

~~177~~ 9.33

Part 23

**SECRET**

Confidential Filing

Relations with Argentina.

ARGENTINA

Position of the Falkland Islands.

Part 1: Sept 1979  
Part 23: June 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>9.6.82</del>							
<del>10.6.82</del>							
11.6.82							
<del>ends</del>							
PREM 19/634							

PART 23 ends:-

*Argentina*

11.6.82

PART 24 begins:-

12.6.82





## Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 10 June 1982, columns  
399-405

Signed AWayland Date 23 April 2012

**PREM Records Team**





Prime Minister

~~Content that the Defense Secretary should proceed as he proposes.~~

MO 5/21

Overlaid.

ABC. 16. / 6

A. J. C. 14 / 6

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

DEATH OF AN ARGENTINE PRISONER  
OF WAR ON SOUTH GEORGIA

You are aware of the outlines of this case. I have now received the report of the Board of Inquiry together with the preliminary views of CINCFLEET and in view of the serious nature of the case the Attorney-General has been consulted. We now need to decide on the way ahead and how we should handle the international and public relations aspects.

In brief the Board of Inquiry reveals that the Argentine prisoner (Artuso) was shot on the day following the reoccupation of South Georgia during the move of the Argentinian submarine SANTA FE across Grytviken Harbour. The SANTA FE was moved because it was blocking the main jetty in the harbour and in danger of sinking from the damage sustained when it was attacked during the operation on the previous day. The Argentine CO and five of his crew were used for the move, guarded by Royal Marines and under the general command of an RN Captain assisted by another officer. The guards were instructed that under no circumstances were the crew to be allowed to touch the main vent levers which would cause the submarine to sink immediately. Unfortunately the control levers which were pointed out to the guards were the low pressure air tank blowing levers. During the move the submarine started to list and





lose buoyancy and the Argentine Captain passed orders to blow tanks. Artuso jumped across the control room to reach for the tank blowing levers but was shot dead by the guard who believed he was attempting to open the main vents.

The Attorney-General is satisfied that there are no grounds for instituting criminal proceedings in a civilian court against the two RN officers in charge of the operation and he also endorses CINCFLEET's view that they should not face a court martial. As far as possible disciplinary proceedings are concerned the Attorney-General considers that while there were certainly some unsatisfactory features about the way in which the operation was organised and supervised he accepts the view of CINCFLEET that the conduct of the two officers did not fall short of the expected standards to such an extent as to constitute a disciplinary offence.

This leaves the question of a possible breach of Articles 50 and 52 of the Third Geneva Convention which prohibit the use of POW's on dangerous work, unless they are volunteers, and limits the categories of work they can be compelled to undertake. The evidence of the Board of Inquiry is not as revealing as we could wish on the question of how far the prisoners were volunteers but there is certainly no evidence pointing unmistakably in the other direction. In these circumstances, and unless further evidence emerges to indicate compulsion, the Attorney-General accepts that there has been no breach of Articles 50 or 52.

I believe that the next step is to inform CINCFLEET of the Attorney-General's views and invite him to take the necessary action. Under Article 121 of the Third Geneva Convention we need to send a report, together with statements from the prisoners, to the protecting power. This report will obviously be based on the Board of Inquiry but will, for example, exclude names of



UK personnel and will also include a section dealing with the consideration given to the report. I would suggest that the ICRC should receive a copy of the report. In parallel I propose to inform the House of the outcome of the case by means of a written PQ and by placing a copy of the report made available to Brazil and the ICRC in the Library. Copies would also be available to the press.

I am copying this minute to members of OD(SA), the Attorney-General and Sir Robert Armstrong and I would be grateful for any comments my colleagues may have as soon as possible since we are under some pressure from the ICRC to issue the report.

SW .

Ministry of Defence  
11th June 1982



4 JUN 1982





ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

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PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
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PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
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MR LITTLER }  
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

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DIO }

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[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

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FM TOKYO 110815Z JUN 82  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELEGRAM NO 292 OF 11 JUNE  
RFI PRIORITY UK MIS NEW YORK  
SAVING WASHINGTON

TOKYO TELNO 285: FALKLAND ISLANDS: JAPANESE VOTE AT THE UN

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO THE MFA LAST NIGHT BY KATO, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU, TO RECEIVE THE JAPANESE RESPONSE TO SIR H CORTAZZI'S PROTEST TO SUNOBE REPORTED IN TOKYO TUR. KATO HIMSELF HAD BEEN AWAY IN VERSAILLES. OUR MEETING TOOK PLACE AFTER A HEATED DISCUSSION IN THE MFA NOT ONLY ABOUT THE FALL-OUT FROM THE JAPANESE VOTE AT THE UN ON THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH RESOLUTION BUT ALSO ABOUT JAPAN'S POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE UK MORE GENERALLY.

2. KATO SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN THE DETAILED BACKGROUND TO THE HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE AT VERSAILLES ON THE NIGHT OF 4 JUNE AS WELL AS THE POLICY REASONS UNDERLINING JAPAN'S DECISION TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION.



TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION.

3. ON THE BACKGROUND KATO'S MAIN POINTS WERE THAT

(A) ONCE THE DRAFT INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 THE JAPANESE LIME HAD CONSISTENTLY BEEN TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION.

(B) THE JAPANESE UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT MR SAKURAUCHI, AFTER DISCUSSION WITH YOU, HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER WITH THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER BUT HAD IN NO WAY ENTERED INTO A COMMITMENT TO CHANGE THE JAPANESE VOTE TO AN ABSTENTION.

(C) THE JAPANESE DELEGATION IN VERSAILLES AT OFFICIAL LEVEL HAD BEEN AT FAULT FOR NOT INFORMING THE BRITISH DELEGATION THAT MR SUZUKI AND MR SAKURAUCHI HAD DECIDED, DESPITE YOUR REPRESENTATION, THAT THE JAPANESE VOTE SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED. KATO EXPRESSED HIS APOLIGIES FOR THIS.

4. ON SUBSTANCE KATO'S MAIN POINTS WERE THAT:

(A) THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE RESOLUTION, CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505 WAS CONSISTEND WITH THE JAPANESE POSITION OVER THE FALKLANDS ISSUED.

(B) JAPAN THOUGHT IT RIGHT THAT THERE SHOULD BE THIS FINAL APPEAL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES BEFORE THE BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY, IN ORDER TO SAVE LIVES. THIS AND THE PREVIOUS POINT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR IN AMBASSADOR NISHIBORI'S EXPLANATION OF THE JAPANESE VOTE AT THE UN.

(C) THE JAPANESE WERE FULLY INFORMED OF THE BRITISH POSITION ON THIS RESOLUTION AND THEY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION AND THINKING OF THE UK GOVERNMENT. BUT TAKEN LITERALLY, IE SEPARATELY FROM ITS BCACKGROUND, JAPAN HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO VOTE IN FAVOUR O THE RESOLUTION.

(D) JAPAN WELL UNDERSTOOD THE PRESENT MOOD OF THE



(D) JAPAN WELL UNDERSTOOD THE PRESENT MOOD OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC. BUT JAPAN VOTED IN FAVOUR OF WHAT IT JUDGED TO BE IN THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD AND WAS STILL OF THE VIEW THAT ITS ACTIONS WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE UK SIDE BEFORE LONG.

5. REFERRING TO THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PERU AND BRAZIL NEXT WEEK KATO SAID THAT THE FALKLAND ISSUE WOULD INEVITABLY COME UP. HE THOUGHT THAT MR SUZUKI WOULD SAY THAT THE ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE, WHICH WAS THE CAUSE OF THE CRISIS, WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NOT COMPATIBLE WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND JAPAN THEREFORE CALLED AGAIN ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

6. FINALLY KATO SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT FEELING AGAINST JAPAN OVER THE UN RESOLUTION VOTE WAS STRONG. HE EARNESTLY HOPED HOWEVER THAT IN THE LONGER TERM INTERESTS OF ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS THERE WOULD BE "NO RETALIATORY ACTION BY THE UK AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT".

7. I REPLIED THAT IT WAS USEFUL TO HAVE THIS DETAILED EXPLANATION BUT

(A) KATO HAD REFERRED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION TO THE POINT THAT "TAKEN LITERALLY" THE RESOLUTION WAS ONE WHICH JAPAN COULD NOT VOTE AGAINST. BUT IF ONE LOOKED AT ITS PARENTAGE ONE WAS BOUND TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE INCLUSION OF REFERENCES TO SCR 502 AND 505 WAS A CYNICAL LAST MINUTE AMENDMENT DESIGNED SOLELY TO ATTRACT VOTES FROM COUNTRIES SUCH AS JAPAN AND ZAIRE.

(B) SINCE JAPAN MUST HAVE LOOKED AT THE BACKGROUND TO THE RESOLUTION AS WELL AS AT ITS WORDING MY ASSUMPTION HAD TO BE THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT ARGENTINA WAS PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARDS EARLY FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. WAS THIS SO? AND IF SO, WHAT DID THE EVIDENCE AMOUNT TO?

(C) KATO HAD ALSO REFERRED TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT



(C) KATO HAD ALSO REFERRED TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DINNER. SINCE THERE HAD BEEN AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF THE FALKLAND ISSUE ON THAT OCCASION AND SINCE THE JAPANESE AS WELL AS MRS THATCHER APPEARED TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT IT HAD BEEN A HELPFUL DISCUSSION IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT NO GOVERNMENT THERE REPRESENTED WOULD WITHIN THE SPACE OF 2 OR 3 HOURS BE VOTING IN THE COMPANY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN A WAY WHICH WAS CLEARLY INIMICABLE TO BRITISH INTERESTS AND PARTICULARLY IN A WAY WHICH MEANT THAT THE UK WOULD HAVE TO CAST A VETO.

(D) KATO HAD REFERRED TO JAPAN'S VOTE IN FAVOUR AS BEING IN THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD. FRANKLY I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THIS AND PERHAPS HE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN WHAT HE MEANT.

(E) SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I THOUGHT WE WOULD ENDORSE THE WISH THAT DIFFERENCES OVER THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE EXACERBATED IN A WAY WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS. BUT IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAD BEEN ALTOGETHER TOO MANY OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE SMALL PRINT OR THE LITERAL WORDING HAD RESULTED IN JAPANESE ACTIONS WHICH WERE EITHER ONLY MINIMALLY IN SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION OR WERE PLAIN UNHELPFUL. THE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE ACTIONS INEVITABLY LED US TO THE CONCLUSION THAT JAPAN HAD SHELTERED BEHIND EXCUSES FOR INACTION BECAUSE SHE LACKED THE POLITICAL WILL TO STAND WITH US ON AN ISSUE WHICH IN OUR VIEW WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND REMARKABLY CLEAR-CUT. FOR THOSE WHO WISHED TO POINT TO JAPAN'S GOODWILL THERE WAS REMARKABLY LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SHOW ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. MY HOPE WAS THAT THE INGENUITY OF THE JAPANESE WOULD LEAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE POSITIVELY HELPFUL FROM THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW.

8. KATO SAID THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS FORCEFUL AND CLEAR RESPONSE. HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER( WHO RETURNS TO TOKYO BRIEFLY TODAY) WAYS IN WHICH JAPAN MIGHT TAKE A MORE HELPFUL LINE OVER THE FALKLANDS IN THE FUTURE.



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PP JEDDA  
PP RIYADH  
GRS 116  
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FM FCO 111800Z JUNE 82  
TO PRIORITY JEDDA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 11 JUNE 1982  
INFO PRIORITY RIYADH, MODUK (FOR DIC ARMS CELL)  
INFO SAVING PARIS, WASHINGTON, TRIPOLI, BAGHDAD

ARMS FOR ARGENTINE

1. I RAISED WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY (11 JUNE) THE REPORT IN THE TIMES OF 9 JUNE THAT ARMS WERE FINDING THEIR WAY TO ARGENTINA VIA SAUDI ARABIA. I MENTIONED EXOCET. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THESE REPORTS MUST BE ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE. THE STORY WAS INSIDIOUS AND IMPOSSIBLE. HE ADDED THAT THE SAUDI DEFENCE MINISTER HAD RECENTLY ASKED THE FRENCH CHIEF OF STAFF HOW FRANCE HAD ALLOWED SUCH SIGNIFICANT FRENCH WEAPONS TO GET INTO THE HANDS OF ARGENTINA FOR USE AGAINST THE BRITISH.

PYM

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*Port Stanley*

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*MS*

*Mr faxed to  
Chegrews*

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GRS 1139

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FM FCO 111700Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 127 OF 11 JUNE 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS: GENEVA CONVENTIONS

1. YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING (EXCEPT PARA 14)  
AS APPROPRIATE TO COUNTER ARGENTINE ACCUSATIONS OF UK BREACHES  
OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS.

HIGH ARGENTINE CASUALTY RATE IN DARWIN AND GOOSE GREEN

2. FACTORS INVOLVED INCLUDED:

(A) ACCURATE GUNFIRE BOTH BEFORE THE BATTLE (NAVAL  
BOMBARDMENT, ARTILLERY AND AIR RAIDS) AND DURING IT.

(B) EXPOSURE OF ARGENTINES IN A SMALL FLAT AREA AND  
THE PARTICULAR TACTICS THEY USED IN WITHDRAWING, WHICH  
MADE THEM ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE.

(C) INADEQUATE ARGENTINE MEDICAL BACKUP CAUSING LOSS  
OF LIFE THROUGH LACK OF IMMEDIATE FIRST-AID.

(D) POOR DISCIPLINE AND PHYSICAL CONDITION OF ARGENTINE  
CONSCRIPT SOLDIERS COMBINED WITH LACK OF COMBAT EXPERIENCE.

ICRC CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON THEIR VISIT TO ARGENTINES CAPTURED  
ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND REPATRIATED VIA ASCENSION ISLAND

3. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) HAVE  
MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE REPORT IS NOT (NOT) INTENDED FOR  
PUBLICATION.

4. AS THE REPORT CONTAINS SOME CRITICISM OF THE CONDITIONS  
IN WHICH THE ARGENTINES WERE KEPT ON BOARD SHIP, THE ARGENTINE  
AUTHORITIES MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RESIST MAKING USE OF THE REPORT  
FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. IF THERE IS ANY LOCAL EVIDENCE OF THIS  
YOU SHOULD:

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- (A) MAKE THE POINT IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE
- (B) INFORM US BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM.

USE OF PRISONERS TO HANDLE DANGEROUS MATERIALS: INCIDENT AT  
GOOSE GREEN

5. AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING EXPLOSIVES OCCURRED AT GOOSE GREEN ON 1 JUNE. THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AMONG OUR OWN TROOPS BUT FOUR OF THE ARGENTINE PRISONERS DIED AND A FURTHER EIGHT WERE WOUNDED. A FULL INQUIRY WILL BE HELD INTO THE ACCIDENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 121 OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION. THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED WHEN AN AMMUNITION BOX WAS BEING MOVED.

6. IF QUESTIONED YOU SHOULD SAY THAT:

(A) PERSONAL DETAILS OF THE DEAD AND WOUNDED, WHERE IDENTIFIABLE, HAVE BEEN PASSED TO THE ARGENTINES AND THE ICRC

(B) THE WOUNDED ARE BEING GIVEN MEDICAL TREATMENT AND WILL BE EVACUATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. ARTICLE 52 OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION ALLOWS POW LABOUR TO BE USED ON TASKS OF AN UNHEALTHY OR DANGEROUS NATURE ONLY IF THEY ARE VOLUNTEERS. THE INQUIRY WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ANY BREACH OF THE ARTICLE.

8. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT ARGENTINE PRISONERS HAVE BEEN COMPELLED TO LOCATE AND DE-ACTIVATE EXPLOSIVES IN THE AREA OF GOOSE GREEN AND DARWIN AND SUGGESTIONS THAT THIS INVOLVED THE REMOVAL OF MINES. THE REPORTS ARE BEING INVESTIGATED.

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS GENERALLY

9. THE SENIOR ARGENTINE OFFICER PRISONER HAS LODGED COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AT GOOSE GREEN. WE AWAIT RECEIPT OF HIS FORMAL PETITION IN LONDON BEFORE PREPARING OUR CONSIDERED RESPONSE. HOWEVER SINCE THERE HAVE BEEN PRESS REPORTS YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING BY WAY OF AN INTERIM REPLY: BRITISH FORCES ARE UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO COMPLY WITH ALL PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. MEASURES TAKEN INCLUDE

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THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF PRISONERS FROM THE COMBAT ZONE. PRIOR TO THEIR EVACUATION PRISONERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN SECURE AND CLEARLY MARKED AREAS. THEY HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT FOOD AND CLEAN SHELTER. SANITARY FACILITIES HAVE BEEN TO THE SAME STANDARD AS THOSE USED BY BRITISH FORCES. WOUNDED ARGENTINE PRISONERS HAVE RECEIVED THE SAME TREATMENT AND PRIORITY OF EVACUATION AS WOUNDED BRITISH SOLDIERS. FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THOSE ARGENTINE SOLDIERS KILLED IN COMBAT HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY BRITISH FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. IT IS HOPED THAT IT WILL SOON BE POSSIBLE FOR ICRC REPRESENTATIVES, WHO ARE NOW OFF EAST FALKLAND, TO INSPECT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE.

#### REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS

10. (A) ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE TO EVACUATE ARGENTINE PRISONERS FROM THE COMBAT ZONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 19 OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION.
- (B) THE ICRC HAVE HAD ACCESS TO ARGENTINE PRISONERS WHEREVER POSSIBLE.
- (C) THE VAST MAJORITY OF POWS HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE ARE KEEPING THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND THE ICRC FULLY INFORMED. WE HAVE SET UP A SPECIAL POW INFORMATION BUREAU FOR THIS PURPOSE.

#### DEATH OF ARGENTINE MARINE ON SOUTH GEORGIA

11. THE FINAL REPORT ON THE DEATH IN DETENTION OF THE ARGENTINE MARINE ARTUSO ON SOUTH GEORGIA IS NOT YET READY. THE COMPETENT LEGAL AUTHORITIES HAVE IT UNDER URGENT CONSIDERATION. THE ICRC HAVE BEEN KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF PROGRESS.

#### USE OF NAPALM/CLUSTER BOMBS

12. NAPALM IS NOT BANNED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW. AS AN INCENDIARY WEAPON ITS USE WOULD BE RESTRICTED BY THE UN WEAPONRY CONVENTION

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(1981) WHEN THAT COMES INTO FORCE. THE CONVENTION WAS DRAFTED SO AS TO PROTECT CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN OBJECTS FROM ATTACKS BY INCENDIARIES. WE ARE NOT (REPEAT NOT) USING NAPALM IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

13. CLUSTER BOMBS ARE PRECISION WEAPONS FOR USE AGAINST ARMoured MILITARY TARGETS. THEY CANNOT WITH JUSTIFICATION BE CRITICISED AS INHUMANE OR INDISCRIMINATE.

14. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION. THE 1981 UN WEAPONRY CONVENTION HAS BEEN CONNECTED TO THE FALKLANDS IN TWO RESPECTS, NAPALM AND CLUSTER BOMBS. THE CONVENTION, WHICH HAS BEEN SIGNED BUT NOT RATIFIED BY BOTH ARGENTINA AND THE UK, IS NOT YET IN FORCE AND YOU SHOULD AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT ITS PROVISIONS ARE EVEN MORALLY BINDING AS YET. ALTHOUGH STOCKS OF ARGENTINE NAPALM WERE DISCOVERED AT GOOSE GREEN, THERE IS AS YET NO FIRM EVIDENCE OF THEIR ATTEMPTING TO USE IT. THERE HAVE HOWEVER BEEN PRESS REPORTS OF BRITISH TROOPS PREPARING HOME-MADE INCENDIARY DEVICES. IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONVENTION CLUSTER BOMBS WERE SUGGESTED FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION UNDER IT, BUT SUCH SUGGESTIONS WERE DROPPED. ATTEMPTS MIGHT BE MADE TO ARGUE THAT USE OF DELAYED ACTION CLUSTER BOMBS AMOUNTED TO THE AERIAL SOWING OF A MINE-FIELD, WHICH WOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE CONVENTION. IN FACT UK CLUSTER BOMBS HAVE NO SUCH PROPERTIES BUT WE WOULD PREFER TO AVOID SPECULATION ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONVENTION TO THEM.

#### RED CROSS PRESENCE IN THE ISLANDS

15. WE HAVE BEEN CO-OPERATING FULLY WITH THE ICRC AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. ICRC REPRESENTATIVES NOW HAVE ACCESS TO AREAS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS UNDER BRITISH CONTROL. THE ICRC ARE ALSO TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR REPRESENTATIVES TO GET INTO PORT STANLEY. THEY WILL BE LOOKING INTO MATTERS OF NORMAL ICRC CONCERN IN AREAS OF CONFLICT, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF SAFE AREAS FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, THE SITUATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CARE OF CASUALTIES.

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SAFETY OF ISLANDERS

16. WE ARE NATURALLY CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE ISLANDERS. ONCE THE ICRC OBTAIN ACCESS TO PORT STANLEY THEIR PRINCIPAL CONCERN WILL BE THE SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. BRITISH FORCES AND THEIR COMMANDERS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MINIMISE THE RISK TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS BOTH IN STANLEY AND ELSEWHERE.

PYM

BY TELEGRAPH

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[IMMEDIATE]

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FILE SW

T

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

11 June, 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 9 June, and for passing on to her the message from your Prime Minister about Colonel Baker of the Legion of Frontiersmen of the Commonwealth. I enclose a letter that the Prime Minister has sent to Mr. Muldoon in reply and I should be grateful if you could ensure that it reaches your Prime Minister. Mrs. Thatcher has asked me to give you her best regards.

W. F. S. RICKETT

His Excellency The Honourable L. W. Gandar

da

file MFS

subject



10 DOWNING STREET

T 128/82  
cc Harris  
ONS

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 June 1982

Dear Rob.

Your High Commissioner has passed on your letter about the message from Colonel Baker of the Legion of Frontiersmen of the Commonwealth. I hope you will be able to thank him for his very moving words, and to say that I am sure the dream of the Legion will come true. The response of the people of this country, and of the Commonwealth, especially in New Zealand, has convinced me that patriotism is a strong plant, not a weed, and that its flowers will indeed bloom even when peace is restored.

Yours sincerely  
Raggett

The Right Honourable R.D. Muldoon, C.H., M.P.

\_\_\_\_\_

B





FILE SW

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+ Bf

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 June, 1982

Falkland Islands: Message from the  
President of Ecuador

BK 11  
Thank you for your letter of 9 June. The Prime Minister is content with the suggested reply to President Hurtado. I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be despatched.

W. F. S. RICKETT

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

da

Argentina Clive

11/6

DRAFT STATEMENT BY MR JOCK BRUCE-GARDYNE MP, ECONOMIC  
SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY

---

I deeply regret that parts of the text of a purely private and personal letter written five weeks ago to an old friend to thank him for entertaining my wife and me to dinner should apparently have been stolen from the recipient, and subsequently published in a weekly newspaper. In that letter I made some off-the-cuff comments about the state of public opinion regarding the Falklands campaign, provoked by the terms of an article which the recipient of my letter had published in the Financial Times on the same day, comments which I now believe to have been wholly erroneous, and indeed, which I would probably, on reflection, have regarded as wholly erroneous even at the time that they were written.

In fact my considered views about the campaign, and the Government policy towards it, were set out in a statement which I gave to the Knutsford Guardian, in which I expressed the hope that "the Argentinian Government will not realise that the international community simply cannot condone unprovoked aggression; that the British Government and people will take whatever action is necessary to restore the rule of law in the Falkland Islands; and that the reversal of their military invasion is the necessary precondition for any lasting solution to the long-standing dispute about the islands future."



(2)

I stand by every word of that.

Nevertheless, I am profoundly distressed that the breach of confidentiality ~~and copyright~~ perpetrated by a weekly newspaper should have caused embarrassment to the Government. I have expressed to the Prime Minister my great regret that I should unwittingly have been the cause of such embarrassment at this time.

11/6  
No biffing cause

Jock Bruce-Gardyne, the Minister of State at the Treasury, was at least until last month a private opponent of the war in the Falklands. In a personal letter to Samuel Brittan, the Economics Commentator, Mr. Bruce Gardyne wrote to say that he agreed with Brittan's disapproval of the war outlined in an article in the Financial Times on 6 May. However, in his letter, also of 6 May, Mr. Bruce-Gardyne wrote that his own disapproval was based on different grounds:

"I think I would dispute your claim that you have got to have a very good cause to go to war. I do not think the cause matters a tuppenny damn. All that matters is the stomach for the fight. The Kaiser in 1914 had given us far less cause to go to war than Hitler in 1939. Yet I suspect that we marched into battle with twice the zest in 1914.

The problem, I suspect, on this occasion, is that the travellers on the Clapham omnibus do not have the stomach for the fight. So biffing the Argies is fine.



Being biffed by the Argies is a mug's game. But it has got nothing to do with causes or morality. I do not think it ever really has.

Presumably since 6 May Mr. Bruce-Gardyne may have been forced to revise his opinion about Britain's readiness to fight - at least at long distance.\*

Later on in the letter Mr. Bruce-Gardyne admits that:

"The whole population in the Falklands could easily be resettled elsewhere on the globe at a far higher standard of living."

But he goes on to say:

"So could the whole population of Israel which would be another problem. Hence I doubt whether this is altogether convincing argument."

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS 11 JUNE

ASTIZ

1. Lieutenant Commander Astiz left the UK at 2120 hours on the first leg of his journey back to Argentina. The plane also carried 20 journalists.

DETAINED VULCAN

2. The RAF Vulcan Bomber which had been detained by the Brazilian authorities was permitted to leave for Ascension Island, en route to the UK, at 1340 hours GMT.

Emergency Unit



FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION )

0700 HOURS 11 JUNE 1982

UNITED NATIONS


- A - UKMIS New York tel no 973 1. Under Secretary-General Brian Urquhart told Sir A Parsons on 10 June that Perez de Cuellar was thinking of briefing the Vactican Secretary of State Cardinal Casaroli (now in New York) to ask the Pope to press President Galtieri to accept the Secretary-General's latest proposals. Perez de Cuellar wanted to know whether acceptance by Galtieri would still be met with rejection by HMG. Sir A Parons explained why this was so, and asked Urquhart to dissuade Perez de Cuellar from launching an initiative by the Pope. Sir A Parsons suggested to the FCO that the Pope should be briefed on HMG's present position.
- B - FCO tel no 522 to UKMIS New York 2. On the assumption that it was too late to brief the Pope before his departure from Rome for Argentina, Sir A Parsons was instructed to brief Cardinal Casaroli. However, Sir A Parsons later saw the Secretary-General and repeated the points he had made to Urquhart. Perez de Cuellar said he did not think that Cardinal Casaroli would take any initiative of his own, and that since HMG could not accept his latest proposals or something like them, he would not himself be pursuing the idea of an approach to the Pope. In the light of this, Sir A Parsons thinks that it would be better for him not to seek out Cardinal Casaroli in case the latter might feel prompted to start thinking about initiatives.
- C - UKMIS New York tel no 975

VULCAN

- D - Britnavat Brasilia tel no 101623Z 3. The Vulcan and its crew left Rio de Janeiro for Ascension Island on 10 June.

ASTIZ

- E - Guidance tel no 124 4. Argentine prisoner of war Lt Cdr Astiz was repatriated via Brazil on 10 June. He was accompanied on the aircraft by an unarmed military escort and some 20 reporters.


R M Jackson  
Emergency Unit

11 June 1982



GR 320

CONFIDENTIAL

UKMIS NEW YORK 101515Z JUN 82

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 973 OF 10 JUNE

INFO F L A S H BONN (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

UN  
ACTION COPY

MY TELNO 949:

FALKLANDS : SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE OF 5 JUNE

1. URQUHART GOT IN TOUCH WITH ME THIS MORNING (10 JUNE). HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR. THE LATTER WAS THINKING OF BRIEFING CARDINAL CASAROLI (NOW IN NEW YORK) TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE POPE TO BRING PRESSURE ON GALTIERI TO ACCEPT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE OF 5 JUNE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR DID NOT WANT TO DO THIS IF ACCEPTANCE BY GALTIERI WOULD STILL BE MET WITH REJECTION BY US.
2. I TOLD URQUHART THAT THIS WAS THE CASE. FIRST, PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S PROPOSALS FOR A TRUCE/UN PRESENCE/CEASFIRE WERE IMPRACTICABLE IN THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE ISLANDS. THE ONLY POSSIBILITY WAS DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT.
3. SECONDLY, HMG COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE AT THIS STAGE A PACKAGE INVOLVING A PLANNED RUN DOWN OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS TO BE REPLACED BY UN OR ANY OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THIS KIND OF THING MIGHT HAVE BEEN A STARTER UP TO 20 MAY, BUT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION NOW.
4. THIRDLY, BY THE SAME TOKEN, HMG WOULD NOT AGREE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH A SHORT TIME LIMIT UNDER UN AUSPICES FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 'TAKING INTO ACCOUNT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS' ETC.
5. I URGED URQUHART TO DISSUADE PEREZ DE CUELLAR FROM LAUNCHING AN INITIATIVE BY THE POPE. I SHALL SEE PEREZ DE CUELLAR MYSELF TODAY TO DRIVE THESE POINTS HOME.
6. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER TIME PERMITS, BUT IF IT DOES, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE POPE COULD BE BRIEFED FULLY ON OUR PRESENT POSITION BEFORE HE GETS TO BUENOS AIRES. OTHERWISE, WHETHER OR NOT PEREZ DE CUELLAR BRIEFS CASAROLI ABOUT HIS INITIATIVE, THE POPE MAY WELL COME UP WITH SOME IDEAS WHICH HE MIGHT HAVE SOLD TO GALTIERI AND WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

PARSONS



C O N F I D E N T I A L

E. K. UN  
(102)

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10 JUN - 72

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CONFIDENTIAL


FM FCO 101800Z JUN 82

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 522 OF 10 JUNE.

INFO FLASH HOLY SEE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON



UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 949 (NOW BEING REPEATED TO THE HOLY SEE):  
VISIT TO ARGENTINA.

1. WE AGREE THAT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO PREVENT  
UNWELCOME INITIATIVES SURFACING DURING THE VISIT.

2. WE ASSUME THAT IT IS TOO LATE FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION TO BE  
TAKEN WITH THE VATICAN. WE SEE MUCH MERIT IN YOUR SUGGESTION  
(TELECON WITH EMERGENCY UNIT) THAT YOU MIGHT BRIEF CARDINAL  
CASAROLI.

2. THIS MIGHT BE NATURALLY EXPLAINED AS AN UPDATE OF THE VERY  
FULL EXPOSITION OF BRITISH THINKING THE CARDINAL RECEIVED FROM  
THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON. WITHOUT APPEARING TO TRY TO  
DICTATE PAPAL POLICY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO GET CASAROLI  
TO ENSURE THAT HE IS INFORMED OF ANY POSSIBLE INITIATIVES.

PYM

C O N F I D E N T I A L



E.R.

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**ACTION COPY** 10 JUN

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OO FCO (DESKBY 102200Z)

OO HOLY SEE

GRS 425

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 102200Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 102110Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 975 OF 10 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE HOLY SEE, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL NO 522: FALKLANDS: POPE'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA.

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT 16.45Z TODAY (10 JUNE) AND REPEATED THE POINTS I HAD MADE TO URQUHART (MY TEL NO 973). PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD EXPECTED THIS RESPONSE. WAS THERE ANY REVISION THAT I COULD PROPOSE THAT WOULD MAKE HIS INITIATIVE OF 5 JUNE ACCEPTABLE TO US? I SAID THAT THE ESSENTIAL POINT WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE UNCONDITIONAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR WHICH SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF OUR ACCEPTING AT THIS STAGE A COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE OF THE KIND THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD PUT FORWARD LAST WEEK-END.

2. I ASKED PEREZ DE CUELLAR WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT CARDINAL CASAROLI WOULD TAKE AN INITIATIVE OF HIS OWN. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE THOUGHT NOT. HE HAD MENTIONED TO CASAROLI YESTERDAY THAT HE MIGHT (MIGHT) WISH TO SEEK HIS HELP IF HE AND HIS TEAM COULD DEVISE SOME PROPOSAL THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES. HAVING HEARD MY REACTION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD NOW TELL CASAROLI THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO COME UP WITH ANY NEW IDEAS. HE WOULD NOT (NOT) TELL CASAROLI THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH ME.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED...



... IN THE MEETING, PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD NOW TELL CASAROLI THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO COME UP WITH ANY NEW IDEAS. HE WOULD NOT (NOT) TELL CASAROLI THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH ME.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT HE WAS NOT JUST BEING BUSY. HE HAD TWO MOTIVES: FIRST: THE MANDATE GIVEN TO HIM BY SCR 505 REMAINED IN BEING AND HE THEREFORE FELT UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO SEIZE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT: SECONDLY, AS A LATIN AMERICAN, HE WAS VERY CONSCIOUS THAT MERE REPOSSESSION OF THE ISLANDS BY US WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. THE ARGENTINES WOULD NEVER GIVE UP THEIR CLAIM, UNLESS SOMEONE COULD DEVISE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH THEY COULD ACCEPT. THE FALKLANDS WOULD THEREFORE BECOME A PERMANENT SOURCE OF TENSION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. DE SOTO ADDED THAT, GIVEN THE RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN BUENOS AIRES, THE POPE'S VISIT PROVIDED A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR PERSUADING THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT SOMETHING SENSIBLE. I REPEATED THE POINTS I HAD ALREADY MADE. FINALLY, PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONFIRMED THAT IF WE COULD NOT ACCEPT HIS PROPOSALS OF 5 JUNE OR SOMETHING LIKE THEM, HE WOULD NOT PURSUE THE MATTER WITH CASAROLI.

4. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ME NOT TO SEEK OUT CASAROLI. AS YOU SAY, HE HAS ALREADY RECEIVED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER A FULL BRIEFING ON THE BRITISH POSITION. IF I WERE TO TALK TO HIM HERE (NOW THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR WILL NOT BE PURSUING HIM) THE END RESULT MIGHT BE THE ONE WHICH WE DO NOT WANT, NAMELY THAT HE WOULD START THINKING OF INITIATIVES WHICH THE POPE MIGHT TAKE DURING HIS VISIT.

PARSONS

NNNN



OO MODUK (DESKBY 101800Z JUN)

75

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 101800Z JUN

FM BRITNAVAT BRASILIA 101623Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK AIR

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VULCAN

ACTION COPY

SIC 19F

FOR GROUP CAPTAIN BURTON FROM BRITNAVAT  
SUBJECT: RELEASE OF VULCAN

1. VULCAN AND CREW LEFT GALEAO AIRPORT RIO AT 101340Z JUN BOUND  
UK VIA ASCENSION. MANY PRESS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS PRESENT. PRESS  
TODAY ALREADY NOTES THE UNDERTAKING WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN GIVEN  
FOR THE RELEASE.

2. BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE REGARD MISSILE AS IN THEIR CUSTODY, BUT FOR  
PRESENT CONTENT REMAINS AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN MY ISF/NCA  
031430Z JUN, ALLOWING SGT PITT RAF TO HOLD ONLY KEY TO STOREROOM.  
AND ACCESS TO CHECK SECURITY OF SEAL NOT LESS FREQUENTLY THAN  
ONCE EVERY TWELVE HOURS.

3. BRITAIRAT CONTACTABLE BUT NOT DUE IN OFFICE BRASILIA UNTIL  
14 JUN.

HARDING

BT

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 10:1634Z ED//JG



ASTIZ

RESTRICTED

NO JUN 842 - 3

ACTION COPY

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OO BERNE

GRS384

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 102100Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 124 OF 10 JUNE 1982

GUIDANCE TELNO 94: LT CDR ASTIZ

1. ON 10 JUNE LT CDR ASTIZ WAS REPATRIATED VIA BRAZIL. HE WAS BROUGHT BACK TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BECAUSE WE WISHED TO RESPOND SYMPATHETICALLY TO APPROACHES FROM THE FRENCH AND SWEDISH GOVERNMENTS TO PUT QUESTIONS TO HIM ABOUT HIS PAST (SEE GTUR). QUESTIONS RECEIVED FROM THESE TWO GOVERNMENTS WERE PUT TO HIM ON 8 JUNE BY THE SUSSEX CONSTABULARY AT THE REQUEST OF THE HOME OFFICE. (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION: ASTIZ REFUSED TO ANSWER ANY OF THE QUESTIONS - AS HE WAS ENTITLED TO DO UNDER ARTICLE 17 OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION). SINCE THERE WAS NO POINT IN DETAINING HIM FURTHER IT WAS AGREED THAT HE SHOULD BE RETURNED TO ARGENTINA.

POSITION UNDER UK LAW

2. THE UK HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TRY HIM FOR ANY OF THE ALLEGED OFFENCES, WHICH WERE NOT COMMITTED ON BRITISH TERRITORY. EVEN IF A CRIME HAD BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST A BRITISH SUBJECT, THIS WOULD NOT IN ITSELF HAVE PROVIDED OUR COURTS WITH JURISDICTION. NOR COULD ASTIZ HAVE BEEN EXTRADITED UNDER THE UK'S BILATERAL EXTRADITION AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE AND SWEDEN, SINCE THE ALLEGED CRIMES HAD NOT BEEN COMMITTED IN THESE COUNTRIES.

POSITION UNDER THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION

3. WE WERE ENTITLED TO HOLD ASTIZ AS A POW UNTIL THE CESSATION OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES BUT WE DECIDED TO REPATRIATE HIM BEFORE WE WERE OBLIGED TO (AS WE HAVE DONE WITH OTHER PRISONERS FROM



RESTRICTED

9842 3

SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS). ASTIZ WAS TREATED FULLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION AND WAS VISITED SEVERAL TIMES BY RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVES. NO PRESSURE WAS BROUGHT TO BEAR ON HIM TO OBTAIN INFORMATION OF ANY KIND.

POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE WITH OTHER PRISONERS

4. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT ASTIZ SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCHANGED FOR THE THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS OR THE HARRIER PILOT AT PRESENT IN ARGENTINE CUSTODY. WE EXCLUDE THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT

A. THE JOURNALISTS ARE NOT IN A COMPARABLE CATEGORY AND SHOULD BE RELEASED ANYWAY.

B. OUR PRESENT POLICY IS TO REPATRIATE POWS ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS AS SOON AS THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE.

C. ASTIZ WAS NOT A HOSTAGE. THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES IS BANNED BY THE CONVENTION.

5. YOU MAY DRAW FREELY ON THE ABOVE, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

PYM



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 30  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM BRASILIA 111430Z JUN 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 268 OF 11 JUN  
INFO FLASH MODUK NAVY, CINCFLEET  
INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, UKMIS GENEVA

YOUR TELNOS 185 AND 186: MV NORLAND

1. ACTION TAKEN ON TURS AT 1115 (-111415Z) TODAY. BRAZILIANS  
UNDERTOOK TO SEEK URGENT ARGENTINE REACTION.

HARDING

FAKLANDS SELECTIVE [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT  
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HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
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DEF HD/FUSD  
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PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
PS/FUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT

COPIES TO  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/ S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR O'NEILL  
HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
MR COLVIN  
DIO  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CABINET  
OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO  
TYPISTS]

42

FAKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

(37)

(6)  
PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
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MR REED, PUSD  
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RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR COLVIN  
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
MENTS STAFF  
DIO  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
~~DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)~~

CABINET  
OFFICE

GRS 410  
FROM OSLO 111545Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 111700Z  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 124 OF 11 JUNE 82  
CONFIDENTIAL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS  
INFO PRIORITY ALL OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON, TOKYO, OTTAWA,  
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON

YOUR TELNO 142 TO BRUSSELS: ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1. IN REPLY TO YOUR COMMUNICATION I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING  
COMMENT FROM STATE SECRETARY BERG WHICH HE HAS ASKED ME TO  
CONVEY TO YOU ON BEHALF OF THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT.

2. NORWEGIAN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED AS A MEANS OF  
FOLLOWING UP AND GIVING EFFECT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION  
502 FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND A NEGOTIATED  
SETTLEMENT. AS LONG AS THE CONDITIONS OF RESOLUTION 502 ARE NOT  
FULFILLED THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT SEES NO REASON TO MAKE ANY  
CHANGE IN THEIR SANCTIONS.



FULFILLED THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT SEES NO REASON TO MAKE ANY CHANGE IN THEIR SANCTIONS ARRANGEMENTS, BUT IF THE SITUATION DEVELOPED AFTER THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN FORCED TO LEAVE THE FALKLAND ISLANDS NORWAY WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION AGAIN. ANY DECISION WOULD DEPEND INTER ALIA ON WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES DECIDED TO DO AS WELL AS NORWAY'S OWN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT SEEMED THE WISEST COURSE. IF THERE WERE TO BE ANY QUESTION OF CONTINUING SANCTIONS BEYOND FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF RESOLUTION 502 THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NEED TO CONSULT THE STORTING AGAIN, BUT BERG EMPHASISED, AT PRESENT NORWAY ENVISAGED NO CHANGE IN THEIR POLICY. HE ALSO MADE IT PLAIN TO ME THAT ALTHOUGH THE PARLIAMENT RISES TOMORROW FOR THE SUMMER RECESS MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WILL BE AVAILABLE AT ANY TIMEV.

3. BERG ADDED THAT HE READ BETWEEN THE LINES THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM SAW A RISK OF THE ARGENTINES CONTINUING HOSTILITIES AFTER THEY HAD BEEN FORCED OUT AND THIS WAS RATHER OMINOUS. I SAID THAT THIS INDEED HOW I READ THE MESSAGE BEARING IN MIND THAT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WERE WITHIN AIR REACH OF THE ARGENTINE MAINLAND NOR SHOULD WE FORGET IN TALKING ABOUT PORT STANLEY THAT THERE WAS ALSO THE QUESTION OF WEST FALKLAND.

4. THIS REPLY IS A BIT OPAQUE, BUT I DO NOT THINK IT SHOWS ANY INCLINATION TO BE UNHELPFUL. THE QUESTION HAS HAD TO BE CONSIDERED VERY RAPIDLY, TOGETHER WITH THEIR PROBLEMS OVER UNIFIL FOLLOWING STRAY'S RETURN FROM THE NATO SUMMIT AND HIS NEED TO DEPUTISE FOR WILLOCH AT THE SPECIAL SESSION IN NEW YORK BECAUSE THE LATTER HAS 'FLU.

BROWN

NNN

SEN AT 1116 28Z

HSP KK



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

~~38~~ 38

DM has seen

PS  
PS/MR BULLARD  
PS/MR SLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

**IMMEDIATE**

**ADVANCE COPY**

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HD/NEWS D  
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HD/ECD(E)  
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HD/PLANNING STAFF

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PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }  
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

~~EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK~~

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KATHMANDU 110630Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 80 OF 11 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY CBF HONG KONG, DELHI AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELEGRAM 78: FALKLANDS: GURKHAS

1. MTUR CONTAINS CLEARST ACCOUNT OF NEPALESE BRIEFINGS MENTIONED IN PARA 3 OF MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 76. THE NEPALESE ARE DISSATISFIED WITH SELECTIVE VERSIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN APPEARING.

2. THE REFERENCES TO THE USE OF FORCE TO DECOLONISE ARE EQUIVOCAL BUT DO NOT DEPART FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S INITIAL COMMENT REPORTED IN MY ELEGRAM NUMBER 40.

3. THE SUGGESTION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTR BRIEFING THAT NEPAL "MIGHT" NOT ALTER HER POLICY IN RESPONSE TO THE REPORTED ARGENTIANIAN DEMAND FOR THE PULL-OUT OF GURKHAS IS ENCOURAGING IN THE SENSE THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ALREADY HAD A SUMMARY FROM RETRACT 03609 JUNE.

4. AS WE EXPECTED (MY TELEGRAMS 45 AND 47), THE NEPALESE ARE NOW RECALLING THEIR EMPHASIS IN THEIR ORIGINAL STATEMENTS OF POLICY



RECALLING THEIR EMPHASIS IN THEIR ORIGINAL STATEMENTS OF POLICY  
ON THE GENERAL DANGERS OF THE USE OF FORCE. THEY ARE NEVERTHELESS  
ADHERING TO THE STATEMENTS AS A WHOLE.

5. WE SHOULD HELP THEM AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN DISCOURAGING PUBLICITY  
IN THE UK ON GURKHAS WHICH CAN ONLY STIMULATE COMMENT HERE.

DENSON

BT

NNNN

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1

TO THE SECRETARY  
OF DEFENCE  
CANTONMENT  
1954

TO THE SECRETARY  
OF DEFENCE  
CANTONMENT  
1954

TO THE SECRETARY  
OF DEFENCE  
CANTONMENT  
1954



43

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

PM has seen

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES. (3)

(6)

PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/PUS  
 PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
 MR BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR GILLMORE  
 MR URE  
 MR BARRETT  
 HD/S AM D  
 HD/DEF D  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF  
 HD/UND  
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 HD/PUSD  
 MR REED, PUSD  
 EMERGENCY ROOM  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
 PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY  
 PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)  
 PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
 PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
 PS/SIR M PALLISER  
 PS/SIR A DUFF  
 MR WADE-GERY  
 MR FULLER  
 MR COLVIN  
 MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
 MENTS STAFF  
 DIO  
 MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
 ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
 DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET  
 OFFICE

GRS 230  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 FROM HOLY SEE 111425Z JUN 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 37 OF 11 JUN 82  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON , AND ROME (ACTIONED)

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 22 AND 522 TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

THE POPE'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA

1. TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE REACHED ME ONLY AN HOUR BEFORE THE POPE'S AIRCRAFT WAS DUE TO TAKE OFF. EFFECTIVE ACTION WAS NOT PRACTICAL.
2. ALL THE EVIDENCE HERE SUGGESTS THAT THE POPE WILL ESCHEW ANY POLITICAL INITIATIVE. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT HIS OFFICIAL CONTACTS WILL BE RESTRICTED TO AN ARRIVAL CEREMONY WHICH GALTIERI WILL ATTEND (AND AT WHICH WE ARE TOLD THERE WILL BE NO SET SPEECHES)



WILL ATTEND (AND AT WHICH WE ARE TOLD THERE WILL BE NO SET SPEECHES)  
AND A PRIVATE MEETING AT THE CASA ROSADA.

3. THE NUNCIO IN BUENOS AIRES IS SAID BY VATICAN RADIO TO HAVE TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 9 JUNE THAT THE POPE'S VISIT WAS EXCLUSIVELY PASTORAL IN NATURE. VATICAN RADIO HAVE ALSO TOLD US THAT DURING THE BRIEF STOP IN RIO THE POPE REFERRED TO HIS VISIT TO BRAZIL IN 1938 AND SAID THAT THAT VISIT, LIKE THE ONE HE WAS ABOUT TO UNDERTAKE TO ARGENTINA, WAS MARKED BY ITS PASTORAL AND ECCLESIAL NATURE, AND HAD NO POLITICAL OVERTONES.

4. WHILST IT WOULD PROBABLY BE USEFUL TO BRIEF CARDINAL CASAROLI DURING HIS STAY IN NEW YORK IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT HE WILL BE GOING TO BUENOS AIRES TO JOIN THE POPE THERE. VATICAN SOURCES SUGGEST THAT HE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN NEW YORK FOR A DAY OR SO.

HEATH

NNNN

R

|

|

6



SUBJECT

cc Madis  
One

PT 23  
HJC 01R

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. T 121A/82

CONFIDENTIAL

9863 - 1

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 436

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 111011Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE QUITO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 70 OF 11 JUNE  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

DISTRIBUTION SELECTORS  
FILE COPY

AR 24/6  
T. a.

FALKLANDS : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT HURTADO

1. PRESIDENT HURTADO HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE  
PRIME MINISTER (RECEIVED ON 4 JUNE):-  
BEGINS

'THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF ECUADOR VIEW WITH THE GREATEST  
ANXIETY THE DETERIORATION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH  
ATLANTIC, WHICH HAS ALREADY PRODUCED SO MANY VICTIMS AND  
CAUSED SO MUCH GRIEF TO THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT.  
FACED WITH THE IMMINENT PROSPECT THAT THE HOSTILITIES WILL  
PRECIPITATE ACTIONS, THE MAGNITUDE AND CONSEQUENCE OF WHICH  
ARE UNFORESEEABLE, I PUT FORWARD THE MOST EARNEST CALL, IN  
THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF ECUADOR FOR AN  
IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND THE SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES WITHOUT  
DELAY, IN ACCORD WITH THE HAPPY INITIATIVE PRESENTED BY  
SPAIN AND PANAMA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. IN MAKING  
THIS IMPASSIONED PLEA, I INVOKE THE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES  
ON WHICH OUR CIVILISATION PRIDES ITSELF, AND TO WHOSE  
DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING BOTH ARGENTINA AND GREAT  
BRITAIN HAVE MADE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS.'

ENDS

2. PLEASE NOW DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER:  
BEGINS

'I SHARE THE DEEP CONCERN WHICH YOU HAVE EXPRESSED ON  
BEHALF OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE AT THE CONFLICT ON THE

1  
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

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C/F COPY  
9863 - 1

FALKLAND ISLANDS. AS I AM SURE YOU RECOGNISE, THAT CONFLICT IS NOT OF OUR SEEKING. OVER NINE WEEKS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE UNPROVOKED ARGENTINE INVASION OF BRITISH TERRITORY, YET THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAVE REFUSED TO HEED THE DEMANDS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 502, ADOPTED THE DAY AFTER THE INVASION, AND WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES.

WE HAVE SHOWN FLEXIBILITY AND PATIENCE: BUT HAVE MET ONLY INTRANSIGENCE FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE NEVER WANTED TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION: BUT ARGENTINE OB DURACY HAS LEFT US NO CHOICE. WE HAVE AT EVERY STAGE OF THE CONFLICT STATED OUR POSITION CLEARLY, AND HAVE CONFINED OURSELVES TO USING THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY TO RESTORE THE RIGHTS OF THE ISLANDERS AND TO PROTECT OUR WON FORCES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER.

MR PRESIDENT, A CEASEFIRE MUST BE UNEQUIVOCALLY LINKED TO IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I HOPE THAT REASON AND HUMANITY MAY YET PREVAIL ON THE ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP AND INDUCE THEM TO ACCEPT THE OFFERS OF A SAFE WITHDRAWAL WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO THEM. THE CHOICE IS THEIRS'.

ENDS

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

2

CONFIDENTIAL





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister 2

The sit reps sent to you in Bonn cover most of the telegrams that have come in.

Inside this folder are the telegrams which amplify the sit reps. It is not strictly necessary for you to read them.

Immediately below are two telegrams not covered by the sit reps.

WA

W/b



T 124A/82

*Subject*

Classification and Caveats  
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby  
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
4  
5  
6 FM FCO 041945Z JUNE 82  
7 TO IMMEDIATE BOGOTA  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

*cc Gladys  
ops*

10 MY TELNO 119: FALKLANDS: PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

11 1. Please now deliver following reply to President Turbay's  
12 letter from the Prime Minister:

13 BEGINS

14 I ~~share~~ share the concern expressed in Your Excellency's  
15 letter of 2 June at the prospect of further bloodshed in the  
16 Falkland Islands. We have no wish to add to the tragic  
17 loss of life which both Britain and Argentina have already  
18 suffered in this conflict. If any means could be found to  
19 persuade the Argentine Government to withdraw their forces,  
20 as demanded by the United Nations Security Council as far  
21 back as 3 April, further conflict could be avoided.

22 ~~Despite Argentina's persistent refusal over more than nine~~  
23 ~~weeks to comply with this Resolution, I still hope that it~~  
24 ~~may not be too late for them to agree to take this step and~~  
25 ~~to end their aggression.~~

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword I warmly
File number	Dept Emergency	Distribution Falklands General
Drafted by (Block capitals) P R FEARN		<p><i>As I told the House of Commons yesterday, if Argentinian withdrawal is can be linked unequivocally to a ceasefire, we will make arrangements on the spot which allow the Argentinian forces to leave the Islands with safety, dignity and respect.</i></p>
Telephone number 233-4692		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

*forces to leave the Islands with safety, dignity and respect.*





File

886  
T  
124A/82  
Bf

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

10 June 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF COLOMBIA

As I told Brian Fall on the telephone from Northolt yesterday, the Prime Minister was not entirely happy with the draft reply to the President of Colombia which you sent with your letter of 8 June 1982 to John Coles. In particular, she thought that the last sentence of paragraph 1 did not ring true.

She therefore deleted this sentence and substituted for it the following one:

"As I told the House of Commons yesterday, provided Argentinian withdrawal can be linked unequivocally to a ceasefire, we will make arrangements on the spot which allow the Argentinian forces to leave the Islands with safety, dignity and despatch".

This change required a consequential amendment to the last paragraph of the message. This paragraph should now end with the words "to stop the fighting". And the rest of the paragraph should be deleted.

Bf

As I told Brian Fall, with these changes the Prime Minister was content for the message to the President to be despatched.

CAW

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

sh



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

Page

2

<<<<

1 <<<<

2 I warmly reaffirm the importance which we attach to our  
 3 relations with the countries of Latin America. We are  
 4 proud of Britain's historical record in supporting the  
 5 efforts of those countries in first establishing their  
 6 independence, and then in assisting the development of the  
 7 rich economic potential with which so many Latin American  
 8 states are endowed. I believe that most governments in  
 9 South and Central America appreciate that it is this same  
 10 devotion to the cause of freedom which leads us now to  
 11 insist on the withdrawal of Argentine forces, so as to  
 12 enable the Falkland Islanders to choose their own way of  
 13 life.

14 I ~~am grateful for the moderate stance~~ <sup>appreciate the concern</sup> that you and your  
 15 Government have ~~adopted~~ <sup>shown</sup> throughout this crisis. I have  
 16 given particularly careful attention to the thoughts in  
 17 your letter, inspired as it is by sentiments of friendship  
 18 and humanitarian concern. But it was Argentine aggression  
 19 which provoked the fighting and it is for the Argentines  
 20 to leave the Islands in order to stop the fighting. I have  
 21 ~~made it clear publicly that the moment they announce they~~ <sup>make clear that</sup>  
 22 ~~are prepared to go we shall do everything possible to~~  
 23 ~~assist them to do so with safety and in good order.~~ <sup>dignity</sup> We  
 24 ~~cannot do more.~~

25 ENDS

26 2. If the Colombians wish to publish this exchange, as they  
 27 did the previous one, we have no objection.

29 PYM

30 NNNN

/// 31  
 // 32  
 / 33  
 34

NNNN ends  
 telegram

BLANK

Catchword



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
HD/PUSD (2)  
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HD/NEWS D  
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HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
*HQ WSP*  
EMERGENCY UNIT.  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

~~Room 8 FOR MODUK~~ C IN C FLEET

ADVANCE COPY

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM PARIS 101750Z JUN 82  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 614 OF 10 JUN 82  
INFO ROUTINE LIMA MODUK

FRANCE/PERU

1. ACCORDING TO FRENCH NEWSPAPERS QUOTING AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE THE PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IN LIMA ON 8 JUNE THAT IN REPLY TO A PERUVIAN PROTEST NOTE ABOUT NON-DELIVERY OF THE EXOCETS PERU HAD ORDERED, FRANCE HAD MADE IT KNOWN THAT SHE WOULD DELIVER THE MISSILES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE FALKLANDS HOSTILITIES ENDED. THE QUAI (FOUQUET) CONFIRMED TO THE EMBASSY THIS MORNING THAT THE FRENCH HAD INDEED SAID THIS TO THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT THE FRENCH HAD PROMISED TO AIRFREIGHT THE MISSILES TO PERU EVENTUALLY.

FRETWELL

NNNN

N

SENT AT 10/1848Z AB



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
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MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
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LORD BRIDGES  
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HD/PLANNING STAFF

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]


[Typists a.a.]

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

RESTRICTED

FM WASHINGTON 102330Z JUN 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2092 OF 10 JUNE  
INFO MODUK (DIS FOR ARMS CONTROL CELL)

ADVANCE COPY



ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA.

1. THE US CUSTOMS SEIZED TODAY IN MIAMI AN AIR CARGO DESTINED FOR BUENOS AIRES OF NAVIGATION AND/OR RADIO PARTS (ORIGIN AND SHIPPER NOT YET IDENTIFIED IN WASHINGTON), WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY BE USED IN PUCCARA AIRCRAFT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE EXPORT LICENCE WAS IN ORDER BUT THE US AUTHORITIES HAVE DECIDED TO REVIEW IT, A PROCESS WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MAY BE PROTRACTED

THOMAS

NNNN



PRIME MINISTER

FALKLANDS ISSUES IN PARLIAMENT, 10 JUNE

At Prime Minister's Question Time, Mr. Foot concentrated - as expected - on the content of his letter to you. The Home Secretary replied on the basis of the mini-statement which you had approved in Bonn overnight, and did not allow himself to be pressed further. Most other Questions were on the Falklands, but the Home Secretary simply referred back to statements and Answers which you have previously given. He did tell the House that you hoped to be in contact with Party Leaders shortly about the review of the work of Government Departments prior to the invasion. He confirmed that the Government would seriously consider representations made about repatriation of bodies.

The final Question came from Leo Abse asking, in over-emotional fashion, how many more men had to die before you would give up this escapade. The Home Secretary spoke, in a moving and effective way, of the special concern felt by those who had fought for their country in earlier times about the fate of those who are asked to fight now. The result was that he was cheered from the House at the end of Question Time.

You saw the Defence Secretary's statement in Bonn. For the Opposition, Mr. Silkin did not press very hard; he simply restated the Opposition's views on the need for action in the Security Council. But he pressed one concern: that MOD had told people not to ring the special telephone numbers in the last 36 hours at a time when many families simply needed a sympathetic voice to talk to, even if that voice could only say that there was no information yet. Mr. Nott stressed that the position of next of kin was an overriding concern for MOD, but that there was a national requirement to counter exaggerated Argentine propaganda, which meant that some comments about action often have to be made earlier than he might wish. MOD had also to consider the operational value to an enemy of making detailed announcements.

/Edward Du Cann



Edward Du Cann wanted an assurance that our fleet was receiving all possible protection from early warning radar and Mr. Nott conceded that we lack an airborne early warning system. Dick Crawshaw, expressing sympathy for relatives of casualties, stressed that we must steel ourselves to go through with the necessary action, in the knowledge that failure to do so would cost more. Charles Morrison started an exchange about news availability and Mr. Nott spoke of criticism both for providing too much and for providing too little. He praised very highly the work of task force correspondents.

Reg Freeson suggested a contradiction between statements that Tuesday's losses would not affect our capacity on the Falklands and our refusal to provide casualty information. Further comments raised no new angles, and Mr. Nott on the whole achieved understanding for his inability to give even orders of magnitude on casualties at this stage.

MA

10 June 1982



Prime Minister

In case this did not  
reach you in Bonn.

CONFIDENTIAL

W  
10/6

GR 320

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 101515Z JUN 82

TO F L A S H FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 973 OF 10 JUNE

INFO F L A S H BONN (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

mt

MY TELNO 949:

FALKLANDS : SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE OF 5 JUNE

1. URQUHART GOT IN TOUCH WITH ME THIS MORNING (10 JUNE). HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR. THE LATTER WAS THINKING OF BRIEFING CARDINAL CASAROLI (NOW IN NEW YORK) TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE POPE TO BRING PRESSURE ON GALTIERI TO ACCEPT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE OF 5 JUNE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR DID NOT WANT TO DO THIS IF ACCEPTANCE BY GALTIERI WOULD STILL BE MET WITH REJECTION BY US.
2. I TOLD URQUHART THAT THIS WAS THE CASE. FIRST, PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S PROPOSALS FOR A TRUCE/UN PRESENCE/CEASFIRE WERE IMPRACTICABLE IN THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE ISLANDS. THE ONLY POSSIBILITY WAS DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT.
3. SECONDLY, HMG COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE AT THIS STAGE A PACKAGE INVOLVING A PLANNED RUN DOWN OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS TO BE REPLACED BY UN OR ANY OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THIS KIND OF THING MIGHT HAVE BEEN A STARTER UP TO 20 MAY, BUT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION NOW.
4. THIRDLY, BY THE SAME TOKEN, HMG WOULD NOT AGREE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH A SHORT TIME LIMIT UNDER UN AUSPICES FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 'TAKING INTO ACCOUNT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS' ETC.

/5.

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

5. I URGED URQUHART TO DISSUADE PEREZ DE CUELLAR FROM LAUNCHING AN INITIATIVE BY THE POPE. I SHALL SEE PEREZ DE CUELLAR MYSELF TODAY TO DRIVE THESE POINTS HOME.

6. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER TIME PERMITS, BUT IF IT DOES, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE POPE COULD BE BRIEFED FULLY ON OUR PRESENT POSITION BEFORE HE GETS TO BUENOS AIRES. OTHERWISE, WHETHER OR NOT PEREZ DE CUELLAR BRIEFS CASAROLI ABOUT HIS INITIATIVE, THE POPE MAY WELL COME UP WITH SOME IDEAS WHICH HE MIGHT HAVE SOLD TO GALTIERI AND WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

PARSONS

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MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
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 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
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 LORD BRIDGES  
 MR URE  
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 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60  
 EMERGENCY ROOM  
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
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 PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MR LETT ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )  
 SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
 MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
 DIO )  
~~RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET~~

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

GRS 90  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 FROM UKMIS GENEVA 101037Z JUN 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 310 OF 10 JUNE  
 AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS5, 8, 11)  
 INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA  
 INFO SAVING BERNE

IMMEDIATE  
 ADVANCE COPY

EQUIPMENT ON ASCOT 2645

1. JOSSERON (ICRC) TOLD US THIS MORNING (JUNE 10) THAT HE HAD LEARNED THAT THE VC10 WAS CARRYING ICRC STICKERS AND MARKINGS. THIS WAS A NEW ELEMENT FOR ICRC AND IS OF CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT TO THEM.
2. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS LAY DOWN STRICT RULES ON THE USE OF THE RED CROSS EMBLEM. ANY BREACH OF THE CONVENTIONS WOULD BE A SERIOUS MATTER. GRATEFUL FOR ANY POINTS WE CAN MAKE TO THE ICRC IN REPLY.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BERNE



~~FLASH~~

GBUGG ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOBONN 016/10

ZZ BONN

GRS 258  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 101010Z JUN 82  
TO FLASH BONN (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 10 JUNE  
INFO FLASH PARIS, STOCKHOLM

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY  
LT CDR ASTIZ

1. THE BRITISH PRESS THIS MORNING IS CARRYING THE STORY THAT ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR ASTIZ TO LEAVE ON 9 JUNE, BUT THESE WERE CANCELLED AT THE LAST MOMENT AND HE IS EXPECTED TO LEAVE ON 10 JUNE. NEWS DEPT ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT A DECISION TO REPATRIATE ASTIZ HAS BEEN TAKEN, BUT ARE REFUSING TO BE DRAWN ON TRAVEL DETAILS. IF PRESSED IN THE HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON, MR WHITELAW IS RECOMMENDED TO SAY THAT ASTIZ IS EXPECTED TO LEAVE LATER TODAY, BUT GIVE NO FURTHER ZNTAILS. WE ARE TELLING THE FRENCH AND SWEDISH EMBASSIES HERE THAT ASTIZ IS LEAVING TONIGHT. IN VIEW OF THEIR PREVIOUS ATTITUDES, IT CANNOT BE EXCLUDED THAT THE FRENCH WILL MAKE A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL APPROACH IN BONN TO PERSUADE US TO DELAY ASTIZ'S DEPARTURE. OUR VIEW REMAINS THAT, IN VIEW OF HIS COMPLETE REFUSAL TO ANSWER ANY OF THE QUESTIONS, NO USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY SUCH A DELAY.
2. WE HAD HOPED THAT ASTIZ WOULD LEAVE LAST NIGHT. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE MOD HAD BOOKED HIM ON A PLANE STAGING HIM THROUGH LISBON, WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS CUSTODY DURING THE FLIGHT. WE WERE UNABLE TO PERSUADE EITHER THE BRAZILIANS OR THE ICRC TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY AND HIS DEPARTURE HAD TO BE DELAYED. THE BRAZILIANS HAVE NOW AGREED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIM ONCE HE REACHES BRAZIL. HE WILL BE TRAVELLING ON A DIRECT BRITISH CALEDONIAN FLIGHT, ACCOMPANIED BY AN UNARMED ESCORT PROVIDED BY THE MOD, LEAVING AT 2100 TONIGHT.

PYM

NNNN



S E C R E T

9603 - 1

ZZ BONN

GRS 528

SECRET

FM FCO 100544Z JUN 82

TO FLASH BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 296 OF 10 JUNE

FOR PS/NO.10 AND PS

FALKLANDS : SITREPS

(A) DIPLOMATIC

VULCAN

1. THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT HAS CONVEYED HIS AGREEMENT THAT THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT MAY LEAVE BRAZIL BUT THE MISSILE SHOULD REMAIN UNTIL THE END OF THE CONFLICT. HE HAS ASKED FOR AN UNDERTAKING THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD PLAY NO FURTHER PART IN WARLIKE OPERATIONS IN THE FALKLANDS. ON INSTRUCTIONS, HM AMBASSADOR HAS AGREED TO THESE TERMS AND GIVEN THE UNDERTAKING.

ASTIZ

2. NEWS THAT THE ARGENTINE PRISONER OF WAR, LT COMMANDER ASTIZ, IS TO BE REPATRIATED ON 10 JUNE HAS NOW LEAKED (PRIMARILY THROUGH AIRLINE SOURCES AT HEATHROW). OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN ARE, HOWEVER, STILL TAKING THE LINE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS TRAVEL ARE NOT YET CERTAIN.

GALTIERI

3. THE ITALIANS HAVE TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE OF AN INTERVIEW PRESIDENT GALTIERI HAS GIVEN TO AN ITALIAN JOURNALIST WHICH IS DUE TO BE PUBLISHED SOON IN THE TIMES. GALTIERI, WHO WAS TENSE AND TIRED, SAID HE WOULD RETIRE BEFORE THE END OF HIS MANDATE IN 1984 IF THAT WERE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. HE DID NOT CORRECT THE JOURNALIST WHEN SHE TOOK THE FALL OF PORT STANLEY FOR GRANTED, BUT IMPLIED THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NEVERTHELESS GAIN THE VICTORY IN THE LONGER TERM.

(B) MILITARY AS PROVIDED BY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
OWN FORCES

4. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE LANDING FORCES DEPLOYMENT. THE BUILD-UP OF FORWARD POSITIONS PARTICULARLY THOSE OF 5 INF BRIGADE CONTINUES COUPLED WITH AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING

(FORWARD)

1

S E C R E T



FORWARD. THE ARGENTINE AIR RAIDS OF 8 JUNE WHICH CAUSED THE LOSS OF THE LSLs SIR GALAHAD AND SIR TRISTRAM HAVE CAUSED MORE CASUALTIES AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES THAN WAS FIRST THOUGHT: 5 INF BRIGADE HAVE SUFFERED LOSSES OF EQUIPMENT OF 1 WELSH GUARDS (AFFECTING THE CAPABILITY OF TWO COMPANIES AND THE MORTAR PLATOON), THE FIELD AMBULANCE UNIT LOST ALL ITS EQUIPMENT AND 9 PARA SQUADRON ROYAL ENGINEERS FIFTY PER CENT. THE BRIGADE HQ ALSO LOST A NUMBER OF VEHICLES. IT IS HOPED THAT THESE LOSSES MAY BE MADE UP FROM THE LANDING FORCE RESERVES BUT THIS SET BACK COULD DELAY PLANNED OPERATIONS.

## INCIDENTS/ACCIDENTS

5. EXCEPT FOR MINOR PATROL CLASHES NO INCIDENTS WITH THE ENEMY OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE LAST 24 HOURS.

## CASUALTIES

6. BECAUSE OF THE OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE DIFFERENT PLACES TO WHICH THE CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN TAKEN THERE HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN FINALISING THE CASUALTY DETAILS. HOWEVER IN THE BOMBING ATTACKS ON 8 JUNE:-

(A) IT IS KNOWN THERE WERE NO DEATHS ON HMS PLYMOUTH BUT 5 WERE INJURED. NEXT-OF-KIN HAVE BEEN INFORMED:

(B) OF THE 17 MEN IN THE LANDING CRAFT 11 WERE PICKED UP BY SEA KING HELICOPTERS. ONE ROYAL MARINE IS KNOWN TO HAVE DIED AND 5 ARE MISSING PRESUMED DEAD:

(C) BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE TO SIR GALAHAD AND HER FULLY LOADED STATE AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK FULL DETAILS OF THE CASUALTIES ARE NOT YET KNOWN BUT IT IS FEARED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN A RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBER OF KILLED AND INJURED. INITIAL FIGURES RECEIVED ARE IN THE ORDER OF 50-60 INJURED BUT THE FIGURE IS EXPECTED TO RISE. THREE SHIPS OFFICERS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE DIED AND NUMEROUS INJURIES TO THE CHINESE CREW OCCURRED BECAUSE IT IS THOUGHT ONE BOMB EXPLODED IN THE GALLEY/MESS AREA.

## INTENTIONS

7. NO CHANGE.

PYM

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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

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MR LITTLER )  
SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
SIR M PALLISER ) CABINET  
MR WADE-GERY ) OFFICE  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO )  
DIO )

RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Mrs Dickson, D/ENERG

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

TK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

GRS 260  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM UKMIS GENEVA 100958Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 309 OF 10 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

ICRC DELEGATION ON SS UGANDA

1. JOSSERON (ICRC) HAS TOLD US THIS MORNING (10 JUNE) THAT FOUR ICRC DELEGATES WERE TAKEN FROM THE UGANDA TO SAN CARLOS LAST NIGHT. BUT THE COMMANDER OF THE GARRISON WAS NOT EXPECTING THEM AND REFUSED TO ALLOW THEM TO STAY FOR MORE THAN A FEW HOURS.
2. ICRC ARE CONCERNED AT THIS LACK OF COMMUNICATION ON OUR SIDE AND ALSO AT THE CONDITIONS THEY WITNESSED IN SAN CARLOS. JOSSERON SAID THAT THE ICRC TEAM REPORTED THAT THE WOUNDED OF BOTH SIDES, POWS, GUARDS AND AMMUNITION HAVE ALL BEEN PLACED INTO THE LOCAL ABATTOIR IN APPALLING AND CRAMPED CONDITIONS. SECURITY WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE DELEGATES TO MAKE EVEN A BRIEF INVESTIGATION OF THE AREA.



INSUFFICIENT FOR THE DELEGATES TO MAKE EVEN A BRIEF INVESTIGATION OF THE AREA.

3. THIS INCIDENT IS EMBARRASSING GIVEN THAT WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO ESTABLISH AN ICRC PRESENCE ON THE ISLANDS SINCE HOSTILITIES BEGAN. THE ICRC TEAM HAD BEEN ON THE UGANDA FOR SOME 48 HOURS BEFORE THEIR LANDING, SURELY SUFFICIENT TIME TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS.

4. EBERLIN, THE ICRC HOSPITAL SHIP EXPERT, REMAINS READY TO GO ON ANY OF THE ARGENTINE HOSPITAL SHIPS BUT ICRC SAY THAT THEY ARE RECEIVING CONTRADICTIONARY INFORMATION ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF THESE SHIPS. THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE BAHIA PARAISO WOULD MEET THE UGANDA ON 11 JUNE BUT THEIR DELEGATE IN BUENOS AIRES REPORTS THAT THE BAHIA PARAISO IS AT PRESENT IN A SOUTHERN ARGENTINE PORT AND WILL NOT SAIL FOR SEVERAL DAYS. THERE ARE SIMILAR CONTRADICTIONS ABOUT THE MOVEMENTS OF THE OTHER ARGENTINE HOSPITAL SHIPS, NONE OF WHICH APPEARS TO BE HEADING FOR PORT STANLEY.

5. JOSSERON WILL BE CONTACTING WING COMMANDER SMITH OF THE MOD POW BUREAU TODAY TO DISCUSS THESE POINTS.

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT AT 10/1023Z IM



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MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
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MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS GENEVA 101000Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 308 OF 10 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, MODUK (NAVY AND PLEASE PASS TO CINCFLEET)

MONTEVIDEO TELNO 455: MV NORLAND

1. WE HAVE TOLD ICRC OF THE URUGUAYAN CONCERN OVER THE VISIT OF THE NORLAND. THEY UNDERSTAND THE URUGUAYAN POSITION AND ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE ANY POINTS WITH THE ARGENTINIANS.
2. ON THE QUESTION OF TRANSPORTING THE ICRC DELEGATES TO THE NORLAND, JOSSERON SAID THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS AS ATTEMPTS TO ARRANGE THIS WITH THE URUGUAYANS ARE PROVING DIFFICULT. HE CONFIRMED THAT ICRC WOULD NEED TO BE ON THE NORLAND 24 HOURS BEFORE IT DOCKED.
3. JOSSERON SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A POSITIVE RESPONSE ON THE QUESTION OF THE NORLAND TAKING ON SUPPLIES IN MONTEVIDEO. A NOTE RECEIVED BY THE ICRC IN BUENOS AIRES STATES EXPLICITLY THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAVE AGREED THAT THE NORLAND SHOULD RECEIVE REASONABLE QUANTITIES OF FUEL, WATER AND OTHER NON MILITARY GOODS SUCH AS FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO



THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAVE AGREED THAT THE NORLAND  
SHOULD RECEIVE REASONABLE QUANTITIES OF FUEL, WATER AND OTHER  
NON-MILITARY GOODS SUCH AS FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO  
ENABLE IT TO PROVIDE FOR POWS AND WOUNDED.

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT AT 10/1027Z IM



Prime Minister

These are the two sitreps that  
were sent to you in Bonn

W  
10/6

S E C R E T

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ZZ BONN

GRS 443

SECRET

FM FCO 101313Z JUNE 82  
TO FLASH BONN FOR PS NO 10  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 300 OF 10 JUNE  
FOR PS NO 10 AND PS  
FALKLANDS : SITREPS

(A) DIPLOMATIC

MEXICO

1. THE MEXICAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER HAS DISCUSSED THE CRISIS PRIVATELY WITH HM AMBASSADOR. TELLO FORESAW GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR A MULTINATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE ON THE ISLAND. IT WOULD BE QUOTE AN ERROR OF HISTORICAL MAGNITUDE UNQUOTE FOR THE AMERICANS TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A FORCE. IF THEY DID, THEY WOULD CONFIRM ALL LATIN AMERICAN SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES ROLE THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS AND RENDER AN EVENTUAL SOLUTION MORE DIFFICULT. BRITISH AND AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS WITH LATIN AMERICA WOULD RECEIVE A GRAVE SETBACK. TELLO ALSO THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT ANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY WOULD WISH TO PARTICIPATE. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF INVOLVING THE UN AT ALL STAGES IN ORDER TO HELP DETER ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTIONS.

ICRC

2. THE ICRC HAVE INFORMED UKMIS GENEVA THAT FOUR ICRC DELEGATES WERE TAKEN FROM THE UGANDA TO SAN CARLOS LAST NIGHT. BUT THE COMMANDER OF THE GARRISON WAS NOT EXPECTING THEM AND REFUSED TO ALLOW THEM TO STAY FOR MORE THAN A FEW HOURS. THE ICRC ARE CONCERNED AT THIS LACK OF COMMUNICATION ON OUR SIDE AND ALSO AT THE CRAMPED CONDITIONS THEY WITNESSED IN SAN CARLOS. ICRC HAVE BEEN PUT IN TOUCH DIRECTLY WITH THE MOD ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS.

BRITISH JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN ARGENTINA

3. THE SWISS GOVERNMENT HAVE FORMALLY ASSURED HM AMBASSADOR BERNE THAT THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES IS TAKING ALL POS-

1

S E C R E T



SECRET

SIBLE MEASURES TO ASSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE THREE JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN USHAIA AND HAS MISSED NO OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE WITH THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN THEIR FAVOUR. A MEMBER OF THE SWISS EMBASSY WILL PROBABLY GO TO USHAIA ON 11 JUNE TO SEE THEM. THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES MAINTAIN THEIR DECISION NOT TO TRANSFER THE JOURNALISTS TO BUENOS AIRES.

(B) MILITARY (AS PROVIDED BY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE)  
OWN FORCES

4. HMS YARMOUTH FIRED 124 ROUNDS ON SAPPER/HILL/MOODY BROOK LAST NIGHT. AN ARGENTINE SHORE BATTERY RETURNED FIRE BUT CAUSED NO DAMAGE.

5. HMS PLYMOUTH IS DAMAGED BUT SEAWORTHY AND IS NOW PROCEEDING TOWARDS THE REPAIR SHIP STENA SEASPREAD IN THE REPAIR AREA TO THE EAST OF THE TEZ.

INCIDENTS/ACCIDENTS

6. NONE REPORTED.

CASUALTIES

7. WE HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS OF THE CASUALTIES ARISING FROM THE BOMBING ATTACKS LAST TUESDAY AFTERNOON.

8. UGANDA WAS DUE TO RV WITH THE ARGENTINE HOSPITAL SHIP BAHIA PARAISO AT 1200Z TODAY TO TRANSFER AN ICRC OBSERVER TO BAHIA PARAISO WHICH WILL THEN GO TO PORT STANLEY. HOWEVER WE HAVE JUST HEARD THAT THE BAHIA PARAISO IS IN A S ARGENTINA PORT AND UNLIKELY TO SAIL FOR SEVERAL DAYS.

INTENTIONS

9. NO CHANGE.

PYM

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DIRECTOR G C H Q



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FOBON013/10

ZZ BONN

GRS 528

SECRET

FM FCO 100544Z JUN 82

TO FLASH BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 296 OF 10 JUNE

FOR PS/NO.10 AND PS

FALKLANDS : SITREPS

(A) DIPLOMATIC

VULCAN

1. THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT HAS CONVEYED HIS AGREEMENT THAT THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT MAY LEAVE BRAZIL BUT THE MISSILE SHOULD REMAIN UNTIL THE END OF THE CONFLICT. HE HAS ASKED FOR AN UNDERTAKING THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD PLAY NO FURTHER PART IN WARLIKE OPERATIONS IN THE FALKLANDS. ON INSTRUCTIONS, HM AMBASSADOR HAS AGREED TO THESE TERMS AND GIVEN THE UNDERTAKING.

ASTIZ

2. NEWS THAT THE ARGENTINE PRISONER OF WAR, LT COMMANDER ASTIZ, IS TO BE REPATRIATED ON 10 JUNE HAS NOW LEAKED (PRIMARILY THROUGH AIRLINE SOURCES AT HEATHROW). OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN ARE, HOWEVER, STILL TAKING THE LINE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS TRAVEL ARE NOT YET CERTAIN.

GALTIERI

3. THE ITALIANS HAVE TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE OF AN INTERVIEW PRESIDENT GALTIERI HAS GIVEN TO AN ITALIAN JOURNALIST WHICH IS DUE TO BE PUBLISHED SOON IN THE TIMES. GALTIERI, WHO WAS TENSE AND TIRED, SAID HE WOULD RETIRE BEFORE THE END OF HIS MANDATE IN 1984 IF THAT WERE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. HE DID NOT CORRECT THE JOURNALIST WHEN SHE TOOK THE FALL OF PORT STANLEY FOR GRANTED, BUT IMPLIED THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NEVERTHELESS GAIN THE VICTORY IN THE LONGER TERM.

(B) MILITARY AS PROVIDED BY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

OWN FORCES

4. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE LANDING FORCES DEPLOYMENT. THE BUILD-UP OF FORWARD POSITIONS PARTICULARLY THOSE OF 5 INF BRIGADE CONTINUES COUPLED WITH AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING FORWARD. THE ARGENTINE AIR RAIDS OF 8 JUNE WHICH CAUSED THE LOSS OF THE LSLs SIR GALAHAD AND SIR TRISTRAM HAVE CAUSED MORE CASUALTIES AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES THAN WAS FIRST THOUGHT: 5 INF BRIGADE HAVE SUFFERED LOSSES OF EQUIPMENT OF 1 WELSH GUARDS (AFFECTING THE CAPABILITY OF TWO COMPANIES AND THE MORTAR PLATOON), THE FIELD AMBULANCE UNIT LOST ALL ITS EQUIPMENT AND 9 PARA SQUADRON ROYAL ENGINEERS FIFTY PER CENT. THE BRIGADE HQ ALSO LOST A NUMBER OF VEHICLES. IT IS HOPED THAT THESE LOSSES MAY BE MADE UP FROM THE LANDING FORCE RESERVES BUT THIS SET BACK COULD DELAY PLANNED OPERATIONS.

INCIDENTS/ACCIDENTS

5. EXCEPT FOR MINOR PATROL CLASHES NO INCIDENTS WITH THE ENEMY OR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE LAST 24 HOURS.

CASUALTIES

6. BECAUSE OF THE OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE DIFFERENT PLACES TO WHICH THE CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN TAKEN THERE HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN FINALISING THE CASUALTY DETAILS. HOWEVER IN THE BOMBING ATTACKS ON 8 JUNE:-

(A) IT IS KNOWN THERE WERE NO DEATHS ON HMS PLYMOUTH BUT 5 WERE INJURED. NEXT-OF-KIN HAVE BEEN INFORMED:

(B) OF THE 17 MEN IN THE LANDING CRAFT 11 WERE PICKED UP BY SEA KING HELICOPTERS. ONE ROYAL MARINE IS KNOWN TO HAVE DIED AND 5 ARE MISSING PRESUMED DEAD:



(C) BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE TO SIR GALAHAD AND HER FULLY LOADED STATE AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK FULL DETAILS OF THE CASUALTIES ARE NOT YET KNOWN BUT IT IS FEARED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN A RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBER OF KILLED AND INJURED. INITIAL FIGURES RECEIVED ARE IN THE ORDER OF 50-60 INJURED BUT THE FIGURE IS EXPECTED TO RISE. THREE SHIPS OFFICERS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE DIED AND NUMEROUS INJURIES TO THE CHINESE CREW OCCURRED BECAUSE IT IS THOUGHT ONE BOMB EXPLODED IN THE GALLEY/MESS AREA.

INTENTIONS

7. NO CHANGE.

PYM

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 PS/MR HURD  
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 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
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Mrs. Dickson, D/ENERG

[Passed to E.R.]  
 [Typists a.a.]

HD Computer

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 IMMEDIATE

FM BERNE 100900Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 159 OF 10 JUNE

YOUR TELNO 110 : BRITISH JOURNALISTS IN ARGENTINA

1. I HAVE TO-DAY RECEIVED A LETTER FROM M AUBERT DATED 8 JUNE IN REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE IN TUR.
2. AFTER EXPRESSING THANKS FOR YOUR KIND WORDS ABOUT THE EFFORTS OF THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES, LETTER STATES THAT EMBASSY HAS ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO RESPOND TO THE CONCERN SHOWN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE THREE JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN USHAIA. THUS, AS HIS DEPARTMENT HAD ALREADY INFORMED THIS EMBASSY (AS REPORTED TO EMERGENCY UNIT ON 08 JUNE) A MEMBER OF THE SWISS EMBASSY WILL VERY PROBABLY GO TO USHAIA ON 11 JUNE TO SEE THE JOURNALISTS.
3. LETTER CONTINUES WITH AN ASSURANCE THAT THE SWISS EMBASSY AT BUENOS AIRES IS TAKING ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO ASSURE THE



3. LETTER CONTINUES WITH AN ASSURANCE THAT THE SWISS EMBASSY AT BUENOS AIRES IS TAKING ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO ASSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE THREE JOURNALISTS AND HAS MISSED NO OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE WITH THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN THEIR FAVOUR. IN RESPECT OF YOUR WISH TO SEE THEM TRANSFERRED TO BUENOS AIRES, M AUBERT REGRETS TO STATE THAT IN SPITE OF REPEATED DEMARCHES BY THE SWISS EMBASSY THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES MAINTAIN THEIR DECISION NOT TO EFFECT SUCH A TRANSFER.

4. TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

POWELL-JONES

NNNNN

SENT AT REC AT 101003Z TWPM/RV





LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
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GRS 130  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM STOCKHOLM 101015Z JUNE 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 115 OF 10 JUNE 1982  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS  
INFO SAVING UKMIS GENEVA, BRASILIA AND MODUK (DS 11 AND SCPL)

MY TEL NO 113 (NOT TO ALL) : CAPTAIN ASTIZ

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ULLSTEN MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON 9 JUNE.

BEGINS:

QUOTE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS NOW INFORMED US THAT THE ARGENTINE CAPTAIN ALFREDO ASTIZ REFUSES TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS REGARDING THE FATE OF DAGMAR HAGELIN WHICH THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT, VIA THE BRITISH, PUT TO HIM YESTERDAY. WE MUST NATURALLY REGRET THE FACT THAT ASTIZ HAS ASSUMED THIS ATTITUDE, AS HE IS OBVIOUSLY IN POSSESSION OF INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT SHED A GREAT DEAL OF LIGHT ON THE FATE OF DAGMAR HAGELIN.

THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS ITS GRATITUDE TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO PUT THE QUESTIONS. WE SHALL NATURALLY CONTINUE OUR WORK TO ESTABLISH THE FATE OF DAGMAR HAGELIN. UNQUOTE ENDS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

MURRAY

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PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
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SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
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MR FULLER ) OFFICE  
MR O'NEILL )  
HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF )  
MR COLVIN )  
DIO )

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
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DIRECTOR G C H Q





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>634</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Sendar to Whitmore dated 10 June 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>31 May 2012</i> <i>Wayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





WITH  
THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE  
PRIVATE SECRETARY

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, WHITEHALL

Telephone: 01-218 9000  
01 218



Draft Statement by John Nott  
to HC 10/6/82

Since I reported to the House on 26 May British forces have moved forward to positions surrounding Port Stanley and are in firm control of high ground on an arc surrounding the town.

Earlier on 29th May 2 Battalion the Parachute Regiment supported by units from the Royal Marines, Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers captured Darwin and Goose Green. This action against a greatly superior force was a remarkable feat and our forces displayed great determination, valour and fighting skill. At the same time units of 3 Commando Brigade liberated the settlements at Teal and Douglas. Whilst these actions were in process 5 Infantry Brigade came ashore without incident and the QE2, which carried them is due back in Southampton tomorrow.

In order to move forward elements of 5 Infantry Brigade as rapidly as possible to the Port Stanley area and given the appalling weather which was making the logistic problems difficult for helicopters, the Force Commander moved some forces with heavy stores and equipment around the coast by landing ships.

~~When the weather cleared on 8th June all but the last elements had moved forward successfully.~~ But the sea movement coincided with better weather and the Argentines at this time renewed their air attacks on our forces. Our latest assessment is that during these attacks at least 7 Argentine aircraft were destroyed and maybe another 4 making 11 in all.



One air attack was launched against the 2 landing ships logistic SIR GALAHAD and SIR TRISTRAM. Both ships were hit. The SIR TRISTRAM had virtually completed off loading and she was not severely damaged. The SIR GALAHAD had already started unloading but still had some men embarked.

Does not seem to have said this part

The House will be anxious to know our latest assessment of casualties, but I must emphasise the very great difficulty which we often experience in assessing the extent of damage and the numbers involved. Casualties are often taken in the thick of hostilities to various places on land and to several ships of the Fleet where the units concerned are involved in battle conditions often in difficulty and danger with the limiting effect this has on communications.

Having consulted the military authorities I am not prepared at this stage to give the total numbers of our casualties and indeed to do so could be of assistance to the enemy and put our own men at greater risk. Meanwhile next of kin are being informed and I will say more as soon as possible.



In another incident Argentine aircraft attacked a small landing craft. 4 Royal Marines and 2 Naval personnel were killed; their next of kin are being informed. In this incident all 4 attacking Mirage aircraft were intercepted by our Sea Harriers and were shot down.

HMS PLYMOUTH sustained an attack on the other side of East Falkland, in the Sound. 5 Royal Naval personnel were injured and their next of kin have been informed. The ship was damaged but she remains operational.

The losses which we have sustained in these incidents are tragic ones and as soon as we can give further information to the families we will do so. I would like to express my tribute to the bravery and skill of those who were involved in the rescue of our men, particularly the helicopter pilots and crews who in extremely hazardous conditions were responsible for saving a great many lives by removing men from the damaged ships.

I must tell the House that the Task Force Commander's plans have not been prejudiced by these attacks and the losses of stores and equipment are already being made good from other stocks held ashore.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

Seen by the P.M.

AK  
/Dn

5

MOD casualty assessment remains 50-60 dead and about 120 wounded.

You should be aware that Mr. Nott and C in C Fleet had a lengthy argument before this afternoon's statement. I understand that C in C Fleet would like to leave open the idea that the casualty figures were considerably higher. He believes that this would help to confuse the Argentines who claim much higher casualties. The argument became an issue of confidence between the two men. Mr. Nott gave no casualty figures in his statement. But there are likely to be continuing arguments between the military and Ministers. The Ministers are understandably reluctant to get involved in calculated misinformation.

MAP

10 June 1982





FILE SW

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 June, 1982

Falklands: Mr. Foot's Letter to the  
Prime Minister of 9 June

You sent me last night a suggested line for the Home Secretary to take at Question Time today if Mr. Foot pursues the point made in his letter.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary have discussed this in Bonn. As a result, the Prime Minister has approved the attached revised line to take.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Andrew Burns in Sir Antony Acland's office.

**M. A. PATTISON**

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

K



IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT WE ARE DEMANDING UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER: WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF THE ARGENTINE FORCES IN PORT STANLEY ANNOUNCE THEIR WISH TO WITHDRAW TO THE MAINLAND THEY WILL BE GIVEN TIME TO DO SO WITH DIGNITY AND IN GOOD ORDER.

WE MADE CLEAR TO THE ARGENTINES BEFORE THEIR INVASION THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS MATTERS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS WITH THEM; EVEN AFTER THEIR INVASION WE WERE PREPARED TO DO SO IF THEY PROMPTLY WITHDREW; BUT THEIR RESPONSE WAS TO INSIST ON AN ULTIMATE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THEM AS A PRE-CONDITION. THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

SINCE OUR LANDINGS ON THE ISLANDS AND THE LOSSES WHICH WE HAVE INCURRED, IT IS UNTHINKABLE TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS AS IF EVERYTHING WERE STILL AS IT HAD BEEN BEFORE. THE SITUATION HAS MOVED ON. AND THE ISLANDERS WILL NEED A BREATHING SPACE BEFORE THEY CAN EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS ABOUT THEIR OWN FUTURE.

10 JUNE 1982





CONFIDENTIAL Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

*Handwritten initials*

10 June 1982

*Dear John,*

*27/5/82*

The Ambassador at Paris has received, and acknowledged, the attached letter and enclosure from M Michel Debré, expressing warm support for Mrs Thatcher's policy in the Falklands.

M Debré was successively Prime Minister, Finance Minister and Foreign Minister under de Gaulle and is a Gaullist of the old school. He still retains considerable respect, although he stood against M Chirac, the present Gaullist leader, in the first round of the presidential elections last year and only obtained 1.65% of the vote. His newsletter, La Lettre, was started during his 1981 presidential campaign and continues to appear sporadically. He remains a member of National Assembly.

No reply from the Prime Minister is called for.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: Rt Hon Michael Foot MP  
House of Commons

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 9 June.

You mentioned the need to maintain the whole-hearted backing of our Allies. I can assure you that our Allies are giving us such backing. President Mitterrand's words at the conclusion of the recent Western Economic Summit Meeting at Versailles provide further evidence of the support we are getting from our friends.

We are not demanding the unconditional surrender of Argentine forces. We have made it clear that if the Argentine Commander on the Falkland Islands announces his wish to withdraw all Argentine forces to the mainland, we will allow him to do so with dignity and in good order. There need be no humiliation involved. This is the way that further fighting and bloodshed can be avoided.

We made clear to the Argentines before their invasion that we were prepared to discuss matters affecting the future of the Islands with them. Even after their invasion we were prepared to do so if they promptly withdrew. The record of the consultations which were

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/carried



carried out through the good offices of Mr Haig, and the British paper on negotiations for a peaceful settlement which we made available to Parliament on 20 May showed how far we were prepared to go to achieve a negotiated settlement. But the Argentine response was to insist on an ultimate transfer of sovereignty to them as a precondition. This could not be acceptable.

Since our landings on the Islands and the losses which we have incurred it would be unthinkable to negotiate about the future of the Islands as if everything were still as it had been before. That would be an unforgiveable betrayal of those whom we have called upon to make such great sacrifices, even to give up their lives, because of the important principles at stake. We cannot allow the Argentines to demonstrate that they have been able to achieve progress in their attempts to impose their sovereignty over the Islands as a result of their aggression.

On the future of the Islands, we must of course consult the Islanders, ~~own wishes~~. They will need a breathing space to allow things to return to normal before they express their views. Rehabilitation and reconstruction must be our immediate priorities. In the longer term our concern will of course be to provide for both assured security for the Islands and prosperity for the Islanders. We are giving considerable thought to how these can best be achieved.

In all these circumstances, I cannot agree with you that there would be any advantage to be gained by seeking now to return to the Security Council. We remain in touch with the Secretary General, with

/whom



whom we have cooperated throughout. But no progress is now possible unless the Argentines change their minds, as it is always open to them to do, about withdrawal. Unfortunately they have shown no signs of such a change.



5 JUN 1982



163







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 June, 1982

Dear Mike, <sup>MA</sup>

Mr Foot wrote to the Prime Minister on 9 June returning again to the points which he had raised at Question Time on 8 June, suggesting that Britain should bring another resolution before the Security Council concerning the Falkland Islands.

/ I enclose a suggested draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature, which we shall be submitting in parallel to Mr Pym. It draws on the line to take for use by the Home Secretary in the House of Commons this afternoon, which was approved by the Prime Minister in Bonn.

Yours ever

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street



*Argentina*FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :0700 HOURS, 10 JUNE 1982

A: (Brasilia  
telno.263 to  
FCO)  
B: (FCO telno.  
183 to Brasilia)  
C, D: (Brasilia  
telnos.265 and  
266 to FCO)

Vulcan

1. The Brazilian President has conveyed his agreement that the Vulcan aircraft may leave Brazil but the missile should remain until the end of the conflict. He has asked for an undertaking that the aircraft would play no further part in warlike operations in the Falklands. On instructions, HM Ambassador has agreed to these terms and given the undertaking.

Astiz

2. News that the Argentine prisoner of war, Lt Commander Astiz, is to be repatriated on 10 June has now leaked (primarily through airline sources at Heathrow). Official spokesmen are, however, still taking the line that the arrangements for his travel are not yet certain.

Galtieri

E: (Rome telno.  
307 to FCO)

3. The Italians have told us in confidence of an interview President Galtieri has given to an Italian journalist which is due to be published soon in the 'Times'. Galtieri, who was tense and tired, said he would retire before the end of his mandate in 1984 if that were in the national interest. He did not correct the journalist when she took the fall of Port Stanley for granted, but implied that Argentina would nevertheless gain the victory in the longer term.



10 June 1982

R M Jackson  
Emergency Unit



VULCAN

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO  
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/P  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
MR BULLARD HANNAY  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/PUSD  
MR REED, PUSD  
EMERGENCY ROOM  
RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY.

FLASH


PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)  
PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR COLVIN  
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
MENTS STAFF  
DIO  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET  
OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL FM BRASILIA 092000Z JUN 8  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 263 OF 9 JUNE  
AND TO FLASH MODUK AIR (SIC 19F)  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (DESKBY 092100Z)  
MY TELNO 258: VULCAN DIVERSION

59 JUN 1982

140



1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 4P.M. (=091900Z) AND SAID  
THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING RULING:

(A) THAT THE ARMAMENTS (IE THE MISSILE) TRANSPORTED ON THE  
VULCAN AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE RETAINED IN BRAZIL UNTIL THE END OF  
THE CONFLICT:

(B) THAT THE VULCAN ITSELF SHOULD BE HANDED BACK TO BRITAIN  
IN RETURN FOR A WRITTEN UNDERTAKING FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT  
THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD PLAY NO FURTHER PART IN WARLIKE OPERATIONS  
IN THE MALVINAS (OF THE IDEA PUT BY SIR A ACLAND TO AMBASSADOR  
CAMPOS - YOUR TELNO 169). A NOTE FROM ME TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER  
WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE.



(C) THAT THE DECISION AT (B) WAS PURELY AD HOC AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE.

(D) THAT, IN VIEW OF THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, BRAZIL WOULD PAY NO ATTENTION TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE BOUT DE PAPIER WHICH I HANDED OVER ON 5 JUNE (PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF TUR REFERS).

2. GUERREIRO SAID HE WOULD INFORM THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR SOON ABOUT THIS DECISION. HE HOPED THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD SWALLOW IT: BUT HE WOULD NOT GIVE THEM THE OPTION OF OBJECTING. NOTHING WOULD BE SAID TO THE PRESS UNTIL OUR REPLY HAD BEEN RECEIVED.

3. ACTION NOW LIES WITH US. IF YOU CAN LET ME HAVE RAPID AUTHORITY TO SEND A NOTE TO GUERREIRO IN THE APPROPRIATE TERMS (WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO SPECIFY), I CAN ARRANGE TO TRANSMIT IT TO ITAMARATY TONIGHT. IT MAY THEN TAKE SOME HOURS FOR THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT MACHINE TO TRANSLATE THEIR AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE INTO THE PRACTICAL MEASURES NEEDED TO ALLOW THE VULCAN TO DEPART, MORE PARTICULARLY AS TOMORROW IS A PUBLIC HOLIDAY THROUGHOUT BRAZIL (CORPUS CHRISTI).

5. I SUSPECT THAT THE BRAZILIANS WOULD BE QUITE GLAD TO GET THE VULCAN AWAY FROM GALEAO BEFORE THE POPE ARRIVES THERE AT 4A.M. LOCAL TIME ON FRIDAY EN ROUTE FOR ARGENTINA. IT IS A BIZARRE AND NOT A PARTICULARLY HAPPY COINCIDENCE THAT ASTIZ WILL BE ARRIVING AT RIO ON BRITISH CALEDONIAN'S FRIDAY MORNING FLIGHT ONLY TWO HOURS LATER.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 09:2055Z ED//MB



ZZ BRASILIA

E R

GRS 358

-9 JUN 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 092350Z JUN 82

TO FLASH BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 183 OF 9 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, MODUK AIR.



YOUR TELNO 263: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. THIS IS GOOD NEWS.
2. (A) MOD AGREE THAT THE MISSILE CAN BE RETAINED IN BRAZIL UNTIL THE END OF THE CONFLICT, PROVIDED THAT IT IS STORED IN AN ACCEPTABLE ENVIRONMENT IE. AS IT IS NOW. WE SHOULD LIKE THE DA TO CONTINUE TO HOLD THE KEY. IF THE BRAZILIANS INSIST THAT IT SHOULD BE MOVED, PLEASE LET US KNOW.

(B) WE AGREE TO SIGN AN UNDERTAKING WITH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:-

'HMG UNDERTAKES THAT THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO.XM 597 WILL TAKE NO FURTHER PART IN THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE ARGENTINES.'

3. WE ARE HAPPY WITH POINTS (C) AND (D) IN YOUR TUR. WE DO NOT INTEND TO INITIATE ANY PRESS ENQUIRIES, BUT IF ON THE VULCAN'S RELEASE WE ARE ASKED ABOUT IT, WE AND THE MOD (SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS) INTEND TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE:-

'Q. HAS THE VULCAN BEEN RELEASED?

A. WE CAN CONFIRM THAT THE BRAZILIANS HAVE NOW RELEASED THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT WHICH HAD TO DIVERT TO BRAZIL LAST WEEK.

Q. ARE YOU PLEASED?

A. NATURALLY, WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE ALLOWED OUR AIRCRAFT TO LEAVE.

Q. HOW WAS THIS DONE?



C O N F I D E N T I A L

9600 - 1

- A. THE AMBASSADOR HAS HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.
- Q. DID WE HAVE TO GIVE ANY ASSURANCES TO THE BRAZILIANS OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS THAT THE VULCAN WOULD NOT BE USED AGAIN IN HOSTILITIES CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS?
- A. YES, WE GAVE ASSURANCES TO THE BRAZILIANS: THE DETAILS OF WHICH ARE CONFIDENTIAL.
- Q. WHAT IS THE VULCAN GOING TO DO NOW?
- A. THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE MOD.
- Q. IS IT LEAVING ANY EQUIPMENT BEHIND?
- A. THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE MOD.
- Q. HAVE THE CREW BEEN WELL-TREATED?
- A. THE AMBASSADOR SAYS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN OFFERED EVERY COURTESY.'
4. IN YOUR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRAZILIANS, WE WOULD NOT OF COURSE WISH YOU TO SAY ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT GIVE THEM THE IMPRESSION THAT OUR CONCERN HAS IN ANY WAY LESSENERED AT THE USE OF RECIFE FOR THE CONTINUING PASSAGE OF ARMS SUPPLIES FOR ARGENTINA.

PYM



0212-10

ACTION

BSB/FCO 002/10

13 JUN 1982

OO FCO DESKBY 100800Z

OO MODUK DESKBY 100800Z



3

GRS 110

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 100800Z

FM BRASILIA 100145Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 265 OF 10 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK AIR (UAA/SIC 19F) DESKBY 100800Z

YOUR TELNO 183: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. NOTE HANDED TO HEAD OF SOUTH AMERICA DIVISION OF ITAMARATY AT 100140Z. HE HAD ALREADY ALERTED THE AIR MINISTRY.
2. TEXT IN MIFT.
3. I DOUBT IF THE DETAILS OF THE ASSURANCE WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL FOR LONG, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE BRAZILIANS WILL BY NOW HAVE TOLD THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNDERTAKING THEY REQUIRED OF US.
4. YOU COULD USEFULLY ADD TO THE LAST ANSWER OF THE PRESS LINE THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT OFFERED TO RELEASE THE CREW BUT THEY ELECTED TO STAY WITH THEIR AIRCRAFT, AS THEIR DUTY REQUIRED.
5. YOUR PARA 4. QUITE SO.

HARDING


NNNN



BSB/FCO 003/10

4

JUN 10 1982



OO FCO DESKBY 100800Z

OO MODUK 100800Z

GRS 100

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 100800Z

FM BRASILIA 100145Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 266 OF 10 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK AIR (UAA/SIC 19F) DESKBY 100800Z

MY I.P.T.: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY NOTE:

BEGINS:

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCY, WITH REFERENCE TO THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT (SERIAL NUMBER XM 597) OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE WHICH WAS DIVERTED TO GALEAO AIRPORT OWING TO FUEL SHORTAGE ON 3 JUNE AND WHICH HAS BEEN HELD THERE SINCE THEN, THAT HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKE, IN RETURN FOR THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO ALLOW THE AIRCRAFT TO REFUEL AND RETURN TO ITS BASE, THAT THE AIRCRAFT WILL TAKE NO FURTHER PART IN THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES AGAINST ARGENTINA.

USUAL ENDING. ENDS.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT AT 100225Z DP/MB



GRS 600

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ROME 091535Z JUN 82

IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 307 OF 09 JUN 82

INFO PRIORITY BOHN

11 12 11  
20 22  
30 33  
38 44  
77 66 55

(100) x 25.  
Ital

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS, UK MIS NEW YORK, BIS BUENOS AIRES

MY TELNO 296: FALKLANDS: ITALIAN REPORTING ON ARGENTINA

1. BARBARANI TODAY SHOWED US A FURTHER SERIES OF TELEGRAMS FROM BUENOS AIRES, DATED 2-7 JUNE.

CUBA

COPIES

2. KOCIANCICH COMMENTS THAT COSTA MENDEZ WAS CAREFUL ABOUT THE WAY HE PRESENTED HIS TRIP TO HAVANA FOR THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING, STRESSING TO HIS DOMESTIC AUDIENCE THAT IT IMPLIED NO CHANGE IN ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN POLICY. HIS STATEMENT ABOUT POSSIBLE READMISSION OF CUBA TO THE OAS HAD DELIBERATELY BEEN GIVEN LITTLE PROMINENCE INSIDE ARGENTINA. HIS FRIENDLINESS TOWARDS CASTRO HAD NEVERTHELESS BEEN CRITICISED IN THE ARGENTINE PRESS: MANY ARGENTINES REGARDED CUBA WITH REPULSION AS A SOVIET TOOL.

ECONOMY

3. KOCIANCICH SAW ALEMANN ON 3 JUNE. ALEMANN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO HIS POLICY OF AUSTERITY. THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLATION (30 PER CENT IN THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF 1982) HAD GONE WELL. BUT BECASUE OF THE WAR, THE ATTEMPT TO CONTAIN PUBLIC SPENDING HAD BEEN GIVEN UP, AND HE COULD NOT NOW PREVENT INFLATION RISING. HE HOPED FOR A RAPID RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS TO PERMIT HIS ECONOMIC PLAN TO BE RESUMED.

4. ALEMANN DESCRIBED US AND EUROPEAN SANCTIONS AS INEFFECTIVE. ARGENTINA HAD DIVERTED EXPORTS OF GRAIN, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT OF MEAT, TO THE USSR, VENEZUELA, IRAN, AND PANAMA. EXPORTS FOR 1982 SHOULD BE DOLLARS 9.5 BILLION AND IMPORTS DOLLARS 6.5 BILLION. THE SURPLUS WOULD PAY INTEREST ON ARGENTINA'S DEBTS. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT TOUCH RESERVES TO DEFRAY DEBTS. BUT WOULD



1982 SHOULD BE DOLLARS 9.5 BILLION AND EXPORTS DOLLARS 6.5 BILLION. THE SURPLUS WOULD PAY INTEREST ON ARGENTINA'S DEBTS. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT TOUCH RESERVES TO REPAY CAPITAL, BUT WOULD NEGOTIATE A DIFFERENT DEBT STRUCTURE WITH ARGENTINA'S CREDITORS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN NEW LONG TERM LOANS. ARGENTINA HAD NO INTENTION AT PRESENT OF SEEKING IMF CREDITS. KOCIANCICH COMMENTS THAT TOO MUCH OF ARGENTINA'S PRESENT DEBT IS SHORT TERM WITH A THIRD OF THE TOTAL OF DOLLARS 39 BILLION FALLING DUE THIS YEAR.

#### GALTIERI

5. THE WELL KNOWN ITALIAN JOURNALIST, ORIANA FALLACI, GAVE KOCIANCICH AN ACCOUNT OF HER RECENT INTERVIEW WITH GALTIERI, SOON TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE WASHINGTON POST AND THE TIMES. GALTIERI WAS TENSE AND TIRED. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD RESIGN BEFORE THE END OF HIS MANDATE IN 1984 IF THAT WERE IN THE INTERESTS OF ARGENTINA. HE ADMITTED TO HAVING MISJUDGED THE BRITISH AND US REACTION TO THE ARGENTINE INVASION. PRESSED TO DEFEND HIS CHARGE OF BRITISH COLONIALISM, HE FELL BACK INSTEAD ON THE ARGUMENT OF GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY TO JUSTIFY ARGENTINA'S ACTION. ASKED TO SAY HOW LONG ARGENTINA WOULD WAIT FOR RECOGNITION OF HER SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH NEGOTIATION, HE MERELY SAID "NOT ANOTHER 150 YEARS". WHEN FALLACI TOOK THE FALL OF PORT STANLEY FOR GRANTED, HE DID NOT CORRECT HER, COMMENTING ONLY THAT THE BRITISH HAD LOST AT DUNKIRK BUT WON FOUR YEARS LATER.

6. ASKED ABOUT ARGENTINA'S INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENT, GALTIERI SAID THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOT SPURN ANY OFFER OF ASSISTANCE, BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN OBLIGED TO SEEK IT. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON ARMS SUPPLIES FROM LIBYA OR ISRAEL.

7. ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS, GALTIERI ADMITTED THAT THE NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES HAD DAMAGED ARGENTINA'S IMAGE ABROAD, BUT SAID THAT THIS "DIRTY WAR" HAD BEEN FORCED ON THE COUNTRY BY THE TERRORISTS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE ISSUE WAS CLOSED. HE PROFESSED A DESIRE TO RETURN TO DEMOCRACY, BUT GAVE NO DETAILS.

8. FALLACI SPOKE TO KOCIANCICH IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, AND HIS REPORTING TELEGRAM IS CLASSIFIED SECRET. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THIS SHOULD NOT BE REVEALED, EVEN AFTER THE INTERVIEW HAS BEEN PUBLISHED.



CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 10 JUNE

Detained Vulcan

1. The Brazilian President ruled that the RAF Vulcan bomber should be handed back to Britain in return for a written undertaking by HMG that it would play no further part in the hostilities in the South Atlantic. The armaments it carried would be retained in Brazil until the end of the conflict.

Military Action

2. The Ministry of Defence issued a further statement concerning Tuesday's air raid on the Task Force at Fitzroy. Casualties from the attacks on Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad are feared to be much heavier than those incurred in the attack on HMS Plymouth, where only five people were injured and no deaths occurred.

Emergency Unit

10 June 1982

4.5 gm

CONFIDENTIAL



SUBJECT

cc Marks  
Ops



T124/82

## NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION

NEW ZEALAND HOUSE · HAYMARKET · LONDON SW1Y 4TQ

Telephone: 01-930 8422 Telex: 24368

From the High Commissioner  
H.E. The Hon L.W. Gandar

9 June 1982

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON S W 1.

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I have today received the following message from my Prime Minister, the Rt Hon R D Muldoon, which he has asked me to pass on to you.

Dear Margaret,

A message has been forwarded to me by Colonel D J Baker, Commandant of the Legion of Frontiersmen of the Commonwealth (New Zealand Division), who wishes it to be passed on to you.

His Command admires your tenacious and sterling British attitude which echoes the many fine qualities of great women of the past who have faced a crisis and ultimately triumphed.

The message reads as follows:

### The Spirit of the Legion

In the fair garden of our civilisation, where all the fruits of human endeavour ripen for the welfare of the people, there grows a little weed called patriotism - shadowed by the growth of hardier plants, even uprooted by the rake of statecraft, it is permitted to live in the borders, and in the guarding hedges, and beyond them.

The weed is sown in sorrow and rooted in disaster. It has its growth in peril and its maturity in war, when its red flowers light the gloom of battle. It is the dream of the Legion to make the red flowers bloom in the garden of the Empire even in time of peace.

God guard thee both. Long live the Queen.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

R D Muldoon

*Yours sincerely  
H.E. Gandar*





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Alan -  
There is no  
trace of  
Pru's  
reply a  
N2  
file -  
Falklands?

Thank you for forwarding to me the splendid message from the Commandant of the Legion Frontiersmen of the Commonwealth (New Zealand Division). Would you be so kind as to tell Colonel Baker how deeply I appreciated it, and to send him my best wishes.

The Rt. Hon. R.D. Muldoon, CH, MP.





Prime Minister  
Wellington  
New Zealand

9 June 1982

Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON

R14 pps

Reply already sent!

*Dear Margaret,*

*AL 1/6*

*h.c.*

*top of file*

A message has been forwarded to me by Colonel D.J. Baker, Commandant of the Legion of Frontiersmen of the Commonwealth (New Zealand Division) who wishes it to be passed on to you.

His command admires your tenacious and sterling British attitude which echoes the many fine qualities of great women of the past who have faced a crisis and ultimately triumphed.

The message reads as follows:

THE SPIRIT OF THE LEGION

In the fair garden of our Civilization, where all the fruits of human endeavour ripen for the welfare of the people, there grows a little weed called PATRIOTISM - Shadowed by the growth of hardier plants, even uprooted by the rake of Statecraft, it is permitted to live in the borders, and in the guarding hedges, and beyond them.

This weed is sown in sorrow and rooted in disaster. It has its growth in peril and its maturity in war, when its red flowers light the gloom of battle. It is the dream of the

Contd/...



Legion to make the red flowers bloom in the  
garden of the Empire even in time of peace.

GOD GUARD THEE BOTH  
LONG LIVE THE QUEEN

*With best regards,*

*Sincerely,*

*Ref Amblode*



CONFIDENTIAL

T 126/82



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 June 1982

Prime Minister

Yes no

Content with the draft message to President Hurtado at A?

Dear Willie,

WM alb

Falkland Islands: Message from the President of Ecuador

With your letter of 4 June, you enclosed a telegram from President Hurtado of Ecuador to the Prime Minister, calling for a ceasefire on the Falklands.

Ecuador has not previously made any direct approach to us over the crisis. Despite their votes in favour of the two Rio Treaty Resolutions, they have striven to remain as impartial as they can.

It would be helpful if the Prime Minister could reply personally to the message. I enclose a suggested text.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
--	---	---------------------------------------

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE QUITO
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	REPEATED FOR INFO : UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
	10	FALKLANDS : MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT HURTADO
	11	1. President Hurtado has sent the following message to the
	12	Prime Minister (received on 4 June):-
	13	BEGINS
	14	"The people and Government of Ecuador view with the greatest
	15	anxiety the deterioration of the conflict in the South
	16	Atlantic, which has already produced so many victims and
	17	caused so much grief to the people involved in the conflict.
	18	Faced with the imminent prospect that the hostilities will
	19	precipitate actions, the magnitude and consequence of which
	20	are unforeseeable, I put forward the most earnest call, in
	21	the name of the people and Government of Ecuador for an
///	22	immediate ceasefire and the suspension of hostilities without
//	23	delay, in accord with the happy initiative presented by
/	24	Spain and Panama in the UN Security Council. In making
	25	this impassioned plea, I invoke the humanitarian principles

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /on
File number	Dept	Distribution <b>FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL</b>
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

Page

2

<<<<

1 <<<<

2 on which our civilisation prides itself, and to whose  
3 development and strengthening both Argentina and Great  
4 Britain have made outstanding contributions."

5 ENDS

6 2. Please now deliver following reply from the Prime Minister:

7 BEGINS

8 "I share the deep concern which you have expressed on  
9 behalf of your Government and people at the conflict on the  
10 Falkland Islands. As I am sure you recognise, that  
11 conflict is not of our seeking. Over nine weeks have  
12 elapsed since the unprovoked Argentine invasion of British  
13 territory, yet the Argentine Government have refused to  
14 heed the demands of Security Council Resolution No 502,  
15 adopted the day after the invasion, and withdraw their  
16 forces.

17 We have shown flexibility and patience: but have met only  
18 intransigence from the Argentine Government. We have never  
19 wanted to resort to military action: but Argentine  
20 obduracy has left us no choice. We have at every stage  
21 of the conflict stated our position clearly, and have  
22 confined ourselves to using the minimum force necessary to  
23 ~~impose pressure on Argentina, to~~ restore the rights of the  
24 Islanders and to protect our own forces, in accordance with  
25 our rights of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN  
26 Charter.

27 Mr President, a ceasefire must be unequivocally linked to  
28 immediate and total Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland  
29 Islands. I hope that reason and humanity may yet prevail  
30 on the Argentine leadership and induce them to accept the  
31 offers of a safe withdrawal which have been made to them.

///

32 ~~Otherwise we shall be obliged to eject them.~~ The

//

/

34

NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword

choice



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

Page

3

<<<<

1 <<<<

2 choice is theirs".

3 ENDS

4  
5 PYM

6 NNNN

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NNNN ends  
telegram

BLANK

Catchword



09 JUN 1982



*[Faint, illegible handwritten text]*



Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

9460 - 1

GRS 356  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 091630Z JUNE 82  
TO FLASH BOGOTA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 128 OF 9 JUNE.  
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T/26/82**

MY TELNO 119: FALKLANDS: PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

1. PLEASE NOW DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY TO PRESIDENT TURBAY'S  
LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER:

BEGINS:

I SHARE THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN YOUR EXCELLENCY'S  
LETTER OF 2 JUNE AT THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER BLOODSHED IN  
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE HAVE NO WISH TO ADD TO THE TRAGIC  
LOSS OF LIFE WHICH BOTH BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA HAVE ALREADY  
SUFFERED IN THIS CONFLICT. IF ANY MEANS COULD BE FOUND TO  
PERSUADE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES,  
AS DEMANDED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AS FAR  
BACK AS 3 APRIL, FURTHER CONFLICT COULD BE AVOIDED. AS I  
TOLD THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY, PROVIDED ARGENTINE  
WITHDRAWAL CAN BE LINKED UNEQUIVOCALLY TO A CEASEFIRE, WE  
WILL MAKE ARRANGEMENTS ON THE SPOT WHICH WILL ALLOW  
ARGENTINE FORCES TO LEAVE THE ISLANDS WITH SAFETY, DIGNITY  
AND DESPATCH.

I WARMLY REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACH TO OUR  
RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA. WE ARE  
PROUD OF BRITAIN'S HISTORICAL RECORD IN SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS  
OF THOSE COUNTRIES IN FIRST ESTABLISHING THEIR  
INDEPENDENCE, AND THEN IN ASSISTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
RICH ECONOMIC POTENTIAL WITH WHICH SO MANY LATIN AMERICAN  
STATES ARE ENDOWED. I BELIEVE THAT MOST GOVERNMENTS IN  
SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA APPRECIATE THAT IT IS THIS SAME  
DEVOTION TO THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM WHICH LEADS US NOW TO  
INSIST ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES, SO AS TO  
ENABLE THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN WAY OF  
LIFE.

I APPRECIATE THE CONCERN THAT YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE



CONFIDENTIAL

9460 - 1

SHOWN THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS. I HAVE GIVEN PARTICULARLY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THE THOUGHTS IN YOUR LETTER, INSPIRED IT IS BY SENTIMENTS OF FRIENDSHIP AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERN. BUT IT WAS ARGENTINE AGGRESSION WHICH PROVOKED THE FIGHTING AND IT IS FOR THE ARGENTINES TO LEAVE THE ISLANDS IN ORDER TO STOP THE FIGHTING.

ENDS

2. IF THE COLOMBIANS WISH TO PUBLISH THIS EXCHANGE, AS THEY DID THE PREVIOUS ONE, WE HAVE NO OBJECTION.

PYM





FILE

KM

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 June, 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 9 June. I will place this before her and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

L. W. F. S. RICKETT

The Rt Hon Michael Foot, M.P.,

Mike

I managed to get a copy of this to the pm via the PCS. The FCO have let Clive have a suggested line for the Home Sec to take if this comes up tomorrow, and the pm will clear this overnight. Sir Anthony Acland will be ready to speak to this. FCO will also let us have a draft reply for the pm by tomorrow evening.

KM

LW  
9/6



Out

CF

9 June 1982

Thank you for your letter to John Coles of 8 June about the gift from the Government and People of the Cayman Islands. The Prime Minister agrees that she should send a message to the Governor, and is content with the draft attached to your letter. I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be despatched by telegram.

W. F. S. RICKETT

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BK



MR. FOOT'S LETTER OF 9 JUNE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:  
POSITIVE PROPOSALS TO ARGENTINA

---

Line to take for Home Secretary at Prime Minister's Questions  
on 10 June

It is not the case that we are demanding unconditional surrender. We have made it clear that if the Argentine forces in Port Stanley announce their wish to withdraw to the mainland they will be given time to do so with dignity and in good order.

We made clear to the Argentines before their invasion that we were prepared to discuss <sup>matters of the</sup> the future of the Islands - ~~including sovereignty~~ - with them. Even after their invasion we were prepared to do so if they promptly withdrew but their response was to insist on an ultimate transfer of sovereignty to them as a pre-condition. This was not acceptable.

Since our landings on the Islands and the losses we have incurred, it is unthinkable to negotiate about the <sup>future</sup> ~~sovereignty~~ of the Islands as if everything were still as it was before. The situation has moved on. ~~We would have to consult the Islanders fully and carefully before we reopened any negotiations.~~ And the Islanders will need a breathing space before they can express their considered views.



MR. FOOT'S LETTER OF 9 JUNE TO THE PRIME MINISTER:  
POSITIVE PROPOSALS TO ARGENTINA


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Since our landings on the Islands and the losses we have incurred, it is unthinkable to negotiate about the ~~future~~ <sup>future</sup> ~~sovereignty~~ of the Islands as if everything were still as it <sup>had been</sup> was before. The situation has moved on. ~~We would have to consult the Islanders fully and carefully before we reopened any negotiations.~~ And the Islanders will need a breathing space before they can express <sup>their</sup> ~~their~~ considered views. ~~show that our future~~





HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

From:  
Michael Foot MP

9 June 1982

*Dear Prime Minister,*


Yesterday at Question Time I raised with you our position in the Security Council and urged that the British Government should bring another resolution before the Security Council for which we can get full support. You know, of course, that we very much regret Britain's veto on 4 June, but that is now past.

Since our exchange in the House, I have become even more concerned about the need to maintain wholehearted backing from our allies and even more convinced that a United Kingdom resolution which indicated the Government's willingness to achieve a negotiated settlement would be well received in the Security Council, and would strengthen the support which we need both now and in the future from the international community.

Of course, I accept your argument that Argentina has caused the whole crisis and that the first requirement must be that they should agree to withdraw from the Falklands. But I cannot believe that it is prudent to continue to press for such withdrawal without any offer whatsoever of further discussions, preferably through the United Nations. There is growing support for this view in world opinion and I believe that it is both short-sighted and dangerous to ignore it. In the longer term, too, there will have to be a negotiated settlement if victory now is not to be followed by continued Argentine harassment which will make the islands untenable for their inhabitants and impose an expensive and risky burden on Britain.

All the indications from the Argentines are that, so long as their only alternative is unconditional surrender to a British ultimatum, they will persist in defending Port Stanley and other points on the islands. This may well lead to heavy casualties.





Both for Britain's good name, and for the sake of the servicemen on both sides who may be killed and wounded, is it not worth giving the Argentines an undertaking that discussions will reopen as soon as they complete their withdrawal?

I urge you and your colleagues to reconsider the Government's position and to initiate positive proposals along these lines in the Security Council.

Michael Foot

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher MP



SAPU(82) 31

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached for information are transcripts of three interviews given for American television by the Prime Minister today.

Cabinet Office

9 June 1982



INTERVIEW GIVEN BY

THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP

TO TOM BROKAW OF NBC TELEVISION (USA)

IN THE GARDENS OF NO 10 DOWNING STREET

ON WEDNESDAY, 9 JUNE 1982

PRESS OFFICE  
10 DOWNING STREET  
Tel No: 930-4455



INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER, I WONDER IF YOU CAN BRING US UP TO DATE ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EAST FALKLAND. THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION THAT YOUR FORCES WOULD NOT MOVE UNTIL PRESIDENT REAGAN LEFT LONDON, SO THAT WOULD SPARE HIM THE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT OF THAT. IS THERE ANYTHING TO THAT?

MRS. THATCHER: THE POSITION IS GOVERNED BY THE PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND IT IS FOR THE MILITARY COMMANDERS TO DECIDE WHEN THEY'RE READY TO MOVE.

INTERVIEWER: WHAT ARE THE CHANCES, AS OF TODAY, OF SOME KIND OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, MAKING A MILITARY BATTLE FOR STANLEY NOT NECESSARY?

MRS. THATCHER: WE'VE BEEN TRYING FOR A POLITICAL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT FOR EIGHT WEEKS, FOR EIGHT WEEKS THE ARGENTINES COULD HAVE WITHDRAWN AT ANY TIME, THEY HAVEN'T WITHDRAWN, IT IS NOW BEYOND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WHEN YOU'VE GOT A HIGHLY COMPLEX POSITION, WITH SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND AIRMEN ABOUT, YOU SIMPLY CANNOT SAY - WE'RE STILL GOING FOR YET ANOTHER NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. I WOULD HAVE NO GROUNDS WHATSOEVER TO THINK THAT WE WOULD GET ONE NOW WHEN WE DIDN'T HAVE ONE FOR EIGHT WEEKS. THE WAY TO DO IT NOW IS FOR ANYTHING LIKE THAT TO BE ARRANGED BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD AND THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT PRESIDENT GALTIERI INSTRUCTING HIS COMMANDER ON THE FALKLANDS TO TRY TO ARRANGE A WITHDRAWAL, THEN IT WOULD BE ARRANGED WITH SAFETY, DIGNITY AND DESPATCH.

INTERVIEWER: I LIKE TO THINK THAT IT'S NOT BLOODTHIRSTY CURIOSITY BUT THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF CURIOSITY NOW ABOUT WHY THE BRITISH TROOPS HAVE NOT MOVED ON STANLEY, THEY SEEM TO BE EXCELLENT POSITIONS, THE WEATHER HAS IMPROVED THERE, REINFORCEMENTS ARE IN PLACE AND THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME QUESTION ABOUT WHY THEY ARE NOT MOVING ON STANLEY.

MRS. THATCHER: YOU CAN'T FIGHT A BATTLE AROUND A CABINET TABLE, IN THE COLUMNS OF A PAPER OR EVEN ON TELEVISION. WE HAVE VERY VERY HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE, WE MUST LEAVE IT TO THEIR JUDGMENT WHEN THEY'VE GOT EVERYTHING READY FOR THE BATTLE TO COMMENCE. WE HAVE GOOD PROFESSIONALS, ALL OUR FORCES ARE PROFESSIONALS, THEY ARE SUPERB. I LEAVE THAT PARTICULAR JUDGMENT TO THEM.



(2)

INTERVIEWER: BUT FROM HERE IT DOES SEEM LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A MAJOR MILITARY BATTLE FOR STANLEY DOES IT NOT?

MRS. THATCHER: INDEED I WOULD EXPECT SO, UNLESS BY ANY CHANCE WE WERE ABLE TO SUCCEED IN PROCURING A COMPARATIVELY EARLY SURRENDER SUCH AS HAPPENED AT DARWIN AND GOOSE GREEN AFTER THE INITIAL VERY HARDLY FOUGHT, VERY TOUGH OPENING ROUNDS OF THE BATTLE. THEN OUR FORCES DIDN'T GO ON, IF THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD GET A SURRENDER AND THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING ONE. THAT I THINK SAVED A LOT OF LIVES.

INTERVIEWER: DURING YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, OR DURING THE CONVERSATIONS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL THAT HAVE OCCURRED HERE IN LONDON IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, WAS THERE ANY SUGGESTION AT ALL FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE THAT THEY... YOU SHOULD FORESTALL A MILITARY BATTLE FOR STANLEY BECAUSE IT MIGHT BE TOO COSTLY IN POLITICAL TERMS, IT WOULD HUMILIATE THE ARGENTINES AND IT WOULD ONLY POLARISE LATIN AMERICA IN TERMS OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN ...

MRS. THATCHER: NONE.

INTERVIEWER: NO SUGGESTION WHATSOEVER?

MRS. THATCHER: NONE.

INTERVIEWER: WAS MILITARY STRATEGY RAISED AT ALL IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT?

MRS. THATCHER: MILITARY STRATEGY IS LEFT TO THE COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD, ANY WISE POLITICIAN KNOWS THAT. THEY HAVE CERTAIN LATITUDE WITHIN WHICH TO OPERATE, THE REST IS LEFT TO THEM. A WISE POLITICIAN IS WELL AWARE OF THAT AND OF COURSE MR. SECRETARY HAIG IN PARTICULAR IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE MILITARY PROBLEM.

INTERVIEWER: DID YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC REQUEST OF PRESIDENT REAGAN OR OF SECRETARY HAI FOR ADDITIONAL POLITICAL OR MILITARY SUPPORT IN THAT AREA?

MRS. THATCHER: DID I HAVE A REQUEST FROM THEM FOR ADDITIONAL...?

INTERVIEWER: TO THEM.

MRS. THATCHER: THEY ARE BEING ABSOLUTELY MARVELLOUS IN THEIR SUPPORT, STAUNCH, AS ONE WOULD EXPECT FROM AN ALLY LIKE AMERICA TO BRITAIN. ABSOLUTELY STAUNCH. WE ARE ANXIOUS THAT IF WE NEED ANY HELP, AFTER THE SURRENDER, THAT THEY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO RECEIVE A REQUEST FOR HELP. IT COULD BE VERY DIFFICULT IF THERE ARE A LOT OF PRISONERS OF WAR BECAUSE WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LOOK AFTER THEM AND WE'RE A LONG WAY AWAY FROM THE SUPPLY LINES, WE HAVE CERTAIN SUPPLIES THERE BUT WE WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT THOSE PRISONERS OF WAR ARE LOOKED AFTER AS WELL AS POSSIBLE.

(2)



INTERVIEWER: DID YOU GET INTO ANY DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT OR WITH SECRETARY HAIG ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN THE FALKLANDS AFTER YOUR EXPECTED MILITARY VICTORY

MRZ.THATCHER: NO, WE ARE ALL VERY MUCH AWARE THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO TRY TO ARRANGE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE FALKLANDS LATER BUT, YOU KNOW, IT IS GOING TO TAKE SOME TIME, THE PEOPLE ON THOSE ISLANDS HAVE GONE THROUGH AN ABSOLUTELY TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE, THEIR WOODL WAY OF LIFE HAS BEEN UPROOTED AND CHANGED. (ABOVE LINE READ 'WHOLE WAY')

THEY'VE ALWAYS REJECTED THE OVERTURES, WELL, THERE WEREN'T ANY OVERTURES, THEY'VE ALWAYS REJECTED ANY IDEA THAT THERE'D BE ANY QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY GOING EVEN IN THE VERY LONG TERM TO THE ARGENTINES. THEN THEY WERE PUNISHED FOR THAT VIEW BY THE ARGENTINE INVADER, THEN THEY'VE HAD A BATTLE OVER THEIR TERRITORY, THEIR HOUSES VANDALISED, SOME OF THEM ... SOME OF THE LEADERS OF THE COMMUNITY TAKEN AWAY TO WEST FALKLAND AND I CANNOT THINK WHAT'S HAPPENED TO THEIR FARMS AND THEIR WOOL SUPPLIES AND WOOL STOCKS, YOU CAN IMAGINE IF THAT HAPPENED IN A PART OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FIRST THING IS REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION AND TO HELP THEM IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE AND TO SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO DEVELOP THE OTHER RESOURCES, FOR THAT AGAIN WE MIGHT NEED HELP. AND IN THE LONG RUN YOU'LL NEED THE CO-OPERATION OF THE ARGENTINIANS, THAT DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN ANYTHING WITH SOVEREIGNTY. AFTER ALL THERE ARE MANY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ORGANISATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS THAT DON'T IMPLY HAVING AN INTEREST IN SOVEREIGNTY OR IN SOMEONE ELSE'S TERRITORY.

INTERVIEWER: BUT THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION IN THE PAST 48 HOURS OR SO THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE THAT HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE FUTURE POLITICAL ROLE OF ARGENTINA, HOWEVER THAT IS DEFINED, ONCE GREAT BRITAIN ACHIEVES WHAT IS EXPECTED TO BE A MILITARY VICTORY THERE.

MRS.THATCHER: YES. WE'RE ALWAYS AT ODDS WITH THIS BECAUSE I DON'T QUITE UNDERSTAND THE VIEW WHICH YOU ARE PUTTING. LOOK, LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY, BEFORE THE INVASION, THE PEOPLE ON THE FALKLANDS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN THEREFOR SEVEN GENERATIONS, FAR LONGER THAN SOME OF THE SPANISH AND ITALIAN PEOPLE IN THE ARGENTINE, THEY HAVE THEIR OWN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SOME OF THE ELECTED MEMBERS ON THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, SO THEY HAVE ... THEY WERE COMING TO SELF-GOVERNMENT. THEY HAD SELF-DETERMINATION, FREEDOM AND JUSTICE UNDER BRITISH LAW. AFTER THE INVASION THEY WANT SELF-DETERMINATION, FREEDOM AND JUSTICE AND NEITHER YOU, WHO HAVE ALL OF THOSE THINGS, NOR I, WHO HAVE ALL OF THOSE THINGS AND WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SEEING THAT THEY HAVE THOSE THINGS, COULD STAND BACK AND WATCH IT TAKEN AWAY FROM THEM. THEY DO NOT HAVE MANY OF THOSE THINGS IN THE ARGENTINE. DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT WE'D HAND THEM OVER TO THE ARGENTINE, NO, AND NEITHER WOULD YOU, BECAUSE WE ARE TRYING TO EXTEND THOSE HUMAN RIGHTS AND THAT LIBERTY AND THAT JUSTICE AND THAT SELF-DETERMINATION. IT'S ALL IN YOUR CONSTITUTION, WHICH IS THE MOST MARVELLOUSLY WRITTEN DOCUMENT I HAVE EVER READ AND IT'S NOT FOR YOU OR FOR US TO LESSEN WHAT THEY HAD. GRADUALLY EACH YEAR WE WERE REPORTING TO THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH ALSO SUPPORTS SELF-DETERMINATION AND WHAT WE WERE DOING TO GET SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THOSE ISLANDS. IT IS FOR THE PEOPLE THERE TO HAVE THE SAY OVER THEIR FUTURE. THE SAME THING HAPPENS IN THE UNITED STATES AND TO THOSE ISLANDS WHICH THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTERS AND SHE HAS A NUMBER, TO HAVE SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT WE WOULD WISH TO DO IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.



INTERVIEWER: BUT ONCE YOU'VE SEIZED THE FALKLANDS ONCE AGAIN MILITARILY .....

MRS.THATCHER: SEIZED?

INTERVIEWER: OR TAKE BACK .....

MRS.THATCHER: ONCE WE'VE REPOSSESSED THAT WHICH IS OURS ..

INTERVIEWER: ONCE YOU TAKE BACK MILITARILY THE FALKLANDS, HOW CAN YOU POSSIBLY SUSTAIN A PROTRACTED PRESENCE ON THOSE ISLANDS, GIVEN THE ENORMOUS COST OF THIS MILITARY OPERATION THUS FAR AND THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES WHICH YOU ALREADY FACE AT HOME?

MRS.THATCHER: IF WE CANNOT GET ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENT WE SHALL HAVE TO ARRANGE FOR THE DEFENCE OF THOSE ISLANDS. IT WILL MEAN THAT WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE A NUMBER OF QUITE CONSIDERABLE EXPENDITURES, FREEDOM IS EXPENSIVE TO DEFEND, IT IS WORTH DEFENDING. WE SHALL HAVE TO EXTEND THAT AIRSTRIP SO THAT WE CAN HAVE MAJOR AIRCRAFT OF A KIND THAT HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO LAND THERE BEFORE, WE SHALL HAVE TO HAVE RAPIER THERE TO DEFEND IT, WE SHALL HAVE TO HAVE SUBMARINES, WE SHALL HAVE TO HAVE SOME SHIPS. YES, WE SHALL HAVE TO DEFEND FREEDOM, I HOPE WE'LL BE ABLE TO GET SOME HELP IN IT, THOSE ISLANDS ARE STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT, AS WELL AS BEING IMPORTANT IN DEMOCRATIC AND POLITICAL TERMS AND I HOPE EVERYONE WILL REALISE THAT ... EVEN NOW, YOU KNOW, THAT SOME VERY BIG OIL TANKERS HAVE TO GO AROUND CAPE HORN TO GET ROUND TO ALASKA, THEY HAVE A VERY ENORMOUS STRATEGIC VALUE, THEY ARE TO SOME EXTENT ALSO THE GATEWAY TO THE ANTARCTIC WHICH WILL PROGRESSIVELY MORE IMPORTANT IN RESOURCE TERMS TO THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.

INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER THIS IS A DIFFICULT QUESTION.....

MRS.THATCHER: I'M USED TO THEM, DON'T WORRY .....

INTERVIEWER: I UNDERSTAND THAT. FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW YOUR COUNTRYMEN OBVIOUSLY ADMIRE YOUR RESOLVE DURING THIS CRISIS. YOUR REPUTATION AS THE IRON LADY, THE ICE QUEEN, A VERY TOUGH POLITICIAN HAS ONLY BEEN ENHANCED BY WHAT IS GOING ON DOWN THERE BUT I WONDER IF THERE ISN'T A MOMENT IN YOUR PERSONAL OR PRIVATE LIFE WHEN SOMETIMES THAT RESOLVE WAIVERS AND FROM A HUMAN POINT OF VIEW IF YOU DON'T HAVE SLEEPLESS MOMENTS WHEN YOU SEE THE YOUNG MEN ON THE BEACHES OR MAKING A LANDING OR ENGAGED IN SOME KIND OF COMBAT WHICH COSTS THE LIVES OF MEN ON BOTH SIDES .....

MRS.THATCHER: MANY EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY OUR PREDECESSORS SO THAT WE HAD LIBERTY AND JUSTICE. WE MUST MAKE THE SAME EFFORT FOR OUR FRIENDS, FOR THOSE WHO RELY ON US AND FOR OUR SUCCESSORS, TO SEE THAT WE PASS ON WHAT HAS BEEN BEQUEATHED TO US. YES, I HAVE THE REPUTATION AS THE IRON LADY AND OF GREAT RESOLVE, THAT RESOLVE IS MATCHED BY THE BRITISH PEOPLE, IT IS, IF I MIGHT SAY SO, MATCHED I BELIEVE BY THE STAUNCHNESS OF THE UNITED STATES. DOES NOT THE UNITED STATES AND ALMOST EVERY PERSON THERE PUT ON THE ARMOUR OF LIBERTY AND CARRY THE SWORD OF JUSTICE?

INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER THANK YOU VERY MUCH.



INTERVIEW GIVEN BY

THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP

TO PETER JENNINGS OF ABC TELEVISION (USA)

IN THE GARDENS OF NO 10 DOWNING STREET

ON WEDNESDAY, 9 JUNE 1982

PRESS OFFICE  
10 DOWNING STREET  
Tel No: 930-4433



INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER, YOU'VE ALREADY SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH BEFORE PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY WAS A TRIUMPH, WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND TO BE THE SPECIFIC OF HIS CRUSADE FOR DEMOCRACY

MRS. THATCHER: I THOUGHT FOR THE FIRST TIME WE'D HAD SOMEONE WHO REALLY PUT THE CASE FOR PROCLAIMING FREEDOM AND JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY ITSELF. WE TEND TO TAKE IT FOR GRANTED, WE JUST DON'T REALISE HOW MANY OTHER PEOPLES IN THE WORLD THERE ARE WHO WOULD LOVE TO HAVE IT. INEVITABLY IN OUR SYSTEM WHICH HAS FREE SPEECH, FULL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, OF ACTION, WITHIN CERTAIN LAWS, WE FIND THAT WE TEND TO BE USING THAT TO CRITICISE OUR OWN FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, OUR OWN WAYS OF LIFE AND YET YOU FIND ON THE OTHER SIDE WHERE THEY HAVE TOTAL CENSORSHIP, THEY TEND TO USE THAT TOTAL CENSORSHIP TO PORTRAY ALL THAT IS BEST IN THEIR LIFE AND NONE OF THE CRITICISMS. I WONDER HOW SOMEONE IN THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WOULD TAKE THAT, IF WE ONLY USED OUR FREEDOM TO DISPLAY SOME OF THE THINGS THAT NEED CORRECTING IN OUR SOCIETY. SO IT WAS ABSOLUTELY MARVELLOUS TO HEAR SOMEONE PUT THE REAL POSITIVE POINTS FOR FREEDOM AND JUSTICE AND SAY WITH ALL THEIR FAULTS AND THERE ARE FAULTS WITH A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, NEVERTHELESS THEY'RE SO FAR BETTER THAN ANYTHING ELSE, THAT WE OUGHT TO BE PROCLAIMING IT FROM THE HOUSETOPS AND TRYING TO EXTEND IT, RATHER THAN CRITICISE IT.

INTERVIEWER: DOES THAT MEAN IN YOUR VIEW THAT THIS IS A CAMPAIGN WHICH SHOULD BE CONDUCTED, FOR EXAMPLE, DIRECTLY INSIDE WHAT IS REGARDED AS THE SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE?

MRS. THATCHER: IT'S A CASE WE SHOULD CONDUCT EVERY DAY. YOU KNOW, SO OFTEN WE JUST REACT TO PROPAGANDA FROM THE COMMUNIST WORLD, OR FROM ... THEY CALL IT EXTREME SOCIALIST WORLD AND WE DON'T REALLY START BY POSITIVELY PUTTING OUR OWN CASE, WE ACCEPT THAT, WE TAKE IT FOR GRANTED. JUST TAKE THE CASE OF A FREE PRESS AND FREE MEDIA, THEY COULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE FREE UNLESS THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY EVERY SINGLE COMMERCIAL ADVERTISEMENT AND COMMERCIAL FUTURE AND COMMERCIAL SUCCESS AND YET YOU WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HEAR THAT PROCLAIMED ON TELEVISION OR IN THE PRESS.

INTERVIEWER: IS IT A CAMPAIGN THAT SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AS VIGOROUSLY IN TOTALITARIAN REGIMES WHICH SERVE THE WEST'S INTERESTS AGAINST THE DEFENCE OF COMMUNISM.

MRS. THATCHER: WELL, YOU KNOW, WE OFTEN CAN'T GET AT THEM BUT WE GET AT THEM TO SOME EXTENT THROUGH OVERSEAS BROADCASTING AND WE HAVE REASON TO KNOW FROM PEOPLE WHO COME OUT FROM TIME TO TIME THAT OUR BROADCASTS ARE LISTENED TO VERY CLOSELY AND I KNOW THAT I'VE HAD SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO'VE COME OUT OF SOVIET RUSSIA AND SOME OF THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES SAYING TO US 'LOOK, WE WANT TO HEAR MORE AND MORE DISCUSSION, GENUINE ARGUMENT, GENUINE DEBATE. WE NEVER HEAR THAT', THEY SAY. 'ON OUR RADIO OR TELEVISION' AND THAT'S REALLY WHAT THEY WANT. IT'S COMPARATIVELY FRESH TO THEM.



INTERVIEWER: ONE OF YOUR COLLEAGUES IN PARLIAMENT TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT THE WEST SHOULD LOOK FIRST TO ITS OWN DEMOCRACY, I'M REFERRING TO EDWARD HEATH, DO YOU THINK HE HAS A POINT?

MRS. THATCHER: I'M NOT QUITE SURE WHAT THAT SENTENCE, UNLESS YOU GIVE ME ITS CONTEXT, MEANS THE WEST TO LOOK FIRST AT ITS OWN DEMOCRACY, BUT WE ARE SAYING AND REMEMBER IT WAS WINSTON WHO SAID 'THAT DEMOCRACY WHATEVER ITS SHORTCOMINGS IS BY FAR THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT' AND OUGHT WE NOT SOMETIMES TO STATE MORE FORCEFULLY THE ADVANTAGES OF A FREE COUNTRY.

INTERVIEWER: I THINK HE WAS REFERRING TO .....

MRS. THATCHER: .... WITH A GOOD SYSTEM OF LAW.

INTERVIEWER: ... THE VERY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE WEST - WHETHER OR NOT IT WASN'T BEST TO GET THAT IN ORDER TO EEE IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE DEMOCRACY.

MRS. THATCHER: WE'RE ALL TRYING TO DO THAT BUT, MY GOODNESS ME, WITH FULL EMPLOYMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN SOME OF THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES, THEY CAN'T EVEN GROW ENOUGH TO FEED THEMSELVES AND THEY CERTAINLY CAN'T DO THE HIGHEST TECHNOLOGY AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF EVERYONE IS VERY LOW. WE ARE TRYING TO GET THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF OUR PEOPLE UP - THROUGH THEIR OWN EFFORTS AND WE TRY FOR THOSE WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED TO SEE THAT THEY HAVE A REASONABLE STANDARD OF LIVING AND ARE REASONABLY WELL LOOKED AFTER BY THE REST WHO HAVE JOBS.

INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER, IT NOW SEEMS CLEAR THERE WILL BE MORE FIGHTING TO RESOLVE THE FALKLANDS CRISIS: WHAT ABOUT AFTER THIS BATTLE, THE BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY, DO YOU THINK A LESS INTENSIVE WAR WILL CONTINUE?

MRS. THATCHER: ONE ALWAYS HOPE THAT WE SHALL HAVE AFTER THAT A COMPLETE ARMISTICE, TO BE ABLE TO TAKE REPOSSESSION OF THE ISLANDS AS A WHOLE AND ALSO TO SECURE A COMPLETE ARMISTICE IN THE MAINLAND. IF WE CAN'T THEN OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE TO DEFEND OUR OWN TERRITORY AND OUR OWN PEOPLE. THEY CAN ONLY LOOK TO US FOR THEIR DEFENCE. WE CAN'T KNOW YET, WE HOPE THAT THE MILITARY COMMANDERS WILL MAKE THE FIRST ARRANGEMENTS AS THEY DID ON SOUTH GEORGIA AND TOOK A SURRENDER THERE. WHAT WE DO KNOW IS THAT WE HAVE A DUTY TO DEFEND OUR OWN TERRITORY AND ABOVE ALL OUR OWN PEOPLE AND TO SEE THAT THEIR FREEDOM AND JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY, ALL OF WHICH THEY HAD BEFORE THIS INVASION, CONTINUES.



INTERVIEWER: SO IF YOU CORRECT WHAT YOU'VE LONG REGARDED AS THE INJUSTICE WHAT HAPPENS THEN: IS THE IDEA, FOR EXAMPLE, OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE SPECIFICALLY INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES A DEAD ISSUE?

MRS. THATCHER: NO, I HOPE NOT. I HOPE IT'S A VERY MUCH ALIVE ISSUE. BUT I THINK YOU KNOW BEFORE WE'VE EVEN STARTED THE MAIN BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY IT'S A BIT DIFFICULT TO SAY PRECISELY HOW THINGS WILL DEVELOP. ONE HAS A NUMBER OF CONTINGENCY PLANS BUT YOU IMAGINE THE LIVES OF THESE PEOPLE, THEY'VE HAD A TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE, THEY'VE HAD A TREMENDOUS INVASION FROM THE ARGENTINES WHOM THEY'VE ALWAYS TOTALLY REJECTED BEFORE AND THEN THEY'VE HAD A BATTLE OVER THEIR TERRITORY, THEIR HOMES, THEIR BUSINESSES, THEIR HOMES VANDALISED, SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN HERDED TOGETHER IN DARWIN AND GOOSE GREEN, THEY'D BEEN HERDED TOGETHER IN A COMMUNITY SETTLEMENT AND HAD TO STAY THERE FOR A MONTH. IT'S GOING TO TAKE THEM SOME TIME TO GET BACK TO NORMAL LIFE, TO REBUILD THEIR FARMS AND THEIR BUSINESSES, IT'S GOING TO TAKE US SOME TIME TO HELP REHABILITATE AND DEVELOP. WE SHALL NEED HELP IN DEVELOPING THE RESOURCES. I THINK WE MAY NEED HELP INITIALLY IN HOW WE DEAL WITH THE PRISONER OF WAR PROBLEM, THEN WE SHALL HAVE TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENCE AND WE SHALL HAVE TO CERTAINLY CONSIDER THINGS LIKE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

INTERVIEWER: WHAT ABOUT LONG TERM NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA FOR THE ISLANDS ULTIMATE FUTURE?

MRS. THATCHER: THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS SELF-DETERMINATION, AFTER ALL THAT'S WHAT THE UNITED STATES STANDS FOR, IT'S WHAT DEMOCRACY IS, THE PEOPLE DECIDE THE FUTURE. SO FAR THE PEOPLE HAVE TOTALLY REJECTED AN ARGENTINIAN FUTURE. I DO NOT IMAGINE AFTER AN INVASION THAT THEY WOULD ACTUALLY WANT ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE ARGENTINIANS AS FAR AS SOVEREIGNTY GOES - NOTHING, BUT NOTHING AT ALL.

INTERVIEWER: AND YET YOU'VE BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE ARGENTINIANS ABOUT THE ISLANDS LONG TERM FUTURE BEFORE THE CONFLICT - DID THE CONFLICT CHANGE THAT IRREVOCABLY?

MRS. THATCHER: YES, BUT NOT NECESSARILY ON SOVEREIGNTY, BECAUSE THE ISLANDERS DID NOT WANT NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY. WE SAID TO THEM AT ONE STAGE - WOULD YOU CONSIDER A VERY VERY LONG LEASE, BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THAT WE HAD TO OBVIOUSLY IN PRACTICAL TERMS, TO WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH THE ADJACENT STATE - - NO, THEY WOULD NOT CONSIDER IT AND WHAT THEY WANTED WAS TO FREEZE ALL QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY. NOW LOO

K, AMERICA HAS SELF-DETERMINATION, THAT'S WHAT DEMOCRACY IS, SO DO WE, SO DO THOSE ISLANDERS. WHO IS AMERICA, OR WE OR ANY OTHER DEMOCRACY TO IMPLY THAT THEY HAVE TO LOSE THAT, THEY DON'T, WE'VE GONE TO DEFEND IT, YOU ENJOY IT, I ENJOY IT, THE PRESIDENT SAYS WE MUST EXTEND IT AND SO DO I. SO LET'S NOT ROB PEOPLE OF IT WHO'VE HAD, AND IF THEY DO NOT WANT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA, THEN IT IS THEIR RIGHT TO SAY NOT.

INTERVIEWER: BUT IN THE LONG TERM, PRIME MINISTER, IF ARGENTINA PURSUES WHAT IT REGARDS AS ITS CLAIM TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THROUGH A LEGAL AND NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WOULD YOU IGNORE ARGENTINA OR WOULD YOU PARTICIPATE AGAIN, AS YOU DID BEFORE THIS WAR?



MRS. THATCHER: I DON'T THINK YOU CAN SAY THAT JUST BECAUSE PEOPLE LAY CLAIM TO SOME ISLANDS OR TO SOME TERRITORY, THAT YOU AUTOMATICALLY HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM. JUST LET ME GIVE YOU ANOTHER ISLAND - TRINIDAD - JUST OFF THE COAST OF VENEZUELA. FAR FAR NEARER TO VENEZUELA THAN THE FALKLANDS ARE TO THE ARGENTINES, WE BROUGHT TRINIDAD TO FULL INDEPENDENCE. THERE ARE MANY OTHER ISLANDS. CUBA IS NEARER TO THE UNITED STATES THAN THE FALKLANDS TO THE ARGENTINE. THE CANARY ISLANDS ARE NEARER TO MOROCCO THAN THEY ARE TO SPAIN. YOU CAN'T JUST JUDGE THE OWNERSHIP OF A TERRITORY BY HOW NEAR THEY ARE TO ANOTHER SOVEREIGN TERRITORY. YOU CAN'T JUST SAY --- LET ME JUST SAY THE IMPLICATIONS OF YOUR QUESTION, YOU CAN'T JUST SAY THAT BECAUSE PEOPLE LAY CLAIM TO A TERRITORY YOU AUTOMATICALLY HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM.

INTERVIEWER: BUT YOU HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH ARGENTINA FOR SEVENTEEN YEARZ.

MRS. THATCHER: WE ARE TRYING ... THERE WAS A 1971 AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THEY SUPPLIED THE COMMUNICATIONS IN A SENSE THAT THEY HAD A SHIPPING LINE AND AN AIRLINE, BUT THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT LET US NEGOTIATE ON SOVEREIGNTY, THAT IS WHAT I AM SAYING. OF COURSE WE WANT TO CO-OPERATE IN EVERY BUSINESS VENTURE AND MANY MANY BUSINESS VENTURES, IT'LL BE NECESSARY IN SOME WAYS FIRST TO DEVELOP THE MATERIALS ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BUT DO NOT THINK THAT BECAUSE SOMEONE ELSE LAYS CLAIM TO TERRITORY THAT YOU HAVE NECESSARILY TO ADMIT A CLAIM, WE HAVE BEEN THERE - THE ISLANDS WERE DISCOVERED BY THE BRITISH - MANY OF OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ON THE FALKLANDS FOR SEVEN GENERATIONS, LONGER THAN SOME OF THE SPANISH AND ITALIANS ... PEOPLE OF SPANISH AND ITALIAN BIRTH, HAVE BEEN IN THE ARGENTINE AND THE FALKLANDS HAD NO INDIGENOUS POPULATION, THE ARGENTINE DID OF COURSE.

INTERVIEWER: JUST ONE FINAL QUESTION, PRIME MINISTER, ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, WHAT DO YOU AT THIS POINT BELIEVE THE ISRAELI INTENTIONS IN LEBANON ARE?

MRS. THATCHER: IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL BECAUSE THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED SOME OF THEIR INTENTIONS AND YET THE ACTIVITIES SEEM TO HAVE GONE WELL BEYOND THOSE ANNOUNCED INTENTIONS. BUT I DO ... I KNOW IS THAT YOU ... IF YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE ANY INTERNATIONAL LAW, YOU REALLY CANNOT HAVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON JUST INFRINGED LIKE THAT AND THEREFORE WE AGREE WHOLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL. WE'VE GREAT FAITH IN MR. HABIB AND WE SUPPORT WHAT HE IS DOING. IT'S A TERRIBLE THING FOR THE LEBANON PEOPLE, THEY'RE NOT A PARTY TO THESE HOSTILITIES AND YET THEIR COUNTRY IS OVER-RUN. YOU'VE GOT TO HAVE INTERNATIONAL LAW UPHELD OTHERWISE THERE'S INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY. I UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS, LEBANON HAS A RIGHT TO LIVE IN SECURITY AND PEACE, SO HAS ISRAEL AND IT'S ALL RELATED TO THE MUCH LARGER PROBLEM THAT SO MANY OF US HAVE BEEN TRYING TO SOLVE FOR QUITE A LONG TIME, THE WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WAS PART OF IT, THE NEXT STAGE IS GOING TO BE VERY VERY DIFFICULT.

INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

MRS. THATCHER: THANK YOU.



INTERVIEW GIVEN BY

THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER MP

TO TOM FENTON OF CBS TELEVISION (USA)

IN THE GARDENS OF NO 10 DOWNING STREET

ON WEDNESDAY, 9 JUNE 1982

PRESS OFFICE  
10 DOWNING STREET  
Tel No: 930-4433



INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER, HOW CLOSE ARE YOU TO REMOVING THE ARGENTINES FROM THE FALKLANDS?

MRS. THATCHER: IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO SAY. I HOPE NOT TOO DISTANT, BECAUSE AFTER ALL OUR TROOPS ARE THERE, IN VERY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SO ARE THE ARGENTINE TROOPS IN VERY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES BUT THE TIME WHEN THE MILITARY COMMANDER MOVES IS UP TO HIM, HE IS THERE, HE KNOWS THE POSITIONS, HE KNOWS HIS PROFESSIONAL FIGHTING MEN, HE KNOWS JUST EXACTLY HOW MUCH HE HAST TO MOVE TO WHERE BEFORE HE MAKES THE FINAL ASSAULT. WE CAN'T FIGHT A BATTLE ROUND THE CABINET TABLE, HE CAN ONLY FIGHT IT ON THE SPOT.

INTERVIEWER: THERE ARE NO POLITICAL RESTRAINTS?

?

MRS. THATCHER: HE HAS NORMAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WHICH YOU'D EXPECT A DEMOCRACY TO HAVE.

INTERVIEWER: IS THERE ANY CHANCE EVEN AT THIS LATE DATE OF AVOIDING A MAJOR BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY?

MRS. THATCHER: ONLY IF THE COMMANDER OF THE AREA, HAVING HIS BACK TO THE SEA, HAVING MANY MANY YOUNG CONSCRIPTS UNDER HIS CARE, THINKS THAT IT WILL BE BETTER TO SEEK TO WITHDRAW. IF HE DID HE'S ONLY TO CONTACT OUR MILITARY COMMANDER AND SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE ARRANGED.

INTERVIEWER: HAS THERE BEEN ANY SIGN THAT HE'S INTERESTED?

MRS. THATCHER: NO SIGN WHATSOEVER. NO RESPONSE OF THAT KIND. INDEED OFTEN THE CONTRARY, YOU KNOW, THERE HAVE BEEN STATEMENTS MADE FROM THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY'RE PREPARED TO SACRIFICE FORTY THOUSAND LIVES AND SO ON, I JUST ALMOST RECOILED WHEN I HEARD THAT KIND OF STATEMENT AND THEY WOULD FIGHT TO THE DEATH AND SO ON. AND I JUST HOPE THAT ONCE THE BATTLE HAS COMMENCED AND THEY'VE TAKEN CERTAIN POSITIONS, THAT BOTH COMMANDERS WILL BE ABLE TO ARRANGE A SURRENDER WHICH WILL SAVE MANY MANY YOUNG LIVES.

INTERVIEWER: - PRIME MINISTER, YOU AND PRESIDENT REAGAN SEEM TO AGREE ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES THAT LED YOU TO SEND THE TASK FORCE. HAS HIS VISIT NARROWED THE APPARENT DIFFICULTY YOU MAY HAVE OVER THE LONG TERM FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS?



MRS. THATCHER: THE LONG TERM FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS IS A FUTURE WHICH ABOVE ALL MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THIS IS WHAT IS WRITTEN IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, THIS IS THE ESSENCE OF ALL OUR WAY OF LIFE IN THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, THAT THE PEOPLE DECIDE. THIS IS WHY I AM PRIME MINISTER, THAT IS WHY PRESIDENT REAGAN IS PRESIDENT BECAUSE THE PEOPLE DECIDED THEIR GOVERNMENT, THEIR FUTURE. THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAVE HAD THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THEY CHOSE TO STAY BRITISH. THEY RECOILED FROM THE ARGENTINE, THEY MUST IN FACT KEEP THAT RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION THEY HAD BEFORE, PEACE WITH LIBERTY, WITH JUSTICE, WITH SELF-DETERMINATION. AFTER WE'VE POSSESSEEEEE REPOSSESSED THE ISLANDS THEY MUST HAVE PEACE WITH LIBERTY, WITH JUSTICE, WITH SELF-DETERMINATION. SO IT WILL TAKE QUITE SOME TIME TO WORK OUT THE LONG TERM FUTURE. WE HAVE TO SEE WHAT BEST WE CAN DO, WE'LL HAVE TO MAKE A LOT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REHABILITATION OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO'VE SUFFERED THE MOST TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE, YOU AND I, WHO'VE NEVER BEEN OCCUPIED CAN'T REALLY IMAGINE WHAT IT'S LIKE TO HAVE TROOPS WITH GUNS IN EVERY STREET AND FIELD YOU'VE KNOWN. THEN WE HAVE TO DO AS MUCH RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AS WE POSSIBLY CAN AND GRADUALLY BUID THINGS BACK TO NORMAL, OR BETTER THAN NORMAL. WE'LL HAVE TO MAKE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEFENCE IN THE INTERIM. EXTENDING THE AIRFIELD AND SO ON.

INTERVIEWER: HOW MUCH ARE YOU WILLING TO INVEST IN THESE ISLANDS THAT APPARENTLY A FEW MONTHS AGO WEREN'T WORTH THE CONTINUED EXPENSE OF ONE OLD ICE-BREAKER?

MRS. THATCHER: WELL, DON'T PUT IT QUITE LIKE THAT - WE SHALL HAVE TO INVEST CONSIDERABLY MORE IN THE ISLANDS THAN WE HAD THOUGHT. LIBERTY AND FREEDOM HAVE BEEN CHALLENGED, THEY ARE WORTH DEFENDING, THE PRICE IS EXPENSIVE, BOTH IN MONEY WHICH PERHAPS IS LESS IMPORTANT, IN LIFE AS WELL, BUT, YOU KNOW, OUR FOREFATHERS SACRIFICED THAT FOR US. LET IT NEVER BE SAID THAT WE WERE LESS WILLING TO MAKE SACRIFICES FOR THE FUTURE THAN THEY WERE FOR US.

INTERVIEWER: WELL NOW GENERAL GALTIERI, FROM WHAT I'VE READ HAS SAID THAT ARGENTINA IS READY TO FIGHT FOR YEARS IF NECESSARY TO REPOSSESS THE ISLANDS, DOESN'T THAT IMPLY THAT YOU MUST MAKE SOME SORT OF ACCOMMODATION WITH ARGENTINA IN THE FUTURE?

MRS. THATCHER: NO, IT DOES NOT. DOES IT MEAN THAT BECAUSE SOMEONE POINTS A GUN AT ME THAT I HAVE TO SURRENDER? NO, THE FIRST THING IS YOU HAVE SELF-DEFENCE, AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE JUST BECAUSE SOMEONE WILL COME ALONG AND SAY TO ONE OF THE ISLANDS WHICH THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTERS, UNDER SELF-GOVERNMENT OF THOSE ISLANDS - I HAVE AN INTEREST IN THOSE ISLANDS, I'M GOING TO EKEEP ON MY INTEREST IN THOSE ISLANDS, THEREFORE I HAVE A RIGHT TO SOMETHING ON THEM. OF COURSE IT DOESN'T, YOU WOULD NEVER HAVE ANY INTERNATIONAL LAW, ANY TRUTH OR ANY JUSTICE OR ANY SECURITY OF ANY KIND AND OF COURSE IT IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH YOU ENJOY AND I ENJOY.

INTERVIEWER: WHAT ABOUT LONG TERM, DO YOU SEE ANY ROLE WHATSOEVER FOR ARGENTINA IN THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS?



MRS. THATCHER: WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN TRYING TO WORK WITH THEM TO TRY TO DEVELOP THE RESOURCES OF THE ISLANDS, OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND IN THE SEAS AROUND - IT'LL BE PROFITABLE AND GOOD FOR THEM, AND PROFITABLE AND GOOD FOR US. THEY HAVE FOR ... EVER SINCE PERON, ALMOST TAUGHT EVERY GENERATION THAT THEY HAVE A TITLE TO WHAT THEY CALL THE MALVINAS. THE BRITISH DISCOVERED THEM, BRITISH PEOPLE HAVE BEEN THERE CONTINUOUSLY FOR A HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS AND WERE THERE FROM TIME TO TIME BEFORE. SOME OF THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ON THE FALKLANDS FAR LONGER THAN SOME OF THE SPANISH AND ITALIANS HAVE BEEN IN THE ARGENTINE. ONLY IN THE FALKLANDS OF COURSE THERE WAS NO INDIGENOUS POPULATION TO DISPLACE, AS THERE WAS IN THE ARGENTINE, SO OUR RIGHT TO THE FALKLANDS IS VERY SIMILAR TO THE RIGHT WHICH THOSE WHO WENT TO THE ARGENTINE EXERCISE NOW ... I MEAN, THEIR RIGHT TO THE ARGENTINE, TO BE IN THE ARGENTINE AND TO HAVE SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE ARGENTINE, IS VERY SIMILAR TO THE RIGHT OF THE BRITISH TO BE IN THE FALKLANDS AND TO HAVE SELF-DETERMINATION OVER THAT.

INTERVIEWER: MANY OBSERVERS AND INDEED I THINK STATE DEPARTMENT PLANNERS SEEM TO THINK THAT INDEPENDENCE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COULD BE AN IMPRACTICAL PROPOSITION.

MRS. THATCHER: WELL, THERE ARE THINGS SHORT OF INDEPENDENCE, I MEAN, YOU KNOW THAT WE HAVE AN UNRIVALED RECORD NOW AND AT ANY TIME IN THE WORLD OF HANDING BACK TERRITORIES ... TO HANDING OVER TERRITORIES OVER WHICH WE HAVE SOVEREIGN POSSESSION TO THE PEOPLE - THAT IS SELF-DETERMINATION, - NEAR YOU, I SUPPOSE THE MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLE IS TRINIDAD, WHICH IS SO MUCH CLOSER TO THE MAINLAND OF VENEZUELA, THAN THE FALKLANDS ARE TO THE ARGENTINE BUT SHORT OF FULL INDEPENDENCE, THERE IS SELF-GOVERNMENT, WHERE YOU CAN HAVE YOUR OWN PRIME MINISTER AND WHOLE LEGISLATURE, BUT STILL RELY ON US FOR DEFENCE AND FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF TERRITORIES WHICH CHOOSE THAT ROLE AND OF COURSE YOU HAVE A NUMBER OF TERRITORIES WHICH HAVE CHOSEN THAT ROUTE. IT'S NOT REALISED SOMETIMES THAT THE UNITED STATES ALSO HAS A NUMBER OF TERRITORIES.

INTERVIEWER: IS IT A PRACTICAL PROPOSITION ALSO TO TRY TO DEFEND ISLANDS EIGHT THOUSAND MILES AWAY WITH ARGENTINA ONLY TWO HUNDRED OR THREE HUNDRED MILES AWAY AND STILL PREPARED PERHAPS TO FIGHT FOR THEM?



MRS. THATCHER: WELL IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT IT IS A PRACTICAL PROPOSITION TO FIGHT FOR THEM EVEN IF THEY ARE EIGHT THOUSAND MILES AWAY. THANKS TO SUPERB EFFORTS ON THE PART OF BRITISH ARMED FORCES AND THEIR OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONALISM... (BOTH TALK AT ONCE)

... NO, INDEED, BUT YOU KNOW, ONCE WE'RE BACK ON THE ISLANDS AND WE REALISE THAT THEY ARE LIABLE TO BE ATTACKED AND INVADDED, YOU MAKE VERY DIFFERENT ARRANGEMENTS. YES, WE HAVE TO EXTEND THE AIRSTRIP, BUT THE AIRSTRIP WILL BE BOTH EXTENDED AND DEFENDED. IT COULD HAVE DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT THERE, BOTH BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS. IT COULD HAVE RAPIERS THERE TO DEFEND IT. WE'LL HAVE TO KEEP SUBMARINES AROUND THE ISLANDS BUT AFTER ALL ALL WHAT HAS BEEN SHOWN IS THAT THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS VERY VERY IMPORTANT, WE HAVE A NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION BUT THE SOUTH ATLANTIC TOO IS VERY IMPORTANT AND THAT IS VERY MUCH ON A STRATEGIC ROUTE, SOUTH OF CAPE HORN. YES, WE SHALL HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO DEFEND IT - WE HAVEN'T LOST BRITISH BLOOD SUDDENLY TO SAY - ALL RIGHT, NOW WE'RE GOING TO LEAVE THESE PEOPLE DEFENCELESS.

INTERVIEWER: ARE YOU THINKING IN TERMS OF SOME SORT OF SOUTH ATLANTIC ORGANISATION?

MRS. THATCHER: IT HAS BEEN MOOTED SEVERAL TIMES BUT NO-ONE HAS REALLY WORKED IT OUT AND IT IS JUST A GENERAL IDEA.

INTERVIEWER: WHAT ROLE WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE UNITED STATES PLAY IN GUARANTEEING THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLANDS?

MRS. THATCHER: IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE MIGHT HAVE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. WHEN THE UNITED STATES ASKED US TO JOIN IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WITH SINAI WE WENT AND DID SO, TO HELP OUR ALLY, THE UNITED STATES. BUT I THINK IT'S JUST A LITTLE BIT EARLY TO TRY TO GET THESE FINALISED YET OR EVEN TO DISCUSS THEM IN DETAIL. IT IS GOING TO TAKE A TIME, IT'S NOT SURPRISING BECAUSE OF THE EXPERIENCES THAT THOSE ISLANDERS HAVE BEEN THROUGH.

INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER, WASN'T THERE AN INTELLIGENCE ERROR OF REALLY MONUMENTAL PROPORTIONS THAT ALLOWED THE ARGENTINES TO TAKE THE ISLANDS?

MRS. THATCHER: I WOULD NOT NECESSARILY SAY SO. IF THERE WAS THEN ALMOST EVERYONE WAS AMZED, THAT THEY WERE ACTUALLY ON THEIR WAY TO INVAD. AS YOU KNOW THEY WERE TAKING PART IN A MAJOR EXERCISE, THERE HAD BEEN MANY MANY EXERCISES BEFORE, THERE HAD BEEN THREATS OF INVASION BEFO AND WHAT WE DIDN'T SPOT WAS THAT THIS ONE WAS ACTUALLY DIFFERENT. WELL, IT HAPPENED, IT HAPPE

INTERVIEWER: THERE'LL BE AN INQUIRY AFTERWARDX?

MRS. THATCHER: I INDEED SHALL HAVE AN INQUIRY, I DO NOT.... AND WHAT IS MORE, MANY MANY PEOPLE IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND PREVIOUS MINISTERS, ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE AN INQUIRY.

INTERVIEWER: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

MRS. THATCHER: THANK YOU.



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UNCLASSIFIED  
FM FCO 092153Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1140 OF 9 JUNE  
AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN (FOR PS NO 10 AND PS).

FALKLANDS : MOD PRESS STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DURING THE EVENING OF 9 JUNE.

BEGINS

'WE ARE NOW ABLE TO SAY A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING RAID ON OUR SHIPS WHICH WE REPORTED LAST NIGHT.

WE KNOW THAT THERE WERE NO DEATHS ON HMS PLYMOUTH BUT THERE WERE FIVE PEOPLE INJURED. THEY ARE UNDER TREATMENT AND THEIR NEXT-OF-KIN HAVE BEEN INFORMED. IT IS, HOWEVER, FEARED THAT CASUALTIES FROM THE ATTACKS ON SIR TRISTRAM AND SIR GALAHAD WERE MUCH HEAVIER: EARLY REPORTS INDICATE A NUMBER OF KILLED AND INJURED.

AS SOON AS WE HAVE INFORMATION NEXT-OF-KIN WILL BE INFORMED: INDEED THIS PROCESS HAS ALREADY BEGUN. BUT IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT, GIVEN THE OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE DIFFERENT PLACES TO WHICH CASUALTIES AND SURVIVORS HAVE BEEN TAKEN, IT MAY BE SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME BEFORE THIS CAN BE COMPLETED.

THERE IS AT THE MOMENT NO FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OR IN THE SERVICES INFORMATION CENTRES. PLEASE DO NOT RING THEM. AS SOON AS WE HAVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION A FURTHER ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE.'

ENDS

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SENT AT 09/2240Z HD



NVEH MU

FCO BINN 059/09

OO BONN  
GRS 190

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 091550Z JUNE 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 968 OF 9 JUNE  
AND TO IMMEDIATE BONN (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FALKLANDS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE OF 5 JUNE.

1. FOLLOWING REFERENCES TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE IN THE ARGENTINE PRESS YESTERDAY AND IN TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS DECIDED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT 1600Z TODAY (9 JUNE):

BEGINS

QUOTE

THE SECRETARY GENERAL STATED IN HIS INTERIM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 2 JUNE ON THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN TO HIM BY SCR 505 HE WOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES IN THE EVENT THAT AN OPPORTUNITY COULD BE FOUND IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES COULD CONTRIBUTE TO BRINGING THE TRAGIC CRISIS TO AN END.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL, BEARING IN MIND HIS STATEMENT ON 21 MAY, SENT MESSAGES ON 5 JUNE 1982 TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER SUGGESTING A PLAN WHICH AIMED AT REALISATION OF SCR 502. UNFORTUNATELY NEITHER PARTY FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT THE PLAN, WHICH CONSTITUTED AN INTEGRAL WHOLE.

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FOBON086/09

PP BONN

GRS 210

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PARIS 091722Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 610 OF 9 JUNE 1982

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK

Moss  
+ N/A

FALKLANDS: MITTERRAND'S STATEMENT

1. IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY (9 JUNE) MITTERRAND WAS ASKED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS ON FRENCH RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. HE SAID THAT THOSE RELATIONS WERE CLEARLY LIABLE TO BE JEAPORDIZED BUT HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO PREVENT THAT.
2. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN THE "MASTER" OF THE ARGENTINE DECISION TO START AN UNSTOPPABLE CHAIN OF EVENTS BY THEIR MILITARY AGGRESSION AND FLOUTING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. FRANCE NATURALLY SUPPORTED BRITAIN, WHICH WAS AN ALLY. FRANCE AND THE UK HAD FOUGHT IN TWO WORLD WARS TOGETHER. FRANCE OWED A REAL DEBT OF GRATITUDE TO BRITAIN AND WAS A MEMBER OF THE SAME COMMUNITY. THE UK BELIEVED ITSELF TO BE WITHIN ITS RIGHT ALTHOUGH FRANCE HAD NEVER RECOGNISED ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UNFORTUNATE CHAIN OF EVENTS WAS ARGENTINA'S.
3. MITTERRAND CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN "THIS WAR MUST NOT TURN INTO A WAR OF REVENGE. THERE ARE LIMITS TO THIS CONFLICT WHICH I FULLY INTEND TO MAKE KNOWN AT THE RIGHT TIME, WHICH WILL NOT BE LONG".

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT AT 09/2319Z HD



PP ATHENS

PP BRUSSELS

PP COPENHAGEN

PP THE HAGUE

PP LISBON

PP LUXEMBOURG

PP MADRID

PP OSLO

PP OTTAWA

PP REYKJAVIK

PP ROME

RR TFC RELAY

GPS 240

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN 091600Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 542 OF 09 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO UKDEL VIENNA WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS  
MOD(DS17)

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON  
LUXEMBOURG MADRID OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK ROME AND BMG BERLIN

MBFR: NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS.

1. IN HIS SPEECH TO THE FEDERAL GERMAN PARLIAMENT THIS AFTERNOON, PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON MBFR (RE-TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN TEXT AS PUT OUT BY NEWS AGENCIES):

STARTS. IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE WITHIN OUR ALLIANCE ON HOW BEST THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS MIGHT BE GIVEN A FRESH STIMULUS. AS A RESULT OF THESE DELIBERATIONS, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE VIENNA TALKS WILL SHORTLY BE INTRODUCING A PROPOSAL UNDER WHICH BOTH ALLIANCES WOULD MUTUALLY REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES TO AN OVERALL TOTAL OF 700,000, AND GROUND AND AIR FORCES COMBINED TO 900,000.

EVEN IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT CANNOT WHOLLY REMOVE THE THREAT AND RELIEVE OUR CITIZENS OF THE BURDEN OF SUSTAINING SIZEABLE FORCES, IT WOULD, NEVERTHELESS, BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS SECURITY IN EUROPE, BOTH EAST AND WEST. IT COULD LEAD TO MILITARY STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS AND REDUCE THE DANGERS OF MISCALCULATIONS AND SURPRISE ATTACKS. IT WOULD ALSO BE A SIGN OF BOTH ALLIANCES' POLITICAL WILL TO ENHANCE STABILITY THROUGH LIMITATIONS ON THEIR FORCES IN THE CENTRAL AREA OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

THE WEST HAS SET A NUMBER OF CLEAR GOALS. WE IN THE ALLIANCE WILL PRRSS ON WITH OUR PLANS TO IMPROVE OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE PROPOSING AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD EQUALISE CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT A SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER LEVEL. ENDS.

TAYLOR

NNNN



CB BONN/FCO 010/09

OO FCO  
R  
R TFC RELAY

GPS 310  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM BONN 091535Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 541 OF 09 JUNE  
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS ROME AND CARACAS

FALKLANDS: GERMAN REPORTING

1. EDERER (MFA SOUTH AMERICA DEPT) BRIEFED US TODAY ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE MINISTER OF STATE, DR CORTERIER, TO VENEZUELA THIS WEEK (OUR TEL NO 486 TO FCO). HE SAID THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE INVASION AND CONDEMNATION OF EC SANCTIONS HAD NOT BEEN CHANGED BY THE VISIT, BUT THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BECOME MORE RELAXED IN THE COURSE OF CORTERIER'S TALKS, AND BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO REMAIN IN TOUCH OVER THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. IN PURSUIT OF THIS THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD AGREED TO VISIT BONN IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER.
  2. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE VENEZUELAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HAD TAKEN A STRONG AND EMOTIVE LINE WITH CORTERIER, CRITICISING THE QUOTE COLONIALIST PRESENCE OF FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS IN SOUTH AMERICA UNQUOTE, AND CLAIMING THAT NATO WAS ATTEMPTING TO CONSTRUCT A MAGINOT LINE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN SOUTH AMERICA, WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE USSR MAKING FURTHER HEADWAY.
  3. THE AD (DEMOCRATIC ACTION) PARTY REPRESENTATIVES ON THE OTHER HAND HAD DISTANCED THEMSELVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT LINE. THEY HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONFLICT WOULD FORCE ARGENTINA TO REINTRODUCE DEMOCRACY, AND HAD SAID THAT VENEZUELA'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND THE USA MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUFFER BECAUSE OF THE FALKLANDS QUOTE PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF BRITAIN'S SUPPORT FOR GUYANA UNQUOTE.
  4. THE ODCA (CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS) HAD WELCOMED CORTERIER'S VISIT AS A MEANS OF KEEPING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION OPEN, AND HAD SAID THAT THE EC SHOULD SEND A MISSION TO VENEZUELA ONCE THE CONFLICT WAS OVER.
  5. EDERER COMMENTED THAT THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT SAW CORTERIER'S TOUR AS A MEANS OF EMPHASISING THE CONTINUITY OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AMERICA, AND HOPED THAT OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD MAKE SIMILAR POLITICAL GESTURES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE ADDED THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD ARRANGED TO MEET PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN THE MARGINS OF UNSSOD TO EXPLAIN THE FRG'S POSITION ON THE FALKLANDS.
- FCO PASS SAVING ABOVE

TAYLOR

NNNN



FO/CB BONN 005/10

OO BONN

GRS 166  
UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 092355Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 520 OF 9 JUNE  
REPEATED FOR INFO: IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN (FOR PS/10 AND PS)  
YOUR TELEGRAM NO.968 : FALKLANDS : SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE  
OF 5 JUNE

1. FOLLOWING IS AGREED PRESS LINE:-  
BEGINS

'I CAN CONFIRM THAT THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 5 JUNE CONVEYING SOME REVISED SUGGESTIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS NOT PUBLISHED THE DETAILS AND IT IS NOT FOR US TO DO SO.

THE FOLLOWING DAY WE RESPONDED THANKING HIM FOR HIS CONTINUING EFFORTS. HIS SUGGESTIONS COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED FOR THE REASONS EXPLAINED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON 8 JUNE: THEY DID NOT PROVIDE UNEQUIVOCALLY FOR IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 502 WHICH IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR A CEASEFIRE.

THE PROPOSALS WERE REJECTED BY THE ARGENTINES.

THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE REPEATED HER OFFER TO FACILITATE THE WITHDRAWAL WITH SAFETY, DIGNITY AND DESPATCH.'

ENDS

PYM

NNNN

SENT AT 10/0230Z MCH



FOBONN 064/09

PP BONN

GRS 250

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MADRID 091203Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 330 OF 9 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY LISBON, BONN,

INFO ROUTINE GOVERNOR GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL)

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 197 : MESSAGE TO SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I TOOK ACTION ON RECEIPT OF TUR WITH THE HEAD OF PEREZ LLORCA'S PRIVATE OFFICE ON 8 JUNE. SOIGNIE SAID THAT HIS MINISTER WOULD BE GRATIFIED WITH THIS MESSAGE, THOUGH HE HAD A GOOD DEAL ON HIS PLATE AT THE MOMENT (BY IMPLICATION ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRONT AS WELL AS EXTERNAL). PEREZ LLORCA LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING YOU IN BONN ON 10 JUNE BEFORE LUNCH. I STRESSED THE VALUE OF THIS PERSONAL CONTACT AND DREW SOIGNIE'S ATTENTION PARTICULARLY TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR MESSAGE.

2. SOIGNIE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD TURN OUR ATTENTION TO PRACTICAL DETAILS OF THE SINTRA MEETING AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT. HE ASSUMED THAT ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS TO REACTIVATE THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE POSTPONED 20 APRIL MEETING. BUT HE DID NOT KNOW IF ANY STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN EG TO BOOK HOTEL ROOMS. I SAID THAT WE TOO WOULD HAVE THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN MIND AND OFFERED TO GET IN TOUCH ABOUT THIS EARLY NEXT WEEK.

3. THE SPANISH PRESS TODAY MAKES SOME PLAY ON MRS THATCHER'S REPLY TO A PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION ON 8 JUNE, POINTING TO HER DEFENCE OF SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY DESPITE SPAIN'S MORAL SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA AND QUOTING HER HOPE THAT, ON THE SPANISH SIDE, RESTRICTIONS ON GIBRALTAR WOULD BE LIFTED. THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT DAY IS NOT MENTIONED.

MAUD

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GRS 600

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ROME 091535Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 307 OF 09 JUN 82

INFO PRIORITY BONN

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS BUENOS AIRES

MY TELNO 296: FALKLANDS: ITALIAN REPORTING ON ARGENTINA

1. BARBARANI TODAY SHOWED US A FURTHER SERIES OF TELEGRAMS FROM BUENOS AIRES, DATED 2-7 JUNE.

CUBA

2. KOCIANCICH COMMENTS THAT COSTA MENDEZ WAS CAREFUL ABOUT THE WAY HE PRESENTED HIS TRIP TO HAVANA FOR THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING, STRESSING TO HIS DOMESTIC AUDIENCE THAT IT IMPLIED NO CHANGE IN ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN POLICY. HIS STATEMENT ABOUT POSSIBLE READMISSION OF CUBA TO THE OAS HAD DELIBERATELY BEEN GIVEN LITTLE PROMINENCE INSIDE ARGENTINA. HIS FRIENDLINESS TOWARDS CASTRO HAD NEVERTHELESS BEEN CRITICISED IN THE ARGENTINE PRESS: MANY ARGENTINES REGARDED CUBA WITH REPULSION AS A SOVIET TOOL.

ECONOMY

3. KOCIANCICH SAW ALEMANN ON 3 JUNE. ALEMANN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO HIS POLICY OF AUSTERITY. THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLATION (30 PER CENT IN THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF 1982) HAD GONE WELL. BUT BECAUSE OF THE WAR, THE ATTEMPT TO CONTAIN PUBLIC SPENDING HAD BEEN GIVEN UP, AND HE COULD NOT NOW PREVENT INFLATION RISING. HE HOPED FOR A RAPID RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS TO PERMIT HIS ECONOMIC PLAN TO BE RESUMED.

4. ALEMANN DESCRIBED US AND EUROPEAN SANCTIONS AS INEFFECTIVE. ARGENTINA HAD DIVERTED EXPORTS OF GRAIN, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT OF MEAT, TO THE USSR, VENEZUELA, IRAN, AND PANAMA. EXPORTS FOR 1982 SHOULD BE DOLLARS 9.5 BILLION AND IMPORTS DOLLARS 6.5 BILLION. THE SURPLUS WOULD PAY INTEREST ON ARGENTINA'S DEBTS. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT TOUCH RESERVES TO REPAY CAPITAL, BUT WOULD NEGOTIATE A DIFFERENT DEBT STRUCTURE WITH ARGENTINA'S CREDITORS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN NEW LONG TERM LOANS. ARGENTINA HAD NO INTENTION AT PRESENT OF SEEKING IMF CREDITS. KOCIANCICH COMMENTS THAT TOO MUCH OF ARGENTINA'S PRESENT DEBT IS SHORT TERM, WITH A THIRD OF THE TOTAL OF DOLLARS 38 BILLION FALLING DUE THIS YEAR.

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GALTIERI

5. THE WELL KNOWN ITALIAN JOURNALIST, ORIANA FALLACI, GAVE KOCIANCICH AN ACCOUNT OF HER RECENT INTERVIEW WITH GALTIERI, SOON TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE WASHINGTON POST AND THE TIMES. GALTIERI WAS TENSE AND TIRED. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD RESIGN BEFORE THE END OF HIS MANDATE IN 1984 IF THAT WERE IN THE INTERESTS OF ARGENTINA. HE ADMITTED TO HAVING MISJUDGED THE BRITISH AND US REACTION TO THE ARGENTINE INVASION. PRESSED TO DEFEND HIS CHARGE OF BRITISH COLONIALISM, HE FELL BACK INSTEAD ON THE ARGUMENT OF GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY TO JUSTIFY ARGENTINA'S ACTION. ASKED TO SAY HOW LONG ARGENTINA WOULD WAIT FOR RECOGNITION OF HER SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH NEGOTIATION, HE MERELY SAID "NOT ANOTHER 150 YEARS". WHEN FALLACI TOOK THE FALL OF PORT STANLEY FOR GRANTED, HE DID NOT CORRECT HER, COMMENTING ONLY THAT THE BRITISH HAD LOST AT DUNKIRK BUT WON FOUR YEARS LATER.

6. ASKED ABOUT ARGENTINA'S INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENT, GALTIERI SAID THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOT SPURN ANY OFFER OF ASSISTANCE, BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN OBLIGED TO SEEK IT. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON ARMS SUPPLIES FROM LIBYA OR ISRAEL.

7. ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS, GALTIERI ADMITTED THAT THE NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES HAD DAMAGED ARGENTINA'S IMAGE ABROAD, BUT SAID THAT THIS "DIRTY WAR" HAD BEEN FORCED ON THE COUNTRY BY THE TERRORISTS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE ISSUE WAS CLOSED. HE PROFESSED A DESIRE TO RETURN TO DEMOCRACY, BUT GAVE NO DETAILS.

8. FALLACI SPOKE TO KOCIANCICH IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, AND HIS REPORTING TELEGRAM IS CLASSIFIED SECRET. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THIS SHOULD NOT BE REVEALED, EVEN AFTER THE INTERVIEW HAS BEEN PUBLISHED.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

ARCULUS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

S. AM. D.  
WED  
CABINET OFFICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

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CONFIDENTIAL

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]



Z BONN

GRS 270

CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM FCO 092130Z JUN 82  
 TO FLASH BONN  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 294 OF 9 JUNE

*AS:*

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF EMERGENCY UNIT WAS RECEIVED FROM BRASILIA TELEGRAM NO 263 OF 9/6.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (DESKBY 092100Z)

MY TELNO 258: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 4 P.M. (=091900Z) AND SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING RULING:

(A) THAT THE ARMAMENTS (IE THE MISSILE) TRANSPORTED ON THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE RETAINED IN BRAZIL UNTIL THE END OF THE CONFLICT:

(B) THAT THE VULCAN ITSELF SHOULD BE HANDED BACK TO BRITAIN IN RETURN FOR A WRITTEN UNDERTAKING FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD PLAY NO FURTHER PART IN WARLIKE OPERATIONS IN THE MALVINAS (CF THE IDEA PUT BY SIR A ACLAND TO AMBASSADOR CAMPOS - YOUR TELNO 169). A NOTE FROM ME TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE.

(C) THAT THE DECISION AT (B) WAS PURELY AD HOC AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE.

(D) THAT, IN VIEW OF THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, BRAZIL WOULD PAY NO ATTENTION TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE BOUT DE PAPIER WHICH I HANDED OVER ON 5 JUNE (PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF TUR REFERS).

2. GUERREIRO SAID HE WOULD INFORM THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR SOON ABOUT THIS DECISION. HE HOPED THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD SWALLOW IT: BUT HE WOULD NOT GIVE THEM THE OPTION OF OBJECTING. NOTHING WOULD BE SAID TO THE PRESS UNTIL OUR REPLY HAD BEEN RECEIVED.

3. ACTION NOW LIES WITH US. IF YOU CAN LET ME HAVE RAPID AUTHORITY TO SEND A NOTE TO GUERREIRO IN THE APPROPRIATE TERMS (WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO SPECIFY), I CAN ARRANGE TO TRANSMIT IT TO ITAMARATY TONIGHT. IT MAY THEN TAKE SOME HOURS FOR THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT MACHINE TO TRANSLATE THEIR AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE INTO THE PRACTICAL MEASURES NEEDED TO ALLOW THE VULCAN TO DEPART, MORE PARTICULARLY AS TOMORROW IS A PUBLIC HOLIDAY THROUGHOUT BRAZIL (CORPUS CHRISTI).

5. I SUSPECT THAT THE BRAZILIANS WOULD BE QUITE GLAD TO GET THE VULCAN AWAY FROM GALEAO BEFORE THE POPE ARRIVES THERE AT 4 A.M. LOCAL TIME ON FRIDAY EN ROUTE FOR ARGENTINA. IT IS A BIZARRE AND NOT A PARTICULARLY HAPPY COINCIDENCE THAT ASTIZ WILL BE ARRIVING AT RIO ON BRITISH CALEDONIAN'S FRIDAY MORNING FLIGHT ONLY TWO HOURS LATER.

PYM



FOBONN 071/09

Z BONN

SRS 407

SECRET

FM FCO 091710Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 9 JUNE.

FOR PS/NO 10 AND PRIVATE SECRETARY

FALKLANDS: SITREP

DIPLOMATIC.

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS DECIDED TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT OF HIS LAST INITIATIVE, HIS APPEAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT GALTIERI, BUT NOT THE DETAILS. (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 968, COPIED TO BONN.) WE ARE AGREEING THE LINE TO TAKE ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT WITH UKMIS NEW YORK.

SEE  
BEHIND

2. BONN TELNOS 538 AND 539 REPORT THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE LIKELY TO CANCEL ORDERS FOR GERMAN WARSHIPS.

3. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE SS UGANDA REPORTING THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE WITHDRAWN PERMISSION FOR TWO ICRC REPRESENTATIVES TO LAND IN PORT STANLEY FROM THE BAHIA PARAISO.

*Paragraph 4 deleted and retained under*

*Section 3(4).*

*Wayland*

*11 September 2012*

5. THERE FOLLOWS THE SITREP AS RECEIVED FROM MOD.

SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION SUTTON AS AT 1700A 9 JUNE 82

6. THE PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEF IS TO UPDATE EVENTS OF OPERATION SUTTON SINCE OD(SA) MEETING AM 9 JUNE 82.

OWN FORCES

7. NO CHANGES NOTIFIED.

INCIDENTS

8. LIBERIAN TANKER HERCULES. FOLLOWING THE BOMBING INCIDENT OF THE LIBERIAN TANKER HEPCULES AT 081400Z, USHUAIA RADIO WAS HEARD BY UGANDA, HECLA AND HYDRA AT 081730 FOR 30 MINUTES REPEATING THE MESSAGE:

QUOTE. STEER 270 TO MAKE ARGENTINE PORT. IF CANNOT MAKE ARGENTINE PORT YOU WILL BE ATTACKED IN 15 MINUTES. UNQUOTE.

9. A SECOND ATTACK, AS REPORTED BY THE MASTER OF HERCULES, TOOK PLACE SHORTLY AFTER THIS MESSAGE.

10. HYDRA HAS BEEN DIVERTED TO RENDER ASSISTANCE: ETA 092300Z.

11. ENEMY LOSSES SUSTAINED DURING EVE 8 JUNE. A TOTAL OF 7 AIRCRAFT (POSSIBLY 8 AS PLYMOUTH WAS ONLY CREDITED WITH ONE KILL IN CTF'S SITREP BUT 2 KILLS IN HER OWN INCIDENT REPORT) AND 4 POSSIBLE KILLS.

ACCIDENTS.

12. GR3 HARRIER. CTF SITREP UPDATE OF 0715A 9JUNE RECORDED THAT THE PILOT WAS UNHURT WHEN A GR3 HARRIER ENGINE LOST POWER ON TAKE OFF AND THE AIRCRAFT HIT THE GROUND AT THE FORWARD OPERATING BASE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS INITIALLY ASSESSED AS A WRITE-OFF: FURTHER INSPECTION LATER TODAY.

CASUALTIES.

13. NONE NOTIFIED.

INTENTIONS.

14. NONE NOTIFIED.

PYM

NNNN



RR TRAFFIC RELAY

GRS 410

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 091430Z

FM BONN 091300Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 539 OF 09 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR HD/DS11, HD/DS 13, RMD4 AND PIC ARMS CONTROL CELL) AND CINCFLEET.

ARMS FOR ARGENTINA: ORDERS FOR GERMAN WARSHIPS

1. COUNSELLOR (DEFENCE SUPPLY) HAS BEEN SHOWN BY AUSWAETIGES AMT TELEGRAMS FROM GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES WHICH REPORT THAT:

(A) ON 27 MAY EMBASSY WERE INFORMED THAT ARGENTINE C-IN-C NAVY HAD DECIDED TO TERMINATE ALL CONTRACTS WITH GERMAN SHIPYARDS BECAUSE OF ARMS EMBARGO AND INTERRUPTION OF SUPPLIES FOR CORVETTES BEING CONSTRUCTED IN ARGENTINA. AN ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUP HAD BEEN SET UP WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THIS DECISION, WHICH APPLIED TO THE FRIGATES, CORVETTE AND SUBMARINE PROGRAMMES. AMBASSADOR ASSESSED THAT THE DECISION WAS FIRM, AND THAT ALTHOUGH THE DETAILS MIGHT BE MODIFIED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH FIRMS CONCERNED, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE TOTAL SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMME WOULD BE TERMINATED. HE ASSESSED THE VALUE OF THE BUSINESS AT RISK AT MORE THAN DM 3 BILLION OVER 8 YEARS, EQUAL TO THE TOTAL VALUE OF GERMAN EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA FOR ONE AND A HALF YEARS:

(B) LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THYSSEN GROUP (THE MAJORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF BOTH THYSSEN NORDSEEWERKE, THE SUBMARINE BUILDERS, AND BLOHM AND VOSS, CONTRACTORS FOR THE FRIGATES AND CORVETTES) WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THAT DECISION TO TERMINATE CONTRACTS WITH GERMAN SHIPYARDS HAD BEEN TAKEN, THOUGH NOT YET IMPLEMENTED. ARGENTINES HAD DECIDED THAT THE NEXT INSTALMENT PAYMENT FOR THE SHIPS DUE ON 19 APRIL, SHOULD NOW BE RE-SCHEDULED FOR 10 JULY AND SUBSEQUENT PAYMENT DATES POSTPONED CORRESPONDINGLY. THIS FOLLOWED ARGENTINE THREATS TO A VISITING REPRESENTATIVE OF THYSSEN THAT CONTRACTS WOULD BE TERMINATED IF OVERDUE SUPPLIES FOR THE CORVETTES UNDER CONSTRUCTION WERE NOT RELEASED WITHOUT DELAY.

2. ALTHOUGH ARGENTINE NAVY HAD IMPLIED THAT SIMILAR ACTION COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE OTHER ARMED FORCES, AUSWAERTIGES AMT ASSES DECISION TO CANCEL AS AN INTERNAL ONE BY THE NAVY, NOT YET IMPLEMENTED AND POSSIBLY NOT YET AGREED BY OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. THEY SUSPECT THE ARGENTINES HOPE TO BE IN A POSITION BY 10 JULY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT GERMAN FIRMS ARE IN BREACH OF CONTRACT AND THEN TO SEEK TO ESCAPE FROM THE CONTRACTS WITH MINIMUM FINANCIAL PENALTY TO THEMSELVES. THE GERMANS ARE WATCHING THE POSITION WITH CONCERN AND WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH THYSSEN HOW TO PROTECT THE LATTER'S POSITION. THEY MAY WELL WISH TO DISCUSS FURTHER WITH US IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. I UNDERSTAND THAT WE CAN EXPECT INSTRUCTIONS SHORTLY ON THE RELATED QUESTION OF THE INTERRUPTION OF BRITISH SUPPLIES FOR THESE SHIPS. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL ALSO FOR GUIDANCE ON LINE TO TAKE IN FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ON THE ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS.

4. I WILL TELEGRAPH FULLER SUMMARY OF GERMAN EMBASSY REPORTS LATER.

TAYLOR

NNNN



RR CINC FLEET

RR TFC RELAY

GRS 730  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM BONN 091251Z JUNE 82  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 538 OF 9 JUNE  
AND TO ROUTINE MODUK CINC FLEET

MOD FOR HEAD OF DS 11, HEAD OF DS 13, RMD 4 AND DIC (ARMS CONTROL CELL).

ARMS FOR ARGENTINA: ORDERS FOR GERMAN WARSHIPS. MY TELNO 539

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF THREE REPORTING TELS FROM GERMAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES.

2. THE FIRST DATED 28 MAY REPORTED THAT THE GERMAN DEFENCE ATTACHE HAD BEEN SUMMONED THE PREVIOUS DAY TO THE ARGENTINE NAVAL STAFF WHERE HE WAS INFORMED BY ADMIRAL GIRLING THAT THE NAVAL COMMANDER IN CHIEF HAD DECIDED TO TERMINATE ALL THE CONTRACTS WITH GERMAN SHIP YARDS ON ACCOUNT OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AND THE INTERRUPTIONS OF SUPPLIES FOR THE CORVETTES BEING CONSTRUCTED IN ARGENTINA. AT THIS MEETING GIRLING HAD REITERATED THE ALREADY KNOWN ARGENTINE DISPLEASURE OVER GERMAN REFUSAL TO SUPPLY 20MM (RHEINMETALL) CANNON. HE HAD INFORMED THE GERMAN DA THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WAS CONSIDERED TO BE AN UNRELIABLE PARTNER. THE TELEGRAM REPORTED THAT AN ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUP HAD BEEN SET UP WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THIS DECISION, WHICH APPLIED TO THE FRIGATE, CORVETTE AND SUBMARINE PROGRAMMES. THE DECISION APPEARED TO THE EMBASSY TO HAVE FOLLOWED THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH DR SANDEMANN, A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE THYSSEN GROUP HELD IN BUENOS AIRES A FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY.

3. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ASSESSED THAT THE ARGENTINE NAVY'S DECISION WAS FIRM, BUT COULD NOT SAY WHETHER DETAILS MIGHT BE MODIFIED IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH GERMAN FIRMS. IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE TOTAL SHIP BUILDING PROGRAMME WOULD BE TERMINATED. THE AMBASSADOR WAS OF THE VIEW THAT THE ARMS EMBARGO WAS THUS RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE OF THE MOST SPECTACULAR BREAKS EVER IN GERMAN-ARGENTINE TRADE RELATIONS. THE VALUE OF THE BUSINESS AFFECTED TOTALS MORE THAN DM3 BILLION SPREAD OVER 8 YEARS, WHICH WAS EQUAL TO THE TOTAL VALUE OF GERMAN EXPORTS (TO ARGENTINA) FOR ONE AND A HALF YEARS.

4. THE ARGENTINE ADMIRAL HAD ALSO IMPLIED IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GERMAN DA THAT FURTHER SIMILAR ACTION COULD BE EXPECTED BY THE OTHER ARGENTINE SERVICES. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT JAPAN AND ITALY WOULD STEP IN AS ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS THOUGH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES MIGHT ALSO BE WILLING. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT INDICATIONS THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOW BE SEEKING ARMS SUPPLIES FROM THE EASTERN BLOC, HE BELIEVED THAT THE DECISION TO TERMINATE THE SHIP BUILDING PROGRAMME WAS INFLUENCED BY A REALISATION IN ARGENTINA THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PURSUE THE WAR WITH SURFACE SHIPS AFTER THE LOSS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE MAIN ARGENTINE PRIORITY WOULD BE FOR NEW AIRCRAFT AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE IN THE POSITION TO PAY FOR AIRCRAFT AND CONTINUE WITH THE SHIP BUILDING PROGRAMME AT THE SAME TIME. THIS PROBABLY EXPLAINED WHY THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOME FINANCIAL PENALTY AS A RESULT OF THE TERMINATION OF THE SHIP BUILDING PROGRAMME. THE DECISION WAS ALSO AN INDICATION THAT ARGENTINA INTENDED TO MAINTAIN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST BRITAIN ON A LONG TERM BASIS AFTER THE RE-TAKING OF THE ISLANDS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION BECAME MORE DISTANT THE GREATER THE BRITISH MILITARY SUCCESS. THE AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED BY DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE GENERAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGENTINE ATTITUDE. ITS EFFECT ON THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION



UNITED KINGDOM AND THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION BECAME MORE DISTANT THE GREATER THE BRITISH MILITARY SUCCESS. THE AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED BY DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE GENERAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGENTINE ATTITUDE, ITS EFFECT ON THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO NATO AND HENCE INDIRECTLY GERMANY'S OWN SECURITY.

5. THE SECOND TELEGRAM (ALSO DATED 28TH MAY) REPORTED THAT DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT DR SANDEMANN, OF THE THYSSEN GROUP (THE MAJORITY SHARE HOLDERS OF BOTH THYSSEN NORDSEEWERKE, THE SUBMARINE BUILDERS, AND BLOHM AND VOSS, CONTRACTORS FOR THE FRIGATES AND CORVETTES) WAS PRESSED ABOUT THE OVERDUE SUPPLIES FOR THE CORVETTES WHICH THE ARGENTINES DEMANDED SHOULD BE RELEASED WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY, THOUGH MORE FOR REASONS OF CONTINUITY OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE ARGENTINE SHIP YARDS THAN FOR MILITARY REASONS: AT THIS MEETING IT HAD BEEN IMPLIED THAT THE NAVY WERE LOSING INTEREST IN THE SHIP CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME, AND THE ARGENTINE SIDE HAD THREATENED THYSSEN THAT UNLESS SUPPLIES WERE RESUMED THEY WOULD BE OBLIGED TO TERMINATE THE CONTRACTS EITHER IN WHOLE OR PART.

6. THE THIRD TELEGRAM DATED 4TH JUNE REPORTED THAT THE LOCAL THYSSEN REPRESENTATIVE HAD SINCE BEEN INFORMED THAT A DECISION TO TERMINATE THE CONTRACTS WITH GERMAN SHIP YARDS HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE COMMANDER OF THE NAVY BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN IMPLEMENTED. THE ARGENTINES HAD DECIDED THAT THE NEXT INSTALLMENT PAYMENT FOR THE SHIPS WHICH DUE ON 19TH APRIL SHOULD NOW BE RE-SCHEDULED FOR THE 10TH JULY AND THAT ALL SUBSEQUENT PAYMENT DATES SHOULD BE POSTPONED SIMILARLY. THE EMBASSY EXPECTED THAT THE CURRENT UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE CONTRACTUAL POSITION WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL 10TH JULY.

TAYLOR

NNNN





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GRS 358

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 092350Z JUN 82

TO FLASH BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 183 OF 9 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, MODUK AIR.

YOUR TELNO 263: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. THIS IS GOOD NEWS.

2. (A) MOD AGREE THAT THE MISSILE CAN BE RETAINED IN BRAZIL UNTIL THE END OF THE CONFLICT, PROVIDED THAT IT IS STORED IN AN ACCEPTABLE ENVIRONMENT IE. AS IT IS NOW. WE SHOULD LIKE THE DA TO CONTINUE TO HOLD THE KEY. IF THE BRAZILIANS INSIST THAT IT SHOULD BE MOVED, PLEASE LET US KNOW.

(B) WE AGREE TO SIGN AN UNDERTAKING WITH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:-

'HMG UNDERTAKES THAT THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO.XM 597 WILL TAKE NO FURTHER PART IN THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE ARGENTINES.'

3. WE ARE HAPPY WITH POINTS (C) AND (D) IN YOUR TUR. WE DO NOT INTEND TO INITIATE ANY PRESS ENQUIRIES, BUT IF ON THE VULCAN'S RELEASE WE ARE ASKED ABOUT IT, WE AND THE MOD (SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS) INTEND TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE:-

''Q. HAS THE VULCAN BEEN RELEASED?

A. WE CAN CONFIRM THAT THE BRAZILIANS HAVE NOW RELEASED THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT WHICH HAD TO DIVERT TO BRAZIL LAST WEEK.

Q. ARE YOU PLEASED?

A. NATURALLY, WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE ALLOWED OUR AIRCRAFT TO LEAVE.

Q. HOW WAS THIS DONE?

A. THE AMBASSADOR HAS HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

Q. DID WE HAVE TO GIVE ANY ASSURANCES TO THE BRAZILIANS OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS THAT THE VULCAN WOULD NOT BE USED AGAIN IN HOSTILITIES CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS?

A. YES, WE GAVE ASSURANCES TO THE BRAZILIANS: THE DETAILS OF WHICH ARE CONFIDENTIAL.

Q. WHAT IS THE VULCAN GOING TO DO NOW?

A. THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE MOD.

Q. IS IT LEAVING ANY EQUIPMENT BEHIND?

A. THAT IS A MATTER FOR THE MOD.

Q. HAVE THE CREW BEEN WELL-TREATED?

A. THE AMBASSADOR SAYS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN OFFERED EVERY COURTESY.'

4. IN YOUR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRAZILIANS, WE WOULD NOT OF COURSE WISH YOU TO SAY ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT GIVE THEM THE IMPRESSION THAT OUR CONCERN HAS IN ANY WAY LESSENED AT THE USE OF RECIFE FOR THE CONTINUING PASSAGE OF ARMS SUPPLIES FOR ARGENTINA.

PYM



GRS 205

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 091845Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 179 OF 9 JUNE,

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA AND MODUK (DS 11 AND SCPL)

MY TELNO 176: LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ

1. IN THE EVENT THE BRAZILIANS WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASTIZ DURING THE FLIGHT AND WE HAVE THEREFORE ARRANGED TO PUT HIM ON A BRITISH CALEDONIAN FLIGHT (BR 661) LEAVING AT 2100 HOURS TOMORROW AND ARRIVING AT RIO AT 0535 LOCAL. THE BRAZILIANS HAVE ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS CUSTODY AS SOON AS HE LANDS IN BRAZIL. SINCE THE PLANE STAGES THROUGH RECIFE WE HAVE ASKED THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY TO ENSURE THAT HE DOES NOT DISEMBARK THERE, AND THAT APPROPRIATE RECEPTION ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE AT RIO. THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY HERE HAS ACCEPTED THESE ARRANGEMENTS, SUBJECT TO FIANL CONFIRMATION, BUT YOU MAY WISH TO CHECK WITH THE ITAMARATY (MINISTER SARDENBERG IN THE MINISTER'S OFFICE HAS BEEN DEALING WITH THE SUBJECT).
2. ASTIZ WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN UNARMED ESCORT, MAJOR PETER ANDREWS, WHO HAS BEEN WITH HIM SINCE ASCENSION. PLEASE ASK RIO TO MEET AND ACCOMMODATE HIM. ANDREWS WILL RETURN TO THE UK A DAY OR TWO LATER.
3. THE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS STILL APPLY AND NO STATEMENT WILL BE MADE TO THE PRESS UNTIL THE PLANE HAS LEFT.

PYM

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PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
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 RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]

[Typists a.a.]

UNCLASSIFIED

(FM BERNE 100840Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 152 OF 9 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO BRASILIA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK  
MOTEBVIDEO

BRESS SUMMARY

1. ALL PAPERS HEADLINE WHAT IS TERMED A SERIOUS BRITISH SETBACK AT FITZROY SETTLEMENT: QUOTE SERIOUS BRITISH LOSSES IN LANDING ATTEMPT UNQUOTE (LA NACION). QUOTE FRIGATE SUNK AND THREE OTHER SHIPS DESTROYED UNQUOTE (ALL PAPERS).
2. GALTIERI'S STATEMENT IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE MADRID DAILY "YA" ARE CARRIED IN THE LEADING PAPERS: QUOTE ARGENTINA WILL NOT ACCEPT A RETURN TO THE STATUS OF 1 APRIL IN THE MALVINAS...



NOT ACCEPT A RETURN TO THE STATUS OF 1 APRIL IN THE MALVINAS... BUT IS WILLING TO WITHDRAW HER FORCES AT THE SAME PACE AS THE BRITISH, LEAVING A UN ADMINISTRATOR TO GOVERN THE ISLANDS UNQUOTE. LA NACION HEADLINES HIS ASSERTION THAT ARGENTINA QUOTE IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE WAR FOR AS MANY MONTHS AND YEARS AS NECESSARY UNQUOTE.

3. HEADLINE ATTENTION IS ALSO GIVEN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SUPPORT FOR BRITISH ACTION BEFORE PARLIAMENT.

4. ON THE INTERNAL FRONT THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, SAINT JEAN, ANNOUNCED THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF 128 PEOPLE AND RELEASE ON PAROLE OF A FURTHER 116 TO MARK THE PAPAL VISIT. HE POINTED OUT THAT OF THE 8'737 DETAINED SINCE THE CONTINUING STATE OF SIEGE WAS DECREED IN 1974, ONLY 475 REMAIN IN DETENTION OF WHICH 262 HAVE NOT YET BEEN TRIED OR SENTENCED.

5. CLARIN REPORTS THAT THE 5-PARTY GROUPING KNOWN AS THE "MULTI-PARTIDARIA" (PERONISTS, RADICALS, CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATS, "DES-ARROLLISTAS" AND INTRANSIGENTS) WILL PUBLISH AN EMERGENCY PLAN, OR DRAFT GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME, NEXT THUESDAY FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION IF ACCEPTED BY THE ARMED FORCES. THE RADICAL LEADER, CONTIN, INSISTED THAT IT WAS NOT A PROPOSAL FOR A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF CURRENT POLITICAL MANOEUVERING TO PREPARE FOR A POST-HOSTILITIES PERIOD WHEN THE JUNTA MAY BE PREPARED TO PERMIT FURTHER CIVIL PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT. THERE IS, HOWEVER, LITTLE SIGN YET THAT THE JUNTA IS WILLING TO BE HURRIED OVER THIS.

JOY 9.6

POWELL-JONES

NNNNN

SENT AT RED AT 100956Z TWPM







WE EXPECT TO DISCUSS THIS WITH OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS ON 14 JUNE AND WOULD BE GLAD OF YOUR VIEWS BY THEN. (FOR ALL) IF OUR JOINT CONSIDERATION RESULTS IN AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LINK BETWEEN THE CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES AND THE LIFTING OF ECONOMIC MEASURES, WE COULD DISCUSS WAYS OF BRINGING THIS TO THE NOTICE OF THE ARGENTINES, SO THAT THEY CAN DRAW THE CONSEQUENCES. IN PARALLEL, THE ARGENTINES COULD ALSO BE TOLD THAT THE ENDING OF HOSTILITIES WILL ENSURE THE EARLY RETURN OF THEIR PRISONERS TAKEN IN THE FALKLANDS. THIS COULD EXERT A STRONG PRESSURE ON THEM TO ABANDON THEIR AGGRESSION AND RESTORE PEACEFUL RELATIONS. 5. (FOR EC MEMBERS) I LOOK FORWARD TO THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN US ON THIS. (FOR OTHERS) I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS. (FOR ALL) MEANWHILE, UNTIL WE HAVE HAD OUR CONSULTATIONS I HOPE WE COULD ALL BE CAREFUL NOT TO PREJUDGE THEIR OUTCOME AND IN PARTICULAR AVOID SAYING ANYTHING IN PUBLIC WHICH COULD LEAD TO AN APPEARANCE OF DISUNITY AMONG US OR SEND THE WRONG SIGNALS TO ARGENTINA.

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IF IMMEDIATE SUBJECTS  
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FO/CB BONN 082/9

PP BONN

GRS 352

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 091600Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 122 OF 9 JUNE 1982

FALKLANDS: THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY

1. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE DRAWN UPON FREELY. GUIDANCE TELEGRAMS 71, 101, 107 AND 113 ALSO REFER.
2. ON 26 MAY THE ARGENTINE CENTRAL BANK ANNOUNCED THAT, WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT, PAYMENTS FOR IMPORTED GOODS COULD ONLY BE MADE AFTER 180 DAYS FROM SHIPMENT DATE. IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA ARE NOT AFFECTED. THIS MEASURE IS AIMED AT SAVING FOREIGN CURRENCY TO MEET NEEDS ARISING FROM THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT. IT FOLLOWS A SERIES OF OTHER MEASURES WITH A SIMILAR OBJECTIVE AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ARGENTINES FACE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN MEETING THEIR FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITMENTS.
3. ARGENTINA STILL HAS TO FIND PURCHASERS FOR PART OF HER LARGE HARVEST OF COARSE GRAINS, MAINLY MAIZE AND SORGHUM. THE ARGENTINES HAVE ONLY LIMITED STORAGE FACILITIES AND NEED TO KEEP THE COARSE GRAIN MOVING ON TO BULK FREIGHTERS AT BAHIA BLANCA, THEIR MAIN GRAIN PORT. THIS IS LIKELY TO PROVE DIFFICULT. CHILLED BEEF, ANOTHER VALUABLE EXPORT, HAS ALSO BEEN HARD HIT BY EC SANCTIONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF THE UK.
4. ON 26 MAY MR CHRISTOPHER MCMAHON, DEPUTY GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND, SPEAKING AT A FOREIGN BANKERS' CONFERENCE IN LONDON, SAID THAT BRITAIN'S FINANCIAL SANCTIONS WERE 'WHOLLY EFFECTIVE' AND HAD BEEN 'ACCOMPANIED BY A SEVERE CONTRACTION ON GENERAL PRUDENTIAL GROUNDS IN THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT AVAILABLE TO ARGENTINA'.
5. ON 1 JUNE THE FORMER JUSTICIALIST MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY, ANTONIO CARIERO, PREDICTED THAT 'THE EMERGENCY THE REPUBLIC IS EXPERIENCING WORSENERD BY THE MALVINAS CRISIS AND THE BLOCKADE IMPOSED ON US FROM ABROAD, WILL REQUIRE HEROIC METHODS FOR A VERY LONG PERIOD OF TIME'.
6. ON 1 APRIL THE OFFICIAL RATE OF THE PESO WAS 11,675 TO THE US DOLLAR. ON 5 MAY THE PESO WAS DEVALUED TO 14,000 TO THE DOLLAR. IT HAS NOW FALLEN TO 14,850 TO THE DOLLAR AND UNOFFICIAL RATES HAVE REACHED 28,000 TO THE DOLLAR.
7. ARGENTINE SOURCES EXPECT A NEW PACKAGE OF EMERGENCY ECONOMIC MEASURES, DRAWN UP BY DR ALEMANN, THE CURRENT ECONOMY MINISTER, TO BE MADE PUBLIC SOON.

PYM

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*MoCS + N/A*





Die A75

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE  
FALKLANDS OPERATION

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute A08597 of 8 June 1982, and she is content for you to write to Lord Chalfont about his offer of his services to write an official account of the operations in the Falkland Islands in the terms of the draft attached to your minute.

You may like to know that Sir Philip Goodhart has also indicated that he would like to write such an account.

JAW.

9 June 1982

A75



CONFIDENTIAL



*Die AH*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

9 June 1982

*Dear John,*

FALKLAND ISLANDS : LIKELY LATIN AMERICAN  
ATTITUDES TO BRITISH ACTION AGAINST THE  
ARGENTINE MAINLAND

The Prime Minister has seen and noted, without comment, your letter of 8 June 1982 to John Coles in which you provided an assessment of likely Latin American activities in the event of British military action against the Argentine mainland.

*Yours m,*

*Anne Whitmore.*

John Holmes Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*AH*





Prime Minister.

AKH  
10/6

From the Secretary of State

John Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

9 June 1982

Dear John,

FUTURE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

In your letter of 26 May to John Holmes you said that the Prime Minister would like to have Lord Cockfield's comments on Mr Hunt's paper and the reactions of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Since you wrote, we understand that Lord Shackleton has been asked to up-date his 1976 assessment. Lord Cockfield thinks Mr Hunt's paper should provide Lord Shackleton and his team with some interesting and worthwhile ideas to follow up. I attach a paper by Department of Trade officials, which Lord Cockfield has approved, concentrating on communications and tourism.

The Secretary of State would be glad to know whether the Prime Minister would wish him to follow up any of the suggestions in the paper, especially the proposed consultancy on the prospects for tourism.

I am copying this letter to Sir Michael Palliser and John Holmes.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN RHODES  
Private Secretary





## Future Economic Development of the Falkland Islands:

Note by Department of Trade officials

### INTRODUCTION

For the purposes of this note it is assumed that there will be an end to military hostilities once we have resecured possession of the Falklands Islands; that although regular communications with Argentina may not be restored in the foreseeable future, communications with other parts of the mainland will be possible. Without the achievement of these conditions, substantial public investment would be hard to justify and private investment is unlikely to be forthcoming.

### CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

2 Until the invasion, a weekly service by F27 or F28 aircraft (with capacity of between 50 and 75 passengers a flight) was operated between Port Stanley and Comodoro Rivadavia in Argentina by LADE, the commercial wing of the Argentine Air Force. Typically, around 25-30 passengers and some cargo were carried on each flight. It can be assumed that this service was not run as a commercial enterprise. When hostilities end, the early resumption of air services to the South American mainland will clearly be important, both as a link to the outside world for the islanders, and as a means of assisting the economic development of the islands, including tourism.

3 There appear to be two possible options: (i) short-haul flights to Punta Arenas in Southern Chile, and (ii) longer-haul flights to Montevideo or Southern Brazil (Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro).





4 The Punta Arenas option would be cheaper. This is because the present runway at Port Stanley could be used for service by turbo-prop aircraft (eg F27, HS748) or the smaller jets (eg F28), which are better suited than larger aircraft to likely traffic demand, at any rate for the time being. The annual operating cost of one or two services a week by an HS748 based at Port Stanley might be between £1½m and £2m, of which about £¼m might be recovered from passenger and freight charges. A charter service would be significantly cheaper, but it is doubtful whether suitable and reliable charter arrangements could be made on a long term basis in Punta Arenas.

5 There are, however, disadvantages with this option. The facilities of Punta Arenas, from the islanders' point of view, are limited, and the nearest international traffic point, for journeys to and from Europe and North America, is Santiago, 1400 miles to the North. Although there are regular daily services between Punta Arenas and Santiago, a fairly slow roundabout journey is inevitable. Moreover, the Argentines might cause trouble on the grounds that a Punta Arenas service operated within their claimed territorial limits: the state of relations with Argentina at the time would determine how great a problem this was.

6 A service to Montevideo or Southern Brazil would cost more but be a more convenient means of communication. Montevideo, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro offer much better facilities than Punta Arenas. All have direct air services to North America and Europe and Sao Paulo and Rio offer a direct connection with the British Caledonian service to London. A runway of 7000 feet would be required to enable the airline to achieve an economic payload: the capital cost of this and of the provision of the necessary navigational aids etc (which may in any case be needed for defence reasons) might be of the order of £17m.





7 The annual operating cost of one service a week to Montevideo by B737 aircraft based at Port Stanley might be of the order of £3½m, of which £0.35m might be recovered from passenger and freight charges. A regular charter operation would probably also be practical if somewhat less reliable, and significantly cheaper: a single round trip service a week might have an annual cost of around £0.7m, less recoveries from passengers and freight.

8 A number of other issues would have to be resolved before any of these services could start, including:-

- (i) The other Government would have to agree.

The only Air Services Agreement between ourselves and a South American country which gives traffic rights to a UK airline on a route from the Falklands is that with Uruguay. Even in that case there is potential for dispute on the grounds that the UK/Uruguayan Agreement has not been ratified. However, the South American Governments concerned are unlikely to have serious economic objections to the service, or at any rate not ones which could not be overcome by a royalty payment. The objections, if they appear, are likely to be primarily on political grounds.

- (ii) Arrangements would have to be made for the operation of the service. Unless the service is to depend on charters from a nearby South American country, arrangements would have to be made for the service to be run from Port Stanley. This would be beyond the capabilities of the existing Falkland Islands Government Air Service. Several UK airlines have experience in managing and operating airlines in third world countries on a contract basis. One such airline,





British Air Ferries, is already showing interest in an operation at Port Stanley.

- (iii) An open-ended subsidy would have to be provided. This is inevitable: but regular air services to the outside world are important to the economic future of the Falklands. It would be desirable to explore ways of reducing the subsidy, eg by dry-leasing aircraft during the Northern summer (or suspending a charter operation), if it were acceptable to discontinue the service during the Falklands winter.

9 The conclusion is that, if the necessary improvements to the runway and other airport facilities at Port Stanley are going to be made largely or entirely in any case on defence grounds, the possibility of direct service to Montevideo or Southern Brazil looks the more attractive. If, however, the costs of the airport improvements cannot be met from the defence budget or in other ways, the Punta Arenas option would be worth further investigation.

#### SEA TRANSPORT

10 Prior to the invasion, the sea service to the Falkland Islands was usually provided by the AES, a Danish vessel chartered by the Falkland Islands Company. The ship made about 4 round trips a year carrying supplies for the islanders on the outward trip from UK and wool on the return. It is understood that frequently on the fourth return journey the vessel was empty. Provided that the Falkland Islands Company intend to maintain the same frequency of services once hostilities cease, there would not appear to be an urgent need to seek new capacity. The provision of additional shipping capacity may in time become necessary as the economy expands. If for any reason additional capacity is required, it may be necessary to contemplate the provision of a subsidised service. Currently a Royal Mail service vessel provides a regular service between the UK and





St Helena with the aid of an annual subsidy of about £1½m a year.

#### TOURISM

11 There does appear to be some potential for further development of this industry which could make a modest contribution to the economic development of the Islands.

12 The main attraction for tourists, who are likely to come in the main from North America, is the wildlife and the remote scenery. Although some hotel development is clearly required, it may well be that some tourists attracted to this kind of holiday could more easily and readily be accommodated on farms and thus provide additional income for farmers' families.

13 It seems reasonable to expect some increase in business for the "Visit Antarctica" cruises which call in on the Falklands 3-4 times a year following the increased interest in the area which the dispute has stimulated. To make the Falkland Islands more attractive to cruise tourists some investment in new hotel and other facilities will be required and labour imported for the season (only about 3 months). Inevitably most of the business provided by the tourists will go to the offshore suppliers of goods and services and special attention will need to be given to ways, including the possibility of some form of tourist tax, to ensure that economic benefit accrues to the Islands.

14 In the Department's view it will be worth seeking specialist advice from tourism consultants. A preliminary discussion has already been held with Mr Bodlender, Managing Director of Horwath and Horwath and a member of the English Tourist Board, who believes that there could well be scope for development of smaller middle quality hotels providing facilities rather than extensive service. The British Tourist Authority have also indicated to the Falkland Islands Tourist Advisory Board that they will be very happy to provide advice and assistance for a nominal fee.





## AGRICULTURE

15 For the foreseeable future agriculture will remain the most important industry and must form the main basis for further development of the Islands. Mr Hunt has told the Department that a Grasslands Trial Unit funded by ODA has shown that there is potential for considerably improving sheep yields. It would seem well worthwhile tapping the considerable goodwill in New Zealand on the Falkland issue to make sure that the best expertise available is brought to bear on this problem.

16 The interest of Birds Eye Walls in purchasing surplus mutton could be followed up although it should be borne in mind that the Falkland Islands are outside the scope of the EC sheepmeat regime and would not therefore benefit from the substantial FEOGA support given to Community production. In particular, as far as MAFF are aware, there are no conventional EC or UK funds which could be used to assist the construction of an abattoir. The figure of £250,000 mentioned for this is also thought to be conservative, particularly given that long term cold storage facilities would probably also be required.

17 Sheepmeat exported to the EC from the Falkland Islands would be subject to a levy of 10 percent and a quota limit of 100 tonnes a year. Without detailed study MAFF initial reaction is that, in view of the transport problems, an operation on this scale is unlikely to be economic. New Zealand frozen sheepmeat is currently landed in this country at about £1300 per tonne. This price is enhanced by its reputation for quality which Falklands meat would probably not have.

## FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY (FIC)

18 It seems essential that particular attention should be paid to the future of the FIC in view of the dominant role that it plays in the economic life of the Islands. The extent to which the parent company is willing to increase substantially its





investment in the Islands will need to be determined and an effort made to see whether the FIC's reluctance to sell land cannot be modified. Given the importance of agricultural development it may be worth exploring whether one of the major companies which concentrate on agricultural marketing (like Dalgety) would be interested in taking over all or some of FIC activities from Coalite, for whom they are somewhat peripheral to their main business interests.

7 June 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0700 HOURS, 9 JUNE

IAEA

1. At the International Atomic Energy Authority board meeting in Vienna Admiral Castro-Madera (Argentina) criticised Britain's use of nuclear powered submarines in the Falklands conflict. The Argentine delegation are also seeking G77 support for a paper backing their position on anti-colonialist lines.

Military Action

2. The MOD issued a statement concerning an Argentine air attack on Task Force ships. HMS Plymouth, HMS Sir Tristram and HMS Sir Galahad sustained some damage. Two, possibly three, Argentine aircraft were shot down and at least four others were damaged.

Emergency Unit

9 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL



MOB STATEMENT AT 0700 HRS WEDNESDAY 9 JUNE 1982

We have reports of a further Argentine air attack at last light yesterday. Four Argentine Mirage aircraft attacking the Task Force were intercepted by two Sea Harriers. All the Mirages were brought down, while our aircraft returned safely.

We have no further details of British casualties or of the damage sustained by our Ships in yesterday's air attacks.



Argentina



UNCLASSIFIED

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION):  
0700 9 JUNE 1982

There have been no significant overnight developments on the diplomatic front.

R M Jackson  
9 June 1982



Ref: A08602



*Mr Coles (of R) A.J.C. 14/6*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

*Sir Robert Armstrong*

*as I was invited*

*not to show this to*

*the Prime Minister. [Signature]*

MR. COLES

I have received a copy of your letter of 5th June to Brian Fall recording the Prime Minister's debriefing on her discussion with other Heads of State and Government at the Versailles Summit on Friday, 4th June about the Falklands.

2. I had an opportunity of hearing from one of the Canadians to whom Mr. Trudeau had debriefed. The picture that emerged was slightly different. There was no doubt that all those present would support us in going on to take Port Stanley and repossess the Falkland Islands. The discussion made it clear, however, that we could not count on such support from that point on. There was a clear warning to us that others would be looking for action on our part which would make possible a complete cessation of hostilities. This was particularly true of President Reagan. There had been agreement on the idea that the lifting of sanctions could be used, after the fall of Port Stanley, to bring pressure to bear upon the Argentinians to agree to a total cessation of hostilities; but my informant said that Mr. Trudeau had suggested that we should strike while the iron was hot; support for this sort of idea might evaporate, and we should do well to follow the thought up quickly in capitals, before the memory of the discussion at Versailles receded too far into the past.

3. I am sending a copy of this minute to Brian Fall.

Robert Armstrong

8th June 1982

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 June 1982

*No - it doesn't  
ring true  
with*

Prime Minister.

*Agree to the message or  
play it?*

*the  
Pri*

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Message from the President of Colombia

The Colombian Ambassador delivered to the FCO on 3 June the enclosed message, dated 2 June, from the President of Colombia to the Prime Minister.

The letter makes no reference to the recent ceasefire proposal put together by the Presidents of Colombia, Peru and Brazil, but warns of the harmful repercussions on relations between Britain and Latin America if the final battle in the Falkland Islands causes a high death toll. It refers to the President's earlier message of 21 May, and the Prime Minister's reply of 25 May. I enclose copies of both.

Since the Argentine invasion, Colombia has been one of the more moderate of Latin American states, and abstained, along with the United States, Chile and Trinidad and Tobago, on both the resolutions adopted by the Rio Treaty States on 28 April and 29 May. We therefore consider that it would be appropriate if the Prime Minister replied. I enclose a suggested draft, in the form of a telegram to Bogota.

The Colombian Government circulated, with our permission, the previous exchange of messages between the President and the Prime Minister as documents of the Security Council. If they were to wish to do the same with the present exchange, we would see no objection.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)

Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister,  
Content with this  
message?

8 June, 1982

Dear John,

Wm  
8/6  
Yes no

A gift of £500,000 from the Government and people of the Cayman Islands was made to the Private Secretary to The Queen on 3 June by the Hon Dennis Foster, Chief Secretary of the Cayman Islands, as a gesture of support in the Falklands dispute. The Queen's Private Secretary has acknowledged the donation.

The gift is to be used for whatever purpose may be deemed appropriate. It is intended that it should be paid to the South Atlantic Fund.

This is a remarkable gesture from a dependent territory with a population of only 17,000. I enclose a draft message which the Prime Minister may wish to send to the Governor. It would most easily be despatched by telegram.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

John Holmes

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street



MESSAGE

DSR 11 (classified)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: G P Lloyd Esq CMG  
Governor  
Grand Cayman

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING


I should like to express our most sincere thanks for the very generous donation that the Cayman Islands have made in the crisis over the Falkland Islands.

.....In Confidence

We are deeply moved by the strength of the support of the Cayman Islands Government and people and for the encouragement and solidarity that you have shown by this quite remarkable gesture.

CAVEAT.....

Please convey to the Government and people of the Cayman Islands my personal appreciation and that of the British Government.



Enclosures—flag(s).....



Political commentary

# The Sheffield and Belgrano

Ferdinand Mount

The sinking of the *General Belgrano* changed everything. The argument in the House of Commons concerned the circumstances in which the British torpedo was launched. How far outside the exclusion zone and how far away from the task force was the Argentinian cruiser when she was fired on? And upon whose orders?

But what overhung the atmosphere and introduced intense foreboding was not the circumstances but the number of Argentinian sailors lost. At that time, 600 were feared dead. Later, the figure was mercifully reduced to nearer 250. It was these figures which set politicians like Denis Healey and David Steel making the inevitable comparison with the number of Falkland Islanders — at most 1,800 and fewer since the invasion. That equation was and is at the heart of the moral conditions upon which the task force was sent in the first place.

The sinking of HMS *Sheffield* adds up to 30 British lives to this equation. This, the worst British naval disaster since the Second World War, destroys at one terrible blow the curious illusion that Britain was to be condemned for inflicting such one-sided damage on the Argentinian forces. For 24 hours after the sinking of the *General Belgrano*, half the world appeared to have adopted the traditional British practice of taking the side of the underdog. Support for Britain was ebbing fast in Western Europe; in Latin America sympathy for the hitherto unpopular Argentinians was growing ominously. There was even vague talk of a conflict between the Hispanic and the Anglo-Saxon worlds.

But the equation is what matters to the British public, I suspect, as much as to the politicians. It is hard but true to say that public opinion might tolerate for several weeks a trickle of casualties from Harriers and Sea Kings as well as from Argentina's Mirages and Canberras. Opinion might even tolerate worse casualties in one final assault upon the islands themselves if that were clearly to be the end of the business. The sinking of a capital ship, however, and many of her crew towards the beginning of a blockade in which many more such losses are likely is something different. It appears to endanger the principle of using force only in proportion to the morally justifiable object.

That principle has been invoked again and again in this column since the dispatch of the task force. Proportionality is an ancient idea in ethics. But its application to modern warfare is especially crucial. To say that one of the most important decisions which has to be taken in 20th-century wars is when to stop fighting is not to 'take fright

at the first whiff of grapeshot' but rather to recognise that, whereas the outcome of many such wars as measured by their initial objectives is frequently blurred and somewhat indecisive the steeply rising costs incurred in men and matériel tend to be all too clear.

The Penguin Edition of Clausewitz's *On War* shows a chess board with metal pieces of stark modern design. Inside, you read all those memorable aphorisms: 'War is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means', and 'War is a game, both objectively and subjectively'. Many people still believe that General Clausewitz and his present-day successors, the military Game Theorists, have achieved a brilliant grasp of the essentials of modern warfare.

When there really is a war on, however, the Game Theorists look not only inadequate but intellectually unsound. Clausewitz himself was sound enough on the limited wars fought by mercenaries over the territorial claims of princes in the 18th century into which he was born. But he did live through the Napoleonic era to see, if not to understand, the first people's wars with their all-consuming, unlimited fervour in the pursuit of sovereignty. His own quasi-scientific pretensions were knocked sideways by his romantic veneration for combat and 'the soul's thirst for honour and renown...to be counted among the noblest feelings which belong to human nature' — just the sort of stuff General Galtieri is supposed to believe in. It takes two to play chess.

What no game theory ever fully takes account of is that this all-consuming quality of people's wars — with remorseless technological advance — means that, over and over again, even small wars surprise us, not only by their unexpected length and ferocity, but by their outcome.

You expect it to last until Christmas; it lasts for four years, or six years. You start fighting on horseback, you finish fighting in tanks and aircraft. You go to war to save Poland; you win, and Poland still loses. This all derives from what Raymond Aron in *The Century of Total War* describes as 'the technical surprise' and 'the dynamism of total war'.

A game is something entirely different. If Watford scores more goals than Liverpool, Watford wins the cup; that may be a surprise result but it is a surprise of a known sort. The game lasts 90 minutes — or, at most, goes into extra time or a replay; at the end, it is still being played under the same rules and with the same intentions as it was at the beginning. War is not like that. Its nature is anarchic and unpredictable.

After only a few days of actual fighting, sporadic but deadly, the Falklands crisis seems to have already gone through this frightening transmutation. How many people expected the initial successes to be so one-sided, or the casualties and the losses of ships and aircraft to rise so terrifyingly and so quickly?

I do not mean to suggest that the Government or Parliament as a whole ever deceived itself or tried to deceive public opinion into thinking that military victory would be easy or bloodless. Even if the politicians had attempted such deception, I doubt whether most people would have swallowed it.

But that is not the same as saying, 'Because we told you at the start that this was likely to be a bloody and costly enterprise, we are therefore entitled to go on to the end, however bitter.' On the contrary, because wars have this terrifying capacity for surprise, the Government is duty bound to consider how much further it would be right to go on and at the same time to weigh the alternatives in the most clear-headed way possible.

It is just because military force is *not* a continuation of diplomacy by other means but rather a unique, explosive unpredictable element that every time you pick up a weapon you must reconsider its use.

It is indeed vital that our task force should be protected to the maximum possible. The rules of engagement must be framed to put the lives of our own servicemen first. The sinking of the *General Belgrano* may well have been justified under those rules. But the more general consequences for human life have to be considered too; Argentinian deaths have to be taken account of, not only on moral grounds but because of the likelihood of Argentinian revenge, escalation and intransigence. If the present tactics cost too many lives, then the correct response is not to alter the rules of engagement but to redeploy the task force to alter the consequences.

Here we are brought up hard against a series of questions: can the British blockade be maintained in the present fashion without further intolerable loss or life? If not, can it be effectively maintained in any other way? If not, can an invasion of part or all of the islands themselves hope to bring a speedy and not prohibitively costly end to the whole business? If not, then is it not the prime duty of the Government to negotiate a cease-fire?

As we go to press, no such cease-fire has been arranged. The pressures on the Government to arrange one are increasing daily. I hope earnestly and without equivocation that such a cease-fire can be arranged.

Whatever compromises might have to be made — and I continue to believe that an honourable settlement is not inconceivable — it should be pointed out that Argentina has already lost hundreds of men, her only cruiser, one of her four submarines, and several aircraft. That is scarcely impunity.

Prime Minister.

I mentioned this article by Ferd Mount this

PA

morning. I think you should read it  
no fuss, if you have time. H.M.M.



SECRET

Prime Minister

fu

Bn



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4

M

8 June, 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Likely Latin American Attitudes to British Action  
Against the Argentine Mainland

Thank you for your letter of 2 June asking for an FCO assessment of likely Latin American attitudes in the event of:

- (a) action against the Argentine mainland; and
- (b) action against Argentine ships within Argentina's territorial waters.

First, as regards the legal position, action by Latin American States in support of Argentina would probably be taken under the Rio Treaty of Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance which provides for collective action in the event of an armed attack against any member state. Under the Rio Treaty a Resolution requires a two-thirds majority (14 out of 21 signatories) to be mandatory, and no member state can be required to use force against its will.

Latin American attitudes so far have been far from uniform and more has been offered in terms of rhetorical than practical assistance. The two consultative meetings of the Rio Treaty powers held so far have passed resolutions critical of the UK (and the US) but have stopped short of calling for collective practical measures. The Argentines have never been confident of achieving a two-thirds majority in favour of more direct and concerted action against us, and have not therefore pressed their case. Provided our repossession of the Islands can now be quick and effective, we can reasonably hope that Latin American opinion will remain divided and that we can exploit this to our advantage in coming months.

It is always difficult to judge accurately the reaction of Governments in relation to new developments. There is a general consensus however among those who know Latin Americans (including businessmen and academics) that a major air attack on the Argentine mainland or in territorial waters would represent an escalation which Latin American countries could not ignore and which would unite them in more specific action against us. We do not believe that most of those concerned would see a distinction between action against the mainland and that in Argentina's territorial waters, so that the two contingencies can effectively be regarded as the same.

/We

SECRET





We have ourselves been making it clear that our quarrel is with the Argentine Government only, not the Argentine people and certainly not other Latin American countries: and that this quarrel is limited to the question of the sovereignty of the Falklands and the Dependencies. Although the Falkland Islands come within the area covered by the Rio Treaty, the act of Argentine aggression and the long history of British occupation have helped to make the relevance of the Treaty's provisions less precise. If we were to act to widen the area of conflict, the Treaty would be seen to apply much more clearly, and in a way that would affect each member state more directly. No Latin American state is likely to accept that Article 51 of the UN Charter, which gives us the right to take the action we have in defence of the Falklands, could be extended to cover action against the mainland or Argentine territorial waters.

We therefore believe that action on the lines of either (a) or (b) above would produce general support in Latin America for practical assistance to Argentina. Several member states, including some moderates, have made it clear to us that such action would inevitably lead to the invoking of the Rio Treaty sanctions machinery. Performance would continue to vary but steps could include:-

- (a) economic sanctions;
- (b) downgrading of diplomatic relations; and
- (c) more importantly, stepping up of overt and covert supply of military equipment and assistance, including use as a conduit for supply from other countries. The impact of such indirect and deniable military assistance could be very telling, as recent experience over EXOCET has shown.

Whatever the level of sanctions adopted, a decision by Latin American countries to take collective action would be seen as a significant milestone in the - so far - toothless history of the Rio Treaty. It would in itself provide impetus to continued Latin American solidarity on the Falklands issue. It would also put the isolation of the United States within the OAS into sharp relief and could lead to further pressures to reorganise regional institutions to the exclusion of the US. The effect on the US position in Latin America - and consequently on US relations with the UK - could be far-reaching. For the United Kingdom it would make a subsequent normalisation of relations with the region very much more difficult.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary



MOD PRESS RELEASE - 8TH JUNE

Elements of 5 Brigade are now firmly established at Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove. Over the last few days, initial deployments to that area have been reinforced, and the troops and their support are now ready to move forward.

2. In the course of this evening Argentine aircraft attacked ships from the Task Force. During these attacks at least two Argentine aircraft were shot down, a further one was possibly shot down and at least four others were damaged, two of these were seen trailing smoke.

3. The frigate HMS PLYMOUTH suffered some damage. Initial reports are that 5 casualties from HMS PLYMOUTH have been removed to another ship and are receiving treatment. The logistic landing ships SIR TRISTRAM and SIR GALAHAD while unloading stores were also attacked and suffered some damage. We have no reports on casualties. No additional information is yet available in Whitehall or in the Service Information Centres. Please do not ring them. As soon as we have any information a further announcement will be made.





10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The update on this  
at 2230 was that  
HMS Plymouth had  
been able to reach  
a safe anchorage  
and that casualties  
numbered five. All  
five have been  
put aboard HMS  
Fearless - no details on  
the injuries.

Peter Ewing, Duty Clerk.

8/6



PRIME MINISTER

c. Mr. Whitmore

MOD gave us at 2100 the following report of two separate raids in the Falklands.

In San Carlos Sound HMS Plymouth (a fairly old type 12 frigate) has been attacked by A4s, and has reported splinter damage and fires under control. However its 4.5 gun and mortar have been severely damaged. Its Seacat is still serviceable. They report one A4 shot down by Seacat, two trailing smoke, and another possibly shot down.

A4s also attacked ships at Fitzroy Settlement. HMS Exeter reports close air patrol shot down one and damaged two. Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, landing ships logistic, have however been damaged. Sir Galahad is burning and abandoned, Sir Tristram was hit aft, and is not burning but has been abandoned for the moment. No knowledge of casualties as yet.

WR

8 June 1982



PRIME MINISTER

c. Mr. Whitmore

BOMBING OF SHIP IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

The Ministry of Defence have given us some further details about the incident which Clive mentioned to you before you left for Windsor.

The oil tanker, called "The Hercules", was bombed late this afternoon by a four-engined aircraft, presumed to be a Hercules, about 480 miles north of the Falkland Islands. The ship, which is of 216,000 tons, is owned by a Monrovia company called United Carriers Incorporated, and is leased to a US company, called the Maritime Overseas Corporation. The Ministry of Defence suspect that this is an arrangement of convenience, and that the ship is actually owned by the US company. It is registered in Liberia, and has an Italian crew of 30. It was heading for Alaska, via Cape Horn, to load up with crude oil, and can therefore be assumed to have no cargo.

The ship was not badly damaged. It was holed in the deck, possibly by an unexploded bomb. It is however listing by six degrees. It has turned round and is heading North East out of the area. It is in no need of immediate assistance as yet.

The Ministry of Defence have warned the President's staff of this incident. The Ministry has also put out a statement saying that no UK aircraft were in the area, and that

/HMS Hydra



HMS Hydra, a hospital ship, has left from Montevideo  
to investigate and offer any necessary assistance.

cm

8 June 1982



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (38)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR SNOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/S Am D  
HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT . } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

EMERGENCY UNIT  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PARIS 081050Z JUN 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 603 OF 8 JUNE 1982  
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON BONN AND ROME



FALKLANDS: FRENCH REACTIONS AFTER VERSAILLES

1. FRENCH PAPERS WHICH HAVE COMMENTED ON THE FALKLANDS IN THE VERSAILLES CONTEXT HAVE STRESSED THE CLOSENESS OF FRENCH AND US VIEWS. LE QUOTIDIEN (RIGHT-WING) AND LE MONDE SAW MITTERRAND AS HAVING JOINED REAGAN IN PUTTING DISCREET PRESSURE ON MRS THATCHER. DELARUE IN AN ARTICLE IN LE MONDE OF 8 JUNE WHICH SMACKS OF OFFICIAL BRIEFING SAYS THAT BRITAIN SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE NUANCE IN MITTERRAND'S REMARK AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE (PARA 1 OF MY TELNO 598) THAT "WE SHALL DO EVERYTHING, ONCE ITS (IE BRITAIN'S) RIGHT HAS BEEN REGAINED, SO THAT PEACE TRIUMPHS OVER WAR". DELARUE WRITES THAT WHILE THE FRENCH AGREE THAT INTERNATIONAL LAW MUST BE UPHELD AND THE ARGENTINES REMOVED FROM THE FALKLANDS, MITTERRAND DOES NOT ENDORSE THE BRITISH CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY AND IT IS IMPLICIT IN THE FRENCH VIEW THAT BRITAIN SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH ARGENTINA A NEW STATUS FOR THE FALKLANDS WHICH WOULD BE FAIR FOR BOTH SIDES.



THIS WAS AN AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE REPORT OF



NEGOTIATE WITH ARGENTINA A NEW STATUS FOR THE FALKLANDS WHICH WOULD BE FAIR FOR BOTH SIDES.

2. OF A PIECE WITH THIS WAS AN AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE REPORT OF 5 JUNE, ATTRIBUTED TO EUROPEAN SOURCES AT VERSAILLES, THAT FRANCE ITALY AND GERMANY WERE ABOUT TO PROPOSE A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON A LONG TERM SETTLEMENT FOR THE FALKLANDS. THE INITIATIVE WOULD START ONCE PORT STANLEY HAD FALLEN.

3. THE FRENCH PRESS HAS REPORTED WITHOUT COMMENT THE INTENTION OF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES TO QUESTION ASTIZ. LE MATIN CARRIES AN ARTICLE ABOUT THE "COMFORTABLE" CONDITIONS IN WHICH ASTIZ IS BEING HELD.

FRETWELL.

NNNN

SENT AT 08/1146Z

BB WASHINGTON

BB 100

BY 10 08/100

1170



CONFIDENTIAL

GR 210  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY FCO 031000Z  
FM KATHMANDU 080600Z JUNE 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 73 OF 3 JUNE  
INFO PRIORITY DELHI

FALKLANDS: GURKHAS

1. WE HAVE NO (REPEAT NO) EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIMS IN THE INDIAN PRESS THAT THERE ARE STRONG FEELINGS IN NEPAL ABOUT GURKHA INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THE LINE TAKEN BY OFFICIALS AND ARMY OFFICERS REMAINS ROBUST. AT SOME STAGE IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF WE SENT A MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION TO THE NEPALESE GOVERNMENT, BUT I SHOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER THIS FURTHER IN THE LIGHT OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FALKLANDS, IN PARTICULAR THE INVOLVEMENT OF GURKHAS IN COMBAT.

2. IN THE MEANTIME, THE MOST USEFUL MEANS OF MAINTAINING THE PRESENT HELPFUL NEPALESE ATTITUDE IS BY INFORMING OFFICIALS AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON. I AM AFRAID THAT YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 60 WAS NOT VERY HELPFUL IN THIS RESPECT. IT HAS BEEN PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE FOR SOME TIME THAT THE GURKHAS HAVE LANDED ON EAST FALKLAND. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HEARD THIS FROM WASHINGTON ABOUT A WEEK AGO. THE BBC WORLD SERVICE ON 7 JUNE STATED THAT 60 ARGENTINE TROOPS HAD BEEN KILLED DURING CLASHES WITH ROYAL MARINES AND GURKHA PATROLS DURING THE LAST 5 DAYS. I AM BOUND TO BE QUESTIONED BY THE NEPALESE ABOUT THIS. I MUST THEREFORE REPEAT THE REQUEST I HAVE MADE ON A NUMBER OF PREVIOUS OCCASIONS (MY TELEGRAMS NOS 49, 59, 62, 66 AND 70) THAT AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO TAKE THE NEPALESE INTO OUR CONFIDENCE.

DENSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL



John Coles, No. 10

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*From: Minister*

*W  
M*

WITH  
THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE  
PRIVATE SECRETARY

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, WHITEHALL


Telephone: 01-218 9000  
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2038/1/2

DSC SITREP FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AS AT 081000A JUN

INTELLIGENCE

1. Current INTSUMs passed separately. 

OWN FORCES

2. Sea. HMS ACTIVE and HMS AMBUSCADE carried out Naval Gunfire Support operations in the Bluff Cove area; HMS AVENGER carried out Naval Gunfire Support operations on Sea Lion Island. Further shelling of the Bluff Cove area was scheduled for last night. Movement of shipping into and out of the Transport Area continues.

3. Land. No reported incidents. Logistic preparation for future attacks has continued. 2 Scots Guards have relieved 2 Para at Bluff Cove; 2 Para have returned to Fitzroy. There has been continued patrolling in the vicinity of the enemy forward positions.

4. Air. Due to poor visibility, only 1 SHAR and 1 GR3 sortie flown. Hercules supply drops and Nimrod surveillance sorties were flown from Ascension. Deployment of 2 Harriers from Ascension to HMS HERMES was delayed because of bad weather.

INCIDENTS

5. HMS EXETER engaged 2 unidentified high level contacts which approached TA from West. Two sea darts were fired and one aircraft was destroyed.

ACCIDENTS

6. A Gazelle of 656 Army Air Squadron crashed on 6 June and all four occupants (2 aircrew, 2 passengers) were killed.

CASUALTIES

7. In addition to those killed in the Gazelle crash, two RM casualties were reported in the 24 hours ending 1200 GMT 7 Jun.

INTENTIONS

8. Sea. HMS CARDIFF and HMS YARMOUTH for Naval Gunfire Support on Mount Herriet and HMS ARROW against Stanley Airfield.

9. Land. 1 Welsh Guard continuing move to Bluff Cove by sea. 1/7 Gurkha, at present at Darwin, moving to Bluff Cove in due course.

10. Air. Two GR3 Harriers supported by Victor Tankers and Nimrod and Hercules SAR, to fly from Ascension Island to HMS HERMES.





10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 June, 1982.

Dear Mr. Needham,

Thank you for your letter of 3 June.

I am glad that Harry Milne and Brook Hardcastle are still managing to get messages out of Port Stanley, and that these report that all are safe and well.

Thank you too for your kind words. We will certainly let you know when you and the Falkland Islands Company can help in the vital stage of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Thatcher

Ted Needham, Esq.

Argentina

Alan - You have the pr. papers  
on file in CF, I believe.

Kay  
8/6

20



FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :

0700 HOURS, 8 JUNE 1982

*Paragraph 1 deleted and retained under Section 3(4).*

*On Wayland*

*11 September 2012*

Vulcan Diversion

: (FCO telno. 2. Instructions were sent to HM Ambassador, Brasilia, to  
to Brasilia) renew representations about the detained Vulcan aircraft and  
to make four main points:-

- (a) the British Government's view that the draft Hague Rules were neither relevant nor binding;
- (b) our view that this is a political and not a legal question;
- (c) Brazilian even-handedness did not appear to apply to military supplies for Argentina transitting Brazil; and,
- (d) the British Government strongly held the view that such arms transits should stop.

: (Brasilia 3. HM Ambassador made representations accordingly to the  
lno.258 to Brazilian Foreign Minister on the evening of 7 June, putting  
to) him through the wringer on the points above. He received  
some small comfort and concludes that the Brazilian Legal  
Adviser will say that the Hague Rules do not apply; that the  
Brazilian Government will then seek a political solution  
(possibly the aircraft being put into bond); and that the  
Brazilians will somewhat late in the day stir themselves to  
discourage the Argentines from routing their arms purchases  
from Libya through Brazil.

Follow-up to the Security Council

: (Tokyo tel. 4. HM Ambassador, Tokyo, reports his representations to the  
.285 to FCO) Japanese Government expressing our astonishment and dismay  
at the Japanese vote. Japanese explanations continued to be  
unsatisfactory. Mr Cortazzi suggested to the Japanese that  
they might now retrieve the damage by reinforcing their  
diplomatic pressure on the Argentines or instituting further  
economic sanctions.

(Accra tel. 5. HM Ambassador, Accra, reports that he conveyed our thanks  
.301 to FCO) to the Togolese MFA for their support and recommends that a  
message of appreciation be sent from the Prime Minister to  
President Eyadema in order to ensure Togo's future cooperation.

: (FCO telno. 6. HM Embassy, Kinshasa, have been informed that in view of  
to Kinshasa) the unhelpful Zairean vote in the Council we no longer feel  
any special commitment to assistance to Zaire.



Relations with Latin America

G: (Brasilia  
telno.255 to  
FOO)

7. HM Ambassador, Brasilia, reports that he and his American colleague (who is the personal nominee and a close friend of President Reagan) are agreed that Brazil sees a rôle for itself in helping to sort out the aftermath of the conflict and will wish to play it. He suggests that Brazil should be helped by us and the Americans so to do and that the time to move in this direction is now and that tactics should be concerted with the Americans during President Reagan's visit to London.

H: (Bogotá tel.  
No.145 to FOO)

8. HM Ambassador, Bogotá, reports that he will present credentials today (8 June) and that it would be helpful if he could hand over the Prime Minister's reply to President Turbay's message when he sees the Foreign Minister.

I: (Caracas  
telno.200 to  
FOO)

9. HM Ambassador, Caracas, has made recommendations about the tactics for accreditation of the new British Ambassador to Venezuela.

US Diplomatic Activity


J: (Washington  
telno.2052 to  
FOO)

10. HM Chargé, Washington, reports that Enders of the State Department was proposing to show the Argentine Ambassador in Washington Haig's tentative proposals of 29 May in order to bring unrealistic Argentine expectations down to earth. HM Chargé strongly discouraged this and informed Enders that the most useful point he could get across to the Argentine Ambassador was that the only option open to them now, short of defeat, was a ceasefire negotiated between the two Commanders with a fixed timeframe for withdrawal.

Comment

11. Action is needed on the idea of a message from the Prime Minister to the President of Togo and on the Colombian President's message to the Prime Minister.

8 June 1982

  
R M Jackson  
Emergency Unit





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>634</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>FCO telegram no. 258 to Santiago dated 7 June 1982</i>	
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PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>49</i> ..... (ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

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7 JUN 1982

(106)

OO BRASILIA

GRS 580

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 071425Z OF 7 JUNE 1982


TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 170 OF 7 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK AIR (SIC 19F), IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DGS/INT AND DIC ARMS CELL) AND IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 252: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE FULL REPORT ON YOUR CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER. GIVEN GUERREIRO'S APPARENT EMBARRASSMENT OVER THE DOUBLE STANDARDS IN APPLICATION OF THE HAGUE RULES (PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TUR) WE THINK IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE RETURNING TO THE CHARGE.
2. PLEASE THEREFORE SEEK AN EARLY MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT YOU HAD REPORTED FULLY ON YOUR CONVERSATION OF 5 JUNE. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS AND OF THE PUS'S DISCUSSION WITH CAMPOS (MY TELEGRAM NO 169) YOU HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
  - A. WE NOTED THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOW SEEKING A LEGAL OPINION ON THE STATUS OF THE AIRCRAFT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT HAGUE RULES OF 1923. THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT THESE RULES WERE NEITHER RELEVANT TO THE CASE IN QUESTION NOR BINDING:
  - B. AS ACLAND HAD MADE CLEAR TO CAMPOS, WE CONSIDER THIS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL, RATHER THAN A LEGAL, QUESTION. BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO IT AND ACLAND HAD MADE CLEAR OUR STRONG CONCERN TO MAINTAIN CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL AND LATIN AMERICA AS A WHOLE:
  - C. WE ALSO NOTED THAT CAMPOS HAD EXPRESSED THE BRAZILIAN





GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO BE EVENHANDED. IF THIS WAS SO, WE WERE NOT IMPRESSED BY BRAZILIAN DEMONSTRATION OF EVENHANDEDNESS IN PRACTICE. THEY WERE ARGUING ON THE ONE HAND THAT THE HAGUE RULES SHOULD APPLY TO THE CASE OF THE VULCAN: BUT WHEN IT CAME TO MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR ARGENTINA TRANSITTING BRAZIL WE WERE TOLD THAT IT WAS NOT THE HAGUE RULES WHICH APPLIED BUT THE RECENT RIO TREATY RESOLUTION. THIS WAS NOT IN OUR VIEW EVENHANDEDNESS:

- D. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS THEREFORE STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF THE VULCAN ON BRAZILIAN SOIL LENT ADDED WEIGHT TO THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT NO FURTHER ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TRANSIT RECIFE OR ANY OTHER BRAZILIAN AIRPORT WITH MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM THIRD COUNTRIES. WE NOTED THAT GUERREIRO HAD TOLD YOU THAT BRAZIL WOULD TAKE MEASURES TO DISCOURAGE SUCH TRAFFIC IF IT WAS FOUND TO BE TAKING PLACE. WE HAD CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS AND WE LOOKED TO THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES.
3. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO ADD, IF YOU JUDGE IT APPROPRIATE, THAT HMG, IN ANY EVENT, FIND IT CURIOUS THAT BRAZIL SHOULD BE ACTING AS A CHANNEL FOR SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM LIBYA. GIVEN LIBYA'S PERFORMANCE AS A SUPPORTER AND SUPPLIER OF GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS AND REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND KHADAFI'S NEFARIOUS BEHAVIOUR IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD, WE ARE SURPRISED THAT BRAZIL SHOULD CONSORT AS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT WITH THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT.
4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, IF WE HAD TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE VULCAN AND PERSUADING THE BRAZILIANS TO STOP FURTHER TRANSIT OF LIBYAN ARMS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THIRD COUNTRIES, THE LATTER ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE OF CONSIDERABLY GREATER BENEFIT TO OUR INTERESTS.

PYM



E.R

BSB/FO 012/8

FCO DESKBY 080800Z

OO MODUK AIR (SIC 19F)

OO MODUK ( FOR BGS/INT AND DIC ARMS CELL)

OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 081500Z  
GPS1060

11

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
- 8 JUN 1982

DESKBY 080800Z

FM BRASILIA 072340Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 258 OF 07 JUNE



AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK AIR (SIC 19F), MODUK ( FOR BGS/INT AND ARMS CELL), AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TEL 170 : VULCAN DIVERSION

1. I CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS EVENING. I PUT HIM THROUGH THE WRINGER ONCE MORE, USING THE POINTS IN YOUR PARA 2. I EXTRACTED SOME SMALL COMFORT, BOTH ON THE VULCAN AND THE LIBYAN ARMS TRAFFIC VIA RECIFE.

2. GUERRIERO HAD OBVIOUSLY REHEARSED THE POINTS HE WISHED TO MAKE IN REPLY, WHICH WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A. MENTION IN MY BOUT DE PAPIER OF A DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONS BECAUSE OF THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE VULCAN SEEMED QUITE DISPROPORTIONATE.

B. IN OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, HE HAD NEVER STATED AS A FACT THAT THE HAGUE RULES SHOULD APPLY TO THE CASE OF THE VULCAN



B. IN OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, HE HAD NEVER STATED AS A FACT THAT THE HAGUE RULES SHOULD APPLY TO THE CASE OF THE VULCAN. IT WAS BECAUSE OF THEIR UNCERTAINTY ON THE QUESTION THAT THEY HAD CONSULTED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S LEGAL ADVISER. HIS WRITTEN OPINION WAS PRACTICALLY READY: AND HE WOULD HOPEFULLY BE SUBMITTING HIS CONCLUSIONS, ALSO IN WRITING, SOMETIME TOMORROW.

C. IF IT TURNED OUT THAT THERE WAS A VERY PRECISE OBLIGATION UNDER THE HAGUE RULES, THEY WOULD BE OBLIGED TO APPLY THEM IN THIS CASE. IF NOT, THEY WOULD HAVE TO TALK TO BOTH PARTIES (SIC) AND SEE WHAT KIND OF SOLUTION THAT WAS FAIR TO BOTH SIDES COULD BE WORKED OUT.

D. AS TO THE ALLEGED ARMS TRAFFIC, AS HE HAD TOLD ME ON SATURDAY, THE RESPONSIBLE SERVICES DID NOT CONFIRM THAT THE SPECIFIC FLIGHT WE HAD INDICATED (YOUR TEL NO 151 REFERS) CARRIED WEAPONS OR WAR MATERIAL. HE REPEATED THAT, IF THEY DID DISCOVER SUCH TRAFFIC, THEY WOULD TRY TO DISCOURAGE IT.

3. ENLARGING ON THESE POINTS, IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONING, GUERREIRO SAID THAT THE LEGAL ADVISER WOULD PROBABLY END UP BY SAYING THAT THE SITUATION WAS ATYPICAL. HE HAD ALREADY ESTABLISHED THAT THE HAGUE RULES WERE INFORMALLY OBSERVED BY SOME OTHER COUNTRIES: BUT NEVER BY BRAZIL. IT WAS ALSO A FACT THAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA WERE NOT STRICTLY SPEAKING AT WAR. HE THOUGHT THAT WHATEVER THE LEGAL ADVICE, IT WOULD HAVE TO COME DOWN TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT CREATE PROBLEMS FOR EITHER PARTY. THEY WOULD CERTAINLY NOT ADOPT A "MECHANICAL" SOLUTION (BY WHICH HE MEANT EITHER TO LET THE AIRCRAFT GO OR TO INSIST THAT IT STAYED HERE, WITHOUT CONDITIONS). SIR A ACLAND HAD MENTIONED TO CAMPOS THE POSSIBILITY OF THE AIRCRAFT BEING PUT INTO BOND, THUS ENDING ITS WARLIKE USE (PARA 9 OF YOUR TEL NO 166 REFERS). HE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT MIGHT USEFULLY BE EXPLORED, THOUGH HE HAD TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NO DECISION OF ANY KIND HAD YET BEEN TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT.

4. WHEN I PROBED HIM FURTHER ON HIS POINT C. AND THE SURPRISING SUGGESTION THAT HE SHOULD TALK TO BOTH PARTIES, GUERREIRO EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT BOTH SIDES UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY PROPOSED SOLUTION WAS NOT ARBITRARY BUT THE FRUIT OF LENGTHY CONSIDERATION. THUS, IF THE LEGAL ADVISER OPINED THAT THE HAGUE RULES DID NOT APPLY, HE WOULD HAVE TO TELL THE AGENTS OF THIS AND BECAUSE THEY WERE THE ONLY



GUERREIRO EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT BOTH SIDES UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY PROPOSED SOLUTION WAS NOT ARBITRARY BUT THE FRUIT OF LENGTHY CONSIDERATION. THUS, IF THE LEGAL ADVISER OPINED THAT THE HAGUE RULES DID NOT APPLY, HE WOULD HAVE TO TELL THE ARGENTINES OF THIS AND PERSUADE THEM THAT THE AIRCRAFT MIGHT BE RELEASED ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

5. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF ARMS TRAFFIC, I REMINDED GUERREIRO THAT WE HAD CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THAT TRAFFIC WAS STILL CONTINUING. THE BRAZILIANS HAD TO REALISE THAT THE WEAPONS IN QUESTION WERE INTENDED TO BE USED AGAINST OUR SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND TROOPS AND THAT WE FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THE NEED TO PUT A STOP TO THEM. I ADDED THAT I HAD RECEIVED ONLY TODAY UNSOLICITED INFORMATION FROM TWO SEPARATE AVIATION SOURCES TO THE EFFECT THAT AN AVERAGE OF TWO SUCH FLIGHTS PER DAY, ONE BY AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS AND THE OTHER BY THE ARGENTINE AIRFORCE, WERE REGULARLY TAKING PLACE. GUERREIRO AGREED THAT, IF THIS WERE INDEED SO, SOMETHING MUST BE DONE TO STOP IT. HE UNDERTOOK TO PASS MY INFORMATION TO THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES AND ASK THEM TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER URGENTLY. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD YET SAID ANYTHING TO THE ARGENTINES ABOUT THIS TRAFFIC. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT, BUT IMPLIED THAT, IF HARD EVIDENCE CAME TO LIGHT, HE WOULD SEEK TO DISCOURAGE THEM FROM USING THIS ROUTE ANY FURTHER.

6. LASTLY, I RETURNED TO GUERREIRO'S SUGGESTION OF DISPROPORTIONALITY AT A. ABOVE. I SAID THAT IT MIGHT PERHAPS SEEM DISPROPORTIONATE TO SPEAK OF A SERIOUS EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS IN NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT NORMAL, SO FAR AS BRITAIN WAS CONCERNED. AT A TIME WHEN A GREAT DEAL OF BRITISH BLOOD AND TREASURE WAS BEING SPENT IN REGAINING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE FOUND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE GONE BACK ON THEIR EARLIER DECISION TO RELEASE THE VULCAN, APPARENTLY ONLY IN RESPONSE TO ARGENTINE PRESSURE. I REPEATED THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS BEING SEEN AS A TEST CASE OF BRAZIL'S WHOLE STANCE IN THIS CONFLICT AND THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO UNDERESTIMATE THE VERY STRONG FEELINGS AROUSED IN LONDON BY IT. GUERREIRO LOOKED SLIGHTLY IMPRESSED.

#### COMMENT

7. MY GUESS IS THAT:

- A. THE LEGAL ADVISER WILL SAY (MAYBE, HAS ALREADY SAID) THAT THE HAGUE RULES DO NOT APPLY.



COMMENT

7. MY GUESS IS THAT:

- A. THE LEGAL ADVISER WILL SAY (MAYBE, HAS ALREADY SAID) THAT THE HAGUE RULES DO NOT APPLY.
  - B. THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL THEN SET ABOUT CONSULTING THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AND ME IN TURN ABOUT A POSSIBLE "POLITICAL" SOLUTION, WHICH MIGHT WELL BE THE BOND MOTION. WITH LUCK, THIS MIGHT LEAD TO THE RELEASE OF THE AIRCRAFT WITHIN A FEW DAYS.
  - C. THE BRAZILIANS WILL, SOMEWHAT LATE IN THE DAY, STIR THEMSELVES TO DISCOURAGE THE ARGENTINES FROM ROUTING THEIR ARMS PURCHASES FROM LIBYA THROUGH RECIFE OR ANY OTHER BRAZILIAN AIRPORT (THOUGH BY THE TIME THEY TAKE ANY EFFECTIVE ACTION, THE MAIN BULK OF THE LIBYAN CONSIGNMENT MAY ALREADY HAVE PASSED THROUGH SAFELY).
8. I THINK, ON BALANCE, IT WAS WORTH TURNING THE SCREW AGAIN IN THIS WAY. BUT I WOULD NOT RECOMMEND THAT WE DO IT AGAIN UNTIL WE HAVE GIVEN THE BRAZILIANS TIME TO MATCH PRACTICE TO GUERREIRO'S MILDLY ENCOURAGING WORDS. I THINK THEY CAN UNDERSTAND THE HIGH TEMPERATURE IN LONDON ABOUT THIS ISSUE; BUT THEY WILL EXPECT US TO UNDERSTAND THAT, FOR OBVIOUS GEOPOLITICAL REASONS, THEY VIEW THE SITUATION DIFFERENTLY.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT AT 07:0100Z BRL

SENT AT 08:0100Z BRL SRI

RECD AT 080100Z HK



CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 071200Z

FM TOKYO 070915Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NO 285 OF 7 JUNE

FI PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS EDD UKVIS NEW YORK

-7 JUN '82

31

UKDEL VERSAILLES TEL NO 10 OF 6 JUNE: FALKLANDS:

SECURITY COUNCIL

1. AS SOON AS I WAS AWARE OF THE OUTCOME OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE OF 4 JUNE I SOUGHT AN INTERVIEW WITH VICE MINISTER SUNOBE WHOM I SAW TODAY.

2. I TOLD SUNOBE THAT ACTING ON PERSONAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOU I HAD TO EXPRESS ASTONISHMENT AND DISMAY THAT JAPAN HAD FINALLY DECIDED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF A RESOLUTION WHICH HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND AND PANAMA BUT NONE OF OUR FRIENDS AND THAT BY DOING SO SHE HAD ENSURED THAT THE RESOLUTION SECURED THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES TO FORCE US TO VETO. I SAID THAT HAVING EXPRESSED OUR POSITION CLEARLY AT THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFT AND HAVING BEEN TOLD THAT THE JAPANESE WOULD ABSTAIN ON THIS I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED BEFORE THE DECISION ON THE SUBSEQUENT ONE.

3. SUNOBE REPLIED THAT THE JAPANESE DECISION HAD FINALLY BEEN TAKEN IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH PARIS AND THAT THEIR DELEGATE'S STATEMENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEIR VOTE WAS LINKED TO THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ARGENTINA WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME. THIS AND THE EXPLICIT REFERENCE IN THE REDRAFT TO SCR 502 HAD FORMED THE BASIS FOR THE JAPANESE DECISION. SUNOBE APPEARED NOT A LITTLE EMBARRASSED HIMSELF IN HAVING TO CLING TO THIS LINE AND WAS CLEARLY DISMAYED BY THE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH REACTION TO THE VOTE.

4. I STRESSED THAT THE VOTE HAD NOT BEEN UNDERSTOOD



SCR 572 HAD FORMED THE BASIS FOR THE JAPANESE DECISION. SUNOBE APPEARED NOT A LITTLE EMBARRASSED HIMSELF IN HAVING TO CLING TO THIS LINE AND WAS CLEARLY DISMAYED BY THE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH REACTION TO THE VOTE.

4. I STRESSED THAT THE VOTE HAD NOT BEEN UNDERSTOOD IN BRITAIN OR BY THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOURSELF. YOU HAD RECEIVED NO ADEQUATE EXPLANATION FROM MR SUZUKI OR MR SAKURAUCHI . I SAID THAT WE HAD THEREFORE NOW ENTERED A NEW SITUATION AND THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I SAW THE NEED FOR JAPAN TO PICK UP THE PIECES. I SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE JAPANESE MIGHT NOW REINFORCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES TO COMPLY WITH SCR 572 AND WITHDRAW. ALTERNATIVELY THEY MIGHT MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT AGAIN UNDERLINING THAT NO NEW CREDITS WOULD BE GRANTED TO ARGENTINA AND THEY MIGHT EVEN NOW CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. FINALLY THEY MIGHT THINK WHETHER IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO RESPOND TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S SECOND LETTER TO MR SUKUKI (YOUR TELNO 162 OF 28 APRIL) EXPLAINING THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT POSITION SO THAT THERE COULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING.

5. ALTHOUGH THE JAPANESE EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR VOTING DECISION CONTINUE TO BE UNSATISFACTORY, THE MFA CAN NOW BE IN NO DOUBT OF YOUR STRONG FEELINGS AND OF YOUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THEY HAD FAILED TO REACT AFTER YOUR PERSONAL INTERVENTION WITH MR SAKURAUCHI LATE ON 4 JUNE.

CORTAZZI

NNNNN







LINE 2

VERSAILLES: AND THAT UKDEL VERSAILLES TELNO 18 TO FCO ISSUED

SUBSEQUENTLY

HERSELF.

3. A SUITABLE OCCASION FO DELIVERING THE LETTER WITH DUE CEREMONY

YTAR SAILER



OO KINSHASA  
 RR HAVANA  
 GRS 178  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM FCO 071745Z JUNE 1982  
 TO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 OF 7 JUNE,  
 AND TO ROUTINE HAVANA  
 SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

UKDEL VERSAILLES TELNO 10: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IN VIEW OF THE UNHELPFUL ZAIREAN VOTE WE NO LONGER FEEL ANY SPECIAL COMMITMENT TO THE ASSISTANCE MENTIONED IN FCO TELNO 69. YOU NEED NOT MAKE A POINT OF LETTING THE ZAIREANS KNOW THIS (ALTHOUGH A HINT MIGHT BE NO BAD THING), BUT IN CASE THEY REFER TO INDIVIDUAL ITEMS YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT OUR POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS:

- (I) IMF AND PARIS CLUB. WE SHALL PLAY THIS BY EAR IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES (INCLUDING THE FALKLANDS) WHEN THE ISSUE NEXT COMES UP.
  - (II) AID. AS THESE ARE OFFERS FROM AID ALREADY PLEDGED WE WOULD NOT WANT TO GO BACK ON THEM, BUT WE SHALL NOT HURRY TO TAKE FOLLOW UP ACTION.
  - (III) WE ARE NOT NOW WILLING TO CONSIDER FINANCING MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE ZAIREAN CONTINGENT IN CHAD.
2. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW IN WHAT TERMS YOU AND HAVANA MADE PLAY WITH THE OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE IN THE AREAS MENTIONED ABOVE.

PYM

NNNN  
 LIMITED  
 CAFD  
 UND  
 ERD

COPIES TO:  
 MR M ATKINSON, HM TREASURY.  
 MR J M HARRIS, EWAD/ODA.  
 MR J LLEWELLYN, ECGD.



CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 071700Z

FM BRASILIA 071620Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 255 OF 7 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

⑦ +23:

FALKLANDS: BRAZIL'S ROLE AFTER HOSTILITIES

1. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE AND I ARE AGREED THAT THE BRAZILIANS SEE A ROLE FOR THEMSELVES IN HELPING TO SORT OUT THE AFTERMATH OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT WITH ARGENTINA.

2. AMBASSADOR MOTLEY (WHO IS THE PERSONAL NOMINEE AND A CLOSE FRIEND OF PRESIDENT REAGAN) TELLS ME THAT MR REAGAN SUGGESTED TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO DURING THE LATTER'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST MONTH THAT, IN THE SAME WAY AS THE UNITED STATES EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO ACT AS MEDIATOR AND ADVOCATE FOR BRITAIN IN ANY SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, SO BRAZIL MIGHT BE WILLING AND ABLE TO ACT LIKEWISE FOR ARGENTINA.

3. IT IS UNQUESTIONABLE THAT BRAZIL, NO LESS THAN THE UNITED STATES, HAS A DIRECT AND PRESSING INTEREST IN RESTORING NORMALCY IN THIS HEMISPHERE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN DISSUADING ARGENTINA FROM ANY IDEA OF PURSUING A WAR OF ATTRITION, ONCE HOSTILITIES ON THE ISLANDS THEMSELVES HAVE CEASED. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE KEENLY AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF CONTINUED INSTABILITY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA INCLUDING ARGENTINA ITSELF.

4. BRAZILIANS ARE NOW MORE CONSCIOUS THAN EVER, FOLLOWING THE INANITIES OF THE TWO TIAR MEETINGS, OF THE SEPARATENESS OF THEIR CULTURE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY FROM THE WINDY MORASS OF HISPANO-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY. NEVERTHELESS, THEY SEE THEMSELVES AS BEING DRAWN WILLY-NILLY INTO THAT MORASS IF HOSTILITIES ARE PROLONGED, WITH NO REAL PROSPECT OF AN HONOURABLE AND SENSIBLE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

5. WE ALL KNOW THAT BRAZIL'S CONDUCT IN THE CONFLICT SO FAR HAS BEEN LESS THAN SATISFACTORY TO US, LARGELY BECAUSE OF HER SUPINE DESIRE TO PLACATE THE NEARER AND THUS MORE IMMEDIATELY THREATENING PARTY TO THE CONFLICT. BUT IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FROM THE START TO BRAZILIANS THEMSELVES THAT BRAZIL WILL HAVE SOONER OR LATER TO



... TO THE CONFLICT. BUT IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FROM THE START TO BRAZILIANS THEMSELVES THAT BRAZIL WILL HAVE SOONER OR LATER TO EXERT HER WEIGHT ON THE SIDE OF A RATIONAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. IT MUST SURELY BE IN OUR INTEREST TO INVOLVE HER, ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO US AS WELL AS TO THE ARGENTINES, IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, WHEN IT COMES.

6. AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF BRAZIL'S INFLUENCE BEHIND THE SCENES WITH ARGENTINA, THE CHIEF OF THE JOINT ARMED FORCES STAFF HAS TOLD ME AS A FACT THAT GALTIERI HAD BEEN PERSUADED BY THE BRAZILIANS (PRESUMABLY BY FIGUEIREDO HIMSELF) EARLY ON IN THE CONFLICT TO WAIVE SOVEREIGNTY AS A PRE-CONDITION OF NEGOTIATIONS, ONLY TO BE RIDDEN OFF IT SUBSEQUENTLY BY HIS FELLOW OFFICERS. ALTHOUGH THE ARGENTINES NEITHER LIKE NOR TRUST BRAZIL, THEY MUST REALISE THAT THERE IS NO OTHER LATIN AMERICAN ADVOCATE WHO WOULD CARRY THE SAME WEIGHT. SEEN FROM HERE, BRAZIL MUST BE A BETTER BET FOR ARGENTINA THAN , SAY , PERU OR VENEZUELA. WOULD SHE NOT BE A BETTER BET FOR US AS WELL, GIVEN THE DISCREET LEVERAGE AFFORDED TO US BY HER DEPENDENCE ON THE LONDON MONEY MARKET?

7. I SUBMIT THEREFORE:

A. THAT BRAZIL HAS A ROLE TO PLAY, WILL WISH TO PLAY IT, AND SHOULD BE HELPED BY US AND THE AMERICANS TO DO SO IN A WAY WHICH BEST SERVES BOTH OUR INTERESTS:

B. THE TIME TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION IS NOW. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT TO LONDON WOULD SEEM TO AFFORD AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO CONCERT TACTICS IN THIS RESPECT.

8. AMBASSADOR MOTLEY HAS SEEN THIS DRAFT AND AGREES WITH IT.

HARDING

KNNN


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E.R.

125

-7 JUN 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

FM BOGOTA 071830Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 145 OF 7 JUNE

FALKLANDS: TURBAY'S MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER

1. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AT 081630Z TO HAND OVER COPIES OF MY LETTERS AND WITH THE PRESIDENT AT 091700Z TO PRESENT MY CREDENTIALS.

2. ALTHOUGH NEITHER APPOINTMENT IS THE OCCASION FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION I WOULD EXPECT THAT MENTION WOULD BE MADE OF THE FALKLAND'S SITUATION. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I COULD HAND OVER PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY WHEN I SEE LEMOS TOMORROW OR INDICATE WHEN THE REPLY MAY BE EXPECTED.

ROBSON

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-8 JUN ...?

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
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM CARACAS #71615Z JUNE 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 200 OF 7 JUNE



YOUR TELNO 104 : FALKLAND ISLANDS AND MY SUCCESSOR

1. MY TEL NO 196 GAVE ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT VENEZUELAN ATTITUDES AS FALKLANDS SITUATION DRAGS ON. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE NEED TO DECIDE TACTICS ON ACCREDITATION.
2. I RECOMMEND NORMAL ROUTINE APPROACH TOPROTOCOL THIS WEEK GIVING TRAVEL DETAILS FOR ARRIVAL OF MY SUCCESSOR ON 26 JUNE AND ASKING FOR NORMAL COURTESIES. THERE IS GOOD CHANCE THAT INEFFECTIVE PROTOCOL WILL TREAT THIS AS PURE ROUTINE FOLLOWING IN AGREEMENT ALREADY GIVEN AND WILL NOT SUBMIT QUESTION FOR POLITICAL CONSIDERATION . MR CARLESS WILL THEN RISK DELAY OF SEVERAL WEEKS FOR ACCREDIATION IF VENEZUELAN DECIDE TO BE AWKWARD, BUT THEY COULD HARDLY REFUSE THIS ONCE OTHER AMBASSADORS DESIGNATE JOINED QUEUE.THERE WILL BE SEVERAL IN THIS POSITION OVER THE SUMMER, INCLUDING THE AMERICANS.
3. THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT ROUTINE APPROACH WILL BE CONSIDERED POLITICALLY, BUT EVEN THEN THERE MAY NOT BE NEGATIVE REACTION: THE VENEZUELAN AMBASSADOR IS AFTER ALL STILL OPERATING IN LONDON. IF THERE IS, THEN WE MUST THINK AGAIN, BUT MR CARLESS CANNOT JUST SLIP IN WITHOUT WARNING IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PROTOCOL.
4. ALTERNATIVE APPROACH OF POSITIVELY SMOKING OUT THE VENEZUELAN ON ACCREDITATION, WHILE NEATER IN SHOWING EXACTLY WHERE WE STAND, RUNS OBVIOUS RISKS. VENEZUELAN ARE ADEPT AT TAKING EASY WAY OUT AND WOULD PROBABLY SUGGEST INFORMALLY THAT A DELAY IN ACCREDITATION



4. ALTERNATIVE APPROACH OF POSITIVELY SMOKING OUT THE VENEZUELAN'S ON ACCREDITATION, WHILE NEATER IN SHOWING EXACTLY WHERE WE STAND, RUNS OBVIOUS RISKS. VENEZUELAN'S ARE ADEPT AT TAKING EASY WAY OUT AND WOULD PROBABLY SUGGEST INFORMALLY THAT A DELAY IN ACCREDITATION MIGHT AVOID POLITICAL CONTROVERSY AND BE IN OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS. ONCE WE GOT INTO THAT NEGATIVE POSITION, THEY COULD SPIN ACCREDITATION OUT FOR MONTHS WITHOUT ACTUALLY MAKING IT A POINT OF CONFRONTATION.

SECONDE

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 072300Z JUN 82


TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2052 OF 7 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

-8 JUN 1982

(12)



FALKLANDS: U S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

1. ENDERS TELEPHONED ME THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A LONG SESSION WITH THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, TAKACS, AND WAS DISTURBED BY HIS TOTAL LACK OF REALISM.

TAKACS, GENERAL MIRET ET AL SEEMED TO BELIEVE THAT THE ARGENTINES COULD HOLD OUT MUCH LONGER ON EAST FALKLAND THAN THE U S ASSESSMENT OR OUR OWN SUGGESTED. THEY WERE THEREFORE MISLED INTO THINKING THAT THEY STILL HAD SOME LEEWAY ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THEY HAD REJECTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RECENT PROPOSALS WAS THE LACK OF BALANCE BETWEEN THE PROPOSALS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINIAN AND BRITISH FORCES. THEY WERE NOW APPARENTLY ABOUT TO FLOAT A PEACE PLAN OF THEIR OWN WHICH WAS, EVEN IN ENDERS VIEW, COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC.

2. IN ORDER TO TRY TO BRING THEM DOWN TO EARTH, ENDERS TOLD ME THAT HE WAS NOW PROPOSING TO SHOW TAKACS THE TEXT OF HAIG'S TENTATIVE IDEA OF 29 MAY (WASHINGTON TELNO 1964), WHICH HAD BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING FROM THE ARGENTINIAN POINT OF VIEW, THAN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SUBSEQUENT PROPOSALS. HE HOPED THAT THE FACT THAT THE TERMS WERE WORSENING FOR THE ARGENTINIANS ALL THE TIME WOULD HELP TO



CONVINCE THEM THAT THE SORT OF IDEAS THEY WERE NOW PLAYING WITH (WHICH HE DID NOT EXPLAIN) WERE MILES BEYOND REACH. HE SAID THAT HIS OBJECTIVE IN ALL THIS WAS TO TRY TO GET THEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR ONLY CHOICE NOW WAS BETWEEN EARLY WITHDRAWAL AND MILITARY DEFEAT.

3. I SAID THAT ANYTHING ENDERS COULD DO TO CONVINCE THE ARGENTINIANS THAT THEY SHOULD ACCEPT OUR CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE WELCOME. BUT I STRONGLY DISCOURAGED HIM FROM GIVING THEM THE TEXT OF EARLIER PROPOSALS. I SAID THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD BY THEM AS REVIVING PROPOSALS WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. AFTER SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION, ENDERS AGREED NOT TO GIVE TAKACS A PIECE OF PAPER, BUT WOULD OUTLINE ORALLY THE SORT OF IDEAS WHICH HAIG HAD PUT FORWARD AND WOULD EXPLAIN THAT THESE HAD BEEN REJECTED BECAUSE:

(I) THE UK HAD LOST CONFIDENCE IN ANY NEGOTIATED DEAL WITH THE ARGENTINIANS, GIVEN THEIR RECORD THUS FAR:

(II) ANY PACKAGE DEAL NOW OF THE KIND WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER WAS RULED OUT BECAUSE OF THE CHANGED SITUATION:

(III) THIS INCLUDED BOTH IDEAS OF A SHARED OR INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND CONSTRAINTS ON DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS.

ENDERS WOULD TRY TO GET IT ACROSS TO TAKACS THAT THE ONLY OPTION NOW OPEN TO THEM, SHORT OF MILITARY DEFEAT, WAS A CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE TWO COMMANDERS WITH A FIXED TIME-FRAME FOR WITHDRAWAL.

4. I TOLD ENDERS THAT I THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THIS KIND OF INITIATIVE WOULD GET ANYWHERE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. MY OWN IMPRESSION (WITH WHICH ENDERS AGREED) WAS THAT THEY HAD DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD PREFER DEFEAT TO WITHDRAWAL. BUT PROVIDED HE SPOKE TO TAKACS ON THE LINES HE WAS NOW SUGGESTING, I COULD NOT SEE THAT IT WOULD DO HARM.

5 I AM NOT SURE WHAT ENDERS IS UP TO. FROM WHAT HE SAID, HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THAT THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF ANYTHING BEYOND A CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT, FOLLOWED BY ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IF HE IS INTERT ON TRYING TO GET THE ARGENTINIANS TO FACE UP TO THIS REALITY IT COULD BE marginally HELPFUL. BUT I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT ENDERS THINKS THAT ANYTHING REPORTED BY TAKACS TO BUENOS AIRES COULD PRODUCE THAT EFFECT.

THOMAS



CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0700 HOURS, 8 JUNE

Vulcan aircraft

1. Efforts are still continuing on the diplomatic front to pressurise the Brazilian Government into releasing the Vulcan aircraft, held at Rio de Janeiro airport.

Military

2. British forces are bombarding Argentine military positions close to Port Stanley. The Gurkhas are on patrol, looking for Argentine pockets of resistance to the rear of British positions. Argentine planes have bombed British forward positions, but there have been no British casualties. One Argentine aircraft is reported to have been shot down.

Atlantic Conveyor

3. Survivors from the 'Atlantic Conveyor', which was destroyed by Exocet missiles, returned to the UK by air yesterday.

Emergency Unit

8 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL



Ref: A08597



Prime Minister.

Command for Sir Robert

Armstrong to write on the

Yes and basis of the report?

talk  
on'

MR. WHITMORE

I have received a letter from Lord Chalfont offering his services to write an official account of the operations in the Falkland Islands and the events leading up to them.

2. At some stage we may well want to have such an account written up. I should have thought, however, that we should be unlikely to want an account written by somebody not in the Government service, at least not until after the completion of the official inquiry.

3. I therefore propose to reply to Lord Chalfont in the terms of the draft attached. I should be glad to know whether the Prime Minister is content.

Philip Goodhart also  
wants to do one

REA

Robert Armstrong

8th June 1982





PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

DRAFT LETTER FROM SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG TO  
THE RT HON THE LORD CHALFONT, OBE, MC.  
House of Lords.

Thank you for your letter of 1st June.

I am sure that there will have to be at some stage an official account of the Falkland Islands operations and the events leading up to them; and I can well understand your own qualifications for writing such an account. But I have to say that it is premature to be thinking about this for the present, and at least until after the official review which the Prime Minister has told the House of Commons will in due course be instituted.

CONQUEROR





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>634</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Santiago telegram no. 283 dated 7 June 1982</i>	
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TYPISTS]

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (36)

*(Prime Minister -  
Work ready at 10:30  
AM)*

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/PUSD  
MR REED, PUSD  
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~  
RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)~~

PS/S OF S DEFENCE  
PS/HOME SECRETARY  
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)  
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER  
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG  
PS/SIR M PALLISER  
PS/SIR A DUFF  
MR WADE-GERY  
MR FULLER  
MR COLVIN  
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-  
MENTS STAFF

CABINET  
OFFICE

DIO  
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD  
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD  
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

*[Copy sent E.R.]*

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 072307Z JUN 82  
TO PRIORITY F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 958 DATED 7 JUNE 82  
INFO PRIORITY HAVANA, WASHINGTON  
INFO SAVING DACCA

HAVANA TELNO 173 (NOT TO WASHINGTON): FALKLANDS: NAM COMMUNIQUE

1. AMIN DOHA, MINISTER FOR INFORMATION OF BANGLADESH, FORMERLY HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON, AND AN OLD FRIEND OF MINE FROM TEHRAN DAYS, LUNCHEDED WITH ME ON 7 JUNE. HE HAS JUST ARRIVED IN NEW YORK, HAVING REPRESENTED BANGLADESH AT THE HAVANA MEETING.

2. DOHA SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE NAM MEETING HAD GOT INTO A HOPELESS MUDDLE ABOUT WESTERN SAHARA, THE CHAIRMANSHIP AND IRAN/IRAQ, THE LATIN AMERICANS HAD TAKEN THE WHOLE PLACE OVER IN A BIG WAY ON THE FALKLANDS, WITH CASTRO ACTING AS IMPRESARIO FOR COSTA MENDEZ.

3. WHEN I REMONSTRATED WITH HIM ABOUT THE WORDING OF THE FALKLANDS PASSAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE, HE FRANKLY ADMITTED THAT BRITAIN'S FRIENDS HAD BEEN SWEEPED AWAY BY THE TORRENT OF LATIN AMERICAN HISTORIC PRESSURE AND THEATRICALITY. ALL UNDER THE TV



3. WHEN I REMONSTRATED WITH HIM ABOUT THE WORDING OF THE FALKLANDS PASSAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE, HE FRANKLY ADMITTED THAT BRITAIN'S FRIENDS HAD BEEN SWEEPED AWAY BY THE TORRENT OF LATIN AMERICAN RHETORIC, PRESSURE AND THEATRICALITY, ALL UNDER THE TV CAMERAS. HE HAD ATTENDED MANY NAM MEETINGS OVER THE YEARS BUT HAD NEVER HEARD ANYTHING LIKE THE VIOLENCE OF COSTA MENDEZ'S RHETORIC. PRETTY WELL EVERY LATIN AMERICAN UNDER THE SUN HAD SPOKEN ON SIMILAR LINES. ALMOST ALL THE VITRIOL HAD BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST BRITAIN, WITH THE UNITED STATES AS A FOOTNOTE MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER. COSTA MENDEZ HAD RECEIVED A LONG STANDING OVATION WITH CASTRO CAPERING IN THE PUBLIC GALLERY AND THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIES, ABANDONING THEIR TYPEWRITERS, DABBING THEIR EYES WITH EMOTION.

4. PERU HAD BEEN STIMULATED BY THESE EXCESSES TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE MEETING TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING 'SOCIALIST FRANCE' FOR REFUSING TO SUPPLY PERU WITH MORE EXOCET MISSILES ON THE DISHONOURABLE GROUNDS THAT PERU MIGHT PASS THEM TO ARGENTINA. EVEN CASTRO BAULKED AT THIS ONE THE PERUVIANS HAD TO BE CONTENT WITH CIRCULATING THEIR TEXT TO ALL DELEGATIONS.

5. DOHA SAID THAT ONLY JAMAICA HAD MADE A FEEBLE EFFORT TO MODIFY THE LANGUAGE, BUT HAD BEEN QUICKLY VAPORISED. GUYANA HAD CONCENTRATED ON THE PASSAGE ON THE GUYANA/VENEZUELA DISPUTE AND HAD DONE PRETTY WELL, PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF NOT HAVING AROUSED LATIN PASSION BY OPPOSING THEM OVER THE FALKLANDS.

6. THERE HAD BEEN WILD LATIN AMERICAN JUBILATION WHEN THE NEWS CAME THROUGH THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD ANNOUNCED THAT SHE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO ABSTAIN AFTER VOTING ALONG WITH US.

7. DOHA HAD CLEARLY BEEN AWED BY THIS DREADFUL PERFORMANCE, AND SPOKE ABOUT HOW WE SHOULD NOW SHOW MAGNANIMITY BY STOPPING SHORT OF STANLEY. EVERYONE KNEW THAT WE HAD WON THE WAR. I GAVE HIM A SHORT HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, ADDING THAT HIS DESCRIPTION OF HAVANA CONFIRMED OUR DISILLUSIONMENT AND CONVICTION THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ARGENTINA BEING READY TO CLIMB DOWN; ALSO THAT THE NAM EXHIBITION WOULD NOT ENCOURAGE US TO INVOLVE THE UN IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATION ON THE FALKLANDS. I ALSO TOLD HIM, WHICH HIS PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE CONFIRMED, THAT THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD BEEN CONDUCTED, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, WITH MUCH MORE MODERATION AND DECORUM; EVEN THE FINAL SESSION DURING WHICH WE HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO CAST A VETO.



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE  
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MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY  
SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

EMERGENCY UNIT  
RESIDENT CLERK

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[Typists a.a.]

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DESKBY 080800Z  
RESTRICTED

FM PARIS 071720Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 599 OF 7 JUNE 1982

MIPT: FALKLANDS: STATEMENTS AT VERSAILLES BY PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

1. THE PHRASE "DOIT RETROUVER SON DROIT" USED BY MITTERRAND IN HIS STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE SEVEN (PARA 1 OF MIPT) WAS TRANSLATED BY THE PRESS SERVICES AT THE SUMMIT AS GREAT BRITAIN'S "RIGHTS MUST BE PRESERVED". TOO MUCH SHOULD NOT BE READ INTO IT. MITTERRAND PROBABLY MEANT THAT BRITAIN HAD TO REESTABLISH ITS FORMER POSITION WHICH WAS PERFECTLY LAWFUL. FRANCE HAS BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO RECOGNISE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER OVER THE ISLANDS (CF PARA 4 OF MIPT).

FRETWELL



ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N GORDON LENNOX  
LORD BRIDGES  
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MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
MR ILETT } TREASURY  
MR LITTLER }

MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY

SIR R ARMSTRONG }  
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET OFFICE  
MR WADE-GERY }  
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }  
DIO }

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[Passed to E.R.]  
[Typists a.a.]

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DESKBY 080800Z

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PARIS 071715Z JUN82

TO IMMEDIATE DESLBY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 598 OF 7 JUN82

Prime Minister

*This telegram reports President Mitterrand's  
national press conference as well as his  
one on behalf of the 7. Works meeting in  
Paris.*

FALKLANDS: STATEMENTS AT VERSAILLES BY PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

1. IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON BEHALF OF THE SEVEN PARTICIPANTS AT THE SUMMIT ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 JUNE, MITTERRAND, AFTER REFERRING TO FRANK EXCHANGES AT THE SUMMIT, CONTINUED ON THE FALKLANDS:-

QUOTE. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT FROM THE VERY FIRST EVENING WE TACKLED THE WORRYING AFFAIR OF THE ACTS OF WAR IN THE FALKLANDS DUE UNFORTUNATELY TO THE ARGENTINE'S VIOLENT INITIATIVE WHICH RESULTED IN A SERIES OF CONSEQUENCES WHICH GREW LOGICALLY OUT OF THAT SITUATION. AND WE AGAIN REPEATED OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE VIOLENT ACTIONS OR INCITEMENTS TO VIOLENCE THAT WERE PREFERRED BY SOME TO DISCUSSION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES, WHENCE OUR SUPPORT OF SC



FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES, WHENCE OUR SUPPORT OF SC RESOLUTION NO 502 AND OUR DESIRE TO SEE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE CONCLUSION OF A CEASE-FIRE, THAT IS, ARMISTICE TERMS APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE CONFLICT OR, RATHER, TO THE TWO COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

WE WANTED TO AFFIRM OUR SOLIDARITY WITH GREAT BRITAIN, WHO AS IT HAPPENS, HAD BEEN THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION AGAINST BOTH ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ITS NATIONAL PRIDE, A SOLIDARITY WHICH IS NATURAL: GREAT BRITAIN MUST REGAIN ITS RIGHT (DOIT RETROUVER SON DROIT), IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT WE SHALL DO EVERYTHING, ONCE ITS RIGHT HAS BEEN REGAINED, SO THAT PEACE TRIUMPHS OVER WAR. UNQUOTE.

2. AFTER HE HAD SPOKEN ON BEHALF OF THE SEVEN, MITTERRAND GAVE HIS OWN SEPARATE, NATIONAL, PRESS CONFERENCE. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF HIS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON THE FALKLANDS:-

3. MITTERRAND WAS ASKED FIRST IF MEASURES HE HAD REFERRED TO IN A PREVIOUS ANSWER AS BEING POSSIBLE IN RELATION TO THE LEBANON WOULD BE THE SAME AS THOSE TAKEN IN RESPECT OF ARGENTINA. AFTER CONDEMNING VIOLENCE IN GENERAL TERMS, MITTERRAND WENT ON TO SAY:

QUOTE. IN THE ARGENTINE BUSINESS THE GREAT PROBLEM ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT AS THE INITIATIVE FOR THE AGGRESSION CAME FROM ARGENTINA, IF YOU CONDEMN VIOLENCE YOU START BY CONDEMNING ARGENTINA. AFTER THAT IT IS A CHAIN OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH IT IS DIFFICULT TO AVOID.

BUT AS THE OBJECTIVE - FRANCE'S, IN ANY CASE (ON THIS I CAN AN ONLY SPEAK FOR MYSELF, FOR MY COUNTRY), IS TO STATE ITS SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN AGAINST THIS VIOLATION OF LAW, AND TO PRESERVE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE THE VERY IMPORTANT RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE, WESTERN EUROPE ALSO, AND LATIN AMERICA, THAT MEANS THAT IN THE DAYS TO COME A WHOLE SERIES OF ACTIONS WILL BE MADE NECESSARY. UNQUOTE.

4. MITTERRAND WAS THEN ASKED IF THE DECLARATION (SIC) OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WENT FURTHER TOWARDS EXPRESSING SOLIDARITY WITH THE UK THAN THE POSITIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN UNTIL THEN AND WHETHER THEY HAD AGREED NOT ONLY ON THE NEED FOR A LOCAL CEASE-FIRE BUT ALSO ON THE NEED FOR A CEASE-FIRE WHICH WOULD COVER ALL THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT, IE THAT ARGENTINA COULD NOT HARASS BRITISH POSITIONS IN THE FALKLANDS WHEN RIGHT HAD BEEN REESTABLISHED. MITTERRAND REPLIED:



\* WHEN RIGHT HAD BEEN REESTABLISHED. MITTERRAND REPLIED:

QUOTE. LISTEN, LETS BE STRAIGHTFORWARD. THERE WAS NO TEXT ADOPTED ON THE FALKLANDS-MALOUINES AFFAIR. I SAY FALKLANDS-MALOUINES BECAUSE IF I SAY MALOUINES, YOU TRANSLATE IT AS FALKLANDS AND IF I SAY FALKLANDS OTHERS TRANSLATE IT AS MALOUINES. BUT ITS ALL THE SAME THING. SO I WON'T MAKE A FUTILE SPEECH ABOUT IT.

IT IS A FACT THAT ARGENTINA PREFERRED TO SETTLE BY FORCE A LONG-STANDING DISPUTE IT HAD WITH BRITAIN. IT IS ALSO A FACT THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAVE NEVER RECOGNISED OR DEFINED BRITAIN'S RIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY. NEVERTHELESS WE ARE ON BRITAIN'S SIDE.

WHY? BECAUSE SHE HAS BEEN ATTACKED, BECAUSE SHE IS OUR FRIEND AND OUR ALLY AND BECAUSE ONCE THE AGRSSION TOOK PLACE A CHAIN OF EVENTS STARTED OVER WHICH WE HAVE NO CONTROL.

WE SUPPORTED FROM THE START UN RESOLUTION 502. THAT IS STILL OUR POSITION. IN ADDITION WE ADOPTED IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AN EMBARGO ON COMMERCIAL EXCHAGES WITH ARGENTINA, WHICH SEEMED TO US THE NORMAL CONSEQUENCE OF OUR CONDEMNATION OF VIOLENCE.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE THEN, AND ESPECIALLY THE BRITISH ADVANCE THROUGH THE FALKLANDS, IS PART OF AN EVENT OVER WHICH FRANCE HAS NO HOLD, EXCEPT INDIRECTLY THROUGH THE FACT THAT SHE PARTICIPATES IN THIS EMBARGO, THAT IS TRUE. WE JUST THINK THAT WHAT ONE COULD CALL A NEW EVENT IN THIS GAME PREDETERMINED BY FATE WOULD ARISE FROM THE FACT THAT BRITAIN HAD RECOVERED THE SOIL WHICH WAS UNDER DISPUTE.

AFTER THAT, A NEW PHASE WILL BEGIN - THAT IS NOT A PRINCIPLE THAT I AM PUTTING FORWARD, IT IS A POLITICAL FACT - WHICH I HOPE WILL CONCLUDE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH A CEASE-FIRE OR AN ARMISTICE, CALL IT WHAT YOU WILL, AND FRANCE WILL NATURALLY BE ON THE SIDE OF THOSE ARGUING IN FAVOUR OF THAT. UNQUOTE.

5. SEE MIFT.

FRETWELL

CCN PARA 3 LINE 11 TO READ 'ON THIS I CAN ONLY ' ETC

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

9135 - 1

OO MONTEVIDEO

GRS 123

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCC 072315Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 343 OF 7 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA

INFO: PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, PRIORITY MODUK  
(FOR DS5, DS11 AND SCPL)

OUR TELNO.172 TO BRASILIA : HOSPITAL SHIPS

1. MV NORLAND WILL ARRIVE IN MONTEVIDEO ON 12 JUNE AND HMS HERALD ON 13 JUNE, NOT (NOT) AS STATED IN OUR TUR.
2. NORLAND WILL OFFLOAD PRISONERS OF WAR AND TURN ROUND WILL BE COMPLETED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. NO (NO) FUEL, WATER, MAIL OR SUPPLIES WILL BE TAKEN ON BOARD BY NORLAND.
4. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER URUGUAYANS HAVE YET GIVEN AN ASSURANCE THAT THEY ARE CAPABLE OF ACCEPTING TWO SHIPS ON SUCCESSIVE DATES.
5. OUR TELNO.172 TO BRASILIA, WHICH WAS INADVERTENTLY NOT ALSO ADDRESSED TO YOU, HAS NOW BEEN SENT TO YOU.

PYM

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO  
S AM D  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1  
CONFIDENTIAL



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 June, 1982

*Dear David,*

Press Requests to Visit the Falkland Islands after Cessation of  
the Hostilities

We are beginning to receive requests, particularly from American journalists and others who have resented being omitted from the press group with the Task Force, for visits to the Falkland Islands after hostilities there cease. About a thousand overseas journalists attended the Zimbabwe independence celebrations in 1980. The liberation of the Falklands is likely to generate at least the same level of interest and we may be faced with a rush reaching the proportions of a second 'invasion'. This has already been discussed with MOD officials.

We have a good story to tell. There are disadvantages either in preventing an influx altogether or adopting a laissez-faire attitude. We therefore suggest that good facilities be provided for 80 or so key journalists. Though this would lead to objections from those not chosen, we could partly meet these by undertaking to let them in by stages as the first group leave (it will probably be a 3-day wonder for some). Our information policy interests would best be served by carefully selecting representatives of the world's most influential media. Preference might be given to the USA, Latin America, the Developed West and third world countries with Falklands interests (eg Security Council members). Our prime aim should be to counter any propaganda campaign the Argentines might mount following defeat. About 25% of the new places might be reserved for the British press (this should suffice given that the 28 British pressmen with the Task Force have so far had exclusive coverage). One way to spread the jam widely would be to favour single reporters and to encourage TV companies and others who need teams to pool resources.

I understand that the Stanley airstrip would need at least 10 days to be repaired. Sending a ship from Montevideo (4 days travel) might be quicker. Temporary accommodation could then be provided on that ship or another vessel moored at Port Stanley. Radio telephone links would have to be established, including equipment for transmitting photos and if at all possible film. In effect we would have to provide a package tour (on a repayment basis) involving transport, briefing, escorting and organised departure. It should be made clear in advance that journalists arriving without accreditation would have to be sent home because facilities are limited.

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/There





There will be staffing implications both in London and in the Falklands. In London a small office would be needed to deal with applications from others to go on later tours. You could perhaps handle this in general, but we would of course be best placed to decide which overseas journalists should be chosen. In the Falklands themselves MOD should take the lead given the likelihood that our armed forces will be in charge of day to day operations for some considerable time after a ceasefire. Extra press officers would presumably need to be sent out temporarily from MOD and FCO.

It would probably make sense to allow the journalists in as soon as practicable after the main Stanley garrison has surrendered. It will be hard to withstand media pressure if there are only small pockets of resistance left, eg on West Falkland. If the Argentines continue long range hostilities from the mainland, eg by air attacks on our ships, the timing will be largely a matter of judgement about military security. It may then be necessary to provide the journalists with protected air or sea transport from, say, Uruguay.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other members of ODSA, Sir Robert Armstrong and to Sir Michael Palliser.

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

*J E Holmes*

David Omand Esq  
PS/Secretary of State for Defence



RESTRICTED

*cc Mr Ingham*

*4/26*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 June 1982

*Dear John,*

Britain and Latin America

Thank you for your letter of 2 June with which you enclosed the texts of the Prime Minister's interviews on 2 June.

In her interview with the Central Office of Information the Prime Minister said that Lord Carrington's visits to Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela in 1980 were the first ever by a British Foreign Secretary to Latin America. In fact they were the first ever to those countries but not the first by a Foreign Secretary to any Latin America country. The material we provided may not have made this clear. Mr Michael Stewart visited Argentina, Chile and Peru in 1966.

*Yours ever,*

for (J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 1AA

W 7 JUN 1982





2

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :  
0700 HOURS, 7 JUNE 1982

United Nations

- A. (UKDEL Versailles telno 002 to UKMIS New York) 1. Instructions were sent to Sir A Parsons to reply to the Secretary-General's latest proposals for a truce, ceasefire, withdrawal of Argentine troops and reduction of British forces. Sir A Parsons saw the Secretary-General at 7 pm (New York time) on 6 June and informed him that his proposals, which formed an integrated package, could not be accepted. Propositions about the reduction of UK forces or about long-term security arrangements would have to be worked out after we had repossessed the islands. We had become disillusioned by negotiations with the Argentinians. We had not received any private indication corroborating purported Argentine willingness to climb down. We could not therefore reinvolve ourselves in interminable negotiations. The Secretary-General indicated that he shared our view of the reluctance of the Argentinians to negotiate seriously but had felt that he had to make another try. His mandate of good offices was still in existence. He had told Ross that in his view the Argentinians had missed an opportunity in the negotiations up to 20 May. UKMIS New York have been informed that the Argentine response to these latest proposals was also negative.
- C. (Washington telno 2044 to FCO) 2. There are indications both from Mrs Kirkpatrick in New York and from Stoessel in Washington that the Americans are fully aware of the Secretary-General's latest proposals and are glum about our likely reaction to them.
- D. (UKDEL Versailles telno 10 to FCO) 3. In response to the voting pattern in the Security Council on the resolution which the UK vetoed on 4 June, instructions have been sent to posts in Tokyo, Dublin, Kampala, Kinshasa, Amman, Georgetown and Accra to upbraid the Japanese and Irish, express our disappointment at the votes from Uganda and Zaire and our appreciation of the votes of Jordan, Guyana and Togo.

Chilean Exercises

- E. and F. (Santiago telnos 281 and 282.) 4. HM Ambassador Santiago has reported that there is something unusual going on in Chilean military deployment. He cites a range of odd incidents and a build-up of Chilean forces in southern Chile. Although it is claimed that exercises are going on, it is possible that Chile is either assembling her forces in order to take defensive or even (though this seems less likely) offensive action against Argentine forces.
- G. (Santiago telno 282) 5. HM Ambassador has proposed that he should be instructed to sound out senior Chileans whom he knows well about the Chilean intentions and to make it clear that HMG would be gravely concerned if the Falklands crisis sparked off an intra-regional conflict. The Emergency Unit checked with Mr Heath by telephone that he did not require instructions before 7 June.

/Arms



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
Arms Supplies to Argentina

6. Diplomatic efforts are continuing to check the supply of arms to Argentina and to ensure that Argentina does not receive more Exocets via Peru.

Comment

7. Instructions to Santiago are needed on the odd Chilean military activities, if possible by 1700 hours our time.

7 June 1982



R M Jackson  
Emergency Unit

SECRET

SECRET



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DESKBY 061200Z TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

FM UKDEL VERSAILLES 060930Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NO 002 OF 06 JUNE 1982  
INFO FLASH F C O. IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.


FALKLANDS: YOUR TELNOS 944 AND 945 TO FCO.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE ASREE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S LATEST PROPOSALS ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO US FOR THE REASONS SET OUT IN YOUR TELNO 944, AND THAT YOU SHOULD PASS A MESSAGE TO HIM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE LINES YOU PROPOSE. IF YOU SEE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IN DELAYING PASSING THE MESSAGE UNTIL THE DEADLINE OF 8 PM TONIGHT NEW YORK TIME APPROACHES, YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO DO SO. WE SHALL IF NECESSARY TELL THE AMERICANS HERE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS CONSIDERED THE PROPOSALS AND HAS SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU TO REJECT THEM.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE CONCLUSIVE OBJECTIONS IN YOUR T.U.R., WE SEE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS OF DIFFICULTY:

1. WE FIND THE THREE TIMES AND DATES IN POINTS 1 AND 2 OF HIS PROPOSALS CONFUSING. IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ON THE GROUND BETWEEN 11 AM ON 7 JUNE AND 11 AM ON 11 JUNE.
11. THE PRESENCE OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL



- 
- I. WE FIND THE THREE TIMES AND DATES IN POINTS 1 AND 2 OF HIS PROPOSALS CONFUSING. IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ON THE GROUND BETWEEN 11 AM ON 7 JUNE AND 11 AM ON 11 JUNE.
  
  - II. THE PRESENCE OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE ISLANDS WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR US TO ENSURE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL IF THEY SET OUT TO DELAY IT UNDER A VARIETY OF PRETEXTS: POINT 3 OF THE PROPOSAL DOES NOTHING TO HELP:
  
  - III. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE BE FREE TO MAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ISLANDS. WE COULD NOT THEREFORE ACCEPT A REDUCTION OF BRITISH FORCES AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL PROPOSES.

FCO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK AND  
WASHINGTON DESKBY 061200Z

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0246/7

E.R.

NYFO 002/07

OO FCO (DESKBY 070300Z)

F-7 JUN 1982

GRS 660

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
DESKBY 070300Z (FCO)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 070220Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 949 OF 6 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



UKDEL VERSAILLES TEL NO 002 TO ME: FALKLANDS.

1. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT 2300Z THIS EVENING (6 JUNE), I.E. ONE HOUR BEFORE HIS DEADLINE. HE HAD NOT BY THEN HEARD FROM THE ARGENTINES. DE SOTO TOLD US THAT COSTA MENDEZ RETURNED TO BUESNOS AIRES LAST NIGHT (5 JUNE) AND THAT HE THOUGHT THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN WORKING ALL DAY ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSAL.
2. I SAID THAT YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD STUDIED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MESSAGE VERY CAREFULLY. YOU ADMIRER HIS PERSISTENCE AND THE QUALITY OF THE EFFORT HE AND HIS STAFF HAD MADE TO FIND A LAST-MINUTE SETTLEMENT. BUT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE YOU HAD A SINGLE OBJECTIVE, NAMELY TO BRING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL BY ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND WAS NOW TOO COMPLEX TO MAKE IT PRACTICABLE FOR A THIRD PARTY TO INTERVENE. YOU COULD NOT AT THIS STAGE ACCEPT AN INTEGRATED PACKAGE INVOLVING MANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS. NOR AT THIS STAGE COULD YOU COMMIT YOURSELVES TO ANY PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF UK FORCES OR ABOUT LONG TERM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE UN'S OR ANYONE ELSE'S AUSPICES. THESE WERE MATTERS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT AFTER WE HAD REPOSSESSED THE ISLANDS.
3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE HAD BECOME DISILLUSIONED BY THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE LAST TWO MONTHS. OUR PROPOSALS OF



WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT AFTER WE HAD REPOSSESSED THE ISLANDS.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE HAD BECOME DISILLUSIONED BY THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE LAST TWO MONTHS. OUR PROPOSALS OF 17 MAY HAD REQUIRED YOU TO MOVE VERY FAR: THE ARGENTINE REACTION HAD INCREASED OUR DISILLUSION. MOST RECENTLY OUR COMPLETE LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE NON-ALIGNED COMMUNIQUE WHICH HAD JUST BEEN DRAFTED IN HAVANA. THIS HAD BEEN AN ARGENTINE TEXT. IT SHOWED ABSOLUTELY NO DISPOSITION ON ARGENTINA'S PART TO COMPROMISE. NOR HAD WE RECEIVED ANY PRIVATE INDICATION FROM THE ARGENTINES TO CORROBORATE WHAT SOME OF OUR FRIENDS WERE TELLING US ABOUT THEIR DESIRE TO CLIMB DOWN. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND YOU WERE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE ANOTHER CHANCE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE RISK OF RE-INVOLVING OURSELVES IN INTERMINABLE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAD REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE ONLY PRACTICABLE WAY OF BRINGING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WAS THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT.

4. IT WAS CLEAR THAT NONE OF THIS CAME AS ANY SURPRISE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE SAID THAT HE HAD FELT HE HAD TO MAKE ANOTHER TRY. HIS MANDATE REMAINED IN EXISTENCE. THE WEATHER SEEMED TO HAVE IMPOSED A LULL ON THE FIGHTING IN EAST FALKLAND AND HE HAD THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY. HE INDICATED THAT HE AGREED WITH MUCH THAT I HAD SAID ABOUT THE RELUCTANCE OF THE ARGENTINES TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. WHEN ROS CAME TO SAY GOODBYE YESTERDAY (5 JUNE) PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD REHEARSED THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIM AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT IN HIS (PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S) VIEW THE ARGENTINES HAD MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY.

5. DURING THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE LEBANON, MRS KIRKPATRICK ASKED ME WHETHER WE WERE GOING TO ACCEPT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S INITIATIVE. I SAID THAT WE WERE NOT AND BRIEFLY EXPLAINED WHY. SHE REACTED GLUMLY AND SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT NOTHING WOULD DO FOR US OTHER THAN TO BUNDLE THE ARGENTINES OFF THE ISLANDS. BUT SHE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO PUT ME UNDER PRESSURE.

6. DE SOTO HAS SINCE TOLD US THAT THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE WAS NEGATIVE. HE WOULD NOT REVEAL THE DETAILS, SAYING THAT HE HAD NOT GIVEN THEM DETAILS OF OUR REPLY.

PARSONS

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ACTION COPY

FM WASHINGTON 061801Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2044 OF 6 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL VERSAILLES PARIS

UKMIS TELNO 944: FALKLANDS, SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSAL.

1. STOESSEL TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD PICKED UP A REPORT FROM QUOTE SPECIAL SOURCES UNQUOTE ABOUT A NEW PROPOSAL BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. HE READ VERBATIM FROM WHAT WAS EVIDENTLY THE SAME TEXT AS THAT REPORTED IN UKMIS TELNO 945. HE ASKED WHETHER I KNEW ABOUT THIS AND HOW WE WERE GOING TO REACT.
2. I THOUGHT IT BEST AT THIS STAGE TO AVOID REVEALING ANYTHING TO STOESSEL ON EITHER POINT, AND ASKED WHAT HIS OWN REACTION WAS. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS WERE QUOTE SORT OF INTERESTING UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT I FELT SURE WE WOULD WELCOME ANY EFFORTS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO BRING ABOUT A SERIOUS CEASE-FIRE BUT, AS STOESSEL KNEW, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE LINKED IN A FOOLPROOF WAY TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL. STOESSEL SAID THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS SEEMED LIKE A STEP IN THAT DIRECTION THEY WOULD PRESUMABLY BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT.
3. THERE IS A DANGER THAT IF WE GIVE THE STATE DEPARTMENT ANY THING MORE TO GO ON AT THIS STAGE, ENDERS MAY SUCCEED IN GENERATING UNWELCOME PRESSURE ON US OVER THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS. I DO NOT INTEND THEREFORE TO SAY ANYTHING MORE TO STOESSEL UNTIL SIR A PARSONS HAS ACTED ON UKDEL VERSAILLES TELNO 002 TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

THOMAS

NNNN



FM UKDEL VERSAILLES 060931Z JUN 82

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO


TELEGRAM NUMBER 10 OF 6 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TOKYO, DUBLIN, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, AMMAN,  
GEORGETOWN, ACCRA, WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK

6 JUN 1982

YOUR TELNO 33: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY



1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S INSTRUCTIONS TO POSTS ON  
THE FOUR POINTS IN YOUR T.U.R. ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. JAPAN. THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE SPOKE STRONGLY TO  
THEIR JAPANESE OPPOSITE NUMBERS HERE ON 5 JUNE. THEY  
GOT NO CLEAR EXPLANATION AND NOT MUCH IN A WAY OF  
APOLOGY. HM AMBASSADOR TOKYO SHOULD SPEAK APPROPRIATELY  
AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, EXPRESSING ASTONISHMENT THAT  
JAPAN SHOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE COMPANY OF THE SOVIET  
UNION, POLAND AND PANAMA, TO THAT OF EG FRANCE AND  
JORDAN, NOT TO SPEAK OF BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.  
HE SHOULD ALSO SAY THAT IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO US THAT  
ANY EFFORT WAS MADE TO RECONSIDER THE JAPANESE POSITION  
EVEN AFTER THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PERSONAL TELEPHONE  
CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER HERE  
LATE ON 4 JUNE.

B. IRELAND. SIR L FIGG SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT IT IS  
BECOMING HARDER AND HARDER TO RECONCILE THE PERFORMANCE  
OF THE IRISH DELEGATION AT THE UN WITH IRELAND'S COMMIT-  
MENTS UNDER THE BASIC DOCUMENTS OF POLITICAL COOPERATION  
IN THE TEN. THIS IS HAVING A VERY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON  
ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WHICH WE FEAR COULD BE LASTING.



B. IRELAND. SIR L FIGG SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT IT IS BECOMING HARDER AND HARDER TO RECONCILE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE IRISH DELEGATION AT THE UN WITH IRELAND'S COMMITMENTS UNDER THE BASIC DOCUMENTS OF POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE TEN. THIS IS HAVING A VERY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WHICH WE FEAR COULD BE LASTING.

C. UGANDA AND ZAIRE. POSTS SHOULD ACT AS YOU SUGGEST. KAMPALA SHOULD SAY THAT OUR DISAPPOINTMENT IS PARTICULARLY STRONG IN THE CASE OF UGANDA, WHICH HAD HITHERTO SHOWN SUCH A CLEAR-SIGHTED UNDERSTANDING OF THE BASIC ISSUES AT STAKE IN THE FALKLAND CRISIS.

D. JORDAN ETC. THIS IS COVERED BY UKDEL VERSAILLES TELNO 1 TO GEORGETOWN OF 5 JUNE.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TOKYO, DUBLIN, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, AMMAN, GEORGETOWN, ACCRA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS

NNNNIZGRT,,





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>634</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Santiago telegram no. 280 of 6 June 1982 to FCO</i>	
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CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0700 HOURS, 7 JUNE 1982Versailles Summit

1. During her press conference at the end of the economic summit, the Prime Minister stated that there had been a long discussion about the Falklands. She said that all nations at the Summit were absolutely staunch in recognising that Britain had been the victim of Argentine aggression.

U.N.

2. The Secretary-General has sent identical messages to the Prime Minister and General Galtieri, putting forward a 'new' plan for a ceasefire and Argentine withdrawal. Sir A. Parsons has advised the Secretary-General that we are unable to accept his proposals.

Military

3. 5 Infantry brigade has now been disembarked on the Falklands, to reinforce the British forces already there.
4. The Q.E. 2 will arrive in Britain on Friday, 11 June with some 700 men from the ships Coventry, Antelope and Ardent.
5. An RAF flight left Montevideo last night for the UK, carrying 51 walking wounded and stretcher cases who had arrived earlier in the day on the hospital ship 'HMS Hydra'.

Emergency Unit

7 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

7 June 1982

You wrote to John Coles on 4 June 1982 about a reply to the telegram from Mr. Lavity Stoutt, the Chief Minister of the British Virgin Islands, about the Falklands dispute.

The Prime Minister has seen the draft reply submitted with your letter and she is content for it to be sent.

CAW

Francis Richards, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

15



012  
RESTRICTED

*Pa*

SAPU(82) 30

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

Attached are notes on the main military and diplomatic developments during the Parliamentary Recess.

Cabinet Office

7 June 1982

RESTRICTED



## MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

### 1. BATTLE FOR DARWIN AND GOOSE GREEN

2 Battalion the Parachute Regiment launched their attack on Darwin and Goose Green on 28 May. A fierce battle lasted all day during which the CO of the battalion, Lt Col H Jones, was killed in a successful attack on two Argentine heavy machine guns. The Argentine defenders finally surrendered on the morning of 29 May after first releasing 112 Falkland Islanders who had been confined for almost 30 days in the recreation centre at Goose Green. About 1,400 prisoners were taken and large amounts of arms and equipment were also captured. Argentine casualties are estimated to have been 250 killed and 120 wounded. British casualties were 17 killed and 34 wounded. Subsequently a further 200 Argentines have walked in and surrendered.

### 2. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY ACTION

British forces also secured Douglas Settlement and Teal Inlet to the NW of Port Stanley before moving forward to secure advance positions on Mt Kent and other areas of high ground overlooking Port Stanley. During these operations there were several successful skirmishes with Argentine troops and a number of prisoners were taken. Subsequently we have continued our preparations for retaking Port Stanley, consolidating the positions already taken and moving forward more men and equipment. 5 Infantry Brigade has now been landed on the Island to reinforce 3 Commando Brigade which made the initial landing. Although the Land Forces Commander has made it clear that the main attack on Stanley will only begin when all these preparations are complete - "I don't want us dashing in there causing unnecessary loss of life of my soldiers ..... We will do it in a proper, sensible, well balanced military way" - we have continued to step up the pressure on the Argentines with probing patrols, Harrier ground attack operations and bombardment of Argentine positions by both shore based artillery and naval gunfire.

### 3. POWs/CASUALTIES

Argentine prisoners taken when the spy ship Narwal was captured were last week taken to Montevideo in Uruguay for repatriation by the hospital ship HMS Hecla along with some British casualties who were flown back to Britain by VC 10. More British casualties are now on the way home after being landed in Montevideo by HMS Hydra. The Argentine hospital ship Bahia Paraiso was allowed to take off Argentine wounded from Port Stanley after being searched by a naval boarding party in accordance with the



Geneva Convention. Subsequently 140 Argentine casualties were transferred to the Bahia Paraiso from the British hospital ship Uganda. Arrangements are also in hand for the repatriation of prisoners captured at Darwin and Goose Green.

#### 4. OTHER MILITARY ITEMS

During the past ten days there have been a number of other military events worthy of mention -

- An unsuccessful attack on a British tanker outside the TEZ by an Argentine Hercules which dropped bombs from its cargo door.

- An unsuccessful attack on HMS Invincible on 30 May by Argentine Super Etendard aircraft equipped with Exocet.

- A number of largely ineffectual high level bombing raids by Argentine aircraft on British troops on East Falkland.

- On 1 June an accident involving explosives at Goose Green killed 5 Argentine prisoners and injured 7 more. There were no British casualties. A Board of Inquiry has been set up in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

- Press reports following the capture of Goose Green claimed that the Argentines had planned to use napalm against British troops and might have actually done so in one (unsuccessful) attack during the battle. This has not been confirmed although aircraft tanks and bombs which could have been used for napalm were captured at Goose Green. The use of napalm is not illegal at present although its use would be banned by a 1977 Protocol signed by Britain (but not by Argentina) which is not yet in force. British forces in the South Atlantic do not have napalm.

- The Australian Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, has informed us that, while Australia is still keen to purchase HMS Invincible, they would not hold us to the sale if as a result of the Falklands operation we wished to retain the ship. The Prime Minister has thanked Mr Fraser for his generous offer and said that we will make a rapid decision as soon as the situation in the Falklands permits.



- On 4 June an RAF Vulcan was allowed to make an emergency landing in Brazil after running short of fuel.

- The QE2 is returning to Britain with survivors from HMS Coventry, Ardent and Antelope. When she returns she will have completed her mission and will be handed back to her owners, Cunard.

/DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS



## DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

### 1. UN SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT RESOLUTION

The draft resolution which we vetoed on 4 June was unacceptable because it failed to establish an explicit link between a ceasefire and Argentine withdrawal. Since Argentina was responsible for the initial act of aggression and has persistently refused to withdraw its troops voluntarily as required by Resolution 502, we would only be willing to agree to a ceasefire if it were irrevocably linked to the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces within a fixed period. The draft resolution set no deadline for the completion of withdrawal. If adopted the draft resolution would have allowed Argentina to lead us back into the morass of procrastination and evasion to which we have become accustomed over the last two months of intensive negotiations, while tying our own hands by the call in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution for a ceasefire. The draft resolution only just obtained the minimum number (9) of positive votes which would have secured its adoption were it not for use of the veto. Three non-aligned countries abstained. (Sir Anthony Parsons' statement earlier in the Security Council debate was circulated as SAPU (29) on 3 June).

### 2. UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES MISSION

The Secretary-General of the United Nations had reported to the Security Council on 2 June on the mission of "good offices" which he had been undertaking in accordance with Security Council Resolution 505. He said that the positions of Britain and Argentina did not offer the possibility of developing at that time a mutually acceptable ceasefire. He would nevertheless maintain close contact with the parties in the hope that his good offices might contribute in bringing the crisis to an end.

### 3. VERSAILLES SUMMIT MEETING

At the Western Economic Summit at Versailles we had valuable discussions about the situation in the Falklands. The Summit countries all agreed that the situation had been brought about by Argentina's aggression, and condemned her recourse to violence rather than the rule of law. They expressed their complete solidarity with us, as the victim of aggression, and confirmed that we must recover what we had lost.



4. RIO TREATY MEETING

Signatories of the Rio Treaty met in Washington on 27-29 May, and adopted a resolution which condemned the United Kingdom, called on the United States to cease support for Britain and its sanctions against Argentina, and invited each member state to support Argentina as it judged appropriate, either individually or on a co-ordinated basis. We nevertheless understand that the terms of the resolution as adopted were significantly less favourable to Argentina's position than the draft which Argentina herself originally proposed. The United States, Trinidad and Tobago, Chile and Colombia abstained on the resolution.

5. NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

The Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement met in Havana from 31 May to 5 June. It adopted a resolution regarding the Falkland Islands which, supported Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Islands. This was only to be expected but the resolution noticeably failed to give full support to Argentina's military activities in pursuit of its claim.

6. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ASTIZ

Lieutenant Commander Astiz arrived in the United Kingdom on 5 June and is being held in secure accommodation which satisfies the conditions of the Geneva Conventions, at the Royal Military Police Depot at Chichester Keep. We have agreed to put certain questions to him on behalf of the Governments of France and Sweden. After that he will be repatriated.

7. UP-DATING OF SHACKLETON REPORT

The Prime Minister asked Lord Shackleton to up-date his 'Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands' produced in 1976. He has reassembled almost all of his original team, and hopes to report within about a month. He and his team will evaluate the overall resource development potential of the Islands, and assess their future economic viability.



*M. C. S.*  
*July 6*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 061200Z TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

FM UKDEL VERSAILLES 060930Z JUN 82  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NO 002 OF 06 JUNE 1982  
INFO FLASH F C O. IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

FALKLANDS: YOUR TELNOS 944 AND 945 TO FCO.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE AGREE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S LATEST PROPOSALS ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO US FOR THE REASONS SET OUT IN YOUR TELNO 944, AND THAT YOU SHOULD PASS A MESSAGE TO HIM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE LINES YOU PROPOSE. IF YOU SEE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IN DELAYING PASSING THE MESSAGE UNTIL THE DEADLINE OF 8 PM TONIGHT NEW YORK TIME APPROACHES, YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO DO SO. WE SHALL IF NECESSARY TELL THE AMERICANS HERE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS CONSIDERED THE PROPOSALS AND HAS SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU TO REJECT THEM.
2. IN ADDITION TO THE CONCLUSIVE OBJECTIONS IN YOUR T.U.R., WE SEE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS OF DIFFICULTY:
  - I. WE FIND THE THREE TIMES AND DATES IN POINTS 1 AND 2 OF HIS PROPOSALS CONFUSING. IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ON THE GROUND BETWEEN 11 AM ON 7 JUNE AND 11 AM ON 11 JUNE.
  - II. THE PRESENCE OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE ISLANDS WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR US TO ENSURE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL IF THEY SET OUT TO DELAY IT UNDER A VARIETY OF PRETEXTS: POINT 3 OF THE PROPOSAL DOES NOTHING TO HELP:
  - III. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE BE FREE TO MAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ISLANDS. WE COULD NOT THEREFORE ACCEPT A REDUCTION OF BRITISH FORCES AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL PROPOSES.

FCO PLEASE PASS DESKBY 061200Z TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

NNNN







1. A TRUCE COMES INTO EFFECT AS OF 11.00 A.M., NEW YORK TIME, ON MONDAY, 7 JUNE 1982.
2. ON WEDNESDAY, 9 JUNE, THE TWO MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE ISLANDS MEET IN THE PRESENCE OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON THE MODALITIES OF THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH IS TO COME INTO EFFECT BY 11.00 A.M, NEW YORK TIME, ON FRIDAY, 11 JUNE.
3. SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS WILL COMMENCE, TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 15 DAYS. ARGENTINA WILL INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE.
4. WITHIN THIS TIME FRAME, THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF PLANS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS). IN THE LIGHT OF THESE PLANS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL UNDER-TAKE CONSULTATIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES.
5. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTE AND TO SEEK, WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, THE COMPLETION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY 31 DECEMBER 1982, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE INITIATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITION OF THE PARTIES AND WITHOUT PREJUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK OR AT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LOCATION IN THE VICINITY THEREOF.
6. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE INAUGURATED ON 1 JULY 1982.
7. SHOULD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AFTER TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES, DETERMINE THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE WITHIN THE TIME FRAME ENVISAGED, HE MAY ESTABLISH A NEW TARGET DATE WHICH WILL BE IN KEEPING WITH THE URGENCY OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO WHICH THE PARTIES ARE COMMITTED.

TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE ABOVE PLAN WILL REQUIRE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS COMMUNICATE THEIR UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE BY 8.00 P.M., NEW YORK TIME, ON SUNDAY, 6 JUNE 1982. UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH POSITIVE RESPONSES, I WILL IMMEDIATELY REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

ENDS



CONFIDENTIAL  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060445Z JUNE 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 944 OF 6 JUNE  
AND TO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

DIST: 1  
We refer. Agree reasons.  
ref.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FALKLANDS:

1. MIFT CONTAINS A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER. AN IDENTICAL MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT TO GALTIERI.
2. THE S-G IS NOT WELL AND DE SOTO DELIVERED THE MESSAGE TO ME LATE TONIGHT (SATURDAY). I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE S-G HAD ANY INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION: I KNEW THAT THEY HAD CALLED ON HIM EARLIER IN THE DAY. DE SOTO SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT: ALL HE COULD TELL ME WAS THAT THE S-G WAS MAKING SURE THAT HIS MESSAGE "GOT TO THE RIGHT PEOPLE".
3. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ANOTHER GENUINE LAST MINUTE ATTEMPT BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT FURTHER BLOODSHED. OBVIOUSLY IT HAS COME TOO LATE, WHILE POINTS 4-7 WOULD DRAW US BACK INTO THE MORASS FROM WHICH WE EMERGED ON 20 MAY.
4. I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO TRANSMIT A MESSAGE FROM THE P.M. TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR BY 8PM NEW YORK TIME ON SUNDAY. THIS MESSAGE MIGHT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-
  - (A) APPRECIATE OF THE S-G'S, CONTINUED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE PEACEFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND TO AVOID FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.
  - (B) REGRET THAT ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE HAS RENDERED HIS APPROACH TO A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL/NEGOTIATIONS UNACCEPTABLE AT THIS LATE STAGE: TO THE VERY END OF THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE WE HAD LOOKED FOR BUT HAD FAILED TO DETECT ANY SIGN OF CHANGE IN ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE:
  - (C) CONFIRMATION AND REINFORCEMENT OF ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE TO BE FOUND IN THE NAM COMMUNIQUE (HAVANA TELS NO'S 3 AND 4 TO ME).
  - (D) IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE THE SG'S PROGRAMME FOR A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT WORK: ONLY DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO COMMANDERS WOULD ACHIEVE THIS NOW (POINTS 1 AND 2):
  - (E) WE WILL NOT COMMIT OURSELVES NOW, AFTER ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED, TO A PROGRAMME FOR A REDUCTION OF BRITISH FORCES "IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS", OR TO FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER UN AUSPICES (POINT 4). WE CANNOT ALLOW OUR RIGHT TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS TO BE PREJUDICED.
  - (F) EQUALLY WE WILL NOT NOW COMMIT OURSELVES TO A PROGRAMME OF NEGOTIATIONS (POINTS 5-7) UNDER UN AUSPICES, ESPECIALLY "TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY": OUR ATTITUDE TO THIS PROPOSITION IS INEVITABLY INFLUENCED BY THE NAM COMMUNIQUE AND BY OUR EXPERIENCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH CONCLUDED ON 20 MAY.
  - (G) HENCE, ALTHOUGH WE APPRECIATE THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SG'S PROPOSALS, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO GIVE UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE TO SUCH A FAR REACHING SET OF PROPOSITIONS "AS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE". WE CANNOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE DRAWN INTO ANOTHER PROBABLY LONG DRAWN OUT NEGOTIATION WITH ARGENTINE FORCES STILL SITTING ON THE ISLANDS. OUR FIRST AND FOREMOST OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO SECURE IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.
5. IT IS NOT INCONVEIVABLE THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS "AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE" FOR PRECISELY THE REASONS THAT THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO US I.E. THAT THEY COULD THEN PRESS FOR A CEASEFIRE WHILE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN ON POINTS 4-7. EQUALLY, IF PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS REVEALED HIS IDEAS TO THE AMERICANS, THEY MAY TRY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON US TO ACCEPT.

PARSONS

NNNN



FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :  
0700 HOURS, 6 JUNE 1982

Vulcan Aircraft

- A. (FCO tel. No.169 to Brasilia) 1. The Brazilian Ambassador was summoned by the PUS yesterday morning and asked that the Brazilian Government should stand by the earlier decision to allow the Vulcan to leave Rio de Janeiro. It was stressed that this matter was a political issue to which the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State attached very great importance. The Ambassador said that he had no firm instructions and would convey this request to his Government. No final decision had yet been taken, but Brazil wanted to maintain friendly relations with the UK. The PUS drew the Ambassador's attention to the transit of Argentine war supplies through Recife and expressed his surprise that Brazil kept such close company with the present Libyan regime. Sr Campos denied having information about this.
- B. (Brasilia telno:250 to FCO) 2. HM Ambassador subsequently reported on his meeting with the Brazilian Foreign Minister during which he handed over the bout de papier. The aircraft will not be released until Legal Advisers have reached a decision: they are due to resume their deliberations tomorrow. The missile will definitely not be released until the end of the hostilities. When asked whether the authorities would have impounded any Argentine military equipment transitting Brazil, the Foreign Minister said that such an action would be unlikely. HMA made the point that the impounding of the aircraft was being used as a propitiatory offering to Argentine/Brazilian relations. The Foreign Minister did not deny this. Although the Brazilians will be seriously worried by the fact that any impounding of the aircraft will have a serious effect on Anglo/Brazilian relations, HMA is not confident that they will allow the Vulcan to depart until the fighting on the Falklands has ended.
- C. (Brasilia telno.252 to FCO)

Non-Aligned Meeting : Havana

- D. (Havana telno.172 to FCO) 3. The Non-Aligned meeting has been extended by a day and will finish probably late on Saturday, 5 June. Agreement on a text on the Falklands was reached within the Latin American group only after long and difficult discussions. The draft text deploras the military operations being carried out by a large UK military contingent with US support: refers to the battle against colonialism as a basic NAM principle: and reaffirms 'solidarity with Argentina in its efforts to end an outdated colonial presence'. Attempts to establish bases in the Falklands are condemned and the US is asked to stop support for Britain. Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad entered reservations to the draft and have managed with African support to include references to Security Council Resolutions 502 and 505. The price was acceptance of the statement deploring use of veto proposed by the PLO with Cuban support. Following the UK veto in the Security Council, Cuba, Argentina and other Latin Americans stepped up pressure on the moderates.
- E. (Havana telno.003 to UKMIS New York) 4. The text is an improvement on the earlier Argentine/Cuban draft as references to UK aggression and illegal action have been removed. However all blame is laid on the UK. Highly



publicised presence of Costa Mendez with Cuban backing, Latin American pressure, crucial timing of UK veto, and exhaustion of delegates are likely to contribute to acceptance of the text when it is submitted for Ministerial approval some time later today.

HMS Hydra

- F. (Montevideo telno.432 to FCO) 5. HMS Hydra was due to enter the Port of Montevideo today in order to permit some 50 British walking wounded and stretcher cases to be repatriated to the UK. During the night HM Ambassador to Uruguay reported serious difficulties with the Uruguayans who objected, presumably at the prompting of the Argentines, to Hydra using the main navigational channel in the River Plate (jointly controlled between Argentina and Uruguay under the River Plate Treaty). More seriously the Argentines were arguing that the British wounded should be interned in Montevideo according to a legalistic interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea.
- G. (Montevideo telno.433 to FCO)
- H. (Montevideo telno.434 to FCO) 6. Fortunately, Miss Hutchinson later reported that after lively negotiations through the Uruguayans both problems had now been resolved and the Argentinians had climbed down. We congratulated Miss Hutchinson on her achievement.
- I. (FCO tel. No.339 to Montevideo)

Arms Supplies to Argentina on the Libyan Air Bridge via Brazil

- J. (Washington telno.2042 to FCO) 7. After continued pressure from HM Embassy, Washington, the State Department have instructed the American Embassy in Brasilia to raise this question with the Brazilian authorities in a low key.

UN Secretary-General


- K. (UKMIS New York telno. 944 to FCO) 8. The Secretary-General has sent identical messages to the Prime Minister and Galtieri putting forward a 'new' plan for ceasefire and Argentine withdrawal. Sir A Parsons comments that Points 4-7 of the Secretary-General's latest plan would draw us back into the morass from which we emerged on 20 May.
- L. (UKMIS New York telno. 945 to FCO). Sir A Parsons recommends a reply by 8.00 pm New York time (ie. midnight Zulu, 1.00 am BST).

Comment

9. The NAM action is over, although a telegram of thanks to selected moderates might be in order. At leisure, we shall have to consider the implications of Brazil's attitude on the Vulcan. And we are revising our procedures on repatriation of wounded in the light of the Montevideo telegrams.

10. But the most urgent action required on overnight developments is to prepare instructions for Sir A Parsons on the Secretary-General's latest initiative. There seems little doubt that his ideas will have attractions for many, including most of our friends and Allies.

6 June 1982

  
R M Jackson  
Emergency Unit



CONFIDENTIAL

765

FM F C O 051215Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH BRASILIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 5 JUNE

INFO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES ( FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY),

MODUK AIR (SIC 19F),

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 166: VULCAN DIVERSION.

1. ACLAND SUMMONED THE BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING AND ASKED THAT THE BRAZILIANS SHOULD STAND BY THEIR EARLIER DECISION TO LET THE VULCAN FLY OUT. WHATEVER THE LEGAL NICETIES, THIS WAS A POLITICAL ISSUE TO WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ATTACHED VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE. WE WANTED TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL, WHICH WE RECOGNISED AS MUCH THE MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRY IN THE AREA. AT THE VERY LEAST, WE LOOKED FOR BRAZILIAN EVEN-HANDEDNESS. WE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THEY COULD INSIST ON HOLDING ON TO THE VULCAN WHILE CONTINUING TO PERMIT SUPPLIES OF WAR MATERIAL FOR ARGENTINA TO BE FLOWN THROUGH RECIFE FROM LIBYA.

2. CAMPOS SAID HE HAD NO FIRM INSTRUCTIONS AND WOULD CONVEY THIS REQUEST TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HIS LATEST INFORMATION WAS THAT THE MINISTRY OF THE AIR HAD DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF ITS OWN LEGAL OPINION TO RELEASE THE PLANE UNARMED. THE ARGENTINES HAD PROTESTED THAT THIS WOULD BE AGAINST BOTH THE 1923 HAGUE RULES, WHICH REQUIRED THE INTERNMENT OF PLANES WHICH HAD STRAYED INTO NEUTRAL TERRITORY, AND AGAINST THE PASSAGE IN THE RECENT RIO TREATY RESOLUTION WHICH REQUIRED BRAZIL NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO OBSTRUCT ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA. THE GOVERNMENT HAD SOUGHT A LEGAL OPINION ON THE ARGENTINE NOTES FROM BOTH THE MINISTRY OF THE AIR AND FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. BRAZIL WANTED TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UK AND TO REMAIN AS EVEN-HANDED AS WAS POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UK AND A BROTHER LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBOUR, WHOSE CLAIM ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BRAZIL SUPPORTED.

3. CAMPOS ASKED FOR OUR EVIDENCE FOR THE TRANSIT OF WAR SUPPLIES THROUGH RECIFE. HE WAS TOLD THAT WE HAD SEEN A NUMBER OF BRAZILIAN PRESS REPORTS WHICH COINCIDED WITH OUR OWN INFORMATION. WE WERE SURPRISED THAT BRAZIL KEPT SUCH CLOSE COMPANY WITH THE PRESENT LIBYAN REGIME. CAMPOS SAID THAT HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THIS, BUT



3. CAMPOS ASKED FOR OUR EVIDENCE FOR THE TRANSIT OF WAR SUPPLIES THROUGH RECIFE. HE WAS TOLD THAT WE HAD SEEN A NUMBER OF BRAZILIAN PRESS REPORTS WHICH COINCIDED WITH OUR OWN INFORMATION. WE WERE SURPRISED THAT BRAZIL KEPT SUCH CLOSE COMPANY WITH THE PRESENT LIBYAN REGIME. CAMPOS SAID THAT HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THIS, BUT COULD THINK OF NO LEGAL BASIS ON WHICH SUCH TRANSIT FLIGHTS COULD BE STOPPED.

4. ACLAND CONCLUDED BY STRESSING THE VERY GREAT SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE REGARDED THIS EPISODE AND OUR VERY KEEN AND GENUINELY HELD DESIRE, REAFFIRMED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEWS THIS WEEK, FOR CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL AND LATIN AMERICA AS A WHOLE.

PYM

NHNN



1-5 JUN

OO WASHINGTON (DESKBY 051300Z)

GHS 425

SECRET

FM BRASILIA 050820Z JUN 82

TO FLASH FOO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 250 OF 5 JUNE

INFO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR S OF S PARTY) FLASH MODUK AIR (SIC 19F) IMMEDIATE DESKBY 051300Z WASHINGTON



22

MIPT: VULCAN DIVERSION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT BOUT DE PAPIER:

BEGINS

1. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE SURPRISED AND DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO DELAY THE DEPARTURE OF THE VULCAN AIRCRAFT NOW HELD AT GALEAO AIR BASE, IN SPITE OF THE DECISION ANNOUNCED ON THURSDAY 3 JUNE BY THE MINISTER FOR AERONAUTICS TO PERMIT THE AIRCRAFT TO RETURN TO HIS BASE, SO LONG AS IT IS TOTALLY DISARMED.

2. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT UNDERSTAND THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT ~~ARE CONSIDERING YIELDING TO PRESSURE BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT,~~ <sup>FOLLOWING INTERVENTION BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, ARE CONSIDERING</sup> ACTION TO IMPOUND THE AIRCRAFT, BASED ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION AT THE TIAR MEETING HELD ON 29 MAY AND ON THE HAGUE RULES OF 1923. IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, THE FORMER ARE NOT BINDING NOR RELEVANT TO THE CASE IN QUESTION. SPECIFICALLY, THE HAGUE RULES WERE PREPARED AS A DRAFT BUT WERE NEVER TRANSFORMED INTO A LEGAL TREATY INSTRUMENT. THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT ARE NOT AT WAR: AND IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO APPLY THE LAWS OF WAR TO CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING THEM. (THE PARTIES THEMSELVES DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THEY ARE IN A STATE OF WAR, AS THEIR RETURN OF PRISONERS BEFORE THE END OF THE CONFLICT ATTESTS.) MORE APPROPRIATE IN THE PRESENT CASE WOULD BE TO APPLY THE LAWS OF PEACE AND, IN CONSEQUENCE, TO ALLOW THE AIRCRAFT TO REFUEL AND PROCEED ON ITS WAY.

3. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DO NOT, HOWEVER, SEE THIS QUESTION AS A LEGAL BUT RATHER AS A POLITICAL ONE. THEY HAVE NO WISH TO INVOLVE BRAZIL IN THEIR CONFLICT WITH ARGENTINA, WHICH IS NOT OF BRITAIN'S SEEKING AND WHICH ITSELF ARISES FROM THE



ACTIONS OF THE PRESENT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN FROM ANY QUARREL WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE.

4. IN THE LIGHT OF THE LONG-STANDING FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND BRAZIL THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT EVEN-HANDED TREATMENT IN THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY ARE WELL AWARE THAT ARGENTINE MILITARY AND OTHER AIRCRAFT HAVE USED AND ARE STILL USING BRAZILIAN AIRFIELDS WHEN TRANSPORTING MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY ARGENTINA. IF THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES TAKE ACTION TO RESTRAIN A BRITISH AIRCRAFT WHICH SOUGHT EMERGENCY FACILITIES OF A KIND GUARANTEED BY INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE, IT WOULD SEEM NO LESS APPROPRIATE THAT THEY SHOULD IMPOUND SUCH ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT AND THEIR LETHAL CARGOES.

5. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REGRET THAT THEY MUST MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE REVERSAL OF THE DECISION ANNOUNCED ON 3 JUNE, IF MAINTAINED, WOULD ~~INEVITABLY~~ HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WHICH BRITAIN AND BRAZIL HAVE ENJOYED WITHOUT INTERRUPTION FOR SO LONG AND BY WHICH BRITAIN SETS GREAT STORE.

ENDS

HARDING

NNNN

CORRECTION: PARA 1 LINE 5 SHOULD READ QUOTE RETURN TO ITS BASE UNQUOTE

SENT/RECD AT050001Z MB/IA

BSB/FCO 004/05

++ 5:9

ZZ FCO

ZZ UKDEL VERSAILLES



XX  
-5 JUN 1982

BSB/FCO 002/06

OO FCO DESKBY 060700Z

OO MODUK AIR DESKBY 060700Z

OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 061300Z

OO UKDEL VERSAILLES DESKBY 060800Z

GRS 760

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 060120Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 060700Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 252 OF 06 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK AIR (SIC 19F) AND MODUK (FOR BGS/INT AND  
DIC ARMS CELL) DESKBY 060700Z

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DESKBY 061300Z, IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES  
(FOR S OF S' PARTY) DESKBY 060800Z

MY TELNO 249 VULCAN DIVERSION

1. I SAW THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT HIS HOME AT 052130Z. THE  
OUTCOME CAN BE SUMMARISED THUS:

(A) RELEASE OF VULCAN. NO RELEASE TILL LEGAL ADVISERS AT  
ITAMARATY AND AIR MINISTRY HAVE PRONOUNCED. NO INDICATION  
OF WHEN THEY MIGHT CONCLUDE THEIR CONSIDERATION, WHICH WILL  
BE RESUMED ON MONDAY.

(B) MISSILE. DEFINITELY NO RELEASE TILL END OF HOSTILITIES.  
MEANWHILE, IT WILL BE KEPT AS SECURE AS POSSIBLE AND, IF FEASIBLE,  
SEALED IN PRESENCE OF MY AIR ATTACHE.

(C) CREW. PRESENT CREW FREE TO STAY OR DEPART FROM BRAZIL.



(B) MISSILE. DEFINITELY NO RELEASE TILL END OF HOSTILITIES. MEANWHILE, IT WILL BE KEPT AS SECURE AS POSSIBLE AND, IF FEASIBLE, SEALED IN PRESENCE OF MY AIR ATTACHE.

(C) CREW. PRESENT CREW FREE TO STAY OR DEPART FROM BRAZIL. SENDING OF REPLACEMENT CREW (SUGGESTED IN YOR TELNO 168) UNACCEPTABLE, AS TOO CONSPICUOUS.

(D) AIRCRAFT SECURITY. MY INSISTENCE ON CONTINUED CREW PRESENCE ON AIRCRAFT WILL BE MADE CLEAR TO AIR MINISTER.

(E) LIBYAN-ARGENTINE AIRBRIDGE THROUGH RECIFE. THE AIRCRAFT REFERRED TO IN MY BOUT DE PAPIER (MY TELNO 250) HAD BEEN INSPECTED BY THE COMPETENT SERVICES, AND NO ARMS FOUND. (I DOUBT THIS)

(F) ARMS FROM BRAZIL. BRAZIL REFUSED TO ALLOW TRIANGULAR ARMS DEALS FOR ARGENTINA I.E. SHE WOULD NOT ALLOW BRAZILIAN ENTITIES TO ORDER ARMS ON BEHALF OF ARGENTINA. BUT TO MAKE UP FOR THIS SHE DID PERMIT SALES OF BRAZILIAN ARMAMENTS, WHICH WERE LESS INTERESTING TO ARGENTINA.

2. I BEGAN BY HANDING OVER THE BOUT DE PAPIER (AS AMENDED BY YOUR TELNO 168) GUERREIRO STUDIED IT IN SILENCE. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY APOLOGIA OF BRAZIL'S DELICATE RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA. HE SAID CANDIDLY THAT BRAZIL HAD TO GIVE ARGENTINA SOMETHING OF WHAT SHE WANTED IN ORDER TO CONSERVE THE GOOD RELATIONS BUILT UP SO LABORIOUSLY. ARGENTINA WAS A BOMB THEY WANTED TO DEFUSE RATHER THAN KICK. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE TIMING OF THE LEGAL STUDY, OR ITS LIKELY OUTCOME. HOWEVER, HE DID ADMIT THAT THE "HOSTILITIES" DURING WHICH THE VULCAN MIGHT BE RETAINED HERE, WERE ESSENTIALLY THE LAND BATTLE ON THE FALKLANDS.

3. I TOLD GUERREIRO THAT IT WAS ALL VERY WELL FOR BRAZIL TO CONCENTRATE ON ARGENTINE REACTIONS, WHICH WE ALL KNEW TO BE UNPREDICTABLE. BUT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT MUST REALISE THAT AN ISSUE OF THIS KIND, COMING AT THE CRITICAL TIME IT DID, AROUSED VERY STRONG FEELINGS IN BRITAIN IT WAS BEING REGARDED AS A LITMUS-TEST OF BRAZILIAN EVEN-HANDEDNESS.

THE VOLTE FACE YESTERDAY, WHEN ALL HAD SEEMED TO BE SATISFACTORILY SETTLED IN THE LIGHT OF THE AIR MINISTER'S NOTE OF 3 JUNE (MY TELNO 239), HAD CAUSED SHOCKWAVES IN LONDON. AS THE PUS HAD TOLD CAMPOS (YOUR TELNO 169) THE BRAZILIAN



SETTLED IN THE LIGHT OF THE AIR MINISTER'S NOTE OF 3 JUNE (MY TELNO 239), HAD CAUSED SHOCKWAVES IN LONDON. AS THE PUS HAD TOLD CAMPOS (YOUR TELNO 169), THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE REGARDED THE REVERSAL OF THE INITIAL DECISION TO RELEASE THE AIRCRAFT.

4. ON THE SALES OF BRAZILIAN ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARGENTINA, I TOLD GUERREIRO THAT PARTICULAR EXCEPTION WOULD BE TAKEN TO THE EXPORT OF CERTAIN KEY ITEMS, FOR INSTANCE A SUBMARINE, AND REMINDED HIM OF HIS ASSURANCE TO ME AT THE START OF THE CONFLICT THAT NOTHING "DECISIVE" WOULD BE PROVIDED TO ARGENTINA. GUERREIRO REPEATED THIS ASSURANCE. SOME BANDEIRANTE MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN MADE OVER; AND THE ARGENTINES MIGHT ASK FOR XAVANTE TRAINERS, WHICH COULD BE CONVERTED TO A GROUND-SUPPORT ROLE. BUT NOTHING LIKE A SUBMARINE WOULD BE HANDED OVER. BRAZIL HAD BARELY ENOUGH MAJOR ARMAMENTS FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES.

5. GUERREIRO AND RICUPERO, WHO WAS PRESENT, WERE UNCONVINCING ON THE ALLEGED SEARCHING OF ONE OF THE ARGENTINE FLIGHTS THROUGH RECIFE, AND THE APPARENTLY NON-MILITARY NATURE OF ITS CARGO. THEY DISMISSED THE NEWSPAPER REPORTS. I SAID THAT THE REPORTS MERELY CORROBORATED DETAILED INFORMATION IN OUR POSSESSION. I ASKED WHETHER THE AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE IMPOUNDED MILITARY EQUIPMENT IF IT HAD COME TO LIGHT. GUERREIRO HESITATED AND THEN SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO IMPOUND SUCH EQUIPMENT BUT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE MEASURES TO DISCOURAGE SUCH TRAFFIC. I ASKED IF THE HAGUE RULES WOULD NOT APPLY IN SUCH A CASE. GUERREIRO AVOIDED COMMENT AND LOOKED UNCOMFORTABLE.

6. FINALLY I PUT IT TO GUERREIRO THAT HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT THE VULCAN WAS BEING USED AS A PROPITIATORY OFFERING TO ARGENTINE -BRAZILIAN RELATIONS. HE DID NOT DENY THIS. I SAID THAT WE HOPED THAT OUR STRONG REPRESENTATIONS, BOTH HERE AND IN LONDON, WOULD CAUSE THE BRAZILIANS TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS. GUERREIRO SAID THAT THEY WOULD CERTAINLY BE GIVEN DUE WEIGHT.

7. IN FACT, I THINK THAT THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE BOUT DE PAPIER WILL HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON THE BRAZILIANS. BUT I AM NOT CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL ALLOW THE VULCAN TO DEPART UNTIL FIGHTING ON THE FALKLANDS HAS ENDED.



CONFIDENTIAL

FM HAVANA 051500Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 172 OF 05 JUNE 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE UK MS NEW YORK AND IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES  
(FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY).

FALKLANDS: NAM COORDINATING BUREAU MEETING: HAVANA 31 MAY- 4 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. BUREAU MEETING HAS BEEN EXTENDED BY A DAY AND IS NOW DUE TO FINISH LATE ON SATURDAY 5 JUNE.
2. FOLLOWING TWENTY HOURS OF DISCUSSION A LATIN AMERICAN GROUP TEXT ON FALKLANDS HAS BEEN AGREED AND IS BEING PUT TO POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL LATER TODAY.
3. UK VETO IN SECURITY COUNCIL ON 4 JUNE HAS LED TO INCREASED CUBAN/ARGENTINE PRESSURE ON NON LATIN AMERICAN GROUP MEMBERS TO ACCEPT REVISED DRAFT ON FALKLANDS.
4. DETAIL: AGREEMENT ON A TEXT ON THE FALKLANDS WAS REACHED AFTER LONG AND DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS WITH GUYANA, JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD RESISTING THE PROPOSED CUBAN/ARGENTINE TEXT (MY TELNO 162 TO FCO). THE TEXT NOW PROPOSED DEPLORES THE MILITARY OPERATIONS BEING CARRIED OUT BY A LARGE UK MILITARY CONTINGENT WITH US SUPPORT. IT ALSO REFERS TO THE BATTLE AGAINST COLONIALISM BEING A BASIC NAM PRINCIPLE AND REAFFIRMS QUOTE SOLIDARITY WITH ARGENTINA IN ITS EFFORTS TO END AN OUTDATED COLONIAL PRESENCE IN THE FALKLANDS UNQUOTE. ATTEMPTS BY ANY POWER TO ESTABLISH BASES IN THE FALKLANDS ARE CONDEMNED AND US IS ASKED TO STOP SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN
5. DESPITE CARIBBEAN MEMBERS EFFORTS NO REFERENCE TO SCR 507 WAS INCLUDED, GUYANA, JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD ENTERED RESERVATIONS

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5. DESPITE CARIBBEAN MEMBERS EFFORTS NO REFERENCE TO SCR 502 WAS INCLUDED, GUYANA, JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD ENTERED RESERVATIONS TO THE DRAFT.

6. NEWS OF THE UK VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 933) HAS BEEN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY CUBAN, ARGENTINE AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN PRESSURE ON DELEGATES, PARTICULARLY AFRICANS TO CONCUR. AFTER A LONG DAY YESTERDAY AND PROSPECTS OF A REPEAT TODAY IT WILL NEED DETERMINATION AND PERSISTANCE FROM MODERATES IF THEY ARE TO BTAIN AMMENDMENTS TO LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT WHICH WOULD ENSURE REFERENCES TO SCR 502, AS THEY HAD INTENDED.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL

CONNOR

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-5 JUN 82

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 060900Z

FM HAVANA 060100Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 003 OF 06 JUNE 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO

MY TELNO 172 TO FCO

FALKLANDS: NAM CO-ORDINATING BUREAU MEETING: HAVANA 31 MAY - 4 JUNE

1. LATIN AMERICAN GROUP TEXT ON FALKLANDS ACCEPTED WITH MINOR AMENDMENTS BY POLITICAL COMMITTEE (FULL TEXT IN MIFT). HOWEVER JAMAICA, WITH AFRICAN SUPPORT, MANAGED TO HAVE INCLUDED REFERENCES TO SCRS 502 AND 505, THE PRICE WAS ACCEPTANCE OF STATEMENT DEPLORING USE OF VETO ON 4 JUNE, PROPOSED BY PLO WITH CUBAN SUPPORT.

2. TEXT IS EXPECTED TO STAND WHEN FINAL DECLARATION IS SUBMITTED FOR MINISTERIAL APPROVAL TONIGHT, SOME RESERVATIONS WILL REPORTEDLY STILL BE LODGED.

3. TEXT IS IMPROVEMENT ON ARGENTINA/CUBAN TEXT FROM UK VIEWPOINT AS REFERENCES TO UK AGRESSION AND ILLEGAL ACTION HAVE BEEN REMOVED, AND IT IS NOW LADEN WITH MORE NAM JARGON. HOWEVER ALL BLAME IS LAID ON UK IN SPITE OF REFERENCES TO SCRS 502 AND 505. HIGHLY PUBLICISED PRESENCE OF COSTA MENDEZ WITH CUBAN BACKING, LATIN AMERICAN PRESSURE, CRUCIAL TIMING OF UK VETO OF 4 JUNE AND EXHUASTION OF DELEGATES WHEN DRAFT WAS PUT TO POLITICAL COMMITTEE THIS MORNING HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ACCEPTANCE OF TEXT.

FCO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK

CONNOR

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ZZ UKMIS GENEVA

GRS 200

82



CONFIDENTIAL

FM MONTEVIDEO 051830Z JUN 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 432 OF 5 JUNE

AND TO FLASH FLASH CINC FLEET, MODUK NAVY

INFO FLASH MODUK (FOR DOMS), BRASILIA AND UKMIS GENEVA.

SIC 19J/Z5G/JDA.

HMS HYDRA: C IN C FLEET TELEGRAM 031607Z. USE OF MAIN  
NAVIGATIONAL CHANNEL.

WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE URUGUAYANS THAT PERMISSION FOR  
HYDRA TO USE THE MAIN NAVIGATIONAL CHANNEL IN THE RIVER PLATE  
SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUESTED AND OBTAINED FROM THE ARGENTINIANS.  
THIS APPARENTLY HAS NOT HAPPENED.

2. IT WOULD SEEM THAT ARGENTINIANS ARE TAKING A DIFFERENT VIEW  
OF HYDRA AS COMPARED WITH HECLA SIMPLY BECAUSE NO ARGENTINIANS  
ON BOARD.

3. I AM NOT CLEAR WHETHER ARGENTINIAN CONCURRENCE HAS BEEN SOUGHT.  
IN THE MEANWHILE WE ARE INVESTIGATING URGENTLY THE POSSIBILITY  
OF HYDRA APPROACHING MONTEVIDEO VIA PURELY URUGUAYAN WATERS.

4. HOPEFULLY WE CAN SEND HYDRA EN CLAIR INSTRUCTIONS URGENTLY.  
IN THE MEANWHILE PLEASE INSTRUCT HYDRA NOT REPEAT NOT TO TOUCH  
NOT ONLY ARGENTINIAN WATERS BUT SUCH WATERS JOINTLY CONTROLLED  
BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY UNDER THE RIVER PLATE TREATY.

5. IN THE MEANWHILE WE ARE EXERTING SUCH HUMANITARIAN PRESSURE  
AS WE CAN, HERE IN MONTEVIDEO.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 05185

1841Z NCG




ZZ CINCFLEET

17-5 JUN 1982

ZZ MODUK NAVY

ZZ BRASILIA

GRS 130



CONFIDENTIAL

FM MONTEVIDEO 051935Z JUN 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 433 OF 5 JUNE

AND TO FLASH UKMIS GENEVA

INFO FLASH CINC FLEET, MODUK NAVY AND BRASILIA.

H M S HYDRA.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

THE ARGENTINIANS ARE NOW ARGUING THAT AS NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN MADE WITH THEM THROUGH THE I C R C THE WOUNDED ON HYDRA SHOULD BE INTERNED UNDER ARTICLE 17 OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA.

2. I HAVE ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THIS IS QUITE RIDICULOUS GIVEN THE EXISTING PRECEDENTS IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT. HOWEVER THE SHORT POINT IS THAT THE URUGUAYANS DO NOT WANT TO BATTLE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS AND HOPE THAT WE CAN PREVAIL ON THE I C R C TO DO THIS.

3. HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE I C R C OFFICE IN BUENOS AIRES I ONLY HOPE I C R C HEADQUARTERS MAY BE MORE SUCCESSFUL. TIME IS SHORT. I TRUST THE SWISS CAN ALSO BE MOBILISED.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 051945Z NCG



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MONFO 007/05

E.R.

ZZ F C O

ZZ BERNE

ZZ UKMIS GENEVA

ZZ CINCFLEET

ZZ MODUK NAVY

91

ZZ BRASILIA

-5 JUN 1982

GRS 50

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MONTEVIDEO 052145Z JUN 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 434 OF 5 JUNE

AND TO FLASH BERNE AND UKMIS GENEVA

INFO FLASH C IN C FLEET, MODUK NAVY AND BRASILIA.



MY TELEGRAMS NO 432 AND NO 433.

AFTER LIVELY NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH URUGUAYANS PROBLEMS NOW RESOLVED AND ARGENTINES HAVE CLIMBED DOWN, SUBJECT TO HYDRA NOTIFYING HER ARRIVAL AT CERTAIN POINTS TO ARGENTINE NAVAL AUTHORITIES THROUGH US.

2. I AM SENDING EN CLAIR MESSAGE TO HYDRA COPIED TO C IN C FLEET.

HUTCHINSON

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E.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

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OO MONTEVIDEO DESKBY 061400Z

5 JUN 1982

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GRS 103



CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 061400Z

FM FCO 052320Z JUNE 1982

TO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 339 OF 5 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA, UKMIS GENEVA, MODUK CINC FLEET, BERNE

YOUR TELNO 434: HMS HYDRA

1. THIS IS VERY GOOD NEWS. WE ENTIRELY AGREE THAT THE STRICT APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 17 WAS QUITE OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE LIBERAL HUMANITARIAN TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND WOUNDED WHICH HAVE SO FAR PREVAILED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT. YOU DID WELL TO PERSUADE THE URUGUAYANS AND THROUGH THEM THE ARGENTINIANS TO CLIMB DOWN.

3. WE SHALL TRY TO ENSURE A SMOOTHER COMPLIANCE IN FUTURE WITH THE PROPER PROCEDURES.

PYM



~~SECRET~~

-5 JUN 82

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OO F C O

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OO D I C ARMS CONTROL CELL

OO TRIPOLI

GRS 138

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 060006Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2042 OF 5 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA D I C ARMS CONTROL CELL, TRIPOLI

YOUR TELNO 165 TO BRASILIA; ARGENTINE - LIBYAN AIRBRIDGE VIA BRAZIL.

1. AFTER CONTINUED PRESSURE FROM US, THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE THIS EVENING INSTRUCTED THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TO RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES. THEY ARE TO NOTE THE REPORTS AND REMIND THEIR INTERLOCUTORS OF BRITISH AND U.S. CONCERN THAT THE LIBYAN/ARGENTINE AIRBRIDGE WILL MERELY PROLONG THE CONFLICT. THEY ARE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THESE REPRESENTATIONS IN A LOW KEY.

THOMAS



NYFO 005/86

(15)


25 JUN

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ZZ FCO

ZZ UKDEL VERSAILLES

GRS 550



CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060445Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 944 OF 6 JUNE

AND TO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FALKLANDS:

1. MIFT CONTAINS A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER. AN IDENTICAL MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT TO GALTIERI.
2. THE S-8 IS NOT WELL AND DE SOTO DELIVERED THE MESSAGE TO ME LATE TONIGHT (SATURDAY). I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE S-G HAD ANY INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION; I KNEW THAT THEY HAD CALLED ON HIM EARLIER IN THE DAY. DE SOTO SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT; ALL HE COULD TELL ME WAS THAT THE S-G WAS MAKING SURE THAT HIS MESSAGE "GOT TO THE RIGHT PEOPLE".
3. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ANOTHER GENUINE LAST MINUTE ATTEMPT BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT FURTHER BLOODSHED. OBVIOUSLY IT HAS COME TOO LATE, WHILE POINTS 4-7 WOULD DRAW US BACK INTO THE MORASS FROM WHICH WE EMERGED ON 20 MAY.
4. I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO TRANSMIT A MESSAGE FROM THE P.M. TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR BY 8PM NEW YORK TIME ON SUNDAY. THIS MESSAGE MIGHT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-
  - (A) APPRECIATE OF THE S-G'S, CONTINUED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE PEACEFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND TO AVOID FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.
  - (B) REGRET THAT ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE HAS RENDERED HIS APPROACH TO A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL/NEGOTIATIONS UNACCEMPTABLE AT THIS LATE STAGE; TO THE VERY END OF THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE WE HAD LOOKED FOR BUT HAD FAILED TO DETECT ANY SIGN OF CHANGE IN ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE:
  - (C) CONFIRMATION AND REINFORMCEMENT OF ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE TO BE



(B) REGRET THAT ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE HAS RENDERED HIS APPROACH TO A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL/NEGOTIATIONS UNACCEPTABLE AT THIS LATE STAGE: TO THE VERY END OF THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE WE HAD LOOKED FOR BUT HAD FAILED TO DETECT ANY SIGN OF CHANGE IN ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE:

(C) CONFIRMATION AND REINFORCEMENT OF ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE TO BE FOUND IN THE NAM COMMUNIQUE (HAVANA TELS NO'S 3 AND 4 TO ME).

(D) IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE THE SG'S PROGRAMME FOR A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT WORK: ONLY DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO COMMANDERS WOULD ACHIEVE THIS NOW (POINTS 1 AND 2):

(E) WE WILL NOT COMMIT OURSELVES NOW, AFTER ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED, TO A PROGRAMME FOR A REDUCTION OF BRITISH FORCES "IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS", OR TO FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER UN AUSPICES (POINT 4). WE CANNOT ALLOW OUR RIGHT TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS TO BE PREJUDICED.

(F) EQUALLY WE WILL NOT NOW COMMIT OURSELVES TO A PROGRAMME OF NEGOTIATIONS (POINTS 5-7) UNDER UN AUSPICES, ESPECIALLY "TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY": OUR ATTITUDE TO THIS PROPOSITION IS INEVITABLY INFLUENCED BY THE NAM COMMUNIQUE AND BY OUR EXPERIENCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH CONCLUDED ON 20 MAY.

(G) HENCE, ALTHOUGH WE APPRECIATE THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SG'S PROPOSALS, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO GIVE UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE TO SUCH A FAR REACHING SET OF PROPOSITIONS "AS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE". WE CANNOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE DRAWN INTO ANOTHER PROBABLY LONG DRAWN OUT NEGOTIATION WITH ARGENTINE FORCES STILL SITTING ON THE ISLANDS. OUR FIRST AND FOREMOST OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO SECURE IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

5. IT IS NOT INCONVEIVABLE THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS "AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE" FOR PRECISELY THE REASONS THAT THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO US I.E. THAT THEY COULD THEN PRESS FOR A CEASEFIRE WHILE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN ON POINTS 4-7. EQUALLY, IF PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS REVEALED HIS IDEAS TO THE AMERICANS, THEY MAY TRY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON US TO ACCEPT.

PARSONS

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-5 JUN

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060446Z JUNE 82  
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 945 OF 6 JUNE  
AND TO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLANDS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE.

BEGINS

MESSAGE TO HER EXCELLENCY, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER,  
M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND  
NORTHERN IRELAND.

EXCELLENCY:

THE ARMED CONFLICT IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS  
MALVINAS) THREATENS TO ENTER INTO A NEW AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS  
PHASE THAT IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE ON BOTH SIDES.  
THIS WOULD GRAVELY PREJUDICE, FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, ANY  
PROSPECT FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE. TENSION AND  
CONFLICT WOULD CONTINUE, IN CONTRADICTION TO THE INTERESTS OF ALL  
CONCERNED.

I FEEL IT MY DUTY IN THIS SITUATION, IN PURSUANCE OF THE MANDATE  
ENTRUSTED TO ME BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO APPEAL DIRECTLY TO  
YOUR EXCELLENCY AND TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI, IN THE HOPE THAT A WAY  
CAN STILL BE FOUND TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO A HALT AND TO INITIATE  
NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THIS CRISIS.

AT THIS LATE STAGE, FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE PARTIES ARE NOT  
LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE. I THEREFORE WISH TO SUGGEST THE FOLLOW-  
ING PLAN WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTEGRAL WGLE.



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AT THIS LATE STAGE, FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE PARTIES ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE. I THEREFORE WISH TO SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING PLAN WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE:

1. A TRUCE COMES INTO EFFECT AS OF 11.00 A.M., NEW YORK TIME, ON MONDAY, 7 JUNE 1982.
2. ON WEDNESDAY, 9 JUNE, THE TWO MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE ISLANDS MEET IN THE PRESENCE OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON THE MODALITIES OF THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH IS TO COME INTO EFFECT BY 11.00 A.M, NEW YORK TIME, ON FRIDAY, 11 JUNE.
3. SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS WILL COMMENCE, TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 15 DAYS. ARGENTINA WILL INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE.
4. WITHIN THIS TIME FRAME, THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF PLANS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS). IN THE LIGHT OF THESE PLANS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL UNDER-TAKE CONSULTATIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES.
5. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTE AND TO SEEK, WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, THE COMPLETION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY 31 DECEMBER 1982, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE INITIATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITION OF THE PARTIES AND WITHOUT PREJUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK OR AT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LOCATION IN THE VICINITY THEREOF.
6. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE INAUGURATED ON 1 JULY 1982.
7. SHOULD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AFTER TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES, DETERMINE THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE WITHIN THE TIME FRAME ENVISAGED, HE MAY ESTABLISH A NEW TARGET DATE WHICH WILL BE IN KEEPING WITH THE URGENCY OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO WHICH THE PARTIES ARE COMMITTED.

TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE ABOVE PLAN WILL REQUIRE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS COMMUNICATE THEIR UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE BY 8.00 P.M., NEW YORK TIME, ON SUNDAY, 6 JUNE 1982. UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH POSITIVE



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TO WHICH THE PARTIES ARE COMMITTED.

TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE ABOVE PLAN WILL REQUIRE THAT THE TWO  
GOVERNMENTS COMMUNICATE THEIR UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE BY 8.00 P.M.,  
NEW YORK TIME, ON SUNDAY, 6 JUNE 1982. UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH POSITIVE  
RESPONSES, I WILL IMMEDIATELY REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST  
CONSIDERATION.

JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

ENDS

PARSONS

NNNN



PART 22 ends:-

FCO to Versailles tel: 23

5/6

PART 23 begins:-

FCO Sitrep 0700 6/6



