SHOWN WORLD OPINION THEIR CONCERN FOR PEACE, FOR LATIN AMERICA'S HONOUR, FOR THE SOLDIERS OF ARGENTINA ETC ETC. PANAMA RESERVED ITS RIGHT TO ASK FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL.

7. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE), IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, MADE A LIMP STATEMENT. TODAY'S DRAFT HAD POSED ONLY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ITS ADOPTION WOULD SERVE TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT. IT HAD CERTAIN POSITIVE ELEMENTS. BUT ONE COULD NOT DISREGARD THAT SCR 502 HAD BEEN ADOPTED TWO MONTHS AGO BUT NO START HAD BEEN MADE TO IMPLEMENT IT. FRANCE THEREFORE UNDERSTOOD WHY ONE PARTY FELT THE NEED FOR FURTHER SAFEGUARDS. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED IN THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS.

8. ROS (ARGENTINA) CONDEMNED "THE UK VETO" IN PREDICTABLE TERMS. THE UK ALONE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL FURTHER DEATHS IN THE CONFLICT. THE MACHINERY FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY COULD NOT WORK IF PERMANENT MEMBERS USED THE VETO ONLY TO SERVE THEIR OWN ENDS. TODAY IT WAS THE MALVINAS, YESTERDAY IT HAD BEEN NAMIBIA, WHAT WOULD IT BE NEXT? I REPLIED BRIEFLY THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRISIS LAY SOLELY IN ARGENTINA'S INVASION; RESPONSIBILITY FOR FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE WOULD LIE IN ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW AS DEMANDED BY SCR 502. THAT ENDED THE PROCEEDINGS.

9. COMMENT IS IN MY THIRD IFT.

PARSONS

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E. 16.

-4 JUN 82

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NYFO 003/05

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OC UKDEL VERSAILLES (DESKBY 050500Z)

GRS 175

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 050500Z (UKDEL VERSAILLES)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050018Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 934 OF 4 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES, WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION S/15156/REV 2 WHICH WAS VOTED ON TODAY (4 JUNE):

QUOTE

THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

- REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) AND THE NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTS THEREOF,
- 1. REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO CEASE FIRE IMMEDIATELY IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) AND TO INITIATE, SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) IN THEIR ENTIRETY;
- 2. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO USE SUCH MEANS AS HE MAY DEEM NECESSARY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION;
- 3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN 72 HOURS AND TO KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

UNQUOTE

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

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GRS 758

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-4 JUN .82

UNCLASSIFIED
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 050021Z JUN 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 935 DATED 4 JUNE 82
AND TO IMMEDIATE C O I

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MY TWO IPTs: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON 4 JUNE
QUOTE

MR PRESIDENT

THE SITUATION FACING THE COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON IS STRAIGHT FORWARD. IF ARGENTINA HAD NOT INVADED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL THERE WOULD BE NO CRISIS AND WE WOULD NOT BE MEETING TODAY. IF ARGENTINA HAD OBEYED THE MANDATORY DEMAND IN SCR 502 IMMEDIATELY TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THE CRISIS WOULD HAVE PASSED AND WE WOULD NOT BE MEETING TODAY.

BUT ARGENTINA DID INVADRE THE ISLANDS AND DEFIED THE MANDATORY DEMAND OF THE COUNCIL TO WITHDRAW. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE FOR MY GOVERNMENT TO HAVE TAKEN THE ATTITUDE THAT ONLY THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER WAS OPEN TO US.

BUT WE DID NOT. OVER MANY ROUNDS OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, WE DID EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO BRING ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS. WE SHOWED FLEXIBILITY. AS THE WORLD WILL KNOW FROM PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS, WE WENT AS FAR AS WE COULD ON 17 MAY TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION WITHOUT COMPROMISING IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES WHICH I HAVE SET OUT MANY TIMES BEFORE THIS COUNCIL. OUR FINAL PROPOSALS WERE COMPREHENSIVELY REJECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. MY GOVERNMENT THEN, NATURALLY AND RIGHTLY, TOOK THEM OFF THE TABLE.

OF ARGENTINA. MY GOVERNMENT THEN, NATURALLY AND RIGHTLY, TOOK THEM OFF THE TABLE.

WE THEN TURNED, UNDER SCR 505, TO TRY TO FIND ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE ACCOMPANIED BY THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AS DEMANDED BY SCR 502. AGAIN, OUR EFFORTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA INSISTED ON PRE-CONDITIONS. THESE WERE FULLY SET OUT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA IN THIS COUNCIL ON 2 JUNE. AS I SAID AT THE TIME, ACCEPTANCE OF THESE PRE-CONDITIONS WOULD HAVE LED US BACK INTO THE MORASS OF PROCRASTINATION AND EVASION WHICH MY GOVERNMENT HAS EXPERIENCED ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF THE MOST INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESENT DEBATE I CIRCULATED INFORMALLY TO DELEGATIONS LANGUAGE WHICH WE COULD HAVE SUPPORTED AS APPROPRIATE TO BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE LINKED INSEPARABLY TO THE IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I DREW ATTENTION TO THESE ELEMENTS IN MY STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL ON 2 JUNE.

THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL IN NO WAY MEETS THESE CRITERIA. THERE IS NO DIRECT AND INSEPARABLE LINK BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITH A FIXED TIME LIMIT. THE WORDING OF THE DRAFT WITHOUT ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT ENABLE ARGENTINA TO RE-OPEN THE ENDLESS PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, THUS LEAVING ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES IN ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF PARTS OF THE ISLANDS.

THIS IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO MY GOVERNMENT. MY DELEGATION WILL VOTE AGAINST THE DRAFT IN DOCUMENT S/15156/REV 2.

UNQUOTE

PARSONS

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*Passed ER
+ The Reby*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 050830Z (DUBLIN ACCRA)
DESKBY 051030Z (HAVANA)
DESKBY 051300Z (PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN)
DESKBY 051400Z (WASHINGTON)

1-4 JUN 82

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050109Z JUN 82
TO FLASH FOO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 936 OF 4 JUNE
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN, MADRID, PARIS, KAMPALA, KINSHASA,
ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN, TOKYO, MOSCOW, PEKING,
HAVANA, UKDEL NATO.

MY IPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IT WAS A VERY CLOSE RUN THING. HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE LAST MINUTE JAPANESE SWITCH (FOR WHICH MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE WAS BITTERLY ASHAMED) THE RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE FAILED FOR LACK OF VOTES. I CONFESS THAT, WITH THE AMENDMENTS, I EXPECTED IT TO DO BETTER.
2. IF ANYONE HAD TOLD ME ON 9 APRIL, WHEN WE NOTIFIED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MEZ, THAT WE WOULD LAST OUT UNTIL 4 JUNE WITHOUT HAVING TO VETO A CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION AND THAT THE EVENTUAL RESOLUTION WOULD ONLY SCRAPE NINE VOTES, I WOULD NOT HAVE BELIEVED IT.
3. I THINK THAT WE OWE THIS NOT UNSATISFACTORY RESULT TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS. FIRST, BASIC SYMPATHY FOR OUR POSITION AMONGST NAM MEMBERS (TOGO, GUYANA AND JORDAN WERE AMONGST THE ABSTAINERS); ARGENTINE UNPOPULARITY; DE PINIES' BULLYING METHODS; AND POWERFUL LOBBYING BOTH HERE AND IN CAPITALS.
4. ANOTHER UNEXPECTED BONUS WAS MRS KIRKPATRICK'S TRULY GROTESQUE INTERVENTION WHEN SHE AT LAST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HAIG TO ABSTAIN AFTER HAVING CAST A NEGATIVE VOTE. (I TAKE AT FACE VALUE THIS EXPLANATION OF HER EXTRAORDINARY BEHAVIOR, THOUGH SHE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY CONFUSED THE ISSUE BY INCOMPEHENSIBLY TELLING THE PRESS THAT WHEN SHE VETOED SHE HAD NOT REALIZED THAT I WAS GOING TO DO SO TOO EXCLAM) HER PERFORMANCE HAS ALREADY EXCITED MUCH MORE MEDIA ATTENTION THAN OUR VETO.
5. THE IMPORTANT THING NOW IS THAT WE SHOULD FIRMLY KILL ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE ARE ISOLATED IN THE UN. I HAVE ALREADY DONE THIS ON ITN AND BBC RADIO. THE FACT IS THAT WE ARE NOT THE

MUCH MORE MEDIA ATTENTION THAN OUR VETO.

THE IMPORTANT THING NOW IS THAT WE SHOULD FIRMLY KILL ANY SUGGESTION THAT WE ARE ISOLATED IN THE UN. I HAVE ALREADY DONE THIS ON ITN AND BBC RADIO. THE FACT IS THAT WE ARE NOT. THE LATINOS GOT A POOR RESULT FOR WHAT LOOKED LIKE A REASONABLE RESOLUTION TO MANY PEOPLE, AND I HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED NUMEROUS EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FROM THIRD WORLD DELEGATIONS FROM AFRICA AND ASIA. EXCEPT IN PUBLIC, I HAVE SENSED NO DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDE TOWARDS US EVEN FROM LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATIONS.

6. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT THE UN WILL NOW DO. THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE TALK ABOUT AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THERE WOULD DEFINITELY NOT HAVE BEEN NINE VOTES FOR SUCH A PROPOSITION HAD IT BEEN TABLED TONIGHT. IF HAVANA COMES UP WITH RINGING LANGUAGE ON THE SUBJECT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PANAMA MAY CALL FOR A VOTE TO MOVE TO THE ASSEMBLY. BUT THEY WILL HAVE TO WORK HARD TO GET THEIR NINE VOTES, EVEN HARDER IF THEY ADOPT THE ALTERNATIVE ROUTE OF GETTING A LETTER SIGNED BY A MAJORITY OF THE WHOLE UN MEMBERSHIP. THE FACT THAT UNSSD II LOOMS NEXT WEEK IS ADDITIONAL INSURANCE AGAINST THIS EVENTUALITY.

7. I HAVE BEEN ASKED FREQUENTLY BY THE PRESS/TV WHETHER TODAY'S EVENTS MEAN THE END OF THE ROAD FOR THE UN OVER THE FALKLANDS. I HAVE REPLIED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES ARE UNAFFECTED BY THE FAILURE OF TODAY'S RESOLUTION. BUT I HAVE EMPHASISED THAT, SO FAR AS A CEASEFIRE IS CONCERNED, NO-ONE CAN NOW BE IN ANY DOUBT THAT THIS MUST BE LINKED INSEPARABLY AND INEXTRICABLY WITH IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

8. FINALLY, WE OWE A GREAT DEAL TO DAVID KARRAN, THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF GUYANA, WHO HAS BEEN A TOWER OF STRENGTH AND HELPFULNESS THROUGHOUT. ALSO THE JORDANIANS WHO STUCK MANFULLY TO THEIR ABSTENTION EVEN WHEN THEY KNEW THAT JAPAN HAD GIVEN WAY. IT WAS ALSO BRAVE OF THE TOGOLESE TO DECIDE TO ABSTAIN ON ANYTHING WHICH DID NOT COMMAND CONSENSUS. I AM SURE THAT APPROPRIATE MESSAGES IN CAPITALS WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 115


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FM BRASILIA 04:2000Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH FOO

-4 JUN 1982

(151)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 245 OF 4 JUNE
AND TO FLASH MODUK AIR (SIC 19F) DESKBY 04:1200Z
REPEATED INFO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES FOLLOWING FOR
SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY
REPEATED INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DESKBY 04/2100Z



MY TELNO 241: VULCAH DIVERSION


1. AIR ATTACHE REPORTED AT 1615 (04:1915Z) THAT THE MISSILE HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY DETACHED FROM THE AIRCRAFT BUT ACTION TO REFUEL AIRCRAFT IS NOW STALLED PENDING CLEARANCE FROM AIR MINISTRY IN BRASILIA.
2. BASE COMMANDER HAS ALSO INFORMED AA THAT DIPCLEAR FOR C130 AIRCRAFT TO ARRIVE AT GALEAO AND PICK UP MISSILE (TELECON QDL MURRAY/GROUP CAPTAIN EMPSON, MOD REFERS) HAD BEEN REFUSED.
3. MISSILE WILL NOW BE TOWED TO SECURE AREA SOME 2 KM FROM AIRCRAFT POSITION. SGT PITT (AA'S CLERK) WILL ACCOMPANY IT AND REMAIN WITH IT UNTIL RELIEVED BY ANOTHER UNIFORMED MEMBER OF MY DEFENCE STAFF.
4. ACTION IS NOW CLEARLY REQUIRED AT A HIGH LEVEL TO UNJAM THE SITUATION.
5. I WILL REPORT FURTHER WITHIN THE HOUR.
6. AA NOW REPORTS (042000Z) THAT BASE COMMANDER, ON INSTRUCTIONS, HAS TOLD HIM THAT SUPERVISION OF THE MISSILE WHILE IN STORE WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE ALLOWED. HE WILL ACCOMPANY THE MISSILE TO THE STOREROOM (STARTING NOW) AND WILL BE GIVEN A KEY. BUT THIS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, GUARANTEE THE MISSILE'S SECURITY, EVEN THOUGH MY STAFF AND I ASSESS THAT THE FAB ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO TAMPER WITH IT.
7. I AM INFORMING MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE.

HARDING

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SENT/RECD AT 04:2030Z AD/ISD

CONFIDENTIAL



E.R.

BSS/FCO 021/04

ZZ FCO

ZZ MODUK AIR (SIC 19F)

ZZ UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 042200Z

-4 JUN '82

GRS 430

SECRET

FM BRASILIA 04:2137Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 246 OF 4 JUNE

AND TO FLASH MODUK AIR (SIC 19F)

REPEATED INFO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DESKBY 042200Z

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YOUR TELNO 245: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. IN RESPONSE TO ME PRESSURE AT VARIOUS LEVELS TO EXPLAIN THE HOLD-UP, HEAD OF AMERICAS DEPARTMENT AT ITAMARATY TELEPHONED AT 1745 (042045Z) ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO INFORM ME OF THE ITAMARATY'S POSITION.
2. RICUPERO SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD RECEIVED AT 10 AM TODAY A FORMAL NOTE FROM THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR REQUESTING THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO INTERN THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT. THIS NOTE QUOTED THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT:
 - (A) POINT 7 OF THE TIAR (RIO TREATY) RESOLUTION OF 29 MAY QUOTE REQUESTING STATE PARTIES TO GIVE ARGENTINA THE SUPPORT THAT EACH JUDGES APPROPRIATE TO ASSIST IT IN THIS SITUATION AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT THAT MIGHT JEOPARDISE THAT OBJECTIVE UNQUOTE.
 - (B) THE HAGUE AIR WARFARE RULES OF 1923, AS SET OUT IN VOLUME II OF OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, ARTICLES 39 TO 46 OF WHICH SPECIFY THE DUTIES OF NEUTRAL STATES TOWARDS BELLIGERENTS. (AT THIS POINT I REMARKED THAT NEITHER BRITAIN NOR ARGENTINA WERE STRICTLY SPEAKING BELLIGERENTS).

REQUESTING STATE PARTIES TO GIVE ARGENTINA THE SUPPORT THAT EACH JUDGES APPROPRIATE TO ASSIST IT IN THIS SITUATION AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT THAT MIGHT JEOPARDISE THAT OBJECTIVE UNQUOTE.

(B) THE HAGUE AIR WARFARE RULES OF 1923, AS SET OUT IN VOLUME II OF OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, ARTICLES 39 TO 46 OF WHICH SPECIFY THE DUTIES OF NEUTRAL STATES TOWARDS BELLIGERENTS. (AT THIS POINT I REMARKED THAT NEITHER BRITAIN NOR ARGENTINA WERE STRICTLY SPEAKING BELLIGERENTS).

3. RICUPERO WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAD REACHED NO DECISION AS YET: THEY WERE IN A 'SUSPENSIVE CONDITION' IF THEY WERE TO AUTHORISE THE DEPARTURE OF THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT NOW THIS WOULD PREJUDICE THE OUTCOME OF THAT CONSIDERATION. THE ITAMARATY BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS SOME PARALLEL BETWEEN THEIR ATTITUDE AND OUR OWN IN RELATION TO ASTIZ, WHERE, ACCORDING TO MOD STATEMENTS, WE HAD SAID THAT OUR INTENTION WAS TO REPATRIATE HIM BUT THAT WE HAD HELD OUR HAND PENDING CLARIFICATION OF REQUESTS TO PUT QUESTIONS TO HIM FROM TWO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS. (AT THIS I SAID THAT, SO FAR AS I KNEW, A FIRM DECISION HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN TO REPATRIATE ASTIZ AND THIS WOULD BE DONE VERY SHORTLY).

4. I SAID TO RICUPERO THAT THIS UNWELCOME NEWS WOULD CAUSE BOTH SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT TO MY GOVERNMENT. WERE WE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE AIR MINISTER'S CLEARLY WORDED COMMUNIQUE OF YESTERDAY STATING THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED ON ITS WAY ONCE DISARMED HAD BEEN INVALIDATED BY THIS SUBSEQUENT ARGENTINE INTERVENTION? RICUPERO WRIGGLED, SAYING THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT FELT THAT THEY HAD TO GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THIS URGENT ARGENTINE REQUEST. HE ADDED THAT, IF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WISHED TO INJECT ANY FRESH THOUGHTS INTO THE BRAZILIANS' CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO TRANSMIT THEM. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE COULD SAY WHEN THEY EXPECTED THEIR 'CONSIDERATION' TO FINISH, HE COULD NOT GIVE ME AN ANSWER.

5. I SAID THAT I HAD ALREADY INFORMED MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN STALLED WITHOUT FUEL AT GALEAO AND THAT THE MISSILE HAD BEEN TAKEN TO STORE OUTSIDE THE SUPERVISION OF MY AIR ATTACHE, WHO HAD PROTESTED ON THIS POINT. I THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT I WOULD RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER. RICUPERO NOTED THIS.

6. SEE MIFT.

HARDING

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THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN THE SERIES IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION.

BSB/FCO 022/04

ZZ FCO

ZZ MODUL

ZZ UKDEL VERSAILLES

OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 042200Z

F-4 JUN 1982

2203Z

GRS 250

SECRET

FM BRASILIA 042020Z JUN 82


TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 247 OF 4 JUNE

AND TO FLASH MODUK AIR (SIC 19F)

INFO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON



MIPT: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. THIS PREVARICATION IS, I FEAR, TYPICAL OF BRAZILIAN SPINELESSNESS AND EXEMPLIFIES THEIR ACUTE ANXIETY NOT TO OFFEND THE ARGENTINES UNLESS THEY FEEL THEY HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE. IT MAY BE, OF COURSE, THAT THEY ARE MERELY PLAYING FOR TIME IN ORDER TO SHOW THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY ARE TAKING THEIR REQUEST SERIOUSLY AND THAT THEIR INTENTION IS EVENTUALLY TO COME DOWN ON THE SIDE OF RELEASING THE AIRCRAFT. BUT WE CANNOT BE SURE OF THIS: AND WE OBVIOUSLY OUGHT TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO PROPEL THEM IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
2. MERELY TO INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DISQUIET AT THIS UNNECESSARY DELAY AND THEIR CONCERN THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD EVEN CONSIDER FOR A MOMENT GOING BACK ON THEIR EARLIER DECISION, ALREADY COMMUNICATED TO THE PRESS, WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT. WE NEED A LEVER.
3. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO USE THE ARGENTINE-LIBYAN AIRBRIDGE VIA BRAZIL (YOUR TELNO 165) AS SUCH A LEVER. THE LATEST ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT IN THE SERIES IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN

GOING BACK ON THEIR EARLIER DECISION, ALREADY COMMUNICATED TO THE PRESS, WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT. WE WOULD A LEVER.

3. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO USE THE ARGENTINE-LIBYAN AIRBRIDGE VIA BRAZIL (YOUR TELNO 165) AS SUCH A LEVER. THE LATEST ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT IN THE SERIES IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN RECIFE LATER TONIGHT. YOU MAY WISH TO INSTRUCT ME TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES TO THIS FACT (OF WHICH THEY WILL ALREADY BE AWARE) AND TO SAY THAT, WHILE THEY ARE INDULGING IN THEIR PROTRACTED CONSIDERATION OF THE VULCAN CASE, THEY SHOULD HOLD THIS ARGENTINE FLIGHT, INSPECT ITS CONTENTS AND IMPOUND ANY WEAPONS FOUND. TO DO THIS WOULD BE NO MORE THAN EVEN-HANDEDLY TO APPLY THE HAGUE AIR WARFARE RULES OF 1923, WHICH THE ARGENTINES PRAY IN AID OF THEIR REQUEST TO IMPOUND THE VULCAN.

4. THIS MIGHT NOT PRODUCE ACTION IN TIME AT RECIFE: BUT IT WOULD CERTAINLY CONCENTRATE THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S MINDS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE LAST FLIGHT WAS REPORTED IN TWO BRAZILIAN NEWSPAPERS AND WE COULD PRESUMABLY LEAK (OR THEY MIGHT THINK THAT WE WOULD LEAK) THE FACT OF OUR REQUEST TO STOP THE PRESENT ONE.

5. ANY LEGAL ARGUMENTS THAT CAN BE MOBILISED IN THE SMALL HOURS TO CONTENT THE ARGENTINE ASSERTIONS REGARDING THE HAGUE RULES WOULD, OF COURSE, COME IN HANDY.

6. I HAVE JUST HEARD (042200Z) THAT ITAMARATY HAVE ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT ABOUT THE ARGENTINE NOTE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE NO COMMENT WHATSOEVER ON THE WHOLE INCIDENT UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED.

HARDING

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

E.R. Coby 8903 - 1

~~14 JUN 1982~~

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ZZ BRASILIA

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FM FCO 050235Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 166 OF 5 JUNE

INFO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR S OF S PARTY) MODUK AIR (SIC 19F)

IMMEDIATE DESKBY 051300Z WASHINGTON

YOUR TEL NO 247: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. YOU SHOULD SEEK MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TO EXPRESS HMG'S SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE DELAY IN ALLOWING THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT TO DEPART. WHILE WE WOULD NOT WISH YOU TO GET INVOLVED IN MORE THAN NECESSARY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT YOU MIGHT WISH TO DRAW ON SOME OF THE FOLLOWING.
2. THE HAGUE RULES WERE DRAWN UP AS A DRAFT, (IN FACT BY A COMMISSION OF JURISTS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS) BUT WERE NEVER TRANSFORMED INTO A LEGAL TREATY INSTRUMENT AND SO ARE NOT BINDING. (BUT, FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION; THE RULE REQUIRING THE INTERNMENT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH ENTER A NEUTRAL STATE REFLECTS GENERAL PRACTICE.)
3. IF THEY CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE INTERNED UNDER THE NORMAL PRACTICE IN TIME OF WAR THE BEST ARGUMENT SEEMS THEREFORE TO BE THAT THE PARTIES TO THE HOSTILITIES ARE NOT AT WAR AND NO ONE IS OBLIGED TO APPLY THE LAWS OF WAR. THE PARTIES HAVE NOT IN FACT APPLIED THEM IN THEIR FULL RIGOUR. THEY HAVE NOT RETAINED PRISONERS OF WAR.
4. THERE IS NO REASON WHY BRAZIL SHOULD NOT IN THIS CASE APPLY THE RULES WHICH WOULD APPLY UNDER THE LAW OF PEACE, NAMELY, TO RELEASE THE AIRCRAFT. THIS WOULD NOT BE OPEN TO

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OBJECTION BY THE ARGENTINES PROVIDED THAT BRAZIL APPLIED THE SAME RULE TO THEM. IN THE INTERESTS OF NOT EXACERBATING THE SITUATION, BRAZIL SHOULD NOT AGGRAVATE THE HOSTILITIES OR RENDER THEM MORE GRAVE BY TREATING THEM AS IF THEY AMOUNTED TO A WAR.

5. YOU SHOULD HOWEVER MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT SEE THIS AS A LEGAL MATTER BUT AS A POLITICAL ONE. THAT IS THE REAL POINT AT ISSUE.

6. WE HAVE CONSTANTLY STRESSED THAT OUR QUARREL IS NOT WITH LATIN AMERICA NOR INDEED WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE BUT WITH THE ACTIONS OF AN ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. IT IS A QUARREL WHICH WE DID NOT SEEK AND ONE IN WHICH WE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WISH TO INVOLVE BRAZIL.

7. WHAT WE BELIEVE WE COULD REASONABLY EXPECT IN THE LIGHT OF OUR LONG STANDING BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL IS EVEN HANDED TREATMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT HMG IS WELL AWARE THAT ARGENTINE AND OTHER AIRCRAFT HAVE USED AND STILL ARE USING BRAZILIAN AIRFIELDS WHEN TRANSPORTING MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY ARGENTINA IF THEY TAKE ACTION AGAINST US. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE EQUALLY APPROPRIATE FOR BRAZILIANS TO IMPOUND SUCH AIRCRAFT AND THEIR CARGOES.

8. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES BRAZILIANS SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT HMG CONSIDER ^{RENEWAL} RENEWAL OF THE DECISION ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY AS HAVING VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, WHICH YOU WOULD NOT CARE TO REHEARSE, FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL WHICH WE VALUE THESE GREATLY.

9. IF YOU CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD HELP BRAZILIANS TO REACH FAVOURABLE DECISION YOU COULD OFFER TO GUARANTEE THAT BOTH THE AIRCRAFT AND THE MISSILE WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE UK AND PUT IN BOND, SUBJECT TO INSPECTION, AND NOT USED IN PRESENT CONFLICT. THIS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS MEETING THE REQUIRE-

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MENTS OF POINT 7 OF THE RIO TREATY RESOLUTION OF 29 MAY IN THAT THEY WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE HOSTILITIES.

0. IN THE LIGHT OF FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESPONSE YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER LOBBYING PRO-BRITISH PERSONALITIES PARTICULARLY IN THE ARMED SERVICES, PRESS, COMMERCE AND BANKING.

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OO F C O DESKBY 042230Z

OO BRASILIA DESKBY 042230Z

OO UKDEL VERSAILLES

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DESKBY 042230Z (FCO AND BRASILIA)

FM WASHINGTON 042140Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 2029 OF 4 JUNE 1982,

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOLLOWING FOR S OF S'S PARTY).

BRASILIA TELNO 245: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. WE HAVE INFORMED THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND ASKED THEM TO GET THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO WEIGH IN. THEY HAVE CONFIRMED THAT IN VIEW OF THE NEED TO PROTECT THE MISSILE'S TECHNOLOGY, HE HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO RAISE THE MATTER AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL (BRASILIA TELNO 241 REFERS).

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DESKBY 041300Z

HAVANA 041700Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 177 OF 4 JUNE,
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKDEL VERSAILLES, FOLLOWING
FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY.

A MY TELNO 162 : FAL LAN : NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

- 1.. REFERENCE TO FALKLAND ISLANDS IN GENERAL STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS IN FINAL COMMUNIQUE REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF MY TUR, WITHDRAWN AT YUGOSLAV INSISTENCE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD ONLY APPEAR IN LATIN AMERICAN SECTION.
- 2.. LATIN AMERICAN GROUP HAVE SINCE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO PRODUCE A TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. EFFORTS WITHOUT SUCCESS UP TO ENDING OF 3 JUNE SESSION. CARIBBEANS, LED BY GUYANA, ARE RESISTING LATIN AMERICAN PRESSURE.
- 3.. AFRICANS HAVE CONTINUED TO WARN THAT A ONE-SIDED TEXT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT APART FROM RADICALS, MOST MEMBERS STILL HOPE TO SEE BALANCED DECLARATION.
- 4.. SPEECH BY COSTA MENDEZ ON 3 JUNE REPORTED TO HAVE DIMINISHED RATHER THAN INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA. FOLLOWING REFERENCES TO COUNTRIES SUCH AS ALGERIA, INDIA, CUBA AND VIETNAM WHO HAD FOUGHT FOR THEIR FREEDOM, HE REFERRED TO A CONTINUING FIGHT OF THE PEOPLES OF SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST APARTHEID. HE FURTHER ASKED WHY COUNTRIES WERE PREPARED TO OPERATE SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA BUT NOT AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THESE REFERENCES WERE REPORTEDLY GREETED WITH LAUGHTER BY SOME AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVES WHO RECALLED THAT ARGENTINA HAD NEVER PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. IT WAS FURTHER POINTED OUT THAT SHORTLY BEFORE THE FALKLANDS CRISIS ARGENTINA SAID IT HAD NO NEED FOR NAM SYMPATHY.
- 5.. COSTA MENDEZ'S REFERENCE TO BRITAIN HAVING EXPELLED ORIGINAL

5.. COSTA MENDEZ'S REFERENCE TO BRITAIN HAVING EXPELLED ORIGINAL INHABITANTS OF FALKLANDS DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE VISITED MOST DELEGATES.

6.. THERE IS A RUMOUR THAT ARGENTINA MAY BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA TO WIN NAM SUPPORT. IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN THE OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE OBVIOUS TO MOST.

7.. WHILE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ALONG SPANISH/PANAMANIAN LINES WITH ADDITION OF REFERENCE TO LINKED WITHDRAWAL MAY AFFECT SOME DELEGATIONS' POSITIONS, CURRENT GENERAL FEELING HERE IS THAT REFERENCE TO FALKLAND ISLANDS WILL PROBABLY BE EVEN-HANDED, WHILE MAKING REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS NAM SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY CLAIM.

8.. IT IS FORECAST THAT MEETINGS WILL CONTINUE INTO FRIDAY NIGHT. A FURTHER DELAY IN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE WOULD HOWEVER BE HELPFUL IF UK VETO WAS TO BE USED.

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FM HAVANA 041740Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 171 OF 4 JUNE,
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

~~IMMEDIATE~~
ADVANCE COPY

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Off/SAMM
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NAM COORDINATING BUREAU MEETING: HAVANA, 31 MAY - 4 JUNE 1982

1.. PLENARY SESSION OF MEETING OPENED ON 2 JUNE BY CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MALMIERCA. HIS SPEECH WAS, BY CUBAN STANDARDS, REASONABLY MILD. REFERENCES TO FALKLAND ISLANDS, CRITICISING BRITAIN AND SUPPORTING ARGENTINA, WERE AS EXPECTED. WORLD PROBLEMS WERE ALMOST ENTIRELY LAID AT THE FEET OF THE UNITED STATES. THE LEVEL OF ABUSE EVENTUALLY CAUSED THE HEAD OF USIS TO LEAVE. MALMIERCA PAID CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD POOR COMPARED WITH EXPENDITURE ON ARMS. MANY OF HIS THEMES WERE REPETITIONS OF NAM FAVOURITE SUBJECTS.

2.. SPEECHES SO FAR MADE BY HEADS OF DELEGATIONS IN PLENARY SESSIONS HAVE BEEN UNEXCEPTIONAL. THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER, MOJSOV, MADE A STATESMAN-LIKE PRESENTATION ON THE FIRST DAY WHICH HAS BEEN PRAISED BY MANY DELEGATIONS. THE PANAMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ILLUECA, SUPPOSEDLY SPEAKING FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP, STRONGLY ATTACKED THE UNITED KINGDOM OVER THE

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FOREIGN MINISTER, ILLUECA, SUPPOSEDLY SPEAKING FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP, STRONGLY ATTACKED THE UNITED KINGDOM OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. HIS SPEECH HAD CERTAINLY NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY SEEN BY AT LEAST THE CARIBBEAN MEMBERS OF THE GROUP.

3.. THE NEW ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, IBRAHIMI, GAVE A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ADDRESS WHICH WAS APPARENTLY WELL RECEIVED WITH SOME SURPRISE BY THE MEETING WHICH HAD EXPECTED A MORE RADICAL TREATMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.

4.. THE SUMMIT SITE IS STILL THE MAJOR PROBLEM. THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER, AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 3 JUNE, GAVE DETAILS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THE SUMMIT. THEY ARE REPORTED TO BE IMPRESSIVE. IN THE PLENARY THE IRANIAN REPRESENTATIVE ABUSED IRAQ. THE IRAQI RESPONSE WAS REPORTED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND WELL RECEIVED. JORDAN SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ.

5.. THE INDIANS ARE STILL KEEPING THEIR HEADS DOWN ON THE SUMMIT SITE. THERE ARE HOWEVER STILL STRONG RUMOURS THAT INDIA MAY PROPOSE CONTINUED CUBAN CHAIRMANSHIP FOR TWO YEARS. HOWEVER OPPOSITION IS SO STRONG THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY MEET FIRM OBJECTION, PARTICULARLY FROM YUGOSLAVIA.

6.. OTHER MODERATES HAVE BEEN MAKING EFFORTS TO REAFFIRM THE NAM'S TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES. PAKISTAN SPEAKER REFERRED TO THE MOVEMENT'S ONE-SIDED CRITICISM OF THE TWO MAJOR POWER BLOCKS AND SINGAPOREAN SAID THAT A MINORITY GROUP OF THE MEMBERSHIP WAS TRYING TO DIVERT THE MOVEMENT FROM ITS INITIAL AIMS.

7.. THE FINAL SCHEDULED DAY OF PLENARY SESSION HAS BEEN REACHED WITH ONLY 23 OF THE 54 SPEAKERS HAVING YET SPOKEN, AND IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE LATE INTO THE NIGHT.

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FM FCO 041700Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 118 OF 4 JUNE 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SOME CURRENT ISSUES

1. WE EXPECT TO BE SENDING YOU GUIDANCE ABOUT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS, ON WHICH YOU MAY BE REQUIRED TO MAKE RAPID ACTION WITH THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA.
2. ON GENERAL POLICY, YOU WILL ALREADY HAVE RECEIVED IN THE VERBATIM SERVICE ONE OR MORE OF THE INTERVIEWS GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON 2 JUNE TO THE BBC, ITN, WEST GERMAN TV AND COI RADIO. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEE THAT THESE SECURE AS MUCH PUBLICITY AS POSSIBLE. PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW SUMMARISES SOME OF THE ISSUES WHICH WILL FACE US AFTER REPOSSESSION OF THE FALKLANDS. THIS IS INTENDED FOR YOUR OWN BACKGROUND USE IN PRESENTING MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS. IT IS NOT IN ITSELF A FORMULATION OF POLICY. MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS MAY BE AMPLIFIED BY THE GUIDANCE IN PARAGRAPHS 4-7 BELOW, WHICH MAY BE USED FREELY. PARAGRAPHS 8-10 ARE OF COURSE FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION.

AFTER REPOSSESSION

3. ONCE THE ISLANDS HAVE BEEN REPOSSESSED, THERE WILL BE FOUR IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES.
 - (A) REHABILITATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR, AND A GENERAL RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLANDERS' WAY OF LIFE. THIS WILL TAKE SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME.
 - (B) PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. LORD SHACKLETON HAS ALREADY BEEN ASKED (AND HAS AGREED) TO UPDATE HIS 1976 REPORT AND ITS PROPOSALS AS TO HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE ACHIEVED. LONG TERM

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ARRANGEMENTS (SEE BELOW) WILL BE ESSENTIAL IF PRIVATE CAPITAL IS TO BE ATTRACTED TO THE ISLANDS.

(C) PROVISION OF LONG TERM SECURITY. A BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE WILL APPARENTLY BE REQUIRED IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH, HOW LONG (SHORT TERM OR LONG TERM) SECURITY MIGHT BEST BE SECURED WITH THE VIEW IN MIND. THERE ARE TOO MANY UNKNOWN FACTORS AT PRESENT FOR WHICH NO PRESCRIPTIONS TO BE MADE. BUT POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE MIGHT INCLUDE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, PERHAPS INCLUDING CONTRIBUTIONS FROM EG THE US AND ONE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

(D) THE ISLANDERS THEMSELVES MUST DECIDE FREELY WHAT FUTURE STATUS THEY WANT. THEY WILL OBVIOUSLY NEED SOME TIME TO SETTLE DOWN AFTER THE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL BEFORE FACING SUCH DECISIONS. HOW LONG WILL DEPEND VERY MUCH ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO WANT ANY KIND OF ASSOCIATION WITH ARGENTINA AFTER THE INVASION AND THE WAY IN WHICH ISLANDERS WERE TREATED DURING THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION. BUT IT WOULD BE IDLE TO SPECULATE AT THIS STAGE WHAT THEIR PREFERENCE WILL BE. THE MAIN THING IS THAT THEY SHOULD BE FREE TO REACH THEIR DECISION, WITHOUT PRESSURE, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

UK-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

4. BRITAIN HAS LONG-STANDING LINKS WITH LATIN AMERICA, TO WHICH WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE. WE WISH TO MAINTAIN THESE FRIENDSHIPS AND INDEED EXPAND THEM. MOST LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AS NEIGHBOURS AND FRIENDS OF ARGENTINA, HAVE SUPPORTED HER CLAIM TO THE FALKLANDS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME MANY HAVE CONDEMNED HER USE OF FORCE. THEY HAVE BY NO MEANS GIVEN ARGENTINA WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT, AND WE HOPE THAT THEY RECOGNISE THAT OUR QUARREL IS NOT WITH THEM. NOR INDEED IS OUR QUARREL WITH THE PEOPLE OF ARGENTINA, BUT WITH THE MILITARY JUNTA WHICH ORDERED AND LED THE INVASION.

ARGENTINE MISREPRESENTATIONS

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5. ARGENTINE CLAIMS THAT BRITAIN IS BEHAVING AS A 'COLONIALIST' POWER IN REASSERTING BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS ARE NONSENSE. IT IS ARGENTINA WHO HAS BEHAVED IN A COLONIALIST FASHION BY TRYING TO SEIZE A NEIGHBOURING TERRITORY AND TO IMPOSE ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY, BY FORCE, ON A HITHERTO FREE AND DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE WHO HAVE MADE IT COMPLETELY CLEAR THAT THEY WISH TO REMAIN BRITISH.

6. IT IS ALSO RIDICULOUS TO CLAIM, AS THE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS DID IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 2 JUNE, THAT BRITAIN IS ONLY INTERESTED IN THE FALKLANDS FOR MILITARY REASONS, AND HAS ALSO OFFERED THE AMERICANS AIR AND NAVAL FACILITIES THERE. THERE IS NO POSSIBLE GROUND FOR THE ALLEGATION THAT WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH BRITISH OR OTHER MILITARY POWER IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IF WE HAD HAD ANY SUCH PRETENSIONS, WE WOULD HAVE KEPT A LARGER GARRISON THAN 40 ROYAL MARINES ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION.

AMERICAN SUPPORT

7. THE US HAS SHOWN ITSELF TO BE A STAUNCH ALLY FROM THE START, DEDICATED LIKE BRITAIN TO UPHOLDING THE PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS SHE HAS MADE TO SECURE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, AND HAVE GIVEN HER EVERY SUPPORT IN THESE ENDEAVOURS: ONLY ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE DENIED THEM THE SUCCESS THEY DESERVED. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN FULL US RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO ACHIEVE ARGENTINE COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 502 BY MILITARY MEANS IF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IS IMPOSSIBLE. PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE THE POINT HIMSELF IN AN INTERVIEW WITH EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS ON 1 JUNE: 'I KNOW THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE LOST MEN. BUT ENGLAND RESPONDED TO THIS, A THREAT THAT ALL OF US MUST OPPOSE - AND THAT IS THE IDEA THAT ARMED AGGRESSION CAN SUCCEED IN THE WORLD TODAY.'

8. YOU SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) COMMENT ON ANY SPECULATION OR REPORTS ABOUT US MATERIAL AID TO BRITAIN IN THIS CONTEXT. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, SUCH SUPPORT HAS IN FACT BEEN SUBSTANTIAL.

BRIEFING BRITISH BUSINESSMEN

9. BRITISH BUSINESSMEN ARE OFTEN WELL PLACED TO EXPOUND AND DEFEND HMG'S POLICIES OVERSEAS. WHERE YOU BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE USEFUL, YOU SHOULD TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF BRITISH VISITORS OR LOCAL RESIDENTS ABOUT OUR POLICY OVER THE FALKLANDS.

MEDIA ACCESS TO THE FALKLANDS

10. ONCE HOSTILITIES CEASE, THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE MANY REQUESTS FROM JOURNALISTS TO BE ALLOWED TO VISIT THE FALKLANDS. THERE ARE OF COURSE STRONG REASONS FOR PROVIDING ACCESS, BUT IN PRACTICE THERE WILL BE FORMIDABLE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS TO OVERCOME AND WE CANNOT AT PRESENT GIVE ANY FIRM IDEA OF WHEN ACCESS WILL BE FEASIBLE. NUMBERS ARE BOUND TO BE STRICTLY

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LIMITED AT LEAST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, AND CONFINED TO WELL-KNOWN JOURNALISTS FROM KEY COUNTRIES. INFORMATION DEPARTMENT WOULD WELCOME NAME(S) OF ANY REALLY WORTHWHILE JOURNALIST(S) WHO MIGHT BE CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION IN A GROUP TO VISIT THE FALKLANDS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER MAJOR HOSTILITIES CEASE. PLEASE DO NOT PRESENT ANY UNDESIRABLE CANDIDATES, AND PLEASE DO NOT PRESENT ANY UNDESIRABLE CANDIDATES.

BY TELEGRAPH:

AMSTERDAM	LYONS	NEW YORK (BIS)	LIMA
BOMBAY	PARIS	WASHINGTON	MONTEVIDEO
BRUSSELS	ROME	CARACAS	SANTIAGO
BRUSSELS (UKREP, SEC)	SEVILLE	MEXICO CITY	PANAMA
BRUSSELS (UKDEL, NATO)	MERID	BRASILIA	PTMAY
COPENHAGEN	STOCKHOLM	HAVANA	OTTAWA
THE HAGUE	MOSCOW	WELLINGTON	CANBERRA
LISBON	NEW YORK (UKMIS)	NEW DELHI	

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

ANKARA	ASUNCION	LUANDA	LUSAKA
ISTANBUL	LA PAZ	ISLAMABAD	KAMPALA
OSLO	QUITO	PEKING	LILONGWE
BERNE	SAN JOSE	TOKYO	KINGSTON
GENEVA (UKMIS)	JEDDA	DACCA	PORT OF SPAIN
HELSINKI	CAIRO	COLOMBO	GEORGETOWN
VIENNA	DAKAR	ACCRA	BRIDGETOWN
BELGRADE	KINSHASA	LAGOS	HONG KONG
BUCHAREST	YAOUNDE	DAR-ES-SALAAM	GIBRALTAR
WARSAW	CAPE TOWN	NAIROBI	(PERSONAL)
RIO DE JANEIRO (IO)	PRETORIA	HARARE	

[ALL PRIORITY]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL

INFORMATION D
EMERGENCY UNIT

COPIES TO:

MR S FULLER, CABINET OFFICE
MR N TAYLOR, PRESS OFFICE,
MOD

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DESKBY 050700Z FCO

PRIME MINISTER
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 10/6

4 June, 1982.

I enclose a telegram which the Prime Minister has received from Senor Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea, President of the Republic of Ecuador. I should be grateful for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send as soon as possible.

W. F. S. PICKETT

Derek Page, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Telegram shown in your dialling instructions

British TELECOM for e show

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WHO MIGHT BE CO
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PLEASE DO NOT

BY TELEGRAPH:
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THE HAGUE
LISBON

ANKARA
ISTANBUL
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BERNE
GENEVA (UKMS)
HELSINKI
VIENNA
BELGRADE
BUCHAREST
WARSAW
RIO DE JANEIRO

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 121A/82

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REXX BY FCO 135
QUITFOCALOR 105/101 3 1345 PAGE1

ETATPRIORITE
SEÑORA MARGARET THATCHER
PRIMER MINISTRO 10 DOWNING STREET
LONDONSW1

R416



TELECOM
shown in your dialling instructions

EL RUFELO Y GOBIERNO ECUATORIANO SIGUEN CON PROFUNDA
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QUE HA CAUSADO YA TANTAS VICTIMAS Y DOLORES A LOS PAISES
INVOLUCRADOS EN LA CONTIENDA. ANTE LA INMINENCIA DE QUE LA
LUCHA ARMADA

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MEO33 SEÑORA PAGE2

TELEGRAM
for enquiries dial the number
shown in your dialling instructions
British TELECOM
shown

MINISTERIO DE
COMUNICACIONES

shown in your dialling instructions

COMMUNICATIONS

EL COMANDO EN JEFE FUERZAS ARMADAS ECUATORIANAS
REPUBLICA ECUATORIANA

RECIBO SEÑALA PAGOS

EL COMANDO EN JEFE FUERZAS ARMADAS ECUATORIANAS
HA HECHO CONOCER A LOS PRINCIPALES HUMANITARIOS
DE LOS QUE SE PRECIA NUESTRA CIVILIZACION, PARA CUYO
DESARROLLO Y AFIANZAMIENTO HAN VENIDO DANDO MUY VALIOSAS
CONTRIBUCIONES TANTO LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA COMO EL REINO UNIDO.
OSVALDO HURTADO LAFERRA
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR



RECIBO
ECS 113 PO SW G
CSFACRAM LN LFTC

shown in your dialling instructions

Telegram shown in your dialling instructions

English TELETYPE

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 050700Z FCO
DESKBY OFFICE OPENING UKDEL VERSAILLES
FM WASHINGTON 050020Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2033 OF 4 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS

ms

UKDEL VERSAILLES TELNO 003: FALKLAND ISLANDS:
SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH SEVERAL TIMES TODAY WITH STOESEL TO KEEP HIM ABREAST OF OUR THINKING AND TO TRY TO MAKE SURE THE STATE DEPARTMENT DID NOT WOBBLE, GIVEN THE ABSENCE FROM WASHINGTON OF BOTH HAIG AND EAGLEBURGER. I HAD TOLD STOESEL THIS AFTERNOON IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT THE LINES WE WOULD NOW BE TAKING, (UKDEL VERSAILLES TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). HE UNDERSTOOD THE LOGIC OF OUR POSITION, BUT WAS WORRIED ABOUT HOW TO EXPLAIN A US VETO AGAINST A RESOLUTION THAT CONFIRMED SCR 502 AND 505.
2. I SAID THAT WHAT WE NOW NEEDED WAS A SERIOUS EFFORT FOR A CEASE-FIRE, NOT ONE WHICH LEFT OPPORTUNITIES WIDE OPEN FOR ARGENTINA TO CONTINUE TO PROCRASTINATE. I EXPLAINED THE POINTS WHICH SIR A PARSONS WAS LIKELY TO BE MAKING IN A UK EXPLANATION OF VOTE (PARA.8 OF YOUR TELEGRAM TO PARIS NO.334) AND REMINDED HIM THAT THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED RADICALLY SINCE SCR 502 HAD BEEN ADOPTED. THE POSITION ON THE GROUND WAS NOW SUCH THAT WE NEEDED AN ABSOLUTELY CLEAR LINKAGE BETWEEN CEASE FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL, WITH A STARTING TIME FOR WITHDRAWAL AND A CLEAR TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION. STOESEL SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THIS WAS RIGHT, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WAS UNDER SOME PRESSURE. I TOLD HIM THAT HAIG HAD ASSURED YOU IN VERSAILLES THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO VOTE WITH SIR A PARSONS. STOESEL SAID, SLIGHTLY HESITANTLY, THAT THIS WAS TRUE: BUT HE RETURNED TO THE PROBLEM FOR THE U.S. OF COMING UP WITH AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OF VOTE. HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS WITH HAIG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. LATER I SPOKE TO STOESEL AGAIN ABOUT THE NEED TO PERSUADE THE JAPANESE TO ABSTAIN, AS A POSSIBLE MEANS OF AVOIDING THE NEED TO VETO. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD WE WOULD BE RAISING THIS WITH THE JAPANESE DELEGATION AT VERSAILLES AND SUGGESTED THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT DO THE SAME. STOESEL UNDERTOOK TO TRY TO SPEAK TO HAIG AT ONCE ABOUT THIS.
4. STOESEL THEN TELEPHONED ME BACK, AFTER THE MEETING WAS WELL UNDER WAY IN NEW YORK, TO SAY THAT HAIG HAD NOW CONSIDERED THE PROBLEM AND HAD DECIDED THAT, GIVEN THAT NO EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO IMPROVE THE DRAFT, IT WAS NO LONGER APPROPRIATE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO VOTE AGAINST IT. HE HAD THEREFORE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK SHOULD ABSTAIN. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, SHE HAD ALREADY ACTED ON HER EARLIER INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TO JOIN US IN VOTING AGAINST. STOESEL SAID THAT SHE HAD NOW BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CHANGE HER VOTE. HE CONCLUDED LAMELY THAT HAIG HAD TRIED TO REACH YOU BY TELEPHONE TO EXPLAIN HIS THINKING. IT WAS MOST REGRETTABLE THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO SO AT THE TIME (THOUGH I UNDERSTAND HE HAD SPOKEN TO YOU SINCE.)
5. I SAID THAT THIS SUDDEN SWITCH WOULD CAUSE THE UTMOST DISMAY.

ONLY THIS MORNING HAIG HAD GIVEN YOU AN ASSURANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD JOIN US IN VOTING AGAINST THE RESOLUTION. MOREOVER I COULD NOT IMAGINE WHAT THE REST OF THE WORLD WOULD MAKE OF THE UNITED STATES CHANGING ITS MIND PUBLICLY IN SUCH A FASHION. STOESEL HAD THE GRACE TO BE EXTREMELY EMBARRASSED.

6. HIS EMBARRASMENT BECAME ACUTE WHEN HE HAD TO TELEPHONE ME TEN MINUTES AFTERWARDS TO TELL ME THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD DUG HER TOES IN AND WAS STICKING TO HER VETO. HER NEW INSTRUCTIONS HAD ARRIVED TOO LATE AND SHE WOULD NOT CHANGE. I SAID I WAS MOST RELIEVED. HAD THE UNITED STATES ABSTAINED AFTER SO MANY ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD STICK WITH US, I FEARED THAT TO SAY THE LEAST IT WOULD HAVE DONE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

7. STOESEL HAS NOW SPOKEN AGAIN TO HAIG WHO AGREED THAT THINGS SHOULD REMAIN AS THEY ARE. IF THE PRESS PICKS UP THE CONFUSION, AS IT SEEMS BOUND TO DO, THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL TRY TO GET AWAY WITH BLAMING IT ON THE DIFFICULTY OF RAPID COMMUNICATION, WITH HAIG IN VERSAILLES ATTENDING THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETINGS. THEY WILL GO ON TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT STOOD, IN PARTICULAR THE ABSENCE OF A DATE CERTAIN OR WIGHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINIAN FORCES FROM THE FALKLANDS.

THOMAS

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 050130Z (PEKING TOKYO)
DESKBY 050500Z (MOSCOW UKDEL VERSAILLES)
DESKBY 050630Z (PARIS)
DESKBY 050700Z (KAMPALA AMMAN)
DESKBY 050730Z (MADRID KINSHASA WARSAW)
DESKBY 050800Z (UKDEL NATO)
DESKBY 050830Z (DUBLIN ACCRA)
DESKBY 051230Z (HAVANA)
DESKBY 051300Z (PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN)
DESKBY 051400Z (WASHINGTON)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050107Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 933 OF 4 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN, MADRID, PARIS, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN, TOKYO, MOSCOW, PEKING, HAVANA, UKDEL NATO.

UKDEL VERSAILLES TEL NO 3 TO YOU (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS:

SECURITY COUNCIL.

SUMMARY.

1. A SLIGHTLY AMENDED VERSION OF THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT FAILED TO SECURE ADOPTION THIS EVENING (4 JUNE) BECAUSE OF VETOES BY THE UK AND US. THE VOTING WAS 9 - 2 (UK, US) - 4 (FRANCE, GUYANA, JORDAN, TOGO). THE RESOLUTION SECURED NINE VOTES ONLY BECAUSE OF A LAST MINUTE SWITCH BY JAPAN. AFTER THE VOTE, MRS KIRKPATRICK ASTONISHINGLY STATED THAT SHE HAD BEEN ASKED BY HER GOVERNMENT TO SAY THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO CHANGE A VOTE ONCE CAST, THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE ITS VOTE FROM A VETO TO AN ABSTENTION.

DETAIL.

2. UPON RECEIPT OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I INFORMED DE PINIES (SPAIN) AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT OF LAST NIGHT. BOTH SIDES SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO VOTING THIS AFTERNOON (4 JUNE). THERE FOLLOWED A DELAY OF ABOUT 2 HOURS WHILE BOTH SIDES COUNTED HEADS, AND MRS KIRKPATRICK MADE SEVERAL EFFORTS TO PERSUADE HAIG IN VERSAILLES TO SWITCH FROM A NOT TO ABSTENTION. SWITH ABSTENTIONS ASSURED FROM GFYANA, JAPAN, JORDAN AND TOGO, AND PROBABLY FROM ZAIRE, IT LOOKED AS THOUGH DE PINIES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET HIS NINE VOTES. BUT, AT THE LAST MINUTE, MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE, TO HIS OBVIOUS CHAGRIN, RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM VERSAILLES TO SWITCH FROM AN ABSTENTION TO A VOTE IN FAVOUR. HE TOOK WITH HIM ZAIRE, AND NEARLY JORDAN AS WELL. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) LEFT THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THIS POINT TO RETURN TO HIS MISSION TO TELEPHONE VERSAILLES IN AN EFFORT TO GER THE JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS CHANGED. BUT IT WAS TOO LATE AND HE COULD NOT DEFER THE VOTE ANY LONGER.

3. THE DRAFT VOTED ON WAS A SLIGHTLY REVISED VERSION OF THE TEXT IN MY TEL NO 926, WITH THE FIRST AND SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS RUN TOGETHER AND WITH AN UNHELPFUL CHANGE TO THE THIRD OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH (REVISED TEXT IN MIFT, TO YOU, VERSAILLES AND WASHINGTON ONLY). I SPOKE FIRST IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE BEFORE THE VOTE (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT, TO YO ND COI ONLY). UGANDA, JAPAN, IRELAND AND ZAIRE ALSO SPOKE BEFORE THE VOTE, DECLARING THEIR INTENTION TO VOTE IN FAVOUR. JAPAN'S STATEMENT WAS BRIEF AND PAINED: JAPAN WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ARGENTINA WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES WITHIN A REASONABLE PZRIOD OF TIME: SHE WAS DISTRESSED AT THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER BLOODSHED: SHE APPEALED TO ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW, SO THAT ARGENTINA'S TIES OF FRIENDSHIP COULD BE RESTORED AND STRENGTHENED. DORR PRODUCED 15 MINUTES OF HIS USUAL SELF-CONGRATULATORY DRIVEL.

4. THE VOTE WAS AS REPORTED IN PARA 1 ABOVE. GUYANA SPOKE AFTER THE VOTE - AN ADMIRABLY ROBUST STATEMENT. DE PINIES (SPAIN) WAS SURPRISINGLY MILD: VARIOUS AMENDMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO THE DRAFT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF COUNCIL MEMBERS' VIEWS: ALTHOUGH A BALANCED TEXT, IT HAD NOT BEEN ADOPTED: THIS WAS NOT A FAILURE FOR ITS SPONSORS BUT FOR PEACE: THE RESPONSIBILITY LAY WITH THOSE WHO HAD PREVENTED ADOPTION.

5. MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) SPOKE NEXT. IT WAS A TRULY ASTONISHING STATEMENT. SHE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL'S DECISION WAS YET ANOTHER FAILURE TO MEDIATE A 200 YEAR OLD CONFLICT. IT REPRESENTED ONE MORE STEP IN THE PROCEFS OFGESCALATION. PHASE ONE HAD ENDED WOTH THE ARGENTINE INVASION: PHASE TWO 'MIGHT WELL END' WITH BRITISH

REOCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS: WHERE WOULD PHASE THREE END? THE VOTE HAD AFFIRMED THE WISH OF THE MAJORITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE. THE US VETO, TO WHICH SHE WOULD RETURN, HAD AFFIRMED DISAPPROVAL OF THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA. SHE THEN READ OUT A POEM (ABOUT THE HORRORS OF WAR) BY THE ARGENTINE POET BORGES. THE FRIENDS OF ARGENTINA, OF THE AMERICAS AND OF WORLD PEACE HOPED THAT THERE WOULD BE 'NO SUCH OFFERINGS' FROM THE BRESENT WAR. THEY HOPED THAT COOPERATION COULD BE RESTORED AND FRIENDSHIPS MENDED. THE US GOVERNMENT HAD WORKED HARD TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT. IT HAD BEEN RENT BY A CLASH OF VALUES, LOYALTIES AND FRIENDS. THAT CLASH HAD CONTINUED RIGHT DOWN TO THE PRESENT VDDE. SHE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT A MEMBER COULD NOT CHANGE ITS VOTE ONCE IT HAD BEEN CAST. BUT SHE HAD BEEN ASKED BY HER GOVERNMENT TO STATE THAT I IT WERE POSSIBLE TO CHANGE A VOTE THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE ITS FROM A VETO TO AN ABSTENTION. THIS STATEMENT HAD AN ELECTRIFYING EFFECT, REVIVING MEMORIES OF CARTER'S VOLTE FACE OVER THE US VOTE ON JERUSALEM IN 1980.

6. KAM (PANAMA) RANTED ON FOR A WHILE IN THE STYLE OF HIS MASTER, ILLUECA. HE NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD CORRECTED ITS VETO, SO ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY THE UK ALONE. THE WORLD NOW KNEW WHO STOOD FOR PEACE AND WHO FOR WAR. NINE COUNTRIES

HAD SHOWN WORLD OPINION THEIR CONCERN FOR PEACE, FOR LATIN AMERICA'S HONOUR, FOR THE SOLDIERS OF ARGENTINA ETC ETC. PANAMA RESERVED ITS RIGHT TO ASK FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL.

7. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE), IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, MADE A LIMP STATEMENT. TODAY'S DRAFT HAD POSED ONLY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ITS ADOPTION WOULD SERVE TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT. IT HAD CERTAIN POSITIVE ELEMENTS. BUT ONE COULD NOT DISREGARD THAT SCR 502 HAD BEEN ADOPTED TWO MONTHS AGO BUT NO START HAD BEEN MADE TO IMPLEMENT IT. FRANCE THEREFORE UNDERSTOOD WHY ONE PARTY FELT THE NEED FOR FURTHER SAFEGUARDS. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED IN THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS.

8. ROS (ARGENTINA) CONDEMNED "THE UK VETO" IN PREDICTABLE TERMS. THE UK ALONE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL FURTHER DEATHS IN THE CONFLICT. THE MACHINERY FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY COULD NOT WORK IF PERMANENT MEMBERS USED THE VETO ONLY TO SERVE THEIR OWN ENDS. TODAY IT WAS THE MALVINAS, YESTERDAY IT HAD BEEN NAMIBIA. WHAT WOULD IT BE NEXT? I REPLIED BRIEFLY THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRISIS LAY SOLELY IN ARGENTINA'S INVASION: RESPONSIBILITY FOR FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE WOULD LIE IN ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW AS DEMANDED BY SCR 502. THAT ENDED THE PROCEEDINGS.

9. COMMENT OS IN MY THIRD IFT.

SUBJECT

SECRET



cc master ✓/o
9

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 June 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Prime Minister held a *tete-a-tete* conversation with President Reagan in the US Embassy in Paris between 1510 and 1620 hours on Friday 4 June 1982. The Americans made it plain that they did not wish anyone else to be present at this meeting.

As you know, the Prime Minister briefed the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and other members of the United Kingdom delegation on her conversation with President Reagan a few hours later.

The Prime Minister said that she had opened the discussion by thanking President Reagan warmly for the material help which the United States had extended to us. She regretted, but understood, that she could not make public the very valuable assistance which the Americans had given. She had then described the various stages of negotiation during the period when we were attempting to reach a diplomatic settlement. Finally, when all previous efforts had come to nought, we had published our own terms for a settlement. But from the moment when we had been obliged to launch military action to re-capture the Islands, everything had changed. We had had to withdraw all the earlier proposals. Now, the only procedure which would be of interest to us would be a cease-fire, irrevocably linked to Argentine withdrawal within 14 days. She had explained to President Reagan why we could not withdraw our own forces nor make concessions to the Argentine desire for sovereignty. She had further explained why we should have to veto the Resolution at present before the United Nations Security Council. She expressed the hope that the United States and France would also veto this Resolution. We could not accept a cease-fire at a time when our forces were poised to take action and were fighting in adverse climatic conditions. If Galtieri wanted to withdraw and communicate this wish to her, both sides could instruct their commanders on the spot to make arrangements. President Reagan, perhaps not entirely understanding the Prime Minister's point, had enquired whether she had made a proposal on these lines. The Prime Minister said that she had not done so. She was merely describing the only procedure which we could accept.

/The conversation

The conversation had then turned to relations with Latin America in general. The Prime Minister had made it plain that she was not interested in humiliating Argentina nor was she at war with the mainland. No-one was more anxious than she for an armistice.

President Reagan had expressed a keen wish to minimise the loss of life. He wondered whether persistent bombardment, rather than a frontal assault, might not help to achieve this. The Prime Minister said that, given the situation of the Argentine forces, this tactic might cause even more deaths. But she had assured the President that we too wished to minimise loss of life. She had told the President of the discovery of napalm bombs at Goose Green (he appeared to be unaware of this) and had also described the treatment which the Islanders had received from the Argentine troops and the recent white flag incident.

The Prime Minister said that the President had expressed considerable interest in how we propose to obtain a cessation of hostilities applying to the mainland as well as the Islands. This had led to a discussion about the possibility of not returning Argentine prisoners until a full cessation of hostilities had been agreed. President Reagan had seemed very interested in this approach. The Prime Minister said we would be very grateful for help from the United States after the Argentine forces had surrendered. But the prisoners could not be returned until an armistice covering the mainland had been secured. President Reagan did not agree with those who argued that Galtieri would not care about the fate of these prisoners. No country could be indifferent to the fate of so many of its citizens.

President Reagan had expressed considerable concern about the future course of events, after the re-taking of Port Stanley. He was worried as to how the situation could be controlled if Argentina continued the war from the mainland. His main interest seemed to lie in the political future of the Islands and in particular in some form of de-colonisation. He had asked whether we could not bring the Islands to self-government. The Prime Minister had replied that this would take time. The effect of recent events on the Islanders was unpredictable. However, self-government should probably be the first objective. President Reagan had pointed out that self-government must involve some protecting power. The Prime Minister said that she appreciated that; it was a matter which we would consider later. (Commenting on this part of the conversation, the Prime Minister said that problems could be caused by the fact that the Americans appeared to wish to move faster than we would want towards self-government. Reagan seemed to be contemplating self-government under some kind of protectorate but he had not gone into detail about security arrangements which remained a gray area.)

/President Reagan

Prime Minister

SECRET

- 3 -

President Reagan had understood that it was not possible for us to take any diplomatic initiative at the moment. He was worried about the situation in Argentina. He was not sure that Galtieri would fall but if he did so it seemed likely that the Air Force commander would take over. The Prime Minister said that we had no intention of gloating when re-possession was complete; we had no desire to humiliate Argentina. President Reagan volunteered the view that Galtieri had authorised the invasion because he would otherwise have fallen from power within days - large-scale strikes, sympathetic to the Peronistas, had been envisaged.

Commenting on the above account, Mr. Pym said that it was close to the conversation he had had with Mr. Haig at about the same time. Haig was very much in favour of self-government for the Falkland Islands but very much opposed to independence.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD(SA) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John Coles

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TOP SECRET



Agreed
ms.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

4 June, 1982

Dear John,

We have received the attached telegram to the Prime Minister from Mr Lavity Stoutt, the Chief Minister of the British Virgin Islands, assuring Her Majesty's Government of the support of his Government and people in the Falklands dispute.

We recommend that a reply should be sent from the Prime Minister through the Governor. A draft is enclosed.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
		UNCLASSIFIED	PRIORITY
ZCZC	1	ZCZC	
GRS	2	GRS	
CLASS	3	UNCLASSIFIED	
CAVEATS	4		
DESKBY	5		
FM FCO	6	FM FCO	JUNE 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO PRIORITY TORTOLA	
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9	YOUR TELNO 28	
	10	1. Grateful if you would pass following message to Chief	
	11	Minister from Prime Minister.	
	12	2. Begins: I am most grateful to you and to the Government and	
	13	people of the British Virgin Islands for your message of	
	14	solidarity and support. Deeply as we regret the present tragic	
	15	conflict in the South Atlantic, we firmly believe in the need to	
	16	uphold the principles of international law and of the United	
	17	Nations. Our resolve to do so has been greatly strengthened by	
	18	the support we have received, particularly from Commonwealth	
	19	countries and dependencies. Ends.	
	20		
	21	PYM	
///	22	NNNN	
//	23		
/	24		
	25		
NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword
File number		Dept Private Office	Distribution Minimal
Drafted by (Block capitals) F N RICHARDS			WIAD CCD
Telephone number 233 4831			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

05EAGRAM LN LFTB
0020 LFX1310 OLF3252 R3A018 TLR855 TFA359
ELB OK V3T0 107
TORTOLA 107/105 23 1340 SVI GOCT

K124 APS/PS

for Wallace 2351/26

Be grateful for
that aft to W/O
with draft reply if
app.

fm H/6

INT
RODRIGUE
LONDON

UNCLASSIFIED FM TORTOLA TO ROUTINE F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 26 OF
DAY PLEASE PAR FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM
CHIEF MINISTER H L STOUTT REGINS ARGENTINE AGGRESSION ON
BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS I
WISH TO ASSURE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT OF

PAGE 2/34

OUR DEEP AND SINCERE FEELINGS OF SOLIDARITY AND SUPPORT
IN YOUR DIFFICULT STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION IN
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE SHARE YOUR GRIEF AT THE TRAGIC LOSS
OF LIVES AND PRAY THAT THE FAIR AND JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE
CONFLICT FOR WHICH YOU ARE STRIVING WILL BE VERY
SOON ACHIEVED. END
BAR HICK

COL ETAT 28 23 MAY
SENT 0047/27TH 1K

05EAGRAM LN LFTB
23554 007 13

copy to ER

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO GENERAL GALTIERI FROM THE PRI

ME MINISTER

I am sending you this personal message because I want to be sure that you fully understand the situation and the choice which now face your country, your government and yourself.

The decisive battle in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) is about to begin. With your military experience you must be in no doubt as to the outcome. In a few days the British flag will once again be flying over Port Stanley. In a few days also your eyes and mine will be reading the casualty lists. On my side, grief will be tempered by the knowledge that these men died for freedom, justice, and the rule of law. And on your side? Only you can answer that question.

Similarly, only you have it in your power to avert this outcome. You can do so by announcing two things without delay. First, that you have instructed the Argentine garrison on the islands to cease fire immediately and to begin withdrawing to the mainland, this withdrawal to be completed within fourteen days, including equipment. Second, that Argentina's claims in respect of the Islands will henceforth be pursued in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, that is to say by peaceful means without the use or threat of force.

If you will make these two announcements today, 3 June, I am ready to instruct the British forces on the Islands to cease fire simultaneously, and to place no obstacle in the way of the departure of the Argentine forces. [When their removal from the Islands is complete, I shall be ready to act in accordance with the third operative paragraph of Resolution No 502 of the United Nations Security Council, which called upon the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to our differences. I suggest that the modalities should be arranged through the Secretary-General of the United Nations.)

Mr President, you initiated this crisis and you have it in your power to end it in the way which I have suggested.

I propose to publish this message as soon as I know that you have received it.

CONFIDENTIAL

Following is text of the Panamanian/Spanish draft resolution incorporating the amendments Sir A Parsons suggests he should propose.

The Security Council:

Reaffirming its Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) and the need for implementation of all parts thereof,

1. Requests the parties to cease firing in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) as soon as a mutually acceptable time has been established in accordance with paragraph 4 below and to initiate, simultaneously with the ceasefire, the implementation of Resolution 502 (1982) in its entirety, the withdrawal of Argentine forces to be completed within 14 days;
2. Authorises the Secretary General to use such means as he may deem necessary and are acceptable to the parties to verify the implementation of this resolution;
cease-fire and withdrawal of Argentine forces
3. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on compliance with this resolution within 72 hours;
4. Requests both parties to communicate in writing to the Secretary General within 72 hours their acceptance of the terms of this resolution, and to specify a time for the commencement of the ceasefire and withdrawal of Argentine forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :
0700 HOURS, 4 JUNE 1982

United Nations

(a) Report

A: (UKMIS New
York telno.
924)

1. Sir A Parsons reports that as a result of vigorous lobbying by British posts abroad Spain and Panama were unlikely to be able to line up the necessary nine votes in favour of their draft Security Council Resolution. Panama therefore proposed an additional operative paragraph in the draft asking the parties to implement immediately SCRs 502 and 505 in all their parts. The Irish Representative meanwhile produced a not unhelpful draft Resolution on a personal basis but this was not actively discussed.

B: (UKMIS New
York telno.
925)

2. When the Security Council met in formal session the Spanish/Panamanian draft Resolution was tabled with the new operative paragraph inserted. Sir A Parsons indicated that this implicit call for a ceasefire simultaneous with withdrawal of Argentine forces improved the draft which would need overnight study. Spain tried to press for an early vote on the draft, or to get an assurance from Sir A Parsons that it was at least conceivable that HMG could accept it possibly with minor amendments. Sir A Parsons went no further than to say that the draft provided a basis for negotiation which might produce a draft acceptable to all. Eventually the Americans persuaded the Argentines to discourage the Spaniard from persisting, and the vote was postponed. The Security Council is to reconvene at 2000Z on 4 June.

C: (UKMIS New
York telno.
926)

D: (UKMIS New
York telno.
927)

3. Sir A Parsons comments that the Spanish Representative's insistence on an early vote was in fact bluster: but he convinced the Americans who were at great pains to postpone the voting in order to avoid having to veto. The Americans said they were sure the Argentines only wanted a fig-leaf in order to withdraw; Sir A Parsons commented that the Argentines had had ample opportunity to convey such a signal to HMG if such was indeed their wish. The French are also anxious to avoid having to veto.

4. There is a serious danger of our being isolated in the Security Council. If the Spanish/Panamanian draft, as amended, were put to the vote it would attract more than the necessary nine votes, and France and the US would be tempted to abstain.

(b) Recommendations

E: (UKMIS New
York telno.
928)

5. Sir A Parsons recommends that we put forward firmly the amendments necessary to make the draft acceptable, and suggests what these should be. Although this might lead Spain and Panama to call for an immediate vote, it could encourage others to try to persuade the Spaniard to allow a genuine negotiation to take place which could last into the weekend.

6. Sir A Parsons' amendments are designed to establish a firm link between the ceasefire and Argentine withdrawal and to eliminate any reference to SCR 505 in the operative part of the

CONFIDENTIAL

/Resolution

FOR INSERT A NEW PARAGRAPH AT THE END OF THE FOLLOWING

Resolution though since we voted for it so recently, it would be hard to avoid the preambular reaffirmation of it. Some rôle for the Secretary-General probably has to be accepted to avoid charges that we were not negotiating seriously on the basis of the Spanish/Panamanian draft.

France/Argentina

F: (Paris
telno.590)

7. The French have told HM Embassy in Paris that Argentina is withdrawing its Ambassador from Paris in reprisal against French support for the UK over the Falklands. The French do not intend to withdraw their Ambassador from Buenos Aires.

Colombia

F: (FCO tel.
No.119 to
Bogotá)

8. The Colombian Ambassador delivered a message on 3 June from President Turbay to the Prime Minister, urging HMG to seek an honourable peace agreement with Argentina. Officials are considering advice on a reply.

Peru

F: (Lima
telno.225)

9. HM Ambassador in Lima delivered the message from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the Peruvian Foreign Minister expressing concern at reports of Peruvian arms supplies to Argentina. The Minister insisted that Peru was not providing military assistance beyond that agreed in long-standing arrangements for Argentine/Peruvian cooperation. However, he warned that an event such as a British attack on the Argentine mainland would lead Peru to respond at least in a limited way to any call by Argentina for military assistance under Article 3 of the Rio Treaty.

COMMENT

10. Although our lobbying action on the original Spanish/Panamanian draft resolution was successful, it seems unlikely that we could secure sufficient support to resist their revised draft. The scope for avoiding a veto has therefore sharply narrowed. The Security Council will meet at 2000Z today and Sir A Parsons will need instructions before then.

11. Points for decision are:


- (a) whether we should confirm a decision to veto the revised Spanish/Panamanian draft as it now stands;
- (b) whether Sir A Parsons should be instructed to put forward the substantial amendments which he has suggested (UKMIS New York telno 928);
- (c) What attitude we might need to take on the Irish draft in the (unlikely) event of it surfacing formally;

/(d)

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

- (d) whether, following yesterday's efforts, further lobbying should be undertaken.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

4 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR INSERT A NEW PARAGRAPH AT THE END OF THE LETTER

B-14


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ZZ FCO

- OO PEKING (DESKBY 040130Z)
- OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)
- OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z)
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- OO KINSHASA (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO WARSAW (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO UKDEL NATO (DESKBY 040800Z)
- OO DUBLIN (DESKBY 040830Z)

E4 JUN 82



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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 040045Z JUNE 82
 TO FLASH FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 924 OF 3 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN MADRID PARIS KAMPALA KINSHASA
 ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO MOSCOW PEKING
 HAVANA AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL NO'S 913 - 917; FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

SUMMARY.

1. IN A DAY OF HECTIC NEGOTIATIONS, SPAIN AND PANAMA FAILED TO LINE UP NINE VOTES FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY TEL NO 915, IN SPITE OF PROPOSING A NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR'S 502 AND 505 SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE. THE AMERICANS, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THE FRENCH, MADE FRENZIED EFFORTS TO AVOID A VOTE TODAY, LEST THEY HAD TO VETO WITH US. DE PINIES (SPAIN) FINALLY AGREED (PROBABLY BECAUSE HE REALISED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE VOTES) TO POSTPONE A VOTE UNTIL 2000Z TOMORROW (4 JUNE). MEANWHILE DORR (IRELAND) PRODUCED A NOT UNHELPFUL PERSONAL DRAFT BUT THIS WAS NOT ACTIVELY DISCUSSED.

DETAIL.

FINALLY AGREED (PROBABLY BECAUSE HE REALISED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE VOTES) TO POSTPONE A VOTE UNTIL 2000Z TOMORROW (4 JUNE). MEANWHILE DORR (IRELAND) PRODUCED A NOT UNHELPFUL PERSONAL DRAFT BUT THIS WAS NOT ACTIVELY DISCUSSED.
DETAIL.

2. AS A RESULT OF THE OVERNIGHT LOBBYING (FOR WHICH I AM MOST GRATEFUL), IT WAS CLEAR AT THE START OF PLAY TODAY THAT WE HAD SIX NEGATIVE VOTES OR ABSTENTIONS (FRANCE, GUYANA, JAPAN, JORDAN, UK, US). WE NEEDED TO PERSUADE ONLY ONE OF THE AFRICANS TO ABSTAIN IN ORDER TO DENY THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT NINE VOTES.

3. AS SOON AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL GATHERED AT 1500Z, THE NON-ALIGNED WENT INTO A PRIVATE MEETING. AT THIS GUYANA PRESSED HARD, WITH SOME SUPPORT FROM JORDAN, FOR MAJOR CHANGES TO THE DRAFT IN ORDER TO MAKE THE CEASEFIRE CONDITIONAL UPON THE COMMENCEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. PANAMA WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE AMENDMENTS. HOWEVER IT EMERGED THAT BOTH TOGO AND ZAIRE WERE UNCERTAIN WHETHER THEY WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION AS IT STOOD. THIS LED PANAMA TO PROPOSE A NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WHICH WOULD HAVE ASKED THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT IMMEDIATELY SCR'S 502 AND 505 IN ALL THEIR PARTS. THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFRICANS AND PANAMA UNDERTOOK TO SELL IT TO SPAIN.

4. MEANWHILE DORR (IRELAND) HAD GIVEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MIFT, "AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION". DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) SHOWED IT TO ME (BUT WOULD NOT AT THAT STAGE LET ME TAKE A COPY). I SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT DO AS IT STOOD. IN PARTICULAR PARAGRAPH 4 (WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN SQUARE BRACKETED BY DORR) WOULD HAVE TO COME OUT. BUT IT HAD POSSIBILITIES. BY THE END OF THE MORNING DORR'S SHYNESS ABOUT HIS DRAFT HAD EVAPORATED AND HE MADE IT GENERALLY AVAILABLE TO MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

5. AS A RESULT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION THAT TOGO HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO ABSTAIN, DE PINIES ACCEPTED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AN AMENDMENT TO GET THE AFRICANS ON BOARD. THE COUNCIL FINALLY MET IN FORMAL SESSION AT 1730Z AND PANAMA INTRODUCED THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENT TO THE TEXT IN MY TEL NO 195; INSERTION OF A NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH, BETWEEN EXISTING OPERATIVE 1 AND 3, READING:

"REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO INITIATE, SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) IN THEIR ENTIRETY." (FOR EASE OF REFERENCE THE TEXT OF THE REVISED DRAFT IS IN MY SECOND IFT).

6. I IMMEDIATELY INTERVENED TO SAY THAT THE AMENDMENT CERTAINLY IMPROVED THE DRAFT. IT NOW CONTAINED THE CONCEPT OF A CEASEFIRE AND SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502, WHICH MEANT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINES FORCES, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY

DRAFT IS IN MY SECOND IFT.
6. I IMMEDIATELY INTERVENED TO SAY THAT THE AMENDMENT CERTAINLY IMPROVED THE DRAFT. IT NOW CONTAINED THE CONCEPT OF A CEASEFIRE AND SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502, WHICH MEANT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINES FORCES, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. WE WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER THE AMENDMENT TEXT VERY CAREFULLY AND I WOULD NEED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS OVERNIGHT, AS THE AMENDMENT RADICALLY CHANGED THE DRAFT. DE PINIES INSISTED HOWEVER THAT THE AMENDED DRAFT SHOULD BE VOTED ON THIS AFTERNOON AND PROPOSED A TWO-HOUR SUSPENSION. AN UNEDIFYING PROCEDURAL WRANGLE FOLLOWED. JORDAN PROPOSED SUSPENSION UNTIL 2100Z. THIS WAS PUT TO A VOTE BUT LOST 5 - 0 - 10. EVERYONE ASSUMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD THEN PUT TO THE VOTE THE SPANISH PROPOSAL FOR 2-HOUR SUSPENSION. BUT INEXPLICABLY HE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL HAD DECIDED TO SUSPEND UNTIL 1730Z (IE EXACTLY WHAT SPAIN HAD PROPOSED) AND GAVELLED THE MEETING TO A CLOSE BEFORE ANYONE COULD PROTEST.

7. DURING THE LUNCH BREAK, MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD A LONG MEETING WITH DE PINIES, THE UPSHOT OF WHICH WAS THAT DE PINIES SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO DEFER THE VOTE UNTIL TOMORROW (4 JUNE) IF I COULD GIVE HIM A REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT IT WAS AT LEAST CONCEIVABLE THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE REVISED DRAFT, PERHAPS WITH ONE OR TWO ADDITIONAL CHANGES. WHEN WE RECONVENED, LICHENSTEIN (US - MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD BY NOW LEFT) URGED ME TO GIVE THIS ASSURANCE. I TOLD DE PINIES (AND LICHENSTEIN) THAT AS I HAD ALREADY SAID THE AMENDMENT IMPROVED THE DRAFT. IT NOW PROVIDED A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION WHICH MIGHT (MIGHT) ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO ARRIVE AT A DRAFT WHICH COULD BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS. IF IT WAS PUT TO THE VOTE AS IT STOOD, I WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST. BUT IF MORE TIME WAS ALLOWED I COULD PUT IT TO YOU OVERNIGHT AND ASCERTAIN WHAT AMENDMENTS YOU WOULD REQUIRE. IN ALL HONESTY I HAD TO SAY THAT I EXPECTED THAT THESE AMENDMENTS WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL, INCLUDING AT LEAST A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND ITS COMPLETION WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, DELETION OF SOME OF THE REFERENCES TO SCR 505 AND CLEARER LINKAGE BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. I COULD NOT THEREFORE GIVE DE PINIES THE ASSURANCE HE WANTED. BUT I THOUGHT THERE WAS A CHANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION AND THAT WE SHOULD TAKE IT. THIS LED TO A SERIES OF INCREASINGLY HARD TEMPERED EXCHANGES BETWEEN ME AND DE PINIES, WITH LICHENSTEIN PLAYING A GENERALLY UNHELPFUL ROLE; HE HAD CLEARLY RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM MRS KIRKPATRICK TO BEND EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT THE AMERICANS FROM HAVING TO VETO WITH US TONIGHT.

8. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) WAS EQUALLY DETERMINED TO AVOID A VETO. HE READ ME A LECTURE ABOUT THE UNDESIRABILITY OF A VETO COINCIDING WITH HAVANA AND VERSAILLES AND PROPOSED CERTAIN FURTHER AMENDMENTS OF HIS OWN TO THE REVISED DRAFT, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS THE RUNNING TOGETHER OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 OF THE TEXT IN

THE RUNNING TOGETHER OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THE TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT. I TOOK WITH HIM THE SAME LINE AS I WAS TAKING WITH DE PINIES AND THE AMERICANS.

9. AT ABOUT 2130Z, DE PINIES SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE ARGENTINES AND THE PANAMANIANS ACCEPTING THE KIND OF AMENDMENTS I WAS TALKING ABOUT. HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO VOTING STRAIGHT AWAY. THIS LED TO FRENZIED EFFORTS BY THE AMERICANS TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO DISCOURAGE DE PINIES FROM PRESSING FOR A VOTE (I DREAD TO THINK WHAT PROMISES WERE MADE TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT THIS). AT THE SAME TIME IT BECAME CLEAR THAT BOTH ZAIRE, AND TOGO, IN SPITE OF THEIR POSITION IN THE MORNING, WERE INCLINED TO ABSTAIN ON THE REVISED DRAFT. SO DE PINIES STILL HAD NOT GOT HIS NINE VOTES AND AMERICAN AND FRENCH EFFORTS TO POSTPONE THE VOTE THEREFORE MET WITH SUCCESS. THE COUNCIL MET FORMALLY AND VERY BRIEFLY AT 2230Z FOR THE PRESIDENT TO ANNOUNCE THAT, FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS, ALL CONCERNED HAD AGREED TO DEFER THE MEETING UNTIL 2000Z TOMORROW (4 JUNE).

10. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN MY THIRD IFT.

PARSONS

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PEKING (DESKBY 040130Z)
OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)
OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z)
OO PARIS (DESKBY 040630Z)
OO KAMPALA (DESKBY 030700Z)
OO AMMAN (DESKBY 040700Z)
OO MADRID (DESKBY 040730Z)
OO KINSHASA (DESKBY 040730Z)
OO WARSAW (DESKBY 040730Z)
OO UKDEL NATO (DESKBY 040800Z)
OO ~~WARSAW~~ (DESKBY 040830Z)

F-4 JUN 1982

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 040046Z JUN 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 925 DATED 3 JUNE 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN, MADRID, PARIS, KAMPALA,
KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN,
TOKYO, MOSCOW, PEKING, HAVANA, UKDEL NATO

MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION PRODUCED ON A PERSONAL BASIS TODAY (3 JUNE) BY DORR (IRELAND):

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982)
NOTING WITH APPRECIATION THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (S/15151) SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. 5 OF RES 052 DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS

1. CALLS THE URGENT ATTENTION OF THE PARTIES TO THEIR OBLIGATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER, TO IMPLEMENT FULLY AND WITHOUT DELAY, ALL OF THE PROVISIONS OF RES. 502 UNDER WHICH THE COUNCIL:
 - (I) DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
 - (II) DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS
 - (III) CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO RESPECT FULLY THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(III) CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO RESPECT FULLY THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

2. TO THAT END

- (I) REQUIRES THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO ORDER AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE FORCES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. 1 OF RES. 502
- (II) REQUIRES THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA IMMEDIATELY TO BEGIN WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS IN COMPLIANCE PAR. 2 OF RES. 502
- (III) REQUESTS BOTH GOVERNMENTS, WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WITH A VIEW TO THE WORKING OUT, WITHIN ONE YEAR, OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. 3 OF RES. 502

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAINTAIN THE MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES WHICH HE WAS ASKED TO UNDERTAKE UNDER THE TERMS OF PAR. 2 OF RES. 505, AND THE CONTACTS HE WAS ASKED TO MAKE UNDER PAR. 4 OF THAT SAME RESOLUTION, SO THAT HIS SERVICES MAY BE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN THE URGENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.

SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN

4. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT TO THE COUNCIL, WITHIN X HOURS, A SHORT REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING, SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN BY AGREEMENT SQUARE BRACKETS END A UN PRESENCE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE LOCAL COUNCIL, FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION REFERRED TO IN PAR. 3 OF RES. 502 AND IN PAR. 2 (III) OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION. SQUARE BRACKETS END

5. REQUESTS BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN WITHIN X HOURS SQUARE BRACKETS END OR SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN AS A MATTER OF URGENCY SQUARE BRACKETS END THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION. SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN SO THAT THERE MAY BE AN IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE END OF FURTHER BLOODSHED SQUARE FRACKETS END

5. REQUESTS BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN WITHIN X HOURS SQUARE BRACKETS END OR SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN AS A MATTER OF URGENCY SQUARE BRACKETS END THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION. SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN SO THAT THERE MAY BE AN IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE END OF FURTHER BLOODSHED SQUARE BRACKETS END

6. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE QUESTION SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN AND TO RESUME ITS CONSIDERATION ON RECEIPT OF THE REPORTS FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ENVISAGED IN PARS. 4 AND 5 ABOVE SQUARE BRACKETS END

PARSONS

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- OO PEKING (DESKBY 040130Z)
- OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)
- OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z)
- OO PARIS (DESKBY 040630Z)
- OO KAMPALA (DESKBY 030700Z)
- OO AMMAN (DESKBY 040700Z)
- OO MADRID (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO KINSHASA (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO WARSAW (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO UKDEL NATO (DESKBY 040800Z)
- OO DUBLIN (DESKBY 040830Z)
- OO ACCRA (DESKBY 040830Z)
- OO HAVANA (DESKBY 041230Z)
- OO PANAMA CITY (DESKBY 041300Z)
- OO GEORGETOWN (DESKBY 041300Z)

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- DESKBY 040130Z (PEKING, TOKYO)
- DESKBY 040500Z (MOSCOW)
- DESKBY 040630Z (PARIS)
- DESKBY 040700Z (KAMPALA, AMMAN)
- DESKBY 040730Z (MADRID, KINSHASA, WARSAW)
- DESKBY 040800Z (UKDEL NATO)
- DESKBY 040830Z (DUBLIN, ACCRA)
- DESKBY 041230Z (HAVANA)
- DESKBY 041300Z (PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN)
- DESKBY 041400Z (WASHINGTON)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 040047Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO


TELEGRAM NUMBER 926 OF 3 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN MADRID PARIS KAMPALA KINSHASA
ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO MOSCOW PEKING
HAVANA AND UKDEL NATO.

BY TWO IPTS. FALKLANDS. SECURITY COUNCIL

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-4 JUN 82



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TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 926 OF 3 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN MADRID PARIS KAMPALA KINSHASA
ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO MOSCOW PEKING
HAVANA AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TWO IPTS: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS REVISED TEXT OF THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT
RESOLUTION (S/15156/REV.1):

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) AND THE NEED
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTS THEREOF,

1. REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO CEASE FIRE IMMEDIATELY
IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS);
2. REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO INITIATE, SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-
FIRE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) IN
THEIR ENTIRETY;
3. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO USE SUCH MEANS AS HE MAY
DEEM NECESSARY TO VERIFY THE CEASE-FIRE;
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION WITHIN 72 HOURS.

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-4 JUN 1982

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OO PEKING (DESKBY 040130Z)
OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)
OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z),
DESKBY 041400Z (WASHINGTON),
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 040048Z JUN 82
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 927 DATED 3 JUNE 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN, MADRID, PARIS, KAMPALA,
KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN,
TOKYO, MOSCOW, PEKING, HAVANA, UKDEL NATO

MIPT: FALKLANDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IN SOME WAYS I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE VOTED TODAY
ON THE SPANISH DRAFT WITH ITS FIRST AMENDMENT. DE PINIES' MODUS
OPERANDI AND OBVIOUS RELISH AT THE PROSPECT OF EXTRACTING WESTERN
VETOS HAD UPSET MANY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND I DOUBT
WHETHER HE WOULD HAVE GOT NINE VOTES.

2. HOWEVER, DE PINIES HIMSELF REALISED THIS AND IT BECAME CLEAR
TO ME THAT HIS THREATS TO CALL AN IMMEDIATE VOTE WERE BLUSTER.
MOREOVER, THE AMERICANS TIED THEMSELVES IN KNOTS IN
ORDER TO GET ANOTHER TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. THEY WERE BUSY THROUGHOUT
THE CHAMBER BEGGING AND PLEADING WITH THE ARGENTINES, PANAMANIAN,
SPANISH AND OTHER LATIN AMERICANS TO GET A POSTPONEMENT. THEY
WANT TO INSERT A NEW PARAGRAPH AT THE END OF THE RESOLUTION.

TO PARSONS

HOWEVER, DE PINIES HIMSELF REALISED THIS AND IT BECAME CLEAR TO ME THAT HIS THREATS TO CALL AN IMMEDIATE VOTE WERE BLUSTER. MOREOVER, THE AMERICANS TIED THEMSELVES IN KNOTS IN ORDER TO GET ANOTHER TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. THEY WERE BUSY THROUGHOUT THE CHAMBER BEGGING AND PLEADING WITH THE ARGENTINES, PANAMANIAN, SPANISH AND OTHER LATIN AMERICANS TO GET A POSTPONEMENT. THEY EXPRESSED NAIVE PLEASURE WHEN DE PINIES GRACEFULLY GAVE IN: THEY DID NOT SEEM TO REALISE THAT THE TRUE REASON FOR HIS ACCOMMODATING ATTITUDE.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK AND HER STAFF (OBVIOUSLY DESPERATELY ANXIOUS TO AVOID HAVING TO VETO) CONTINUED TO ASSURE ME THAT THE ARGENTINES ONLY WANT A RESPECTABLE FIG-LEAF IN ORDER TO WITHDRAW. THEY TALK ABOUT THEIR CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY, AND SECRET CHANNELS DIRECT TO THE JUNTA IN BUENOS AIRES. I HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN ONE SHRED OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR CONTENTION. IF THE ARGENTINES REALLY WANTED A FIG-LEAF AND GENUINELY INTENDED TO WITHDRAW, THEY WOULD HAVE HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN SENDING US A SIGNAL EITHER THROUGH THE AMERICANS OR THROUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR EVEN BETWEEN THE COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD. NOTHING OF THIS KIND HAD EMERGED AND WE WERE OBLIGED TO CONCLUDE THAT THEIR APPARENT SHOW OF FLEXIBILITY OVER THE SPANISH DRAFT WAS YET ANOTHER DEVICE DESIGNED TO DRAW US INTO INTERMINABLE NEGOTIATIONS WHILE THEY STAYED ON THE ISLANDS FOR AS LONG AS THEY COULD. ROS, IN TALKING TO THE SPANIARDS, MADE NO BONES ABOUT THE FACT THAT HIS INSISTENCE ON RETAINING THE REFERENCE TO SCR 505 IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE DRAFT IN MY I.P.T. WAS IN ORDER TO RESUSCITATE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ENDED ON 21 MAY - INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND ALL THAT.

4. THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN SHOWING THE SAME DESPERATION AS THE AMERICANS TO BUY TIME IN ORDER TO FIND LANGUAGE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CO-SPONSORS AND ARGENTINA, WHICH THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO VETO.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT IS GOOD THAT WE HAVE GAINED ANOTHER TWENTY FOUR HOURS (FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE FALKLANDS-PASSAGE IN THE NAM COMMUNIQUE IN HAVANA), BUT WE MAY FIND THAT THIS HAS BEEN AT THE COST OF SERIOUS ISOLATION. IF THE SPANISH DRAFT WITH ALL THE AMENDMENTS PROPOSED WAS PUT TO THE VOTE, IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY GET MORE THAN NINE VOTES: AND A MAJOR EFFORT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS (PERHAPS IN VERSAILLES) TO PREVENT THEM FROM RATTING ON US AT LEAST TO THE POINT OF ABSTENTION.

6. I BELIEVE THAT OUR BEST TACTIC IS FIRMLY TO PUT FORWARD

AND A MAJOR EFFORT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS (PERHAPS IN VERSAILLES) TO PREVENT THEM FROM RATTING ON US AT LEAST TO THE POINT OF ABSTENTION.

6. I BELIEVE THAT OUR BEST TACTIC IS FIRMLY TO PUT FORWARD ALL THE AMENDMENTS WE NEED TO MAKE THE LATEST DRAFT ACCEPTABLE TO US, AS RECOMMENDED IN MIFT. SPAIN, PANAMA AND THEIR ARGENTINE FRIENDS WILL EXPLODE, AND MAY INSIST ON AN IMMEDIATE VOTE ON A TEXT DESIGNED TO LEAVE US IN MAXIMUM ISOLATION. IF THEY SUCCEED, WE WILL HAVE TO FACE IT AS SOMETHING WE ALWAYS ANTICIPATED, IN THE NOT UNSATISFACTORY KNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE NOW HELD OUT FOR OVER SIXTY DAYS.

7. BUT IT IS STILL POSSIBLE THAT THE DO-GOODERS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WHO ARE GENUINELY SYMPATHETIC TO US WILL TAKE UP OUR AMENDMENTS, PUT A BRAKE ON DE PINIES AND CO, THUS STARTING A GENUINE NEGOTIATION WHICH COULD GO ON INTO THE WEEKEND.

8. I HAVE MADE BRUTALLY CLEAR TO DE PINIES AND MANY OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT, IF THE SPANISH INTENTION, AS CLAIMED IN DE PINIES' STATEMENTS, IS TO SAVE FURTHER BLOODSHED, HE WILL ONLY ACHIEVE THIS BY GETTING A RESOLUTION ADOPTED, NOT BY GETTING VEToes. THIS HAS HAD SOME EFFECT.

PARSONS

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(2) INSERT A NEW PARAGRAPH AT THE END AS FOLLOWS:

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- OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)
- OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z)
- OO PARIS (DESKBY 040630Z)
- OO KAMPALA (DESKBY 030700Z)
- OO AMMAN (DESKBY 040700Z)
- OO MADRID (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO KINSHASA (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO MADRID (DESKBY 040730Z)

-4 JUN '82

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 040049Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 928 OF 3 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN MADRID PARIS KAMPALA KINSHASA
ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO MOSCOW PEKING
HAVANA AND UKDEL NATO.

MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED PANAMANIAN/
SPANISH DRAFT WHICH I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD PUT FORWARD TOMORROW
(4 JUNE):

(1) REPLACE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 WITH THE FOLLOWING:
"1. REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO CEASE FIRING IN THE REGION OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) AS SOON AS A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
TIME HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW
AND TO INITIATE, SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE, THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 14 DAYS".

(2) REPLACE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 WITH THE FOLLOWING:
"2. AUTHORISES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO USE SUCH MEANS AS HE MAY
DEEM NECESSARY AND ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES TO VERIFY THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION".

(3) INSERT A NEW PARAGRAPH AT THE END AS FOLLOWS:

6. I BELIEVE THAT OUR BEST TACTIC IS FIRMLY TO PUT FORWARD

IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 14 DAYS".

(2) REPLACE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 WITH THE FOLLOWING:

"2. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO USE SUCH MEANS AS HE MAY DEEM NECESSARY AND ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES TO VERIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION".

(3) INSERT A NEW PARAGRAPH AT THE END, AS FOLLOWS:

"4. REQUESTS BOTH PARTIES TO COMMUNICATE IN WRITING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITHIN 72 HOURS THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THIS RESOLUTION AND TO SPECIFY A TIME FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES."

FOOTNOTE: OPERATIVE 4 OF S/15156/REV.1 WOULD BECOME OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3.

2. THESE AMENDMENTS TAKEN TOGETHER ESTABLISH A FIRM LINK BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND PROVIDE A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE LATTER. THERE IS NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE DETAILS BEING WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT BUT I ENVISAGE THAT, IN THE VERY UNLIKELY EVENT OF OUR AMENDMENTS BEING ACCEPTED AND RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN THESE TERMS, OUR LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL UNDER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 WOULD SPECIFY THAT THE TIME FOR COMMENCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. THE AMENDMENTS ALSO ELIMINATE ANY REFERENCE IN THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS TO SCR 505. BUT I THINK THAT, HAVING VOTED FOR IT SO RECENTLY, WE CANNOT AVOID THE PREAMBULAR REAFFIRMATION OF IT. I REALISE THAT YOU WILL NOT LIKE THE ROLE ASSIGNED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN OUR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2. BUT WE WOULD BE PROTECTED BY THE REQUIREMENT THAT ANY MEANS HE USES MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES; AND FOR US TO EXCLUDE THE SECRETARY GENERAL ALTOGETHER WOULD LAY US OPEN TO THE CHARGE HERE THAT WE HAD NEVER SERIOUSLY INTENDED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE REVISED PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT AND THAT WE HAD ONLY BEEN PLAYING CYNICALLY FOR TIME TODAY.

PARSONS

NNNN

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-3 JUN 1982

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FM PARIS 031730Z JUN82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 590 OF 3 JUN 82

FRANCE/ARGENTINA

1. AS REPORTED IN TELECOM GROWCOTT/ARBUTHNOTT THE QUAI TOLD ARBUTHNOTT THIS EVENING THAT, AS A REPROVAL AGAINST FRANCE'S SUPPORT FOR THE UK OVER THE FALKLANDS, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS WITHDRAWING THEIR AMBASSADOR FROM PARIS. THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BUT WAS NOT YET OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED: THE QUAI DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE AMBASSADOR HAD LEFT PARIS YET. THE ARGENTINE'S WERE SAYING THAT OTHER MEASURES MIGHT BE TAKEN, BUT THE ONLY ONE THEY HAD MENTIONED WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF CLOSING THE ARGENTINE ECONOMIC BUREAU IN PARIS.

2. THE ARGENTINES HAD NOT ASKED THE FRENCH TO RECALL THEIR AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES, NOR WOULD THE FRENCH DO SO UNLESS ASKED TO.

FRETWELL

COM PAA 1 10,3 6 TO READ PARS OF COURSE

SENT AT 031752Z SM

CONFIDENTIAL

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-3 JUN-

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RR UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 631
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 031652Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE BOGOTA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 OF 3 JUNE
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK
FALKLANDS: COLOMBIAN MESSAGE

1. THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR DELIVERED TO URE TODAY A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TURBAY TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:
BEGINS

IN YOUR REPLY TO MY MESSAGE OF 21ST MAY, YOUR EXCELLENCY STATED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD A SPECIAL INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA AND CERTAINLY HAD NO DESIRE TO CREATE A CHASM BETWEEN THIS PART OF THE WORLD AND YOUR COUNTRY.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MALVINAS WAR WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE FINAL BATTLE COULD BE A TERRIBLY CRUEL ONE, CAUSING A FEARFUL DEATH TOLL. THIS REGRETTABLE OCCURRENCE WOULD HAVE MOST HARMFUL REPERCUSSIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND WOULD BRING ABOUT DIFFICULT TO HANDLE SITUATIONS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MOST OF THE COUNTRIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE AND GREAT BRITAIN.

YOUR EXCELLENCY IS WELL AWARE OF WHAT COLOMBIA'S POSITION HAS BEEN, AND HOW WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY VOTED TO ABSTAIN FROM CONDEMNING YOUR COUNTRY AT THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION OF THE RIO DE JANEIRO TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE. IN VIEW OF THIS STAND, COLOMBIA FEELS THAT SHE CAN URGE YOUR EXCELLENCY TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AN HONOURABLE PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ARGENTINA, THUS AVOIDING THE UNNECESSARY HOLOCAUST OF MANY INNOCENT LIVES. THE ENDING OF THIS WAR, WITHOUT GIVING RISE TO UNNECESSARY AND DAMAGING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND LATIN AMERICA, LIES IN YOUR HANDS AS RULER AND DEPENDS ON YOUR

DECISIONS.

HOPING THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL BEAR THIS FRIENDLY SUGGESTION IN MIND.

ENDS

2. IN THANKING THE AMBASSADOR, URE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF COLOMBIA'S RESTRAINED ROLE IN THE OAS AND SAID THIS ADDED WEIGHT TO ANY COMMUNICATION FROM THE COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT. THE LETTER WOULD BE TRANSMITTED PROMPTLY AND THE AMBASSADOR COULD BE SURE THAT IT WOULD BE VERY CAREFULLY STUDIED. HE COULD ASSURE HIS GOVERNMENT THAT NO-ONE COULD BE MORE ANXIOUS THAN MRS THATCHER AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO AVOID UNNECESSARY BLOODSHED. BUT IT WAS THE ARGENTINE INVASION WHICH HAD STARTED THE BLOODSHED, AND IT WAS THEIR DEPARTURE WHICH COULD END IT. URE WENT ON TO REFER TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S BROADCAST LAST NIGHT AND HER OFFER TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO GIVE THEM TIME TO WITHDRAW IN GOOD ORDER IF THEY DECLARED PROMPTLY THAT THAT WAS THEIR INTENTION. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT MORE WE COULD DO: THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF LEAVING ARGENTINE TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS, WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE BE CONTRARY TO SCR 502.

3. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION BUT THAT HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD STILL FIND OUR WAY TO OFFER THE ARGENTINES THE PROSPECT OF SOME ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS. HE SAID HE THOUGHT HE HAD DETECTED A HARDER ATTITUDE ON THIS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S BROADCAST LAST NIGHT. HE HAD ALSO REPORTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER APPEARED TO BE WORKING TOWARDS THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FALKLANDS INTO A US/UK MILITARY BASE.

4. URE SAID HE THOUGHT THE AMBASSADOR MIGHT HAVE MISINTERPRETED THE LAST POINT: IN REFERRING TO THE POSSIBILITY OF US PEACE-KEEPING FORCES, MRS THATCHER WAS REFERRING TO THE PROSPECT OF INTERNATIONALISING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE FALKLANDS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO LEAVING A MASSIVE BRITISH GARRISON IN PERPETUITY. CLEARLY THERE HAD TO BE SOME SAFEGUARD AGAINST A REPETITION OF ARGENTINE AGGRESSION. AS REGARDS AN ARGENTINE ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS, THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN A PERIOD OF CALM DELIBERATION AFTER THE END OF HOSTILITIES, BUT THE ARGENTINES

SURELY HAD ONLY THEMSELVES TO BLAME IF THE ISLANDERS WERE LESS ATTRACTED TO THIS PROSPECT NOW THAN BEFORE THE OCCUPATION. THE AMBASSADOR APPEARED TO RECOGNISE THESE FACTS.


5. WE ARE CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF A REPLY TO TURBAY'S MESSAGE.

PYM

E.R.

F-4 JUN 1982

(4)



CONFIDENTIAL
FM LIMA 032020Z JUN 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 225 OF 03 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MODUK

MY TELNO 223: FALKLAND/PERUVIAN MILITARY AID

1. I CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELNO 126. I ALSO GAVE HIM TO READ A COPY OF WASHINGTON TELNO 1959.
2. DR ARIAS SAID THAT HE RECALLED READING THE WASHINGTON POST REPORT AT THE TIME AND SAID THAT THIS WAS A FABRICATION. HE HAD NOT BEEN ASKED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE EXOCET MISSILES. HAD HE BEEN SO ASKED HE WOULD HAVE REPLIED THAT PERU WAS BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH THE FRENCH NOT REPEAT NOT TO SUPPLY THESE MISSILES TO THIRD COUNTRIES. IN FACT THE SUBSEQUENT FRENCH REFUSAL TO SUPPLY EXOCET MISSILES ON ORDER BY PERU HAD ALREADY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A PERUVIAN PROTEST TO THE FRENCH ON THESE GROUNDS. DR ARIAS WAS DISMISSIVE ABOUT MY REFERENCE TO THE PRESS AND OTHER REPORTS TO THE EFFECT THAT PERU WAS ALREADY PROVIDING ARGENTINA WITH IMPORTANT MATERIAL ASSISTANCE. THERE WERE IN EXISTENCE LONG STANDING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH PROVIDED FOR ARGENTINE/PERUVIAN COOPERATION IN THE REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE BY PERU OF ARGENTINE ENGINES AND SPARE PARTS (BRITDEFAT TELNO UBA 022212Z OF 2 JUNE). THESE CONTRACTS WOULD BE HONOURED AND THE ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT INDEED HAVE BEEN INTENSIFIED AS A RESULT OF THE HOSTILITIES. BUT HE INSISTED THAT THE PERUVIAN POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. PERUVIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING UNLESS ARGICLE 3 OF THE TIAR WERE TO BE INVOKED BY ARGENTINA AS A RESULT OF, EG, A BRITISH ATTACK ON ARGENTINE MAINLAND BASES. BUT EVEN IN SUCH A CASE ANY ASSISTANCE OFFERED WOULD BE ON THE LIMITED TERMS NECESSARY TO AVOID WEAKENING PERU'S OWN DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS.
3. IN ANOTHER PART OF OUR CONVERSATION ABOUT HIS PERFORMANCE AT THE OAS MEETING IN WASHINGTON, HE SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO

REQUIREMENTS.

3. IN ANOTHER PART OF OUR CONVERSATION ABOUT HIS PERFORMANCE AT THE OAS MEETING IN WASHINGTON, HE SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO INSERTING THE REQUIREMENT THAT QUOTE ADEQUATE COORDINATION UNQUOTE BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE MEMBER STATES IN ARTICLE 7 OF THE OAS RESOLUTION PRECISELY IN ORDER TO AVOID THE RISK OF INTERNAL PRESSURES LEADING TO INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVES BY MEMBER COUNTRIES.

4. DR ARIAS THEN TOOK ME BACK TO MY EARLIER REFERENCE TO ANGLO/PERUVIAN RELATIONS AND TO OUR QUARREL NOT BEING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. HE SAID THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF ANGLO/PERUVIAN RELATIONS AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THESE MIGHT BE AFFECTED BY WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE NOTABLE HARDENING OF OUR POSITION SINCE THE ARGENTINE REJECTION OF THE BRITISH DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT. HE SAID THIS MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR COUNTRIES LIKE PERU, WHO REGARDED THEMSELVES AS BELONGING TO THE WEST, TO OVERCOME THE DEEP DIVISIONS AND GRAVE PROBLEMS WHICH THE CONFLICT HAD GENERATED. DR ARIAS SAID THAT WE HAD ALREADY WON THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS AND HE HAD NO DOUBT WE COULD DEFEAT THE REMAINING ARGENTINE TROOPS AT ANY TIME WE WISHED TO DO SO. BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO AVOID THE CONCLUSION THAT THE BRITISH DESIRE WAS TO IMPOSE AN IGHOMINIOUS DEFEAT AND CONSEQUENT HUMILIATION ON ARGENTINA. THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION AFTER THE FALKLANDS HAD BEEN REPOSSESSED MILITARILY. THIS WOULD BY NO MEANS BE THE END OF THE AFFAIR SEMICLN QUOTE THE CONTRARY. EVEN GRAVER PROBLEMS WOULD THEN COMMENCE WITH UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR GOVERNMENTS LIKE PERU'S WHICH WERE IDEOLOGICALLY IN SYMPATHY WITH THE WEST. THE SITUATION WOULD BE EXACERBATED BY AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA WITH ALL THE DANGEROUS POSSIBILITIES THAT THIS WOULD GIVE RISE TO. THESE CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT BE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AT THIS STAGE BUT THEY WERE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO PERU. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE EVIDENCE OF GREATER AWARENESS IN BRITAIN OF THE DANGERS TO WHICH BRITISH INTERESTS WERE EXPOSED EVEN IN THE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES OF THE AREA.

5. I GAVE DR ARIAS TO READ THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTERS MOST RECENT BBC INTERVIEW. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION IN WHICH I SPOKE ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE, THE ARGENTINE MILITARY AGRESSION, THEIR CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE AND LACK OF CREDIBILITY, I ALSO SPOKE TO DR ARIAS ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELNO 130 ABOUT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. HE WAS RECEPTIVE TO THE SUGGESTION THAT A SHIP MIGHT BE MADE AVAILAABLE AND UNDERTOOK TO PURSUE THIS PROPOSAL AND LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS ANYTHING HAD BEEN DECIDED.

SPOKE ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE, THE ARGENTINE MILITARY AGRESSION, THEIR CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE AND LACK OF CREDIBILITY, I ALSO SPOKE TO DR ARIAS ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELNO 130 ABOUT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. HE WAS RECEPTIVE TO THE SUGGESTION THAT A SHIP MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE AND UNDERTOOK TO PURSUE THIS PROPOSAL AND LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS ANYTHING HAD BEEN DECIDED.

WALLACE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

Argentina

LKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0700 HRS : 4 JUNE 1982

UN : Security Council

1. An amendment to the Spanish and Panamanian draft has been tabled. This links the call for a ceasefire with the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 502 and 505. The Council meets again at 2000 GMT today.

Military Action

2. An RAF Vulcan landed in Rio de Janeiro when it ran short of fuel. The Brazilian Government has announced that the Vulcan may leave Rio provided that it is first disarmed.

4 June 1982

Emergency Unit

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>633</i> (one piece/item number)	
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
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FROM THE CHAIRMAN



STRICTLY PERSONAL

3rd June, 1982

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

Dear Prime Minister

Shortly after our exchange of letters on 22nd and 26th April, the direct telex link with Stanley was cut off and there has been little worthwhile from the Islanders to pass on to you. I was delighted to see that our people in Darwin and Goose Green had sent you a direct message of appreciation for all you have done for them and it was evident from your television interview last night that it was greatly appreciated.

Somehow or other, Harry Milne our General Manager in Stanley is still managing to get brief telegrams out to me through Buenos Aires to say that they are all still safe and well there but they must be extremely anxious. Copies of the telegrams are attached, together with the telex from Brook Hardcastle, our Farms General Manager in Darwin, which I have acknowledged through the B.B.C. "Calling the Falklands".

May I express my very sincere admiration for and congratulations on the tenacity and good sense with which you have handled the whole affair. I share your hope that action on Stanley can be avoided but also your comment that the Argentines offer little ground for optimism.

Finally, if it is considered at any stage that there is any way in which I or The Falkland Island Company can be of service, we shall be pleased to do what we can. I would certainly be glad to be able to get out there as soon as that is physically possible.

Yours Sincerely
Kenneth Sedham

Coastlife Group Limited

CONFIDENTIAL

da
e Minister ^{cc Press Office}
ware. I have
the cheque to be mod.

WR
3/6

3 June 1982

1982.

I enclose a copy of some self-explanatory
correspondence, and I would be grateful if you
could ensure that the cheque for £500,000 from
the Governor of the Cayman Islands reaches the
South Atlantic Fund safely.

Wonderful
mt.

W F S RICKETT

Queen
man
e for
Atlantic

dence
th June.

Derek Piper, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

Blom

3/6

M. Pattison, Esq.

Handwritten initials

Prime Minister *cc Press Office*
To be aware. I have
sent the cheque to the MOD.



BUCKINGHAM PALACE

WR
3/6

3rd June, 1982.

Wonderful
mt.

Val Mike.

I enclose a copy of a letter to The Queen of 31st May 1982 from the Governor of the Cayman Islands, together with my reply and the cheque for £500,000 which is to be donated to the South Atlantic Fund.

We shall be releasing the correspondence to the press at 11.00 a.m. tomorrow, Friday 4th June.

Yours truly,
Philip Glanville

M. Pattison, Esq.

Group Limited

I enclose a copy of your self explanatory correspondence, and I would be pleased if you could return the cheque for £500,000 to the Governor of the Cayman Islands through the South Atlantic Fund office.

Gareth Piper, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

Handwritten signature

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 June 1982

Dear John,

Lt Commander Astiz

You will have seen a copy of Mr Pym's minute of 3 June to the Secretary of State for Defence about the repatriation of Lt Cmdr Astiz. It referred to the French Government's reaction to our informing them of the refusal of the Argentine Government and of Astiz personally to allow French (and Swedish) questions to be put to him.

The French made a further approach to us on the subject on 2 June. I attach a copy of Sir J Fretwell's reporting telegram. No new legal arguments were adduced for pursuing the French request, but the Ambassador disturbingly commented that M Gutmann came close to making a direct and overt link between the sort of help we are seeking from the French on such matters as the supply of arms to Argentina by third parties and the co-operation they are seeking from us on Astiz.

French refusal to take no for an answer is awkward. Their latest response is a rather crude attempt to pressure us (and unjustified in its accusations that we have been dilatory and not taken their request seriously). But we continue to need French assistance over the supply of arms to Argentina. Against that, the arguments for early repatriation of Astiz remain valid.

President Mitterrand may raise this with the Prime Minister at Versailles. I therefore enclose a brief in the form of Points to Make on which the Prime Minister could draw. As you will see, a Parliamentary statement is offered. If it is decided that the French Embassy could be offered access to Astiz, this would obviously help in presenting our case to them.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT: FALKLANDS: LT CMDR ASTIZ

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Fully understand your need to convince French public opinion that everything possible done to pursue Astiz. An odious man; public opinion rightly enraged.

2. Have spent great deal of time on French request to put questions to Astiz. Fact is that Astiz (and Argentine Government) unwilling to answer questions. Further attempt (either by UK or France) not only unproductive but bound to lead to accusations by Argentina of coercion under Article 17 of Third Geneva Convention. Need for UK to be free to criticize Argentina for breaches of Convention.

3. Number of considerations:
 - i) no jurisdiction in UK to try Astiz. Could not be handed over to France for trial because crimes not committed there.
 - ii) need to ensure UK is scrupulously fulfilling international legal obligations. We are defending international law over Falklands: cannot abuse it over POWs.

 - iii) continued detention of Astiz - and, by extension, further attempts to get him to answer questions - could be used by Argentina as excuse for retaliation against British POWs and other British subjects. Argentines continue to hold Harrier pilot.

/iv) as numbers

iv) as numbers of Argentine POWs rise, need to retain cooperation of ICRC. They have said further questioning of Astiz would oblige them to criticise UK publicly.

v) UK decision to detain Astiz has already generated good deal of publicity and support for French case. This presumably helpful to French government.

4. See no point in further questioning: most unlikely he would cooperate. Could have very unwelcome repercussions for UK. How hard would this really be for French opinion to understand? Would a Parliamentary statement (discussed beforehand with the French if they wish) help?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 June 1982

TELENY 021300Z JUN 82


2 JUN 1982

FM PARIS 021132Z JUN 82

IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 572 OF 2 JUN 82

INFO BRAZILIA TRIPOLI WASHINGTON MODUK (DS11 AND DS15) UKM'S GENEVA STOCKHOLM



X2

YOUR TELNO 151 TO BRAZILIA AND MY TELNO 562 (NOT TO ALL):
FALKLANDS

1. GUTMANN, SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE QUAI, TELEPHONED THIS MORNING TO MAKE TWO POINTS.
2. HE SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO OUR DEMARCHE ON 31 MAY (MY TELNO 566) ABOUT THE POSSIBLE SUPPLY OF LIBYAN ARMS TO ARGENTINA CHEYSSON HAD SPOKEN FORCEFULLY TO GADHAFI WHO HAD CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT ARMS WERE BEING SUPPLIED BY LIBYA.
3. GUTMANN WENT ON THAT HE HAD BEEN GLAD TO BE ABLE TO GIVE US THIS POSITIVE RESPONSE, BUT WE WOULD FIND HIS SECOND POINT LESS AGREEABLE. HE HAD BEEN FRANKLY SHOCKED TO FIND THAT BRITAIN WAS BEING SO DILATORY IN THE MATTER OF CAPTAIN ASTIZ. THIS WAS NOW A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THAT OUR LEGAL ARGUMENTS HELD WATER. IT SEEMED TO THEM THAT THEIR VIEWS WERE NOT BEING TREATED SERIOUSLY. THE MATTER WAS A VERY IMPORTANT ONE TO THEM. I RECALLED TO HIM MY CONVERSATION WITH DUFOURCQ ON 29 MAY AND SAID THAT THE POINTS RAISED ON THAT OCCASION WERE NO DOUBT BEING CONSIDERED IN LONDON. THERE WOULD BE NO DOUBT THAT HIS RESTATEMENT OF FRENCH CONCERN WAS TRANSMITTED TO LONDON.
4. GUTMANN CAME CLOSE TO MAKING A DIRECT AND OVERT LINK BETWEEN THE SORT OF HELP WE ARE SEEKING FROM THE FRENCH ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE SUPPLY OF ARMS BY THIRD PARTIES AND THE COOPERATION WHICH THEY ARE SEEKING FROM US ON ASTIZ.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT AT 021153Z SM/JEG



FCS/82/78

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Lt Cmdr Astiz

1. Thank you for your minute of 28 May. I am grateful for all the trouble that your Department has taken over this man since his capture in South Georgia last month. I agree that the arrangements you have made to hold him at Chichester after his arrival from Ascension Island should prove satisfactory insofar as continued custody is required.
2. As you will know, we informed the French and the Swedes that neither the Argentine Government nor Astiz personally was prepared to have questions put to him about his earlier alleged misdeeds. There has now been a strong reaction from Paris and Stockholm. Both governments have urged us to reconsider the possibility of putting their questions to Astiz, arguing that the Geneva Convention does not explicitly prevent this. The Swedish Foreign Minister has appealed personally to me through our Ambassador and has undertaken to give me in writing the Swedish legal interpretation of the Geneva Convention on this score. French representations have been equally forceful and may be renewed in Versailles (we are providing separate briefing for the Prime Minister).
3. I nevertheless recognise that our own legal advice points to early repatriation and that the Attorney General recommended this in the event that Astiz did not wish to answer further questions, as has proved to be the case. We need to bear in mind, particularly at a time when the Argentine Junta may increasingly see defeat staring them in the face, that the continued detention of Astiz may encourage, or be used as an excuse for, retaliation against British prisoners-of-war and other British subjects. I am very aware of their continued

/detention

SECRET



detention of our Harrier pilot, Flt Lt Glover. There have been other reports of possible Argentine action against British subjects in Argentina.

4. Moreover, as the numbers of Argentine POWs in our hands may rise still more sharply in the immediate future, we shall need to retain the goodwill and cooperation of the ICRC. The ICRC have told us that they lost credibility with the Argentines when we held back Astiz. From recent contacts with them it is clear that if we were to question Astiz further they would feel bound to criticise us publicly. I am therefore inclined to agree that we may have now exhausted the public relations possibilities of the Astiz case; and that, since extradition of Astiz to France or Sweden is in any case excluded, it would make sense on balance to repatriate him soon after his arrival in the UK. However, clearly no decision should be taken until after Versailles. Moreover the Attorney General is now considering whether the French Embassy could be given access to him first. Finally, we need to make sure that a formal decision is not carried out before we have replied to the Swedish legal memorandum to which I have referred above. I should be grateful therefore if our people could keep in touch about the repatriation arrangements.

5. I am copying this minute to OD(SA) colleagues, Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Michael Palliser.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'F. Pym', is written above the typed name.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
3 June 1982

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 June 1982

Prime Minister

A.S.C. 4
6.

Dear Sir,

Bombing of the BRITISH WYE

OD(SA) on 1 June invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to arrange for a suitable protest to be made to Argentina over the attack on the BRITISH WYE. As you will recall, the attack involved an Argentine Hercules aircraft dropping 8 bombs at the ship north east of South Georgia. One bomb hit the ship but bounced off unexploded into the sea.

I understand, however, that in reaching this decision, Ministers may not have been fully aware that the BRITISH WYE was in fact being used as a tanker to supply fuel to the Task Force, even though she was not actively engaged in this at the time of the Argentine attack. An Argentine merchant vessel engaged in comparable tasks would, under existing Rules of Engagement, be regarded by us as a fair target, both within and outside the TEZ.

Following further discussion in the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 2 June, the Chief of Defence Staff agreed that this point had not been fully brought out in discussion at OD(SA) and that he would not wish to press the idea of a protest. In the circumstances Mr Pym takes the view that a protest could appear hypocritical and would serve little purpose. He therefore recommends that no further action should be taken.

I am copying this to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD(SA), the Attorney General, Sir Robert Armstrong and to Sir Michael Palliser.

Yours ever
John Holmes

David Omand Esq
Ministry of Defence

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 June 1982

*Top copy
on
Versailles
format*

Dear John,

Falklands: Other Territorial Disputes

In your letter of 1 June you said the Prime Minister wished to have a comprehensive list of territorial disputes before she went to Versailles.

I enclose a list which we have attempted to make as comprehensive and as accurate as your deadline allowed. Only Eastern Europe has been excluded: none of the historical 'claims' there is being seriously pressed at present (those of Hungary on Romanian Transylvania, of Romania on Soviet Bessarabia, Bulgaria on Yugoslav Macedonia and Albania on Yugoslav Kosovo).

The list is intended for background only. Third parties might regard it as expressing or implying a British official view of the facts or merits of any particular case and it could be used against us. Moreover, some of the entries (eg those relating to possible claims by Saudi Arabia on Oman and by Vanuatu on the Wallis and Hunter islands) include 'sensitive' information. You will see that Africa has a large number of territorial disputes. Member states of the Organisation of African Unity are pledged not to use force in the settlement of disputes and are bound by the Boundary Resolution of 1964 to accept frontiers inherited at independence. But these constraints have not proved fully effective.

No attempt has been made to assess the possible impact had Britain failed to resist Argentina's invasion of the Falklands. But the 'ripple effect' could have exacerbated at least the disputes between Argentina and Chile, Venezuela and Guyana, and Guatemala and Belize.

/I might

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[Faint, mostly illegible text on the reverse side of the page, including some handwritten notes and a signature.]

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I might mention incidentally that Mr Rostow has told us he had referred to the existence of some 150 (not 100) territorial disputes and that he had plucked the figure out of thin air. Our figure comes to just short of 90.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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LETTERCODE/SERIES <u>PREM19</u>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <u>633</u> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Enclosure to letter from Holmer to Coler dated 3 June 1982</i>	
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SAPU(82) 29

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached for information is the text of Sir A Parsons' speech in the
Security Council on 2 June 1982.

Cabinet Office

3 June 1982

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SIR A PARSONS' SPEECH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 2 JUNE 1982

I PAY TRIBUTE ONCE AGAIN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS HE HAS MADE DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 502 AND 505. THE FACT THAT IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE IS NOT IN ANY WAY THE FAULT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE HAS AGAIN DISPLAYED THE HIGHEST QUALITIES DEMANDED OF HIS OFFICE.

I HAVE SAID BEFORE, BUT IT CANNOT BE REPEATED TOO OFTEN, THAT THE CURRENT BREACH OF THE PEACE WAS CAUSED BY ARGENTINA. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH CLOSED THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL ON 1 APRIL. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH REMAINED SILENT IN THE FACE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL NOT TO USE FORCE LATER THAT SAME DAY AT THE TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING OF THIS COUNCIL. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH THE NEXT MORNING INVADED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IT WAS AND IS ARGENTINA WHICH HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION 502 WHICH DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE TROOPS. FAR FROM WITHDRAWING THEM, ARGENTINA REINFORCED THEM. IT IS THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH WAS THE VICTIM OF THE ARGENTINE ACT OF AGGRESSION. IT IS THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF THE ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE TO OCCUPY THE ISLANDS. I DO NOT PROPOSE NOW, MR

PRESIDENT, TO DWELL ON THE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCES THE ISLANDERS HAVE SUFFERED OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. REPORTS SO FAR ARE NECESSARILY INCOMPLETE BUT FROM THOSE AREAS WHERE ISLANDERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TALK FREELY OF THEIR EXPERIENCES UNDER ARGENTINE OCCUPATION, SOME VERY SOMBRE AND DISTURBING FACTS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE.

I HAVE HAD OCCASION AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS OF THIS COUNCIL TO SET OUT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION IN DETAIL. I WILL NOT WEARY THE COUNCIL BY REPEATING ALL MY ARGUMENTS, WHICH, I BELIEVE, EFFECTIVELY REFUTED SOME OF THE MORE EXTRAVAGANT DISTORTIONS ADVANCED TODAY BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA. I MUST REPEAT ONCE AGAIN THAT IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH FIRST USED FORCE AND BEGAN THE PRESENT CRISIS. EVERYTHING WE HAVE DONE SINCE HAS BEEN IN EXERCISE OF OUR INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE. WE HAVE NEVER ARGUED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS ASSUMING THE TASK OF EXECUTING THE MANDATE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE TRUE POSITION IS THAT IN THE FACE OF ARGENTINA'S FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF RESOLUTION 502, WE HAVE EXERCISED OUR RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE FOR WHICH NO MANDATE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS REQUIRED BY THE TERMS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN CLEAR. AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO PAY. PEOPLES MUST NOT BE SUBJUGATED AGAINST THEIR WILL. PEOPLES MUST ENJOY THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. POLITICAL PROBLEMS MUST NOT BE SETTLED BY ARMED FORCE. THESE ARE PRINCIPLES WHICH MY GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN PREPARED TO COMPROMISE. THEY HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH "COLONIALISM" "IMPERIALISM" AND OUTWORN SHIBBOLETHS OF THAT KIND. WHAT CONCEIVABLE REASON COULD MY COUNTRY HAVE FOR WISHING TO ESTABLISH BRITISH OR OTHER MILITARY POWER IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IF WE HAD HAD SUCH EXTRAORDINARY PRETENTIONS, I SUGGEST TO THE COUNCIL THAT WE WOULD HAVE KEPT A LARGER GARRISON THAN 40 ROYAL MARINES ON THE FALKLANDS BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION. WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER, SHORT OF COMPROMISING THESE PRINCIPLES, TO BRING ABOUT THE PEACEFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CENTRAL ELEMENT SCR 502 - NAMELY UNCONDITIONAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS. THIS HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE AND WE HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO DEFEND THESE PRINCIPLES BY OTHER MEANS. WE HAVE NEVER BROKEN OFF OR INTERRUPTED NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED FULLY AND IN GOOD FAITH THROUGHOUT THIS LONG PERIOD.

TURN NOW TO THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE HELD PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 505. AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL RECALL, THIS RESOLUTION REAFFIRMED RESOLUTION 502 BY WHICH THE COUNCIL - AS LONG AGO NOW AS 3 APRIL - DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION WAS THAT IT WOULD WELCOME A CEASEFIRE WHICH WAS INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND TO THE COMPLETION OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD. THIS POSITION WAS BASED SQUARELY ON RESOLUTION 502.

THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA HAS SET OUT IN FULL THE RESPONSES OF HIS GOVERNMENT DURING THE PAST WEEK. I DO NOT INTEND TO FOLLOW HIM DOWN THAT PARTICULAR ROAD OF CONTROVERSY. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS MAINTAINED A UNIQUE CONFIDENTIALITY ABOUT THE NATURE OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE OUTSET AND EVEN IN THE FACE OF THE STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA, I DO NOT INTEND TO BREACH THAT CONFIDENCE. I WOULD ONLY SAY THIS: THAT THE EXPLANATION BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA MAKES CLEAR IN MY JUDGEMENT THAT IF ARGENTINE PRE-CONDITIONS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED, THEY WOULD HAVE LED US BACK INTO THE MORASS OF PROCRASTINATION AND EVASION WHICH MY GOVERNMENT HAS EXPERIENCED ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS OF EXTREMELY INTENSIVE NEGOTIATION. THE PLAIN FACT IS, MR PRESIDENT, THAT UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA CHANGES ITS POSITION IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE DO NOT EXIST. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE CALL BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVES OF SPAIN AND PANAMA FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MY DELEGATION. A CEASEFIRE WHICH IS NOT INSEPARABLY LINKED TO AN IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 502 BECAUSE THAT RESOLUTION DEMANDS THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE CALL FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE WOULD LEAVE ARGENTINE FORCES IN POSITION.

AS I INDICATED EARLIER, THE UNITED KINGDOM IS PERFECTLY PREPARED FOR A CEASEFIRE SO LONG AS IT IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEMAND IN RESOLUTION 502 FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. WE HAVE NO WISH TO INFLICT OR SUFFER FURTHER CASUALTIES. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS HONOURABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ARGENTINE FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502. BUT THE COUNCIL'S

DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL MUST BE HEEDED. BECAUSE THE CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION READ OUT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN DOES NOT LINK THE CEASEFIRE WITH WITHDRAWAL, MY DELEGATION WILL BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE IT.

A RESOLUTION BETTER FITTED TO THE NEEDS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD, I SUGGEST, CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

1. A REAFFIRMATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505, IN ALL THEIR PARTS.
2. AN EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HIS CONTINUING EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACEMAKING.
3. A REITERATION OF THE DEMAND IN RESOLUTION 502 FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.
4. A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, WHICH WOULD COME INTO EFFECT AS SOON AS WATERTIGHT ARRANGEMENTS EXISTED FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, IN DIGNITY AND ON AN HONOURABLE BASIS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HAVE TO BE AGREED BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE ISLANDS.

THESE ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. I COMMEND THEM TO THE COUNCIL. MY DELEGATION COULD SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION.

IN CONCLUSION, MR PRESIDENT, AT RISK OF REPEATING MYSELF, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE ONE THING: THE OBJECTIVE OF MY GOVERNMENT IS TO SET FREE THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FROM ARGENTINE OCCUPATION WHICH BY THEIR OWN DEMOCRATIC DECISION THEY NEVER, NEVER, WANTED. ALL WE WISH TO DO IS TO ENABLE THOSE PEOPLE TO RESUME THEIR PEACEFUL, HARMLESS AND INOFFENSIVE LIVES AND TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS, IN FREEDOM AND WITHOUT CONSTRAINT, REGARDING THEIR LONG TERM FUTURE. WHEN WE TALK ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO SHIELD THE ISLANDERS AGAINST ANY THREAT OF RENEWED AGRESSION - THAT IS ALL.

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

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MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
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MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)
RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS T60
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

Hd/SPD

Miss Dickson, D/ENERG

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[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

RESTRICTED
DESKBY 030730Z
FM WELLINGTON 030500Z JUN 82
TELNO 185 OF 03 JUN

mb

FALKLANDS.

1. HEAD OF PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT AN AUCKLAND BUSINESSMAN AND HIS WIFE HAVE SENT HIM NZ DOLLARS 1,000 FOR THE SUPPLY OF A NZ PRODUCT FOR THE IMMEDIATE CONSUMPTION OF BRITISH TROOPS IN THE FALKLANDS. AFTER DISCUSSION INVOLVING MR MULDOON HIMSELF A CONSIGNMENT OF NZ DUNBAR WHISKY AT A CONCESSIONARY PRICE WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR DESPATCH FROM AUCKLAND TO LONDON BY BA FLIGHT BA 10 AT 040430Z. HENSLEY HAD SPOKEN TO DOWNES, ACTING BA MANAGER IN AUCKLAND WHO HAD HAD TO REFER TO HIS HEAD OFFICE.
2. PLEASE ASK BA HQ TO AUTHORISE DOWNES TO TAKE THIS CONSIGNMENT FREE OF CHARGE. THIS COULD BE A USEFUL, IF MINOR, P R EXERCISE IN THE LIGHT OF STAUNCH NZ SUPPORT OVER THE FALKLANDS BUSINESS. MR MULDOON PROPOSES HIMSELF TO ISSUE A SHORT PRESS

EXERCISE IN THE LIGHT OF STAUNCH NZ SUPPORT OVER THE FALKLANDS
BUSINESS. MR MULDOON PROPOSES HIMSELF TO ISSUE A SHORT PRESS
RELEASE ONCE THE CONSIGNMENT HAS LEFT NZ.

STRATTON

NNNN

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EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

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SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)
RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERG

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM TOKYO 030115Z JUN 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NO 280 OF 3 JUNE
AND FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

FCTO TELNO 76 TO DUBLIN: FALKLANDS/SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION TAKEN. MFA CONFIRM THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY INSTRUCTED THEIR
DELEGATION TO ABSTAIN.

CORTAZZI

NNNN

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MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)

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Mrs. Dickson, D/ENERGY

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[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

Hq Wex

CONFIDENTIAL

F4 ROME 030850Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO. 296 OF 03 JUN 82

SAVING FOR INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKHIS NEW YORK, BIS BUENOS AIRES, OTTAWA

MY TELEGRAM NO. 285 (NOT TO OTTAWA): FALKLANDS: ITALIAN REPORTING ON ARGENTINA

1. BARBARANI HAS SHOWN US FURTHER TELEGRAMS FROM BUENOS AIRES.
2. KOCIANCICH INTERPRETS THE CALL BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON GALTIERI ON 30 MAY AS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE JUNTA ARE SEEKING TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. HE NOTES ALSO THAT THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, FULFORD, IS LEAVING AT ARGENTINE REQUEST: KOCIANCICH'S EXPLANATION IS THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN SLOW IN GRANTING AGREEMENT FOR THE NEW ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE (A MILITARY OFFICER) AND THAT FULFORD MADE RASH PRO-BRITISH STATEMENTS ON RETURN FROM CONSULTATIONS ON OTTAWA.
2. ON THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY, KOCIANCICH ESTIMATES THAT THE CANCELLATION OF AID AGREEMENTS WITH AID FRANCE VIA LUETHANSA AND MAUD

ON THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY, KOCIANCICH ESTIMATES THAT THE CANCELLATION OF AIR AGREEMENTS WITH AIR FRANCE, KLM, LUFTHANSA, AND BRITISH CALEDONIAN WILL AFFECT 20 PER CENT OF ARGENTINA'S SERVICES. ADDINT THAT SOME OF THIS TRAFFIC SHOULD GO TO ALITALIA AND IBERIA. THE SEARCH FOR OTHER EXPORT MARKETS DO COMPENSATE THOSE LOST IN EUROPE IS PROVING DIFFICULT. AN ATTEMPT IS UNDER WAY TO INCREASE THE VOLUME OF TRADE WITH THE ANDEAN PACT (IN 1980 ARGENTINE'S EXPORTS THEN WERE DOLLARS 370 MILLION AND IMPORTS DOLLARS 505 MILLION) BUT KOCIANCICH SEES LITTLE SCOPE FOR INCREASE. IMPORT TARIFFS ON LATIN AMERICAN GOODS HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY 20 PER CENT. FOR ALL IMPORTS EXCEPT THOSE FROM LATIN AMERICA A NEW REGULATION INSISTS ON CREDIT OF AT LEAST 180 DAYS.

3. FINALLY, KOCIANCICH SPECULATES ON DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE RECAPTURE BY BRITAIN OF THE FALKLANDS (WHICH HE SEES AS INEVITABLE). HIS ARGUMENT RUNS AS FOLLOWS:

- A) THE WIDE SUPPORT FOR GALTIERI ON THIS ISSUE, EVEN FROM HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS, SHOWS HOW THE WHOLE OF ARGENTINA AND INDEED LATIN AMERICA ACCEPT ARGENTINE'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS.
- B) WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGES IN ARGENTINA AFTER THE DEFEAT, IT CANNOT RENOUNCE THE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY.
- C) IT WOULD THEREFORE BE A GRAVE MISTAKE FOR BRITAIN TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE LONGER TERM. THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING A BRITISH GARRISON ON THE FALKLANDS ARE ENORMOUS, AND THE IDEA OF A SECURITY PACT INVOLVING OTHER STATES OF THE REGION IS UNREALISTIC.
- D) ITALY AND THE WEST SHOULD THEREFORE MAKE CLEAR THAT SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN DOES NOT IMPLY DENIAL OF THE NEED FOR RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS ONCE THE ARGENTINE TROOPS HAVE WITHDRAWN.
- E) A DISTINCTION MUST BE DRAWN BETWEEN THE PRESENT REGIME AND THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE. A BRITISH STATEMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH A MORE DEMOCRATIC ARGENTINE REGIME MIGHT EVEN ASSIST A RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE AFTER GALTIERI'S FALL (BARBARANI WAS VERY SCEPTICAL ABOUT THIS LAST POINT).

4. WE DREW ON RECENT MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS TO EXPLAIN TO BARBARANI BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS, STRESSING THAT FULL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL REMAINED A PRECONDITION.
FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ARCULUS

NNNN

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 PS/MR ONSLOW
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MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG
 SIR M PALLISER
 MR WADE-GERY
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO } CABINET OFFICE
 DIO

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

HD/SED

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MADRID 031220Z JUN 82
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 318 OF 3 JUNE
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAMS NO 907 AND 913

1. AS AGREED IN TELECON HEAD UN DEPARTMENT/FAULKNER WE GAVE THE HEAD OF PEREZ LLORCA'S PRIVATE OFFICE OUR REASONS WHY THE SPANISH RESOLUTION WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US (2ND TUR).

2. HAVING IN MIND THE TIME FACTOR AND THE NEED TO HELP ITS AUTHORS UNDERSTAND WHY THE SPANISH RESOLUTION WAS INADEQUATE, I GOT IN TOUCH WITH THE HEAD OF UN DEPARTMENT AT THE SPANISH MFA ON RECEIPT OF YOUR FIRST TUR. I ASKED WHETHER PINIES HAD REPORTED ON OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION. NOT SURPRISINGLY HE HAD NOT DONE SO. I THEREFORE TOOK CASAMIRANDA THROUGH IT, STRESSING THAT THE TEXT WAS NOT TO BE TABLED BUT ILLUSTRATED THE KIND OF CEASEFIRE WE WERE READY TO CONTEMPLATE. HE WELCOMED THIS ACTION BUT MADE NO COMMENT OF SUBSTANCE. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT ITS FOURTH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH, I DREW CASAMIRANDA'S ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE DOUBTS ABOUT THE ARGENTINIAN COMMANDER'S ATTITUDE TO A CEASEFIRE (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MADRID TELEGRAM NO. 309).

MAUD

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

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MR ILETT } TREASURY
MR LITTLER }
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY
SIR R ARMSTRONG }
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY }
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }
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RESIDENT CLERK

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 031359Z JUN 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 582 OF 3 JUNE 1982
INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 581: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. THE QUAI HAVE NOW TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT THE SPANISH/
PANAMANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRENCH
IN ITS PRESENT FORM. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED
TO STAY IN VERY CLOSE CONTACT WITH SIR A PARSONS. THE FRENCH
WISH TO SEE IF THE RESOLUTION CAN BE AMENDED SO AS TO SUIT ALL
PARTIES, AS HAPPENED WITH RESOLUTION 505. THE FRENCH DID NOT
THINK A VOTE WAS IMMINENT. IF ONE WERE TAKEN WITH THE DRAFT
STILL IN ITS PRESENT FORM THE FRENCH WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY
JOIN US IN OPPOSING IT. IF THE RESOLUTION IS AMENDED THEY
WILL RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION.

FRETWELL

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (38)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR GRSLOW
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[Passed to E.R.]

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FM PARIS 031320Z JUN 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 581 OF 3 JUNE 1982
AND TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 322: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. AS HAIG WAS UNAVAILABLE I SPOKE TO ONE OF HIS SPECIAL ASSISTANTS. WE HAVE NOW LEARNT FROM HAIG'S STAFF THAT A TELEGRAM OF INSTRUCTIONS IS BEING SENT TO THE US MISSION IN NEW YORK. THIS ASKS THE US AMBASSADOR TO WORK CLOSELY WITH OUR MISSION TO SEE IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION ACCEPTABLE. IF THIS PROVES IMPOSSIBLE, THE US AMBASSADOR IS INSTRUCTED TO JOIN WITH US IN A VETO.
2. CHEYSSON, LIKE HAIG, IS INVOLVED IN THE MITTERRAND/REAGAN TALKS AND LUNCH. I THEREFORE SPOKE TO CUTMANN. HE SAID THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET TAKEN A POSITION ON THE SPANISH/

TALKS AND LUNCH. I THEREFORE SPOKE TO GUTMANN. HE SAID THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET TAKEN A POSITION ON THE SPANISH/PANAMANIAN DRAFT. HE AGREED THAT IT WAS UNBALANCED AND WAS SURE THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT VOTE FOR IT. I REACTED WITH SURPRISE AT EVEN THE NOTION OF AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE. GUTMANN RESPONDED THAT THE CLIMATE WAS BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT; THERE WAS A NEED FOR A POSITIVE UK GESTURE IN THE DIRECTION OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK WAS ABOUT TO ENTER THE BARGAINING STAGE. I EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF FRANCE SUPPORTING THE UK IN REJECTING THE RESOLUTION. GUTMANN HEDGED AND SAID IT MIGHT NOT GET 9 AFFIRMATIVE VOTES. I ASKED HIM FOR FRENCH HELP WITH THE TOGOLESE AND WITH ZAIRE. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT NOW THAT FRANCE WAS EXERCISING ITS PRESIDENTIAL FUNCTION IN THE COUNCIL. IN FURTHER ARGUMENT GUTMANN ACCEPTED THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS "DEMAGOGIC", BUT REFUSED TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO OPPOSE IT. HE SAID HE WOULD CALL BACK AS SOON AS HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH CHEYSSON. I WILL REPORT AS SOON AS HE DOES.

3. FRENCH BRIEFING TO THE PRESS THIS MORNING SEEMS TO HAVE EXPRESSED NERVOUSNESS ABOUT THE APPARENT RELUCTANCE OF THE UK TO NEGOTIATE AND TO HAVE EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR AN EARLY CEASEFIRE. THERE WERE ALSO SUGGESTIONS THAT FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES WERE NOW ACTING TOGETHER IN RELATION TO THE FALKLANDS.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 031345Z GDS/TC



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

3 June 1982

Dear John,


You wrote to John Coles on 1 June 1982 in response to my letter of 25 May asking for information about the Falkland Islands Company.

I was grateful for your advice and I attach a copy of the letter which I have now sent to Mr Robert Simpson.

Yours sincerely,

John Holmes

John Holmes Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



British Antarctic Survey stations. Britain is shown on the same scale.

completing work in the Antarctic alternates with laboratory work in the United Kingdom and preparation for the next season. Mapping is undertaken by the Directorate of Oceanography and the Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Defence. The Survey is also maintained with university departments at Aberdeen, Leicester, Sheffield and elsewhere. Medical services and research are now organized by the Institute of Environmental and Offshore Medicine of the University of Aberdeen.

The four divisions were formerly scattered around the country: the administrative office was in London and the scientific divisions were housed at various universities and research institutes. It was not until 1976 that they were able to come together in a new headquarters building, which was officially opened by HRH The Duke of Edinburgh. A commemorative stone (collected in the Antarctic) marking this event is set in the floor of the entrance hall. The building had been specially designed for the Survey and is fully equipped with laboratories, workshops, a small library, archives room, conference room, and a computer.

Until recently Antarctic activities have been concerned almost exclusively with pure science but, with increasing world demand for food and minerals, there is increasing interest in possible Antarctic resources. Attention is now being focussed on the living resources of the Southern Ocean, and it has been estimated that it might be possible to harvest many million tons of the shrimp-like krill without depleting stocks - a significant addition to the total world catch of fish.

This gives increasing urgency to scientific research - to provide a sound basis for any management policy in order to avoid over-exploitation.

Some coal deposits are known inland but they are in extremely inhospitable areas and extend under great thicknesses of permanent ice. It is unlikely that it will be economic to exploit them in the foreseeable future.

International groups of Antarctic scientists have been studying the implications of these developments, trying to ensure that any exploitation will be subject to rational control and that impact on the environment will be kept to a minimum.

BAS headquarters

All aspects of the work, both scientific and logistic, are organized by the BAS headquarters in Cambridge, and constant communication is maintained between headquarters, the Antarctic stations and ships by radio teleprinter and emergency telegraphy.



A high-density beach of Antarctic fur seals at Bird Island, off South Georgia.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

3 June 1982

Dear Mr Simpson,

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 20 May.


I doubt whether it would be appropriate for me to let you have information about the Falkland Islands Company, since it is a private company. Rather, I suggest that you contact the company or its parent firm, Coalite, direct to obtain the information you are seeking.

You also asked about the extent and nature of Mr Denis Thatcher's interests in the Falkland Islands Company. He has no interests in either the company or in Coalite.

Yours sincerely,

Anne Whitmore

Robert Simpson Esq.



British Antarctic Survey stations. Britain is shown on the same scale.

In the winter, the Survey is in preparation for the next season. The Survey is supported by the Department of the Ministry of Defence, the Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Defence, the University of Aberdeen, Leicester, Sheffield and elsewhere. Medical services and research are now organized by the Institute of Environmental and Offshore Medicine of the University of Aberdeen.

The four divisions were formerly scattered around the country: the administrative office was in London and the scientific divisions were housed at various universities and research institutes. It was not until 1976 that they were able to come together in a new headquarters building, which was officially opened by HRH The Duke of Edinburgh. A commemorative stone (collected in the Antarctic) marking this event is set in the floor of the entrance hall. The building had been specially designed and built for the Survey and is fully equipped with laboratories, workshops, a small library, archives room, conference room, and a computer.

Until recently, Antarctic activities have been concerned almost exclusively with pure science, the search for fossil fuels, and the food and minerals. There is increasing interest in the possible Antarctic resources. Attention is now being focussed on the living resources of the Southern Ocean, and it has been estimated that it might be possible to harvest many million tons of the shrimp-like krill without depleting stocks - a significant addition to the total world catch of fish and Crustacea. This gives increasing urgency to scientific research to provide a sound basis for any management policy in order to avoid over-exploitation.

Some coal deposits are known inland but they are in extremely inhospitable and inaccessible places and extend under great thicknesses of ice. It is unlikely that it will be economic to exploit them in the foreseeable future.

International groups of Antarctic scientists have been studying the implications of these developments and are trying to ensure that any exploitation will be subject to international control and that impact on the environment will be kept to a minimum.

BAS headquarters

All aspects of the work, both scientific and logistic, are organized by the BAS headquarters in Cambridge, and constant communication is maintained between headquarters, the Antarctic stations and ships by radio teleprinter and emergency telegraphy.



A high-density beach of Antarctic fur seals at Bird Island, off South Georgia.

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Until recently, Antarctic activities have been concerned almost exclusively with science but, with increasing world demand for food and minerals, there has been a growing interest in the Antarctic resources. Attention is now being focussed on the living resources of the Southern Ocean, and it has been estimated that it might be possible to harvest many million tons of the shrimp-like krill without depleting stocks — a significant addition to the total world catch of fish and Crustacea. This gives increasing urgency to scientific research — to provide a sound basis for any management policy in order to avoid over-exploitation.

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International groups of Antarctic scientists have been studying the implications of these developments and are trying to ensure that any exploitation will be subject to rational control and that impact on the environment will be kept to a minimum.

BAS headquarters

All aspects of the work, both scientific and logistic, are organized by the BAS headquarters in Cambridge. Close liaison between headquarters and stations is maintained by radio teletypewriter and emergency telegraphy.



A high-density beach of Antarctic for seeds at Bird Island, off South Georgia.




Sediment coring in George VI Sound to investigate the sea bed below an ice shelf.

The headquarters organization consists of four divisions — an Administration Division, which is responsible for co-ordination, logistics, recruiting, finance and publications, and three scientific divisions: Atmospheric Sciences, Earth Sciences and Life Sciences. Each scientific division has a section head, one or two scientific assistants and up to five graduate scientists. The latter are usually recent graduates, recruited for about 5 years. In the Atmospheric and Life Sciences Divisions, an initial training period in the United Kingdom is followed by 2½ years in the Antarctic and a further period up to 2 years in the United Kingdom completing the research for publication. For the earth scientists, summer field work in the Antarctic alternates with laboratory work in the United Kingdom and preparation for the next season. Mapping in the United Kingdom is done by the Ordnance Survey and the Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Defence. The latter is also maintained with university departments at Aberdeen, Leicester, Sheffield and elsewhere. Medical services and research are now organized by the Institute of Environmental and Offshore Medicine of the University of Aberdeen.

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Publications

The scientific results of most of the Survey's work are compiled to World Data Centres and published in the *British Antarctic Survey Scientific Reports* and the *British Antarctic Survey Bulletin*. Papers also appear in other appropriate scientific and technical journals. A general booklet entitled *British Antarctic Survey* gives a general account of the history and work of the organization, and a series of post-cards show the BAS Antarctic bases, ships and aircraft, and scientific activities. The achievements of the Survey are recorded in the *British Antarctic Survey Annual Reports*. All of these BAS publications are on sale to the public.



British Antarctic Survey stations. Britain is shown on the same scale.

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File End



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 June 1982

FALKLANDS: SITREPS

I write to confirm the arrangements which I discussed with you and David Omand today on the telephone.

We agreed that you would provide a diplomatic SITREP and the Ministry of Defence would supply a military SITREP to reach me in Versailles at the following times (Paris time):

Friday: 10 p.m.
Saturday: 8 a.m. and 10 p.m.
Sunday: 8 a.m.

These timings have been selected to fit in with the Prime Minister's programme in Versailles. I should be grateful if they could be closely observed and if the telegrams could be addressed to me personally.

Should there be urgent developments which cannot await the above SITREPS, you will doubtless get in touch with me at Versailles by telephone or urgent telegram.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence).

A.J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Copy filed on
for Twin visit
Versailles Summit

NATURAL ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL

British Antarctic Survey



The British Antarctic Survey, a component body of the Natural Environment Research Council, is responsible for British scientific research in Antarctica, the Falkland Islands Dependencies — a total land area of about 700,000 sq km — and the surrounding seas. The Survey began in 1943 under royal auspices and from 1946 onwards was controlled by the Colonial Office and Foreign Office. It was transferred to the NERC in April 1967. Two Antarctic stations were established at the beginning of 1944 and 17 more in the ensuing years, six of them being occupied at present by a total wintering party of about 70 men. There are also several minor stations and a number of field huts which are used by additional summer field parties. (It is impossible to carry out most field work in the winter darkness — continuous throughout the whole year.)

This is a key area for scientific work and BAS activities, which have expanded in scope since 1949, now cover a very wide range of disciplines and extend to the study of the continent's geology, glaciology and field geophysics over the Antarctic Peninsula area and inland areas. The sixth station, on the sub-Antarctic island of South Georgia, now has a much reduced scientific programme. Research is also carried out by Medical Officers at the bases. Men and supplies are taken to the bases by the Royal Research Ship in two specially designed ice-strengthened ships, the Royal Research Ship *Bransfield* and then transported to the more remote localities by two De Havilland Twin Otter aircraft.



Franz Josefshafen observatory, Argentine Islands (lat. 65° 15' S, long. 64° 16' W), on the west coast of the Antarctic Peninsula.



Twin Otter aircraft supplying geologists, glaciologists and geophysicists at Steadfast Depot, Alexander Island.

When the annual relief has been completed, the ships undertake biological, geophysical and hydrographical surveys, and transport field parties to otherwise inaccessible places. *John Storer* has recently been re-engined and converted into a marine biological research ship. Her main role now is participation in the Offshore Biological Programme, investigating the seas in the vicinity of South Georgia.

The amount of sea ice varies greatly from year to year and place to place, and the relief work is very difficult. American satellite imagery is used to find suitable flight routes, and reconnaissance flights by BAS aircraft also provide useful information.

The aircraft's task is to support field parties by laying depots and transporting men with their vehicles (motor toboggans) and equipment. They also carry out important airborne radio echo ice-depth sounding and magnetometer surveys. They are based at the station on Adelaide and off the west coast of the Antarctic Peninsula during the summer and return to Canada for overhaul during the southern winter.

International co-operation

Since the International Geophysical Year, 1957-58, for which the Antarctic was set aside as a special study area by 12 nations, BAS work has been carried out in a special area by 12 nations, BAS of co-operation, which characterized the ICY period. The spirit of the Antarctic Treaty by the 12 nations in 1959 and has since been accepted to by twelve others. The Treaty covers the region south of lat. 60° S. Under its terms, the continent is used for peaceful purposes only; claims to territorial sovereignty are left in abeyance and controversy is avoided; scientific investigation and international co-operation are promoted.

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FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HRS: 3 JUNE

UN

1. The Security Council has met in formal session. A draft resolution, sponsored by Spain and Panama, which calls for an unconditional cease-fire was tabled. Voting on the draft resolution takes place at 1500 GMT today.

Military Action

2. The Ministry of Defence have announced the loss of two Harriers during continued attacks on Argentine military installations on the Falklands. Both pilots were safely recovered.

3. MOD also announced that an accident involving explosives occurred at Goose Green on 1 June. There were both British and Argentine casualties.

4. The Task Force has been reinforced by the deployment of further RAF Harriers from RAF Wittering. These Harriers flew to the area of operations via Ascension Island using air to air refuelling.

Hospital Ships

5. The hospital ship, HMS Hecla, has arrived in Montevideo. 24 Argentine prisoners were disembarked. 18 injured British servicemen also left the Hecla to return by air to the UK.

Emergency Unit

3 June

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 June 1982

HMS INVINCIBLE

Thank you for your letter of 2 June. As I told you last night, the Prime Minister agreed that the Ministry of Defence should issue the press statement which you enclosed. I also asked John Holmes last night to arrange for a revised version of the reply to Mr. Fraser to be telegraphed to our High Commission in Canberra. I enclose the text of the revised message.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to John Holmes (FCO).

A J COLES

David Omand, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

B

- (d) lobbying in Paris and Washington to ensure that firm instructions are sent to keep their Representatives in New York on UK's side;
- (e) a high level approach in Georgetown to extract a negative vote from Guyana

US Views

G - FCO tel no 1098 to Washington
 H - Washington tel no 1990

4. Instructions were sent to Sir N Henderson in Washington to reiterate to President Reagan HMG's appreciation for US support. HM Ambassador drew on this message in speaking reassuringly to Haig, who was dismayed at UK press criticism of his attitude, and passed it to the President.


Bilateral with President Reagan

I - Washington telno 1997

5. The bilateral between the Prime Minister and President Reagan has now been confirmed for 1500 hours on 4 June.

Comment

6. While there may still be a possibility of further negotiations on drafts (and Sir A Parsons's circulation of our own draft has had a useful confusing effect), we have to assume a vote on the Spanish/Panamanian draft this afternoon. Urgent lobbying action is now required, as set out in para 3 above. Sir A Parsons does not need new instructions.



P R Fearn
 Emergency Unit

3 June 1982

Emergency Room

22 JUN 1982

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FM FCO 021110Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 492 OF JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNOS 906 AND 907: FALKLANDS: SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. YOU SHOULD TELL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT WE ARE DISAPPOINTED, THOUGH NOT SURPRISED, BY THE TERMS OF THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE TO THE FIVE-POINT PLAN PEREZ DE CUELLAR PUT TO THEM AND US ON 31 MAY. WE HAVE MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE ANY FORM OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS AND THERE IS CLEARLY NO QUESTION OF OUR SIMPLY HANDING OVER THE TERRITORY TO A THIRD FORCE. THE ARGENTINES ARE ONCE AGAIN ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL WHICH HAVE NO BASIS IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 AND WHICH WE CANNOT POSSIBLY CONSIDER.

2. AS FOR THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 6-8 OF YOUR FIRST TUR, YOU SHOULD TELL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PRACTICABLE TO ARRANGE FOR A UN PRESENCE AT TALKS BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. THE TALKS MIGHT TAKE PLACE AT VERY SHORT NOTICE, AND THERE COULD CLEARLY BE NO QUESTION OF HOLDING THEM UP TO ALLOW TIME FOR UN REPRESENTATIVES TO ARRIVE. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE ONCE AGAIN THAT WE ARE NOT SEEKING TO HUMILIATE ARGENTINA. THE ARGENTINES CAN HAVE AN HONOURABLE WITHDRAWAL IF THEY WANT IT.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF THE GOVERNOR, YOU SHOULD TELL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT MINISTERS HAVE NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION ABOUT WHO WILL BE THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ISLANDS IN THE FUTURE. YOU CANNOT ANTICIPATE WHAT THAT DECISION WILL BE. BUT WE ARE ANXIOUS TO RESTORE LIFE ON THE ISLANDS TO NORMALITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE ARE NOT ATTRACTED

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BY THE SUGGESTION THAT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY OCCUPATION SHOULD BE REPLACED BY BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION DURING THE COOLING-OFF PERIOD.

4. SINCE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO ANY UNDERTAKINGS TOWARDS ARGENTINA ABOUT THE RUN-DOWN OF BRITISH FORCES AFTER ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, LET ALONE THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES, IT FOLLOWS THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT DE SOTO'S IDEA FOR THE LATE INTRODUCTION OF UN OBSERVERS FOR THE PURPOSES HE ENVISAGES. FOR THE TIME BEING YOU CAN DO NO MORE THAN REITERATE THE POINT IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 485 THAT WE MIGHT IN THE LONGER TERM WISH TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ISLANDERS.
5. YOU HAVE THE DISCRETION YOU SEEK ON TACTICS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING THE ILLUSTRATIVE USE OF YOUR DRAFT RESOLUTION.

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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 PS/SIR A DUFF
 MR WADE-GERY
 MR FULLER
 MR O'NEILL
 ED/ASSESSMENTS STAFF
 MR COLVIN
 DIO
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
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TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 913 OF 2 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, DUBLIN, MADRID, KAMPALA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, HAVANA.

YOUR TELNO 492 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY (2 JUNE) THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THE COUNCIL MET FORMALLY AT 2000Z. SPAIN AND PANAMA TABLED A BRIEF DRAFT RESOLUTION SIMPLY CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY SPAIN, PANAMA, JORDAN, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, MYSELF, SOVIET UNION, AND CHINA. ALL, EXCEPT MINE AND JORDAN'S WERE PRO-ARGENTINE, IN MOST CASES STRONGLY SO. PANAMA AND SPAIN PRESSED FOR A VOTE TONIGHT. BUT SOME DELEGATIONS NEEDED TIME FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND THE VOTE WILL NOT BE UNTIL 1500Z TOMORROW (3 JUNE). MY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN MY FOURTH IFT.

DETAIL

2. I SPOKE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 492 AT 1445Z TODAY (2 JUNE). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS WHAT HE HAD EXPECTED. HE WOULD NOW SUBMIT HIS REPORT.

3. AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT 1500Z,

499 AT 1445Z TODAY (2 JUNE). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS WHAT HE HAD EXPECTED. HE WOULD NOW SUBMIT HIS REPORT.

3. AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT 1400Z, THE SECRETARY GENERAL READ OUT HIS REPORT. THE TEXT IS IN MIFT (TO YOU AND WASHINGTON ONLY). YOU WILL SEE THAT IT IS A BRIEF AND EVEN-HANDED ACCOUNT OF HIS EFFORTS DURING THE LAST SEVEN DAYS AND IT DOES NOT APPORTION BLAME FOR THEIR FAILURE. HE AFFIRMS HIS READINESS TO REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES AND TO CONTINUE TO EXERCISE HIS GOOD OFFICES. THE MANDATE HE WAS GIVEN BY SCR 505 THUS REMAINS IN BEING. PANAMA PRESSED FOR AN EARLY FORMAL MEETING AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT 2000Z, BUT PANAMA REPLIED EVASIVELY TO REPEATED QUESTIONS BY THE PRESIDENT (DE NANTEUIL, FRANCE) ABOUT WHAT RESULT HE EXPECTED FROM THE MEETING.

4. DE PINIES (SPAIN) TOLD ME DURING THE LUNCH HOUR THAT HE WAS URGENTLY SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS TO TABLE A SHORT RESOLUTION SIMPLY CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE AND A FURTHER REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITHIN 72 HOURS. WE TELEPHONED THE DEPARTMENT TO ASK THAT ATTEMPTS BE MADE IN MADRID TO CALL DE PINIES OFF OR AT LEAST CONFUSE THE ISSUE.

5. HOWEVER, WHEN THE COUNCIL ASSEMBLED FOR A FORMAL MEETING AT 2000Z, DE PINIES TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HIS INSTRUCTION AND WAS ABOUT TO TABLE HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT). I TOLD HIM FIRMLY THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST IT. I SAID THE SAME TO MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) AND TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

I THEN GAVE PLAN X (IE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY TELNO 987 - NOT TO ALL) TO DE PINIES AND MRS KIRKPATRICK, EXPLAINING THAT I DID NOT INTEND TO TABLE IT: IT WAS ONLY MEANT TO ILLUSTRATE THE KIND OF CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION WHICH WE COULD SUPPORT. WE SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE COPIES OF PLAN X TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, WITH THE SAME EXPLANATION. THIS TACTIC HAD THE DESIRED EFFECT OF MUDDYING THE WATERS AND RAISING DOUBTS ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF DE PINIES' DRAFT. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT FORMAL MEETING, AND AFTER ITS CLOSE, THERE WAS MUCH HUDDLING OF DELEGATIONS OVER OUR TEXT.

6. AT THE FORMAL MEETING, THE SECRETARY GENERAL READ OUT HIS REPORT. DE PINIES THEN SPOKE, INTRODUCING HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH SPAIN AND PANAMA WOULD CO-SPONSOR. KAM (PANAMA) FOLLOWED SUIT, WITH LIBERAL REFERENCES TO OUR "ARROGANCE" "INTRANSIGENCE" AND "COLONIAL AGGRESSION". NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) MADE A

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7. ROS (ARGENTINA) SPOKE AT LENGTH. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD SHOWN THAT THE UK DID NOT INTEND AT ANY TIME TO HEED THE COUNCIL'S APPEALS. ITS ONLY OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONTINUE ITS AGGRESSION, WITH THE INTENTION OF INSTALLING IN THE ISLANDS A MILITARY SYSTEM AS PART OF ITS PLAN TO DOMINATE THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS WERE SIMPLY A MASK. ROS QUOTED VARIOUS STATEMENTS OF YOURS: UPI REPORTS ATTRIBUTING TO BRITISH OFFICIALS THE IDEA OF PERSUADING THE AMERICANS TO ESTABLISH A LARGE AIR AND NAVAL BASE IN THE FALKLANDS: A GUARDIAN ARTICLE ABOUT GIVING THE FALKLANDS THE SAME STATUS AS ASCENSION, AND SO ON. ARGENTINA ON THE OTHER HAND HAD REPLIED PROMPTLY AND POSITIVELY TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS UNDER SCR 505. ROS THEN READ OUT THE ARGENTINE TERMS OF 28 MAY (MY TELNO 884) AND GAVE HIS VERSION OF THE TERMS WE HAD TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS EVIDENT. IN ITS VIEW, THE COUNCIL OUGHT TO ENDORSE THE RESTORATION OF A COLONIAL SITUATION, PLUS A MILITARY FORCE TO PRESERVE IT. THIS CONFORMED TO THE PATTERN OF THREAT AND AGGRESSION PURSUED BY THE BRITISH SINCE 1833. IT RECALLED GUANTANAMO, DIEGO GARCIA AND ASCENSION. THE COUNCIL SHOULD DEMAND ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES THAT ITS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS OFFER TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY BASE IN THE FALKLANDS, ROS THEN READ OUT THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE RIC TREATY POWERS ON 28 MAY. ARGENTINA HOPED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD REFLECT ON IT.

8. CORREA DA COSTA (BRAZIL) THEN MADE A NOTABLY PRO-ARGENTINA SPEECH. BRAZIL HAD MADE SEVERAL EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE UK HAD UNILATERALLY INTERRUPTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS. THE UK HAD NO RIGHT TO TRY UNILATERALLY TO ENFORCE SCR 502. THE COUNCIL SHOULD DEMAND AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, WITH UN PARTICIPATION. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR COMPETITION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS TO BE EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

NO RIGHT TO TRY UNILATERALLY TO ENFORCE SCR 502. THE COUNCIL SHOULD DEMAND AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, WITH UN PARTICIPATION. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR COMPETITION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS TO BE EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

9. I SPOKE NEXT (TEXT IN MY THIRD IFT - FCO, COI AND WASHINGTON ONLY).

10. TROYANOVSKY'S (USSR) STATEMENT WAS VERY SIMILAR TO THE ONE HE MADE ON 22 MAY (MY TELNO 821). HIS ONLY NEW POINT WAS TO EXPLOIT OUR INSISTENCE THAT AMERICAN FORCES WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN LONG TERM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND ACCUSE US OF NEFARIOUS STRATEGIC DESIGNS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

11. DE PINES THEN INTERVENED A SECOND TIME TO COMPLAIN, WITH SOME PASSION, THAT I HAD MISREPRESENTED HIS DRAFT. THE REFERENCE IN THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH TO THE NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTS OF SCRS 502 AND 505 MEANT THAT THERE WOULD BE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, AS WELL AS THE OTHER STEPS REQUIRED BY SCR 502. WHAT HE WAS ASKING FOR WAS SIMPLY A CEASEFIRE, WHICH WAS A DIFFERENT CONCEPT FROM THAT OF A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

12. LIN QING (CHINA) SPOKE BRIEFLY IN SUPPORT OF DE PINES' DRAFT. I SPOKE IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO TROYANOVSKY AND ROS SPOKE IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO ME. THERE ENSUED A PROCEDURAL ARGUMENT, IN WHICH SPAIN AND PANAMA PRESSED FOR A VOTE TONIGHT. BUT JAPAN INSISTED ON THE NEED FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND IT WAS FINALLY AGREED TO MEET AGAIN AT 1500Z TOMORROW (3 JUNE) TO VOTE.

13. MY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN MY FOURTH IFT.

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TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 914 OF 2 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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3 4

MIPT : FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 2 JUNE

INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS)

1. THE PRESENT INTERIM REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF RESOLUTION 505 (1982) WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED AT ITS 2368TH MEETING ON 26 MAY 1982. RESOLUTION 505 REQUESTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES, BEARING IN MIND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) AND THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982: TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE-FIRE; AND TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND, IN ANY CASE, NOT LATER THAN SEVEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION.

2. IN THE AFTERNOON OF 26 MAY, I MET SEPARATELY WITH THE PARTIES AND REQUESTED THAT EACH PROVIDE WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A STATEMENT OF THE TERMS IT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE FOR A CEASE-FIRE. IT WAS MY HOPE, AS I EXPLAINED TO THE PARTIES, THAT, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR REPLIES, TERMS COULD BE DEVELOPED WHICH WOULD BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. I INDICATED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF A CEASE-FIRE AS MENTIONED IN RESOLUTION 505 COULD BE MADE

STATEMENT OF THE TERMS IT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE FOR A CEASE-FIRE. IT WAS MY HOPE, AS I EXPLAINED TO THE PARTIES, THAT, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR REPLIES, TERMS COULD BE DEVELOPED WHICH WOULD BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. I INDICATED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF A CEASE-FIRE, AS MENTIONED IN RESOLUTION 505, COULD BE MADE ON SHORT NOTICE, WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. ON 27 MAY, I RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS PROVIDING AN INDICATION OF THE TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR A CEASE-FIRE. ON THE SAME DAY, I RECEIVED A FIRST RESPONSE FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS SUPPLEMENTED ON 28 MAY BY A COMMUNICATION ON THE TERMS FOR A CEASE-FIRE ACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA.

4. I HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES WITH THE PARTIES, INCLUDING CONVERSATIONS BY TELEPHONE WITH THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP OF ARGENTINA. DURING THESE EXCHANGES, WHICH CONTINUED UNTIL THIS MORNING, I EXPLORED VARIOUS APPROACHES IN SEEKING THE DEGREE OF AGREEMENT NECESSARY FOR A CEASE-FIRE.

5. IT IS MY CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT THAT THE POSITION OF THE TWO PARTIES DO NOT OFFER THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING AT THIS TIME FOR A CEASE-FIRE WHICH WOULD BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN TO ME BY RESOLUTION 505 (1982), I SHALL NEVERTHELESS MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES IN THE EVENT THAT AN OPPORTUNITY CAN BE FOUND IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF MY GOOD OFFICES CAN CONTRIBUTE TO BRINGING THIS TRAGIC CRISIS TO AN END.

PARSONS


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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030109Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 915 OF 2 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON HAVANA DUBLIN MADRID KAMPALA KINSHASA
ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO UKDEL NATO PARIS
MOSCOW AND PEKING.

MIPT: FALKLANDS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED BY SPAIN AND PANAMA
ON 2 JUNE.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) AND THE NEED
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTS THEREOF,

1. REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO CEASE FIRE IMMEDIATELY
IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS);
2. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO USE SUCH MEANS AS HE MAY DEEM
NECESSARY TO VERIFY THE CEASE-FIRE;
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION WITHIN 72 HOURS.

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
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 TO FLASH FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 916 OF 2 JUNE
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 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY 3 IPT'S: FALKLANDS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

BEGINS

I PAY TRIBUTE ONCE AGAIN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS HE HAS MADE DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 502 AND 505. THE FACT THAT IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE IS NOT IN ANY WAY THE FAULT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE HAS AGAIN DISPLAYED THE HIGHEST QUALITIES DEMANDED OF HIS OFFICE.

I HAVE SAID BEFORE, BUT IT CANNOT BE REPEATED TOO OFTEN, THAT THE CURRENT BREACH OF THE PEACE WAS CAUSED BY ARGENTINA. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH CLOSED THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL ON 1 APRIL. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH REMAINED SILENT IN THE FACE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL NOT TO USE FORCE LATER THAT SAME DAY AT THE TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING OF THIS COUNCIL. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH THE NEXT MORNING INVADDED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IT WAS AND IS ARGENTINA WHICH HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION 502 WHICH DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE TROOPS. FAR FROM WITHDRAWING THEM, ARGENTINA REINFORCED THEM. IT IS THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH WAS THE VICTIM OF THE ARGENTINE ACT OF AGGRESSION. IT IS THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF THE ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE TO OCCUPY THE ISLANDS. I DO NOT PROPOSE NOW. MR

WAS AND IS ARGENTINA WHICH HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION 502 WHICH DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE TROOPS. FAR FROM WITHDRAWING THEM, ARGENTINA REINFORCED THEM. IT IS THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH WAS THE VICTIM OF THE ARGENTINE ACT OF AGGRESSION. IT IS THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF THE ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE TO OCCUPY THE ISLANDS. I DO NOT PROPOSE NOW, MR PRESIDENT, TO DWELL ON THE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCES THE ISLANDERS HAVE SUFFERED OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. REPORTS SO FAR ARE NECESSARILY INCOMPLETE BUT FROM THOSE AREAS WHERE ISLANDERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TALK FREELY OF THEIR EXPERIENCES UNDER ARGENTINE OCCUPATION, SOME VERY SOMBRE AND DISTURBING FACTS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE.

I HAVE HAD OCCASION AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS OF THIS COUNCIL TO SET OUT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION IN DETAIL. I WILL NOT WEARY THE COUNCIL BY REPEATING ALL MY ARGUMENTS, WHICH, I BELIEVE, EFFECTIVELY REFUTED SOME OF THE MORE EXTRAVAGANT DISTORTIONS ADVANCED TODAY BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA. I MUST REPEAT ONCE AGAIN THAT IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH FIRST USED FORCE AND BEGAN THE PRESENT CRISIS. EVERYTHING WE HAVE DONE SINCE HAS BEEN IN EXERCISE OF OUR INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE. WE HAVE NEVER ARGUED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS ASSUMING THE TASK OF EXECUTING THE MANDATE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE TRUE POSITION IS THAT IN THE FACE OF ARGENTINA'S FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF RESOLUTION 502, WE HAVE EXERCISED OUR RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE FOR WHICH NO MANDATE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS REQUIRED BY THE TERMS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN CLEAR. AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO PAY. PEOPLES MUST NOT BE SUBJUGATED AGAINST THEIR WILL. PEOPLES MUST ENJOY THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. POLITICAL PROBLEMS MUST NOT BE SETTLED BY ARMED FORCE. THESE ARE PRINCIPLES WHICH MY GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN PREPARED TO COMPROMISE. THEY HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH "COLONIALISM" "IMPERIALISM" AND OUTWORN SHIBBOLETHS OF THAT KIND. WHAT CONCEIVABLE REASON COULD MY COUNTRY HAVE FOR WISHING TO ESTABLISH BRITISH OR OTHER MILITARY POWER IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IF WE HAD HAD SUCH EXTRAORDINARY PRETENTIONS, I SUGGEST TO THE COUNCIL THAT WE WOULD HAVE KEPT A LARGER GARRISON THAN 40 ROYAL MARINES ON THE FALKLANDS BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION. WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER, SHORT OF COMPROMISING THESE PRINCIPLES, TO BRING ABOUT THE PEACEFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CENTRAL ELEMENT SCR 502 - NAMELY UNCONDITIONAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS. THIS HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE AND WE HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO DEFEND THESE PRINCIPLES BY OTHER MEANS. WE HAVE NEVER BROKEN OFF OR INTERRUPTED NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED FULLY AND IN GOOD FAITH THROUGHOUT THIS LONG PERIOD.

I TURN NOW TO THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE HELD PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 505. AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL RECALL, THIS RESOLUTION REAFFIRMED

HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO DEFEND THESE PRINCIPLES BY OTHER MEANS. WE HAVE NEVER BROKEN OFF OR INTERRUPTED NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED FULLY AND IN GOOD FAITH THROUGHOUT THIS LONG PERIOD.

I TURN NOW TO THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE HELD PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 505. AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL RECALL, THIS RESOLUTION REAFFIRMED RESOLUTION 502 BY WHICH THE COUNCIL - AS LONG AGO NOW AS 3 APRIL - DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION WAS THAT IT WOULD WELCOME A CEASEFIRE WHICH WAS INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND TO THE COMPLETION OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD. THIS POSITION WAS BASED SQUARELY ON RESOLUTION 502.

THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA HAS SET OUT IN FULL THE RESPONSES OF HIS GOVERNMENT DURING THE PAST WEEK. I DO NOT INTEND TO FOLLOW HIM DOWN THAT PARTICULAR ROAD OF CONTROVERSY. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS MAINTAINED A UNIQUE CONFIDENTIALITY ABOUT THE NATURE OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE OUTSET AND EVEN IN THE FACE OF THE STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA, I DO NOT INTEND TO BREACH THAT CONFIDENCE. I WOULD ONLY SAY THIS: THAT THE EXPLANATION BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA MAKES CLEAR IN MY JUDGEMENT THAT IF ARGENTINE PRE-CONDITIONS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED, THEY WOULD HAVE LED US BACK INTO THE MORASS OF PROCRASTINATION AND EVASION WHICH MY GOVERNMENT HAS EXPERIENCED ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS OF EXTREMELY INTENSIVE NEGOTIATION. THE PLAIN FACT IS, MR PRESIDENT, THAT UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA CHANGES ITS POSITION IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE DO NOT EXIST. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE CALL BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVES OF SPAIN AND PANAMA FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MY DELEGATION. A CEASEFIRE WHICH IS NOT INSEPARABLY LINKED TO AN IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 502 BECAUSE THAT RESOLUTION DEMANDS THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE CALL FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE WOULD LEAVE ARGENTINE FORCES IN POSITION.

AS I INDICATED EARLIER, THE UNITED KINGDOM IS PERFECTLY PREPARED FOR A CEASEFIRE SO LONG AS IT IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEMAND IN RESOLUTION 502 FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. WE HAVE NO WISH TO INFLICT OR SUFFER FURTHER CASUALTIES. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS HONOURABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ARGENTINE FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502. BUT THE COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL MUST BE HEEDED. BECAUSE THE CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION READ OUT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN DOES NOT LINK THE CEASEFIRE WITH WITHDRAWAL. MY DELEGATION WILL BE OBLIGED TO

WE HAVE NO WISH TO IMPOSE OR SUFFER FURTHER OBLIGATIONS. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS HONOURABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ARGENTINE FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502. BUT THE COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL MUST BE HEEDED. BECAUSE THE CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION READ OUT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN DOES NOT LINK THE CEASEFIRE WITH WITHDRAWAL, MY DELEGATION WILL BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE IT.

A RESOLUTION BETTER FITTED TO THE NEEDS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD, I SUGGEST, CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

1. A REAFFIRMATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505, IN ALL THEIR PARTS.
2. AN EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HIS CONTINUING EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACEMAKING.
3. A REITERATION OF THE DEMAND IN RESOLUTION 502 FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.
4. A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, WHICH WOULD COME INTO EFFECT AS SOON AS WATERTIGHT ARRANGEMENTS EXISTED FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, IN DIGNITY AND ON AN HONOURABLE BASIS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HAVE TO BE AGREED BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE ISLANDS.

THESE ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. I COMMEND THEM TO THE COUNCIL. MY DELEGATION COULD SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION.

IN CONCLUSION, MR PRESIDENT, AT RISK OF REPEATING MYSELF, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE ONE THING: THE OBJECTIVE OF MY GOVERNMENT IS TO SET FREE THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FROM ARGENTINE OCCUPATION WHICH BY THEIR OWN DEMOCRATIC DECISION THEY NEVER, NEVER, WANTED. ALL WE WISH TO DO IS TO ENABLE THOSE PEOPLE TO RESUME THEIR PEACEFUL, HARMLESS AND INOFFENSIVE LIVES AND TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS, IN FREEDOM AND WITHOUT CONSTRAINT, REGARDING THEIR LONG TERM FUTURE. WHEN WE TALK ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO SHIELD THE ISLANDERS AGAINST ANY THREAT OF RENEWED AGGRESSION - THAT IS ALL.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030111Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 917 OF 2 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DUBLIN MADRID KAMPALA KINSHASA ACCRA
PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO UKDEL NATO HAVANA
PARIS MOSCOW AND PEKING.

MY FOUR IPTS: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. SPAIN AND PANAM WILL PRESS HARD TOMORROW MORNING (3 JUNE) FOR AN IMMEDIATE VOTE ON THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION. THEY CAN COUNT ON SIX AFFIRMATIVE VOTES (CHINA, USSR, POLAND, SPAIN, IRELAND, PANAMA). I THINK WE CAN COUNT ON FIVE NEGATIVE VOTES OR ABSTENTIONS (FRANCE, UK, US, GUYANA, JAPAN).
2. SPAIN/PANAMA THEREFORE HAVE TO GET THREE OUT OF THE FOLLOWING FOUR IN ORDER TO GET THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES TO TURN OUR NEGATIVE VOTE INTO A VETO: JORDAN, TOGO, UGANDA, ZAIRE.
3. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT PLAN X MAY CREATE A NEGOTIATING SITUATION AND BUY US MORE TIME. WE KNOW THAT IRELAND, GUYANA, UGANDA, FRANCE AND JORDAN ARE IN A HUDDLE TO SEE IF THEY CAN GET A NEGOTIATION STARTED ON THE BASIS OF PLAN X. BUT WE NEED TO PLAN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE SHALL BE FACING A VOTE ON THE SPANISH DRAFT TOMORROW MORNING.
3. I RECOMMEND THAT THE MOST URGENT LOBBYING SHOULD NOW BE CARRIED OUT IN DUBLIN, KAMPALA, AMMAN, AND KINSHASA. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT MR CONNOR SHOULD TRY TO GET HOLD OF OTUNNU (UGANDA) AND KAMANDA (ZAIRE), IF POSSIBLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH SINCLAIR (GUYANA), TO TRY TO PERSUADE THOSE CONCERNED NOT TO VOTE FOR THE SPANISH DRAFT. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT TOKYO SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THE JAPANESE ABSTAIN, AS I BELIEVE THEIR DELEGATION HERE ARE RECOMMENDING. WE HAVE ASKED THE FRENCH TO LOBBY IN LOME (THE TOGOLESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS ILL AND IN ANY CASE

AND KAMANDA (ZAIRE), IF POSSIBLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH SINCLAIR (GUYANA), TO TRY TO PERSUADE THOSE CONCERNED NOT TO VOTE FOR THE SPANISH DRAFT. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT TOKYO SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THE JAPANESE ABSTAIN, AS I BELIEVE THEIR DELEGATION HERE ARE RECOMMENDING. WE HAVE ASKED THE FRENCH TO LOBBY IN LOME (THE TOGOLESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS ILL AND IN ANY CASE UNHELPFUL.)

5. AS REGARDS THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS, I AM PRETTY SURE THAT DE NANTEUIL IS RECOMMENDING AN ABSTENTION. HE WILL NEED VERY FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS TO STAY WITH US. MRS KIRKPATRICK, WHO SPENT THE LATTER PART OF THE AFTERNOON CLOSETED WITH GENERAL MIRET OF PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S STAFF, IS IN A STATE OF AGONY. SHE TOO WILL NEED FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO DO THE RIGHT THING.

6. FINALLY, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF A HIGH-LEVEL APPROACH COULD BE MADE IN GEORGETOWN TO TRY TO EXTRACT A NEGATIVE VOTE FROM GUYANA.

7. EMERGENCY UNIT: PLEASE REPEAT MY TEL NO 907 (WHICH CONTAINS THE TEXT OF PLAN X) TO ALL POSTS WHICH ARE INSTRUCTED TO LOBBY.

PARSONS

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ACTION cc.

SECRET

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SECRET
FROM FCC 021136Z JUN 82
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1098 OF 2 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 1971: FALKLANDS

1. WHEN YOU CALL ON PRESIDENT REAGAN, PLEASE SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HAVE ASKED YOU TO TELL HIM ONCE AGAIN BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR EUROPE HOW VERY GREATLY WE APPRECIATE ALL THE SUPPORT WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED AND ARE CONTINUING TO RECEIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS PERIOD. THE VERY CLOSE DIALOGUE WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN WITH HAIG, CLARK AND OTHERS HAS BEEN INVALUABLE. THE PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE OPEN BRACKETS YOUR TELNO 1977 CLOSE BRACKETS WHICH THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE AVAILABLE HAS FACILITATED OUR OPERATIONS AS NOTHING ELSE COULD HAVE DONE. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED TO THE UNITED STATES BY ARGENTINA'S ATTACK ON THE FALKLANDS OPEN BRACKETS YOUR TELNO 1978 CLOSE BRACKETS ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. THE POSITION OF PRINCIPLE TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF, AND ESPECIALLY HIS PUBLIC INSISTENCE THAT AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO PAY HAS BEEN AND REMAINS AN INTENSELY BENEFICIAL INFLUENCE.

2. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO SAY THAT WE LOOK FORWARD GREATLY TO OUR FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS IN VERGAILLES AND LONDON. WE HAD TO CONCLUDE IN RESPONSE TO HAIG'S MOST RECENT SUGGESTIONS THAT THESE COULD NOT BE PURSUED SO LONG AS ARGENTINA CONTINUES TO ATTACH CONDITIONS TO COMPLIANCE WITH UNSOP 502. IT WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ARGENTINE COMMANDER TO EFFECT AN HONOURABLE WITHDRAWAL, AND THUS PROBABLY TO SAVE MANY LIVES. UNFORTUNATELY, WE SEE NO SIGN THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE PREPARED TO DO THIS. WE CONSIDER THAT THE BEST HOPE LIES IN LEAVING THEM TO CONFRONT THE CHOICE THEMSELVES. WE HAD

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TO REFLECT THIS VIEW IN OUR RESPONSE TO HAIG, AS WE SHALL NOW HAVE TO REFLECT IT IN OUR RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN.

3. IN OUR CONVERSATIONS AT VERSAILLES AND IN LONDON WE SHALL HOPE TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO TRY TO ENSURE BOTH THAT HOSTILITIES COME TO A COMPLETE CONCLUSION AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM PORT STANLEY, AND THAT THE NEXT PERIOD IS ONE OF REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, WITH THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND NOT ONE OF CONTINUING BITTERNESS AND HOSTILITY.

WE SHALL VALUE THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER THROUGHOUT THAT PERIOD JUST AS WE HAVE VALUED AMERICAN SUPPORT AND THE SUSTAINED CONSULTATIONS FROM WHICH WE HAVE BENEFITED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS.

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NEW YORK

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
OO FCO

GRS170

2 JUN 1982

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 021548Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1990 OF 2 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.



Action

YOUR TELNO 1098: FALKLANDS

1. I SAW HAIG JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR EUROPE WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE WAS VERY WORKED UP ABOUT SOME OF THE PRESS THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN APPEARING, PARTICULARLY IN THE UK, ALLEGING THAT HE IS QUOTE WET UNQUOTE AND TRYING TO DISSUADE THE BRITISH FROM ACHIEVING WHAT THEY THINK ARE THEIR PROPER MILITARY OBJECTIVES. HE SEES THE HAND OF HELMS AND CARBOUGH, NOT TO MENTION JEANE KIRKPATRICK, IN THESE MACHINATIONS.
2. THANKS TO YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE CONVEYING GENEROUS APPRECIATION OF AMERICAN SUPPORT AND THE VALUE OF THE DIALOGUE, I WAS ABLE TO REASSURE HAIG THAT YOU WERE FULLY AWARE OF HIS STALWARTNESS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. HE WAS MUCH RELIEVED BY THE MESSAGE SINCE HE CONSIDERS THAT HE HAS LENT OVER BACKWARDS FOR US AND QUOTE RESENTS BITTERLY UNQUOTE, TO USE HIS OWN WORDS, THE CURRENT CRITICISMS.
3. I AM SURE THAT HE WAS SUITABLY AND ADEQUATELY ASSUAGED BY YOUR MESSAGE.
4. THE MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 1098 HAS ALSO BEEN PASSED TO THE PRESIDENT.

HENDERSON

NNNN

Alaska 02 2330
JUN 2 1982

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IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY



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OO FCO DESKEY 022330Z

OO PARIS

GR 7B

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DESKBY 022330Z

FM WASHINGTON 022330Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1997 OF 2 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

36c.

Lead ERB
Lead Planning
Lead NAB
Lead Emergency Unit
PS (2)
PS/PUS
Mr. Sullivan
Lead Budgets
Mr. Evans
Cab. Office - Sir R. Armstrong
Sir M. Palmer

RC

YOUR TELNO 1101: BILATERAL WITH REAGAN

1. THE AMBASSADOR WAS ABLE TO PASS THIS MESSAGE TO DEEVER ON BOARD PRESIDENT REAGAN'S AIRCRAFT. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER IN PARIS AT 1500 ON 4 JUNE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE MEETING WILL BE HELD AT THE US RESIDENCE.

THOMAS

NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Sir Peter

Thank you for your letter of 1 June, and for your kind words. I am well aware of the interest you have always taken in the Falkland Islands, and I will certainly consider your suggestions.

The Shackleton report is now being updated. I had a long talk with Lord Shackleton of Lord Thurston last week and also saw some of our people from the British Antarctic Survey. Sir Peter Scott, C.B.E., D.S.C.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

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IMMEDIATE
ADVISE

[Faint handwritten notes in blue ink, mostly illegible]

[Faint mirrored text from the reverse side of the page]

SECRET



edHank
Sps

T1208/82

EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA

INFORMAL TRANSLATION

Bogotá, 2nd June 1982.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain
London

Dear Prime Minister,

In your reply to my message of 21st May, Your Excellency stated that the United Kingdom had a special interest in Latin America and certainly had no desire to create a chasm between this part of the world and your country.

Recent developments in the Malvinas war would suggest that the final battle could be a terribly cruel one, causing a fearful death toll. This regrettable occurrence would have most harmful repercussions in Latin America and would bring about difficult to handle situations in the relations between most of the countries in this hemisphere and Great Britain.

Your Excellency is well aware of what Colombia's position has been, and how we have consistently voted to abstain from condemning your country at the Organ of Consultation of the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. In view of this stand, Colombia feels that she can urge Your Excellency to consider the possibility of reaching an honourable peace agreement with Argentina, thus avoiding the unnecessary holocaust of many innocent lives. The ending of this war, without giving rise to unnecessary and damaging tensions between the United Kingdom and Latin America, lies in your hands as ruler and depends on your decisions.

Hoping that Your Excellency will bear this friendly suggestion in mind, I remain,

Yours sincerely,

Julio César Turbay-Ayala
President of the Republic of Colombia

EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA



EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA

BOGOTA JUNIO 2/82

"EXCELENTISIMA SEÑORA
MARGARET THATCHER
PRIMER MINISTRO DE LA GRAN BRETAÑA
LONDRES

APRECIADA PRIMER MINISTRO:

EN VUESTRA RESPUESTA A MI CABLE DE MAYO 21 VUESTRA EXCELENCIA AFIRMABA QUE EL REINO UNIDO MIRABA CON ESPECIAL INTERES A LATINOAMERICA Y NO QUERIA DE NINGUNA MANERA CAVAR ABISMOS ENTRE ESTA PARTE DEL MUNDO Y VUESTRA PATRIA.

LOS ULTIMOS DESARROLLOS DE LA GUERRA EN LAS MALVINAS HACEN PENSAR QUE LA BATALLA FINAL PUEDE SER DE INUSITADA CRUELDAD QUE DEJARIA UN ATERRADOR SALDO DE MUERTOS. ESTE DEPLORABLE HECHO REPERCUTIRIA MUY NOCIVAMENTE EN LATINOAMERICA Y CREARIA SITUACIONES DE DIFICIL MANEJO EN LAS RELACIONES ENTRE LA GRAN MAYORIA DE LOS PAISES DE ESTE HEMISFERIO Y LA GRAN BRETAÑA.

VUESTRA EXCELENCIA CONOCE CUAL HA SIDO LA POSICION DE COLOMBIA Y COMO HEMOS VOTADO PERMANENTEMENTE EN EL ORGANO DE CONSULTA DEL TRATADO DE ASISTENCIA RECIPROCA DE RIO DE JANEIRO ABSTENIENDONOS DE CONDENAR A VUESTRO PAIS. ESTA CIRCUNSTANCIA LE PERMITE A COLOMBIA INVITAR A VUESTRA EXCELENCIA A CONSIDERAR LA POSIBILIDAD DE PACTAR UNA HONROSA PAZ CON ARGENTINA EVITANDO EL INNECESARIO HOLOCAUSTO DE MUCHAS VIDAS INOCENTES.- EN VUESTRAS MANOS DE GOBERNANTE Y EN VUESTRA DECISION ESTA EL PODER TERMINAR ESTA GUERRA SIN CREAR INNECESARIAS Y PERJUDICIALES TENSIONES ENTRE EL REINO UNIDO Y LATINOAMERICA.

EN ESPERA DE QUE VUESTRA EXCELENCIA TOMARA EN CUENTA ESTA AMISTOSA GESTION ME SUSCRIBO COMO VUESTRO SERVIDOR Y AMIGO,

JULIO CESAR TURBAY-AYALA
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA."

EMBALADA DE BOLIVIA

SECRET

2 pps. 70
See under



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

2nd June 1982

ms

Prime Minister

Dear John,

A.P.C. 3/6

PERUVIAN AID TO ARGENTINA

Thank you for your letter of 1st June about the Peruvian proposal on the evacuation by their Air Force of Argentine wounded. The FCO are replying to Lima this afternoon, following consultation with MOD. The lines of their reply are as follows.

The arrangements for a Peruvian flight would be complicated but feasible. The fact is, however, that all the Argentine wounded have now been removed by helicopter from Goose Green and Darwin to the San Carlos area where they have been or are being embarked on our hospital ship SS Uganda prior to their transfer to the Bahia Paraiso in due course. Furthermore, although the Buffalo aircraft has a very short landing and take-off capability, the airstrip at Goose Green is not in a good state. We could not guarantee that it would be safe to land there; this is particularly so because of the large quantity of unexploded ordnance which, I gather, is littered around the airfield, both as a result of our attacks and Argentine activities before we captured the airfield.

In addition to these points which effectively rule out the Peruvian proposal, we have some reservations about Peruvian pilots familiarising themselves with the lie of the land,

* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * These reservations are not however sufficiently strong to outweigh the desirability of channelling the Peruvian wish to help in the direction of humanitarian aid. In this context it is being suggested to Peru that further humanitarian assistance may well be needed in due course and that the best means of providing it may be by ship rather than aircraft.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO)

* ~ * Passage deleted and
retained under Section 3(4).
Cl Wayland

John [unclear]
(D B OMAND)

A J Coles Esq 23 April 2012

SECRET

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (36)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE

HD/PUSD (2)
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HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS WGO
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

ADVANCE COPY

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MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR }
MR ILETT } TREASURY
MR LITTLER }
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY }
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }
DIO }

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[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

RESTRICTED

FM BRASILIA 02:1741Z JUNE 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 231 OF 2 JUNE
REPEATED INFO PRIORITY MODUK

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FALKLANDS: BRAZILIAN REQUEST FOR PRESS FACILITIES

1. ALEXANDRE GARCIA, A SENIOR STAFF REPORTER ON THE WIDELY-READ ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY MANCHETE, ASKED ME YESTERDAY IF WE COULD ARRANGE FOR HIM TO GO TO PORT STANLEY AS SOON AS THE FIGHTING IS OVER WITH A VIEW TO WRITING A MAJOR REPORT ON THE ISLANDS AFTER BRITISH REOCCUPATION.

2. GARCIA IS A FIRST-CLASS JOURNALIST AND A MAN OF CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL COURAGE. HE HAS DONE OUR CAUSE GREAT SERVICE BY PUBLISHING A SERIES OF HARD-HITTING AND GRAPHICALLY-ILLUSTRATED ARTICLES IN MANCHETE ABOUT THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, DRAWING IN PART ON HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF VISITING THE ISLANDS UNDER ARGENTINE OCCUPATION, WHICH HE FOUND ABOMINABLE. HE ALSO RUNS A DAILY 5-MINUTE SLOT IN RADIO MANCHETE AT BREAKFAST TIME, WHICH HE HABITUALLY USES TO CASTIGATE THE ARGENTINES. HE IS AN INTELLIGENT AND OBJECTIVE MAN WHO WAS, INCIDENTALLY, RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE EXCELLENT COVERAGE OF THE ROYAL WEDDING IN

FOR MUCH OF THE EXCELLENT COVERAGE OF THE ROYAL WEDDING IN SUCCESSIVE ISSUES OF MANCHETE LAST YEAR. HE HAS DIRECT ACCESS TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO AND WAS RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT PINOCHET WHEN HE VISITED CHILE LAST MONTH (SANTIAGO TELNO 231 REFERS).

3. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHAT ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO GET GARCIA AND HIS PHOTOGRAPHER TO THE FALKLANDS AT THE EARLIEST APPROPRIATE MOMENT. IF NECESSARY, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO FLY TO LONDON EN ROUTE FOR PORT STANLEY, WHICH COULD INCIDENTALLY OFFER THE MOD A GOOD OPPORTUNITY OF BRIEFING HIM.

4. WE HAVE ALSO HAD REPEATED REQUESTS FOR ACCESS TO THE FALKLANDS BY OTHER INFLUENTIAL BRAZILIAN MEDIA ORGANISATIONS - NOTABLY O GLOBO AND JORNAL DO BRASIL (THE LATTER, LIKE MANCHETE, AN ARDENT SUPPORTER OF THE BRITISH CAUSE IN RECENT WEEKS). I UNDERSTAND THAT MOD PRESS DEPARTMENT HAVE A LONG WAITING LIST. BUT, IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING INFLUENTIAL BRAZILIAN OPINION ON OUR SIDE IN THE PRESENT CRISIS, IT WOULD CLEARLY BE IN OUR INTERESTS TO GET REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE THREE ORGANISATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY GARCIA, TO THE FALKLANDS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

HARDING

NNNNN

SENT/RECD AT 02:2132Z AD/RD

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2 June 1982

2 June 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to convey her thanks for the material on Latin America which you provided at very short notice today. Mrs. Thatcher found that it was admirably suited to her needs and made extensive use of it in connection with the various media interviews which she has given today.

JC

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

mid-July.

May I also take this opportunity to say again how greatly heartened I have been throughout the last few difficult weeks by the consistent support which you have given us over the Falklands crisis and which underlines yet again the common objective we have in ensuring that aggression does not pay.

The Rt. Hon. J.M. Fraser, CH, MP.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 June 1982

Thank you very much for your message of 1 June which was passed to me by your High Commission.

It was most considerate of you to tell us that we should not feel held to any moral obligation over the proposed sale of HMS INVINCIBLE. We are also grateful for Ian Sinclair's agreement not to press John Nott to conclude the contract arrangements whilst military operations involving HMS INVINCIBLE are still in progress in the South Atlantic.

As you may have heard, the fitting out of her sister ship HMS ILLUSTRIOUS has been accelerated and we now expect her to enter service rather earlier than had been expected, in late summer this year. I am hoping that we can make a rapid assessment of where we stand as soon as the situation in the Falkland Islands permits. I believe that we should be able to give you a clear indication of our view concerning HMS INVINCIBLE by mid-July.

May I also take this opportunity to say again how greatly heartened I have been throughout the last few difficult weeks by the consistent support which you have given us over the Falklands crisis and which underlines yet again the common objective we have in ensuring that aggression does not pay.

The Rt. Hon. J.M. Fraser, CH, MP.

SUBJECT

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FM FCO 022000Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 205 OF 2 JUNE.

INVINCIBLE

1. PLEASE NOW PASS THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR FRASER.

BEGINS: THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 1 JUNE WHICH WAS PASSED TO ME BY YOUR HIGH COMMISSION.

IT WAS MOST CONSIDERATE OF YOU TO TELL US THAT WE SHOULD NOT FEEL HELD TO ANY MORAL OBLIGATION OVER THE PROPOSED SALE OF HMS INVINCIBLE. WE ARE ALSO GRATEFUL FOR IAN SINCLAIR'S AGREEMENT NOT TO PRESS JOHN NOTT TO CONCLUDE THE CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS WHILST MILITARY OPERATIONS INVOLVING HMS INVINCIBLE ARE STILL IN PROGRESS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

AS YOU MAY HAVE HEARD, THE FITTING OUT OF HER SISTER SHIP HMS ILLUSTRIOUS HAS BEEN ACCELERATED AND WE NOW EXPECT HER TO ENTER SERVICE RATHER EARLIER THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED, IN LATE SUMMER THIS YEAR. I AM HOPING THAT WE CAN MAKE A RAPID ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE STAND AS SOON AS THE SITUATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PERMITS. I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU A CLEAR INDICATION OF OUR VIEW CONCERNING HMS INVINCIBLE BY LATE SUMMER.

MAY I ALSO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SAY AGAIN HOW GREATLY HEARTENED I HAVE BEEN THROUGHOUT THE LAST FEW DIFFICULT WEEKS BY THE CONSISTENT SUPPORT WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN US OVER THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AND WHICH UNDERLINES YET AGAIN THE COMMON OBJECTIVE WE HAVE IN ENSURING THAT AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY. ENDS
2. MOD ARE ISSUING TODAY THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT.

BEGINS: THE PRIME MINISTER HAS RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA CONCERNING THE PROPOSED SALE OF HMS INVINCIBLE TO THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY. WHILST THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ARE STILL KEEN TO PURCHASE HMS INVINCIBLE, THEY HAVE INFORMED US THAT THEY WOULD NOT HOLD US TO THE SALE IF, AS A

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RESULT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS OPERATION, WE WERE TO DECIDE THAT WE WISHED TO RETAIN THE SHIP. THIS IS A MOST HELPFUL GESTURE, WHOLLY IN KEEPING WITH THE TREMENDOUS SUPPORT WHICH THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN US THROUGHOUT THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AND WHICH UNDERLINES YET AGAIN THE CLOSE TIES BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS THANKED MR FRASER FOR HIS TYPICALLY GENEROUS MESSAGE AND HAS TOLD HIM THAT WE WILL BE MAKING A RAPID ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE STAND ON THE FUTURE OF HMS INVINCIBLE AS SOON AS THE SITUATION IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PERMITS. WE HOPE TO HAVE TAKEN FINAL DECISIONS ON THE SALE WITHIN A FEW MONTHS.

ENDS

PYM

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CONFIDENTIAL



MO 14/5

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~9207000~~ 218 2111/3

2nd June 1982

See file.

HMS INVINCIBLE

Thank you for your letter of 1st June forwarding the message from Mr Fraser to the Prime Minister.

My Secretary of State has considered this carefully and is of the view that it is now likely that the Australians are seeking themselves to begin to back out of the purchase of HMS INVINCIBLE both because of financial concerns and the renewed doubts which there must have been about the vulnerability of a single carrier. The new Australian Defence Minister, Ian Sinclair, is known to have set in hand a reappraisal of his equipment programme in the light of the Falklands experience.

If the Australians do mean to let us off the hook then it is Mr Nott's view that it would be politically almost impossible to avoid reconsidering the proposed sale. Our operations in the South Atlantic have already stimulated considerable fresh criticism of the decision to offer HMS INVINCIBLE for sale and this is likely to intensify when the Islands are finally repossessed. It will be a major theme in Parliament over the next two months. If we were to retain HMS INVINCIBLE then we could still hold to the policy of having two carriers in service, with a third remaining in the stand-by squadron to be available when one of the other carriers is in refit and HMS HERMES would not need therefore to be run on for as long as is presently planned. All this will, in my Secretary of State's view, need very urgent consideration so that final decisions can be taken before the end of this month and he will bring forward proposals soon showing the extra costs involved.

I attach at Annex A a draft reply to Mr Fraser which Mr Nott suggests that the Prime Minister sends straight away. This holds the position over until the Falkland Islands have been repossessed. Since Mr Fraser has already made public the fact that he has sent his message, Mr Nott further suggests that the Ministry of Defence puts out the statement at Annex B to this letter as soon as

A J Coles Esq

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CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1



CONFIDENTIAL



possible this evening. These texts have been agreed with the
FCO at official level. Let me know as soon as possible please
whether the Prime Minister is content for this to be done.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

*Yours ever,
D B Omand*

(D B OMAND)

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CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A

DRAFT REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA

1 June
Thank you very much for your message of ~~yesterday's~~ date which was passed to me ^{by} ~~from~~ your High Commission.

It was most considerate of you to tell us that we should not feel held to any moral obligation over the proposed sale of HMS INVINCIBLE. ~~We do of course feel under such an obligation but nevertheless we much appreciate your message and are~~ ^{We also} grateful for Ian Sinclair's agreement not to press John Nott to conclude the contract arrangements whilst military operations involving HMS INVINCIBLE are still in progress in the South Atlantic.

As you may have heard, the fitting out of her sister ship HMS ILLUSTRIOUS has been accelerated and we now expect her to enter service rather earlier than had been expected, in late summer this year. I am hoping that we can make a rapid assessment of where we stand as soon as the situation in the Falkland Islands permits. I believe that we should be able to give you a clear indication of our view concerning HMS INVINCIBLE by mid-July.

May I also take this opportunity to say again how greatly heartened I have been throughout the last few difficult weeks by the consistent support which you have given us over the Falklands crisis and which underlines yet again the common objective we have in ^{ensuring} ~~seeing to it~~ that aggression does not pay.

CONFIDENTIAL

HMS INVINCIBLE : STATEMENT BY MOD

The Prime Minister has received a message from the Prime Minister of Australia concerning the proposed sale of HMS INVINCIBLE to the Royal Australian Navy. Whilst the Australian Government are still keen to purchase HMS INVINCIBLE they have informed us that they would not hold us to the sale if, as a result of the Falkland Islands operation, we were to decide that we wished to retain the ship. This is a most helpful gesture wholly in keeping with the tremendous support which the Australian Government has given us throughout the Falklands crisis and which underlines yet again the close ties between our countries.

2. The Prime Minister has thanked Mr Fraser for his typically generous message and has told him that we will be making a rapid assessment of where we stand on the future of HMS INVINCIBLE as soon as the situation in the Falkland Islands permits. We hope to have taken final decisions on the sale within a few months.

SAPU(82) 28

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached for information are transcripts of the Prime Minister's interviews with BBC News and ITN this evening.

Cabinet Office

2 June 1982

Television interviews given by the Prime
Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, to
Keith Graves (BBC) and Alastair Burnet (ITN) on
Wednesday, 2 June, 1982 in No 10 Downing Street.

BBC INTERVIEW

INTERVIEWER: RPRIME MINISTER, WE APPEAR TO BE POISED FOR THE DECISIVE BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY, CAN YOU SEE ANY WAY OUT OF THAT, ANY WAY OF AVOIDING THAT BATTLE?

MRS.MARGARET THATCHER: NOT UNLESS ARGENTINA DECIDES TO WITHDRAW HER TROOPS, THAT WOULD BE MARVELLOUS IF SHE DID, AFTER ALL IT'S WHAT RESOLUTION 502 SAID, BUT SHE HASN'T DONE IT IN 7 WEEKS - I DON'T KNOW WHETHER SHE WOULD BE CONSIDERING IT NOW, I WOULD ONLY BE TOO DELIGHTED IF SHE DID, IT WOULD SAVE SO MANY YOUNG LIVES.

INTERVIEWER: WOULD YOU BE PREPARED, EVEN AT THIS 11TH HOUR, TO SORT OF LET THE ARGENTINES OFF THE HOOK, IF PRESIDENT GALTIERI SAID - RIGHT, WE DO WANT TO PULL OUT - OR DOES IT MEAN THAT THEY'VE GOT TO SURRENDER? WOULD YOU GIVE THEM AN HONOURABLE WAY OUT IN OTHER WORDS?

MRZ.THATCHER: I'M NOT QUITE SURE WHAT YOU'RE ASKING

INTERVIEWER: WELL, I WONDER WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAVE TO SURRENDER TO THE BRITISH FORCES OR WHETHER IF PRESIDENT GALTIERI SAID TO PERHAPS PEREZ DE CUELLAR 'WE DO WANT TO PULL OUR TROOPS OUT', WOULD YOU HOLD BACK YOUR FORCES AND ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO PULL OUT HONOURABLY?

MRZ.THATCHER: IF THEY SAY 'LOOK, WE'RE GOING TO WITHDRAW AND WE ARE GOING TO WITHDRAW WITHIN THE NEXT TEN TO FOURTEEN DAYS THEN THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR A BATTLE.

INTERVIEWER: SO THERE IS STILL A POSSIBILITY, YOU THINK, THAT THAT BATTLE

MRS.THATCHER: IT'S A POSSIBILITY TOTALLY LINKED TO A TIMED WITHDRAWAL.

INTERVIEWER: I'M SURE YOU'VE NOT CONTEMPLATED ANYTHING BUT A VICTORY IF IT DOES COME TO AN ALL-OUT BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY BUT WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THAT VICTORY, WHAT'S THE NEXT STEP?

MRS.THATCHER: IT ISN'T THAT WE TALK SO MUCH IN TERMS OF VICTORY OR DEFEAT, WE TALK IN TERMS OF REPOSSESSING THE FALKLANDS WHICH WERE INVADED BY THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSOR, SO WHAT WE ARE REALLY TALKING ABOUT IS ALL THE ARGENTINE FORCES GOING BACK TO THE MAINLAND SO THAT WE REPOSSESS THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THEN WE HAVE TO START RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION AND THEN WE TALK ABOUT A FUTURE. THERE ARE IMMENSE PLSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT, I HAVE ASKED LORD SHACKLETON TO UPDATE HIS 1976 REPORT, THINGS ARE A LITTLE BIT DIFFERENT BUT I WANT TO BE READ TO GO AHEAD AS SOON AS WE ARE ABLE TO. AND ALSO WE'LL HAVE TO TALK TO SOME OTHER NATIONS ABOUT HAVING SECURITY FOR THOSE ISLANDS. THIS MUSTN'T HAPPEN AGAIN, WE HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT KIND OF FUTURE THE ISLANDERS WANT. IT WILL TAKE THEM SOME TIME TO DECIDE AND IN PART IT WILL DEPEND UPON WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO BY WAY OF DEVELOPMENT, WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO DO TO HELP US BY WAY OF SECURITY, BUT WE ARE A DEMOCRACY, THEY WERE BORN FREE AND THEY MUST HAVE A RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, SO IT WILL TAKE QUITE A TIME TO TALK IT THROUGH.

INTERVIEWER: DO YOU SEE A ROLE IN THE FORESEEEABLE FUTURE ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FOR THE ARGENTINES-?

MRS THATCHER: I CANNOT, MYSELF, SEE A ROLE IN ANYTHING RELATING TO SOVEREIGNTY, FOR THE ARGENTINES ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. YOU SAW WHAT HAPPENED IN GOOSE GREEN AND DARWIN, HOW OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TREATED, THEY'D NEVER WANTED TO GO TO ARGENTINA BEFORE, THEY'LL BE EVEN LESS LIKELY NOW. THEY WERE BORN ACCUSTOMED TO LIBERTY AND JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY. WE HAVE GONE TO DEFEND THOSE RIGHTS. I BELIEVE THEY'LL BE EVEN MORE DETERMINED NOW TO KEEP THEM, I MOST CERTAINLY SHOULD BE. THEY'VE BEEN LOYAL TO US, WE MUST BE LOYAL TO THEM AND, YOU KNOW, IT IS AFTER ALL A CARDINAL PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THAT COUNTRIES SHOULD COME TO SELF-GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENCE AND I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN DO THAT WITH THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

INTERVIEWER: MY COLLEAGUE, BRIAN HANRAHAN, WHO HAS SPOKEN TO A LARGE NUMBER OF THE PEOPLE WHO WERE FREED AT GOOSE GREEN BY THE PARATROOPERS, SAYS THAT NONE OF THE PEOPLE HE'S SPOKEN TO WANT TO BE ANYTHING BUT BRITISH CITIZENS, NONE OF THEM WANT TO LIVE UNDER ANY FORM OF ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, SO IT WOULD APPEAR THAT BRITAIN'S PRESENCE IS GOING TO BE IN THE FALKLANDS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS BUT HOW DO WE MAINTAIN THAT PRESENCE MILITARILY?

MRS-THATCHER: I THINK WE ARE GOING TO BE THERE FOR SOME TIME, IF NOT ALONE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, BECAUSE I HOPE WE CAN ARRANGE SOME OTHER PEOPLE TO HELP, TO HAVE A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WITH US. YOU KNOW, WHEN THE AMERICANS ASKED US TO JOIN THEM IN A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN SINAI I SAID - YES, BECAUSE IT HELPED PEACE IN THAT AREA, AND I'M SURE WE'D HAVE JUST EXACTLY THE SAME RESPONSE FROM THEM. I HAD A WONDERFUL MESSAGE FROM THE PEOPLE OF GOOSE GREEN AND DARWIN, IT CAME IN THIS MORNING THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE - SAYING 'THANK YOU FOR LIBERATING US, THANK YOU FOR BEING SO STEADFAST AND GOD SAVE THE QUEEN'. IT WAS A VERY TOUCHING MESSAGE BUT IT SAID REALLY EVERYTHING THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE FEEL, THEY'RE BRITISH TOO, THEY'VE BEEN LOYAL, THEY KNOW WHAT BRITAIN HAS DONE TO LIBERATE THOSE ISLANDS, THEY'RE INTENSELY GRATEFUL BUT THEY ALSO REALISE THAT IT'S SOMETHING WHICH SPEAKS FOR WHAT WE STAND FOR IN THE WORLD. THEY'VE NOT LET US DOWN AND WE MUSTN'T LET THEM DOWN.

INTERVIEWER: YOU TALK ABOUT A BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE SHORT TERM AND THEN PERHAPS SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE, ARE THE CABINET UNITED IN THAT, BECAUSE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS, AS I'M SURE YOU'RE AWARE, IN THE LAST WEEK, THAT THERE HAVE BEEN DIVISIONS IN THE CABINET AS TO WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN WHEN ONCE AGAIN WE ARE IN CONTROL OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS?

MRS. THATCHER: THE CABINET HAS NEVER BEEN MORE UNITED IN THE WHOLE OF MY GOVERNMENT, IT IS TOTALLY UNITED. I THINK PERHAPS YOU MISTAKE SOMETIMES A LITTLE DISCUSSION AND A LITTLE ARGUMENT BEFORE WE COME TO CONCLUSIONS, WITH THE UNITY WHICH WE HAVE WHEN WE'VE REACHED THAT CONCLUSION, YOU KNOW IN THE INNER CABINET FIVE OR SIX VOICES ARE BETTER THAN ONE, FIVE OR SIX MINDS ARE BETTER THAN ONE, SOMEONE MAY HAVE A FACET OF EXPERIENCE WHICH NONE OF THE REST OF US KNOW, IT MAY ALTER THE VIEW ONE TAKES OF A SUBJECT BUT ON PRINCIPLE AND ON PURPOSE WE DO NOT DIFFER ON HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE THAT OF COURSE WE ARGU AND DISCUSS AND ONCE WE'VE REACHED A CONCLUSION WE ARE TOTALLY AND UTTERLY UNITED AND STEADFAST AND WILL STICK IT OUT.

INTERVIEWER: SO YOURSELF AND MR. PYM HAVE REACHED A CONCLUSION AND YOU BOTH AGREE ON THAT CONCLUSION WHICH IS WHAT YOU'VE OUTLINED?

MRS. THATCHER: ABSOLUTELY, WE ARE AGREED TOTALLY ON OUR PURPOSE AND ON OUR OBJECTIVES. HE WAS THROWN IN AT THE DEEP END, HE NOT ONLY HAD THE FALKLANDS BUT EUROPE - I THINK HE'S DONE SPLENDIDLY. AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND NUMBER 10, WE HAVE BEEN ABSOLUTELY AS ONE OVER THE WHOLE OF THIS. WE TRIED OF COURSE WE TRIED, WE ALL OF US TRIED, TO SEE IF WE COULD GET WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT A FIGHT - WITHOUT A BATTLE. YOU HEARD ME IN I THINK IT WAS A BBC BROADCAST, SAY THAT IT WOULD BE ONE'S GREATEST DESIRE IF ALL OUR YOUNG PEOPLE COULD COME HOME, IF WE COULD HAVE GAINED REPOSSESSION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITHOUT FIGHTING. WE TRIED, WE DIDN'T SUCCEED. THEN WE DIDN'T FLINCH FROM OUR PURPOSE - NAMELY TO REPOSSESS THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, FOR THOSE BRITISH PEOPLE WHO LIVE THERE AND TO RETURN TO LIVE UNDER BRITISH LAW AND IN A WAY OF LIFE WHICH THEY HAVE COME TO KNOW AND THINK IS FAR, FAR BETTER THAN WHAT THE FASCIST DICTATOR OFFERS.

INTERVIEWER: ? HAVE YOU BEEN UNDER ANY PRESSURE IN THE LAST WEEK OR TWO FROM THE AMERICANS, FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN PERSONALLY, NOT TO TAKE THAT FINAL STEP INTO BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY? THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS FROM AMERICAN MEDIA TODAY THAT HE HAS SPOKEN TO YOU IN THE LAST FEW DAYS AND URGED YOU NOT TO TAKE THAT FINAL STEP INTO PORT STANLEY.

MRS. THATCHER: PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE GOVERNMENT AND I BELIEVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE AS STAUNCH IN DEFENCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AS I AM. AFTER ALL THEY'RE ALL WRITTEN IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THEM AND SELF-DETERMINATION IS AT THE HEART OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. THEY WOULDN'T SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD DENY OUR PEOPLE THINGS WHICH ARE TOTALLY FUNDAMENTAL TO THE AMERICANS, ABSOLUTELY AT ONE IN PRINCIPLE. YOU KNOW WHEN I FIRST HEARD THAT THERE WAS AN ARGENTINE FLEET IN A POSITION AND OF SUCH A COMPOSITION THAT IT COULD INVADE AND I KNEW THEN THAT THE INVASION WOULD COME WITHIN TWO DAYS, IT WAS GOING TO COME, WE HAD TO GET CERTAIN THINGS ON THE WAY, BUT THE OTHER IMMEDIATE THING THAT I DID WAS TO GET ON TO PRESIDENT REAGAN TO SAY - LOOK, DO YOU REALISE WHAT'S HAPPENING? AND IT CAME AS MUCH OF A SURPRISE TO THEM AS IT WAS TO US. PLEASE WILL YOU GET ON TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI TO PERSUADE HIM NOT TO DO IT. NOW YOU KNOW YOU'VE HEARD SO MANY TIMES THAT THE AMERICANS AND THE ARGENTINES HAVE TRIED TO SET UP A FRIENDSHIP, ALTHOUGH THEY'RE VERY DIFFERENT COUNTRIES AND I THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD BE BOUND TO HAVE SO MUCH INFLUENCE BUT GALTIERI SNUBBED PRESIDENT REAGAN THEN. I THINK EVEN SINCE THEN PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS ALWAYS HOPED THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD SEE SENSE AND HAVE SOME THOUGHT FOR THEIR YOUNG PEOPLE ON THOSE FALKLANDS. I THINK HE STILL HOPES IT NOW BUT I HOPE IT TOO BUT I CONFESS THAT I WAS ALWAYS SCEPTICAL RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING AFTER THE INVASION HAD OCCURRED. I COULD NOT MYSELF SEE THAT A DICTATOR OR A JUNTA WOULD WITHDRAW, THEY INVADDED PARTLY TO TAKE AWAY ATTENTION FROM THE SITUATION AT HOME AND I COULD NEVER SEE THAT HE WOULD WITHDRAW. I'M AFRAID THAT VIEW TURNED OUT TO BE RIGHT. BUT AFTER WE GOT ON THE ISLANDS AND THEY'D EXPERIENCED SOME OF THE BATTLES, ONE HOPES THAT EVEN NOW THEY MIGHT - I'M NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC BUT ONE NEVER LOSES HOPE.

INTERVIEWER: OF COURSE PRESIDENT REAGAN COULD AND UNDOUBTEDLY DOES AGREE WITH YOUR PRINCIPLE BUT HE COULD BE ASKING YOU NOT TO HUMILIATE THE ARGENTINES ANY MORE THAN YOU HAVE TO, HE COULD BE ASKING YOU TO GIVE HIM ANOTHER CHANCE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES? IS HE DOING THAT AT THE MOMENT?

MRS.THATCHER: I DON'T UNDERSTAND 'ANOTHER CHANCE', WE'VE BEEN TRYING TO PUT PRESSURE ON THEM THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS AND THROUGH PEACE TALKS FOR OVER SEVEN WEEKS, NEARLY EIGHT WEEKS, IT'S ONLY TOO EASY FOR THEM TO ASK FOR MORE TIME, THEY'VE HAD A LOT OF TIME, IF THEY'RE GOING TO WITHDRAW THEY WILL DECIDE TO WITHDRAW WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS - I WOULD BE SO PLEASED IF THEY DID. WHY DO PEOPLE TALK ABOUT HUMILIATION? I'M NOT SEEKING TO HUMILIATE ANYONE AT ALL, I AM JUST ASKING THAT THE INVADER RETURNS HIS TROOPS TO THE MAINLAND. THAT IS NOT HUMILIATION, THAT IS TO SAY HE SHOULD NEVER HAVE INVADED AND PLEASE WILL HE RESTORE THE POSITION BY RETURNING HIS TROOPS TO THE HOMELAND. THAT IS NOT HUMILIATION, IT IS THE RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

INTERVIEWER: AND HE STILL HAS A FEW DAYS TO DO THAT YOU'RE INDICATING?

MRS.THATCHER: HE COULD DO IT NOW.

INTERVIEWER: ON A MORE PERSONAL LEVEL, DO YOU EVER HAVE ANY DOUBTS WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE CASUALTY FIGURES ON BOTH SIDES ABOUT THE COURSE WHICH THE COUNTRY THE COURSE WHICH YOU'VE TAKEN THE COUNTRY ON TO RE-GAIN THE FALKLANDS?

MRS.THATCHER: ONE FEELS EVERY SINGLE LOSS OF COURSE. A LOT OF PEOPLE WILL HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES SO THAT WE CAN ENJOY LIBERTY AND JUSTICE, NOW THE CHALLENGE HAS COME TO US, JUST AS OUR FOREFATHERS DIDN'T FLINCH FROM IT WE MUST NOT FLINCH FROM IT. NEVERTHELESS ONE STILL FEELS EVERY LOSS BUT LIBERTY AND JUSTICE AND THEIR FUTURE IN THE WORLD ARE WORTH FIGHTING FOR BECAUSE THEY ARE THE ONLY THING THAT GIVES LIFE ITS DIGNITY AND MEANING . IT HAS FALLEN TO US ONCE MORE TO DEFEND THOSE PRINCIPLES. YOU WOULDN'T EXPECT BRITAIN TO FLINCH.

INTERVIEWER: COULD I DEAL PERHAPS WITH A COUPLE MORE POINTS; THERE'S A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONTROVERSY OVER THE RETURN OF THE BODIES OF THE BRITISH DEAD TO THIS COUNTRY, ARE YOU CONSIDERING CHANGING THE NORMAL PRACTICES THAT APPLY THERE, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT A LOT OF FAMILIES HAVE SAID THEY WANT THEIR DEAD BROUGHT BACK? IS THAT GOING TO BE POSSIBLE DO YOU THINK?

MRS. THATCHER: I UNDERSTAND THE FEELING AND EVERYONE WILL UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE YOU HAVE TO THINK FIRST HOW TO WIN THE BATTLE AND OF THE SAFETY OF YOUR TROOPS AND FORCES. AFTERWARDS YOU THINK OF HOW TO HONOUR THOSE WHO'VE FALLEN IN THE BEST POSSIBLE WAY. THE COMMONWEALTH WAR GRAVES HAVE WONDERFUL CEMETRIES, BEAUTIFULLY KEPT AND HONOURED IN PERPETUITY. WE CAN ONLY PUT IT TO PEOPLE THAT THERE IS A TRADITION THAT PEOPLE ARE BURIED THERE, WHERE THEY FALL. IF HOWEVER SOME PEOPLE STILL FEEL STRONGLY THAT THEY WISH TO HAVE THEM HOME THEN OF COURSE WE'LL CONSIDER THAT. I THINK THAT EVERYTHING SHOULD BE PUT TO THEM AND THEY WILL BE THE FIRST TO UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE MIDDLE OF A CONFLICT YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW TO SEE THAT THROUGH FIRST. OF COURSE THOSE PEOPLE WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LOVED ONES WOULD WANT TO GO THERE AND SEE HOW WE HONOUR THEM AND OF COURSE WE WOULD ARRANGE THAT. IT WOULD BE OUR HONOUR AND PRIDE TO DO SO AND THEY'D HAVE A WONDERFUL WELCOME FROM THE FALKLANDERS TOO. AND I HOPE THAT THEY'D BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND EVEN MORE THAN NOW WHAT THEY WERE FIGHTING FOR.

INTERVIEWER: IT'S BEEN CONFIRMED REALLY TODAY THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE CONSIDERING, EVEN IF THEY DIDN'T USE, NAPALM, HOW DO YOU REACT TO THAT? IT'S CAUSED A LOT OF CONTROVERSY OBVIOUSLY.

MRS. THATCHER: CONTROVERSY - IT'S REPUGNANT - ONE RECOILS. ISN'T IT JUST ONE MORE THING THAT MAKES ONE REALISE WE HAVE TO FIGHT, THAT OUR WAY OF LIFE SHALL CONTINUE, FOR GOOD THINGS THAT WE UPHOLD?

END OF BBC INTERVIEW

ITN INTERVIEW

ALASTAIR BURNET: PRIME MINISTR, DO YOU EXPECT AN EARLY CONCLUSION TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS?

MRS.THATCHER: ONE ALWAYS HOPES FOR AN EARLY CONCLUSION, BUT ONE'S LEARNED THROUGHOUT THIS WHOLE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN THAT THINGS TEND TO TAKE LONGER THAN YOU EXPECT.

A.BURNET: DO YOU THINK DIPLOMACY HAS GOT A PART TO PLAY NOW?

MRS.THATCHER: I THINK A DECISION TO WITHDRAW TROOPS ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINES MAY HAVE A PART TO PLAY, THEY HAVEN'T WITHDRAWN THEM FOR THE LAST SEVEN WEEKS, I ALWAYS THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR A DICTATOR TO WITHDRAW BUT IT IS ALWAYS JUST POSSIBLE THAT AT THE VERY LAST MINUTE HE MIGHT THINK THAT THEY HAVE THEIR BACKS TO THE SEA AND THAT HE WOULD QUITE LIKE TO AVOID WHAT COULD BE A PROLONGED AND DIFFICULT BATTLE FOR ALL OUR PEOPLE.

A.BURNET: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO ENCOURAGE HIM?

MRS.THATCHER: I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANYTHING MORE I CAN DO, AS YOU KNOW WE MADE UP OUR OWN TERMS AND PUBLISHED THEM - THEY WERE QUITE CLEAR - ABOUT HOW FAR WE WERE PREPARED TO GO TO AVOID A CONFLICT AND AVOID LOSS OF LIFE. EVERYTHING, BUT EVERYTHING HAS BEEN TURNED DOWN. THERE IS JUST A POSSIBILITY NOW BUT I DON'T RATE IT VERY HIGHLY.

A.BURNET: YOU'VE BEEN TOLD TO BE MAGNANIMOUS IN ANY VICTORY, WHAT DOES 'MAGNANIMOUS' MEAN TO YOU?

MRS.THATCHER: IT IS NOT A WORD I USE IN CONNECTION WITH THE FALKLANDS. IN CONNECTION WITH A BATTLE ON THE FALKLANDS, SOMETIMES I THINK PEOPLE ARE USING IT TO SAY - ALL RIGHT, HAND SOMETHING TO THE ARGENTINES. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO AN INVADER, AND AN AGGRESSOR, AND A MILITARY DICTATOR, THAT WOULD NOT BE MAGNANIMITY, IT WOULD BE TREACHERY OR BETRAYAL OF OUR OWN PEOPLE. WE COULDN'T BETRAY OUR OWN PEOPLE.

A.BURNET: THERE IS A VIEW THAT ONE SHOULD NOT HUMILIATE ONE'S OPPONENT, THAT MERELY MAKES LIFE DIFFICULT FOR EVERYONE.

MRS.THATCHER: I'M NOT TRYING TO HUMILIATE ANYWAEED ANYONE, I'M JUST TRYING TO REPOSSESS ISLANDS WHICH ARE BRITISH SOVEREIGN TERRITORY FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE BRITISH, TO HAVE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, TO LIVE THEIR OWN WAY OF LIFE UNDER A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN CHOICE. THAT'S NOT HUMILIATION, THAT IS LIBERTY, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY.

A.BURNET: YOU'VE SAID BEFORE THAT THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS SHOULD BE PARAMOUNT - IS PARAMOUNT STILL THE RIGHT WORD?

MRS.THATCHER: SELF-DETERMINATION IS THE RIGHT WORD. WE HAVE IT HERE, THE UNITED STATES HAVE IT, ALL DEMOCRACIES HAVE IT, WHERE YOU HAVE AN ISLAND THAT IS PEOPLED, HAS BEEN PEOPLED FOR A VERY LONG TIME AND AFTER ALL THE BRITISH PEOPLE DIDN'T DISPLACE ANY INDIGENOUS POPULATION, THEY WENT THERE, SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN THERE FOR SEVEN GENERATIONS. WHAT WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THERE IS THAT THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THE WAY OF LIFE WHICH THEY HAVE HAD.

A.BURNET: THE IDEA OF SOME SORT OF SHARED SOVEREIGNTY WITH ARGENTINE HAS BEEN TAKEN UP AND AT LEAST DISCUSSED BY GOVERNMENT. IS THAT IN THE BACK OF YOUR MIND NOW?

MRS.THATCHER: NO, I DON'T BELIEVE FOR ONE MOMENT THAT AFTER WHAT PEOPLE HAVE EXPERIENCED THEY WOULD SEE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AS PLAYING ANY PART IN THEIR FUTURE. THEY DIDN'T WANT IT BEFORE, THEY WOULD NOT EVEN CONSIDER A VERY LONG LEASE OF SAY 250 YEARS, THEY SAID 'NO, WE WANT TO STAY WITH OUR BRITISH WAY OF LIFE'. NOW THAT THEY HAVE EXPERIENCED WHAT IT'S LIKE TO LIVE WITH THE ARGENTINES ON THE ISLANDS I THINK THAT THEIR HOSTILITY TO THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE EVEN GREATER.

A.BURNET: - IT WOULD BE SURPRISING IF THERE WERE NOT DIVISIONS OF OPINION AMONG YOUR OWN ADVISERS ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE MILITARY ACTION IS OVER. HOW SERIOUS ARE THOSE DIVISIONS?

MRS.THATCHER: DIVISIONS OF OPINION, I KNOW WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO NOW ARE TWO THINGS, WELL, THREE THINGS REALLY. FIRST, WHEN THE ISLANDS HAVE BEEN REPOSSESSED, AND THERE IS STILL, AS YOU SAY, A VERY BIG COULD BE LENGTHY BATTLE AHEAD, IF THE ARGENTINES DON'T WITHDRAW. THAT HAS TO BE COMPLETED AND THE ISLANDS REPOSSESSED. WE ARE NOW THINKING OF THE REHABILITATION, REPAIR, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT THAT MUST TAKE PLACE. THAT WILL TAKE QUITE A TIME. I HAVE ASKED LORD SHACKLETON WHO DID A WONDERFUL REPORT IN 1976, WHICH ALAS WE DID NOT FULLY FOLLOW UP, TO UPDATE HIS PROPOSALS IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SO THAT WE WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO GO ON TO DEVELOP THE RESOURCES OF THOSE ISLANDS.

THIRDLY WE'LL THEN HAVE TO CONSIDER THE WHOLE FUTURE WITH THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS, OF WHETHER WE CAN BRING THEM TO FULL I DEPENDENCE OR SOME KIND OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, AND FOURTHLY, WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO GET SOME ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE WILL HAVE TO STAY THERE FOR SOME TIME BUT WE WILL WANT SOME OTHER HELP FROM OTHER NATIONS - AFTER ALL WHEN THE UNITED STATES ASKED US TO GO AND JOIN THEM WITH A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IN SINAI, WE DID IT. THAT'S THE KIND OF THING THAT I AM THINKING OF.

WE SAID 'YES' TO THEM AND I THINK THAT THEY ARE NATURALLY INTERESTED AND I THINK PERHAPS THEY AND SOME OTHER NATIONS WOULD HELP. IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE GET SECURITY FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS IF WE'RE TO GET THE CAPITAL TO GO THERE TO DEVELOP THE ISLANDS TO GIVE GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PEOPLE. SO WE HAVE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, THE REPOSSESSION, AND ALL OF THE OTHER THINGS THAT WE ARE THINKING OF. OH, THERE ARE VARIATIONS IN VIEW, THERE ARE MANY THINGS THAT YOU CAN DO BUT NOT FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION IN ANY WAY, ONLY HOW CAN WE BEST DO IT.

A. BURNET: WOULD YOU CONSIDER A PART FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, SAY, IN THE FUTURE SUPERVISION OF THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS?

MRS. THATCHER: THAT WOULD BE POSSIBLE BUT I THINK ONCE WE HAVE REPOSSESSED THE ISLANDS, I THINK IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DO IT BY A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE OF THE KIND WHICH I HAVE INDICATED.

A. BURNET: IT IS SUGGESTED THAT ARGENTINA MIGHT NOT ACCEPT A MILITARY DEFEAT, WOULD SIMPLY GO ON TRYING TO BOMB THE ISLANDS AND THEREBY WAIT AND PREPARE UNTIL BRITAIN WAS CAUGHT NAPPING AGAIN.

MRS. THATCHER: THAT IS EXACTLY WHY WE ARE SPENDING SOME CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TIME ON THINKING HOW BEST TO SECURE THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE SECURED AGAINST INVASION BY SEA, OR INVASION BY AIR AND I THINK THAT'S WHY IT'S IMPORTANT TO HAVE MORE THAN ONE NATION INVOLVED IN THEIR SECURITY.

A. BURNET: WOULD YOU THINK OF A MILITARY BASE THERE WHICH A NUMBER OF NATIONS MIGHT USE?

MRS. THATCHER: WELL, WE HAD A VERY VERY TINY LITTLE GARRISON, OBVIOUSLY THERE HAS TO BE FAR MORE THERE THAN THERE WAS IN THE PAST, YOU HAVE TO THINK OF THE TWO THINGS: PROTECTION AGAINST INVASION BY SEA AND OF COURSE I BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE TO LENGTHEN THE AIR STRIP, AS A MATTER OF FACT IF WE HAD LENGTHENED THE AIR STRIP BEFORE AND IT HAD NOT BEEN DEFENDED THE INVASION WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN EASIER. BUT LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY, WE'RE VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE PROBLEM, IT MUSTN'T HAPPEN AGAIN, WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO GET THE CAPITAL TO DEVELOP THE MANY RESOURCES THAT WE COULD DEVELOP AND WE HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW TO DO IT, FIRST, WITH OTHER NATIONS, A POSSIBLE UNITED NATIONS FORCE BUT THE UNITED NATIONS IS ALREADY VERY HEAVILY INVOLVED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, SO IF WE COULD DO IT THROUGH A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE I THINK THAT WOULD BE THE BEST THING.

A. BURNET: WHAT ODEEE DO YOU THINK OF THE UNITED STATES PART IN THIS CRISIS SO FAR? HAS AMERICA REALLY BEEN A GOOD ALLY?

MRS. THATCHER: THE UNITED STATES IS AS STAUNCH IN THE PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY AS THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IN HER HEARTS OF HEARTS SHE KNEW AND ALWAYS KNEW THAT THERE COULD NEVER BEN ANY NEUTRALITY BETWEEN THE MILITARY JUNTA AND DEMOCRACY. WHAT SHE HAD HOPED TO DO WAS TO TRY TO SECURE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES WITHOUT A BATTLE. WE'RE VERY GRATEFUL TO HER FOR MAKING THAT EFFORT, IT WAS NOT HER FAULT THAT IT DID NOT SUCCEED, IT WAS THE FAULT OF THE ARGENTINES. SHE MADE THE EFFORT, WE TRIED TOO. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS MADE THE EFFORT BUT HE COULD NOT SUCCEED IN GETTING THE ARGENTINES TO WITHDRAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT RESOLUTION. THE FAULT LIES, NOT WITH THE UNITED STATES, NOR WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THEIR EFFORTS WERE SPLENDID, IT LIES WITH AN INVADER WHO'S DETERMINED O TO TRY TO KEEP THE FRUITS OF INVASION AS A CONDITION OF WITHDRAWAL. THAT WAS AND REMAINS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

A. BURNET: AND DO YOU THINK OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS HAVE BEHAVED AS TRUE ALLIES SHOULD?

MRS. THATCHER: THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY SPLENDID RIGHT AT THE BEGINNING WHEN THEY AGREED TO PUT ON A BAN AGAINST ARGENTINE IMPORTS, AGREED NOT TO EXPORT ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THEY ACTED SWIFTLY, IT HELPED TREMENDOUSLY, ALONG WITH THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE WORLD THAT WE WERE RIGHT AND THE ARGENTINE WAS WRONG, IT WAS AS CLEAR CUT AS THAT. WE ARE RIGHT, THEY ARE WRONG. WE ARE THE VICTIMS, THEY ARE THE AGGRESSORS AND I THINK THEY HAVE BEHAVED EXTREMELY WELL. OF COURSE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT NEITHER ITALY, NOR IRELAND, CO-OPERATED TO THE FULL IN EXTENDING THOSE SANCTIONS BUT WE'RE VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE OTHERS FOR REMAINING STANCCCH AND TRUE AND FRANCE AND GERMANY LED - AND HOLLAND - WERE LED ON THIS BUT THEY DIDN'T HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THE OTHERS TO FOLLOW.

A. BURNET: HAVE YOU CHANGED YOUR MIND ABOUT THE MEDIA'S COVERAGE OF THE FALKLANDS?

MRS. THATCHER: I HAD ONE OR TWO RATHER ACID THINGS TO SAY ABOUT CERTAIN PROGRAMMES, I NOTICE THAT OTHER PEOPLE HAD ACID THINGS TO SAY ABOUT THOSE PARTICULAR PROGRAMMES, MAY I SAY THAT I THINK SINCE THEN IT IS VERY MUCH BETTER. I THINK IN THE EARLY DAYS THERE WAS A PROBLEM, I THINK SOME OF YOUR PEOPLE DIDN'T FULLY REALISE THAT IF YOU ARE FIGHTING A BATTLE IN SOUTH GEORGIA AND SO ON - WE HADN'T PERHAPS MADE PROVISION FOR GETTING PHOTOGRAPHS HOME, WE THOUGHT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS TO WIN THE BATTLES, TO REPOSSESS AND WE HADN'T PUT THE EQUIPMENT DOWN THERE TO GET PHOTOGRAPHS HOME. UNDOUBTEDLY IN THE EARLY DAYS THAT CAUSED A PROBLEM BECAUSE WE WERE GETTING THE ACTUAL NEWS BUT WE WEREN'T GETTING THE PHOTOGRAPHS AS YOU WERE GETTING THEM FROM THE ARGENTINE WHICH WAS MUCH CLOSER. I HOPE THE CO-OPERATION IS VERY MUCH BETTER NOW. IT WAS OUR DECISION, YOU KNOW, TO PUT CORRESPONDENTS ON BOARD THE SHIPS - I THINK SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN VERY VERY HELPFUL INDEED AND GIVEN VERY VERY VIVID ACCOUNTS AND HELPED US TO KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON, SO I HOPE ALL IS WLRKING WELL.... WE ALL STAND FOR THE SAME THINGS, WE ALL BELIEVE IN THE SAME THINGS AND YOU COULDN'T DO WITHOUT THAT LIBERTY WHICH IS PART OF OUR TRADITION.

A. BURNET: FINALLY, DO YOU THINK THAT THE BODIES OF THE BRITISH FORCES SHOULD BE BROUGHT HOME FOR BURIAL?

MRS. THATCHER: I KNOW THAT THERE'S QUITE A LOT OF STRONG FEELING ABOUT THIS AND I THINK THE OTHER SIDE HAS BEEN PUT TODAY, THAT USUALLY THE SOLDIERS ARE BURIED ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE, THAT

HOW THE BATTLE IS WON, I THINK EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE IMPLRTANT THING IS TO TRHTO WIN IT AND THEN WHEREVER WE'VE BEEN WE'VE HAD THE MOST WONDERFUL COMMONWEALTH CEMETRIES WHICH ARE LOOKED AFTER BEAUTIFULLY. I HAVE VISITED SOME AND THEY'RE LOOKED AFTER FOR EVER AND HONOUR IS DONE TO EACH AND EVERY PERSON WHO'S FALLEN IN A SEPARATE GRAVE AND OF COURSE ONE ALWAYS TRIED TO ENABLE THE RELATIVES TO GO THERE. THE SAILORS ARE BURIED AT SEA AND THE AIRCRAFTMEN WERE WHERE THEY FALL. IF HOWEVER PEOPLE DO FEEL VERY STRONGLY THEN OF COURSE WE'D HAVE TO TAKE THEIR FEELINGS INTO ACCOUNT. IF MOST OF THM FEEL THAT THE TRADITION SHOULD OBTAIN IT WILL BE HONOURED WITH GREAT DIGNITY AND IF THEY WANT TO GO AND SEE, AS OF COURSE THEY WOULD SO WOULD I, WE'LL MANAGE WITH THE HELP OF THE TREASURY AND THE M.O.D. TO GET THEM THERE, TO REASSURE THEM. AND OF COURSE THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS WOULD GIVE THEM A WONDERFUL WELCOME BECAUSE THEY KNOW THE SACRIFICES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THEM AND I WOULD JUST LIKE THE RELATIVES TO KNOW WYEEE WHY THEIR LOVED ONES FELL - THEY FELL IN THE CAUSE OF LIERTY, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY.

A. BURNET: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

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INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 1971: FALKLANDS

1. WHEN YOU CALL ON PRESIDENT REAGAN, PLEASE SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HAVE ASKED YOU TO TELL HIM ONCE AGAIN BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR EUROPE HOW VERY GREATLY WE APPRECIATE ALL THE SUPPORT WHICH WE HAVE RECEIVED AND ARE CONTINUING TO RECEIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS PERIOD. THE VERY CLOSE DIALOGUE WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN WITH HAIG, CLARK AND OTHERS HAS BEEN INVALUABLE. THE PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE OPEN BRACKETS YOUR TELNO 1977 CLOSE BRACKETS WHICH THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE AVAILABLE HAS FACILITATED OUR OPERATIONS AS NOTHING ELSE COULD HAVE DONE. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED TO THE UNITED STATES BY ARGENTINA'S ATTACK ON THE FALKLANDS OPEN BRACKETS YOUR TELNO 1978 CLOSE BRACKETS ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. THE POSITION OF PRINCIPLE TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF, AND ESPECIALLY HIS PUBLIC INSISTENCE THAT AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO PAY HAS BEEN AND REMAINS AN IMMENSELY BENEFICIAL INFLUENCE.
2. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO SAY THAT WE LOOK FORWARD GREATLY TO OUR FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS IN VERSAILLES AND LONDON. WE HAD TO CONCLUDE IN RESPONSE TO HAIG'S MOST RECENT SUGGESTIONS THAT THESE COULD NOT BE PURSUED SO LONG AS ARGENTINA CONTINUES TO ATTACH CONDITIONS TO COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 502. IT WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ARGENTINE COMMANDER TO EFFECT AN HONOURABLE WITHDRAWAL, AND THUS PROBABLY TO SAVE MANY LIVES. UNFORTUNATELY, WE SEE NO SIGN THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE PREPARED TO DO THIS. WE CONSIDER THAT THE BEST HOPE LIES IN LEAVING THEM TO CONFRONT THE CHOICE THEMSELVES. WE HAD

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TO REFLECT THIS VIEW IN OUR RESPONSE TO HAIG, AS WE SHALL NOW HAVE TO ANALYSE IT IN OUR RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN.

1. IN OUR CONVERSATIONS AT VERSAILLES AND IN LONDON WE SHALL HAVE TO DECIDE UPON IN WHICH WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO TRY TO BRING DOWN VERY HOSTILITIES TO A COMPLETE CEASEFIRE AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM PORT STANLEY, AND THAT THE NEXT PERIOD IS ONE OF REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, WITH THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND NOT ONE OF CONTINUING BITTERNESS AND HOSTILITY.

WE SHALL VALUE THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER THROUGHOUT THAT PERIOD JUST AS WE HAVE VALUED AMERICAN SUPPORT AND THE SUSTAINED CONSULTATIONS FROM WHICH WE HAVE BENEFITED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS.

PYM

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- HD/DEF D
- HD/PLANNING STAFF
- HD/UND
- HD/NEWS D
- HD/ERD
- HD/ECD (E)
- HD/FUSD
- DEF HD/FUSD
- HD/RES D
- PS
- PS/MR HURD
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- PS/LORD BELSTREAD
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- MR COLVIN
- DIO
- MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
- ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
- SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
- DIRECTOR G C H Q

CABINET OFFICE

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cc Econ Pol. Pt 7
Versailles Summit

CABINET OFFICE
70 WHITEHALL
LONDON SW1A 2AS

Not dealt
with Econ Pol

2nd June 1982

01-XXXXXXXX 233 8378

Ref: B06511

7A

Dear Andrew,

Falklands: Briefing for Versailles Summit

This letter is simply to confirm Robert Wade Gery's telephone conversation with you this morning.

Contrary to earlier indications No. 10 have today told us that they would like briefing provided for the Prime Minister's use at Versailles covering the attitude of each of our six Versailles partners to the Falklands crisis. This should be supported by relevant documents, eg the text of Security Council resolutions, Haig proposals, etc. There is no need to cast it in the normal form of a brief, and a Line to Take will not be necessary. To save time it should not be processed through our numbered briefing series here but might conveniently take the form of a private secretary letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's office to No. 10, with copies to the Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office.

Such a letter will of course need clearance in advance with the Ministry of Defence and should, for the Prime Minister's convenience, include material which is primarily on their side of the house, eg facts about United States military and logistic assistance and about French and other help with countering Argentine efforts on arms procurement.

Yours ever

David

A D S GOODALL

R A Burns Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

cc Mr Coles, No. 10
Mr Webb, MOD
Mrs McGraffin

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Argentina

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 HOURS : 2 JUNE 1982

Military Action

1. The Ministry of Defence announced that initial estimates indicated that some 250 Argentine personnel were killed in the repossession of Darwin and Goose Green. Funeral arrangements are being made in accordance with Article 17 of the 1949 Geneva Convention.
2. Included in the weapons and equipment captured at Goose Green airstrip were two nearly complete Pucara aircraft, 20 mm cannon and 2.75 inch rockets.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

3. No declaration has yet been adopted at the NAM meeting in Havana. Both the Cubans and the Argentines have, however, tabled texts which are hostile to the UK. These texts are being resisted by a group of mainly African countries and, as a consequence, the Cubans are reported to be seeking some form of compromise.

2 June 1982

Emergency Unit

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FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :
0700 HOURS, 2 JUNE 1982

UN

(a) Sir A Parsons' Discussion with Secretary-General and his Staff

: (FCO telno. 1. Sir A Parsons spoke as instructed. The Secretary-General
88 to UKMIS was disheartened by our 'clarifications'. In a wide-ranging
New York) discussion the Secretary-General and his staff raised a number
: (UKMIS New of points:-
ork telno.
06)

(a) Ceasefire

Even if we could not accept UN observers, could we not accept some UN presence in negotiations between the military commanders on the spot?

(b) Administration

Would it be possible to refrain from sending the Governor back? Could a military officer be appointed, on an interim basis, to carry out the functions of the Governor during the cooling-off period?

(c) Observers

Could we accept that in the closing stages of the Argentine withdrawal UN observers should 'begin to trickle in' so that by the time of complete Argentine withdrawal there would be a small core of UN observers who would monitor non-re-introduction of Argentine forces and the gradual running down of the British military presence?

Sir A Parsons said he was prepared, without commitment, to ask London's views on these points.

(b) Argentine Views

: (UKMIS New 2. The Secretariat reported that the Argentines could accept
ork telno. the Secretary-General's 5 point plan on condition that:-
99 para 5)

(i) Point 3 means token commencement of the withdrawal but the completion of the total British withdrawal would be within Y days;

(ii) it is clearly understood that British forces would not remain alone on the Islands: withdrawal of Argentine forces from the areas they occupy should correspond with a gradual take-over of those areas by UN forces;

(iii) British forces shall abstain from widening their areas of occupation at the date of ceasefire.

Our Mission said that these conditions were not acceptable.

(c) Likely Developments Today

3. The Secretary-General has asked the Argentines and us to respond to the ideas at paragraph 1 by 1600Z today. On the assumption that neither side can agree quickly to these new points and that Argentine conditions concerning the Secretary-General's 5 point plan are unacceptable, the Secretary-General will report to the Security Council today that his efforts have been unsuccessful. He will not include the text of the Secretary of State's message of 31 May. There will be informal Security Council consultations at 1500Z today.

: (FCO tel.
o.485 to UKMIS
New York)

(d) Sir A Parsons' Recommendations

:(UKMIS New
York telno.
X07)

4. (i) For tactical reasons, and with the Secretary-General's Report in mind, we should provide comments on questions (a) and (c) at paragraph 1 and while it may be difficult, any comments on (b) would be useful. (ii) That we should give Sir A Parsons discretion to float amongst delegations, as he thinks fit, a draft Resolution. The objective would not be to table it (unless it seemed likely to be adopted) but rather to indicate to the moderate states what in practice would be acceptable to us in terms of a ceasefire, thereby influencing them and conceivably starting a negotiation which might buy us more time.

US

:(FCO telno.
090 to
Washington)
:(Washington
telno.1971)

(a) Sir N Henderson's Meeting with Judge Clark

5. Sir N Henderson explained our attitude on ceasefire, withdrawal, and the future. Judge Clark was somewhat equivocal about timing, though he gave the impression that the best moment would be immediately after the surrender of the Argentine garrison. Clark emphasised the strength of the President's support for us even though the President believes considerable damage has been done to US/Latin American relations. Clark has undertaken to arrange for Sir N Henderson to call on the President this morning.

:(Washington
telno.1974)
:(Washington
telno.1988)

(b) Sir N Henderson's Discussions with Mr Haig

6. Mr Haig is unable to come to London today. Mr Haig accepts that there is no point in pursuing further his ideas on the Falklands. But Haig is concerned about how to end the conflict after Argentine surrender. He does not believe independence is a viable option. At the UN he hopes we can avoid a situation in which the UK and the US are isolated. According to Haig, the President will wish to discuss with the Prime Minister ways of trying to mend fences with Latin America and preventing the Russians from exploiting the crisis. (The State Department has now suggested that the Prime Minister's meeting with the President might take place in Paris from 1530 to 1630 on 4 June.)

:(Washington
telno.1987)

:(Washington
telno.1977)

(c) Sir N Henderson's Assessment of US Support

7. Sir N Henderson reviews the way in which policy has been formulated and the scale of the support we have received. He judges that: we should not take US assistance for granted; constant work is necessary to keep the Administration, Congress and public opinion on the right lines; the value of US support is great.

Comment

8. With continued Argentine insistence on a total British withdrawal (even if apparently on a different time-scale to Argentine withdrawal), the Secretary General seems certain to report failure to the Security Council today. Informal consultations of the Council will begin at 1500Z today. These are expected to lead to a formal meeting of the Council in the afternoon, New York time. We need to give Sir A Parsons instructions by 1600Z, for his meeting with the Secretary General.

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
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9. These instructions will need to cover:

- (a) comments on the Secretary General's new points on UN participation in ceasefire negotiations, the future administration of the Islands and the timing of an observer presence (points (a), (b) and (c) of para 1 above of Sitrep). Sir A Parsons recognises that we may not want to give a specific reaction on the question of the Governor's return. But he recommends that for tactical reasons we should at least feed in comments on (a) and (c);
- (b) whether we should instruct him to say that the Argentine conditions on the Secretary General's Five Point Plan are unacceptable;
- (c) whether Sir A Parsons should have discretion to float our own draft Resolution in the Security Council.

10. Although Mr Haig was unable to stop over in London today, Sir N Henderson has asked to see President Reagan before the latter's departure for Europe. We shall need to consider whether he should have further instructions for this meeting (eg at least to inform the President of the position we shall be taking with the Secretary General and in the Security Council). We shall need to work hard to retain American support in the Council and Mr Haig has emphasised to our Ambassador his hope that we can again 'manoeuvre' to avoid US and UK isolation at the UN.

11. We need also to respond to the State Department's new proposal for the timing of a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister in Paris.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

2 June 1982

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ZP UKMIS NEW YORK
OO WASHINGTON

11 JUN 1982

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TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 488 OF 1 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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YOUR TELNOS 899 AND 900; FALKLANDS; SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S FIVE-POINT PLAN IS CERTAINLY UNACCEPTABLE AS IT STANDS. BUT I AGREE THAT WITHOUT RAISING FALSE HOPES OR MISREPRESENTING OUR POSITION YOU SHOULD GIVE HIM A REASONED RESPONSE ON THE LINES YOU PROPOSE. WE ASSUME THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS OBLIGED BY PARA 5 OF RESOLUTION 505 TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL TOMORROW, 2 JUNE, BUT HOPE THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS TACTIC, TOGETHER WITH EITHER EQUIVOCATION OR DILATORINESS ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINES, HIS REPORT MIGHT FALL SHORT OF DRAWING A LINE UNDER HIS PRESENT EFFORTS. THUS ENCOURAGING AT LEAST SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO ARGUE THAT HE SHOULD MERELY BE MANDATED TO CONTINUE HIS NEGOTIATIONS. THE POINTS TO MAKE HAVE ALREADY BEEN LARGELY COVERED IN YOUR CONVERSATION WITH DE SOTO.
2. YOU SHOULD TELL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT WHILE OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS PLAN GIVE US DIFFICULTY WE APPROVE THE EMPHASIS ON TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME. WE LOOK FORWARD TO LEARNING OF THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE. MEANWHILE WE HAVE A NUMBER OF COMMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION.
3. YOU COULD PRESS THE SECRETARIAT ON THE MODALITIES FOR A CEASEFIRE AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE EVENT OF A BREACH. OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT AT THIS STAGE A CEASEFIRE CAN ONLY BE SATISFACTORILY WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US THAT OUR HANDS SHOULD BE IN ANY WAY TIED EITHER BY THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION OR BY THE PRESENCE OF UN OBSERVERS (PARAGRAPH 7 OF YOUR TELNO 899). (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY, WE COULD NOT (NOT) ACCEPT UN OBSERVERS.) WE COULD NOT STAND IDLY BY WHILE ARGENTINE FORCES, IN BREACH OF WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS,

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RETAINED CONTROL OF ANY PART OF THE FALKLANDS.

4. YOU SHOULD REMIND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT OUR POSITION ON BRITISH WITHDRAWAL IS THAT WE CANNOT NOW ACCEPT THAT WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL WITH ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. YOU MAY HOWEVER SAY THAT ONCE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL HAS TAKEN PLACE WE SHOULD NATURALLY WISH TO REDUCE THE BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE IN AND AROUND THE ISLANDS FROM ITS PRESENT LEVEL AT A TIME OF OUR CHOOSING AND AS AN ACT OF OUR OWN VOLITION PROVIDED THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS IS SATISFACTORILY ASSURED. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THIS POSITION, YOU SHOULD PRESS THE SECRETARIAT TO SAY WHAT THEY MEAN BY 'TOKEN' BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. HOW WOULD SUCH WITHDRAWAL BE GRADUATED THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL?

5. WITH REGARD TO POINT 5 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PLAN, YOU MAY SAY THAT WE STAND BY PARAGRAPH 3 OF SCR 502. BUT, AS YOU MADE CLEAR IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON SCR 505, WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE POSITION REACHED IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS IS ANY LONGER RELEVANT. THOSE NEGOTIATIONS IN ANY CASE RELATED TO AN INTERIM PERIOD, NOT TO THE LONGER TERM, WITH WHICH PARA 3 OF SCR 502 WAS CONCERNED. SCR 505 THEREFORE PROVIDES NO RELEVANT 'FRAMEWORK'. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE UNTIL THE ISLANDS HAVE RETURNED TO NORMAL AND THE ISLANDERS HAVE HAD TIME TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE. THIS COOLING-OFF PERIOD CAN ONLY BEGIN AFTER ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IT IS IN ANY CASE ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NOTHING ON NEGOTIATIONS IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE ARGENTINES COULD USE AS AN EXCUSE FOR DELAYING THE COMPLETION OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 020118Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 906 OF 1 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 488: FALKLANDS: SECRETARY-GENERAL

SUMMARY

1. I ACTED THIS AFTERNOON (1 JUNE) ON THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS DISHEARTENED BY THEM. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION CERTAIN IDEAS EMERGED WHICH I UNDERTOOK TO PUT TO YOU OVERNIGHT. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SUBSEQUENTLY SAW ROS WHO SAID THAT ARGENTINA COULD ACCEPT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S FIVE-POINT PLAN ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS THAT WOULD CLEARLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. PEREZ DE CUELLAR RECOGNISES THAT HIS CURRENT EFFORTS HAVE COME TO AN END. HE WILL SO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOMORROW (2 JUNE). THERE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE AN IMMEDIATE FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT 1930Z. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD HAD ANY RESPONSE FROM THE ARGENTINES TO HIS FIVE-POINT PLAN. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SEEING ROS IN A HOUR'S TIME. MEANWHILE, THE ARGENTINES HAD TOLD HIM THAT "THEY WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ON THAT BASIS". HE TOOK THIS TO MEAN THAT THEY AGREED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW FIRST. I THEN SAID THAT WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S CONTINUING EFFORTS. YOU APPROVED THE EMPHASIS IN HIS PLAN ON TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD. BUT IT WAS YOUR FIRM VIEW THAT, NOW THAT OUR AND ARGENTINE FORCES WERE LOCKED IN COMBAT ON EAST FALKLAND, A CEASEFIRE COULD ONLY BE WORKED OUT BY THE COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. I DREW AN ANALOGY WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS AT KILOMETRE 101 WHICH HAD LED TO A CEASEFIRE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL IN OCTOBER 1973. I THEN EXPLAINED WHY WE COULD NOT ACCEPT UN OBSERVERS AND ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE ARGENTINES WERE TO STOP THEIR WITHDRAWAL ON THE PRETEXT OF ALLEGED BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE BY US. WOULD NOT THE WHOLE

SPOT. I DREW AN ANALOGY WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS AT KILOMETRE 101 WHICH HAD LED TO A CEASEFIRE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL IN OCTOBER 1973. I THEN EXPLAINED WHY WE COULD NOT ACCEPT UN OBSERVERS AND ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE ARGENTINES WERE TO STOP THEIR WITHDRAWAL ON THE PRETEXT OF ALLEGED BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE BY US. WOULD NOT THE WHOLE STRUCTURE COLLAPSE? LIKE DE SOTO LAST NIGHT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD NO ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

3. I THEN MADE THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELNO 488. IN REPLY TO OUR QUESTIONS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND A WAY OF ENABLING THE ARGENTINE LEADERS TO SAVE FACE VIS AS VIS THEIR OWN PUBLIC. DE SOTO ADDED THAT FOR THIS REASON THE ARGENTINES WOULD HAVE TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE BEGINNING (REPEAT BEGINNING) OF BOTH SIDES' WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US.

4. I NEXT MADE THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELNO 488. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT THE UK WAS NO LONGER COMMITTED BY WHAT WE HAD AGREED TO DURING THE PREVIOUS ROUND. BUT SURELY WE DID NOT EXCLUDE CONSIDERING SOME OF THOSE POINTS AGAIN. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT A QUESTION THAT I COULD ANSWER DIRECTLY.

5. AT THIS POINT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS CLEARLY DEPRESSED BY THE "CLARIFICATIONS" I HAD GIVEN HIM AND WAS ON THE POINT OF SAYING THAT HE DID NOT FEEL HE COULD CARRY ON. HOWEVER DE SOTO, WHO DISPLAYED TODAY MORE ENTHUSIASM THAN PEREZ DE CUELLAR FOR KEEPING THE LATTER'S EFFORTS GOING, LAUNCHED US INTO A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF:

- (A) THE PART THAT THE UN COULD PLAY IN BRINGING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND THE BEGINNING OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL;
- (B) WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN DURING THE COOLING OFF PERIOD REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

I MADE CLEAR THAT MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS DISCUSSION WAS ENTIRELY WITHOUT COMMITMENT.

6. DE SOTO TOOK UP MY REFERENCE TO THE KILOMETRE 101 NEGOTIATIONS IN 1973. MAYBE WE COULD NOT ACCEPT UN OBSERVERS. BUT COULD WE NOT ACCEPT SOME UN PRESENCE IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT? PEREZ DE CUELLAR ADDED THAT AS A LATIN AMERICAN HE WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR THE ARGENTINES TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE IF A THIRD PARTY WAS PRESENT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. UN OFFICIALS COULD PLAY A PART, AS THEY HAD AT KILOMETRE 101.

IN 1973. MAYBE WE COULD NOT ACCEPT UN OBSERVERS. BUT COULD WE NOT ACCEPT SOME UN PRESENCE IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT? PEREZ DE CUELLAR ADDED THAT AS A LATIN AMERICAN HE WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR THE ARGENTINES TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE IF A THIRD PARTY WAS PRESENT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. UN OFFICIALS COULD PLAY A PART, AS THEY HAD AT KILOMETRE 101.

7. SECONDLY, DE SOTO SAID THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR THE ARGENTINES TO SAVE FACE IF THE STATUS QUO ANTE WAS NOT PRECISELY RESTORED. HE ACCEPTED THAT YOU WERE DETERMINED TO RESTORE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION AND A FULL ROLE FOR THE ELECTED COUNCILS. BUT WOULD IT AT LEAST BE POSSIBLE NOT TO SEND THE GOVERNOR BACK? FOR INSTANCE, COULD A MILITARY OFFICER BE APPOINTED, ON AN INTERIM BASIS, TO CARRY OUT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR DURING THE COOLING OFF PERIOD?

8. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED WHETHER OUR OBJECTION WAS TO UN OBSERVERS OR TO ANY OBSERVERS. I SAID THAT WE SAW OVERRIDING OBJECTIONS TO INTRODUCING ANY OBSERVERS BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINE FORCES WHEN WE HAD NO REASON TO TRUST THE ARGENTINES AND FEARED THAT THEY WOULD GO BACK ON ANY AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW. DE SOTO ASKED WHETHER, AGAIN TO HELP THE ARGENTINES, WE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THAT IN THE CLOSING STAGES OF AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL UN OBSERVERS SHOULD "BEGIN TO TRICKLE IN". HIS IDEA SEEMED TO BE THAT BY THE TIME THE ARGENTINES HAD WITHDRAWN COMPLETELY THERE WOULD BE A SMALL CORE OF UN OBSERVERS ON THE ISLANDS WHO WOULD MONITOR NON-REINTRODUCTION OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND THE GRADUAL RUNNING DOWN OF THE BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE: THIS IMPLIES THAT A PHASED RUNDOWN OF BRITISH FORCES WOULD HAVE BEEN AGREED IN ADVANCE, PERHAPS WITH A SUCCESSION OF CEILINGS WHICH WOULD BE LOWERED FROM TIME TO TIME.

9. AT THE END OF THE MEETING I SAID THAT I WANTED TO EMPHASISE THAT WE WERE NOT OUT TO HUMILIATE ARGENTINA. EVEN THOUGH A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TOMORROW LOOKED INEVITABLE, AND A UK VETO QUITE LIKELY, I DID NOT SEE WHY THIS NEED BE AN END TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS. I DID NOT KNOW HOW YOU WOULD REACT TO THE VARIOUS IDEAS THAT HAD EMERGED FROM THE DISCUSSION (IE THOSE IN PARAGRAPHS 6 TO 8 ABOVE) BUT I WAS PREPARED, WITHOUT COMMITMENT, TO SEEK YOUR VIEWS ON THEM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ACCEPTED THAT THESE IDEAS HAD NO STATUS AT PRESENT BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY THEM OUT ON ROS AND LET ME KNOW HIS REACTION. WHEN HE HAD SEEN ROS (20452) HE WOULD MAKE AN IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER IT WAS WORTH PURSUING HIS EFFORTS.

(IE THOSE IN PARAGRAPHS 6 TO 8 ABOVE) BUT I WAS PREPARED, WITHOUT COMMITMENT, TO SEEK YOUR VIEWS ON THEM. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ACCEPTED THAT THESE IDEAS HAD NO STATUS AT PRESENT BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY THEM OUT ON ROS AND LET ME KNOW HIS REACTION. WHEN HE HAD SEEN ROS (2045Z) HE WOULD MAKE AN IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER IT WAS WORTH PURSUING HIS EFFORTS.

10. AFTER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH ROS, DE SOTO ASKED GOULDING TO SEE HIM. HE SAID THAT ROS HAD GIVEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR A PIECE OF PAPER IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS (SECRETARIAT'S TRANSLATION):

'THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IF:

- (1) POINT 3 MEANS THE TOKEN COMMENCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL BUT THE COMPLETION OF THE TOTAL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL, WHATEVER ITS RHYTHM, WOULD BE WITHIN Y DAYS;
- (2) IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT IN NO CASE WOULD BRITISH FORCES REMAIN ALONE ON THE ISLANDS. THE BLUE HELMETS SHOULD BE ON THE ISLANDS BEFORE THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES. THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM SHOULD CORRESPOND WITH A GRADUAL TAKEOVER OF CONTROL OF THOSE AREAS BY BLUE HELMETS;
- (3) THE BRITISH FORCES SHALL ABSTAIN FROM WIDENING THEIR AREAS OF OCCUPATION AT THE DATE OF CEASEFIRE.''

GOULDING SAID THAT WHAT THIS AMOUNTED TO WAS THAT A DATE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED FOR THE COMPLETION OF TOTAL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL AND THAT BRITISH FORCES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE WHOLE OF THE ISLANDS. THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US.

11. DE SOTO WENT ON TO SAY THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOLD ROS OF THE IDEAS WHICH HAD EMERGED FROM HIS EARLIER DISCUSSION WITH ME. ROS HAD AGREED, WITHOUT ANY ENTHUSIASM, TO PASS THESE TO BUENOS AIRES AND SEEK THEIR REACTION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD SAID THAT, AS HIS WEEK WOULD EXPIRE AT 1800Z ON 2 JUNE, HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR BUENOS AIRES' REACTION BY 1600Z THAT DAY. THROUGH DE SOTO, HE PUT THE SAME REQUEST TO ME.

12. DE SOTO SAID THAT, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE CONDITIONS (PARA 10 ABOVE) AND THAT NEITHER YOU NOR BUENOS AIRES WOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE QUICKLY TO THE IDEAS THAT HAD EMERGED THIS AFTERNOON, PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD SUBMIT HIS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT LUNCH TIME TOMORROW (2 JUNE). IT WOULD BE A BRIEF NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF HIS CONTACTS AND WOULD STATE HIS CONCLUSION THAT THE BASIS DID NOT AT PRESENT EXIST FOR NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE. HE WOULD NOT (NOT) INCLUDE THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE OF

ABLE TO ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE CONDITIONS (PARA 10 ABOVE) AND THAT NEITHER YOU NOR BUENOS AIRES WOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE QUICKLY TO THE IDEAS THAT HAD EMERGED THIS AFTERNOON, PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD SUBMIT HIS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT LUNCH TIME TOMORROW (2 JUNE). IT WOULD BE A BRIEF NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF HIS CONTACTS AND WOULD STATE HIS CONCLUSION THAT THE BASIS DID NOT AT PRESENT EXIST FOR NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE. HE WOULD NOT (NOT) INCLUDE THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE OF 31 MAY.

13. MEANWHILE, THE NEW PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (DE NANTEUIL, FRANCE), WITHOUT CONSULTING ME AND APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO PANAMANIAN PRESSURE, HAS CONVENEED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AT 1500Z TOMORROW (2 JUNE). HE EXPECTS TO PROCEED TO A FORMAL MEETING IN THE AFTERNOON AT WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL PRESENT HIS REPORT. HE HAS NO CLEAR IDEAS ABOUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN THEREAFTER AND DOES NOT ADMIT TO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE.

14. I RECOMMEND THAT, FOR TACTICAL REASONS AND WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S REPORT IN MIND, I SHOULD GIVE HIM COMMENTS ON THE POINTS IN PARAS 6 AND 8 ABOVE BY 1600Z ON 2 JUNE. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU MAY WELL NOT WISH ME TO COMMENT ON PARA 7 BUT ANYTHING I COULD SAY ON THIS QUESTION WOULD BE USEFUL.

15. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT I BE GIVEN DISCRETION TO FLOAT AMONGST DELEGATIONS AS I THINK FIT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MIFT. I WOULD NOT PROPOSE TO TABLE IT OR TO SEEK A VOTE ON IT, UNLESS, BY SOME MIRACLE, I THOUGHT IT LIKELY TO BE ADOPTED AS IT STOOD. MY PURPOSE WOULD BE TO INDICATE TO THOSE DELEGATIONS WHO INTENDED TO TABLE SIMPLE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS WHAT WOULD IN PRACTICE BE ACCEPTABLE TO US. THIS WOULD HELP TO BRING HOME TO THEM THE FACT THAT THEIR EFFORTS WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF A CEASEFIRE, RATHER THE OPPOSITE. THIS MIGHT MAKE SOME OF THE GENUINE MODERATES, EG JAPAN AND THE AFRICANS PLUS JORDAN, PAUSE BEFORE AGREEING TO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO A SIMPLE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT A NEGOTIATION MIGHT THEN START WHICH WOULD BUY US MORE TIME. I BELIEVE THAT THE PANAMANIAN OBJECTIVE IN TRYING TO FORCE A QUICK MEETING AND THEREAFTER A QUICK BRITISH VETO IS TO INFLUENCE THE NAM MEETING IN HAVANA.

PARSONS

E. R.

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
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31 MAY 1982

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DESKBY 010200Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010008Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 899 OF 31 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



YOUR TELNO 485; FALKLANDS; SECRETARY-GENERAL.

1. I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT 1900Z TODAY (31 MAY) ADDING THAT HE WAS FREE TO INCLUDE IT IN HIS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IF HE WISHED.

2. BEFORE THE MAIN MEETING (WHICH WAS A FORMALITY) HE HAD ASKED TO SEE ME ALONE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SEEING ROS AN HOUR LATER. IF HE DETECTED ANY SIGN OF CHANGE IN ROS'S ATTITUDE, HE WAS DISPOSED TO MAKE A FINAL ATTEMPT OVER THE NEXT TWO DAYS TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIVE PARAS 1 AND 2 OF SCR 502 (HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF PARALLEL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL) IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID WHAT LOOKED LIKE BEING A BLOODY BATTLE FOR STANLEY, WITH HEAVY CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES, FOLLOWING BY TOTAL ARGENTINE HUMILIATION. HE ASKED ME IF I COULD HINT AT ANYTHING BEYOND WHAT WAS IN YOUR MESSAGE E.G. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SHORT OR LONGER TERM. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT SPECULATE ON THESE LINES. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR HIM TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF THE ARGENTINES ALTERING THEIR POSITION.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TELEPHONED ME AFTER SEEING ROS TO ASK IF I WOULD RECEIVE DE SOTO IN MY MISSION; PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK US ON WHICH HE NEEDED CLARIFICATION.

4. DE SOTO TURNED UP ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER. IT EMERGED THAT A FIVE POINT PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TELEPHONED ME AFTER SEEING YOU TO ASK IF I WOULD RECEIVE DE SOTO IN MY MISSION: PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK US ON WHICH HE NEEDED CLARIFICATION.

4. DE SOTO TURNED UP ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER. IT EMERGED THAT A FIVE POINT PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND 505 (SEE NEXT PARAGRAPH) HAD BEEN PUT TO THE ARGENTINES WHO, AFTER LONG DELIBERATION AMONGST THEMSELVES, HAD AGREED TO FORWARD IT TO BUENOS AIRES. HOWEVER, ROS HAD NOT BROUGHT ANY FRESH INSTRUCTIONS TO DELIVER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: HE HAD CALLED ONLY TO HEAR OUR FINAL RESPONSE. HE HAD AGAIN SHOWN INTEREST IN THE SIXTH SENTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE AND HAD ASKED WHAT WE MEANT BY "THE LONGER TERM" AND "ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS".

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S FIVE POINT PLAN IS AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) AT TIME T A CEASEFIRE WOULD COME INTO FORCE AND BE MONITORED BY UN OBSERVERS;
- (2) AT TIME T PLUS 24 HOURS, ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 (I.E. TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL);
- (3) AT TIME T PLUS 24 HOURS, TOKEN BRITISH WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN (DE SOTO THOUGHT THAT "TOKEN" MIGHT MEAN THE REMOVAL OF ONE BATTALION).
- (4) (2) AND (3) ABOVE WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN 'X' DAYS;
- (5) NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SCR 505 (REPEAT 505).

6. I FIRST ADDRESSED ROS'S QUESTION ABOUT WHAT WE MEANT BY "THE LONGER TERM" AND "INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS". I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT PLANS YOU HAD IN MIND. HOWEVER, THINKING ALOUD AND PURELY ON A PERSONAL BASIS, I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT YOU ENVISAGED UN INVOLVEMENT IN THESE PROCESSES. MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT, ONCE PASSIONS HAD COOLED, THE PROBLEM WOULD BE BETTER DEALT WITH IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, NAMELY THE US AND OTHER IMPORTANT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. TO BE FRANK, HARKING BACK TO OUR PREVIOUS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, WE REGARDED THE UN AS HAVING COME CLOSE TO "PRE-JUDGING THE OUTCOME" THROUGH ITS ENDORSEMENT OF THE NAM'S SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. I WAS NOT SAYING THAT THIS DEALT THE UN OUT OF THE ACT IN ALL RESPECTS, BUT IT MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO REGARD IT AS AN IMPARTIAL ACTOR IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

7. WE THEN TURNED TO THE POINTS IN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S PLAN. I ASKED DE SOTO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE, THE UN OBSERVERS ARRIVED, AND THE ARGENTINES THEN REFUSED TO

RESPECTS, BUT IT MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO REGARD IT AS AN IMPARTIAL ACTOR IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

8. WE THEN TURNED TO THE POINTS IN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S PLAN. I ASKED DE SOTO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE, THE UN OBSERVERS ARRIVED, AND THE ARGENTINES THEN REFUSED TO WITHDRAW ON TRUMPED UP ALLEGATIONS THAT WE HAD BEEN IN SOME WAY CHEATING, E.G. THAT WE HAD BEEN REINFORCING, MOVING TROOPS FORWARD BY NIGHT ETC. HE HAD NO ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

8. WE THEN SMOKED HIM OUT ON THE REFERENCE TO SCR 505 IN POINT (5). HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS THE ONE ATTRACTIVE POINT FOR ARGENTINE IN THE WHOLE PACKAGE, I.E. THEY COULD USE THE REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 505 TO ARGUE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ENVISAGED IN POINT (5) WOULD BE ABOUT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, UN ADMINISTRATION ETC. WE MADE QUITE CLEAR TO DE SOTO THAT THESE CONCEPTS WERE NO LONGER ON THE TABLE SO FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED.

9. WE THEN MADE THE POINT THAT THERE COULD BE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN POINTS (1) - (4) ON THE ONE HAND AND POINT (5) ON THE OTHER: IF THERE WAS, WE WOULD BE BACK WHERE WE STARTED, I.E. BOGGED DOWN IN INTERMINABLE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. DE SOTO ACCEPTED THIS, MAKING THE GLOSS THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD PROBABLY WANT A CEREMONIAL OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS AS A FACE-SAVER AT SOME POINT DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD.

10. DE SOTO SUMMED UP PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S VIEWS AS FOLLOWS. POINTS (2) AND (4) WOULD GIVE US TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, WHEREAS POINT (3) (TOKEN BRITISH WITHDRAWAL) WOULD AMOUNT TO THE RESTORATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. HE BELIEVED THAT, IF THE ARGENTINES ACCEPTED THIS PACKAGE, THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SITUATION MENTIONED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE. HE HOPED THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO CONSIDER "THE LONGER TERM" MORE AS "THE NEAR FUTURE" THAN AS THE PROGRAMME SET OUT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HER ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON 27 MAY.

11. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

PARSONS

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OO WASHINGTON

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DESKBY 311400Z

FM FCO 311130Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 485 OF 31 MAY

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 894: FALKLANDS/SECRETARY GENERAL

1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR,
WHICH HE MAY PUBLISH IF HE WISHES.

BEGINS.

I AM SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE IN ORDER TO CONFIRM THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION YOU PUT TO
SIR A PARSONS ON 26 MAY. YOU ASKED WHAT TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE
WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE ALREADY
PARTICIPATED CONSTRUCTIVELY AND ACTIVELY IN SEVERAL MAJOR
EFFORTS TO SECURE A RESOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, MOST
RECENTLY THAT WHICH YOU YOURSELF SO ENERGETICALLY CONDUCTED,
AND WE SHOULD GREATLY WELCOME IT IF A CEASEFIRE COULD BE
BROUGHT ABOUT. OUR ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS THAT A CEASEFIRE
MUST BE INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL
OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND TO THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL
WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD. IN TAKING THIS POSITION, WE BASE
OURSELVES SQUARELY ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, A
MANDATORY RESOLUTION WHICH DEMANDED IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE
WITHDRAWAL AND WHICH HAS NOW BEEN REAFFIRMED BY THE SECURITY
COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION 505. WHILE WE SHOULD BE WILLING
TO CONSIDER IN THE LONGER TERM THE POSSIBILITY OF
ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
PROTECTION OF THE ISLANDERS THERE IS NO QUESTION OF OUR

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AGREEING TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES IN PARALLEL TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. YOU HAVE CONVEYED TO US THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO THE QUESTION YOU PUT TO THEM IN PARALLEL ON 26 MAY. THEIR REPLY SEEKS TO IMPOSE ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. OUR POSITION REMAINS AS SET OUT ABOVE. IT IS GREATLY TO BE REGRETTED THAT ARGENTINA HAS STILL NOT SEEN FIT TO AGREE TO THE UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER. SUCH A CHANGE OF POSITION ON THE PART OF ARGENTINA WOULD TRANSFORM THE SITUATION. ENDS.

2. I RECOGNISE THAT YOU WILL NOW FACE A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION IN THE COUNCIL IN WHICH YOU MAY WELL BE ISOLATED OR NEARLY SO. BUT TO HAVE GOT THIS FAR IS A CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENT, FOR WHICH WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL.

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OO FCO DESKBY 020200Z

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SKBY 020200Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 020120Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 907 OF 1 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MIPT: FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 502 AND 505 (1982),

GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE CONTINUATION OF THE BREACH OF THE PEACE IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS), CAUSED BY THE INVASION BY ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS MEETING ON JUNE 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF UTMOST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HIS FURTHER EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505 (1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION.
2. REITERATES ITS DEMAND FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS), IN COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502 (1982).
3. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES, AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES, TO CEASE ALL FIRING AND OTHER HOSTILE ACTIONS AS SOON AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA CONFIRMS THAT IT IS READY AND WILLING TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES WITHIN (14) DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARRANGEMENTS AGREED BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE AND BRITISH MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS),
IN COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502 (1982).

3. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES, AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS A
PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES, TO CEASE ALL FIRING AND OTHER
HOSTILE ACTIONS AS SOON AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA CONFIRMS
THAT IT IS READY AND WILLING TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES WITHIN
(14) DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARRANGEMENTS AGREED BETWEEN THE
ARGENTINE AND BRITISH MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
(ISLAS MALVINAS).

4. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO AUTHORISE THEIR MILITARY COMMANDERS
TO ENTER INTO CONTACT ABOUT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
SO THAT A CEASFIRE CAN BE ARRANGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3
ABOVE.

PARSONS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June, 1982

PERUVIAN AID TO ARGENTINA

The Prime Minister has seen Lima telegram number
216 reporting the Peruvian Foreign Minister's remark to
the effect that Peru has offered Argentina a Peruvian Air Force
buffalo to help evacuate Argentine wounded from Goose Green.
You will doubtless be considering this matter in conjunction
with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but you may care to
know that the Prime Minister has minuted to the effect that if
this can be arranged in practical terms she herself has no
objection.

D Omand, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
MOD

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Z WASHINGTON

11 JUN 1982

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 190

SECRET

FM FCO 011330Z JUN 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON


TELEGRAM NUMBER 1090 OF 1 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1088: HAIG'S VIEWS ON THE FALKLANDS

1. MINISTERS HAVE NOW CONSIDERED HAIG'S SUGGESTIONS IN YOUR TELNO 1964. PLEASE SPEAK TO HIM ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.
2. AS HAIG KNOWS, THE PRESIDENT TELEPHONED THE PRIME MINISTER LAST NIGHT AND MRS THATCHER EXPLAINED OUR POSITION. WE WANT TO ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE AND A COMPLETE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND TO DO SO WITH THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES. GIVEN THE MILITARY SITUATION, WE CONSIDER THAT A CEASEFIRE CAN BEST BE NEGOTIATED BY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS REMAINS AS DESCRIBED IN MY TELNO 1083. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HAIG AT VERSAILLES, BUT WE WOULD ALSO BE VERY GLAD TO HAVE A TALK WITH HAIG BEFORE THEN IF THIS COULD BE ARRANGED. COULD HE POSSIBLY LOOK IN HERE TOMORROW ON HIS WAY TO FRANCE? IF SO, WE WOULD WISH TO ANNOUNCE THIS AS A BRITISH INVITATION.
3. WE SHALL SEND A SEPARATE TELEGRAM ABOUT TIMINGS FOR THE BILATERAL MEETING AT VERSAILLES.

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FM WASHINGTON 011540Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1971 OF 1 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

1 JUN 1982

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FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL TO ME YESTERDAY, 31 MAY, I SAW JUDGE CLARK AT THE WHITE HOUSE EARLY THIS MORNING. I ASKED FOR A WORD PERSONALLY WITH THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW MORNING BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR EUROPE AND CLARK SAID THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE THIS.
2. IN THE MEANTIME I EXPLAINED TO CLARK, AS INSTRUCTED, THE BRITISH ATTITUDE ON CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL AND THE FUTURE. THE PRIME MINISTER WANTED IT UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD NEGOTIATED IN GOOD FAITH FOR WEEKS AND THE ARGENTINIANS HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST IN A SERIOUS SETTLEMENT; NOW THAT WE HAD ENDURED THE EFFORT AND SACRIFICES OF RETURNING IN FORCE TO THE ISLANDS, WE COULD NOT SIMPLY PULL OUT BEFORE OUR TASK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND MAKE WAY FOR SOME CONTACT GROUP INCLUDING COUNTRIES FROM LATIN AMERICA.
3. I EXPLAINED TO CLARK THE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES OF TIMING AND THE INHERENT PROBLEM OF ACCEPTING A DETAILED PLAN FOR CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL AND THE FUTURE WHEN POISED BEFORE A MAJOR BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY. HAIG HAD ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED THAT THE PLAN SHOULD BE LAUNCHED ONCE WE HAD TAKEN PORT STANLEY, BUT HE HAD GONE BACK ON THIS AND IN HIS LATEST IDEAS HAD STATED THAT WE MUST ACT BEFORE AN ATTACK BECAUSE THAT WAS THE ONLY HOPE OF GETTING LATIN AMERICAN, AND FOR THAT MATTER ARGENTINIAN, ACQUIESCENCE. IT STRUCK ME THAT JUDGE CLARK WAS EQUIVOCAL ABOUT THE TIMING AND INDEED SAW THE DIFFICULTIES OF DOING ANYTHING BEFORE THE ASSAULT; HE RATHER GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT HE THOUGH THE BEST MOMENT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SURRENDER OF THE ARGENTINE GARRISON HAD OCCURRED.
4. CLARK SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT DID UNDERSTAND THE FIRMNESS OF OUR POSITION. NEITHER HE NOR HAIG WERE WISHING TO UNDERMINE THIS. THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD CLARK, FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY HER REMARK THAT QUOTE WE ARE GOING IT ALONE UNQUOTE. THIS WAS NOT HOW THE AMERICANS SAW IT. QUOTE WE ARE IN IT WITH YOU UNQUOTE, JUDGE CLARK SAID. THIS WAS VERY MUCH THE PRESIDENT'S CONVICTION. BUT THIS DID NOT PREVENT HIM FROM BELIEVING THAT

HENDERSON

CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE TO THE USA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBOURS, THAT THE US SHOULD NOT NEGLECT ANY CHANCE OF PREVENTING FURTHER BLOODSHED AND THE HUMILIATION OF ARGENTINA THAT COULD GIVE A HOSTAGE FOR THE FUTURE, AND THAT IN THE LONG-TERM THERE HAD TO BE A SETTLEMENT ABOUT THE ISLANDS. CLARK SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN HAVING BRAZIL ALONGSIDE THEM IN AN ATTEMPT AT A NEGOTIATIONS BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF BRAZIL THOUGHT THAT WE WERE INSISTING ON UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER AND THE HUMILIATION OF ARGENTINA.

5. CLARK ALSO MENTIONED THE FEAR THE US GOVERNMENT HAVE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA GENERALLY, AND IN PARTICULAR IN ARGENTINA.

6. I SAID THAT ARGENTINA HAD NOT SHOWN MUCH INDICATION OF A READINESS TO LIMIT THEIR AGGRESSIVENESS. THEY HAD LAUNCHED FREQUENT ATTACKS ON THE BRITISH FLEET, INCLUDING ONE ONLY LAST SUNDAY. IF THEY WERE READY TO LIMIT HOSTILITIES THERE WAS NO DIFFICULTY IN THEM SHOWING IT. AS IT WAS THEY WERE SCURRYING AROUND THE WORLD TRYING TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES. AS CLARK HAD MENTIONED BRAZIL, I SAID I MUST TELL HIM THAT WE HAD CATEGORICAL EVIDENCE THAT IMPORTANT WAR MATERIEL FROM LIBYA WAS BEING SENT TO ARGENTINA THROUGH BRAZIL. THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNEW THE DETAILS BUT IF HE COULD DO ANYTHING TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BRAZIL ON THIS MATTER, THIS WOULD BE USEFUL. CLARK UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO THIS.

7. FINALLY I MENTIONED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER LOOKED FORWARD TO HAVING A PRIVATE TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT IN FRANCE ON FRIDAY WHERE THEY COULD GO OVER THE WHOLE MATTER CALMLY. JUDGE CLARK SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO EAGER TO HAVE THIS MEETING AND HE WOULD PURSUE FURTHER THE BEST PLACE AND TIME FOR BOTH SIDES.

HENDERSON

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

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FM WASHINGTON 012025Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1974 OF 1 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS


1. HAIG HAS SPOKEN TO ME IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT AND MY TALK WITH JUDGE CLARK. HE SAYS THAT THERE IS NO GOOD IN PURSUING HIS IDEAS. IT IS A PITY, BUT HE UNDERSTANDS.
2. I REFERRED TO THE CHANGE HE HAD MADE BETWEEN MAKING THE APPEAL BEFORE AND AFTER THE SURRENDER OF THE ARGENTINIAN GARRISON. HAIG SAID THE LATTER WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE BRAZILIANS AND LATIN OPINION GENERALLY.
3. MUCH THOUGH HE WOULD LIKE TO COME TO LONDON TOMORROW, HAIG CANNOT DO SO. HE WILL BE IN THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY GOING TO PARIS AND ATTENDING MEETINGS THERE AND COULD NOT EXTRICATE HIMSELF.

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11 JUN 1982



SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 020045Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1988 OF 1 JUNE 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

FALKLANDS

188

1. HAIG ASKED ME TO CALL THIS EVENING BEFORE HE SET OFF WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR EUROPE. HE HAD WITH HIM STOESEL, EAGLEBURGER AND BURT. HE SAID THAT IN HIS ABSENCE, HE WISHED US TO REMAIN IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH EAGLEBURGER ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UN. HE DID NOT EXPECT A RESOLUTION TO COME FORWARD FOR ANOTHER DAY OR TWO. THE ARGENTINIANS WERE STILL PUTTING FORWARD WHOLLY UNREALISTIC REQUIREMENTS FOR A CEASEFIRE, ASKING FOR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL. BUT HE HOPED THAT WE COULD AGAIN MANOEUVRE, AS WE HAD SO SUCCESSFULLY IN LAST WEEK, TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH WE AND THE AMERICANS WERE ISOLATED IN THE UN.

2. IT WAS AS USUAL CLEAR THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION THAT HAIG HAS NO CONFIDENCE WHATEVER IN MRS KIRKPATRICK, WITH WHOM HE HAS JUST HAD ANOTHER MAJOR ROW ON THIS ISSUE, AND FORESEES MORE TROUBLE FROM HER. HE SEEMED UNCERTAIN ALSO ABOUT THE FRENCH: I ENCOURAGED HIM TO SPEAK TO THEM.

3. HAIG THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO WIN MILITARILY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE QUESTION WAS, HOW, AFTER THE GARRISON HAD SURRENDERED, TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END. I SAID IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINIANS ACTUALLY PREFERRED MILITARY DEFEAT TO ANY DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THEIR PROSPECTS OF CONTINUING WITH AIR ATTACKS WOULD BE MUCH DIMINISHED ONCE WE HAD RECOVERED CONTROL OF THE PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD. HAIG AGREED BUT SAID THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WAYS OF TRYING TO MEND FENCES WITH LATIN AMERICA AND LIMIT SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPLOIT THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS. HE SAID AGAIN THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT INDEPENDENCE COULD BE A VIABLE SOLUTION. WE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SYMPATHIES WERE FIRMLY WITH US.

4. HAIG ADDED IN PARENTHESIS THAT OUR LAST ATTACK ON THE AIRPORT HAD PUT THE ARGENTINIAN RADAR THERE OUT OF ACTION FOR A FEW HOURS: BUT IT WAS NOW BACK IN OPERATION.

HENDERSON

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PP UKMIS NEW YORK

GPS 200

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1987 OF 1 JUNE 1982,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK.

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MY TELNO 1968 AND TELECON BAYNE/THOMAS; FALKLANDS. BILATERAL WITH REAGAN

1. WE EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICANS THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO GET TO PARIS FOR A MEETING AT 1500 ON 4 JUNE AND SAID THAT, IF THE PRESIDENT REALLY FELT UNABLE TO MISS THE BOAT TRIP THAT EVENING, THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIKE TO INVITE HIM TO BREAKFAST THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOW TOLD US THAT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES IT WOULD CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE OFFENCE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IF HE WERE TO MISS THE BOAT TRIP. UNFORTUNATELY, HE IS NOT FREE FOR BREAKFAST THE NEXT MORNING. STATE DEPARTMENT WONDERED WHETHER A MEETING IN PARIS STARTING HALF AN HOUR LATER IE RUNNING FROM 1530 TO 1630 WOULD BE ANY BETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S POINT OF VIEW.

HENDERSON

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1977 OF 1 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR P/S S OF S AND CD5).

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FALKLANDS: WHAT USA SUPPORT HAS MEANT.

1. IT IS NOW A LITTLE MORE THAN A MONTH SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION MADE ITS PUBLIC DECLARATION OF U S SUPPORT IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS AND PROMISED MATERIEL ASSISTANCE. THE DECISION ANNOUNCED BY HAIG ON 30 APRIL WAS NOT AUTOMATIC GIVEN OTHER U S INTERESTS AT STAKE. AS WILL BE EVIDENT FROM THE ACCOUNTS WE HAVE SENT YOU OF THE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE U S ADMINISTRATION, IT WAS NOT ARRIVED AT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. ON THE OTHER SIDE THERE WERE THOSE WHO ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PRESERVATION OF U S RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA; THE NEED TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS NO OPPORTUNITIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE; THE GENERAL ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIETNAM; AND THE WIDELY HELD VIEW, HOWEVER UNREASONABLE, THAT THE FALKLANDS ARE A QUOTE COLONIAL UNQUOTE PROBLEM. ALL THESE FACTIONS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE U S TO CONTINUE TO SIT ON THE FENCE. PRESERVING ITS ROLE AS A MEDIATOR.

2. THE U S ADMINISTRATION HAVING TAKEN ITS DECISION HAS STOOD FIRMLY BY IT, THOUGH MRS KIRKPATRICK AND THE LATIN AMERICAN SPECIALISTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC HAVE CONSTANTLY AND MORE OR LESS PUBLICLY QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF CONTINUING PUBLIC

2. THE U S ADMINISTRATION HAVING TAKEN ITS DECISION HAS STOOD FIRMLY BY IT, THOUGH MRS KIRKPATRICK AND THE LATIN AMERICAN SPECIALISTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC HAVE CONSTANTLY AND MORE OR LESS PUBLICLY QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF CONTINUING PUBLIC SUPPORT. U S PUBLIC OPINION WHILE GENERALLY VERY SUPPORTIVE HAS ON OCCASIONS SHOWN SOME SIGNS OF WAVERING, WITH CONCERN ABOUT THE LOSS OF LIFE AND DAMAGE TO U S INTERESTS. HAIG PUT UP A COURAGEOUS PERFORMANCE IN THE OAS LAST WEEK WHERE U S POLICY WAS UNIVERSALLY DENOUNCED. THE PRESIDENT HAS REMAINED FIRM IN SUPPORT OF HIS DECISION, THOUGH SOME OF THOSE AROUND HIM HAVE NOT. U S SUPPORT HAS BEEN ESSENTIALLY ATTRIBUTABLE, HOWEVER TO THE EFFORTS OF HAIG AND WEINBERGER.

3. HAIG HAS I REALISE AN EXTREMELY DISCONCERTING TENDENCY TO SHIFT HIS POSITION FROM DAY TO DAY. HE IS HYPERACTIVE AND ANXIOUS TO GET INTO THE ACT AND EVER READY TO COME UP WITH SOME PLAN. THE CONTRADICTIONS WE GET IN HIS THINKING ARE ALSO A FUNCTION OF HIS CONCERN TO CONFIDE IN US AT EVERY STAGE, EVEN WHEN HIS IDEAS ARE HALF-FORMED.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT IS I THINK IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT U S ASSISTANCE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED: THAT IT REQUIRES CONSTANT WORKING ON THE U S ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION TO KEEP THEM IN THE RIGHT POSITION: AND THAT ITS VALUE TO US IS VERY GREAT.

5. I DO NOT NEED TO GO INTO DETAILS ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN, THE FULL EXTENT OF WHICH IS WELLKNOWN TO THE JIC. SO FAR AS COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES ARE CONCERNED, THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE ESPECIALLY AVAILABLE SATELLITE COMMUNICATION CHANNELS AT CONSIDERABLE COST TO THEIR OWN OPERATIONS, COMMUNICATION SETS FOR OUR SPECIAL FORCES ON THE ISLANDS, SECURE SPEECH FACILITIES WITH THE FLEET AND SATELLITE WEATHER INFORMATION. SO FAR AS EQUIPMENT IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE OVER THE LAST MONTH PROCURED AT LEAST DOLLARS 120 MILLION OF U S MATERIEL MADE AVAILABLE AT VERY SHORT NOTICE AND FREQUENTLY FROM STOCKS NORMALLY EARMARKED FOR U S OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. THIS EQUIPMENT HAS INCLUDED THE LATEST AIR TO AIR SIDE-WINDER MISSILES URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR USE BY THE HARRIERS, THE VULCAN PHALANX ANTI-MISSILE GUN SYSTEM FOR HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, 4700 TONS OF AIRSTRIP MATTING FOR PORT STANLEY AIRPORT ONCE IT HAS BEEN RECAPTURED, CONVERSION OF THE SS STENA INSPECTOR FOR USE AS A REPAIR SHIP IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, SHRIKE MISSILES FOR USE BY THE VULCANS, HELICOPTER ENGINES, SUBMARINE DETECTION DEVICES FOR USE BY THE SEA KING HELICOPTERS,

GUN SYSTEM FOR HMS ILLUSTRIOUS, 4700 TONS OF AIRSTRIP MATTING FOR PORT STANLEY AIRPORT ONCE IT HAS BEEN RECAPTURED, CONVERSION OF THE SS STENA INSPECTOR FOR USE AS A REPAIR SHIP IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, SHRIKE MISSILES FOR USE BY THE VULCANS, HELICOPTER ENGINES, SUBMARINE DETECTION DEVICES FOR USE BY THE SEA KING HELICOPTERS, TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION ON A LARGE SCALE FOR ASCENSION ISLAND FOR OUR FORCES, STINGER GROUND TO AIR MISSILES (ALREADY USED SUCCESSFULLY AGAINST ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT), AS WELL AS THE USUAL ARRAY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION. MANY OF THESE ITEMS HAVE BEEN PROCURED AT EXTREMELY SHORT NOTICE (OFTEN 24 HOURS) AND FLOWN IMMEDIATELY TO THE UNITED KINGDOM OR ASCENSION ISLAND. BOTH HAIG AND WEINBERGER HAVE TAKEN THE CLOSEST INTEREST IN THE PROCESSING OF THESE REQUESTS, WITH WEINBERGER INTERVENING TO ENSURE THAT THE LARGER AND MORE DIFFICULT ITEMS WERE MADE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AT WHATEVER THE COST TO U S FORCES' REQUIREMENTS. THERE HAS BEEN THE SAME PATTERN OF HELP WITH THE NUMEROUS REQUESTS WE HAVE PROCESSED FOR URGENT TECHNICAL ADVICE IN RELATION TO U S SUPPLIED WEAPONRY AND THEIR MATTERS.

6. AS YOU KNOW, THE ADMINISTRATION IS ANXIOUS THAT THE DETAILS OF THE HELP THEY HAVE GIVEN SHOULD NOT OFFICIALLY BE MADE PUBLIC, DESPITE THE MANY LEAKS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE. BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE FULL EXTENT OF THEIR ASSISTANCE WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HAIG. THEY CERTAINLY FEEL THAT IN TERMS OF PRACTICAL SUPPORT AND IN WAYS THAT REALLY MATTER THEY HAVE, DONE, AS THEY COULD BE EXPECTED TO, A VERY GREAT DEAL TO ASSIST US.

7. F C O PLEASE PASS TO NO. 10 DOWNING ST.

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TO IMMEDIATE LIMA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 126 OF 1 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MODUK
YOUR TELNO 213: FALKLAND ISLANDS

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Prime Minister

Word reading in full.

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1. WE APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTY OF BELAUNDE'S POSITION AND ACCEPT THAT HE MAY HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN KEEPING HIS MILITARY UNDER CONTROL.
2. BUT THE FACT IS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH BELAUNDE. THESE HAVE NOT HAD ANY NOTICEABLE EFFECT. WHILE WE WANT TO RETAIN PERUVIAN GOODWILL TO THE EXTEND POSSIBLE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO KEEP BELAUNDE IN PLAY WILL LEAD HIM TO RECOGNISE THE REALITIES OF OUR POSITION OR TO BRING HIS INFLUENCE TO BEAR IN ANY USEFUL WAY ON THE ARGENTINES. INDEED THE PERUVIANS ARE ALLEGING THAT IT WAS WE, NOT THE ARGENTINES, WHO REJECTED BELAUNDE'S EARLIER PROPOSALS (WASHINGTON TELNO 1941).
3. IT WOULD ALSO SEEM INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO SEND A FURTHER CONCILIATORY MESSAGE TO BELAUNDE, GIVEN THE INCREASING EVIDENCE OF PERUVIAN SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA. IT MAY WELL BE THE CASE THAT THIS HAS NOT BEEN ON BELAUNDE'S DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY, BUT IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT HE KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT IT. FURTHERMORE, PERU VOTED IN FAVOUR OF BOTH RIO TREATY RESOLUTIONS AND PRESS REPORTS OF BELAUNDE'S AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S COMMENTS (WASHINGTON TELNO 1959 AND YOUR TELNO 214), IF ACCURATE, LEAVE LITTLE DOUBT OF WHERE PERUVIAN SYMPATHIES LIE.
4. IF, THEREFORE, I WERE TO SEND A MESSAGE, IT WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE TO BE UNFORTHCOMING ON THE SCOPE FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE TOUGH ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES. I ASSUME THAT THIS WOULD NOT HELP BELAUNDE VIS-A-VIS HIS MILITARY OR HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE CONTINUATION OF PERUVIAN MILITARY SUPPLIES: IN WHICH CASE IT WOULD BEST NOT BE SENT.
5. THERE IS HOWEVER A NEED TO REGISTER AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL

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OUR CONCERN IN THE QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA. UNWARRANTED IN THE VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT TO SEE AN EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH PERU AND OUR OWN GOVERNMENT WE HAVE APPRECIATED PERU'S CONTINUED EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THAT WE CAN DO NOTHING TO PREVENT THEM FROM DOING SO. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA: AND THE MANY PRESS AND OTHER REPORTS THAT PERU IS ALREADY PROVIDING IMPORTANT MATERIAL ASSISTANCE. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE WOULD TAKE A GRAVE VIEW OF ANY SUCH ACTION: IT WOULD CLEARLY BE A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT FOR ANGLO-PERUVIAN RELATIONS. OUR QUARREL IS WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, NOT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION: COUNTRIES WHICH ALLOW THE CONFLICT TO WIDEN IN SCOPE WILL BE DOING THEMSELVES AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE A GRAVE DISSERVICE. THE FACT IS THAT ARGENTINA WAS THE AGGRESSOR: THE UK THE VICTIM. WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO FIGHT, WITH THE GREATEST RELUCTANCE, TO DEFEND OUR RIGHTS AND THOSE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS. WE HAVE REMAINED FLEXIBLE THROUGHOUT, SEEKING ONLY THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION 502, WHICH IS BINDING ON ALL MEMBER STATES. IT IS ARGENTINA THAT HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IT IS THEREFORE ARGENTINA, NOT BRITAIN, WHICH HAS BEEN INTRANSIGENT. MOST RECENTLY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACCEPT THE BRITISH DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH PROVIDED FOR A CEASEFIRE WITH MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL. THEY NOW HAVE ONLY THEMSELVES TO BLAME FOR THE SITUATION THEY ARE IN. THE PROVISION OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA BY THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD BE AN ENDORSEMENT OF ARGENTINE AGGRESSION AND LIKELY ONLY TO PROLONG AND EXACERBATE THE CONFLICT.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS

President Reagan telephoned the Prime Minister at 2330 hrs last night. Since the call took place on a secure telephone, and as there was no Private Secretary at No.10 at the time, it has not been possible to produce the normal record of conversation. I give below an account of the conversation as conveyed to me by the Prime Minister. I should be grateful if you would ensure that its contents are very carefully protected and, given the circumstances of the call, that this record is not quoted in any way.

The President said that he was looking forward to seeing the Prime Minister at Versailles to discuss events in the Falklands. However as the military advance might change the diplomatic options open between now and next Friday he felt impelled to speak now.

President Reagan said that the USA considered it imperative that the UK should show that it was prepared to talk before the Argentinians were forced to withdraw. Willingness on the UK's part to negotiate now could prevent a Peronist take-over in Argentina in the future. The President had spoken to the President of Brazil who shared his view that the best chance for peace was before complete Argentine humiliation. As the UK now had the upper hand militarily it should strike a deal now.

The Prime Minister emphasised that the United Kingdom could not contemplate a ceasefire without Argentine withdrawal. Having lost ships and lives because the Argentinians refused to negotiate for seven weeks we would not consider handing the Islands over to a third party. Our intention was first to repossess, then restore order and finally to consider the future with the islanders.

/President

President Reagan said that his understanding was that a ceasefire would require instant Argentine withdrawal. A British withdrawal would not take place until a multi-national peacekeeping force arrived.

The Prime Minister stressed that Britain had not lost precious lives in battle and sent an enormous Task Force to hand over The Queen's Islands immediately to a contact group. The immediate priority after Argentinian withdrawal would be to restore British law and administration, to carry out reconstruction and development with which we should need help and try to arrange a multi-national security force - for which we should also need co-operation.

President Reagan said that he understood the Prime Minister's immense problems. He suggested, however, that we were in a sufficiently powerful position now that if a ceasefire could be agreed the world would know that it was the Argentinians who had retreated. If the UK were to retain sole military occupancy she might face another Argentinian invasion in the future.

The Prime Minister said that she understood the President's fears but as Britain had had to go into the Islands alone, with no outside help, she could not now let the invader gain from his aggression. The Prime Minister asked the President to put himself in her position. She had lost valuable British ships and invaluable British lives. She was sure that the President would act in the same way if Alaska had been similarly threatened. Conditions necessarily changed once lives had been lost. Self-determination for the Islanders had to be the paramount consideration. She agreed with his excellent TV interview when he had said that if the aggressor were to win then about fifty other territories would be at risk.

The Prime Minister concluded by saying that the most sensible thing would be for the Argentinians to withdraw. No-one would be more pleased than she if they did. There was no alternative. She looked forward to continuing their discussion at Versailles on Friday and hoped that sufficient time would be allocated to it.

I am copying this letter ~~and enclosure~~ to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A.J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DESKBY FCO 011400Z
FM KATHMANDU 011000Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 66 OF 1 JUNE
AND TO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR DS6 AND DS11)
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

MY TELELETTER 287 OF 27 MAY TO BURTON, SAD, AND DALES' MINUTE
OF 6 MAY

FALKLANDS: DEPLOYMENT OF GURKHAS

1. SINCE MY TELNO 61 REPORTED PRO-MOSCOW ATTACKS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF GURKHAS, A SENSATIONAL NEWSPAPER IN NEPAL, OF LIMITED CIRCULATION, HAS CLAIMED THAT "THEY ARE LOSING THEIR LIVES" IN IMPERIALIST INTERESTS. RUMOURS ARE ALSO CIRCULATING OF HEAVY LOSSES. WHILE AGENCY REPORTS AND NEPAL RADIO'S REPLAY OF BBC BULLETINS KEEP THE PUBLIC INFORMED WITH REASONABLE OBJECTIVITY, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR CONTINUED IMMEDIATE ACCOUNTS OF MOVEMENTS OF 1/7GR AND ANY FUTURE ENGAGEMENT IN COMBAT, AND LOSSES. GIVEN PUBLICITY WHICH THE GURKHA BATTALION HAS RECEIVED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE NEPALESE GOVERNMENT HEAR FROM US FIRST RATHER THAN FROM THE MEDIA OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS, IF THEY ARE TO CONTINUE TO DEAL HELPFULLY WITH LOCAL AND POSSIBLY FOREIGN CRITICISM, DURING NAM MEETING.

2. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THIS MORNING THAT A SOURCE IN THE ROYAL PALACE HAD INDICATED THAT THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WAS BEING CAREFULLY STUDIED THERE. THIS IS HARDLY SURPRISING AND DOES NOT, IN MY VIEW, SUGGEST THAT THE NEPALESE GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO CHANGE THE POSITION SET OUT IN PARAW ITO 3 OF MY TELELETTER UNDER REFERENCE. THE AMERICANS ARE HOWEVER CLEARLY FOLLOWING NEPALESE REACTIONS CLOSELY.

DENSON

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TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 488 OF 1 JUNE
INFO IMOEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNOS 899 AND 900: FALKLANDS: SECRETARY-GENERAL
1. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S FIVE-POINT PLAN IS CERTAINLY UNACCEPTABLE AS IT STANDS. BUT I AGREE THAT WITHOUT RAISING FALSE HOPES OR MISREPRESENTING OUR POSITION YOU SHOULD GIVE HIM A REASONED RESPONSE ON THE LINES YOU PROPOSE. WE ASSUME THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS OBLIGED BY PARA 5 OF RESOLUTION 505 TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL TOMORROW, 2 JUNE, BUT HOPE THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS TACTIC, TOGETHER WITH EITHER EQUIVOCATION OR DILATORINESS ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINES, HIS REPORT MIGHT FALL SHORT OF DRAWING A LINE UNDER HIS PRESENT EFFORTS, THUS ENCOURAGING AT LEAST SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO ARGUE THAT HE SHOULD MERELY BE MANDATED TO CONTINUE HIS NEGOTIATIONS. THE POINTS TO MAKE HAVE ALREADY BEEN LARGELY COVERED IN YOUR CONVERSATION WITH DE SOTO.
2. YOU SHOULD TELL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT WHILE OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS PLAN GIVE US DIFFICULTY WE APPROVE THE EMPHASIS ON TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME. WE LOOK FORWARD TO LEARNING OF THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE. MEANWHILE WE HAVE A NUMBER OF COMMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION.
3. YOU COULD PRESS THE SECRETARIAT ON THE MODALITIES FOR A CEASEFIRE AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE EVENT OF A BREACH. OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT AT THIS STAGE A CEASEFIRE CAN ONLY BE SATISFACTORILY WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US THAT OUR HANDS SHOULD BE IN ANY WAY TIED EITHER BY THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION OR BY THE PRESENCE OF UN OBSERVERS (PARAGRAPH 7 OF YOUR TELNO 899). (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY, WE COULD NOT (NOT) ACCEPT UN OBSERVERS.) WE COULD NOT STAND IDLY BY WHILE ARGENTINE FORCES, IN BREACH OF WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS.

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RETAINED CONTROL OF ANY PART OF THE FALKLANDS.

4. YOU SHOULD REMIND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT OUR POSITION ON BRITISH WITHDRAWAL IS THAT WE CANNOT NOW ACCEPT THAT WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL WITH ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. YOU MAY HOWEVER SAY THAT SINCE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL HAS TAKEN PLACE BY APPROXIMATELY EQUAL STEPS TO REDUCE THE BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE BY ONE THIRD ON THE ISLANDS FROM ITS PRESENT LEVEL AT A TIME OF OUR CHOICE AND AS AN ACT OF OUR OWN VOLITION PRESERVING THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS IS UNDESIRABLY ENDANGERED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THIS POSITION. YOU SHOULD PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO SAY WHAT THEY MEAN BY 'TOKEN' BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. HOW WOULD SUCH WITHDRAWAL BE GRADUATED THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL?

5. WITH REGARD TO POINT 5 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PLAN, YOU MAY SAY THAT WE STAND BY PARAGRAPH 3 OF SCR 502. BUT, AS YOU MADE CLEAR IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON SCR 505, WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE POSITION REACHED IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS IS ANY LONGER RELEVANT. THOSE NEGOTIATIONS IN ANY CASE RELATED TO AN INTERIM PERIOD, NOT TO THE LONGER TERM, WITH WHICH PARA 3 OF SCR 502 WAS CONCERNED. SCR 505 THEREFORE PROVIDES NO RELEVANT 'FRAMEWORK'. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE UNTIL THE ISLANDS HAVE RETURNED TO NORMAL AND THE ISLANDERS HAVE HAD TIME TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE. THIS COOLING-OFF PERIOD CAN ONLY BEGIN AFTER ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IT IS IN ANY CASE ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NOTHING ON NEGOTIATIONS IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE ARGENTINES COULD USE AS AN EXCUSE FOR DELAYING THE COMPLETION OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

PMH

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE

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ED/PLANNING STAFF
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ED/FUSD
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PS/MR HUED
PS/MR ONSLOW
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1982

British Antarctic Survey

Dr. Ady and Dr. Swithinbank called on the Prime Minister this evening. The invitation to them to do so stemmed from Mrs. Thatcher's meeting last Friday with Lord Shackleton and Lord Buxton who suggested that a conversation with representatives of BAS could be enlightening.

I enclose a summary record of the conversation.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries of the members of OD(SA) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SUBJECT

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RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN DR. ADY AND DR. SWITHINBANK OF THE
BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY, AT 1800 HOURS ON TUESDAY, 1 JUNE 1982,
10 DOWNING STREET.

The Prime Minister said that she would be most grateful for views on the future development of the Falkland Islands, their dependencies and the British Antarctic territory. Were the geological structures promising? Did natural resources offer development prospects. Would the wild-life of the area be of interest to tourists? She wondered whether the Government had consulted BAS sufficiently in recent weeks.

Dr. Ady said that BAS had been in close touch with MOD, though Dr. Swithinbank thought that contact had not been at a sufficiently high level for discussion of policy issues.

Dr. Ady then explained that BAS had been operating continuously since 1944 in the Antarctic. We were the only country which had done so. We now led the world in Antarctic science. Other countries frequently sought our advice. Dr. Swithinbank said that it was the hope of all those interested in the scientific development of Antarctica that scientific productivity would be the criterion for their activities. All BAS bases had been established according to scientific criteria. But no research was being carried out on behalf of the Government at present. He was now writing a paper describing the research which BAS should try to conduct in the future. The terms of reference of BAS did not of course include the Falkland Islands. He then showed the Prime Minister some recent landsat photographs of the area and confirmed, in answer to the Prime Minister's question, that Argentina received these photographs direct. BAS possessed the largest collection of satellite pictures of the Antarctic on this side of the Atlantic. They had been the first organisation in the world to use such photographs to make a series of detailed maps of the area. The situation in Antarctica was very different from that of the Falkland

/Islands.

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Islands. In Antarctica a number of countries had claims. We like others had in effect ceded part of our Sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty. This had been a conspicuous success in maintaining the peace for 20 years. Argentina's motive in maintaining its presence in the area seemed to be almost entirely military. But it was to some extent restrained from pursuing its claims by the prospect of opposition from the United States, the Soviet Union and others. The Treaty arrangements had worked well but the difficult problems lay ahead. For the future, he would like to see an international authority regulating mineral exploration and exploitation. Most of the Treaty powers had a similar desire but the emotional attraction to Argentina of territory as such could create difficulties for the future. Argentina wished to extend its territorial sovereignty as far as it could in the area and, with the military in charge, anything could happen.

Dr. Ady informed the Prime Minister that the FCO were preparing a paper on the future of the Treaty arrangements. He found it a very good document.

He then referred to Lord Shackleton's excellent report on the Falkland Islands. The Prime Minister said that she had recently asked Lord Shackleton to up-date it. What were the prospects for oil in the area? Dr. Ady said that some of the surveys had not been very promising but natural gas had been discovered about half-way between the Falkland Islands and Patagonia. He thought it would be worthwhile arranging for the geophysics of the area to be properly researched and for a hole to be drilled. There were possibilities of oil development around South Georgia too. But commercial companies would not quickly become involved because of the political instability and uncertainty about the median line between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. The BAS had been looking at the possibilities of developing krill around South Georgia for some years. The Russians, Poles and others had been harvesting krill but we had not. The BAS was now doing a thorough study of the life-cycle to provide a proper basis for

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/future harvesting.

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- 3 -

future harvesting. Dr. Swithinbank thought that some 50 million tons of krill could be harvested each year and that this was a sustainable yield. But as regards the Falkland Islands, they could never support a large number of people because the land was not fertile. Argentine hostility towards the Islands would persist for a very long time. There must be some guarantor, besides ourselves, of its defence. Taking up an earlier remark of the Prime Minister, he expressed relief that she did not envisage extending the Treaty arrangements of Antarctica to the Falkland Islands. This could cause chaos in Antarctica by importing into the area the UK/Argentine adversarial relationship.

Dr. Ady said that one of the problems of BAS was tele-communications. As soon as Port Stanley had been taken, the normal BAS communication channel via Cable and Wireless had ceased. They would not wish to depend on Cable and Wireless in the future and were hoping to establish direct satellite communication. Dr. Swithinbank said that the main significance of the Falkland Islands for the work of the BAS lay in the Port Stanley airstrip. But there could be an all-weather 10,000 ft airstrip on South Georgia (the Ministry of Defence had all the necessary information about this).

The Prime Minister enquired whether Argentina had made a distinctive scientific contribution. Dr. Ady replied that it had not done so in the field of Antarctic research - this was in the hands of the military who were in Antarctica for their own purposes.

The Prime Minister said that she would like to be able to draw President Reagan's attention to the value of the scientific research which was being carried out in Antarctica. Dr. Swithinbank suggested that she should mention Dr. Frank Williamson, the Chief Scientist at the Division of Polar Programmes at the National Science Foundation. He would certainly speak well of BAS. Another American who knew their work was Dr. L.M. Gould, the former President of Carleton College.

/ Dr. Ady

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- 4 -

Dr. Ady recalled that Argentine territorial ambitions in the area were deeply rooted. He had personally been involved in an incident in 1952 when the Argentines had fired at a BAS base on the northern tip of the British Antarctic territory.

Dr. Swithinbank said that the BAS had a particular need for high altitude photography of the whole area, i.e. photographs taken from up to 45,000 ft. This would be the next step in mapping the Antarctic peninsula. He would be most grateful for any assistance which the MOD could offer.

The Prime Minister enquired whether the Falkland Islands could provide a base for the future International Antarctic Authority. Dr. Swithinbank said such an Authority would be necessary when mineral exploration commenced. The Falkland Islands might be a possibility as a base but the problem was whether Argentine agreement could be secured.

Finally, Dr. Ady said that he thought fresh planning was necessary for the future of the BAS. At the moment its activities were on a declining curve. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office were preparing a paper on the subject.

A. J. C.

1 June 1982

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELNO 1983 OF 1 JUNE 1982,

INFO PARIS.

FALKLANDS: US TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

1. IN A US TELEVISION INTERVIEW AT THE WEEKEND (A CURTAIN RAISER TO THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT) PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WAS ASKED WHETHER CONTINUED FIGHTING BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA WOULD INTRUDE ON THE SUMMIT. HE REPLIED :

"IT SO HAPPNES THAT LIKE MANY OTHERS WE FOUND OURSELVES IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE -- EMBARRASSING SITUATION -- BECAUSE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. ON THE ONE HAND, GREAT BRITAIN, AN ALLY, A FRIEND, THE WHOLE HISTORY OF THAT COUNTRY IS INTERWOVEN WITH OUR OWN, MANY, MANY YEARS AND PARTICULARLY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS CENTURY, WITH TWO WORLD WARS, WE ARE REALLY WELDED TOGETHER WITH GREAT BRITAIN. AND SO IF THERE ISN'T A

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Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

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W

~~WELDED TOGETHER WITH GREAT BRITAIN.~~ AND SO IF THERE ISN'T A REFLEX OF SOLIDARITY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE THEN BETWEEN WHOM COULD SUCH A REFLEX EXIST?

WE AREN'T, IN SAYING THAT, SETTLING THE PROBLEM IN LAW. BY USING FORCE, BY CHOOSING FORCE, ARGENTINA HAS IN FACT BROKEN THE RULE OF LAW AND DISPLACED SOMETHING WRONG. AND SO, THE BRITISH REACTION WAS A FAIRLY OBVIOUS ONE. THE BRITISH WOULDN'T HAVE SENT A NAVAL TASK FORCE ALL THAT DISTANCE JUST TO MAKE IT GO ON, SAIL TOWARDS CHINA OR POLYNESIA.

WE HAVE NOTHING AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF ARGENTINA, AND WE ARE REALLY VERY SAD TO BE IN SUCH A SITUATION IN WHICH THOSE COUNTRIES COULD PERHAPS DOUBT OUR FRIENDSHIP, THE COMMON BASIS, THE COMMON CIVILIZATION THAT WE HAVE. SO WE ARE IN A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS ONLY A BAD SIDE TO IT AND THAT OF COURSE IS VERY FREQUENT IN POLITICAL LIFE. SO I DECIDED THAT OUR DUTY WAS FIRST OF ALL TO SHOW FULL SOLIDARITY WITH THE BRITISH, NUMBER ONE, BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN THE VICTIMS OF AN OPPRESSION. THEY HAVE BEEN INJURED, THEIR INTERESTS, AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL PRIDE AS WELL.

THE SECOND POINT IS THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING THAT WE CAN DO BECAUSE, ONCE GREAT BRITAIN HAS MANAGED TO AGAIN GET CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY OR PART OF THE PROPERTY, THEN WE MUST DO ALL THAT WE CAN POSSIBLY DO IN ORDER TO MOVE TOWARDS PEACE BY THE VARIOUS MEANS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WILL EVOLVE, IN PARTICULAR, THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION. AND AS WE SAID AT THE VERY BEGINNING, THROUGH RESOLUTION 502 IN PARTICULAR WE MUST MOVE TOWARDS PEACE THROUGH LAW. SO THAT IS THE SITUATION''.

HENDERSON

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FM WASHINGTON 020045Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1988 OF 1 JUNE 1982,

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG ASKED ME TO CALL THIS EVENING BEFORE HE SET OFF WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR EUROPE. HE HAD WITH HIM STOESEL, EAGLEBURGER AND BURT. HE SAID THAT IN HIS ABSENCE, HE WISHED US TO REMAIN IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH EAGLEBURGER ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE UN. HE DID NOT EXPECT A RESOLUTION TO COME FORWARD FOR ANOTHER DAY OR TWO. THE ARGENTINIANS WERE STILL PUTTING FORWARD WHOLLY UNREALISTIC REQUIREMENTS FOR A CEASEFIRE, ASKING FOR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL. BUT HE HOPED THAT WE COULD AGAIN MANOEUVRE, AS WE HAD SO SUCCESSFULLY IN LAST WEEK, TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH WE AND THE AMERICANS WERE ISOLATED IN THE UN.

2. IT WAS AS USUAL CLEAR THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION THAT HAIG HAS NO CONFIDENCE WHATEVER IN MRS KIRKPATRICK, WITH WHOM HE HAS JUST HAD ANOTHER MAJOR ROW ON THIS ISSUE, AND FORESEES MORE TROUBLE FROM HER. HE SEEMED UNCERTAIN ALSO ABOUT THE FRENCH: I ENCOURAGED HIM TO SPEAK TO THEM.

3. HAIG THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO WIN MILITARILY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE QUESTION WAS, HOW, AFTER THE GARRISON HAD SURRENDERED, TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END. I SAID IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINIANS ACTUALLY PREFERRED MILITARY DEFEAT TO ANY DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THEIR PROSPECTS OF CONTINUING WITH AIR ATTACKS WOULD BE MUCH DIMINISHED ONCE WE HAD RECOVERED CONTROL OF THE PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD. HAIG AGREED BUT SAID THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WAYS OF TRYING TO MEND FENCES WITH LATIN AMERICA AND LIMIT SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPLOIT THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS. HE SAID AGAIN THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT INDEPENDENCE COULD BE A VIABLE SOLUTION. WE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SYMPATHIES WERE FIRMLY WITH US.

4. HAIG ADDED IN PARENTHESIS THAT OUT LAST ATTACK ON THE AIRPORT HAD PUT THE ARGENTINIAN RADAR THERE OUT OF ACTION FOR A FEW HOURS: BUT IT WAS NOW BACK IN OPERATION.

HENDERSON

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 011630Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 383 OF 1 JUNE

INFO PRETORIA

FROM REID

OUR TELNO 58 TO PRETORIA : FALKLANDS : ARMS

1. WHEN I CALLED ON HIM THIS AFTERNOON, VAN DALSEN SAID HE
HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MINISTERS TO TAKE UP THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE QUESTION IN THE FINAL SENTENCE
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SPEAKING NOTE OF 11 MAY (OUR TELNO 327)
IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENQUIRED (IN ORDER TO GIVE FURTHER
CONSIDERATION TO OUR REQUEST TO SUSPEND ARMS DELIVERIES TO

OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SPEAKING NOTE OF 11 MAY (OUR TELNO 327) IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENQUIRED (IN ORDER TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO OUR REQUEST TO SUSPEND ARMS DELIVERIES TO ARGENTINA) WHETHER WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE THE SUPPLY OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND OTHER STRATEGIC MATERIAL TO SOUTH AFRICA.

(B) WE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE REQUEST WHICH HE PUT TO ME ON 25 MAY THAT WE SHOULD COMMENT ON PERSISTENT RUMOURS THAT WE HAD SECRETLY INSPIRED THE ARGUS GROUP'S REPORT OF 24 MAY IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE SAG INTO MAKING A STATEMENT.

(C) WE HAD SUPPLIED MINES AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS (SWAPO, ANC ETC) WHICH HAD BEEN USED TO KILL SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS.

(D) BY VOTING IN FAVOUR OF SCR 432 (OF JULY 1978) WE HAD CHALLENGED SOUTH AFRICA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER WALVIS BAY. AND YET WE NOW CONTINUED TO ASSERT OUR CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS, A CLAIM WHICH WAS BASED ESSENTIALLY ON THE SAME GROUNDS AS THEIR CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER WALVIS BAY.

(E) WE NEVER CRITICISED SWAPO, WHO WERE CONDUCTING A WAR AGAINST NAMIBIA AND HAD FREQUENTLY COMMITTED ACTS OF TERRORISM.

2. TO (A) ABOVE I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE ANYTHING MORE THAN A PERSONAL REPLY, WHICH WAS THAT I TOOK THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION TO BE RHETORICAL. THE SOUTH AFRICANS MUST SURELY REALISE THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF OUR BREACHING THE MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO. I ADDED THAT OUR REQUEST HAD BEEN THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD STOP THE DELIVERY OF ARMS OF ALL KINDS AND ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES WHICH THE ARGENTINIANS MIGHT USE AGAINST BRITISH FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS. WE WERE NOT COMPLAINING ABOUT MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION.

COMPLAINING ABOUT MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION. NOR WERE WE NECESSARILY ASKING THEM TO SUSPEND SUPPLIES AFTER THE FIGHTING IN THE FALKLANDS HAD FINISHED. OUR REQUEST TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS WAS THEREFORE OF AN ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT CHARACTER FROM THEIRS TO US.

3. TO (B) I USED THE TALKING POINT IN YOUR TELNO 196. VAN DALSEN DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS. I ADDED THAT WE HAD SAID TWO THINGS ON THE RECORD - IE, THAT WE HAD NOTED AND REPORTED GENERAL MALAN'S STATEMENT THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD NOT SUPPLIED ANY MISSILES OR AIRCRAFT PARTS. WE LATER SAID THAT WE HAD NOTED THE LIMITED SCOPE OF GENERAL MALAN'S STATEMENT ETC (CF PARA 4 OF GUIDANCE TELNO 109). I SAID THE PRESS HAD BEEN QUITE UNSCRUPULOUS IN EMBELLISHING WHAT OUR SPOKESMAN HAD SAID. I WENT ON TO ASK WHETHER VAN DALSEN WAS SAYING THAT WE HAD DRAWN WRONG INFERENCES FROM GENERAL MALAN'S STATEMENT. NOTHING WOULD PLEASE US MORE THAN TO HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE ASSURANCE. VAN DALSEN FELL BACK ON A RECAPITULATION OF HIS SPEAKING NOTE OF 11 MAY : BUT HE DID NOT REPLY TO MY QUESTION.

4. TO (C), I SAID THAT I HAD NOTICED REPORTS IN THE AFRIKAANS PRESS THAT WE HAD SUPPLIED LAND MINES TO SWAPO. THE SADF HAD ON AT LEAST TWO PAST OCCASIONS APPROACHED US OVER BRITISH MADE MINES. WE HAD REPLIED IN DETAIL. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR SUPPLYING ANY WEAPONRY TO SWAPO OR THE ANC. I COULD TELL HIM IN CONFIDENCE THAT SOME MONTHS AGO THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAD SOUGHT TO BUY FROM US 24 X 40 MM BOFORS AA GUNS. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE STRICTLY FOR DEFENCE, AND FOR USE ONLY IN ANGOLA, WE HAD REFUSED AN EXPORT LICENCE OUT OF CONCERN THAT THEY MIGHT BE USED TO KILL SOUTH AFRICANS. THIS MADE QUITE AN IMPRESSION. VAN DALSEN WAS CLEARLY UNAWARE OF THE HISTORY OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE SADF AND OUR DEFENCE STAFF ABOUT THE MINES. I SAID I HAD SEEN MENTION IN THE PRESS TODAY OF CLAYMORE MINES. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD PROVIDE DETAILS WE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS.

EXPORT LICENCE OUT OF CONCERN THAT THEY MIGHT BE USED TO KILL SOUTH AFRICANS. THIS MADE QUITE AN IMPRESSION. VAN DALSEN WAS CLEARLY UNAWARE OF THE HISTORY OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE SADF AND OUR DEFENCE STAFF ABOUT THE MINES. I SAID I HAD SEEN MENTION IN THE PRESS TODAY OF CLAYMORE MINES. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD PROVIDE DETAILS WE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS.

5. TO (D) I SAID THAT I WOULD SEEK LEGAL ADVICE, BUT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT WE DID NOT QUESTION SOUTH AFRICA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER WALVIS BAY (AND THE PENGUIN ISLANDS). HAVING BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED IN RESOLUTION 432 AT THE TIME I WOULD MAINTAIN THAT ITS REAL MEANING WAS TO DEFER NEGOTIATION OVER THE FUTURE STATUS OF WALVIS BAY UNTIL NAMIBIA HAD BECOME INDEPENDENT. I DID NOT THINK WE CONSIDERED THAT THE RESOLUTION CALLED IN QUESTION THE CURRENT STATUS OF WALVIS BAY. ITS TERMS WENT, OF COURSE, FURTHER THAN WE WOULD HAVE WISHED, BUT THAT WAS THE PRICE WE HAD HAD TO PAY FOR AN AGREED RESOLUTION.

6. TO (E) I SAID THAT WE DEPLORED VIOLENCE OF ANY KIND IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. THE LATEST OCCASION ON WHICH WE HAD COMMENTED WAS THE RECENT SWAPO INCURSION (TEXT IN FCO TEL TO CAPE TOWN NO 164). VAN DALSEN DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF IT.

7. VAN DALSEN ENDED BY STRESSING THE VERY SERIOUS CONCERN WITH WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT LOOKED ON OUR HANDLING OF THIS MATTER. THERE WERE OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

8. THE INTERVIEW WHICH LASTED 25 MINUTES WAS COURTEOUS ON BOTH SIDES. I APOLOGISED FOR NOTHING, AND HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT, AT THE END, VAN DALSEN WAS SOMEWHAT ON THE DEFENSIVE.

9. I FELT IT UNAVOIDABLE TO GIVE SOME REPLY TO (A) ABOVE, BUT HAVE LEFT IT OPEN TO BE CHANGED IF YOU WISH. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS IF MY REPLY TO (D) IS INCORRECT OR INCOMPLETE.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June, 1982

ms
Prime Minister

AR 1/1

Dear Sir,
HMS INVINCIBLE

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Acting High Commissioner of Australia. This contains the text of a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Fraser who states that if, following the end of the current hostilities in the South Atlantic, we wish to take another view about the sale of Invincible, we should not feel ourselves held to any moral obligation. Mr Fraser further states that the Australian Minister for Defence will not press Mr Nott to conclude contract arrangements until we indicate that we are ready to proceed.

DF
I should be grateful if you could let me have an early draft reply to Mr Fraser for signature by the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (FCO), John Halliday (Home Office), Keith Long (Paymaster General's Office), Jim Nursaw (Attorney General's Office), John Kerr (HM Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

you see

file holes.

D Omand, Esq
Ministry of Defence

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AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

Acting
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

1 June 1982

In the High Commissioner's absence at a Conference in Geneva, I have been asked by my Prime Minister to convey to you urgently his following letter dated 1 June 1982:

"We continue to watch the progress of events in the Falklands - with concern for the losses you have suffered and with admiration for the strength with which you are sticking to the task. I have tried to underline in discussions I have had overseas the fact that anyone resisting aggression, Britain particularly in the Falklands, does so not so much for themselves but on behalf of us all. You should continue to feel that you have the strong support of your friends.

It occurs to me that the time will come at the end of hostilities when you will wish to consider the naval losses you have taken and the state of public opinion in Britain, and that then you might well come to another view about the sale of Invincible. While we continue to be keen to make the purchase, I want you to know that if after such re-assessment the British Government concludes that it should not sell Invincible, then you should tell me and not feel yourself held to any moral obligation.

With this in mind also, the Australian Minister for Defence will not press Mr Nott to conclude contract arrangements until such time as you indicate that you are ready to proceed, although of course for our own financial arrangements if the matter is to proceed, we would want to finalise the contract documents as soon as this can reasonably be done."

Yours sincerely,

R.H. Robertson

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1.

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IF MY REPLY TO (D) IS INCORRECT OR INCOMPLERE.

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DESKBY 011100Z

FM TRIPOLI 011005Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 158 OF 1 JUNE

MY TELNO 157: LIBYA/ARGENTINA

1. A BRITISH PILOT WITNESSED ON 31 MAY THE ARRIVAL OF A BOEING 707 AIRLINER IN CIVIL LIVERY, CALL SIGN ARGENTINA 1420, AT TRIPOLI AIRPORT. HE THEN SAW IT PARK IN THE MILITARY AREA.
2. THE PILOT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD BY A SWEDISH SOURCE THAT THE AIRCRAFT LOADED 400 ERM MISSILES. HE DESCRIBED THE SWEDE AS A MISSILE EXPERT EMPLOYED BY THE LIBYAN AIR FORCE TO TRAIN LIBYANS ON THE ERM WHICH HE ASSUMED TO BE A SWEDISH MISSILE. THE SWEDE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE MISSILE WAS A QUOTE MINI EXOCET UNQUOTE WITH A DIAMETER OF 23 CENTIMETRES. THE SWEDE WHO WAS DESCRIBED AS PRO-BRITISH AND MUCH CONCERNED THAT THE LEAK SHOULD NOT BE TRACED TO HIM, WAS CALLED TO THE AIRPORT AFTER DARK TO ASSIST IN THE LOADING.
3. I HAVE HAD A SIMILAR, THOUGH EXPANDED, REPORT FROM MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE. ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT REVEAL HIS SOURCE I BELIEVE IT TO HAVE BEEN THE SAME SWEDE. ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN TWO AIRCRAFT CAME YESTERDAY AND LOADED 400 G(SIC)RM MISSILES. THE GERMAN'S SOURCE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THESE MISSILES ARE MANUFACTURED IN LIBYA AT A FACTORY BUILT BY A SWEDISH COMPANY FOR THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL OFFICE AT AIN ZAHRA, 30KM SOUTH EAST OF TRIPOLI. THE AREA IS SEALED OFF AND THERE IS PARTICULAR CARE TO KEEP SOVIET NATIONALS AWAY.
4. THE GERMAN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE MISSILE HAD A RANGE OF 3KM, WAS ESSENTIALLY A SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE WHICH COULD "AIM ITSELF". BUT IT COULD BE CARRIED BY AIRCRAFT AND WAS SUITABLE FOR ONE OF THE TYPES OF AIRCRAFT IN THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE. IT COULD ALSO BE ADAPTED TO HELICOPTERS.
5. ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN THE MISSILE IS GOOD TECHNICALLY WITH A CLAIMED SUCCESS RATE OF 90 PER CENT. ITS ONLY PROBLEM IS SAID TO BE THAT WHEN TRAVELLING CLOSE TO THE SEA REFLECTED LIGHT CAN AFFECT ITS ACCURACY.

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6. THE GERMAN SEEMED TO BE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT ALTHOUGH THE SWEDISH FIRM HAD CONSTRUCTED THE FACTORY, THE MISSILE PARTS WERE OBTAINED FROM VARIOUS SOURCES AND THE END PRODUCT ASSEMBLED HERE.

7. I CAN TRACE NO REFERENCE IN MY OUTDATED JANE'S AND APOLOGISE FOR THE AMATEUR DESCRIPTION OF MISSILE DETAILS. I REPORT THEM AS DESCRIBED TO ME.

BURTON

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

1 June, 1982

Mr. Whitmore

A.J.C. 46

Dear John,

Clive Whitmore's letter of 25 May to Brian Fall asked for a factual note on the Falkland Islands Company, following an approach by Mr Robert Simpson.

I enclose a background note. I also enclose a guidance telegram recently sent to all posts to enable them to rebut Argentine allegations about the Company's role in the Islands. We have not prepared a draft reply to Mr Simpson since his letter was not copied to us, but could of course do so if required.

However, it seems to us that it would be inappropriate for the Government to comment, as Mr Simpson asks, on the functions of a private company. Could Mr Simpson be advised to contact the Falkland Islands Company or Coalite direct to obtain the information he is seeking?

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

J E Holmes

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

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FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY

Essential Facts

1. The Falkland Islands Company (FICo) is a major owner of land in the Falklands and is by far the largest of the overseas companies with commercial interests in the Islands. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Coalite Limited, whose Chairman is also the Chairman of FICo. Coalite's interests are very wide-spread. They include the production of smokeless fuel; chemical-processing; coal and fuel-oil distribution (including 6% interest in Sovereign Oil and Gas UK); vehicle-building and distribution; building materials; shipping; oil-rig servicing; transport and warehousing. The turnover was of the order of £360 million in the financial year 1980/81; profit was about £21.5 million. The Company was No.46 in the profitability league of the top 200 British companies in 1981.

2. FICo has virtual monopoly control in many areas of commercial life in the Islands. Its operations include:-

- (a) ownership of 45% of farmland and 50% of the wool producing capacity;
- (b) through ties with other externally-owned farming companies, a strong influence on at least half of the remaining farmland;
- (c) providing direct employment for 240 people and, indirectly, many more;
- (d) effective control of internal and external shipping;
- (e) ownership of the sole commercial jetty and direct employer of the only dock labour force, giving it control over the loading and unloading of all produce and supplies;
- (f) a dominant rôle in the marketing of Islands' wool through its conduct of auctions between the two UK brokers principally involved;

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- 2 -

- (g) most of the insurance, finance and other commercial services for its own and other enterprise;
- (h) the largest buying agent and importer of equipment for its own and other farms and for retail in its own stores and the settlement shops;
- (i) marketing diesel fuel supplied by MOD.

3. The Company's investment record in the Islands has in the past been poor but has improved in recent years. Under the supervision of the Grasslands Trials Unit, 500 acres in Lafonia have been reseeded with encouraging results. The Company has also responded to Lord Shackleton's recommendation concerning the establishment of smaller farming units by selling its Green Patch Farm to the Government for subdivision. Nevertheless, local FICo managers are under strict control of the Head Office in London and find it difficult to obtain money for capital investment projects which do not show quick returns. Lack of investment was one of the major criticisms in the 1976 Shackleton Report.

4. The Argentines regard the Company as a major obstacle to their ambitions. In 1978 Argentine interests made a fairly overt bid for ownership of the Company, although the Argentine Government at the time maintained that they had played no direct part. The Argentine Government suggested to the previous Government on several occasions that the Company be taken over by a joint holding company representing UK, Argentine and Islander interests. Since the invasion the Argentines have repeatedly tried to portray the Company as a principal perpetuator of the Islands' colonial status, particularly in thier discussions with the UN Secretary-General.

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OO BRUSSELS

GRS 319

R E S T R I C T E D

FM FCO 121630Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 92 OF 12 MAY.

FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY

1. ARGENTINE PROPAGANDA IS SEEKING TO PORTRAY THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY AS A MONOPOLISTIC ENTERPRISE WHICH HAS DOMINATED AND ATROPHIED POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN THE FALKLANDS. IN COUNTERING SUCH PROPAGANDA, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING:
2. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY HAS PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISLANDS, BUT SO HAVE COMMERCIAL CONCERNS IN MANY BRITISH AND FOREIGN COMMUNITIES. WE REJECT ANY SUGGESTION THAT IT DOMINATES THE ISLANDS. IT EMPLOYS LESS THAN 14 PER CENT OF THE ISLANDS POPULATION. THOUGH IT HAS SUBSTANTIAL HOLDINGS, IT IS ONLY ONE OF ABOUT 40 INDEPENDENT LAND OWNERS ON THE ISLANDS. IT HAS BEEN WORKING ACTIVELY OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS TO SPLIT UP AND SELL OFF SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS TO SMALL FARMERS AND ENCOURAGE INDEPENDENT TENANTS. THE COMPANY HAS ALSO BEEN COOPERATING IN PLANS TO DIVERSIFY THE ISLANDS ECONOMY INTO NEW FIELDS.
3. THE COMPANY'S ROLE IN NO WAY DETRACTS FROM THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS OF THE ISLANDERS, WHICH ARE EXERCISED THROUGH THEIR OWN FREE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS INDEPENDENT OF COMPANY INFLUENCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLANDS IS BASED ON UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, ELECTING COUNCILS WHICH INCLUDE NO EX-OFFICIO COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES. ONLY TWO COMPANY EMPLOYEES SERVE ON THE PRESENT COUNCILS. THEY WERE FREELY ELECTED BY THE POPULATION AND HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE EXTREMELY INDEPENDENT MINDED IN THEIR ATTITUDE TO COMPANY AFFAIRS. THERE ARE FULL UNION RIGHTS IN THE

R E S T R I C T E D

THIS WAS AN ARGENTINE ATTEMPT

TUDISTS

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4936 - 1

FALKLANDS, A UNION WITH OVER 500 MEMBERS WORKING FOR NUMEROUS EMPLOYERS, AND LEGISLATION GOVERNING WAGES, WORKING CONDITIONS, COMPENSATION, ETC.

4. AN ALLEGATION HAS SURFACED THAT MR DENIS THATCHER IS A FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY SHAREHOLDER. IF RAISED, YOU CAN SAY THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO TRUTH IN THIS STORY.

PYM

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[ALL ROUTINE]

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GRS 330
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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 010300Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 375 OF 1 JUNE
INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA AND JOHANNESBURG
INFO SAVING CG CAPE TOWN AND DURBAN

MS

OUR TELNOS 375 AND 377 AND 58 TO PRETORIA
FALKLANDS ARMS

1. MEDIA REPORTS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS CONCENTRATE UPON THREE THEMES:

(A) SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT (SAG) INDIGNATION OVER ALLEGED BRITISH USE OF THE MEDIA TO ATTEMPT TO FORCE OFFICIAL RESPONSE OVER ALLEGATIONS OF WEAPONS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA.

(B) WARNINGS THAT THE SAG WILL SOON TAKE THIS UP OFFICIALLY WITH HMG.

(C) DAMAGING IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S STANDING ABROAD.

2. A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN THE SUNDAY EXPRESS ON 30 MAY HEADLINED QUOTE THE BRITS GROW ANGRIER UNQUOTE REPORTS BRITISH DISSATISFACTION WITH GENERAL MALAN'S STATEMENT. IT ALSO EXAMINES THE REASONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S CHANGING STANCE ON THE ARMS ALLEGATIONS AND REPORTS A QUOTE EXPERIENCED EUROPEAN DIPLOMAT IN CAPE TOWN AS SAYING QUOTE THIS WAS HARDLY THE TIME OR OCCASION TO TRY TO BLACKMAIL THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INTO LIFTING ITS ARMS EMBARGO. UNQUOTE.

3. VADERLAND ON 31 MAY CLAIMED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES WERE DISCONCERTED BECAUSE THE BRITISH HAD APPARENTLY USED THE MEDIA AGAIN OVER THE WEEKEND (29/30 MAY) TO AROUSE ANXIETY OVER SOUTH AFRICA'S ALLEGED PROVISION OF ARMS TO ARGENTINA.

4. TODAY'S (1 JUNE) DIE BURGER REPORTS FROM LONDON THAT A QUOTE DIPLOMATIC STORM IS BUILDING UP IN THE MIDST OF CONTINUING ALLEGATIONS THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS PROVIDING WEAPONRY TO ARGENTINA AND COULD BREAK AROUND SOUTH AFRICA'S HEAD AS SOON AS THE CRISIS AROUND THE FALKLANDS ISLANDS IS RESOLVED UNQUOTE. MRS THATCHER IS REPORTED TO BE FURIOUS OVER REPORTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN AND ISRAELI WEAPONS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA. DIE BURGER'S LONDON OFFICE NOTES THAT BOTH ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SIR JOHN LEAHY FORMER BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN SOUTH AFRICA. QUOTE WHY THE SAME OFFICIAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TWO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE SO DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICALLY AND POLITICALLY HAS STILL NOT BEEN MADE CLEAR BY THE BRITISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS UNQUOTE.
FERGUSON [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FALKLAND ISLANDS

THIS WAS AN ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT...

TYPISTS

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MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/S Am D
HD/DEFENCE D
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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GRS 250
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FM UKMIS GENEVA 011020Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 282 OF 1 JUNE 1982
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS 11 AND DS 15)
INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, BERNE

YOUR TELNO 309 TO MONTEVIDEO: FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC

1. WE HAVE DISCUSSED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE LAST FEW DAYS WITH THE ICRC THE PROPOSAL THAT SOME OF THEIR DELEGATES SHOULD SAIL FROM MONTEVIDEO ON BOARD HMS HECLA FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
2. ICRC CONFIRM THAT, SINCE THERE IS STILL NO PROSPECT OF ANY OTHER FASTER MEANS OF REACHING THE FALKLANDS, THEY INTEND TO TAKE UP THIS OFFER. THEY RECOGNISE THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS FIRST PUT TO THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF GETTING THEIR PEOPLE TO THE SS UGANDA AND OTHER BRITISH HOSPITAL SHIPS TO ACT AS OBSERVERS

PUT TO THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF GETTING THEIR PEOPLE TO THE
SS UGANDA AND OTHER BRITISH HOSPITAL SHIPS TO ACT AS OBSERVERS
(YOUR TELNOS 199 TO ME AND 304 TO MONTEVIDEO).
AS HAS BEEN REPORTED BY TELEPHONE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT, THE
ICRC STILL SEE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THIS PROPOSAL,
WHICH THEY ARE NOW VENTILATING DIRECT WITH MOD. WE AWAIT
THEIR CONSIDERED REACTIONS.

3. ICRC HAVE HOWEVER NOW CONFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD LIKE
TO PUT ON BOARD HECLA FIVE DELGATES, TWO OF THOSE
CURRENTLY HANDLING THE REPATRIATION OF THE NARWAL PRISONERS
AND THREE OTHERS, TO ARRIVE IN MONTEVIDEO BEFORE HECLA LEAVES
WHICH THEY PRESUME WILL BE AFTER LATE ON 2 JUNE. THE
MISSION OF THESE FIVE WOULD BE:
(A) TO TAKE ON THE HOSPITAL SHIP OBSERVER ROLE, IF AGREED.,
(B) TO HELP WITH ARGENTINE CASUALTIES AND OTHER POWS., AND
(C) TO PROVIDE ANY OTHER ASSISTANCE ON TRADITIONAL RED CROSS
LINES EG THE NEGOTIATING OF CEASEFIRES AND DESIGNATION OF SECURE
ZONES ETC.

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 011115 Z MDH/

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SECRET
FM MONTEVIDEO 011230Z JUN 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 411 OF 1 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

FALKLANDS: CEASE FIRE.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASKED ME THIS MORNING WHETHER
WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE I WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE A VERY
EARLY AND DISCREET MEETING WITH HIM AND THE ARGENTINE
AMBASSADOR HERE TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO ACHIEVE A CEASE
FIRE. MINISTER SAID THAT DOUBTLESS THE BRITISH WOULD TAKE PORT
STANLEY BUT AT AN APPALLING COST. HE KNEW THAT COSTA MENDOZA
WANTED THE FIGHTING STOPPED AS INDEED DID THE STATE DEPARTMENT
HE HIMSELF WAS PREPARED TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINIANS TO
WITHDRAW EVEN IF HE WERE TO BE ACCUSED OF BEING A TRAITOR.

2. I SAID THAT I WOULD TRANSMIT THIS SUGGESTION IMMEDIATELY
ALTHOUGH I WONDERED HOW HIS SUGGESTION WOULD FIT IN WITH THE
EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. MINISTER
SAID HE WOULD NOT CONVENE THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF
WITHOUT FIRST HAVING A TELEPHONIC WORD WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

HUTCHINSON

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE
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HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
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DEF HD/FUSD
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PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
PS/FUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILMORE
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MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
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ZZ WASHINGTON

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GRS 190

SECRET

FM FCO 011330Z JUN 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1090 OF 1 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1088: HAIG'S VIEWS ON THE FALKLANDS

1. MINISTERS HAVE NOW CONSIDERED HAIG'S SUGGESTIONS IN YOUR TELNO 1964. PLEASE SPEAK TO HIM ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.
2. AS HAIG KNOWS, THE PRESIDENT TELEPHONED THE PRIME MINISTER LAST NIGHT AND MRS THATCHER EXPLAINED OUR POSITION. WE WANT TO ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE AND A COMPLETE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND TO DO SO WITH THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES. GIVEN THE MILITARY SITUATION, WE CONSIDER THAT A CEASEFIRE CAN BEST BE NEGOTIATED BY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. OUR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS REMAINS AS DESCRIBED IN MY TELNO 1083. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HAIG AT VERSAILLES, BUT WE WOULD ALSO BE VERY GLAD TO HAVE A TALK WITH HAIG BEFORE THEN IF THIS COULD BE ARRANGED. COULD HE POSSIBLY LOOK IN HERE TOMORROW ON HIS WAY TO FRANCE? IF SO, WE WOULD WISH TO ANNOUNCE THIS AS A BRITISH INVITATION.
3. WE SHALL SEND A SEPARATE TELEGRAM ABOUT TIMINGS FOR THE BILATERAL MEETING AT VERSAILLES.

PYM

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE LIMITED

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DEF HD/FUSD

HD/RES D

PS

PS/MR HUDD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/LOED BELSTREAD

PS/FUS

MR BULLARD

SIR I SINCLAIR

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR UEE

MR BARRETT

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S/MR ONSLOW
S/PUS
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R I SINCLAIR
R GIFFARD
R WRIGHT
R ADAMS
ORD N GORDON LENNOX
ORD BRIDGES
R URE
R GILLMORE
D/PUSD (2)
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D/PLANNING STAFF
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DIO

~~ROOMS FOR ROBERT CLIN CLERK~~

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

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UNCLASSIFIED
FM LIMA 011500Z JUN 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 220 OF 1 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS

1. TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS THE SENDING OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE YESTERDAY BY PRESIDENT BELAUNDE URGING PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ARRANGE AN IMMEDIATE TRUCE, AS QUOTE HIS WORD WOULD BE DECISIVE IN AVERTING THE FINAL BATTLE UNQUOTE. LOCAL DIPLOMATIC SOURCES ARE QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE MESSAGE WAS SENT AT ARGENTINA'S BEHEST.
2. THE MESSAGE ALSO STATED THAT WORLD PEACE WAS SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT AND THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE THOUGHT IT OPPORTUNE TO ADDRESS AN URGENT REQUEST FOR A TRUCE TO THE US PRESIDENT TO BE FOLLOWED BY A NEGOTIATED PEACE SETTLEMENT. THE MESSAGE ALSO STATES QUOTE I AM CONVINCED THAT YOUR WORD WOULD BE DECISIVE IN AVERTING THE FINAL BATTLE, WHOSE DISASTROUS OUTCOME CAN BE ANTICIPATED IN VIEW OF THE LAMENTABLE ENCOUNTERS WHICH HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. HEMISPHERIC UNITY, THE STRENGTH AND PERMANENCE OF WHICH ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON WORLD PEACE, IS BEING SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY THIS CONFLICT UNQUOTE.

WALLACE

THIS WAS AN ARGENTINE AIR FORCE MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY [PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

3

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES. (37)

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PS/MR ONSLOW
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PS/LORD BELSTEAD
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SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
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HD/PLANNING STAFF
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FM WASHINGTON 011540Z JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1971 OF 1 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL TO ME YESTERDAY, 31 MAY, I SAW JUDGE CLARK AT THE WHITE HOUSE EARLY THIS MORNING. I ASKED FOR A WORD PERSONALLY WITH THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW MORNING BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR EUROPE AND CLARK SAID THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE THIS.
2. IN THE MEANTIME I EXPLAINED TO CLARK, AS INSTRUCTED, THE BRITISH ATTITUDE ON CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL AND THE FUTURE. THE PRIME MINISTER WANTED IT UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD NEGOTIATED IN GOOD FAITH FOR WEEKS AND THE ARGENTINIANS HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST IN A SERIOUS SETTLEMENT: NOW THAT WE HAD ENDURED THE EFFORT AND SACRIFICES OF RETURNING IN FORCE TO THE ISLANDS, WE COULD NOT SIMPLY PULL OUT BEFORE OUR TASK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND MAKE WAY FOR SOME CONTACT GROUP INCLUDING COUNTRIES FROM LATIN AMERICA.

THIS WAS AN ARGENTINE AIRFORCE BOEING 707 AIRCRAFT

COUNTRIES FROM LATIN AMERICA.

3. I EXPLAINED TO CLARK THE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES OF TIMING AND THE INHERENT PROBLEM OF ACCEPTING A DETAILED PLAN FOR CEASEFIRE WITHDRAWAL AND THE FUTURE WHEN POISED BEFORE A MAJOR BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY. HAIG HAD ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED THAT THE PLAN SHOULD BE LAUNCHED ONCE WE HAD TAKEN PORT STANLEY, BUT HE HAD GONE BACK ON THIS AND IN HIS LATEST IDEAS HAD STATED THAT WE MUST ACT BEFORE AN ATTACK BECAUSE THAT WAS THE ONLY HOPE OF GETTING LATIN AMERICAN, AND FOR THAT MATTER ARGENTINIAN, ACQUIESCENCE. IT STRUCK ME THAT JUDGE CLARK WAS EQUIVOCAL ABOUT THE TIMING AND INDEED SAW THE DIFFICULTIES OF DOING ANYTHING BEFORE THE ASSAULT. HE RATHER GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT HE THOUGH THE BEST MOMENT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SURRENDER OF THE ARGENTINE GARRISON HAD OCCURRED.

4. CLARK SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT DID UNDERSTAND THE FIRMNESS OF OUR POSITION. NEITHER HE NOR HAIG WERE WISHING TO UNDERMINE THIS. THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD CLARK, FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY HER REMARK THAT QUOTE WE ARE GOING IT ALONE UNQUOTE. THIS WAS NOT HOW THE AMERICANS SAW IT. QUOTE WE ARE IN IT WITH YOU UNQUOTE, JUDGE CLARK SAID. THIS WAS VERY MUCH THE PRESIDENT'S CONVICTION. BUT THIS DID NOT PREVENT HIM FROM BELIEVING THAT CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE TO THE USA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBOURS, THAT THE US SHOULD NOT NEGLECT ANY CHANCE OF PREVENTING FURTHER BLOODSHED AND THE HUMILIATION OF ARGENTINA THAT COULD GIVE A HOSTAGE FOR THE FUTURE, AND THAT IN THE LONG-TERM THERE HAD TO BE A SETTLEMENT ABOUT THE ISLANDS. CLARK SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN HAVING BRAZIL ALONGSIDE THEM IN AN ATTEMPT AT A NEGOTIATIONS BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF BRAZIL THOUGHT THAT WE WERE INSISTING ON UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER AND THE HUMILIATION OF ARGENTINA.

5. CLARK ALSO MENTIONED THE FEAR THE US GOVERNMENT HAVE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA GENERALLY, AND IN PARTICULAR IN ARGENTINA.

6. I SAID THAT ARGENTINA HAD NOT SHOWN MUCH INDICATION OF A READINESS TO LIMIT THEIR AGGRESSIVENESS. THEY HAD LAUNCHED FREQUENT ATTACKS ON THE BRITISH FLEET, INCLUDING ONE ONLY LAST SUNDAY. IF THEY WERE READY TO LIMIT HOSTILITIES THERE WAS NO DIFFICULTY IN THEM SHOWING IT. AS IT WAS THEY WERE SCURRYING AROUND THE WORLD TRYING TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES. AS CLARK HAD MENTIONED BRAZIL, I SAID I MUST TELL HIM THAT WE HAD CATEGORICAL EVIDENCE THAT IMPORTANT WAR MATERIEL FROM

MISSILES. AS CLARK HAD MENTIONED BRAZIL, I SAID I MUST TELL HIM THAT WE HAD CATEGORICAL EVIDENCE THAT IMPORTANT WAR MATERIEL FROM LIBYA WAS BEING SENT TO ARGENTINA THROUGH BRAZIL. THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNEW THE DETAILS BUT IF HE COULD DO ANYTHING TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BRAZIL ON THIS MATTER, THIS WOULD BE USEFUL. CLARK UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO THIS.

7. FINALLY I MENTIONED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER LOOKED FORWARD TO HAVING A PRIVATE TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT IN FRANCE ON FRIDAY WHERE THEY COULD GO OVER THE WHOLE MATTER CALMLY. JUDGE CLARK SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO EAGER TO HAVE THIS MEETING AND HE WOULD PURSUE FURTHER THE BEST PLACE AND TIME FOR BOTH SIDES.

HENDERSON

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39) 41

PS/M. HURD
PS/MR GNSLOW
PS/PJS
~~MR BELLARD~~
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/EPD
HD/ECD (E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
EMERGENCY ROOM ✓
RESIDENT CLERK

~~PS/RO~~ 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR LEFT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)

RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS GENEVA 011020Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 284 OF 01 JUNE 1982

INFO ROUTINE MONTEVIDEO

INFO SAVING BERNE , BRASILIA

FALKLAND ISLANDS : REPATRIATION OF WOUNDED POWS

1. AS REPORTED BY TELEPHONE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT,
ICRC INFORMED US AT 1630 GMT ON 31 MAY OF RECEIPT OF A NOTE
FROM THE ARGENTINE MISSION CONFIRMING THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERN-
MENT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEIR WOUNDED REPATRIATED VIA MONTEVIDEO.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BERNE AND BRASILIA.

MARSHALL

RIP

GRS 100

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM BERNE 011500Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 144 OF 01 JUNE

THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS IN USHUAIA.

THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF A COMMUNICATION RECEIVED FROM
THE SWISS FDFA TODAY (01 JUNE):

BEGINS .

ON 28 MAY 1982 THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES TELEPHONED
MR WINCHESTER WHO EXPLAINED THAT THE PRISON CONDITIONS HAD NOT
CHANGED AT ALL AND THAT THINGS CONTINUE TO GO WELL FOR THE THREE
JOURNALISTS.

THE OPORTUNITY WAS TAKEN TO INFORM MR WINCHESTER THAT THE SWISS
EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES HAD BY NOTE ON 26 MAY REQUESTED THE
ARGENTINE MFA TO SUPPORT A SETTLEMENT OF THIS MATTER AS QUICKLY
AS POSSIBLE.

ENDS.

POWELL-JONES

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE.

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

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ADVANCE PIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

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MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
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MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD (2)
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HD/ERD
HD/EGD(E)
HD/UND
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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
EMERGENCY UNIT
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE

MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

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MR WADE-GERY }
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C PLEET

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

GRS

SECRET

FM BRASILIA 010245Z JUN 81

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 010400Z MODUK

AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 010800Z FCO

SIC UBA

FOR BGS (INT) AND DIC ARMS CELL FROM BRITAIRAT.

LIBYAN ARMS FOR ARGENTINA

1. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM RECIFE AND MY INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED THE FOLLOWING (SOME OF WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN PASSED IN PREVIOUS SIGNALS):

A. THERE HAVE BEEN TO DATE TWO RETURN FLIGHTS TO LIBYA VIA RECIFE FROM ARGENTINA. THE RETURN JOURNEY OF THE THIRD FLIGHT IS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE TONIGHT 31 MAY/1 JUN. DETAILS OF THESE FLIGHTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) FLIGHT NUMBER ONE (UNDERLINED)
THIS WAS AN ARGENTINE AIRFORCE BOEING 707 AIRCRAFT WHICH

I) FLIGHT NUMBER ONE (UNDERLINED)

THIS WAS AN ARGENTINE AIRFORCE BOEING 707 AIRCRAFT WHICH PASSED THROUGH RECIFE NORTHBOUND ON MAY 25TH. THE TAIL NUMBER WAS TC 93. THE AIRCRAFT WAS BASED AT EL PALOMAR AND WAS FROM ONE BRIGADA AEREA. THE CAPTAIN'S NAME WAS CASTIELLA AND THERE WERE SIX OR SEVEN OTHER CREW MEMBERS, OF WHOM IT APPEARED THAT THREE WERE CIVILIANS AND FOUR MILITARY, JUDGING FROM THE NUMBER WEARING UNIFORMS. TWO OR THREE OF THE CREW WERE ARMED. THE PLANE WAS EMPTY OF CARGO AND ONLY TOOK ON A FULL FUEL LOAD. FROM ENQUIRIES THE CAPTAIN MADE AT THE AIRPORT REGARDING WEATHER IT APPEARED THAT HE INTENDED TO GO DIRECT TO TRIPOLI AND NOT STAGE THROUGH LAS PALMAS ALTHOUGH THIS APPEARED ON THE FLIGHT PLAN.

II) FLIGHT NUMBER TWO (UNDERLINED)

THE SAME AIRFORCE 707 RETURNED TO RECIFE ON 27 MAY LANDING 2307 GMT AND DEPARTED AGAIN SOUTHBOUND AT 0005 GMT ON 28 MAY. DURING THE HOUR ON THE GROUND THE AIRCRAFT ONLY TOOK ON FUEL. THE AIRCRAFT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE COME DIRECT FROM TRIPOLI. THE SOURCE AT RECIFE WAS ABLE TO SEE THE INSIDE OF THE AIRCRAFT DURING THE TURN-ROUND AND REPORTED SEEING SIX LONG BOXES, APPROX 5 METERS IN LENGTH, IN PAIRS BEHIND EACH OTHER RUNNING ALONG THE LENGTH OF THE FUSELAGE. MANY SMALL WOODEN BOXES WERE LOADED ON TOP. NONE OF THE BOXES WERE MARKED AND THE SUGGESTION THAT EXOCET MISSILES MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONTAINED IN THE LONG BOXES IS BASED UPON THEIR SIZE AND SHAPE. ON BOTH ITS LANDING AND TAKE-OFF RUN AT RECIFE THE AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED TO USE A LOT OF RUNWAY, CONSISTENT WITH A HEAVY LOAD OF CARGO.

III) FLIGHT NUMBER THREE (UNDERLINED)

DURING THE EVENING OF MAY 28TH A BOEING 707 OF THE AIRLINE AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS (CARGO VERSION) LANDED AT RECIFE TO REFUEL NORTHBOUND FROM ARGENTINA TO TRIPOLI. THE AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED TO BE EMPTY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE FLIGHT NUMBER WAS 1417. THE DAC AUTHORISATION NUMBER WAS 689/PL2. THE CAPTAIN'S NAME WAS CUNIVERT AND HE WAS APPARENTLY A CIVILIAN. THE REST OF THE CREW WERE A MIX OF MILITARY AND CIVILIANS.

IV) FLIGHT NUMBER FOUR (UNDERLINED)

THIS WAS THE BOEING 707 ON ITS RETURN FLIGHT FROM TRIPOLI. IT LANDED AT RECIFE AT 0640GMT ON 30 MAY, DEPARTING SOUTHBOUND AT 0755 GMT. IT WAS REFUELLED ONLY, TAKING ON A FULL FUEL LOAD AND REQUIRED NO OTHER HANDLING OR SERVICING. ITS FLIGHT NUMBER WAS AR 1417. THE FLIGHT PLAN INDICATED STAGING THROUGH LAS PALMAS EN ROUTE FROM TRIPOLI TO RECIFE BUT REMARKS MADE BY THE CREW APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT IN FACT THE AIRCRAFT CAME DIRECT. THE CREW WERE THE SAME AS FOR FLIGHT NUMBER THREE. JUST INSIDE THE AIRCRAFT FRONT DOOR ON THE RIGHT WERE THREE BUNK BEDS. ONE ABOVE

EN ROUTE FROM TRIPOLI TO RECIFE BUT REMARKS MADE BY THE CREW APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT IN FACT THE AIRCRAFT CAME DIRECT. THE CREW WERE THE SAME AS FOR FLIGHT NUMBER THREE. JUST INSIDE THE AIRCRAFT FRONT DOOR ON THE RIGHT WERE THREE BUNK BEDS, ONE ABOVE THE OTHER, MAKING IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR MY SOURCE TO GET A GOOD IDEA OF THE NATURE OF THE CARGO. IT WAS CLEARLY FULL OF WOODEN BOXES BUT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE THIS TIME TO DETERMINE THEIR SIZES. THIS AIRCRAFT HAD A LONGER LANDING AND TAKE-OFF RUN THAN THE MILITARY AIRCRAFT (AND CONSIDERABLY LONGER THAN THAT NORMALLY USED BY A PASSENGER 707). THE AIRCRAFT HAD THE LETTERS "GO" PAINTED ON THE NOSEWHEEL DOORS AND ON THE NOSE. THERE WAS NO NUMBER AT ALL ON THE AIRCRAFT TAIL.

V) FLIGHT NUMBER FIVE (UNDERLINED)

EN ROUTE FROM ARGENTINA TO LIBYA. I PERSONALLY OBSERVED ANOTHER AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS BOEING 707 LAND AT 2230 ON 30 MAY TAKING OFF AGAIN NORTHBOUND AT APPROX 2300GMT. THE AIRCRAFT RECEIVED FUEL ONLY, AND DURING ITS TURN-ROUND WAS PARKED A LITTLE WAY FROM THE AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING AT RECIFE. IN COMPANY WITH MY SOURCE I WAS ABLE TO GET INSIDE THE RESTRICTED AREA AND OBSERVE THE TURN-ROUND ACTIVITY IN THE DARK FROM A POSITION NO MORE THAN 15 METERS FROM THE AIRCRAFT. DURING THE TURN-ROUND THE CAPTAIN AND TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS CREW TALKED ON THE GROUND WITH THE ARGENTINE CONSUL. THREE OTHER CREW MEMBERS WERE OBVIOUSLY GUARDING THE AIRCRAFT AND WERE CLEARLY ARMED. ONE OF THEM WAS POSITIONED AT THE TOP OF THE AIRCRAFT STEPS TO PREVENT ANYBODY ENTERING THE AIRCRAFT. THE FLIGHT NUMBER (FROM A COPY OF THE FLIGHT PLAN SOURCE WAS ABLE TO PROCURE FOR ME) WAS AR 1420 AND THE REGISTRATION MARK WAS LV JGR. THE NAMES OF THE CREW WERE AS FOLLOWS: COMMANDANTE SAN JUAN CARLOS, DEPUTY COMMANDANTE BIRO VALENTIA, DEPUTY COMMANDANTE LEVAGGI ANGEL, TWO TECHNICIANS MENENDEZ VICENTE AND LIMA MARCELO, STEWARD DORA GUSTAVO, TWO OTHER CREW MEMBERS CARIDI JOSE AND TORIELLI.

B. I DID NOT SEE ANYONE IN AN AIRFORCE UNIFORM. THOSE VISIBLE ALL APPEARED TO BE CIVILIANS. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM THE TREND OF THE PREVIOUS FLIGHTS THAT FLIGHT AR 1417 WILL STAGE BACK THROUGH RECIFE SOMETIME DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS ON THE NIGHT 31 MAY/1 JUNE, ALMOST CERTAINLY DIRECT FROM TRIPOLI AND WITH A FULL CARGO LOAD. MY SOURCE WILL DO ALL HE CAN TO ENTER THE AIRCRAFT AND TAKE NOTE OF WHAT IS CONTAINED THEREIN.

2. COMMENT (UNDERLINED)

A. THE FIRST RETURN FLIGHT IN THE MILITARY BOEING 707 MUST HAVE RECEIVED DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FROM THE MINISTERIO DA AERONAUTICA IN BRASILIA AND I WOULD IMAGINE THAT THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME LEVEL OF INSPECTION AT THAT LEVEL. ALSO THAT

HAVE RECEIVED DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FROM THE MINISTERIO DA AERONAUTICA IN BRASILIA AND I WOULD IMAGINE THAT THERE MUST HAVE BEEN KNOWLEDGE OF THE FLIGHT AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. ALSO THAT, AS THE FLIGHT WAS RETURNING THROUGH RECIFE FROM TRIPOLI IT MUST HAVE CONTAINED ARMS/WEAPONS OF SOME SORT. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO INSPECT THE CARGO ON THE GROUND.

B. THE SUBSEQUENT FLIGHTS IN BOEING 707S OR AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS WOULD HAVE MERELY HAD TO RECEIVE AN AUTHORISATION NUMBER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION (ONE OF THE DEPARTMENTS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE AIR MINISTER). IN ALL CASES FLIGHT PLANS SUBMITTED CLEARLY INDICATED AN ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF TRIPOLI, HOWEVER THE FIRST RETURNING CIVILIAN 707 PASSED THROUGH RECIFE SOUTHBOUND WITHOUT ANY DELAYS AND THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT ITS CARGO SHOULD BE INSPECTED.

C. IT IS MY JUDGEMENT THAT THE SOURCE REFERRED TO, WHO HAS BEEN INVALUABLE, IS TOTALLY RELIABLE AND ONLY AIMS TO PROVIDE AS MUCH ACCURATE INFORMATION AS IS POSSIBLE. HIS OWN REPORTED OBSERVATIONS WERE AT TIMES BACKED UP BY COPIES OF DOCUMENTS WHICH HE WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN.

D. IT WOULD CLEARLY BE QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO DO MORE THAN OBSERVE THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF THE BOXES CONTAINED IN THE AIRCRAFT, SINCE IT WAS AT ALL TIMES CAREFULLY GUARDED INSIDE AND OUT, SOME OF THE GUARDS BEING ARMED AND CLEARLY WELL AWARE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING ANYONE AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT.

E. THE VIEW IS THUS EXPRESSED THAT EXOCET MISSILES COULD HAVE BEEN CARRIED BACK TO ARGENTINA ON FLIGHT NO TWO AS SIX BOXES APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN LARGE ENOUGH TO CONTAIN THIS MISSILE. PARA 2. OF UBA 311400Z MAY SHOULD BE TREATED WITH RESERVE AS CLEARLY IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY AT THIS STAGE WHAT MAY BE CARRIED ON THIS FLIGHT.

HARDING

NNN

SENT/RECD AT 01:0435Z BRL/RR

FLASH [PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (57) (44)

PS (6)
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
MR REED, PUSD
[EMERGENCY ROOM] ✓
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (4 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/ROME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/SIR M PALLISER

PS/SIR A DUFF

MR WADE-GEHY

MR FULLER

MR COLVIN

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF

CABINET
OFFICE

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
FM LIMA 311550Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 216 OF 31 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS/PERUVIAN AID TO ARGENTINA

- If it can be merged in practice - 1/2 hrs
Have no objection
ms*
1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT PERU HAS OFFERED ARGENTINA A PERUVIAN AIR FORCE BUFFALO TO HELP EVACUATE ARGENTINE WOUNDED FROM GOOSE GREEN SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO YOUR GIVING PERMISSION FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO LAND THERE. DR ARIAS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE LARGER HERCULES AIRCRAFT (C.F. PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 207) CANNOT LAND AT GOOSE GREEN AND THAT PERU WISHED TO MAKE THIS GESTURE TOWARDS ARGENTINA EVEN THOUGH, AS I EXPLAINED AND HE KNEW, THE ARGENTINE WOUNDED WERE BEING EVACUATED ON THE BRITISH HOSPITAL SHIPS IN THE SAME WAY AS THE BRITISH WOUNDED. DR ARIAS ADDED THAT THE PERUVIAN OFFER WAS NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY THE ARGENTINES AND THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN IF AND WHEN IT WAS ACCEPTED.
 2. IT RATHER LOOKS AS THOUGH THE MILITARY PRESSURES FOR MORE PRACTICAL AID TO ARGENTINA ARE MOUNTING AND THAT THIS MAY BE A HALF-WAY PROPOSAL WHICH IS BEING TAKEN BOTH AS A SDP TO THOSE WHO ADVOCATE THE ADOPTION OF MORE RADICAL MEASURES FOLLOWING THE APPROVAL OF THE GAS RESOLUTION AND IN ORDER TO BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
 3. I REALISE THE HORRENDOUS COMPLICATIONS THIS FLIGHT IS LIKELY TO POSE IF THE ARGENTINES ACCEPT AND THE PERUVIANS PERSIST IN GOING THROUGH WITH THIS IDEA. ON THE OTHER HAND, I NEED NOT SPELL OUT THE EFFECT ON LOCAL OPINION OF A BRITISH REFUSAL TO ALLOW PERU TO UNDERTAKE A MISSION OF THIS NATURE.

WALLACE

SECRET

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0700 HOURS 1 JUNE

UN

(a) Sir A Parsons' Meeting with the Secretary General

1. Sir A Parsons delivered the Secretary of State's message. The Secretary General told Sir A Parsons privately that, in an attempt to avert a bloody battle for Port Stanley, he was disposed to make a final attempt over the next two days to bring about implementation of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of SCR 502 (the Secretary General fully understands that there is now no question of parallel British withdrawal).

A (FCO telno 485 to UKMis New York)
B (UKMis New York telno 899)

(b) Argentine Views

2. The Argentines have not come up with anything new. They are seeking clarification of references in the Secretary of State's message to 'the longer term' and 'alternative international security arrangements'.

(c) Secretary General's Five Point Plan

- (i) At Time T a ceasefire would come into force and be monitored by UN observers;
(ii) At Time T plus 24 hours, Argentine withdrawal would begin in implementation of SCR 502 (ie total Argentine withdrawal);
(iii) At Time T plus 24 hours, token British withdrawal would begin. [Secretariat thought that 'token' might mean the removal of one battalion];
(iv) (2) and (3) above would be completed within 'X' days;
(v) Negotiations would begin under the auspices of the Secretary-General within the framework of SCR 505.

The plan has been given to both Argentina and the UK. According to a member of the Secretariat, the Secretary General believes that points (2) and (4) would give us total Argentine withdrawal, whereas point (3) on token British withdrawal would amount to the restoration of British administration. In the Secretary General's view, if accepted by the Argentines, this package would amount to the transformation of the situation mentioned in the last sentence of the Secretary of State's message.

(d) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

4. Sir A Parsons judges that the Secretary General is acting in good faith; (The Secretary General may have been encouraged to some extent to have a last try by his meeting with Dr David Owen on 31 May). Sir A Parsons believes the Secretary General's proposals are unacceptable: if UN Observers were in situ under a mandatory resolution, and the Argentines found pretexts not to withdraw, it would be very difficult for us to resume military action: the plan involves some British withdrawal: it could also resuscitate the whole idea of UN interim administration, target dates and UN provision on negotiations for a final solution.

FLASH

PLEASE RETURN COPY TO (1782)

MR 1 M STEWART AND STAFF, MOD
MR 1 M STEWART AND STAFF, MOD
MR 1 M STEWART AND STAFF, MOD
MR 1 M STEWART AND STAFF, MOD
MR 1 M STEWART AND STAFF, MOD

ADVANCE COPY

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT PERU HAS OFFERED ARGENTINA A PERUVIAN AIR FORCE SQUADRON TO HELP EVACUATE ARGENTINE WOUNDED FROM GOOSE GREEN SUBJECT OF COURSE TO YOUR GIVING PERMITS FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO LAND THERE. DR ARIAS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE LARGER HERCULES AIRCRAFT (C.F. PARAS OF MY TELNO 207) CANNOT LAND AT GOOSE GREEN AND THAT PERU WISHED TO MAKE THIS GESTURE TOWARDS ARGENTINA EVEN THOUGH, AS I EXPLAINED AND HE KNEW, THE ARGENTINE WOUNDED WERE BEING EVACUATED ON THE BRITISH HOSPITAL SHIPS IN THE SAME WAY AS THE BRITISH WOUNDED. DR ARIAS ADDED THAT THE PERUVIAN OFFER WAS NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY THE ARGENTINES AND THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN WHEN AND WHEN IT WAS ACCEPTED.

MILITARY AND DIPLOMATICAL ASSISTANCE

5. But Sir A Parsons suggests that the Secretary General's proposals pose greater difficulties for the Argentines than for us. The proposals also allow us to buy a little more time, since the Secretary General is thinking of delaying his report to the Council until 2 June in order to explore his ideas. Sir A Parsons recommends that he should be instructed to give the Secretary General a reasoned response, pointing out the genuine objections, drawing attention to positive elements, and seeking clarification of those points which are obscure, eg the relationship in time between points (4) and (5) and what is meant by 'token'. If possible, Sir A Parsons would wish to give the Secretary General a response by 1900Z.

E (Washington telno 1985) (e) Rio Treaty Meeting Resolution

6. The Argentines have circulated this as a document of the Security Council. Sir A Parsons recommends that we reply in reasoned terms and asks for comments by telno 897)1400Z on his draft of a possible reply.

G (UKMis New York tel no 898) (f) Libyan Arms for Argentina

7. We have received information that Libya is supplying Argentina with French-made arms, including air to air missiles and that these have been shipped by Aerolineas Argentinas via Cape Verde/Las Palmas and Brazil. Action is being taken to stop these flights with Brazilian, Portuguese, Moroccan, Spanish and Cape Verde authorities. We have also asked the French and the US respectively to put pressure on the Libyans and the Brazilians to stop these supplies.

(g) Comment

8. Although the Secretary-General's new proposals have delayed further Security Council action, they pose in themselves new difficulties for us. It is likely that the Argentines will reject them. But we are required to give a response today, though this could be by way of seeking clarification. Sir A Parsons will need instructions by 1900Z.

9. The main difficulties are:

- (a) A UN presence on the Islands;
- (b) the lack of clear linkage between ceasefire and irrevocable Argentine withdrawal;
- (c) a "token" British withdrawal;
- (d) a commitment to immediate negotiations on the future of the Islands with, though this is not clearly spelt out,


/ a probable

SECRET

- 3 -

a probable UN interim administration.

10. The text of SCR 505 is attached for reference.
11. Further action is required on Sir A Parsons' proposed comments on a reply to the Argentine~~s~~ introduction of the Rio Treaty Resolution as a Security Council document.



R Fearn
Emergency Unit

1 June 1982

SECRET

E. R.

NYFC002/1

OO F C O (DESKBY 010200Z)

GR 750

31 MAY 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


DESKBY 010200Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010008Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 899 OF 31 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



YOUR TELNO 485; FALKLANDS; SECRETARY-GENERAL.

1. I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT 1900Z TODAY (31 MAY) ADDING THAT HE WAS FREE TO INCLUDE IT IN HIS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IF HE WISHED.
2. BEFORE THE MAIN MEETING (WHICH WAS A FORMALITY) HE HAD ASKED TO SEE ME ALONE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SEEING ROS AN HOUR LATER. IF HE DETECTED ANY SIGN OF CHANGE IN ROS'S ATTITUDE, HE WAS DISPOSED TO MAKE A FINAL ATTEMPT OVER THE NEXT TWO DAYS TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIVE PARAS 1 AND 2 OF SCR 502 (HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF PARALLEL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL) IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID WHAT LOOKED LIKE BEING A BLOODY BATTLE FOR STANLEY, WITH HEAVY CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES, FOLLOWING BY TOTAL ARGENTINE HUMILIATION. HE ASKED ME IF I COULD HINT AT ANYTHING BEYOND WHAT WAS IN YOUR MESSAGE E.G. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SHORT OR LONGER TERM. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT SPECULATE ON THESE LINES. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR HIM TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF THE ARGENTINES ALTERING THEIR POSITION.
3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TELEPHONED ME AFTER SEEING ROS TO ASK IF I WOULD RECEIVE DE SOTO IN MY MISSION; PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK US ON WHICH HE NEEDED CLARIFICATION.
4. DE SOTO TURNED UP ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER. IT EMERGED THAT A FIVE POINT PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502...

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TELEPHONED ME AFTER SEEING ROS TO ASK IF I WOULD RECEIVE DE SOTO IN MY MISSION: PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK US ON WHICH HE NEEDED CLARIFICATION.

4. DE SOTO TURNED UP ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER. IT EMERGED THAT A FIVE POINT PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND 505 (SEE NEXT PARAGRAPH) HAD BEEN PUT TO THE ARGENTINES WHO, AFTER LONG DELIBERATION AMONGST THEMSELVES, HAD AGREED TO FORWARD IT TO BUENOS AIRES. HOWEVER, ROS HAD NOT BROUGHT ANY FRESH INSTRUCTIONS TO DELIVER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: HE HAD CALLED ONLY TO HEAR OUR FINAL RESPONSE. HE HAD AGAIN SHOWN INTEREST IN THE SIXTH SENTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE AND HAD ASKED WHAT WE MEANT BY "THE LONGER TERM" AND "ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS".

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S FIVE POINT PLAN IS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) AT TIME T A CEASEFIRE WOULD COME INTO FORCE AND BE MONITORED BY UN OBSERVERS;

(2) AT TIME T PLUS 24 HOURS, ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 (I.E. TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL);

(3) AT TIME T PLUS 24 HOURS, TOKEN BRITISH WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN (DE SOTO THOUGHT THAT "TOKEN" MIGHT MEAN THE REMOVAL OF ONE BATTALION).

(4) (2) AND (3) ABOVE WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN 'X' DAYS;

(5) NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SCR 505 (REPEAT 505).

6. I FIRST ADDRESSED ROS'S QUESTION ABOUT WHAT WE MEANT BY "THE LONGER TERM" AND "INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS". I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT PLANS YOU HAD IN MIND. HOWEVER, THINKING ALOUD AND PURELY ON A PERSONAL BASIS, I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT YOU ENVISAGED UN INVOLVEMENT IN THESE PROCESSES. MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT, ONCE PASSIONS HAD COOLED, THE PROBLEM WOULD BE BETTER DEALT WITH IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, NAMELY THE US AND OTHER IMPORTANT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. TO BE FRANK, HARKING BACK TO OUR PREVIOUS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, WE REGARDED THE UN AS HAVING COME CLOSE TO "PRE-JUDGING THE OUTCOME" THROUGH ITS ENDORSEMENT OF THE NAM'S SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. I WAS NOT SAYING THAT THIS DEALT THE UN OUT OF THE ACT IN ALL RESPECTS, BUT IT MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO REGARD IT AS AN IMPARTIAL ACTOR IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

7. WE THEN TURNED TO THE POINTS IN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S PLAN.

CLOSE TO "PRE-JUDGING THE OUTCOME" THROUGH ITS ENDORSEMENT OF THE NAM'S SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. I WAS NOT SAYING THAT THIS DEALT THE UN OUT OF THE ACT IN ALL RESPECTS, BUT IT MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO REGARD IT AS AN IMPARTIAL ACTOR IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

7. WE THEN TURNED TO THE POINTS IN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S PLAN. I ASKED DE SOTO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE, THE UN OBSERVERS ARRIVED, AND THE ARGENTINES THEN REFUSED TO WITHDRAW ON TRUMPETED UP ALLEGATIONS THAT WE HAD BEEN IN SOME WAY CHEATING, E.G. THAT WE HAD BEEN REINFORCING, MOVING TROOPS FORWARD BY NIGHT ETC. HE HAD NO ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

8. WE THEN SMOKED HIM OUT ON THE REFERENCE TO SCR 505 IN POINT (5). HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS THE ONE ATTRACTIVE POINT FOR ARGENTINE IN THE WHOLE PACKAGE, I.E. THEY COULD USE THE REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 505 TO ARGUE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ENVISAGED IN POINT (5) WOULD BE ABOUT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, UN ADMINISTRATION ETC. WE MADE QUITE CLEAR TO DE SOTO THAT THESE CONCEPTS WERE NO LONGER ON THE TABLE SO FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED.

9. WE THEN MADE THE POINT THAT THERE COULD BE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN POINTS (1) - (4) ON THE ONE HAND AND POINT (5) ON THE OTHER: IF THERE WAS, WE WOULD BE BACK WHERE WE STARTED, I.E. BOGGED DOWN IN INTERMINABLE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. DE SOTO ACCEPTED THIS, MAKING THE GLOSS THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD PROBABLY WANT A CEREMONIAL OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS AS A FACE-SAVER AT SOME POINT DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD.

10. DE SOTO SUMMED UP PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S VIEWS AS FOLLOWS. POINTS (2) AND (4) WOULD GIVE US TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, WHEREAS POINT (3) (TOKEN BRITISH WITHDRAWAL) WOULD AMOUNT TO THE RESTORATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. HE BELIEVED THAT, IF THE ARGENTINES ACCEPTED THIS PACKAGE, THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SITUATION MENTIONED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE. HE HOPED THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO CONSIDER "THE LONGER TERM" MORE AS "THE NEAR FUTURE" THAN AS THE PROGRAMME SET OUT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HER ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON 27 MAY.


11. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

PARSONS

E.R.

(4)

31 MAY 1982



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CD F C O (DESKBY 010200Z)

GR 300

CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 010200Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010025Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 900 OF 31 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECRETARY GENERAL

1. ALTHOUGH ROS GAVE NO INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION (PARA 2 OF MIPT), I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A GENUINE EFFORT BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO TRY TO FIND A LAST-MINUTE SOLUTION WHICH WILL AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE IS PLAYING SOME KIND OF DOUBLE GAME.
2. HOWEVER, AS I SEE IT, HIS PROPOSALS ARE UNACCEPTABLE. FIRST, IF UN OBSERVERS WERE IN SITU UNDER A MANDATORY RESOLUTION, AND THE ARGENTINES FOUND PRETEXTS NOT TO WITHDRAW, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO RESUME MILITARY ACTION. SECONDLY, HIS PLAN INVOLVES SOME BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. THIRDLY, IT COULD RESUSCITATE THE WHOLE IDEA OF UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, TARGET DATES AND UN SUPERVISION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FINAL SOLUTION.
3. NEVERTHELESS, IT ENABLES US TO BUY A LITTLE MORE TIME: PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS OBVIOUSLY THINKING OF DELAYING HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL UNTIL WEDNESDAY IN ORDER TO EXPLORE HIS IDEAS TO THE FULL. HE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL HAVE ALREADY DRIVEN OFF THE PANAMANIAN WHO FORMALLY REQUESTED AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON (MONDAY), APPARENTLY ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE.
4. I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT I SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO GIVE HIM A REASONED RESPONSE: POINTING OUT THE GENUINE OBJECTIONS TO HIS PROPOSALS, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS, AND SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF THOSE POINTS WHICH ARE OBSCURE, E.G. THE RELATIONSHIP IN TIME BETWEEN POINTS (4) AND (5) AND

OWN INITIATIVE.

4. I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT I SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO GIVE HIM A REASONED RESPONSE: POINTING OUT THE GENUINE OBJECTIONS TO HIS PROPOSALS, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS, AND SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF THOSE POINTS WHICH ARE OBSCURE, E.G. THE RELATIONSHIP IN TIME BETWEEN POINTS (4) AND (5) AND WHAT IS MEANT BY "TOKEN". I SHOULD IF POSSIBLE LET HIM HAVE A RESPONSE BY 1900Z TOMORROW, 1 JUNE.

5. IN FACT, AS WAS THE CASE WITH HIS AIDE MEMOIRE AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND, HIS PROPOSALS POSE GREATER DIFFICULTIES FOR THE ARGENTINES, SINCE THEY INVOLVE TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITH THE FACE-SAVERS OF TOKEN BRITISH WITHDRAWAL AND A RATHER VAGUE FORMULATION ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS ANOTHER REASON WHY IT WILL BE IN OUR INTERESTS TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT HIS PLAN RATHER THAN REJECTING IT OUTRIGHT.

PARSONS

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(5)

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31 MAY 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 010200Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010030Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 901 OF 31 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY TWO IPTS: FALKLANDS: SECRETARY-GENERAL.

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT DR DAVID OWEN CALLED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS MORNING (31 MAY): HE LUNCHEDED WITH ME THEREAFTER. OWEN WAS VERY FIRM WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND WITH THE PRESS THAT THE ARGENTINES MUST WITHDRAW OR BE THROWN OUT. BUT I THINK THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR MAY HAVE BEEN TO SOME EXTENT ENCOURAGED TO HAVE A LAST TRY BY SOME OF THE THINGS WHICH OWEN SAID TO HIM. FOR EXAMPLE, OWEN TOLD HIM THAT THE BRITISH PUBLIC MOOD WAS SHIFTING AGAINST TOTAL HUMILIATION OF ARGENTINA AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS BEGINNING TO THINK OF WAYS AND MEANS OF AVOIDING AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD CREATE AN ENDLESS VENDETTA BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. HE URGED PEREZ DE CUELLAR NOT TO THROW HIS HAND IN TODAY, HINTING THAT THIS MIGHT SPOIL AN ACT WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

2. OWEN WENT OVER MUCH OF THIS GROUND WITH ME AT LUNCH. HE REITERATED THAT HE SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND FIRMLY BELIEVED THAT WE MUST GET THE ARGENTINES OFF THE ISLANDS. HE SEEMED TO KNOW A FAIR AMOUNT ABOUT HAIG'S IDEAS AS SET OUT IN WASHINGTON TELNOS 1961-1964. (HE IS STAYING WITH VANCE AND MAY HAVE GOT HOLD OF THIS INFORMATION THROUGH HIS AMERICAN CONTACTS). I WAS VERY CAREY. HE WAS ANXIOUS LEST A BRITISH VETO

AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD CREATE AN ENDLESS VENDETTA BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. HE URGED PEREZ DE CUELLAR NOT TO THROW HIS HAND IN TODAY, HINTING THAT THIS MIGHT SPOIL AN ACT WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

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PARSONS

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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 485 OF 31 MAY

FOR INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 894: FALKLANDS/SECRETARY GENERAL

1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR, WHICH HE MAY PUBLISH IF HE WISHES. BEGINS.

I AM SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE IN ORDER TO CONFIRM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION YOU PUT TO SIR A PARSONS ON 26 MAY. YOU ASKED WHAT TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE ALREADY PARTICIPATED CONSTRUCTIVELY AND ACTIVELY IN SEVERAL MAJOR EFFORTS TO SECURE A RESOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, MOST RECENTLY THAT WHICH YOU YOURSELF SO ENERGETICALLY CONDUCTED, AND WE SHOULD GREATLY WELCOME IT IF A CEASEFIRE COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT. OUR ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS THAT A CEASEFIRE MUST BE INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND TO THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD. IN TAKING THIS POSITION, WE BASE OURSELVES SQUARELY ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, A MANDATORY RESOLUTION WHICH DEMANDED IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND WHICH HAS NOW BEEN REAFFIRMED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION 505. WHILE WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER IN THE LONGER TERM THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ISLANDERS THERE IS NO QUESTION OF OUR

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Prime Minister

ODSA decided not to publish the earlier reply to the secretary-general. but he wanted a reply to be published. Mr. Lynn therefore authorized the revised version. A.F.C. 1/6

CONFIDENTIAL

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AGREEING TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES IN PARALLEL TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. YOU HAVE CONVEYED TO US THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO THE QUESTION YOU PUT TO THEM IN PARALLEL ON 26 MAY. THEIR REPLY SEEKS TO IMPOSE ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. OUR POSITION REMAINS AS SET OUT ABOVE. IT IS GREATLY TO BE REGRETTED THAT ARGENTINA HAS STILL NOT SEEN FIT TO AGREE TO THE UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER. SUCH A CHANGE OF POSITION ON THE PART OF ARGENTINA WOULD TRANSFORM THE SITUATION. ENDS.

2. I RECOGNISE THAT YOU WILL NOW FACE A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION IN THE COUNCIL IN WHICH YOU MAY WELL BE ISOLATED OR NEARLY SO. BUT TO HAVE GOT THIS FAR IS A CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENT, FOR WHICH WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL.

PYM.

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BY FCO 291000Z


FM WASHINGTON 290800Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1958 OF 29 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, OAS POSTS.

Action OAS
29 MAY



MIPT : FALKLANDS/RIO TREATY

1. TEXT OF RESOLUTION APPROVED TODAY, 29 APRIL, IS AS FOLLOWS:

SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

WHEREAS:

RESOLUTION I OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ADOPTED ON APRIL 28, 1982, DECIDED QUOTE TO KEEP THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OPEN, ESPECIALLY TO OVERSEE FAITHFUL COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION, AND TO TAKE SUCH ADDITIONAL MEASURES AS ARE DEEMED NECESSARY TO RESTORE AND PRESERVE PEACE AND SETTLE THE CONFLICT BY PEACEFUL MEANS UNQUOTE:

THAT RESOLUTION URGED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM QUOTE IMMEDIATELY TO CEASE THE HOSTILITIES IT IS CARRYING ON WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION DEFINED BY ARTICLE 4 OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, AND ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT THAT MAY AFFECT INTER-AMERICAN PEACE AND SECURITY, UNQUOTE AND URGED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA QUOTE TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING ANY ACTION THAT MAY EXACERBATE THE SITUATION UNQUOTE:

THE SAME RESOLUTION URGED THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC QUOTE TO CALL A TRUCE THAT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RESUME AND PROCEED NORMALLY WITH THE NEGOTIATION AIMED AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA OVER THE MALVINAS ISLANDS AND THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS UNQUOTE:

WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC INFORMED THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION OF ITS FULL ADHERENCE TO RESOLUTION I AND ACTED CONSISTENTLY THERE WITH, THE BRITISH FORCES PROCEEDED TO CARRY OUT SERIOUS AND REPEATED ARMED ATTACKS AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC IN THE ZONE OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS, WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION DEFINED BY ARTICLE 4 OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, WHICH MEANS THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS IGNORED THE APPEAL MADE TO

WHICH MEANS THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS IGNORED THE APPEAL MADE TO IT BY THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION:

FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION I, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DECIDED TO APPLY COERCIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND IS GIVING ITS SUPPORT, INCLUDING MATERIAL SUPPORT, TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH CONTRAVENES THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER OF RESOLUTION I:

AS A CULMINATION OF ITS REPEATED ARMED ATTACKS, BEGINNING ON MAY 21, 1982, THE BRITISH FORCES LAUNCHED A BROAD-SCALE MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC IN THE AREA OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS WHICH AFFECTS THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE:

THE DEPLORABLE SITUATION RAISED BY THE APPLICATION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COERCIVE MEASURES THAT ARE NOT BASED ON PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARE HARMFUL TO THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, CARRIED OUT BY THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY—WITH THE EXCEPTION OF IRELAND AND ITALY—AND BY OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED STATES, IS CONTINUING: AND

THE PURPOSE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE IS TO QUOTE ASSURE PEACE, THROUGH ADEQUATE MEANS, TO PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE TO MEET ARMED ATTACKS AGAINST ANY AMERICAN STATE, AND IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THREATS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ANY OF THEM, UNQUOTE.

RESOLVES:

1. TO CONDEMN MOST VIGOROUSLY THE UNJUSTIFIED AND DISPROPORTIONATE ARMED ATTACK PERPETRATED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND ITS DECISION, WHICH AFFECTS THE SECURITY OF THE ENTIRE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE, OF ARBITRARILY DECLARING AN EXTENSIVE AREA OF UP TO 12 MILES FROM THE AMERICAN COASTS AS A ZONE OF HOSTILITIES, WHICH IS AGGRAVATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT WHEN THESE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN ALL POSSIBILITIES OF NEGOTIATION SEEKING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT HAD NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED.

2. TO REITERATE ITS FIRM DEMAND UPON THE UNITED KINGDOM THAT IT CEASE IMMEDIATELY ITS ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND ORDER THE IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THEIR USUAL STATIONS OF ITS TASK FORCE AND ALL OF ITS ARMED FORCES DETAILED THERE.

3. TO DEPLORE THE FACT THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS HELPED TO FRUSTRATE THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT WERE CONDUCTED BY MR. JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

4. TO EXPRESS ITS CONVICTION THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO REACH WITH THE GREATEST URGENCY A PEACEFUL AND HONORABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IN THAT

THE CONFLICT, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IN THAT CONNECTION, TO RECOGNIZE THE PRAISEWORTHY EFFORTS AND GOOD OFFICES OF MR. JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO PROVIDE ITS FULL SUPPORT TO THE TASK ENTRUSTED TO HIM BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

5. TO URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO ORDER THE IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF THE COERCIVE MEASURES APPLIED AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, IN OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY RECOGNIZED IN THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE.

6. TO URGE THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, AND THE OTHER STATES THAT HAVE TAKEN THEM, TO LIFT IMMEDIATELY THE COERCIVE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.

7. TO REQUEST THE STATES PARTIES OF THE RIO TREATY TO GIVE THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC THE SUPPORT THAT EACH JUDGES APPROPRIATE TO ASSIST IT IN THIS SERIOUS SITUATION, AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THAT OBJECTIVE. IF NECESSARY, SUCH SUPPORT MAY BE ADOPTED WITH ADEQUATE COORDINATION.

8. TO REAFFIRM THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, IN PARTICULAR, THOSE THAT REFER TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

9. TO KEEP THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION AVAILABLE TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT WITH THEIR PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN ANY WAY IT MAY SUPPORT THE MISSION ENTRUSTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND TO INSTRUCT THE PRESIDENT OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION TO KEEP IN CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.


10. TO KEEP THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OPEN TO SEE TO IT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION ARE FAITHFULLY AND IMMEDIATELY CARRIED OUT AND TO TAKE, IF NECESSARY, ANY ADDITIONAL MEASURES THAT MAY BE AGREED UPON TO PRESERVE INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION.

HENDERSON

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31 MAY

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RESTRICTED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 312152Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 898 OF 31 MAY 1982

MIPT: FALKLANDS: OAS RESOLUTION.

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

BEGINS

YOUR EXCELLENCY

I HAVE THE HONOUR, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1982 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA TOGETHER WITH ITS ENCLOSURE, TO STATE THE FOLLOWING BY WAY OF REPLY.

THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES ON 29 MAY 1982 (THE OAS RESOLUTION) FAILS TO REFER TO RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505 ADOPTED ON 3 APRIL AND 26 MAY 1982 BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH HAS "THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY." THE OAS RESOLUTION THUS FAILS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ARGENTINE INVASION ON 2 APRIL AND THE RESULTING BREACH OF THE PEACE WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL DETERMINED TO EXIST. MOREOVER, THE OAS RESOLUTION FAILS TO ENDORSE THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR THE "IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS", AN OMISSION MADE THE MORE REMARKABLE BY THE FACT THAT BY ARTICLE 25 OF THE CHARTER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS "AGREE TO ACCEPT AND CARRY OUT" SUCH DEMANDS.

OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE OAS RESOLUTION REFERS TO "THE UNJUSTIFIED AND DISPROPORTIONATE ARMED ATTACK PERPETRATED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM." THIS CHARGE IS NOT WELL-FOUNDED IN FACT OR LAW. MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL RECALL THAT IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH FIRST USED FORCE BY LAUNCHING AN ARMED ATTACK ON THE

RESOLUTION FAILS TO ENDORSE THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR THE "IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS", AN OMISSION MADE THE MORE REMARKABLE BY THE FACT THAT BY ARTICLE 25 OF THE CHARTER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS "AGREE TO ACCEPT AND CARRY OUT" SUCH DEMANDS.

OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE OAS RESOLUTION REFERS TO "THE UNJUSTIFIED AND DISPROPORTIONATE ARMED ATTACK PERPETRATED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM." THIS CHARGE IS NOT WELL-FOUNDED IN FACT OR LAW. MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL RECALL THAT IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH FIRST USED FORCE BY LAUNCHING AN ARMED ATTACK ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS ATTACK WAS UNJUSTIFIED IN THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS AND WAS DISPROPORTIONATE IN THAT THE TINY BRITISH GARRISON WAS OVERWHELMED BY A VASTLY SUPERIOR ARGENTINE FORCE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE UNITED KINGDOM IS FULLY JUSTIFIED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECOGNIZED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN TAKING MEASURES IN EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE OF BRITISH PEOPLE AND BRITISH SOVEREIGN TERRITORY. THESE MEASURES HAVE NOT BEEN DISPROPORTIONATE IN ANY WAY. THE BRITISH FORCES NOW ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ARE SMALLER IN NUMBERS THAN THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION FORCES.

WITH REGARD TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE OAS RESOLUTION, THE UNITED KINGDOM CAN ONLY DENY THAT IT IS ENGAGED IN "ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC". THE UNITED KINGDOM IS, AS STATED ABOVE, TAKING MEASURES IN SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND RESOLUTION 502.


THE UNITED KINGDOM IS SURPRISED BY THE ASSERTION IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE OAS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARGENTINA CONDUCTED THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THE LATTER'S REPORT DOES NOT BEAR OUT THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE FULL TERMS OF THE BRITISH POSITION WAS MADE PUBLIC AT THE TIME.

THE UNITED KINGDOM AGREES THAT IT IS URGENT TO REACH A PEACEFUL AND HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, WHICH WAS STARTED BY ARGENTINA AND IS GREATLY REGRETTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM. A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD PERMIT THE LEGITIMATE COUNTER MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST ARGENTINA IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD TO BE LIFTED.

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PARSONS

31 MAY



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RESTRICTED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 312150Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 897 OF 31 MAY 1982

WASHINGTON TELNO 1958: FALKLANDS/OAS RESOLUTION.

1. THIS RESOLUTION HAS BEEN CIRCULATED AS A DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY ARGENTINA.
2. I RECOMMEND THAT WE REPLY, IN REASONED TERMS. MIFT CONTAINS A DRAFT ON WHICH I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS BY 011400Z.

PARSONS

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CC LUXEMBURG

26 MAY

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26
MAY
1982

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 262104Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 857 DATED 26 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, MADRID, ALL EC POSTS, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, AMMAN, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, ASUNCION, BOGOTA, QUITO, LIMA, LA PAZ, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, PORT OF SPAIN, MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO, TEGUCIGALPA, CARACAS, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, HAVANA, BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, DACCА, LAGOS, NEW DELHI, YAOUNDE, DAKAR, ADDIS ABABA, JAKARTA, BAGHDAD, MASERU, MAPUTO, MOGADISHU, COLOMBO, DAMASCUS, BELGRADE, LUSAKA, ALGIERS, LUANDA, BAHRAIN BELMOPAN, GABORONE, RANGOON, NICOSIA, SANA'A, CAIRO, BANJUL, TEHRAN, ABIDJAN, NAIROBI, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, LILONGWE, KUALA LUMPUR, VALLETTA, PORT LOUIS, RABAT, KATHMANDU, MUSCAT, ISLAMABAD, DOHA, JEDDA, FREETOWN, SINGAPORE, KHARTOUM, DAR ES SALAAM, TUNIS, ABU DHABI, CARACAS, HARARE, ANTANANARIVO, LIBREVILLE, MONROVIA, VICTORIA, VILA.

MIPT (NOT TO ALL) FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SCR 505 (1982) WHICH WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 26 MAY BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF 3 APRIL 1982,

NOTING WITH THE DEEPEST CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) HAS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION;
2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES BEARING IN MIND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) AND THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982;
3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION WITH A VIEW TO ENDING THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS);
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING, IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE;
5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN SEVEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

ENDS

PARSONS

NNNN

From: Sir Peter Scott CBE DSC

10
THE NEW GROUNDS
SLIMBRIDGE
GLOUCESTER GL2 7BT

Tele: Cambridge (045 392) 333
Cable: Wiltford Darley

1st June 1982

Dear Prime Minister

As we corresponded previously about the Falkland Islands, may I say how very greatly I admire your masterly handling of recent historic events. Having been three times to the islands, having many friends there, and being Chairman of the Falkland Islands Foundation, I have great concern for the future of the archipelago and its people, and have been thinking a great deal about ultimate long-term solutions.

I make so bold as to attach a short paper on them which might have some elements in it (notably those pertaining to the rich and varied wildlife of the area) that could usefully be fed into the different formulae which are no doubt now under consideration, or will be during the coming months.

With every good wish.

Yours very sincerely

Peter Scott

11
From Sir Peter Scott

SOME LONG TERM CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Any long term solution to the Falkland Islands problem will involve careful examination of the following factors, among others:-
 - 1.1 The best interests of the Islanders, and their views in the matter.
 - 1.2 The political resolve of the U.K. electorate to defend the islands across 8,000 miles of ocean.
 - 1.3 Argentina's obsession with the Malvinas - which will not go away.
 - 1.4 The strategic importance of the Falklands, and their Dependencies for stability in the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean, in the light of Soviet interest in the area and the possibility of a sharp left turn in Argentine politics.
 - 1.5 The future of the Falkland Islands economy, which might, among other things, develop a strong tourist industry based on the spectacular wildlife and on recent history.
 - 1.6 The options for any ultimate international control arrangements to which the Islanders might, in due course, agree.
2. Since recent events, the islands can never be quite the same again. The Islanders seem likely to wish for the re-establishment of a British style of local government, which we shall have to defend. Any failure to do so adequately would amount to a betrayal of those killed and wounded in the present hostilities.
3. The Shackleton Report should be up-dated, reviewed and recast in the light of the new situation. The airport runway should be extended, as suggested in the Report, not only for defence but for wildlife and historical tourism.
4. It is not widely realised that the wildlife of the Falkland Islands is extremely rich. It includes two species of seals - the Elephant Seal, which is the world's largest, and the Southern Fur Seal, and also the Southern Sea Lion. No less than 152 species of birds have been recorded, of which the most spectacular are the penguins and the albatrosses. Nine species of penguins occur there, of which five breed regularly, some in colonies of many hundreds of thousands. Seven species of Albatross have been seen, though only one breeds - the Black-browed - in vast aggregations. Seventeen of the 152 kinds of birds are endemic, occurring only in the Falklands.

- 2 -
5. Tourism based on this profusion of wildlife, combined with the intense interest in the dramatic events of 1982 (as well as those of the two world wars), could and should be developed extensively as soon as large-scale direct air travel to Stanley is possible.
 6. Consideration should be given to a number of possibilities for protecting this unique wild habitat with its animals and plants. Options include:-
 - 6.1 A declaration that the Falkland Islands, or some of them, (and, perhaps at a later date, their Dependencies, or some of them) including the 200-mile zone around them, be declared an area of outstanding biological significance, to be protected under the World Heritage Convention as an "International" or "World Park".
 - 6.2 Extension of the Antarctic Treaty boundary to include the Falkland Islands, when the Treaty is revised in 1991. (There is a proposal that Antarctica should be designated a World Park, but it seems unlikely to attract much support at present.)
 - 6.3 Inclusion of the Falklands in the 'Islands for Science' programme originally put forward by the U.S. during World War II. A small number of islands have already been designated.
 - 6.4 These options suggest alternatives to the United Nations, as a basis for an ultimate international solution.
 7. In putting forward the above options, I firmly believe that new generations will more readily accept the philosophies of environmental conservation and the protection of wildlife, and be somewhat less commercially orientated.
 8. To me one thing is clear - under no circumstances, now, can the Falkland Islands be transferred to Argentine sovereignty. British sovereignty must be maintained, hopefully with the help of our allies, for a period of years. In that connection, the 1991 revision date for the Antarctic Treaty could be a convenient one for any long-term international solution of the sovereignty issue.
 9. In considering options mentioned above, (especially 6.2) the record of Argentina's flagrant infringement of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty should be carefully noted. These concern overt military activity at Argentine bases on the Antarctic continent.
 10. As we may soon be involved in negotiations for an armistice, when the Falkland Islands have been liberated, I hope we can emphasize again and again that our quarrel is with Galtieri and his Junta for having invaded and for disregarding Resolution 502. It is not with the Argentine people.

Peter Suck

1st June 1982

cc. Econ Pol. Pt 7.
Versailles Summit.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1982

FALKLANDS: OTHER TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

The Prime Minister was impressed by a remark made by President Reagan on television recently to the effect that, if the aggressor had his way over the Falklands, there would be serious implications for some fifty other territorial disputes. Since then, I understand that Mr. Eugene Rostow has referred to one hundred such disputes which could be exacerbated if Argentina succeeds in its aims in the South Atlantic.

The Prime Minister expects to have to spend a good deal of time on the Falklands in conversation with our allies during the various forthcoming international meetings. She would like to be armed, before she goes to Versailles, with a comprehensive list of territorial disputes with, in each case, a very brief description of their cause and the present situation. I emphasise that this could be very much in the form of a list with no more than two or three sentences relating to each dispute. Could this possibly be produced by close of play on 3 June?

SK

dealt with on
Econ Pol Pt 7.

G. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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cc master

RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN DR. ADY AND DR. SWITHINBANK OF THE
BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY, AT 1800 HOURS ON TUESDAY, 1 JUNE 1982,
10 DOWNING STREET.

The Prime Minister said that she would be most grateful for views on the future development of the Falkland Islands, their dependencies and the British Antarctic territory. Were the geological structures promising? Did natural resources offer development prospects. Would the wild-life of the area be of interest to tourists? She wondered whether the Government had consulted BAS sufficiently in recent weeks.

Dr. Ady said that BAS had been in close touch with MOD, though Dr. Swithinbank thought that contact had not been at a sufficiently high level for discussion of policy issues.

Dr. Ady then explained that BAS had been operating continuously since 1944 in the Antarctic. We were the only country which had done so. We now led the world in Antarctic science. Other countries frequently sought our advice. Dr. Swithinbank said that it was the hope of all those interested in the scientific development of Antarctica that scientific productivity would be the criterion for their activities. All BAS bases had been established according to scientific criteria. But no research was being carried out on behalf of the Government at present. He was now writing a paper describing the research which BAS should try to conduct in the future. The terms of reference of BAS did not of course include the Falkland Islands. He then showed the Prime Minister some recent landsat photographs of the area and confirmed, in answer to the Prime Minister's question, that Argentina received these photographs direct. BAS possessed the largest collection of satellite pictures of the Antarctic on this side of the Atlantic. They had been the first organisation in the world to use such photographs to make a series of detailed maps of the area. The situation in Antarctica was very different from that of the Falkland

/Islands.

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Islands. In Antarctica a number of countries had claims. We like others had in effect ceded part of our Sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty. This had been a conspicuous success in maintaining the peace for 20 years. Argentina's motive in maintaining its presence in the area seemed to be almost entirely military. But it was to some extent restrained from pursuing its claims by the prospect of opposition from the United States, the Soviet Union and others. The Treaty arrangements had worked well but the difficult problems lay ahead. For the future, he would like to see an international authority regulating mineral exploration and exploitation. Most of the Treaty powers had a similar desire but the emotional attraction to Argentina of territory as such could create difficulties for the future. Argentina wished to extend its territorial sovereignty as far as it could in the area and, with the military in charge, anything could happen.

Dr. Ady informed the Prime Minister that the FCO were preparing a paper on the future of the Treaty arrangements. He found it a very good document.

He then referred to Lord Shackleton's excellent report on the Falkland Islands. The Prime Minister said that she had recently asked Lord Shackleton to up-date it. What were the prospects for oil in the area? Dr. Ady said that some of the surveys had not been very promising but natural gas had been discovered about half-way between the Falkland Islands and Patagonia. He thought it would be worthwhile arranging for the geophysics of the area to be properly researched and for a hole to be drilled. There were possibilities of oil development around South Georgia too. But commercial companies would not quickly become involved because of the political instability and uncertainty about the median line between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. The BAS had been looking at the possibilities of developing krill around South Georgia for some years. The Russians, Poles and others had been harvesting krill but we had not. The BAS was now doing a thorough study of the life-cycle to provide a proper basis for /future harvesting.

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future harvesting. Dr. Swithinbank thought that some 50 million tons of krill could be harvested each year and that this was a sustainable yield. But as regards the Falkland Islands, they could never support a large number of people because the land was not fertile. Argentine hostility towards the Islands would persist for a very long time. There must be some guarantor, besides ourselves, of its defence. Taking up an earlier remark of the Prime Minister, he expressed relief that she did not envisage extending the Treaty arrangements of Antarctica to the Falkland Islands. This could cause chaos in Antarctica by importing into the area the UK/Argentine adversarial relationship.

Dr. Ady said that one of the problems of BAS was telecommunications. As soon as Port Stanley had been taken, the normal BAS communication channel via Cable and Wireless had ceased. They would not wish to depend on Cable and Wireless in the future and were hoping to establish direct satellite communication. Dr. Swithinbank said that the main significance of the Falkland Islands for the work of the BAS lay in the Port Stanley airstrip. But there could be an all-weather 10,000 ft airstrip on South Georgia (the Ministry of Defence had all the necessary information about this).

The Prime Minister enquired whether Argentina had made a distinctive scientific contribution. Dr. Ady replied that it had not done so in the field of Antarctic research - this was in the hands of the military who were in Antarctica for their own purposes.

The Prime Minister said that she would like to be able to draw President Reagan's attention to the value of the scientific research which was being carried out in Antarctica. Dr. Swithinbank suggested that she should mention Dr. Frank Williamson, the Chief Scientist at the Division of Polar Programmes at the National Science Foundation. He would certainly speak well of BAS. Another American who knew their work was Dr. L.M. Gould, the former President of Carleton College.

/ Dr. Ady

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- 4 -

Dr. Ady recalled that Argentine territorial ambitions in the area were deeply rooted. He had personally been involved in an incident in 1952 when the Argentines had fired at a BAS base on the northern tip of the British Antarctic territory.

Dr. Swithinbank said that the BAS had a particular need for high altitude photography of the whole area, i.e. photographs taken from up to 45,000 ft. This would be the next step in mapping the Antarctic peninsula. He would be most grateful for any assistance which the MOD could offer.

The Prime Minister enquired whether the Falkland Islands could provide a base for the future International Antarctic Authority. Dr. Swithinbank said such an Authority would be necessary when mineral exploration commenced. The Falkland Islands might be a possibility as a base but the problem was whether Argentine agreement could be secured.

Finally, Dr. Ady said that he thought fresh planning was necessary for the future of the BAS. At the moment its activities were on a declining curve. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office were preparing a paper on the subject.

A. J. C.

1 June 1982

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1982

Dear John,

British Antarctic Survey

Dr. Ady and Dr. Swithinbank called on the Prime Minister this evening. The invitation to them to do so stemmed from Mrs. Thatcher's meeting last Friday with Lord Shackleton and Lord Buxton who suggested that a conversation with representatives of BAS could be enlightening.

I enclose a summary record of the conversation.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries of the members of OD(SA) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
John Holmes

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June, 1982

EXOCET MISSILES

(27/5)

I enclose a letter which I have received from the Ambassador in Luxembourg which in turn encloses an advance copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from a Mr Jackson who wishes to pass on an idea which might help deal with the Exocet missile.

I should be grateful if you could let me have in due course a reply which I might send to Mr Jackson on behalf of the Prime Minister.

A. J. COLES

N H R Evans, Esq
Ministry of Defence

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June, 1982

You told me this morning that following the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with Sir Nicholas Henderson last night, the impression had been obtained that Mrs Thatcher had criticised the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for not informing her of the fact that President Reagan was due to telephone her yesterday.

I have discussed this with the Prime Minister who has asked me to convey the assurance that this must have been based on a misunderstanding. She intended absolutely no criticism of this kind.

Since I heard the Prime Minister's conversation with Washington at around 0030 hrs this morning I think I can explain how the misunderstanding arose. The Prime Minister meant to convey to the Ambassador that she was surprised that the President should have rung her to propose a new peace initiative without giving any forewarning of the subject matter of the conversation. I think Mrs Thatcher felt that, given the relationship between ourselves and the Americans, some advance warning of the nature of the President's message could have been expected.

You did, of course, tell No.10 late yesterday afternoon that the President would be telephoning the Prime Minister - Mrs Thatcher was informed at once at Chequers. In the event, the call did not take place until 2330 hrs.

A. I. COLES

John Holmes, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RJ



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1982

Thank you very much for your letter of 27 May about the support of the Australian Federal Minister for Telecommunications for the Government's policy on the Falkland Islands. Australian support has indeed been most impressive and encouraging - and I know that the Prime Minister is personally most grateful for it.

A. J. COLES

PART 22 begins

E. C. Glover, Esq.

[Handwritten mark]

8 PART 21 ends:-

31 MAY '82

PART 22 begins:-

1 JUNE '82